THE

POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL

WORKS

OF

LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE,

President of the French Republic.

PUBLICK LIBRARY

NOW FIRST COLLECTED.

WITH

AN ORIGINAL MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE,

BROUGHT DOWN TO THE

PROMULGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1852;

AND

OCCASIONAL NOTES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED AT THE OFFICE OF THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON LIBRARY, 227, STRAND.

MDCCCLII.

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

	PAGE
Analysis of the Sugar Question	1
Extinction of Pauperism	93
A few words relative to Joseph Bonaparte	129
Opinions on various Political and Administrative Questions	159
Of Governments and of their Supporters	222
Reply to M. de Lamartine by Prince Napoleon-Louis Bonaparte	229
The Past and Future of Artillery	241
"L'Idée Napoléonienne"	257
The Revision of the Constitution	289
Miscellaneous Papers, &c.	317
An Incident in the Life of the Emperor	319
Translation of Schiller's "Ideal"	323
Correspondence	324

PAPERS RELATING TO THE COUP D'ETAT.

I. Authentic Accounts of the Events of December, 1851. By A. Granier de Cassagnac	333
II. The Last Sitting of the Legislative Assembly	394
III. Confiscation of the Property of the Orleans Family	419
IV. New Electoral Law	427

LIFE AND WORKS

OF

LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE,

&c. &c. &c.

VOL. II.

THE

POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL

WORKS

OF

LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE,

President of the French Republic.

PUBLICK LIBRARY

NOW FIRST COLLECTED.

WITH

AN ORIGINAL MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE,

BROUGHT DOWN TO THE

PROMULGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1852;

AND

OCCASIONAL NOTES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED AT THE OFFICE OF THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON LIBRARY, 227, STRAND.

MDCCCLII.

LONDON:

SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET,

COVENT GARDEN.

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

	PAGE
Analysis of the Sugar Question	1
Extinction of Pauperism	93
A few words relative to Joseph Bonaparte	129
Opinions on various Political and Administrative Questions	159
Of Governments and of their Supporters	222
Reply to M. de Lamartine by Prince Napoleon-Louis Bonaparte	229
The Past and Future of Artillery	241
"L'Idée Napoléonienne"	257
The Revision of the Constitution	289
Miscellaneous Papers, &c.	317
An Incident in the Life of the Emperor	319
Translation of Schiller's "Ideal"	323
Correspondence	324

PAPERS RELATING TO THE COUP D'ETAT.

I. Authentic Accounts of the Events of December, 1851. By A. Granier de Cassagnac	333
II. The Last Sitting of the Legislative Assembly	394
III. Confiscation of the Property of the Orleans Family	419
IV. New Electoral Law	427

CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY

ANALYSIS

OF

THE SUGAR QUESTION.

1842.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

SHORTLY after Louis Bonaparte's incarceration in the citadel of Ham, the sugar question became the subject of animated discussion between the government and those interested in this branch of production.

The manufacture of beetroot sugar, factitiously created and supported by a high protective tariff, was one of the Emperor Napoleon's schemes for interrupting the ordinary course of commerce, and was adopted more especially with a view of injuring ourselves, the greatest commercial nation in the world. It was natural, therefore, that the heir to the empire, with his Napoleonist vanity, prejudices, and animosities, should throw himself heartily into the cause, as an advocate for the continuance of an illiberal policy, which had been bequeathed to the French nation by his uncle;—for to abandon any one "idée Napoléonienne" would, in his eyes, be treason against the whole.

The beetroot sugar-makers were very grateful to the prince for his labour in their cause, and considered that his pamphlet so well represented the merits of their case, that they requested of the author 3000 copies for distribution amongst the members of government, and the assembly, and other parties interested in the question.

PREFACE.

Fortress of Ham, August, 1842.

THERE has been already so much said and written on the advantages and disadvantages of the manufacture of indigenous sugar, that at first sight the discussion seems exhausted. Yet, as the greater number of the men who have raised their voices for or against this branch of industry were directly interested in the question, we may reproach them with too much partiality in the statement of their subject, with too much ardour in the defence of their cause; and Montesquieu has said: passion makes one feel, but not see.

Nevertheless, two remarkable works have served me as guides; one of these, entitled *Des Colonies sucrières et des sucrières indigènes*, is a regular treatise on the subject, due to the talent and patriotism of M. Lestiboudois, deputy of the department du Nord; the other is the *Examen de la question des Sucres*, by M. Molroguier, one of the eminent chiefs of the Board of Indirect Contributions, in which all that respects taxes and their collection is treated in a very superior manner.

I cannot boast then of having been the first to advance towards the issue of a labyrinth, wherein so many interests cross one another in all directions; but I hope that I have analyzed and reproduced in its true light, a question which the partisans of free trade have chosen to shuffle and mystify. I believe I have been impartial; the welfare of the colonies

is not dear to me the of native industry; and if, on the one hand, the manufacture of sugar is entitled to all my sympathies as an imperial creation, on the other hand, I cannot forget that my grandmother, the Empress Josephine, was born in those isles that now re-echo with complaints against the competition of the products of the mother country. Besides, however glorious I deem it to defend the institutions of the Emperor, my veneration for the chief of my family would not go so far as to make me extol what my reason should reject as pernicious to the general interest of my country.

If I thought the invention of Achard opposed to the welfare of the greatest number, I would attack it, despite its imperial origin; I am a citizen in the first place, a Bonaparte only in the second.

I have sought mainly to support my reasonings by official data; and although my peculiar position has necessarily presented obstacles to a work which requires extensive research, and frequent communications with men versed in industrial questions, I have been able to procure all the documents published by the government; men, then, may attack my reasonings, but not the authenticity of my figures. At all events, however imperfect this treatise may be, if it contributes to throw any light on discussion, and to gain over some opinions to the cause of an industry which I regard as a fruitful source of prosperity for France, I will thank Heaven that it has allowed me, even in captivity, to be useful to my country, as I thank it every day for permitting me to be on this French soil, the object of all my affection, and which I would not quit for any consideration, not even for that of liberty.

NAPOLEON-LOUIS BONAPARTE.

VI m.7 ANALYSIS

OF

THE SUGAR QUESTION.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF THE QUESTION.

THE struggle of England against the French Revolution resulted in the loss of our colonies, and the destruction of our maritime commerce. Our difficulties thence were all the greater, that the war intercepted goods which had become of the first necessity, such as sugar and coffee, and products important to industry, such as cotton, indigo, and cochineal.

We had to fight both by sea and land; Aboukir, Trafalgar, closed the sea to our valour and our commerce. Thereupon it was that the leader of the French government took one of those resolutions which only a great man can conceive and accomplish; he resolved to transport the colonies to Europe, by charging science to discover in our climate equivalents to the products of the equator.

The enterprise seemed impracticable. It entirely succeeded. Sugar, the most important export of the West Indies, became a French product.

By the decree of the 25th of March, 1811, the Emperor ordered that 32,000 hectares should be devoted to the

culture of beet-root, and he placed a million francs at the disposition of the minister of the interior for the encouragement of this industry, and also for the culture of the woad which was to replace indigo. He not only recognised the efforts of producers by pecuniary recompences, but he likewise paid them with another wholly French coin—honour. On the 2nd of January, 1812, M. Benjamin Delessert, for example, received the cross of the Legion of Honour, as a reward for the success he had effected in the manufacture of sugar.

The invaluable discovery, however, was received with Parisian sarcasms, and the men who ever doubt that which they do not understand, laughed at this new conception of genius.

But whilst at Paris they turned the beet-root into ridicule, the English took the matter in earnest, and tried every means to stifle results at their birth. We read in the *Journal de l'Empire* of the 11th of April, 1811, the following article:—"An important fact published by the celebrated Prussian chemist, M. Achard, proves how much the English are alarmed at the measures taken by the Emperor Napoleon to replace the sugar cane. Anonymous propositions have been made to M. Achard, first, in 1800, of a sum of 50,000 crowns; and, in 1802, of 200,000 crowns, if he would publish a work in which he should state that his enthusiasm had led him astray; that his experiments on a larger scale had shown him the futility of his first essays; and that he had at length acquired the disagreeable conviction that beet sugar could never supply the place of that of the cane. The honour and disinterestedness which characterise M. Achard led him, and most justly, to decline the insulting offers."

This attempt not having succeeded, the English had recourse to another expedient. They got the celebrated

chemist, Sir Humphrey Davy,* who might be considered acquainted with whatever related to science, to write a Treatise on Agricultural Chemistry, in 1815, to show that beet-root produced a *bitter sugar*, thus compelling him to sacrifice his conscience as a scientific man to his patriotism as a citizen.

In fact, it was wholly against the interest of England that sugar should become a continental product. Situated between Europe and America, Great Britain seeks to be the *entrepot* of the merchandise of the world. Its innumerable vessels conveying the large proportion of the freightage, she desires to promote the exchange of the *natural products* of each country on the condition of giving it in return her *manufactured products*. Thus, as a general proposition, every fresh continental industry occasions to her a double loss. It supersedes her manufactures, and it lessens her freights.

In 1815, the entire Napoleonian edifice seemed likely to fall with the Emperor; but the foundations had sunk too deep into the French soil. The great creations remained erect; the Code Napoleon, the organization of justice, of finance, of the army, of the public administration, of public education, resisted the shock. The discovery of the beet-sugar survived also.

Limited at first to a corner of France, this native manufacture abode there, inoffensive and unknown, almost seeming to keep itself out of sight in order to make the world forget its origin, and sharing the lot of the flag of Austerlitz, which, like itself, obliged to hide, still preserved a whole futurity of glory.

The Restoration, it must be acknowledged, better comprehending the interests of France than the government which succeeded it, knew how to protect at once the

* The fact is reported in the pamphlet of M. Matthieu de Dombasle on beet-root sugar, p. 9.

colonies and the sugar industry—the child of the empire. It promoted the native manufacture by exempting it from taxes, and by imposing duties on colonial sugars. It promoted the transmarine production, like that of the mother country, by facilitating its exportation, and by raising to to prohibitive rates the tariff of foreign sugars.

But since 1830, the destruction of the native manufacture, alike with the ruin of the colonies, seems a fixed system, conceived with Machiavelism, pursued with perseverance. It is easy to convince ourselves of this.

In 1830, the manufactories yielded for consumption only seven millions of kilogrammes* of beet-sugar; but, with the aid of science, the process was rapidly advancing towards perfection, and the harvests were almost doubling from year to year.

The colonies, on their part, which in 1816 had only imported into France 17,677,000 kilogrammes of sugar, had so increased their fertility, that in 1831 they sent into our ports nearly 88,000,000 kilogrammes (see the table at the end of this book). Now, what was the course of the government on observing this increasing production of the colonies and manufactures? It seemed to apply all its efforts to encumber the market, by closing up openings and introducing between two rival productions a third competitor, the foreign sugar which it favoured: 1. By reducing the protective duty.† 2. By abolishing drawbacks. 3. By equalizing the *rendement*‡ upon foreign

* A kilogramme is 2 lb. 8 oz. 3 dwts. 2 gr. troy; 2 lb. 3 oz. 4.428 dr. avoirdupois.

† DUTIES.

Year of the Law.	Colonial Sugars,	Foreign Sugars.	Protective Duty.
July 27, 1822	45	95	50
April 26, 1833	45	85	40
1840	45	65	20

‡ *Rendement*, the difference, or waste, upon the refining of sugars.

refined sugars with that on French sugars. The results are readily shown :—

In 1832, there were entered at the French ports 3,439,624 kilogrammes of foreign sugar, and the exports of refined sugars rose to 22,111,600. In 1841, there were entered 21,511,816 kilogrammes of foreign sugar, and the exports of refined sugars fell to 10,808,500 kilogrammes. (See table A).

Before we examine the various modifications to which the sugar legislation has been subjected, let us establish one leading fact. The depression of colonial property is traceable back to an epoch anterior to the development of the native manufacture. That depression always compelled the colonies to sell their sugars dearer than those of the English West Indies ; and it was only under the Restoration that they obtained some advantage by effecting the almost entire prohibition of foreign sugar. In the Report on the Inquiry made by order of the government in 1829, we find the following passage :—"When the Restoration restored our colonies to us, the plantations were in a state of ruin, and the planters overwhelmed with debt. England had guaranteed their tranquillity, but she had taken little heed to their welfare in any other respect. Her tariff had subjected the produce of Martinique and Guadeloupe to duties heavier than those imposed on the produce of the English West Indies. *This long endured depression is one of the causes which up to this day influence the dearness of production.*"

It was this dearness of production which obliged the colonies in 1820 to complain of the fall which had taken place, and to demand an augmentation of the protective duties on foreign sugars. Although this protective, or surtax, was then 27f. 50c. per 100 kilogrammes,

struggle against the competition of the foreign sugars.* In 1822 their clamours became more vehement than ever, and yet, at that period, their produce exceeded by 11 millions of kilogrammes the harvest of 1820, while the imports of foreign sugars had fallen from 8 millions to 3 millions. "What, then, did the colonists require?" asks M. le Comte d'Argout, the chairman of the Committee of Inquiry, in 1829; and he supplies his own answer: "*Prices equal to those of* 1816 *and* 1818." There, indeed, lies the difficulty. The price of sugar having fallen from 93f. per 50 kilogrames to 74f. in 1820, and to 63f. in 1822, the complaints of the West Indian planters induced the government to raise the surtax on foreign growths to 50f. The colonists, thinking themselves sure of remaining absolute masters of the French market, gave exaggerated development to their productive powers, and at many points replaced the coffee plant by the sugar cane; but this substitution occurring in places unfavourable to the new cultivation, and operated by means of onerous loans, the remunerative price remained, of necessity, at a high figure. The Inquiry of 1829 clearly demonstrates this substitution, which is also attested by the following official returns:—

* See the Report above cited.

COMPARATIVE POSITION OF CULTIVATION IN THE COLONIES.*

	Denomination of the Culture.	Number of Hectares under Cultivation. 1826.	1836.	1839.
MARTINIQUE.	Sugar	17,621	23,777	19,814
	Coffee	3,861	2,917	2,463
	Cotton	720	249	165
	Cocoa	491	464	389
	Provisions, &c.	9,403	12,710	14,382
	Total	32,096	40,117	37,213
GUADELOUPE.	Sugar	22,909	24,573	20,984
	Coffee	6,964	5,838	6,914
	Cotton	2,208	1,027	1,076
	Cocoa	68	179	124
	Cinnamon	...	...	2
	Tobacco	...	...	23
	Provisions	10,202	13,141	16,060
	Total	42,351	44,758	45,183
GUIANA.	Sugar	797	1,571	1,305
	Coffee	473	188	156
	Cotton	1,877	2,746	2,389
	Cocoa	373	197	167
	Cinnamon	1,291	829	1,179
	Pepper and nutmegs	...	...	124
	Annatto	...	...	2,657
	Provisions	7,713	6,235	4,154
	Total	12,524	11,766	12,131
BOURBON.	Sugar	8,241	14,530	22,405
	Coffee	8,909	4,179	5,733
	Cotton	66	...	...
	Cocoa	59	28	74
	Cinnamon	3,500	2,980	2,761
	Tobacco	...	...	610
	Provisions	44,800	43,985	38,403
	Total	65,575	65,702	69,986

* These statements are extracted from the *Annales Maritimes et Coloniales*. Baron Dupin, in his pamphlet, entitled *La Verité des Faits*, p. 44, says, that so far from our being able to charge Bourbon with having destroyed its coffee plantations, in order to replace them with the sugar-cane, the former have increased in the

In 1826, although at that time there was no longer any foreign competition, and, as yet, no home competition, it was against the superabundance of their own produce that we had to protect our colonies. The excess of our stocks had produced a fall in prices. (*Rapport Ducos*, 1839, p. 5.) The government, by the law of the 17th of May, granted a drawback of 120 francs *per* 100 kilogrammes of refined sugar, which would have had the effect of creating for colonial sugars, refined in France, a market abroad, and of protecting at once the colonies, the refiners, and the rising trade of beet-root. Thus, then, at three different epochs, and before the *practical intervention of the beet-root*, there were three crises, or falls of prices, occasioned twice by foreign competition, and once by excess of production on the part of the colonies; but it is to be emphatically observed, and always kept in mind, that the exclusion of foreign produce, or the invigoration of our exports, promptly remedied the evil.

Since 1830, one sole idea has predominated in the mind of the government over all others.—the immediate interest of the revenue; in subservience to which, native produce and colonial produce have been thrown back upon the French market, in order that the one of them may destroy the other, and the sugar of India triumph over both.

This intention clearly manifested itself so early as 1832.

Although the native product was at that time very limited, yielding only 12 millions of kilogrammes of sugar,

island to the extent of one-fourth in superficies. This result, it is true, may be made out by a comparison of the year 1819 with the year 1838; but upon a comparison, among themselves, of the years subsequent to 1827, one may satisfy oneself that the coffee plantations have diminished in Bourbon by nearly one-third in about ten years, and that the sugar-cane has usurped a great number of hectares of land, formerly devoted to other cultivation.

M. le Comte d'Argout, the king's minister, proposed a tax of five francs per 100 kilogrammes on beet-root sugar. The proposition was rejected by the Chambers. In 1833, the drawback was abolished, and this measure had effects which it is necessary to examine.

To return, on the exportation of refined sugars, simply the duties they have paid, on entering in a raw state, without any distinction of origin, is to favour foreign produce.

The state of the case is this,—100 kilogrammes of raw sugar produce or *render* from seventy to seventy-five kilogrammes of refined sugar. This difference or waste is called *rendement.* If foreign sugars are subjected to the same *rendement* as our own colonial sugars, receiving on their export the duties paid according to their *tarif de provenance,* as the former are cheaper, the refiners use them in preference to our own, the sale of which is restricted accordingly. This is precisely what happened, because they chose to place foreign produce on the same footing with our own, instead of following the example of England, where foreign sugar receives upon re-exportation in a refined state, not the entire duty it has paid, but the duty charged upon English colonial sugar.

There is also another consideration. If the *rendement* is fixed at too high a figure, the refiners receive less than they have paid, and exportation becomes prohibited to them; if, on the contrary, it is fixed at a lower figure than the actual waste, this is encouraging exportation by a species of disguised premium. Now, if French sugars alone enjoyed this benefit, it would be to the advantage of the country to diminish the rate of *rendement;* but if foreign sugars are admitted to share the profit, the consequence is that, of a hundred kilogrammes, there remains over to the refiners a certain quantity which has entirely escaped taxation.

For the information of those who may imagine that this change was introduced without a full comprehension of the results it was calculated to produce, we will quote a passage from the Report of M. Passy, 4th March, 1833 :—"The substitution of a drawback for the bounty, will alter all the respective positions. Wherever there is returned to exported sugars only the integral amount of duties paid upon entry, *foreign sugars, by reason of the lower price they fetch at the entrepots, will present the only chance of profit to the exporter, and our colonial sugars will be completely excluded from the foreign markets, which hitherto have kept up their price.* What, then," added the deputy of L'Eure,—"what, then, will become of the 20 millions of kilogrammes that our colonies produce, over and above what is required for national consumption? In the state of slavery in which the black population lives, the colonists could not leave them for one moment unemployed, nor yet could they immediately find a new employment for them. Every consideration will compel them to carry on their works, and it will only be by submitting to a *very low price* for their produce, that they will find any opening for it. To what figure will our colonial sugars fall? It were hazardous to offer a precise prediction; but there can be no doubt that the *fall will be enormous, and the reaction will be felt by the beet-root sugars.*"

We may also quote the words of M. Ducos, a few years later, indeed, but on precisely the same question. In his Report, 1839, p. 63, he thus expresses himself :—"The new arrangement of our tariffs will not leave much *chance of exportation to the colonial sugars*, which will not yield to the French refiners the same advantage as foreign sugars, the price of which will be proportionately lower, and which, moreover, enjoy on their side a higher drawback."

Let us continue to analyze the acts of the government.

In 1833, they put a higher duty on the raw white sugar of the colonies, or, in other words, they prevented the improvement of colonial sugar, in order to keep up its freightage weight. On this subject, M. Molroguier remarks very justly, in his examination of the sugar question, that it was a measure more worthy of a barbarous age, than of the enlightenment of our epoch. "They might as well," said he, "force the colonists to put stones and metals into the sugar in order to increase its weight."

To complete the list of these measures, as hostile to the colonies as to beet-sugar, they reduced by ten francs the surtax on foreign sugar. In conclusion, let us point out that the crises which so afflicted the two French industries, had nothing extraordinary about them; they were quite foreseen by government, and by the parliamentary committee.

The overstocking of the markets, then, has proceeded, in great measure, from foreign sugar, as the following calculation will evidently show; add together, on the one hand, the two productions, colonial and domestic; on the other, the home consumption and the exportations of colonial sugars, raw and refined: then subtract, and you will find that since 1834, the time of the suppression of drawback, a very small quantity of our sugar would have remained unsold, if the foreign sugar had not come to supersede our produce in the entrepôts, in exportation, and even in consumption.

Total, during seven years (from 1834 to 1840) of the importations of colonial sugars and of the produce of domestic sugars	820,445,171 kil.
Total, during the same period, of the home consumption and of the exportations of colonial sugars, both raw and refined	777,543,427 kil.
Excess, over consumption	42,901,744 kil.

A very inconsiderable quantity, which would not have created any great heaviness of stock, since it was not more than about six million kilogrammes a-year.

But if we add to this a figure, the quantity of foreign sugar, arrived during the same period, and which amounts to 78,736,586 kil.
We. find the quantity of sugar which has not found a sale to be . . . . . 121,638,330 kil.
or more than 17 millions of kilogrammes a-year.

If the question had been earlier presented in this form, we should undoubtedly have avoided many collisions of interests; but that would not have answered the purpose of those who seek to bring about, at whatever cost, the suppression of the beet-root.

To mislead the public mind, these persons represented the beet-root as alone responsible for all the depression and perturbation that had occurred. Instead of elucidating the question, they have done all in their power to obscure it; instead of conciliating opposite interests they have chosen to excite them one against the other. Let us follow the progress of facts.

In 1835, a proposition for a duty on home sugar was renewed in the Chambers, and again refused. It was only on a third attempt, on the 18th July, 1837, that the duty on manufacture of 11 francs per 100 kilogrammes, was adopted, to commence on the 1st of July, 1838.

Finally, on the 1st of July, 1839, they put on a further tax of 5 francs 50 centimes.

This was a grand step effected. On one side they had clipped the wings of home manufacture, and on the other they had managed to persuade the colonies and the sea-

ports that their property depended on the downfal of the beet-root.

What proves how entirely the colonies deceived themselves is, that this tax, which restricted to one half the production of native sugar, and closed 166 manufactories, did no good to the colonies. The fall in price went on, and brought about the crisis of 1839, which necessitated the decrees of the 15th and 27th May of the governors of Martinique and Guadeloupe, permitting the exportation of sugars by any ship and to any destination.

This measure was followed in France by the reduction ordonnance of the 21st of August, 1839, which ordonnance, by-the-bye, was illegal,* and which reduced the duties on colonial sugar by 13 francs 20 centimes. But these measures only produced a still greater disturbance than ever, for the decrees of the governors occasioned a rise in the places of growth, whilst the expectation of the reduction, and the reduction itself, maintained the decline in the French markets.†

Thus, then, without ameliorating the impoverished condition of the colonies, they had accumulated, in the space of thirteen months, the following charges upon the manufacture of native sugar :—

---

* Art. 34 of the law of the 17th Dec. 1814, says formally, that royal ordonnances may in case of emergency diminish the duties upon raw material necessary in manufactures. Now, colonial sugar is assuredly not raw material necessary in manufactures.

† M. Ducos, in his report of 2nd July, 1839, says, that at this time the price of sugar was higher in foreign markets than in our own; a circumstance that had not been witnessed for twenty-five years. This rise was occasioned by the bad harvest of Louisiana, and the emancipation of negroes in the English West Indies.

	Per 100 kilog. francs.	cent.
Tax imposed on 1st July, 1838 . . .	11	
Increase of duty on 1st July, 1839 . .	5	50
Reduction of duty on colonial sugar, by ordonnance of 21st August, 1839	13	20
Total difference against native production .	29	70

The result of these fiscal measures and of the anti-colonial laws, of which we have spoken, must have been the almost total ruin of the two industries; but by one of those lucky chances that happen in human affairs, the colonial sugars, which, since 1834, had been exported in a refined state only in very small quantities, began from this time to be exported from the entrepots in a raw state. This circumstance lessened in some slight degree the accumulation; while native sugar, on its part, supported with extraordinary firmness the load which had been imposed on it.

In 1840, they re-established the old tariff on colonial sugar, and increased by 10 francs the duty on native sugar. The duty now amounted to 27f. 50c. per 100 kilogrammes. They still further diminished the sur-tax on foreign sugars 20 francs, and lowered their *rendement*, which, in 1839, had been raised to 75 per cent., to 70 per cent., the rate of the French *rendement*. Was not this a protection of their importation and their exportation, to the detriment of the national products?

They hoped that all these so abrupt changes would ruin the French manufacturers, or at least bring the majority of them to withdraw from business upon indemnification. The artifice of the government had been to bring two adversaries both to form the same wishes.

In fact, in 1841, petitions flowed in from all parts. The colonists said, "kill them;" and the beet-rootists repeated,

with all Christian humility, "kill us." There only remained to pronounce the sentence and to pay the funeral expenses; but frequently the last obstacle to be surmounted is the most difficult. At the very moment when the law for the suppression with indemnification, was on its way to the Chambers, public opinion became aroused, and, no doubt, alarming reports reached the ears of the ministry, as thus: —"Some large manufacturers, who have made their fortunes, and some petty manufacturers, who are up to the ears in debt, are very anxious for an indemnity; but the real manufacturers, those who have surmounted by their own efforts, and by the help of science, all the obstacles which nature or the government had opposed to the development of their industry,—the hundred thousand hands interested in the manufacture which gives them bread,—the eight principal departments, to which this industry is a fruitful source of prosperity, will not quietly see your vandalism accomplished, and if you persist in your project, dread the popular discontent."

These words touched many hearts—how many are there not which fear alone renders gentle—and the sugar bill was adjourned till the next session.

Such are the vicissitudes which the beet-sugar industry has undergone during the last thirty years. Repulsed, in the outset, because it had, people said, no chance of life, it was attacked with fury so soon as it manifested strength and indicated too many chances of development.

Before we analyze its advantages and disadvantages, let us state a few facts:—

1. The government has always manifested the same hostile intentions towards it, and addressed to it the same reproaches in 1832, when it only produced 12 millions of kilogrammes of sugar, and in 1837, when it produced 50 millions, and in 1841, when it only produced 26 millions.

2. Despite the reluctance of the Chambers, the incessant efforts of the government were successful; and without any sort of regard to justice, the manufacturers of sugar passed abruptly, without transition, from a system of freedom and encouragement, to that most rigorous and oppressive system, a tax on manufacture.

3. The restriction imposed on native industry benefited only foreign sugar, which replaced in our markets the deficiency thus occasioned in the manufacture of our own produce. It is, therefore, in favour of foreign sugar, and not in favour of our colonies, that the destruction of the beet-root is sought.

4. As to the colonies, their position has been identically the same since 1820. To secure their prosperity it would have been necessary to raise to a very high figure the price of sugar in the French market, a condition opposed to the general interest, and, moreover, altogether impracticable, so long as there shall exist domestic or foreign competition,—so long, in other words, as the colonies shall not be the sole source of supply to France. The cause of their decay, then, is not the beet-root. In 1820 and 1822, when our home sugar industry was still in its infancy, the colonies made precisely the same outcry against foreign sugar. No: the malady under which they are succumbing, is to be traced to our maritime wars, to the fiscal measures of the government, to the particular nature of the soil, and to the monopoly so long and so obstinately maintained. It is then urgent to relax the bonds which attach them to the mother country.

The question, reduced to its simplest expression, is this: France, including the 10 millions of kilogrammes she exports, consumes 120 millions of sugar; our colonies furnish only 80 millions, so that 40 millions remain to be obtained to complete the total supply. If the native product

is suppressed, these 40 millions must come to us from abroad. The rise in price that is expected, will only be for a time ; foreign sugars, which already enter in immense quantities, will enter in still greater quantities, more especially if the sur-tax is further lowered ;* prices will give way, there will be another outcry of the colonists, as prior to 1830, against the competition of the produce of India, and we shall have destroyed a French industry for the sole benefit of the foreigner. The maintenance of that industry, then, is a national question.

Regarded in this point of view, an ample discussion would appear idle ; but we must take the problem as it has been proposed to us, and must consider, in relation to the general prosperity of France,—

The interest of native industry ;

The interest of the colonies ;

The interest of the consumers.

CHAPTER II.

INTERESTS.

EVERY question should be considered under the threefold aspect of interest, revenue, and justice.

The interests involved in this question bear relation to agriculture, to industry, to the colonies, to our shipping, to our revenue, and lastly, to the consumers. Before we proceed to analyze these various heads, let us examine the real importance of the indigenous manufacture.

* The petition of the merchants of Havre insists upon this point.

NUMBER OF MANUFACTORIES AND EXTENT OF THE CULTIVATION OF BEETROOT IN 1840.

Names of the Departments.	Number of Manufactories in operation.*	Number of hectares† planted with beetroot.	Annual production of beetroot in met. quints. (100 kilog.)	Annual value of the production in francs.
Nord	155	12,241,03	5,145,599	8,391,458
Pas-de-Calais	74	7,162,76	2,316,123	3,835,302
Aisne	36	3,358,88	859,742	1,547,726
Somme	36	5,106,37	1,084,734	2,102,343
Puy-de-Dôme	12	1,029,18	286,927	376,237
Oise	7	1,101,72	274,275	405,546
Moselle	6	501,53	135,441	249,475
Côte-d'Or	6	461,92	76,264	152,528
Isère	5	754,00	155,540	309,115
Meurthe	5	460,40	98,003	196,006
Haute-Saône	4	229,37	37,105	74,210
Seine-et-Oise	4	1,628,86	391,781	1,427,363
Loiret	3	467,10	83,925	204,396
Seine	3	1,326,82	421,981	843,962
Seine-et-Marne	2	650,91	148,047	249,659
Charente-Inférieure	2	193,00	24,955	75,985
Drôme	2	1,177,39	270,408	540,816
Jura	2	no return	no return	no return
Saône-et-Loire	2	335,21	97,004	147,793
Allier	2	129,50	19,860	39,720
Loire-et-Cher	2	211,29	34,018	85,046
Ardennes	1	141,84	42,066	63,099
Ariége	1	no return	no return	no return
Bouches-du-Rhône	1	307,00	67,230	134,460
Calvados	1	193,77	136,824	248,317
Côtes-du-Nord	1	89,00	16,000	32,000
Eure-et-Loire	1	248,80	46,154	92,308
Haute-Garonne	1	86,04	11,665	29,082
Indre	1	257,48	33,807	130,778
Loire	1	50,00	5,748	11,496
Meuse	1	164,24	34,460	68,920
Orne	1	83,66	10,117	21,829
Bas-Rhin	1	1,942,50	446,186	751,086
Sarthe.	1	346,92	36,380	130,050
Vosges	1	73,74	20,031	50,185
Yonne	1	204,19	39,504	87,303
Indre-et-Loire	1	206,35	43,443	88,164
Seine-Inférieure	1	610,06	134,958	258,656
Tarn-et-Garonne	1	104,00	17,236	25,854
Vaucluse	1	730,50	119,775	239,550
40 Departments.	389	44,367,33	13,223,316	23,717,843

* The number of manufactories in each department is taken from an official work published in 1840.

† A hectare comprises two French acres, or 200 square perches.

The numbers above given are extracted from the *Statistique Agricole de la France*, and from the Report of M. Dumont, the deputy of *Lot et Garonne*, presented at the sitting of 29th April, 1842.

Here are further data as to the number of manufactories and their productions:—

					Kil. of Sugar.
From 1837 to 1838	there were	600	manufactories,	producing	49,226,091
„ 1838 „ 1839	„	555	„	„	39,199,408
„ 1839 „ 1840	„	422	„	„	22,748,957
„ 1840 „ 1841	„	389	„	„	26,925,562
„ 1841 „ 1842	„	398	„	„	30,493,624

With the exception of the first, these figures are taken from the statements published by the Board of Indirect Taxes. (See *Documens sur les Sucres*, Session 1841, Appendix 7, p. 26.)

The adversaries of the beet-root, who make a handle of everything, exclaim with their ordinary faith, on seeing the produce of 1842 exceed the preceding harvest, that the tax upon manufacture is not high enough, since the number of manufactories and their *rendement* continue to increase!

Their fears may be easily allayed: the bait held out to the manufacturers by the prohibition of their trade, with indemnification, produced two effects, readily conceivable: first, that of making several manufacturers who had discontinued their works, resume them, in the hope of making an advantageous bargain with the government; and, secondly, that of augmenting the returns by these manufacturers, since it was to be presumed that the amount of indemnity would be in proportion to the official quantity of sugar given out by each establishment. (See report of M. Dumont, and chap. iv. of this pamphlet.)

It is probable, that the return of the number of hectares put under cultivation with beet-root, as well as that of

their produce, was made before the tax, which greatly reduced the manufacture and the breadth of plantation. And, besides, the disproportion, which will be remarked in certain departments, between the number of manufactories and the production of beet-root, proves that many hectares under this cultivation are designed to feed cattle. We will, then, assume from 26,000 to 30,000 hectares as the figure nearest approximating to the actual condition of things, 8,800,000 metrical quintals as the annual product of beet-root, the value of which to the cultivators may be put at 14 millions of francs, and, lastly, the figure of 40 millions of kilogrammes as the average quantity of raw sugar delivered, or capable of being delivered, by the manufacturers. This, indeed, only amounts, according to the official investigations, to 30 millions for the year ending 1841-42; but we may calculate that a certain quantity evaded the duty prior to the last ordonnance. The quantity of molasses used in distilling, or other industries, is about 9 millions of kilogrammes. The setting to work these 389 manufactories, requires a floating capital of about 24 millions of francs.

They feed every year a multitude of collateral occupations, such as those of the dealers in bone-charcoal and acids, of lime-burners, of basket-workers, linen-workers, copper-smiths, zinc-workers, tin-workers, locksmiths, joiners, wheelwrights, engineers, &c., to which they pay a yearly sum of about 7,500,000 francs.

They consume of pit-coal alone, 2,500,000 hectolitres, which, at the rate of 85 kilogrammes the hectolitre, creates a tonnage of 212,000, to be conveyed every year by canal or otherwise.

A harvest of 8,800,000 metrical quintals of beet-root yields about 1,800,000 metrical quintals, or 180 millions of

kilogrammes of pulp, capable of fattening about 24,000 cattle or 400,000 sheep.*

The dung of these animals serves to manure a large breadth of hectares, and the residue derived from desiccation is employed to the same purpose, as are also those leaves of the beet-root that are not used as food.

These 389 manufactories directly employ 50,000 workmen, at the rate of 125 agricultural and manufacturing labourers to the production of 100,000 kilogrammes of sugar. And as one of the advantages of these establishments is to employ women and children, one may, without exaggeration, estimate the number of persons actually employed as being double that of the workmen; and adding to this number the manufacturers themselves and their families, we shall find at least 102,000 individuals directly interested in the native manufacture.

In the shape of wages these manufactories pay to the operative classes upwards of 7,000,000 francs per annum, and this during the six months of the year when agriculture would leave them without occupation.

To sum up: it is clear that an annual production of 40 millions of kilogrammes, the value of which is 48,000,000 francs, creates a circulation of money to the extent of 96,000,000 francs, without reckoning the amount employed in refining.

AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS.

Agriculture in France is far from having attained the perfection one would desire for it. Out of 24,118,944 hectares of arable land there are every year 6,763,281 hectares left fallow, that is to say, which remain uncultivated, or re-

* At the rate of 50 kilog. a-day during five months for a beast, and of 5 kilog. a-day during three or four months for a sheep; a beast previously weighing 250 kilog. weighs, when fattened, from 325 to 350 kilog.; a sheep of 15 kilog. weighs, when fattened, 21 kilog.

cultivated only with altogether secondary produce; for, according to the *Statistique Agricole de la France*, they return only 92,285,902 francs (at an average per hectare of 13 francs 25 centimes). If this number of hectares* were cultivated, they would return 1,075,361,679 francs, reckoning at 159 francs per hectare the average value of the cultivated land. The consequent augmentation of agricultural income would be 983,000,000 francs.

The progress of agriculture mainly depends upon the suppression of fallows; but this result can only be attained by the introduction into the rotation of crops of plants that require the hoe. Now, beet-root essentially needing the application of the hoe by handwork, and considerable manuring, it improves the land not only by itself but also by the analogous cultivation which it brings into use. It is a well known fact, that corn, grown in succession to beet-root, produces one-tenth more than in rotation with any other crop. It weighs heavier, and accordingly fetches, for the most part, a higher price by one-fourth. In a word, wherever beet-root is grown, the rent of land has risen considerably, the wages of labour have followed that advance, and general prosperity has advanced to a prodigious extent.

	Extent in Hectares.
* Arable Lands	17,355,663
Fallow	6,763,281
Vineyards	1,972,340
Chesnut Plantations	455,386
Olive Plantations	121,228
Mulberry Plantations	14,276
Orchards, Nursery-grounds, &c.	766,577
Meadows, Pastures, Heath	14,331,671
Woods of every description	8,804,550
Lands not comprised within the agricultural denomination	2,153,646
General total of the surface of France	52,765,618

These figures are extracted from the *Statistique Agricole de la France.*

The adversaries of the production have denied even its most self-evident advantages, reproaching it, in their blind fury, now *with exhausting the land by requiring excessive manuring*,* and, in the same breath, with *occupying some of the most admirably cultivated land*;† now alleging that the culture will produce no advantages worth mentioning, because it is limited to *some* 15 *or* 20,000 *miserable hectares*;‡ and now, again, setting up a cry of apprehension that *the beet-root will usurp all the arable land in France, and compel us to have recourse to foreign corn.*§

It is obvious that these various objections neutralize one another; for if beet-root exhausts the land, the agriculture of the districts in which it has existed for the past thirty years cannot be *admirably cultivated*, as the author of the *Verité des Faits* states them to be. It is singular that it should be reproached with not developing itself, when its adversaries are employing all their ingenuity in the adoption of measures calculated to arrest its development, and to prevent its introduction into the districts where agriculture is still in a backward state; and it is not less surprising that, at the same time, they should pretend, that were it to be permitted the soaring flight at which it aims, it would cover the whole country.

Besides, it is not correct to say, that only from 20 to 30,000 hectares are improved by this cultivation. The following figures, extracted from the official statistics, prove that, as we have already stated, a great portion of the land planted with beet-root is applied, not to the manufacture of sugar, but to the fattening of beasts; a circumstance which raises the number of hectares employed in this product to 57,661; and as this root ordinarily takes its

* Dupin, *Verité des Faits*, p. 8. † Ib., p. 5.
‡ Ib., p. 13. § Report of M. Ducos, 14th May, 1837.

place in at least triennial rotations, the practice of cultivating it continuously on the same land being only exceptional, we must at least triple the number above given, and this would exhibit at least 172,983 hectares profiting by the improved cultivation of the beet-root. It is not without use to point out that many other important productions of the French soil occupy only a limited extent of land.

Denomination of the Culture.	Number of Hectares applied to each Culture.	Total Value of the Annual Product.	Value per Hectare.
	Hectares.	Francs.	Francs.
Potatoes	921,970	202,105,866	219
Hemp	176,148	86,287,341	489
Olives	121,228	22,776,398	187
Flax	98,241	57,507,216	585
Beet-root	57,661	28,979,449	502
Mulberry trees . . .	41,276	42,779,088	1,038
Madder	14,676	9,343,349	636
Tobacco	7,955	5,483,558	689

It results, from the examination of these documents, that if you were to destroy the manufacture, you must also entirely prohibit the cultivation of beet-root, as already has been the case with tobacco, which would deprive the French soil of an annual revenue of 29 millions of francs. But as there is now manufactured a considerable quantity of potato-sugar, you must, on the same principle, proscribe also this root, so useful to the poorer classes, a thing quite impossible.

It exhibits, therefore, very little judgment to speak contemptuously of such a cultivation as this, more especially when one reflects upon the immense advantages which its development would produce. The simple fact is, that, without at all diminishing the annual production of the corn crops, the extension of beet-root cultivation would supersede a large proportion of the existing fallows. This root would, probably, take the place in several departments

—as it has already done in the department du Nord—of colewort, tobacco, &c., a substitution which would transfer the cultivation of the latter hoed plants to other places where they would displace fallows. The illustrious deputy of Bordeaux, whom I lament to find my adversary on this question, M. Ducos, considers this substitution maleficial; and, in his report to the Chamber of Deputies, in 1839, he regrets that beet-root should, in the department du Nord, have displaced tobacco, "*that plant,*" as he says, "*so precious and so envied by nearly all our other provinces.*" Now, as M. Molroguier, in his interesting work, entitled "*Examen de la Question des Sucres,*" well points out, the greatest eulogium that can be passed on the beet-root is to demonstrate its cultivation preferred to that of a plant *so precious and so envied* as tobacco.

Let us inquire what would be the advantage to France of extending the native manufacture, in the event of its being rendered hereafter the sole supply for home consumption.

France at present consumes 110 millions of kilogrammes of sugar, equivalent to $3\frac{1}{3}$ kilogrammes a-head; but it is clear that our consumption will still increase to an immense extent. This is demonstrated, first, by the actual progress of consumption, that consumption being now seven times greater than it was in 1816, and having almost doubled since 1830; secondly, by the example of England, which consumes 200 millions of kilogrammes of sugar, equivalent to 8 kilogrammes a-head. We, it is said, shall never attain this enormous figure, because tea and other hot beverages are not in such general use in France as in England. But the more prevalent use of tea is not, in my opinion, the principal cause of the great consumption of sugar in England, but rather the easiness of people's circumstances, the progress of which always involves the

greater and greater consumption of all kinds of produce. Compare the personal habits of the two nations. We do not in France consume so much tea as the English; but then we consume a vast quantity of sugared drinks and sugared meats, which the English never use. It is probable, then, that if the prosperity of France were gradually to rise, and if the price of sugar were gradually to fall, we should, in a few years, consume quite as much sugar as England, and more, in proportion to the population: that is to say, that 33,000,000 French would consume 264 million kilogrammes of sugar.

To produce that quantity of sugar, would require nearly 200,000 hectares of land. These 200,000 hectares would yield to agriculture an annual revenue of 100 millions of francs, and supposing the rotations to be quadrennial, 800,000 hectares would profit by the improved cultivation of the hoed plants, and throughout that extent of land fallows would disappear. This product, moreover, would confer upon 660,000 labourers the easiness of circumstances secured by the labours of agriculture in combination with those of manufacturing industry. The gain, then, would be immense, without reckoning further the augmentation in the value of the lands.

M. Lacave-Laplagne, the Minister of Finance, stated to the Chamber of Deputies on the 23rd May 1837, "That he considered it as no real advantage to agricultural interests that the rent of land had been doubled, and in some cases quadrupled by the cultivation of beet-root."

Now, what has occasioned this increased value of the soil? Evidently an increase of fertility, or an increase of commercial activity, giving advantageous employment to the products of agriculture. This increase of value, then, is a true benefit, although, in this case, as in all the improvements which change the respective positions of indi-

viduals, there are occasioned individual sufferings and partial inconveniences.

Baron Charles Dupin, in his turn, denies another fact equally patent with the preceding; the advantage, namely, derived from the refuse of the beet-root in feeding cattle; and to make out his case, he reminds his readers that the importations of cattle into the department du Nord are becoming gradually larger and larger.—(*Observations au Conseil d'Agriculture, p.* 12.) Nothing can be easier than to explain this circumstance. The pulp of the beet-root is advantageously employed, not in *feeding* cattle, but in *fattening* them, and this more especially in winter, when there is a deficiency of forage. Its action is similar to that of grains. Now, the more a district applies itself to the fattening of beasts, as a speculation, the larger, as a matter of course, will the importations of cattle into that district become. But there is another consideration which may also serve to explain this increase in the importation of cattle,—namely, that the population of the department du Nord, which is the principal seat of the native manufactures, has, within the last ten years, increased by one-fifteenth;* the means of that population have increased concurrently, and therewith the consumption of meat.

The learned statist remarks, and accurately, that the nearer the process of extracting the juices is brought to perfection, the less nutriment will remain in the impoverished body acted upon, and that, of consequence, the less profitable will the pulp become for fattening beasts; but let it be closely kept in mind that what you lose on the one hand, you regain a hundred-fold on the other. If you

* Census of 1827	962,648
„ 1837	1,026,417
Increase . .	63,769

succeed in extracting mechanically and chemically all the sugar that exists in the beet-root, you have solved the problem, and the native sugar will bear the same tax with the colonial sugar.

Again, with a view to depreciate the importance of the beet-root culture, and to extol that of the sugar-cane, the celebrated advocate of the latter exclaims, in his *Observations Exposées au Conseil Général d'Agriculture*,—(p. 9) "You talk of the limited extent of the soil in our four colonies; yet that soil exceeds in extent 12 millions of hectares: that is to say, is nearly one-fourth the extent of France, and twenty-one times greater than that of the department du Nord." Let us investigate the value of these figures.

Out of these 12 millions of hectares, our four sugar-growing colonies have only 164,513 hectares under cultivation, (of which only 64,508 are under sugar,)* supporting 376,000 persons, of whom no more than 31,000 are whites.† Now France has, out of her 52 millions of hectares, 27 millions of hectares under cultivation. Deducting, therefore, from both countries, the lands not cultivated, the importance of the colonies, in an agricultural point of view, instead of being equivalent to one-fourth of France, is only equivalent to $\frac{1}{176}$, or rather less than one-half of the department du Nord. As to population, the importance of the colonies is as only $\frac{1}{88}$ of the population of France, and about one-third of that of the department du Nord,‡ placing

* *Tableau Statistiques de la Marine*, 1839. The cultivation of the sugar-cane employs in our colonies, according to M. Dupin, only 94,568 persons.—*Verité des Faits*, p. 40

† *Notes Statistiques de la Marine.*

‡ The population of the department du Nord is 1,026,349; its surface is 567,863 hectares, of which 382,152 are under cultivation, without reckoning the woods, pastures, orchards, and meadow-lands.—*Statistique Agricole.*

here, in the same rank with the free population of the French colonies, the 261,300 slaves of African race.

It already results, then, from the preceding statements, that, regarded solely in its agricultural and industrial relations, the manufacture of native sugar is of far greater value to France than are her colonies.

INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS: CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN INDUSTRY.

Agriculture is the first element of the prosperity of a country, because agriculture reposes upon immovable interests, and because it creates the healthy, vigorous, moral population of the rural districts. Manufacturing industry too often rests upon ephemeral bases; and although, in certain points of view, it developes the intelligence to a greater degree, it has the disadvantage of creating a sickly population, having all the physical defects resulting from the unwholesome labour of close rooms, and the moral defects resulting from poverty, and the aggregation of large numbers of persons within a small space.

The manufacture of native sugar, so far from being subject to these defects, combines, on the contrary, all the advantages of agriculture and of manufacturing industry; and indeed, in my opinion, solves, if not completely, at least in great measure, one of the most important problems of the age in which we live—the welfare of the labouring classes. A few words will suffice to develope this idea.

Of old, there was, properly speaking, but one species of property—land; this was possessed by a small number of men; the nobles had taken possession of it. But the progress of civilization created another species of property—trade, more dangerous in its character than the former, because it can be more easily converted into a monopoly.

However tyrannical the yoke of the landed proprietor, however vexatious tithes, and dues, and serfage, the feudal

lord could not sequestrate wholly to his own profit the lands upon which his vassals breathed, walked, and slept, and where, at least, the sun shone upon their wretchedness.

But trade needs neither light nor space. In a square of some few yards, above or below the surface of the earth, the manufacturer keeps a whole tribe of vassals. If his speculations fail, or his fortune is made, he dismisses his labourers, who, without shelter or bread, feel all at once the earth—that common mother—crumbling away from under them.

The manufacturer has no need, like the feudal seigneur, to embattle his castle, or to ride in armour of proof over his broad domains, to maintain obedience or chastise his subjects; he simply closes the doors of his workshops, and the fate of hundreds of individuals is at his mercy.

The territorial aristocracy was subdued in France; gunpowder prostrated their proud keeps, and the revolution said to the people, "This land that thou labourest, that thou waterest with thy sweat, that but for thee would remain a waste, to thee I give it!" The people shared that land amongst them, and the soil has become all the more fertile for that distribution.*

But how are we to combat the oppression of a property which can neither be seized nor divided? Shall we tell the people to attack the machines? Each aggressor would only thence derive a few pounds of iron; it were thus an unproductive and simply criminal violence. An indispensable element of the wealth of nations, trade should be extensive in its actions, while it is restricted in its oppres-

* It is true that the excessive subdivision of land involves much injury to agriculture; but this is the common fate of all institutional changes. Amelioration must be preceded by transformation, and each transformation brings with its patent advantages inconveniences which are not remedied until the new interests created are regulated by a fresh organization.

sive effects. Its onward movement should be encouraged, but, at the same time, the hands it employs should be protected. A government alone can completely solve this problem of the organization of labour; for a government alone can surround itself with all the intellect, and appeal to all the intelligence of the land. It is expedient to meditate upon the examples presented to us by two commercial countries—England and Switzerland.

Great Britain—that Queen of Industry—employs, in four or five of her principal towns, thousands of operatives. So long as there is a ready market for their productions—so long as the manufacturers are flourishing, the operatives do not suffer; but let any event shake credit or close the markets, or let over-production occasion excess of stock, and on the instant, whole populations—as is the case at the present moment—fall a prey to all the anguish of destitution, to all the horrors of hunger; the soil, we repeat, literally crumbles away from beneath their feet, and they are left without fire, or food, or shelter.

Switzerland presents a different aspect. That small country, which, set in the midst of Europe, and surrounded by custom-houses, inhales and exhales wholly by land all the importations and all the exportations of her industry, has nevertheless attained a prodigious degree of commercial activity; her products compete in every part of the world with those of Great Britain.

Switzerland, like any other country, feels the crises which for a while suspend the work of her manufactures; but her labouring population is never reduced to famine. And I will explain why it is so.

The manufacturing industry in Switzerland is spread over the country, instead of being exclusively aggregated in the towns It diffuses itself throughout the length and breadth of the land, settling down wherever a water-course,

a road, a lake, favours its establishment. The consequence of this system has been to accustom the agricultural classes to pass alternately from the labour of the fields to that of the factory. Even in the towns of Switzerland you see the agricultural population coming in the morning to the workshops, and returning in the evening to their villages. Thus, when a calamity befals manufactures, the operatives no doubt suffer, but they find in the fields, at all events an occupation, and a shelter from absolute want.

Well, in France the manufacture of sugar from beetroot produces the same happy result. It keeps the workmen to the fields, and occupies them during the worst months of the year. It communicates to the agricultural class the best methods of cultivation, and initiates them in industrial science, and in the practice of chemistry and mechanics. It disseminates the centres of labour, instead of collecting them upon one point. It favours, then, the principles upon which repose the good organization of societies and the security of governments, for to create prosperity is to assure order.

MARITIME AND COLONIAL INTERESTS.

The interests of the colonies not appearing valid to arouse the country against the continental manufacture, the adversaries of that manufacture invoke to their aid the graver interest of external commerce and of our mercantile marine. They dwell with especial complacency upon the assertion that our colonial navigation is our principal nursery for good seamen ; and therefore, that to sacrifice the colonial interests is to renounce for ever all idea of the preponderance of France by sea.

Before we inquire into the justice of this reasoning, let us first exhibit the actual state of our colonial relations.

It results, from the examination of the official documents, (see Tables A and B at the end of this Essay,) that

all our colonies are not equally depressed ; our relations with Bourbon and Cayenne are marked by continuous advance. In the last quinquennial period, from 1835 to 1840, the increase in shipping has been, thirteen ships, and 7328 tonnage, to Bourbon ; and nine ships, and 2916 tonnage, to Cayenne. As to our importations and exportations, the increase in value during the same period has been 6,110,464 fr. as regards Bourbon ; and 1,582,929 fr. as regards Cayenne. It is well known, in fact, that Bourbon more especially has, within the last few years, immensely advanced in prosperity. St. Denis and St. Paul, not long since mere hamlets, are now towns with populations respectively of 14,000 and 10,000 souls. During the year just passed (1841), the importations from Bourbon into France have attained a figure far higher than that exhibited by any of the preceding twelve years. It may even be presumed that the aggrandizement of this island has injured, by its competition, the French West Indies, for its soil is more fertile, it enjoys greater commercial liberty, and its sugars are subjected to a lower duty than those of our other colonies.* In 1838, it imported into France 26 millions of kilogrammes of sugar : in 1841, 28 millions.

Thus it is evident, that when we speak of the depression of our colonies, we must understand this to be spoken only of the colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe.

But let us accept the question as it is presented to us, and combine in one category all these territories, the scattered wreck of our colonial greatness.

* The ground of this lower rate of duty has been, with apparent reason, assigned to the greater distance of Bourbon ; but, on the other hand, it would seem that the more advantageous position of this island, the fertility of its soil, and its prosperity, should be held sufficient reason for subjecting its products to the same duties that are paid by the West India colonies. The English make their East Indian sugars pay a higher duty than the West Indian.

It is affirmed that our commerce declines daily; but look at the official returns. (See Table B.) The value of the importations into France has diminished, it is true; the total tonnage, between 1835 and 1840, has fallen by 2316 tons, as compared with the tonnage of the preceding quinquennial period; but, on the other hand, the exports of French products have been continuously increasing, and that in a very marked manner. Upon consulting the last returns of the custom-house, you will see, that in the year 1841, the colonial navigation, expressed both in shipping and tonnage, far exceeded that of preceding years. Let people, if they choose, call this a stationary condition, but do not let them say there is a rapid decline. (See Tables B. and C.)

In order to ascertain the actual position of the shipping and men employed in the navigation of our four colonies, I have had recourse to the data furnished by the minister of marine.* They are drawn up on hypotheses most favourable to the colonies: for their result—one extremely difficult to credit—is, that on the average, each vessel makes but two voyages and a half in the year,—that is to say, one voyage going, one returning and half a voyage out again. Deducting the double voyages made to the same colony, or to different colonies by the same ships, we find that in,

1836	there were	762	to and fro, made by	323	ships, manned by	4408	sailors
1837	„	687	„	272	„	3837	„
1838	„	772	„	306	„	4179	„

The average result exhibits the number of ships employed as 300, and of men, 4174. But as these ships bring us

* *Appendice des Notices Statistiques sur les Colonies Françaises*, 1840. I should not venture to question the authenticity of official calculations if I had not discovered, in the same publication, as I shall show in Chapter IV., the most glaring and obviously intentional inaccuracies in favour of the colonies.

coffee, dye-woods, liquors, cotton, copper, cocoa, indigo, &c., it is clear that the transport of sugar alone employs an inferior number of ships and men.

Now, as there is an annual average of 32,637 seamen who embark for long voyages and in the coasting trade, it is manifest that the sugar-trade with our colonies only employs one-eighth of the seamen so afloat, or one twenty-third of the number on the register, who, in 1840, numbered 96,700 men.

Baron Charles Dupin, indeed, contends that it is the colonial trade which forms the best seamen; the coasting trade, in his opinion, not sufficiently habituating the men to the dangers of the sea. I should not presume to question the *dictum* of one so competent to pass a judgment on such matters, were it not a well understood fact that England, an essentially maritime power, derives the best seamen in her royal navy from the coasting trade between London and Northumberland, which supplies the British metropolis with coals; and it is to secure to the naval service this arduous apprenticeship, that the working of coal mines, within a certain distance from London has been expressly prohibited by the authorities.

Unquestionably, a trade which employs four thousand seamen merits all the care of the government; but to say that, deprived of this trade, France must renounce all idea of being a maritime power, is merely to manifest the determination to protect private interests, under the mask of general interests. There are, on the contrary, various facts which clearly prove that hitherto the colonies have been rather one of the causes which have impeded our maritime progress, and that the monopoly which they have enjoyed, and which now is crushing them, instead of serving to develop our maritime relations, has kept them within restricted limits. In fact, ever since the depression of our

colonies, which has occasioned their commerce to present fewer chances of advantage to our shipping-interest, the *general shipping-trade* of France has increased to a very immense extent. From the returns of the Custom House, in 1840, it appears that the tonnage, representing the onward movement of the general shipping trade of France, has increased by upwards of one millions of tons in five years (see Table B); and adopting, as the limits of comparison, 1835 and 1840, the augmentation in the total movement of competing shipping has been 59 per cent. The number of registered seamen has increased in similar proportions—viz.:

1836	90,511 men
1837	92,930 „
1838	91,320 „
1839	95,009 „
1840	96,709* „
1842	119,000† „

It results from this examination that the *activity of general competing shipping is in inverse proportion to the activity of a monopoly shipping;* and it may be safely laid down, that the general interests of our marine are in antagonism with colonial interests, since the more these suffer, the more those improve. The example of North America affords another not less striking proof that colonies are not the sole element of the shipping of a

* M. Thiers, in his speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 8th May, 1840, says, that the real register is 110,000, because to the figure above given may be added 10,000 men, foreign fishermen, settled for many years in our ports, and native registered labourers.

† Though I do not generally derive my information from the newspapers, the return for 1842 is taken from an article in the *National*, which bears a semi-official character, as being a letter addressed by M. Marec, sub-director of the Navy Board, to the Editor of the *National*, 19th Oct. 1842.

country, for that youthful Republic has, without any colonies at all, attained a register of seamen, numbering 180,000 men (*Rapport de M. Ducos*), 1839, page 36), whereas that of England presents only a total of 120,000. Had the United States possessed the vast and wealthy colonies of England, they might perhaps have reached, ere now, a higher degree of commercial prosperity; but I am persuaded that if they had held amid the ocean two or three islands upon which they relied, as upon the sole means of developing their shipping, they would have remained in a permanently stationary condition. It would have befallen them, as for the last twenty-six years it has befallen us; they would, under shelter of prohibitive duties, have urged to excess the production of their colonies, and have created a factitious prosperity, to which they would have attached all the more importance that it fostered a privileged shipping, which, fearing no rivalry, would have remained without improvement, and have preferred certain and easy profits, on a limited field of operations, to the chances presented by the navigation of the world, where the risks are in proportion to the gains, as the progress is in proportion to the competition. There is no doubt that in their congress the Americans would have found great statists, who, misled by the noble desire to defend the local interests of which they were the representatives, would have set forth with infinite complacency, with all the ascendancy of science, and all the influence of eloquence, the advantages of these unlucky islands; but if their opinion had prevailed, American shipping would have remained in its infancy, instead of embracing the universe, and overspreading the seas, as the most dangerous rival of Great Britain.

It is not we alone who regard the colonial monopoly as mischievous to France; the same men who now cry, *No*

colonies, no ships! speak as we do here, when free trade is in question. "France," said M. Ducos to the chamber, on the 22nd May, 1837, "France, in adopting the system of protection, condemned consumers to enormous sacrifices; in the narrow interest of the colonies she imposed *narrow limits* on her shipping; she centralized her markets in *three or four miserable islets,* she cut off from her trading industry the magnificent continents of America and India! . . . . . ."

In reference to the same points it is expedient to refute another calculation of the delegates of the sea-ports.

The merchants of Havre, in October, 1841, addressed to the minister of the marine a petition, in which they thus expressed themselves: "France consumes about 125 millions of kilogrammes of sugar; 80 millions of this quantity are supplied by the colonies; 45 millions, then, remain to be furnished, in order to complete the consumption. If beet-root sugar did not exist, we should have to import 45 millions of kilogrammes of foreign sugar every year into France, which would give to our *declining shipping-trade* new aliment to the extent of 45,000 tons."

The calculation is not correct.* The suppression of native sugar would result, as its first effect, in raising the price of sugars: this is admitted by the merchants themselves. Now, every one knows that the consumption of an article falls off in proportion to the rise in its price. It is probable, therefore, that instead of 45,000 tons, the shipping interest would only have from 20,000 to 30,000 to convey. But adopting the calculation of 45,000, this tonnage would enter into the competing shipping, in which we are still decidedly inferior. Notwithstanding the progress we have

* France consumes only 110,000 millions of kilogrammes of sugar, and its general shipping, instead of declining, has considerably increased, as we have above demonstrated.

lately made in this respect, it is shown by the official customs' returns for 1840, that, of a given tonnage, 67 per cent. belongs to foreigners, and only 33 per cent. to the French flag.* Hence, of 45,000 tons of sugar, the French mercantile marine would only have 14,850 tons to carry. To remedy this disadvantage, the government, it is true, protects the French shipping by placing a less duty upon certain products imported in French bottoms, and especially upon sugars. Supposing this protection to double the ordinary proportion, French shipping would then have 29,700 tons to carry, which, divided by 230, the average tonnage, would give 128 entries inward; and as seven-eighths would come from Cuba and Porto Rico, and make about two voyages and a half *per annum*, the result would be, 102 ships manned with 1,326 seamen. Such, under the most favourable hypothesis, is all the augmentation that our shipping and our commerce would attain by the suppression of native sugar.

Lastly, the following fact, disclosed in his place in the Chamber, on the 5th April, 1842, by M. Fould, deputy, proves, most manifestly, that the interest of our shipping is only a pretext put forward to intimidate the partisans of continental industry. "Government," said the member for St. Quentin, "has handed over to foreign shipping, freight to the extent of 200,000 tons, or near double the colonial imports, because the revenue got an advantage by it. We are, then, entitled to say, to the minister of marine: 'How can you support a measure which will only give to French shipping 29,000 tonnage, when you benevolently abandon 200,000 tonnage to the foreigner?'"†

* Upon an average of ten years, from 1830 to 1840, of 1,987,000 tons entering French ports, 1,327,000 were under a foreign flag, and 660,000 under the French flag.

† "The government purchases every year 10,000 tons of tobacco from foreigners. It has this year bought 100,000 tons of coals for the

INTEREST OF THE REVENUE.

The charge advanced against the manufacture of native sugar, that it lessens the revenue, is equally unfounded with the rest of the allegations to which it has been subjected. A glance at the official returns will show that the receipts of the exchequer from the duties upon imported sugars have been gradually increasing for the past fifteen years; and, on comparing the receipts of the five years immediately anterior to 1840, with those of the five years which preceded them, we find an increase in the revenue from this source to the extent of two millions of francs (see table A); and as we must further add to that sum, the duties levied upon the manufacture of native sugar since 1838, and which, up to 1840, amounted to 8,638,220 francs, the receipts of the exchequer from this source have, during the last five years, increased on the average by nearly four millions of francs.

Surely, with such facts before us, it cannot be seriously asserted that the revenue from sugar has been experiencing a gradual decline. Moreover, the exchequer derives from the native manufacture profits not the less real that they are somewhat more difficult to identify,—such, for example, as the increase of indirect taxes, of duties on the inheritance or conveyance of landed property, on patents, licences, doors windows—receipts which obviously increase with the increasing prosperity of the departments. We must, further, add the dues on the conveyance of sugar and charcoal by the canals, and the custom-house duties on sea-coal, derived

use of our shipping; all this freight enters our ports in foreign bottoms, to the prejudice of our own vessels. I calculate that in the course of the next twelve months, you will have 200,000 tons to transport in the same way."—Speech of M. Fould, in the Chamber of Deputies, April 5, 1842.

chiefly from Belgium and England. The Havre merchants are more candid in the matter, for they say: "If foreign sugar were called in to furnish the excess of consumption over colonial supplies, there would result to the exchequer the following gain:—45 millions of kilogrammes of foreign sugars, even at a reduced duty of 60 fr. 50 cent., would produce to the revenue 27,225,000 francs, whereas 45 millions of kilogrammes of beetroot sugar produce only 12,375,000 francs; the difference, then, in favour of the revenue, created by the foreign sugar, would be 14,850,000 francs."

This calculation is not correct. France consumes only 110 millions of kilogrammes of sugar; of this quantity, the colonies furnish 80 millions, so that only 30 millions remain to complete the supply. These 30 millions, at 60fr.50 cent., would produce 18,150,000 francs; the same quantity of beetroot sugar, at 27 fr. 50 cent. per 100 kilogrammes, would produce 8,250,000 francs: the difference in favour of the revenue would then be 9,900,000 francs. But as the indirect taxes of which I have just spoken would amount at least to two or three millions, the greater profit to the revenue, from the entry of foreign sugars, would not exceed at the most, seven or eight millions.

If, however, the restrictions above set forth are somewhat exaggerated in themselves, they at all events place the question in its true aspect—that is to say: "the revenue is not losing—*on the contrary;* but it would gain still more if foreign sugars were to supersede beetroot sugar." On this principle, why not, also, sacrifice colonial sugar to foreign sugar? the treasury would be a greater gainer than ever: or why put a different duty on sugars imported in French bottoms? The treasury would gain far more by having all sugars brought in foreign bottoms. Why, in short, not abandon every branch of our industry? The treasury, no doubt, would get all the more in the way of

duties, though France would decline in relation to her material interests, as she has already declined in relation to her political position, losing at once her prosperity and her independence.

We have repelled the assertions of the antagonists of beet-root, by opposing to them, not subtle arguments, but official figures and facts. Let us, in a few words, sum these up :—

Baron Charles Dupin affirms that *the colonies are equal in extent to one-fourth of France.* Now, deducting the unproductive lands of the two countries thus compared, the cultivated lands of our four colonies are equal to $\frac{1}{10\,4}$ of France.

Admiral Duperré stated to the Chambers *that the colonies employed* 15,000 *seamen*; now the figures published by the minister of marine prove that our four sugar growing colonies employ only 4000 seamen.

M. Ducos, in his Report of the 2nd July, 1839, says, "*that our commerce and our mercantile shipping have lost their outlet and their element of transport.*" (See table B.) Now, the tonnage representing the general shipping movement of France, has increased in the last quinquennial period from 1836 to 1840, by 1,060,000 tons. M. Ducos adds, "*our manufactures are struck in their exports;*" whereas, the value of our exports to the colonies has increased, in the last quinquennial period, by 7,963,697 francs. "*The treasury,*" he says, "*sees its receipts diminishing;*" whereas, the receipts of the treasury have increased, in the last quinquennial period, by 3,721,524 francs. "*Our fleet,*" says he, "*is in danger of losing its men,*"* yet the register of seamen in 1840 exceeded by 6198 men the register of 1836, and that of 1842 exceeded it by 28,489 men.

We put it to our readers, whether it would be possible for men to contradict more daringly the evidence of facts?

* All the words in italics are those of M. Ducos, in his Report.

Now, if men so conscientious and so honourable as MM. Dupin, Duperré, and Ducos, fall into such exaggerations, what faith can we place in the reproaches directed against the native manufacture by the other organs of the colonial interests?

When persons are compelled, in the defence of any cause, to pervert the truth, it is an evident proof that they are unable to confess the whole truth, or to place things before the world in their actual aspect. As to this question, it is not every one who will venture to admit that which, however, every one ought to see, that the interest of the colonies is merely put forward as a pretext, and that if the Chambers do not put a stop to the system hitherto in progress, the ruin of the colonies will follow close upon the suppression of the native manufacture, in order to leave the field perfectly clear for foreign sugars.*

INTEREST OF THE CONSUMERS.

The apostles of perfectly unshackled free trade have adopted as a principle this maxim: *Let every country deal in its own natural products;* and, thereupon, as beetroot only contains 10 per cent. of saccharine matter, whereas the sugar-cane contains 21 per cent., they persecute the former plant without mercy. If this principle were to receive its immediate and full application, we should see the downfal of every branch of our industry, and whole populations would die of hunger; but mark this important fact: a hectare planted with beetroot yields, on an average, from 1500 to 1600 kilogrammes of raw sugar;† whereas a hectare

* M. Duvergier de Hauranne and M. Wurstemberg said, in 1840, "We prefer colonial sugar to beetroot sugar; but we still rather prefer *foreign sugar* to colonial sugar."—(*Moniteur*, 9th May, 1840.)

† We sometimes hear it mentioned that a hectare planted with beetroot has produced 2000 kilogrammes of raw sugar, and more; but these are isolated instances.

planted with sugar-cane produces, in our colonies, only 1400 kilogrammes. (See *Vérité des Faits*, par Ch. Dupin, page 31.)* Thus, on an equal surface, the hectare of beetroot gives 100 kilogrammes more sugar than if it were planted with sugar-cane. The one production then is quite as natural as the other; and if the price of the home sugar, under equal duties, is higher than that of the colonial, the reason is that the process of extraction has not yet been brought to perfection, and that labour in France is dearer than the slave labour of the colonies. The evident aim of the partisans of free trade is to effect the prosperity of the majority of consumers by reducing the price of all articles of first necessity. It is with this aim that they encourage machinery, the immediate result of which is to lower the price of manufactured goods.

Admitting the advantage of relieving certain articles of first necessity from impediments, it must at the same time be admitted, that the interest of consumers is not always the general interest: for example, it is to the interest of the whole society to raise certain taxes, though these are a burden on every individual.

* The subjoined figures represent the averages of three, four, or five years, between 1832 and 1836, and prove the lesser return of the hectare under sugar-cane—

	Hectares under cultivation.	Total kilog. of raw sugar.	Average per hectare.
Guadeloupe . . .	24,810	37,436,472	1,509
Martinique	21,179	29,258,716	1,381
Bourbon	14,530	21,793,140	1,500
French Guiana . .	1,571	2,120,119	1,349
	62,090	90,608,447	

Average of the sugar produced per hectare, 1459. M. Ducos, in his Report, p. 19, says that the produce per hectare is 2500 kil. of sugar in Martinique, 3000 in Guadeloupe, and from 4000 to 4500 in Bourbon. Adapting the figures above given to this estimate, the 62,090 hectares applied to the cultivation of sugar in our four colonies would return 200 millions of sugar, instead of 80 millions!

Suppose that by still further reducing the sur-tax on foreign sugars, the present price were lowered 10 francs per 50 kilogrammes, what would be the result, taking the home consumption of France at 110 millions? This reduction of 20 centimes per kilogramme would be a total benefit to the consumers of 22 millions, or of about 67 centimes to each individual; how would this gain compensate for the destruction of an industry which supports 100,000 families, which enriches eight departments, and which puts 100 millions of francs into circulation?

The leading interest of a country does not consist in the cheapness of its manufactured goods, but in the alimentation of labour. To create the greatest possible amount of occupation, to give employment to every hand, this should be the first care of a government. To protect the consumer at the expense of home labour is, in general, to favour the wealthier class to the detriment of the poorer; for production is the life of the poor man, the bread of the labourer, the wealth of the country. The interest of the consumer, on the contrary, compels the manufacturer to become an oppressor. To defeat competition, and to produce his goods at the lowest possible price, he must keep millions of individuals in indigence; he must be perpetually lowering wages; he must employ women and children, and leave the strong man without occupation, and wholly at a loss what to do with his strength and his youth.

England has realized the dream of certain modern economists; she surpasses all other nations in the cheapness of her manufactured products. But this advantage, if it be one, has only been obtained at the cost of the operative classes. The low price of goods depends on the low price of labour, and the low price of labour involves the utter wretchedness of the people. It is shown, in a recent publication, that, during the last few years, while English

industry has been *tripling* its production, the sum paid in wages has diminished by *one-third*, having been reduced from 15 millions sterling to 10 millions. The consumer, it is true, has pocketed this third of the wages, taken from the sweat of the labourer, but hence also have risen the disorder and distress that have so deeply affected the prosperity of Great Britain.

If, in France, the partisans of free trade should venture to put their pernicious theories into practice, France would lose at least two milliards of her wealth,* two millions of operatives would be thrown out of work, and our commerce would lose the advantage it derives from the immense quantity of raw materials imported to feed our manufactures.

* The following is an enumeration of the principal branches of industry, compiled from Schniltze, (*Statistique,*) which owe their existence to the system of protection, which, under the empire of that system, have developed and perfected themselves to such a degree that they are now progressing to a capability of competing with foreign products, but which would be completely annihilated by the free introduction of English, Belgian, Swiss, German, and Italian goods.

Designation of the Industries.	Number of workmen employed.	Value created by these industries.
		Francs.
Iron trade; extracting, melting, &c. .	45,862	127,884,726
Cutlery	50,000	
Metals, other than iron	26,956	13,715,061
Sea coal, kennel coal, &c.	26,966	29,005,601
Glass work, crystal work, &c. . . .	10,477	30,145,836
Porcelain and chinaware	10,052	15,908,621
Pottery	10,433	11,517,501
Linen trade	600,600	200,000,000
Cotton trade	600,000	600,000,000
Woollen Trade	150,000	400,000,000
Silk trade	400,000	185,000,000
Sugar trade	50,000	60,000,000
Total . . .	1,980 746	1,673,169,346

We should add to this table the manufacture of firearms, watches, paper, books, machines, plated goods, soap, &c., which employs fully 200,000

The history of the birth of all the industries of France, the example of all nations, the *dicta* of all the more eminent men who have presided in administrations, agree on this point,—that the existing industries of a country ought to be protected so long as they need protection; and even the celebrated minister Huskisson, though a disciple of Adam Smith, declared that, "National industries should not be placed, in the home market, in antagonism with foreign rivalry until they can sustain the competition: for then," said he, "not only do we multiply interchange, but we give the native manufacturers a fear which serves them, as it were, for a vehicle."—(Quoted by M. Molroguier, p. 321.)

To sum up,—there are only two systems: one, which places the alimentation of labour far before the cheapness of the product; the other, which considers the low price of the merchandize as the first element of prosperity. To propound a measure which is to have, as its two-fold result, the diminution of labour, and the augmentation of the price of the goods, is to propound that which has no principle to support it. Now, in the special case under consideration, to prohibit the manufacture of beetroot sugar must occasion the cessation in France of the labour of 50,000 operatives, and the augmentation of the price of sugar; the interest of the consumer, then, concurs with the interest of the producer, in demanding the maintenance of the industry.

From what has been above stated, it results that agriculture, industry, competing shipping, consumers, are all interested in the continental manufacture. External commerce and the exchequer would alone derive advantage from its suppression.

other operatives, whose labour would be annihilated by free foreign competition. Lastly, we should also reckon the value of raw materials necessary to industry, which figure in the import returns for 1840 to the extent of 507 millions of francs, and which would no longer feed our commerce if France were to receive the manufactured products of foreign countries.

It becomes the question, then, which are the interests that are of the greatest importance to the general prosperity of France. Now, the Emperor Napoleon made the following classification, exhibiting the basis on which the political economy of France ought to be founded :—

" Agriculture is the basis and the force of the prosperity of the country.

" Industry is the well-doing, the happiness of the population.

" External commerce is the superabundance, the beneficial employment of the two others.

" This latter is made for the two others,—the two others not made for it.

" The interests of these three essential bases are divergent, and not unfrequently opposed."

This lucid classification indicates what to France is the importance of the interests that are connected with these three grand elements of the prosperity of nations.

Agriculture and industry being the two *causes* of vitality, whilst external commerce is only its *effect*, a wise government should never sacrifice the major interests of the former to the secondary interests of the latter.

It may, then, be admitted as a principle that the manufacture of beetroot-sugar, a source of wealth to agriculture and to industry, should not be sacrificed to a commercial interest. Above all, it should not be sacrificed to a fiscal interest; and in betraying these principles, one would undergo the fate of Spain, which lost the empire of the world because she abandoned her agriculture and her industry for her commerce; we should degrade France to the rank of those American states where agriculture is in its infancy, where industry is null, and where external commerce is the sole source of wealth, customs' duties the sole revenue of the exchequer.

CHAPTER III.

RIGHTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE TWO INDUSTRIES.

It is not sufficient to have enumerated the general and special interests that are connected with the continental sugar industry; we must, also, repel the attacks of which it is made the object, by recalling the actual rights which it might justly invoke.

To create an industry, there is needed the science to invent, the intelligence to apply, the capital to establish, and the customs' duties to protect up to its complete development.

It is by the fortunate combination of such conditions that England has attained so prodigious a degree of industrial activity: to the same system France, in like manner, owes most of her industries; for it is in urging science to discoveries by the allurement of considerable premiums, in supplying the paucity of capital by considerable advances, in restricting foreign product by prohibitive duties, that Napoleon endowed France with cotton-spinning, with the kerseymere manufacture, with madder, with woad; that he gave an impulse to the spinning of flax by machinery; and that he gave similar impulse to iron foundries, to silk manufactures, and to cotton and wool manufactures.

The manufacture of beetroot sugar, which also owed its existence to the protective system, rapidly developed itself; and at the close of the restoration, it only needed a few more years' development, to attain that highest degree of perfection which would have permitted it to compete on equal terms with the produce of the tropics. Protection was never intended to be permanent; it was in its very nature to

diminish in proportion as improvements advanced; but it was pre-eminently unjust to burden all at once the native manufacture with an oppressive impost. M. Matthieu de Dombasle rightly observes: "It is a principle of financial policy, observed universally, to tax only those mature industries, whose products and development are capable of being clearly ascertained by experience, and to give time to manufacturers to cover by just profits the capital representing their first investment, their experiments, and their losses."

To justify the arbitrary transition from a state of protection to a vexatious system of imposts, it was alleged that the existence of the beetroot prevented the government from fulfilling towards the colonies the *compact* which the mother-country had undertaken. So true is it, that even in questions of material interests, right is the first reason invoked. But there can be no compact except between equals. The colonies were established in the interests of the mother-country, in order to supply her with goods which her own soil cannot produce; and, further, to furnish them at a cheaper rate than that at which foreigners would supply them.

They exist, then, on exclusive, selfish grounds: the mother-country designed to create for herself a new source of wealth, but not dangerous rivals to her continental products. This is so completely the case, that from the outset she prohibited the importation of any colonial products at all similar to our own,—such as rums and tafias,—which might by their competition, interfere with the spirituous productions of the mother-country; and if, latterly, these have been admitted into the French market, it has only been on the condition of being burdened with an enormous duty.

Thus, when sugar became a product of the French soil, it should have enjoyed the protection and advantages

granted to all continental commodities over colonial commodities: an inviolable and hitherto unquestioned right.

Besides, so soon as the colonies supplied this commodity at a price higher than that charged by foreigners, the very condition of their establishment was at an end.

It has been said, by way of justifying the barbarous idea of suppressing the native manufacture: Government, which, for the benefit of the revenue, took into its own hands the farming of tobacco, may also, on the same principle, annihilate beetroot-sugar. The reasoning is not exact: government, in appropriating the monopoly of tobacco, did not violate the rights of a territory, by stamping it with barrenness, for the benefit of a tropical product; it simply limited it: it did not deprive the soil of one of its most valuable branches of production, but simply made itself the sole proprietor of that culture.

If the government were to appropriate to itself the monopoly of native sugar, in order to regulate its production by the requirements of consumption, as it does already with regard to tobacco, we should not approve of this measure, but still it would be neither contrary to general right, nor so pernicious as absolute suppression; for agriculture would not lose one of its richest branches of culture, nor industry one of its finest acquisitions.

In the name of justice there arises another consideration of a higher order—that, namely, of the rights acquired by thirty years' efforts, by enormous results, and by daily advancing progress.

An industry which can alike invoke the past and the future, has the right and the power to demand to be preserved; for the right and the power of the things of this world are calculated according to their duration. To kill that which ought to live, is a barbarous pleasure, contrary to the laws of nature: it is at once a crime and an error.

Let us now demonstrate what may be the future of the native manufacture, by enumerating the principal improvements which it has already successively undergone.

To follow the course of progress, to mark the point it has already attained, but at the same time to show that it is still far from its goal, and that processes and systems vary from day to day, is to furnish the two-fold proof of the deficiences to be supplied, and of the great improvements to be achieved.

The beetroot is washed, grated, the pulp is pressed, the juice flows into a first copper, where it is defecated—that is to say, separates itself from all the foreign and insoluble matters which the beet sugar holds in suspension, and from a portion of those which have become dissolved. It passes successively through filters and evaporating vessels, where it purifies itself and becomes concentrated. It then passes into a boiler, where it condenses; thence into the cooler; and, lastly, into the moulds; where it crystallizes, is purified by draining, and clarified, a process which consists in pouring through the interstices of the now crystallized sugar a colourless syrup, which expels the highly coloured syrup it encounters on its way. The last operation is called *lochage*, and consists in removing the sugar from the moulds, in the shape in which it becomes an article of commerce.

Let us examine the progress which has been made by the various processes.

CLEANING.—The beetroot was formerly washed by hand, a very laborious and tedious process. This operation is now performed by an open-work cylinder, called the *laveur Champonnois*, the axle of which is on a level with a vessel full of water, to which a rotatory motion is given.

GRATING.—The sugar of the beetroot is contained in a sort of vessel, called *utricule*. In order to extract it,

these utricules must be cut open; for this purpose they formerly used a plain grater, but now they have graters fixed on to the periphery of a cylinder, which, at one time, made from six to eight hundred revolutions a minute, but which now performs so much as from a thousand to twelve hundred revolutions.

PRESSURE.—The pulp, enclosed in bags, is subjected to very heavy pressure; the bags were formerly made of linen, but they are now made of wool, a change which of itself materially facilitates the operation. To the double-action press of M. Isnard have succeeded, one after the other, the *presse à vis*, the *presse à coins*, the *presse à balancier*, the *presse à percussion*, and now we have the hydraulic press, the power of which is immense. We will here remark, that, notwithstanding the successive improvements which these three first processes have undergone, the means of grating and pressing are still so far from perfection, that M. A. Baudrimont, professor* in the *ecole pratique des mines et des arts*, states, in his pamphlet, page 40, that by grating the beet-root by hand, with the ordinary sugar-grater, and then squeezing it in a towel by the process of twisting, you realize more sugar than by Burette's grater and the immense action of the hydraulic press. M. Matthieu de Dombaste has accordingly invented a plan for simplifying the two last-named operations, which consists in cutting the beet-root into very small slices, and then letting it macerate in boiling water. But it appears that this process also involves some difficulties of execution.

DEFECATION.—This process was formerly performed by means of a combination of sulphuric acid, lime, and blood—a difficult operation, for which simple lime has been substituted, on account of the employment of bone-charcoal. Experiments are now being made to ascertain whether a sulphureous acid, the result of an infusion of gall nut, will not be an advantageous substitute for lime.

FILTERING.—This operation, which takes place several times during the manufacture, has been brought to great perfection. First, the simple filter was displaced by Taylor's filter, which affords an immense filtering surface in a limited space; then M. Dumont employed animal charcoal dust as a filtering medium, which combined within itself the two operations of filtration and of the discolouring action of the charcoal. Lastly came the perpetual filters, invented by Peyron.

CLARIFICATION.—This is effected with blood, when the filtration through the black dust has not been sufficient. Means have been found of revivifying, after its first use, the animal charcoal, which is then employed in large quantities to discolour the syrup, and this invention has enabled us to apply the article to this use, while restricting its consumption.

BAKING.—After the last filtration, you proceed with the baking, the object of which is to give the syrup the highest degree of concentration. Prior to 1810, the only process with which we were acquainted was that of Achard,—slow crystallization in flat vessels placed in a stove; next came baking in an oven; and then baking by steam in cauldrons, the form and construction of which have undergone numerous variations. Then came the apparatus of Howard, Derosne, Roth, and Degrand, designed to effect the baking by low pressure, the air in the cauldrons being rarefied, so as to economize the fuel.

FILLING.—After baking, the syrup is poured into moulds, and left to crystallize. These moulds were formerly made of earthenware; but zinc moulds have latterly been substituted, because the sugar does not adhere so firmly to them, and because they are less liable to be broken.

As the complement of all the improvements that have been introduced, we must not forget, that in the north of

France the grand moving power of these establishments is steam, which serves at once to heat and to work the washing-machine, the grating-machine, the pressing-machine, and sometimes even the pumps.

It is, then, due to all the combined efforts of chemistry, of mechanics, of the arts and of the sciences, that the manufacturers succeeded in giving an immense development to their trade, though the price of sugar, which under the Empire was nine francs per kilogramme, has since fallen to one franc ten centimes, and though, then protected and encouraged, it has now to support a tax of 27 francs per 100 kilogrammes; or together, a difference, to the detriment of the manufacturers, of 817 francs per 100 kilogrammes!

With such facts before us, do not the eulogies exclusively reserved for the colonies inspire one with a mournful sensation? Should not a man who has a mind so superior, a national feeling so intense, as Baron Charles Dupin, hesitate before he indulges in enthusiasm for them alone, and exclaim, as though the home manufacturers had done nothing—"The colonists have in twenty years succeeded in sextupling their produce!" Now, without blaming any one, we prefer to reserve our admiration for the successes we have above recorded, successes obtained by the persevering efforts of human genius, while those of the colonists are due only to the sweat of the slave.

From what has here been stated it is easy to arrive at the conviction that, sooner or later, native sugar will be able to support an equality of taxation. The delegates of the colonies and of the seaports already propose this equalization, knowing perfectly well that in the present state of things beetroot sugar could not endure the burden, and must of necessity succumb. It is sufficient for our purpose to take a note of this proposition, as recognising

the rights possessed by the native manufacture. In fact, let us suppose the latter capable of supporting the competition they offer to it, its proximity to the places where it is consumed would always give it an advantage in the market, and it would be, as at present, a dangerous rival to the colonies; it would produce, then, the same commotions that are now charged against it; and yet its adversaries acknowledge, that then they would no longer have the right to contest its existence: nor have they that right now, since they avow themselves that some few simplifications in the processes would annihilate what they emphatically call the colonial compact, and the major interests of the seaports and of the shipping!

If the prospect of the continental sugar-industry appears to us under the most brilliant colours, it is not so with that of the colonies, the existence of which seems menaced by the emancipation of the slaves. The example of the English West Indies proves that, if emancipation does not utterly destroy the prosperity of these islands, it diminishes in an immense proportion the production of sugar. It is a fact known and acknowledged by every one, that the liberated slave prefers the culture of coffee and other colonial goods, to the fatiguing and painful culture of the sugar-cane. Thus, after the impulse given by the men in power, it is in the natural course of things that the *Government, after having indemnified the French manufacturers, to induce them not to produce any more beetroot sugar, should be made to indemnify, in their turn, the proprietors of the colonies, in order that they may not produce any more cane sugar!*

In the Chambers they have already met this objection by this singular argument: they say, it is exactly because the inevitable emancipation of the negroes must bring about a grand agitation in the colonies, that it is necessary to

improve the condition of the planters by suppressing the native sugar, and to put them in a better position to support the crisis which menaces them: which is as much as to say, the emancipation of the negroes must ruin the colonies! Well! *fatten them before you kill them;* fatten them, above all, with the wreck of a flourishing industry. This reasoning is a mere sophism, and all the worse logic that, according to what has been stated, the suppression of the beetroot would not stay the fall of the colonies.

There is another consideration of a high order in favour of the native sugar, and which is equivalent to a right—independence.

A nation is culpable in placing at the mercy of others its supply of articles of primary necessity. To be in a position from one day to another to be deprived of bread, sugar, iron, is to subject one's destiny to a foreign decree; it is a sort of anticipatory suicide, which it has been thought to prevent by according a special protection to French grain and iron.

If war were to break out, our colonies would be no longer able to supply our markets, and we should find ourselves again in the same state that we were in under the Empire; with this difference, that the high price would far more seriously incommode the population, for the use of sugar has since acquired great extension. It is said that in such a case the neutral powers would furnish us with sugar, or else that the native manufactures would be at once re-established. But would it be to our interest to transfer to a doubtful ally a supply for which he would make us pay an exorbitant price, and allow him to gain every year millions by another article which we might produce ourselves?

As to the supposition of reconstructing our own manu-

factures, it is not when a country is obliged to resort to extraordinary taxation, in order to organize its defence, that it can employ its capital in reviving an industry, and in operating a change in cultivation, always a long and expensive operation, and which displaces many interests.

To sum up: everything concurs in favour of the native manufactures. The inalienable rights of every home product over colonial products; rights acquired by the efforts of thirty years, by sacrifices, and by success; the rights of ordinary justice, for it is upon the faith of the protection it enjoyed that it borrowed capital, built factories, hazarded experiments, gave great impulse to its industry; the rights that every industry has, the daily improvements of which permit it to invoke the future; in fine, the rights which we may call political, because the preservation of the native sugar is a guarantee of independence during war, as it is a fruitful source of labour and prosperity during peace.

CHAPTER IV.

EQUALITY OF IMPOSTS.

CONCURRENTLY with two systems laid down, one of which is for the suppression of the manufacture, and the other for its maintenance and development, a third party has been formed, which, not presuming to declare a decided opinion, for fear of collision with contrary interests, contents itself with demanding *that two products equally French may be subject to the same tax.*

What can, apparently, be more just? They avoid the offensive words prohibition and ruin, and seem only to call for an equitable assimilation; but at bottom, this opinion is the most dangerous to the French industry, for it

is the most treacherous. In the name of the common right, it demands the most flagrant injustice, the most absolute inequality.

We proceed to prove this.

It is clear that, under present circumstances, the price of sugar being far from high, the slightest increase of tax would ruin most of the manufacturers; let us not forget that the law of 1837 closed nearly two hundred manufactories, and reduced the production by one half; and if, since 1840, the number of workshops and their returns have made an ascending movement, this revival, trifling in itself,* is only due to the bait held out by the suppression with indemnification. M. Dumon, deputy of Lot and Garonne, who certainly will not be charged with partiality in favour of the beetroot, declares solemnly in his report (page 5, Sitting of the 29th of April, 1842): "It is universally notorious, that the hope of indemnity gives to the manufacture of native sugar a reckless activity: as it was thought, that the amount of the indemnity to each manufacture would be based on the production, they resolved to produce at any cost, in the confidence *that the losses in the manufacture* would be amply compensated by their share in the indemnity. We have received, in this respect, information quite in conformity with the public understanding on this subject. Closed workshops were re-opened, workshops in operation pushed production to excess." Thus, then, the adversaries of the beetroot acknowledge it: so far from realizing great profits, there are manufacturers who, at this present time, work even *at a loss*, and if during the last two years there has been an increase in the production, this over-production is due to the hope of an advantageous reimbursement, and not to the too prosperous state of the trade.

* The increase from 1840 to 1842 was only nine manufactories and four millions of kilogrammes of sugar.

Now, if the duties are already so heavy that the works are oppressive to some, and scarcely remunerative to others, the least augmentation would involve inevitable ruin, and as the *equality of imposts* would nearly double the duties, with which the manufacture is at present oppressed, this measure, so benevolent in appearance, would be in reality *the suppression of the manufacture without any indemnity*, an expropriation without redemption. If the prohibition with redemption is a monstrous measure in all respects—for among other disadvantages it only indemnifies the rich and leaves the poor without labour—what should we think of the suppression without any sort of compensation to any one? Let us repeat, then, that in the actual state of things, the equality of imposts, called by its real name, signifies prohibition without indemnity, which, in its turn, means spoliation.

So much for the immediate application. As to the measure in itself, let us see if it is equitable in principle. Let us suppose that we can, without injuring the interests of the mother-country, impose upon beetroot sugar a duty equal to that which the customs exact from transmarine sugars, this assimilation would be an inequality in favour of the colonies, for this simple reason, that the colonist does not bear the same charges as the home inhabitant of the kingdom.

To prove this, let us reproduce a passage extracted from the Appendix to the *Notices Statistiques Officielles des Colonies*, page 25, thus expressed: "Land-tax does not exist in the colonies, in this sense, that the land there is not directly taxed, and that the realty of the towns is only taxed in proportion to the rent paid for it; but the absence of territorial contributions is compensated by the impost placed on colonial agriculture, in proportion to the number of hands employed by each inhabitant—an impost

known by the name of Negro poll tax. Part of this contribution is collected in Bourbon directly, and the rest, as in the other colonies in the form of a tax paid by the planters on the export of their goods." The following is the amount of the contributions paid by the colonies, according to the same authority.

Imposts paid by the Inhabitants of the Four Sugar Colonies in 1838.*

DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS.

	Francs.
Poll tax on the country Negroes	1,448,000
Urban poll tax, and house tax	604,000
Licences	342,000
Personal contribution	240,000
Total	2,634,000

INDIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS.

Registration duties and fees, customs' duties, mortgage duties, &c.	3,149,087
Total	5,783,087

Thus the expenses which the inhabitants of the four colonies have to defray for their internal government, are nearly six millions a-year. This figure, divided by the population, which, in the same year, was 372,418 souls (*same appendix*, page 11) without reckoning the civil and military servants of the government, gives a mean impost of 17 francs a head, while an analogous calculation applied to the mother-country exhibits the mean impost to be more than 38 francs a head, on the basis of 1,284,105,960 francs,† as the annual contribution to be distributed among

* The year 1838 was selected by the official compiler as exhibiting more exactly the ordinary amount of the imposts.

† Such is the estimate of the receipts for the year 1843. We know that the estimated expenditure exceeds the receipts by twenty-seven millions, and that even this figure does not indicate the actual amount of the final budget.

33,540,910 inhabitants, the number of the population according to the census of 1837.

But the compiler of the official work from which we have derived the foregoing information, has arrived, by the aid of convenient deductions, at an entirely different result. In the first place, he does not include (page 11), as part of the population of the colonies, 6683 civil functionaries and military officers. In the second place, he only estimates the free population at 114,000 souls, whereas, at page 11, he has estimated it at 120,000; and lastly, he deducts all the slaves, and represents the taxation of six millions as supported by the 114,000 free colonists alone. This result obtained, he compares it with the total imposts of France, which he first brings down to a milliard, and then divides by the entire population, comprehending proprietors, employés, operatives, labourers, servants, the army, the navy, &c. By this ingenious calculation he readily proves that the colonist pays fifty-two francs in taxes instead of seventeen, and that the home subject pays thirty-one instead of thirty-eight.*

The incorrectness and bad faith of such a calculation are self-evident; we can only compare together two things that are alike; and if we propose equitably to balance the burdens of the two countries, as borne by each individual, we must, in both countries, divide the amount of contributions by the total population; or we must, in both cases, reckon only the class of actual tax-payers. Besides, the slave does not himself pay taxes, because he has not himself the benefit of his labour; his master, realizing all the profit, pays, of course, the tax for him; but, in France, all personal taxes, direct or indirect, and of whatever description, being included in the value of the article manufactured, or of the day's labour

* Appendice des Notices Statistiques sur les Colonies Françaises, imprimé par ordre du Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Marine. Oct. 1840, p. 18.

of the operative and artisan, it is, after all, the man who gives employment that pays the tax. The official calculation, then, is completely erroneous.

When the object is to exalt the importance of the colonies with a view to their comparison with France, the calculation is made, as by M. Charles Dupin, upon the geometrical surface of the two countries; because the colonies having a far greater extent of utterly uncultivated than cultivated land, it is quite practicable, by including in the calculation rocks, marshes, and primitive forests, to prove that our four sugar colonies are equal in extent to one-fourth of France. So, again, when it is the object to make the most of the population of the colonies, the negroes, men, women, and children, are all reckoned as French citizens. But when, on the other hand, the question is whether, upon statistical calculations, the colonists or the home population are the more heavily taxed per head, a scratch of the pen cuts off the entire slave population, a portion of the free population, and the civil and military servants, in order to prove, against the evidence of facts, that the colonies are more heavily taxed than the mother-country.

It is painful to mark such inaccuracies in a work compiled by order of the minister of marine. What are we to think of an administration which so utterly forgets its first duty—impartiality; which, for the purpose of injuring a trade on which depends the prosperity of so many departments, does not hesitate to publish, as official documents, a series of fabrications?

Other writers include among the taxes paid by the colonists, the customs' duties imposed on their products; but these duties are, ultimately, paid by the consumers at home, so long as the selling price is not below the cost price; and besides, the duty upon colonial sugars is far less oppressive than that imposed on the native industry, for it is levied on

consumption and not on production In fact, the colonist does not pay the duty upon his sugar until the actual moment of his selling it: up to that time he is exempt from taxation. In France, on the contrary, the manufacturer is always in advance with the excise, which penetrates into his privacy, spies all his movements, sounds every hole and corner of his house,* and imposes the duty even before the sugar is crystallized—before the product of his industry has received the form which gives it its commercial value. Until the French manufacturer has sold his sugar, he is losing all the interest of the money he has paid to the excise.

The delegates of the colonies further represent, as an indirect tax of the most onerous description, the effect of the monopoly which obliges the colonists to consume only the productions of the mother-country ;† but this obligation is onerous only in respect to flour,—which, besides, is partly consumed by the garrisons,—and in respect to cod-fish ; for all the other articles are of the same nature with those which France exports to the foreign islands, and to America in general, as any one may see upon consulting the customs' returns. It is, therefore, no special burden for the colonists to be obliged to consume only French productions, such as silk, cotton, woollen, and linen goods, wines, earthenware, mercery, perfumery, prepared hides, olive-oil, candles, salted meats and fish, &c., since the inhabitants of Haïti, of the English and Spanish possessions in America, and especially those of the United States, find it advantageous to procure these articles from France.

* The excise officers are authorized to wall up all doors of communication between a workshop and the adjacent houses. If, in France, the charcoal-burner is master, as the saying is, in his own house, at all events the sugar manufacturer is not.

† M. Jollivet estimates the obligation as equivalent to a tax of twelve millions. We are well acquainted, however, with the correctness of colonial calculations.

The colonists are exempt from another charge which weighs without distinction upon all Frenchmen at home—the conscription. Assuredly the obligation to remain eight years in the ranks of the army must count as an onerous impost, at a time when everything, political rights alike with the duties of the citizen, is estimated at its weight in gold.

The military service may, without exaggeration, be considered an annual impost of 160,000,000 francs; for, according to the law of population, there are, out of 33,000,000 souls, 286,000 men who every year attain the age of from twenty to twenty-one years, and who are, consequently, within the conscription; deducting from this number 86,000 persons who may have legal causes of exemption, there remain at least 200,000 men who may be called upon to draw lots, and who, to secure themselves against unfavourable chances, would have each 800 francs to pay to assurance societies; it is therefore 200,000 times 800 francs that we may fairly reckon as the value of the conscription impost, if we would reduce to figures the sacred duty of serving our country.

Not only are the colonists exempt from paying this debt to the common country, but the men of the continent are taken from agriculture, and sent to the colonies to defend the colonists from their slaves, which protection on the part of the mother-country costs us annually 7,000,000 francs.

RECEIPTS IN 1840 OF THE FOUR SUGAR COLONIES.

	Francs.
Local receipts of the four sugar colonies .	6,284,037
Credits allotted by the mother-country to the marine budget	7,295,903
Total receipts . .	13,579,940*

* In the official receipts, the official compiler has placed against Martinique the estimate of 1839, in preference to that of 1840, by reason of the earthquake of 1839, which materially reduced the receipts of the following year.—*Appendix*, p. 24.

To sum up: the colonist has the benefit of slave labour, cheaper than free labour; his taxes are lighter, and his products do not pay duty until their consumption; he enjoys exemption from military duties; he is, then, more favoured than the Frenchman at home. The manufacturers of beetroot have, consequently, the right to say to the government, to the Chambers, to the country: "We are quite willing not to invoke the privileges and protection hitherto accorded to all native industries over colonial products; but, then, we demand equal justice for all. We consent to an equalization of duties upon the same products, if you subject the producers of both countries to the same burdens; let native sugar be taxed as high as tropical sugar, when the French soil is no more heavily taxed than the soil of our colonies, when the free man of colour receives the wages due to his labour, when every inhabitant of the colonies pays his contribution to the defence of the common country; but to establish an equalization of tariffs before you have established an equalization of burdens, would be the most flagrant iniquity; for, in the name of justice, you would dispossess thousands of Frenchmen and ruin thousands of individuals, without compensation; in the name of equality you would heap upon the industry of the mother-country more charges than upon colonial industry; you would, in a word, commit a revolting act of tyranny. 'For,' as Montesquieu says, 'there is no tyranny more cruel than that which is exercised under shadow of the laws, under colour of justice, when, so to speak, you drown unhappy wretches from the very plank on which they have just saved themselves.'"

CHAPTER V.

ALLIANCE OF THE DIFFERENT INTERESTS.

Interests of the Native Manufacture, of the Colonies, and of the Consumers.

THE results shown in the preceding chapters seem to us to prove to demonstration, that the manufacture of native sugar ought to be maintained and protected as one of the most brilliant industrial acquisitions with which the genius of the Emperor Napoleon has endowed France. But it is also quite a matter of justice that the government should seek the means of protecting colonial interests, without, however, forgetting the general interest of the consumers.

Since 1830, the government has exhibited itself, with regard to this question, either very culpable or very incapable. Culpable, if it desired, as we believe, to arrive by side-paths and exaggerated accusations at the suppression of the beetroot; incapable, if such be not the result it sought to attain. In fact, in all countries, to govern is to lead; and if in a free country a government cannot of itself resolve all questions, its duty consists, at least, in wisely propounding them. On the enunciation of a problem frequently depends its good or ill solution.

The ministers, in broadly asking the general councils of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, whether or no it was necessary to *destroy* the beet sugar, committed a great imprudence; for they awakened the passions hostile to the native manufacture, and their doubt as to its preservation clearly showed the possibility of a complete suppression. In opening a discussion on this ground with the interested parties, they did not help out the solution, for it was clear that each would demand the ruin of its rival, without

troubling itself about the general interests of France. If, on the contrary, the government had energetically protested against every project for the destruction of the native manufacture, and, this first basis once laid, had sought the means of allying the rival interests, there is no doubt that, long since, the two industries would have been living peaceably under the shelter of protective laws.

Let us suppose, for instance, that the government should submit to-morrow to the same councils, the question, whether or no it were advisable to suppress the spinning of flax by machinery; in the interest of consumers, of commerce, and of shipping, it would arouse against that beautiful industry a fearful storm; for there is every probability that the merchants of the sea-ports would come and set forth with complacency, as they do now with regard to sugar, all they would gain in tonnage and exchange by the importation of the foreign woven fabrics.

The great art of a government is to consult all capacities, by chalking out for them the goal, and the path they have to pursue to it, for without that there is much ado about nothing, much labour and no result. There never has been in France so much knowledge and intelligence set in motion, and ready to concur to the general good; never, however, has so slight a result been produced: the reason is, there is no unity, no direction, no system; and society, filled with ideas without facts, and with facts without thoughts, is weary of theories without application, and of application without aim and without result.

An important remark is peculiarly apt in this place:—Nothing, in our opinion, can replace, particularly for the welfare of material interests, the council of state, such as it was organized under the Empire; for to frame good special laws, you require special and impartial men who, free by political influences, placed on neutral ground, make it their

business, after a profound discussion, to introduce into the laws, beside the scientific theory, the practice of experience.

Under the Empire, the council of state, composed of enlightened men, and divided into special sections, was charged with framing and discussing bills *before submitting them* to the approval of the Chambers; and, just as warlike and industrial machines, before being given out to the public, undergo, in the workshop, the tests which art has recognised as necessary, so, under the Empire, the laws, before being launched into the political world, were weighed, analysed, discussed, without party spirit, without display, without precipitation, by the ablest men in France. Now, on the contrary, all the laws issue off-hand from the portfolios of the ministers, and are revised, or enlarged, or cut up by a commission, the members of which, often ignorant of the questions submitted to them, frame the law, according as they may desire to strengthen or overthrow a ministry, or as the interest of the place they represent is favourable or opposed to the general interest.

On the question before us, there have been reports upon reports, inquiries upon inquiries, laws upon laws; and, for the last twelve years, it has still been growing more and more obscure. The evil has grown worse; the Chambers have protected, by their votes, now, native sugar to the detriment of colonial sugar; now, colonial sugar to the detriment of native sugar; or, finally, foreign sugar to the detriment of the two others. This result is natural; whatever ability a minister, or the members of a commission, or of a legislative assembly, may possess, their labour will never be so perfect as if, by the elaboration of special men, it had previously undergone a close discussion.

In the present state of things, it is the press that is charged with doing the preparatory work of the council of state; but it is no substitute for it, no one being commissioned

to gather, analyse, and combine, all the good and useful ideas which emanate from the daily and periodical press.

In order to bring about the alliance of the various interests engaged in the sugar question, several systems have been proposed which are not worth recalling; we content ourselves with merely expressing our own opinion as to the means most calculated to produce a result which all should desire from their hearts.

We propose the following modifications in the present legislation:

1. To diminish, by seven francs per 100 kilogrammes, the tax on the native manufacture, and to place on *consumption* the duty at present levied on *manufacture*.

2. To subject the sugars of Bourbon to the same tax as the West Indian sugars.

3. To suppress the higher duty, which places the white raw sugars of the colonies in a less favourable position than those of another shade.

4. To reduce the import duties on such colonial products as have no corresponding growth in France.

5. To reduce, from 70 to 67 francs per 100 kilogrammes, the *rendement* of colonial sugars, on their exit in a refined state, and to raise from 70 to 75 francs per 100 kilogrammes the *rendement* upon foreign sugars.

6. To permit to the colonies the direct exportation of their sugars to foreign countries, in French vessels.

7. To authorize them to refine at home the sugar they themselves consume or which they can export directly abroad.

8. To establish, in the interest of the two French products, and for the benefit of consumers, a surtax upon foreign sugars, upon a sliding scale proportioned to the current price of sugars.

Let us inquire into the consequences of such measures as these.

NATIVE SUGARS.

Native sugar is an essentially taxable article, and the government has done quite right in making it pay a duty; but it is certain that the transition has been too abrupt, and contrary to every principle of justice and good policy; for the effect produced by this impost has been to ruin the manufactures which were not in full operation, and in a prosperous state, and to augment, on the contrary, the activity of the others. It destroyed the weak for the benefit of the strong, it obstructed the development of the manufacture in the departments where agriculture was in a backward state, and where it would have been of immense advantage to the soil, as well as to the welfare of the working classes, and it compelled it to concentrate itself where the richness of the soil, the abundance of capital, the long established position of the factories, alone permitted it to struggle against the tax. Baron Charles Dupin rightly marks this effect as a disadvantage; but does not the fault lie with those who have used their best efforts to oppress this industry and impede its progress? The remedy for this disadvantage would be to diminish the impost by 7 fr. per 100 kilogrammes. This would allow other manufactories to establish themselves in other departments; and the interest of the country, as well as the duty of the government, is to extend the benefits of this industry over the whole surface of France, to encourage the new manufactures instead of concentrating them in a few privileged points.

One important amelioration would be to alleviate the load which the manufacturers support, by rendering the collection of the impost less vexatious, and by adopting the system in use with regard to brandy, the duty on which is levied on consumption. This alteration seems all the easier and

the more profitable, that M. Molroguier, one of the most distinguished commissioners of the board of excise, recommends the change, in his examination of the sugar question, and proves that it would be an advantage, not only for the manufacturers, but even for the treasury, which would avoid, by this means, all chance of fraud.

DIRECT EXPORTATION TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES OF COLONIAL SUGAR, REFINING, AND RENDEMENT.

To permit the colonies to export directly abroad in French vessels the sugar which they cannot dispose of in the home market, would be to promote their commerce, and to increase their welfare. This measure is so much in the very nature of things, that the governments of Martinique and Guadeloupe had recourse to such means, in 1839, to promote the sale of the products which encumbered these colonies, and which were, by an extraordinary exception, dearer in the foreign than in the French markets.

It is probable, that the colonies would find a vent for them out of France, as, since 1834, their products were exported from the French warehouses even in the raw state, although a double freight had necessarily increased their price. This is the table of re-exportations. (See Return of the Board of Customs, 1841, p. xiv.)

Years.	Re-exportation of Colonial Sugars.	
	Raw.	Refined.
	Kilogrammes.	Kilogrammes.
1834	53,056	53,351
1835	4,350,875	1,259,625
1836	5,570,000	6,538,732
1837	652,361	2,085,075
1838	9,305,962	2,779,177
1839	8,511,105	6,366,127
1840	172,702	466,107
1841	357,607	40,952

Recently, a newspaper printed a petition of the colonies, wherein the demand for a free exportation was made. The United States would offer them, perhaps, a certain vent; for Louisiana finds the culture of the sugar-cane daily diminishing. In the present state of things, our four sugar colonies import from America and the foreign colonies to the value of nine millions; they only export in return six millions.

Sugar, then, would raise them from their inferiority in the balance of their special commerce. But if, on account of the dearness of their productions, it was impossible for them to sell abroad their raw sugars, it would be the duty of the home government to allow them to refine, merely prohibiting their importation of the refined article into France; for either the colonies should only export abroad, in a refined state, the excess of what they had not been able to sell in France in a raw state, an amount so slight as not to alter their relations with the mother-country, or they should export direct to foreign countries the greater part of their sugars, and then France would receive from the foreign colonies what sugar she required to complete her supply, and in this case the introduction would not injure any national interest, while it conferred great advantage on the treasury.

Besides, by lowering the *rendement* on the refined sugars of the colonies, and by raising the *rendement* on the foreign sugars re-exported, the colonies perhaps would find it to their advantage to have their sugar refined in France, and would limit themselves, in that case, to the refinement of sugar for their own consumption. Although this quantity only amounts to 115,000 kilogrammes, it would be still a great advantage, for at present they cannot consume their own production till it has twice crossed the Atlantic.

In any case, according to all probabilities, the exports of

France would not be diminished ; they would be augmented, on the contrary, by the very improvement in the condition of the West Indies, for the more flourishing the colony, the more multiplied are its commercial relations with the mother country. England has exported to North America a far greater amount of her products, since the latter has acquired independence. Spanish commerce profits much more by the free trade granted to the island of Cuba than if she had maintained there an oppressive monopoly. Our colonies, it may be objected, would supply themselves rather from England than from us. But, in the first place, we should probably still consume a large proportion of their sugars, and the same exchange would take place ; and, in the next place, the habits, tastes, and wants of colonies do not change, even when they separate from the mother-country. The two countries above mentioned afford the proof of this. There is a more striking proof still in the instance of St. Domingo, which has continued to prefer our products to those of England ; in that of the Mauritius, which supplies itself still from us with a great amount of merchandise, although, transferred to the rule of the English, it scarcely sends us any of its products. In 1841, we exported thither to the value of 6,412,147, and we only imported thence to the value of 75,612 francs. (See Returns of the Board of Customs.) Lastly, that which assures us that our colonies would not cease to supply themselves from France, is, that the United States of America and the foreign colonies derive from us the same species of goods that we export to our colonies, wheat excepted. France exports, to the value of twenty-one millions of francs, to the English, Danish, Dutch, and Spanish possessions in America, and only receives from them to the value of fifteen millions, while the value of her commerce with the United States had risen in 1841 to the enormous sum of

340,632,706 francs. (See Returns of the Board of Customs.) There is, consequently, no reason to believe that our colonies would go elsewhere in search of the articles which the Americans themselves find it advantageous to receive from France. Besides, this free trade already exists in great measure in Bourbon and Cayenne; has it at all injured French commerce?

There is another argument wherewith to meet those who place the colonies on the same footing with the mother country. Since, in their opinion, colonial sugar is a product as French as the products which grow on the banks of the Seine, it comes, then, absolutely to the same thing, that French ships should exchange abroad French colonial sugar for foreign manufactures, or export French goods for the purpose of bringing back foreign sugar. In considering all the facts, one is astonished to see how, in international relations, routine still impedes improvement and development in commercial relations.

The monopoly of the colonial commerce was established in the interest of the mother country, in order to promote its commerce and increase its welfare; and now that the revolution brought about by the beetroot, and the loss of our other possessions in America, has rendered this monopoly injurious both to the mother country and to the colonies, we persist in maintaining it!

SUGARS OF BOURBON.

We have already stated why the same duties ought to be imposed on the sugars of Bourbon as on the sugars of Martinique and Guadeloupe; it would be mere justice: we ought to protect those who suffer, and not those who are prospering. The English have set the example of such measures, for, contrary to the usage in France, they have put a higher duty on the sugar of India than on the sugar of their West Indian islands.

WHITE SUGARS.

We have no occasion to recur to the propriety of a measure that should tend to put an end to the differential duty which oppresses the white sugars. It is obligation imposed on the planters only to send very sugars into France, in order to retain in this commodity all its freightable weight, is a barbarous law.

COLONIAL PRODUCTS OTHER THAN SUGAR.

The government has been long since advised to reduce the import duties on products which are not produced in France as advantageous to both parties. This would induce the colonists not to persevere in an excessive culture of the cane; but, on the contrary, to resume the cultivation of coffee, cocoa, cinnamon, and cotton. The treasury, it is true, would be a loser for a time; yet coffee, among other things, becoming cheaper, there would be a larger consumption of it, and this would involve a double advantage: in the first place, it would balance the loss; in the second, and most beneficially for the poor classes of society, it would substitute warm drinks for spirituous liquors—a true sanitary benefit. Besides, with the increased use of coffee, the consumption of sugar would proportionably increase.

SURTAX.

As to the surtax on foreign sugars, it should be sliding, in proportion to the current price of sugars, as is now the case with the duties imposed on foreign wheats; otherwise there would be two rocks to apprehend: if you fix it too low, as has been the case since 1830, foreign sugar becomes a dangerous rival to the French products; and if you fix it too high, we undergo the inconvenience which the inquiry of 1829 developed in these words:—"The surtax esta-

blished in 1822 was calculated at a rate to exclude foreign sugar from our consumption, *even at a time when our own colonies could not satisfy all our demands.*"

Now, by establishing a proportionate surtax when the price of sugars was too high, foreign sugars would come in, which would be for the interest of the consumers, and even of the refiners. When the sugar was at a very low figure, the surtax on foreign sugars would reach a prohibitory rate, so that this third product should not, by its presence in bond, encumber the market, and produce those commercial crises which we have had so often to deplore.

Thus, then, it only rests with the government and the Chambers to restore life to native industry and to the colonies, without interfering with the interests of the consumers. But to arrive at this immense result, they must propose to themselves but one end—the general prosperity of France; and they must crush beneath their feet those selfish and miserable views of private interests which are ever detrimental to a nation, and which dishonour the representatives of a great people.

CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

IMPORTANT French interests are suffering; they call for a prompt, an effectual remedy: a palliative would only aggravate the position. Uncertainty as to the future is the greatest of all evils.

The question must be clearly put, the solution must be decisive.

Since it is the existence of the manufacture of beetroot sugar which is compromised, it is necessary, first of all, to

know who would profit by the suppression, and in whose interest it is sought to obtain it.

1. Is it in favour of the colonies?
2. Is it in favour of foreigners?

To get clear of this dilemma is a matter of imperious necessity, for the Chambers should duly weigh the consequence of the measures that are proposed to them.

In the first case, if it is frankly, sincerely in favour of the colonies that the internal sacrifice is to be made, let them then adopt the measures most calculated to produce this result. He who wishes the end, must wish also for the means.

It is absolutely necessary, to raise the value of the principal product, to increase the surtax,* and assure the future of production, by declaring the maintenance of slavery; for with foreign competition there can be no remunerative price, and consequently no relief; without security for the future, no prosperity. Now, the surtax at present is only twenty francs per 100 kilogrammes on foreign sugars. These take possession of the market in an ever-increasing proportion, and thus make up the deficiency in the native manufacture, since the tax which has been imposed on it.

If the beetroot were to disappear entirely, the gap would be instantly filled up. To ameliorate the condition of the West Indies, it would be necessary to raise the surtax, and to raise it considerably; we have seen that, when the colonial products stood alone in competition with the foreign products, the rates of 27 fr. 50 c., of 30 fr., of 40 fr., were declared insufficient in 1820, 1822, 1826, and the outcry of

* What we here say has just been confirmed by the petition of the colonial council of Martinique, presented by the mayor of that island, M. Huc. The planters demand:—1. The prohibition, with indemnity, of the native production:—2. *The increase of the surtax upon foreign sugars.*

the colonies did not cease till the surtax was elevated to the prohibitory rate of 50 francs.

As to the prospect of the slaves, the planters require to be secured. We may as well suppress the cultivation of the cane, as proclaim emancipation. Ever under the blow of this threatening measure, the planters will not find capital ready to adventure itself in the support of an industry with one foot in the grave; their depression will continue to increase, since one of the causes of their difficulties is the high rate of the capital, the use of which is necessary to them.

The two principal means which we have here pointed out, can alone make the suppression of the beetroot advantageous to the colonies; and if the government had recourse to them, its action would be frank and honourable, and its consequences would be immediate and certain.*

On the other hand, however, this first hypothesis would be entirely opposed to the general prosperity of France. It would sacrifice the free labour of 100,000 Frenchmen to the enforced labour of 90,000 slaves.† (Such is the number of slaves engaged in the culture of the cane in our four colonies.)

It would sacrifice an annual revenue of 14 millions for agriculture, of 8 millions for the working classes, and a circulation of 100 millions, to an increased receipt for the treasury of 7 or 8 millions at the most.

There would be, in this case, a violation of all rights; for the products of the French soil ought to have the priority over the products of the tropics: the colonies were esta-

* But, on the contrary, they have already let us see, as in the petition of the Havre merchants, that after having destroyed the beetroot they would also lower the surtax upon foreign sugars.

† It is clear, that we do not reckon the slaves and free men of colour, since they are, on the contrary, interested in the suppression of the sugar-cane.

blished in the interest of the mother-country, and not the mother-country in the interest of the colonies.

There would be a violation of principles, for the interests of agriculture and industry ought not to be sacrificed for the profit of foreign commerce, and still less for the profit of the treasury.

In a word, there would be a manifest violation of general interests; for the prosperity of seven departments, the population of which amounts to four millions of inhabitants, would be immolated to thirty-one thousand colonists, and the interest of consumers to two islands of the ocean. (We have proved that Martinique and Gaudeloupe are the only suffering colonies.)

This first hypothesis is, then, impossible. It is impossible, in fact, to restore the price of sugars to what it was under the Restoration. It is impossible to restrict the consumption of an article of provision that has become indispensable. It is impossible to stay the march of civilization, and to say to the men of colour who live under the French rule: "You alone shall never be free."

It is, then, impossible for the suppression of the native manufacture to be effected in the interest of the colonies.

There remains the second hypothesis, the only realizable, the only probable one, the only one that the government has in view—the abandonment of our supply to the foreigner. In this case, nothing can be more clear. We must do away with the surtax altogether, in order that the advantage of the consumers may be, at least, a sort of compensation for the ruin of so many existences. It is true, in that case, we shall not only have abandoned the future of agriculture, of industry, of our independence, but we shall have also lost the colonies, and the interests connected with them—interests the importance of which is being now so exalted, for the sole benefit of the foreign colonies.

The prosperity of France, then, is entirely opposed to the

destruction of the beetroot, in whatever way it is set about, in whatever aspect we view the consequences. To preserve it, allying its existence with the welfare of the colonies, is the only practicable measure. Reason points this out to the government, duty enforces it.

To this end, the first resolution to be taken is to expel the foreign sugars, holding them in reserve by means of a sliding duty, proportionate to the current price, in order to allow their admission only in case of the French productions not being adequate to the consumption.

As to the colonies, the mother-country no longer permitting them to dispose as they please of the market, and to fix the price according to their convenience, it ought to relax the bonds of the monopoly which is crushing them, open to them outlets to the foreigner, and take the measures of which we have spoken above, for associating their welfare with that of the mother-country.

This system, or some analogous system, would, beyond any doubt, reconcile the interests which, now in antagonism, are waging a fratricidal and fatal war. But we fear that, in the eyes of power, the prosperity of seven departments, the welfare of a large portion of the working class, the revival of the colonies,—all these grand national advantages disappear before a question of revenue, and, above all, of complaisance towards foreigners.

There was a time when men, perhaps over-systematic, but honourable no doubt, said: "Let the colonies perish, rather than a principle!" Now, it is said: "Let colonies, industry, principles perish, provided the receipt of the treasury is not a centime less than it used to be."*

	Francs.
* Definitive budgets from 1830 to 1839	2,683,648,944
Provisional ditto from 1840 to 1843	1,120,955,459
Total . . .	3,804,604,403

Meanwhile France has a right to demand from those who have ruled her for twelve years, one of two things—peace or war. Either war with all its chances, or peace with all its benefits. Now the chief advantage of peace is to have low taxes, and to employ the resources of the country in giving great activity to industrial and commercial relations, and to the communications of men with one another. If we are at peace, why have we spent, since 1830, nearly four milliards * in training the *élite* of the population in the profession of arms, without advantage to any one? or, if war threatens us, why not employ these men and these millions in causing respect for France?

If we have peace, why destroy a flourishing industry to increase the revenues of the treasury by seven or eight millions, whilst on the other hand we maintain an army dearer than that which conquered at Eckmuhl and at Wagram? † and why sacrifice three hundred millions on the fortification of Paris? Why, in a word, be so prodigal on the one hand, and so avaricious on the other?

It seems as though for the last twelve years we have been setting ourselves the task of preventing any firm and befitting posture abroad, by exhibiting a fear of war; and of preventing, in their turn, in the interior, all the grand projects which peace protects and develops, under the pretext of a pending war.

Thus, throughout, there is flagrant contradiction between

* In how admirable a position would not France have been if she had employed half this sum, that is to say, nearly two milliards, in the improvement of agriculture, in the encouragement of industry, or in the creation of new paths of communication.

† The French army, in 1809, 736,000 men strong, cost 320,000,000 francs, even counting the Imperial Guard. In 1840, the army, 500,000 men strong, cost 367,233,184 francs. The central administration of this army cost, in 1809, 5,017,194 francs. The central war administration cost, in 1840, 6,838,776 francs.

words and deeds. They would put down, they say, French industry for the benefit of our shipping and of the colonies, and they abandon the honour and interests of our shipping by adhesion to the Right of Search, and they will ruin the colonies by the emancipation of the slaves!

This abandonment of all system, this confusion of all notions of just and unjust, arise from the contempt into which the eternal principles have fallen upon which are based the life and wealth of nations. They wanted to divide that which is indivisible, putting on one side the material interests, on the other the moral wants, of the nation, as if the effect could be separated from the cause; as if the body could direct itself and prosper without the soul, which is its essential guide. For a people, honour, for an individual, evangelical morality, are ever the best guides and the best counsellors amid the embarrassments and perils of life.

Honour shows to a people the path they must pursue, and it may almost always be rendered into positive and palpable advantages in questions of tariff.

Is not the example of the years that have just passed by, sufficient to convince us of this truth? Under the pretence of encouraging and developing material interests, honourable policy has been abandoned, and the immediate consequences of this system have been the establishment of the Prussian duties, which exclude our commerce from the East and the North of Europe. The Confederation of the Rhine has withdrawn itself from our influence, and rejected our products. Soon, we shall no longer supply, even to our intimate and faithful ally, Switzerland, the two principal elements of our exchange, salt and sugar.

England, for the last twelve years, has inundated us with her linens, without lowering the duties on our wines, that chief product of the French soil. Spain augments her tariffs to

restrict our exports, and gives herself up to England, because she knows that she cannot rely on the alliance of France. Lastly, America, to whom we have benevolently given twenty-five millions, has increased the duties on our products. The French influence seemed to disappear from the other side of the Atlantic on the day when the treaty of commerce made by the Emperor Napoleon in favour of our southern wines came to an end.

Let us not, then, separate honour from material interests; let us not build false systems of commercial prosperity on the ruin of a flourishing and national industry. Let us not forget that maxim of Montesquieu: "*Injustice and cowardice are bad managers.*"

As to the native industry, let it raise its head: its enemies will hesitate before they give it the last blow. The Chambers, we hope, will cover it with their protecting votes, and that daughter of the Empire will return to life, if instead of abandoning herself and seeking alms, she proudly vindicates her rights, and replies to her adversaries: "*Respect me, for I enrich the soil, I fertilize lands which without me would remain uncultivated; I employ hands which without me would remain idle. In a word, I resolve one of the greatest problems of modern society—I organize and moralize labour.*"

SUGARS.—TABLE A.

YEARS.	SUGARS IMPORTED AND MANUFACTURED.				SUGARS ON WHICH DUTY HAS BEEN PAID.		SUGARS RE-EXPORTED.		Net Profit to the Revenue from the Importation of Sugar.		Average price of the Sugar called Good Fourths.		Home consumption.
		Colonial.		Foreign.	Native.	From the French Colonies.	From Foreign Colonies.	Out of Bond as imported.	From the Interior in a refined state.				
	Average of five years.	kilogr.		kilogr.	kilogr.	kilogr.	kilogr.	kilogr.	kilogr.	Average of five years.	francs.	fr.	c.	kilogr.
1826	75,448,429	73,266,291		9,677,915	1,500,000	69,315,681	2,148,235	7,557,426	4,744,000	26,877,602	31,273,444	74	00	68,219,916
1827		65,828,406		12,128,244	2,200,000	59,573,255	944,376	9,230,457	6,528,700		24,036,453	78	50	55,988,931
1828		78,474,978		8,715,216	2,685,000	70,922,969	679,887	9,550,853	6,815,900		28,774,618	77	32	67,471,956
1829		80,996,914		11,694,918	4,380,000	74,010,058	529,094	7,791,319	9,536,400		27,657,989	73	20	69,382,752
1830		78,675,558		10,601,893	7,000,000	68,884,944	776,866	9,663,618	12,028,300		22,645,507	71	58	64,633,510
1831	81,615,295	87,872,404		9,584,928	9,600,000	81,289,571	445,803	10,700,815	3,827,200	26,391,831	27,131,488	65	45	76,908,174
1832		77,307,799		3,439,624	12,000,000	82,247,661	346,543	6,292,855	22,111,600		20,485,620	68	43	72,482,604
1833		75,597,243		6,107,800	20,000,000	69,918,686	1,588,176	4,322,241	15,007,200		21,631,552	68	50	76,499,662
1834		83,049,141		12,080,451	30,000,000	66,473,430	4,366,804	5,109,790	3,923,100		31,729,750	66	50	96,919,134
1835		84,249,890		10,434,289	40,000,000	69,339,548	3,292,480	12,497,403	5,999,800		30,995,748	63	79	106,632,228
1836	79,212,596	79,326,022		9,461,555	48,968,805	66,188,958	1,012,833	11,957,099	10,605,100	*28,388,711	26,638,686	65	00	105,565,496
1837		66,535,563		10,618,467	49,226,091	66,489,668	3,342,966	7,978,433	5,901,600		30,731,513	61	50	113,157,125
1838		86,992,808		12,389,707	39,199,408	68,146,685	3,309,480	18,141,320	7,454,200		29,564,724	57	50	103,201,173
1839		87,664,893		6,396,818	22,748,957	71,613,062	655,340	14,771,577	9,218,300		24,844,110	55	03	85,799,059
1840		75,543,696		17,355,299	26,959,897	78,445,086	6,666,360	6,406,920	4,902,400		30,164,526	64	00	112,051,343
1841		85,850,823		21,511,816	30,493,624	74,514,503	12,042,268	6,310,906	10,808,500		35,096,627	58	50	106,241,895

* We must add to the net profit of the Exchequer the duties paid by beetroot sugar, which amounted, in 1838, to 707,792 francs; in 1839, to 3,372,904 francs; in 1841, to 4,557,434 francs; and in 1841, to 4,854,085 francs. Adding the three first figures to the corresponding years above, we have, as the last quinquennial average of the net profit to the Exchequer, the sum of 30,116,355 francs.

NOTE.—The figures contained in this table are all official. The native production is approximatively given, up to 1835, because, till that epoch, it was free from tax, and, consequently, not susceptible of exact returns; but, since 1838, the figures above given are extracted from documents furnished by the Board of Indirect Taxes. The figures indicating the quantities of sugar re-exported in a refined state, express the quantities of the sugars in a raw state; in order to ascertain the corresponding quantities of the refined sugar, we must divide the quantities given by the allowance for waste—75 or 70, and multiply the quotient of that division by 100. The home consumption is thus calculated: we add together the sugars that have paid duty, both colonial and foreign, and the home production, and deduct from the total the quantity of sugar exported after being refined. To arrive at the actual consumption, we must add to the above figures the quantity of beetroot sugar that escapes the tax, and the quantity of potato sugar that is produced, and which has been estimated at from three to four millions of kilogrammes per annum.

COURSE OF THE SHIPPING BETWEEN FRANCE AND HER FOUR COLONIES, AND OF HER GENERAL SHIPPING.

TABLE B.

(Official figures, derived from the Custom House Returns.)

Years.	Colonial Sugars.												General Navigation.	
	Martinique.		Guadeloupe.		Bourbon.		Cayenne.		Total.					
	Imports and Exports.		Imports and Exports.		Imports and Exports.		Imports and Exports.		Imports and Exports.					
	Average of five years.	shipping.	Average of five years.	tonnage.	Average of five years.	shipping.	Average of five years.	tonnage.	Average of five years.	shipping.	Average of five years.	tonnage.	Average of five years.	tonnage.
1831	269	290	69,204	76,003	339	389	85,610	95,395	137	112	42,318	33,437	42	50	8,031	8,514	788	841	205,164	213,349	1,957,000	1,568,000
1832		284		73,449		354		87,276		132		41,151		45		8,208		815		210,084		2,024,000
1833		212		54,257		280		70,821		135		42,421		40		7,736		667		175,235		1,881,000
1834		279		71,435		335		88,368		149		46,496		33		6,594		796		212,893		2,133,000
1835		283		70,879		337		86,191		157		48,088		45		9,103		822		214,261		2,183,000
1836	247	240	64,576	63,142	290	319	77,678	85,872	150	146	49,646	44,842	51	57	10,947	12,525	739	762	202,848	206,381	3,017,000	2,499,000
1837		236		60,703		245		63,579		156		50,659		50		11,085		687		186,026		2,608,000
*1838		258		70,152		291		80,986		172		61,118		51		11,889		772		224,145		3,281,800
1839		260		67,899		316		82,953		146		47,839		44		9,375		766		208,066		3,369,000
1840		242		60,985		282		75,004		133		43,772		53		9,865		710		189,626		3,530,000
1841		261		71,386		319		85,493		193		63,122 *		53		10,067		826		230,068		3,355,800

* From 1838 the official valuation of the tonnage has been reduced about 15 per cent.; but in this Table we have retained the old calculation, in order to present a fairer comparison with preceding years.

VALUE OF THE COMMERCE OF FRANCE WITH HER FOUR SUGAR COLONIES.

TABLE C.

(Official figures, derived from the Custom House Returns.)

Years.	Importations into France from										Exportations from France to										Importations and Exportations. Total.	
	Martinique.		Guadeloupe.		Bourbon.		Cayenne.		Total.		Martinique.		Guadeloupe.		Bourbon.		Cayenne.		Total.			
	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.	Average of five years.	francs.
1831		18,992,039		26,183,619		15,003,276		2,426,758		62,605,692		12,637,930		12,143,453		3,715,508		1,736,792		30,233,683		92,839,375
1832	16,726,396	16,403,337	25,801,243	23,366,978	16,157,597	14,911,218	2,312,802	2,000,528	58,988,354	56,682,661	15,502,102	21,259,168	15,648,270	22,908,491	6,593,511	5,537,403	2,044,065	2,027,046	39,787,748	51,732,108	98,775,786	108,414,769
1833		14,761,803		21,161,430		16,178,236		2,157,740		54,259,209		12,438,288		12,296,101		7,020,561		2,272,611		34,057,561		88,286,770
1834		17,230,360		24,556,013		46,313,882		2,249,732		60,349,987		14,464,877		14,584,955		8,743,725		2,156,572		39,750,129		100,100,116
1835		16,244,440		23,738,175		18,380,773		2,679,254		61,042,642		16,710,248		16,508,352		7,949,356		2,027,305		43,195,261		104,237,903
1836		15,428,532		23,641,254		16,134,257		3,051,555		58,255,598		15,655,825		20,203,758		7,569,044		2,758,345		46,186,972		104,442,570
1837	16,002,086	13,428,410	21,728,746	17,236,252	18,085,640	15,453,411	3,019,381	2,762,054	58,836,038	48,880,127	17,180,124	17,307,861	16,875,647	17,614,966	10,775,732	10,776,198	2,919,915	3,098,441	47,751,420	47,797,469	106,587,775	97,677,596
1838		17,112,402		21,511,860		21,120,609		2,734,991		62,479,862		15,594,485		15,192,701		13,745,876		3,417,307		47,950,369		110,430,231
1839		18,650,715		25,021,860		21,234,453		2,905,471		65,712,499		16,387,523		14,359,977		11,686,629		2,682,273		45,316,407		114,028,006
1840		15,390,374		20,332,506		16,485,470		3,645,336		55,853,686		20,954,924		16,806,836		10,100,917		2,843,212		50,505,886		106,359,572
1841		16,664,123		20,445,380		22,045,411		3,438,244		60,593,158		18,330,403		17,377,412		16,012,379		2,507,513		54,227,702		114,820,800

EXTINCTION OF PAUPERISM.

1844.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

THE idea suggested in the Essay upon the Extinction of Pauperism, is, in the first instance, that of associating the unemployed labourers of the community in the cultivation of the waste lands of the state and the communes, upon a sort of joint-stock principle, the lands so occupied being formed into agricultural colonies. It is further proposed, so far to engage the services of those associated in this manner, that such members of the association as may be found capable of working in particular trades should be delegated to them. In other words, the author proposes to form a joint-stock company out of unemployed hands, for the general advantage of the association, all members being liable to be employed in such branches of industry as the directors may consider most advantageous for the general community, and upon such terms as may be deemed equitable.

He proposes, further, to retain a reserve fund, to be applied in the form of *bonuses*, or improved shares, to those who shall have been, for a series of years, deserving members of the association.

It will be apparent that this project is only a modification of the principles of Socialism or of Communism (we are hardly clear which is which), and as such repugnant to all sound principles of political economy, and the dictates of common sense; the conditions necessarily requiring that the most skilful and successful labourers should gain no more than the average of the community, sacrificing the balance for the general advantage, in which would equally participate the least skilled and the least productive members.

The scheme is also subversive of the acknowledged principles of commercial enterprise, by requiring, in the first instance, the investment of a large amount of the public revenue, produced by taxation of the general community, for the employment of its least profitable members, and without any of the guarantees for economic and profitable employment usually attributable to free commercial undertakings.

It would be a vain labour to discuss in detail all the fallacies which are apparent upon the face of this work; we have pointed them out very generally: we will only add that, considering the views here advocated by the writer, it is certainly a remarkable inconsistency to find him, within half-a-dozen years afterwards, putting himself forward as one engaged upon a "mission" against Socialism.

Such, however, are the plausible generalities, such the frauds, by which unscrupulous persons delude public opinion and achieve a temporary power.

PREFACE.

I MUST commence by a few words in explanation of the title of this pamphlet.

It will, perhaps, be thought, as a distinguished literary character has already observed, that the words, Extinction of Pauperism, do not directly apply to a work, whose only object is the welfare of the working classes.

It is true that there is a great difference between the misery which arises from the necessary stagnation of labour, and pauperism, which is frequently the result of vice. However, it may be asserted that the one is the immediate consequence of the other; for if ease, instruction, and morality, are disseminated among the working classes, which are the most numerous body, pauperism is extirpated, if not entirely, at least in a great measure.

Thus, in proposing a method which would have the power of initiating the multitude in all the advantages of civilization, it would stop the sources of ignorance, vice, and wretchedness. I think then I may, without arrogance, affix to my work the title of "Extinction of Pauperism."

I give my reflections to the public, in the hope, that if they are developed and put into practice, they may tend to the relief of mankind.

It is natural for the unfortunate to think of those who suffer.

LOUIS-NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

Fortress of Ham, May 1844.

EXTINCTION OF PAUPERISM.

CHAPTER I.

THE riches of a country depend on the prosperity of agriculture and industry, on the development of commerce at home and abroad, and on the just and equitable division of the public revenues. There is not one of these different elements of prosperity which is not undermined in France by organic vices in our social position. All men of independent minds acknowledge this, they only differ as to the remedies to be applied.

AGRICULTURE.

It is proved that the extreme division of properties tends to the ruin of agriculture, and yet the re-establishment of the law of birthright, which maintained the large properties, and was in favour of a high state of culture, is impossible. We must even congratulate ourselves in a political point of view that it is so.

INDUSTRY.

This source of wealth has now neither rule, nor organization, nor aim. It is an engine which works without a regulator; it little signifies the human force it employs, crushing men and materials equally under its wheels; it depopulates the country; conglomerates the people into small spaces without room to breathe; weakens the mind as well as the body; and afterwards throws these men on the world, when

she no longer requires them, men who have sacrificed their strength, their youth, and their existence in her service. Industry devours her children and lives only by their destruction—she is the true Saturn of labour.

Must we then, to remedy these defects, place her under a yoke of iron, rob her of this liberty which is her sole existence, in a word, kill her because she is a murderess without profiting by the immense benefits she offers? We think it is sufficient to cure those she has wounded, and to protect her from wounds.

But it is urgent to do so, for society is not a fictitious being, but a body composed of flesh and blood and bone, which can only prosper when all the component parts are in perfect health.

An efficacious remedy is required for the evils of industry; the general good of the country, the voice of humanity, the interest even of the government, demand it imperatively.

INTERIOR COMMERCE.

The interior commerce suffers, because industry, producing too much in comparison of the small retribution she gives to labour, and agriculture not producing enough, the nation being composed of men who produce, who cannot sell, and famished consumers who cannot buy, the want of equilibrium of the situation obliges the government here, as in England, to seek in China for some thousands of consumers in presence of millions of French or English who are destitute of everything, and who, if they could purchase food and suitable clothing, would create a far greater commercial movement than the most advantageous treaties.

EXTERIOR COMMERCE.

The causes which paralyze our export trade from France are too closely allied with politics for us to speak of them here;

suffice it to say, that the quantity of merchandize a country exports is always in direct proportion to the number of bullets she can send amongst her enemies when her honour and dignity demand it. The events which have lately passed in China are a proof of this assertion.

We will now speak of taxation.

TAXES.

There are few countries in Europe so highly taxed as France; she would be, perhaps, the richest country in the world if the public fortune was directed in a more equitable manner.

Raising taxes may be compared to the influence of the sun, which draws up the vapours from the earth to scatter them afterwards in showers over every place which requires rain to render it fertile and productive. When this restitution takes place regularly, fertility ensues, but when heaven in its wrath pours it out partially in storms, waterspouts, and in tempests, the germs of production are destroyed and barrenness ensues, because some receive far too much and others not enough. Yet, whatever may have been the genial or ungenial state of the atmosphere, generally at the end of each year the same quantity of water has been taken up and given back. The division, then, makes the difference; when it is equitable and regular, it creates abundance — when lavish and partial, it is followed by scarcity.

The effects are the same of a good or badg overnment. If the sums raised every year on the generality of the inhabitants are employed for unproductive purposes, as in creating useless appointments, erecting useless monuments, or keeping up, during a profound peace, a more expensive army than that which conquered Austerlitz, taxation in this case becomes an insupportable burthen ; it exhausts the country,

it absorbs without returning. But if, on the contrary, these resources are employed to create new elements of produce to re-establish the equilibrium of wealth, to destroy poverty by organizing and promoting labour—in fine, to cure the evils that civilization brings with her; then taxation becomes, as was once said by a minister at the tribune, *the best investment* for the public.

It is in the budget that we must seek the first support for every system which has for its object the relief of the working classes. To seek for it elsewhere would be chimerical.

The savings banks are, doubtless, useful institutions for the easy class of workmen; they furnish them with the means of making an advantageous use of their economies and superfluity: but for the most numerous class, which has no superfluity, and consequently no means of putting by anything, this system is useless. To desire to relieve the distress of men who have not the means of existence, by proposing to them to put aside every year *a something* they have not, is an act of heartless derision or an absurdity.

Let us, then, now see what can be done? Our law of the equal division of property is the ruin of agriculture. We must remedy this defect by an association which, whilst employing all the unoccupied hands, will regenerate large properties and put them under culture, without injuring our political principles.

Industry daily calls men into cities and enervates them. We must recal the overplus of the cities into the country, and renovate their minds and bodies by the fresh air.

The working classes possess nothing; we must make them landholders. Their only fortunes are the sinews of their arms; we must give these arms an employment which will be useful to all. They are as a tribe of Iliotes in the midst of a tribe of Sybarites. We must give them a place

in society, and attach their interests to the soil. They are now without organization and without ties, without rights and without a future; we must give them rights and a future, and raise them in their own good opinion by promoting association, education, and good order.

CHAPTER II.

PROPOSITION.

THREE things are necessary for the accomplishment of a project so worthy of the democratic and philanthropic spirit of the age, so essential to the general welfare, and so necessary for the tranquillity, of society.

I. A Law. II. An Investment of Funds taken from the Budget. III. An Organization.

I. THE LAW.

There are 9,190,000 hectares of uncultivated land in France, according to the official statistical accounts, which belong either to the government, to corporations, or to private individuals. The lands, heaths, commons, and pastures, yield a very trifling revenue—about eight francs a hectare. It is a dead capital, which is of no profit to any one. Let the Chambers decree that all these uncultivated lands belong by right to the workmen's association, on paying annually to the actual proprietors what these now get for them. Let them give these unemployed lands to the hands which are also unoccupied, and these two unproductive capitals will be regenerated by each other; we have found means of relieving distress and enriching the country. That we may not be accused of exaggeration, we will suppose that two-thirds of these nine millions of hectares may be given to the association, and that the other third, either cannot be cultivated, or is occupied by buildings, canals,

rivulets, &c.; there would then remain 6,127,000 hectares to cultivate. This scheme would be carried out by the creation of agricultural colonies, which, established throughout France, should form the basis of one vast organization, of which the poor workmen should be members, without being personally proprietors.

II. THE INVESTMENT OF FUNDS.

The necessary advancements for creating these establishments must be furnished by government. According to our calculations this sacrifice would amount to nearly 300 millions, to be paid in four years; for at the expiration of that period these colonies would already be profitable, as well as having supported a large number of workmen. After ten years the government might raise a ground-rent of about eight millions, without reckoning the increase of the indirect taxes, the receipts from which must always increase with increased consumption.

This advance of 300 millions would not then be a loss, but would be a *magnificent investment.* And could the government, after reflecting on the grandeur of the object, refuse this advance, when it annually expends 46 millions* to prevent or punish attacks on property, when it sacrifices any year 300 millions to teach the country the art of warfare, and when it has just proposed a grant of 120 millions to construct new prisons?—refuse this small advance in a country which gave 2000 millions to the foreigners who

* *The Budget of* 1843:—

Expenses of criminal or correctional justice . .	4,149,400
Gendarmerie and sergeants of the city	19,703,782
Commissioners and agents	1,032,000
Superior administration of the police of safety .	97,800
Houses of detention transporting the condemned .	6,280,000
The galleys	5,728,550
The country guards paid by the communes . . .	9,000,000
Total . .	46,111,551

invaded France, and 1000 millions to the emigrants; which, without any ground for alarm, spent 200 or 300 millions on the fortifications of Paris—would that country hesitate to pay 300 millions in four years to extirpate pauperism, to free the corporations of the heavy burthen this misery lays on them; in fine, to augment the territorial riches by more than 2000 millions?

III. THE ORGANIZATION.

Multitudes without organization are as nothing; when disciplined, they are everything; without organization they can neither express themselves nor be understood; they can neither listen nor receive a common impulse.

On one side, the voices of 20 millions of men, disseminated over a vast territory, is lost without an echo, and on the other there is no voice strong and persuasive enough to go from one central point to convey to 20 millions of consciences, without *acknowledged intermediators*, the (always severe) doctrines of power.

Now the reign of castes is over, multitudes are to be governed; they must therefore be organized, to be enabled to express their wishes, and disciplined, that they may be directed and enlightened for their own advantage.

Ruling a nation by force and violence is not governing it; government consists in leading a people to a brighter future, by making an appeal to their reason and their good feelings.

But as the multitude require to be instructed and rendered moral, and the government, in return, requires to be restrained and even enlightened upon the interests of the majority, it is imperatively necessary that there should be two equally powerful movements in the people—an action of power on the multitude, and a re-action from the multitude upon power. Now these two influences cannot work without clashing, except through the mediation of men

who command both the faith and confidence of those they represent, and the confidence of those who govern. These mediators will have the confidence of the first when they are freely elected by them: they will merit the confidence of the second when they fill so important a place in society, for in general, man becomes what the function he fulfils obliges him to be.

Guided by these considerations, we would have an intermediary class created between the workmen and their employers, enjoying privileges legally acknowledged, and elected by all the workmen. This intermediary class should be composed of men of integrity.

We would wish that all the workmen should assemble annually in the corporations, to elect their representatives, in the proportion of one middle man of known probity to ten of the workmen. Good conduct alone should be the title to eligibility. Each head of a manufactory or farm, &c., should be obliged by law to employ a middle man, if he have ten workmen, to guide them, and to give him a salary double the amount of that he pays his workmen. These middle men should fill the same part that the non-commissioned officers do in the army. They should form the first step of social hierarchy, by stimulating the laudable ambition of all, in showing them a reward easy of attainment. Raised in their own estimation by the very duties they would have to perform, they must necessarily set a good example. By these means each ten workmen would be endowed with a germ of improvement. The best method of improving mankind is always to set before them an object which is honourable and respected.

The impulsion to be given to the multitude by enlightening them, and teaching them to speak and act, becomes simplified in the proportion of 10 to 1. Supposing that there are 25 millions of men who live from day to day by their

labour, we shall have two millions and a half of middle men, to whom they can speak unreservedly, as they at once participate in the interests of those who obey, and the ideas of those who command.

These middle-men should be divided into two classes: one should remain in private industry; the other should be employed in the agricultural establishments; and, we repeat it, this different mission should be the result of the right of direct election given to the workmen.

CHAPTER III.

THE AGRICULTURAL COLONIES.

We will suppose that the three preceding measures are adopted.

The 25 millions of workmen have their representatives, and a quarter of the arable lands of France becomes their property.*

In each department, such more especially where the uncultivated lands most abound, a number of colonies will spring up, offering food, education, religion, and labour to all those who are in want of them; and God knows the number of such in France is extensive enough!

These charitable institutions, surrounded by a selfish world, given up to the feudal system of property, must produce the same beneficial effects as the monasteries, which, in the middle ages, collected, among the depths of the forest, soldiers and serfs, the germs of literature, of peace, and of civilization.

* We have supposed that the workmen's association would only at first farm the lands, since it would pay the present proprietors the trifling revenue which they would draw from uncultivated lands and the corporations, but by degrees they would purchase and become the sole proprietors.

The association being one for the whole of France, the unequal portioning of the uncultivated districts, and even the small portion of lands in certain districts, would not be an obstacle. The poor families in a department who were not possessors, according to the principles of the agricultural colony,* would go to the nearest establishment, the great benefit of the partnership being primarily to dispense assistance equally,—to relieve all the poor without being stopped by the consideration which now is an excuse for all want of pity: *He is not of my commune.*

The agricultural colonies would have two objects to fulfil; the first, of affording food to a great many poor families, by making them cultivate the land, and take care of the animals, &c.; the second, to offer a temporary asylum to that floating multitude of workmen to whom the prosperity of industry gives a feverish activity, and who are thrown into poverty when there is a stagnation of business, or when the establishment of new machinery plunges them into the depth of misery.

All the poor, all individuals without work, would find that in these places they may derive advantage from applying their strength and their intelligence to the benefit of the whole community.

Then there would be in these colonies, beyond the number of men co-operating, women and children to do the work of the farms, and many workmen constantly employed, either in clearing new land or in building new establishments for the old and infirm. The advances made to the association, or its ulterior advantages, would allow of

* We say, according to the principles, because, as soon as the association was on the road to prosperity, it would be its interest to establish agricultural colonies in every department, either for clearing the uncultivated lands, or for purchasing ground from which private industry does not derive great advantage, but which a company might turn to good account.

its employing considerable capital yearly for these productive expenses.

When private industry requires help, she will always come to ask for it at these central establishments, which, in truth, will always give remunerative wages; for it is evident that the workman, certain of finding a regular existence in the farming districts, will not accept employment from private industry unless he is certain of obtaining a return which will give him the means of more than the common necessaries of life, which were always procurable from the general association.

To stimulate these exchanges, as well as to excite the emulation of the labourers, a sum should be reserved out of the profits of each establishment for the purpose of creating a separate sum for each workman. These funds would constitute a real savings bank, which will deliver a share or *bonus* to each workman on his departure, above his pay; and the amount of which would be regulated according to his good behaviour and the length of his service. So that the labourer might, by means of this individual sum, amass in course of years what would suffice to insure his comfort for the remainder of his life, even out of the colony.

We will have recourse to a simile to explain our system more clearly. When a large stream runs through a country, it is a source of general prosperity; but sometimes the too great abundance of its waters, sometimes their great scarcity, produces inundation or drought. What is done to remedy these two evils? We will take the Nile as an example, where large basins are dug, to disperse the water when there is too much, and to retain it during periods of scarcity; and by this means the banks are rendered fertile by the constant equality of the water. This is what we would propose for the working classes: a stream of wealth, which may be made either a source of

ruin or fertility, according to the way its course may be directed. We ask for large asylums for the floating multitudes of workmen, where pains will be taken to develop their strength as well as their minds; asylums which, when the general activity of the country is on the wane, will preserve the surplus of the unemployed forces, to restore them later by degrees to the general movement. We ask for real drains for the population reservoirs, useful to labour, which will always maintain at an equal height that level of divine justice, which has ordained that the sweat of a poor man's brow shall receive its just reward. The middlemen or representatives of the workmen, shall regulate this constant change. The middle-men of private industry, acquainted with all the wants of their subordinates, shall share with the mayors of the corporations the right of sending those to the farming colonies whom they cannot employ. The middle-men of the colonies, knowing the capacity of each person, shall try to place advantageously in private industry, as many as it really requires. Some practical inconvenience may, perhaps, arise from this exchange, but what institution in the world is free from that in the commencement? It will have the incalculable advantage of multiplying the instruction of the people, of giving it healthful labour, and of teaching it agriculture; it will render the system general which has been already introduced in the instances of beetroot sugar and silk, of making the workmen pass alternately from the workshops to the fields. The middle-men will be one in ten, as in private industry. Above the middle-men, there will be directors employed to teach the cultivation of lands. These directors will be elected by the workmen and middle-men united. To render them eligible, proofs will be required of their special knowledge of agriculture. Then, above these workmen, middle-men, and directors, there will be a governor

to each colony: this governor will be chosen by the middle-men and directors.

The administration will be formed of the governor and a committee formed of a third of the directors and two-thirds of the middle-men. The accounts will be printed annually, communicated to the general assembly of the workmen, and submitted to the council-general of the department, who will audit them; and will have the power of dismissing the middle-men or directors, if they have shown incapacity. Every year the governors of the colonies will go to Paris, and there, under the presidence of the minister of the interior, they will discuss the best use to be made of the annual profits, for the advantage of the general association.

Every beginning is laborious; so I have not been able to devise the means of creating these farming colonies economically, except by establishing a species of camp, where the workmen will be lodged, as our troops are, during the early periods. It is unnecessary to say, that the moment the receipts surpass the expenses, these barracks will be replaced by healthy dwellings, built after a well-digested plan; afterwards, additional buildings will be constructed, to afford the members of the colony and the children civil and religious instruction.

Moreover, extensive hospitals will be constructed for the infirm, and for those whose age disables them from work.

Strict discipline will be maintained in these colonies; the life shall be salutary, but rough: for the object is not to feed the idle, but to ennoble man by healthy and remunerative labour, and by a moral education. The labourers and families occupied in these colonies shall be kept in as simple a manner as can be. The lodging, the pay, and the food, shall be regulated according to the tariff of the army; for military

organization is the only one based at once on considerations of the welfare of all its members, and the strictest economy.

Yet these establishments should have nothing military in their character :—they should only borrow from the army its admirable organization, and nothing more.

The army is simply an *organization*—the working class would form an *association;* these two bodies would, therefore, have a different principle and object.

The army is an organization which, as it must blindly and instantly execute the orders of its chiefs, should be based on a hierarchy which depends upon the head of the state.

The labourers' class forming an association whose chiefs would only have to regulate and carry out the general will, its hierarchy must be the result of election. What we propose has not, therefore, anything to do with military colonies.

In order to render this system more palpable, we will draw up a sketch of the probable receipts and expenses of a farming colony. These calculations are based on official figures; yet the reader will understand the difficulty of settling a budget of this nature. There is nothing more inexact than calculations of the money value of agricultural produce. We do not pretend to have foreseen everything. "The best precaution," says Montesquieu, "is to think that we cannot foresee everything." But if our figures will admit of many interpretations, it is not so with the system itself. It is possible that, notwithstanding all the care we have employed in framing our estimates, we may have omitted some expenses, or even some receipts, or else reckoned the returns of the land at too high a price; but these omissions will not injure the fundamental idea, which we consider to be just, true, and productive of good results; the following simple reasoning will prove it :—

Ordinarily the revenues of land are divided into three

ports the labourers who till the earth, the second is the property of the farmer, the third enriches the proprietor.

In our model farms the working men will alone have all these three shares: their advantages will be immense, as they will at once be labourers, farmers, and proprietors; and it is known that in a well-established association the expenses are always less than in a private undertaking. The first will support a great many poor families in humble comforts; the second part will go to establish the individual improved shares; — or *bonuses* of which we have spoken; the third part will afford the means not only of building alms-houses, but of constantly increasing the capital *by purchasing other lands.*

This is one of the great advantages of our project, for every system which does not contain within itself a means of continual increase is defective. It may produce good results for a time, but when the effect it was to produce is realized, the uneasiness it intended to destroy is renewed —it is as if nothing had been done. The poor-laws and workhouses in England afford an example of this.

Here, on the contrary, when the farming properties shall be making a good return, they shall always have the power of extending their domain, of multiplying their establishments, and of adding new labourers. The only circumstance which could for a short time interfere with this increase would be that of private industry requiring labourers, being able to employ them more advantageously; but then the cultivated lands would not be abandoned; the surplus hands of the working class would return to the public domain until fresh stagnation sent them again to the farming colonies.

So, while on one hand the general law exists for equally dividing properties and subdividing them from day to day, the working establishments would reconstruct large properties and extended schemes of cultivation.

While industry attracts the population to the towns, the colonies call them back into the country. When there is no longer any land sufficiently low-priced in France, the association will establish branch societies in Algeria, and even in America. It may one day invade the world, for wherever there may be a hectare of uncultivated land, and a poor person to feed, it will repair thither with its capital, its army of labourers, and its unceasing activity.

And should we be accused of dreaming of an imaginary good, we need only recall the example of the celebrated English company of the East Indies. What was that but an association such as we propose, but whose results, however astonishing, were not as favourable to the cause of humanity as the one we ardently invoke.

Before we dive so deep into futurity, we will calculate the receipts and the probable expenses of these establishments.

CHAPTER IV.

RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES.

ACCORDING to our ideas, the working association would have to clear the two-thirds of 9,190,000 hectares of land now uncultivated, that is, 6,127,000 hectares.

In order to ascertain how much these hectares would return, if put into high cultivation without fallow land, we have made the following calculations:—

The number of cultivated hectares in France is . .	19,314,741
That of the natural as well as artificial meadows . .	5,774,745
Total extent in hectares	25,089,486

The value of the raw produce of these hectares is—

For the cultivated land	3,479,583,005fr.
For the meadows	666,363,412
Total produce	4,145,946,417

The average produce by a hectare of land, sown or put into meadows, is about 165 francs.

On the other side, there are in France 51,568,845 domestic animals, which give a rough produce of 767,251,851 francs. One with the other, then, each head of cattle produces 15 francs; and as these cattle are fed on about 26 millions of hectares, that makes about two heads of cattle per hectare. On an average, it may be said, that each hectare produces 195 francs, of which, 165 francs are the revenue of the land, and 30 francs for the revenue of the cattle.

Our 6,127,000 hectares, put into cultivation and meadows, will then produce—

For the rough produce of the earth	1,010,955,000fr.
And for the produce of the animals	183,810,000
Total	1,194,765,000

We will explain later why we do not include in the rough produce of the cattle the value of the meat consumed. Deducting from this figure what these hectares now produce, according to the statistics, that is to say, two-thirds of 54,709,364, the territorial wealth will have increased by 1,140,055,363 francs.

Let us now see what will be the outlay. To facilitate our calculations, let us imagine that the lands to be cultivated were equally divided over the several political divisions of France. We shall have 6,127,000 hectares to divide by 86, which will give us 71,241 hectares in each department. In fixing a period of twenty years, at the end of which all the lands should be put in cultivation, there would be annually in each department 3562 hectares to clear.

The number of hands necessary for this labour may be reckoned thus:—A labourer clears on an average* three

* According to the information we have received, a man clears two hectares of wood a year, or four hectares of brushwood; the average

hectares a year; but as the sick must be counted, and as the second year the labourers are obliged to give a part of their attention to the culture of the already cleared lands, and to assist the farming families who will be called annually in excess, we will only reckon a labourer as equal to two hectares a year. We will give 1781 labourers to accomplish this task in twenty years, and as each year there would be 3562 hectares cleared, the colony would receive every year 120 families to assist in the culture of the cleared lands,* and to take care of the animals, since we have already reckoned, after the general calculations in France, two animals a year for each hectare. The colony will then purchase annually double the number of cattle they shall have cleared hectares of land, beginning at the close of the first year. Thus, during twenty years, the colony will have receipts and expenses which would follow an increasing ratio.

The receipts, without reckoning the first advances of government, are composed of the periodical increase of 3562 hectares cleared, and of the annual increasing value of these hectares: for even admitting that the lands produce

is then three hectares, in supposing an equal quantity of woods and brush-woods, which is evidently much beyond the reality, since the uncultivated lands which are to be cleared are not comprehended among the forest lands; we might thus take as the average four hectares instead of three.

* A great cultivator, who is well versed in everything relating to agriculture, has had the goodness to furnish us with the following information:—

To cultivate a farm of 150 hectares, according to the ancient system, corn, hay, and fallow land, it requires

Seven men and one female servant all the year round.

Six thrashers for six months.

Four sawyers employed for three months.

Twenty reapers occupied for six weeks.

In the new system, where the fallow land is replaced by weeded plants, it requires an additional man by the year.

In our calculations we have there put a sufficient number of hands.

195 francs each hectare, they would not yield this sum until they had been three years in cultivation, and after four years of labour; that is, the first year after being cleared it would give 65 francs a hectare, the second 130 francs, and 195 francs the succeeding years.

Now, with regard to the expenses, setting aside the first cost of the establishment for the maintenance every year, the expenses would occur of 1781 workmen and 120 families. The interest of the land belonging to the corporations or private individuals, the expenses of the stables, those of the administration, with the purchase of 7124 head of cattle; added to which, there would be a regular annual increase, which would consist in the keep of 120 new families, besides the construction of barracks to lodge them. Each workman would receive the pay of a soldier; each family the pay of three workmen. The dress of a labouring man must be far less expensive than that of a soldier; but we will calculate it at the same rate, that we may not change the established prices. Each man's expenses would then be 318 francs per annum,* including everything.

The middle men would receive the pay of non-commissioned officers, the directors the same as officers, and the governor the pay of a colonel.

Until the colony began to yield some profit, all the labourers would be lodged in barracks, constructed like those in our military encampments. These large and healthy

* The expenses of an infantry soldier are, annually,

The pay at 30 centimes a day . .	francs	109	50 centimes.
General messes	„	86	15 „
Value of labour	„	64	67 80
Clothes	„	34	30 „
Hospital expenses	„	24	13 „
	francs	318	85 80

barracks * generally contain twelve men, but we would only put into them a squadron of ten men, with their middle man, when unmarried; for the married labourer, there would be a family in each barrack, and these barracks would be on a smaller scale.

In several departments there are similar buildings near the manufactories of sugar.

On making the calculations which are at the end of this work, we find that with an advance of 311 millions, the receipts and expenses of the colonies would, at the end of twenty-three years, stand thus:

Receipts	1,194,694,800
Expenses	378,622,278
The profit of the association would be	816,072,522f.,

206,400 families, 153,166 workmen of the poor class would have been fed, clothed, and lodged; France would be enriched by 12 millions of new cattle; and in fine, the government would derive near 37 millions of francs according to the present calculation.

* DIMENSIONS OF BARRACKS.

Depth.	3 m. 90
Length	4 60
Height at the right foot	1 00
Height under the chief rafters	3 30
The walls, mud, and hurdles, in thickness	0 10

To encamp a division of infantry of 10,904 men, it requires 1160 barracks, of the model proposed; one may estimate them at 150,000 francs, the expenses of construction at 12,000 francs, the necessary expenses for keeping them up eight years that they might last. (Aide Memoire du Genie, by Capt. Clusné, page 516.)

CHAPTER V.

CONCLUSION.

In the summary view that we have given of the profitable results of our scheme, we have stated them very far under the reality, for whilst the cultivation of a *quarter* of the domain, which is now barren, would increase the income of France one-fourth part, this increase of money would give an immense impetus to every branch of labour, a fact which is more easily understood than explained in all its bearings. Not only would these colonies prevent, in twenty years, more than a million of souls suffering extreme penury, but they would encourage a thousand branches of industry annexed to agriculture; and this annual sum of 800 millions, exchanged within the country for other productions, would augment consumption and nourish trade in an equal proportion. These profits would offer a more advantageous return for all the fruits of labour than the most advantageous treaties of commerce could; since this annual value of 800 millions exceeds, by 156 millions, the value of all our exports from France, which amounted to 644 millions in the year 1842.

In order to render this truth more ; and to show the great importance of internal commerce, let us suppose that these farming colonies were not in the middle of the country, but separated by an arm of the sea and a line of custom-houses, and that they were still only allowed to have commercial dealings with France. It is clear that if their agricultural productions give them a benefit of 800 millions, that sum would be exchanged for continental produce, either manufactured or grown, of different soils.

We are of opinion that the increase of internal consumption, favoured by this increase of wealth and law, would counteract, more than anything else, the depression of which certain branches of trade complain, and especially that they would partly put a stop to the ills from which the cultivators of vines suffer so essentially, by rendering bread and wine cheaper.

In truth, it is presumable, that from the nature of their soil, these colonies would produce corn and cattle, but not wine. Thus, by increasing the production of corn and cattle, but not of wine, they would lower the price of these articles of necessary use, which would tend to increase their consumption, by permitting the poorer classes to partake of them ; and on another hand, the decrease of poverty would add to the number of those who drink wine, and, consequently, to the general consumption.

It is not difficult to explain, by official calculation, the distress of our vine growers. France produces annually, without reckoning brandy, 36,783,223 hectolitres of wine.

She consumes	23,578,248
She exports	1,351,677
Total of the internal and export consumption	24,929,925

After subtracting this amount from the production, there remains 11,853,298 hectolitres unemployed.

These calculations show the cause of our difficulties, and the means of remedying them ; they prove the superiority of the natural market over that of exportation ; for if by the scheme we have pointed out, the activity given to commerce at home increased the consumption only by one-tenth, which is not improbable, the increase would be of 2,357,824 hectolitres, which is nearly double what we export.

On the other hand, if the policy of our government sup-

ceeded in increasing our exports by one-fifth, which we do not anticipate, this increase would be only of 270,334 hectolitres.

Labour which creates independence, and independence which consumes the articles of existence, are the true causes of a country's prosperity. The first duty of a wise and enlightened ruler is to endeavour, therefore, by the improvement of agriculture, to increase the general consumption at home, which is very far from having arrived at its height. For by the statistics, each inhabitant consumes on an average, of wheat, corn, and rye, 271 hectolitres, which makes 328 rations of bread annually for each person ; 20 kilogrammes (*forty pounds*) of meat ; 70 litres (about 89 quarts) of wine ; of sugar, 3-4 kilogrammes; which proves that, *humanly speaking*, there are several millions of individuals in France who neither eat bread, meat, nor sugar, and who do not drink wine ; for all rich people consume far more than this average ; that is, they consume 365 rations of bread, instead of 328 ; 180 kilogrammes of meat in lieu of 20 kilogrammes ; 365 litres of wine, instead of 70 ; and 20 kilogrammes of sugar, instead of 3 and two-fifths.

Our produce is not too great, but our consumption is not enough !

Instead of going to China, then, to find a market, let the territorial wealth be increased ; let all the idle hands be employed for the benefit of the poor, all trades: or rather, let both work if they can ; but, above all, let it not be forgotten that a country so richly favoured by heaven as France, contains within herself all the elements of wealth ; and let it not be said that, to the disgrace of our civilization in the nineteenth century, at least a tenth part of our population is in rags, and dying from starvation, when there are millions of francs' worth of manufactured produce which cannot find a sale, and millions of the productions of the earth which cannot be consumed.

To conclude: the system that we propose is the result of all the reflections, of all the aspirations evolved by the most competent economists for half a century. In Monsieur Gouins' Report to the king, which is at the head of the official Farming Statistics (page 28), the minister affirms, that one of the greatest improvements to be obtained, would be that of clearing these lands, which only produce eight francs annually a hectare. Our project would realize this idea.

Every man really endowed with love for his fellow creatures is desirous that justice should at length be done to the working classes, which seem deprived of all the advantages which civilization procures. Our project gives them all that improves the condition of man—independence, education and government—and to each, the possibility of raising himself by merit.

Our organization tends to nothing less than converting the poorest class of the present day into one of the richest associations in France.

At present, the reward of labour is a matter of chance if not of oppression. The master oppresses the workman, who revolts. By our method the salaries are fixed, as all human affairs should be regulated, not by force, but by a just equilibrium between the wants of those who work and the requirements of their employers.

Now, everything centres in Paris, which absorbs the whole industry of the country; our system, without injuring the centre, reanimates the extremities, by setting in operation eighty-six new bodies of workmen under the high protection of government, in the hope of constant improvement.

And what is required to realize this project? One year's pay of the army—fifteen times as much as was given to America—a sum equal to that spent in the fortifications of Paris.

This advance would return to France, in twenty years,

the sum of two thousand millions; 800 millions to the working classes, and 37 millions to the treasury!

Let the government put our project into execution, by modifying it with all that men who are versed in such complicated matters can furnish of useful information and new ideas; let the government take a deep interest in all the great national concerns, establish the welfare of the multitude on a firm basis, and its own position will be firm. Poverty will no longer be seditious when opulence is no longer oppressive; opponents will vanish; and the superannuated pretensions which are attributed with or without reason to some individuals, will vanish as the land breeze, which curls the surface of the waters under the equator, ceases in presence of the trade winds, which fill the sails and propel the vessel.

How great and holy is the mission, and how worthy of inspiring man's ambition, that consists in mitigating evil passions, in healing wounds, in calming the sufferings of humanity, in uniting the citizens of one country in a common cause, and in hastening a project which civilization must sooner or later accomplish.

Two centuries ago, La Fontaine uttered a sentence which is too often true, and yet most melancholy and destructive of all society, of all rule, and of all hierarchy.—"I tell you in plain terms, our master is our enemy!" At this period, the object of all enlightened governments should tend by its efforts to hasten the period when men may exclaim—The triumph of Christianity has destroyed slavery—the triumph of the French revolution has put an end to bondage—the triumph of democratic ideas has caused the extinction of pauperism!

EXPLANATORY TABLES.

Calculation of the Expenses and Receipts of a Farming Colony.

End of the First Year.

EXPENSES.			RECEIPTS.	
1781 working men at 218 fr.	566,358			
120 families, a family reckoned as 3 labourers	114,480			
Additional pay of 190 middle-men at 36 fr.	6,340			
19 farm directors, at 1,800 fr.	34,200			
1 governor	6,000			
The medium value of the sowing being 23 fr. 20 c. a hectare	82,638			
Price of 7124 head of cattle, at 36 fr. 20 c.*	257,880			
Stables and granaries	100,000			
Expenses of administration	10,000			
Interest of the price of the land, 3652 hectares	31,807	1,210,212		
162 barracks, for 11 men, at 130 fr.	21,060			
Tools	50,000			
120 men for a family, at 100 fr.	12,000	83,060		
	1,293,272		Gift of government	1,293,270

* We have not included the keep of the animals in the expenses, because their dung and the value of the offal, which amounts yearly to 515,180,518 fr., will more than compensate the expenses of keeping them.

End of the Second Year.

EXPENSES.		RECEIPTS.	
The same expenses as the preceding year .	1,210,242	Gift of the government	1,146,701
Progressive administration each year. 120 new families, 1 director, 12 middlemen	116,812	Revenue of 3,565 hectares at 65 fr. . .	231,530
120 barracks . . .	12,000	168,019	
Interest on new lands	31,807		
Tools	5,000		
New expenses of administration and support . . .	2,500		
	1,378,231		1,378,231

End of the Third Year.

Expenses equal to the preceding year . .	1,378,231	Gift of the government	851,660
Above	168,019	Revenue of 3562 hectares at 130 fr. . .	463,060
		Revenue of 3562 hectares at 65 fr. . . .	231,530
	1,546,250		1,546,250

End of the Fourth Year.

Expenses	1,546,250	Gift from government .	525,089
Surplus	168,019	Revenue of 3562 hectares at 195 fr. . .	694,590
		Revenue of 3562 hectares at 130 fr. . .	463,060
		Revenue of 3562 hectares at 65 fr. . . .	231,530
	1,714,269		1,714,269

End of the Fifth Year.

Expenses	882,288	Revenue of preceding year	1,714,269
		Surplus of regular increase	694,590
Profit	526,571		2,408,859

It is evident that the expenses increasing annually .	fr. 168,019
And the revenues	694,590
At the end of ten years the revenue would be . . .	fr. 5,881,309
The expenses	2,722,383
The profits	3,158,926

The whole of the lands would be cleared in twenty years, but they would not be in full productiveness until the end of the twenty-third year; at this period the expenses, which for several years would have been stationary, would be . . . . . fr. 4,402,573

The revenues would be	13,891,800
The clear benefit of	9,489,227

As we have, for the facility of calculation, reckoned the expenses and receipts for one department, if these are multiplied by 86 we shall have at the end of twenty years the following results for the whole of France.

The government would then have given 311,038,092 in four years, that is—

The first year	fr. 111,221,392
The second year	98,616,286
The third year	73,242,760
The fourth year	27,957,654
Total	311,038,092

The annual receipts would be	fr. 1,194,694,800
The annual expense of these 86 colonies would be .	378,622,278
The profit of the Association . .	816,072,522

206,400 families, 153,166 workmen of the poor class, would be maintained, and France would be enriched by 12 millions of new cattle. Thus the government would receive a revenue, at the present rate of nearly 37 millions of francs, on the ground-rent alone, without counting the tax on the houses, the additional centimes, and the indirect taxes.

TABLES IN PROOF OF CALCULATION, TAKEN FROM THE OFFICIAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS.

THE EXTENT, VALUE, AND PRODUCE OF THE FARMING DOMAIN.

Designation.	Extent of the Culture in hectares.		Value of the Produce in francs.		Value of the Seed sown annually, in francs.
Wheat	5,586,786		1,102,768,057		182,163,337
Corn	4,733		806,723		93,293
Grain	910,932		144,170,723		00,925
Rye	2,577,253		296,296,740		55,279,842
Barley	1,188,189		137,622,411		21,388,838
Oats	3,000,634		302,011,470		43,605,437
Indian corn	631,731	13,900,262	71,796,084		2,282,097
Vines	1,962,340	Wine	410,029,152		.....
		Brandy	59,059,150		.....
Potatoes	921,970		202,100,866		21,696,579
Buck wheat	651,241		61,388,641		3,995,854
Dry vegetables	296,925		52,007,840		8,107,419
Gardens	360,696		157,093,888		.....
Beet-root	57,663		28,979,449		754,687
Colza	173,506		51,126,744		602,813
Flax	176,148		86,287,341		7,487,617
Linseed	98,241		57,507,216		5,217,350
Tobacco	7,955		5,483,558		.....
Madder	14,674		9,343,34		.....
Hops	826		951,559		.....
Chesnut trees	455,386		13,528,190		.....
Mulberry trees	41,276		42,779,088		.....
Olive trees	121,228		22,776,398		.....
Divers cultivations	64,397		12,209,868		.....
		Beer	58,035,735		.....
		Cider	84,422,136		.....
Natural meadows	4,198,198		462,598,243		.....
Artificial meadows	1,576,547		203,765,169		38,303,953
Fallow lands	6,763,281		92,285,902		
Grazing lands, heaths, pasture, and commons	9,191,076		82,064,046	Total, fr.	414,689,744
Woods: Of the crown	52,972		1,047,404		
Woods: Of the state	1,048,907		32,064		
Woods: Of the corporations & private persons	7,333,965	8,804,550	172,861,152		
Forest lands	368,705				
Orchards, nursery grounds, and osieries	766,578				
Surface of the roads, rivers, towns, &c.	2,153,646				
		Total, fr.	4,526,796,890		
Extent of the whole territory in hectares	52,768,617				

The whole extent in cultivation .=19,314,741 hec.
Extent of cultivation and meadows=25,089,406 „
Extent of sown lands . . . .=17,852,499 „
Extent, or nearly so, of grazing lands for the animals . . .=26,000,000 „

NUMBER, VALUE AND PRODUCE OF ANIMALS.

Designation.	Number or quantity.		Value in francs.		Total revenue in francs.	
Bulls	399,026	9,936,538	33,613,999	876,245,753	9,695,577	312,215,607
Oxen	1,968,838		301,819,337		62,576,699	
Cows	3,501,825		487,875,633		214,700,094	
Calves	2,066,849		52,936,763		25,153,237	
Rams	575.715	32,151,430	9,243,405	314,383,257	2,607,790	120,050,413
Sheep	9,462,180		127,862,305		42,233,316	
Ewes	14,804,946		135,938,491		59,925,119	
Lambs	7,308,589		41,339,056		15,284,217	
Pigs	4,910,721		172,556,008		79,427,010	
Goats	964,300		8,851,451		5,448,301	
Horses	1,271,630	2,818,496	218,498,584	417,884,283	120,852,951	221,95,036
Mares	1,194,231		174,709,681		91,583,036	
Colts	352,635		24,626,018		8,659,029	
Mules	573,841		64,284,246		21,244,148	
Donkeys	413,519		16,217,371		7,771,306	
	51,568,845		1,870,572,369		767,251,851	

The average price of each head of cattle is $= \frac{1,870,572,369}{51,568,845} = 36.2$ francs.

The average revenue per head . . . $= \frac{767,251,851}{51,568,845} = 14.87$ francs.

The number of animals on each hectare $= \frac{26,000,000}{15,568,845} = 1.98$ animals.

The average produce of lands each hectare $= \frac{25,089,486}{4,145,946,417} = 165$ francs.

The average value of the grain each hect. $= \frac{17,852,499}{414,679,741} = 23.2$ francs.

Principal Articles of Consumption divided by Number of Inhabitants.

	Hectol.	
Wheat	1,72	2 hec. 71
Grain	0,33	
Rye	0,66	
Barley, oats, maize, buck-wheat, chesnuts	0,29	
Potatoes	2,34	
Dry vegetables	0,09	
	Kil.	
Meat	20,00	
Wine	0,70	
Beer	0,12	
Cider	0,50	
Total value of meat consumed	——	543,180,518

A FEW WORDS

RELATIVE TO

JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

A FEW WORDS

RELATIVE TO

JOSEPH BONAPARTE.*

JOSEPH BONAPARTE, who was the elder brother of the Emperor, and his most intimate friend, died at Florence, after a long and painful illness.

When we gaze on that tomb which has closed over an old man who, in his time, was the possessor of two thrones, and reflect that he died an exile in a foreign land, after twenty-nine years of banishment, we must share in the sentiment of general regret which was manifested by the country and echoed from the press.

But as this melancholy event has given rise to unfounded assertions and illiberal attacks, we feel it to be our duty to clear the memory of one who can no longer refute them himself.

In rendering a just tribute to departed worth, we do not consider it necessary to heap fulsome praise on Joseph Bonaparte; but we highly disapprove the line that was adopted by one of the most esteemed journals, which, forgetting the high opinion that the King Joseph entertained for its editors, and forgetful of the sympathy and intimacy which reigned between them in 1833, has selected from his

---

* M. Louis Bonaparte speaks of Joseph *Napoleon* Bonaparte; but we prefer adhering to his real name.—EDITOR.

history only the least glorious act of his life, and appears to take delight in exaggerating the part he took in the unfortunate events of 1814.

We will not alter history; but we assert that when a man has served his country honourably for forty-seven years, and has been distinguished by numerous traits of courage, one of which would serve to build a reputation in the present day, it is ungenerous to pass over all these facts in silence, and only to dwell on a day of weakness. General Foy, Benjamin Constant, La Fayette, Laffitte, Clauzel, Pajol, Drouet d'Erlon, are dead; the life of each of these heroes is marked by years of glory, but also by some days of error; the press, with reason, uttered no reproach on their memory, and why should not the brother of the Emperor have been treated with the same indulgence? But, then, all these illustrious men died in France among their countrymen, while Joseph died in banishment.

The glory of the empire was so great, that the individuality of all but the chief actor was eclipsed, and the only remembrances of this drama left in the minds of the multitude, are two immense presentations—the great man, and the great people. But if we examine into separate facts, we shall find that the Emperor's brothers might likewise claim their share of renown, and that their glory would not be dimmed by comparison with those eminent men who at all times have immortalized their country.

Joseph Bonaparte was born in 1768, and became at the age of twenty-two a representative of the district of Ajaccio, of the Corsican Assembly of Ozezza; he was distinguished by his devotion to France, and to the revolution. He was appointed ambassador at twenty-eight, and during the time that he nobly represented the interests of his country at Rome, he suppressed, by his firmness, a rising of the people, originating in excitement against the tri-coloured flag. When he was elected a member of the Cinq Cents, he distinguished

himself by his brilliancy of speech, and by the warmth with which he defended the principles of the great revolution, of which he had ever been an enthusiastic admirer. He afterwards became a member of the senate, and concluded an advantageous treaty of commerce, in 1800, between France and the United States, in concert with Rœder and Fleurien; he had the signal honour of establishing peace with Germany, at Luneville, in the year 1800, and of forming one of the congress which signed the treaty of peace with England, at Amiens, in 1802.

Moreau wrote him a complimentary letter in the following terms—"Citizen Minister, accept my congratulations for the manner in which you besieged and took possession of Mantau, without quitting Luneville." France was entirely indebted to Joseph's ability for retaining this important seat of war.

In 1803, at which period he was a senator, he signed the voucher which ratified the changes which had taken place in Germany, and which was signed by Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Bavaria. Germany, which had formerly been divided into 284 states, was now compressed into 147.

The Empire had just been created, and in default of heirs male, the popular voice had named Napoleon's brothers, Joseph and Louis, and their descendants, as Napoleon's successors.

Joseph, who until this period had only figured in diplomacy, was named as the commander of a regiment, at the celebrated camp of Boulogne. The Emperor was anxious that his brothers, who were hereafter to be the pillars of a new edifice, should be capable of conducting both military and civil affairs.

About this time, the throne of Lombardy was offered to Joseph, who refused it, because the Emperor had imposed as a condition, that he should renounce his rights to the

throne which had just been founded, and pay an annual tribute to France.

Soon after the campaign of Austerlitz, Joseph was put at the head of an army, which was to conquer the kingdom of Naples, and to repulse the English and Russians, who supported Caroline's cruel and arbitrary government.

Forty thousand Frenchmen took the field, and the enemy was soon routed at Capona, at San Lorenzo, at Lago Negro, at Campo Tenere; and the Emperor's brother ascended the ancient throne of the house of Anjou.

Certainly, the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, and the regeneration of this part of Europe, are trifling events when put in comparison with Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, but the impartial historian will not allow himself to be dazzled by great events only: it is his mission to render justice where justice is due, without making the merit of the actor dependent on the extent of the field.

We are still strongly impressed in reading the accounts of the expedition of Charles VIII., in 1494. We feel proud to see, that in the fifteenth, as in the nineteenth century, the petty tyrants of Italy quailed before the French flag, and then, as now, invoked the support of France against their oppressors; but Charles VIII. knew not how to take advantage of victory—in vain the Italians cried aloud for liberty. Philip of Comines says in his Memoirs, book vii. chapter vi., "The king did not exactly understand the meaning of this word." Indeed, he spent his time in giving tournaments and entertainments, and his short stay in Italy left no trace behind it, except that of the bravery of the French. Joseph, on the contrary, took advantage of his brief authority to implant French ideas and principles of equality in this remote part of Europe, principles which outlived his downfall. He endeavoured to throw a ray of light over this country, degraded as it was by the most brutish despotism, by using the most persuasive and the gentlest measures.

Instead of remaining, as Charles VIII. had, at Naples, employed in breaking lances, he went twice through the country, from Reggio to Tarente, inquiring everywhere into the wants of the people, and making it a point of honour to relieve the heart-rending poverty of the inhabitants of this fine climate, which contrasts so highly with the abundance of nature; and to his intermediation we may attribute the beginning of civilization among the numerous body of Helots, who are denominated Lazzaroni, at Naples. He employed them in agriculture, and on the roads, and it was they who opened the passage of Capo di Monte. Plans were drawn for executing the old project of uniting the Ionian and Tyrrhenian seas by a canal. Thus, while the Emperor, amid his gigantic projects, formed the plan of digging up the bed of the Seine, and of making a sea-port of Paris, his brothers were imitating his ideas of improvement in other countries. For while Joseph, at the extreme end of the Italian peninsula, laboured to realize an idea first conceived by the Romans, Prince Eugene began to dig up the bed of the Po, an undertaking of the greatest advantage for Italy, and which, according to the plans, was to be finished in 1830; and King Louis, in Holland, was preparing to dry up the lake of Haarlem.

As soon as Joseph was at the head of government, he selected a ministry from amongst the most distinguished men, which he divided into special sections. In this assembly, where every plan was weighed with the greatest considerateness and capacity, most important changes were agreed upon in the financial and judicial administrations: for the taxes were equally distributed, the law was made the same for all classes, and justice was placed in the hands of upright and independent men. By his conciliatory manners, and the creation of the national guard, Joseph put a stop to the hordes of brigands who infested the country; and by a skilful measure he abolished the feudal rights by the inter-

vention of the nobles themselves; he suppressed the convents by the intervention of the clergy, and prepared the advent of a new and enlightened race by founding many civil and military colleges, most of which are still existing. He opened a high-road to Reggio; he cultivated a considerable portion of ground called Tavoliere di Pulglier; he removed the custom-houses to the frontiers; he began to embellish the capital; and within the short space of two years, this country, formerly so barbarous, became peaceful, regenerate, and enriched, by the persevering efforts of a worthy member of our revolution.

But the Emperor's elder brother had still a harder task to perform; his exertions were not to be confined to the kingdom of Naples when Europe was in a blaze, and the ancient thrones all crumbled into dust at the sound of our cannon.

It was with reluctance that Joseph quitted the enchanting coasts of Capria and Ischia, and went to meet his brother at Bayonne. Many imperative circumstances obliged him to accept the crown of Spain: the Emperor having said that Charles IV. had refused to return to Spain without the Prince of Peace; that Ferdinand was a man of no talent or honour, one in whom he could not confide; and that the example of a son dethroning his father was an act of too great immorality to be perpetrated in Europe; said, in addition, to the junta then assembled at Bayonne, that his acceptation of the crown was the only means of getting out of present difficulties; Joseph accepted it from duty rather than ambition.

The first congratulations the new king received were from Ferdinand! from the very man whose throne he was about to occupy: which was a plain proof of the baseness of his predecessor.

Supported by the consent of all the Spaniards assembled

at Bayonne, Joseph thought that the Iberian soil was equally ripe for regeneration as that of Naples had proved. Faithful to his original principles, wishing to make use of gentle methods only for establishing his authority, he begged his brother to withdraw all the French troops from Spain, feeling certain of obtaining the suffrages of the people without foreign troops, and trusting to the success of a frank appeal to the chivalrous character of the Spaniards. If the course of events warred against this proposition, we must at least acknowledge its grandeur, and that it was not power alone that Joseph coveted, but the welfare of Spain. As at Naples, he began by collecting all the most eminent men around him, and by abolishing all the abuses which had existed during the last reign, grounding his institutions on those of France. But neither Joseph's cultivated mind nor the bravery of our troops could conquer the Spanish fanaticism excited against us by the animosity of the monks, and supported by the English army. Joseph's policy, which best suited the goodness of his heart and the philosophical turn of his mind, was all pacific. Events obliged him to be only a soldier. Although he was not wanting in courage or the decision of character requisite in the critical events of the war, he could not always impress on the different corps of the army that necessity for union so indispensable to success, for the Emperor alone was able to repress that jealousy among the marshals which was constantly the cause of failure in the best combined plans. Still Joseph did all the good in his power in the short interval that the cares of the war left him, and his efforts were especially directed to the avoidance of bloodshed, and to receiving the crown with the free consent of the Spanish. With this object in view, he assembled a central junta at Granada, which was to decide this simple question—"Shall we, or shall we not, accept the king and the constitution offered to us by the junta of Bayonne?"

If the nation consented to the award of this general assembly, Joseph promised to send away the French troops, and to submit entirely to the national wish, legally expressed. But of what avail are the best and purest intentions in the midst of events which are hurried on by jarring passions? like foot-stones placed across a rolling torrent, the fury of the waters carries them away, and history alone preserves a trace of them!

Yet, notwithstanding the partial victories of the French troops, and that Joseph's liberal offers had opened the gates of Seville, Grenada and Jaën to him, the Emperor, tired of this war, which went on so long, suddenly stopped the supplies which he had sent to Spain, and issued a decree, declaring great part of the country in a state of siege. These two measures, which must greatly have exasperated the Spanish nation, afflicted Joseph very deeply; he set off for Paris, intending to explain his views to his brother, and to protest against these measures.

The Emperor assured him that the state of siege would very soon cease—that this decision had had a good effect on the English government, which offered to withdraw her troops from Portugal if the French troops evacuated Spain; to acknowledge Joseph as king if he received the sanction of the Cortes, and if France, on her side acknowledged the house of Braganza in Portugal. On his return to Spain, king Joseph found that his plans of pacification could not be realized, and he accordingly wrote the following letter to his brother, which portrays completely the honourable character of the man :—

"Madrid, 23rd March, 1812.

"TO THE EMPEROR.

"SIRE,—When, a year ago, I asked your majesty's opinion before my return to Spain, you urged my going back, and consequently I am now here. You were kind enough to say,

that I should always have the power of leaving this country if the hope we had indulged was not realized. In that case, your majesty assured me of an asylum in the centre of the Empire, between which and Mortfontaine I might divide my residence. Sire, events have deceived my hopes; I have not done any good, and I have no longer a hope of being of any service. I pray your majesty then to permit me to place in your hands my right to the crown of Spain, which you deigned to transmit to me four years ago. In accepting this crown, I had no object in view but the welfare of this vast monarchy. It has not been in my power to accomplish it. I pray your majesty to receive me as one of your subjects, and to believe that you will never have a more faithful servant than the friend whom nature gave you.

"JOSEPH."

We may well understand that the Emperor could not accept this abdication, for above all things he was anxious to put an end to the war with Spain, in order that it should not interfere with his projects; and in spite of the resistance of the Spaniards, and the support of England, Spain would have been conquered if fortune had not abandoned our eagles in the Russian campaign.

States are destroyed either by too much pride or by cowardice. The Empire fell because it had extended its civilizing influence too far. It was not given to the greatest nation or the greatest genius to combat at the same time the ancient dynasty on the borders of the Tagus, and that of Moscow, and to regenerate Europe in ten years!

The country's reverses sent back all these plebeian kings to France, who had spread over Europe under the shadow of a crown the principles of '89. Victory had made them kings: in defeat they were again citizens and soldiers. In 1814, the Emperor confided to Joseph the defence of Paris, and the care of his son and the Empress: he gave him a

solemn injunction—under all circumstances to prevent his son's falling into the hands of the enemy. Joseph faithfully fulfilled this order, which had a melancholy result.

This act in the life of the king of Spain has always been very severely censured, but never with so much acrimony and exaggeration as in the History of the two Restorations of 1811 and 1815, by Monsieur Achille de Vaulatelle, from which work the *National* gave extracts on the 8th of August.

The veneration we entertain for the man whose loss we deplore, does not blind us so far as to deny the share of responsibility which fell on him for the calamities of the year 1814. But if we allow that he did not show all the energy of character which so difficult a position required, we maintain that Joseph was never guilty of the cowardice which the article in the *National* imputes to him. We will recal the facts briefly. While the Emperor manœuvred his troops between the Marne and the Seine, to stop the progress of his enemies, they advanced on Paris by Rheims and Soisson; but Napoleon hoped that the capital could still hold out a few days longer, and that he should be in time to return and defend it in person; still he was aware of the gravity of the circumstances, and dreaded above all things that his son might fall into the hands of the allies, and serve as a hostage to the enemy. Thus, in the event of Paris not holding out, he wrote the following letter to his brother, King Joseph:—

"Rheims, 16th March, 1814.

"After the instructions I gave you verbally, as well as by letter, you are not, *under any circumstances, to allow the Empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy.* I am going to manœuvre in such a way that it is possible you may be some days without receiving intelligence of me. If the enemy advances on Paris in such

force that all resistance becomes useless, send off the Empress, my son, the high dignitaries, the ministers, the officers of the council of state, the great officers of the crown, the Baron de Bouillerie, and the treasurer. *Do not quit my son*, and remember that I should prefer knowing that he was in the Seine, to his falling into the hands of the enemies of France. The fate of Astyanax, the prisoner of the Greeks, has always appeared to me the most unfortunate in history.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON."

Joseph, unfortunately, fulfilled faithfully the orders he had received; he declared that he would remain in Paris; and he did stay there as long as he thought it could possibly be defended. But when he saw that the partisans of the Bourbons disseminated disaffection and alarm everywhere, when the Duc de Feltre, who was minister of war, had assured him that he had no arms to distribute among the populace, and that the enemy had reached Montmartre—he thought the time was come to follow his instructions, and authorized the capitulation. Alas! every one felt that the Emperor alone could daunt exterior and interior enemies; for Lavalette wrote a letter on the 28th to head quarters, which letter is counter-signed in the manuscript of 1814, in which the following passage occurs;—"The partisans of foreigners, encouraged by what is occurring at Bourdeaux, hold up their heads; secret spies second them; Napoleon's presence is essential if he would prevent his capital being delivered to the enemy. There is not a moment to be lost."

Certainly it is ever to be regretted that Joseph did not feel inspired by one of those magnanimous resolutions which sometimes turn a defeat into a victory, or at least immortalize misfortune. He should have disobeyed the Emperor's instructions, and understood that there are moments in which the heart alone should be obeyed. But his conduct

was far removed from the despicable part which Monsienr Achille de Vaulatelle would suggest.

That author represents him as solicitous only for his personal safety during the last agony of the Empire, thinking only of his throne of Spain—refusing to abdicate; and De Vaulatelle even puts these words into the Emperor's mouth, "Would it not be thought that I was robbing him of his share of a paternal inheritance." The letter we have quoted before proves the falsehood and improbability of this supposition. What! Joseph, who in 1812 abdicated the crown of Spain at Madrid because he thought that he could not do any good, refusing to abdicate in 1814, in the midst of the disasters of the empire, when it was a question of saving France and the Emperor!

This accusation is not only improbable, but absurd. The words attributed to the Emperor were true; but they were uttered at quite another period, and to a totally different person. It was to his sister, the queen of Naples, that the Emperor addressed those words, uttered with bitter irony, when, in 1806, she claimed as a right the power which the Emperor only delegated for the advantage of the people When persons attempt to write history, they should at least ascertain the truth of quotations.

The accusing Joseph and Jerome of having feared the enemy's bullets at Paris, in 1815, is spreading a calumny which their whole life refutes. Joseph behaved with the greatest courage in the campaign of Naples. At Gaëte he mounted the breach bravely; when in Spain, he exposed himself in front of the battles of Talavera, Almonaced, and of Ocana. And as for Jerome, he proved fully at Waterloo, as he had before given proof in Silesia, that the blood of the Emperor ran in his veins.

We repeat, that Joseph was not a man of energetic mind, or of great imaginative genius in forming the boldest resolutions. The war and the consequent events never electrified

his faculties. During victory, he was modest and always resigned; under defeat, he was a slave to the orders he received from his brother. Had the Emperor ordered him to remain immovably at his post in 1814, he would have remained there: he ordered him, on the contrary, to go with his son, and he went.

We cannot pay a higher tribute to his memory than by bringing forward here the copy of part of a letter which was written to him in 1824, by the distinguished patriot General Lamarque:—

"TO THE COMTE DE SURVILLIERS.*

"..... .....

"I have been an exile like yourself; like you I have wandered in foreign lands, constantly breathing vows for my country. I well know how irritable and susceptible one becomes under such circumstances, how keenly one feels the attacks of enemies; but, on my return, I see that during my exile I always exaggerated the importance of such attacks. The generosity of the French nation is an immense shield which shelters those who are in distress, and the blows aimed at the victim fall on the aggressor.

"You would have more to fear, Sire, if you were again on the throne. Be at peace on that point, and let not the calumnies which reach you across the ocean disturb your interior comfort nor the quiet of your retreat. It is the last shock of the tempest, the last tide of the expiring wave. General, depend on my attachment, which is hardly exceeded by that which I bear to my father's memory; accept the assurance of my gratitude, and the sincere and respectful homage of your very humble and very obedient

"MAX. LAMARQUE.

"Paris, March 27, 1824."

---

* The title which the ex-king bore subsequently to his retirement from the Spanish throne in 1814.—EDITOR.

Joseph retired to the neighbourhood of Lausanne, in the year 1814, and informed the Emperor that several assassins had been sent from Paris to murder him. This warning caused the arrest of two persons in the island of Elba, who acknowledged their crime, and named the authors of this infernal machination.

During the Hundred Days, Joseph entered still more confidentially into the projects, the fears, and the hopes which actuated his brother. Joseph suggested the idea of sending a confidential person to Pozzo-di-Borgo, to try and gain him over to the French cause, and to use his influence to divide the coalition at the congress of Vienna. The envoy, who was the bearer of five millions of francs and the promise of a high position in Corsica, arrived too late. Pozzo-di-Borgo, seduced by these offers, replied to the bearer, "I have just quitted the congress. I have exerted all my eloquence and my powers to stir up the congress against the Emperor. I cannot now undo what I have done. I should ruin myself without saving the Emperor. Why did you not arrive some hours sooner!" On what do the destinies of empires depend!

Joseph saw his brother at Rochefort for the last time; he proposed to give himself up to the English in his place; who, deceived by the likeness, would imagine that they were carrying the Emperor to England, while he would quietly go to the United States of America. Napoleon refused; and then the two brothers took an eternal adieu of each other. One set out for St. Helena, and the other for the United States.

Here began a new life for Joseph, which will be differently judged by different parties, because it cannot quite escape from political passions which still divide France. He settled at Point Breeze, near Philadelphia, where he soon acquired the influence and esteem always accorded to

an illustrious name, a large fortune, unpretending and prepossessing manners, and great generosity. Many wrecks of our political dissensions came to seek a refuge near him, and Clauzel, Levèvre-Desnouettes, Lallemant, Bernard, and many others whose names are now forgotten, received constant proofs of the goodness of his heart. Napoleon having made an appeal to his family from St. Helena, that each member should subscribe, in order to put the sums he required at his disposal, Joseph unhesitatingly offered his whole fortune to his brother. The Emperor took but little advantage of this noble offer.

The 5th of May, 1821, was a day of heart-rending grief to all the members of the Bonaparte family. The great man had died in captivity, and his son was still in that position. Joseph, desirous of doing everything which he thought could be pleasing to the shade of the Emperor, asked permission of Austria to go to the Duke de Reischstadt, that he might receive the advice and consolation of his father's brother and friend. Monsieur de Metternich refused.

While Joseph was living on the banks of the Delaware, only occupying himself with the welfare of those around him, he received a proposition which surprised as much as it must have affected him. A deputation from Mexico came to offer him the Mexican crown. The former king of Naples and Spain replied, nearly in these words, to the deputation: "I have worn two crowns; I would not take a step to wear a third. Nothing can gratify me more than to see men who would not recognise my authority when I was at Madrid, now come to seek me in exile, that I may be at their head: but I do not think that the throne you wish to raise again can make your happiness; every day that I pass in the hospitable land of the United States, proves more clearly to me the excellence of republican institutions for America. Keep them, then, as a precious gift from

heaven; settle your internal commotions; follow the example of the United States; and seek among your fellow-citizens for a man more capable than I am of acting the great part of Washington." When Lafayette made his triumphal voyage to the United States, he came to see the brother of the Emperor; he loudly deplored the part he had taken in 1815, and said, in these words: "The Bourbon dynasty cannot last: it too openly wounds the national feeling; in France, we are all persuaded that the son of the Emperor can alone represent all the interests of the revolution. Place two millions at the disposal of our committee, and I promise you that, with this sum, in two years, Napoleon II. will be on the throne of France." Joseph thought the means inadequate to the object to be attained. He did not accept these offers.

But the truth of Lafayette's prediction was to be verified in the principle, and the word Liberty coming across the ocean soon taught Joseph that France had again planted the tri-coloured flag.

King Joseph, imbued with the ideas of the revolution of '89, could not misunderstand the great principle of the sovereignty of the people; but, in his opinion, it was necessary that the application of the principle should be regular and legal; and when he heard how quickly a new government had been established in 1830, he addressed the following protest to the Chamber of Deputies, which we bring forward again as an historical document, in the form in which it was published by all the journals of the period.

"*To the Members of the Chamber of Deputies at Paris.*

"GENTLEMEN,—The memorable events which have again raised the national colours in France, and destroyed the order of things established by foreigners, have shown the

nation in its true light, in the intoxication of delight; the great capital has renovated the whole nation.

"Exiled from my native land, I should have appeared in it as soon as this letter, if I had not read, among many names acknowledged by the liberality of the nation, that of a Prince of the House of Bourbon. The events of the last days of July have blazoned forth this fact: it is impossible for a house reigning by divine right to maintain itself on the throne, when it has once been driven away by the nation, because it is not possible for princes born with the pretension of being predestinated to rule over a people, to rise above the prejudices of their birth. Thus the divorce between the House of Bourbon and the French people had been pronounced, and nothing in the world could destroy the remembrance of the past. So much bloodshed, battles, glory, so much progress in every act of civilization, so many prodigies accomplished by the nation under the influence of liberal doctrines, were so many brands of discord lighted each day between the rulers and the ruled. Worn out by so many revolutions, and desirous of finding peace under a charter, given and accepted as an anchor of safety after so many storms, the good spirits were in vain disposed to make every sacrifice. More powerful than men, the force of circumstances was there, and nothing could reconcile men who had hitherto remained stationary, and those whom a revolution of thirty years had aggrandized and regenerated. In vain, the Duke of Orleans abjures his house at the moment of her misfortunes. A Bourbon himself, he returned to France sword in hand with the Bourbons, headed by foreigners. What signifies it that his father voted for the death of the king, his cousin, to put himself into his place; what does it signify that the brother of Louis XVI. named him lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and regent for his grandson? Is he the less a Bourbon for

this? Has he on this account the less pretension that he ought to be called to the throne by his birthright—that by the choice of the people, or the divine right, he counts on the throne of his ancestors? Well, his children think otherwise; and the past and the present, do they not shew us beforehand what the future will be under a branch of this house? The 14th of July and the 10th of August, did they not predict clearly enough the last days of July in 1830; and are not these days an augury of another 28th of July at some more or less distant period? No, gentlemen, princes who are appointed by the divine right never forgive those to whom they are indebted; sooner or later they punish those who have conferred benefits on them; their pride only bends before the author of the divine right, because he is invisible. The annals of all nations tell us truths; they are prominent enough in our own revolution; they are written in letters of blood on the walls of our capital. Of what use has the two thousand millions been to our country, which has been so lavishly spent on the enemies of the country, and the humiliation with which all were formerly greeted? You, who build on foundations of sand, if you forget these eternal truths, you will be accountable to all nations, and to posterity, for the new calamities which you will engender. No, gentlemen, there is no earthly legitimacy but the governments chosen by the people. Nations create and destroy them at will; nations alone possess rights; individuals and private families have simple duties to perform.

"The family of Napoleon was called by three millions five hundred thousand votes: if the nation thinks it is for its interest to make another choice, it has the power and the right,—*but the nation alone.*

"Napoleon was proclaimed by the Chamber of Deputies in 1815, which was dissolved by foreign bayonets.

"I have positive reasons for knowing that Napoleon II. is worthy of France: it is, especially as a Frenchman, that I wish the incontestable claims he has to the throne should be acknowledged, as long as the nation has not adopted another form of government. For legitimacy only he does not require another election; however, the nation has the right to confirm or reject the title she gave, *if such is her will.* So far, gentlemen, you are bound to Napoleon II.; and until Austria has given him up to the wishes of the French, I offer to share your dangers, your efforts, your undertakings, and on his arrival to transmit to him the wishes, the example, and the last dispositions of his father, who died a victim to his enemies on the rock of Saint Helena. The following words were conveyed to me by General Bertrand:—"Tell my son to remember, above all things, that he is a Frenchman; and that he should give the nation as much liberty as I did—equality. A foreign war did not enable me to do all that I should have done in a general peace: I was perpetually dictating. Tell him that I had but one spring for all my actions, the love and glory of the great nation. Let him take my motto, *All for the French people,* since what we have been was through the people." Gentlemen, I have fulfilled what appeared to me a sacred duty. May the bones of our exile reach across the Atlantic, and carry the same conviction to his countrymen's hearts which is in his own. *France alone* has a right to judge Napoleon's son; the son of that man of the people can alone reunite all parties under a really liberal constitution, and preserve the peace of Europe. The successor of Alexander is aware that Alexander died regretting that he had sent away Napoleon's son. The new king of England has a grand duty to perform, that of washing away the opprobrium which remains on the ministerial gaolers of Saint Helena:

the sentiments of Austria cannot admit of a doubt—those of the French nation are in favour of Napoleon II.

"The liberty of the press is the triumph of truth: it is that which will carry conviction to all hearts. Let it be heard, and may the wishes of a great nation be fulfilled.

(Signed) "JOSEPH NAPOLEON BONAPÀRTE."

"Near Yuhn, the 18th September, 1830."

We consider that we ought to cite the article which appeared in the *Constitutionnel* of the 7th of August, 1844, regarding this letter; which explains, in its own way, the political opinions of the Emperor's brother: we shall see how much party spirit defames characters when it suits their policy.

"It is necessary to remind the Bonapartes," says this journal, "that Napoleon's elder brother had abdicated his old claims before the new and striking rights of the dynasty of July. The head of the Napoleon family testified, *by all his acts*, his profound respect for the national wish that had erected the throne of 1830."

After the death of the Duc de Reicshstadt, Joseph went to settle in England. He went there in 1832, and called around him his brothers Lucien and Jerôme, and his nephew Prince Louis Napoleon. It is easily to be supposed, that the events which gradually unfolded themselves before him, and the menacing opposition to the acts of the French government, often formed the subject of his reflections.

Feeling persuaded that the government could not maintain itself if it did not frankly follow a more national course, the chief of the Emperor's family thought it was necessary to the success of what he called the popular cause that a sincere and complete union should be effected between the republican and the Bonapartist party. Under this idea, several friends of Carrel, and, among others,

Messieurs B—— and T——, came to call on him: they had several long conferences together, and, if they remember the high esteem Joseph had for them, and the conformity of their opinions on all leading questions, they will, we are persuaded, regret having allowed to appear in these journals, as the only funeral oration of a man who had received them so cordially,—*No, Joseph does not merit the regrets of France.*

Several general officers came also to see King Joseph; and Messieurs M. M. F—— and S——, not being able to go as far as London, came to Ostend to deliver to Prince Louis Napoleon, that he might transmit them to his uncle, a few words of consolation and hope from Jacques Laffitte and Lafayette.

But these conferences had no result, because the French government did not regard this fusion of the two national parties with indifference: to prevent them executing their threats of uniting their joint efforts against them, they had recourse to one of those stratagems which we have often witnessed. As among all numerous parties there are unluckily always some false brethren, they insinuated into the republican clubs in Paris men who were employed to excite the democratic feeling against the Empire, and who urged on the most quarrelsome and the most inconsiderate to attack all this most glorious epoch in the *Tribune* newspaper, and to bring forward the crimes of Marat, Lebon, Saint-Just, and Robespierre, thus burying in oblivion all the great realities of the revolution to enhance its excesses.

Although the *National* newspaper never gave vent to these firebrand declamations, they irritated Joseph very deeply, and made him more repugnant as to the conditions they wished him to accept.

The projected alliance was broken off, and government attained its object. In general, Prince Louis Napoleon

agreed with his uncle in all fundamental questions, but he differed with him on one essential point, which offered a ludicrous contrast,—the old man, whose days were numbered, would not hasten anything, but was resigned to trusting everything to time; while the younger, who was impatient, was anxious for action and for accelerating events.

The insurrection of Strasbourg in the month of October, in 1836, took place therefore without Joseph's authority or participation, and consequently he was very much displeased, more especially as the newspapers deceived him as to the object and intentions that his nephew had in view, and in 1837 he returned to America. On coming again to Europe in 1839, he found his nephew in England; when he was enlightened as to the means and prospects of Prince Louis Napoleon, he was quite restored to his confidence and affection.

The publication of the *Idées Napoleoniennes* gained his approbation, and on this occasion he openly said that, in the character of the friend and confidant of all the Emperor's most intimate thoughts, he could loudly proclaim that the book was the exact and faithful report of his brother's political ideas.

Until the year 1840, Joseph preserved his strength, energy, and all the shining qualities of his mind, but he had then a paralytic attack, from which he never recovered completely. He went to the German baths to recover his strength. He returned to England after the Boulogne business, and eventually obtained permission to go to Florence, where it was hoped that the climate might re-establish his health. During the latter years of his life he was much engrossed by the recollection of the misfortunes of his family; he several times expressed how bitterly he felt his nephew's captivity at Ham, and how unjust it was of France

to allow all those men to die in exile who had served her so faithfully.

Attended by the Queen Julie, whose devotion failed not to the last, and who was ever a comforting angel, as well as surrounded by his brothers Louis and Jerome, whom he loved affectionately, he expired, gently; and, as a righteous man, he would have seen the approaches of death without regret, if the phantom of exile had not intruded even on his last moments, to wring his heart and poison his last farewell.

Joseph died on the 28th of July, 1844, at nine o'clock in the morning, and the intelligence of his death was a subject of bitter regret, not only to his family, but to all those who had known and cared for him; and on this subject a most painful reflection arises, that an absence of twenty-nine years from his own country had naturally thinned the number of those who in France were personally attached to him, while they had constantly added to the number of those who in foreign countries had been able to appreciate his noble qualities. So that one of the sad effects of exile is, that although a general feeling of regret was evident in Paris, it was probably at Florence, in the United States, and even in London, that the most genuine tears were shed for the death of Napoleon's brother.

We will now say a few words about his disposition.

Joseph was calculated to shine in the arts of peace, while his brother's genius was never happy but in the midst of events which war engenders. From their earliest ages this difference of capacity and inclination was plainly manifested. When he was at school at Autun with his brother, Joseph did all his Latin and Greek compositions, while Napoleon assisted Joseph in all physical and mathematical problems. One made verses, while the other studied Alexander and Cæsar.

Joseph, who had a fine memory, and had read a great deal, early accustomed to the war of words, knowing by heart all the most beautiful parts of the classic authors, was formed to live in a constitutional government, where patriotic opinions, eloquently delivered, affability of manners, and purity of character, are the principal qualities which distinguish men. Although he always conducted himself with honour and tact in the different events of his life, if he did not shine with all the brilliancy that might have been expected from his talents, it was because he was of a placable nature, and, from his chancing to be born at a revolutionary period, he was obliged to become one of the chief instruments of a policy of war, independence, and absolute power, whilst his own feelings were in favour of a liberal constitution.

But one of Joseph's principal merits, in our opinion, was, that he remained faithful to the last, and was always a true patriot of the revolution of '89. The struggle of the people against the old dynasty had made a deep impression on his mind; and these early feelings of our youth always remain when we are indebted to them for years of glory and happiness. The crowns of Naples and of Spain, which he had successively worn, were only accessory events to him. The Empire itself was only an episode in the midst of a great revolutionary drama, which had moved his whole soul, and he had every feeling bound up in it. The adulations, the honours, the charms even of power, which he had enjoyed, like so many others, had glided past him without reaching his heart, and, under the purple as under the cloak of exile, the man remained the same—a valiant adversary of all oppression, of all privileges, and of all abuses,—a passionate defender of equality and of the liberty of the people.

Joseph, like all actors, retired from the stage, like all men

who have a long past and a short future, delighted in recalling the events he had witnessed, and the episodes which he related with a peculiar charm interested every one by their great simplicity or startling earnestness.

He spoke with pleasure of the plebeian origin and the poverty of his family, which had numbered so many monarchs among its members. He one day related that his brother Louis, for whom he had always felt all the tenderness and care of a father, was to leave Marseilles to go to school at Paris: Joseph took him to the coach, and, at the moment of parting from him, he felt that the weather was cold, and that his brother had no cloak. Then, not having the means of buying one, and not choosing that his young brother should be exposed to the intemperance of the weather, he took off his own cloak and wrapped Louis in it as the coach was starting. This action, which they mutually recollected when they were monarchs, always remained engraven in their hearts as a tender recollection of constant affection.

Another day, Joseph related an incident that chance interfered with, and which, if it had succeeded, would completely have changed the Emperor's destiny and the fate of France.

It was in '94: the General Bonaparte had been denounced at the revolutionary tribunal, and put under arrest at Nice. Joseph, fearing for his life, consulted with Junot, and formed a project for his escape. The day was fixed, the boat that was to land General Bonaparte in Piedmont was ready, when a sudden thought coming into Junot's head, put an end to the scheme.

"Deliver Bonaparte, and put him in safety," said Junot, "I should like nothing better; for I would hazard my own life in the attempt; but, if we went into another country, should we not be regarded *as emigrants?*" At the word

emigrant they started, for they had not, until then, reflected on all the consequences of the step: and as, in the eyes of republican soldiers, death was preferable to the disgrace of being considered emigrants, they instantly renounced their intention, and Napoleon remained.

When Joseph, who was then Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, was proceeding to Amiens with his colleagues, in the year 1802, to conclude a peace with England, they were, he said, very much engrossed with the question as to the state to be observed with the English officials: they were anxious, for the interest of their mission, not to lack in etiquette; yet, as they represented a republican state, they did not wish to show too much deference to the high English titles that came to treat with them. The French proxies were very much puzzled to know who ought to pay the first visit. As they were very young, they did not know that the foreign diplomatists always conceal the inflexibility of their policy under flexible forms. But they were soon relieved from their embarrassment; for, to their great surprise, they found Lord Cornwallis, on their arrival at Amiens, waiting for them at the door of the hotel, and without any form or ceremony, his lordship himself opened the door of their carriage, and gave them each a cordial shake by the hand.

King Joseph related many interesting anecdotes, which are to be found in the Memoirs he left. We will only repeat one observation of the Emperor's, which is interesting, as it explains, in some measure, why those who have governed us since 1830, notwithstanding their personal rank, have not produced anything. The Emperor said one day to his brother, "Talleyrand has a great deal of wit, has he not? Well, Joseph, do you know why he has never done anything great? It is because great ideas only come

Although kindness and gentleness were inherent qualities in Joseph's disposition, he often got into a violent passion when any one touched those sensitive nerves which vibrated at the recollection of his brother's and his country's misfortunes. There were two subjects especially which he could never speak on calmly: Saint Helena, and the policy of the French government since the year 1830. Its ungenerous conduct towards the Bonapartes excited a rage which it was difficult to quell. It was permitted to this venerable old man, who had such great patriotism, who had seen such great deeds, to accuse France and its government of weakness.

We have taken a rapid sketch of the principal events in the life of King Joseph. It is evident, if his participation in the events which illustrated the Republic and the Empire are lost sight of beside the immense deeds of his brother, that they are so, not from the insignificance of his own efforts, but because everything seems diminutive beside a giant. But if, in the present day, a man existed among us who, as a deputy, diplomatist, king, citizen, or soldier, had constantly distinguished himself by his patriotism and brilliant qualities; if that man could boast of his oratorical powers, and of having concluded advantageous treaties for the interests of France; if he had refused a crown because the conditions attached to it were against his conscience; if he had conquered a nation, gained battles, and illumined two thrones with the torch of French ideas; if, in fine, in good or in evil fortune, he had always remained faithful to his vows, to his country, and to his friends, that man, we say, would hold the highest place in the public opinion. Statues would be erected to him, and civic crowns would adorn his grey hairs. Well! this man formerly existed with all these glorious and honourable antecedents. Yet, on his forehead misery was stamped. His country had rewarded his services by a banishment of twenty-nine years!

We lament, but we are not surprised at it. There are only two parties in France—the conquered and the conquerors of Waterloo. The conquerors are in power; and all that is national still bears the oppression of defeat.

At a time when all noble and patriotic sentiments are condemned as a crime, when our flag retreats before foreign aggression, when, to signalize only one fact, the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour has been given to the Duc de Bayleu, to the man who sent twenty thousand men to die in the English hulks; at such a time, we say, it is natural, it is even reasonable, that the relations of Napoleon should languish in prisons and die in exile.

NAPOLEON-LOUIS BONAPARTE.

OPINIONS

ON VARIOUS

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

QUESTIONS.

OPINIONS

ON VARIOUS

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

QUESTIONS.

I.

NOTES CONCERNING THE EMPEROR.

M. ARAGO having, through M. Thayer, his colleague in the municipal council of Paris, requested from the prisoner at Ham some information regarding Napoleon's mathematical studies, Prince Napoleon Louis wrote the following letter to M. Thayer:—

MY DEAR M. THAYER,

Your letter gave me much pleasure, as a long time had elapsed since I had heard from you. I should be only too happy if I could be of use to the celebrated and learned man of whom you speak, by furnishing him with new disclosures concerning the Emperor's mathematical studies; unfortunately, however, I know but little on the subject, and General Montholon, whose memory I taxed, only remembers some unimportant facts. I will, nevertheless, give you my own conjectures and my personal recollections; you can then make what use you please of them.

It is an indisputable fact, that the Emperor had distinguished himself at the school of Brienne, by his application to mathematics. He studied Bezout, and Bezout ever

after remained his favourite author, for he never forgot the friends of his youth. His taste the exact sciences is easily explained; for that which marks great men, which inflames their ambition and makes their will absolute, is the love of that truth which they believe to have alone acquired; thus the Emperor, in his youth, was induced to prefer to any other science that which always gives incontestable results beyond the power of chicanery and bad faith. But, from the first, his practical mind had most easily retained that portion of mathematical science which serves to resolve all problems of general utility. In science, as in politics, he rejected theories or principles whose immediate bearing he did not see, and that is perhaps the reason why he preferred the practical talent of Monge to the transcendant genius of Laplace. He certainly valued the latter most highly, but he could not love a learned man himself in himself, and accessible only to the initiated. It was doubtless a great merit to advance the science, but to make it popular was, in his eyes, a still greater merit. How well would he have appreciated the talents of your illustrious colleague, M. Arago, who possesses, in such a high degree, the two faculties so rarely found united in one man: to be the high priest of science, and yet to know how to initiate the unlearned in its mysteries.

The Emperor had an astonishing memory for figures, and never forgot numbers when explaining the mutual relation of the various elements of our civil and military organization. My mother has often told me, that she has seen the Emperor calculate the most complicated military evolutions, remembering the position of each corps, the relations of the different armies, the number of the regiment, and the time each would employ in getting over the allotted distance. Perhaps you know that, as he was one day auditing the accounts of the treasury, relating to the passage of troops

through Paris, he affirmed, against the declaration of the administration, that the 32nd had never passed through the town. An inquiry was instituted, and it was, indeed, ascertained that it had only passed through St. Denis, but that, as that town had no military paymaster, the sum which was furnished to the regiment had been put to the account of Paris. Judging of these facts superficially, it might be said that this facility of calculation and this surprising memory were the results more of an arithmetical than of a mathematical mind; but when we inquire farther we find that that which seems to us a simple proportion of figures is, in fact, the result of studied combinations. The banker who calculates simple or compound interest works but a schoolboy's sum; but he who includes in his calculations, like the unknown figure equations, all the physical and moral influences which make an army live, march, and conquer, who calculates how a word, which goes to the soldiers' hearts, increases their strength, and who fixes their number by the degree of sympathy or of hatred with which the flag of French democracy will be met by the foreign nations, he is indeed more than an arithmetician—he resolves the grandest problems of transcendent mathematics, for, as the result of his calculations, stand glory, nationality, civilization!

The Emperor often inquired into the house expenses of the members of his family. One day, being probably preoccupied by some budget, and unconscious of the presence of any one else, he advanced towards my mother, and asked her: "Hortense, how much do you spend in your kitchen, and how much in your stable?"—"Sire, I do not remember." "Oh, you are a fool! You may always easily remember the figures of your budget; in every well-regulated household the quarter of the revenues only should be spent for the kitchen, and a fifth part for the stable."

On another occasion, giving us some rules for our con-

duct, he said: "In everything you undertake give two-thirds to reason, and let chance rule the other third; if you increase the share of the former you will be pusillanimous, if of the latter you will be rash."

At St. Helena, with his soul smarting under many griefs, he sought distraction by occupying himself with such matters as might fix his attention without exciting painful remembrances, and there he revelled in figures as a poet does in verses. Sometimes he endeavoured to find a new way of construction for military bridges, and calculated their power of resistance; sometimes he compared the rapidity of his strategical movements with those of the generals of antiquity; sometimes he calculated on paper whether it was possible that an army should intrench itself every evening as the Roman legions did, and for this purpose he calculated how much digging and filling up could possibly be executed in a short time; sometimes, again, he employed himself with statistics, and sought the solution of a problem which had greatly interested him during his reign, namely, that of the extinction of pauperism.

The Emperor Napoleon had, in short, studied mathematics deeply, and valued this science above all others; but, in conformity with his peculiar character, he had only made use of such problems as were capable of direct application. He said that drawing and the exact sciences give precision to the mind; and it is a fact that drawing teaches the eye to *see*, and mathematics the mind to *think*. He also held that it was wrong to overburden the heads of young people, and weary their mind by too profound analytical studies.

Allow me, in conclusion, to hazard a philosophical sketch. Great men have always a vast influence over the generations which succeed them, although this influence be often denied and combated. Thus the influence of Charlemagne was felt for several centuries; and, even at the present time,

the education of the young is in accordance with the impulse given by this great man. At the time when Christianity and barbarism overthrew the Roman empire, the Church was the torch of science, the beacon of civilization, and through it alone was it possible to soften the manners of the people, and to introduce discipline among the armed hosts. Charlemagne made use of the prestige attached to the Church, restored it to its original austerity, and increased its influence and power. To enter this Church, which then ruled in Constantinople as well as in Rome, it was necessary to know Greek and Latin; these two languages were therefore the basis of all science, the indispensable road from ignorance to knowledge, from barbarism to civilization. Now, although our social condition is completely changed in the course of a thousand years, although the gateways of knowledge have been forced open by the laity, this ecclesiastical method was still implicitly followed in education but fifty years since; and it needed a revolution like the revolution of '89, and a man like Napoleon, to raise the physical and mathematical sciences above the dead languages; and that must also be the aim and end of our existing society, for these sciences produce workers instead of creating idlers.

It was the mission of the Emperor, in politics as in education, to substitute another for the edifice of Charlemagne; but the time was too short for this and for many other things. And is it not incomprehensible that an examination in Latin and in Greek is still preliminary to entering the Polytechnic and military schools; that in the nineteenth century, Latin should be necessary to construct men-of-war or fortresses!—Latin to learn to propel bullets, or to apply chemical and mechanical science to the arts!

When we make these comparisons, the disheartening conviction forces itself upon us that even great minds are often the slaves of prejudice and of routine. The most

futile and useless customs have deep-seated roots in the past; and though at first sight it may seem that a breath will be sufficient to destroy them, they frequently resist social convulsions and the efforts of a great man.

If this letter does not give a satisfactory reply to the questions you have addressed to me, you will, nevertheless, I hope, see in it, my desire to conform with your request, and with that of M. Arago, whose scientific attainments no one can admire more than I do. Be so kind to remember me to Madame Thayer and to the duke of Padua, and believe in my sentiments of the highest esteem and friendship.

NAPOLEON LOUIS BONAPARTE.

Progrès du pas-de-Calais, 6th December, 1842.

II.

THE SLAVE TRADE, THE PHILANTHROPISTS, AND THE RIGHT OF SEARCH.

LET us honour those philanthropists who, by a happy application of a grand philosophic idea, do good to their fellow-men; but let us beware of those men whose theories are more brilliant than true, who pursue an idea without considering the contrary effects it may produce, and who, anxious to embrace the entire world in their overflowing love, occasion misery to mankind. The particular characteristic of these crude spirits of whom we would speak, is that they excite their sympathies for woes which are entirely foreign to them, and of which they know little. The ardour of these men grows always in inverse ratio to the distance at which the objects of their sympathy may be. They are callous to the misery of the French proletary classes, to the poverty of the labourer who dwells under the same roof with them; but as soon as our antipodes are the victims of some

cruelty, then their passion is roused; for the humanity which suffers at the other end of the world seems to them more worthy of commiseration than that which languishes at their doors. And if, after all, they really did good to any one, we would bless their efforts, for all men are brothers. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case.

But to facts. Public feeling in Europe grew intolerant of slavery and the export of slaves. The feeling was genuine, for it was a popular one; but the so-called philosophers have taken it in hand, and have aggravated the evil they sought to cure. This can easily be proved. In most of the hot countries of America the earth is exclusively tilled by blacks. The African race is necessary in this climate; slavery forced them to labour, and the import annually increased their number. The property of two-thirds of America depended on slavery and on importation. A religious and Christian feeling, which we are far from blaming, as we share it ourselves, spread over Europe, and, commiserating the sufferings of a whole race of human beings, it cried unanimously: "No more slavery, no more slave trade." Then the European race in America replied: "Emancipation for us is synonymous with robbery, ruin, and murder, for the slaves are our property; we have bought them—you must buy their liberty; and if you liberate them all at once they will kill us. We also are your brothers, and we too have a right to your protection."

As there was justice in this retort, the French government replied: "Well, slavery may continue for the present, but the importation of slaves must cease. We will abolish it by the treaty of the right of search." What was the consequence? As the importation of slaves was an imperious necessity for many parts of America, so long as slavery existed it was obliged to continue; and it is carried on to this day surreptitiously on an immense scale. While the

trade remained unchecked, it was impossible to forbid the supply; so long as an imperious want is felt by a whole class of society, it always finds means to provide for it. The consequence, however, is, that the poor negroes, instead of being crowded in vessels by twenties, are now packed by hundreds; and when the ships which carry them are pursued by the philanthropic cruisers, the slaves are thrown into the sea to evade the penalty imposed by the European governments. As a proof of what we advance, we will cite one fact out of hundreds which took place on the coast of Brazil in 1836, and which was well known to the whole French squadron.

An English cruiser sights a ship whose appearance indicates her to be a slaver, and pursues her. The latter makes away as quickly as her spread sails will carry her, but the Englishman is near, is on the point of reaching her, when all at once a large quantity of barrels are thrown from the ship into the sea. One of these barrels floats near the English ship; it is seized, raised on deck, opened; a cry of horror is heard from the sailors, for a negro is found to be confined in the barrel, and in every one which could be rescued from the sea was another. The slaver tried, by this means, to hide his merchandise; the laws of the philanthropists had then changed a slave merchant into an assassin. And this is by no means an isolated fact. It is averred that Brazil receives more negroes annually by contraband means than it received before the treaties for the suppression of the traffic in human beings. Thus the negroes suffer more now than they did before; the right of search has not done any service to humanity, and as long as slavery exists it will remain so. What can be done, then? If the great question of the abolition of slavery had been taken in hand by the governments, parties sincerely anxious to promote the good of humanity and the interests of the white and of the black races, they would have accustomed the slaves in their

colonies to pass insensibly from the condition of forced to that of free labour by submitting them to a gradual apprenticeship. During that time they, in concert with the governments of the slave states, should have watched that the import trade was carried on with all possible humanity, by inflicting severe penalties on all captains of vessels who had not treated the negroes as Europeans emigrating to America. All the governments of Europe should have agreed in endeavouring to persuade all the American governments to follow their example, and then their arguments would have taken effect; whereas now the Brazilian government, for example, may demand of France by what right she prevents slaves from being brought to her, since she permits them in her own colonies.

If slavery were extinguished, the slave trade would be annihilated with it, and humanity would be satisfied. Now, however, hatred has been fostered between the master and the slave, the trade is carried on surreptitiously, and becomes more horrible the more one tries to repress it. Finally, this suppression serves as a pretext to England which is ever ready to declare war, or, in other words, to kill thousands of Englishmen and of Frenchmen for the so-called interests of humanity.

In conclusion we repeat that, if philanthropy, well directed, is one of the most noble of human virtues, false philanthropy is the worst of its sins. This reminds us of the noble words of M. Villemain, when he was not a minister: "Truth must be a precious thing in itself, since the errors of generosity which pure minds commit, are nearly as fatal to humanity as the crimes committed by the wicked."

Progrès du pas-de-Calais, 4th February, 1843.

III.

UNION IS STRENGTH—AN HISTORICAL LESSON.

In 1685, the throne of England was filled by a king whose name was James II. this prince was simple in manners, exempt from vices, and possessed of many very commendable qualities.

On his accession, people remembered with interest the vicissitudes of his past life. They remembered that in his youth he had fought courageously in the civil wars, and that, in exile with his family during the Republic and the Protectorate, he had been brought up in that school of adversity always so praised and often so resultless. When he had arrived at that age when experience and reason should take the place of short-lived illusions and unbridled passions, he seemed the man most capable of giving happiness to the people he was called upon to govern.

And yet such did not turn out to be the case. James II. was the most contemptible king that England has ever had, for he had nothing English in him; neither mind, nor heart, nor affections, nor religion. Even his good qualities were opposed to those of the nation.

England was a municipal country, he was for centralization; England was constitutional, he was a despot; England was Protestant, he was Catholic; England was proud and independent, he was servile, and the slave of the foreigner.

The great political events which the king had witnessed as duke of York, instead of creating in him matured convictions based on the terrible example of his predecessors, had left no traces in his mind except a profound hatred of new ideas and a doubt in the existence of good. He called progress a Utopia; glory, a delusion; honour, a

necessity. Convinced that the prerogatives of the crown were of more value in the eyes of God than the rights of the people; that the liberties and rights for which the English people had fought during forty years, were prized only by a factious minority which poisoned the public mind; that the liberal institutions, the fruits of the revolution, constantly menaced his authority,* he resolved to re-establish in all their integrity, by cunning or by force, all the old abuses, the old customs, and the old laws.

For success in this perfidious plan, he relied on the moral depression of the nation, on the support of a foreign power, on the disunion of political parties, on the army, and on the resources of his wily mind.

At this epoch, the nation was lying prostrate in universal apathy; the political changes which had taken place within the short space of fifty years had exhausted the powers, weakened the confidence, and almost annihilated the opinion of the public. The different parties, having exhausted their former violence, still retained their former animosities, and by their disunion exposed the country to a party without honour or patriotism. Hallam says, in his *Constitutional History* (vol. iii. p. 75) :—"*There was a great relaxation of principle in the higher classes; and in the lower ones a selfish servility towards those in power, and an immoderate thirst for place.*" James II. also said to the ambassador Barillon, his confidant (Hallam, p. 76), "*that he knew England well enough to be convinced that the prospect of having places and offices would make more Catholics than the permission to celebrate mass in public.*"

The parliament was a faithful representative of the

* James II. often said that a government could not exist with such institutions as the Habeas Corpus and the Test Act. (Dalrymple,

corrupt condition of the nation. It neither supported the measures of the government nor formed a compact and national opposition, so that there was never a decisive majority; and one of the most important laws was passed, according to Hallam, by a majority of one. The people, in return, looked on the debates of the houses of parliament as they would on a cockfight, and vociferously applauded the conqueror, whoever he might be.

In the meantime, James's political conduct made him many enemies. At home, there was nothing but despotism and corruption; abroad, only weakness and dishonour. His first act on ascending the throne was to implore a subsidy from a foreign monarch, and later, when insurrections had broken out in various parts of England, he made that a pretext for keeping up a larger standing army than England had ever had before.

Although this country was at peace with all the foreign powers, yet the noise of drums and the clash of warlike instruments resounded everywhere; and the army which, during the Republic and under the Protectorate, had made the English name respected on the continent, now only served to uphold the most shameful government which has ever oppressed the country. The officers were also chosen, not for their merits as soldiers, but for their political opinions.

The proof of this grasping for supremacy exists in the following extract of a letter from Barillon:—"*It seems to me,*" says the ambassador, "*that the king is pleased enough to have a pretext for raising more troops. He thinks that the Duke of Monmouth's insurrection will serve to make him more completely master of the land, and then his project is entirely to abolish the militia, as he has seen their uselessness and danger on the late occa-*

this establishment abolished, but he is determined to make sure of the country, and believes that for this purpose his measures are indispensable." (Dalrymple, p. 169.)

One must, indeed, always reign either by moral or physical force. James II. chose the latter, and thought that, with a servile parliament, an obedient bench of judges, headed by such men as Herbert and Jefferies, and with a permanent army, he could make himself absolute master of his subjects, and control their laws and their consciences. He introduced a law for the preservation of the person of the king, which, as Hallam says, was full of dangerous and unconstitutional innovations. He violated the privileges of the corporations, limited the elective franchise, and even the university of Oxford, the sanctuary of monarchical opinion, was not secure from his arbitrary persecutions. Public indignation was greatly excited by the dismissal of the professors of Magdalen college, and it was openly said on this occasion (Hallam, page 104):—*What have we gained by our revolutions, if James II. is to govern us as despotically as the Tudors did?*

The composition of the privy council, whose members were chosen from amongst the most unpopular men in the kingdom, irritated the entire nation, who heard with indignation (Hallam, page 79) that an unprincipled minister, an intriguing priest, or a licentious poet, had been raised to the councils of a monarch, whose favour could only be obtained by treading under foot all political honour and religious faith. And yet when the famous decree of liberty of conscience, which so deeply shocked public opinion, was proclaimed, the municipal bodies were sunk so low by the habit of submission, that congratulatory addresses were sent by hundreds by all the sects, all the grand juries, the corporations, towns and hamlets, and these addresses, the deceitful homage of the oppressed, were repeated with the

same apparent fervour on the occasion of the birth of the Prince of Wales. The English historian says (Hallam, page 101 :)—"*At the present day, when we know the prevailing spirit of the people of that age, we should blush at the cowardice and hypocrisy of our forefathers, did we not know that these addresses were, in fact, but the work of a contemptible minority.*"

The foreign policy of James II. was as severely censured as his government at home. At this time the Augsburg league had been formed to resist the ambitious projects of Louis XIV. England, as a free, a Protestant, and a maritime country, was deeply interested in the independence of the Netherlands. It ought to have been placed at the head of the league ; but, says Hallam, the sinister inclinations of the king had weaned him from the real interests of his country, and had made him the vassal of a foreign king. His ministers lauded the Anglo-French alliance, and Sunderland wrote to the French ambassador (Hallam, p. 75):—"*I can plainly see the apprehension that many people have of an alliance with France, and the efforts they make to weaken it, but that will not be in any one's power.*" This letter shows the blindness of the English court. And how could it have escaped the catastrophe which awaited it, when it had no uprightness in its diplomatic relations, even towards the power to which it owed most? While James II. was conspiring with Barillon against the liberties of the people, and sending protestations upon protestations to Louis XIV., he was secretly treating for an alliance with Spain. (Hallam, p. 108.)

One very remarkable fact took place in this reign, which proves how impotent governments are when they act against the general feeling of the country. They may, indeed, repress insurrection for a time, they may stifle complaints and corrupt individuals, but what they gain on one side

they have to give up on the other: the vitality of action which they repress by physical force will take root and develope itself in the minds of the people.

It is curious to see that this English king, the vassal of Louis XIV., anxious to destroy the protestant religion and popular liberty in his own country, was yet not strong enough, spite of troops, judges, and courtiers, to refuse an asylum to the victims of the revocation of the edict of Nantes, who introduced into the country that spirit of reform and of liberty which he wished to destroy.

Yet, in spite of the growing unpopularity of the king's government, the national spirit had so degenerated, as we have before shown, that a successful termination of his projects might have been looked for, had not a fortunate change taken place among the parties which then divided England. As long as Anglicans, nonconformists, dissenters, Whigs, and Tories waged a fratricidal war against one another, the executive gained strength by their disunion; and public opinion, left without a guide, reeled unsteadily, like a ship without compass and without helmsman. What can be more deplorable than to see parties obstinately maintaining a war of words about mystical theories, while, at bottom, they are agreed on the grand fundamental principles whose general adoption would secure the prosperity of their country! All parties should have been united on one point, for all, except the one in power, wished for the freedom and glory of England, all acknowledged the will of the people as a supreme authority, and free elections as the means which should introduce harmony among the children of the same great family.

Unfortunately a common antipathy unites parties and individuals more easily than a common sympathy; and though all had the same love of country in their hearts, it was only the hatred against an anti-national executive

which ranged them under the same banner. From that moment the cause of James II. was irrevocably lost, and that of the English people securely gained. It was in vain that the king boasted of being surrounded by men who had successively served the Republic, Cromwell, and Charles II.; these men represented no party and no interest, for deserters never take their colours with them. There were only two parties in England, one composed of the men in power —men without principle, honour, or national feeling; the other composed of the entire country, led by men devoted to the liberty and glory, to the independence and greatness, of their country. Protestantism was then, in England, the symbol of all liberal interests, and to insure its triumph, puritans and Anglicans, republicans and monarchists, united against the common enemy. From this union was born, brilliant and full of promise, the celebrated revolution of 1688. Many tears had been shed, much blood had been spilled, and long years had passed before this great result could be achieved, for *since the Restoration twenty-eight years had elapsed!*

Progrès du pas-de-Calais, 10*th of March*, 1843.

IV.

OPINION OF THE EMPEROR ON THE RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH THE EUROPEAN POWERS.

For the last twelve years controversy has been busy in discussing the relative advantages of an English or a Russian alliance, as if it were absolutely necessary that France should be in close league with one or the other of these countries. To hear these two theses alone occupy the political world, it would seem that France had need of another power beside its own to make itself respected, of another voice beside

its own to make itself heard in the congress of nations. On the other hand we do not promise that France should stand isolated, and have no frank and amicable understanding with other powers; but we hold, that an alliance should be the result of long and friendly relations between nations, and not the fruit of a sudden whim. These are the words of the Emperor Napoleon on this subject:

"France is, by its geographical situation, the fertility of its soil, and the intelligent energy of its inhabitants, the arbiter of European society;—she exceeds the part which nature has assigned her when she becomes a conqueror; she falls from it when she obeys the rule of any alliance whatsoever. She is to the nations of Europe what the lion is to the animals which surround it. She cannot move without protecting or destroying; she may lend the support of her strength, but she never exchanges it—as an aid which may be necessary for the defence of another. Her own strength suffices for herself, even when she is momentarily weakened by that malady of nations, intestine convulsions; for she needs but a convulsive effort to punish her enemies for having dared to call her to the fight.

"In 1793 all Europe was allied against France; a hundred thousand Vendeans, in English pay, threatened Paris; one million three hundred thousand Frenchmen enrolled themselves as soldiers, for the love of their country,—and not, as has been written, to escape from the axe of the executioners of a Robespierre or a Couthon. The coalition was overthrown and forced to acknowledge the Republic.

"What France achieved then, France was able to do in 1814 and 1815; though fatigued with long exertions this comparative lassitude was more than compensated by the advantages of her unity, her obedience to one order. Neither

her to pass under the yoke. General Bonaparte would have saved her, the Emperor lost her by abdicating.

"When one has the honour and happiness of belonging to France, one should feel the whole bearing of this position, and not from being a *sun* sink into a *satellite*.

"Powerful as England is, alone she cannot intervene in the affairs of the continent with the importance of a nation of the first rank; she must, necessarily, be supported at Vienna, Paris, or St. Petersburg; and on this account has Lord Castlereagh bestowed the high-sounding title of kingdom on the estates of Hanover, in order that he might have a king's voice in the Germanic Diet."

What has taken place during the last twelve years proves the depth of thought in Napoleon's observations. In 1830, the French government eagerly sought the goodwill and support of England, and England replied: We will support your principles in Europe, but resign your interests to us. Recognise the treaties of 1815, and the supremacy of our marine; promise to evacuate Algeria when we demand it,—even to sacrifice some one of your branches of industry, and allow our supremacy to be established in the East and in the Mediterranean." These promises having been made, England will demand the fulfilment of the contract when she deems the time favourable. She stands on her right. But why has our government, through its chief, pledged our future prospects, and neglected the interests of the country for those of a dynasty? We wish a good understanding to reign between the two most civilized nations of the world, but only on condition that the privileges and the dignity of each be weighed with the same weights and in the same balance, and that the men charged with the high mission of reconciling two rival nations should have no other object than the happiness of France and the development of its agricul-

tural, industrial, and commercial resources, which can only be achieved by an upright, energetic, and national system of government.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 22nd March, 1843.

V.

THE OPPOSITION.

THE opposition will never fill a very high place in public opinion so long as it has no passions—no system—no aim. No matter whether its passion be for economy, the development of material interests, the supremacy of the country, glory or liberty; whatever it be, the opposition must have its cause at heart to be able to rouse the popular heart. Let its system be English, American, Prussian, or Turkish, it must prove that its convictions are firm before it can convince others. Let the goal towards which it strives be near or far, it must, at least, exist, and be comprehensible, that one may judge it, and if it be good, pursue it; for the people will tire of always moving on without hope of attaining their ends.

Now, except a small knot of men who share our convictions, there is no party in the Chamber; the chiefs of the dynastic opposition, except M. de Lamartine, have no passions, no system, no object. Ask them how they understand the international relations of France with the other powers of Europe, and they will give an equivocating reply. Ask them how they propose to effect a diminution of taxation, an amelioration of agricultural interests, the organization of industry, and the extension of trade, and they will reply by generalities. Ask them their plans for the satisfactory arrangement of the political privileges of the citizens, the military organization of France, and the organization which the working classes so imperiously demand, and they will be unable to answer at all.

Wrapped in the cloud of opposition, they marvel that the nation does not follow them in their nebulous march, and that their blank flag is impotent to rally around them an army of liberal minds. They invoke the manes of Foy, of Manuel, of La Fayette, forgetting that these men possessed the qualities they need. During the Restoration, the passion of the chiefs of the opposition was liberty; their system, the English constitution; and their object, the establishment of parliamentary government. Therefore, their every blow and their every word was heard from one end of France to the other; and from 1816 to 1830, they surmounted all obstacles, and cut their way slowly but progressively to triumph.

We feel personally too much esteem for the chiefs of the dynastic opposition not to tell them the truth, by applying to them these noble words of M. de Lamartine: "France must cease to be France, or you must give up making an opposition without principle or character. The country is weary of a war of words, of chicanery, and double dealing; urgent demands and positive opinions are required, and efficacious remedies for deeply felt sufferings."

For twelve years past our energy may be measured by the downfall of liberty. In 1830, the people drove away, in three days, a monarchy of eight centuries; a new dynasty is raised to the throne; the ministry explains this event by these words, since become historical: *Parceque Bourbon* (because he is a Bourbon); you reply by your celebrated *Quoique Bourbon* (although a Bourbon), and thus you think to save the great principle of election.

The nations rise, and the ministry declares for war if Austria begins a campaign. You ask if it is probable; and Italy is invaded. Poland hoists the flag of independence, and implores the assistance of France; the ministry declares it is too far, and you cry: "Would to God it were nearer!"

and Poland is annihilated. The laws of September, which violate all the promises of the Revolution, are revised, and you content yourselves with saying that the word *attentat* (attempt) is too vague and undefined. The electoral reform, which you clamoured for with us under the Restoration, is demanded, and it is much that you vote for consideration of the capabilities of voters.

The expenditure swells by millions, and you put yourselves in high feather, and end by proposing a reduction of 50,000 francs on a budget of a milliard and a half (1,500,000,000 frs.)

France is insulted, the ministry lowers its head; you raise yours, but are silent; thus displaying the most deplorable spectacle, arrogance under subjection.

Finally, the right of search angers the nation, the ministry maintains it, and you content yourselves with saying—We wish it were not so.

Is this, we ask, language befitting men who aspire to represent the French democracy, that upright, proud, and courageous body?

Know, that like the human body, a social one can only prosper when the different parts of which it is composed regularly fulfil their several respective functions; the inaction of a single one causes the destruction of all the others. The head, the seat of intelligence, ought to lead the rest of the body; for, if it neglects its mission, it must die with it. You, as deputies, are the head of the nation; and as it receives neither impulsion nor direction from you, it ought to perish. But, as nations do not perish, France will advance without you, for you do not know how to lead her.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 1*st April*, 1843.

VI.

ON THE PROJECT OF A LAW FOR THE RECRUITING OF THE ARMY.

ONE of the most grave reproaches which can be made against the government, and which, if there were a truly national opposition, it ought to hear repeated every day, is, that it has not taken advantage of the last twelve years of peace to institute a military organization of the country, so that France need never fear an invasion.

Since 1830, the war budgets have amounted to the immense sum of three milliards and a half; and yet, when, in 1840, rumours of war began to alarm those in power, they confessed in the Assembly that France was not prepared, that they needed a year to make her ready; that the infantry wanted appointments; the cavalry, horses; the artillery and the fortresses, arms and materials of war; and the whole army a reserve; so that, since twelve years, we have spent more than three milliards and a half, and have neither sufficient materials nor a good military organization.

At the present time, it is not enough for a nation to have a few hundreds of cavaliers armed in steel, or some thousand mercenaries, in order to uphold its rank and support its independence; it needs millions of armed men; for when a war breaks out, the nations struggle with each other in masses; and when the fight has commenced, the genius of the leader and the bravery of the troops gain the victory; but *organization alone* resists a defeat and saves the country. The Emperor has said, a nation is never in need of men even after the most destructive wars, but it is often in want of soldiers.

This maxim is of the greatest importance to us, and

should be always kept in mind. Our political station, our isolated position as a people, make it our imperative duty to organize our forces, not that we may again conquer the world, but that we may be for ever protected against invasion. We ought to profit by our misfortunes, and by the example of other nations.

In 1792, there was one nation in Europe which lived only on its military reputation ; having had at its head a great man who had glorified its name, and having triumphed in many battles over Austrians, Russians, and French, it relied securely on its past achievements. Frederick lived no longer ; but the Prussian army was still commanded by some of his most celebrated officers. Confiding in the talent of its leaders, and the recollections of the past, it proudly rushed into war ; but after the first campaign a few French battalions put it to flight, and the officers of Frederick bit the dust ; and when the Republic had brought forth a man who surpassed the Prussian hero by the difference of the impulses which governed them, Prussia was conquered in one single battle.

But the Prussians knew how to profit by their reverses ; and in order that another Jena should not again ruin their country in one day, they have established the most perfect military organization which has ever existed among civilized nations.

Well, we also live on our past glory—we have among us the old officers of the Emperor ; but the terrible example of Waterloo has not taught us. We are defenceless.

We must insist on this comparison to prove that this is not a question of a law of details, but a question of the principle of existence. The problem to be resolved is this : *to resist a coalition, France needs an immense army of trained men : nay, more, it needs a reserve of trained men in case of reverse.* But as no state in the

world can, without exhausting its resources, constantly maintain hundreds of thousands of men in active service, a system ought to be invented which should offer the greatest possible advantages in time of war, without causing too heavy an expense in time of peace. That is the problem, and thus put, the question becomes a great one. It is unnecessary to treat it in detail. If the military organization of a people had not always to agree with its natural qualifications, its political position, and its social condition, it would be simple enough to find the best means of having a good army, for the question would merely be to have as many soldiers as possible, and to keep them as long as possible in the regiments. The man who has been in the army six years, as in France, is better trained than he who has only been three years, as in Prussia; but he who serves ten years, as in England, or twenty years, as in Austria or Prussia, will be better still. The question is more political than military.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 29th April, 1843.

VII.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

We stated at the end of the last chapter, that the law which provides for an organized defence of the country is more a political than a military law, which means, that the basis on which it rests will be good or bad, according as the policy of the government is national or not.

If the government be anxious to maintain the great interests of the country, it will endeavour to reduce the expenditure of the country by diminishing the number of its standing army, and by considerably augmenting its reserve forces; it will establish an arsenal in every great territorial

and will not place all the military stores and depôts of arms on the frontiers. It will organize an army in such a manner that it can in a short time, and without expense, be placed on a war footing. It will reduce the staffs to the smallest possible limit, and create a military spirit by securing the future prospects in life of the officers and soldiers, by reserving civil appointments for them in their old age; and it will always keep the army at the frontiers; and in brigades and regiments, for good discipline can only be attained where the troops are kept together in numbers, and where there is a daily intercourse between the generals, the officers, and the men. We have, in place of this, an army, brave and efficient, no doubt, but which consists of only 344,000 drilled men—an insufficient number in time of war, and a ruinous burden to the country in time of peace. The army has no reserve, is encumbered by useless and costly machinery, and has 100 more generals at its head than the armies of the Empire ever had.* It is administered by a department which employs 300 clerks more than during the Empire, and whose administrative system consists in spending 100 francs to save five. It follows, as a matter of course, that this army costs more than that which conquered at Wagram and at Austerlitz. And yet we need more than a year to place our army on a war footing; and the army, scattered over the whole country, and far from the frontiers, is not only nowhere united as one, but is quartered in the centre of the kingdom, at Paris, as if the enemy were there.

In the face of such a state of things Marshal Soult felt that something ought to be done; but he proposes such

* The generals in active service under the Empire at the period of the battle of Austerlitz were 253; during 1843, 353. The budget of war in 1809, for 736,000 soldiers was 320 millions; in 1843, for 344,000 men, 331 millions. The staff under the Empire cost 9 millions; in 1843, 17 millions.

insufficient improvements that it is not worth while to change the law and incur new expenses.

The new law on the recruiting of the army proposes extending the time of service to eight years, and that such contingent should have served in the field, which would place eight contingents at the disposal of the government. According to the report of General Préval, by deducting what belongs to the marine, the exempt, the rebellious, the half-pay, each contingent of 80,000 is reduced to 65,000. This available number, multiplied by eight years' service, gives 520,000 men, which, with gradual losses calculated according to official documents, is reduced to 421,000 men, and adding those always available, (such as gendarmerie, officers, volunteers,) amounting to 89,000 men, we have a total of 510,000 men.

Article 31 of the law decrees, that when it is requisite to give unlimited furloughs to the soldiers in service, they shall be released on condition of necessity of their service, and the men in reserve shall be subjected to reviews and drills.

Now let us suppose that of the eight years of service, the government keeps the soldiers six years in the field and two on open furlough. The result will be, according to all calculations, and including those not subjected to recal—

	415,000	men.
And a reserve of	95,000	„
Total	510,000	„

If the time of service be only five years, the active army would be—

	367,000	men.
On the reserve	143,000	„
Total	510,000	„

It is at once evident that this total of 510,000 men is insufficient for even an insignificant war, and that the

reserve means nothing; for what is a reserve of 95,000 men, or of 143,000 men without officers, and whose whole organization may be summed up in the words: They can be called together for reviews and for drills? And yet, to have this so called reserve, France is condemned, during the most profound peace, constantly to maintain under arms 415,000 men, and to spend more than 400 millions of francs.

General Préval, who revised the report of the commission, being, no doubt, struck by the inefficiency of such a reserve, proposes not to subject the soldiers on open leave of absence to periodical drills; but it has grieved us much that the general has declared himself opposed to any organization of the reserve. How can a man so enlightened and so practical as General Préval oppose a system which presents so many advantages? Probably only because he regards the question more in a political than a military point of view. As a member of the government, he takes care, when he speaks of the military institutions of Prussia, to represent them as a yoke of iron oppressing the population, and as being diametrically opposed to our manners and our French institutions, forgetting that the French nation is better fitted than any other for supporting such institutions; for the Prussian system is based on the most perfect equality, nay, on principles of democracy. It is, no doubt, tyrannic, as all laws are, which, adopting great principles, inflict the same tax on all men, and force rich and poor alike to pay their debt to their country; but this tyranny of the law is the inevitable offspring of a democratic society, and in it consists true equality. The member of the government again peeps through when he says in page 33:

"Will there be no risk in scattering the depôts of arms over the country indiscriminately, and in bringing away, throwing together, and moving a mass of men in whom the

excitement of youth and passion is not tempered by experience, by discipline, or by an order of ranks?"

Which means, that in democratic France the government is not sure enough of general support to introduce such equalizing institutions, which have, for thirty years, been the glory of monarchical Prussia.

In our next chapter we shall say some words on the organization of the army in the country of Frederick the Great, and offer our views of the manner in which the same grand institution might be introduced into France.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 3rd May, 1843.

VIII.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

BEFORE entering on an exposition of the system which we would introduce in France, we will say a few words on the military organization of Prussia.

Prussia has 14,330,000 inhabitants; the army consists of 145,000 men, the Landwehr of 385,000.

The army must be considered as a large school, in which all the citizens have to learn the profession of arms. Every soldier only remains three years in service, and, on his dismissal, is counted in the reserve for two years longer; this means, that in case of war he is obliged to join his regiment, and in time of peace he is drilled for two years in the Landwehr of the first ban.

The force of the state is thus composed:—

1. *The permanent army*, consisting of men from the age of twenty to twenty-five. More than a hundred thousand annually attain this age, but only about twenty-five thousand are enlisted.

2. *The Landwehr of the first ban*, consisting of all the young men of from twenty to twenty-five who have not

served in the army; of soldiers who have served three years, and of the entire population of from twenty-five to thirty-two years of age. Only the staff of each battalion, and one sergeant-major, one quartermaster, and two corporals, for each division, are permanent and annually paid. The cavalry is on the same footing. The government maintains in pay for each squadron, one officer, one quartermaster, three lieutenants, and a trumpeter. It is exercised twice a year for a month.

3. *The Landwehr of the second ban.* This may be considered as the reserve of the army, and consists of the best drilled men, and of men in the prime of life, men of from thirty-two to thirty-nine, who have all served either in the army or in the Landwehr of the first ban. It has no permanent officers.

4. *The Landsturm,* or Landwehr of the third ban, only exists on paper, and includes all men from seventeen to fifty years of age, but is only summoned in extreme cases.

The active army, including the first Landwehr, counts 330,000 fighting men; add to it the Landwehr of the second ban, which alone contains nearly 200,000 fighting men, and there will be a total of about 530,000 men.

The principle of this organization rests on the system of recruiting by provinces. Prussia is divided into provinces, districts, circuits, and parishes. The districts are so composed that they recruit at the same time the regiments of the line and of the Landwehr, which bears the same number. Each circle furnishes a battalion of Landwehr of the first ban and one of the second ban; the smaller territorial divisions furnish companies. The artillery of the Landwehr is only to join the artillery of the line in case of war. Each battalion of infantry of the Landwehr gives a company of a hundred soldiers, eight corporals, and an officer, which, during the training, is collected and drilled

by officers and lieutenants of artillery, taken, with their field-pieces, from the standing army. Each division, or brigade, has its head-quarters in the province where it is recruited.

Thus Prussia, with a population two-and-a-half times less numerous than that of France, can bring 530,000 trained soldiers to defend the country in case of attack, and this at a cost of less than *fifty million* francs per annum; and a beat of the drum is sufficient to bring the troops together or to send them home. This system affords such immense advantages, that they outweigh all errors of detail which may perhaps be found; for, we repeat it, the question is not to know whether soldiers who have been three years in service are as well broken in to the trade as those who have served eight years, but to find a system which, in cases of urgent danger will bring together thousands of trained men; and which, in time of peace, is not a great drag on the budget, and takes but few young men from the tillage of the soil.

The Prussian system resolves this problem materially and morally, and merits our admiration from a philosophical as well as a military point of view, for it destroys all barriers between the citizen and the soldier, and exalts the sentiments of every man, by making him feel that the defence of his country is his first duty. There lies, indeed, the great difference between the Landwehr and the national guard as it is at present organized. In Prussia, the entire nation is armed to defend the country; in France, the bourgeoisie alone is armed for the defence of their private interests; they do not, therefore, write "*glory, independence,*" on their flags, but "*public order.*" In Prussia, the traffic, which may well be called a traffic in white men, and which may be described in a few words:—"For the rich who wish to free themselves from military service, to buy a man of the people, and send him to be killed in his stead, does not exist."

There are no substitutes. The Prussian organization is, therefore, the only one which suits our democratic tendencies, our equalizing manners, and our political position, for it is based on justice, equality, and economy, and has for its object, not conquest, but independence.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 5th May, 1843.

IX.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

MONTESQUIEU says: "It must be remarked that what has contributed more than anything else to make the Romans masters of the world is, that having successively conquered all other nations, they renounced their own customs as soon as they found better ones." Without pretending to an empire over the world, we might well follow this example, and take from foreigners those institutions which are best adapted to our habits, rejecting at the same time those which are opposed to our nature or to our requirements. The difficulty is in the choice;—thus, instead of endeavouring to introduce into France the aristocratic constitution of England, it would be better were our statesmen to adopt from British institutions those which protect individual liberty, which encourage the spirit of association, and develope a spirit of legality. It would be well also if they were to borrow from Germany its system of public education and of municipal and military organization. As this last-named question is the subject of our essay, we will show how it could be applied in our country.

France would have to be divided into thirty or forty military districts. Each district would be enough to recruit one military division, composed of troops of the line and of national guards. The head-quarters would be in the chief town of the district, which would also be the central depôt

The national forces should be composed :—

1. Of the permanent army ;
2. Of the reserve of this army ;
3. Of the national guard of the first ban ;
4. Of the national guard of the second ban.

As France, on a population of thirty-five millions, annually produces from 315,000 to 320,000 young men of twenty years of age, one might take, says General Préval, in his interesting report, from 140,000 to 150,000 conscripts, without injuring either trade or agriculture ; and this is applicable to our system, which reduces the length of service nearly by half.

Calculating on 145,000 young men per annum, we should have :—

1. The permanent army, composed of young men from twenty to twenty-seven years of age, whose annual contingent would be 80,000, and who would remain four years in service and three in reserve.

2. The reserve of the army, composed of soldiers who had served four years, and remain in the reserve for three years longer ; which means, that in time of war they should be bound to rejoin their regiments, while in time of peace they would be drilled every year with the national guard of the first ban.

3. The national guard of the first ban, composed of such of the conscription of twenty to twenty-seven years who have not been called upon to serve, and whose annual contingent would amount to 65,000 men. The staff of each battalion and some lieutenants would be permanent, and the preference would be given to half-pay officers, who would only receive an increase of pay during the manœuvres.

It would be drilled twice a-year ; one month in Spring, after the field labours ; one month in Autumn, after the harvest.

The horses of the artillery would be farmed out to the peasants, as in Germany.

The national guard of the second ban would be formed of all men of twenty-seven to thirty-five years, who have left the reserve or the national guard of the first ban. It would have no permanent appointments, and only be drilled one fortnight in the year.

Making these calculations according to the official documents, deducting the men required for the marine, the unenrolled and the annual losses; adding, on the other side, men not included in the calculations, such as volunteers, re-enlisted, gendarmes, officers, and culprits, &c., we have the following available army :—

1. The permanent army.	1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th contingent . .	227,000	316,000 men.
	Men generally exempt from conscription .	89,000	
2. Reserve and National Guard of the first ban	Soldiers on furlough, 5th, 6th, and 7th contingent . . .	146,828	521,198 „
	Seven contingents of the National Guard	374,370	
3. National Guard of second ban	As it is composed of the two seventh contingents, leaving the reserve and the National Guard of the first ban, which are each reduced by annual losses to 48,356 men, it leaves	677,000	„
	Total . .	1,514,198	„

If the Prussian system were followed, this army of a million and a half of men would not cost so much as the 344,000 men which compose the actual army. By adopting the recruiting by provinces the matter is simplified. Even the soldiers of the permanent army would not be obliged to remain constantly under arms, as they could be sent home and recalled without great expense, as long as they did not leave the district. Of the 316,000 men of the army, not more than two-thirds would be in service during

it; for the soldier who has once learnt the handling of arms and had the schooling of the battalion, learns nothing during the winter, except perhaps to go to the public-house and sleep ten hours out of the twenty-four.

The great meetings of the body of the army and the national guard for the spring and autumn reviews would give occasion for popular festivals, which would excite emulation among the troops, infuse life throughout France, and cherish the sacred fire and high military spirit, which form the noblest national virtue. The recruiting by districts would also have the immense advantage of diminishing the fearful mortality which reigns among the young conscripts, and the cause of which is the long marches they are obliged to make to join their regiments, and the home-sickness they feel when, as is often the case, they are sent, during the first months, three hundred leagues from their birthplace. According to the official lists, the losses of the army are:—The first year, $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; the second, $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; the third, $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; the fourth, $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; the fifth, 3; and the remaining years, 2 per cent.; and according to these lists have we calculated the above tables.

Now, we will consider how much these 1,500,000 men will cost in round sums:

	Francs.
Central administration (personal and material) .	1,500,000
Staff expenses	10,000,000
Gendarme expenses	17,000,000
Military jurisdiction	400,000
Pay and keep of soldiers, taking into consideration that about 100,000 would be on leave of absence during the winter	100,000,000
Regimentals and camp equipments	12,000,000
Military stores	5,000,000
Transport stores	1,300,000
Horses	5,000,000
Harness	400,000
Forage	27,000,000
Carried forward	179,600,000

	Francs.
Brought forward	179,000,000
Retired pay and enlisting fee	400,000
Extra pay	900,000
Temporary expenses	800,000
Subsidy to a retiring fund for labourers . . .	500,000
War chart, and new chart of France	300,000
Artillery stores, powder and saltpetre	10,000,000
Educational stores	8,000,000
Military schools	2,400,000
Wounded soldiers	2,700,000
	205,000,000
Pay and maintenance of 521,000 men in the field for two months	23,000,000
Staffs and officering of the National Guard of the first ban	23,000,000
Expenses during a fortnight of the National Guard of the second ban	8,000,000
Total	239,000,000

France would then have, for 239 millions of francs, a million and a half of trained men; for it must be remembered that these 1,500,000 men would have all been four years in service, or would have been exercised for seven years twice a-year, during two months, with the troops of the line; and this military force would be all the more imposing, because a telegraphic order would place these 1,500,000 men under arms, in marching order, and with scarcely any extra expense. At present, however, France spends nearly 400,000,000 for its army; and deducting the 30,000 men required for Algeria, the 14,000 gendarmes, the veterans, the garrisons of Paris and of Lyons, it would not have 200,000 men to protect the frontiers; while, from the side of the Rhine alone more than 500,000 men could be brought against us in a fortnight. We ask all unbiassed men if we ought not to take advantage of the present state of peace to prepare France for resisting any invasion; and the best means would be to adopt a system such as we propose, a system which the Emperor himself submitted to

the Council of the State, when he wrote: "Continue the bans of the national guard, so that every citizen may know his post in time of danger; that M. Cambacérès, for example, may be able to take up a gun when danger threatens; and then you will indeed have a nation firmly established, able to defy time and men."

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 7th May, 1843.

X.

OUR COLONIES IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.

If France were in a normal state, the government might, perhaps, be doing its duty sufficiently if it repeated the words of the Almighty to His creatures: *Increase and multiply.* It might say to them: "Cross the seas, and wherever you find a shore, a country, an island, or a rock, plant your intelligent and industrious race there as the germ of a new civilization."

Unfortunately, in the actual state of things, France cannot extend its empire to isolated points situated at the extreme ends of the globe without serious inconvenience. Instead of scattering her forces, she ought to concentrate them; instead of lavishing her treasures, she ought to economize them, for the day may come when she will need all her children and all her resources. And these distant possessions, onerous in peace and disastrous in war, are a cause of decline instead of being a germ of prosperity.

Two interests have hitherto always prompted us in the establishment of new colonies—the commercial or the military interest. When European governments seized upon vast continents in Asia, Africa, or America, it was to found new satellite kingdoms there, which should be producers or consumers for the metropolitan state. Or, when they extended their dominion to unproductive or sparely populated

countries, it was to fortify strategical points which, by their position, govern the great maritime roads on which the commerce of the world passes, and which, consequently, in time of war, secure the influence of the country to which they belong. Thus, England has taken possession of Gibraltar, Malta, St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope, Aden, and Heligoland. Neither the Marquesas nor the Society Islands can be ranked in the same category. They are rocks valueless in themselves, not situated on any commanding road, and they govern neither a strait nor river's mouth. They are of no importance whatever as colonies or military positions; for if these islands had offered any great advantages, the English or the Americans would long since have taken possession of them, nor have looked upon our conquest with such indifference. But let us hear the ministerial papers.

The *Journal de Débats* of the 27th March says, that the Island of Tahiti has a circumference of from thirty-five to forty leagues, which is just the half of Guadeloupe. It consists of two high points united by a marshy isthmus, and, adds the correspondent of the journal, is alone worth as much as all the Marquesas. Judge then of the importance of the latter! Yet the French government will spend millions of francs to establish useless colonies, four thousand leagues from Brest, when we have already too many of these imperceptible points on the map, and when our resources ought to be husbanded to colonize Algeria and Guiana; for they are the sole possessions beyond the sea which can ever become a real source of profit for France.

M. Noyer, who has published much useful information about this latter country, which he has most minutely explored, and which is half as large as France, says that the possibility of the acclimatisation of European labourers has been partly proved by the agricultural colony founded by the governments in 1821 on the banks of the Mana. He

adds, that if its virgin forests, filled with colossal vegetation, were cleared, immense benefits would result from it to France.

The arsenals of Guadeloupe and of Martinique, which import wood for civil and maritime purposes from the Island of Porto-Rico, would be a useful market for the importation of wood on a large scale. The prosperity of some of the colonies of North America is due in a great measure to the use they made of their forests. But instead of endeavouring to develope the resources of a country whose soil is as extensive as it is fertile, our government glories in seizing upon all the sterile rocks which the other great powers have despised.

In case of war, we should need the following immense forces for the defence of our foreign possessions: for Algeria, 60,000 men; for Guadeloupe and Martinique, 10,000 men; for Guiana, 5000 men; for Bourbon, 3000 men; for the factories in Africa, 2000 men; for the Marquesas and Society Islands, 10,000 men. As to Pondicherry and Chandernagor, it is difficult to form an estimate of what would be required to resist the imposing forces of the English in India. That would be a total of 100,000 men without taking into account the ships, the munitions of war, and, consequently, the money which all these armaments would cost. It was, therefore, a great truth which was uttered in the Chamber during the three days these debates took place, "that the British government is pleased to see the French government extend its colonial possessions." Of course, the more it extends them, instead of improving those it already possesses, the more will it impoverish the nation.

We have, in fact, but two territories of any importance beyond the seas—Algeria and Guiana. We shall lose Algeria by a foolish and aimless war; we shall lose Guiana by neglect. What object can our ministers have in making so

injudicious a use of the power they possess? Only to deceive public opinion and gain a pretext for creating new offices. When independent men openly attack the cowardice and weakness of the system, the partisans of peace at any price say: "Do not accuse our policy; we have, *in spite of England*, taken possession of the Mandana and the Society Isles." Unfortunately, many fools will believe them, until the day will arrive when France, rousing its energy from exhaustion and misery, will prove to the world that the destinies of a great nation cannot be neglected with impunity.

Progrès du Pas-de Calais, 14*th June*, 1841.

XI.

PEACE OR WAR.

In the public debates of the Chamber on the budget of the minister of war, the words "peace" and "war" have frequently sounded from the tribune of the nation.

All upright men, all firm and just minds, agree that, after 1830, only two courses were open to France. A haughty and proud one, the result of which might be war; or a humble one, but which would reward humility by granting to France all the advantages which peace engenders and brings forth.

Our opinion has always been, that in spite of its dangers, a grand and bold policy was the only one which became our country, for honour is always the best guide; and in 1830, when moral force was in our favour, France could easily have regained the rank which is hers by right; but we confess that the peace policy had also its favourable, even its glorious side. History would have forgiven us for temporarily humbling ourselves before foreigners, in order to develope all the resources of France, to rear, instruct, and enrich the people. It would have been a glorious task to

accustom the nation to true liberty by creating a loyal, upright, and just administration, which would have discarded the errors of former governments, which could only counterbalance liberal institutions by governing the masses by intimidation, and their chiefs by bribes.

It would have been a noble aim to discipline the democracy and accelerate its peaceable reign by giving to each his place, by fixing the duties and granting the rights of the people, by creating for it an interest amongst the community and a property in the state.

It would have been a noble aim to secure the peace of the domestic hearth, to temper the character of individuals by increasing the guarantees which protect individual liberty, by uniting men in associations, by teaching them that true independence is submission to the law agreed to by all.

It would have been a noble aim to endeavour, by all possible means, to extinguish pauperism, to diminish the heavy burdens of the poor, to excite a spirit of active charity among the citizens by rewarding virtue, by casting out and punishing vice.

And finally, it would have been a noble aim to have made any fresh revolution impossible, by satisfying the general interests; to have economized the resources of the country, and organized its strength so that, on the day of danger, France would have presented the imposing spectacle of a nation invincible through the unity of all its children, through the accumulation of its riches, and through the vigour of its constitution.

In place of all this we have had, for thirteen years, neither peace nor war; we have had all the modifications of a humiliating peace, and all the burdens of an unfortunate war. The *National* lately proved by figures that the budgets since 1830 had exceeded those of the Empire;

and that, adding even the two milliards paid by the Restoration to foreigners for the costs of the invasion, the expenses of the Empire are still a milliard less than those of the present government. It is, however, more serious still, that even the resources accumulated during the Restoration have been squandered. The 1500 millions in the chest of the sinking fund, the funds of the savings' banks, a large part of the state forests, all have disappeared to pay for useless undertakings, and the public debt has been increased by a considerable sum. Thus our nation, formerly so glorious and so respected, has become the laughing-stock of Europe.

Foreigners, pointing to our nation, exclaim, "The French, spite of all their revolutions, have not yet been able to attain either liberty, or order, or prosperity. Their privileges and abuses have only changed hands! They do not choose their representatives; for what are 200,000 electors in proportion to thirty-five millions of inhabitants! *Their persons are not safe, for the lowest police agent has the right to throw them into prison, and to keep them in it for months. They are carried away from their natural judges; more than twenty persons may not meet to speak on their own affairs; misery is advancing with giant strides over France; her trade languishes; the number of criminals is on the increase,** and in no other large country are the roads so bad, nor are there so few railroads and canals. What, then, have the French gained by their revolutions?"

We have gained one thing, *experience*—that sad and terrible, but true experience, which teaches us not to put our faith in individuals, but only in institutions; not to trust to the promises of men, but only to their former lives; never to applaud words, but only deeds; not to ask for

* How strikingly prophetic of the present state of things! January, 1852.—EDITOR.

any ministry, but to ask for something positive, a principle or a system; in short, to demand for our country either war with all its chances, or peace with all its advantages!

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 26th June, 1843.

XII.

THE CONSERVATIVES AND ESPARTERO.

THOSE men who call themselves conservatives because they have places, honours, and sinecures to conserve, profess a profound contempt for the Regent of Spain, and it is indeed assuming an air of aristocracy to abuse the man who has been freely elected chief of a great state. But they do not see that by acting thus they judge themselves; they behold the mote in their neighbour's eye, but consider not the beam in their own, when they shrug their shoulders at a government which, raised by a revolution, is constantly occupied in suppressing revolutions; which, born of a liberal movement, cannot bear liberty; which, raised by the civil and parliamentary power, is supported by an armed force! We do not undertake to be Espartero's champion, for in our eyes he wants the two most important qualities for the chief of a great people—namely, to be able to go in advance of public opinion, and to pardon. Yet, in spite of his faults, we maintain that Espartero's government is more national and more permanent than the government of the conservatives, and we can easily prove it. Suppose any riot were to break out like those of Lyons, Toulouse, or Lille, and the government were obliged to send all the soldiers of the line from Paris—would their system maintain itself like that of Madrid by the support of the national guard alone? Certainly not. If the ministry had not 60,000 men in Paris, the defenders of the treaties of 1815, of the right of search, and of the

censorship, would not remain in power a single day. They are not even so strong as the weak Espartero: and if the one falls, as fall he will, the others will, we hope, not rule over us long. Indeed, if their reign were prolonged, we should despair of the future prosperity of the country; for they poison the sources of life which should make France the first among nations, and every day extinguish a hope or a point of faith in us. Yet in spite of sad experience, and in spite of the universal decline, we cannot give way to despair, for the thought strengthens that they who base their government on selfishness and evil passions, have built on quicksand. It is superfluous to conspire against them; their own weapons, their own acts, will turn against them. Once the patriots of England began to despair of the liberation of their country, and, filled with respect for the New World, in which high spirits can live at ease, they bade adieu to the country of their forefathers and embarked; but Providence held them back. Charles I., furious at seeing the number of his subjects diminish, ordered all the vessels in the Thames bound for America to be stopped. On one of the vessels which were brought back into the port were Ludlow, Hampden, and Cromwell!

No one can escape his destiny: if a government is doomed to destruction, it perishes by the very means it uses to save itself. Espartero hoped to strengthen his power by the bombarding of Barcelona, and sapped its very foundations. The conservatives thought that with their fortifications of Paris they had immutably established their principle of peace at any price; whilst, like the kings of Egypt, they have only raised their own immense gravestones—so immense for such little men, that they will not only bury their own bodies in their vast dimensions, but also the very names of the founders.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 6th July, 1843.

XIII.

IMPROVEMENTS TO BE INTRODUCED INTO OUR PARLIAMENTARY MANNERS AND CUSTOMS.

THE political institutions of Great Britain have been introduced into France, but all those practices which perfect and render useful these institutions have been neglected. We wish to call the attention of our statesmen to the dissimilitude which exists between the parliamentary practices of the two countries.

In England the most important questions, previous to their being brought before Parliament, have been examined and discussed in public and private meetings, which act like so many mills—sifting, grinding, and kneading the political matter before it passes to the great parliamentary compressing machine. When a member of the House of Commons comes to Westminster, he is already fully acquainted with all the subjects which will occupy the attention of the House during the session, for he has on many occasions already spoken of them at meetings and dinners, and discussed them at his club. We may here remark that the custom prevalent among our neighbours to deprive themselves of the company of the women in their clubs and after their meals has great influence on public opinion, for the absence of the women allows the men to discuss daily the political events of the day.

In France, however, the deputy, when he comes to the Chamber, has only heard of political controversy through the medium of his newspaper, and he has no opportunity of ascertaining what public opinion really tends to, or of preparing himself for the serious discussions of the tribune by smaller discussions on the

The right of association is therefore the fundamental basis of a representative government.

We will now examine the parliamentary customs, when the Parliament is assembled.

Although the English are extremely scrupulous in observing all the forms of the prescribed ceremonial, they do not waste their valuable time on the unimportant preliminaries of the session, and the discussion on the address is never an endless debate, wherein every orator directs ingenious shafts of synonymes against his adversary. For, indeed, the policy of a great people should be clear and prompt, and the party which can only triumph by questionable abuse is very impotent.

But although the English are prompt when promptness is necessary, they can also proceed in their measures with deliberate slowness when the public interest requires it. Custom prescribes in England, in order that a minister or an opposition may not take the opinion of Parliament by surprise, or gain a measure by a vote given in a moment of excitement, that every proposition, before it becomes law, be read three times before the Chamber, and that, therefore, three solemn votes shall have sanctioned the acts of Parliament in the eyes of the country. This law is of the greatest importance, for it is not only a real proof of consistence of opinion, but it considerably increases the influence of the legislative assembly. Let us suppose, for example, that a law which oppresses many private interests be brought forward at a sitting, and passed by an insignificant majority, as is frequently the case in France, what influence can such a law have when the individuals who suffer under it may say,—"If an accidental indisposition, or a dinner, had not kept some of the deputies from the Chamber, I should be a millionaire instead of being ruined; I should be an elector in place of being deprived of political

rights; I should be freed from an oppressive tax instead of being overburdened with taxation?"

But if the law had to be read three times, the injured interests would submit without a murmur, for they would then not attribute the measure to chance, but to the clearly-expressed will of the representatives of the nation.

Another custom, no less important, prevents all parliamentary fraud: it is the custom of retaining the same numerical proportion between the minister and the opposition in all the sessions. When once the session is opened, a member cannot absent himself unless a member of the opposite opinion consents to absent himself likewise; thus several members may be absent without changing the relation of the parties to each other. This arrangement is called pairing off.*

In France, several deputies of the same opinion may absent themselves, with the permission of the president, and by so doing, change the majority into a minority.

There is, finally, in the English Parliament one arrangement which, though it appears insignificant, is yet of vast importance; this is the total absence of a tribune or pulpit, which orators like to occupy. Every one speaks from his seat, and this custom permits the most humble talents to make themselves heard without forcing them to make a set speech.

The great disadvantage of a tribune is, that it only allows accomplished orators to speak; and great orators are often not the most logical men, nor do they best appreciate the merits of a question. We feel convinced that there are many talented and thoughtful men among the deputies who

* The author is in error as to the practice of "pairing off," which is simply one of convenience between members; and would not avail against "a call" of the House. Any member may absent himself, without leave, except when there is a call of the House, which is never done except after notice.—EDITOR.

would often say a few words if they could speak from their places, and not be obliged to ascend the tribune, which intimidates all those who are not in the habit of speaking in public. When a deputy in France wishes to make a few observations from his seat, the others call out constantly: "To the tribune!" which means, "We do not want a few sensible words which explain the question; we want an oration with its three points, its exordium and its peroration."

With a tribune, a parliament has too much the appearance of a theatre, where only the great actors can succeed; without one, it is like a meeting of sensible men, who discuss the matter before them without ostentation or show.

With a tribune, lawyers generally carry off the palm; without one, every sensible man may exercise that influence over his equals which an upright feeling, a just thought expressed without ostentation or superfluous phraseology, always gives.

We wish, as we have often said, for a complete change in the laws which rule the national representative system; but the desire for a greater good should not prevent the expression of a wish for simple improvements; and for this reason we submit the following propositions to the partisans of the charter of 1830:—

1. *The right of association.*

2. *More dispatch in the preliminary installation of parliament, and in the discussion on the address.*

3. *That a law be not valid till it has been read three times in the Chamber.*

4. *That if a member wishes to absent himself, he must make an arrangement with one of his political opponents to absent himself likewise, so that these absences do not influence the relative numerical strength of parties.*

5. *To abolish the tribune, and let every member speak from his place.*

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 18*th September*, 1843.

XIV.

OFFICIAL APTITUDE.

THE qualification for public professions is only attained by a laborious apprenticeship. Thus to learn the art of war, of healing, of expounding the civil or the religious laws, one must devote whole years to study, undergo severe examinations—in a word, one must prove oneself qualified to fill those offices which one undertakes. But for the art of governing, which is unquestionably the most difficult of all arts, no apprenticeship is needed. Is that logical? We think not. Under the ancient *régime*, it was enough to be one of the ruling class—it sufficed to be a noble to be eligible for all offices. At the present day, although there is no longer the same difference of classes, it still suffices to belong to the political party which constitutes the majority of the Chamber, to be eligible for all ministerial offices.

That is the great fault of our constitutional organization; the political opinions of men are everything; their intrinsic worth, their special aptitude, nothing.

Thus, we see a lawyer at the head of public works, a merchant governing the interests of commerce and agriculture, an illustrious author directing the diplomatic affairs of the nation, &c., and then, at the first nod of the Chambers, the decorations and the parts change, the minister of commerce takes the home affairs, the minister of war the foreign affairs, and so on.

In consequence of this confusion, the *bureaux* alone decide all important questions; they really govern the country, and the officials at their head influence the ministers, as specially qualified men always must influence those who are not so

qualified, as men who retain their posts influence those who change.

According to our ideas, the constitutional government would be better established if the ministry were composed of men most qualified for their special offices, with one chief at their head, who should be responsible to the Chamber.

This real president of the council, countersigning all the acts of the executive, would be the personification of the general policy of the government; his business would be to explain to the Chambers the system and the progress of government; business would then not be hindered by discussions, and the policy of the government would be explained with more frankness and unity, and attacked and modified with more advantage. If the Chambers blamed the political tendency of the government, the president would be replaced by another, but his dismissal would not have the disastrous effects of an actual change of ministers, which carries confusion into all branches of the administration, causes the business to stagnate, and irregularity to pervade all public business.

It must be acknowledged that the ministry represents immutable interests under temporary influence; but immutable interests should be represented by men immovable by the Chamber; the temporary influence must obey the legal manifestations of the country.

Whatever may be the policy of the government, France needs an army, an administration, a system of agriculture, commerce, manufactures, relations with foreign nations, and these can only be well conducted in all their details by men specially qualified for their different tasks; on the other hand, the political tone given to all these interests is eminently changeable in its nature; the Chamber gives this political tone; let it then be represented by one man, removable at will.

In one word, policy must have its orator, but the affairs of the state must have their ministers.

At the present time, however, politics take precedence of everything; the best general will perhaps give in his resignation because a law on the sugar question has not been adopted, or a man who has conceived a vast plan for the improvement of agriculture and of manufactures may retire because the Chambers have rejected a law on military organization.

The system is not only absurd and illogical, but it threatens to undermine the prosperity of France. And this we intend to prove in a future chapter.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 17th November, 1843.

XV.

CHURCH AND STATE.

THE church claims the right of teaching the young in the name of a privilege of instruction. The state, on the other hand, claims the sole right of directing public instruction in its own interest. This struggle is the necessary result of diverging opinions, ideas, and feelings between the church and the state; each wishes to influence the coming generation in a different direction. We do not share the opinion of a distinguished orator, that the rupture of all the ties which bind the clergy to the civil power would put an end to this discord. The ministers of religion in France are, unfortunately, for the most part opposed to democratic opinions, and to give them uncontrolled authority over the schools would be to permit them to teach the people hatred of liberty and of the revolution. On the other hand, taking from them their salaries would throw them all on the people again, and would force them again to exact the tithes for their maintenance, to traffic in holy things, and to leave the poor without that spiritual direction which is

to them a consolation in their misery. To take from the clergy the support of the state, would be to exclude the poor from the church, and the Emperor Napoleon has said: "We have not the right to exclude the poor from that which consoles him for his poverty, on account of his poverty." All the ceremonies of worship must be gratuitous to the people.

The aim of the statesman should be to annihilate as much as possible the spirit of classes, and to unite all the citizens in thought and in interest.

Two things are necessary to banish the germs of discord which are ever growing between the temporal and the spiritual power; "The university must cease to be atheistic, and the clergy must cease to be ultramontane."

The university will give up atheism as soon as the government will have the courage to be something, and, encouraging real philosophy, will appoint to preside over tuition the most able and most virtuous men, without seeking to please either the disciples of Loyola or the disciples of Voltaire.

The clergy will cease to be ultramontane as soon as they are forced to learn and to mix with the people, by receiving their education from the same source as the generality of citizens.

The south of Germany is unquestionably the place where the catholic clergy is the best instructed, the most tolerant, and the most liberal, because the young men of Germany, destined for the pulpit, learn theology at the universities in common with the students of other professions.

Instead of being, from their childhood, withdrawn from the world, and instead of imbibing in their seminaries a spirit hostile to the society in which they are to live, they learn betimes to be good citizens before being good priests. The German clergy is therefore also distinguished for its learning and its patriotism. They are ready to sacrifice

everything for the triumph of liberty, for the independence of Germany. In their eyes a priest is called upon to preach morality and charity; to sympathise with the oppressed, to preach justice and tolerance, to predict the reign of equality, to teach men that political redemption will infallibly follow religious redemption.

Let then religious education in France be conducted as in Germany, and the same evangelic principles will produce the same happy result. The unity of laymen and priests will re-act favourably on society, for priests will be citizens, and citizens will become more religious.

Then, but not till then, shall we gladly see with us, as in Germany, the ministers of religion presiding over the education of the young, teaching them the morality of Christ, that sublime morality which annihilated slavery, which taught men they were all equal, and that God had implanted in their hearts one faith and one love—faith in virtue and love for each other.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, Dec. 13, 1843.

XVI.

AN OLD STORY WHICH IS ALWAYS NEW.

ONE summer's day the Emperor Napoleon having risen earlier than usual, by chance entered one of the grand reception saloons in the Tuileries, and was much surprised to find an immense fire lighted in the chimney and a child busily heaping large logs of beech upon the fire. The Emperor stopped, asked the child what induced it to make such a large fire on a summer's day, and in a room which was only used on grand reception days, and received the following naïve answer from the child, who did not recognise him: "*Sir, I am making cinders for my father, as they are his perquisites.*" The conduct of our governments since 1830 is in every respect like that of the man in

the palace of the Tuileries who uselessly burnt the wood confided to his care to increase his gains; they also destroy all the resources of France, and let sordid, selfish interests supersede the general interests: and of their policy of the last fourteen years nothing has resulted but fire and smoke.

As in the anecdote we have related, the treachery of our statesmen has been disguised, not open, and their cunning consists in making guilty actions appear justifiable. If the man in the Tuileries had simply carried away the firewood of the palace, his advantage would have been greater but the theft would have been too apparent and the enterprise more dangerous, for after a few days it would have been discovered. By managing it as we have shown, he was apparently fulfilling his duty faithfully. His business was to make the fires, and he made them; his profit was to gather the cinders, and he gathered them. What then was his fault? Making fires uselessly. Now, if we review the acts of the government since 1830, we shall find that all their acts can be classed under the head—dilapidation of the public revenues and of the honour of France.

We will not speak of the hundreds of millions swallowed up by the ministry of war during fourteen years, when every one knows that in spite of this extravagant expenditure our army wants an organized reserve, efficient arms, horses and accoutrements. Nor will we speak of the expense of the budget of marine, since the government has let one of its members publicly accuse it, an incident which amused us not a little. But we must say, that all the military expeditions undertaken for the last fourteen years, were only intended to deceive public opinion, to enrich some contractors, to satisfy some ambitious men, and to give to other nations additional proofs of the submission of the French government to their demands and of its cowardice before their threats.

Our readers will remember that in 1832 the brave Admiral Roussin forced a passage into the Tagus, but having no troops for debarkation the result of the expedition was to permit the French government to say emphatically—"The tricolor flag waves *under* the walls of Lisbon." In 1837, public opinion in France was indignant at seeing the peninsula of Italy entirely given up to Austria, the government thereupon sent a fleet to Ancona. Our soldiers, showing everywhere the same anxiety to uphold our military reputation, took the town in an hour; but of what use could be two thousand men, shut up in a dismantled fortress three hundred leagues from France, opposed to an Austrian army of a hundred thousand men? Various opinions existed on what this little army *might* do; it was soon apparent what they *were to do.* General Cubières, commander of the French troops, unhesitatingly acted as a spy to the papal government, and gave up to it the men who trusted in the representative of the French government. The troops were soon recalled, and the result of the expedition was the dishonour of the French flag in the eyes of friends and enemies, and the loss of our influence over the people of Italy.

In 1838, the insolence of the Mexican government forced the ministry to send a squadron to America to demand a sufficient reparation. Arrived at Vera Cruz it bombarded the fort of St. Jean d'Ulloa, but when the fortress was taken the French could not take advantage of their victory, for they had not sufficient land troops. The Americans then decreed the expulsion of the French, and sent fresh troops to Vera Cruz. The Prince de Joinville landed with his marines and some gunners, who fought most bravely, but what could a few hundred men do, scattered through a large town? They were obliged to re-embark, closely pursued by

Anna pompously styled himself conqueror of the French. The result of this expedition was another decline of our influence in this country, in proof of which soon afterwards the Mexicans again persecuted our fellow-countrymen, and excluded French manufactures from their markets.

Serious difficulties now arose at Monte Video. The government sent Admiral Baudin with a squadron and three thousand land troops; three thousand was a small number, still it was something. England, however, thought it too much, and at her demand they were withdrawn from the expedition. Admiral Baudin was replaced by Admiral Mackau, who was more accommodating, and the ships sailed for the river Plate, where we soon afterwards saw a representative of France treading all French interests under foot, abandoning fifteen thousand countrymen to the fury of a tyrant, and receiving in reward of his services the ministry of marine.

Need we now predict what the result of the expedition to Morocco will be? What the Prince of Joinville will do with eighteen hundred troops, when Marshal Bugeaud, at the head of eighty thousand men in Algeria, has for four years been only skirmishing with the enemy? He has, indeed, so well scattered his forces over the vast territory, that he would need several months, and reinforcements from France, before he could collect together seven or eight thousand men to oppose either against Abd-el-Kader or the Moors. The Emperor Napoleon, with thirty thousand men, defeated three Austrian armies, and conquered Italy in one year; with thirty thousand men he defeated the Turkish army, the army of the Mamelouks, and conquered Egypt within fourteen months; and you, with eighty thousand men, cannot even subdue a brigand chief, when the whole continent is at peace, the seas open, and when you have had fourteen years to organize your resources!

Are we not right in saying, that when your senseless policy has kindled large fires at the extreme end of the world, nothing is consumed but the honour of France? And of all your pompously heralded and piteously ended expeditions, the country has only smoke, and you have the cinders, which you may sell by weight.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, August 3rd, 1843.

XVII.

PEACE.

We hear it ceaselessly repeated that peace is a blessing and war a scourge, and no one doubts the truth of the saying; but it is not sufficiently insisted on, that though war is often a necessity, when one has a great cause to defend, it is a great crime to wage it for a whim, without aiming at a great result,—without hoping for a great advantage.

We will now examine whether the government consolidates the peace of this country and turns it to advantage, or whether it does not rather constantly endanger it.

The executive boasts of the present quietude—but is that called consolidated peace, to kill a people by plunging it in lethargic sleep, to enfold it in its past glory as in a winding-sheet, to disorganize society by corruption, and above all this, to make the sleep so factitious, the corruption so frightful, that all look forward with certainty and with terror to the moment of awaking—is it not rather introducing temporarily the quiet of the grave into the country?

Peace should be the result of difficulties overcome, of hostile interests satisfied—and when it is so, the most perfect security reigns over society. But nothing of the kind exists now. The government did not conquer difficulties when they presented themselves; they put them aside; heaping them up for the future, so that as no question has

been settled, a day will come when all this reserve of difficulties and obstacles, bursting the dikes which restrain it, will sweep away the unskilled policy of the French cabinet. Therefore are all minds anxious about the future.

To consolidate peace, one must have a just and great principle; confess it openly, and defend it bravely; one must give foreigners a high idea of the good faith and of the strength of France, proving at the same time by acts that she has no desire for conquest.

Our government has, however, followed a diametrically opposite course these fourteen years. Instead of being inflexible and dauntless in upholding the rights of France, it has abandoned them as soon as they were attacked; instead of satisfying Europe by its conduct, it has constantly disturbed other nations by undertaking conquests or expeditions, which interrupted the general harmony of nations without augmenting the influence or power of this country.

By this false policy, the French cabinet has justly drawn upon itself the distrust of all other nations, and rekindled ancient jealousies.

The other nations accused of deceit a government which, in spite of promises, cannonaded Lisbon, took Ancona, bombarded the ports of Mexico, excited the pasha of Egypt to rebellion, fomented the Spanish troubles, seized upon the Marquesas islands and upon Tahiti, and uselessly bombarded Tangiers and Mogador.

Foreign statesmen exclaimed—"The French are then still troubled by the same ambition! The only way to govern them is to blind them by the glitter of military renown; and their present government, which is so eminently pacific in its desires, is yet obliged, in order to secure its existence, to ransack the land and the sea for the opportunity for some little military success."

At home the government was accused of cowardice and

weakness, for it was seen to shrink back from the execution of its own projects, to give way to the first threat of the stranger, and to compromise, by useless expeditions, our dignity, our honour, and our interests. Old animosities then revived, and the French people said—"These foreigners are still animated by the same spirit which prompted all the coalitions against our country. We have never had more humble or more submissive men at the head of our government, and yet as soon as they show the least wish to make our influence felt in the world, they are instantly forced by the hatred the foreigners bear towards us, to resign their pretensions and lower our flag!"

Nothing contributes so much to poison all questions and confuse all combinations as a cowardly policy, undignified and inconsistent, which does not know what it would have, because it does not dare to will.

It cannot be called consolidating peace to keep up a factitious tranquillity during a few years. To consolidate a peace is to banish all international hatred by favouring the interests and peculiar tendencies of each nation; to create an equitable balance between the great powers; in a word, to follow the policy of Henry IV. and not the disastrous career of the Stuarts and of Louis XV.

In the memoirs of Sully will be found the great thoughts of a man who had given peace to France and founded religious liberty. Henry IV. foresaw that all the European nations must be equal in power, and none govern another by its preponderance, before a European tranquillity could be firmly established. He foresaw that equality is the source of all justice for nations and for individuals. He had induced the majority of Europe to second him in his humane intentions; and at the moment when the blade of a cowardly assassin cut short such an invaluable life, he was collecting an army composed of European contingents,

whose object was not barren conquest but universal peace. His purpose was to force Spain to recognise the equality and independence of nations, and he had established a kind of Areopagite court, whose task was to be to settle the quarrels between nations by reason and not by brute force. Had Henry IV. lived, he might justly have been called the hero of peace.

Let us now compare the contemptible policy of the last Stuarts with this noble project. They plunged England, wearied of revolution, into an ignoble torpor, and then betrayed her honour to the stranger; they reigned in peace, but their anti-national conduct occasioned, as was inevitable, a war which lasted twenty-five years.

History affords us a hundred examples of an undignified peace always occasioning a bloody war. In 1763, during the reign of Louis XV., a peace was concluded which was called "the shameful peace;" it lasted twenty-eight years, but produced that glorious reaction called the French Revolution, which deluged Europe with blood for twenty-four years.

And our present government is preparing the same fate for us; its love of peace is a selfish and blind policy which compromises all who partake of it. The facts are patent. Some years since no rivalry existed between England and France; the two nations were advancing, side by side, on the road to progress; but the government has acted so wisely that it has re-aroused all the former feelings of jealousy between the nations, partly by its attacks, partly by its concessions; it has rekindled all the old quarrels, and it will be the cause of conflagration, if it ever breaks out, for it has heaped up the combustibles.

In conclusion, we say to the men who govern us: You are not men of peace, for you are incapable of conceiving or of executing any of those great projects which secure the peace of the world. You have compromised France by

leaving her isolated in Europe, and by exhausting the *country with preparations for war, which have not even a* war for object; at home, you have sown discord; abroad, you have united all our enemies by one feeling of suspicion and hatred. You have left all great questions unsettled, and yet you know there are questions of independence and honour which may not be slighted or suppressed. You are not men of peace, for you constantly find occasion to shed French blood superfluously. The country will one day demand an account of you of the hundred thousand men killed in Algeria, which sacrifice has not even secured our supremacy. Abd-el-Kader is the real Phœnix of the fable, who rises again from his ashes; and as soon as any war breaks out in Europe we shall have to abandon a conquest which has cost us so dear. France will ask an account even of the small number of men who have died gloriously but unnecessarily in all your unprofitable expeditions; for although humanity may permit the lives of millions of men to be staked on the field of battle to defend national independence, it curses and condemns immoral wars which kill men with the object only of influencing public opinion, and of supporting an ever insecure government by futile expedients.

You are not men of peace, and if one day the war breaks out, you will be responsible, for you have made it inevitable. A celebrated writer has truly said: "He who declares war is not its real author, but he who has made it necessary by an undignified, paltry, and disloyal policy."

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 5th November, 1843.

XVIII.

THE NOBILITY.

It is an interesting philosophical question to examine how long men will pursue the glitter of a vanished object.

Astronomers teach us that there are stars so distant from our globe that if they were to be suddenly annihilated we should still see them for twenty years. And it is the same with the aristocracy; we yet see its brilliancy although the reality has long since disappeared. Ever since '89, there have been no principalities, duchies, counties, marquisates, or baronies, and yet there are still princes, dukes, counts, marquises, and barons.

Authority, riches, and a name of heroic memory have at all times had a legitimate influence, and the title which represented these various attributes naturally gave consideration to him who bore it; but when, in the course of time, authority, riches, even memorials, have disappeared, the title alone should no longer enjoy any consideration, for it no longer represents anything.

Some centuries ago the aristocratic titles indicated a real power and real degree of rank. To be duke of Burgundy, Brittany or Normandy; to be a count, a baron, or a knight banneret, was to be king on a small scale, to rule over vassals, to belong to the oppressors and not to the oppressed. Such a position was naturally sought after and honoured. The nobles had, however, not only privileges but also duties; they bore the costs of war, and their blood and their gold flowed on the battle-field. Power and glory were behind their battlements.

But by degrees the royal power absorbed all other powers scattered over the French soil. The nobility became corrupt and unmindful of its ancient device—"nobility has obligations" (*noblesse obligé*),—it assumed that of "nobility is

exempt;" and from that moment dates their decline. The monarchical form survived, but the army of nobles was curtailed and destroyed, and still the monarch has retained the inoffensive privilege of granting degrees in this imaginary body.

We consider it as inconsistent to create dukes without duchies, as to appoint colonels without regiments. For if the nobility, with its ancient privileges, is repugnant to our ideas, nobility without privileges is simply ridiculous. The writers of the fourteenth century, speaking of the generals of antiquity, said—Prince Hannibal and Duke Scipio; they were right, for these titles of prince and duke not only indicated dignity but power; but at present, with the exception of the royal family, these titles mean nothing.

And yet how strange a thing human nature is! If the ministry had named M. Pasquier general *in partibus*, he would have imagined that they were mocking him, by giving him a title emblematic of an authority he could not exercise; they name him duke, like Hannibal or Charles the Bold, and he is thankful!

We can only approve of a clear and bold system in politics. If the government wishes to reconstruct a system the kings and the people have been five hundred years in pulling down, let them take such measures as will lead to the required result; let them give the nobles the baptism of glory, for there can be no nobility without that illusion; let them grant to them vast territorial possessions, for there is no nobility without riches; let them re-enact the law of primogeniture, and let the first-born alone inherit the title, as is done in England, for without this arrangement, which isolates the head of the family, and sends his brothers back to the people, the influence is divided, and the nobility becomes too large a severance from the people. Let them do all this, and, although we shall oppose them, we shall at

least acknowledge that they are consistent, and that what they wish to construct will have a comprehensible form. But making some little dukes by stealth, and some little counts without authority and without respect, is to shock the democratic feelings of the majority of Frenchmen without any object or result—it is like condemning old men to play with dolls.

We wish that, instead of making a few nobles, the government would make millions upon millions of them. We wish it would accomplish the task of ennobling the thirty-five millions of Frenchmen, by giving them instruction, morals, and wealth, advantages which have hitherto been the inheritance of a few, whilst they should be the inheritance of all.

Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 23rd December, 1843.

OF GOVERNMENTS

AND OF THEIR SUPPORTERS.

SOME years ago there lived, in the United States, a man named Sampatck, who constructed, with considerable skill, a scaffolding above the falls of Niagara, and after having imposed a heavy tax upon the immense crowd which came from all the surrounding districts, he majestically ascended his structure, and from thence threw himself into the foaming waves of the cataract. He repeated the same trick several times, until he was at last engulphed by the current. Now, there are some governments whose mode of action in the world in every point resembles the American juggler; their history can be told in these words—laborious scaffolding and a fearful fall.

On some stakes, driven into the ground, they raise an immense unshapen structure, composed of pieces picked up among the ruins of the past; and when their task is done, their unskilful construction, alike unsubstantial and useless, serves only to overthrow them from a higher altitude.

For raising a scaffolding is not building. To appeal to the vulgar passions of a crowd is not to govern. The rock alone gives a solid foundation, and to build on a rock now means, to establish a government on democratic principles; "on well defined and graduated bases" as M. de Cormenin has said, "raising one thing on another like the several rings of the same chain."

The ancient régime was indestructible as long as its two supports, the clergy and the nobility, represented in themselves all the vital elements of the nation. The clergy ruled the consciences, and conscience, then, was synonymous with opinion; and the civil and military nobility gave it its power. But now, when the nobility no longer exists, when political faith is totally independent of religious faith, it is like building on sand to lean on these two powers.

It is a true maxim, but too vague a one, to say that governments must obey the feelings of the masses and favour general interests. What are the feelings of the masses, and what are general interests? Every one will answer the question according to his own doctrines.

A government of the present day must base its moral influence on a principle, its physical strength on organization. Then, the new régime will have as firm a basis as the old one, for the adoption of a principle recognised by all will strengthen it, and the establishment of a good organized force will support it. Let us suppose, now, that a government frankly accepts the principle of the sovereignty of the people by election; it must be supported by all, for what individual, what party, or what class, would venture to attack that privilege, the legalized fruit of the will of an entire nation? Let us suppose, again, that a government organizes a nation by giving to every individual his rights and defined duties; a legalized position in the community, a place on the social ladder; it will then have enrolled the whole people and introduced order, based on equality of rights, and ruled by a hierarchy of merit.

Voltaire once said: "if you put a coward among a regiment of the grey musketeers, he will grow valiant at once." The same holds good in politics. Give privileges and a legal position in society to the most anarchical prole-

tary, and you make him at once a man of order, devoted to the good cause because he has his interests to defend.

Men are what institutions make them, and their institutions should agree with what civilization requires of them.

The revolution of '89 has destroyed the entire feudal system of olden times. Social, political and commercial arrangements have been entirely reversed; but as yet, nothing stable has taken its place; and for that reason, the ancient régime always re-appears after a victory of the people, in spite of its changes. The Emperor said: "One only destroys what one replaces." Where feudality has been replaced by something else, it has never revived; where a blank remains, it always shows itself again.

There is only one class in France in which aristocracy can never be re-introduced, and that is in the army; and the reason is, because the ancient aristocratic system has been entirely replaced by a democratic system, which, excepting some imperfections, inevitable in every human institution, is based on equality and regulated by merit.

The first consul said, one day, to the council of state: "There is a legislative and an administrative power, but what is the rest of the nation? Grains of sand—you must fix some blocks of granite in the soil, upon which we may erect a new system."

He had not time to finish his work, but his transcendant genius recognised as a fact that a nation like ours, which had safely passed through a revolution, could not preserve and defend its new rights, its new interests, and new ideas, except by a well-regulated organization. He foresaw that, as the old *régime* had perished through its excess of corporations, the new one might perish, in its turn, through excess of individualism, which means the preponderance of the individual.

The new system ought to be speedily constituted on a firm footing; and, as each country has its particular character and distinctive feature, so all the laws should bear the national seal unmistakeably stamped upon them. All institutions in France should have a democratic character, as in England all institutions, great or little, must be tinged by the aristocratic. The moment a foreigner puts his foot on our soil, he should perceive at once the character of the people whom he visits. He would have to acknowledge that he was in the most civilized country in Europe, when he saw thirty-five millions of men enrolled under the banner of the law, ennobled by equality, distinguished only by merit, advancing in unanimity towards liberty; when he saw a government, strong in the support of the people, boldly challenge the future, and, without caring to explore a spent mine, perseveringly devising the most fruitful means of developing the moral and physical resources, and the highest instincts of a great people, and the immense latent treasures of a great empire.

But now, when a foreigner enters our land, he might fancy himself still at home; when he sees the institutions regarding personal liberty and right of association, he might fancy himself in Austria or in Russia; and when he considers our political constitution, he might imagine himself in England; for he will hear the two Chambers make use of the same aristocratic jargon as is spoken in the British parliament. He will see ministers aping the follies of the nobility, and despising official aptitude, or thinking themselves qualified for everything, change from one office to the other, from the ministry of the interior to that of commerce, from commerce to war, from war to foreign affairs. He will see them confide the most important interests of the country to the *bureaux*, and consider themselves quit of all responsibility when they have made a speech in the Chambers—never

thinking that in a municipal country, like England, public business is not prejudiced, as in a centralized country like France, by the want of special qualification for business in a minister, or by his carelessness. He will see in France bad copies of the constitutions of the continent—copies of everything, except what might tend to a glorious liberty. Must not we, as a free people, or who at least deem ourselves free, since we have made several revolutions to gain freedom—must we not blush when we see that even Ireland, oppressed Ireland, enjoys, in some respects, greater privileges than France? Here, for instance, twenty persons cannot meet without permission of the police; whilst in O'Connell's country, thousands assemble, discuss their interests, and threaten the foundations of the British empire with destruction, and no minister dares to violate the law which secures liberty of association.

We must repeat, in conclusion, that France is not organized according to its habits, interests, or requirements; neither liberty nor authority are firmly established. Except the small number of men composing what is in legal terms called the nation, there are but grains of sand, *grains, however, which if united, would be an immovable rock, and which, scattered, are only dust!*

LOUIS-NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

REPLY TO M. DE LAMARTINE,

BY

PRINCE NAPOLEON-LOUIS BONAPARTE.

1843.

M. Chapuys-Montlaville, deputy, having proposed to publish a French Plutarch for the use of the people, communicated his intention to M. de Lamartine. The illustrious representative wrote a letter on this subject, and in one passage of this epistle the Consulate and the Empire were so maligned, that the prisoner of Ham thought it his duty to reply to it in the following letter, addressed to M. Chapuys-Montlaville.—*Note in Temblaire's edition.*

REPLY TO M. DE LAMARTINE,

BY

PRINCE NAPOLEON-LOUIS BONAPARTE.

Fortress of Ham, August 23, 1843.

TO MONSIEUR CHÂPUYS MONTLAVILLE.

MONSIEUR,—I have just read the letter which M. de Lamartine has addressed to you, and in which he expounds his ideas as to the qualifications required in popular publications. This letter contains such an unjust reference to the Consulate and the Empire, that I consider it my duty to reply to it, convinced that in your impartiality you will give attentive consideration to my reflections on that glorious period.

The influence which the Emperor Napoleon exercised over civilization is thus judged by M. de Lamartine:

"This man appears. He arrests the revolutionary movement at the point where it was ceasing to be convulsive and was becoming creative. He commences a reaction against liberty which was beginning to react on itself; he takes advantage of all the regrets, the animosities, and the apostasy which a revolution always scatters on its path; he crushes growing liberty with the remains of what she had

to scatter to have room for her growth ; he re-constitutes an ancient *régime* with names and things of to-day ; he forces the press to submit to censorship, the tribune to silence: equality he supplants by an aristocracy of plebeians, liberty by state prisons ; philosophy and liberty of conscience degenerate to a concordat; a religion of the state, to sacrilege, the oppression and the captivity of the pontiff. He extinguishes throughout Europe the pacific glory of the French name and the love for French ideas, and brandishes instead the horrible glitter of arms and the violence of conquest. What is the final résult of this monological drama? . . . . Another name in history,—but Europe twice in Paris ; the limits of the French empire circumscribed by the sullen uneasiness of the western states ; England enjoying the sole and unrivalled supremacy of the seas; and in France, reason, liberty, and progress indefinitely retarded by this episode of glory, having, perhaps, to strive more than a century to regain the ground lost in one day ;—such is the 18th Brumaire."

When one reads this passage, in which the most patent facts of contemporary history are so grossly misrepresented, one can hardly believe that it was written by the illustrious representative of Mâcon, especially when he asserts solemnly in the same letter that, in writing a history for the people, one should only regard truth. But has M. de Lamartine adhered to his own principles?

I do not defend the *principle* of the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, nor the brutal manner in which it was achieved. An insurrection against an established power may sometimes be a necessity, but never an example which can be converted into a principle. The 18th Brumaire was a flagrant violation of the constitution of the Year III, but it must be acknowledged that the constitution had already been three times audaciously infringed ; on the 18th Fructidor, when the government violated the independence of

the legislative body by condemning its members to transportation without benefit of trial; on the 30th Prairial, when the legislative body violated the independence of the government; and on the 22nd Floreal, when, by a sacrilegious decree, the government and the legislative body violated the people's sovereignty, by annulling its elections.

The only question of importance then is, whether the 18th Brumaire saved the Republic or not; and to elucidate this it suffices to show what the state of the country was before and what after the event.

M. de Lamartine is the first author who has ventured to assert that the revolutionary movement ceased to be convulsive and became creative under the directory. It is, on the contrary, notorious that the directory had only retained the hatreds of the convention without inheriting its truthfulness or its energy. France was perishing by corruption and anarchy. Society was governed by contractors and speculators, men without patriotism or conscientiousness. The generals of the army, as Championnet in Naples, and Brune in Italy, finding themselves stronger than the civil power, no longer obeyed its orders, and imprisoned its messengers. Others treated with the chiefs of the exiles and betrayed the Republic. Credit was destroyed, the treasury was empty, the *rentes* had fallen to eleven francs, the revenues of the country were squandered by a venal administration; the most fearful organization of robbers infested France. The western provinces were constantly in a state of insurrection; Italy was lost, and, spite of the victory at Zurich, the ancient *régime*, strengthened by our defeats, by our intestine dissensions, and by the weakness of our government, advanced threatening at the head of a foreign coalition. Liberty, instead of reacting on itself, as M. de Lamartine says, was a word without any meaning; for the only laws put in execution were those of exclusion and

proscription. There were 145,000 of French people in exile. The followers of the Convention were excluded from all offices. The writer whose expressions tended to attack the existing form of government was liable to the punishment of death. The law of hostages, which destroyed the security of 200,000 families, was rigorously enacted. Countless hindrances prevented liberty of religious worship. The persecutions of the theophilanthropists had excited Belgium to revolt; refractory or consecrated priests were alike consigned to prisons or sent into exile. The law of forced loans exercised the most ruinous influence on property. Landed estates could not be sold, and the sources of the public revenues were dried up. Such was the liberty which reigned at this unhappy period. General Bonaparte lands at Fréjus; and "France," says M. Cormenin, a straightforward and patriotic man—"France, fearing inroads from abroad and unsettled at home, hastens towards this man, offers him unlimited power, and only cries, 'Save me!'" The people violate the quarantine laws to bring him more quickly on shore, exclaiming, "We prefer the plague to invasion;" and the first consul, scarcely installed, establishes order in the moral and in the physical world; he settles all dissensions and unites all the republicans against the common enemy; he brings regularity into the financial affairs and into the administration of justice, and makes the murmuring army bend to his authority. He forms the basis of equality by the institution of his civil code, which, says M. Cormenin, "is the most durable legislative structure of modern times, on account of the solidity of its materials, the most magnificent one on account of its simplicity, the most unitarian on account of the fusion in it of all written and all customary systems of law. By his centralized organization, he secures the unity and the nationality of France; by his concordat he reconciles the

clergy, re-establishes religion, proclaims liberty of worship, and confirms one of the grandest results of the Revolution by making the Pope sanction the sequestration of the ecclesiastical revenues. The First Consul heals all the wounds of the country. and releases nine thousand political prisoners from captivity; he allows the proscribed men, among whom are the members of the Constituent Assembly, to return; he recalls Lafayette, Latour-Maubourg, Bureau de Puzy, and those condemned to transportation, such as Carnot, Portalis, Simeon, Barbé-Marbois. He revives glorious memories; he consoles the misfortunes of the last of the Duguesclins, of the widow of Bailly, president of the celebrated sitting of the *jeu-de-paume*, and of the sister of Robespierre. He pacifies la Vendeé, settles the disturbances of Toulouse, satisfies the malcontents of the south of France, and puts an end to the insurrection in Belgium. Then, no longer needing soldiers to keep Paris quiet, he sends them to the frontiers, reconquers Italy, makes peace, and forces all the sovereigns of Europe to acknowledge the French Republic and its illustrious representative.

These were the consequences of the 18th Brumaire; and this is what M. de Lamartine calls taking advantage of the disappointments, the animosities, and the apostasy of the Convention! The Consulate saved the Republic and the fruits of the revolution from complete ruin; and this fact has been acknowledged by all conscientious republicans, such as Carnot, Thibeaudeau, Cormenin, Carrel! To assert the contrary is against all evidence. The Empire has perhaps overthrown some of the new ideas, or ignored some of the new truths; but the Consulate stands, for all true patriots, as the purest emblem of the Revolution, as one of the noblest pages of our history. If there exists yet any sincére national opinion whose mission it is to revive repub-

lican forms, it exists among that small body of high-minded men who regret the extinction of that creative and organizing government composed of two elective Chambers, of a Council of State, and of a responsible chief with a civil list of two millions. They regret that honest, economical government which established prosperity with a budget of 700 millions, and they regret that powerful and proud policy which had made us the first among nations.

Another complaint is: "Napoleon extinguishes throughout Europe the pacific glory of the French name, and the love for French ideas." Now, when General Bonaparte took the lead of affairs, the Republic was at war with all Europe; all foreign nations, without exception, were in arms against France; the glorious truths promulgated by our assemblies, had been obscured by so many evil passions that they could no longer be recognised! Where was then the pacific glory of which M. de Lamartine speaks? It was, on the contrary, Napoleon who, by controlling the passions of the people, made the truths of the French revolution triumph everywhere. He planted the civilizing ideas and laws of France in the soil of Poland, Italy, Germany, Spain and Switzerland. Who does not know that, by a dash of his pen, he annihilated two hundred and fifty-three little feudal states in Germany; that from the Vistula to the Rhine he abolished serfdom, the abuse of feudal laws—that he introduced the French civil code, public trial by jury in criminal matters; that he rooted out religious intolerance, and established liberty of conscience! Who does not know that he planted the germs of growing nationality in Poland and in Italy, that he erected national tribunals, and spread the benefits of an enlightened government! Who does not know that he pacified the Swiss cantons, and gave them a federal constitution, the loss of which they regret to this day! And, who does not know that even

in Spain he abolished the inquisition and feudalism, and did much towards establishing a more liberal and a more enlightened government than they have had since twenty-eight years! Not long since, Coblentz paid a noble homage to the memory of the Emperor, when it illuminated the town because the Prussian government had not been able to deprive it of its French laws.

"The result of the Empire," says the illustrious author, whom I regret being obliged to refute, "is Europe twice in Paris; England enjoying the sole and unrivalled supremacy of the seas, and in France, reason, liberty and progress indefinitely retarded by this episode of glory." This is true in the sense that these lamentable results proceeded not from the triumph, but from the fall of the Emperor. Weep then with us, with France, with all nations, the reverses experienced by our arms, for had they remained victorious to the end, England would have been humbled, the European oligarchy annihilated, the nationality of neighbouring nations restored, and liberty firmly established in Europe!

I do not systematically defend all the institutions of the Empire, nor all the actions of the Emperor—I only explain them. I regret the establishment of an aristocracy which forgot its plebeian origin after the fall of its chief, and made common cause with the oppressors; I regret some acts of violence superfluous on the part of a power founded on the will of the people; but I maintain, that of all the governments which preceded, or which followed the Consulate and the Empire, none did even a thousandth part as much for the prosperity of France, even in time of peace, as the Emperor did during his wars.

Read M. Cormenin's splendid work on centralization, and you will find this remarkable passage in it:—"The division of France into departments, the legislative code, the financial arrangements, the home administration, the

well disciplined army, the organized police, and the national unity, are the envy and admiration of Europe!" Well, except the departmental division, all these institutions were created by the Emperor.

M. de Lamartine should examine the organic laws of the Empire, and he will see that, in spite of their faults, the senate with its elected members, the legislative body with its paid members, the electoral colleges, and the cantonal assemblies, had a much more democratic basis than the present Chambers. He should study the organization of the imperial Council of State, composed of the most celebrated official capacities, and then let him say whether he believes that he can achieve the immortal task of the civil code, and implant respect for the law in the heart of Frenchmen, with all the charters of 1814 or of 1830, with upstart aristocracies, laws hastily framed, voted at one sitting, and stuffed with contradictory amendments?

He should consult the report of M. Villemain on public instruction, and he will see that the Emperor, who organized the primary and secondary instruction, and who instituted the university, had more lyceums and communal colleges, and more students in those establishments in 1812 than there were in France in 1840.

He should refer to criminal statistics, and he will see that crime has been progressively increasing since the Empire.

He should inquire into the state of the working classes, and he will find that wages during the Empire were double what they are now; that the institution of judges has neither been developed nor improved, and that the pauper establishments have been destroyed and no new ones erected.

He should look into the official documents collected by the marine captain, Laignel, and he will find that the Emperor constructed 103 ships of the line in ten years,

in spite of the disasters of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and in spite of continental wars, while from 1814 to 1842 the Restoration and the present government have only constructed four.

He should count all the marshes drained, the canals and harbours made, the roads opened, the monuments erected, the manufactures created during fourteen years of war, and compare them with the fruits of twenty-eight years of peace, and a budget of more than six hundred millions annually.

And the much decried state prisons were established on a more humane and legal and less arbitrary footing than the prisons of the Restoration, than those of Doullens and Mont St. Michel of the present system. During the Restoration, political prisoners were not separated from the lowest criminals. At present they can only give in their complaints to inspectors and prefects, who are too dependant to dare to undertake the defence of the enemies of the government. Under the Empire, the state prisons were visited by the councillors of state on extraordinary missions, officers next in rank to ministers, and whose high political standing made them fearless advocates of justice and humanity.

M. de Lamartine should examine the acts of Napoleon with impartiality, as a philosopher and a conscientious man, such as I consider him, and then he will do him honour as the first organizer of French democracy, as the most fervent promoter of civilization.

Napoleon had his faults and his passions, but he will be for ever distinguished from other sovereigns in the eyes of the masses, because he was the king of the people, while the others were kings of the nobles and the privileged classes.

As a citizen, and as a man devoted to the liberties of my

country, I make a great distinction between the Consulate and the Empire; as a philosopher I make none, because Napoleon's mission remained the same whether Consul or Emperor. As Consul, he established the principal blessings of the revolution in France; as Emperor, he established them all over Europe. His mission, which was at first purely French, afterwards became universal.

It is sad to see a man like M. de Lamartine misunderstand such great truths; yet how can we wonder at it, when the deputy of Mâcon, in a speech made to his constituents last year, denied the influence of Rome on the civilization of the world, and attributed to Carthage an influence it never exercised? The poet who forgets that we nations of the west owe everything to Rome, even our language, which he adorns and improves—this poet may also forget our civil glory, and the civilizing influence of the Emperor; for the traces of the genius of Rome, as the traces of Napoleon's genius, are graven on our soil and in our laws in indelible characters.

I cannot understand how a man who has accepted the glorious task of advocate of democratic interests, should be so insensible to the prodigies brought forth in the struggle between the European aristocracies and the representative of the revolution; that he should be unrelenting against his faults, without pity for his reverses, when his melodious voice always finds strains of pity for the misfortunes, and of apology for the faults, of the Bourbons. (See the last speech of M. de Lamartine at the banquet of the Mâcon.) M. de Lamartine has tears and lamentations for the violence of the Polignac ministry, and his eyes remain dry and his words harsh at the sight of our eagles falling at Waterloo, and our plebeian Emperor dying at St. Helena.

M. de Lamartine has addressed his letter to you in the

to religion; I send you mine in the same sacred name. Public opinion, the ruler of the world, will decide which of us two has judged of the epoch of the Consulate and the Empire from its true aspect.

I have great pleasure in taking this opportunity of expressing the high esteem I feel for you, and beg you to accept, &c. &c.

NAPOLEON-LOUIS BONAPARTE.

THE PAST AND FUTURE

OF

ARTILLERY.

1846.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

THE following pages formed the Preface to *A History of Artillery*, intended by its author to form five quarto volumes, with engravings, but of which one volume only appeared. We restrict ourselves to the general observations upon the subject, the rest of the volume being too technical to interest the general reader.

THE PAST AND FUTURE

OF

ARTILLERY.*

PREFACE.

More than five centuries ago fire-arms were first used in Europe; since that time their improvement has been a constant subject for scientific inquiries and for governmental researches.

What progress has been made in our times in propelling projectiles by means of gunpowder?

What influence has that progress exercised on the art of war and on society itself?

By what means has that progress been achieved?

What improvements can be realized in the immediate future?

It is impossible to describe the different phases of an art without, at the same time, giving a history of civilization, for human knowledge includes everything, and each of its acquisitions needs the assistance of all its branches.

To give a construction conformable to the laws of mechanics, of physics, of chemistry, of metallurgy, of ball-practice to artillery, it was necessary to master the principles of all these sciences, and to introduce uniformity, simplicity, regularity, and the necessary harmony into the great mass of machinery; governments themselves must

first have achieved and founded harmony, the principal and most fruitful cause of progress.

Inventions born before the time remain useless until the level of common intellects rises to comprehend them. Of what advantage could a quicker and stronger powder therefore be, when the common metal in use was not capable of resisting its action? Of what use were hollow balls, until their employ was made easy and safe, and their explosion certain? Or what could the rebounding range, proposed by Italian engineers in the sixteenth century, and since employed with much success by Vauban, avail, when fortification offered fewer rebounding lines than now? How could attacks by horse-artillery, attempted in the sixteenth century, succeed, when the effects of rapidity in the movement of troops on the field of battle was so little known that the cavalry always charged at a trot? There is a mutual combination which forces our inventions to lean on and, in some measure, wait for each other. An idea suggests itself, remains problematical for years, even for centuries, until successive modifications qualify it for admission into the domain of real life. It is not uninteresting to trace, that powder was probably used in fireworks several centuries before its propelling power was known, and that then some time elapsed before its application became easy or general. Civilization never progresses by leaps, it advances on its path more or less quickly, but regularly and gradually. There is a propagation in ideas as in men, and human progress has a genealogy which can be traced through centuries like the forgotten sources of giant rivers.

I have endeavoured to trace and describe this genealogy; and that being granted, I have ventured, I trust without presumption, to indicate what must be its future direction if its logical development be continued.

It has already been asserted that fire-arms have con-

tributed to revive military tactics and strategy, to raise royal authority, reduce the great vassals, and create French unity. Such was its influence on society; then came the reaction, and the strengthened central power: the true principles of the art of war re-established, have in their turn exercised a great influence on the construction and use of fire-arms.

If I may be permitted to find fault with those who have preceded me in this branch of science, I would blame them for having written too systematically, for having confused dates, for having argued on unfounded premises, for having explained effects without inquiring into causes.

Some authors attribute an influence to fire-arms from the first period of their introduction, which they never had, and never could have had. They at once made it the principal support of royalty, and even insisted on the repugnance of the aristocracy for this new destructive weapon. I must combat these prejudices. Fire-arms, like everything pertaining to humanity, did not spring up in a day. Its infancy lasted a century, and during that period it was used together with the ancient shooting instruments, over which it sometimes was victorious, but by which it was more frequently defeated.

At first the use of artillery, being of a costly nature, was confined to cities and castles; because, in the sixteenth century, castles and towns were richer than kings. In 1415 we find Charles VI. begging his faithful cities to lend him their war engines, cannon and artillery, to enable him to defeat the English, promising to restore them when the danger had passed. Artillery was not used by royalty until the time of Charles VII.

As to the aristocracy, there exists no proof of its aversion to fire-arms; and the learned M. Lacabane has recently established, by an old deed he has discovered, that, as early

as 1339, a noble cavalier, the lord of Cardaillac, himself manufactured the ten cannon required for the defence of Cambrai, and that the powder was made by the squire, Etienne Morel. And even before the adoption of fire-arms the feudal armies set great store by their engines of war: thus we see Saint Louis, in the treaty he made with the Sultan for the reduction of Damiette, stipulate by a separate article that his eighteen engines should be restored to him.

Now, if the aristocracy valued such imperfect machines so highly, why should it have despised better and more efficacious weapons? It is curious to trace on what the frequently repeated assertion, that the nobility considered the use of powder as a cowardly way of fighting, is based. One would expect to hear the authorities of the fourteenth century quoted; nothing of the kind; the opinion is only founded on two passages in the memoirs of Bayard and Montluc, on the philosophical reflections of two men who lived two hundred years after the introduction of fire-arms, at a time when many people attributed the invention of gunpowder to Archimedes. It was not the feeling excited by the appearance of an entirely new instrument which made them repeat the well-known exclamation of Archidemus, King of Sparta, at the sight of the first catapult: *This is the tomb of bravery!* Bayard and Montluc both deplored, as we might still deplore, that bravery was not the sole cause of victory; but in spite of that they made the best possible use of fire-arms.

Bayard superintended the artillery in person on the field of Ravenna and of Marignan, and Montluc had his share in making the infantry give up the use of the cross-bow and adopt portable fire-arms instead. At Cerisoles and at Sienna, at Thionville, and at the battle of Ver, he com-

he declares in Book V. of his 'Memoirs,' that in all his military expeditions he always placed himself near the cannon.

Thus we see how badly the examples were chosen, when, to prove that the flower of the chivalry was averse to the use of fire-arms when they were introduced, two captains of the sixth century are quoted, who were the most prudent and the most experienced of their time, and who almost always charged at the head of their infantry, and made frequent and judicious use of artillery.

It is true that some persons have asserted, that Dugueselin had shown his aversion for fire-arms, by refusing the cannon which was offered him in 1369 for the siege of an abbey of Perigord; but if the persons who make this assertion had attentively read the rhymed chronicle of Cuvelier, which is the most authentic document existing on the exploits of the Breton hero, they would have seen that Dugueselin did not refuse cannon, but *engines;* now by this name the chroniclers of the sixteenth century never meant fire-arms, but counterpoising machines; they called fire-arms either cannons, bombarding machines, or powder engines. Besides, whatever meaning be given to the word engine, this example would prove nothing, for in the preceding year, that is, in 1368, Dugueselin himself directed the engines used before Tarascon, and Cuvelier tells us he went to seek the engineers.

I have enlarged on this example, because, in the course of my studies, I have frequently found opinions admitted as facts which had not any more solid foundation than the above cited.

For instance, all the modern authors who have written on the middle ages constantly speak of balistas and catapults; and in Captain Brunet's "History of Artillery" it is stated, that, before the invention of powder, the neuro-

balista had made a large breach in feudal institutions, which soon crumbled away entirely before the attacks of fire-arms. And I can prove that no neurobalistic artillery existed in the middle ages, for this word means machines, having for a motive power the strong twisted cords of sinews. At the period we speak of, the balista and the catapult of the Romans had fallen into disuse, and the machines used in sieges were not able to make breaches in the thinnest walls; how then could they have made them in feudal institutions?

There is yet another error which passes for truth. Several military writers assert, that fusees or flying balls were used against Bordeaux in 1450; and Captain Brunet does not hesitate to affirm, also, that under Charles VII. parks of artillery surrounded the war rockets. I can prove that the error originates in the words rockets and fusees. The flying engines, far from being rockets, were counterpoising machines which launched stones, and by rocket or fusee was meant a fire-arrow. I have even been fortunate enough to find the exact date of the importation of rockets into France; but they were not made use of for some time after the date referred to.

In a great number of works, and among others in the treatises of Maurillion and of Carion de Nisas, the disuse of defensive arms is mentioned as one of the most remarkable effects of gunpowder. I do not share that opinion, for the difficulty of procuring any large quantity of armour, and the necessity of making the infantry more mobile, have alone occasioned this partial change. I can indeed prove that the warriors of the middle ages could only with much trouble obtain entire suits of armour. The German cavalry, according to Machiavelli, had never any complete ones. I must mention, also, that if a warrior was followed by six or seven satellites, he alone was clad in mail; under

Louis XII., Guicciardini tells us that the king called sixteen hundred lances, or warriors, a large army, while at the present day we have often eight thousand cuirassiers on a battle field. Then again, the mass of pilgrims which the crusades brought for the conquest of the Holy Land had no defensive armour, and could have had none, on account of their number; and if in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the foot soldiers of France, Spain, and Italy were covered with corslets or breastplates stuffed with tow, the best infantry, which were the English archers, the Swiss, the Landsknechte, had, for the most part, no defensive armour. At Agincourt the English archers were, according to Lefevre de Saint Remy, an eye-witness, without armour, and barefooted; at Marignan the Swiss threw away their caps, their hats, and even their slippers, to be more free in their movements ("Life of the Constable of Bourbon"). Steel armour, more or less complete, has always been, with some exceptions, confined to the heavy cavalry, and that is still the case.

It is equally interesting to write the history of the *personnel* of the French artillery, and I must mention that I have corrected the list of the great masters of the art of war, which is very incorrectly given in the Annual of 1835, though it was compiled under the superintendence of an artillery committee.

After having examined historical facts, I have been led to comprehend the etymology of the different names given to fire-arms, and I am convinced that most of them are in flagrant opposition to history and good sense.

Thus I can prove, among other things, that to trace bombarding-machines from *bombus* and from *ardere*, arquebus from *arco bugio*, fusil from *focile*, pistol from *pistole*, and musket from *Moscow*, is, if the expression can be allowed, like looking for noon at four o'clock.

I have not the presumption to suppose that I may not also have been deceived, but at least my readers can verify my assertions themselves, as I base what I assert on quotations. When we treat of an obscure past we cannot claim credence on our own assertions; it does not even suffice to mention one's authority; one must, on material points, give the very text, for the reader may often understand the passage on which an argument is based in quite a different manner.

I did not wish to write a novel, but a conscientious history, and I have studiously endeavoured to avoid exaggerating the results which artillery has produced while studying its origin and effects with enthusiastic interest. The part it has played in the battles by which the fate of nations were decided, the part it has played in sieges when the sovereign power was in constant strife with the feudal powers, the part it has played in the progress of civilization, in the application of various sciences, are facts which need but to be enumerated in their proper place to make their importance appreciated.

Although Gribeauval is the only one who has really made a distinction between field artillery and siege artillery, I have been obliged to separate the history of the two branches from the first, because the use of artillery on the battle-field has no relation with its employment in the attack or defence of fortified places, and its influence in both cases was very different.

The progress of artillery in sieges was very rapid and its influence paramount; while, on the contrary, on the battle-field many different elements influenced the arming the ordnance, and the movement of the troops.

After proving the facts relative to field artillery, I shall try to investigate the cause of the various and numerous

transformations which have been attributed to it, and to explain why warriors who, on their large horses cased in mail like themselves, had so long reigned masters on the battle-field, why they had to transform themselves into infantry and fight on foot for 150 years; why they cast off the lance and adopted fire-arms more readily than the infantry. I shall endeavour also to explain why the infantry, which formed in compact masses at the commencement of the fourteenth century, afterwards formed in line without any depth, and then from the end of the fifteenth century again formed a deep compact line, which, since the sixteenth century, has been gradually diminishing down to the present time. Also, why it successively gave up the bow, the pike, the cross-bow, the musket, until it adopted the musket with bayonet, which is at the same time a thrusting and a shooting weapon.

It is very interesting to examine into the causes of all these changes, because this examination shows what was the predominant feature in battles at various epochs; for the organization of armies was never the result of preconceived theories, more or less scientific, but the inevitable consequence of necessities which made themselves imperiously felt at the moment.

Thus, in the fourteenth century, everything gave way before the soldier on horseback, and everything was changed to resist him. In the fifteenth century it was changed again to resist the archer; in the sixteenth, great battalions of pikemen occasioned a necessity for change; then comes the reign of cannon, which entirely changes the order of battle, and forces both infantry and cavalry to obey its laws.

That little causes often produce great effects is especially true in respect to artillery. Thus the substitution of iron for stone balls, the invention of mounting artillery on wheels or

fore-carriages, of the mode of harnessing, of charging in advance, the placing of hollow bullets in the heart of the instrument, the rebounding charge in attack, the organization of cavalry, and numerous other ameliorations, trifling in themselves, have all exercised an influence not only on the art of war, but on the destinies of nations.

When we trace the different phases through which the human mind has passed before bringing forth the simple and efficacious system of artillery we have at present, it will be seen that progress has two dangerous enemies to contend with, imprudent innovations and routines. At all periods absurd systems and inventions appear. Thus, in the fifteenth century the English had in the rear of their army an immense plough drawn by fifty horses, intended to open a trench round places at one stroke, as a plough traces a furrow. In the fourteenth century there was a machine three stories high propelling 140 balls at once. Under Louis XII. a kind of wooden parapet with cross-bows and lances was constructed at an immense expense, to surround the army when it encamped, like a herd of sheep. There were fire-arms of all dimensions, and projectiles of all kinds, from the bomb-ketches throwing a bullet of 700 kilogrammes, to the serpentine, 10 metres in length, throwing a ball of 15 grammes; then the steam cannon, an absurd invention, which, by means of a boiler and a vast mechanism, produces the same effect as can be obtained with 10 grammes of powder in a pocket-pistol.

Anything complicated has never produced satisfactory results in war, and the inventors of these systems always forget that the object of progress is, to achieve the greatest possible effect with the least labour and expense.

On the other hand, the too fond adherence to old practices has kept up the most stupid customs for centuries. Who would imagine, for instance, that the pots of quick-

lime extolled by Végèce in the fourth century of the Christian era, and afterwards by the Emperor Leon in the ninth century, as useful for blinding the assailants, remained in constant use in sieges down to the sixteenth century? Who could think that the miraculous properties attributed, in the twelfth century, to mercury or quicksilver in the composition of fiery projectiles, should have gained credence with the artificers down to the end of the reign of Louis XIV.? At that time not a petard was made without a bit of mercury in the charge.

Not only does routine scrupulously regard old errors as sacred, but it opposes the most legitimate and evident improvements with all its strength; and it is melancholy to reflect that, in many things, France has given the most remarkable instances of this antipathy to progress.

France was the last to adopt guns, and the last to leave off pikes. The northern nations had bombs, and shells, light field-pieces, and horse artillery, long before we had adopted them. If a war had broken out in 1840, our infantry would not have had a single percussion gun, while in the English, Prussian, and confederate armies, they were already adopted.

Nothing is more instructive than to read the discussions which took place on the system of which Gribeauval at last achieved the triumph. It will then appear what arguments the Vallières, the Dupujets, the Saint Aubains employed to impede the important reforms proposed by that general; and it is a singular fact, that all the objections made to Gribeauval's system were well founded, only the advantages of the system were better founded.

Whenever a new idea arises, it has in its train new advantages and new inconveniences. It is the work of genius to strike the balance, and see to which side it inclines.

advantages the spirit of routine, or the negligence of our governments has made us lose, we have always regained them on the field of battle. At Stonekirk, the French musketeers had only firelocks, and the allies swivel guns. What did our soldiers do? They threw away their firelocks and seized the swivel guns of the enemy. At Nerwinde, in 1693, the French artillery had no howitzers; it took them from the prince of Orange. And, under the Republic and the Empire, our cavalry regiments started on foot and returned on horseback. We will hope it will always remain so.

As I had only the progress of French artillery in view, I have only spoken of foreign troops when their history was intertwined with ours, or when it furnished examples I could not find elsewhere. I have omitted all details concerning marine artillery, because that would form a history in itself, and because I should have had to speak of the construction of ships and of sea-fights, which would have taken me beyond my limits. I have made no mention of military bridges, because my plan seemed to me extensive enough as it was, and because this history, spite of the importance of the subject, has no direct relation with firearms. I must, however, remark, that since the time of the chief gunner, Girauld, who constructed a bridge across the Seine after the battle of Monttéry in 1465, the artillery has nearly always undertaken the construction of military bridges.

In conclusion, I must express my regret that the plan which the Emperor had one day expressed was not executed, as it would have been of material advantage to my work. He, who thought of everything, wished the *savants* to construct an explanatory catalogue, classified according to the subject, in which all authors who have written on any subject of human knowledge should be classed by centuries.

and the merits of their works judged. If this had been done, he who wished to write the history of any science, or to journey to a distant country, would have easily found the authentic sources which would have furnished him with the requisite information. Under existing circumstances, the inquirer, eager to learn, is like a traveller in a country of which he has not a topographical chart, and who has to ask his way of all those whom he meets. That was, also, my case; and though I have found some uncharitable people who would not reply, I have met with others who, with laudable generosity, gave me all the assistance they could. My peculiar position obliges me to withhold their names, but I shall retain their kindness in grateful remembrance. One person above all, a friend of my youth, has even made the necessary extracts for me from the manuscripts of the royal library; and if my work has any value, I owe it to that person, who procured the most interesting and most valuable documents for me.

As to the illustrations, my friend Dr. Conneau, the voluntary companion of my captivity, has prepared them, under my direction, with a zeal which triumphed over all difficulties. They are all copied from manuscripts, from old books, or from antiquated but still existing objects. I have only retouched those which were not quite intelligible, on account of the carelessness of the original designers.

The plates in the first volume represent the different pieces of artillery seen in perspective, because their object was only to give an idea of the construction peculiar to different epochs, and besides, the original drawings were so made; but in the second volume, the illustrations are made with mathematical exactness.

A powerful motive has induced me to undertake such a

laborious work; that motive is, love of study and of historical truth. I therefore dedicate this work to those who love science and history—the best guides in prosperity, the most effective consolers in adversity.

NAPOLEON-LOUIS BONAPARTE.

Fortress of Ham, the 10*th May*, 1845.

"L'IDÉE NAPOLÉONIENNE."

A MONTHLY PUBLICATION.*

"Not only the ashes, but also the ideas of the Emperor must be brought back."

1840.

* Only one number appeared of this publication.—EDITOR.

"L'IDÉE NAPOLÉONIENNE."

I.

FRANCE has been exhausting itself during the last five-and-twenty years in vain efforts to establish a lasting state of affairs. The causes of disquiet constantly reappear, and society passes by turns from feverish agitation to lethargic apathy.

This instability is always one of the symptoms of transition when those who govern leave to circumstances the change from an old system to a new one, without even endeavouring to give it a firm and regular direction.

The great Revolution of 1789 had two distinct characteristics—one social, the other political. The social revolution has triumphed in spite of our reverses, while the political one has failed in spite of the victories of the people. That is the cause of all our discomfort now.

When Napoleon appeared at the commencement of the nineteenth century, the aspect of affairs was entirely changed; the waves of popular violence were appeased, the ruins were cleared away, and order and prosperity rose from the crater which had at first swallowed both.

The great man accomplished one of the greatest problems for France and for Europe. He boldly, but without disorder or excess, ruled the transition between ancient and modern interests, and he raised the broad foundations of the triumph of the social and political revolution. But

when the Empire fell, the elements of discord reappeared; from the past there rose again superannuated claims, and with it the revolutionary excesses they had occasioned. The *régime* of 1800, instituted by a great genius, had founded progressive institutions on principles of order and law, but the old *régime* presented itself in 1814 and in 1815 under the mask of liberal ideas. The corpse clothed itself in bright-coloured rags, and the shroud of a corpse was looked upon as the robe of a child full of promise.

This deception caused a dangerous agitation in the minds of the people; all names and all principles were confounded; the foreign oppressor was hailed as the liberator of nations; the glorious ruins of the armies of the Republic and the Empire were called brigands; the advocates of the oligarchical system of England were called liberals; while they who mourned the tutelary and democratic authority of the plebeian hero who secured the independence of the people, and was the true representative of our revolution, were called partisans of absolutism.

We hoped, at one time, that this period of falsehood and uncertainty was at an end, and that the Revolution of 1830 would definitively secure the destiny of France. Vain hope! That revolution has only sown more elements of discord and strife, and now everywhere are confused theories, sordid passions, and petty interests.

Corruption on one side, falsehood on the other, and hatred everywhere: that is our condition! And in this chaos of misery, it would seem that there is no longer any idea great enough to collect a majority, nor a man popular enough to personify a great interest.

This subdivision of parties, this want of grandeur, this indifference of the people, proves sufficiently how inadequate all the theories advanced since 1815 have been to establish a system or consolidate a party.

Society in France does not obey a regular impulse, but seeks some beaten track to follow; it does not progress, but wavers. And to us, who seek and waver also, a guide has appeared. This guide is the extraordinary man, the second Joshua, who detained the organ of light and dispersed the darkness. The track is the furrow he drew from one end of the world to the other, and which will bring forth prosperity and plenty.

In the difficult path which our age must cross, it seems to us more logical, instead of electing as our doctrinal leaders the college orators, to follow the precepts and be the apostles of a man whose wisdom as a legislator was greater than his prowess as a general. When, in the history of past ages, we find a great man appearing upon the stage of the world who united in himself the double character of founder and warrior, we always see his successors resuming the institutions he had sanctioned, and following the measures he had indicated.

For centuries the nations on the shores of the Jordan obeyed the laws of Moses. The institutions of Mahomet founded that empire of the East which still resists all our attempts at civilization. Spite of Ceasar's assassination, his policy and his measures maintained the unity of the Roman empire for six hundred years, repelled the barbarians, and extended the limits of the empire.

For eight centuries the feudal and religious system established by Charlemagne has governed Europe, and served as a transition state between Roman manners and the social condition which sprung up in 89. And we who have had among us, and at our head, a Moses, a Mahomet, a Cæsar, a Charlemagne, shall we seek elsewhere than in his precepts an example and a political creed?

Great men have so much of the Divinity in them that they never die entirely. Their spirit survives, and the

Napoleonist idea has burst from the tomb of Saint Helena, as the moral of the Evangelium has risen triumphantly, spite of the torments of Mount Calvary.

Political like religious faith has had its martyrs; like religious faith, it will have its apostles and its reign.

We will endeavour to explain in a few words what we mean by the Napoleonist idea.

Some moral, progressive, and civilizing influence springs from every political convulsion. The Napoleonist idea sprung out of the French revolution as Minerva from the head of Jupiter, with a helmet on its head, and clad in mail. It struggled to live, and triumphed to convince; it has fallen, to rise again from its ashes, imitating the Divine example.

The Napoleonist idea means, to reconstitute French society, overthrown by fifty years of revolution, to conciliate order and liberty, the rights of the people, and the principles of law.

Between two infuriated parties, one seeing only the past, the other aspiring to the future, it steps in with ancient forms and new principles.

As it builds on a solid foundation, it rests its system on the principles of eternal justice, and treads under-foot the reactionary theories brought about by party excesses.

It replaces the hereditary system of the old aristocracies by a hierarchical system, which, while it secures equality, rewards merit and guarantees order.

It disciplines democracy, and renders her an element of strength and stability.

It makes liberty an element of its strength, because it judiciously prepares for its reign by laying broad foundations before erecting the edifice.

It neither follows the inconsistent way of party nor the passions of the mob; it commands through reason, and leads, because it is able to go in advance.

Soaring above political *coteries*, exempt from all national prejudices, it looks upon the French as brothers easily reconciled, and on the different nations of Europe as the members of a great family.

It does not advance by exclusion, but by reconciliation, and unites the nation instead of dividing it. It gives to each one the place due to him—the office he deserves, according to his capability and his actions, without taking heed of his opinions or his political antecedents.

Having no other desire but for the public good, it does not seek for artificial means to support an insecure power, but only for means to advance the prosperity of the country.

It looks only at deeds, and hates useless words. It executes in one year measures which others would discuss for ten years. It sails boldly across the ocean of civilization, instead of remaining in a muddy pond to waste its time by trying its sails.

It rejects the polemics of the day which resemble the religious discussions of the middle ages, when people fought for metaphysical questions, such as the transubstantiation of the blood of our Saviour, instead of debating great evan gelical principles. Therefore, it never raises its voice to blame or to approve of a petty law founded on imaginary guarantees, on reactionary exclusiveness, or curtailed liberties ; it plays no child's games, but, a giant itself, when it wars, it is a Titanic war : its arms are entire nations, and its triumphs or reverses are, for the world, the signal of slavery or of liberty.

The Napoleonist idea is divided into as many branches as there are phases of human genius; it inspires agriculture, invents new manufactures, and takes from other countries improvements which may be of use to France. It levels mountains, crosses streams, facilitates international communications, and obliges all nations to be at peace.

It gives work to every one. It goes into the huts holding in its hand, not barren declarations of the rights of man, but the means for slaking the thirst and appeasing the hunger of the poor, and with a tale of glory to awaken its patriotism! The Napoleonist idea is like the evangelic idea: it flies from pomp, and needs not luxury nor display to conquer, and invokes the God of armies only in urgent need. Humble without grovelling, it knocks at all doors, receives insults without hatred or revenge, and marches onwards without stopping, because it has the light before it, and the people following it.

The Napoleonist idea, conscious of its strength, rejects corruption, flattery, and falsehood—the vile auxiliaries of weakness. Though it expects everything from the people, it does not flatter them: it despises the phrases with which democracy flatters the masses to rally round it petty sympathies, imitating the courtiers who flattered the king in his old age, by praising merits which he no longer possessed. Its object is not to create a temporary popularity, by exciting half-forgotten hatreds, and by flattering dangerous passions. It speaks candidly to every one,—to king and to citizen, to rich or to poor; it praises or blames as actions are praiseworthy or blameable.

The Napoleonist idea has long since found favour with the people, because with them feeling precedes reason, and the heart feels before the mind conceives. When Christianity first appeared, the nations adopted it long before they understood its morality. The influence of a great genius, like the influence of the Divinity, spreads like electricity; it fires the imagination, inspires the hearts, and charms because it touches the soul before persuading it.

It would use the influence it exercises over the masses, not in revolutionizing, but in organizing and regulating society. The Napoleonist idea is in itself peaceable rather

than warlike, and more in favour of order than of change. It unhesitatingly and conciliatingly proclaims the moral policy of its great founder. It developes the great principles of justice, law, and liberty, which are too often forgotten in unsettled times.

As it wishes, above all, to persuade and to convince, it preaches unity and confidence, and rather appeals to reason than to force. But if, when urged too far by persecution, it becomes the sole hope of oppressed people, and the last refuge of the glory and honour of the country; then it resumes its helmet and its lance, and, rising on the altar of the people, deceived by ministers and orators, it will say to them as Saint Remy said to the proud Sicambre—"Throw down thy false gods and thy brazen images; burn what thou hast till now adored, and adore what thou hast burnt."

II.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM.

We have said that the Napoleonist idea unites liberty with law, and that should be the secret of modern legislation.

When Napoleon ascended to power, France had long been a prey to two equally oppressive evils—tyranny and anarchy; and these two evils had produced the melancholy result, that those who had been oppressed hated authority, under any name or form; those who had suffered from anarchy detested liberty, whatever form she might assume. It was Napoleon's mission to resecure French society, and to reconstitute law and authority, by laying the foundation of institutions which should consecrate the reign of liberty.

According to his own opinion, he required a reign of twenty years to effect this; he only reigned fifteen.

In the eyes of some people, the Emperor passes for a

tyrant, and yet if we examine the acts of his administration and understand the spirit which dictated them, we shall be convinced of this truth, that all his institutions had a much more democratical but a much less revolutionary tendency than anything which has been established since his fall. For one thing must be taken into account, that the masses in France are not naturally revolutionary, and that to build with them is building on a solid foundation.

In the electoral system, of which we shall speak, will be found a sketch of the distinctive character of the Emperor's system.

Let us premise, in the first place, that Napoleon acted with the noble aim of constructing for the future. He saw that the feudal system which had governed all Europe for a thousand years had been irrevocably destroyed in 1789. But is not enough to destroy; for, as he said, one only destroys what one replaces by something else. It was therefore necessary to substitute an equally strong democratic organization for the strong feudal organization.

We must also remark, that he introduced into all his institutions an elasticity which allows of their modification, and admits of the extension or contraction of the political network, without changing its fundamental basis. This has the one great advantage, that the improvements introduced modify, but do not destroy; the respect due to law is not weakened, for such a respect cannot take root in the minds of the people while the legislation is constantly changing.

The electoral system was like the financial system: in the latter, Napoleon had introduced the additional centimes, the effect of which was that the scale of taxes could be raised or lowered, according to the needs of the treasury, without creating new taxes, of which the collection is always onerous.

In the same manner, to make the privileges of election more real, the Emperor needed not to make new laws, but simply to authorize the electoral colleges to choose their own deputies directly, instead of presenting government candidates to them for election.

The Emperor had laid the foundation on which alone universal suffrage can be established without inconvenience, and a general election, organized on his plans, instead of being a continual source of agitation and disorder, becomes a great institution, which, by disciplining the masses, secures order and stability.

We must go back to the first establishment of the electoral system, so that we may be better understood. Thibeaudeau, in his *History of the Consulate and the Empire*, thus speaks of the electoral laws which had preceded the consulate:—"The constitution of the year III. had shown itself impracticable, and nowhere more so than in the elections; before the 18 Fructidor they brought royalists into the legislative body; that day drove them from it. Then came the turn of the jacobins; the 22 Floreal discarded them. In the following elections they re-appeared, maintained themselves, and prepared to oust their rivals. Nothing was durable; it was always only a triumph of party. Could a government more skilful or more firmly instituted than the Directory have escaped this see-saw game? Sièyes thought not, and proposed to deprive the people of direct elections, and allow them only to make lists of notabilities—to name candidates from which the senate should elect the members of the legislative body and of the tribunals. These lists were to contain the names of such persons as had been before elected by the people to some public office, or who had been in government employ, who were therefore interested in upholding the principles and consequences of the revolution.

When Napoleon was made Consul for life, he suppressed these lists, and established district assemblies, consisting of all the citizens domiciled in the district. These assemblies elected the members of the electoral, the district, and the departmental colleges. Eligible to the electoral colleges were those most highly taxed in the department, but ten members could be added to the district college, and twenty, not being landowners, to the departmental colleges. These extra members were chosen from the members of the Legion of Honour, or from men who had rendered the state some service. The colleges presented two candidates to the vacant places in the legislature, and only the departmental college proposed candidates for the office of senator; one of the two candidates had to be chosen from the members of the college.

If we examine the spirit in which these laws were framed, at a time when the country was just emerging from violent struggles, and when foreign wars were imminent—when even the most ardent friends of liberty acknowledged the necessity for restraining electorate privileges—one cannot help confessing that it must have been the Emperor's intention to establish election on broader bases. We do not doubt that he would have modified his system when peace was firmly established, and that the electoral law would then probably have been as follows:—

"All Frenchmen are electors, and eligible.

"The election has two degrees. First, all the citizens domiciled in a canton will meet and proceed to the election of members of electoral colleges for the district and the department.

"The colleges will then proceed to the direct election of deputies. Only the departmental colleges will propose three candidates to the government for the office of senator.

"The deputies will be protected during the time the legislature is assembled."

Such a law seems to us to agree with all ideas of progress, and with the conditions of stability indispensable to the prosperity of the country. The system openly sanctions the feeling of liberty; it gives political privileges to all, without incurring the dangers and inconveniences of what is called universal suffrage. The electoral colleges chosen by the people secure the supremacy of the people. They are intermediate bodies between the people and the government, and form a classification of citizens; it is, in a word, a hierarchical and a democratic organization; hierarchical, because the man is first citizen, then elector; then member of an electoral college, because he has gained the confidence of the citizens; then deputy, because he has acquired the confidence of the electors. Many degrees have to be gained, but the organization is at the same time democratic, because it is founded on the people.

For in a well-organized body two contrary currents must always be perceptible; one rising from the base to the summit, the other descending from the summit to the base.

This influence of the government, which must be felt in the lowest classes of the people—and the authority of popular will, which even the head of the state must acknowledge, must act and re-act by gradual degrees in the ascending as in the descending current.

When the people vote in a body on the public street, and give their suffrage directly, it is as if all the blood of the body rose to the head, and the consequence is, discomfort, congestion, giddiness.

Even the interests of the people are inadequately represented, because reflection and judgment have no influence over the election; only passion and the excitement of the moment direct the vote.

A striking example of this truth presents itself in the

democracy of the Swiss Cantons. The people, assembled in a body on the public-place, choose their representatives; yet, though they enjoy the plenitude of power, the retrogressive spirit is firmly implanted in the minds of the people in these Swiss Cantons. There is no ancient prejudice which they do not sanction in their popular assemblies, and no improvement which they do not reject.

In France just the contrary takes place. In our electoral system, founded on fear and privilege, the influence of the government acts directly on the people, and this influence, which might nevertheless be enlightened and protective, acts by corrupting the consciences of the people, by deceitful promises, by making a real political traffic of the votes of the citizens.

We will not mention other systems of reform enunciated by men whom we cannot fail to respect, but who have nevertheless been carried away by a purely reactionary feeling.

The government, so say some partisans of reform, influence the votes of the administration by their employés; we must, therefore, exclude all men in office. But do you not see that by curing one evil you introduce another, and that instead of establishing a system on the generous principles of liberal government, you only plunge the country into hatred, distrust, and reaction. For, suppose now that you have an upright and honest administration, which makes virtue and merit the only title to office, would you exclude such men from the legislative chamber? Go back to the history of the past,—Sièyes, thinking that true republicans could only be found among the employés of government, made his lists of notabilities, in his constitution of the year VIII., consisting of all the officials. You who suppose good Frenchmen are only those who do not serve

Chamber of Deputies. Forsake all this hatred, this bitterness, and party rivalry. Rise above these feelings, and overthrow all exclusive systems, whatever be their name. Give rights to all, so that all may be interested in the support of established government. Think only of the country's good, and above all do not fear the people,—it is more conservative than you !

III.

EXILE.

" YOU whom happiness has made selfish, who have never suffered the torments of exile, you think it light punishment to rob men of their country ! Know that exile is a continual martyrdom ; that it is death, but not the glorious death of those who fall for their country, nor the sweeter death of those whose life was spent amid the charms of their domestic hearth, but a death of consumption, slow and terrible, which undermines you and leads you noiselessly and unnoticed to a desert tomb."

" In exile the air you breathe suffocates you, and you live only on the faint breeze which comes from the distant shores of the land of your birth.

" A stranger to your countrymen who have forgotten you, —a stranger among those with whom you live, you are like a plant brought from a foreign clime, which fades for want of a handful of earth in which it can take root.

" An exile may find generous souls and enlightened characters in the stranger's land, who will endeavour to be kind and considerate towards him ; but friendship, the harmony of hearts, he meets with nowhere, for it must be based on mutual feelings and interests ; even the kindness rendered him will lose its charms, for it will all savour of charity. It needs too much courage to act towards an exile as towards any one else.

"Oh thou exile, thou true pariah of modern society, if you would not have your heart broken every moment, you must, as Horace says, enfold yourself in your virtues, and, armed in threefold armour, be inaccessible to the émotions which lurk behind each step of life!

"Never give way to an unburdening of the heart, to sympathetic excitement which might remind your fellow-countrymen of your existence; they would come insultingly and ask by what right you, as an exile, dare to express an opinion on the affairs of your country,—by what right you dare weep or rejoice with your fellow-citizens. If you meet with one of your friends in the foreign land, with one of those whose antecedents bind him to your family, or with whom you have passed your youth, stay the feeling which draws you to him; offer him not your hand; for you would see him turn away quickly; .... and he is right, for your contact is contagious; your embrace, like the breeze of the desert, which burns all it touches. If it were known he had spoken to you, they would take from him and from his children their daily bread! In the eyes of the great ones of the earth it is a crime to be connected with an exile.

"Do you see afar that flag with its beautiful colours? Do you hear those warlike chants? Wretch! run not to join your brothers; tie yourself, like Ulysses, to the mast of your ship; if you offered to share their dangers, they would say—We have nothing to do with your race! ....

"If a public calamity afflicts your fellow-citizens, and if, to relieve the sufferers, rich and poor bring their offerings, do not send your savings, for they would say to you—We do not want the mite of the exile.

"Be wary of every step you take, of every word you utter, and of every sigh which escapes from your breast, for men are paid to falsify your actions, to misrepresent your words, and to give a meaning to your sighs.

"If you are slandered, do not reply; if you are insulted, keep silence, for the organs of publicity are closed against you; they do not receive the complaints of banished men. The exile must be slandered without replying, and must suffer without complaining: justice does not exist for him.

"Happy are they whose life is spent among their fellow-citizens, and who, having served their country with glory, die on the spot where they were cradled. But woe to those who, beaten by the waves of fate, are condemned to a wandering, aimless existence, without charms; and who, after having been everywhere in the way, die in a foreign land, without a friend to weep over their tomb!"

IV.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY.

EVER since 1815 we have been condemned to be copyists of our neighbours. If imitation always produced resemblance, we would advise the copying to be persevered in, for England has great and noble institutions. But, unfortunately, servile imitations always produce a pernicious effect. Take our neighbour's coat, if you insist on it, but at least cut it to your size.

We may take advantage of England's experience, and adopt their analogous laws, but let us not adopt their parliamentary language nor their party denominations, for we should then not understand each other.

We have neither the same character, nor the same manners, nor the same nature: the same words would represent totally different things.

There is now in France a political party which gives itself the pompous title of Conservative! Is it not ridiculous to adopt such a name in a country where nothing is in its place, and where everything must be changed? In

England such a title is easily understood; for society there rests on foundations laid centuries ago.

We do not share the opinions of the Tory party, but we grant that they might say to the English people, "We call ourselves Conservatives, because we wish to conserve a political system which has made England one of the first nations in the world; because, with this system persevered in for a century, the country has become the seat of manufactures of all kinds; our industry and our commerce have increased, and our arms have won glory from one end of the world to the other; we are proud of our old system, because by it we have governed and maintained individual liberty, and the liberty of the press; served no dynasty, nor ever made common cause with the enemies of our country. We are proud of the past, and we fear the future, and that is the reason why we are Conservatives."

But of what can French conservatives be proud? They have, as a party, no glorious antecedents, and would to-day conserve what yesterday they helped to pull down. On what is their structure based, when they fear that an opponent should touch it? What can protect them from the spirit of change and progress?

Is it the throne? That has no solid foundation, and neither influence nor honour; the head of the state is, so to speak, a prisoner in his palace. Is it the Chamber of Peers? It represents nothing; its feeble and almost inaudible voice has no influence on public opinion. Is it the Chamber of Deputies? It only represents two hundred thousand electors, and has neither the dignity of a senate nor the generosity of a democratic assembly. Its parties have neither conscience nor principle; their voices are unechoed, a majority can scarcely be collected in it, and they have not the strength to uphold what they approve of, nor to overthrow what they blame.

Do they consider the material condition of France so prosperous that they would conserve it? Let them look round and behold flatness in all mercantile transactions, stagnation in manufactures, misery in the people, and corruption among the higher classes.

Is that a moral condition which pleases you? Do you not see that we are advancing to complete dissolution, and that selfishness and robbery are the passions of the day?

Is it the peace at home which charms your conservative spirit? The peace is broken every moment. Revolt continually prowls about the streets, as it did ten years ago; you cannot protect the life and property of your citizens against constantly recurring revolt. And when even the revolutionary spirit slumbers, your timorous minds always fear it: your police agents disturb the peace of families, and your violence outrages the domestic hearth.

As to our foreign relations, there the conservative tendency is still more inexplicable. Our representatives are hardly tolerated in the northern courts; in the southern ones they have no influence. North and south our policy is awkward and undecided. In the east as in the west they do not understand what we would have, and they doubt even whether we know ourselves. We command respect nowhere, and nowhere do we excite sympathy. We should be laughed at by Europe, and despised by our neighbours, if they could forget what we have been.

Call yourselves conservatives if you will—short-sighted and narrow-minded statesmen, we can only laugh at you from pity; for it argues incapacity and folly to preach the conservation of a weak and faulty system instead of seeking for an efficacious one in its stead.

V.

OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY IN ENGLAND.

As a general fact the assertion is true, that there is more liberty in England and more equality in France. That follows as a matter of course, from the organization of the two communities. In those countries in which there is a powerful aristocracy, the great families were always the zealous defenders of liberty, because they needed it for themselves as a safeguard against the sovereign power, while they always opposed equality because it interfered with their privileges.

Thus, when the English barons combined in 1215, to force the great charter from King John, they inserted, as one of the principal clauses, that no free man could be arrested and imprisoned, except on the sentence of his peers and according to the laws of his country.

But we must remark, that all the recent organizations having equality for their bases, abrogate liberty in some sort; thus the conscription, which is one of the most democratic institutions, since it compels all citizens to bear the same responsibilities, destroys individual liberty to a high degree, as it prevents the individual from following any desired profession, and forces him to sacrifice the best years of his youth to the profession of arms.

But to return to our subject, which is to consider what guarantees an English citizen possesses against arbitrary power.

We have stated that Magna Charta proclaimed the fundamental principle of individual liberty; but during the despotic governments of the Tudors and the first Stuarts, it was generally recognised that every Englishman, being arbitrarily incarcerated, might appeal to a court of justice.

These appeals, however, were generally useless as long as the power of the sovereign was, in point of fact, unlimited, and while the judges were dependent on the crown. At the commencement of Charles I.'s reign, the courts of justice even decided that they could not liberate a prisoner arrested by order of the king or of the lords of the privy council, even when the arrest was made without sufficient grounds. This decision caused a stormy debate in the house, and led to the Petition of Rights (in the third year of the reign of Charles I.) which decreed that no one could be arrested or imprisoned by virtue of such power. As the judges paid no attention to this petition, another statute was framed, by which the judges were required to issue a writ of *habeas corpus* upon motion without delay. This writ is an order addressed to the gaoler, or to the person in whose custody the prisoner is, to bring the prisoner before the court, which is then obliged to examine into the legality of the imprisonment within three days, without regard to the authority which had decreed the arrest. But means were found to evade the law; and these abuses of power were not really repressed until a definite voting of the famous *habeas corpus*, in the 31st year of the reign of Charles II.

The following are the principal clauses of the act:—

1. "On a complaint being made in writing by, or in the name of, any person arrested or accused, (provided the writ does not make an impeachment for a crime of the more serious order, such as treason, felony, or that the prisoner be not arrested on a legal judgment for debt,) one of the judges of the high court shall issue a writ, ordering the accused to be brought before him, when he will liberate him on sufficient bail, until the accused shall appear before the competent tribunal to answer for the crime of which he is accused.

2. "The officers and agents who do not conform precisely

to this writ, or who defer its execution, shall be amenable to the most severe penalties.

3. "Any person, once acquitted, shall not be liable to be taken again for the same offence.

4. "All persons arrested for one of the graver offences (treason or felony), and who, therefore, cannot be liberated, must be tried at the next assizes, or else liberated on bail.

5. "No inhabitant of Great Britain, except condemned convicts, can be transported beyond the United Kingdom. Any infraction of this clause is subject to heavy penalties."

The statute of *habeas corpus* applied principally to persons accused of criminal offences; but, by another statute, promulgated in 1816, it was extended to every case of illegal arrest; therefore, according to existing laws, any person whose liberty has been infringed under any pretext, can demand a solemn explanation of the cause of his detention, by appealing to this act. No criminal can be imprisoned beyond a certain time; the assizes take place twice a year, generally in March and April, and in July and August. If a crime has, therefore, been committed in autumn, the prisoner cannot be detained beyond spring, which is the longest imprisonment he need to undergo, as the court, generally, only postpones the trial at the express wish of the prisoner.

All the prisons and lunatic asylums are regularly visited by persons whose duty it is to discover abuses and receive complaints. 'The person in charge of the prisoner, and to whom the *habeas corpus* writ is addressed, has to make a return, in writing, of the cause of imprisonment, so that the judge and court may decide the question. The return of the gaoler is read in full court, and the cause of the detention publicly discussed. That is the great safeguard; for, though the public may be excluded from the preliminary examination of the prisoner, that never happens without important

grounds for privacy; and as the friends and legal advisers of the accused are permitted to assist him by their counsel, it is almost as if the accused underwent a preliminary examination to see if the grounds for his arrest are satisfactory or not.

If one court refuse a *habeas corpus*, the plaintiffs may apply to another; thus, no one can be the victim of legal oppression in a country where the judges are quite independent and generally respected, except by a chain of circumstances against which it is impossible to guard.

There is no public prosecutor in England; for the attorney-general only interferes in very extraordinary cases. No doubt many culprits escape from justice through the absence of such a functionary; but individual liberty also runs less risk of being violated.

The citizens are, moreover, not only protected by the law, but by the manner in which it is administered, and in which government exercises its power. Authority in England is never governed by passion; its proceedings are moderate and strictly legal; the violation of the dwellings of citizens, to which one is so subject in France, under the name of domiciliary visits, is unknown in England; family affairs are respected, and correspondence never tampered with; the first of all liberties, freedom to go and to come, is not hindered, for no one is required to have a passport, that oppressive invention of the committee of public safety, which embarrasses and annoys the peaceful citizen, without presenting any obstacle to those who wish to deceive the vigilance of the law.

Another safeguard of liberty is the police organization, which instead of provoking crime in order to punish it, prevents it and lessens the penalties. The only thing for which a person may be imprisoned arbitrarily and without mention of motive in the writ, is for contempt of court; so

that if a court or a judge, before whom a prisoner is brought, is informed that another court has imprisoned him for contempt towards it, no trial can take place into the justice or injustice of the imprisonment, as it is taken for granted that such imprisonment is legal.

Thus, in the curious conflict which took place lately between the House of Commons (which, in some respects, has the same attributes as a court of justice) and the Court of Queen's Bench,* the latter would have at once released the sheriffs had the real motive been explained in the writ. But when they were brought before the court under a writ of *habeas corpus*, it was found that the writ of imprisonment contained no other allegation of offence than that they had been committed for contempt of the privileges of the House of Commons. And it is usual, as a mark of respect which courts owe to each other, to presume that the offence has really taken place.

It must be confessed that a power of this nature is exorbitant; a majority of the House of Commons might imprison any one they pleased, without any possibility of appealing to *habeas corpus*, if the writ of the speaker assert that it is for contempt of the house.

But in that case the accused would appeal to a power,

* It will be recollected that, in a report made by the inspectors of prisons, it was stated that they had found in Newgate an obscene book published by the publisher Stockdale. The report was printed and sold by Hansard, printer to the House of Commons, by order of the House. Stockdale indicted Hansard for libel; and the court of Queen's Bench, having decided that the order of the House of Commons did not justify the printer, gave judgment in favour of Stockdale, and ordered the sheriffs to put in execution. Then the House of Commons condemned the sheriffs to imprisonment for a supposed contempt of the privileges of the House. The dispute, which lasted some time, was eventually put an end to by an act of parliament, which established that no publication, appearing by authority of one of the two Houses of Parliament, should in future be liable to attack or question before a court of justice.

which has never failed in England when it is appealed to to protect liberty; and that is, public opinion.

For, it must be confessed that, however good the laws may be, power may infringe them or turn them to its advantage, if public opinion be not always ready to restrain it when it swerves from the path of justice. Indeed, a law or a charter, unsupported by public opinion, is but a shred of paper; but when public feeling guarantees it, then it becomes a holy covenant, and to efface a single word, or not to execute them all faithfully, is a sentence of death for the infringer.

The Emperor Napoleon said one thing to the council of state deserves the deepest consideration from statesmen:—"There is no public spirit in France, because property here is in a state of dependence." The Emperor meant, no doubt, that France, after having been so long troubled, wanted a calm, moderate, regular spirit, which brings all passions down to the level of public opinion; that susceptible spirit, so full of consideration, which can never sanction the violation of those laws which protect the domestic hearth.

We cannot now inquire into the meaning of the "dependence of property;" it will suffice to state the fact, that in France, where the people are jealous of everything which offends the laws of equality or of national honour, individual liberty is not so religiously respected. The government may disturb the peace of families and violate the sanctity of their dwelling; it may detain them imprisoned for months and break through all individual considerations, as long as it arouses no political passions; some high-minded men may raise their indignant voices, but public opinion will look on calmly and unconcernedly.

There lies the great cause of the despotism of the government: it can be arbitrary because nothing restrains it. In England, on the contrary, all political passions

sleep before a violation of the common rights of citizens; for England is a legal country, and France has not yet become one; and England is a strongly constituted country, while France has struggled for forty years with revolutions and counter-revolutions, and has yet its religion of principles to create.

VI.

ON THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE.

ONE of the generals who had done the most for the military organization of Prussia, thus expressed his thoughts one day: "That in a well organized state one ought not to know where the soldier begins or where the citizen ends." These words express the philosophy of a system which will infallibly be adopted by all the continental powers, because it meets the new wants of the people of Europe.

It does not suffice now, that a nation has some hundreds of iron clad horsemen, or some thousands of hirelings and mercenaries to maintain its ranks and its independence; it needs millions of men; for, when a war breaks out, whole nations will fight, and when the struggle has commenced, genius will decide the victory, but organization alone can resist a defeat. It is therefore indispensable that each nation should be able to equip numerous armies; but as no state in the world can, without exhausting its resources, constantly keep hundreds of thousands of men unemployed, a system must be found which offers the greatest possible advantages in war, without causing too much expense in time of peace. The Emperor often thought of this, even while he was struggling against all Europe; Prussia carried the idea out in order that its monarchy might not again be staked on the issue of a single battle.

Here is a summary of the military organization of Prussia.

Prussia has 14,330,000 inhabitants; the army consists of 145,000 men; the landwehrs of 385,000.

The army must be considered as a great school, in which all citizens learn the profession of arms. Every soldier remains only three years in service: when he leaves the army he belongs to the reserve for two years longer; which means that, in case of war, he has to join his regiment again, and that, in time of peace, he is drilled during the two years with the landwehr.

The state forces are thus divided:

1. The army of men of twenty to twenty-five years of age. More than an hundred thousand annually attain this age, but only about five-and-twenty thousand are raised.

2. The landwehr of the first ban, consisting of young men of twenty to twenty-five, who have not entered the army; of soldiers who have served three years, and of the entire population, from twenty-five to thirty years of age. Only the staff of each battalion and a serjeant-major, a quartermaster and two corporals to each company, are permanently appointed and paid by the year. The same is the case with the cavalry; the government pays annually one officer, one quartermaster, three lieutenants and a trumpeter for each squadron.

3. The landwehr of the second ban, which may be considered as an army of reserve; it is composed of the best trained men, and of men in the prime of life, from thirty-two to thirty-nine years of age, who have all served in the army or in the first landwehr. It has no permanent appointments.

4. The landsturm, or landwehr of the third ban, which only exists on paper; it includes all men from seventeen to fifty years of age, but it is only summoned in extraordinary cases.

The active army, and the landwehr of the first ban, amounts to 330,000 fighting men; if we add the landwehr of the second ban, which alone counts nearly 200,000 fighting men, there is a total of about 350,000 men.

This system is carried out by recruiting by provinces. Prussia is divided into provinces, districts, circuits, and parishes. The districts are so arranged that they recruit at the same time the regiments of the line and of the landwehr of the corresponding number. Each circuit gives a battalion and a squadron to each ban. The smaller territorial divisions give companies. The artillery of the landwehr only joins the artillery of the line in case of war. Each battalion of infantry of the landwehr gives a company of a hundred soldiers, eight corporals, and an officer, for this purpose; and they, during the manœuvres, are drilled by artillery officers and lieutenants of the regular army, with their field-pieces. Each division, or brigade, has its headquarters in the province in which it is recruited.

Thus Prussia, which is only half as large as France, can bring 530,000 trained men to defend their country. This system offers immense defensive resources, and though it has some defects, they are amply compensated by its advantages. The question is not, we repeat, to know whether soldiers who have served three years are as skilled in their profession as those who have served eight years; it is clear that those who are best trained to military discipline will make the best soldiers; but the important point is to organize a system which gives thousands of trained men in time of danger, and which, during peace, is not a heavy burden on the budget, and does not take too many young men from agricultural pursuits.

The Prussian system resolves the problem materially and morally; for this organization is not only advantageous in a military point of view, but it deserves to be admired

philosophically, as it throws down all barriers between the soldier and the citizen, and exalts the feelings of every man, by showing him that the defence of his country is his first duty. There lies the great difference between the landwehr and the national guard, constituted as it now is. In Prussia, the whole nation is armed for the defence of the country; in France, the bourgeoisie alone is armed for the defence of private interests.

The Emperor Napoleon, in whose head great ideas were constantly arising, presented twenty modifications of a project for the organization of the threebans of the national guard to the council of state. But circumstances prevented the accomplishment of this plan; and the Emperor, occupied by other matters, had to abandon a project which would have protected France from any reverses. He wrote to the council of state:—

"Continue to organize the bans of the national guard, so that each citizen may know his post in time of need, and that even M. Cambacérès may take his gun when danger threatens; then you will, indeed, have a nation firmly united, able to defy centuries and men. I shall raise the national guard to the level of the line; the old retired officers will be its chiefs and fathers. Its ranks shall be sought for as eagerly as court favours;" and, he added, "I will not hear of exemptions, they are a crime; how could I burden my conscience with having killed one man rather than another? I do not know even whether I should exempt my son!"

We must, in a few words, express our anxiety to have this beautiful idea carried out in France. We do not propose to establish recruiting by provinces, as it is in Prussia, because we think that, in time of war, this system might be found inconvenient. But we would have the national guard raised to the rank of the army; so that, like the army, the

national guard should be, in time of peace, the guardian of our liberties, and during war, the hope and the support of the country.

In ordinary times, the army should only have 200,000 men under arms; it should be composed of young men from twenty to twenty-six; they should remain six years in service. When they leave the ranks they should remain in the reserve, which would be the first ban of the national guard, four years longer; that is to say, during war they should be obliged to join their regiments, and during peace to form a part of the first ban of the national guard.

This first ban should be composed of all men from twenty to twenty-six, who have not entered the army, and of all men from twenty-six to thirty years of age. It should be drilled twice a year for a month.

The second ban should comprehend all men from thirty to forty; and the third, all men from forty to sixty years of age.

Only the first of these three bans, which would be considered as the reserve of the army, would have permanent staffs, and the officers eligible by seniority or by merit would be its chiefs and instructors.

The second ban of the national guard would have no permanent appointments; the officers would be elected by their fellow-citizens, and would only be reviewed every three months.

The third ban of the national guard would only exist on paper.

France should be divided into thirty-three military arrondissements, which would make a population of a million to each arrondissement (this idea will be found in the Memoirs of the Emperor). Each arrondissement would make a military division of the national guard, which, organized in brigades and divisions, would have its head quarters in the chief town of the arrondissement.

France would thus have more than 1,200,000 trained men, enough to supply all the exigencies of the most complicated events. The advantages of this system would be immense. We have now a great and glorious army which could do prodigies if it were required; but the rest of the nation has no military organization; the national guard would be of little use in case of invasion; its organization is rather opposed to, than harmonising with, that of the army. Instead of inspiring the people with a military feeling, it debases and deadens the spirit. The object of the organization of the national guard seems but to keep the streets quiet. Men who have never borne the privations of a soldier, and who have not had the instructions for becoming an officer, are named its generals, and usurp these honoured tokens; the sole recompence for twenty years of misery, privation, and danger from the defenders of the country.

This confusion of honours and titles naturally engenders rivalry; instead of advancing in harmony, the citizens of the same country are divided, and learn to hate each other.

In our project, however, all rivalry would cease, for the national guard and the army would have the same organization; and by appointing as officers to the national guard of the first ban those military men whom age has rendered unfit for active service, the incalculable advantage would be obtained of employing these venerable heroes, and of giving more opportunities of advancement to the young, so impatient to attain honour. The old army chiefs would instil a military fire into the whole population, and that is necessary in a people jealous of its independence.

It must be remarked that at present the army is divided into two camps—the old and the young officers; as we have now been at peace for twenty-five years, it may be said that the head is old while the body is filled with youthful vigour. The former are old traditions and living emblems

of our past glory; the latter are the future hope of the country. These two classes have distinct interests, which must be satisfied. Since 1830, the administration has felt the difficulty of giving to each part of the army what they required; and in this, as in all things, they acted with violence and partiality, instead of following the principles of justice. It has struck out of the lists of our former glories not only those whose body was weakened by too much labour, but also those powers of mind and strong memory which seemed dangerous to its existence.

As to the young officers, favour has been too often the cause of their advancement, and services rendered have been left unrewarded; thus the government, feeling the necessity of infusing younger blood into the army, and of advancing the younger generations, has displeased every one, instead of finding means to conciliate all. A government ought to know how to employ all talents, and give to each the office in which he can make himself most useful to society.

The organization which we propose would, therefore, offer great advantages:

1. In an economical point of view; for of the 1,200,000 men, only 200,000 would be taken from agricultural pursuits. 2. In a moral point of view, since it would banish all rivalry between the national guard and the army, and spread a military spirit throughout the nation. 3. In government, for it would employ all military capacities, the old and the young heroes.

But, if even all these advantages did not spring from this project, still we should advise its adoption, or the adoption of an equivalent; for, organized in this manner, France would be secure from all invasion; it could defy the world, and repeat, with truth, the words of the proud Gauls, "If Heaven should fall, we would hold it up on the points of our lances."

THE

REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

1851.

NOTE.

Révision de la Constitution.

THE pamphlet with this laconic title is in truth the *programme* of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's autocracy. It is confidently attributed to the President's own hand: it has certainly proceeded from his closet, and speaks beyond mistake his principles and his purpose. It was for three weeks, we are informed, the only brochure on the events of the day permitted to circulate—it is the only one, at least, that our correspondent was able to transmit to us; and when we add that the political press in Paris had been, for the preceding months, tolerably free and unusually prolific, its sudden and total suppression on and since the 2nd of December—rendered more striking by the solitary appearance of this ill-omened apology for despotism—is in itself a fact abundantly characteristic and condemnatory of the recent usurpation. The pamphlet was, no doubt, sent forth in the hope that it would find a resting-place in public opinion —*the raven from the ark*—but we confidently expect that whenever the waters shall subside and the country begin to resume its natural state, it must be a bird of another colour that shall bring back the *olive-leaf*.

Quarterly Review for January, 1852.

THE

REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

WHATEVER real or imaginary difficulties may now interfere with the revision of the Constitution of 1848, there are few sensible or intelligent men who do not see the absolute necessity for it, and this at no very distant period.

When we recal the stormy times in which this Constitution was prepared and discussed, the great uneasiness which pervaded every mind, the moral influence which revolutionary men and facts always exercise over the conduct and language of the best informed and firmest in principle of the electors and representatives, and add, that though a solemn pledge was given by the provisional government that the will of the nation should be consulted, they were compelled to issue a decree for proclaiming a republic, in order to avoid anarchy, and that after having proclaimed universal suffrage as the principles of election, they adopted the scrutiny of votes,—a most unsatisfactory method for the people, as robbing them of their free will and transferring electoral power into the hands of the newspapers and committees, who monopolize the exercise, while apparently they would promote the extension, of right;—finally, if we dwell on that vital principle of the Constitution never having been acknowledged by the people, these combined considerations will bring us to the conclusion that the quality of the Constitution was as ephemeral and accidental as

the period, the ideas, the events, and influences which produced it.

On the other side, the want of confidence it evinces in the executive power, the secondary rank in which it places it, so contrary in spirit to the elevated condition it confers—the numerous and permanent causes of dissension which it creates between the two powers—the impossibility of the country interposing its voice in its own affairs for a period of four years, whatever a change of feeling or of events might induce,—these and many other considerations render the Constitution one entailing immense and lasting danger upon society.

If to these we add the universal, solemn, and inveterate condemnation which the population of each department has expressed and signed against it, we shall readily understand why every enlightened and practical man is of opinion that it must immediately be revised.

We may, under this certainty, which neither prejudice, tactics, nor intrigue can avert, investigate and discuss the chief points in which reform is essential.

II.

Without entering into any idle discussions between a monarchy and a republic, we will investigate the causes which, for the last sixty years, have produced constitutions so sterile and impotent.

Doubt and timidity are universally felt. Many who have witnessed the fall of the monarchy twice successively, have become republicans from despair of the cause; and others, imagining that the republic leads to all sorts of horrors, have adopted monarchical ideas; but the evil is not in the form, it is at the root, and it is ever the same, whether the country adopts a republican or a monarchical form of government.

rule, its preponderance, and its forgetfulness of the part which the executive power should play in France, which has overset Constitutions and governments.

This power is the vital spring of our existence as a nation, and we must not lose sight of it in our political institutions.

The constant tendency of royalty in France has been to introduce unity in all things—in the territory, in the organization of the clergy, in the government, the judicial assemblies, the army, and the laws—and to submit everything in different degrees to its direction and authority.

III.

In all those stupendous works which have produced the great unity in France, the royal power has ever been the cause and effect.

The royal power, as a cause, fought against all local and divided authorities, seigneuries, provinces, municipalities, bishops, and abbots; as the result, it concentrated all these conquered authorities, and, in the general interest of order and good government, formed a pedestal for the throne out of their ruins.

The characteristic and innate genius of the French nationality, and the constant and uniform tendency of its history, was the gradual increase of central power, and the successive abolition of local or partial powers, which were derived either from the citizens or the nobility, the clergy or the parliament; and the last struggle of monarchy against feudality, in which both perished by the unforeseen intervention of revolutionary spirit and ambition, ended also in the triumph and in a great accession of central power.

IV.

Thus, the French revolution, which destroyed the throne and the nobility, stripped the clergy, and broke up the

machinery of the ancient dynasty, accomplished, without suspecting it, the providential work begun by royalty so many centuries before, by the overthrow of feudality and the concentration of power; for it introduced unity throughout, by dividing the country into departments, ruled by hierarchical functionaries emanating from one central point; by dispensing justice from several springs, applying a general law in the name of a central power; among the clergy, by attaching it to the state, from the immunities granted through it; in the army, as withdrawing it from the influence of the nobility, as well as from the provincial interests, and placing it entirely in the hands of government.

Thus the revolution, which destroyed ancient France, respected, accelerated, and completed the movement which arose, and which every year spread and strengthened the central and directing power; and it may be asserted that the committee of public safety, D'Anton and Robespierre, those bloodthirsty enemies of monarchy, carried out and completed the strengthening of the executive and ruling power, the work of Louis-le-Gros and Louis XI., of Richelieu and Louis XIV.

In presence of this tendency of the central power to elevate and increase its dominion, which is the proper and distinctive characteristic of political progress in France, we cannot but allow that it was completely misconceiving the historical tendencies of the country, its tradition, morals, and the genius of its government, to have thought of giving it the English constitution in the year 1815. History proves that the political tendencies in England have ever been totally different from those in France; and that that which with us was the work of the initiative power and efforts of royalty, was with the English the work of

V.

In England, the royal prerogative does not direct; it is directed. The grand Charter of 1215, and the Bill of Rights of 1689, placed the English royalty under the dependence of three orders,—the clergy, the nobility, and the commons, united in Parliament; and although these two constitutional acts give considerable rights to the sovereign, such as the sovereignty of the national church, the command of the armies by land and by sea, the patronage of ecclesiastical dignities, of judicial, diplomatic, and administrative appointments, none of these rights can be exercised without the countersign of a responsible minister, representing the majority of the two Houses,—the royal authority being not only under control, but subject to the concurrence of the three orders united in sovereign assembly.

In the same way that a central, high, and free power is fitted for the historical development of France, and to her greatness and genius as a nation, so is a royal moderate power, guided by the three great bodies of the state, fitted to the traditionary and political character of Great Britain.

The formation of the English nationality has proceeded from totally different means from those followed for the formation of French nationality.

England has had neither a Louis-le-Gros, Louis XI., nor a Louis XIII., to make a formidable war against the barons, and to dismantle and raze their fortresses. England has never had a Philip Augustus, nor a Louis IX., nor a Philip IV., to develope the communal franchises; nor has she had a Charles VII., Henry II., or Louis XIV., to create judicial unity, to suppress local customs, and to submit all jurisdictions to a council of state. England has remained feudal—England has preserved the

in their primitive form and power; and in England, at the present day, the bishops, lords, and municipal bodies dispense justice within their respective jurisdictions; and, to speak the language of her institutions, the monarchy of Great Britain is less of a sovereignty than a suzerainty.

Since the period of the grand Charter in 1215, the English monarchy has never tried, systematically, to throw off the superintending agency of the three great bodies of the state; she has ever considered herself as their ally, rather than their supreme ruler. The works which royalty accomplished in France, the nobility and third estate completed in England; in one instance, the initiative came from the crown, in the other, from the nation.

Thus, in France, Henry IV. commenced the Canal de Brisac, and Louis XIII. completed it; Louis XIV. contributed magnificently to the Canal of Languedoc; Louis XIII. founded the Military Marine; Louis XIV. founded and endowed several manufactories; in fine, all the great undertakings and improvements in France were due to royalty; while in England, the improvements and undertakings always emanate from the nobility and corporations.

Since the fall of the Roman nobility under Augustus, the history of the world has not presented so intellectual, so patriotic, so active, and so politic a body, as the English nobility; taking the lead in everything,—in the navy, the army, in agriculture and trade; an aristocratic, liberal, conservative, and progressive body, censuring the king, but venerating royalty.

Since the fall of the Roman wardens under Constantine, no body of manufacturers or tradesmen have shown themselves more sagacious, more firm, more elevated, or more national, than the English corporations.

Since the fall of the Roman *jurandi* under Constantine,

there has never been a body of manufacturers and merchants who have shown wiser instincts,—been more foreseeing, firm, and dignified than the English corporations;—associations of men of mingled pride and deference, performing their duties as scrupulously as they obey the laws, valuing the law as highly as their privileges, bending without servility to the aristocracy, and directing the people with gentleness.

These three great portions of the English society, the church, the nobility, the commons and corporations, are bodies specially formed to govern, uniting the past and present, and living in wonderful harmony. Rivals only in activity, intellect, and patriotism, royalty is their link rather than their guide, and presides over the common work, rather than accomplishes it herself.

VI.

It is easy to understand that a constitutional and parliamentary form of government is the one calculated for such a nation. There is no fiction in the English government; intrigues and parties are powerless. There is no taking of hands between aristocrats and democrats to effect revolutions; no third parties interfere among the ministers, trying right and left to obtain a majority; we do not see the royal power undermined quietly by some, or loudly defamed by others; each one quietly continues his employment; each one occupies his place, and is contented, without thinking of aggrandizing or changing it.

In every country, where, as in England, three great bodies could be found, so ancient, so national, so strong, so intelligent, and so united, so conservative and so liberal, the constitutional form of government would be the one best suited to it, and the direct and immediate action of the central power might be very limited, because these great *historical*

destiny, or their cause from the destiny and power of the sovereign; indeed, they think they should infringe their own greatness by interfering with his.

But in a country like France, where every great body, has been crushed and annihilated, where there is no longer any body of nobility, or body of citizens, or body of clergy, possessing a political existence; where no assembly could be found without collecting together four or five opinions at variance, struggling to exterminate each other; where all is rivalry, ambition, or party; where the principle of authority is based more on the want that is felt of it, than on the respect entertained for it; the parliamentary rule with a central regulating power, over-ruled and debased, is, as a principle of government, a mere fiction, and as a social guarantee, a lasting cause of disorder.

VII.

As we have been enlightened by the experience of thirty years on the representative government which has ruled over France, we will quietly inquire what there was really in the powers created by the charters in 1814 and 1830 in similarity with the English government.

These charters gave the king great privileges—the choice of his ministers, the nomination to appointments, the framing the laws with the concurrence of the Assembly, the making of treaties of alliance, the declaring war; but what reality did these rights possess in royal hands? Hardly any.

The ministers were all made by majorities, and too frequently by coalition and party work. France no longer possessing any large associations, or great traditional and permanent interests, the majority has always been more or less turbulent, laboriously constructed, and more laboriously maintained. The monarchy of 1814 lost its majority in 1825, after a struggle of ten years; the monarchy of 1830

never really had one until 1841, and they fell together, after seven years' warfare.

The ministers were then the produce of all the internal agitations; and the king, who was supposed to select, really endured them. As they were not, as in England, the representatives of the great national interests, but the representatives of coalitions or parliamentary compromise, forcing themselves in by the aid of the press and the tribune, they had no ties with the national and lasting interests of royalty, and, far from sheltering it by their systems, they confounded it by their intrigues.

The public functionaries were generally received by the king as they were designated by his ministers, who endured them themselves on account of their own precarious situation in the face of a changeable and unreasonable majority, constantly abused by the journals, who wished to enjoy the advantages arising from their unpopularity.

Feeling themselves set up, or at least protected, by the influence which was necessary in carrying on the march of government, these agents, certain of the present, generally made sure of the future by gliding into the ranks of the opposition, in hope of becoming ministers on a future day; and when it happened that they were not ungrateful, it was always to their real patron the ministry, and never to the king, their constitutional and fictitious patron, that they accorded all their adhesion and gratitude.

Thus the right of giving away places encumbered by restrictions, which resulted from the king's submission to the ministers, and the ministers' submission to the majority, while they again were compelled to submit to the majority of an electoral body, directed and maintained with great difficulty, ended in reality in the creation of a selfish and uncertain patronage, generally acquired by the opposition, sometimes by the ministers, but never by the head of the

state. As for the concurrence of the Assemblies from 1814 to 1848, royalty never possessed it for a single day, fully, truly, and unreservedly.

All this in the first place was the fault of the times; political agitations had scattered over France numberless mutilated and defeated parties; and during the most brilliant moments of the prosperity and glory of the monarchy, there was always some one, even in the Chambers, who was at work against it. It was also especially the fault of France herself, engrossed with personal ideas and selfish ambition, agitated with unworthy disputes, instead of being supported, as England is, by that great body, at once liberal and conservative, daring and prudent, which renders its policy a national tradition. In England, a prime minister is only the most accredited chief of a large collection of legitimate ideas and interests, accepted and real, holding their place in public opinion, and in the nation. In France, the ministry is usually represented by groups of deputies, flanked by groups of journalists, organized with difficulty and in a furtive manner, without any real or deep root in the country.

When placed at the heads of their majorities, like generals at the heads of their troops, the ministers rather took part with the Assemblies than with the king; because the Assembly, disciplined by themselves, formed their strength, and secured their ambition, even against the throne. So it is we have seen statesmen engage in violent attempts against the monarchy, and rouse the Assemblies and the newspapers against her, because she had resisted their encroachments; witness the fatal consequences of the defection of Chateaubriand in 1814, and of Thiers in 1830.

VIII.

The Assemblies have never been, in the words of the Charter, the sincere, loyal, and disinterested collaborators of

the central power. Without speaking of the extreme opposition which has always been more or less openly the enemies of royalty, or of the king, the majority itself, organized, disciplined, and supported by fleeting combinations, transitory associations, and perpetual compromises, had a constant tendency rather to depress the throne than to support it, and to extend the parliamentary domain by successive encroachments on the royal domain.

Charles X., urged beyond endurance by the encroachments of the Chambers, openly resisted and was defeated. Louis Philippe, defended by a majority that was painfully directed and composed, saw our ambitious deputies convert the streets into a field of battle, and he was driven away.

We see, then, that there cannot be anything more futile or chimerical than the idea of giving a country a government that does not accord with its nature, its tendencies, or its antecedents. Where the government does not emanate from the constitution of the country itself, from its habits or character, its belief, even from its prejudices, all that charters create out of this basis is false and perishable.

France desires that her rulers should possess a real, serious, and efficacious power, and for this reason, that in great revolutions she looks to such men. It was vain that the charters of 1814 and of 1830 had laid down as a constitutional basis the irresponsibility of the king and the responsibility of ministers. In truth, the king has always been responsible, and the ministers have not. Charles X. died in exile, and Monsieur de Polignac died quietly in Paris; Louis Philippe died in England, and a year after the revolution of February, Monsieur Guizot entered again as quietly upon his political rights as into his drawing-room.

IX.

Whatever government a nation gives itself, whether monarchical, constitutional, or republican, one of its first and fundamental wants is the spirit of combination.

In a monarchical and aristocratic country, the spirit of combination results from the existence even of those great traditional bodies which receive and perpetuate the idea of former administrations.

In democratic governments, whatever name may be given to the chief of the state, the spirit of combination can only come from the chief himself, everything around him being only moveable, variable, and transitory.

But to enable a chief of a democratic government to give unity and consistency to public affairs, he must have a system, and be armed with the necessary means of adopting it. The national representation, possessed of its immense rights, and holding the budget in its hands, is always in a situation to moderate and to restrain the system, and to put a boundary to its encroachments if they become contrary to the real or apparent interests of the country; but if it is perfectly understood that this opposition to the erroneous or exaggerated views of the chief of the state arises from the legislative body, common sense finds it difficult to comprehend how the opposition could reasonably become ministers, since ministers are the necessary agents of the chief of the government, the receptacles of his thoughts, and organs of his will; it is indispensable that that they should depend on and be devoted to him, under the penalty of crushing the power and attributes given him by the constitution. This is an elementary condition of the appointment of a chief of the state which the constitution of the United States has not failed to sanction.

In electing a president for four years, the United States

are aware, in the first place, what system they are raising to power, and they are afterwards certain that this system will be frankly carried out and tried for four years, without any impediments arising from the ministers empowered to apply it, whatever this system may be, whether peace or war, banking, liberation or slavery, protection or the annexing a new state.

If after having rendered the president responsible for the acts of his government, the American constitution had imposed on him the necessity of receiving his ministers from the hands of a parliamentary majority, although these ministers differed from him on many subjects, or even had totally different ideas, the constitution would sullenly, and as it were regretting that she granted them, rob him of the means of fulfilling duties imposed. It is a manifest truth which will not admit of argument, that to be responsible, you must be free, so that the ministers of the president of the United States are the objects of his direct and free choice, the depositaries and organs of his ideas, which they know, they accept, and they obey,—are disengaged from all political responsibility towards the chambers, and entirely covered by the responsibility of the president, whose views they only record and carry out.

Such ideas and such facts are, as we have said, an elementary and fundamental necessity in democratic countries, where the chief of the government, who is empowered to direct public affairs upon his own responsibility, should be armed with the necessary authority for effecting his projects.

It is surprising that Monsieur de Tocqueville, who has studied the government of the United States, should not have perceived as the result of his meditations the spirit of so simple and so wise an arrangement: he might with great reason, when speaking of the double responsibility of the president and his ministers, introduced into the Constitu-

tion of 1848, boast that he had inserted "an unheard of novelty." A responsible chief obliged to employ responsible ministers—that is to say, independent of him, is, as Monsieur de Tocqueville truly said, an unexampled thing. Unfortunately for this combination, we are obliged to admit that what is unexampled, has ever been valueless.

X.

Perhaps persons may be found who will be more struck by words than ideas, and who will say to us, as certain daily papers have said—"You only want to have clerks, then."

Certainly Henry IV., Louis XIII., Louis XIV., Louis XV., Louis XVI., and Napoleon, exercised a sway in their government, which is no longer according to our manners or the period in which we live, and which no one would rationally dream of re-establishing; yet these princes all had ministers, even subject to this authority, whose career and renown always acted as motives for the emulation of statesmen, and these ministers were not clerks. Neither Sully, Richelieu, Colbert, Louvois, Choiseuil, Turgot, Vergennes, Maret, nor Talleyrand were clerks. There may, therefore, be great ministers even under an authority which absorbs or rules all others; still more, then, under the head of a state, who is only the first subject of a constitution.

No, I repeat, it is not clerks we want; we leave the minister all initiative power and liberty of thought, provided he does not force it upon the chief of the government, whose assistant, collaborator, and *secretary* only he is, as he was called in ancient political parlance; for under the present hypothesis it is not to the minister, but to the chief of the state, that the nation has confided its interests.

Above all things, we wish to avoid the lamentable instability produced by a change of ministry arising from the variations in assemblies so fluctuating as ours are. It is in-

troducing anarchy into the government by a combination, which in subjecting the minister to a legislative control, induces even the best intentioned men to neglect all the great questions, whilst they are labouring for popularity in the assemblies; frequently to the prejudice of the head of the government, whose policy they are nominally acting upon, and who still remains responsible to public opinion and to revolutions for his acts, views, and intentions, which he is thus incapacitated from following out.

What we object to is, that when fortunate circumstances lead such men to power as Monsieur Casimir Perier and De Villele, whose uncommon capacities would save a monarchy, they should be dismissed, and government deprived of their aid, to satisfy some low parliamentary intrigue.

We also object to parliamentary influence and discussions in the tribunes, which oblige the chief of the state to select, exclusively, for his ministers, political characters or clever men, well versed in oratory, instead of choosing special and practical men.

Above all things, we would prevent the people suffering longer from all those false combinations which always act to their detriment, and only favour private ambition and political parties.

XI.

All that has been said of the necessity of a high central power unfettered and strong, giving a general direction to public affairs, and making use of a spirit of combination in his administration, is equally applicable to the Republic as to a monarchy, for the name given to the machine is very unimportant, when the wheels and springs are the same.

Let us follow the constitutional fictions in the practice of the present government, and we shall demonstrate that it is as disorganized under the empire of the constitution of

1848, as it was under the rule of the charter of 1814 and of 1830.

The first and most engrossing idea of a minister on arriving at power, is to insure a majority for himself in the assembly. To insure this object he is obliged to give sureties to the parliamentary groups, who have associated themselves with his fortunes, and who will bring him adherents. These sureties consist of influence and appointments. Favours are thus generally bestowed on enemies, or at best on the lukewarm, rather than on devoted friends.

This fatal manner of acting, but which is essential to the greater number of new administrations, particularly in troublous times like the present, when the majorities and the means of government are not yet established, facilitates and brings into the bosom of the assembly a ministerial party, living on the favours of the administration, but not devoted to the heart of the state; men who solicit favours from every minister, but who would think they compromised themselves by appearing at the President's palace.

This ministry, although the mandatory voice and organ of the chief of the state, is obliged thus to support itself, and to act by creating a strength for itself which is personal, and frequently independent of, if not hostile to, the central power. On the other side, the minister is responsible to the assembly, and it is necessary that the administration should possess its confidence; but as having been appointed by his predecessors is not exactly a claim on his confidence, he frequently changes or discharges important functionaries who owe their position to his predecessors.

Experience has thus taught the functionaries that their existence, and their future prospects, depend on the ministers they serve, and not exclusively on the head of the state, whose policy, views, and undertakings are

frequently subjects unknown and indifferent to them. The functionaries have, and must generally have, a very moderate share of devotion for the chief power; and it may also be said that, with rare exceptions, their regard for the minister is also very lukewarm, because the frequency of the ministerial crises obliges them to study all those who may be called to succeed him.

Furthermore, to complete the picture, the ministers whose interests are separate from those of the President, have others which separate them from each other.

Not submitting to any superior and general influence, each shutting himself up in his department, jealous of power and of each other's influence, they each draw their own way instead of being united in one idea and one common effort for the general advantage.

XII.

We plainly see the natural results of such a system. At home, the bondage of ministerial power to parliamentary combinations and cliques, neglect and disaffection towards the central and moving power, a gradual weakening and fall of authority and of government.

Abroad, the effects are not less disastrous or more concealed. The diplomatic agents, being only the organs of ministers, perpetually dismissed, thrown out, and renewed, and who represent nothing certain, stable or traditional, in the eyes of foreign cabinets, and their governments only viewing them as the confidents of an ephemeral policy, do not commit themselves to men in a situation liable to perpetual change. If, on the contrary, foreign courts had about them men invested with the direct and personal confidence of the chief of the government, and stable

natural consequence, and advantageous alliances for the country would easily be established.

Such is the effect of the parliamentary power in France, and of its constant tendency, by its unvarying encroachments, to crush the government within, and to compromise it without.

It is unceasingly occupied by mean and petty jealousies, eager in the pursuit of office, and lessened in the opinion of other countries by the exhibition of undignified, unpatriotic, and ignoble struggles, in which society is completely sacrificed to party spirit and ambition.

It could be only through wilful blindness, or a wish to leave the country a prey to rapine, dissensions, and revolutions that on a revision of the constitution a system of government so unfitted to the character and antecedents of France, and which must inevitably result in her overthrow and periodical ruin, should be maintained.

XIII.

We shall doubtless be asked, what, in our opinion, is the system which maturity, reflection, experience, and the country's welfare, would lead us to prefer to the parliamentary mechanism, already judged and condemned by all men who do not rank speechifying, parade, theatrical scenes, personal importance, and the vain boasting of the tribunes, above the quiet, the well-being, and the glory of the country?

Let the government be monarchical or republican; let France, in the exercise of her liberty, her reason, and her power, give herself a president or a king—we repeat, in the name of common sense, supported by thirty years' experience, that order, peace, and the security of the country will not be found except in the political system whose foundations

were laid in 1799, in 1802, and in 1804, by the greatest genius of modern times.

This system is the *representative* system which is suited to France, and not the parliamentary system adopted by England.

To judge soberly of this system of government, we must first abstract the grand historical figure that presides over it; for by absorbing the attention of the whole world to himself, the Emperor Napoleon threw the great bodies into the shade which formed the basis of his political institutions.

We all admire now the civil and military institutions with which he endowed France, because they yet exist, though weakened by parliamentary usurpation, and we have the machinery before us. The political institutions, on the contrary, by vanishing with him, have only left confused traces, of which it has been very easy to degrade the character.

What was the idea of the Napoleonist institutions, established at the beginning of the century, and which lulled France from revolutionary agitations?

It was the division and independence of powers, which Montesquieu designates as the vital principle of liberty.

And he also adds, that if, in any society whatever, the man, the assembly, or the class which makes the law, has also the power of executing it, there must be disorder and anarchy. We know what admirable reasons Montesquieu gives for it, and how the experience of centuries has hallowed this principle.

Well! the idea of the institutions of 1799, of 1802, and of 1804 are nothing more than the principles of liberty among all nations, for these principles completely divide the executive from the legislative government.

The Constitution of 1848 itself proclaims this principle, for it says, in the 19th Article, "The separation of powers

is the first condition of free governments;" and nevertheless, after this solemn declaration, it confounds them all.

By the Emperor's system the government proposes the laws; a council of state, composed of the most eminent legislative capacities, discusses and enlarges on the projects, regulates the order, and presents it to the legislative body. They either accept or reject it; it is then sent back to the government, after a contradictory discussion with the commissaries of the council of state. The senate, which is empowered to watch over the maintenance of the institutions and the harmony of the powers of the state, and which, among other attributes, has the right to consult the sovereign people either to modify the constitution or to provide for unforeseen emergencies, examines the project of law in its turn, in a constitutional point of view, and proposes the promulgation or non-promulgation of it to the chief of the state.

Then the heart of the government promulgates and has the law put into execution by ministers who depend only on him, who never appear at the assembly, who have nothing to discuss with the legislative body, and who are therefore in a condition to govern the country without any parliamentary influence on their minds.

Now, is there any necessity to dwell on the advantages of so simple, so rational a government? Do they not instantly present themselves to the mind?

And as for all real and serious liberties, are they not insured by the vote on the laws for taxation? A popular assembly, who hold the strings of the purse, is she not in reality the mistress of her own government, to maintain and direct it according to the wishes of the country?

Thus, setting aside the initiative and parliamentary omnipotence, that principle which so fatally rules the government now, embarrasses all the administrative powers, by constantly disturbing the minds of the people, and paralyses

the strength of the country, we have here a power as truly independent as any we have had for the last thirty-six years, for it has, as they all have had, the vote on the budget. But inasmuch as this legislative power has no direct relation with the ministers—that it does not argue with them, that it has no power to elevate or to overturn them, as defined in that of the parliamentary initiative—it gives to none of its members the power of exciting the public mind by introducing subjects which are at variance with public tranquillity—and thus those agitations, coalitions, and intrigues, which have characterized parliamentary governments ever since the year 1814, have now no object.

On the one side, the government, occupied with deeds instead of words, by administering and not legislating, may devote its whole time and all its thoughts to the public weal, instead of using it in miserable dissensions and agitations; on the other, the legislative power, having only to make laws, and not to make or unmake ministries, may retain the ordinary conditions of quietude, steadiness, and patriotism which become a deliberative body.

The tribunal disputes between the parliamentary orators and those of the council of state may still excite passions, but they can no longer determine ministerial crises, and while the government may quietly assist at these oratorical displays, it will possess the double advantage of adding to the greatness of the ruling power, because it will indicate the most clever, the most intellectual, and the best informed men from whom the ranks of the council of state may be recruited.

We will make one reflection here, which, unhappily, has but too much influence in the government of societies; it is, that institutions which do not calculate on human ambitions and passions, end in disorder to the government, and in misery to the people.

One of the capital vices of this parliamentary system, is not only to impose on ministers the chimerical obligation of being at once great orators and great statesmen; not only to have concentrated in their hands a number of high functions which it is physically and morally impossible for any man to fulfil together, but by this senseless division of power to discourage and annoy the most legitimate ambition.

It is the height of imprudence to permit the portfolios of ministers to be the aim and object of all the political capacities in such a country as France; it is as if, instead of serving the country, every intellect was to be put in play for the valueless work of attacking the government, merely to upset it.

Under such a system it seems as though all was done when the ambition of such and such statesmen is condemned, and the observation is made "that he did it." The real fault is in the institution; from the deplorable system of abstracting from power a great share of the political intelligence of the country, which naturally turns against the government; and in this particular the partisans of the English school have grossly deceived themselves.

The English aristocracy, with its enormous wealth, places, estates, titles, and honours, cares little about the moral or material advantages of the government. The debates in the house of commons serve to point out those men that should be chosen for its agents, and when once they are placed in power they interfere no more, and return to their country places.

In France, on the contrary, in this eminently democratic country, every celebrity aims at power. They solicit from the state all the advantages of rank and importance, which society cannot give them; and as by the parliamentary system the government is thus organized, to the advantage

of a very limited number, it is continually attacked by all dissatisfied ambitions.

It was then with great skill, and an extensive knowledge of the human heart, and of the character of our country, that the legislator of the years 1802 and 1804 enlarged the circle of important functions by summoning all the talent and intellect either to the senate, the council of state, or the ministry. Not content with separating the executive from the legislative power, he also skilfully separated the administrative duties from the discussion of laws and regulations. Every one is aware that the *Conseil d'Etat* was a real ministry for ideas and intentions, as the so-named ministry is now one of action and execution. When we reflect that these institutions, founded by a great man, and which are equally adapted to the republic as to the monarchy, for the denomination of the chief of the state is independent of the system—when, I repeat, we reflect that this work of the greatest genius of the age has been abandoned for wretched imitations of English or American systems, made by obscure lawyers, obscure journalists, or unknown authors, it is enough to confound the human mind.

In conclusion, we consider that it is to the interest and honour of France to revise the constitution in the spirit of Napoleonist institutions; we are convinced, after the lamentable experience of thirty-six years of English or American constitutions, that it is high time to return to a national system — the work of a great man, which is suited to the genius of our administration, and the only one which can put an end to the agitations of the country.

Let it be fully understood that we do not recommend the plan of the constitution of the years '8 and '12, which emanated from Monsieur Sièyes's extraordinary mind, nor his complicated system of election: what we

wish to see carried out in these great institutions is the creative genius of Napoleon;—that is, the system itself, with its organization of power, its links, connexions, and mechanism, far more than its title.

As to a parliamentary government, we repeat, upon the authority of reason and history, that whether it be republican or monarchical—whether it has a president or a king at its head, it will only produce what it has hitherto produced in France, where there is no necessity for its adoption, as it is not a national work, but a foreign importation, and will only end in disquietude, contentions, abuses, revolutions, and ultimate ruin.

XIV.

Yes! let us not deceive ourselves; there are fundamental rules of existence for all governments, whether republican or monarchical, which cannot be dispensed with. One of these fundamental conditions in France is, that the legislative power should examine, discuss, control, and moderate, but never rule.

The history of the last sixty years proves that in a country like France, abounding in different parties, with men of indefatigable and dissatisfied ambition, torn by intestine struggles between parties and cliques, legislative assemblies being incapable of directing themselves, are still less capable of directing the central power, which they must invariably lead to destruction.

Charles X. and Louis Philippe, hurled from the throne by parliamentary coalitions and the two revolutions of the 29th of July, 1830, and the 24th of February, 1848, brought about by assemblies which were not aware of the evil they were perpetrating, are startling facts, which defy contradiction and leave no room for doubt.

It would therefore be madness, as well as useless, after these three examples, to commence a fourth, with the

same data; its inevitable termination is known beforehand. Every power which establishes itself by means of constitutional fictions and parliamentary omnipotence is inevitably a fallen power, do what it may;—whether it be pliant, like Louis XVI.; arrogant, like Charles X.; or wily, like Louis Philippe;—and France may prepare herself for a fourth revolution, which will probably be the last, as society will perish in it.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS,

CORRESPONDENCE,

ETC.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS,

CORRESPONDENCE,

ETC.

AN INCIDENT IN THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR.

An incident having reference to diplomatic matters, briefly referred to in the notice about the ex-king Joseph Bonaparte, is described at length by M. Louis Bonaparte, in a paper inserted in his work, entitled "*A quoi tiennent les Destinées des Empires*":—

In 1815 Napoleon came in twenty days from Cannes to Paris. France rose proudly under the tricolor flag, the men of the people gained courage, the traitors trembled, and the cry of *Vive l'Empereur* was echoed from the Rhine to the ocean, from the Meuse to the Mediterranean. On the 25th of March, 1815, Napoleon was in his cabinet in the Tuileries, alone with his brother, the ex-king of Spain. He loved his brother Joseph best, and had great confidence in his judgment. The conversation, though serious, had the natural tone usual among friends discussing their common interests. "Why," said king Joseph to his brother, "did you not postpone your return to France until the Congress of Vienna was dissolved?" "Circumstances," replied the Emperor, "precipitated my return. The Bourbons had acted in such an impolitic manner that I knew I

should be received with open arms in France by the people and the army. I could not remain at Elba; my resources were intercepted; hired assassins were daily attempting my life; and it was proposed in Vienna to send me to a more distant island in the Atlantic. We must now try to divide the coalition. Some negotiations were commenced with Köller, the Austrian commissary, from Elba; but I cannot trust Metternich; as to Russia, that is a different thing." "I am quite of your opinion," said Joseph, "and the man whose influence would be of the greatest advantage to you is Pozzo di Borgo. I once was very intimate with him, and we have a mutual friend, L——, who would, I am sure, take charge of a communication from him." "But," asked the Emperor, "what can I offer Pozzo for his mediation? I know the Corsicans better than you; and, whatever ambition they may have, nothing equals, in the eyes of mountaineers, the prospect of a high position in their birthplace." "Offer him the highest office in Corsica, and five millions down, and I do not doubt your success. I will write to him, and recall to him the memories of youth, it is an easily sounded cord." "But do you think that now, when I have to organize the defence of France, which will even force me to diminish your allowance as royal princes, I can give five millions to a diplomatist?" "Well," said Joseph, "I will arrange that; and, if you sanction the negotiation, I can procure the money." The project was approved of; M. L—— consented to undertake the mission, and started with the five millions in his carriage. Difficulties, the nature of which we have forgotten, detained M. L—— several times on his journey, and he did not arrive in Vienna until the 12th of May. He immediately drove to the Count Pozzo di Borgo's dwelling. The Count was not at home, but M. L—— made himself known, insisted on being admitted, and was shown

into, a waiting-room. He remained several hours. Towards evening Pozzo di Borgo arrived: he was pale, exhausted, and seemed half dead with weariness, like a man who has gone through a great struggle. He is surprised to see M. L——, and asks the purport of his journey; the latter communicates it; and Pozzo di Borgo, after having twice read Joseph's letter, seems overwhelmed by agitation, falls into an arm-chair, and exclaims, "Ah, my dear L——, why did you not come a few hours sooner! I have just come from the Congress; the opinions were quite divided, and the reason you see me so exhausted is, because I employed all the strength, the intelligence, and the persuasion I was master of, to induce Austria and Russia not to retire from the coalition, and not to disavow the manifesto of the 25th of March. If you had come yesterday, even this morning, I swear to you I would have taken Napoleon's part, and I should have been successful . . ." Then he rose, paced the chamber agitated by different feelings, and added, "If I could but retract what I have said . . ; but what reason could I give for such a sudden change? . . . It is impossible; what would the world think of me? I have just exhausted all my eloquence to prove that there can be neither peace nor truce with Napoleon. But, I will consider; come again to-morrow; I am exhausted by the discussion, and by your proposition, now." The next morning, at eight o'clock, M. L—— was with the Count Pozzo di Borgo. "Well," he asked, "have you decided?" "Oh, my friend, it is impossible; I should ruin myself, without saving the Emperor; I had but one shaft, and I directed it against him. See, read; this is the extract of the report of the conferences of Congress; it confirms the declaration of the 25th of March, and unites Europe against Bonaparte."

Revue de l'Empire, April, 1843.

TRANSLATION OF SCHILLER'S "IDEAL."

Whilst in his prison awaiting his trial before the Court of Peers for the affair at Boulogne, M. Louis Bonaparte amused himself in producing the following translation, in French, of the "Ideal," by Schiller:—

1.

"O tems heureux de ma jeunesse, veux-tu donc me quitter sans retour; veux-tu t'enfuir sans pitié avec tes joies et tes douleurs, avec tes sublimes illusions? Rien ne peut-il donc t'arrêter dans ta fuite perfide? Tes flots vont-ils inévitablement se perdre dans le sein de l'éternité?

2.

"Les astres brillants qui éclairèret mon matin dans la vie ont perdu leur éclat; l'idéal qui gonflait mon cœur, ivre d'espérance, s'est enfui. Elle est aneantie cette douce croyance en des êtres créés par mon imagination; ces rêves si beaux, si divins, ils sont tombés en proie à la triste réalité.

3.

"De même qu'un jour Pygmalion étreignit la pierre de ses ardents transports, jusqu' à ce que le sentiment eut coulé brulant dans la fibre glacée du marbre; de même, j'enlaçais la nature de mes bras amoureux, avec une ardeur juvénile, jusqu'à ce qu'elle eut commencé à respirer, et à se réchauffer sur mon cœur de poëte.

4.

"En partageant mes brulants transports elle s'animait à ma voix, me rendait les baisers d'amour, et compressait lès battements de mon cœur. La fleur, l'arbre, tout vivait

pour moi, le murmure des ruisseaux chantait à mon oreille, même les objets inanimés paraissaient sensibles au retentissement de ma vie.

5.

Mon étroite poitrine se dilatait par un effort tout puissant dans un cercle immense, et je voulais entrer dans la vie en paroles et en actions par les illusions, comme par le bruit. Comme il était grand ce monde tant qu'il ne fut pas éclos à mes yeux, mais comme j'ai vu peu de choses s'épanouir, et ce peu, comme il était petit et mesquin.

6.

Avec quelle audace il s'élançait dans le vie, transporté par une noble ardeur, le jeune homme que le délire de ses rêves rendait heureux, et dont aucun souci n'avait encore arrêté la fougue; le vol altier des projets l'importait jusqu'au sommet du firmament—rien n'était trop élevé, rien n'était trop loin, parceque dans son ivresse il a cru pouvoir l'atteindre.

7.

Avec quelle facilité il était transporté? Qu'y avait-il de trop difficile à son bonheur? Comme sur le chemin fleuri de la vie il était joyeusement accompagné. L'amour avec son doux retour—la Fortune avec son brillant diadème—la Gloire avec sa couronne étincelante—la Vérité avec l'éclat du soleil.

8.

Mais hélas! à peine au milieu de sa route, ses compagnons infidéles l'avaient déjà abandonné, et l'un après l'autre, ils s'étaient enfuis précipitamment. Le bonheur, au pied léger, avait déjà disparu. La soif de la science n'était pas appaisée, et les sombres nuages du doute obscurcissaient l'image brillante de la vérité.

9.

J'ai vu la couronne sacrée de la Gloire, flétrie sur des fronts vulgaires! hélas, le tems heureux de l'amour n'a eu qu'un trop court printems, et ma route devint bientôt de plus en plus déserte, le silence s'accrut, et c'est à peine si l'esprit jette encore une faible lueur sur mon obscur sentier.

CORRESPONDENCE.

M. Capefigue, in his "Histoire de l'Europe," states, in reference to the Strasburg affair, that "an offer was made to M. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte of permission to go to America," which was "accepted by him in a suitable letter," in which he pledged himself "upon his honour," that he "would never return from exile;" and that, "consequently, upon this letter the king in his clemency commuted all the penalties incurred by him to a sentence of exile to America;"—and further, that in spite of the aforesaid promise, and act of clemency exercised by his Majesty, "M. Bonaparte had hardly reached the United States when he received intelligence of the dangerous illness of his mother, the Duchesse of St. Leu, upon which he hastened back immediately to her, troubling himself little about his pledged honour." In reference to this statement, M. Louis Napoleon addressed the following letter to M. Capefigue:—*

"London, November 10th, 1846.

"SIR,

"The serious accusation against me, contained in the 9th volume of your History of Europe, compels me to address you, for the purpose of refuting a very old calumny, which I did not expect to see again ; by an

* "The Prisoner of Ham," p. 336.

historian, who in his history of Charlemangne had addressed some flattering words to me.

"You believe, that in 1836, when I was suddenly seized and carried off *in spite of myself*, out of France, I gave my promise to remain in perpetual exile in America, and that my prompt return to Europe was a violation of my word of honour. I here renew my formal denial, so often given, of the truth of this accusation.

"In 1836 the French government did not even seek to negotiate terms of freedom with me, because it was well aware that I preferred a solemn trial and sentence to liberty. It, therefore, exacted nothing from me, because it could exact nothing; and I could promise nothing because I asked for nothing. In 1840, M. Frenckarre, himself, *Procureur General* to the Chamber of Peers, was obliged to declare that I had been set at liberty *without conditions*. Such is his own expression, reported in the "Moniteur" of September, 1840. You will, I hope, place faith in the words of the man, who, while expressing himself thus, read the act of accusation to the Chamber of Peers. I returned, therefore, to Europe in 1837, because no moral obligation prevented me from coming to close my mother's eyes.

"If, pre-occupied by this pious duty, I had had the weakness to violate a promise given, the French Government would not have required, after the death of my mother, to assemble a *corps d'armée* in order to force me to quit Switzerland; it would only have needed to call upon me to keep my word. Had I violated one promise, the French government would not have placed any reliance on a second; while, on the contrary, it frequently caused me to be informed during my residence at Ham, that immediately into an engagement with the reigning doors of my prison should be opened.

And had I, as you seem to believe, trifled with *good faith,* I should have subscribed to all the proposals made to me during my captivity; while on the contrary I preferred remaining six years a captive, I preferred running the risks of an escape to submitting to conditions which I thought dishonourable.

"Blame, Sir, if you will, my political conduct, distc my actions, falsify my intentions; I will address no complaint to you; you exercise your right to judge; but I will never permit any person to attack my honour, since, thanks be to God, I have preserved it untainted through many cruel trials.

"I trust, Sir, that you will give to this just refutation, a publicity as wide as the circulation of the writings which flow from your pen.

"Receive, &c.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON LOUIS."

Amongst the men of note with whom M. Louis Bonaparte corresponded during his captivity at Ham, was M. Louis Blanc, who wrote to him as follows in reference to his conduct in regard to the amnesty proposed:—

"PRINCE,

"One of our mutual friends, M. Poggioli, has handed me the letter which you were good enough to write to me. It is needless to say, how much I am touched with the expressions of sympathy which it conveys, and which my feelings so completely reciprocate.

"M. Poggioli, whom we are both fortunate in being able to call a friend, and whose attachment to your person is not less enlightened than ardent—M. Poggioli has furnished me with a copy of your reply to Mon. Odilon Although you are, at this moment, a captive and in misfortune,

I should hesitate to express to you the sentiments of esteem and compassion, which the perusal of your letter has awakened in my mind, had I not had previous opportunities of knowing you. You remember perhaps, Prince, the visit which I had the honour of paying to you at Ham, and with how much frankness I explained to you, in what my opinions differed from yours. An independent man and a republican, guided wholly by conviction and without expectations from any quarter,—I have little fear that anything which falls from my mouth or flows from my pen, however eulogistic, can be suspected of flattery. I confess, therefore, sincerely, that your answer to M. Odilon Barrot, affected me to the bottom of my heart. The resolution which it contains, was the only one worthy of you, and you are the very last person, in my opinion, who ought to have sacrificed what you owe to your character, as the price of opening your prison doors. Be assured, that by a course of conduct so noble, you have filled all your true friends with joy and your enemies with heavy displeasure.

"If you could decide on devoting to the greatness of your country, to equality, and to the republic, what you think you owe to the traditions of the Empire and a sort of family veneration for your name, with what eagerness would my heart fly towards you! Let us hope, all of us who love your person, without embracing your opinions, that the conviction will, one day, possess your mind in favour of these democratic tendencies, combined with the disinterested inspiration which it already exhibits. Nothing can more properly justify you in indulging this hope, than the constancy and dignity with which you bear your misfortunes.

"Receive, &c.,

"LOUIS BLANC.

"Paris, Feb. 12th, 1846."

Madame Georges Sand also wrote him a very long letter about the same time, from which the following is an extract:—*

"Meanwhile you need not affect the idea which you attribute to me, gratuitously enough, of considering me a political person. Oh no! I never entertained such a ridiculous thought; my dear Prince, at the time in which we live, I have simplicity enough to protest against all politics, not being able entirely to embrace the opinions of any party—I have but a poor head, full of Utopian ideas; I know well enough, that if you have been moved towards me by a sympathetic impulse, it is only because you have felt, and guessed that there is a good heart underneath these dreams of mine; as to my *illustrationship*, I do not care very much for it, and would readily part with it, for the least social progress. I said you were kindly forcing us, because we are here, two or three together, speaking often of you, and after many a strong protestation against your accession to any power whatsoever, always saying, 'He is endowed with the gift of making himself loved—it is impossible not to love him:' and then when some more come in and speak to us thus, of the three pretenders whom a revolution could offer to the *Bourgeoisie*, to the army, and to the people, (the Duke of B., the Prince of J., and L. B.) the last one, alone, has some chance of exciting the fanaticism, or settling the fears of the revolutionary powers—then we look at each other with fear, and wish to banish you from our hearts—although you are, indeed, little to blame in all this. I have read your writings; you, most certainly, are possessed with convictions, enthusiasm, and a feeling of greatness, and ability into the bargain; but let me say, heroic child, you are such as my father would have gloried to be

* "The Prisoner of Ham," p. 378.

—you are a *Bonapartist!* And we also, even we, would have maintained such a title with pride against the anathema of the stupid *Restauration*, had we been ten years older, or fifty years younger. But should we, who never were intoxicated by the direct magnetism of your *Giant Uncle*, see in the past anything but the revolution commenced in 1789, and brought to a close in 1804? You may say what you like, the transformation of the revolution in his person may have been necessary, providential, it certainly was magnificent and brilliant as the sun—but *Equality* proclaimed by *La Convention*—what became of it under *his* sword? Do not think we wish to repudiate what there was sublime in *him*—no—*but the fatality he carried with him, is, what we do not care to begin again with; we do not think it any longer necessary, and we feel it would be fatal.* We have, indeed, many things besides, to guard and defend against Europe, as well as the right of not selecting our own general, and our own *Emperor*. We have to conquer the right of not selecting any more monarchs, and of *not enduring any more the Dictatorship of Generals*. In fine, since I have given way to the impulse of writing to you first, to thank you for having thought of me, my soul is, as it were, divided in two parts; the necessity of admiring you, and of *believing in you* (*!*)—and I do not know what besides, but something like dread of the terrible name which you bear. I deem myself bound to protest against those dreams of your heroism, yet it fills me hot with horror—for a prisoner has nothing left but his dreams, and it is therefore so very inhumane to counteract them! You ought to hate me! To hate all those Republicans who cannot love you without afflicting you. A friend of mine told me the other day, he had said to things of the very description calculated to be painful to your feelings; but on seeing that you were thankful for

his candour, he went away so touched with greatness of mind, and your goodness, that *he was not able to refrain from tears.* Oh! yes, indeed, indeed, I well understand one might shed tears of tenderness over you; but I understand also, that one should prefer to rend one's heart, rather than to betray, the GREAT CONQUERESS, THE GREAT EMPRESS, THE GREAT AND MOST HOLY EQUALITY. *Are you going to say, you are its champion as well as ourselves? I would have believed it, indeed, before reading your volume, but can do so no more.* You must think us fools, for dreaming of attaining the end without using those powerful means in a rather warlike and absolutist shape; as to me, I do not know what we might be doomed to accept — I am not so closely connected with the political world, as to have any distinct anticipations on the subject, but *I dread the man who would come to spread over the Popular Legions, the wings of the Imperial Bird;* I would not come to clap him on the shoulder, like Falstaff, telling him, '*God save thee, my sweet boy.*' We know too well how *Shakspeare's* Henry V. answered his merry fellows, *Sir John Bardolph* and *Pistol,* but I could never make up my mind to think that that young Eagle would allow himself to grow intoxicated by the smell of gunpowder, and that then he would not fly through the smoke of victory, much higher than he at first intended to soar. So it is, dear Prince, pardon me, I adhere dotingly, to the *Montagne* for the past, and as for the time to come, to the *thoroughly levelled plain.*"

PAPERS

RELATING TO

THE COUP D'ETAT, 1851—2.

I. AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER, 1851. BY A. GRANIER DE CASSAGNAC.

II. THE LAST SITTING OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 2.

III. CONFISCATION OF THE ORLEANS PROPERTY.

IV. THE ELECTORAL DECREE.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

THE political life and works of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte would not be complete without full details of his last great achievement, the Coup d'Etat of 1851-2. Under this head, therefore, we proceed to reprint the most authentic records which exist of the extraordinary proceedings which have marked the excited period between December 1851 and February 1852; thus bringing the career of the most unscrupulous adventurer that the chances of fate ever threw up to the surface of society, to the very latest period.

The first work republished is a translation of a "*Récit Complet et Authentique des Evénéments de Décembre*, 1851," by A. Granier de Cassagnac, a *valet de plume* in the President's retinue, and which may therefore be looked upon as the version which that individual would wish to palm upon society of atrocities which will remain to history as a monument of disgrace and humiliation to the century in which they occurred.

The remaining papers are a curious and verbatim record of the last sitting of the Legislative Assembly on the morning of the Coup d'Etat—the decree for the plunder of the property of the Orleans family—and the new Electoral Law by which M. Bonaparte completes the theoretic part of his Constitution.

The working of it is yet to come, and is "big with the fate!" of France and—of M. Bonaparte.

EVENTS OF DECEMBER, 1851.

BY

A. GRANIER DE CASSAGNAC.

I.

THE whole world was paralysed by the dreadful situation to which France was reduced by the systematic opposition and hostility of the Assembly, and by the glaring plots of the ancient dynasties. Neither the government nor industry could advance: there was a general stagnation of agriculture, of commerce, of the laws, of power, and of society. The Assembly, by unceasing delays and impracticable systems, had stopped the progress of the railways. The firm and single arm of power, so necessary to crush democracy, was checked by the Assembly, who refused to make a law for dismissing the disaffected mayors.

The gratitude and respect due to the former services of the army were refused by the Assembly, who rejected their humble petition for affording relief to the poor veterans. The Assembly spurned the idea of revising an absurd Constitution which condemned France, bound hand and foot, to democracy and socialism, although urged on them by above two millions of petitioners, by an immense majority of the councils of arrondissements, and by eighty, out of eighty-four, of the general councils of departments.

II.

All parties were agreed that the position was intolerable, and that some change must be made.

Several of the conservative members, when paying their

farewell visit to the President of the Republic, on the prorogation of the Assembly, previous to their return to their counties, entreated him to dissolve the Assembly before the next session.

At the same time overtures were made by the party called "fusion" to assist the President in supporting society, or to unite with him in the maintenance of order, should it be deemed indispensable to make a *coup d'état.*

A few days before the meeting of the Assembly, some of the red and socialist party proposed to the President to trust to them, and to form a ministry from their ranks.

At last, on the first of December, a proposition of concurrence was brought in the evening to Louis Napoleon, in the name of the legitimist chiefs.

It is clear, then, that all parties, without exception, judged that the position was no longer tenable. Everybody proposed to the President to assist him to get out of it; only each of these parties wished the President to trust exclusively to them. But Louis Napoleon would only trust to France!

III.

The President of the Republic, beset by two conspiracies, and fettered by his responsibility as chief of the state, had no longer freedom of action: all that was left to him was the choice of the sacrifice necessary to preserve France and Europe.

First, there was a vast organization of brigands, directed by the secret societies, and sheltered by the flag of what was termed the "Montagnards," who, for the most part, certainly did not know the nature and extent of the crimes which they fathered.

The government was aware of all the meshes of this net, and held in its hand all the threads of this communist conspiracy.

The precise and detailed accounts from the prefectures and law courts left no possible doubt as to the plans of murder, robbery, and incendiarism for the month of May, when public authority would be weakened, and which might explode at the first favourable crisis.

Then a conspiracy against the President of the Republic was whispered, got up by the ancient parties intending to upset him, and to substitute a dictatorial Assembly. The projects, the plans, and the instigators of this conspiracy were well known to Louis Napoleon.

When we openly denounced it in the *Constitutionnel* of the 24th of November, the conspirators, although named, did not dare to bring us up to the bar of the Assembly, because they imagined, not without reason, that we should have brought forward dates, facts, and documents, and that we should have become the accusers, rather than the accused.

This plot of the ancient dynasty was so far advanced, that among M. Baye's papers were found organized decrees of the new government, the distribution of the principal offices, and the preparation for a seizure of arms, founded on the presumed concurrence of the 10th legion of the national guards of Paris.

IV.

It is plain that this constitution, which the members, on the 2nd of December, pretended so hypocritically to venerate, was threatened by them with approaching ruin; and the President, charged with an immense responsibility, could no longer hesitate. What could have restrained him? The political parties were notoriously incapable of saving France, and their coalition would not have survived their triumph. The legitimists daily aggravated the dangers of society by strengthening communism and weakening the springs of the administration and of the

laws; in a few months it would be too late for him, and for every one.

In the face of such danger, struck with the confidence of the six millions of men who had confided their fate to him, and struck with the duties which this confidence imposed on him, he determined to save the country, knowing that he gave, as guarantee of his loyalty, his head to the passions of the present, his memory to the judgment of the future.

It was immediately after the hostile act of the "*questeurs,*" that the President formed his resolution, and adopted his measures for an event, which was evidently approaching. Three men were the confidants of his thoughts: Monsieur de Saint Arnaud, the minister at war; Monsieur de Morny, one of the representatives of the people, and Monsieur de Maupas, the prefect of police. Louis Napoleon explained to them the immense dangers which threatened society, and which daily increased: he told them his plans, and implored them to join with him; all three promised. Monsieur de Morny undertook all the political responsibility as minister of the interior; Monsieur de Saint Arnaud, the military operations; Monsieur de Maupas the direction of the police.

For more than a fortnight these three men, with the President, arranged all the details of this immense undertaking, which far exceeded the difficulty, the talent, and the grandeur of the 18th Brumaire; and the most trifling things were forcseen, concerted, and prepared, with such wonderful secresy, that the most trusted friends and the most necessary agents, had not even a suspicion the moment before the drama commenced.

V.

The simultaneous action of all the measures to be taken was evidently the first condition for success, and the principal

measures were four in number;—the arrest of guilty or dangerous persons;—the publication of official acts; the investment and occupation of the palace of the Assembly, and the distribution of troops on the points which were judged necessary.

A quarter past six o'clock was fixed on as the hour for the execution of these measures.

It was essential that the whole plan should be carried out at the same time, in order that it might strike terror by its arrangements. At a quarter past six the arrests took place; at half-past six the troops were at their posts; at seven, the decree for the dissolution of the Assembly, and the proclamations, were sent from the prefecture to cover the walls of Paris.

Exactly at half-past six, Monsieur de Morny, accompanied by two hundred and fifty of the chasseurs of Vincennes, took possession of the ministry of the interior, and gave Monsieur de Thorigny a letter from the President, thanking him for his valuable services, and communicating the decisive step he had determined upon.

The printing and publishing the decree for dissolving the Assembly, as well as the proclamation to the army, and the appeal to the people, had been confided to Monsieur de Beville, a lieutenant-colonel on the staff, and one of the President's orderly-officers. The necessary workmen were ordered to the National printing-office, for an important work; at eleven o'clock the director was sent for under some pretence. As the clocks struck twelve a company of armed police who had been on duty to protect the printing-office against some pretended dangers, entered the yard. Sentinels were immediately placed at the doors and windows, and it was not until all these precautions had been taken, that Monsieur de Beville produced the papers which had been entrusted to him, and which he superintended per-

sonally during the printing, and until their safe arrival at the police office.

VI.

The persons who were to be taken by the police were of two different descriptions: the members of the Assembly who were more or less implicated in a flagrant plot, the heads of the secret societies, and the commanders of barricades, always ready to obey the orders of the factions. For the last fortnight they had all been watched, and never lost sight of by invisible agents, and not any of these agents had an idea of the real objects of his mission, all having been put upon different and imaginary services.

The total number of the persons to be taken amounted to seventy-eight, among whom were eighteen members of the Assembly, and sixty heads of secret societies, and barricades. The eight hundred *sergens de ville*, and the brigades *de sûreté* had been ordered to the police office at eleven at night on the 1st of December, under the pretext that the refugees of London were in Paris. At half-past three in the morning of the 2nd, the officers of the peace and the forty police commissioners were ordered to the office; at half-past four they had all arrived, and were placed in small divisions in separate rooms to prevent questions.

At five o'clock, all the commissioners went separately into the prefet's private room, and received from his own lips the full and true account, one at a time, with the descriptions of the plans, papers, and the necessary orders. The men had been selected with especial care, for the sort of employment which was allotted to each; and all set off imbued with zeal and energy, determined at all risks to fulfil their duty; and not one has failed in his promise. A great many carriages, prepared beforehand, were kept in readiness on the quays, about the police office, so as not to excite attention.

It had been planned by the prefect of police and the minister of war, that the arrests should take place a quarter of an hour before the arrival of the troops at their different destinations. The arrests were to take place at a quarter past six, and the agents were ordered to be at the doors of the persons named, at five minutes after six. Everything was effected with the most astonishing punctuality, and no arrest occupied more than twenty minutes.

VII.

Some of these arrests present such characteristic traits that we consider them worthy of being recorded. All the particulars relating to them may be relied on as scrupulously exact, having been copied from official documents. The most important of all—that of General Changarnier—had been intrusted to two men of extraordinary energy, the commissioner of police, Leras, and Captain Baudinet, of the republican guard; they were assisted by fifteen chosen agents, thirteen republican guards, and by a piquet of ten men, on horseback.

At five minutes past six the police commissioner rang at the door of the general's home,No. 3, rue du faubourg St. Honoré. The porter, after the customary question of "Who is there?" being followed by the answer of "Open the gate; we wish to speak to you," refused to obey. It was then evident that the porter was on his guard, and the agent who was the nearest to him was ordered, in a low voice, to continue to talk to him, so as to occupy him at the gate, and prevent his going up to the general. By the side of the gate, and belonging to the house, there is a grocer's shop; some customers were already at the counter; it struck the commissary of police that the grocer's lodging must communicate with the yard. He went into the shop and demanded the key of the passage in an authoritative tone;

he obtained it, and entered the house with his followers. The porter had already given the alarm, by a loud ringing of bells, hanging in the general's apartments; and his servant was found on the staircase, above the entresol. The commissary of police snatched the key of the apartment out of his hand, opened the door, and went in. At the same moment, an inner door was opened, and the general appeared at his bed-room door, in his shirt, with bare feet, and a pistol in each hand.

The commissary caught his arms, and said—"What are you about, general? Your life is not threatened. Why, then, defend it?"

The general became calm, gave up his pistols, and said "I will follow you—I am going to dress myself."

The general was dressed by his servant, and said to the commissary, "I know that Monsieur de Maupas is a gentleman; will you tell him that I depend on his courtesy not to deprive me of my servant, whom I cannot do without." This request was instantly granted.

In the carriage, General Changarnier spoke of the events of the day, and said—"The re-election of the President was certain; he need not have had recourse to a *coup d'état;* he has given himself a great deal of unnecessary trouble." Then he added, "When the President has a foreign war, he will be glad to send for me, to confide the command of the army to me."

VIII.

General Cavaignac's arrest was effected with the same ease and promptitude; the commissary of police went into No. 17, rue du Helder, and the following dialogue passed between him and the porter:—

"Which are General Cavaignac's apartments?"—"He is not at home."

"He is not; that is, he is asleep; you are come too early; his apartments are at the entresol."

They knocked at the door, and asked for the general. A female voice replied first, "He is not at home."

A moment afterwards the commissary rang again: then a man's voice said, "Who is there?"—"The commissary of police; in the name of the law, open."

"I will not open the door."—"General, I am about to burst open the door."

The general then opened it himself.

The commissary said, "General, you are my prisoner—all resistance is useless: my measures are taken; I am ordered to seize your person in virtue of a warrant, which I will read to you."—"It is useless to do so."

The general was much exasperated; he struck his fist on a marble table, and used violent expressions. On the commissary trying to calm him, the general eyed him steadily, and said, "What do you mean by arresting me? Give me your names."—"We will not conceal them from you, general; but this is not the time. You must dress yourself, and follow us."

The general became tranquil, and said, "Very well, sir, I am ready to follow you; only give me time to dress; send out your people."

He asked permission to write, and leave was given him to do so.

When the general was ready, he said to the commissary, "I have only one favour to ask you—it is, to allow me to go to my place of destination with you only." The commissary consented.

During the journey, the general was much engaged in thought, and he only spoke once.

"Am I the only one arrested?"—"General; I am not called on to reply to that question."

"Where are you taking me to?"—"To Mazas."

IX.

When Blanchet, the commissary of police, presented himself at the house in which General de Lamoriciere lived, No. 11, rue de Las Casas, the porter refused to give him a light or to point out the general's apartments. The commissary rang the bell at the first floor; a man servant opened the door, but instantly closed it again. He returned almost immediately with a light, and, seeing the commissary's scarf, he hastily extinguished his lamp, and ran down a back staircase, calling out "Thieves!" He was stopped by the sergens de ville, who were placed outside of the house. He then gave himself up, and conducted the commissary to his master's room. At first the general did not utter a word; he then looked towards the chimney-piece, and asked his servant what had become of the money he had placed there. The servant having replied, that it was put away safely, the general asked for his clothes, and dressed himself. The commissary said, "Sir, the observation you have just made is very insulting to me." "How do I know that you are not thieves?" replied the general. When the commissary showed him his badge of office he was silent. M. Blanchet said to him, "General, I have orders from the prefect of police to treat you with all possible consideration, and I wish to act with the greatest leniency; and I will put you into a chariot alone with myself, if you will give me your word of honour that you will not attempt to escape." "I will not make any promises; I will answer for nothing; do as you please with me."

They then made him get into a hackney-coach with some of the police agents. When he came opposite to the Legion of Honour he put his head to the window, and wanted to harangue the soldiers. The commissary did not allow him to utter a word, and observed that he should be obliged to use harsh measures with him if he attempted it

again. The general replied, "Do as you like." When he arrived at the prison of Mazas he appeared much more calm. He begged the commissary not to seize his arms, which were of value, and to send him some cigars, and the "History of the French Revolution." The commissary complied with his wishes.

X.

General Leflô, who was lodging at La Questure, was in bed when the commissary awoke him, and showed him his warrant. He arose, and, during the time of dressing, he uttered threats against the commissary, and invectives against the President of the Republic. "Napoleon wishes to make a *coup d'état!* We will shoot him at Vincennes; and as for you, we will not send you to Nouka-Hiva, we will shoot you with him."

The commissary answered, that resistance was useless, that the town was in a state of siege, and that he must know the consequences.

When he was getting into the carriage he addressed the colonel of the 42d foot, and wished to harangue the soldiers. Colonel Espinasse ordered him to be silent, and the soldiers crossed their bayonets on him. From the Assembly to the prison General Leflô did not speak a word.

XI.

General Bédeau lives in a spacious house, at No. 50, in the rue de l'Université, where there are several staircases. The commissary Hubaut did not know which staircase led to the general's apartments, nor on which story they were. It was necessary to act with some address with the porter. The commissary entered alone. The porter refused to say where the general's apartments were, observing, "I never saw you come to the general; and, in these times, I mistrust night wanderers." At length he was persuaded, and showed the commissary the way.

The servant came, and half opened the door; the commissary pushed it open, and went forward; the servant ran away frightened, the commissary following, until he came to the general and told him his orders.

General Bédeau was thunderstruck, but, recovering from his surprise, he protested against this violation of the constitution, and said to the commissary, "You are acting in opposition to the laws; you must not forget that I am a representative of the people and the vice-president of the Assembly; you cannot arrest me, since you cannot assert that you have taken me in *flagrant délit*." He protested that he had not plotted, and asked the commissary's name. He said, that he had seen honourable mention of M. Hubaut in the papers, that he was astonished that he could be the man to arrest General Bédeau, and that, being vice-president of the Assembly, and having already bled for the cause of order, he could, had he chosen it, have set aside some persons, "as he knew how to risk his life."

The commissary answered, that he did not come to hear his warrant disputed, but to execute it; that if the general could risk his life he was also determined on sacrificing his own in the discharge of his duty; that he must submit quietly, or he should be obliged to use harsh measures. He ordered the general to rise, who dressed himself with the most provoking slowness.

When they were about to depart, the general's face became gloomy and wrathful. He leant against the chimney, and said, "I will not go now; I will only go by force, and be carried away from my house as a criminal. Now, I dare you to seize the vice-president of the National Assembly by the collar and to drag him off."

The commissary said, "Do you not acknowledge, sir, that I have acted towards you with all possible civility?"

Yes, sir," said the general. The commissary thereon

seized hold of him: he made the greatest resistance, but he was carried into the carriage, exclaiming aloud, "Treason! To arms! I am the vice-president of the Assembly, and they have arrested me!"

It was useless; the carriage set off, and the sergens de ville followed it. On arriving at Mazas he harangued a division of the republican guards, who turned a deaf ear to him.

General Bédeau met Generals Changarnier and Cavaignac in the prison lodge, and he shook hands with the latter.

XII.

Colonel Chavras, who was living at No. 14, rue St. Honoré, at first refused to open his door, but seeing the door beginning to split, he said, "Stop, I will admit you," and he directly opened it.

The commissary Courteille told him his business, and the colonel replied, "I anticipated it; I fully expected it; I might easily have made my escape, but I would not desert my post. I thought it would have happened two days ago, and under this conviction I had loaded my pistol, but I have discharged it," and he pointed to a double-barrelled pistol on the chest of drawers. The commissary took possession of it. "Had you come that day I should have blown your brains out."

He got into a carriage quietly without making any resistance. On the way he asked, where they were taking him? As the commissary did not immediately reply, he said, "Are you taking me to be shot?" The commissary replied, that he was going to Mazas.

When he arrived at the prison he threw himself into a passion, refusing to state his civil position, and insisting on having "representative of the people" on his order for imprisonment.

XIII.

The commissary Boudrot got into the celebrated Monsieur Charles La Grange's rooms, at No. 27, rue Casimir Perier, as Monsieur La Grange was getting up to inquire the reason of the shricks of terror uttered by his servant, who was come to open the door. Monsieur La Grange made many protestations, adding, that the constitution was violated, that it was only necessary for him to fire one pistol-shot from the window to call all the people to arms. That if he chose to defend himself, he could murder them, and that they would be obliged to use force to carry him from his house. The police seized several political documents, two pistols, two moulds for making bullets, several cartridges, three poignards, and a cavalry sword, numbered 478, claimed by a sergeant of the republican guard, of the name of Kerbeau, as belonging to him, and having been stolen from the barracks in which he was quartered, on the 24th of February.

On his way to his destination in Mazas, Monsieur La Grange said, several times, "It is a bold game, but it is well played." At Mazas, Monsieur La Grange said to General Lamoricière, "Well, general, we wished to put the fellow in, but he has put us in instead."

XIV.

Monsieur Grippo, the red-hot socialist, lodged at No. 15, rue Ponthieu, and he had a complete arsenal under his bed. A large pile of newly-sharpened arms, two daggers, a loaded pistol, and a magnificent red cap, perfectly new.

The arrival of the commissaire Gronfier, with his agents, completely overset Monsieur Grippo; and on being questioned as to the things found under his bed, he answered,

that he had purchased them, as he had a *taste for the navy.*

Madame Grippo, who is a most energetic woman, spoke in the strongest terms to her husband, "Is it possible to have so little courage, and to allow oneself to be arrested without making any resistance?"

But, alas! neither these words, nor the sight of the arms, could revive Monsieur Grippo. "What resistance could he make?" said an eye-witness of the scene, "for Monsieur Grippo was seized with an internal derangement, which he could not control."

XV.

Perhaps some people may be curious as to the manner of Monsieur Bayes's arrest. It was made without any serious obstacle, though not without a struggle; for he bit and scratched like one of the attornies whom Petroneus denominates "*vultures togati.*"

XVI.

Monsieur Thiers was sound asleep when Monsieur Hubaut, senior, got into his bedroom, at No. 1, place St. George's. Hubaut drew back the crimson damask curtains, lined with white muslin, and explained the object of his visit.

Monsieur Thiers sat bolt upright, put his hands to his eyes, and lifted up his white cotton nightcap: "What is the cause of this?"

"I am come to search your house, but do not be alarmed; no harm will be done to you; and there is no fear for your life." This last assurance was much needed, for Monsieur Thiers seemed much cast down.

"But what do you intend doing? Do you know that I am a representative?"—"Yes; I am not come to dispute that point with you: I am here to execute the orders I

have received."—"What you are doing, may send you to the scaffold!"—"There is not any consideration that will stop me in the discharge of my duty."—"But this is a *coup d'état*, is it not?"—"I cannot answer any questions; pray rise."—"Am I the only one in this situation, or are others of my colleagues implicated?"—"I really do not know, sir."

Monsieur Thiers got up, and dressed very slowly, refusing the assistance of the agents. Suddenly he turned to the commissary:—"Suppose I was to blow out your brains?"—"I do not believe, sir, you could be guilty of such a crime, but I am prepared, and could easily prevent it."—"Do you know the laws, and that you are acting in direct opposition to the constitution?"—"I have no orders to dispute with you; and, besides, your own knowledge is so far superior to mine. I can only execute the orders given to me, as I executed yours, when you were the minister of the interior."

A search having been made in Monsieur Thiers' writing-room, without bringing forward any political correspondence, the commissaire expressed surprise; and Monsieur Thiers replied, "that for some time past, he had always addressed his political correspondence to England, and that none would be found in his house." On being asked to go down stairs, in order to depart, he appeared alarmed, and hesitated much. He imagined, that he was going to the police-office, and he was not undeceived. His fears were much increased, when he saw the road which the carriage took, and he endeavoured, by captious arguments, to turn the agents from their duty.

When Monsieur Thiers arrived at the prison of Mazas, he asked if he might have his *café au lait*, as he was accustomed to have. He was overwhelmed with attentions, but his courage quite forsook him in prison; and his firmness did not exceed that of Monsieur Grippo. His transfer to the prison of Ham was dispensed with by a high

power, and he was temporarily taken to his own house. By a new decree, he was sent to the bridge of Kell, on the right bank of the Rhine.

On setting off, and for some minutes after, Monsieur Thiers wept abundantly; how noble and fertile were these tears, if they flowed in expiation of many revolutionary doctrines, and many acts of anarchy. Bitter, alas! if they were caused only from a jealous and boundless ambition, fallen from a pinnacle without dignity or lustre.

When he arrived at Kell, Monsieur Grangier de la Mariniére brought the officer of the peace, Monsieur Vendeubach, a letter, filled with protestations, and one of thanks for the civilities Monsieur Thiers had received. Monsieur Thiers declared, that he was going to Frankfort, and from thence to Dresden, to meet an old friend, with whom he should amuse his mind by painting.

XVII

The most dangerous of the heads of the secret societies were arrested, at the same time that the representatives were taken from their beds; and this was effected with equal ease. The same species of arrest is going on without relaxation, and has already been productive of good results. The public hardly knows the names of these bold and indefatigable enemies of society; and we will only give the names of those who are considered the most celebrated in the revolutionary world. They are—

Messieurs Grignon (Henri Gustave)
„ Stevenot
„ Mechel
„ Artaud (Denis Claude)
„ Geniller (Guillaume)
„ Philippe (Alphonse)
„ Six (Theodore)

Messieurs Delpech (Célestin)
„ Gabriel (Nicholas François)
„ Schmidt (Jacques Frédéric)
„ Baune,—brother of the representative
„ Vasbenter
„ Houl (Michel Abraham)
„ Cellier (Charles)
„ Jacotier (Louis François)
„ Kuch (Marie Alphonse)
„ Brun (François)
„ Lemesle
„ Malapert (Pierre Antoine)
„ Hiblach
„ Lecomte (Minor)
„ Meunier (Arsène)
„ Buisson (Alexandre)
„ Mussot (Pierre)
„ Bonvallet (Théodore Jacques)
„ Choquin (Etienne Simon Nicolas)
„ Guiterie (Charles)
„ Billotte (Léon Joseph)
„ Voinier (Aimé)
„ Thomas
„ Curnel
„ Boireau
„ Crousse (Charles-Joseph-Albert)
„ Baillet
„ Noguez (Antoine-Denis)
„ Lucas (Louis Julien)
„ Lassere (Jean Tudore)
„ Cahaigne
„ Magen (Hyppolite)
„ Polino (Antoine-Charles).

XVIII.

However delicate in its nature, the mission which devolved upon the army was one about which no doubt existed either on the President's mind, or on that of the minister of war. What in truth did Louis Napoleon Bonaparte ask of it—Was it a crown? No. Was it the triumph of any particular party? Certainly not. Louis Napoleon only required the army to protect the liberty of the whole of France from the designs of the factious; and to maintain order in the streets until ten millions of electors, solemnly consulted, should have evinced their wishes by a vote.

So simple, so noble, and so loyal a mission, confided to an army so well disciplined, and so patriotic, was eagerly accepted, and punctually executed. It was at half-past three in the morning, only three hours before the moment decided on for the execution of the scheme, that General Magnan, commander-in-chief of the army of Paris, was sent for by the minister of war, and received from him, at one time, an explanation of the steps necessary to be taken, and the orders to execute them. General Magnan had before been made aware of the circumstances,—the necessity of the measure had been pointed out to him,—and he had begged to be sent for, at the moment he was to mount his horse. There is so much good sense, and such perfect discipline in the army of Paris, that every regiment was at its post at the minute specified.

Colonel Espinasse, commanding the Nipert brigade of the 42nd foot, was commissioned to take possession of the palace of the legislative Assembly, and to occupy it. The Assembly was on that day guarded by a battalion of the 42nd foot, under the superior orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Niel, of the 44th foot, who commanded in the name of the Assembly. Colonel Espinasse, a most intelligent and brave officer, has one of the most brilliant reputations in the

army, and distinguished himself particularly at the siege of Rome, and lately in Algiers, in several obstinate engagements in which he commanded the rear-guard.

XIX.

At a quarter past six, Colonel Espinasse arrived at the Assembly, which faces the place de Bourgogne, and having caused the gate to be opened, sent for the commanding officer, while his troop took possession of the courts around the palace. The commanding officer found himself regularly relieved by his superior officer, and the battalion of the guard was taken back to the barracks. When the 42nd foot entered the legislative apartment, three commissaries of police, each accompanied by ten agents, entered at the same moment, with orders to arrest the *questeurs*. By half-past six, the Assembly had been surrounded, and occupied without the slightest difficulty. Monsieur de Persigny, the confidant of all these measures, and whose self-abnegation and devotion are unequalled, had assisted in this delicate and most important service, and went to give an account of it at the Elysée palace. Before we close this article relative to the Assembly, we must observe, that an order, either badly given, or misunderstood, was the cause of nearly sixty representatives getting in, one by one, through a little door, situated in the rue de Bourgogne, opposite the rue de Lille. These members met in the Hall of Conferences, and began to be a little turbulent.

As soon as the minister of the interior was informed of their presence there, he sent an order to have them immediately turned out. The commandant Saucerotte, of the municipal guard, who was charged with executing this order, prefaced it by a short and pithy speech.

Monsieur Dupin, when called upon by his colleagues, made the following speech to them:—

"Gentlemen, the constitution is violated. We have the law on our side; but we are not the strongest. I advise you to go away. I have the honour to wish you good morning."

As these words did not have a decisive effect on the meeting, the commanding officer said he should order in the soldiers, upon which the members immediately retired.

XX.

All these steps had been so promptly executed, and with so much order, with such precision, and in such perfect quiet, that Paris, stupified, awoke on the 2nd of December, under the impression that an event had taken place, through the courage and sagacity of some individuals, which was for the benefit and salvation of all parties. There was but one cry—"the game has been well played." The first and general impression was favourable, because the President had shown that he was very skilful, very determined, and very powerful.

No one thought now of the constitution which they had become accustomed to despise. No one inquired, or occupied themselves about the representatives, whom they had long regarded with contempt. The energetic act of the President was generally approved, with this one proviso:—"Will it succeed?"

XXI.

After the first moment of surprise, the populace ran to inquire for news, and hastened to read the printed papers which were posted on the walls.

First the following decree appeared, giving a summary of the great acts of the 2nd of December:—

"In the name of the French people,

"The President of the Republic decrees:—

"Art. 1. The National Assembly is dissolved.

"Art. 2. Universal suffrage is re-established; the law of the 31st May is annulled.

"Art. 3. The French people are convoked for their votes from the 14th to the 21st December.

"Art. 4. The state of siege is decreed throughout the first military division.

"Art. 5. The Council of State is dissolved.

"Art. 6. The Minister of the Interior is charged with the execution of the present decree.

"Given at the Palace of the Elysée, the 2nd December, 1851.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE."

"DE MORNY,

The Minister of the Interior."

XXII.

We have already said that no regret was felt for the Assembly, still less did the world occupy itself about the "council of state," which had become a focus of parliamentary intrigues. The whole country was called on to pronounce freely as to its fate; and there was a feeling that in future there would be no juggling among bands of plotters, and that France was about to free herself from the selfish rule of party spirit.

Next appeared this admirable address to the army, which had become the safeguard of society, and the security of the laws:—

"SOLDIERS,—Be proud of your mission! you will save your country, for I depend on you, not to violate the laws, but to enforce the first law of the country—respect to the

national sovereignty, of which I am the legal representative. For some time you have suffered, as I have done, from the obstacles which were raised against the advantages I wished to confer on you. These obstacles no longer exist. The Assembly threatened the authority which I hold from the whole nation. The Assembly is dissolved.

"I make an honourable appeal to the people, and to the army; and I say, either give me the means of assuring your prosperity, or choose another in my place.

"In 1850, as in 1848, you have been treated as the vanquished party. After blighting your heroic disinterestedness, they disdained to consult your likings or your wishes. Yet you are the elect of the nation. To-day, at this solemn period, I wish the voice of the army to be raised. Vote freely, then, as citizens; but as soldiers, do not forget that passive obedience to the head of the government is the strict duty of the army, from the general to the ranks. It is for me, responsible as I am for my actions to the people and to posterity, to take the measures which appear to me indispensable for the public weal. As for you, remain faithful to the laws of discipline and order. Assist the country, by your imposing appearance, to declare its wishes in quiet and reflection. Be ready to repress every attempt against the free exercise of the sovereignty of the people.

"Soldiers,—I speak not to you of the remembrances which my name recals to you—they are engraven in your hearts. We are united by indissoluble ties. Your history is my own. There is in common between us in the past a community of glory and of misfortune. In future we shall have in common feelings and resolves for the repose and the grandeur of France.

"Given at the Palace of the Elysée, the 2nd December, 1851.

(Signed) "LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE."

So noble a discourse must evidently have been understood by the army, for the President of the Republic only begged them to cause the free expression of the universal will to be respected.

XXIII.

Louis Napoleon next addressed himself to the whole nation, and asked them, in the following words, to declare if they wished to be saved from anarchy and plunder by the establishment of an earnest and rational form of government:—

"FRENCHMEN,—The present state of things cannot last. Each passing day increases the dangers of the country. The Assembly, instead of being the support and stay of the government, is become a hot-bed of plots. The patriotism of three hundred of its members could not stay this fatal tendency. Instead of framing laws for the general benefit, it is forging arms for civil war. It aims at the power which I hold directly from the people; it encourages all evil passions; it endangers the peace of France. I have dissolved it, and I make the people the judge between it and me.

"The constitution was, as you know, made with the intention of weakening beforehand the powers which you were about to confide to me. Six millions of votes were a startling protest against it; still I faithfully observed it. Provocations, calumnies, insults, alike found me invulnerable; but now that the fundamental treaty is no longer respected by those who incessantly invoke it, and that the same men who have already ruined two monarchies would fetter me, in order that they may overthrow the Republic, my duty is to outwit their perfidious intentions, to maintain the Republic, and to save the country by invoking the solemn judgment of the only sovereign I acknowledge in France—the people!

"I appeal, then, truly to the whole French nation, and I say, if you wish to remain in this uncomfortable condition, which degrades and compromises our future, choose another in my place, for I no longer wish for a power which is powerless to do good; which renders me responsible for acts which I cannot prevent; and which chains me to the helm when I see the vessel plunging into the abyss.

"If, on the contrary, you have still confidence in me, give me the means of accomplishing the grand mission that I hold from you. This mission consists in closing the era of revolutions, in satisfying the legitimate wants of the people, and in protecting them against all subversive passions; it consists especially in creating institutions which shall outlive mankind, and which shall be lasting foundations on which something durable may be established.

"Persuaded that the instability of power—that the preponderating influence of a single Assembly are constant sources of trouble and dissension, I submit to your suffrages the following fundamental basis of a constitution which the Assemblies will hereafter develop:—

"1st. A responsible chief, named for ten years.

"2nd. Ministers dependent alone on the executive authority.

"3rd. A council of state, comprised of the most distinguished men, preparing the laws and supporting them, by their arguments, in presence of the legislative body.

"4th. A legislative body, discussing and voting the laws, which body shall be chosen by universal suffrage, and secret voting.

"5th. A second assembly, composed of all the most enlightened men of the country; a power that shall carry weight; a guardian of the fundamental treaty, and of the public liberty.

"This system, created by the first consul, at the com-

mencement of the century, has before given France repose and prosperity, and will again ensure them to her.

"This is my firm conviction. If you are of the same way of thinking, declare it by your votes. If, on the contrary, you prefer a government without strength, either monarchical or republican, taken from I know not what, of the past, or the imaginary future, reply negatively. Thus, then, for the first time since 1804, you will vote with a knowledge of what you are about to do, and who and what you vote for.

"If I do not obtain the majority of your suffrages, then I shall call a new Assembly, and I shall restore to it the command I received from you.

"But, if you think that the cause, of which my name is symbolic, that is, 'France, regenerated by the revolution of '89,' and organized by the Emperor, is one common cause still, proclaim it by consecrating the powers for which I ask you.

"Then will France and Europe be preserved from anarchy, all difficulties will be removed, rivalries will have disappeared; for all will respect the decree of Providence in the choice of the people.

"Given at the Palace of the Elysée, the 2nd December, 1851.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE."

XXIV.

What can be more simple, more natural, or more universally desired, than a power, lasting enough to re-establish society, shaken by so many rude attacks? What can be more fruitless, more annoying, or more revolutionary in itself, than this parliamentary government, under which the deliberating assemblies have embroiled all affairs, con-

perpetually into struggles with the government, and lowering it in the public opinion?

Who, on the contrary, will not be in favour of calm, enlightened, and hard-working assemblies, assisting the chief of the state, instead of undermining and opposing him? And who but feels that universal suffrage, exercised in the *communes* by persons who know and esteem each other, far removed from the influence of gossiping advisers, will take France out of the hands of the old party, and will return men to the Assembly who will be devoted to the public welfare, and not to plotting and cabals?

The great measures which the President had adopted, the frankness of his appeal to the people's good sense, patriotism, and free will, under the protection of the army, must and will strike the world with admiration.

One only of these measures was ill-advised.

Relying on the example derived from other striking periods of our political history, the President at first wished that each affirmative or negative vote should be given with the names of the party, by means of registers left at the mayoralties: this was a tribute offered to the magnanimity and courage of the French.

When the President was informed of the deep root which secret voting had taken in our political ideas, he did not hesitate to maintain that system; wishing, above all, that the opinion of each individual should be free and unfettered.

XXV.

It would have been madness to imagine that the old political parties and the Socialists would yield without a struggle.

As early as ten o'clock in the morning the government was aware that the members of the parliamentary cliques were trying to meet, and that the heads of the secret societies were establishing a permanent sitting.

Thus, labouring under the most lamentable blindness, aid was being given to democracy and red republicanism—by whom?—by Legitimists, Orleanists, and Moderate Republicans, and the President was called on to protect society against the inhabitants of the faubourgs, who were incited to rebellion by large landed proprietors, ancient ministers, and influential men, who were anxious to outlaw the chosen head of six millions of Frenchmen.

Fortunately there are foolish schemes which are harmless from their extreme folly; and the government neither dreaded democrats, who were known to be condemned by all the intelligent and respectable men of the working classes; nor the deputies, whom it knew to be disunited, powerless, and without any general aim or object. Then there were the soldiers, who were cool, determined, and well commanded; and the twelve brigades then in Paris might have settled an enemy ten times more numerous and more formidable.

XXVI.

There was a meeting at ten in the morning at M. Crémieux's, No. 10, in the rue des Petits Augustins, of some of the Mountain, of which Monsieur Crémieux was president.

As soon as the government had notice of it, troops were sent off, the place of meeting was surrounded by them, and the members were taken away.

At the same hour, preparations were making at the mayoralty of the 10th division for a meeting of the members of the old coalition, which was to take place between twelve and one. We have already said that, in the plan for a new government, seized among M. Baze's papers, it was found that great hopes were entertained by the Assembly of the concurrence of the 10th legion of the national guard; consequently, the national guards, as well as the deputies, were ordered to remain at home.

About two hundred deputies, chiefly belonging to the Legitimist and Orleans parties, had met at the mayoralty, making use of the most violent language, and voting, in the name of the Assembly, the deposition of the President of the Republic, though their numbers did not amount to a third of the Assembly. They also deemed it necessary to call for the direct interposition of the military. General Oudinot was named as the commander of the parliamentary troops, M. de Lauriston as the commander of the national guard, and M. Tamisier was to be the head of General Oudinot's staff.

Speeches, as it may be imagined, were very plentiful at the mayoralty—harangues within and without, harangues from the windows, and in the court-yard, and speeches from tables and chairs; never were speeches more abundant. The number of the national guards was small; but the mob was great. The people appeared very inquisitive, but pretty tranquil. When M. de Morny heard of this meeting, he gave orders for it to be dispersed, and the members to be arrested in case of any show of resistance.

As soon as a detachment of chasseurs, despatched by General Forey, and accompanied by four commissaires of police, with several of the subordinates of the police, arrived, matters took a different turn; the chasseurs closed the windows, and removed the orators from them; the commissaires mixed among the persons collected. The president pretended to receive them as though they came for his orders. The commissaires immediately answered that they were come, not to receive orders from the ex-representatives, but to arrest them if they refused to disperse instantly.

The streets round the mayoralty were so crowded, and the number of people to be arrested was so great, that additional troops were required, and General Forey headed

they would yield only to force, M. Benoit d'Azy was caught hold of by a commissaire of police, and removed. All opposition ceased from this moment, and the deputies were placed between four files of soldiers and conducted without any obstacle to the barracks on the quai d'Orsay.

Some attempts made by General Oudinot to turn the soldiers from their duty were only answered by murmurs. Recollecting the face of a serjeant, who had been present at the siege of Rome, he said to him, "Can this be you, Martin, who are taking me to prison?"—"I beg pardon, general, but I have no power to relieve you from that punishment."

XXVII.

The number of deputies arrested in the course of the day amounted to two hundred and seventeen. They were removed towards night to the prisons of Mazas, Mount Valérien, and Vincennes.

During the execution of this important business at the mayoralty, the Archbishop of Paris was humbly requested to allow armed agents to be placed in the towers or belfries of all the churches in Paris, to prevent the red republicans executing their intention of ringing the tocsin.

At the same time the High Court of Justice had met spontaneously at the Palace of Justice. They had just finished the decree in which they declared that they had taken cognizance of passing events, when two commissaires, headed by a battalion of the municipal guards, entered the room, and showed the order to arrest the members of the court, if they did not immediately disperse. They offered no resistance, but instantly rose and separated, without carrying away the papers placed before the president of the court. Among the most important was the decree, already drawn up, but without signatures.

Thus ended all the attempts at opposition this day. All

these attempts were futile and unconnected, and evidently based on the knowledge that no real danger could accrue to their authors; for on the 24th of February (1830) the two legislative assemblies, the Council of State, and the Court of Accompts had allowed themselves to be dissolved without any resistance; the political orators, who had such brilliant opportunities of making speeches, had not uttered one; not a legion of the national guard had assembled to protest; and yet, on that 24th of February, it was not a question of a loyal appeal to the people, protected by the army and the whole administrative power;—on the 24th of February, the government, the laws, finances, and both public and individual security—all was crumbling to dust; and all the thunderbolts of eloquence and of war which have now been hurled at Louis Napoleon Bonaparte for supporting order and saving the upper classes, were then silent, having taken to flight before a democracy which threatened France and the whole of Europe.

XXVIII.

The army in Paris was calculated to silence every fear, from its numbers, its bravery, and its discipline. Its love of order did not admit of a doubt that France, under its protection, might freely choose her own course, without fearing rival parties, or the brutal tyranny of the Socialists or demagogues.

The army was composed of eleven brigades, viz.—

The brigade of Cotte
„ Bourgon
„ Canrobert
„ Dulac
The cavalry brigade of Reybell.

These five brigades composed the division under Carrelet.

The brigade of Sauboul
„ Forey
„ Ripert

These three brigades composed the division under Renauld.

The brigade of Herbillon
„ Marulaz
„ Courtigis

These three brigades composed the division under Levasseur.

Casting a glance over the composition of these eleven brigades, they include—

Eighteen regiments of infantry of the line,
Three regiments of light infantry,
Four battalions of foot chasseurs,
Two battalions of republican guards,
Two battalions of moveable gendarmerie,
Four companies of engineers,
One company of sappers and miners,
Two regiments of lancers,
Two squadrons of dragoons,
Two squadrons of moveable gendarmerie,
Nine battalions of artillery, in brigades,
Ten battalions of artillery, not in brigades.

This was the effective army of Paris, properly speaking, without including the neighbouring garrisons, which might double the number in a few hours.

During the days of December, there was called in from the out-districts only one division, that of the heavy cavalry from Versailles, consisting of the first and second regiments of carabineers, the sixth and seventh regiments of cuirassiers, and the twelfth regiment of dragoons, commanded by General Korte.

XXIX.

Allow me now to give a sketch of the characters and services of the general officers commanding this army, that we may the better appreciate it.

General de Saint Arnauld, the minister of war, has a cultivated and resolute mind, with a ready talent. Foremost during the war in Africa, where he was for fifteen years in the school of Marshal Bugeaud, whose intimate friend he was, he showed himself to be a perfect military commander while commanding in the province of Constantine, and during his expedition to Kabyle, which he conducted with consummate ability.

Three months of field service, twenty-six battles, the hardest campaign of the African wars, with great popularity among the troops, were General Saint Arnauld's recommendations to the President of the Republic, and rendered him worthy of the great and distinguished part he has played.

General Magnan, the commander-in-chief of the army in Paris, is an old soldier of the Empire, a brilliant officer, of great authority in the army. He displayed wonderful talent in conducting the operations of these past days, and especially those of Thursday the 4th, when his orders were given with precision and perfect coolness, accompanied by much foresight.

FIRST DIVISION.

General Carrelet, who commanded the first division, is an ancient colonel of gendarmerie. He is a determined man, and a distinguished officer, having frequently been in command.

General Cotte was a cavalry officer. He was placed at the head of a brigade of infantry, and inspired his soldiers with energy and bravery. Monsieur de Cotte has naturally

great polish of manners, and is destined to great things. He distinguished himself much in the African army. He is cool and intrepid, with great natural boldness of character. He led on the attacks upon the barricade in the rue St. Denis; his horse was killed under him; the colonel of the 72nd was wounded; the lieutenant-colonel and the adjutant-major were killed, and twenty men, killed or wounded, fell round him. The soldiers were deeply affected by such cool courage and self-command.

General de Cotte's elevation of mind and talents are known to the whole army, as well as his deep devotion to the cause of the President of the Republic.

General Bourgon is a distinguished officer, esteemed by the soldiers; he is a man of bold resolves, intelligent, and cool.

General Canrobert is an officer of great promise, and out of the common line. The battles in Africa, in which he distinguished himself, are beyond number. He was captain-adjutant-major to the brave General Combes, who was killed by his side at the siege of Constantine; during the struggle with Bou Maza he commanded and led on the 5th battalion of the Vincennes chasseurs; at the siege of Zaatcha he was the admiration of the whole army, when, leading on the Zouaves, and, at the head of twenty men, mounting first to the breach; two only of these men, besides himself, remained alive.

When under the orders of such a man as General Canrobert, troops must feel redoubled courage, and become irresistible.

General Dulac is an officer of resolute character, and prompt in execution. His regiment destroyed the first barricade in the faubourg Saint Antoine in the days of June, and he was promoted to the rank of a general of brigade for this feat.

General Reybell, who commanded the cavalry brigade,

is a man of tried bravery. He had given proofs of his loyalty and honour, for, a slave to a sense of duty, it was he who accompanied the king as far as St. Cloud.

XXX.

SECOND DIVISION.

General Renauld is endowed with great courage, and was highly esteemed by the army in Africa. General Bugeaud particularly appreciated his talents in commanding the rear-guard. He distinguished himself first in Spain, where he was wounded; and he was afterwards wounded several times in Africa. General Renauld is of energetic and determined character. His division was not engaged in any serious action; but it is brave and well commanded, and will daunt any enemy.

General Sauboul is an officer who can be relied on; he is much esteemed, and a man of determined courage.

General Forey is well known among the army as a distinguished officer, and will certainly become one of the first generals of division. The regiment that was ordered to take possession of the mayoralty of the 10th arrondissement belonged to his brigade.

General Ripert is a brave old soldier of the empire: of often tried courage, and devoted to his duty.

THIRD DIVISION.

General Levasseur is well known as a most energetic officer. He was long engaged in the war in Africa, where he distinguished himself. The insurgents might kill him, but they would never induce him to hold terms with disorder.

General Herbillon is a very distinguished officer. He is a clever, brave, and determined man. After saying that he

commanded during the siege of Zaatcha, no farther commendation is requisite.

General Marulaz is a most intrepid warrior, and highly esteemed by the army in Africa. He distinguished himself particularly at Kabyle, where he commanded the 20th regiment of the line.

General de Courtigis, who has the command at Vincennes, is a distinguished officer of high moral courage.

XXXI.

THE DIVISION OF THE HEAVY CAVALRY OF VERSAILLES.

The general of division, Korte, is one of the Emperor's officers, and was almost a comrade of the Lassalles and Montbruns. He served for some time in the war in Africa, and was wounded in the days of June. He is a finished cavalry officer.

General Tartas had resigned his seat as a representative in the Assembly to resume the command of a brigade. He is a very distinguished cavalry officer, and much liked by the army; he was for some time in Africa during the war, where he reaped many laurels; he was considered one of the best colonels in the army before he arrived at the rank of a general officer; he commanded the cavalry at the battle of Isly.

General D'Allonville is a man of a prompt and decided character, possessing much influence over the minds of the soldiers; he served for some time in the African war, where he was esteemed the bravest of the brave; he distinguished himself at the battle of Isly, where he took the Moorish cannon.

With such an army and such commanding officers, no doubt could be entertained by the President of the Republic, and intelligent men who interested themselves so warmly in the event, that the result would be that of silenc-

ing the disaffected, and protecting the liberty of the reigning powers in France, and of allowing the nation to choose her own form of government, after having had three or four prescribed to her by coteries and factions.

Thus a momentary doubt of the success of the measure never crossed any mind.

XXXII.

OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND OF DECEMBER.

At six o'clock in the morning, the National Assembly and its precincts were occupied by three battalions, and the entrances were guarded by the troops of the Ripert brigade.

An hour afterwards, the regiments of the three divisions of the army of Paris were arranged in brigades, and occupied the Quai d'Orsay, the Carousel, the Gardens of the Tuileries, the Place de la Concorde, and the Champs Elysées. A sufficient number of troops was left in the barracks to maintain order.

The arrests which took place in the Assembly and elsewhere, were effected without any resistance, and the parties who were arrested were taken in carriages to Mazas or Vincennes, without any opposition from the mob; and the words which several of the deputies addressed to the soldiers excited no reply but that of general reprobation.

Some representatives attempted to get into the National Assembly by a small door leading into the rue de Lille, the soldiers instantly drove them away.

The decrees of the President of the Republic were read to the troops about nine in the morning; they were received with universal approbation and indescribable enthusiasm. The army instantly saw that the safety of the country and the whole community depended upon them; the chiefs encouraged each other to accomplish the grand mission entrusted to them; and each determined to rival the others in courage and devotion to their country's cause.

The minister of war rode quickly through the troops at half-past eight, and was loudly cheered. His old brother officers, who had known him in Africa, where he distinguished himself, felt entire confidence in him. The appearance of the army, and the perfect reliance which it felt in the chief of the state, were a sure guarantee of the great result that would follow.

The troops were arranged in the following order:—

National Assembly—Ripert's brigade.

Quai d'Orsay—Forey's brigade.

Tuileries—19th and 51st line—General Dulac.

Place de la Concorde—Cotte's brigade.

Champs Elyseés—1st and 7th lancers—General Reybell.

Avenue Marigny—division of heavy cavalry; General Korte—Conrobert's brigade.

The brigades under Sauboul, Marulaz, Courtigis, Bourgon, &c. remained in their barracks, and occupied Paris.

The President of the Republic mounted his horse at twelve o'clock, attended by Marshals Jérome Bonaparte and Excelmans, the Minister of War, the general commanding the national guards, General Count de Flahaut, General Schramm, and several other general officers and representatives. He passed in front of the troops, followed by an immense crowd, who greeted him with the greatest enthusiasm, and with hearty cheers. The troops appeared to be animated with the best spirit, and with one voice expressed their devotion to the great cause they were employed to defend. The President returned to the Elysées, amid deafening acclamations from the assembled multitudes, and from the entire army.

The army was firmly decided on executing its task with the most devoted energy.

At four o'clock in the afternoon General Korte's division of the reserved cavalry was reviewed by the Prince in

the Champs Elysées, who was most enthusiastically received.

The soldiers returned at night to their barracks; the tranquillity of Paris was not disturbed; and the inhabitants showed by their countenances that they approved of the great act of the chief of the government.

XXXIII.

Day of the 3rd of December.

The minister of war having been informed that the representatives of the Mountain were organizing a revolutionary movement, in conjunction with the socialist sections of Paris, gave immediate orders for the troops to be victualled and ready, in case of a collision, to resist with every possible advantage. In order to avoid any unnecessary fatigue to their men, the generals were not to take up their military positions until the insurrection had begun.

Some barricades which were constructed in the faubourg Saint Antoine, and in the rues de Cotte and Saint Marguerite, as well as in the rues de Saint Aumaire and Saint Lion Sauveur, were destroyed in the morning by a battalion of the 44th regiment of line, a battalion of the 19th light cavalry, and some detachments. Several shots had been fired on the soldiers by the rioters, blood had flowed, and the struggle had begun. The insurgents had assembled first in the faubourg Saint Antoine, where they commenced firing on some detachments of the brigade of Marulaz. On being repulsed in their attempts, they tried to raise the quartier Saint Martin; when followed to this point by General Chapuis, they went over to the left bank of the Seine, to foment the faubourgs Saint Jacques and Saint Marceau. Sums of money were distributed, and the insurrection became organized. The representative M. Bau-

din was killed by the soldiers of the brigade of Marulaz, and M. Madier de Montseau, another representative, was wounded on the barricade of the faubourg Saint Antoine.

Towards four o'clock the crowds began to gather about the porte Saint Denis, and in that neighbourhood. A barricade that had been formed in the rue Rambuteau, was carried by a detachment of the chasseurs of the line without firing a shot. A detachment of the republican guard easily demolished two others in the rue St. Martin; and several other barricades which had been begun were destroyed by General Levasseur's columns.

The greater part of the brigades remained in the barracks during the day, and small detachments acted.

But in spite of the example, and even the money, offered by the insurgents, they could not induce the faubourgs to rise; the inhabitants were entirely in favour of government.

As fresh attempts of the socialist party were anticipated, Bourgon's brigade was ordered to take up its position for a skirmish by four o'clock in the morning, and the other brigades to hold themselves in readiness.

Printed and lithographed handbills, inciting the people to civil war, were seized, bearing the signatures of Michel (de Bourges), Schœlcher, Leydet, Mathieu (de la Drôme), Jules Favre, E. Arago, Madier de Montjeau, E. Sue, Esquiros, de Flotte, Chauffour, Brives, &c.

About seven o'clock in the evening some of the agents of the disaffected party mixed among the revolutionary mob, and appointed a meeting at eight on the boulevard St. Martin. Numerous crowds were formed on the boulevard des Italiens, but were dispersed about ten by a picket of cavalry. At eleven o'clock the boulevards were deserted, and Paris seemed more quiet. The troops retired to their barracks, but the revolutionists were concerting plans for the next day.

A proclamation was stuck up from the Minister of War, enforcing in the strongest terms that by the laws regarding the state of siege, every person taken with arms in his hands, or constructing a barrier, would be shot; and all persons who were the bearers of false intelligence would be reckoned among the insurgents. It was evident that the minister's zeal was not to be slackened by any considerations.

Under the favour of the night, the government took advantage of a momentary calm throughout the city to despatch eight deputies under escort to the prison of Mazas, by the Northern Railway. They had been foremost in rebellion, and in resisting the armed force. Their ultimate destination was the prison of Ham. During their journey they had ample opportunity of seeing how adverse the country was to them. They were constantly greeted by shouts of "Long live Napoleon!"

The one hundred and fifty representatives arrested at the mayoralty of the tenth arrondissement on the 2nd, were mostly conveyed to the fortress of Mont Valérien. Several were offered immediate release; but they declined it from a motive which will be generally understood, and which shows how much they disliked the idea of taking any part in a struggle between society and anarchy: almost all of them were set at liberty four days afterwards.

The opinions which had been so much in favour of the President the evening before, began to assume another complexion in the quarters of the Chaussée d'Antin and the boulevards des Italiens, under the influence of representatives, who tried every possible means to excite the people to rebellion.

The night was pretty calm. "To-morrow we shall have serious work," said the Minister of War, who then, for the first time, took a little rest. Hitherto he had directed the

whole of the active part of this immense movement with an energy and zeal which assured its success.

The army felt confidence in their general, remembering the laurels he had so lately won in Kabyle: and desired nothing better than to try their strength with these anarchists, these Parisian Arabs! They trusted also to their commander-in-chief, who was a distinguished soldier under the Empire, and had quelled the rash attempts made at Lyons against order and rule.

XXXIV.

The day of the 4th of December.

The morning was passed in preparations on the part of the insurgents; numerous and hostile groups were formed on the boulevards. Towards noon, some formidable barricades were formed at the porte Saint Denis, and in the following streets,—Saint Martin, Saint Denis, du Petit Carreau, Rembuteau, faubourg Saint Martin, and by the canal. A fearful struggle appeared unavoidable.

The rioters, who were not supported by the faubourgs, made every effort and used every means to seduce the populace to act with them, for they felt that the day for the great battle had come.

The commander-in-chief, Magnan, issued orders to the troops for a general movement of several brigades at the same moment on the quarters of Saint Denis, Saint Martin, and the Temple, where the insurgents were established. This well-planned disposition of the forces had the most excellent result.

"Be perfectly at ease," said he, to the minister of war, to whom he explained his intentions: "Confide the command of this day to me, and I will answer for the success

At two o'clock, you will hear the roaring of the cannon, and I promise you, that, with such troops, Paris will this evening be cleared of her enemies."

"I depend on it, and I leave you to your own judgment, because I know you," the minister answered.

Bourgon's brigade, which first took up its position for engagement, opened its fire, and swept the boulevards to the Saint Denis gate. At the moment it commenced the attack, Carrelet's division came out of the rue de la Paix and the boulevards, and pushed on Bourgon's brigade, as far as the rue du Temple, which it entered, to get to the rue du Rembuteau, turning to the right.

Cotte's brigade entered resolutely the rue Saint Denis, and a battalion of the 15th light infantry pushed on to the rue du Petit Carreau, which was already barricaded. At the same time that Bourgon's and Cotte's brigades penetrated into the heart of the city; the head of General Levasseur's column, commanding the 3rd division, entered the rue Saint Denis, and took up its position to strengthen Carrelet's division.

General Dulac was fixed on by General Levasseur to demolish the barricades in the rue Rembuteau, with the brave 51st, 19th, and 43rd of-the-line, and General Marulaz, who acted in the rue Saint Denis, and the cross streets. All this quarter of the town was enclosed in a net-work of troops.

These three columns, which formed a junction by means of the adjacent streets, were led on with such energy that the result was very speedy. The barricades, first attacked by cannon, were carried by the bayonet. All the part of the city which reaches from the porte Saint Martin to the pointe Saint Eustache was searched, the barricades taken away, destroyed, and burned, and the insurgents dispersed and killed. The engagement began at half-past

two o'clock; and at five o'clock the troops had returned to their position on the boulevards.

While this was going on, General Conrobert, who had taken up his position at the porte Saint Martin, destroyed the barricades, with his usual despatch, both in the faubourg Saint Martin and the adjoining streets, and pushed on to the canal, destroying the insurgents wherever he went. Here, as at Zaatcha, he set an example of bravery.

Reybell's brigade at the same time swept the boulevards from the Madeleine to the boulevard Poissonnière. They got as far as the boulevard Montmartre without firing a shot; but there they were assailed by shots fired from the windows by the insurgents, who were placed in many of the houses. They halted; and, assisted by the tirailleurs of the infantry, and some of Conrobert's brigade, they fired several volleys at the windows, burst open the doors with cannon, and promptly expelled the insurgents, after having killed a large number.

Courtigis's brigade also speedily carried the barricades, which had been erected in the faubourg Saint Antoine, and remained master of the place.

This great and simultaneous movement had exterminated the enemy, who left the barricades covered with their dead bodies; and all resistance became impossible for the future. On our side, we had to deplore the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Loubeau, of the 72nd, and the wound of Colonel Quilico, of the same regiment. Our losses amounted to about twenty-five killed, among whom was one officer, and one hundred and eighty-four wounded, amongst whom were seventeen officers.

The conduct of the army was admirable, for its enthusiasm and spontaneous feelings; it performed its duty well, and was determined, at all cost, to conquer the criminal resistance which held the country in check.

The brigades took up their position in the quarters they had conquered, about six o'clock in the evening. Immediately after, the streets were illuminated; the inhabitants, rid of the rioters, and the alarm they had inspired, came into the streets, and voluntarily gave the soldiers coffee, wine, and all sorts of refreshments. The bivouac fires were lighted in all the occupied quarters, and the regiments were universally greeted with the most cordial reception and warm sympathy, more especially in the neighbourhood of the markets, and about Saint Monica and the Pantheon. The last shots were fired about nine o'clock at night, in the rue Montorgueil, where a last attempt was resolutely quelled by Colonel de Lourmel with the 51st line. The whole army gathered cheerfully round the bivouac fires for the night, happy in having so nobly discharged their duty, and in having ensured peace and prosperity to France for the present and the future.

The combat was ended. The alarmed rebels fled in all directions, and Paris appeared momentarily transformed into a mighty camp. During the night, patrols of infantry and cavalry searched all the quarters where the troops were not stationed; they met with no resistance.

It is melancholy to relate that, notwithstanding the Minister of War's proclamation against the assembling of passengers, or bystanders, several unoffending people fell victims to their curiosity on the boulevards. There, as in the month of February, 1848, the rioters, with diabolical intentions, fired shots close to these groups with the intention of irritating the troops against the inhabitants of the aristocratic parts of the town, and that the populace might appear to be led on by them to retaliate; but, fortunately, the victims were not numerous.

XXXV.

The day of the 5th of December.

Some attempts at barricades had been made during the night in parts of the town which the soldiers had not visited, so that, on the morning of the 5th, some barricades were reported in the rue Rochechouart and in the Croix-Rouge.

The commander-in-chief, in concert with the Minister of War, ordered a great movement of the troops to the barriers of Rochechouart, and on the Croix-Rouge, to complete the defeat of the insurgents; but the columns met with no opposition, as the enemy fled at the approach of the troops, and the barricades, no longer defended, were all destroyed.

General Carrelet went with the moveable gendarmerie to Ménilmontant, where he met with the national guards of Belleville and Menelmontant, with the mayor at their head. He was cheered by them. General Conrobert went nearly as far by the Boulevard Poissonnière without meeting with any opposition.

All the companies paraded every part of the town, and were kindly greeted wherever they appeared. Confidence and pleasure beamed in every countenance, the shops were re-opened, and the public funds rose. Some of the troops again bivouacked in the streets, and met with the same hospitality they had done the night before. The division of reserved cavalry returned to Versailles.

The rioters who had fled from Paris made another attempt at La Chapelle St. Denis, where they erected some barricades; but they were quickly driven away by two companies of the 28th, who killed several, and brought away thirty-three prisoners.

The night was calm; and we have not to record any attempt at disorder.

The minister thanked the army in a proclamation, and congratulated it in the name of the country, in terms which went direct to the soldier's heart—

"SOLDIERS,—

"You have this day performed a great act in your military career. You have preserved the country from anarchy and plunder, and saved the Republic. You have shown yourselves what you will ever be, brave, zealous, and indefatigable. All France admires and thanks you. The President of the Republic will never forget your devotedness.

"Victory could not be doubtful; the real people, the respectable members of society are on your side.

"In every garrison in France your companions in arms will be proud of you, and will, if requested, follow your example."

XXXVI.

The day of the 6th of December.

Paris had resumed her usual appearance. The circulation of vehicles, which had been stopped for a short time, was now restored; the shops were opened, business went on, the inhabitants breathed afresh, and congratulated themselves on having escaped the danger that threatened them.

The troops returned to their barracks; and only the most important points were guarded, by placing detachments in the houses on the boulevards, and at the corners of the streets of Rambuteau, Saint Martin, Saint Denis, Beaubourg, &c.

Confidence was now entirely restored; the extirpation of the rebels, the excellent accounts from the provinces, the energy, union and bravery of the troops and officers, and the universal interest felt for the head of the state, formed

such a combination of strength, that implicit faith was felt in the future.

The evil days were passed, and all Paris rejoiced. The public funds rose four francs in the course of the day.

XXXVII.

The government never felt, and never could have entertained a moment's uneasiness as to the issue of the struggle. If the whole of Paris had risen, the army was quite powerful enough, and quite determined enough to reduce it. There was not a soldier who had not resolved to avenge the army for its humiliation on the 24th of February, and to take his revenge for the *crosse en l'air*.

But, far from the whole of Paris being to be dreaded, the real work-people did not join at all in the disorder; the only struggle was with the secret societies, directed by the Mountain representatives, and with part of the inhabitants of the second arrondissement, who were momentarily led away by some Orleanists and Legitimists.

The real people, the genuine workmen, were so little in favour of the riot, that the driver of a glass coach gave information at the ministry of foreign affairs, and was the cause of the arrest of a *very well-dressed gentleman*, who was in his carriage, and wanted to bribe him with twenty francs.

The secret societies, directed by the ambitious, preying on the credulity of the weak-minded, recruited by the idle, by fanatics, and malefactors, composed the army of the Red Republicans and Socialists—it was they who raised and defended the barricades, in the faubourgs and centre of Paris.

The second arrondissement of Paris is the most aristocratic, the most luxurious, and the most wealthy; it did not, however, give proofs of being the wisest. Unluckily,

it contributed more than any other part to the revolution of February, by shouts of "Vive la reforme!" The purse-proud spirit of this arrondissement has again, for a short time, enrolled itself in the cause of the Orleanists, the Carlists, and the Representatives; and history will hand down the glaring crime of the Boulevards des Italiens and Montmartre having fired on the French army, and that the wealthy aristocracy had aided and abetted robbers. When the dead bodies of the rioters were picked up, there was found to be a majority of—malefactors and *yellow gloves!*

XXXVIII.

The plan of the insurrection was to have carried it on very slowly, so as to have tired out the troops. This idea was soon given up; the troops fought so heartily, and killed so many rioters, that they deemed it essential to shorten the struggle as much as they could, and they were the first to be tired out.

When the rebels, driven from all parts, had left the field of battle to the brave soldiers, many persons said to themselves—Will this begin again? To such a question, there is but one answer to make.

The army collected at Paris comprised twelve brigades: of these brigades, only six had been engaged, and of these six brigades only half the soldiers fought.

The rioters might re-commence without any real danger to the capital.

It would not be doing justice if we concluded this narrative without pointing out those men to whom the country is so much indebted for the part they took against the enemies of order, and who, though not belonging to the army, displayed such admirable courage and resolution.

Monsieur de Morny countersigned the decree for the dissolution of the assembly; and it is only the feeling of

the important service rendered to France, and to all Europe, which could inspire such fearlessness. When Louis Napoleon intrusted Monsieur de Morny with the ministry of the interior, he undertook the office with a calm and steady hand, which no agitation or event could ever cause to tremble. The political men whom the President of the Republic had confided in, had given proofs of their talent, their patriotism, and their devotion, and not any failed during this crisis, on which the salvation of France depended; and all must have felt re-assured, with a ministry composed of such men as Messieurs de Turgot, de Morny, de Saint-Arnaud, Fould, Rouher, Fortoul, Magne Lefevre-Duruffé, and Ducos.

XXXIX.

Two great results have just been obtained by the army of Paris.

Socialism, driven from the barricades, shot down, dispersed and disarmed, seeing her remains given up to the active and indefatigable scrutiny of the police, whose untiring industry and calm courage will soon be brought to light in the councils of war, and the accomplices of the insurrection, however bloodthirsty, could never have stopped the soldiers, even by the aid of that culpable diversion which some evil-minded and misled spirits among the higher orders of *the Boulevard de Gand** had hoped to turn to their own advantage.

The workmen of Paris, whose cause the President doubly espoused, by suspending the law of the 31st of May, and so re-establishing their right of suffrage, and by supporting order, which ensured them work, had not mixed in the struggle, as they had not and could not have anything in common with upstarts without influence, or secret societies without morality.

* Meaning the fashionable quarters, where kid gloves are worn.—*Editor.*

There was, then, a moral certainty on the evening of the 6th of December, that the serious struggle had ended in Paris, for, an immense majority of the shopkeepers, and the almost totality of the workmen, not taking any part in the battle, the army had no more adversaries.

It remained to be seen which side the departments would take.

XL.

The determination of the rural proprietors, whether great or small, was not to be doubted: two millions of petitioners, and the vote of eighty general councils, had sanctioned beforehand the President's strong measures.

It might be doubtful what part might be taken by the secret societies established in some small towns, guided by the ambitious and idle, and joined in some parts of the country by wretched peasants, whose understandings had been misled and their hearts corrupted. The thunderbolt of the 2nd of December having astonished the whole world, and been beforehand with all preparations, the chiefs were at first knocked down. The feeble resistance on the 3rd blinded them in some degree. On the 4th, the political leaders in Paris wrote word that the whole city had risen together; that the shopkeepers had declared themselves in their favour; that their victory was certain; and it was on these silly and unfounded assurances that in twenty of the *chefs lieux d'arrondissement* the democracy suddenly took up arms, imprisoned the authorities, took the power into their own hands, and sullied its violent and short-lived reign with robbery, murders, and crimes of every sort; natural episodes in its bloody history.

The truth soon came to light. Society everywhere defended itself; the brigands, who had shown themselves to be cruel, naturally showed themselves to be cowardly.

Abandoned by the leaders in Paris, who had plunged them into crime, they soon separated, and the tribunals are about to hunt out this wandering herd of fools and idlers, comprising the envious and criminal, who have so imprudently led to their own discovery; thus indicating to the government every part of a gangrene and corrupt population, which the hand of justice must cut off for the good of others.

If we study attentively in the following picture the effect produced in the departments by the intelligence from Paris, we shall find that everywhere the immense majority of the inhabitants at first appeared calm, contented, and even enthusiastic; and that the false news, the criminal excitement of parties in Paris on the 3rd and 4th, alone led to the partial insurrections in places overrun with the secret societies.

XLI.

The immense majority of the population of the departments have been always devoted to the President of the Republic, and hoped for the re-establishment of a firm power in his hands, without which there could be neither employment, security, nor prosperity.

The impression produced by the account of the act of the 2nd of December was generally favourable in the provinces; but there, as in Paris, the secret societies endeavoured to resist a measure which was their death blow. The orders to rise came from Paris on the 4th and 5th of December, and a few of the most ambitious plunged an army of idlers and thieves into the most awful crimes, trained long before for a fatal attack upon order to be made in 1852.

Fortunately, all the departments did not belong to the secret societies, the greater number remained quiet.

There were l'Aisne, les Hautes Alpes, the Ardennes,

l'Ariége, l'Aube, les Bouches-dus-Rhone, le Calvados, le Cantal, la Charente, la Charente-Inférieure, le Cher, la Corréze, la Corse, les Côtes du Nord, la Creuse, la Dordogne, le Doubs, l'Eure, l'Eure et Loir, le Finistère, la Gironde, l'Indre, l'Indre-et-Loire, l'Isère, les Laudes, la Loire, la Haute Loire, le Loire-et-Cher, la Loire Inférieure, la Corrèze, le Maine-et-Loire, la Manche, la Haute Maine, la Mayenne, la Meuse, le Morbihan, la Moselle, le Nord, l'Oise, l'Orne, le Pas-de-Calais, le Puy-de-Dôme, le Haut-Rhin, le Rhône, la Haute-Saône, la Seine-et-Marne, la Seine-et-Oise, la Seine-Inférieure, la Somme, Vaucluse, la Vendée, la Vienne, les Vosges—making in all forty-nine departments which were not at all disturbed.

The five departments of le Lot, les Basses et les Hautes-Pyrenées, la Marne, and le Bas-Rhin, manifested some temporary occasions for uneasiness.

The sixteen departments of la Côte-d'Or, le Tarn-et-Garonne, les Deux-Sèvres, le Gard, la Haute-Vienne, la Haute-Garonne, le Tarn, les Pyrénées-Orientales, l'Ille-et-Vilaine, la Meurthre, l'Ardèche, l'Aveyron, l'Ain, le Loiret, le Lot-et-Garonne, Saône-et-Loire, made some attempts at insurrection, which were speedily and effectually put down.

Twelve departments were more or less in the power of the victorious insurgents for some time. These were, l'Aude, Saône-et-Loire, la Drôme, l'Yonne, la Sarthe, le Gers, l'Hérault, le Jura, la Nièvre, l'Allier, le Var, and les Basses Alpes.

Even in these places, of which some will eternally lament a blot which will be handed down to posterity, were a few men who, by means of surprise and violence, imposed their short-lived and bloodstained rule.

XLII.

Although the disturbances in the provinces were of longer duration than those in Paris, for want of sufficient forces to direct on the different points, they were not the less completely and certainly suppressed. In every place the administration and the respectable portion of the inhabitants did their duty.

On the 6th of December the question of order was settled in Paris, and, being so there, it was virtually so everywhere.

On this day M. de Morny addressed the following letter to General de Lavœstine, the commander-in-chief of the national guard of Paris, expressing the strongest and most natural indignation.

Paris, the 7th December, 1851.

"GENERAL,

"In several parts of Paris some proprietors have had the unblushing assurance to write on their doors, *Arms given up.* One might comprehend that a national guard might write up, *Arms taken by force*, by way of extenuating his conduct in the eyes of the nation, and his want of fidelity to his fellow-citizens; but this mark of his dishonour, written on the front of his own house, revolts against a Frenchman's nature.

"I have issued orders to the prefect of police to give me a list of the legions who have done so, in order to propose to the President of the Republic to issue a decree for their being dissolved."

General Lavœstine immediately answered this question, and pointed out the legion in Paris whose arms had been used to assist the insurrection.

Paris, the 7th December, 1851.

"MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

"All the national guard will commend the sentiments contained in the letter you have this day done me the honour to address me.

"One of the Paris legions has been doubly disgraced by submitting to be disarmed at home, and by the shameless inscriptions of which you speak. Although more than sixty men were at its head quarters, it was taken by the insurgents. It is the 5th legion.

"I hasten to point it out to you, and to beg it may be disbanded. I am happy, on the other hand, to be in possession of many facts which stamp the spirit of order and discipline which reigned uninterruptedly throughout the other legions."

The 5th legion was immediately disbanded.

The government was thus enabled on the 7th to resume its usual order of precedence, and Monsieur de Morny did so by addressing a circular letter, in the following terms, to the Prefects:—

"Paris, the 7th, 1851.

"MONSIEUR LE PREFET,

"My circular of the 3rd of December invested you with the power of suspending, and even of discharging, all the functionaries whose principles you could not depend on.

"These extraordinary powers were conferred on you while there was an urgent necessity to destroy resistance, which might have been of a nature calculated to compromise the great measures for the public welfare, emanating from the Prince Louis Napoleon.

"These powers sanctioned your discharging the magistrates—they cease now that the government has mastered its difficulties. The time that will elapse before the ex-

amination of the votes, admits that the ordinary method of nomination should be adopted.

"You will then, for the future, allow the courts of appeal the free and full exercise of the right they possess of presenting, and the minister of justice the right which belongs to him of nominating, to all the law appointments. The minister of justice recommends the attorneys-general to consult you as to the changes and appointments that are to take place."

XLIII.

On the 8th of December the President of the Republic closed the era of dissension, and commenced the era of confidence and union, by this admirable proclamation to the French people:—

"FRENCHMEN,

"The disturbances are quelled. Whatever may be the decision of the people, society is re-established. The first part of my task is fulfilled; I knew that by appealing to the nation, to put an end to party dissensions, I should not endanger the public security.

"Why have the people revolted against me?

"If I no longer possess your confidence, if your ideas are changed, it is unnecessary to shed human blood; all that is requisite is to place a negative vote in the urn. I shall always respect the decree of the people.

"But, until the voice of the nation has been heard, I shall not shrink from any effort, or from any sacrifice, to foil the attempts of the disaffected; and this task has become an easy one for me.

"On one hand the folly has been shown of contending with an army, united by the ties of discipline, and inspired by sentiments of military glory and devotion to its country.

"On the other hand, the calm attitude of the inhabitants of Paris, and the terms in which they reprobated the insurrection, have fully proved on which side the capital is.

"In the populous *quartiers*, where formerly insurrection was so rife, and the workmen so easily led to anarchy, the present attempt has been met with profound repugnance against those detestable incitements.

"Thanks be to the intelligent and patriotic inhabitants of Paris. Let them rest assured that my only ambition is to insure peace and prosperity to France.

"Let them continue to lend their aid to the government, and shortly the country may quietly accomplish the solemn act which should usher in a new era to the Republic.

"Given at the palace of the Elysée, the 8th of December.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE."

XLIV.

A most important step was taken by the Minister of the Interior on the same day; it was a proposition in the form of a decree, the intention of which was to defend society against the perpetrators of vice and crime.

This is the memorable document, which, if rigorously enforced, will ensure quiet to France for the next generation:—

THE DECREE OF TRANSPORTATION.

The President of the Republic,

At the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior,—

Considering that France requires order, industry, and security; that during many years the inhabitants have been seriously disturbed and alarmed by the machinations of anarchy, as well as by the revolutionary attempts of men adopted by the secret societies and condemned offenders,

ever ready to become the tools of disorder; considering that this class of mankind, from its constant defiance of all laws, not only endangers quiet, industry, and public order, but also sanctions unjust accusations and gross calumnies against the well-disposed working population of Paris and Lyons;

Considering that the present code of laws is incomplete, and that it is essential to make an alteration in them in unison with the requirements of humanity and public security,—

Decrees:—

Article 1. That any individual placed under the surveillance of the high police who is known to be guilty of having escaped from confinement, shall be transported, as a means of insuring public security, to Cayenne or Algiers, the minimum of the period five years, and the maximum ten.

Article 2. The same law shall be applicable to individuals found guilty of having belonged to secret societies.

Article 3. The fact of being a second time placed under the surveillance of the high police will for the future give the government the right of fixing on the place where the condemned party shall reside until the term of his punishment is ended.

The government will determine the necessary formalities in proof of the condemned party remaining in the place appointed for him.

Article 4. A residence in Paris or the neighbourhood is interdicted to all persons placed under the surveillance of the high police.

Article 5. Individuals to whom the preceding article relates are ordered to quit Paris and its neighbourhood within ten days from the promulgation of the present decree, unless they have obtained a permission of residence

from the government. A route-paper with protection will be given to those who require it, which will regulate their itinerary to their former residence, or to the place they intend living at.

Article 6. In case of disobedience of the fourth and fifth articles of the present decree, offenders may incur transportation to a penal colony, either to Cayenne or Algiers, as a measure for the public security.

Article 7. Individuals transported by virtue of the present decree, shall be subjected to hard labour in the penal establishment; they will be deprived of their civil and political rights; they will be subject to military jurisdiction; the military laws will be applicable to them; and in all cases of escape from the establishment, the convicts will be condemned to imprisonment, which cannot exceed the period for which they were condemned to transportation. They will be under the discipline and military subordination of their chiefs and civil or military guardians during the time of their imprisonment.

Article 8. The executive power will determine the organization of the penal colonies.

Article 9. The ministers of war and of the interior are charged, as far as each is concerned, with the execution of the present decree.

Given at Paris, at the palace of the Elyseé National, with the consent of the ministry, the 8th of December, 1851.

LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

A. DE MORNY, Minister of the Interior.

Four great results, equally arising from the President's decided measures, are brought to light by the preceding facts:—

First, the Reds, the Socialists, and the Democrats, were

the only parties who wished to oppose an act which would evidently re-establish the component parts of order, destroyed by the jealousies of the fallen dynasties, who were battling and abusing each other in the Assembly, spreading their disaffection and communicating their ill-feelings to the country.

The whole population, excepting the Reds and the Communists, willingly accepted the enlightened and determined decree of the 2nd of December.

Thus the President prevented the fatal crisis of 1852, which, to judge from the partial and unconnected attempts of the would have been the total destruction of France, and thrown her into an abyss of rapine and bloodshed. Instead of the immense conspiracy of murderers and brigands organized by the secret societies, and hurled at the same time on the nation, there were twenty-five or thirty partial risings, which were firmly put down: an irreparable disaster for the victims, an eloquent and instructive lesson for the well disposed.

On the other side, if hitherto there have been divisions in the various classes of society, these divisions have nearly disappeared, and will entirely vanish before the necessity of defending family, property, religion, and morality, against bands of malefactors. Soon there will be neither Legitimists, Orleanists, or Bonapartists; there will only be men fighting against wild beasts.

The Reds, by taking up arms and marching against the towns, by imprisoning the authorities, by murdering the soldiers and pillaging the public banks, by destroying property, violating women, and roasting children alive, have denounced themselves to the magistrates, to the respectable part of the world, and to the police. Each person knows who his neighbours are within a circle of three or four leagues in the departments; thus these offenders will be

hunted, followed, and each individual arrested wherever he may be concealed—these malefactors, who were organized, directed, and finally abandoned by the Mountain: and if the weak-minded and inconsiderate can inspire any pity, there can be none felt for the leaders, for the chiefs of the brigands, who caused innocent blood to flow, and made a monstrous attack on the whole society.

The secret societies in Paris could not, after the most exact calculation, reckon more than from 3000 to 3500 enlisted recruits who were really to be dreaded, and ready to fight. The measures adopted on the 2nd of December will nearly have annihilated this army of Socialists.

Firstly, the losses were incalculable behind the barricades, and even exceeded those of the days of June; then the arrests, which already exceed 1600, and which continue at the rate of forty a day at the least, have cleared the ranks of the insurgents wonderfully. It may be anticipated that in a few days all the active and military *personnel* of the secret societies will be in prison.

The deliverance of France from the tyranny of the demagogues, and restoring it to liberty, sovereignty, and repose, will be the final results of the President's conduct in having permitted the country to be cleared of corrupt and dangerous characters, who formed the army of Socialism, and having opened for it an era of true liberty, repose, confidence, industry, and prosperity.

We are already able to estimate the material results of the act of the 2nd of December. On the 1st of December the five per cents were at 91 francs 60 centimes; on the 16th of December they were at 100 francs 90 centimes.

This is a rise of ten francs, which is an increase of a tenth of public and private wealth.

THE LAST SITTING

OF

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

THE following account of the proceedings of the legislative body on the 2nd December, is taken *verbatim* from the notes of the two short-hand writers of the *Moniteur* who were present, and who took down every word that was uttered. The *Moniteur* of course gave no report of the sitting, as it was considered by the new government to be null and void. We are indebted to the *Morning Chronicle* for its first publication in this country:—

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

Extraordinary Sitting of Tuesday, Dec. 2, 1851.

[Held in the large room of the Mairie of the 10th arrondissement, at eleven o'clock in the morning.]

M. Benoist-d'Azy, one of the vice-presidents, took the chair.

There were also present of the members composing the bureau of the Assembly, M. Vitet, vice-president, and MM. Chapot, Moulin, and Grimault, secretaries.

Great agitation was perceptible amongst the members present, amounting to about 300, belonging to every shade of opinion.

The President—The sitting is commenced.

Several Members—Let us not lose time!

The President—A protest has been signed by several of my colleagues. The following is the text of it.

M. Berryer—I think that it is not becoming the Assembly to make protests; the Assembly cannot meet in its usual place of its sittings, and in consequence meets here. It ought, under such circumstances, to act as an assembly, in place of protesting. (Hear, hear, and general marks of assent.) I propose that we proceed as if we were a free assembly, in the name of the constitution.

M. Vitet—As we may be expelled by force, would it not be useful to at once agree on some other place of meeting, either in Paris or out of it?

Several Voices—In Paris! in Paris!

M. Bixio—I have offered my house.

M. Berryer—That will be the second object of our deliberation; but the first thing to be done by the Assembly, which is already in sufficient number to deliberate, is to express its will by a decree. I ask permission to speak on that point.

M. Monet—I ask permission to speak on an act of violence against the Assembly. (Noise and interruption.)

M. Berryer—Let us leave aside all mere incidents, for we have not, perhaps, a quarter of an hour left us. Let us pass a decree. (Yes, yes.) I propose that, in the terms of Art. 68 of the Constitution, "inasmuch as obstacles are thrown in the way of the execution of its mandate, the legislative Assembly decrees that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte is deprived of the office of President of the Republic, and that in consequence the executive power passes at once to the legislative Assembly." (Loud and unanimous approbation.) I propose that this decree be signed by all

M. Bechard—I second the motion.

M. Vitet—We will remain *en permanence.*

The President—The decree shall be immediately printed by whatever means we can find most readily. I now put the adoption of the decree to the vote. (Yes, yes.)

The decree was then adopted unanimously, amidst mingled cries of "Vive la Constitution!" "Vive la Loi!" "Vive la Republique!"

The decree was then formally drawn up by the members of the bureau.

M. Chapot—The following is the draft of a proclamation proposed by M. de Falloux.

M. de Falloux—Read it.

M. Berryer—We have other work to do. First of all, let us dispose of the decree.

M. Piscatory—The only true proclamation is the decree.

M. Berryer—It was a private meeting which agreed to the proclamation, but we are here a regularly constituted Assembly.

Several Voices—The decree! the decree! nothing else!

M. Quentin Bauchart—We have now to sign it.

M. Piscatory—Permit me to make a suggestion to hasten the work. Let us pass round a number of sheets of paper, and on them sign our names; they can afterwards be annexed to the decree. (Yes, yes).

Sheets of paper were then circulated as proposed.

A Member—Orders ought to be given to the colonel of the 10th legion to defend the Assembly. General Lauriston is present.

M. Berryer to the President—Give a written order.

Several Members—Let the *rappel* be beaten.

An altercation here took place at the bottom of the room between some representatives and some citizens, who were

persons was heard to cry out, "Gentlemen, in an hour perhaps we will sacrifice our lives for you!"

M. Piscatory, raising his voice—I wish to say one word. (Noise, cries of "listen! listen!") We cannot—we ought not—we will not exclude the public. They who desire to enter will be welcome. A phrase has just been pronounced, which has reached my ears. "In an hour, perhaps," said some one, "we will sacrifice our lives for you!" Why exclude such persons? We cannot receive many; but the persons who can find room ought to be allowed to remain. (Hear, hear). The debates, according to the Constitution, are public. (Approbation).

The President—The following is the decree of requisition for our defence:—"The legislative Assembly, in conformity with article 32 of the Constitution, calls on the 10th legion of the national guard of Paris to defend the place where the Assembly is sitting." I consult the Assembly on its adoption.

The decree was then adopted unanimously. A certain agitation followed, mingled with noise, several members endeavouring to make themselves heard at the same time.

M. Berryer—I beseech the Assembly to keep silent. The bureau, which is at present occupied with drawing up the decrees, and to which I propose to entrust all the necessary powers for the different measures to be taken, has need of calm and silence. Those members who have motions to make can make them afterwards; but if every one thus speaks at the same time, nothing can be done. (Hear, hear). Silence was then by degrees restored.

A Member—I propose that the Assembly remains *en permanence* until the armed force be sent as it orders. If we separate before the armed force arrives, we shall not be able to meet again.

M. Legros-Devot—Yes, yes; we must remain *en permanence.*

M. Favreau—I wish to state what passed this morning at the Assembly. The Minister of Marine had given Colonel Espinasse orders to clear the different rooms. We were about thirty or forty in the Salle des Conférences. We declared that we were about to proceed to the hall in which our sittings usually took place, and that we would remain there until any one dared to expel us. M. Dupin was at once sent for by some of us, and he came to the hall where we always met. We invested him with a scarf, and when the troops presented themselves, he asked to speak to the officer in command. Colonel —— came forward, and M. Dupin said to him, "I have the sentiment of right, and I speak its language. You display here a considerable force; I protest."

M. Monet—I was present at the scene just described, and I propose to have inserted in the minutes an account of the act of violence committed against us. On the invitation of my colleagues, I read article 68 of the Constitution, whereupon I was seized by the body, and torn violently from my place of sitting.

M. Dahirel—We, who were met by bayonets, were not much surprised at that being done.

MM. Odilon Barrot and de Nagle here entered the room and affixed their signatures to the decree of *déchéance.*

The President here directed M. Howyn-Tranchère to have the representatives let in who were detained at the door.

M. Piscatory—I request to be allowed to state a fact, which appears to me important. I went just now to have some of our colleagues admitted, they being prevented by persons outside from entering. The police officers who stood there informed me that the mayor had given orders

that no person whatever should be permitted to enter. I at once went to the mayor, who said to me, "I represent the executive power, and I cannot allow any representatives to enter." I informed him of the decree which the Assembly had just passed, and signified to him that there was not any other executive power but the legislative Assembly, (hear, hear), and I then withdrew. I thought it my duty to make that declaration in the name of the Assembly. (Yes, yes; approbation). As I passed, one of the by-standers said to me, "Make haste with what you are about, for in a few minutes the troops will be here."

M. Berryer—I propose that provisionally a decree be passed, ordering the mayor to leave the approaches to this room free.

M. de Falloux—It appears to me that we do not take into consideration two things; the first, that your orders will not be executed; and the second, that we shall be expelled from this place. We ought to come to some understanding as to another place of meeting.

M. Berryer—With the persons not belonging to the Assembly who are present, we should do a useless thing. We can easily give notice amongst ourselves of the place where we are to meet. (No, no.) I again propose the provisional decree. (Noise.)

The President—M. Dufaure wishes to speak. Silence, gentlemen. Remember that minutes are hours.

M. Dufaure—The observation which has just been made is a just one, since we cannot openly designate our place of meeting. I propose to the Assembly to confer on its bureau the right to decide. It will give notice to each member separately. Gentlemen, we are now the only defenders of the constitution, of right, of the republic, and of the country. ("Yes, yes;" approbation; cries of "Vive la République" are heard). We are not wanting to ourselves at this

conjuncture, and if we are obliged to yield to brute force, history will place to your account that, to the very last moment, you resisted by all the means in your power. (Bravos; loud applause.)

M. Berryer—I propose that the Assembly, by a decree, order all heads of prisons to deliver, under pain of dismissal, such representatives as have been arrested.

A decree to this effect was put to the vote by the President, and adopted unanimously.

General Lauriston—The Assembly is not in a place of safety. The municipal authorities pretend that we have forced the doors, and that they cannot allow the mairie to be occupied by us. I know that the police agents have gone to inform the authorities, and that in a short time a considerable force will drive us from the room.

A Member here entered, crying out, Let us make haste, the armed force is coming.

It was at this moment half-past twelve.

M. Antony Thouret entered and signed the decree of *déchéance*, saying, They who do not sign are base cowards.

Immediately after, intimation was given that the troops had arrived. Profound silence then ensued. The members of the bureau stood up on their seats, in order to be seen by the whole Assembly, and by the officers of the troops. The troops entered at the bottom of the room, but the officers in command did not appear.

M. Antony Thouret—Since they who occupy the mairie do not enter into this room to dissolve this sitting, which is the only legal one, I propose that the President should send a deputation, in the name of the legislative Assembly, to summon the troops to withdraw in the name of the people. (Hear, hear, and approbation.)

M. Cault—I demand permission to be one of the persons sent.

The President—Be calm, gentlemen; our duty is to remain assembled, and to wait.

M. Pascal Duprat—You will not be able to defend yourselves, except by a revolution.

M. Berryer—We will defend ourselves by the right.

Several Voices—And by the law—the law! We want no revolution.

M. Pascal Duprat—You wish to send to every part of Paris, and particularly to the faubourgs, to say that the Legislative Assembly is still upstanding; that it possesses all the power of right; that in the name of that right it appeals to the people—that is your only means of safety. (Great agitation; murmurs.)

Several Members at the end of the room—They are coming up the stairs! We hear their footsteps. (Great sensation, followed by a profound silence.)

The President—Not a word, gentlemen; not a word! let there be absolute silence. I give you, permit me to say, more than an invitation—I give you an order.

Several Members—It is a sergeant that is sent.

The President—A sergeant is a representative of the public force.

M. de Falloux—If we have not force on our side, let us at least exhibit proper dignity.

A Member—We will have both. (Profound silence.)

The President—Remain in your places. Bear in mind that all Europe regards you.

M. Vitet and M. Chapot here went out at the door at which the troops were to enter, and advanced to the landing-place. A sergeant and a dozen of the Chasseurs of Vincennes of the 6th battalion were on the stairs.

M. Grevy de Charency and some other members followed MM. Vitet and Chapot. Some persons not belonging to the Assembly were also on the landing-place, and

amongst them M. Beslay, member of the Constituent Assembly.

M. Vitet, addressing the sergeant—What do you want? We have met in virtue of the constitution.

The Sergeant—I am only executing the orders which I received.

M. Vitet—Go and say to your officer what I have said to you.

M. Chapot—Tell your officer to come up stairs.

(A moment or two after a captain made his appearance.)

M. Vitet, to the officer—The Legislative Assembly is assembled here. It is in the name of the law and of the constitution that we summon you to withdraw.

The Officer: I have my orders.

M. Vitet—A decree has just been adopted by the Assembly, which declares that, in virtue of art. 68 of the constitution, inasmuch as the President of the Republic throws obstacles in the way of the Assembly exercising its rights, the President is deprived of his functions, and all public functionaries and depositaries of the public authority are bound to obey the Assembly. In consequence, I summon you to withdraw.

The Officer—I cannot do so.

M. Chapot—Under penalty of being deemed a traitor, you are bound to obey—bound to do so on your personal responsibility.

The Officer—You must be aware what an instrument is. I merely obey. However, I go at once to state what you have said.

M. Grevy—Do not forget that you are bound to obey the constitution and article 68.

The Officer—Article 68 was never made for me.

M. Beslay—It was made for every one, and you owe it

MM. Vitet, Chapot, and other representatives returned to the room.

M. Vitet related to the Assembly what had passed between him and the officer outside.

M. Berryer—I propose that it shall not be merely by an act of the bureau, but by a decree of the Assembly, that it be at once declared that the army of Paris is charged with the care of watching over the defence of the Legislative Assembly, and that General Magnan be enjoined, under pain of being guilty of treason, to place the troops under his command at the orders of the Assembly. (Hear.)

M. Pascal Duprat—He is no longer in command.

M. de Ravinel—It is Baraguay d'Hilliers who is in command. ("No, no;" "Yes, yes.")

Several Members—Summon the general in command, without giving any name.

The President—I consult the Assembly.

The Assembly, being consulted, voted the decree unanimously.

M. Monet—I propose that a duplicate of the decree pronouncing the *déchéance* be forwarded to the President of the Assembly.

Several Members—He is no longer President of the Assembly. (Agitation.)

M. Pascal Duprat—Since the word must be pronounced, it is impossible to deny that M. Dupin has acted a most cowardly part. I propose that his name be never pronounced amongst us. (Loud murmurs; agitation.)

M. Monet—I beg pardon; I meant to say the President of the High Court of Justice. It is to him that I propose to send the duplicate of the decree.

The President—I proceed to consult the Assembly on M. Monet's motion.

The Assembly adopted the motion unanimously.

M. J. de Lasteyrie—I propose to you, gentlemen, to

pass a decree ordering the commander of the army of Paris and all the colonels of legions of the national guard to obey the President of the Assembly, under pain of high crime and misdemeanour, in order that every man in the capital may be aware of what is his duty, and that if he fails in it he is guilty of treason towards his country. (Hear, hear.)

M. Dufraisse—Ordering also the commander of the national guard of Paris.

The President—It is evident that such a decree as is spoken of applies to all functionaries and commanders.

M. Dufraisse—It is better to specify.

M. Pascal Duprat—We have to fear the effect which will be produced in the departments by the highly objectionable decrees published this morning by the President of the Republic. I propose that the Assembly adopt some measure to let the departments know what is the attitude which we have assumed in the name of the Legislative Assembly.

Several Voices—Our decrees, our decrees are there.

M. de Ressegnier—I propose that the bureau be charged to draw up a proclamation to France.

Various Voices—No, no! our decrees only.

The President—If we had proper means of publishing our decrees, all would be well; but without that we can do nothing.

M. Antony Thouret—Emissaries ought to be sent through Paris to give a copy of our decree.

M. Rigal—I propose that all the necessary measures be taken to have the decree printed.

From all sides—It is done! It is done!

A Member: I propose that the telegraph be put into requisition.

M. de Ravinel—And that the director be interdicted from communicating with the departments unless for the purpose of transmitting the decrees of the Assembly.

M. Dufraisse—I propose, should the Assembly think fit to order it, that a decree be published forbidding all managers of the public money to give it up on the orders of the present public functionaries. (It is done, it is done.) Is that comprised in the decree?

M. Colfavru—Evidently, since the decree declares all the attributions of the executive power have passed into the hands of the Assembly.

M. de Montebello—Pecuniary responsibility is a matter of right.

M. Antony Thouret—It appears to me that the Assembly ought to pay some attention to the position of the generals, our colleagues, who are at Vincennes.

From all sides—That is done. There is a decree voted on the proposition of M. Berryer.

M. Antony Thouret—I beg pardon; but I was not present at the time.

General Oudinot—Never have we had more need of paying deference to our President than at present. It is well that he be invested with a kind of dictatorship, if I may call it so (marks of disapprobation from several members.) I withdraw the expression, if it can awaken the slightest susceptibility. All I mean is, that his word ought on the instant to obtain respect and silence. Our power and dignity consist altogether in our union. We are then, I conceive, completely united—there is no more in this Assembly left or right. (Hear, hear.) We have all hearts which beat responsive to the calls of the present moment. It is France in her totality which is wounded at present. (Hear, hear.) One word. When the President shall think fit to send one or several of us on any mission whatever, we must at once obey. As to me, I will be completely obedient. I conceive that all propositions should pass through the bureau; for if not, what will take place?

That propositions will be brought forward the second time, as M. A. Thouret has just done. Let us not lose time in what we do, and let everything pass through the hands of the members of the bureau. Let us obey the President. As to me, I submit in the most complete manner to his orders. (Hear, hear.)

The President—I quite agree with the honourable gentleman, and consider that the strength of the Assembly consists in preserving the most perfect unity. I now propose, in conformity with the recommendation given me by several of my colleagues, that General Oudinot be invested with the command of the troops. (Loud applause.)

M. Tamisier—No doubt General Oudinot, like all our colleagues, would do his duty; but you ought to bear in mind the Roman expedition which he commanded. (Loud exclamations, marks of disapprobation.)

M. de Ressegnier—You disarm the Assembly a second time by such observations.

M. Dampierre—Yes, he ruins us.

M. Tamisier—Allow me to conclude—you misunderstand me.

The President—If any division creeps in amongst us, we are lost.

M. Tamisier—It is not a division. But I ask what authority will he have over the people?

M. Berryer—Put the proposition to the vote, Monsieur le President.

M. Pascal Duprat—We have amongst us a man who, in other circumstances, though less difficult it is true, knew how to resist the objectionable projects of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and that man is M. Tamisier. (Exclamations and murmurs.)

M. Tamisier—But I am not known! What could I do?

M. Piscatory—I pray you allow the vote to take place.

Let it be well understood that when M. Tamisier objected to the name of General Oudinot, he did not intend to sow division amongst us.

M. Tamisier—No; I swear to you I objected simply because I was of opinion that the nomination in question would not produce on the people of Paris the effect you anticipate.

General Oudinot—I am ready to submit to whatever orders may be given me for the safety of my country. In consequence, I am ready to accept the command.

From all sides—Vote, vote! The nomination of General Oudinot!

The President—I proceed to consult the Assembly.

The Assembly unanimously adopted a decree appointing General Oudinot commander-in-chief of the troops.

General Oudinot—One word. Monsieur le President and colleagues, I cannot refuse the honour which you confer on me, for to do so would be an insult to my companions in arms. They have done their duty in Italy, and will do so everywhere. At present ours is traced out; it consists in obeying the orders of our President, because those orders he will draw from the right of the Legislative Assembly and from the Constitution. (Hear.) Order then, and General Oudinot will obey. Had he need of popularity he would have found it from the honours now conferred on him. (Applause.)

M. de St. Germain—I propose that the decree nominating General Oudinot be at once drawn up. He ought to have a copy of it.

The Members of the Bureau—We are drawing it up.

Whilst the members of the bureau were drawing up the decree, General Oudinot approached M. Tamisier and spoke to him for a moment or two.

General Oudinot—Gentlemen, I have just asked M.

Tamisier to serve under me as my head of the staff—(hear, hear)—and he consents to do so. (Enthusiastic bravoes.) I propose to the President to immediately inform the troops of the line of the honour which you have entrusted to me. (Hear, hear.)

M. Tamisier—Gentlemen, you have given me a difficult task to perform, and one which I certainly never desired; but before I leave this room to execute the orders of the Assembly, let me be permitted to swear to you that I go to defend the Republic.

Various Voices—Bravo! bravo! Vive la République! Vive la Constitution!

At this moment the members who happened to be near the door announced that an officer of the 6th battalion of chasseurs had arrived with fresh orders. General Oudinot advanced to the officer, as did M. Tamisier.

M. Tamisier read to the officer the decree which appointed General Oudinot commander-in-chief of the army of Paris.

General Oudinot, to the officer—We are here in virtue of the Constitution. You see that the Legislative Assembly has nominated me commander-in-chief. I am General Oudinot; you must admit my authority, and you owe it obedience. Were you to resist my orders, you would incur the severest punishment; you would be immediately called before the military tribunals. I order you to withdraw.

The Officer (a sub-lieutenant of the 6th Chasseurs of Vincennes)—General, you are aware of our position. I have received orders, and must obey them.

Two sergeants, who were at the sides of the officer, said something to him in a low voice, and appeared to encourage him to resistance.

General Oudinot—Be silent, and allow your officer to speak. You have no right to speak.

One of the Sergeants—Yes, I have the right.

General Oudinot—Be silent, let your officer speak.

The Sub-Lieutenant—I am only second in command. If you think fit you can order my superior officer up here.

General Oudinot—Thus, then, you refuse to obey?

The Officer (after a moment's hesitation)—In the most positive manner.

General Oudinot—A written order will be given you in an instant. If you do not obey it, you must abide the consequences.

A certain movement was here perceptible amongst the soldiers.

General Oudinot—Chasseurs, you have a commander, and you owe him respect and obedience. Let him speak.

A Sergeant—We know him well: he is a gallant fellow.

General Oudinot—I have told him who I was. I now ask his name?

Another Sergeant was here about to speak—

General Oudinot—Be silent, or you will be considered bad soldiers.

The Officer—My name is Charles Guédon, sub-lieutenant in the 6th battalion of Chasseurs.

General Oudinot—You declare, then, that you have received orders, and that you will wait your instructions from the officer placed over you on this occasion?

The Officer—Yes, general.

General Oudinot—It is the only thing that you can do.

General Oudinot and M. Tamisier then re-entered the room. It was then a quarter-past one.

General Oudinot—Monsieur le President, I have this moment received two decrees, which give me, one the command of the troops of the line, and the other that of the

appointment of M. Tamisier to the head of my staff for the line, and I have now to ask you to accept M. Mathieu de la Redorte as head of the staff for the national guard. (Loud approbation.)

Several Voices—You can make what nominations you please; it is in your power.

The President—You use your right in nominating your officers, but since you make your views known to us, I think I can reply that we approve of your choice. (Yes, yes, and approbation).

General Oudinot—In consequence, M. Mathieu de la Redorte is to be considered head of the staff for the national guard. (Yes, yes).

The President (after some delay)—I am informed that some members have departed, but I presume that no one will think of retiring until we see the end of what we can do.

From all sides—No, no; we remain here *en permanence*.

M. Berryer, re-entering the room with several of his colleagues, said—Gentlemen, a window was open looking into the street, where a considerable number of persons were collected. I announced to them from the window that the Legislative Assembly, sitting regularly, and in more than a sufficient number for the validity of its decrees, had pronounced the *déchéance* of the President of the Republic; that the command of the army and the national guard was conferred on General Oudinot, and that his head of the staff was M. Tamisier.

This announcement was received with acclamations and bravos.

M. Guilbert, captain of the 3rd battalion of the 10th legion of the national guard, here presented himself in uniform at the door of the room, and announced to General Oudinot that he had come to place himself at the orders of

General Oudinot—Well done, captain; you give a good example.

M. Balot, captain of the 4th battalion, without uniform, made a similar declaration.

After some further delay, two commissaries of police appeared at the door of the room, and, on the orders of the President, advanced to the bureau.

One of the Commissaries (the elder)—We have orders to clear the mairie. Are you willing to obey that order? We have full powers from the Prefect of Police.

The President—I have to ask the commissaries this question: Are you aware of article 68 of the Constitution? Are you aware of its consequences?

The Commissary—Certainly, we are perfectly acquainted with the Constitution; but in our present position we are obliged to execute the orders of our superiors.

The President—In the name of the Assembly I proceed to read to you article 68 of the Constitution. It runs thus: "Every measure by which the President of the Republic dissolves the Legislative Assembly, prorogues it, or opposes any obstacle to its exercising its functions, is a crime of high treason. By that sole act the President is deprived of his office, and all citizens are bound to refuse him obedience. The executive power then passes *de jure* into the hands of the Legislative Assembly. The judges of the high court of justice are at once to meet under pain of treason; they are to call a jury in whatever place they may deem suitable, and are to nominate the magistrates, charged to act as law officers of the Republic." It is in virtue of article 68 of the Constitution, which has just been read to you, that the Assembly, prevented from sitting in its usual chamber, has met here. It has voted a decree which will now be read to you.

M. Vitet then rose, and read as follows:—

"FRENCH REPUBLIC.

"The Legislative Assembly, sitting extraordinarily in the mairie of the 10th arrondissement;

"Taking into consideration Art. 68 of the Constitution, and looking at the fact that the Assembly is prevented by violence from exercising its mandate;

"Decrees as follows:—

"Louis Napoleon Bonaparte is deprived of his functions as President of the Republic; all citizens are bound to refuse him obedience; the executive power passes *de jure* into the hands of the Legislative Assembly. The judges of the high court of justice are bound to assemble immediately, to proceed to the trial of the President of the Republic and his accomplices.

"In consequence, all functionaries and depositories of the public force and authority are enjoined to obey all the requisitions made in the name of the Assembly, under penalty of high treason.

"Voted unanimously, in public sitting, on this 2nd day of December, 1851.

"For the President (prevented from attending)

"BENOIST D'AZY,
VITET. } *Vice-Presidents.*

"GRIMAULT,
MOULIN,
CHAPOT, } *Secretaries.*

"And all the Members present."

The President—It is in virtue of that decree that the Assembly summons you, by my mouth, to obey its requisitions. I repeat to you, that legally there exists in France, at this moment, but one authority—that vested in the body

which is sitting here. It is in the name of the Assembly, which is the guardian of that authority, that we call on you to obey. If the armed force, if the usurping power acts towards the Assembly with force, we are bound to declare to it that we are in our right. An appeal is made to the country, and the country will reply.

M. de Ravinel—Ask the commissaries their names.

The President—We who speak to you are MM. Vitet and Benoist d'Azy, Vice-presidents, and MM. Chapot, Grimault, and Moulin, Secretaries of the Legislative Assembly.

The Commissary (the elder one) — Our mission is a most painful one. We have not even a complete authority, for at the present moment it is the military force which acts, and the step which we are now taking is intended to prevent a conflict, which we would have regretted. The Prefect had given us the order to invite you to withdraw; but we find here a considerable detachment of Chasseurs of Vincennes, sent by the military authority, which pretends alone to have the right to act; for the course which we are now adopting is non-official, and intended to prevent a regrettable conflict. We have nothing to say to the question of right; but I think it right to inform you that the military authorities have severe orders, and most probably they will execute them.

The President—You must be aware, sir, that the invitation to which you are now assigning a non-official character, cannot produce any impression on us. We will not yield except to force.

The Second Commissary (the younger one)—Monsieur le President, here is the order which has been given to us; and without any more delay we summon you, whether right or wrong, to disperse. (Violent murmurs.)

The First Commissary (the elder one)—Lemoine, Bacheral, and Marlét.

At this moment an officer entered the room with an order in his hand, and said: I am a military man; I have received an order, and I am bound to execute it. Here it is.

"Commandant—In consequence of orders issued by the minister of war, have the mairie of the 10th arrondissement at once occupied by your men, and arrest, if necessary, such representatives as do not on the instant comply with your order to disperse.

"MAGNAN, Commander-in-chief."

(Explosion of murmurs.)

Several Members—Well, then, arrest us. Give orders to arrest us.

Another officer here entered, with an order in his hand. He marched up to the bureau, and read the following order:—

"The general-in-chief orders that all representatives who do not oppose any resistance shall be allowed to leave the mairie. As to those who refuse to comply with this injunction, they are to be at once arrested, and taken, with all possible consideration, to the prison Mazas."

From all sides—All of us to Mazas!

M. Emile Leroux—Yes, yes. Let us go there on foot.

The President (to the officer)—You appear before us with an order; we are bound, before all, to ask you, as we have already done the other officer, if you are acquainted with article 68 of the Constitution, which declares that every act of the executive power to prevent the meeting of the

Assembly is a crime of high treason which puts an end at once to the powers of the head of the executive power. It is in virtue of its decree, declaring the *décliéance* of the head of the executive power, that we act at present; if we have not the force to oppose——

M. de Larcy—We oppose the resistance of right.

The President—I have to add that the Assembly, obliged to provide for its safety, has nominated General Oudinot commander of all the forces, which may be called on to defend it.

M. de Larcy—Commandant, we appeal to your patriotism as a Frenchman.

General Oudinot, to the officer—You are the officer in command of the 6th battalion?

The Officer—I am the officer in command, *ad interim*. The commandant is ill.

General Oudinot—Well, then, you have just heard what the President of the Assembly has said to you?

The Officer—Yes, general.

General Oudinot—That there is not for the moment any other power in France but the Assembly. In virtue of that power, which has delegated to me the command of the army and of the national guard, I declare to you that we cannot obey the order which forbids our remaining together, unless we are forced to do so. In consequence and in virtue of the rights which we hold from it, I order you to evacuate the mairie yourself and cause all others under you to do the same. You hear my orders, will you obey?

The Officer—No; and for this reason, that I have received orders from those above me in command, and that I will obey them.

From all sides—To Mazas! to Mazas!

The Officer—In the name of the orders of the executive power, we summon you to disperse off the instant.

Various voices—No, no, there is no executive power. Use force if you want to get us out.

The officer then gave orders to his men to advance, and several chasseurs entered. A third commissary of police and several police agents also entered. These commissaries and agents seized on the members of the bureau—General Oudinot, M. Tamisier, and several other representatives, and conducted them to the landing place. The stairs were still occupied by the troops, and the commissaries were obliged to go down to give and receive orders. After the delay of about a quarter of an hour, the soldiers opened their ranks, and allowed a passage to the representatives still in the custody of the commissaries and agents. The whole body then entered the court-yard, when General Forey came forward. General Oudinot spoke to him a moment, and then, turning round, stated to the representatives that General Forey had replied to him, "We are soldiers, and know nothing but the orders which we receive."

General Lauriston—He ought to be acquainted with the law and constitution — we have been military men like him.

General Oudinot—General Forey declares that he is bound to obey the executive power only.

All the Representatives—To Mazas. We are ready to proceed to Mazas.

Several National Guards in the court-yard cried as the door opened to allow the officers to go in and out, "Vive la République! Vive la Constitution!"

Some minutes elapsed, and at last the door opened for the last time, and the agents ordered the representatives to proceed.

MM. Benoist-d'Azy and Vitet, the vice-presidents, declared that they would not go out, unless by force. The

agents then seized them by the arm, and conducted them into the street. The secretaries, General Oudinot, M. Tamisier, and the others were led out in the same way, and then the whole party proceeded on their way between two lines of soldiers. M. Vitet was held by the collar by a police-agent; General Forey was at the head of the troops and directed the column. The Assembly was then conducted as prisoners in the midst of cries of "Vive l'Assemblée!" "Vive la République!" "Vive la Constitution!" uttered by persons in the streets and at the windows, until arrived at the barracks on the Quai d'Orsay, passing by the Rues de Grenelle, St. Guillaume, Veuve de l'Université, de Beaune, and the Quai Voltaire. All the representatives entered the yard, and the door was shut on them. It was then twenty minutes past three.

On the proposition of a member, a list of the names was then taken down in the yard itself, when it was found that 220 members were present. When this was terminated,

General Oudinot said, the officer in command of these barracks has received orders to prepare chambers for us to withdraw to, as we are considered prisoners. (Hear, hear.) Do you wish me to have the officer in question summoned? (No, no; it is not necessary.) Well, then, I will leave him to execute his orders.

Some minutes after, the room having been got ready, several representatives proceeded there, the rest remaining in the yard.

At half-past four MM. Victor Lefranc and Bixio rejoined their colleagues, constituting themselves prisoners with them.

At half-past eight General Radoult-Lafosse, and MM. Eugene Sue, Benoit (du Rhône), Toupet des Vignes, Arbey, Paulin Durieu, Therlhard-Laterisse, Chanay, and Fayolle, arrested in the morning at the Palace of the As-

sembly, and kept prisoners all day at the adjoining building of the new Hotel of Foreign Affairs, were brought to the barracks, the whole number of the representatives then confined there being 232.

At a quarter to ten cellular carriages and omnibuses were brought into the court. The representatives were put into them and carried away to Mont-Valerien, Mazas, and Vincennes.

CONFISCATION OF THE PROPERTY

OF THE

ORLEANS FAMILY.

THE last arbitrary acts of the dictator, coming within the scope of the *coup d'état*, and obviously forming a part of the scheme, were the decrees for the confiscation of the Orleans property, which are hereunto appended for the honour of history. The correspondent of a daily paper, in communicating it, says:—

"The confiscation of the great possessions of the Orleans family has created a most painful sensation here—a sensation of alarm as well as of sorrow and indignation. As far as I can judge of the state of public opinion, the feeling on this occasion is even more hostile to the measures of Louis Napoleon than on the occasion of the *coup d'état*. At that time there was some appearance of an excuse for the conduct of the President—at present there is none. The decree which confiscates the immense property of the descendants of Louis Philippe does not venture to palliate the measure by alleging the pretended conspiracy. It is put on the ground of right, although it will be remembered that Louis Philippe, before accepting the Crown, stipulated for the settlement of these possessions on the junior branches of his family." The following are the decrees with respect to the Orleans property:—

The President of the Republic,

Considering that all the governments which have succeeded each other have judged it indispensable to oblige

the family which ceased to reign to sell the real and personal property which it possessed in France; that in this manner, on the 12th of January, 1816, Louis XVIII. constrained the members of the family of the Emperor Napoleon to sell their personal property within a delay of six months, and that on the 10th of April, 1832, Louis Philippe acted in the same manner with regard to the princes of the elder branch of the Bourbons;

Considering that such measures are for the interests of order and the public; that now more than ever high political considerations imperiously command the diminution of the influence which the possession of nearly three hundred millions of property in France gives to the Orleans family;

Decrees:

Art. 1. The members of the Orleans family, their husbands, wives, and descendants cannot possess any real or personal property in France; they shall be bound to sell, in a definitive manner, all the property which belongs to them throughout the whole extent of the territory of the Republic.

Art. 2. This shall be effected within the delay, for free property, of one year from the date of the promulgation of the present decree, and for property liable to liquidation or dispute from the date at which the property shall have become irrevocably their own.

Art. 3. In the event of the sale not having been effected within the above prescribed delays, the administration of domains shall proceed therewith, in the forms prescribed by the law of the 10th of April, 1832.

The proceeds of the sale shall be handed over to the proprietors, or to those having a right thereto.

Given at the Palace of the Tuileries, the 22d of January, 1852. LOUIS NAPOLEON.

(Countersigned) X. DE CASABIANCA, Minister of State.

The President of the Republic,

Considering that, without encroaching on the right of property in the person of the princes of the Orleans family, the President of the Republic would not justify the confidence of the French people, if he permitted properties which ought to belong to the nation to be abstracted from the domains of the State;

Considering that, according to the ancient public law of France, maintained by the decree of the 21st of September, 1790, and by the law of the 8th of November, 1814, all the property which belonged to the princes on their accession to the throne was of full right and at the very instant united to the domain of the crown;

That thus the decree of the 21st of September, 1790, and the law of the 8th of November, 1814, enact—"The private property of the prince who comes to the throne, and that which he possessed during his reign, on whatever title it may be, are of full right and at the very instant united to the domain of the nation, and the effect of this union is perpetual and irrevocable;"

That the consecration of this principle ascends to very distant times of the monarchy; that amongst others may be cited the example of Henry IV.; that prince having wished by letters patent of the 16th of April, 1590, to prevent the union of his properties with the domain of the crown, the parliament of Paris refused to enregister those letters patent by a judgment of the 15th of July, 1591, and Henry IV., subsequently applauding this firmness, issued in the month of July, 1607, a decree revoking his first letters patent;

Considering that this fundamental rule of the monarchy was applied under the reign of Louis XVIII. and Charles X., and reproduced in the law of the 15th of

That no legislative act had revoked it on the 9th of August, 1830, when Louis Philippe accepted the crown; that thus by the fact of that acceptation all the property which he possessed at that period became the indisputable property of the State;

Considering that the general donation, subject to a life interest, consented to by Louis Philippe for the advantage of his children, to the exclusion of his eldest son, on the 7th of August, 1830, the very day on which the throne was offered him, and before his acceptation, which took place on the 9th of the same month, had only for his object to prevent the union to the domain of the State of the large estates possessed by the prince called to the throne;

That at a later period when it became known, this act excited public disapprobation (*souleva la conscience publique*);

That, if the annulling of it was not pronounced, it was because there did not exist, as under the ancient monarchy, an authority competent to repress the violation of the principles of public law, the protection of which was formerly confided to the parliaments;

That, in reserving the life interest of the property comprised in the donation, Louis Philippe deprived himself of nothing, and wished only to assure to his family a patrimony become that of the State;

That the donation itself, not less than the exclusion of the eldest son, in the expectation of the accession to the throne of that son, was on the part of the King Louis Philippe the most formal recognition of that fundamental rule, since it required so many precautions to elude it;

That it would be vain to allege, that the union to the public domain of the properties of the prince could only result from the acceptation of the crown by him, and that as such acceptation only took place on the 9th of August, the

donation consented on the 7th of the same month should produce its effect;

Considering that at the latter date Louis Philippe was no longer a private person, since the two Chambers declared him King of the French, under the sole condition of taking an oath to the charter;

That, in consequence of his acceptation, he was king on the 7th of August, since on that day the national will was manifested by the two Chambers, and that the fraud on the law of public order does not exist less when it is concerted in view of a certain fact which is immediately about to be realized;

Considering that the property comprised in the donation of the 7th of August being irrevocably incorporated in the domain of the State, could not be detached by the clauses of Art. 22 of the law of the 2nd of March, 1832;

That it would be contrary to all principles ascribing a retroactive effect to that law, to cause it to render valid an act radically null, according to the legislation existing at the time at which the act was consummated;

That, besides, that law dictated by private interest, under the influence of political events, cannot prevail against the permanent rights of the State, and the immutable rules of public law;

Considering, besides, the rights of the State thus claimed, there still remains to the Orleans family more than one hundred millions, with which they can support their rank abroad;

Considering, also, that it is right to continue the annual allowance of 300,000f. inscribed in the budget for the dowry of the Duchess d'Orleans;

Decrees:—

Art. 1. The real and personal property which is the object of the donation made on the 7th of August, 1830,

by the King Louis Philippe, is restored to the domain of the State.

Art. 2. The State remains charged with the payment of the debts of the civil list of the last reign.

Art. 3. The dowry of 300,000f. awarded to the Duchess d'Orleans is maintained.

Art. 4. The property returning to the State in virtue of Art. 1 shall be partly sold (*vendus en partie*) by the Administration des Domains, and the proceeds shall be divided as follows:—

Art. 5. Ten millions are allowed to Sociétés de Secours Mutuels, authorized by the law of the 15th of July, 1850.

Art. 6. Ten millions shall be employed in ameliorating the dwellings of workmen in the great manufacturing towns.

Art. 7. Ten millions shall be devoted to the establishment of institutions for making loans on mortgage (*institutions de crédit foncier*) in the departments which may demand that measure, on submitting to the conditions considered necessary.

Art. 8. Five millions shall serve to establish a retiring pension fund for the poorest assistant clergy (*les desservans les plus pauvres*).

Art. 9. The surplus of the properties mentioned in Art. 1 shall be united to the dotation of the Legion of Honour, and the revenue of it shall be employed as follows; and if insufficient, the deficiency shall be made up from the resources of the budget.

Art. 10. All the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the army and navy, who shall henceforth be nominated or promoted in the National Order of the Legion of Honour, shall receive, according to their grade in the legion, the following annual allowances:—

Simple members of the Legion (as heretofore)	250f.

Officers	500
Commanders	1,000
Grand officers	2,000
Grand Crosses	3,000

Art. 11. A military medal is created, giving the right to 100f. of life-rent in favour of soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the army and navy, placed in the conditions which shall be fixed by subsequent regulations.

Art. 12. A national château shall serve as a house of education for the indigent daughters or orphans of the families whose chiefs shall have obtained that medal.

Art. 13. The château of Saverne shall be repaired and finished, to serve as an asylum for the widows of civil and military high functionaries who may die in the service of the State.

Art. 14. In consideration of the present, the President of the Republic abandons all demand relative to the confiscations pronounced in 1814 and 1815 against the Bonaparte family.

Art. 15. The ministers are charged each in what concerns him with the execution of the present decree.

Given at the Palace of the Tuileries, the 22nd of January, 1852.

By the President,

LOUIS NAPOLEON.

X. DE CASABIANCA, Minister of State.

It will be observed that this state paper is countersigned by the Minister of State, "Casabianca," and not by M. de Morny, who, unscrupulous enough, as he had been in measures of daring violence and coercion, refused to participate in an act of simple robbery. There are men who will cut you a score or two of throats, and like the job, but who would scorn to descend to picking pockets! We are

glad before concluding our present labours to have an opportunity of doing an act of moral justice, by recording that M. de Morny is no longer in the councils of the Dictator of France; and that M. Fould also, the Minister of Finance, resigned at the same time with him, when the work became too dirty for their hands. The following copies of bulletins announce the names of their less scrupulous successors:—

"Louis Napoleon, President of the Republic, decrees:

"M. Abbatucci, honorary counsellor of the Court of Cassation, is named Keeper of the Seals and Minister of Justice, in the room of M. Rouher, whose resignation is accepted.

"Given at the palace of the Tuileries, this 22nd of January, 1852.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON.

(Countersigned) "X. DE CASABIANCA."

"Louis Napoleon, President of the Republic, decrees:

"M. Fialin de Persigny, ex-Minister Plenipotentiary, is named Minister of the Interior, in the room of M. de Morny, whose resignation is accepted.

"Given at the Tuileries, this 22nd of January, 1852.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON.

(Countersigned) "X. DE CASABIANCA."

"Louis Napoleon, President of the Republic, decrees:

"M. Bineau, ex-Minister, is named Minister of Finance, in the room of M. Fould, whose resignation is accepted.

"Given at the Tuileries, this 22nd of , 1852.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON.

(Countersigned) "X. DE CASABIANCA."

NEW ELECTORAL LAW.

In the name of the French people.

Louis Napoleon, President of the Republic,

On the report of the Minister Secretary of State of the Department of the Interior, decrees:—

CHAPTER I.—ON THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.

Art. 1. Each department shall have a deputy for every 35,000 electors; nevertheless, there shall be a deputy the more in each one of the departments in which the number of electors, exceeding the 35,000, shall amount to 25,000. In consequence, the total number of deputies in the next Legislative Body is 261. Algeria and the colonies do not nominate deputies to the Legislative Body.

Art. 2. Each department is divided, by a decree of the Executive Government, into electoral districts equal in number to the deputies ascribed to it by the table annexed to the present law. This table shall be revised every five years. Each district elects one single deputy.

Art. 3. The suffrage is direct and universal. The ballot is secret. The electors assemble in the principal place (*chef-lieu*) of their commune. Each commune may, nevertheless, be divided, by decree of the Prefect, into as many sections as the number of inscribed electors may render necessary; the decree may fix these sections elsewhere than in the principal place of the commune.

Art. 4. The electoral colleges are convoked by a decree of the Executive Government. The interval between the promulgation of the decree and the opening of the electoral colleges is twenty days at least.

Art. 5. The electoral operations are verified by the Legislative Body, which is the sole judge of their validity.

Art. 6. No one is elected or proclaimed deputy in the Legislative Body on the first ballot if he has not obtained, 1. The absolute majority of the suffrages expressed; 2. A number of votes equal to one-fourth of that of the electors inscribed on the lists of the electoral district. On a second ballot, the election takes place by a relative majority, whatever may be the number of voters; in case the candidates shall obtain an equal number of suffrages, the elder shall be proclaimed deputy.

Art. 7. The deputy elected in several electoral districts must make known his option to the President of the Legislative Body within the ten days which shall follow the declaration of the validity of those elections.

Art. 8. In case of vacancy by option, death, resignation, or otherwise, the electoral college which has to fill up the vacancy is assembled within six months.

Art. 9. The deputies cannot be proceeded against, accused, or judged, at any time, for the opinions they may have expressed in the Legislative Body.

Art. 10. No arrest for debt (*contrainte par corps*) can be exercised against a deputy during the session, and during the six weeks which may precede or follow it.

Art. 11. No member of the Legislative Body can during the session be prosecuted or arrested for any criminal matter, except in case of *flagrante delicto*, until after the Legislative Body shall have authorized the prosecution.

CHAPTER II.—OF ELECTORS AND ELECTORAL LISTS.

Art. 12. All Frenchmen, aged twenty-one years, and enjoying their civil and political rights, are electors, without condition of property qualification (*cens*).

Art. 13. The electoral list is drawn up in each commune by the mayor. It comprises in alphabetical order—1. All the electors residing in the commune during six months at least; 2. Those who, not having attained on the formation of the list the condition of age and habitation, will attain it before the definitive closing.

Art. 14. The soldiers in active service, and the men retained for the service of the ports or the fleet, in virtue of their entry on the lists of the maritime inscription, shall be inscribed on the lists of the communes in which they were domiciled before their departure. They can only vote for deputies to the Legislative Body when they shall be present, at the moment of the election, in the commune in which they be inscribed.

Art. 15. The following cannot be inscribed on the electoral lists:—1. The persons who are deprived of their civil and political rights, in consequence of condemnation to *peines afflictives ou infamantes*, or to *peines infamantes* only; 2. Those to whom the correctional tribunals have interdicted the right of vote and election, by application of the laws authorizing that interdiction; 3. The condemned for crime to imprisonment, by application of Article 463 of the penal code; 4. Those who have been condemned to three months' imprisonment, by application of Articles 318 and 423 of the penal code; 5. The condemned for robbery, swindling, embezzlement, embezzlement by holders of public money, or offences against public morals, punished by Articles 330 and 334 of the penal code, whatever may be the duration of the imprisonment to which they may have

been condemned; 6. The persons who, by application of Article 8 of the law of the 17th of May, 1829, and of Article 3 of the decree of the 11th of August, 1848, shall have been condemned for outrages to public and religious morality, or decency, and for attacks on the principle of property and family rights; 7. The persons condemned to more than three months' imprisonment, in virtue of Articles 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46 of the present law; 8. The notaries, registrars, and ministerial officers dismissed in virtue of judicial judgments or decisions; 9. The condemned for vagabondage or mendicity; 10. Those who shall have been condemned to three months' imprisonment at least, by application of Articles 439, 448, 444, 445, 446, 447, and 452 of the penal code; 11. Those who shall have been declared guilty of the offences punished by Articles 410 and 411 of the penal code, and by the law of the 21st of May, 1836, prohibiting lotteries; 12. The soldiers condemned *au boulet* or to hard labour; 13. The persons condemned to imprisonment, by application of Articles 38, 41, 43, and 45 of the law of the 21st of March, 1832, on the recruiting of the army; 14. The persons condemned to imprisonment by application of Article 1 of the law of the 27th of March, 1851; 15. Those who have been condemned for usury; 16. Persons declared incapable of managing their own affairs; 17. Bankrupts *non-réhabilités* (*i. e.* those who have not paid their debts), whose bankruptcy has been declared either by the French tribunals, or by judgments rendered abroad, but having effect in France.

Art. 16. The condemned to more than a month's imprisonment for rebellion, outrages and violence towards the authorities or agents of the public force, for public outrages to a juryman on account of his functions, or to a witness on account of his deposition, for offences against the law

on assemblages and the law on clubs, and for violations of the law on hawking, cannot be inscribed on the electoral list for five years from the expiration of their penalty.

Art. 17. The electoral lists which served for the vote of the 20th and 21st of December, 1851, are declared valid up to the 31st of March, 1853.

Art. 18. The electoral lists are permanent. They shall be annually revised. A decree of the Executive Government shall determine the rules and forms of that operation.

Art. 19. At the time of the annual revision, and within delays fixed by decrees of the Executive Government, every citizen omitted in the list may present his claim at the *mairie*. Any elector inscribed on one of the lists of the electoral district may call for the erasure or the inscription of a name omitted or unduly inscribed. The same right is vested in the prefects and sub-prefects. A register shall be opened in each *mairie*, on which all claims shall be inscribed in order of date. The mayor shall give an acknowledgment for each claim. The elector whose inscription shall be disputed shall be informed of the fact without expense by the mayor, and may make his observations on the subject.

Art. 20. The claims shall be decided on by a committee composed, in Paris, of the mayor and two deputy-mayors; and in every other place of the mayor and two members of the municipal council chosen by the council.

Art. 21. Notification of the decision shall be made to the parties interested, through the medium of a sworn agent, within a delay of three days. They may appeal within a delay of five days after receiving the notification.

Art. 22. The appeal is to be made to the *juge de paix* of the canton by a simple declaration to the registrar; the *juge de paix* shall decide on it within a delay of ten days, without expense or any form of procedure, and on a simple

notice given three days beforehand to all the parties interested. If the demand should involve the prejudicial solution of any question of state, he shall previously send the parties before competent judges, and fix a short delay in which the party raising the prejudicial question may justify it. In this case, Article 855, 856, and 852 of the Code of Procedure shall be followed.

Art. 23. The decision of the *juge de paix* is the last resource; it may be referred to the Court of Cassation, but the appeal cannot be received unless it be made within ten days from the notification of the decision. It cannot be delayed. It is made by a simple request, announced to the defendants within ten days after; it is made through an advocate at the court, and decided immediately, and without expense. The documents furnished by the parties are to be transmitted without expense by the registrar of the *juge de paix* to the registrar of the Court of Cassation. The Chamber of Requests of the Court of Cassation shall decide definitively on the appeal.

Art. 24. All judicial documents in electoral matters are exempted from the stamp, and registered without charge. The extracts from the registers of births necessary to establish the age of electors shall be delivered gratuitously, on unstamped paper, to all who may claim them. They shall bear at their head the announcement of the special purpose for which they are intended, and cannot serve for any other.

Art. 25. The election is made on the revised list during the whole year following the close of the list.

CHAPTER III.—OF THE PERSONS ELIGIBLE.

Art. 26. All electors who are twenty-five years of age are eligible, without any condition of residence.

Art. 27. Those persons specified in Arts. 15 and 16 of the present law are declared unworthy of being elected.

Art. 28. Any deputy who, during the period of his mandate, shall have undergone any condemnation which, according to the preceding article, would deprive him of the right of being elected, shall be deprived of his quality of member of the legislative body. His dismissal shall be declared by the legislative body after examining the documents in justification of it.

Art. 29. All paid public functionaries are incompatible with the mandate of deputy of the legislative body. Any paid functionary elected a deputy to the legislative body shall be considered as having resigned his functions from the very fact of his admission as member of the legislative body, if he does not declare his option before the verification of his return. Any deputy of the legislative body is considered to have resigned his seat if he accepts paid public functions.

Art. 30. The following public functionaries cannot be during the six months immediately following their dismissal, their resignation, or any other change in their position, viz. :—First presidents, procureurs-general, presidents of the civil tribunals, procureurs of the Republic, the commandant-in-chief of the national guards of the Seine; the prefect of police, prefects, and sub-prefects; archbishops, bishops, and vicars-general; general officers commanding military divisions and sub-divisions; maritime prefects.

CHAPTER IV.—PENAL ENACTMENTS.

Art. 31. Any person who shall get himself set down on the electoral list under false names or false qualities, or

shall, in getting himself inscribed, have concealed an incapacity provided for in the law, or shall have obtained an inscription on two or several lists, shall be punished with an imprisonment of from one month to one year, and a fine of from 100f. to 1000f.

Art. 32. He who being deprived of the right of voting, either in consequence of a judicial condemnation or of having failed in business without being rehabilitated, shall have voted, either in virtue of an inscription on lists anterior to his incapacity, or in virtue of a posterior inscription, but effected without his participation, shall be punished by an imprisonment of from a fortnight to three months, and a fine of from 20f. to 500f.

Art. 33. Whoever shall have voted in an electoral meeting, either in virtue of an inscription obtained in the first two cases provided for by Art. 31, or in falsely assuming the names and qualities of an elector inscribed, shall be punished by an imprisonment of from six months to two years, and a fine of from 200f. to 2000f.

Art. 34. Shall be liable to the same penalty every citizen who shall have taken advantage of a repeated inscription to vote more than once.

Art. 35. Whoever, being charged at a voting-place to receive, reckon up, or examine the bulletins containing the votes of the citizens, shall have withdrawn, added to, or altered the said bulletins, or read any other name than that inscribed thereon, shall be punished with an imprisonment of from one year to five, and a fine of from 500f. to 5000f.

Art. 36. The same penalty shall be applicable to any person who, when charged by an elector to write down his vote, shall have written down on the bulletin another name than that which was mentioned to him.

Art. 37. All entrance into the place of voting with arms displayed is interdicted. Any case of infraction will be punishable by a fine of from 16f. to 100f. Should the arms be concealed, the penalty shall be an imprisonment of from a fortnight to three months, and a fine of from 50f. to 300f.

Art. 38. Whoever shall have given, promised, or received money, securities, or property, on condition either of giving or of obtaining a vote, or of abstaining from voting, shall be punished with an imprisonment of from three months to two years, and a fine of from 500f. to 5000f. Whatever persons, in the same conditions, shall have made or accepted the offer or the promise of public or private employments, shall be liable to the same penalties. Should the offender be a public functionary the punishment shall be doubled.

Art. 39. Those persons who, either by violence or menace against an elector, or by causing him to apprehend the loss of his situation, or some damage to his person, family, or fortune, shall have induced him to abstain from voting, or shall have influenced his vote, shall be punished by an imprisonment of from one month to one year, and a fine of from 100f. to 1000f. The penalty shall be doubled if the offender is a public functionary.

Art. 40. Those persons who, by aid of false news, calumnious rumours, or other fraudulent manœuvres, shall have surprised or turned aside any votes, or shall have determined one or several electors to abstain from voting, shall be punished with an imprisonment of from one month to a year, and a fine of from 100f. to 2000f.

Art. 41. When by assemblages, clamour, or menacing demonstrations, the operations of an electoral college shall have been troubled, or the exercise of the electoral right

interfered with, the offending parties shall be liable to an imprisonment of three months to two years, and a fine of from 100f. to 2000f.

Art. 42. All violent irruption into an electoral college, with a design to prevent a choice being made, shall be punished with an imprisonment of from one to five years, and a fine of from 1000f. to 5000f.

Art. 43. Should the offending parties have been the bearers of arms, or if the balloting-box shall have been violated, the punishment shall be solitary confinement of an aggravated character for the period specified.

Art. 44. Should the offence have been committed in pursuance of a concerted plan to be executed either throughout the whole Republic, or in one or several departments, or in one or several arrondissements, the punishment shall be hard labour at the hulks for a limited period.

Art. 45. The members of an electoral college who, during the time of its meeting, shall have rendered themselves guilty of violence or outrage, either towards the persons presiding, or towards any one of them, or who by acts of violence or menace shall have retarded or prevented the electoral operations, shall be punished by an imprisonment of from one month to one year, and a fine of from 100f. to 2000f. Should the balloting-box have been violated, the imprisonment shall be from one year to five, and the fine from 1000f. to 5000f.

Art. 46. The carrying away of the urn containing the votes given and not yet examined, shall be liable to an imprisonment of from one year to five, and a fine of from 1000f. to 5000f. If this act of carrying away the urn shall have been committed by persons uniting together for the purpose of acting with violence, the penalty shall be

solitary confinement of an aggravated character for the period specified.

Art. 47. Any violation of the ballot made either by the members of the bureau, or by the agents appointed to guard the bulletins not yet examined, shall be punished by solitary confinement for the period specified.

Art. 48. The crimes provided for by the present law shall be tried by the Court of Assizes, and offences by the correctional tribunals; Art. 463 of the Penal Code may be applied.

Art. 49. In the event of conviction of several crimes or offences provided for by the present law, and committed previously to the first prosecution, the *maximum* of the penalty may be applied.

Art. 50. Public and civil prosecutions will be prescribed after three months from the day on which the result of the election is proclaimed.

Art. 51. The condemnation, if pronounced, cannot in any case have for effect to annul the election which has been declared valid by the competent powers, or which has become duly definitive from the absence of any regular protest formed within the delay fixed by the special laws.

Art. 52. All previous laws are abrogated as far as they are contrary to the present law.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS.

Art. 53. A special law will regulate the mode of voting of the army for the election of the President of the Republic.

Art. 54. A regulating decree issued in execution of the provisions of Art. 6 of the Constitution will fix—1. The

administrative formalities for the annual revision of the lists; 2. All the provisions relative to the composition, the functions, and the operations of the electoral colleges.

Done at the Palace of the Tuileries, this 2nd of February, 1852.

(Signed) LOUIS NAPOLEON.
(Countersigned) F. DE PERSIGNY.

List of the number of Deputies to the Legislative Body to be elected by each Department:—

Ain, 3; Aisne, 4; Allier, 2; Alpes (Basses), 1; Alpes (Hautes), 1; Ardèche, 3; Ardennes, 2; Ariége, 2; Aube, 2; Aude, 2; Aveyron, 3; Bouches-du-Rhône, 3; Calvados, 4; Cantal, 2; Charente. 3; Charente-Inférieure, 4; Cher, 2; Corrèze, 2; Corse, 1; Côte-d'Or, 3; Côtes-du-Nord, 5; Creuse, 2; Dordogne, 4; Doubs, 2; Drôme, 3; Eure, 3; Eure-et-Loir, 2; Finistère, 4; Gard, 3; Garonne (Haute), 4; Gers, 3; Gironde, 5; Hérault, 3; Ile-et-Vilaine, 4; Indre, 2; Indre-et-Loire, 3; Isère, 4; Jura, 2; Landes, 2; Loir-et-Cher, 2; Loire, 3; Loire (Haute), 2; Loire-Inférieure, 4; Loiret, 2; Lot, 2; Lot-et-Garonne, 3; Lozère, 1; Maine-et-Loire, 4; Manche, 4; Marne, 3; Marne (Haute), 2; Mayenne, 3; Meurthe, 3; Meuse, 2; Morbihan, 3; Moselle, 3; Nièvre, 2; Nord, 8; Oise, 3; Orne, 3; Pas-de-Calais, 5; Puy-de-Dôme, 5; Pyrénées (Basses), 3; Pyrénées (Hautes), 2; Pyrénées Orientales, 1; Rhin (Bas), 4; Rhin (Haut), 3; Rhône, 4; Saône (Haute), 3; Saône-et-Loire, 4; Sarthe, 4; Seine, 9; Seine-Inférieure, 6; Seine-et-Marne, 3; Seine-et-Oise, 4; Sèvres (Deux), 2; Somme, 5; Tarn, 3; Tarn-et-Garonne, 2; Var, 3; Vaucluse, 2; Vendée, 3; Vienne, 2; Vienne (Haute), 2; Vosges, 3; Yonne, 3.—Total, 261.

CALCUTTA PUBLICK LIBRARY.

This decree is followed by another of considerable length, ordering the annual revision of the electoral lists, and the regulations to be observed at the elections. These differ little from those already existing. A third decree convokes the electoral colleges for the 29th of February, for the election of the deputies.

THE END.

LONDON:
SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET,
COVENT GARDEN.