

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS

ON THE

ANNEXATION OF MYSORE.

LONDON :

JOHN CAMDEN HOTTEN, PICCADILLY.

1866.

INDEX.

	PAGE
ALLEN'S INDIAN MAIL	41
ATHENÆUM	72
BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE	73
BOMBAY SATURDAY REVIEW	106
DAILY NEWS	55, 64, 74
EXAMINER	36, 83
FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW	17
HOMeward MAIL	68
LONDON REVIEW	89
MADRAS ATHENÆUM AND DAILY NEWS	96
MADRAS TIMES	100
PALL-MALL GAZETTE	79, 95
PETITION	1
MR. GOLDWIN SMITH	13
SPECTATOR	90
STANDARD	46, 51
STAR	61
SUNDAY TIMES	77
TIMES OF INDIA	111

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS
ON THE
ANNEXATION OF MYSORE.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS

ON THE

ANNEXATION OF MYSORE.

LONDON :

JOHN CAMDEN HOTTEN, PICCADILLY.

1866.

P R E F A C E.

THE following collection of articles on the Mysore Case will probably not appear to the ordinary reader deficient either in numerical strength or in the various shades of public opinion—from the *Standard* to the *Star*—which they represent. No other Indian question has ever, without being formally brought for discussion before the public in Parliament, called forth so strong and unanimous an expression of opinion from both the English and the Anglo-Indian press. But still it is necessary to state, for the benefit of those who have not followed the history of the case, that, numerically and politically strong as this collection may appear to them, it does not contain anything like the number of articles which have from time to time appeared, protesting against the annexation of Mysore. These articles were not, as a rule, preserved, since it is only quite recently that the idea of republishing them has suggested itself. It would now be difficult, if not impossible, to recover all, inasmuch as some of the journals in which they appeared have ceased to exist; and to recover even the majority would involve the loss of much valuable time. These considerations will account for the fact, that although the press of India, European and Native alike, has been all but unanimous in

strenuously denouncing the contemplated annexation of Mysore, it is here represented by only five articles which happen to have been preserved.

It has been thought unadvisable to republish any of the numerous anonymous letters on the Mysore Case which have appeared in the press—able and interesting as many of them have been—inasmuch as they carry with them no editorial guarantee for fairness and accuracy. They would therefore be out of place in a pamphlet the object of which is to show how strongly public opinion has pronounced against the annexation of Mysore.

INDEX.

	PAGE
ALLEN'S INDIAN MAIL	41
ATHENÆUM	72
BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE	73
BOMBAY SATURDAY REVIEW	106
DAILY NEWS	55, 64, 74
EXAMINER	36, 83
FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW	17
HOMeward MAIL	68
LONDON REVIEW	89
MADRAS ATHENÆUM AND DAILY NEWS	96
MADRAS TIMES	100
PALL-MALL GAZETTE	79, 95
PETITION	1
MR. GOLDWIN SMITH	13
SPECTATOR	90
STANDARD	46, 51
STAR	61
SUNDAY TIMES	77
TIMES OF INDIA	111

*(Petition presented to the House of Commons on Friday,
10th August, 1866, by J. S. Mill, Esq., M.P. for
Westminster.)*

TO

*The Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled,*

The Humble Petition of the undersigned,

Humbly Sheweth,

That some of those whose names are subscribed to this petition have been for many years engaged in various branches of the public service in India; others have given much attention and study to the history, ethnology, politics, and social economy of that country; and all are deeply concerned in the continued peace, good order, and general welfare of her Majesty's Indian dominions, and of the allied and independent States.

Your petitioners have observed, with great regret and anxiety, from the Papers Relating to Mysore, ordered to be printed by your Honourable House on the 13th March, 1866, that the Government of India has resolved upon the extinction of the Native State of Mysore, and the annexation of its territories to those of the Crown, on the demise of the present aged Rajah.

The pleas upon which it is declared that the dominions of Mysore may be legally claimed as a lapse to the British Government at the reigning Rajah's death, appear to be two in number: first, that the son who has been adopted by his Highness from a distant branch of the Royal family, in conformity with the law of India, is not entitled to be the heir and successor to his sovereignty without the sanction and consent of the Paramount Power; and, second, that the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 between the East India Company and the Rajah, is not a real, but a personal treaty, applying only to the prince with whom it was contracted, and not binding on his successors.

petitioners believe these two pleas to be equally unjust and indefensible.

Your petitioners had indeed been led to hope, since the promulgation of her Majesty's Royal Proclamation to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India, on the 1st November, 1858, that the policy of annexation had been definitely abandoned: more particularly since the official publication of the late Viceroy, Earl Canning's despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 43 A, dated from Simla, the 30th April, 1860, commonly called the Adoption Despatch, your petitioners understood and trusted that the unfounded and untenable doctrine of the lapse of Hindoo Principalities on the refusal of the British Government to sanction the succession of an adopted son, had been disclaimed and renounced for ever.

Your petitioners have reason to believe that the publication of this Adoption Despatch, and the measures consequent upon its approval by the Secretary of State for India, taken in conjunction with the gracious promises of her Majesty's Proclamation of 1858, had spread a sense of security and a spirit of hearty allegiance, not only throughout the Native States, but throughout the whole of India. Your petitioners would look with grief and alarm upon any measure, such as the annexation of Mysore by the non-recognition of the Rajah's lawful heir, that might contradict the admissions and assurances of the Adoption Despatch, or discredit the promises of the Royal Proclamation.

On this point your petitioners beg leave to cite the following remarks by Sir Frederick Currie, a Member of the Council of India, in his Minute printed among the Papers Relating to Mysore. After referring to Lord Canning's letter on Adoption, he says:—"If on this, the first occasion, since the promulgation of this celebrated assurance, of an adoption to any Chiefship of consideration and value, the adoption is disallowed, in order that the province may be appropriated by the British Government, what will be the opinion in the native mind of British faith and British honour? Will not the Chiefs of India believe that the promise of the Viceroy was made in an hour of weakness and danger, to be disregarded when power should be restored and the danger had passed away?"

The late Earl Canning, in the Adoption Despatch of 1860,

fully acknowledged that no precedent could be found for declining to recognise a succession by adoption :—"We have not shown," he says, "so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from the Paramount Power." And he adds :—"I believe that there is no example of any Hindoo State, whether in Rajpootana or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power, by reason of that Power withholding its assent to an adoption."

All the attributes and titles of sovereignty were attached to the Rajah of Mysore in the transactions and Treaties of 1799, 1803, and 1807 ; and Lord Canning when Viceroy of India, so late as March, 1860, simply renewed an uninterrupted recognition when he observed, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, that his Highness was "the Sovereign of Mysore," and that the people of Mysore were "his subjects."

Your petitioners cannot, therefore, doubt that the Rajah of Mysore is the Sovereign Prince of a Hindoo State, and they cannot understand how on his death, leaving an adopted son, that Hindoo State can be justly or consistently annexed as a lapse to the Paramount Power.

It is true that in the Treaty of 1799 with the Rajah of Mysore, his "heirs and successors" are not expressly mentioned ; but it has been laid down by all the great authorities on International Law, that the omission of these words, or of any other formula distinctly implying hereditary succession or the perpetuity of obligations, is immaterial, where the stipulations of the contract are evidently intended to be permanent. Now, not only is the Treaty of 1799 announced as "a Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance," but it contains a special formula implying perpetuity in the asseveration that it "shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon endure."

But the Native State of Mysore, as it subsists at present, was not constituted merely by the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, between the East India Company and the Rajah, nor does its separate existence depend solely upon that Treaty. The stipulation that such "a separate Government" should be established under "a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore," and the cession of the provinces allotted to form the restored State, were made in

and the Nizam, acting, in the words of the Marquis Wellesley, by virtue of their "right of conquest" over Tippoo Sultan's "dominions conquered by their united arms." In the Subsidiary Treaty between the Rajah and the East India Company, to which the Nizam was not a party, there is no cession or grant of territories, no specification of districts, no definition of the frontiers and limits of the Mysore State; but reference is made to the cession and specification of territories as having been already effected and recorded in the Partition Treaty with the Nizam, and one of its Schedules. It is thus clear that the two Treaties must be read together; and that the separate existence of the Mysore State is guaranteed by the Partition Treaty with the Nizam.

The Partition Treaty with the Nizam also contains the solemn declaration, that its conditions, "by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon endure."

Your petitioners have, indeed, observed in the Minute by Mr. R. D. Mangles, Member of the Council of India, printed among the Papers Relating to Mysore, an attempt to destroy the force of the words implying perpetual succession in the two Treaties of 1799, and they "shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon endure," by declaring them to be mere forms of "Oriental phraseology, which do not imply perpetuity to Indian minds," and he alludes to the frequent recurrence of such terms in "Hindoo grants," dependent on the will of the Sovereign. Without admitting that these words can fail to imply perpetuity to every reasonable human mind, Indian or European, your petitioners beg leave to remind your Honourable House that this phraseology did not by any means emanate from an Indian mind; nor does it occur in an Oriental document, or in a Hindoo grant, but in two British Treaties, which were drafted in the English language, and every word of which was dictated by the Marquis Wellesley himself.

Your petitioners are firmly convinced that the permanence of British supremacy is essential to the welfare and progress of India; but they are equally convinced that this supremacy must be mainly based upon moral influence, and not upon mere material strength, and they believe, therefore, that the

annexation of Mysore, in defiance of two solemn Treaties which are still in full force, the moral influence of Great Britain would be very much diminished, while her material strength would not be in the slightest degree augmented.

Your petitioners are strongly impressed with the truth of the opinion pronounced by the late Earl Canning in the following passage from the Adoption Despatch of the 30th April, 1860 :—
“ Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected, so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards Native States.”

Your petitioners desire respectfully to urge upon your Honourable House that no measure could be more surely calculated to raise doubts as to the ultimate intentions of the British Government towards Native States than the annexation of Mysore.

In that same Despatch of the 30th April, 1860, Earl Canning expressed his belief, in which your petitioners cordially concur, that “ the safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well affected to us.” From all that your petitioners have been able to learn, from every available source of information, and especially from the Papers recently printed by order of your Honourable House, the Rajah of Mysore appears always to have been distinguished as a well-affected Native Chief. The Rajah was warmly thanked by Earl Canning for the assistance he gave “ in preserving peace and encouraging loyalty” during the insurrection of 1857, for “ the fidelity and attachment to the British Government which had long marked his Highness’s acts,” for “ ready and useful assistance rendered to the Queen’s troops, and “ for the fresh proofs of the spirit by which his Highness is animated in his relations with the Government of India.” In another despatch to the Secretary of State, dated the 30th March, 1860, and quoted in the Papers relating to Mysore, Earl Canning speaks of the Rajah as “ a venerable and loyal Prince,” and observes that he “ possesses a very strong claim to have his wishes and feelings consulted by us.” And in 1862, as your petitioners learn from the recently printed Papers, the Rajah received an acknowledgment from Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, that, “ for more than

ment, who felt assured when trouble recently overtook them, that, as his Highness was the oldest, so would he be the staunchest, of their friends."

Your petitioners cannot conceive any measure by which the well-affected and loyal Princes of India could be more effectually discouraged, menaced, or insulted than by the refusal to recognise the heir of the Rajah of Mysore, and by the destruction at his death of the ancient Principality which was restored in 1799, and placed in a position of protected and tributary subordination to the British Government under a solemn Treaty with our ally the Nizam.

Some of your petitioners are able, from their own experience and from information to which they have had access, to corroborate what is said by Sir Frederick Currie, in his Minute printed among the Papers relating to Mysore, "that it is impolitic to give occasion to the chiefs of India generally, who are said to be anxiously watching our decision of this case, to think that we are compassing the acquisition of the valuable province of Mysore, after the solemn proclamation of the intention of the Crown to maintain the integrity of treaties."

Your petitioners beg to refer to the words of the Marquis of Dalhousie, who, in his Minute of the 30th August, 1848, printed in the Sattara Papers of 1849, even when recommending that no just opportunity of taking possession of native States by the process of "lapse" should be omitted, declared that "wherever a shadow of doubt can be shown, the claim should at once be abandoned." The Minutes of dissent against the threatened annexation of Mysore, recorded by such distinguished Members of the Council of India as Sir George Clerk, Sir John Willoughby, Sir Frederick Currie, Sir Henry Montgomery, and Captain Eastwick, are surely sufficient to raise much more than that "shadow of doubt" which Lord Dalhousie held should lead to the abandonment of such a design.

Your petitioners are firmly of opinion that the several appropriations of territory and revenue in India during the last twenty years have not realised the anticipations of those who advocated a policy of annexation, by contributing to the resources of the public treasury; but, on the contrary, that those acquisitions of

of increased establishments, civil and military ; that every new Province absorbed since 1848 has proved a burden on the revenues of Her Majesty's older possessions in India ; for instead of any surplus having ever been derived from the States thus annexed, the Imperial treasury has been constantly called upon to supply their deficiencies.

Nor do your petitioners believe that there would be any real financial gain by the annexation of Mysore, which already pays, and has paid for the last sixty-seven years without fail, an annual subsidy of 250,000*l.*, besides maintaining a large body of Horse, the cost of which might be easily commuted, if thought advisable, to a cash payment, so that at present nearly one-third of the gross revenue of this Principality is applicable to imperial purposes.

Your petitioners would regard with the deepest anxiety the effect which the renewed discussion of actual and prospective measures of annexation, commencing with that of Mysore, might produce throughout India, and among the native troops of the three Presidencies.

Your petitioners desire to remind your Honourable House that during the rebellion which broke out with the mutiny of the Bengal Sepoys in 1857, and was not finally suppressed till 1859, it became necessary to augment the British forces in India to the enormous number of 122,000 men ; of whom 35,000 disappeared entirely from the muster-rolls in those three years, having either died or been discharged from wounds or ruined constitutions ; that during the same three years upwards of forty millions sterling were added to the public debt of India ; and that since that period an army of 70,000 British soldiers has been stationed in India as a permanent peace establishment.

Your petitioners cannot but assume that it will never be otherwise than a great risk and a great strain upon British power, should such a sudden call for large reinforcements to India recur ; and that the possibility of such a call recurring must to a certain extent compromise and forestall the military strength of the Empire.

And on this point also your petitioners beg to adduce the testimony of Earl Canning, who writes as follows in the Adoption

“ We shall not become stronger so long as we continue adding to our territory without adding to our European force ; and the additions to that force which we already require are probably as large as England can conveniently furnish, and they will certainly cost as much as India can conveniently pay.”

Your petitioners cannot but contemplate the possible concurrence of circumstances under which it might be still less convenient for England to furnish 70,000 men for India, even in time of peace, than it is at present ; and taking into consideration the vast area and immense population of India, they know of no policy by which the number of British troops could be safely reduced except that of maintaining, encouraging, and strengthening the allied and protected States. As the late Earl Canning declared in that Letter on Adoption from which your petitioners have so often quoted, “ should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in these native States.

A combined system of British possessions and protected States, under which all external and foreign affairs, the general principles of taxation, legislation, commerce, and currency, and the relations between the constituent Principalities, can be dictated and controlled by the Imperial Power, while the details of administration in the dependent States are carried out by native authorities, has always appeared to your petitioners to be the system best calculated to maintain the supremacy of Great Britain, and to secure the peace and prosperity of India ; to promote a fair balance between centralized and localized government, to institute a visible chain of allegiance and responsibility, and to provide for the gradual enlightenment of the less civilized regions and races, not only by the example of good order in the British Provinces, and direct guidance by British functionaries, but more effectually by the practical experience and established habits of Native Princes, ministers, and officials.

And notwithstanding the extinction of so many important native States during the last twenty years, such a combined system of British Provinces and Native Principalities—though not by any means perfect in plan or operation, does still exist

and ought, in the opinion of your petitioners, to be carefully and scrupulously upheld.

Your petitioners look more especially upon Mysore as a State which ought to be saved from extinction; not merely out of a regard for the faith of treaties, not merely in recognition of the continuous services rendered by its government, and the personal fidelity of its Sovereign, but because it either is or is capable of being made in all respects the very type and exemplar of what a protected Native State ought to be. It pays more than an adequate tribute to the Imperial Power, amounting very nearly to one half the collective contributions of all the tributary States. Under its treaty engagements the laws and administrations can be improved and controlled by the authoritative counsel of the British Government. And, finally, the administration of Mysore has been actually reformed by the agency of a British Commission, and all the machinery is in working order for its gradual transformation into a model Native State.

And here your petitioners would call the attention of your Honourable House to one more consideration, by which Earl Canning, in his Adoption Despatch, advocated the maintenance of Native States:—"As to Civil Government, our English officers are too few for the work which they have on their hands, and our financial means are not yet equal to the demands upon us. • Accession of territory will not make it easier to discharge our already existing duties in the administration of justice, the prosecution of public works, and in many other ways."

Lord Canning thus admits that annexation has failed, and must fail, as a financial measure, and that the supply of qualified English officers for civil administration has already begun to fall short of the demand for their services.

Your petitioners are fully aware that the very fact of the reform of Mysore by British Commissioners has been turned into an argument against the claims of the reigning Prince, whose alleged misrule has been invidiously contrasted with the success of British management. But these objections are, they respectfully submit, most inappropriate and most unfair. The East India Company, from the first, was directly responsible for the good government of Mysore, both as the guardian of the infant Prince,

and from its controlling prerogative when his minority was passed. Under this guardianship the Rajah was allowed to assume absolute power at the age of sixteen; and after that period, as stated by Sir Henry Montgomery in his Minute recently printed among the Mysore Papers, "it is officially on record that not only was no advice rendered, but that it was systematically and purposely withheld.

The candid acknowledgment of Lord William Bentinck, who was Governor-General in 1831, when the management of Mysore was assumed, and the Report of the Special Committee of Inquiry in the next year, prove that the extreme measure of superseding the Rajah was not justified either by the facts of the time, or by the terms of the Treaty.

And the records of Government show that, until very lately,—the management of Mysore by a British Commission in trust for the Rajah, was intended to be temporary, until, in the words of the Court of Directors, "a satisfactory system of administration should be framed, and arrangements made for its permanent and undisturbed operation." Such a system has been framed, and ample securities can be obtained for its maintenance and progressive improvement, either under the present Rajah or under his successor.

Your petitioners cannot admit that there is anything exceptional in the case of Mysore, except the large amount of its revenue, which renders its acquisition apparently, though delusively, advantageous. It would be very easy to contrive pretexts equally or even much more specious for the annexation of several other native States, and even for the gradual absorption of all that remain. Nor do your petitioners believe, if the scheme for annexing Mysore be permitted to succeed, the officials at Calcutta, who are traditionally and professionally committed to a policy of territorial extension, will refrain from pressing so perfect a precedent as that of Mysore would be, on the first favourable opportunity.

In conclusion, your petitioners beg to record their earnest conviction, that our territorial acquisitions in India have already overstepped the limits of profit, utility, and safety; that by seizing upon dubious occasions for extending its direct possessions the

and caused an undue draft upon the military resources of the Empire; has diluted and adulterated the administrative ability at its command; has lowered the moral dignity and influence of Great Britain, not only in the East but in Europe; has gone very far towards relieving from responsibility, where it has not destroyed, the conservative forces of society in India; and, if allowed to proceed in the same course, will soon be placed without informants, friends, or auxiliaries, in immediate contact with all the pent-up ambition and concealed fanaticism of an immense and populous continent.

And your petitioners therefore pray that your Honourable House will take such steps as may seem in your wisdom most efficacious for preventing the annexation of Mysore, and for ensuring, with the least possible delay the re-establishment of a native government in that tributary State, with every possible security for British interests and for the prosperity and happiness of the people of the country.

And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

JOHN BRIGGS, General, *formerly Senior Commissioner for the Government of Mysore.*

J. S. FRASER, General, *formerly Resident at Hyderabad, Travancore, and Mysore.*

J. LOW, Lieut.-General, *late Member of the Supreme Council of India, formerly Governor-General's Agent in Rajpootana, &c. &c.*

GEORGE NÖTT, Major General, *Madras Army.*

THOMAS LAW BLANE, *late Member of the Board of Revenue, Madras.*

G. LE GRAND JACOB, Major General, *late Political Commissioner Southern Mahratta Country.*

C. CLEMONS, Lieut.-General, *Madras Army.*

G. WILLIAMS, Colonel, *formerly Commissioner of Military Police, North West Provinces of India.*

W. G. WHITE, Major General, *formerly Commanding Resident's Escort, Mysore.*

H. E. HICKS, Lieut.-Colonel, *Royal Artillery.*

GREGORY HAINES, Lieut.-Colonel, *late Superintendent of Ban-*

- E. DICKEY, Major General, *late Superintendent of Studs, Bengal Presidency.*
- ROBERT NORTH COLLIE HAMILTON, Bart., *late Agent to the Viceroy, Central India.*
- J. ANDOVER WOOD, Captain, *late of the Madras Army.*
- J. FRUSHARD, Captain, *late Indian Navy.*
- G. W. BELL, Barrister-at-Law, *Middle Temple.*
- JOHN BURKETT, Barrister-at-Law, *London Institution.*
- HENRY RICHARD, *Secretary of the Peace Society.*
- T. RICHARDS, 12, *Addison Crescent, Kensington.*
- FREDERICK HARRISON, *Lincoln's Inn.*
- HENRY EDWARD BATT, 34, *Holland Villas Road, Kensington.*
- FELIX JONES, *late Political Resident, Persian Gulf.*
- F. BURGOYNE, Colonel, *late Commandant Madras Horse Artillery.*
- JOHN CRAWFORD, F.R.S.
- T. COCKBURN, *late Major 43rd Light Infantry.*
- W. H. BAYLEY, *formerly Secretary to Government, Madras.*
- P. T. FRENCH, Lieut.-Colonel, *late Political Agent, Jodhpore, and Resident at Baroda.*
- F. HELBERT, Captain, *late Special Assistant to the Governor-General's Agent, Central India.*
- JOHN DICKINSON, *late President of the India Reform Society.*
- T. MASON, Major, *late Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, Northern Division, Madras.*
- J. M. LUDLOW, *Barrister at Law.*
- CHARLES FREDERICK NORTH, Major-General, *late Royal Engineers.*
- EVANS BELL, Major, *late of the Madras Staff Corps.*
- ALEXANDER TAYLOR, M.A., *Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, and Chaplain of Gray's Inn.*
- G. E. MAGNUS, *Oakbrook, Hammersmith.*
- GOLDWIN SMITH, M.A., *late Regius Professor of Modern History, Oxford.*
- SIDNEY JAMES OWEN, *Lee's Reader in Law and History at Christ Church, Reader in Indian Law at the University of Oxford, late Professor in the Elphinstone College, Bombay.*
- GEORGE WARING, M.A., *Magdalen Hall, Oxford.*

MAX MÜLLER, M.A., *Fellow of All Souls, Oxford.*

WILLIAM SHAEN, M.A., 8, *Bedford Row.*

F. W. CHESSON, 3, *Catherine Terrace, South Kensington.*

E. W. BRAYLEY, F.R.S., *Principal Librarian, London Institution.*

ARTHUR MAGNIAC, *late Bombay Civil Service.*

GEORGE HALL, Captain, *Bengal Artillery.*

A. HEYLAND, *late Bengal Civil Service.*

J. FULTON, Colonel, *Bengal Army.*

(And many others.)

MR. GOLDWIN SMITH ON THE ANNEXATION OF MYSORE.

(From the *Daily News* of August 8th, 1866.)

SIR,—The projected annexation of Mysore, upon which the nation is now called upon to decide in the last resort, if carried into effect, will, as you have not failed to perceive, be a turning-point in our history as an Indian power. It imports, in fact, nothing less than the final, irrevocable assumption of direct dominion over the whole of India. If we abolish the native dynasty of Mysore we must abolish the other native dynasties. The eyes of the other princes are eagerly bent on this case. They know it to be their own; they know that the real reasons for absorbing Mysore are equally valid for the absorption of their own principalities. They will no longer be our trustworthy allies with the knife of annexation at their throats; they will plot against us, and we shall have to put them too out of the way.

The Marquis Wellesley was too much of a conqueror. But in other respects he was, perhaps, the wisest of our Governors-General. If he had not more Oriental learning than the rest, he had more of the sympathetic insight of genius into the East. Perhaps there was something Oriental in his own character. No Indian statesman, I believe, would presume lightly to reverse any decision of the Marquis Wellesley.

Lord Wellesley when, with the aid of native allies, he had overthrown Tippoo, forbore to annex Mysore to the British dominions. He took from the gilded prison in which the policy of Hyder and

Tippoo had kept him, the representative of the ancient Rajahs, the object of hereditary reverence to the people of Mysore, and restored in his person a native principality, tributary to the English Government, and subject to British guidance and control. In the treaty which forms the instrument of settlement, it is declared that the compact shall be binding "as long as the sun and moon endure." Those words are not from an Oriental pen, but from that of Lord Wellesley himself. They seemed to denote an everlasting covenant, such as cannot be broken by us without a forfeiture of honour. But what is certain is, that the arrangement suggested to Lord Wellesley by a magnanimous policy was intended by him, in pursuance of the same policy, to be perpetual.

The present Rajah has always been loyal to us, but we have taken the government of the principality out of his hands on ~~the~~ ground of his misconduct or incapacity as a ruler, a step the necessity of which I do not presume to call in question. He is old and childless. But he claims to exercise the right of adopting an heir, according to the established custom of India, which, like the custom of the Roman Empire, recognises succession by adoption, and the validity of which we, after ignorantly disputing it, and suffering severely by our ignorance, have solemnly and finally acknowledged. It has been determined, however, in the exercise of an alleged right of sovereignty, to disallow the adoption, and to seize the rich province of Mysore, a possession on which it is not denied that we have for some time cast a longing eye, into our hands.

Five members of the Council of India—Sir H. Montgomery, Sir F. Currie, Sir J. P. Willoughby, Sir George Clerk, and Captain Eastwick—have at different times recorded their formal dissent from the proposal of annexation.

I will not put the question on grounds of the highest morality, which perhaps a conquering nation, such as England is in India, may be said to have once for all set aside. But there is a kind of morality which is a part even of the policy of conquest. We are in India a power not only alien, but unbeloved; and so we must remain, because, though our statesmen may be kind and beneficent, our soldiery, our subordinate officials, and the dominant race generally, always are and always will be trampling, in the pride of conquest and of superior race, upon "the nigger."

We have not, and never can have, any root in the affection, any more than in the ancient reverence, of the people. But we used to possess, and we have not yet entirely lost, the allegiance which, in the perfidious East, belongs to a power of superior good faith and justice. By this we may trust, as much as by force, our ascendancy has been hitherto preserved. The mock Roman policy of Lord Dalhousie (who little knew what the true Roman policy was) terribly shook this great pillar of our dominion. Lord Dalhousie's fatal work was partly undone by the honour and moderation of Lord Canning. But it will be renewed and completed by the annexation of Mysore. "As far as the (Indian) chiefs and princes are concerned," says Sir J. P. Willoughby, "I am satisfied that the absorption of the Mysore State would be construed by them as a repudiation of all the pledges and assurances we have during the last five years so lavishly bestowed, and defeat one of the main objects of Lord Canning's renunciation of the right to interfere with adoptions, namely, as he himself explained, to satisfy the princes of India, at once and for ever, that we are not lying in wait for opportunities of absorbing territory, and that we do deliberately desire to keep alive a feudal aristocracy where one exists." We, as conquerors, set up the native principality of Mysore; and by the same right, perhaps, we may, if we choose, pull it down. But if all the princes and chiefs of India are sure to regard its destruction as a renewal of the policy of unscrupulous absorption which has already opened a gulf of the most fearful peril, there is surely something stronger in the eye of a conqueror than right, that bids us pause before we assent to the proposal.

The Indian princes are not only useful allies, and capable of becoming dangerous enemies, but they are the only mediating links between us and the vast population in the face of which we stand as foreign rulers, and the character, feelings, and tendencies of which are still, to a great extent, an enigma and a mystery. They alone can give us warning when we are liable to be taken unawares by some rebellious movement going on in those dark depths of Indian sentiment where the earthquake of the great mutiny had its source. In their persons and those of their ministers alone have we any hope of really associating natives with us in the work of government, and thereby ulti-

mately leaving in India traces of a nobler work than that of conquest. "A combined system," says a petition recently presented to Parliament, "of British possessions and protected states, under which all external and foreign affairs, the general principles of legislation, taxation, commerce and currency, and the relations between the constituent principalities, can be dictated and controlled by the imperial power, while the details of administration in the dependent states are carried out by native authorities, has always appeared to your petitioners to be the system best calculated to maintain the supremacy of Great Britain, and to secure the peace and prosperity of India; to promote a fair balance between centralized and local government, to institute a visible chain of allegiance and responsibility, and to provide for the gradual enlightenment of the less civilized regions and races, not only by the example of good order in the British provinces, and direct guidance by British functionaries, but more effectually by the practical experience and established habits of native princes, ministers, and officials." The actual association of the subject and despised with the dominant race in the administration of the country under our direct dominion, though attempted in good faith, is, judging from experience, an almost hopeless task. Conquest, after all, is conquest; it carries with it inevitably the pride of the conqueror, the humiliation of the conquered, and the social estrangement with which real political union cannot co exist. The very approach of a native to the avenues of high office in the civil service seems already to have touched to the quick the sensibility of the dominant race. By the system of tutelage only can we train native rulers. Our authority as the tutelary power of course carries with it the right and the duty of suspending protected princes who may be personally convicted of incompetence as rulers, without which we might do mischief, as perhaps we have already in some cases done mischief, by removing from bad princes the fear of deposition by their subjects, which forms the only check upon the excesses of despotism in the East.

The financial results, hitherto, of the annexation policy render it, to say the least, very doubtful whether, in a financial point of view, we should really gain by the annexation of Mysore, which already pays with punctuality a heavy subsidy, and maintains a

large body of horse. The military demands of India on this country are already, considering the increased difficulty of recruiting, terribly heavy ; and in case of a European war and a simultaneous disturbance in India, they would become too great for us to meet. In the department of civil government the English officers are, as Lord Canning said, too few as it is for the work which they have on their hands.

The framers of the petition from which I have already quoted conclude by recording their earnest conviction "that our territorial acquisitions in India have already overstepped the limits of profit, utility, and safety ; that by seizing upon dubious occasions for extending its direct possessions, the British Government in India has dispersed its material strength, and caused an undue draft upon the military resources of the empire ; has dilated and adulterated the administrative ability at its command ; has lowered the moral dignity and influence of Great Britain, not only in the East, but in Europe ; has gone very far towards relieving from responsibility, where it has not destroyed, the conservative forces of society in India ; and, if allowed to proceed in the same course, will soon be placed without informants, friends, or auxiliaries, in immediate contact with all the pent-up ambition and concealed fanaticism of an immense and populous continent." As these are in effect the recorded views not only of these petitioners, but of the Marquis Wellesley, Lord Canning, and of five members—not the least eminent for knowledge and wisdom—of the Council of India, the nation will surely do well to examine into their soundness before it suffers a step to be taken which, if successful, may, at the cost of some loss of character, add a little to our revenue, but which, if unsuccessful, may plunge the empire and Indian society in confusion and disaster.—I am, &c.

GOLDWIN SMITH.

ENGLAND AND THE ANNEXATION OF MYSORE.

(From the *Fortnightly Review* of September 15th, 1866.)

THE keen and excited movement at present taking place in the order of our political ideas would be very incomplete in its scope,

superficial and inadequate, if it did not carry us beyond the questions of parliamentary and administrative reform at home, up to the not less momentous questions connected with the national colonies and dependencies. That we are either on the eve of a gigantic political revival, or else on the point of sinking finally into a condition of stagnation, it is impossible not to believe. The existence of a very high degree of national excitement is obvious. The critical question is, whether the national energy is strong enough to transform this excitement of opinion into corresponding action. Every person who is concerned for the cause of progress and civilization must feel how much depends upon the set of the tide of English political opinion at the present moment. Men have arisen, it is true, in these later days, who would fain discard patriotism from the catalogue of human virtues, but even they admit that increased alertness, vigour, and sincerity in England's discharge of her national duty is one of the most important events that could happen to the race. The repetition, however, of vague revilings is not worth much after a certain time. It is likely to be a more profitable expenditure of mental energy on the part of public writers to insist on the practical points at which a revived national earnestness could be most effectively and usefully brought to bear. How far this new earnestness can be good for anything, without giving a more democratic shape to the only organ by which it can operate—the House of Commons—is a question that need not be here considered. The daily growing sense of the necessity of making public opinion more effective may be trusted to lead to the discovery and adoption of the means proper to such an end. Meanwhile, every case that can be pointed out where a vigorous exertion of public opinion is desirable, contributes to the proof of the exigency of the situation.

It is no cynical exaggeration to say that the amount of active political sympathy in England with the affairs of her colonies, and of the great Indian Empire, is, comparatively speaking, very small. Of passive well-wishing there is an abundance, for which the people of other countries, misled by traditions of selfishness and rapacity that have long ceased to be true, unjustly refuse to give us the least credit. Englishmen at large desire nothing

the best government which can be devised to meet their special circumstances. They detest nothing more than the notion that England has a right to look upon India "as a warren or preserve for its own use; a place to make money in; a human cattle farm, to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants." But general good-will of this sort is not sufficiently direct and forcible when you have a whole army of officials in the country imbued with special sentiments not exactly the reverse of this, but in effect, at all events, something exceedingly like the reverse. We can scarcely wonder that those who have no personal or immediate interest in Indian affairs should content themselves with the consciousness of their own honest wishes for the happiness and prosperity of India, without descending into the details of Indian administration—repulsive as these details are from their technicality, the uncouthness of their phraseology, the unfamiliarity of the ideas which underlie them, and the remote, unusual air of the historic events with which they are in most cases so closely connected. But though this ignorance, and the consequent impossibility of anything like an active public supervision of Indian administration, are very easily explained and very natural, they are particularly unfortunate when we remember that this is the only kind of supervision which the extinction of the Company and the transfer of its authority to the Crown have left. Theoretically, the Government of India is after the most perfect type. There is a single minister with undivided responsibility, but assisted in the formation of his judgments by a council of men with special knowledge and experience in the matters of the department, and each of whom registers the reasons of his dissent from a decision of the chief minister. But to whom is the chief responsible? The efficacy of responsibility consists in its being exacted by those in whose interests the minister is intrusted with power. The Indian minister is expected to govern in the interests of the people of India. He is responsible, not to the people of India, but to the people of England; that is to say, to those who, from their own natural and almost inevitable ignorance, are unable to judge, with any pretensions to accuracy, of the merits and demerits of his conduct. Obviously this is not responsibility at all in the sense in which responsibility is the safeguard and warranty of the judicious use of authority.

The state of affairs in India varies so constantly from year to year, that even those who are best acquainted with them avow their inability to criticise with confidence and effect the measures of the Indian minister, supplied as he is with all the official papers and other means of information. The danger of this is too visible under a system which makes a man virtually autocrat over India, not because he knows or cares anything about India, but because he is a good politician, and this happens to be the only post which his party can afford to give him. The danger is increased by the fact that to accept such a post is rather a nuisance to the politician. As has been very justly said, "to a rising statesman who has made his mark in the House, and who has a political future before him, it must be no slight sacrifice to have suddenly to turn aside from questions in which he ~~takes~~ a warm interest, to spend the best hours of his life in mastering questions which, from a merely personal point of view, have neither interest nor use." There is no fear that the present Indian minister will fail to give his best powers to the duties of his office. Lord Cranborne has always shown himself able, immensely industrious, and endowed with a sufficiently strong will. But in the absence of possible criticism in the House, is not the otherwise invaluable virtue of having a strong will almost as bad as any vice? There is, however, no end to the evils that must accrue where the minister is practically irresponsible while the public rest tranquil in the security of his theoretic but fictitious responsibility. Indeed, this is precisely the most dangerous state of things that any confusion of political ideas could possibly produce.

General considerations, however, are commonly neglected, especially in this country, unless they are bound up with one or more particular cases. Happily for my purpose, though unhappily on other and larger grounds, a very remarkable and important episode in the history of English rule in India is occurring at the present moment, which illustrates to too great perfection both the absence as a matter of fact of English supervision, and the evil consequences which result from the consciousness of this on the part of the various branches of the Indian Government. The story of Mysore has this additional advantage, that it is not yet completed. The matter is still

being transacted under our eyes. The fifth act of a drama of which all India supplies the keenly-interested spectators has yet to be added, and the nature of the concluding scenes it is still within the power of the English public and the English minister to determine. When it is remembered that, in the opinion of many persons best qualified to give an opinion, this determination will mark the turning-point of the career of England in India, the importance of the decision being in the right direction cannot easily be overrated.

The history of the circumstances of the case is very brief and simple. In 1799, after the siege of Seringapatam and the death of Tippoo, the territory of Mysore fell by right of conquest to the disposition of the East India Company and their ally, the Nizam of the Deccan. A treaty was made with the Nizam and the Company for parties, by which the Nizam took a portion of the dominions of Tippoo, the Company took a second portion, while it was agreed that the remaining portion should be restored to the old Hindoo line of Rajahs, dispossessed by Hyder Ali thirty-eight years before. Then a Subsidiary Treaty was made with the Company and the restored Rajah, then an infant, for parties, in which the Rajah, among other things, agreed to supply certain funds to the Company, while Lord Wellesley, then Governor-General, reserved to his successor in that office the power "either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the Government of Mysore," or to bring under the direct management of the servants of the Company "such part or parts of the territorial possessions of the Rajah as shall appear to him, the said Governor-General in council, necessary to render the said funds efficient or available either in time of peace or war." Although Lord Wellesley quite consistently reserved this right to administer part or parts of the Mysore territory in case of non-payment, or probable non-payment, of the promised funds, he had previously, in the Partition Treaty, guaranteed the separate existence of the Mysore state, along with the other conditions of that treaty, "as long as the sun and moon endure." It has been contended, by the way, that this is only an otiose Oriental phrase, but such a contention is sufficiently refuted by the fact

that it was not an Oriental, but Lord Wellesley himself, who dictated the clause. Thus, by these two treaties together, (1) a separate state of Mysore was set up; (2) the sovereignty was conferred upon the representative of the old line of the Rajahs; (3) the new ruler agreed to do certain things; and (4) the Governor-General reserved the right of remedying any neglect to do these things. This was in 1799. The young Rajah was left to be brought up in a harem, and an able though unscrupulous minister reigned in his stead. In 1811 the Rajah displaced the minister, and took the reins of power into his own hands. He committed the usual follies and extravagancies of Eastern sovereigns. His private debts were enormous. The liabilities of the state were only to be discharged by oppressive taxation. From oppressive taxation grew discontent; and discontent grew into insurrection. The Company assisted the Rajah, put down the revolt, and then took the Government out of the Rajah's hands. This was in 1829—31, and twenty years after he had come to actual power, and found two millions sterling in the treasury, the result of Poorneah's zealous exactions. Since 1831 the Rajah has been a pensionary in the country over which he is nominally sovereign, and his territory has been administered in his name by a commission of English officials. The case now stands thus. The Rajah is still alive. He has begged to be restored to his dominions, but in vain. He has adopted a son, according to Hindoo usage, who will perform the funeral rites, which only a son is able to perform, and will accede to his personal and private property. But the British Government refuse to recognise the Rajah's right to adopt an heir to his dominions, and have resolved upon the decease of the present aged Rajah, to extinguish the native state of Mysore, and annex the territories to those of the Crown.

These are the facts. I need scarcely say that each of them, about which any dispute is possible, is disputed with a bitterness peculiar to Indian writers. The *odium Indicum* is not inferior in bitterness and persistency to the *odium theologicum*. The interpretation of the Partition Treaty is oppugned. So is that of the Subsidiary Treaty. Our conduct in leaving the young Rajah to be brought up in the vicious traditions and pestilent habits of the harem is alleged, and not without justice, to have been an

entire dereliction of anything like morality. The insurrection which took place during the Rajah's own tenure of authority arose partly, it is hinted, from the rapacity of Poorneah, the minister whom we ourselves installed in 1799. It was not without the sinister and Machiavellian connivance of the authorities of Fort St. George that the Rajah was permitted to run, with scarcely a single warning or remonstrance, the course of evil doing which eventually gave an excuse for our interposition in 1831. And there can be no doubt that, viewed from the point of the higher international morality, measured by the purer standard of the political duty of the superior to the inferior race, which prevails in the present decade of century, the policy of the Indian Government, prompted by men of the old school like Sir Thomas Munro and Sir Mark Cubbon, was in the last degree selfish, grasping, and hollow. We have no right to sit in judgment on men for not being in advance of the mental habits of their time. But the least that we can do is to show that political ideas have advanced, by repairing, wherever by good fortune it is still possible, the evil that was then inflicted. It is undeniable that the Rajah, when an infant, was left to be brought up in a way which the British authorities well knew to be the worst possible way; and that when he had grown up and acceded to power, and developed those vices of which the education permitted by us had sown the too fruitful seeds, we still held all but absolutely aloof, and refrained from making friendly use of our power of suggesting ordinances which he was bound to promulgate and execute. It was distinctly asserted by Lord William Bentinck's commission to inquire into the causes of the insurrection which was a plea for our assumption of territory, that the "disturbances that had occurred were greatly attributable to the withdrawal of the advice of the British Resident." All this certainly does not prove either that we ought to restore the old Rajah to his sovereignty, or to permit him to adopt, but it does prove that the Government, wishing to deny him the exercise of this right, does not come into court with clean hands.

We may, however, leave this and many other similar bits of skirmishing ground outside of the main field of the debate. There are two simple issues on which the public verdict has to be

annex the Mysore Territory? *Second*, Granting that the legal right could be ever so satisfactorily established, does a general view of our position towards the Indian native princes countenance the expediency of availing ourselves of it? There is a pitiful kind of so-called statesmanship popular in England, according to whose canons the second of these questions is superfluous. This policy consists in standing on the narrow edge of our technical rights, and disregarding anything like a sagacious balancing of our interests against our rights. We may see the results of such a policy in the slumbering embroilment between England and the United States which Earl Russell has bequeathed to us as the fruit of his conduct from first to last about the *Alabama*—popularly so much admired, legally so extremely defensible, and as a specimen of the sagacious farsightedness proper to a statesman so unboundedly despicable. One may hope, however, that the end of these ideas is not very remote, and that the new generation of rulers will learn to stick to a technical right only when it lies in the course of what is politically expedient. Meanwhile, it cannot escape any reader of Sir Charles Wood's despatches on the Mysore question that far greater stress is laid on the considerations of what we may find ourselves empowered to do, than upon those other considerations of what it is to our advantage to do.

I. The rights of the Rajah, and therefore those also of the Indian Government, must, it is plain, be derived from and defined by the Partition Treaty with the Nizam and the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah himself. The article on which the question mainly turns is that memorable Fourth Article, which I have already quoted, and which read simply seems to mean that the Indian Government should have the right of taking all measures necessary for the security of the Subsidy. Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General by whose authority the Rajah was deprived of his government, expressly said, in a despatch to the Court of Directors at home, that he could not help entertaining "certain doubts, both as to the legality and the justice, according to a strict interpretation, of the course that has been pursued." He gave as a reason for these doubts, that "the treaty warrants an assumption of the country with a view to secure the payment of our Subsidy," whereas "the Subsidy does

not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy." Then, again, the treaty only authorised the assumption of part or parts of the country, whereas the whole was assumed. Lord Metcalfe, who succeeded Bentinck, is said to have spoken of the assumption as "a harsh and unprovoked measure," and it is evident from the wording of his letters to the Rajah that he favoured his claim to a restoration of his rights. The Company itself is found upon one occasion expressing its desire "not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency *when the country shall be restored to the Rajah.*" Lord Hardinge, when Governor-General, wrote a despatch in which he conveyed his doubts as to our right to keep the country when there was no longer any cause for anxiety about the Subsidy. Can anything be clearer than that up to 1847 nobody hinted that the treaty could be interpreted other than in one way? The kind of argument with which Sir Charles Wood replied to this cloud of witnesses may be inferred from a single paragraph in his momentous despatch of July 17, 1863,—“His Highness makes the following statement: ‘By an article in the treaty between the British Government and myself, it was provided, that, if at any time the affairs of my country fell into confusion, the British Government should have the power of assuming the management of the country until order was restored.’ With respect to this point, it is sufficient to state that the treaty contains no condition under which the administration of the Maharaja’s possessions, if once assumed by the British Government, was to be restored to his Highness.” It is hard to imagine even a minister of Sir Charles Wood’s long and varied official experience condescending to such a sophism as this. As if it were not plainly implied, on the most elementary principles of construing such documents, that the administration of the Rajah’s possessions was to be restored to him as soon as the purposes for which the treaty authorised its assumption were satisfied. What would be thought of a landlord who, after distraining for rent and satisfying his demand, should decline to quit the premises on the ground that there was no clause in the agreement stating the conditions on which he should quit them? With reference to the same paragraph, Sir Henry Montgomery, in recording the reasons for his

“in all fairness, if the treaty is to be quoted in such rigid interpretation when adverse to the Rajah's claims, it may also be quoted in the same strictness as not authorising the assumption of the entire country under any view of its real condition at that period.”

Of course the Indian Government does not rely on such augmentation as that of the late Indian Secretary, of which I have just given a sample. They fall back on the fruitful pretext which Lord Dalhousie invented and made so much of both in the case of Mysore and the Carnatic. “The treaty,” Lord Dalhousie said of that with the Rajah in 1799, “is exclusively a *personal* one,” for no mention is made of heirs and successors. This is uncommonly ingenious and acute, but when we remember the circumstances under which this so-called personal treaty was made, the worth of such a notion is more truly measured. What could Lord Wellesley's object have been in going through the farce of a personal treaty with a child five years old? What reason was there for setting up the child at all if he were only to play warming-pan for the East India Company? The Company needed no fiction of this sort. Their troops were victorious. The country was theirs, and it was the deliberate choice of the Governor-General to erect it into a state as long as the sun and moon shall endure. Lord Wellesley was, of all the Governors-General that ever India has had, the least likely to play a trick, to go through an unintelligible performance of this kind. It is incumbent on those who rely on the personal treaty argument at least to furnish some comprehensible theory of Lord Wellesley's motives and policy in what, without explanation, seems so meaningless and irrational a proceeding.

We now come to the immediate bearing of this issue, whether, according to the two treaties of 1799,—the Partition Treaty and the Subsidiary Treaty,—the Rajah of Mysore is the sovereign prince of a Hindoo state. For if he is, why should he be deprived of the sovereign attribute of being able to adopt? And if he dies leaving an adopted son, how can his state be annexed as a lapse to the paramount Power? The history of the view taken by the Indian Government of the right of the Hindoo princes to adopt successors to their territories shows that this right was respected until Lord Dalhousie's decision in the Sattara

case. "The decision in the Sattara case," says Sir Frederick Currie, recording his dissent from the despatch of 1864, "whatever its merits may be, undoubtedly caused surprise and alarm throughout the length and breadth of India; and when this was followed by the proceedings of the Government of India in the cases of Kherowlee, Nagpore, Jhansee, &c., during the same administration, that surprise and alarm became consternation and dismay. Shortly after came the mutiny, and the disorganization which accompanied it. On the restoration of order, some special measures were deemed necessary by Lord Canning, who had succeeded Lord Dalhousie, to allay the alarm, and remove the belief, engendered by the proceedings above alluded to, the annexation of Oude, &c., that every pretext, however subtle or futile, would be taken to attach and absorb all the remaining chiefships and principalities of India." The chief of these special measures was the publication of the famous Adoption Despatch (April 30, 1860), a document only second in importance to the Queen's proclamation of 1858, assuming the paramount sovereignty of India. At this time England first stood "face to face with its feudatories." A great convulsion "has been followed by such a manifestation of our strength as India had never seen, and if this in its turn be followed by an act of general and substantial grace to the native chiefs, over and above the special rewards which have already been given to those whose services deserve them, the measure will be seasonable and appreciated." "Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected," said Lord Canning in the despatch, "so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards native States." In order, therefore, to rob our policy of this pernicious uncertainty, an assurance was proposed by Lord Canning, to be given, and in time was given, to every chief above a certain rank, that the paramount Power desired to see his government perpetuated, and that on failure of natural heirs, his adoption of a successor, according to the laws and customs of his race, whether Hindoo or Mohammedan, would be recognised, and that nothing should disturb the engagement thus made to him so long as his house is loyal to the Crown, and faithful to the conditions of treaties. Distinct assurances in this sense were given to the princes

individually. But the Rajah of Mysore was not included in the list of chiefs to whom this assurance was conveyed. And why? Because it was hoped, and fully expected, in the first place, that the Rajah, being old and childless, would refrain from adopting, and would allow his dominions to lapse to the English Crown. In the second,—and this has been too much overlooked by people who are content to be guided by what Lord Canning actually did,—it was felt that to give the Rajah permission to adopt would be tantamount to an express invitation. If the Rajah had received this formal and public permission, his omission to avail himself of it would have perplexed and offended his own subjects. They naturally would have expected him to use, in favour of one of his own race, the power thus deliberately bestowed upon him, rather than by his negligence in doing what he had been thus almost bidden to do, to cause the transfer of his dominions to an alien government. And in the third place, Lord Canning could not divest himself of the evil influence of the Calcutta Foreign Office, which insisted that the Treaty of 1799 was a personal treaty, that the Rajah was only set up for his own life, without any intention of continuing his authority to his heirs and successors, and that therefore he had not the right of adoption admitted to be inherent in a Hindoo prince. Strictly speaking, we have not bound ourselves by any assurance to the Rajah of Mysore to let him adopt, as we have bound ourselves to other princes affected by such permission. We have thrown ourselves upon our own interpretation of the Treaties of 1799, and, admitting that there is not “a single instance in which adoption by a sovereign prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from the paramount Power,” we deny, in fact, that the Rajah is a sovereign prince.

II. This brings us to the broader and more important point of the expediency of annexing Mysore. Although as a matter of fact we did not expressly include Mysore in the assurance that we had abandoned the policy of annexation, Mysore will be the first opportunity of testing the sincerity of our professions. No amount of reasoning or explanation will convince the native princes that if we do not adhere to the non-annexation policy in the case of Mysore, we shall adhere to it in any other case where annexation

attorney on the one hand, and from a rapacious place-hunter or patronage-seeker on the other, must admit that everything turns in such a case on what will be thought of our policy by those whom it is our interest to conciliate. If, as is distinctly asserted by men of the highest authority and greatest knowledge, such as Sir Frederick Currie, the consequence of annexation would be invincible distrust in the minds of the native princes; and if, as all parties now admit, it is of the deepest importance that the princes should remain staunch and loyal to English interests, what can be more deplorable, more hateful, than to find that English and Indian politicians cannot get beyond the one fact that the assurance of the Adoption Despatch was never conveyed to the Rajah of Mysore? The facts should be viewed largely, and with reference to human nature, rather than to principles of hair-splitting. What are the native princes likely to think, with their logic deeply infected with the inflammatory sense of self-interest? "If on this, the first occasion," says Sir F. Currie, "since the promulgation of this celebrated assurance of an adoption to any chiefship of consideration and value, the adoption is disallowed, in order that the province may be appropriated by the British Government, what will be the opinion in the native mind of British faith and British honour? Will not the chiefs of India believe that the promise of the Viceroy was made in the hour of weakness and danger, to be disregarded when power should be restored and the danger had passed away?" We shall be accused of acting hypocritically from first to last. Lord Wellesley established a kingdom which he never meant to be maintained. He made a treaty with the Nizam to last while sun and moon should endure, but he only meant while it should suit English policy. We assumed the administration of Mysore under the pretext of securing a subsidy, but all the time we never intended to give it back again. We declared that we recognised the right of adoption, and on the first opportunity we decline to do any such thing. We declared that we had given up the evil policy of annexation, and then we annex the first territory on which we can lay our hands. It is not difficult to see how ugly our conduct can thus, without much forcing, be made to look. And all India is said, on creditable authority, to be watching the case. Two of the greatest princes Holkar and Scindia have

written home, although their own rights of adoption—and this is very well worth noticing as a sign of their profound alarm—were assured to them so far back as the Governor-Generalship of Lord Ellenborough. The Rajah of Mysore was one of the most loyal of our allies during the terrible Rebellion of 1857-9, so that besides general charges of breaking treaties and proclamations, we shall be deemed thoroughly insensible of anything like gratitude or good-will, even for the most enormous services. There is something portentous in all this, when we remember Lord Canning's words, that cannot be too often quoted, that our supremacy will never be heartily accepted so long as any doubts are felt as to our ultimate intentions towards native states.

But is there nothing to be said on the other side? Is the Government policy the result of sheer fatuous blindness? Have they not a single argument? It would be unjust to deny that they have a very good argument indeed, so far as it goes. The country has been brought under English administration into the most flourishing and prosperous condition. Are we to throw all back again, allow the population once more to be oppressed with iniquitous exactions, and tacitly watch a distinct step taken backwards in the direction of despotism and degradation? As Mr. Mill has put it, though without special reference to the present case, "A tyrant or sensualist who has been deprived of the power he had abused, and instead of punishment is supported in as great a wealth and splendour as he ever enjoyed; a knot of privileged landholders who demand that the State should relinquish to them its reserved right to a rent from their lands, or who resent as a wrong any attempt to protect the masses from their extortion; these have no difficulty in procuring interested or sentimental advocacy in the British Parliament and press. The silent myriads obtain none." Lord Canning, again, friendly as he was to the claims of the native princes, has left on record his conviction, "founded on experience of the past, that if the authority of the British officers were removed, or even hampered, the peace and prosperity of Mysore would be at an end." These considerations are plainly of the greatest weight, and point to a grave danger attendant upon any steps incautiously taken in the Rajah's favour. If the alternative lay between annexation and the immediate restoration of his kingdom to the Rajah, to be brought by

him and his successors into the dark bondage of old times, no honourable Englishman could hesitate about pursuing the former course, at whatever ultimate risk. But this is not the alternative, nor anything like it. There is a course open by which we shall allay the dangerous alarm of the native princes, preserve the reputation of the British Government for good faith and gratitude, avail ourselves of the native social forces for the benefit of the "silent myriads," and make for ourselves an unrivalled opportunity for the infusion of such European ideas as it may be desirable and possible to introduce. The son adopted by the Rajah is a child. Let him be recognised on the Rajah's death, and instead of leaving him to grow up anyhow, as the present Rajah was allowed to do at the beginning of the century, let us surround him with the best European and native influences that are within reach. The present chief minister of the Rajah of Travancore, although a native, was brought up at a Government school in Madras, has been penetrated with European ideas, and has been for years doing his best to introduce them into his government. When the young Rajah came of age, European influence would still be present in the shape of a Resident and his assistant officers; only the main object should be to leave the general administration as much as possible in the hands of native officials. The Residency, if inspired by something better than the sinister ideas of the Calcutta Foreign Office, would be a standing guarantee against the oppression of the population by the emissaries of the prince. This has been tried with success in Travancore. What objection could there be to a similar experiment in Mysore? Only this, that the English Government would have fewer places to give away, and as Mysore is a pleasant land, flowing with milk and honey, Anglo-Indian officials would think themselves very deeply wronged if any trifling considerations of imperial policy were allowed to weigh against their personal interests. In the scale against the official love of patronage and place, let us set the conviction expressed in a recent petition to the House of Commons by a body of men of the greatest consideration both in India and in this country: "A combined system," they say, "of British possessions and protected states, under which all external and foreign affairs, the general principles of taxation, legislation,

principalities, can be dictated and controlled by the imperial power, while the details of administration in the dependent states are carried out by native authorities, has always appeared to your petitioners to be the system best calculated to maintain the supremacy of Great Britain, and to secure the peace and prosperity of India : to promote a fair balance between centralized and localized government, to institute a visible chain of allegiance and responsibility, and to provide for the gradual enlightenment of the less civilized religions and races, not only by the example of good order in the British provinces and direct guidance by British functionaries, but more effectually by the practical experience and established habits of native princes, ministers, and officials." The same persons go on to show, that there are special reasons why this combined system of British protection and supervision should be tried in Mysore. They find in it the very type and example of what a protected native state ought to be. Nearly one-third of its gross revenue is available for imperial uses, amounting to one-half of the total payments of the tributary states. Under its treaty engagements the British Government may interpose its authoritative counsel for the improvement and control of the law and administration. And, lastly, all the machinery has been so reformed by the British Commissioners as to be now in the most perfect working order. With reference to the government of India, people at home are ordinarily content with a very rough-and-ready theory. They suppose that our only business is to superimpose European civilization upon Oriental barbarism, and that the latter will eventually be crushed out. But this shows what is not, perhaps, a very wonderful ignorance of the working of social forces. In taking all the government, from its principles down to its lowest details, into our own hands, what are we doing? First: we are forgetting that Hindoos and Mohammedans are not Hottentots or Troglodytes, but a population with ideas and laws and traditions and beliefs and prejudices. We are ignoring all these; and instead of recognising them as active forces, which may be partially controlled and utilized, we pen them up, to burst upon us some day with the accumulated violence of years. Second: we are freeing those high-caste natives, who have unbounded influence over the populace, from any sort of responsibility for the

friendless, and without any means of authentic and wide information as to the concealed working of all those forces which operate none the less powerfully because we choose to suppose that they are extinct.

And this brings us to a point which, if its weight with the mass of Englishmen be considered, ought perhaps to have been placed at the very head and front of my argument—the wishes of the population. I think we can scarcely help agreeing with Mr. Prinsep, that a petition for the Rajah's restoration, signed by between 7000 and 8000 persons, when "10,000 signatures might be expected to be at his command at any time in the city and environs of his immediate residence," must be set down as "of no value whatever." The Mysore Commissioner, whose communications, by the way, are sometimes more like those of a gossiping maid-of-honour than those of a grave and responsible official, assures the Foreign Secretary at Calcutta that the signatures are chiefly those of the Rajah's tradesmen. Very likely this is the case. Still not many words need be expended upon the *à priori* probability of a native Oriental population desiring the restoration of the representative of a long line of rulers, and preferring to be governed by their own countrymen rather than by people whom they regard as they might regard irresistible but odious demons. To the Oriental the Englishman, not improved by being one of the dominant race, is a veritable Yahoo. Sir Frederick Currie said in 1863 that from his own experience he cannot doubt the truth of the report that "the people are now anxiously awaiting our decision in this case; that they will be exceedingly disappointed when the truth of this decision is known; and that our philanthropy will cause discontent throughout the length and breadth of the province." If I had space for a digression, I might expatiate upon the marvellously improved interest in the natives on the part of the Government, who only four years since, to suit purposes of their own, re-transferred large districts of the Nizam's territories, that had been eight years in British hands, to what is authoritatively declared to have been a "more corrupt and tyrannical government than ever that of Mysore was in its worst times." To convict the Government of hypocrisy, however, would be no great triumph. But it is im-

the people as a plea for not restoring his throne to the Rajah, when our own system of administration could be carried on by him under the supervision and control of a Resident. It may be said indeed that the prince thus restored would be a puppet, a mere *roi fanéant* in the hands of an English Mayor of the Palace. Even if he were, if this be the form of government most congenial to the natives and most conducive to our own interests in the country, what reason is there why we should not lend ourselves to what, at the most, would be a piece of harmless pageantry? Surely we are not such consistent sticklers for hard fact in all our matters of government at home, as to think compliance with a taste for a royal puppet too dear a price to pay for the invaluable results of disarming the perilous distrust of the other native princes, and establishing a model of what a Protected Native State should be.

Apart from theoretic notions of our duty as the superior race in a conquered country, there is one powerful consideration which even the most high-handed and unscrupulous kind of politicians may be able to estimate. Every increase of the Indian territory governed directly by us involves an increase of military and civil expenditure. It is the latter item which accounts for the zeal of the officials in the cause of annexation. And we have the testimony of Earl Canning himself that "we shall not become stronger so long as we continue adding to our European force; and the additions to that force which we already require are probably as large as England can conveniently furnish, and they will certainly cost as much as India can conveniently pay." As it is, we have a peace establishment of about 70,000 British troops for India. Every annexation may be said, on Lord Canning's authority, to necessitate an increase of this large and expensive force. And in corroboration of this we have the statement of the petitioners against the annexation of Mysore, a statement uncontradicted by the authorities, "that every new province absorbed since 1848 has proved a burden on the revenues of her Majesty's older possessions in India; for instead of any surplus having ever been derived from the States thus annexed, the Imperial treasury has been constantly called on to supply their deficiencies." In the rebellion of 1857-9 the number of troops was raised to 100,000. If there is any doubt as to the cost of

attached to the reports of the most impartial and experienced of Anglo-Indians, the incorporation of Mysore is just one of those measures most likely to pave the way for renewed disaffection and its disastrous consequences. This is what we are risking; and to gain what? A very slight, and in the long run very questionable, increase of revenue from the Mysore territory, and a few more places to give away to the officials of the Indian Government. It is for this that we expose ourselves to a drain upon our military resources, which, if it came when we were engaged in any other struggle, would be mortally calamitous. Without this possible drain of 50,000 additional troops, the necessity of maintaining the ordinary peace establishment makes us confront Europe and the West in the attitude of a man with one arm fast tied up. We have abandoned our legitimate influence in the West in order to annex in the East. We preach moral suasion in Europe, so that we may be free to practise material repression in Asia. We make ourselves despised in one continent, in order to make ourselves hated in another. It would be paying many of our Cabinet Ministers of either party much too high a compliment to say that this is their deliberate policy. They have replaced our old, and in many points our bad system of "Thorough," by the new, and in all points the worse principle of "Drift." There is no such thing as policy. Each incident in each department is considered and settled just as it turns up. A bit of tittle-tattle from the Rajah's Court,—the statement that his Highness joked about some member of the Madras service,—this is the kind of material of which the modern State Paper is composed, on which the English Minister is supposed to shape his decision and which, if he be a self-willed man, determines the policy of the empire. The story of Mysore illustrates only too perfectly the perils in which the "Drift" system may involve us in matters not immediately under the public eye. The only consolatory reflection is that in this instance public opinion may even now come into operation, and reverse a policy which is opposed alike to all principles of justice and to the expediency of the hour.

JOHN MORLEY.

INDIAN ANNEXATION.

(From the *Examiner*, April 1, 1865.)

WE thought that the annexation of Indian territory was for ever at an end. Not so, however, for within three years of the great rebellion to which this annexation so largely conduced, and within a still shorter time of the denunciation of the policy of that measure by the Queen's proclamation by the Governor-General, confirmed by the approval of two Secretaries of State, we find that an annexation on a very handsome scale was in the contemplation, and seems, indeed, still to be in the contemplation, of the Indian authorities. Mysore is the country in question, and may be briefly described. It is about the size of Ireland, that is, contains good 30,000 square miles. It is a table land rising from 2500 to 3000 feet high, and therefore, although lying between the 12th and 14th degrees of latitude, is from 8 to 10 degrees cooler than the region lying on the sea-level. It is wonderfully well watered, having the peculiar advantage for India of partaking of the rains of both monsoons. In short, it is a very fertile land, with a population, chiefly Hindoo, of some 4,000,000, and a yearly revenue of about a clear 1,000,000*l*.

About four centuries ago, when India was known to Europe only by name, and America not known to it at all, an adventurous Rajpoot prince, pushing his fortune from north to south, founded the kingdom of Mysore, and he is the ancestor of the existing Rajah as much as Henry the Seventh is of Queen Victoria. In 1731, the Rajah of Mysore, an infant, became a mere puppet in the hands, first of a Hindoo Mayor du Palais, and eventually of the celebrated Hyder Ali, who, from a common trooper, made himself a powerful sovereign, the ablest, the bitterest, and the most dangerous of all the Indian enemies of England; Burke's black cloud, "compounded of all the materials of fury, havoc, and desolation, which hung for awhile on the declivities of the mountains," and then burst, pouring all its contents on the plains of the Carnatic, was of his concocting.

Hyder Ali was succeeded by his almost equally celebrated

two Mohammedan princes lasted but thirty-eight years, when the dynasty terminated by the capture of their capital, Seringapatam, and the death of Tippoo in the storm, in the year of 1799, or the last but one of the last century. The real hero of this achievement was the Governor-General, the future Marquis Wellesley, and it must be admitted that he made a generous and, as the sequel in similar cases has proved, a wise and politic use of his conquest. After dividing some territories, chiefly conquests made by Hyder and his son, between the British and their ally, the Subah of the Deccan or Nizam, he resolved on restoring the ancient kingdom of Mysore to the descendant of its native sovereigns, then a child of six years of age. "A lineal descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore," says Lord Wellesley in one of his dispatches, "still remained at Seringapatam, but whatever might be the hopes from the moderation and humanity of the conquerors, this young prince could assert no right to any share of the conquered territory." Such being the case, it was bestowed on him by the free gift of the conquerors, that is virtually, of the British Government, for the share of the native ally was purely nominal. The cession was accordingly made by an express treaty.

For the first twelve years after the cession, the Government of Mysore was carried on smoothly, for the Rajah was in his minority, and the administration conducted by a Mahratta Brahmin, one of the class of Hindoos who are the financiers of Southern India, and who well understand the art of extracting the utmost revenue short of risking insurrection. But a palace intrigue ousted the Brahmin from place, and, at sixteen, the boy king proclaimed his own majority, and assumed the reins of government. The British Government, by the express enactments of the treaty, his perpetual tutor and guardian, stood by with folded hands and did nothing. His political education had been left to his mamma and his grandmother: he governed as badly as his protectors could wish; he squandered two millions left him by the Brahmin financier; he added to the taxes, and he produced a partial insurrection by these sure means.

This course of maladministration was allowed a free rein for twenty years, when, in 1832, the whole kingdom was sequestered,

a whole generation—been ruled by English officers like an old British province, all remonstrance on the part of the Sovereign of Mysore being evaded or left unheeded. There was one man on the spot, who afterwards became great, who foretold, even within five short years of the restoration of the Rajah, what the result would be of leaving him to the tender mercies of the Government of Madras, under which he was placed. This was the future Duke of Wellington, at the time a young major-general, and the present is one of the many examples which his Indian career yields of a quick and most sound and judicious prescience. “The Government of Fort St. George ought,” said he, “to have no more to do with the Rajah than they have with the Subah of the Deccan or the Peshwa. The consequence of the continuance of the present system will be that the Rajah’s Government will be destroyed by corruption, or, if not by corruption, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil, or who has the strength or character or talents to defend the Government of Mysore.” The future duke certainly knew the men of authority well. Of a future governor of that presidency, Sir Thomas Munro, he had in some respects a high opinion, but he knew him to be an avowed enemy of a native principality in Mysore and an equally avowed friend to its annexation. The very man who afterwards sequestered Mysore as Governor-General happened to be Governor of Madras at the moment the duke was writing, and in his political views is well known to have been under the inspiration of the same Sir Thomas Munro, a shrewd, keen Caledonian, and writer of excellent English. The functionaries of Madras, it must be admitted, have not been happy in their diplomacy, for the men who now winked at the corruption of Mysore with seeming hope of annexation, happened, unluckily for them, to be the successors of Burke’s “incorrigible and predestinated criminals,” the men who brought Hyder’s invasion on the Carnatic. They, indeed, did not, perhaps, mean mischief, but they pursued the very policy which led to it.

Lord Dalhousie favoured the annexation of Mysore as advocated by the smaller local politicians, and this was, of course, to be expected from one who, in the course of his eight years’

Rajah, when his lordship wrote, he said, was sixty-two years of age, as he informed himself, of a short-lived family, no reigning prince of his house for twenty generations having reached the age of sixty. Such being the case, he could not be expected to live long, and, not having male heirs or intending to adopt one, his kingdom would necessarily lapse to the original donor, for to name a successor was not to be thought of. In the Minute in Council in which these notions are recorded, Lord Dalhousie observes that the treaties by which the kingdom was bestowed on the Rajah "are silent as to heirs and successors. No mention is made of them; the treaty is exclusively a personal one." No heirs are certainly named, for an obvious reason. It would be contrary to Hindoo law to do so, since the Hindoo sovereign names his own heir, having, moreover, the legal right of adopting one, while, even failing his doing so, the power rests with his eldest surviving widow. But the treaty contained words still stronger than those of heirs. It was called "a treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance," made to last "as long as the sun and moon shall endure." And so Lord Dalhousie's limits to the endurance of the sun and moon were confined to the lifetime of a single prince of a short-lived generation! His lordship's hopes have been signally defeated. The man of sixty-two, whose shortness of life was reckoned upon, still lives at seventy-one, and openly and publicly affirms his determination to exercise his lawful right of naming his own heir.

All this was well enough for Lord Dalhousie, a professed annexationist. But what can be said for Lord Canning, who, to our great mortification, turns out to be an annexationist also in so far as concerns Mysore—he who published the Queen's proclamation confirming the native princes of India in their hereditary dominions, while he himself added a confirmation of the right of adoption? He had personally witnessed the evil effects of the rapacity of his predecessor's administration and the benefits which were derived during the rebellion from his own moderation and abstinence towards the native princes. "Should the day come," said his lordship, as late as 1860, "when India shall be threatened by an eternal enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern empire shall incur more

those native states. But, to make them so, we must treat their chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity, teaching them that, in spite of all suspicions to the contrary, their independence is safe, and we are not waiting for plausible opportunities to convert their country into British territory, and convincing them that they have nothing to gain by helping to displace us in favour of any new rulers from within or without."

We are utterly dismayed at finding the noble lord, at the very moment of writing those sentiments, actually contemplating the overthrow of the kingdom of Mysore, and the repudiation of a solemn treaty then but three score years old, and to the enactments of which there were still living witnesses. Wonderful is it to see an English gentleman of high integrity, blameless life, and eminent ability, when transmuted into an Indian politician, fancying figments and adducing reasons which would damage the reputation of a village attorney. "It has been supposed," said his lordship, "that he will bequeath his kingdom to the British Government. I say supposed, because there is no formal or official evidence of his purpose." He himself knows it, however, through an entirely private channel, which channel, however, he does not name, and he soon discovers, by letters from the Rajah himself, that the whole story is a fiction, and that his Highness entertained no such sentiments as those ascribed to him. His lordship then writes a letter to the Rajah expressive of deep disappointment, so angry, so discourteous, and expressing sentiments so utterly adverse to his avowed professions, that some have fancied he was not its actual author, for it seems to have been despatched in haste, and was, indeed, the last important act of his public Indian life, in all other respects so eminently meritorious.

It has been said that we have received no valuable consideration for our grant of Mysore to its native prince. If this were true it would assuredly be no excuse for a most flagrant breach of good faith. But it is not true, for we have received the full value of what we bargained for, the fame of generosity, humanity, and moderation, the avowed and proclaimed price which the framer of the engagement himself stipulated for, with the admitted loyalty of the donee and his family in the long period of sixty-

annual tribute of a quarter of a million a year, so punctually paid that up to the present time it has amounted to the handsome total of 16,500,000*l.* For very shame let us hear no more of Mysore annexation !

THE MYSORE RAJ.

(From *Allen's Indian Mail*, April 22, 1865.)

As the case of the venerable Rajah of Mysore is likely to be brought before Parliament in the course of the present Session, it may be worth while to give a brief outline of the dealings of the British Government with this native State. Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahauder is the lineal descendant of the ancient princes of that country. Towards the middle of the last century, however, the power passed from the hands of the sovereign into those of his Prime Minister, an hereditary officer, who constituted himself a Mayor of the Palace. Some years later regal functions were usurped by Hyder Ali, though the mockery of the royal title was still bestowed upon the feeble representative of the ancient rulers of the land. At the death of Tippoo Sahib it was discovered that the throne was both nominally and virtually vacant, for the Rajah had died some months previously while the Sultan was too much occupied in preparing for his final struggle with the British to pay any attention to his royal puppets.

The territory that, by right of conquest, became the joint possession of the East India Company and their faithful ally the Nizam, in superficial area exceeded Ireland, and from its comparative elevation is one of the most delightful regions of India. Lord Wellesley's counsellors, including Sir Thomas Munro, were eager to divide this fine country between the conquerors, reservation being made of a small slice for the Peishwah as the reward of his neutrality during the war with Tippoo. The Governor-General, however, took a more provident view of the question. He saw that a mere extension of the frontier was by no means an advantage, and in the present instance the principal northern passes leading into Mysore would be placed in the custody of the Nizam. The British possessions would thus always have been open to attack, while the power of the Nizam would have been

dangerously augmented. At the same time he recognised the inexpediency of placing upon the throne any member of the usurping family, the inveterate enemies of the English, and, consequently, inclined towards a close alliance with the French, at that time dreaded all over the world. Luckily a third course suggested itself, and was at once adopted by the Governor-General. Without any unnecessary delay the representative of the ancient Hindoo rulers was raised out of the abject poverty into which the Royal race had sunk, and was declared the sovereign of Mysore. The ceremony of installation was performed with much pomp and circumstance. The infant prince, for he was not more than five years old, was received at the entrance of the building temporarily erected for the purpose by the British Commander-in-Chief and the chief officer of the Nizam's forces; and taking him, one by the right hand, the other by the left, General Harris and Meer Allum conducted him to the ivory throne of his ancestors, on which he seated himself under a Royal salute from the artillery and three salvos of musketry from the infantry.

The new kingdom thus happily inaugurated was somewhat less extensive than the one that had formerly existed under the sway of the Rajah's forefathers. Equal portions had been abstracted for the benefit of the Company and their ally, while a third tract had been set aside for the Peishwah, of which two-thirds were subsequently yielded to the Nizam. Two treaties were drawn up on the occasion, the one ancillary to the other. The Partition Treaty defined the limits of the new kingdom of Mysore, and of the respective acquisitions of the East India Company, and their ally; while the Subsidiary Treaty regulated the future relations that were to subsist between the Rajah and the British Government. His Highness engaged to receive a military force from the Company for the protection of his dominions, for the maintenance of which he undertook to pay the annual sum of 245,000*l*. On the other hand he was to keep on foot at his own charge an effective body of 4000 horse to serve wherever the British Government might think proper to send them. He further pledged himself not to hold any communication whatever with any foreign State, or to suffer any European to enter his service.

any time there was a failure in the funds destined to pay the subsidy, or if the British Government had reasonable grounds for apprehending such failure, power was given to the Governor-General in Council "either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the Government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Behauder, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder as shall appear to him, the said Governor-General in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient or available either in time of peace or war." It was further agreed that "whenever and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed, and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the said East India Company, the Governor-General in Council shall render to his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed." It was likewise stipulated that in no case whatever should "his Highness's actual receipts or annual income arising out of his territorial revenue be less than the sum of one lac of star pagodas, together with one-fifth of the net revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him." Finally, his Highness promised to "pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both States." This treaty, as stated in the preamble, was to be binding upon the contracting parties "as long as the sun and moon shall endure."

As the tender years of the Rajah incapacitated him from a king any part in public affairs, the actual administration was entrusted to a Brahmin, named Poorneah, who had been Finance Minister to the late Sultan, and was an adept in the collection

under his rule, ought to have been singularly prosperous; but Poorneah appears to have thought much more of accumulating money than of "developing the resources of the country." He was also fortunate in having large stores of sandal-wood to dispose of; and thus, on his forced resignation in 1811, upwards of two millions sterling in hard cash were found in the royal coffers. The young prince, though only sixteen years of age, took the reins of government into his own hands, and, his education having been altogether neglected, things very soon went utterly to the bad. For twenty years a reckless and improvident system was carried on, without thought for either the prince or the people; but all this time the Madras Government looked on supinely, only occasionally offering a feeble remonstrance. In 1830, however, a rebellion broke out in the north-western districts of Mysore, for the suppression of which the aid of the British troops was applied for and granted, according to the treaty. But this insurrection was converted into a justification of the assumption of the entire management of the country, although, so far from there being any apprehension of a failure in the funds destined for the pay of the troops, the subsidy was actually in advance. Lord William Bentinck, in after times, deeply regretted the hastiness with which he had acted with regard to Mysore, and more than once said that it was the only act of his Indian administration that he looked back upon with regret. Sir Charles Metcalfe also qualified the supersession of the Rajah as a "harsh and unprovoked" measure, and both he and Lord William were in favour of reinstating his Highness, care being taken that the country did not again fall into the hands of unprincipled administrators. The Court of Directors, however, were averse to any sudden cancelment of the sequestration of the country, although they expressed their desire that respect should be paid to native usages, and that no system should be introduced which could not be worked afterwards when the country was restored to the Rajah. That dispatch was written in the autumn of 1835, and the country has not yet been restored, in spite of the urgent petitions of the Rajah to each successive Governor-General. The Home Government indeed—using Sir William Denison as their mouthpiece—affected to be puzzled as to the possibility of ever placing his Highness in his former position.

was made in the treaty for such a contingency. And yet the treaty clearly enough indicates that only a temporary occupation was ever contemplated, for it provides that *so long as any part or parts* of the Mysore kingdom shall remain under the control of the Company's government, the Governor-General shall render to his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenue collected in his territories. Lord Auckland was more reasonable, though particularly careful not to commit himself to any precise date for the restoration of the country to its rightful prince. The administration, he wrote, was to remain on the existing footing until the arrangements for the good government of his Highness's territories should "have been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance." Twenty-nine years have elapsed since that intimation was given, but apparently the arrangements are not yet satisfactorily established.

And now it is pretended that the Rajah is excluded from the right of adoption accorded to all the other princes and chiefs of India ranking above a Jagheerदार, because his territories were not personally governed by him at the time of the proclamation of the Adoption Despatch. But if the treaty did not contemplate the reinstatement of the Rajah, if once superseded, nor the Adoption Despatch confer upon him the right to name an heir, how came it that Lord Canning was so anxious that his Highness should "bequeath his kingdom to the British Government?" If he had the power to will away his territories, surely he had power to adopt an heir. The noble earl, however, attached great importance to the bequest of the country "in full sovereignty to the Crown, by the free will of the ruler, and in a spirit of loyal attachment to the British power." In truth, the Rajah has never been backward in testifying his "loyal attachment," and even Lord Canning sent him his "warm thanks" for the good services rendered by him during the critical period of the Indian mutiny. The only valid objection to the reinstatement of the Rajah lies in the fertility of his kingdom, and its general desirableness as a British possession. The spirit of annexation still sits in the Council Chamber, and perverts the judgment of otherwise upright and incorruptible statesmen. But there is one point which seems to have been overlooked by each successive Viceroy. If the native kingdom of Mysore, constituted in 1799 out of the joint

spoils of the East India Company and the Nizam is to cease and determine on the death of his Highness, it is not the British Government alone that will come into the inheritance. The Nizam will certainly be entitled to reclaim his moiety, and if that claim be not allowed, her Majesty's Government will simply be guilty of a gross act of robbery and spoliation. But it cannot be that the British Parliament will carry its culpable indifference on the subject of Indian questions to such an extreme as to silently acquiesce in the absorption of this native kingdom. It would be an act that would shake all faith in the sincerity of the Queen's Proclamation, and would go far to undo all that has been done and won by the liberal policy inaugurated on the final suppression of the mutiny. And Parliament must do something more than record its votes. It must see that its decrees are carried into execution. It is useless to order the restoration of Mysore unless that order be executed. The principality of Dhar is still kept back from its lawful ruler, and so will it be with this fine table-land unless very peremptory injunctions are issued for its immediate restoration to the venerable Rajah.*

(From the *Morning Standard*, November 22, 1865.)

THE Minister, whoever he may be, upon whom will devolve the duty of bringing forward the next Indian budget, will possibly be able to say that the amicable relations with Bhootan, just announced by telegraph, have been maintained. But we much mistake if he will not find it necessary to give considerable attention to a storm in another quarter, which—though moral elements only be at work—threatens to prove of very serious import. We allude to the affairs of Mysore, the absorption of which state by the British Government is known to be impending upon the death of the present titular Sovereign, against that Sovereign's will and the will of his subjects. The adoption of a son the other day by the dispossessed Rajah was not, on the face of it, a very remarkable measure; for the course is customary among Hindoos having no natural heirs, and is believed to be essential to their

* For a fuller and more detailed history of this disgraceful case we refer our readers to "The Mysore Reversion, an Exceptional Case." By Major

salvation. But in the present case the action is taken in the face of the declaration of the paramount Power that the Rajah has no territory to bequeath, and that the child whom he adopts will not be recognised as his representative. It is evident that out of these conditions a very serious difficulty is likely to arise; and it behoves Parliament and the public, to whom the Rajah is making a last appeal, to ascertain why his claim should be officially declared "exceptional," and why the renunciation of the annexation policy in the Queen's Proclamation, and the recognition of the right of adoption by a separate act of Government, should go for naught in his favour.

Since 1854 the ancestors of the present Rajah of Mysore may be considered to have been independent Sovereigns; but their power fell from them after the accession of a minor to the throne in 1731, when the Prime Minister became the virtual ruler of the country; and a series of difficulties arising with which nobody else was able to deal, the celebrated Hyder Ali, who had commenced his career as a simple trooper, became master of the situation, and soon made himself master of the state. He did not pretend to the nominal sovereignty; but this also was assumed by his son and successor, Tippoo Sahib, who took upon himself all the style and emblems of royalty. When, in 1799, the Mussulman ascendancy at Mysore was overthrown, by the capture of Seringapatam, the British Government concluded a treaty with their ally, the Nizam, by which it was agreed to divide the country into three portions, two to be taken by the contracting parties respectively, and the third to be given to the representative of the Mysore Princes, then an infant, and now the claimant to whom we refer. By the terms of the treaty known as the "Partition Treaty of Mysore," the Rajah was to be placed in a tributary and dependent position towards the British Government, in return for its military protection, and as security for the regular payment of a fixed military subsidy and of additional contributions in time of war. In the last words of the preamble to this document, it is declared that all articles, "by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties so long as the sun and moon shall endure, and its conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said con-

Treaty," with the Rajah himself, is further described as one of "perpetual friendship and alliance," subject, of course, to the conditions laid down, which have never to this day been broken.

How the Rajah fell into misfortune was in this manner. Himself an infant at the time of his accession, the reins of government were entrusted to one Poorneah, a Brahmin, who had been Tippoo's Finance Minister, and who had considerable reputation in revenue matters for his success in putting on the screw. This man had everything his own way for some years, the youthful Rajah in the meantime having his education carefully neglected by his mother and the ladies of the harem, who gave him the kind of training most adapted for his future ruin. Dissensions and intrigues were inseparable from such a conjunction, and the palace and the durbar had their share, until at last the "Palace Party" prevailed, and in 1811 Poorneah was finally deprived of power, the Rajah, then at the ripe age of sixteen, declaring his majority and taking the rule into his own hands. Of course he could not govern, and the British authority, which had allowed his training to take its chance, made no attempt to help him in his responsibility. So things which soon began to grow bad, soon after began to grow worse. In a native state, good government mainly means a good revenue, and this particularly fell off. As old taxes were neglected, new ones were adopted to reinforce them. The people did not like the addition, called it oppression, and open insurrection was the consequence—not general, but confined to a particular district. This was in 1830; and the British authority, which had taken no effectual means for prevention, now decided with remarkable promptitude upon the nature of the case. The insurrection having been put down, Lord William Bentinck, who had become Governor-General two years before, acting upon what we are assured were "the exaggerated representations of the Madras Government," despatched to the Rajah an intimation, couched in terms of great severity, that under the provisions of the Treaty of 1799, the British Power had determined to take into its own hands the management of Mysore. There was nothing for it, therefore, but for the Rajah to surrender his authority, which he did with all submission; and two Commissioners were at once put in charge of all the departments of

Rajah's court the semblance of diplomatic relations between the two sovereign Powers. This measure was avowedly temporary, and in the exercise of the sole right to which the Government could pretend—that of interference in the event of having reasonable ground to anticipate failure in the payment of the subsidy; but even then such interference would be limited to the part or parts of the territory that might need assistance, the occupation of the entire state being never provided for by the treaty. However, the hold then gained has never been relaxed, but only tightened from time to time. Thus the office of resident has of late years been abolished, the principality being ruled by a Commissioner exercising all the powers of the governor of a province; and of late, in official correspondence, even the style of Rajah of Mysore has been denied to this unfortunate Prince, who is now described simply as the Rajah *residing* at Mysore. To say that his Highness took his own part in the matter and tormented the Government with appeals, is only to say that he was an Eastern Prince with a grievance. By judicious management the finances were restored to a prosperous footing, and then surely the British Power could have no doubt about the payment of the subsidy. But this excuse wanting, a plea of misgovernment was set up—although such a contingency was not referred to in the treaty—and incapacity for rule on the one side, was made a pretext for retaining it on the other. From 1834 to 1847 the Rajah never ceased to claim his restoration. Three Governors-General—Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe, and Lord Hardinge—admitted that his supersession was inconsiderate, unduly severe, and of doubtful legality. Neither the Supreme Government nor the home authorities ever rejected or contested his claim, but only postponed their consent to a more convenient season, placing before him the prospect of reinstatement as soon as an orderly administration had been established. It was not until 1847 that the determination to deny the claim became apparent; and since that period it has been either ignored or met with a decided negative. Yet, in 1857, the Rajah, who has never failed in his loyalty through all his troubles, was so zealous a supporter of British interests as to win a letter of thanks from the Government for his conduct. The first great blow which he

to have been strangely misled in reference to the case. In reply to a memorial from the Rajah, Lord Canning, just before his departure from office, wrote to him a formal refusal of his claims upon grounds which are for the most part clearly untenable. His lordship declares that the Marquis Wellesley, when making the treaty, retained the right of conquest and prescribed the details of the partition of the territory which was acquired by British arms; that the Subsidiary Treaty was necessarily subordinate to the Partition Treaty, and that the British Government, in the exercise of the rights of conquest which they had acquired, had the same power to take away that they had to give; that the Rajah forfeited his position by misgovernment, and that the treaty, being a personal one, does not apply to his descendants, even though they be natural-born heirs. Such is the substance of Lord Canning's argument, which is fallacious in several important particulars. Lord Wellesley, if not surrendering the rights of conquest, at least made those rights subservient to the conditions of the treaties, and his successors have no justification for falling back upon those rights in order to break those treaties—which are clearly broken by the retention of Mysore. And even if the treaties allow the lapse, the state must fall, not to the British Government only, but to the British Government and the Nizam—the contracting parties to the partition and subsidiary settlement. It is true that the protectorate of the state was given to England, as having had the largest share in the conquest; but in the case of its reversion the Nizam would resume his original right; and, after all, the Nizam, who is so coolly ignored by Lord Canning, contributed no less than 20,000 men, with establishments in proportion, in aid of British arms. To deny him his share now is not precisely the treatment which we should give to an European ally, or that an European ally would consent to accept; nor, indeed, is it to be supposed that the Nizam will give his concurrence to the arrangement. But whatever action the Nizam may take in the matter, the Rajah's claim has plainly legality on its side, and cannot be rejected or ignored without not only grievous injustice to the claimant, but infinite mischief to ourselves. For, let Mysore become British territory, and nothing will persuade the “princes, chiefs, and people of

mation are not all moonshine, the Adoption Despatch so much waste paper, and British honour a thing to be talked about in time of difficulty, but having no existence when we are strong enough to do without it.

(From the *Morning Standard*, January 4, 1866.)

WE have no desire to reopen the case of the Rajah of Mysore, which has been already discussed in these columns. The long suspension of that unfortunate Prince from power, and the impending annexation of his territory, will doubtless suggest one of the many awkward questions which threaten the Secretary for India in the coming session. But in the meantime it is most important that a certain act of the local authorities in relation to his Highness should not pass unnoticed, for it involves an even more dangerous precedent than the principal wrong. The appropriation of the territory has of course been made upon some kind of pretence ; but the subsequent action of Government involves a breach of religious toleration and an invasion of personal liberty, without any attempt at justification, and in ostentatious defiance of the law of the land.

The sequestration of the state of Mysore—now administered by a British Commissioner—was made upon the pretext that the Rajah was unable to keep order among his subjects, and so secure the payment of a certain subsidy to our Government. It was never asserted that his Highness was in any way hostile to the paramount power ; nor was there even the smallest foundation for such a supposition. On the contrary, the loyalty of this prince was conspicuous even in the trying times of the mutinies, when a bold bid for his rights would have had a fair chance of success. Remonstrances and protests he has made from his early manhood up to his present old age ; but he has uniformly confined himself to strictly legitimate efforts, and his official relations with the British authorities have never been otherwise than of a friendly character. There can be no excuse, therefore, for depriving him of any measure of personal liberty which is allowed to the rest of her Majesty's subjects in India ; and the restraint which has been placed upon such liberty brings a serious responsibility upon its authors. As for the facts, they are plain enough, and rest upon

the authority of official correspondence published at Madras. In referring to the relations thus made, we may remind our readers that the Rajah a short time since adopted an heir in accordance with the requirements of the Hindoo faith, which enjoins such a course, in the failure of a natural inheritor, as necessary for salvation. The British Government, having determined upon the annexation of his territories at the Rajah's decease, refused to recognise the adoption; for although Mysore is administered only on behalf of the Rajah, who has never been formally deposed, his case has been declared exceptional, and not included in the acknowledgment of the general right of adoption granted by our Government, which limits its application to existing rulers. The quibble is unworthy of those by whom it is advanced, and is admissible even as a quibble only upon the ground of the existence of an illegal state of things. That is to say, our Government have kept their hold upon the country long after the original cause has passed away, and in violation of the treaty by which they obtained a joint share in its protectorate, and then turn round and say that his Highness not being a *de facto* ruler, is excluded from the benefit of the general concession.

The circumstances referred to are briefly these. The subjects of the Rajah, represented by a number of influential native gentlemen, who look up to him as their legal ruler, and naturally take a warm interest in his recent act of adoption, determined upon presenting him with an address of congratulation upon the event. For this purpose they applied to the Sheriff of Madras to convene a public meeting, at which such a testimonial might be discussed and agreed to. The sheriff, who doubtless had an official disrelish of the idea, returned answer that the subject was not of sufficient importance to justify him in complying with the requisition. The promoters of the movement, therefore, determined to take the duty upon themselves. The result was a great gathering of their friends, at which the address was adopted by an unanimous vote. The proceeding was a perfectly legal one, and the addresses delivered upon the occasion were free from any element of disloyalty. There was nothing, in fact, to warrant interference or even objection on the part of authority; and the practice among the natives of such a constitutional method of

to encourage rather than repress. But an unexpected difficulty arose in the conveyance of the address to his Highness. The deputation appointed for the purpose having proceeded to Mysore, despatched a letter to Major Elliott, the superintendent of the district, informing him of their mission, with the object of which the Rajah was already acquainted, and desiring permission to wait upon his Highness. To this application Major Elliott returned a curt, cold, formal, and not quite courteous reply, referring the deputation to the Commissioner, and reproving them for having been guilty of a breach of etiquette in not having solicited an introduction from that official before venturing to approach the person of his Highness. The deputation therefore made application to Mr. Bowring, enclosing Major Elliott's communication, with a very proper complaint as to its tone. But the Commissioner was worse than the superintendent. Through the cold medium of his secretary he gave them a decidedly warm lecture upon the monstrous breach of etiquette they had committed in not applying to him in the first instance, an omission, however, which he was considerate enough to ascribe to their ignorance. With regard to their "self-imposed mission," he declared that it was disagreeable to the Rajah, as a source of expense and embarrassment; and he pointed out to them the obvious advantage they would have gained by going at once to the official mountain-head, in being told at the outset what he told them now—that orders recently received by him from the Government of India precluded his presenting them to the Rajah for the purpose intended. His missive concluded in these terms:—"While regretting the inconvenience to which you have been put, the Commissioner does not consider it necessary to invite you to return to the province." The deputation, however, were not quite defeated. They returned to the charge in a communication which must have been irritating from its temperate tone, but in which they managed to say this—that so far from being a self-imposed mission they were deputed by a large body of their countrymen; that so far from putting the Rajah to any expense, the cost of the demonstration had been defrayed by the meeting; that if embarrassment had been caused to his High-

and they further requested, since the Commissioner would not allow them access to the palace, that he would present the address to the Rajah on their behalf. For this purpose they forwarded the document to him through the post. This was too much for the Commissioner, who trusted himself with very few words this time, but returned the address with a brief rejoinder declining to be the agent in the matter.

Thus it appears that a native prince, not only holding his titular rank, but being the nominal ruler of his territory, may be denied his personal liberty in the important respect of holding communication with his subjects, and be reduced to the condition of a state prisoner, without even the imputation of any offence either in his own person or through others, or departing in any way from amicable relations with our Government. The precedent is a very awkward one, and leads to the natural suggestion that the caprice of arbitrary power may not stop at this point. That it will have a most mischievous effect upon the "princes, chiefs, and people of India," to whom her Majesty's proclamation made such flattering promises, is beyond a doubt. Hitherto political aggression has been conducted in one of two ways—by sheer force, or the pretence at least of legality. But here we have an act of personal restraint exercised towards an ally for which no justification whatever can be offered. And who of our other allies can say that his turn may not come next? Friendship will be considered no guarantee. The Rajah of Mysore has been always friendly, and his fidelity has been put to a very strong proof; but this virtue has not saved his kingdom, and it will not, apparently, save his person, if found to be unpleasantly in the way. Legal means of attaining an object will not be held to secure safety. Nothing could be more legal than the Rajah's proceedings and those adopted by his subjects. The natural tendency of such a lesson as this is to drive natives with grievances into secret machinations, so that we shall not know what they are about until the occurrence of an unpleasant crisis. This is not quite the way to strengthen our hands in India, or even to maintain ourselves on the existing footing; and the present embarrassment—for embarrassment it must prove to be—should be a warning of the consequences of taking one false step. We have

no right for many years past; and we have admitted the real tenure of our position by never formally dispossessing the Rajah of his country. All we have ventured to do is to indefinitely postpone a reply to his repeated appeals, and form a quiet determination to clinch our hold upon the kingdom after his death. By exercising the right of adoption—the pretence of excluding him from which is derived entirely from a state of things created by ourselves—his Highness has made a legitimate counter-move, and in order to resist it we have no other resource than to refuse it recognition, and attempt by illegal means to stifle opinion upon the subject. Such a course of action, unworthy as it is of a great nation, must be well understood in India, and the religious element, necessarily involved in the affair will not, it may be easily imagined, detract from its damaging effect.

(From the *Daily News*, August 2, 1866.)

It seems to have occasioned some surprise that on the only two opportunities yet afforded Lord Cranborne for publicly announcing his political programme, he should have taken pains to express his strong disapproval of the policy of annexation. It has been remarked that in his election speech at Stamford his sole reference to Indian topics was an elaborate protest against this policy.* Yet in the debate on the Budget there were two or three facts mentioned which seemed to indicate that the protest was not only necessary and well-timed, but that it had an immediate bearing on the course which Lord Cranborne has marked out for himself. He sums up his political creed in the resolve to “keep peace and push public works,” and he probably grudges the heavy expenditure now required for our large Indian army, and thinks how much more profitably a part of it might be invested in irrigation, railways, or roads. But his only hope of being able materially to reduce our military expenditure lies in the establishment of profound tranquillity throughout India; and India cannot be really tranquil so long as the native princes entertain the slightest suspicion that the all-powerful British Government is disposed to avail itself of any plausible pretext for annexation. And, inasmuch as this suspicion is still enter-

Secretary's early and emphatic renudia-

tion of all thoughts of annexation was not only expedient, but even essential to the success of the policy he has mapped out.

There are, no doubt, many who believe that the policy of annexation is as dead as Queen Anne, and that Lord Cranborne went out of his way to slay the slain. But this belief only shows how little Englishmen know about what is going on in India. Probably not one in a hundred had ever heard of "the little principality of Mysore," to which Mr. Smollett referred the other night, and not one in a thousand knows that for years the Government of India have been manœuvring to get possession of it. Throughout the whole of India the Mysore case has long been anxiously watched, and keenly discussed, as a question involving interests of imperial magnitude, in consequence of the apprehensions which the annexation of the kingdom could not fail to awaken in the native mind. Yet in England, to the general public, the very name of Mysore is unknown.

Sir Charles Wood was by no means a popular minister, and yet, without one protest from Parliament, and barely one protest from the English press, he was allowed to commit himself to a measure of annexation which, in the opinion of those who know India best and have her interests at heart, will affect the welfare and even the security of our whole Indian empire, by spreading terror and distrust among the native states. Until a deputation on the subject went up the other day to Lord Cranborne, no public protest had been made. This silence, moreover, was maintained by Parliament in face of the fact that, even by his own Council, here in England, Sir Charles Wood was vigorously opposed. Five of its ablest and most experienced members—Sir George Clerk, Sir Henry Montgomery, Sir John Willoughby, Sir Frederick Currie, and Captain Eastwick—all earnestly protested against the annexation of a loyal and friendly state as both dangerous and unjust. Now that the mutiny is beginning to be forgotten, India is forgotten with it. There is, again, as much point as ever in the old saying, that a broken head in Whitechapel creates a greater sensation among Englishmen than does a revolution in Hindostan. Not that there is much reason to apprehend that a revolution, or even a riot, would be the immediate result of the annexation of Mysore. The danger lies in the effect the measure would produce upon the minds of the

native Princes, by giving just ground for their suspicion that the policy of annexation is still alive; and hence the paramount necessity that the new Secretary of State for India should take the earliest opportunity of repudiating this policy. As appeared from the debate in the House of Commons, the wildest rumours are afloat in India about "the designs entertained by officials in high places upon Scindia and Holkar," and "the danger in which even the past services of the Princes of the Rajpoot States were of being forgotten." We know nothing as to what is meant by this allusion to the Rajpoot Princes, but the rumour about Scindia and Holkar is perhaps traceable to the fact, in itself sufficiently alarming, that they have both written to England in urgent remonstrance against the annexation of Mysore. Such a fact speaks volumes, and we cannot wonder that the wildest rumours are based upon it; and however absurd these rumours may appear to Englishmen, who know into what utter disfavour the annexation policy has fallen in England, and who even believe it to be dead, it is not at all difficult to understand why among the natives such rumours should obtain general credence. They have no key to the rapid changes in English public opinion, and they know that only a few years ago the annexation policy was in full force and favour, producing effects the memory of which it will take generations to efface. It is no doubt true that the Queen's Proclamation most explicitly disclaimed all wish for further acquisitions of territory, and that Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch was full of similar protestations. So far as words went nothing could be more reassuring or conciliatory than his statements that "the safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of native chiefs well affected to us;" that during the mutiny native States "had served as breakwaters to the storm, which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave;" that renouncing henceforth our policy of annexation, we intended to treat their "chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity, teaching them that, in spite of all suspicions to the contrary, their independence is safe, and that we are not waiting for plausible opportunities to convert their country into British territory; and convincing them that they have nothing to gain by hoping to displace us in favour of any new rulers, from within or from without."

This language was, indeed, all that could be wished, but unhappily the native mind, constitutionally prone to take Talleyrand's view of the use of language, had already been taught by the great apostle of annexation himself, Lord Dalhousie, that it was quite possible to declaim in the most virtuous strains against annexation, and yet somehow at the same time annex. His despatches contain denunciations of "ambitious greed" quite as explicit as those in the Queen's Proclamation, or Lord Canning's despatch, and perhaps quite as sincere, since his matchless skill in framing fair *prétex*ts for unfair acts enabled him to impose upon himself as easily as for a time he imposed upon the world. If he had been simply a violent aggressor or unprincipled intriguer, the baneful influence of his policy might gradually have been obliterated by an upright successor. But, high-minded and honourable, yet guilty of dishonourable acts, he taught the natives a lesson they were only too ready to learn, to associate honest professions with dishonest practice, and trust our good intentions least when we paraded them most. No wonder, then, that the friendly professions contained in the proclamation and the despatch—so novel, moreover, and so completely at variance with our former policy—were regarded by the natives as requiring some practical confirmation, to show the sincerity of our sudden conversion, and that they have been anxiously awaiting the first case by which to judge for themselves whether we really meant all we said under the immediate influence of the terrible lesson taught us by the mutiny, or whether there was still to be the old Dalhousian discrepancy between our words and our acts; and as this first case happens to be the Mysore case, can we wonder at the consternation and disgust with which they heard that in the face of all our professions of friendship, of our belief in the importance of "maintaining native chiefs," and our gratitude for their services in the hour of danger, we, nevertheless, intended to annex the territories of a loyal and friendly ruler—a ruler whom the Queen herself pronounced the "oldest and staunchest of her Indian allies?" They may well give credence to the wildest rumours about "the designs of officials in high places" upon Holkar and Scindia, and the Rajpoot Princes. If the Queen's "oldest and staunchest ally" is thus treated, who can be safe? Holkar and Scindia may well write to England,

for they enjoy in full the friendship and alliance which have proved so perilous to the Rajah of Mysore. It is marvellous that a man of half Sir Charles Wood's capacity should not have seen that this one act, giving as it so palpably does the lie to all our professions, would completely undo whatever good effects may have been produced by the Queen's proclamation and Lord Canning's despatch, and that the natives would look upon these and all future assurances as idle pledges made in the hour of our weakness, to be thrown to the winds in the hour of our strength. And in this case what becomes of Lord Canning's hope, that "should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in the native States, which will serve as breakwaters to the storm that might otherwise sweep over us in one great wave?" Yet English journalists of ability are found to condemn Lord Cranborne's studious profession of friendship to the native States, not on the ground that our professions are now regarded with so much suspicion that it is safer to withhold them until they can be accompanied by acts, but because, forsooth, the policy of annexation is dead.

We have heard it argued that as the native Princes know that Lord Canning did not send his adoption-despatch to the Rajah of Mysore, they are prepared for the annexation of the kingdom. But it is no secret in India, whatever it may be in England, that Lord Canning withheld his adoption-despatch from the Rajah because he then believed that the Rajah intended to bequeath Mysore to the British Government, and he saw it would interfere with this intention if he sent the Rajah a formal permission to adopt, since the people of Mysore would naturally wish this permission to be given effect. This argument, therefore, begs the question at issue as completely as does the other stock argument of the annexationists, that we are bound to take possession of Mysore "in the interests of the people." The Rajah has formally declared that he has no wish to alter the present system of administration, and, apart from his wishes, there is a treaty empowering us to introduce into Mysore such regulations and ordinances as we may deem fit. Nor is there anything to prevent.

English principles, and surrounding him with able and enlightened advisers. Similar influences have converted Travancore, once our enemy, into a friendly and prosperous State, furnishing an example to all India; and we might with ease make just such another model State of Mysore, a monument at once of our forbearance and our strength. It is strange that those who honestly put forward the "interests of the people of Mysore", should overlook the duty which, as the paramount Power of India, we owe to the multitudes still under the dominion of native chiefs. These latter sometimes really require protection from oppression and misrule, and we might constantly interfere on their behalf if our motives were above the suspicion of greed. But if we were to seize Mysore, how could we ever again interfere with the internal administration of a native kingdom without being suspected of making the interests of the people a pretext for annexing the State. We should be throwing away a splendid opportunity of proving our disinterestedness, and showing that, in deed as well as in word, in the hour of our safety and strength, and not merely in the hour of our weakness, we have renounced for ever the dreaded and dangerous policy of annexation. We should be wantonly opposing a grievous obstacle to those reforms in India by which alone we can discharge, in a manner worthy of a great nation, our imperial trust. We cannot better fulfil this trust than by teaching the people to govern themselves, and encouraging such native States as Travancore and Mysore, overshadowed by our influence, and amenable to our control. If the Mysore Rajah's rights were purely imaginary instead of being matter of written treaty, it would still be a wise imperial policy to recognise them. The recognition need not be treated as a reversal of the policy in favour at Calcutta, and upheld by a former Government, but as an act of free grace and favour on the part of the Crown. That grace could be better extended to no one than to a ruler whom the Queen herself pronounced the oldest and staunchest of her allies.

A fertile and pleasant province like Mysore, providing a cool summer retreat for Government, and snug berths for sons and nephews, may seem a rich prize to Indian officials; but it is marvellous that any English statesmen, taking from a distance a comprehensive survey of the great empire of India, and mindful

of the giant career that, for good or evil, lies before it, should have failed to see that twenty such provinces as Mysore would be dearly purchased if their possession crippled the influence which it is our high mission to exercise upon the future of India, by shaking the confidence of our native subjects and allies in our moderation and even our good faith.

(From the *Morning Star*, August 2, 1866.)

It is not very long since the intelligence from India was watched with far more painful eagerness than reports of battles in Bohemia or even the final struggles of the American combatants. It seemed then that we could never forget the story of Cawnpore or the heroic defence of Lucknow—that for the future the affairs of India must ever be interwoven with the threads of our own political life. There were, however, not wanting those who predicted that when the crisis was passed and our authority firmly re-established, an interval of chilling, if not perilous, apathy would ensue; and that it would be well for us if we at last awoke from the slumber of years without the occurrence of another and a greater catastrophe. Neither our statesmen nor the public were in the mood to listen to forebodings which could only prove true on the assumption that England failed to learn the lesson which was taught her by the mutineers, and that she would hereafter neglect the duties she owed to the greatest of her dependencies. So long as Lord Canning remained at the helm it was certain that India would be ruled with the utmost conscientiousness and good faith. If Lord Elgin had been called upon to play a part in questionable transactions, it was not the less true that he had exhibited the highest executive and administrative qualities in a succession of important colonial Governments. When Sir John Lawrence was appointed he went forth to govern the empire which he was believed to have saved amid an all but universal chorus of praise. Without wishing to detract from the merits of an able and eminent public servant, we think it would have been well if those in authority had remembered that the administrator of the Punjaub was also a disciple of Dalhousie, and

his faith in a policy of annexation. In his eye, as in that of his far more unscrupulous master, the native princes are excrescences to be removed, their Courts either costly pageants or hotbeds of corruption, and their territories blotches on the map so long as they retain a quasi-independence in the midst of British rule. We readily exonerate Sir John Lawrence from the imputations of perfidy and unscrupulousness which darken the fair fame of Lord Dalhousie; but the fact nevertheless remains that the present Governor-General belongs to the same school as the annexer of Oude, of Nagpore, and of half a dozen other tributary States.

From all that we can learn, Sir John Lawrence has made up his mind to annex the territory of Mysore on the death of the present Rajah, who is now between seventy and eighty years of age, and has long passed the average length of days of his short-lived family. Yet the Mysore dynasty has reigned, with the exception of one short interval, for four centuries; the rights of the present Rajah, who was raised to the throne in 1799, when he was only a child, are secured by a treaty to which Lord Wellesley was a party; and the reigning Prince was "faithful among the faithless found" when the mutinies were threatening to engulf our Indian empire in a vortex of ruin, and when it only needed the torch of civil war in the Presidency of Madras to divide the British forces and to give to the conspirators in the Northern Provinces a reasonable prospect of consummating their rebellious designs. The history of our relations with Mysore, from the time that, acting in concert with the Nizam, we rescued this ancient sovereignty from the temporary yoke imposed upon it by Sultan, and placed Mysoor Kishna on the musnud, is not one which an Englishman can read with self-complacency; for while the Indian Government reserved to itself a certain right of interference, and actually exercised that right in a manner so high handed and unjustifiable that Lord William Bentinck subsequently put on record the expression of his sorrow for what he had done under a grievous misconception of the facts, no provision was made either for lessening the tribute paid to the East India Company when it was found to be far in excess of what the people could pay, or for instructing the young Prince in the science of government. He was left to do the best he could for himself and for his people with the knowledge that a crash, if

hungry annexationists were ready to heap up complaints against him at the Viceregal headquarters, and were only too eager, if the opportunity should arise, to pounce upon his territory and divide the official spoil which whetted their cupidity. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, his reign has been a popular one. He has been repeatedly panegyricized by successive Viceroys, and his services during the mutinies placed him on an equality with such princes as the Maharajah of Cashmere and the Rajah [of Puttiala. But although upon every ground of public faith the sovereignty of the chief of Mysore is entitled to as much respect from us as if it were a thousand miles distant from India, Sir John Lawrence has intimated that on the death of his Highness the succession will pass into our hands. The only pretext for such a monstrous proceeding is that the Rajah's family is extinct in the direct line, and that in conformity with immemorial Hindoo custom, he has adopted, from a collateral branch of his house, a son and heir, whose right to succeed him he has proclaimed in the most solemn and formal manner, and amid the unanimous rejoicings of his subjects. The Rajah formally apprised the commissioner at Mysore of what he had done; and on the 29th of March, 1864, the Viceroy sent this reply:—

“The Rajah has a full right to adopt so far as his private property is concerned; but his Highness must be distinctly informed that no authority to adopt a successor to the Rajah of Mysore has ever been given him, and that now no such power can be conceded him.” We say nothing of the arrogant terms in which this missive is couched, although the individual who penned it, and he by whom it was dictated, might have consulted with profit the pages of some polite letter-writer. But those who remember the Queen's Proclamation, published in 1858, which repudiated any desire on her Majesty's part to extend her territorial possessions, and pledged her royal word “to respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as her own;” and who also remember Lord Canning's despatch confirming the Hindoo law of adoption—will see how completely the Governor-General's letter is at once an act of usurpation and a breach of a solemn and binding contract. Besides, upon what ground of legal right does the Viceroy claim to give or refuse the Prince that power to adopt a successor which the Calcutta Foreign Office says has been with-

held? It is not conferred upon us by the treaty which placed him on the throne; it has not been surrendered by him; and it is therefore clearly a right inherent in the sovereignty.

Should the annexation of Mysore be accomplished, it will prove as fruitful of disaffection as the greased cartridges or the annexation of Oude. Many of the most enlightened and experienced public men whom India has produced, or who have made a reputation in connexion with Indian politics, are profoundly convinced of the injustice, as well as danger, of the policy which Sir John Lawrence threatens to pursue towards Mysore. We were glad that some of them—men like Sir Henry Rawlinson, Mr. Grant Duff, Colonel Sykes, Major Evans Bell, and Mr. Dickinson—have lost no time in memorializing Lord Cranborne on the subject; and we hope that the new Secretary of State will be able to revoke the approval which it is believed a majority of the late Cabinet gave to the mischievous projects of Lord Dalhousie's favourite pupil.

(From the *Daily News*, August 16, 1866.)

MR. GOLDWIN SMITH'S powerful letter deprecating the annexation of Mysore must have considerably astonished that large class of educated Englishmen who read with interest whatever bears his signature, but who, as a rule, have little leisure or inclination to concern themselves about Indian affairs. The policy of annexation was indeed only a few years ago brought painfully home to all classes by the terrible tragedy which it helped so largely to bring about, and which for once redeemed even Indian topics from the unpardonable sin of dulness. But, as annexation was rarely or never mentioned in public or in private but to be decried, and as even the Government both here and in India officially treated it as an error of the past, for which they promised the most ample atonement in the future, it was naturally enough looked upon as for ever exploded and banished beyond all hope of recal. Hence the surprise which was recently expressed at Lord Cranborne's elaborate and repeated disavowal of an acquisitive policy, and which made one critic facetiously declare that the

Jacobite, but intended to give his loyal support to the House of Guelph.

The annexation of Mysore can obviously confer no greater advantage upon us than a slight increase of revenue, and though, perhaps, less obvious, it is not a whit less certain that it threatens the very existence of our Indian Empire. We got, on the whole, so well out of the Mutiny of 1857, that, though it is not exactly a pleasant page in English history, there is already a tendency to make light of its dangers, to hold that it gave the natives a proof of British invincibility which they will not wish renewed. But the natives know very well that the mutiny failed so egregiously merely because it was so absurdly mismanaged. Rebellion, like everything else, requires practice, and a second attempt would be a very different affair from the first. The first broke out, by a mere accident, too soon, and thus not only spoiled the half-matured plans of its leaders, but further deprived them of the inestimable advantages of concert. A few months, or even weeks more, and a far larger area of sedition would have been prepared; and what did still more to make the mutiny a failure was the want of powerful leaders. It would have presented a very different aspect if the leading chiefs, the owners of the great historical names of the country, had been leagued against us. There is little doubt that a word from the very Rajah whose territory we are about to take, by way of showing our gratitude for his forbearance, or from the Nizam, would have set Southern India in a blaze. Lord Canning was not a man to conjure up imaginary peril, and he certainly had no motive for under-estimating the actual perils over which he had triumphed. Yet he deliberately put on record his conviction that the conduct of the native princes during the crisis had saved our Empire. Yet these are the men whose confidence in our friendship and good faith we are deliberately throwing away, in order to "add a little to our revenue, at the cost of some loss of character."

The present danger of seizing Mysore consists chiefly in the fact that the Mysore case is the first that has occurred since the Queen's Proclamation and Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch, and that the eyes of the native princes are therefore eagerly bent upon it, as the first practical test of the sincerity of our marvelous and sudden conversion from the Dalhousian policy so popular

before the mutiny. But within fifteen years some other case is pretty sure to occur in which we shall have no temptation to refuse to practise the honesty we have professed. By this forbearance we shall not only have more character than at present to spare for an act of spoliation, but—what is obviously more important—we shall considerably lessen the risk to our throats, since the native princes will see that we are not utterly dishonest, or deliberately bent upon wholesale annexation, although our virtue may not be proof against a prize so tempting as Mysore.

Mr. Goldwin Smith's un-Indian readers must have mentally asked, when they had finished his letter, how on earth any Secretary of State not in Hanwell could have deliberately committed himself to a policy which, "if successful, may, at the cost of some loss of character, add a little to our revenue, but which, if unsuccessful, may plunge the empire and Indian society in confusion and disaster." Hopelessly perplexing as the question may appear to those who do not know anything of Indian politics, it presents little difficulty to those who do. Lord Chesterfield, laughing at the pompous historians of his time, who thought that for every big result there must be some equally big cause, declared that the greatest events in history occasionally owe their origin to circumstances of the most contemptibly trivial character. Two powerful nations are plunged into war, and the face of Europe is changed because one ambassador insults another over his cups, or lampoons the favourite poodle of a king's mistress. Lord Chesterfield, as being at once a statesman and a leader of fashion, had ample opportunities for testing the truth of his theory, which, however inapplicable to an age of telegrams and "special correspondents," was no doubt applicable enough to an age in which half a dozen diplomatists, at a secret conference, determined the fate of an empire. And, as regards diplomacy, India is nowadays very much what England was in the time of Chesterfield. It is no less free—perhaps it is even more free—from the publicity which can alone keep diplomacy under control. An Anglo-Indian official, for instance, finds himself called on to report on the capacity for administration displayed by a native prince. He naturally looks at the question from the narrowest point of view, and without any reference to imperial con-

However honest and high-minded he may be, it is not in human nature—certainly not in British nature—that he should prefer the system of a native prince to a system which is not only British, but has the further merit of being his own. His view is, therefore, unfavourable to the prince, and he has every facility for getting this view accepted at head-quarters.

On all occasions the Government apply to him for information, and he must be more than human if he does not, in his answers, give disproportionate prominence to whatever facts supports his own preconceived theory. The present Commissioner of Mysore is one of the ablest and most upright officials in India, and yet in a state paper of the highest importance addressed to the Supreme Government he is not ashamed to insert such tittle-tattle as this:—"In the course of our conversation regarding the decision of Government against his claim, the Maharajah suddenly changed the subject, and began to joke about a certain retired officer of the Madras army; returning for a time to the question before us, he again broke off to talk jocosely about an officer in the commission: such has been his character through life." We are not blaming the Commissioner, who may have honestly believed that "jocoseness" was the most signal proof of unbusiness-like habits that a prince could give. He would probably have reported even more unfavourably of an interview with the late Lord Palmerston. It is not the man that is in fault—he is expected and encouraged to supply his superiors with information of this kind—but the system of confidential correspondence by which a kingdom is gossipped away as easily as the character of an old maid. In this way one official, looking at the question from a strictly local—we might almost say personal point of view, and without a thought of the immense imperial interests at stake, commits the Calcutta Government, which in its turn commits the Home Government. The nation is, of course, blissfully ignorant and indifferent on an Indian question, and so there is no pressure from without to resist the pressure from within. However, the petition presented to Parliament by Mr. Mill, and the letter of Mr. Goldwin Smith, whose powerful intercession will secure him the lasting gratitude of all interested in the welfare of India, show that public attention is at last being aroused to the Mysore case, and that Lord Clarendon

borne will not want influential support in his resolution to oppose the annexation policy of Calcutta.

(From the *Homeward Mail* of August 20th, 1866.)

THE Mysore annexation question, which for a long time seemed to be quietly rotting on Lethe's wharf, has been launched again on the flowing river of public discussion; and may, perhaps, under judicious management, take a place among the miscellaneous topics of discourse which are thrown up by the necessities of the recess, and fill newspaper columns, in the shape of outside correspondence, whilst parliamentary reporters are taking their autumnal rest. Hitherto the times have been singularly unpropitious for such discussion. Great party conflicts at home, and great national wars abroad, occupied the public mind throughout the session, to the almost entire exclusion of all interest in Indian affairs; but now that we have subsided into our normal state of quietude, subjects which had lain for months in a state of suspended animation have been galvanized into a state of fresh vitality, and even the threatened annexation of an Indian province may be considered worthy of an occasional column in a daily paper. In these favourable circumstances we are again hearing something about Mysore. It has received a new impetus from the trumpet of Mr. Goldwin Smith, who has come forward in the columns of the *Daily News* to condemn, as an act equally unwise and impolitic, the annexation of the province to our Indian empire. It is very true that Mr. Goldwin Smith says nothing on the subject which has not been said scores of times before; but if he does not bring any new arguments, he brings a new name to the discussion, and that goes a great way. It is, at all events, something to see what a highly intelligent and cultivated outsider thinks of a matter beyond his ordinary circles of thought, which he approaches without any foregone conclusions or any prejudices to warp his judgment. His opinion may not intrinsically be worth as much as the opinion of a man who has been studying Indian history and Indian politics during the greater part of his life; but it will perhaps carry more weight with it in the estimation of the general public, because it is an "old Indian" view of the question.

most elaborately and exhaustively in the minutes of several of the leading members of the Council of India, which were laid before Parliament and printed in the Mysore Blue Book. But the Mysore Blue Book may be said to have fallen almost stillborn from the press. This is attributable, in part, to the fact that the papers were issued at a time when public attention was diverted into other channels. But something, we are afraid, must be assigned to the normal indifference with which the public, described by the *Daily News* as "un-Indian readers," regard the utterances of old Indian officers. - But, whatever may be the cause of the little effect produced by the publication of a collection of the most remarkable State-papers, illustrative of any Indian question, which India has thrown up since the days of the great mutiny or rebellion, the fact exists, and in the presence of such a fact we welcome with more than ordinary satisfaction the appearance of Mr. Goldwin Smith in the arena of Indian controversy, and the support which he has received from the *Daily News* and other liberal journals. For we do not think that the above-named organ of public opinion really overstates the case when it says that "Mr. Goldwin Smith's powerful letter deprecating the annexation of Mysore must have considerably astonished that large class of educated Englishmen who read with interest whatever bears his signature, but who, as a rule, have little leisure or inclination to concern themselves about Indian affairs. The policy of annexation was indeed only a few years ago brought painfully home to all classes by the terrible tragedy which it helped so largely to bring about, and which for once redeemed even Indian topics from the unpardonable sin of dulness. But, as annexation was rarely or never mentioned in public or in private but to be decried, and as even the Government both here and in India officially treated it as an error of the past, for which they promised the most ample atonement in the future, it was naturally enough looked upon as for ever exploded and banished beyond all hope of recal. Hence the surprise which was recently expressed at Lord Cranborne's elaborate and repeated disavowal of an acquisitive policy, and which made one critic facetiously declare that the new Secretary might as well have told the public that he was no Jacobite, but

if people were surprised that Lord Cranborne should think it necessary even to refer to a policy which they fondly imagined to have been long since buried and forgotten, what must be their astonishment at learning that only the other day the late Government finally resolved upon the annexation of Mysore—a measure fraught with consequences so important to our empire that it may fairly be described as ‘a turning point in our history as an Indian power,’ in consequence of the alarm and distrust it will excite among the native princes, who will no longer be our trustworthy allies with the knife of annexation at their throats?” To the Indian reader it may appear somewhat strange that facts which have been officially before the public for many months, and well known to the initiated, we might almost say for years, should now, on the declaration of Mr. Goldwin Smith, “astonish a large class of educated Englishmen;” but it certainly is true that many people who will not read in a Blue Book what is written by high Indian authorities, such as Sir George Clerk, Sir Frederick Currie, Mr. Mangles, Mr. Eastwick, Sir John Willoughby, Sir Henry Montgomery, and Mr. Prinsep, will read in the columns of a newspaper, what is written by Mr. Goldwin Smith, and, therefore, the services of a free lance from the ranks of the outside public are always, in such a case, of immense value.

It need scarcely be said in this place that in the general tenour of the arguments adduced both by Mr. Goldwin Smith and by the editor of the *Daily News* we heartily concur; because they are arguments which we have reiterated in the columns of this journal. But we think that the *Daily News*, in its article of the 16th, falls into an error in attributing to the representations of Mr. Bowring, the present Commissioner of Mysore, the unfavourable opinions of the Maharajah’s character, upon which, in some measure, was based the adverse reply given to his demand for the restoration of the Government of the province. This is certainly an anachronism. A reference to the dates given in the published correspondence will convince our cotemporary of this; for Sir Charles Wood’s despatch, disposing of the claims of the Maharajah is dated July 17, 1863, whilst Mr. Bowring’s report, quoted in the *Daily News*, bears date February 18, 1864. But, of course, this report is cited in corroboration of the alleged

justice of the recorded sentence, and the remarks, therefore, of the journalist are not less applicable to the case, when he says:—

“An Anglo-Indian official finds himself called on to report upon the capacity for administration displayed by a native prince. He naturally looks at the question from the narrowest point of view, and without any reference to imperial considerations, with which he considers it not his province to deal. However honest and high-minded he may be, it is not in human nature—certainly not in British nature—that he should prefer the system of a native prince to a system which is not only British, but has further the merit of being his own. His view is, therefore, unfavourable to the prince, and he has every facility for getting this view accepted at head-quarters.” We are afraid that, as a general rule, this is only too true. But it must be recorded that there are honourable exceptions to the rule. Men like Malcolm, and Elphinstone, and Metcalfe did not argue in this way; nor did they wish their subordinates so to argue. Nothing can be more emphatic than the manner in which the last-named statesman denounced these one-sided self-interested decisions, saying,—

“Several questions have lately occurred, in which our interests and those of other powers and individuals are at variance, and in the decision of which we are likely to be biassed by regard for our own benefit, unless we enter with a liberal spirit into the claims and feelings of others, and make justice alone the guide of our conduct. . . . In all these cases the right on our part to come to the decision apparently most beneficial for our own interests, seems to me to be doubtful. Had our right been clear, I should be far from having any desire to suggest its relinquishment. But when the right is doubtful, when we are to be judges in our own cause, when, from our power, there is little or no probability of any resistance to our decision, it behoves us, I conceive, to be very careful lest we should be unjustly biassed in our own favour, and to be liberal only in examining the claims and pretensions of other parties. The Christian precept ‘Do as you would be done by,’ must be right in politics as well as in private life; and even in a self-interested view we should, I believe, gain more by the credit of being just and liberal to others, than by using our power to appropriate to ourselves everything to which we could advance any doubtful pretension.” It is a

pity that such sentiments as these have been so often disregarded.

(From *The Athenæum*, August 25, 1866.)

THE famous proclamation of November, 1858, which Mr. Thurlow rightly calls the Magna Charta of India, is due to the Conservative party : but it was scarcely issued when it was falsified and violated by Lord Canning and Sir C. Wood in the annexation of Mysore. It is curious to see how this reprobator of the Company's "earth-hunger" speaks of this last flagrant injustice :—

"In 1832 the British Government again stepped in to quell the civil strife engendered by the utter incapacity for ruling of which the Rajah of its choice had afforded more than ample proof. Within a few years of this accession, this young prince had squandered upwards of two millions sterling of accumulations, while the revenue and public had both increased until all classes bordered on despair. The country then assumed by treaty has since been held and governed for that country's good, the Rajah being treated with great financial liberality and the political consideration to which his rank entitled him. The executive, however, was taken from him, and entrusted to a mixed commission of soldiers and civilians ; and the constant intrigues of more than twenty years to recover independence have hitherto been met by us with silence or refusal. Under English sway that promised land of India has attained a measure of prosperity unrivalled in the East. Her woody slopes, of many thousand feet in altitude, and many thousand miles in area, now produce coffee and cinchona ; and while the tiger and the leopard of the jungles are rapidly receding before the constantly advancing strides of European planters, the lofty plateaux have become the sites of peaceful cities, of which the climate is described as follows :—'At Bangalore, about three thousand feet above the sea, the thermometer has been found not to rise above 82° in the shade ; and the annual average at noon is 76°. The nights are never hot ; and while the evenings and mornings are at all times cool, there is an elasticity in the air at once invigorating and delightful.' Now it happened that the Hindoo Rajah of this fruitful country, when bargaining for payment of his debts and some reduction

executed a testamentary instrument in favour of the Queen of England, failing lineal descendants of his own; but the childless ruler, now verging on extreme old age, has since that time so far modified his views as to request the sanction of the paramount power to an adoptive heir. The much-vexed question of adoption thus threatened to destroy the building prosperity of Mysore; but, considering the extent to which European capital is invested there, and the daily increasing national value of the resources of the country, the Government of India, both in England and in India, steadily and very properly refused to release the Rajah from his plighted word; and there is now no reasonable doubt, that, whenever his Highness shall shake off his mortal coil, his territories will tranquilly become incorporated with our own."

If Mr. Thurlow had studied the subject at all, he would have found out that the two millions accumulated by Purneah were the great cause of the revenue collapsing when the young Rajah was put on the throne. That large sum was raised by grinding exaction, and the impoverished ryots were thus rendered unable to pay what would otherwise have been but a reasonable land-tax. The assertion that the country was "assumed by treaty" is incorrect. We were only entitled to assume the administration if the sum covenanted to be paid to the British Government should be withheld, and we even then could not assume more than such part as would enable the debt to be discharged." We should like to see some evidence that the Rajah "executed a testamentary instrument in favour of the Queen of England," and till that evidence is adduced, we shall take leave to utterly disbelieve the statement.

(From *Blackwood's Magazine*, September 1st, 1866.)

BRIEF as his tenure of office has been, Lord Cranborne has already applied a remedy to the personal grievances of the Indian officers. He has thrown open the Staff Corps to all without exception, and has arranged for getting out of the revenues of India compensation for the pecuniary losses with which they were threatened. Other difficulties, however, are not overcome.

John Lawrence, to annex the kingdom of Mysore on the death of the reigning sovereign, on the plea that he has no legitimate issue, and that on former occasions the Company refused to acknowledge the claims of adopted children. Now, this is perfectly true. We acted on this principle in various instances, and conspicuously so in the case of Nana Sahib, of which the result was a feeling of bitter hatred towards us in every region where the old customs of Hindooism prevail. We may go on with the practice if we will, because there is not force enough in Mysore to resist us; but if we do, we must make up our minds to the consequences—which may not show themselves to-morrow or next day, but will surely wait on us sooner or later. Lord Cranborne, we doubt not, will give his best attention to this point also; and if he do, we feel that the issues may be left safely in his hands.

(From the *Daily News* of September 17th, 1866.)

WE should be very glad to hear what a native of India had to say on any question affecting the interests of his country, and we therefore heartily welcome a pamphlet, just forwarded us, on a question so important as the contemplated annexation of Mysore. The pamphlet is entitled "*Adoption versus Annexation*," and is written by Vishwanath Narayan Mandlik, Pleader in her Majesty's High Court, Bombay, and is dedicated, by permission, to Sir George Clerk, Member of the Council of India, and twice Governor of Bombay. We trust that the good example which its author has set, in making this appeal to English public opinion, may serve as a precedent for his fellow countrymen. We can assure them that there is every disposition on the part of the English public to give the natives of India a fair hearing, and that if they will only put their grievances forward clearly and temperately, as the author of this pamphlet has done, they may count upon impartial, and even indulgent, criticism. They may have occasionally to complain of our misgovernment; but this is mainly due to the fact that, from our not unnatural inability as a nation to look at Indian questions from the native point of view, we cannot discern what they really want. Take, for instance, the question which this pam-

phlet treats—the Hindoo practice of adoption. It is almost impossible for an average Englishman to comprehend the social and religious importance with which this practice is invested by the Hindoo mind. It is to him almost unintelligible that any sane human being should look upon an adopted son—perhaps a stranger up to the moment of adoption—in the same light as a son born of his loins, and should as vehemently resent any injustice done to the first as to the last. We cite the practice of adoption, because it happens to be the one of which the pamphlet treats. But there are various other points, upon which the native feeling is rarely fathomed to its depths, even by the ablest Englishmen. Lord Dalhousie, with all his administrative capacity, failed utterly to realise the deep-rooted strength of what appeared to him irrational and flimsy prejudices, and, as a natural consequence, he was sowing the seeds of mutinous anarchy while he honestly believed himself to be introducing permanent reforms. It has been said that Lord Dalhousie, with all his talents, failed in this respect from want of experience. But, at any rate, he had more experience, as well as more ability, than the average Englishmen of whom we are speaking. Besides, even Anglo-Indians who have passed their lives in India, discharging the most important official duties, fall into the same error. Mr. R. D. Mangles, who has been thought worthy of a seat in the Council of India, draws, with triumphant assurance, a distinction between the right of the Mysore Rajah's adopted son to inherit the private estates of his father and his right to inherit the sovereign title.

Mr. Mangles might as well draw a distinction between Earl Grosvenor's right to the marquise of Westminster and his right to the Grosvenor estates. In the eyes of the Hindoo, the Mysore Rajah's adopted son stands to the Rajah in exactly the same relation as in English eyes Earl Grosvenor stands to the Marquis of Westminster. It may or may not be a flimsy and irrational native prejudice to treat an artificial tie, created by a few painfully pagan ceremonies, as if it were a natural tie of blood. But still it is a prejudice which in the eyes of all India—indeed of the civilized world—we have as a nation most solemnly sworn to respect. We should have discovered its absurdity before we

of the Government by the Queen's proclamation and Lord Canning's adoption despatch. And if these national promises are to bind us, if we are to treat the adopted son of a Hindoo Prince as a Hindoo would treat him, it is palpably absurd to maintain, as Mr. Mangles maintains, that the English Government has a right to say that a Rajah's adopted son may succeed to his father's private estates but not to his title. A son, half-recognised in this way, is a nondescript, for whom there is no place in Hindoo tradition or law. Such a relationship was never contemplated by Hindoo writers. The advocates of the doctrine put forward by Mr. Mangles have been over and over again challenged to produce a single precedent on their side, but they have failed to do so. Yet Mr. Mangles would have us believe that this semi-recognition involves no "outrage upon the religious feelings of the Hindoo community," for it must be remembered that the Hindoos regard adoption as essentially a *religious* rite. He might as well tell us that it would be no outrage upon English feeling, if Government told Earl Grosvenor that he might succeed to the estates, but not the marquise of Westminster, or if Government told Mr. Smith that he was perfectly at liberty to marry if he so pleased, but that the little Smiths would be bastards. As the author of the pamphlet puts it, the theory "of Mr. Mangles makes a distinction without a difference." "The right of a Hindoo to adopt is absolute," and "it is no less than adding insult to injury" magnanimously to tell a Rajah that his adopted son may perform the funeral rites which secure his father's salvation, though he may not inherit his father's title.

We have dwelt upon this point because it aptly illustrates the importance of such a pamphlet as the one we are discussing, and shows the paramount necessity of hearing from the natives of India themselves what they think and want. Here is an Anglo-Indian speaking *ex cathedra*, with all the authority of high official position, and all the weight of long and varied experience, and graciously undertaking, as he modestly puts it, to "brush away a fallacy spun to ensnare the ignorant," and we find him leading his unfortunate fellow-countrymen, who naturally look up to him as a guide, still further into the dark. We have heard

in favour of the annexation of Mysore as the clearest exposition and best defence of their policy. Among the blind the one-eyed is king. Happily there is yet time to save them both from "falling into the ditch;" and the pamphlet under discussion ought to contribute to this desired end. We may mention that we are not accepting the author's *ipse dixit* merely because he is a native of India, though on this ground we should prefer his opinion on a question of native law and feeling to that of an Englishman, albeit a member of the Indian Council. He supports his view with a formidable array of distinguished Hindoo writers, but their very names would strike terror into most English readers. We must refer to the pamphlet itself those who care to prosecute the inquiry. Indeed, the question seems to us perfectly soluble by common sense, without reference to authority. To the Hindoo, adoption is a most solemn religious rite; it is not optional, but in the highest degree obligatory. The English theory, therefore, that a Hindoo prince may adopt, if the paramount Power of India gives consent, but not otherwise, seems to us only a fresh illustration of the apparent impossibility for an Englishman to look at certain Hindoo customs from the Hindoo point of view. If he errs, however, he errs through ignorance, and this ignorance can best be removed by the natives of India coming forward themselves, as the author of this pamphlet has done, and telling us what they wish or believe.

(From the *Sunday Times* of September 23, 1866.)

A BRIEF recital, in our last, of the wrongs which the Nizam of Hyberabad endures from the government of India concluded with a promise of directer appeal to the material sensorium—or, more colloquially, the breeches pocket—of our friend and client, the British tax-payer. Redemption of that promise may be usefully prefaced by a glance at the analogous case of the Rajah of Mysore, with which that of the Nizam is, under treaty and otherwise, intimately connected. From the parliamentary papers, under date of March 13th ult., relating to that principality, it appears that Government contemplates extinction of the state and absorption of its territory, at the demise of the venerable reigning Rajah, on

is not entitled to succeed him in the sovereignty, without sanction of the paramount power. Such adoption is, nevertheless, in strict conformity with the law of India ; and the proposed nullification is not only incongruous with past recognitions in the vice-regal despatches of Lords Dalhousie and Canning, but stands formally condemned, on the minutes of the council of India, by five prominent members, headed by Sir George Clerk ; and the protest of men so experienced and distinguished against this menaced treatment of our ally of sixty-seven years' standing is, simply, the plainest of corollaries from patent historical facts and notorious obligations of treaty. Dissent from the project is, in fact, securely based upon the circumstances of 1798-1800, and upon the terms of alliance concluded with the Rajah and the Nizam in the second and third years of that period. Mysore is the joint conquest of the combined forces of the East India Company and the Nizam—wrested from the usurper, Tippoo, and restored to its ancient ruler in 1799. For this signal and fruitful overthrow the Earl of Mornington (better known by his later title, the Marquis of Wellesley) had elaborately and patiently prepared by negotiation and treaty with the Nizam, who was the first to discard and extirpate from his army the French element then gradually extending throughout the Deccan, as well as in the ranks of Tippoo. In the tripartite treaty which restored the Rajah to Mysore, and regulated the results of the victory, the usual attributes and titles of sovereignty were formally and spontaneously accorded, as they again were in the later arrangements of 1803 and 1807 ; and his highness was recognised as the sovereign of Mysore, in a state despatch of Lord Canning, so recently as March, 1860. The same treaty (of '99) is described, in its preamble, as one “ of perpetual friendship and alliance ”—words which were dictated by the Viceroy himself, together with the marked asseveration that such treaty “ shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon endure ! ” The same formula (invoking, moreover, the Divine blessing) occurs in the partition treaty with the Nizam, which ratifies the agreed cession and definition of territory, with the separate independence of Mysore. Two solemn treaties, valid and intact, are therefore wantonly defied, in the threatened act of annexation, together with the warning (no less solemn) which Lord Canning bequeathed in his celebrated adoption despatch, of

the 30th April, 1860 :—" Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected, so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards native states." Now, with allegiance so disheartened, and doubts so widely fermenting, that—as testified by Judge Edwards, of Agra—" all eyes are now fixed on Mysore," what chance, O tax-payer, of recalling any of those 70,000 soldiers from India who would just now be so mightily welcome at Chatham, and who may be anon more urgently needed? From that ample reserve it were idle to expect that we can ever recruit the home defence, so dangerously dispersed, unless the new policy recently foreshadowed take immediate and reassuring action in abandonment of this utterly indefensible scheme, and in juster dealings with our other ally, the Nizam, whose interests it so directly involves. Deliberately annulling the sovereignty and the treaty rights of native rulers, or even leaving them in restless mistrust of our faith and intentions, we relinquish all rational hope of consolidating upon peaceful and confiding relations a power which might easily dispense with at least one-third of the present enormous garrison.

THE MAN IN POSSESSION.—A STORY OF MYSORE.

(From the *Pall Mall Gazette* of September 26th, 1866.)

At the close of the last century the British army in India, commanded by General Harris, and directed by the youthful energies of Lord Mornington, advanced upon Seringapatam, the great stronghold of Mysore, captured it by assault, and killed Tippoo Sultan, the Mahometan usurper of the kingdom, and our own most inveterate foe. Associated with us in this enterprise were the troops of the Nizam, the great chief of Hyderabad in the Deccan, the moral results of whose alliance with the English in this conjuncture, were greater than its physical effects, for the hard and dangerous work of fighting fell chiefly upon our own regiments. It was an old feud. A war but half finished in the time of Lord Cornwallis was then brought to a close. For many years there had been an intense desire on the part of the English

and over and above his own especial cruelties to our countrymen he had become in a manner identified with revolutionary France; he flaunted the "Cap of Liberty," and was growing into an Oriental Napoleon. In such circumstances it was not strange that the English in India were eager for the overthrow of Tippoo, and had moreover strong legitimist sympathies in favour of the deposed Hindoo dynasty of Mysore. They knew little, and they cared little, about that dynasty; but to love legitimacy of any kind was to hate revolutionary France. Even in the first war we find General Meadows writing to Lord Cornwallis:—"I mean that the three Governors (English), the Nizam, and the Peishwah should dine at Seringapatam, with the old Queen of Mysore sitting at the head of the table. For my own part I freely confess that I should prefer the dignity and justice of dethroning the cruel tyrant and usurper, and restoring the kingdom to the Hindoo family—the lawful owner—to the wiser policy perhaps of only clipping his wings so effectually that he could soar no more in our time." What is here called the wiser policy was adopted with the limitation of "our time." But after Meadows and Cornwallis had returned to England, Tippoo Sultan soared again; the opportunity so long sought arrived; the family of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan became pensioners of the British Government, and the kingdom of Mysore lay prostrate at the feet of the conquerors.

The country might then, by right of conquest, have been divided between the British Government and the Nizam. But it was held that a moiety of the territory wrested from Tippoo would be inconveniently large, on administrative and political grounds, for either of the allies. There was, moreover, some of the old legitimist feeling, of which we have spoken, still alive among the chief people in India; so it was determined to erect, from the leavings of the English and the Nizam, a new, comparatively circumscribed, Hindoo principality in Mysore; and the legitimate representative of the old Rajah of the country, being then a child, was formally placed on the throne by the agents of the two Governments. A treaty known as the "Partition Treaty," between the English and the Nizam, guaranteed the rights of the restored dynasty; and a second treaty between the English and the new Rajah of Mysore, known as the "Subsidiary Treaty,"

fixed the relations between his Highness and the paramount State. It was a convenient arrangement for us at the time. It answered our purpose very well. It was in accordance with the declared policy of the British Government; and although the sagacity of the Governor-General may have foreseen the result, and some men, among whom was Thomas Munro, declaimed against our forbearance, the scheme was generally considered to be equally wise and just.

A "subsidiary treaty" is a treaty that secures the payment of a subsidy, or a certain sum of money, in return for which, in his case, the British Government were to furnish to Mysore the means, within and without, of military defence. In the event of any failure or any imminent likelihood of failure on the part of Mysore to pay this money, the British Government had, by treaty, the right to step in and assume the administration for its own security. It does not appear, however, to have been contemplated that this assumption was to be anything more than a temporary sequestration. The "man in possession" was to remain only until the debt had been paid, and something like security had been afforded, by the restoration of financial prosperity, for the payment, in successive years, of the annually accruing debt. During the minority of the young Prince, under the management of the famous administrator Purneah, everything went well, as far as the external relations of Mysore were concerned. The subsidy was punctually paid, and there was order throughout the principality. But soon after the Rajah took the direction of affairs into his own hands, there were symptoms of disorganisation, which continued to increase; the revenues fell off, and it was said that the subsidy was in danger. Whether this was actually the case, has been questioned. But after a while the advisers of Lord William Bentinck persuaded him that the time had come for the righteous interposition of the British Government; and so the administration of Mysore was transferred to the hands of a commission of English officers, a sum fixed by treaty was annually paid to the Rajah, and the surplus revenues were to be left to accumulate in the Mysore treasury. There are abundant proofs on the records of Government that neither in India nor in England was this regarded as more than a temporary sequestration. But years passed; order was restored;

the revenues increased, the surplus increased. There was no debt—indeed, there never had been any—to the British Government; but the “man in possession” remained. It is said that Lord William Bentinck repented of what he had done, and spoke after his return to England, of this act as the only one throughout his whole career the retrospect of which disturbed his conscience. But the Rajah never ceased to hope and to believe that the government of the country would some day be restored to his hands.

We pass over a period of twenty years, taking no note of his aspirations or his endeavours during all that interval, and come to the time when, after the great mutinies or rebellions of 1857-58, the proclamation, in the Queen's name, of what was regarded by the natives of India as a new policy caused the Rajah, then more than sixty years of age, to feel confident that a new era had been inaugurated, and that the disappointments of a third part of a century would soon cease to sicken his heart. During all the dark season of our trouble, when he might have wrought grievous mischief to our people, he was firm and faithful to the British alliance. He had great faith in the Queen's proclamation—great faith in the justice and generosity of Lord Canning. It seemed to him that the hour and the Man both favoured the realisation of his hopes. He reasserted, therefore, his claims with increased emphasis, and it is impossible to deny the logical force with which he argued his case. From the Government of India the appeal was carried in due course to the Queen's Government at home. But nothing that he could say was of any avail. The “man in possession” was a fixture in Mysore.

Then the Rajah, who, for purposes of succession, is a childless old man, and who is said by those who know him best to have wished that his sovereignty, in the event of his restoration even for a day, should lapse to the British Government, straightway adopted a son with all due ceremonial formality. The argument against him had been that if he was not strong to govern in the green branch, how was he likely to be strong in the dry? But this could not apply to his successor, whom the British Government might train and qualify for beneficent administration. The right of adoption, however, was refused as ruthlessly as the per-

been declared to be extinct. On the death of the present nominal ruler, the territory is to become, unless the hand of annexation be now arrested, part and parcel of our British provinces in the East.

There is an outcry against this, as much on the score of policy as on the score of justice. It is affirmed, not merely by "interested agitators" on the one side, and "maudlin sentimentalists" on the other, but by hard-headed men of ripe Indian experience, that this adverse decision is the greatest blunder that could be committed at the present time. Mysore is a fine country, but for all that "the game is not worth the candle." The princes and people of India have been taught to believe that the old annexation policy (which Lord Cranborne declared in the first speech which he delivered after his appointment to the Indian Ministry to have been one of the weightiest causes of the convulsions of 1857) has been irrevocably abandoned. We do not care to inquire what was the intention of that celebrated manifesto—with what restrictions it was fenced in, with what reservations and exceptions it was burdened in the minds of its original framers, or what constructions have been put upon it by later interpreters. In India it has been accepted without any emascuations, and we do not hesitate to endorse the opinions of those experienced Indian statesmen who declare that, after such a declaration, the appropriation of the first Native State worth taking, that has fallen in our way, will be regarded as a rampant violation of the pledges and promises of the Queen. It is not too late to rectify this error. There are petitions now before Parliament which will compel notice, and Lord Cranborne has before him a golden opportunity of acquiring for himself new honours by looking the question fairly in the face, and removing the "man in possession."

REMARKS ON THE MYSORE BLUE-BOOK, WITH A FEW WORDS TO MR. R. D. MANGLES.

(From the *Examiner* of September 29th, 1866.)

MAJOR EVANS BELL fights bravely in a good cause. Most of our Indian dependencies have been so long conquered and an-

nexed that it is now impossible to restore them to their native rulers. But it is possible to avoid further extension of our Indian empire in ways which, if they favour our national vanity and love of aggrandizement, experience has proved to be as impolitic as they are unjust; and to this end Major Bell devotes himself with praiseworthy zeal. After two earlier books on the general character of our Indian rule, he last year published a trenchant volume of strictures on "The Mysore Reversion," and here he carries on the argument in an able pamphlet, suggested by the recent publication of Parliamentary Papers relating to Mysore: in it he sets himself to refute the four principal objections raised to the project for restoring the native government to Mysore; "first, the reversionary right of the paramount Power to take that country by 'lapse;' secondly, the duty of the paramount Power to secure a good administration for the people; thirdly, the great weight and authority of those who recommend the annexation; and fourthly, the necessity of our Government maintaining, at all hazards, the consistency and inflexibility of its own well-considered decisions." Major Bell shows that, even if the decisions were well considered, their consideration lay almost exclusively with Lord Dalhousie, a potentate in whose doctrines it is not generally wise to place much reliance, while wiser and more temperate men have been of an altogether different opinion; and he further shows that, if it be so, it is mere cruelty and folly to persevere in injustice rather than acknowledge and retrieve the error.

"When Sir Henry Montgomery is seen to accuse his own Government of 'a breach of good faith;' when Sir John Wilmoughby denounces 'the flagrant injustice' of the decision; when Sir Frederick Currie declares it to be 'unjust and illegal, and a violation of special treaties, which the British Government have bound themselves to maintain inviolate;' when Sir George Clerk condemns it as 'the result of wild counsel prompting the indiscriminate gratification of a selfish policy,' 'unworthy of a great nation,' neither 'honest nor dignified,' and regrets that so 'loyal a Prince' should be made 'the victim of such extreme measures;' and when Captain Eastwick asserts that the treatment of the Rajah 'cannot be justified by our

can we expect to be said and thought on the subject by the dependent Sovereigns of India and their advisers and adherents?"

We need not repeat the history of the Mysore annexation, beginning as far back as 1811, well told in Major Bell's 'Mysore Reversion,' and discussed by us a year and a half ago. Major Bell here shows how, in nearly every stage of our dealings with the State during the past fifty years, we have acted at best with want of forbearance and consideration, often with manifest injustice and culpable neglect of our own true interests.

"Mr. Bowring, the present Commissioner of Mysore, has evinced an enlightened and disinterested desire to do equal justice to all his subordinate officials, without regard to race or creed, and with a sole view to the public good, by promoting—and I believe he is the only Provincial Lieutenant in India who has ventured on such a bold step,—a Brahmin gentleman, a native of Mysore, to the charge of a District, and by what he probably has found still more difficult, maintaining him in that position for two years. I doubt very much whether this Brahmin gentleman is the only native servant of Government in Mysore or in India, who is fit for so high or even for a higher position. And if the reigning Rajah or his successor were again permitted to take a share in the executive government of the country, it is probable that the gradual introduction of well-qualified and educated natives into posts which have been hitherto exclusively reserved for English officers, might, by the Prince's influence and in deference to his natural prepossessions, be considerably accelerated. And this is the greatest reason of all that I wish to see the native monarchy substantially and not colourably restored. This is my greatest reason for deprecating any attempt to settle this question by a measure, however liberal, of compromise and compensation. I earnestly wish to save British honour in the face of the Princes and people of India,—I certainly do not underrate the urgency of that consideration,—but above all I want to extend our means of usefulness. It is only by employing a native dynasty as a medium that we can arrive at the most satisfactory and durable result of our struggles and labours,—a reformed native State, organized on British principles, and never released from Imperial supervision, but governed and administered entirely by its own Princes and its own statesmen and officials.

The reformed institutions that are only to be found in our own immediate possessions, under the management of English officers, are superficial and precarious, and even while they seem to work smoothly, are maintained by a disproportionate waste of life and power on our side, and at a cruel cost of humiliation and political proscription to the most advanced and most improvable classes of the native community.

“The most powerful arguments against renewed annexations seem to me to spring from the impossibility that all the varying interests and requirements of an immense continent, with nearly two hundred millions of inhabitants, speaking upwards of twenty distinct languages, can be adequately watched and tended by a centralized Government of salaried officials, such as now attempt to rule all India by correspondence from Calcutta. Such a Government cannot continue for an indefinite period to command respect and obedience, or to be satisfactory and improving to the people in its action. The happiness and progress of nations do not depend on forms. The best institutions are not permanently safe unless they are under the custody of men who understand them, who have a personal interest in their security, and who are bound to the soil by the ties of blood and property. The system of governing India, in every district and in every detail, by Englishmen, is open to these fatal objections, that it lowers the moral influence of the Paramount power, that it deprives of political privileges those among natives who, with a little help and guidance, are fit to use them, while it does not educate for political life those who are as yet unfit. And the perpetual continuance and extension of such a system can only be plausibly justified on those grounds of utter contempt for the races to be governed which consign them to perfect stagnation, or incite them to privy conspiracy.

“A more hopeful and a more progressive policy will never be devised amidst the antipathies and antagonism and vested interests of Calcutta. It must originate here, and it is high time to make a beginning. Let us begin by abstaining from the unjust extinction of a reformed native State.

Mysore affords only one instance, just now the most conspicuous instance, of the prevalent policy of our Indian Government. Here and there a different policy has been adopted and

“The State of Travancore, now so noted for its prosperity and good government, was in the year 1808 in a much worse plight than Mysore was in 1831. There were no doubtful intrigues, as alleged against Sattara; there was no question of fiscal extortion, paralleled and even exceeded in British districts, as alleged against Mysore,—but there was open war against the paramount Power, and utter disorganization throughout the country. The subsidy due to the Honourable Company had fallen into a long arrear; the Rajah, under the influence of an ambitious minister, defied the injunctions of the Madras Government to reduce the number of his troops; the Resident's house was attacked, and an attempt made to murder him. One of the chief officers of the court, the minister's brother, treacherously induced a party of English soldiers to come on shore from a ship for refreshment, and had them all put to death. For several months the Rajah's troops resisted in the field the military measures that were adopted for his coercion. When the Travancore army was dispersed, the minister committed suicide; his brother was taken prisoner and publicly executed; and the Rajah was reduced to submission. The disorders consequent on this insurrection were so difficult of repression, and a spirit of disaffection became so manifest throughout the country, that in 1809, under Article V. of the Treaty of 1805 (identical with Article IV. of the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore), the management of Travancore was assumed by the British Government. For five years full authority was exercised by Colonel John Munro, the Resident, as Dewan or Minister; and in 1814, on the accession of a young Rajah, the administration of the state was transferred to a native Dewan, extricated from its embarrassments, and in a condition of great prosperity. The good effects of this period of British instruction have never been lost; the supervision of the Madras Government has never been withdrawn; and although neither the local administration nor the exercise of the Resident's influence has been uniformly irreproachable, on the whole the progress of Travancore has been steady and satisfactory. The Maharajah and the heir apparent, his brother, Prince Rama Vurmah, both of them accomplished English scholars, are distinguished for

Travancore, Madava Rao, is a graduate of the Madras University. In special recognition of his merits as a ruler, the Rajah has lately received an augmentation of his titles and honours, and has been invested with the Star of India; while his able minister has been deservedly admitted to the Companionship of the same exalted Order."

So it has been with all the other allied States in India. So we may fairly hope that it will be with every State in which, instead of degrading its own chiefs and forcing English rule upon it, we honestly try to imbue the native governors with English principles, and to make them willing friends rather than discontented subjects:

"We want the Native Princes of India much more than they want us. We cannot get near the people without the good will of their natural leaders. We want them both for the discipline and the education of that vast population. Mr. Gladstone eloquently observed in his speech of the 12th March last: "When we are told that affairs are managed more economically, more cleverly, and effectually in foreign countries, we answer 'Yes, but here they are managed freely; and in freedom, in the free discharge of political duties, there is an immense power both of discipline and of education for the people.'" The nearest approach to political freedom that the people of India can make in their present phase of civilization must be made by means of reformed Native States, owning allegiance and subordination to the Imperial Power. The British Government of India should not attempt to be ubiquitously executive; it should be constructive and critical, not operative; it should everywhere contrive and control the organization, but wherever native agency is available, it should not undertake more than the superintendence of functions.

Even if natives administer judicial and financial affairs worse than English officers,—which I do not admit,—native Princes, when once put in the right way, can govern much more effectually and economically for themselves as well as for us, than English Commissioners. And even if we are not at present prepared to increase the number or the area of our reformed native dependencies, let us not, at an immense sacrifice of honour and moral influence, strike out of our system the most prosperous and to

us the most profitable of them all, by reverting to an abandoned policy, and reasserting a usurped and disclaimed prerogative."

In that healthy tone all Major Bell's pamphlet is written, and it is in that temper that India must be governed, if it ever is to be governed in a way worthy of its English masters.

REMARKS ON THE MYSORE BLUE-BOOK, WITH A FEW WORDS TO MR. R. D. MANGLES.

(From the *London Review* of September 29th, 1866.)

WE have on previous occasions, in noticing works by Major Bell on the Mysore case, expressed a decided opinion that he is advocating the cause of justice and political morality in urging the claims of the Rajah to a restitution of the province which he formerly reigned over, but from which, several years ago, he was suspended by the Anglo-Indian Government. As long as that restitution continues to be denied, we cannot be surprised that the Major should seize every fresh opportunity for bringing the matter before the attention of the home public; and of late two circumstances have occurred, having a serious bearing on the future course of events. These are, as Major Bell points out, the Rajah's formal and public adoption of a son on the 18th of June, 1865, and the appearance of the papers relating to Mysore, moved for by Sir Henry Rawlinson in the House of Commons, on the 27th of February, 1866. How far the Rajah's adoption of a son will be recognised by the opponents of his claim as an argument in favour of restitution, may be doubtful, as politicians of that class have always strongly resisted the practice of adoption by native princes; but it will strengthen the case of the advocates of justice, since it appears that Lord Canning only consented to our continued usurpation of Mysore under the impression that the Rajah did not wish to adopt a son, and would bequeath his dominions to the British Government. In the thick pamphlet before us, Major Bell has summarized the more important evidence contained in the Blue-Book—of course from his own point of view, but with ability and knowledge. We quite agree with the concluding sentences of his preface, in which he advocates restitution to the

“The generous concessions of the Sovereign, in a time of peace and prosperity, do not produce an impression of weakness, but of strength and confidence. And a great work of restitution may easily be conducted as a Royal act of grace and favour, so as to convey no ostensible censure or reproof to those who have hitherto opposed it. The real political danger in India is not what it has been recently represented. The danger is, not that the Viceroy's authority will be despised, but the Queen's. There is no danger that the tributary and protected Princes and their Ministers and adherents will learn to look for orders to London instead of Calcutta in ordinary matters. The danger is that if, in their extraordinary emergencies, an appeal to Great Britain is found to be nugatory, they may say in their despair, ‘There is no Imperial Power; there is no Parliament: there is no Sovereign over us; there is only a Collector.’”

MYSORE.

(From the *Spectator* of October 6th, 1866.)

LORD CRANBORNE will, we believe, act wisely in arresting the annexation of Mysore, though for reasons other than those upon which so much stress has been laid. With all that endless story of treaties, interpretation of treaties, agreements, cessions, counter-cessions, and promises, Hindoo rules of succession, Mussulman rules of succession, and all the rest which fill up windy pamphlets on both sides, we have little or no concern. Those things have an importance, but the broad facts are above and beyond them, and the broad facts, as we read them, are these. The Queen is Empress of India, Sovereign by native as well as European admission of the entire continent, heir to the whole prerogative of Delhi, possessor by a right acknowledged by every prince in India of the paramount power. Every native prince obeys her orders, every lapsed fief is by native admission hers. That power she is bound to exercise with a single eye to the general welfare of the whole population submitted to her authority, and not to the sole advantage of any one province of her dominion. She has no more right to tax Bengal in order that the Punjaub or Guzerat should be untaxed than to tax Ireland in order to exonerate

Scotland, no more claim to bestow a special advantage on Mysore to the injury of Bombay, than the King of Prussia now has to exempt Hanover from the conscription while imposing it on Posen and the Mark. If, therefore, the general welfare of India required that Mysore should be directly administered by her agents, no right whatever could be pleaded in bar of that supreme necessity, any more than the right of the Highland chiefs to hereditary jurisdiction could be pleaded against an Act taking it away from them. The natives have never denied this, never questioned the right of the Mogul to remove any Mohammédan ruler or invade a Hindoo State, if considerations of general policy required it,—lay down in fact as a general principle that a sovereign must be expected to increase his direct dominion by all fair means, one of which, they add, is force. The best European analogy to the Indian position is perhaps that of Germany, though it is far from perfect. If Hanover were a State in any true sense of the word, the action of the King of Prussia in abolishing it would be simply oppressive, but it is not; it is simply a section of Germany, in which it was once expedient for German interests that a separate sovereign should reign, and is now expedient for German interests that he should not. The analogy is not perfect, for in India the Queen possesses a special and admitted right in every native State which the King of Prussia did not possess in Germany, namely, a right to control all foreign affairs, and to appoint an envoy, whose “advice must be followed on every occasion,” great and small. She is, in fact, the only true Sovereign, and the single point at issue is whether the existence of subordinate hereditary jurisdictions is beneficial to all India or not.

That is a very difficult and, with all deference to the very able Indians who signed the petition presented by Mr. Mill, by no means a settled point. In the case of a State not paying a fair tribute autonomy is injustice, for the people of Bengal are taxed to exempt the people, say, of Guzerat. Bengalees, being our subjects, are taxed for the general defence of the Empire, while Guzerattees are not, and the latter are, in fact, at this moment relieved from the fear of the Pirates who used to ravage their coasts, at the expense of men who have no reason whatever to dread any attack by sea. That anomaly, we admit, does not

whole, more beneficial to India than the people of any province should have the security, the order, and the consequent wealth which follow an annexation, which have followed it, for example, in Berar, and in a less degree in Nagpore—should have strict justice, sound education, and railroads, or should have that possibility of native careers, of independent and spontaneous development, which the so-called Native State retains. Up to the departure of Lord Dalhousie in 1855 the former policy was in the ascendant. It was the full conviction of that Governor-General, the most statesmanlike, except Lord William Bentinck, who ever reigned in India, that British direct rule brought to the masses of the people full compensation for the injury it inflicted on the aristocracy, and that such rule was in the long run the strongest, the cheapest, and the most vivifying mode of administering India. He intended to make of the Continent one vast military monarchy, the right arm of England in Asia, ruling a rich and orderly people, who, slowly disciplined by British sway, slowly permeated by British education, and slowly, if possible, brought to perceive the superior claims of Christianity, might in the end be ready for self-government as a thoroughly civilized and progressive Asiatic people. If that was a small policy, where is there a great one to be found? It failed, first, because Lord Dalhousie retired; secondly, because it lacked one essential datum—the acquiescence of Northern India; and thirdly, because it had one radical and, we fear, incurable defect. It barred up native careers. This vice of our administration even the mutiny has not taught us to cure, and at the present moment the martial races who crowd under our banners are forbidden by law to rise to military command, and the heir of the proudest noble, who could raise an army on his own estates—one-fourth of the whole Bengal army were, for example, retainers of Koer Singh—cannot receive an ensign's commission in his own regiment, must, if he serves at all, obey among his own retainers the youngest lad from England. The mutiny, however, did teach us that the natives prefer their own system of government, with its open careers and occasional injustices, light taxation, and frequent robberies, to our more orderly, more rigid, but leaden rule; that it was dangerous to produce so awful a scene as a continent occupied only by officials and peasants; that the native princi-

palities acted as breakwaters when a surge of native feeling—we will say, at the risk of being misunderstood, of national feeling—threatened to overwhelm the foreigners. Madras was saved by the Nizam. Bombay was saved because Gwalior broke the rush of the wave which had the able coward, Tantia Topee, on its crest. The Punjaub was saved because the old Sikh princes of the protected states stood honestly by our side. In this very case it is, we believe, quite true that a signal from the Rajah of Mysore would have brought the descendants of Tippoo's soldiers down upon Madras, and he did not give it. It is certainly true that the despised Nawab of Moorshedabad could have imperilled our possession of Calcutta. When, therefore, the waves receded, Lord Canning determined that the breakwaters should be guaranteed, and published the famous proclamation, the Golden Bull of India, which was understood by every native prince to mean this :—"We are to be subjects of the Queen as Empress, but masters within our own territories ; and the policy of annexing States, of destroying our rank as well as abrogating our powers, is given up." It was given up in intention, at all events, the great feudatories were received openly in that character by the Viceroy, their ministers received places in the new order of things, Dinkur Rao, of Gwalior, entering the Council, and there was again a firm, large, and consistent policy.

It has not endured six years, has never been tested, has never been perfected, and is to be broken up again. The annexation of Mysore may be, in our judgment is, perfectly legal, but it appears to every native prince, and therefore to every native, an unfair underhand attempt to cancel the Golden Bull. Whether the Rajah of Mysore had a right to adopt or not, without the consent of the paramount power, does not signify a straw ; we do not believe that he had, but we readily acknowledge that to prove he had not, Lord Cranborne must quote Mussulman precedents directed against Hindoo houses. • It is a Mussulman empire, not a Hindoo state, that we have inherited. At all events the natives thought that permission was sure under the proclamation to be granted, consider that document annulled, and tremble for themselves till the greatest but one of them all—the Nizam is the greatest, as we shall one day find out—has offered his own abdication. Is it wise or right, for the sake of

one province, to abandon so suddenly, in so apparently crafty a style, a policy meant for an empire, to paralyse our own power for good by sowing distrust over an entire continent? So long as we are trusted on the point of the subordinate sovereignty we may interfere for good as much as we like in "Native States," introduce milder laws, wiser taxation, better roads, do anything almost we think fit to do, but that point once unsettled, we shall be baffled by passive resistance at every turn. It may be necessary one day to unsettle it, the new policy may fail, as the old one failed, a third policy of appointing picked native rulers for life may prove wiser than either, but till we resolve, and announce that we resolve, that the mixed system shall end, let us at least adhere to it. This playing with thrones and policies, inventing new states and new systems, every six years, is as childish as it is riskful. The Indian papers speak of interests which the exchange of direct for indirect rule would endanger in Mysore. Well, if native interests are in question, call a free native Durbar—Sir John Lawrence knows how to do it—and let that decide; if European, let the Rajah give individual compensations. The settlers knew perfectly well that Mysore was not annexed, but only sequestrated, and we can put any interests we like under the direct control of the European resident. The payers also say, and say truly, the plateau is a valuable military position. Then the Rajah must exchange the Mysore horse for the British contingent, as the Nizam has, we believe, done. They say, perhaps correctly, that a third of the revenue is not a sufficient share to meet Imperial expenses. We doubt it, and it will look dirty to higggle at such a moment, as if we had abandoned a policy to gain a penny; but if it is so, let the tribute be increased. Finally, they say the people of Mysore will suffer, and it may be terribly true, but if India is benefited by Mysore suffering, Mysore must suffer. The Rajah has no more right, treaties or anything else notwithstanding, to govern Mysore contrary to the interests of India, than the Guelph has to continue governing Hanover contrary to the interests of Germany. It is for the interests of the people of the whole Empire, let him be swept away like the Guelph, but if it is not, he should be restored; and it never can be to the interest of an empire to change its policy every six years, when the policy has not failed.

when no danger is approaching, simply for the sake of a sum of money. At all events, if we change it let us say so, let us plead Imperial reasons, and not annex a province on a construction of a treaty so lawyer-like, that it would barely cover our claim to a simple estate.

MYSORE AND THE LATE GOVERNMENT.

(From the *Pall Mall Gazette*, November 8th, 1866.)

SIR,—As the Mysore question seems at last to be attracting attention in England (in India it has for years been watched with the keenest anxiety), you may perhaps think the accompanying letter not unworthy a place in your columns. Although well known among the Anglo-Indians who take an interest in the Mysore case, the letter has never, I believe, been published. It certainly furnishes a curious commentary upon the annexation policy contemplated by the late Government towards this “oldest and stanchest of their friends.” They clearly meant to devour him out of pure affection. But as the native princes of India may not at all understand this proof of British friendship, it would surely have been wiser in the annexationists to treat their “stanchest friend” as generously as the grateful Cyclops treated Ulysses, and consent to “eat him last.”—Your obedient servant,
ANGLO-INDIAN.

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJAH OF MYSORE.

“MAHARAJAH,—It is with sincere gratification that I inform your Highness that I have received her Majesty's commands to acknowledge the receipt of the friendly letter and the other tokens of your good will which you lately forwarded. The assurances of your Highness's friendship are very welcome to her Majesty, who can receive no such precious gifts from the Princes and chiefs of India as the good words which they send to her from their distant homes.

“From your Highness these good words are especially gratifying. For more than sixty years you have been the faithful

ally of the British Government, who felt assured, when trouble recently overtook them, that, as your Highness was the oldest so would you be the staunchest of their friends if evil and misguided men should seek to sow sedition in your Highness's country. By the blessing of God the Southern Peninsula of India remained undisturbed; but your Highness, nevertheless, was enabled to contribute to the success of British arms by the assistance which you rendered to the passage of her Majesty's troops towards the disturbed districts, whilst by your personal bearing in this critical conjuncture you encouraged and sustained the loyalty of your subjects and helped to preserve the tranquillity of the country.

"I am commanded by her Majesty to send to your Highness a few specimens of the manufactures of Great Britain, and other articles of which her Majesty requests your acceptance, as tokens of her friendship and esteem. I must not conclude this letter without thanking your Highness for the kind communication which you addressed to myself, and assuring you of the very great respect and consideration with which I subscribe myself, your Highness's faithful friend and well-wisher, &c. &c."

THE MYSORE PETITION.

(From the *Overland Athenæum and Daily News* of October 27th, 1864.)

THE letter of our London correspondent, published on Wednesday, referred to the "Monster Petition" sent home by a very large number of the subjects of the Rajah of Mysore, protesting against the continued exclusion of his Highness from any share in the administration of his country, after the causes which led to his deprivation of power had long ceased to exist. The petition further protested against the understood refusal of the British Government to permit his adoption of an heir to his principality, in default of those of his own body, about whom, it seems, there would have been no dispute, had he been fortunate enough to possess any. Our correspondent represents that both matters have attracted some attention in official circles, but does

not hold out much encouragement to the hopes of those who framed and signed the petition. The minds of the Government in England, he thinks, are made up to reject all applications on either point alluded to, but he at the same time affords us some ground for believing that the threatened annexation of Mysore when the Rajah dies, and the denial of his requests to be again invested with the Sovereignty of his country and left free to choose a successor, will not escape without severe criticism in both Houses of Parliament. He mentions that two eminent authorities on questions of international law, have given it as their decided opinion that the kingdom ought to be restored to the Rajah. And as regards the adoption of an heir, he believes there is no doubt that Sir John Lawrence was one of the majority of the Indian Council which decided to restore to the Rajah his dominions.

“This decision (we are told) was so far acted upon that a despatch was actually written and sent to the Supreme Government of India, ordering the restoration, and nominating the Ministers who possessed the Rajah's confidence and to whom the Government looked for the good administration of the country. There was only one dissentient from the decision in the Council, but that one was sufficient, directly, or indirectly to procure the reversal of the measure adopted. The question was brought into the Cabinet by the Duke of Argyle. It was there decided that the kingdom should not be given back to the Rajah, and Sir Charles Wood was sent down to Victoria-street to write a dispatch reversing the orders sent out a short time ago.”

This, in the main, is no novelty to us. In fact, we mentioned the favourable decision of the Home Government in one of our previous articles about Mysore. But we consider our correspondent wrong in laying the blame of the subsequent miscarriage on the Council of India or any member of it. That the Duke of Argyle was an active party in procuring the cancelment of the original despatch, we can very readily believe; but we have good reason to suppose that the mischief was chiefly done by parties in this country, who feared lest their own lucrative employments in Mysore should be abolished by the restoration of the Rajah's rule and the introduction of natives into offices now held by Europeans. But whether the case was so, or not, is a question which

the merits of it. If Sir Charles Wood and his Council had agreed that the Rajah, after his long penance should have the Government of his country restored to him under conditions, or be made at any rate the nominal head of it, with a share in the management of affairs, it mattered not whether objections to the measure arose here or at home. They had decided that he was entitled to obtain the restitution which he sought, and ought not to have been diverted from their purpose. But we presume, they have now gone too far in the way of refusal to draw back, without a sacrifice of dignity greater than they will be willing to make even at the dictation of honour and justice, so far at all events as the reinstatement of the Rajah in his former position of authority is concerned. But the right of adoption is another matter which cannot be so easily got over, because it involves the disposal of the Rajah's State when he dies, as to which point difficulties may arise with the Nizam, together with inevitable discontent on the part of the people of Mysore, and the other native chiefs of India.

Our correspondent refers to the impression current out here, that the Rajah was especially excepted by Lord Canning from the list of those princes to whom the right of adoption was formally conceded by her Majesty, after her assumption of the direct Sovereignty of India. He believes that this will be the substance of the answer given by the Secretary of State to the Mysore Petitioners, but adds that even if this were true it could not invalidate the Rajah's right. In this respect we heartily agree with him, because there was no reservation whatsoever on the subject, when Lord Wellesley elevated him to the guddee, and none can foist it into the treaty, without the commission of downright dishonesty on the part of the strong Power, which forces the weaker individual to submit. But, if our correspondent is rightly informed, there is no such exception to the Mysore Rajah's prejudice, as has been represented. The contrary appears to have been the case. "So far, from it being true, however," writes our correspondent, "I believe that documents exist under Lord Canning's own hand and seal which would show that it was never his intention to interfere with the Rajah's right of adoption." That will settle the question if the fact can be proved,

State and the Council of India, notwithstanding that the arrangement fell through, proved that they fully recognised his Sovereign rights secured by the treaty of Mysore; among which, of course, that of adoption was included. No doubt about the point was ever raised until years comparatively recent, when acquisitive Governors-General, backed by equally ambitious Boards of Control, for we must acquit the late Court of Directors of having been *participes criminis* in their offence, until a late period of their history—cast covetous eyes on the territories of native princes, and sought occasion to appropriate them. We had hoped that this evil disposition had died out in the councils of the British Government, when the great fear caused by the mutinies and rebellion took place, and that we should never have heard of it again. But it appears that we were too sanguine in our expectation, and that the snake was only scotched, not killed and is again rearing its head. We have already seen its activity in the case of Dhar, and where next it will appear remains to be seen, unless Sir John Lawrence puts his heel upon its head and crushes it, while he holds the chief rule in India; despite the Duke of Argyle, who is understood to entertain views entirely in accordance with those of the Viceroys gone by, whose policy was of an aggressive and most offensive caste. The subject is again acquiring serious proportions, more particularly when considered with relation to the growing dissatisfaction that prevails at home relative to the number of British troops, properly so called, which it has been thought necessary to maintain in India. There have been frequent growls on that account for some time past, not only proceeding from economical members of Parliament who object to the army estimates on principle, but likewise from parties outside the House of Commons, whose exceptions may be taken as representing those of a very influential portion of the tax payers who speak for the municipal constituencies of the United Kingdom. Our London correspondent draws attention to this matter. He says that the Home Government were largely guided in their “*very discreet*” conduct of the late Danish business by the amount of European force which they maintained in India, and that “the idea of retaining 80,000 British troops in India will not last much longer. It will soon explode. * * *

80,000 troops for India; so the sooner you set about some means of re-organizing the native army the better."

We doubt whether he is correct as to the disinclination, and still more as to the ability of England, to furnish any amount of force that may be requisite for Indian Service. But he is right in assuming that its present strength should be reduced as far as is consistent with safety. Reverting to the modern policy of laying hands on all that we can seize, is certainly not the best mode of reconciling the troops to our Government, but renders necessary the maintenance of a greater body of troops than we ever had before in this country, when we were engaged in conflict with powerful native princes, who sought to drive us out of it, and who have ceased to exist. We have now no enemies to fear except those whom we create. The natives have felt the amount of strength that we can put forth when occasion demands it, and they will not readily provoke a fresh exercise of it. But on the other hand, we should be very careful about giving rise to discontents, which, gradually accumulating, may again lead to serious disaffection, perhaps extending to the native armies that still remain, by shaking the faith of the native princes and their subjects in our fidelity to engagements contracted when they were strong, and we comparatively weak. Our proper course is, more especially after the Queen's proclamation, to remove the ill-effects of the policy pursued in latter years, and thus to reassure the native mind as to our honest intentions for the future. But it unhappily appears that the Home Government is urging us the other way, and tending to render it impossible to reduce the large amount of the European force now in the country. Those who call for the diminution of it, must themselves endeavour to remove the causes which lead to the necessity for its existence, and this they can do only by affording the natives practical assurance that the British Government are dealing fairly with them.

AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE.

(From the *Madras Times*, February 17, 1865.)

OUR readers are doubtless already aware that the Home Government have determined upon annexing the native state of Mysore

to the Madras Presidency upon the death of the present Rajah. At first sight, it would seem highly desirable, that such a plan should be carried out in its entirety, for it is not easy to divest oneself of the prejudices against the continued existence of native states in the very centre of our Empire. Bred up as we English are with the deepest deference for liberty, and accustomed from our earliest years to take a pharisaical kind of pleasure in comparing our virtues with the vices of our Continental rivals, we are yet not very successful in taking a dispassionate view of our conduct towards the princes of India, and unhappily are far more skilful in submitting everything to the test of our self-interest. We have been wonderfully successful in our annexation policy hitherto, and are prone to regard with complacency means and measures which when enacted in Europe or America excite our liveliest indignation. Like David our wrath is kindled against the despoiler of the one little ewe lamb, and we are as blind as that heroic and susceptible monarch was to his own glaring misdeeds of a kindred nature. As yet there is no Nathan bold enough to denounce us, and a writer like Major Evans Bell assuming that character for the nonce, is placed at the mercy of a government in whose employ he at present is. Occasionally the Indian Press awakes to a consciousness of the evil we have done, and are continuing, and the sympathies of generous-minded men, the expectations of the educated natives, are aroused for a moment, and then allayed by renewed indifference. We may, in a general way, assert that no man of any intelligence, who has read the History of British India, will be prepared to deny, that we have established our Empire by a bold, unscrupulous, selfish, aggrandizing policy, and that whether by the exigencies of our distance from home, or from the danger to our existence in the growth of a powerful native opposition to our rule, we have been almost forced to perpetuate the misdeeds of the early Governor-Generals and to close our eyes steadfastly to the rights and wrongs of our conduct. Fortune for a time favours the brave, but her sympathies are not eternal, and it would be well if before we are compelled to do it, we now commence such schemes of restitution as are due from a professedly Christian power conscious of wrong-doing. We are striving our utmost to educate the native's mind, and to convert him to our religion and ways of thinking,

little conscious that in proportion as his intellect expands, so much the more readily will he be able to comprehend the illegal foundation, the ignoble construction, the weak supports of our Empire. We are quite aware that when once we concede a restitution of his Government to a native prince, we shall ensure the arrival of applications for justice from all parts of India, and that much uneasiness will be caused in the minds of natives by an exhibition of a disposition to do justice to their former rulers who have been wrongly dispossessed by us. We feel that our liberality would be construed as fear, that our really honest perceptions of justice would be regarded as evidences of our inability to hold our own, and that with the production of such unfavourable sentiments towards us, a blow of a very serious character would be sustained by our power. Expediency undoubtedly urges the retention of our hold on the native states, and their gradual absorption into our own dominions, and the question arises whether we are to continue to rule this country by principles of expediency in preference to principles of justice. The kingdom of Mysore has not yet been actually annexed, but at any day the death of the now very aged Rajah will call for the immediate settlement of its destiny, and in anticipation of that issue, Major Evans Bell has written a very clever book,* in which he attempts to rouse the public mind to a sense of the injustice that is already determined upon by Sir Charles Wood, and has been communicated to his Highness by Sir William Denison.

The present Rajah of Mysore is the legitimate descendant of the founders of the Hindoo dynasty, which was established some four centuries since. In 1731 the musnud was occupied by a minor, and the minister, who virtually ruled the country, abused the confidence reposed in him to such an extent, that matters fell into dire confusion, and Hyder Ali, once a simple trooper, succeeded in establishing the Mussulman ascendancy in Mysore, which, after thirty-eight years, terminated with the death of Tippoo Sultan, at the siege of Seringapatam, in 1799. The conquest was effected by the British troops in alliance with the Nizam, who had an army of 20,000 men in the field, including 6000 cavalry, the arm in which we were most deficient; and it was at

* The Mysore Reversion "An Exceptional Case," by Major Evans Bell, Madras Staff Corps. London: Trübner and Co. 1865

first proposed by Lord Wellesley to recognise one of Tippoo's sons as the lawful heir to the vacant throne. This scheme was soon abandoned "from a dread of French influence, and partly, also by a regard for the *antiquity* of the Hindoo royal family's *legitimate title*." We have italicized the Governor-General's words, considering that they should have weight in deciding the question of the final settlement of the country. At the same time, however, in addressing the Court of Directors, his lordship expressly remarked that the *young prince could assert no right to any share of the conquered territory*. Accordingly, the prince was raised to the throne, his investiture being deliberately treated by Lord Wellesley, not as the restoration of the old Government and dynasty, but as "the creation of a new one." The Rajah was at the time barely four years old, and could have had no voice in the treaty by which the Governor-General and the Nizam disposed of the territory they had conquered. Still he is to all intents and purposes bound by the obligation accepted by his ministers on his behalf, and his claims should therefore be considered as coming from the nominee of the allies, rather than from the legitimate representative as he is of the old dynasty. In declining to re-establish that dynasty, in the manner the allies in Europe some fourteen years afterwards did, when placing Louis XVIII. on a throne whence his family had been removed some twenty-five years previously, Lord Wellesley evidently desired to perpetuate a recollection of the fact, that the kingdom was conquered and disposed of by the allies without regard to any claims that might be made for its restoration by the heirs of its former monarchs. Sir Thomas Munro was strongly opposed to this proceeding, and earnestly advocated the equitable division of the country between the allies, but his counsel was overruled. However, it is very manifest that the British cannot legitimately dispose of the Mysore state without the consent of the Nizam, who was a party to the treaty which constituted it. This fact the Secretary of State persistently declines to consider, and for many years the Rajah has been treated by the Supreme Government as though they have the sole control over the destinies of his throne. The Nizam rendered us the most effective service in the subversion of the Mussulman power, and without that service we should in all probability have been unable to

obtain that end. His Highness, therefore, would have participated on equal terms with us in 1799, had we then partitioned the kingdom as Sir Thomas Munro recommended, and the lapse of sixty-six years does not diminish his descendant's claim to participate on equal terms with us, should we, on the death of the Rajah, determine to abolish the nominal native sovereignty of the province in our own favour.

The infant Rajah remained secluded in his mother's zenana until he attained his sixteenth year. His education was neglected, and the country was ruled by an able Brahmin, Poorneah, who left a sum in hard cash exceeding two millions sterling when he was deposed in 1811. From that date up to 1832 the Rajah governed the country almost unrestrictedly, and abuses which had been kept down during Poorneah's time grew with the rapidity and luxuriance of weeds, the British Government maintaining an indifference to all irregularities so long as their subsidy was duly paid. No remedies were suggested, no reforms advised, but the Rajah was permitted, unaided and inexperienced, to depute authority to a herd of such unprincipled parasites as always abound in semi-barbaric courts. The Rajah, according to his lights, ruled the country as well as could be expected; and although his method of administration was radically bad and prospectively ruinous, no charge of cruelty or turpitude has been brought at any time against his Highness himself, and Lord Wellesley cheerfully bore testimony after personal acquaintance to his habitual goodness and loyal disposition. In 1830 the vast hoards left by Poorneah had disappeared from the Treasury, and to meet the extravagant expenditure on all sides, the land assessment and other taxes were raised, by which the ryots were harassed and oppressed, and the Western Province of Nuggur broke out in open rebellion, and a spirit of disaffection spread all over the country. British troops had lived in free quarters in the country for thirty-three years professedly to support the musnud raised by British prowess, and to obviate the necessity of the Rajah maintaining a large native army, which might prove troublesome should he seek to remove his neck from the yoke of foreign rule. These troops were promptly sent to the seat of the rebellion, and at once quelled the disaffection, whereupon Lord William Ben-

tinck, the Governor-General, "acting on the exaggerated representations of the Madras Government, despatched to the Rajah an intimation, couched in terms of great severity, that under the provisions of the treaty of 1799, the British Government had determined to take into its own hands the management of Mysore." This treaty is given at length in the volume before us, and we fail to find in it any authority for this extraordinary determination; and, as Major Bell points out, the mere outbreak of an insurrection could not justify it. The Rajah himself, in a letter to Lord Elgin, dated April, 1862, remarks that "insurrection is the chronic state of India, and may be compared with the cholera, as an epidemic from which the best governed states, as well as the best ordered constitutions, are never safe," and he adds that, as regards Nuggur, he "had no hereditary claim to that division," and "may be supposed to have had no personal influence over it." The subsidiary force had always been paid regularly under the understanding that it would be employed to suppress any disturbances, and therefore it could not be argued for a moment that the assumption of the Government was equitable on account of the services of that force being after a long period of inaction called into requisition. It is undoubted that the Rajah was directly responsible for the mis-government of the country by his ministers; but as we studiously avoided rendering him any advice or moral support, and stood complacently regarding the development of his suicidal policy without moving a finger to arrest the inevitable confusion that would result therefrom, we could not consistently divest him of his power, simply because he ruled his people in a native way. When we were allied with the Nizam in the grand work of king-making, we certainly did not, so far as the treaties show, reserve a power to dethrone the Rajah, and having once refounded the musnud, we could not justly overturn it at our will, so long as the new monarch remained faithful to his obligations to the allies. The treaties empowered us to dictate and enforce such ordinances as were calculated in our opinion to ensure good government, but instead of exercising this privilege, we kept aloof from all participation in the administration of the country until a crisis was commencing. Even could the treaties be construed into permitting the arbitrary and immediate assumption of the direct government, it certainly did not warrant one party

to it adopting so extreme a measure without the consent or knowledge of the other, and we again assert that as the kingdom was originally conquered by the British and the Nizam, so, in case of its legal reversion to those allies, must it be disposed of by *mutual* consent.

In an early issue we will consider what steps the Rajah has taken to regain his power, and the success that has attended his exertions.

THE CASE OF MYSORE.

(From the *Bombay Saturday Review* of July 7th, 1866.)

THE Government of India, with the full consent of the Home Government, seems now about to put an end to the unwise settlement of Mysore made sixty-five years ago, by the perpetration of a great wrong. When the "ferocious son" of Hyder Ali lost life and empire by the taking of Seringapatam in 1799, it pleased the Marquis Wellesley, in the partition of the conquered territory, to raise from a prison, a titular Rajah, a boy of five years of age, without means or friends, and to place him on the musnud of a goodly third portion of the province that was divided. His reasons for his policy were,—first, jealousy of the Nizam, whose power he feared would be unduly aggrandized if he gave him half of the conquered territory; and second, his belief that the creation of a native state by the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore, would be acceptable to the inhabitants of the country besides adding to the popularity of himself and the Government of the Company which he represented. A simpler and a wiser policy was sketched at the time, by a man of greater sagacity and deeper penetration in Indian affairs than Lord Wellesley, but it was not followed. Sir Thomas Munro, then the little known Major Munro, Secretary to the Mysore Commission, in his Minute on the partition dated 10th June 1799, said that not only "the simplest, but the wisest plan would be to permit the Nizam to an equal partition of all territories which we do not give up to the Mahrattas." Anticipating the weak reason of Lord Wellesley, fear of the power of the Nizam, Munro says:—"I do not know a single argument against the partition of the Mysore dominions, unless

it may be thought that it would make the Nizam too powerful; but this is an objection without much foundation; for there can be no doubt that the actual power of the Company will be increased in a much higher proportion than the Nizam's by the acquisition of an equal share of territory; and that consequently his relative strength, with respect to them, will be rather diminished than augmented. We may assert, that the Nizam's army has not contributed so much as the Company's to the conquest of Mysore; but he has done all that he could; his troops have done more than was expected; and had they done less, still every principle of good faith demands that both parties should share alike. No political advantage can be

gained by dragging the descendant of the Rajahs of Mysore from his obscurity, and placing him on the musnud, unless we suppose it to be one to divide only a part of the country, in order that we may, by excluding the Nizam, extend our own influence over the rest. Had we found a prince in captivity who had once enjoyed power, a proper regard for humanity, and the supposed prejudices of the nation in favour of one who had once been their sovereign, would no doubt have pleaded strongly for his restoration; but no such motive now calls upon us to invest the present Rajah, a boy of six years old, with royalty; for neither he, nor his father, nor his grandfather, ever exercised or knew what it was; and long before the usurpation of Hyder, the Rajahs had been held as state prisoners by their delways or ministers. No attachment remains towards the family among the natives; for it has been long despised and forgotten, and there is perhaps none of them who would not prefer a strong permanent government like that of the Company, to one like that of the Rajah, which must necessarily be composed of different interests,—must be weakened and perplexed by intrigue, and must carry with itself, like the double governments of Oudh and Tanjore, the destruction of the resources of the country.

. Where the people themselves are so indifferent about the matter, for strangers to raise a child to sovereign power, whose ancestors have been in prison half a century, would be a proceeding so altogether new, in the transactions of the world, that we could scarcely hope that any man would believe that

than by a wish of securing to the Company a more general influence in Mysore than they could have otherwise obtained." These sagacious counsels were unheeded. The great Marquis had his own way. The child, "whose ancestors had been in prison half a century," was made a sovereign, and Munro's apprehensions have been completely realized. For a period of nearly twenty years from the assumption of power, in the name of the Rajah, and during his minority, an able native minister, aided by such remarkable administrators as Close, Webbe, Wilks, and others at various times, ruled the country with great success; and when the Rajah came into actual possession, the country was in a flourishing condition, and his treasury filled with the accumulations derived from a state which has been wisely and economically administered.

A few years of the Rajah's rule changed everything; venality, corruption, and oppression abounded. In 1825 the disorders in the State had reached such a height that the Madras Government of Sir Thomas Munro only refrained from direct interference from the fear of lessening the Rajah's dignity, and shaking his authority in such a manner as might make it impracticable to re-establish it. At last in 1831 oppression drove the people into open insurrection which had to be quelled by British troops, and Lord William Bentinck, the then Governor-General, felt himself under the necessity of "superseding the Rajah, and carrying on the Government of Mysore in the name and by the sole authority of the Company." A Commission was appointed to investigate into the causes of the disturbances—and the result was that the affairs of the Mysore country came to be administered by British officers appointed by the British Government, the condition of things that pertains at the present moment. The wise rule of Sir Mark Cubbon, pursued in the face of difficulties, and much vexatious opposition from the Rajah himself and his tools—for a period of nearly thirty years, has raised the Mysore territory to a height of prosperity which it had never previously attained. The Rajah too had altered his line of conduct, and gave unequivocal proofs of his loyalty to the British Government during the perilous period of the mutiny.

Such was the position of affairs, when about a year prior to the departure of Lord Canning from India, the Rajah, whom

Lord Wellesley raised from the dunghill to the throne, transmitted to the Government of India a khureeta in which, while expressing regret for the past and amendment for the future, he asked to be restored to the position he formerly held; that the stigma which attached to his name might be removed—"that I may appear," he said, "once more before my own subjects, and the princes and the people of India, as the sovereign of Mysore in fact as well as in word." This application was in several parts couched in terms of the worst possible taste. It was of course not the production of the Rajah, but most probably of some hanger-on—belonging to a class of Europeans of indifferent character, who infest the native courts, and prey on the resources of princes and chiefs who believe they have grievances against the Supreme Power. It was a blunder to put forward imaginary rights to a territory which he held entirely by the grace and favour of the British Government; but it was also unfair and ungenerous on the part of Lord Canning to take such unsparing advantage of it. We grieve to state, that within a few days of his leaving for ever the shores of India, Lord Canning thought fit to indite a lecture to the unhappy Rajah, rating him soundly for putting forward "pretensions based upon erroneous assumptions," and upbraiding him (unjustly in our opinion) for having permitted himself "to forget the generosity of the British Government in order to call in question its good faith and justice,"—at the very moment he was counselling the Secretary of State to do a great wrong.

We cannot play fast and loose with such serious phrases as "the good faith,—the justice, and the generosity of the British Government." If the little, great man who presided over the destinies of India sixty-six years ago—chose to set aside the statesman-like propositions of the obscure Major Munro, for the settlement of the conquered territory of Mysore, that he might, in the grandiose style so characteristic of him, from 'motives of policy, moral considerations, and sentiments of generosity and humanity,' bring forward a scion of 'the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore'—it will not do for the British Government to try to set him aside on wretchedly insufficient grounds with the same grand phrases still on its lips; paltering with words in a double sense, as unworthily as the fiends denounced by Macbeth.

Most truly has it been remarked by Sir J. P. Willoughby, in a note to his able minute on the Mysore case, that Lord Wellesley in his treaty evidently never contemplated permanent assumption for a temporary object. After Lord William Bentinck assumed the territories of the Rajah in 1831, on suppressing tumults which the latter could not quell, he seems to have felt he had gone too far. He asked himself the question:—"Has the Company's Government assumed the management of the Mysore country on its own account, or is that country still maintained for and on behalf of the Rajah? Is the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore virtually cancelled, or is it still in full force? The answer must be decidedly that the management has been assumed *for and on behalf of the Rajah, and that the treaty is in full force.*" We believe impartial persons acquainted with the whole facts of the case will readily endorse Lord William Bentinck's conclusion. On what pretence then do we still retain our hold on the Mysore country, and keep the Rajah of our own making in a degraded condition? He committed no crime against the British Government, he was never charged with disloyalty, he never plotted against us,—on the contrary there is the acknowledgment of Lord Canning himself that he performed valuable services to the British Government during the period of the mutiny. Why then has he not been restored? He was set aside because his kingdom was full of disorder; but though order has long been restored he is still kept in a state of degradation? Why should this be so? We fear the true answer is, that Mysore is a rich province, we covet it, we are calling might right, and have resolved to keep it.

Our pretence that what we do is for the good of the people will not be believed by either Indian princes, or the Indian people. Our apparent interests are too nearly concerned to blind any one. Moreover, two Governors-General in succession, seem to have cast an evil eye on the country, and made up their minds in different ways characteristic of the men, that it would be ultimately made over to us, or must be annexed. Lords Dalhousie and Canning both made much of the facts, that the Rajah was old, more than sixty, that he had no legitimate son or grandson, nor any lawful heir, that he was not likely to adopt; and Lord Canning seems to have made sure, on earnest declarations "more than once repeated, of the Rajah's wish that everything

he possessed, should at his death pass into the hands of the British Government." How all this is now changed we well know. We have been deservedly defeated by our own cupidity. That the author of the much-vaunted despatch—(an unfortunate despatch in our opinion in several respects) on adoption, should have dealt so harshly with the Mysore case is a mystery to us; his whole proceedings are completely in contravention of the pledges so solemnly made therein to the princes and chiefs of India. If it was ever intended to annex the Mysore state to the British dominions, the time for doing so was on the occasion of Lord William Bentinck's assumption of the Government of the country in 1831, on the pleas that the Rajah was neither able to maintain order, nor meet his obligations. It was afterwards found that both pleas were exaggerated. Though we believe Lord Wellesley's Subsidiary Treaty never contemplated annexation on the score of temporary internal disarrangements in the state—still a colourable pretext for annexation might have been found when we directly interfered. The notion, however, was never once entertained either by the Governor-General or the Court of Directors. To annex now, or on the death of the present Rajah, and not to permit the right of adoption,—would be considered by every native state as a violation of the faith pledged to the people of India by the Queen's proclamation, and Lord Canning's celebrated letter on adoption. The pretext of holding Mysore for the good of the people can never impose on any one, so long as our own interests are clearly served by our doing so. Mysore is a beautiful and fertile country. Could we acquire it honestly it would be a valuable possession. But the acquisition of twenty provinces as beautiful as Mysore, were that possible, would be no compensation for bartering the honour and good faith of the British Government—now too clearly at stake in the policy proposed to be carried out.

LORD CRANBORNE ON NATIVE STATES.

(From the *Times of India*, August 15, 1866.)

LORD CRANBORNE has begun well. His trumpet has given:

ford, when he presented himself for re-election, on accepting office as her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India, he said : "Take, again, as another instance of this gradual convergence of opinion, that great dependency with which I have at this moment the honour of being once more especially connected—I mean India. Thirty years ago the predominant idea with many English statesmen was, that our interests in India consisted in extending our territory to the largest possible extent, and that it was our duty, as a matter of prudence, to extend our influence and power over the vast districts upon our frontiers, thinly inhabited by barbarous tribes, in order to ward off the possible attacks which some other European Power might some day make upon those frontiers. To such ideas the great disasters of Cabul and Afghanistan were due, and to that annexation policy the terrible disaster of the mutiny of 1857 must, to a large extent, be ascribed. But as time has gone on, that desire of increased dominion, which is the natural temptation of all powerful states, has been overcome, and statesmen of all parties have arrived at the conclusion that we now hold in India pretty well as much as we can govern, and that, at all events until we have more thoroughly consolidated our authority there, and have left the marks of it by diffusing all the blessings of the civilization which we ourselves enjoy, among the populations of that vast empire—until that happy time arrives, or until we have approximated to it much more nearly than now—we should be pursuing an unwise and dangerous policy if we tried to extend our borders or to lessen the power or the permanence of those native rulers upon whose assistance we have so long relied. I believe the native princes were formerly the objects of jealousy and distrust to English rulers, but within the last ten years a great change has come over the spirit of our statesmanship in that respect; and there is now, I think, a general desire to uphold them in the rights and honour which they justly earned by their loyal support at the time of the mutiny, and to look upon them not as impediments to our rule, but as its most useful auxiliaries."

About the wisdom of these words, which were loudly cheered, men may differ. The few pregnant sentences printed above contain indeed the statement of those vital questions of Indian policy which are more vexed and controverted than all others,

and around which alone, perhaps in these days, anything like partisanship gathers. But even those, whose opinions are in direct antagonism with the doctrines propounded by the new Secretary of State, must admire the manliness with which he has declared this portion of his political faith to the world. We may admit it to have been a necessity of his position that he should say something about India; but he might have delivered himself of a few meaningless platitudes about advancing the prosperity of the country and the happiness of the people, which on such public occasions are the available stock-in-trade of what are called "safe" statesmen. An experienced leader, like Lord Derby, might, not improbably, protest against the indiscretion of a young member of his Government "making the running" so early in the race. If "language was given to men for the concealment of their thoughts," Lord Cranborne has in this case made a bad use of his tongue. But the public will not think this, whatever his party may do. They like such intelligible declarations of sentiment, whether they sympathize or not with the feelings expressed. Plain words of this character can make no vague, indistinct impression on the hearer's mind. We know at once the best, or the worst; we know what we have to expect. The first words which, in his new capacity of Secretary of State for India, Lord Cranborne has spoken about the great country which it is now his function to administer, have made us as well acquainted with his views on this point as if he had held the seals of office for as many years as Sir Charles Wood.

But whilst men of all shades of opinion may admire this frank and manly departure from the ordinary official course of reticence and reservation—this repudiation of the oracular two-edged style of delivery, the waiting upon time and circumstances for the practical development of a policy, which characterizes the procedure of "discreet statesmen" at the outset of their careers—it is for us, and for those who think with us, to rejoice still more in the spoken words themselves. Apart from the particular speaker himself they have not taken us by surprise. Whether as the result of conviction or the result of accident, the conservative party have become to a certain extent identified with the policy which has been thus enunciated by Lord Cranborne. The Queen's proclamation of the 1st of November, 1858, was pre-

pared by Lord Derby's Government. Mr. Disraeli, in a very remarkable speech in the House of Commons, whilst the "mutiny" was still uncrushed, traced the rising to political causes, and tore in shreds the flimsy fallacy that the great convulsion was merely a superficial military revolt. Contrasting such views with those expressed by the Duke of Argyll, and declared by him to have been favoured by Sir George Cornwall Lewis, and with the action of the late Government, in permitting the Council to decree the absorption of the Mysore into the British Indian Empire, we have something to guide us to the conception that the policy of the Whig party in England inclines towards annexation, and that the policy of the Tories is against it. We repeat, that this may be the result of accident, not of conviction; but anyhow the line seems to be pretty clearly defined, and there is at least nothing anomalous or inconsistent in such a distinction. Conservative instincts are naturally in favour of ancient dynasties and old nobilities. Political and social iconoclasm is not among the vices of the party.

It may be said that to declare a certain policy is one thing, and that consistently to adhere to it is another. English statesmen, we know, have a way of eating their own words—sometimes with a voracity that is surprising. The system is commonly this: when they desire to violate a declared principle they discover some exceptional circumstances in the case, which take it out of the category to which their promises or pledges are said to have had reference. All rules have an exception; and the exception made, is said to be altogether in accordance with the views and intentions of the statesman who originally pronounced the policy. Practically, it often comes to this, that declared principles are observed only so long as there is no particular object in violating them. We thought that Sir Charles Wood had spoken out very plainly in the House of Commons on the policy of supporting the few remaining native princes and chiefs of India, whom the great besom of Lord Dalhousie had not utterly swept away. But he has himself told us, under his own hand, how he dealt with the only great question of the kind which ever came before him. We presume, therefore, that Mysore is to be regarded as an "exceptional case." This simply means that the prize was worth the

absorbing such a state were worth the obloquy that might descend upon us for violating the principles and promises which we had broadly asserted and solemnly made. But that they could be worth any such sacrifice a statesman would never have believed for a moment. Then, again, our correspondents in England so consistently assure us that Lord Stanley (though he made much of the case of Dhar, which never was in any real danger, and of the Carnatic case, which had been disposed of before the issue of the Queen's proclamation) has thrown Mysore over altogether, that, however reluctant we may be to believe the story, we cannot convince ourselves that it is untrue. What, then, is the amount of faith which we are to place in the recorded principles of an English Minister? We know that this question may be asked; and that the answer given may be "None." But we confess that on this point we have, nevertheless, some faith in Lord Cranborne. We do not think that, without very strong convictions, he would have gone out of his way to declare, in such emphatic language, his belief that the policy of annexation is unwise and dangerous; and, therefore, we have some well-grounded expectations that he will be faithful to his first words. He may be sure that those words will be speedily translated into all the native languages of India, and that they will engender an amount of confidence which can be destroyed only by an act of apostasy, which would be fatal for ever to his reputation as a public man.

THE END.

LONDON:
SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET,
COVENT GARDEN

Handwritten signature or initials, possibly "J. H. Edwards", with a large flourish and a small circle below.