

MEMOIRS
OF
MARSHAL NEY.

PUBLISHED BY HIS FAMILY.

ILLUSTRATED WITH
PORTRAIT, MAPS, AND PLANS.

SECOND EDITION.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
BELL AND CHURTON, HOLLES STREET.
1834.

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OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.

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
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BOOK THE FIFTH.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL COLLAUD TO GENERAL NEY.

“Strasbourg, 21st Brumaire, Year VIII.
(November 21st, 1799.)

“MY DEAR GENERAL,

“THE director of the telegraph has this instant forwarded to me the following despatches.

‘18th Brumaire (Nov. 9th, 1799.)

‘The legislative body has removed to St. Cloud. Bonaparte is appointed commandant of Paris. All is quiet, and every body satisfied.’

‘19th, at noon.

‘The Directory has resigned. Moreau commands at the palace of the Directory. All’

“This last word announces something yet to come.

COLLAUD.

The incomplete sentence of this telegraphic despatch was calculated to raise the most intense

anxiety in the two French generals. They knew that a revolution of some sort had taken place; but who had assumed the reins of power, and what new forms or modifications the government had undergone, were still unexplained, and they were impatient to obtain further intelligence. The circumstance that Bonaparte was commandant of Paris, and Moreau of the Luxembourg, led them to infer that the popular cause was safe; but the tribune, like the field of battle, had its fluctuations, and it was not without uneasiness that they awaited the clearing up of their doubts and fears. The news came at length. The legislative councils at Paris had been divided in opinion; the minority in the one had joined the majority in the other, and each party, on the eve of coming to blows, had invoked the assistance of the army.

The troops, placed between these two hostile divisions of the legislature, obeyed the call which appeared to them the most legal, and a new power had in consequence assumed the place of the old. Bonaparte was certainly calculated to inspire unlimited confidence. As a great statesman and an able commander, he was equally qualified to govern nations and to command armies. But so many men had reached the highest eminence only to fall to the ground, and so many great reputations had melted away on the burning pinnacle of power, that the troops saw with cold indifference the elevation of their general. A sort of mistrust of the future seemed to pervade the minds of all; and each left

it for time to show what opinion he ought ultimately to form. The trial turned out favourable.

Bonaparte had found both the treasury and the storehouses empty; yet the army was succoured almost immediately, whilst the weak tools of the Directory were suddenly superseded by a set of men strong in mind and honest in principle. Each branch of the service was now confided to prudent and able hands. Ney did justice both to the choice and to the acts of the new government; but still he withheld his confidence from it until time should verify whether it would continue to justify the expectations of the people. The following letters to Ney give an idea of the feelings of the army and the generals on the subject.

“Wagausel, 4th Frimaire, Year VIII.
(November 25th, 1799.)

“MY DEAR GENERAL,

“I arrived four days since, to take the command of this division, Laborde having obtained leave of absence.

“I am of your opinion with regard to the movement of the 18th Brumaire. Time alone will inform us whether we shall be happier or not. Nevertheless matters begin to look more auspicious; but I have no belief in our obtaining peace. Our unhappy sisters* will throw obstacles in the way. A promise was made that they should remain inviolate; for my own part, I care not a rush whether they do or not. It is sufficient for us to defend our own

* The impromptu republics established by the Directory.

unhappy country. Vampires have sucked its life's blood, and our brave republicans have fought only to enrich the swarm of advocates and attorneys that batten on its vitals. Each year must the war be prolonged and their families gorged with wealth. I expect General Lecourbe every moment; he is on his way to Bruxal. Adieu, my dear General, believe in my warmest friendship for you. • COLLAUD."

• "Wagausel, 5th Frimaire, Year VIII.

• "I wrote to you yesterday, my dear General, by General Lecourbe; you will no doubt receive my letter to-day.

"I am positively informed that Championnet has tendered his resignation, which has been accepted. General Moreau is to command an army, and to marry a relative of Bonaparte's. It is rumoured that another general-in-chief has also resigned. This appears to be Masséna. Others say that he was dismissed. It seems certain that there will be a congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, Cobentzel, the author of the treaty of Campo-Formio, having received orders to return immediately from Petersburg to Vienna. It is equally true that the Elector of Bavaria is trying to make up matters. He has sent to Paris, as minister, M. de Otto, formerly his minister at the circle of the Upper Rhine, at Frankfort.

"The Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire has received its full consummation at Paris. The enthusiasm in favour of Bonaparte is at its height, and several of the Fructidorean laws are said to have been already repealed. • It seems that the Consulate

will act in all these matters with prudent delay, in order that the anarchists may have no pretence for exclaiming against a royalist reaction. Let us hope that the 18th will produce the effect anticipated by the true republicans.

“ It has frozen very hard all night. If the Rhine once begins to drift ice, good-bye to the cables, and the bridge of Nekerau, and the communication with Spires by means of boats.

“ We shall risk the trip to Frankfort. I do not think we can remain long upon the right bank.

“ Health and Friendship. COLLAUD.”

Ney at length began to share in the same ideas and hopes. He perceived that, every day, some ferocious order or some petty tyranny was suppressed. As a substitute for the forced loan, a slight tax had been imposed, and the hostages set at liberty. Each individual Frenchman could now marry, and work for his livelihood in any manner he thought proper. No man had now to dread the interference of an agent of the Directory ; it was no longer necessary to sever the ties of his dearest affections, or submit to prescribed hours of rest and sleep : in fine, civil liberty remained unshackled. Nevertheless, the power of government having become concentrated, it had encroached upon certain rights ; and men do not readily forego franchises which they have already enjoyed. The privileges of the city were reduced, and elections were no longer direct. The representatives voted, but did not debate the laws they passed. The tribune had long been considered a

safeguard to liberty; and Ney, who till now had cared only for war and battles, saw with regret that it was reduced to silence.

Other acts displeased him still more. The laws which excluded the nobles from public employments, had been repealed; and individuals previously banished for crimes against freedom, were admitted into the Senate. Soldiers, though they take little heed of theories, are extremely susceptible concerning the choice of men appointed to put these theories into practice; and the troops therefore felt some mistrust at the appointment of individuals who had shown themselves hostile to free institutions. Ney was an enemy to oppression, and would neither perpetuate nor extend it: but he would enter into no pact with the emigrants, still less would he suffer them to command those by whom they had been conquered. Lefebvre, like Moreau and Macdonald, had concurred in the establishment of the Consulate; and to him Ney confided his fears, asking him with a sort of bitterness, if the brave soldiers of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse were to become a prey to intrigue, and be delivered up to those whom they had defeated in battle? In this letter, Ney showed that his heart was lacerated, and Lefebvre hastened to apply balm to the wound.

“No, my dear Ney,” he replied;—“times are altered, places are no longer bestowed by intrigue, and every personal consideration must now yield to the public good. Do not believe, then, all that is told you about the government, which, you may be assured, is wholly devoted to those who, like your-

self, have rendered eminent services to your country. You see a proof of it in the confidence I have obtained; and another, in the appointment of Mortier, who was totally unknown here, to the command of the 17th division. Be not therefore uneasy, and depend upon it, my dear Ney, that all will go on well.

“ Health and Friendship. LEFEBVRE.”

“ Head-quarters at Paris, 26th Germinal,
Year VIII. (April 16th, 1800.)”

This assurance, together with those made by Bernadotte, quieted Ney's apprehensions. Living in retirement at Malgrange, where his still unhealed wounds confined him to his bed, he was already beginning to give himself up to favourable anticipations, when the publications by the government accounting for the failure of certain negotiations for peace, entirely restored his confidence, and with it his enthusiasm. We have already stated, how strongly the want of peace was felt, and that hopes had been raised of its being soon concluded: the First Consul, since his appointment, had applied all his energies to realize the expectations of the people.

The various sacrifices of the allies, and their vain attempts to humble France, must have made them feel the hopelessness of their war against liberal institutions. They had exhausted their resources, and a feeling of false glory alone could prompt them to a further sacrifice of human life by a continuance of the war. A single advance might perhaps lead to the pacification of Europe, and the First Consul accordingly made proposals of peace to Austria and Great Britain. The first of these powers sent an

evasive answer, but without bitterness or recrimination. This was not the case with Great Britain ; that power sent an insulting reply to France, and displayed unequalled benignity in her own favour. She was, as her government stated, ever desirous of peace ;*—she had assumed arms only to

* The following is the substance of Lord Grenville's reply :—

“ The King has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire to see a permanent peace re-established in Europe. He neither is, nor was he ever, engaged in any contest from motives of vain and false glory. He has never entertained any other views than those of protecting the rights and happiness of his subjects against all aggression.

“ It is from these motives that he has resisted an unprovoked attack ; and it is from the same motives that he is under the necessity of still continuing the struggle ; nor has he any hope that, at the present moment, he could obviate such necessity by negotiating with those whom a new revolution has so recently placed at the head of affairs in France. In fact, no real advantage can result in the furtherance of so great and so desirable an object as a general peace, until it distinctly appears that those causes have ceased to act which originally occasioned the war, have lengthened its duration, and have more than once renewed its consequences.

“ That system, the dominant influence of which France justly considers the cause of its present misfortunes, is also the same that has dragged the rest of Europe into a long and destructive war, of a nature contrary to the present usages of civilized nations.

“ It is to extend that system, and overthrow all established Governments, that the resources of France have, from year to year, been lavished and exhausted, even in the midst of the most unparalleled distress.

“ To this spirit of destruction, which could respect nothing, the Low Countries, the United Provinces, and the Swiss Cantons—those ancient friends and allies of his Majesty—have been sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged, and Italy, now torn from

repel an unjust aggression ; but being under an obligation to protect Europe, and save it from the pillage and devastation which everywhere attended the French arms, she could not lend herself to a transaction which would free her from the violence of war only to make her a victim of the machinations

the grasp of its invaders, has been the theatre of rapine and anarchy to the greatest extent. His Majesty has himself been driven to the necessity of maintaining a difficult and expensive struggle in order to secure the independence and existence of his dominions.

“ Neither have these calamities been confined to Europe alone ; they have reached the most remote parts of the earth—nay, they have even extended to countries so far removed from the seat of the present contest, both in their geographical situation and with reference to their local interests, that the very existence of the war may be unknown to nations who have suddenly found themselves involved in all its horrors.

“ Experience has proved that so long as such a system prevails, and the blood and treasure of a populous and powerful nation are lavished to support it, no other opposition than open and energetic hostility could efficaciously prevail against it. The most solemn treaties have only paved the way to fresh aggression ; and it is to determined resistance alone that the preservation will be due of all that remains of stability in Europe, as connected with individual liberty, social order, and the free exercise of religion.

“ In providing for the security of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place confidence in the simple renewal of mere general professions which announce a wish for peace. Such professions have been repeatedly proclaimed by all who have successively directed the resources of France towards the destruction of Europe—by those very individuals whom the present rulers of France have declared, from the beginning and at all times, incapable of maintaining relations of friendship and peace.

“ His Majesty will certainly feel the most lively satisfaction

of peace. The French, according to the statement of the British minister, bore a blind hatred to the rest of Europe, which they had forced into a destructive and obstinate struggle of a nature long since exploded among civilized nations. They had pillaged the United Provinces, spread fire and sword through Switzerland, devastated the Low Countries, and covered Italy with ruins. Not satisfied with all this, they were again ready to invade Europe, and resume the course of their depredations. But England, indulgent as she ever proved herself to be, was ready even now, at the eleventh hour, to grant them her pardon, and aban-

when he perceives that the danger no longer really exists which has so long threatened his own dominions and those of his allies ; when he can be convinced that resistance is no longer a necessity ; when, after so many years of crime and misfortune, he sees better principles prevail in France ; when, in fine, those gigantic projects of ambition, and those plans of destruction, which have made even the existence of civil society a problem, are totally abandoned.

“ But the conviction of such a change, agreeable as it would be to the wishes of his Majesty, can result only from the experience and evidence of facts.

“ The most natural, and at the same time, the best guarantee of the truth and stability of this change, would be the re-establishment of the race of princes who, during so many centuries, were able to preserve the internal prosperity of the French nation, and secure for it external consideration and respect. Such an event would have overcome, and will at all times overcome, the obstacles opposed to negotiations for peace. It would secure to France the undisputed enjoyment of its ancient territory, and would give to every other nation of Europe, by tranquil and peaceable means, that security which they are now forced to seek by other means.

“ But however desirable such an event may be, both for France

don to them the enjoyment of their ancient territory ; but on one condition nevertheless : that they should disavow their long errors, and recall that very moral dynasty which, during so many centuries, had produced the happiness of France, and maintained the security of the Continent. Thus, the brave men who had perished in the field of battle, and the generals who had commanded them, were to be considered traitors and rebels, and their great undertakings and splendid victories, the ignoble workings of base cupidity. It was impossible to insult an army more cruelly, or more unworthily to misrepresent history. The French government, nevertheless, swallowed the

itself and for the whole world, his Majesty does not exclusively attach to it the possibility of a solid and lasting pacification. His Majesty has no pretension of dictating to France what shall be the form of her government, nor into whose hands she shall place the authority requisite for conducting her affairs as a great and powerful nation.

“ His Majesty considers only the security of his own dominions, those of his allies, and those of Europe in general. Whenever he is convinced that this security can be obtained in any manner whatsoever, whether it result from the internal state of that country whose situation originally caused the danger, or from any other circumstance leading to the same end, his Majesty will seize with eagerness the opportunity of concerting with his allies upon the means of an immediate and general pacification.

“ Unfortunately, up to the present time, his Majesty has no other alternative left than to prosecute, in concert with the other powers of Europe, a just and defensive war, which his zeal for the happiness of his subjects will never allow him either to continue beyond the necessity to which it owes its origin, or to put an end to on any other conditions than those which he thinks may contribute to secure to them the enjoyment of their quiet, their constitution, and their independence.”

insult, for the nation wanted repose, and nothing but a statement of facts was opposed to the misrepresentations of the British minister. The reply is no doubt foreign to the private memoirs of Marshal Ney ; but it is so closely connected with the history of the times, that it will not be out of place here.

“ Paris, 28th Nivose, Year VIII. (Jan. 28th, 1800.)

“ The official note, bearing date of the 14th of Nivose, Year VIII. addressed to me by the Minister of his Britannic Majesty, having been laid before the First Consul of the French Republic, he remarked with surprise that it was founded upon an incorrect opinion relative to the origin and consequences of the present war. Far from war having been provoked by France, it may be remembered that from the very beginning of the revolution, she solemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her repugnance to make conquests, and her respect for the independence of all other governments ; and it is beyond all doubt that, being occupied at that period solely with her internal affairs, she would have avoided interfering with those of Europe, and have remained faithful to her professions.

“ But from an opposite feeling, the moment the French revolution burst forth almost the whole of Europe united to destroy France. This aggression existed long before it became public. Internal resistance was excited ; they who opposed the revolution were well received at foreign courts, their armed meetings tolerated, their conspiracies countenanced, and their extravagant declamation encouraged ; the French nation were insulted in the persons of their

agents, and England, in particular, set the example, by sending back the French accredited agent. In short, France was attacked, by overt acts, in her independence, her honour, and her security, long before war was declared.

“ Thus, France is warranted in imputing the evils which she has herself suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe, to projects of subjugation and dismemberment, which have several times been attempted and pursued. Such projects, long without example, as applied to so powerful a nation, could not fail of producing the most fatal consequences.

“ The Republic having been assailed on all sides, may naturally have been expected to carry on all sides its defensive exertions ; and it has made use of the means which lay in its own power and in the courage of its citizens, with no other view than the protection of its own independence. So long as its enemies have shown a determination to deny its rights, it has relied solely upon the energy of its resistance ; but whenever they have abandoned their projects of invasion, it has constantly sought the means of reconciliation, always manifested intentions of peace ; and if its good wishes have not been realised—if, in the midst of those internal tempests successively produced by revolution and war, the present holders of the executive power in France have not always evinced as much moderation as the people have evinced courage, it must be more particularly attributed to the fatal rage with which the resources of England have been applied to effect the ruin of France.

“ But if the wishes of his Britannic Majesty are, as he asserts, in unison with those of the French Republic, with regard to the conclusion of a peace, why, instead of attempting to justify the war, does he not try to end it? What obstacle is there to prevent a reconciliation of mutual and acknowledged utility, more especially when the First Consul of the French Republic has personally afforded so many proofs of his eagerness to put a stop to the calamities of war, and of his desire to observe, in the most rigorous manner, existing treaties.

“ The First Consul of the French Republic can have no doubt that his Britannic Majesty recognises the right of nations to choose their own form of government, since it is to the very exercise of such right that he owes his own crown; and he cannot conceive how, in the most direct opposition to this fundamental principle, upon which the actual existence of political societies rests, his Britannic Majesty’s minister could throw out hints tending to interfere with the internal affairs of the Republic, — hints which are not less offensive to the French people and their government, than an attempt would be offensive to England and his Majesty, which should tend to produce in that country the republican form of government adopted there in the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne of Great Britain that family whom birth had seated upon it, but who were precipitated from it by a revolution.

“ If, at no very distant period, when the constitutive system of the Republic offered neither the

strength nor the solidity which it now displays, his Britannic Majesty thought himself warranted in making overtures of reconciliation, and demanding conferences to treat of peace, how happens it that he now feels repugnance in renewing negotiations to which the present and reciprocal state of affairs promises a more speedy progress? The voices of nations join on all sides with that of humanity in imploring the termination of a war already marked by disasters of great magnitude, and a prolongation of which threatens Europe with a general convulsion,—with the prospect of irremediable evils. It is to arrest the course of such calamities, or at least to confine their direful effects to those persons alone who have caused them, that the First Consul of the French Republic proposes an immediate termination of hostilities by a suspension of arms, and the appointing forthwith of plenipotentiaries on both sides, to meet at Dunkirk, or in any other town offering equal advantages for rapidity of communication, there to proceed, without delay, in the re-establishment of peace and amity between the French Republic and England.

“The First Consul offers to give the necessary passports for this object.

“CH. MAURICE TALLEYRAND.”

The British Government deeming France unequal to maintain the struggle, persisted in forcing the Bourbons upon her. But whence originated the tender anxiety affected by the British monarch in favour of this good and moral family? Why, from the very fact, that these princes, being detested by

the French nation, would have been unable to govern it without trouble, and that a people in hostility with an unpopular government could not, for a long period, acquire any influence on the Continent. This calculation, so cruelly realised afterwards, was too palpable not to strike every mind. Both the army and the people were seized with indignation; and preparations were immediately made for war. Nothing was now thought of but to take vengeance for this odious coalition against the tranquillity, nay, the very existence of France as a nation. Ney, suffering less from his wounds, assumed the command of the troops collecting upon the Rhine. They were already beginning to be numerous; a host of young patriots had obeyed their country's call, and the old soldiers were resuming their arms. Men, horses, and provisions were in equal abundance.

Ney was not proof against this sudden emulation; the excitement of military glory was general and spontaneous; the organization of the armies was prompt, rapid, and perfectly planned; and the wounded General had a presentiment of the greatness to which France would speedily attain. Dismissing therefore his vain alarms, he now devoted his whole attention to seconding the movement in preparation. The government had succeeded in quieting and giving peace to the western provinces, and the different corps lately employed in suppressing revolt in those provinces, and keeping them in order, were now debouching upon the Rhine. The army rapidly collected its forces, and was in a

short time as powerful as in the best days of its victories.

The cold weather had ceased. Austria summoned her youth to the field, and, money in hand, bargained for all the soldiers whom Bavaria and Wirtemberg could supply. Moreau was appointed to oppose her, and was preparing to set out to join the army. The imperial troops, under the command of Kray, who had been recently gathering laurels on the Adige, were divided into four corps led by men of acknowledged ability and tried courage. The French were constituted in a similar manner. Lecourbe commanded the right wing, Sainte-Suzanne the left, Moreau retained the reserve, and the centre, in which Ney had a command, was under St.-Cyr.


CHAPTER II.

BOTH armies were ready for the field, and the powers to which they respectively belonged had made every possible sacrifice and exertion to enter upon the campaign with good effect. The Austrian army contained a hundred and thirty thousand men, and extended from the Maine to Voralberg. The French were somewhat less numerous; but to make up for this inferiority, they were less scattered and more compact. The soldiers of their army had, moreover, the firmness of purpose always produced by profound conviction of right, and a sense of monstrous injustice. Peace had been refused to them; they were going to win it at the sword's edge, and force their most implacable enemies to give repose to the world, which would thereby be able to recover from the grievous evils inflicted upon it by a war against the natural rights of mankind. Their measures were speedily taken, and they prepared to turn the Imperialists. On the 15th of April, Sainte-Suzanne made a movement upon Offenburg; and Staray, who commanded the Austrian right wing, pressed forward to close the passes of the Black Mountains against him. Saint-Cyr crossed the Rhine at Old Brissac, Lecourbe at Stein, and Moreau at Basle. All three debouched unexpectedly

upon the centre of the Austrian army, and were well nigh crushing it. But the country was mountainous and difficult, and the centre of the French army, entangled in the intricacies of the ground, was still struggling in this wilderness, densely inhabited by a hostile population, even after the right wing had conquered at Stockach and the reserve at Engen.

Ney marched at the head of the French centre. At Burken and at Nimburg he encountered armed multitudes, similar to those whom, at a former period, he had chastised on the Maine and the Elaz. After routing and dispersing them, he thought himself freed from these undisciplined hinds, when he perceived them again forming at Bromberg. As Tharrau was coming up to them, Baraguay, at the head of the 3rd, advanced to meet the regular troops by whom they were supported. Ney therefore continued his movement; but the country became at every step more rugged and more difficult to penetrate. Here was a deep chasm, there a valley without an opening; rocks and ravines succeeded each other, and it was with great difficulty that the French troops made any progress through these wild regions. Moreau had been informed that the country was open and easy to cross. Some persons had persuaded him that there was a high road from Friburg to St. Blaize, leading through Todnau, and he gave particular orders that this road should be followed; but neither the peasants nor the hunters of the country had ever heard of it. Nevertheless, the general's instructions being positive, an attempt was

made to obey them, and the troops became bewildered amid rocks, and glens, and precipices. The waggons and artillery were obliged to be sent back, and the corps continued their march without cannon or ammunition. Thus lightened, they succeeded in advancing somewhat further; but such were the obstacles which these mountains presented, that the troops were continually forced to halt, and then either turn or pass over them. The sappers worked with all their might, but they had no tools: they could scarcely obtain even a few hoes, and the soldiers helped them as well as they could with their bayonets. But this weapon was ill-adapted to such work, in which, with its aid, they made but slow progress. Nevertheless, by dint of perseverance, they succeeded in opening one passage and repairing another; and after two days of excessive fatigue and exertion they reached St. Blaize. Ney arrived there on the 15th of April; it was already occupied by a division of the reserve, from which he borrowed ammunition and artillery, and proceeded to meet the enemy, who had formed upon the Wutach. The country was covered with rugged and almost inaccessible mountains, and it was with the greatest difficulty that he effected his movement. At length he arrived in sight of a numerous column of Austrians, occupying the heights of Stettin. The night became so dark that he could not reconnoitre all the outlets, neither could he, without danger, defer seizing them until the morning. The imperial forces were drawn up in line in the gorges of the moun-



tains ; and if he did not attack them immediately, they might attack him. He was therefore anxious not to expose himself to the chances of an attack by surprise. The 54th was at the head of his column ; it advanced upon the enemy, who before the dawn of day were entirely put to flight.

He pursued, overtook, routed them again, and did not stop till he came in sight of St. Atilia, which is the nucleus of a series of valleys diverging in different directions. The approaches are rugged, precipitous, and woody ; and the Austrians defended them with an obstinacy which it took a long time to overcome. Baraguay at length broke and drove the Imperialists upon Zolaus. Ney continued the movement, and, keeping to the left, advanced towards Mulheim. The cannon roared at some distance in his front, and a succession of reports convinced him that they must proceed from an action not far off. He therefore pressed his march, overtook the enemy, and drove them in disorder upon Tutlingen. This position, protected by formidable heights, was further defended by the columns which had been previously routed, and had rapidly advanced from Zolaus and Moreingen ; he therefore ordered Bonnet to force it with the van-guard. The undertaking was one of great difficulty ; but as the cannon continued to thunder with increasing spirit, there was no time to be lost, and Bonnet making a desperate effort, rushed with determination upon the position, and carried it. Ney immediately let loose his columns upon the defeated troops,

pressed, and harassed, and drove them upon Neuhausen; but the imperial cavalry covering the plain, he was compelled to halt and take up a position.

The cannonading having ceased, the prisoners and deserters from the Austrian army stated that the French had been obliged to make a retrograde movement. Ney immediately began to calculate how he should convey assistance to the latter; for it seemed impossible to penetrate through the Austrian masses, or even to cut a passage through the dense bodies of cavalry which appeared at a distance. On a sudden, however, the firing recommenced, and having spread farther on, Ney felt assured that the right wing of the French had recovered the chance of the day. Such was indeed the case; and the imperial troops which covered the road from Tuttlingen to Stockach were already beginning to disappear. Ney followed them at a distance. He was desirous of ascertaining their movements, tracking their march, and opening a communication with such of the French corps as were engaged. He pressed and drove the enemy forward, and by dint of fighting and manœuvring, arrived at the debouches of Schwandorf. It was now eight o'clock, the evening was getting dark, and he took up a position for the night. The battle had been very hotly contested: ten thousand men were lying dead on the ground, and the French had been very near sustaining a defeat at Maskich, to counterbalance the success they had obtained at Engen.

Their centre was now in line, and as a fresh attack upon them offered no chance of success, the

Austrians retreated. Ney pursued them and advanced upon Buchen, which was still occupied by a hostile column ; this he charged and overthrew ; and then, continuing his pursuit, overtook the Austrian rear-guard, which he drove as far as Kreenheistetten. The Imperialists, fearful of his turning their right, formed into line ; and in this position Ney could attack them only with a feeble van-guard. He however perceived that they were discouraged and in consternation. The defeats which they had sustained in immediate succession had damped their courage, and he did not hesitate to attack them. Their opposition was such as might be expected from an army contending for its communications. They were however unable to resist, and, being driven from position to position, were at length obliged to evacuate the field, leaving twelve hundred prisoners in the hands of the French. Ney closely pursued them ; and convoys, horses, baggage,—all in short that covered the road, fell into his hands.

The Austrian forces at Inzhoffen were struck with consternation ; even the imperial columns, then on their way to Sigmaringen, had taken the alarm. There was a general halt, and all formed in line of battle. In an instant Ney's feeble van-guard had thirty thousand men in front of it, and it was obliged to halt, but without slackening its fire, or ceasing to attack and overthrow the Austrian corps which successively ventured within its reach. The movement of the action had carried it upon the heights of Inzhoffen, whence it could behold the impression it had made upon the enemy's masses. The whole

army of the latter, drawn up in a succession of lines, was grouped in the angle formed by the Danube, and did not occupy the space of a single division. Its two wings touched the river, whose precipitous banks covered them. Its artillery commanded all the approaches, and crowned all the heights. This situation was critical; and both officers and men of the Austrian army were discouraged and disheartened, and dared not even continue the passage of the river which they had begun. In justice, however, we must add, that had they even displayed the most undaunted courage, they could not, situated as they were, have avoided a terrible defeat. Every shot fired at them would have told with deadly effect, and if one line had been missed, another would have been struck; not a single shot would have been lost, and the Austrian army, mowed down by whole files, must have either perished on the banks of the Danube or laid down its arms.

The situation of the Imperialists was singularly disadvantageous, and Ney strained every nerve to profit by it. He called up his own artillery, and requested Saint-Cyr to send him more; but all that he and his commander possessed was insufficient, and he could do no more than prove that if the opportunity was lost it was not from any fault of his. He placed his twelve pieces in battery; but sixty being opposed to them, he was obliged to abandon the attempt.

After this failure the Austrian army resumed its confidence and finished crossing the river. Its right

wing, sent so injudiciously into the passes of the Val d'Enfer, was now debouching. Thus its forces were united, while those of the French were somewhat scattered. The Austrians, thinking it not impossible to recover their good fortune, suddenly recrossed the river, and took up their position upon the heights of Biberach. This was a bold and well-conceived movement. Ney, with the extreme left of the French, proceeded along the banks of the river, the approaches to which, besides being tortuous and difficult, were moreover guarded by a numerous body of partisans. Being constantly obliged to fight, as well as to turn the natural obstacles of the place, which are numerous and close to each other, the French general was not quick enough. When he debouched the Austrians had already given way. Saint-Cyr had attacked them; and men, artillery, and approaches,—all had been carried.

Ney, having thus arrived too late to take any share in the victory, set out in pursuit of the vanquished enemy. He followed and harassed them without intermission, and drove them in disorder behind the Iller. Here their resistance became more energetic, and the struggle more serious. They had twenty thousand men in line; the approaches were fortified, and the houses of the villages they occupied had embrasures. The fire of the French was well sustained, and yet the action did not seem drawing to a close. Ney, tired of this vain delay, rushed upon the intrenchments, and joining the enemy hand to hand, overthrew and drove them to Illertissen.

The Imperialists, beaten both at Memmingen and

at Brauendenburg, retreated to Ulm. This place is situated in a bottom or dell, and though of no importance in itself, contained extensive storehouses. It was defended by the Michelsberg batteries; and by means of its fortifications, it gave great facilities for manœuvring on both banks of the river. The Austrian masses were grouped upon the left of the French army; and the latter could not extend itself until it had beaten them. Moreau, from the top of the Abbey of Weblengen, beheld the position of the enemy, and directed Ney to attack and oblige them to concentrate their forces upon the Guntz. The Hulans were accordingly charged, broken, and thrown in disorder upon Wizeghausen, where they rallied and endeavoured to take up a position; but on seeing the 54th French advance in double quick time, they became alarmed and dared not receive the charge.

The left bank was now no longer destined to be the theatre of operations. New combinations had been formed, and every corps pushed on to the right, towards the Lech. Ney followed the movement, and had scarcely reached the Iller, ere he heard a heavy cannonade. The Archduke Ferdinand had seized this opportunity to attack Sainte-Suzanne, who was on the point of being overpowered. It became therefore necessary to fall back upon the Danube, and proceed in all haste to his assistance.

The different corps of the army soon debouched. The centre passed along the left bank, the reserve took its station upon the right, Sainte-Suzanne and

Saint-Cyr crossed the Blau, Delmas descended the Iller, D'Hautpoul followed, and the republicans seemed again bent upon trying their fortune; but every one has not the talent of seizing an opportunity. When about to strike the blow, they became alarmed; and their efforts were spent in empty air, amid vain and powerless manœuvres.

Meanwhile, the Austrians resolved not to stir until they should ascertain the result of the operations conducted by the First Consul. Their quarters were good, they had provisions in abundance, and to remain quiet in the enjoyment of ease and plenty seemed to them the best thing they could do. But the French, without provisions or forage, as usual,—men and horses being equal sufferers from want,—had no such motive for prolonging this strange state of inaction. Ney made this observation to Saint-Cyr, and the latter to Moreau, without either being able to obtain a satisfactory answer. On the 19th of May, as the day was declining, and Ney and Saint-Cyr warmly debating this point, an orderly arrived with orders to the latter to fall back with his columns.

“What!” cried Ney, “at the beginning of night, and when all is ready for action?”

“It is a cruel thing,” Saint-Cyr replied; “but such is the order. We must leave the spot where the enemy is to be found, to go where we shall find nobody, save only stern and invincible hunger stalking through our ranks with deadly power.” And he put his columns in motion; but his col-

league did not follow him. Sainte-Suzanne being again exposed upon the Iller to the attacks of the Austrians, Ney was sent to support him.

The French were aware that before Moreau could reach Bavaria, a part of the Austrian forces had already advanced upon Guntzburg; but they knew neither what positions the Austrians had taken up, nor the description of force by which these positions were occupied. The chief of brigade, Chalbos, being sent with a detachment of the 45th demi-brigade to reconnoitre, advanced towards Neuburg. The Wirtemberg chasseurs defended the approaches to that place; he charged, and broke them, making about a hundred prisoners. This success emboldened him; and, acting on the spur of his courage, he pressed the chasseurs more vigorously, and rushed boldly upon a heavy body of hussars. But whilst he was thus pushing forward, the cuirassiers of General Mack intercepted his rear, and having with them some pieces of cannon, destroyed a considerable number of his men, but without being able to break them. Thrice did Chalbos rush upon the foe, and drive them back; but the movement of the battle had thrown him to the left, and he found himself stopped by a vast bog. His men were out of breath, and the cannonading was becoming every instant more murderous; he was therefore reduced to lay down his arms. Chalbos was a brave, able, and devoted officer, and Ney was profoundly afflicted at his misfortune.

“Behold,” he said with grief, “the consequences

of this inexplicable halt ; behold the fruits of our cruel stagnation !”

The 8th were mounted, and he immediately despatched them to the place where Chalbos was made prisoner ; but the Austrians were drawn up in great force, and to have attacked them would have brought on a general engagement. Great, therefore, as was Ney’s regard for his captive officer, he did not feel justified in shedding the blood of numbers of brave men in order to rescue one from captivity.

This check was not the only circumstance which the French army had to deplore : its present state of inaction proved very prejudicial to its discipline. Some of its soldiers had shrunk, not indeed from the enemy, but from the annoyances of a faction whom they considered hostile to the best interests of their country. These soldiers had accordingly deserted their post. Others of the men committed each day the most culpable excesses. Though now abundantly supplied with provisions, they indulged, without restraint, in the disorders which their previous distress had long caused to be tolerated, and plundered the habitations in the neighbourhood of their camp. Ney had several times expressed his extreme displeasure at the disorderly conduct of these men, and issued severe orders on the subject ; but none of the officers seemed to carry his orders into execution. They continued blind to that which they ought to have prevented ; and the whole division became culpable for want of care and vigilance. Ney, driven to harsh measures,

resolved to punish those who did not prevent such excesses, as well as those by whom they were committed.

“The volunteers of the 103rd, and more especially those of the 54th,” he wrote to General Bonnet, “commit every possible excess in the houses, and particularly in the mills adjacent to the camp. We must, my dear General, beat to quarters and call the roll. One battalion out of every three must form a double chain of posts round the camp, and continue to do so until the offenders are discovered.” *

The discovery soon took place. The men, being confined to the camp, and subjected either to severe duty, or to wearisome inaction, became discontented with this punishment, which affected them all, and they who had done nothing to deserve it revenged themselves upon those who were really guilty. The latter, being punished by their comrades, of whose unpleasant restraint they were the cause, were forced to discontinue their depredations. Several officers who had distinguished themselves by their culpable tolerance of such excesses, were brought to a court-martial, and one of them was suspended. This severity put a stop to the system of pillage: no one dared again to indulge in it; and the officers became more vigilant and attentive to their duty.

The case of the vedettes was more serious, for it involved a question of capital punishment. Two chasseurs had abandoned their post, and were con-

demned to be shot. The council of revision annulled the sentence, in consequence of an informality in the proceedings, and a new trial was directed to take place. Another court-martial assembled, and gave precisely the same decision as the first ; which decision was also annulled. Ney then reported the state of the case to General Saint-Cyr, and left it to him to act as he thought fit. The despatch was conceived in the following terms :—

“ You will perceive, my dear General, by the decisions in the case of two chasseurs of the 8th regiment, who basely abandoned their post when on vedette, that the decree of the General-in-chief, bearing date the 7th Florial, which specially applies to the case, has been interpreted by the council of revision, under the presidency of General Desbrulys, in a manner calculated to degrade the authority of General Moreau. The decision of the first court-martial having been thus set aside, I ordered a second to assemble. The latter very thoughtlessly set forth in its judgment an article contradictory of the crime, so that its sentence has likewise been quashed. As I have not sufficient commanders of corps to compose a third court-martial, may I beg of you, my dear General, to submit the case to the General-in-chief, in order to prevent pusillanimous judges from thwarting, in a manner so dangerous to the discipline of the army, the provisions and moral object of his decree.” *

In spite of this deference to legal forms which

* Raggenburg, 6th Prairial, (May 26th.)

protected two guilty soldiers from merited punishment, a good effect was produced upon the whole army. The fear of being tried by judges less scrupulous, put an end to every kind of depredation, and restored the powers of discipline, which for a while had been relaxed.*

Moreau pursued his movement towards Bavaria ; but Kray, instead of following him, collected his forces at Michelsburg, and remained in this central position ready to profit by the least chance which fortune might throw in his way. On the 24th of May he had been on the point of overpowering Sainte-Suzanne ; and on the 5th of June he came unexpectedly upon Richepanse, whom he placed in still more imminent jeopardy. This officer, who had recently been appointed to the command of the left wing, was a man of the firmest resolution, and one who possessed the most powerful mental resources ; but great as were his talents and courage, he could not make head against the heavy masses which were debouching upon him. His right being much less extended than that

* We have dwelt a little upon these somewhat unimportant facts, because, in a recent publication, they have been presented in an unfavourable light. The punishment inflicted by the soldiers themselves upon their guilty comrades, although sanctioned by the orders of the General-in-chief, is termed extra-legal. The sentences upon the chasseurs, though neither was executed, are termed acts of barbarity ; and the author of the work alluded to, accompanies his account of these circumstances with the most atrocious details, the untruth of which has fortunately been proved, but which tend to show the facility with which the writer of "The Campaign of 1800," takes advantage of every calumny tending to implicate or dishonour a brother officer.

of the Austrians, and his centre broken, he was driven back upon the Roth. Ney, however, crossed the Iller, advanced rapidly towards the Austrians, and came up with them on the platform of Kirchberg. They were numerous and flushed with victory; but as the danger of remaining inactive was becoming greater every moment, and he was unable to fall back, he put himself at the head of his grenadiers, and under a tremendous fire, advanced, with fixed bayonets, and without firing a single shot. This bold attempt was successful, and the broken Austrian ranks were driven from their position. Richepanse, threatened on his left, had just made a retrograde movement; Ney was therefore forced to follow his example, and abandon the platform he had so gallantly won. The Imperialists immediately took possession of it, covered it with troops and artillery, and for a moment threw the French ranks into confusion. These being crippled by the shots which were showered upon them, the men asked to be led to the charge. Having formed, they marched up in double quick time, and soon encountered the enemy, hand to hand. Every individual soldier displayed the most daring courage; both officers and men felt the same enthusiasm, and the Austrians could not withstand the shock. The reserves of the latter having come to their assistance, the action was renewed; but General Bonnet led the attack with such talent and effect that they were again broken.

The French remained masters of the day, and those formidable masses which had come to take from

Richepanse the only bridge over the Iller that he could use, now fled before them. The junction with the left wing was, however, not yet effected: some Austrian columns which occupied the woods, having cut off the communications of the French forces, Ney despatched two officers to open them again,—the one a lieutenant of cavalry, the other a brave captain of infantry, whom family reasons had formerly obliged to resign his commission, but who, having some time previously returned to the army, had been unable to obtain his letters of service. In vain had Ney exhausted his interest at head-quarters in favour of these two officers: justice had been done to neither. The valour of Lieutenant Daiker, and the talents of Captain Guy Descoutes, had been equally disregarded. Both were in that mood of mind so favourable to deeds of great daring. Perceiving a column of enemies, they boldly marched up and summoned them to surrender. The troops which supported these officers were at a considerable distance behind them. But boldness is a power which seldom fails to intimidate men discouraged by defeat: the Austrians laid down their arms, and quietly followed the officers to head-quarters.

The junction was now effected; and the French had captured twelve hundred prisoners with five pieces of cannon. They then marched up again to the Austrians, whom they reached upon their whole line. After a severe action, the imperialists were driven back to the place whence they had originally set out, and the left wing of the French army was saved.

But this able operation was not unattended with bitter feelings in him who had conducted it. Ney loved and honoured courage, and was always fond of bringing it forward wherever he found it, whether in an officer or a private soldier. General Grenier had superseded Saint-Cyr in the command of the centre; and Ney brought to his notice the officers who had particularly distinguished themselves in this affair. Among others was Captain Dulaunay of the 48th, whose bravery and talents Ney held in great estimation.

“He has real talent,” wrote Ney to General Grenier; “pray do not overlook him, for you would deprive the army of an officer who will worthily run his career.”

But whilst he was unsuccessfully soliciting in favour of a man who had still to win his way to fame, he was near losing an officer who had already risen to eminence. Bonnet, in return for the talent and gallantry he had evinced at Kirchberg, was harshly received at head-quarters. Disgusted at such treatment, he resolved to throw up his commission. Fortunately he could not execute his intentions, except through Ney, his commanding officer, who took good care not to second them. Bonnet was a man whom he could not easily consent to lose; his talents, firmness, and daring courage, were qualities which rendered his services most desirable, and Ney therefore sought to pacify him.

“Your determination, my dear General,” he wrote to him, “has deeply affected me; and I place sufficient reliance on your friendship to hope that

you will not persist in it. It is no doubt to the report of the General-in-chief that you owe the annoyance you have experienced; but there is not a man among us who is not acquainted with your courage, and does not do justice to your talents. The army and your comrades are unanimous in this respect, and in sober earnest that ought to be sufficient for you. I trust, therefore, that you will remain, and forget the unmerited treatment you have received. I return you your letter to the General-in-chief, and hope you will consider it cancelled." *

Bonnet yielded to this wish, was soon after appointed general of division, and in a short time distinguished himself by several new feats of arms.

Moreau, impatient at the slow progress made by his right, resolved to carry on operations with his left. Bonnet with his division cleared the flanks of the army, and took a part in divers battles fought upon the banks of the Biber. The Austrians, defeated in every action, rallied the wreck of their forces, and spread through the valley of the Roth; Bonnet followed and again overthrew them. Those who escaped him fled back to the Brentz, and no Austrian patrols nor reconnoitring parties were any longer to be seen in this part of the country.

The crippled Imperialists could nowhere make a stand. Ney was anxious to support his lieutenant, and take advantage of the victory he had achieved.

"Let us march, my dear General," he wrote to Grenier, "upon Donawert. The Austrians are un-

* Osterberg, 22nd Prairial, Year VIII. (June 11th, 1800.)

able to resist us. We have a moral superiority over them, and they cannot escape us."

Grenier dared not take such a movement upon his own responsibility. He had just received intelligence of the surrender of Genoa. One of his officers had witnessed the joy which the news of this event had spread through the Austrian camp. He had seen the Imperialists emerge from discouragement to boldness, treat with derision what was said of the successes of the First Consul, and flatter themselves that they should soon resume the offensive, and again drive back their republican adversaries upon the Rhine: and indeed fortune seemed to have returned to them, for Grenier dared not attempt the movement, urging in excuse the unlucky chances which it offered.

"Chances!" Ney replied; "I perceive none but lucky chances. The enemy are confined to the left bank; their columns are some above and some below Ulm. Could we not, if these appear too formidable, attempt a diversion? Could we not feign to surprise the passage at Elchingen, whilst in reality we crossed the river at Guntzburg? If the operation were successful, the Austrians would lose their communications; if it did not succeed, we should only have to retire beyond the Guntz, and resume our present positions."

There arguments were conclusive, but neither Ney nor Grenier had the chief command, and two days more elapsed before they could attempt to cross the Danube. This was however effected almost without obstacle, on the 10th of June, and the re-

publicans, drawn up on the plains of Hochstadt, avenged the defeat which the French armies had sustained there almost a century before.

Kray, informed of Moreau's irruption in his rear, immediately raised his camp, abandoned the position where he had so long held the French in check, and thought only of repossessing himself of his communications. But he found this by no means so easy as he had imagined. The French had crossed the Danube at Blenheim—they also occupied Donawert; and the roads, together with the heights which run along the banks of the river, were in their possession. If therefore the Austrians wished to re-establish their line of communication, they must risk a circuitous march, advance as far as Nordlingen, expose their flank, and run the chance of a speedy defeat. Field-Marshal Kray had, in the mean time, thrown a portion of his troops upon the Inn, in spite of the danger of such a movement; and having formed his infantry into two columns, he pushed them, under the protection of his cavalry, one upon Dillengen and the other upon Languenau. Ney being confined to the left bank, and obliged to guard the approaches to the Guntz, saw with regret the Austrian forces file off. In vain did he invoke Grenier's friendship;*

* TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRENIER.

1st Messidor (June 20th.)

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Every report I have received acquaints me with the precipitate retreat of the enemy upon Ulm; and at the very moment I am writing this letter, two columns, the depth of which I cannot see, are in full march descending the left bank of the Danube.

in vain did he urge this general to follow him, march upon Guntzburg,* and debouch by Leipheim :† the commander of the centre was afraid of exposing his rear, and anxious to secure its safety. Yielding

One is pursuing the Rudheim road ; its head already appears beyond that village, and keeps along the Dillengen causeway. The other is proceeding through Languenau, and appears to be pursuing the same direction. I calculate this force at twenty thousand men of all arms. Nothing has occurred in front of my present position, of which the enclosed is a correct plan. I think, my dear General, that it would be urgent to bring my forces closer together, and my cavalry near to the valley of the Aost. General Richepanse must have a very weak force in front of him : would it not therefore be advisable to urge the general-in-chief either to cause this general to be supported by us, so that he may press with vigour upon Ulm, or to cross over to the left bank of the Danube, in order to force the enemy to leave part of their force before it ? This diversion would render our enterprises more easy.

You will have work to do to-morrow, my dear General ; pray concentrate your forces in a good position, and make me come to you before the action begins.

If you think proper, I will collect my forces at Guntzburg and Reisemberg to-morrow by daybreak, and I shall even expect your orders to-night. Affairs are pressing. Pray do not forget me.

* TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRENIER.

1st Messidor (June 20th.)

MY DEAR GENERAL,

- It is two o'clock ; and the Austrian columns which I mentioned in my last are just formed into line in front of Languenau, with their left towards Nerenstitten, and their right upon Reidhen. They seem drawn up across the road to Dillengen. I believe they will remain this evening in the position I have mentioned. I am going this instant to set out for Guntzburg, and have directed General Bonnet to report to me every movement he may remark to-morrow morning. I am expecting with impatience the order to follow you to the left bank of the Danube.

however to Ney's entreaties, he allowed that general to cross the Danube and join the van-guard, which he found in the most inactive and inefficient state, negligently extended along the banks of the Brentz. Ney could not conceal his surprise at this inaction, and wrote to Grenier as follows :

Do not leave me here when you are fighting, for if you do I shall quarrel with you, and never pardon you for my inaction, unless circumstances absolutely require that it should continue.

NEY.

† TO THE SAME.

1st Messidor (June 20th.)

MY DEAR GENERAL,

As I have received no reply to the different communications I have addressed to you during the day, I beg to inform you that I have just collected the materials necessary for the speedy repair of the bridge of Reidenberg ; the only one which, under present circumstances, seems to me adapted to operate a diversion ; for it would be imprudent to rebuild those of Leipheim and Guntzburg whilst the enemy are in force upon those points. It is even probable they will march to-night, so as to reach the Brentz by daybreak, where you will have taken up your position. They will not dare to attack you in front before they have made you develope your right towards Heydenheim, which will oblige them to leave a corps of observation in a line with Grengen. As I might easily reach Gungenfingen by the time the attack began, by passing either through Laumgen or through Reimburg—the latter in preference,—my presence at such a juncture would enable you to give support on the right, and thus baffle, for a considerable time, the attempts of the enemy, so as to give the general-in-chief, Moreau, sufficient time to come up with the centre and part of the right wing. Perhaps the latter forces are already near you ; for it is certain, my dear General, that the first days of Messidor must necessarily decide the fate of the campaign. The enemy have committed an irretrievable fault in allowing themselves to be forced to receive battle in their rear. Let us profit by it ; the moment is favourable.

“ They will escape us if we do not march ; they will be too far off if there is any further delay. Forward then, my dear General, forward ! And if we cannot follow them,—if the army is not ready to debouch, at least let the cavalry follow them, push, press, and force them to lose time.”

Neither infantry nor cavalry stirred, and yet matters were becoming every instant more serious. The Austrian Field-marshal was rapidly advancing towards the Naab, and his grand park of artillery was proceeding by forced marches to Amberg. Ney again intreated that he might be permitted to pursue him.

He wished, he said, “ to march upon Nuremberg, force the imperial army constantly to develope its right, and threaten the rear of its divisions upon the Maine.”

His desire was complied with ; he put his troops in motion, and in two consecutive actions broke the Austrian rear-guard. The news of the battle of Marengo soon followed that of the surrender of Genoa. The French, elated at this intelligence, were rapid and energetic in their operations. The Austrians, on the other hand, were sinking under the despondency caused by their reverses. Ney pierced through the curtain which covered their retreat, and witnessed the terror by which they were stricken. The opportunity appeared to him favourable ; he gave notice of it to the commander of the centre, and appealing again to the energy and vivacity which ought to be the concomitants of a pursuit, added :

“ If the General-in-chief would order a march of two successive days, and force the enemy to receive battle, I think the army of Baron Kray would soon encounter a fate similar to that of the Baron de Melas, if not worse. An officer sent with a flag of truce has acquainted the Austrian generals with our brilliant success in Italy. They are struck with consternation at the news, and have attempted no concealment as to the extent of their disaster. They are in despair of themselves and their monarchy, and seem more disposed to flee from us than again to risk the hazard of arms. You see then, General, the chances which fortune holds out to us ; let us not neglect them. Never was there an opportunity of striking a more powerful blow.”*

These pressing instances were unattended to ; the time was frittered away, the opportunity lost, and Kray completed his manœuvre.

The Austrian army being in position at Neuberg, Ney was instructed to harass it. But the Prince of Reuss was engaged with another part of the French army. Moerfeld had been defeated at Dachau, and the Archduke Ferdinand at Landshut ; Lecourbe and Decaën had beaten other corps of the imperial army, and Field-marshal Kray having continued his retreat, had established himself at Muldorf. Ney followed his movement, advanced upon Ingolstadt, and pushed the heads of his columns under the very batteries of that place, then commanded by the

* Hochaltingen, 6th Messidor, Year VIII. (June 25th, 1800.)

Austrian General Neu. This officer, though a man of valour and energy, was proud, haughty, obstinate, and a little addicted to vain boasting. It was he who, after the retreat of 1795, affected to inquire what had become of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse. Having been formerly successful in surprises, he was resolved to try whether they would not succeed on the present occasion.

He accordingly put himself at the head of part of his garrison, and fell unexpectedly upon the French posts. But the republican forces, no longer exposed either to the severity of winter or to the ravages of famine, were on the alert, guarded with care, and the Austrian general was foiled in every attempt.

Nevertheless a severe action took place; the cannon roared, and the rolling fire of the Austrians produced a terrific effect. Ney advanced at the head of a squadron of hussars. Laughter and gaiety had seized upon his men. They had just forced the payment of the contributions, and had witnessed the ludicrous scenes and whimsical subterfuges to which an operation of this kind always gives rise. Here, a chapter would not allow a patrimony of St. Peter's to be touched; there, an abbot was ready to suffer martyrdom rather than part with his money: nowhere did God's ministers give up their worldly wealth without the most lamentable wailings.

• These anecdotes had lightened the toils of the march; the men continued their gossip and their amusing stories even after they had reached the field

of battle. The troops received the order to form; still the conversation did not cease, until an old hussar put an end to it by a sally.

“We have other amusements now, friends,” he exclaimed; “Here we are, *nez à nez*,* (Ney à Neu). Let us see how matters will come to pass.”

And in truth they came to pass very favourably for the French troops, who immediately formed and advanced towards the enemy, amid shouts of laughter. The Austrians were driven back upon the town; but, having immediately received reinforcements, they rallied, re-formed, and prepared again to advance upon the French. Ney spared them part of the trouble, and rushing upon them, broke through their ranks, put them completely to the rout, and took six pieces of cannon, together with six hundred prisoners.

Receiving, almost immediately after, intelligence of the Armistice of Parsdorf, he gave information of it to General Neu, and proposed a suspension of hostilities; but the obstinate old German, exasperated by his defeat, replied that he had no instructions, and was not at all disposed to allow himself to be shut up.

“Very well,” Ney replied; “your will be done. To keep you in is not what embarrasses me. I only wish to place upon your shoulders the responsibility of the blood which will be uselessly spilt. I therefore await your pleasure.”

* *Nez à nez* (nose to nose), pronounced Ney à Ney. The pronunciation of the German Neu is between the name Ney and the English monosyllable Nigh. Thus the English reader may easily understand the double-entente.—ED.

This softened Neu, and the strife of war ceased at Ingoldstadt, as it had along the rest of the line. But the Austrian commander, obliged to give way on the main point, was stubborn in matters of less importance.

One day he established his troops in the villages contained within the line of demarcation, and on the following refused to permit an account to be taken of his force. Ney's remonstrances against this were of no avail: the old German would never admit the unreasonableness of his pretensions. In vain did the French general urge, that, although authorised to let the provisions pass which were necessary for the subsistence of the garrison, he would not allow the governor to rob the farmers of their crops, nor to introduce into the place a stock of provisions beyond its immediate wants. Neu took no notice of these objections, and persisted in his measures. Ney was therefore forced to give way on one point, in order not to ruin the villages; but he was inexorable on the other;—he stopped the governor's waggons, seized his convoys, and cut off his provisions. The Austrian was now in his turn obliged to yield, and furnish a statement of his situation, which he had before obstinately refused.

There was another measure equally unpleasant, which Ney felt compelled to adopt. The Austrian general had flattered himself that the occupation of the villages would procure him the resources he wanted. But Ney had an exact inventory made of the corn, the cattle, and even the wood included in

the line of demarcation, and it was not without considerable vexation that the governor perceived he could make away with nothing.

The war operations being thus suspended, the republicans flattered themselves that a peace would soon follow. The conditions had been not only discussed but agreed upon, and their ratification was expected to take place immediately. But Austria never negotiates except to take breath. She had still a very numerous army remaining, and she determined again to try the chances of war. On a sudden she raised scruples to entering into any treaty without the concurrence of Great Britain ; and a refusal was actually given to receive the officer despatched to present the preliminaries to the Emperor for ratification. This subterfuge led to preparations for an immediate renewal of the campaign. Ney gave notice to the Governor of Ingoldstadt of the rupture of the armistice, and summoned him to yield the ground he could no longer defend, and quietly evacuate the villages which he occupied. This was a demand by no means pleasing to the Austrian commander, but his memory was good, and, profiting by the lesson which the French had before given him, he complied with Ney's demand.

The Austrian forces accordingly re-entered the place. Bonnet occupied Abach ; General Desbrulys was in position on the right bank of the Danube ; General Goba held the left bank ; and Ney was preparing to act vigorously against the garrison of Ingoldstadt. But the Austrians now eluded the war,

as they had just before eluded peace. In order to prolong the cessation of hostilities, they gave up Ingoldstadt, Ulm, and Philipsburg. Great Britain, so haughty at the commencement of the campaign, now not only consented, but even solicited to treat for peace. All seemed to promise a term to this horrible destruction of human life; and yet it was as far distant as ever.

CHAPTER III.

THE interference of the British Government rendered the question under debate much more complicated than it really was. France demanded that Great Britain should be placed in the same situation as herself: that the war should cease on the sea as it had ceased on the land. The cabinet of St. James's considered this demand unreasonable, and pretended that a compliance with it would prove very detrimental to British interests. This might be true; but, as the cabinet of St. Cloud observed, if a long suspension of hostilities were prejudicial to Great Britain, a lengthened armistice was not less so to France. The then state of things must necessarily lead to a speedy settlement of the question of peace or war. The maritime armistice would serve as a guarantee to the Consular Government of the sincerity of the British Government in the establishment of a peace; whilst the continental armistice would be security to the latter government of the sincerity of France in her exertions for the same object. Austria, in the state in which the chances of war had placed her, was necessarily anxious for a prompt solution of the question. The three powers were thus in a situation not to hesitate about the sacrifices which each might have to make in bring-

ing the point to an issue. These observations were just; but what is just, is not always that which Great Britain is the most ready to adopt: the cabinet of St. James's therefore eluded the point, and Austria, making common cause with it, refused to follow up negotiations in which her insular ally did not participate. This was carrying her complaisance a little too far, and the French republic determined to demand satisfaction; but Austria was herself quite ready to take the field again, and her troops, in the quietude of their cantonments, had lost the fatal impression made by their defeats. They had acquired strength from repose, were numerous, and commanded by new generals. Thus they had all the elastic enthusiasm of a new army—of men first going into the field. Their general-in-chief was the Archduke Ferdinand, a young, ardent, and resolute prince, who united to that handsome and martial appearance which pleases the soldiers, great personal bravery, a good eye, and a vigour of execution by no means common.

Ney had repulsed the Austrian advanced posts, driven them from Haag and Mattenpot, and forced them back upon the Iser. The archduke hastily advanced to avenge their defeat, and attacking the republicans in his turn, endeavoured not only to beat but likewise to turn them. He passed the Iser on the 29th of November, debouched by Muldorf and Crayburg, bore upon the left of the French army, and threatened to cut off its communications. This was a bold and well-concerted manœuvre; but the ground being wet and full of deep ruts, the

Austrian forces were obliged to take up a position. They established themselves in front of Ampfingen, and covered the plain and heights with their columns.

Night having set in, Ney contented himself with following the line of their advanced posts along their front ; but daybreak was still distant when he perceived them in motion. He saw them first reduce, then extinguish their fires ; and not doubting that they were preparing to march towards him, he made ready to receive them. They soon debouched, and threw heavy masses of cavalry upon his centre, drove in his advanced posts, and, threatening his right wing and rear, pushed dense columns of infantry towards the woods of Archau and Hasslach. But Ney, who had a quick eye upon their motions, despatched General Ruffin to the woods, and directed General Deperrières to occupy the village. Both of these officers were active, brave, and devoted, and the archduke exhausted himself in useless efforts to dislodge them. In vain did he bring up his columns to the charge—in vain did he press upon the centre and left wing of the French : he was always repulsed and kept in check upon every point. The courage of the republican soldiers vied with the talents of their leaders ; and they not only drove back the enemy's columns, but pursued, overthrew, and forced some of them to lay down their arms.

The disproportion in numbers was, however, too great to allow of Ney's further continuing the contest ; he therefore retired slowly and in good order, without allowing the cavalry which pressed upon

him to obtain the least advantage. A piece of cannon, twelve hundred prisoners, and so unequal a combat maintained during a whole day, already constituted a noble feat of arms. But what rendered it still more admirable, and stamped it with real importance, was the fact that it broke the movement of the archduke, and gave Moreau time to collect his forces.

The Austrians fancying that the French army was retreating, began to pursue it. Kinmayer advanced upon Darfen, Baillet towards Prievendorf, and Riezel endeavoured to reach St. Christophe. The prince himself occupied the causeway of Haag; and the Austrian army resuming its movement, persisted in endeavouring to turn the French. Unfortunately for the Imperialists, the season was not favourable to such vast combinations. The ground, as we have before observed, was broken up, and the lateral columns were obliged to follow narrow and difficult roads, cut up by waggons and rendered almost impassable by the heavy rains. That alone pursued by the archduke had a firm and spacious causeway. This difference in the roads necessarily caused a great difference in the march, and it was upon this circumstance that Moreau formed his plan of battle.

Ney, and the remainder of Grenier's troops, had established themselves to the left of Hohenlinden; Grouchy held the approaches to the forest, which extended as far as the village; and the reserve, in position on the right, reached from St. Christophe to Ebersburg. Moreau perceived all the advantages

which time and locality offered him, and did not despair of overpowering the centre before the forces by which it was to be supported could be formed into line. Grenier received orders not to seek the enemy, but, if they appeared, only to endeavour to check their advance. Richepanse was sent into the forest to take them in flank; but they already occupied every glade and every path, and the French general was obliged to engage them, although separated from the forces which followed him. He continued to advance nevertheless, and reached the nucleus of the defile. The Austrians being here entangled in deep glens, he charged and broke them.

Their ranks being thrown into confusion, Moreau soon perceived their wavering and indecision. Judging therefore that Richepanse was driving them before him, he forced them back into the wood. But as Ney directed this part of the action, we shall give an account of it in his own words, by inserting his report.

“ At six o'clock in the morning the enemy, with considerable forces, consisting principally of artillery, attacked us near Hohenlinden on the high road to Muldorf, directing their greatest efforts against the right of General Grouchy, who received them with vigour. Soon after, my division was warmly attacked, and the enemy began to gain the heights of Krainaker. The general-in-chief, judging that they were not yet entirely free from the defile, ordered a general attack. The columns of attack debouched upon Hohenlinden, in order to reach the height on the left near Krainaker, and that on the road to

Burkrain, which the enemy already occupied in strong force. The velocity of the manœuvre, together with the vigour of the attack, obliged the enemy to make a precipitate retreat. It was now twelve o'clock. At this juncture Grouchy's division, on my right, forced the enemy's left to make a retrograde movement, and the rout of the latter was soon complete.

“ Having become masters of the defile of Mattenpot, a quantity of artillery and ammunition-waggons fell into our hands. General Heudelet's brigade, in which was Adjutant-General Ruffin, pursued the routed enemy as far as the last-named village, and effected a junction with Richepanse's division, which had just debouched upon this point, and was vigorously beset. The two generals acted in concert to force the enemy to a complete retreat upon the Haag. Meanwhile the column on the right, under the command of the Archduke John, began to debouch upon Preiserdorf and Hartofen, in order to develope the left of Bonnet's division, whilst a second column from Burkrain had already begun to emerge from the forest and advance by a cross road towards Hohenlinden. But the two last battalions of the 103rd, the battalions of grenadiers, the 76th, the 13th dragoons, and the 19th cavalry were placed by échelons upon the several openings. These, in conjunction with Bonnet's division, succeeded not only in keeping the enemy in check, but even in repulsing them with loss.

“ General Heudelet's brigade having skirted the wood and driven the enemy as far as Haag, I di-

rected that it should return towards Schnauping with the 8th regiment of chasseurs, in order to follow the enemy, who seemed to be obtaining some success on our left. This brigade took up its position in front of the village, and was upon the flank of the enemy, who had taken up theirs behind Burk-rain. It was now seven o'clock in the evening.

“The combined movements of the neighbouring divisions, together with the vigorous exertions of that under my command, made us masters of eighty pieces of cannon, an immense number of ammunition-waggon, many stands of colours, and about six thousand prisoners, among whom were several general officers and a great number of distinguished field-officers.

“The brigadier-generals of my division generally, the officers of every rank, and the men of every corps, did their duty on this memorable day. The emulation in deeds of glory displayed by so large a portion of the troops under my command, prevents me from naming for the present those who distinguished themselves in such a manner as to deserve the notice of the general-in-chief and of the government; nevertheless, from my personal observations, I must, my dear general, request the following promotions :—

“The rank of general of brigade for Adjutant-General Ruffin, on account both of former services and of his conduct during the present battle.

“The rank of adjutant-commandant for Commandant Passinges, one of my aides-de-camp, chef-de-bataillon and acting head of the staff of my

division, in reward for his talents and courage, of which he furnished a signal proof in charging at the head of twenty-five chasseurs of the 8th, a large body of cuirassiers and hussars forming the escort of the Archduke John, who was forced to detach more than a hundred and fifty men to drive him back; he retreated with order, and after wounding several of the enemy with his own hand, rejoined his corps covered with blood.

“The rank of chef-de-brigade in the 103rd for Citizen Brayer, chef-de-bataillon in the same corps; a promotion due to his zeal, courage, and talents.

“The rank of chef-de-bataillon in the 103rd for Citizen Schwiter, captain-adjutant-major in the same corps. This promotion is solicited by the corps itself,—a daily witness of the merit of this officer.

“The rank of captain in the second regiment of hussars for Citizen Daiker, lieutenant in the 4th hussars; this officer having quitted the former corps only since the last organization. Citizen Daiker has already distinguished himself by his valour and capacity. On the present occasion he had a horse killed under him, and another wounded.

“For Citizen Randon, lieutenant engineer-geographer, his confirmation in that rank, which he has been unable yet to obtain, although he has performed its duties ever since 1791. I ask for this confirmation in favour of Citizen Randon’s talents and capacity in this branch of the service.

“For Citizen Perrier, private in the 9th hussars, and orderly to Adjutant-Commandant Ruffin, the rank of quarter-master-serjeant, in justice to his

courage, and to the services he has rendered since the opening of this campaign, more especially on the 12th, when his horse was wounded."

Such was the fate of the archduke's forces. Pressed and forced back upon each other, the columns could not withstand the shock of the French army, and they either dispersed or laid down their arms. The lateral columns were not more fortunate. Before night the French had taken a hundred pieces of cannon and eleven thousand prisoners. Six thousand Austrians were left dead on the field of battle, whilst the French had not three thousand hors-de-combat.

The republicans having achieved this splendid feat, made ready to reap the fruits of their victory. They accordingly marched upon the Inn, and prepared to turn the Tyrol, for the purpose of seizing the communications between Vienna and Italy. But the undertaking was by no means unattended with difficulty; it was necessary to cross a deep and precipitously imbedded river, which Turenne himself had pointed out as a formidable line of defence. Nevertheless, if the passage were not surprised, it would be impossible to isolate the scattered corps of the imperial army. Moreau therefore resolved to make the attempt. His centre and right wing rested upon Rosenheim; Ney advanced upon Muldorf, to carry the bridge-head which covered that place. Unfortunately the immense plain which separates the Inn from the Iser prevented him from pressing the work with vigour. The enemy might have debouched from Crayburg, and placed the French

army in peril. Ney sought a means of securing it from this danger, and calculated on the possibility of carrying Crayburg, which would enable him the more easily to become master of Muldorf. Having explored the banks of the Inn, he fancied he perceived a ford at a little distance from Enseldorf. On questioning the peasants, he found all of his opinion that the river was fordable in that place. The unanimity of their opinions on this point made him resolve to try what confidence might be placed on their information. He therefore directed his engineers to sound the depth of the water, and ascertain whether or not the troops could cross. The engineers expressed some doubts; but as the capture of Crayburg would have offered so many advantages towards effecting that of Muldorf, by bringing to a term the movement on the right, and forcing many very important openings, he insisted upon trying the experiment. The water was too deep, and he was forced to give up all idea of this coup-de-main.

Though unable to carry the place, he determined at all events to occupy one of the hamlets which supported it, and requested the Austrian general opposed to him to give him up Altmuldorf. As Ney's artillery commanded the position, the Austrian dared not refuse. He sought, however, to gain time; and answered that Kinmayer alone could order the delivery of such a post. Kinmayer, he said, was absent, having been sent for by the archduke; but was expected to return in a few hours, and would doubtless before night comply with the French general's demand. But Kinmayer did not

return : he was superseded by Schwartzenberg, who gave up two-thirds of the village to the French. The latter general then applied to Ney for a suspension of arms during four hours. Ney granted him three, and all seemed again to promise peace.

The right wing of the French having crossed the Inn, the Austrians continued their retreat, and Ney advanced upon Muldorf. He found the Imperialists still occupying the right bank ; they were beginning to destroy the bridge. He therefore pressed his march and summoned them to retire immediately. They refused at first, but he threatened to destroy them with grape-shot if they delayed, upon which they withdrew. The citizens then ran to the bridge and soon extinguished the fire which had begun to consume it. Ney immediately pushed on to Crayburg, saved also the remains of the bridge of that town, and then proceeded to Burkhausen. Here the discussion was longer, and the negotiation less successful.

The place was strong, well stocked with provisions, not very distant from Brannau, then occupied by the Austrian forces, and the garrison was well-disciplined. Colonel Wacquant refused to surrender without the usual ceremonies. Ney urged that it was as easy to turn him as to crush him with shot and shells ; still this stickler for the forms of war would listen to nothing, and insisted upon a regular summons. During this parley the cannon began to sound in the direction of Salzburg ; a sharp action was taking place there, which rendered the governor more anxious for delay ; but Decaën had advanced

to Lauffen, and was busy in the destruction of the hopes with which the Austrian beguiled himself. Ney refused to submit to his ridiculous demands and pay him the honours which he solicited. He therefore prepared to cross the Salza. This proved sufficient; Wacquant in alarm abandoned the place and retreated to Brannau. Lauffen and Salzburg also opened their gates to the republicans.

The Austrians could no longer maintain themselves in the Tyrol. The French were also on the eve of communicating with the army of Italy. Thus would the two republican armies be soon able to act in concert, and their operations consequently become more prompt and decisive; and thus would Austria be forced to submit to peace. And indeed General Meerfeld soon presented himself with a flag of truce at the advanced posts of the French; but the Aulic Council, always infatuated with Great Britain, again pretended that they could not treat without the concurrence of that power. The French refused to listen to such strange scruples, and continued their movement. Ney had arrived upon the Ems, and nearly overtaken the Austrian rear-guard. He was directed to continue his pursuit; but he could not reach the enemy without crossing the plain, and was not sufficiently strong to encounter the cavalry by which it was covered. Unable therefore to employ force, he had recourse to stratagem. He demanded an interview with Schwartzenberg, represented to that general the hopelessness of the struggle and the danger of resistance; in short, he performed his part

so well, that he obtained, without firing a shot, that which he did not feel himself strong enough to carry by arms. The prince gave up the whole country to him, and peaceably withdrew behind the Ips. This was Ney's last feat in this war; the armistice of Steyer closed the arena, and he fell back upon Burkhausen.

The war had now ceased; but discontent and weariness, always to be found among the French troops when, not in the field, broke out among them as usual. The weather was cold, and the men, without shoes or clothing, were quartered in villages which contained no provisions of any sort, all having been either burnt or plundered. Men are always exasperated by hunger; and this was the case with the French soldiers. They became very troublesome, and their exactions elicited dreadful reprisals. Several were murdered by the inhabitants; and Ney, anxious to prevent fresh crimes, directed that the cantonments should be disarmed. Now, the cantonments belonged to Bavaria; and this electorate, though separated from the coalition ever since the armistice of Parsdof, had become neither more complying nor less hostile towards the French. It had, at Burkhausen, the president of a commission still more personally hostile, if possible, than his government: this was the Baron of Leyden. Expelled from Landshutt for his intrigues and hatred of the French, he thought he might take his revenge at Burkhausen. He accordingly opposed the disarming of the cantonments; but his opposition not being attended to, he thought to involve

in difficulty those who directed the execution of this measure. He accused them of having made away with a few bad swords and old pistols. But the charge was untrue—for these arms had been deposited at head-quarters; and he gained by his attempt only the odium of having made an unfounded accusation. He was not however discouraged: unable to injure the subalterns, he attacked the general himself, whom he allowed to carry no measure into effect without the most active opposition. If there was a requisition for provisions, he forbade the population to obey it; if shoes were demanded, he opposed their delivery. When the works which covered Burkhausen were to be destroyed, and the assistance of the peasants demanded for this purpose, he came forward as an officious judge of matters that did not concern him, declared the one as useless as the other was oppressive, and applied all his means to throwing obstacles in the way. He forbade the inhabitants to purchase the materials, and enjoined the villages to refuse their labour. Neither did he consider this violent opposition sufficient, but attempted to bribe some officers on the French staff. Ney, indignant at his impudence, threw him into prison. The Bavarian became outrageous at this, and after obtaining his freedom withdrew from the place, declaring that Ney should hear of him; and he kept his word;—but, at all events, he was got rid of for the time.

The local administration remained, however, under his influence. The authorities issued requisitions on the one hand, and ordered, on the other,

that such requisitions should not be obeyed. Thus no provisions could be obtained. And as if misfortunes can never come single, Dessoles, being obliged to go to Paris, had left the direction of the staff to Lahorie. This latter general loved the pomp of head-quarters, and took a pride in showing his importance. He was clever, but of a sombre character; and being little accustomed to fighting, he entertained a dislike to those who distinguished themselves in the field of carnage;—it was that secret aversion which officers wielding the pen always entertain towards those who wield the sword. He would willingly have allowed the soldiers to starve in order to save the peasants from supplying a single ration of food to the army. Not that he cared for one more than for the other; but the latter were protected by men of influence, whilst the former had no protectors, nor any other right to protection than the wounds received in defence of their country. Thus the claims to Lahorie's especial favour preponderated on the side of the peasants.

Some requisitions being mentioned to him as having been made for the troops, he suspended their execution. The exhaustion of the country having been represented to him, he ordered that the storehouses at Brannau should be opened, and the provisions which had been collected there for the soldiers distributed to the inhabitants. But these warehouses belonged to Ney's cantonments, and this general refused to give up their contents. The man of "a little brief authority" waxed wroth; but not daring to attack Ney openly, he vented his spleen

upon the officers and commissary-general of his division. He brought charges against the former; then brutally arresting the commissary-general, sent him, under pretence of preventing a scandalous exposure, to another division of the right wing. But he had ill-calculated his means of vengeance. Ney rejected his pretended kindness in preventing exposure, and demanded a public investigation. Lahorie, as a justification of this proceeding, then reverted to certain complaints which he stated had been made to him by Prince Charles, and by the Elector of Bavaria. But Ney having persisted in obtaining an investigation, the result was Lahorie's utter discomfiture. Such a thing is not easily forgotten, and Lahorie waited only for an opportunity of revenge, which at length came.

We have already mentioned the estimation in which Ney held Lieutenant Daiker, and the homage he had rendered to the bravery displayed by that officer under the walls of Ulm. Ney having, on a former occasion, requested Daiker's promotion to the rank of captain, had renewed this request after the battle of Ingoldstadt, and again after the victory of Hohenlinden, in both of which actions Daiker had particularly distinguished himself. But no notice was taken of these repeated applications; and Lahorie, far from promoting Ney's protégé, imagined to apply to his case a former decision of the general-in-chief, and even to contest the rank which Daiker then held. Ney was indignant at such a proceeding, and referred the case to the commander-in-chief, to whom he wrote as follows:

“ You know Daiker ; you are acquainted with his courage and zeal ; you well know how little he deserves the treatment he has met with. You may easily perceive that he is not the real object of dislike : he is struck only by a rebound. I am myself the individual aimed at by this unjustifiable persecution. As there is a dread of attacking me face to face, my officers are made to stand the brunt of these manœuvres against me. But you are just, and will never allow your name to be made use of for the purpose of crushing a man whose talents and services entitle him to find in you nothing but a protector.”

This appeal produced the desired effect, and Lahorie was obliged to adjourn his vengeance. The army repassed the Rhine, and here the matter dropped.

CHAPTER IV.

NEY now returned to France. He had won renown both as a soldier and as a commander, and his greeting at Paris from the head of the state was most flattering. Policy was no doubt connected with the praises lavished upon him. The First Consul was well aware that the armies of the North felt some little jealousy of the splendid victories gained by those of the South; and he was anxious to extinguish so dangerous a feeling of rivalry. He wished to convince the nation that he had no respect of persons, and would acknowledge and reward the services performed on the Rhine equally with those done on the Adige. His reception of Ney was perhaps more warm on this account. Be that as it may, Ney was much gratified by it; whilst the reforms which had taken place in every department of the state were calculated to win his warmest applause. Wise laws had consolidated the foundations of the social edifice; the criminal laws were in progress of useful revision, and justice had resumed her power; the public accounts were becoming every day more clear, and the machinery of government much more rapid in its operations. The First Consul, always at work, animated the

whole, and personally discussed every change. Not a public measure took place, from the decree which changed the denominations of the weights and measures, to the law establishing the courts of justice, which bore not the stamp of his powerful genius. It was difficult not to admire his perseverance, still more difficult not to feel emotion at his solicitude. He overlooked no interest, neglected no branch of administration. Education, commerce, arts, religion, industry—he gave life to all, and held the whole in the grasp of his gigantic mind.

The war had been unsuccessful during his absence, but the moment he assumed the personal command of the republican forces, the ascendancy of the French arms was restored. The republican armies again sent beyond the frontiers, carried all before them, overthrew the enemies of free institutions, and baffled the most odious plots against their country. The coalition against France was forcibly dissolved. Austria treated on the 9th of February, Naples on the 28th of March, and Rome on the 1st of July: in a word, Bonaparte renewed the wonders of Campo Formio, and forced Europe to subscribe to peace. He was therefore the benefactor of nations.

Ney, like every good patriot, gloried in the greatness and prosperity of his country. He joined the great body of his countrymen in cherishing the colossal genius which had raised it from the abyss into which it had fallen, and bestowed his warm applause upon the acts of the consular administration.

The First Consul was not insensible to Ney's good

opinion, and, whether from regard or from policy, determined to attach that general to his person. Madame Bonaparte approved of this resolution, and wished to concur in effecting it. She had recourse to those means which a woman well knows how to employ, and called love to her aid. She brought about an attachment between Ney and a young female favourite of hers, winding up the romance with the marriage of the lovers. Madame Louis Bonaparte had a friend of her childhood named Mademoiselle Auguie, a lovely and amiable girl, whose misfortunes rendered her still more interesting. She was the daughter of a former receiver-general, whose fortune had been greatly reduced by the revolution. She had seen her father thrown into a dungeon, and her mother, condemned to captivity by the same sentence, elude it at the cost of her life, in the hope of preserving from the ruffian grasp of her persecutors, a last resource for her children.

Josephine was desirous of promoting the happiness of a soldier whose future renown she foresaw would be great, at the same time that she procured for her young friend the brilliant and honourable rank in society to which this interesting girl was entitled, and which Ney's military rank and high respectability of character were calculated to give her. Josephine therefore gave Ney a letter of introduction, enclosed in the following note, as grateful to his own feelings as it was flattering to the family to whom it was addressed.

“ I enclose you, General, the letter which you

requested for Citizen Auguié. May I beg that you will read it. I have not mentioned in it all the good I know and think of you; for I would leave this amiable family the satisfaction of discovering your good qualities themselves. But I here repeat the assurance of the interest which both Bonaparte and I take in this marriage, and of the satisfaction which Bonaparte will feel in promoting the happiness of two persons towards whom he entertains very strong feelings of regard and esteem. I share with him this double feeling.

“LAPAGERIE BONAPARTE.”

“Malmaison, 10th Prairial, Year X. (May 30th, 1802.)”

Ney was delighted with his prospects of domestic happiness: for the young lady was as elegant and accomplished in mind as she was beautiful in person; and preparations were soon made for the wedding. In spite of Ney's success in his profession, and the commands which he had held during six years of warfare, his private fortune was but trifling: for he possessed only a small estate, the value of which did not exceed eighty thousand francs. This was singular in a general officer of the van-guard, but it was not less true. He therefore trusted, for future means, to his professional talents; — the world knows how the trust was redeemed.

M. Auguié, his father-in-law, with the wreck of his fortune, had purchased the chateau of Grignon; there the marriage was celebrated.

In the village dwelt an old couple, who had been married half a century; Ney clothed them, and

made them receive their second* nuptial benediction on the same day, and at the same altar with himself and his young bride—thus marking his own marriage by an act of benevolence. “These old people,” he observed, “will recall to my memory the lowness of my own origin; and this renewal of their long union will prove of happy augury for my own.”

The thought was the emanation of a noble mind, but the presage which it expressed was unhappily not to be accomplished.

Ney continued his military duties. At the end of the preceding year he had been appointed inspector-general of cavalry, and he gave to these troops all the attention which their importance in the army required. He made many useful alterations in their equipments and exercise; he moreover reformed abuses, repaired former negligences, and obtained for the several corps a distribution of relief of every kind. But a more important mission awaited him. Discord, which had just been extinguished in France, had again burst into a flame in Helvetia: the smaller cantons had resumed arms, and were about once more to plunge the country into the horrors of civil war. The First Consul, who for two years past had been solicited to become the mediator between these mountaineers, had constantly declined interfering. But now the question assumed a new form: it was now no longer a verbal

* In France, when a couple has spent half a century in the joys of wedded life, the nuptial benediction is renewed.—*En.*

discussion, but an appeal to force; and a spark might fall and again set Europe in a blaze. He therefore acted according to the expediency of the case, and sent General Ney to establish peace and concord in Helvetia. All the cantons had solicited the mediation of the French Consul, and each was therefore bound to abide by it. But as moderation is seldom the concomitant of political differences, and fortune changes the minds of men, Ney had orders to give notice of his intervention, and at the same time to assemble troops to make it respected. His mission, one of pure benevolence if passions and personal feeling were made to yield to the general interests of the country, was to become one of rigour if the inhabitants would not make this sacrifice. He was instructed, in a word, "to keep himself ready to act, according to circumstances, either the part of mediator, or that of general—to employ force if it were indispensable, and immediately to enter the Pays de Vaud if the insurgents should attack him." *

Ney, as we have already shown, had formerly served in Helvetia; but he had only vague notions concerning the dissensions which agitated that country. He nevertheless set out, reached Geneva, and devoted the time whilst his troops were assembling, to acquiring a precise and thorough knowledge of the state and views of the different parties, and of the forces they could bring into the field.

General Seras, who commanded at Geneva, had

* Letter from the War Minister, dated 10th Vendemiaire.

made a collection of their libels, reports, and proclamations, and by means of these documents Ney soon discovered what projects he had to repress, and what kind of men he was sent to oppose.

The chiefs of the insurrection concealed neither the motives by which they were actuated, nor the object they had in view. They did not deny their wish to overthrow the institutions lately established, and revive those which had existed prior to the revolution of 1798: that is to say, they wanted to restore to each canton its particular form of sovereignty, and establish so many separate states, united only by the bond of the old confederation, and which were to have no other central point than a diet, the members of which should be obliged strictly to adhere to the imperative instructions of their constituents.

Such was the object they wished to attain; and they applied to its pursuit all the obstinacy by which the Swiss are characterized. They had given more or less publicity to their plots, according as circumstances commanded circumspection or inspired boldness. So long as the territory had been occupied by French troops, they had never attempted to use force; but they had reserved the means of doing so on any future occasion, either by misleading their own party with false hopes, or by applying to foreign courts, more especially to those of London and Vienna, for support against the protection which France gave to the new system of their government—a system intended to conciliate the administrative federalism of the cantons with the unity of a central government, invested

with sufficient power to put down internal dissensions, and with authority to treat, in the name of the whole confederation, with foreign states and potentates.

After the peace of Luneville, the First Consul offered to withdraw the army of occupation from Helvetia, and the government of that country injudiciously accepted the offer. The leader of the counter-revolutionary faction thought this a favourable opportunity for his projects, and endeavoured to avail himself of it. The members of this faction persuaded themselves, or at least tried to do so, that the First Consul had been compelled to recall his troops; and that several of the great powers of Europe intended to oppose any interference by France in the affairs of Switzerland. They interpreted the treaty of Luneville, so far as Helvetia was concerned, in a manner quite contrary to its spirit. They rekindled old associations of glory, and compared the then state of Switzerland to its former situation. The sojourn and passage of the French troops had, they said, imposed heavy burthens upon the citizens of Helvetia. By such an argument they found it not difficult to excite feelings of hostility in a people naturally fond of money, and to whom even the name of impost was almost unknown before the French revolution. In the Catholic cantons, they strengthened the idea that the constitution, by allowing the free exercise of different religions, had injured the religion professed by the majority. In a word, they neglected no means of inflaming the minds of the people

against the government and attaching them to their own party.

They were sure of co-operation in the towns formerly aristocratic, whose inhabitants regretted the privileges they had lost, and saw with displeasure an equality of rights granted to all the citizens. They had the same certainty with regard to the cantons formerly democratic, particularly those of Uri, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, inasmuch as these cantons had always evinced a decided repugnance to every kind of innovation.

Matters being thus ripe for an uprising, the cantons of Uri, Schwitz, and Unterwalden declared themselves in a state of insurrection. They proclaimed the revival of their ancient constitution, and their separation from the rest of Switzerland. The Grisons, under the influence of the partisans of Austria, and through the intrigues of Austrian agents, placed themselves under the protection of that power, and then followed the example of the three smaller cantons, which Glaris and a part of Appenzell soon joined. Meanwhile, Zurich refused to obey the government and receive its troops. About the same time, some ex-members of the oligarchic government of Berne raised an insurrection in Argau, a country formerly belonging to that canton, and succeeded, by dint of money and intrigue, in assembling a body of peasants, who marched into Soleure, next into Berne, and enlisted into their body, either by force or by good-will, every man they met on their way.

The government troops, distributed on many

points, were neither numerous enough nor commanded with sufficient ability to make head against the storm. They had attempted to force Zurich ; but the valour of the citizens, and the tumultuous march of the hostile columns which were assembling in their rear, had forced them to abandon the undertaking, and they were obliged to retreat, leaving a free scope to the insurrection. They who conducted the uprising, immediately formed themselves into a diet, and called upon the young men to take arms. They ordered levies of men and horses, and decreed the formation of an army of twenty thousand men. This latter measure, however, rather cooled the zeal of the inhabitants : each became less eager and less bold when he found his personal services called for. But the diet well knew how to excite and subjugate the population ; and gold soon smoothed every difficulty. This kind of argument had been successfully tried already ; for it was well known that in the democratic cantons considerable sums of money had been distributed, which could not have been raised in the cantons themselves, because they are miserably poor, and all their inhabitants live either in mediocrity or in complete poverty. The aristocratic cantons, more especially Berne, had made very heavy sacrifices. Money had been lavished with a sort of profusion ; and it was with the aid of this stimulus, rather than any other, that the insurrection had been excited and kept up. Each soldier received eighteen sous* per

* About ninepence, an immense rate of pay in Switzerland, particularly at that period.—Ed.

diem, besides rations of bread and meat. A premium was also given to desertion from the government troops: a reward of four louis-d'or* being promised to each foot soldier who deserted with his accoutrements, and one of fifteen louis-d'or to each horse soldier who with his horse and accoutrements joined the ranks of the insurgents. The use of such means proved fatal to the government.

The army of the insurgents contained between seven and eight thousand men. From a thousand to twelve hundred of them had served in the legions of Bachmann and Roverea, both of which officers, during the last war, had been in the pay of Great Britain. This army was divided into regiments; it was tolerably well supplied with arms and ammunition, and was not deficient in artillery. It had, moreover, at its disposal the arsenals of Berne, Basle, Zurich, and Soleure; but its guns were badly served, being manned by soldiers unaccustomed to such duty. The cavalry was weak in numbers, consisting only of a handful of Helvetian hussars who had joined the insurgents, and a few companies of recently levied dragoons little accustomed to military manœuvres. The principal columns of this little army were concentrated between Moudon and Payerne. On its right was a small corps commanded by Colonel Wagner, and a strong detachment commanded by Auf-der-Maur was under the walls of Friburg.

The documents collected by General Seras giving

* The louis-d'or, in those days, was worth a little more than a pound sterling.—ED.

but little information concerning the officers who commanded the insurgents, Verninac supplied the deficiency. This diplomatist, who had long resided in the confederation, was well acquainted with the men who had just raised the standard of rebellion in this unhappy country. He sent General Ney a series of biographical notices of them, which though somewhat tinged with acrimony, were not wholly devoid of truth. We insert some of these.

“ General Bachmann, commander-in-chief of the insurgent army, was formerly a colonel in the service of France, whence he passed as major-general into that of the King of Sardinia. On the fall of this prince, Bachmann, being refused employment in the French armies, entered the service of England, and levied a legion bearing his name, which he commanded during the last war. He is about sixty-four years of age, and is said to possess military talents.

“ The general officers under his command are :—

“ Auf-der-Maur of Schweitz, about thirty-two years of age, and once a captain in the service of the King of Sardinia. He is related to Reding, whose creature he is. He may possess courage, but is deficient in talent ; in temper he is impetuous and obstinate.

“ Wattenwyl of Berne has served in Holland. His military knowledge is not, it is said, very extensive. He has talent nevertheless, and is one of the party chiefs who would incline the most towards an accommodation.

“ Herrenschwand of Morat is an ex-officer of

large property, and a man of great information. Prior to the revolution, he obtained the citizenship of Berne.

“ Pillichaudi, formerly a seigneur in the Pays de Vaud, has likewise obtained the citizenship of Berne. He is a notable agitator, very resolute, and wholly devoted to the oligarchy.

“ The other officers of the army are, for the most part, young men from Berne, Zurich, and Soleure. Some have served with Bachmann, and with Roverea, who also commanded a legion in the pay of England.

“ The man who, during the revolution, has displayed the strongest hostility to the government, is Reding of Schweitz. He commanded the troops of the smaller cantons when General Schawenburg reduced them to submission. He has since been landamman of the Helvetian republic, and, whilst he held that office, contributed greatly to embroil the affairs of his country. He was dismissed from the government on the 17th of April last, since which period he has not ceased to agitate his canton, where he has a number of individuals in his interest. These, having nothing to lose, procure him the means of exercising a most dangerous influence. It is generally believed that it was he who ordered the massacre of a detachment of French troops, sent in the year VII. to Schweitz to restore public tranquillity. He has ever shown himself an enemy to France, and has often used the name of the First Consul to deceive his fellow citizens. His talents are not above mediocrity; but he is ambitious,

headstrong, and very firm in pursuing his determination. The oligarchy have won him to their interest, and have known how to make use of his pride and influence. He is, at the present moment, president of the diet assembled at Schweitz.

“Reding is powerfully seconded by the monks, more especially the Capuchins, among whom one Paul Stiger has made himself conspicuous. This fanatic excites the peasantry, communicates to them the fury with which he is himself animated, and makes use of their ignorance and superstition to stimulate them to the most lamentable excesses. Though censured by his bishop, he nevertheless continues his scandalous course of proceeding.”*

* The other party chiefs designated by Verninac were:—

“*In the Canton of Berne.*

“Freudenriech of Thorberg, an enlightened man, who resided in England during the revolution. He is one of the coryphæi of the oligarchy, and much attached to the ancient order of things.

“D'Erlach, ex-bailly of Berthoud. He is advanced in years, and his mental faculties are a little impaired. It was he who raised the peasants of Argau, of whom he at first assumed the command, but it was taken from him.

“Thormann, secretary of state under Reding. He is haughty, intriguing, and one of the bitterest among the oli-

garchs. He is an enemy to France, as are all the instigators of the counter-revolution.

“*In the Canton of Basle.*

“Mérian, ex-grand tribune, a partizan of Austria, ignorant, intriguing, and a man of property.

“*In the Canton of Glaris.*

“Zwniff, a headstrong old man without talent.

“*In the Canton of Unterwalden.*

“Dr. De Flue, a man of learning, belonging to one of the most ancient and respectable families in Switzerland. He exercises great influence.

“Wursch, ex-prefect, and

now landamman; he is fanatical and headstrong, and a warm supporter of the party of the demagogues.

“In the Canton of Friburg.

“Montenach, and Gadi formerly avoyer. Both are clever and well informed.

“In the Canton of Schaffhausen.

“Pfister, a man of very ordinary capacity, devoted to the insurgents.

“In the Canton of Tessin.

“Rossi, post-master at Lugano. He undertook to make known to the second auxiliary demi-brigade the proposals of the insurgents.

“In the Territory of Baden.

“Baldinger, a man of no capacity, but guided by Charles Reding, a relative of Reding of Schweitz. Charles Reding is a man of talent.

“In the Canton of Uri.

“Muller, formerly landamman; he is without talent, de-

voted to Reding, and a red-hot demagogue.

“Jauch, cunning and well informed.

“In the Canton of Appenzell.

“Zellweguer, one of the richest individuals in Switzerland, in a state of exasperation, and an ignorant man.

“In the Canton of the Grisons.

“The Salis family, respected, influential, and devoted to Austria.

“In the Canton of Zurich.

“Hirzel, Wiss, and Reinhard, formerly members of the oligarchic government; clever and well informed men, and who have always served their party with great zeal.

“In the Canton of Lucerne.

“Balthazar, a former member of the government; a man of business, and exasperated.

“In the Canton of Soleure.

“Gloutz, a weak man devoid of talent.”

CHAPTER V.

THE rights established by the revolution of 1798, were now trampled under foot, and the doctrines and institutions of a past age proclaimed. This was a war in defence of principles upon which the two parties could not agree; and Ney's object was to take such measures as should repress the animosities and overcome the prejudices of both.

The whole of his disposable force consisted of four hundred men of the 2nd light infantry. The insurgents had just beaten the Helvetian troops at Morat, and the Genevese in exultation at this victory, calculated upon still more brilliant feats of arms by the confederates. Ney soon perceived that the object of the confederation was to gain time, disperse and annihilate the remaining forces of the government, drive him from the Swiss territory, and then declare, upon the frontier, that all further intervention was useless, as the Swiss people were agreed, and party dissensions at an end. This plan, had it succeeded, would have changed the aspect of affairs; and Ney took measures to defeat it. He sent officers to hasten the march of the different French corps, and direct them upon Locarno, Huningue, Geneva, and Besançon. At the same time he marched towards Versoix, at the head of the

small force he had with him. Not that he much depended upon what these four hundred men could do, but he thought they would produce a great moral impression: he therefore led them towards the Pays de Vaud. But Colonel Rapp had already stopped the movement which it was Ney's purpose to counteract. This officer, having been despatched by the First Consul to make known his determination to the Swiss people, arrived at Lausanne just as the troops defeated at Morat were taking refuge there. Having notified to them the intervention of the French government, they received the intelligence with joy, hailed the measure as a benefaction, and hastened to make it known to the insurgents, among whom it spread dismay. Rapp, who was compassionate and of easy temper, made every allowance for men under circumstances such as these misguided men were placed in. He at first listened to them without uttering a word; he sympathized in their grief, and was anxious to give them time for it to exhale. But far from quieting, his silence only rendered them less tractable. He at length lost all patience, and unfolding a paper which he held in his hand, presented to them the following proclamation by the First Consul:—

BONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
TO THE EIGHTEEN CANTONS OF THE HELVETIAN
REPUBLIC.

“ Saint-Cloud, 18th Vendemiaire, Year XI.
(October 10th, 1802.)

“ INHABITANTS OF HELVETIA,

“ For two years past you have offered a most afflicting spectacle. Hostile factions have succes-

sively usurped the powers of the state, marking their passage by a system of partiality which equally betrays their weakness and their incapacity. During the year X. your government requested that the small number of French troops still in Helvetia should be withdrawn, and the French government readily embraced the opportunity of doing honour to your independence. But, soon after, your party feuds broke out with fresh fury, and Swiss blood has been spilt by Swiss hands.

“For three years past you have been disputing without being able to settle your differences; and if you are left any longer to yourselves, you will destroy one another for three years longer without coming to any better understanding. Your history proves, moreover, that your intestine wars have at no period been terminated but through the efficacious intervention of France.

“It is true that I had resolved to meddle no more with your affairs; for I had constantly observed that your different governments asked my advice without following it, and oftentimes made an undue use of my name to serve their own party views or passions.

“But I can no longer, nor ought I to remain insensible to the misfortunes which now bear upon you. I therefore depart from my resolution, and become the mediator of your quarrels. But my mediation shall prove effective: it shall be such as becomes a great people, in whose name I speak.

“Five days after this proclamation has been notified to you, the senate shall assemble at Berne.

“The whole of the magistracy formed at Berne since the capitulation, shall be dissolved, and cease to assemble or to exercise any authority.

“The several prefects shall proceed to their respective posts.

“All the authorities which have been constituted, shall no longer assemble nor act.

“All armed meetings shall be dispersed.

“The first and second Helvetian brigades shall form the garrison of Berne.

“The troops which have been raised upwards of six months, shall alone remain in corps.

“Every discharged soldier of the belligerent armies, who is now armed, shall deposit his arms at the municipality of the commune to which he belongs.

“The senate shall send three deputies to Paris; each canton may likewise send deputies.

“Every citizen, having held the office of landamman, or that of senator, or who may have successively held appointments in the central government, may proceed to Paris, for the purpose of pointing out the means of restoring union and peace, and of conciliating all parties.

“With regard to myself, I have a right to expect that no town, commune, or corps will do any thing contrary to what I here proclaim.

“Inhabitants of Helvetia, let hope revive among you.

“Your country is on the brink of a precipice, from which it shall be immediately withdrawn.

“Every man of good principles will co-operate in this noble work.

“ But if, contrary to my expectations, there are among you a great number of individuals so devoid of virtue as not to sacrifice their passions and prejudices to the good of their country, ye have woe-fully degenerated, O ye people of Helvetia, from the greatness of your forefathers !

“ There is no man of sense among you who does not perceive that the mediation which I have undertaken is a blessing of that Providence which, amid so many shocks and revolutions, has always watched over the independence of your nation ; and that such mediation is the only means left of saving both parties from destruction.

“ For it is time you should consider that, if the patriotism and union of your ancestors founded your republic, the bad spirit of your factions will, if it continue, infallibly overthrow your nation ; and it would be painful to think that, at a period when several republics have been raised, fate had marked the end of one of the most ancient.

“ BONAPARTE.”

“ By order of the First Consul,

“ H. B. MARET, Secretary of State.”

This communication was indeed harsh, but it was precise. The insurgents must now either give way or fight : they must either lay down their arms, or add to the horrors of civil, the devastation of foreign war. The officers of the insurgent forces soon made up their minds to the former alternative ; but the case was different with the representative of the diet attached to the army : this individual, who was

conceited, bold, and presumptuous, attempted to discuss upon a question already settled. Having insisted upon the magistracy appointed by the insurgents retaining their appointments, Colonel Rapp replied by pointing out the clause in the proclamation which related to them. He then demanded that the Landraths should be maintained : Rapp again referred to the decision of the First Consul. Having next insisted that the government should preserve its new powers, Rapp lost all patience, and handing him the proclamation, told him harshly that he came there to ratify, and not to negotiate. Still the obstinate representative endeavoured to prolong the discussion ; but the officers, weary of this waste of words, observed to him that they were receiving an official document which the colonel had no mission to modify ; and that it must be either wholly accepted or rejected.

The representative hesitated an instant at this formidable alternative ; but immediately recovering himself, threatened France with the acts of despair to which such harshness would drive the heroes of Morgaten.

“ I believe in the marvels you announce,” the colonel replied ; “ you will no doubt fight and die like brave men. But General Ney has put his troops in motion. One of his divisions is assembling at Pontarlier, another at Huninguen, a third is advancing by Bellinzona, and a fourth is about to debouch from the Valais. If these troops advance a single step, and push on towards Aarburg, Estevayer, Villeneuve, or Locarno, you will be annihili-

lated at a single blow ; and in the glen, without a second outlet, in which you have imprudently placed yourselves, you will not have even the satisfaction of a glorious death. I offer this to your consideration."

Rapp's statement was lamentably correct ; but although the council felt their weakness, they were far from imagining all the disadvantages of their position. Nevertheless, both the generals and the representative hastened to subscribe to every condition, in order to extricate themselves from it. Bachmann signed a suspension of arms, and the representative signed the act of dissolution of the body whose delegate he was.

The mediation being thus accepted in principle, nothing remained but to carry the details into execution. Ney stopped his movement ; but as there was yet no guarantee of the submission of the diet, and the snow season was approaching, he so disposed his troops as to be able, at a moment's notice, to put down resistance, if it were offered. He soon had reason to congratulate himself on this act of prudence.

No sooner was the armistice concluded than it was violated. The insurgent army advanced to Friburg, and even summoned it to surrender.

The news of the First Consul's proclamation had reached this place. The troops which defended it knew confusedly that the proclamation commanded peace, and prescribed that both victors and vanquished should lay down their arms. They therefore urged this in reply to the summons : but Colo-

upon his honour, that such was not the case, but that the government had been obliged to give way to the insurgent forces. The garrison believing in this statement, yielded the place without resistance. It was impossible to obtain success by baser means, or to give a more glaring instance of the bad faith and dishonourable practices of the confederates.

The commission sitting at Berne was neither more honourable in its conduct, nor more sincere in its professions. Colonel Rapp having summoned it to dissolve, it pretended to be unable to do so unless authorised by the diet. The latter, in its turn, eluded giving such authority; and an attempt to gain time was made by all parties concerned in the revolution. On the other hand, the conduct of the Helvetian government was still more censurable than that of the confederates. Having been established with all the attributes of power, it proved as feeble and irresolute as before its late overthrow. Nothing could induce it to come to any fixed determination. In vain did Ney urge the senate to assume a firmer attitude; in vain did he call upon Rapp to acquaint him with the decision of the diet: the one was always timid and wavering in its replies, the other had nothing but hopes and vague surmises to send him. Under these circumstances he resolved to go himself and put an end to an uncertainty which had already lasted too long.

He accordingly set out with two officers, and had not yet reached Moudon ere he met Adjutant-General Lemarrois, on the road with an answer from Schweitz to his last despatch. The diet re-

fused to be dissolved, and signified its intention of using the right which the Swiss held from their forefathers, and from established treaties, of constituting their government according to their wants.* It was not without anger that Ney saw the undue advantage which had been taken of Rapp's openness and candour; but he had just received his appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the Helvetian republic, and his instructions breathed nothing but peace and good-will. Flattering himself, therefore, that he should soon bring the diet to a more becoming determination, he continued his journey. That which he required will be found in the following letter, containing the First Consul's instructions; and it will be seen that it was impossible for any

* THE DIET OF THE CONFEDERATED CANTONS TO CITIZEN COLONEL RAPP, AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE FIRST CONSUL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

CITIZEN COLONEL,

The Landamman Reding has this day laid before us your two letters of the 27th Vendemiaire, year XI: the one forwarded to him by a messenger, the other by an express.

You refer more especially in one of them to an engagement stated to have been entered into by our representative attached to the army of the confederation, who is also a member of this diet.

The enclosed is a copy of the report which he made to us on this subject, and if you reflect upon its contents, you will be convinced that our intention still remains the same it has ever been: namely, not to oppose the armed forces of the French Government. But we have been driven by past events to put ourselves upon our guard, and take precautions necessary to our safety against the Helvetian Government which has just been re-established. This we have done in the firm persuasion that

country to show deeper interest and greater solicitude for another than France did for Switzerland on this occasion.

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GENERAL NEY.

“ Paris, 26th Vendemiaire, Year XI.
(October 18th, 1802.)

“ GENERAL,

“ I am directed by the First Consul to inform you that he has been pleased to appoint you minister plenipotentiary from this republic to the Helvetican republic. You will therefore proceed to Berne, where you will receive the further instructions he has directed me to send you, and you will there fulfil the duties of your mission.

addressing to him, and also the reports which he has received from yourself.

It was not from our own wish that we undertook so difficult a charge as that we hold : it was imposed upon us by the confidence of our fellow-citizens ; and both our conscience and our duty towards them render it incumbent upon us to strive, in the most scrupulous manner, to execute its duties. As deputies we cannot take upon ourselves to dissolve our own body.

The Swiss have inherited from their forefathers the right of constituting their government according to the wants of their country : a right which has again been secured to them by the First Consul himself, in his capacity of high contracting party in the treaty of Luneville, and for which we owe him our deepest gratitude. This right is of a nature to impose upon us the obligation of transmitting it to our descendants. Therefore, neither we nor our constituents can forego it.

The First Consul, in his magnanimity, will doubtless not disapprove of this our mode of thinking, which ought to be that of every Swiss who truly loves his country ; and surely he will never suffer a nation, which in nowise opposes his power, to be treated with hostility, more especially when that nation desires

“A few days since, Helvetia was in agitation; the flame of civil war burst forth in every part of it; but the proclamation of the First Consul has given ideas of order and peace to all its inhabitants. The citizens of that country, struck with the wisdom of the advice given to them by the First Consul, have lost no time in following it. The principal object of your mission is to maintain and direct them in this just and prudent deference. It is probable that the senate, recently reinstated at Berne, will evince little of that strength of opinion so necessary to the authority it is called upon to exercise; it is likewise presumable that the municipal authorities of that city will feel but little disposed to submit to the

nothing more ardently than to owe once more the power of forming its political institutions to the kindness of the French Government.

We are in like manner persuaded that the Swiss nation will preserve an eternal remembrance of such an act of beneficence, and that its efforts will ever tend to prove, on all occasions, its attachment to the French Government.

Have the goodness, Citizen Colonel, to use your influence with the First Consul of the French Republic, your powerful principal, to induce him favourably to receive our representations: the happiness of an honest and independent nation depends upon it. Surely, to secure this happiness must be the object of your mission, and also your personal wish; and if you condescend to grant our request, you will certainly confer it upon us. We have the honour to be,

Citizen Colonel,

The Deputies composing the Diet of the Confederated Cantons, and in their name,

ALOYS REDING, President.

authority of the senate. From your title of minister plenipotentiary, your former office, and your talents, you will derive means of influence which you will employ, more especially in preventing any marked opposition to the government. All who have been, or now are in authority in Helvetia, must live together in peace and harmony. The present moment must appear favourable to no one for disputing about obedience and power. The universally accepted mediation of the First Consul ~~must~~ give sufficient influence to his minister to enable him successfully to recommend concord, tranquillity, and confidence in the friendly sentiments of the First Consul. The constant principle of your conduct lies in the execution of the clauses of the First Consul's proclamation, which recommend the return of the senate to Berne, the dispersion of the recently armed troops, and the sending to Paris of deputies from the different parties, in order to proceed to the social organization of Helvetia.

“ I have reason to believe, from the letters of Citizen Verninac, that the two first clauses are fulfilled. If any thing still remains to be done in the second, you will use every exertion to secure its immediate and entire execution.

“ It is of great importance that the last should be executed, in conformity with the just and impartial views of the First Consul, who has ever proved that he granted no favour to factions. He mistrusts, and justly so, every man who has rendered himself conspicuous in either of the parties which have nearly destroyed Helvetia. But as among such individuals

there are some whose motives are above suspicion, it is but just that they should be consulted, and deference be thus shown to the opinions of the great number of citizens who placed confidence in them.

“The First Consul is desirous that you should advise the choice of the most prudent men of all parties. They who, during the late troubles, evinced the most regret at being seduced to join in them—they who were in the greatest alarm at the dangers of ~~their~~ country—and they who with the greatest degree of sincerity hastened to give the preference to measures of conciliation over an appeal to arms, seem to him the best qualified to work at framing the institutions of their country.

“Do not cease to impress upon the minds of the citizens of Helvetia, that the First Consul has most particularly in view the repose, happiness, and greatness of Helvetia; that the Helvetian republic can be neither rich, nor happy, nor powerful, except by its union with France; and that it is principally with this view that he is desirous that the confidence should not be withdrawn, which Switzerland has always placed in the French government.

“The foreign powers are no longer enemies of France; but the present state of peace cannot destroy envy, and all have not, like France, a wish that Switzerland should enjoy peace. It is the policy of some to consider the agitation of Helvetia a means of giving uneasiness to France and the neighbouring states; and this agitation offers, perhaps to certain individuals hostile to the peace of Europe, a prospect more or less remote of political dissen-

sions, the result of which might be a renewal of war.

“ Thus, the tranquillity of Helvetia is an advantage common to the whole of Europe ; and its prudent and calm organization under the safeguard of France is connected with the most important interests of the general peace ; consequently, the accomplishment of this organization appertains to the duty of the government of the republic, and forms one of its paramount interests.

“ Such, Citizen, is the precise sense in which you are to express yourself. All that you may say to the persons with whom you may be in communication must tend to prove that the First Consul will suffer nothing against the repose and power of Helvetia ; that he considers it a duty to renew the friendly and eminently confidential relations which have at all times united Helvetia to France ; and that any organization which could effect this object, so honourable, and at the same time so useful to Helvetia, would receive his approbation, provided it accorded with the feelings of the majority of the Helvetian people.

“ I am expressly directed by the First Consul to recommend your carefully avoiding to write to any authority whatever in Helvetia. The frequent abuse of official documents in that country renders it incumbent upon us to confine ourselves to verbal communications, which, moreover, are well suited to the occasion, and sufficient for the provisional state in which every constituted authority is placed, until the country is wholly organized.

“ I am happy, Citizen, that the choice of the First Consul has fallen upon you to direct the legation of the republic in Helvetia, as it gives me an opportunity of corresponding with you, and of acquainting the First Consul with the proofs of prudence and zeal which you will give in the course of your mission.

“ I think it right to observe to you that malevolent persons are endeavouring to spread a report that the First Consul would feel disposed to yield to a wish which a spirit of imitation might excite, relative to the presidency of the Helvetian republic. You must formally discourage any such notion, which is as far from the anticipations of the First Consul, as contrary to his firm determination.

“ I must also, by the express command of the First Consul, beg of you to avoid, at meetings of the authorities, any set speeches which might be taken down and published. You must take care, at the same time, to impart to your advice a character of dignity and kindness in keeping with the duties of a purely political minister. You must avoid any display that would seem too military, or resemble command. All that might make you appear to the Swiss as the general of an army stationed on their frontier, must be carefully avoided. Now that compliance has been yielded to the directions of the First Consul, you are the minister of a powerful ally, who would only give good advice, and act according to the inspirations of wisdom.

“ I have now, General, only to request that you

will punctually acquaint me with whatever passes around you. Under present circumstances no detail is indifferent ; and the First Consul, to whom I shall communicate all your despatches, wishes to be regularly informed of every thing that occurs in Helvetia. I have the honour, &c.

“ CH. TALLEYRAND.”

CHAPTER VI.

SUCH were the First Consul's instructions to Ney, and such the duties he had to perform. As the agitation of Switzerland was likely to embroil Europe, it became expedient to put an end to it, dissolve the armed bands which still existed in the country, and place the power of the state in the hands of prudent and disinterested men capable of doing justice to the institutions by which they were to be governed. This mission, though flattering, was not unattended with difficulty. Berne, it is true, had accepted the mediation; Soleure had followed that example; and Friburg, which the insurgents had just evacuated, had hastened to acknowledge the act by which the country was to be saved from destruction. But the rest of Switzerland remained in arms. The diet protested, and refused to dissolve itself; and Berne, at the very time it yielded to the will of France, obeyed with evident repugnance the government which that power had reinstated. Matters were in a state of extreme delicacy, and Ney, contrary to his opinion, was obliged to yield on some points, the better to stifle the passions in ferment around him. The government, however, continued weak and vacillating; it seemed fearful of committing an act of

firmness. Dolder, its president, was an Argovian manufacturer, of the strictest honesty and morality ; but passive, indifferent, governed alternately by the opposite factions, and paying but little attention to the administration of the laws. Neither he nor his colleagues dared to show the least resolution. In vain did Ney represent to them that the safety of the country depended upon them, and point out the line of conduct prescribed by the act of mediation : he obtained nothing but sterile protestations and empty assurances. They had been four days at Berne, and no public measure had yet been taken. Ney went to the senate-house, and endeavoured to make the senators assume an attitude consistent with their authority ; but all his remonstrances were unavailing : the very name of Reding threw these pusillanimous magistrates into an agony of dread ; and the French general was obliged to repeat the assurance he had already given them that he would disperse the diet of Schweitz, and take care that the decrees of the senate should be executed. This declaration having inspired them with a little confidence, they appointed three of their members to proceed to Paris, and took the necessary measures for the election of the other deputies, who were likewise to go thither as the representatives of the different cantons.

The diet, on the other hand, was not less wavering and undecided ; and, though it did not break up, it appeared more disposed to act on the defensive than on the offensive, and seemed to have no other object in view than uttering silly declamation about its pretended rights. Colonel Rapp, a little ashamed

of having been made its dupe, had gone to summon it to fulfil its engagements; but, from the peculiar bent of his mind, Rapp was the least qualified of any man to carry on such a negotiation. Kind-hearted, of easy temper, and naturally disposed to espouse the cause of the weaker party, he confined his attack to Reding's dissertations, and obtained no other result from his attempt than the announcement of the resolution, nay, the necessity under which the assembly of ~~Schweitz~~ felt itself, of waiting for the appearance of the French troops before it broke up. Ney was less complying. The diet seemed straining to keep up agitation throughout the country, and excite vain hopes among the people. Sometimes it boasted of the support of Great Britain; at others it spread reports of troubles at Paris;—one day Austria was marching to the assistance of the Swiss Cantons; the next brought news of the overthrow of the First Consul. There was no kind of absurdity which it did not propagate for the sole purpose of increasing the irritation of the people. Ney despatched a summons calling upon it to disperse forthwith; and directed the officer entrusted with the message, to threaten it with the national vengeance, if it dared any longer to delay. But it was now in no situation to obey the summons; for, being itself suspected of indifference to the cause of the confederation, it was governed by its guards, and could adopt no measure which was not agreeable to them. It was moreover imbued with Reding's notion, that it could not, without dishonouring itself in the eyes of Europe, break up until the French columns should appear, and dissolve it by force.

Ney was therefore obliged to recur to force to carry his point, and accordingly put his troops in motion; but the diet was beforehand with him: the armed bands, collected by means of beacon fires and other signals, quickly assembled round its standard. Formidable columns were speedily collected upon the right bank of the Reuss, and extended from Lucerne to the conflux of this river. From the nature of the mountains in which they were, they had the power of keeping up a resistance which could be overcome only at the expense of torrents of blood. To combat and defeat these troops, was nevertheless not very difficult: but Ney considered that violence had always better be avoided, and that a friendly intervention ought to be conducted by pacific means alone. He had a lieutenant able to comprehend the importance of his mission; and to this officer he stated his apprehensions, and submitted his plans for counteracting those of the confederates. Séras was this able assistant; he entered fully into Ney's views, and was entrusted with the command of the movement. Being a prudent and able soldier, he knew full well how to make allowances for the feelings of men under political excitement. He perceived that the diet, fully conscious of its weakness, and of the folly of resistance, was desirous only to save appearances, and he humoured it in this desire. Having drawn out his forces, he paraded, affected rapid marches, and displayed to the affrighted deputies the prospects of an immediate attack. Those who until now had beheld war only at a remote distance, drew back in affright from the conflagration that seemed about

to be kindled. Bachmann was the first to lay down his arms. This noble-minded man, though without fortune or prospects, and already advanced in years, voluntarily doomed himself to exile rather than continue a struggle which would no doubt have encircled his brows with laurels, but reduced his country to wretchedness.

Séras, whose march was becoming more free, advanced to Lucerne, Zug, and Sarnen, all of which he occupied without obstacle. But the case was different at Zurich: there resistance had long been prepared, and the struggle seemed likely to become serious. Séras marched towards that place at the head of seven battalions of infantry, the 3rd chasseurs, and a company of light artillery. But no sooner did the troops of the confederation, then in position upon the Aar, perceive the French advancing towards them, than they fell back in great haste. Séras followed them, pressed his march, and after a pursuit of fifteen leagues, came up with them on the Limath, which he crossed, and formed into line upon both banks. The night passed without incident. At day-break, the insurgents wanted to establish their posts; but the French drove them back to Zurich, and entered the place with them. Colonel Mayer, who appeared before Séras under a flag of truce, made an attempt to protest against the intervention; but the French general ordered him to be silent, and continued his movement. The bands of music at the head of the French troops played airs denoting victory, and the citizens of

recovering, they mingled their acclamations with the music of the French, and saluted the French columns with cries of "Long live the First Consul! Vive la France!" They then ran to the prisons, and delivered those whom a short time before they had confined there as traitors to their country. Considerable bodies of insurgents, however, came to their assistance; but the French avoided hostilities, and opened negotiations. They represented to the Swiss people that the intervention, far from being prejudicial to their country, was the life-boat which the First Consul had launched for them in their danger; and that the first magistrate of the French republic had no other object than to restore peace to their country, secure their liberties and independence, and do justice to all parties. Both soldiers and peasants immediately laid down their arms, and returned peaceably to their homes.

Forty pieces of cannon, a great number of muskets, and immense stores of ammunition, fell into the hands of the French; but a much more important result was produced by the prudent conduct of Séras, who succeeded in throwing a strong discredit upon the diet at Schweitz. During these operations not a shot was fired, nor a drop of blood spilt, nor a single ground of dissatisfaction given to the citizens:—nothing could have been more ably and more successfully managed.

Zurich having submitted, Séras marched to Schweitz, where no greater resistance was offered than at Zug and Lucerne. The leaders of the insurrection, and the members of the diet, fled with

equal speed, and no one made the least attempt to stop them.

Arms, ammunition, and provisions in abundance fell into the hands of Séras, who now held at his disposal all the resources of the confederation. The storm, nevertheless, had not yet blown off. The men who had so easily surrendered the place, did not discontinue their invectives against the First Consul; and some of them even went to the length of boasting that they had adjourned their vengeance till the snow season;—they even talked of Sicilian vespers, and of the speedy extermination of the French in Switzerland. Doubtless, such atrocities were not germane to Helvetian manners; nevertheless, the corpses of the murdered French soldiers were still lying in the vale of Disentis, and the troops of Séras were reminded of the circumstance by the Swiss themselves. This was a delicate reminiscence, and calculated to excite bitter feelings on both sides.

On the other hand, the small committees which existed in every part of Helvetia, together with the monks, and more especially those of Einseidlen, did not cease from agitating the country. As such manœuvres might possibly lead to an explosion fatal to Switzerland, Ney hastened to put these agitators down, warning the monks that the least attempt against his soldiers would be severely punished; and in order to prevent the turbulent and headstrong from attempting any important movement, he resolved to disarm the people. This was a delicate measure; the mountaineers were never without

their arms ; they carried them in their excursions, and displayed them in their cottages, where they formed at the same time a piece of ornamental furniture and a means of defence. These men were extremely jealous of their right to carry arms. But matters had assumed so serious an aspect, that Ney did not hesitate : he ordered that the arms should be given up, and, contrary to his expectations, he obtained them without any dangerous opposition. The measure nevertheless called forth the strongest remonstrances, and various subterfuges were employed to elude it. One pretended that he had always respected the established order of things ; another attributed his assuming arms to particular circumstances ; a third declared that he had participated in no reaction whatever ; a fourth vowed he had never committed any act of violence. Each, according to his own view, was entitled to retain his carbine ; each, according to his own statement, was quite incapable of encouraging or permitting the least excess. The government was simple enough to add its testimony to the accounts which the inhabitants gave of themselves. The men who composed it were apprehensive that the measure in a still greater degree would alienate from them the public opinion ; they therefore talked much of the peaceable disposition and moderation of those whom the French had surprised with arms in their hands. Ney paid no attention to this base truckling of the government, and excepted from the measure none but landowners residing upon remote estates. There still remained stores of arms and ammunition which the diet had

ordered to be concealed among the mountain rocks. As no search could lead to their discovery, Ney offered a reward to such individuals as would point out the places of their concealment, by which means he was soon able to seize almost the whole of them.

The Grisons were not so easily managed; neither was this to be wondered at. Prior to the late changes, the sovereignty descended, among them, even to the lowest shepherd. They had no other code of laws than a few fragments of the *Carolinæ*; each commune was sovereign and independent, and no citizen was subject, even in last resort, to any jurisdiction but that of his own commune. The Grisons paid no taxes; so far from it, that some among them levied imposts on foreign states in the shape of secret pensions, granted to them by the governments who wished to secure votes at the diet of the Three Leagues.

Service in the armies of foreign potentates was also a source of wealth to them; and appointments in the government and judicature at home constituted another road to fortune. The existence of a central government had destroyed these means of gain; gratifications had been superseded by taxes; pensions had ceased, and places of public trust had become less lucrative. The inhabitants had been obliged to forego all these abuses, and to complete the sum of their vexations, they were undergoing persecution for having so long enjoyed them. The Valteline, for instance, not satisfied with putting an end to a ruinous administration, had seized and sold the property of its *powerful*

sovereigns, the Grison shepherds. The lower orders were not less irritated at these things than the patri-cians. The clergy had lost their former influence in public measures; and the mechanics no longer enjoyed a monopoly of the fruits of industry. All classes were therefore in a state of intense excitement, and trembled with anger at the very name of a French intervention.

The lesser cantons were neither more tranquil nor more resigned than the Grisons. An explosion seemed likely soon to take place, which might lead to much bloodshed; and Ney, anxious to avert such a calamity, sent officers to all parts of Helvetia. He professed compassion for some, to whom he represented that, although the charges of occupation were no doubt heavy, they were nevertheless preferable to the immense sacrifices and alarms which civil war would inevitably have produced. He consoled others, announcing a speedy termination of their misery, and promising that it should cease with the return of their deputies. He declared that, in the mean time, he would lighten the burthens of the occupation as much as lay in his power, and that no contributions should be levied on the citizens, except those absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the troops under his command. He likewise sent to the religious corporations, and enjoined the principals of convents to use their influence in quieting the people, maintaining peace in country places, and turning the inhabitants from acts of rebellion, or from any other proceedings that might tend to involve them in difficulties.

These measures produced a sort of tranquillity in the smaller cantons, and the population resumed their labours. An unobservant spectator might have supposed the dissensions of Switzerland for ever terminated: but it soon became evident that such was by no means the case. The Swiss have all the duplicity remarked in mountaineers of every country; but nature has provided them with a play of features which prevents them from concealing their feelings. The expression of their countenance is too marked, and their blood does not flow with sufficient rapidity, to enable them to substitute the expression of an unfelt emotion for that by which they are really affected. Every feeling is depicted in their features, and in spite of themselves they expose that which they are most anxious to conceal. Ney's troops, billeted upon and fed by the inhabitants, soon attracted their confidence, and became acquainted with their most cherished projects. The French soldiers pitied their situation; and contenting themselves with the coarse fare supplied by their hosts, recommended concord, appeased their dislikes and prejudices, and by such conduct drew forth the confidential overflowings of their lacerated bosoms. They had not ceased to look upon Reding as their providence; they placed all their hopes in him, relied on his courage, and considered themselves invincible whilst he was still among them. Auf-der-Maur, though more a man of execution, was less to be feared. But as both inflamed the imaginations and fed the false hopes of these indocile herdsmen, Ney gave orders for their apprehension, as well as for that of some other indi-

viduals, who, without great personal fame, still exercised a sort of influence over the opinions of the peasants. Among the latter were Wursch, ex-landamman of the insurgents, to whom public report attributed the massacre of the French troops stationed at Schweitz; and Hirzel, a cunning and plausible man, and an incurable aristocrat.

Reding, when apprehended, was returning from a journey to the smaller cantons. He was at first surprised and struck with consternation; but soon recovering, he consoled himself under the idea that this measure proceeded from the French plenipotentiary, and that the Helvetian government would never have dared to adopt it. As for Aufder-Maur, he was affected even to tears. Having committed divers excesses, and amongst others plundered the house of General Wonderweide, his situation was calculated to make him uneasy.

This event was not displeasing to the rich landowners, whom the popularity and turbulence of Reding had displeased. But the people were very differently affected, and at first gave way without restraint to the grief caused by his arrest. They however remained peaceable, and soon forgot their dissensions and him who had promoted them. The national party, on the other hand, took courage; and they who, being intimidated until now by the desperate efforts of a faction in its death-struggle, had not dared to manifest the slightest opposition to it, no longer feared to declare their feelings and principles, and to point out several undiscovered stores of arms in the mountains. In

neighbourhood of Schweitz four pieces of cannon were concealed, together with a large store of ammunition ; at Glaris, St. Gall, and Mels there were twenty pieces of artillery, with considerable stores. These last resources of the insurgents were now seized, collected at Brunen, and sent to Lausanne by the lake of Lucerne. And it is a singular fact, that the arrival of these things, which a week previously would have excited an insurrection among this haughty population, now gave a species of satisfaction. The people congratulated themselves at being deprived of the means of undertaking any future insurrection. No one had it any longer in his power to feed the flame of revolt ; and the inhabitants quietly resumed their habits of industry and moderation. Thus, by long-suffering and indulgence, Ney easily obtained that which he would perhaps have been unable to effect by violence.

Murat, anxious to pay the tribute of praise which Ney's conduct deserved, wrote to him as follows :—

“ This campaign of an instant has covered you with glory. It is a noble thing to have obtained, by mild proceedings, combined with a formidable appearance, that which another would have effected by force of arms. And recollect, my dear General, that you have a neighbour who will feel a real pleasure in seconding your operations with all his power.

“ Milan, 27th Brumaire, Year XII.” (Nov. 18th, 1802.)

BOOK THE SIXTH.

CHAPTER I.

NEY was yet far from the accomplishment of his mission ; and if he had no positive and resolute resistance to put down, he had nevertheless to contend against the listlessness and indifference consequent upon defeat. The vanquished had, it is true, left the field, but they still refused to sanction the interference against which they had been contending, and declined taking any share in the discussion of the question which it had raised. One very important circumstance preyed heavily upon their minds. The time was fixed for the election of the deputies to be sent to France for the purpose of framing a new constitution. They trembled therefore for the safety of their franchises ; and obedience to such an injunction as the one notified to them by the First Consul of the French Republic, seemed to them a mere preliminary to the total subversion of their liberties. On the other hand, they considered it an act of vassalage to go to France, a foreign state, for the purpose of discussing the articles of their own free constitution. Ney made due

allowance for their objections, which he knew to arise from a highly honourable feeling ; and he accordingly endeavoured to soothe their excited apprehensions. In this attempt he showed no disposition to enforce ; he only endeavoured to persuade : he represented to them that they were sacrificing the substance to the mere form ; that their objection was only prolonging the occupation of their country ; and that the convocation to which they evinced such repugnance was a simple matter of form, which any state, under certain circumstances, might feel compelled either to require from another or to comply with at the call of another. He further urged, that in the request of the First Consul to send deputies to France there was really nothing either to humiliate or alarm them, and the First Consul himself had made it with no other view than to remove the persons composing the deputation beyond the influence of local prejudices ; that it would be impossible for these deputies to draw up a durable constitution, and such a one as should secure the permanent welfare of their country, unless they were wholly independent, and not within reach of the intrigues and secret plots of factious men. The mediator, he said, in urging that they should go to him, had no other object than to listen to their opinions, make up their differences, comply with just and equitable claims, and carry into effect the combined views of men adequate to the task of framing institutions in unison with their political rights and the best interests of Switzerland.

Though these observations were not without

weight, the hesitation still continued, until by a lucky inspiration of thought Ney succeeded in changing the public feeling. He had constantly sought for opportunities of becoming personally acquainted with the most influential men in the country. These he visited, and entertained in his turn, collecting with care the opinions of each relative to the troubles of Helvetia and to the individuals who had successively taken a leading part in public affairs. This plan, which was the means of his obtaining useful information, brought him into contact with M. de Mulhinen, formerly a colonel in the service of France, a man of highly honourable character, free from exaggerated opinions, and zealously devoted to his country. Being strongly attached to the oligarchic party, whose confidence he enjoyed, no man was better able than M. de Mulhinen to set forth the views of that party, and advocate its rights; nor was any man better deserving of attention on such a subject. Ney, who had already mentioned M. de Mulhinen to the First Consul, was desirous that he should join the deputation; but the Helvetian sometimes urged his repugnance to go to France, at others objected that he had no mission. As he would not consent to take a voluntary share in the construction of the constitutional edifice, Ney imagined to have his assistance requested by the French government. The ex-colonel, informed no doubt of Ney's project, wrote to the French minister for foreign affairs, stating that he was resolved not to go to Paris. But Ney's letter had been so pressing, that Talleyrand replied to M. de Mulhinen's by an

earnest request, almost amounting to a command, to join the deputation.

“The happiness of Helvetia,” he wrote, “and the success of the First Consul’s mediation, are to be found only in a great and speedy conciliation of all party opinions. The friends of freedom will not make it triumph in Helvetia except in honouring its cause by their moderation, and in displaying a strong spirit of concord, as well as the most complete indulgence for past errors.”

This request, combined with Ney’s solicitude, and compliance with every reasonable wish, overcame the scruples which a high sense of honour, as well as the workings of malevolence, had opposed to his exertions. The smaller cantons proceeded to elect their deputies, which until now they had obstinately refused to do; and these deputies, when elected, immediately set out to join those of the confederation who were already at Paris.

The Helvetian deputation being thus complete, the first part of Ney’s mission was fulfilled; but no sooner had he got over one difficulty than another crossed his path. The First Consul received the deputation in the most gracious manner, and declared to its members that Switzerland, from its geographical situation, its manners, and its customs, being essentially a federative state, the object of their meeting was, not to bewilder themselves with vain theories, but to establish and form, upon a just basis, such a government as nature had pointed out to them; that each deputy was therefore called upon to give his views and opinions, state the particular

wants of his own canton, and point out the institutions best suited to it; and that these institutions being once settled, the bond which was to unite the different states would naturally follow.*

* BONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL AND PRESIDENT, TO THE DEPUTIES OF THE EIGHTEEN CANTONS OF THE HELVETIAN REPUBLIC.

St. Cloud, 19th Frimaire, Year XI.
(November 2nd, 1802.)

CITIZENS, DEPUTIES OF THE HELVETIAN REPUBLIC,

The situation of your country is critical; moderation, prudence, and the sacrifice of your passions are necessary to save it. Having resolved, in the face of Europe, to render my mediation effective, I shall fulfil all the obligations which the noble office I have undertaken imposes upon me; but that which is difficult without your concurrence, will become easy with your aid and influence.

Switzerland bears no resemblance to any other state, either in the succeeding events of several centuries, in its geographical and topographical situation, or in its different languages, different religions, and the extreme difference of manners existing in the several parts of its territory.

Nature has rendered your state a federative one, and no wise man could form a wish to subjugate it.

Circumstances, combined with the spirit of past ages, has established in your country a sovereign people and a subject people; but recent events, combined with a different spirit, sprung from a new era and more consistent with reason, have restored an equality of rights among all the inhabitants of your territory.

During many centuries, several of your cantons have followed the most absolute democracy; in others, a few families have usurped the power, and thus become, at one and the same time, subjects and sovereigns. The influence of the spirit prevalent in Italy, Savoy, France, and Alsace -- states by which you are surrounded -- essentially contributed to establish in the latter cantons the order of things adopted there; but the opinions of these different countries are now changed, and the renunciation

This declaration again put all Switzerland in commotion. In the proposed federative system, the oligarchs perceived a means of regaining their ascendancy; the economy with which it was to be attended pleased others; and the major part of the of all privileges is your first necessity, as well as your first right.

That which is therefore consistent with the wish and interests both of your nation and of the several countries which border upon it, is comprised under the following heads:—

1. Equality of rights throughout your eighteen cantons.
2. A sincere and voluntary renunciation, by the patrician families, of their privileges.
3. A federative organization, in which each canton shall be administered according to its language, religion, manners, and customs, interests, and opinions.

The most important task is to decide upon the specific organization of each of your eighteen cantons.

This being once settled, you will have to determine upon the connexion which shall exist between them; and then to establish your central organization, which is in reality much less important than your cantonal organization. Finance, army, administration,—nothing can be uniform among you. You have never been able to support a standing army; you can never possess great financial resources; and you have never even sent diplomatic agents to the different powers of Europe. Situated, as you are, on the summit of the chain of mountains which separates France, Germany, and Italy from each other, you partake of the peculiar spirit of these several nations. The neutrality of your country, the prosperity of your trade, and your being governed as one family, are the only things suitable to your population, and likely to preserve you as a nation.

I have always urged the same opinions to your deputies, whenever they have consulted me on their affairs; and these opinions seem to me so well founded that I had hoped you would have been induced, without the employment of any extraordinary means, and by the very nature of things, to concur in the truth of this system. But they who seemed the most con-

population, who saw in it a proper degree of freedom, and an assured existence as a nation, were pleased that such advantages should be acknowledged and guaranteed by France. Some individuals were nevertheless discontented, and vented
vinced of its justness, were likewise the very persons who, from interested motives, clung with the greatest pertinacity to family privileges, and who, having granted their good wishes, and many the assistance of their sword to the French armies, felt a disposition to seek elsewhere than in France a support for their country.

Any organization made in Helvetia, which your people might have supposed contrary to the wishes and interests of France, could not possibly have proved advantageous to you.

Having hitherto spoken to you a language which a Swiss citizen might have used, it now behoves me to address you as the chief magistrate of two powerful countries, and not to conceal from you that France will never allow a system of government to be established among you, which might prove favourable to her enemies.

The repose and tranquillity of forty millions of men who are your neighbours, and without whom you could neither subsist as individuals nor exist as a state, must also be of great weight in the scale of general justice. Let there be among you nothing hostile to them:—let every thing be in unison with their feelings; and, as in ages past, let it be your first interest, your first policy, and your first duty, to do nothing nor suffer any thing to be done in your territory, which either directly or indirectly may injure the interests, the honour, or the cause generally of the French people.

If your own advantage, and the necessity of terminating your dissensions, were not sufficient to call for my interference in your affairs, the interests of the allied republics would alone have imposed that duty upon me. And indeed, your insurgents have been led on by men who have actually waged war against us, since their first acts have been an appeal to privileges, and the destruction of equality, which is a manifest insult to the French people.

their feelings in murmurs and complaints. These were the supporters of the unitary system, at whose head appeared Dolder the president, the statthalter Fueslin, Mohr the senator, Stapfer, and some friends of these individuals. They had expected the establishment of a strong and powerful republic; but this hope being now destroyed, they were unable to

No particular party among you must gain the ascendancy, and, less than any other, the party which has been defeated. No counter-revolution can take place.

It is a pleasure to me to hold communication with you, and I shall often repeat the views I have just unfolded, because it is not until your fellow-citizens are convinced of their correctness, that your several opinions can be reconciled and your citizens live happy.

The policy of Switzerland has always been considered, by Europe, part of that of France, Savoy, and the Milanese; because the very existence of Switzerland is strongly linked with the safety of those states.

The first and most essential duty of the French government will always be, to take care that no system hostile to it prevails among you, and that men devoted to its enemies shall not succeed in placing themselves at the head of your affairs. It is expedient not only that we should have no subject of uneasiness with regard to that portion of our frontier which is open, and which you cover, but that every thing should tend to convince us that, if your neutrality were forced, the good feeling of your government, as well as the interests of your nation, would induce you to side with, rather than against France.

I shall bestow ample consideration upon any proposal or observations which you may make to me, either collectively or individually, or by deputations of single cantons. The senators Barthélemy, Fouché, Rœderer, and Desmeunier, whom I have directed to collect your opinions, study your interests, and ascertain your views, will give me an account of all you wish they should either acquaint me with, or deliver to me on your behalf.

BONAPARTE.

disguise their displeasure, and they spread abroad the most unfavourable insinuations against the intentions of the French government.

The cantonal system, they said, offered no doubt some advantages ; but it likewise opened the door to the oligarchy, for it admitted the patrician families to public offices, by which means the latter would soon be enabled to revive the cantonal sovereignties ; that, moreover, France was reorganizing the cantons, separating the powers of each, and giving to each a separate policy. Who would answer, they asked, for the good intentions of that power ? — who would guarantee that its government had no afterthought : that it had not formed a plan to obtain possession of such parts of Helvetia as would contribute to the security of its frontiers ? If it had no views of aggrandisement, would it not establish a central government in Helvetia — a power which might give a simultaneous impulse, and impress a uniform direction, to the whole country ? By such an act, the state of Switzerland would become settled, the people would possess their immunities, and the enjoyment of a blessing which they had acquired at the price of their blood would not be poisoned by fear or suspicion.

In vain did Ney state that these apprehensions were unfounded : that France would not only seize upon no part of the Swiss territory, but would oppose every encroachment or usurpation by any other state ; and that the First Consul had made an explicit declaration to this effect : — still the unitarians continued to insist upon the defects of the cantonal system. It was to no purpose Ney

represented to them that the form of government with which they found fault, was the one adopted by their forefathers ; that it would put an end to the difficulties attendant upon centralization in a country the different parts of which were so dissimilar in language, manners, interests, and religion ;—that the plan of settlement which they rejected was that of an agricultural and commercial family, each member bearing only a share of the common burthens proportionate to his means :—he could make no impression upon these headstrong men, who persisted in imputing undue motives to the First Consul, and complained bitterly that he seemed anxious to put down military spirit among them and convert a nation of warriors into a community of ploughmen. There was really nothing to justify such an imputation. As for the last, had it even been well founded, which was far from being the case, it ought not to have excited such clamours. The time had gone by when an irruption of goatherds could make monarchs tremble : the improvements in the art of war had for ever destroyed the preponderance of brute force ; and the Swiss, unable to make head against Austria, or to resist France,—having, moreover, no public revenue, nor the means of assembling and providing food for an army, must, of necessity, content themselves with the secondary importance which nature and the political constitution of Europe had assigned to them. In the situation in which they were then placed, they could exist only by labour and industry, and through the benevolent assistance and

protection of their neighbours : their demeanour ought therefore always to be peaceable, and marked by hospitality. This Ney stated to them in very broad terms, adding that it would be folly, in their country, to cultivate a martial spirit for which there could be no possible employment.

These observations were just ; but the passion of the Swiss is that of arms. They really fancied that they were on the brink of annihilation as a people, and were eager to reject beforehand measures which nobody ever thought of imposing upon them. A military establishment was, according to them, their only safeguard ; to deprive them of it, was reducing them to a state of subjection, and exposing them to charges and imposts, the idea of which threw them into a state of real alarm. The contributions and supply of men and provisions which war would force upon them, appeared dreadful. The sums which their whole population might economize during ten years, did not seem to them sufficient to meet the wants of one of the armies which a war would inevitably bring into their mountains. This led them to another speculation diametrically opposed to their feelings, when they urged their fears that France would subjugate their country. If, they said, Switzerland were united to France, its inhabitants would be subject only to the charges imposed upon the nation at large, and they should moreover enjoy the benefits of the departmental system, which they well knew how to appreciate. France, on the other hand, must be glad to incor-

porate them in its own territory ; for their country completed the defence of the French frontier. Upon these grounds they calculated that their union to that great nation would put an end to their state of fluctuation and misery, and they therefore thought it advisable to solicit such union.

As Ney well knew the intentions of the First Consul, he did not encourage these views. But the Swiss, affecting to be incredulous as to Bonaparte's motives, persisted in imputing ambitious views to France, and in affecting to believe that this power was desirous of annihilating the military propensities of the Helvetians. Ney therefore resolved to put an end to imputations of which he easily saw the drift ; and indeed this was dictated to him by humanity and sound policy. The letter addressed by the First Consul to the deputies of the cantons said not a word of Helvetian troops. The cantonal system was insisted on, and every thing led to the belief that an army being useless in the new institutions by which the country was in future to be governed, that which existed would speedily be disbanded, and the unfortunate soldiers who composed it left without the means of livelihood. The French general therefore proposed to incorporate them in the Swiss demi-brigades serving in France. But so great was the hatred which the different parties bore to each other, that the one which in the new form of government seemed likely to be at the head of affairs, obstinately refused to sanction such an arrangement.

Though the situation of these brave men ought to have disarmed the hatred of their enemies, the factions opposed to them were inexorable. The poor soldiers, far from exciting commiseration, were by party spirit made objects of bitter hatred. Without the means of subsistence, or any prospect of future employment, and rejected by their own countrymen, they were reduced to the most deplorable want. Some came to implore Ney's pity ; others, indignant at receiving such contumelious treatment in reward of their services to their ungrateful country, endeavoured to enter the service of foreign states. They offered themselves to Austria and Great Britain ; so that whichever of these powers received them, would raise up so many more enemies against France. If these soldiers renounced a military life, it would be still worse ; for when the habits of men are once acquired, they can with difficulty conform to others to which they have been all their lives unaccustomed. If therefore they were forced to embrace the callings of civil life, they might feel greatly dissatisfied ; and it was to prevent the breaking out of fresh disorders that Ney proposed to enlist them under the French banner.

The First Consul, " who would have no foreigners in the service of France," at first rejected the proposal. But he soon felt how prudent it would be, and how important for the tranquillity of Helvetia, to remove from that country men pursued by such vindictive hatred. Both humanity and policy pleaded in their favour, and he consented to receive them

into the ranks of the French army.* Malevolence could now injure these men no longer; nevertheless, in spite of Ney's precautions throughout this business, he was everywhere received with coldness, indifference, or mistrust.

A host of banditti suddenly appeared in all parts of the country. Robbery, incendiary burnings, and even murders, became matters of common occurrence; no one could any longer depend upon the strength of the law; and no one had any further confidence in the power of the government to protect the lives and properties of the citizens. The pusillanimity of the executive had already rendered it despicable; all parties now turned it into ridicule, and the people seemed to make a merit of eluding its decrees. This feeling, skilfully kept alive by secret emissaries, tended to excite the hopes and increase the irritation of the different parties. But such a state of things could not last; and the opponents of

* THE MINISTER-AT-WAR TO GENERAL NEY, MINISTER
PLENIPOTENTIARY.

Paris, 22nd Nivose, Year XI. (Jan. 12th, 1803.)

CITIZEN GENERAL,

I have submitted to the First Consul the observations which you addressed to me on the 3d Nivose, on the necessity of deciding upon the ultimate fate of the troops now in the pay of the Helvetian government, and also the proposal of incorporating them in the Helvetian demi-brigades at present in the service of the French republic.

The First Consul having given due weight to your observations on this subject, has directed me to inform you that if the Helvetian government has no further necessity for the services of those troops, the French government will take them with pleasure.

BERTHIER.

France flattered themselves that by dint of agitation and disorder they should bring about the form of government for which they had previously taken arms. A number of Swiss officers and men of every description, in the pay of Great Britain, had returned to their native country ; and the colonel of the regiment of Watteville himself had just arrived at Berne. All had, no doubt, their instructions from the enemies of France, and each religiously fulfilled them.

The government was aware of these intrigues, but dared not repress them. It was itself verging towards its dissolution, and each of its members, more occupied with his own interests than with state affairs, dared not brave the factious spirit about to be arrayed against him. All perceived the danger, but not one had the courage to apply the remedy. The police was no longer to be depended on : its zeal and fidelity were extinct ; British gold had corrupted every one of its agents, and they whose duty it was to serve the government, were the first to betray it. On the other hand, the counter-police was perfectly well organized. The government took no measure, nor issued any decree, which was not prematurely made public, whilst seditious meetings were held with perfect impunity. All the inveterate prejudices of the aristocracy were now united to the burning excitement of the democracy, in one common sum of hatred to France ; and both parties concerted, concocted, and spread abroad the most atrocious libels against the First Consul, and the order of things which he was desirous of establishing.

These calumnious reports kept the minds of the mountaineers in a constant ferment. Being promised the benefits of the insurrection, they hoped to obtain a sensible improvement in their condition; and as all sorts of crimes are of easy perpetration when a whole population is agitated, the gunpowder was stolen from the government stores, arms were collected in the canton of Berne, and all seemed to indicate an approaching convulsion. Happily the mediation produced its fruit in due season, and these plots and dissensions were adjourned for a time, until the feelings excited by the new constitution should subside. Many particulars of this great political act being yet unknown, they offered matter for speculation sufficient for the present to occupy every mind.

CHAPTER II.

THE particulars of the new constitution had not yet reached Switzerland ; but every one knew that it established the political rights of all the cantons, abolished subjection, made every Swiss citizen equal, and gave to each a right of voting even in the most unimportant affairs of the state. Twenty years of age, a wife, and landed property worth two hundred francs, were the qualifications for an elector, who could vote for the appointment, as well as for the dismissal, of those called to wield the powers of state. But the nature of the general bond by which these independent populations were to be connected, was not yet stated ; and each was impatient to know what happy combination had been hit upon that could make so many contending interests merge into one general interest. M. de Talleyrand spoke of it in his despatches as likely to satisfy all parties, and put an end to all their differences.

“ The publication of the act of mediation,” he wrote to Ney, “ exposing to all Europe, in a noble, candid, and generous manner, the wise and beneficent views of the First Consul with regard to Helvetia, will have refuted, in a manner worthy of him, the infamous and absurd slanders which the enemies of the peace of Europe have had the boldness to cast

upon him, and which can have found believers only among servile beings as incapable of scanning the greatness of his ideas, as of feeling that his power needs no dissimulation, and that it is not the consciousness of strength, but of weakness, which inspires statesmen with thoughts of injustice and tyranny."

This brilliant announcement, far from making the general impatience subside, was like oil poured upon fire. After much speculation and anxiety, the particulars at length came, and the clauses of the federal pact which it had taken so much time to frame were now made public.

The nineteen cantons were confederated according to the principles established in the constitution of each. They mutually guaranteed their respective institutions, territories, freedom, and independence, both against the enterprises of foreign states, and against the usurpation of any one canton, or any particular faction. The respective contingents which each was to furnish in men and money were determined; and there were to be no subject countries, nor any privileges of place, birth, persons, or families. Each Swiss citizen might settle in any canton he pleased, there to exercise his industry, and enjoy the political rights conferred by the local constitution of the canton.

The cantons abolished the old dues of *traite intérieure* and *traite foraine*. They decreed the free circulation of produce, cattle, and goods, the abolition of all *droits d'octroi*, and the establishment of a uniform standard for their coin.

The direction of the public force, and the framing of laws, treaties, alliances, and declarations of war, were vested in an assembly of deputies from each canton, who were to meet alternately at Berne, Friburg, Soleure, Basle, Zurich, and Lucerne. Each deputy received instructions from his constituents, and could vote only to the extent expressed in such instructions. The diet, as this assembly was termed, was to act in the name of the entire confederation, and alone to possess the right of communicating with foreign powers. The avoyer of the canton in which it assembled, was to add to his title that of landamman, and preside over the diet whilst it remained in that canton. He was also to supply its place in the intervals between the sessions. He was to keep the seal of state, pursue the diplomatic relations of the country, and give credentials to the agents which the Helvetian republic might send to foreign states.* And, as nothing was to remain vague or uncertain, but all be precise and determinate, the period of the delivery of the powers was also fixed. The new magistrates were to assume the direction of affairs on the 10th of March; the constitution was to be in force on the 15th of April; and the elections were to be over by the 1st of June. The diet was to assemble in the beginning of July, and the duration of its session was not to exceed a month. To these provisions were added some regulations not less praiseworthy, but which afterwards led to very stormy debates in the new diet. The act of mediation had regulated the use to be made of national property, and provided

* See Appendix at the end of the volume, No. I.

for the liquidation of the Helvetian debt; it had, in short, protected the interests, as it had secured the freedom of every citizen.

Thus was the great problem solved which had so long agitated Helvetia. The act of mediation guaranteed and co-ordained her rights; and it gave her that which she had vainly sought at the cost of much trouble and bloodshed, namely: a joint connexion, and a common focus of power, which, by repressing disorder and putting down resistance, should satisfy the wants and exigencies of the confederation. The measure was hailed with general satisfaction; it extinguished all party hatred, destroyed the conspiracies against which the country had so painfully struggled, and every one acknowledged the wisdom by which it was dictated.

But what contributed more especially to render it popular, was the enthusiasm of the commissioners appointed to carry the cantonal constitutions into effect. They had been eye-witnesses of the conduct of the First Consul; they knew the sentiments by which he was actuated; they had seen his zeal and anxiety in settling the rights of each canton, and securing to the whole the benefit of wise institutions. Their praises of his benevolence, and their accounts of the interest he took in the Swiss people, were eloquent and inexhaustible.

This confidence in the First Consul, and the cessation of the charges of the occupation, restored the Swiss people to their ordinary sense of justice. They admitted that France had reason to feel alarm at the troubles which had taken place upon her fron-

tier, and that she might, without being excited by ambitious or interested views, interfere in the dissensions of her neighbours.

The French legislative body had just opened their session, and the statement of the situation of the republic was presented by Chaptal, then minister of the interior. This account of the prosperity of the country, and the recollection of the disorder and anarchy from the horrors of which the powerful mind of Bonaparte had so promptly relieved it—together with the solicitude of a prudent and liberal administration, which provided for all the wants of trade and gave the highest encouragement to industry—produced a strong effect upon the Swiss, naturally a covetous people, and who had scarcely yet emerged from the convulsions of intestine troubles. It taught them that a government anxious to repair national disasters, and promote national improvement, would be likely to apply its best energies to the maintenance of public tranquillity in a neighbouring state with which it was so closely connected as with Switzerland; and it convinced them that the First Consul could have none but peaceable intentions. His mediation, therefore, no longer appeared to them an attempt influenced by ambition, as calumny had taught them to believe,—but a work of conciliation and kindness, and an immense benefit conferred upon Helvetia, suffering, as she had been, under the turbulence of desperate factions. The winter being past, they resumed their ordinary occupations, and disavowed

for ever the principles of those men who were still eager to lead them astray.

D'Affry, an old general officer formerly in the service of France, and appointed landamman by the act of mediation, had just arrived. He was as respectable by the moderation of his political principles, as by his talents, firmness, and patriotism. The French plenipotentiary received him in a manner worthy of the office to which he had been raised. The firing of guns, guards of honour, and every thing which surrounds and indicates to the people the high powers of a state, were lavished upon him with profusion and a courtesy which greatly flattered the self-love of the Swiss. D'Affry, being a native of Friburg, he determined to transfer the seat of his government to that city. Preparations were immediately made for his journey, which took place with a pomp of military pageantry never before witnessed in those mountainous regions.

The former government forthwith resigned its authority, and the new order of things was constituted. Nevertheless, this was not effected without some little difficulty, for all party feeling had not yet merged into concord and oblivion. The several factions had sunk, it is true, under the ascendancy of France; still they did not despair of raising opportunities for trouble, and seizing some unexpected chances by which they might at least adjourn a question that seemed already decided, if not raise their fallen influence. Of this a lamentable instance soon occurred. The reader may recollect with what

uneasiness the Helvetian troops had contemplated their future prospects, and the eagerness they had displayed to be received into the French service. These soldiers, formerly so despised and repulsed by their fellow-citizens, were now on a sudden made objects of the most anxious commiseration and most delicate attentions.

A French military expedition had been sent to St. Domingo ; it had beaten and dispersed the blacks ; but being assailed in its turn by the yellow fever, the havoc made by this frightful disease had in a short time reduced its number to comparatively very few men. Its losses were soon known all over Europe. The Swiss have naturally a strong repugnance to crossing the sea ; and on intelligence of the disasters of the French army at St. Domingo reaching Switzerland, it was eagerly taken advantage of, to give probability to a report that the Helvetian demi-brigades were destined to replace the troops whom the yellow fever had cut off in the West Indies, and that if they once embarked they would never more return. Then, as if it were not sufficient to awaken the terrors with which the idea of a tropical climate always inspired these mountaineers, much was added concerning the advantages which the British service held out, and the care and attention paid to the soldiers in that of Austria. These reports, this pretended commiseration, and an artful contrast drawn between a life of adventure across the ocean, and the quiet service of a friendly power, produced the desired effect : the different corps assembled at Berne became mutinous and disorderly,

and great numbers of them deserted. The landamman, alarmed at this sudden disorganization of the army, issued a proclamation, which seemed to make some impression. Ney, on the other hand, wrote them a letter, which was read at the head of each company.* He reduced to their just standard the insinuations which had troubled these poor men; pointed out to them the advantages they would derive from the French service, and the satisfaction and honour which would accrue to them from being assimilated to those brave soldiers who had filled Europe with the fame of their victories, and with admiration of their good discipline.

These two addresses seemed to have restored the confidence of the Swiss soldiers; and General Wonderveidt, who commanded them, made them execute a military promenade. At the first halt, the non-

* TO GENERAL WONDERVEIDT.

5th Germinal, Year XI. (March 26th, 1803.)

Have the goodness, Citizen General, to make known, by an order of the day, to the troops under your command, that I herein express my satisfaction to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, at the good discipline which they have maintained, and the exactness with which they have performed their respective duties since my arrival in Switzerland. I trust they will properly appreciate the marks of kindness and esteem shown to them by the First Consul, in assimilating them, in compliance with my request, to the French troops, who by their brilliant exploits have raised the glory of their nation to so high a pitch; and that they will show themselves deserving of the promotion and rewards which he confers upon those who distinguish themselves by their bravery and talents. These soldiers cannot doubt that their condition will be bettered by entering the service of the French republic. The old soldiers will receive

commissioned officers and the elders among the privates went in a body, and assured him of their submission, and blind obedience to any orders he might think proper to give them. They begged him at the same time to overlook the faults of some young soldiers, of whose conduct he had reason to complain. The general granted their request with a good grace, and the promenade continued. Each seemed actuated with the best intentions; the men returned to their respective stations, and all appeared forgotten. The suspicions of the French plenipotentiary were not however lulled: the late agitation among these men appeared to him too singular to be unconnected with some political combination. He therefore directed all the officers to be present at the evening roll-call; and by thus placing the men under the immediate observation of their superiors, he succeeded in keeping them in order. Mean-

the pension established by our laws, so soon as their age, their infirmities, or their wounds incapacitate them from continuing to follow their honourable profession.

I particularly recommend to the officers not to swerve, in the execution of their duty, from the firmness required by that severe discipline which constitutes the strength of the French armies, and has always enabled them to overcome their enemies. They who, from neglect, should fail to acquit themselves of this sacred duty, may expect exemplary punishment. I again repeat to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, that they must proceed to the places which the French government has directed me to assign to them, and they may rest assured that they will have no cause to regret it. They may also rely upon it, that those among them who are entitled to their absolute discharge, shall obtain the same after the review of general inspection for this purpose.

while, party malevolence was at work, and the ferment it produced became every instant more active. Ney therefore ordered that the French posts should be doubled; and by this display of force, succeeded in delaying the explosion.

Nor would it perhaps have taken place at all, had not a trumpeter of the Helvetian hussars, more eager than his fellows, sounded the *bout-selle*, or “To horse.”

At this signal the men rushed forth in a state of mutiny, and committed the most unpardonable excesses. In vain did the officers attempt to stem the torrent—their authority was disregarded, and several among them were wounded. The French posts came up on hearing the tumult; but the instant the Swiss perceived them they sounded the charge and fired at them. A corporal of the 42nd was killed; the patrols, whose anger was roused at the sight of their slain comrade, were eager to avenge his death. Nevertheless, the officer commanding them succeeded in preventing them from returning the fire, and calmly addressed the mutineers, whom he informed that the perpetrators of the murder just committed should be punished in due course of law. They however paid no attention to this, but scattered themselves through Berne in order to obtain artillery and ammunition, neither of which they possessed, and also to plunder the houses of some of the citizens, in which they expected to find a rich booty. But Ney had already taken his measures, and the French troops were under arms. Their patrols, greatly strengthened, paraded

through the streets, and drove from the arsenal some of the mutineers who had succeeded in effecting an entrance there. Order was soon restored; and at daybreak a court-martial having assembled, one of the Swiss grenadiers was condemned to be shot. After the execution of the sentence, his comrades walked round his body, wondering how this single execution could suffice for the expiation of their crime, and how the French could have the generosity to leave the punishment of their guilt to their own officers.

Such was the result of this infernal machination. It cost the lives of two men; but the corps of Swiss troops marched very peaceably to Auxonne, where it arrived without any event worth recording.

CHAPTER III.

THE satisfaction was general among the inhabitants of Switzerland ; but the working of their new institutions required men of talent, and those to whom this task was confided were precisely the individuals who had already been declared incapable of performing such duties. The minister for foreign affairs in France consented that Reding and his friends, who were detained in captivity at Aarbourg, should be restored to freedom, but on condition that they went to France, and did not return to their own country until the elections were over. Under existing circumstances, this measure was useless, and not very generous : for, on the one hand, the passions of the multitude no longer seconded the intrigues of these men, whilst, on the other, the constitution proclaimed an amnesty for all political errors and offences, and it was unfair to make conditions for granting them what was their right. Ney took this latter view of the case in his despatch to the minister.

“ I have received,” he wrote to the latter, “ your instructions under date of the third instant, and will conform to them. I will, however, venture to observe, that what relates to the prisoners offers more difficulties than one. In the first place, it is nearly

optional with them to proceed to France or not ; in the next, as the act of mediation pardons all the offences necessarily attendant upon a political revolution, I am of opinion that their freedom ought to be full, entire, and free from restriction. And this opinion is the stronger, inasmuch as these prisoners have now scarcely any influence in their mountains. The inhabitants compare their present situation with the past—they contrast the tranquillity of the one with the sacrifices and alarms of the other, and are not at all inclined for a revival of their late troubles. I think then, that the deliverance of the prisoners should be unshackled with conditions ; nevertheless I shall impose those which you specify.

“ Berne, 8th Nivose, Year XI. (February 27th, 1803.)”

The minister avoided a reply, and Ney applied to the First Consul in person, who, more magnanimous than his minister, authorised the plenipotentiary not only to send the prisoners to their respective cantons, but, likewise, not to use any influence to prevent their being elected members of the diet. This was a happy measure, as it prevented a fresh collision ; for whether the people were desirous of giving their fallen chiefs a mark of their esteem, or that the aristocracy had exerted their influence among them, a great majority elected Reding to the chief magistracy of Schweitz, Wursch to that of Underwalden, and Zellweiger to that of Appenzell.

Ney was thus able to yield to the wishes of the people, and his doing so rendered him

It did not however facilitate the duties of his mission. The men whom he had thus allowed to rise once more into power, still retained the irritability consequent upon defeat. Far from moderating unjust pretensions, they lent their aid to support them. The former central administration, established perhaps upon correct views, had nevertheless been formed upon a scale out of proportion with the resources of the country. Surcharged with sinecures, and much of the useless machinery which encumbers the other governments of Europe, it was, from the very beginning, unable to provide funds to meet the expenses of its own support. Its troops were consequently unpaid, its subordinate functionaries left without their salaries, and it was under the necessity of resorting to expedients to raise money. It increased the taxes to a most unreasonable amount, sold off annuities, and yet the arrears left at its dissolution still exceeded six millions of francs.*

The act of mediàtion provided for the liquidation of this debt, by directing that what was termed national property should be applied to this purpose. This property consisted of the domains and bonded securities belonging formerly to the different cantons as sovereign states. Having been declared national property by law, they had been placed at the disposal of the minister of finance, and in part dissipated. Some of the cantons had managed to elude this measure, which was however common to all. Basle had hitherto escaped by means of the con-

fusion it had contrived to raise between the property of the city and that of the canton. Zurich had with equal success followed the example of Basle, and Schaffhausen had likewise managed to preserve its annuities. This was now the subject of debate in the new diet. The cantons which had freely given up their bonded securities, demanded that the other cantons should do the same, and thereby concur in preserving the ancient character for integrity which the Swiss had acquired among nations. But the other cantons strenuously resisted this demand; and the new magistrates, far from endeavouring to overcome such unreasonable obstinacy, gave it their support. Nevertheless, if Berne had not been a party concerned, the matter would have been amicably settled; but Berne being forced to come to a settlement with the confederation, was bound also to settle with those cantons the existence of which the haughty Bernese considered to have originated solely in the late revolt.* The humbled oligarchy set forth in the most violent language the sacrifices which that city had made; and it must be admitted that they were enormous.

Prior to the invasion, Berne possessed immense wealth. It had a considerable sum in its treasury, well-filled storehouses, and contracts and annuities to the amount of more than twenty millions of francs.† All had been either sent away or consumed

* Berne was to have remitted, in debentures upon the interior, to have them cancelled:

To the canton of Vaud	.	1,800,000 francs.
To the canton of Argau	.	2,357,000

† £800,000.

by General Brune.* The stores had been applied to feed the French army, the treasure to pay the men, and the bonded securities forwarded to Paris. The debentures were, it is true, afterwards restored to the power which superseded the central administration, but at the cost of four millions of francs,† which the government of the canton was under the necessity of raising by an alienation of property valued at six millions.‡ Being unable to meet some further expenses, this unfortunate canton was reduced to alienate to the amount of six millions more, and what remained of this last sum was handed over to the administrative chamber at Berne, which, after taking a portion of it to carry on the service of the state, made over the remainder to the city. The latter then entered into a contract to pay sixty thousand francs a year to the hospitals which it contained, and received as a consideration, South Sea

* For the information of such as might be tempted to introduce foreign armies into their native countries, we insert the following statement of what the invasion of 1798 cost the canton of Berne.

The French general took as follows:—

	Francs.
From the treasury	7,000,000
From the mint, in bars	3,700,000
In contributions	4,000,000
For debentures (purchased back)	4,000,000
850,000 cwt. of wheat, at 20 fr. per cwt.	17,000,000
6000 chars of wine, at 240 fr. each	1,440,000
Articles taken from the arsenals, value	7,000,000
Total	44,140,000 fr.
	or £1,765,600

annuities, bonds of Joseph II. a transfer of debentures upon Denmark, and other securities equally difficult to convert into cash. Meantime, the disturbances of October had burst forth. Berne encouraged them with all its might, but was under the necessity also of supplying with funds those who conducted them; and its treasury being empty, it had recourse to its foreign securities, and thus raised a further sum of two millions of francs.*

Berne still possessed debentures to a considerable amount; the commissioners, or members of the diet appointed to put in motion the machinery of the new government, required that they should be given up, and the Bernese refused. The question now became rather embarrassing: the delivering up of these securities was prescribed, it is true, by the federal pact; but the same pact likewise ordained the endowment of the sovereign cities, without, however, stating which of the two measures should take place first. Berne, anxious to secure some portion of the wreck of its possessions, contended that the latter should be first executed; the other cantons, which had so long envied the prosperity of Berne, demanded the priority of the former. This difference led to angry debates: the other cantons would not even be satisfied with the delivering up of what Berne then possessed, but endeavoured to throw upon that canton the responsibility of the alienations it had been forced to make. This was certainly a monstrous pretension; but it was not more unreasonable than many others: for the commissioners, though

always unanimous in their opinions when Berne was the object of attack, could not agree upon any other point. Local cupidity seemed the order of the day : each endeavoured to get rid of the charges which weighed upon his own canton, and to share the spoil wrung from the others. The following instance is too closely connected with our narrative to be omitted.

Glaris claimed certain domains possessed by St. Gall ; this canton refused to give them up, and Zurich interposing, claimed them for itself ; then, as if there were not already claimants enough, a fourth party came forward with similar pretensions.

A decree had at first been passed for the suppression of convents, and the application of their possessions to the establishment of useful and charitable institutions ; but certain deputies whom this measure did not suit, had sufficient influence to get the decree revoked. They had represented to the First Consul of the French republic that such suppression might create disturbances, and lead to dissatisfaction among the people ; for the mountaineers would not fancy their old political institutions restored to them if they no longer saw those monks among them whom they had been taught from their infancy to respect and cherish. Bonaparte gave credit to this statement, and decided that the property of the convents should be restored. It was this decision which brought a fourth claimant to the disputed domains in the person of the Abbot of St. Gall. This reverend competitor, more sharp-sighted than his rivals, claimed not only these lands and the feudal rights attached to them, but likewise the sovereignty with

which his office was formerly invested. His pretensions, as may be imagined, were not very well received ; but being a man of energetic temperament, and moreover a wily priest, he soon threw the whole country into commotion. His monks excited the people of St. Gall to open revolt, and his money produced wonderful effects upon the shepherds of Ury. Nothing was talked of but a league, a catholic union, the necessity of uniting in the defence of the church.

Ney knew what all this meant, and endeavoured to avert the evils which it threatened to produce. He invested the canton with the sovereignty* claimed by the abbot, recommending at the same time that the churchman should be treated with extreme liberality. But the obstinate priest would enter into no compromise, and it was at length agreed to submit the question to the arbitration of the landamman.

* TO THE LOCAL COUNCIL OF ST. GALL.

The act of mediation has settled the sovereignty of your country upon the cantonal government. The ex-prince can no longer have any right to it, nor to any of the lands and revenues which he enjoyed in his former capacity of sovereign. Every attempt to violate this principle would be the more injudicious, because it could lead to no good result.

The first basis provides for the liquidation of the debts ; it is doubtless an object of extreme importance, and deserving of the greatest attention. The French government, moreover, will feel much pleasure at the council acting with the greatest generosity towards the ex-abbot and the monks of the convent of St. Gall, and settling in an amicable manner the divers questions relating to them, so as to leave no further cause of trouble in one of the principal cantons of Switzerland.

27th Vendemiaire, Year XII. (October 20th, 1803.)

But this measure had no better success : the landamman was addicted to procrastination, and many questions submitted to him were never settled at all. Being extremely reserved and timid in meddling with whatever interested the court of Vienna, he became still more so when he had to decide upon the claims of priests and religious communities. The tenants of the cloister had always found especial favour in his canton, and he had himself violent personal feelings in favour of Austria ; so that the strongest remonstrances made by Ney could not induce him to come to a decision. Nevertheless, matters were pressing : the public business of the canton was at a stand, and the intrigues of the monks seemed likely to excite fresh troubles, unless measures were speedily taken to destroy their influence.

The canton of St. Gall, now in the peaceful enjoyment of its independence, would naturally be supposed favourable to the system which had secured its franchises. But such was not the case ; for the monks still exercised unbounded influence over the people, in whom they excited strong prejudices against France, and favourable feelings towards Austria. This state of things, together with the nature and extent of the frontiers of St. Gall, gave a very peculiar importance to the question submitted to the landamman's arbitration ; and Ney argued the point with unusual warmth. He maintained that the Abbot of St. Gall did not come within the provisions of the clause upon which he founded his claim ; and that the community which this abbot represented, having been dissolved under the unitarian

government, could not be again established,—in fact, on account of its debts and its uselessness—and in law, from the spirit and tenour of the new federal pact. This treaty sanctioned the sovereignty and independence of the canton, and could not, as Ney justly observed, have a retroactive operation “in favour of squandering usufructuaries who would be in constant rivalry with the sovereignty of the people.” These arguments, though just, only irritated the monks; and Ney at length had recourse to the kind offices of the Pope’s Nuncio, who had arrived at Lucerne during the discussion. He was a worthy and kind-hearted man, attached to France, and thankful to the First Consul for the peace which the Catholic church then enjoyed. Desirous of doing what would please the chief of the French republic, he warmly interposed to adjust these differences. But the patrimony of the church is not easily alienated; the priesthood of all countries strenuously resists every attempt to touch its temporalities. The monks of St. Gall would not forego any of their pretensions, and the Nuncio had lost all hope of overcoming their obstinacy, when Ney by a new expedient succeeded in shaking it for an instant. He imagined to erect a bishopric, found a chapter and a college, and appoint the monks to offices with emoluments that would secure to them an easy and independent existence. The prospect of bettering their individual conditions overcame their late scruples, and they deserted the abbot, who without their assistance was unable to agitate the country. But the Catholic clergy are inexhaustible in expedients when threatened with

the loss of possessions wrung from superstition and fanaticism. A new and successful intrigue won back the support of the monks ; the abbot resumed the quarrel, and succeeded in transferring to Rome the trial of his claims. The Bernese, on the other hand, found means, by consuming the time and creating delays, to defer the delivery of their debentures until it became their turn to be the directing canton ; and then, being both judges and parties, they were able to adjudicate in their own favour.

CHAPTER IV.

SWITZERLAND had now entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with France ; but as the new form of its government rendered this treaty very burthensome, the First Consul determined to make it lighter by altering it to a defensive alliance, and a treaty of assistance in case of need. The diet, then sitting, at first received this modification, with great delight ; but suddenly changing its views, became cold and wavering, and soon after gave way to foolish intrigues and chimerical plots. In this manner time glided on. The more Ney urged it to come to a decision on any point, the more it would affect independence ; at length he was obliged to recur to threats, and he could only get the better of its indecision and procrastination by declaring that he would write to Paris. The diet then seemed to awaken as from a trance, examined and discussed certain points submitted to its deliberations, and resolved “to enter into no treaty with the French general, but to offer him only negative observations, and allow no counter-proposal to escape it, which might become binding.”* Meantime, the political horizon had once more become overcast : war had been again declared against France by Great Britain, the mortality at St. Domingo still continued, and the diet conceived hopes

* Sitting of the 18th of July.

of ultimately eluding the stipulations of an act, the wisdom of which it had just before loudly proclaimed. An oath to the new constitution no longer appeared to it necessary, and many of its members consequently felt no scruple in declining such oath. In vain did the most reasonable of the deputies urge the propriety of taking the oath, and the positive duty of its observance : in vain did they represent the necessity of “dissipating the uneasiness and preventing the troubles which must arise from a refusal to sanction, or even a delay in sanctioning by a voluntary acceptance of it, a work which might possibly be represented as the effect and consequence of circumstances.”* The only answer they obtained was, “that the oath was unnecessary ; that the cantonal governments had taken it ; that Switzerland was organised in the manner prescribed by the act of mediation, which sufficiently proved that she considered this act binding.” This was indeed eluding the question ; moreover, it was not true that the oath had been taken by all the cantonal governments, for several among them had confined themselves to a vague promise that they would work in furtherance of the general good of their country ; and if the government of the country had been formed pretty nearly according to the tenour of the act of mediation, each deputy did not the less arrogate the right of interpreting this act according to his own peculiar views, until he could get rid of it altogether. But the diet had also its collective views, and the question was adjourned to the ensuing session.

* Sitting of the 8th of July.

In such conduct the members of the diet displayed a deplorable want of sincerity, and showed that they had no wish to bring the settlement of the political institutions of Switzerland to a conclusion. A conference however took place with the French plenipotentiary ; but the commissioners of the diet, as if to put it out of their own power to make any counter-proposal which might become binding upon them, had omitted providing themselves with powers, and the conference was therefore reduced to a simple conversation. As what passed gives a pretty correct idea of the views and pretensions of these haughty mountaineers, we shall here transcribe some parts of this conversation.

“What need have we of powers, or negotiations ?” asked Rheinhart, deputy of Zurich. “Would it not be much better to proclaim the independence of Switzerland, and secure an absolute neutrality ?”

“Independence !” replied Ney ; “why, is it not secured to you by the act of mediation ? As for the neutrality which you claim, you will obtain it by and by. Each thing must come in its turn. That which is urgent at the present moment is, to settle your relations with each other, and with France ; and if you delay doing this, you will get into the same state of confusion as that from which you have but so lately emerged.”

“True ! but at all events, if Switzerland is attacked, France ought not only to defend her, but to pay the expense of such defence.”

“And would you look on as quiet spectators ?” retorted Ney.

“No !” said the deputy ; “but you should not carry to too great an amount the assistance we are to bring. You now fix it at sixteen thousand men, thus raising it to double the amount specified in the treaty of 1771. This is too heavy an aid for the Helvetian people to supply : they could not support so large a levy.”

“Give me,” Ney replied, “an account of the population of Helvetia at these two periods, together with a list of the troops you possessed at the former, and those you now possess. I will reduce the number fixed, if I find it too heavy. But I would urge you to bear in mind that the aid required by France is an eventual compensation for a positive engagement.”

“I know that,” said Jauch, deputy of Ury ; “but the generosity and benevolence of France form the basis of our relations with her. Switzerland feels grateful for her friendship, and is desirous that the old alliance should be remembered in the new.”

“So it shall.”

“Then let the year 1516 be mentioned as the fortunate period at which the friendship commenced between the two nations.”

“This recollection is too appropriate not to be admitted,” the plenipotentiary replied ; “but I must also offer one, which refers, it is true, to a less remote period, but is equally useful to the people you here represent. In the treaty of the Year VI. it is stipulated that a road shall be cut along the left bank of the Rhine. For a long time it has been

impossible to execute this plan ; but now, when all assumes a new life, when a fresh impulse is given to”

“ ’Tis the duty of Switzerland to oppose its execution,” said the deputy, interrupting Ney.

“ What !” the latter replied ; “ prevent the opening of a road which would shorten distances and render communications more rapid ?”

“ The smaller cantons would be ruined,” returned the deputy, “ if trade were diverted into a new channel.”

It was not this, however, that alarmed the deputy of Ury ; but Ney feigned to think so, and limited his demands to the opening of a road between the lake of Geneva and that of Neufchatel.

“ This at least,” said he, addressing himself to Jauch, “ can give no ground of discontent to the smaller cantons.”

“ Doubtless not,” replied the imperturbable deputy ; “ but how many of the others would it not injure !” And he began to enumerate the confusion it would cause in the trade of some, the obstacles it would throw in the way of others.

“ All this may be true,” replied Ney ; “ but we are not now seeking to ascertain whether the execution of this latter plan offers any disadvantages ; we admit that it may, and we are only anxious to discover whether these disadvantages outweigh its advantages :—this is the real question.”

“ Admitted,” said d’Affry ; “ but you are not in want of roads. Should you be attacked by Austria,

you can easily debouch upon Italy, and all along the course of the Rhine. You can have no occasion to borrow our territory for such a purpose."

"No doubt," Ney replied. "Nevertheless the First Consul does not see matters in the same light that you do, and I must inform you that I consider it very strange you should enter upon such discussions before the absolute neutrality of Helvetia is proclaimed. However, I thank you for letting me know your opinions; you have at least the merit of sincerity."

Jauch having withdrawn, the conversation became more free and open. Rheinhardt sought an excuse for the conduct of the diet, and endeavoured to explain away its procrastination.

"Such delay must appear strange to you," said he to Ney, "and this is natural enough. Consider, however, our situation and that of France. The First Consul animates all, and keeps opposing factions in awe; and you will probably have no occasion to apprehend trouble or disorder whilst he remains at the head of affairs. But, as a man, he is subject to the common lot of men. Now, when all depends upon the life of a single individual exposed to so many casualties, is it surprising that we should hesitate to draw upon ourselves a portion of the storm which might otherwise burst at a distance from us?"

"Is it this that stops you?" exclaimed Ney. "Is this the sole ground of your apprehensions? Trust yourselves with confidence to the fortunes of France, and instead of predicting that she will encounter

future misfortune, try rather to conciliate her kindness, by founding the institutions which are to form your future government. Have you flattered yourselves, moreover, that in your relative situation you can share in our good fortune without running any of our evil chances?"

"No, certainly," the landamman replied; "such a thing is impossible. But so many changes are in preparation!"

"What changes, pray?"

"Oh! nothing, or scarcely any thing," replied d'Affry smiling; "only the creation of a vast empire, and the crowning of the First Consul Emperor."

"What! do you believe ——?"

"Alas! yes," interrupted d'Affry; "I believe that the First Consul is on his way to Brussels to be crowned."

The landamman's smile now produced its counterpart on the muscles of Ney's countenance. "Brussels!" said he; "what! in a city so recently annexed to France? Are you sure of this?"

"Sure of it? Oh! no, by no means sure. But it is perhaps from mere curiosity that Cardinal Caprara and the minister Cobentzel have preceded him to that antient city, and that the ambassadors of divers other powers are also about to proceed thither!"

These reports greatly amused Ney; but the landamman persisted, nevertheless, in giving credit to them, and in contending that Switzerland could not settle its internal administration until that of France

was first determined. Ney represented that the two countries were quite independent of each other, and that, even if the First Consul should assume the imperial purple, the mountains of Helvetia would not the less preserve their democratic institutions. The landamman made no direct reply, but launched forth in praise of the genius and labours of the extraordinary man who wielded the destinies of France ; but through this noisy enthusiasm it was easy to perceive a desire to take the benefit of acts of long standing, and that he would rather have held his appointment from a descendant of Louis XIV. than from the First Consul. All the other members of the commission entertained the same hopes, uttered the same sentiments, and evinced the same prejudices as d’Affry.

France had forced the Swiss factions to live together in good intelligence ; but the government of George III. having again declared war against France, each was anxious to act according to the chances which time and events might offer, and the diet endeavoured to elude signing the treaty of alliance. Its members fancied that the days of Lautrec were returned, and began to coquet with their duties and set up unreasonable pretensions. Already had Zellveiger demanded the evacuation of Switzerland by the French troops ; Reding, still more audacious, had even ventured to threaten with the gallows those deputies who had defended interests to which he was hostile. Ney, however, having insisted upon a categorical answer from the diet, its turbulent members were obliged to adjourn the

realization of their foolish hopes, and discuss the question of the settlement. In this debate the hostile party manfully maintained their opinions, and set up the most unreasonable pretensions. Not that the individual deputies were unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their constituents: taken separately, each of them was conciliating, honourable, of easy intercourse, and of amiable manners. But when in a body, some strange feeling, as if each was emulous of a superiority in cunning and trickery, seemed suddenly to arise among them, and they admitted and seriously discussed the most extravagant schemes. Besides this, every thing submitted to them seemed to excite their mistrust; the plainest propositions were denied, and the most natural measures modified and spoilt.

On this occasion the landamman spoke first, and with extraordinary dexterity and address. He endeavoured to palliate the procrastinating spirit of the commissioners, and stated as the cause of their delay, that they had to compare the treaties entered into at different periods, and likewise the changes presented by each period. This was certainly prudent, and ought to have led to salutary reflections; for how could they mistake relative situations so opposed to each other as that of the period at which they were then debating, and that of the former period alluded to? But this was of little consequence to the deputies:—being actuated by recollections of past ages, they entertained no views but such as were connected with the desire of giving the same idea of their government to posterity.

selves entertained, and of impressing a belief that they possessed the power of making neighbouring states tremble. They at first took the perpetual peace of 1516 for their grand argument; and as the project under consideration was in no wise opposed to its principles, they considered it a sufficient groundwork to bear the edifice of their own false views and follies. But on a sudden they took up a new ground, having made the discovery that perpetual treaties were not consistent with the customs of the Helvetic nation, the most interesting part of whose history consisted, as they said, in the renewal of alliances: and as their manners and the nature of their interests underwent a change from one century to another, they could enter into no engagement beyond half a century. The conditions, moreover, offered by France, were neither sufficiently positive nor extensive enough. France undertook, it is true, to defend Helvetia, but did not state in what manner; and to ascertain this was a point of vital importance, for the confederation could not charge itself with the burthen of the expense, which would far exceed the whole of its resources. Between allied states, it is not the actual but the relative amount of the means applied to the common stock, that establishes the reciprocity. Thus, it was not unreasonable to expect that France would defend Switzerland at her own cost; and if in return the latter granted an assistance of troops, it must be on very special conditions, and on the payment of large sums of money.

Meantime, the commissioners, in their several con-

ferences with Ney, set up the most inconceivable pretensions. When the plenipotentiary talked to them of limits, and of rectifying boundaries, they expressed their surprise at Bienne being taken from them, and that some unimportant villages, long since annexed to France, were not restored to them ; but they took especial care to say not a word about the communes given to Basle, or those annexed to Soleure ; they avoided uttering a syllable about the Frickthal, of which they were in possession, and which produced an annual revenue of two hundred thousand francs, or eight thousand pounds sterling. On the question of trade and commerce, they made complaints and raised pretensions equally unreasonable. The fact is, they wanted to be freed from every obligation, so that they might proceed without restraint. They claimed to purchase from France, duty free, all the raw silk they wanted for their manufactories. Ney showed them that from their proximity to Piedmont and to Germany they might procure the silk, manufacture it, and still undersell the French market ; that the riband manufactories at Zurich had already done considerable injury to those of St. Etienne and Chaumont ; and finally, that the exportation duty upon raw silk in France was not greater than the protection of the French silk manufactories required. Still they insisted upon a compliance with this demand, or at least, the entrance into France, duty free, of articles of Swiss manufacture : that is to say, they would have glutted the French markets with manufactured articles, the first material of which they had purchased at a lower rate than the

French could possibly obtain it at, and which they had likewise been able to weave at a cheaper rate, their texture imitating the finest of the British manufactures : in a word, they would have given facilities to a smuggling trade, which the similarity of the goods would have rendered difficult of repression.

Ney put an end to these pretensions and tergiversations by dismissing the commissioners, after informing them that he should leave his government to decide upon these questions, and immediately transmit their observations to the French minister for foreign affairs. But as night brings reflection, the next morning the landamman begged that Ney would make no such communication to his government. He admitted, that in the warmth of debate his colleagues had gone further than they ought to have done ; and he moreover stated that the commissioners were now ready to take into consideration, and admit, with blind confidence, such modifications as the plan was susceptible of. The conferences of the commissioners with Ney were then resumed without interruption, and each turned his attention seriously to settling, upon an equitable basis, the treaty of alliance which was to connect France and Switzerland. Ney had always a pen in his hand ; he led the debate on each question, and wrote down each resolution the instant it was carried. Being conversant with the different dialects of the mountains, he was able to address each commissioner in his own native idiom, which rendered the proceedings much easier and more rapid. Some of the deputies, however, persisted in their pretensions : Muller Friedberg

still insisted that France should defend Switzerland at her own expense; and Reinhart maintained his opinions about the limits. But Ney, perceiving the ascendancy he had acquired over the majority, refused to admit such pretensions. Jauch again renewed his demands with regard to the national industry, and maintained with much warmth, that the adoption of his views was not less advantageous to France than to the Swiss cantons themselves.

“You are well aware,” said he to Ney, “that Switzerland produces nothing in abundance; her necessaries of life, as well as her articles of luxury, are all drawn from foreign countries; and if she succeeds in maintaining the balance of her trade by the production of her own industry, it will be by dint of extraordinary activity and perseverance. It is only by working more than the common herd of men, and imposing upon himself a degree of self-denial seen perhaps in no other country, that the Swiss operative contrives to live. In like manner, the Swiss merchant and manufacturer succeed only by the most patient assiduity, and the strictest privations. And if a people, having no other capital than their own labour and the privations they are able to bear, possess a trade, they obtain it at a much greater cost than more favoured nations, and by a much stronger effort. Now the principal industry of Switzerland consists in spinning and weaving: the population of six of the cantons live almost entirely by this kind of labour. The muslins, linen, and cotton cloths which they manufacture, are sold in France, and the money which these goods produce,

being swallowed up by rapid and considerable exchanges, soon returns to the place whence it originally came. Hemp, flax, iron, tobacco, broad-cloths, silks, wine, soap, hardware, and the productions of the Levant—such are the articles with which our goods are paid for. France and Switzerland are necessary to each other : they reciprocally consume each other's produce ; and when the manufactories cease working in our mountains, the work of yours also slackens. We can suffer no misfortunes without their rebounding upon France ; and this correlativeness acquires a still greater importance from the circumstances under which we are placed. Is it not your interest to reduce, by every possible means, the trade of Great Britain ? And is not the increase of competition, and the glutting of every market with rival productions, one of the surest means of doing so ? Encourage, therefore, the manufactories of your allies, and do not force them to a state of inactivity, of which England will reap all the advantages."

"I would willingly do as you wish, if it were practicable," Ney replied ; "but the remedy appears to me worse than the evil, and I do not think it would be prudent to try it."

Jauch was about to reply. "What need is there of a reply ?" said Ney. "Submit your views to the French government, which will perhaps view them in a more favourable light than I do." Jauch followed this advice, and no further difficulties were made.

The principal clauses of the treaty being now admitted, there remained only some points of minor

First Consul. Meantime, the amended project was proposed to the diet, and agreed to without a dissenting voice. A resolution, thanking Ney for the kindly interest he had taken in this long discussion, was likewise passed, and the landamman was directed to convey to him, in warm terms, the gratitude of the diet for the solicitude with which he had debated the interests and the wants of Switzerland.

Thus, after much trouble, this delicate negotiation was brought to a close ; but it required no ordinary share of patience and diplomatic tact to conciliate those mistrustful and vain-glorious men, whose presumption had been strengthened by the kindness of the First Consul. There was, however, another point which increased the difficulties of the negotiation. Neither the principles nor the individual interests of the several commissioners were the same ; and the latter were divided in language, religion, and political doctrines. They individually bore as much hatred towards each other as they collectively bore towards France. But it became necessary to moderate these feelings, and make them merge into one common interest, in order to obtain one common treaty. This undertaking, difficult as it was, Ney succeeded in accomplishing.

The conditions of the alliance being stipulated, those of the capitulation, or terms of service of the Swiss soldiers lent or to be supplied to France, were next to be considered. There was no little difficulty in settling these terms ; but the obstacles arose out of the thing itself, and not from objections raised by the individuals who were to settle the

clauses. The military commissioners, much more prudent than the members of the diplomatic commission, did not give way to rash and unreasonable pretensions. No doubt they were anxious to obtain "the greatest possible number of commissions for officers, and supply the smallest possible number of Swiss recruits;" but beyond this, their demands were reasonable, and their observations well founded. Still the difficulty was great. The former capitulations* were not general to the whole country, but only bound the particular cantons granting them. Matters were now upon a different footing: the First Consul no longer had to treat with such or such state of the confederation, but with the diet representing the whole of the confederated cantons as forming one political body; and the diet alone could take measures to secure the execution of the treaty. It was this that caused the difficulty. The Swiss, alarmed at the idea of a conscription, were fearful of establishing a precedent for it. They feared that so alarming a mode of recruitment would be made permanent in their country; and they apprehended that if such were the case under the central form of their new government, one canton would be called upon to supply the men which another could not furnish.

This repugnance to a conscription was natural enough; but the feelings of aversion entertained throughout the country towards the Helvetian troops already in the French service, were by no means so.

* Treaties empowering a foreign state to levy troops in Switzerland.—ED.

Although the cantons were constantly complaining of the smallness of their population, they would not allow the recruits which they were to supply, to fill up the vacancies in the demi-brigades already in the service of the French republic. They would not allow those unfortunate soldiers, of whom we have already spoken — those despised Helvetian troops who had fought and bled in the civil wars of their country — to enter the regiments about to be raised.* They were looked upon as so many pariahs, and every one despised and spurned them. To these feelings were added many doubts and fears with regard to the formation of the new corps. The interests of the country in general, and the advantages of its citizens in particular, were made the touchstone of popular feeling, and a cry was attempted to be raised by the opposition. But their tactics failed them on the present occasion, and nothing

* “The military commission authorised by the diet has come to no ultimate decision upon the fate of the three demi-brigades. I was desirous that the French government should retain the faculty of taking, on this subject, whatever determination it should deem advisable; but it is my duty to inform you, Citizen Minister, that the commission has requested, in the strongest terms, that these demi-brigades shall be joined together, and form only one corps. It is also desirous that the number of officers exceeding the wants of this new corps should be put upon half pay. And lastly, it is anxious that whatever measures the French government adopts in this matter, should give facilities to the cantonal governments for getting gradually rid of the officers appointed by the late Helvetian government, who might still remain after this change, in order to replace them successively by officers appointed under the new order of things.” —Letter from the Plenipotentiary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berne, 22d Fructidor, Year XI. (September 9th, 1803.)

now remained but to settle the particulars of the plan laid down. The Swiss were anxious to adopt the French improvements in the military art, possess troops of all arms, and substitute the system of legions for that of regiments recommended in the plan. The strength of these regiments being fixed at four thousand men, the number was considered too great, inasmuch as the regimental accounts would be too complicated, and the drilling difficult. On the other hand, the staff was not deemed sufficiently numerous. The Swiss had formerly one hundred and ninety-eight companies in the service of France, exclusive of the regiment of guards; now the aid stipulated amounted to almost double that number, whilst they themselves were allowed only a hundred and forty-four at home. "Hence," said the commissioners, "there are fewer honourable and lucrative appointments, consequently less chance of rising in the service." They therefore considered this condition unfavourable.

With regard to pay and retiring pensions, the project assimilated the Swiss to the French troops. This did not appear just to the Helvetian commissioners; because, as they urged, the French troops were discharging a duty, their own bearing a burthen. The former were fighting in defence of their hearths; the latter were shedding their blood for foreign interests and foreign institutions. And, besides,—not only did the Swiss run, in favour of foreigners, the chances and dangers of the field of battle, but they had long distances to travel, expensive uniforms to purchase and renew; and it was

moreover acknowledged and admitted, that "they had always received greater pay, and larger retiring pensions," than the troops of the foreign state which they served.

This latter assertion was, however, incorrect with regard to France. According to the terms of the old capitulation, they were entitled, it is true, to a fixed rate of pay, and to a *monstre* above that of the national troops; but the amount of this *monstre* had never been fixed: it varied according to the will of the French minister for the time being, and the pay now offered exceeded the average of that granted at former periods. Ney considered it sufficient; for he did not think that raw recruits, who had still to win their first laurels, ought to be better paid than veteran soldiers who had already distinguished themselves in the field.

He was more indulgent with regard to the repugnance expressed by the Swiss soldiers to serve beyond seas. The plan under discussion had only excepted the East and West Indies. They would be delighted, they said, at having to serve only in Europe, and defend the French territory. This, Ney observed to them, was impossible; for with such a clause they might, as their forefathers had done, refuse their co-operation on the eve of a battle. They were well aware, he said, that a war, originally defensive, might by its results become offensive; and it would be hard that France, if she found it necessary to chastise the states of Barbary, should not have the power of sending thither any Swiss troops that might be at Marseilles. Ney thought,

however, that the French government would use such power with great circumspection; because auxiliary troops at such a distance from the country they were serving, might be easily worked upon by tempting offers from the enemy, and in such expeditions it would be but prudent to admit as small a number of them as possible. But the principle must be laid down, and he would except only the East and West Indies.

As a last demand, the Swiss claimed the right, in the event of their country being in imminent danger of war, of recalling their troops from France. This seemed unreasonable to Ney. War could not be declared against them except by powers against which France was pledged to assist and defend them; and if this demand were acceded to, they would deprive her of their troops at the moment when she most needed them. Strange as this pretension was, the First Consul had just complied with their wishes on a point almost as strange: in his munificence, he had consented to defend Switzerland at the cost of France. The plenipotentiary therefore followed his example, and consented that, the case occurring, the cantons should have a right to recall their troops paid by France.

The conditions were now settled: Ney had fixed the bounty for enlisting, and the management and discipline of the different corps; he had admitted every claim that appeared to him just, and rejected those which were unfounded. Having been under the necessity of exceeding his instructions in many points, he would not sign the articles until he had

previously obtained the consent of the First Consul. Among his secretaries was one of whose zeal and abilities he entertained a high opinion; he therefore despatched him to Paris, and soon received, with authority to conclude the treaty, expressions of satisfaction from the chief of the French republic.

“The First Consul,” wrote the minister, “before whom I have laid the articles of the treaty of alliance, and of the military capitulation agreed upon between you and the Helvetian commission, has directed me to express his satisfaction at the zeal which you have displayed in following up and closing this negotiation.

“You are hereby authorized to sign the two treaties, and even to yield, if you deem it necessary, to the subsequent demands made relative to the recruits, and to the colonies in the East and West Indies.

“These two changes affect the 7th and 18th articles of the capitulation. In article 7, it may be expressed, that the recruits shall be paid from the day of their joining their regiment, or of their arrival at the dépôt fixed for that regiment; and in article 18 it may be stipulated that the Swiss troops shall never be employed out of Europe.

“You will bring as near together as possible, the periods for exchanging the ratifications of these treaties. It is of advantage to Switzerland that its connexion with France should be speedily fixed, particularly as the terms agreed upon are so favourable.

“The changes operated through the mediation of the First Consul, in the organisation of Switzer-

land, would unavoidably render other changes necessary in the relations of that country with France ; and it was to complete these advantages and secure the prosperity of Switzerland that the First Consul was anxious to restore to her the benefits she had derived from her ancient capitulations, and from the system of alliance and neutrality which she had always pursued.

“ The concessions now made to Switzerland are more numerous than those she obtained by her ancient treaties ; but the First Consul is of opinion that, by extending these prerogatives and honorary distinctions, he shall attach Switzerland still more strongly to France ; he has therefore determined to give this strong proof of the estimation in which he holds the character and courage of the Swiss nation.

“ It is the intention of the First Consul to facilitate, so far as his power extends, the execution of the military capitulation ; and he apprehends no inconvenience from making the Helvetian demi-brigades already in the service of France enter into the composition of one of the four Swiss regiments, and giving their government the necessary latitude for this incorporation. It will be easy hereafter to concert upon the manner of carrying this into effect.

“ Citizen Bouyer, who handed to me the two projects of treaty, has perfectly acquitted himself of the mission which you confided to him. Your good testimonials in his favour have given me the best possible opinion of his talents and zeal ; and he fully justifies this opinion. I shall with pleasure take the earliest opportunity of employing him agreeably

to your desire, and shall make his services known to the First Consul.

“CH. MAUR. TALLEYRAND.

“Paris, September 21st, 1803.”

The First Consul now left every thing to the prudence and discretion of his plenipotentiary; the diet, on the other hand, announced that it was at length ready to conclude the two treaties, its members having received the necessary powers from their constituents. All being thus definitively agreed upon, both parties thought they had brought this laborious negotiation to a close. But the spirit of faction was still at work: Reding again raised his voice against the alliance with France, and beguiled himself with hopes of success. He was deputy of Schweitz; he commanded the votes of his colleagues of Ury, Zug, and Unterwalden, and considered himself sure of support from the deputies of Glaris and Appenzell. An opposition thus constituted seemed to him sufficient for his purpose; and he immediately set up an opinion in the diet, that by the new constitution of Switzerland, treaties could not be concluded by individual suffrage, but to make them valid required the votes of three-fourths of the cantons, not of three-fourths of the deputies. Such an interpretation of the constitution was loudly protested against by the majority of his colleagues, but he persisted in it, and a stormy debate ensued. A great number of deputies deprecated an obstinacy which nothing could justify: but Reding was inflexible. Zellveiger, however, put an end to the

obstacle by joining the majority, Hees followed his example, and Reding's plan was defeated.

Still he did not yield : the deputies of Ury, Zug, and Unterwalden clung to him and his fortunes, and these four resolved to carry their opposition to extremes. They uttered the bitterest invectives against France, and found fault with every article of the treaty. The other deputies in reply said, that France was as great and generous, as the treaty was full of wisdom and prudence ; that Switzerland now enjoyed institutions which she had been seeking in vain during several centuries ; that no enslaved people would now wear chains in the land of freedom ; that there no longer existed in Switzerland either oppressors or oppressed ; but that the mountains of Helvetia now possessed but one community of happy citizens, who all enjoyed the same rights, had the same obligations to fulfil, and were united by a common bond, of which their forefathers had seen the advantages, though they had never been able to establish a confederation upon the same principles.

These facts were evident, and neither Reding nor his friends attempted to deny them ; but unable to offer even specious arguments against the treaties which they so violently rejected, they affected scruples of another kind. They feigned now to doubt the power with which, a short time previously, they had maintained that they were invested, and insisted that the question of the ratification ought to be submitted to the cantons. Reinhart of Zurich, and Fruenderick of Berne, perceiving that these head-

listen to reason, and Zellweger of Appenzell joined his remonstrances to those of the two former ; but all was of no avail : Reding and his supporters persisted in maintaining that they could not ratify the articles agreed upon without consulting their constituents. Their opposition was however unheeded ; and the two treaties were signed by the diet on the 4th of Vendemiaire, Year XII. (27th of September, 1803,) and sent to the different cantons for ratification.

Though the treaties were received with great enthusiasm in each canton, still all did not ratify them with equal promptitude. In some the delay was unavoidable, in others difficulties were purposely raised. Berne, Zurich, Basle, and Soleure gave them the final sanction amid the most joyful acclamations. The external Rhodes of Appenzell ratified them immediately ; and of eight thousand men composing this latter assembly, there was not one who did not individually express satisfaction :—never had such unanimity been witnessed before.

The smaller cantons were almost the only ones which delayed the ratification of these treaties. Their inhabitants were as enthusiastic in favour of the measure as the rest of Switzerland ; they were delighted that the theatre of war had been removed far from their mountains, and that their fortunes were again connected with those of the French nation, under whose banner their warriors might earn fame and fortune. Such, however, was not the case with Reding : he was hostile to the doctrines of the French republicans, and, being still angry at the in-

tervention of Bonaparte in the affairs of Switzerland, continued to evince as much dislike to the treaties, as he had before professed hatred of the French republic. His friends were far from countenancing his obstinacy: Wurch even drew up a very excellent report of the negotiations of the diet, which was greatly applauded; but, like his friends, Jauch and Muller, he respected, in his obstinate colleague, the uncompromising defender of Swiss independence. All three blamed his violence, and disavowed his acts, but neither had the heart to separate from him. They were anxious to allow him the honour of taking the lead in getting the treaties ratified, and they wished to wait until he had obtained the sanction of his constituents, before they convoked the assemblies of their own cantons. But Ney, who had the welfare of these cantons at heart, represented to the three deputies the injury which the whole of Helvetia was likely to sustain from such delay; Zug therefore set the example, which Ury followed immediately. Reding now found that he must yield to the torrent. The Landsguemende accordingly assembled, joined their vote to that of the rest of Switzerland, and the ratifications were exchanged on the 1st of December, 1803.

All was now terminated; arrogant pretensions or disappointed ambition could no longer throw obstacles in the way, or demand further concessions from the French minister. The whole of the Swiss people were much pleased with the conditions they had obtained. France had undertaken to defend their country, and to admit them to serve under its banner; thus they had the advantage of yielding to

their fondness for arms, without their country being called upon to make any pecuniary sacrifices for the defence of its territory. Switzerland was now free; she had neither oppressors nor slaves among her citizens. The individual interests of the cantons were regulated by the local administrations, the general interests of the country by the diet. Helvetia had no longer to apprehend any attempts upon her franchises, nor any political agitation in her interior; she had all the advantages of centralization without its expenses. Thus her situation was most propitious, and she did ample justice to the friendly and disinterested views of France. Her citizens seemed to glory in proclaiming that they owed all these advantages to the First Consul of the French republic and to his plenipotentiary.

They now admitted that the mediation, which a powerful number of their citizens had strenuously opposed, had been undertaken with views of benevolence and conciliation; they acknowledged the patient and mild manner in which it had been conducted; and they felt the necessity of disavowing the prejudices they had at first conceived against it. The inhabitants of Soleure thought it but justice to express their gratitude to Ney, not only for the broad and noble basis upon which he had established the relations between France and Switzerland,* but

* THE AVOYER AND COUNCIL OF THE CANTON OF SOLEURE TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL-IN-CHIEF NEY, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY IN SWITZERLAND.

Soleure, October 5th, 1803.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Mr. Avoyer Frim of Wartenfeld, our deputy at the general diet of Friburg, lost no time, on his return hither, in giving

likewise for the spirit of concord he had displayed in his relations with the deputies of the several cantons, and the care with which he had reconciled their differences. Those of St. Gall avowed their obligation to him for the warmth and perseverance with which he had defended their interests; and those of Appenzell voted him an address, in which they stated what he had done for the happiness of Switzerland. The citizens of Bernè went still farther: they determined to perpetuate the remembrance of Ney's mission by the erection of a public monument; they likewise had a medal struck, upon which were represented the disorders to which he had put an end and the peace he had established.

These warm and grateful feelings were general throughout the country, and a fresh benefit conferred by Ney, increased them to a pitch of enthusiasm.

us an account of your Excellency's particular attention to our legation, and how much you had personally contributed to consolidate the union between the confederated cantons, as well as to hasten the important work of the alliance with the French republic, and that of the capitulation for the Swiss troops in the service of France. We acknowledge, as we ought to do, the good offices which your Excellency has been so good as to render us on this occasion; we shall never forget that it is to your Excellency—to the worthy representative of the pacificator of your country, that we owe the happiness we are about to enjoy from the confederation guaranteed by the First Consul; and we dare flatter ourselves that the bonds of amity, existing for so many centuries, and now strengthened by gratitude, will prove indestructible, and that in future nothing will alter the harmony between the two nations.

Receive the assurance of our profound respect,

GERBER, Secretary of State.

P. GLUSZ RUCHT, Avoyer in charge.

The country being happy and satisfied, he deemed the presence of the French troops no longer necessary, and accordingly withdrew them. This proof of confidence completely won the affection of the Swiss people ; all celebrated the magnanimity of the French general by public rejoicings, and all were loud in acknowledgment of the services he had rendered them. But he was about to make his escape from these flattering testimonies of regard ; his mission being now at an end, with the exception of some trifling details, and the French armies being in the act of assembling on the coast of the British channel, he applied for leave to join them. He was therefore appointed to the command of the corps-d'armée encamped at Montreuil. Prior to Ney's departure, the landamman was authorised to express the regret of the confederated cantons at losing him, and in their name to forward to him a snuff-box, with the monogram of Switzerland set in diamonds on the lid, and accompanied with the following letter :

“ GENERAL,

“ At the moment of your departure from us, and when I am myself about to deliver over my office to a successor, allow me to fulfil a most agreeable duty : that of speaking of the good you have done us, and of our gratitude towards you.

“ It is not solely the expression of my own private sentiments that I now offer you. Having for the last ten months enjoyed the most delightful intercourse with you, it is quite natural that I should entertain

But as chief magistrate of all Switzerland, it is in her name that I now address you.

“All the cantons, on being made acquainted with your intended departure, have expressed the most lively regret. They all set a proper value upon the share you have taken in the beneficial changes which the present year has brought us. Switzerland is restored to peace, order is everywhere established, and the diversity of opinions among us merges each day into a spirit of moderation and harmony. Our line of conduct is traced with regard to internal administration, at the same time that our foreign relations are become surer and more honourable, — those with France, in particular, having been stipulated in two treaties, which our forefathers would have signed as we have done. All this, General, we in part owe to your care. Switzerland having become happy and peaceable by this mediation, will not separate your name from that of the mediator himself.

“An act of kindness attaches him who performs it, as well as him upon whom it is conferred: we therefore do not fear that you will forget us; we would even on every occasion continue to rely upon your support, for you have conferred upon us at once the right and the habit of doing so.

“The cantons have expressed a wish that you should accept a feeble pledge of their attachment and gratitude; and seeing the preparations for your departure, I have requested M. Maillardoz to present it to you at Paris.

“It is a token of remembrance and nothing more;

to your recollection a nation whom you have so essentially obliged, it should prove the means of your not forgetting the sentiments which every member of that nation will for ever feel towards you.

“ LOUIS D’AFFRY,
Landamman of Switzerland.

“ MAUSSON,
Chancellor of the Confederation.”

“ Friburg, December 28th, 1803.”

BOOK THE SEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

NEY had left France in the confident enjoyment of the blessings of peace ; he found her on his return, again involved in the bustle of war. Great Britain had laid down her arms for a time, only because every other enemy of France had evacuated the field, and because single-handed she could not continue the war with any chance of success. But her government had calculated also upon the internal troubles with which the absence of foreign war was likely to be attended in France ; it had been expected that envy, and hatred, and jealousy, and party-feeling, would inflict a death-wound upon the French republic which the foreign hosts coalesced against it had vainly attempted. But the powerful mind of the First Consul had crushed the strength of factions, and raised an extraordinary enthusiasm throughout the nation in favour of his government. His exertions towards the improvement of the national resources, were prodigious. In the midst of war, when assailed by the combined efforts of the most powerful nations in Europe, he had successfully cultivated the arts of peace ; and the short respite from hostili-

ties which France had just enjoyed, had enabled him to consolidate his work, and found an edifice of eternal fame, much more noble and imperishable than that cemented by human blood. He had given an extraordinary impetus to the national industry ; he encouraged both the useful and the liberal arts ; and he was the patron of learning and science. He called to his councils men of all ranks and professions—talent being the only passport to his favour. Under his rule, the country presented the picture of one vast family, each of whose members seemed to become daily more and more attached to the institutions which they had won from their former oppressors, and to rally with tenfold confidence round the chief who had foiled all the attempts of its enemies. The British government having soon discovered its mistake, determined to check, if possible, the career of greatness to which the duration of peace seemed likely to lead the French republic. Divers changes had taken place in the constitution of Europe, without the least opposition on the part of the British cabinet, or without its taking umbrage ; but, on a sudden, it seemed roused from its tolerance and long-suffering, and seizing, as a pretence, those changes which it had not attempted to prevent, war was again declared.

France, taken by surprise, was far from being prepared to meet the exigencies of war. The state of her finances had imposed upon her measures of the strictest economy. The officers of her armies were dispersed on leave of absence, and the armies themselves in a very inefficient state. The infantry was

incomplete, and the cavalry had not half the number of horses necessary for the field. The artillery was still less able to act. Marmont, by whom it was commanded, had imagined improvements in this branch of the service, which had necessitated a fresh casting of the guns. He was likewise effecting a total change in the form of the tumbrels, and in the construction of the gun-carriages. The First Consul, however, soon got everything in a state of preparation; he found in his own genius, and in the enthusiastic devotion of the nation to his wishes, all the resources necessary for carrying on the war. He called the young men to arms, provided horses, and soon got the artillery in order. In a few months all was ready; and an army more numerous and better equipped than at any preceding period of the wars of the republic, was sent to the sea-coast bordering upon the British channel.

The French people at length forgot their dissensions: the unprovoked aggression of Great Britain had united every patriot hand and heart against the common foe, and the republic was no longer torn by contending factions. The declaration of war by that power induced the First Consul, now free from the attempts of his continental neighbours, to renew the project he had in contemplation five years previously, but of which he had not then dared to attempt the execution: he resolved to cross the straits of Dover, and terminate at once, upon the banks of the Thames, a quarrel which could not be brought to an issue upon the Continent. But, as British squadrons covered the surface of the channel, and the dispro-

portion of force between the navies of France and those of Great Britain destroyed all chance of success in a naval action, he sought the means of scattering those formidable fleets which he could not conquer, and thus rendering them powerless. The small vessels used in the defence of seaports, roadsteads, and the mouths of rivers, supplied him with the means of effecting this object. Feigning an intention of using such craft in distant expeditions, he altered their form, the shape of their sails, the manner of rigging them, and gave orders that many should be built of various sizes and upon different models. He divided them into three classes. The *prâmes* formed the vessels of the first class ;—each carried six twenty-four pounders, which could be shifted from side to side, thus forming so many floating batteries, which, it is true, might drift to leeward, being unable to sail upon a wind, and therefore to advance, unless the wind were right aft or at all events abaft the beam. But as floating batteries, they were excellent ; they could act as batteries broadside-to, protect the local navigation, or cover the movements of a flotilla. They could moreover strand at low water without changing their position or diminishing their power of doing mischief, and could take shelter in places where neither ships of the line nor frigates could follow them.

The second class consisted of gun-boats, which were better adapted for navigation. Their form was more calculated for naval manœuvres, and they could sail near the wind. Each contained four twenty-four pounders and a howitzer. Some had

thirty-six pounders, and were large enough to carry two hundred men.

The peniches, or gun-barges, which formed the third class, were small galleys with eighteen benches of rowers, carrying a four-pounder and a howitzer fore and aft.

These vessels were built with the most extraordinary despatch. The French nation had taken up the cause of its chief magistrate, against whom personally the whole enmity of the British government was said to be directed. The people did not limit their aid to the demands which their government made upon them ; they spontaneously granted much more than was asked. They seemed delighted to supply the First Consul with all the means he might require to come off victorious from a contest which attacked their institutions. The department of the Haut-Rhin presented him with a ship of the line ; that of the Côte-d'or, with a hundred pieces of cannon. The departments of the Gironde and the Loire-inférieure were still more liberal ; and there was not a town in France, even the smallest, nor even a hamlet, that did not make its offering and express its sentiments of patriotism.

This formidable armament did not, however, for a moment interrupt the arts of peace. The government, ever carefully attentive to the wants of the nation, pursued its undertakings of public utility, and its attempts at national improvement. It increased the number of public schools, and established secondary schools, in which the youth of France, under excellent regulations, and a strict and im-

partial discipline, received liberal instruction, and were qualified to enjoy the system of equality established by the revolution. It assembled likewise the veteran soldiers mutilated and disabled in war, formed them into military colonies, and bestowed upon them a portion of the territory which they had aided in conquering. Camps of refuge were established at Alexandria, and roads made upon Mount Cenis and across the Simplon. The bridges of Roanne, Corbeil, and Nemours—the canals of Arles, St. Quentin, and Aiguës-Mortes—all in short that the First Consul undertook—were evidences of his zeal in promoting the public welfare, and of the vastness of his genius. He ordered the draining of the Colentine marshes, and likewise those forming the muddy banks of the Canche. At Cherbourg, Boulogne, Rochelle, Cette, Nice, Marseilles, Ostend, and Havre-de-Grace, all was bustle and activity, and the result of his gigantic plans may now be seen in those seaports. In every part of the kingdom improvements were made, and great and useful works begun.

The brilliant administration under which these national works were carried into effect, was not, however, secure from the venom of envy. They whose assistance and co-operation it had not condescended to accept, as well as those to whose ambition it had not ministered, united to attack it: at first, indeed, by intrigue and silent plots, but soon after more openly. They pretended to see in the great undertakings of the First Consul, nothing but subjects of anxiety and apprehension. Moreau, whose military renown should have saved him from the weakness of

jealousy, sided with the malcontents. He openly blamed the First Consul in all his measures, and attacked the integrity of his motives and intentions.

“What !” said he one day to Ney, when in a fit of envy he was inveighing against those who had rallied round the head of the state ; “do you also go to the Tuileries ?”

“Yes, indeed, I do,” Ney replied. Moreau seemed surprised. “I go thither,” Ney continued, “just as I should do if you held the office of First Consul.”

“But how he has deceived us !” rejoined Moreau.

“May be so,” answered Ney ; “but I shall ever be grateful to him for his rapid and beautiful administration of public affairs. However, I have devoted my life to my country, and not to those whom events may place at the head of its affairs.”

The conversation then turned from the person of the First Consul to the acts of his government. Moreau dwelt at great length upon the danger of attempting to invade England : he deemed it nothing short of madness to confront line-of-battle ships with gun-boats, and to expect that the passage across the channel would be won with such craft.

Ney was of a different opinion. Barring the accidents of the sea, he thought that, by taking advantage of light winds, calms, and long nights, it was not impossible to elude the vigilance of the channel fleet, and escape from the overwhelming superiority of the British naval force. He had procured a journal of the winds prevalent in the channel, and was well acquainted with their course, their variation, the periods when they blow with violence, and those

when their force is lessened. He had therefore no doubt that by seizing a favourable opportunity, the French army might escape the fleet which alarmed Moreau, and effect a landing upon the shores of England. The British nation, he said, were convinced of this; for the British admirals, who, in 1756, were consulted as to the possibility of such an event, had unanimously declared that they could not insure that a landing would not be effected, even had they ten times the force they commanded; and in 1770 the same answer had been given. The Duke of Argyle, and some of the most distinguished British officers of the period, had often declared their conviction in parliament that situations and conjunctures might often arise at sea which would give a hostile army every possible opportunity of landing in England, without the British fleets, even were they collected together, being able to secure the safety of the coast. The reason of this, he said, was very clear. The westerly winds, and those from the south and south-west, blow from France to England, and during their prevalence vessels sailing from the ports of France make good way, whilst those of England cannot leave their ports; thus the most formidable fleets are of no use during the continuance of those winds, and an attempt might be successfully made.

“A sudden cessation of wind,” continued Ney, “might produce the same effect as a violent and continued gale; for if the British fleet were overtaken by a dead calm, either in the middle or at the end of a voyage from one part of the coast to an-

other, it would baffle the skill of its officers and render the valour of its seamen of no avail. What could be done with ships of the line under such circumstances? Have recourse to oars?—that would be impracticable. Use their boats?—what chance would these have against our host of gun-boats, peniches, and light vessels, armed and equipped as they are? Besides, the tides and fogs will again increase our chances of success. How many of our squadrons are there which have escaped from the British cruisers in a fog, or during a dark night! Recollect that the Prince of Orange crossed the channel, and during six hours his fleet passed close to that of James II. without being perceived. The Earl of Dartmouth having ascertained at length that it had sailed, bore up in pursuit of it; but as he began to brace up his yards the wind became more a-head, having veered to the south, and he was unable to interrupt the prince's landing.

“The same thing afterwards occurred to the French fleet cruising off Brest. It suffered the ships under the command of Admiral Anson to pass without perceiving them, and this distinguished officer did not know the danger he had run until his return to England. But these are not our only chances. The English are terror-stricken at our preparations, and the malcontents among them are excited with hope. Such vessels as ours have always terrified those islanders. In the reign of Elizabeth, one of our ministers frankly declared that England had never been more exposed to the dangers of an invasion than since the King of Spain had built

small boats, similar to those used by the Flemish and the French. The same description of vessels has even more recently excited the fears of Boscawen. This admiral knew the amount of our force in the Mediterranean; he knew that having been defeated in a great naval action on the 20th of November 1759, we were not in a state to attempt any enterprise. Still, the impression made upon him by one gun-boat on the coast, was such, that on seeing a few sails appear on the horizon, he had no doubt of their forming part of an invading expedition, and immediately stated his apprehensions to the king and the government. In an incredibly short space of time all England was in rumour, whilst the dreaded expedition turned out to be nothing but a convoy of colliers!"

The means of attack, which appeared so dangerous to the British government, and were treated so lightly by Moreau and others at Paris, were, nevertheless, not those which the First Consul intended to employ. He had no idea of engaging line-of-battle ships with gun-boats: his views were much more consistent. What his exact intentions were, Ney did not precisely know; but he had faith both in the genius of his general, and in the destinies of France;—he was moreover penetrated with the idea of calling England to a severe account for three centuries of hostility.

The month of March had just begun; the Canche was restored to its bed, and the harbour of Ambleteuse open, whilst that of Vimereux had piers and plenty of water for the ingress and egress of vessels.

All the great works, which had changed the appearance of the whole country, were nearly complete. Ney's duty was confined to the care and drilling of his men. The corps under his command consisted of three divisions: one stationed at Ostro-Hove, another at Etaples, and the third at Fromesseu. All three were commanded by officers whose military fortune was inseparable from that of the First Consul. Dupont, who was at the head of the first, had not been without some influence in the destinies of Napoleon: he had contributed to bring him forward, and being soon after appointed to the direction of the cabinet topographique, had supported him with his interest. Partounaux, who commanded the third, was in a diametrically opposite situation with regard to the First Consul. Having been denounced for his opinions to the clubs at Marseilles, his protestations of hatred to kings were of no avail, and he would probably have been dismissed from the service, had not Bonaparte taken him under his protection, placed him in active service, afforded him opportunities of distinguishing himself, and enabled him to give the lie to his accusers. Partounaux ever bore this in remembrance, and was devoted body and soul to his protector. Loison was at the head of the second division. This officer had yet had no direct communication with the First Consul; but he was ardent, enterprising, and fond of military glory. He thrilled at the bare name of Marengo; and the man who had won that day was his idol upon earth.

With such officers under him, Ney's duties were

not very severe: he could depend upon their vigilance, and feel sure that the details of the service were not neglected. But Ney was accustomed to see every thing done himself, and convince himself from actual observation that no part of the duty was omitted. He inspected the most important posts, and examined every position; he went through the camp and had reason to express satisfaction at the intelligence displayed in its formation. The bar-raques, or wooden huts, being all built upon the same model, and perfectly uniform, had the most agreeable appearance. They were whitewashed, and divided into groups; these again were intersected by streets, or rather alleys, each bearing the name of some distinguished soldier, or of some great battle won. In front were avenues; the parade was surrounded by plantations; and in the rear were kitchens, dancing-rooms, and gardens.

The interior of the squares or groups was equally well distributed. The first huts contained hurdles fixed horizontally about two feet from the ground, and covered with fresh straw for the men to sleep upon. Farther on were the eating-huts, with their fire-places, benches, racks for the firelocks, and pegs for the knapsacks. The general distribution of the camp was beautiful, but Ney did not think the situation well chosen. The means of defence did not appear to him good, nor the batteries properly supported. Moreover, the prames being obliged to proceed along the coast to reach Etaples and Vimeux, might be captured or destroyed by the British

by no means secure from a coup-de-main. He therefore hastened to obviate all these defects, by distributing his forces in a different manner, and establishing moveable sentinels, who passed each other every quarter of an hour from St. Frieux, which lay at his extreme right, to the mouth of the Canche, and continued on the other side from the right bank of the Somme as far as the Authie, which was at his extreme left. Pickets of cavalry and light artillery were placed along the whole line, in order to ensure the safety of the flotilla. As espionage tries to find an entrance everywhere, and had its signals and means of communication in the camp, Ney took the severest measures against it. He gave orders to fire at any person who should enter this long line of posts ; he placed guards at the windmills, and laid an embargo upon the fishing-boats. Nor did his vigilance stop here : considering that the fate of his country depended upon the projected expedition to England, the details which might conduce to its success were the constant objects of his solicitude. He had received his troops from General Soult, who had taken charge of them for him, and bestowed upon them the same care and attention as upon his own. Ney, grateful for this act of kindness, called upon Soult, and they reconnoitred together Vimereux, Ambleteuse, and all the line of coast under Ney's command. Boulogne, in particular, attracted his attention. This seaport was free from the dangers by which it was formerly beset. Large vessels could now leave its harbour without risk : they were no longer in danger of grounding when they tried to

place themselves under the protection of the batteries, nor of being taken when they ran down the coast. The artillerymen had become perfect marksmen ; a fort rose from the middle of the reef of rocks, and the anchorage was securely guarded.

To these powerful means of defence were added mortars which threw shells to a distance of two thousand toises, guns which carried still farther, and a formidable work commanding the passes. Though all this was calculated to inspire confidence, still the security did not seem sufficient. Ney well knew that this immense armament would strike terror into the British government, and that every attempt would be made to destroy the flotilla ; he felt confident that, dangerous as the undertaking was, it had its chances of success, and he dreaded the attempts of a bold and brave enemy to prevent it, as well as the effects of treachery. The very last attack had shown that the British shells could reach the shipping at the very extremity of the harbour. He feared that Nelson might take advantage of this circumstance, and succeed in setting fire to the French flotilla. He supposed that a British squadron might sail from England at twelve o'clock at night, reach Boulogne at five in the morning, lay broadside-to off the battery Des Grenadiers, and Fort l'Huert, send bomb-ketches forward, and before daylight create a dreadful confusion in the harbour. If the rasant batteries, or the side batteries interrupted the attack, the British might send a few old frigates to give another direction to their fire, if not to silence it, and meanwhile shot be poured upon the harbour ; trea-

chery might also assist, and the First Consul's immense armament be totally destroyed.

To prevent such a disaster, the attack must be immediately counteracted and the enemy repulsed. If the bombardment were prolonged, it would inevitably cause immense damage. Ney's alterations therefore tended to foil such an attempt, if made by the British navy. He directed that a division of prames should lie at anchor at the mouth of the Lyonne, so as to form a salient angle, under cover of the rasant batteries, and be always ready for immediate action; that these prames should be supported by two lines of gun-boats, which should go out every day with the tide, and lie at anchor outside until the British squadron was announced by signals on the heights. The gun-boats, manned by picked detachments, were to set sail directly towards the British ships, and, after receiving the first broadside, attempt to carry them by boarding. If the wind and the chance of the day were both unfavourable, they were to fall back under cover of the batteries on the coast, and gain Etaples, Vimereux, or Ambleteuse. The two last of these seaports being exposed to the same dangers as Boulogne, Ney thought the same plan ought to be adopted with regard to them. General Soult, to whom he submitted his plans and fears, wrote him the following note :—

“I sincerely thank you, my dear General, for your observations upon the defence of Boulogne. I will profit by them, if circumstances allow me to do so.

“We have two prames ready to go out in case of attack; we are in expectation of several others

now fitting out at Havre, Dunkerque, and Ostend, and which are likewise intended to protect and support the vessels of the flotilla at anchor in the roads.

“In the event of attack, some divisions of gunboats and pirogues should proceed to the roads; and this would be the more necessary, because it would not only disencumber the harbour, but would force the enemy, whatever were their force, to keep at a respectful distance.

“Numerous precautions have been taken against the effect of fire, and some fresh precaution is taken every day. Of late, the duty upon the quays has been performed with tolerable exactness, and we observe with pleasure that, in this respect, there is an evident improvement.

“The flotilla has not yet been able to go outside the harbour, because, until to-day, the men have not ceased working day and night at their buildings; but that labour being now far advanced, I hope to resume this exercise, which is necessary, both for the sailors and troops, and likewise to accustom the enemy to have us in sight.

“As for the ports of Ambleteuse and Vimereux, of which you also speak in your letter, it appears to me very difficult for the enemy to succeed in any serious attempt; for the situation of these two ports, and the armament employed in their defence, are obstacles which they could not easily overcome.

“Believe in the assurance of my friendship,

“SOULT.”

The precautions alluded to by Soult corresponded very nearly with those recommended by Ney; nevertheless, though they were quite sufficient to foil a coup-de-main, he still did not think them calculated to attain the object in view. The centre of operations appeared, in his judgment, badly chosen; and he would have removed the camp from Boulogne to Etaples, which offered immense advantages. Its bay is capable of holding from fifteen to eighteen hundred vessels, secure from bombs; and all might leave it during the same tide. It would take them, it is true, two hours more to reach England from Etaples than from Boulogne; but on the other hand, if the weather was bad, they would be able to reach the Canche much more easily, and run less risk of grounding. A fort was in progress of building upon the Banc-aux-chiens; and the roadstead and outer anchorage of the harbour, already defended by three batteries, would now be secure against any attack. But the flotilla and the *matériel* of the army being stationed at Boulogne, Ney's idea was not carried into execution. Meantime, an imaginary danger spread alarm along the coast; and it was of a kind that neither redoubts, nor armies, nor flotillas could arrest. It was reported that the British cruisers had thrown three poisoned bales of cotton upon the coast; that the British government, in short, had called the plague to its assistance.* The First Con-

* TO THE POSTS ALONG THE COASTS.

Battery of St. Frioux, 25th Ventose, Year XII.
(March 16th, 1804.)

Remain at your posts, Citizens, and increase your vigilance.

sul refused to believe such a thing ; nevertheless, it being reported to him, he instructed Ney to ascertain the fact.

“ I am informed, Citizen General Ney,” he wrote, “ that the English have thrown bales of cotton upon our coast, which has led to the supposition that these bales are poisoned. Give me all the particulars you can collect on this matter. It would be lamentable to think that every principle of humanity could be thus violated. BONAPARTE.”

“ Malmaison, 30th Ventose, Year XII.

(March 21st, 1804.)”

Ney, although he had no high opinion of the principles on which Great Britain was then governed, thought with the First Consul, that this charge was

The English, unable to conquer us by force, are employing their last resource : THE PLAGUE.

Five bales of cotton have just been thrown upon our coast.

All are hereby forbidden to approach any boats or objects that may be cast on shore.

Let patrols be instantly set on foot accompanied by custom-house officers.

VILLATTE, General of Brigade.

P. S. These presents shall pass from post to post, from the battery of Petite-Garonne to the entrance of the harbour at Boulogne.

VILLATTE.

VILLATTE, GENERAL OF BRIGADE, TO GENERAL-IN-CHIEF SOULT, COMMANDING THE CAMP AT ST. OMER.

Battery of St. Frieux, 25th Ventose, Year XII.

GENERAL,

The English unable to conquer us by force, are recurring to their last resource : THE PLAGUE.

Five bales of cotton have just been cast upon our coast ; I hasten to give you notice of it.

From St. Frieux to the mouth of the Canche, all the troops are

too monstrous to be believed. He nevertheless set inquiries on foot, and after due investigation discovered that this alleged horrible attempt, which had terrified the whole country, turned out to be an old hammock which some fishermen had found on the sea-shore.

at their posts ; patrols are spread along the strand, and are accompanied by custom-house officers.

In sight of this battery, and almost within shot, are a frigate and two sloops of war belonging to the enemy ; also several small fishing-boats, which I presume contain other bales of cotton.

As no one is allowed to take out any boat or vessel, I have just received orders to fire at everything that may appear in the offing within the range of our batteries.

Be so good, General, as to give orders to the detachment of the 46th regiment, sent to guard the battery of St. Frieux, to build their huts behind and close to the battery.

If there be any thing new, General, I shall lose no time in giving you intimation of it.

Health and respect.

VILLATTE.

CHAPTER II.

THIS alarm, though false, increased the hatred felt against England by every individual in the French army, and was not without influence in the manifestation of this feeling. For a long time past Great Britain affected a blind aversion towards the First Consul, and this aversion was made manifest, not only in parliamentary declamation, but in the diplomatic despatches sent abroad. * At Petersburg, Admiral Warren had announced new contests which were to overthrow General Bonaparte. At Madrid, the British ambassador, Freire, had several times declared that Bonaparte could not long escape : that sooner or later he must fall either by steel or by poison.*

George Cadoudal, and his band of assassins, having been landed upon the French coast by British vessels, had nearly realised these atrocious predictions ; and as if to show the fulness of the measure of iniquity, the unworthy plots of two British agents had just been discovered. Drake, the British minister at the court of Bavaria, not satisfied with planning the overthrow of the French government, and the murder of the First Consul, aimed at a renewal of the

* April 3rd, 1803.

horrors of the infernal machine, by blowing up the powder-mills, if an opportunity offered.* Spencer Smith at Stuttgard, where he was the accredited British agent, was engaged in similar machinations. Like his colleague, he plotted murder, offered wages to infamy, and encouraged the most disgraceful and atrocious actions; whilst the British minister at home, far from disavowing such acts, took them upon his own responsibility.

He declared in the face of all Europe, that he should be culpable if he did not second the exertions of those of the inhabitants of France who made

* "Article II. The principal object of this journey being to overthrow the present government, one of the means of succeeding is to acquire a knowledge of the enemy's plans. For this purpose it is of the highest importance to begin by establishing sure correspondences in the different public offices, thus obtaining an exact knowledge of every measure to be adopted with regard either to the interior of the country or to the exterior. A knowledge of their plans would furnish the best weapons for defeating them, and the failure of such plans is one of the means to be used in bringing absolute discredit upon the government: this is a first, and indeed the most important step towards the object in view.

"The persons employed in the powder-mills might be gained, with the aid of associates, and the mills blown up, when an opportunity offered.

"It is above all things necessary to bring into the plot, and secure the fidelity of some printers and engravers, in order to print and do what the association may require.

"It would be desirable to ascertain precisely the state of parties in France, more especially at Paris.

"It is understood that all possible means shall be employed to disorganize the armies either out of or in the country."

(Instructions from the British minister, Drake, to one of his agents, M. D. L.)

a profession of hostile sentiments towards its present government.* Thus the plan of attempting the First Consul's life, or at least the project of destroying what he had done, was avowed and proclaimed by the British government. England wished not only to strike down the great man who had united the scattered elements of national strength in France, but likewise to overthrow the institutions, dissolve the armies, and annihilate, in a word, all that had been obtained in that country by ten years of unprecedented victories.

The last attempt of the British diplomatists having failed, the First Consul had escaped the poniards of their hired assassins ; but the army did not deceive itself with regard to the existing state of things : it felt that the popular energy was exhausted, that each citizen was tired of war and strife, and that the advantages of the revolution would be lost, should any accident deprive the republic of its powerful chief. Its own glorious labours would, in such case, be deemed a lengthened revolt, its victories a series of crimes, and that France, which it had so nobly defended — which it had surrounded with glory so bright and dazzling, would become a prey to the emigrants. It was outrageous at this persevering personal enmity to its leader, round whom it assembled, and intreated that his existence, together with the fruits of its own labours, might be rendered secure. The dragoons, assembled in independent divisions, took the lead : they urged the

* Note of Lord Hawkesbury, addressed to the foreign ministers at the Court of St. James's.

First Consul to assume the imperial purple, and their desire, repeated by even the smallest hamlets, became that of entire France. Addresses from the different corps poured in ; — each day Loison transmitted some, and Dupont renewed the expression of his own wishes, in forwarding those of the officers under his command.* Ney joined in the expression of this general feeling.

Such a change in the form of government was rather a sudden return to monarchy, and the danger was perhaps less imminent than the army supposed ; but nature has its casualties as well as fortune, and if Bonaparte were fortunate enough to escape steel and poison, he might perchance be seized with sudden disease, and leave his great work incomplete in the hands of a less able successor. The new institutions of France were by no means consolidated ; they might be attacked and the country exposed to the strife of ambitious men, each eager to seize upon the supreme power. The thought of an hereditary sovereign excited, no doubt, a strong repugnance in many ; but the civil rights of the French citizens had just been proclaimed, liberty and equa-

* TO GENERAL-IN-CHIEF NEY.

I enclose, my dear General, the personal addresses from the generals and colonels of the 1st division to the First Consul. They all contain the same wish which we have already expressed at the head of the troops, that the hero of France should be invested with the Imperial dignity. May I beg you will lay these addresses before him as the most sacred pledge of the devoted attachment felt towards him by the division he has placed under my command.

DUPONT.

Head-quarters, Fayelle, 14th Floréal, Year XII.

lity formed the basis of the laws of France, and the object of the revolution was attained. It was now absurd to sacrifice the substance to the form, place in danger the object which had been obtained by such enormous sacrifices and exertions, and all this to conciliate a mere sensitiveness of principle which in state affairs must needs give way to expediency. The army felt no such foolish delicacy : both officers and men were impatient to place the guardianship of the principles which they had so nobly defended, in the hands of a man capable of still making them triumph. Ney therefore assembled his corps-d'armée, and the following address was agreed upon :—

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, GENERALS, OFFICERS, AND
SOLDIERS OF THE CAMP OF MONTREUIL TO THE
FIRST CONSUL.

9th Floréal, Year XII. (April 29th, 1804.)

“ The French monarchy has crumbled to pieces under the weight of fourteen centuries ; the noise of its fall has alarmed the world and shaken all the thrones in Europe. France, abandoned to a total subversion, has during ten years of revolution undergone all the evils which could desolate a nation. You have appeared, Citizen General, radiant with glory and surpassing genius, and suddenly the storm has blown off.

“ Victory has placed you at the helm of government : justice and peace are seated by your side.

“ The recollection of our misfortunes was already beginning to be effaced, and all the feelings of the French people were about to merge into that of grati-

tude alone, when a dreadful event has shown them the new dangers which they are about to encounter.

“Your life, vainly defended by thirty millions of men, has been threatened; and a single blow of a poniard would have thrown back the destinies of a great people, and revived among them the dreadful excesses of ambition and anarchy.

“So appalling a prospect has dispelled every illusion, and the minds of all are divided betwixt horror of the past and dread of the future. France, with all its greatness and power, seeing that it might lose all in a single day, has been struck with consternation and dread. It is now like the colossus with feet of clay. The time has come to put an end to such a state of anxiety, by making our powerful institutions secure for us a lasting prosperity. The same cry is heard from every part of France; be not therefore deaf to this expression of the national will.

“Accept, General Consul, the Imperial crown offered to you by thirty millions of people. Charlemagne, the greatest of our ancient kings, obtained his from the hands of victory: do you, with still more glorious claims than his, receive yours from those of gratitude. Let it be transmitted to your descendants, and may your virtues be perpetuated upon earth with your name!

“As for us, General Consul, full of love for our country and attachment to your person, we devote our existence to the defence of both.”

The camps of Ostend and St. Omer followed the example of that of Montreuil, and expressed the same

wish in still more enthusiastic language. It was at first deemed advisable to prevent those tumultuous meetings, where each lights his enthusiasm at the torch of his neighbour, whom he excites in his turn. Deputations were therefore thought of, and it was proposed to allow only an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and a soldier to vote in each company, as the representatives of that company. But all vehemently claimed their rights, and each was desirous of giving his individual vote. Never was such eagerness seen, nor so complete a feeling of unanimity; but likewise, as Soult observed, "the nation had never done so much for its happiness as by acquitting its debt of gratitude."* The legislature, the senate, and the whole of the magistracy, from the body of judges down to the petty magistrates in the villages, declared the same intentions, and expressed the same desires. The First Consul therefore accepted this new dignity, and was proclaimed Emperor on the 14th of May, 1804.

The question of hereditary descent was referred to the primary assemblies, but the feelings of the nation in its favour were expressed throughout the country. The power with which Napoleon was invested was accordingly settled on his family, and the order of succession regulated: there was no interval between him who died and him who succeeded, so that no opening was left for the plottings of ambitious men. This new order of things led to new titles and powers. As Consul, Bonaparte had generals in chief; as Emperor, he was obliged to assume the forms of

* Letter to Ney, dated 17th Floréal, Year XII.

monarchy, and create great dignitaries, and marshals of the empire. Ney was included in this new aristocracy ; he received the staff of supreme command, as did also Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Davoust, Bessières, Kellermann, Lefebvre, Perignon, and Serrurier.

CHAPTER III.

“WHEN Pepin was crowned,” says Montesquieu, “it was one ceremony more, and one phantom less: he only acquired ornaments by it, but nothing in the nation was changed.” This was the case with the new dignity conferred upon Napoleon Bonaparte: it gave him no power which he did not already possess; it only consolidated those rights which the people had conquered, placed them beyond the reach of the assassin’s dagger, and established a centre round which the nation could rally when it was attacked; and if the revolution was assailed in the person of its chief, its benefits were nevertheless now secured to the nation. The army, constantly exposed to see its dearly bought fame dishonoured, and the principles for which it had fought and bled disavowed, hailed with enthusiasm this new pledge of security. It remembered that the old aristocrats of France, eternally plotting against the life of General Bonaparte, had always found him in their way whenever they made any attempt hostile to the nation. It was he who beat them on the 13th of Vendémiaire; it was he who foiled them on the 18th of Brumaire, and utterly frustrated their plans. In him the army beheld the champion of the new prin-

ciples, the hero of civilization and improvement: and it applauded with transport the elevation of a man whom his own labours, and the odious conspiracies against him by foreign states, had equally tended to establish as the representative of the French revolution. Thus, each day brought its particular homage to the popular chieftain; and the unanimous feeling in Bonaparte's favour, which pervaded all classes of the nation, was evinced each day by some fresh act. The new Emperor always loved to honour courage, and excite it by rewards and distinctions. In Italy he decreed swords of honour to those who won distinction in the field; in Egypt he gave pecuniary rewards; and in France he addressed words of praise. Being now invested with supreme authority, he instituted the Legion of Honour, distributed in person crosses to the troops then at Paris, and directed the marshals of the empire to distribute, among the corps on the coast, a number of crosses destined for each. Ney received seventy-seven great and a hundred and thirty small crosses for the corps under his command. But the enthusiasm in favour of the Emperor was so great that all regretted the distance which had prevented them from being in Paris, to be invested with the badge of honour by Napoleon himself; and this feeling was so strongly expressed by the general officers that Ney felt it incumbent upon him to state the circumstance to him who was the object of it. He wrote as follows:—

“It is my duty to acquaint your Majesty with the feelings of regret expressed by the general officers

at not receiving this glorious decoration from your Majesty's own hands. They had flattered themselves that they should have been equally fortunate with those members of the Legion of Honour who were present, at Paris, at the ceremony of the 14th of July.

"This desire, in which I share with them, has its origin in our attachment to your Majesty ; and you give an additional value to your favours when you confer them in person."*

The anniversary of St. Napoleon's day was not far distant, and the Emperor, anxious to meet the wishes of Ney's officers, fixed that anniversary for the ceremony of investiture. But an idea struck him that the same opportunity might serve to appease the jealousies existing among the different French armies, and induce the troops of each corps to entertain the same kindly feelings towards each other which they seemed to do towards him. His idea was, in short, to make the troops forget the distinctions of the Rhine and the Adige, and that all their hatreds as well as all their affections should be in common. He therefore ordered the several corps stationed at Bruges, at Ostend, and at Montreuil to join those encamped at Boulogne. The commanders of the corps received directions to concert with each other in bringing the troops into amicable communication, and making them fraternize. The camp of St. Omer's was to receive the others ; and Marshal Soult, by whom it was commanded, was anxious to

* Letter of the 6th Thermidor, Year XII. (July 25th, 1804.)

ascertain Ney's opinion as to the best mode of providing accommodation for his guests.

"His Majesty," wrote Soult, "seems desirous that the troops of the camp of Montreuil should take up their quarters in our camps, and become the guests of the troops of St. Omer who now occupy these camps. The latter will entertain the men composing your army, as well as the troops who shall arrive from the different reserves. By these means his Majesty's wish that the troops should fraternize together, will be accomplished. It would be difficult to fulfil this his Majesty's intention, unless your troops were settled in our camps; although perhaps you would prefer that they should be encamped with tents in some spot agreed upon near the place fixed upon for the ceremony, or else cantoned in the neighbouring villages; and that, under all circumstances, they should be in our camps on the 28th, to dine and fraternize with the other troops, who will be present at the ceremony. If you think, my dear Marshal, either of these plans preferable to the other, pray let me know immediately, and I shall lose no time in concerting with you on the best means of insuring its execution."

Ney adopted the plan which appeared most convenient to his colleague. Soult narrowed his cantonments, the cavalry was quartered in the villages, the infantry provided with tents; each soldier had a companion, each officer a guest; and the whole army found quarters within the limits assigned to the camps of St. Omer.

On the day before the ceremony, all the several

corps reached the quarters prepared for them. The evening was spent in friendly greetings and joyous anticipations. Some indulged in dreams of military fame; others, and these composed the majority, called to mind the hazards and dangers which the revolution had run. And, in truth, it had been assailed by conspiracies and armies in succession: at one time it was near being crushed by the plots of the emigrants; at another it was in imminent danger from a coalition of kings. But Napoleon Bonaparte had always appeared as its tutelary genius: he had repaired the disasters consequent upon the defeats of its brave defenders, and frustrated the wily plots of its enemies. He was now in the act of consummating his work, and taking under his especial guard and governance the principles which he had defended. Personal ambition, as these brave soldiers could not but admit, had some share in his undertakings; but who was free, they asked, from faults? Besides, it was the least of two evils: it was the alternative between the confirmation, by law, of a popular dictatorship, which already existed, and a total sacrifice of the benefits of the revolution. With the exception of himself, there was no man to whom the preservation of these benefits could be safely confided. Of three leading generals, in whose keeping the fortunes of the revolution had been placed, one had quitted his country, another had betrayed the principles he defended, and the third had just entered into a compact with the emigrants. When each of the Emperor's competitors had proved himself so ignominiously faithless to his

country, it was hardly fair to expect that he should himself be free from every weakness of human nature. At all events Napoleon was faithful to his principles, and his own ambitious feelings were closely interwoven with the greatness of the French nation.

At daybreak the cannon announced the beginning of the festivities, and every one was soon ready to participate in them. The troops were drawn up upon the ground set apart for the ceremony; it was a gentle slope terminating at the cliff on the seashore. In the middle of it was a throne, from which all the columns, formed by the several corps, diverged.

The infantry was spread out in the shape of a fan; in its rear the cavalry described a semicircle, and farther back were the inhabitants of the country, whom curiosity had brought to the spot. The esplanade formed an amphitheatre, and each spectator could distinctly perceive, at one and the same time, the English coast whence the elements of war were propelled, and that throne which had just been raised amid agitation and alarm. Each individual present was impatient to reach the one, and each internally resolved to defend the other to the last drop of his blood.

The thunder of the artillery, announcing the arrival of the Emperor, turned the thoughts of the spectators into another channel. Each became silent and motionless; and when the monarch appeared at the head of his suite, a spontaneous shout rent the air, every hat was waved, and a profound si-

lence succeeded this burst of enthusiasm. The new members of the Legion of Honour were assembled at the head of each demi-brigade, and Napoleon, having ascended the throne, rose and addressed them as follows :—

“ You severally swear, upon your honour, to devote yourselves to the service of the republic, to co-operate with all your might in maintaining the integrity of its territory, and defending its government, its laws, and the property acknowledged by those laws. You swear to resist, by every means which justice, law, and reason allow, all attempts to re-establish feudality and its titles, or the privileges which they conferred. You swear, in short, to co-operate with all your might in the maintenance of liberty and equality. You swear all this !”

These were the very principles which the new members of the Legion of Honour had themselves proclaimed; these were the principles which they had made triumph in the field of battle; the Emperor’s appeal to them was therefore received with the loudest acclamations. Napoleon continued :—

“ You, soldiers, severally swear to defend, at the peril of your lives, the honour of the French name, your country, and the institutions and laws by which it is governed !”

“ We swear it !” cried the soldiers simultaneously.

The sound of this oath had scarcely subsided, when a small squadron appeared in full sail entering the port of Boulogne. It was commanded by Captain Daurier, who after having been obliged to put twice into Havre-de-Grace, to escape from the British

cruisers, had at length eluded their vigilance and reached Boulogne in safety. The applause was renewed on receiving these particulars, and the troops then filed off. The remainder of the day was spent in dancing, running races, and other manly sports; the whole was wound up by a display of fireworks, and when the bouquet was let off, fifteen thousand men, formed in line of battle at the top of the cliff, kept up a running fire with starred cartridges.

All this produced fresh acclamations, and the night had set in for some time ere the army returned to their quarters. But the festival, and the preparations for it, had been perceived by the British cruisers, who gave intelligence to their government of the evacuation of the camps of Bruges, Ostend, and Montreuil, and the concentration of the whole French army before Boulogne. All England was in rumour at this news; and the British government persisted in its opinion that the prizes assembled on the French coast were intended to engage decked men-of-war, and that the army about to embark in these boats intended to attempt forcing the passage, and hoped to cross the straits by the military strength of the flotilla alone. It therefore resolved to anticipate the French army and trouble its preparations: its cruisers accordingly got under weigh, and proceeded to attack the flotilla at Boulogne.

The military combinations, which were to enable the French to reach the coast of Great Britain, being far from complete, the armament was content merely to take up the gauntlet thrown to it. The fire was opened at about half range, and in a short time the

engagement became very animated. The Emperor in person directed the French. He was in a boat with Admiral Bruix. The British squadron was soon thrown into confusion; one of its cutters was taken, and its sloops of war were in tow. The French gun-boats closed their ranks in order to attempt boarding the British vessels: but these, not daring to prolong the struggle, hauled off and were soon out of sight. The Emperor then withdrew, after expressing his satisfaction at the conduct of the flotilla, and stating that the enemy, whom it had just dispersed, would not fail to attack it again; but that if it continued to display the same energy and courage, all the British navy together would be unable to prevent the French army from landing on the English coast, where they would be able to crush, in its very strongholds, that demon of strife and bloodshed which had so long desolated the Continent.

He had inspected and was well acquainted with this part of the coast: he therefore proceeded towards Montreuil. Detachments were placed on the road at short distances from each other, and the Emperor was everywhere received with the most deafening acclamations. About two-thirds of the camp of Montreuil had been unable to assist at the ceremony, and were desirous of expressing, like their brethren, their zeal and attachment towards their sovereign, whilst those who had already done so during the ceremony, were eager to repeat their professions.

Ney's men were all under arms; and they exe-

cuted every manœuvre and evolution in line with such precision and rapidity, that Napoleon was delighted at their skill. He expressed his satisfaction to Ney, to whom he stated how much he was gratified at the noble bearing of the men and their elegant and soldier-like appearance, contrasting so strongly with the rags which, until lately, had formed their only clothing.

“No doubt, Sir,” Ney replied, “the military administration, like every other branch of the public service, has experienced the happy effects of your government. It is greatly improved, and has become provident and economical. But if I might venture to make an observation, I should say that it would be advantageous to the service, if zeal were stimulated by rewarding the exertions of those by whom the duties of the commissariat are conducted.”

“Do you mean in the person of your commissary-general?” asked the Emperor.

“Yes, Sir : I mean by making Marchand a commander of the Legion of Honour. No man is more deserving of such distinction ; no man has sounder principles or more extensive talents, and none is more devoted to your person.”

The Emperor approved of this idea, and thought that the members of the military administrations ought likewise to reap the reward of their exertions, by sharing in the honours bestowed on the officers and soldiers of the army. He therefore followed Ney's suggestion with regard to Marchand, and other functionaries in the same branch of the ser-

vice. Having continued to observe the conduct of the troops, he had the oldest soldier of each demi-brigade presented to him. He interrogated these veterans, inquired in what battles they had fought, and where they had been wounded; and he conferred a pension upon each of them. Such acts of liberality produced a powerful effect among the soldiery, who became still more attached, if possible, to their Emperor. They saw that the helm of state was now held by a man who could appreciate the services of a soldier, and that opprobrium and beggary would no longer be the reward of bravery in the field of battle.

Meantime, the British had resolved to make another attack upon the flotilla. Having invented new engines of terrific effect, they announced the speedy destruction of the armament. On the 1st of October they set sail, and next day fifty-four vessels of all sizes, under the command of Lord Keith, appeared off Boulogne. The British commander, having ranged his fleet in line of battle, sent off twenty fire-ships towards the harbour. These were filled with fire-works and projectiles, having a pendulum affixed, which after a certain number of oscillations fired the train and blew up the whole.

These horrible machines passed through the French lines and exploded between their vessels and the shore. The shock was dreadful; it was felt at a distance of three leagues in the country, but it did very little damage to the flotilla. A peniche was destroyed. Its crew, seeing one of these vessels approach, took it for an armed brig, and determined

to attack it at close quarters. Having approached, they were about to attempt boarding it, when with a sudden explosion it blew them and their boat into the air. Notwithstanding the danger, the French endeavoured to board several of these vessels and prevent their exploding: they succeeded in getting possession of one, and were thus able to ascertain of what these formidable engines of destruction were composed.

The action continued till the night was far advanced. The British had lost several vessels, either captured or sunk; and the French line being still compact and in good order, they dared not continue the conflict. Thus the expensive attempt, which had been so long in preparing, and had been announced with so much pomp, proved a total failure. This ill success was therefore likely to weaken the confidence of the other states of Europe in British power.

Ney expressed his satisfaction to Soult at the result of this attack, and invited him to a military fête at Montreuil. Ney's men were becoming daily more skilful in their evolutions, and their general daily acquired a stronger taste for those manœuvres which he alone directed.

"On Sunday next, my dear Marshal," he wrote to his colleague, "I shall manœuvre sixteen battalions; if your occupations enable you to absent yourself during part of the day, I shall be delighted to receive you in the midst of my troops. The manœuvring will begin at seven in the morning, in the plain near the Chateau de Recques, on the road from

Boulogne to Montreuil, and at a distance of about three quarters of a league from the latter town. Should you find it necessary to return to Boulogne the same evening, you can easily do so. You promised to come and see me after the Emperor's departure, and I call upon you to keep your word."*

The sight was deserving the attention of such a man as Soult. The troops were active and expert in each evolution and manœuvre, and Ney, with his own powerful and manly voice, gave the word of command to this immense column.

* Letter of the 11th Vendemiaire (Oct. 3rd, 1804.)

CHAPTER IV.

THE summer was over, the rains began to be more frequent, and the winds, which are always high upon the coast, to blow with greater violence and impetuosity. The huts already bore marks of their fury: the walls of some were blown in, the roofs of others carried away, and the men were constantly employed in repairing the ravages of the gale, which were as constantly renewed. The health of the troops began to suffer, and Ney resolved to pull down the huts and erect stronger, larger, and more commodious buildings, better calculated to resist the wind, and keep out the cold and rain, than the slight wooden cabins occupied by the men during the fine weather. There was however so great a scarcity of stone, that recourse was had to the fragments found in the beds of the neighbouring rivers. Pits were also opened in the soil to find those materials for building which its surface did not yield. At length, by dint of labour and perseverance, a sufficient quantity was collected, and each soldier became either a mason or a carpenter. They pulled down and built up again with the same zeal and alacrity; and, in a short time, spacious

habitations covered the ground previously occupied by slight and narrow huts.

Nor was this Ney's only care. As winter was fast approaching, he was anxious that the men should have a place of meeting, where they might pass their hours of leisure when off duty. He therefore had three spacious halls built behind the front of each regiment. The first, in the centre of the first battalion, was used as a fencing-room; the second, in the rear of the second battalion, was a dancing-room; the third, placed on the same parallel, but in the space which separated the two battalions, formed a room for the officers. Here exercises in military tactics took place. Ney ordered that each officer should give an account of the manœuvres in which he had taken a part, and of the grand military operations he had personally witnessed. The attack of fortified places, the administration of armies, a knowledge of military law — all, in short, requisite to constitute an able commander, he wished them to study and make themselves masters of; and as solitary research in such matters often leads to error, he built this room for the purpose of their studying together, assisting each other with their observations, debating upon what they had seen, and stating any opinions they might form upon different practical points of the military art. This was perhaps a difficult and irksome undertaking for men previously accustomed to a life of activity; but Ney thought it indispensably necessary to add precept to example, and fortify the courage which led them to victory with the theory

in which the French officers of that period had often shown themselves deficient.

Marshal Ney himself submitted to the same task he imposed upon the officers under his command. He felt the want of correcting many erroneous notions, and of discussing many still undecided questions in military tactics. The standing regulations of the army were ambiguous in many points and defective in others; they did not determine either the positive strength or the composition of the several corps, and the manœuvres which they indicated were in many respects bad. Ney endeavoured to give fixed notions on these matters. He sought to discover what ought to be done, and he pointed out the defects of what had been done. He disclaimed any intention of writing a treatise on these matters, which he modestly said was "beyond his abilities;" but he was anxious, he stated, to acquire information, and to search into the causes of that which he was interested in knowing. In his opinion, the tactics of military manœuvres consisted principally in forming rapidly into close columns, and in making the troops march in line of battle. He applied himself to the study of the different manœuvres by which these objects might be attained, by simple movements in column, or by battalions on one or two lines, and he pointed out all the changes of front which might be executed by this mode, as well as by the evolutions most commonly in use. He successively examined all that related to armies in active service: the commissariat, marches, encampments, arms, and man-

œuvres ; and it is but doing him justice to say, that he pointed out at that period most of the improvements which have since been made. This work, so full of novel views at the time it was written, is of less interest now ; but we shall give some fragments of it at the end of this volume, indicating those parts which have since been carried into execution.

Time sped on amid these studies, and the British government had begun to acquire more confidence. Still it laboured under the same mistake with regard to the Emperor's plan for the invasion of England. There were four thousand flat-bottomed boats on the French coast ; and the building of new prames and peniches proceeded with vigour. Every thing tended to confirm the opinion that the flotilla was to cross the channel by main force. If the attempt upon England offered any chance of success, the British cabinet fancied themselves well acquainted with the nature and extent of such chance. But the English ministers were completely deceived ; and while they were watching with intense anxiety the flotilla at Boulogne, the real plan of invasion was in progress of development. Napoleon never entertained the idea of attempting to cross the channel in gun-boats under cover of a fog, or during a gale of wind, or by main force. His plans were better conceived, and this immense armament of gun-boats was a mere feint to conceal them. His object was to scatter the forces he could not encounter—to disperse the fleets he could not hope to overcome. The French fleets were to sail from Toulon, Roche-

fort, Cadiz, Brest, and Ferrol, entice away in pursuit the British blockading squadrons, lead them into the midst of the Indian Ocean, return suddenly and get into the channel before the British ships had crossed the line on their return. The French would then command in the channel, and be masters of the coast on either side of it ; and their forces might embark in the gun-boats and get possession of London, nay, of the whole of England, before the immense navy of Great Britain, which Napoleon had been unable to encounter hand to hand, could interfere. The French fleets, which had been long detained in the harbours above mentioned, at length set sail, and the troops on the coast received orders to hold themselves in readiness to embark at a moment's notice. The instructions given to the several commanders were precise, and provided against every contingency ; they even indicated the boats in which each corps was to embark. Arms, horses, ammunition, soldiers, civilians,—each object had its place, and each individual was stationed according to his rank and employment.*

* TO MARSHAL NEY, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE CAMP
AT MONTREUIL.

Paris, 29th Ventose, Year XIII.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

I have the honour to inform you that, in conformity to the intentions of his majesty the Emperor, the troops of the camp at Montreuil are to form three divisions, which are to embark in the following manner on board of the first and second squadrons of the imperial fleet:—

One division shall embark on board of the vessels of first and second class belonging to the first squadron ; the second division

Ney had only to see to the exact execution of the orders transmitted by the minister. He distributed his ammunition, and the tools he was to take with him, among the several transports. He then arranged

on board the vessels of the second class of the second squadron; the third division, or the division of the van-guard, on board of the vessels of the third class belonging to the first and second squadrons.

Consequently the first division, commanded by General Dupont, shall embark on board of the fifth and eighth divisions of gun-boats, and the ninth and tenth divisions of gun-barges, forming part of the first squadron.

The second division, under the command of General Loison, shall embark on board of the eleventh, twelfth, seventeenth, and eighteenth divisions of gun-barges forming part of the second squadron.

The third division, or division of van-guard, under the command of General Malher, shall embark as follows:—General Marcognet's brigade on board of the tenth and eleventh divisions of peniches of the first squadron, and General Labassée's brigade on board of the twelfth and thirteenth divisions of peniches of the second squadron.

The horses of the third regiment of hussars shall be shipped on board of the first division of stable transports attached to the first squadron, and those of the tenth regiment of hussars on board of the fourth division of stable transports attached to the second squadron.

The horses belonging to the artillery trains shall be shipped on board of the second division of stable transports attached to the first squadron, and of the third division of stable transports attached to the second squadron.

The artillery shall be shipped on board of the first and second sections of the twentieth division of transports.

Lastly, the baggage of the staff officers and of the troops composing the first division, commanded by General Dupont, and of the first brigade of the van-guard under General Marcognet, shall be shipped on board of the thirtieth division of transports;

the distribution of the flotilla : he directed that each battalion and each company should make themselves acquainted with the vessels assigned to them, and every man be ready to rush on-board at the very first

and that of the second division, commanded by General Loison, and of the second brigade of the van-guard under General Lambassée, on board of the thirty-first division of transports.

Each transport vessel shall be definitively attached to its section of gun-boats, gun-barges, or peniches. There shall be no further change. Each company shall know its boat ; and each general of division shall know the officer by whom it is commanded.

Three men from the third regiment of hussars, and from the tenth regiment of chasseurs, shall be placed in garrison on board of each stable boat belonging to the first squadron. The battalion of the train shall supply three men for garrison on board of each stable boat of the second squadron.

The vessels destined to convey the baggage of the army shall be distributed as follows : — a boat for each regiment ; one for each general of division ; one for two brigadier generals. They shall be assigned to each in the squadron to which they respectively belong.

In furtherance of the above instructions, I have to request, Monsieur le Maréchal, that you will prepare a statement by which I may ascertain, by separate tables :—

1st, with regard to the war flotilla :

The distribution of the infantry, by battalions or by companies, on board of each section of the flotilla ;

The distribution of the artillery companies ;

The distribution of the train companies ;

The distribution of the companies of sappers ;

The distribution of the cavalry ;

The distribution of the staff officers, inspectors, commissaries-general, unattached officers of health, together with the number of horses and grooms each will be allowed to ship on board of the war flotilla, according to their respective ranks ;

And, lastly, the distribution of the guns, carriages, ammuni-

signal. But as dispatch necessitates great precision of movement, he resolved to drill his troops into such precision, by making them execute sham embarkations. The divisions composing his corps successively fell in upon the shore, and by turns escalated the gun-boats in which they were to embark. This they executed in beautiful style, and Ney was satisfied with it; but the divisions had only performed it separately,—when together, they might display less coolness and promptitude, and he resolved to put them to the test.

The infantry, cavalry, and artillery having assembled on the beach, each column placed itself opposite to its own vessels. All were formed into platoons for embarking, at a little distance from each other, and divided by sections. The whole, from left to right, were in a parallel line to the anchorage. A first gun was

tion-waggons, and generally all the *personnel* and the *matériel* which each war boat of the first and second squadrons of the imperial flotilla is to contain.

2ndly, with regard to the transport flotilla:

The distribution of the garrison men on board of each section of the flotilla;

The distribution of the troop horses;

The distribution of the artillery;

The distribution of the baggage of the army and of the staff horses;

And, lastly, the distribution of the commissariat, secretaries, sutlers, grooms, servants, and generally all the *personnel* and *matériel* to be contained in each of the transport vessels attached to the first and second squadrons.

I enclose a list of the vessels of war and transports belonging to each of these squadrons.

BERTHIER, Marshal and War Minister.

fired: the general officers and staff officers alighted from their horses, and placed themselves at the head of the troops which they were respectively to lead. The drums had ceased rolling, and the men had unfixed their bayonets. Every thing was ready, and each man prepared. A second gun was heard nearer to them, and the generals of division gave the word of command: "Prepare to embark!" The brigadier-generals received it, transmitted it to the colonels, and the latter to the officers under them. A dead silence now succeeded; each man was attentive and motionless, and each controlled the intense excitement under which he laboured. A third gun gave forth its thunder, and the word, "Forward columns!" immediately followed. Each soldier now yielded to an almost uncontrollable emotion, when a last report was heard. The word "March!" was pronounced; it was almost drowned by acclamations; the columns immediately put themselves in motion, and got into the boats. In ten minutes and a half, twenty-five thousand men were already on board. The troops felt assured that they were immediately to set sail: they took their places, and were engaged in making their quarters comfortable, when a shot was unexpectedly fired. The drums rolled, and called the men to arms; they formed upon the decks of their respective boats. A fresh discharge soon followed the first; they fancied it was the signal for weighing anchor, and they received it with cries of "Long live the Emperor!" but it was only an order to land. They were unable to control the expression of their disappointment, which broke forth in

murmurs. They resigned themselves, however ; and scarcely had thirteen minutes elapsed ere they were again upon the beach, formed in line of battle.

The Marshal now saw that he could depend upon his preparations, and calculate to a minute the time his troops would occupy in embarking.

His provisions and hospital stores were shipped ; and he had only to put on board of his prames cartridges for his infantry, some flints, and a chest of tools which he expected from St. Omer. All being thus in readiness, he was now waiting for the curtain to rise upon the last act of the drama.

The British navy had completely fallen into the snare laid for it : the moment the fleet cruising off Rochefort perceived Missiessy to leeward, it bore down in pursuit of him. The British fleet off Toulon was still more completely misled. Ville-neuve, who had sailed on the 15th of January, was struggling with a violent gale of wind, while the British admiral stood out to sea ; for so great was the anxiety of Lord Nelson, who commanded the British fleet, to anticipate the French in reaching the place to which he fancied they were bound, that he paid no attention to the contingent chance of their not weathering the gale. And in truth the scattered French ships were obliged to return and refit. They had affected to threaten Egypt, and Nelson hastened thither ; but not finding them, he proceeded to the West Indies, where he was equally unsuccessful. He then went from coast to coast in pursuit of a fleet which was snugly anchored at Toulon. His colleague was also enticed to persevere in a vain pur-

suit. The channel was now almost free, there was but a small British force in the Mediterranean, and the moment seemed to have arrived when a decisive blow was to be struck, and England attacked upon her own shores.

The unexpected return of Missiessy destroyed many of the chances of success. That admiral, who had proceeded very rapidly to Martinique, had returned with still greater rapidity; and the fear evinced by the British government of an attack upon Jamaica having consequently subsided, the naval force about to be sent to the assistance of that island was prevented from leaving the channel. Thus many of the chances in favour of Napoleon's enterprise were lost. Still the French armament was calculated to inspire confidence in the ultimate result. Napoleon had fifteen ships of the line at Ferrol, six at Cadiz, five at Rochefort, and twenty-one at Brest. Ville-neuve had directions to unite them with the twenty which he commanded, and with this prodigious fleet to take possession of the straits of Dover. He accordingly sailed from Toulon on the 30th of March, anchored on the 14th of May at Fort-de-France, took the Diamond on the 25th, stood out to sea on the 28th, and it was known that on the 23rd of June he was in the latitude of the Azores. He was therefore expected every hour to make his appearance in the channel. But when every one was in anxious expectation of his arrival to consummate the Emperor's gigantic plan, intelligence arrived that, having sustained considerable damage in an action of some hours with the British, he had sought refuge

at Ferrol. Thus was the opportunity lost of reaching the British coast without opposition.

All hope, however, was not yet destroyed, and Napoleon had still confidence. It is well known that he continued his preparations and encouraged his navy. He still flattered himself, and the nation felt as he did, that Villeneuve, penetrated with the full importance of his mission, would again put to sea, effect a junction with Gantheaume, and after dispersing Cornwallis's squadron, at length reach the channel. But Villeneuve seemed beset by a strange fatality: he left Ferrol only to run into Cadiz; and there was no further dependance to be placed upon the co-operation of his fleet. What was now to be done? The Emperor sought advice and information from every man of talent and experience in the kingdom. If Villeneuve remained at Cadiz, what measure was to be taken? Such was the question he proposed, and upon its solution depended whether the undertaking should be pursued or not. No one could strike out any satisfactory plan, and yet every one seemed convinced that the invasion was practicable; but the scheme seemed so excellent to Napoleon, and so likely to succeed, that although the non-appearance of the squadron had caused a good opportunity to be lost, still he would not give up the scheme, as he entertained a hope that another propitious opportunity might occur for carrying it into execution.

Meantime, some British vessels having appeared in observation off the Boulogne roads, Napoleon ordered that troops should be embarked, and these

vessels attacked. Ney immediately made the necessary preparations, put three thousand picked men on board the peniches, and gave the command of them to officers in whose bravery and talents he could confide. General Marcognet, remarkable for his coolness and intrepidity, and Chef-d'escadron Crabbé for his prudent valour, had the direction of this column, with orders to board the vessels off the harbour. The weather however was so bad, that the peniches could not put to sea;* meantime other circumstances intervened, and led to new plans.

Austria, which had hitherto appeared timorous and wily, now became every day less reserved. Her government seemed occupied in laying in provisions, and forming depôts of military stores. At length she assumed an attitude of defiance, and war became inevitable. The Emperor had long watched her motions; he had previously declared that he was desirous of peace, but of "a frank, evident, and entire peace — a peace which the movements of troops, and the formation of hostile camps should

* TO THE WAR MINISTER.

I have the honour to inform your excellency that the fifth and eighth divisions of gun-boats, and the four divisions of peniches, were early yesterday provided with sufficient garrisons, and ready to put to sea; but towards midnight a westerly wind sprang up, freshened considerably, and rendered it impossible for the intended expedition to quit the harbour.

It is now half past five; and I have just ordered the troops to land. Those on board the peniches have passed a somewhat rough night. They evince, nevertheless, no other regret than that of not having been able to reach the enemy.

NEY.

Etaples. 25th Thermidor, Year XIII. (August 13th, 1805.)

not render more deplorable and a thousand times worse than war could be." Austria was led into these measures by Great Britain, which had at length perceived, to its full extent, the dangerous situation in which the Emperor's combinations had placed it. The French fleets might repeat their manœuvres, plan them better, and evince greater daring. If the British government despatched its squadrons in pursuit of them, England would be exposed to the hazards it had already run; if the French fleets were allowed to proceed peaceably in their operations, the British colonies would be in danger. The navies of England being insufficient to guard the two hemispheres, the cabinet of St. James's caused a diversion by exciting Austria to declare war against France.

The French armies on the frontier soon advanced and crossed the Inn; and nothing now remained but to attack the forces of the coalition. All was speedily prepared to take the field. The troops at Zeist, Ostend, Calais, Boulogne, and Ambleteuse, were already in motion. They set out on their march with their arms and baggage, and without changing the order of their organization. Their march was conducted in the order of war: each was at his post; the generals of division at the head of their divisions, the brigadier-generals at the head of their brigades, and the colonels at the head of their regiments. It was, as it was then stated, the execution of a grand military movement. But a counter-march was soon to bring back the troops to the stations they had just quitted; and the strictest orders were given to pre-

vent all disorders during the march. The artillery was assembling waggons and cattle upon the Rhine, and the commissariat collecting provisions from Landau to Spires. The troops were to take nothing with them that would delay the march, and no article that could be provided at Strasburg was to be removed from their late quarters on the coast.* To these general arrangements, Ney added many of his own. He was anxious that the men should be taken care of, their cantonments made comfort-

* TO MARSHAL NEY.

Boulogne, 9th Fructidor, Year XIII.

You will receive enclosed, Monsieur le Maréchal, the orders which I sent off this morning for the movement of counter-march which your army is to execute.

The 22nd regiment of the line, forming part of the centre, shall proceed to Etaples on the evening previous to the departure of your last division, in order to occupy the camp near that place.

I have given orders to send to Etaples the third battalion of that regiment now at Belhune, and likewise its dépôt.

Brigadier-General Martillière shall proceed to Etaples to take the command there, under the orders of General of division Carra Saint-Cyr, who shall reside at Boulogne.

There shall be two companies of artillery at Etaples, selected by the senior inspector ; also an artillery officer to command the artillery, who shall be under the command of General Favie, commanding the artillery upon the coast, and resident at Boulogne. Measures will be taken with regard to the fleet and the sailors.

Commissary-General Desmandoir will remain provisionally in charge of the commissariat at Boulogne, and direct the service at Etaples.

General Songis is charged with the necessary arrangements, in order that on your arrival at Strasburg you may have cattle for all your artillery. He is authorized to send with the divisions all he shall consider necessary for this purpose, and which

able, and every unnecessary fatigue spared them. He entered, on this head, into the most minute details. He directed that none but the corps fixed upon to occupy the head-quarters of the different stations should be taken to them, and that those who were to take up their quarters beyond them should proceed by the shortest road, and without halting. He likewise paid great attention to the men's arms, and to their shoes. In a word, his vigilance and anxiety were so great, that, according to a flattering expres-

he may think he cannot be supplied with at Strasburg. The general in command of your artillery shall do nothing without the orders of General Songis. All that belongs to the commissariat of your army must follow it, for it will be provided with food upon the banks of the Rhine by the same officers as when it formed part of the army on the coast.

We are only making a grand military movement, it being the Emperor's intention to order, a few months hence, your return hither by a counter-march.

Each military authority and each commissariat must remain at its respective post during the march.

I have given orders that all the muskets marked as unfit for service, shall be changed. Take care that each division remains until this order is executed. You may correspond on this subject with General Songis, who has sufficient authority for making the necessary exchanges, on drawing up the usual *procès-verbaux*.

Such, Monsieur le Maréchal, are the principal arrangements which regard the forces under your command ; but, as you cannot leave till after the departure of the last detachments of your army, you will retain the command of the district until that time. You will likewise give to General Martillière such information as you may deem necessary.

It is possible I may have forgotten some particulars, but we will supply this omission in executing the movement.

BERTHIER, Minister of War.

sion of the government, "he left nothing for the minister to do."

His colleagues displayed the same zeal, and the army rolled on like a torrent towards the Rhine. The simplicity of its organization gave it great rapidity of motion. It was divided into seven corps, each of which had its separate commissariat, and acted independently of the others, though directed to the same object. The Emperor had reserved to himself the command of the whole; the war minister fulfilled the duties of major-general of the army, and transmitted his sovereign's orders to the different commanders. In the absence of the Emperor, his lieutenant, Prince Murat, directed the operations of the army.

The several corps remained under the command of the marshals. The first, which occupied Hanover, was confided to Bernadotte, the second to Marmont, the third to Davoust, the fourth to Soult, the fifth to Lannes, the sixth to Ney, and the seventh, which still remained on the coast, to Augereau. A certain force of cavalry was attached to each, and the surplus of this arm was formed into a reserve consisting of six divisions: two of heavy cavalry, and four of dragoons.

The first division of heavy cavalry was commanded by General Nansouty, the second by General D'Hautpoul; the first reserve of dragoons by General Blein, the second by General Walter, the third by General Beaumont, and the fourth by General Bourcier.

All these corps did not amount to more than a

hundred and eighty thousand men. This was not a force commensurate with the greatness of the contest in preparation ; for the coalition did not confine its efforts against France to the troops it had in line : it appealed to the population of its territories, calling upon every individual to assume arms in defence of their liberties. It thus brought in array against the French, the very principles it was anxious to destroy. In Germany, it raked up national antipathies ; it flattered Italy with a spirit of independence ; and it sought everywhere to sow the seeds of insurrection against Napoleon. Not that the mass of the population thus sought to be seduced, were to be caught by such a bait, for they generally valued the institutions of the French nation, and did not behold, without distrust, this sudden interest taken by kings in the popular cause ; but they were easily excited by the picture which was drawn of the sacrifices imposed upon them, and by showing them that the French did not allow them to share in the political benefits which they themselves enjoyed. The coalition was thus preparing to attack France upon the whole of the vast line which they occupied. Russians, British, Swedes, and Hanoverians had joined in the contest ; the approach of such a host of enemies might therefore lead to results unfavourable to the French, and a reverse place them in collision with populations impatient of their yoke. But the Austrians had imprudently spread themselves through Bavaria, before the Russians had well quitted Poland. Napoleon therefore hoped to an-

ticipate the former, overpower the latter, and by placing himself between both, dissipate this league of kings before it was in a state to injure him seriously in the field. According to his calculations, a junction of the allies with each other could be effected only in Suabia. Now, from this country to Boulogne, where the French troops were stationed, the distance was about the same as to Podolia, where the Russian troops were assembled. He therefore made it his object to start first, and to conceal, for a few days, the secret of his grand manœuvre from Boulogne to the Rhine. Marmont, whose forces were on board the flotilla when he received orders to march them into Germany, was directed to give out that his troops were landing to go into cantonments; and Bernadotte, stationed in Hanover, was to confirm the opinion that he intended to spend the winter there. Each however pressed his march, and proceeded with equal celerity to the point indicated, so that the French columns were pouring upon the banks of the Rhine, when the members of the coalition fancied them in snug quarters upon the shores of the British channel. The first and second corps had reached Mayence; the third was spread round Mannheim; the fourth had halted in the neighbourhood of Spire; the fifth was quartered at Strasburg; and the sixth, which had left Montreuil on the 28th of August, reached Lauterburg on the 24th of September. In this short interval Ney's division had executed a march of more than three hundred leagues, which was upwards of ten

leagues a day. History has no example of such rapidity ; but the celerity of this march had prevented the artillery and engineers from taking their measures, and nothing was ready for crossing the Rhine. Thus the troops had a short time to take breath and obtain a momentary respite from their fatiguing duties.

CHAPTER V.

THE several corps rested on the 25th and 26th of September. They were refreshed, in excellent condition, and eager to meet the enemy. The movement was resumed on the morning of the 27th: Murat, at the head, crossed the Rhine at Kehl; Lannes followed him; and both advancing upon the outlets of the mountains, brought all the Austrian forces upon the Iller to a stand. From the number of the French reconnoitring parties, and the frequency of their patrols, Mack fancied that the whole of Napoleon's army was advancing upon him. He supposed that the French, having resolved to penetrate through the defiles of the Black Forest, would attempt to reach the upper waters of the Danube; and he accordingly took measures to prevent them. But whilst he was waiting until they appeared in front of him, they were in motion to fall upon his rear. Marmont had crossed the Rhine at Mayence, Davoust at Mannheim, Soult at Spire; and all, following corresponding roads, were proceeding by forced marches upon Ingolstadt and Donawert.

Ney, like his colleagues, had received orders to cross the river; but his departure from Boulogne had been so unexpected, and his motions so rapid, that nothing was ready. The artillery had been unable to collect its cattle, or the commissary-gene-

ral to provide rations ; and the engineers by whom the bridges were to be built had not even begun this necessary work. Ney was however so eager to push on and lead his men to victory, that his very impatience gave him the means of overcoming the difficulties which stopped him.

Ammunition was what he most wanted ; he therefore issued a requisition for the horses belonging to the several villages of the country occupied by his corps, and thus succeeded, if not in setting his guns in motion, at least of being followed by a number of cartridges adequate to a first consumption. And, as it was of no use to possess the means of fighting, unless the enemy could be reached, he directed that the banks of the river near to where he was, should be examined. But the timber found on them being insufficient for his purpose, he rode to Hagenbach, where he found both boats and timber in abundance. Thus the means of building a bridge being obtained, the engineers immediately set to work, and erected one a little below Lauterburg. Ney pressed the work, and in fifteen hours it was finished. The troops immediately fell in and were formed to the right of Lauterburg. The drums were beating, the bands playing, and never were French soldiers actuated by stronger feelings of enthusiasm. All had waking dreams of glory, and each congratulated himself that he had at length reached those banks upon which they were to meet and to conquer the Austrians. On a sudden the drums rolled, a dead silence succeeded, and the word of command alone interrupted the calm which followed.

The movements being finished, and the troops formed into close columns, the different generals conveyed to them the Marshal's thanks and congratulations. They had passed through France without committing the least excess; they had shown themselves patient, attentive to discipline, affable towards the hosts upon whom they had been billeted, and he could not sufficiently testify his approbation of their conduct. This unexpected praise filled them with emotion, and in the satisfaction of their hearts they swore they would continue to deserve the praises of such a commander. The whole army was full-dressed, and both officers and men had placed small branches of oak in their caps, as a presage of the victories which they soon after gained. They marched in columns of regiments,*

*** ORDER OF MARCH OF THE SIXTH CORPS OF THE GRAND ARMY IN CROSSING THE RHINE BY MEANS OF THE BRIDGE THROWN ACROSS THAT RIVER OPPOSITE DURLACH, ON THE 4TH VENDEMAIRE, YEAR XIV.**

The troops shall march with the right at the head, and by intervals of sections, if possible. If not, they shall march by the flank, and the sections shall re-form as soon as the passage is effected.

First division: General Dupont.

First Brigade: General Bouges.	} 9th light infantry and 1st huss.	{	The 1st squadron of the 1st regiment of hussars.
			The 1st company of voltigeurs of the 1st battalion.
			The 1st company of carabiniers.
			2 pieces of artillery: a four-pounder and a howitzer.
			8 companies of the 1st battalion.
			The 2nd battalion of the 9th, with its light company at the tail of the battalion.
			A detachment of ten gendarmes.

and defiled in beautiful order, to the cries a thousand times repeated of "Long live the Emperor!" On a sudden the news reached them that Napoleon had just arrived at Strasburg; it spread like wild-

Second
Brigade :
General
Marchand. { 32nd regiment of the line : 2 battalions.
6 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder, 4 eight-pounders, and a twelve-pounder.
96th regiment of line : 2 battalions.

Second division : General Loison.

First.
Brigade :
General
Villatte. { 1 battalion of the 6th light infantry.
2 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder & a howitzer.
2 battalions of the 6th light infantry.
19th regiment of the line : 2 battalions.

Second
Brigade :
General
Roguet. { 69th regiment of the line : 2 battalions.
6 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder, four eight-pounders, and a twelve-pounder.
76th regiment of line : 3 battalions.
A detachment of twelve hussars.
A detachment of ten gendarmes.

Third division : General Malher.

First
Brigade :
General
Marcognet. { 1 battalion of the 3rd light infantry.
2 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder & a howitzer.
2nd and 3rd battalions of the 25th light infantry.
27th regiment of the line : 2 battalions.

Second
Brigade :
General
Labassée. { 50th regiment of the line : 2 battalions.
6 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder, 4 eight-pounders, and a twelve-pounder.
59th regiment of the line : 2 battalions.
A detachment of twelve hussars.
A detachment of ten gendarmes.

Cavalry : General Tilly.

General
Dupré's
Brigade. { 3rd regiment of hussars.
12 pieces of artillery : namely, 3 howitzers, 6 eight-pounders, and 3 twelve pounders.
10th regiment of chasseurs.

The

fire through the ranks, and the enthusiasm of both officers and men amounted almost to delirium. Each swore to conquer or perish, and each aspired to fighting under the Emperor's eye.

The Rhine was now crossed, but the artillery remained behind, and the enemy were close at hand. Nor was this the only drawback: the provisions were nearly all expended, and troops were arriving from all directions. Marshal Lannés having unexpectedly withdrawn from the mountains, where he had spread alarm, was advancing upon *Louisburg*. Murat was debouching upon the *Gleims*, the imperial guard was proceeding to *Canstadt*, and there being no means of meeting the consumption, Ney, though in the second line, was ordered to provide them.

The reserve park, the provisions and subsistence, the *personnel* of the commissariat; the baggage of the army beginning with that of the general staff,—the remainder to follow after the order laid down above. The four last companies of the 59th regiment to close the march and serve as an escort. Each regiment shall leave only a serjeant and twelve men with the waggon. During each day's march the battalions shall alternately supply four companies, according to the order laid down.

The squadron of gendarmerie shall close the march.

The chef-d'escadron, Jammeron, charged with the police of head-quarters, shall provisionally do the duty of baggage-master general. He shall maintain the most exact order during the march, and point out the places where the waggon are to be parked, always being kept near the reserve park of artillery.

A detachment of twenty men from the select company of the 3rd hussars shall follow everywhere the Marshal commander-in-chief. This detachment shall be relieved every fifth day by one from the 10th hussars, alternately with the 1st hussars and the 22nd chasseurs, as soon as this last regiment joins the corps d'armée.

Though this commission was conveyed in the most flattering terms, no attempt was made to conceal the difficulties of finding such supplies, but at the same time the necessity of doing so was strongly urged.

The troops were threatened with famine, and the country was exhausted. It was as urgent to supply the wants of the one, as to avoid ruining the other. Provisions must be collected from a country afflicted with a sudden irruption, and more than that, they must be supplied immediately. But the generals were ably seconded by the different commissariats, and that which at any other time might have been considered impossible, was done in a few hours. The inhabitants felt that the French had not deserted the cause which they had so long defended, and, under the excitement of such feelings, made the most extraordinary exertions.

But this was by no means the case with their rulers: they feared and detested the principles of the French, and in seeking the support of Napoleon's eagles, they followed them only with a species of hesitation. Several among them had agreed to unite their forces with those of France. Ney summoned to his standard those who were selected to join him; but no act of hostility having taken place, and the fortune of the French arms being still undecided, each urged a pretext for not obeying the summons. One stated that he had disbanded his troops; another that he had not yet assembled his. The Elector of Baden required a fortnight's

delay before he could get ready to begin the campaign; and the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt could not collect his forces in less than a month. Both might have sent at a moment's notice the number of troops they had agreed to supply; but they wished previously to see which way the tide of events flowed, and then determine to which side they should carry assistance.

The Duke of Wirtemberg went far beyond his fellow sovereigns, and gave a specimen of Germanic arrogance with which he thought to intimidate Marshal Ney. The left wing had pressed its march; Soult had reached beyond Heilbron, and Davoust was advancing upon Oettingen. The movement which was carrying the French troops into the heart of Bavaria had begun, and Ney advanced to support it. But no sooner had the Duke notice of his march, than he did all in his power to stop him. He had, without making the least objection, suffered the Austrians to cover his dominions with their patrols; but his friends and allies, the French, whose chances of fortune he had pledged himself to share, were not to be allowed to approach either Stuttgard or Louisburg; and what is still more singular, the French minister at the duke's court supported these unreasonable pretensions. He invoked the rights of the alliance between France and Wirtemberg, and expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of the direction pursued by the sixth corps. This solicitude in favour of the Duke of Wirtemberg was certainly most exemplary; but Ney had his instructions, and quietly pursued his march. The diplo-

matist, still more impetuous than the prince at whose court he resided, now broke through all bounds. He summoned, not Marshal Ney, but the "Commander" of the French troops, to halt and not to proceed to Louisburg; and as if this were not sufficient, he sent the summons by one of the duke's officers.*

Nevertheless, the French troops pressed their march and soon debouched. The elector in a fury put himself at the head of his guards, declared himself an independent sovereign, and dared any one to enter his residence, threatening to fire at any individual who should be bold enough to brave his prohibition.

Such menaces were likely to have but little weight with a man of Ney's character; nevertheless the Marshal, on being informed that the whole of the royal family were assembled at Louisburg to celebrate the marriage of one of its members, generously resolved not to trouble the nuptial festivities, and withdrew to the banks of the Necker. This considerate act of kindness emboldened the elector, who was naturally violent, tyrannical, and conceited;

* The undersigned, Commander of the Legion of Honour, Minister Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the Emperor of the French to his Highness the Elector of Wirtemberg and to the Circle of Suabia, requests and commands, if necessary, the commander of the French troops proceeding to Steinheim, not to take the road to Louisburg, the electoral residence, and inhabited at the present moment by the Elector, but to proceed along the causeway leading to Zuffenhausen and Canstadt, where an Austrian detachment arrived about twelve o'clock this day. The commander, moreover, may place full reliance upon any information given to him by the electoral officer, bearer of these presents.

CH. DIDELOT.

and being accustomed to see every thing bend to his harsh will, he took it into his head that Ney had withdrawn in consequence of his threats, and determined to try whether he could not take further advantage of the awe with which he fancied he had inspired the French marshal.

He began by setting forth, in the most pompous terms, the friendship which subsisted between himself and the Emperor Napoleon, boasted of the supposed deference which that monarch would pay to his wishes, and concluded by demanding that Stuttgard should enjoy the same exemption from receiving the French troops as Louisburg had done. In addition to this, he himself undertook to point out the road which the sixth corps was to pursue, and the position it was to occupy. But Ney, taking no notice of these vain pretensions, continued his movement. Again did the French minister interfere, give the elector all the weight of his official support, and insist upon the French troops keeping from Stuttgard. Ney replied to this singular injunction by pressing his march. The diplomatist in a rage protested against this breach of alliance; he bitterly complained of this want of deference to a prince who was the friend of the Emperor Napoleon, and appealed to Murat for an ultimate decision on the point at issue. Ney however paid no attention to this protest: he had instructions to occupy Stuttgard, and he summoned the garrison to open the gates of the town. The governor of Stuttgard was an old and prudent man, who felt all the danger of his situation, but who had received orders to employ force against force.

His garrison manned the ramparts, but he hesitated as to the manner in which he should act under these delicate circumstances. On the one hand, he was bound to obey his instructions; on the other, the unfortunate inhabitants would be unnecessarily exposed to the inconvenience of a siege, which must soon end in the fall of the place. Ney also filled him with dread: the French marshal was threatening and imperious; he displayed that sternness and inflexibility of purpose which he so well knew how to assume in the execution of his duty. Fear, and the instinct of preservation, soon put an end to the governor's hesitation, and he chose to run the risk of being disgraced by his self-willed prince, rather than, by an injudicious resistance, expose the town under his command to the horrors of a capture by storm. He therefore opened the gates to Ney, but was immediately after brought to a court-martial by the elector's orders, and condemned to imprisonment for life.

Ney, who had been the cause of the old general's crime, was denounced to his Emperor; the elector complained officially, and in terms of great bitterness, of the violence offered to him in thus occupying Stuttgard against his will, and demanded reparation for the insult. It was intimated to him that this was going too far, and he therefore dropped the matter, but it still rankled in his heart.

The Austrians covered Wirtemberg; their armies and those of the French were already, as it were, in presence, and still the princes of the right bank persisted in eluding their engagements. The more

Ney pressed them, the greater were their protestations of zeal ; but they did nothing. Sometimes the different corps which they intended to supply, could not be immediately assembled ; sometimes the cattle for the artillery had not yet arrived. In vain was message after message sent to these sovereigns and to their generals : the same pretences were always put forward, the same difficulties always stood in the way of compliance. Meantime, the movement continued, and as it would have been dangerous to have left doubtful allies in the rear of the French army, Ney stated his situation to the Emperor, who, aware that success always puts an end to such wavering, replied by the following pithy note.

“ MY COUSIN,

“ I calculate upon your having reached Stuttgart. Marshal Lannes is on his way to Louisburg, ready to fly to your assistance should you require it. Prince Murat, aware of what is passing, is proceeding to Radstadt. Should it be necessary for him to march to you, he will not wait for orders. Watch the movements of the enemy ; endeavour to cut off their cavalry patrols. Nevertheless it is not my intention that you should go beyond Stuttgart, nor even there have any serious engagement.

“ Whereupon I pray God, &c.

“ NAPOLEON.”

“ Strasburg, 8th Vendemiaire, Year IV.

(September 30th, 1805.)”

It was no difficult matter to do what the Emperor required. The French troops, having turned the

mountains, were able both to descend and to ascend the Danube; they could therefore reach the enemy in all directions. Mack was in a very critical situation: he knew not where to make a stand or whither to proceed. Instead of grouping his forces in a central position, which would have enabled him to try the chance of a battle, he was anxious to occupy all the passes. One day he would send his forces in one direction, the next he would march in an opposite one. If he reached Vorarlberg, he would retrograde upon Stockach, march to Ulm, or Memmingen, always abandoning the point already occupied by his forces in order to defend one which they did not occupy.

Ney thought that "if advantage were taken of this information, to push with celerity upon Donauwert, and debouch upon Ulm and Riedlingen, the Austrians would be unable to make head and must inevitably be defeated." Orders for this movement were accordingly given; the French forces advanced, and took up a position. But Murat sent Ney an order to divide his corps, place part at Hessingen, part at Suessen, and his van-guard at Heydenheim. The two former of these places being at a distance of six leagues from each other, this movement appeared too dangerous to Ney, and he refused to execute the order.

"When the enemy is in presence," he replied to Murat, "the van-guards are the posts by which the divisions in line are covered. In this case, they cannot be further asunder than twice the distance of cannon-shot. When the enemy is far off, to place

these divisions six leagues asunder is giving them up to the light cavalry and exposing them to be cut off."

These observations were unanswerable; but Murat supplied the place of the Emperor, and as he peremptorily repeated the order, Ney was forced to obey. This was the first act of the kind that Murat had ventured to take upon himself; Ney yielded to it with bitterness of spirit, which he took care that the prince should know. He wrote to him as follows:—

"Coppingen, Oct. 4th, 1805.

"You cannot doubt that I experienced great pain in reading the letter which your Serene Highness wrote to me this morning.

"It is only after having commanded during two years the corps which the Emperor has placed under my command, and at the very instant I am about to justify the confidence which his majesty reposes in me, that I find myself suddenly deprived of the portion of glory which my zeal, the confidence my troops have in me, and some experience in war may have led me to expect. You are a soldier, Prince, and the bitterness of my regret cannot be matter of surprise to you.

"I will not remind you that I have gone through my various campaigns with honour, and am wholly a soldier. I have never aspired to any other glory than that of arms; but I may be allowed at least to say that, the Emperor having shown me such distinction and kindness, it is lamentable that I should lose the opportunity of proving to him, by some important service, the extent of my gratitude.

“ At all events, we are on the eve of a battle ; my post is sacred to me, and I will never think of quitting it so long as I have a chance of shedding my blood in his majesty’s service.

“ I have opened my heart to your Serene Highness with the candour of a soldier, and with the same candour I beg you will believe in the sentiments, &c.

NEY.”

Murat did not then enjoy the celebrity to which his subsequent deeds raised him. Only a short time before, he had been aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, now Emperor, and his marriage with that general’s sister, together with a high office at court, constituted all his claim to the command of the army. Ney’s letter was calculated to remind him of his sudden elevation ; but he felt that he had courage and talent to do that which he had not yet done to deserve it. He was judicious enough to make due allowance for Ney’s letter ; too high-minded not to admit the justice of the Marshal’s complaints, he was too generous to avail himself of the advantages which the Emperor had given him, and he endeavoured to render as light as possible to Ney, the subordination which so deeply wounded the latter’s feelings.

“ I approve,” he replied to the offended marshal, “ and participate in the feelings you express ; and were I in your place, I should think as you do. But I did not solicit the command which his majesty the Emperor has entrusted to me ; and when, this morning, I made you acquainted with my arrangements, it was with a view to put an end to the con-

fusion existing in the march of the two corps, and not to make you feel that I had the power of giving you orders."

This explanation was far from satisfactory to Ney; but Lannes being almost immediately after subjected to the same thing, both these marshals resigned themselves to receiving from Murat those orders which they wished to receive only from the Emperor.

CHAPTER VI.

THE movement continued; the French occupied Nordlingen, held the outlets leading to the Danube, and were on the eve of consummating a great military combination. Marmont had orders to march upon Neuburg, Davoust to follow him, and Bernadotte to push towards Munich with the Bavarian army, of which he had just assumed the command. Murat, on the other hand, was to press the advance of his columns, debouch before Donawert, force that place, and get possession of the bridge. As he was to be supported by Lannes and Soult, there seemed no doubt of his success.

These manœuvres were now unmasked to the Austrians, who had not before noticed them. They perceived with alarm the French unexpectedly debouching upon their rear, and they found it necessary to run all the risks of their disadvantageous situation, in order to preserve their communications. The Emperor would not however expose his army to any of the hazards sometimes caused by a desperate enemy in a critical situation, but resolved to bring all his available forces into the field before he attacked them. He accordingly directed Ney to join him at Donawert. This marshal had just taken up a position on the Brentz. Instead of

establishing his force at Heydenheim where he could get neither provisions nor waggons, he had taken upon himself to modify his instructions, and had marched his columns into fertile valleys where every thing was abundant. His corps accordingly occupied Herbrechtingen, Giengen, and Hohenmemmingen, positions which not only supplied the necessaries not to be found at Heydenheim, but commanded the course of the Danube, and all the roads leading to that river from Ulm to Donawert; but, as a drawback, these valleys were rather too far to the right of the line of operations. Ney, being called at a fixed hour to the point where he was to engage the enemy, found that he could not possibly reach it if he were first to march to Neresheim. But to proceed thither along the bank of the Danube, and effect a long march by his flank, might possibly appear to his staff a dangerous measure. He did not however share in the apprehensions of his staff with regard to the enemy's plans, neither did he in general participate in its views; he therefore decided upon attempting this movement. He felt convinced that Mack had only "a few squadrons of light cavalry before Donawert, and would take good care not to give battle with the Wernitz in his rear." As for any attempts upon the sixth corps by the Austrians, he was sure that they had no certain intelligence concerning his march, and did not even know that the French were formed into a corps-d'armée.*

The marshal was right: the fourth corps carried

* Ney's letter to the war minister, dated 14th Vendemiaire (October 6th.)

Donawert without resistance, and the sixth had completed its movement along the banks of the river without accident, when it received orders to take up a position. Soult, who had advanced upon Donawert on the 6th, found in the neighbourhood, as he stated in a letter to Ney, only a few bodies of cavalry, which he did not even attempt to engage. After an uninterrupted march of fifteen hours, he had arrived in front of the bridge which he was to carry; his light infantry sprang upon the joists which the Austrians were attempting to burn, and the river was crossed.

The Austrians now fell back upon the Lech; the French pursued them, and advanced towards Neuburg. But the Emperor being informed that the enemy were concentrating their forces upon this place, and supposing they had abandoned Michelsberg, resolved to get possession of Ulm. He accordingly directed Ney to attack them on the left bank, whilst Soult pressed them on the right. He was convinced that the Austrians had retired from the banks of the river, and that by marching he could circumscribe their operations. But Ney was of a different opinion; for the Austrians had just quitted the left bank of the Lech, and were advancing in confusion towards Ulm. The bridge at Guntzburg being destroyed, their flanks were secure and their rear out of reach. He therefore had no doubt that they would again attempt to debouch upon the left bank, and thus place the dragoons at Heydenheim in danger, if not immediately ordered to fall back upon his corps.

Ney reached the heights of Bamberg on the 8th,

and on the 9th continued his movement. Loison had taken Elchingen, Dupont occupied Albeck, and Malher had halted at Riedhausen. Thus Ney's division threatened Guntzburg and Ulm at the same time, and was able to defeat or keep the Austrian army in check whenever it appeared. But fortune seemed to have deprived Mack's army of the power of undertaking any thing. Davoust* had nearly reached Aicha, Bernadotte was entering Munich, whilst Soult and Marmont were pushing towards Landsberg. The Austrian forces were now completely invested, and their field of operations confined to the space between the Upper Lech and the Danube. Thus circumscribed and surrounded, they

* Head-quarters, Donawert, 16th Vendemiaire,
(October 8th) 12 o'clock at noon.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

The Lech being crossed, Marshal Soult's army is on its march to Augsburg, where it will arrive this evening.

Prince Murat with ten thousand cavalry will be this evening at Zumershausen, and will establish posts at Burgau.

Marshal Lannes will be this evening half-way from Zumershausen to Vertingen. Marshal Davoust with his corps-d'armée will be at Aicha. It is impossible that the enemy, to whom our having crossed the Danube and the Lech is known, and who likewise cannot be ignorant of the alarm which their troops beyond the Lech must necessarily feel, should not think seriously of retreating. It is probable that they will at first attempt doing so upon Augsburg; but they will soon find that they are too late, and will then try to effect their retreat by Landsberg. If our forces arrive in time, they will either determine to give us battle, or withdraw into the Tyrol; but it is likely they will choose the alternative of fighting. Under this supposition, the Emperor wishes that your corps-d'armée should take a part in the battle. His Majesty does not think that the enemy would be rash enough to cross to the left bank

had no alternative but either to throw themselves into the Tyrol, or to risk a battle ; as to the idea of their venturing upon the left bank, Marshal Berthier considered it would be madness in them to attempt it, and still greater madness in the French to suppose that they would do so. A battle was therefore inevitable, and Napoleon was anxious that Ney should take a part in it. "Do not lose sight of this fact," wrote the war minister : "that the Emperor is obliged to spread his forces a little, and that he requires all his confidence in his generals, and all their activity, so that they do not remain idle whilst he is acting."

Ney's men were overpowered with fatigue : during of the Danube, because all their stores are at Memmingen, and they have the greatest interest in not losing their power of communicating with the Tyrol, which by such a manœuvre they would leave entirely exposed. It is the Emperor's intention, therefore, that you proceed this day to Guntzburg, and occupy it with your van-guard. You will use all the means in your power to unite to your force General Gazan's division, and General Bourcier's division of dragoons.

You will give notice to General Baraguey-d'Hilliers that, should the enemy be so injudicious as to attempt penetrating by Heydenheim, Aalen, and Nordlingen, he will receive instructions from you to retreat before them, pursuing the road to Heydenheim, Aalen, and Elwangen, so as to dispute this ground, which is the great and only communication for everything coming from France, and is so well covered with detachments, that after a short march General Baraguey-d'Hilliers will have collected twenty thousand men. As for you, Monsieur le Maréchal, with Gazan's division, and General Bourcier's dragoons, your force will consist of more than thirty thousand men. Repair the bridges in your rear, and obtain as many passages as you can, so that the moment you are sure that the enemy have evacuated

three days they had obtained neither provisions nor rest. The rain fell in torrents, the ground was soaked with water, and all the evils of a military life seemed to have befallen these brave soldiers at the same time. But Berthier's despatch was pressing, and Ney directed General Malher to make preparations for the march. On the 10th, at three o'clock in the morning, this general reached Riedhausen, and resuming his march at dawn of day, advanced towards Guntzburg. The road was broken up, the country intersected with marshes, and it was with the greatest difficulty that he effected his movement. He at length reached the banks of the river. Ney had indicated to General Malher a ford which he had formerly known, and which no doubt still existed, directing him to try its depth, and stating what parts of it seemed best calculated

Ulm, and are marching either upon Augsburg or upon Landsberg, you may by a flank march keep in a parallel position with them, and bear upon their flanks the moment Marshal Soult, Marshal Davoust, or Marshal Lannes, shall come up with and attack them. You will however take care, Monsieur le Maréchal, to keep a division at Gundelfingen, in order that it may serve as your van-guard, in the event of the Emperor wishing to make you march upon Ulm, by Lawingen, and Albeck. The Emperor supposes that you have had the bridge of Dillingen repaired.

By it, Marshal Lannes can communicate with you. Send out cavalry patrols to meet him.

Marshal Murat has also received orders to communicate with you. Send cavalry patrols to meet him also. The present time, Monsieur le Maréchal, is of great importance; the Emperor depends upon your zeal, your talents, and your activity: all are requisite at this moment.

MARSHAL BERTHIER, War Minister.

to afford him a passage. But Malher cared not for obstacles; indifferent as to the depth of the water, he formed his columns and led them to the attack. Marcognet being ordered to force Guntzburg, opened his fire, fell with his whole force upon the Tyrolians who defended the approaches to the Danube, and carrying all before him, cut the men to pieces and took their guns. He then dashed into the river, crossed the first branch, seized the island, and reached the bridge across the second branch. The timbers supporting the bridge were cut away; he however attempted to set them up again, but grape-shot being poured without intermission upon his troops, he was forced to abandon the undertaking and retire to the skirt of the wood.

Ney, soon informed of the resistance which Malher encountered, sent the second division to his assistance; but they arrived too late, General Labassée having been more successful than his colleague. This latter general had reached the point indicated in his instructions. Neither the difficulties of the ground, nor the fire of the infantry, nor the thunder of the artillery, could stop him. He reached the bridge of Reseinsberg, sprang upon the platform, crossed it in an instant, and rushing upon the Austrian troops through a very destructive fire, cut many of them to pieces and put the remainder to flight. These he pursued, drove into the place, and took possession of the heights.

The Austrian army, almost entirely assembled under the walls of Guntzburg, immediately came up and renewed the action, which every instant

became hotter and more deadly. General Malher advanced with the rest of his troops to the assistance of his colleague. The Austrians were thrown into confusion, and their infantry entered the place, which they dared not again leave. But their cavalry still held out; its confidence was not yet shaken, and it persisted in its attempts to force the heights occupied by the brave 59th. It advanced with great gallantry towards this regiment, but, being constantly repulsed by a well-sustained fire, as often returned to the charge with fresh fury. Five times it was driven back, and still it was not discouraged: it rallied, re-formed, and attacked again. The gallant 59th lost its best officers; Colonel Lacuée was killed, and two chefs-de-bataillon were hors de combat. The regiment, eager to avenge its losses and obtain satisfaction for these repeated desperate assaults, made a mighty effort, and by its fire completely disorganised this obstinate cavalry, which it at length forced to withdraw from the field. Malher thus invested the place and entered it before day-break.

The second division was just in sight, and Ney himself, with two-thirds of his force, appeared upon the right bank. He had forced the passage of the river, captured the cannons, the colours, and about a thousand men. The Emperor expressed his satisfaction at this successful operation, but still persisted in believing that the enemy were manœuvring upon the Iller, and pressed Ney to advance and take possession of Ulm. "He left it to him to march as he thought proper in order to effect this object, but the

place must be surrounded by the 11th ; this was important in every point of view." *

Ney prepared to make the attempt : Loison pushed on by the right bank, Dupont was directed to approach the left, and Baraguey-d'Hilliers, who was at Stolzingen with the dragoons, received orders to proceed towards Languenau, and take up a position behind Albeck, which he was to support. Dupont was to provide ladders, timbers, and every other implement necessary for scaling, without, however, making any attempt till further orders. But, in a course of such rapid events, each hour brings its particular incident—each instant leads to fresh combinations. On a sudden, intelligence arrived that the Russians had begun to appear upon the Inn. The French Emperor hastened to meet them, and Murat took the command of the right wing. This prince, being master of the enclosed area which contained the Austrian army, fancied likewise that he must give them the coup-de-grace upon the Iller, and consequently proceed thither in search of them. It was to no purpose that Ney argued against this opinion, urging that the archduke, having left Guntzburg at the head of ten regiments of infantry and several corps of cavalry, had no doubt proceeded to Ulm where fifteen thousand men had arrived from Schaffhausen the day before ; that all tended to show that the Austrian prince aimed at cutting off the French communications, and intended to carry on his operations by the left bank. Murat

* General order of the 10th of October, Zomershausen, six o'clock in the evening.

refused to believe that the archduke would dare to undertake such a thing. Marches, sickness, and the want of provisions, he said, had made sad ravages in the French army; and his principal instructions were to prevent the Austrians from communicating by their right with the forces on the confines of the Tyrol. He was therefore anxious to assemble all the troops he could dispose of and give the enemy battle upon the Iller.

Ney deemed this a very imprudent step, and endeavoured to dissuade Murat from pursuing it. This led to a warm discussion between the two commanders. They were equal in rank, and both hasty and impetuous in temper. The one was impatient at being commanded by an equal of less standing in the service; the other was determined that his orders should be obeyed. They were on the point of settling their dispute by single combat; already had Ney written to appoint a place of meeting, when, recollecting that he was in the presence of the enemy, he altered his mind, and resolved to bear that which he could not prevent. He sent a corps of observation in front of Albeck, and summoned Dupont and Baraguey-d'Hilliers to the right bank.* Nevertheless the movement ap-

* "TO GENERALS DUPONT AND BARAGUEY-D'HILLIERS.

"Guntzburg, 19th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.
(October 11th, 1805.)

"In compliance with the Emperor's new arrangements, the right wing, upon which the 6th corps depends, is to be under the orders of His Serene Highness Prince Murat. As it is the formal intention of His Serene Highness to concentrate upon the right bank of the Danube, and parallel to the Iller, all his

peared to him so serious that he considered it his duty again to point out its consequences to the minister. He represented to him the chances of the approaching battle, and the danger of abandoning to the Austrians the outlets from Ulm. They might suddenly attack the rear of the French the moment the latter had crossed the river, seize their communications, and place them in the situation in which they had themselves been placed. They might

united force, in order to give the enemy battle, who seem determined to defend themselves, only a corps of observation shall remain at Ulm, on the left bank of the Danube. This corps shall be composed of the 1st battalion of the 9th light infantry, and the two last squadrons of the 1st hussars, lately attached to General Baraguey-d'Hilliers' division of cavalerie-à-pied. This detachment shall be commanded by M. Crabbé, my aide-de-camp, to whom I forward particular instructions.

"General Dupont shall therefore immediately quit his position at Albeck, advance with the two first squadrons of the 1st hussars, and his infantry, which shall be followed by the two regiments of dragoons commanded by General Sahuc, and cross to the right bank of the Danube either by the bridge at Elchingen, or by that at Guntzburg. Should the morasses be impracticable, this force shall return by Gundelfingen, and thence proceed to Guntzburg. In either case, the artillery and baggage shall pass by Gundelfingen, and take the lead in the march, by setting out a few hours before the troops.

"The division of General Baraguey-d'Hilliers shall precede the movement of the troops under the command of General Dupont, and shall preserve the same order in the advance of its guns and baggage. NEY."

This order was, no doubt, unknown to a writer who constantly boasts of having been Marshal Ney's providence. The following is an extract from a work, entitled, "*Napoleon au tribunal de César*," vol. ii. p. 112. "Fortunately Ney took upon himself to execute but a part (of Murat's orders): he sent

march upon Elwangen, Heydenheim, and Neresheim, and even push on to Nordlingen, if they thought proper. Nor was this the only evil: the French wanted to give them battle, but how, if such a movement took place, was this to be effected? how were the Austrians to be got at? The Iller was nowhere fordable; the Austrians had only to destroy the bridges, and the French forces had no means whatever of crossing. Even should the Austrians determine to

Loison's division from Elchingen to the Roth, but left Dupont and Baraguey-d'Hilliers upon the left bank of the Danube, in spite of the orders of the Grand Duke of Berg. I was only made acquainted with these particulars at a later period, and it gave me a high opinion of Ney's talents. I afterwards found that I was indebted for it *to one of his officers.*"

It is true that Ney left Dupont and Baraguey upon the left bank, but not in spite of the Grand Duke's orders. The circumstance took place in a manner much more flattering to Ney's self-love. The Emperor, surprised at seeing his communications given up to the Austrians, revoked some of his arrangements, and Ney had the satisfaction of receiving orders from the Grand Duke to re-occupy the positions whose importance he had so vainly endeavoured to point out.

"I am grieved to the heart," he wrote to Dupont, "at the dreadful fatigue I am forced to make your brave men undergo; but it has just been determined by Prince Murat, who assures me it is a formal order from His Majesty, that your division shall remain in observation upon the left bank of the Danube, in order to keep in check the enemy's forces now at Ulm. Select the position that shall appear to you best calculated to effect this object."

Guntzburg, 20th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.

(October 12th, 1805.)

Believe, after this, the vain boasting of a man who pretends to have directed Ney, and who proves himself ignorant of the marshal's most simple combinations.

give battle, the result might be disastrous for the French, who were without stores, and among whom the want of provisions was already very severely felt. However brave and efficient their cavalry might be, still the want of forage, and the long marches it had performed, had cruelly thinned its ranks. The division of hussars and chasseurs attached to the sixth corps did not exceed nine hundred strong. That of General Bourcier, consisting of six regiments of dragoons, contained at most sixteen hundred men under arms. The whole corps could not muster more than seventeen thousand men, which number did not exceed the amount of a strong division.

The rest of the right wing had equally suffered, General Gazan's division was reduced to five thousand men, that of General Oudinot mustered about six thousand, and that of General Suchet eight thousand ; the dragons-à-pied four thousand ; the cavalry at most five thousand. General total, fifty thousand men. Could such a force, and in such a state, inspire much confidence ? And were the advantages expected worth the risks to be run ?

The marshal's anticipations proved but too correct. The Austrians, having reached Ulm on the 10th in the night, crossed the Danube on the morning of the 11th, and immediately spread like a torrent over the communications of the French army. Meantime Dupont executed his movement ; he and the Austrians came unexpectedly upon each other, and a fierce engagement ensued. The immense superiority of the Austrian forces rendered their fire very destructive, and the French rushed upon them with

fixed bayonets. This threw their ranks into disorder ; but scarcely was a column broken ere another took its place. Baraguey, who alone supported Dupont's division, did not appear, and Dupont, obliged to sustain the attack of a whole army, was unable to keep back the columns which covered the plain, and the Austrians continued their movement.* Werneck marched upon Heydenheim, and Reisch proceeded with a strong column towards Elchingen. This position was almost abandoned ; he seized and occupied it, and made such immediate preparations as circumstances required. He damaged the bridge, cut up the timbers, undermined the piles, and left only a narrow passage for the purpose of observing the right bank. In the avenue leading to it he planted six pieces of cannon, supported by a nume-

* GENERAL DUPONT TO MARSHAL NEY.

Chabanois, August 6th, 1806.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

I have just received your letter in which you ask for further particulars, in reference to the action of the 19th Vendemiaire, concerning the dragons-à-pied, commanded by General Baraguey-d'Hilliers. The following is what occurred : On receiving your orders to march upon Ulm, my division began the march and reached Hasslach at noon. Having been informed by your instructions that the division of dragoons was to form in second line behind mine, and support it in case of need, I caused Albeck to be entirely evacuated, and withdrew all the baggage of my division, in order to leave this point free, and avoid all confusion, so that nothing might impede the movement of the division of dragoons. You are aware, Monsieur le Maréchal, that I had scarcely reached Hasslach ere I found all the Austrian army prepared for battle, and my division immediately engaged it. Under circumstances so critical, and of which there are but few

rous body of troops, and his position then seemed secure. But not content with what he had already done, he occupied the gardens round Elchingen, and entrenched his forces within the castle, the convent, and the chapel. Every wall was converted into a fortification, every corner made use of, and every natural obstacle turned to some account.

Ney had just led his second division to the banks of the Roth, when he received orders to proceed to the Leiben, and to send Dupont back to Albeck. The Emperor Napoleon had, like Ney, seen the importance of maintaining the position on the left bank, and had severely censured the plan of disgarnishing and abandoning the heights which commanded the river. The marshal had just despatched orders to the first division to occupy them, when he received intelligence of the severe action which that division

examples, I despatched orderly upon orderly to General Baraguey, to acquaint him with my situation, and urge him to press his march; but I know not whether these orderlies ever reached him: the fact is, no assistance came.

I cannot give you any positive information with regard to the hour at which your orders were received by that general; but I believe that the officer of your staff who brought me mine was likewise the bearer of his, and he can therefore give you an exact account of his mission.

I have always thought, Monsieur le Maréchal, that if your instructions had been executed, and your corps-d'armée been able to engage, the Austrian army would have been annihilated on that day. The success obtained by my division, and which it owes entirely to the truly extraordinary courage it displayed, only leaves me one regret, that of not having fought under your eye, and in the presence of the Emperor.

Receive, Monsieur le Maréchal, the assurance of my respectful sentiments.

DUPONT, General of Division.

had maintained, and of the preparations for defence made by General Reisch. He immediately despatched the third division after the second, and hastened in person to join the columns under Loison, which he overtook on the 13th, at seven o'clock in the evening; at eight he resumed his march, and on the 14th, at daybreak, he appeared before Elchingen. This little town is built principally upon a platform, whence its houses and gardens extend to the banks of the river. On the right is a forest, which reaches to the Danube, and on the left, villages and clusters of trees. In front, the ground is intersected with enclosures, and terminates in a peak sixty toises above the level of the river. From the right bank, Elchingen had the appearance of a strong fortress covering formidable works, defended by a numerous army, and to be approached only after crossing a river which alone seemed to form an insurmountable barrier. Ney however brought up his forces to the bridge, where they collected some timbers, and tried to adjust them. The artillery thundered from the place, and the French soldiers, soon out of patience at the slow progress of their preparations, rushed upon the works in spite of the enemy's fire, sprang from timber to timber, overturned all who opposed them, carried the passage in a very short time, and the whole French force debouched upon the left bank. There was here only a narrow meadow in which the French troops could form into line; however, they marched up to the enemy, drove them from garden to garden, and from house to house, and succeeded in forcing them to evacuate the principal buildings. No-

thing daunted, the Austrians continued to make a vigorous defence ; and when at length they were expelled from the last houses, they rallied, formed upon the platform, and seemed resolved again to try the chances of fortune. But the French light cavalry had debouched : Colonel Colbert was already in line of battle, and General Roguet, having driven before him large bodies of Austrians which had offered a most determined resistance in the abbey of Elchingen, had just crowned the heights. Reisch, drawn up in two lines, with his right against the woods which skirt the road to Oettingen, developed his force in a line parallel to the Danube. At a short distance a little higher up, was General Miezery, placed there to maintain the communication between this column and that under Werneck which was proceeding to Heydenheim ; and in the rear of the enemy, but it was not known where, was General Dupont's division, which, as we have before stated, had been first sent to the right bank, and immediately after received orders to re-occupy Albeck.

The situation of the French army was critical, and its arrangements somewhat confused ; but Ney did not despair of bringing the action to a successful issue. Having feigned to operate with his right, he drew the enemy's reserves upon that point ; and no sooner did he perceive their centre weakened, than, putting himself at the head of part of his forces, he manœuvred to cut it off with his left, and seize its communications. Colbert developed his column below Elchingen ; whilst Roguet, with the 69th, fell back by platoons to the left, intrepidly

brushing along the enemy's line, and receiving their fire close to the muzzles of their firelocks. The 76th, which followed in columns, bore to the right, and the 18th dragoons began also to move. The collision was dreadful, and in a moment two of the Austrian squares were broken. But Reisch now discovered the object of Ney's manœuvre; he perceived that the marshal wanted to turn him, and was trying to seize upon the cross road leading from Elchingen to the high road from Albeck and Ulm. He therefore closed and grouped his columns, from one extremity of his line to the other, forming them all into squares, and making them press to the right. But this manœuvre was of no avail: the French infantry dispersed the Austrians in the woods, the cavalry broke them in the plain, and they were overpowered on all sides. They succeeded, however, in preserving their communications; some single corps were driven upon Languenau, the remainder threw themselves into the forest of Kesselbrun, where they rallied. But Villatte having followed the movement, his columns were already on the skirts of the wood. General Malher likewise reached the field of battle, cleared the left, and placed his division on the second line. The action was now resumed with fresh fury; the French were about to carry the Hasslach woods, and establish themselves on the road to Albeck; and victory seemed already to have crowned their exertions, when an incident occurred which had well nigh turned the fortune of the day. Werneck, informed of the battle, had returned in all haste; Dupont, on the other hand, who had taken

refuge at Brentz after the action at Hasslach, had executed his movement by Languenau, and had just reached Albeck, when the Austrian column appeared. The one held the road, the other resolved to force it, and the struggle was violent ; but the Austrians could not with the most prodigious efforts succeed in overcoming the resistance opposed to them. They made several charges, but were always driven back with loss. The French columns from Elchingen now appeared and rendered their already unfavourable situation still worse. Having again formed, they advanced with fury upon the French ; but General Bourcier having come up with his cavalry, they were broken, and part of them driven upon Languenau, part upon Jungingen. Ney did not attempt to pursue them ; he had made five thousand prisoners, with numerous pieces of cannon and colours ; but on his right, the artillery thundered with increasing energy. He therefore altered his march, and proceeded in the direction of the firing.

It had however gradually ceased, and the night was quite dark when he arrived. He took up a position, with his right at Albeck and his left towards Oettingen, intending to resume the attack at daybreak. But the Emperor, who at first had not properly appreciated the importance of the action at Hasslach, soon discovered his mistake. His columns were converging upon Ulm when he received intelligence of this engagement. He therefore pressed the march of all his corps, and assumed in person the direction of the movement. Bessières proceeded to Wassen-Horn, Soult advanced upon Memmingen,

and Marmont, in position at Oberkirch, completely invested the right bank. Murat passed to the left, Lannes followed and pushed towards the Michelsberg. Ney received orders to support Lannes and resume the positions he had left the day before. At daybreak therefore he marched towards Jungingen, a village already occupied by General Suchet. The troops were formed into line, and an attempt was made to take a circuit round the heights and thus turn the redoubts which covered them.

Ney led the right and Lannes the left ; and all being ready, the movement commenced. The Austrians, in position near Michelsberg, at first made a desperate resistance, but being attacked in front at the same time that they were threatened on the rear, were forced to give way and seek refuge in the town. Ney drove with impetuosity the columns opposed to him into the suburbs ; Lannes was still contending with the redoubts in front of his corps, but perceiving that his colleague was master of the heights, he formed his troops under the glacis. Stung to the quick at seeing his colleague in advance of him, he excited his generals and officers to emulate the deeds of the corps commanded by Ney. Vedel, at the head of the 17th light infantry, rushed upon the redoubts which covered Frauenberg and carried them. Lannes warmly applauded this feat, and resolved to pursue the road which this brave colonel had thus opened for him. He accordingly advanced to force and carry the place, or at least to share with his colleague the glory of overthrowing the battalions of the enemy who de-

fended it. The 17th again pushed forward into the hottest of the affray. Ney on his part urged forward the 6th light infantry and the 50th regiment of the line. The attack was near succeeding: these brave battalions had crossed the bridges, and the Austrians in consternation threw away their arms and fled. The French had now only to follow up their success and push into the place; but although the fortune of the day was decided, the Austrians might still make such a resistance as would cause a dreadful butchery among their assailants, and the Emperor was unwilling to make an unnecessary sacrifice of life. He therefore stopped his columns, and gave the Austrians time to recover from their consternation, leaving Colonel Vedel, who had advanced too far, and some hundreds of his men, prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

The French were now masters of all the forts and of every avenue leading to Ulm. Werneck, again defeated in front of Albeck, was pushing in great disorder towards Franconia. The hopes of the Austrians were annihilated, and their generals, unable to obtain a passage through the French army by force of arms, attempted to negotiate for one. Prince Lichtenstein was accordingly deputed to Ney, with an offer to surrender Ulm, on condition that the troops it contained should be allowed to join Kienmayer, and take a share in his operations. They declared that if this offer, which they considered reasonable, were refused, they had resolved neither to make nor to receive further overtures, but to bury themselves under the ruins of

the town. Ney made no attempt to interrupt the prince ; he respected his misfortune, and honoured him as a man ; but, situated as the Austrians were, these proposals were inadmissible, and Ney candidly told him that the army from which he came deputed must undergo the fate of war. Lichtenstein returned to Ulm with this unfavourable answer. The Austrian generals again assembled, and came to a determination to try what effect their ultimatum would make upon Ney ; they accordingly forwarded to him their resolution couched in the following terms :—

“ The garrison of Ulm, understanding with regret that the equitable terms which it considered it had a right to demand of his excellency Marshal Neu* have not been accepted, is firmly resolved to run the chance of war.

“ The COUNT GIULAY, Lieut.-Gen.
LOUDON, Lieut.-Gen.

The COUNT RIESCH, Lieut.-Gen.”

“ Ulm, October 16th, 1805.”

This determination was worthy of the brave men who formed it ; but courage is unfortunately of no avail when it is not seconded by fortune. Ulm was without stores, and the French were in possession of the heights which commanded the place. The Austrian army was forced to submit to the law of necessity ; and thirty-three thousand men, most of whom

* This mistake in spelling Marshal Ney's name is not surprising in Germans, for they pronounce Neu something like Ny, and this they might have imagined to be Ney's name.—Ed.

had distinguished themselves in honourable battles, defiled in sorrow before the French battalions, to whom they delivered up their arms and colours. The sixth corps had defeated them in six consecutive engagements: namely, at Guntzberg, at Hasslach, at Elchingen, at Albeck, and at Michelsberg; it had taken from them fourteen thousand prisoners, a numerous artillery, and ten standards. The battle of Wertengen and the capitulation of Memmingen were the only feats of which the sixth corps could not claim the glory, every other defeat of this Austrian army being achieved by the troops under Ney's command. The Emperor, anxious to confer upon this corps a mark of his approbation, ordered it to assume the place of honour in this victory by taking possession of the conquered city.

MILITARY STUDIES

BY

MARSHAL NEY.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TROOPS COMPOSING THE LEFT CORPS.*

THE generals of division, in superintending the drilling of the several regiments under their command, will be pleased to apply, to the principal evolutions in line hereinafter described, the observations which I have made upon each, whether with a view to obtain all possible celerity and precision in the movements required in the execution of such evolutions, or to simplify some of them, or to compare the manœuvres prescribed in the drill regulations of 1791 with those more commonly in use in the field, and which experience teaches us to prefer.

There is no general officer of the present day who does not admit the advantage of acting in the field

* General Schneider, member of the Military Board, has been so good as to read Marshal Ney's manuscript, and to indicate the points of similarity between these studies and the changes adopted in the new infantry regulations.

with troops skilled in the execution of great manœuvres; for knowledge renders military enterprises less doubtful, and obviates many difficulties which seem insurmountable. With such soldiers, the results of well-combined operations is no longer left to the chance of events. Moreover, the confidence of the troops in the superiority of their tactics will render their conduct in the field always more or less satisfactory, and will maintain, with their reputation, the honour of the several regiments, and the glory of the arms of the empire.*

MARCHES AND EVOLUTIONS IN COLUMN.

Marches and evolutions executed in column, form the essential parts of military tactics. In such cases, commanders of battalions and of platoons cannot pay too much attention to all that relates to the direction of the march, to the perpendicular of the flank pivot where the guides are, to the distances between the platoons or the divisions† of which the columns are composed, and to the intervals between the different battalions or regiments, in order to give the commander-in-chief the facility of deploying in every direction; resuming the line of battle either to the front, or on one of the divisions or subdivisions of

* These are excellent views with regard to the advantages of drilling, and skill in manœuvring. The prodigies performed at Ulm and Austerlitz have shown sufficient grounds for appreciating the results of such a system.

† The distances and covering of the guides, are in fact the ground-work of the march in column.

the centre, or on one of the two flanks; and of executing, in fine, all such movements, facing to the rear of the original direction, or by a counter-march.

EXAMPLES OF THE MARCH IN COLUMN TO OUTFLANK
ONE OF THE WINGS OF THE ENEMY'S LINE IN-
TENDED TO BE ATTACKED.

I.

The attack with four regiments being directed against the right wing of the enemy, the general in command shall march his lines by the left; the battalions shall be formed into columns by platoons, the left in front, at whole or half distance.* The columns thus prepared shall, in marching forward, take a diagonal to the left, and by heads of column formed by each battalion. So soon as the three first platoons shall have taken the given direction, the remainder shall insensibly resume the perpendicular by moving obliquely to the right. The heads of columns marching on the diagonal to the left, having now sufficiently approached the point fixed on for outflanking the enemy's line, and by a rapid movement resumed the perpendicular, shall re-form the line of battle by a general wheel to the right.

It will be advisable, if circumstances admit of

* An excellent method of outflanking an enemy on either wing.

it, to keep the columns at the distance of only a half battalion or division from each other, in order to shorten the movement; and also to close the platoons to half distance whenever the columns change their direction. By such means, a too great undulation will be avoided.

II.

If, however, the diagonal to the left, taken by each column, should not prove sufficient to outflank the enemy's right wing, the commander-in-chief must form his new line by successive battalions, beginning with the right of his two lines and giving the following word of command:—"By the right of the two lines, and by successive battalions form line of battle to the right." The first battalion having executed its movements by platoons to the right in line of battle, shall advance twenty-five paces, in column by platoon, in order to establish itself upon the oblique line indicated for this movement. The other battalions shall successively continue to march until the right of each is parallel with the left of the last formed battalion. They shall then execute a conversion by platoons to the right, and successively take up their proper position in line.

If the attack be directed against the left wing of the enemy, the lines shall march by the right, the columns having the right in front. This measure is applicable to manœuvres I. and II. It is necessary, during the march of the columns on the diagonal, to designate the last battalions of the two lines as the regulating battalions, when the left is in front,

and the first battalions, when the right is in front. Care must also be taken to make the columns of the second line march so that their heads be directed between the interval of those of the first line, without, however, losing the distance in line prescribed to them. But the moment the columns march directly forward, those of the second line shall resume the perpendicular.

III.

The enemy being drawn up parallel to the front of your four regiments, and it being the intention of the commander-in-chief to deceive them with regard to the true point of attack, — if it is meant to be on the enemy's right, the battalions of both lines shall form by platoons to the left, and march on, appearing thus to retreat. So soon as the heads of the two lines shall have extended the space of one or two battalions beyond the enemy's front, a new oblique line shall be formed in the following manner: On the command, "Form the oblique line, left wing in front," — the fourth platoon of the third battalion of the first line, and the eighth platoon of the third battalion of the second line, or such other platoons as may be directed, shall march by the right flank, and by file to the right; as shall likewise all the platoons preceding those which serve as the axis of the movement, upon the new line taken. The platoons in the rear shall move by the left flank, and form perpendicular to the head. A general wheel to the right will replace the line in the order of battle prescribed.

IV.

If, on the contrary, the commander-in-chief determine to attack the left of the enemy, the battalions of the two lines shall march to the right, and, as soon as the heads of the columns of the two lines shall have extended the space of a battalion or two beyond the enemy's front, he shall form an oblique line, right wing in front, upon the eighth platoon of the second battalion of the first line, and upon the eighth platoon of the first battalion of the second line. All the divisions preceding those designated for the formation of the oblique line shall operate successively by the left flank, and form on the new line; those in the rear shall operate by the right flank, in order to resume the distance and perpendicular of the head. A general conversion to the left will replace the line in the order of battle prescribed.

V.

But if the two heads of columns of the lines, the right being in front, should come to the diagonal on the left towards the centre of the enemy's front, and you intend to attack the left of the enemy's line;—in that case the platoons preceding those which are to serve as the axis, shall operate by the right flank, and those in the rear by the left flank; and, the perpendicular being taken, the line shall be resumed by a general wheel to the left. Nevertheless, if, during the movement, the enemy should make a demonstration of attack, it

would be prudent to form the platoons in the prescribed line of battle, as they successively came up, for the purpose either of making head against the enemy, or of protecting the manœuvre.*

If, on the contrary, your heads of columns arrive, the left in front, upon the diagonal on the right, and proceed towards the enemy's centre, and you intend to attack the right wing of the enemy's line,—all the platoons preceding those which serve as the axis in the two lines, shall operate by the left flank, those in the rear by the right flank; and the oblique line of battle shall be re-formed by means of a general conversion of platoons to the right.

VI.

The four regiments marching in column of platoons, the right in front, on a line parallel to the enemy's front, as if they intended to attack the enemy's left wing, when, on the contrary, their right wing was the object of attack: in such a case, the oblique line might be formed, the left wing advanced on the first platoon of the third battalion of the first line, and the eighth platoon of the third battalion of the second line, or such other platoons as might be selected; the platoons preceding these, to operate by the right flank, and to proceed along the new perpendicular; the platoons in the rear, to operate by the left flank, and by file to the right. A general wheel by platoons

* The same project of outflanking the enemy by simple and sure means—in column, and by one to the left, or one to the right in line of battle.

to the left would place the line in the order of battle required.

It is to be observed that this movement must either be rapidly executed, or take place at some distance from the enemy, because, for a time, the column stands with its rear to the latter.

VII.

The same manœuvre may also be performed if the lines march in columns of platoons towards the right of the enemy's line, though the commander-in-chief intends to form his oblique line upon the enemy's left. In this case, the platoons in the rear of those fixed upon as the axis of the movement, shall operate by the right flank and by files to the left; those in front of the axis shall operate by the left flank. The perpendicular being assumed, the line of battle shall be reformed by a general conversion to the right by the two lines. Whenever the commander wishes to change the perpendicular of the columns, he will take care to establish, as in a change of front, the platoon designated for the rest of the troops to form upon.

SOME MANŒUVRES BY MEANS OF THE COLUMN.

Four regiments in columns with intervals, marching right in front, by platoons or divisions, at whole or half distance:—If the commander requires to

make them march by front of regiments in columns, on the reverse flank of the guides in natural order, he shall give the following command after halting :— “ By platoons (or divisions) on the uneven or alternate battalions of each regiment, to the right form line of battle.”

This movement being executed, he may resume his line of battle by a change of front on the centre of each regiment, the right wing forward : that is to say, on the first division of the even battalions of each regiment. But if he wanted to form into line of battle by an inversion of regiments to the other flank, the change of front must be effected with the left wing forward ; that is to say, on the fourth division of the uneven battalions of each regiment. If he wished to march in column of regiments by the proper pivot flank, he must execute a conversion of the divisions or platoons by inversion to the left.

II.

By this disposition of columns of regiments, the commander might easily form his four regiments into a hollow square. If such were his intention, the first regiment would stand fast ; the uneven battalions of the second and third must execute a conversion to the right by battalions, or by platoons half-wheel to the right, and the even battalions must effect a conversion to the left. The fourth regiment, after having closed its ranks, would form the rear face. The square may march in any required direction, and be reduced on the same principle on which it was formed.

III.

The commander having reduced the square in order to form into line in the same order of columns, the first regiment shall operate by platoons to the right after having cleared the second regiment; the latter shall then advance the space of one division, in order to form the basis for the general line. The first regiment shall halt and form in battle; the third and fourth shall operate to the left by platoons, and place themselves successively in the alignement.

If this is to be effected in front on the second regiment, the column shall close to division distance, after which, forward and wheel.

But if the commander intended to form two lines, the uneven regiments would stand fast, whilst the even numbers executed the movement above indicated for the third and fourth regiments.

IV.

Should the commander, however, find that the movements prescribed for the manœuvre No. IV. are too slow of execution, he may form a single column of regiments. He will command to form close column, the right in front, upon the colour division of each battalion; and, having closed in mass, he may form into line by battalions in mass, or deploy on any named battalion.*

* This is the manœuvre adopted by the regulation of the 4th of March 1831, the movements in mass being preferred in this regulation.

V.

The four regiments having deployed, and the commander being desirous instantly to form two lines, and to place the uneven battalions in the first, and the even battalions in the second, he shall form close columns of regiments, the right in front, on the fourth division of the uneven battalions, then close the masses, at the distance of a battalion from each other, upon the second regiment, and afterwards form into line upon the colour division of each battalion.

But if the general in command wished that the even battalions should form the first, and the uneven battalions the second line, the close columns would form on the first division of the even battalions, left in front; the masses would be closed to battalion distance, and the deployment would, in like manner, be made on the colour division of each battalion.

VI.

If the commander wants to march in columns, with the left in front, by entire regiments in their proper order: (let us suppose that the odd battalions are in the first, and the even battalions in the second line;) he will command a change of front to be effected on the colour platoon of each battalion, right wing in front. If, on the contrary, he wished to march with the right in front, the change of front must be effected upon the colour platoon of each battalion, the left wing in front.

The battalions would thus be in line of battle by inversion.

If the even battalions were in the first, and the uneven battalions in the second line, the column might be formed by fronts of regiments in columns of march, the right in front, by effecting a central change of front in each battalion, left wing forward; and, on the contrary, a change of front, right wing forward, if the troops were to march with the left in front. In this case the battalions would likewise be in line of battle in inverted order.*

VII.

The line of four regiments or eight battalions being fully deployed, as in manœuvre No. V., if the intention of the commander be to make the eight battalions march in two contiguous columns in order to conceal his force and give greater compactness to his movement, — the regiments shall form, in the rear, into columns by divisions, viz.: the first regiment with the left, and the second with the right in front. The same movement shall be adopted for the third and fourth regiments. This movement may be executed by the following command: —“On the left of the uneven regiments, left in front, to the rear in column; and on the right of the even regiments, right in front, to the rear in column.”

* At present the column is always first formed, even for a change of front.

MARCH IN LINE AND INCREASE OF FRONT.

I.

The principles of the march in line are clearly enough indicated in the regulation of 1791. The men and the battalions are placed square to the front, on the ground they occupy, and in perfect alignement; the colours are generally carried six paces in front, when the line is to march, for the purpose of giving the cadence of the step, serving as a point of intermediate direction, and preventing the battalions from bulging out beyond the one appointed to direct the movement.

This arrangement, though good in itself, is seldom observed in actual warfare.* The regiments shall continue, nevertheless, to follow this mode, and also the following, which appears to me better adapted to render the direction visible to the whole of the line, and to facilitate the correctness of the line when the word is given to halt.

On the cautionary command:—"Battalions (or lines) will advance," the colours remain in the ranks; the regulating battalion shall advance three paces, so that its rear rank be exactly on a line with the battalions to the right and left. The general guides, or camp colourmen, of the other battalions, shall advance to the same alignement. At the word HALT! the whole shall line themselves on the

* The Marshal endeavours to avoid the evils admitted to exist in the old system of marching in line of battle, and he gives the means of doing so. But at present the formation into column by battalions is preferred, even for marching in line of battle.

directing battalion. Whenever the first line is to charge bayonets, the directing battalion shall not move from its place in line of battle.

As, on many occasions in war, great advantage may be derived from increasing the front of the line, the commander may effect it in the following manner :—

Let us still suppose four regiments or eight battalions upon one or two lines, and that the front is to be increased by some battalions on the wings.

If it is to be of the four battalions placed at the two wings on the first line, the third rank of those battalions shall go to the right about, retire thirty paces to the rear, front, then quickly forming into two ranks, proceed in double-quick time to align on the first platoon of the first battalion. There shall be a lieutenant and two non-commissioned officers to the third rank of each platoon. The non-commissioned officers shall be placed to the right of the sections, and the lieutenant shall act as captain. An adjutant-major shall command the two battalions of each regiment thus formed, and to which four drummers shall be attached. The formation shall be the same for the third rank of the two battalions on the left, but the platoons shall execute the inverse movement. These battalions may be employed according to circumstances.*

* Excellent method of passing from a formation of three ranks to a formation of two, in order to extend the line.

PASSAGE OF LINES.

The passages of lines may be effected by column in different ways, besides those specified in the regulations :—

I.

Two lines of four or eight battalions having to execute the passage of lines to the front by column : the first line stands fast ; the battalions of the second, having broken into platoons to the right, shall march forward, change the direction to the left by heads of columns of battalions, pass outside the right of the battalion on the first line, and replace themselves in order of battle, either upon the first platoon or division, or upon one of the divisions or subdivisions of the centre. But if the commander wishes positively to place the first line on a parallel with the second, the heads of columns, after they have passed the right of the battalions of the first line, shall oblique to the left in a sufficient degree to regain the platoon front which they have lost by the direct march. This manœuvre is applicable either to the first or to the second line.*

The battalions of the second line may likewise gain ground to the front by proceeding round the left of the battalions on the first line. In this latter case they will break by platoons to the left, and will

* The method of passage of lines, in the regulations of 1791, was quite defective ; the Marshal substitutes a mode of doing it in proper columns, which is much more rational. The manœuvre in the regulations of the 4th of March 1831, is very like that of the Marshal.

change their direction to the right on reaching the level of the left of the standing battalions.

The movement to the rear is executed in the same manner: the battalions of the first line, after facing right about, and by platoons to the right, march forward, change their direction to the left and pass round the left of the battalions of the second line, and so on by both lines alternately.

II.

The passage of lines to the front may likewise be effected by columns of whole regiments for both lines. In this case the second line must form a close column of regiments, the right in front, either upon the first division of the even battalions, or upon the fourth division of the uneven ones. Each column shall march forward and pass through the interval between the two battalions of each regiment of the first line which precedes them. After having gained sufficient ground, each column shall form into line upon one of the divisions prescribed for its formation. The passage of line of regiments of the second line may likewise be effected by the latter executing the movement of the passing the defile forward by the centre. This mode is perhaps preferable, because the manœuvre takes up less time, and the heads of columns may immediately execute the platoon firing.

The passage of line retrograde, by columns of regiments, would be evidently too dangerous very near the enemy. Those prescribed by the regulations, and those indicated in No. I. for columns

of battalions, must, therefore, alone be put in practice.

In the supposition of a general attack in front, the heads of columns of each regiment of the second line, shall march up to the intervals between the battalions of the regiments which precede them on the first line, and thus uniting the *ordre profond* to the *ordre mince*, necessarily give more vigour to the ensemble of the charge. The movement being concluded, the regiments shall extend to the front.

CHANGES OF FRONT.

The changes of front upon one or more extensive lines are seldom executed in actual war. Nevertheless, as most of these movements are effected by the column, I shall give some examples of the manœuvre.

I.

Four or eight battalions, on one or two lines, having to execute a change of front perpendicularly or obliquely, the right wing forward, either upon the centre, or nearer one of the two flanks of the line :—

If the lines are composed of four battalions, the first line shall form the close column of divisions, the right in front, upon the first division of the third battalion, and the second line upon the first division of the second battalion.

If there are eight battalions, the first line shall, in like manner, be formed by column upon the first

division of the fifth battalion, and the second line upon the first division of the fourth battalion.

The columns being formed upon either supposition, all the divisions in front of that of formation of the first line (first division of the third battalion, or first division of the fifth battalion,) shall resume the distance from the head or right of the column ; and all those in the rear of the division of formation, after the facing about, shall resume the distance from the rear or left of the column ; and then, in succession as the divisions resume their distances, they shall front.

Immediately after the movement of the first line is begun, the second shall march forward, taking its distance from the head, and shall establish itself parallel to the first line.*

A general conversion by divisions to the left will place the two lines in the exact order of the change of front commanded.

This movement might be effected by platoons, and its execution rendered much more rapid.

The principle of a change of front, as it may be perceived, remains the same as that laid down in the regulations : that is to say, that if the first line operates it upon the fourth battalion, the right wing forward, the second line executes it upon the third battalion ; in like manner, if the first line executes it upon the third battalion, the left wing forward, the second line effects it on the fourth battalion, and so on.

* The method here proposed is much superior to that in the regulations of 1791, and very much resembles that adopted in the new regulations of 1831.

II.

Four or eight battalions upon two lines intending to execute a change of front with firing, breaking successively to the rear by platoons or divisions from one of the two wings, in order to form a new oblique line upon one of the flanks:—

When the order for this movement is given, the first division of the battalion on the right of the first line shall operate by the left flank, and by file to the rear by the left; it shall proceed in its whole depth, then face to the right, and march forward, taking a direction behind the front, in order to place itself in line of battle on the extreme left of the line. So soon as the first division has passed to the parallel of the centre of the second division, this latter shall likewise make its movement by the left flank, and so on with regard to the other divisions. The moment a battalion of the first line has unmasked the front of a battalion of the second line, it shall immediately be replaced, and so on. The battalions of the second line shall execute the fire commanded for those of the first, but none of these battalions shall fall back until the battalions of the first line have executed their movement; after which, if the commander wished to prolong the line, by adding the second to it, he must command the latter to execute the same manœuvre; or, lastly, by the same movement he may replace it in its position of battle in second line.

If the movement is to be effected by the left of the line: in that case the fourth division of the last battalion must move by the right flank and by files

to the rear by the right, so as to proceed behind the front, in order to replace itself by the left in battle towards the extreme right of the line, and so on with the other divisions.

III.

Changes of individual fronts by battalions give infinite facility in executing the principal manœuvres of war. They occupy two or three minutes only, and, consequently, they enable the commander to change the front of his line in a very short time, either by executing an oblique change of front upon each battalion, the left wing forward, re-forming afterwards upon the battalion on the right of the first line, by battalions forward in line of battle ; or the right wing forward, re-forming upon the last battalion forward in battle. Lastly, this oblique arrangement allows of attacking by order of echellons.

PASSAGE OF DEFILES AND BRIDGES.

The passage of a defile to the rear, by the flank and by files, according to the regulation, is in general very long, and borders too much on confusion to be executed in the presence of the enemy. This movement may be effected in column by sections, platoons, or divisions, either to front or rear.*

* This reason is the same as the one stated in the new regulations, in which the method presented by Marshal Ney is adopted.

I.

To pass a defile to the front from the centre, according to regulation, the first battalion proceeds by sections to the left, the second, by sections to the right; they afterwards march forward and form up into line as the defile widens.

Here a battalion is supposed to be posted behind a defile whose width would not allow the passage in front of more than one platoon at a time. In this case all the sections of the half battalion on the right would wheel back into column, the left in front, behind the second section of the fourth platoon; and the sections of the half battalion on the left, into column, right in front, behind the first section of the fifth platoon. The battalion marching in this order of column of attack, at section distance, through the defile, should gradually reform upon the centre and forward in line of battle, as the defile became wider.

II.

If the defile is wide enough to allow the free passage of a division: in that case all the platoons of the right shall form into column, the left in front, at platoon distance, behind the fourth platoon; and those of the left, with the right in front, behind the fifth platoon. The advance in line of battle shall be executed in the same manner as that specified for the column, by fronts of platoons formed by the sections of the half battalions on right and left.

This mode may be applied to a line of several

battalions, by forming the uneven battalions into columns by sections or platoons, the left in front, and the even battalions the right in front. In this case the columns must be closed, so that there remain only an interval of three paces.

III.

The passage of the defile in retreat, is effected in the natural order of the sections, platoons, or divisions, in the following manner:—

As the battalion is to break backwards by sections of the two wings at the same time, let us suppose that the defile is behind the second section of the fourth, and first section of the fifth platoon. All the sections of the right wing shall break successively on the left backwards, then front and march; those of the left, on the right backwards, then front and march. On reaching the entrance of the defile, the sections of the right shall make a conversion, or wheel to the left, and the sections of the left a conversion to the right, proceeding together on the new line indicated. To cover the retrograde movement, it will be necessary for the platoon or division at the entrance of the defile to march up twenty-five paces to the front, and throw out some tirailleurs. Lastly, so soon as the two wings have effected their movement, the platoon in advance shall recall its tirailleurs by the rallying beat of the drum, and after facing about, place itself three paces in front of the centre of the battalion, and there serve as a base on which to form the general line.

IV.

If the retrograde movement is to be effected by platoons from both wings of a regiment at the same time, the eighth platoon of the first battalion, and the first platoon of the second battalion, shall likewise advance obliquely to the left and right, in order to cover the point indicated for the passage of the defile to the rear. The platoons of the right, and those of the left of both battalions, shall break to the rear in the same manner as the sections, and the line of battle shall be re-formed in the manner already specified. •

If, instead of breaking by platoons, the commander thought proper to break by divisions: in such case the fourth division of the first battalion, and the first division of the second battalion, should execute the same movements.

To aid the judgment of commanders of battalions and platoons as to the distances they are to observe during the march, and to enable them to ascertain when they are to halt, so that the line shall not offer too extensive a development at the moment of conversion to the left to enable the platoons coming from the right, and of wheel to the right for those marching from the left, to resume their order of battle, they shall count as many paces as there are files in their platoons, and then multiply by the number which are to follow them, deducting those which are keeping the enemy in check. By such means the commanders of battalions will find no difficulty in halting and forming in line of battle exactly parallel to the original front of the line, by a general conversion to the left.

MARCH OR ATTACK BY ECHELLONS.

This manœuvre is extremely advantageous in war; but it requires great perfection in the marching of the troops, in order that the attack upon the enemy may be supported with rapidity and intelligence, and that the battalions which refuse the attack may be in a fit state to execute attentively every movement which circumstances may require.

I.

Eight battalions upon two lines having to attack the right wing of the enemy placed parallel to their front :—

The movement shall begin by the left at full distances, either by regiments or by battalions, whichever may be preferable. So soon as the last battalion of the first line has marched forward, it shall be followed by that of the second line, and so on by the remaining battalions. In the supposition that the enemy refuses its right, and makes a demonstration of attack with its left upon the right flank of the echellons in march: in this case, all the battalions shall effect together a change of direction to the right by battalions; or, for the sake of more compactness and greater celerity, a change of front upon the colour platoon of each battalion in the two lines, left wing forward. This manœuvre being performed, the battalions may continue the attack by echellons, or march forward and place themselves in line of battle upon the first battalions of the right of the two lines, which serve as pivots or points-d'appui.

By this operation the two wings act alternately on the offensive.*

If the attack were to be made on the left wing of the enemy's line, the movement must begin by the right of the two attacking lines. The change of direction by battalions must be executed to the left; or the change of front made right wing forward.

II.

If the commander wishes to attack with only the first line in echellons of battalions, either by the right or by the left, the battalions shall march at full distances after the echellons are established; and if they were threatened with an attack by cavalry, each battalion should form into column of division at platoon distance, the right in front, upon the colour division of each battalion, if the movement were effected by the right of the line; or the left in front, if the movement were effected by the left of the line. This being done, the first division of each head of column would stand fast. The uneven platoons of the second and third divisions should then wheel to the right, and the even platoons wheel to the left. The fourth division should close up, and then face about so as to form squares by battalions placed in echellons.

III.

The attack in echellons by the centre, is in general too dangerous a manœuvre to be frequently used in

* This is a beautiful manœuvre, and has been adopted in France.

war, unless the commander is certain that the enemy have imprudently weakened their centre to strengthen their wings; and that when he has reached the central position he can maintain it, cut off the enemy's wings, and force them to give battle separately. This attack upon the centre requires great resolution and extreme celerity in the march of the assailants.

Let us suppose a first assailant line of eight battalions: in this case the battalions Nos. 4 and 5 shall begin to march at half distance; the other battalions shall in like manner follow at half distance, so that the movement may be better concentrated. It would be prudent not to make the second line march otherwise than in line of battle, in order that it may serve as a support to the two wings of the echellons of the first line, and be able to relieve the first line thus formed, and protect it in case of necessity.

RETREAT EN ECHIQUIER, OR ALTERNATE RETREAT.

The retreat en echiquier upon two lines, may be effected according to the principles laid down in the regulations, by falling back by battalions a hundred or a hundred and fifty paces. But in order to change alternately the defensive into the offensive, the even battalions of the second line, instead of falling back at the same time as the even battalions of the first line, may form columns by divisions, at either close, half, or whole distance behind the first division, the right in front, and then ad-

vance outside the right of the even battalions of the first line then in retreat, and form into line a few toises in the rear of the left of the uneven battalions of the first line. This movement may be alternate in the two lines, and by even and uneven battalions, during the whole time that the retrograde movement lasts.

SQUARES.

Squares are formed three deep, in conformity to the Emperor's instructions ; and sometimes also by doubling up the interior sections, according to the principle laid down in the regulations of 1791. Regiments may also be practised to fire from the four sides by the simple column ; and as this is often seen in war, the troops generally marching in that order, it would be advantageous to accustom the men to it.

I.

Four regiments crossing a plain in columns with intervals, by platoons or by divisions. If they were attacked by cavalry, and had not time to form into the prescribed squares, the regiments should close up in mass, the three files on the proper pivot flank (it is supposed that the columns have here their right in front) should face to the left flank ; and those on the reverse flank should face to the right ; the last division would go about.*

* This formation is adopted in preparing against charges of cavalry.

II.

But if the four regiments marched upon two lines in columns: the first and second regiments of the first line, the right in front, in column upon the eighth platoon of the even battalions, if it be by platoons, or upon the fourth division of the same battalions, if it be by divisions; and the first and second regiments of the second line, with also the right in front, but to the rear in columns upon the first platoons of the uneven battalions, or the first divisions of the same battalions, if it be by divisions:—this arrangement would enable the commander to form squares, either by making the uneven platoons wheel to the right, and the even platoons to the left, the column being by divisions at half distance; or, after having closed up in mass, by making the three files on the right and left flanks of the columns face as above to the left and to the right. Should circumstances permit, the quincunx may be formed, in order that the fire may cross without inconvenience to the troops.

III.

The four regiments may also be formed into columns in the following manner:—The first regiment of the first line forward into column, the right in front, upon the fourth division of the even battalion; the second regiment in the rear into column, the right in front, upon the first division of the uneven battalion. The first regiment of the second line forward into column, the left in front, upon the first division of the uneven battalion, and

the second regiment in rear into column, the left in front, upon the fourth division of the even battalion.*

IV.

Four regiments upon two lines may easily form the hollow square, and place within it the baggage and implements of war, which they might have to cover or protect on a march. In this case, the two lines should leave no interval between the battalions and the regiments. The first battalion of the first line should break to the rear into column, by platoons, the left in front, at whole distance, upon the eighth platoon; the fourth battalion of the same line into column by platoons, the right in front, behind the first platoon; the first battalion of the second line forward into column, the right in front, upon its eighth platoon, and the fourth battalion forward into column, the left in front, upon its first platoon; a wheel by platoons to the right, by the right flank, would close this part of the square, and a wheel to the left, by the left flank, would close the other part. The second and third battalions of the second line must face about. The grenadiers might be so disposed as to cover the exterior and interior salient angles of the square.

* The new regulations do not, and very properly so, allow of squares formed of more than three battalions.

CONCLUSIONS.

Battalions and regiments shall be progressively accustomed to execute all the above manœuvres, both halting and in marching.

The generals of division shall see that this be done, and shall give to each brigadier-general and colonel under their respective command a copy of these instructions.

As the whole of military tactics lies in the science of forming troops into column with rapidity, and making them march in line of battle, I shall apply myself more particularly to show the utility of making whole lines operate by simple movements in columns of battalions upon one or two lines, and by such means execute all possible changes of front, either from the halt or on the march, comprising generally the principal movements used in war.*

It is not my intention to develop the knowledge required to carry on warfare on a large scale, but I shall confine myself to the simple mechanism of the evolutions which form the essential ground-work of its particular enterprises. It belongs wholly to the individual genius of the commander to direct his lines of operation in such a manner as to embrace a vast whole; and to be able at the proper time, to take advantage of all the events and circumstances which succeed each other so rapidly in the field of battle.

The success of every operation in war depends upon confidence of the troops in their leader, which

* Good reflections and excellent principles.

can only be acquired by the example which the general must give when the danger is common to all. He must, without intermission, and with unceasing solicitude, attend to the wants of the men, and insure, by the most persevering activity, the execution of his orders;—nothing being more important in war than to impress upon his army at once, and decidedly, the utmost punctuality in marching at the very moment specified, in order that combined movements may produce the effect intended. False interpretations and misunderstandings put forth by inexperienced men, must be corrected by laconic, clear, and precise orders for movements. It belongs principally to the intelligence of the staff officers to extirpate this military defect, which may lead to so many evils when the remedy is not applied on the instant.

OBSERVATIONS AND GENERAL SUMMARY.

Columns by battalions at platoon distance, of one or two lines at once, allow the commander to execute every possible manœuvre, change his direction frequently, and march on the diagonal to the left, the columns having the left in front, and on the diagonal to the right, if the right is in front; likewise to change the direction to the right.

Changes of front by individual battalions are the easiest, because they require only a simple platoon wheel, either in the proper or in an inverted

order. Their execution takes up much less time than those indicated in the regulations, and no part of the troops present their rear to the enemy.

Passage of lines by individual battalions forward by the centre.—The battalions of the second line march as in a passage of a defile, forward by the centre, and the forming into line is effected almost without the necessity of any general words of command. The passage of lines, in retreating, does not offer the same advantage; that prescribed by the regulations may be used in preference.

ADJUTANTS-COMMANDANTS.

During war, these officers shall be employed in active service and in the army offices, but more especially in the former, in order to select the places of encampment, form the camps, and stake out positions when circumstances admit of it. They are to keep up communications with the head-quarters of divisions and with general head-quarters; fix upon the places for distributing the provisions, forage, &c.; direct the van-guards, and general and particular reconnoitring parties; proceed with parties to observe the force, the position, and the movements of the enemy. The adjutants-commandants employed in the army offices shall be specially charged with collecting the states as to the situation of the forces; they shall also provide for the wants and subsistence of the men; write reports upon the observations made respecting the country, the topography of the war,

marches, encampments, &c. &c., and superintend the *personnel* and *matériel* of the staff.*

The assistant adjutants-commandants shall assist the latter in their important duties. The assistants, to qualify themselves for war, and to benefit as well by their own observations as by those of the other officers in the army, shall write down, in the form of notes, anything that may strike their attention with regard to good or bad dispositions, and neglect nothing to render such remarks profitable to themselves in their profession. The most important thing for a staff-officer is to inure himself to fatigue from the very opening of the campaign, by remaining constantly dressed and booted, in order that, on the very first shot fired, he may be able to proceed in all haste to the place of action, and return and give information to his superiors. The assistants and other officers of the staff shall be present at every distribution of rations or any thing else to the men; they shall reconnoitre during the night in the camps and at the advanced posts. An adjutant-commandant shall regulate the roster of duty, beginning from the head, in every thing relative to the service, and from the junior in every thing concerning distributions, errands, and other duties of fatigue.

* The rank of adjutant-commandant does not now exist; but the duties assigned to that officer, and the marshal's instructions, are perfectly applicable to the staff-colonel of the present day.

AIDES-DE-CAMP.

Besides the confidence of the general officers, of which aides-de-camp must render themselves worthy by indefatigable zeal, it is necessary that they should be extremely active, well acquainted with the different corps of the brigade or division to which they belong, the names of the several officers in command, and those of the commissaries, that they may be able to transmit orders with precision, and superintend their execution.

THE COMMANDANT AT HEAD-QUARTERS.

He shall personally take the orders of the chief of the staff, shall preside at parade, and superintend the interior and exterior duty at headquarters. The watch-word shall be given only in garrisons, such a practice being found useless in camps, where the development is too extensive, especially when several divisions composing a corps-d'armée, act individually in pursuit of the enemy.

PERSONNEL OF HEAD-QUARTERS.

The commander of the artillery.*

* All that follows, as far as No. 7, is order given to chaos. It was worthy of a mind like that of the Marshal to feel the want of this, and to dare undertake it. The principles of this organization have been adopted in the new regulations for the field.

A company of guides on horseback, taken from all the corps composing the army.

A company of guides on foot.

Half a company of light artillery.

A company of pontoonmen.

A section of miners.

A company of sappers.

A company of armed bakers, and two sections of butchers.

A company of swimmers of a hundred men.

Engineer officers.

Officers topographers.

Commissaries general.

Inspector and sub-inspector of musters.

Officers of health and of pharmacy. The officers of health shall have voursches,* and shall follow everywhere.

A division of horse gendarmerie.

A military commission, or standing court-martial.

Messengers.

Administration of posts, and the veterinary artist of head-quarters.

Paymaster-general, guarded by the guides of the general-in-chief.

Four washerwomen and two sutlers, with carts, each of which shall bear a plate.

* A sort of light car.—Ed.

INDISPENSABLE OBJECTS ATTACHED TO A GENERAL STAFF.

A bridge equipage consisting of pontoons, another of trestles for crossing a river of from a hundred to two hundred feet wide, provided with cramp-hooks, cordage, anchors, two skiffs, beams, timbers, carpenter's tools, torches, combustibles, pitch, &c. &c.; ladders with cramp-hooks to scale, when necessary, the walls of a town, or other places not strongly fortified by art and nature. The whole placed in drays or other strongly built carriages.

The light artillery attached to head-quarters shall always have a good stock of rockets for signals, either to direct night movements, or to guide columns of attack before day-break, whether in an open country, or when forcing redoubts and entrenchments or storming a fortified place.

An equipage of tumbrils for the provisions and forage.

Baggage of head-quarters. — Fix its amount with precision, and preserve the greatest order on a march; and maintain a discipline always difficult, particularly among the soldiers who have the direction and superintendence of the train.

The commander of the equipages, waggons, tumbrils of rockets, bridge-equipages, pontoons, and other implements of war, must be a man of firm character, well informed, and extremely strict. It is necessary that the soldiers of the train should have learned to manœuvre, in order that, in case of need, the commander of the equipages or of the

park might be able to form a square against the enemy, and to re-form with equal facility into one or more columns. The execution of such manœuvres requires great rapidity and precision.

THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

Besides the staff officers under the command of the chief of the staff, the number of which is fixed by laws and decrees, there shall be an under chief of the staff, who shall superintend the work in the offices, the execution of reports, the destination of troops, and draw up papers upon the reconnoitings, &c. &c.

The under chief of the staff shall distribute to individuals alone who are attached immediately to the staff—the billets which the commander of head-quarters shall issue to him. The orders respecting the police at head-quarters, and all measures concerning the details relative thereto, shall be placarded inside the office of head-quarters. The commander of the gendarmerie, specially charged with this branch of the service, shall keep a register, in which shall be entered the orders and arrangements concerning the distribution of rations, billets, the interior and exterior service, the police, sutlers, washerwomen, prisoners of war, spies, delinquents belonging to the army, convicts, execution of sentences, recruits, deserters, &c.

The following order in billeting, once established, shall be invariably maintained during the war.

The under chief of the staff shall receive from the commandant of head-quarters, or from the commander of the gendarmerie, billets for the general officers, artillery officers, officers of engineers, assistants, aides-de-camp, adjutants, commandants, and other persons immediately attached to the general head-quarters.

Billets distributed by the commander of head-quarters or under chief of the staff, — To the officers or subdivision of gendarmerie, for the non-commissioned officers and gendarmes.

Commander of the guides, — To the horse and foot guides, and the half company of light artillery.

Commander of the gendarmerie, — To the sutlers and washerwomen.

Commander of engineers, — To the sappers and pontoonmen.

Commissaries, — To the bakers and butchers.

Commandant of the artillery, — To the swimmers and the reserve park of artillery.

Paymaster, — To the clerks, and other individuals attached to the treasury.

Director-general of posts, — To the messengers and administration of posts.

Inspectors of the administration of bread, liquors, and forage, — To that administration.

The guard of general head-quarters, and of the chief of the staff, shall be furnished by the horse and foot guides.

The guard of the general in command of the artillery, by the horse or foot gunners.

The guard of the commandant of engineers, and all field officers of that arm, by the sappers, pontoonmen, miners, and swimmers.

The guard of the inspector and sub-inspector of musters, by the bakers and butchers.]

The guard of the commissary-general, and the other commissaries, by the bakers and butchers.

The guard of the general administration of posts, by the guides of head-quarters.

The guard of the administration of bread, meat, liquids, and forage, shall consist of a detachment of infantry taken from the division nearest to head-quarters.

The guard of the treasury to be taken from the guides of general head-quarters, or to consist of grenadiers attached to the general staff.

STAFF OF A DIVISION.

The general of division. — The chief of his staff, taken from among the adjutants-commandants; two generals of brigade, two adjutants-commandants, and four assistants.

The commandant of head-quarters selected from among the field-officers of the division, or from among the unattached field-officers at home.

A division or sub-division of gendarmerie, to carry on the police; the commander of this corps is to communicate with the commander of the gendarmerie at general head-quarters.

Pontoonmen, sappers, and mines, to be taken by detachments from those employed in the army.

Two officers of engineers employed in military reconnoitring, constructing military works, tracing and stacking out camps and positions, drawing plans of the ground and of marches, engagements, &c. &c.

Paymaster of the division.

Officer in charge of the topographic department.

A bridge equipage of trestles for crossing a river from one to two hundred feet wide, together with a skiff, anchors, cordage, beams, timbers, carpenter's tools, combustibles, torches, scaling-ladders to storm a place; rockets to direct the columns during the night, or to serve as signals on a day of battle, engagement, crossing a river, &c. &c. :—

A company of bakers.

One of butchers.

One of swimmers.

Commissaries.

Inspector and sub-inspector of musters.

Commandant of artillery.

Commandant of engineers.

Waggon equipages for the carriage of provisions.

Administrations of posts, bread, liquors, and forage.

Officers of health, surgeons, compounders of drugs.

—The surgeons shall follow everywhere either in voursches or on horseback.

A company of grenadiers to guard head-quarters, and a detachment of a hundred foot soldiers to be alternately on duty with the baggage, waggons, administrations of posts, &c., and to supply sentries for the post, the inspectors and sub-inspectors of musters, the commissaries, the paymasters, &c.

COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION IN INFANTRY, CAVALRY,
AND ARTILLERY.

Four regiments of the line, forming two brigades.

One regiment of light infantry, employed in the van-guard.

Four regiments of cavalry, chasseurs, dragoons, or cuirassiers.

One regiment of chasseurs or hussars, employed in the van-guard.

Two companies of light artillery, detached among the infantry brigades; and a half battery for the van-guard.

Eight pieces of heavy artillery, twelve and eight pounders, and six or eight inch howitzers.

A park of reserve, with the necessary ammunition, containing cartridges for infantry and cavalry, besides those required for the light and heavy artillery.*

The grenadiers of the whole division may be united so as to form the reserve of the division, to which the heavy cavalry and artillery may be attached.

It is necessary that the park of artillery should be provided with grenades, and the grenadiers exercised in using them, for the storming of a work, a fort, a garrisoned place, &c.

In order to form the staff officers, an adjutant-

* This organization must depend upon the country in which the war is carried on, the troops opposed to you, the resources at your disposal, and the object in view. In other respects the proportions are excellent.

commandant shall have the command of the vanguard. He shall be relieved once a month by another, and successively by the field officers of the line.

The other divisions shall be, as much as possible, of the same composition as the above.

The division shall be commanded by the chief of the staff of the army, a general officer, one or more colonels of regiments of the line, chefs-de-bataillon, and chefs-d'escadron, who shall alternately be officer of the day to superintend the execution of orders with regard to the service of the advanced posts, the camp, the police, the night rounds, &c.

ON ENCAMPMENTS.

The regiments of infantry distributed in the different brigades which are to compose the division, or those composing several divisions of the army assembled in a single position, shall be placed in the order of their numbers one, two, three, and four, from right to left, unless particular reasons should prevent this arrangement, which, however, is strictly to be followed if the ground admits of doing so, in order to efface any impression of preference, and prevent jealousy. The French armies are too tenacious of the point of honour to render it prudent in any general officer to grant distinctions to such or such regiments.

The light infantry shall be invariably placed in front of the line, on the flanks, and sometimes in the rear of the camp.

The cavalry in the rear and upon the flanks of the line of encampment.

The light cavalry, with the van-guards.

The light artillery, in front and upon the wings of the line of encampment.

The heavy artillery, in the intervals between the brigades, and in reserve behind the line.

The reserve, behind the line, where shall be assembled the park of artillery, the provision waggons, the baggage, &c.

The baraques or huts, whether built of boards or of straw, shall be placed in lines of two or three ranks. The distance prescribed between each and between the different battalions and regiments, for the purpose of preventing fire, shall be strictly observed. The same shall hold good with regard to the cavalry and the artillery. The area of the camp shall be marked by stakes driven into the ground, as shall likewise the communications with the vanguard, the detached posts, body of reserve, place for distributing rations, head-quarters, &c. &c.

The fasces of arms shall be formed fifteen feet in front of the flag of the line of huts. The firelocks shall occupy the development of the platoons to which they belong; the cartouches and sabres shall be sheltered as much as possible from the damp and rain by means of sheds made of boards, or covered with thatch.

The colours and drums shall be placed in the centre of the firelocks of their respective battalions.

Each infantry regiment shall have, on the right and left of its front, a pole, at the end of which shall

be nailed a board with the number of the regiment inscribed.

The colonel shall have, near his hut, a similar pole showing his name.

The cavalry shall be cantoned, if the locality allows it, but always near the camp. In the contrary case, the horses shall be picketed in two ranks, and the men have their huts in the rear of them. The front and rear shall be kept clear in order to facilitate the falling in. For this purpose openings shall be left between the squadrons.

The colonels of cavalry shall, as well for their regiments as for themselves, adopt the method of poles showing the numbers of the regiments and the names of the colonels, as prescribed for the infantry.

The artillery shall follow in every respect the same arrangements that are prescribed for the infantry and cavalry; so also shall the van-guard and the reserve.

The guards shall be so stationed as to maintain tranquillity, watchfulness, order, and cleanliness in the camp.

The fires for cooking shall be placed according to the sinuosity of the ground, either in the front or in the rear of the line of encampment.

The privies upon the flanks.

SERVICE OF THE CAMP.

The drums shall beat the reveillé from two till three in the morning; at four the troop or assembly,

when the men shall take their arms, shall form in front of the colour, and be ready to execute any movement which circumstances may require. In the event of a manœuvre, the guards of the camp and the police guards shall receive notice to remain at their respective posts. They shall prevent any stranger from entering the camp. But if the troops do not manœuvre, they shall be dismissed at broad daylight, after having been inspected.

The trumpeters shall sound the *boute-selle*, or "to horse," immediately after the beating of the *reveillé*. The horses shall be saddled and prepared, at four the bridles shall be put on, and the cavalry regiments shall, in the greatest silence, fall in at the place indicated for that purpose. The colonels shall order the captains to have the rolls called, and if at broad day-light there is no manœuvre to be performed, the squadrons shall return to the camp in the same order, after the inspection of clothing, accoutrements, harness, and arms.

The heavy artillery shall put the horses to the guns at the same time that the cavalry mount, and the gunners shall be ready to march.

The light artillery shall mount, and the horses be harnessed to the pieces.

All these arrangements shall be equally applicable to the rear-guard, the waggons, the baggage, and all, in short, belonging to a *corps-d'armée*.

The van-guard shall have its duty diminished during the day, in order to be more active and alert during the night. As soon as the day closes, the

videttes shall be doubled. A service of patrols shall be established in such a manner, that there shall always be some on duty. If there are different outlets to guard, leading to the principal post, they shall be barricaded with ladders, felled trees, or waggons without wheels, and be further guarded by squads of infantry. The cavalry shall guard the advanced posts during the day, and occupy the most advanced positions in the neighbourhood. At night-fall, they shall withdraw to a good distance in the rear of the infantry, and only four or five cavalry orderlies shall remain at the principal post of infantry, to carry to the commandant of the camp intelligence of any attack that may be made upon the van-guard. At daybreak, the cavalry shall scour the country according to the orders it may receive, and the infantry remain under arms till its return. It is very necessary that a detachment of cavalry of the new guard should, in reconnoitring, accompany the one relieved, in order to become acquainted with the localities and with the inequalities of the ground.

The order of the day shall be given out after parade, or in the morning immediately after inspection.

The generals and staff-officers shall proceed to the camp at four in the morning, when the troops fall in. They shall remain until the return of the reconnoitring parties.

The service of the camp and of the advanced posts shall begin at the reveillé. The posts shall remain doubled, until the return of the reconnoitring

parties sent in the direction of the enemy; and if there is nothing new, the relieved guards shall return to the camp.

If the troops in the camp are to march against the enemy, the colonels of regiments, and even the officers and non-commissioned officers, shall write in their pocket-books the principal dispositions for the attack which they will have to operate. For it is not indifferent to an officer anxious to do his duty properly, to know the right, the centre, and the left of the brigades or divisions of the camp with which he will have to act, and more especially the hospitals for the wounded, the places where the rations are to be distributed, and lastly, the point on which the reserve park of artillery will be stationed during the skirmish, engagement, or battle.

The report of the officers of the day shall be addressed to the chief of the staff of their division, who shall forward it to the general staff.

The firelocks shall be drawn as soon as the advanced guards have returned to the camp. The adjutant-major of each battalion shall assemble, for this purpose, the men just come off guard, and shall receive back the ball-cartridges. Each soldier shall be furnished with a pricker to clear the touch-hole of his piece, two flints garnished with sheet-lead, and placed in reserve in the pocket of the cartridge, a cloth to wipe the pan, and a small phial of oil to keep the lock in order.

The cavalry soldiers, besides being provided with these articles, as necessary to the carbine as to

the musket, shall each have a small hatchet in the left holster, instead of a second pistol. This hatchet consists of a hammer and a blade in the shape of a half moon, formed of a single piece of metal. At the bottom of the handle, there shall be a screw-ring to enable the rider to fasten his horse to a tree, &c. This screw shall be fixed inside the handle by means of a matrice formed therein.

Colonels of infantry and cavalry may, on days of rest, have the different classes of recruits drilled, and the infantry exercised in the drill of platoons and battalions, the cavalry in that of squadrons. The officers and non-commissioned officers shall be instructed at least twice a week, in the theory relating both to the manner of giving the word of command, and the execution of evolutions and grand manœuvres, and also in the military rules and the administration of military bodies. It is then that colonels well versed in the art of war shall examine them on points of knowledge necessary for the attack and defence of a fortified place, the attack and defence of a post, reconnoitring to be effected in an open or wooded country, and lastly, on the different occurrences in war in which the duties of officers are so important.

The cavalry officers and non-commissioned officers shall be instructed in the theory of their own arm. The cavalry shall take care during the war to have two horses in each squadron with pack-saddles, to which shall be fastened two baskets lined with strong leather, containing a stock of cartridges for

the carbines, muskets, or other firelocks ; also spare flints and worms for drawing charges.

The guard-rooms shall be established at the advanced posts, and the men guilty of breach of discipline shall be sent thither. These shall have no huts, and shall receive nothing but dry bread, with the exception of soup twice a week.

The code of penalties and military crimes shall be read every Sunday at the head of each company.

The retreat shall be beat at specified hours ; the band shall play an hour beforehand in front of the fasces of arms, the colours and the drums, and in the centre of the battalions.

The roll shall be called immediately after the tattoo, and the fires extinguished at tattoo at eight or nine o'clock at night ; or at ten o'clock, when soup is to be served out, &c. In the cavalry, the rolls shall be called four times a day : in the morning when the men mount their horses, at noon, at two o'clock, and in the evening before the horses are dressed. The same regulations apply to the infantry, to whom, every regulation relating to the service and to the police, is likewise applicable. The cavalry shall have, if possible, pickets with iron points, to picket the horses in camp or at bivouac. But the laxity of discipline during actual service is the cause that this article, so necessary to cavalry soldiers, is seldom preserved more than a few months, because it is inconvenient to the men when in the ranks.

The soldiers shall be exercised in making fascines, saucissons, gabions, and in constructing works neces-

sary in a campaign, such as intrenchments, redoubts, &c. The officers shall endeavour to acquire skill in directing these works, in order to be able to intrench themselves with detachments, in case of need, for the defence of a post, or a wood, or a village, or a defile, a bridge, a river, a ford, &c. The sentries and videttes shall be accustomed to place themselves at night in holes which they shall dig. This plan, besides sheltering them from surprise, enables them to hear at an immense distance the approach of any one, by listening from time to time with the head reclining in the excavation.

Both infantry and cavalry shall supply night pickets, who, every evening before the tattoo, shall assemble behind the hut of each colonel, to be employed as circumstances may require.

The cavalry shall send patrols during the night along the great communications in the rear of the camp, and along those of the different head-quarters.

DISTRIBUTION OF RATIONS.

The chief of the staff shall issue an order of the day, stating the arrangements relative to the distribution of rations, whether for two, three, or four days. When rations are to be distributed, each regiment shall send an armed detachment with the fatigue-men, whose turn of duty it is, and also the adjutants and under-officers. The corps shall be mentioned which in their turn take precedence in the distribution, consisting of bread, meat, rice, salt, dry vegetables, brandy, wine, vinegar, forage, straw, oats, &c. Water shall also be sent for in a

regular manner; the fountains, springs, wells, and brooks in the neighbourhood of the camp shall be guarded by posts of infantry.

The cavalry shall proceed to the distributions in the same order as the infantry, and shall have, to water their horses, a place different from that resorted to for water by the infantry, and which shall be guarded by a mounted vidette.

The staff officers shall be directed to be present, by turns, at the issues, for the purpose of preserving good order there, and examining the quality of the bread, meat, forage, liquids, &c. Articles of bad quality, spoilt or unwholesome, shall not be paid for to the contractor, provided there be a *procès-verbal* requiring that they shall be burnt. The receipts of the adjutants and quarter-master serjeants shall be given to the store-keeper in the presence of the quarter-master general and the commissary-general, both of whom are to be present at the distributions.

ON THE MARCH OF A CORPS-D'ARMÉE, A DIVISION, A BRIGADE, A RECONNOITRING PARTY, A PATROLE, &c.

A body of troops shall never leave the camp except on a formal order of the general in command, and in presence of the staff or other officer appointed to carry the order into execution, after having examined the instructions for the direction of the march and the nature of the enterprise. If the expedition is not a secret one, it is necessary that the

commander of the detachment should read the instructions, and make, in case of need, such reflections and observations upon them as he may think proper, and which the staff officer shall report to his general, if he be not attached to the expedition, in which case he shall forward them by a cavalry orderly.

When a corps-d'armée is preparing for a movement, either for offensive operations, or to effect a retreat, the men shall fall in without the least noise, an hour before the march. The generals of brigade shall march at the head of their respective columns, and the staff-officers, before the troops engage, on the flanks and in the rear, in order that the officers of regiments may remain in their places of battle, and that the distances may be well observed without allowing the depth of each column to lengthen out. Each regiment of infantry and of cavalry shall form a rear-guard, commanded by officers of firmness, and notoriously devoted to military discipline. This guard is to prevent the number of stragglers from being too great, and force the men to keep to their ranks. The soldiers under arrest, in confinement, or in the guard-house, shall march at the head of the battalions to which they belong, with their coats turned, their muskets slung reversed on their backs, without bayonet, or sabre, or cartridges. They may be made to engage with the tirailleurs; so soon as the action begins, ammunition and bayonets may be given out to them. After the action they shall return to the guard-house, unless their colonel for-

gives their fault on account of their good conduct during the action. The men thus in confinement shall be forced to perform all the drudgery of the camp, field works, &c.

The van-guard shall proceed with all the precautions necessary to insure a march, and discover by its flankers the situation of the enemy. It shall open its march with a squadron of light cavalry, a company of carabineers, an eight-pounder or a four-pounder; a battalion of light infantry, three squadrons of light cavalry upon the flanks of this battalion of light infantry, behind which shall be two pieces of artillery: a howitzer and an eight-pounder, or a four-pounder, and a subdivision of sappers. The remainder of the infantry shall follow with the remaining artillery, and the march shall be closed up by the cavalry. The piece of cannon at the head of the column shall be fired as rapidly as possible the moment the enemy is perceived in force, in order to give notice to the corps-d'armée. A staff-officer shall be immediately despatched to the general in command, to report on what has been perceived of the enemy's force, position, or motions.

The corps-d'armée shall march, so far as the nature of the ground will permit, by platoons or divisions, at half distances, and even in columns of half-battalions or battalions, if the country should become more open, and when the position which the army is to occupy by a rapid attack requires that it should form into line of battle with great celerity. The cavalry stationed in the several divisions shall march on the roads upon

the flanks and in sections, or by fours. The battalions shall maintain a distance of twenty toises from each other, the regiments a distance of sixty toises, and the brigades a distance of a hundred and twenty toises. But, to insure precision in this arrangement, staff-officers, or adjutants-major from the infantry regiments, and intelligent orderlies on horseback, shall be stationed so as to prevent the columns from becoming encumbered, or from stopping during the march. If the enemy is far off, there shall be a general halt of half an hour after every two hours of march. If it be a forced march, it shall continue four hours, and then a halt of an hour for refreshment.

It is necessary to accustom a number of non-commissioned officers, placed along the whole depth of the column, on the pivot flank, to repeat the word of command "halt," from the head to the rear, if the column is to stop, and the march is by files, sections, platoons, or divisions; also the word "march" after the halt, when the command to resume the march is given, &c. This very simple measure is of the greatest importance.

The drummers and fifers shall, during the march, be distributed at the head of their respective battalions. A number of them, fixed by the drum-major or by the corporal-drummer, shall execute different beats accompanied by the fifes. By day only, and when the enemy is far off, the bands shall remain at the head of their respective regiments, and shall play from time to time, different warlike airs.

The cavalry trumpets shall play flourishes; the

march shall be commanded by sound of trumpet, and the sounding of a call shall suffice to stop the column. The march shall be resumed, whenever it can be so managed, only after the men have had their soup.

The greatest order shall exist in the march of the baggage and the provision waggons, which shall be guarded by a detachment of infantry and cavalry, taken either from the reserves of the different divisions, or from the army in general. The guard of head-quarters, the commissariat, the gendarmerie, the sutlers, &c. shall follow in the order laid down by the commander-in-chief.

The park of artillery, the bridge-equipages, and the other implements of war, shall always remain with the reserve, to which also shall be attached the surgeons and the moveable hospitals.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE MARCH OF ONE OR MORE DIVISIONS OF A CORPS-D'ARMÉE.

Order of march for the

The division of the general commanding the van-guard, or the brigade forming the van-guard, or, in fine, the flankers, shall quit the position of at two o'clock in the morning precisely, with arms and baggage. It shall march with the right (or the left) in front, secure its march and its flanks, maintain the greatest order in its movements, and proceed to the camp, place, position, &c. of fixed upon and staked off by the engineer and staff-

officers, in pursuance of instructions to this effect. It shall place its right (after having established its advanced posts in a line with) on the village behind the brook, its centre upon the heights of, and its left shall extend to the forest of, whose outlets and skirts it shall guard. Its reserve, park of artillery, and baggage, shall be stationed in the rear of the village, at the river or wood of, and the head-quarters of the division shall be established at

The first, second, third, or fourth division shall quit its camp and proceed to, and, on reaching its position, shall connect by posts its right with the left of the first division, and its left with the right of the third division: thus the first division shall occupy the position of, the second division that of, the third that of, and the fourth, &c. The reserves shall be established in the best manner possible in the centre and rear of their respective divisions. The head-quarters of the first division shall be at, those of the second, third, and fourth, &c.

The reserve of the army shall occupy the position of, the grand park shall be at, in the rear of the centre division of the army. (Name the head-quarters of the reserve and of the commander-in chief of the artillery.)

If the army marches in different columns,—which is almost always the case in actual service, in order as well to accelerate the march, and facilitate the providing of food, as to act upon a great extent of front,—the order of march shall specify the

direction of each, the particulars of its position of encampment, and its flanks — so that a service of patrols and reconnoitring parties may be established, to prevent the enemy from throwing a large force between them and engaging them separately, or from taking them in flank or in the rear. The columns ordered to flank the army shall detach a battalion, two pieces of light artillery, and two squadrons of light cavalry, under the command of an adjutant-commandant, whom the general of division may send to reconnoitre the ground which the division is to occupy, and who shall report to this general any discoveries he may make during his expedition.

The generals of division shall be careful to transmit to the general-in-chief a report of every circumstance which may occur during the march. This latter shall specify the division in which he will remain on the day of a battle, engagement, or march. All reports shall be written or made verbally by the aides-de-camp, each of whom shall be provided with a pocket-book, in which he shall write the reports, and also the orders to be given to the different corps.

The strictest orders shall be given that no musket shall be fired during the march of a column. If the firelocks have been loaded for some days, the adjutant-major shall assemble all the men of the battalion, and have the whole of them discharged together.

Every thing captured from the enemy shall be sent to the head-quarters of the division, and thence

to general head-quarters. It shall be stated in general orders that the proper staff-officers shall deliver specific receipts, whether on the arrival of prisoners of distinction, or on the delivery of pieces of cannon, colours, standards, or any other implements of war. The receipt shall specify the sum allowed by the general-in-chief for each article, and these sums shall be paid by the paymasters of the divisions to the quarter-master of each regiment, and under the authority of the conseil-d'administration, which shall certify the propriety of each claim. A staff-officer shall be appointed exclusively to superintend the prisoners of war, their removal to the rear of the army, and their exchange if necessary. His proceedings shall be certified by a register, countersigned through each page by the chief of the general staff. This officer shall receive the sums of money sent to our own prisoners of war, and those received for the prisoners we have captured.

A DAY OF ENGAGEMENT OR OF BATTLE.

All the grenadiers of brigades, of divisions, or of the whole army, shall be assembled to form corps of reserve, and decide the fate of the battle by an act of vigour. This arrangement is equally necessary whether the field of battle be a plain or a country intersected with ditches, woods, and other obstacles.

All the troops shall, if circumstances admit, undergo a strict inspection before the battle ;

and the generals shall harangue the men and excite each to do his duty. They shall state the rewards which the government confers upon such as distinguish themselves, and invoke the justice of their cause, which must make them triumph over the enemy.

The generals and field-officers of corps shall remain at their respective posts, in order to execute the movements and manœuvres ordered by the general-in-chief. The generals may, on that day increase the number of their staff, by taking an officer and a non-commissioned officer from each regiment of cavalry; and an adjutant-major, or an adjutant non-commissioned officer, on horseback, from each regiment of infantry, to transmit orders and reports to the generals who command them. All important reports shall be conveyed to the general-in-chief by an aide-de-camp attached to the adjutants-commandants, or by an officer of correspondence. Each of these shall take care to write in his pocket-book the order to be executed, or the report to be made, in the event of the general transmitting them being unable to write and sign a letter or note.

The baggage, equipages, provision waggons, &c. shall, during the action, be assembled in the rear of the reserve; the armed detachments taken from the camp shall return to their respective corps, the reserves acting as the guard. The park of artillery, the bridge-equipages, and the other implements of war, shall never quit the reserve; but should the latter have to engage, the commander of the reserve

shall leave a battalion or a squadron to serve as a guard of safety, and shall take care to give notice to the commander-in-chief, by despatching a mounted officer.

The hospitals shall be distributed along the right, the centre, and the left, so as to receive the wounded whom the officers of health attached to the several divisions may send thither, after having put on the first dressings. Should the number of wounded increase, so that any one hospital were over-filled, the commander of the reserve should give a sufficient guard to the director-general of the hospitals, to enable the latter to assemble in all haste a number of waggons belonging to the country, sufficient to contain the sick. The removal of the wounded from the hospitals must be made slowly, and with the greatest care.

The men killed in the field of battle shall be immediately buried, or removed from the sight of the soldiers. But if the battle were long, and the loss of life very great, it would be expedient, after the victory, to have a funeral ceremony for the burial of the brave men who had fallen, and even to erect monuments in commemoration of the battle. Nothing tends more to increase the strength and confidence of an army than the conviction that when a soldier is wounded, great care will be taken of him, and if he falls, his memory will be honoured by a funeral ceremony ; that he will, in short, be consigned to the grave, with all the honours granted to those slain in the field of battle.

Never, under any circumstances, shall a soldier

quit his ranks, unless he be seriously wounded. The repairs necessary to his arms often serve as a pretence for leaving the field of battle. The officers and the non-commissioned officers in the rear shall pay the strictest attention to this. They may replace arms that have become unfit for service by others taken from the killed or wounded.

Each regiment shall have one or more waggons to collect the arms that want repair and those taken from the enemy. The armourers shall render the former fit for service at the first regimental halt, and the others shall be sent to the office of the general staff. It would be better to break them to pieces than to leave them at the disposal of the inhabitants of a conquered country, who would often return them to the enemy, or even use them against the army, if there were any negligence in picking them up and carrying them away in waggons.

The most rigorous orders shall be given that no wounded soldier shall be carried by his comrades further than the first hospital. Two men shall suffice for a fracture, and one for a slight wound.

They who have itch or syphilis shall undergo medical treatment in the hospitals which follow the general head-quarters.

Colonels of regiments shall take care to deliver with great pomp the arms of honour awarded by the government to the non-commissioned officers and privates who have distinguished themselves in battle. They shall parade the regiment under arms, and make a speech suitable to the occasion. This plan leads to prodigies of valour.

Punishments for cowardice likewise require an imposing form. If an officer, non-commissioned officer, or private, is guilty of it, he must be publicly degraded in the presence of the whole regiment paraded without arms. The colonel's speech must be short, but energetic, in order to excite the love of glory, and deprecate with horror that cowardice which shames and disgraces the army and the nation. It is requisite that every regiment should have thrée provosts to perform such military executions.

Regiments losing their colours or standards, their cannon, or their colonel, shall have no others during the campaign, unless they make an equivalent reprisal from the enemy.

Pieces of cannon, colours, standards, baggage, and other implements of war taken from the enemy, shall be paid for, exclusively of the reward given by the government, at the rate fixed by general orders. This sum shall be paid by the conseil-d'administration of each regiment, to be distributed among all the non-commissioned officers and privates who compose the same.

During battle, the regimental band shall assemble in the rear of the regiment, and play warlike airs. The trumpeters shall sound flourishes: the drummers and fifers shall be sent to the right and in the rear of their respective battalions, in order to execute the beats which the colonel may direct. The sappers shall be assembled on the right of the regiment, to be employed wherever their services may be requisite. They shall be armed with fire-

locks, besides their hatchets. Their officers shall carry a brace of pistols, in a belt round the waist; they shall also have a small cartouche, with the number of the regiment upon it. Each officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, shall wear the number of his regiment upon the facings of his coat.

After the battle, each colonel shall minutely inspect his regiment, as well to ascertain what men are present, as to ascertain the state of their arms and accoutrements. Those men who remain absent four days from the regiment without good cause, shall be placed in confinement, and shall forfeit their pay during the period of such confinement; the sums thus forfeited shall be applied to the minor articles of equipment for the men of the regiment generally. The colonels shall address to the chief of the staff of their respective divisions, and the latter to the chief of the general staff, an exact statement of the losses sustained by their regiment, its prisoners of war, its killed and wounded, its captures from the enemy, &c. They shall do their best to make such reports as circumstantial as possible, and shall include the whole of the occurrences of the battle, manœuvres, changes of position, charges, retreats, —every movement, in short, executed during the action.

When the enemy is retreating, and the line has received the command to halt, the regimental bands must execute airs of victory, and the cavalry trumpets sound flourishes. Nothing gives greater relaxation to the men than this, and nothing urges

them more strongly to deeds of heroism. If at this moment the colonels can issue a small ration of wine or brandy to the men, it would add to the general excitement. Wine is always to be preferred, because it gives real strength without injury ; whereas brandy is only good for night marches, or just before the attack of an important post, a redoubt, an intrenchment, a storming, &c. &c. But when success is obtained, it is prudent to relieve the men who have won it by others who have taken no share in the action. A man adapted to such desperate service and such coups-de-main, is scarcely ever able to display the same energy in defence as in attack.

If the victory gained is of sufficient importance to fix the attention of the commander-in-chief, the troops shall be either assembled immediately after the battle, or on the following day. Guns shall be fired in token of rejoicing : the men shall fire five rounds, as shall likewise the artillery, in pursuance of orders to be given for the firing to take place from right to left at the same time. The generals shall be at their respective posts ; they shall talk to the men about the national gratitude which the latter have just earned by their valour, and exhort them to continue in the same course, in order to force the enemy to sue for peace. This is always the great object pursued throughout a war. The intelligence and information possessed by the French armies require that they should be duly apprized of the cause for which they are fighting ; and it is only when the aggression is justified by the pro-

vocation, that they can be expected to display surpassing heroism. An unjust war is repugnant to the national character; the men, who soon become well-informed on the subject, evince much less courage; and if they suffer themselves to be killed rather than disobey their officers, it is not less true that they no longer show the same energy in dangerous attacks. French soldiers must never be called upon to fight except in a just cause, one founded upon incontrovertible political reasoning, and free from improper motives.

FRAGMENTS UPON ARMS.

The sabre of the foot soldier must be so formed as to be adapted to the barrel of the musket.

In action, many bayonets are broken or carried away by cannon shot; the men, in falling, often bend or break them, and are thus without the means of defence. If a soldier has a sabre-bayonet he is safe. There are situations in war when a man can act neither with his firelock nor with his bayonet, as during the night for instance. He might then carry his musket as the dragoons do their carbines, and use his sabre-bayonet in a confined space where his musket would only embarrass.

The sabre-bayonet shall have a foot of sharpened blade, and a foot and half without being sharpened, in order that the men may not be wounded in loading their pieces. It shall weigh only double the

weight of the common bayonet, shall have a light but solid hilt, with a guard which, by means of a spring, shall fold down when the sabre is fixed on the firelock. The socket shall be three inches long, the hilt four inches and half, and the guard, with a spring as aforesaid, in order to admit of the musket being fired. The length of the sabre shall be two feet six inches.*

Thus, when the men in the first rank charge bayonets, by applying the lock of their firelocks to their right haunch, which diminishes the length fourteen inches, as they present their arm diagonally,—a musket with the sabre-bayonet would still extend beyond the front of the first line five feet ten inches. A sabre-bayonet in the second rank would extend beyond the first four feet four inches; one in the third rank two feet ten inches. Let it be observed that eighteen inches are allowed from the first to the second rank, and the same from the second to the third.† It is not to be presumed that with such a range of bayonet, the enemy's cavalry could break a line so formed; and a charge of bayonets against infantry not so well armed must prove fatal to the latter. But the men in the third rank, to avoid the danger in making a charge, would not bring down their bayonets to the charge until they were close to the enemy: they would advance porting arms; for if a man fell, as he could not

* About two feet nine inches, English measure.—ED.

† The reader must bear in mind that all these calculations are made by French measure, which is larger than the English.—ED.

see the ground covered by the first and second ranks, he might wound some of the men in these ranks. Besides, the sabre-bayonet should only be fixed upon the piece at the very moment the cavalry is seen preparing to charge, or at the very instant a charge against infantry is ordered.

The chasseurs and hussars, now that they have firelocks, must be in some degree assimilated to the infantry. The carbine shall have a ramrod with a slide or ring at its extremity; and a ring which turns over the muzzle of the piece, so that the ramrod may enter the barrel naturally, without its being necessary to turn it in order to ram down the cartridge. The loading effected, the ramrod brings back the ring to its former position. In this manner the ramrod is never lost, even when the carbine is hung up by a peg. This kind of ramrod might be adapted to the infantry muskets. To facilitate the taking out of the ramrod, there might be a screw at the extremity, which could be unscrewed at pleasure. The objection is, that if a ramrod were to break, the man could not borrow one from a fellow-soldier. But it is the least of two evils, for most of the detached ramrods are lost.

There must be a single pistol in the right holster, without a ramrod, of the same calibre as the carbine, and a little larger than our common pistols; in the left holster a hatchet so made that the bayonet may be fixed upon it, in order that if the man in close battle should break his sword, he may defend himself with his hatchet, and stab with his bayonet. These hatchets serve, moreover, for every thing

the men may want to cut during a campaign: pickets for encamping, or any thing else. There must be a screw and a ring at the end of the handle, for the purpose of hanging up the hatchet, or fastening the horse.

THE THIRD RANK OF INFANTRY CONSIDERED AS A RESERVE; ADVANTAGEOUS USE TO BE MADE OF IT UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN WAR.

A line of infantry cannot, without some danger, march to offensive warfare with bayonets charged three deep. Any unevenness in the ground, indeed the least undulation, forms an obstacle dangerous to the precision necessary in such an attack. The bayonets of the third rank might easily wound the men in the first, because they only reach the shoulders of these men; and because the men in the third rank have no facility to distinguish, like those in the first and second rank, the ground which the line has to pass over.

To avoid the danger of this kind of attack, the charge with the bayonet should be made only by the first and second ranks; the third should follow with ported arms. The line having reached the ground occupied by the enemy, should fire without moving from the position of charge bayonets; the third rank, and without any other notice than the firing, should advance as tirailleurs. But if the enemy stood the charge, they should not quit their place, but bring down their bayonets to the charge,

in order to support and increase the impetus given by the two first ranks.

Supposing a regiment marching in column by sections, platoons, or divisions, to gain a position indicated, and on its way thither to be attacked or harassed by the enemy's cavalry:—the colonel, to clear and cover the march, may detach the third rank of the three first, of the four last, or of the whole of the divisions forming the column. The third rank of the uneven platoons shall march to the right of each respective division, in either one or two ranks; the rear of the third rank of the even platoons shall, in like manner, flank the left of the column. The same disposition shall be pursued whether the left or the right of the column be in front.

A lieutenant and a drummer from each company shall always march with the men of the third rank when acting as *éclaireurs*.

In the event of a battalion of infantry being attacked by a body of horse (we suppose here that circumstances prevent the battalion from forming into square, which is the only effective mode of resisting such an attack), after the two first ranks have fired, the third shall advance as *tirailleurs*; and when the line has reloaded, it shall follow the impetus given by the third rank, with charged bayonets and in double-quick time. But if the *tirailleurs* were, in their turn, threatened by the enemy, the lieutenants should order the rally to be beat, and form groups, in the centre of which they would maintain themselves with their drummers until

the arrival of the line. Should the danger continue, the third rank should resume its original station; in the contrary case, it should proceed with its attack.

Some of the enemy's horsemen might perhaps succeed in passing the wings and attacking the rear: in that case the whole should halt, the rear rank face about, and, after firing and reloading, charge bayonets. The two first ranks should then, after firing, reload, and also come to the charge. If in defiance of this firing the enemy continued their attack upon the front and the rear of the line, the colonel should command the second rank to carry arms in order to fire at will front and rear, or by the even files to the front and the uneven to the rear. The first and third ranks should, in the mean time, remain with the bayonet at the charge until the danger was over. In this situation the supernumerary rank should be distributed in the intervals of the second rank, behind the captains and serjeants closing the third rank. Those over and above might be placed to the left of the grenadiers, and between the seventh and eighth platoons of the battalion.

If a column of infantry were obliged to cross a plain in effecting its retreat, and were attacked by a numerous cavalry, it must form without hesitation into close column by divisions, and then into square, if necessary. The men of the third rank of the sections which have doubled, and of those preceding them, may be successfully employed in advancing from the square to repulse the assailants,

and even to cover the march when the danger is over.

When a regiment is drawn up in line, in any camp fixed upon or staked out, the third rank shall advance from the line to any distance determined upon by the colonel in command, in order to cover the line, allow it to form the fasces of arms, and order the service of the advanced posts, pickets, and camp guards. When this is done, the third rank shall resume its place.

If the camp were attacked, the third rank should fall in without any word of command, upon the ground it is to occupy, in front of the line, in order to give the remainder of the regiment time to form and prepare for action. A column of infantry sent to search a wood, or a village, or any other part of a covered country, may, during its march, employ the men of the third rank, without deranging in any way the ensemble of the corps.

OBSERVATIONS UPON DIFFERENT MODES OF FIRING.

Direct and oblique firing are those which, in war, present the least confusion, and allow colonels of infantry best to observe the results, so as to follow up the evolutions which circumstances may render necessary.

In this kind of firing, the front rank kneels. This movement generally displeases the men, and exposes them to ruptures as they rise to reload their pieces. Another disadvantage not less im-

portant is, that it prevents the line from charging rapidly with the bayonet. There are but few instances to be cited during the last war, in which direct firing, according to this system, has been executed with any great success. This circumstance alone would militate against its practice. What matters the period at which the soldiers were first accustomed to execute a dangerous movement? If its execution is disadvantageous in war, there ought to be no hesitation in rejecting the practice.

It has been remarked that when, in dangerous situations, the soldiers have been obliged to kneel, there has been some difficulty in making them rise during the enemy's fire, because they were in some measure sheltered from it; for the most even ground has always some slight inequalities which shelter a man in such position.

The firing of two ranks, or file firing, is, with the exception of a very few movements, absolutely the only kind of firing which offers much greater advantages to the infantry than those above-mentioned. The third rank, during this firing, exchange their loaded pieces with the discharged pieces of the second rank; but this exchange is made with repugnance, and the men of the second rank fire with much less confidence the pieces which have not been loaded by themselves.

Most infantry officers must have remarked the almost insurmountable difficulty they find in stopping file-firing during battle, after it has once begun, especially when the enemy is well within

shot ; and this firing, in spite of the command given by the field-officers, resembles general discharges. It would be better, therefore, after the two first ranks have fired, to charge boldly with the bayonet, and by an act of vigour force the enemy to retreat.

The German soldier, formed by the severest discipline, is cooler than any other. Under such circumstances he would, in the end, obtain the advantage in this *kind* of firing, if it lasted long.

This imperfection disappears when the firing is confined to the two first ranks, the third porting arms and remaining as a reserve to be used according to circumstances. It has, moreover, been proved that the best drilled infantry in firing is not, on that account, the best in battle. Ammunition always fails in the end, and this diminishes the men's confidence ; each then finds some excuse, either in the condition of his firelock, or even in his own impatience and vivacity, for hastening his retreat, unless the movement becomes offensive.

These observations are of a nature to urge colonels of infantry regiments to prepare and drill their men to attacks by main strength, so peculiarly adapted to the vivacity and temperament which distinguish the French soldier from that of other nations.

After the two first ranks have fired, the third, having reserved its fire, will increase the disorder in the enemy's ranks if they be broken. This rank may be employed with the same success in protecting the retreat of the line, should unforeseen events

render a retrograde movement necessary. This reserve, so essential, offers an infinity of resources of which the commander may avail himself according to circumstances.

The firing of infantry, of whatever nature it may be, offers real advantages only when troops are acting on the defensive.

A country covered with wood, intersected with hedges, ditches, defiles difficult of access, rivers, marshes, fords, and bridges, is favourable to this kind of warfare ; for such natural obstacles may be strengthened by redoubts, intrenchments, felled trees, and other field works.

The defensive system is ill calculated for the French soldier, unless his excitement be kept up by diversions and successive excursions. In a word, if the lesser kind of warfare be not constantly carried on, idleness destroys the strength of a body of troops acting merely on the defensive. It is constantly in danger of being surprised day and night ; whereas expeditions prudently combined, raise the courage of the men, and prevent them from discovering the real cause of their dangerous situation.

In offensive warfare, the French soldier has inexhaustible resources ; his active genius, and his bravery in storming, double his energy ; and a French commander ought never to hesitate in marching against the enemy with the bayonet, if the ground is at all adapted to a charge in line with one or more battalions at a time.

It is by attacking that the French soldier is

inured to all kinds of warfare, whether when he braves the fire of the enemy, which is seldom very destructive, or when the field is left open to his intelligence and boldness.

One of the greatest difficulties in war is to have the men inured to marching. The other nations of Europe will with difficulty reach the same perfection in this respect as the French, whose abstemiousness and physical temperament are powerful causes which, in ~~this~~ kind of fatigue, have given them such immense superiority over the Austrians.

The rapidity of a march, or rather skilful marches, almost always determine the success of a war. Thus, colonels of infantry ought to neglect nothing to obtain progressive perfection in ordinary and forced marches. To accomplish this object so essential in war, it is necessary to oblige the men to carry their knapsacks from the very opening of the campaign, and also to accustom them to the works attendant upon military operations. The health of the soldiers depends upon this; it will also effect a considerable saving of men who are lost in partial actions, and also prove a great saving in hospital expenses.

It is this power of marching which constitutes the strength of infantry; and enterprises which seem to present the greatest difficulties, become comparatively easy by the advantages accruing from rapid marches.

SOME REFLECTIONS UPON MOVEMENTS OF INFANTRY
AND OTHER POINTS OF WARFARE.

Most of the infantry manœuvres executed in time of peace are not used in war; those easiest to be understood ought to form the basis of manœuvring, and their execution should be rigorously enforced. The superfluous must be rejected without hesitation, and the leisure of winter quarters, now spent in teaching useless evolutions, which the troops will scarcely ever have occasion to perform even in the course of numerous campaigns, be devoted to instructing the infantry officers and non-commissioned officers. They should be taught the system of attacking and defending fortified places; they should be exercised in the erection of military field works, in attacking and defending a post, in military reconnoitring, &c.; and lastly the coup-d'œil must be exercised in the choice of positions and encampments, whether for offensive or defensive operations.

It is admitted by all military men that infantry is the great lever of war, and that the artillery and cavalry are only indispensable accessories. Care ought therefore to be taken that the officers and non-commissioned officers of infantry should be as well informed as possible. The national genius discloses a vast field of resources for this object, and particularly at the present period when promotion is open to all.

The greatest powers of Europe have always shown the most particular and unremitting attention to the

drilling and forming of their infantry, without considering the too great number of evolutions invented in time of peace, for the soldiers' torment, by officers often more systematic than experienced in war. Two essential conditions constitute the strength of infantry :—

That the men be good walkers and inured to fatigue.

That the firing be well executed.

The physical constitution, and the national composition of the French armies, fulfil the former most advantageously ; the vivacity and intelligence of the soldiers ensure the success of the latter.

The following evolutions, to which the infantry ought to be restricted, both in time of peace and of war, would, I imagine, meet the views of government and the real end of the institution of infantry.

EVOLUTIONS IN LINE.

First part.

Formation of a regiment in line of battle. (The places of the officers and non-commissioned officers in the ranks, and in close order.)

Open and close the ranks.

The manual exercise.

The command and execution of the different firings.

Break and form by files, sections, platoons, and divisions.

Form a line into close column.

Deploy into line.

Second part.

March in order of battle, in close column, and in column of route.

Oblique and diagonal march.

Change of front and of direction.

Passage of defile by wings or centre, either in front, or in rear of the line.

Order in echellons.

Retreat in échiquier, or by alternate divisions.

Passage of lines.

Formations against cavalry. (Squares.)

The soldier's instruction in platoon and battalion, ought to be founded upon these evolutions.

In order to facilitate their execution, it would be important, besides exercising the men in the marching step, the ordinary step, and the quick step, to exercise them also in running. This method would produce amazing celerity in the formation of the different columns, and also in the deployments. French soldiers are more calculated than those of any other nation to attain this perfection, which so well agrees with their intelligence.

I think, in summing up my reflections, that it would not be useless to advise colonels of infantry regiments to avoid, with the greatest care, a reverse at the opening of the campaign. The least check has more influence than is generally supposed upon the remaining operations of the campaign : it diminishes the confidence of the men, by raising mistrust of the commander's talents. The least success, on the contrary, impresses upon the

troops, from the very beginning, that just military pride which doubles their strength, and serves as a presage of a series of brilliant feats.

Victory smiles in general upon those only who know how to command it by good preparations. It is seldom the effect of chance or of unexpected good luck, but the fruit and recompense culled by the experienced soldier, whose discernment is supported by the resolution and boldness of his undertakings.

Irresolution in war is the most dangerous defect in a commander, more especially when the enemy is approaching. He must make up his mind without long deliberation, and above all things prevent French soldiers from giving way to their propensity to criticism. The most distinguished men in the career of arms have never ceased repeating this axiom: "Make your preparations for attack or defence *instantly* on the enemy's approach; should you even be obliged to execute them with disadvantage, do not hesitate." The enemy, who is a good observer, would take advantage of your indecision. It is often better to come to a bad decision immediately, than to hesitate between several good ones; for the bad one has always some favourable side by which success may be obtained. Moreover a vigilant mind is never embarrassed by the presence of the enemy, which on the contrary will tend to facilitate the boldness of its conceptions.

ON THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF INTRENCHMENTS.

There are three kinds of intrenchments used in war :

Redoubts, or closed works.

Continuous lines.

Detached works, open at their gorges.

Experience has convinced well-informed soldiers, that redoubts, particularly those in the form of a quincunx, are to be preferred to all kinds of intrenchments ; they are indeed the ~~only~~ ones which suit the French, because they allow of offensive retaliations on the part of those who defend them, which is peculiarly adapted to the national character of Frenchmen.

This species of intrenchment has been used with the greatest success, and has decided the fate of several celebrated battles ; those of Pultawa and Fontenoy, for instance, Frederick the Great held them in great estimation ; and they were very useful, during the last war, in the intrenched camp of the creek of Ham at Dusseldorf.

Intrenchments, or continuous lines, of which great use was made in the old wars, are adapted to absolutely defensive operations. They are open to the great inconvenience of spreading the means of defence along a considerable extent, and, consequently, of being weak upon all points which the enemy may attack.

They offer moreover the great disadvantage of forcing an army to abandon them the instant any part of them is carried.

The British often use them, and were thus in-

trenched at the last battle which decided the fate of Egypt.

Detached works ought to be considered simple batteries only, for the employment of the artillery and of some troops. I think they ought not to be used except in the rear of redoubts, and for the establishment of fixed batteries and a part of the reserve. This species of intrenchment is seldom capable of being long defended.

ON THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF AN INTRENCHED
CAMP FORMED BY TWO LINES OF REDOUBTS, IN
THE FORM OF A QUINCUNX.

1st, the Defence.

To defend an intrenched camp, the troops must be divided into four bodies: one to be placed in the redoubts, two at a hundred and fifty toises behind them, and the fourth to form a reserve.

The redoubts shall be mounted with the necessary cannon. The light and heavy artillery shall be placed in the most advantageous positions.

These arrangements being made, and the enemy having given the signal of attack, the redoubts, which are so many little fortresses reciprocally protecting, though independent of, each other, will necessarily oblige the assailants to break their lines, as well to surround them as to prevent the double fire of their artillery and musketry. If some of the redoubts are carried, and the others sorely beset, then the light and heavy artillery must batter those

in possession of the enemy, directing the whole of their fire against them. Now is the time for the second line to act: it must fall with impetuosity upon the broken enemy, weakened by the exertions they have already made, discouraged by their losses, and surprised that in attacking they become the attacked. This offensive return generally produces a great effect, and forces the enemy to make a retrograde movement. Should the attack of the second line not produce the effect anticipated, the reserve covers its retreat.

2nd, the Attack.

For the attack of an intrenched camp with two divisions of eight battalions each: the troops shall arrive in columns, and form into line out of the reach of the enemy's shot.

The first line, which is that of attack, shall detach about a company from each battalion as tirailleurs; to these volunteers, shall be added the sappers of the battalions and of the division, with hatchets, a few hoes, fascines, and light ladders.

The point of attack shall be either on the right or the left, and must embrace two salient redoubts, together with those defending them in the second line.

As soon as the troops are within half cannon range of the enemy, the tirailleurs shall advance at a run, and leap into the ditches of the works attacked, in order to cut the palisades and make openings through which they may penetrate into the interior. Meanwhile, the line of attack shall advance in good order with the light artillery, which

shall fire as it proceeds, and be protected by the heavy artillery which shall remain with the second division.

The tirailleurs must carry the redoubts attacked ; if they are not strong enough, they shall be reinforced by a few companies of grenadiers. In no case must the line of attack be broken, in order that it may always be ready to face the enemy's second line and reserve.

The redoubts being taken, the line shall advance rapidly; porting arms ; it shall not fire until it is within twenty-five paces of the enemy, who shall then be instantly charged with fixed bayonets.

The cavalry must follow the division of attack, in order to be in a situation to take advantage of the victory when once the redoubts are taken and the enemy routed.

• The second division shall deploy at the distance of cannon-shot, feign an attack upon the left of the enemy's camp, and then advance, or protect the retreat, according as events may turn out.

ON THE ATTACK OF INTRENCHMENTS, OR CONTINUOUS LINES, BY ONE OR MORE DIVISIONS.

A division of four regiments, or eight battalions, charged to make the principal attack, shall form into line beyond the range of the cannon of the enemy's intrenchments which they are to storm. Every order for the details of the undertaking must be clear, precise, and laconic. The instant before the

attack, the staff-officers having the direction of the columns, shall ascertain whether all the officers clearly comprehend the instructions given, in order to avoid misconceptions, which are always dangerous and sometimes fatal to the success of combined operations. The general officer in command shall harangue the men in a manner suited to the occasion, and with that energy which characterizes a warrior.

All being ready, the signal of attack shall be made by three guns being fired, and the troops shall march to the enemy at the charge, and in the following order :—

The companies of tirailleurs of the eighth battalion, the command of which shall be intrusted to a field or a staff officer, shall cover the front of attack. The men shall each be provided with a hatchet besides his firelock ; and when within musket shot they shall run as fast as possible into the ditches of the intrenchments, cut the palisades, tear away the fascines and gabions, and make openings.

An officer of engineers and the sappers of the army attached to this division, shall march with the tirailleurs for the same purpose. So soon as the officer shall have reconnoitred the situation of the enemy's intrenchments, he shall despatch a non-commissioned officer, or proceed himself in all haste to make his report, in order that, if circumstances require it, the plan of attack may be changed.

The sappers of the four regiments of infantry shall be divided into four equal bodies :

The first shall open the march of the two com-

panies of grenadiers formed in column of platoons in front of the first battalion of the first regiment, at a hundred and fifty toises in the rear of the tirailleurs, and a hundred and fifty toises in advance of the column.

The second shall be at the head of the two companies of grenadiers, also in column of platoons, first battalion, second regiment, right brigade.

The third shall be at the head of the two companies of grenadiers, first battalion, third regiment, left brigade.

The uneven battalions shall be formed in column of platoons, the right in front. They shall follow the movement of the grenadiers, observing the prescribed distance of a hundred and fifty toises, until the moment the grenadiers arrive within fifty toises of the intrenchment. Then, the double quick step to close up and give impetus to the storming.

The men of the battalions in column, and also the grenadiers, shall each carry, if necessary, a fascine under his left arm, to fill up the ditches and be enabled to pass with greater ease the impediments which the enemy may oppose to the attack.

The even battalions shall march in line, carrying arms, at three hundred toises from the four columns of attack. The interval occasioned by this distance shall be filled by a squadron of light cavalry.

The light artillery shall be placed upon the two exterior flanks of the columns of attack of the first and fourth regiments, on a level with the companies of grenadiers, whose movements it shall follow within one hundred and fifty toises of the enemy's intrench-

The remainder of the cavalry and of the artillery of the line shall form a reserve, and march in the second line three hundred toises in the rear of the even battalions, in order to be employed as circumstances may require.

An officer of engineers, or of the staff, shall be attached to each column of attack.

After the intrenchments are carried, the tirailleurs shall pursue the routed enemy, and clear the interior flanks of their works.

The sappers of the division and those of the regiments shall fill up the ditches, and make openings for the passage of cavalry, at the places pointed out by the officers of engineers or staff officers attached to the columns of attack. The grenadiers shall remain within the intrenchments.

The moment the columns of attack have passed the intrenchments, they shall form as a first line, one hundred and fifty toises in advance of the grenadiers.

The even battalions shall pass by platoons, right in front, through the intervals of the first line, then form into line, and charge bayonets on the enemy's reserve, should it still resist. They shall be preceded by tirailleurs.

The eight companies of grenadiers shall form the reserve, and march one hundred and fifty toises in their rear.

The light artillery and the cavalry shall march on the flanks of the even battalions, now become the first line, constantly developing the enemy's wings; and the light cavalry shall charge as tirailleurs whenever a favourable opportunity offers.

If, upon one of the flanks of the principal attack, the ground presents advantages sufficient, several pieces of artillery of the line shall be united to silence the enemy's fire and protect the attack made by the columns.

Should the enemy's intrenchments present a greater development than the front of attack of one division, the second division shall dispose its forces in the same manner, and the third shall march in line of battle in the rear of the centre of the two first, in order to support and protect the attempt.

In the event of failure, the retreat shall be effected in the same order as the attack, until the troops reach the level of the first position; and if by a vastly superior force the enemy compelled a retrograde movement, the retreat should, in such case, be effected *en échiquier*. In this predicament, the cavalry and light artillery should be employed on the flanks, and stationed according as circumstances might require.

ON THE ATTACK OF DETACHED WORKS COVERED AT THEIR GORGES.

An army protected by a line of redans or detached works covered at their gorges, is to be attacked at daybreak.

The division of attack shall be formed into close columns of divisions, preceded by some companies of *éclaireurs*.

The columns of attack shall penetrate within the intervals of the redans, and break the enemy, who, being in line of battle, will be unable to resist the shock of the numerous columns by which they are surrounded. The second division shall follow the movement of the first, in line of battle.

APPENDIX.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS.

No. I.

FEDERAL ACT.

TITLE I.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

ARTICLE I.

THE nineteen cantons of Switzerland, to wit:—Appenzell, Argau, Basle, Berne, Friburg, Glaris, Grisons, Lucerne, St. Gall, Schaffhausen, Schweitz, Soleure, Ticino, Thurgau, Underwalden, Uri, Vaud, Zug, and Zurich, are confederated together, conformably to the principles established in their respective constitutions. They reciprocally guarantee their constitutions, territory, liberty, and independence, both against the attacks of foreign powers, and against the usurpations of any particular canton or faction.

II.

The contingent in troops or money, which may become necessary for the execution of this guarantee.

shall be supplied by each canton in the following proportions :

Of fifteen thousand two hundred and three men to be supplied, the contingents are thus regulated :

Berne	2292
- Zurich	1929
Vaud	1482
St. Gall	1315
Argau	1205
Grisons	1200
Ticino	902
Lucerne	867
Thurgau	835
Friburg	620
Appenzell	486
Soleure	452
Basle	409
Schweitz	301
Glaris	241
Schaffhausen	233
Underwalden	191
Zug	125
Uri	118

The sum of 490,507 Swiss livres shall be paid by the several cantons as follows :

Grisons	12,000 livres
Schweitz	3,012
Underwalden	1,907
Uri	1,184
Ticino	18,039
Appenzell	9,728

Glaris	.	.	4,825
Zug	.	.	2,492
St. Gall	.	.	39,451
Lucerne	.	.	26,016
Thurgau	.	.	25,052
Friburg	.	.	18,591
Berne	.	.	91,695
Zurich	.	.	77,153
Vaud	.	.	59,273
Argau	.	.	52,212
Soleure	.	.	18,097
Schaffhausen	.	.	9,327
Basle	.	.	20,450

III.

There exist no longer in Switzerland, either subject countries, or privileges of place, birth, persons, or families.

IV.

Each Swiss citizen has the faculty of removing his domicile from one canton to any other, there freely to exercise his industry. He acquires political rights conformably to the laws of the canton in which he resides; but he cannot enjoy political rights in two cantons at the same time.

V.

The ancient dues of *traite interieure* and *traite foraine* are abolished. The free circulation of produce, cattle, and goods, is guaranteed. No *octroi* dues, entrance dues, or transit or custom-house dues, can be established in the interior of Switzerland. The revenue arising from the custom-houses on the

external limits shall belong to the cantons bordering upon foreign countries ; but the tariffs must be submitted to the approval of the diet.

VI.

Each canton maintains the tolls applied to keeping in repair the highways, causeways, and banks of the rivers ; but the tariffs also require the approval of the diet.

VII.

The money coined in Switzerland shall have a uniform standard, fixed by the diet.

VIII.

No canton shall give an asylum to a legally convicted criminal, or to an accused under legal prosecution.

IX.

The number of paid troops which a canton may maintain, is limited to two hundred men.

X.

All alliance between any two cantons, or between any single canton and a foreign power, is prohibited.

XI.

The members of the government, or the legislative body of any canton, violating a decree of the diet, may be arraigned as rebels before a tribunal composed of the presidents of the criminal tribunals of all the other cantons.

XII.

The cantons shall enjoy all the powers not specially delegated to the federal authority.

TITLE II.

DIRECTING CANTON.

XIII.

The diet shall assemble by turns, and from one year to another, at Friburg, Berne, Soleure, Basle, Zurich, and Lucerne.

XIV.

The cantons, of which these cities are the capitals, shall, in succession, become directing cantons. The year of the directorship begins on the 1st of January.

XV.

The directing canton supplies the deputies of the diet with residences and a guard of honour; it also provides for the expense of the session.

XVI.

The avoyer or burgomaster for the time being of the directing canton joins to his title that of landamman of Switzerland. He keeps the seal of the Helvetian republic, and cannot absent himself from the city. The great council of his canton grants him a fixed salary, and pays all the extraordinary expenses attached to his office.

XVII.

Foreign ministers shall deliver their credentials, or their letters of recall, to the landamman of Switzerland, and shall apply to him in all negotiations. . He is likewise the channel of every other diplomatic relation.

XVIII.

At the opening of the diet he gives all the information he has received relative to such internal and external affairs as interest the confederation.

XIX.

No canton shall, within its own territory, levy and put in motion more than five hundred militia-men, without having first given notice to the landamman of Switzerland.

XX.

In the event of a revolt in the interior of a canton, or in any other case of extreme emergency, the landamman may make troops march from one canton to another; but only on the demand of either the greater or the lesser council of the canton requiring assistance, and after having taken the opinion of the lesser council of the directing canton, with the proviso of convoking the diet after the repression of hostilities, or if the danger should continue.

XXI.

If, during the recess of the diet, differences should arise between two or more cantons, application is to be made to the landamman of Switzer-

land, who, according as circumstances are more or less pressing, shall either appoint arbitrators to conciliate such differences, or adjourn the matter to the nearest session of the diet.

XXII.

The landamman of Switzerland admonishes the cantons, if their internal conduct should tend to interrupt the tranquillity of Switzerland, or if any thing occurs within their territory in violation either of the federal act, or of their individual constitutions. He may also direct a convocation of the great council, or of the lands-gemeinde in those places where the supreme authority is exercised by the people.

XXIII.

The landamman of Switzerland sends, when requisite, inspectors to examine the highways, roads, and rivers, and orders the necessary repairs to be made to them; and, in case of necessity, he commands the immediate execution, and at the cost of those bound to pay it, of such works as are not begun or finished at the time prescribed.

XXIV.

His signature gives authenticity and a national character to the acts to which it is affixed.

TITLE III.

THE DIET.

XXV.

Each canton sends a deputy to the diet, to whom one or two counsel may be attached, to supply his place in the event of absence or illness.

XXVI.

The deputies sent to the diet shall have limited powers, and shall not vote against their instructions.

XXVII.

The landamman of Switzerland is, in virtue of his office, the deputy of the directing canton.

XXVIII.

The nineteen deputies composing the diet shall have twenty-five votes in the deliberations.

The deputies of the cantons whose population exceeds a hundred thousand inhabitants, to wit: those of Berne, Zurich, Vaud, St. Gall, Argau, and Grisons, shall have two votes.

The deputies of the cantons whose population is less than a hundred thousand souls, to wit: those of Ticino, Lucerne, Thurgau, Friburg, Appenzell, Soleure, Basle, Schweitz, Glaris, Schaffhausen, Underwalden, Zug, and Uri, shall have only one vote each.

XXIX.

The diet under the presidency of the landammann of Switzerland shall meet on the first Monday in June, and its session shall not exceed the term of one month.

XXX.

There may be extraordinary diets.

1st, on the demand of a neighbouring state, or of one or more of the cantons;—should the demand be admitted by the great council of the directing canton, which, if it be in recess, shall be convoked to this effect.

2dly, on the advice of the great council, or of the lands-gemeinde of five cantons, who may think a demand well founded, which the directing canton may have rejected.

3dly, when they are convoked by the landamman of Switzerland.

XXXI.

All declarations of war, and treaties of peace and alliance, emanate from the diet, but the consent of three-fourths of the cantons is necessary.

XXXII.

The diet alone concludes treaties of commerce and military capitulations for foreign service. It authorizes the cantons, if necessary, to treat individually with any foreign power for other objects.

XXXIII.

No recruiting for a foreign power shall take place in any canton without the consent of the diet.

XXXIV.

The diet orders the contingent of troops to be supplied by each canton as provided in Art. II. ; it appoints the general who is to command them, and takes, moreover, all the necessary measures for the security of Switzerland and for the execution of the other provision of Art. I. It possesses the same right, should troubles break out in any canton, so as to threaten the tranquillity of the other cantons.

XXXV.

It appoints and sends ambassadors extraordinary.

XXXVI.

It decides in all disputes between the cantons, provided such disputes have not been settled by arbitration ; and for this purpose it creates a syndicship at the conclusion of its ordinary labours. But in such cases, each deputy has but one vote, and is not subservient to instructions.

XXXVII.

The procès-verbaux of the diet shall be entered in two registers, one of which remains in the directing canton, and the other, together with the seal of state, is to be transported, at the end of December, to the capital town of the new directing canton.

XXXVIII.

A chancellor and a register appointed by the diet for two years, and paid by the directing canton, con-

formably to the regulations made by the diet, shall always follow the seal and register.

XXXIX.

The constitution of each canton, written upon parchment, and sealed with the seal of the canton, shall be deposited in the archives of the diet.

XL.

The present federal act, also the particular constitutions of the nineteen cantons, annul all former provisions contrary to any thing contained in all or either of them, and no right whatsoever concerning the internal government of the cantons and their relations with each other shall be founded upon any former political state of Switzerland.

WHEREAS the repose of Switzerland and the success of the new institutions to be formed require that the measures necessary for making these institutions succeed the order of things, which is now at an end, and investing new magistrates with the care of the public happiness, be kept free from the influence of passion and from all that might excite contention, and that such measures be executed with moderation, impartiality, and prudence; it would be difficult to carry such institutions into effect, except through commissioners appointed by the act of mediation itself, and who are animated by its spirit.

From these considerations,

We in our said capacity, and with the reservation hereinbefore expressed, DO HEREBY ENACT as follows :

ARTICLE I.

Friburg shall be the directing canton for the year 1803.

II.

Citizen Louis d'Affry is landamman of Switzerland for that year; and is, to this effect, invested with extraordinary powers, until the meeting of the diet.

III.

The original act of mediation shall be delivered to the landamman, to be by him deposited in the archives of the directing canton.

IV.

In each canton there shall be a committee of seven members, one of whom shall be appointed by us, and six by the ten deputies appointed to confer with us; and this committee is authorized to carry the constitution into effect and administer provisionally.

V.

(Contains the names of the members composing these committees.)

VI.

On the 10th of March next, the central government shall be dissolved, after handing over its papers and archives to the landamman of Switzerland.

VII.

Each committee shall meet on the 10th of March, in the capital of the canton for which it is appointed, and shall give notice of its meeting to the prefect.

VIII.

Twenty-four hours after notice is given of the meeting, the prefect shall transmit to the committee the papers of the administration.

IX.

In cases which may require special instructions or authority, the committee shall apply to the landamman of Switzerland.

X.

On the 15th of April the constitution shall be in activity ; by the 1st of June each canton shall have elected its deputy to the diet and drawn up his instructions ; and on the first Monday of July in the present year the diet shall assemble.

XI.

Causes pendent at the supreme tribunal shall be heard by the tribunal of appeal of the canton. The supreme tribunal shall, on the 10th of March, cease to exercise any functions.

XII.

The Helvetian troops at present in the pay of Switzerland, who, on the 1st of May, are not employed by the cantons, shall be taken into the service of France.

XIII.

No prosecutions shall take place for offences relative to the revolution, committed or pretended to have been committed by persons either in their individual capacity, or in the exercise of some public office.

WHEREAS the dissolution of the central government, and the restoration of the sovereignty to the cantons, require that the liquidation of the Helvetican debt should be provided for, and also that the disposal of the property termed national, be determined upon:

WE, in our said capacity, and with the reservation hereinbefore expressed, DO HEREBY ENACT as follows:

ARTICLE I.

The property and possessions formerly belonging to the convents shall be restored to the latter, whether such property and possessions be situated in the same canton or in any other.

II.

The administration of national property, other than that belonging to the cantons of Vaud and Argau, is provisionally restored to the cantons to which such property formerly belonged. The bonded securities belonging to Berne shall be provisionally placed in the hands of three commissioners appointed by the cantons of Berne, Vaud, and Argau.

III.

In each canton burthened with debts contracted prior to the revolution, a fund shall be assigned for the purpose either of hypothecating or of liquidating them; the said fund to be raised from the property formerly belonging to the canton.

IV.

A revenue shall be reconstituted for each town, proportionate to its municipal expenses.

V.

The national debt shall be liquidated, and the securities obtained upon foreign countries in favour of certain cantons, shall serve at first for its extinction. Should the debt exceed the amount of the said securities, the payment of the surplus shall be borne by the other cantons, each paying in proportion to what remains of its former immoveable* property, after acquitting its own cantonal debts contracted prior to the revolution.

VI.

All moveable and immoveable property remaining after the formation of the communal fund, and the liquidation of the cantonal and national debts, shall become once more the property of the cantons to which they formerly belonged. That remaining in the cantons of Vaud and Argau shall belong to those cantons. Whatever remains of the bonded securities of Berne shall be distributed in equal portions among the cantons of Berne, Vaud, and Argau.

* The word must stand thus, as it does not convey the meaning of a freehold. The law of Switzerland, like that of France, is founded upon the civil or Roman law. The nation acknowledges only two kinds of property: moveable and immoveable; the former consisting of what we term personal property, and the latter of houses and lands.

VII.

A committee composed of five members, to wit : Citizen Stapfer, minister of the Helvetian republic ; Citizen Kuster, ex-minister of finance ; Citizen Raemy, formerly chancellor of Friburg, and now member of the administrative chamber ; and Citizen Laurent Mary, of Lucerne, president of the administrative chamber, shall verify the wants of the municipalities, determine the extent of such wants and the amount of the funds necessary to constitute their revenue.

No. II.

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GENERAL
NEY, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY IN HELVETIA.

Paris, 29th Prairial, Year XI.
(June 17th, 1803.)

CITIZEN,

Towards the close of the year VI. the French and Helvetian republics concluded a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive : but the new organization of Switzerland having rendered the conditions of this treaty too burthensome to that country, the First Consul, willing to bestow upon it a mark of his kindness, is disposed to confine the treaty to a mere defensive alliance, and to renew the capitulations in virtue of which a certain number of Swiss troops were, during a long period of time, attached to the service of France.

The principal stipulations of the project of treaty, of which I herewith transmit you a copy, are the same as those of the treaty of 1777, and some have also been taken from the treaty of the year VI. The stipulations of the project of capitulation, also sent with this despatch, resemble those of most of the old capitulations concluded between France and the Swiss cantons or their allies; but, the organization and relative position of the two countries being in some degree changed, modifications have become necessary both in the treaty and in the capitulation.

By the treaty of alliance of 1777, France might, in case of war, make a voluntary levy in Switzerland of six thousand men. The intention of the First Consul is that this assistance so lent shall be greater and more secure, and that Switzerland shall supply twelve thousand men, raised, armed, and equipped at its own expense, and who shall be paid and fed by France from the moment they leave the Swiss territory.

The number of French troops with which the First Consul shall supply Switzerland for its defence, is not fixed in the project of treaty; it will vary according to circumstances and the wants of the moment. Were it fixed beforehand, it would give Switzerland a less sure guarantee than one resulting from an engagement to defend her made by the French government.

I have included in the project of treaty of alliance, every other relation which ought to subsist between France and Switzerland; but, before I enter upon

these matters, I shall, in order not to interrupt the military details of this letter, speak to you about the renewal of the capitulations.

These were formerly nothing but private contracts between France and one or more states of the Helvetian confederation. At present they must be concluded with the diet, and they include all the cantons in one and the same engagement.

One sole capitulation must therefore serve for all the Helvetian troops which France may have in her service. This act must include the demi-brigades already organized, the troops which, according to the act of mediation, the cantons cannot keep, and which have just come to France; and lastly, those which may be necessary to complete a corps of sixteen thousand men.

This corps must be divided into four regiments, and each regiment into four battalions of nine companies. The particulars of the organization are given in the accompanying project of capitulation.

The pay, the soldiers' *masse*, the barracks, and the pensions, shall be upon the same footing as among the French troops; but the Swiss captains shall be charged with the recruiting of their companies.

It was formerly the custom in Swiss regiments to require only two-thirds of natives; but it seems expedient that this proportion should extend to three-fourths, both for the better insuring that the regiments are well composed, and because Switzerland will have fewer troops in the service of other powers, and may therefore supply France with a greater number.

Each regiment, consisting of four thousand men in time of peace, shall be increased to five thousand in time of war. This surplus shall serve to repair the losses of each of the four battalions, and to keep each of them always a thousand strong. These *depôt-corps* shall have no separate organization : their officers and non-commissioned officers shall be taken from the regiment which each is intended to complete.

The Italian republic shall take one regiment into its service, which shall have the same organization ; and the Batavian republic shall likewise have one.

Thus Switzerland shall keep in the service of other powers six regiments consisting of twenty-four thousand men in time of peace, and of thirty thousand in time of war.

There is no objection to Switzerland concluding a capitulation with Spain, and another with the Pope ; but the diet must engage to conclude none with any other power ; and this condition must be insisted upon. France could not depend upon soldiers who would have to fight against troops of their own nation. The Swiss, by confining themselves to the service of the allies and natural friends of France, are fighting as it were under one and the same banner, and serving the same cause. They are themselves interested in not embracing any other party, as it would expose them to serve with less zeal, and to encounter, even out of their own country, all the evils of civil war.

The Swiss troops engaged under the capitulation, and those which, in execution of the treaty of de-

fensive alliance, shall be supplied to France, must serve everywhere except in the East Indies, in America, and in the colonies.

The treaty of 1777 simply stipulated that they should be employed only in defending the possessions of France in Europe ; but this clause was neither extensive enough nor sufficiently clear. Switzerland might infer from it that the defence of a territory does not include the obligation of going beyond its frontiers. Nevertheless, as a war defensive in its origin may become offensive in its results, it is necessary that there should be no doubt as to the obligation of serving in every place not formally excepted in the treaty.

With regard to the details of the internal organization of the Swiss troops, you are at liberty to modify the project of capitulation in any manner that may appear to you most favourable to the good administration and discipline of the corps. But their division into four regiments, the appointment of a colonel, four chefs-de-bataillon, a major, four adjutants-major, and a quarter-master to each, must be maintained. The appointment of colonel-general of the Swiss troops may even be revived.

This appointment was formerly in the gift of the King, who generally conferred it upon a prince of the blood. In future it will be filled up by the First Consul. With regard to the other appointments, they shall be regulated by the past.

The King appointed the field-officers of each regiment and also the captains of grenadiers. The First Consul shall appoint to the corresponding

grades in the new organization, such as those of colonel, chef-de-bataillon, major and captain of grenadiers. The captains of fusileers shall also receive their commissions from him, and shall be chosen by seniority of standing from among the lieutenants of the same regiment. The commissions for the subaltern ranks on the staff and in companies shall be given by the colonel-general. You will, in concert with the Helvetian deputies, consider of what modifications the several articles of the project of capitulation may be susceptible with regard to promotions.

The old capitulations granted to the Swiss troops, the free exercise of their religion and of their own laws: the new project allows them the same privileges.

Soldiers who have obtained pensions, or have retired upon half-pay, may receive it either in Switzerland or in France; they may thus choose their own place of residence.

I have great reason to believe that the diet will find the clauses of the treaty and capitulation proposed, as advantageous as they are honourable to Switzerland. France, by taking Swiss troops into her service, shows the high estimation in which she holds their fidelity and valour, and she will preserve that military spirit among them which, together with her assistance, must continue to secure the independence of their country. Lastly, she strengthens those bonds of affection and good neighbourhood which have constantly existed between the two countries, and which Switzerland, now restored to tranquillity by the First Consul's

act of mediation, must be particularly desirous to maintain.

I now come to the clauses of the treaty of alliance, which have nothing to do with that of military aid.

The two Governments agreed, by their treaty of the second Fructidor, year VI., that the limits of the two countries should be determined by a convention. This demarcation has not yet been rectified, and the consequences are greater facilities for smuggling in certain parts of the territory, and more difficulty in the communications. These are evils which must be put an end to ; certain communes, like that of Cressonières, are half Swiss and half French : it would, therefore, be desirable that they should belong to us entirely.

The territory beyond the Dole was ceded to us for the purpose of opening a new road between Gex and Morey : but there was no special convention for this cession, and it is right that it should be mentioned, as I have done it, in the project of treaty.

It is with the cantons which border upon us, and not with the diet, that the work of demarcation must be concerted ; this labour will thereby become much easier, because we shall not then have to discuss it with the whole of Switzerland, and it will be sufficient to state the basis of this work in the treaty which you are empowered to conclude with the diet.

Switzerland engaged by the treaty of the year VI. to receive annually from France two hundred and fifty thousand quintals of salt ; but, since the separation of the Valais, its consumption

has diminished. It is just that a quantity of salt equal to the consumption of the Valais should be deducted. The quantity can then be taken to that country by means of a separate and special convention, and the receipts of the salt-pans continue the same.

Article X. of the project, according to which a communication by water is to be established between the lake of Neufchatel, that of Geneva, and the navigable part of the Rhene, may possibly not be very speedily executed. The greater part of Switzerland will bear no share in this expense; but as such a communication would be very useful to trade, it is necessary to secure the right of carrying the plan into execution at any future time, and to maintain this article, which is almost wholly borrowed from the treaty of the year VI.

This latter treaty has served as the basis of the new project in all that concerns the commercial relations of the two countries, and in the manner of terminating litigations: but some explanations or corrections have been added, necessary to prevent a return of chicanery, to which the conciseness or false interpretation of certain articles had led.

It is advisable to establish clearly that with regard to rights of importation, exportation, or transit, the Swiss shall be treated in France and the French in Switzerland as the most favoured nations; and that each shall enjoy the rights of natives in all things relating to their persons, as well as to actions which they might have to bring before the tribunals of the country they are in.

The dues of *traite foraine* being for the time abolished both in France and Switzerland, it has not appeared necessary to insert in the project of treaty, that the French, who would alienate their property in Switzerland, should be exempt from those dues. But should the diet appear disposed to revive them for foreigners, you will stipulate, in the treaty, an exception in favour of the French.

The article of the treaty of the year VI. relative to extradition,* must already have been modified, and made to correspond with the laws of amnesty relative to persons accused of emigration. This article does not stipulate that the latter shall not be allowed to remain in the country; it is confined to the cases of extradition generally mentioned in other treaties, and it contains a further guarantee for the punishment of offences of less magnitude, and to which extradition does not apply.

The administration of the two frontiers had often complained of the damage committed in the forests on both sides of the border. It is to prevent the recurrence of this, and to render smuggling more difficult, that Article XVIII. has been added to the

* This word might be adopted in our language with advantage, as we have none which conveys the same meaning. Extradition signifies the delivering up of criminals who may have sought refuge in any country, to the Government whose subjects they are, on a claim being made to this effect. Its use is more especially applied to political offences. Great Britain is the only power in Europe whose Government dares not commit such a breach of the national hospitality; and the British territory is, therefore, the only sanctuary in which political offenders can find refuge.

project. By this article, the cantons bordering upon France are bound to establish custom-houses and forest agencies, whose members shall concert with those of France, but only under the authority of their respective Governments.

The development into which I have entered, is sufficiently indicative of the spirit of benevolence and friendship in which the French Government proposes to the Helvetic diet to conclude a treaty of defensive alliance and a capitulation.

These two acts together include every point in which France and Switzerland have a mutual interest in coming to an understanding.

Equally distinguished as you are, General, both as a soldier and a politician, you will possess a double advantage in the important negotiation entrusted to you, and for the success of which the Government relies upon the talents and zeal of which you have given such constant proofs.

I have the honour, &c.

CH. M. TALLEYRAND.

No. III.

TO MARSHAL NEY, AT HAGUENAU.

Paris, third complementary day, Year XIII.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

In pursuance of the Emperor's orders, you will cross the Rhine on the 4th Vendemiaire, upon a

bridge thrown over that river opposite Dourlach, and on the evening of the 5th, you will proceed to this town.

You will have Marshal Lannes in advance of you, and you will follow the same road so as to march upon Stuttgard when you receive the order to do so.

You will have rations of bread distributed to your men for four days, and make the necessary arrangements to have a quantity of biscuit made sufficient also for four days. This biscuit is intended for your use on a day of battle, should your assembled forces find any difficulty in procuring provisions.

You will issue fifty cartridges to each man, and take care that your artillery is well provided with ammunition, and your park in a good position.

You will also have the great-coats and shoes distributed, which are in store. Marshal Soult will be on your left ; he passes by the road to Spires. He has directions to provision his forces from the country on the left, so that the territory included between his right, Spires, Vislack, and Heilbron, will furnish the necessary requisitions for your army. All the provisions for which you may be under the necessity of issuing requisitions in the dominions of the princes friendly to France shall be acknowledged by regular receipts. Marshal Lannes, who marches in advance of you, has orders to issue his requisition to the right.

If any extraordinary occurrence should impose upon you the necessity of changing any of the above arrangements, you will apply for orders to Prince Murat ; all those given from this place being sub-

servient to any unexpected movements made by the enemy.

I have the honour, &c.

MARSHAL BERTHIER, War Minister.

P.S. The Elector of Baden is to supply a body of troops and six pieces of artillery, with cattle and provisions.

These are to proceed to Dourlach, where they will be at your disposal.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,

No. IV.

ORDER TO MARSHAL NEY, COMMANDING THE SIXTH CORPS-D'ARMÉE.

Head-quarters, Strasburg, 4th Vendemiaire,
Year XIV.

In consequence of the plans determined upon by the Emperor, Marshal Ney is directed to concentrate his army at Stuttgard on the 8th and the 9th. He will place his van-guard in position two leagues in advance of that town upon the road to Eslingen.

Marshal Ney will make arrangements for distributing, on the 10th, to his whole corps-d'armée, rations of bread for four days, independently of the four days' stock of biscuit which he has with him, so that the bread may be distributed for the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th: which will make from the 11th, rations for eight days, — four in bread, and four in biscuit.

It is to be presumed that his movement in advance of Stuttgard will begin on the 11th, in pursuance of an order he will receive to this effect; and this movement must not be embarrassed for want of provisions.

Marshal Ney is informed that Prince Murat will be at Stuttgard on the 10th, with three divisions of dragoons, and General Baraguey-d'Hillier's division of foot dragoons, which will make about fifteen thousand men. He will, therefore, make the necessary arrangements, so that these corps, as well as his own corps-d'armée, may, on their arrival at Stuttgard on the 10th, find rations of bread for four days.

The Emperor is aware of the difficulties which Marshal Ney will have to encounter; his Majesty knows that, on this occasion, the Marshal will require all his activity to succeed in procuring the requisite supplies; and these difficulties will be the greater, because the corps under the command of Marshal Lannes, which is likewise to debouch by Louisburg, and pursue the road to Gemund, will procure, at Louisburg, four days' rations of bread, as will also the Imperial Guard. The Marshal will, therefore, have to provide at Louisburg, Stuttgard, and in the environs of these places, two hundred and forty thousand rations of bread: namely, one hundred and forty thousand from Louisburg, and a hundred thousand from Stuttgard.

General head-quarters will, on the 10th, be at Louisburg.

Marshal Ney will, on the 9th, have the proclama-

tion, which shall be sent to him by the Aid-Major-General, chief of the General Staff, read publicly to the assembled forces under his command.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

No. V.

TO MARSHAL NEY.

Strasburg, 5th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

I am directed by the Emperor to give you the order to begin your march to Stuttgard the moment you receive this. It is his Majesty's wish that you should so manage matters, as to carry the enemy's post of cavalry at Pforzheim. The Emperor trusts, therefore, Monsieur le Maréchal, that you will send him to-morrow fifty or sixty prisoners. These gentlemen are pleased to be facetious, and to salute our patrols: you must, therefore, turn them, in order to carry them. I have sent a similar order to Prince Murat, to force on his side the enemy's posts of light cavalry, stationed near the outlets of the Black Forest. The Emperor, therefore, hopes to have in his power to-morrow two hundred of the enemy's cavalry as prisoners of war.

The Emperor, Monsieur le Maréchal, could have wished that you had reported to him your position to-day. His Majesty desires that you will write to me twice a day.

You will proceed to Stuttgard only by short marches, for if you are there by the 8th it will be time enough. I have to inform you that Marshal Soult, with his corps-d'armée will be at Heilbron on the 7th.

When you reach Stuttgard, your divisions must be near to each other, in order that your corps-d'armée may assemble in line of battle in less than two hours. The Emperor will have no partial engagements by divisions; therefore, it is his Majesty's order that you take up a good position at Stuttgard, as he will have no action engaged on that side.

I have the honour, &c.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,

Major-General of the Army.

P.S. I have directed my aide-de-camp, M. Lagrange, to hand you over with this 25,000 francs for secret service.

No. VI.

TO MARSHAL NEY.

Strasburg, 7th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.
(Sept. 29th, 1805.)

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

I have laid your correspondence before the Emperor, who finds it very interesting. His Majesty has also read your letter from Carlsruhe, dated the 6th Vendemiaire, and says that you have acted perfectly

right. Having no orders to give you to-day, I send back your aide-de-camp, and 25,000 francs in gold for secret service. I have the honour, &c.

MARÉCHAL BERTHIER,
War Minister and Major-General of the Army.

No. VII.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRINCE OF WIRTEMBERG.

Ettlingen, 10th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.
(Oct. 2nd, 1805.)

The Emperor has forwarded to me the complaint which your Highness has made against Marshal Ney. Having to make a report to his Majesty on the subject, it has been incumbent upon me to inquire into the circumstances upon which this complaint is founded.

Marshal Ney had orders to proceed with his corps-d'armée to Stuttgard. No treaty had been communicated to the staff, fixing in a positive manner the relations of your Highness with France. Moreover, all the different points of your Highness's dominions were occupied by the enemy's patroles, consisting entirely of cavalry, and not amounting in the whole to the complement of half a regiment.

On the other hand, it was positively affirmed that the Austrians were marching upon Stuttgard by Rottemburg. The non-existence of a treaty between the Emperor and your Highness, the cloud which

your Highness had thrown over your intentions, in allowing your territory to be occupied by so small a force, — all this led to the measure of marching into your Highness's dominions, as into a state occupied by the enemy. Your Highness is too good a soldier not to know, that in war, no considerations are allowed to have weight, which might endanger the success of military operations. Marshal Ney having then received no other instructions than to occupy Stuttgart, it would be difficult to make a crime of his having obeyed the orders given him.

The general staff would deserve to be blamed for having Stuttgart occupied, if there existed stipulations not to occupy that city ; but your Highness knows that no treaty had been concluded to this effect, and that even to this day no such treaty is in existence.

Doubtless the general staff would have acted improperly in sending an army into the dominions of a sovereign prince, without an understanding with him, or without some previous steps ; but no such imputation could be made in the present instance, because your Highness's dominions had previously been violated by the enemy, whose patrols occupied its several outlets.

It is my duty not to conceal from your highness, that Marshal Lannes had orders to occupy Louisburg with his army, and in this measure military considerations yielded to all others ; but his Majesty has now given orders that

no troops shall, in future, pass through the residence of your Highness; consequently Marshal Lannes is about to proceed to Kanstadt. I trust this explanation will prove satisfactory to your Highness.

Moreover the whole matter has arisen from circumstances which will not occur again.

No. VIII.

TO MARSHAL NEY.

Louisburg, 12th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.
(Oct. 4th, 1805.)

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

I read your letter of the 11th to the Emperor, and also your report to me upon the situation of the enemy's troops.

With such officers as you, and a commander like the Emperor, we shall do wonders.

I send back to you two officers of your staff who were here.

You know my attachment to you.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,

War Minister and
Major-General of the Army.

No. IX.

ORDER TO MARSHAL NEY.

Nordlingen, 15th Vendemiaire,
Year XIV. (Oct. 7th.)

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

The Emperor thinks that you are in a very good position at Giengen.

Marshal Soult has just crossed the Danube at Donnawert. The enemy seem to be in force at Neuburg, for the purpose of defending the Lech. It is his Majesty's desire that Ulm should be immediately attacked. You might attack it by the left bank of the Danube, and Marshal Soult by the right. But as Marshal Soult will be unable to march until to-morrow morning, let me know by the return of my messenger whether the enemy have still any forces at Ulm, and what they are doing.

The Emperor would, at the same time, order a march upon Augsburg and Landsberg, in order to cut off all the forces which the enemy may still have upon the Iller.

Take possession of Gundelfingen and Lauingen, and likewise of one or two bridges across the Danube, so that, if the intelligence the Emperor may receive should induce his Majesty to direct a march upon the Upper Lech, you may be able to effect it by a flank-march. Send likewise patrols of cavalry upon Donnawert, which will make us masters of the whole of the left bank. By these means our communications will be easy.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

No. X.

TO MARSHAL NEY.

Donnawert, 16th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.

Twelve o'clock at night (Oct. 8th).

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

You must have heard the cannonading which took place during the day; it was caused by eleven battalions of Austrian grenadiers, coming from Botzen in the Tyrol, who, being hemmed in by Prince Murat with his cavalry, were attacked by Marshal Lannes with the grenadiers forming his first division, and made prisoners with their artillery and colours.

Marshal Soult having proceeded to Augsburg, it is essential that you should speedily reach Guntzburg, in order to intercept all the movements of the enemy from Ulm upon Augsburg, also from Ulm upon Donnawert. Should the enemy manœuvre on the right bank, be very careful to advance rapidly and parallel to them. Throw Gazan's division upon ~~the right~~ bank; and, lastly, do not lose sight of this fact: that by the Emperor's plans, which are to surround the enemy, and cut off their retreat, he is obliged to spread his forces a little, and that he requires all his confidence in his generals, and all their activity, so that they do not remain idle when they should act. In a word, Monsieur le Maréchal, you are to observe the force at Ulm: if it marches upon Donnawert, you will follow it, and so you will

should it march upon Augsburg, keeping always to its left, that is to say, between it and Donnawert; and you will always keep one of your divisions a half march in the rear, to form your van-guard, and enable you to maintain yourself between the enemy and Donnawert, should they march upon that town, or even send strong detachments thither.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,
Major-General of the Army.

No. XI.

ORDER TO MARSHAL NEY.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

The Emperor has just learned from General Savary the particulars of your glorious action; it now remains to take possession of Ulm, which is important in every point of view. His Majesty leaves it to your own discretion to march as you think proper on this occasion; but surround Ulm in the course of to-morrow.

The foot dragoons will continue to remain under your command. You will station them at Grumberg, upon either bank, whence they will be able to proceed when they may be wanted. Immediately after the capture of Ulm you will not wait for fresh orders; and you will leave an engineer officer there to complete the works which the Austrians have begun.

You will march upon Memmingen, or upon any

other point whither the enemy may have gone, whom you will press as much as possible.

The forts of Middelheim and Landsberg shall be occupied in force: Middelheim by Marshal Lannes, and Landsberg by Marshal Soult, whence they may, if necessary, direct their forces to Kempfen and Fuessen. Do not fail, on your arrival at Ulm, to send me every possible information regarding the enemy's force, the number of their corps, and the direction they are in.

The Emperor recommends that you should march and make your divisions engage in mass. You may have General Baraguey-d'Hilliers' division of foot dragoons at Ulm. But if circumstances require it, you are authorised to leave in that place only a number of the foot dragoons sufficient to keep it, and to take the remainder with you to form your reserve.

As the Emperor is going to Munich, where our troops will arrive this evening, his majesty intends waiting there for the Russians, who have just debouched. In the mean time the Emperor leaves to his highness Prince Murat the command of all his right wing, consisting of Marshal Lannes' corps, your own, and the reserve of cavalry.

Gazan's division returns under the command of Marshal Lannes, in pursuance of the orders which it has received.

You will address your reports on service to his highness Prince Murat, but this does not prevent your corresponding with the Emperor and me.

This evening, at Augsburg, the Emperor will write to you when he has read your report.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,
Major-General of the Army.

Head-quarters, Zusmerhausen, 18th Vendemiaire,
Year XIV. (October 10th), six o'clock in the
evening.

No. XII.

CAPITULATION OF THE CITY OF ULM, OCCUPIED BY
THE TROOPS OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF
AUSTRIA AND KING OF HUNGARY, TO THE ARMS
• OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH
AND KING OF ITALY.

Between us, Alexander Berthier, Marshal of the
Empire, commander of the first cohort of the Legion
of Honour, Grand-Cordon, Grand Master of the
Hounds, Great Officer of the Red Eagle, Major-
General of the Grand Army, and War Minister,
stipulating for and in behalf of his Majesty the
Emperor of the French and King of Italy,

And Field Marshal Baron Mack, Quartermaster-
General of the Armies of his Majesty the ~~Emperor~~
of Austria and King of Hungary,

It is agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I.

The place of Ulm shall be delivered up to the
French army with all its stores and artillery.

Answer.—Half of the field artillery shall be left
to the Austrians. (*Refused.*)

II.

The garrison of the place shall evacuate it with all the honours of war, and having defiled, shall deliver up its arms. The officers shall be sent back to Austria on their parole; the non-commissioned officers and privates shall be conducted to France, where they shall remain until regularly exchanged.

Answer.—The whole shall be sent back to Germany, on condition of not serving against France until they are exchanged. (*Refused.*)

III.

All the baggage belonging to the officers and men shall be left to them.

Answer.—And the regimental cash chests likewise. (*Refused.*)

IV.

The Austrian sick and wounded shall be taken care of, like the French sick and wounded.

Answer.—We well know the honour and humanity of the French.

V.

Nevertheless, if before the 3rd Brumaire, Year XIV. (October 25th, 1805), at noon, a corps-d'armée shall appear strong enough to raise the blockade of Ulm, in such case the garrison of that place shall be discharged from the capitulation, and be free to act in any way it may deem advisable.

Answer.—If before the 25th of October, at midnight, inclusive, a force of Austrian or Russian troops should un-blockade the city, the garrison shall march

out free, from any of the gates it pleases, with its arms, baggage, and artillery, to join the troops which shall have caused the blockade to be raised.
(*Granted.*)

VI.

One of the gates of Ulm (that of Stuttgard), shall be given up to the French at seven o'clock in the morning, and also quarters sufficient to contain a brigade.

Answer.—Yes.

VII.

The French army may use the great bridge across the Danube, and communicate freely from one bank to the other.

Answer.—The bridge has been burnt, but every exertion shall be made to rebuild it.

VIII.

The service of the armies on either side shall be so regulated as to prevent any disorder from taking place, and the greatest harmony shall exist between the two armies.

Answer.—French and Austrian discipline will answer for this.

IX.

All cavalry, artillery, and waggon horses belonging to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, shall be delivered up to the French army.

X.

Articles I. II. III. IV. and IX. shall be carried into execution only at the pleasure of the commander of the Austrian forces, provided the delay go not beyond the 3rd of Brumaire, year XIV. (October 25th, 1805) before noon.

And if, at this period, an army of sufficient strength should appear and force the raising of the blockade, the garrison shall be at liberty, conformably to article V. to do as it pleases.

Made in two parts at Ulm, this 25th of Vendémiaire, year XIV. (October 17th, 1805.)

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

MACK.

No. XIII.

LIST OF REGIMENTS IN THE CITY OF ULM.

Part of the cavalry regiment of Schwartzenberg, hussars.

The regiments of Hohenlohe, dragoons; Mack, cuirassiers; Archduke Francis.

A detachment of the Blanckenstein hussars; several orderlies attached to the general officers, from the regiments of Latour, Rosenberg, Klenau, and that of the Archduke Albert.

INFANTRY.

Tyrolian chasseurs.

Collowrath.

Manfredini.

Frolich.

Archduke Charles.

A detachment of the Emperor's regiment.

GRENADIERS.

Hilburghausen, formerly Bender,	1	battalion.
Archduke Charles	1	do.
Manfredini	1	do.
Colloredo	1	do.
Stuart	1	do.

No. XIV.

ADDITIONAL CAPITULATION TO THE CAPITULATION
OF ULM.

Marshal Berthier, Major-General of the French army, authorised by special order of the Emperor of the French, gives his word of honour:—

1st, That the Austrian army is beyond the Inn, and that Marshal Bernadotte, with his army, is in position between Munich and the Inn.

2ndly, That Marshal Lannes, with his corps-d'armée, is in pursuit of Prince Ferdinand, and was yesterday at Aalen.

3rdly, That Prince Murat with his corps-d'armée was yesterday at Nordlingen; and that Lieutenant-Generals Werneck, Hohenzollern, and seven other generals have capitulated, with their corps-d'armée, at the village of Trotzelfingen.

4thly, That Marshal Soult is between Ulm and Bregenz, watching the road to the Tyrol, so that there is no possibility of Ulm being succoured.

Lieutenant-General Quartermaster-General Mack, giving due faith to the above declarations, is ready to evacuate, in the course of to-morrow, the city of Ulm, on the following condition:—

That the whole of Marshal Ney's corps, consisting of twelve regiments of infantry and four regiments of horse, shall not quit Ulm, and a radius of ten leagues from it, until the 25th of October at midnight, at which period the term of the capitulation expires.

Marshal Berthier and Baron Mack, Lieutenant-General and Quartermaster-General, severally agree to the above articles.

Consequently, to-morrow at three o'clock in the afternoon, the Austrian army shall defile before his Majesty the Emperor of the French, with all the honours of war. It shall lay down its arms, and road tickets shall be given to the officers, who shall preserve their arms, to proceed to Austria by the road to Kempten, and by that of Bregenz for the Tyrol.

Made in two parts at Elchingen, October 19th, 1805, (27th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.)

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL MACK.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.



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