THE

CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

WITH

HIS BROTHER JOSEPH,

SOMETIME KING OF SPAIN.

SELECTED AND TRANSLATED, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES, FROM THE

'MÉMOIRES DU ROI JOSEPH.'

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE REET.

855.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS — Proposal to purchase Ragny — Arrests — Napoleon's promotions — The Constitution — Jérôme — Louis — The portrait — The English in Brittany — Society in Paris — The *Marseillaise* — Junot — Marmont — Committee of Public Safety — Lanjuinais' report — Victory of Quiberon — Lucien arrested — Peace with Spain, Naples, and Parma — Family matters — Corsica — The government — The Tenth of August — The Convention purified — Napoleon's mental state — Law of the 17th Nivôse — Royalist agitations — Napoleon to remain in France — Decisions concerning emigrants — Approval of Louis — Insurrectionary spirit — The Constitution generally accepted — 13th Vendémiaire — Napoleon's further promotions — Directors — Provision for the Bonaparte family .. .. Page 1–27

CHAPTER II.

Introductory remarks — Conquests and treaties — Joseph ambassador at Rome — Affairs of Rome and Naples — Death of Hoche — Treaty of Radstadt — Egyptian expedition — Capture of Malta — Conquest of Egypt — Suspicions of Josephine 28–40

CHAPTER III.

The Consulate. — Madame de Staël — Capture of Ivrea — Lucien and Jérôme — Treaty of Luneville — Russia and Austria — Mission of M. de Colentzel — Death of the Emperor Paul — Concordat — Insurrection in Guadaloupe — Treaty of Amiens — Corsica — Pauline .. 41–55

CHAPTER IV.

The Empire. — Introductory remarks — Campaign of 1805 — The army and its chiefs — Progress of events — Battle of Wertingen — The Russian and Austrian armies — Occupation of Vienna — Estimation of French generals — Negotiation with Austria — Battle of Austerlitz — Conduct of Barbé-Marbois — Peace of Presburg .. .. Page 56–68

CHAPTER V.

Summary — Preparations for the expedition to Naples — Projected marriages — Schönbrunn proclamation — Instructions to Joseph for the invasion of Naples — Conduct of Masséna — English ministry — Barbé-Marbois — Army returns — Surrender of Naples — Instructions for its government — The revenue — The lazzaroni — French troops — Neapolitan fiefs — Supply of funds from France — Military robbers — Instructions for the siege of Gaeta — Severity necessary — Joseph King of Naples — Provision for Bernadotte 69–97

CHAPTER VI.

Introductory remarks — Naples: peculation — Defence of the coast — Jourdan — Army regulations and supply — Siege of Gaeta — Military government — Insurgents — Body-guard — Expedition to Civita Vecchia — Gendarmerie — Sir Sidney Smith — Appointments — Louis to be King of Holland — Jérôme — Institution of orders — Distrust inculcated — Precautionary measures — Strength and cost of the army — Joseph's speech and letters — Jourdan and Masséna — Conduct of Rome — Neapolitan duchies — French civil code — Instructions for the invasion of Sicily — Arms and ammunition — Distribution of the army — Arrests ordered — Loans — Negotiations with England — Neapolitan salt-tax — Roderer — Character of Joseph's government — Assassination of blind French soldiers — The ex-Queen — War in Calabria — Peace with Russia — Fear for Naples 98–154

CHAPTER VII.

Introductory remarks — Reynier's narrative of the battle of Maida — Naples: mistakes of Joseph's government — The army: its employment, composition, and strength; remarks on its dispersion; and instructions for its better distribution — Severe measures recommended — Expedition to Calabria — Proposed fortresses — Negotiations with England — Neapolitan provincial guards — Illness of Mr. Fox — Recognition of Joseph — Affairs of Germany — Revolt desirable in Naples — Pillage and burning of Lauria — Treaty with Russia — Joseph's guard — Dragoon regiments — Sites of proposed fortresses 155–204

CHAPTER VIII.

Introductory remarks — Renewal of war with Russia — Protection of Pescara — Warlike preparations — Desire for peace in England — Death of Mr. Fox — Neglect of sick soldiers — Joseph's guard — Precautionary measures — Character of Prussia — Austrian alliance desirable — Prussian campaign of 1806 — Army of Naples — Berlin decree — Proposal to Macdonald — Rebellion in Poland — War between Turkey and Russia — Murder of blind soldiers — Joseph's demands — Character of the campaign — Rœderer and Dumas — Supplies for Napoleon's army — Conduct of Austria — Suppression of convents in Naples — Siege and fall of Dantzic — Jérôme and Louis — Coinage for Naples — Proposed fortresses — Battle of Friedland — Shipbuilding — Designs upon Corfu — Ali Pacha of Janina — Peace of Tilsit — Finances of Naples .. .. Page 205–250

CHAPTER IX.

Introductory remarks — Naples : army regulations, appointments, strength, cost, &c. — Shipbuilding — Want of returns — Neapolitan soldiers — Affairs of Corfu — Want of information — Russian squadron — Instructions for Cæsar Berthier — Expedition to Scylla — Revenue of Naples — Code Napoléon — Arrests ordered — Lucien's interview with Napoleon — Milan decree — Expedition to Rome — Expedition to Sicily — Composition of the army of Sicily — Government of Ionian Islands — Rochefort squadron — Neapolitan finance — Toulon squadron — Capitulation of Reggio — Salicetti and Rœderer — Capture of Scylla — French armies — Conduct of Admiral Cosmao — Neapolitan cardinals — Affairs of Spain — Joseph's title to Sicily .. 251–313

CHAPTER X.

Summary of events — Affairs at Bayonne — State of Spanish affairs — Joseph to be King of Spain — Civil honours — Joseph enters Spain — Troops for Vittoria — Position and movements of the army — Operations of Bessières — Siege of Saragossa — Battle of Medina de Rio Seco — Savary — State of the French army in Spain — Operations of Moncey — Joseph's fears and encouragement — He enters Madrid — Proceedings of Cuesta — Joseph's difficulties — Answer to his complaints — He leaves Madrid — Defeat of Dupont — Appointment of Ney — Instructions to Savary — Sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal 314–345

CHAPTER XI.

Introductory remarks — Spain: mismanagement of affairs — Joseph's retreat — Appointment of ambassadors — Severe examples necessary; indulgence fatal — Decree and project for the organisation of the army — Affair of Bilbao — Joseph's suggestions for a plan of operations, and Napoleon's observations thereon — Meeting of sovereigns at Erfurt — Want of information .. .. Page 346–368

CHAPTER XII.

Introductory remarks — Spain: army supply; dislike of contracts — Displeasure with Lefebvre and Victor — Finances — Insurrections suppressed — Appointment of magistrates — Disposal of Ney's forces — Regulations for agents — Battles of Espinosa, Tudela, and Somo Sierra — Formation of the Foreign Regiment of Spain — Joseph's guard — Revenue — "The Emperor's Instructions; Administration" — English army — Military movements — Battle of Mancilla — Retreat of the English — Lefebvre taken prisoner — Deputations from Madrid to the provinces — Orders concerning the families of French emigrants 369–390

THE

CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

WITH

HIS BROTHER JOSEPH,

SOMETIME KING OF SPAIN.

SELECTED AND TRANSLATED, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES, FROM THE

'MÉMOIRES DU ROI JOSEPH.'

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE REET.

855.

LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,
AND CHARING CROSS.

PREFACE.

THESE volumes contain a translation of all the Letters and Orders of Napoleon published in the Memoirs of King Joseph.

I have added to them a few letters of Napoleon taken from other sources, and a few, not written by Napoleon, which appeared to me to deserve insertion, either for their intrinsic interest, or as explanatory of his. I should have inserted many more if I had not been restrained by the expediency of keeping the English publication within moderate limits.

Napoleon's letters contain, of course, some uninteresting details. I have not, however, ventured to curtail them. It appears to me that the reader must wish to see at full length all that came from such a man; and I feel that it is only by studying the details of his orders that their wonderful fullness, minuteness, and precision can be estimated.

In many cases I have left untranslated technical terms for which we have no equivalents. The military and the political hierarchy of France differ much from our own; and where there was no corresponding English expression, I preferred the French term to a tedious circumlocution. Sometimes, also, I have been forced to reproduce rather

could write, when he gave himself time, with great clearness, force, and compression; but he was almost always hurried. His secretaries were trained to keep up with his rapid dictation. He seems seldom to have read over what they wrote; sometimes he did not even sign it; and the necessary consequence was that the inconsistencies, the repetitions, and the obscurities which belong to what is spoken, and are assisted and explained by the voice and the manner, were reproduced by the too faithful amanuensis with all their imperfections unpalliated.

I have been beset, therefore, by a constant temptation to improve on my author—to translate not what he actually dictated, but what he would have dictated if he had had the opportunity of reconsideration. I have yielded, however, to it very sparingly, and I hope that the reader will think that I have erred rather by being too literal than by being too free.

THE TRANSLATOR.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS — Proposal to purchase Ragny — Arrests — Napoleon's promotions — The Constitution — Jérôme — Louis — The portrait — The English in Brittany — Society in Paris — The *Marseillaise* — Junot — Marmont — Committee of Public Safety — Lanjuinais' report — Victory of Quiberon — Lucien arrested — Peace with Spain, Naples, and Parma — Family matters — Corsica — The government — The Tenth of August — The Convention purified — Napoleon's mental state — Law of the 17th Nivôse — Royalist agitations — Napoleon to remain in France — Decisions concerning emigrants — Approval of Louis — Insurrectionary spirit — The Constitution generally accepted — 13th Vendémiaire — Napoleon's further promotions — Directors — Provision for the Bonaparte family .. .. Page 1–27

CHAPTER II.

Introductory remarks — Conquests and treaties — Joseph ambassador at Rome — Affairs of Rome and Naples — Death of Hoche — Treaty of Radstadt — Egyptian expedition — Capture of Malta — Conquest of Egypt — Suspicions of Josephine 28–40

CHAPTER III.

The Consulate. — Madame de Staël — Capture of Ivrea — Lucien and Jérôme — Treaty of Luneville — Russia and Austria — Mission of M. de Colentzel — Death of the Emperor Paul — Concordat — Insurrection in Guadaloupe — Treaty of Amiens — Corsica — Pauline .. 41–55

CHAPTER IV.

The Empire. — Introductory remarks — Campaign of 1805 — The army and its chiefs — Progress of events — Battle of Wertingen — The Russian and Austrian armies — Occupation of Vienna — Estimation of French generals — Negotiation with Austria — Battle of Austerlitz — Conduct of Barbé-Marbois — Peace of Presburg .. .. Page 56–68

CHAPTER V.

Summary — Preparations for the expedition to Naples — Projected marriages — Schönbrunn proclamation — Instructions to Joseph for the invasion of Naples — Conduct of Masséna — English ministry — Barbé-Marbois — Army returns — Surrender of Naples — Instructions for its government — The revenue — The lazzaroni — French troops — Neapolitan fiefs — Supply of funds from France — Military robbers — Instructions for the siege of Gaeta — Severity necessary — Joseph King of Naples — Provision for Bernadotte 69–97

CHAPTER VI.

Introductory remarks — Naples: peculation — Defence of the coast — Jourdan — Army regulations and supply — Siege of Gaeta — Military government — Insurgents — Body-guard — Expedition to Civita Vecchia — Gendarmerie — Sir Sidney Smith — Appointments — Louis to be King of Holland — Jérôme — Institution of orders — Distrust inculcated — Precautionary measures — Strength and cost of the army — Joseph's speech and letters — Jourdan and Masséna — Conduct of Rome — Neapolitan duchies — French civil code — Instructions for the invasion of Sicily — Arms and ammunition — Distribution of the army — Arrests ordered — Loans — Negotiations with England — Neapolitan salt-tax — Roderer — Character of Joseph's government — Assassination of blind French soldiers — The ex-Queen — War in Calabria — Peace with Russia — Fear for Naples 98–154

CHAPTER VII.

Introductory remarks — Reynier's narrative of the battle of Maida — Naples: mistakes of Joseph's government — The army: its employment, composition, and strength; remarks on its dispersion; and instructions for its better distribution — Severe measures recommended — Expedition to Calabria — Proposed fortresses — Negotiations with England — Neapolitan provincial guards — Illness of Mr. Fox — Recognition of Joseph — Affairs of Germany — Revolt desirable in Naples — Pillage and burning of Lauria — Treaty with Russia — Joseph's guard — Dragoon regiments — Sites of proposed fortresses 155–204

CHAPTER VIII.

Introductory remarks — Renewal of war with Russia — Protection of Pescara — Warlike preparations — Desire for peace in England — Death of Mr. Fox — Neglect of sick soldiers — Joseph's guard — Precautionary measures — Character of Prussia — Austrian alliance desirable — Prussian campaign of 1806 — Army of Naples — Berlin decree — Proposal to Macdonald — Rebellion in Poland — War between Turkey and Russia — Murder of blind soldiers — Joseph's demands — Character of the campaign — Rœderer and Dumas — Supplies for Napoleon's army — Conduct of Austria — Suppression of convents in Naples — Siege and fall of Dantzic — Jérôme and Louis — Coinage for Naples — Proposed fortresses — Battle of Friedland — Shipbuilding — Designs upon Corfu — Ali Pacha of Janina — Peace of Tilsit — Finances of Naples .. .. Page 205–250

CHAPTER IX.

Introductory remarks — Naples : army regulations, appointments, strength, cost, &c. — Shipbuilding — Want of returns — Neapolitan soldiers — Affairs of Corfu — Want of information — Russian squadron — Instructions for Cæsar Berthier — Expedition to Scylla — Revenue of Naples — Code Napoléon — Arrests ordered — Lucien's interview with Napoleon — Milan decree — Expedition to Rome — Expedition to Sicily — Composition of the army of Sicily — Government of Ionian Islands — Rochefort squadron — Neapolitan finance — Toulon squadron — Capitulation of Reggio — Salicetti and Rœderer — Capture of Scylla — French armies — Conduct of Admiral Cosmao — Neapolitan cardinals — Affairs of Spain — Joseph's title to Sicily .. 251–313

CHAPTER X.

Summary of events — Affairs at Bayonne — State of Spanish affairs — Joseph to be King of Spain — Civil honours — Joseph enters Spain — Troops for Vittoria — Position and movements of the army — Operations of Bessières — Siege of Saragossa — Battle of Medina de Rio Seco — Savary — State of the French army in Spain — Operations of Moncey — Joseph's fears and encouragement — He enters Madrid — Proceedings of Cuesta — Joseph's difficulties — Answer to his complaints — He leaves Madrid — Defeat of Dupont — Appointment of Ney — Instructions to Savary — Sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal 314–345

CHAPTER XI.

Introductory remarks — Spain: mismanagement of affairs — Joseph's retreat — Appointment of ambassadors — Severe examples necessary; indulgence fatal — Decree and project for the organisation of the army — Affair of Bilbao — Joseph's suggestions for a plan of operations, and Napoleon's observations thereon — Meeting of sovereigns at Erfurt — Want of information .. .. Page 346–368

CHAPTER XII.

Introductory remarks — Spain: army supply; dislike of contracts — Displeasure with Lefebvre and Victor — Finances — Insurrections suppressed — Appointment of magistrates — Disposal of Ney's forces — Regulations for agents — Battles of Espinosa, Tudela, and Somo Sierra — Formation of the Foreign Regiment of Spain — Joseph's guard — Revenue — "The Emperor's Instructions; Administration" — English army — Military movements — Battle of Mancilla — Retreat of the English — Lefebvre taken prisoner — Deputations from Madrid to the provinces — Orders concerning the families of French emigrants 369–390

THE FAMILY OF BONAPARTE.

NAPOLEON'S BROTHERS.

JOSEPH,
King of Naples, 1806—King of Spain, 1808—Count Survilliers, 1815.

LUCIEN,
Prince of Canino, 1816.

LOUIS,
Constable of France, 1804—King of Holland, 1807—Count of St. Leu, 1810.

JEROME,
King of Westphalia, 1807—Prince of Montfort, 1816.

SISTERS.

ELIZA,
Princess of Lucca and Piombino, 1805—Grand Duchess of Tuscany, 1806.

PAULINE,
Princess Borghese, 1803.

CAROLINE,
Grand Duchess of Berg and Cleves, 1806—Queen of Naples, 1808—Countess of Lipona, 1829.

NAPOLEON'S WIVES.

JOSEPHINE,
Viscountess de Beauharnois, 17— —Empress of France, 1804.

MARIA LOUISA,
Archduchess of Austria, 1791—Empress of France, 1810—Duchess of Parma, 1814.

MINISTERS.

CAMBACERES,
Second Consul, 1799—Prince of Parma, 1804.

CAULAINCOURT,
Duke of Vicenza.

CHAMPAGNY,
Duke of Cadore.

CLARKE,
Duke of Feltre.

FOUCHÉ,
Duke of Otranto.

LEBRUN,
Duke of Plaisance—Governor-General of Holland.

MARET,
Duke of Bassano.

SAVARY,
Duke of Rovigo.

TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento, 1804—Vice Grand Elector, 1807—Prince de Talleyrand, 1814.

MARSHALS AND GENERALS.

ARRIGHI,
General—Duke of Padua.

AUGEREAU,
Marshal—Duke of Castiglione.

BERNADOTTE,
Marshal—Prince of Ponte-Corvo—Crown Prince of Sweden.

BERTHIER,
Marshal—Duke of Neufchâtel—Prince of Wagram.

BESSIERES,
Marshal—Duke of Istria.

DAVOUST,
Marshal—Duke of Auerstadt—Prince of Eckmuhl.

EUGENE BEAUHARNOIS,
Marshal—Viceroy of Italy—Prince of Venice.

GOUVION ST. CYR,
Marshal.

GROUCHY,
Marshal—Count of the Empire.

JOURDAN,
Marshal.

JUNOT,
Marshal—Duke of Abrantes.

LANNES,
Marshal—Duke of Montebello.

LEFEBVRE,
Marshal—Duke of Dantzic.

MACDONALD,
Marshal—Duke of Taranto.

MARMONT,
Marshal—Duke of Ragusa.

MASSENA,
Marshal—Duke of Rivoli—Prince of Essling.

MONCEY,
Marshal—Duke of Conegliano.

MORTIER,
Marshal—Duke of Treviso.

MURAT,
Marshal—Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves—King of Naples.

NEY,
Marshal—Duke of Elchingen—Prince of Moskwa.

OUDINOT,
Marshal—Duke of Reggio.

SOULT,
Marshal—Duke of Dalmatia.

SUCHET,
Marshal—Duke of Albufera.

VICTOR,
Marshal—Duke of Belluno.

LETTERS

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

CHAPTER I.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 23rd of May, 1795, to the 7th of February, 1796. Napoleon was born on the 15th of August, 1769. He was therefore at the beginning of this period in his 26th, at the end of it in his 27th year. He had acquired the rank of General of Brigade, but during the earlier part of this period was living in Paris unemployed. His brother Joseph, one year older, had been forced, by the insurrection of Corsica against France, to leave his judgeship at Ajaccio, and to take refuge in Marseilles, where he married Julie, daughter of M. Clary, a rich merchant. Napoleon was engaged to her sister, Eugénie Désirée.

The date of Napoleon's first letter, May 23, 1795, is about ten months after the 9th Thermidor, an II. (27th of July, 1794). The third of the revolutionary Constitutions, that of an III., was then under discussion in the Convention. It was a work of elaborate puerile ingenuity. Jealousy of power was its ruling principle; and the precautions taken against power were constant change and constant collision. Neither the electoral, nor the legislative, nor the executive body was to remain unaltered

for more than a single year. Experience was made a positive disqualification: neither a member of the legislature nor a member of the executive was re-eligible until after an interval. The members of the legislature could hold no other functions, and, as is always the case with a representative body from which all members of the government are excluded, they soon settled into a permanent opposition.

The Directors, with no common head and no common interest, who had not selected one another as colleagues, and whose length of power depended on the chances of the die, split into hostile factions, each endeavouring to drive the other into exile or to the guillotine. All the ends of government were sacrificed to republican jealousy of its means. The only wise act of its framers was a decree of the Convention that the new legislative body should contain two-thirds of the members of the Convention. This decree was utterly opposed to the whole spirit of the new Constitution; but it provided that the new government should not be administered by unpractised men. It produced results of still greater consequence—it occasioned the insurrection of the 13th Vendémiaire, which made the fortune of Napoleon, and thereby has influenced all the immediately subsequent and many of the remote destinies of the world.

Many of the early letters relate to trifling family details; they are full of repetitions, and, if they had been written by Joseph instead of by Napoleon, would not have been worth translation. I have thought it advisable to translate them all, and in full, as the earliest, and perhaps the sincerest exposition of the opinions and feelings of a young man who in a very few months was to be managing the affairs of Europe instead of those of Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Madame Mère.

[1.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

May 23, 1795.

I went yesterday to Ragny, the estate of M. de Montigny. If you were the man to make a good hit, you would come and buy this estate for eight millions in assignats. You might invest 60,000 francs of your wife's fortune in it: I wish and advise you to do so. Remember me to your wife, to Désirée,* and to all your family.

France is not to be found abroad. Living about in seaports is rather after the manner of an adventurer, or of a man who has his fortune to make. If you are wise, you have only to enjoy yours. I have no doubt that you might have this estate for 80,000 francs in specie. Before the Revolution it was worth 250,000. I consider this to be an unique opportunity for investing part of your wife's fortune. Assignats are losing in value every day.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, May 29, 1795.

Gentlemen in green neckcloths are arrested here on the suspicion that they are Jesuits. Many are arrested suspected to be emigrants. We begin to perceive that the Royalists are to be feared because they believe themselves to be favoured, and that it is time to put an end to their hopes.

I sent the Constitution to you yesterday by Casabianca. Everything rises frightfully in price; it will soon be impossible to live; the harvest is waited for impatiently.

[3.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

June 23, 1795.

I have received your letter No. 16. I was pleased with Chiapé's letter; he has great interest; if he were here, he might

* Afterwards Madame Bernadotte.

do what he liked. I will do what I can to find a place for Lucien. I am employed as General of Brigade in the Army of the West, but not in the artillery. I am ill, which forces me to take a furlough of two or three months. When my health is re-established I shall see what I can do.

The Constitution is to be read to-day to the Convention; happiness and tranquillity are expected from it; I will send it to you as soon as it is in print and I can get it.

Jérôme writes to ask me to find him a boarding-school; there is not one to be had just at present. Casabianca intends to send his son to Genoa, and from thence to Corsica; he keeps him at home doing nothing.

Casabianca is going to write to you about Songis and your brother-in-law. The last law seems to be very favourable to them; there is no doubt therefore that they will be able to return, and that we shall get their names struck out from the list of emigrants.

[4.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

June 24, 1795.

For the Consul's pension, a certificate that he has not emigrated since 1789 is required, and a power of attorney.

I have not been able to obtain a commission for Louis in a regiment of artillery. As he, however, is only sixteen, I shall send him to Châlons, where he will pass his examination, and become an officer in a year's time. To-day the Constitution is to be read to the Convention; I will send it to you as soon as it is printed.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

June 25, 1795.

I will execute your wife's commissions immediately. Désirée asks me for my portrait; I am going to have it painted; you will give it to her if she still wishes for it; if not, keep it for yourself. In whatever circumstances you may be placed by fortune, you know well, my friend, that you cannot have a better

or a dearer friend than myself, or one who wishes more sincerely for your happiness. Life is a flimsy dream, soon to be over. If you are going away, and you think that it may be for some time, send me your portrait; we have lived together for so many years, so closely united, that our hearts have become one, and you know best how entirely mine belongs to you. While I write these lines I feel an emotion which I have seldom experienced. I fear that it will be long before we see each other again, and I can write no more.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, July 7, 1795.

I have had no news from you since you went. To reach Genoa the river *Lethe* must be crossed, for since she has been there, Désirée writes to me no longer.

The English have landed 12,000 men, mostly emigrants, in Brittany. This does not cause much anxiety here; the superiority of our infantry is so certain that we laugh at these English demonstrations. The armies of Italy and of the Pyrenees appear to be sharply attacked.

Some articles of the Constitution are being decreed every day. We are very quiet; bread continues scarce; the weather is rather cold and damp for the time of year; the harvest is delayed in consequence. A *louis* is worth 750 francs.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, July 18, 1795.

The English will be obliged to re-embark in a few days. Pichegru is preparing to cross the Rhine. La Vendée, properly so called, is quiet; the Chouans begin only on the bank of the Loire. It is said that peace with Spain is at hand. The Dutch appear delighted with their revolution; it is not probable that the Stadtholder will return; his party is absolutely extinct.

hope. Italy continues to be enriched with the spoils and from the misfortunes of France. Galéazzini is, I believe, at Genoa. Give me quickly some news of yourself.

Luxury, pleasure, and the arts are reviving here in a wonderful manner. Yesterday they acted *Phèdre* at the Opera-house, for the benefit of a former actress; the crowd was immense from two o'clock in the afternoon, although the prices were trebled. Equipages and dandies are re-appearing, or rather they remember their period of eclipse only as a long dream. Libraries are formed, and we have lectures on history, chemistry, botany, astronomy, &c. We have heaped together here all that can make life amusing and agreeable; reflection is banished. How is it possible to see the dark side of things when the mind is constantly whirled about in this giddy vortex? Women go everywhere; to the theatres, to the public walks, to the public libraries. You find beauties in the philosopher's study. Here, more than in any other country, do women deserve to hold the helm. Indeed all the men are mad about them; they think only of them, and live only for and through them. A woman does not know her value, or the extent of her empire, till she has spent six months in Paris.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, July 19, 1795.

No letter from you yet, though it is more than a month since you left me. I have not heard either from Désirée since she has been in Genoa. We are tolerably peaceable here. There was a little disturbance at the theatre when the "*Réveil du Peuple*" and the "*Marseillaise*" were sung. It seems that our young people do not approve of this hymn. The proposed Constitution is becoming law every day. Instead of our representatives being named directly by the primary assemblies, as was the proposal of the Committee of Eleven, there are to be electoral assemblies.

You will make use, I suppose, of your visit to Genoa to send home our plate and valuables.

Louis has been five or six days at Châlons-sur-Marne; he will make himself a man there. He is well inclined; he is learning mathematics, fortification, and fencing.

I am waiting to hear from you before I decide on buying an estate; nothing tolerable is to be had for less than 800,000 or 900,000 francs.

Junot's servant, Richard, who went in charge of my horses, has been taken prisoner by the Chouans, 12 miles from Nantes. Horses here are above all price; the one that I gave to you is worth five times what it cost me; take care of it.

Junot is here, leading the life of a jolly companion, and spending as much as he can of his father's money. Marmont, who came with me from Marseilles, is at the siege of Mayence. It seems that the army of Italy has been beaten; that we have evacuated Vado and Loano.

I long to hear from you, and for tidings of all your circle. Love to your wife, whom I desire earnestly to meet in Paris, where life is much happier than at Genoa. This is the place where an honest and prudent man, who cares only for his friends, may live just as he likes, in perfect freedom.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, July 25, 1795.

I am appointed General in the Army of the West; but my illness keeps me here. I expect more detailed accounts from you. I suppose that you purposely avoid telling me anything of Désireé; I do not know whether she is still alive.

All goes on well here. In the South alone there has been a little disturbance, got up by the young people; it is mere childish folly.

On the 15th the Committee of Public Safety is to be partially renewed; I hope that they will choose good people. Reinforcements are being sent to the Army of Italy; would you like me to go there?

Your letters are very dry; you are so prudent and laconic that you tell me nothing. When will you return? I do not

think that your affairs need keep you away beyond the month of Thermidor.

It is not certain that Lanjuinais' motion will pass; it is possible that no change may be made with respect to the retrospective effect. It would be committing the same fault in principle. I sent to you, at the time, Lanjuinais' report.* Good bye, my dear friend; health, gaiety, happiness, and pleasure to you. I have sent to you letters from Mariette, Fréron, and Barras, introducing you to the chargé-d'affaires of the Republic. Permont is here; he begs to be remembered to you, and so do Muiron and Casabianca.

[10.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, July 28, 1795.

Thirteen thousand emigrants, having landed on the peninsula of Quiberon, near Lorient, raised batteries to defend the isthmus. The English ships, and the fort of Penthièvre, which they held, helped to protect them; they considered themselves in safety. Hoche blockaded them on the main land. The emigrants made a sortie on the 29th, and were beaten. On the 2nd of Thermidor, the columns of the Army of the North having arrived in the night, we passed the isthmus, drove in the advanced posts, carried the batteries, and killed a great many of these poor creatures; 10,000 were made prisoners, and we seized 60,000 muskets, 40,000 coats, corn, salted meats, and more than 160,000 pairs of shoes. Such has been the result of this celebrated invasion; one cannot help wondering at Pitt's folly in sending 12,000 men to attack France. Among the prisoners are the Bishop of Dôle and his clergy.

All goes well. This affair has somewhat distressed the little

* The motion and the report of Lanjuinais were in favour of the repeal of the law of the 17th Nivôse, which applied the rule of equal partition to all successions which had occurred since the 14th July, 1789, without regard to any intermediate acts or settlements. Lanjuinais denounced the injustice of this retrospective legislation. His report, here alluded to, is to be found in the 'Moniteur' of the 7th August, 1795.—TR.

Coblentz party; they went about yesterday in low spirits, and seemed to think that the conquerors of Europe were possessed of some courage. In other respects we are very quiet.

[11.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, July 30, 1795.

You will receive with this letter the passport you asked for. To-morrow you will have a letter from the Committee of Foreign Affairs to our minister at Genoa; he is asked to give you all the help that you may want.

You ought to have received a letter from Fréron, introducing you to Villard.

Lucien has managed to get himself arrested; a courier who starts to-morrow carries an order from the Committee of Public Safety to set him at liberty.

I will do all that you wish; have patience, and give me time.

The peace with Spain renders the invasion of Piedmont inevitable. The plan which I proposed is being discussed; it will certainly be adopted. If I go to Nice, we shall meet, and Désirée likewise. I am only waiting for your answer before I buy you an estate.

I shall write to Madame Isoard to desire her to give Lucien some money; I will find a place for him in Paris before I go.

I suppose that when you wish to return you will let me know. You will probably be made a consul in Italy.

All is quiet here. The peace with Spain and Naples, of which we heard yesterday, has enchanted us. The funds are rising, and assignats increasing in value.

We have not yet had any hot weather here, but the harvest is as good as possible; all goes well. This great nation gives itself up to pleasure: balls, theatres, women (and ours are the finest in the world), are the great business of life. Ease, luxury, fashion, have all re-appeared; the reign of Terror is remembered only as a dream.

The news of the splendid victory of Quiberon, and the peace with Spain, have changed in an instant the state of our affairs.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Aug. 1, 1795.

Louis is at Châlons, where he is hard at work. I am well pleased with him.

To-morrow four members of the Committee of Public Safety are to be renewed. I will send you their names.

Peace is concluded with Spain, Naples, and Parma; 40,000 men of the army of the Pyrenees are marching towards Nice. My plans of attack are adopted. We shall soon have some very serious work in Lombardy. The King of Sardinia will no doubt wish to make peace; it will depend upon us whether we make it with the Emperor, but we shall exact and obtain very advantageous terms.

The new constitution in general gives great satisfaction; it promises happiness, tranquillity, and a long future to France. The peace with Spain has raised considerably the value of assignats. There is no doubt that by degrees all will be re-established; in this country a very few years will effect it. Your friend Jams* has called on me; he is in Paris.

Sallicetti is still supposed to be in Switzerland, and it is said that he has publicly declared that, even if he were to be recalled by a decree, he would not return. I do not know if this be true.

I have had no letter from you since No. 4, dated the 25th of Messidor. I have not yet received No. 2. The English may have intercepted it. Write to me oftener. You never tell me anything of Mademoiselle Eugénie, nor of the children whom you ought to be expecting. You are strangely forgetful of your duty in that respect. Pray let us have a little nephew; you must make a beginning. Julie would make an excellent mother. You would deprive her of the greatest happiness in life—nursing and bringing up one's children. What are you doing at Genoa? What is said there? How are you amusing yourself? I should think that it must be a very different place from this,

* Afterwards steward of King Joseph.

which is the centre of science, pleasure, art, and civil liberty. A new play was acted to-day, called Fabius. I will send it to you when it is printed.

The [Corsican] refugees who have enough to live upon are wrong to go back. It is probable that Corsica will soon belong to us; they may return then more honourably. I am not speaking of those who have not enough to live upon. Everything is horribly dear here, but this state of things will not last. I should like to send for Jerome; it would cost only 1200 francs a-year.

Adieu, my dear friend: I wish you happiness, freedom from care, courage, and friendship. My compliments to Julie, and say something to the silent lady.*

Napoleon to Joseph.

Paris, Aug. 9, 1795.

I saw yesterday Madame de Sémonville; she is expecting her husband, who is to be exchanged for the little Capet.† She is just the same as ever, and so are her two daughters. They are very plain, but the younger is clever.

I have received a letter from Désirée, which seems to be very old. You never told me of it.

I continue to be in the same state. It is not impossible that I may return, as formerly, to Nice.

To-day is to be the purification of the Assembly. It will end in the arrest of eight or ten members.

Everything here appears to be going on pretty well. We are expecting the Government to be formed in two months. Barthélémy, Sémonville, Truguet, and Pichegru are spoken of; but this is mere report. I sometimes see Truguet.

Some one—I cannot remember who—told me that you were amusing yourself extremely. I congratulate you. I was not aware that Genoa was so gay.

* Mdlle. Eugénie Désirée Clary.

We get on very well here, and are very happy. It appears as if every one wanted to make up for past sufferings, and the uncertainty of the future prompts people to enjoy unsparingly the present.

Mariette is interested for Lucien, and takes great interest in me.

If you want introductions for Tuscany, I will send you some from Carletti, the Grand Duke's minister.

Would it be possible to get anything out of the lawsuit which we had in Tuscany? You ought to find out all about it: I will send you the best introductions. Ask me quickly for what you want. Your friend Jams dined with me yesterday.

Good bye, my dear friend; be cautious as to the future and satisfied with the present; be gay, learn to amuse yourself. As for me, I am happy. I only want to find myself on the battle-field; a soldier must either win laurels or perish gloriously.

Chauvet is here.

[14.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Aug. 12, 1795.

The 10th of August was celebrated yesterday with great pomp; more than 400,000 people were present; there was some cheering.

The Convention has been purified: 6 or 7 members have been arrested; none of your friends are among them.

All is perfectly tranquil here; the constitution makes progress, and is the principal foundation of our hopes.

Sémonville is coming back, he will be exchanged; I dined two days ago with his wife. Every one thinks that his own friends will be members of the Directory. It is possible that Servan, the ex-Minister of War, may be one.

The peace with Spain is the forerunner of a general peace with Europe, and especially with Italy.

La Vendée is still disturbed. These gentlemen seized Richard and my horses.

The events in Ajaccio are strange; it seems that they are always tearing each other to pieces in that unhappy country. What will be the end of Paoli?

What has become of Permont's companion? I saw Permont yesterday, with his daughter, the young lady of the little flaxen wig; she talked much of you.

It seems that there have really been riots in London, and that there exists there an element of ferment which may lead them a great way.

Let me often hear from you; you contrive never to tell me anything; you keep me so ill-informed, that I know not whether to decide upon going to the South or to the North; is it a want of tact or of interest on your part? Yet it is impossible for me to doubt either your intelligence or your affection.

Riter still has some influence here; he is an excellent man. This town is always the same, always in the pursuit of pleasure, devoted to women, to the theatres, balls, the public walks, and the artists' studios.

Fesch seems to wish to return to Corsica after the peace; he is always the same, living in the future, sending me letters of six pages about some subtilty no broader than a needle's point; the present is no more to him than the past, the future is everything. As for me, little attached to life, contemplating it without much solicitude, constantly in the state of mind in which one is on the day before a battle, feeling that, while death is always amongst us to put an end to all, anxiety is folly—everything joins to make me defy fortune and fate: in time I shall not get out of the way when a carriage comes. I sometimes wonder at my own state of mind. It is the result of what I have seen and what I have risked.

Good bye, my dear Joseph.

P.S. On second thoughts, I shall not draw the bill of exchange: I made the same remark on the subject that you did.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Aug. 14, 1795.

Riter goes as the representative to the armies of the Alps and of Italy.

The purification of the Assembly is finished; we expect news of the army. It ought to have crossed the Rhine.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Aug. 20, 1795.

I am attached for the present to the topographical board of the Committee of Public Safety for the direction of the armies; I replace Carnot. If I ask for it, I can be sent to Turkey as general of artillery, commissioned by the Government to organise the Grand Seignior's artillery, with a good salary and a very flattering diplomatic title. I would have you appointed consul, and Villeneuve* accompany me as engineer; you say that M. Danthoine† is there already; therefore, before a month is over I should arrive in Genoa; we should go together to Leghorn, where we should embark; considering all this, will you purchase an estate?

We are quiet here, but perhaps storms may be brewing; the primary assemblies will meet in a few days. I shall take with me 5 or 6 officers; I will write to you more in detail to-morrow.

Vado will soon be retaken.

The resolutions of the Committee of Public Safety appointing me director of the armies, and of the plans of the campaign, have been so flattering to me, that I fear that they will not let me go to Turkey; we shall see. I am to look at a villa to-day. I embrace you. Continue to write to me as if I were going to Turkey.

* M. Villeneuve was Postmaster-General under the Empire, and brother-in-law to King Joseph, having married one of the demoiselles Clary.

† Another brother-in-law of King Joseph's, father of the Duchesses of

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Aug. 25, 1795.

I hope that, when peace is made with Naples, you will have a consulship there.

We are very quiet here; the Convention is to be renewed by one-third. I am overwhelmed with business from 1 o'clock in the afternoon. At 5 o'clock I go to the committee, and work from 11 in the evening till 3 o'clock the next morning.

The law of the 17th Nivôse was discussed yesterday, and disposed of after long debate.* On the 20th the primary assemblies will meet; they will proceed to elect a third part of the legislature, after which the executive power will be appointed: we shall then be governed under the new constitution.

There is no news; our armies are separated by the Rhine; Mayence is not besieged; La Vendée continues in the same state; our troops of the armies of the Pyrenees are to join the armies of Italy and of La Vendée.

[18.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Aug. 29, 1795.

Our affair with Milleli cannot be disposed of without the evidences. The army of the interior has accepted the constitution; several of the Sections of Paris have required the troops to be sent away, and the repeal of the decree which limits the renewal of the Convention to one-third; they have been ill received. In other respects all is quiet here; the mass of the Parisian people is good; some of the young people would like to carry further the reaction, but they are not dangerous.

Good bye! health, gaiety, and happiness! I have heard nothing of what you tell me from Marseilles.

* See the letter of the 25th July, 1795.—TR.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Aug. 30, 1795.

I do not know what is become of Antoine Rossi; I am told that he is living near Avallon, in Burgundy.

We are negotiating with the Empire; La Vendée is still in force; it is said that the English contemplate another landing. I should like to have my portfolio with all my papers. Let me know the political state of Corsica.

[20.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 1, 1795.

You wished to have letters of introduction to Villard from his father: I send them to you.

Chiapé* is to join the army of the Alps; Riter and Mayre remain with the army of Italy.

There is here, as there is everywhere else, some excitement on account of the renewal of the Convention; the Royalists are agitating: we shall see what will happen.

The estate which I wish to buy for you is to be sold to-morrow. Scherer is to join the army of Italy, Kellermann the army of the Alps, and Canclaux the army on the shores of the Mediterranean. We are forming a camp to watch the movements of the malcontents in the south. Hoche is to go to La Vendée, Moncey towards Brest.

I remain with the Committee of Public Safety; I am waiting for your letters before I decide.

[21.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 3, 1795.

The estate, nine leagues from Paris, which I thought of buying for you, was sold yesterday. I had made up my mind to give

* Afterwards Director-General of the Telegraph.

1,500,000 francs for it, but, strange to say, it went for 3,000,000.* We are becoming quiet here; there will not be any disturbance; the constitution will make the people happy.

[22.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 5, 1795.

The Committee have decided that it is impossible for me to leave France during the war. I am to be re-appointed to the artillery, and I shall probably continue to attend the Committee. The elections and the primary assemblies take place on the day after to-morrow: the peace with Hesse Cassel is concluded.

National property and emigrants' estates are not dear, but those belonging to individuals go for extravagant prices.

If I stay here it is possible that I may be fool enough to marry; I wish for a few words from you on the subject. Perhaps it would be well to speak to Eugénie's brother. Let me know the result, and all shall be settled.

Chauvet, who is going to Nice in ten days, will take you the books which you asked for.

The celebrated Bishop of Autun† and General Montesquiou are allowed to return; they are struck out of the list of emigrants.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 6, 1795.

The consulship of Chios is vacant, but you tell me that you would not like to live in an island: I hope for something better for you in Italy.

It was decided yesterday that all those who were engaged in the defence of Toulon, or who have held office under the king, are to be considered as emigrants. Fréron and Tallien spoke with great power. The primary assemblies meet to-day; there are many placards on each side; we hope that they will be printed. There is no fear for the Constitution, it will be ac-

* In assignats.—TR.

† Talleyrand.

cepted unanimously: the only cause of alarm is the Decree retaining two-thirds of the Convention.

I shall remain in Paris, chiefly on your business.

Whatever happens, you need fear nothing for me; all honest people are my friends, to whatever party or opinion they may belong. Mariette is extremely zealous in my service: you know his opinions. I am very intimate with Dulcette;* you know my other friends of the opposite party.

Continue to write to me fully; tell me your plans; manage my business so that my absence may not interfere with my wishes.

I am writing to your wife. I am pleased with Louis; he answers my expectations; he is good, and of my own making: ardour, talent, health, ability, punctuality, and kindness—he has everything.

You know well that I live only to give pleasure to my friends. If my wishes are seconded by the good fortune which as yet has never failed me, I shall be able to make you happy and to fulfil all your wishes.

What you tell me of Felicino † is very gratifying; let him go to Corsica and bring back his money. I will find him a pretty place near Paris, where he may live happily with his wife.

I feel much the loss of Louis; he was of great use to me: there is no man more active, clever, and insinuating. He could do in Paris whatever he liked. If he had been here the affair of the nursery garden and that of Milleli would have been concluded. Since I lost Louis I have been able to attend only to important affairs. Write to him and tell him that you are waiting for him to send to you his first drawing, that you may judge of his progress, and that you have no doubt that he will keep his promise to write as well as Junot does before the end of the month.

I shall have three horses to-morrow, which will enable me to drive about a little, and to get through all my business.

Adieu, dear Joseph; amuse yourself; all goes on well; be gay; think of my affairs, for I am fool enough to wish to keep house.

* I suspect a misprint, never having heard of Dulcette.—TR.

† Friend of the Bonaparte family.

As you are not here, and you are determined to remain abroad, the affair with Eugénie must either be concluded or broken off.

I wait impatiently for your answer. You can stay as long as you like at Genoa; your motive is clear; it is to get from Corsica the little property that remains to us. Remember me to Felicino.

] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 8, 1795.

I wrote yesterday to your wife, my dear Joseph; she must have received my letter. The primary assemblies will meet in three days. The army of Sambre and Meuse and that of the North have accepted the Constitution; several communes round Paris have likewise accepted it. Some of the sections in Paris are disturbed by the spirit of insurrection; it is the work of some aristocrats, who wish to profit by the exhaustion of the patriots, drive them away, and raise the banner of counter-revolution. But the real patriots, the whole Convention, and the armies are here to defend our country and our liberty. Nothing will come of it.

I send a newspaper with some Toulon news. All is well and quiet here. The partial excitement is not much attended to.

I see nothing in the future but what is agreeable. Were it otherwise, one must live in the present. A brave man despises the future.

[25.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 11, 1795.

You will receive with this a letter from General Rossi. He has retired to Le Morvan in Burgundy, and waits there till the peace takes him back to Corsica.

The primary assemblies of Paris have rejected the decree which allows the electors to name only one-third of the Legislature. They have accepted the Constitution. The Section des

Quinze-Vingts, a part of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, accepts the decree and supports the Convention. The armies, the city of Rouen, and more than a thousand communes, have done the same. We expect to hear to-day what has been done in the rest of France. There has been some ferment in the sections of Paris, but they have failed in striking their blow.

The army of the Sambre-et-Meuse has crossed the Rhine and occupied the duchy of Berg and the town and citadel of Düsseldorf. This operation, planned two months ago, is one of our most brilliant successes. It will have an immediate influence on the peace with the German Circles.

You cannot come, I suppose, until the passage is free from Genoa to Marseilles. By that time the new government will be acting.

Volney started for America a month ago. Gentilli is here, and asks for a retiring pension. Sebastiani, who has a troop of dragoons, goes soon to join his regiment, forming part of the army of Italy. We are impatient for news from that army. A speedy opening of the coasting-trade with Genoa is important to our commerce and to our supplies. Adieu.

[26.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 15, 1795.

The majority of the republic has already accepted the Constitution and the Decree. Some sections in Paris are still agitated, but the country will be saved. We have a large army in La Vendée.

I have just read, in a printed report from Cambon on the affairs of the South, this passage:—"In this imminent danger the brave and virtuous General Bonaparte put himself at the head of 50 grenadiers and opened a passage for us."

It is probable that in a month's time the government will be appointed; we shall then be more tranquil. If peace is made this country will be more prosperous than ever: the public mind is in a state of activity and excitement which will be favourable to commerce.

I have your letter of the 12th. There is no news. Lyons, Bordeaux, and the majority of the republic have accepted. Before a month is over the Constitution will be put in force. We do not know yet whether Marseilles has accepted; we shall hear to-day.

[27.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 18, 1795.

As I think that false reports as to what passes here must be spread, I write every day..

The Constitution is accepted by all the world; the Decree of the 5th, for the retention of two-thirds of the members of the Convention, is accepted by the majority of the primary assemblies of the Republic.

Of the 48 sections of Paris, only that of the Quinze-vingts has accepted the decree; the armies accept everything, both the Constitution and the decree. All goes on well therefore, and this crisis, which might have been fatal to liberty, secures the Republic for a long time; we have not had a single disturbance here.

The passage by our troops of the Rhine will hasten peace with the German Circles. We are impatiently expecting the army of Italy to regain its superiority.

The Government will be appointed immediately. The destinies of France appear to be serene; one of the primary assemblies amused us by asking for a king.

[28.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Sept. 22, 1795.

I have just received your letter of the 19th Fructidor [4th September], with an enclosure for Muiron.* We are expecting

* He was killed at the bridge of Arcole, when aide-de-camp to Napoleon, who wrote the following letter to his widow:—

"Muiron was killed by my side on the field of Arcole; you have lost a

the conclusion of the affairs of Corsica with some anxiety; here all is quiet.

There is a majority in France for retaining two-thirds of the Convention; if there be no collision, the Constitution will be in force before a month is over.

The army of the Rhine continues to advance; it will soon cause peace to be made with the German Circles. We are expecting before long satisfactory accounts from the army of Italy.

La Vendée continues in the same state; the Republic is in great need of peace.

It was said yesterday that there was some disturbance at Marseilles; the law respecting emigrants cannot have been popular there.

[29.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Sept. 26, 1795.

Your letter of the 24th Fructidor [10 September] is just come.

My mission is talked of more than ever; it would have been settled by this time if there were not so much excitement here; but there is now some disturbance, and embers which may burst into flames; it will be over in a few days.

I have received M. de Villeneuve's papers; he cannot hope to be more than a captain; it is only through great interest that I shall be able to get him attached to my mission in this capacity; but his chief object must be to serve and to be of use.

You ought to have received ten days ago a letter from Rossi for his mother. Lucien is on his way hither; if I am still here I will try to be of use to him.

There is a great deal of excitement here. The moment appears to be critical; but the genius of liberty never forsakes its defenders. All our armies are successful.

husband whom you loved; I have lost a friend to whom I had been long attached; but the country sustains a greater loss than either of us, in losing an officer distinguished as much for his ability as for his rare bravery. If I can be of any use to you or to your child, pray depend entirely upon me."—ED.

The Committee for Maritime Affairs have ordered their agent to pay the consul his salary and to assign him a residence.

[30.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, night of the 13-14 Vendémiaire, 2 in the morning [Oct. 6], 1795.

At last all is over. My first impulse is to think of you, and to tell you my news. The royalists, organised in their sections, became every day more insolent. The Convention ordered the section Lepelletier to be disarmed. It repulsed the troops. Menou, who was in command, is said to have betrayed us. He was instantly superseded. The Convention appointed Barras to command the military force; the committees appointed me second in command. We made our dispositions; the enemy marched to attack us in the Tuileries. We killed many of them; they killed 30 of our men, and wounded 60. We have disarmed the sections, and all is quiet. As usual, I was not wounded.

P.S. Fortune favours me. My respects to Eugénie and to Julie.

[31.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Oct. 9, 1795.

The newspapers will have told you all that concerns me. I have been appointed by a decree second in command of the army of the Interior; Barras is appointed Commander-in-chief. We have conquered, and all is forgotten.

I have appointed Chauvet Commissary-General. Lucien is to accompany Fréron, who starts this evening for Marseilles.

The letters of introduction for the Spanish embassy shall be sent off to-morrow.

When the storm is over I shall have Villeneuve appointed chef de bataillon of engineers.

Ramolino * is appointed inspector of waggons. I cannot do

* Related to Bonaparte's mother.

more than I am doing for you all. Adieu, dear Joseph ; I will neglect nothing that may be of use to you or contribute to your happiness.

[32.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Oct. 18, 1795.

I have just received your letter of the 10th Vendémiaire [2nd October]. I will take an opinion upon your business and on your wife's interests.

I am general of division in the artillery, and second in command in the army of the Interior. Barras is Commander-in-chief.

All is quiet here. We are waiting for the Government to be formed and the Convention renewed. Several departments have elected Barras, Chénier, and Sièyes.

Assignats continue to fall in value. It is hoped that when the Government is formed something will be done. I think that it is unwise to keep much in them.

I am extremely busy. Fréron, who is at Marseilles, will help Lucien. Louis is at Châlons. Madame Permont has lost her husband.

One Billon, who I am told is an acquaintance of yours, has proposed for Paulette.* He has nothing. I have written to tell mamma that it is not to be thought of. I will learn more about him to-day.

[33.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Oct. 20, 1795.

I have given your letter and your case to two different lawyers. I will send you their answers.

All goes on well. I am very busy, which prevents my writing to you more in detail. I am longing for Fesch. Boisnot† is here, and employed. Junot begs to be remembered to you.

* Pauline Bonaparte, soon after married to General Leclerc.—ED.

† Boisnot, a devoted friend of the Bonaparte family, was sent to Elba in 1814 by Joseph, to warn Napoleon against certain emissaries from Paris. —ED.

[34.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Nov. 1, 1795.

It is already more than a week since I was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior.

The Committee of the Cinq Cents and that of the Anciens have met; the former has already made out its list for the directors. It is supposed that the names will be Sièyes, Rewbell, Barras, Letourneur de la Manche, Cambacérès, and Larevellière-Lépeaux. One of these six must of course be left out.

My health is good, although I am very busy.

[35.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Nov. 9, 1795.

My intervals of leisure are so short that I can write to you only a line, but Fesch, whom I have desired to write to you, is to give you all the information that may interest you.

Lucien is appointed Commissary of the Army of the Rhine. Louis is with me; he is writing to you I believe.

Good bye, dear Joseph; give my love to your wife and Désirée.

[36.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Nov. 17, 1795.

I hear from you very rarely; you must not, however, be severe with me; you know that my duties and the constant excitement in which I live prevent my writing to you regularly; but Fesch ought to do so every day.

Our family is in want of nothing. I have sent them money, assignats, &c. I received 400,000 francs for you only a few days ago. Fesch, to whom I paid the money, will account for it to you. Ornano will come hither. I shall perhaps be able to send for our family. Give me more detailed accounts of yourself,

want I feel is of your society. If your wife were not expecting her confinement, I would try to persuade you to pay Paris a visit shortly.

Songis is my aide-de-camp and chef de brigade; Junot chef de bataillon; Louis, and five others with whom you are not acquainted, are aides-de-camp capitaines.

[37.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Dec. 31, 1795.

I have received, dear Joseph, the letter in which you complain of my silence; I have, however, written to you. You need not be uneasy about our family; they are well provided with everything. Jerome arrived yesterday with General Augereau. I am going to send him to a school where he will do well.

I have sent to you a passport for Blaccini. In a few days you shall have letters of marque. You will soon be a consul. Don't be uneasy. If you are tired of Genoa, I see no objection to your coming to Paris. I can give you an apartment, a table, and a carriage.

Oson goes the day after to-morrow. He takes Genoa on his way, and carries some presents from me to your wife.

If you do not wish for a consulship, come hither. You shall choose your place. Adieu, my dear Joseph; you would do me wrong if you thought that I could be indifferent for one instant to anything that concerns you. Be cheerful, and, if you are tired, come to Paris and amuse yourself there till you find something to do that suits you.

[38.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 11, 1796.

I sent to you, my dear Joseph, the passport for Blaccini more than a fortnight ago. You must have received it with the

The multiplicity and the importance of my business prevent my writing to you frequently. I am happy and contented. I have sent to our family from 50,000 to 60,000 francs in money, assignats, and things. I continue satisfied with Louis. He is my aide-de-camp capitaine. Marmont and Junot are my two aides-de-camp chefs de bataillon. Jerome is at school learning Latin, mathematics, drawing, music, &c.

I see no objection to Paulette's marriage if *he* is rich.

Adieu. Nothing can diminish the interest which I take in all that may please you. Kind remembrances to Julie.

[39.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 7, 1796.

You will certainly have the first consulship that suits you. In the mean time keep house for yourself in Genoa. Salicetti, who is the Commissioner of the Government at the army, and Chauvet, who is Commissary-General, will employ you at Genoa, so as to render your residence there neither expensive nor useless.

Lucien starts to-morrow for the army of the North. He is made a Commissariat officer. Ramolino is here, in the Commissariat. Ornano is Lieutenant in the Legion of Police. Our family is provided for. I have sent to them everything that they can want. Fesch will be well placed here. Salicetti will be zealous in your service. He has been much pleased with me. I wish you to remain at Genoa, unless he employs you at Leghorn. All this is only provisional. You will soon be a consul. Nothing can exceed my anxiety to make you happy in all respects.

CHAPTER II.

BETWEEN the last letter of the previous chapter and the first of this chapter little more than three months elapsed. During this interval the engagement between Napoleon and Eugénie Désirée Clary must have been broken off. The merchant's daughter missed becoming Empress of the French to become Queen of Sweden. On the 9th of March Napoleon married Josephine. On the 27th of March he arrived at Nice, the head-quarters of the army of Italy. By the 29th of April, with 30,000 men, he had beaten the Piedmontese and Austrian armies, of 80,000 men, in four battles, and forced Piedmont to abandon the contest, and cede to him the great fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria, with their vast magazines. On the 9th of May he forced the bridge of Lodi; and on the 15th of May, the date of the first of the following letters, he entered Milan.

The following letters extend from the 15th of May, 1796, to the 25th of July, 1798. During the fourteen first months he was in Italy, engaged, until April, 1797, the date of the Preliminaries of Leoben, in the wonderful campaigns which drove the Austrians across the Alps, and virtually destroyed the independence of the Pope.

From that time until the 30th of October, Napoleon occupied with Josephine the beautiful villa of Passeriano, near Udine, employed in the overthrow of the Venetian republic, and in negotiating the treaty of Campo Formio—a time to which he

We have no letters between Napoleon's return to Paris, on the 5th of December, 1797, and his arrival at Toulon in the beginning of May, 1798, to take the command of the army of Egypt. A few letters, written during the voyage, and two from Egypt, fill the remainder of this chapter.

[40.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, May 14,* 1796.

All goes on well. Pray arrange Paulette's affairs. I do not intend Fréron to marry her. Tell her so, and let him know it too.

We are masters of all Lombardy.

Adieu, my dear Joseph; give me news of my wife. I hear that she is ill, which wrings my heart.

[41.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Verona, Aug. 26, 1796.

I have your letter of the 30th, without any details from Corsica. You will find with this letter my answer to one from the administrators of the Department du Liamone. Such being the law, the organization of the two departments must be retained.

We have made peace with Naples, and a treaty with Genoa, and we are going to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia.

Things are somewhat better on the Rhine. Moreau has gained a victory. Kleber replaces Beurnonville. All looks well.

I am anxious for regular news from Corsica, and to know the state of Ajaccio. My health is fair; nothing new in the army.

* This date is erroneous. Napoleon entered Milan the 26th Floreal, or the 15th of May.—Tr.

[42.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Dec. 10, 1796.

We have made peace with Parma. I expect every day to hear that you are the minister there. Come back as soon as you can. Mix yourself up little, or not at all, with Corsican politics. Arrange our domestic affairs. Let our house be in a habitable state, such as it was, adding to it the apartment of Ignazio, and do the little things that are necessary to improve the street.

I expect Fesch and Paulette at Milan in a fortnight. As you return by Milan, settle the San-Miniato * business. Miot goes to Turin; Cacault to Florence.

[43.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Passeriano, July 4, 1797.

With this letter, Citizen Ambassador,† you will find a copy of my note to the Pope's envoy at Milan.

I believe it to be very important to the welfare of France, and indeed of religion, that the Pope should give strict orders to our prelates to obey the laws of the Republic. As you have not received instructions on this subject from our Minister of Foreign Affairs, you can only follow up my note.

I beg you to interest yourself, unofficially, to obtain a cardinal's hat for the archbishop of Milan.

[44.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Passeriano, July 4, 1797.

With this letter, Citizen Ambassador, you will find a letter written to me formerly by citizen Monge. It is essential to the

* A property near Florence, on which the Bonaparte family had some claims.—ED.

† Joseph was now the French ambassador in Rome.—TR.

dignity of the French Republic and to humanity that you should make the Court of Rome feel the necessity of not sacrificing men so esteemed as those who are mentioned in this letter.

I believe it to be indispensable that, while you endeavour to maintain a good understanding between the French Republic and the Court of Rome, you should repress the madness with which many of the members of that court seem to wish to oppress those who have received our artists or assisted our ambassadors.

From the beginning of your mission assume a tone befitting the nation that you represent.

[45.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Passeriano, Sept. 2, 1797.

I request you, Citizen Ambassador, to make the Court of Rome explain itself, and recognise the Cisalpine Republic, as the King of Sardinia and the republics of Genoa and Venice have done.

[46.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Passeriano, Sept. 2, 1797.

You will find, Citizen Ambassador, with this letter a copy of the despatches of the Roman minister at Milan, intercepted by us. I request you to take the initiative, and to make known to his Holiness that I am dissatisfied with this minister, and that I wish the Court of Rome to remove him, and, if a minister is wanted there, to replace him; though I think that your presence in Rome makes the latter unnecessary. On that point, however, his Holiness must take his own course.

[47.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Passeriano, Sept. 29, 1797.

I have received, Citizen Ambassador, your letter of the

mediately to the Court of Rome, that, if General Provera * is not immediately sent away from Rome, the French Republic will consider his presence there as an act of hostility on the part of his Holiness. Explain how indecent it is, when the fate of Rome depended on us, when she owes her existence to our generosity, to see the Pope renewing his intrigues, and wearing colours that cannot be agreeable to us. You may say in your conversations with the Secretary of State, and even in your note, if necessary, "*The French Republic was generous at Tolento; she will not be so again under similar circumstances.*"

I am reinforcing the garrison of Ancona with a Polish battalion.

The squadron of Admiral Brueys answers for the conduct of the Neapolitan Court. You need feel no anxiety. If Naples attempts to interfere, I will immediately destroy her commerce by the squadron, and, as soon as circumstances permit me, I will send thither a column of troops by way of answer. I shall see M. de Gallo† in an hour. I shall take a tone which will deter these Neapolitan gentlemen from marching on Rome.

In short, while the present state of affairs in Rome continues, you must not suffer a general so well known as M. Provera to command in Rome. The Directory does not intend to allow the petty intrigues of the Italian princes to recommence. Knowing well the Italians, I attach the greatest importance to preventing the Roman troops from being under an Austrian general.

In your conversation with the Secretary of State you will say, "The French Republic, always well disposed to the Pope, is perhaps on the point of restoring Ancona to him. You are ruining your own affairs. You will be responsible. You will have revolts in Macerata and Urbino. You will ask assistance from France, and it will be refused." In fact, rather than give to the Court of Rome time to intrigue against us, I will make the beginning. Demand not only that M. Provera be deprived of the command, but require him to leave Rome in 24 hours. Show decision of character. The greatest firmness and the

* He had commanded in Italy against the French, and was at this time in the command of the Roman army.—ED.

† The Neapolitan ambassador.

plainest speaking are necessary with such people. Show your teeth, and they are afraid; use them with too much consideration, and they become insolent.

Say publicly in Rome that, as M. Provera has been twice my prisoner of war, he will soon be so a third time. If he attempts to visit you, do not receive him. I know well the Court of Rome. This matter alone, well managed, may ruin it.

The aide-de-camp who brings you this letter has orders to go on to Naples, and see citizen Canclaux. He will see with his own eyes whether the Neapolitan troops are moving. I cannot believe it, though I have perceived for some time a sort of coalition between the courts of Naples and Rome, and even Florence. It is the alliance of the rats against the cat.

You will find with this letter one which, if you think it expedient, my aide-de-camp will present to the Secretary of State, telling him, at the same time, in the tone which becomes the conquerors of Italy, that, if M. Provera has not left Rome in twenty-four hours, we shall be forced to pay them a visit.

Should the Pope die, you will do all that you possibly can to prevent his having a successor, and to bring on a revolution. The King of Naples will keep quiet. Should he move after the revolution has been made and the people has seized the power, you will declare to the King of Naples, if he passes his frontier, that the Roman people is under the protection of the French Republic. You will then proceed in person to the Neapolitan general, and say to him that the French Republic sees no objection to a negotiation as to the demands of the Court of Naples [on Rome], particularly as to those made by M. Balbo in Paris, and by M. de Gallo to me; but that he must not support them by arms, such conduct being regarded by the French Republic as an act of hostility to herself.

In all this matter you will put on a bold exterior, to deter the King of Naples from entering Rome, tempered by the kindest representations, in order to convince him that it is not his interest to do so. If, in spite of all your exertions, the King of Naples should enter Rome, which I do not expect, you will remain there, and affect to ignore altogether any authority which he may exercise there. You will protect the people of Rome,

and be their avowed advocate; your advocacy being such as may be worthy of the representative of the first nation of the world.

You must be aware that, under such circumstances, I shall take quickly the measures which may be necessary to enable you to support your declaration that you will oppose the invasion of Rome by the King of Naples.

If, on the Pope's death, there is no insurrection in Rome, and there are no means of preventing the election of a Pope, do not suffer Cardinal Albani to be named. You will not only use your right of pronouncing an exclusion, but you will alarm the Cardinals by threatening that I shall in that event march instantly on Rome. We do not oppose his being a pope, but we will not suffer the assassin of Basseville to be a sovereign. But if Spain also pronounces an exclusion against him, I do not see a possibility of his success.

[48.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Radstadt, Oct. 1, 1797.

I have ordered Haller to pay your current expenses. He says that he has given you 50,000 francs.

Nothing new in France. All is quiet here. This Congress goes on ill. The pretensions on each side are exaggerated.

Do not suffer Provera to be in Rome.

[49.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Passeriano, Oct. 16, 1797.

You will find with this letter, Citizen Ambassador, a copy of one which I have written to the Minister of the Cisalpine Republic. Pray communicate it to the best composers, and beg them in my name to try for the prize.

[Enclosure, same date.]

I request you, Citizen Minister, to make known to the composers in the Cisalpine Republic, and generally in Italy, that I

offer, by competition, for the best march, overture, &c., on the death of General Hoche, a medal worth 60 sequins. The pieces must be received by the 30th Brumaire [20th November]. You will have the kindness to name three artists or amateurs as adjudicators, and to charge yourself with the other details.

[50.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Passeriano, Oct. 30, 1797.

I have received, Citizen Ambassador, your note on General Provera. It was right in style and substance. I think it necessary that you should write officially and procure the liberation of all persons imprisoned for their opinions. Watch always the doings of the Neapolitans. I send French troops to Ancona and into Romagna.

[51. NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Nov. 8, 1797.

I have received your last letter, Citizen Ambassador. Our military chest is so poor that I cannot repay to you what you have spent for the army.

The department of finance must have remitted to you. Employ the money first in reimbursing yourself your advances for the army, and then ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs for your salary.

[52.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Nov. 11, 1797.

You ought not to hesitate, Citizen Ambassador, in accepting the Pope's proposition. Let him give the prisoners their liberty and property, and let them go. They lose nothing by living out of Rome.

[53.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Nov. 12, 1797.

General Duphot * will give you this letter. I recommend him to you as an excellent man. He will talk to you about the marriage which he wishes to make with your sister-in-law. It will, I think, be a good match for her. He is a distinguished officer.

[54.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Nov. 15, 1797.

I start to-morrow for Radstadt, to exchange ratifications, execute the treaty, and be present at the imperial congress.

Haller will pay the three or four months' salary due to you, and also that for the next three months.

My wife thinks of setting off in three or four days to visit Rome. If this should be talked about or be in any way objectionable, send a courier to Florence to stop her.

[55.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan (no date).

I inform you, Citizen Ambassador, that the definitive treaty of peace was signed on the night of the 26-27th. These are its principal conditions:—

France has Mayence, the frontier of the Rhine (except Cologne), Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Santa Maura, and the Venetian establishments in Albania below the Gulf.

The Cisalpine Republic has the frontier of the Adige, Mantua, Peschiera, and their citadels.

Genoa has the imperial fiefs.

The Emperor has Istria, Dalmatia, and the town of Venice.

You may publish the fact of peace, but conceal the conditions.

* Assassinated soon after by Joseph's side.

[56.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Dec. 14,* 1797.

I joined in your indignation, Citizen Ambassador, when you informed me of the arrival of General Provera.

You may declare positively to the Court of Rome that, if the Pope receives in his service any officer known to have been in the service of the Emperor, all good understanding ceases between France and Rome. We shall take it as a declaration of war.

You will let the Pope know, by a special note addressed to him personally, that, although we are at peace with the Emperor, the French Republic will not allow the Pope to receive among his troops any officer or agent belonging to the Emperor, of any denomination, except the usual diplomatic agents.

You will require the departure of M. Provera from the Roman territory within twenty-four hours; in default whereof you will declare that you quit Rome.

In your conversation with the Pope you will let him know that I have just sent 3000 more men to Ancona, who will not turn back until you send them word that M. Provera and all the other [Austrian] officers have quitted the territory of his Holiness.

You will make known to the Secretary of State that, if his Holiness attempt to execute any of the prisoners whom you have demanded, the French Republic will retaliate by arresting all the relations of Cardinal Rusca, and of the other cardinals who mislead the Roman Court.

Let the style of your notes be concise and firm. If necessary, leave Rome and go to Florence or to Ancona.

You will not fail to let both his Holiness and the Secretary of State understand that, as you cross the Roman frontier, you will declare the annexation of Ancona to the Cisalpine Republic. This, of course, is to be spoken, not to be written.

* This must be a misprint. Napoleon returned to Paris on the 5th of December, 1797.—TR.

[57.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Head-quarters, Toulon, May 4, 1798.

The courier who takes this letter will leave Paris on the 9th, in order to inform me who is the retiring director. Pray write by him, and send me the newspapers from the time of my departure.

I have desired all my couriers to call on you. Send them all to me at Toulon, particularly Moustache and Le Simple.

[58.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Head-quarters, on board l'Orient, Toulon Roads, May 19, 1798.

We are just setting sail. I shall not touch at Ajaccio. If Lucien is not elected deputy, he may come hither. He will always find here opportunities. A frigate sails in a fortnight.

I hope that you have bought Rise. I should like you to add to it one of the two estates near Roche, in Berry, which you proposed to me, and which I saw on my road, of the probable value of 300,000 or 400,000 francs. I should prefer that of M. de Montigny, which I looked at four years ago for you. Inquire if the title is safe, and write to Junot's father about one or the other. One of these, with Rise, will do.

[59.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Head-quarters, on board l'Orient, May 25, 1798.

We have joined the convoy from Genoa. We have had good and bad weather and calms. We are going on steadily for Elba.

This evening we pass Bastia. I was not sick on the open sea.

Pray tell me about my affairs. I sent to you instructions from Toulon. Your part of our arrangement goes on well.

[60.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Head-quarters, on board l'Orient, May 25, 1798.

The convoy from Civita Vecchia is joining us. That from Ajaccio joined us yesterday. We are in full sail for our destination. I am well. All goes on well here. I am anxious to hear that you have settled my little affairs about Risc and in Burgundy.

[61.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Head-quarters, Malta, May 29, 1798.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers is going to Paris. He was unwell. I use him to carry parcels and flags. I hear nothing from you about Risc or Burgundy. I write to my wife to come out to me. Be kind to her if she is near you. My health is good. Malta cost us a cannonade of two days: it is the strongest place in Europe. I leave Vaubois there. I did not touch Corsica. I have had no French news for a month.

We write by a ship of war.

[62.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Cairo (no date).

M. Calmebet has 100,000 francs in my name in the Mont de Piété. Tell him to re-invest the interest, and to spend as little as possible.

As for my own plans, I wait for news from Constantinople and from France. If the Congress of Radstadt does not end, if the Irish are beaten, we ought to make peace, and to use Egypt to obtain a brilliant and permanent one. Be kind to my wife; see her sometimes. I beg Louis to give her good advice. I have received from you only one letter by Le Simple. I hope that Désirée, if she marries Bernadotte, will be happy; she deserves it. A thousand kisses to your wife and to Lucien; I send to her a handsome shawl. She is an excellent woman; make her happy.

[63.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Cairo, July 25, 1798.

You will see in the newspapers the result of our battles and the conquest of Egypt, where we found resistance enough to add a leaf to the laurels of this army. Egypt is the richest country in the world for wheat, rice, pulse, and meal. Nothing can be more barbarous. There is no money, even to pay the troops. I may be in France in two months. I recommend my interests to you. I have much domestic distress. Your friendship is very dear to me. To become a misanthropist I have only to lose it, and find that you betray me. That every different feeling towards the same person should be united in one heart is very painful.*

Let me have on my arrival a villa near Paris or in Burgundy. I intend to shut myself up there for the winter. I am tired of human nature. I want solitude and isolation. Greatness fatigues me; feeling is dried up. At 29 glory has become flat. I have exhausted everything. I have no refuge but pure selfishness. I shall retain my house, and let no one else occupy it. I have not more than enough to live on. Adieu, my only friend. I have never been unjust to you, as you must admit, though I may have wished to be so. You understand me. Love to your wife and to Jérôme.

* The suspicions of Josephine's honour, hinted at in this remarkable letter, disturbed Napoleon during the whole of his Egyptian campaign. Bourrienne describes his distress and his plans of divorce six months afterwards, in consequence of some information from Junot.[1] And on his return to Paris on the 16th October, 1799, he refused to see his wife for three days, and consented to a reconciliation only in consequence of Bourrienne's representations that a conjugal quarrel might interfere with the ambitious plans which he was then meditating, and which he executed about three weeks later.—TR.[2]

[1] Bourrienne, tome ii. chap. xiv.

[2] Ibid., tome iii. chap. iv.

CHAPTER III.

The letters contained in this chapter belong to the period of the Consulate. The first of them was written about three months before the battle of Marengo.

[64.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

March 19, 1800.

M. de Staël is in the deepest poverty, and his wife gives dinners and balls. If you still visit her, would it not be well to persuade her to make her husband an allowance of from 1000 to 2000 francs a-month? Or have we already reached the time when not only decency, but duties even more sacred than those which unite parents and children, may be trampled under foot without the world's being scandalized? Let us give Madame de Staël the benefit of judging her morals as if she were a man; but would a man who had inherited M. Necker's fortune, and who had long enjoyed the privileges attached to a distinguished name, and who allowed his wife to remain in abject poverty whilst he lived in luxury,—would such a man be received in society?

[65.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Aosta, March 28, 1800.*

Pray give 30,000 francs to my wife. The principal obstacles are overcome; we have taken Ivrea and its citadel, in

* This date is erroneous. May ought to be substituted for March. Bonaparte left Paris on the 6th of May, 1800, and crossed the Great St. Bernard on the 20th. Ivrea was taken on the 22nd. The battle of Marengo was fought on the 14th of June.—Tr.

which we found 10 guns. We fall down upon them here like a thunderbolt; the enemy did not in the least expect us, and even now can hardly believe that we are here.

Very great events will soon take place, which will, I trust, have great results for the glory and the happiness of the Republic.

A thousand remembrances to Julie.

[66.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Dec. 2, 1800.

Lucien has reached Spain. Jérôme is on his way to Brest, on board the Admiral's ship, with Rear-Admiral Gantheaume. Louis has left Berlin for Dresden. He is to go to Denmark. It is proper that your official despatches should be addressed to the minister, and taken directly to him by the courier. That need not prevent your writing to me a short note whenever you think it worth while.*

I hear from Moreau that the Austrians have asked for two passports to send two couriers to Cobentzel; it is probable that by this time he has received two couriers from Vienna. I wait for news of them before I decide on setting out.† It would perhaps be useful to say, in the course of conversation, that, when once I shall have left Paris and commenced military operations, it is very probable that the project of indemnifying the House of Austria in Italy will be abandoned. You may add that as soon as I am in Italy the negotiations will naturally be on the spot where I am.

As for the English, they themselves have broken off everything. We can no longer admit them at Lunéville, particularly as we also have engagements to fulfil, and cannot treat until they have acknowledged the freedom of the seas.

Try to let this courier be back in Paris by the 16th. Austria

* Joseph was at Lunéville, negotiating with the Count de Cobentzel. The battle of Hohenlinden, which decided the war, was fought on the 3rd of December, 1800.—TR.

† To take himself the command in the field.—TR.

shall recollect my departure if it takes place. You must therefore send me word by your courier if all hope is lost, as I am inclined by Pitt's speech in the English parliament to believe.

[67.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 12, 1801.

I send to you, Citizen Minister, a copy of a letter from General Brune, which will be in the 'Moniteur' to-morrow.

It is probable that, if Mantua is not given up to the French army, General Brune will be in Venice in a few days, and the Austrians behind the Tagliamento. Make M. de Cobentzel understand that we shall then have to think for ourselves; he changes his mind every day; it is a contemptible mode of negotiating. If the Adige be the boundary, half of Verona will belong to the Cisalpine Republic, and the other half to Austria. The same thing with respect to Porto Legnano. Insert in one of the protocols a declaration by you that, if we enter Venice, nothing on this side of the Brenta will belong to the Emperor.*

[68.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 20, 1801.

By this time you must have received, Citizen Minister, the instructions sent from Paris on the 29th Nivôse [19th January]. A courier arrived yesterday from Russia, who had made the journey in fifteen days: he brought me an extremely friendly autograph letter from Paul I. This courier met, at ten leagues from St. Petersburgh, an officer, sent by M. Sprengthorten,† bearing a letter from me to the Emperor in nearly the same terms.

I expect a Russian plenipotentiary in four or five days.

The dispositions of Russia towards England are very hostile. You will easily understand that our interest is to be in no hurry,

* Vous n'aurez désormais à l'Empereur que la Brenta. I suspect this

for peace with the Emperor is of no importance compared with an alliance which would overpower England, and preserve Egypt to us.

The armistice with Austria in Italy is not yet concluded. You ought incessantly to complain of this. If Austria is sincere in her proposal to give up the whole right bank of the Adige, why does she not accept the armistice, of which the condition is her giving up merely the fortified places on that bank?

Tuscany should adopt as the first principle of her policy that the Emperor ought not to be allowed to pass the Adige. If, however, the course of events were such as to lead to the restoration of the Grand Duke, we certainly could not consent to it as long as we are at war with England, for as long as that war lasts we must always distrust Austria, we must always keep a large army in Italy, and, in order to exclude, as we must, the English from Leghorn and the coast of Tuscany, we must retain possession of the country.

You ought never to speak of Naples or of the Pope. Whenever they are mentioned, you should say, "Have you any powers from those princes?" "France will negotiate with them directly."

Whenever the King of Sardinia is spoken of, you should say only that, if we removed him for having fought for the Emperor, the Emperor ought to have restored him; that, at all events, we shall come to an understanding with him, and so arrange matters in Italy as to prevent his alarming his neighbours, and to make the general tranquillity rest on a secure foundation. With respect to the stipulations which M. de Cobentzel may wish to make respecting the Empire, you must promise nothing in our name. Our conduct will depend on circumstances, and on the individuals in power at Vienna; say that we have no confidence in Thugut, and that we can enter into no engagement with the Emperor as long as the council is influenced by that minister.

Besides it is difficult to negotiate respecting Germany without the co-operation of Paul I.

To resume.

1. Keep open the protocol, discuss all the questions tho-

roughly, even the terms of the definitive treaty; but sign nothing for ten days, when we shall have settled with Paul I.

2. In the interval, try to persuade them to find a place for the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Germany.

3. Do not mention the King of Naples, the Pope, or the King of Sardinia. If the Austrian plenipotentiary gave up Tuscany, it might be stipulated that an Infant of Spain should be placed on that throne; in which case France and Spain would jointly engage to obtain for the Grand Duke a proportionate indemnity in Germany.

4. Say nothing about the Cisalpine Republic but that a form of government shall be established there which will not cause any alarm to the neighbouring states.

5. Make no engagements for us as to Germany, except with respect to the Grand Duke of Tuscany; say that the other matters shall be settled when peace is concluded with the Empire.

6. Make no mention in the treaty of the details of its execution. Leave them to be the subject of a separate convention.

7. Do not let us agree to evacuate the countries beyond the Inn and the Adige a moment before it is necessary, and insist on the payment of the contributions which have been imposed.

8. As for the evacuation of the right bank of the Rhine, it cannot take place till peace with the Empire is made.

9. With regard to Switzerland, her independence and neutrality may be stipulated. You ought to send two couriers every day. The affairs of Europe are in a crisis; the old system is changed, and the new one not yet settled.

[69.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 13, 1801.

Citizen Minister,—This morning the treaty of Lunéville was published. It has perfectly fulfilled the expectations of the Government.

Citizen Talleyrand writes to authorise your return to Paris. I shall not write to M. de Cobentzel. I can treat him only as an

duct was unworthy of his character. He will, however, be well received here, and there is no objection to his coming. In this case it would be unwise, and it would appear improper, if you were as intimate with him as you were at his first visit. We did as much for him on that occasion as we are doing at present for M. Katilschen,* because we thought that he came to remove every obstacle, and to make peace, instead of endeavouring as he did to gain time, and making use of the extraordinary confidence which I placed in him to advance the success of M. Thugut's system. You may, however, tell him that if he had not had the good sense to remain at Lunéville we should have imposed harder conditions upon Austria.

I have but one word more to say: *The nation is satisfied with the treaty, and I am extremely pleased with it.*

[70.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, April 11, 1801.

The Emperor of Russia died on the night of the 24th of March, of a stroke of apoplexy. I am so deeply afflicted by the death of a prince whom I highly esteemed, that I can enter into no more details. He is succeeded by his eldest son, who has received the oaths of the army and of the capital.

[71.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

July 19, 1801.

It seems to me necessary that you should come to an understanding with Cardinal Gonsalvi respecting the bishops who have sworn to the Constitution. He appears to think that the Concordat does not oblige the Pope to address to them a brief commanding them to resign their sees,† and he requires them

* The Russian Envoy.—TR.

† Joseph was now charged with the negotiation of the Concordat with Rome. Napoleon, for the purpose of introducing a new hierarchy, proposed that *all* the bishops should resign, and that a proportion of them

to retract before they can receive dioceses. This would dishonour them, and would compromise the temporal power which, from the time of the Constituent Assembly, has supported this portion of the clergy.

This is important.

[72.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, July 19, 1801.

I desire you, citizen, to continue your conferences with Cardinal Gonsalvi and your other colleagues.

1. To come to an agreement respecting the constitutional bishops, and to render them as eligible as the bishops who have not sworn to the Constitution.

2. To determine the terms of the bull.

I should like the bull to be published in France as soon as possible, in order that I may immediately nominate the archbishops and bishops. I wish the bull to be published in Paris on the 15th of August. All my nominations will be made by that time, so that the new diocesans may enter upon their duties in the first days of Fructidor [end of August]. Make it felt that I attach great importance to this business being settled by the month of Frimaire [November-December], when the legislative body is to meet, and the debates will begin.

It would be as well to put all these matters into a protocol.

[73.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Dec. 29, 1801.

It is settled that Louis and Hortense are to be married on the 14th; they are to live in my house in the Rue de la Victoire. I shall probably set off for Lyons in the course of the next ten

days. The Minister for Foreign Affairs went on the 2nd, and the Minister of the Interior will go on the 11th.*

Four hundred and fifty deputies from the Cisalpine Republic reached Lyons a fortnight ago, and by this time they must have met in council.

I hope that before I go you will let me hear three or four times from Amiens, and tell me for certain the day on which the definitive treaty is to be signed. It appears to me that there is no longer any serious obstacle.

[74.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 6, 1802.

I am to set off to-morrow at midnight for Lyons. I shall stay there only eleven or twelve days.

I believe that General Bernadotte has gone to Amiens. Whether he be there or not, I wish him to let you know if he would like to go to Guadaloupe as Captain-General. The island is in a high state of prosperity and of cultivation; but Lacrosse made himself unpopular; and as he had only 500 whites in his service, he was driven out, and a mulatto has set himself at the head of the colony. The peace with England was not then expected. Three ships, four frigates, and 3000 good infantry, have been sent to disarm the blacks, and to maintain tranquillity. It is an agreeable and important mission in every respect. Some reputation is to be gained, and a great service done to the republic, by tranquillising for ever this colony. From thence he may perhaps go to take possession of Louisiana, and even of Martinique and of St. Lucia.

If this tempts Bernadotte's ambition, as it appears to do, you must immediately let me know; for the expedition will set off in the month of Pluviôse [January-February], and missions

* Joseph was at this time negotiating the Treaty of Amiens. The objects of Napoleon's visit to Lyons were to arrange the details of the Constitution of the Cisalpine Republic, and to be received as its President. —TR.

to the colonies are desired by the most distinguished generals. I shall wait for the courier's return before I appoint to this post.

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 1, 1802.

I have received your letter of the 12th Pluviôse. Matters appear to be advancing at Amiens. A week sooner or later will make no difference.

The affairs of the Cisalpine Republic appear to have given general satisfaction. I beg you to speak to Lord Cornwallis about the infamous pamphlet which I enclose. Impress upon him how little it suits the dignity of either country to allow such nonsense to be published in London by an emigrant, at a time when I am particularly anxious to put an end to all that can excite complaint from England.

Tell Lord Cornwallis that he ought not to trust to Mr. Jackson; he lives in bad society, and gets his information from swindlers, whose only object is money. What Lord Cornwallis has already heard from Mr. Jackson ought to be a sufficient proof of this.

Sebastiani has returned from Constantinople. The Grand Seignior has written to me a most satisfactory letter.

[76.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 7, 1802.

Your dispatch of the 16th Ventôse [6th March] has just arrived. I do not think that there is now much difference between the different proposals. The last wording of the English proposal respecting Malta is not far from ours. It is easy to find a middle course with regard to the matter of the prisoners. I do not see what there is to prevent the immediate conclusion of the treaty. If Lord Cornwallis means what he says, peace ought to be signed by noon on the 12th. If this is not done, it will be evident that some change has taken place in the plans of the British Cabinet, and this, in the present state of Europe, would

be madness. At any rate I expect my courier to return with accurate information by noon on the 19th instant. I have yielded to all the demands of England; if peace is not made immediately, I do not fear war. Express yourself strongly on this subject, and let me know by noon on the 19th what I am to expect; for as it seems that the English are arming at Plymouth, I must look to the safety of our fleet. As for the Turkish ambassador, it is impossible to discuss again a matter on which our decision has been often repeated. Our peace with Turkey shall not be made at Amiens, but this is no objection to the article which guarantees the integrity of the Ottoman empire.

[77.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 8, 1802.

I have received your letter of the 18th. I adopt, though against my will, this formula: "The Sublime Porte is invited to accede to this treaty." I do not, however, give up my intention of making a separate treaty with the Porte, for the present one does not settle all our differences. As I have not at this instant the draft before me, I do not know if it contain an article guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey. I think that such a clause must be inserted. For the rest, I give you all the latitude necessary to enable you to sign in the evening. When this courier arrives, you will be in conference. I do not think that he will be able to reach you before 9 o'clock.

I am of your opinion that it is extremely important not to lose another minute. Do all in your power, therefore, to finish and to sign.

You will let me know in your answer if the courier arrived before 9 o'clock, as I have promised him in that case 600 francs.

I expect my courier to-morrow before 12.

[78.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, March 10, 1802.

It is 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and the courier is not yet arrived whom you promised to despatch after your conference yesterday morning, and whom I expected at midnight. Yet Otto's despatches and all the letters from England confirm the report that she is making considerable armaments, and that squadron after squadron is being sent off. Lord Hawkesbury told Otto that Cornwallis had received his last instructions. The differences at Amiens were not worth making such a noise about. A letter from Amiens, I suppose by Mr. Merry, caused the alarm in London, by asserting that I did not wish for peace. Under these circumstances, delay will do real mischief, and may be of great consequence to our squadrons and our expeditions. Have the kindness, therefore, to send special couriers to inform me of what you are doing, and of what you hear; for it is clear to me that, if the peace is not already signed or agreed on, there is a change of plans in London.

However that may be, go on with your negotiation; be satisfied with inserting in the protocols, notes to show plainly that it is England that does not wish for peace, or delays it.

[79.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, March 11, 1802.

Your letter of the 10th March has reached me, and I see that, although you are agreed, you have not yet signed. This delay is really strange. Yet it is certain that Lord Cornwallis had received his final instructions, and had only to sign. Moustache, whom I am expecting this afternoon, will doubtless clear up some of this mystery.

I will not, on any pretext, have the name of Genoa substituted for that of Liguria. I would rather not have it mentioned. Neither will I evacuate Otranto before the English

could not have been done if they were to keep Malta for six or eight months; but now that all must be evacuated in the course of three months, it is useless to mention it.

[80.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 11, 1802.

Moustache has just arrived. I have already sent you word by the courier, who started three hours ago, that I attach no importance to the acknowledgment of Liguria. Nor is the secret article relating to Naples of any value, as it has no substantial object; for it would be impossible for me to evacuate Taranto with the artillery, &c., for the next three months, however much I might wish it. These articles are therefore quite useless.

I see, then, no obstacle to peace. You must only take care to word the article on prisoners so as not to excuse Portugal from what she is bound by the secret articles of her treaty to pay to us. This is for your private information, for you ought not to say a word about it, as England has never mentioned it.

You may tell Lord Cornwallis openly that the King of Prussia has recognised the Italian Republic, and has congratulated me, through his ambassador, on the result of the Congress of Lyons:

That on the evening of the 17th M. Cobentzel received a courier from Vienna; he came in person to notify to me that the Emperor was rejoiced to see the Italian Republic delivered from the horrors of anarchy, and was ready to receive the Italian ambassador whom I might think fit to send to him:

That all the sovereigns of Italy have recognised the Italian Republic:

Lastly, That the courier whom M. Markoff despatched to St. Petersburgh with news of the Congress of Lyons has returned, and that the Emperor Alexander is more inclined than ever to join with France in all the important affairs of Europe.

You will also make Lord Cornwallis aware that I am not duped by the hostile demonstrations in London; that they are not an European intrigue, but mere cabinet intrigues to procure a change of ministry; and that I shall pity England if such

miserable manœuvres should revive the war. Say also that I am perfectly convinced that, in the present state of Europe, England cannot with any reasonable hopes be the only power at war with us.

If you think that peace will be signed in twenty-four hours, keep Moustache, and send him on to London to announce it to Otto.

[81.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 11, 1802.

It is 9 o'clock; a telegraphic despatch from Brest, sent on the evening of the 21st, informs me that our squadron reached the Cape * on the 5th of February; that our troops had disembarked; and that the Cape and the fine northern plain were occupied by our soldiers. I give you the earliest intelligence, that you may make use of it. I shall not have the details for three days, when I expect the courier, but I thought it not unimportant that you should be immediately aware that all our troops have landed; the army and the fleet occupy a safe position whatever may happen.

[82.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 21, 1802.

Your last letter has been shown to me. I approve of your conduct, and especially of your reserve.

It seems that to-day we are again approaching an agreement. As to the prisoners, Otto tells me that the English ministers admit that France should be allowed in account what the prisoners taken from the allies of England have cost her. This seems right.

With regard to Malta, there can be no harm in declaring, since it is a fact, that the post of Grand Master is vacant; as one of the articles provides that there shall be no longer an

* In Hayti.—TR.

English or a French nation,* a Frenchman cannot be appointed. This stipulation has been made chiefly on account of the Bourbons; because it has been said that England wished to appoint a Bourbon Grand Master. We hold that the French emigrants are not eligible, as there is no longer a French nation, and, although the emigrants are in exile, they retain their nationality.

The words "forming part of the Neapolitan army," which they want to substitute for the term "native," are rather important if their secret wish is to introduce French emigrants or Englishmen; if this be not the motive for the change of words, it is of less importance.

What relates to the Prince of Orange may stand if the words "patrimonial estates" are added.

What is very important is that no mention should be made of nobility as regards Malta; our system of government is opposed to it. It would be absurd if we were made to say that a man must be noble in order to enter the order of Malta: the middle course, and the right one, is not to allude to the subject. This matter is the most important in the Maltese questions.

It is also important to put the article on Turkey last, and to cancel the words "allies of England;" otherwise you would likewise have to insert "former allies of France, allies of Russia, and of the Emperor;" but the better plan is to suppress the words "allies of Great Britain." This is a very important article, because these words, standing alone, would give to England a species of supremacy which would not suit us.

I have just received letters from St. Domingo, dated the 20th February; they contain good news. Port Republicain has been taken, with all its forts, without burning anything. They have taken Toussaint's military chest; it contained 2,500,000 francs. The Port de la Paix and St. Domingo are occupied. The Spanish party has submitted, and on the 29th General Leclerc had gone to attack Toussaint, who held out with 7000 or 8000 men.

You will find enclosed a letter to Jérôme.

[83.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, April 11, 1803.

I send to you, Citizen Joseph, what has been done as to the courts in Corsica. Just as it was going off I have been informed that some of the names are ill-selected. As the matter is very important, I request you to consult with the Cardinal of Lyons, and other persons who know well the candidates, and to send me a new list, altered as you may think right, ready for my signature.

[84.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Camp, Boulogne, 1803.

Paulette * writes to me that her marriage has been made public, and that she starts for Rome to-morrow. You or mamma should write to Borghese's mother, to introduce her. Tell her at the same time that I am ready to take among my aides-de-camp Borghese's brother, if he wishes to enter the army.

* Pauline Bonaparte, after the death of her first husband, General Leclerc, married the Prince Borghese.—ED.

CHAPTER IV.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 25th of September to the 27th of December, in the year 1805.

The last letter of the previous chapter, dated in the beginning of 1803, is the last in which he tutoyes his brother. On the 18th of May, 1804, he was proclaimed Emperor.

In September, 1805, he left Paris to begin the campaign which was ended by the battle of Austerlitz, fought on the 2nd of December, and the peace of Presburg, signed on the 27th of December, 1805.

During Napoleon's absence, Joseph was his representative.

[85.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Strasbourg, Sept. 25, 1805.

My Brother,—I have reached Strasbourg ; all the army has passed the Rhine. The enemy occupies the outlets of the Black Forest. Our manœuvres will soon begin. Do all that you can to urge the nation as regards the conscription. I am satisfied with the departments which I have gone through. Whereupon I pray God to keep you in his holy and worthy protection.

[86.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Strasbourg, Sept. 30, 1805.

My Brother,—I am this instant starting to carry my head-quarters to Louisbourg on the Necker. The whole army has

, advanced by several days' march into the interior of Germany; they are all well-disposed. The army has suffered no losses, either by desertion or by sickness. The weather is splendid. The Emperor of Austria, who came to join his army, has returned to Vienna, and terror reigns already in the enemy's ranks.

I have received information that the Austrians are withdrawing troops from Italy, that they may march on Bavaria. I wish you to see the Minister of Police, the Minister Dejean, and the Chief Secretary of War, to learn if all has been done relating to calling out the reserves of the conscription. If these ministers and the prefects would put a little zeal into their services, the conscripts ought to join their regiments in less than a month from this time. I intend the conscription of the present year (1805) to join me in the course of a month from the 23rd of October. Pay the greatest attention to this.

[87.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Essling, Oct. 1, 1805.

My Brother,—The army is advancing rapidly. The 1st and 2nd corps * have joined the Bavarians, and left Würzburg; the 3rd, 4th, and 6th are beyond the Necker. The enemy marches and countermarches, and seems to be very much puzzled. In a few days we shall be fighting. The army has not had one loss, either from desertion or sickness. I shall be at Stuttgardt this evening. As we shall move very quickly, you must not be astonished if you hear nothing from me for some days. It will be enough to put into the 'Moniteur' that the Emperor is at Stuttgardt; that the army has passed the Necker, and has already gained two great victories—the first, in that we have had neither sickness nor desertion, but, on

* The 1st corps, under Bernadotte, came from Hanover; the 2nd, commanded by Marmont, came from Zeist, in Holland; the 3rd, 4th, and 6th, under Davoust, Soult, and Ney, came from the camp of Boulogne, and crossed the Rhine between Mannheim and Strasbourg.—ED.

the contrary, have been joined by many conscripts; the second, in that we have been joined by the Bavarian, Danish, and Würtemberg armies, and that all the Germans are well disposed towards us.

[88.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Louisbourg, Oct. 2, 1805.

My Brother,—I entered Louisbourg yesterday; I reside in the Elector's palace: he has definitively joined us. No blood has yet been spilt on either side; although we have cut off several patrols of the enemy's cavalry, and they have brought to me 30 horsemen as prisoners. We are all in full march, and manœuvring on a great scale.

[89.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Louisbourg, Oct. 3, 1805.

My Brother,—I go to-night. Events will become more interesting every day. You need put into the Moniteur only that the Emperor is well, that on Friday, October 3, he was still at Louisbourg; that the alliance with Bavaria is concluded. I heard yesterday at the Court theatre the German Don Juan. I suppose that the music of this opera is the same as in Paris: it seemed to me to be very good.

[90.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Louisbourg, Oct. 4, 1805.

My Brother,—I am glad to hear that the conscription is going on well in Paris. Let me know if the reserves of the years 1801, 1802, 1803, 1804 have already marched. I am this instant leaving Louisbourg.

[91.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Zusmarshaussen, Oct. 9, 1805.

My Brother,—The three bulletins which have been sent to Paris will have given you an idea of what has passed here. Give the enclosed letter to the Préfet of Paris. The weather changed two days ago; it rains a great deal.

We shall reach Munich this evening, or to-morrow at latest. The Russians are beginning to arrive. The enemy is weakening very much his forces in Italy in order to send troops hither. The next three or four days will probably be eventful. Many remarkable feats of arms may take place.

The action of Wertingen does great credit to the dragoons and to the cavalry. It is a pleasant little success for Murat, who was in command.

The good feeling of the army, their wish to be seriously engaged, and their patience under fatigue, are of good omen. My head-quarters to-day are at Zusmarshaussen. I have neither carriage nor secretaries, nor anything else here, but I intend this evening to join the head-quarters at Augsbourg.

I keep the enemy surrounded in Ulm; they were defeated yesterday by Ney. The details to-morrow.

[92.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Augsbourg, Oct. 21, 1805.

My Brother,—The bulletins have informed you of our glorious successes. Nothing can be better. I have reason to be satisfied with the heroism of the army and with its attachment to me.

[93.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Munich, Oct. 27, 1805.

be false ones, which you would have to disavow. It is better to wait for real news.

I hope by the end of the month to express to you my satisfaction on the arrival of the conscripts. I have as yet sustained no great losses. But if the war continues, I must lay my account to have to leave a strong army in the North, to protect Holland.

The conduct of Prussia is equivocal. I have called out the reserve in only 54 departments. Not that I do not want the whole, but because I fear the state of feeling in some departments. If the Minister of the Interior sees no objection to calling out the reserves of the remaining departments, let it be done. They should all be moved towards Strasbourg. I will let the Minister of War know the corps in which they are to be incorporated.

I manœuvre against the Russian army, which is in position behind the Inn, and strong.

Before a fortnight I shall have opposed to me 100,000 Russians and 60,000 Austrians, sent from Italy or from the other reserves of that kingdom. I shall conquer them, but probably not without loss.

I presume that Dejean is taking measures to clothe the conscripts. The absence of the army from France must save much of the expense which it cost in the camp at Boulogne.

[94.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Braunau, Oct. 30, 1805.

My Brother,—I reached Braunau to day. It snows heavily. The Russian army seems frightened by the fate of the Austrians. They have abandoned to me Braunau, one of the keys of Austria, well fortified and full of magazines. We shall see now what this Russian army will do. It has lost its presence of mind. They rob, steal, and outrage everywhere, to the great disgust of the people. They look down on the Austrians, who seem no longer to like fighting: by *they*, I mean the Russian officers; the men are brutes, who do not know an Austrian from

[95.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Lentz, Nov. 6, 1805.

My Brother,—My advance is within six marches of Vienna. The weather is unseasonably cold; there is a hard frost. My last Paris news is of the 28th of October. I presume that Jérôme is on board his ship, and is anxious to distinguish himself, and to be useful to me.

[96.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Schönbrunn, Nov. 15, 1805.

My Brother,—The bulletin has told you all that I found in Vienna.* I manœuvre to-day against the Russian army, and have not been satisfied with Bernadotte;† perhaps the fault is in his health.

When I let him enter Munich and Salzbourg, and enjoy the glory of these great expeditions without his having to fire a gun or to endure any of the fatiguing services of the army, I had a right to expect that he would want neither activity nor zeal. He has lost me a day, and on a day may depend the destiny of the world. Not a man would have escaped from me. I hope that he will repair his fault to-morrow by a more active movement. I want Junot. Every day convinces me more and more that the men whom I have formed are incomparably the best. I continue to be pleased with Murat, Lannes, Davout, Soult, Ney, and Marmont. I hear nothing of Augereau's march. Masséna has behaved indifferently. He made bad dispositions, and got himself beaten at Caldiero. Prince Charles's army is advancing on me. The Venetian country must by this time be evacuated. It may be as well if you let him know, through our common friends, that I am not very well pleased, I will not say with his courage, but with the ability which he has shown. This will

* An immense arsenal, containing 100,000 muskets, 2000 pieces of cannon, and vast stores of ammunition, was found there.—TR.

† Joseph's brother-in-law.—TR.

rouse his zeal, and may stop the disorder which is beginning in his army. I know that a contribution of 400,000 francs has been imposed on the Austrian portion of Verona. I intend to make the generals and officers who serve me well so rich that they will have no pretext for dishonouring by their cupidity the noblest of all professions, and losing the respect of their soldiers. General Dejean is absurd about arming the citadel of Ancona: his reasons are contemptible. Support the Constable.* All the arguments that Dejean uses are good for nothing. It is a habit of engineer officers to wish to show their cleverness; I choose it to be armed, and that is enough.

The Emperor of Germany writes beautiful letters to me; but though he has allowed me to occupy his capital, he has not yet shaken off the influence of Russia. Just now he is supposed to be with the Emperor Alexander, but some day or other he must make up his mind.

[97.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Znaim, Nov. 18, 1805.

My Brother,—I received your letter of the 15th in Moravia. We are pursuing the Russian army with our swords almost in their backs. They have lost about 6000 men in the different engagements, and are making long forced marches to evacuate Austria. I expect to be at Brünn to-morrow. My advanced posts are before Olmütz, in which fortress the Emperor of Germany has taken refuge.

All that is going on in the Bank had been long foreseen by sensible people. The principal cause is that they discount every species of paper in circulation; but the root of all this evil is that the interest of most of the directors is opposed to that of the public and of the State. I see little chance of finding a remedy, but I will try to do so on my return; till then it must be let alone. You may say that I shall be in Paris before Christmas.

* Prince Louis Bonaparte.

[98.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Brünn, Nov. 21, 1805.

My Brother,—You have thrown away 26 millions ;* where will you find money for the pay and subsistence of the troops? I owe nothing to Vanlerberghe ; so much the worse for him if he has engaged himself with Spain about matters which do not concern me. It is enough for me that his failure is no fault of the treasury.

[99.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Brünn, Nov. 24, 1805.

My Brother,—I inform you that the Emperor of Germany has just sent to me M. de Stadion, his minister in Russia, and Lieut.-General Comte de Giulay, with full powers to negotiate, conclude, and sign a definitive peace between France and Austria. I have given similar powers to M. de Talleyrand. You will state this in the 'Moniteur,' and add this paragraph : "It is to be hoped that the negotiation will produce peace, but this hope must not slacken the zeal of our administrators ; on the contrary, it is an additional motive for hastening the conscripts on their march, according to the old proverb, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. His Majesty recommends the Ministers of War and of the Interior to press on their preparations."

You will insert as news from Vienna, "Negotiations have begun. It is said that the Emperor of the French is going to Italy. It is also said that he intends to appear in Paris when least expected there. We have not yet seen him."

[100.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Brünn, Nov. 26, 1805.

My Brother,—I am still at Brünn. I have given audiences to Stadion and to Giulay. I receive to-morrow Haugwitz, the

* In assisting the House of Vanlerberghe.—TR.

Prussian minister. I hope soon to make peace. You cannot conceive how anxious I am to to Paris. See if the Tuileries are at last finished. It seems to me that they ought to have been ready by the 1st of November. The Emperors of Germany and Russia are at Olmütz. The Russian army is reinforced from time to time.

[101.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Austerlitz, Dec. 3, 1805.

My Brother,—I hope that, by the time this courier reaches you, my aide-de-camp Lebrun, whom I sent off from the field of battle, will have got to Paris. After some days of manœuvres, I had yesterday a decisive battle. I put to flight the allied army, commanded by the two Emperors of Germany and Russia in person. It consisted of 80,000 Russians and 30,000 Austrians. I have taken about 40,000 prisoners, among whom are 20 Russian generals, 40 colours, 100 pieces of cannon, and all the standards of the Russian imperial guards. The whole army has covered itself with glory.

The enemy has left at least from 12,000 to 15,000 men on the field. I do not yet know my own loss. I estimate it at 800 or 900 killed, and twice as many wounded. A whole column of the enemy threw itself into a lake, and the greater part of them were drowned. I fancy that I still hear the cries of these wretches *whom it was impossible to save.** The two Emperors are in a bad

* This is a remarkable passage. The inference which Napoleon intended Joseph to draw is, that he would have saved the Russians from being drowned, if he had been able. But, in fact, they were drowned intentionally, and by his orders.

This is the account of the transaction by M. Thiers:—"The flying Russians threw themselves on the frozen lakes. The ice gave way in some places, but was firm in others, and afforded an asylum to a crowd of fugitives. Napoleon, from the hill of Pratzen, overlooking the lakes, saw this disaster. He ordered the battery of his guard to fire round shot on the parts of the ice which remained unbroken, and thus to complete the destruction of the wretches who had taken refuge there. Nearly 2000 persons were thus drowned among the broken ice."—Consulat et Empire, livre xxiii. p. 326.

A person, not an eye-witness himself, but who had carefully collected

situation. You may print the substance of this, but not as extracted from a letter of mine, it would not be suitable. You will receive the bulletin to-morrow. Though I have been sleeping for the last week in the open air, my health is good. To-night I sleep in a bed in the fine country-house of M. de Kaunitz, near Austerlitz, and I have put on a clean shirt, which I had not done for a week. The guard of the Emperor of Russia was demolished. Prince Repnin, who commanded it, was taken, with a part of his men, and all his standards and artillery.

The Emperor of Germany this morning sent to me Prince Lichtenstein to ask for an interview. It is possible that peace may soon follow. On the field of battle my army was smaller than his, but the enemy was caught in a false position while he was manœuvring.*

[102.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Schönbrunn, Dec. 13, 1805.

My Brother,—You need not have announced so pompously that the enemy had sent plenipotentiaries, or have fired the guns. It was the way to throw cold water on the zeal of the nation, and to give foreigners a false impression as to our affairs at home. Crying out for peace is not the means of getting it. I did not think it worth putting into a bulletin, still less did it deserve to be mentioned in the theatres. The mere word *peace* means nothing, what we want is a glorious peace. Nothing could be more ill-conceived or more impolitic than what has just been done in Paris.

information respecting this battle from eye-witnesses, described to me the scene. The French batteries fired, by Napoleon's order, first, not on the Russians, but on the parts of the ice nearest to the shore. When these were broken, the Russians were on a sort of island of ice. They all fell on their knees. The batteries then fired on them and on the ice on which they stood until the last man was killed or drowned. My informant computed the number thus destroyed at 6000.—TR.

* The news that Stadion and Giulay had been sent by the Emperor of Germany to negotiate for peace was announced by Joseph in the theatres. The guns of the Invalides were also fired, that day being the anniversary

[103.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Schönbrunn, Dec. 15, 1805.

My Brother,—I have got your letter of the 7th.* I am not accustomed to let my policy be governed by the gossip of Paris, and I am sorry that you attach so much importance to it. My people, under all circumstances, has found it good to trust everything to me, and the present question is too complicated to be understood by a Parisian citizen. I mentioned to you my disapprobation of the importance which you gave to the arrival of the two Austrian plenipotentiaries. I disapprove equally of the articles which the 'Journal de Paris' keeps on publishing. Nothing can be more silly or in worse taste. I shall make peace when I think it the interest of my people to do so; and the outcries of a few intriguers will not hasten or delay it by a single hour. My people will always be of one opinion when it knows that I am pleased, because that proves that its interests have been protected. The time when it deliberated in its sections has passed. The battle of Austerlitz has shown how ridiculous was the importance which, without my orders, you gave to the mission of the plenipotentiaries. I will fight, if it be necessary, more than one battle more to arrive at a peace with securities. I trust nothing to chance; what I say I do, or I die. You will see that the peace, advantageous as I shall make it, will be thought disadvantageous by those who are now clamouring for it, because they are fools and blockheads, who know nothing about it. It is ridiculous to hear them always repeating that we want peace, as if the mere fact of peace was anything; all depends on the conditions. I have read the extract from Fesch's letter. He does not know what he is talking about, nor M. Alquier any more, when they speak of a disembarkation of 8000 Austrian cavalry—as if 8000 cavalry could be so easily embarked.

* In this letter Joseph had dwelt on the general wish in Paris for peace. —TR.

[104.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Schönbrunn, Dec. 20, 1805.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 11th, acknowledging the telegraphic despatch announcing the battle of Austerlitz. The negotiations continue. My army is getting rest and equipments. Prince Charles's army is close by. If peace is not quickly made, there will be an engagement in less than a month, which will not leave the Austrian monarchy the shadow of a resource.

The returns of Marshal Kellermann of the 2nd and 3rd of December mention a much less number of conscripts than are announced by the reports of Marshal Moncey: 10,000 have not yet reached the two armies of reserve. Louis has pushed things too far in leaving Paris so ungarrisoned. I had sent for the 86th and the 5th to Versailles, in order, if necessary, to call them to Paris. The objection to summoning to Paris the other regiments from the camp of Poitiers is, that, being all Belgians, the vicinity of their own country would induce them to desert. From the north there is nothing to fear. The disagreements which existed between France and Prussia have been removed, to the general satisfaction. It is useless to publish this, or to make great advances to Lucchesini.*

[105.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Schönbrunn, Dec. 23, 1805.

My Brother,—I send to you an open letter, which you will read, seal, and give to M. Barbé-Marbois. I doubt whether to attribute his conduct to treason or to folly. He has advanced to the contractors for the army 85,000,000 belonging to the Treasury. If I had been beaten, he would have been the most useful ally that the coalition could have had. I suspend my judgment until I can ascertain myself the causes of such an enormous deficit. Talk it over confidentially with the Finance Minister, and take the

* The Prussian Minister.

utmost care that not a farthing goes out of the Treasury without an order. M. Barbé-Marbois has been unfaithful to his duties. You need not say this to him, nor alarm him too much until I come, which will be very soon. Show this letter to the Minister of Finance, and send quietly for the cashier who keeps the securities, to see which of them have left his custody, and to be sure that he parts with no more. I tell you frankly that I think that M. Barbé-Marbois has betrayed me. Say nothing of all this to M. Cambacérès, because the brothers Michel are concerned in it, and I do not know how far his interests may be affected. Say slightly to M. Marbois that a storm is brewing, and that there is only one mode of averting it, which is replacing the securities in the Treasury before my arrival; and that he will do well to arrange with Desprez that all may be replaced in its ordinary state; otherwise the storm will break. I should not be surprised if Desprez and the other jobbers connected with Barbé-Marbois, in their fear, replace what has been taken.

[106.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Schönbrunn, Dec. 27, 1805.

My Brother,—The peace was signed at Presburg at 4 o'clock this morning by M. de Talleyrand, the Prince Lichtenstein, and General Giulay. I am to have an interview with Prince Charles. I have not time to write more. Guns ought not to be fired for a peace until it has been signed. You may announce this by forty discharges.

CHAPTER V.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 31st of December, 1805, to the 31st of March, 1806.

They relate the success of the first of Napoleon's attempts to seize the ancient monarchies of Europe, and to convert them into sub-kingdoms to be governed by his own brothers and kinsmen—attempts which produced his own ruin and the dismemberment of the great empire of which he was the immediate sovereign. The first of these letters informs Joseph that he is to command the army which is to invade Naples.

The last orders him to assume the Neapolitan crown.

[107.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Munich, Dec. 31, 1805.

My Brother,—I am at Munich. I shall remain a few days to receive the ratification of the treaty, and to give to the army its last orders.

I intend to take possession of the kingdom of Naples. Marshal Masséna and General Saint-Cyr are marching on that kingdom with two corps-d'armée.

I have named you my Lieutenant commanding-in-chief the army of Naples.

Set off for Rome forty hours after the receipt of this letter, and let your first dispatch inform me that you have entered Naples, driven out the treacherous Court, and subjected that part of Italy

You will find at the head-quarters of the army the decrees and instructions relating to your mission.

You will wear the uniform of a general of division. As my lieutenant, you have all the marshals under your orders. Your command does not extend beyond the army and the Neapolitan territory. If my presence were not necessary in Paris I would march myself on Naples; but with the generals whom you have, and the instructions which you will receive, you will do all that I could do. Do not say whither you are going, except to the Arch-Chancellor; let it be known only by your letters from the army.

[108.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Munich, Dec. 31, 1805.

My Brother,—I have demanded in marriage for Prince Eugène, Princess Augusta, daughter of the Elector of Bavaria, and a very pretty person. This marriage has been agreed on; I have demanded another princess for Jérôme. As you have seen him last, tell me if I can reckon on the young man's consent. I have also arranged a marriage for your eldest daughter with a small prince, who in time will become a great prince. As this last marriage cannot take place for some months, I shall have time to talk to you about it. Tell mamma, as from me, about the marriage of Prince Eugène with Princess Augusta. I do not wish it to be mentioned publicly.

[109.] NAPOLEON TO PRINCESS JOSEPH.

Munich, Jan. 9, 1806.

Madame, my Sister-in-law,—I settled some time ago the marriage of my son, Prince Eugène, with the Princess Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria. The Elector of Ratisbon marries them at Munich on the 15th of January. I am detained, therefore, for a few days longer in this town.

The Princess Augusta is one of the handsomest and most

accomplished persons of her sex. It would be proper, I think, that you should make her a present costing from 15,000 to 20,000 francs. She will set off for Italy on the 20th of January. The King of Bavaria will write to you to announce the marriage. Whereupon I pray God, madame, my sister-in-law, to keep you in his holy and worthy protection.

[110.] Imperial Camp of Schönbrunn, 6 Nivôse, an 14 (Dec. 27, 1805).

Soldiers, for ten years I have done everything to save the King of Naples. He has done everything to ruin himself.

After the battles of Dego, Mondovi, and Lodi, he could have resisted me but feebly: I trusted him and treated him with generosity.

After the second coalition was broken at Marengo, the King of Naples, who had been the first to begin that unjust war, abandoned at Lunéville by his allies, stood alone and defenceless. He entreated, and I pardoned him a second time.

A few months ago you were at the gates of Naples. I had sufficient reason to suspect the treachery which was meditated, and to revenge the outrages which I had received. I was again generous: I acknowledged the neutrality of Naples, and directed you to quit that kingdom: for the third time the house of Naples was saved and re-established.

Shall we pardon a fourth time? shall we trust a fourth time a court without faith, or honour, or intelligence? No! no! The Neapolitan dynasty has ceased to reign, its existence is incompatible with the tranquillity of Europe and the honour of my crown.

Soldiers, march; throw into the waves, if they wait for you, the weak battalions of the tyrant of the seas. Show the world how we punish treachery. Let me hear without delay that all Italy is subject to my authority or to that of my allies: that the finest of countries is relieved from the yoke of the most faithless of men: that the sacredness of treaties has been avenged: and that the manes of my brave soldiers, massacred in the ports of Sicily, on their return from Egypt, after having escaped

from the desert and from a hundred battles, are at length appeased.

Soldiers, my brother marches at your head. He knows my plans, he possesses my authority and my confidence. Give to him yours.*

[111.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Munich, Jan. 12, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 7th. You started on the 9th. To-day you must be at Chambéry. The 15th or 16th you will be near Rome. I have sent to you General Dumas. Marshal Masséna must be with the army. I calculate that after a few days' rest you will have nearly 40,000 men, which you can divide into three corps; Masséna will have the largest, General Saint-Cyr the second, and General Reynier the smallest, consisting of 6000 good troops, as a reserve. Attach yourself to General Reynier. He is cold, but of the three he is the best able to make a good plan of campaign, and to give you good advice. In your position the secret is to make each of the three believe that he has your confidence.

This letter will be presented by my aide-de-camp Lebrun, whom you may keep. You may employ General Dumas on your staff. He does not understand much about manœuvring, he has not had enough military experience. Your great business is to keep your troops together, and to reach Naples with all your forces as soon as possible.

An army composed of men belonging to different nations will soon commit blunders.† The thing to be done should be to watch for them, and turn them to account; but you have nobody about you who can direct you how to do this. A week more or less is not of importance. Besides the three corps which I have mentioned to you, keep in hand a strong body of cavalry and light artillery, to be sent wherever it may be

* Such frequent reference to this proclamation is made by Napoleon's letters, that I have thought right to insert it.—TR.

† The forces at the disposal of the King of Naples were English, Russian, and Neapolitan.—TR.

wanted; but it is difficult to believe that the Russians and English will not retire as your army becomes strong and well organized. If, contrary to my expectations, the enemy should be strongly reinforced, on the first notice from you I will be with you. Talk seriously to Masséna * and to S——, and say that you will have no stealing; Masséna has been robbing terribly in the Venetian country. I have recalled S—— to Paris on the same ground. He is a rogue.

Keep strict discipline in this matter. Take six aides-de-camp. Hold no council of war, but collect opinions one by one. Write to me frequently and fully, that I may give you as much as possible of my advice. When you have entered the kingdom of Naples, after the first battle, explain to the Neapolitans in your proclamation all that I have done to remove from them the war, and all that the Queen has done to attract it. Few, very few flags of truce. Prince Eugène, who commands in the kingdom of Italy, will keep a reserve ready to meet any unexpected event. You should establish your line of communication—that is to say, your line of posts and marches, in short, what a line of communication consists of—by Tuscany, not by Ancona and the Abruzzi, for I wish you to act on Naples through Rome. Otherwise the war might be prolonged, you might be forced to conquer the Abruzzi, and the enemy might have time to prepare the defence of Naples; but, I repeat, a fortnight is not of importance. Keep your troops well together. General Mathieu, who knows well the country, and enjoys your confidence, is to join you. Pray send me every day the returns of the numbers and positions of your troops. Whereupon I pray God that he will keep you in his holy and worthy protection.

[112.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Munich, Jan. 14, 1806.

My Brother,—I have your letter of the 10th. I sent to you my aide-de-camp, Colonel Lebrun. I send you M. de Ségur,

* In the original only "M——" is inserted. As this obviously means Masséna, I have so translated it throughout.—TR.

whom also you may keep near you during the campaign. The young Clary and Rœderer are going to your head-quarters, to be in your personal service. Salicetti is also ordered thither. Yesterday Eugène was married civilly; two hours hence the Elector of Ratisbon will marry them in the church. I send you a copy of the marriage contract, which is to be a secret. No one but you has a copy, or has even seen it.

[113.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Stuttgardt, Jan. 19, 1806.

My Brother,—I wish you to enter the kingdom of Naples in the first days of February, and I wish to hear from you, in the course of February, that our flag is flying on the walls of that capital. You will make no truce, you will hear of no capitulation: my will is that the Bourbons shall have ceased to reign at Naples. I intend to seat on that throne a prince of my own house. In the first place, you, if it suits you; if not, another. I repeat, do not divide your forces; let all your army pass the Apennines, and let your three corps march on Naples, so disposed as to be able to join in one day on one field of battle. Leave a general, some depôts, some stores, and some artillerymen at Ancona for its defence. Naples once taken, the distant parts of the kingdom will fall to you of themselves. The enemy in the Abruzzi will be taken in the rear, and you will send a division to Taranto, and another towards Sicily, to conquer that kingdom. I intend to leave under your orders in the kingdom of Naples, all this year, and afterwards, until I make some new disposition, 14 regiments of French infantry and 12 regiments of French cavalry, all on a full war establishment. The country must find provisions, clothes, remounts, and all that is necessary for your army, so that it may not cost me a farthing. My troops belonging to the kingdom of Italy will not remain in the kingdom of Naples longer than you think necessary, after which they will return home. You will raise a Neapolitan legion, into which you will admit only Neapolitan officers and soldiers, such as choose to adhere to me.

[114.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 27, 1806.

My Brother,—I reached Paris yesterday evening. To-day I held a council. I am indignant at the mismanagement of my finances. I have appointed the councillor of state, Mollien, minister of finances. I am delighted with everything that you did while you were at Paris. Receive my best thanks, and, as a proof of how well I am pleased, I shall send you by the first messenger my portrait on a snuff-box.

Hold a proper tone towards the army. Suffer no peculation. I hope that you are pleased with Masséna; if not, send him back. It seems that the Queen of Naples has been trying to bribe here. Let nothing affect your plans. I reckon on your entering the kingdom of Naples the first week in February.

To-day the Princess Julie and her children dine with me.

I have this instant received a letter from the Queen of Naples, begging for quarter; I shall not answer it. Do not you answer any that you may receive from her. If she sends any one to you, let her messenger be told that your orders are to occupy Naples. After her breach of treaty, I trust none of her promises.

[115.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 27, 1806.

My Brother,—I hear that the court of Naples sends Cardinal Ruffo to me with propositions of peace. My orders are that he be not allowed to come to Paris. You must immediately commence hostilities, and make all your arrangements for taking immediate possession of the kingdom of Naples, without listening to any propositions for peace, armistice, or suspension of arms—reject them all indiscriminately.

[116.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 30, 1806.

My Brother,—I suppose that by the time you receive this letter you will be master of Naples. I can only repeat to you my former instructions and my decided intention to conquer the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. As soon as you are master of Naples you will send two corps, one towards Taranto, the other towards the coast opposite Sicily. You will affirm in the strongest manner that the King of Naples will never sit again on that throne, that his removal is necessary to the peace of the Continent, which he has troubled twice. You will insert in your general orders the enclosed proclamation.*

[117.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 30, 1806.

My Brother,—M. Miot sets off to-day to join you; I hope that he will find you in Naples; you may employ him in military administration. I wish all the palaces in Rome, or in the Roman states, which belong to Naples and to Venice, to be occupied immediately. Give your assistance to Cardinal Fesch, if necessary, in taking possession of them.

[118.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 31, 1806.

My Brother,—The Marquis Gallo has left the Neapolitan service, and is going to you to offer you his best assistance. He will be the first Neapolitan to swear fealty to you. It is supposed that the Prince Royal remains in Naples; if so, seize him and send him to France with a sufficient and trustworthy escort. This is my express order, I leave you no discretion. From all

* The proclamation of Schönbrunn, of the 27th December, 1805, already inserted.

that I hear I infer that the royal family has embarked, that the forts will be delivered to you, and no resistance made. In that case you will instantly form a corps of from 22,000 to 23,000 men, which will march towards Reggio to pass immediately into Sicily.

In this first moment of alarm and confusion it will be easier to cross than at any other time. You have got my Schönbrunn proclamation; I delayed its publication because I did not choose to announce your march to Naples without being sure that you would reach it. To-morrow it will be printed in the 'Moniteur,' and communicated to all the courts of Europe. This must convince you that the old race of the kings of Naples reigns no longer.

I am impatient for a return of the numbers and position* of your army, particularly as to the position of all our third and fourth battalions. I will send you enough conscripts to keep your regiments on a full war establishment. Pay, clothing, and food you must supply. I need not tell you that my proclamation must be translated into Italian, and stuck up in all the towns and public places in the kingdom. If any of the great people or others are troublesome, send them to France, and say that you do it by my order. No half-measures, no weakness. I intend my blood to reign in Naples as long as it does in France: the kingdom of Naples is necessary to me.

[119.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 24th. General Saint-Cyr attended my levee yesterday. I expressed to him openly my displeasure, and ordered him to return instantly to his post. I send you a paper on Naples, containing at least geographical information. It is drawn up by M. de Vintimille;

* "États de situation." This is a technical expression, denoting a

who has resided in Naples, and is anxious to enter my service: I have sent him to Naples, where he may be useful to you.

The return enclosed in your letter of the 24th is too concise. From the moment that you reach Naples you will be in no want of money, if you take care that nobody robs. In the Venetian country Masséna took all that he could. When you receive this letter you will be on your march, and I am impatient to hear that you have conquered Naples. You have 5 divisions of infantry; keep them always together. Believe in my friendship. Disregard those who would keep you out of fire; you have your reputation to make if there should be an opportunity. Place yourself conspicuously: as to real danger, in war it is everywhere.

[120.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 4, 1806.

My Brother,—I hope that at this instant you are marching on Naples. I need not tell you to issue no bulletin, nor communicate anything with respect to the army of Naples to the public. Send me the details, that I may see what ought to be published. Whatever is official ought properly to be addressed to the minister of war.

[121.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 7, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 28th of January. I thoroughly approve your answer to the Prince Royal of Naples; a stop must be put to all such absurdities.* Your drafts on Paris will be regularly paid. I am surprised at the bad state of your artillery, and at your general want of supplies. This comes of generals who think only of robbing; keep a strict

* The King and Queen offered to abdicate in favour of the Prince. Joseph answered that it was too late; that he came to execute Napoleon's orders, not to treat.—TR.

hand over them. I ask from you only one thing,—be master. I am anxious to hear that you are at Naples. I approve of your delaying for a few days; everything requires time; I agree with you that it is better to begin a day or two later and go straight forward. March on boldly. In your endeavours to improve the condition of your army on their way to Naples, you will be doing what I wish. Give me an account of the loans which you have made, and of the drafts that you have drawn, distinguishing private loans from drafts, that I may pay the former out of my own purse, and the latter by the treasury. You cannot have too many staff-officers. When you enter Naples, proclaim that you will suffer no private contributions to be raised, that the whole army will be rewarded, and that it is not right that only a few individuals should be enriched by the exertions of all. I do not see that you have as yet chosen any aides-de-camp of unquestionable ability; take one engineer and one artillery officer.

Fox is at the Foreign-office, Grenville at the Home-office, Spencer at the Admiralty, Addington Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hawkesbury at the Treasury, Wyndham Minister of War, Sheridan Treasurer of the Navy.

You know England well enough to form some idea of what this may lead to. I am well pleased with my affairs here; it gave me great trouble to bring them into order, and to force a dozen rogues, at whose head is Ouvrard, to refund. Barbé-Marbois has been duped just as the Cardinal de Rohan was duped in the affair of the necklace, with the difference that in this case more than 90 millions were in question. I had made up my mind to have them shot without trial. Thank God I have been repaid. This has put me somewhat out of humour. I tell you about it that you may see how dishonest men are. You, who are now at the head of a great army, and will soon be at that of a great administration, ought to be aware of this. Roguery has been the cause of all the misfortunes of France. M. d'Haugwitz is here; we have not yet come to an understanding. The court of Prussia is very false and very stupid. All my army is still in Germany. I shall be glad, if possible, to hear, before March, of your enter-

legislative body, and for my troops to cross the Inn; it will have become an old story. There must be no evasion or hesitation. The Bourbons have ceased to reign in Naples. What I have said in my proclamation is unalterable. Send me the returns of all your army.

Schimmelpenninck no longer sees clearly; he has quite lost his judgment. When you speak of Naples, remember that the same family reigns in Spain, and take care to say nothing that may offend them.

I take the greatest interest in your prosperity, and particularly in your glory; in your position it is the first of wants, without it life can have no charm. I have sent Mathieu Dumas into Dalmatia. I hope that he has reached you. I doubt, however, his being as useful as you think. He has no military experience; but I shall be glad to hear that he is with you. Marquis Gallo starts in a few days. He will be the first that will swear fealty to you.

[122.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 9, 1806.

My Brother,—I have your letter of the 31st of January. I repeat, keep all your troops together, so that they may be always able to make a junction in one day. The great thing is to take Naples. Naples taken, everything falls, and a province which could not have been conquered by two regiments will submit to a company. Keep the corps of General Lecchi within reach of your centre: as the English and Russians have embarked, there is nothing to stop you. March, then, straight on Naples. General St. Cyr must by this time have returned to your army. The instant that I saw him at my levee I ordered him to set off. I would not hear a word from him. Be strict with everybody. The return which you have sent me is not clear. I do not see the position of General Gardanne's division, nor his force. Let Cæsar Berthier take the trouble to give me regular returns, with the artillery, the horses, &c. &c., and not mere results, which tell nothing. The returns of my armies form the most agreeable

portion of my library. They are the volumes which I read with the greatest pleasure in my moments of relaxation.

I see already in those which you have sent to me traces of the disorder which Masséna produces everywhere. I see companies that do not properly belong to the army of Naples. This carelessness will at last derange the administration of the army, and destroy its discipline. Send me perfectly accurate returns. I am going to employ myself in sending to you artillery and artillerymen. You will have many fortresses to garrison.

[123.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 9, 1806.

My Brother,—Captain Jacob must by this time have reached Naples to command your navy. I put at his disposition all the frigates and light vessels that I can spare. The Minister of Marine is writing to inform him of the orders which I have given. I have directed a trustworthy accountant to be sent to you to act as Receiver-General. You can name a Neapolitan Minister of Finance. Appoint Miot Minister of War, if, as I suppose, he has your confidence. I shall send also two or three safe young men for your Audit Office.

[124.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 9, 1806.

My Brother,—If you find in Rome a Russian minister accredited to the Sardinian Court, or any Sardinian minister, send them away. The first thing to do when you reach Naples is to keep in place all those who are in the employment of the Government. The next is to effect a general disarming, then to appoint a good Minister of Police, to drive all foreigners from Naples, and to seize all the English merchandize in the kingdom. Let the three or four Tuscans who have always been the most devoted agents of M. Acton* be arrested, and send them

* The Neapolitan Prime Minister.—Tr.

to Fenestrelle, whither you may send all whom you find troublesome.

Above all, do not lose a day or an hour in trying to seize Sicily; many things will be easy in the first moment, and difficult afterwards. I have directed several ships to Civita Vecchia, to be sent on to you at Naples; but I fear that it may be some time before they arrive. I think that you may appoint, if you think fit, Salicetti Minister of Police.

Take the title of Governor-General, and begin all your public acts in this form:

"By the Grace of God, and the Constitution of the Empire, Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy; Joseph, Great Elector, Governor-General of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, in virtue of the powers delegated to us by our august Brother and Sovereign, have ordered and do order as follows." *

When you have taken Naples, and all looks settled, I will communicate to you my plans for getting you acknowledged King of Naples.

[125.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 14, 1806.

My Brother,—I have ordered Cardinal Fesch to require the Russians, the English, the Swedes, and the Sardinians, to be sent out of Rome, and out of the Papal territory. Give him military assistance if it is necessary, for I intend to drive them out of Italy. The Holy See was very absurd the other day in wishing to keep Jackson in Rome.

I hope that you are now in Naples; you have been too long about it. It is time to make an end of it. As for your plan of campaign, now that the English and Russians are gone, your march on Naples is not objectionable. It would have been different if their army had been equal to yours. Your army is too scattered. It ought always to march so as to be able to concentrate itself in one day on a field of battle. With 15,000

* I am not responsible for the grammar of this sentence.—TR.

men I could be superior on the day of battle, and beat your 36,000; but your dispositions do no harm in the present state of things. I am anxious to hear that you are at Naples.

[126.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 17, 1806.

My Brother,—In the returns which you have sent to me, you do not mention the 10th, 20th, 102nd regiments of the line; the 14th and 23rd light infantry; the 7th, 23rd, 24th, 29th, and 30th dragoons; nor the dragoons of Napoleon and of the Queen belonging to the army of Italy. These regiments ought to have joined you by this time, and to have raised your army to 40,000 men. Send me a regular return, battalion by battalion, company by company, and squadron by squadron.

[127.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 18, 1806.

My Brother,—Your letter of the 8th of February has reached me. You must have received my proclamation to my army at Schönbrunn, which I had kept in reserve. Caution is no longer necessary. You are already master of Naples, and on the point of taking Sicily by surprise; this is your chief aim. The Neapolitan arrangements are already approved by Prussia. You should entitle your acts "Joseph Napoleon;" you need not add "Bonaparte." *

[128.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 25, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 14th. I congratulate you on the surrender of Naples and of the other

* From this time the Bonaparte family changed their name to that of Napoleon.—ED.

places. I have ordered the Neapolitan officers who are in Paris and in my kingdom of Italy to be sent to you: you may have all of them.

[129.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 27, 1806.

My Brother,—I have ordered 500,000 francs, in gold, to be sent from Milan to Naples. I am sorry that your bill was protested, especially if it was in your name, or if there was a letter from you. It would have been easy to pay it by bills of exchange on Paris. I am waiting for your next courier to tell you to take the title of King of Naples. You may in the mean while give the name of ministers to those whom you appoint members of the government. I have already told you that you may have all the Neapolitan officers whom you like. By this time you can no longer be in want of money. Disarm Naples, and levy a contribution of 10 millions upon the town; it will be easily paid. You may safely resort to the expedient of confiscating all the English merchandise. The loss will fall upon the part of the nation which deserves least consideration. I have sent you some naval officers. I congratulate you upon your reconciliation with St. Januarius.* But I suppose that, notwithstanding this, you have occupied the forts; that you have taken care to garrison and to provision them; that you have disarmed the town, and been rather severe in your government. Many things belonging to the palaces have been removed and concealed. You ought to get them restored. Disarm the populace; send away all strangers, the Russians, the English, and even the Italians who are not Neapolitans.

Make your army rich, but do not let them rob.

* Joseph had presented St. Januarius with a diamond necklace.—TR.

[130.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 2, 1806.

My Brother,—Tascher has brought me your letter of the 18th of February. If the convicts are in your way, you can very well send them to France. Begin by sending home all the Jesuits; there can be few Neapolitans among them. I do not acknowledge that order. Miot must have arrived by this time. I have sent five or six accountants to you; they are young men of undoubted probity and of ability. Captain Jacob, a distinguished naval officer whom I sent to you, must have joined you. Dismiss Sibille, he is a thief. I have ordered General Radet, who is at Milan, to go to Naples to organise and command your national guard. Neither Berthier nor Saligny is better than the present head of your staff.

It seems to me often that your ideas of men are somewhat false. You must see them near to judge of them. I hope that you occupy all the forts, and that you have had them provisioned. Be inflexible with the peculators. Arcambal must have reached you. I have ordered Dalbreton to Naples. Take any head of your staff that you prefer. I have desired Colonel Gentili to go to Naples. I hope that you will be satisfied with Radet. As for your flag, I scarcely know what to say. You know what sort of people the Turks are. I have forced them to acknowledge the kingdom of Italy. Tell the Neapolitans that, sooner or later, their flag will be respected. Try to make them accept mine; the naval men will tell you how to manage it. We are writing to Algiers and to Tunis. I send you Forfait as a maritime prefect. Employ him as you think fit. I approve much of all your selections. I have desired all the Neapolitans in the kingdom of Italy to be sent to you. Masséna has robbed wherever he could. Let him be advised to return three millions. Salicetti will do this for you. Let him see Masséna, and tell him that S—— has formally admitted that Masséna received three millions as a gift; that, if they are not returned, in the accounts which I shall publish in May of the contributions levied by the

name a commission of seven officers to oblige him to restore it. It is a very serious matter.

You are too cautious. Naples can well give you four or five millions. I open the session to-morrow. Announce my speedy arrival at Naples. It is so far off that I do not dare to promise you that I shall go, but there is no harm in announcing it, both for the sake of the army and of the people. General Dumas' first order was to go to Dalmatia. The order to go to Naples missed him. I have repeated it. Sebastiani has not yet recovered from his wound.

Your troubles are what always occur. Never go out without guards. Form your guard of four regiments of chasseurs and hussars, with two battalions of grenadiers taken from the grenadiers of the army, and a company of light artillery. In all your calculations assume this: that, a fortnight sooner or a fortnight later, you will have an insurrection. It is an event of uniform occurrence in a conquered country. I am not sure that you may not be able to make use of Alquier and David, who are at Rome; send for them. There are several consuls from Sicily in the Neapolitan states. You can send back Bavastro and Sibille without the intervention of the Minister of Marine. Let Captain Jacob give them notice that I order them back to France. Whatever you do, the mere force of opinion will not maintain you in a city like Naples.* Take care that there are mortars in the forts and troops in reserve to punish speedily an insurrection. Disarm, and do it quickly. General St. Cyr ought to have reached you; he is not without experience, and will be of use. I have sent to you Generals Donzelot and Lamarque, two distinguished men. Donzelot is fit to be the head of a staff. I do not know how far he would be better than Cæsar Berthier; you will be more sure of the attachment of Berthier. I presume that you have cannon in your palaces, and take all proper precautions for your safety. You cannot watch too narrowly those about you. The presumption and carelessness of the French is unequalled. Gallo must have reached you; he professes boundless devotion. You may keep the officer of gendarmerie who

* Joseph had said in his letter of the 18th February, 1806, "This town appears to me to be more populous than Paris. I can maintain my position only by the assistance of public opinion."—TR.

carries this letter. He is clever, and may serve you in the police.

All the troubles under which you are suffering belong to your position. Disarm, disarm. Keep order in that immense city. Keep your artillery in positions where the mob cannot seize them. Reckon on a riot or a small insurrection. I wish that I could give you the benefit of my experience in these matters, but I see from the little that Tascher tells me that you will get well out of them.

[131.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 6, 1806.

My Brother,—I have your letter of the 22nd of February. Let the lazzaroni who use the dagger be shot without mercy. It is only by a salutary terror that you will keep in awe an Italian populace. The least that the conquest of Naples must do for you is to afford supplies to your army of 40,000 men. Lay a contribution of 30 millions on the whole kingdom. Your conduct wants decision: your soldiers and your generals ought to live in plenty. Of course you will call together the priests, and declare them responsible for any disorder. The lazzaroni must have chiefs; they must answer for the rest. Whatever you do, you will have an insurrection. Disarm. You say nothing about the forts: if necessary, do as I did in Cairo; prepare three or four batteries whose shells can reach every part of Naples. You may not use them, but their mere existence will strike terror. The kingdom of Naples is not exhausted; you can always get money, since there are royal fiefs and taxes which have been granted away. Take care not to confirm these ancient abuses. In a fortnight or three weeks, by a decree of yours or of mine, they must all be repealed. Every alienation of the royal domains, or of the taxes, though its existence may be immemorial, must be annulled, and a system of taxation, equal and severe, must be established. Naples, even without Sicily, ought to give you 100 millions.* It does not, because the old system of the

* Four millions sterling.

Spanish kings, when they governed through Viceroys, has been followed. I have sent to you naval officers, and as many ships as I could. They will not arrive as soon as might be wished, but they will arrive. I have ordered 1,200,000 rations of biscuit to be sent to you from Toulon. You have no money, but you have a good army and a good country to supply you. Prepare for the siege of Gaeta. You speak of the insufficiency of your military force: two regiments of cavalry, two battalions of light infantry, and a company of artillery could put to flight all the mob of Naples. But the first of all things is to have money, and you can get it only in Naples. A contribution of 30 millions will provide for everything, and put you at your ease. Tell me something about the forts. I presume that they command the town, and that you have put provisional commandants into them. You must set about organising a gendarmerie. You feel on entering Naples as every one feels on entering a conquered country. Naples is richer than Vienna, and not so exhausted. Milan itself, when I entered it, had not a farthing. Once more, expect no money from me. The 500.000 francs in gold which I sent to you are the last that I shall send to Naples. I care not so much about three or four millions as about the principle. Raise 30 millions, pay your army, treat well your generals and commanders, put your matériel * in order.

[132.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 8, 1806.

My Brother,—I see that by one of your proclamations you promise to impose no war contribution, and that you forbid your soldiers to require those who lodge them to feed them. It seems to me that your measures are too narrow. It is not by being civil to people that you obtain a hold on them. This is not the way to get the means to reward your army properly. Raise 30 millions from the kingdom of Naples. Pay well your army;

* Matériel is a technical term signifying all that belongs to an army except the men: *they* are called the personnel.—TR.

remount well your cavalry and your trains; have shoes and clothes made. This cannot be done without money. As for me, it would be too absurd if the conquest of Naples did not put my army at its ease. It is impossible that you should keep within the bounds which you profess. Back yourself if you like by an order of mine. I have already said to you, and I repeat, do not engage to maintain the ancient fiefs and alienations. It is necessary to establish in Naples a land-tax and stamp-duties as in France. If fiefs are to be given, it must be to Frenchmen who support your crown. I do not hear that you have shot any of the lazzaroni, although I know that they have used their daggers. If you do not begin by making yourself feared, you will suffer for it. The imposition of a land-tax will not produce the effect which you apprehend; everybody expects it, and will think it quite natural. At Vienna, where there was supposed not to be a farthing, and they hoped that I should not levy a contribution, a few days after my arrival I levied one of 100 millions: it was thought very reasonable. Your proclamations have not enough the style of a master; you will gain nothing by spoiling the Neapolitans. The people of Italy, and in fact of every other country, if they do not feel that they are mastered, are disposed to rebel and to murmur. Bear in mind that, if circumstances have not permitted you to make any grand military manœuvres, you may get the reputation of having maintained your army, and of having made the country in which you are furnish you with everything that you want. This is a great portion of the art of war. About 40 Neapolitans, men of letters, or possessing some other merit, have received orders to go to Naples. Most of them are respectable people, who will be useful to you. You will not be able for a long while to dispense with the assistance of a French army. I shall send you large reinforcements.

The new English Cabinet appears to entertain more rational opinions than the late one, if I may judge by a letter from Mr. Fox, giving notice to the police of a plot to assassinate me. He names the individual, and gives some details of the way in which it was to be done; and he lets us know that it is at the express

command of the King that he writes. Prussia, in the treaty which I have just concluded with her, has already acknowledged you. On your measures during the next three months will depend the ease or difficulty of your administration and the fortune of your children. You must find out abuses, and so put an end to the national debt. I will manage all that by decrees, before you become King of Naples. You will have in hand your contributions, and will be able to have a navy and an army. I say a navy, because you must be aware that your communication with Sicily, and the protection of your coasts both against the Barbary powers and the English, make it necessary that you should have at least three ships of the line and six frigates. My affairs are not yet quite settled, but it is possible that I may make Louis King of Holland. It is more certain that I shall give the duchies of Cleves and of Berg to Prince Murat—in fact, it is already done.

I shall leave in Naples and Sicily only as many troops as you are willing to maintain, and as you think necessary to your safety. In my opinion, you will not be able for many years to keep less than 30,000 French soldiers in the two countries. But this may be done by keeping the companies at their fullest, which will save money. If 20,000 are enough, I shall be glad.

The English have taken the Cape of Good Hope.

Make no engagements which may be mischievous to your future reign. Send to me all that is necessary for deciding on the unpopular measures, consequent on the rights of conquest, which must be taken, doing as little harm as possible to the country.

You must establish in the kingdom of Naples a certain number of French families, holding fiefs either carved out of domains of the Crown, or taken from their present possessors, or from the monks by diminishing the number of convents. In my opinion your throne will have no solidity unless you surround it with a hundred generals, colonels, and others attached to your house, possessing great fiefs in the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. Bernadotte and Masséna should I think be fixed in Naples, with the title of princes, and with large revenues. Enable them to

found great families: I do this in Piedmont, the kingdom of Italy, and Parma. In these countries and in Naples 300 or 400 French military men ought to be established with property descending by primogeniture. In a few years they will marry into the principal families, and your throne will be strong enough to do without a French army: a point which must be reached. In the discussions between Naples and France, France will never desire to supply Naples with more troops than are absolutely necessary. She will always wish to keep them together to meet her other enemies. I intend to give Dalmatia to a prince, as well as Neufchâtel, which Prussia has ceded to me.

There are about 100 old gardes-du-corps here, good men, who may be useful in your body-guard, mixed with the Neapolitan nobles.

I presume that you are marching on Sicily.

Do not lose an instant in dividing your territory into military divisions or governments, and into intendencies or prefectures. Naples alone, without Sicily, might be distributed into at least twelve prefectures or departments. Four courts of appeal would probably be more than enough.

[133.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 12, 1806.

My Brother,—I have sent to you 500,000 francs in gold, of the kingdom of Italy, and I have ordered that the 500,000 which you have drawn for shall be paid out of a sum of 2,700,000 francs. This is all that I can do for the army of Naples. My armies are very numerous; they are coming home, and cost enormous sums; so does my fleet. I can meet no new expense. Up to this time your Neapolitan administration has been too lax. That is not the way to manage such a people. The only civilians whom I have sent to you are some auditors—young men who will learn Italian quickly, and are honest.

It is absolutely impossible that I should send you 1,500,000 francs a month for the army of Naples. Levy a war contribution

of 30,000,000 on the kingdom of Naples. It is strange that it gives only a third of what I get from the kingdom of Italy. You are too kind. That is not the way to begin an administration. However, settle your affairs so as to provide for yourself. Take the properties of all those who have followed the Court.

I send you a copy of a decree requiring the sums of which the Treasury has been robbed to be repaid. Masséna and S—— have stolen 6,400,000 francs. They shall repay to the last farthing.

Your bills of exchange shall be paid. Send me the account of them, for a sum of 2,700,000 francs, which had been lost sight of, has been restored.

Let Masséna be advised to return the 6,000,000. To do so quickly is his only salvation. If he does not, I shall send a Military Commission of Inquiry to Padua, for such robbery is intolerable. To suffer the soldiers to starve and to be unpaid, and to pretend that the sums destined for their use were a present to himself from the province, is too impudent. Such conduct would make it impossible to carry on a war. Let S—— be watched. The details of their plunderings are incredible. I learn them from the Austrians, who themselves are ashamed of them. They allowed corn to go to Venice. The evil is intolerable. The remedy I will apply. I order Ardent to be arrested. He must be in Paris or in Milan. He is an agent of S——. If he should be at Naples, have him arrested, and sent under a good escort to Paris. You have seen that Flachat has been condemned to a year's imprisonment in irons, and that his transactions have been declared void.

[134.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 12, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received the return of your army up to the 1st of March. I hope that your troops by this time occupy all the posts within the kingdom of Naples. You have artillery at Capua and in Naples. You need have no difficulty in be-

sieging Gaeta. Do not waste your cannonades. Place thirty or forty pieces of cannon in battery, and let your park be so supplied as to keep up a continued fire. Eight or ten days of open trenches will put you in possession of the town, even supposing it to make so long a defence. You must try, if possible, by batteries placed to the right and to the left, to intercept their communication with the sea. Nothing will frighten or dispirit them more.

Your draft for 500,000 francs shall be paid. Jams was written to on the receipt of your letter.

You have 40,000 men; that is more than enough to conquer Sicily and Naples.

Fesch will have told you of my disputes with the Court of Rome. I do not intend that Court to receive a minister from any power with which I am at war. On this condition only it shall retain its independence and sovereignty. Use the same language. Organise your kingdom with energy.

[135.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 18, 1806.

My Brother,—I send you the return of the Neapolitan officers who are leaving the army of Italy for your army. I see by it that five of these officers belonged to my guard. They are tried officers, and you may trust them. The army of Italy regrets the engineer and artillery officers whom it sends to you. Employ them according to their rank, and promote them according to their seniority.

[136.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 20, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 7th of March. I am extremely surprised that you have not shot the spies of the King of Naples who have been thrown on shore.

What do you mean me to do with them at Fenestrelle? None but abbés or Englishmen are to be sent thither; put to death the leaders of the mobs. Your administration in Naples is too feeble. You treat that populace with too much consideration. I cannot imagine why you do not execute the laws. Every spy should be shot; every lazzarone who stabs a soldier should be shot. The property of all those who belonged to the Court should be confiscated; and, if what the papers say be true, that you have arrested that wretched Castelcicala; send him under a good escort to Fenestrelle, and confiscate his jewels and his estates.

As for Masséna, S—— was desired to go to him, and I hope that he will restore all that he has taken from the military chest of the grand army: his theft amounts to 7,000,000 or 8,000,000. Make an example of some of the officers; do not spare even the generals.

The 7000 or 8000 convicts that you have are not dangerous at Naples; they would become so if they escaped to the Abruzzi. You give too much importance to a mob which two or three battalions and a few pieces of cannon would bring to reason; it will not be submissive until it has had its insurrection, and you have made some severe examples. If you have more cavalry than you want, send it to the kingdom of Italy. However, to say the truth, I cannot conceive how in a country like Naples, the Abruzzi, and Taranto, where it can spread itself, it can give you trouble. The rapidity of its movements is very useful in the open country.

I have arranged the depôts for your army. They must be left in Romagna and near Bologna, and the conscripts taken from them. You have ten times as many troops as you want: 6000 men are more than enough to keep down the kingdom of Naples. Show vigour and make examples. I repeat, let spies be shot, and not sent to Fenestrelle. Not having the proofs, I do not know what to do with the wretches. Your letters tell me nothing; I hear nothing from you about the sea. I do not know if the English are showing themselves, nor the troops which they have on the Sicilian coast. You move much too slowly. You ought already to be master of Sicily. Do not fear the Russians; they.

can do you no harm. I hope that at present you are master of Reggio, and of all the towns on the continent. In war loss of time is irreparable. The excuses that are made for it are always bad. There is always some cause of delay.

[137.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 23, 1806.

My Brother,—I have already told you that I think your operations too slow. The first things to do are to get money and to make severe examples of the assassins. In a conquered country kindness is not humane. Many Frenchmen have been already assassinated. As a general rule it is impolitic to appear kind until one has been severe.

[138.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 31, 1806.

My Brother, — I have sent you Marshal Jourdan, to be employed as Governor of Naples. They have alarmed you unnecessarily about this fortress of Gaeta. I do not see how the transport of thirty pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, will cost so much money. I am sorry that you do not make a regular siege; a bombardment will cost you more, and perhaps uselessly. Nothing is so expensive as a bombardment, if it is kept up. A siege is much more certain. I do not know what to do in France with the convicts whom you have sent to me; I intend to send 500 to Palmanova, and 500 to Alexandria, to be employed on the works. You must go on quietly in your creation of Neapolitan corps. Do not raise more than two regiments, or you will have a mob that will run at the first cannon-shot.

Many abuses take place in the conquered countries of Italy. There were none with the grand army. General Dumas can do nothing with such bad troops as the Neapolitans.

Four millions taken by Masséna have been found; two more must be recovered. I could not have paid your bills of exchange

without them. There is nothing sacred about the azzendamenti,* for there is nothing sacred after a conquest. With such principles you will never found a kingdom. Your government of Naples is much-too lax. If you showed more vigour your army would be at its ease.

You must not send back all the Italian regiments; you might expose them to unnecessary marches. I do not see my way clearly yet. I had rather you would send back to the kingdom of Italy two or three French regiments, whichever you like, but keep the Italians. They would not be of much use to me in a great war against Austria, but they are very good in Naples, where they support the police, are faithful, and are infinitely superior to the Neapolitans. Under all circumstances, the fewer French troops you keep in Naples the better. I want them everywhere, and I have no difficulty in feeding and paying them. From 12,000 to 15,000 men are more than enough to take Sicily. You do not tell me if you are master of Reggio and Taranto. Your last letter is of the 18th. You have been then more than a month at Naples. You go on very slowly.

[139.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 31, 1806.

My Brother,—I think it right to bring the Neapolitan business to a close. The opening of negotiations with England decides me not to lose a moment; for while a negotiation is pending every new event is troublesome. A deputation of three members of the Senate, one of whom is Rœderer, is to wait on you. Princess Julie is already treated as Her Majesty. The instant the deputation from the Senate reaches you, you will fire the guns and receive the fealty of your subjects. You

* The azzendamenti were portions of the public revenue alienated to individuals, like our redeemed land-tax. Joseph had excused himself for not confiscating them by saying that they possessed all the sacredness of property, having been granted to individuals in consideration of sums furnished by them to the state.—TR.

will see that I have created six fiefs in your kingdom. You had better, I think, give the best to Marshal Bernadotte, with the title of Duke of Taranto. I have given Neufchâtel to Berthier, because I ought first to think of him who has served me longest and who has never failed me. Your connexion with Bernadotte, whose children are your nephews, requires you to give him some privileges in your palace. You should secure him 400,000 or 500,000 fr. a year. The Queen of Naples did as much for Nelson. I reward, as you see, and I intend to reward, my generals and soldiers nobly. Be inflexible, and let no one rob.

CHAPTER VI.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 10th of April, 1806, to the 24th of July, 1806. During this period Napoleon was in Paris, or in the neighbourhood, engaged in an abortive negotiation with England, and in a negotiation with Russia, which produced the treaty signed by Oubril in opposition to his instructions, and not ratified by Alexander.

Joseph was employed in taking possession of his kingdom, in the siege of Gaeta, and in the defence of his coasts.

[140.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, April 10, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 27th of March. I have an accurate statement of the sums which Masséna, S—— the paymaster, and the other officers have received. I have dismissed S——, who was at the bottom of this disgraceful business. Six or seven millions are important to the army. It is adding absurdity to roguery to say that this money was a present from the new governments. Such an excuse is more revolting than the crime itself. Many bills are drawn upon me from Naples. Recollect that I have enormous expenses, and may be unable to meet them. I have directed the 2,900,000 fr., for which you told me a month ago that you had drawn on me, to be paid. But take care that all is regularly passed through the treasury. There are forms from which I myself am not exempted. The safety of the state depends on

them. I must be certain that when my troops quit the kingdom of Naples their pay is not in arrear.

[141.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, April 10, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 30th of March. I am glad to be assured that my troops will have been paid up to the 1st of April. Henceforward I shall not be able to send you any money.

You may send into the Pope's territory towards Ancona the regiments which you do not want. They will feed themselves there. I think in fact that you have too many troops: send away 4 out of your 14 regiments of infantry, and one-third of your cavalry. This will enable me to form a corps of reserve, which will be fed at the expense of the Pope, and can move from Ancona towards the Po, or on any other point where its services may be required. When I have received your answer I will put this reserve under a distinguished general.

[142.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, April 11, 1806.

My Brother,—I have your letter of the 2nd of April. That of Colonel Lebrun seems to me to be written in a disposition rather to exaggerate difficulties than to diminish them. Troops need not be posted along the roads, but it is necessary to be master of the coast. You cannot be safe at Reggio unless you occupy Cotrona, Rossano, Catanzaro, Castella, and in short the whole coast on either side, extending towards the Gulfs of St. Euphemia and of Squillace. General Reynier seems to me to have conducted his march imprudently. Troops should have been sent to take possession of Cotrona, Cosenza, and Castella, while he marched on Reggio.

An enemy who is master of the sea will always disturb the

It seems that Calabria is 55 leagues long, whilst in one part it is only 8 or 9 broad, and in another less than 15.

You must have a governor for each of the two Calabrias. You should have commandants on the principal points of the coast, and should establish in the two provinces three flying camps of 700 or 800 men, infantry and cavalry. You will soon, however, remedy these little temporary inconveniences. Towards Taranto you will find supplies of artillery.

Marshal Jourdan will be very useful to you when you have confided to him the government of Naples. He has experience, and a name and a reputation to preserve, which will render him peculiarly fit to command in a great city.

[143.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, April 11, 1806.

My Brother,—You must not disguise from yourself that you will have real possession of the kingdom of Naples only in so far as you establish there a great number of French. That can only be done by giving to some of them lands, and to others employment, especially in the army, and by intrusting them with the command of towns and of military stations and of fortresses.

I see no reason therefore why you should be in a hurry to form Neapolitan regiments, or to call for the services in your army of Neapolitan officers, who will never be really to be depended upon. You will have national property to dispose of, that of the clergy, and of the monasteries, and the fiefs of the crown. What you have to do with them need not be begun yet, but ought to be kept in view.

I cannot too strongly recommend you to establish, as soon as possible, moveable columns and military commissions, not only for the sake of executing speedy justice upon the banditti, but also to punish without delay the excesses of the soldiers, which it is of consequence that you should repress severely.

I suppose that you occupy all the ports of the Adriatic, in order to intercept all communication with the Ionian Islands. Remember that it is necessary, speaking largely, that every

village in your dominions should have seen your troops, and that it is important, at the same time, that the people should not have cause to complain of them. Your army should not be scattered; it is better to have a corps of 600 men, who may make six excursions to different points, or who may send patrols everywhere, but so as to keep the main body in one place, than to divide such a corps into 6 companies of 100 men at each post. Endeavour to keep your battalions together. There is no use, in your position, in making the troops serve in pickets, nor in forming battalions or large detachments exclusively composed either of light infantry or of grenadiers. That breaks up the different corps, and withdraws the officers and soldiers from their principal leaders. The inevitable consequence is to destroy all administration and all responsibility, and everything falls into confusion. It is a principle that companies of light infantry or of grenadiers should not be collected until on the eve of an action. Do your best therefore to keep your battalions and squadrons together; otherwise your army will lose all distinctness, and get into incalculable disorder.

There should be one head-quarter for the whole of Calabria; you will place there the centre of your administration, and the depôts of the regiments, in that province. Cosenza, or Cassano, may be chosen for this purpose. It would be well to keep a certain quantity of biscuit there, in well-managed magazines. I have some at Genoa and at Leghorn, and I have to-day ordered that it should be sent to you without delay.

[144.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, April 11, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received no details about the siege of Gaeta; the engineers and artillery officers ought to send me some. They write so little and so briefly that one knows nothing. It is absurd to place mortars at more than 3000 yards from the walls. I hope that you are master of the Capucin convent. Is the tower of Atra taken, and Monte Secco? What is there to prevent batteries from being established at the point,

to sweep the harbour, and to make the approach dangerous to a man-of-war?

[145.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, April 11, 1806.

My Brother,—Confiscate all ships in the ports of Naples bearing the flag of the Ionian republic, and dismiss all the commissioners of that republic who are in your kingdom. Have a skilful search made into the books of the merchants who have transactions in money for the Russians and Ionians, and seize that money. With a little address, this operation ought to yield you several millions.

[146.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Malmaison, April 12, 1806.

My Brother,—Besides 1300 rations of biscuit, which should have been sent to you from Toulon, I have ordered for you 100,000 from Leghorn, and 400,000 from Genoa. I have also ordered 2 captains, 6 lieutenants, and 12 midshipmen to proceed to you. The vessels which you ought to have for the Sicilian expedition are very light pinnaces, to be worked with oars. This expedition has nothing in common with that of Boulogne, since there is no doubt of your being able, with a breeze, to cross the strait of Messina in three or four hours.

[147.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, April 21, 1806.

My Brother,—I have your letter of the 5th. I am glad to see that a village of the insurgents has been burnt. Severe examples are necessary. I presume that the soldiers have been allowed to plunder this village. This is the way to treat villages which revolt. It is one of the rights of war; but it is also a duty prescribed by policy.

Beginning with the 1st of May, I have established a courier to communicate regularly with the kingdom of Naples; this measure will afford us quicker means of correspondence than the ordinary post, and is one of which your administrative departments may take advantage.

I have collected the depôts of your army in Romagna, and in the territories of Bologna and Modena: I have distributed them into two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and one of dragoons. At the same time, I have ordered a great number of conscripts towards those depôts, in order that the 14 battalions of which they consist may be rendered complete, and give me a reserve of 14,000 men to hold Upper Italy. It will be necessary that the Majors should repair thither, and that the cadres of the other battalions, that is to say the officers and non-commissioned officers, should be sent there, as well as the regimental books, without which they will be lost in these numerous moves, and this would be a source of disorder and confusion. The 62nd regiment has 4 battalions with your army. Send to the depôt the cadres of the 3rd and the 4th; which will leave you 2 tolerable battalions of 700 or 800 men each. The cadres of the 3rd and 4th battalions added to their depôt will bring it to 2000 men. The 20th consists of 4 battalions; one is with your depôt, the other 3 are with your army; keep the 1st and the 2nd, and send back the cadres of the 3rd. The 14th chasseurs has 4 squadrons with your army; send the cadres of the 4th back to the depôt; do the same with the 25th chasseurs, and the 23rd, 29th, and 30th dragoons. Keep, generally speaking, only the 3rd mounted squadron of all your French cavalry regiments, for the sake of having one at the depôt: this will relieve your pay-list, bring your accounts into order, and will increase the number of my troops in Italy; for Europe is not yet sufficiently settled to enable me to dispense with an army at hand. I see that the 14th light infantry has 3 battalions with the army; if so, send the 3rd battalion back to the depôt. Do the same thing with regard to the 1st light infantry, the 42nd and 6th of the line, and the 23rd light infantry. Retain only 2 battalions with the army, and send the cadres of the other battalions to the depôts in the kingdom of Italy. I shall be

glad if you will send back 4 French regiments, such as the 62nd, and the next 3 regiments that have had the most work. If you decide on this, you should send then by Ancona. The regiment of Latour d'Auvergne, which consists of 3000 men, and the 2 battalions of the 1st Swiss, will make up to you for the loss of these 4 regiments; and you must be aware that it will make a great difference to me; for if the movements of the Russians should oblige me to march against them, it would then be too late to withdraw troops from you.

You have too many men you have also too many horses. Send back to the kingdom of Italy and to Ancona all that are of no use to you. Keep the Poles, the Swiss, and the Corsicans; they are excellent soldiers for the country that you are in. You ought to find cloth and shoes in Naples and in your kingdom. You should clothe your troops with the wool of the country. I think that 10 French regiments of 2 battalions each, with 1000 men in a battalion, which would make 20,000 men in all, 2000 Germans, 1200 Swiss, and as many Corsicans, would be enough for the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; you do not want in Sicily more than 15,000 men. However, the matter is not urgent. I still leave all that you have at your disposal, except that I advise you to send to the depôts in Italy your 3rd and 4th battalions and your 4th squadrons, and to keep only 2 battalions to each regiment of infantry and 3 squadrons to each regiment of cavalry.

[148.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, April 21, 1806.

My Brother,—Light troops, such as the Corsicans, who, as well as the Italian soldiers, speak the language of the country, will do excellently to fight the banditti in Calabria. Organise 4 moveable columns commanded by intelligent, honest, and resolute officers; let each column consist of 700 or 800 men, some horse, but many more of foot, distributed in the different parts of that province, and sending detachments in every direction. Before these columns have been established a month they will

know the ground well; they will have mixed with the inhabitants and hunted down the brigands: let them be shot on the spot as soon as they are taken. It is also of the first consequence that you should occupy the coast. All the measures that you have taken for the establishment of military commandants are good, but take care that there be no robbery. If their conduct is arbitrary, if they annoy and rob the people, they will raise insurrections. You must strike boldly, dismiss ignominiously, and bring before a court-martial the first offender. Organise few Neapolitan troops; they are not to be trusted at first; you may form them into one regiment and send them to France. When they arrive in Italy* I will take them into my service; they will be useful in the Pyrenees.

Your measure of taking into your pay all the officers who have not followed the King of Naples is open to much criticism. Do not involve yourself in an immense expense; the presence of many soldiers in Naples will do no harm as long as you have a large French army there; but when the French troops are gone, the Neapolitans will be all ready organised, and you will not be able to trust them.

You should send them to France. I do not include in this category those who opposed the Queen, and were persecuted under the old régime.

On the whole, I see many good measures in your decrees. I cannot too strongly recommend you to display vigour. You should establish in every province "proveditors," after the manner of our *préfets;* generals cannot administer. It seems to me that your gendarmerie is not sufficiently numerous. Put a captain with a company of gendarmes on foot into each of your military districts; let these companies be composed one half of French and the other of Neapolitans upon whom you can rely, and let there be among them some who have been in France.

* Italy, in Napoleon's letters, generally means his kingdom of Upper Italy.—Tr.

[149.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, April 27, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 12th from Cosenza. The Poles are ill adapted to mountain warfare; the Polish colonels' conduct does not surprise me. I am sorry that you have not 2 Italian regiments in Calabria; facility in speaking the language of the country is a great point. The Corsicans are well fitted for this service. I was indignant at reading General Duhesme's refusal to send a battalion to the aid of Cosenza; express to him my severe displeasure. He should have sent, not 1 but 3 battalions, with a brigadier-general. This system of dividing the main body was fatal to the armies of the Rhine; where I have been I have never allowed it. On the bare notice of an insurrection in the rear of General Reynier he should have made his preparations and marched.* General St. Cyr is more annoyed at interference than any one else; nothing does so much harm in war as these feelings. Unite the whole division of General Reynier, which consists of 8000 or 9000 men, in order to garrison the coast and to be ready to cross over into Sicily. Put into Cosenza Corsicans and Italians, or even Neapolitans, if you have any on whom you can sufficiently rely; spare your French troops by not opposing them in small parties to the peasantry; above all, forbid small garrisons, otherwise you will have great losses; the real system is that of flying camps. The best way is to station round Cosenza 1800 men under a general of division, and to let them perpetually send out columns of from 500 to 600 men to scour the country. All the points of the coast on which there are forts capable of affording shelter to a small body of men against the insurrections of a town or of the peasantry may be taken advantage of in order to protect the coast, but there ought nowhere to be less than 400 men: smaller detachments should be put only into fortresses and well-fortified posts.

Have your shoes and uniforms made in Naples; clothing from

France would never reach you. Pay your army regularly. If you have too many troops, return to Italy the cavalry that you do not want; even send back, as I have already told you, 4 French regiments to Ancona. You should take the Corsican legion into your service, and you can then put Calabrians and Neapolitans into it. Send to Corsica for recruits; you know that the King of Naples did so. Send thither, therefore, recruiting parties, but do not employ F——; he is a knave and also a coward, and would be of no use to you.

Send your dragoons to the depôts in Italy; there are many troops there which are not as experienced as the other regiments of the grand army; I wish to prepare them for war as I did the other regiments in Germany.

Whenever you mention a town to me, make a note of its population, for one can obtain no information here upon the subject. If Colonel Laffon had attacked the insurgents boldly, with 400 men he might have brought them to reason. An unorganised body always yields to an attack; this was done by General Dufour. Tell him that he shall be promoted in the Legion of Honour for his good conduct. Let it also be known that I give 8 eagles of the Legion of Honour to the 1st and 2nd light troops, and to the 6th and 42nd of the line: you will send me the names of those who have distinguished themselves.

[150.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, April 27, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 13th of April from Scigliano, with that of General Reynier dated the 11th. I am glad to see that the courts-martial do justice upon the banditti who infest the high roads; it is the only way to clear the country and to destroy the influence of the Queen. When people perceive the danger which they incur in executing her orders, things will take a different turn. I have been at St. Cloud for some days; my troops continue to occupy Braunau, and are upon the Inn. I am expecting the restitution of Cattaro, which the Russians say that they are willing to give

up to me; their occupation of it serves only to compromise the Austrians.

[151.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 1, 1806.

My Brother,—It appears from the report which I have received upon the siege of Gaeta that the artillery has not 20 pieces of cannon, and that there are only 2000 men before the place. This report is dated the 13th April.* You ought to have 6000 men. You should put in requisition all the carriages for the transport of tools, shot, and guns. You ought to have no difficulty in getting 80 pieces of cannon from Capua, from Naples, and from the other fortified places in the kingdom. The whole ramparts of the town being exposed, and liable to be battered at 400 yards, it will soon be dismantled. But it seems that sufficient attention is not paid to this important object. In fact, you have brought into play only the division of General Reynier, and that division forms but a quarter of your troops. You will not take Gaeta without system, nor without bestowing the greatest attention upon it, and already much time has been lost.

[152.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 4, 1806.

My Brother,—Your letters of the 18th and 19th of April have reached me. I am glad to see that you are making preparations for the Sicilian expedition. I am going to send you

* The report seems to have been erroneous. On the 31st May there were before Gaeta—

660 artillerymen,
180 engineers,
3570 infantry, and
250 cavalry:

4660 in all. —ED.

a company composed of 100 men of the body-guard of the late King. They did not emigrate with him; most of them have been employed, and have, for many years, given me proofs of their zeal. They wished to be attached to *my* person, which did not appear to me to be suitable, but I saw no objection to their entering your service; they are men of honour who will do their utmost to serve you. By adding to them some officers and Neapolitans belonging to the first families, you will be able to form a few companies of guards of 100 horse each. By this means you may attach to yourself some of the great landowners, who would not willingly enter the line. I see many advantages for you in keeping by your side 100 Frenchmen of good family, who will have employment and bread, and who will set a good example to the Neapolitan nobles. Be certain that when you have landed in Sicily you will soon be master of the island, without having any siege to make. The court must fly or remain. It would be dangerous to remain, they will therefore go, and when once they are gone you will have an easy bargain of the rest. The Sicilians, like all islanders, love novelty; the capture of Naples will have great influence on them. Have some little pamphlets written which may make them feel the advantage of belonging to a French Prince, who will protect them from the insults of the Moors, and will give them tranquillity and a Mediterranean trade. Take into your service the generals, officers, and soldiers who you think will do for your guard; but pray do not lose sight of the 100 guards whom I am going to assemble at Chambéry and to send to you.

[153.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 21st of April from Gerace. You should not cramp yourself in any way; you may send back all the officers whom you do not wish to keep. You may take all you want for your guard; you may form Neapolitan regiments. If you wish to organize one after the French manner, and will fill it up to 3000 men, send it to

me. I will employ it in the Pyrenees, but the number of soldiers must be complete.

I have made General Reynier Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour; this will prove to him my satisfaction with his conduct.

[154.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 9, 1806.

My Brother,—I have given to General Lemarrois, my aide-de-camp, the command of Ancona and of the coast of the Adriatic from Rimini to the Neapolitan frontiers, that he may intercept all communication between the Russian squadrons and the island of Corfu. He will correspond with you, and will be always ready to do all that the good of the service may require. I put him under the orders of the Viceroy of Italy, because it is the easiest and quickest channel for him to receive your commands.

The court of Rome is behaving ill; at all events I keep Ancona and Civita Vecchia; but there is no good in explaining oneself on the subject.

There should be about 1200 men at Ancona. The 1st battalion of the regiment of Latour d'Auvergne should be there. I have no cavalry to send thither; you have too much; send a regiment of dragoons, which is wanted to watch the coast; it will diminish by so much your expenses. I intend also to occupy Civita Vecchia. There is a quantity of artillery there; you may take some for the siege of Gaeta. I would have sent a general to take the command of Civita Vecchia, but, as you complain of having too many, send a general with one regiment of horse and another of foot to take possession; these regiments will march as if on their return to Etruria, and when they have got as far as Civita Vecchia they will take the place and occupy it, so as to intercept all communication with the sea. The general in command of these regiments will apply for instructions to the Viceroy, who is at the head of one of the armies of Italy. My intention is that he should command the whole Mediter-

however, you do not wish to deprive yourself of French troops, send an Italian regiment to Civita Vecchia. General Duhesme would be a fit man. This measure will be inconvenient to the English, and will put me in a suitable position towards the court of Rome. I need not tell you that all this should be kept secret. No proclamation should be made on entering Civita Vecchia; simply seize the place. The regiments that you send to me may very well share the duty with the few troops of the Pope who are there already, and who will willingly serve under a French general.

P.S. If, in consequence of my preceding letters, you have sent some regiments of infantry and of cavalry on their way to Upper Italy, you can use some of them for Ancona and Civita Vecchia.

[155.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, May 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letters from Chiaretti and Catanzaro. I have ordered the Foreign Office to consider the subjects which you mention, your arms and your flag, and I think that what you propose will be considered most suitable. I see that the "Bergère" is captured; it was rather imprudent in her to attack a frigate. The naval resources of Venice are small; at present they are employed in supplying the islands of Dalmatia. This diversion affects Sicily, by calling away the forces of Russia in that quarter. I have desired M. Lavalette to send to you every day by the Naples courier, the newspapers, and everything that comes out here.

[156.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 13, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letters of the 28th and 30th of April. A hundred pieces of heavy cannon at Taranto are too many. This is French ordnance, which I

had sent thither from Mantua. Pass some on to Gaeta and to Reggio, but it is necessary to keep a considerable quantity of artillery at Taranto, which is destined some day to play a great part.

I saw with pleasure that the Marquis of Rhodie had been shot. Twenty thousand conscripts of the levy of 1806 will arrive in Italy before the end of the year to fill up my ranks. Your plan of completing 4 French regiments with Neapolitans is bad. You will soon have no reserve to depend upon. For the present I intend to leave at your disposal 4 or 6 regiments on the war footing for the service of your kingdom. There will be no Piedmontese in these troops; they will be composed of pure French, and will form a reserve which will put you quite at your ease. You had better organise 2 or 3 Neapolitan regiments; there is no objection to my employing them in France, where they will become attached to the country, and acquire habits of discipline and order which they never would get at home. I made a similar arrangement for my Italian kingdom, and I found it answer. Take care that no Neapolitan enters a French regiment; it would spoil everything; you would not know to whom to trust, should anything occur. This should be your policy for at least ten years.

The journeys which you make have a very good effect. By showing yourself everywhere with your troops, you will accustom the country to your government.

I have asked you to send the cadres of your 3rd and 4th battalions and of your 4th squadrons back to the kingdom of Italy: they will enable me to have a reserve of 20,000 men. The conscripts cannot go from France to the extremity of the Neapolitan kingdom without clothing. They must also be drilled before they start. I receive every ten days a return of your depôts; I will send to you some men from them.

I advise you to pay your army well, and to dismiss all whom you cannot pay.

[157.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 16, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 4th of May from Taranto. I am surprised that there are not the proper gun-carriages at Taranto. General St. Cyr had them in charge; his absence has been too short for them to be destroyed in the mean while, unless it has been done on purpose.

I do not think that Colonel Gentili is capable of bringing into order your gendarmerie; it is an organisation of a peculiar kind, is not to be found in any other country in Europe. It cost me a great deal of trouble to set it on foot in the kingdom of Italy, where it is beginning to work. It is the most effectual way of maintaining order, and it constitutes a supervision half civil and half military, extending over the whole country, which gives you the most exact reports. Do not expect that with a few pickets and a few moveable detachments, such as you have seen in the gendarmerie of Corsica, you will obtain these results. You must have stationary detachments which may become thoroughly acquainted with places and people. The only objection is the expense, but, as the greater part of your country is mountainous, you require more foot than horse. It should not cost you more than 800,000 or a million francs a-year. It will soon be organised. Do not discourage Radet too much.* Prevent him from publishing more than he ought: there must, however, be some circulars and some trouble. However, it is for you to restrain his movements and to direct them as you wish. If, after all, you are not satisfied with him, send him back to me; I will replace him by Brigadier Bugnet, who is organising the gendarmerie of Genoa and of Parma, and whom you saw at Boulogne. He is a man of a mild character, and he knows the system thoroughly.

Russia is beginning to make advances: she has just ordered Cattaro to be given up to me; and I think that the Russian

* General Radet was employed in organising the Neapolitan gendarmerie. Joseph complained that he was too busy and officious, and wished to take Colonel Gentili in his place.—TR.

squadron will soon abandon the Adriatic. I do not know what measures you have taken for the distribution of your troops in the kingdom of Naples. You may have difficulty in finding food for them. If this is the case, you know that I have authorised you to send some of them back to me.

[158.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 19, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 8th of May. I see with pleasure that you are satisfied with the spirit of the Neapolitans. Do not begin the fire upon Gaeta till you have plenty of guns in position, and have brought a great quantity of ammunition to the park.

Whatever they may tell you, believe that one fights with cannon as with fists. When once the fire is begun, the least want of ammunition renders what you have already done useless. You will not have Gaeta unless you besiege it regularly. Two carriages for each gun are not too much. You should have an abundance of sacks of earth, of fascines, and of saucissons* prepared beforehand. At the moment that the fire opens, have 9000 or 10,000 infantry before the place, so as to be sufficient for the trenches and the assaults. Establish batteries of mortars and red-hot shot, to keep off the ships. None of all these should begin to fire until the last moment. During the 12 days that the siege of Gaeta ought to last, the fire ought to go on continually increasing. In the mean while you should have ready a good governor and at least 500 or 600 men, partly French and partly Italians. Erect batteries, construct places d'armes, where the troops will be sheltered by redoubts, and ready to oppose any sallies; in short, combine every means of attack. From this time you need be in no hurry to take Gaeta; Europe is, and will be, at peace.† There are but few Russians at Corfu; as many as half their number have already reached the Crimea. The 2000 or

* Long fascines.—TR.

† Even in May, 1806, Napoléon did not foresee the campaign of that year in Prussia, and still less that in Poland.—ED.

3000 men whom the English may send to Gaeta will not be in Sicily.

As war is not to be feared in the present state of Europe, Sicily is everything and Gaeta nothing; that is to say, nothing for the next two months: you should take it before September; till then there is no cause for fear; and if by that time you are able to enter Sicily, that will be the great point. It is also of great consequence to your further movements that you should be master of Civita Vecchia, and of the whole coast as far as Piombino. I wrote to you to send thither one regiment of infantry, and one of cavalry, with a general. It seems that you prefer to keep all your troops. You certainly have too much cavalry. As I was in doubt as to what you would do, I ordered a Swiss battalion which is at Ancona to be sent to Civita Vecchia. A battalion of the regiment of Latour d'Auvergne ought to be at Ancona. General Lemarrois must have arrived there. He wants a regiment of horse; I suppose that you have sent one to him. You should hermetically seal the whole coast of Italy against the English and against all communication with Corfu. Order the general in command before Gaeta to hold no parley with Sir Sidney Smith; he is a chatterer and an intriguer, and tries only to deceive.

If you do not put the Sicilian expedition under Masséna, send him to Gaeta and let him stay there. Jourdan possesses the activity and prudence which are requisite to keep Naples and the adjoining coast. Reynier is as fit as anybody else to take Sicily. I cannot too strongly advise you to have many engineer and artillery officers. Do not begin to besiege Gaeta until you have guns, carriages, ammunition, gabions, tools, earthbags, &c., and 10,000 infantry; otherwise you will be accused of having received a check, the capture of the place will be delayed, and valuable preparations will be wasted. When you have reached that point, you can draw from the castle of St. Angelo, from Ancona, &c., the powder and everything else requisite for increasing your means. For my part, I think that Gaeta might have been taken two months ago. As it is, perhaps it is better that it was not, if you can see your way to an early invasion of Sicily. Do not let Gaeta in any way diminish your resources

for the Sicilian expedition. Gaeta will not resist a continuous attack, if you have no want of artillery and stores. Beyond all doubt, you might carry the place in 12 days; but to do that, you must have tons of powder, abundance of carriages, gabions, fascines, tools, and at least 20 engineer officers, besides many officers of artillery. I wish that you would send me the returns of your force on the 13th of May, and of its distribution, and that you would let me know how you organised your expedition for Sicily. By the returns which I have, I see that there are only the 10th and 62nd, making less than 3000 men, before Gaeta. I do not see that you have there all the requisite means for executing the preparatory works of a siege. There is not enough artillery nor enough infantry, and there should also be some cavalry to keep a good watch upon the coast. You might make a better distribution of your army, which is far from inconsiderable. The cavalry may be of use to you in several points of the coast. I have always been in the habit, at Boulogne, on the coast of Brittany, of Normandy, &c., of making the chasseurs and hussars practise with the guns, so that they could run whenever they were wanted to serve the batteries. You should put in command before Gaeta one of your principal generals. I see there only the Brigadier-General Lacour: Girardon would do better. You should send thither four or five Brigadier-Generals to command in the trenches, and really to carry on the duty. The greater part of your engineer officers ought to be at the siege of Gaeta.

In spite of the good spirit which prevails in your kingdom, do not trust to it too much; do not arm too many people; it can do no good, and may do harm; on the first disturbance on the Continent it would turn against you. On the other hand, as your army consists of 40,000 men in infantry, cavalry, artillery, French, Italians, and Poles, you may dispose of 15,000 for the Sicilian expedition, send 9000 to Gaeta, and still have a reserve of 16,000 men. Not a day passes without my writing orders for the proper organisation of your depôts of cavalry and of infantry: the returns are sent to me every five days, and are

do not want; keep less cavalry if it costs you too much, but take care that the regiments of dragoons and of chasseurs buy horses in the kingdom of Naples. It would be a pity if the cavalry regiments which I have there should become dismounted. Let them always have at least 500 horses; the expense will not be large, and my cavalry will thus be kept effective and in good order. When a pressure has come it is too late. I suppose that you have surrounded Gaeta with cavalry, and that the coast of Civita Vecchia, as well as that from Gaeta to Naples, is well guarded.

My troops are still in Germany, which I shall not evacuate till I have Cattaro; but a courier has left St. Petersburg, carrying the order that it be given up to me. So I think there will soon be an end of that. If I were threatened with war, I should say to you, "Take Gaeta, concentrate all your resources, and put off the expedition to Sicily." In my present position I tell you the contrary. The less attention you pay to Sir Sidney Smith, the less you speak of him, the better. You should punish the officers under whose charge the prisoners were to march, and who have allowed them to escape. Such carelessness is very culpable.

The business with Holland is settled, and before long Louis will be King of Holland. He is willing, but his health continues to be indifferent. It appears that the squadron that Jérôme is in, and which has been to the East Indies, has captured a large English convoy and three men-of-war. I have no anxiety about this squadron.

You have not yet mentioned the establishment of the express; I suppose, however, that it will be done in time.

[159.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 21, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letters of the 10th and 11th of May. Like you, I had thought of the order of St. Januarius, but we must wait. Send me an account of its institutions and duties. It seems to me too religious. In the first

place, I do not like an order founded by the Bourbons. Institutions should be original, and in harmony with the spirit of the age. In Europe the very name of St. Januarius excites a smile. You should find something which may command respect, and which others may be inclined to imitate. Even the English wish to create something similar to the Legion of Honour.

I have read your letter over again, and I do not see that you have anything to be proud of.* Who founded the order of Constantine? what are its statutes, its privileges?—send me an account of it likewise. I have already begun to quarrel with the piratical states on the subject of your kingdom. Sooner or later we must make an end of them. There are more than 8000 of your subjects between the two regencies. I have sent to them already some assistance, but I do not intend to allow your people to be slaves. With patience and much negotiation we shall get what we want. Nothing can be more important to your people or more popular than the protection of their coasts from the Barbary pirates. It may be the foundation of an order. I will consider of it, and do you give it your attention.

Have you much property belonging to the Knights of Malta? It would be turning it to a good use if you were to employ it in the deliverance of these poor people. It is impossible to set them free without paying for it, as I set the example at Genoa. If you resumed the estates which belonged to the order of Malta, and gave them to an order founded for this purpose, which you may call "The Order of the Deliverance," or by some other name, they would be returned to their original purpose. This order would be well received in your country, and thought an honourable distinction in Europe. Your order should be founded on something of this kind. But it is a subject which requires to be well weighed. I understand that you wish for something religious. Nothing is more so than the defence of the Cross; and this order would be at the same time religious and political. I write without having reflected; this idea requires to be matured.

* Joseph had ventured to say, "I see with some pride that I had already, before receiving your Majesty's instructions, taken all the measures pre-

[160.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 21, 1806.

My Brother,—You have not sent me the name of the governor of the village who came to the assistance of the 300 men of the 6th regiment, nor the name of the captain in that regiment who tore down the standard which the rebels had planted on the church tower.

The intelligence that I have from Russia is all pacific. The Russians will abandon the Queen of Naples. Prussia is at war with Sweden and England. The harbour of Cattaro is soon to be given up to me. Eight or ten cruisers, which I have in the different seas, inflict frightful damage upon the English trade.

[161.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 21, 1806.

My Brother,—You keep too large a force in Puglia. Two or three regiments of cavalry, five pieces of artillery, and 2500 or 3000 men, Italians or Poles, are more than sufficient in that province on the coast of the Adriatic. To guard coasts, it is especially cavalry and field artillery that are wanted. 2000 or 3000 men are enough at Pescara. Keep 6000 or 7000 men within reach of Gaeta, with cavalry and field artillery. The least check before this place through a sally of the enemy, who would destroy your works, would make you lose the labours of a month, perhaps even some of your siege-train, and would give your enemies a mischievous reputation. Put Marshal Masséna before Gaeta; give him 7000 men, and make the works of the siege go on. What has Masséna to do at Naples?

[162.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

May 24, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 15th May. You are not well acquainted with any populace, still less with

that of Italy. You trust too much to their demonstrations. Take your precautions well, but without causing alarm. At the least disturbance on the Continent, that is to say, at the very instant when you require proofs of their attachment, you will see how little you can depend upon them. I shall not answer you on the subject of the body-guard.* You must not suppose me to be so ignorant of the present disposition of Europe as to believe that Naples is too philosophic to have any prejudices in favour of birth; and if Naples seems so to your eyes, it is because all conquered nations put on the same appearance, disguising their sentiments and their habits, and prostrating themselves with respect before him who holds their fortunes and their lives in his hand. You will admit that there are prejudices as to birth in Vienna. Well, the princes there invited private soldiers to their tables. Besides, what I do is less for the sake of Naples than for that of France, where I wish to unite all classes and all opinions. As for the army, when they are told that it is my command, I hope that they will have the goodness to approve of it; I have not accustomed them to interfere with what I do.

I foresaw what has happened at Capri.† With regard to a solitary island there is but one alternative—to put into it a great many troops or none at all.

There have arrived at Alexandria only 800 convicts. If you really sent off 4000, and they have escaped on the road, your kingdom must be poisoned.

Without doubt you should form companies of your guard from the Neapolitan nobility. What I purpose to send to you from France is a very small number.

I advise you again not to be intoxicated by the demonstrations of the Neapolitans.‡ Conquest produces on every people the

* Joseph had requested that gardes-du-corps should not be sent to him from France, on the ground that the Neapolitan noblesse were anxious to serve in his body-guard, and lived familiarly with their French colleagues, and that the strangers would be ill received by the noblesse and by the French army.—TR.

† It was taken, with its garrison, by Sir Sidney Smith.—TR.

‡ Joseph had represented the Neapolitans as attached to his government and to his person.—TR.

same effect as it now does upon them. They seem favourable to you because the opposite party is silent; but as soon as the Continent is troubled, when the 40,000 French cavalry, infantry, and artillery, now in the kingdom, are reduced to a few thousands, and the news is spread that I have been beaten on the Isonzo, and that Venice is abandoned, you will see what will become of this fine attachment. And how could it be otherwise? What have you done for them? What knowledge have you of them? They see the power of France, and they think that, because you are appointed King of Naples, all is settled, because fate has ordered it, because it is new, and because there is no help for it.

You are wrong to send Corsicans who have served England to the departments; they will infect the country. Send them to Alexandria, and let me have a return of them. I will see to their being formed into a corps.

[163.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 24, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 16th May. I should have liked to have the details of the sortie of the enemy from Gaeta. You do not besiege the place regularly. I have already told you to keep Marshal Masséna there, with a sufficient number of brigadier-generals to admit of there always being one in the trenches. You should have 6000 or 7000 men. You do not want so many troops on the coast of the Adriatic. I should have liked a report of the attacks on Ischia and Procida. Either keep many troops there or none: it is an opportunity for making use of Neapolitans or Italians. With the army which you have you should suffer no check and endure no affront.

Sir Sidney Smith is a man whom it is easy to deceive. I have often laid traps for him, and he has always fallen into them; when he has suffered three or four times, he will get tired.

[164.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 26, 1806.

My Brother,—I wish you to send to my cabinet all the newspapers and the new publications that appear in your kingdom. I shall have extracts taken from them, and so learn many interesting details. I have ordered M. Lavalette to send what appears here to you.

[165.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 27, 1806.

My Brother,—I cannot send you any more artillerymen. All troops are fit to serve coast-batteries, even cavalry. I must repeat to you that a regiment of infantry must be sent to Civita Vecchia. You have three times the number of troops that you want. It is essential to occupy Civita Vecchia, in order to deprive the English of all correspondence with Rome. What are you doing with the immense force of cavalry which you keep at Naples? You have also too many troops on the coast of the Adriatic. If you have hopes of soon making your expedition into Sicily, you can, as I have already told you, defer taking Gaeta. If you do not see an early opportunity of crossing into Sicily, I think that you should make haste to get rid of this blister Gaeta. Time lost is not to be regained, and Civita Vecchia ought already to be occupied.

If you cast a glance upon all the coasts which I am obliged to furnish with troops, from Ragusa all the way to the Texel, you will see that yours is the point of the empire upon which I have the largest force assembled.

It is not by placing troops everywhere, but by making them move about, that you will guard all points. Moreover, you must not be disconcerted at the landing of some 50 English upon your shore, since they disembark even upon my coast of Normandy and La Vendée; but I take no notice of them; the peasants ring the tocsin, and provide for their own defence: from Ostend to the Pyrenees I have not 4000 men.

Establish a good police and courts-martial, and you will have nothing to fear from the English. Never talk about Sir Sidney Smith; all that he wants is to make a noise, and the more you talk about him the more he will intrigue.

Europe is not yet quiet. The Russians, who said that they had despatched the order to evacuate Cattaro, make delays. They are having a great discussion on the subject with the Court of Vienna. You should reflect, and, without taking alarm, you should ask yourself what decision you would take if I should have occasion to recall my army upon the Adige. Could you remain at Naples with a quarter of the force which you have, and send back three-quarters into Upper Italy? You have at Naples some detachments of the 60th; send them to join their corps. This manner of dispersing the army is fatal to discipline and order.

[166.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 30, 1806.

My Brother,—I am not surprised at your praise of Marshal Jourdan. I was equally well satisfied with his administration of the kingdom of Italy. He is honest, active, and temperate.

I cannot see why you leave Marshal Masséna at Capua; send him before Gaeta, and desire him to direct with activity all the operations of the siege.

[167.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 31, 1806.

My Brother,—Do not organise your guard so as to be under the control of a single commander; nothing can be more dangerous. Sooner or later it would be necessary to retrace your steps, and it is better not to start in a wrong direction. I have told you already, and I repeat it, that you place too much confidence in the Neapolitans. I say this especially with respect to your kitchen and the guards of your person: lest you should be

French cooks, that you have your table attended to by your own servants, and that your household be so arranged that you may be always guarded by Frenchmen. You have not been sufficiently acquainted with my private life to know how much, even in France, I have always kept myself under the guard of my most trusty and oldest soldiers.

Of all the men on whom you have conferred appointments I know no one, except the Duke di San-Teodoro, whose correspondence with the Queen when he was at Madrid I have seen. Be he what he may, I do not disapprove of your having made him Master of the Ceremonies. But take care that your *valets-de-chambre*, your cooks, the guards who sleep in your apartments, and those who come during the night to awaken you with dispatches, are Frenchmen.

No one should enter your room during the night except your aide-de-camp, who should sleep in the chamber that precedes your bed-room. Your door should be fastened inside, and you ought not to open it, even to your aide-de-camp, till you have recognised his voice; he himself should not knock at your door till he has locked that of the room which he is in, to make sure of being alone, and of being followed by no one. These precautions are important; they give no trouble, and the result is, that they inspire confidence, besides that they may really save your life. You should establish these habits immediately, and for a continuance; you ought not to be obliged to have recourse to them on some emergency, which would hurt the feelings of those around you. Do not trust only to your own experience. The Neapolitan character has been notorious in every age, and you have to do with a woman who is the impersonation of crime.

I have sent you some auditors whom I wish you to employ; you can rely upon their honesty.

It is reported everywhere that Civitella has been taken with 150 of the garrison.

[168.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, May 31, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 21st. Of all your marshals Jourdan is the one whom you can least spare; for it is indispensable that you should have a governor of Naples who may govern the town with judgment and activity during your absence. He does not require a large staff. I have already written to you that you may send back all the generals whom you do not care to keep. Your most ruinous expense is your cavalry, and half of them can be of no use to you. I see no difficulty in your sending back to Ancona and Civita Vecchia all that you do not want. As it is necessary that the number of horses in my cavalry regiments should be complete, I have furnished the funds enabling them to have 700 horses each. I wish your cavalry regiments to be remounted at Naples, where the horses are good. You will see in my decree that you are to provide a sufficient number for the three squadrons of each of your regiments to have 540 horses. This money shall be immediately repaid to you. I wish you to send back in preference the regiments of dragoons, as I should like to assemble them, and to put them into training, so that they may be on a par with those of the grand army. Send back the cadres of the 3rd and 4th battalions; it will be another saving of expense. Send also all the majors. Send back the battalion of the 3rd light infantry, and let it march towards Grenoble. It is of little use to you, and must cost you a great deal; and I wish to recast it. I see that the Italian regiments have a great many men in the hospitals: you have four of these regiments. Send back two at least. You have in fact an army of 52,000 effective soldiers; that is a great deal more than you want. Of these 52,000 you have 44,000 present under arms and 6000 in the hospitals, without counting the Neapolitan regiments that you may have raised. By sending back two regiments of infantry and three of Italian cavalry, four regiments of French dragoons, and the battalion of the 32nd, you will not materially diminish your forces, although your finances will be much relieved. It appears, too, that the Neapolitans are so favourably disposed

towards you that you may easily raise one or two Neapolitan regiments, who would serve you as well as the Italians. You have sent me no monthly return; I wish to have one with every detail. I want always to keep a certain number of soldiers in the kingdom of Italy; and if so many troops are kept at Naples, I am obliged to form new regiments, which is a considerable increase of expense.

You have four regiments of light infantry and ten regiments of the line, all French; six regiments of dragoons and five of chasseurs, also French; four regiments of infantry of the line and three of cavalry, all Italian; one of Polish foot and one of Polish horse; one cavalry regiment of Hanoverian chasseurs, one Swiss regiment, and a battalion of the 32nd French light infantry; so that you have more than 7000 horse. You may very well send back the 1400 men of the three Italian regiments and the 1600 which form the four regiments of French dragoons; you will still have 4000 horse, and your finances will be greatly relieved. If you part with 3000 Italian foot-soldiers and the 531 French of the 32nd light infantry, you will also, without weakening yourself to any great extent, considerably reduce your expenses. 1500 horses are the most that could cross over into Sicily; and if you keep 7000 for the rest of your kingdom, you will have an army of 30,000 men. At present you have 45,000; far too many. Add to this, that when you have landed in Sicily you will no longer be menaced on your coasts, for every effort of the enemy will be directed on Sicily.

I repeat to you again that, with respect to the generals, you may send back whomever you please, as well as any of the other staff officers. I have just ordered a levy of 3000 Dalmatians, which will cost much. If I had had two of the Italian regiments which you have at Naples I should have sent them to Dalmatia and saved myself a great expense. If you do not send me two, I shall be obliged to make another levy. However, as I have already told you, you may retain or dismiss just as you like, provided that you do not ask me for money, and that you keep all your troops in good order. You must get for yourself money, for it is the mainspring of all. The kingdom of Italy, of which the population is

of Naples, pays more than 110,000,000 in contributions. The establishment of municipal dues, of indirect taxes, the revocation of grants, the destruction of privileges, and uniformity of administration, are measures which you will regret not to have taken during the war. What you can do now will not be possible two years hence.

Your 7000 horse cannot cost you, all included, less than 7,000,000; you would save 3,000,000 if you sent back 3000. The calculation of what an army costs, including the pay, the staff, the hospitals, &c., is 1000 francs a man for the cavalry and 500 for the infantry. You have 45,000 foot and 7000 horse; that makes 29,000,000. By getting rid of 7000 horse and some useless people you may reduce your expenses to 22,000,000. I wish you to keep the Hanoverians, because, as they are Germans, I could not employ them against Austria. Keep also the Poles.

[169.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I could not put M. Rœderer's speech in the 'Moniteur,' because, in truth, it is nonsense. He speaks in the name of the Senate as he would do in a newspaper article. He compares me to Machiavelli. I never saw a speech with so little meaning in it, and on an occasion when so many good things might have been said. I also see some passages in your speech which you must allow me to think ill-judged. You compare the attachment of the French to my person to that of the Neapolitans for you: that looks like a satire. What love for you can have a people for whom you have done nothing?—whom you govern by right of conquest with 40,000 or 50,000 foreigners? In general, the less you speak of me and of France, directly or indirectly, in your State papers, the better it will be. There are also some remarks upon the Senate which appeared to me ridiculous, and were thought so by several members of our Senate, men of sense. I have seen several letters of yours, in which you talk of your colleagues, of Pernon, Berlier, &c.; that is out of place, and tends to give you a character which

does not belong to you. You must be a king, and speak as a king. You would be ill off if your only claim to the goodwill of the senators and the conscillers d'état of France consisted in having been their inferior or their colleague in a corps législatif. Such language displeases even those to whom you write.

I do not think that M. Rœderer can be a Senator of France and at the same time your prime minister. Keep him, if you like, as a companion; he has qualities which I value, but he has no tact; he will make no friends for you, he will give you no good advice. If you had no French army, and the late King of Naples no English one, which would be the stronger in Naples? I certainly am not in want of a foreign army to keep me in Paris. I am sorry to see in your letters that you are captivated by particular services. To be captivated is very dangerous. The Neapolitans behave well; there is nothing extraordinary in that: you have treated them kindly; they expected worse at the hands of a man who was at the head of an army of 50,000 men. Your disposition is mild and temperate; you have a good understanding, and you are appreciated; but this is very far from a national feeling, from a submission and attachment founded on reason and interest. These distinctions ought not to escape you. I do not know why I tell you these things, for they will certainly annoy you. What I want is that your acts and your language should be decorous, and suitable to your character.

[170.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I send you a note from the Foreign Office on the arms of the kingdom of Naples. What they suggest appears to me to be reasonable enough, except that I think that the order of the Crescent ought to be omitted; it is obsolete, and it ought not to be revived, as the Grand Seignior has adopted it. The Legion of Honour might be substituted, or the new order which you are to establish.

[171.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 24th of May. I know Marshal Jourdan well; you should attach him to your person; he is experienced, moderate, active, and devoted. I know no man more fit for the government of Naples; for you must have one upon whom you can entirely depend, who will watch the town, which is the more important as it is on your maritime frontier. He will receive the revenues of the duchy which I shall give him from among those which I have reserved for myself in the kingdom of Naples. You should add to it a good salary as governor, so as to give him a great position in the country. Jourdan and Reynier are the two men whose services you should secure. Masséna is good for nothing as a civilian, he is incapable of attachment. He is a good soldier, but entirely devoted to money; it is the sole motive of his conduct, and his only incitement to action, even when under my eye. At first he coveted only small sums; but now thousands of millions would not satisfy him. I am astonished to learn from your letters, and from other sources of information, that the Abruzzi are not yet subdued. What are Reynier and St. Cyr about? Are they asleep? This is a new manner of doing duty.

[172.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 5, 1806, 11 A.M.

My Brother,—The conduct of the court of Rome bears the stamp of madness. I wished with the first stroke to make them feel all that they had to fear from me; and besides, I thought that, in any circumstances, the insulated papal territories of Benevento and of Ponte Corvo could not fail to be troublesome to your kingdom. I have made them into two duchies: that of Benevento for Talleyrand, and that of Ponte Corvo for Bernadotte. I know that these provinces are poor, but Talleyrand is rich, and I will make Bernadotte's duchy worth having. Let these

territories be occupied, at first, as mere military positions. You must be aware that I give the titles of Duke and Prince to Bernadotte for your wife's sake; for I have in my army generals who have served me better, and on whose attachment I have more reason to rely. But I thought that it was proper that the brother-in-law of the Queen of Naples should have a distinguished position in your kingdom. As for the other six duchies, I shall be able to bestow them without difficulty. Both Massena and Jourdan would do. Every blot disappears in time, and the names of the conqueror at Fleurus, and of the conqueror at Zurich, will live, and will be all that will be remembered in the time of their children. When you are master of Sicily, create three more fiefs, and give one to Reynier. I assume that you put him at the head of your expedition, and it will be no small encouragement to him if he has some notion of what I intend to do for him.

Tell me what titles you would give to the duchies in your kingdom. Th titles are not so important as the property attached to them. Each should have 200,000 fr. a year. I have required, also, that the owners of the titles should have a residence in Paris, for the centre of the whole system is there. I intend to have in Paris one hundred fortunes, all of them having grown up with the throne, and alone preserved by entails, while all other fortunes will be split into fragments by our law of inheritance. Establish our civil code in Naples; by that means all the fortunes which you do not preserve will disappear in a few years. This is the great advantage of our civil code. If the rules about divorce make a difficulty for you at Naples, I see no objection to cancelling that head of the code; nevertheless I think it a useful one; for why should the Pope interfere in cases of nullity of marriage? Change it, however, if you think it necessary. As to registrations, you may leave them to the clergy. With these modifications you ought to introduce our civil code; it will consolidate your power, since by means of it all that is not entailed is broken up, and there remain no other great families than those which you endow with fiefs. It is this that has always made me advocate the civil code, and which determined me to establish it.

In an hour I am to receive the Turkish ambassador, proclaim Prince Louis King of Holland, and Cardinal Fesch coadjutor of the Elector, the Arch-Chancellor. I wish you to send 2 squadrons of cavalry and some infantry to Benevento and to Ponte Corvo; pray consider this as an express order, and appoint a commandant to those places who will deliver them over to Bernadotte and Talleyrand; this will prevent meetings, petitions, &c. As this news will get into the papers in two days' time, you must not lose a moment. Cardinal Ruffo has arrived at Ancona; if I had foreseen it, I would have written to Lemarrois to arrest him and send him to Paris.

[173.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 6, 1806.

My Brother,—From all I hear about Gaeta, it appears that the Neapolitans have spiked 4 of your guns, that they succeeded in their sortie, and killed many of your French troops; that before that place the duty is not performed regularly, and that your army makes war as if it consisted of recruits. I have told you a hundred times that you should keep 4 brigadier-generals before Gaeta, as one ought always to pass 24 hours in the trenches, wrapped in his cloak; and that you should have at least 6000 men there. I really cannot imagine what you do with your 40,000 men. You require a first-rate general to command before Gaeta: you have marshals and generals everywhere except where they should be. Since the world began, the reliefs in the trenches have never been made by daylight. I have no returns of your army. I do not know whether you have done as I told you with respect to Ancona and Civita Vecchia; so that I am ignorant of the position of my army of Naples. I desire, however, that you will not demoralize my troops by allowing them to be beaten by Neapolitans. The sally from Gaeta is a real defeat, encouraging to the Neapolitans and discouraging to my soldiers.

[174.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 6, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 27th of May. It would be of great importance if you could at length execute your invasion of Sicily. Peace may be made at any moment, and the uncertainty of your operations would cause delay.* In your letter you do not tell me the number of your vessels, nor do you enter into any details; so that I do not know whether your expedition is ready or not. It is urgent, however, that I should have very precise information on the subject. How do you intend to embark your troops? In what port will you place them while waiting for an opportunity? You ought to land 9000 men at once, with 10 pieces of cannon and 300 charges for each, 15 rations of biscuit and 50 cartridges per man. Marshal Jourdan is much more fit to command troops in the interior than Marshal Masséna, who, on the other hand, is much more capable of helping you to take Sicily by a coup-de-main. To command the 9000 men who are to land first in Sicily, you want a man of determined character, who has mixed in great events. General Verdier would do, perhaps, better than Reynier; if you do not appoint Masséna, send them both. In war, as in literature, each man has his own style. For sharp and prolonged attacks requiring great boldness, Masséna would do better than Reynier. To protect the kingdom against invasion in your absence, Jourdan is preferable to Masséna.

Simultaneously with the departure of your expedition, you must push on the siege of Gaeta, in order to attract thither as many as possible of the English vessels. When once you have effected a landing, I shall consider Sicily as conquered. This is what will happen:—The enemy will oppose your landing; failing in that, they will attack you in 36 hours, and if beaten will retire to their ships. Although the strait is only two or three leagues wide, the currents are so strong that it is possible that the same

* The negotiation conducted by Lord Yarmouth and Talleyrand was still pending; the fate of Sicily was the great question.—TR.

boats may not be able to go, come back, and return to Sicily in those decisive 36 hours. You want first boats, and then a harbour; in a fortnight, sooner or later, you will have the boats, for the speronari, the Neapolitan feluccas, or anything else will do. What harbour have you chosen? How many boats of all kinds can it hold? What boats have you? I want clear notions on these matters. It would be madness to attempt to land an advanced guard of less than 9000 or 10,000 men. From the information which I have received, it appears that there are in Sicily nearly 6000 English.

On reading over your letter with attention, I find some passages which I do not understand. You say that General Reynier is to establish a battery on the other side, opposite to Pezzo, and that then the rest of the army will cross over. By sending some gunboats, without doubt this battery may be easily established; but you must not wait for it. In this case two-thirds of your boats should carry only troops, every one of whom should have his 50 cartridges, and there must be 50 per man in reserve distributed to the companies, 12 or 15 rations of biscuit, and a few rations of brandy. The remaining third should be loaded with artillery, so that, two hours after the landing, the boats that carried the troops may return to bring others, without caring whether there are batteries or not, or waiting for them to be prepared. 9000 or 10,000 picked men are worth 20,000: unquestionably they will be enough, if there are only 6000 or 7000 English, to take Sicily; not that I object to 5000 or 6000 men being sent afterwards. You must trust to no one to choose these troops. These 9000 men must be the *élite* of 20,000; they must be well armed, and distributed in three divisions, each commanded by two brigadiers and a general of division, all true soldiers and men of vigour. Each division should have six guns, and some engineer officers. If you have these, whether the remainder join them or not, you will be master of the country.

Under the circumstances I consider Masséna to be the best to command these three divisions. If you were really accustomed to war, I should advise you to accompany them; but it is better that you should stay at Naples: it would be risking

too much, and you would be of no use, for, after all, your presence would not add to their strength. You have not sufficient practice in campaigning to make the good of your presence compensate for the harm which your being beaten would do. I think that you should establish yourself at Reggio to direct the embarkation yourself. Your presence will, without doubt, be necessary afterwards, but it will be in the interior of Sicily, when your 9000 men have landed. It is probable that your expedition will not be larger. You will be wanted in Sicily as you were in Calabria, to manage the political and internal affairs. You should aspire to the kind of glory which suits you, and not risk it all for the sake of another. When you have organised the expedition, you will have the credit of it, and a general acquainted with war will do better without than with you. If you organise the expedition of Sicily on the principle that you are to accompany it, and the chances of the sea prevent that, your reputation may suffer.

I think, then, that the expedition should be organised on the supposition of your absence; that the advanced guard of 9000 men should be landed at once; and that the 5000 or 6000 men, by whom they are to be reinforced and kept up to their proper number, should be ready to follow. You are a soldier only so far as a king ought to be; if you undertake the details of the expedition, you expose yourself uselessly to what may be very disagreeable. If Sicily were nearer, and I myself could be with the advanced guard, I should go over with it; but then my experience of war might enable me with these 9000 troops to beat 30,000 English. If, therefore, I were to run some risks, they would be compensated by real advantages, and those advantages would be such as to make the actual danger very small. Suppose that Masséna or Reynier cross with the 9000 men, if they succeed, it is well; if they do not succeed, it is a check of no great importance. Supposing, on the contrary, that you cross over, it gives no additional chance of success, perhaps indeed less; and in case of failure, it would be a very material check. I wish you to write to me a little more fully on this subject.

The young aide-de-camp whom you sent to me, and with whom I conversed in order to learn the opinion of the army

uttered many absurdities. The Sicilian expedition is easy, since there is only a league of sea-passage, but it requires to be made with system, for no success is to be had by trusting to chance. You began the campaign so ill, that, had the English and Russians stood their ground, you would probably have been beaten. In war nothing is to be done but by calculation. Whatever is not profoundly considered in its details produces no good result. Weigh carefully what is to follow immediately the disembarkation, so that no check may affect my army of Naples. I repeat it, 36 hours after the 9000 men are landed the English will be routed; if so, they will re-embark, and as the court will follow them, the resistance cannot be long.

[175.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 6, 1806.

My Brother,—You have in the kingdom of Naples 862,000 pounds weight of powder; that is to say, 300 at Naples, 200 at Ancona, and more than 300 at Capua. That is a great deal more than you need for all that you can have to do.* You are not, then, in want of powder. Besides, as soon as your detachments are at Ancona and Civita Vecchia, you may take some from Ancona. You have 68 24-pounders of brass, 45 16-pounders, and 19 12-pounders; that is to say, 132 brass cannon of large calibre, and 46 mortars. You have in iron 17 36-pounders, 147 33-pounders, 104 24 pounders, 51 18-pounders, and 36 12-pounders; that is to say, nearly 400 pieces of ordnance in iron, independently of some of 8 and of 6 pounds calibre, and of all your field equipage. You have, then, a sufficient number of projectiles. With a little activity and management, therefore, your artillery will not be in a bad condition: you have altogether nearly 1000 pieces of artillery. France has not in all more than 15,000, and you know what a cloud of fortified places we have.

* Joseph had complained of want of powder.—TR.

[176.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 6, 1806.

My Brother,—I see entered in the accounts of the War Department 27,000 pair of shoes as having been sent two months ago to your army by way of Genoa and Rome. Let me know if you have received them, or write to Rome for news of them. 200,000 rations of biscuit have been sent to you from Leghorn, 400,000 from Genoa, and a great quantity from Toulon. Write me word what you receive of these things as fast as they arrive.

[177.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 7, 1806.

My Brother,—I cannot send you any reinforcements; I cannot send all my troops to fill Naples: I have but few in Italy. Dalmatia, Istria, and Cattaro take a great many. It appears from your returns that you have 53,000 men, of whom 8000 are in the hospitals; there remain, therefore, 45,000 in health and present under arms. That is 15,000 men more than you want. You have abundance of everything. You were not so ill off for powder as you thought; you have more coast-guns and siege-artillery than you require. You have twice as many generals and staff-officers as necessary. If you cannot take Sicily and Gaeta and keep Naples with your present army, you would do no more with 100,000 men. I will analyse the return that you sent to me dated the 29th of May. What do you want at Naples with two companies of horse-artillery, that is to say, with 120 men? Four regiments of infantry at Naples are a great many; two are enough, if you add, when requisite, one or two more regiments of cavalry. The police duties of large towns are performed by cavalry, and also the observation of the coast; your cavalry is employed so as to be of no use to you. You can, therefore, spare 3000 infantry at Naples. A regiment of infantry of the line is not wanted at Portici, nor one at Capua. One

as well as infantry. At Capua one cavalry regiment is sufficient. It is useless to keep a regiment of horse at Caserta. The 1st regiment of infantry of the line is not wanted at Chieti; two cavalry regiments at Gravina and Matera are too many; one is enough. The 2nd regiment of Italian infantry is useless at Pescara; and so is the 5th at Molfetta. You keep, in short, 9600 men between Taranto and Pescara! 3000 are sufficient; this gives you 6000 available men. If you intend to hold every post in your immense kingdom of Naples, all the French army will not be enough.

I see by your returns that your troops are not employed. When I was fighting in Moravia, at 20 leagues from Vienna, I did not keep as many soldiers in that town as you do in Naples, and what have you to fear in Naples, where you have fortresses? This is how I would place your troops when you make your expedition to Sicily:—The 22nd light infantry and 52nd of the line at Naples, also the 4th, 14th, and 25th light cavalry; that would be 4000 men for that town, of whom more than 1200 would be cavalry. It would be their duty also to keep Portici. Two regiments of dragoons should be added to the Naples division to guard the coast of Salerno; the 6th of the line, the 10th, 62nd, and 101st of the line, and the 4th Italian regiment, with 800 horse (which with the artillery and sappers would make more than 9000 men), should be charged with the siege of Gaeta, having first put a small garrison into Capua. The 1st, 14th, and 23rd light infantry, the 1st, 20th, 29th, 42nd, and 102nd of the line, the Poles, Corsicans, and Swiss, with some regiments of chasseurs and dragoons, should compose your Sicilian expedition. You would have a corps of 18,000 men by adding to these the battalions of grenadiers of the two regiments which I place in Naples, and those of the 4th Italian regiment. Four hundred horse, the 2nd Italian regiment, and 4 pieces of artillery would be enough to protect the coast from Pescara to Manfredonia: they might be formed into 3 moveable columns of more than 600 men each, who might be sent wherever they were wanted. Towards Taranto 3 regiments of horse, which would amount to 1200 men, and 2 regiments of Italian infantry, making in all nearly 4000 men, might be formed into 6 moveable

columns of 600 men each, infantry and cavalry, a force which would occupy the peninsula of Otranto, and would extend over the whole heel of Italy.

Remember that you have in the kingdom of Naples, substantially, an army of 60,000 men. I have not yet called out the conscripts, and it is not possible that the skeletons of the regiments should be filled up before the month of December; besides that I shall require the 3rd battalions for other purposes. You have an immense army. In making this distribution, I act according to your ideas: were I in your place, I should leave not more than 400 men at Pescara, and only one regiment in the peninsula of Taranto. As to powder, you can draw some from Ancona and Civita Vecchia, and you have 430,000 kilogrammes, that is to say, 860,000 pounds weight,* independently of 18,000 cartridges. With that your supply cannot run short; you have a sixteenth part of all that there is in France. The Queen of Naples has but a small force in Sicily, and the English have only 6000 men. As for the Russians, they have not more than 3000 men at Corfu, and they are not thinking of you.

[178.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 10, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letters of the 31st of May. I am glad to hear that General Duhesme has started to occupy Civita Vecchia. I send his instructions through the commander-in-chief of my army of Italy; I wish you to have as little as possible to do with these quarrels with the Pope. Let General Duhesme know that he forms part of the Army of Italy.

[179.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 11, 1806.

My Brother,—All the details I receive of the affair on the 15th of May before Gaeta prove to me that there is no sort of

* This is the weight in French pounds.—TR.

regular service done there, and that General Lacour has not the faintest idea of the manner in which a siege should be conducted. There is not a single precedent for sending Corsicans, that is to say inexperienced troops, to the trenches. My advice is that you should withdraw them from Gaeta, and send them into Calabria, where they will be in their proper place. You could not have worse troops for a siege.

[180.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 13, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 4th of June. You tell me that you have sent back to France some commissariat officers who have committed depredations at Cosenza and at Civitella; you ought to have arrested them. It is impossible to govern with this weakness. Send me their names, that I may have them arrested before they cross the Alps. Let me have the names of the Corsican officers who were in the English service. You say that they quitted Corsica not long ago; they are therefore guilty of rebellion: you should have had them arrested and sent to Fenestrelle.

Write to Prince Eugène, to General Junot at Parma, and to General Menou at Turin, to arrest them as they pass. It would be strange if my subjects had a right to enter the service of my enemies, and to escape punishment merely by quitting it. It is not enough that there are complaints of General Lecchi. I must know what sort of complaints they are. The Queen of Naples used to complain of him, but without any reason.* In all the measures of your government which have fallen under my observation I see too much softness; you want vigour. The proclamations of the English to the blacks might have been expected. The blacks should not have been put before Gaeta.†

* Joseph had sent General Lecchi away "because he was complained of."—TR.

† The English had addressed proclamations to the blacks in the French service, from St. Domingo, exciting them to desert.—TR.

[181.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 18, 1806.

My Brother,—I have told you how difficult it will be for me to procure the money that you ask me for; but empower some one to raise a loan for you either in Paris or in Holland. The Dutch have abundance of capital. I will readily guarantee any sum that you borrow as King of Naples. I have no doubt that by this means you will be able to obtain as much money as you want. The Kings of Wurtemberg and of Bavaria have raised similar loans. I have already answered you on the subject of M. Rœderer, that it was impossible for him to be minister at Naples, and, at the same time, remain senator in France; but I tell you again that nothing need prevent your keeping him as long as you like, without giving him any ostensible title.

[182.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 21, 1806.

My Brother,—Lord Yarmouth has arrived in Paris with powers from the King of England to sign the peace. We should agree pretty well if it were not for Sicily. The English would be willing to acknowledge you King of Naples, but not of Sicily, as it does not belong to you. For my part, it does not suit me to conclude anything till you are in possession of the whole of your kingdom. It has oozed out in the negotiations that, foreseeing that Sicily would be an obstacle, they allowed six weeks to pass without sending thither reinforcements, thinking that in the mean while you would take possession of the island; but that at last they were obliged for the sake of appearances to send some troops.*

* This is improbable in the highest degree.—TR.

[183.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 21, 1806.

My Brother,—They insert in my returns a great many pairs of shoes as having reached Naples by land by way of Genoa and Turin; let me know the number that you have received. I see in your returns that the 10th and 20th regiments of the line have still their 3rd battalions in your army; pray send back the cadres of these battalions. The 62nd has its 3rd and 4th battalions; send back their cadres. I am surprised that the colonel of the 62nd has not yet arrived. The 4th regiment of chasseurs, and almost all your regiments of cavalry, have still their 4th squadron; send back likewise their cadres. This will much relieve your finances, will not diminish the strength of your army, and will place me in a condition to form at Bologna or in the Romagna a second army either to support you or to go to any other place where it may be wanted. I have already told you to send back any general officers who are in your way. You may also send to Paris General St. Cyr if he is of no use to you. The returns furnished by your staff are not good. I have ordered the Minister of War to send to you printed forms.

[184.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 21, 1806.

My Brother,—The affairs of the Continent appear to be settled; my troops will soon enter Cattaro. Two or three engagements have taken place with the Russians, and they have been beaten. The Emperor of Russia wishes to make peace; he has sent plenipotentiaries. If you had taken Sicily, we should have peace even with England. The passage across the strait cannot be much more than 4000 yards. You must have a great number of speronari and boats of all kinds. With all this you ought soon to be master of the island.

[185.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 21, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 12th of June. I cannot promote any of the engineer officers till Gaeta is taken. General Camprédon ought not to have made this request.

They insert in the 'Journal de Paris' a great many absurd articles upon Naples. For instance it is not right to say that the salt-tax has been abolished in Naples, when I have just laid it on in France. Pray tell Rœderer not to interfere; nothing can be more awkward or worse conceived than his articles. Of course you should be considerate in your government of Naples, but you might manage it better; do not make the French feel that the kingdom of Naples is of no use to them. What business has Rœderer to speak of Naples in the newspapers? If you have abolished the salt-tax, you have done wrong. If you are so indulgent, you will lose your kingdom. You will take neither Gaeta nor Sicily, and you will be always in want. If you accustom your people to pay no taxes, how will you keep up an army or navy? They ought to pay as much as the French. In France they pay the excise and the other duties on salt, the registry and the stamp duties, &c. I can hardly believe that you have had the folly to put an end to the salt-tax; you probably have only made some modification in it.* But what was the good of putting that into the 'Journal de Paris'?

[186.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 22, 1806.

My Brother,—The court of Rome has gone quite mad. They refuse to acknowledge you, and I know not what sort of a treaty they wish to make with me. They think that I cannot

* This was true. Joseph defends himself by stating that the change which he had made was the requiring every commune to purchase from the government a quantity fixed by the government at a price also fixed by the government.—TR.

reconcile a great respect for the spiritual authority of the Pope with the repression of his pretensions to temporal dominion. They forget that St. Louis, whose piety was undoubted, was almost always at war with the Pope, and that Charles V., who was an eminently Christian prince, long besieged Rome, and ended by taking possession both of the city and of the States of the Church.

[187.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 22, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letters of the 13th of June. I am sorry that you are deprived of the talents of Captain Jacob. You place confidence in M. de Lostanges,* who is not brave, who will intrigue as much as possible, and who will serve you ill. Jacob is brave, and has shown ability on the coast of the Channel. If you give positive orders to Captain Jacob, he will do everything you desire. Having said this, I leave you to act as you think proper; but so long as you have not a national army (and you cannot have one within ten years), you must be prepared to meet with some repugnance on the part of the French in deferring to Neapolitan command. The Frenchman has never been obedient, and is still less so since the war and the revolution have excited him.

[188.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 24, 1806.

My Brother,—This wrong-headed Rœderer is at his tricks again. Now he wants to deprive my ministers of the clerks in their offices. Enclosed is the letter which he has written to the Superintendent of Military Accounts. This step does not surprise me on the part of Rœderer, who has neither tact nor a sense of propriety, but it does surprise me on the part of

* Joseph had complained of the insubordination of Jacob, and had replaced him by Lostanges.—TR.

Dumas. I have desired the minister Dejean to reprimand him severely. Rœderer wants also to carry off our actors, and upon which of them do you think he casts his eyes? only upon Fleury and Talma. I know it because they have declared that they could not listen to his applications without being authorised. M. Rœderer, then, is not aware that none of my subjects can leave France without my permission? and it is not by attempts to seduce them that they will be obtained.

[189.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 26, 1806.

My Brother,—I see from your letter of the 17th that you have received some biscuit, and that 12,000 pairs of shoes have reached you from France. Take care to inform me of the arrival of each consignment of biscuit and shoes, that I may make sure of not being cheated in my accounts. Count the biscuits one by one; their quality should be good. The shoes ought to be made of stout leather, not pasteboard; they cost me 5½ francs a pair. If they are not good, let me know, I will have deductions made for them in the general settlement. General St. Cyr asks for troops, because he thinks that he saw some Russian frigates; but no general is satisfied unless he has an army. Of course you have answered him that a general has always enough troops if he knows how to employ them, and if, instead of sleeping in towns, he bivouacs with his men. If an army were required at each head-quarters, all the troops in France would not be sufficient to protect the coast of Naples. If whenever there is the least disturbance General St. Cyr will take the field with a few moveable columns of 500 or 600 men each, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, he will beat the rebels, take the banditti prisoners, and be on the spot wherever the enemy may choose to land.

I beg you to tell me whether you have sent back the cadres of your 3rd and 4th battalions, and your fourth squadrons; it will diminish your expenses and enable me to send a good reserve corps to your depôts, to keep up the numbers of your regiments. Do not delay the Sicilian expedition. Believe me, you will not

be in want of powder. If it is at all economically used at Gaeta, they will not consume more than between 300,000 and 400,000 weight in the siege.

You will be sorry that you sent back the French naval officers. You will feel the want of them as soon as you commence your expedition to Sicily.

Two batteries of three 24-pounders are not enough at Canatello and at Scylla. If, as your equerry says, you intend to assemble your troops at Scylla, you will want more guns there; you ought to have about thirty 18, 24, and 36 pounders.

[190.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 28, 1806.

My Brother,—It appears, from a review of your depôts in the kingdom of Italy, which took place on the 15th of June, that the majors, the books of accounts, and the cadres of the 3rd and 4th battalions, and of the 4th squadrons of several regiments of your army, had not then arrived at the depôts.

[191.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 29, 1806.

My Brother,—M. Cellerier is enticing all the actors and actresses in Paris to Naples. Already one or two actresses of the Opera have signified to me their wish to go to Naples; you must feel the absurd effect of such conduct. If you want Opera-dancers, be sure that I will send you as many as you like, but it is not right to endeavour to seduce them. Russia behaved in this way, and I was so disgusted that I ordered the Emperor of Russia to be told that I would send him, if he wanted them, all the actresses of the Opera, with the exception of Madame Gardel. I should have put Cellerier in prison if he had not been known to be your architect.

[192.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, June 30, 1806.

My Brother,—You will see by the accompanying decree, which will be sent officially to your Minister of War, that I have put the Corsican legion at your disposal. All the rolls shall be sent to you, in order that you may yourself appoint the officers. If it suits you, you may recruit the legion in Corsica, but without taking any conscripts for the purpose. I think that you would do well to keep at its full number a corps of Corsican troops. If you would like to have all the Polish troops, I will send them to you likewise; you may also take into your service the 1st Swiss regiment, which is composed of four battalions. The 4th battalion is in Corsica; I will order it to join at Naples. Of all the Swiss regiments that you could have, this one will be the most attached to you, because it is composed of men who fought by the side of the French in the revolutionary wars. The other regiments are differently manned; you could not equally rely upon them. You have already the Corsican legion, consisting of 2000 men; these, with a Swiss regiment of 3000, and 3000 Poles, give you altogether a corps of 8000 men.

[193.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 5, 1806.

My Brother,—Your government is not sufficiently vigorous; it is not sufficiently strongly organised. You are too fearful of making enemies; you are too kind. You place too much confidence in the Neapolitans at this juncture. Be sure that this system of moderation will not succeed in the end. This is the opinion of all the army at Naples. Be therefore more energetic,

[194.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 5, 1806.

My Brother,—You have sent a sufficient number of convicts; we no longer know what to do with them, nor how to feed them. They are an enormous expense. They have infected the hospitals on their road; a great many have escaped, and it will be difficult to catch them in the mountains.

There are in France already so many convicts that it is impossible for me to receive any more; pray do not send them to me.

[195.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 6, 1806.

My Brother,—I see no objection to General Mathieu's accepting one of the commands in your guard. The enemy will not make any serious incursions; at most they will only lay waste a few villages. The English are not such fools as to compromise their troops. There is no harm in your sending General St. Cyr back to France. Since you are organising Neapolitan regiments, I do not know why you should not put into them your recruits. I have a great objection to placing Neapolitans in French cadres; I always refused to do so in Italy.*

You have the 20th regiment of the line: complete the 2 battalions of that regiment, which are with your army, to 2400 men, that is to say, to 150 for each company. There are only 1500 French at present belonging to the 20th; you may therefore employ in this manner 900 Neapolitans. If this answers, I will send you the cadres of the 3rd and 4th battalions, which may also be filled up with Neapolitans. In this way your object will be attained, and the character of my army will not be changed.

* It is difficult to reconcile this passage with the following one.—TR.

[196.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 6, 1806.

My Brother,—I shall be glad to hear that you have appointed M. Arrighi,* who is Vicar-General of the island of Elba, to a bishopric in your kingdom.

[197.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 8, 1806.

My Brother,—I have done what you wished for Major Thomas. You may tell him that he is an officer of the Legion of Honour. You may dismiss all the officers whom you do not want. I have already told you that you may send back St. Cyr or Masséna. If you have any more precise complaints to make against General R——, send them to the Minister of War, that he may be punished.

Everything belonging to the linen and shoes and stockings of your army will be sent immediately to Naples. You must not be surprised at the details into which I enter. I must think of everything, so as never to be taken unawares. The kingdom of Naples takes up 14 of my regiments; 8 are employed in Istria and Dalmatia; that makes 22 regiments out of my own disposal. I must find substitutes for them, and I must keep in my depôts in Italy sufficient winter clothing for 30,000 conscripts.

Is it prudent to put arms into the hands of persons who belonged only yesterday to the opposite party? Have you not too much confidence?

My negotiations with England are going on; if it were not for Sicily all would be already settled.

I am sorry to see that your gunboats, which are your means of transport, are employed before Gaeta, where they are of no use, and are even in some danger from the immense superiority of the enemy.

* Related to the Duke of Padua.—ED.

I wish you to send me the exact state of your Neapolitan army, in respect of generals as well as soldiers. Be careful in this matter. It is throwing away your resources to take into your pay troops without officers, little attached to you, who may fail you in a crisis. You should guide yourself by this supposition: If a new coalition were formed, and if a battle were lost on the Adige, what would be the conduct of these fellows? I know that this will not take place. But, after all, it *may* happen, and it is in ordinary times and in peace that wisdom and foresight should be shown.

[198.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 12, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received the return of your army; it is carelessly drawn up. There are some inaccuracies in it; the strength of your cavalry on service is not distinguished from that in the depôts; your minister of war should attend to this. When you have taken Gaeta I wish you to send me back the cadres of your 4th squadrons; send back also all your dragoons, as well as the grenadiers and light companies belonging to your 3rd and 4th battalions, for I want to form a real army out of your depôts, to be used on any emergency.

My position is brilliant, but my dominions are so extensive that I must pay great attention to keeping my troops in hand, so as to make them go as far as possible. I am aware that it would be better to keep the regiments at Naples undivided, but, in that case, I could not have given you, besides the Poles, Corsicans, and Swiss, 14 regiments of infantry; I was obliged to send to you what was nearest. Within the next three months your 3rd and 4th battalions will afford me a corps of 20,000 well-trained men; if you then continue to want a great many troops, it will be easy for me to withdraw 5 regiments, or 10 battalions, from your army, and to send you 10 complete 3rd battalions, which would make 9 regiments of 3000 or 3500 men each. This is what I aim at; it would produce simplicity and economy, but in the mean time I am carried away by circum-

stances, and I must have in hand a force to defend the Isonzo at a moment's notice. You are so far off, and events succeed each other so rapidly, that all would be decided before you and your army had time to arrive. Endeavour therefore to send back all the majors, the 3rd battalions, both officers and soldiers, the grenadiers, and the light companies. I have authorised you to fill up the 20th with Neapolitans. If you think that this combination will succeed, keep the cadre of the 3rd battalion; it seems that you have sent back the cadre of the 2nd battalion of the 62nd. Recruit your Corsican legion in Corsica; admit into it no Neapolitans; it should be composed entirely of Corsicans.

When Gaeta is taken, I wish you to send back the 3rd battalion of the 32nd; that corps is in training, and it ought to be kept together. The Poles are to remain in your kingdom; they may even enter your service if you please, but, in any case, as long as they form part of your army, they should be kept up and paid out of your treasury. When you are master of Gaeta, send back all your Italian troops, both infantry, cavalry, and sappers and miners; I want them for Dalmatia, where I keep up a fierce war with the Russians and the people of Montenegro, and I wish the two nations to share the danger.

[199.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 15, 1806.

My Brother,—I have ordered all the clothing and shoes which belong to your battalions in the field to be sent to them from the battalions in the depôts.

I do not think that the negotiations with England will come to any good; they have taken into their heads to keep Sicily for the late King of Naples; I cannot agree to this article. As soon as the fire is opened on Gaeta, assemble as many fresh troops as you can. Take care to keep a column of 4000 or 5000 men in reserve, not to be under fire before the fourth or fifth day, to be employed only on some important occasion, or to hold some important work. I cannot understand of what use your gun-

boats will be; they would do better on the coast of Sicily. The enemy will be too strong for them to come out, or you will lose a good many.

Your first object should be to take Sicily. With regard to Gaeta, it seems to me that your equipment for the siege is very good, and that you have sufficient ammunition. Desire the artillery not to fire with whole charges when half charges are enough.

I am sorry that you have no small mortars: 8-inch mortars, at a distance of 200 or 300 yards, do great execution. The object is not to fire a great deal, but to fire well. Why is not the engineer officer Chambarlhac at the siege? He is a good soldier. It is impossible to have too many artillery and engineer officers there.

[200.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 16, 1806.

My Brother,—The 6th battalion (bis) of the train ought to have reached Naples; your minister has by this time received orders to send back to the kingdom of Italy the detachments of the 7th and 4th battalions (bis). Directly after the capture of Gaeta send back the detachments of these battalions; the object is to keep the regiments in a good state. Let those who assassinated the blind soldiers from Egypt be tried and punished as they deserve. Make the trial striking; I will let it be as well known as possible here.* The atrocious cruelty of the Queen is, however, known to the whole world, including Russians, Austrians, and English. They are well aware that she could not return to Naples, as she would have to wade through a sea of blood. The contempt which she inspires is universal, and considerably diminishes the sympathy felt for her by those who have ruined her.

* Some blind French invalids, returning from Egypt, had been shipwrecked on the Neapolitan coast, and murdered by the peasants.—ED.

[201.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 19, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter.* Nothing could be more fortunate than the landing of the English. General Reynier will be joined by the brigades, which are posted *en échelons* along the coast, and will beat the English. Without cavalry they cannot attempt to remain in the country; it is probable that they will feel the effects of this invasion. You have a great many horse and they have none. It is difficult to conceive the fatality that has urged them on. Do not be surprised at the little mischief which your cannonade will do at first to Gaeta; if your fire is, as I suppose, well directed, whole pieces of the wall will fall all at once on the sixth or seventh day of the cannonade, and then is the time that you must not lose a moment in assaulting the works. I have ordered not only linen and shoes, but everything that they can spare you, to be sent to you from the depôts. Be vigorous.

[202.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 21, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 12th of July. You have as yet no tidings of General Reynier, and you have made no expedition from Naples. The art of war, which everybody talks about, is difficult. In all your council you have not one man who has the first rudiments of it.

I have concluded my peace with Russia; the treaty was signed yesterday the 20th of July.† Russia does not interfere in the affairs of the late King of Naples. It has been settled that she will acknowledge you when the war is over, and that in the mean time you will receive and protect her merchandise in the ports of Naples, as she will protect yours in the ports of

* Announcing the landing of General Stuart in Calabria.—TR.

† The Treaty of Oubril, which Alexander refused to ratify.—ED.

Russia; that the Russians are to remain in Corfu, and that intercourse is to be free on both sides.

We are still negotiating with England; Sicily continues to be the stumbling-block; they appear, however, inclined to yield a little, but, for God's sake! with 36,000 men, do not let one of your divisions be destroyed. The reason why you have no news of Reynier must be that the communications are cut off and the country is in insurrection. I am very sorry that business keeps me in Paris; if I had been in Naples, not an Englishman would have landed, or, if they had, they would have been surrounded, within four days, by double their force, and pursued by columns of cavalry; not one would have escaped. But how can it be helped? This result would have been obtained by movements of brigades in *échelon*.

I have desired 500,000 fr. and 30,000 pounds weight of powder to be sent to you, but recollect that it is very difficult to send you 5 or 6 millions in specie. Naples is full of resources, but a firm and vigorous administration is necessary to make use of them.

[203.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 21, 1806, 10 o'clock P.M.

My Brother,—You may announce the peace with Russia; do not, however, appear to be too glad, as that would injure our reputation for power. A courier who has just arrived from London makes me think that the English are astonished by this decision of Russia, and that they are somewhat inclined to give up Sicily, which till now has been the stumbling-block. If these suppositions are confirmed you will have the finest kingdom in the world, and I hope that, by setting to work earnestly to form a good army and fleet, you will assist me to become *master of the Mediterranean, which is the chief and perpetual aim of my policy*. For that, it is requisite to obtain large sums from the people. Naples and Sicily ought to yield you 100 millions; Italy and France pay me more in proportion. You should have 6 vessels of the line, 9 frigates, and 10 brigs, and

you ought to keep up an army of 40,000 men, French and Neapolitan. Keep, however, these hints to yourself just now, for it is possible that the project may fail, and I would rather have ten years of war than allow your kingdom to remain incomplete and Sicily in dispute.

[204.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 24, 1806.

My Brother,—I received your letter of the 14th at 11 o'clock at night. You may employ or send home General St. Cyr, as you think best. The enemy must have been very strong to attempt Naples.* Is it possible that with 36,000 men you are reduced to be on the defensive against 8000 English, and that you abandon the third part of your kingdom to them? Your council have not two ideas on the subject of war. I hope that by this time you have taken Gaeta.

You do not tell me that you have made any expeditions into Calabria to disengage Generals Verdier and Reynier, but I trust their safety to the slow and unskilful movements of the English ashore.

* Joseph had expressed a fear that the English fleet might attack Naples.—TR.

CHAPTER VII.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 5th of July to the 2nd of September, 1806. During this period Napoleon was negotiating with England, and believed himself to be at peace with Russia. He appears to have been rather less than was commonly the case oppressed by business. His letters to Joseph are many and long, and abound, even more than his earlier ones, in military and political theory.

The first letter in the chapter is General Reynier's narrative of the battle of Maida. Its peculiar interest appeared to me to justify its insertion.

[205.] GENERAL REYNIER TO JOSEPH.

Catanzaro, July 5, 1806.

Sire,—The interruption of my communications has prevented my writing to your Majesty since my letter of the 29th, in which I mentioned the sailing of the English expedition and of the flotilla from Messina.

Seeing that the expedition steered towards the Gulf of St. Euphemia, and that the flotilla, which was between the point of Pezzo and Cape Spartimento, intended at that time only to divert my attention by a false attack, I determined to leave at Scylla and Reggio detachments to guard the castle and the hospital, and a small detachment at Tropea, and to direct all the troops whom I could collect towards the point of disembarkation. I wished to march immediately on the English, to throw them

into the sea, and to return quickly to succour Scylla and Reggio.

This appeared to me the most soldierlike and the wisest plan, as, the English being driven away, the whole invasion was at an end. Your Majesty knows that my troops were much dispersed, to guard the batteries and magazines, and to keep quiet the two Calabrias. Your Majesty knows also that the departure of the troops called away to Gaeta and Puglia had reduced my main body to 1000 men, of whom 800 were in the province of Cosenza and 200 garrisoned Cotrona.

I had informed your Majesty of the presence in Calabria of many agents sent by England and by the Sicilian Court, who employed all means to excite insurrections. I had several moveable columns pursuing them.

On the 30th of June, in order to follow the movements of the enemy's fleet, I put in march the 23rd light-infantry and a part of the 42nd, and directed all the detachments to unite at the river Angitola. On the evening of that day, seeing that the English fleet was steering towards the Gulf of St. Euphemia, I ordered General Compère, whom I had left with two battalions between Scylla and Reggio, to leave in those places only enough men to guard the forts and the hospital, and to join me immediately, without troubling himself about the Messina flotilla, which still kept threatening to disembark on the coast. I ordered the commanders of those forts to defend themselves until my return as soon as I had beaten the English army.

On the 1st of July I reached Monteleone. The English had disembarked in the night at St. Euphemia. Three Polish companies advanced on them, were repulsed with loss, and retired behind the Angitola. General Digonnet, with a company of Polish grenadiers and the 9th chasseurs, arrived during the night at the river Lamato from Catanzaro.

On the 2nd I encamped on the heights of the Angitola. The enemy remained in the same position, his right on the bastion of Malta, where he established himself with a strong battery, and his left on the village of St. Euphemia. He sent patrols to San Biaggio and Nicastro, which revolted immediately, and hoisted the red cockade. Many armed banditti descended the mountains

to join them. We learned that in almost all the villages the banditti and the lower classes, excited by the priests and the agents of the Sicilian Court, were ready to hoist the standard of revolt. While I delayed forcing the English to embark, every day increased this ferment, and threatened my communications.

On the 3rd I took a position on the Lamato, near Maida, in order to have only three hours' march to reach the position of the enemy, to attack his centre between the sea and the mountains, to be less harassed by the fire of the ships, and to remove my right from the banditti who were collected at the foot of the mountains.

I hoped to be joined during the evening and the night by the troops which General Compère was bringing from Reggio, and thus to be able the next morning to attack with all my forces. We had estimated the enemy at 6000 men, but the reports of deserters and spies informed us that he was stronger, and had been joined by about 2000 armed banditti. Some persons, especially M. Lebrun, your Majesty's aide-de-camp, proposed to me to remain observing the enemy without attacking him, and thus to wait for reinforcements. But I answered that I could not receive reinforcements in less than twelve or fifteen days; that my position on the Lamato was not tenable, being surrounded by woods through which banditti from the revolted villages could attack my rear; that it would be necessary to take a position either at Cotrona or between the Angitola and Monteleone, positions having each their inconveniences, and in which I should have been as much surrounded by insurgents after my voluntary retreat as if I had been beaten; that I could not march against the troops commanded by the hereditary Prince of Sicily, which were reported to have landed between Reggio and Scylla, without having on my back the English army in an extremity of the peninsula still farther than I was from assistance; that, having collected 5150 French troops who had often distinguished themselves, I might well expect, by a vigorous attack, to beat an English army of from 6000 to 7000 men, drive it into the sea, restore instantly the tranquillity of the country, and return quickly to beat the Neapolitans disembarked between Scylla and Reggio.

However, as my troops from Reggio did not arrive in time, I

delayed the attack. Three of the enemy's transports sailed for Sicily, and during the night four arrived and disembarked reinforcements.

The 4th of July, at sunrise, I perceived a movement in the enemy's camp, and that their troops approached the sea. Many thought that they were going to re-embark. They marched along the coast in two columns towards the mouth of the Lamato; they then retired a little from the sea, and the head of a column appeared at one time to be directed towards my camp. They made several marches and countermarches, having always on their flank a ship of the line, a frigate, and several gunboats. They extended their right towards the Lamato, and seemed to prepare to pass it, so as to intercept my road to Monteleone. They formed in two lines, and advanced the first, quitting thus the protection of their ships and gunboats. I thought that the moment was favourable to an attack; that, as they were somewhat divided by the Lamato, I could crush, by a vigorous charge, a part of their army; that the rest, particularly those who had turned my right by advancing towards the Monteleone road, would be unable to re-embark, and must surrender, and that no time was to be lost in seizing this opportunity. By passing the Lamato I could, without losing time or encountering any obstacle, attack them with my infantry, my light artillery, and my cavalry, which, unhappily, consisted of only 150 men of the 9th chasseurs. I should have lost these advantages if I had allowed them to pass the Lamato, because the ground on the other side is uneven, and full of marshes and thickets, which would have prevented my making the attack with the vigour and quickness which were requisite to render its success complete. It was necessary to beat them before the crowd of banditti which hovered about my rear was sufficiently organised to attack me from behind through the wood while I was employed in fighting the English towards the sea.

At 9 in the morning I put my troops in motion; two light companies were ordered to thread the thickets which line the bed of the Lamato. The 1st and 42nd regiments, 2400 strong, under the orders of General Compère, passed the Lamato, and

1500 strong, under the orders of Brigadier-General Peyri, passed the Lamato, and formed in a second line in *échelon* behind the right of the 42nd, making my centre. The 23rd light infantry, 1250 men strong, under the orders of General Digonnet, crossed and formed on my right. Four pieces of light artillery and the 9th chasseurs, under the orders of General Franceschi, were also part of my centre.

The English had eight field-pieces; their flanks were protected by a ship of the line, a frigate, and some gunboats.

The light troops, detached along the Lamato, were pressed by the English, who were crossing the river. The first line of the enemy advanced a little, following the skirmishers, whom I made retreat, in order to draw them on. I ordered the 1st regiment of light infantry to advance its left in order to support the skirmishers, and the rest of the brigade of General Compère to move by *échelons*, the Swiss and the Poles to follow this advance in a second line, and the 23rd infantry, which had wandered a little towards its right, to re-approach the Swiss, as I wished to direct all my efforts on the centre of the enemy.

As soon as the 1st light infantry was within half gun-shot of the English regiments, which remained carrying arms, its drums beat the charge, and the 42nd regiment charged the instant after at the same distance. The English battalions then opened a fire, exceedingly well kept up, which at first did not stop the charge of the French regiments; but when they had only fifteen steps to make in order to reach the enemy's line with the bayonet, and destroy it, the soldiers of the 1st regiment turned their backs and fled. Those of the 42nd perceived this movement, and, though they had only a few more steps to take, began to hesitate, and followed the example of the 1st. As soon as I perceived the flight of the 1st regiment, I turned towards the second line, to charge with that, but the Poles were already in flight. The Swiss battalion, carried away a little by the example of the other troops, hesitated; however, I made several of its companies advance, which checked a little the enemy's pursuit of the 1st and the 42nd. I went instantly to the 23rd regiment, to see if it was possible to make, with this regiment and the chasseurs, a new attack on the enemy's centre; for his advance exposed his

left flank, and left a great interval, through which he could have been taken in flank; but this regiment was a little too far to the right, and was already engaged in checking the left of the enemy, and would have been destroyed if it had moved to join in my intended attack.

The troops which had disbanded having fled to a great distance from the field of battle, I had no more at hand. All that I could do was to try to preserve the remainder of my force, to take the road to Catanzaro and Cotrona in order to rally them, to send my wounded to Cotrona, the place to which I had already been advised to retire, and wait there for the reinforcements which your Majesty will send, in order to drive quickly the English from the continent, to avenge our defeat, and succour the garrisons of Scylla and Reggio.

A body of the enemy advanced from the Lamato towards Monteleone, and reached the camp which we were occupying an hour before. Our communication with Monteleone being thus cut off, we could not recover our baggage, which had been left there to avoid its encumbering us in our attack. It by no means suited me to march towards Monteleone, where no reinforcements from your Majesty could have joined me, and where I should have been squeezed between the English and the enemy's troops, which must have landed between Scylla and Reggio, seeing that I was not strong enough to hope to beat them both consecutively. I hope that the paymaster and those who kept guard over our baggage retired by the mountain-roads to Catanzaro.

The enemy appeared to us to be more numerous than ourselves by one-third; he extended much beyond our wings, although he was drawn up in two lines, and had a detached corps beyond Lamato. He may have had 8000 infantry and 2000 armed peasants.

Even before the battle the country had begun to rise; almost all the inhabitants assumed the white flag and the red cockade. Even Catanzaro rang the tocsin and displayed the white flag. As the troops were encamped beneath its walls, I thought it necessary to occupy it, in order to force it back into obedience, and to get the provisions of which we were in want.

If many of the soldiers wanted the vigour for which I hoped

from soldiers of such established reputation, I am satisfied with the officers; they did their duty well. General Compère was wounded in the arm at the head of the 1st regiment; he was from his horse and taken prisoner.

Major Gastelouis of the 1st regiment was killed. Major Clavel of the Swiss regiment was dangerously wounded. Major Rey of the 23rd regiment was wounded, as well as Marchand, Duchaume, and many brave men. I do not know my loss exactly as yet, but I have with me about 4000 men, of whom 300 are wounded.

The enemy pursued us as far as the entry of the valley of Lamato, but captured only the wounded who were left on the field after the charge. I am exceedingly grieved by these events. I did what I thought best under difficult circumstances, and I thought that I could not hesitate between the advantages of obtaining a quick decision by an immediate action, and the danger to which we should have been exposed by delay; but I was supported neither by the number nor by the courage of my troops.

A portion of the army is so much affected, that, not relying on its standing before the enemy, I have been forced to retire to this spot, and I may retreat as far as Cotrona, which is my sole support in this country, and is the only place where I can find supplies and prepare the troops for action. Catanzaro being the capital of the province, I shall try to remain near it, in order to revive the spirit of the inhabitants, and to protect our friends from the brigands.

I have with me about 4300 men. I shall carefully keep them together, and try to restore their courage, and to employ them as soon as I have been reinforced. General Verdier is at Cosenza with 800 men. I have not received news from him; but as his whole force consists of a Polish battalion, he cannot have done more than hold out against the insurgents.

I have no news from the little garrisons which I left in the forts of Scylla and Reggio. It is important that troops should be sent immediately to drive the enemy from their posts, and to reconquer the country. We are burning with desire to take a brilliant revenge for our defeat.

[206.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 26, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 17th. I see that all your military operations are wrong. I cannot understand how, surrounded as you are by men of military experience, there are so few who can give you good advice. Your army is large enough not only to besiege Gaeta and keep Naples, but to oppose all landing of the enemy and regain Calabria; but your measures have no life or movement, no organisation or method. Till now you have made nothing but mistakes; but I ought not to distress you. I warned you not to listen to General Dumas, who has had no practice in war. It seems that no one knows where your troops are; they are scattered everywhere, and assembled nowhere. General Reynier made ill his dispositions for battle, and did not know how to direct 6000 men against the enemy. But since then he has been shamefully neglected. What will become of him, as even the head-quarters of the province are not held by you? For my part, I am not surprised at what happens in Calabria; I have long been acquainted with the sort of disposition which prevails there. Your policy with regard to Naples is just the reverse of what ought to be pursued towards a conquered nation. Let your troops march together, do not scatter them. I suppose that you have armed all the castles in Naples. What is the meaning of this Neapolitan National Guard? It is leaning on a reed, perhaps putting arms into the hands of your enemies. How little you know of men! Act at least with vigour. Keep your troops in hand, disposed in *échelons*, so that you may assemble 18,000 men on one point and crush the enemy. I do not see in your letter that you are uniting your forces; all is unintelligible. The negotiations advance. It seems that Sicily is yielded, so that that obstacle is gone; perhaps, before 10 days are over, it may all belong to you.

[207.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

July 28, 1806.

My Brother,—I am sure that you will soon have Gaeta. That place is becoming of great importance to you. General Reynier had a right to expect assistance; he may have acted on this supposition, and may find himself much exposed. A force of 10,000 men, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, must immediately be sent to Cassano to extricate and reinforce him; for one cannot tell what misfortunes may have happened to him. The first cause of all this is your keeping so many troops in Naples. I had warned you of what would follow. All that you want in Naples are commandants in the forts, provisions, ammunition, and depôts, with one or two regiments of horse and one of foot. You have established yourself as in time of peace; you have placed too much confidence in the Neapolitans. It is an error which has many consequences; you must remedy it: enter Calabria, disarm the rebels, and make examples that will not be forgotten. The ex-Queen in what she does acts the part of a sovereign. To preserve one's army, gain its esteem, and be feared by the enemy, it is necessary to act with severity and energy. As soon as General Reynier is extricated and joined by your reinforcements, you must place brigades of your troops in *échelon*, at distances of a day's march, between Naples and Cassano; so that in three days four brigades, making from 10,000 to 12,000 men, may be able to assemble. You have three French regiments who fought under Reynier; there remain 11 who have done nothing; by adding to them two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with the Italians, Corsicans, and Neapolitans, you can very well have eight brigades of more than 3000 men each, under the command of two lieut.-generals and four brigadiers, which may communicate and assemble in a short time. It is by placing your troops in *échelon* that you may be on the defensive and prepared for any event, for, if you afterwards see something to be gained by taking the aggressive, the enemy, having seen that you were on the defensive, will not find you out, and before he

can change his attitude, the ten or twelve days that you want for your operations will have passed. I am not sure whether what I have been saying is very intelligible.* Great faults have been committed in your system of defence, and they never can be committed with impunity. An experienced soldier sees them at the first glance, but the effects are felt two months afterwards. As your two principal objects were Gaeta and Reggio, and you have 38,000 men, you ought to have had 10 brigades forming 5 divisions, placed in *échelon*, at distances of one or two days' march; you would then have occupied such a position that the enemy would not have daréd to move, for in an instant, and without losing a single day, you might have assembled your troops at Gaeta, at Reggio, or at St. Euphemia. You should arrange your Sicilian expedition in this way: you should start too formidable to be attacked; you should abandon every position in your rear, except the defence of your capital, and should act entirely on the aggressive against the enemy, who can attempt nothing when once you have accomplished your landing. Such is the art of war; you will see many men who can fight well, but none who understand how to apply this principle. If there had been a brigade of 3000 or 4000 men at Cassano, nothing of this would have happened; it would have been at St. Euphemia as soon as General Reynier, and the English would have been beaten; or, rather, they would not have landed; they were emboldened by the false arrangement of your defence.

If I were to send to you badly trained recruits, who in this season would fall ill, the ruin of your army would be complete. I have organised your depôts as a reserve; I am forming them into two corps, which will unite with the artillery at Ancona to

* As a specimen of the occasional obscurity of Napoleon's style, and the consequent difficulty of translating his letters, I add the original of this sentence:—"C'est par ces placements en échelons qu'on est sur la défensive, à l'abri de tous les évènements, en ce que, lorsqu'on veut ensuite prendre l'offensive pour un but déterminé, l'ennemi ne peut le connaître, parce qu'il vous a vu sur une défensive redoutable, et qu'avant les changements qui se sont passés sur la défensive, les dix ou douze jours des opérations sont terminés." Napoleon might well add, "Je ne sais si on comprendra quelque chose à ce que je dis là."—TR.

join the troops of General Lemarrois, and be prepared to go to your assistance wherever they may be wanted.*

I will never make peace without Sicily. If it is necessary, I will proceed to Naples at the right time, but I am not without hopes of peace within ten or twelve days on these terms.

I ought to tell you that General D—— employs in the public service young men of a re-actionary spirit; amongst others the sons of L——. They are all thoroughly ill-disposed. The blunders in Calabria will cost me more men than I have lost in the Grand Army.

All the art of war consists in a well-arranged and extremely circumspect defensive, and a bold and rapid offensive. As soon as you have Gaeta, remove your troops from Naples, garrison your castles, and provision them for a month. Leave a regiment of cavalry and 1500 infantry to keep order. Place your first brigade one day's march out of Naples, and the rest as I have told you, consulting a little the character of the ground.

[208.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 30, 1806.

My Brother,—I have already sent to you 500,000 francs. I have just given orders to send to you 500,000 more. I have also ordered five battalions of 1000 men each to be collected at Ancona, from whence they will march to your support immediately after their arrival.

I have seen with pleasure the capture of Gaeta.

I am waiting for intelligence of General Reynier. I cannot too often repeat to you—do not keep your troops in Naples; have there only enough to hold the city and the forts. Let camps or cantonments be formed at a distance of one or two days' march from Naples. Establish yourself in a country-house; this step, which would not have been advisable before the capture of

* Joseph wished the depôts of some of the French and Swiss regiments in his service to be removed to the Neapolitan territory, in which case the recruits would have been sent to him as soon as raised.—TR.

Gaeta, is very fit now that the public mind is reassured. Do not listen to those who would put you between Benevento and Capua. Place yourself between Naples and Calabria; assemble your forces and despatch expeditions to burn the insurgent villages. I suppose that you have driven back into the sea the English who have landed on the coast of Salerno. Do not let the Calabrians and the enemy take the initiative; you have force enough to reconquer the kingdom of Naples and of Italy.* The English are not formidable; but if you attack them without artillery and in disorder, and, for the most part, with bad troops like the Poles, failure is not surprising.

The Governor of Naples ought to have a house in the town, and also apartments in the castles, and the castles should be provisioned for three months.

You should not make one retrograde step: perish, if necessary, upon the Neapolitan territory. Your dispositions have not all been good.

There should be no troops at Naples; 100,000 men cannot keep the town, nor will order be maintained there by 15,000 better than by 1500. Vigorous measures will reassure your capital more than assembling within its walls a quantity of troops which will in time be considered barely enough to do the police duty.

You may take the aggressive in Calabria without descending into the extremity of Italy, unless you are obliged to do so in order to extricate General Reynier; your troops will march willingly. From Cassano to Naples is only 50 leagues. You must not lose a moment in placing there your advanced posts. It is the only way of securing peace to your kingdom. If it is not done soon, even our negotiations will suffer. The occupation of this position by 6000 men, who may be reinforced in one day by 3000 more, and in two days by 6000, who, if attacked by a force considerably superior, may retreat one day's march, and thus join another 3000, will restore to you tranquillity and prevent the affairs of Calabria from having any further influence on politics. In the mean time, you will organise your service, you will send expedi-

* I suspect that "l'Italie" is inserted in the text by mistake, instead of "la Sicile."—TR.

tions to subdue the villages; and, lastly, if the enemy should attempt to attack Naples, in two days you might assemble there 9000 men. But these things are not done suddenly; a landing is not easily accomplished; it is always preceded by disturbances in the interior. I am impatient to hear that you have occupied Cassano. Besides this, you should order two or three of the large villages that have behaved the worst to be pillaged; it will be an example, and will restore the gaiety and the desire for action of your soldiers. Supposing the English to be in force in Calabria, and that they are willing to pursue seriously a war in which the gain is so disproportionate to the cost, if you have an advanced guard at Cassano, sustained at distances of a few marches by two or three brigades, you will be reinforced in three days by 9000 men; and if, after all, your advanced troops should think themselves not sufficiently strong, by retreating one march they would be joined by 3000 more. It is in this manner that a war is carried on when you have a great many points to keep, and you do not know which of them the enemy will attack. You may remove your own head-quarters to 10 or 12 leagues distance from Naples; posts of cavalry and signals should be established that you may communicate with the points of the coast on your right flank; and when at length the time comes and the weather is cooler, you can put yourself in motion, and retake the whole of Calabria.

It does not enter into my plans ever to make peace unless I have Sicily. If Calabria continue an obstacle, and the affairs of the Continent do not call me elsewhere, I shall be at Naples towards the end of September.

You have as good generals as are to be found in France. St. Cyr is very prudent. Reynier indeed has committed all sorts of faults which I did not expect. To succeed, one must be sometimes very bold, and sometimes very prudent. As soon as Reynier returns to you, send the 3 regiments which are with him to the rear, where they may be quiet. They should be at one of the intermediate stations, neither the nearest to Cassano nor the nearest to Naples. I see no objection to your employing French officers in your service, nor to your placing them in your guard, provided that you do not too much weaken the cadres of

the regiments. You will let me know about it, and send me a memorandum, that I may replace them in their corps.

[209.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 13, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 19th of July. I see with pleasure that you have sent off 6 regiments of foot and 2 of horse to Cassano. These are enough to subdue the whole of Calabria and to beat the English. Our ignorance of what has happened to General Reynier makes me uneasy; perhaps he may maintain himself in the environs of Cotrona. It is urgent that he should be extricated, for he can have very few provisions. In the different letters which I have written to you I have told you what to do. Your troops should be arranged, I cannot too often repeat it, in *échelons*, the castles of Naples provisioned and armed, your depôts placed in security in Gaeta and Capua, and your 25,000 or 30,000 men stationed in such a manner that in four days three-fourths at least of them can be brought together, and in five forced marches be thrown either upon Naples or upon Cassano. You have coasts to defend, it is true, but so have I in every direction; and if it were the fact that their ships gave such an advantage to the English, it would follow that with their 50,000 disposable men they might hold in check a much greater number of my troops; but for everything you must have a plan.

I told you long ago that you disperse your troops too much; keep them assembled, and you will experience what has happened in France: the English have often landed, but they have been well beaten, and they no longer venture to disembark.

If, instead of leaving Cassano without troops, you had stationed 2 regiments there, instead of keeping them in Puglia and scattered along the coast, the English would have been driven back into the sea, and you would have secured tranquillity for a long time. The idea that Naples cannot be defended against a maritime power is ridiculous. If, indeed, you say that you ought to choose for your habitual residence some other town than Naples

—one situated further inland—I am of the same opinion. I should be glad to have plans of the forts of Naples with remarks by engineers, and plans of Capua with notes informing me of the chief points of the environs. You will have Naples and Sicily, you will be recognised by the whole of Europe; but if you do not take more vigorous measures than you have done as yet, you will be dethroned disgracefully in the first continental war. You are too indulgent, especially for the country in which you are. You should disarm, sentence, and exile. In my opinion the first works to be constructed when you are master of Sicily will be a fort at Faro, and another at Scylla. However, have no fears. I will keep my promises, and I will be with you myself, if necessary, at the end of September. The kingdom of Italy yields me 140 millions of francs Milanese; the kingdom of Naples and of Sicily should yield you as much; you cannot do with less. You should have in your service 3000 Corsicans, 6000 Swiss, and not more than 6000 Neapolitans. You do not sufficiently employ the Neapolitan officers who have served in the Army of Italy. Follow my maxims: make your army patriotic; employ officers who are partisans of France, and who have displayed energy; they will never betray you for Queen Caroline. If you govern your country with vigour, and raise from it a revenue of 140 or 150 million francs, you will be able to keep 6 vessels of the line and as many frigates, which, joined to my fleet at Toulon, will render more expensive and less secure the English ascendancy in the Mediterranean. Do not make too much use of the Neapolitan troops, which would abandon you if I were beaten in Italy. You should think of these things, and employ troops which will not desert you.

The 1st Swiss regiment is composed of men who have served in France, and who will remain faithful. So will the Corsicans, and they can be easily recruited. The Neapolitan patriots who were in France at the time of the Italian revolution will likewise be true to you. I make no mention of the French army, because, as the destiny of France can be affected only by a coalition of all the rest of Europe, under such circumstances she would want all her troops, and I could scarcely spare you more than 2 or 3 regiments. Bear in mind what I tell you: the fate of your reign

depends on your conduct when you return from Calabria. Grant no pardons; do military execution on at least 600 rebels; they have murdered a greater number of my soldiers. Let the houses of thirty of the principal heads of villages be burnt, and distribute their property among the troops. Disarm all the inhabitants, and pillage five or six of the large villages which have behaved worst. Desire the soldiers to treat well the towns which have remained faithful. Confiscate the public property of the revolted villages, and give it to the army; above all, disarm vigorously.

Since you compare the Neapolitans to the Corsicans, recollect that when Niolo was taken forty rebels were hung upon the trees, and such alarm was spread that not a person ventured to stir afterwards. On my return from the Grand Army, Piacenza rebelled; I sent thither Junot, who sent me reports full of French cleverness, and declared that no rebellion had taken place. I ordered him to burn two villages, and to shoot the ringleaders, among whom were six priests. This was done, the country was subdued, and will remain so for a long time.

You see the awe inspired by the Queen; I certainly do not set up her conduct as an example, but it is no less true that it gives her power. If you act with vigour and energy, there will be no disturbance, either in Calabria or in the other provinces, for the next thirty years.

I will end my letter as I began it: you will be King of Naples and Sicily, you will have three or four years of peace. If you choose to be a mere nominal sovereign,—if you do not hold the reins with a firm and steady hand,—if you listen to the opinions of the people, who know not what they want,—if you do not make yourself rich by putting an end to old abuses and encroachments,—if you do not impose taxes sufficient to enable you to keep in your service French, Corsicans, Swiss, and Neapolitans, and to arm your vessels, you will do nothing at all, and, in four years, instead of being of use to me, you will do me harm, for you will deprive me of some of my resources.

You must construct a fort at Scylla; send me as soon as possible the plans, that I may approve them. As soon as you are

in Sicily, hasten to erect a similar fort on the coast opposite to Scylla, in order to unite our two kingdoms.

As Calabria has revolted, why should you not seize half the estates in the province, and give them to your army? This measure would be, at the same time, a great help to you and an example for the future. You will never succeed in changing and reforming a country by weak measures; extraordinary and vigorous expedients are requisite. As the Calabrians have assassinated my soldiers, I myself will issue the decree confiscating for the benefit of my army one-half of the revenues of the province, both public and private. But if you begin by asserting that Calabria is not in revolt, and that it has always been attached to you, your kindness, or, in other words, your weakness and timidity, will be very mischievous to France.

You are too indulgent.

[210.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 31, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 22nd of July, in which you inform me of the entrance into Naples of the troops from the siege of Gaeta. I am glad to see that you have given 6000 men to Marshal Masséna for the expedition into Calabria, but I am sorry that you have not placed your troops in *échelons*, which would enable you, if necessary, in three days to assemble them and fall upon the English. I will suppose Masséna arrived at Cassano: if he should hear that General Reynier is hemmed in by 12,000 English and 4000 or 5000 insurgents, he will take up a position, and will be forced to wait a fortnight till you send him reinforcements. On the other hand, by placing these troops in *échelons*, they would be able in three or four days, either to join him, or to return, if they were wanted, to Naples or to Salerno, and he would be able to extricate Reynier without delay. You are aware that by this time Reynier has with him not more than 4000 men, dispirited and in disorder. What a disgrace and misfortune it would be, if these brave fellows, after having defended themselves to the

utmost, were obliged to surrender their colours! I have written to you two long letters on the subject. I have ordered the Poles to join you, as well as their depôt. I have ordered 6000 men to be assembled, under the command of General Lemarrois, at Ancona, in order to proceed to Naples, but it will require time to collect them at Ancona. I have also given orders to General Lemarrois to despatch to you all the detachments of the Corsican legion and of the Poles which are with him, and the Swiss battalion from Ancona. I have ordered General Duhesme to send to you the battalion of the regiment of Latour d'Auvergne which is at Civita Vecchia. The other two battalions of this regiment are at Genoa, and are immediately to set off in order to join the first. But it is not troops that are wanting to you; it is skill in collecting them, keeping them together, and making them act with vigour.

[211.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 1, 1806.

My Brother,—You deal in useless hypotheses.* A year sooner, or a year later, you will be master of Sicily, and that Medea will not have an inch of ground there. General Camprédon has just arrived. He appeared to me to be extremely pulled down. When he has rested I will send him back to you, but I should like, before he returns, to come to some decision respecting the fortifications of Naples. You should therefore send him all the necessary plans. You ought to have a large fortress, in which all the artillery and the depôts may be in safety, and which may stand a long siege, so as to allow time for succours to arrive. Where should this fortress be? Which

* Joseph had asked Napoleon whether, in the hypothesis that the circumstances of Napoleon were such as to require the French army in the kingdom of Naples to leave that kingdom in order to join the army of Upper Italy, the fortresses of St. Elmo, Capua, Gaeta, and Pescara should be garrisoned or abandoned. This hypothesis, though often suggested by Napoleon, seems to have offended him when suggested by another.—TR.

situation will you select? shall it be at Cassano, or elsewhere? These are very important questions. For after all you cannot stand unsupported in the midst of a hostile people, whose disposition is and always has been fickle, and who for the few first years of your reign will be unsettled. Supposing the French to be beaten in Italy, and that we were forced to fight in the kingdom of Naples: it would be of great consequence to possess a fortress capable of containing the depôts, the hospitals, the various supplies and munitions of war; and which might serve the army as a rallying-point where they might concentrate their defence.

There may be some arguments in favour of placing this fortress at Naples itself; not that any man of sense would think of enclosing that immense town within the walls of a fortification, but it might be situated in the environs, and so that its fire should bear on the roadstead. This would give you the twofold advantage of defending the town, and of keeping it in subjection, which would be a most important result. I am not thinking of a mere citadel, which would be of little use, but of a fortification at least 6000 yards in extent. Consult some engineers on the subject. It would be a great advantage if, by means of a single fortress, you could hold the town in submission, have batteries on the fort, and shelter all the artillery establishments, the magazines, and the depôts of the army. By working at it for three or four years, and spending 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 fr. a year, you might have a fortress which could stand a siege of six months, and, as it would contain a garrison of 12,000 or 15,000 men, would give occupation to a considerable army. There is no good in having a number of fortresses.

Whether you establish this fortress at Naples or at Capua, you will want one at each extremity of Calabria, at Charybdis and at Scylla, to unite the two parts of your kingdom; another at Taranto, or in a better situation if it is possible, which may be able, even if we should lose our superiority on land, to afford shelter to my magazines and to my ships, if they should be wanted at Taranto to arrange the affairs of the Levant. It will afterwards be necessary to establish forts in the islands, and good redoubts with masonry in the embrasures commanding the anchorage; but this is not of the first consequence. The most

important point is to have a good place of security, in which the King himself might take refuge and defend himself for years with the men who are most attached to him. For when once the kingdom of Naples is gained, it should be the first principle of the reigning family never to pass the frontier, and to perish, if forced to do so, in its defence. When the nation believes this, a new direction will be given to public opinion. A dynasty educated in this principle would be never conquered or dethroned. You must perceive that, if the ex-King of Naples had possessed such a fortress, and had shut himself up in it instead of flying to Sicily, you would have found no resources in artillery, you would have had two sieges, which might have lasted a couple of years, and peace or some other event on the Continent might have saved him.

[212.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letters of the 24th. You may tell Marshal Masséna that I have released Ardant.* Having examined with attention the sections of Gaeta, I think that it is not worth occupying. A fortress cannot be strong which can be battered in breach without getting to the covered way, and of which the breach itself is practicable without having to pass a ditch or blow up a counterscarp. I know nothing about either Capua or Pescara, but I can hardly think that Pescara can require 3000 men for its defence.

Even if war should spring up again on the Continent, I should be satisfied with taking back from the Army of Naples the same number of troops which I have sent to it from its depôts; that is to say, as many as four regiments of infantry and three-quarters of the cavalry: with these I should have enough.

* In his letter of the 24th Joseph had said, "Masséna is mad about his money in the hands of one Ardant, whom you have arrested in Paris. Perhaps this sum may be left to him. It is not a sixth part of what you

[213.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 6, 1806.

My Brother,—It seems that the English are becoming more conciliatory. The negotiations have been opened in form. Lord Lauderdale and Lord Yarmouth are the English negotiators; the former arrived this morning. As the King of England is aware that I am determined to be master of Naples and Sicily, this point may be considered as granted. You have a fine kingdom; it is your duty not to fall asleep on your throne, but to organise your finances with energy, so as to have a good fleet and a good army. You must not forget that the kindness of kings consists in strength and in strict justice. You confound the kindness of a monarch with that of a private individual. I am waiting to hear how many estates you have confiscated in Calabria, and how many rebels you have executed. You should shoot in every village three of the ringleaders. Do not spare the priests more than the others.

[214.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 7, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 29th of July. I see with pleasure that the troops have arrived at Lagonegro, from whence I conclude that they have by this time joined those of General Reynier at Cosenza, and that the English have either been driven into the sea or forced to re-embark.

[215.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 9, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 30th of July.* It pains me to see the system which you pursue.

* In this letter Joseph had said, "In the province of Montefusco 10,000 men are enrolled in the provincial guards. 15,000 enrolled themselves voluntarily in Naples. I disarm every one except the provincial guards. I make

What good will 50,000 armed and trained provincial guards do? None but to spend your money, to oppose your wishes, and to make all sorts of claims. No system can be more false, or, in its ultimate results, more fatal. At the first rumour of war upon the Continent, the men will at the best remain neutral, the officers will negotiate with the enemy. If they hear of a battle lost on the Isonzo or on the Adige, they will turn against you. If I am at peace, or if I conquer, what will you want with them? I should not consider this system as without disadvantages even in France; how much more dangerous will it be in a country whose antipathy towards you can be overcome only by time, only by years! You are too precipitate. Some parti disembarkations and the escape of a few wretched convicts may be prevented; but what trifling advantages are these that you should sacrifice to them the safety and sovereignty of your kingdom! You must not think that these landings will be perpetually repeated, and that they grow again like the heads of the hydra. A few striking successes will inspire such terror that no more attempts will be made to land on your shores. I witnessed the war in La Vendée, which, it was supposed, would never end; I saw my troops in Egypt harrassed and annoyed by the Bedouins; a few signal failures put an end to it all, and restored tranquillity. But those who surround you have no knowledge of men. You do not listen to a man who has done much, seen much, and thought much. Do not carry out your scheme of a national guard—nothing can be more dangerous. Those fellows will get vain, and fancy that they are not conquered. No people that has this idea is really subdued. You make me laugh when you say that these men are 50,000 enemies of the Queen. Naples is a country of intriguers, who change with every wind; you exaggerate their hatred of the Queen: you do not know mankind. There are not twenty people who hate her as much as you think, and there are not twenty people who would not yield to one of her smiles, to one of her advances. What a nation most hates is another nation. Your 50,000 men all hate the

I make out and print the register of this army of the interior, which will amount to 50,000 men, all proprietors or notoriously enemies of the ex-Queen."—TR.

French. Time, prudence, and family alliances, can alone bring them together. You raise 50,000 men, and make them think themselves necessary; this is to put yourself in a false position and to spoil your conquest.

Neither am I satisfied with the manner in which you have distributed your regiments in Calabria. The 1st and 42nd have suffered much; they are reduced to one-half. You have sent thither five regiments of foot; they would be sufficient if they were backed at three days' march by 2500-men, and at another two days' march by 2500 more. I have explained to you how the rules of war require this to be done. I am sorry not to see Masséna sufficiently strong, and in the course of receiving reinforcements, for the English have certainly added to their strength at the lower end of Calabria. You seem to have too many troops everywhere. Your reserve would be very well if it were half way between Naples and Cassano. The number of troops that you maintain at Naples is absurd. The enemy will never land before that city. He will be no more anxious than you are to bury himself in a great town without having beaten the army of observation. There ought to be a brigade two leagues from Naples, so that it can be there in the course of four hours. You had not enough cavalry in the camp of St. Euphemia; it would have done wonders there. You have too large a force at Gaeta, in the Abruzzi, and in Puglia. The art of war is to dispose your troops so that they may be everywhere at once. For instance, you have placed nearly 3000 men in Puglia; three-quarters of these troops should be stationed so that they can in one or two days return to Gaeta, or march on Naples. I would undertake to have an army less by half than yours, and still to have a greater force at Cassano, at Gaeta, if necessary in the Abruzzi, and in Puglia.

I beseech you not to read this without attention. The art of distributing troops is the great art of war. Place them always in such a manner, that whatever the enemy may do you may be able to have your forces united within a few days. Want of acquaintance with this first principle in war caused Reynier's misfortunes, and makes you feel uneasy while you have an abundance of troops. So long as you do not make it a

maxim to have depôts in the forts of Naples, two regiments of cavalry and one of infantry at the gates (you may employ at Naples the Neapolitans whom you have already at Capua and elsewhere), you will always feel the want of troops. An army would not suffice to guard your capital; and yet two battalions would be enough if the people were accustomed to no more.

I observe in your returns 1200 men of the guard; are these Italians or French? You have never spoken of them to me. Do not derange the cadres of my regiments without my knowing anything of it. If you had consulted me, I should have told you that it is needless to spend so much on your guard. I see that your regiments of cavalry are very weak; if you withdraw men from them for your guard, all order and all regularity of accounts will be lost. You ought to have made my Minister of War report to me on the subject and propose to me a decree; I should have done what was right. If from the 14 regiments which you have you take the best men for your guard, I shall end by having no army in Naples.

All that you tell me of the money scattered by the English is untrue. I have not been taken in. I am well used to rumours of this kind. All that is said of the plundering by the English is equally false. My old experience tells me more than all the reports which can be given to me. If you really must have 4000 Neapolitans at Naples, so be it; but then have no more, and select for this service fathers of families, very cowardly, very old, who are just fit to protect the house when there is a cry of thieves. To do otherwise would be to prepare for yourself great misfortunes. The revolt has not gained ground because the English have not advanced into the interior; they were afraid of losing their soldiers through the great heats among the mountains, of being cut off, and of suffering some great check.

You have far too many generals; I can but repeat to you that you may send back as many as you please. You have at Naples regiments which will be useless from the manner in which they are employed.

Fools will tell you that cavalry are of no use in Calabria; if this is the case, they are of no use anywhere. If Reynier had had 1200 horse, and had managed them properly, he would have

inflicted severe injury on the English, particularly if he had had dragoons, as they carry guns and can fight on foot; but your dragoons are dispersed, and therefore useless. You have five regiments of dragoons all scattered abroad; you ought to collect them and form them into a reserve, with four pieces of light field artillery. These 3000 men, who would be able to march 30 leagues in two days, could be directed on Naples, or on any other point which might be threatened. Of what use are 3000 isolated dragoons, who do nothing for you, and forget that they are dragoons? 2000 or 3000 dragoons, posted 40 leagues from Naples, on the road towards Cassano and St. Euphemia, would have arrived there at the same time with Reynier. I tell you again, keep your dragoons together; give them four or six pieces of light artillery as well as guns and cartridges. Treat them as infantry, and organise them so as to move rapidly. Between Cassano and Naples there are 50 leagues. If you post brigades of these dragoons *en échelon*, in 36 hours they might reach either Naples or Cassano. By keeping them under the orders of a single commander, who would put them every day through their foot exercises, you would make them into excellent infantry.

There remains one thing for me to tell you: form Neapolitan regiments, but not too many of them. Of what use would they be to you if I were beaten on the Isonzo? In all your operations, both civil and military, steer by this possibility, as if it were your pole-star: all your proceedings should have reference to it. I only laughed at your fears for Naples during the late events; and although I saw that the army was extremely ill-placed, I felt that, when the danger came, instinct would teach you to make a better distribution. The only results were the loss of a few men, some trifling landings of the enemy, and partial failures. But it would be otherwise if I were at war, and if I were beaten on the Isonzo. You must not think that every Neapolitan regiment which you create increases your strength. From the time that you oblige me to send you money, I shall be able neither to raise troops nor to regulate my expenditure.

I flatter myself that you have nothing to fear at present; you will be King of Naples and Sicily. But you must weigh

seriously all your measures. Whenever you sign a document, do you ask yourself, "Would the effect of this be good if the French army were driven back to Alexandria?"* If you are not penetrated with this idea, you will not reign long, and you prepare misfortunes for yourself and for all the Neapolitans who may join your cause. What sort of troops ought you to have? I say Corsicans, who will get on better in Naples than in France, because they will agree better with the Neapolitans than with the French; as many Swiss as you like—they are good and faithful soldiers; perhaps a few German regiments from Hesse Darmstadt, or from the other states of my German Confederation; also a few Neapolitans, but introduced gradually, almost imperceptibly, and chosen from among the men who have served in France, and who formed part of the army of reserve in the eighth year of the Republic, and who have since then been put to the proof; all others would fail you. If Italy were once to raise the cry, "Drive the barbarians beyond the Alps!" all your army would abandon you. I wish you to consult me upon all such important matters. It will not do to say that you would take refuge in my camp. An exiled, vagrant King is a contemptible being. In a short time I shall consolidate my system in such a manner as to spare you a number of French sufficient, with your royal army of Corsicans, Swiss, and Neapolitans, to enable you to weather any storm.

It is of equal importance that you should recall all the diplomatic agents appointed by the late dynasty. It is not right to leave them at their posts; they betray you everywhere; and, indeed, it is impossible for an honest man to change his colours between morning and evening. You have several consuls who make a very bad figure.

The month of August is drawing to a close; in four weeks' time, towards the 15th of September, the weather will become good; at the end of October all your sick will recover.

The time for action for the French in Naples is from October

[216.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 10, 1806.

My Brother,—Some of your regiments have detachments at Gaeta, at Naples, in the Abruzzi, and in Calabria. The consequence is, that no proper accounts are kept, and that there is neither order nor esprit-de-corps. Your first care should be to keep together the battalions, otherwise you will have no army. You should attend to this every day; I do so myself every morning.

[217.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 12, 1806.

My Brother,—Mr. Fox's illness delays the negotiations. The Grenville party, which is in the ascendant, appears little inclined to peace. I have just heard that Mr. Fox has undergone an operation, which will prevent for some time his taking a part in cabinet councils. But this operation saves his life. The King of Prussia has acknowledged you King of the Two Sicilies, and has appointed M. Humboldt to be his Minister at your court. M. Humboldt has already started. If, as the King supposes, you do not choose to send a Minister to Prussia, you may give credentials to M. Laforest. You have been recognised by Austria, and also by Russia in the secret articles of her treaty. You are, therefore, acknowledged by nearly all the powers in Europe.

You are aware that I no longer recognise a German Empire, The Emperor has himself relinquished his title, and keeps only that of Emperor of Austria. The German princes, united under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, hold at Frankfort an assembly composed of two colleges, over which the High Chancellor of the Empire is President; I have reserved to myself the right of appointing this functionary. I have assumed the title of Protector of the Confederation.

I told you that I had formed all the available troops in your depôts into eight battalions. These eight battalions, forming in

all a force of more than 5000 men, are marching towards Ancona, and will soon be directed on Naples; they will repair the losses in your army. You will gain 6000 more in the months of October and November by the cessation of sickness among your troops. I think that you would do well to leave a large army in Calabria, that you may be able to occupy yourself seriously with the Sicilian expedition. You must, I think, feel the importance of my advice respecting the use to be made of your dragoons by placing them half way between Naples and Calabria. Counting the 5000 or 6000 men who will be sent to you from your depôts, you will undoubtedly have an army of more than 40,000 men; 20,000 should be kept in Calabria between Reggio and Cassano, and 20,000 between Cassano and Naples. I have just called out 50,000 conscripts; they will join in the course of October. All the divisions of your army are to have considerable reinforcements from them. You will be able also to obtain assistance in the month of September from your depôts, which will at that time be joined by the invalids left by your army in the kingdom of Italy. You will find that the discouragement of your troops produced by the great heat is easily cured in Italy by the return of the cool season; the influence of weather is incalculable.

You must leave General Reynier at Reggio, at the head of a strong division. You should have three divisions in Calabria, commanded each by one general of division and by at least two brigadiers. You should send to Calabria neither Poles nor Italians, nor perhaps the 1st and 42nd of the line, who appear to have suffered a great deal at St. Euphemia. You had better recall them to Naples, whence they might even be sent back to Franc[illegible] if it be true that they have suffered so much, and I will replace them by two other regiments of light infantry. You have a battalion of the regiment of Latour d'Auvergne, which I wish to keep in the kingdom of Naples. The other two battalions, whose strength is 2000 men, are at Genoa; I shall order them likewise to proceed to Naples.

I advise you to spend an hour every morning in reading your returns, in order that you may know the position of every part of your army, and that you may recall the portions which are

scattered right and left, so as to keep your troops together, for otherwise you cannot be said to have an army.

[218.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 16, 1806.

My Brother,—I enclose to you General Charpentier's notes on the formation of General Lemarrois' corps. I have ordered the 1st brigade, under the command of General Tisson, to proceed to Pescara. I expect it to arrive there by the 1st of September. In this case, allow them to rest for some time at Pescara, and do not oblige them to rejoin their divisions, especially those which are in Calabria, or they will all go to the hospitals. If, however, you are in want of them, as this brigade is well trained and in good order, you may send for them to Naples; but let them take short marches; keep them away from their regiments, particularly from those in Calabria, till October. As soon as they have joined their regiments, take care to send all the officers and non-commissioned officers back to their depôts in the kingdom of Italy, that they may superintend the training and clothing of the conscripts whom I shall send to them. Success in war is not obtained by having a great many troops, but by their being well organised and well disciplined. You must see how much you gain by my sending you in this manner a body of 5000 men, who form a reserve even before they are incorporated, instead of sending them to you in small detachments, which would only have filled your hospitals.

I do not yet put the 2nd half-brigade at your disposal, because I must hold the Roman States in check, and I have no other troops to send thither; for the depôts, as you will see by the returns which I enclose, contain only men unfit for service. Above all, I beg you to send back to the depôts all the officers and non-commissioned officers, for I intend your 14 depôts to form for me a reserve of 14,000 men, to be employed in reinforcing your regiments, or otherwise, according to circumstances. By this means, when your regiments are all completed on a war footing, your army will consist of 45,000 men fit for

action. You must see that, if I paid less attention to my army, large as it is, it would not be sufficient for my wants. You have just now a great number of invalids; they will all leave the hospitals in October. Take care of your arms; they are not abundant even in France. Form your Neapolitan regiments by degrees. You want good soldiers, and not troops that will revolt or run. You see that I am in no hurry for my Italian army; I have as yet formed only its nucleus. It is true that I have in France three excellent and well-trained Italian regiments; but still they are not equal to your old French regiments.

[219.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Aug. 17, 1806.

My Brother,—No one speaks ill of General Mathieu Dumas* to me; and since you do not suppose him to be a great warrior, I agree with you in your estimate of his integrity and good character. All I feared was, that you relied on his military talents. Thus with a word of explanation you have reconciled me to him. I should like very much to hear of a revolt of the Neapolitan populace You will never be their master till you have made an example of them. Every conquered country must have its revolt. I should see Naples in revolt as a father sees his children in the small-pox; the crisis is salutary, provided it does not too much weaken the constitution. It is for this reason that your forts should be armed and provisioned. The part of your kingdom which is nearest to attaining a state of tranquillity, if you would but execute strict justice, is Calabria.

I am spending a week at Rambouillet. I urge the conscription in every direction, and send nearly half the conscripts to my depôts for the armies of Naples and Italy. Take care of your muskets: before the end of November 4000 or 5000 men

* Joseph, who was always faithful to his friends, in answer to Napoleon's sneers respecting General Dumas, said that Dumas was abused to the Emperor because he was an honest man, but admitted that he was not a great general.—TR.

will come out of your hospitals; and if their regiments have not paid proper attention to their muskets you will experience a great scarcity of them. The negotiations with England continue to languish. I can tell you no more about them than you will see in the 'Moniteur.' Lord Yarmouth is recalled, and Lord Lauderdale remains in sole charge; but they have already gone beyond the question of Sicily,* for upon that point I would listen to no compromise. Whether the result be peace or war, Naples and Sicily shall be yours.

[220.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Aug. 18, 1806.

My Brother,—The 1st regiment of the line, one of the best in the army, is at Pescara, where it is of no use; call it to Naples without delay. Since it is already inured to the climate, it is better that this regiment should march the distance from Pescara to Naples than the 4 battalions of the brigade of General Tisson. If, however, circumstances should oblige you to move General Tisson's brigade to Naples, I shall order the brigade of General Laplanche Mortières, also consisting of 4 battalions, which I am now sending to Ancona, to proceed to Pescara. See what it is to distribute troops properly, and consider the good which the 1st regiment might have done in the direction of Cosenza. Certainly it is of very doubtful utility at Pescara. The division in the Abruzzi has had no pay for five months.

[221.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Aug. 20, 1806.

My Brother, — I have authorised Generals Dédon and Camprédon to enter your service. These are two good selec-

* This was not exactly true. The utmost concession made by the English negotiators was, to admit that the question of Sicily might be considered, provided an equivalent were offered to the King of Sicily and voluntarily accepted by him.—TR.

tions. As to Rœderer, I do not think him a great financier; I believe that you have too much confidence in him. He is too restless to be a good administrator, and perhaps, indeed, to be steady in his attachments. Take him, but remember that I have warned you. I believe that you will repent. You are a young man, and nature has made you too kind; we must not always judge by our impressions, but look to what men have already done; however, I will say no more, because it has come to my knowledge that my letters have been seen by several persons. What I tell you is certain; my letters have been quoted in Paris, and I have recognised my own expressions; as you write to me with your own hand, no other person ought to read my letters—you should keep them under lock and key. You are justly reproached with talking too much of your affairs, and to too many people. Dédon is an honest man, and so is Camprédon. I fancy that you are sure of their consent. You may state generally that I shall see with pleasure the officers of my troops enter your service, and that their places will be restored to them if they should be forced to leave you. It would be well if you could attach Masséna; for though he has not great military talents, you may want him as a man of energy.

[222.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Aug. 20, 1806.

My Brother,—The Minister of War has sent me a return, received from the chief of your staff, of the new organisation of the army of Naples. I perceive that there is only one of the battalions of the 14th regiment of light infantry in Calabria; so much the worse; bring the two together, never separate your battalions if it can be avoided. I see that you keep in Calabria the 1st light infantry, and the 42nd;* this is wrong; you should recall them to Naples, encourage them yourself, and take particular care of them. Polish infantry is not suited to

* These were the regiments that first turned their backs and fled at Maida, and probably suffered the most.—TR.

such severe mountain expeditions; bring it back and station it at Naples, or at Taranto, or in the Abruzzi. I observe with regret that the light cavalry and the dragoons have been mixed: they are not the same arm. Moreover, a regiment of dragoons thus isolated can do nothing; assembled in bodies of 2000 men, and capable, as they are, of manœuvring well on foot, they would be very useful to you. To find the 1st regiment of the line in the Abruzzi is enough to make one swear. It is one of your best regiments. The 24th dragoons are also useless there. The 1st battalion of the 3rd Italian regiment of the line, and the royal Italian chasseurs, would be sufficient there. The 5th Italian regiment of the line and the Neapolitan dragoons are enough for Puglia. You can withdraw the 6th chasseurs from the vicinity of Naples. You will find annexed the distribution which I make of your army, in order to threaten Sicily and to be prepared for everything. Besides the 5000 men whom I send to you from your depôts, the battalions of the regiment of Latour d'Auvergne, which is on its way to Gaeta, the Polish lancers, and the Swiss battalion, which has reached Pescara from Ancona, you will soon receive the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the regiment of Latour d'Auvergne, consisting of 1000 men each, which are at present at Genoa, as well as the Swiss battalion, which is in Corsica, and which is to land at Piombino, to proceed from thence to Civita Vecchia. When once the army is thus placed, not one disembarkation will be effected in Calabria, and you will be able to do what is most important, to punish the brigands severely. You will do well, when you put the Poles into Naples, to place there General Dombrowski, which will give you a greater hold upon them. You are not in want of generals, but one brigadier is sufficient in the Abruzzi; his first duty is to guard Pescara, and to collect there ammunition and victuals for a month. It would, however, be as easy to succour Pescara from Ancona or Rimini as from Naples. I have given orders to this effect to Lemarrois. The general in command at Pescara must correspond with him by signals, and by small posts of cavalry keeping up a constant communication. At present everything depends

there in a manner not to be shaken. This will encourage the army, will exercise an influence upon Sicily, and even upon the course of negotiations. Put the Corsican legion under a Corsican.

PLAN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY OF NAPLES — BY THE EMPEROR.

Advanced guard of the army of Sicily :—

First Division—General Reynier, Commander.

The 14th and 23rd light infantry, the 29th and 52nd of the line, and the 6th chasseurs.

Second Division—General Verdier, Commander.

The Corsican legion, the 22nd light infantry, the 10th and 20th of the line, and the 4th chasseurs.

Third Division—reserve—General Gardanne, Commander.

The 1st Neapolitan light infantry, the 101st and 102nd of the line, and the 14th chasseurs.

These three divisions under the order of a marshal.

The first placed at Reggio, and from St. Euphemia as far as the port of Catanzaro.

The second at Cosenza and beyond Cotrona.

The third at Cassano as far as the borders of Calabria.

Reserve of Dragoons—General Merinet, Commander.

The 7th, 23rd, 24th, 28th, 29th, and 30th, forming three brigades, each commanded by a general of division, placed according to the nature of the ground as far as the borders of Calabria, each brigade having 2 guns and a detachment of light infantry. For this purpose the battalion of the 32nd light infantry is to be put at the disposal of

All the dismounted dragoons at Naples or anywhere else are to rejoin. Care must be taken that all the dragoons have their arms and 50 cartridges, and that the farriers have their utensils, and that the men are frequently exercised on foot.

By means of these dispositions the advance of the 2000 or 3000 dragoons might reach Cassano by a forced march of a day and a half, and the brigades in *échelons* would arrive with 8 hours' interval between each. If they retreated they could march on Salerno and Naples; moving to the right, they would reach the coast and destroy any troops that attempted to land. Lastly, if required, by moving to the right they would occupy Matera and Puglia.

At Salerno would be placed a division under the orders of General Girardon, composed of the 6th and 62nd of the line, the 2nd Italian infantry, and the guard both horse and foot. This corps must be placed so as to be able to unite and manœuvre.

Two hours distance from Naples should be placed another division under the orders of General Espagne, composed of the 1st and 42nd of the line, and the 1st light infantry. A good position must be chosen, and, if there be wood, they may be encamped.

In Naples should be placed the Poles, the 1st Neapolitan regiment, the Swiss battalion which is now in Calabria, those which are to come from Ancona and Corsica (in order that all that regiment may be reorganised), and the 9th and 25th chasseurs.

At Gaeta should be placed the black pioneers and the battalion of the Tour d'Auvergne: in the neighbourhood the Polish Uhlans.

At Pescara and in the Abruzzi the 3rd Italian regiment of the line and the Royal Italian chasseurs.

In Puglia the 5th Italian regiment of the line, the Napoleon dragoons, and the 1st regiment of Neapolitan chasseurs.

A communication should be established between Taranto and Cassano. The general depôt of the army should be at Capua: each regiment should send thither a captain, 2 lieutenants, and

All the sick, on quitting the hospitals, should join there; 14 quarters must be assigned to the 14 regiments respectively. The sick will rest there a fortnight; they will rejoin the army only by detachments of 100, so that there may be no unembodied men on the roads, and that men may not get to the end of Calabria, ill-clothed, unarmed, and half sick. Each detachment will be conducted by an officer, and his route will be given by the staff. They will be supplied with wine and white bread, following my example on the Adda, so that no man will be assassinated or endangered.

The army will communicate with the depôts in Italy by way of Capua.

REMARKS.

This disposition of the army of Naples shows that there are rather too many troops by one-third than too few. The enemy landing with even 30,000 men would not land with impunity.

The King should never sleep in Naples till the peace. His right position seems to be Salerno. If he were to reside even at Caserta or at Portici, Naples would be easily kept quiet by 2 pieces of cannon and a regiment of cavalry. The general who commands in the Terra di Lavoro must correspond by pickets with General Duhesme, in order to have his assistance if necessary. For the same purpose the general who commands in the Abruzzi and at Pescara must communicate with Ancona by pickets and signals. If an English squadron were to present itself before Naples, and to attempt a bombardment, an attack on the forts, or an insurrection, the Swiss and Neapolitan troops would be immediately assisted by the division encamped at 2 hours distance; 24 hours after, all the camp from Salerno might be there, and the reserve of dragoons might arrive during the night. At the same time all the cavalry in Gaeta and the part of the garrison which can be spared would set out. At Capua would be immediately found 3000 cavalry, 4000 men belonging to different troops, and 6 good French regiments of infantry, making altogether more than 15,000 men. Lastly, if the attack

might set out from Cassano, and in 6 or 7 days of good marching might reinforce the army of Naples. But this seems an impossible supposition. What enemy would be mad enough to land in the capital, not having the forts, or between Salerno and Gaeta, having Capua on his left? Would he go to Taranto? The reserve from Cassano would be there immediately. All along the coasts there are small forts where 200 men could maintain themselves, as we see in Reggio and Scylla, where it seems that a small number of men has held out for more than a month. As to Gaeta, we must act decidedly; it has this inconvenience, that in an enemy's hands it stops the communications with Rome. If the port will not hold ships of war, the fortifications should be demolished, and the guns carried to Capua, but the citadel should be left, so that 400 or 500 men occupying it may prevent the enemy from wishing to seize the isthmus.

By means of the 5000 men who, when this letter is received, are entering Pescara, each battalion on service will have more than 1000 men effective. The Italian depôts of dragoons are very strong; the 23rd and 24th have more than 400 men respectively. The King of Naples may keep these 2 regiments, but in the winter it would be proper to send back the 2 first squadrons belonging to the depôt. This is not pressing at present.

The dispositions which have been sketched appear to have other advantages. The knowledge of them will alarm the enemy, who will see that we are thinking seriously of Sicily. The troops will recover their spirits because they will feel that they are strong and united. To repress little partial insurrections, Neapolitans, Corsicans, and Italians should be employed. In such skirmishes are lost many good men who ought to be reserved for more important purposes. The batteries of Reggio and Scylla should be repaired, and those points fortified, in order that, if the army should be forced to fall back on Naples, they may defend the batteries for a long time:

[223.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Aug. 20, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 8th of August, together with a return by which I see that the 10th of the line is reported as having 58 men out of the government of Naples; the 52nd, 145; the 101st, 15; and the 1st Neapolitan regiment, 668. You must order them to rejoin in detachments, and take the greatest care to keep your regiments assembled. In a country like Naples they would become scattered according to the fancy of the commandants of forts, and you would no longer have an army. There is too much infantry at Naples, and one regiment of cavalry is not enough. Pray what becomes of all your cavalry? I think it likely that the English may have taken Reggio and Scylla, and may have fortified themselves in one of them. It is also possible that, when they become aware what is the strength of Marshal Masséna, they may collect their forces; I therefore wish you to have sufficient troops in *échelons* to go to his assistance if necessary. When I see that you keep such a fine regiment as the 1st of the line at Pescara, I think it possible that you may have others lying idle towards Taranto. Whatever you may say, you have nearly 40,000 men, counting the Neapolitans. You have 6000 cavalry, but they are scattered and disorganised, and not placed as they ought to be. It is of paramount importance to the success of the negotiations that the English should be driven from Reggio and Scylla, and that the preparations for landing should be recommenced. Attempts of the enemy upon the coast of Pescara or of Taranto will end in nothing: all they can do is to endeavour to defend the extremity of Calabria. You must therefore keep your forces between Naples and Calabria; in future this should be your chief object. I have not yet received a report on Gaeta, nor a complete plan from which I may learn the state of its harbour; however, everything will soon change in your favour. Autumn will restore the vigour and spirits of your soldiers; your invalids will recover; the roughness of the sea will force the English to be more careful, and will add to the difficulty of their operations.

Lastly, I send to you a considerable reinforcement, since your different regiments will receive altogether nearly 5000 men.

If you do not establish as a principle that the enemy will not attack in force any point by the occupation of which they get nothing, if you insist upon guarding every point, you will do nothing. Assemble all your dragoons and form them into a reserve. Take pleasure, if you can, in reading your returns. The good condition of my armies is owing to my devoting to them 2 or 3 hours in every day. When the monthly returns of my armies and of my fleets, which form 20 thick volumes, are sent to me, I give up every other occupation in order to read them in detail and to observe the difference between one monthly return and another. No young girl enjoys her novel so much as I do these returns. It shocks me to see your corps scattered in different provinces. Your 3rd and 4th battalions are in Italy well organised; your 1st and 2nd battalions ought to be brought well together. You should immediately issue an order to the different detachments to rejoin their regiments. I am impatiently waiting to hear whether Reggio and Scylla have been able to resist for so long a time. I have sent to you nearly 5000 men from your depôts. I cannot send you as many more before the month of February, if, indeed, you should require them. I again beg you to send back the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 8 provincial battalions which I have sent to you. Several battalions belonging to your depôts in the kingdom of Italy are without their majors. I do not know the cause of this.

You have 14 French regiments; choose from among them 4 of those which are in the best heart, and place them between St. Euphemia and Reggio; place 4 equally good regiments between Cosenza and Cassano. Form these 8 regiments into 2 divisions; call them the advanced guard of the army of Sicily. Form the remaining 6 French regiments into 2 divisions, 3 regiments in each, to be thus disposed: one division at half a day's march from Naples, and the other at 2 days' march from Naples, on the road to Calabria. Add to each of these divisions a regiment of cavalry and some artillery. Then bring together all your regiments of dragoons, consisting of 2000 or 3000 men; place them between Lagonegro and Naples, forming them into 3 bri-

gades of 2 regiments each, at one day's march the one from the other. Take care that these men are often exercised on foot. With respect to the garrisons of Naples, of the islands, of Pescara, of Gaeta, of Capua, and of Taranto, place there your Poles, the Italians, the Neapolitans, the Corsicans, and the Swiss. The auxiliary troops whom you have for the purpose of keeping Taranto may, if necessary, be directed on Cassano, and in the same way those who are at Cassano may go to Taranto. As soon as your troops are collected they will believe in their own strength. That belief will spread throughout the kingdom and will have more influence than even the appearance of the troops. What is wanted for our general policy is, that you should be master of Reggio and of Scylla as soon as possible. I think that the 1st light infantry and the 42nd should return towards Naples.

[224.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Aug. 21, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 12th of August, containing the details of the capture and pillage of the town of Lauria.* Be sure to order that all the rebellious villages near Euphemia experience the same fate; and above all seize the chiefs. In the official reports circulated by the English on the Continent they assert that they were but 5000 against General Reynier. If this be true, it is very extraordinary, and shows what sort of troops the French are, and how much they require to be well led, supported, and encouraged. All the depôts in Italy send to the battalions in the field their disposable clothing; I have written to tell you to make a depôt for it at Capua. Send thither all the clothing; much of it requires to be made up. I enclose you a statement of what has already been sent, and of the stock of linen, shoes, and stockings.

Pescara appears to be in the worst possible state; send thither

* The town was burnt, and the inhabitants were shot as they were trying to escape the flames.—TR.

an artillery officer, with a small sūm of money, to repair the gun-carriages, and to re-establish a sufficient number of batteries to arm the bastions, and to ensure the place from being carried by assault. It seems that Reggio surrendered on the 10th of July. The battle of St. Euphemia took place on the 4th, consequently Reggio surrendered 6 days afterwards. I cannot imagine how troops can have been left in a post so defenceless—for the enemy did not even batter it.

[225.]—Extract from a letter from Joseph to Napoleon, dated the 13th August, 1806.

"I remain here till your Majesty's birthday, on which I wish you joy. I hope that you may receive with some little pleasure this expression of my affection. The glorious Emperor will never replace to me the Napoleone whom I so much loved, and whom I hope to find again, as I knew him 20 years ago, if we are to meet in the Elysian Fields."*

[226.] Napoleon to Joseph.

Rambouillet, Aug. 23, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 13th of August. I am sorry that you think that you will find your brother again only in the Elysian Fields. It is natural that at 40 he should not feel towards you as he did at 12; but his feelings towards you have greater truth and strength; his friendship has the features of his mind.

These disembarkments of Neapolitan troops in Calabria are of no consequence. They are feeble attempts, and the cool season, which is approaching, will enable my troops to treat the invaders as they deserve, and to pursue them in every direction.

The brigade of General Tisson ought to have arrived at Pes-

* This extract is introduced in order to make the next letter intelligible. —Tr.

cara. You have a right to dispose of it as you think fit, as it is on the territory occupied by your army. You may either dismiss or retain General Tisson; but send back the officers and non-commissioned officers of the battalions as soon as the men have joined their different regiments.

The brigade of General Laplanche Mortières is also on its way to Naples. You must have received the Swiss battalion which was at Ancona, and that of Latour d'Auvergne which was at Civita Vecchia. The 2nd battalion of Latour d'Auvergne is on its way, as well as another Swiss battalion from Corsica; thus in September and October the number of your troops present under arms will be increased to more than 45,000. I have raised 50,000 men in France, and I shall divide half of them between your depôts and those of the army of Dalmatia.

[227.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 27, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 18th of August.* I have sent no generals to your army. I do not know what you mean when you mention General Marchand. You may send back as many generals and officers as you like; it will diminish your expense, and give me pleasure.

The treaty with Russia was to be ratified on the 15th. I hear that the ratifications are soon to be exchanged. I tell you this, because doubts have been expressed as to the ratification. You must not, however, make it public. The English appear to be much divided as to peace; they have shown great contempt for King Ferdinand and Queen Caroline. Sicily seems to be yielded, but there are other obstacles which render doubtful the issue of the negotiations.

* Joseph said that he heard that General Marchand was coming to him, and added that he had already more generals than he wanted.—TR.

[228.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 28, 1806.

My Brother,—"Le Vétéran," commanded by Jérôme, anchored two days ago in the bay of Laforêt near Quimper: she was separated from her squadron 25 days ago by a storm. This news came by the telegraph, which at the same time tells me that Jérôme is well: as yet there are no further details.*

[229.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 29, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 19th of August. It is very important that you should send to my Minister of War a return of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, whom you have taken from the different regiments of the army of Naples to form your guard. You must not pay your guard as highly as I do mine; it is an unnecessary expense. In forming and paying my guard, my object is to furnish rewards for from 5000 to 6000 men out of my numerous army. Your guard is created for a different purpose. Treat your guard a little better than the troops of the line, but not much better. I certainly had rather that you should arm only between 12,000 and 15,000 of the militia of Naples, than 50,000. It is for you to decide upon your own affairs; but you should never lose sight of this. If we were defeated on the Isonzo, and the enemy were in Milan, which side would these men take?

Your Swiss regiment will soon receive many recruits. Place their depôt in Capua; they will be joined by the battalion which is in Corsica. The battalion in the island of Elba will also join immediately. In consequence of the precautions which have been taken, that regiment will soon consist of 4000 men.

I rejoice at the arrival of the fine season; it will invigorate

* The entrance of this vessel into the small port of Concarneau, near Quimper, by a dangerous channel, to escape Admiral Keith's squadron, is one of the exploits of the French navy.—ED.

your troops and cure your invalids. The negotiations get on slowly; their issue is doubtful.

[230.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 29, 1806.

My Brother,—In order to put an end to all discussion, I have published a decree fixing what each regiment is to furnish for your guard. In this way no regiment will be too much weakened.

[231.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 30, 1806.

My Brother,—The French garrison of Reggio, composed of 680 men, has just arrived at Genoa. I have ordered every detachment to join its depôt in the kingdom of Italy. You had better exchange them as soon as possible for an equal number of the garrison of Gaeta; you ought to have a list of the names of the men belonging to that garrison. Make your Minister of War write to the Neapolitan commandant that such and such men belonging to the garrison of Reggio are exchanged for such and such men belonging to the garrison of Gaeta. I know that the garrison of Scylla has arrived at La Ciotat; you will do the same with regard to the men composing that garrison.

[232.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 30, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter. I need not tell you of what importance it is to obtain immediate possession of Reggio and of Scylla. Every day's delay is an evil, for the enemy will turn them into fortresses, which it will be difficult for us to take. The heat will soon diminish, the dog-days are nearly over, and your sick will get well. Nevertheless, I have

just ordered a corps of 600 dragoons to be formed; they are to be taken from the depôts of your 6 regiments which are in Italy, 100 from each; you will receive them towards the end of September, completely armed and equipped. They will repair the losses in your dragoon regiments. Although they are weak in number, do not fail to carry out my plan of forming them into one body; you will thus have in hand a reserve of cavalry, and also of infantry. But no time should be lost: let Reynier return to seize Reggio and Scylla.

Send me returns of your troops every fortnight. Up to the present time your returns have been very ill prepared. It is of great consequence that I should thoroughly understand the state and position of your army.

I have advised you to establish a great depôt of convalescents at Capua, and to send thither the depôts of all your regiments. This is of great importance, and will save you a great many men. Do not allow your soldiers to proceed singly to Calabria. Order all the men on leaving the hospitals to go to the great depôt at Capua, and, after having rested there for 15 or 20 days, let them be clothed, armed, and sent in detachments of 100 men, under the command of an officer, to join their regiments. I have given a company and the Legion of Honour to the Italian lieutenant who behaved so well in the islands of Tremiti. From the last return of your army, it appears that the strength of your dragoon regiments was as follows:—the 23rd, 518 men; the 29th, 473 men; the 24th, 511 men; the 28th, 773 men; the 7th, 427 men; the 30th, 425 men; in all, 3127. I can hardly believe what you tell me, that they are reduced to 1800 men. You must then have 1200 sick. The fact is, that several of these regiments must be scattered. You should assemble the detachments.

[233.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 2, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 22nd of August. General Camprédon has entered your service, and is

about to join you. I see that your two engineers incline towards Capua. I am not opposed to this idea; but I think that they decide this question too easily. I do not consider the vicinity of Naples as an inconvenience. I do not admit that that huge capital would confine you. On the contrary, you would keep it in check, and have a harbour within your defences.

These are the three chief objects to be held in view, in order that the great fortress which I wish to establish may be as useful as possible. 1st, to command the capital, so that no one may be its master unless he be also master of the fortress; 2ndly, to contain all the arsenals and the magazines belonging to the army; 3rdly, to contain the arsenals and the ships of the Neapolitan navy. The fortress of Capua has only one of these advantages; it can have no influence on Naples, which is out of the reach of its fire, and as it is not a seaport it cannot contain the naval arsenals; it can therefore hold only the military stores. To possess the three requisites, the fortress must be situated within range of the heart of Naples, and must surround the harbour. A fortress placed at Castellamare would not command Naples, but it would possess the other two advantages; that is to say, it might contain the military and marine arsenals. It would do this as well at Gaeta, if the harbour can contain men-of-war. I wish this fortress to be on the sea, because I may not be destined to be always inferior in the Mediterranean, and because, even if such be the case, it is impossible to prevent a maritime fortress from being revictualled in winter. I revictualled Malta; and if it had been besieged in the 12th year of the republic instead of during the absurd government of the year 7 and the calamities of the year 8, it would never have surrendered for want of provisions, still less would a place as near to Corsica and Toulon as Gaeta, Naples, or Castellamare. It is ridiculous in an engineer to say that it would be difficult to victual Gaeta. I am not aware that there exists in the world a river larger or more navigable than the sea; but if frigates cannot enter Gaeta, this point offers no advantages, and you must look about the coast for some point where a harbour may be easily constructed, if there be none already, and where there is water for 6 or 7 ships of the line. As to the expense, the kingdom of Naples

is rich enough to allow you to employ in this manner 6 millions a year for ten years; you would thus have a place, like Strasbourg, Alexandria, &c., capable of a long resistance, and to be attacked only by a large army with immense supplies.

The engineers whom you have consulted have not sufficiently extensive ideas; let them draw a map of the ground round the fortress of St. Elmo and between Mount Vesuvius and Naples. Tell them to describe on these two points a circle 3200 yards in diameter, which may reach the sea at one end and the town at the other, so that the advanced works may be at a distance of 800 yards from the houses, and desire them to let me know, not by arguments or profound combinations, but by calculations belonging to the art of engineering, the objections to each plan. Desire another engineer officer to examine Castellamare and all the peninsula of which the isthmus is the land lying between Amalfi and Castellamare. By constructing a fortress round Castellamare 8000 or 10,000 yards in extent, you would always be master of the harbour, and your naval and military stores would be in safety whatever might happen. A few forts erected at Castellamare and at Amalfi would enable you to keep possession of the peninsula. You should establish a good fort on the island of Capri, and these works, with a garrison of 16,000 or 20,000 men, would have several advantages. A long siege might be stood in this entrenched camp, which, according to my map, would be 4 leagues long and 3 leagues broad, without including the island of Capri. Even if the enemy's force were very superior, still they could not take Capri and the forts defending the isthmus without a vast quantity of ammunition and a great loss of time. When they had succeeded in this, they would have to take the fortress itself. It is evident that years would elapse in this siege, and that the enemy would have to sacrifice immense resources which might have been otherwise employed.

It may be added that the position of Castellamare offers, to a certain extent, the same advantages as the vicinity of Naples. Being at a distance of 4 leagues by sea from Naples, the trade of that town would always be exposed to it. Against an enemy master of the peninsula and of Capri the navigation of the bay

of the weather, to tack in so narrow a gulf. The fortress would be within sight of Naples, and would influence the town much better than if it were placed at Capua. For these reasons, setting aside the nature of the ground, with which I am not acquainted, but judging only by the geographical position and its maritime situation at only 4 leagues from Naples, Castellamare would be my choice. Next to Castellamare I should select Gaeta. One advantage of a maritime position is, that nearly half the place is beyond the reach of attack. If you select Gaeta you should treat the existing fortifications as the citadel, and the fortress should be established in the isthmus at a distance of from 2000 to 4000 yards in advance, surrounding it either with good detached forts or by lines, so that before the garrison could be reduced it would be necessary to make three or four sieges, which, as each of them would require thirty or forty days of open trenches, would enable a determined monarch to defend himself there with the best of his subjects during eight or nine months of continued siege.

As for attacks from the sea, they go for nothing: as long as the enemy wastes his powder in that way there is nothing to fear. Twenty mortars of long range, a few batteries of 36-pounders, and some forts, which you will always be able to erect at sixty or eighty yards from one another, will soon disgust him. Let Pozzuoli be likewise examined; it is situated on a bay, and only two leagues from Naples. Have a report on it. You might take this peninsula and the islands of Ischia and Procida; this would be another system of fortifications, but it should be so arranged that, even if the islands were taken, the fortress would remain in its full strength. A place of depôt for stores is not like a system of fortified places for the defence of a frontier. I do not care whether the depôt is established near Rome, Sicily, or Taranto; nevertheless, I should like it to be as near to Naples as possible.

In establishing this fortress what is your object? It is to render Naples independent of the events in Upper Italy. I will suppose the Austrians recovered from their present state of dejection and reconquering the Adige and Piedmont;

If an army much stronger than that of the King of Naples, and reinforced from the sea, should oblige him to retire from the field, he would have his plans and movements ready settled; he would retreat into his fortress, carrying with him his treasures, his archives, a few devoted subjects, and some hostages taken from the opposite party. If you will only calculate the fearful amount of resources which the enemy would be obliged to collect, you will see how difficult it would be for 60,000 men to obtain possession of the kingdom of Naples, though there were no more French in Italy. When the kings of Naples, warlike, as it is the first duty of a king to be, have a central capital, in which they know that they must shut themselves up and defend themselves, they will make it strong. When this takes place, when the hostile powers see this system established, and the King secure in his fortress, they will respect him; they will prefer peace to a struggle which would weaken too much the resources of the allies, who will have also to deal with France. A fortress constructed for this purpose deserves the expenditure of considerable sums. Five millions of francs a year employed, not on what in the engineer's jargon are called establishments, but in constructing half-moons, would in five years make this place formidable.

After employing four or five years in this way you will have time to build barracks and large magazines, the cost of which will not signify, as with years and centuries everything becomes easy.

You ought to make another fortress in Sicily, at Messina or at Faro, but I think it would be useful to begin immediately by the fortifications of Scylla. The 300 men whom you left there defended themselves for a fortnight. If you had taken the precaution of working at the fortifications during four or five months, the same men would have held out for three months. With Scylla you are master of the Straits. It is not necessary to weaken your resources by dividing them between Reggio and Scylla. If General Reynier, instead of scattering his forces, had had 800 men at Scylla with his artillery and stores, he would not have lost them. Your other fortifications have no object;

the protection of a strait or of an anchorage, are useless, but they are only secondary. As long as the enemy does not land forces superior to yours, a few small forts may be of use: he will not attempt a siege when he may any day be driven into the sea. What is most important, in my opinion, is a place of depôt to be traced early in the next month. Supposing the plan of the works to be determined upon by that time, the order in which they are executed is of the greatest importance. You should have a plan traced, and decide upon the mode of its execution, and not let your engineers construct a fortress which, after ten years of labour, will not be strong enough to hold out against a squadron, because it will not be finished. I intend it to be capable of some degree of resistance in 1808.

To conclude, I wish you to fortify Scylla in such a manner as to prevent the garrison of 700 or 800 men whom you have left there, with the batteries which command the strait, from being taken by storm, and to enable them to hold out during fifteen or twenty days of open trenches. I also wish you to send me some notes upon Gaeta and the ground surrounding it, on the country between Vesuvius, Naples, and Portici, as well as upon Castellamare and the whole of that peninsula. You have four or five years in which to execute these works. In the mean time, so arrange your affairs that, whatever storm may sweep over you, you may not be taken unawares or unprepared.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 3rd of September, 1806, to the 28th of July, 1807.

At the date of the first letter Napoleon had just received the news of the non-ratification of the Oubril treaty, and therefore of the renewal of the war with Russia.

At the date of the last he was in Dresden, returning from the wonderful campaign which may be said to have begun by the battle of Jena on the 14th of October, 1806, and to have ended by the battle of Friedland on the 14th of June, 1807.

[234.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I have just received the news that the plans of the cabinet of St. Petersburg have been altered by the change of ministry, and that the treaty which was concluded on the 20th of June with M. d'Oubril has not been ratified. You need not communicate this intelligence. You had better, however, take precautions with respect to Corfu, to prevent your ships from being caught there. It is very important that you should soon be master of the whole of Calabria. The approaching season will increase the difficulty of landing on your coast, and, by restoring the health of your invalids, will put a greater number of troops at your disposal. Perhaps, on the whole, you will think it better to wait a few days before you announce this news. The only

reason alleged by the Emperor of Russia was, that he would not make peace without England.

The two battalions of Latour d'Auvergne have already gone beyond Sarrana, and will soon join you. If there are any Russian ships in your ports sequester them.

You may give orders at first that means be taken to prevent the Russian ships in your harbours from clearing out, and delay seizing them till the last moment, so that the news may reach the Russians as late as possible. They may not get it for some days, and the delay of a few days will be useful, especially to my army of Dalmatia and Ragusa. Keep it therefore to yourself to the very last.

[235.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 1, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 26th of August. Take Rœderer, since he possesses your confidence. To ask for M. Collin was absurd. As for the Abbé Louis, if he had wished to leave me I should not have opposed it. If you want a person who understands the customs, there are some subordinates of M. Collin who may be sent to you.

[236.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 4, 1806.

My Brother,—There are 89 pieces of ordnance at Pescara. There are 12 gun-carriages which want repairing: order it to be done. Send to Pescara a military commandant, a resident artillery officer, a detachment of artillery, and 20 more gun-carriages to protect the place from being taken by assault. The defences appear to be pretty good. It might be surprised from the sea, which would be inconvenient.

[237.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 7, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 26th of August. I see that Masséna is still far from Reggio; this is giving the enemy time to fortify it, and much time will be lost in taking it. I am not told whether you are master of Cotrona.

[238.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 8, 1806.

My Brother,—I see with extreme surprise that the chief of your staff, indeed that an officer in your army, presumes to communicate with the enemy without having been authorized by you.* I cannot understand it. Is General Berthier ignorant of the first duties of his profession? Sidney Smith's answer is impertinent, like everything else that proceeds from him. You ought to have put General Berthier under arrest for a week; and on the first repetition of the offence you should deprive him of his rank. I am writing to his brother, that he may make known to him my severe displeasure. Receive no flags of truce; they have always been used against us by the enemy.

[239.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 12, 1806.

My Brother,—I have appointed Colonels Cavaignac and Blaniac to be brigadier-generals, as a reward for good service.

* A letter from Sir Sidney Smith to General Cæsar Berthier, the chief of Joseph's staff, fell into Joseph's hands, and was sent to Napoleon. It was apparently an answer.—TR.

[240.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 12, 1806.

My Brother,—I told you that Russia had not ratified. Prussia is arming in a most ridiculous manner; however, she shall soon disarm, or pay dearly for what she is doing. Nothing can exceed the vacillation of that cabinet. The Court of Vienna makes me great protestations, and its total want of power inclines me to put faith in them. Whatever happens, I *can* face, and *will* face, every enemy. The conscription which I have just levied is going on in every direction. I am going to call out my reserve;* I am fully provided and in want of nothing. Whether it be war or peace I shall not diminish your army. In a few days perhaps I may put myself at the head of my grand army:† it consists of nearly 150,000 men, and with that force I can reduce to submission Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. There will be a somewhat formidable army in Upper Italy. Keep these dispositions secret; they will be best proclaimed by victory.

Press your enemies sharply; drive them out of the peninsula; recover Cotrona, Scylla, and Reggio. The negotiations with England are still going on; but peace or war must be decided in a week. Fox is incapable of taking part in public affairs; he is quite overpowered by his illness, which will probably bring him to his grave. Jérôme has landed; I have made him a prince, and I have given him the great cordon of the Legion of Honour; I have arranged his marriage with the Princess Catherine, the Duke of Wurtemberg's daughter. As I shall be obliged to call for a *plebiscitum* on his account, that is to say the sanction of the people to his succession to the crown, I wish Lucien not to let slip this opportunity.‡

* In France, usually only half the conscripts are called out at first: the other half is called the reserve, and in peace is seldom called out. It remains, however, liable to serve; and on an emergency, the reserves of the four or five previous years are sometimes called out together. This was done in 1854.—TR.

† He did so twelve days after the date of this letter.—TR.

‡ Joseph wrote to Lucien. Lucien answered that he would not part with his wife or make any change in the position of his children, and that

Be quite easy about political affairs; go on as if nothing were happening. If indeed I am again forced to strike, my measures are so well and surely taken, that the first notice to Europe of my departure from Paris will be the total ruin of my enemies. Let your newspapers describe me as occupied in Paris with hunting, amusements, and negotiations. If the warlike preparations of Prussia are mentioned, let it be supposed that they take place with my consent; and M. Humboldt must have received orders to proceed to your court as Prussian minister. I will never lay down my arms unless Naples and Sicily are yours. I have called your attention to Pescara: keep there a sufficient quantity of powder, of gun-carriages, a military commandant, an engineer officer, an artillery officer, a storekeeper, a commissariat officer, a garrison of 400 or 500 men, and provisions for a month. Order the troops in the Abruzzi to shut themselves up in Pescara on an emergency, sending word at the same time to the general in command at Ancona. If the enemy succeeded in landing and throwing 1000 men into that place, he would soon be able to sustain a siege, which would be very inconvenient.

In the midst of all these events I do not forget the sea. I have schemes which may possibly in a month or two make me master of the Mediterranean.

[241.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 13, 1806.

My Brother,—Everything proves that Mr. Fox is dead. Lord Yarmouth has been triumphantly received in London, because he was known to belong to the peace party. Mr. Fox's illness has filled the nation with consternation. The ministers seemed delighted with these demonstrations, and all hope of peace is not yet lost. The English minister in Paris is too ill to see anybody. He has attended no conference since the arrival of his last courier. Prussia makes me a thousand protestations, which do not prevent my taking my precautions: in a few days she will have disarmed, or she will be crushed. Austria de-

clares her intention to remain neutral. Russia does not know what she wants, but her distance renders her powerless. Such, in two words, is the state of affairs.

I fancy that in the course of the next ten days the peace of the Continent will be more settled than ever. As to England, I can conjecture nothing. Her conduct is decided, not by general politics, but by internal intrigues. The last news announced that Mr. Fox was at the point of death; his friends are deploring his loss as if he were already dead.

[242.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 15, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 5th of September. I see no objection to the arms which you wish to adopt. It appears that there has been an insurrection near Terracina, which has interrupted the communications: it was probably assisted by the sight of some English ships. I suppose that you speedily set things to rights. As soon as he heard of it the Viceroy sent 3 battalions from Ancona to reinforce General Duhesme. As they are taken from the depôts of your army, give orders that they may continue their march to Naples, without stopping at Civita Vecchia or in the Pontine marshes.

[243.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 17, 1806.

My Brother,—I have just received the news of Mr. Fox's death. Under the present circumstances, he dies regretted by both nations.

The Commandant of Terracina appears to be a Neapolitan. He has spread over Italy a report that there are but two days' provisions in Gaeta. He has given himself airs of importance, and has alarmed Rome and its environs; reprimand him in my name. I know not who this colonel is—he calls himself L——. You would not do ill to get rid of such people. As if it were pos-

sible that there could be provisions for only two days at Gaetá, and that none were to be found, not even in the houses of the townspeople!

I hear from Pescara that General Tisson's corps has left there many invalids, and that General Dombrowski allows them to remain in such a state of misery and destitution that they have not even paillasses. Send thither immediately a commissariat officer, and let General Dombrowski join the Poles in Naples. He is not fit to command a province; a French colonel or major would do better. It is dreadful to think that the sick can be neglected and in want. It is perhaps to be regretted that these troops joined you so early. A month later they would have arrived in good health. You ought to have a hospital well provided at Pescara.

[244.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 18, 1806.

My Brother,—I have issued a decree which settles the number of men whom I can spare from my French regiments to form your guard. I can allow you no more. Your guard should not be too numerous. It is advisable not to excite the jealousy of the Imperial Guard; it is by looking forward that one prevents inconveniences, and this one might some day become serious. 3000 men! my own guard has no more.* I am obliged to replace the officers whom you have taken, which increases my expenses considerably. My 15 gendarmes are not well treated at Naples; send them to Milan. This is of great importance, because they write to their comrades; and I am inclined to feel hurt that my kindness in sending men out of my own guard to Naples should be thus repaid. They had an employment; those who deprived them of it and sent them adrift have done ill, and have no idea of what is proper or of what is due to me. It was wrong to wish them to quit my guard without

* This was Joseph's estimate of the number of French officers and

first informing me. I cannot help being displeased with the officers who have left their regiments without my permission. The generals wrote to me, as was regular; the colonels and captains ought to have done so too. These things are very important, because, after having joined your service in this manner, they may just as easily pass on to another. A gentleman does not act irregularly.

When you receive this letter, the month of October, in which all your sick will get well, will not be far off. I think that it would be prudent to leave no invalids in Calabria, but to send them to Capua. The European horizon is rather dark; it is possible that I may soon be at war with the King of Prussia. I have already written to you on the subject. Occupy Calabria, Scylla, and Reggio without exciting attention, and send away the sick from thence, in order that, if it were absolutely necessary, you might concentrate all your troops before Naples without difficulty or delay. You alone must know the motive for this arrangement; it should be executed naturally, and in fact it is conformable to the principles of war. The extremity of Italy exposes its flank to attack; if the English were to arm to a great extent, your invalids ought to be placed in safety in a town like Naples or Capua. In my opinion, Capua is the place for all your sick. There are no other measures for you to take at present. In the first place, it is possible that in eight or ten days all may be settled, or, if not, that the Prussians may be so completely beaten in the first encounters that a few days may terminate the contest. At any rate, execute exactly all that I have told you. If Capua is considered capable of maintaining a siege, you may arm the defences, as it will contain your hospitals, which you cannot expose to surprise or pillage. You may begin to send thither some artillery, and make it the centre of your resources. I repeat to you, you will do injury to your affairs if you allow any one else to read this letter. I am in the habit of meditating for three or four months beforehand on the best course to pursue, of calculating on the possibility of the worst. You will, therefore, do injury to your affairs if you allow what I am now writing to you to be known.

[245.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 20, 1806.

My Brother,—The arming is going on actively on both sides; order General Chambarlhiac of the Engineers to travel post to Ulm in Bavaria, where he will receive further orders. Brigadier Montbrun is useless, perhaps troublesome to you, and he is necessary to me for skirmishing warfare: desire him also to join the Grand Army. Send General Laplanche Mortières back to Ancona to be in command there. I wish to recall Lemarrois to my side. Let these movements be made with the utmost expedition; October is at hand, sickness will disappear. The English, tossed by the tempests, will not be able to continue their operations; they will be tired, too, of constant failure. Read over and over again the last letters which I have written to you, and execute the dispositions which I have mentioned, quietly but unremittingly. As soon as reports of armaments reach Naples, announce that all will be settled; and when you hear of the commencement of hostilities, say that I am acting in concert with England to compel Prussia to restore Hanover; as Lord Lauderdale is still in Paris, this will not appear improbable.

If you can spare General Espagne, send him back to Milan, where he will form part of the army of Italy. If you do not want General Dombrowski, let him come to Paris, whence I shall send him to Germany. That Polish general might be of some use to me. Do not be in the least uneasy; you will hear of my arrival at the army, and of the commencement of hostilities, only with the news of my success. The conscription is advancing rapidly; 20,000 men are crossing the Alps to join your depôts; 40,000 men are to fill up my regiments. I am going to call out the reserve. The national guard is on foot everywhere.

[246.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 24, 1806.

My Brother,—I start this night for Mayence, where I shall

bacérès and the Minister Déjean to write to you every day to give you the news.

[247.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Mayence, Oct. 1, 1806.

My Brother,—I am leaving Mayence for Würzburg, where I am assembling all my army.

The following letter is published by M. Thiers, and is translated as the most vivid picture of the state of Napoleon's mind at this time. Few governments have altered less in character than that of Prussia.

[248.] NAPOLEON TO M. DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD,

French Ambassador in Vienna.

Würzburg, Oct. 3, 1806.

I am here since yesterday, which has enabled me to converse at some length with the Duke.* I have communicated to him my firm resolution, whatever be the result of the present discussions, to break off all alliance with Prussia. According to my last news from Berlin we may not be at war, but I will have no alliance with a power so changeable and so contemptible. Of course I am ready to be at peace with her; I have no right to shed uselessly the blood of my subjects. I want a continental alliance to support my maritime projects. Circumstances led me to one with Prussia; but she is now, as she was in 1740 and always has been, without consistency and without honour. I esteemed the Emperor of Austria even in his calamities when events separated us; I believe him to be constant and true.

* The Duke of Würzburg, the well-known Archduke Ferdinand of

Speak in this tone, but without eagerness. My position and my strength are such that I can fear no one, but these efforts press on my people. Of the three powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, I want one for an ally. Prussia can never be trusted; there remain Russia and Austria. An Austrian alliance once enabled us to be strong at sea. Austria, like myself, wishes for quiet. An alliance, based on the independence of Turkey, guaranteed by us, and with a mutual understanding, securing the peace of Europe, would enable me to turn my attention to my fleet. It would suit me. Austria has often hinted this to me. The present moment, if she is ready to take advantage of it, is peculiarly favourable. I say no more. I have explained myself more fully to the Prince of Benevento, who will communicate with you. Your part is played as soon as you have insinuated, as slightly as possible, that I am not opposed to a system which might unite me more closely to Austria. Keep watch on Moldavia and Wallachia, and let me have early notice of any attempts by Russia on Turkey. Whereupon, &c.*

[249.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Würzburg, Oct. 5, 1806.

My Brother,—I am starting for Bamberg, round which place my troops are in motion. I am quite well, and I have good hopes of soon coming to the end of all this.

[250.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bamberg, Oct. 7, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 25th of September; I see with pleasure that you have got rid of that wretched Fra Diavolo. The healthy season is coming; your sick will soon get well. As soon as the French cease to be overcome by the heat, they will recover their energy. Send back

the generals whom you do not want; they are very expensive, and are only in your way.

We commenced hostilities yesterday. I will send your aide-de-camp back to you in 10 days; I saw him to-day.

I have desired Prince Eugène and M. Cambacérès to write to you by every opportunity. Till the first important news reaches you, spread the report that peace is made, and that an interview has taken place been the two sovereigns in which all has been settled. The conduct of Prussia is insane. The war party have gained the upper hand in the cabinet.

During the 18 days which elapsed between Napoleon's letters to Joseph of the 7th and the 25th of October, he had subdued Prussia.

I insert two letters of Napoleon's, written during this interval, to Murat and to Soult. The battle of Jena was fought on the 14th of October.

[251.] NAPOLEON TO THE GRAND DUKE OF BERG.

Imperial Head-quarters, Schleitz, Oct. 10, 1806, 5 A.M.

General Rapp has informed me of the happy result of yesterday evening. It appears to me that you had not enough of your cavalry united and in hand. You reduce it to nothing by dispersing it. You have 6 regiments—I have always advised you to keep at least 4 in hand. I did not see more than 2 with you yesterday. Our reconnaissances towards the right are now less important. Marshal Soult being at Plauen, we must reconnoitre in force towards Pösneck and Saalfeld. Marshal Lannes reached Grafenthal on the evening of the 9th. He attacks Saalfeld to-morrow: you see how important it is that I should know in the course of to-day the enemy's movements towards Saalfeld, in order that, if he collect there more than 25,000 men, I may send reinforcements by Possheim and take them in the rear. I

have ordered the divisions of Dupont and Beaumont to move on Schleitz. To be prepared for everything we must reconnoitre a good postion in advance of Schleitz to serve as a field of battle for more than 80,000 men. Do not let this prevent your sending by daybreak strong reconnaissances towards Auma and Pösneck supported by Drouet's division. Davoust's first division will be at Saalburg, his two others in advance near Obersdorf, and his light cavalry in advance. I have ordered Ney to Tanna. Your great business to-day is, first to profit by yesterday's success by picking up as many prisoners and getting as much information as possible; secondly, to reconnoitre Auma and Saalfeld in order to know precisely what are the movements of the enemy.

[252.] NAPOLEON TO MARSHAL SOULT.

Obersdorf, Oct. 10, 1806, 8 A.M.

We beat yesterday the 8000 men who had retreated from Hof to Schleitz, where they expected reinforcements during the night. Their cavalry has been cut to pieces and a colonel taken prisoner. More than 2000 muskets and caps were found on the field. The Prussian infantry did not stand. We have not caught more than 2000 prisoners, as it was night and they dispersed in the woods. I reckon on a good number this morning.

This, I think, is clear: the Prussians intended to attack; their left will debouch to morrow by Jena, Saalfeld, and Coburg. Prince Hohelohe's head-quarters were at Jena, Prince Louis's at Saalfeld. Their other column debouches by Meiningen on Fulda, so that I suspect that you have nobody before you, perhaps not 1000 men between you and Dresden. If you can crush one of their corps, do so. I cannot move; I have too much still behind: I shall push my advances to Auma. I have examined a good field of battle for 80,000 men beyond Schleitz. I send Marshal Ney to Tanna, two leagues from Schleitz. You could reach Schleitz from Plauen in 24 hours.

On the 5th the Prussian army moved towards Thuringia, so that I think that they must be many days too late. My junction

is nothing. Marshal Lannes will be at Saalfeld to morrow, unless the enemy is there in great force.

Therefore to-day and to-morrow are lost for advancing. If I effect my junction, I shall push on as far as Neustadt and Triplitz; after that, if the enemy attacks me, I shall be delighted; if he allows himself to be attacked, I shall not leave him alone. If he moves by Magdeburg, you will be in Dresden before him. I am anxious for a battle. His intention to attack shows great confidence. He may therefore attack me even now—nothing would please me better. After the battle I should be in Dresden and Berlin before him.

I am impatient for the cavalry of my guards. Forty guns and 3000 horse, such as *they* are, are not to be despised. You see now my plans for to-day and to-morrow. Act as you think best, but procure bread, so as to have enough for some days if you join me.

If you can do anything against the enemy within a day's march, do it boldly. Place small cavalry posts between Plauen and Schleitz for rapid correspondence. Up to the present time the campaign seems to open happily.

I presume that you are at Plauen; you ought to have it.

Let me know what you think that you have before you. None of the troops at Hof have retreated by Dresden.

P.S.—I have this instant your dispatch of 6 o'clock yesterday evening. I approve of your dispositions. The fact that the 1000 cavalry which were at Plauen have retreated to Gera shows that Gera is the place of junction of the enemy's army. I doubt whether it will all be collected before I am there. In the course of the day, however, I shall know more. You will learn something at Plauen from intercepted letters.*

[253.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Potzdam, Oct. 25, 1806.

My Brother,—I am glad to see that you have sent back

cavalry regiments are of little use to you in Naples. I might indeed have some remark to make on your sending to me 2000 convicts, whom I shall not know what to do with in France. I only hope that they may be well guarded, and not allowed to infect Piedmont. Take every means of protecting your troops from disease.

I am sorry to see that you have sent back Verdier; he is an excellent officer; few men would in certain events have been of more use to you. Send back all the generals who are of no use, but keep the good ones, those who have been accustomed to fire and to fighting. I have crushed the Prussian monarchy; if the Russians come, I shall destroy them also, nor do I fear the Austrians. I do not ask you for troops, I am not in want of any. Send me, however, some cavalry, if you can; for the more you send to me, the more I shall be able to withdraw from Italy for the Grand Army. This is just the country for cavalry, and it can do nothing in Naples against the brigands, and among the rocks and mountains. I have ordered my treasurer to send you 500,000 fr. more in gold. If, in consequence of the losses that your Poles have sustained, their companies should be incomplete, send them to Landau, where they will become part of the northern legion. This will save you expense.

[254.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Berlin, Oct. 30, 1806.

My Brother,—I have the return of the officers whom you have sent back. I approve very much of what you have done: these officers will be of more use to me in other places; perhaps you still keep too many. Nevertheless I am aware that it is necessary to organise the army and the country, and that for this purpose you require a certain number of men. If General Mosul of the Engineers has not yet gone beyond Milan, tell him to join the grand army by way of the Tyrol. Give the same order to General Debille and General Franceschi, if it is he

[255.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Berlin, Nov. 4, 1806.

My Brother,—The bulletins will have informed you of what is going on here. I have taken 120,000 prisoners; park, magazines, baggage,. everything has fallen into my power. The three fortresses on the Oder have capitulated. I have completely crushed the power of Prussia. Austria has begun to arm on the pretext of protecting her neutrality. We must make corresponding preparations in Upper Italy. If Austria were to attack us, you would gain this advantage by my position—that the Russians would concentrate their forces in Poland, and that England would direct hers upon Sweden. I will leave you all the infantry that you have at present; but you must scrupulously execute the following orders:—

First send all the officers and non-commissioned officers belonging to the 3rd and 4th battalions back to their depôts. Two months ago I sent you 4000 or 5000 men from your depôts; I suppose that you have incorporated them in the regiments.

Secondly, send back to me all the officers and non-commissioned officers and the majors.*

Thirdly, send back the French and Italian cavalry, and keep only 4 regiments of French chasseurs or dragoons. You have 12, you have therefore to send back 8. Keep the Polish regiments and the 1st regiment of Italian cavalry: send back the other two. This is very important. I am on the borders of Poland; to make war in that country one must have cavalry. Relying on your sending back yours, I have withdrawn 8 regiments of horse from Italy, and, if you fail me, enough will not be left there. The last 2 months have been spent in arming and victualling my strong places in Italy. I have just given orders that my army may be assembled by the 1st of December; it will consist altogether of more than 60,000 men. I hope that by that time I shall have received the 8 regiments for which I am asking you; after a few

days' rest they will be able to do themselves credit. Add that this will save you much money, and thus enable you to raise some battalions of Neapolitan infantry, composed of men who are attached to you and whom you can trust; they will be of more use to you than cavalry. Manage to send back with the cavalry a squadron of your regiment of light artillery. You can do without it, while it is indispensable here for manœuvres in these immense plains.

[256.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Berlin, Nov. 7, 1806.

My Brother,—I am sorry to hear of the death of your aide-de-camp Colonel Bruyère; he was an accomplished officer: if only he had been killed on the field of battle!

I see with pleasure that you have sent back 5 dragoon regiments; you are aware that I wish you to send back a few more regiments of cavalry. You propose to send me a Neapolitan regiment; you may do as you please about it; I own that I should very much like a regiment of 2000 Neapolitans. If you send this regiment, direct it on Brescia, from whence I shall have time enough to send for it to Berlin. As for the generals and aides-de-camp, you may take those whom you prefer. If you are sure that you do not want Marshal Masséna, send him to Berlin. I will try to give him the command of one of my corps.

[257.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Berlin, Nov. 11, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 28th of October. I see no objection to your printing the bulletins as

[258.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Berlin, Nov. 12, 1806.

My Brother,—Your newspapers contain nothing but petty details of assassinations and murders. This suits admirably the object of our enemies, who wish to persuade the world that everything is topsy-turvy in the kingdom of Naples. Forbid them in future to print anything except what is important.

[259.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Berlin, Nov. 15, 1806.

My Brother,—Your aide-de-camp Clary has just arrived, and at the same time I have received your letter of the 30th, which was sent to me by post from Mayence. You will see by the bulletins that our affairs here are prospering; that my army is on the Vistula; and that Poland is enthusiastic. I am master of all the strong places. I have taken in the campaign 140,000 prisoners, of whom 20,000 are cavalry. I have captured more than 800 pieces of cannon, and 250 standards and colours. The Prussian army and monarchy have ceased to exist.

[260.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Berlin, Nov. 16, 1806.

My Brother,—I have ordered M. Mollien to send you 500,000 francs in gold, for your aide-de-camp tells me that you are poor. I cannot at present answer your question whether Julie ought to join you. I will make up my mind in a few days. I am going to try to organise some Prussian and German regiments here for your service. The news of what has just happened has thrown London into consternation. The occupation of Hamburgh, which I have just effected, and the declaration of the blockade of the British islands,* will increase this uneasiness.

* This was the celebrated Berlin Decree, which declared the British Islands in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce with them.—TR.

It appears that the recent elections have gone against the government.

[261.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Posen, Nov. 29, 1806.

My Brother,—I see with pleasure that the number of your invalids is beginning to diminish. Everything will go on better and better with you.

I occupy the whole country on this side of the Vistula. I am at Posen, the capital of Great Poland. The Poles of all classes exhibit the greatest enthusiasm. I still wish you to send as many cavalry regiments as you possibly can into Italy: that arm costs you much, and, as far as I can see, is of little use to you.

[262.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Posen, Dec. 3, 1806.

My Brother,—You require a man of ability and energy; I think that Macdonald would suit you. Have a letter written to him at Paris on the subject; and if he consent to enter your service, it will be a great advantage for you. You understand that a proposal of this sort must come from you.*

[263.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Posen, Dec. 3, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 17th of November. I see that you have sent back 2 regiments of Italian cavalry and 4 regiments of French dragoons. You have 2 regiments of dragoons, 1 Italian regiment, and 5 regiments of

* Macdonald was the intimate friend of Moreau. He fell with Moreau, and was for five years in disgrace. This letter shows that Napoleon remembered him, and wished him to return to the service. He became marshal after the battle of Wagram.—ED.

chasseurs. As I suppose that you keep the chasseurs, I have ordered a reinforcement of men for each of those regiments to be sent to you. I have sent to M. Déjean the list of the men whom you have taken for your guard. It seems to me that I have nominated most of them.

[264.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Posen, Dec. 5, 1806.

My Brother,—I asked for your Polish legion; it is urgently wanted. I suppose that it has already reached Milan. Send off all the Polish officers whom you have; let them travel post; they are not all wanted for the march of the legion. The whole of Poland is in rebellion, and troops are being raised there in every direction. I have ordered 600 men to be sent to you from your dépôts in Italy, well armed and clothed. They may take the horses belonging to the sick, or you will easily procure others for them. I have made preparations in Italy; I have formed two camps, one at Verona and one at Brescia, for it does not do to be taken unprepared; and I have had these places provisioned. Austria, however, has at my request dissolved her corps of observation, and all inclines me to think that she wishes to be quiet.

You still keep 3 regiments of French dragoons: if you can send them back, either all or in part, it will be useful; but do not alter too much your military organisation. I suppose that you are master of Reggio and of Scylla. The present season in Calabria must be good for the French: you must turn this weather to account in quieting the country. In the winter the French are capable of marching to any extent. You ought to be thoroughly acquainted with the present position of your army. I should like to have a fresh return giving exactly the numbers present under arms and those in the hospitals, and showing clearly the situation of your troops. I had concluded a truce, but the King of Prussia was unable to ratify it, as he was already

time. Give some news of Borghese to his family; he is at Warsaw, at the head of his regiment. All the strong places in Silesia will soon be in my power. Prince Jérôme is in command of a German division. Although the declarations of Austria are pacific, I did not like to give precise orders to the Queen to join you at Naples. You may, however, do as you like about it; but she does so well in Paris, and I dislike so much to see women and children running into the midst of sedition and rebellion, that in truth I see no objection to her delaying her journey. I have written to tell her that you have sent for her, but that I think she had better pass some more of the winter in Paris.

Now that you are more at rest, I suppose that you open your palace and enliven the society of Naples; this is necessary both for your sake and for that of the town. You should have a large circle, and not live too quietly.

[265.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Posen, Dec. 7, 1806.

My Brother,—I was glad to see that you had sent some cavalry regiments back to Italy. I have given orders that 900 men, well armed and clothed, should be sent to join you from your dépôts, to reinforce the 6 regiments of cavalry remaining with you.

[266.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Posen, Dec. 11, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 22nd of November. I wish to have a return showing the positions of the French, Italian, and Neapolitan troops who are at present under your orders.

[267.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Posen, Dec. 14, 1806.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 27th of November. If you can find some thousands of Neapolitans who are willing to serve with the Grand Army, assemble them in bodies and send them to Augsburg. You do not mention the Polish legion; officers are what I want above all. If the legion has not yet left Naples, collect all the soldiers in one battalion, and send to me the officers and non-commissioned officers of the other battalions. I have granted the different decorations which you asked me for.

[268.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Warsaw, Jan. 2, 1807.

My Brother,—In the return of the 24th of November I see that the 2 brigades belonging to the provisional reserve, which were taken from the dépôts in Naples, and consisted of 8 battalions, are not yet broken up, and that the detachments have not yet joined their regiments. I hope that by this time they have done so. There are all sorts of objections to these irregularities; the accounts are thrown into confusion, and the regiments are discouraged. The officers and non-commissioned officers of these provisional battalions are besides wanted at the dépôts, to instruct the great number of conscripts who have just arrived. Pray attend to this. It is very important. Send back to the dépôts the majors, the officers, and non-commissioned officers of the 3rd battalions, and order the provisional detachments to join their regiments.

[269.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Warsaw, Jan. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—You will find enclosed a decree which I have just issued.* I beg you to give the most positive orders

* This decree does not appear. It probably related to the two regiments, the 1st light infantry and the 42nd, which began the flight at Maida.—TR.

for its execution. I want to add 2 regiments to the Army of Italy. Besides, these regiments have suffered so severely in Calabria, that they require to be brought together. I even intend them to proceed to Germany, that I may have them under my eye. They have also to wipe out the shame of having been beaten by the English. By the returns of the Army of Naples of the 1st of December I see that the provisional battalions are still in existence. What are your minister of war and the chief of your staff doing? Desire these battalions to be broken up immediately, and the detachments to be incorporated in their regiments. You will see that I send you 5000 men, armed and equipped, from your dépôts. Before the month of June you will have 6000 more. Take care to send back the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 3rd battalions. The 6th of the line is very weak. It would be an economy and good for the service to incorporate the privates* in the 1st battalion, and to send back the cadre of the 2nd to the dépôt. I think that you had better treat in the same way all the regiments of which the battalions, including the reinforcements that I am sending to you, do not amount to 800 men. My battalions here have each an effective force of 1250 men. In this way you can diminish your expenses considerably without weakening your army, and you may send back from 150 to 180† officers. It would facilitate also the forming cadres in Upper Italy. You may take this opportunity to get rid of all the officers who are tired of the service and the country. I leave you, however, to do as you think proper.

* In the text the word is "officiers," but this must be a mistake. The officers make part of the cadre, which consists of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers. All that follows shows that it was the privates who were to be retained, and the officers who were to be sent back.—TR.

† In the text "15 à 1800 officiers." This must be an error of a cipher. —TR.

[270.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Warsaw, Jan. 11, 1807.

My Brother,—You ask me for 24,000,000 a-year. The French army which I have in the kingdom of Naples would not, anywhere else, cost me so much. The large armaments which I am making will not admit of my sending such a large sum out of France.

I have, however, ordered all that can be spared from the mint of Turin to be sent to you.

[271.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Warsaw, Jan. 18, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 29th of December. I see by it that you do not keep Marshal Masséna. You have now with you not one man who has been mixed up in great events. You will want such a man in the summer. I think, then, that you would do well to ask for the services of General Macdonald, and by a direct proposal. You will see that I have ordered a detachment of 5000 or 6000 recruits to be sent to you from Italy.

[272.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.*

Warsaw, Jan. 28, 1807.

Monsieur mon Frère,—I could not receive your Majesty's letter and wishes for my happiness without strong emotion. Your fortunes and my victories have interposed between us vast countries: you are on the shores of the Mediterranean, I am on those of the Baltic; but in the harmony of our measures we tend towards the same objects. Keep a watch on your coast; do not suffer it to be approached by the English or by their commerce;

* This letter was to be given to Joseph by the deputation sent by him to compliment the Emperor on the New Year. Hence its official form.—ED.

their exclusion will restore the tranquillity of your country. Your kingdom is rich and populous; with the help of God, it will attain power and prosperity. Accept my most heartfelt wishes for the happiness of your reign, and trust, in every situation, to my fraternal affection. The deputation sent to me by your Majesty has honourably fulfilled its mission. I have requested them to carry back to your Majesty the assurance of my most sincere attachment.

On this, I pray to God, Monsieur mon frère, that he may keep you in his holy and honourable care.

[273.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Warsaw, Jan. 30, 1807.

My Brother,—Turkey has declared war against Russia, as you will see by the bulletin of to-day. A Tartar who left Constantinople on the 3rd of January brings me most favourable news.

1,000,000 francs in gold has been sent from Turin to Naples. My health has never been so good, as the ladies have found.

[274.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Leibstadt, Feb. 21, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 28th of January. I see no objection to General Macdonald's entering your service retaining the rank of a French general. You tell me that Marshal Jourdan has 140,000 francs a-year, and yet is not satisfied: what do you wish me to do for him?* I have ordered 1,000,000 francs to be sent to you. I will send you whatever I can, but in my present situation I am obliged to incur many expenses. M. Rœderer will have no peace till he has convinced you that I can send to you a great deal of money.

* Marshal Jourdan did not complain that he was badly paid, but that he had nothing to do.—ED.

[275.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, Feb. 22, 1807.

My Brother,—The sinking fund has only enough for its ordinary purposes; it cannot lend.* I have, however, sent you a million, and ordered you to have another.

[276.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, Feb. 23, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 2nd of February. I have read the papers relating to the infamous assassination of the blind French soldiers on their return from Egypt. It is horrible. All the evidence should be printed in French and in Italian. It will be an historical document.

[277.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.†

Naples, Jan. 14, 1807.

Sire,—I send General Cæsar Berthier to your Majesty. He will inform your Majesty fully as to the state of the army. I have no doubt that he will obtain from your Majesty all that is necessary to enable us to deserve your Majesty's confidence.

That is to say,—

1. A loan, or a gift, of 10,000,000.

2. A monthly sum paid regularly, here, or in Paris, were it only 1,000,000.

3. A promotion of the brigadier-generals, colonels, and officers of the corps which have had none since the campaign of Austerlitz.

4. The decoration of the Legion of Honour, which your Majesty allowed to be hoped for by the corps which carried on the

* Joseph had requested a loan of ten millions of francs from the sinking fund.—TR.

† This letter is inserted to render the next intelligible.—TR.

siege of Gaeta, and to which you may think the troops who made the Calabrian campaign entitled.

Many regiments, Sire, have lost a third of their numbers by fatigue, sickness, and battle. Their complaints and their importunities to be allowed to go to the grand army have forced me to take this step. The letters which they receive from their comrades, the promotions of which they hear, the prodigious victories of your Majesty, the painful and obscure war in which they are engaged here, the erection of the Madeleine, in which they have no part, although they feel that this war is as severe as that of those in whose honour it is raised,—all these things discourage them. It is absolutely necessary that you should do something to reanimate their spirits. What I ask for will have that effect. There is not a private who does not feel that this country cannot provide for the army, or who does not think that, when he is left to the resources which it can furnish, he is abandoned.

[278.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, March 1, 1807.*

My Brother,—I send back to you General Cæsar Berthier. I leave you to appoint whom you please Minister of War, or Chief of the Staff of my army of Naples. I have given the Legion of Honour to the men whom you suggested to me. I was sorry to see that you proposed M. de Bouillé, who has never been in battle. This is the way in which I am forced to give undeserved rewards. I have appointed Colonels Huart, Abbée, and Cardeneau, brigadier-generals. I have promoted Steinhaut of the 4th chasseurs to be colonel, and given companies to Lieutenants Rœderer and Clary.

I refer you to Cæsar Berthier as to your comparison of the services of the army of Naples to those of the grand army. Neither the staff, nor the colonels, nor the other regimental officers, have taken their clothes off for the last two months, some not for four months (I myself have been a fortnight without

* This letter was written three weeks after the battle of Eylau.—TR.

taking off my boots), in the middle of snow and mud, without bread, wine, or brandy, living on potatoes and meat, making long marches and countermarches without any sort of comfort, fighting with our bayonets frequently under grape-shot; the wounded obliged to be removed in sledges, in the open air, to a distance of fifty leagues. To compare us with the army of Naples, making war in that beautiful country, where they have bread, wine, oil, linen, sheets to their beds, society, and even women, looks like an attempt at a joke. After having destroyed the Prussian monarchy, we are fighting against the remnant of the Prussians, against Russians, Cossacks, and Kalmucks, and the tribes of the north, who formerly conquered the Roman empire. We have war in all its fierceness and all its horrors. In such fatigues every one has been more or less ill, except myself, for I never was stronger; I have grown fat.

I see from your returns that you have 53,000 men effective, and 43,000 present under arms. This is more than you want. You have before you an effective force of only 18,000 English, of whom there are not 10,000 present under arms. The Russians have something else to do than to meddle with you. The immense levies that I am making in France and Italy prevent my sending you money. Would you have thought that, in spite of my large possessions, I should have just been forced to spend 12,000,000 francs in buying horses in France? Such a war as I am engaged in consumes both men and materials; immense sums are requisite merely to repair my losses. I am obliged to keep up a considerable army of observation in Italy. I must pay numerous bodies of national guards to watch my coasts, for my coasts and my harbours are blockaded like yours. All the assistance that I can give you is this: 6000 men from the depôts of your army, well armed and equipped, are in march to reinforce your regiments; 3000 more will start on the 15th of April, which will make a reinforcement of 9000 men. Since January I have sent you 1,000,000 francs, which was all that I had left in my little treasury in Turin. I have ordered 500,000 francs a month to be sent to you during April, May, June, July, August, September, October, and November, which will amount to 4,000,000

On looking at M. Rœderer's report I am convinced that you have immense resources. When you have to pay 26 millions on account of a national debt, there are at once 26 millions to be got by merely stopping payment for one year. Your Neapolitan army is too expensive. But what does M. Rœderer mean by talking of a sinking fund? What business have you with such nonsense? Your business is to pay your army. Is it possible that in a country which is not yet consolidated by the recognition of Europe or by peace, the establishment of such institutions should be thought of? M. Rœderer is in a position unfavourable to your interests. He wants to put his theories into execution, and to make himself popular in the country by endeavouring to relieve it.

Create no orders of knighthood; found no new financial institutions. All these things should be done in time of peace. Everything will come with peace, and peace will come in time. One cannot make a man of imagination like M. Rœderer understand that the great art is to be governed by time; that what ought not to be done till 1810 cannot be done in 1807. The Gallic temperament cannot submit to wait upon time, and yet it is by doing so that I have gained all my success. I might say of Dumas what I have said of Rœderer. They are men who never have had, and never will have, the prudence to be governed by time; who will do to-morrow what ought not to be done till the day after, and will never know how to extricate you from your difficulties. A man like Salicetti would have made a good Minister of Finance. Pay your army first; it is a sacred debt. Allow no complaining. With the French you must show firmness. The army of Naples has no cause for murmuring. Say to them, "Do you complain? ask General Berthier, he will tell you that your Emperor has been living for weeks upon potatoes, and bivouacking in the snows of Poland. You may judge from this of what happens to the officers; they get nothing to eat but mere meat!"

[279. NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, March 5, 1807.

My Brother,—You will find annexed the report which has been made to me of the despatch of 4600 men to your army, to reinforce your companies. As soon as they arrive, send back the officers and non-commissioned officers, and incorporate these detachments into your regiments.

[280.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, March 11, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 20th of February. The English squadron is before Constantinople. I have news up to the 10th to the effect that the English ambassador has left that capital. We shall see now how this will turn out.

[281.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, March 12, 1807.

My Brother,—I send you the orders which I have just given for 1600 men to join you in the course of April. Take care to incorporate them into your regiments as soon as they arrive, and to send back the officers and non-commissioned officers to your depôts.

[282.] NAPOLEON TO TALLEYRAND.

Osterode, March 12, 7 P.M.

I have received your letter of the 10th. I have 300,000 rations of biscuit in Warsaw. From Warsaw to Osterode is 8 days' journey. Do miracles to enable me to have sent to me every day 50,000 rations of biscuit and 2000 pints of brandy. The success of the greatest combinations, indeed the fate of

Europe, depends on a question of subsistence. To beat the Russians, if I have bread, is child's play. I have millions, and I am ready to pay. Whatever means you employ, I admit to be good, if, on the receipt of this letter, you send to me overland, by Meaza and Zakroskin, 50,000 rations of biscuit and 2000 pints of brandy. 80 waggons a day, which I am willing to pay with their weight in gold, are enough. If the patriotism of the Poles cannot do this, they are not worth much. This matter is more important than all the negotiations in the world. Call together the Commissary, the Governor, General Lemarrois, and the most influential members of the government. Spend money. I approve of everything. Biscuit and brandy are all that we want. These 300,000 rations of biscuit, and these 18,000 or 20,000 pints of brandy, if they reach us in a few days, will spoil the combinations of all the hostile powers.*

[283.] NAPOLEON TO TALLEYRAND.

Osterode, March, 1807.

It is true that Andréossy† is not a man of talent or a first-rate observer, and perhaps he exaggerates what he perceives; but you are credulous; it is as easy to seduce you as you find it easy to seduce others. Any one can deceive you by flattering you. M. de Vincent caresses you to cheat you. Austria fears us, but she hates us. She is arming in the hope of profiting by our defeat. If we conquer, she will act as M. d'Haugwitz did one day after Austerlitz, and you will seem to have been right. But if the event be doubtful, we shall find her in arms on our rear. But she must be forced to explain herself. She is making indeed a great mistake in not joining us, now that we are masters of Prussia, and can restore to her what Frederic took from her. In a single day she might be repaid for all that she has lost during

* Thiers, vol. vii. p. 412.

† Andréossy was the French Minister in Vienna, and reported the increasing hostility of Austria. Vincent was the Austrian Minister in Warsaw.

the last half-century, and recover what she has been deprived of by Prussia and by France. But she must speak out.

Does she wish for indemnities? I offer her Silesia.

Is she alarmed at the state of the East? I will put her at her ease as respects the low Danube by putting Moldavia and Wallachia at her disposition.

Does our presence in Dalmatia disturb her? I am ready to make any sacrifices there, receiving an equivalent.

Or, in short, is she preparing to make war, to try again her strength against us, when we are fighting all the rest of the Continent? Be it so. I am ready for my new enemy. But let her not think to surprise me. Only women or children can suppose that I shall bury myself in the wilds of Russia without having taken proper precautions. Austria will not find me unready. She will find in Saxony, in Bavaria, and in Italy armies to resist her.

She will find me fall back on her with all my weight, crush her, and punish her more severely than I have punished any of the kingdoms that I have conquered. For her faithlessness I will make her an example more striking, more terrible than anything which is suggested even by the present state of Prussia. Let her explain herself. Let me know what she means.*

[284.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, March 14, 1807.

My Brother,—Send back to Toulon the battalions which you have of the 32nd infantry; this will diminish your army by only 400 men, and will enable me to recast that regiment.

* Thiers, vol. vii. p. 461.

I have inserted these letters from Napoleon to Talleyrand, then his Minister at Warsaw, as they show the difficulties with which he had to contend, and for how little, among those difficulties, he reckoned the Russian army; and as showing also the nature of his relations at this time with Austria. The second letter is a splendid exhibition of sober, resolute, calculating audacity.—ED.

[285.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, March 20, 1807.

My Brother,—The conscripts who have reached you in police caps are without doubt those who have been sent from the army of Italy. I have expressed my displeasure at their not having been sent to you properly armed and equipped. It is impossible that you should take conscripts for your guard.* M. Déjean is not authorised to change the destination of a single conscript; but I have written to M. Lacuée to take 100 conscripts from the levy of each year, under the title of General Depôt of Naples, for you to place in your guard. You will annoy me much if you take those who are intended for the regiments; it serves as a pretext to the colonels for committing abuses. You have withdrawn the best companies from my cavalry regiments for your guard; this will disorganise them. Recollect that it takes six campaigns to form the character of a regiment, and that it can be destroyed in one moment. You have a great deal of cavalry; send two more regiments to Italy, for I intend to withdraw from thence most of the cavalry. For all whom you send to me, Neapolitans or others, employment will be found here.

[286.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Osterode, March 20, 1807.

My Brother,—I cannot help being extremely displeased with the manner in which you disorganise my regiments. You have taken the best companies of the cavalry to form your guard, so that the regiments to which they belonged have lost their staple, and are no longer of any service. This is the way to make a few men of very little use, and a great many altogether useless. My purpose, which I announce to you as Commander-

* Joseph, in order to keep up his guard, had proposed to take for it every year 100 of the conscripts sent from France to reinforce the French army in Naples.—TR.

in-Chief of my army, is not to allow even a drummer-boy to leave my regiments without my order. Dumas' attempt is absurd. He is taking a great deal of trouble to form bad Neapolitan regiments, which will be the first to fire on you if any disaster should occur; and, what is the worst of all, my army is disorganised in order to form a heap of establishments.

[287.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Castle of Finckenstein, April 13, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 13th of March. I see with pleasure that your troops are in good health, and that all goes on well with you. Pay attention to the discipline of your army; one month's relaxation will cause mischief which can be repaired only by six month of incessant care. If you form a camp, place it between Naples and Calabria. It would be absurd to do anything which might suggest the possibility of your evacuating the capital. It is probable that the 6000 English who left Sicily have returned to the Atlantic; I expect, however, information on the subject. We are here in the midst of snow, while in your part of the world the sun is perhaps becoming too hot. I have this instant received letters dated the 3rd of March from Constantinople. The English have completely failed, and the Ottoman empire shows an energy which is most important to me, and confounds our common enemies. The English have suffered a check which they will feel sensibly.

[288.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, April 14, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 26th of March. I have appointed Colonel Destrées Brigadier-General. Since you wish me to tell you what I think of your proceedings at Naples, I own that I was not very well pleased with the

preamble to the decree suppressing the convents.* In what concerns religion the language employed should be in a religious and not in a philosophical spirit. You should display the talents of a ruler, not those of an author or of a man of letters. Why talk of the services which the monks have rendered to the arts and to science? Their merit does not consist in those services, but in their administration of the consolations of religion. This preamble is entirely philosophical, which is not what was wanted. You seem to me to insult those whom you expel. The preamble ought to have been in accordance with the monacal system. Disagreeable things are better endured from one who agrees with you than from a person who differs. You ought to have said that the number of the monks made their subsistence difficult; that the dignity of their profession required that they should all be well supported; that for that purpose a part must be removed; that some must be preserved, because they are required for the administration of the sacraments, and that others must be released, &c. &c. As a general principle, I distrust a government which deals in fine writing. Each decree ought to have its own appropriate and professional style; a well-informed monk, approving the suppression, would have expressed himself differently. People bear injury when unaccompanied by insult, and when the blow does not appear to come from an enemy. Now the enemies of the monacal profession are literary men and philosophers. You know that I am myself not fond of them, since I have destroyed them wherever I could.

An English vessel, which was carrying 25,000 muskets to Palermo, has been shipwrecked on the coast of Spain; this event must be considered as fortunate, for there is a great deficiency of arms in Europe.

* The preamble stated in effect that the religious orders, which once were the preservers of knowledge and reasoning, had become unnecessary. That the attention of the present age was directed towards art, science, military, colonial, and commercial objects. That the expense required for these purposes obliged economy in other things. Wherefore, &c.

[289.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, April 18, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 29th of March, and I thank you for all that you say. Peace is a marriage which depends on a union of inclinations.* If we must still fight, I am ready. You will see by my message to the Senate that I am raising fresh troops.† I am not of your opinion, that you are beloved by the Neapolitans. This is the test: If there were not one Frenchman in Naples, would you be able to raise 30,000 men to defend yourself against the English and the party of the Queen? As I am sure of the contrary, I cannot think as you do. No doubt your people will become attached to you; but it will be after eight or ten years of peace, when you know them, and they know you; attachment with a nation means esteem, and they esteem their sovereign when he is dreaded by the bad, and when the good regard him with confidence. He then may count on their fidelity and assistance.

Like you, I thought the Luxembourg fête absurd. I heard of it too late, or I should have prevented it. Being unable to do so in time, I have let the thing pass without saying anything about it, and you should do the same. It is the fault of the Queen, who is too indulgent; she ought to have said that it was not suitable.

By this time you are eating green peas at Naples, and perhaps you find shade agreeable. We are still as if we were in the month of January. We have opened the trenches before Dantzic; 100 siege-guns have begun to be collected there. The works are at 120 yards from the place, which is garrisoned by 6000 Russians and 20,000 Prussians, commanded by General Kalkreuth. I hope to take it within a fortnight, and this capture will be of some service to me. In short, you need have no uneasiness.

* In the letter to which this is an answer Joseph had expressed a belief that he was really loved by his new subjects. He had ventured to recommend Napoleon to make peace on any terms (faire la paix à tout prix). He had also complained that Cambacérès had given a fête in the Luxembourg, in the apartments of the Queen of Naples.—TR.

† He called out in March, 1807, the conscription of 1808.—TR.

[290.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, April 24, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 2nd of April. I am glad that you are satisfied with the disposition of your people. The fire opened upon Dantzic this morning. There are 80 pieces of cannon, and the batteries are at 80 yards from the place. The Emperor of Russia has joined his army. It seems that a grand council of war deliberated on attempting to raise the blockade of Dantzic; but they were afraid, and kept quiet. I devote all my exertions to taking that place, which will yield me 18,000 prisoners, and will place an army of 25,000 men again at my disposal.

[291.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, May 2, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 15th of April. I see that you have named General Lamarque Chief of the Staff; and that you have given the command of a division on the coast to General Berthier. I approve of these appointments. I advise you to withdraw none of my troops, whether officers or privates, to make them enter the army of Naples. Every corps returning from Naples is no more than a skeleton, because the old soldiers have been removed; this does much harm. You speak in your letter of the 9th of April of a report upon Sicily, which they have forgotten to annex. Can I have the 1st Neapolitan regiment sent to the Grand Army? It is the only way to form the Neapolitan troops. I am glad that you have dispatched the 32nd light infantry to Italy; I shall send it on to Toulon to be reorganised.

[292.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, May 4, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 15th of April. I do not doubt that in time M. Rœderer may become all that you say.* When a man gets accustomed to affairs he despises theory, or uses it only as the geometers do, not to walk in a mathematically straight line, but to keep in the same direction. However, I believe in M. Rœderer's attachment, in his honesty, and in his intelligence; but will his imagination ever be tamed down to business? This can be proved only by experience. In your correspondence with my ministers† you must expect to be treated as Commander-in-Chief of my army, and to hear of my displeasure whenever the rules of administration are not followed. For instance, it has annoyed me a little that several of my corps have been in some measure disorganised. I do not value my army by its numbers, but by the men of experience and bravery that it contains. The whole army of France is unable to furnish my guard without being somewhat enfeebled in spirit. Consider then the harm which has been done to the armies of Holland and Naples by the loss of the men who have been taken for the guards of those two countries. I could mention a regiment, once excellent, which the King of Holland has ruined for me; it is now worth nothing: but that now belongs to the past. I will send you as many French conscripts as you like; but I entreat you to take care of the regiments belonging to the army of Naples, and to keep them in good order. You must resent any chattering or manifestation of discontent. I think that the habit of governing will, with your natural good sense and abilities, strengthen your

* M. Rœderer was the subject of a running dispute between Napoleon and Joseph; Napoleon, who never overcame a prejudice, always sneering at him as a theorist and a philosopher; Joseph, who never abandoned a friend, defending him as a man not only of integrity and diligence, but of sound practical sense.—TR.

† Joseph had complained that he received rebukes from the Emperor and from his ministers.—TR.

character, and render you capable of conducting this vast machine, if it should be your lot to survive me.

Prince Jérôme is doing well; I am very much pleased with him, and am greatly deceived if there is not stuff in him to make a first-rate man. You may be sure, however, that he has no idea that I think so, for in my letters I do nothing but find fault with him. He is adored in Silesia. I placed him there purposely in a distant and independent command, because I do not believe in the proverb that it is necessary to know how to obey in order to know how to command.

I am not ill-pleased with Louis; but he is too kind for the dignity of a crown. He does not pay much attention to my advice; nevertheless, I continue to give it to him, and experience will soon teach him that much of what he has been doing was wrong. I blamed the institution of his order, not that I objected to it in itself, but it was premature; for how could he avoid giving it to the persons by whom he was surrounded? and how set this indelible stamp upon men who were unknown to him, and who at the first reverse perhaps will show themselves to be worthless? This remark is likewise for your benefit; you must feel its force. Wait till you know something of the men who surround you. A king must not institute an order as he arranges a hunting-party, as a mere amusement. It must be attached to some great recollection. Your coronation will be a memorable epoch; all Europe will then be at peace. Louis has also just permitted the Dutch ladies to re-assume their titles, they are given to them even by his chamberlains. I was very angry with him. Nor was I satisfied with his quoting to me your example, as if there were anything in common between a kingdom like yours and a republic which has undergone as many trials as France. If you have occasion to write, say something to him about it; for, as all this is supposed to be done by my advice, it has a bad effect in France. As I do not intend to re-establish the old titles in France, I will not have them restored in a country to which I have guaranteed a constitutional government, and whose fortunes have so much resembled those of France.

It would be proper to have a cipher between you and me; and

I have written to M. Talleyrand to send you one. My health is very good. We begin, at last, to perceive the approaches of spring. The siege of Dantzic is advancing. We have 80 guns placed in battery; we ought to occupy the covered way and pass the ditch in two or three days.

I recommend the principality of Benevento to your care. Treat it well, for I should be sorry if you were to do anything to annoy the Prince, with whom I am perfectly well satisfied.

[293.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, May 6, 1807.

My Brother,—If you have money coined, I wish you to adopt the same set of values as in the coins of France; and that you place the arms of your kingdom on one side, and your own head upon the other. I have already done this for my kingdom of Italy; and the Princes of the Confederation do the same. In this manner there will be a uniform coinage throughout Europe, which will be a great advantage to trade. It might be as well to inscribe the value of the coin by way of legend, as for example—"*Napoléon de* 20 *fr.*"

[294.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, May 19, 1807.

My Brother,—I have seen General Mathieu; I let him know that I was sorry that the English were established on the Continent. You should take Scylla, if possible, and then fortify it, and place in it a good garrison, provisioned for three months. You should keep only a few troops in Lower Calabria. On an invasion, all the troops that are requisite for the defence of that province should retire upon Scylla. Nine hundred men, infantry, gendarmerie, or artillery, will keep you in possession of the lower part of the province, and will form the garrison of Scylla, which might hold out for more than a month, during which time the army would relieve it.

Among the plans which you have sent to me I do not see one for Castellamare; it is to that place that I am most inclined. The position cannot be more unfavourable than that of Genoa; and Genoa is reckoned a good fortress. In mountainous situations, the good positions generally resolve themselves into two or three, which alone are susceptible of defence. My intention is, that the fortress should be also a seaport; you have three—Naples, Castellamare, and Taranto. I prefer Castellamare to the others, because I would establish lines of fortification closing the isthmus of Amalfi, and construct in the island of Capri a fort which would command the fishery and the coast of Naples, and be within reach of succours from Toulon. I take it for granted that in two or three years, and with 7 or 8 million francs, these ends might easily be accomplished at Castellamare, although it would afterwards require a labour of 20 years to complete it. What enemy would undertake to take Naples if he had not a sufficient force to take Castellamare? and what force would be sufficient to take Castellamare, if the isthmus and the place were defended by 18,000 or 20,000 men? It would require an army of at least 50,000 men. You will ask me how the kingdom of Naples is to obtain these 20,000 men. Why, as you will have the crews of your men-of-war and of the French ships sent thither in order to revictual the place, the Royal guard, the main body of the Neapolitan army, the gendarmerie, and the main body of the French auxiliary army, you are more likely to have 30,000 than 20,000 men. One year of war in this peninsula, and the kingdom of Naples will be saved. They say that Castellamare is mountainous; it cannot be more so than Genoa. Two plans must therefore be made, one of the lines and one of the fortress; and first of all, the plan of the lines, which are to close up the isthmus. I am aware that it is 2 leagues in breadth; but the points of defence of this space would probably be reduced to 7 or 8 forts, which, maintained by an army of 20,000 men, would not be easily taken. However, supposing them taken at last, there should be at Castellamare a continued fortification like that of Genoa. Add to this a good fort in the island of Capri. This is the plan to which you should adhere. Give positive orders for its preparation; and

that I may properly understand the situation, employ an artist to make a relief of the whole peninsula, so that I may see how the mountains command one another.

[295.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, May 27, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 10th of May. I beg you to take care of my cavalry; it is getting ruined at Naples. The Pacha of Janina is an enemy of the Russians, but he is false; there is no harm in your sending him some assistance, but this should not be pushed too far; fair words will be enough. Contradict in the Neapolitan newspapers all the false reports which are spread upon the affairs of Turkey; insert a statement that Dantzic is taken, and that I find there immense stores of all descriptions. You will read the particulars of the surrender of that place in the different bulletins. The Russian expedition, under the command of General Kamoreskoi, after having been beaten, has re-embarked and disappeared. We are beginning at last to have a little warm weather here.

[296.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Finckenstein, May 28, 1807.

My Brother,—Address a letter to the bishops of your kingdom to order public thanksgivings throughout the territory for the successes of the French army and the capture of Dantzic. Publish in all your newspapers the news from Constantinople * annexed to this letter. Insert frequent contradictions of the evil reports which the agents of England and Russia are pleased to disseminate.

* Probably the retreat of Admiral Duckworth's squadron, after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the alliance of Turkey against France.—TR.

[297.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tilsit, June 20, 1807.

My Brother,—I am on the Niémen. The battle of Friedland, which was fought on the anniversary of that of Marengo, has decided the contest. The Russian army has been destroyed; you will doubtless have received already the bulletins. I presume that you will have a Te Deum throughout your kingdom for so happy an event. This battle has been as decisive as those of Marengo, of Austerlitz, and of Jena.

[298.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tilsit, June 27, 1807.

My Brother,—I have concluded an armistice with the Emperor of Russia. He orders his ships to cease all hostilities against the French flag, or the flags of Italy and Naples; my desire is that, if any Russian ships enter your ports and apply for refreshments, you let them have all that they ask, either in return for payment, or else keeping an account of the value. I have instructed Prince Eugène to give you the details of all which has passed here latterly. Make known at Corfu the orders which the Emperor of Russia has given to his admiral, and all that has happened.

[299.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tilsit, July 4, 1807.

My Brother,—I think it will be desirable that you should begin the construction of two ships of 74 guns; that five-twelfths of them should be completed this year, and that in the spring they be fit to be launched. Pray let me have a report upon Taranto. Would one of my squadrons be safe there? Would its anchorage be safe from a coup-de-main? Are the islands fortified? I have been here a fortnight with the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. They dine with me

every day, and we spend the greater part of our time together. Everything leads me to think that peace will soon be concluded. Cattaro and Corfu will be given up to me. Keep these conditions as secret as possible. I wish you to send to Taranto and Otranto two companies of French artillery, with a colonel and two second captains of artillery; one French regiment of the line and one regiment from my kingdom of Italy; a colonel of engineers, a major, two captains, and four lieutenants of engineers, and two companies of sappers under the command of General Cæsar Berthier, and of another general to him, and of an adjutant. They are to be sent to Taranto and Otranto, on the pretext of putting those two places in a state of defence, so that at the first intimation, and without the English suspecting what they are about, they may be able to cross over to Corfu, and take possession of the town, which will be put into their hands by the Russians. I suppose that you have a sufficient number of small vessels to carry them all over in one or two passages. You must likewise send over provisions enough to last this garrison five or six months, especially wheat. It is true that Ali Pacha will furnish them with it as well as with meat and with all that they may want. I think that I have already told you that you ought to send no more succours to Ali Pacha; you showed too much zeal in that affair. Things are never so simple as they appear. If possible, try to have some brigs or gunboats at Taranto, Otranto, or Brindisi, in order to keep the communication open between Corfu and your kingdom: your Minister for Naval Affairs can order this to be done. I need not tell you that in the treaty you are recognised by the whole of Europe.

[300.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tilsit, July 5, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 17th of June. I am astonished at what you tell me, that the English have taken away the bronze cannons from Malta, and substituted iron in their places.

[301.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tilsit, July 8, 1807.

My Brother,—Peace was signed to-day between France and Russia by the Prince of Benevento and the Princes Kourakin and Labanoff. The ratifications will be exchanged to-morrow. Russia has acknowledged you as King of Naples.

[302.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tilsit, July 9, 1807.

My Brother,—Peace was signed yesterday, and ratified to-day. The Emperor Alexander and I parted to-day at 12 o'clock, after having passed three weeks together. We lived as intimate friends. At our last interview he appeared in the order of the Legion of Honour, and I in that of St. Andrew. I have given the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour to the Grand Duke Constantine, to the Princes Kourakin and Labanoff, and to Count Budberg. The Emperor of Russia has conferred his order upon the King of Westphalia, the Grand Duke of Berg, and on the Princes of Neufchatel and Benevento. Corfu is to be given up to me. The order of the chief of the staff to have Corfu occupied by the troops whom I mentioned to you has been given to an officer who is on his way to you. Do not lose time in victualling that island, and sending thither all that is necessary.

[303.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Kœnigsberg, July 12, 1807.

My Brother,—I see in the French papers some letters of King Ferdinand, which have probably been taken from the Neapolitan newspapers. What is the object of this? King Ferdinand has a right to defend his throne in every possible way. Why, then, print insignificant letters? Your course is never to speak of him. These disembarkations and incursions of the banditti, which in reality are trifling, are improperly exaggerated.

Your ministers are always cracking their whips; they ought, on the contrary, to make as little as possible of these disturbances, and represent them to the public as even less than they are; this is important. The inference naturally drawn is, that the kingdom of Naples is the prey of every species of depredation, an opinion founded not on fact, but on the stupidity of your police and the struggles of parties. It was thus in France during the revolution—one party pushed the other to extremities. But the situation of your kingdom is different.

[304.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Dresden, July 18, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 6th of June. If you send Neapolitan troops into Italy, they must be paid by you, as the troops belonging to the kingdom of Italy, which are in the kingdom of Naples, are paid by Italy. I greatly fear that your finances will be damaged by theories and speculations; all that I hear from Naples suggests this idea. A long lapse of time, and men of experience, are necessary to carry out changes in the financial system of a country; and I see that at the beginning of your reign, and while still at war, you are making alterations in the mode of collecting the revenue. I look upon men of learning and brilliancy as I do upon coquettes. They are very well to live and converse with, but we should no more think of taking the latter for our wives than the former for our ministers.*

* This letter has been imitated rather than quoted by Thiers, vol. vii. p. 430.—TR.

CHAPTER IX.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 31st of July, 1807, to the 1st of April, 1808. With the exception of a short visit to Northern Italy, Napoleon passed these eight months in Paris, St. Cloud, or Fontainebleau, engaged towards the South in preparing the means of seizing Portugal and Spain, and towards the East in settling with Russia the partition of Turkey. Joseph passed them in Naples. They were the last eight months of his short and troubled Neapolitan reign: a reign to be followed by one rather longer, but still more disturbed.

[305.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, July 31, 1807.

My Brother,—I cannot help being displeased at your having sent into my armies Neapolitan officers, of whom many are still attached to the late court, and others are men of bad character, turned out of my army of Italy, whom you have been so obliging as to promote. It is a strange policy to put arms into the hands of our enemies. For example, I will mention a Colonel Alfan de Ribeira who was sent to Dalmatia, and whom I had arrested and sent to Fenestrelle; a Captain Blanco Gaetano, who was sent, I know not how, to the Grand Army; a certain Debouge, related to Chevalier Micheroux; likewise Pellegrini, Borgheggiani, Leoni, &c. All these are suspicious characters. There are others, besides, who have been dismissed from my surveying departments in Italy, on account of official faults or

for other reasons. Let me know what you wish to be done with them. A man has but to present himself, and Dumas is ready to give him a title. It is folly to make officers of such people.

[306.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 2, 1807.

My Brother,—You do not acquaint me sufficiently often with the situation of your army. Send me every fortnight returns like those which Prince Eugène sends to me of his army, and pay great attention to their being drawn up with care. I have given orders for the reinforcement of the garrisons of Ancona and Civita Vecchia, and I am going immediately to occupy Leghorn, where the English continue to trade without molestation.

[307.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 3, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 24th of July. What you tell me of the armament of Taranto is not satisfactory. Are the batteries which were furnished with guns when I thought of sending a squadron to that roadstead still armed? Let me have a little sketch which may make me acquainted with each battery, and the number of guns of which it is composed. If the old batteries have been armed, no human power can overcome them by sea.

[308.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 4, 1807.

My Brother,—I have written to recommend you to put in course of construction two vessels of 80 guns and two frigates; and you have not let me have an answer.

[309.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 5, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 28th of July, in which you tell me that you are going to build two vessels of the line and one frigate. This is very important. If you should only complete the first quarter of these ships in the present year, you would be able to finish them next year. Make arrangements to receive early information of the occupation of Cattaro and of Corfu, and send the news immediately to me. I am surprised that you have not mentioned the passage through Naples of the French and Russian officers who left Tilsit for Cattaro two days after the peace was signed; tell me when they passed through, and when you hope to receive information on the subject.

[310.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 17, 1807.

My Brother,—Neither I nor my ministers hear anything of my army of Naples: I have no returns: I asked you to send them to me every ten days. Nor have I any detailed account of the execution of my orders relating to the occupation of Corfu. I told you that 4000 men should be sent thither. The troops may be blockaded in that island; 1500 men are not enough. Let me have a return of the regiments which you send thither, with the names of the staff, engineer, and artillery officers. Order your Chief of the Staff to correspond frequently and at length with the minister on everything relating to the army, and to send to him a return every five days. If things go on in this way, I shall be obliged to send a Chief of the Staff to Naples.

[311.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 16, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 8th. The Neapolitan troops cannot bear eagles, as they are not the arms of your kingdom. Nor must they take the French tricolor flag—the French tricolor flag is not the flag of Naples. On the whole, it is more natural that your troops should carry colours with the arms of your kingdom. I am sorry that you have so many Neapolitan troops: you must be aware that as far as I am concerned these troops are no better than none at all, it takes so long to form the spirit and the general tone of an army. If I am forced to give you money, I must withdraw my army. For every Neapolitan regiment which you form I must withdraw a French regiment; this is to change good money for bad.

Take it as a principle that my expenses are enormous, especially those of my navy. The Italians in the Grand Army were of use, but they were troops whom I had organised for six years, and who had been formed at the camp of Boulogne.

If the company of light horse is composed of men of property, I see no objection to your sending them to France, and I will have them trained.

[312.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 1, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 2nd of August. I do not believe that M. Nardon can discharge the functions of Prefect of Police at Naples, because you want for that place a man who has worked several months in the department, because the office of Prefect of Police is to be learnt only by practice, and because nothing which is written upon the subject gives a clear idea of the duties. Besides, M. Nardon is difficult to get on with, and very ambitious; he is zealous, but hasty in his views; however, he is not without merit.

I have ordered a review of the Neapolitan regiments which

are in Italy, and, according to the report which I receive, I shall determine what to do with them.

Write to Ali Pacha to promote the provisioning of the island of Corfu; I have learned with great interest that my troops are at length arrived there. I am very impatient to hear that General Cæsar Berthier has joined them. I reiterate to you my advice to garrison that island fully; it ought to have from 4000 to 5000 men and a sufficient number of artillery and engineer officers to put the place in the best possible state of defence.

[313.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 1, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received the returns of the army of Naples up to the 15th of August. I see that the Corfu division is composed only of two battalions of the 6th of the line, 1500 strong, of one battalion of the 5th Italian regiment of 900 men, and of 130 gunners. That is not enough. I have given orders that detachments from the 6th French regiment of the line and the 5th Italian start for Ancona in order to complete those corps to the full number.

Besides this reinforcement I wish you to send off a battalion of 740 men, light infantry. I suppose that you have sent a brigadier-general with General Berthier.

[314.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 2, 1807.

My Brother,—You will find annexed the letter which I have written to your wife. The weather here has become much cooler; I therefore wish her to start on the 15th.

I enclose a memorandum on Prince Pignatelli. Is there any harm in allowing him to remain in France and to live in Paris?

[315.] NAPOLEON TO THE QUEEN OF NAPLES.

St. Cloud, Sept. 2, 1807.

My Sister and Sister-in-law,—I wish you to start for Naples; the present season is the best. I think therefore that you should set out on the 15th of September, so as to reach Milan on the 23rd or 24th, and to arrive at Naples during the first ten days in October. As this letter has no other object, I pray God, my sister and sister-in-law, that he may have you in his holy and honourable keeping.

[316.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 27th of August. It does not tell me whether my troops have entered Corfu, neither do my ministers know anything more on the subject; we are in perfect ignorance of what is going on at Naples.

The letters which you write to me are mere notes; this is natural, but your chief of the staff ought to write at length and in detail to the minister. Have the two convoys entered Corfu? is the citadel in their possession? in what state did they find it? what are the Russians about? where are they? Nothing is known here on these subjects. The isles of Corfu do not form part of your* kingdom, but, in the mean while, I wish that the troops which are there should be considered as belonging to your army, and that you should take the requisite measures for paying them and furnishing them with ammunition and provisions. I told you that you had not sent thither a sufficient number of gunners. Advise General Cæsar Berthier to treat the inhabitants well, to make himself loved by them, to leave them their constitution for the present, to be as little as possible a burden to them, and to put the fortress of Corfu, as soon as he can, in a state of defence. Send as many provisions thither as possible.

* In the original "notre," which must be wrong.—TR.

[317.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—You sent me a short return, dated the 28th of August, in which the men on detachment and those that are in the hospitals are put into the same column. There is too much difference between them to admit of their being confounded together. For instance, the 52nd is reported as having 898 men effectives and 1000 at the hospitals or detached. This confusion makes the return useless; it gives me no idea of the state of my army. I wish you to send to Corfu the 1400 men of the 14th light infantry, and that the garrison be increased to 5000. Send thither Brigadier-General Donzelot, to be second in command under General Cæsar Berthier.

[318.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 28th of August, in which you tell me that General C. Berthier has started, but you do not acquaint me with his arrival. If the Russians land on your coast treat them well, and send them to Bologna, where the Viceroy will give them a farther destination. I approve highly of Salicetti's proposal that you should send 5000 quintals of wheat to Corfu.

I have already informed you that, although the isles of Corfu do not form part of your kingdom, they are nevertheless under your civil and military government as commander-in-chief of my army of Naples. In general, I wish you to interfere as little as possible with the constitution of the country, and to treat the inhabitants well. The Emperor Alexander, who gave them their constitution, thinks it very good. Make General Cæsar Berthier aware that I wish the inhabitants of these islands to have cause only to rejoice at having passed under my dominion; that when I selected him I relied on his honesty and on his endeavours to make his government popular. The idea of

establishing packets is very sensible. My troops have taken possession of Cattaro; the English are besieging Copenhagen, which still holds out.

[319.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—Besides the islands of Corfu, I must be entitled to some possessions on the continent of Albania, which were, I think, occupied by the Russians, and formerly belonged to the Venetians: let me have a report on the subject. It would be well to prepare some plans for the establishment of field-fortifications, which may enable me always to be master of these posts on the main land.

[320.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Sept. 7, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 29th of August with the returns annexed. When the 6th of the line left Naples it was 1600 strong, when it reached Otranto it must have been reduced to 1500, and by this time probably to 1300. The men who belong to this regiment should, on leaving the hospitals, proceed to the depôt at Otranto, whence they should start for Corfu well-armed and equipped. I have ordered the Viceroy to send from Ancona 1200 men of the 6th, 7th, and 5th Italian regiments, in order to complete these regiments to their full number. I am aware that the present season is critical for my army of Naples, but the rainy season will commence in November, and they will regain their strength. It is necessary that you then take Reggio and Scylla; it is humiliating that the English should have a footing on the Continent—I will not endure it. Act on this.

[321.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Sept. 7, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 28th of August; it was brought to me by an officer who has given me some details on the state of Corfu. I beg you to send thither money enough for my soldiers always to have three months' pay in advance. I intend General Cæsar Berthier to have a suitable allowance.

It will not be necessary to send thither every kind of provision and ammunition. I suppose that it would be impossible for you to get a few armed corvettes across.

[322.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Sept. 10, 1807.

My Brother,—I see that you do not include the troops which are in Corfu in the last return of my army; they ought, however, to be included, since they form part of the army of Naples: I think that it was dated the 28th. A column of 1400 men belonging to the army of Naples is at Ancona. I see by your return that the 29th regiment of dragoons is at Naples. I have just ordered a column of 3000 men to be assembled at Ancona. As soon as they have done what I want at Ancona, these 3000 men will start to join your army, for I intend to increase your battalions to an effective of 1260 men. Your cavalry is very weak; let me have a report upon your remounts; your depôts are likewise ill off for cavalry. I have just given orders that the 250 horses which are there be sent to reinforce your regiments.

[323.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Sept. 11, 1807.

My Brother,—I see by your letter of the 2nd of September that Ferdinand has left Sicily. I am waiting for further intelligence to confirm this news.*

* It was not true.—ED.

[324.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rambouillet, Sept. 14, 1807.

My Brother,—My relations with Russia continue to be on the best possible footing. Denmark has declared war against England since the 16th of August. Copenhagen is blockaded by land and by sea; but the English army is itself blockaded between the town and a body of Danish troops which occupy the flat country in the island of Zealand. On the 28th of August, which is the date of the last news from Copenhagen, the affairs of the English seemed to be turning out ill, and it was hoped that they would fail, and be forced to re-embark. The Russian squadron, which was at Tenedos, has received orders to repair to Cadiz, or to one of my ports. I have sent orders in every direction to insure their being well received. If by chance you have the means of communicating with this squadron, do not fail to inform the admiral of what is going on at Copenhagen, of my fears lest the English should endeavour to intercept the Russian squadron, and of the advice which I have sent to Cadiz for him, and which I repeat to him through you, to take refuge in one of my ports till all is settled. Besides the great Russian squadron, there is another in the Adriatic; the Viceroy tells me that it has arrived in Istria. It is desirable that you should inform the officer in command of what is passing at Copenhagen, without attracting to it too much attention; advise him to manœuvre with prudence, because it is possible that the English may try to carry off his squadron; and let him know that, if these fears are well founded, he may take refuge in Ancona, or in any other harbour of yours where he will be safe. Be cautious in these communications, for it is my interest that the English should continue to allow the Russians to navigate freely. If the Russian ships should enter your harbours, give orders that they be furnished with all that they want, and that every care be taken to protect them against the English.

I see with great regret that the colonel and probably the grenadiers of the 6th regiment have been taken. General C. Berthier delayed this expedition too long. If any Russian

officers of superior rank should arrive in Naples, I beg that you will receive them at your Court with particular attention, and that you will let them know that it is by my desire.

[325.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Sept. 25, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 16th. I cannot imagine how you can want such a number of troops in the kingdom of Naples, which is attacked only by a few wretched banditti. Still less can I understand, unless it is explained by the theories of your Minister of Finance, that, with the assistance of the 6,000,000 francs which I send to you, you are not able to pay 25,000 men* in a kingdom the population of which amounts to more than 4,000,000. That you have no commerce is not a satisfactory reason. If you can give corn, wine, and bread to an army, the money required for its pay is trifling. It is true that you export no goods, but also that you export no money. Your finances are generally believed to be horribly ill managed. This is very unfortunate. Naples costs me an army, and costs me money besides. The first thing to be done is to allow no arrears in the pay of your army. Besides, winter is at hand: what can prevent your merchant-vessels from taking your commodities to Genoa and the other French ports?

My wish is that there should be two brigadier-generals at Corfu: in the event of Berthier's death, Donzelot succeeds him. I am sorry to see that the 101st has only one battalion in the Terra di Lavoro, that the 20th of the line is not brought together in the province of Salerno, that a portion of it is in Puglia, and that the Swiss regiment is not brought together. In your return of the garrison of Corfu you give 1600 men to the 6th of the line; you are aware that the grenadiers and one company have

* When Joseph asked for money, Napoleon would never admit that he had more than 25,000 troops: when he asked for men, Napoleon proved to him that he had 45,000 or 50,000.—ED.

been taken—that is to say, 300 men; there can, therefore, only remain 1200. I have ordered the whole of the regiment of Isembourg to Naples. I have also ordered the Viceroy of Italy to send you a reinforcement of from 3000 to 4000 men, taken from the depôts of your army. This reinforcement will leave Ancona in two detachments, one on the 15th of October and the other on the 1st of November.

[326.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Sept. 26, 1807.

My Brother,—You have sent to the kingdom of Italy two foot regiments: the first, which consists of 1500 men present under arms, 1900 effective, seems tolerably good. I have ordered the two first battalions to be completed and sent to France; the third battalion will return to Naples for recruits.

The 2nd regiment has 700 men present under arms; it is bad in every respect. I have ordered all the men fit for service in the two first battalions of this regiment to be incorporated in the two first battalions of the 1st regiment, and those of the third battalion to go to recruit in Naples. The regiment of *chasseurs* has no horses. The depôt at Mantua is a gang of bandits, who commit every sort of excess. Good peasants will make soldiers, but not rascals such as these. I wish you to send off your light artillery to Upper Italy, as it is of no use to you in the species of war in which you are at present engaged.

[327.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 1, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 20th. I have already sent back the cadres of your Neapolitan regiments. What is the good of sending to me regiments composed of companies of 40 men? Each company should consist of from 120 to 140. There will be, therefore, about enough in the two Neapolitan regiments to form two tolerable battalions. The

cadres of the 2nd regiment, which are on their way to Naples, may return when they have 3000 recruits. You ask me to order the third battalions of the regiments belonging to the army of Naples to be sent to Gaeta, Naples, and Otranto. If I were to do this, these regiments would soon be ruined, for how is it possible to send conscripts without clothing or rest from the farthest points of France to Naples?* You do not bestow sufficient care and thought on military organisation. My armies are large and strong only because I pay the utmost attention to these details. If the kingdom of Naples contributed the revenue which it ought to do, you would not be in want of troops. I could send them to you, but you pay nothing. Your finances are deplorably administered; they are all managed theoretically, but money is eminently a matter of fact. Try to send me some details upon Corfu. Send thither some officers. As yet I have heard nothing. You should communicate with Corfu three times a week.

[328.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 26th of September, with others from Corfu. I had not desired General Cæsar Berthier to declare that Corfu formed part of the empire; and as I was silent, he ought to have been so likewise. Signify to him my displeasure. He ought to have announced that the present constitution was to be preserved. Tell him to act with more prudence and circumspection. I cannot imagine how it is that the powder magazines are not yet at his disposal. Still less

* At this time Napoleon's regiments consisted, with few exceptions, of three battalions, two on service, and the third at the depôt of the regiment, always established on French territory. In the depôt the conscripts allotted to each regiment were detained, with their commissioned and non-commissioned officers—technically, their cadres—for about a year, and then sent off to their regiments, where the privates were incorporated in the first and second battalions, and the cadres were sent back to the depôt. Joseph requested that the depôts of three of the French regiments might be established at Gaeta, Taranto, and Naples.—TR.

can I understand how he can propose to restore Parga to Ali Pacha; he is mad to think of such a thing. Write frequently to him to cool his ardour, and to make him go on more slowly. Explain to him that neither he nor any one else knows what he will have to do to-morrow, and that he must be prudent systematically and generally. He ought not to have hoisted the French colours; in his letters he forgets the most important things, such as the number of Russian troops who are in Corfu. You have doubtless sent thither, as I ordered, corn, powder, and, above all, the 14th light infantry; you are aware that I have not enough troops there. If you have not already despatched the 14th, do so without delay: this is my desire. There will be no difficulty about the ammunition and provisions which are at Corfu belonging to the Russians; they will all be given up to me. I am expecting the Russian ambassador, and this will be the first thing which he will do. I hope that you have sent to Corfu one of your most active officers, who will make his report as soon as possible. As yet I have no clear ideas about that country; and how should I, considering that I have not yet been informed of the numbers and positions of the Russian troops which are there?

Give positive orders to General C. Berthier to employ in Zante and Cephalonia only a few French officers with the troops of the country, and the Albanians whom he has taken into his service, but not a single French soldier of the line, nor one Italian. I wish all my troops to be concentrated at Corfu, Parga, and Santa Maura, and that Parga be fortified and put into a good state of defence. The works there should be carried on without interruption until it is safe from any Turkish attack. The same thing should be done at Santa Maura. Ali Pacha and the Turks, however, must be treated well. Authorise General C. Berthier to build in the dockyard of Corfu two brigs, to be manned by the sailors of the country. A French garrison and a few French officers of marines shall be sent thither.* These two brigs are to defend the island against the corsairs. Pay regularly the troops in the Ionian Islands, and put always a

* Apparently to Santa Maura.—TR.

sum of 50,000 francs at the disposal of the governor for extraordinary expenses, and the same amount at the disposal of the commandants of the artillery and engineers respectively, taking care, however, to replace every month what they have expended.

This is the way in which I wish my troops to be placed:—

General C. Berthier, Governor-General, at Corfu, with a battalion of the 14th light infantry, 2 battalions of the 6th and 15th Italian regiments, and the troops of the country. He will have under his orders General Cardeneau, who will be second in command, and replace Berthier if anything happens to him, an aide-de-camp, 6 adjutants on the staff (the colonel of the 6th having been taken prisoner, the major will replace him), a colonel of engineers, a colonel of artillery, a chef-de-bataillon of artillery acting as superintendent of the park, a chef-de-bataillon and 4 other officers of engineers (in the whole, 6 engineer officers for Corfu), and 4 second captains of artillery (also making altogether 6 artillery officers for the staff at Corfu). The garrison of Corfu will furnish to Parga a detachment of 600 men, which will be relieved whenever it is thought proper. This detachment is to be composed thus: of 3 companies of the 6th, to be completed at the time of their departure to more than 100 men present under arms for each company, which will make 300 men; 6 pieces of field-artillery with half a company of artillery; 100 Greeks, and 2 companies of the 15th Italian regiment, which also are each to be kept up to 100 men present under arms. These troops are to be under the orders of a French brigadier-general, a chef-de-bataillon, a captain who is to be unattached and to act as governor of the fort of Parga, of an officer of engineers, and of a permanent artillery officer. Besides the field-pieces, 18 or 20 iron guns are to be sent to Parga, and you should set to work immediately to make it a sort of basis of operations protected against attempts on the part of the Turks or any other power. Batteries should be erected there sweeping the sea, to prevent the approach of the English. General Donzelot is to command at Sta. Maura; he will have under his orders the 2nd battalion of the 14th light infantry, 900 Albanians, 6 field-pieces, and a company of artillery. A

sufficient number of iron guns should be sent to enable him to erect batteries on the coast. He will see that the fortifications which are to protect the island from the English are carried on with the utmost diligence. He will likewise have under his orders 2 officers of engineers and an officer commanding the artillery. At Cephalonia there should be a French chef-de-bataillon as commandant, 2 captains, a lieutenant of artillery, and a detachment of 16 gunners, 600 Albanians, and 600 Greeks raised in the country. Zante should be treated in the same way. In this manner, if a considerable English force were directed upon Cephalonia or Zante, and if these islands could receive no assistance from Sta. Maura or from the Turks on the mainland, I should be exposed to the loss of only a few officers and of no French soldiers. If you were to send to Corfu 6 companies of your Neapolitan regiments, each consisting of 120 men, they might enter my service there, and be usefully employed. It remains for you, therefore, to despatch the requisite number of officers of artillery and of engineers, to send another brigadier-general to command at Parga, and the requisite number of officers to be commandants at Zante and Cephalonia. The commandant of Sta. Maura will keep up a regular communication with the governor-general at Corfu; but he will also correspond directly with you to give you frequent intelligence of all that passes. You will instruct these different commandants to keep on good terms with the Turks and conciliate them, but to be always prepared for defence.

[329.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—By your return, sent to me on the 8th of September, I see that there are in Corfu only one colonel of artillery and 3 capitaines-adjoints. You must, therefore, also send thither a chef-de-bataillon; send likewise a captain to Sta. Maura. I see that there is [in Corfu] only a chef-de-bataillon of engineers; a colonel must be sent thither: that there are only 2 companies, making together 130 men, of foot-artillery; 2

more must be sent. I see no artificers there; a party must be sent under a good officer to repair all the carriages.

I do not see that any field-artillery are sent; there ought to be at least 18 pieces. The governor is not to shut himself up in the town; he must defend the whole island, Sta. Maura, and Parga. I informed you of my wishes in my letter of yesterday. Let them be attended to.

I despatched gold for Corfu a week ago. It must not be allowed to want anything. Why do not you send out cruisers to prevent the enemy from infesting the Adriatic and your seas? Why cannot you, in this season, send corn and oil by water to Marseilles?

I am anxious that, as soon as winter comes, you should keep the English off the Continent.

Let me know why Butrinto and the other parts of the Continent which belong to the Ionian Islands are not occupied. Attend to what I have said respecting the forts. Follow scrupulously my instructions, for you do not know my plans.

[330.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received letters of the 20th of September from General C. Berthier. His correspondence is not satisfactory. He mentions the Russian squadron only to complain of Admiral Siniavin's conduct, but he does not tell me the number of their ships of the line and frigates, nor the strength of their troops, nor the time fixed for the admiral's departure. I have still to learn the numbers of the Russian troops at Corfu, nor am I acquainted with the force of the English cruisers on those coasts. Give orders to General Berthier to keep a journal with an accurate account of all that enters and leaves Corfu, of his correspondence with Ali Pacha and the Greeks, and with the other Turkish pachas. He ought to send you this journal regularly. I was sorry to see that on the 20th of September General Donzelot and the 14th light infantry had not reached Corfu. This is of the greatest import-

ance. I have sent some biscuit and corn to Corfu from Venice and Ancona; I depend upon your sending 10,000 quintals from Otranto. I wish Corfu to be supplied with provisions for a year. I have ordered 250,000 francs in gold to be transmitted to Corfu, without fail. It is of great consequence to me that the garrison of Corfu should be paid well and regularly. It always distresses me to see the pay of my troops in arrear; it can be caused only by a total want of order in the administration. But what is an ordinary evil in Naples would be a very great one in Corfu.

[331.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 16, 1807.

My Brother,—I have sent to you the regiment of Isembourg, composed of 3 battalions, and I have directed between 3000 and 4000 men to be sent from your depôts to reinforce your army. But, for Heaven's sake, do not endure the disgrace of the presence of the English at Reggio and at Scylla; it is an ignominy which has never been equalled. On the 9th of November the first detachment from your depôts, consisting of 1500 men, ought to arrive at Naples.

[332.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 18, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 8th, with the return annexed. I see that you have nearly 40,000 men present under arms and 7000 at the hospitals. I am sending to you as many as 6000 men, counting the regiment of Isembourg and the different détachments from your depôts. Your return was drawn up in the season at which the hospitals are fullest; before two months are over, half the invalids will have left them. How can you bear the shame of the presence of the English at Scylla? You were wrong in allowing them to establish themselves there; they will not be driven out

without a siege. I repeat to you, take Scylla: all that General Lamarque alleges in his report is absurd. If I had 40,000 men in Italy I would be master of the whole kingdom of Naples and of the Papal States, and would keep 20,000 men upon the Adige to reinforce the French army. You will receive this letter before the 1st of November. Before the end of that month let the English be driven out of Scylla, and no longer sully by their presence a single spot on the Continent.

This operation will restore to you the services of all your troops. Your guard is in itself enough for Naples. In November the banditti will not stir a finger, since your troops will not be stopped by the heat. Two of my frigates and a few corvettes have left Toulon for Corfu. Give secret orders to Otranto and to Tarento to the effect that, if they present themselves at those forts, they may be protected, and not taken for English. I can think of no place but Corsica to receive the 4000 convicts whom you want to get rid of. I see no objection to your sending them thither directly, if you wish to do so. As to Piedmont and the interior of France, they are already infested by convicts, and my subjects have a right to complain that I allow them to be so disturbed. Only a few days ago six Neapolitans assassinated some Frenchmen. There are complaints indeed in Corsica, but, as the inhabitants always carry arms, they can protect themselves.

[333.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 18, 1807.

My Brother,—I send you an order which I have just issued; you will communicate with the Viceroy as to its execution.* You have in Italy 10 French regiments, or 20 battalions, which at the rate of 1260 each, or 140 men per company, will make 25,200 effective; 2 Italian battalions of 2520 men, 1 Swiss regiment, the regiment of Isembourg, and that of Latour d'Auvergne. There are 2 regiments or 4 battalions at

* The nature of this order does not appear.—TR.

Corfu, which will make an effective force of 5400; and an Italian battalion of 1250 men.

[334.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 18, 1807.

My Brother,—You propose to send me Neapolitan regiments, but those which you have already sent are not complete. I do not want regiments composed only of officers. I do not object to receiving Neapolitan regiments, provided that each company consist of 140 men. The regiments which you have in Italy are composed of only 60 men to a company; this is not the way to make regiments. The 3rd battalions should have been left at Capua, in order, in the favourable season, to send large detachments to recruit the two 1st battalions. My two Neapolitan battalions will soon be reduced to nothing. The regiments which you send to me must, then, consist of 2 battalions, with 9 companies in each. Every company should cross the Alps with 140 men, which makes 1260 for each battalion. The 3rd battalions will remain at Capua to collect the recruits; they will send every year from 700 to 800 men to reinforce the two 1st battalions. By this means it will be possible to have 2 regiments.*

As to your having at Naples Neapolitan troops as good as mine, I do not think that you or your daughter will live long enough to witness such a miracle. I see that you are no wiser than three-quarters of mankind, who do not appreciate the difference which exists between troops. You cannot replace with foreigners such troops as I have given to you. The Russian soldiers are inferior to mine, the Germans still more inferior, and the Italians more so still, and yet the Italians have been in training for the last 12 years; there are many French among them, and they have passed 4 years in the camp at Boulogne. I wish you to send back the regiment of pontoneers, the bat-

* Napoleon estimates that two battalions, consisting of 2520 men in the whole, will require annually from 700 to 800 recruits. This supposes them to be destroyed and replaced in little more than three years.—TR.

talion of artillery-drivers, and the French regiment of horse-artillery which you have. You do not want Neapolitan regiments of artillery, they would be of no use at Naples. I think that you might send me back some more French cavalry regiments; this would tend to lessen your expenses. Would the mere idea that I have to leave 30,000 Frenchmen to guard the kingdom of Naples serve to pay them? And would it not be a charge upon France? * I am glad to hear what you tell me about Rœderer. I think that you are wrong to pay so highly the French officers who are at Naples. If you do so, you must considerably diminish their numbers. As to the contractors, I cannot understand why you deal with them, considering that you have everything, corn, wine, cloth, &c. You want contractors only for the fabrication of the articles, and then the sum which you would have to pay them would be very trifling.

[335.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 21, 1807.

My Brother,—It appears from your letter that you spend 36 millions on the French army; this is a great deal too much. You have two regiments of dragoons, which are incomplete; if they each consisted of 900 men and 600 horses, they would cost you only 700,000 francs apiece, or 1,400,000 francs for the two. You have three incomplete regiments of *chasseurs;* if each of these three regiments were composed of 800 men and 600 horses, the three regiments would cost you only 2 million francs. Your cavalry, therefore, even supposing its strength to be more than 4000 men and 3000 horses, would cost you only 3,500,000 francs. You are aware that there is a great difference between their present number and the complete state at which I have estimated them; they should therefore cost you much less. Ten regiments of infantry, each consisting of 2 battalions, each battalion consisting of 1000 men, or 20,000 in all, ought to cost not

* This passage is inserted, though it has no meaning, to avoid altering the text of any letter of Napoleon's.—ED.

more than 10 million francs.* You know that you have not nearly so many. A battalion of artillery-drivers ought not to cost you more than 400,000 francs; a battalion of artillery ought to cost you only 700,000 francs. Your army, therefore, ought not to cost you 15 millions; and even from these 15 millions you must deduct the difference between the complete numbers, which I have inserted, and those which you actually have. It is true that the cost of the generals, of artillery repairs, and of breakages, must be added; but after all, if you put these at 5 millions in addition, with 20 millions you have much more than is necessary for all your expenses. I beg you to have all this calculated, and to keep your accounts by double entries, first taking each corps separately, and afterwards the whole collectively. As to the pay, it ought to be much less than the 6 millions which I send to you. I have diminished your expenses considerably by ordering the officers of your 3rd and 4th squadrons to return to Italy; by desiring you also to send back the cadres of your 3rd and 4th battalions; by keeping your three battalions up to an effective force of 140 men to each company; by withdrawing your pontoneers, your battalions of artillery-drivers, and your horse-artillery. You had better replace all these troops with infantry. In political administration the problems are never simple. That a measure is good in itself is not sufficient to make it expedient. For instance, it is no doubt a good thing to have a regiment of horse-artillery, but the question is, is it the best thing? Might not the money be better employed on a foot regiment of 3000 men, which would not cost more? The necessity of looking carefully to the state of my forces, in order to avoid throwing all my affairs into disorder, requires that I should place my army of Naples upon a definite footing, and that I should know that it is well kept up. You may understand the attention which I am obliged to bestow upon these details when I tell you that I have more than 800,000 men under arms. I have an army on the Passarge, near the Niémen; I have one at Warsaw, and another in Silesia; another at Hamburgh; another at Berlin; and one at

Boulogne. I have one which is marching upon Portugal, and I am preparing a second at Bayonne.* I have an army in Dalmatia, which is now being reinforced by 6000 men. I have also an army in Italy, an army at Naples, and garrisons along all my sea-coasts. You may judge, then, whether, when all these forces flow back into the interior of my states, and I shall no longer have any aid from without, my expenses must not be calculated with the utmost strictness.

You ought to have an inspecting officer, capable of giving you a return of the cost of a regiment formed according to our regulations.

[336.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 21, 1807.

My Brother,—I see by your letter of the 3rd of October that your kingdom, taking one month with another, gives you 900,000 ducats, which make 4,410,000 francs, that is to say, nearly 53 millions a-year. This is very little. The kingdom of Italy yields me 122 millions. I should like to have a statistical return of your kingdom to make me well acquainted with its extent, population, and taxation. It seems to me that your kingdom ought to yield at least 100 millions.

[337.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 27, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 16th of October. I am impatiently expecting the report of the officer whom you sent to Corfu. General Cæsar Berthier does not write. How is it possible that Admiral Siniavin should go to Messina, when he has received orders, which I myself have seen, to proceed to Cadiz or Toulon, or to one of your ports?

I suppose that General Donzelot, the 14th light infantry, and

* This is the first hint as to the seizure of Spain.—Tr.

some powder, have reached Corfu. Expeditions have left Venice and Ancona. I have declared war against Portugal; you should therefore seize all the Portuguese vessels which are at present, or which may arrive, in your harbours. An army of 30,000 men, commanded by General Junot, is already on the frontiers of Portugal. I hope to reach Lisbon in November. Your cruisers may take whatever is under the Portuguese flag. How is it that your shipowners send out no privateers? You may send 500 convicts to Corsica, embarking them at Civita Vecchia. They will have work found for them there, and you will get rid of them.

You may send to France as many Neapolitan regiments as you like, but completed to their full numbers. I have brought back to France as many as possible of your cadres, and filled them up to 140 men per company. I have ordered the 1st Swiss regiment to pass from my service into yours, and I have given orders to the 1st battalion of this regiment, which is in the island of Elba, to join the other battalions without delay.

[338.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 30, 1807.

My Brother,—1500 men from your depôts have left Ancona to join the army of Naples, and 3434 are to start for the same destination on the 5th November; this will give you a reinforcement of 5000 men. I have given orders that on the 1st of January 2000 more may be ready to start.

I desire that my regiments of the army of Naples, having already 140 effective in each company, may receive each a reinforcement of 150 men. The colonels who are in Italy ought to keep them up to their full numbers. For this purpose, you must send a return to me, and one to Eugène.*

* The Viceroy of the kingdom of Italy.—TR.

[339.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Oct. 31, 1807.

My Brother,—I do not know whether you have established the *Code Napoléon* in your kingdom. I wish it to become the civil law of your states, dating from the 1st of January next.* Germany has adopted it; and Spain will do so soon. This will be very useful.

You ought to arrest a M. B——, a French emigrant, pensioned by England; let him be shut up in a fortress till we have peace. Treat in the same way Lombardi, Perano, Cara, Martini, the two brothers Cerutti, Laurent Durazzo, the Abbé del Arco, and the Chevalier de Costes. Prepare a prison in some fortress, and let all these people be confined in it. I have given orders to arrest all Corsicans pensioned by England. I have already sent many to Fenestrelle—among others, one Bertolazzi. I advise you to take the same measures in your kingdom. Order the detachment of the 81st, which is at Corfu, to join its depôt in Italy. It has 9 officers and 183 men.

[340.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Nov. 2, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letters of the 23rd. I have not yet quite made up my mind not to go to Italy; I should not like to cross you on the road: as soon as I have decided I will write to you.

Pray make the expedition to Reggio and Scylla, and deliver the Continent from the presence of the English. You have ten times as many troops as are wanted for that purpose, and the season is favourable. I see with pleasure that you have ordered the Russian garrison of Corfu, which has landed at Manfredonia, to be well received.

* This allows only two months for a change of the whole civil law of the country. The prophecy that Spain would soon adopt the Code Napoléon shows that Napoleon already contemplated the seizure of Spain.—TR.

[341.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Nov. 3, 1807.

My Brother,—I send you a report which will show you what your army ought to cost you, supposing its strength to consist of 36,000 foot and 4000 horse; and certainly it does not amount to that. It ought not to cost you more than 24 million francs, of which only 7 or 8 millions should be in money, and the rest in provisions, forage, &c.

[342.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Nov. 6, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your return of the 15th October, which you sent to me with your letter of the 27th. I see by this return that you have 27,000 men present under arms. It is inconceivable that with this number of troops you should suffer the English to remain at Scylla and Reggio. I entreat you not to lose a moment in making this expedition, which is of the greatest importance. A single division may march boldly on Reggio and Scylla, provided an intermediate division keep up the communication between the first division and Naples.

[343.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Nov. 7, 1807.

My Brother,—Have you begun to build your ships of the line? When will they be finished? You ought more than any one else to feel the importance of obtaining these two ships, which will put you in a condition to fear nothing from the English frigates, and the English have not enough ships of the line to place them everywhere.

[344.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Nov. 7, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 29th of October, by which I see that you have sent 131,000 pounds of powder and 600,000 infantry cartridges to Corfu. I am surprised that you do not mention my frigates. You ought to have heard of them, as they sailed from Toulon in the beginning of October.

Order the 6th regiment of chasseurs to proceed without delay to Treviso. I wish no time to be lost in executing this order.

[345.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Fontainebleau, Nov. 7, 1807.

My Brother,—I have told you that I wished Cephalonia to be garrisoned by Albanian troops, and that there should be no French troops in that island, except one or two officers. The same thing with respect to Zante. Two of my frigates and one corvette ought by this time to have arrived at Corfu; they left Toulon on the 7th of October. When you receive this letter, 40 days will have passed since their departure; you ought then to have some news of them. These frigates may be useful in transporting my soldiers to Corfu. I hope that the troops sent thither by the Viceroy to complete the 6th and the 14th have all arrived. On the reception of this letter I wish you to send to Corfu a battalion of the 2nd Italian regiment, which you will complete as fully as you can. You will likewise send thither a Neapolitan regiment complete to 140 men per company. Two battalions of Latour d'Auvergne should also be sent; their numbers should be increased so as to make altogether 1800 men. Add to these 200 French and Italian artillery. You will therefore send to Corfu a reinforcement of 3600 men, which, with the 6th of the line, the 14th light infantry, the 5th Italian regiment, and the artillery, will form a division of more than 8000 men. Send Brigadier-General Valentin to Corfu in order that there may

always be there besides the Governor-General two brigadier-generals. Send thither likewise the staff-officer Romeuf, and several officers of the staff. Send also a squadron of chasseurs of 200 men, a company of horse-artillery with 120 horses, so that there may always be a division of artillery in Corfu with 8 pieces of cannon. There are only 120 gunners in those islands; that is clearly insufficient. Pray have these orders executed punctually. In the return which you have sent to me I see that there is but one adjutant commandant: one is not enough. I entreat you to supply Corfu as soon as you can with provisions, corn, and powder. It is necessary that you should send thither several hundred thousand cartridges, and that there should be corn enough there to last a year. General Cæsar Berthier ought to be master of the island, and never, under any circumstances, to suffer himself to be shut up in the fortress. With the troops which I am sending to him he may assume this attitude, since he will have from 8000 to 9000 men. This is connected with some larger schemes of which you know nothing.* Lose no time therefore. There ought to be 400 artillerymen in Corfu. Send thither also another detachment of military artificers. You do not answer all my letters, nor do you correspond with Corfu. I ordered the fortifications of Corfu, Parga, and Santa Maura to be gone on with: I hear nothing about it. I have desired the Viceroy to send thither some biscuit, much corn, and some powder. In this season the enemy's cruisers cannot prevent the arrival of our ships.

The Viceroy tells me that on the 2nd of October he sent 2200 tons of flour to Corfu; between the 15th and the 22nd 15,000 rations of biscuit; and that on the 20th of October he sent off some powder and shot from Venice.

* Under the agreement made at Tilsit by Napoleon and Alexander for the partition of Turkey, France was to have Greece. Corfu was a stepping-stone.—TR.

[346.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Nov. 20, 1807.

Monsieur mon Frère,—I have received your letters of the 7th, 9th, 11th, and 12th of November. I have been two days in Milan. I shall reach Venice on the 2nd of December. Berthier must have written to tell you that I shall be glad to meet you there, if your affairs permit you to come. I am impatiently expecting to hear of the arrival of the 14th light infantry, the detachment of the 6th, and the artillery, at Corfu, that the French troops are assembled, and that I am prepared there to repel any aggression on the part of the English, and to defend not only the fortress but the whole island. You should continue to correspond with Ali Pacha, and let him know that I learnt with regret the change in his feelings towards me; that, instead of sending abundance of provisions to the Ionian Islands, he refused even to give them what they asked for; tell him that his conduct has been neither right, wise, nor politic. Whereupon, Monsieur mon frère, I pray God that he keep you in his holy and honourable care.

[347.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Dec. 17, 1807.

My Brother,—I saw Lucien at Mantua and had with him a conversation of several hours. He has no doubt acquainted you with the sentiments with which he left me. His notions and his expressions are so different from mine that I can hardly make out what it is that he wants; I think that he told me that he wished to send his eldest daughter to Paris to live with her grandmother. If he still is thus disposed, I desire to be immediately informed of it; the girl must reach Paris in the course of the month of January, either accompanied by Lucien or under the charge of a governess who will take her to Madame. It appeared to me that there was in Lucien's mind a contest between opposite feelings, and that he had not sufficient strength

to decide in favour of any one of them. I exhausted all the means in my power to induce him, young as he is, to devote his talents to my service and to that of his country. If he wishes to let me have his daughter, she must set off without delay, and he must send me a declaration putting her entirely at my disposal: for there is not a moment to lose, events are hastening on, and my destiny must be accomplished. If he has changed his mind, let me know it immediately, for I shall then make other arrangements.

Tell Lucien that I was touched by his grief and by the feelings which he expressed towards me; and that I regret the more that he will not be reasonable and contribute to his own comfort and to mine.

I think that this letter will reach you on the 22nd. My last news from Lisbon are dated the 28th of November; the Prince-Regent had embarked for the Brazils, he was still in the roadstead of Lisbon; my troops were only at a few leagues' distance from the forts which form the entrance of the roadstead. I have heard from Spain no more than is contained in the letter which you have read. I am waiting with impatience for a clear and decisive answer, particularly with regard to Charlotte.*

P.S. My troops entered Lisbon on the 30th of November; the Prince Royal escaped in a man of war; I have taken 5 ships of the line and 6 frigates. On the 2nd of December all was going on well at Lisbon. England declared war against Russia on the 6th of December. Pass this news on to Corfu. The Queen of Tuscany is here: she wishes to go to Madrid.

The reader may be interested by Thiers's relation of the interview between Napoleon and Lucien.

"M. de Meneval went during the night to bring Lucien from his inn to Napoleon's palace. Instead of throwing himself into his brother's arms, Lucien addressed him with a haughtiness excusable in a man without material power, but perhaps carried

* Lucien's daughter.—TR.

further than mere self-respect required. The interview was painful and stormy, but not useless. Among the possible arrangements in Spain one was that of the marriage of a French princess to Ferdinand. Napoleon had just received a letter from Charles IV. repeating his request for such a marriage, and, though he leant towards a more radical solution, he did not exclude this middle course from his projects. He wished Lucien then to give him his daughter by his first wife to be brought up by the Empress-Mother, to imbibe the feelings of the family, and to be sent to Spain to regenerate the Bourbons. If it should not suit him to give her this part to play, there were other thrones, more or less lofty, to which he could raise her. As for Lucien, he wished to make him a French prince, and even king of Portugal, which would put him in the neighbourhood of his daughter, on condition of his dissolving his second marriage, the divorced wife being indemnified by a title and a great fortune.

"These arrangements were practicable, but they were demanded with authority and refused with anger; and the brothers separated, both excited and irritated, but without a quarrel, since a part of what Napoleon asked—the sending Lucien's daughter to Paris—took place a few days after." *

[348.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Milan, Dec. 17, 1807.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 11th of December from Bologna. I see by the letters which you annex that several ships have been taken near Otranto. There seems to be mismanagement in that quarter. Send thither a naval officer.

Why not make the ships sail at fixed times? This would be

* Thiers, vol. viii. p. 365.

much better than allowing them to start without superintendence and several together.

[349.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Turin, Dec. 28, 1807.

My Brother,—I send you a copy of a decree which I have just issued in consequence of the changes in the commerce by sea. I wish it to be executed in your dominions.* Equip as many privateers as you can to pursue the ships which communicate with Sicily, Malta, or Gibraltar, and which go to and from England. I have ordered an embargo upon all Sardinian ships and ships coming from Sardinia. It is by means of Sardinia that the English correspond at present. I have ordered all vessels coming from thence to be stopped. It is advisable not to make this measure public. I start in an hour, and I shall reach Paris on the night of the 1st. Whereupon I pray God that he may keep you in his holy and honourable care.

[350.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 10, 1808.

My Brother,—There is no end of the impertinences of the court of Rome; I am anxious to have done with it.† I have dismissed its negotiators. I wish you to assemble at Terracina a column of 2000 Neapolitan troops, infantry and cavalry, a French battalion of from 800 to 900 men, a cavalry regiment

* The Milan Decree, which declared subject to capture every ship which had touched at any port in the British Islands or in the British colonies. It was provoked by our Orders in Council, which declared subject to capture every ship which had *not* touched at a port in the British Islands or in the British colonies. Between the two, all commerce by sea by any nation whatever was prohibited.—TR.

† In a letter dated the 26th December, 1807, to which this is an answer, Joseph complained that an agent and a consul from the ex-King of Naples were allowed to reside and to display the old Neapolitan arms in Rome; that the Pope not only did not acknowledge Joseph, but had even appointed Bishop of Capri a nominee of the ex-King.—TR.

of 400 men, 4 Neapolitan and 6 French pieces of horse-artillery, which will make 3000 men and 10 pieces of cannon: you will do all this quietly. You will put this column under the orders of a brigadier-general, who will wait at Terracina for orders from General Miollis, under whose command the column is to be. General Miollis is collecting 3000 men at Perugia, and General Lemarrois as many at Foligno. With these 6000 men Miollis will march towards Rome, as if he were going to rejoin the army of Naples. When he has reached Rome, he will take possession of the Castle of St. Angelo, and assume the title of commander-in-chief of the troops in the Papal States, and he will send orders to your division at Terracina to join him in Rome as soon as possible. You feel that this expedition must be kept very secret. Your column of Terracina ought to time its movements so as not to reach Rome until General Miollis has entered the city. Perhaps it need not enter, but it must be within four or five leagues. I will desire the Viceroy to let you know on what day General Miollis is to reach Rome, that the column may not march till the last moment. I reserve my further orders till Miollis arrives in Rome.

[351.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 11, 1808.

My Brother,—I thank you for your new year's wishes. You will see that I answer your letter of the 26th of December by the measures of which my yesterday's letter has informed you. With regard to the pamphlet which you mention,* I paid no attention to it—I am accustomed to such intrigues. In general I do not read what is addressed to me through the press.

* Joseph had warned his brother against giving credit to a pamphlet of one Giraud, in which the government of Naples was attacked.—TR.

[352.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 12, 1808.

My Brother,—I send you a report from the Minister of Marine. Captain Trullet can protect your convoys from Otranto to Corfu. Let me know what you intend to send by them.

[353.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 18, 1808.

My Brother,—There is no doubt that the troops which are at Corfu should remain under your orders as commander-in-chief of my army of Naples. You tell me that the Russians have left behind them three magazines full of powder; write to General C. Berthier to take possession of them; there can be no difficulty about it. If you have any information concerning the quantity of powder contained in these magazines, let me have it. There ought by this time to be no Russians at Corfu.

[354.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 18, 1808.

My Brother,—Your aide-de-camp has been very well received by the Emperor of Russia—he has appointed a minister to your court. M. de Mondragone * will be well received; I thought that he was already on his way to Paris. Desire him to start without delay. A courier, whom I expect in four days, will bring the Emperor's answer, but you ought not to keep Mondragone till it arrives.

* Joseph's ambassador to St. Petersburg.—ED.

[355.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 24, 1808.

My Brother,—My squadron from Rochefort sailed on the 17th of January with a fair wind under orders for Toulon; there it will join my Toulon squadron. I think therefore that between the 10th and 15th of February they will appear before Naples. In the first place it is necessary that the roadstead of Baia should be fortified in such a manner as to protect my squadron if it should be attacked by a superior force, and to secure it against all hazards. You must fit out your frigates and your gunboats, and collect the brigs which are scattered about your coasts, in order to assemble a considerable number of transports for the Sicilian expedition. My wish is, that Marshal Jourdan, accompanied by General Salligny and 9000 men, should embark on board this squadron, which will take them straight to the coast of Sicily, as near Messina as possible, where they will effect a landing; and at the same instant General Reynier, with another 9000, will embark at Reggio and Scylla in gunboats, brigs, polacres, and other small vessels of the country, and thus form an army of 18,000 men. A battery of 18 pieces of artillery and 6 mortars should be immediately constructed on the promontory of Faro, opposite to Scylla, and a similar one should be erected at Scylla. The battery at Faro should be intrenched and fortified, so as to be defended even on the land side. These two formidable batteries will render the sea no longer an obstacle, and the communication between Scylla and Faro will be always easy. You will continue to send over, by means of gunboats, vessels of the country, &c., all the requisite reinforcements. With 13,000 French, 2000 or 3000 Neapolitans, and other troops, and a safe communication, Sicily is ours, for the English will not persist in defending the island if it is impossible for them to intercept the communication between Messina and Scylla. If my squadron, on reaching Faro, is able to carry off some ships and damage the enemy, it may do so, but I wish it not to remain anchored for more than forty-eight hours off the coast of Sicily, but to stand out again to sea in order to proceed

to Taranto or return to Toulon, as the wind may serve. Supposing all this to happen, and your troops to be already gone, those which reach Rome on the 1st of February will proceed towards Naples, and I have taken other measures to send you a force sufficient to hold Reggio, Scylla, Taranto, and Naples with an iron hand. You will receive this letter on the 2nd of February, I may get your answer on the 10th, and my final orders may reach Toulon on the 14th, probably before the arrival of my squadron. These are the questions to which I desire an answer:—

1. Will 12 vessels of the line and a few frigates be safe in the roadstead of Baia, whatever may happen? Let me have a sketch of it, and tell me what batteries you have there.

2. Would the same squadron at Taranto be protected against a superior hostile force?

3. Are you master of Scylla? Is it certain that the mortars and guns of the battery at Scylla would cross fire with that which is to be established at Faro?

4. How many gunboats, speronari, and other boats have you which might facilitate General Reynier's embarkation?

5. Will your three frigates be equipped and able to join my squadron, so as to afford further means of transport for my troops?

6. Have you 500,000 rations of biscuit? If not, let them be made, and let the ships carry them, that they may be landed with the troops.

7. Are the speronari safe in Reggio and Scylla from the dangers of the sea, and from the attack of a superior force?

8. Where is it thought that the squadron ought to anchor, to effect a landing and take immediate possession of Faro?

9. Can you embark in the transports six 12-inch mortars, 3000 shells with their appurtenances, nine mortar-beds, eighteen 24 or 36-pounders in iron or brass, with 500 rounds apiece, in order immediately to arm the battery of Faro?

10. Have you vessels which you can turn into horse-transports for 400 artillery horses? These vessels must ply between Scylla and the coast of Messina, so as to land all the cavalry.

11. What number of speronari, gondolas, or other boats can you add to my squadron in order to hasten the landing?

the secret only Salicetti, Jourdan, and one officer of the navy; and you will conceal even from them that my squadron is coming from Rochefort and Toulon—keep that to yourself. Within four-and-twenty hours after the arrival of my squadron at Baia you will embark the 8000 infantry, 1000 artillery and sappers and miners, with 20 field-pieces and a caisson apiece: the remainder should be embarked in the transports, or even in your three frigates, which, if you like, you may have armed *en flûte*. You will embark your biscuit in the transports. My squadron may also, when the troops are put on shore, land, if necessary, 3000 or 4000 rations of biscuit. Send likewise about thirty masons, with the means of constructing six ovens, and some gangs of bakers. You will put on board draft-horses or mules, but all this should be done so quietly as not to betray any extraordinary movement. The squadron may easily carry 18,000 men, but there are in every regiment servants and non-combatants, so that I think you could embark conveniently only 9000 good infantry, that is to say, 6 regiments, taking care that each regiment may leave 4 companies at Naples; therefore, instead of 18 companies, not more than 14 will go, containing each 1400 men present under arms. The cavalry will embark at Reggio. As soon, however, as your movements are revealed you may direct your cavalry to the points which, under the protection of the batteries, it can reach without danger: You know that the transformation of ships of thirty or forty tons into horse-transports is the affair of an instant.

The principle on which this expedition is founded is this: to gain possession of Scylla and Faro. If you can only keep Faro for a certain period, you will be master of Sicily. Load some small vessels with 20,000 quintals of flour, which you will obtain at Naples or elsewhere, and you will have all that is requisite to be master of the passage as long as it is wanted, and to send over as many troops as you like; and even the English will not accept the challenge. When I say biscuit, I mean also rice and brandy. If fortune seconds my undertaking, I may keep possession of the passage from Naples to Sicily for a week. Embark with each battalion 200 pioneers' tools, in order that they may be able to intrench themselves immediately, to erect the battery

which will close the straits, to construct ovens, to hut themselves, and then Sicily is taken. Your local knowledge may suggest modifications of this plan, always retaining this foundation, to obtain the command of Faro and Scylla; the other places fall of themselves. It might be proposed to go straight to Palermo; but this would be hazardous. The possession of Palermo will not give you Sicily, but that of Faro will; the communication is everything. I presume that you will send with the army some faithful and clever Neapolitans, to give the necessary information. There are two leagues between Faro and Messina; you may therefore be master of Faro without Messina. An intrenched camp may be formed, the left side towards the sea and the right towards Messina, or intersecting the small peninsula of Faro.

I have no doubt that you must take possession instantly of Melazzo. At Melazzo means of subsistence will be found. What sort of a place is Melazzo? Can my ships be protected there against a superior force, if a battery be immediately established? Is there a road for the artillery between Melazzo, Faro, and Messina? Are there any rivers or torrents between Melazzo and Faro which prevent communication? In my opinion, you should land as near Faro as possible, but still it must be in a place where you can anchor and disembark. By a quick march you may seize Messina, should the English not be there; and I think it unlikely that they will shut themselves up in that place. If they keep the citadel, you will get everything by taking the town. I need not tell you that every man should have 50 cartridges in his knapsack and 50 more in his box, and you ought to embark 100 more in the small vessels. When the men land, they will take out their boxes and biscuits. This operation will probably be accomplished if it is kept quite secret. I shall postpone giving you the last instructions till I receive an answer to this letter.

Let me know where you hear that the English ships are. In your return of the 15th of December, which is the last that I have, I see that you have at Naples the 29th, 52nd, and 102nd, and that these three regiments can supply the 1400 men whom I ask for; the 20th of the line, which is at Salerno, and the 10th, which is in the Abruzzi, can furnish you with as many more;

you have companies of artillery artificers, sappers and miners: so that the number of men that you require is ready. I conclude that you have reinforced Reynier's division, since you have sent troops to Reggio. I see that you have altogether present under arms 17,000 French infantry, 2400 cavalry, and 1700 artillery. You may devote to the expedition 12,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 1000 artillery and sappers and miners, which will make 15,000 men. The 2000 Italian foot, the regiments of Isembourg and of Latour d'Auvergne, and your Neapolitan army will afford 3000, without counting another reinforcement of 4000 men, which will arrive by Reggio. During this time you will receive the division of Miollis, and other troops which I am directing on Florence, and which will soon join you. The troops which will embark at Reggio should be formed into two divisions of 4500 men each, the same as to those from Naples, and these divisions should be commanded by one general of division and two brigadier-generals. French troops require a great many generals. Besides, it is you who begin hostilities, and you will send all your army of Naples. The great point is, that you should be master of Scylla and Messina, or at least of Faro. The English, who are far from expecting this expedition, will not be ready in less than a month to oppose my 9000 men, and in this time you will reinforce them with 9000 more, and your kingdom will receive all the troops whom you want.

P.S. You will find annexed a plan for your army, arranged as I think it ought to be.

No one here is acquainted with the coast of Sicily; and at this season it is of great consequence that my squadron should enter a roadstead whence a landing may be effected with security. Melazzo is exposed to a squall from the north; if my squadron met with a north wind there, would it run the risk of being stranded? If my squadron were to reach Reggio, either by forcing a passage through the strait, or by going round Sicily, is there a bay between Messina and Catania in which the men might disembark, sheltered from the wind? How many ships has the enemy at Messina? Are they protected by his batteries?

If there should be no roadstead or harbour between Messina and Catania, it may be necessary to go straight to Palermo. What are the fortifications of that town? Where would the squadron anchor? Would it be protected from the enemy? To go to Palermo would require three-quarters of the troops comprised in the return which I enclose, that is to say, you would need 15,000 men. You might embark 1500 cavalry soldiers with only their saddles; they would find horses at Palermo. But my squadron, and that of Toulon, will not be able to transport more than 11,000 men. Can you, between the 10th and 15th of February, find means of embarking from Naples 4000 infantry and 600 horses? How many ships have you? and of what size? If your three frigates are ready for sea, they must be armed in flute; in this way they alone will carry 1500 men. You must feel how anxious I am to receive answers to these questions. Whatever may happen, I strongly advise you to put the batteries in the roadstead of Baia into a good state. I see three principal points on the plan; at each of these points there must be 20 pieces of ordnance, of which at least four should be mortars. Order the batteries and platforms to be prepared, but quietly and without appearing to do anything extraordinary, so that, as soon as the expedition becomes notorious, the pieces of artillery may be carried thither in 24 hours. I suppose that between Naples and Scylla there is no tolerable roadstead in which my squadron could be protected from the north wind. Send me likewise the state and positions of your navy, and every detail concerning the coast of Sicily. A coast-guard officer, well acquainted with the harbours, bays, and roads of that island, would be of great use to me. Send me a Sicilian, a practical engineer and a sailor: both of them should be here before the 10th of February. Secrecy and secrecy.

COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY OF SICILY REFERRED TO BY THE PREVIOUS LETTER.

Staff.

Marshal Jourdan, commander-in-chief.
General Dedon, commanding the artillery.

Four adjutants-commandants, French.
Eight adjoints to the staff, French.
Two adjutants-commandants, Neapolitan.
Four adjoints to the staff, Neapolitan.
A colonel and a major of artillery, French, commanding the park.
Three field-officers and six captains of artillery, French.
One field-officer and three captains of artillery, Neapolitan.
Two field-officers and six officers of engineers, French.
Eight officers of engineers, Neapolitan.

FIRST DIVISION.

General of Division Lamarque, commander.
Lucotte and Huart, generals of brigade.

First Brigade.

A regiment of infantry, French, of two battalions, each battalion seven companies, including grenadiers and light companies, each company 150 men present .	1500	
Note.—There will remain in the depôt at Naples two companies of each battalion to receive the men leaving the hospitals, and the recruits from the depôts in Upper Italy.		
A regiment of light infantry, Neapolitan . . .	1000	
Total of first brigade		2500

Second Brigade.

A similar French regiment	1500	
An Italian regiment	1000	
		2500
Two companies of artillery, one French, the other Neapolitan, and one company of drivers, 300 men, will be attached to the division		300
Total of division		5300

Brought forward	5300

SECOND DIVISION.

First Brigade.

A French regiment, and 1000 men from the regiment of Isembourg or Latour d'Auvergne .	2500	

Second Brigade.

A French regiment, and 1000 Neapolitans or Corsicans	2500	
A French and Neapolitan company of artillery, and a company of drivers	300	
Total of second division . .	——	5300

General Salligny or Maurice Mathieu may command this division. For generals of brigade, General Merlin or Digonnet, or any one else.

General total	10,600

Thus these two first divisions, which will embark at Naples, will consist of:—

French infantry	6000
Italian	1000
Auxiliary	1000
Neapolitan	2000
Artillery and drivers	600
	10,600

To which must be added for the park 400 artillerymen, 100 drivers, 100 sappers, and 100 artizans=700. Grand total 11,300.

As these regiments may be diminished at the moment of embarking, by sickness or otherwise, to the extent of 400, there would remain only 10,900 men.

With this division, 400 pioneers' tools for each division, and 1200 for the engineers and artillery, must be embarked.

Besides the 50 cartridges which each man will have in his knapsack, chests, containing 100 cartridges per man (each chest of a size which can be landed easily by two men), must be embarked. They will be landed with the men, and contain a million cartridges. Another million must be embarked in the transports.

Two pieces of cannon and a caisson will be embarked in each vessel of the squadron. All the other caissons and chests will be embarked in the transports, so as to have a double provision for 24 pieces of field-artillery, making two divisions of 12 guns each—that is to say, for each division two 12-pounders, eight 6 or 4-pounders, and two howitzers. If 3-pounders, mountain-pieces, are at hand, four of them must be embarked.

Two companies of artillery and 100 drivers have been allotted to each division; they can attend to 600 horses: 300 horses should be embarked if possible, and stalls should be made to hold two squadrons of chasseurs, of 300 horses each.

80,000 quintals of flour, 500,000 rations of biscuit, and 500,000 rations of brandy must be embarked in the squadron.

Each division must have its ambulance, and there must be one generally for the whole corps. From Naples, then, there will embark for this expedition nearly 12,000 men.

The second part of the expedition will be composed, like the first, of two divisions, consisting each of two brigades, comprising three French regiments, one Swiss, one Neapolitan auxiliary, 200 Neapolitan horse, chasseurs and dragoons; making from 7000 to 8000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. All the gunboats and light vessels will assist it.

When the expedition has left Italy, there will remain in the kingdom of Naples 40 companies, being 4 per regiment; if they average 50 men, that makes 2000; three complete regiments, 4500 men; the guard, 3500 men; two Italian regiments, 200; the Neapolitan troops, &c. Altogether more than 15,000 men.

A few days after the sailing of the expedition, 6000 grenadiers will enter Naples, and 2000 the Abruzzi; as for generals and staff officers, there are always enough in Naples, as the generals of brigade can act as generals of division, and colonels as generals of brigade.

[356.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 26, 1808.

My Brother,—I wrote to you yesterday at great length on my plans; I presume that you have already answered me by sending me all the necessary information. Everything inclines me to think that the attempt must be made before the 15th of February. You must obtain the means of embarking between 3000 and 4000 men in very large vessels; they will be able to go wherever they like, for with 15,000 men you will not be tied down to holding a single point. The great thing is to take Scylla. Your letter of the 15th does not mention it: this puzzles me.

Pray repeat to General C. Berthier that he must put no French troops either in Cephalonia or in Zante, and that all his French troops must be assembled at Corfu and at Santa Maura. I am impatiently expecting to hear of the arrival of the 14th, of the detachments of the 6th, and of the Italian regiments. From the moment that you can reckon upon assembling 6000 men at Corfu, there will be no danger of the English landing there, since they could not do it with even 12,000 men, a force which is out of proportion to the resources of England. I have written to the Ottoman Porte, in order that, if the English disembark near Corfu and besiege the fortress, the army of Dalmatia may be able to start from Cattaro, to cross the territory of Ali Pacha, and make its appearance before Corfu. I have there 20,000 men, who, when they reached Butrinto, would easily cross to Corfu, join the garrison, and drive the besiegers into the sea. I expect that, if the 14th, the remainder of the 6th, and the Italians have arrived, the English will not be allowed to land; and if even they effected a landing, the fortress would be defended for more than six months. It is probable that before the blockade had been kept up two months, the army of Dalmatia would have reached Butrinto. Marmont has sent a consul to Beyrout, and I have requested Ali Pacha (and, indeed, I have made the Porte order him) to place Tartars between Butrinto and Cattaro, to accelerate the communication.

As Mocenigo is at Naples, you may learn from him the quantity of powder left by the Russians at Corfu; it is absurd that it is not yet given up to me. It is of consequence that you should ascertain the number of the ships of war, frigates, &c., which the English have before Corfu. You should get these reports from Otranto and Brindisi. I also wish you to learn how many men-of-war can find shelter in Brindisi, and if the batteries protecting the harbour are in a good state. I am longing to hear that Scylla is taken.

[357.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 26, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 15th of January. Your plan for an order appears to me to be the best, because it has some meaning.* I shall give the order of the Iron Crown to Marquis Gallo, and the Eagle to Prince Colonna, Commandant of the National Guard of Naples, to Prince Bisignano, and to Duke Cassano. I accept your order with pleasure.

I suppose that your ambassadors for Paris and St. Petersburg have already started. I told you that the news was very well received in Russia. Your letter of the 15th informs me that 500 men have sailed for Corfu with a favourable wind; I am anxious to hear of their arrival.

[358.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 28, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 18th, with the report of General Donzelot. It proves to me the incapacity of Berthier, who ought on his arrival to have sent you a similar report. I wish you, therefore, to send one of your aides-de-camp to Corfu with an order to General Donzelot to undertake the government of the Ionian Islands. You will say that you have received the decree appointing him; and you will desire General Berthier to remain a fortnight with General Donzelot, after

* What this plan was does not clearly appear.—TR.

which he will repair by land to Cattaro, visit that place, inspect the roads, survey the whole of Dalmatia, and thence join me in Paris. Your aide-de-camp must be discreet; you will tell him what is in his despatches, in order that he may not deliver them unless General Donzelot is at Corfu; if he should be at Santa Maura, he must be sent for to Corfu; and if there should be any obstacle to his quitting Santa Maura, General Berthier ought not to suspect the object of your aide-de-camp's mission, as it would annoy him. Repeat the order to the Governor-General to withdraw the French troops from Zante and Cephalonia, and to place them only at Santa Maura and Corfu. No French must be left even at Parga. The Governor will leave at Zante and Cephalonia only two French officers, with 25 or 30 French; the same at Parga. The 6th, the 14th, and the Italians should be all assembled at Corfu and Sta. Maura. Send off immediately four French engineer and two artillery officers from Naples to Corfu. I see that, by way of provisions, all that they have at Corfu are 14,000 quintals of bad flour; but General Donzelot makes some omissions, for I am assured that there are also several thousand quintals of corn. I am impatient to hear if your convoy of the 8th has arrived; it seems to me that there was 100,000 lbs. weight of powder in it. If the Russians had magazines there, why not have taken them? It will not be difficult for you to embark 500 or 600 tools, they take little room. One of the brigadier-generals at Corfu will take the command of Sta. Maura. Send 10 more artillery officers to Corfu. As to money, I have ordered 250,000 francs to be sent thither every month. Since I gave this order three months ago, from 700,000 to 800,000 francs must have arrived there; and that sum was sufficient to finish the works and pay the troops. The aide-de-camp whom you send must bring back a report of the state of Corfu on the 1st of February, magazine by magazine, and bastion by bastion. Everything inclines me to think that Corfu will be attacked in March or April. I have desired some corvettes and brigs to be sent from Ancona and Venice; I have not heard of their arrival.

[359.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Jan. 30, 1808.

My Brother,—One of my squadrons will shortly appear before Corfu; it will be strong enough to drive away the enemy's cruisers, and to be mistress of the sea for several days. Make such dispositions that the remainder of the 14th light infantry, of the 26th of the line, and of the Italian depôts, all the powder and ammunition, the artillery and engineer officers, and in fact all that you intend for Corfu, may be ready at Brindisi and Otranto, in order to take advantage of my squadron and cross. My wish is that there should be at Corfu 4000 French and Italians, 1000 natives and Albanians; so that in the face of these 5000 men the enemy will not be able to land with less that 12,000; that the fortresses may be victualled so as to hold out during more than six months of open trenches, to give me time to relieve them. As the Porte has permitted me to pass through Albania, 20,000 men might, on a landing being effected, reach Butrinto in a week. I wish you to assemble at Brindisi a battalion of 500 or 600 Neapolitans; the squadron will protect their passage. Send also the requisite number of artificers, the detachment of artillery, and, above all, powder and provisions.

[360.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 7, 1808.

My Brother,—I wrote to you on the 24th of January on the Sicilian expedition, and I conclude that you have made the necessary dispositions. I received this evening the following intelligence:—Admiral Ganteaume writes to me, dating the 23rd of February, from the roadstead of Toulon, that my Rochefort squadron was signalled off Villefranche on the 3rd, at 10 o'clock in the morning; that he was proceeding to join it; and that he should probably proceed to Corfu to drive off the English cruisers, to protect the passage from Brindisi and Otranto

to Corfu, and to try to take some of the enemy's ships. You feel the importance of profound secrecy, and yet of sending without delay two safe and intelligent officers, one to Otranto and Brindisi, and the other to Taranto. The one whom you send to Otranto ought to manage so that all the convoys in those ports may be ready to sail, in order thoroughly to victual Corfu. Corfu is of such importance to me, that its loss would be a fatal blow to my plans; the Adriatic would be closed, and your kingdom would have on its left side a port in which the enemy would recruit Albanians and other troops to attack you. In my hands it will have great influence on Albania. I depend, therefore, on your zeal that nothing will be forgotten, and that this solitary opportunity of securing Corfu against all danger will be seized. All the 6th of the line, the 14th light infantry, the 5th Italian regiment of the line, a Neapolitan battalion, and another Italian battalion, ought to be sent to reinforce the garrison of Corfu. I have no return of the troops at Brindisi and Otranto. I cannot estimate, therefore, the strength of the garrison when the reinforcements have arrived. But I wish you without delay to embark another French battalion, the nearest within reach, in order that there may be 6000 men, French, Italians, or Neapolitans, in the island of Corfu alone, without including the Albanians and Ionians, who would increase the number up to 7500. The English will then not be able to land, and I shall be master of the island for ever. Send over all the powder, tools, and gun-carriages at your disposal, and all the money that you have in your treasury at Naples, at the rate of 250,000 francs per month. Pay these 250,000 francs in advance for February and March. You will therefore take advantage of this opportunity to send to them at least 1,000,000 francs. Load the vessel with corn, flour, and other things. I will repay all the extra money which you send thither. Send over also some extra engineer and artillery officers. When you have thus made Corfu safe, you will send some discreet person to Admiral Ganteaume to let him know whether you wish him to present himself before Reggio. Desire him to appear before Catania and Reggio to protect the landing of 7000 or 8000 men, who are to occupy Faro, place a battery there, and take

possession of the suburbs of Messina. As soon as this is done, Sicily is conquered, as you would then direct all your troops upon Reggio, so as to increase the number of the expedition which is to start from thence to 15,000. This plan supposes that you are master of Scylla, which is the most important post in the world. If Scylla is not yours, all this becomes impossible, and you will have lost Sicily through your own fault.*

I send you a memorandum on the state of my fleet and of the means of transport which it affords. You of course have done the same, and your letter, which I expect to-morrow, will let me know on what I can depend. You must not, in any way, discontinue your preparations for embarkation from Naples, for it is possible that Admiral Ganteaume may sail towards Naples, if his movements in other directions are impeded, and that he may proceed to Cape Mortadella, in order to take possession of Faro. Besides, I am expecting another squadron in the Mediterranean, and it is as well that your means of transport should be ready in any case. That cursed rock Scylla interferes with all my projects, and yet I had impressed upon you that everything depended upon it. It is possible that my squadron may be forced to take refuge in the harbour of Taranto. Place some guns on the island, and let all be ready to protect my ships.

To sum up, on the 3rd of February, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Admiral Ganteaume had not left Toulon, and had not decided whether he should direct his course on Corfu or on Naples. If he were detained by wind or weather, so that there were time for my orders to reach him, and I had received your answer to my letter of the 24th of January,† I should certainly desire him to sail for Naples. But is Scylla taken? It is probable that Admiral Ganteaume has sailed for Corfu, that he will have reached it, or nearly so, when you receive

* Scylla was not then in Joseph's power.—TR.

† It is remarkable that in his letter of the 24th January Napoleon informs Joseph, as a matter perfectly arranged, that the fleet was to sail from Toulon for Naples, and would be there between the 10th and 15th of February, and desires Joseph to have 9000 men ready to embark in it for Sicily. It now appears that no orders to this effect had been sent to Admiral Ganteaume, and that, instead of Naples, his destination was Corfu.—TR.

this letter; in this case you should complete the garrison of Corfu to 6000 men, French and Italians, and supply it amply with provisions. You should urge on the siege of Scylla, and desire Admiral Ganteaume, if you think it advisable, to appear before Catania and Reggio, and to land 7000 or 8000 men to occupy Faro, and then you should direct all your force upon that point. In fact, you must go on with your naval preparations at Naples, in order to land as many men as you possibly can in Sicily. In the present state of Europe you cannot be in want of troops, and I will send you as many as you like. When you hear that Ganteaume has reached Corfu, hurry on to Reggio the troops which you have between Naples and that place, as the whole movement is to be made from Reggio, and at the same time continue your naval preparations at Naples. Whilst waiting for news of Admiral Ganteaume, you should endeavour to be always ready at Naples to embark your troops in his ships, in order to sail straight by Mortadella, and to seize Faro. You must, however, keep all this perfectly secret, for intelligence of your movements may be carried quickly into Sicily, and an indiscretion would expose you to the greatest misfortunes. Salicetti, one naval officer, and yourself, ought alone to be in the secret; even the officer whom you send to Otranto and Brindisi ought to know nothing about it: you will give him a sealed letter, which he is not to open, unless he hears something extraordinary at Otranto. I need not recommend you to keep the batteries at Taranto and Baïa in good order, that they may protect my squadrons. Of course I shall write to you every day.

When you know that Ganteaume has arrived before Corfu, despatch a courier to the Viceroy and to General Lemarrois to hasten the departure from Venice and Ancona of all that is intended for Corfu.

[361.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 8, 1808.

My Brother,—I wrote to you yesterday: it is now noon, and I have not yet received the courier whom I expect from Toulon to-day to tell me what my squadron did on the 4th. Pray

send plenty of money to Corfu. The Porte must have ordered Butrinto to be given up to me. As soon as this important port is in my power, 2000 Albanians are to be assembled there.

You should consider Corfu as of greater consequence than Sicily. The fate of Sicily is certain, that of Corfu is yet undecided. In the last negotiations England did not object to giving me Sicily. Take advantage of this opportunity to send over rather 1000 men too many than 1000 men too few, and rather to add another company of artillery than to take one away. Remember well what I tell you. In the present state of Europe the greatest possible misfortune would be the loss of Corfu. I depend upon your dexterity to guarantee to me the possession of this important post for ever. Let everything be referred to you. Increase rather than diminish the number of staff, artillery, and engineer officers, whom you send thither. Desire the governor to levy more Albanians, and to carry the number up to 6000 instead of 3000. I should like to have from 2000 to 3000 Albanians in each of the stations of Parga, Santa Maura, and Butrinto, under the orders of a French general.

It is 2 o'clock in the afternoon; I have just received your letter of the 28th of January. How is it that your letters take eleven days on the road from Naples? They ought to arrive in eight days. My express service is getting out of order; I have complained to Lavalette. Endeavour on your side to find out the cause.

[362.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Feb. 9, 6 o'clock in the afternoon.

No courier has arrived either yesterday or to-day from Toulon; I have therefore no news; I can only refer to my letter of the 7th. Letters from Rome say that Salicetti's house has been undermined, that his children are killed, and he himself slightly hurt. How horrible! I am impatiently waiting for details.

I shot to-day at Mortefontaine from 1 o'clock till 4; I killed twenty hares. The house looked to me even more frightful and uninhabitable than it did four years ago.

[363.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 10, 1808.

My Brother,—You will find annexed a memorandum of what has been sent from Venice to Corfu. You will see that it has been considerable both as regards ammunition and provisions. Let me know what has been received.

[364.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 11, 1808.

My Brother,—Admiral Ganteaume writes to me, dated the 4th of February, that he is ready to set sail; that he purposes to do so on the 8th; that Admiral Allemand, in command of the squadron from Rochefort, anchored in the bay of Juan on the 3rd; and that he immediately ordered it to join him. Admiral Allemand has been lucky: he passed the strait * in the night of the 26th of January without being seen by the English. On his way he took several prizes, which he burnt. I am impatiently expecting an answer to my letter of the 24th of January; this is the eighteenth day since it was sent; I hope to receive your answer this evening. If Ganteaume goes first to Corfu, I am very anxious that you should try to execute the Sicilian expedition. I am longing to hear that Scylla is taken. The terrible misfortune which has happened to Salicetti† seems to me to have been the result of over-indulgence. When were traitors ever before allowed to live, and to live free, in a capital—wretches who had plotted against the state? Their lives ought not to be spared, but, if that is done, at least you should send them sixty leagues from the capital, or shut them up in a fortress: any other conduct is madness.

* Of Gibraltar.

† His house was blown up, and he and his daughter injured, by a person whose sons had suffered for having taken part in a conspiracy.—TR.

[365.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 11, 1808.

My Brother,—The kingdom of Naples is very ill administered; my troops are not paid, and the arrears increase every day. Rœderer makes fine plans, ruins the country, and puts no money into your treasury: this is the opinion of all the French who come from Naples. Rœderer is honest and has good intentions, but he has no experience. The great art is to do in every year no more than is requisite, and Rœderer does in one year what ought to be done in ten. This is sufficient in itself to ruin you and to displease your people.

[366.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 12, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 3rd of February. I see with great regret that Scylla is not yet in your power. I am waiting anxiously for the letter which you promise me for to-morrow. You might as well have let me know to-day how many vessels you have, for I have not heard of the departure of my squadron, and I might have ordered it in the first place to proceed to Baia. By this time, however, you must know what Admiral Ganteaume has done. If you are ready to undertake the expedition from Reggio, my Corfu squadron may go thither and take its share in the operation, but the possession of Scylla is very important. A squadron could scarcely venture to pass through the strait if Scylla were armed with a good battery. Captain de Simone has not yet arrived. I conclude that you have told nothing to him or to any other person.

[367.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 15, 1808.

My Brother,—I send you the report of an American captain who left Palermo on the 6th of January. From this report it appears that the English have no troops in Sicily. Under such circumstances the expedition will succeed easily. In your recent letters you do not mention this important subject.

[368.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 15, 1808.

My Brother,—My squadron left Toulon on the 10th of February at 10 o'clock in the morning, under the command of Admiral Ganteaume. Its strength consists of 2 three-deckers, 8 ships of 80 and 74 guns, several frigates and brigs, and of 3 large ships *en flûte* laden with artillery and ammunition for Corfu. At 6 o'clock on the evening of the 10th the squadron was out of sight, sailing with a fair wind, which probably carried it on beyond Cape Bon. I wrote to you on the 7th of February, to-day is the 15th; it is probable that whilst I am writing you will receive that letter. I told you that Admiral Ganteaume would certainly go to Corfu, and this is in fact what he has done. I refer you to the dispositions contained in my letter of the 7th for conveying to Corfu all that is provided in Brindisi and Otranto. Send thither also all the money that you can; spare nothing, and let there be 6000 men, French, Italians, and Neapolitans, in the island of Corfu alone. I wrote to you in the same letter on the Sicilian expedition. It is but a step from Reggio to Corfu; and if the English, as I am assured is the case, have not more than 4000 or 5000 men in Sicily, the expedition from Reggio to seize Faro will be made easily, and you become master of Sicily. The minister for maritime affairs must have written to you subsequently, and indeed have sent you an officer. I am waiting with impatience for your news, and I reckon upon your activity in this

important conjuncture. I count upon the success of the expedition from Reggio, but nevertheless prepare your resources at Naples; I am expecting other squadrons.

[369.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 17, 1808.

My Brother,—Like you, I am indignant at the capitulation of General Reynier.* It was for acting in the same way that I set aside Marshal Brune. I am equally dissatisfied with the clauses of the capitulation. Why were the Sicilians permitted to return to Sicily? why these communications and parleys? You ought not to allow them; but just now, when my squadrons are in motion, and the invasion of Sicily may take place from day to day, I think that you had better delay taking any steps. As to Cavaignac,† I cannot imagine it to have been anything but an oversight—it would have been too stupid.

I have informed you that my squadron sailed on the 10th of February; it is not improbable that on the 20th it may arrive at Corfu, and that on the 25th or 30th Admiral Ganteaume may appear before Reggio, land between Catania and Messina, seize Messina and even Catania, blockade the forts, and capture Faro. This operation might be facilitated by his threatening Syracuse, which would deceive the English. As soon as you know his plans you will make General Salligny support Reynier, who will thus have 12,000 men, and you should then immediately put into motion another body of between 4000 and 5000 to occupy Reggio and Scylla. The English prisoners taken at Reggio ought to give you information as to the troops in Sicily, particularly the English. You say nothing about them in your letter. Are there many at Messina? All accounts say that

* General Reynier had admitted the garrison of Reggio to capitulate, omitting in the capitulation all allusion to King Joseph. Joseph was furious; said that he had rather the castle had remained in the hands of the rebels, and proposed the immediate recall of Reynier.—TR.

† He had omitted on some occasion to use his title of Equerry to King Joseph.—TR.

the storms which have prevailed in your seas since the beginning of the month have dispersed the English expedition, and there is nothing which inclines me to think that the troops in Sicily have been reinforced. I know even that there have been complaints in London of the small number of troops in that important island.

[370.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, Feb. 26, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 17th. I do not know why you suffer General Reynier to have all these parleys with the English; nothing can be more contrary to my wishes and to my orders. Why does he take upon himself to send back prisoners?—all that is absurd.* In one of your recent letters I think that I perceived that you were losing confidence in Salicetti. I can imagine no greater misfortune for you than to alienate so valuable a man. Rœderer belongs to the men who always destroy those to whom they are attached,—whether from want of tact or of good fortune it does not signify. Salicetti is popular with the French at Naples, and you have not one friend who does not hate Rœderer. He is at Naples, as in Paris, esteemed by neither party—a man without judgment or tact, in whom I nevertheless appreciate several good qualities, but as a statesman I set no value on him.

[371.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 2, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 22nd of February.† I do not wish my ships to be scattered; two ships

* Reynier had made some exchanges of prisoners with the English army in Sicily.—TR.

† In that letter Joseph asked to be allowed to keep in the Bay of Naples two of the French ships of the line to protect his commerce, which was intercepted by a couple of English frigates.—TR.

of the line in the harbour of Naples, unsupported, would be of no use to you. I choose to have all my ships kept together. It cannot, I think, be long before you have news of Admiral Gantcaume.

[372.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 5, 1808.

My Brother,—I have desired 500,000 francs to be sent to you from Florence and the same sum from Milan. It will go by post, and will reach you, I hope, in a few days after this letter. I was delighted to hear of the capture of Scylla. I approve of your establishing a battery at the Point, but the principal battery ought to be at Scylla; the height is not an objection, it will have a wider range; mortars must be placed there. By this time Admiral Ganteaume must have arrived at Corfu; he has on board his ships *en flûte*, mortars, shot, 80 gun-carriages, 10,000 lbs. weight of powder, and 5000 quintals of flour: he was to leave all this at Corfu. I augur well of the expedition, and if, as they say, there are only 6000 English in Sicily, there will not be more than 4000 under arms; they will probably shut themselves up in Syracuse. A Spanish squadron of 6 ships left Carthagena on the 12th of February. for Toulon, where I am waiting for it. The squadron from Lorient has not been able to get under sail, and the weather is becoming so fine that I doubt whether it will be able to pass out.

I need not impress upon you the importance of the battery of Scylla; it is protected by the fort. Listen to no remonstrance. Appoint a good colonel to command Scylla; give him 600 French troops, some provisions, a commissariat officer, a chef de bataillon of artillery, and two second captains, and let him be quite independent, and leave some money with him; he might hold out for twenty days, and there is no doubt but that in fifteen you could come to his assistance. As soon as your troops have embarked for Sicily, a large proportion of the troops which I have at Rome will march towards Naples: they

are all companies of grenadiers and light infantry, and are the finest troops in the world. It is possible that in the course of a week I may start for Spain; the Grand Duke of Berg* set off a fortnight ago. I have 80,000 men at a distance of 30 leagues from Madrid; Junot holds Lisbon and Portugal with 30,000, and yet I have not brought home one man belonging to the Grand Army. I have nearly 300,000 men in Poland and on the Oder. We are beginning to raise the conscription for this year, and in the course of the next three months I shall have 80,000 men to reinforce my regiments. Think what an expense all this must be to me. Your Neapolitan regiment forms part of a division of 10,000 men under the command of General Duhesme, and has been for the last fortnight at Barcelona, where it does very well. You are aware that it will require recruits. Prepare therefore a provisional battalion of 1000 men and send it to Turin; it will keep up the numbers of your regiment.

[373.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 12, 1808.

My Brother,—Rear-Admiral Cosmao's conduct is absurd.† I cannot help deploring the imbecility of my sailors. The instructions given to him by Admiral Ganteaume were to raise the blockade of Corfu. When Admiral Ganteaume ordered him to repair to Taranto, it was on the supposition that he would be inferior to the enemy, but, being superior, common sense ought immediately to have suggested to him to go to Corfu.

I do not approve of your retaining my ships at Baia or Naples;

* Murat.—TR.

† Ganteaume's fleet, when it left Toulon, consisted of ten ships of the line, two frigates, two corvettes, and three ships en flûte. On the first night a gale of wind separated Admiral Cosmao with four ships of the line and two smaller vessels from the rest of the fleet, and he took refuge from weather and the enemy in the port of Taranto. Joseph advised him to send his storeships to Corfu, but left him to his own discretion as to his ships-of-war.—TR.

the expedition being at an end, they should re-enter my ports. Your orders to Cosmao were not sufficiently pressing; he ought to have been ordered to set sail an hour after his arrival, especially as at Corfu he was safe; he should also have been told to escort all the convoys from Brindisi and Otranto, and to raise the blockade of Corfu; and if he received no orders from the Admiral, to take a cruise and return to Toulon. It is a great misfortune that, when everything else is favourable, the stupidity of a naval officer prevents his using our good fortune. I believe that, if a galleon carrying 30 million of piastres were to sail into the midst of the squadron, they would not have the sense to take it.

I suppose that Ganteaume has been at Corfu ever since the 24th of February. I cannot understand his long delay. You would certainly have given to the fleets another chance of joining, if you had desired Cosmao to go straight to Corfu.

[374.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 16, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 7th. Rear-Admiral Cosmao's letter is inconceivable.* A mistake is always possible, but not such a one as this. Ganteaume tells him, in his instructions, that his chief object is to raise the blockade of Corfu; that he is not to approach it except in force, and, if the enemy be superior, to take refuge in Taranto. How is it that Cosmao, with a superior force, does not enter Corfu? I never knew such conduct. I told you that your first letter was worthless; your second is no better; my fine flutes will be taken. You should have held a council: there was no objection to Cosmao's entering Corfu. Your ships had nothing to fear. I do not know what has become of Ganteaume. Here is an expedition which has failed through the utmost possible stupidity. Cosmao seems not to be aware that the number of

* In his letter to Joseph, Cosmao said that his instructions prohibited his approaching Corfu.—TR.

ships at Corfu is known at Otranto. These men do not understand French. Admiral Ganteaume's instructions might have been clearer, but they were enough for any man of ordinary sense; no instructions can provide for every contingency. I hope that Ganteaume is at Corfu.

[375.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 19, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 10th of March. Admiral Ganteaume was, as I thought, at Corfu. If Rear-Admiral Cosmao had been more intelligent, he would have spared the Admiral much anxiety, and have avoided wasting eight days.

[376.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Paris, March 25, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 11th. I cannot imagine how you could have refused to receive the Cardinals, and thus have appeared to act against my wishes.* I see no objection to your sending Cardinal Ruffo of Scylla and the Archbishop of Naples to Bologna; the other Cardinal Ruffo, the former commander of the Calabrians, may be sent to Paris—the rest, whom you do not want, to Bologna. But you must first send some one to Gaeta to receive their oaths, and afterwards to provide for their removal to Upper Italy.

I am surprised that the priests in Naples venture to stir.†

* General Miollis had sent to Naples from Rome the Neapolitan Cardinals. Joseph would not receive them.—TR.

† They had proposed to receive the Archbishop of Naples, who had refused to swear fidelity to Joseph, with a triumphal procession.—TR.

[377.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, March 29, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 20th of March with the despatches of the 15th from Corfu. It seems to me that at last Corfu is reasonably well provided. There should be at least 200,000 lbs. weight of powder and 20,000 quintals of corn and flour there: it was greatly in want of money. Let me know if the Admiral has taken with him the "Ville de Paris" and some Italian brigs, and what cruiser he left in the Adriatic. You saw the news from Spain in the 'Moniteur' of to-day. I have not yet heard of the entry of my troops into Madrid; they ought to have got there on the 23rd. The Grand Duke of Berg* enters at their head. Place my troops during the summer in healthy situations, that there may be as few losses as possible among them. Fortify Scylla, for it is not impossible that the enemy may attempt to retake it. Place the division charged with the defence of the country in échelons. The General who commands in Calabria must have his plans formed beforehand, in order to assemble his men and go quickly to the assistance of Scylla. This fortress must be supplied with provisions for at least two months, must have a good Commandant, good batteries sweeping the straits, and good fortifications towards the land. It is perhaps unlucky that, just when General Reynier's experience and local knowledge might have been of use to you, you should have permitted him to return. It must be owned that Admiral Ganteaume has been horribly interfered with by the weather, which has made him lose 20 days, during which he might have done so much; but this experiment shows us at any rate what is possible. I have 10 ships at Flushing, I have some at Brest, and I have a new squadron at Rochefort and at Lorient. You ought to have let me know more precisely in what manner Faro is fortified.

* Murat.—TR.

[378.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, March 29, 1808.

My Brother,—The Neapolitan regiments of horse and foot which I have taken into my service are not full. Send me 1000 conscripts to complete them. I have furnished the chasseurs with horses: both regiments are at Barcelona. If you have at your disposal another regiment of 2000 Neapolitans, send it to me.

[379.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, March 31, 1808.

My Brother,—You have seen the news from Spain in the 'Moniteur.' I will tell you, *as a secret*, that my troops entered Madrid on the 24th; that King Charles protests against all that has been done;* he believes his life to be in danger, and he has implored my protection. Under these circumstances I shall go. I have many troops in Spain; they have been well received there. I need not tell you that I have not recognised the new king,† nor has he been acknowledged by the Grand Duke of Berg.‡ They have made each other civil speeches without meeting, as the Grand Duke could not treat him as a king until I had recognised him. I may start any day for Madrid. This information is for your use, and for you alone.

[380.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, April 1, 1808.

My Brother,—I can make out nothing from your letter of the 23rd. I suppose that Champagny's letter is anterior to the quarrel respecting M. d'Aubusson's letters of credit.§ I have

* His abdication and Ferdinand's succession.—TR.

† Ferdinand VII. ‡ Murat.—TR.

§ I have not been able to ascertain to what this alludes.—TR.

expressed my displeasure to Champagny.* All this is the work of a diplomatic committee, composed of three old noodles of immense reputation who commit nothing but follies: I have just turned them all out. Even England is so well aware that you are King of Naples and Sicily, that she has renounced the attempt to separate Sicily from your dominions. Pay attention to the draft of a proclamation which you are about to receive from Paris, for it may contain similar improprieties.

* Joseph had complained of a letter from M. de Champagny to his minister, Marquis Gallo, proposing that Joseph should call himself simply "King of Naples."—Tr.

CHAPTER X.

THE letters contained in this chapter extend from the 15th of April to the 9th of August, 1808.

During this period Napoleon was absent from Paris, preparing and afterwards superintending the seizure by, or rather through, Joseph of the crown of Spain. The succession of events was so rapid, that it may be convenient to keep in mind, while reading these letters, the following dates:—

The 14th of April, Napoleon reached Bayonne.

2nd of May, insurrection in Madrid, subdued by Murat.

5th of May, surrender of the crown of Spain by Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. to Napoleon.

22nd to 30th of May, insurrections throughout Spain.

3rd of June, Dupont reached Baylen.

6th of June, Joseph proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies by Napoleon.

7th of June, Dupont took and sacked Cordova.

Same day, arrival of Joseph at Bayonne.

15th of June, the French fleet at Cadiz surrendered to the Spaniards.

Same day, meeting of the Junta, called together by Napoleon from Spain for the purpose of forming a constitution and acknowledging Joseph.

7th of July, the constitution sworn to by the Junta and by Joseph.

9th of July, Joseph entered Spain.

Same day, commencement of the siege of Saragossa.

14th of July, defeat of the Spaniards under Blake and Cuesta by Bessières, at Medina de Rio Seco.

20th of July, Joseph entered Madrid.

22nd of July, Dupont and his army at Baylen surrendered to the Spaniards.

29th of July, Joseph quitted Madrid.

1st of August, Sir Arthur Wellesley landed in Portugal.

9th of August, Joseph reached Burgos in his retreat from Madrid.

[381.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, April 15, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter, with three from the Queen of Naples, and Charlotte,* and Zenaïde.† You no longer mention Admiral Ganteaume; he ought, however, to have sailed long ago. It is true that this is the season of north-easterly winds. I arrived at Bayonne yesterday: the Infant Don Carlos is here also. I have not yet been able to see him, as he fell ill on the day before my arrival. I am expecting the Prince of the Asturias, who has taken the name of Ferdinand VII., and I am also expecting the unfortunate Charles IV. and the Queen. The Grand Duke of Berg is at Madrid. General Dupont is at Toledo. I have divisions at Aranjuez and at the Escurial.

[382.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, April 18, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 7th of April. I am pleased with what you tell me of Corfu. I am glad to see that it is in a good state. I am also happy to hear

* Joseph's youngest daughter. † His eldest daughter.

that you are fortifying Scylla. You are sufficiently acquainted with the country to know how to place your troops during this season, in order especially to preserve the important post of Scylla. What I particularly desire is, that they should be placed in healthy situations. You are right in sending recruits to Barcelona. I have mounted your chasseurs. All these troops are acquiring experience and courage, which will be useful to your kingdom. Send me as many Neapolitan regiments as you please, provided that the strength of each of their companies amounts to 140 men. Thank Julie and Zenaïde for their letters; I will answer them, but at present I am too busy. You must have been very glad to see your children again in such good health; they are interesting to me in several respects. The Infant Don Carlos is here: this young prince, who is only twenty, fell ill on his arrival, so that I have not been able to see him. He has several grandees of Spain with him. The Prince of the Asturias, who calls himself Ferdinand VII., is at a distance of 20 leagues from the frontier, with a large suite. King Charles IV. and his Queen are on their way hither. He has protested, and has appealed to my arbitration. My troops are at Madrid, Barcelona, Figuèras, Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, and Burgos: the Spanish army is not formidable. The country is in a state of ferment. The Grand Duke of Berg and Marshal Moncey are at Madrid, General Dupont is at Toledo, and Marshal Bessières at Burgos. I have nearly 100,000 men here in provisional regiments. They improve every day by exercise and training; they are all big lads, twenty years old, and I have reason to be satisfied with them. These corps have not been increased by a single man belonging to my grand army, either in cavalry, infantry, or artillery. Send back to Italy a regiment of cavalry, and the 6th battalion of drivers, for which I have asked you several times. By this time you know Naples well enough to be able to find Neapolitans to fill their places. I cannot do without the French drivers, and my grand army must be ready to second me, if necessary, in the course of the summer. My squadron has returned to Toulon in good order. The "Whale" flûte has arrived at Minorca. I have lost nothing, and have sailed my squadron and

leave the Scheldt. I have already eight ships at Flushing; they were built at Antwerp; I shall have eight more in the course of the summer. Pay attention to my orders with respect to the blockade, and see that they are executed. Every American ship which enters your ports comes from England: start with this principle. Up to the present time all my army of Spain is at my expense, and costs me enormous sums. The conscription which I am now raising, that which perhaps I soon shall be obliged to raise, my cavalry regiments which I make up to 1200 horse—all these entail immense expense on me, but circumstances force me to cover Europe with my troops. England is beginning to suffer. Nothing but peace with that country can make me sheathe the sword and restore tranquillity to Europe.

It is not impossible that in the course of five or six days I may write to desire you to repair to Bayonne.* You will leave Marshal Jourdan in command of your army, and appoint whomsoever you like Regent of your kingdom. Your wife should remain at Naples. If this should take place, you will find relays along your road. Up to the present time, however, all is still uncertain.

[383.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, May 6, 1808.

My Brother,—You will find annexed a pamphlet, which will acquaint you with the state of affairs in Spain. The conclusion is approaching. King Charles has yielded up to me his right to the throne, and he is about to retire to Compiègne with the Queen and some of his children. A few days before this treaty was signed, the Prince of the Asturias abdicated: I restored the crown to King Charles. The Grand Duke of Berg has been appointed Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and President of all the councils. There was a great insurrection at Madrid on the 2nd of May; between 30,000 and 40,000 persons were collected in the streets and the houses, and fired from the windows. Two battalions of fusileers of my guard, and

* This was the first hint to Joseph that he might have to exchange the

400 or 500 horse, brought them to their senses. More than 2000 of the populace were killed. I had 60,000 men in Madrid who could do nothing. We have taken advantage of this occurrence to disarm the town.

[384.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, May 11, 1808.

My Brother,—You will find annexed the letter of King Charles to the Prince of the Asturias and a copy of my treaty with the King. The Grand Duke of Berg is lieutenant-general of the kingdom, president of the junta, and generalissimo of the Spanish forces. King Charles starts in two days for Compiègne. The Prince of the Asturias is going towards Paris. The other Infants are to occupy villas in the environs of Paris. King Charles, by his treaty with me, surrenders to me all his rights to the crown of Spain. The Prince had already renounced his pretended title of King, the abdication of King Charles in his favour having been involuntary. The nation, through the Supreme Council of Castile, asks me for a king; I destine this crown for you. Spain is a very different thing from Naples; it contains 11 millions of inhabitants, and has more than 150 millions of revenue, without counting the Indies and the immense revenue to be derived from them. It is besides a throne which places you at Madrid, at three days' journey from France, which borders the whole of one of its frontiers. At Madrid you are in France; Naples is the end of the world. I wish you, therefore, immediately after the receipt of this letter, to appoint whom you please Regent, and to come to Bayonne by way of Turin, Mont Cénis, and Lyons. You will receive this letter on the 19th, you will start on the 20th, and you will be here on the 1st of June. Before you go, leave instructions with Marshal Jourdan as to the disposition of your troops, and make arrangements as if you were to be absent only to the 1st of July. Be secret, however; your journey will probably excite only too much suspicion, but you will say that you are going to

[385.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, May 21, 1808.

My Brother,—The captain of the Neapolitan gunboat "Le Requin" must be arrested and brought to trial for having cowardly surrendered his boat.

[386.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, June 16, 1808.

My Brother,—I am writing to M. Laforest. On your side get some information from ——,* whom you are in the habit of seeing, concerning the person whom I am about to mention to you. He is the Chief of Criminal Justice in Madrid. If his talents and decision are such as I hear, and he can be trusted, great use may be made of him. The junta is to address you to-morrow. Prepare your answer. You must speak of the sorrow with which you are filled by the disturbances in Spain, and of your regret at being obliged to obtain by a forcible repression a result which should have been produced by reason and conviction alone. Indicate a wish to be soon in the midst of your new subjects, in order to conciliate all interests, and to begin your reign with acts of pardon and clemency. This speech should not be short, and should be carefully expressed. Hédouville speaks Spanish perfectly; you may take him for your private secretary. Till he has entered your service definitively I shall continue to give him the rank of minister-plenipotentiary. He is a safe man in all respects, on whose honesty and devotion you may build. You must think about appointing a Master of the Household, a High Chamberlain, and a Master

* When King Joseph quitted Switzerland in 1815 he left his papers buried in a wood near Prangias. They remained in the earth until 1818. Some portions became illegible: this is one.—ED.

Napoleon and Joseph were at this time both at Bayonne. Joseph arrived on the 7th of June. Napoleon had proclaimed him King of Spain and of the Indies on the 6th. The Junta, a body named by Napoleon,

of the Horse. Consult on the subject d'Azanza, d'Urquijo, and the Duke della Parca. In three or four days the chief officers of the crown as well as the ministers must be appointed. These nominations will be your best proclamation.

[387.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 7, 1808.

My Brother,—I have made Generals Salligny and Maurice Mathieu Counts of the Empire, and General Merlin a Baron. I have given the Eagle of the Legion of Honour to the Duke of Noga. I have also bestowed the title of Count of the Empire upon Stanislas Girardin. I have given Marquis Gallo a pension of 5000 ducats a-year. With regard to Marshal Jourdan, I fear that, if I gave him such a high title as Duke of Fleurus with a fortune, he would want to return to Paris.* You should send for him to Madrid, and tell him that I intend for him one of the ten duchies which I have not yet given away, and in this way gain a few months. He will serve you in Spain, and get used to it.

[388.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 10, 1808.

My Brother,—The orderly officer whom I sent yesterday to St. Sebastian has informed me of your arrival there.† By this time you must have reached Tolosa. I hope that you have written to me from thence; if not, let the page who takes this letter bring me an answer. I wish you to write to me every day during your journey. General Reille has taken possession of Figuèras with a division. He will remain there some days to collect his troops, after which he will march on the strong points in Catalonia. You ought, I think, to write every day to General Savary at Madrid, and to Marshal Bes-

sières at Burgos, that you may be made aware of all that is going on. Azanza* and Urquijo† write, of course, every day to the junta of Madrid. It is requisite that Cevallos‡ should write from Vittoria a despatch to all the Spanish ministers abroad to announce your arrival in Spain, your arrival at Vittoria, &c. &c. This despatch should be carefully written; if he does not wish to employ a courier, he may send his despatches to M. de Champagny, who will see that they go. He ought to write another circular from Burgos to indicate to your diplomatic agents the language which they are to hold respecting the late events and the constitution.§

[389.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 10, 1808, 6 P.M.

My Brother,—I received your letter to-day. You may do as you please with regard to the contribution to be levied on Santander.‖ I had ordered Marshal Bessières to enforce it as soon as my troops marched on the town. The inhabitants deserve to be well punished for their shameful treatment of the consul and the French inhabitants. All that I care about is that the French whom they have arrested, and whose property they have seized, be indemnified, which will not cost much. I beg of you to write to me more in detail. I have had news from Russia. They know and have recognised all that has taken place in Spain.

[390.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 12, 1808, 8 A.M.

My Brother,—I am sending a squadron of 200 dragoons to Vittoria. I have given the command to your aide-de-camp

* Minister of the Indies. † Secretary of State.

‡ Minister of Foreign Affairs.—TR.

§ Joseph had proposed to the Junta a constitution for Spain, which was accepted by the Junta on the 7th of July.—TR.

‖ Joseph wrote to ask whether he was at liberty to diminish or remit a contribution of 12,000,000 reals imposed on the town of Santander by the French general.—TR.

Tascher. I have two objects in this,—first to form this young man, who has never before had a command, and secondly to keep an eye upon your rear. You will authorize him to correspond directly with yourself. The squadron will reach Vittoria on the morning of the 14th or 15th, and will garrison the town. I have also ordered the 3rd battalion from the depôt of provisional regiments to repair to Vittoria; its strength amounts to 400 men; with the squadron of dragoons it will form a sufficient garrison. I wish you to leave Tascher with this detachment, that he may acquire knowledge and experience, and become available for employment. When I quit Bayonne you must keep one of your aides-de-camp in the town to correspond with you directly, and to tell you all that goes on. I suppose that by this time you have reached Vittoria. The squadron which I am sending thither will sleep to-night (the 12th) at Irun, and to-morrow at Tolosa, and reach Vittoria at latest on the morning of the 15th. The battalion from the depôt of provisional regiments, which is to sleep at Tolosa to-morrow, will also reach Vittoria on the 15th. Till this troop arrives, keep at Vittoria a battalion of the 2nd light infantry, which, as soon as the advanced party of the garrison arrives, will rejoin the troops at Burgos. Besides the 500,000 francs which I have lent to you, I have at Burgos about 300,000 francs. You will find annexed an order for them, and you will send me an order on your treasurer to repay these 300,000 francs to me out of what remains to be paid to you from your appanage as a French prince for the year 1808. As it was included in the budget, you ought to receive this allowance till the 1st of January next.

[391.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 12, 1808, 4 P.M.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 11th. I suppose that to-day you are at Vittoria. There are no longer any troops at Burgos, except some depôts and a garrison in the castle. I do not think, therefore, that it would be prudent in you to arrive in that town before the 12th light infantry that

is to say, before the 15th. You will hear important news there, and you will make up your mind. Marshal Bessières was to commence operations this morning, the 12th. It is probable that by the 14th an engagement will have taken place. When once he has beaten Cuesta, either at Benevento or at Leon, I think the moment will be opportune for communicating with the troops of the line. O'Ffarill assures us that they ask for nothing better than to submit, and that they are aware that they are playing a bad game. If you succeed in bringing back the troops of the line from Galicia, the most difficult part will be done. The plans are such that Marshal Bessières may have just beaten the rebels when you arrive. In that case send them conciliatory messages by some of the Spaniards who are with you, taking care not to employ as messengers any ministers or members of the government, lest they should be detained. If you decide upon posting from Burgos to Madrid, you may get there in 30 hours, by way of Aranda. I have just inquired when the 3 million francs which you have here were to be sent; your agent answered that they could not go before Thursday. I have desired one million to be sent this evening; it will arrive at Vittoria under Tascher's escort.

[392.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 13, 1808, 6 P.M.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 15th, from Salinas. One million of the 4 millions of francs which you have here was sent last night under the charge of Tascher; the other 3 will be sent to-morrow with an escort of infantry. On the 16th, therefore, you will have at Vittoria 4 million francs, between 300 and 400 horse, and 1000 foot. They are wanted at Vittoria. Marshal Bessières is, at this time, with all his forces assembled, at Medina de Rio Seco. It is probable that by the 15th he will have engaged Cuesta.* In the course of the

* Bessières engaged and defeated Cuesta and Blake, commanding the Spanish armies of Castile and Galicia, at Medina de Rio Seco, on the 14th. —TR.

16th, therefore, you will know what to do. You will find the 16th regiment at Burgos, with 6 pieces of cannon, 4 select battalions, and 1 squadron of cavalry, besides 1000 men who occupy the citadel. Send an aide-de-camp to the camp of Marshal Bessières to bring you the news. Keep Merlin with you. You will have to act according to circumstances. You will either march with your reserve to the camp of Marshal Bessières to reinforce his army, and preside in person over the first victory, thus announcing by a striking event your arrival in Spain, and causing peaceable overtures and conciliatory measures to succeed the battle; or you will send your reserve of infantry to Marshal Bessières, and yourself travel by post to Madrid through Aranda. The position of the French armies in Spain was excellent. In war a bad disposition changes everything. It still is good, but, against my opinion, Savary has foolishly scattered the divisions of Frère and Gobert. I had intended Gobert's division and a regiment of cuirassiers to reinforce Marshal Bessières' corps. His force being thus increased by 6000 men, the enemy would have had no chance against him. You will find annexed the notes which I have just dictated to General Bertrand for General Savary, describing what the position of the army should be in every possible conjuncture. Keep this copy.* When you hear that Marshal Bessières has beaten Cuesta, your situation will be better than ever. In the position of the army there are only two principal points. The most important is that of Marshal Bessières,† and I am annoyed, therefore, at General Savary's not having seen that he was wrong in hesitating to reinforce Marshal Bessières. The other important point is that of General Dupont:‡ he has more troops than he wants there. Saragossa and Valencia are posts of little consequence. Saragossa is useful for the purpose of completing the pacification of the country, but not for offensive purposes. Valencia, if the error of sending General Frère thither had not been committed, is of a lower order. In three days 3 fine regiments of the line will arrive,

* Found in Joseph's carriage after the battle of Vittoria, and published by Napier.—ED.

† Between Valladolid and Palencia.—TR.

which are intended by me to hold Biscay, and to reinforce your army. Marshal Bessières has ordered General Gaulois, who had 2 battalions at Santander, to join him. As this General did not start till the 12th, he will not reach Marshal Bessières' corps for some time. Ask the Marshal to give you the itinerary of this brigade, in order that you may know where to find it, if circumstances should become urgent.

Do not be uneasy; you will want for nothing. General Rey, my aide-de-camp, sends 10,000 men to-morrow to Figuèras in Catalonia. Be happy, and, above all, be well. Get to Madrid.

[393.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 14, 1808.

My Brother,—In one of your letters you talk of a continental war. I thought that I had told you that my relations with Russia were good. With regard to Austria, the noise that she is making is only the result of a panic; it is all unimportant.* A report which you will find annexed will tell you how the places in your rear, Vittoria, Burgos, &c., are guarded, and will give you a general view of the position of my army in Spain.

[394.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 14, 1808, 11 p.m.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 13th from Vittoria. You will get this letter at Burgos, where, as I learn from a despatch of Marshal Bessières, independently of General Rey's brigade, you will have found General Gaulois' brigade and a battalion from Paris. These troops are to start on the 17th to join General Rey's brigade. This will enable him to support Marshal Bessières.

Do not be uneasy about Biscay; there will be quite enough

* Nine months after, he was at war with Austria.—TR.

infantry, cavalry, and artillery to keep it in check. Santander has been evacuated because Marshal Bessières has thought fit to assemble his forces. If you could send thither a Spanish colonel or some one to command in your name, it would be a great advantage. It is possible that they may ask you for troops; you will tell them that some are being sent to them. Marshal Bessières was to be in presence of the enemy to-day. Therefore, on the 16th, the day on which you will receive this letter, you will get reports from the aides-de-camp whom you have sent, which will give you information as to the forces of Cuesta, and as to what Marshal Bessières has done. That you should proceed to Madrid immediately after the capture of Benevento, and the success of Marshal Bessières, must be right. If you take with you to Palencia the brigades of Generals Rey and Gaulois, the battalion from Paris, and your mounted guard, you will have a division of nearly 5000 men and 10 pieces of artillery, which will be a good reserve to support Marshal Bessières.

Tascher, with the 12th marching squadron, ought to arrive this evening at Vittoria. As soon as the 13th marching squadron, which is to sleep to-night at Irun, reaches Vittoria, the squadron commanded by Tascher is to leave for Burgos. I conclude that you write every day to Marshal Bessières and General Savary. This is necessary, in order that they may report to you. You will thus be really in command of the army. Be happy and cheerful; take care of your health. The action of Marshal Bessières will draw up the curtain from before the affairs of Spain. Troops are arriving from every side.

[395.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 15, 1808, 9 P.M.

My Brother,—I received your letter of the 14th at 8 o'clock. It was delivered to me by the page whom I sent to you. Since then a courier ought to have reached you, bearing notes on the position of the army. You tell me in your letter that you have heard nothing from Madrid for 48 hours. Up to

this time my communications with Madrid are uninterrupted. The courier who arrived yesterday started from Madrid on the 11th, at midnight, and I am expecting to-night the one who started on the 12th. I have this moment received news from Saragossa of the 13th. All is well there. They had committed some follies and some military mistakes, which had done harm, but all that is now remedied. A bridge has been thrown over the Ebro at a distance of 1000 toises from the city, and a tête-de-pont established on it. The rebels, feeling the importance of this position, attacked it; they were repulsed and cut off, many of them were killed and taken prisoners, and their 8-pounders captured. Among the killed are several officers of the line. I send you General Verdier's report. On the other side the trenches are advanced in two directions. They are providing the artillery with ammunition. A convent, which is at a distance of about 120 yards from the walls, and which the enemy were anxious to preserve, has been taken. The state of the troops before Saragossa is as follows: 12,000 infantry, 1300 cavalry, and a great many field-pieces, drawn by 600 artillery horses.

I have sent to Pampeluna a garrison of 2000 men, in order to have a column of 12,000 or 15,000, which may be sent to hold Navarre.

Desire the authorities of Burgos, and of all the towns in Aragon and Navarre, to have all letters opened, and to stop the printed papers and bad news which the insurgents circulate. It is a great means for securing tranquillity in your rear.

[396.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 16, 1808, noon.

My Brother,—I send you some letters which were seized by General ——* in his expedition of the ——.* Palafox had escaped when the bombardment took place. The courier from Madrid of the ——* has just arrived.

There is no doubt that Marshal Moncey has succeeded against the insurgents of Valencia; that he has not thought proper to

attack the town, which he probably found barricaded; and that he is parleying or encamped before it. I send you a letter from Laforest.* M. d'Urquijo must not begin by committing follies. The Secretary of State should transmit everything to the different ministers, and they alone ought to act; otherwise there would be only one minister in Spain, the Secretary of State, and the other ministers would become ciphers. The Secretary of State was wrong in sending the Constitution to the Assembly; he ought to have sent it to the Minister of Justice. Laforest's proposal with respect to the Court of Appeal seems to me good. I still think that you could not have a better Minister of Police than the man whom I pointed out to you;† he has decision, talent, and dexterity.

[397.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 17, 1808.

My Brother,—I have just received your letter announcing the victory of Medina de Rio Seco. It is a glorious victory. Send Marshal Bessières the Golden Fleece as a proof of your satisfaction. This is the most important event in the Spanish war; it gives a colour to the whole business. It is now necessary to support General Dupont. Gobert's and the intermediate divisions may all join him. It is of great consequence that General Dupont should beat the army of Andalusia. When I have clearer accounts of the result of Marshal Bessières' achievements, and of the events at Valencia, I will send you a scheme of action. Rey's and Gaulois' brigades should rejoin Marshal Bessières, who will then have more than 21,000 men in his divisions in the field. He will have enough to conquer the Asturias and Gallicia. The 14th and the 44th of the line are to arrive here this evening; the 43rd and the 51st will be here in five days; many more battalions of reserve are coming; your rear will consequently be kept quite safe. General Dupont is now the principal object.

* This letter does not appear.—TR.

† M. Caballero.—ED.

[398.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 18, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 17th from Aranda. The Prince of Neufchatel has communicated to me General Savary's letter. Savary is an excellent man in a subordinate situation, but he has not experience or powers of combination enough to wield such a vast machine. He does not understand this war of marches. I am anxious for Jourdan to join you. Nothing can make up for the want of the habit of commanding in chief, which gives that of calculation and of combination. You will receive to-morrow some memoranda on the state of affairs. The Queen * left Stupini on the 15th; as this is the 18th, I suppose her to be at Lyons. I start to-morrow for Pau. General Drouet d'Erlon, who is in command of the 11th military division, remains at Bayonne. At Barcelona General Duhesme has had the convents searched; cartridges were found in them: he therefore, as was proper, seized everything. I tell you what he did as an example, and that you may take care to search the convents. You must not let Savary suspect my opinion of his incapacity. After all, he is a useful man, as he possesses energy, zeal, and despatch. Pray tell me from time to time how the Duke del' Infantado, and generally the people round you, behave. The renunciation of the princes of the house of Spain has been inserted in the official journal of St. Petersburg, which I received to-day. Have no fears concerning war, and do not be uneasy about the success of my armies in Spain. Here, in two words, is the substance of the memorandum which you will receive to-morrow. Leave Moncey at San Clemente or in the environs, that he may threaten Valencia. Keep 12,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in Madrid, including the line of communication to La Mancha. Increase General Dupont's corps to 22,000 men, infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Put 3000 men in the mountain passes and communications of La Mancha, whom he may call in as a

reserve on a day of action. Furnish him with reinforcements to this amount as soon as possible, that he may immediately attack and beat the enemy. On the other side you will find a return of your army.

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN.

Bayonne, July 13, 1808.

Corps of the Eastern Pyrenees :—

General Duhesme, commander, operating independently in Catalonia, 20,000 men. This includes General Reille's division, stationed at Figuèras.

Corps of Aragon :—

General Verdier, commander, 16,000 men. This includes the garrison of Pampeluna, and 3000 men of the 14th and 44th of the line, which leave Bayonne to-morrow to join General Verdier.

Corps of the Western Pyrenees :—

Marshal Bessières, commander. First division in the field in the kingdom of Leon, 17,000 men. A column at Burgos, 2000 ; at Aranda, 1000 ; at Vittoria, 2000—total 22,000. Reinforcements now on march towards Burgos and Vittoria will raise this corps to the above-mentioned strength.

Corps of Madrid :—

Under Marshal Moncey, 18,000 men. This includes the troops which keep up the communication as far as La Mancha, and General Rey's brigade.

Corps of General Dupont :—

25,000 men. This includes the troops which keep up the communication from La Mancha.

Some changes are to be made in these two last corps.

Grand Total—101,000 men.

The staff has not obtained returns showing exactly the troops that are on their march to join these corps, but there is no doubt that in fact there are now in Spain 116,000 men present under arms.

[399.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 18, 1808.

My Brother,—I am not pleased with General Reynier's letter. It seems as if he made concessions.* I have ordered Marshal Jourdan to set off by post. He will reach Madrid about the middle of August. I have desired him to give up the command of the army of Naples to the senior general of division. He will unite the two offices of commandant of my army under the title of chief of your staff; and of captain of your guard, if you are willing to confide these duties to him.

[400.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 18, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 17th. I suppose that you started to-day for Madrid. I should have preferred your passing through Palencia and Valladolid. As soon as I receive further reports from Marshal Bessières, and I have conversed with Marshal Moncey's aide-de-camp, I will write to you in detail on the state of affairs. 3000 men are to set off to-morrow to join the corps before Saragossa. It is essential to have a trustworthy general at Burgos, to collect the troops which are about to repair thither, and to correspond with you. Some particulars of your reception at Burgos would have interested me. I am inclined to think from several accounts that Marshal Bessières beat only two-thirds of the army of Gallicia, and that the other third took no part in the affair of Rio Seco. What I have seen up to the present time of Marshal Moncey's opera-

tions makes me think that he has done all that he could; that he has beaten the rebels in every encounter; that he has inflicted great injury upon them; and that, in fact, he deserves nothing but praise. If his health were not so bad, he would be a good governor of Madrid. After the great victory of Medina de Rio Seco, General Dupont may think seriously of destroying or dispersing the troops of General Castanos. I presume that you correspond with Marshal Bessières by Valladolid.

[401.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

July 18, 1808.

Sire,—It appears to me that no one has told your Majesty the whole truth. I will not conceal it. Our undertaking is a very great one: to get out of it with honour requires vast means. I do not see double from fear. When I left Naples, I saw the risks before me, and I now say to myself every day, "My life is nothing, I give it to you." But if I am to live without the shame of failure, I must be supplied largely with men and money. *Then* the kindness of my nature may make me popular. Now, while all is doubtful, kindness looks like timidity, and I try to conceal mine. To get quickly through this task, so hateful to a sovereign, to prevent further insurrections, to have less blood to shed and fewer tears to dry, enormous force must be employed. Whatever be the result in Spain, its king must lament, for, if he conquers, it will be by force; but, as the die is cast, the struggle should be cut short. My position does not frighten me, but it is one in which a king never was before. I have not a single partisan.*

* I have translated this letter, written by Joseph only nine days after he entered Spain, to show how early the difficulty of the undertaking showed itself. Napoleon's answer exhibits his usual determination not to believe what he did not like.—TR.

[402.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 19, 1808, 10 P.M.

My Brother,—I received your letter of the 18th at 3 o'clock this morning. I am sorry to see that your courage seems to fail you; it is the only misfortune which I feared. Troops are pouring in continually from all quarters. You have a great many partisans in Spain, you have all the honest people, but they fear to come forward. I do not, however, deny that you have a task, but it is a great and a glorious task. Marshal Bessières' victory, entirely defeating Cuesta and the army of the line in Gallicia, has greatly improved the whole state of affairs; it is worth more than a reinforcement of 30,000 men. As General Dupont has been joined by the divisions of Gobert and Védel, the attack must be vigorously pressed in that direction. General Dupont has good troops; he will succeed. I would rather that the 2nd and 12th light infantry had reinforced Marshal Bessières; but, since you have thought proper to take them to Madrid, keep them for your guard; they will soon be joined by 2000 conscripts from the battalions on drill; and these two fine regiments, with those of your guard, will form you a splendid reserve. You ought not to be surprised at having to conquer your kingdom. Philip V. and Henry IV. were forced to conquer theirs. Be happy; do not allow yourself to be so easily affected, and do not doubt for an instant that everything will end sooner and more happily than you think.

All goes well at Saragossa.

[403.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, July 21, 1808.

My Brother,—You will find annexed some memoranda of the state of affairs, which I hope that you will read with attention.* I have traced out in them the position of Marshal Bes-

sières' corps, that of the corps of Aragon, which is commanded by General Verdier, with the simple title of General of Division, and of the corps in Catalonia under the command of General Duhesme, also with only the title of General of Division. You will see that these 3 corps compose a force of 60,000 men present under arms. You know better than I do the positions of the troops on the other side of Madrid, which are composed of the 3 divisions of General Dupont, the 3 divisions of Marshal Moncey, and the reserve of the guard. The fall of Saragossa will alone restore to you the services of 12,000 available men out of the 18,000 in Aragon. It is necessary that our communications with Marshal Bessières should be open. I have heard nothing of him since the 16th. An active and intelligent general should always be kept at Burgos.

I start to-night for Pau, where I shall hear of your arrival at Madrid. I have postponed my journey for two days, in the hopes of receiving news of what has been done at Benevento and at Leon.* General Drouet, who is in command of the 11th military division, is to remain at Bayonne.

Take care of your health. Be happy and fear nothing, and never doubt complete success. Send back Tournon to me when you no longer want him.

[404.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Pau, July 28, 1808, 4 A.M.

My Brother,*—It is you who command; I have already told you so; I will say so in my general orders. Savary acknowledges it in his reports to the Chief of the Staff, when he says that he shall not move without your orders; you might, therefore, have spared yourself a page of twaddle. As it is, write to me constantly and in detail (which you do not), and desire your staff to send their returns, and to write every day to the chief of my staff.

* Joseph had complained that General Savary acted independently of him, and asked whether he or Savary held the command of the French

The military movements of Savary make me shrug my shoulders; he makes nothing but false moves. Gobert should remain with Dupont, as he is there already; Moncey at San Clemente, or in the environs; and Dupont should be reinforced. I could have wished Ney's brigade to join Marshal Bessières on the 20th; but since it is at Madrid, keep it for two months. The men are tired and want rest; they have just made forced marches; if you continue to urge them, they will fall sick. I am anxious to have further news of Bessières, I have heard none since the 15th. Be well, and believe [redacted] my friendship.

[405.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tarbes, July 23, 1808.

My Brother,—I have arrived at Tarbes. I wrote to you this morning from Pau. I return the letters which your courier brought to me; I have kept one from Marshal Jourdan, containing nothing but military reports. I have just received intelligence from Russia, dated the 2nd of July. You are on the best terms with them. They have obtained some advantages over the Swedes. Marshal Bessières has removed from Burgos the general whose duty it was to observe Aranda and Vittoria. It is necessary, however, to keep some one at Burgos; you are aware of its importance. Marshal Bessières has such a fine army that he can very well spare a brigade to hold Burgos.

[406.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Auch, July 24, 1808.

My Brother,—I arrived to-day at Auch; to-morrow I shall be at Toulouse. I send you your courier from Naples. I have opened all the police and army reports, but have found nothing interesting. The Queen is at Lyons; if you do not think proper that she should go to Madrid, perhaps you would do well if you allowed her to come to Paris. In the present state of things nothing must be done that may appear odd. I have not heard

of your entry into Madrid; your last letter was dated the 19th, from Buitrago, at 11 o'clock at night. Nor have I any news of Marshal Bessières. I believe that I have told you to keep an eye on Burgos, and to place there a general on whom you can rely. The specie has been despatched from Paris for the second instalment of the loan. I suppose that the Minister of Finance will have executed the royal acknowledgment of that debt, and will have taken steps to deposit the securities in conformity with the demand for them addressed by the bank to M. Baguenault.

[407.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Toulouse, July 25, 1808.

My Brother,—Faudras brought me at 11 at night your letter of the 20th of July, informing me of your entry into Madrid. Marshal Bessières writes from Benevento, dated the 20th, that he is about to march upon Leon. I have just received from Santander the intelligence that 1500 men from the Asturias, who had arrived in that town, went away on hearing of Cuesta's defeat. The orderly officer, Destourmel, coming from Marshal Bessières, says that he fell in with one of Cuesta's columns near Benevento. It appears that Cuesta, with a remnant of 3000 or 4000 men was directing his course towards Estremadura. The Chief of the Staff has ordered 3000 or 4000 men to be at Burgos in the beginning of August, to maintain security in your rear. As the greater number of these men are conscripts, they must be drilled, and you must be satisfied if they keep safe the communication between Madrid and Marshal Bessières. You should send a general to Burgos to keep watch over Vittoria and Aranda, and to correspond with Madrid, and with Marshal Bessières, who will have reached Leon by the 23rd. You have probably received letters from General Verdier, before Saragossa. The Chief of the Staff has sent you word of Colonel Pépin's attack upon Villa Feliche, near Daroca, by which 4000 rebels were dispersed. I hear from Saragossa that the town will soon surrender. Marshal

Bessières' officer says that Zamora, Valladolid, and Palencia, are tired of being pillaged by both parties; and that the priests, and even the monks, are longing for peace. Colonel Pépin, who is before Saragossa, assures me that all the small towns and villages through which he has passed do the same. I approve highly of the measures which you have taken for reinforcing General Dupont.

[408.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Toulouse, July 28, 1808.

My Brother,—General Mathieu Dumas will deliver this letter to you. He is going to join the army of Spain. We must endeavour to employ him according to his wishes. The great thing is, that he should be of use to you. Your equerry, Filangieri,* was sent to you this morning. I shall be at Bordeaux on the 31st. I received this morning news from Russia of the 9th, and letters from the Emperor. What has happened in Spain they considered as an old story, and all was settled. Austria is seized with a senseless panic.

Marshal Bessières was due on the 23rd at Leon. An English newspaper says that my squadron has been cannonaded for three days by the rebels in Cadiz, that it has been forced to strike, and that it is in the harbour of Cadiz. This is an English report. All seems to prosper about Lisbon. I hope that General Dupont made no further delay after he heard of Marshal Bessières' victory. Bessières seems to have found a great quantity of muskets, cartridges, and powder, at Benevento.

I have appointed Marshal Pérignon Governor of Naples and Commandant of my army. The Grand-Duke† is still very ill. I am well pleased with the spirit of that country. Dessolles asked me when I was at Auch for employment in Spain; he is going thither. The Queen‡ has written to me from Lyons; I suppose that in your next letter you will mention her. I think

* The late Viceroy of Sicily.—ED.

† Murat.

‡ Joseph's wife.—TR.

that she had better spend the remainder of the summer in Paris; it is too hot for her in Spain at this season. However, I wait your decision.

[409.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Agen, July 30, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 23rd. The Chief of the Staff has received letters written on the morning of the same day from Marshal Bessières, which announce that there exists no longer a hostile army in Castile; that Cuesta, with 500 horse, was directing his course towards Toro; and that his place of retreat, as the Marshal was almost sure, is Badajoz, in Estremadura; that the city and province of Leon and Zamora have submitted. Bessières intended to rest on the 25th and 26th at Léon, and then to march upon Gallicia. General Dessolles has received his appointment to the army of Spain; he proceeds to Burgos. The Chief of the Staff will inform you of the orders which he receives. General Dessolles, when he reaches Burgos, will have from 5000 to 6000 men. 500 horse of the 26th regiment, and 500 Polish light-horse belonging to my guard, are marching on Burgos. It is inconceivable that, after reaching San Clemente, Marshal Moncey should have retired upon Ocaña.* The conduct of this officer is extraordinary. His movement has been unfavourable to all parties, but especially to General Dupont, since the provinces of Murcia and of Valencia cease to be menaced. It appears that General Dupont has already 20,000 men; if he has committed no mistake, with such a force he has nothing to fear from the enemy. I have received intelligence from Saragossa of nearly the same date with that from Marshal Bessières, and equally satisfactory. General Mathieu Dumas must have joined you. It is very hot here. I am well pleased with the spirit of

* Subsequent events showed that Moncey's retreat to Madrid was prudent. Had he remained in Aragon he might have shared the fate of Dupont.

these provinces. I shall be at Rochefort on the 3rd, and probably on the 7th or 8th at Nantes.

[410.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

Madrid, July 22, 1808.

Sire,—If your Majesty would write to General Caulaincourt that you are informed that in cold blood he arranged the pillage of the churches and houses in Cuenza, it might do much good. I know that the public sale in Madrid of the church plate has done much harm. Every sensible person in the Government and in the army says that a defeat would have been less injurious.

[411.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

Madrid, July 23, 1808.

Sire,—Marshal Moncey has arrived. He found everything hostile on his march. He complains bitterly that the pillage by General Caulaincourt has increased the general exasperation. Since Cuenza was plundered many of the wealthier families fly with their property.

[412.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

Madrid, July 24, 1808.

Sire,—The honest people are as little on my side as the rogues are. No, Sire, you are deceived. Your glory will be shipwrecked in Spain. My tomb will be a monument of your want of power to support me, for no one will suspect you of want of will. This will happen, for I am resolved under no circumstances to recross the Ebro.

Yet 50,000 good troops, and 50 millions, sent before the end of three months, might set things right. The recall of five or six of your generals; sending hither Jourdan and Maurice Mathieu, who are honest men; on your part, absolute confi-

dence in me; on my part, absolute power over the officers who misconduct themselves,—the union of all this alone can save the country and the army.*

[413.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bourdeaux, July 31, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letters of the 24th, 25th, and 26th. The style of your letter of the 24th does not please me. To die is not your business, but to live and to conquer, which you are doing, and shall do.

I shall find in Spain the Pillars of Hercules, but not the limits of my power.

Troops and succours of every description are on their way towards you. Your forces are more by one-third than are necessary, if they are well managed. Excepting the preposterous retreat of Moncey from San Clemente upon Ocaña, and his deplorable council of war, I am well content with my troops.

Savary is a man of intelligence and of courage, who has erred in his general arrangements because he has not been used to command-in-chief, but who, nevertheless, is stronger than any of those whom you have about you. Caulaincourt did what was perfectly right at Cuenza. The city was pillaged: this is one of the rights of war, since it was captured while the defenders were still in arms. Russia has recognised you; the letter announcing it has been despatched to Count Strogonoff. On reaching Paris I shall learn that Austria has done the same. Your position may be painful as king, but, as a general, it is brilliant. There is only one thing to fear: take care not to impair the spirit of the army—not to sacrifice it to the Spaniards. No measures are to be kept with ruffians who assassinate our wounded, and commit every kind of horror; the way in which

* These letters are inserted to explain the answer to them. At the date of the last, Joseph had been less than a fortnight in Spain, and only four days in Madrid. Neither he nor Napoleon knew of the surrender of

they are treated is quite right. I have told you already, and I repeat it, since the glorious victory of Medina de Rio Seco, which so promptly settled the question of Spain, Marshal Bessières is absolute master of the North. I am glad to see that you have not sent Morlot's division to Marshal Bessières, as was suggested. You must support Dupont. Make yourself easy as to the result. I am not surprised at what has happened; if I had not expected it, should I have sent 150,000 men into Spain, and raised two conscriptions, and spent 80 millions? I would rather have lost a battle than have had to read Moncey's report. My health is good. I reached Bourdeaux this morning. I am going to Rochefort.

[414.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bourdeaux, Aug. 1, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 27th.* The report of the officer of cuirassiers is enough to make me forebode evil from General Dupont's mistakes. To be attacked on the 13th, and not have provided for his retreat on the 18th! —this is inconceivable. Whatever reverses fortune may have in store for you, do not be uneasy; in a short time you will have more than 100,000 men. All is in motion, but it must have time. You will reign; you will have conquered your subjects, in order to become their father. The best kings have passed through this school. My orders were given more than three weeks ago. Health to you, and happiness; that is to say, strength of mind.

* Neither Joseph when he wrote this letter, nor Napoleon when he received it, knew of the surrender of Dupont. But Joseph had stated, on the authority of an officer of cuirassiers, that General Gobert had been killed, that there had been fighting for some days, and that his communication with Dupont was cut off.—TR.

[415.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

St. Augustin, Aug. 1, 1808.*

Sire,—I reached this place at noon yesterday with the whole of the army. The rear-guard will sleep at Alcovendas, which it will leave at 2 to-morrow morning. The soldiers are generally worn out, the officers are not strong, the men are young and raw. I think that your Majesty had better incorporate the privates in your old regiments and send back the officers to their depôts. In fact, with the exception of the old regiments of the guard, they are evidently a collection of youths who are not yet soldiers. Every officer going from Spain will tell the same story to your Majesty.

I am waiting for news of the enemy, and of Marshal Bessierès, before I decide to raise the siege of Saragossa, which I defer to the last extremity. The matériel of the artillery is in the worst state possible; the whole must be renewed if we are to move forward. And your Majesty must adopt a vigorous and consistent system. Veterans must be opposed to the swarms of new soldiers which will start up from all sides, who will be supported by enthusiasm, and will fight in their own country. The conscripts of the last levy are too young: they are tired out before they arrive, and the climate finishes them.†

[416.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bourdeaux, Aug. 3, 1808.

You cannot think, my friend, what pain it gives me to think that you are struggling with events which are as much above what you are accustomed to as they are beneath your

* Joseph left Madrid on the 29th of July, having on the 28th received the news of Dupont's capitulation. He had inhabited his capital for only eight days. He retired to Miranda, on the left bank of the Ebro, between Burgos and Vittoria.—TR.

† I have inserted the preceding letter of Joseph's to show what was the state, after fifteen years of constant war, of an army of Napoleon's.—TR.

natural character. Dupont has dishonoured our flag. What incapacity, what cowardice! Those troops will be taken by the English. Events of such importance make it necessary for me to return to Paris. Germany, Poland, Italy, &c., all depend on one another. I am really grieved when I feel that I cannot be with you and my soldiers at this juncture. I have ordered Ney to proceed thither. He is an excellent man, full of zeal and courage. If you become intimate with him, he may make a good commander-in-chief of the army. You will have 100,000 men, and in the autumn Spain will be conquered.

If Savary were to make an armistice, we might obtain some influence over the insurgents: we might hear what they have to say. I think that, as far as your own inclinations are concerned, you care little to reign over the Spaniards. My health is better than ever. I have told Maret to send you a cipher for secret correspondence. Berthier sends you some memoranda on the state of the army in Spain.*

Tell me that you are well and in good spirits, and are becoming accustomed to the soldier's trade. You have a fine opportunity to study it. I have written to tell the Queen to go to Paris.

[417.] BERTHIER TO SAVARY.

Bourdeaux, Aug. 3, 1808.

What has happened to Dupont is without an example, and his capitulation is worthy of the conduct that led to it. The Emperor thinks that, if the troops in échelons in the line of communication between you and Dupont have been allowed to march to give themselves up to the English, the vagueness of the terms of the capitulation has not been remarked. I say "to the English," for it cannot be hoped that they will be honest enough to let our troops cross the sea. From your silence we hope that you have withdrawn these troops to Madrid. On reading carefully General Dupont's report, it appears that he did not capitulate until the day after the battle, and that the corps of Generals Védel and Dufour, which are comprised, we know

not why, in the capitulation, were not engaged. Dupont's own story shows that Castanos was not nearly so strong as he is reported to have been, and that he had collected his whole force at Baylen. The Emperor does not estimate his troops of the line at more than 15,000, or his armed peasants at more than the same number.

From Belliard's letter it seems that orders have been given to raise the siege of Saragossa.

This is premature.

You must see that, unless there be an army to cover Pampeluna and keep down Navarre, the enemy might mask Pampeluna, raise Navarre, cut off the communication with France by Tolosa, and be on the rear of our army. Supposing the enemy to be collected before Pampeluna, and the town blockaded, he might in five or six marches be in the rear of Burgos. The army which besieges Saragossa is therefore necessary to keep down Navarre, and to prevent the insurgents of Arragon and Valencia from penetrating on our left. For if, as General Belliard tells us, General Verdier marches his troops to Logrono, throwing 2000 men into Pampeluna, he would be worse placed at Logrono than at Tudela, if the communication with Bayonne were intercepted.

If Castanos advances, and you fight him, the best may be hoped; but the manner in which he moved towards Dupont leads us to expect from him great caution.

Perhaps, by means of flags of truce, a suspension of arms might be agreed on, without the King's apparent interference, terminable on eight days' notice by either party, giving to the French the line of the Douro, and then, passing by Almazan, the Ebro. The insurgents might think such an armistice desirable, as it would enable them to organise themselves in Madrid, and it might not be unfavourable to us, as it would enable us to see what that organisation would be, and to ascertain what the nation really wishes.*

* This proposal of an armistice, giving up to the insurgents all Spain to the south of the Douro and the Ebro, that is to say, four-fifths of the

[418.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Rochefort, Aug. 6, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 30th of July. The Grand Army is on its way to you. This reinforcement, joined to Marshal Bessières' forces, will enable you to show your teeth. I will write to you more at length when I know that you have received your cipher. I shall be glad to hear that you have shown decision and ability.

I shall be in Paris in a few days.

[419.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Niort, Aug. 9, 1808.

My Brother,—Your letter of the 3rd of August has reached me. I send to you a letter which I have just received from Marshal Jourdan. I am extremely pleased with the spirit of the department of La Vendée, through which I have just passed. I can only repeat to you once for all, that nearly the whole of the Grand Army is on its way, and that before the autumn Spain will be inundated with troops. You must try to preserve the line of the Douro, to keep up the communication with Portugal. The English are of little importance; they have never more than a quarter of the troops that they profess to have. Lord Wellesley has not 4000 men, and, besides, I believe that they are directed towards Portugal.*

strangely with the general tone of Napoleon's correspondence. It seems to show that he did not really feel the confidence of success which he expresses in his letters to Joseph.—TR.

* Sir Arthur Wellesley landed in Portugal on the 1st of August.—TR.

CHAPTER XI.

THE letters in this chapter extend from the 16th of August to the 12th of October, 1808; that is to say, from the arrival of Napoleon at St. Cloud until his return to Bayonne.

His principal business during these two months was the removal of the Grand Army from Germany to Spain. For this purpose it was necessary to be sure of Russia. Busy as he was, he gave up a month to a meeting with Alexander at Erfurth, and purchased his acquiescence by completing the sacrifice of Sweden and Turkey to Russia.

[420.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 16, 1808.

My Brother,—I have seen Messrs. Azanza and Urquijo. I have not learnt much from them: they wait in this place to see what turn the Spanish affairs will take. I have desired them to write to you in detail.

[421.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 16, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 10th. All that goes on in Spain is deplorable. The army seems to be

How was it possible to think of evacuating Spain for no reason, without even knowing what the enemy was about? For it appears from the reports of the 8th, that it was not known at Burgos on the 10th whether General Castanos had effected his entry into Madrid. In all that has been done there are not the first rudiments of the knowledge of war. I hope that Marshal Bessières has advised you not to evacuate in this way the whole country, without coming within sight of the enemy. They tell me that Saragossa would certainly have been taken if it had not been that General Belliard gave orders to raise the siege, and that then, after a lapse of 48 hours, during which they laboured at the evacuation of the works, and at using up the ammunition, the order arrived to go on with the siege. On the 10th the enemy did not seem to have more than 5000 or 6000 men round Saragossa, which is very different from 40,000. In your position one sees enemies everywhere, and sees them immensely strong. Your army, organised as it is, is capable of beating all the insurgents; but it wants a head. The country which suits your army is a flat country; and you have entangled yourself in a mountainous one, without reason or necessity. In so precipitate a retreat, how many things must have been lost or forgotten! The army retiring in this manner cannot but have been exceedingly demoralized. I hope that you will not evacuate Burgos; from whatever side the enemy may advance, you will have a fine opportunity of beating him. With the corps of Marshal Bessières you have enough to beat the insurgents; and when you hear of the movements of the army of General Castanos, you will reflect on your own with astonishment. The troops before Saragossa are no doubt in danger. I cannot conceive by what fatality, having no longer any hope of taking the town, they remained in such a false position. If they go on so, I fear that sooner or later they will meet with some great misfortune.

[422.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 23, 1808.

My Brother,—Enclosed are some letters which I send you for your guidance.

P.S.—There is too much prudence among the people around you. Attack the enemy; do not let him attack you.

[423.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 27, 1808.

My Brother,—The northern courts have acknowledged you. 10,000 men of the grand army have reached Mayence. By the month of January you will have 100,000, and there will not be in all Spain one village in insurrection. Send the Duke of Frias as your ambassador to Paris; I will receive him with the utmost ceremony. Send letters of credence to Pardo at St. Petersburg; the Emperor of Russia desires it much. Send a grandee of Spain to Paris, on his way as ambassador to Vienna; he will wait to receive my orders before he starts. Appoint a minister in Denmark. Do not be in the least uneasy. I have received your letter of the 9th from Burgos, and a duplicate.*

* In that letter Joseph expressed his conviction that the Spaniards would never be reconciled to his rule, or forgive the injuries which had been inflicted on them by France; that it was necessary to conquer Spain, and then to partition it, uniting Gallicia to Portugal and the provinces on the north of the Ebro to France; that he could not submit to reign over the remaining remnant: and therefore implored to be allowed to abandon Spain and to return to Naples. This was the only answer given to it by Napoleon.—TR.

[424.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Aug. 31, 1808, 4 A.M.

My Brother,—I wish you to order the chief of the staff, Marshal Jourdan, to send to me every five days a return of the army of Spain, and to write to me every day three or four pages describing all that goes on. Since Jourdan has replaced Belliard I know nothing of the army. I have not had one return since July. Attend to this order, and see that it be executed.

[425.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 1, 1808.

My Brother,—I sent you word that a Spanish minister ought to be sent to Paris. M. de Frias is very fit for this mission. I will not have M. de Mazaredo. I want a man of high birth, and favourable to the existing system. Send M. de Frias as soon as possible.

[426.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 1, 1808.

My Brother,—I send you a memorandum on the return of your army of Spain, which proves that at your headquarters nothing is known upon the subject. You will also find annexed a statement of the corps which are in Spain at the present moment, without counting those in Catalonia. Order a return of the places where the different detachments are to be found, and collect them together. Frère's division is composed of 3 battalions of the 2nd legion of reserve; the 4th battalion is with the corps of Marshal Bessières, forming part of the supplementary regiments. It should be united to the first battalions. The 5th battalion is at Bayonne; you should recall it. In this manner Frère's division will have

5 battalions, forming 4000 men, all belonging to the same legion, which is always an advantage, both for keeping the accounts and for the general good of the corps. As a general rule, endeavour to unite every corps, and to call in every detachment. There is great need of your attention to re-organise the army. I advise you to take care that they send you returns every five days, that you may see what progress is made.

[427.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 7, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 1st of September. It is unfortunate that Marshal Moncey permitted the escape of the army of Montijo, as it was a collection of bad troops, on whom he should have executed speedy justice. I suppose that you have given orders to fortify Tudela, and to establish redoubts upon the heights which command the line of operations towards Pampeluna. To neglect this would be to undervalue the importance in every respect of Pampeluna.

The evacuation of Tudela was a misfortune, since it fatigued the army unnecessarily. You know how deeply I am grieved at what goes on in Spain; but an interview which I am to have with the Emperor of Russia, and which is fixed for the 26th, obliges me to start for Saxony in eight or ten days. The chief of the staff sends you the organisation of the army of Spain, which I have divided into 6 large corps. If at the commencement of the campaign the enemy stands before you, you should strike the first blow; for it is to be feared that on the arrival of the Grand Army he may retire to Santander, and, scouring the country,* —— You must begin —— *

* Illegible.—ED.

[428.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 8, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 3rd of September. I do not approve of your sending Prince Mazerano to Vienna. It is a strange policy to send into Austria, as ambassador, a man who will endeavour to do mischief both to you and to me. You should take one of the Negretes, or the son of your minister for foreign affairs, or some man in a similar position, whose fortunes are intimately connected with your own; or else you should send no one at all. You should order the five or six persons arrested at Bilbao by General Merlin to be shot, especially the man who was designated as commander-in-chief by the proclamation of the Junta. If you do not perform some acts of rigour, these disturbances will never end. This appears to me to be very important. It is very strange that Navarre is so spared. Bilbao, Biscay, and Navarre ought to feed the army: if they do not, what am I to do?

[429.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 9, 1808.

My Brother,—I think that it is necessary for you to reduce ——,* by means of an expedition of 6000 men. This force, forming a column which should start from Bilbao, will be sufficient. This point is of importance, as entailing the submission of Montana, an object which it is indispensable to attain before the larger operations of the army. I suppose that Marshal Moncey remains at Tudela; with the troops that are already under his command, he has double the force necessary to keep that position. I presume that he will not let the enemy establish himself within three marches. You have doubtless

* Illegible. Supposed to be Santander or Valmaseda.—ED.

also occupied Burgos in force. You should leave at Bilbao the new troops which are there; they are sufficient. Above all you should accomplish the disarming of the whole of Biscay and Navarre. I strongly advise you to make a severe example of the insurgents of Bilbao, especially of the commander of the armed force, who has been arrested, and to send several hostages into France. I review to-morrow the division of Sebastiani, which will start on Monday for Perpignan. It is composed of 12 field-pieces and of 4 regiments. The roads of France are covered with troops, coming either from Italy or from Germany. You should make the inhabitants grind for you, and not always draw your flour from France. The provinces which you occupy can and must furnish you with provisions. The Spaniards recall to me the Arabs; at Burgos and elsewhere they appear well-disposed towards you, because they see that you have many troops, and that you are able to crush them; but on your first retrograde movement they will fire upon you. You should take hostages, and force them to disarm. Do not listen to your ministers, they do not seem to have two ideas. This fatal system of indulgence has lost us Spain. You might have disarmed all the infantry, dismounted the cavalry, and made prisoners of the whole Spanish army. Madrid furnished the enemy's army with 2000 horses; when Madrid was abandoned they might have been seized to remount the French regiments. Of course the colonial merchandise coming from England ought to be confiscated at Santander. This town ought to pay at least 2,000,000 fr. If you think that you owe the allegiance of these provinces to their affection, you deceive yourself; if they do not revolt, it is not from want of inclination, it is because they dare not: of this you may be quite sure. You have received the decree for the general organisation of the army of Spain. For the present you must conform to it as far as may be possible.

DECREE, DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 1808.

1*st Corps*,—Marshal Victor, Commander.

3 divisions of infantry, Generals Villate, Ruffin, and Lapisse; 1 of cavalry, General Beaumont. [Estimated by editor at 22,000 men.]

2*nd Corps*,—Marshal Soult.

3 divisions of infantry, Generals Meulon, Merle, and Bonnet; 1 of cavalry, General Lasalle.—26,000 men.

3*rd Corps*,— Marshal Moncey.

3 divisions of infantry, Generals Musnier, Merle, and Bonnet; 1 cavalry.—20,000 men.

4*th Corps*,—Marshal Lefebvre.

1 French division, General Sebastiani; 1 troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, General Leval; 1 Poles, General Valence; 1 brigade Dutch infantry; 1 brigade Westphalian infantry; 3 regiments of cavalry.—25,500 men.

5*th Corps*, in Catalonia,—General Saint Cyr, Commander.

5 divisions of infantry, Generals Chabran, Souham, Lecchi, Pinot, and Chabot; 1 of cavalry. [Force not stated, estimated by editor at 32,000 men, including Duhesme's division at Barcelona.]

6*th Corps*,—Marshal Ney.

3 divisions of infantry, Generals Marchand, Lagrange, and Mermet; 1 division of troops from the Vistula; and 1 of cavalry.—27,200 men.

Reserve,—Marshal Bessières.

1 division of infantry, General Dessolles; 6 battalions of fusileers, and 6 of grenadiers and chasseurs of the Imperial guard; the cavalry of the guard; and 4 divisions of dragoons.—34,000 men.

Total—186,700 men.

[430.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 14, 1808.

My Brother,—I sent you word that Generals Maurice and Salligny were to replace Lefebvre and Frère. I send to you a plan for the organisation of the army of Spain, such as it should be. I wish you to be acquainted with the whole of it in order that you may conform to it as much as possible.

THE PLAN REFERRED TO BY THE PREVIOUS LETTER.

First observation:— St. Cloud, Sept. 15, 1808.*

The position of the army of Spain for purposes of offence is essentially bad.

The position of the Ebro and the important débouché of Burgos are tenable only while Tudela is occupied.

If Tudela is not occupied by us, the enemy, seeing our mistake, will occupy it, if he has the means. By moving to Estella he would be eight marches in our rear in a country of mountains and defiles.

This paper should not be communicated to the generals on the wings of the army.

Orders should be sent to them, not reasonings. The King may study it, and discuss it with some of the officers about him.

* This paper, though called by Napoleon a projet d'organisation, is in fact a criticism on the existing position of the army and a scheme for its future operations in different contingencies. The organisation of the army was provided for by the decree of the 7th of September.—TR.

Tudela then must be occupied. It is not probable that the enemy, who seems to have no plans and no great force, has attempted to return to it. It must be occupied offensively with from 16,000 to 18,000 men; three-fourths posted on the right bank of the Ebro, the other fourth on the left.

Sixty thousand Spaniards, even regular troops, could not force such an army, so encamped and hutted; and the commander at Tudela, if he thought it unadvisable to fight, might in two hours be on the left bank of the river, and retreat from position to position till he reached our entrenched camp at Pampeluna. Instead of acting thus, this force of from 16,000 to 18,000 men has been placed with its right at Logroño: a bad system, good for customhouse officers, not for soldiers.

Second observation:—

This corps on the left, concentered at Tudela, has nothing to do with the rest of the army. Its duty is independent; its principal business is to keep down Navarre, which has been explained above. It will have its own line of operations, resting on Pampeluna, where will be its heavy baggage, means of transport, and whatever would embarrass its motions.

Third observation:—

The troops encamped at Tudela, from 16,000 to 18,000 strong, always provisioned for one month, must not be idle. They should send out parties one or two marches distant, to the right and to the left, and thus cover Logroño.

Under such circumstances what will the [Spanish] army of Aragon do? Will it leave Saragossa to move on Logrono? Then the troops at Tudela will attack its rear.

Will it move by Los Arcos on Pampeluna? Then one of two things may be done.

The army at Tudela might march to Saragossa and take the town, or it might send by the left bank a detachment to Los Arcos.

Fourth observation.

If we do not occupy Tudela, this is what the enemy will do. He will march thither himself, if he is in force, and then all Aragon will rise: and the French army, if threatened at the same time on its right, will lose valuable time in manœuvring, and may be beaten by inferior numbers. For instance, 20,000 insurgents moving on Tudela, and spreading false rumours, might lead the French army to send 15,000 or 16,000 men to reinforce its left. This would take 5 or 6 days. Then, if the enemy appeared with all his force before Burgos, there would not be time to recall that detachment, and the army might be forced to retreat over the mountains after only a third of it had been engaged.

Fifth observation.

With from 15,000 to 18,000 men at Tudela, an enemy's army, even of 40,000 troops of the line, would excite no alarm at Burgos. There would be time to see and to count it. You might cross the river, take up positions on the left of the Ebro, and give time for the rest of the army to move on Tudela, where our real strength would be.

The proof of this is, that the slightest rumour disturbs the head-quarters, ill-placed as they are.

In war, spies and information count for nothing. To trust to them is to risk men's lives on trifling grounds. Thus, though the enemy spread the report that his whole army marches from Saragossa on Tudela, our troops will not abandon it until they have actually seen him, taken some 30 or 40 prisoners, and obtained from them precise and reliable details. If we do not give the enemy credit for combined operations, this is what he may do, perhaps has done. Feeling secure as to Saragossa by the evacuation of Tudela, he may move on Sos, and disturb the communications between Pampeluna and France, and the army and Pampeluna. They would write to head-quarters that we must retire to the camp of Pampeluna, and the enemy would become the master of his operations. If this enemy is a mere rabble,

the fate of the French soldier, so frequently ill-commanded, is to be deplored. By such a retreat of our left, our centre would be turned and forced also to retreat, and possibly 60,000 brave men might be manœuvred in a manner which would discourage and disorder the whole army.

Sixth observation.

We have already* shown that the system of lines of troops (cordons) is among the worst: that even a line like that of the Rhine or the Vistula can be held only by occupying bridges and having the power of resuming the offensive. Though in a plain, Tudela has the advantages of a commanding elevation, for like that it is an offensive position. The enemy has to fear and to take precautions on every side.

The result of these six observations is, that the whole left should be concentered at Tudela; the 16,000 men collected there should form, should excite, should animate one another, and constantly threaten the enemy.

Instead of 5000 only 2000 men should be left at Pampeluna. We ought to act on the offensive, as becomes a French army, and not, as we are doing, mildly on the defensive.

We have remarked on the left of the army; the right is not better posted. Why occupy Burgos with only cavalry? Why not with all the corps of Marshal Bessières, from 16,000 to 18,000 strong? By sending out reconnaissances to the distance of 35 or 40 miles, our defensive would be honourable, and we should know all that the enemy was doing. All the Spanish army would then be insufficient. Even if they had 40,000 regular troops, our advanced detachments would see them, and manœuvre in consequence, or fall back on other corps. But this is repeating what has been said in previous notes.

Marshal Ney's corps of the centre and the corps round the King, each 20,000, might be placed in a second line between Logroño and Burgos. The left column should be 3 days of forced marches from Tudela; the right, one day from Burgos.

The army, thus placed offensively on the right and on the left, would not be disturbed by false rumours spread by the enemy. It should receive clear distinct orders. When before were 20,000 French alarmed at the approach of double their number? They are frightened though no one is before them. There is not an ensign who does not see that the army is in a false position. This is always the case with an ill-conceived and ill-managed defensive. We shall see the change in the feelings of the people and of the army when what has been suggested in this note, and in the previous ones, has been executed.

Second Part.

The army being organised and placed as it is, what is to be done? After its disposition has been rectified detachments may be sent to Soria, the town taken, some houses burnt, some hostages taken, the inhabitants disarmed, the property of the nobles, who have left it, burnt. This operation is also important as covering the centre of the army.

Some pages have been cut out containing instructions given before the calamity of Dupont was known.

1. Not to evacuate.
2. To take Saragossa.
3. To be in a position to communicate with Portugal.

But, unhappy as it is that when all these three things were feasible not one was done, yet all that is now matter of history, and irremediable.

What more? Send two columns, one from Bilbao, the other from Reynosa, to Santander; take possession of the town, burn the standard used when Ferdinand was proclaimed, drive away the bishop, carry off hostages.

So much for the centre and the right. As to the left, parties should be sent as far as Reynosa, and hostages taken.

All these smaller operations will prepare for those which will take place when the reinforcements arrive, and will afford an army of 60,000 men the room, the activity, and the confidence which it ought to have. They will enable real information to be received, and stop the rumours spread about our camps, which discourage the soldiers and excite the insolence of the inhabitants. In Biscay and in Navarre all suspected persons must be arrested. Why was not the house of Valdez seized at Burgos?

The insurgents act vigorously: the French army carries its indulgence up to weakness.

[431.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Sept. 17, 1808.

My Brother,—I shall not answer your last letter,* in which you appear to me to be out of humour. I have observed this rule with you for a long time past. You have too much sense not to be aware that this is the only course open to me when you write in such terms. Nor shall I ever discuss the past with you unless you ask me to do so for your particular benefit, and to serve you as a rule for the future. As long as you are convinced that everything has been done by you in the best possible way, I ought to leave you in this belief, and not teaze you, since the past can never be remedied. I have granted all the rewards which General Merlin asked me for on account of the affair of Bilbao, the more willingly as his demands seemed to me to be reasonable.

[432.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Sept. 20, 1808.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 13th. You may keep Negrete as long as you like; he need not hasten his departure for Vienna.†

[433.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Metz, Sept. 23, 1808.

My Brother,—I am still on my way to Erfurt, where the conferences are to take place on the 27th. All the roads in France are filled with troops; the Grand Army is marching in three divisions, and the rear is already beyond Paris.

[434.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

Miranda, Sept. 14, 1808.

Sire,—I have received your Majesty's letter of the 7th. I am approaching Marshal Moncey. I have ordered him to hold Tudela. I shall bring together in that neighbourhood a great part of the army. It seems that it is in that direction that the enemy collects his means and will make his attempt.

I am sure that, if I were to quit the line of the Ebro, leaving garrisons only in Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Pancorbo, and Burgos, and collecting all my forces, amounting now to 50,000 men, well organised, rested, and in a good state, I could disperse the enemy and reach Madrid, where the government which they are trying to create would disperse of itself. I should move, always in one body, in every direction in which I could find subsistence and an enemy. I should carry everything with me, and not draw near to Burgos until the Grand Army was there. Till then, I should be in Spain as you were in Egypt, as a seventy-four is at sea. I should avoid difficult countries, and be always secure and master in the plains. The defiles, the mountains of Biscay, and the communications with France would be interrupted until the first troops of the Grand Army, collected at Bayonne, entered Spain in bodies of 20,000 or 25,000 men. Such a scheme may seem bold, but I am sure that it would succeed better than the tentative defence to which I am condemned along a line of more than 150 miles.

It is possible that such a move may disperse the elements that are going to unite at Madrid, and that the surprise of these incomplete formations may facilitate the submission of the whole country on the arrival of the great force which your Majesty is directing on it. This, Sire, is my view.

If your Majesty will consider it, and give me your orders, I will execute them, confident of full success. I shall leave behind me Saragossa and partial insurrections; I shall beat the large bodies, and I shall spread terror among the theorists of Madrid. They will flee [illegible]

that 50,000 French are marching on them. But until the Grand Army reaches me, *you* will know nothing of *us*, *we* shall know nothing of *you*.

If you agree with me, Sire, give me your approbation, and I answer for the execution. I have thought much on my position, and this seems to me the best course. I am sure that, when I have talked to Marshals Jourdan, Ney, and Bessières, I shall find that they think with me.

[435.] JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON.

Miranda, Sept. 16, 1808.

Sire,—I have communicated my plan to Marshal Jourdan and Marshal Ney: they both agree with me. I have no doubt of the assent of the other Marshals. I may have your Majesty's answer by the 1st of October, indeed before, as I sent my plan on the 14th.

If your Majesty approves my scheme, you may not hear of me until the Grand Army reaches me; but I am sure that it will find affairs here in a much better state than if any of the other five plans are adopted.

[436.] NAPOLEON'S OBSERVATIONS ON JOSEPH'S PLAN of the 14th September.

Châlons-sur-Marne, Sept. 16, 1808.

First observation.

The proposal is, to march with 50,000 men on Madrid, keeping them together, and abandoning all communication with France.

The art of war is an art founded on principles which must not be violated. To change one's line of operation is an operation which only a man of genius ought to attempt. To lose one's line of operations is an operation so dangerous that to be guilty of it is a crime. To preserve it is necessary in order to avoid [illegible]

the magazine of supplies, and the place to which one's prisoners, wounded, and sick are to be sent.

If, when the French were in Madrid, they had extended their forces on the town, and used the Retiro as the deposit of prisoners, of hospitals, and of the means of keeping down a large town and using its resources, they might have lost their line of communication with France, but would have preserved their line of operation,* especially if they had seized their opportunity to collect a large amount of supplies, and had established, a day or two's march from the principal débouchés, posts like the citadel of Segovia, for the purposes of support and observation.

But at this instant to rush into the interior of Spain, without any organised centre or magazines, with hostile armies on one's flanks and in one's rear, would be an attempt without precedent in the history of the world.

If, before Madrid was taken, and depôts of subsistence for eight or ten days and of ammunition were provided, this army were beaten, what would become of it? Where would it rally? Where would it send its wounded, whence would it draw its supplies? for it is provided only for its current wants. Nothing more need be said. Those who dare to recommend such a step would be the first to lose their heads as soon as the results began to show its absurdity.

The garrison of an invested fortress has lost its line of communication, but not its line of operation, for its line of operation is from the glacis to the centre, where are the hospitals, the magazines, and the stores. Is it beaten on a sortie? it rallies on the glacis, and has three or four days to restore the spirit of its men. If troops such as those of the Guard, and Generals such as Alexander or Cæsar, could be guilty of such follies, no one could answer for the event—still less with an army in such circumstances as ours. This scheme, opposed as it is to all the rules of war, must be given up. A general who attempted such an operation would commit a crime.

2nd observation.

What, then, is to be done?

What has been already advised. To concentrate the left at Tudela, not by way of a cordon, but posted on each side of the Ebro, ready to pass it if necessary, and keeping its communication with Pampeluna; to concentrate the right about Burgos, intercepting the road between Reynosa and Madrid, the reserve in the second line, ready to move in either direction.

Under these circumstances, the reserve, Marshal Ney's corps, and that of Marshal Bessières might be united and thrown upon the enemy approaching by the Madrid road or by the Palencia road. These 36,000 or 40,000 men may easily make three or four marches in any direction. It is possible, without doubt, that the enemy would not stand the approach of so great a force; if he retreated five or six marches, advantage might be taken of it to seize Reynosa and Santander, very important operations. What encourages the enemy to hold Reynosa is that you occupy Burgos only with cavalry, and show symptoms of abandoning it. In war, all is opinion; opinion as to the enemy, opinion as to oneself. After the loss of a battle, the physical difference in the loss of the conqueror and of the conquered is little; the moral difference is enormous, as we see from the effect which two or three squadrons may produce on a beaten army. Nothing has been done to give confidence to the French; there is not a soldier who does not see that everything breathes timidity, thence he forms his opinion as to the force of the enemy. He has no means of knowing what is opposed to him except what he hears, and the attitude which he is desired to assume.

Third observation.

There is no doubt that with the number of troops which form the army of Spain you may march to Madrid, and you ought to do so, but only after having destroyed all the enemy's corps by combined movements on Palencia and Saragossa, if the enemy commits the fault of approaching you in force. But, to do this, one must have one's army in hand, understand one's art, and act

again; attack the enemy if he comes within two marches. If you obtain a decisive victory over his united force, or several victories over his separate corps, these victories will point out what is to be done. But all these battles must be fought according to the rules of war; that is to say, with the line of operations secure.

[437.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Kaiserslautern.

My Brother,—You will have received some remarks upon the paper annexed to your letter of the 16th. In war, you must have sound and precise ideas. What you propose is not feasible. You must adopt it as a general principle that the enemy is not to be suffered to establish himself within three, or even four, days' march from Burgos. Palencia is only two days' march. The enemy would probably not have gone thither if Burgos had been occupied by a force capable of taking the offensive; and when once the enemy is beaten and driven beyond Palencia, Santander will fall or be carried in a short time, which will be important. As to your left, the corps at Tudela ought always to have its retreat open upon Pampeluna; and if 12,000 or 15,000 men were pushed on to Pampeluna, they would be safe in the town or in the intrenched camp. All this must depend upon what the enemy does. In war, in the face of the enemy, one must act; one has always the night in which to make preparations. Of course the enemy is not left to take up a position without being reconnoitred; but it is wrong to calculate theoretically what you will do, since this must always be dependent on what has been done and will be done by him.

According to the laws of war, every general who loses his line of communication deserves death. By the line of communication * I mean that which reaches from the army to

* Napoleon, writing hastily, confounds the line of *communication* with the line of *operation*, which he had carefully distinguished in the preceding paper. In all this letter the word operation ought to be substituted for communication, in order to adhere to the nomenclature of the preceding

the places where are hospitals, the succours for the sick, the provisions and the ammunitions of war; where the army can be restored and reorganised, and can recover in a day or two of rest its spirit, impaired sometimes by some unforeseen accident. The line of communication is not lost because it it disturbed by guerrillas, by insurgent peasants, and in general by that which is called a war of partisans. A few detached men will always force their way, whatever course one takes; such enemies may stop couriers, but are not capable of making a stand against a van or a rear guard. If this be all, it amounts to nothing. The line of communication is organised on the principle that . . . . . .* had been fortified . . . . .,* and more troops might have been assembled there if necessary in a few days. There is great difference between operations with a well-considered system from an organised centre, and proceeding at hazard without such a centre, and risking the loss of one's communications.

[438.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Erfurt, Sept. 27, 1808.

My Brother,—I arrived this morning at 9 o'clock at Erfurt. The Emperor of Russia reached Weimar yesterday. Our interview is to take place here in an hour's time. The King of Saxony came yesterday, as well as many other princes.

[439.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Erfurt, Oct. 1, 1808.

My Brother,—I have been here for the last four days with the Emperor of Russia, the King of Saxony, and many sovereigns and princes. Affairs are taking a good turn for us.

* The words omitted are illegible in the original.—ED.

[440.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Erfurt, Oct. 11, 1808.

My Brother,—I send you a translation of two letters intercepted in the hands of a courier from Palafox.

I am still with the Emperor of Russia. All goes on as well as possible.

[441.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Erfurt, Oct. 13, 1808.

My Brother,—I have arranged all with the Emperor of Russia.* I am to start to-morrow for Paris, and in a month's time I shall be at Bayonne. Send me an exact statement of the position of the army, in order that I may trace a definitive plan of operations, making as few removals as possible. At present the enemy's presumption is so great that I am inclined to think that he will remain where he is. The nearer he is to us the better. A well-arranged manœuvre might terminate the war by a single blow; and for this my presence is necessary.

I shall set off as soon as I have put the *corps législatif* in motion.

[442.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Oct. 18, 1808.

My Brother,—Berthier left me to-day for Bayonne. I shall be there in a few days. It is requisite that I should have all the plans and details of the course of the Ebro from Tudela to Frias, and of the roads between Vittoria and Logroño. Is the

* This arrangement was, to give Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia to Russia as the price of her not interfering with the seizure of Spain by Napoleon.—TR.

fortress of Burgos preserved, or was it destroyed? What bridges are occupied on the Ebro? There must be some intelligent cavalry officers who have travelled over the country between the Ebro and Soria, Tudela and Logroño. Send one or two of the best of them to Bayonne to give me information respecting the roads and the country. If, among the Spaniards who are attached to you, there are any who are well acquainted with the provinces of Soria and Montana, and the country about Santander, I should be very glad if, on any pretext, you could send them to Bayonne. I intend to stay there, however, only a very few days, and then to put myself immediately at the head of the army.

[443.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

St. Cloud, Oct. 19, 1808.

My Brother,—I arrived in Paris last night, having left Erfurt on the 14th. Everything was arranged as I could wish it to be; and after spending 18 days there, the Emperor and I separated on the best possible terms. Marshal Jourdan does not write to the Prince de Neufchâtel,* so that I have no details on the state of the armies. All that I can find out is that you have evacuated the whole of the right bank of the Ebro. From that moment your position became bad. The enemy, as he no longer fears your taking up the aggressive from Burgos, may safely direct his movements on Bilbao, and establish the theatre of war in the mountains, just as, fearing no longer that you should descend by the right bank upon Saragossa, he is equally able to attack your extreme left.

If you had occupied Burgos and Tudela in force, and prepared for taking the offensive, not one of these things could have happened.

Is the enemy at Burgos? Have you left any troops in the citadel, or have you destroyed it? I know nothing of what you have done, except that it is bad. I cannot understand why

* Berthier.

the staff does not communicate every occurrence in detail, nor why they omit to send to me the generals' reports, in order that I may understand the state of the question. I ought to know the exact number of the killed and wounded in every skirmish, in fact the most minute particulars. It is inexplicable, it is treating me shamefully. The staff ought to write three pages every day.

CHAPTER XII.

THE letters in this chapter extend from the 3rd of November, 1808, to the 19th of January, 1809, that is to say, from the arrival of Napoleon at Bayonne to begin the second Spanish campaign, until his departure from Valladolid to prepare for the campaign which was terminated by the battle of Wagram.

When he entered Spain, the French armies had either capitulated to the English at Cintra or to the Spaniards at Baylen, or had retired beyond the Ebro. When he left it, less than three months afterwards, the English had been driven out of Spain, the resistance of the Spaniards was confined to the defence of a few towns and a guerrilla war in the southern and western provinces, and Joseph was again in Madrid. Napoleon forced him to call himself King of Spain and commander-in-chief of the French armies, but in reality neither was his royalty recognised by the Spaniards, except within the country occupied by the French army, nor his command by the French.

On his arrival at Bayonne, Napoleon, the most provident, the most accurate, and the most powerful of administrators, and the best obeyed of generals, found that his orders, both as to the preparations for the campaign and as to the management of the war, had been ill followed. The army was without clothing, and, instead of being kept together near Vittoria, the left had been sent as far as Lerida to the east, and the right, under Marshal Lefebvre (the Duke of Dantzic) and Marshal Victor,

had marched to the west to attack the Spaniards under Blake, had defeated him, entered Bilbao, and pushed on towards Valmaseda. General Villate's division, part of Victor's corps, was at Valmaseda when Lefebvre, in want of supplies, fell back on Bilbao, and Victor, hearing of Napoleon's arrival, and anxious to return to head-quarters, where he would be under the Emperor's eye, marched back towards Vittoria, leaving Villate exposed to an attack by superior forces.

"Thus," says Thiers, "began the series of faults, the result of the selfishness and the jealousy of our generals, which lost the cause of France in Spain, and, by losing it in Spain, lost it also in Europe." *

[444.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, Nov. 3, 1808.

My Brother,—I have this instant reached Bayonne; all your troops are scattered. Let us hear from you at least once or twice a day, that I may know the positions of all the different corps. Having ridden post over a part of the Landes, I am rather tired.

[445.] NAPOLEON TO THE MINISTER DÉJEAN, DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF WAR.

Bayonne, Nov. 4, 1808.

You will find annexed a report of the Commissary. You will see how shamefully I am treated; I have only 1400 coats, 7000 great-coats instead of 50,000, 15,000 pairs of shoes instead of 129,000. I am in want of everything; nothing can be worse than the clothing. My army will begin the campaign

* Thiers, vol. ix. p. 403.

naked; it has nothing. The conscripts are not clothed. Your reports are waste paper. Merely sending convoys is not enough; they should be despatched regularly under an officer or a clerk, and they would arrive.

You will find enclosed letters from the Prefect of the Gironde and a report from Inspector Dufreme. You will see that all is robbery and peculation. My army is naked, just as it enters on a campaign. I have spent a great deal, which has been money thrown into the sea.

[446.] NAPOLEON TO DÉJEAN.

Tolosa, Nov. 5, 1808.

What I want are great-coats and shoes. I should want nothing if my orders had been executed; not one has been executed, because the Commissary cannot be relied on, and because he has been dealing with rogues. You must send to Bayonne a commissary above suspicion. I will have no contracts; you know that contracts produce nothing but robbery.

I have annulled the contract for clothing at Bourdeaux. Send thither a director to make clothing on my account, who will receive from the Prefect assistance, a workplace, and work-people. Act on this principle, that every contractor is a thief; that, when you pay, contracts are unnecessary; and that the best plan is always to make for yourself.

How is this working establishment to be managed? Like those in our regiments: an honest commissary must be put at its head, and three or four master-tailors under him; and three field-officers among those at Bourdeaux must receive the clothing and see that it is good. Give the commissary funds, and no contract will be necessary. You will see by my decree that a commissioner is to be added to the commissary, a man who will stake his reputation on the success of the undertaking, and two good storekeepers and two master-tailors. These five persons are enough, and I shall have clothing as good as that of my guard.

There can be no difficulty in getting through the work: 10,000 suits of clothes a-day might be made; all that would be necessary would be to send for workpeople from every part of France. If you had acted thus all would now be going on well. Better late than never. I will have no contracts. This must be the system when the clothing is made out of the regiment.*

[447.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tolosa, Nov. 4, 1808.

My Brother,—I reached Tolosa at 6 this afternoon. I start to-morrow at 5, and shall be at Vittoria some time in the night. I wish to be lodged outside the town. I suppose that you have sent me escorts, and above all relays of saddle-horses, to half way between Mondragone and Villafranca. I shall of course ride the whole distance; nevertheless, relays of four carriage-horses each may be useful. I do not wish to ride the same horse more than 10 or 12 miles. I wish to enter Vittoria incognito, indeed unsuspected. This is the reason why I shall arrive at night; it will not be known till the next day, and then, at 9 in the morning, they may fire a salute of 60 guns. I have just dictated to the Prince of Neufchâtel† all the military instructions for Marshal Moncey and for Marshal Ney. They will be sent off in a couple of hours. To save time I send to you a courier at once.

[448.] BERTHIER TO JOSEPH.

Bayonne, Nov. 4, 1808.

I have laid before the Emperor your Majesty's letter of the 2nd of November.

The Emperor, Sire, commands me to write to the Duke of

* Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, tome ix. p. 370.

† Berthier.—TR.

Dantzic to express displeasure at his having engaged in so serious an affair without orders, and so unskilfully.

The Emperor hopes that, in pursuance of the instructions contained in my letter of yesterday,* you have ordered Marshal Bessières to march on Burgos. Your Majesty must think, as we do, that the enemy may order thanksgivings for the inconsiderateness of the Duke of Dantzic. The Emperor wishes, Sire, that the Duke be allowed to continue to manœuvre on the right. His fixed determination is to employ against Santander only the corps of Marshal Bessières and the Duke; to keep in reserve the corps of Marshal Victor, for the purpose of seconding either of those marshals, or of making a sudden move towards the left in another direction.

[449.] BERTHIER TO MARSHAL LEFEBVRE.

Bayonne, Nov. 5, 1808.

The Emperor, M. le Maréchal, has seen with pain that, without orders, you engaged the army of General Blake, which, if it had been allowed to remain 48 hours longer where it was, might have been taken or attacked with success.

[450.] BERTHIER TO MARSHAL VICTOR.

Vittoria, Nov. 6, 1808.

His Majesty, M. le Maréchal, has been much displeased at your having left General Villate unsupported when he was engaged with the enemy, a fault the graver as you know that Marshal Lefebvre had already committed that of leaving one of your divisions† exposed when he fell back on Bilbao. You knew, M. le Maréchal, that this division was exposed at Valmaseda, as General Labruyère had communicated with it on the morning of the 5th. How came it, then, that, instead of moving

* This letter does not appear.—TR.

† This same division under General Villate. It formed part of Victor's corps.—TR.

in person at the head of your troops to support one of your divisions, you left this important operation to a general of brigade, in whom you had no confidence, and who had not one-third of your force? How came it that, after you knew, in the course of the 5th, that Villate's division was engaged, instead of running to his aid, you chose gratuitously to assume that he was victorious? His Majesty asks since when firing and an attack have been proofs that the enemy is in retreat?

And yet, M. le Duc, Marshal Jourdan's orders were precise—not to move on Miranda until the retreat of the enemy was ascertained. You moved while it was ascertained that the enemy was fighting. You know that the first of military rules is, in any doubt, to assist those who are attacked, for on that assistance may depend their safety. Under no circumstances could your march to aid Villate have been objectionable, as the hypothetical nature of your order to march on Miranda implied that no plan of the general in command depended on its execution.

What happened was this: the [Spanish] column with which General Labruyère was engaged reached General Villate, who, attacked in front and rear, was saved only by his intrepidity. He killed great numbers of the enemy without much loss to himself, and on the evening of the 5th retired to a position about five miles before Bilbao. The wish of the Emperor is, that you move immediately towards Orduna; that you march at the head of your troops; that you keep your troops together; that you manœuvre so as to keep yourself in communication with the left of Marshal Lefebvre, who must be at Bilbao. As we know nothing here of what the enemy did on the 6th, or is likely to do on the 7th, you will act according to circumstances.

[451.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Cabo, Nov. 10, 1808, 8 P.M.

My Brother,—I shall start at one to-morrow morning for Burgos, where I shall make my arrangements for the day; to

conquer is nothing,—one must know how to profit by success. I think that you were to be at Briviesca to-morrow. I am as anxious that you should be treated with ceremony as I am careless about it myself: it does not suit the character of a soldier, and I hate it. I think that deputations from Burgos ought to meet and receive you on your arrival. I will give the orders for disarming the people and burning the standard which was used on the proclamation of Ferdinand. Make it evident that this is no laughing matter. I hear that the army of Estremadura has been destroyed; it was a cowardly rabble of braggadocios that could not stand the charge of one brigade of General Mouton's. If you have any intelligence of what has happened near Orduna, or of Marshal Lefebvre or of Victor, write word to me.

I am waiting for news from that quarter before I act. General Digeon, who is at the head of 1000 horse, is at Miranda, in order to protect the passage of the Spaniards who accompany you, and that of the military chest and artillery which I am sending towards Burgos. Your affectionate brother.

"His Majesty the Emperor is in bed, and commands me to send off this despatch unsigned."—MENNEVAL.*

[452.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Burgos, Nov. 19, 1808.

My Brother,—I have ordered the paymaster to transmit to your minister of finance 500,000 francs out of the 6 millions which will be obtained from the sale of wool.† This must not prevent your minister of finance from raising money on the

* This letter was printed by M. Thiers, tome ix. p. 444, with some slight variations.—ED.

† Napoleon found at Burgos large stores of wool belonging to the Dukes of Medina-Celi, Ossuna, l'Infantado, and other great Spanish proprietors, which he confiscated and ordered to be sent for sale to Bayonne. Joseph, however, was entitled, as King of Spain, to a duty of 20 per cent. on their export.—TR.

20 per cent. duty due to you for the export duty on these wools. I will order the payment of the duty to be guaranteed to any persons with whom your minister may treat.

[453.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Burgos, Nov. 20, 1808.

My Brother,—The insurrection is at an end in the provinces of Santander, of Biscay, of Soria, and to-morrow, or the day after, probably will be so in that of Burgos; but in order that the country shall be really subdued, it is necessary that the inhabitants, corregidors, and superior magistrates, whom the people are accustomed to obey, should be appointed by you, and repair to their posts, where they should make proclamations, grant pardons to any rebels who submit and bring in their arms, and, above all, issue circulars to the alcades and curés, in order to make them feel that they are under your government. This measure will enable you to reorganise the police and the finances, and to influence the conduct of the people. It is also requisite that the intendants and corregidors should communicate with your ministers, and pass on to them any information which they may obtain. I believe that there were six or seven intendants in Old Castile. I attach great importance to your doing all this. It will be more useful than any proclamations. I think, therefore, that you had better send circulars widely to the alcades and curés. My troops have entered Santander. I am told that many insurgents from Biscay have submitted, asking for nothing better than to lay down their arms if they can be sure of receiving pardon, and of escaping investigation.

[454.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Aranda, on the Douro, Nov. 23, 1808, 7 P.M.

My Brother,—I arrived here at 4 o'clock. Marshal Ney was to march on Soria on the 22nd. I have not yet heard any-

and disorder at Madrid. I send you some intercepted letters. I have ordered General Darmagnac to send a company of the 118th to Lerma to garrison the place and to keep order there; he is to send another to Gumiel, for the same purpose.

[455.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Aranda, Nov. 24, 1808.

My Brother,—Marshal Ney entered Soria on the 22nd, at noon. Some shots were fired, and a few peasants were cut down. His forces are distributed at Siguenza, on the road to Madrid; at Agreda, on the road to Pampeluna; and at Medina-Celi, on the road to Saragossa and Madrid. It is necessary that you should immediately send some one to Soria to put the country in order. A provisional government has already been appointed; but as the capital of a province this town is important.

[456.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Aranda, Nov. 25, 1808.

My Brother,—I am sorry for what has happened to the person whom you sent to Santander.* If he had had a regular commission, stamped and signed by you, and sealed with your arms, this would have not occurred. When you wish to send men on similar missions, this is the method which I wish you to follow:—

1. Give to the person whom you send an authentic warrant, stamped and signed by you, and sealed with your arms. 2. Let him be accompanied by a French officer belonging to your guard, who will be the bearer of a letter either from General Dumas or from the commandant of the province to the French commandants. 3. This mission should be announced to the commandant, we will say of Santander, by a letter, signed by

* An agent of Joseph's had been arrested by the French authorities at Reynosa, though provided with a passport from the Spanish Minister of Police.—TR.

one of your generals or ministers. Experience has proved the necessity of these precautions.

[457.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Aranda, Nov. 27, 1808.

My Brother,—You and your guard may commence your march towards Lerma, where you can sleep, and reach Aranda on the ——.* The action at Espinosa,† and still more that at Tudela,‡ show what stuff the Spanish soldiers are made of. Yet there were at Tudela 30,000 of their best troops and 60 pieces of cannon; only 6000 of ours were in action. Castaños and Palafox began the rout. Send to Pampeluna an intelligent Spanish officer to converse with the 3000 or 4000 prisoners who have been taken, and to ascertain the names of the regiments which were present. If Marshal Ney had not let himself be deceived by the inhabitants, and had not remained till the 23rd and 24th at Soria, because he imagined that the Spaniards had 80,000 men, and other such follies, he would have arrived on the 23rd at Agreda§ as I had ordered, and not a man would have escaped.

P.S. Should this letter reach you too late, it will be enough if you start on the 29th, and are here in the evening of the 30th.

[458.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Buytrago, Nov. 30, 1808, 6 P.M.

My Brother,—We have had an action. A corps of 9000 men occupied Somo Sierra; 4000 were in position at Sepul-

* Illegible.—ED.

† Fought on the 10th and 11th of November, in which Victor defeated Blake.—TR.

‡ Fought on the 23rd of November, in which Lannes defeated Castaños and Palafox.—TR.

§ From Soria, which they reached on the 23rd, to Agreda, is 35 miles of mountain. It was impossible that they could the same day reach Agreda.—ED.

veda.* The body at Somo Sierra was beaten, their guns, about 50 baggage-waggons, and many prisoners taken, and the rest dispersed in the mountains. The sight of about 50 officers escaping at full speed, followed a few moments after by our hussars, brought the first intelligence of the engagement to Buytrago. My cavalry is this evening at St. Augustin. The body at Sepulveda took refuge in the mountains, pursued by our cavalry. They will probably retreat upon Segovia. Our loss is almost inappreciable. Only about 10 of our infantry have been killed or wounded, and 15 Poles, belonging to the guard, who made a brilliant charge. Come as fast as you can, but bring your guard with you as a protection against the banditti, of whom a few are to be found wandering about the mountains. You will find annexed the Madrid Gazette of the 29th.

[459.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Chamartin, Dec. 5, 1808.†

My Brother,—You must take steps to organise a foreign regiment, under the name of "The Royal Foreign Regiment of Spain." There should be included in this regiment all the Austrians, Prussians, and Italians who have passed the last ten years in Spain. Begin by forming a battalion. Appoint as colonel one of the chief officers of your guard, and as general Salligny, or one of your aides-de-camp. Choose for them a chef-de-bataillon and six captains out of your guard, and the requisite number of sergeants. Such a cadre may be sufficient for 1200 men: there are enough in Madrid for the purpose. This battalion may parade to-morrow at noon in the court of the

* Somo Sierra is the crest of the Guadarrama chain which separates Old and New Castile. Sepulveda is a village on the northern foot of the mountain, Buytrago on the south. St. Augustin is about half-way between Buytrago and Madrid. Joseph slept there on the first night of his flight from Madrid.—TR.

† Joseph was then in the royal country residence of Pardo, a few miles from Madrid. Chamartin is a villa near the gate of Madrid. The French troops had entered Madrid the day before, that is, on the 4th.—TR.

palace. They can be supplied with arms out of those seized when Madrid was disarmed. You should give them cartridges, and send them to the Escurial to complete their organisation. As soon as the 1st battalion is formed, you should begin a 2nd, then a 3rd, and then a 4th. This royal foreign regiment of Spain will thus be composed of four battalions, each consisting of six companies, each company containing 200 men, and each battalion 1200: in the whole 4800 men. One of the advantages of this will be to clear off the crowd of strangers who swarm in Madrid, and who may be put to some use when they are provided with officers and non-commissioned officers out of your guard. You should immediately re-organise your guard. Let each regiment be composed of four battalions, and each battalion of four companies containing 200 men; you have alrcady the cadres. Thus your guard will consist of 3200 men. Admit no one into it except the French conscripts whom I have ordered from Paris and Bayonne, and French soldiers who, either as prisoners with Dupont or otherwise, have been for less than a year in the Spanish service. Of these you may be sure. There are alrcady several hundred of them here. Look for some barracks in the environs of Madrid, in which they may be collected.

[460.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Chamartin, Dec. 12, 1808.

My Brother,—Send agents into the provinces to seize the funds of every town and village in that part of Cuença, La Mancha, Castile, Segovia, and Talavera de la Reyna, into which we have entered. There is money everywhere.

[461.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Chamartin, Dec. 18, 1808.

My Brother,—M. Cabarus declaims, but proposes no measures. I can find only 13 millions in the public exchequer, and 11 millions in the caisse de consolidation and

others, which makes altogether 24 millions, and, with the eight that you brought, 32 millions. You must make use of them either through the capitalists in Madrid, or by any other means. It is for the Minister of Finance to find out the way. Here is already a fortnight passed, and these moments are the most precious, as force may now be employed. You should therefore procure about 30 million reals in specie, without losing a minute.

[462.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Chamartin, Dec. 22, 1808.

My Brother,—I send you several memoranda, which I wish you to read with attention, and to use as rules. Send a brigadier-general belonging to your suite to Guadalaxara, to take the command of the corps which is there, and to correspond directly with you on all that happens. If Ruffin's division has not arrived by this evening, send out on the Toledo road to discover what has become of it.

THE EMPEROR'S INSTRUCTIONS.

Madrid, Dec. 22, 1808.

The Emperor, with a force equal to that which he has left under the King, but somewhat inferior in cavalry, is marching on Valladolid. The advanced posts will perhaps be in Medina del Campo to-day, and Marshal Ney's head-quarters will be at Arevalo.

The Emperor will probably sleep at Villa Castin. The manœuvre of the English is extraordinary. It is known that they have left Salamanca. It is probable that they have sent for their transports to Ferrol, on the supposition that they cannot safely retire on Lisbon, as from Talavera we can occupy the left* bank of the Tagus, and exclude them from the river; besides which Peniche has no harbour. With all their cavalry, they cannot embark except from a good port protected by a

* I suspect that this ought to be the *right* bank.—TR.

fortress. Everything leads to the conclusion that they are leaving Portugal, and taking Ferrol, which gives them these advantages, for the base of their line of operation.

But while thus retreating they may hope to strike a blow at Marshal Soult,* and they may not have made that attempt until they had secured their retreat by its natural road on the right bank of the Douro. They may also have reasoned thus:—1st. If the French entangle themselves with Lisbon we shall retreat on Oporto, and be still on our natural road to Ferrol. 2ndly. They may hope for reinforcements. But whatever be the conduct of the English, it will produce events which will have a great influence on all that is to come.

The only object of the King ought to be to keep Madrid. All the rest is unimportant. All that remains of the Spanish armies cannot stand before the 8000 cavalry left with him.

The army which covers Madrid defends the Tagus, the right leaning on Talavera, and the left towards the head of the river before Guadalaxara. The enemy can advance only by Estremadura, and the Duke of Dantzic has there the force which is necessary to resist him. If, as I ordered, the Duke beats him on the 24th and disperses him, the Duke's corps will be quite at our disposal. After the battle he should make a tête-de-pont at Almaraz, leave there Lasalle's division and some light infantry, and return with the rest of his infantry to Talavera to take part in the general manœuvres which the Emperor will direct towards Avila and Ciudad Rodrigo, or he may march towards Toledo or Madrid if the King should require him to protect the capital.

The enemy may come from Andalusia; our posts have been pushed as far as Manzanares, the plain of La Mancha is empty, and the enemy appeared to have done nothing on this side the Sierra Morena. At the worst, Marshal Victor, with the divisions of Latour Maubourg, Ruffin, and Villate, is strong enough to resist anything which may come either from Andalusia or Tarancon by Cuenza. It seems that there is a Spanish division

* This was in fact the object of Sir John Moore's march to Sahagun.—TR.

in the mountains of Cuenza covering Valencia. I think that Marshal Victor may give some light companies to the brigade of dragoons which is at Tarancon. The position of Aranjuez is very favourable. It is the true point for opposing anything advancing either from Cuença or from Andalusia. If Ruffin's division marches to support Marshal Victor, it would not be prudent to leave Madrid with only Leval's division. It would become necessary to retreat by two marches towards Madrid, and he would have been ordered to do so after he had fought his battle, if I had not considered that there is still time, and that all may be changed by the events of the next few days, and if a retreat were not in itself always mischievous. If Talavera were evacuated by us, and entered by the enemy, the effect would be bad; but this consideration must not stop us in a case of necessity. There will, however, be no such necessity while the Emperor leaves troops below Madrid.

As to Madrid, there are 5 short pieces, with their carriages; they must be placed in battery. Something has been done to the fortifications; it is essential that they should be actively carried on. The establishments and magazines must be placed in the Porcelaine, the clothing made up quickly, and the Retiro provisioned for 4000 or 5000 men for a month. If the engineers do their duty, and are well supported, in ten days the Porcelaine ought to be in a state to enable the 3000 Germans to shut themselves up in it, and with a resolute commander to hold it against all the armies of Spain for eight or ten days until they are relieved.

The King, going from the Pardo along the outside of the town, will do well to look at the magazine, and in two or three days he may visit the Retiro, always keeping on the outside of the town.

The signing the registers must be continued.* The measures ordered by the Emperor should be actively continued, such as putting into the Retiro the furniture from the houses of those who have been condemned, and the inquiry as to their property: the making up of the clothing, and the establishing the magazines in the Retiro, must be pushed on.

* Containing the list of those who adhered to Joseph.—TR.

With respect to the clothing for the King's troops, the Emperor has ordered 1200 coats and red trowsers, hats, &c., to be put at the disposal of General Salligny to clothe the foreign Spanish battalions, and 400 white coats, trowsers, &c., to be collected in the Escurial for the recruits of the royal guard. They may be taken immediately, and the recruits dressed in them, to give the guard in the Escurial a good appearance. Supposing these bodies clothed and armed and officered, they may be useful at once, at least to keep up communications: 150 men might be placed at the Puerte de Guadarrama, 150 at the post now held by the pickets of gendarmerie, 150 halfway between Guadarrama and Villa-Castin, and 150 at Villa-Castin, making altogether 600 men. The King may also place 150 men and half a company of cavalry halfway between Guadarrama and Segovia, in order to hear frequently from Segovia, which will be the depôt of our wounded and prisoners. In these posts there are 6 gendarmes d'élite, whom the troops will support. They should be distinguished from the Spaniards by some peculiarity of uniform, such as a white stripe on the arm. The rest may keep guard over the Escurial, and from the return which will be made to the chief of the staff 400 may be deducted as belonging to the King's guard.

The King must have at the Pardo half the infantry of his guard, his cavalry, and his artillery. If he can join to it 400 men from the above-mentioned regiment,* this will give him at the Pardo a little reserve of 2000 men, which must be of use.

ADMINISTRATION.

Measures must be taken to provision the magazines of Madrid, to have in them 12,000 quintals of flour: when it is sure that we shall reach Valladolid, 20,000 rations of bread must be sent to them, and 20,000 rations of biscuit be placed in the Porcelaine. The King will order to Segovia one of his officers, who will send every day, by way of Villa-Castin, 5000 rations of bread and 2000 rations of wine or brandy to the army. The

* Apparently the Spanish foreign regiment.—TR.

King must send to-morrow an aide-de-camp to Marshal Victor at Aranjuez, one to General Latour Maubourg, and one to the Duke of Dantzic at Talavera. It will be proper to keep 25 cavalry and 50 infantry as a post of observation between Alcala and Madrid.

There is a depôt of cavalry at Leganes; all the detachments of cavalry which reach the army must be collected there; in less than a week more than 1000 cavalry belonging to the divisions of Milhaud, Lasalle, Latour Maubourg, and Lahoussaye will arrive there. They must be allowed to rest, reviewed, and kept till further orders. By placing one of his aides-de-camp at the head of this force, the King will obtain in a few days 1200 cavalry.

As for the unembodied men, there are 5 depôts for them in the Retiro. All the infantry and cavalry belonging to Marshal Soult will be sent to Segovia. Several generals will reach Madrid; their destinations are annexed. No detachment must be sent off to Aranjuez, to the Duke of Dantzic's corps, or to any other corps: 2000 men will thus be collected at the Retiro. The return of them must be sent to the chief of the staff, and, with the exception of those belonging to Ruffin's division, they will be despatched as the Emperor will direct, taking care that they be well clothed, armed, and equipped, and have their 50 cartridges per man.

[463.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Villa Castin, Dec. 23, 1808.

My Brother,—I have crossed the Guadarrama with a portion of my guard, and in very unpleasant weather. My guard is to sleep to-night at Villa Castin. Marshal Ney is at Medina. It seems that the English are at Valladolid,* probably with only a vanguard, and that the rest of their army is in position at Zamora and Benevento. It appears that they have established their line of operations in Corunna.

You will have seen in your instructions that Madrid is your

* This was an error.—ED.

principal object. Ruffin's division ought to have arrived. Order it to be put into the Madrid newspapers that 20,000 English are surrounded and lost; insert also the annexed letter,* which will show the Spaniards how they are treated by their dear allies; and add some remarks upon those who called the English into Spain, which is thus ravaged both by her enemies and by her friends.

I have ordered that all the unembodied men, the convoys, &c., at Boscquillas, proceed to Segovia, which is becoming the centre of the army's operations.

I conclude that Marshal the Duke of Dantzic will attack tomorrow the enemy's force which is before him, take their guns, and pursue them with the cavalry; when this is done, he may be directed on any other point.

The 2nd regiment of dragoons, and the 2nd battalion of the 55th, which were sent to Guadalaxara, require an intelligent commander. If threatened they may retire on Alcala. The weather is somewhat cold.

Take care of the post by La Rosas and Guadarrama, that we may be able to communicate. This little town has behaved well. Most of the inhabitants have remained.

[464.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Tordesillas, Dec. 27, 1808, 3 A.M.

My Brother,—I have received your letter of the 24th. Berthier is writing to you. If the enemy should make a movement, it will probably be on the side of Cuenza. You can detain him as long as you like when he attempts to cross the Tagus, which is without a bridge in all its upper stream; the enemy has nothing which can resist the division of Latour Maubourg and those of Villate and Ruffin. I think that you will soon receive 2000 unembodied soldiers belonging to the different corps which have just reached Madrid. You should form them into provisional regiments, and use them to hold the

* This letter does not appear.—TR.

Retiro. I suppose that the Duke of Dantzic beat the enemy on the 24th, and that on the 26th he will have returned to Talavera. Order him to come to Toledo with Sebastiani's and Milhaud's divisions. You can then, in case of any movement, assemble at Aranjuez the divisions of Sebastiani, Ruffin, and Villate, those of Latour Maubourg and of Milhaud, the 26th chasseurs, and the 3rd hussars. This is more than is wanted. In case it should be necessary to assemble these troops at Aranjuez, the division of Valence should approach nearer Madrid, and General Lasalle, supported by 4 companies of voltigeurs, should keep the bridge of Almaraz. This seems the most natural arrangement. General Lucotte has, I suppose, posts of observation along the Tagus at the different ferries. General Lahoussaye has entered Valladolid. The enemy has not appeared there since a week ago, when he sent an expedition of 100 men to carry off the intendants and 300,000 reals; he afterwards sent back the intendants. Marshal Soult is at Carrion; the English are in front of him. I, with all the troops that have come from Madrid, am on the right of the English. Their numbers appear to be about 36,000. I shall reach Medina de Rio Seco to-day; and either to-day or to-morrow great events will probably take place. If the English have not already retreated, they are lost;* and if they retire, they will be pursued so vigorously to their ships, that half of them will never re-embark. I have already ordered no more bread to be sent to us. A small quantity of biscuit should be made and conveyed upon waggons to the other divisions. La Porcelaine† must, above all, be supplied with provisions. Put into the newspapers, and spread in every direction, the report that 36,000 English are surrounded, that I am at Benevento‡ upon their rear, whilst Marshal Soult is in front of them. If the enemy makes any serious attempt on Aranjuez, celebrate my victory

* Sir John Moore began his retreat from Sahagun on the evening of the 24th.—TR.

† La China, a royal porcelain manufactory, converted by the French into a fortress, mounting, when taken by us in 1812, 200 guns.—TR.

‡ At this time, and indeed for two days longer, Sir John Moore was at Benevento.—TR.

over the English, fire the cannons and receive congratulations. The news will soon reach you.

Send to me 1000 copies of my proclamation, and an equal number of the newspapers which have appeared at Madrid since your return. Give to Marshal Victor the command of General Lucotte's corps of observation.

[465.] NAPOLEON TO JOSEPH.

Benevento, Dec. 31, 1808.

My Brother,—My vanguard is near Astorga. The English are running away as fast as they can, abandoning ammunition, drums, and baggage. There are more than 200 carriages on the Astorga road. Marshal Soult has beaten 3000 men of Romana's at Mancilla, taken 1500 prisoners, &c., and 2 standards. This success was the work of Franceschi and his cavalry; he was to enter Leon yesterday, and march upon Astorga. The English have not only cut the bridges, but have undermined and blown up the arches; a barbarous and unusual use of the rights of war, as it ruins the country to no purpose: they are, therefore, abhorred by everybody. They have carried off everything, oxen, mattresses, blankets, and then maltreated and beaten the inhabitants. There could not have been a better sedative for Spain than to send to her an English army. The newspapers should make the most of this. Let Urquijo insert in them some letters, purporting to be written from Valderas, Sanaguer, Benevento, and from the convents from which they turned out the monks. Their robberies are indescribable.

Their real force amounts to from 20,000 to 21,000 foot, and between 4000 and 5000 horse, with about 40 pieces of cannon. They ought to be grateful to the mountain of Guadarrama and to the horrible mud for opposing our progress.

The Dutch brigade ought to have reached Madrid.

If it should be still at Aranda, order it immediately to repair thither. A Hessian battalion ought to be at Segovia; repeat the order for it to proceed to Madrid. You were right to retain

the battalion of the 43rd. The Commandant of Toledo lost his head when he evacuated the town for no reason: what he saw on his rear was a troop of peasants, who made a riot, taking advantage of the Duke of Dantzic's negligence in having no posts at Talavera. Dessolles's division is returning to Madrid; if you are in no hurry for it, let it remain for two or three days at Villa Castin, to get into order and to rest. I have no news from Saragossa. General Lefebvre, in command of the chasseurs of my guard, has allowed himself to be taken prisoner. I had sent him with a detachment of chasseurs to reconnoitre, desiring him to run no risks. He crossed the river opposite Benevento, and found there 3000 British horse; he charged them, killed a great many, but was forced to yield to numbers. In attempting to recross the river his horse was wounded, and he was drowning, when two of the English saved him. This affair has cost me 60 of my chasseurs, wounded, killed, and taken prisoners. You may conceive how much it has annoyed me. In the evening I brought 8000 cavalry to the spot; but the English were far away. We find already that my proclamations are useful in the provinces. You should send several thousands of them to Leon, Salamanca, and Valladolid. You must order some pamphlets to be written in Spanish, describing the state of Spain abandoned to the treachery of the English. They cannot be too much abused, for everybody is displeased with them. Make a great noise about the addresses from the city of Madrid. I think that Madrid should send deputations to Valladolid, Salamanca, Leon, Segovia, Guadalaxara, and Toledo, to engage those towns to follow its example. Madrid should address all the provinces, and send deputations to Seville and Valencia as soon as the other towns have been excited. Twenty-two marching companies, making in the whole 3000 men, have reached Madrid.

[466.] NAPOLEON TO FOUCHÉ.

Benevento, Dec. 31, 1808.

I am informed that in some of the families of emigrants the children are withdrawn from the conscription, and brought

up in disgraceful and culpable idleness. It is certain that the ancient and opulent families who do not support the present system oppose it. I wish you to make a list of 10 of the principal families of this description in each of the departments, and of 50 such families in Paris, stating the fortune, the age, and the occupation of each member. I intend to issue a decree ordering all the young men in these families between the ages of 16 and 18 to be sent to the military school of Saint Cyr. If any objection be made, give no answer, except that such is my pleasure. The generation that is to come ought not to suffer for the animosities and petty passions of this. If you have to correspond with the prefects on this subject, use this language.*

* Thiers, tome x. p. 109.

I have inserted this letter as characteristic of Napoleon and of his system of government at this time.—TR.

END OF VOL. I.

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, AND CHARING CROSS.