16°H79

HISTORY

OF THE

PLANTING AND TRAINING

OF

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

BY THE APOSTLES.

BY

DR. AUGUSTUS NEANDER.

WITH THE AUTHOR'S FINAL ADDITION

ALSO, HIS

ANTIGNOSTIKUS;

OR,

SPIRIT OF TERTULLIAN.

FROM THE GERMAN BY J. E. RYLAND.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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BOOK VI.

THE APOSTOLIC DOCTRINE.

CHAPTER II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

We wish in this place to take some notice of the peculiar doctrinal character of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which we find the leading points of the Pauline doctrine under a peculiar form, as held by a man of independent mind, who differed from Paul in his constitutional qualities, in his mental training, and in the mode of his transition from Judaism to Christianity. As to the first point, the author of this epistle seems to stand to the apostle in the same relation as Melancthon to Luther; the one quiet and gentle, the other ardent and energetic. As to their education, Paul was brought up in the school of Pharisaism; in the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, we recognise the training of an Alexandrian Jew. Hence arose the difference between the two, that Paul received a more dialectic education, by which his logical faculties were still further developed, and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews a more rhetorical one; though Paul, like Luther, possessed in a very high degree the gift of natural eloquence. Lastly, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews appears to have made the transition from Judaism to Christianity, not, like Paul, by a sudden crisis, but by a more quiet gradual development, in which the higher spirit concealed under the forms of Judaism revealed itself to him. Accordingly, we must consider his twofold relation to the Alexandrian-

Jewish, and to the Pauline theology. Several differences in the development of doctrine between these two great teachers of the church, may be explained from the peculiar design of this epistle, which was addressed to a community of Christians, who, though faith in Jesus as the Messiah had found ready acceptance with them, were still enthralled in the forms of Judaism.[1]

[1] This view we must maintain, notwithstanding the reasons alleged against it by Dr. Röth in his Latin Dissertation (Frankfort, 1836), in which he endeavours to show that this epistle was addressed to the church at Ephesus, consisting of Gentile Christians. As the epistle perfectly suits a church consisting of Jewish Christians, and the difficulties attached to this hypothesis are only superficial, so we cannot, on the other hand, conceive of a church of Gentile Christians to whom an epistle could be addressed in such a form and of such contents. And, on the latter supposition, it would not be easy to explain the manifestly close connexion of the didactic and parenetical elements from its commencement, since a church consisting of Gentile Christians might be forced by persecution to fall back into heathenism, but never from such a cause, to pass over to Judaism. The contents of this epistle, which tend to show the superiority of Christianity to Judaism, are therefore by no means adapted to the purpose of encouraging its readers to constancy under persecutions. Dr. Röth appeals to chap. iii. 12; but apostasy from the living God need not be exactly a relapse into idolatry; for as communion with God, according to the convictions of the writer, could only be through Christ, so an apostasy from Christ must in his esteem have been equivalent to apostasy from the living God. Still less can the passage in chap. x. 32 be adduced in evidence, for doubtless divine illumination appeared to the author as necessarily depending on the gospel; and a transition from any other religious stand-point, on which man could not be set free from the dominion of the principle of sin, was looked upon by him as a transition from darkness to light. The same remark applies to chap. vi. 4. Also, the enumeration of points of instruction for catechumens in chap. vi. 1, does not prove that they were only such as would be imparted to heathens; for by "repentance from dead works," the author no doubt understands conversion from all ungodliness, and by πίστις in this connexion, agreeably to the Pauline ideas, he meant faith in the peculiarly Christian sense; so that faith in Jesus as the Messiah is included in it, which in articles of instruction for heathens must also, we allow, have been rendered very prominent. Besides, for the instruction of Jews passing over to Christianity, it was requisite to define the nature of Christian baptism, in relation to that of John and other kinds of lustration; and the doctrine of the resurrection and of the judgment, though already acknowledged by the greater part of the Jews, must be promulged afresh with many peculiar modifications in connexion with the doctrine of Jesus as the Messiah. Thus the author enumerates those universal articles of primary religious instruction, which needed to be addressed to Jews as well as to Gentiles. From chap. xiii. 9, it does not follow that his readers had never before

Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews agree in this, that they both represent Judaism as inadequate for satisfying the religious wants of man. This is the purport of what is said in chap. vii. 19, that Judaism could "make nothing perfect;" its religious institutions were not fitted to realize the ideas prescited by them to the conscience; the sacrifices and the priesthood were unable to satisfy that religious want, to which both owed their existence; namely, to accomplish the removal of the disunion between God and man. Those religious ideas were here represented in sensible images, which were first realized by Christianity. Both Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, place the central point of religion in redemption from guilt and sin, the restoration of communion with God, whence proceeds the impartation of a divine life, the source of true holiness; and the inability of Judaism to attain this object formed, in the estimation of both, its essential defect. In this epistle (viii. 12; vi. 4; ix. 15) the forgiveness of sins, the communication of a new divine life, and divine power for sanctification, are described as the work of Christ—as the effect of Christianity; it is maintained, that by this new principle of life, the redeemed are able to render true spiritual worship, which comprehends the whole life, so that now the whole soul, animated by a new spirit, becomes a thank-offering for the grace of redemption bestowed upon it (xii. 28; x. 14; xiii. 15); and in the same manner Paul contemplates the whole Christian life as an act of true spiritual worship.

observed the Jewish laws relating to food, and therefore were not Jews, but only, that according to the supposition of the writer of the epistle, they no longer as Christians placed their dependence on such outward things. At all events, by "the divers and strange doctrines," some peculiar opinions must be understood which were placed by the false teachers in connexion with the Jewish laws on food. The passage in chap. x. 40, can only be intended to mark a later generation (in this case no matter whether of Jewish or Gentile descent), which had not yet come into existence, and therefore would not have attained to a participation of the Messianic kingdom—if this kingdom had commenced earlier, and thus the development of the human race had been earlier closed. According to the other interpretation also, it would have been necessary for the author to have addressed his readers in the second person, for the rhetorical figure Anakoinosis, on the supposition of the author being of Jewish descent, whoever he might be, would here be as little employed as in chap. ii. 3, even supposing that the epistle had been written by Paul himself.

But these two writers differ in their manner of carrying out the fundamental ideas which they hold in common. Paul, in opposition to the merit of works on the legal stand-point, and especially against the tenet that an observance of the law was absolutely necessary for the Gentiles in order to salvation—develops his doctrine of justification by faith alone, independently of the works of the law. This doctrine, that no one could become righteous before God by the observance of the law, but only through faith in Jesus as the Messiah and Redeemer, lies also at the basis of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But since the author of this epistle directs his argumentation especially against those who were still captivated by the pomp of the Temple worship, the priesthood and the sacrifices, and were in danger of being entirely seduced from Christianity by the impression these objects made upon them, this gave a peculiar direction to his reasoning, and it aimed at showing that by all this ritual their religious wants could not be satisfied, but that its only use was to direct them to the sole true means of satisfaction. As Paul declared that the law could not bestow the justification which man required, but that it only awakened that feeling of want, which nothing but faith in Jesus as the Redeemer could satisfy, so in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is shown, that the mediation required by man's relation to God and heaven, could not be effected by the Jewish priesthood, but that it only availed to call forth a longing for such a mediation, and thus led to Him who alone could bestow it.

But in one respect an opposition may seem to exist between the Pauline views and the doctrinal scheme of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Paul contemplates the stand-point of Judaism as abolished. Everything in religion is represented as proceeding from faith in Christ alone; in receiving the gospel a man is in effect dead to his former religious stand-point; whatever was before the ground of his confidence, now appears to him as an absolute nullity. On the contrary, according to the views presented in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the whole Jewish cultus is, it is true, only a shadowy image of something superior; but the writer considers it as still continuing to exist till everything earthly, and consequently this form of earthly worship, shall come to an end, when the Messianic kingdom being consummated,

a higher order of things shall succeed. Thus we may here meet with a view, which was originally entertained by converts from Judaism, that the communion with the sanctuary of heaven bestowed by Christianity, would be carried on in this world in combination with the forms of a cultus which typified heavenly things; that a new higher spirit would continue to operate in the ancient forms of religion. But still this is only an apparent contradiction between the two great teachers; for it is evident from the train of thought in this epistle, that the writer looked on the Jewish cultus as entirely superfluous, since it could contribute nothing towards effecting communion with heaven and reconciliation with God, on which everything depended. But since Christianity effected all this, since it bestowed everything demanded by the religious wants of man, of what use was another cultus?

If, in connexion with such views, the Jewish cultus could still find a place, the only point of junction could be, the representation that the conscientious observance of all that belonged to the Mosaic cultus, would be a preparatory purifying and sanctifying process, to qualify for the participation of divine things through the medium of Christianity. This was the stand-point from which Philo, in his work *De Migratione Abrahami*, combats a religious idealism which would have explained away the whole of outward Judaism as superfluous. But in this epistle we can find no trace of attributing such a continued preparatory utility to Judaism; according to its fundamental ideas, connexion with Christ as the true high-priest renders superfluous all other methods of purification and sanctification. If the author of this epistle had some notion that these outward forms of Judaism, whose design was only preparative and typical, would linger in existence till the whole terrestrial economy would be terminated by the second advent of Christ at no very distant period, it by no means follows that he considered these forms as of essential importance. We must only bear in mind in what light the author viewed the relation of the present to the future. This relation was the same in his conceptions as in Paul's. To Christians the future is by faith already become a present. They ascend with the confidence of faith into the holiest of holies in heaven, which Christ has rendered accessible to them; x. 22. They already belong to

the heavenly Jerusalem, and are become the associates of angels; xii. 23. They have already been made partakers of an eternal unchangeable kingdom; xii. 28. They have already felt the powers of the world to come. Hence it follows, that, as they no more belong in their inward life to this transitory world, but to the higher future world they are actually raised above the whole stand-point of Judaism. When in ix. 9, it is said, that, in the καιρὸς ἐνεστηκὼς (equivalent to αἰὼν οὗτος), there is a sacrificial worship, which yet, like all such outward things, cannot bestow [1] the right constitution of the inner life, the *purification* from guilt, which man requires in order to become a member of God's kingdom, it must be recollected that Christians do not belong to the αἰὼν οὗτος, but to the αἰὼν μέλλων, and hence all this is nothing to them. When the author speaks of outward ordinances,[2] ix. 10, which were "imposed until the time of reformation;" it is added, that Christ[3] is He from whom the διόρθωσις emanates, which frees from the yoke of these ordinances, though in its whole extent it will first take effect in the οἰκουμένη μελλοῦσα. In fact, he contrasts with the Jews who serve an earthly sanctuary (xiii. 10) the Christians to whom the altar in heaven stands open, while it is closed against the Jews who cleave to an earthly sanctuary. This is the contrast between those whose worship still adheres to the veil of outward sensible forms, and those who rise at once to heaven. As Jesus suffered the gates of Jerusalem, so, according to the symrepresentations employed in this epistle, must those who desire to belong to him withdraw themselves from the terrestrial Jerusalem, the earthly sanctuary, as from this world in general; xiii. 13. We here find the same principles as in Paul's writings. The author of this epistle does not, indeed, argue directly against the maintenance of the outward forms of the Jewish cultus, nor does he demand their abolition; but this even Paul would not have done in an epistle addressed to Christians who belonged to Judaism by national descent and education.

[1] Paul would have said that all this could not contribute to their *justification*.

[2] The same which Paul asserts of the σαρκικὰ τοῦ νόμου, of the being in subjection to the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου.

It may appear as rather un-Pauline that he treats only of the salvation of those who belonged to the posterity of Abraham, and of Christ's relation to such. We may indeed doubt, whether Paul, if he had been writing to a church composed entirely of Jewish Christians, could have so far restrained himself, as not to have dropped some expressions on a subject which so deeply interested him as the divine purpose to incorporate the Gentiles with the Jews in the kingdom of God, by faith in the Redeemer; and whether he would not have felt compelled to have adverted, at least in an apologetic manner, to his peculiar vocation as a preacher of the gospel among the Gentiles. Yet it is certain that a writer who so expressed himself respecting the conditions of admission into the Messianic kingdom and on the relation of Judaism to the work of Christ, as we find to be the case in this epistle, must have agreed with the Pauline doctrine in thinking, that as the attainment of eternal salvation was independent of Judaism and determined alone by faith in Christ, therefore by the fulfilment of this one condition it was attainable by all men. We also find that he selects as a type of Christ, not one of the family of Abraham, but Melchisedec—an indication of Messianic universalism. If we call to mind that he considers the λαὸς as representative of the theocratic people in general, the posterity of Abraham as representatives of the human family in general, who are destined for the kingdom of God, we shall not be able to detect any contradiction between himself and Paul.

With respect to the work of Christ, the author of this epistle appears to differ from Paul in not bringing forward the resurrection as a seal of the redemption effected by the Saviour in the same way as that apostle. But it is not difficult to perceive, that the same conception of the resurrection in relation to the whole of the Christian system lies at the basis of this epistle. There is the same connexion between sin and death presupposed, as when it is said in ii. 14, that Satan had the power over death, that is, that death was not an original element in the creation, but was first occasioned by Satan, by means of sin, which is the work of Satan, and connected with sin, belongs to Satan's kingdom. In the same sense as Paul intends, sin is also considered as the sting of death; for it is said that men oppressed by a

consciousness of guilt are kept in continual bondage through the fear of death,—*that* fear of death, which presents itself in connexion with the divine judgment to the agonizing conscience as something so terrible, and which blasts the cheerful enjoyment of life. When it is affirmed that Christ through death destroyed the kingdom of Satan, who had power over death, and thereby freed men from the bondage in which they were held by the fear of death,—it is presupposed that, by the power of his holy life, he left the grave victoriously at his resurrection, and by this event gave a pledge to his redeemed of a life of eternal happiness. It is said in v. 7, that Christ, who, as he had assumed human nature with all its weakness, sin excepted, was subjected to death, poured forth in his struggle with death fervent prayers and tears to God who could redeem from death, and on account of his perfect resignation to the will of his heavenly Father, and his perfect obedience, was heard, that is, was delivered from death by means of his resurrection. The God of salvation is described in xiii. 20, as he who had brought from the dead the great leader and ruler of the church of God; and in these words it is implied, that Christ by his resurrection became the leader from death to life of the church of God formed by him as the Redeemer, and laid the foundation for its salvation; and therefore God, in raising him from the dead, proved himself to be the God of salvation.

We see, then, that the same view is taken in this epistle as in Paul's writings, of the connexion of the resurrection with the work of redemption. But that the exaltation of Christ to heaven is more frequently adverted to than his antecedent resurrection in this epistle, may be traced to the prevailing form of its representations, in which Christ is compared to the high-priest of the Old Testament economy; for as high-priest, having ascended to heaven and remaining there, he fulfils his office by interceding with God for believers, and bringing them into perpetual communion with God and heaven. A contrast is pointed out between Christ and the Jewish high-priest in this respect, that the latter could enter into the holy of holies in the temple, which was only a symbol of that in heaven, but once a year, and was obliged it again, as he himself had no abiding residence in the most holy place, much less could he obtain an entrance into it for those

on whose account he held the priestly office. It was a necessary consequence of this mode of representation, that there was less occasion for mentioning the resurrection, and that topic was brought forward more prominently to which the resurrection forms an introduction and transition.

But this idea of the high-priesthood of Christ is only a particular form of representing the general Christian idea of Christ as the Mediator, by whom the communion of the human race with God, broken off by sin, is again restored. That the writer of this epistle made use of this form, was principally owing no doubt to the peculiar character of the churches whom he addressed; but in part probably to the peculiarity of his own religious training. This form is indeed borrowed from Judaism. Yet it by no means denotes a transient relation in the historical development of Christianity, but is connected with one of its constant relations to human nature; a relation in virtue of which, under the consciousness of his earthly limitations and his sins, man feels himself in need of a mediation to fill up the infinite chasm that separates him from a holy God. Hence in all religions, and in various stages of civilization, methods have been invented for satisfying this want; a caste of priests, or saints who have attained perfection by an unworldly asceticism, or some kind of mediators the offspring of the imagination, and a multitude of sensible objects, have been made use of, as points of connexion for the religious sentiment in its aspirations after God. Christ has for ever satisfied this undeniable want of human nature, which no human being who stood himself in need of redemption and mediation could satisfy, and consequently all priesthood and sacrificial worship are henceforth superfluous and abolished. The redeemed are dependent on no other being for the purpose of mediating their relation to God. Through him they are brought into a lasting connexion with God and the heavenly holy of holies; through him, as the everliving high-priest, they continually draw nigh to God: it is he who intercedes for them continually with God, and through their relation to him their whole life is consecrated to God and acceptable to him; vii. 25, 26. Now this is in perfect harmony with what Paul teaches (according to the explanation we have given of his views) respecting the scheme of mediation for believers; respecting the whole Christian life as a thank-offering for the

blessings of redemption, and the free access to God through the mediation of Christ; and from the manner in which he applies to Christianity the Jewish ideas of the temple and the sacrifices and the whole ceremonial worship, we are authorized to infer, that he would make a similar application of the idea of the priesthood.

In order to realize this idea for the benefit of the human race, it was needful that Christ, who, according to his divine nature as Logos, effectuates the derivation of all created existence from God and its connexion with God—should become acquainted with all the weaknesses, sufferings, temptations, and conflicts of those for whom he had to intercede as high-priest, from his own experience, that he might understand the exigencies in which they would require his aid, feel genuine sympathy with their infirmities, and infuse true confidence into their hearts. At the same time, the writer of this epistle considers the sufferings of Christ in the twofold point of view, of active and passive satisfaction, which we have explained in the representation of the Pauline doctrine. - Both are here combined in the idea of the all-sufficient sacrifice presented by Christ as high-priest, which effects that for which no human ritual was adequate. The relation of the sufferings of Christ as the Sinless One to the sins of mankind is thus illustrated, that as the sins of the people were symbolically transferred to the victim, (as if it could suffer what the people deserved,) so Christ in his sacrifice had taken upon himself the sins of mankind; his redeeming sufferings were the pledge that their guilt would be no more charged upon them; ix. 28. As to the other part of Christ's work noticed by Paul,—his active obedience,—it is in this epistle expressly stated that Christ, according to the divine appointment, having proved himself to be the Holy One in all human temptations, and under the severest death-struggle, gained thereby the dignity of high-priest; v. 7, &c. The sacrifice of Christ obtains its due significance only in this moral connexion, not as an *opus operatum*, like the sacrifice of animals, but as the act of One who, revealing the eternal divine essence in human nature, and exhibiting the perfect union of the divine and human in a holy human life, verified it also in death, as the consummation of a life which had been the revelation of the eternal Spirit of God in a sinless holy humanity. The significance

of the death of Christ is founded on his having, "by an eternal Spirit, offered himself without spot to God." Thus the Epistle to the Hebrews distinguishes, as we find in Paul, two eras in the life of Christ; his appearance on earth, when he entered into fellowship with mankind, to bear the load of sin and to free them from it; and his life as the Glorified One, which no longer stands in relation to sin, but in which he only exhibits what he obtained by his perfect, holy life, and what those have to expect who are freed by him from sin, and called to the perfect communion of his blessed life: ix. 28.

By what Christ has in this manner accomplished, he has now once for all made objective satisfaction for mankind to the requirements of the holiness of God, of the moral order of the universe. Mankind defiled by sin cannot enter into the heavenly sanctuary:[1] They must first be purified and consecrated in order to enter into the fellowship of heaven. This work, accomplished objectively by Christ, is now carried on in its consequences, till everything is conquered which opposes the realization of the holy kingdom of God among mankind, till that higher world, first apprehended by faith, becomes an actual reality to the sanctified human race.

Faith is also represented in this epistle as the instrument of appropriating this objective work by individuals, and of accomplishing in them this subjective purification; that faith by which men enter into communion with Christ; iii. 6, 14. It is the confidence of faith which enables men to appropriate purification by the blood of Christ, and purges the heart from the consciousness of guilt; x. 22. We here find the same thing which Paul describes as justification by faith, only with an allusion to sprinkling with the blood of the sacrifices, in accordance with that reference to the Jewish cultus which pervades this epistle. As in Paul's writings, it is here insisted that faith must prove itself genuine by perseverance; x. 36, iii. 14. And we find also the same connexion indicated between Faith, Hope, and Love; x. 23, 24.

In Paul's writings, a general conception of faith lies at the basis of the particular Christian application of the idea; as a

[1] By a transference of the subjective to the objective, the writer of this epistle (ix. 25) speaks of a purification of the heavenly sanctuary itself, inasmuch as it would have been defiled by the sins of mankind could they have entered it without a previous purification.

general fundamental direction of the disposition without which no communion with the divine, no religious life can exist; and this idea is expressed in this epistle in a still more general way than when Paul points to justifying faith in the case of Abraham. It is described as being an apprehension of the invisible by the whole direction of the disposition,—a surrender of the spirit to something invisible by an act of inward self-determination, by which man raises himself above the natural connexion of causes and effects, and enters by the direction of his inward life into a higher order of things revealing themselves to him. Faith, according to Heb. xi. 1, is that by which the object of hope already becomes present; by which man is convinced of the reality of what he cannot perceive by the senses.[1] While in the constant succession in the phenomenal world he sees only the visible develop itself from the visible, and one phenomenon from another, and the understanding, cleaving to earthly phenomena, would explain and define everything from this causal connexion;—faith, on the contrary, rises to an act of creative omnipotence as the original ground of all existence, and acknowledges that the universe was made by the invisible creative word of God; xi. 3. Even here, agreeably to what we have remarked above, there is involved a peculiar Christian application of the general idea of faith, only what Paul distinguishes as justification through faith, is here represented under other forms on account of the references to the Jewish cultus. Moreover, in accordance with the peculiarly hortatory character of this epistle, faith is exhibited in its aspect of perseverance under all the sufferings and conflicts of earthly life;—faith in its unflinching constancy towards the future, a faith which steadily aims at perfection, and by which those who exercise it are matured for that final aim; (τελείωσις.) By this faith a man follows after Christ, in whom a perfect pattern is exhibited, and who has passed through all temptations and conflicts, with an unwavering constancy of faith, to that state of glory whither all believers must follow him by the same path; xii. 2. But it has been most unjustly attempted to find a contrariety between the idea of faith in this epistle and in Paul's writings, as if in the former it merely implied a reference to something future, a conception of its nature which

[1] As Theodoret says, δείκνυσιν ὡς ὑφεστῶτα τὰ μηδέπω γεγενημένα.

would best suit a lifeless Judaism. It is evident from the general idea of faith as we have explained it, and from the whole train of thought in this epistle, that by means of faith a vital connexion is formed between the Present and the Future. By means of faith, according to the doctrine of this epistle, the Future becomes in some measure a Present to the mind, although this Present has a necessary bearing to a more perfect development, a consummation in the Future. In connexion with faith is given the experience of the glory of the divine word, vi. 5; by faith Christians enter the future world, and become inhabitants of the heavenly Jerusalem, xii. 22. By faith they partake of the powers of the world to come, and obtain a partial anticipation of the Future; faith penetrates through the veil which conceals from human eyes the holy of holies in the heavens, and already enters it; vi. 19.

With respect to the relation between the ideas of this epistle and the ideas of the Alexandrian-Jewish theology as they are represented in the writings of Philo, we must here have recourse to the distinction between religious realism and religious idealism; in other words, that stand-point which considers the positive and historical in religion only as a symbolical clothing of general ideas, and as the means of stimulating and training the mind towards the contemplation of ideas—and that stand-point on which religion is acknowledged, not as an object merely of the intellect, but as an independent power in the life, a living communion with God effected by means of certain historical facts, as the highest end of a created being, and a complete satisfaction of his religious wants.

On this complete difference of the religious stand-point, a difference is founded in the interpretation of the Old Testament and of Judaism. Philo viewed the historical and the positive in Judaism only as symbolical veils of general ideas, which for the most part were borrowed from a very different stand-point, and which he attributed to Judaism by an arbitrary disregard of historical accuracy. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews conceives of Judaism, according to its true historical destination and intention—to prepare the way for realizing the kingdom of God through Christ—to prefigure the divine in sensible forms—which would subsequently actually appear among mankind. If he arbitrarily explains

some things according to the letter, yet a higher necessity lies at the basis of these meanings, the reference to the facts of religion from which the satisfaction of the religious wants of mankind proceeded, and which were really prepared by Judaism. The predominant idea of this epistle, the high-priesthood of Christ, has a significance entirely real, founded on fact, and relating to the most pressing religious wants of mankind. The Logos in himself is not the high-priest; he can only lay claim to this character in consequence of his having assumed human nature, and thus accomplished, in the manner described, the redemption of mankind. Christ as glorified and exalted to heaven, has actually performed that for the religious life of men which their imperative religious wants sought in the priesthood. On the contrary, Philo calls the Logos himself the high-priest, as the divine reason revealed in creation, by which it is connected with the Deity. This reason, which reveals the highest being, the ὄν, and communicates worthy and elevated ideas of it, is hence called the high-priest of God in the creation. As the ideal ground of the phenomenal world, it mediates for it before God, for in idea all is perfect, but defective in actual appearance. The Logos is hence represented as the *κόσμος νοητὸς*, the *παράκλητος*, the *ἱκέτης* for the *κόσμος αἰσθητός*. This idea is symbolically represented in Melchisedec, and the Jewish high-priest.[1] Thus we see here, on the one hand, abstract general ideas which can have no significance for the religious life; and on the other hand, appearances taken from the facts of religious experience. On the one hand, the language of religion is arbitrarily explained, according to a speculation which was the production of a foreign soil; on the other hand, according to sentiments founded in the disposition which it was designed and adapted to express. Here it is proper to notice a passage, in which the author of this epistle describes the power of the Logos in a manner resembling Philo's, but which furnishes no suffi-

[1] See *Leg. Allegor.* iii. § 26, where Melchisedec is spoken of as the symbol of the Logos, *ἱερεὺς γάρ ἐστι λόγος, κλῆρον ἔχων τὸν ὄντα καὶ ὑψηλῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ λογιζόμενος.* *De Cherubim*, § 5, the Logos is termed *ἱερεὺς* and *προφήτης* for the soul. *De Sacrif. Abel et Caini*, § 36, *ὁ πεφευγὼς ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἱκέτης αὐτοῦ γεγονὼς λόγος.* The high-priest in his robes is a symbol of the universe, *ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἦν τὸν ἱερωμένον τῷ τοῦ κόσμου πατρὶ παρακλήτῳ χρῆσθαι τελειοτάτῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν υἱῷ.* The universe according to the Platonic idea. *De Vita Mos.* iii. § 14.

cient evidence to assume that he had the language of Philo actually in his thoughts. It is the description (common to both) of the all-penetrating and cutting sharpness of the Logos. But, in the Epistle to the Hebrews,[1] we have presented to us a matter of religious experience, the living power of divine truth, penetrating, judging, and punishing the soul, the power which lays open all secret wickedness, before which no deception can stand. But Philo understands by the term the power of logical discrimination, especially in reference to the divine reason, that efficiency by which it fixes the limits of the various kinds of existence, arranges the various classes of creatures, and forms compound bodies from the simple elements.

CHAPTER III.

THE DOCTRINE OF JAMES

We proceed from Paul's representation of Christian truth to that of James, which forms a more marked contrast to it than any other in the writers of the New Testament. This is chiefly owing to James's peculiar point of view, and to the difference occasioned by it in the development of the doctrines of justification and faith. But on comparing the two types of doctrine with one another, we shall perceive their essential unity resulting from the Spirit of Christ in both, only that the views of the latter apostle were not so completely disengaged from the garb of the Old Dispensation, nor wrought out in the same sharply defined form. The contrast that

[1] Hebrews iv. 12. Ζῶν γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἐνεργὴς, καὶ τομώτερος ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν μάχαιραν δίστομον, καὶ διϊκνούμενος ἄχρι μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς τε καὶ πνεύματος, ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν, καὶ κριτικὸς ἐνθυμήσεων καὶ ἐννοιῶν καρδίας. *Quis Rer. divinar. Hæres*, § 26, Ἵνα τὸν ἀδίδακτον ἐννοῆς θεὸν τέμνοντα, τάς τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἕξεις ἁπάσας ἡρμόσθαι καὶ ἡνῶσθαι δοκούσας φύσεις, τῷ τομεῖ τῶν συμπάντων αὐτοῦ λόγῳ, ὃς εἰς τὴν ὀξυτάτην ἀκονηθεὶς ἀκμὴν, διαιρῶν οὐδέποτε λήγει τὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, ἐπειδὰν δὲ μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ λεγομένων ἀμερῶν διεξέλθῃ, πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτων, τὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ εἰς ἀμυθήτους καὶ ἀπεριγράφους μοίρας ἄρχεται διαιρεῖν αὖτος ὁ τομεύς. *Philon. Opera*, tom. iii. p. 30, ed. Lips. 1828.

here exists we cannot but regard rather as formal than material.

This difference is closely connected with the difference in the formation of the religious character of the two apostles, and with the difference in their respective spheres of labour. As to the latter, we must bear in mind, that James in his peculiar position had not, like Paul, to vindicate an independent and unshackled ministration of the Gospel among the Gentiles in opposition to the pretensions of Jewish legal-righteousness; but that he felt himself compelled to press the practical consequences and requirements of the Christian faith on those in whom that faith had been blended with the errors of carnal Judaism, and to tear away the supports of their false confidence. While Paul was obliged to point out to those who placed their dependence on the justifying power of the works of the law, the futility of such works in reference to justification, and to demonstrate that justification and sanctification could proceed only from the faith of the gospel,—James, on the other hand, found it necessary to declare to those who imagined that they could be justified before God by a faith in the Jewish sense as we have before explained it, that such a faith with which their practice was at total variance, was an absolutely worthless thing.[1]

[1] It serves to confirm what we have asserted above—that the argumentation in the Epistle of James is by no means directed against Paul—the example of Rahab adduced in it, cannot be supposed to relate to any use which Paul could have made of it; for the manner in which the doctrine of Faith is unfolded in the 11th chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, could certainly give no occasion to such a line of argument, since in that section, believing confidence is described precisely as a principle which impels to action, and the faith of Rahab is marked as being of a kind that induced her to receive the spies. The very point is here made prominent on which James lays so much stress, and hence we infer that it cannot form an antithesis to his own views. Nor could Paul, in his oral instructions, have made use of the example of Rahab; for in those passages of the book of Joshua there was nothing he could make use of in support of his doctrine of justification by faith. Nothing is to be found there respecting a πίστις nor of a δικαιοῦσθαι before God, and with those points alone St. Paul was concerned, and for their confirmation he quoted Gen. xv. and Habakkuk ii.; this example of Rahab, which can only be explained from the reference to Paul's doctrine, testifies against the supposed discrepancy in the views of the two Apostles. The citation of such an example can be explained and justified only from the point of view which we have taken.

The apostle affirms, that as a sympathy that shows itself in mere words to the afflicted is worth nothing, so a faith without works is entirely vain. Accordingly, he compares a faith that does not manifest itself by works, to a pretended love that is not verified by corresponding acts, to a sympathy that evaporates in mere words. From this comparison, it is evident that as what he here describes as a pretended love is in his judgment undeserving of the name of love, the same may be said of a pretended faith. But as by arguing against the value of a love that only shows itself in words, he did not intend to depreciate the worth of love itself, just as little could he design to cast a slight on the worth of faith by what he says against the value of a faith that exhibits itself only in outward profession. He considers such a faith which is unaccompanied by works, as dead; it is a faith which is destitute of that divine life which spontaneously produces good works. In reference to this necessary intimate connexion between faith and works, James says, addressing a man who depends on this inoperative faith (ii. 18), "Show me how thy faith can exist without works, and I will prove to thee my faith by my works." "As the body without the soul is dead, so" (he says, ii. 26) "faith without works is dead." The comparison is here a general one, without descending to particulars. It is evident, that James could not mean to say that works (the outward act) bear the same relation to faith as the soul to the body, but only (which agrees with the whole train of his thinking) that the absence of works is a proof that the faith is destitute of what corresponds to the soul as the animating principle of the body. Works, therefore, are signs of the vitality of faith.

We shall be assisted in forming correct ideas of his doctrine respecting faith, if we examine the examples which he adduces of genuine and spurious faith; on the one hand, the faith of evil spirits in a God, which only fills them with terror, and, on the other, the faith of Abraham. He here applies the same term πίστις to two distinct affections of the soul. In the first case, where the reference is to the faith of evil spirits, the feeling of dependence on an Almighty Supreme Being shows itself as something unavoidable, as an overpowering force, but it is only a passive state (a πάθος), with which the spontaneity, the free receptivity and

self-activity of the mind by no means corresponds, the whole internal constitution of a rational being is opposed to it. The feeling of dependence on God is something which man cannot get rid of, however much he may desire it. In the second case, faith is not merely something passive, existing independently of the self-determination of man, but a voluntary recognition of this dependence takes place by an act of the will, and thereby becomes a regulating principle of the whole life. Hence, in the former instance, works as well as the whole tendency of the life must stand in contradiction to what from this stand-point is called faith; in the latter, the inward tendency of the life proceeding from faith necessarily manifests itself by works. That work of Abraham which the apostle adduces, was indeed no other than an expression of that unconditional and trustful surrender to the Divine will, which is likewise by Paul considered as a mark of Abraham's genuine and divinely approved δικαιοσύνη. But Paul adduces this example with a special reference to its internal importance in opposition to a vain righteousness of works; James makes use of it in its outward manifestation against an *opus operatum* of faith; and in this point of view he could say that by his ἔργα Abraham proved that he was a δίκαιος; faith cooperated with his works; by works his πίστις proved itself to be τελεία. When the Holy Scriptures tell us that Abraham's faith was imputed to him by God for righteousness, this can only be understood of a faith which was accompanied with good works as marks of its genuineness. Certainly James, who believed in the divine omniscience, could not suppose that the outward act was requisite to make Abraham's disposition manifest to God; but he meant to say that Abraham's faith could not have justified him before God, if it had not been such as would manifest its inward quality by such works. But Paul would not have applied the same term πίστις to two religious stand-points that differed so widely from one another; he would hardly have designated by this name what James asserts of evil spirits; he would not have distinguished between a *fides informis* and a *fides formata*, but only have designated by this term the "faith that worketh by love." And although in combating the erroneous tendency he would have agreed with James, yet his method of combating it would have been

quite different. He would have pointed out, as he has done in several passages of the Epistle to the Romans, the necessary intimate connexion between faith and a moral transformation; he would have shown those persons who professed to believe, that what really deserved the name of πίστις, was entirely wanting to them. But the elements of such a demonstration are to be found in the Epistle of James, where he speaks of a new birth, a new creation proceeding from faith; i. 18. Yet it is not his manner to develop what is contained in the idea so systematically as Paul is wont to do, who exhibits to us, if we may so express it, the speculative and the practical, as they interpenetrate each other. James is throughout practical rather than speculative. He contents himself with stating experimental appearances, while Paul would profoundly investigate their causes. To Paul the central fact on which everything turns is the relation of man to God and the great revolution that must be effected in that relation in order that man, by nature estranged from God, may become an object of his good pleasure. Only to the sight of that God who beholds the inmost recesses of the spirit, and to whom the invisible world lies unveiled, is the whole new direction of the life apparent in that internal act of faith which lays hold of redemption, and from which everything must be developed that belongs to the perfection of the Christian life. In the sight of that Being who beholds the invisible, man is justified when he believes; he is justified by his faith. But James, who contemplates the outward manifestation of things as they are developed in time, takes into account the cooperation of faith and works for the justification of man; for like Paul he recognises only that faith which works by love and thus originates the new creation in man, as justifying faith, and requires that it should express itself in works in order to distinguish it from whatever else may be called faith. Had James intended to say that works must be visible in order that man may appear just before God, this would have been a material contradiction between himself and Paul. But as surely as James acknowledged God as the omniscient who penetrates into all that is hidden from mortal vision, must he have known that true faith and the right state of heart which it involved must be manifest to God, before it could be discernible to man, by its outward

signs. But one thing is certain;—the point of view taken by these two Apostles, the direction of their contemplations, is not exactly the same. There is this great difference in their respective stand-points; Paul fixes his attention principally on the objectively Divine, the ground of God's election, on which the confidence of man must rest: James concerns himself with the subjectively human, with what man must do on his part, assuming those arrangements and acts on the part of the Divine Being which must form the basis of everything.

A contradiction may indeed seem to exist between the two when the one, as the mark of the stand-point of legal righteousness adopts the phrase, "Do this, and thou shalt live!" while the other, from his own peculiar stand-point, says, "A doer of the work—this man shall be blessed in his deed,"[1] and we readily grant that Paul would not have *so* expressed himself. But this contradiction vanishes if we take care to notice the different connexions in which these words are used. Paul speaks of the *νόμος* as the summary of individual imperative prescriptions, and of man on the legal stand-point, antecedent to Christianity. James is speaking of the new law of life revealed by the Messiah, which he designates the *νόμος τέλειος* in reference to its forming the consummation of Judaism, just as Christ in his sermon on the mount represents the gospel to be the fulfilling of the law. Viewing it in this connexion, he also calls it the "law of liberty," i. 25; doubtless from the fact, that those who truly receive it, render a free, loving obedience, issuing from an inward vital principle. He considers this law as equivalent to the *λόγος*, the published doctrine of Christ. By this doctrine the law becomes a law of freedom, and a perfect law, inasmuch as in the words of Christ the law first finds its full significance, and from faith in Christ the free obedience of love is first rendered to it. Thus the Christian stand-point where the law becomes glorified appears as that of freedom and perfection, in contrast to the earlier stand-point of slavery and imperfection. Since, then, James thus agrees with Paul, although he would not have made such

[1] Paul, from the legal as opposed to the evangelical stand-point, says, *ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς*. James, from his own position says, *ὁ ποιητὴς ἔργου οὗτος μακάριος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει αὐτοῦ ἔσται*.

a contrast as the latter Apostle, between the gospel and the law, we are not justified in tracing modes of expression in James that resemble the Pauline, to the direct influence of Paul, but we must rather refer what both have in common, to the Divine original fountain of the revelation of Christ, in whose words we can point out the connecting link. In reference therefore to the law, as the law of Christ, James says what Paul himself must have granted,—that mere knowledge can profit nothing—that it is all-important that this doctrine should not be made an object of mere indolent contemplation, but should evince its power as a law regulating the life—that whoever exemplifies this doctrine in his life, will be blessed in his deed[1]—that only he who regulates his life by Christianity can experience in life its blessed effects; he alone will feel truly blessed in the influence proceeding from Christianity.

In relation to moral requirements, James differed widely from the abettors of a Jewish legal righteousness, who laid more stress on a multiplicity of individual good works than on the regulation of the life by one governing principle; for it is one of the characteristics of this Epistle, and closely connected with his argument on faith, that he traces back belief, knowledge, and action, to the unity of the whole life proceeding from a Divine disposition, and opposes the isolation of all those things which can only maintain their true significance when comprehended in that unity.

Thus he says, Whosoever imagines that the worship of God consists in certain single acts, deceives himself; it consists in the whole direction of a life devoted to God, in preserving oneself from contact with all ungodliness. He combats the superficial moral judgment, according to which a man believes that he may be excused for transgressing certain commands, if he only avoids certain sins. The law is a unity, and whoever violates it in only one point, is guilty of violating the whole. According to James, the fulfilling of the whole law consists in love; ii. 8. Hence he particularly speaks

[1] ἐν, in James i. 25, ought by no means to be translated *through*. The ἔσται implies, that James considered the blessedness not merely as something proceeding from the deed as an outward result, but as something involved in the deed, a feeling that necessarily accompanied it; we are led to think of the beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount. See Schneckenburgh's excellent remarks on this passage.

against those who were accustomed to consider an offence in words as a mere trifle, or who believed that they could exercise genuine devotion towards God while they were in the habit of passing uncharitable judgments on their fellow-men. This is a contradiction; good and evil cannot proceed from the same fountain; it is of the first importance that language should be the organ of a disposition that regulates the whole life both in word and deed. And in reference to the theoretical part of religion, he says that true wisdom and true knowledge must show themselves in the general course of the life. He considers the whole Christian life as a work. That perseverance which consists in maintaining the faith under trials must have its perfect work—that is, must consist not merely in single good acts, but embrace the whole of life; i. 4. Of practical Christianity, he says, that the ποιητὴς ἔργου is blessed in his ποίησις; i. 25.

Although Christianity presented itself to this apostle as the consummation of the law, yet he by no means adopted the Ebionitish notion, that Christ had only perfected the Mosaic law by the addition of certain moral prescriptions, such as are given in the Sermon on the Mount, so that he might be considered simply as the Supreme lawgiver and teacher; but he acknowledged as the peculiar distinction of Christianity, the impartation of a new divine principle of life, which by its internal operation produced the fulfilment of the law. He beheld in the Messiah the author of a new moral creation through the divine principle of life which he communicated; he describes the word of truth as the instrument of regeneration, giving birth to a new creation; i. 18. The word (he affirms) must penetrate the very depths of human nature, and by an internal transforming power effect its deliverance from sin; i. 21. But he was very far from believing that the Christian could altogether come up to the requirements of the law of liberty, which seeks for a free obedience proceeding from love, and could thus be justified by his own course of life. He declares (including himself) that "in many things we all offend;" iii. 2. Every man, he says, must be penetrated by the conviction, how much he stands in need of the divine mercy that he may be able to stand before the divine tribunal; and ought to be impelled by this consideration to exercise mercy towards others; ii. 13.

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After what has been said, it cannot be denied that there are differences between the two apostles, in the dogmatic and ethical mode of their instructions; but still it may be shown, that though the Christian spirit appears more fully developed and more perfectly formed in one scheme of doctrine than in the other, yet the same spirit pervades both. Paul, though he considered good works as the necessary marks of the new spiritual creation, and the necessary fruits of an actual internal righteousness, would certainly not have expressed himself exactly in this manner, that a man is justified not by faith alone, but also by his works,—that faith and works must co-operate for his justification. He would not only have avoided saying this in reference to the legal works preceding the transformation of the life by faith, (in which James agrees with him,) but also in reference to the works produced by faith; for he always considered the πίστις alone as that by which a man becomes just before God, and the source from which all other good develops itself by an internal necessity; and the life of believers proceeding from faith is always alloyed by a mixture of the σάρξ, for which reason a justifying power cannot be attributed even to those works which are the fruits of faith. But since James, as we have remarked, acknowledges the continual defects of the Christian life and the need of forgiveness of sin even on the stand-point of the gospel—since he presupposes that the Christian can only obtain that mercy from God which he constantly needs, as long as he shows mercy to others — all material difference vanishes. Paul approaches nearer to James on another side, where he is less dogmatically exact, and is not led to employ the strong contrasts which are frequent in the controversial parts of his writings, for even according to his own views, works necessarily belong to the Christian life as an expression of faith and of the δικαιοσύνη obtained by it, and faith must be verified by the whole course of life; hence he asserts, on occasions when it was of importance to bring forward this truth, that every man will receive according to that he hath done in his earthly life, whether it be good or bad, 2 Cor. v. 10. Nor is it difficult to deduce this mode of expression from the Pauline principles, and to show its perfect harmony with them. In the works which proceed from faith, the difference must be verified between genuine and spurious faith, and the difference

will gradually make itself known according to the degree in which faith has penetrated the life. Although in redemption, justification, and the impartation of a new divine life, by which man is first rendered capable of accomplishing good works, all is an act of grace, yet, according to Paul's doctrine, there is also a rewardable righteousness, and the bestowment of a reward, in proportion as men show themselves active when the new creation has been effected, according as they make use of the grace bestowed upon them. And if such expressions, though strictly in accordance with the Pauline doctrine, were taken by themselves, they might be supposed to be contradictory to it, like those of James, to which they have an affinity.

Moreover, as James was altogether a Jew, but a Jew whose views were rendered complete by faith in Jesus as the Messiah, it was his aim to lead his countrymen by the same way which he had taken himself, from Judaism to faith in Jesus as the Messiah, though without departing from the national theocratic forms; hence he did not, like Paul, who laboured among the Gentiles that stood in no national relation to the law, represent Christ as the abolisher of the law, but as its fulfiller; and this view was countenanced by Christ's own language in Matt. v. 17.[1] The law hence became to him changed in its spirit; from being imperfect, it became perfect; from being a law of bondage, it became a law of liberty. But he received the new spirit under the old forms, similarly to many Catholics who have attained to free evangelical convictions, and yet have not been able to disengage themselves from the old ecclesiastical forms; or like Luther, when he had already attained to a knowledge of justification by faith, but before he was aware of the consequences flowing from it in opposition to the prevalent doctrines of the church. And thus James, though he acknowledged that the Gentiles by faith in Jehovah and the Messiah were entitled to the same theocratic privileges as the Jews who observed the law, did not enforce on the believing Jews the non-observance of the law, Acts xv. 21. And what he says to Paul in Acts xxi. 21,[2] implies that he would have thought it wrong to have led the Jews who were scattered among the heathen to forsake the observance of the

[1] *Vide* Neander's Life of Jesus, (p. 94, Standard Library Edition.)

[2] The believing Jews needed no new precepts; they knew what they were bound to observe as Jews. See vol. i. p. 118.

law. Now Paul was so far averse from this, that he allowed the Jews to remain Jews, as he allowed the Gentiles to retain everything in their national character and habits which did not contradict the spirit of the gospel: he himself did not repudiate his Jewish character and education, but celebrated the Jewish feasts with the Jews, when there was opportunity. But since he considered the religious obligation of the law in every respect as abolished, he must naturally have been less scrupulous in its outward observance, and must rather have felt himself bound to depart from it when required to do so by higher considerations, as soon as the observance of the law was in any way incompatible with the duties and claims of his vocation, as for example, when it obstructed his free intercourse with the heathen. Among the Gentiles he lived as one by birth a Gentile; Barnabas and Peter did the same; Gal. ii. 14.[1] James would not have so easily agreed to this, nor indeed was such expansion of sentiment required for his peculiar sphere of labour, since his adherence to the observance of the law rather promoted his success among his countrymen, to whom his ministry was confined.

With the difference in the doctrinal scheme of the two apostles, their manner of enforcing the duty of veracity is also connected. James repeats the command of Christ to the letter, as it was originally given, yet showing at the same time, that he correctly understood its sense and spirit. Among Christians, no oath ought to be required for a confirmation of what they asserted, their love of truth and mutual confidence ought to be so great, that their Yea and Nay should be a sufficient pledge. It was their duty to guard from the first against the guilt of falsehood or perjury; James v. 12. Paul does not mention Christ's command in this verbal form, but only enjoins, in reference to the disposition, that Christians should speak truth to one another, as being members one of another; and because language was intended for the very purpose of maintaining and exhibiting the spiritual commu-

[1] Perhaps the partisans of James, mentioned in Gal. ii. 12, went down to Antioch for the purpose of examining whether the Jews who lived among the Gentiles, allowed themselves to be led into violations of the law, which they were not justified in doing by the resolutions of the apostolic convention; but it does not follow from this, that they were acting by the command, or even in accordance with the wish of James.

nion, in which, as members of the same body, they must stand to one another. From this it was easy to deduce the obligation which they were under on this point towards society at large, since all men as rational beings created for the realization of the kingdom of God, might be considered members one of another, and language was in like manner designed for the maintenance and exhibition of this more general relation; Ephes. iv. 25. And he had confessedly no scruple, when sufficient confidence was not felt towards him by all the persons concerned, and where it was of special importance to obtain undoubting confidence in his assertions, to make use of a form of asseveration which would be deemed equivalent to an oath.

As the ethical element predominates in the Epistle of James, so an anxiety for the exclusion of every appearance of charging the causation of sin upon God is very conspicuous, and an emphatic maintenance of the freedom of the will, whose self-determination is the necessary condition of all the operations of divine grace. Let no one excuse himself (is the apostle's doctrine) for yielding to evil, on the plea that he could not withstand its enticements,—that a higher power, a fatality, a divine predestination hurried him into sin. Far be it from God to tempt any man to evil. As no evil can affect Him, the holy and blessed One, so he tempts no one to evil; but it is the indwelling sinful desire of every man by which he is seduced to evil. This also makes an opening for the temptations of Satan, yet even by his power no one can be forced to sin against his will: iv. 7. Thus the ground is taken away from every man for throwing off the blame of his sins by pleading the temptations proceeding either from God or Satan; since to the believer the ability is given, by his own higher moral nature (the image of God in his soul), and the guidance of the Divine Spirit, to withstand his sinful desires and the temptations of Satan; it must be his own guilt if he yield and allow himself to be carried away to the commission of sin. He has only to subordinate his own will to the will of God, and in communion with God to withstand the evil spirit, who will then flee from him; all temptation to evil will fail before a will that is in real earnest and devoted to God. Only let a man surrender himself to God by a steady determination of his will, and God's

said will not be wanting; i. 13—16; iv. 7, 8. James, like Paul, presupposes two principles of action in the believer —the image of God restored through Christ, and the sinful desire which still cleaves to the soul, and renders it accessible to temptations from without. When he says that the desire bringeth forth sin, (i. 15,) it is not meant, that the desire itself is something purely natural, or morally indifferent, but it is rather presupposed that the element in human nature, according to its actual condition, which, when a man does not withstand, but surrenders himself to it, gives birth to the sinful act, is in itself something sinful. But James limits himself, for the most part, to the outward manifestations of the moral life; he does not, like Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, go to the root of the opposition between good and evil in the depths of the human heart; yet he forms, even on this side, an important link in the complete development of Christian doctrine. The manner in which he expresses himself respecting the free determination of the will in relation to a divine causation in evil and good, furnishes us with an important supplement to Paul's doctrinal method, where, (as in discussing the doctrine of election, predestination, and the unconditionality of the divine decrees,) owing to his peculiar character, and his practical or argumentative object, only one side of Christian truth is brought forward, and other aspects of it are put in the background. Hence, if we wish to form a doctrinal system from such single passages, not taken in connexion with the analogy of the whole New Testament doctrine, errors must arise, which we shall learn to avoid, by comparing the degrees of development and peculiar schemes of doctrine belonging to the several apostles which serve mutually to complete one another.[1]

[1] In reference to all the topics discussed in this chapter, I wish to direct the attention of my readers to an essay by Dr. Clarics Frommann, now pastor of the Lutheran church at St. Petersburgh, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1830, part 1. It will be clear to the attentive reader, that in the representation given above, I have viewed the subject, not from the stand-point of a contracted dogmatism which would adjust all contradictions, but from that stand-point which unprejudiced historical investigation and genetic development enable me to occupy. But I cannot hope to secure myself against the suspicions of the prejudiced, who, of all persons, deem themselves the most free from prejudice.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF JOHN.

THIS apostle, compared with Paul, has one point in common with James, that, by his peculiar mental development, he was not adapted and disposed to that intellectual cast of thought which distinguished the dialectic Paul. But if in James the practical element predominated, in John we find the intuitive, though deeply imbued with the practical; he presents contemplative views of the fundamental relations of the spiritual life, rather than trains of thought, in which, as in Paul's writings, distinctions and contrasts are made with logical precision and minuteness. In reference also to the peculiar development of his Christian life, he had not been led like Paul to faith in the Redeemer through severe conflicts and opposition, nor like him at last attained peace after a violent crisis. He resembled James in having reached his Christian stand-point through a course of quiet development, but differed from him in this respect, that his higher life had not been first moulded to a peculiar form in Judaism—and that he had not from such a stand-point been gradually brought to faith in Christ, and at the same time had modified his conceptions of Christianity by his former views; but from the first, the whole development of his higher life had proceeded from the personal observation of Christ and intercourse with him. As the consciousness of his own moral disunion was elicited by the contemplation of a perfect divinely-human life, in which the archetype of man was realized before his eyes, so by continuing to live in communion with this model of perfection, he gained power to overcome that disunion. Hence everything in his view turned on one simple contrast;—divine life in communion with the Redeemer,—death in estrangement from him. And as the whole of his piety was the result of his personal experience and contemplation of the Redeemer, all his views of religion were grounded on the life of Jesus, and might be considered as so many reflections of it. It was this which gave them a vital unity, so that it was hardly possible to distinguish them into the practical and

theoretical. This is shown in those pregnant words by which his style is marked,—*Life*, *Light*, and *Truth*; and their opposites—*Death*, *Darkness*, and a *Lie*. As in communion with God, the original fountain of life, which can be obtained only through his self-revelation in the Logos, the spirit of man finds its true life,—as when in this true life, the consciousness of the spirit develops itself, the life becomes the light of the spirit, and the spirit lives in the truth as its vital principle; so by the separation of the spirit from its original, by the disjunction of the knowledge of man's self and of the world, from the knowledge of God, death, misery, darkness and falsehood are the result. The human spirit created after the image of the divine Logos, must be enlightened by communion with this divine fountain of life; a life in God, divine life as the true life of the spirit, is naturally accompanied by the true light of knowledge. But since man by the direction of his will has turned himself to the undivine, he has in so doing estranged himself from the source of his true light and life, and is no longer in a state susceptible of its reception. The divine Logos never ceases, indeed, to manifest himself to the souls of men, as Paul declares, that in God they live and move and are; his light shines in the darkness of the human race, who have turned away from God; and from its illumination emanated all the goodness and truth that preceded the personal appearance of the Logos; but this revelation was opposed by an impenetrable intensity of darkness.[1] Hence

[1] I cannot entirely agree with the interpretation proposed by Frommann, in his excellent work on the doctrinal views of John; Leipzig, 1839, p. 249;—that John, in the first clause of i. 5, depicts the relation of human nature in its original state to the revelation of the divine Logos, and that, in the second part of this verse, καὶ ἡ σκοτία, he speaks of that relation since the Fall. According to this, the σκοτία in the first clause, to use the language of the schoolmen, would describe the state of man on the stand-point of *pura naturalia* as *informis negative*, and from the revelation of the Logos the *gratia informans* must proceed, which man required for the perfection of his spiritual nature. But in John, we never find the representation of such a mere negative relation of the human spirit to the Logos, as existing apart from communion with him, and possessing a susceptibility not yet satisfied. "Darkness" always denotes, in his phraseology, an actual opposition against the divine light of the Logos, a predominance of the undivine. It is contrary to the style of his conceptions, that he should suppose the spirit of man, formed after the image of the Logos, to be

the Logos himself must break through the separating limits —bring himself nigh to man estranged from God—reveal and communicate himself as the divine fountain of life in the form of an assumed humanity, a visible human life serving as a medium for the manifestation of the divine life which is in him, and for bringing men to a participation of it. John i. 7—14.

Satan appears as the summit and representative of this self-seeking tendency dissevered from connexion with God, and hence given over to darkness and falsehood; John viii. 44. He stands not in the truth;[1] with the disin its original state otherwise than in communion with that divine source of life and light. Verse 4 relates to what the Logos was or ought to be, according to his essential nature, to mankind; and in verse 5, John passes on to the state of mankind estranged from God by the misdirection of their will.

[1] Frommann maintains, in his work before quoted, p. 332, that Satan, according to John's views, is no other than "the seductive spirit of the world conceived of in concrete personality;" the principle of evil in the world hypostasized; and that the idea of a fallen Intelligence is altogether foreign to this apostle. But if this were so, we must explain his language in one of three ways. Either he intentionally chose the form of such a personification; or the prevalent religious conceptions, which had proceeded from an incorporation of the idea of evil, had taken possession of his mind without his making it a subject of special reflection (which is Scheiermacher's view); or he really considered Satan as an absolutely evil being who had existed from eternity. There appears nothing to favour the first supposition; with respect to the second, this doctrine is so closely interwoven with the whole system of John's theology, that we cannot help believing that he had been compelled to reflect on the meaning of this representation, and to form a definite idea respecting the nature of Satan and his relation to God. But the admission of an absolute Dualism is utterly irreconcilable with John's theism. There remains then no other alternative but the supposition that he considered Satan as the Intelligence who first apostatized from God. The passage in John viii. 44 contains nothing contradictory to it. The persons whom Christ there declares to resemble Satan in their dispositions, he could not intend to describe as absolutely evil by nature, but as those who, by the repeated suppression of their nature derived from God, had attained this unsusceptibility for truth and goodness, this habitual perverseness. Frommann says, p. 335, that the fall of a good angel presupposes an original evil principle operating upon him, and that, in order to explain the existence of Satan, we are again driven to the assumption of another Satan. But this objection is obviated by what we have before remarked respecting the necessary inexplicability of the origin of sin, founded in the very idea of evil. We must again maintain what we have asserted against all attempts to find an absolute Dualism in John. The doctrine of a fallen spirit from whom all evil proceeds, we are justified in presuming

position that has become a second nature, he can find in the truth not a single point on which to rest, because there is no truth in him. Owing to his predominant tendency to falsehood he wants the organ requisite to admit and to appropriate the revelation of truth.

Where a created spirit yields itself wholly and purely to the revealed God, or the Logos, there is truth. Wherever he dissevers himself from this connexion, and lives, thinks, and acts in this state of selfish separation, there is falsehood. As the truth, according to John, proceeds from the tendency of the whole life towards God, the true and the good are in his view one, as on the other hand, sin and falsehood. When the spirit withdraws itself from the revelation of eternal truth, and suppresses its original consciousness of truth, self-deception follows, and the deception of others. Hence Satan is represented as a liar, and the father of lies. And thus the universal contrast is formed. Those who are in a state of vital communion with God, who have received a divine life, are born of God, and hence are called the children of God; and those who live in communion with that spirit from whom at first proceeded all the tendencies of sin and falsehood, or who are of the world, belong to the world; understanding by the world not the objective world as such, the creation of God, which, as founded in the Logos and as a revelation of God, is in itself something good, but the world in a subjective reference as far as the heart of man is fixed upon it, and is separated from its relation to God, so that the world is treated as a supreme object of regard, while the knowledge of God is entirely lost sight of.

Since, according to John, participation in the divine life depends entirely on faith in the Redeemer, this forms a new era of development in opposition to the former prevailing principle, and that state of estrangement from God, and of moral corruption from which believers are extricated. Though we find in John no such ample representation of human nature to be the only one by which the idea of a Satan can harmonize with the strictly theistical conception which evidently lies at the basis of John's theology, if nothing can be proved contradictory to this supposition, as certainly nothing of this kind can be proved in it. But such a Dualism as is founded in Heracleon's idea of Satan, we cannot presuppose without hesitation in that of John, but it will be necessary to produce distinct expressions which afford positive evidence of such a conception.

in its estrangement from God, as is delineated in Paul's writings, (which may be explained from the peculiarity of his doctrinal method, and the peculiar style of his writings,) still it may be easily perceived that his views were essentially the same, and in perfect harmony with the essence of Christianity. We find here the same contrast between what human nature is, and is able to produce in the state of estrangement from God, and that higher stand-point to which it is raised by the transforming influence of a divine principle of life communicated to it, or, in other words, the *σαρκικὸν* and the *πνευματικὸν*. When John, in the introduction to his Gospel (i. 12), describes the children of God as those who owed this distinction, not to their descent from any particular race of men, and in general not to anything which lies within the compass of human nature;—when Christ says to Nicodemus, that what is born of the flesh is flesh;—such language is, in the first place, opposed to the Jewish notion that outward descent from the theocratic nation gave an indisputable right to participation in the kingdom of God and in the dignity of his children; but this particular application is deduced from a truth expressed in the most general terms, namely, the general position, that the natural man by his disposition is estranged from the kingdom of God, and must receive a new divine life, in order to become a member of it. Hence in John, as well as in Paul, the same conditions and preparations are required for partaking in the blessing Christ is ready to bestow on mankind, the consciousness of bondage in the God-related nature of man,—the consciousness of personal sinfulness—a sense of the need of help and redemption, a longing after a new divine life, which alone can satisfy all the wants of the higher nature of man. We may here adduce the allusion to the brazen serpent (iii. 14), where the Jews, who in believing confidence expected by looking at it to be healed of their wounds, represent those who, under a sense of the destruction that threatens them from their spiritual maladies, look to the Redeemer with confidence for spiritual healing; and all those parables in John's Gospel, in which Christ speaks of thirst for that water of life, and hunger for that bread of life, which he is willing to bestow. Accordingly John, in his first Epistle, says that whoever believes himself to be free from sin, is

destitute of uprightness, and deceives himself; that such a man makes God a liar, since he acts as if all which the earlier divine revelations have asserted respecting human sinfulness, and which is implied in God's sending a Redeemer to the human race, were false; 1 John i. 9.

But in order that men may attain to faith in the Redeemer, and avail themselves of his aid, the outward revelation of the divine, with all the attestations that accompanied it in the external world, are not sufficient. Without the inward sense for the divine which is outwardly manifested in the person of the Saviour, they can give it no admission into their hearts. The outward power of the divine can exert no compulsive influence, but requires the mind to be already in a susceptible state, in order to produce its right effect. Without this, all external revelations and appeals are in vain; the unsusceptible "have eyes but they see not;" John xii. 40. Hence the attainment of faith depends on a preparative operation of the Holy Spirit on men's minds, by which a sense of the divine is awakened within them, and a consciousness of their higher wants. Thus a susceptibility for what will give real satisfaction is developed, so that faith naturally results from the conjunction of this inward susceptibility with the external divine revelation. To this Christ refers when he says to the Jews, (to whom, on account of the enthralment of their minds in earthly things, his words were necessarily unintelligible and strange,) in order to draw their attention to the grounds of their being offended with him (John vi. 44, 45), that they could not believe, that they could not come to him, that is, attain to faith in him, owing to this tendency of their disposition.[1] No one (he declared) could come unto him who was not drawn to him by the Father who sent him; who had not heard the awakening voice of the heavenly Father in his inmost soul, and followed it. These words have indeed been misunderstood by the advocates of the Augustinian system, as if a divine excitement, independent of all human self-determination, were intended as producing that susceptibility for the divine; but this would be to impose a sense foreign

[1] In contrast to their bodily coming to him, which was only on account of their bodily necessities, for which they thus sought to obtain relief, the true spiritual coming to him must proceed from a feeling of their real spiritual necessities.

to the connexion and the design of the discourse; and greater importance has been attached to a single metaphorical expression than it can have in such a connexion. Certainly the *divine* impulse must be here contrasted with what is merely sensible and human; and the figurative expressions denote the power with which the divine impulse, when it is once felt, operates on the soul,—the power with which the divine manifests itself to the self-consciousness; but it is by no means said that this divine impulse of an operation of God to arouse the suppressed knowledge of God acts alone, and that man, by his free self-determination, does nothing to promote it. This supposition would be inconsistent with the design of all the passages of this kind, since, taken in their connexion, the words are intended to awake men to a sense of their criminal unsusceptibility as the cause of their unbelief. It would also contradict John's declaration of the condemnation that accompanied the appearance of the Redeemer and the publication of the gospel; for this condemnation implies the fact, that in the different reception given by men to the gospel, their different susceptibility or unsusceptibility for believing is manifested, and thus the difference of their entire disposition and character.

According to the doctrinal views of John, a twofold meaning is attached to the phrases, *εἶναι ἐκ θεοῦ*, and *εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας*. They either indicate, in the highest sense of the words, the inspiration first proceeding from faith through the divine spirit of life, which is the spirit of truth; or in a subordinate sense, the general connexion of the human mind with God, the capacity for the true and the divine, that inward susceptibility founded on the developed knowledge of God, which is the preparative for faith. In reference to the latter it is said, in John viii. 47, "He that is of God, heareth God's words;" and xviii. 37, "Every one that is of the truth, heareth my voice." Hence, though John presents in diametric opposition the idea of the natural man estranged from God, and the man who is born of God, yet according to his doctrine, various steps and transitions must be admitted between the first stand-point and the second, according as the original knowledge of truth and of God which has been suppressed by the sinful bias of the will, more or less prevents men from hearing the voice of God, and following

the drawings of their heavenly Father.[1] The slumbering sense of God may indeed be awakened by the immediate impression of the glory manifested in the appearance of Christ; but it may also happen that a man, by following the drawing of his heavenly Father antecedent to the revelation of Christ, uprightly strives after the divine and the good, and such a one is led through the divine to the divine. The confused partial revelation of God which had hitherto illuminated the darkness of his soul, and conducted him in life, leads him to the revelation of the divine original in human form, and he rejoices actually to behold the archetype in its effulgence which had hitherto shone upon him with only a dim and distant lustre; John iii. 21.

With respect to John's idea of the work of redemption, that appears most prominent which he had received from the immediate observation of the life of Christ, and its immediate impression on his religious self-consciousness. The life of Christ as the humanization of the divine, of which the design was to give a divine elevation to man, is the self-revelation of the divine Logos (as the revealing principle for the mysterious essence of God) in the form of humanity, appropriated by him in order to communicate divine life to human nature, and to transform it into a revelation of the divine life. John's remarkable words, "The Logos became man, and we have beheld his glory as it was revealed in humanity," describe the nature of Christ's appearance, and what mankind are to become through him who is the central point of Christian faith and life. The same sentiments are expressed in his first epistle, "We announce to you as eye-witnesses, the manifestation of the eternal fountain of life, which was with the Father, in order that you may enter into fellowship with it." He states as the essential marks of this manifestation of the divine glory in human form, that he appeared full of grace and truth; *grace*, which means the communicative love of God, God as love; and *truth*, according to John's conceptions of it, as we have already remarked, is not anything speculative and abstract, but proceeds from the life, and embraces the whole unity of the life, and hence is one with goodness and holiness. Truth is

[1] The darkness which cannot admit the divine light that shines upon it.

the essential predicate of the inward unity of the divine life; and Christ (in John's Gospel) calls himself the truth and the life. Hence, the ideas of love and holiness are the two divine attributes which (as far as it is possible to reduce John's pregnant words to precise intellectual notions) will most nearly express what he represents as the characteristic of the glory of God revealed in the life of Christ; and agree with his using love and holiness in his first epistle as designations of the divine being.[1]

God has been glorified in Christ (John xiii. 32), in him as the Son of Man, by whom the archetype of humanity is realized;—that is, he has exhibited in human nature the glory of God, the perfect image of God as holy love. As man was created in the image of God, and was destined to glorify God, that is, to manifest him in his glory with self-consciousness—this is now fulfilled by the Son of God in human form. The practical revelation of the heavenly Father in the obscure subjective consciousness of man, and his perfect revelation in the appearance of the Son, are mutually related; the former was a preparation for the latter; and the latter reflects fresh illumination on the former. As whoever understands that revelation of God which pierces through the thick darkness of the soul, must be attracted by the perfect revelation of the same God in his Son, it follows, that whoever knows the Father must necessarily recognise the Father in the Son,—while the not recognising, or the denying of the Son, is a proof that a man knows not the Father, and is estranged from him. The image of the Father is perfectly exhibited in the Son, in his holy love to man, and in him also was first revealed in a comprehensible manner what a being that God is, whose holy personality man was created to represent.[2] Through him God closes up the chasm that separated him from the human race, and im-

[1] John does not make use of the second term precisely, but it is implied in what he says; for when he affirms in 1 John i. 5, "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all," as darkness is a designation of sin,—light, by contrast, is expressive of holiness.

[2] After Christ had said (John vi. 45) that all must be led to him by the voice of his Father speaking in their hearts, he guards against a misapprehension, as if this was in itself a complete knowledge of the Father. This only the Son possesses, and he alone can reveal it. The former must be therefore something preparative, a way-mark to more perfect knowledge.

parts himself to them in the communion of a divine life; and by that life it is taught that all living knowledge of God can only proceed from life; and thus the apostle was justified in saying, "Whoever hath not the Son, hath not the Father also."

The Son is a perfect personality in humanity, in which the eternal personality of God is imaged. Thus by the drawing of the Father man is brought to the Son, and through the manifestation of the Son he is led to the Father. Along with the Son man loves the Father, and with the Father he loves the Son. This is a position which appears with increasing luminousness in the historical development of mankind, and to it history is constantly giving a clearer commentary.

John contemplates the whole life of Christ from the beginning as a revelation of the glory of the divine Logos, as in short a connected revelation of God; and hence the divine in reference to Christ must never be viewed as something isolated and extraneous. His miracles also, as marks of a divine power controlling nature, as witnesses to the presence of such a power, are not explicable from natural causes in the phenomenal world; they cannot be regarded as isolated or superadded from without, as a new order of facts differing in their essential qualities from the other works of Christ. Only as far as the glory of God which originally dwelt within him, which at the beginning of his public ministry as the Messiah was entirely veiled under the ordinary forms of human life—from that epoch came forth on particular occasions from its concealment, and manifested itself in such results in the world of the senses by which even carnal men might be roused to perceive the presence of the divine—only in reference to this beginning of a new epoch in his ministry for the revelation of the glory of God among mankind, John distinguishes the beginning of the miracles of Christ (ii. 11) as the beginning of the revelation of his glory. When he tells us, that the Baptist saw the Spirit of God descending on the Redeemer, by which he was distinguished as the personage who would baptize with the Holy Spirit, he certainly did not mean to intimate that Christ, according to the common Jewish and Judaizing-Christian view, was then first furnished with the fulness of divine power for his Messianic calling;—

decidedly opposed to such a representation. According to his own conceptions, since Christ was no other than the incarnate Logos, all that was divine in former revelations became concentrated in him; hence, single transitory impulses and revelations of the Divine Spirit could not be attributed to him; but the Holy Spirit, which illuminated and inspired former prophets partially and occasionally, dwelt in him from the beginning in its totality, and operated by him from this time in those extraordinary signs which were perceptible to common men. It was precisely for this reason, that the Son possessed his divine life, not as something communicated from without, but dwelling in his very being, and essential to it, that the divine fountain of life itself was manifested in him, that he alone could communicate divine life to others, John v. 26; and the baptism of the Holy Spirit which he administers, is no other than the immersion of human nature in the divine life communicated by him, so that it becomes completely imbued with it; John vii. 39.

But as the miracles of Christ appear sometimes in relation to the inward essence of his appearance, to the δόξα which proceeded from the indwelling of the Logos as simply belonging to his nature; so, on the other hand, they are the marks or signs of the revelation of this indwelling glory for carnal men, in order to lead them from his appearance in the sensible world to the divine, to excite their susceptibility for the total impression and display of the divine δόξα revealed in the Son of Man. In this sense, Christ said to Nathaniel, whose faith was founded on these outward signs, "Thou shalt see greater things than these; from this time thou shalt see the heavens opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending on the Son of Man." Greater than all the signs and wonders which attended or followed it was his *advent* itself; for by it the chasm between heaven and earth was closed, it became the bond of communion between both, the medium by which the fulness of the divine power was poured forth on mankind, and in comparison with which the total assemblage of divine communications to the human race, all earlier Angelophanies and Theophanies were only as so many single rays of the Deity.

We thus ascertain the gradations in the use of the term *faith* by John; he understands by it, either the acknowledgment of a higher power proceeding from impressions made on

the senses, from the impression of extraordinary facts in the sensible world, as in ii. 23; or the possession of the heart by an immediate spiritual impression of the divine in the life and words of Christ, as was exhibited in Peter's confession; vi. 68.

Though John presents, with peculiar earnestness, the self-revelation and self-impartation of Christ as the incarnate Logos through the whole of his earthly life for an object of believing appropriation, yet it is evident from various intimations, that he attributes the same importance as Paul to the sufferings of Christ in the work of redemption. As far as Christ in his sufferings manifested the love of God to the fallen race of man, and carried the moral ideal of his life through a series of conflicts to its triumphant conclusion—and with self-denying labour completed the work which his heavenly Father had commissioned him to fulfil—the Saviour affirms in reference to these his impending sufferings, that he had, in determination of will, already fulfilled them, xiii. 31; that now was the Son of Man glorified, and God was glorified in him. He speaks of his sufferings as the completion of his life devoted to God as a sacrifice, xvii. 19; that he thus devoted himself to God, or presented himself as a sacrifice, for his disciples, that they might be devoted or consecrated in the truth. The realization of the ideal of holiness in Christ's life and sufferings, is here represented as the ground of the sanctification of the human race. Had he not himself realized this ideal, he could not have furnished this principle of sanctification for all mankind, which they as individuals receive only by entering into communion with him, and by appropriating the truth which he announced. In John's writings, as in Paul's, we find the idea of Christ's bearing the punishment of sin for mankind, and the reconciliation of mankind with God through him, though this idea is not so expressly developed, and though greater prominence is given to the idea of Christ as the dispenser of divine life, and the founder of a communion in that life. Thus John the Baptist compares him, as innocent and full of heavenly mildness and patience under sufferings, to a Lamb, on whom the punishment of sin and the guilt of mankind are (as it were) laid and thus carried away;[1] and the apostle himself designates him in his first

[1] We have not entered into the controversy respecting the sense in which the Baptist originally used these words, since it is here only

epistle, the sin-offering, the ἱλασμὸς for sin. And when Christ had been declaring that divine life would be attained only in communion with him, that as the bread of heaven he was the same for the spiritual life of man which material bread is for the bodily life, he added (vi. 51), that the bread[1] was his body,[2] which he *would* give for the life of the world; he then repeats the same idea though under a different form, and describes how he must be received in his whole nature, divine and human. We are therefore led to believe, that between these two views, of which one relates in general to the whole being of Christ, and the other to his offering up himself for the salvation of men, an internal connexion must exist. The communication of divine life by the Redeemer,—all that his divine life could effect for mankind, depended on this, that as he himself had glorified the Father on earth, he would be exalted in that human nature in which he had so glorified him, above the limits of earthly existence to the fellowship of his Father's glory; that he might from that time, by an invisible spiritual agency, complete among men the work of which he had laid the foundation during his earthly sojourn, that he might now glorify him through the development of the divine life, and the victorious progress of the kingdom of God on earth. Christ himself points out this necessary connexion in that passage of John's Gospel, where he compares his life on earth to a grain of corn which must first be dissolved, and lose its peculiar form, in order that it may not abide alone, but bring forth much fruit. The divine life remained hidden in himself as his own exclusive possession during his sensible presence on earth. There was indeed a natural reason for this, that the apostles, as long as they saw Christ sensibly present among them, and enjoyed on all occasions his personal guidance, were dependent on his outward superintendence; they could not raise themselves above his human personality to the higher point of view of him as the Son of God, to an independent spiritual communion with him

of importance to determine the ideas of the apostle John on the subject.

[1] This is not exactly the same as his calling himself, in his whole being and appearance, the Bread of Life.

[2] To justify this interpretation, I refer to Lücke's commentary on these words.

apart from his bodily presence and agency, and therefore had not attained to the independent maturity of the spiritual life which proceeded from the Redeemer. Under these circumstances, the disciples could not have been fitted for a participation of the Redeemer's life, if his sensible presence had not first been withdrawn. But this negative, the removal of this hindrance to the higher influence of Christ on the disciples, would not alone have been sufficient, if the advent of a new positive power had not also been connected with it. His ascension to heaven was only a necessary preparation, in order to make the disciples susceptible of the divine influences of the glorified Redeemer. In the firm consciousness that he would be able to operate with such power on mankind, Christ said, (John xii. 32,) that when he should be lifted up from the earth, he would draw all men unto him. In reference to this connexion of events, John contemplates the communication of the divine principle of life which would be made by Christ to believers, and imbue the character of each individual, as well as the life of the collective body, which would bring the Christian life to its full vigour and maturity, the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*—as a result of the glorification of Christ, which would not take place till that was realized.[1]

Whatever is required on the part of men for the appropriation of what Christ effected as the Redeemer of mankind, John includes in *faith*. This is that one work which God

[1] With respect to the question,—in what sense the words in John vii. 38 were originally spoken by Christ, they relate not to one definite future transaction, but, as John iv. 14, to a perfectly general position, that faith in him would be for any individual a fountain of divine life, which was represented under the image of living water. But John was justified in saying, that what Christ here spoke could not be fulfilled at that time, since the consciousness of a divine life received from Christ was not yet developed in believers, but would take place at the effusion of the Holy Spirit, which would produce that consciousness; his language is therefore, in this respect, somewhat prophetic. The New Testament ideas of *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, and of *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, are closely connected; they are related to each other as effect and cause. Though with faith in Christ the impartation of a divine life was granted to believers potentially and in principle, yet the effect was first manifested after the effusion of the Holy Spirit. From that era, the divine life resulting from the participation of the Divine Spirit which believers received, streamed forth on mankind, and subsequent history furnishes the correct interpretation to these words of Christ, and verifies their truth. John, therefore, gives an historical commentary rather than a simple verbal explanation.

requires, John vii. 29, in contradistinction from the πολλὰ ἔργα of Jewish legal holiness; and from this one internal work, this one act of self-determination, everything will spontaneously follow which is requisite for the sanctification of man. But he distinguishes, as we have already remarked, the faith that proceeded from the predominance of a sensuous element, the faith of authority, (which as it arose more from an impression on the senses than on the mind, easily gave place to other sensuous impressions, and vanished,) from the faith which, as it proceeds from the inner life, the deeply felt need of a redemption from sin, or from an impression of the divine on the very depths of the heart, produced a permanent effect, the μένειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔχειν τὸν λόγον μένοντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ. This faith (as in Paul) is a direction and acting of the disposition, by which a man surrenders himself wholly to him whom he acknowledges as his Redeemer, and enters into communion with him. By this faith, entrance is made into communion with the Redeemer, and at the same time a participation obtained in his divine life. Whoever believes on him has everlasting life, has passed over from death unto life, is regenerated by the Divine Spirit, by whom, instead of the former predominant principle of sin, his mind is now controlled, he is awakened to a divine life, and has become a child of God. Hence his life is now developed according to a new form and a new law.

What John asserts respecting the relation of Christ's precepts to faith, readily harmonizes with the Pauline view of the relation of the law to faith. He speaks, it is true, of the commands of the Lord in the plural number, but they are all traced back to that one which is the characteristic of the καινὴ διαθήκη, the command of brotherly love; and the novelty of this command compared with the commands of the old law, is shown in its enjoining on believers to love as Christ loved, as he gave his life for the salvation of men, to exercise a self-sacrificing brotherly love according to his example. From this reference to the Saviour, it is evident that such commands cannot be intended as are prescribed from without, in addition to believing, but only those which are spontaneously developed from the divine life, which accompany faith, as obligations necessarily involved in it, requirements of the law of the inward life, so many distinct

traits in which the image of the life of Christ exhibits itself to believers. This new command presupposes faith in the redeeming self-sacrificing love of Christ, and from the knowledge of this love the impulse is awakened to exercise similar love towards the brethren; 1 John iii. 16; iv. 10—19. John says, (1 Ep. v. 3,) that the commands of Christ are not difficult, though they exhibit an ideal of holiness; but he affirms this, not on account of their contents, but on account of their peculiar relation to faith, and to the inward life of believers; because these commands do not as a mere dead letter oppose the principle of sin which rules in the hearts of men, but presuppose the life-giving spirit of love which develops itself from faith, since both the inward impulse and the power to fulfil them proceed from communion with the Redeemer, the new divine principle of life. John himself adduces as a proof that these commands are not difficult, this fact, that what is born of God receives power to overcome all that is undivine, that faith in Jesus as the Son of God has the power of overcoming the world, that in this faith is already placed the victory over the world and all that is undivine; 1 John v. 4; even as Paul declares that a man with this faith is already practically dead to the world. Christ, in the Gospel of John (xvi. 33), requires those who believe on him to confide in his having overcome the world (the whole power of evil)—to be assured that through him it had been brought to nothing; believers, accordingly, by virtue of their fellowship with him, share in this victory, they need no longer to dread the power of that enemy, and hence John could term faith itself "*the victory that overcometh the world.*" But whoever keeps not Christ's commands proves by his conduct that he is destitute of that divine life and communion with Christ, and therefore cannot in a true sense believe on him. Whoever lives in sin, and pretends to believe in Christ and to know him, is in fact very far from knowing him or believing on him. According to John's conceptions, it is impossible to separate either faith or knowledge from the life. Whoever knows Christ can know Him only as the Holy One who appeared to destroy the kingdom of evil among mankind, and to take away sin. And whoever has known him and believed in him as such, whoever has received the image of such a Christ into his inward life, can no longer live in the service of sin.

Very different from this faith in the real historical Christ, was the superstitious belief in that phantom which men formed of a Messiah in conformity with their own evil inclinations. An example of the latter kind of faith is mentioned by John in his Gospel, ii. 23, where he says that many believed in Jesus as the Messiah, on account of the miracles which they saw him perform. But since they were not actuated by the feeling of a higher necessity, nor sought and saw in Him a Saviour from sin—since they were not susceptible of the spiritual impression of the divine, but were only touched by an impression on the senses, only such an image of the Messiah could be formed in their minds as corresponded to a desire that was composed of carnal elements. Hence their faith, or rather their superstition, when its carnal expectations were disappointed, was soon succeeded by unbelief. Hence Christ would not surrender himself to the enthusiasm with which they professed attachment to him, for by his penetrating glance into the secret state of their hearts, he knew that they were still far from that faith which would be capable of fellowship with himself. To such a faith, which would require to be purified from the alloy of the sensual element, by awakening the slumbering religious sentiment through intercourse with the Redeemer, Christ referred when he said to the multitude who professed to believe on him, (viii. 31,) "If they now really received into their hearts, and appropriated that word to which they had hitherto given only a superficial acceptance, they would thus become truly his disciples—they would know the truth in their inward life, and by its power pervading their whole being, would be progressively freed from everything by which their higher nature, the religious sentiment implanted in their constitution, had been held in bondage."[1]

[1] In this passage, the idea of freedom is presented under a different aspect from what we find in Paul's writings, not in contrariety to legal bondage, but to a political semblance of freedom. True freedom, Christ says, is inward, proceeding from redemption. Till man longs after this, he is still in slavery, though enjoying complete outward independence, since he does not freely regulate himself according to the law of his original and true nature, but is controlled by a foreign principle, by which this his original and true nature is oppressed. But it will easily be seen, that the same general idea of the contrariety between freedom and slavery lies at the basis, as in Paul, and the threefold stand-point in the moral development of man may be readily

Though John contrasts the children of God, those who are born of God, with those who belong to the world, to the evil spirit, the children of the διάβολος, but only in general terms without any gradations; yet in the idea of the former, he by no means supposes an equally definite and complete manifestation in every individual, and is far from excluding various degrees of development. He says, as we have already noticed, that faith involves victory over the world, and that whoever believes in Jesus as the Son of God, by the power of this belief overcomes the world. By virtue of the divine principle of life, temptation to sin can find in the believer no point of connexion, and everything which assails him from without, can only contribute to promote the development of the divine life in him, and the victory of the cause of Christ, which by its nature is all-conquering and tending to perfection; 1 John iv. 4. Whoever is born of God, sinneth not, but preserves himself from all the allurements to sin, and the evil one toucheth him not, (evil can find in him no point of connexion; 1 John v. 18.) Because he is born of God, it is impossible for him to sin; since the seed of the divine life dwells within him, from which nothing evil, but only good can proceed; 1 John iii. 9. But from this description we are not to conclude that the idea and its manifestation perfectly correspond, and that it is intended to exhibit the Christian as sinless. John presupposes the contrary, since even in Christianity he still admits the need of forgiveness, and of progressive purification from sin. "If we confess our sins"—is his language,—that is, are penetrated by a consciousness of the sin that still cleaves to us, and are filled with a feeling of penitence,—"God is faithful and just[1] to forgive our sins, and to cleanse

[1] Two ideas are here closely connected. The faithfulness of God consists in this, that God in his acts, in the government of the world, shows himself always self-consistent; he responds to the expectations which he has awakened by his revelation in words, or by his providence in general history, or by the operations of his Spirit in the lives of individuals, and fulfils his promises; and as he has promised the forgiveness of sins to those who confess them, he bestows that blessing. His justice is shown by his fulfilling the laws which he established for his own kingdom; he gives to every one what belongs to him according to these laws; and thus the forgiveness of sins is granted, whenever the condition is fulfilled on which it was promised.

us from all unrighteousness," 1 John i. 9. We must, therefore, take the following view of John's doctrine; though the Christian as such, in reference to his life founded on communion with Christ, though his divine indwelling life cannot itself be affected by sin, yet as it is engrafted on a sinful nature which is continually opposed to it, it is always subject to being disturbed by its incursions, from which it can only be preserved by maintaining a constant warfare. The divine life, until it has pervaded and appropriated man's whole nature, which can never take place during his earthly existence, must develop itself by a continual process of purification: to this subject relates what Christ says in the metaphor of the vine; John xv. His disciples were already pure through the word spoken by him, inasmuch as they had received it as a purifying principle into their souls; but it was needful for its purifying to be manifested by an inward thorough purification of their whole nature. As the vine-dresser cuts off from the fruit-bearing branches of the vine all the useless shoots, that it may produce more fruit, so God purifies the whole nature of man by a gradual process which develops itself from a life in communion with Christ, in order that the fruit-producing power of the living sap received from him may not be lessened by mixing with the foreign sap belonging to the wild stock of the old nature, but manifest itself in continually richer fruits, the works of a genuine Christian disposition.[1]

In this manner we may easily explain the apparent contradiction in John's language, when he says that whoever sinneth knoweth not Christ, and yet speaks of the forgiveness of sins as needed by every Christian, and ready to be imparted to him. The life of the believer is distinguished from the life of the natural man by this, that it is animated, not by the principle of ἁμαρτία, but of the divine life, and hence what is sinful appears only as something still cleaving to him, and therefore always opposed by him. Accordingly, John represents these two states and tendencies of life as totally irreconcilable; walking in the light is a life devoted to

[1] The Pauline doctrine of good works as fruits of faith, and also the Pauline doctrine of charisms as the fruits of human nature when pervaded and purified by the divine principle of life, find here a point of connexion.

God by its prevailing tendency; and to walk in darkness is a life devoted to sinful inclinations, and proceeding from a sinful tendency.[1] We here may observe the unity of John's doctrine with that of Paul. As Paul represents faith, in its idea and principle, as an act by which a man dies to himself, the world, and sin—but yet, in the new life developed by its practical operation, infers a continued mortifying of the sinful principle; so likewise in John we find the same relation exhibited between being born of God, and maintaining a conflict with the world and sin. The distinction which is founded on these views between the objective of redemption apprehended by faith, and the progressive subjective development of the divine life, leads to the Pauline conceptions of *δικαιοσύνη* and *δικαίωσις*; John also contemplates the perfectly Holy Jesus, objectively as the intercessor with the Father for believers who are still burdened with sin.

As, according to John's ideas, the future is already apprehended by faith as present, so the divine life in the present is viewed as the commencing point and germ of a creation that

[1] It is the object of the First Epistle of John to counterwork the false confidence in the forgiveness of sins, the error that a man continuing in sin can be a partaker of forgiveness; still a Christian sympathizing love towards erring brethren is not excluded. By these brethren, who have a claim on Christian sympathy, he understands those who, though in general they had evinced an earnest desire for sanctification, had yielded to some sudden temptation. It is true he considers all sin as standing in contradiction to the divine life, the *ζωή*; but still a transient decline of this higher life, which has already become predominant over the sinful principle, is to be distinguished from an absolute suppression or entire destitution of it. The apostle here refers to such a momentary decline as results from yielding to temptation. It is the Christian's duty to pray for such fallen brethren, and it may be expected that God will revive them again, since it is presupposed that the persons who are the objects of this intercession, have still within them the germ of the Christian life, and are in a state susceptible of such a divine operation. But, on the other hand, John, in describing the acts that proceed from such a sinful state, which is marked by a total destitution of the divine life, a continued spiritual death, employs the phrase *ἁμαρτίαι πρὸς θάνατον*. To such cases the intercessory prayers for the forgiveness of sins could not relate, since the persons in question did not belong to the Christian community. But it by no means follows that believers were not to pray for their conversion; only they were not to consider them as *Christian* brethren, and pray for them in that sense in which those who were conscious of sin still cleaving to them, prayed for one another. Lücke, in his excellent commentary, agrees with this view of the subject.

embraces eternity. As an anticipation of the future thus exists in the present, there is a necessary reference to a future development and consummation. Whoever believes in the Redeemer (John declares) *hath* eternal life,—he has passed from death unto life—he can die no more—he can no more experience death. The divine life which he has received, can no more be interrupted by death. During his earthly existence there is the beginning of the development of this divine life; it is a fountain which springs up to everlasting life, which continues to flow onward till it enters the ocean of eternity, John iv. 14. Believers have the firm consciousness that they are the children of God, 1 John iii. 2, and that they shall attain to the full possession of all the rights and privileges founded on this relation; but the full understanding of what belongs to the realization of this idea is not yet granted to them—the dignity of the children of God in all its extent can be known only by its actual manifestation. But as in divine things knowledge and life are inseparably united, the perfect knowledge of Christ and God will accompany the perfect formation of the life in their image; 1 John iii. 2. The same connexion between the life of faith and of hope is here exhibited as in Paul's writings.

But it is a characteristic of John's views, that a reference to communion with the Redeemer in the inward life and in the present, predominates over the reference to the future and to outward facts; he dwells upon the elements of the inner life, the facts of Christian consciousness, and only slightly adverts to outward matters of fact, and what relates to the Church. In accordance with this spirit, he exhibits all the particular incidents in the outward history of Christ only as a manifestation of his indwelling glory, by which this may be brought home to the heart; he always avails himself of these narratives, to introduce what the Redeemer declared respecting his relation to mankind as the source of divine life. John is the representative of the truth which lies at the basis of that tendency of the Christian spirit, which sets itself in opposition to a one-sided intellectualism and ecclesiastical formality—and is distinguished by the name of Mysticism.

The same peculiarity marks his representations of the judgment and of the resurrection. The judgment he considers as something present, as a fact inseparable from the redemption of mankind and the publication of the gospel.

There follows, as a necessary consequence, a separation between those who with susceptible minds receive the divine, and those who exclude themselves by their unsusceptibility; those who, with a sense of their spiritual necessities, receive the offered redemption—whether a longing and striving after the divine life had already developed itself in their higher nature—or that the religious consciousness was awakened through intercourse with the Redeemer;—and those who, either by the predominance of the sensual element, or by spiritual pride and confidence in a legal righteousness, were prevented from attaining a knowledge of their need of redemption, and from surrendering themselves to the impression of the divine in the appearance, words, and works of the Redeemer. John always considers judgment as the opposite of salvation, *σωτηρία*—for the judgment of a Holy God is such that no man can appear before it as guiltless. The ideas of the judgment of God and condemnation must coalesce, in their application to man estranged from God by sin. But the revelation of God's love in redemption appears as a deliverance from the condemnatory judgment, and nothing more is required than the acceptance of the offered mercy through faith in the Redeemer. He who will not believe, owing to his predominant sinful tendency, excludes himself from the offered salvation, and the judgment that he pronounces against himself is founded on the unbelief which proceeds from the state of his interior disposition; John iii. 17. God sent his Son into the world (that is, caused him to appear among the mass of mankind hitherto estranged from God)—not to condemn the world—(as the Jews imagined that he would pass sentence on the Gentile world), but that mankind, who were under the dominion of sin and estranged from God, might be rescued through him from impending ruin. Whoever now believes on him, is not condemned; he has appropriated salvation by faith, and such a one, being certain of eternal life in communion with the Redeemer, need no longer dread condemnation. But whoever does not believe on him is already practically condemned by his own unbelief. In this the judgment consists, that men from their love of darkness (of the undivine), on account of the sinful tendency of their life, are not willing to admit the fountain of light (this their conduct towards the divine, as it proceeds from

their disposition, is a practical judgment). As the gospel cannot reveal its power for the salvation of men without this process of separation taking place, which John calls judgment, the end of Christ's appearance must include with the redemption of the susceptible, their separation from the unsusceptible. "*For judgment,*" said Christ, "*I am come into the world, that they who see not,*"[1] that is, those who see not, but are at the same time conscious of their not seeing, and are actuated by a sense of their need of illumination; "*may obtain their sight,*" may be cured of their blindness, in reference to divine things; "*but that they who see,*" who have the means granted them of knowing the truth, but who are not disposed to know it, and who are prevented from humbling themselves before the true light by the self-conceit of their imaginary far-sightedness, and though they have eyes to see, they see not, "*may be given up to their blindness;*" John ix. 39, 40.[2] To such a moral judgment connected with the publication of the gospel we must refer what Paul says of the publication of the gospel, that to some it is the savour of life unto life, and to others the savour of death unto death; 2 Cor. ii. 16. But the idea of this outward moral judgment, as well as the idea of the continued spiritual awakening of mankind by the publication of the gospel, by no means excludes a final judgment and a universal resurrection; but the former appears as a symbol and preparative of the latter, and the connexion of the two is exhibited in Christ's discourse in the 5th chapter of John's Gospel. At first, Christ speaks of the power conferred upon him as the Messiah to awaken the spiritually dead, and at the same time to judge them according to their respective conduct towards the divine life that was offered for their acceptance. As the Father awakens and calls to life the dead, so also the Son awakens to a true divine life whom he will;[3] for the Father has com-

[1] Not without reason the subjective negative particle μὴ is used here.

[2] As in the instance which gave occasion to this whole discourse, the blind man was made to see by the Redeemer, and as one spiritually blind, who supposed that he could not see, he was healed of his spiritual blindness and enlightened; while, on the contrary, the deluded Pharisees showed that, having eyes to see they were blind, since, in spite of facts, they denied the truth.

[3] This was intended to point out to the Jews, that everything depended on the manner in which they conducted themselves towards

mitted to him all the power of judgment, that all may show their reverence for the Father, by the manner in which they reverence the Son. He who honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father who sent him.[1] "He who receiveth my word and believeth on him who sent me," continued Christ, corroborating his former declaration, "*hath everlasting life*, and cannot come into condemnation, but is passed over from death unto life." By participation in a divine life, he is already removed beyond the stroke of judgment, which can only affect those who are estranged from God. "A time is coming, and already is" (inasmuch as Christ by the power of his words had already produced such effects), "when the dead" (the spiritually dead) "will hear the voice of the Son of God" (by the publication of the gospel), "and those who hear, shall live; for as the Father hath the fountain of life in himself, he has also given to the Son to have life in himself;" (only because the original fountain of divine life in the Son has communicated itself to mankind, can divine life be imparted to the dead through him;) "and he hath given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is a Son of Man." As man he came to impart divine life to men; and thus as man to administer judgment to men. Then Christ passes on from the present to the future, from the process of development among mankind, to the last decisive result, and says, "Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming in which all who are in their graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth; they who have done good to the resurrection of life, and they who have done evil to the resurrection of condemnation;" John v. 28, 29.

It is owing to the same peculiarity which characterises John as the author of the εὐαγγέλιον πνευματικόν, that in the last of Christ with his disciples, he does not mention what relates to his resurrection, his return to inflict judgments on the reprobate city of God, and his coming to the final judgment and the consummation of the church, but only the premises of an inward revelation of his Spirit to his

him; and that the communication of the divine life was not to be confined within the limits which they wished to assign from their national theocratic stand-point.

[1] In this consists the judgment, that every man proves by his conduct towards the Son what his feelings are toward the Father.

disciples, that after his bodily presence was withdrawn from them, and when they might suppose that they were altogether separated from him, he would reveal himself to them in a more glorious manner, and receive them into his communion, never again to be separated from them. The bodily reappearance of Christ among his disciples appears, in this connexion, only as of preparatory importance for continued spiritual communion with them, his constant spiritual self-revelation among them; so this reappearance of Christ for the religious development of the apostles, and the development of the church in general, was only of such preparatory importance, and intended to form a transition-point. Thus in these promises contained in John's Gospel, the second advent of the risen Saviour is certainly presupposed, although the fact is not expressly mentioned. It lies at the basis of these promises, though they do not distinctly refer to it. And in this respect it amounts to the same thing whether we admit one such reappearance of Christ after his resurrection, or several of the kind.[1] In order gradually to prepare their minds, he begins with assuring them that the Father would give them, instead of his own sensible presence among them, another helper to abide with them for ever,—the Spirit of truth, who alone could impart the full knowledge of the truth announced by himself, and who would communicate himself through this truth, as he says, (John xvi. 14,) that his Spirit would glorify him, since he would open to them the meaning of the doctrine he had taught. But since this Spirit is no other than the divine life communicated by Christ, the indwelling of God in the hearts of believers accomplished by him, he afterwards transfers what he had said to them of the coming of this Spirit, to his own coming to them in spirit. He points them to the great day, on which he would see them again in spirit, when the transient pain of separation from him would be succeeded by the everlasting joy of seeing him again and communing with him; when they would need no more to ask him questions, but he

[1] But we have in the *Life of Jesus*, p. 772, (p. 471, Standard Library edition,) proved the opinion to be unfounded, that according to John's Gospel, only *one* such reappearance of Christ immediately followed his resurrection, and that the other reappearances of Christ took place after his ascension to heaven.

would speak to them concerning the Father openly and without reserve. But though John dwells at length on the spiritual element and on what relates to the revelation of Christ in the hearts of the disciples, he by no means excludes his bodily resurrection and his own prediction of it; John x. 18. And thus from this scheme of doctrine it cannot be concluded, that John had not learned from the discourses of Christ the doctrine of his personal coming (*παρουσία*) to judgment, and for the consummation of his church. The contrary rather follows from what we have already remarked respecting the connexion in John's views of the judgment and the resurrection, and the twofold mode of representing them. And what John says in his First Epistle of the signs of the last time, the marks of an impending manifestation of an opposition to Christianity, points to the same fundamental ideas respecting the development of the kingdom of God, as those that occur in Paul's epistles. There are not wanting also some intimations of an approaching personal *παρουσία* of Christ, (1 John ii. 28, iii. 2,) though the peculiarity of John's character is shown by his only giving slight hints on the subject, and not, like Paul, a formal delineation of it.

It belongs also to this peculiar tendency of John's mind, that Christ is not represented by him as the founder of a church; even the idea of an *ἐκκλησία* is not distinctly brought forward, though its existence is implied, 3 John 6. But what constitutes the essence of the idea of a church, the idea of a communion of hearts founded in faith on the Redeemer, of the communion of believers with one another and with the Redeemer, a communion of faith and love, was expressed by him most emphatically—for this idea would necessarily proceed from that which was the soul of his whole life, the consciousness of communion with the Redeemer, and of the divine life received from him.

Thus we find in John's Gospel a reference to a religious community, to be formed out of all others among mankind, which would listen to the voice of the Redeemer, the "one fold under one Shepherd," a communion which would be founded on the equal relation of all to Christ the common head, and corresponds to the Pauline idea of one body under one head, John x. 16. As Christ and the Father are one, so are believers, since through him they are one with the Father,

by virtue of their mutual participation of the divine life. Thus they form a union to which no other in the world is comparable, and the glory of Christ reveals itself among them. They constitute before the eyes of the world a living testimony to the divine call and work of Christ. The communion of *the divine life thus manifested, points to its divine origin*, John xvii. 21. John also distinguishes between an *inward* community—the assemblage of those who stand in communion with the Redeemer, and which embraces the whole development of the divine life among mankind—and an *outward* community of believers, which it is possible for those to join who have no part in the former. Thus in 1 John ii. 19, he speaks of those who went out from the believers, but in fact (as far as it regarded their principles and disposition) never belonged to them, for had they really belonged to them in their inward life, they would not afterwards have renounced their society. But by this outwardly expressed renunciation, by their opposition to the community of believers, it now became manifest that not all who were outwardly joined to that community shared in its essential qualities, and really belonged to it. We find here, as in Paul's writings, the distinction of the visible and the invisible church.

John does not mention in his Gospel the institution of baptism by Christ, but he treats at length of that which forms the idea, the spiritual element of baptism—for to this the conversation between Christ and Nicodemus relates—that moral transformation by a new divine principle of life, in opposition to the old sinful nature of man, without which no one can become a member of the kingdom of God, that is, of the invisible church.[1] And this also applies to the Holy Supper. For as what Christ in his conversation with Nicodemus designated by the name of regeneration, has a relation to baptism, so what he represents in the sixth chapter of John, under the image of "eating his flesh and drinking his blood," bears a similar relation to the Supper. Christ had described himself as the true manna, the true bread from

[1] The mention of "*water*" in John iii. 5, is only of secondary importance, in order, by referring to a symbol familiar to Nicodemus, to render palpable to his mind that all-purifying power of the Divine Spirit which was needful for every man. Hence, in the subsequent part of his discourse, Christ mentions only being "*born of the Spirit.*"

heaven, the bread which is not of an earthly perishable nature, with only an earthly power to recruit the bodily life, but which is of divine origin and nature, capable of imparting divine life, and of satisfying the wants of the inner man for an eternal duration. He describes himself as having come down from heaven, in reference to his whole being, in order to impart divine life to mankind, so that every one can only by communion with the divine fountain of life, thus appearing in human nature, attain to a participation of a divine life. From stating what he *is* to mankind in his whole divine and human nature, Christ goes on to declare what he will *give* to mankind for their salvation, (corresponding to the bestowment of the manna which was sought for from him)—the surrender of his flesh (his life belonging to the sensible world) for the salvation of mankind. And since his words were so misunderstood by the Jews, as if he had spoken of eating his flesh in a literal sense, he took occasion to express what he had before said of himself as the bread of life, in even stronger terms under an image still more striking, and marking the idea still more accurately; he represented the eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood as a necessary means for the appropriation of eternal life. This eating of his flesh and drinking of his blood he considers equivalent to the *life of men*, by which the fountain of divine life itself enters into mankind, makes them entirely its own, as if men had converted into their own substance the flesh and blood of the incarnate Logos. He here speaks of the participation of divine life by means of his appearance in humanity, of the impartation of divine life depending upon and accomplished by the historical Christ, while he guards himself against being supposed to speak of his body in a literal sense, by saying, as a key for the right interpretation of his words, "*The spirit giveth life—the flesh profiteth nothing;*" therefore, he could not have intended to say, that men should make use of his flesh as an object of sense, for, like all flesh, it could not profit the inner man, but that by means of his appearing in the flesh in the sensible world, they should appropriate his spirit as the life-giving principle. "*The words that I say unto you, are spirit and life;*" they cannot be rightly understood according to their mere sound, their literal expression, but only according to their contents, which are spirit and

life, possessing a divine vitality.[1] Therefore, the symbol, "eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ," relates to the process of imbuing the whole nature of every one who is received by faith into his communion, with the *divine* principle of life, which, through him, has become a *human* principle in all who stand in communion with him; the constant humanizing of the divine in which continued appropriation and imbuing, the whole development of the Christian life consists. As regeneration, the commencing point in the Christian life, is represented by baptism, so is this, the sequel of regeneration, the continual regeneration (as it were) of man, the continued incorporation of mankind into the body of Christ, represented by the Supper. Thus John and Paul agree, and on this subject complete each other's views.

The essence of Christianity, according to John, is comprised in this, that the Father is known only in the Son, and only through the Son can man come into communion with the Father; 1 John ii. 23; 2 John 9. But no one can be in communion with the Son without partaking of the Holy Spirit which he promised in order to renew human nature in his own image; 1 John iii. 24. Both John and Paul place the essence of Christian theism in worshipping God as the Father through the Son, in the communion of the divine life which he has established, or in the communion of the Holy Spirit, the Father through the Son dwelling in mankind, animated by his Spirit, agreeably to the triad of the Pauline benediction,—the love of God, the grace of Christ, and the communion of the Holy Spirit, (2 Cor. xiii. 13;) and this is the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity in the connexion of Christian experience. It has an essentially practical and historical significance and foundation; it is the doctrine of God revealed in humanity, which teaches men to recognise in God not only the original source of existence, but also of salvation and sanctification. From this trinity of revelation, as far as the divine causality images itself in the same, the

[1] We cannot agree with those who think that Christ has here given the interpretation of his own words, and that he wished to say that, by his flesh and blood, nothing more was to be understood than his doctrine in reference to divine life-giving power. By σὰρξ and αἷμα, he certainly meant more than his ῥήματα. These words of Christ contain only the canon of correct interpretation, and leave the application to

reflective mind, according to the analogy of its own being, pursuing this track, seeks to elevate itself to the idea of an original triad in God, availing itself of the intimations which are contained in John's doctrine of the Logos, and the cognate elements of the Pauline theology.

As, accordingly, James and Peter mark the gradual transition from spiritualized Judaism to the independent development of Christianity, and as Paul represents the independent development of Christianity in opposition to the Jewish stand-point, so the reconciling contemplative element of John forms the closing-point in the training of the apostolic church, and now from the classical era of original Christianity, we must trace a new tedious development of the Church, striving towards its destined goal through manifold trials, oppositions, and conflicts. Perhaps this greater process of development is destined to proceed according to the same laws which we find prefigured in the fundamental forms of the apostolic church in their relation to one another, and in the order of their development.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS

MADE BY THE AUTHOR TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

P. 6, note 2, *add*, "It is stated, in Luke xxiv. 53, that the disciples '*were continually in the temple*,' and hence it might be plausibly inferred, that this was the case on the morning of this High Feast; yet possibly, when Luke wrote his Gospel, he had not obtained precise information respecting the particulars of this event, or only gave here a short summary of it."

P. 10, l. 22, *after* "interpretation" *add*, "But we shall be led to a different conclusion, after reading the description of the occurrences in the church at Corinth, which we find in the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, or the account in the Acts of the Apostles of the wonders on the day of Pentecost. An unprejudiced examination, as we shall show more fully in the sequel, can leave no doubt that the extraordinary appearances in the Corinthian church are to be attributed not to speaking in foreign languages, but to speaking in an ecstatic and highly elevated state of mind. The account in the Acts would certainly, on a superficial view, lead us only to the notion of foreign languages, and several passages might without violence be explained to mean nothing else than that the author of the account referred to the use of such foreign languages. But should our supposition be correct, that the same notion of the gift of tongues is applicable to all the appearances of this kind in the Apostolic age; and if we must set out from one principal passage for determining this notion; then we should make use of the passage in the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, in order to explain all the rest, as a record which gives direct evidence on the subject, and, on account of its greater clearness and distinctness, with far more propriety than the account in the Acts, which is defective in clearness and distinctness, and in its existing form could not

have proceeded immediately from an eye-witness. But the assumption that the fact denoted by 'speaking in other or new tongues' must have been the same from the beginning, we cannot consider so certain as to be applied to every single passage in spite of all the difficulties that present themselves. Not unless the exposition of all the passages taken separately lead to the same fundamental fact, can we regard such an assumption as sufficiently justified. Now although, as follows from what has been said above, the ancient opinion that the apostles were furnished in a supernatural manner with a knowledge of languages for the publication of the Gospel, cannot be maintained; yet, by the account in the Acts, as long as we explain it by itself alone, we might be led to that same view, only a little modified. And we do not venture to decide *à priori*, that the communication of such a supernatural gift of tongues was an impossibility. It must be our special business, first of all, to harmonize the facts as they are reported in the historical records, for not till then can we examine how they are related to the known laws of the world and of human nature; those laws according to which we see the Divine Spirit and Christianity operate on all other occasions. If we compare all that is known to us in this last respect, we shall never find that the immediate illumination of the Holy Spirit takes the place of the intellectual faculty, or infuses in an immediate manner *that* knowledge which might be attained by the natural application of the understanding and the memory. According to the same law by which that is not communicated by the light of the Holy Spirit which can be discovered by the intelligent use of the art of interpretation, it was not the office of this Spirit to communicate a complete knowledge of languages. The apostles learnt languages when they needed them, in the same manner and according to the same laws as any other persons, under the guidance of that Spirit who endowed them for their vocation in general. We may indeed find examples of immediate intuition, or tact, or feeling, which, in certain moments, allows that to be known which otherwise it would take a longer time to acquire by a continued effort of the understanding. In other cases it happens that one person by a certain intuitive power or immediate feeling knows what another must acquire in a more tedious way. But although the apostles were obliged to learn languages in

the common way, yet we do not venture to assert that, at the time when the new creation called into being by Christ first became consciously known to the disciples, something very *different from the ordinary course of things might not happen.* We could imagine that the great divine event by which a higher spiritual life would be communicated to all, and all the contrarietics proceeding from Sin, or connected with it, among the nations of the earth, were to be removed, would also be outwardly manifested by breaking down the limits of national peculiarities and languages: by virtue of the connexion—which as yet we are far from perfectly comprehending—between the inward and outward life of the Spirit,—between the inward view or thought, and its outward expression, language, such a sudden elevation might result. A symbolical prophetic wonder, to shadow forth, how the new divine life which here first of all manifested itself would claim all the tongues of mankind as its own,—how by means of Christianity the separation of nations would be overcome. In one brief interval there would be a representation of what is grounded in the essence of the redemption accomplished by Christ,—which it would require a course of ages to develop in the use of ordinary means.

"This view we should certainly be compelled to adopt, if we could venture to make use of the account in the Acts as the report of an eye-witness, and a narrative derived from one source. Without doing violence to the words, we cannot fail to perceive, according to Acts ii. 6, 11, that the person from whom the account, as there given, proceeded, regarded the disciples as speaking in various foreign languages which had been hitherto unknown to them. But we have here hardly an account from the first hand, and we find means, indeed, to distinguish the original account of the transaction from the modification given to it in the later composed narrative. If those who came from distant parts heard the Galileans speak in foreign languages, which must have been unknown to them, this must have appeared to every one, even to such as were wholly unsusceptible of the divine in the event, as something striking, although such an one had felt too little interest for the deeper meaning of the transaction, and had been too thoughtless, to reflect on what formed the groundwork and cause of so inexplicable a phenomenon. But now, though,

previously, mention had been made of speaking in unknown, foreign languages, yet the persons who are introduced speaking in the following verses (12 and 13), express their astonishment only as respecting something, which surprised the sober-minded part of the spectators, so as to leave them in doubt what it meant, while others, the altogether rude and carnally-minded, supposed they witnessed only the signs of intoxication. All this suits very well, if we take it as describing the impression made by the announcement of the novel things relating to the kingdom of God, uttered in a state of elevated emotion. Such utterance must have so affected the different classes of hearers that some must have been amazed by what they could not comprehend, while others would throw ridicule on the whole affair as a mere exhibition of enthusiasm. And what the Apostle Peter says in ii. 15, in answer to that charge, seems rather to confirm this explanation than the other. Why should he have referred to the fact that it was not the time of day in which men indulge in drinking, when he could have brought forward proofs suited to enlighten the carnal multitude, that an effect like this, the ability to speak foreign, unknown languages, could not be one of the effects of intoxication?

"And if we look at the first words with which the narrative of these great events begins, we shall find ourselves not compelled by them to form such a representation as is derived from vv. 7—12. It is said in v. 4, 'And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance.' By these 'other tongues,' which differed from common human tongues—tongues as they were new-created by the power of the Holy Ghost, we are by no means obliged to think of foreign languages. We find, even in that narrative, elements which point to something else than what we should infer from vv. 7—12. And those words themselves cannot literally be understood of purely distinct foreign languages. It is certain that among the inhabitants of the cities in Cappadocia, Pontus, Lesser Asia, Phrygia, Pamphylia, Cyrene, and in the parts of Libya and Egypt inhabited by Grecian and Jewish colonies, the Greek language was at that time for the most part more current than the ancient language of the country. There remain out of the whole list of languages only the Persian, Syriac, Arabic, Greek and Latin

languages. Unquestionably, therefore, the description is rather rhetorical than purely historical.

"If we compare some other passages in the Acts in which this Gift of Tongues is mentioned, there appears in these accounts nothing of the kind which we find in the former passages. As speaking with new tongues was one of the first marks of the consciousness that proceeded from the new divine life communicated by , one of the most prominent marks of the new Christian inspiration, so this was everywhere repeated where that event of the first Christian Pentecost was renewed, where the Christian life and consciousness first showed itself, as when, during the preaching of the Apostle Peter, faith germinated in the already prepared hearts of the Gentiles, and they received the first divine impression of the power of the Gospel, (Acts x. 46;) or just as the disciples of John at Ephesus were first instructed fully respecting Christ and the Holy Spirit imparted by him, and received Christian baptism, Acts xix. 6. In such situations and circumstances, the power of speaking in foreign languages would have been without object or significance. Whenever the consciousness of the grace of Redemption and of a heavenly life springing from it was awakened in man, his own mother-tongue, and not a foreign language, would be the most natural channel for expressing his feelings; otherwise, we must suppose the exertion of a magical power gaining the mastery over men, and forcing them to express themselves in foreign tones like unconscious instruments; a thing contrary to all analogy in the operations of Christianity.

"In the first of the two passages we have just quoted, (Acts x. 46,) 'speaking with tongues' is connected with 'magnifying God,' which intimates the relation between these two acts,—the former being a particular mode of the latter. In the second passage, (Acts xix. 6,) 'speaking with tongues' is followed by 'prophesying' (προφητεύειν); and as by this (the full explanation of which we reserve for the sequel) is to be understood, addresses in a tone of spiritual elevation, it may be regarded as something allied to the former.

"Proceeding from this point, we shall be led to the following conclusion. The new spirit which filled the disciples, of which they were conscious as a common animating principle, created for them a new language; the new feelings and intuitions

revealed themselves in new words; the new wine required new bottles. We know not whence the origin is to be deduced of this designation, taken as it is from the life, and corresponding to the nature of the fact. Yet a true tradition might form the ground-work of the critically-suspected passage at the close of Mark's Gospel, so that Christ himself may have marked the speaking in new tongues as one mark of the operations of the Spirit, which he imparted to his disciples. At all events, we find what is related to it in meaning in the discourses of Christ,—the promise of speaking with the new power which would be imparted to the disciples by the Holy Spirit, and of the 'new mouth and wisdom' (Luke xxi. 15) that he would give them. From the beginning, this speaking with tongues might not be employed for the instruction of others, but only be an immediate involuntary expression of the heart impelled by inward pressure to reveal itself in words. We have no reason for taking any other view of the first Pentecostal day. Peter's discourse gave the word for others, the *ἑρμηνεία* of the new tongues, or the added *προφητεύειν*. Thus it was perhaps something annexed to the original use of this designation when, as the various degrees of Christian elevation became separated from one another, the "speaking in tongues" was used especially to designate the highest degree, that ecstatic state in which the thinking faculty is less consciously active.

"On reviewing the account in the Acts of the Apostles as it lies before us, we certainly recognise in it, according to what has been said, a predominant ideal element, which has infused itself into the construction of the history, and modified it. If we assume as a possible case, that the peculiar essence and aim of Christianity had represented it visibly in a symbolic wonder, we shall now be compelled at the close of our inquiry, to regard this not as the purely historic and objective, but to transfer it to the subjective point of view, so that the conception of the fact according to this idea, has in this particular instance been involuntarily altered. If any persons are disposed to call this a mythical element mingling with the historical, after the preceding explanation of the idea, we shall not dispute about a name. Only we must once for all declare, that such single unhistorical traits can by no means be employed to stamp the whole narrative in which they

occur as unhistorical or mythical. By the consequential application of such an arbitrary principle of criticism—that, in general, where anything is found unhistorical or mythical, no real history is to be recognised,—very little history would be left; the greater part of history must be sacrificed to a destructive criticism, which is quick to descry everywhere some departures from the strictly historical."

P. 20, l. 11 from the bottom, *after* "ideas" *add*, "Christ did not as a teacher propound a certain number of articles of faith, but while exhibiting himself as the Redeemer and Sovereign in the kingdom of God, he founded his church on the facts of his life and sufferings, and of his triumph over death by the resurrection. Thus the first development of the church proceeded not from a certain system of ideas set forth in a creed, but only from the acknowledgment of one fact which included in itself all the rest that formed the essence of Christianity—the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah, in which were involved the facts by which he was accredited as such by God, and demonstrated to mankind; namely, his resurrection, glorification, and continual agency on earth for the establishment of his kingdom in Divine power."

P. 26, l. 6, *after* "property" *add*, "On comparing the accounts in the Acts of the Apostles, we must either say, that in the passages which treat of the community of goods we are not to interpret everything literally, since in an artless narrative by an eye-witness whose feelings were excited by the objects before him, such delineations might easily mingle;—or, that in the narrative given in the Acts, the various gradations in the form of this community of goods—the eccentric relation accruing from the first glow of Christian enthusiasm, and the later limitation of the community of goods produced by circumstances, the return of things to their wonted channels, could not be kept distinct from one another; that things of different kinds were mingled together in the narrative, which might easily happen in an historical representation collected from various sources. Whichever of these two suppositions we prefer, it is plain that no one can be justified, merely on account of this difficulty, in suspecting the historical authority of these accounts.

"At all events, the community of goods practised by the

first Christians, whatever form we suppose it to have taken, was something that was formed from within; it was the natural expression of a spirit which bound them all to one another. Everything here must have proceeded from the power of the one Spirit, must have depended solely on the free act of the pure disposition; nothing was effected by the force of outward law."

P. 28, l. 5 from the bottom, "faith," *add the following note.* "I can by no means assent to Baur's assertion in his work on the Apostle Paul, p. 22, that the Apostles are delineated in the Acts as super-human, and as it were magical beings. I cannot approve of his exposition, in considering the passage in Acts v. 13, as strongly supporting his views, understanding the words λοιποῖς, '*the rest*,' to mean the other Christians of whom none ventured to join themselves to the apostles, but were kept at a distance by reverential awe. By the ἅπαντες in v. 11, can only be understood the collective body of believers, in distinction from the apostles. The λοιποὶ distinguished from the ἅπαντες can only be those who were not Christians, afterwards called λαὸς, '*the people*,' who reverenced the Christian community on account of the Divine powers displayed in it, a view which is confirmed by a comparison with ii. 47."

P. 29, l. 13, *after* "take place" *add*, "Every unprejudiced reader of the New Testament cannot fail to perceive that such an expectation filled the souls of the apostles; and it could not be otherwise. The gaze that is fixed on a distant object can as little measure time as space. To one whose look is directed on the object of his anxiety, the distant appears nigh at hand; he overlooks the windings of the way, which separate him from the object of his anxious expectation. But gradually the objects separate themselves which at first were mingled together in the perspective. So it was with the prophets who gazed on the Messianic times from the Old Testament stand-point; and so it was with the apostles, as they directed their looks to the second advent of Christ. Christ himself has left no distinct information respecting the time in which this decisive event is to happen, but has expressly informed us that it belongs to those hidden things which are known only by their fulfilment. It would require the comparison of the discourses of Christ with one another,

and deep reflection on their contents, in order to the course of his kingdom's development, and to judge aright respecting the nearness or distance of its end. If, on the one hand, many isolated expressions of Christ which present the points of greatest moment relating to the progress of his kingdom in perspective exhibition, may be so understood, as if that last decisive period were at hand; on the other hand, his parables indicate a slower process of development; as if it would not suddenly, but gradually, and working outwards from within, pervade and penetrate the life of humanity. But naturally these isolated, brief expressions are most easily recollected, and absorb the attention. The contents of the parabolic intimations are learnt gradually, and are better understood from the history itself. It belonged to the essence of Christianity, that it should represent itself at first, not as a new principle for earthly history, not as destined to form a new cultus, and to give a new form to all earthly relations; it was not the idea of a renovated *time* that Christianity first attempted to realize, but everything appeared only as a point of transition to a new, heavenly, eternal order of things which would commence at the second advent. Hence, at first, everything earthly *must* have appeared as ready to vanish, as quickly passing away, and the eye was fixed only on that future heavenly kingdom as the unchangeable state, to which believers in spirit and disposition already belonged. It would only by degrees be rendered apparent that the process of the world's transformation coming forth into outward appearance would not be effected suddenly at the advent of Christ, but must make its way by internal changes in a gradual development. Thus the disciples must at first have contemplated the whole outward system of Judaism from this point of view, and in this relation to the approaching kingdom of Christ. Its *whole cultus appeared to them as an institute* which must continue to exist, till all things would become new. But here also, as the renewing effect of Christianity was to proceed from within, the true light had not yet risen upon them."

P. 41, l. 8, *after* "affected" *add*, "But instead of the Pharisees, the Sadducees came forward as persecutors of the Gospel which was spreading in every direction with unrestrained power. The earnestness and zeal with which the disciples testified of the risen Saviour, and of the hope of a future Resurrection founded

on him, must have rendered them hateful to this sect. A predominant negative tendency will always be suspicious and mistrustful of popular movements which proceed from a positive religious interest, and from a state of elevated feeling relating to the invisible world; and from suspicion, it is easily roused to active hostility. The Sadducees also were noted for their harshness and inhumanity. And since they could not venture to oppugn directly and openly the doctrines of the Pharisees, they must have welcomed the opportunity of attacking, under another pretext, a sect zealous for those doctrines, and rapidly spreading, and upon whom they could bring the authority of the Sanhedrim to bear. But what served to render the Christians hateful to the Sadducees, must have contributed to render the Pharisees favourably disposed towards them."[1]

P. 44, last line of the note, *after* "history" *add*, "The same remark applies to Baur's objections, page 18. An exact account of what took place in the Sanhedrim, we cannot indeed expect. This we know, to begin with, that we have not before us a formal legal deposition. But the want of such a document can be no reason for rendering the whole transaction doubtful. Can we pronounce the historical narratives of the ancients to be incredible, because the speeches they contain are composed in accordance with the sentiments of the persons to whom they are attributed? But in the ancients we recognise in their composition the art which lets every one say what he might have said from his standing-point and in his own character. In the accounts now under consideration, this objectivity of historical art is wanting, and where original accounts, such as frequently occur in the Acts, in the discourses of Peter or

[1] This is contrary to the opinion maintained by Dr. Baur, who, in his work on Paul, p. 34, will not allow any historical truth in the account contained in the Acts, of the persecutions excited by the Sadducees against the Christians, and calls in question generally the truth of the account respecting these early persecutions. He sees in it nothing but a connexion formed *à priori* (*nur eine apriorische combination*). "Since the discourses of the disciples," he thinks, "could contain nothing more important than the testimony to the resurrection of Jesus, no more embittered and decided opponents of it need be imagined than the Sadducees, the avowed deniers of the doctrine of a Resurrection." We must here, as in relation to other points, recognise the objective historical pragmatism (a consideration of events in their actual causes and effects) which this kind of criticism would change into the subjective.

Paul, do not form the basis, we cannot be surprised, if in these artless narratives, the principle that was believed to animate the proceedings against the Christians should be put into the mouths of the actors as their subjective maxim. Lastly, the conduct of the Sanhedrim is by no means so marked by delusion and want of sense as to render the narrative palpably unhistorical. From *their* standing-point the Sanhedrim could not recognise a miracle in the cure of th lame man. And yet, as they had no means at hand to plain the whole as an imposture, and to convince the peop of it, they were obliged to hush up the affair if possibl without arousing afresh, by more violent and forcible measure the popular enthusiasm which they wished to allay. Bu indeed, every plan will prove at last to be devoid of sens which is undertaken as a reaction against a movement men's minds founded on perfect justice and undeniable trut —a folly which earthly rulers are still apt to repeat."

P. 44. l. 2, "before the Sanhedrim," *add note*:—"Ba is certainly right, when in the words εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, Ac iv. 5, he finds an implication that the members of Sanhedrim were not all then present in Jerusalem, p. 1 But when he detects here a design on the part of the inventi historian, to insinuate how very important the affair regarded by the authorities, we cannot agree with him. W ever wrote with this design would certainly not have satis himself with such an indication, but would have expres much more strongly what he wished to be noticed. In this for of expression we see nothing more than that it was known t the reporter, who, from his proximity, was best acquainted wit the events, that a part of the members of the Sanhedrim wer not then residing in the city, and were perhaps scattere about the adjacent country, and that his knowledge of th circumstance unconsciously affected his phraseology. So that on the contrary, in this little turn of expression we find a mark of originality and the absence of design.

P. 44. l. 8, "before them," *add note*:—"Baur is also disposed to see something unhistorical in the appearing of the lame man after his cure, with the two apostles, before the Sanhedrim. But whichever may have been the case, whether he was seized in company with the apostles and brought forth at the same time, or whether he appeared by the special

orders of the Sanhedrim, because the *corpus delicti* related to him; in either case there is nothing improbable. The Sanhedrim, or a party in it, might wish to try whether they could not succeed, by a personal inspection, or cross-examination of the man, to elicit something which might be turned against the apostles, or tend to allay the popular ferment. Finally, the presence of the man who was made whole, at these proceedings, has nothing to do with the main point on the decision of which the whole narrative stands or falls."

P. 45. l. 21, "Christians," (note.) Baur considers that what I have here regarded as possible, and probably sufficient to explain the whole transaction, is a gross violation of historical writing, p. 21. "Nothing can be more blameable," he says, "than an historical method which, instead of examining a matter openly, freely, and thoroughly, arbitrarily introduces fictions in the place of historical truth." But such a method I believe myself never to have been chargeable with. I have only offered this as a conjecture, to which I attach no great weight. The example of a Nicodemus, which, indeed, will find no favour at the tribunal of a criticism that is founded on a system of fictions, proves that there might be secret friends of the cause of Christ in the Sanhedrim, and in the Acts (ch. vi. 7) it is remarked that "*a great company of the priests were obedient to the faith.*" Lastly, the representation I have given of the transaction stands in no need of such a supposition in order to free the whole of the narrative from the charge of internal improbability. I wish the intelligent reader to decide for himself, which of us, Dr. Baur or myself, lies most open to the charge of substituting arbitrary fictions for historical truths.

P. 46, l. 1, "two thousand," (note.) We must here notice Baur's assertion, that the numbers in the Acts appear altogether unhistorical. Baur reasons thus, p. 37:—The number of believers mentioned in Acts i. 15, ("about an hundred and twenty") is manifestly false, for it contradicts the statement of the Apostle Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 6, that Christ, after his Resurrection, appeared to more than five hundred brethren at once. "If this small number be manifestly incorrect, then the large numbers which afterwards occur in the Acts are not more trustworthy, and we must come to the conclusion that the small number preceded the large ones only to give a more

vivid impression of the rapid and important increase of the church, which makes each class of numbers, the small and the great, equally suspicious." Even if Baur's supposition were correct, the correctness of the conclusion he draws from it is by no means evident; for of this artificial design in the use of small and large numbers in order to render more illustrious by the contrast the Divine in the rapid spread of the church, I can find no trace in this simple, artless re- nor of all those little trickeries which Dr. Baur palms upon the author of the Acts; and I think that the natural construction of this book must make this impression upon every ingenuous and unperverted mind. But the supposition itself I cannot allow to be valid. I see no contradiction between the account in the Acts and Paul's statement; for the reference in Acts i. 15 is not to the sum total of the whole Christian church, but merely to the number of those who were assembled in that place. When Baur further maintains, that the persecution raised against Stephen will not allow us to suppose that the church was so large and important, I cannot comprehend this, for it is by no means clear that all the Christians in Jerusalem must have been affected by that persecution.

P. 46. l. 5, "gospel," (note.) Dr. Baur charges me with a grave fault in my historical investigations—that I have not mentioned the wonderful deliverance of Peter from prison. He finds here the inconsequential attempt to set aside an anti-supernaturalist principle, a dishonourable concealment of difficulties. He maintains that the alternative is necessary, either to confine oneself to a simple, literally true relation, or allow historical criticism, if we believe it cannot be got rid of altogether, to exercise all its rights. Certainly, if my work were exegetical, a commentary on the Acts, I must necessarily occupy myself with the examination of that special point, what opinion is to be formed respecting the appearance of the angel, and Peter's wonderful release—what relation the subjective conception in the narrative of the Acts bore to the objective of the actual fact. But as an historical writer, I was justified in making a selection from the narrative, of what appeared suitable to a pragmatical object; I was nowise bound to treat every point with equal fulness. The deliverance of Peter from prison was no very important link for

me in the pragmatical connexion of the history. But since Dr. Baur has desired that I should express myself on this point, which I had passed over in silence, I find no reason why I should not express my opinion with the utmost frankness. I am not troubled at the reproach of partiality, nor inconsequence, nor indecision, nor weakness of faith. I am not prevented by *à priori* grounds from admitting the angelic appearance; but the account is not sufficiently definite and exact to accredit such a fact, and in the words of Peter, spoken before the Sanhedrim, no allusion to such a release is found. But if I acknowledge a break in this historical connexion, and an obscurity hanging over the narrative, it by no means follows that there is no historical truth at the basis, and still less, that everything was so put together in order to magnify the apostles: nor can I admit that this is the consequence of that obscurity which I acknowledge. I would rather say, that the fact of a release by a special divine guidance, to us unknown, became involuntarily transferred into the appearance of an angel of the Lord who freed Peter from prison. As to the alternative laid down by Dr. Baur, I admit it, and avow that criticism must be granted its full right in these investigations. But in the way Dr. Baur applies it, I cannot recognise its full right, but only an arbitrariness against which, in accordance with my convictions of the duty of an historical inquirer, I must declare myself, in its application not only to this, but to any other historical question. This criticism, professedly so free from assumptions, proceeds on assumptions which I must reject as unfounded; and hence the opposition which exists between our modes of treating the history of Christianity.

P. 46, l. 20, "Gamaliel," (note). Baur, in p. 35 of his work above referred to, considers the introduction of Gamaliel as somewhat unhistorical, and the words ascribed to him as a fabrication. What was really historical could only amount to this, that at that time the view prevailed among the rulers of the Jews that it might be best to leave the cause of Jesus to its own fate, in the certain presumption that in a short time it would be seen how little there was in it. On this presumption the speech was framed which the historian puts into the mouth of Gamaliel. But we find nothing at all which can justify such a re-casting of history. The speech ascribed

to Gamaliel is so characteristic and individual, that it makes us so much the less inclined to call in question the fact that it was actually spoken, and spoken by Gamaliel. It perfectly suits the stand-point which this teacher of the law, as he is represented in the text, occupied among the Jews. The man who could form an intelligent judgment of Grecian literature, was also capable of rising to this higher historical stand-point in his judgment of Christianity. That Paul, who was at first animated by a fanatical fury against Christianity, proceeded from his school, is no argument to the contrary; for it is allowed, how little right we have to judge of teachers by their scholars. Let it be recollected, too, that this was before Stephen made his appearance, which placed Christianity in a far more odious light to the party of the Pharisees. And if the mention of the example of Theudas is an anachronism, which did not proceed from Gamaliel, yet it by no means follows that the text, the leading idea of the speech, was derived from him. The characteristic opening words of Gamaliel, by the sharp impress they bear, might easily be amplified, and it would be very natural that Gamaliel should appeal to examples from history in support of his advice. This is what we consider as certain. Baur maintains that if the narrative in the Acts of what had preceded these transactions in the Sanhedrim be correct, Gamaliel could not have uttered such words; for history, to the evidence of which he appealed, would have already determined the question. Here then is the dilemma, either Gamaliel did not utter this, or all which is here told of the miracles of the apostles, and the extension of the Christian church, did not really take place. But we cannot acknowledge the correctness of this dilemma. No external evidence is sufficient to effect in man a complete conversion of his religious and intellectual stand-point. Although the power with which Christianity diffused itself, and what he had learnt of the wonderful cures performed by the apostles, would strike Gamaliel with astonishment, yet they were not sufficient to lead him to acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah, and to that point he must have come already, if the evidence of history had been all that was needful to decide the question for him.

P. 49, l. 2, *after* "important" *add*, "Although what we say is disputed by persons occupying two opposite stand-points,

—those who in a rude and lifeless manner advocate the supernatural in Christianity, and those who deny everything supernatural,—yet we cannot give up an idea which is of importance in relation to the development of Christianity from the beginning—namely, that the supernatural and the natural, the Divine and the human, always work together in harmony."

P. 49, l. 10, *for* "knowledge" *read* "consciousness."

P. 49, l. 17, *after* (ἀποκάλυψις) *add*, "Thus we perceive how the mixing of the theocratic element which had served for the development of the Hebrew nation, with Grecian culture, must have served to prepare the way for understanding the truth revealed by Christ; for thus the coarse and narrow Jewish spirit was refined and expanded so that it could follow more easily the development of Christian truth when it broke through the limits of Jewish nationality."

P. 50, l. 11, *after* "perception" *add*, "If in the Acts of the Apostles we had a narrative composed on philosophic principles, after the manner of the classical historians of antiquity, tracing the whole series of things to their origin, and distinguishing the various turning-points in actions and events, we might be able to determine more exactly the position which Stephen occupied,—his relation to Paul in the development of Christianity. But since the accounts in the Acts are not of this sort, and contain many gaps, nothing is left for us but to adopt that divining process, by which many passages in history have been placed in their true light, which by skilful comparison and combination can learn from mere fragments the structure of the whole, and, where only effects are presented to the eye, can educe and lay open their principles and causes. Stephen disputed much, as we are expressly told in ch. vi. 9, with the foreign Hellenistic Jews, and we may justly assume that the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah, and of his work as truly Messianic, formed the subject of these disputations—that Stephen used the Old Testament, in order to lead the Hellenistic Jews to this acknowledgment, and that consequently these disputations would relate to the exposition of the Old Testament. Great irritation was excited against Stephen, such as had never till that time been called forth on the question whether Jesus was the Messiah. The Sanhedrim had believed that it was necessary to check the

spread of the new sect; but of an upstir among the people in relation to it, no trace had yet been seen; something new, therefore, must intervene by which the acknowledgment of the Messiahship of Jesus would become so offensive to those who adhered to the established religion. And this probable supposition is confirmed by the charge brought against Stephen by the parties who were thus irritated: 'We have heard him speak blasphemous words against Moses and against God,' Acts vi. 11. For the first time since Christ personally had ceased to be the object of the attacks of the Pharisaic party, had such an accusation been heard against a Christian; for hitherto the believers, agreeing with the Pharisees in the strict observance of the Mosaic Law, had given occasion for no such charge. Evidently, it was not the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah, but the manner in which Stephen spoke of the Messianic work of Jesus, and of the effects that would be produced by Christianity, that was the occasion of this charge of heresy. The charge of uttering blasphemy against Moses would lead us to infer that Stephen was the first who presented the Gospel in opposition to the Mosaic Law, and had spoken against its justifying power and perpetual validity; and this, to the Jews, who made all justification and sanctification to depend on the law, and believed in its indefeasible validity, must have appeared as blaspheming the divine authority of Moses. It would also appear to them as blasphemy against God, in whose name, and as whose ambassador, Moses appeared, and who had promised an ever-enduring validity to his law. Stephen, we may presume, as Paul at a later period, endeavoured to prove from the prophetic passages of the Old Testament, that too much was ascribed to the law from the ordinary Jewish stand-point, and that the Old Testament itself pointed to a higher stand-point, to which it was only preparatory. This view is confirmed by the charge brought by the Sanhedrim against Stephen, which we shall notice presently in our historical representation. The whole religious stand-point of the Old Testament is founded on the principle that religion was held within the bounds of space and time, and must necessarily be connected with certain places and times. The controversy against an over-valuation of the law must hence have led Stephen to controvert an over-valuation of the temple,

By him it was first acknowledged and expressed, that a perfectly new stand-point in the development of the kingdom of God was to be created by Christ—a purely spiritual worship embracing the whole life of which faith in its founder would be at once the foundation and centre. He referred, probably, to the expressions of Christ which related to the impending destruction of the Temple at Jerusalem, and the founding of a new one by himself, as well as to other intimations of the great transformation of the world, which were contained in the words he uttered, since with the Temple the whole form of the Old Testament cultus must come to an end. But if our supposition be correct, how can we consider that the charge brought against Stephen deserved to be called a false one? In the same sense, in which it might be afterwards said of Paul, that his enemies unjustly accused him of blasphemy against Moses, against the Temple of the God of the Old Testament. While Stephen was convinced that, taking into account the ultimate aim of the Old Testament development, he only honoured the Old Testament and God as therein revealed, he was charged with an inimical design; and since his opponents understood in a different sense what he said, from what he intended, he could, in this respect, designate their accusation as false. Moreover, it is possible, that the materials which the author of the Acts made use of in this part of his narrative, proceeded from a person who could not comprehend the stand-point to which Stephen was elevated, and hence could not distinguish Stephen's real meaning from what his enemies charged him with. Stephen's defence[1] would also have taken quite a different form, if he

[1] But here the question arises whether we have the discourse of Stephen in all essential points as it was spoken, or a free version of it by the author of the Acts. The latter is advocated by Baur. But we must maintain that if the author of the Acts had been so skilled in historic art as to be able to transport himself to Stephen's standpoint, and to invent such a discourse in his style and character, his own historical composition would have been altogether different. He would then, from the first, have drawn a clearer representation of the man, and of his importance in relation to the subsequent development of Christianity, which would have rendered it needless for us to attempt it by means of a conjectural combination. The manner in which these things are here narrated, stands in most striking contrast to that artistical dexterity which is presupposed in the invention of such a discourse. Certainly it cannot be supposed that if such a writer had wished to represent in the person of Stephen, the collision that then first took

could have explained the charges brought against him as entirely founded on misapprehension—if he had not acknowledged a portion of truth as the ground-work which he could not retract, but was on the contrary prepared to maintain with earnestness. After this preliminary justification we proceed with the narrative."

P. 50, l. 25, "stand-point," *add* note, "To which Baur of Tubingen has properly drawn attention in his ingenious essay, *De Orationis habitæ a Stephano, Act.* c. vii. *consilio.* In trying to establish a divine objective or historical pragmatism in the relative position of these two champions of the Christian faith (for which I am under obligations to Dr. Baur, who probably first drew my attention to it), I cannot agree with Dr. Schneckenburger, who thinks he has detected a subjective pragmatism purposely framed by Luke. In the simple representation given by Luke from the notices of single facts lying before him, I cannot discover any direct intention to exhibit Stephen in his public character and in his disputations with the Jews as a prototype of Paul. (See Schneckenburger's work on the Acts, pp. 172, 184.) If such had really been his design, it would, I think, have been more strongly marked, after the manner of his times. Indeed, the views ascribed to Luke of becoming the apologist of Paul in opposition to the partizans of Peter, are of too artificial a cast, and too little supported by his own language, to induce me to approve of such an hypothesis."

P. 51, l. 15, "what Stephen really said," (note.) Baur properly compares what the false witnesses said against Christ. (Matt. xxvi. 61.) See my "Life of Jesus," p. 281, fourth edition, (p. 181, English translation.) But when Baur, in his book on Paul, p. 56, would find it no historical truth, but only a designed imitation of the history of Christ, transferring to Stephen what in Matt. xxvi. 60, is said of Christ, we cannot grant our approval. We can discover no trace of such a design. "But," says Baur, "since false witnesses appeared against Jesus with the same accusation, so false witnesses probably were not wanting here;" as little also can it be

place between the spiritual worship of Christianity and the standpoint of the Jewish cultus, still involved in carnality, he would so have concealed his real design, that it would only be apparent at the end. A plan so artificial and carefully adjusted could hardly have been undertaken by a Christian of that primitive age.

supposed how their witness should be here nothing but falsehood. But there is no contradiction in this, that an accusation may be false in the sense in which it is put forth by those who make use of it, and yet a truth may lie at its basis. But if the author of the Acts has not distinguished and developed more clearly in what sense the accusation is false, and in what sense it contained truth, instead of detecting a design in this, we should rather note the want of historical skill, and of a regular development.

P. 51, l. 17 from bottom, "Blasphemy," (note.) Baur is disposed to find in this whole representation of the progress of the transaction, something unhistorical. How can it be supposed, he thinks, that Stephen would be accused in this tumultuous manner by the Sanhedrim, who listened to him at first so quietly, but then are described as all at once breaking out upon him with such fury? This tribunal must have compromised its dignity, and by such an extra-judicial infliction of death, have exposed itself to the heaviest responsibility before the Roman governor. As we can form no consistent notion of such an act of the Sanhedrim, it is far more probable, that everything proceeded only from a tumultuary movement of the people, who seized Stephen in their fanatical excitement, and dragged him forth to be stoned. Since the author of the Acts wished to give the transaction great importance, to represent in Stephen the image of Christ, since he wished him to deliver a discourse, he must for these reasons bring him before the Sanhedrim, and he must, however improbable it may be, let them take a part in the tumultuous proceedings against him. We grant, that in the description given in the Acts there is a want of clearness and luminousness in particular points, but this can decide nothing against the credibility of the whole. Although we should not dispute very strongly whether Stephen was sacrificed to popular fury, or appeared before the Sanhedrim itself, still we find a pledge for the latter in this: that the discourse handed down to us bears the impress of one actually delivered, and presupposes such a tribunal before which it was delivered. It may indeed be thought that the fanatical Jews dragged Stephen before the great assembled Sanhedrim, or that the Sanhedrim was assembled for the examination of this charge; for we are surely not justified in admitting, that everything that is narrated in the Acts respecting Stephen happened in

one day. Now, hitherto, no occasion had been found to accuse the Christians of apostasy from Judaism; nothing was known of them, which could make that accusation credible. It might, therefore, happen that the better members of the Pharisaic party in the Sanhedrim were not exactly prejudiced against Stephen. When he appeared before them, the Divine, which expressed itself in his whole appearance, at first made an impression that commanded the regard of a part of the assembly; and then the manner in which he began to speak of the dealings of God with their forefathers was suited to testify his piety, to counterwork the accusations brought against him, and to dispose his hearers in his favour. Also, though we who have the whole discourse before us know what its aim was from the beginning, yet it is not clear that his hearers could so soon apprehend it. And this serves to explain how it could happen that they heard Stephen patiently, till he came to the words in which his Christian feeling expressed itself so powerfully and unreservedly, regardless of consequences. Here, then, fanatical fury broke forth; they would not listen any longer to the blasphemies of Stephen. He was dragged out, and now the punishment began which the infuriated people inflicted on him. Thus we shall be able to lay down correctly the connexion of these transactions, and find nothing which justifies the denial of their historical truth.

P. 52, l. 2 from bottom, *for* "relinquish" *read* "discharge."

P. 54, l. 2, "could not complete," *add* note:—"We must always maintain against Baur that Stephen's discourse is left unfinished, that he could not complete the plan he had sketched; that just when he had reached the principal point, for which all that went before was preparatory, he was interrupted; unless, perhaps, the discourse as we have received it, is imperfectly reported."

P. 55, l. 20, "Lord Jesus, receive," (note.) I can find no ground whatever to discover (as Baur has done) in Stephen's manner of speaking and acting, instead of the image of Christ as impressed by his Spirit on his genuine disciples, nothing but the impression of the subjective fiction which makes Stephen a copy of Christ. To support the latter view, it is urged that such words as Stephen used occur in Luke xxiii. 34 and 46. This agreement could not be merely accidental, but points to the same source. But I do not perceive

that the literal agreement which exists here, can only be so explained, since the agreement may be very naturally accounted for on the ground that the Spirit of Christ, expressed in those words of Christ which are transmitted to us by Luke, so expressed itself in Stephen. That false testimony against Christ, of which the false testimony against Stephen is to be taken as an imitation, does not in so many words appear in Luke.

P. 56, l. 3 from bottom, *after* "destruction" *add*, "As we have frequently observed, that the hostilities waged against a truth when first brought to light, with which its publishers have had to contend, have very much contributed to render their consciousness of it more clear and complete, and to make them better acquainted with the consequences that flow from it,—so here also the opposition of Pharisaical Judaism must have had a powerful and beneficial influence in relation to freer views of the Gospel among the Hellenists."

P. 57, l. 13, "Restorer." (Note.) הַשָּׁהֵב or הַקָּהֵב. See Gesenius's Dissertation *De Samaritanorum Theologia*, (1822,) and his *Carmina Samaritana*, p. 75.

P. 58, l. 17, *for* "this intelligence," *read* "the highest intelligence."

P. 60, l. 17. "The information," &c. In the fourth edition, the former part of this paragraph is as follows:—"It must have occasioned great surprise to the church at Jerusalem to hear that Christianity had first gained an entrance among a people who were not considered as belonging to the theocratic nation. Not that any such scruples could be felt, as were excited at the spread of the Gospel among the Gentiles, since the Samaritans, in common with the Jews, practised circumcision and observed the Law of Moses. Moreover, Christ himself had set the example by his personal ministry among the Samaritans, and had so far counteracted the prejudice against them. Yet the disunion between the Jews and the Samaritans was so great that the former could not view without some mistrust the formation of a church among the latter, and believed that they must ascertain the manner in which the Gospel operated among them before they could acknowledge the new believers as Christian brethren. There must have been a special reason for the mission of the Apostles Peter and John to Samaria. If we were disposed to infer the object of their

mission from the effects that it produced, as if these gifts of the Spirit could not be imparted by a deacon, but required the superior agency of the apostles, we should proceed on an ungrounded supposition—and to infer the design from the consequences, is, as it appears in this case, always very uncertain. With much greater right we may admit, that a kind of mistrust was the cause of this mission. This mistrust must have related either to those among whom Philip laboured, or to himself the labourer. It might certainly be the latter, as Baur allows,—a consequence of the continually increasing opposition between the Christians of Palestinian and those of Hellenistic descent and education, a symptom of which would be, that the old church could not fully trust the freer mode of thinking among the Hellenistic preachers, which already began to be formed from Christianity. But with greater certainty we are justified in regarding this mission as owing to the national distrust felt towards the Samaritans. Both grounds of mistrust might indeed be blended together, yet we find in the narrative no point of connexion for the first. At all events it is evident, that the manner in which the Gospel gained entrance among the Samaritans must have appeared to the two apostles as defective. Jesus had indeed been acknowledged as the Messiah, and baptism had been administered in his name, but the believers as yet knew nothing of the Holy Ghost; for what this might be could only be known from inward experience, and this was still something foreign to the Samaritans. They had received the baptism of water without receiving the baptism of the Spirit. The cause of this may be traced to the manner in which they became believers; for according to the universal law of the development of the Christian life, the effects of faith are conditioned by its quality, and this again, by the mode of its origination. Among the Samaritans, living faith in the Redeemer appears to have been still wanting. Since it was not a feeling of the need of redemption founded in the consciousness of sin that had led them to believe, their faith does not appear to have proceeded from the right religious and moral principle. It was at first in their minds only an undefined and obscure longing after fresh and higher revelations, and this longing was still more perverted from its true aim by the deceptive arts of the Goës Simon, which, from the partial satisfaction they gave, led them

still further astray. The superiority of Philip, which was evinced in his works, had moved them afterwards to believe him rather than Simon, to place more confidence in his words. Still this was a faith which proceeded from impressions on the senses, and depended on the person of him whom they had beheld performing such wonderful works. What Philip announced to them, and they had been moved to acknowledge as true by outward appearances, still remained to them something external. The Christ whom he preached was to them only an outward object of faith, and had not yet passed into their inner life. The operation of the Holy Ghost was still something foreign which astonished them in the effects produced by another person. Certainly the two apostles would perceive that what Philip had effected was only the beginning, and that still more must take place, in order to found a true Christian church. We have not a full account in the Acts," &c.

P. 62, note 1, *after* "basis" *add*, "But the narrative in the Acts is clearly distinguished by the genuine historical impress from all those fancies, so that no one, unless his mind be so far perverted as to have lost all perception of the difference between fiction and historical reality, can fail to recognise it."

P. 66, l. 10, *after* "occasion" *add*, "But before we proceed any further, we must take notice of what has been urged from two different stand-points against the credibility of the account in the Acts which we here follow, and against the internal probability of the whole narrative.[1] The stand-point which Peter afterwards occupied in relation to Paul and the preaching of Paul among the heathen, must testify, on the contrary, that he had attained to views similar to those of Paul in a peculiar, independent manner. It has been asserted, indeed, that Peter's vacillation, such as he exhibited in his conference with Paul at Antioch, cannot be explained on this ground; but that every difficulty will be removed, if we suppose that Peter was forced to admit an independent development of

[1] By Gfrorer, in his work, "Die heilige Sage," 1 Abth. s. 444, and by Baur, in his often-quoted work on Paul. The first proceeds on the supposition that the Acts consist of two distinct parts, and that the first part was composed by a follower of Peter; and Baur, on the supposition that the whole was pervaded by a henotic or conciliatory design; but they both arrive at similar results.

Christianity among the Gentiles, by an impression from without: in opposition to his own stand-point and mode of thinking, by the personal superiority of Paul and the acknowledged facts of his ministry. But is it, then, really probable, that men who were wedded to the mode of thinking which made participation in the salvation of the Messiah dependent on the observance of the Mosaic Law, should allow themselves so easily to be moved, solely and entirely by the mental superiority of an individual who, from the difference between his own stand-point and theirs, must have been so far less fitted to operate upon them, or by an adduction of facts which testified of the similar effects of faith in Gentiles and Jews, to the admission of a principle which ran counter to the whole system of their deeply-rooted convictions? We know full well, how hard it is to conquer inveterate prejudices by an appeal to external facts—how strongly men are disposed to explain away, or to interpret in their own favour, all facts which may testify against their prejudices. And would a man of Peter's strongly marked individuality, be the kind of person to be induced to give up his principles, by an influence proceeding only from without, apart from any point of internal connexion in his own course of development? A far more natural explanation it will be, if we can show a preparation for such an acknowledgment on the part of Peter through the medium of his own inward experience. The first point of connexion lay in the essence of the truth announced by Christ, and in his own words, which led to such an understanding. If this be admitted, it will be self evident how a development proceeding from Peter's own Christian consciousness might gradually prepare him for such an acknowledgment. But this development from within might also be supported by outward facts, which might easily be forthcoming, if, before the entrance of Paul on his apostleship, the publication of the Gospel had anyhow come into contact with the Gentiles; when it would be perceived that among *them* also the hearts of men invited and admitted it. But, of course, Christian truth cannot gain full possession of the inner man without a struggle. Everywhere we shall be prepared to expect in the development of Christianity a co-operation of the supernatural and the natural. And when we find an account handed down which corresponds to all these points, we cannot hesitate to acknowledge the impress of nature and

of truth. Idea and history are brought into unison with each other. Moreover, Peter evidently occupies a middle position betweer James and Paul, and this intermediate stand-point will therefore necessarily correspond to his own course of development.

"If we examine it closely, what Paul says in the second chapter of his Epistle to the Galatians respecting his relation to Peter, and that apostle's relation to Judaism, is so far from contradicting the view we are advocating, that it perfectly agrees with it. If we carefully weigh what Paul there says, we shall be led directly to assume such a course in Peter's development, as we have already traced.

"When Peter, under the influence of the Jewish Christians at Antioch, was led to abstain from free intercourse with the Gentile Christians, Paul did not consider it necessary first of all to convince him of the truths that were opposed to his line of conduct, but taking for granted his theoretic agreement with him, only accused him of the contradiction between his principles and his conduct at that time. He could not express himself more strongly in order to mark how freely Peter had hitherto acted in reference to the Mosaic Law; Gal. ii. 14, 'If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles and not as do the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as the Jews?' It is evident from these very words of Paul, that Peter had expressed by his actions the conviction that salvation did not depend on the observation of the law; that he had felt no scruple to live with the Gentiles as a Gentile, as Paul, in v. 16, avers, speaking from his own stand-point and that of Peter as identical; 'Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ.' In v. 18 he charges him with seeking to restore what he had already destroyed; which can only refer to that renunciation of the Mosaic Law which was involved in Peter's former line of conduct. Here, therefore, such a revolution is presupposed in Peter's views as cannot be sufficiently explained by the influence of another person on his mind. If everything had proceeded from the influence of Paul alone, should we not find a hint referring to it in some part of the Pauline Epistles? Had not Paul, when he declared that he needed not first to learn the truths of the Gospel from the apostles in Palestine,—that from the beginning he had acted independently

in the publication of the Gospel—the most natural opportunity for making this claim, that Peter first through him had learnt the true nature of the Gospel in relation to the Mosaïc Law, and to do homage to the principles first of all laid down by himself as the only correct ones?

"The narrative in the Acts furnishes us here with the only right clue to the course of Peter's religious development, and which we are compelled to seek by the subject itself. The narrative is in fact drawn from the life, and contains in it all the elements from which a natural vivid representation can be formed, although the author himself has been at no pains to make it such.[1] It cannot be called an arbitrary manufacture of history, if we employ the same operation of which every historian must make use where he has to form a vivid historical representation from an account which does not develop all the points that are requisite for a perfect understanding of the facts. Necessarily he must amplify several things which are not literally contained in the account lying before him, but which are indicated by the given outlines, if he would unite everything in one picture according to the laws of analogy. So in the account given in the Acts, the leading principle is to give prominence to the supernatural and the divine; that is here the side that belongs to historical truth; as to the natural circumstances and natural connexion of causes and effects, to which the narrator does not direct his

[1] Even Baur has acknowledged that the notion of a mythical composition is not admissible here. He thinks that he has detected a designed fabrication for an apologetic and conciliatory object that lies at the basis of the whole book of the Acts. But as we cannot in general find in the simple character of this book any ground or point of connexion to support the charge of such a *fraus pia* pervading the whole of it, so we think that in this particular part, whoever views the narrative with an unprejudiced eye, must decide against Baur's unnatural artificial construction of it. The vision that happened to Peter, which related to the rights of the Gentiles to a participation in the kingdom of the Messiah, was copied (according to Baur) from the appearance of Christ to Paul, for the purpose of accrediting his call as an apostle to the Gentiles, (p. 78,) and contained the legitimation of those rights. Such things may, indeed, be imagined if persons are disposed to fashion the materials lying before them according to their arbitrary preconceptions, or if they can look at everything only through spectacles of their own making, and see in all things the reflection of their own odd fancies. But whoever is not labouring under the complaint of spectral appearances, will certainly find nothing whatever in this whole narrative which can justify such a comparison.

attention, we must endeavour to fill them up according to the indications contained in the account itself.

"The impulse once given to the further spread of the Gospel beyond the bounds of Judea could not stop. Thus we find churches founded in the west on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, though of their origin we have no distinct account. Possibly, the happy effects of their visit to the Samaritans induced both the apostles, or at least the energetic Peter, to extend their missionary labours. Or it might be, that the scattering abroad of the believers, occasioned by the persecution against Stephen, led to the founding of these churches. At all events it was natural—since the apostles were at first the Patriarchs (so to speak) of the whole church, and in the original community of believers everything was under their guidance—that the newly-founded foreign churches should also stand, according to this analogy, under their superintendence. And in virtue of the gift of church-guidance peculiar to Peter, recognised and actually claimed for him by Christ himself, the business of taking the oversight of the younger churches must have been specially committed to him. A visitation journey of this kind led him to the churches founded in the west, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea.[1] He was still accustomed to labour only among the Jews; yet he had already, as we have seen, visited a people not belonging to the theocratic nation, the Samaritans, who had experienced the operations of the Holy Spirit through faith in Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah. Already he would have heard of the preaching of the Gospel among the Gentiles by the scattered Hellenists, and of the receptibility which was found to exist in the hearts of the Gentiles; perhaps, also, he had had an opportunity, in the course of his ministry among the Jews who lived in the midst of the heathen world, of noticing

[1] Acts ix. 31. Baur's assertion (p. 40), that this was undertaken in order to counterwork the more liberal principles spread abroad by the Hellenists, we cannot regard as properly supported, since no trace of it can be found in the narrative itself. Nor does it by any means follow, because there is nothing said here of laying on of hands and the communication of the Holy Spirit, that the mention of these things in connexion with the ministry of the apostles among the Samaritans is unhistorical. Although both journeys come under the common category of visitations, yet the difference—a difference of object and in the mode of operation arising from the different class of persons, in one case the Samaritans, in the other the dispersed Jews, among whom the foundation of the Church had been already laid—is not on that account destroyed.

traces of that deep concern with which many Gentiles listened to his preaching. And what he actually witnessed might bring to his remembrance many things which Christ intimated in his discourses. Thus there might be a preparation for the entrance of new light into his soul, though it could not penetrate all at once. There was necessarily a conflict in his soul between the rays of the new light, and the darkness arising from his earlier habits of thinking. But now a divine call reached him from without, and co-operated with what was taking place within his breast.

"As among the Gentiles, at that time, there were many noble-minded men, dissatisfied with the ancient superstition, who longed with conscious or unconscious anxiety after a divine revelation which might impart the confidence of religious conviction[1] raised above the strife of human opinions, so we recognise in the centurion Cornelius a representative of this better class of Gentiles, an historical image from the life, and no mythical personage. He belonged to the Roman cohort which formed the garrison of Cæsarea Stratonis, a town on the sea-coast, thirty-five miles from Joppa. This man appears first, like many of those among the Gentiles who were filled with a sense of their religious wants, and were seeking after the truth, to have turned from the popular polytheism to the worship of Jehovah in Judaism, and thus to have reached a theistic stand-point which formed a bridge for him to Christianity."

P. 68, l. 13, *after* "enigmatical" *add*, "The Proselytes of the Gate, who borrowed the general principles of Theism from Judaism, but held them in an isolated state, separated from all that gave it vitality, found in it consequently not enough for their religious necessities. But they were roused by the felt deficiency to search and examine. With this, the expectation of the Messiah, which easily passed over to them from the Jews, was fitted to harmonize, and would assume a form

[1] A prophetic longing, such as is contained in those words in Plato's Phædon, although it might not be so strictly intended by the philosopher, where it is said, that "taking the best and hardest to be refuted of human opinions, a man must venture on the voyage of life, carried over on this, as on a raft, unless he can be carried over more securely and free from danger in a more trustworthy conveyance, or some divine word:" *τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον· εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θείου τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι.*—Ed. Bip. vol. i. p. 194.

corresponding to the stand-point and spirit of their seeking; it was not difficult for them to strip off the sensuous political covering. Now a person of such a religious constitution of mind and disposition as Cornelius, must have had his attention roused when he heard that the Messiah, from whom he expected fresh divine light, had appeared, and when he heard of the spread of the new announcements, and of Peter's extraordinary works; for we shall be quite justified in assuming that such a report had reached him of what had taken place in the surrounding country. And here we must apply what we have before remarked respecting the use of the accounts in the Acts as historical records. Especially in reference to the mode in which Cornelius was induced to send for Peter, the original source from which alone every other account could be derived, and to which every other must be traced back, could only have been his own deposition respecting what had happened to him."

P. 69, l. 2, *after* "Eph. iii. 10" *add*, "In the picture which we are enabled to form by this combination of views, all the particular traits may not possess equal certainty. But we may be assured that an exhibition on the whole will remain, of which no sophistical destructive arbitrary criticism can deprive us."

P. 75, l. 22, *for* "It was natural, &c., . . . them;" *read*, "As all the conditions under which a living faith in the Redeemer is formed, existed in the souls of these men who were seeking after salvation, so by the powerful testimony of Peter such a faith was soon awakened, and after such preparatives followed more quickly than would otherwise have happened. And as this faith in the process of its formation and in its quality differed essentially from the faith of the Samaritans, which arose more from outward events, and adhered to what was external, so also the effects were in an inverted relation. While among the Samaritans after they had received water-baptism, no trace was to be seen of the effects of the baptism of the Spirit, here on the contrary, in these men, who were so prepared, the usual marks of the outpouring of the Spirit were perceptible, even before they had received baptism. The word which found a receptive soil in their hearts effected everything by its indwelling power, and these effects of the word testified their well-founded claim to baptism."

P. 77. Book iii. Ch. i. The following is the introductory paragraph in the 4th Edition :—"When anything new or great is to take place in the development of the kingdom of God, divine wisdom is wont so to order events, that an impulse is given to its progress not on one side only, but in several directions. Without being aware of it, the men whom God employs as his instruments co-operate from various stand-points, in order to prepare the way for that, which in the issue is destined to effect a great revolution. The various threads in the course of the world's history are joined together at last in one point. Beginnings are made and apparently fail; and yet what seemed to rise only to sink for ever, finally becomes the victorious creative principle of a new and illustrious epoch. So it was here.

"Stephen, who appears to have been chosen, in order that Christianity, freeing itself from the garb in which hitherto it had been developed, and shattering the forms of Judaism, might exhibit itself and show its power through him as the principle of a new creation adapted for the whole human race, died as a martyr for the great new idea first brought by him to light. But this idea did not die with him: it found other organs in those who were allied to him by descent and education, the Hellenists, who while they extended their agency among the Gentiles, realized in various small circles the intentions of Stephen. Then Peter himself came forth from the midst of Palestinian Judaism, who from quite a different quarter, and as it were against his will, was led by a combination of influences to vindicate the independent development of Christianity among the Gentiles. It might have been imagined that the more liberal Hellenistic culture would produce the man by whom the idea put forth by the Hellenistic Stephen was destined to be carried out in all its extent. But God likes to work by opposites, and very differently from the calculations of human sagacity. There is a divine impress stamped on the paradoxes which meet us in the development of the kingdom of God. Thus not from the Alexandrian, but the Pharisaic school, that great man was to come forth, who was destined to represent Christianity in opposition to the Pharisaic stand-point which hitherto had been his own. This new development was to emanate, not from what was allied to it, but from the diametrically opposite

The Pharisee was to be transformed into the scribe of the kingdom of God. It was important that the new spirit should receive its form not from the delicate shell of Hellenic culture, but from the hard kernel of Pharisaism. The solid Christian realism as it was represented in Paul, could impress itself more distinctly on the hard substance of rugged Pharisaism, than on the tender yielding material of Hellenistic culture. And yet it was not unimportant that in Paul there should be a portion of the Hellenist element amalgamated with the Palestinian and Pharisaic. What had been partially effected in the development of Stephen and the Hellenists, down to the mission of Peter to Cornelius, was concentrated here. If in the method by which Peter, the advocate of the contracted Palestinian conception of Christianity, was led to more liberal views, something analogous may be imagined to the method in which Paul was converted from the most violent opposition to the Gospel to the reception of it in its most comprehensive form, we may be allowed to consider the latter as an objective type of the process of historical development according to the same law and with the same great outlines, and not as the arbitrary fiction of any human mind.

"With what we have just now remarked, is closely connected one principal distinction of the Apostle Paul in the historical development of Christianity. It was not merely that churches were founded by him among the heathen, and that the sphere of his labours was so extensive; but by him especially the fundamental truths of the Gospel were developed in their living organic connexion, and formed into a compact system. The essence," &c.

P. 78, l. 14, *after* "it", *add*, "The more definite the object of the author of the Acts might be in noticing the change of the apostle's name from Saul to Paul from this period—if, as Baur assumes, it was an imitation of the alteration in Peter's name (p. 93)—so much less likely is it, that he would have stated the fact without making any remark upon it."

P. 80, l. 8, *after* "literature" *add*, "But might he not at a later period have been induced, while exercising his ministry among people of Hellenic culture, to have made himself better acquainted with Hellenic literature? The man who felt himself impelled by the glowing zeal of love, and who knew how to become, as to the Jews a Jew, so to the Greeks a Greek, in order to win them over to the Gospel—might, for promoting

that object, read many writings of the Grecian philosophers and poets. It may, indeed, be asked, whether he would have time amidst his prodigious and varied labours for such a purpose, having in addition to work for his livelihood? But can we venture to measure Paul by the common standard? It would not be easy to say what was not possible to such a man. Yet we must not draw too large a conclusion from the few passages of ancient authors which occur in his writings. It is true we shall find in him such expressions respecting the relation of Christianity to the culture and philosophy of the ancient world, to which the history of Grecian philosophy gives the best commentary, and which may give evidence of a deeper acquaintance with it. But what in others would be the result of study, might in Paul's case be sufficiently accounted for, from the deep insight of his universal Christian knowledge of the world. In the First Epistle to the Corinthians and in the Epistle to the Romans he had several opportunities of making use of his knowledge of Grecian literature, if he had been familiar with it. And we know that an Apollos was his superior in Grecian culture, and that he speaks of himself as 'rude in speech' (*ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ*) 2 Cor. xi. 6, compared with others."

P. 81, l. 1, *after* "aliment" *add*, "The three great teachers of the church who were especially called to testify of the opposition between flesh and spirit, nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural, the merely naturally human and the Christian—these three heroes of the Gospel, Paul, Augustin, and Luther, had in common, a nature fervid and containing a fulness of power which could not be easily compelled, but would resist so much the more strongly the reins and the yoke, or any violence done to it. But while in an Augustin the unbridled rude nature manifested itself in the outbreak of lust and passions unchecked by any higher power, and thus he was taught the power of sin, it was otherwise with Paul as well as with Luther. The strict discipline of the law to which he had been subjected in the school of the Pharisees prevented the power of sin from breaking forth outwardly; it was driven back inwardly. 'Certainly he belonged to the earnest upright Pharisees who strove after the righteousness of the law with their whole souls. In the sight of men he appeared as righteous, blameless. As he himself could affirm that, 'touching the righteousness which is in the law,' he was

'blameless,' Phil. iii. 6, and 'in the Jews' religion he was above many of his equals in age,' Gal. i. 14."

P. 85, l. 25, *for* "because unusual," &c., *read* "because these not unusual," &c.

P. 86, l. 11, *after* "Redeemer" *add*, "But this inward transaction may be conceived of in two ways, the difference of which is determined by a difference in the conception of Christianity itself, and of the person of Christ especially, and by the still more general difference in the mode of contemplating God and the Universe. It may be so understood as to exclude the supernatural altogether, while everything is considered only as the result of a natural, psychological development. For the living Christ who reveals himself to the spirit, is substituted the power of an idea which through him is excited in the human spirit, or to the shining forth of which in the consciousness of the spirit the first impulse has been given by him. What represented itself to the spirit of Paul, as Christ, was only the symbolical vision of this idea involuntarily transferred to a definite person, who served as a foil for it. What appeared to the spirit as something external, was nothing else than the reflection of what proceeded from his own inward being. Such a conception as this, which makes Christianity and Christ totally different objects from what they were to Paul, which regards as self-deception what inspired him, what was the soul of his life, his thinking and his acting, and gave him power for everything—such a conception we must most emphatically reject. But something altogether different is a spiritual inward revelation of Christ as a real fact, in the same sense as Paul would regard it, and as Christ promised to his disciples; not the conscious arising in the mind of an idea but a revelation of the same Christ, by whom in his earthly manifestation the salvation of mankind had been effected, in his glorified personality, with whom believers must come into a real relation. But if we regard this as a spiritual inward transaction proceeding from the contact of the higher self-consciousness with the living Christ, and that what represented itself to the outward senses was only as a reflection of that revelation which took place in the inner man—by a conception thus understood, the divine and the truth of the event would lose nothing. At all events, that inward revelation of Christ is always the chief thing, and however we may conceive of the appearance as outwardly

recognisable to the senses, yet still this was only the medium in order to lead to that inward revelation of Christ, to prepare him for that real spiritual communion with the living Christ, from which his whole apostolic efficiency proceeded; as among the earlier apostles the reappearance of Christ after his resurrection was only the preparation for the ever-enduring communion, into which they would enter with Christ. The perceptions of the senses," &c.

P. 88, l. 1, *after* "Christ" *add*, "But if we allow that from these words of Paul nothing can be concluded with certainty, excepting an inward revelation of Christ which he was conscious of having received, yet we can by no means grant that all his other expressions respecting this transaction are to be explained according to this passage, and consequently that there is nothing more than that pure internal revelation to form the basis of everything else that he reports. By mentioning in this passage only the one point of highest interest, he by no means excludes all others; but it suited his purpose and aim to make one thing prominent, since he wished simply to point out the independent source from which he drew his knowledge of Christian truth. And in this respect, the way in which Christ appeared outwardly to him was a matter of comparative indifference. It is evident, that whatever of that kind might have happened, there was no occasion to mention it here. But it is another important point which Paul brings forward in 1 Cor. ix. 1, when he adduces his having seen Christ as a pledge of his genuine apostolic dignity. It could be only such a seeing of Christ, which could have this importance attached to it. It belonged to the apostolic calling to testify of Christ the Risen One from a personal sight of him. Because Christ had been seen by Paul, he stood in this respect on an equality with the other apostles; and in the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians he evidently places the appearance of the risen and glorified Saviour, which was vouchsafed to himself, in the same category with all his other appearances after his resurrection. Hence we see how important it was for him, as well as for the other apostles, to be able to testify from personal experience of the great fact—the basis of Christian faith and hope—the real resurrection of Christ, and his glorified personal existence. Hence the image of the glorified Christ is present to his contemplation when he testifies of the revelation of the glory of God in Christ, and speaks of that perfect con-

formity to his image to which believers will hereafter attain. But may not what we have before said of the case of Cornelius be made use of as an argument against the objective reality of this appearance of Christ? May it not be said—As Cornelius could only testify of his own subjective experience of what he *believed* that he had seen, so it might have been with Paul. As far as he tells us of his experience, he is trustworthy; but it does not appear from this that he was capable of distinguishing between the objective and the subjective. Hence we are not at all justified in supposing anything else than the inward vision. But the comparison is not altogether correct. In reference to what was communicated to Cornelius, it is not a point of importance whether it was a real angelic appearance, or a vision. The importance of the transaction, in itself, and in a religious view, remains just the same. On the contrary, the importance of what was seen by Paul, consists in this—that he could testify from his own beholding and experience, that he actually saw the risen and glorified Christ, which was the foundation of his whole religious faith. His believing confidence would have arisen from self-deception, if we admit that he had here confounded the objective and the subjective. We cannot bring ourselves to admit this, if we hold in due esteem this belief of Paul, and what he effected by means of it for the salvation of men. Besides, we are justified in placing greater confidence in a Paul than in a Cornelius, for forming a correct judgment respecting himself. Paul, who knew by experience the state of ecstasy, could well distinguish it from the state of waking and thoughtful religious consciousness, as we may learn from the passage above quoted in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians.

"But in truth, a transaction of this kind can never be proved in a manner that will be universally satisfactory. In order to recognise it in its reality, a peculiar stand-point to view it from is necessary; and whoever is a stranger to this, must struggle against admitting the fact. For history in general, there is no such thing as mathematical demonstration. Faith and trust are always required for the recognition of historical truth. The only question is, whether there is sufficient ground for it, or more which prompts to doubt. The decision depends upon the consistency of the facts, and of the whole department to which they belong. The demand for doubt is stronger in proportion as the nature of the transactions in

question, and of their appropriate department, is something foreign to the spirit of the inquirer, and as these facts are less capable of being decided according to the standard he is familiar with, and are more out of the circle of his experience. This remark applies particularly to transactions which follow other laws than those of the common course of nature, and in which something supernatural is involved. Whoever thinks that everything must be explained by those laws, is necessitated to acknowledge nothing supernatural by the whole stand-point from which he contemplates the universe; such an one will feel himself compelled to refer the history of Paul's conversion to those common laws, and to deny everything that opposes them; it would be in vain to dispute with him about special points, when the absolute contrariety of his whole stand-point has predetermined the course of his examination and its result. Especially in the explanation of the transaction of which we are here speaking, it is of consequence in what relation the inquirer is placed to that on which the essence of the Christian faith rests, and with which it stands or falls—*the fact of the actual resurrection of Christ.* Whoever acknowledges this, occupies a standpoint where he can have no motive to deny the supernatural in the history that is connected with that fact. Such a person can have no ground for mistrusting the expressions of Paul respecting this appearance to him of the risen Saviour. But whoever from his own point of view cannot acknowledge the actual resurrection of Christ, is so far incapacitated for admitting the objective nature of this appearance to Paul, and must from the first stand in a hostile relation to it.

"But it is always most important, that we should not separate what God has joined together; that we should not tear asunder the connexion between the objective and the subjective, the divine and human, the supernatural and the natural."

P. 91, l. 4, *after* "Arabia" *add*, "The question here arises, With what view, and for what object, did Paul visit Arabia? He might find an opening for preaching the Gospel among the numerous Jews who were scattered over Arabia, and devote his activity to that object. He would here first of all appear as an apostle to the Jews. But the reason might be, that he felt himself impelled to prepare himself in quiet retirement for the great office entrusted to him by a Divine call. On merely internal grounds the question cannot be decided. It

is equally possible, that the man of glowing zeal and unwearied activity felt himself impelled to testify among the Jews of that truth to which he had hitherto been an enemy, as that after such an astonishing conversion of his inner life, a season of contemplative repose would form the transition-point and preparation for his great activity. And the connexion in which this statement occurs in the Epistle to the Galatians, is not decisive of the question; for either view equally suits the antithesis in that passage, that Paul did not go up to Jerusalem in order to make his appearance under the sanction of those who were apostles before him."

P. 92, l. 5, *after* "Jerusalem" *add*, "As to the object of this journey, it follows from what Paul himself states, in his Epistle to the Galatians, (i. 18,) that the main object at least, was not to form a connexion with the Christian church and Jerusalem, but to become personally acquainted with the apostle Peter. This does not exclude what we are told in the Acts of his intercourse with the whole church, and his disputations with the Hellenists; only these did not form the object for undertaking the journey, but only something additional while carrying out his original design. But it may be asked, Why was Paul anxious to become personally acquainted with Peter? If Peter was more allied to Paul by the fire of an outwardly directed activity, yet, on the other hand, there appears the deep inward element, the contemplative tendency of John's spirit as more in alliance with Paul. Hence Paul might desire to be personally acquainted both with Peter and John. But the characteristic qualities of John's mind appear not to have been prominently brought into action till a later period. Peter, in virtue of his peculiar *χάρισμα κυβερνήσεως*, and the position in which he had been placed by the Lord himself, had from the first taken the lead in all that related to the government of the church. He was especially active in promoting the spread of Christianity—a sufficient reason why Paul, before entering on his public ministry, should wish to confer with him in particular. If Paul had already attained a clear insight into the principles according to which he founded the Christian church among the Gentiles, a subject closely connected with them, namely, the relation of the Gospel to the Law, might form the topic of discussion between them. Among the reasons which might

lead him to wish for a personal acquaintance with Peter, this might be one, that he wished to know more exactly what he thought upon this subject. Although it was not till Paul had already gained an independent sphere of action, that a full conference took place between them on the relation of the different spheres of apostolic service and mode of operation, yet this does not render it impossible that at this first interview between Peter and Paul, they conversed on what was essential for the founding of a Christian church. Now if, as is very likely, the conversion of Cornelius had already taken place, we may also presume that Peter by what then occurred was prepared to acknowledge the principles laid down by Paul. But if the contrary was the fact, the conference with Paul might be one of those influential circumstances by which the conflict in Peter's mind that terminated at the conversion of Cornelius, was brought to its final result. In the first case, Peter might have acted as a mediator between Paul and James, the brother of the Lord, who in this respect stood furthest from him.. It is remarkable, that these were the only leaders (Coryphæi) of the church with whom he at first came in contact.

"But here another question arises. Was it purely accidental, that Paul met with but one apostle and one apostolic man? Did he avoid an interview with the collective church and with the rest of the apostles? On either supposition we must regard the narrative in the Acts on this point as erroneous. But what design could Paul have had in so acting? Shall we seek for the reason in what he says in the Epistle to the Galatians, that he wished to avoid the appearance of not having from the first entered independently on the preaching of the Gospel, and of having been instructed and furnished with full powers for it by the apostles? But this appearance would be as much supported, if not still more so, by seeking a conference with the pillars of the church. If Paul had wished sedulously to avoid everything which might favour such an appearance, he would not have gone at all to Jerusalem. Only one supposition remains, that Paul did not show himself openly, but merely conferred in secret with Peter, on account of his personal safety, in order to defeat the plots of his embittered enemies among the Jews; and that through Peter he met with James in the same private manner.

This supposition is confirmed by Paul's representation in the passage of the Epistle to the Galatians, to the effect that, for fourteen years (or eleven years after this journey) he had been quite unknown by sight to the churches in Judea, and that they had only heard of him by report. But this would lead us to explain several things in the narrative of the Acts respecting this visit of Paul to Jerusalem as untrue,[1] since in that case all could not regard the account that Barnabas[2] introduced Paul to the apostles in general, as perfectly accurate, since Paul, according to his own statement, met only with Peter.[3] If Paul at that time, in order to evade the plots of the Jews embittered against him for his apostasy, had been induced to remain in secret with Peter without showing himself openly, it follows that the report of the change that had taken place in his character must have already been widely spread in Jerusalem. But this being presupposed, it cannot be admitted that the Christians in Jerusalem were filled with mistrust against him, nor could he have needed the friendly offices of Barnabas in order to gain admission to the church. It is also highly improbable, that the conversion of such an adversary, which was accomplished, too, in so remarkable a manner, should not have become known after so long an interval among the Christians in Jerusalem. And if only such a concealed visit of Paul to Jerusalem be admitted, the disputations between him and the Hellenists could not have taken place. Certainly, this supposition has several things in its favour, and admitting it, the credibility of the Acts in all essential points would still remain unshaken. From this one mistake, that the visit of Paul to Jerusalem instead of

[1] Here we must also in truth acknowledge that Baur's doubts are not altogether unfounded, although we cannot acknowledge the decisive tone of his assertions to be equally well-founded, and at all events can only admit an accidental error of tradition, which nowise affects the general truth of the narration, and implies no designed fabrication for a special purpose.

[2] According to an account not sufficiently authenticated, in the Hypotyposes of Clement of Alexandria, in Eusebius, (*Hist. Eccles.* ii. 1,) Barnabas had been one of the seventy disciples.

[3] But this erroneous statement involves only an ignorance of particular circumstances; for as soon as it was known that Paul had made his first visit to the church at Jerusalem, without an acquaintance with the peculiar circumstances under which it took place, the assumption might be easily made, that he was then introduced to the apostles in general.

a private, was represented as a public one, other mistakes would follow without occasioning what might justly be called an essential deviation from historical truth. Meanwhile, we do not venture to maintain this, since many adjustments can be conceived between the two accounts, according to which they supply each other's deficiencies.

"We cannot so certainly contradict the assertion, that Paul's conversion must have been already generally known in Jerusalem. It may lessen the difficulty if we consider that the young man Saul could not at that time have attained to such great eminence, that the greater part of those three years after his conversion had been spent in retirement in Arabia and that his return was rendered difficult by political occurrences—the war with King Aretas. But it was also possible, that Barnabas aided him by his good offices, though they might not be required for the precise object of removing the mistrust of the believers. He might have applied to him as to a Hellenist, one of his old acquaintances, and through him have been introduced to Peter. In itself it is perfectly natural that he should first resort to those Christians who stood nearest to him by descent, and probably by early connexions. Thus it might easily happen that, although he had not yet come in contact with the whole Church, he had had intercourse with many Hellenists, and through them was involved in those disputations which led to the persecutions afterwards raised against him.

"But in reference to these disputations of Paul with the Hellenists, questions suggest themselves which we must examine before we proceed any further with the consideration of his life and labours:—the question, whether Paul from the beginning occupied that peculiar point of view which he held afterwards on the opposition between the Law and the Gospel, and in accordance with this had resolved to present Christianity to the Gentiles in its independent development, separate from Judaism, or whether such a tendency was formed in his mind by the opposition his preaching met with from a hostile Judaism—the question, from what influences the development of this peculiarly Pauline element is to be deduced; and this question, again, is connected with the more general one, respecting the sources to which Paul was indebted for his knowledge of Christian truth.

"In passing over from the stand-point of Pharisaism, it might very easily happen that dependence on the authority of the Mosaic Law as a matter of perpetual obligation would be at the same time given up. This might happen in the instances of such conversions as were effected in the way of ordinary instrumentality. But it was altogether different with such a conversion as Paul's, which was not brought about by any such instrumentality, but in an immediate and sudden manner by a violent crisis. Here then could be no connecting link, but only an absolute opposition. We may suppose that the powerful spirit of Paul, disposed to meet in violent opposition, would forsake the natural course of development, and be impelled, like the later ultra-Paulinians, to a direction altogether hostile to Judaism.

"We have already remarked, that the influence of Hellenism on a man who in early youth had been trained in the schools of the Pharisees, cannot here be taken into account. In general, we must not proceed on the supposition that the liberal spirit was universal among the Hellenists. If, as appears from Philo's writings, this was not the case even at Alexandria, where the Hellenic element of culture exerted the greatest influence and power, so much less are we justified in supposing it to have been with the Hellenists generally, among whom we cannot admit the predominance of the element of Grecian culture in an equal degree. It was what might be expected, when a number of persons had devoted themselves so much to a foreign element of culture, as to become estranged from the Jewish, that others would be so much more mistrustful of all application to what was Hellenic, and the opposition to the abuse of freedom would drive them more violently to unreason, servitude to the letter, and illiberality. As we find among the Alexandrian Jews three parties, we might expect a similar variety among the Hellenistic Jews. The family of Paul, from which sprang the pupil of Gamaliel, was probably attached rather to the more contracted, than to the liberal class. Ananias, the teacher of Paul, when he professed himself a Christian at Damascus, was universally respected on account of his legal piety, and such a man would be very far from leading Paul nearer the direction which the apostle's mind afterwards took. We might sooner think in this connexion of the

influence of the liberal-minded Christians, such as proceeded from the midst of the Hellenists in consequence of the impulse given by Stephen, and of the influence of the new ideas called forth by the martyr Stephen; but we do not know, whether Paul soon after his conversion came into a social circle where influences of this kind would act upon him, and at all events we have no proof of it. But even apart from the Divine element, if we only consider the great originality of Paul's mind, we must not attribute too much to determining influences from without on such a man. Moreover, there was the extraordinary nature of his conversion, in which the Divine element so powerfully predominated, by which, in virtue of that immediate communication with Christ, he was placed on a level with the other apostles. Hence also that Christian originality which marked the apostles in consequence of their personal connexion with Christ, must be also ascribed to him, if to any one. And that it was so he testifies, declaring that he received the Gospel not from men, nor was instructed in it by men, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ; that as soon as God had revealed his Son in him that he might publish him among the Gentiles, he at once sought not human counsel, nor visited the apostles at Jerusalem, but betook himself to a spot the furthest from all such instruction, where he must derive all his knowledge from an entirely different source.

"In order rightly to understand the whole force and meaning of Paul's expressions relative to that internal transaction of which he alone could testify, we must first of all understand what he means by the term ἀποκάλυψις. Everything good and true must be finally traced back to the Father of lights, from whom all light beams forth for the spiritual world; his revelation in all must be acknowledged; and especially is this idea applicable to all that is original and immediate in the consciousness, where from the hidden depths of the spirit, by virtue of the root of our existence in God, the light of new creative ideas springs up in the soul. Thus, if Paul had not more distinctly defined the idea of revelation, we might say that from the stand-point of religious intuition, looking only at the Divine causality, and not regarding natural instrumentality, he had derived from Divine revela-

tion what proceeded from within by the development of reason. But if Paul knew this idea of revelation in a general sense, and expressly distinguished from it another more limited idea, then we must reject the supposition that he only by a peculiarity of religious dialect called *that* revelation which from another point of view might be otherwise named. He had in fact a peculiar word to designate that general idea of revelation which applies to all consciousness of religious and moral truth, to which the mind is led by the contemplation of creation, or by entering into itself, by conscience and reason; the word φανεροῦν, which he uses for this purpose in the well-known passages in the first chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. But when he speaks of what can be known neither from the contemplation of creation, nor from the existence of reason or conscience, but only by a communication of the Spirit of God, differing from all these, and newly imparted, he uses the word ἀποκαλύπτειν. Paul, it is true, also uses the more general designation, the word φανεροῦν, for that which cannot be known by the natural medium; but no passage can be pointed out, in which the word ἀποκαλύπτειν is used in the more general sense.

"Tholuck, indeed, in the last edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, p. 72, has appealed to Phil. iii. 15, as a passage to which this construction of the idea will not apply. And, certainly, there is some truth at the basis of what he says. No doubt, Paul in those words was not thinking merely of such an advance of insight into Christian truth as proceeds from an immediate operation of the Holy Spirit; but instrumentality by a process of thought animated by the Holy Spirit is not excluded. There is, without doubt, in these words, a reference, not merely to new knowledge, such as must be communicated at once by the light of the Holy Spirit; they rather suggest that Christians who are still immature ought to learn more thoroughly, and better understand, the contents of *the* Christian truth already communicated to them, by further meditation carried on in the divine illumination which they have already received, or more fully animated by the Divine Spirit, whose organs they have become; as, for instance, the relation of the Gospel to the Law, and the consequences developed from faith in the justification obtained through Christ. But still the word

ἀποκαλύπτειν here retains its fundamental meaning, inasmuch as the insight spoken of, does not proceed from natural reason, but is obtained only by the new light of the Holy Spirit. Here also there is an illustration of the difference between the words φανεροῦν and ἀποκαλύπτειν.—Only Paul does not distinguish here the operation of the Divine Spirit upon the soul, by which, first of all, in an immediate manner, by means of a divine light rising upon it, it is led to the consciousness of such truths as could not be known by unassisted, natural reason—and the further development of these truths when once introduced into the consciousness, by the power of reflection exercised upon them while animated and led by the Holy Spirit. Still the divine light is always to be distinguished from the natural reason, into which it enters as something new—the fountain whence all is drawn, whether the original and the immediate of Divine communications is intended, or the further development and elaboration of the original,—and on the other hand, the reason, either in its simple receptivity, or in its self-activity as an organ to be worked according to the peculiar laws of its nature, but always as an organ for the higher factor, the revealing or animating Holy Spirit. Now, inasmuch as everything is to be traced back to this, which, without its aid, could not be effected by the unassisted reason, the use of ἀποκαλύπτειν in its meaning as opposed to φανεροῦν is suitable. And we can only distinguish in the application of this idea, which always retains its own peculiar meaning, the wider and the limited use of it—the latter, when the subject spoken of is the original, creative operation of the Divine Spirit, by which the knowledge of things hitherto hidden, is imparted; the ἀποκάλυψις in such a sense as is essential to the charisma of prophecy.

"It is, therefore, plain, that when Paul attributes all his knowledge of Christian truth to ἀποκάλυψις, he traces everything back to an internal Divine causality. But here the question arises, whether in reference to all which Paul knew of the life, the ministry, the discourses and commands of Christ, all other sources of knowledge were excluded, and only this one left. In this case a supernatural communication would have occupied in him the place of all other communications through natural human instrumentality.

"But it contradicts all analogy in the mode of the Spirit's

operations in laying the foundation of the Christian Church, and in the propagation of Christianity, that what was matter of historical tradition, should be conveyed into the consciousness by a supernatural revelation, independent of this historical connexion. The office of the Spirit, of whom Christ says that he shall take of his own, and bring to remembrance what he himself had spoken on earth, was not first of all to create a tradition of Christ's words independent of this remembrance. It is perfectly unnatural to suppose that Christ communicated to Paul, in special visions, what he had spoken and commanded on earth. And it is by no means in contradiction to Paul's asserted independence in his apostolic vocation, that he obtained the historical materials of Christ's life and doctrine from the natural source, common to all, of tradition. It was in this connexion enough, and the only important point, that in the understanding of the truth announced by Christ, and knowledge of its nature, he was dependent on no human instruction, but drew everything from the inward revelation of Christ, from the light of the Holy Spirit. This Spirit, who took of the things of Christ, and brought to remembrance what he had said, performed the same office for him as for the other Apostles. On all occasions when Paul quotes the words or commands or Christ, he speaks in a manner that leads us to think of no other source of knowledge than that of tradition. So where he mentions the institution of the Supper, he would have expressed himself quite differently, if the details of that institution had been made known to him by an immediate revelation from the Lord. He would, no doubt, have given quite a different turn to the expressions, indicating the manner in which he had been informed of it."

P. 95, l. 5, *after* "himself," *add*, "Where Paul, in his epistles, speaks of the imitation of Christ, he speaks as if a distinct historical image of the Saviour was well known throughout the Church; and taking everything together, we are justified in supposing that he made use of an original historical record respecting Christ's ministry in his addresses as a point of connexion for his instructions, which shorter record fell into oblivion when the canonical gospels had attained to general notoriety and repute.

"We may also admit, that Paul, making use of such historical

materials, learned to understand and develop from the same the substance of Christ's discourses and the import of the transactions of his life, the substance of the truth revéaled by Christ, through the peculiar communications of the Divine Spirit which we have distinguished by the name of ἀποκαλύψεις, and through his peculiar mental activity animated by the same Spirit from whom these original movements proceeded. By these means he developed still further, according to the deductions they offered, and in relation to the controversies of his times, the truths which had been introduced into his consciousness by those ἀποκαλύψεις. The manner in which he accomplished this was determined by the manner in which he himself had been converted, and by his dialectic cast of mind, as it had been developed in the Pharisaic school. And thus we can make it very evident to ourselves, how so many deep truths expressed by him, (as, for example, on the relation of the Law to the Gospel,) unfolded themselves to him from a pregnant hint given by Christ himself.

"If, therefore, we have good reason to believe that the peculiarities of Paul's views respecting the relation between the Law and the Gospel were early developed in his mind, we can at once account for his being induced in his disputes with the Hellenists to exhibit this side of evangelical truth more freely, and thus to excite still more the anger of the Jews. On the other hand," &c. (P. 98, l. 2.)

P. 99, l. 18, "Barnabas," (note.) When Baur, in the work already quoted, p. 40, casts a doubt on this mission of Barnabas from Jerusalem, and thinks that after the dispersion of the Hellenists occasioned by the persecution raised against Stephen, he had sought to form an independent sphere of action out of Jerusalem, this is only a specimen of those arbitrary conclusions and combinations raised to the dignity of facts by Dr. Baur, of which we have pointed out the futility.

P. 103, l. 8, "founder," (note.) When we take into account the great influence of the Latin language as the language of the government in this chief city of Roman Asia, we shall certainly find no ground in the Latin form of the name to doubt, with Baur (p. 90), the truth of this account of its origin, and to find in it an anachronism.

P. 105, l. 8, *after* "it" *add*, "At all events, if we admit that

Paul took such a journey, we must consider it as one not mentioned by him in the Epistle to the Galatians, and as the second of the journeys which he made to Jerusalem, after his conversion. But it may be asked, whether this journey of Paul's is on the whole sufficiently accredited? its not being mentioned in the passage quoted from the Epistle to the Galatians excites strong doubts. It may, indeed, be thought possible that in numbering his journeys to Jerusalem up to a certain time, this journey was passed over as not very important, or that at the instant of writing he did not happen to think of it. Still we cannot consider this as at all probable. Paul certainly so expresses himself that we cannot attach any other meaning to his words than, that after that short stay of fourteen days in Jerusalem, he had not been there till that journey which constituted an epoch in the history of the Church; hence he could say that he had continued personally unknown to the Churches in Judea—that they had only heard by report of the labours of him who had once been a persecutor. And what conclusion must we draw from this, relative to the account in the Acts? Nothing more than that the tradition which Luke followed, and which united Paul and Barnabas in their labours at this period, joined them here together, although for some reason this was an exception; or Paul might have been chosen as a delegate, but some unknown circumstance might have prevented his taking the journey. At least, we can more easily admit an oversight here, than resolve to do violence to Paul's own declaration."

(Note.) "I agree here, as in most points, with Bleek; see his *Beiträge zur Evangelien-Kritik, Berlin*, 1846, p. 55; a work that contains the results of an unprejudiced, profound and cautious criticism; from this writer, indeed, no other could be expected."

P. 107, note 1, *add*, "Baur (p. 94) objects to the use I here make of this work of Lucian's, because it is evident, he says, that in this discourse he was not describing an historical person, but only intended to paint the manners of the times. Certainly, we do not appeal to Lucian's work as a sure source of historical information, but can only suppose a groundwork of special historical truth, which Lucian fills up for the object he had in view. But this decides nothing against my use of it. If Lucian gives the manners of his times, the traits must be borrowed from the life, and hence, we can make

use of his work a proof that the narrative under our consideration contains nothing inconsistent with the character of the times to which it belongs."

P. 108, l. 16, "discourse," (note.) Baur maintains that this discourse bears the marks of an artificial composition; that the greater part is cast in the same mould as the discourses of Peter, already reported in the Acts, and only at the close, a Pauline turn of expression is brought in, a foreign element, not at all suited to the whole. We very readily grant that we have no exact and complete report of Paul's discourse, and that we should have recognised more of what is peculiarly Pauline, if the discourse had come down to us in its original form. Yet we cannot assent to what Baur says about the composition; but we think that here may be discerned the genuine main features of the discourse delivered by Paul. We find here a combination of the peculiarly Pauline as it appears in the doctrine of Justification, with what, according to the nature of the case, formed the common type in all apologetical discourses of the apostles when addressing Jews. The references to the ancient history of the Theocratic people and to the Messianic element must naturally be prominent at all times. The adducing of Christ's resurrection as a proof of the divine agency belongs also to the common foundation of the Christian testimony, and is brought forward not less in the Epistles of Paul. As Paul was speaking to persons who for the first time were invited to the Faith, he would naturally express himself otherwise than in his epistles addressed to believing Christians. In such a discourse the resurrection of Christ was necessarily introduced as a practical divine credential for the Messiahship of Jesus; a credential also for what he had effected by his sufferings for the salvation of mankind. If this kind of composition is to be set down as unpauline, then Romans iv. 25, must be also unpauline. See Schleiermacher's *Einleitung in das neue Testament*, p. 375.

P. 109, *l.* 8 *of note* 1, *instead of* "*πάντων*, to refer," *read* "*πάντων*, led him to refer."

P. 111, note 4, *after* "nature," (p. 112,) *add*, "What Baur says (p. 95) in [illegible] on these words, induces me to add a few words to justify my remarks. He finds fault with the first words as giving 'a very unworthy view of Christianity—since it must follow that miracles belong so essentially

to Christianity that wherever it is not accompanied by such acts, it does not manifest its divine life-power. And since, confessedly, no such wonders take place now, Christianity must have been long devoid of vitality.' But this can have been written only in consequence of a palpable distortion of my language, though not intentionally; for such a distortion might easily take place without design, by interpreting what I have said, from a foreign stand-point. Of divine powers in Christianity persons speak in one sense from a supernaturalist point of view, and in another sense from a rationalist standpoint that denies the supernatural, whether it be a Rationalism connected with a deistical or pantheistical view of the Universe, which with reckless consequentness goes to the length of denying everything supersensual or connected with a future life, or an inconsequent Rationalism, which still leaves something supersensual and beyond the present life. If by the divine powers of Christianity we understand something specific and peculiar, not proceeding from the regular development of human nature, something new, in a true sense supernatural, which is introduced through the supernatural event of the appearance of Christ and his whole work—then from such a point of view, what we call miracle will appear as the sign corresponding to this supernatural principle on its introduction into the natural development of mankind; an operation akin to this causality. And it can with perfect justice be said, that whoever finds himself on this stand-point of contemplation, whoever acknowledges the Scriptural Christ in his true supernaturality, has no reason in the nature of the case itself for not acknowledging a miracle involved in a transaction connected with the first development of Christianity. And it is by no means affirmed that this supernatural divine power having once entered into the life of Humanity, must always be accompanied by such miracles. Rather, we consider it as belonging to the law of the development of this divine power in the human race, that after it has once adapted itself to the natural development of humanity, these outward marks of the supernatural will retire. But what Christianity has effected and continues to effect for the spiritual and moral transformation of the world—we recognise as something proceeding from the same divine power indwelling in Christianity and identical with this miraculous element. But the case is alto-

gether different, when by 'the divine power of Christianity' nothing more is understood than an excitement of the powers already lying in human nature through the impulse given by Christ, in no other sense than we may speak of the excitement of higher powers in humanity by the movement called forth by any eminent man through his influence on society, or in no other sense than as we speak of a divine power in all the manifestations of Truth and Goodness.

"But as to the second part of this note, it stands in no contradiction to the idea of a miracle as I have represented it. It would only affect such an idea of a miracle as Dr. Baur has erroneously attributed to me and the advocates of the supernaturalist point of view, which he considers the only consequential one, viewing the subject from his stand-point of thorough consequential Naturalism or Pantheism; but against which I have often sufficiently guarded myself both in this work and in the Life of Jesus. It is by no means asserted in these words, as Baur's interpretation of them would imply, that the miracle could be denied only from the stand-point of a mechanical view of nature, which certainly would be an unfounded and unjust assertion. There is a *certain denial* of miracles, (which is not to be said of every denial,) and so there is a certain mode of *asserting* miracles, which proceeds from a mechanical view of nature. These words do not, indeed, commend the miracle to the stand-point of a contemplation of nature, which is not absolutely mechanical, to prove its possibility; but they only refer to it so far that from the stand-point of a deeper living conception of nature, there is no cause to set oneself beforehand against many immediate operations which are analogous to what we term miracles; that from this stand-point we cannot so easily permit ourselves to pass sentence on uncommon occurrences, as if they were absolute impossibilities. I have written this by way of explanation for the advocates of another stand-point, as far as freedom from prejudice, the love of truth, and rectitude can receive such an explanation. Whoever knows how to estimate scientific character, even with opposite convictions, will not be disposed, with Dr. Baur, to describe me as one who only uses the weapons of a vulgar controversialist."

P. 112, note 1, *add*, "Although I am very far from con-

founding this (the Apostolic) age with the Homeric, I can by no means acknowledge the correctness of Dr. Baur's assertion, that at this time, among the uninstructed people, there might be a belief in demoniacal and goëtic operations, but not in new appearances of the gods, and therefore this account of the Lycaonians must be unhistorical."

P. 112, l. 8, "ferment," (note.) When Baur says against these words, that the religious ferment rather excited doubt and unbelief, we must reply, that in times of such ferment, heterogeneous elements are wont to come together, fanaticism, superstition, and unbelief, which Baur himself, as is evident from his own expressions, must acknowledge; but then no ground is left for disputing what I said.

P. 113, l. 26, *after* "Paul" *add,* "And this transition from one extreme to the other, from a reverence which beheld beings of a higher order in the apostles, to rage against them as enemies of the gods, in such a popular assembly, who by instantaneous excitement were soon driven from one impression to its opposite, cannot be regarded as surprising."

P. 115, *after the paragraph ending* "among the heathen," *add,* "It was a principal object with Paul, to explain to the apostles the manner in which he had been accustomed to publish the Gospel among the Gentiles, and to obtain from them an acknowledgment of his apostolic ministry as not a vain one. This must certainly have been to him a point of the first importance. If the apostles and James, the brother of the Lord, (who stood next to them, and had the greatest influence in the Jewish Church,) were disposed to be on good terms with him, their influence would have a great effect, and there would be no danger of a division in the church. If, on the other hand, they placed themselves in opposition to him, all conferences with any other parties would be useless. Yet this would not prevent Paul from acting as a delegate from one church to the other.

"If we learn from the account in the Acts that public conferences were held, yet we must presume that these were not the first, but that Paul first of all explained himself in private to the apostles, before whom he could express himself without reserve on every topic, prior to his bringing forward the subject in an assembly consisting of such heterogeneous materials. We must necessarily presuppose that he assured

himself of perfect agreement with the apostles before he would venture to risk the issue of such a public council. But if we set out with that private conference between Paul and the apostles, we are certainly justified in concluding that this could not be considered as sufficient, but that it would be attempted to bring the church in which so much that was Jewish predominated, to an acknowledgment of the points agreed upon by Paul and the apostles; and this could be done only by public conferences. Thus we must maintain that the account in the Acts and that in the Epistle to the Galatians do not contradict each other; indeed, so far from that being the case, if we had only one representation, we should be led to fill it up with the substance of the other, by tracing the pragmatic historical connexion.[1] Paul, therefore, first of all, applied himself to the apostles Peter and John, and to James the brother of the Lord. To them he explained, how he had been accustomed to publish the Gospel among the heathen, and described to them the success of his ministry —what God had effected by him for the conversion of the Gentiles, how God himself had thus accredited his method as the right one. And the apostles, prepared by what had already taken place,[2] acknowledged that God, who had called Peter to publish the Gospel among the Jews,[3] and also

[1] I cannot comprehend how Baur (p. 116) can find fault with such an adjustment, which appears to me absolutely necessary, as uncritical and arbitrary. That Paul in the Epistle to the Galatians says nothing of a public discussion, is not surprising; for he brings forward what for him was the most important point, in combating with his opponents, who wished to make the authority of the Palestinian apostles and of James absolute.' But those public discussions and their result he could take for granted, as well known. They were not of so much consequence to him, as the acknowledgment of his independent call from heaven to publish the Gospel. The phrase κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσι is certainly nothing more than a designation for what had before been left indefinite, and it must be granted Dr. Baur, that nothing more can be drawn from it with certainty; but it is very possible that there was a reference in the apostle's mind to what had taken place δημοσίᾳ.

[2] We believe that it has been sufficiently indicated above, that the preceding developments, as recorded in the Acts, which were connected with the conversion of Cornelius, offer no contradiction to what now took place.

[3] Peter, as the person who from the first had been most active for the spread of the Gospel, here makes the principal figure; James's vocation was confined to the internal guidance of the Church at Jerusalem. That Peter was preeminently the apostle of the circumcision is quite con-

bestowed on Paul the power to labour for the Gospel among the Gentiles. They agreed with him, that they and Paul should each continue to labour in their respective spheres, on the sole condition that the new churches among the Gentiles should give a pledge of their common faith with the primitive Church at Jerusalem, and their gratitude to the persons from whom they had received the Gospel, by contributing towards the temporal necessities of the poor among them. What had been now expressed on both sides? That the Gentiles should not be subject to the pressure of Judaism, but with them everything should depend on faith in the Redeemer; that on the other hand, the Jewish Christians should not be compelled to renounce at once the ecclesiastical constitution corresponding to their popular theocratic stand-point founded in their historical development. How easily might Paul's ardent spirit, in his zeal for the fundamental truths of the Gospel, which to him were most important, have been hurried along to require from the believing Jews, that they should place themselves on a level with the Gentiles in a renunciation of everything Jewish. If they really acknowledged that nothing more was required for the justification of man than faith in the Redeemer, without the works of the Law, it would appear a necessary consequence, that they should give a practical proof of their assent by throwing off the yoke of the Law. Their adherence to the observance of the Law appeared at variance with this belief; it was a practical confirmation of the opposite conviction. Paul might easily have taken this view of the subject. And on the other hand, how easily could the Palestinian apostles, who had been accustomed to connect the new spirit of the Gospel with the old Jewish form of life, have been induced to consider as inseparable what had been mingled in their own conceptions and practice, especially since Christ himself had in all things observed the Law. What an impression might the sight of a heathen, living altogether in a Gentile manner, make at once on a James who probably had never left Jerusalem, and had lived from his youth up in the strict observance of the Law!

sistent with his having been once and again called to extend his ministry to the Gentiles; and equally so was it consistent with Paul's being the apostle of the uncircumcision, that he rejoiced in the opportunities he had of converting individuals among the Jews. Rom. xi. 14.

And was such an one to be acknowledged as a member of the same religious community, as an equally privileged brother in the faith? In the conduct of the apostles on this occasion, we are struck with the combination of genuine liberality of mind and wisdom; how each side retained their own stand-point, indicated by history, and yet both renounced it, and raised themselves to the fellowship of a higher unity, founded on the essence of the Gospel, by which all their contracted individuality was abandoned. In the conviction that faith in Jesus as the Messiah was the only necessary and all-sufficient means of justification and sanctification, the Palestinian apostles must have agreed with Paul. Otherwise they would not have granted that this without the Mosaic Law, was sufficient to make the Gentiles fellow-members of the kingdom of God. The same must also apply to the Jews, or we must admit that in their opinion, the Jews who observed the Mosaic Law would have some preeminence in the kingdom of the Messiah. But of such an opinion we find no trace. On both sides there was an acknowledgment of equal Messianic rights to believing Jews and Gentiles. Nothing, therefore, prevented the union of both in one body. Either they followed in their practice such principles as they had developed into clear consciousness, or they followed the pressure of history, guided by the Holy Spirit, without being clearly conscious of the principles which formed the rational ground of their conduct. In the first case they followed the principles which Paul expressed when he said, 'that to the Jews he became a Jew,' (1 Cor. ix. 20,) in order to gain the Jews to the Gospel; or, 'Let every man, wherein he is called, therein abide with God.' (1 Cor. vii. 24.) Two principles form the basis of these words; first, that a man without giving up anything of his inward freedom must accommodate himself outwardly to the stand-point of the Jews, in order to gain them so much more easily to the faith; and secondly, that no one should withdraw arbitrarily from the stand-point on which he has been placed by historical development. Whoever had embraced the Christian faith, being a member of the Jewish people, was required to make no external alteration, but might expect that by the power of the new Christian spirit everything would be transformed by an internal change, or by the great developments in the world's history,—such, for

instance, as the destruction of Jerusalem,—the judgment on the corrupt Theocracy, the dissolution of outward Judaism, would be brought about. But in the second place, it was admitted that many who felt themselves compelled to acknowledge the operations of the Holy Spirit among the Gentiles, as shown in their agreeing in the fundamental position of the alone justifying power of faith—still, without giving themselves a clear account of the reason, could not resolve to give up the outward Judaism, from which the whole of their religious development had proceeded; for in religion, to put away the outward, which has grown up intertwined with so many devotional feelings, is always a most difficult task; and this was more especially the case in the relation of Christianity to Judaism, since in the latter so many things might be spiritualised in the Christian. Thus a James might find it very difficult to resolve to renounce altogether the outward observances of Judaism. It was otherwise, as appears from what we have already said, with the apostle Peter. At all events, we can find in the conduct of the elder apostles nothing of indecision or inconsequence—nothing implying a claim, that when they acknowledged that the Gospel without the Law was designed for Gentiles as well as for Jews, they felt compelled to take a part in preaching the Gospel among the Gentiles on a contrary principle. There was evidently nothing of the kind. It argued no inconsistency that they considered *that* alone as a call from God, indicated by historical development, to form a transition-point to the Gospel for the Jews; just as Paul regarded it as *his* vocation, indicated by his peculiar religious development, to be the apostle of the Gentiles. Not in these principles lay an indecision and inconsequence, which would have punished themselves by their consequences, and brought on those later dissensions between the Jewish and Gentile Christians. It was the fault of men that the views of the guiding wisdom of the apostles could not be accomplished, since so many knew not how to enter into these principles and the spirit which had suggested them. Well-intended plans of conciliation seldom attain their end among conflicting contrarieties.

"The most important points, accordingly, were first of all discussed between Paul, James, Peter, and John. Then, in particular circles, Paul and Barnabas narrated what God had

effected by their preaching among the Gentiles, and their accounts were received with friendly sympathy."

P. 116, l. 16, "Titus," (note.) It appears from Paul's own representation, he had no share in any part of this proceeding; for he distinguishes expressly (Gal. ii. 4—6) the false brethren from the δοκοῦντες εἶναί τι. By the name of false brethren, certainly those persons were designated who did not acknowledge the believing Gentiles as true brethren in the faith, and did not admit the principle on which the Christian community was founded, that faith in Jesus as the Messiah is the only and sufficient means of salvation for all. Paul was one with the apostles in opposition to these views. But it may be asked whether that dispute broke out before or after the explanation between Paul and the elder apostles. The former is far more probable; for as that explanation was for him the principal object of his journey to Jerusalem, he would attend to it before anything else.

P. 119, note 2, after the last line, *add*, "In this new edition I must adhere to this explanation, and cannot agree with that recommended by Dr. Baur after Gieseler—namely, that these words contain a reason for the leading thought that the Gentiles, by faith in Jesus Christ as the Messiah, must be also incorporated in the kingdom of God; for if this could have been effected by the Mosaic Law, it must long ago have been brought to pass, since the Mosaic Law must have been sufficiently known to them, as it was read every Sabbath in the synagogues. I cannot find this sense indicated in the words. Had this been intended, I should have expected an addition to v. 21, "in every city in which Gentiles dwell," and yet this would have said too much. And the leading thought—"and yet this has not effected the conversion of the Gentiles"—must have been actually expressed. We should consider ourselves quite unauthorized, arbitrarily to supply so important a proposition. According to my view, only something unessential is supplied in a proposition which the speaker merely expresses incidentally, and then hastens away from it."

P. 121, l. 10 from bottom, *for* "principles" *read* "motives."

P. 122, l. 16, *for* "principles" *read* "motives."

P. 128, l. 6 from bottom, *after* "prefigured," ***add,*** **"the reconciliation of man with God."**

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P. 131, *after* "1 Cor. xiii." *add*, "Which Schleiermacher also acknowledges in his work on Christian Morals, p. 308. Yet we cannot perfectly agree with him when he asserts that the predominant Christian idea for everything which can be called virtue in the higher sense of the word, is χάρισμα. Inasmuch, indeed, as along with the Christian disposition all the virtues belonging to the essence of its practical exemplification in life are not given at once—inasmuch as its development is gradual, and hence it may follow, that in the unity of the same disposition, one virtue may predominate in one person, and another in another, the name Charisma may be applied to it. Yet this difference is found to exist; for the full soundness of the Christian life in every man, and for the good success of every labour for the kingdom of God, the cooperations of all the fundamental or cardinal virtues is required; but the same cannot be said of all the peculiar capabilities which are marked by the name of Charisma, lying outside the department of morals, although appropriated by it. In this respect it cannot be laid down at once as a requirement, that they should all be connected with one another in every individual. Rather is this excluded by the idea of individuality. Peculiar charisms belong to every one, which do not exist in others; and this indicates the need of individuals having their deficiencies made up by others, like the collective members of one body; to the soundness of the body belongs the connecting organism of all the charisms proceeding from the appropriation of the collective life of humanity by the divine life of Christianity."

P. 132, l. 14 from bottom, *after* "itself" *add*, "But as to all Christian truths, as far as they proceed from the connexion of the sphere of the new higher life which the Holy Spirit alone can disclose, is given the name of mysteries."

P. 138, l. 2 from bottom, *add*, "We see how already in these peculiar modes in which the Divine Spirit who animated the church operated, in these original charisms, the various activities belonging to the perfect development of the reason, which would afterwards be animated by Christianity, are foreshadowed, such as the exposition of what is written or spoken by others, and criticism.

"In the charism of διδασκαλία itself, we find again a difference in reference to the λόγος γνώσεως and the λόγος

σοφίας. It is evident, from the manner in which they are mentioned separately (1 Cor. xii. 8), that there is a certain distinction between them, but it is difficult to ascertain what it is precisely. Elsewhere the word γνῶσις denotes the theoretical in distinction from the practical, and refers to the intellectual development of Christian truth. Thus the Corinthians boasted of their gnosis, because they had learned many conclusions deduced from Christian truth which had not yet become clear to others who were too much entangled in their former stand-point. And Paul does not deny that they were before many in point of knowledge; only he missed in them that humility and love, without which all knowledge in reference to divine things is worthless. He joins together in 1 Cor. xiii. 2, "understanding all mysteries and having all knowledge." But the idea of σοφία might seem to be referrible to the intellect. Aristotle makes the distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις, that the former refers to the eternal and divine, but the latter to the useful for man. But the contrast here made by that great teacher, closely depends, with his whole mode of contemplation, on the relation of the Divine to the human, and on the boundaries of morals. In common language, certainly the distinction between the ideas σο[redacted] and φρόνιμος often vanishes, and the former term is used to designate any knowledge or skill in the department of practice.

"In the First Epistle to the Corinthians Paul distinguishes by the name of "the wisdom of the perfect" a more profound development of Christian truth, by means of which it is shown that what natural reason represents as foolishness, contains in it inexhaustible treasures of wisdom. But the same Paul also uses the word σοφία in cases which relate altogether to the practical, and where it corresponds rather to prudence. Both senses meet in the idea of Christian wisdom, of which we shall speak in the chapter on doctrine.

"If we revert to the peculiar idea of wisdom, and endeavour to investigate what Paul designates "the wisdom of the perfect," shall we not obtain an accommodation between the theoretical and the practical, by which σοφία is distinguished from γνῶσις? The idea of wisdom bespeaks an object-forming activity of the mind, and hence refers to those acts by which the ideas originating within are brought forth into

outward visibility. As, according to Paul, the highest object of creation in reference to this world can only be attained by the redemption of mankind, so the Divine wisdom reveals itself especially in the manner in which this is effected, and the various generations of men are brought to a participation in redemption, by the various stages in the course of development under the Divine guidance which brings all things to the same end. (Rom. xi. 33 ; Eph. iii. 10.) Thus the wisdom of the perfect has for its functions and object, to produce the conviction that in the relation which the development of humanity bears to the appearance of Christ, and to the redemption accomplished through his sufferings, the Divine wisdom reveals itself, and hence that preaching which appears as foolishness to those who are without the pale of Christianity, gives the most abundant disclosures of the Divine wisdom—and that in the unveiling of that hidden design of redemption all the treasures of wisdom are contained. With this idea what is represented in the Epistle to the Hebrews as the doctrine of perfection, may be placed in connexion. And thus the λόγος σοφίας may be applied to a special department of knowledge distinguished from the general idea of gnosis. But the wisdom that guides human life and determines human action must form itself according to the doctrine of Divine wisdom ; the new mode of treating all the relations of life proceeds from that which 'the wisdom of the perfect' teaches us to recognise as the central point for the whole moral formation of life ; so therefore, the ethical element, the more practical, in distinction from the more theoretical gnosis, would here find its point of connexion."

P. 162, l. 33, note, *for* "longing for," *read* "attaining."

P. 163, l. 16, "Hades," *add* note, "See *the Shepherd of Hermas*, iii. ch. 15. Fabricii cod. Apocryph. p. iii. p. 1009. [lib. iii. simil. ix. p. 428, ed. Hefele. Tub. 1847. κατέβησαν οὖν μετ' αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ, καὶ πάλιν ἀνέβησαν.]"

P. 164, l. 15, *after* "weight," *begin a new paragraph thus* :—"Even if in 1 Cor. xv. 29, a substitutionary baptism for the dead is intended, as indeed appears to be the most natural interpretation, yet this could not be made use of, by way of analogy, to support the existence of infant-baptism. For if the interpretation alluded to be correct, yet we cannot so understand it, as if the Christians imagined that their

deceased relatives who died in unbelief could be benefited by a substitutionary baptism; for according to this supposition, Christians need not care so much for converting the living as for baptizing [or baptizing for] the dead. And certainly Paul would not have used, even as a mere *argumentum ad hominem*, a superstition carried so far beyond all bounds. He could not even have mentioned a superstition productive of such a distortion of Christianity without strong expressions of his disapprobation. We must rather form such a conception as the following of the state of the case. It seems that at that time, in Corinth, an epidemic had been raging which in many instances had terminated fatally. When those who had already believed were taken away by death before they could receive baptism, as they otherwise would have done, their relations were baptized in their stead, since they knew that they could themselves submit to baptism, and avow Christian conviction in the name, and according to the intention of the deceased. But then, faith, as the necessary condition of baptism, was presupposed to exist in these persons in whose stead they allowed themselves to be baptized. Paul might indeed for the occasion have borrowed an argument from the conviction lying at the basis of such a custom; but he would probably have taken care to explain himself, at another opportunity, against this custom itself, as he did in reference to females speaking in their public assemblies.

"If the alteration in the conception of baptism, in the confounding of baptism and regeneration, had already at an early period spread widely, we should so much more expect the early introduction of infant-baptism, which might so easily proceed from such an alteration. If this were not the case, we might well conclude, that other powerful causes counter-worked the influence of such an alteration—in part, another important point in the conception of baptism derived from the Apostolic times—in part, the not yet supplanted consciousness of the non-apostolic institution of infant-baptism."

P. 171, l. 14, *after* "Jews," *add the following paragraph*:—"It has been asserted by Dr. Baur, that such conduct would have been a contradiction of Paul's principles, and therefore this account is unhistorical, and that such a fabrication owes its origin to the pretended conciliatory attempts of the author

of the Acts. But we can see no proofs whatever of this contradiction. The same Paul who so strenuously opposed the circumcising of Titus, because it would have appeared a practical confirmation of the principle that a participation in all the privileges of the kingdom of God depended on circumcision—this same Paul could yet allow Timothy, the son of a Jewess, and brought up in Judaism, to be circumcised, in order thereby to procure an easier entrance for him among the Jews; and since here circumcision was founded on descent, it could not be made use of to justify a dogmatic conclusion, as might have been the case with the circumcision of a Gentile. And with respect to this method of Paul's acting generally, which is often ascribed to him in the Acts—that among the Jews he observed Jewish practices, and lived altogether as a Jew; we believe in this respect, as well as in others, it can be shown that what the Apostle himself asserts in his Epistles concerning his conduct, leads us to presuppose examples of such a kind as are recorded in the Acts. What are we to understand, when Paul says in 1 Cor. ix. 20, that 'to the Jews he became a Jew in order to gain the Jews—to them that are under the law, as under the law, that he might gain them that are under the law?' Must we not from such words conclude, that he, without prejudice to his inward freedom from the Law, believed that in the outward observance of it he could place himself on a level with the Jews—that he felt himself compelled so to act in order to pave the way more easily to the hearts of the Jews, whom he wished to gain over to the Gospel? Are they not exactly such acts which gave his Jewish adversaries the opportunity to set his conduct in a false light before the Gentiles, and to accuse him of inconsistency? Certainly, from what we find in the Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians, we shall be obliged to assume that he acted exactly as we are told was the case, in the Acts of the Apostles. We make these remarks here once for all, in order not to return again to this ground of suspicion against the Acts."

P. 174, l. 14, *for* "Jews" *read* "Gentiles."

P. 175, l. 7, *after* "Macedonia" *add*, "If we admit that Luke speaks in his own name in Acts xvi. 10, it would follow that Paul first met with him again at Troas, and received him into the company of his missionary associates. His

medical skill might be very useful to gain an opening for publishing the Gospel among the Gentiles, as we now find it in modern missions to the heathen. Even the gift of healing would not render this useless; since that gift was applicable only in particular cases where its possessors were prompted to employ it by an immediate Divine impulse, or a feeling excited in their minds. But the case will be different, if we admit that the account in chap. xvi. 10, was taken unaltered from the journal of Timothy, and therefore he is the speaker who describes himself as one of Paul's companions in the publication of the Gospel."

P. 175, l. 5 from bottom, *for* "Literalee" *read* "litorales."

P. 176, l. 12, "somnambulism," (note.) Even if we were not in a position to understand sufficiently the incident here narrated from the representation given in the Acts, yet this could not justify us in regarding it with Baur as a designed fabrication, with which everything else in the character of this book is at variance. Do we not find in history many an enigmatical appearance which yet gives us no right to call in question the truth of a narrative? We see no reason in all that Baur says, that can induce us to surrender our view of the matter. We recognise the same principle acting in this prophetess as in the μαντικὴ of the ancients, and in their oracles, in which certainly not everything can be accounted for as a deception. That from our well-established stand-point, which is neither that of crude supernaturalism, nor that of Dr. Baur's rationalism, we are fully justified in distinguishing between the objective and the subjective in the account, we need not point out after the foregoing investigations.

P. 176, last line, note 3, *add*, "In contradiction to Baur's interpretation of my words, I must remark, that I have made this comparison by no means in reference to the effects resulting from a conversion—that I by no means assumed that the female in question, by her conversion, *had* lost the capability of putting herself into such a condition; but my only point of comparison was this, that, generally, that capability *might* be lost."

P. 177, last line, note 1, *add*, "What Dr. Baur has said against the view I have taken of this transaction, may appear well-founded from the stand-point of his arbitrary *aut-aut*,

which is very convenient to his whole party for the contradiction of what will not suit their presuppositions, but will be at once dismissed by those who take the trouble to enter into the connexion of the idea presented to them."

P. 178, last line of text, "depart," (note.) According to Baur, p. 152, the person who fabricated this narrative in order to exalt the Apostle Paul above Peter, wished it to be understood, that only the impression of the earthquake as a supernatural evidence of the innocence of the prisoners had induced the Duumvirs so to act, which would certainly be an internal mark of improbability. But verily, whoever made it his business so to magnify his heroes, and to set everything in the light of the wonderful, would not have expressed himself so vaguely that a reader would only guess at such a connexion, but would have set the point of view in which the transaction was to be regarded, straight before his readers.

But when Baur, in reference to our filling up of the connexion, thinks that so important a circumstance could not possibly be passed over by a faithful historian, we shall certainly grant that he would have given such an explanation if he had been a pragmatical narrator, and had placed himself altogether on the stand-point of his readers, and had made a point of telling them all they wished to know. But this is not the case; the narrator's only concern was what the Duumvirs did, not the reasons which induced them so to act.

P. 185, l. 5, *for* "those" *read* "that."

P. 185, l. 8, "laws," *add* note, "Baur imagines (p. 482) that he has detected something unhistorical in Acts xvii. 6. 'How could it be said of Paul and his companions, since it was for the first time that they had visited these parts, that they had thrown the whole *οἰκουμένη* into confusion?' But is it not natural, that impassioned accusers, who wished to make the most of the object that roused their enmity, should use the language of exaggeration? 'What a long time intervened before Christianity appeared so politically dangerous to the Romans as is implied in the words *ἀπένδοτα*,' &c. Certainly it was a long interval before Christianity appeared as a religion dangerous to the state in the sense in which it was so esteemed in the second century. But it was something quite different when the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah was so misrepresented, as if a worldly kingdom was

intended, and as if another ruler was to be set up against the Roman Emperor. Such an accusation had already been made against Jesus himself, and in the first age of Christianity no other would be found. At a later period, quite different accusations were brought against the Christians from the stand-point of the Roman civil law."

P. 188, l. 15, *for* "this" *read* "their."

P. 188, l. 22, *after* "superstition" *add*, "What the Athenians alleged, in order to throw ridicule on the new religion announced by Paul, shows plainly what he made the chief topic of his addresses, and by what method he handled it. He did not begin with the Old Testament, as if he had been instructing Jews, nor represent Jesus as the Messiah spoken of by the prophets. Hence his hearers were very far from seeing in him an advocate of the Jewish religion. He testified of Jesus as the Saviour of all men, accredited by God, and of his reappearance after being raised from the dead to an existence raised above all death, as a pledge of the same eternal life for all who were willing to accept the offered salvation. This was doctrine adapted to the religious wants of all. The Athenians confined their attention to what the apostle constantly declared to them of Jesus and the resurrection, without troubling themselves about the consequences involved."[1]

P. 192, note 1, l. 18 from bottom, *after* "particular nation" *add*, "The stand-point of the ancients for contemplating the world, wanted the idea of a unity of mankind, not only as to their origin, but also as to their peculiar nature and the end of their development. There was wanting generally the unitive and teleological point of view which Christianity first brought to light. While every thing, in a certain sense, points to a beginning, from which the development of the existing race has proceeded, men have fancied themselves in a circular course, without an end between the dissolution of the ancient race and the beginning of the new, an alternation of passing away and becoming; *vide* Plato's Timæus, vol. ix.

[1] When Baur regards this whole narrative taken from the life, only as a fabrication made with reflective design, I need only, without wearying myself and intelligent readers with a refutation of particulars, since the same game is constantly repeated, appeal to what I have already said against this whole method, which makes a subjective pragmatism out of an objective one.

ed. Bip. p. 291. Politicus, vol. vi. p. 32. Aristotle, Metaphys. l. xii. c. 8. vol. ii. ed. Bekker, p. 1074. Polyb. Hist. l. vi. c. 5. § 5, 6."

P. 194, l. 18, *after* "again" *add*, "But this result cannot be regarded as any impeachment of the wisdom of the speaker. He could only do his part to prepare his hearers for the new truths he wished to communicate, and, as much as possible, to obtain a favourable hearing. But after all, he could not help giving offence to those who were too much attached to their Hellenic point of view, to admit of a receptivity for anything higher. This could in no way be avoided, or he need not have published the Gospel at all."

P. 194, last line note 4, *add*, "According to some, the name of this Dionysius gave occasion to the whole fabrication of the appearance of Paul on the Areopagus; we recognise in such an opinion the same strange, topsy-turvy criticism, which, instead of finding in the Montanist Paraclete a reference to St. John's, would rather find a reference to the Montanist Paraclete in the Gospel of John, as a later piece of patchwork!"

P. 198, l. 11 from bottom, *after* "kind" *add*, "This view I must even now, in the fourth edition, maintain in opposition to Dr. Baur, (p. 371.) I must still assert that the disputes which broke out in the Jewish assemblies, whether Jesus was the Messiah, could not attract the attention of the Roman authorities, and that their banishment affected not Jews and Christians, but only Jews as Jews."

P. 202, l. 8 "immortality," *add* note, "The passages in the First Epistle to the Thessalonians that relate to the expectation of Christ's second *παρουσία* have altogether the impress of this first age, looking forward with intense longing to his speedy return. Only in this first period could such exhibitions of enthusiastic excitement, as were actually witnessed in the church at Thessalonica, in connexion with this expectation, make their appearance. Only then could such an apprehension arise, that those who were "asleep" (1 Thess. iv. 13) would be so far inferior to those still living of that generation who would be witnesses of Christ's second advent. Whoever, at a later period, would have wished to write such an epistle under Paul's name, would certainly not have encouraged the expectation of Christ's advent being so near—an expectation which would have already been cor-

rected by the intervening period. Rather would such a person have had a special interest to admonish them, not to expect this advent too soon, that they might not be mistaken if it were postponed to a later period. The manner in which the second advent of Christ is spoken of in this epistle, instead of being, as Baur imagines, a mark of its spuriousness, is rather the surest and most palpable proof that this epistle could have been written at no other period."

P. 203, l. 4, "imparted to them," *add* note, "All this must certainly give the impression of a person who writes from the fresh lively recollection of his own recent experiences; and not the impression of a designed recapitulation of the Acts, and an imitation of the Pauline epistles, a mark of spuriousness which Baur is disposed to find, p. 481."

P. 203, l. 14, "with confidence," *add* note, "What Baur says against the genuineness of the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, which bears on the face of it so decidedly a Pauline impress, shows us how hard it is to satisfy these modern critics. If similar expressions to those in the other Pauline epistles occur, they must be borrowed from them. On the contrary, if there are turns of expression which do not occur in the other Pauline epistles—this is an indubitable sign of an un-Pauline origin. But one should suppose that precisely the conjunction of what is allied to the Pauline epistles, with other things which are not elsewhere found just so expressed in Paul, provided there be nothing evidently at variance with the Pauline characteristics, would be rather an evidence of genuineness; for, an individual who had the Pauline epistles before him, and wished to write another after them in Paul's name, would have shown himself more as a slavish imitator. Baur would find something thoroughly un-Pauline in the circumstance that the churches in Judea are presented as a pattern to the Gentile Christians; especially he could not speak of those persecutions without referring to himself as a chief partaker in the only ones which could here be taken into consideration. So moreover, that extreme general hostile tone towards the Jews, which alludes to the *odium generis humani* cast upon the Jews, appears to him altogether un-Pauline. But if this had been interpolated by another person, it would be difficult to reconcile his being so hostilely disposed towards the Jews with his pointing out

the churches in Judea as patterns for imitation. Only in a spirit so original and unfettered as Paul's could both meet together. Now, the persecutions which the Christians in Judea had suffered at various times, and of which he might have been in part an eye-witness on his first visit to Jerusalem after his conversion, were in his fresh and lively recollection. In this view he could name no Gentile church as an object of imitation. How natural that he should here name the parent church, since he was always animated with the conviction that believing Jews and Gentiles ought always to be bound together in one Christian community! The recollection that at an earlier period he had been so violent a persecutor of the Christians, could least of all prevent his so expressing himself, for, as he says, he had since been made a new creature, and all things had become new. Nor do I know how Paul could have delineated more strikingly than in that manner, the ungodliness, the inhumanity, and the envy of the Jews towards the Gentiles, of which in his last missionary journey he had such frequent experience. The passage where he represents the believers among the Gentiles as imitators of the primitive church in Judea, was a natural occasion for mentioning that the same Jews had killed Jesus and the prophets, and had everywhere persecuted himself as a witness of the Christian truth by which the Gentiles also would partake of salvation. In the accidentally chosen expression *ἐκδιωξάντων* may be traced the fresh recollection how he had been driven out from the cities where he preached the Gospel, through the influence of the Jews who had instigated the Gentiles. At a later period, when Paul was brought more into collision with Jewish Christians than with Jews simply, he had less occasion for so expressing himself. Criticism ought not merely to consider the Pauline epistles as a whole, but study them chronologically, and carefully distinguish the various stages of Paul's literary activity. In reference to peculiarities of style, turns of thought, and dogmatic development, a difference will here indeed be perceptible, and it will be seen that the Epistles to the Thessalonians have exactly those characteristics which belong to the first stage, while his other epistles of which the genuineness has been disputed, have on the contrary the characteristic peculiarities of the last stage."

P. 203, l. 14, *after* "with confidence" *add*, "As this epistle contained so many peculiarly important lessons, exhortations, and warnings for different members of the church, Paul must have been earnestly desirous that it should be read by all. Whether he wished it to be read before all at their public meetings, or that all should have an opportunity of reading it privately, cannot be determined precisely from the words in ch. v. 27." (Note.) "This wish appears perfectly natural on the first occasion of writing to them, as in every letter which is intended to meet the wants of many members in a community, and I do not see in it the marks of an importance attributed to letter-writing not suitable to the times, nor with what propriety Baur could say that 'this must have been written according to the views of an age which did not see in the letters of the apostle the natural medium of mental intercourse, but a sanctuary to be approached with all due reverence, so that their contents were to be known as accurately as possible, particularly by means of public reading,' &c. This is indeed 'not seeing the wood on account of the trees!' How naturally the words in ch. v. 27, are connected with the preceding request 'to greet all the brethren!'"

P. 204, l. 6 from bottom, *after* "this opinion" *add*, "I cannot perceive the justness of Baur's remark, p. 49, 'How could Paul rationally attach any weight to such a criterion of the genuineness of his epistle, which as soon as it was once known to be such, would be used so much the more for the purposes of forgery?' Paul's Greek writing was probably not so easy to be imitated. Also in the words *πάσῃ ἐπιστολῇ* (iii. 17) I cannot find, with Baur, a mark of spuriousness. It by no means follows, that the author had falsely indicated Paul's custom to add something in his own handwriting to his epistles. If Paul had otherwise added such closing words in autograph in order to testify his love to the church, yet he might have been induced by the peculiar circumstances of this church to make use of this for another purpose as a criterion of its being his genuine epistle. Or he might first of all have been induced with this view to make such a closing addition, and afterwards, when this view had been lost sight of, still on other accounts to have retained the practice. But he must have foreseen that he would have occasion to write several other letters to the churches. We are not at all

justified in asserting that the greatest part of Paul's correspondence has been handed down to us."

P. 204, l. 21, "principles and opinions," *add*, "That something of this kind happened so early in the church at Thessalonica, while on the other hand we find no trace of it in the later epistles of Paul, is explained by the peculiar circumstances of that church, the excited state of its members, that one-sidedness of the Christian spirit which directed its attention only to the future, that limitation of mental vision which did not equally take in the whole of Christianity, but gazed alone on the second advent. Such a one-sided religious interest would easily be seduced to call all means good which would gratify its indulgence. In later times Paul had far more to do with adversaries who disputed his apostolic authority than with false friends who sought to avail themselves of it for their own ends. His later false adherents were more sober, and free from the enthusiastic tendency of the Thessalonians. Thus everything is explained by a perfectly consistent and genuine historical impress, bearing marks of the peculiar circumstances of this church. What purpose would it serve of the author of a forged epistle to warn them of other epistles also forged in Paul's name?"

P. 205, l. 28, "to the very last," (note.) In the marks of this last epoch which are specially noticed in this Epistle, we find proofs of their proceeding from this division of the apostolic age, rather than a later period. At a later period, the specification of heresies as omens of the approach of Antichrist would certainly not have been wanting.

P. 207, l. 10 from bottom, "temple at Jerusalem," *add* note, "If it had been of so much importance to the author of the Acts for his apologetical or conciliatory purpose, as Baur maintains, to notice Paul's journeys to the feasts at Jerusalem, why should he allude so slightly to the journey of which we are here speaking, (xviii. 18, 22,) so that it has given occasion to moot the question, whether he actually visited Jerusalem at that time? Here, certainly, nothing less is shown than such a purpose. Baur assumes, (p. 194,) that the words which are favourable to his opinion (xviii. 21.) are decidedly genuine, though, to say the least, they are very suspicious. But these words, even admitting them to be genuine, by no means testify such a purpose

in the Acts, and contain nothing irreconcilable with the Pauline stand-point; for all turns upon this point, *how* the necessity he speaks of is to be understood? and of this nothing more is said."

P. 2. 6, l. 10 from bottom, "imagination," *add* note, "See an example in Josephus, how by such operations the Roman army of the Emperor Vespasian were filled with amazement.—*Antiq.* viii. 2."

P. 217, l. 21, "John the Baptist," *add* note, "The appearance of these disciples of John at Ephesus bears the impress of historical truth, whether we regard the account itself, or compare it with what we know from other sources to have been the position of John and his disciples in reference to the various tendencies of the age. The obscurity that attaches to the narrative of these disciples cannot be taken as a mark of the unhistorical; it belongs rather to the peculiarities of that uncertain transitional stage which had been formed from a mixture of impressions respecting John the Baptist, with the scattered accounts received of Christ. No man can form an image expressed in clear and well-defined lineaments, out of a misty, indistinct appearance. The deficiency is not to be attributed to the historian, but is owing to the peculiar character of historical development at such a period. Instead of our being able to detect an imaginative subjective element, an artistic attempt at historical composition, in this representation, we find, on the contrary, nothing more than the raw material of facts, and miss entirely the historic art of genetic pragmatism. But criticism after the newest fashion professes to have discovered a trickery here which will account for everything. The historical basis is only this, that Apollos, who had been converted to Christianity from the school of the Alexandrine Jews, in consequence of his Alexandrian education had already acquired a more liberal conception of Christianity. He had occupied a solitary, isolated position between the Paulinians and the Judaizers, until by means of Aquila and Priscilla he had become better acquainted with the Paulinian doctrine, and had been induced to connect himself with the Paulinian party. Such was the origin of the fiction which made Apollos one of John's disciples, who was first instructed in Christianity by Aquila and Priscilla. This would not have

happened, if the author of the Acts had not required the disciples of John for his machinery. For Paul, as well as Peter, was to acquire distinction from the fact, that by the magical effect of the imposition of his hands on persons of a different religious stand-point, on passing over to Christianity they would be made partakers of pretended higher spiritual gifts. This had already taken place among Jews, Samaritans, and Gentiles; only the disciples of John were left, and these also must serve as a foil, in order that the same fabrication which at an earlier period had procured such honour for Peter in the family of Cornelius, might now glorify Paul among John's disciples as a counterpart to him, and who was not to be regarded as his inferior. Whoever can satisfy himself with this unnatural tissue of plan-making so very contradictory to the impression which such a book must make upon every unperverted mind—he is welcome to do so!"

P. 218, l. 20, "inspiration," *add* note, "Whoever is capable of transporting himself into the apostolic age, will assuredly not fail to perceive the historical impress in this narrative, and will not attempt with Baur to regard the προφητεύειν and γλώσσαις λαλεῖν as merely mythical designations of mental communication through Christianity. The phenomena of the higher life are wont to wear peculiar marks in different ages. Thus the phenomena of whose qualities we have already spoken belong to the peculiar marks of the inspiration proceeding from the new divine life when it took possession of men's souls. There are not wanting analogies in history of general religious awakenings or "*revivals*," though we need not, therefore, mistake the difference in reference to the greater or less purity in the development of the divine life. We are also by no means induced to attribute a magical effect to baptism or the laying on of hands, but we must only regard both as individual points in the connexion of the whole, as combined with the whole preceding spiritual operation on the minds of the disciples of John. Have we not then, here, perfectly definite historical marks which exclude everything mythical? Does not the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians refer to such phenomena which everywhere accompanied the development of the Christian life? Does not Paul appeal to such operations of the Pneuma among the Galatian churches (Gal. iii.

2, 5.) which distinguished the new creation of faith from the old legal stand-point, and does he not recount, moreover, the δυνάμεις which were efficacious among the Galatians? We well know, indeed, that the communication of the Spirit contains more than this in itself, but still these marks are not exclude'. Those phenomena, so far from belonging to the department of the mythical, rather necessarily belong to the historical image of this memorable age."

P. 225, l. 10, *after* "disposed" *add* "to boast."

P. 229, l. 8, *for* "and it presented" *read* "and presented."

P. 234, l. 11 from bottom, *after* "among the Jews" *add*, "Some persons might easily be induced to find in 1 Cor. x. 7, a confirmation of that view of the Christ-party. But however they might be led by the similarity of the expression to refer this passage to the Christ-party and to make use of it according to this supposition, yet we must dispute the correctness of such an application; for evidently the reference here is not to a party like those who are named in 1 Cor. i. 12, but only to the leaders of a certain clique who maintained that they stood as preachers of the Gospel in a special relation to Christ, and wished to take the precedence of Paul; those judaizing party-leaders who by their obtrusive urgency and intermeddling believed they could acquire greater reputation than the apostle for activity in the cause of the Gospel. But if such men boasted personally of their special connexion with Christ, it by no means followed that a party attaching itself to them might feel justified in transferring to itself collectively what they claimed for themselves as individuals."

P. 242, l. 13, *after* "1 Cor. xv. 33" *add*, "If this view be thought too venturesome, since in the two Epistles to the Corinthians no other distinct trace of a direct combating with such a party can be found, it only remains to be said, that there were certain persons οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ of whom Paul, knew nothing worse than that, instead of making common cause with all those whom they ought to have acknowledged as members of the one body of Christ, made even their wishing to belong to Christ alone an affair of party, and so instead of putting an end to all party feeling by a reference to Christ, created a fourth party, which by its opposition to the other parties would be hurried unavoidably into much that

was one-sided and erroneous. We should find the first appearance of this kind in the fact, that the wishing to join themselves to no party was made an affair of party. And thus by the reference to such a party, Paul might be induced to say,—Was Christ divided? that they could think of calling themselves alone after Christ, and dare appropriate to themselves a name that belonged to all. In this way a better explanation would be obtained, how it is that no further distinct reference to such a party occurs in his epistles."

P. 247, l. 19, "object," *add*, "As Christianity taught men to acknowledge that the realization of the kingdom of God in humanity was its highest office, that it was the highest good to which everything else was to be referred; so also it allowed marriage and the family constitution to be regarded as something on the whole belonging to the moral problem of humanity and to the representation of the kingdom of God; but it also acknowledged cases, in virtue of a disposition that subordinated all other things to the kingdom of God, in which the individual moral problem of a life devoted to spreading the kingdom of God might involve an exception to the general problem, which is denoted by *εὐνουχισμὸς διὰ τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν* (Matt. xix. 12)."

P. 248, l. 20, "higher life," *add* note, "Gal. iii. 28, *οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. On the contrary, Aristotle says; *Χεῖρον ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς*, Magn. Ethic. i. 34, ed. Bekker, p. 194."

P. 252, l. 12 from bottom, *for* "distinction" *read* "destination."

P. 261, l. 13, *after* "perfection" *read*, "But in order rightly to understand what he says on this subject in connexion with this period of the development of God's kingdom and with Paul's peculiar stand-point, and to form a correct judgment according to the laws of Christian ethics, we must attend to the following considerations. The soul of Paul was animated to an extraordinary degree with a glowing desire to carry to all men quickly the message of salvation. His single life, which allowed him to extend his ministry in all directions without delay and to gain his own livelihood without any hindrance, was an important means for the execution of his plans. It constituted, in fact, an *εὐνουχισμὸς*

διὰ τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, which the Lord had evidently designed for him. As he was withheld by nothing in the publication of the Gospel, but lived wholly for the cause of the Lord, it appeared to him the happiest condition; and looking at it from the stand-point of his own peculiar endowments and vocation, he wished that all men could share this glorious and happy life dedicated to the Lord. In addition to this, he had not yet found realized his idea of Christian wedlock in which man and wife are both dedicated to the Lord alone, and are joined together in a life animated and sanctified by the Spirit of the Lord. From this proceeded what he says of the obstacles presented by the married state for fulfilling the duties of the Christian life. He has evidently in his eye not an union, such as would correspond to the idea represented by himself in this epistle and in the Epistle to the Ephesians, in which both parties were as one in fellowship with the Lord and viewed and treated everything in the light of this fellowship, but of a divided state of the soul between a regard to the Lord on the one hand, and to the world and the wedded associate on the other. And thus what he says of the injurious effects of marriage is derived from its want of correspondence to the Christian idea of marriage. And he might so much the less think of the extension of the kingdom of God by the natural propagation of the human race, since he expected the second advent and the end of the world as events near at hand,—a view of things necessarily arising from the first stage of the development of God's kingdom. But if he was disposed on this side to recommend a single life, it only makes his pastoral wisdom and consideration more remarkable in deeming it needful to limit this recommendation, and in warning against the injurious effects of a forced celibacy not aided by peculiar endowments, amidst the threatening contagion of moral corruption in such a church as the Corinthian. He placed

the essence," &c.

P. 262, l. 12, *for* "relation" *read* "relations."

P. 263, l. 21 from bottom, *after* "slave" *add*, "Moreover, χρῆσθαι τῇ δουλείᾳ would be a very singular mode of expression, since the apostle might have said much more simply, 'Remain a slave.' But the expression μᾶλλον χρῆσαι might be very well used when speaking of an opportunity of obtaining

freedom; and if Paul wished to say that in case any one could obtain his freedom he should remain a slave, he would have suggested a more appropriate reason, for in what he does say we find absolutely nothing that can serve as a confirmation of it. The fact that the slave as a Christian shares true freedom with his fellow-Christians, and that he who is free partakes in this bond-service of Christ with the slave who is a Christian, contains no reason why a slave, when his freedom is offered him, should not accept it. Nor can this be inferred from v. 20, for in that nothing more is said than that no one should arbitrarily withdraw from the relations of life in which he finds himself; but it does not follow from this that when an opportunity is presented by God of entering into more favourable earthly relations, a man is not to embrace it. Such an exhortation, without any further confirmation of it, would be only an arbitrary dictation on Paul's part. But if he said, 'Whoever can be free, let him avail himself of the opportunity,' there was no occasion to support it by any further reason. He only guarded himself against a misapprehension which might have arisen from too broad an application of the principle he had laid down."

P. 266, l. 1, *after* "made" *add*, "But it is striking that in the Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians we can find no intimation that Timothy had visited them in the interval,—nothing that relates to the manner in which he was received by the church. This may be explained in two ways; each has its difficulties, and we do not believe that complete certainty can be arrived at.

"It might have happened that Timothy had been prevented from coming to Corinth, and then Paul would be induced, as Timothy had returned to him without any news from the Corinthian church, before his departure from Ephesus, to send Titus to Corinth that he might operate on the minds of the converts there in a manner suitable to the impression made by his epistle, and bring back news of the state of things among them. We must then assume that he sent no fresh letter by this new messenger, or at least only sent with him a few lines as his credentials, since, having written so full a letter to the Corinthian church before, he thought it unnecessary on the present occasion. In this way it can be

explained that we find in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians no hint of an intervening epistle after that first.

"But the second supposable case is this—that Timothy actually came to Corinth, but communicated to the apostle very sad and distressing accounts respecting the disposition of a part of this church. In consequence, Paul was induced to send Titus to Corinth with a second epistle referring to the occurrences in the Corinthian church, of which he had been informed by Timothy, and since enough had been spoken of this intervening visit and of Timothy's reception in this last epistle, no more was said on these points in our second epistle, which was strictly speaking the third, and in all the fourth. In the decision of this question all turns upon this point, whether the often-mentioned writing in our second epistle according to the marks notified in the passages referred to, can be what we call the First Epistle to the Corinthians, or whether we are obliged to suppose another which would be that sent by Titus. Paul says at the beginning," &c.

P. 267, l. 19, *after* "1 Cor. iv. 8—19; vi. 7; x. 1" *add*, "Do not in fact several severe passages occur in this epistle which might have awakened in the heart of Paul, so full of fatherly love towards the church, the apprehension that he had uttered something which might wound them too deeply? Is it not a striking agreement when in this epistle so much is said of an individual on whom Paul had passed so severe a judgment, and exactly in our first epistle such a case occurs affecting such an individual? Will not this serve as a proof that we are required to think of this very epistle? This epistle was also well suited to call forth in the Corinthians that sense of their criminality and that sorrow that lead to salvation, as Paul says of that epistle in 2 Cor. vii. 9.

"Still, we must not trust too much to this plausible appearance. Although the case here mentioned seems to be the same with that which we find in the first epistle, yet on a closer examination of particulars, some important marks meet our notice which point to a difference. Paul guards himself, ii. 5, against the supposition that he felt personally injured. 'But if any hath caused grief,' he says, 'he hath not grieved me, but in part, that I may not overcharge you all.' He therefore represents what had taken place as

not affecting himself personally, but rather as an injury done to the whole church. But in reference to that offender of whom we are informed in the first epistle, there was no reason whatever that he should so guard himself. In that whole affair there was absolutely nothing personal. If he took it so to heart, it would only reflect credit on him from every quarter. It manifested his fatherly care for the salvation of that individual and for the welfare of the whole church. When, moreover, he speaks of a pardon to be granted by himself and the church, this certainly suits far better a wrong done personally to the apostle in the exercise of his official power, than to a sin for which the divine forgiveness was to be chiefly sought, and not a forgiveness dependent on the will of a man.[1] Paul, in speaking (vii. 8) of the wholesome effects of the epistle in question, reckons among them (v. 11) that an opportunity was given to the church, of proving their complete freedom from blame in the affair. But in the case of that offending person no blame could attach to the church excepting their having omitted to show their abhorrence of such conduct by excluding him from church-communion. On the other hand, what is said would find its immediate application if the main point was, contumacious behaviour of an individual against the apostle of a kind in which others might have appeared to take a share. Further, Paul says in v. 12, that he had written in this tone to them, 'not for his sake who did the wrong, nor for his cause that had suffered wrong, but that they might have the opportunity of showing to one another their sincere attachment for him.'[2]

[1] We know indeed that it can be explained by referring everything to a re-admission to church-communion; but the striking part of the expression will not in that way be rendered prominent; and the other explanation is far more simple and natural.

[2] Internal grounds do not render it necessary to depart from this objective and generally accredited reading. Certainly the zeal of the church for Paul's authority would first of all be expressed among themselves in their mutual behaviour towards one another. This it was which Titus must first observe among them as the effect of Paul's epistle. But that Paul had cause to recognise this zeal as not assumed, but as genuine and sincere, may be inferred from the phrase "before God." Thus this reading gives a very suitable sense. Also, what follows in verse 14 agrees very well with it, where Paul says that he was not ashamed of what he had boasted to Titus respecting the Corinthian Church, but that his boasting was found a truth. Paul had previously

That expression ἀδικεῖν was in itself not suited to mark a sin as such. And if he was speaking of a vicious person as such, the principal thing as far as regarded that person would be to lead him to repentance. He needed not to avoid the appearance of being too zealous in such a cause. No one, as we have said, could blame him for that. But every thing agrees very well with the supposition, that the case was one in which Paul was personally injured. Under such circumstances there was occasion for guarding himself against the reproach that he had been carried away by personal feelings. And thus he could affirm, that he had been moved to write not from a desire to retaliate on the person who had done him wrong, nor from concern for his own honour or the honour of him on whom the wrong had been committed; but he wished to give them an opportunity to clear themselves of all share in this matter, and to evince their zeal for his person and his apostolic authority.

"It remains to be noticed that the affair of that immoral person occupies only a very small part of that first epistle, and many other subjects are treated of far more fully. By what is said in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians of the letter in question, we shall be led to suppose that it related wholly or principally to that one affair.

"If we compare all these marks with one another, we shall certainly be disposed to favour the second of the above-named suppositions. We shall be led to believe, that Timothy brought many painful and distressing accounts to the apostle, especially respecting the commotion excited by an individual who had acted contumaciously against Paul and called in question his apostolic authority. On this account Paul sent Titus with a letter to Corinth, in which he expressed himself very strongly respecting that affair; so much so, that after Titus had set out, his fatherly heart was seized with anxiety lest he had written too harshly, and been guilty of injustice to the church."

P. 271, l. 2, "against the apostle," *add* note. "As to the

told Titus, who was perhaps afraid of the hostile tone of the excited church, that he knew they would by no means make common cause with that person who had risen up so warmly against Paul's apostolic authority; and so it proved. They vied with one another in zeal for the maintenance of his authority.

assertion of Dr. Baur that all the details given in the Acts of Paul's conflicts with Jewish exorcism and heathen magic, and of the popular tumult occasioned by the decline of the worship of Artemis, have no historical worth, but are only designed fabrications to please the imagination or to magnify Paul in comparison with Peter—such an assertion we regard as completely baseless. Whoever indeed cannot for one moment transport himself out of the narrow circle of that limited view of the world which belongs to the nineteenth century, must see everywhere, in the wonderful age of which we are speaking, mythus or intentional fiction. But when Baur, in reference to Acts xix. 20, says, 'What would such a Christianity be, but an exchange of one form of superstition for another? And yet the author of the Acts can pass such a judgment as this (xix. 20) upon it. Such a view is too unworthy of the position of an apostle, and too much conformed to a later period, to allow of our having any doubt about its origin:'—we reply, Certainly if nothing more had taken place for the spread of Christianity than the extraordinary event recorded in that passage of the Acts, this could have rendered it no help. But those facts could not have taken place if the Gospel had not previously been revealed as the power of God in the hearts of men. Paul, who met the Jews that 'required a sign,' with 'the demonstration of the Spirit and of power,' nevertheless made his appeal that he had been accredited as an Apostle by *σημεῖα, τέρατα* and *δυνάμεις*, 2 Cor. xii. 12. According to the views of the apostles the two were to be combined; the *internal* evidence of the power of God by the spiritual operation of the published word, and the accompanying *external* signs presenting themselves as visible marks of the former. But it belongs to the method of these most ancient Christian records, that the internal operations are only briefly indicated or presupposed instead of being described at length, while on the contrary whatever could be an object of outward observation is given more in detail."

P. 272, l. 19 from bottom, *for* "usions" *read* "allusions."

P. 275, l. 1, *for* "Rut" *read* "But."

P. 276, l. 3 from bottom, note, *after* "wickedness" *add*, (*4th edition,*) "As I must here re-affirm the view I have before taken, I must also state that I find no ground for the

complaint made by Rückert, with whom Baur agrees, against Paul, although I must admit the right to such a free judgment even on an apostle, and can find in it nothing unchristian. Neither can I here discern that excessive warmth of temper, which never does good, nor afterwards the return to moderation and prudence at the cost of truthfulness, in order as far as possible to repair the damage done by the former, even if I admit as settled the disputed point that the reference here is to the same case as in 1 Cor. v. 3. I discern in this latter passage nothing but genuine apostolic zeal against sin which could be held back by no considerations, and which even the unfavourable issue could not prove to be wrong; for what is right remains so, independently of the consequences, which depend on the wills of men and on circumstances."

P. 276, l. 18, *for* "he took advantage of this arrangement to excuse a sense," &c. *read*, "they took advantage of this arrangement to accuse him of a sense," &c.

P. 278, l. 18 from bottom, *after* "to the glory of God" *add*, "Since his judaizing opponents, with whom arrogance stood in the place of power (2 Cor. xi. 21), in whose sight he would willingly appear as deficient in what they regarded as strength, and who could not understand the divine power in earthen vessels—charged him with threatening to do more than he was able to perform, he expressed himself with confidence against them; that he would prove himself to be a genuine apostle in the fulfilment of his threatenings, and in the punishment of the bad. He only wished that he might have no opportunity of proving this, but that everything wrong in the church might be set right before he came, and thus no occasion be left of administering punishment. He would gladly then be regarded as an incapable or not genuine apostle by the non-fulfilment of his threatenings, provided only the Corinthians showed themselves to be approved [illegible]ians, for all the power granted to him was only for the truth and not against it. 2 Cor. xiii. 6, 8."[1]

[1] Baur, proceeding on the assumption that the same affair is referred to in 2 Cor. ii. as in 1 Cor. v., and that Paul in his first epistle threatened more than he had power to accomplish, concludes thus, (p. 329,) "This passage contains a not unimportant criterion for judging of the alleged miracles of the apostles. The apostles had certainly the consciousness

P. 281, l. 9, "nation," *add* note, "This is contrary to Baur, p. 117; nor is it set aside by what he says in his *Paulus*, p. 378. While he asserts, that 'the Jews living in Rome were regarded by him no longer as Jews, but as Romans,' he adds, 'so much the more if, what I am far from denying, there were Gentile Christians among them.' But it must be admitted, that Paul when he wrote the epistle thought particularly either of the one or the other. A quite different class of references must have suggested themselves to the apostle, if he wrote to a church of which the most influential part were Jews, from those he would have employed in writing to a church consisting mainly of Gentiles. Therefore the argument against Baur's position is not weakened by the addition he has here made to it."

P. 287, l. 19, *for* "Let such a one" *read* "Let not such a one."

P. 297, l. 18 from bottom, *after* "marks" *add*, "Baur, indeed, (p. 181,) finds the mark of a later period in the circumstance that Paul allowed only the presbyters to come

of miraculous power in themselves, and in this consciousness they could regard very distinguished effects of their agency, operations of a powerful energy, as *σημεῖα*, *τέρατα* and *δυνάμεις*. But as at that time in a definite case, in which this (consciousness) was so distinctly expressed, a miracle, strictly so called, was far enough from taking place, just as little will this have happened at any other time." We perceive that Dr. Baur from the stand-point of his consequential philosophy must so judge respecting everything distinguished as a miracle, since this stand-point excludes *à priori* the recognition of anything supernatural whatever. But we cannot consider the premises here advanced, and the conclusion drawn from them, as correct. For even if we grant the disputed point, the identity of the two cases, still it will not be evident that Paul ascribed to himself a power which he could not exercise, for he expressly represents as his object, 1 Cor. v. 5, to awaken to repentance the person whom the judgment was intended to affect, that through bodily suffering he might obtain spiritual health. Now, if that offender had already given signs of repentance, the fulfilment of such a judgment must of course fail, as Paul in the passage quoted tells us that he would gladly for the good of the church appear as one who threatened in vain. Lastly, there appears no good reason for placing the extraordinary operation in question under the same category as other miracles. Christ himself did not perform miracles of judgment, and in no passage has he given such power to the apostles, as is the case with the other miracles, to the accomplishment of which Paul refers in his epistles as indisputable. And his language here is more credible in proportion as such outward miracles appeared little in his eyes in comparison with an internal miracle. 1 Cor. i. 22, 23; ii. 4.

as representatives of the churches; but we cannot allow the correctness of this opinion. Without something of the later hierarchical tendency, they could not so be regarded. And since he could not arrange for all to come, was it not most natural that he should choose these, especially since they had to watch over the whole of the churches? And that this office was assigned by Paul to the presbyters is evident from those epistles of which the genuineness is admitted by Baur himself; from the idea of *κυβερνῆσις*, 1 Cor. xii. 28; of *προϊστάμενος*, Rom. xii. 8; from what Paul says in 1 Cor. xvi. 15, 16, respecting the relation of the churches to those who have to fill ecclesiastical offices; in which words might be also found from Baur's point of view the marks of a later age."

P. 297, l. 3 from bottom, *after* "more decided tone" *add*, "We do not see how Baur can infer from the passages of Paul's epistles, in which he speaks with sanguine hopes of the consequences to be expected from his journey to Jerusalem, that Paul could not at that time have so spoken. Who can calculate the alternations of feeling in a human soul? Especially does it make a difference whether he wrote his epistle several months before, (and yet he anticipated even then the dangers that awaited him, Rom. xv. 31, a passage indeed not admitted as genuine by Baur,) or if he gave this parting address, as he was going to meet the expected end of his journey after he had received many prophetic warnings."

P. 298, l. 6, "gain many adherents," (note.) It is possible, that v. 30 may refer to the presbyters personally, and the words may be so understood that the false teachers would proceed from their own body; but since the presbyters appear as representatives of the churches, it is not necessary to make the reference so confined. It may be properly taken in a more general sense, that false teachers would not only find entrance into the churches from other places, but also proceed from among these churches themselves.

P. 301, l. 20, "concurred," *add a fresh paragraph*:—"The reception which Paul met with at Jerusalem must have been different according to the various materials of the Christian church, which at that place was mixed with Jews. We must here suppose the transition from Judaism to Christianity, in manifold gradations, though all the members, notwithstanding the greatest differences on other points, were bound

to one another by the common faith that Jesus was the Messiah. The most important point of difference, which, as we shall see, lasted to later times, was this,—those who, along with their faith in Jesus as the Messiah, still held fast to the Jewish stand-point, but at the same time acknowledged the free development of Christianity among the heathen, on whose privileges they imposed no restraints; on the other side were those who were never disposed to consider the uncircumcised who did not observe the Mosaic Law, as equal partakers with themselves of the kingdom of God. We can hardly be surprised at this, when we recollect that the number of believing Jews is reckoned in Acts xxi. 20 as amounting to many myriads, though this is not to be regarded as an exact enumeration, and those who came up to the feast from other parts must be taken into account. But we cannot venture to draw an inference from the small number of Christians among the Jews in the third century, respecting the relative proportions at this period. The powerful impression of Christ's appearance operated on many; and whatever among the body of the people was opposed to faith in him, the contrariety that was consciously felt between the spirit of Christ and their carnal views, now vanished, since they could depict a Messiah according to their mind, in him whose personal image no longer stood before their eyes; and what they had been wont to expect from the Messiah, they transferred to Christ, whose speedy return they anticipated to found his kingdom in the world. Among many of this class nothing was to be found peculiarly Christian, and they distinguished themselves from other Jews only by acknowledging Jesus as the Messiah. Hence, the spiritual superiors of the people gave themselves no further concern about such a Christianity, and allowed it to remain undisturbed. But it was quite natural that such people, when their Messianic expectations were not fulfilled, should apostatize altogether from the faith.

"Those who were more thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the Gospel, the more enlightened among the Jewish Christians, received Paul with Christian brotherly love."[1]

[1] In reference, also, to this part of the history we must maintain the same view which has hitherto approved itself to us in making use of the Acts; namely, that the difficulties it presents in attempting to obtain an historical representation from it, do not proceed from

P. 303, l. 13, *after* "from the law" *add*, "It is indeed true, that when once this was generally acknowledged, that circumcision was of no avail for obtaining a part in God's kingdom, it would sooner or later fall into disuse. But in that principle all the apostles agreed, as appears from what has been said above, even had we not made use of the accounts in the Acts. According to the principle in which both parties were unanimous, the two different forms of the church among Jews and Gentiles, founded on a natural and national distinction that arose from the process of historical development, existed for some time side by side. As the apostles among the Jews acknowledged the free agency of the Holy Spirit among the Gentiles, and allowed the churches founded among them to be formed in their own way, so Paul also allowed the church among the Jews to develop itself freely in their way. In the natural historical process of development no violent encroachments were made on either side. And why could not both peculiar ecclesiastical forms exist together for a length of time, though the distinction must be obliterated by the progressive development of the church?

"Without departing from the principles of strict truthfulness, Paul could repel those charges to which we have referred, for he was very far from wishing to anticipate in an arbitrary manner the historical development; it was with him an avowed principle that every man should abide in those relations which belonged to him when the call of Christianity reached him, and not wilfully renounce them. 'He was far from that hatred against Judaism, and the ancient theocratic people, of which his violent opponents accused him. On the principles which he avowed in his epistles, according to which, to the Jews he became a Jew, as to the Gentiles a Gentile, and weak to the weak, he declared himself equally ready to do what James proposed,"[1] &c.

any designed object on the part of the author, but on the contrary, from the want of pragmatism, (*i. e.* a clear exhibition of causes and consequences,) the rude collocation of facts, so that the narrator never placed himself on the stand-point of other persons, to answer questions which must occur to them in order to explain the connexion of the facts. Hence we are obliged to supply many things by historical combination before we can obtain an intelligible history.

[1] We must not interpret too rigidly the words of James when he

P. 307, l. 10, "containing truth," (note.) The manner in which Paul here comes before us in the Acts, corresponds most exactly to his character, as we learn it from his epistles, combining a warmth of temperament with a sagacity which knew how to turn every circumstance to the best account. A later writer, attempting to fabricate a story, would not have represented Paul as speaking in the way mentioned in Acts xiii. 3.

P. 307, l. 12, "corrected himself," (note.) We need not be perplexed with the ἤδειν in Acts xxiii. 5. The very turn of the expression shows us that Paul in his momentary embarrassment, and regretting his intemperate language, only sought to make an excuse, and the words, as the bystanders would be aware, are not to be taken too stringently.

P. 307, l. 16, "himself of that means," (note.) Everything here is exactly to the life. To fabricate this would require a talent for description different from what the author of the Acts possessed. Paul might have had in his thoughts another line of defence; but after he had allowed himself to be carried away by his warmth, and returned from the digression, he chose this prudential method in order to give a favourable turn to his cause.

P. 307, l. 15 from bottom, "himself belonged," (note.) Baur thinks that this representation of the transaction as we take it from the Acts, must be regarded as unhistorical throughout. It is an entire distortion of the question in dispute which Paul here allows himself, and inconsistent with his love of truth; and the dispute thus called forth between the Pharisees and Sadducees is something altogether improbable. "Parties who differed from one another on such essential points, but who nevertheless so frequently met in society, and were united in the same official body, must have so long exhausted themselves respecting their points of difference, that it was impossible they could, on every occasion, make them afresh the subjects of the most violent di[illegible],

desires Paul (Acts xxi. 24) by that act to prove that he also lived in the observance of the law; we obtain their correct meaning by contrasting them with the charge made by the Jews. The stand-point on which Paul to the ἄνομοι became an ἄνομος, was indeed different from that of James, and we know not whether James and Paul referred particularly to the special difference existing between themselves. There are many differences on which it is better to be silent, than to express our opinion.

least of all in such a case, in which, as in the one before us, the easily detected stratagem of an opponent would be made use of in the dispute to his own disadvantage." As to the first point, I do not see why Paul, setting out from his own subjective train of thought, could not bring forward that side of the controversy from which his own cause must appear in a favourable light to a majority of his judges, while he kept in the background the other points in dispute. It was not a false connexion, but one perfectly corresponding to the truth, according to his convictions. Ever since he had testified among the Gentiles of Jesus the Risen One as the foundation of the whole Gospel, he had been the object of the most violent attacks of the Jews. This faith involved everything else that belonged to this controversy. Whether the hope of a resurrection to eternal life would be fulfilled, depended on the question whether Jesus was the Messiah, and whether he had really risen. Paul was conscious that he testified of the reality of all the hopes of the pious under the Old Covenant, and that he was a truly orthodox Jew. This he asserted with unwavering conviction. This was a line of conduct by which he occupied the stand-point of his opponents, and obliged them to acknowledge what he maintained to be true—a method which perfectly suited Paul's rhetoric and dialectic.

As to the second point, we know indeed that the Sadducees gladly retired from public offices, and wherever they occupied them, felt obliged, from regard to popular opinion, to accommodate themselves to the maxims of the Pharisees. (*Προσχωροῦσι οἷς ὁ Φαρισαῖος λέγει, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄλλως ἀνεκτοὺς γενέσθαι τοῖς πλήθεσιν.* Joseph. Antiq. xviii. c. 1, § 4.) But the warmth of party feeling could easily gain the ascendency over cold-blooded politics, and the forcibly restrained enmity between the two parties would readily break out again on many occasions. It might very possibly happen that owing to the quite tumultuary manner in which matters had been carried on against Paul, the leaders of the people had not yet learned what was the *corpus delicti* in his case; and since the Pharisees had always heard him assert that Jesus the Risen One had appeared to him, they fixed their attention on that one point, because their controversy with the Sadducees, which to them was far more important, became the subject of discussion.

P. 321, l. 6, "corrupted the simple Gospel," (note.) "Baur and Schwegler are disposed to find in these appearances the marks of a post-apostolic age, and make use of the smaller Paulinian epistles, in order to support the fabrication of a peculiar post-apostolic literature: we maintain, on the contrary, that exactly such mixtures of the religious spirit, as we here find them, serve to elucidate the transition from the Pauline to the succeeding age. The course of historical development would allow us to assume such links, even if unquestionable records had not borne evidence of their existence."

P. 326, l. 15, "by communion with Christ alone," (note.) "The arbitrary manner in which Baur and Schwegler attempt to prove the gnostic element in this epistle, and in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Philippians, requires no refutation. No one who is not entangled in a fixed delusion, can think of finding in the use of the word πλήρωμα in the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, a reference to the gnostic doctrine of a Pleroma. The use of this word in these epistles is most naturally accounted for, from the peculiar Pauline circle of ideas, of which the germ lies at the basis of the other Pauline epistles, but here appears more fully expanded, as belonging to this stage of his doctrinal development. We shall have more to say respecting it in the second section relating to doctrine, and shall then enter more fully into the refutation of the asserted difference of doctrine between this and the earlier epistles of Paul. How far is the pure, practical spirit in the Epistle to the Colossians from everything gnostic! Where, in the second century, could the mental tendency be found from which such an epistle could proceed? where was the man who could write such an epistle? According to the whimsical notion of the criticism just now in vogue, the most powerful minds, who were capable of the greatest things, existed in that age; and yet their names and persons are lost in profound obscurity. But as error and truth go together in the developing processes of history, and mutually check and modify one another, so the springing up of sects at the close of the Pauline age, and the later stage in the impress of the apostolic doctrine, constitute a middle link presupposed by the formation of the gnosis in the second century. The criticism which we combat, passes over this middle link by an unhistorical hysteron-proteron."

P. 329, l. 8, "and not an imitation by another hand," (note.) "I will here notice some of the doubts that have been raised in recent times against the genuineness of this Epistle to the Ephesians; those, I mean, which could strike so able a critic as De Wette, a man distinguished by so much love for truth, and so disposed to receive it. The collocation of apostles and prophets in ch. ii. 20; iii. 5; iv. 11, must be un-apostolical. It is true such a phrase does not elsewhere occur in the Pauline epistles, but it is not on that account to be set down as something un-Pauline, or foreign to the Pauline age. In ch. iv. 11, the apostles so called in a stricter sense are brought forward—after them more are named who published the Gospel in a wide circle, whose activity was not confined to one congregation—the common missionaries, the evangelists corresponding to what the διδάσκαλοι were for single congregations, and those in whom the creative element of immediate spiritual excitement predominated, who received by special revelations disclosures respecting Christian truth, in whom the power of inspiration appeared especially in discourse, who as teachers stood nearest to the apostles in originality, the prophets. That there were such prophets who as missionaries stood by the side of the apostles, is testified by the Acts, and apart from that, by the name of Barnabas, and 1 Cor. xii. 28. A later writer would not have been induced to place together in this manner apostles and prophets; for this position of the prophets was foreign to a later period. Of the Montanist body of prophets, to whom Baur and Schwegler allude, there is no trace in this epistle; and indeed, generally, we should regard it as the most flagrant anachronism to pretend to find anything Montanist in this epistle. In the manner of distinguishing between the ποιμένες and διδάσκαλοι, we also recognise something which belongs only to this age; (compare the distinction of διδάσκαλοι and κυβερνήσεις, 1 Cor. xii. 28; the distinction of διδάσκειν and προίστασθαι, Rom. xii. 7, 8.) But Baur thinks that he has discovered in the whole passage an idea foreign to Paul, of a progressive development of the church, the representation of an approaching more perfect age of ecclesiastical development, which certainly would not be in harmony with the expectation of the speedy second advent of Christ. But this passage contains nothing of the kind; Paul speaks only of the church of that age in

which he wrote the epistle, and marks its development from its νηπιότης to its τελειότης, a perfectly Pauline idea, which is found in the universally acknowledged genuine Pauline epistles. We are at a loss to conceive how any one could think of finding here the Montanist idea of successive stages in the growth of the church. De Wette moreover maintains that the mention of the doctrine of Justification in ch. ii. 8—10, is hardly in accordance with the apostle's doctrinal theology. But this I cannot perceive. On the contrary, I recognise nothing but what is most truly Pauline. Although Paul is not writing to those in whom he would presuppose a disposition to confide in the merits of the ἔργα νόμου, not to those who were formerly Jews, yet he had reason to bring forward the universal and to him ever-present truth, that, in their being called to Christianity, all of them, without distinction, were indebted for everything to grace alone; the few who had hitherto led a more moral life, as well as the majority who had been sunk in vice. Compare 1 Cor. i. 29, 30. In this passage he was obliged thus to express himself on account of the contrast, since he wished to lay a stress upon the point. The new creation, previous to which they could accomplish nothing good, and to which they owed everything, must necessarily manifest itself by ἔργα ἀγαθά. In the next place De Wette notices the arbitrary application of the passage in Ps. lxviii. It is indeed a free application, but yet spirited and not forced. In that passage Jehovah is represented as a victorious leader, bringing his enemies in triumph to the heights of Zion, to whom his conquered foes do homage by the presentation of gifts. This is applied to the manner in which Christ ascended to heaven after overcoming the powers that opposed the kingdom of God. But in accordance with his object the apostle represents the gifts received as imparted. As the communication of the Holy Spirit to believers is an evidence of the victory over the kingdom of darkness, so the special charisms are marked as the gifts of victory belonging to the glorified Christ. Examples of such a free use of Old Testament passages are to be found elsewhere in Paul's writings; compare Rom. x. 6, &c. The quotation in ch. v. 14, is certainly a problem to be explained, but we are not authorized to employ it in casting suspicion on the genuineness of the epistle. The appeal in ch. iii. 3, to what he said before, is

certainly somewhat singular, and we can point out nothing similar in Paul. But the singularity is softened when we recollect that this is a circular epistle which was intended for several churches to whom Paul was personally unknown, and that what is said relates to the great novel idea of the one church of God, to be formed from Jews and Gentiles, by faith in the Redeemer, an idea which was first set by Paul in the clearest light. The passage in ch. vi. 2, 3, is also remarkable; but if the apostle, expressing the precept in the Old Testament form,[1] has added a sign, in order to mark its importance, which is affixed to this precept from the Old Testament stand-point, it appears to me to be at least no decisive mark against the genuineness of the epistle. In ch. iv. 28, I can find nothing so very strange in such a connexion: 'He who hitherto, through idleness, has been led to steal from others, must labour as a Christian, not only that he may honestly gain his own livelihood, but in order to be able to show kindness to others. Let him who has hitherto seized on the property of others be changed into one who even maintains others in need by the produce of his own labour.' The comparison of marriage with the relation of the church to Christ, ch. v. 23, appears to me, though not occurring elsewhere in Paul's writings, as perfectly consonant with Christian ideas, and by no means un-Pauline.

P. 331, l. 3, *after* "them," *add*, "Everything in this epistle, the state of mind with which the writer contemplates impending death, the manner in which he judges of himself, his pathetic exhortations to the church, all bear the inimitable impress of Paul. A later writer attempting to forge a letter in his name, would not have expressed himself with that apparent uncertainty in reference to his future lot, iii. 11, 12."

[1] In the severe language against the judaizing proselyte-makers, (Phil. iii. 2, 3,) I cannot with Baur find anything un-Pauline. The predicate *κύνες* as a designation of shameless men is not at all extraordinary. It perfectly comports with the indignation of Paul against those persons who would mislead Christians, and turn them aside from seeking salvation, that he should term the mere outward circumcision a *κατατομή*, as in Gal. v. 12; it is also altogether Pauline when Christians are termed "the true circumcision who worship God in the spirit," Rom. ii. 29. It is also by no means far-fetched, but very naturally connected, when Paul, who had to fight far and near with these judaizers, is induced to oppose his own example to what was the only glory of these

P. 339, last line, *add*, "As to the two other pastoral letters, I will not deny that along with the impression of the genuine Pauline, and of what is against their composition at a later period, some things are to be found which might excite a doubt even in the mind of a critic not ill-disposed, but which will lead us to consider the very peculiar relation by which these epistles are distinguished from all the rest of Paul's."

P. 342, l. 12 from bottom, "in Crete and in Ephesus," (note.) "I cannot, with De Wette, consider it so extraordinary that so much is said respecting false doctrines in the new churches, nor that Paul deemed it necessary to direct the attention of Titus to the fact, who, from long observation, must have been well aware of the danger. The fermenting process in the development of Christianity at that time might easily extend its influence from one district to another, as soon as Christianity had found its entrance into men's minds, and hence, from the first, Christianity was threatened by dangerous disturbing forces. Along with the seeds of Christianity these foreign elements might spread from Asia Minor, or Achaia, to Crete. For a considerable time the seeds of Christianity might have been scattered before there had been the means of organizing a church. Paul felt himself compelled to warn Titus of the danger, of which he had gained information in Crete itself, and from other quarters. The defects in the character of the people appeared to him to render great circumspection necessary; these defects are noticed by Polybius, (vi. 46, § 3:) *Καθόλου δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν διισχροκέρδειαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν τρόπος οὕτως ἐπι-*

degree, but counted them all as nothing in order to seek his righteousness in Christ, which is followed by that glorious passage, iii. 9—15, which breathes entirely the spirit of Paul. That in i. 1, the deacons immediately succeed the bishops, is a mark which testifies against a time, only somewhat later, in which bishops and presbyters already began to be distinguished. But the name of Clement (iv. 3) reminds Dr. Baur at once of his hobby-horse, the Clementines, and calls up by the association of ideas Peter, Simon Magus, the Gnostics, and many more of whom no one else would have thought of meeting in this epistle. What allusions indeed may not be found, when (ii. 4, 7) one is led to think of the Valentinian Sophia, which would penetrate into the essence of Bythos, and sink down into Chaos, and when Christ is thought to form a contrast to it? or when Schwegler considers Euodias to be a symbol of the Jewish-Christian party, and Syntyche a symbol of the Gentile Christians, and would find under the phrase *σύζυγος γνήσιος* the apostle Peter (with reference to the Clementines) as one on the conciliatory stand-point?

χωριάζει παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ μόνοις Κρηταιεῦσι τῶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν νομίζεσθαι κέρδος· and § 5, Οὔτε κατ' ἰδίαν ἤθη δολιώτερα Κρηταιέων εὕροι τις ἄν. Paul probably had these national vices in his mind when he laid down the qualifications that were necessary for the office of presbyter."

P. 357, l. 21, "and an erroneous application of it," *add*, "We can certainly well imagine, that James, who had advanced in gradual development from the Law to the Gospel as the fulfilling of the Law—who, remaining on his Jewish standpoint, by faith in Jesus as the Lord and Saviour, the Author of the new divine life, continually spiritualized and glorified this stand-point more and more,—might from such a course of development, misunderstand the Pauline doctrinal type which had been formed under an opposite course of development. We can suppose, that when he met such a mode of expression, he might feel it his duty to combat it, since practically injurious consequences appeared to flow from it. We can suppose that he knew not how to separate the correct understanding and the misunderstanding from one another, since to him the whole mode of contemplating the subject was quite foreign. Thus James might have attacked Paul, though both were bound together by the Spirit of Christ."

P. 358, l. 21, "which left the disposition unchanged," (note.) "Baur's authoritative decision (p. 686) 'that this is a perfectly untenable self-contradictory idea,' cannot at all move me. That the idea of the *opus operatum*, according to the original and common meaning of the phrase, can only denote something outward, I am well aware; but a word may be used in a sense besides the common,—in an improper and metaphorical sense. So I have used the word here, which I was perfectly justified in doing, to denote a superficial holding for true, which remains as something outward to the soul, without affecting the disposition or the heart. It is the same making an outward thing of religion which places its essence either in ceremonial observances, or in such a faith. Both spring from the same root. The proof he adduces in p. 567, only serves to confirm my assertion. Certainly there was also among the Jews a false theory, which attributed an unfounded value to a dead faith in the one God in opposition to idolatry, and made this a support of moral inactivity. This Jewish notion of πίστις need only be applied to the new object, Jesus the

Messiah. But that a person expressing his opposition to a certain tendency, should thereby be induced so to express himself as if he meant another tendency which agrees only accidentally with this in the mode of expression—of that there is not a single example in history."

P. 360, l. 10, begin a new paragraph thus:—"We do not wish to deny that even in churches composed of Jewish Christians, and of Jewish-Christian views, there might be individuals who had been influenced by the Pauline doctrine; and we grant that it is possible, that James, by what he had heard of the expressions of individuals who had been thus influenced, had been induced to combat such a tendency in his epistle. And we should be disposed thus to account for the existence of the epistle, if it could be proved that it was directed against various theoretical and practical errors springing out of different roots. But this was not the case. It is evident from what has been said, that all the evil which is combated in this epistle must be referred to one root, that of the common Jewish mind which had received the belief in Jesus as the Messiah. Hence we shall be induced, if it be possible, to regard the individual error, not as something isolated, as we must if we deduced it from the Pauline element, but rather as connected with that common fundamental tendency.

"But further, we must here consider the position of James in relation to Paul. If we believed ourselves justified in admitting an open contrariety between them, we might suppose that James, in consequence of his peculiar course of development, was incapable of entering into the peculiar Pauline form of doctrine, and had combated it as a misconception that stood opposed to him. But we have shown that we can by no means be led to presuppose such a hostile relation between James and Paul, although there was a party named after the former apostle who set themselves in opposition to Paul, as indeed there was a Pauline party who formed themselves into an opposition not sanctioned by Paul himself. According to this supposition we cannot admit that James combated either the doctrine of Paul itself, or a misunderstood version and application of it, without, at the same time, distinguishing the correct view of it, and guarding himself against the appearance of contradicting the Apostle Paul, especially since this appearance might so easily arise among

Jewish-Christian churches; or we must take the matter thus, that James had controverted that dogmatic phraseology without being aware of its connexion with Paul's system, which we cannot consider as in the least degree probable.

"Thus far we have taken for granted that this epistle was the production of him who is named in it as its author. But, very recently this has been disputed both on external and internal grounds.[1] Several weighty authorities have favoured the opinion that this epistle was forged in James's name, in order to promote a certain class of religious opinions. The design might have been to counterwork the Pauline doctrine of Justification, to set the authority of James against Paul, and this design might well suit the one-sided tendency of a Jewish-Christian, &c. . . . . .

"Others are disposed to find out in this epistle a refined Ebionitism, in which the Jewish element had lost much of its original coarseness, although the practical basis which distinguished this stand-point from the Pauline, remained the same. The origination of this epistle at a later period is indicated by the influences which the Pauline spirit had already exerted on the elements that were opposed to it. Thus the softened Judaism, which could not altogether escape the influence of the Pauline ideas, must contain the certain mark of a later, more advanced Christian development. In our inquiries on this subject, all depends on how we view the relation of Christ to the developing process of Christianity. If persons regard Christ only as the individual who gave the impulse to a new development, which, through a Paul, and the spirit exhibited in the Gospel of John, was carried forward beyond his personal efforts, to them such a view may commend itself. And so James may appear as the rigid Ebionite, who could not possibly have written such an epistle, and so it may appear necessary to invent such an intermediate step for the Ebionitism, softened and spiritu-

[1] The external grounds against the genuineness of this epistle, though the Peschito is in favour of it, would have greater weight if the doubts that arose in the first century as to acknowledging this epistle might not be so easily explained from its spreading among Jewish-Christian churches (a circumstance suited to excite in many minds a prejudice against it) an argument against Paul's doctrine which it was believed to contain, to which must be added the indistinct designation of the author at the head of the epistle.

alized by the aggressive influence of the movement set a-going by Paul. To *us* the relation of Christ to Christianity appears quite different, since we must regard the revelation through Christ as the original and perfect one, from which the whole developing process of the apostolic doctrine is to be deduced. We shall refer the elements akin to the Pauline doctrine in James, not to Paul, but to the same original source from which Paul derived them, that is, to Christ himself. The fulfilment of the Law in the Gospel, which is exhibited in the Sermon on the Mount, reappears in the conception of Christianity peculiar to James, and we cannot fail to notice several correspondences with the sayings of Christ. Although James and Paul are representatives of the two opposite extremes in the development of the Christian doctrine, yet in virtue of their common relation to the original source of revelation in Christ, a relationship to one another, and a higher unity, must result between them. If we know the real Christ, we shall not be disposed to believe that James, who had received unto himself the whole personal impression of the Saviour, could remain on the stand-point of the common Jewish narrow-mindedness. As we find in his epistle that image of James which all the historical data would lead us to frame, so, on the other hand, no trace is to be found in it of its being composed in post-apostolic times,—nothing, especially, which points to a later form of Ebionitism. The manner, also, in which the approach of Christ's second advent is spoken of, suits best the apostolic age. Had the epistle been forged in favour of any of the party interests of the day, we should have met with references to the manifold contrarieties of Christian development then existing, as, for instance, those of the Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians, the Paulinian and anti-Paulinian systems. But no one, except he belongs to the class who can find everything everywhere, can detect in this epistle any of all these and similar references to the contrarieties of that age, excepting only the possible allusion to the Pauline doctrine of faith. But even here the anti-Pauline sentiment obtrudes so gently, as we could hardly expect in a party-writing of the second century, and in which it forms a striking contrast to the Clementines.

"But is this allusion really so very evident?" &c. (*vide* p. 362, l. 1.)

P. 366, l. 21 from bottom, "expected from such a standpoint," (note.) "As the ultra-Paulinism of the second century stood quite aloof from James, so in the hostility shown to the Epistle of James we recognise the one-sidedness of the Lutheran element. Although the Epistle of James occupies a subordinate place in the development of Christian truth, compared with the Pauline epistles, yet it is important for checking several one-sided extravagances to which the Pauline element might be carried without it. Thus its position in the Canon has a peculiar propriety. Its importance in a practical view is beautifully exhibited by the excellent THOMAS ARNOLD in the volume of his Sermons entitled *Christian Life, its Hopes, its Fears, and its Close*, p. 51:—'But for those who complain that no preaching but that of the very Gospel itself is becoming a Christian minister, or useful to Christian people, I would refer them for an answer not only to some of the books of the Old Testament, which, on their notion, we might almost strike out of our Bibles, but to a complete portion of the New Testament itself—to the Epistle of St. James, the Lord's brother. That epistle undoubtedly supposes that they who were to read it had received other teaching beforehand; that the Gospel in the strict sense had been already preached to them. But in itself it does not in that high sense preach the Gospel; it dwells rather from beginning to end on such points of Christian duty as are required to perfect the man of God unto all good works, points which may be called properly moral. Now that some Christian preaching, in particular circumstances, should follow the model of St. James's Epistle, appears to me no just matter of blame. But as St. James's Epistle is in the New Testament only one out of many, and as he himself must often and earnestly have preached the Gospel in the more strict sense, although he did not do it in this one epistle, so should we, both preachers and hearers, greatly deceive and hurt ourselves if we forget that the proper preaching of the Gospel and the believing it is our one great business, without which, and except as founded upon it and taking the knowledge and belief of it for granted, all other preaching is to Christians worse than unprofitable, not edifying their souls, but rather subverting them.' (See also Dr. Arnold's *Sermons on the Interpretation of Scripture*, Serm. xxxiii. and xxxiv.—TR.)"

P. 372, l. 16, *after* "apostolic fellowship" *add*, "An impartial examination of history shows that such fellowship always existed. The two apostles never ceased to acknowledge one another as genuine ministers of the Gospel, though Paul must always have protested against that *tendency* which attributed an excessive regard to Peter, and would have made everything bend to that—a tendency which in later ages became a sign of the times, and was actually embodied under Peter's name."

P. 373, last line (note), *add*, "Also, on the supposition that the first Epistle of Peter was forged in his name, it appears to me by no means natural for the writer to mention Rome under that designation. It cannot be proved that at the end of the first or the beginning of the second century Rome was commonly designated by the name of Babylon, and it might be expected that whoever forged such an epistle, would by some intimation let it be known that this name was to be taken symbolically, since it was of importance to him that all his readers should understand that the epistle was written from Rome. At all events, it is far more natural to understand by the term *ἡ συνεκλεκτὴ*, Peter's wife rather than the church. This, we feel assured, is the only sound interpretation of the record. The antiquity of the other explanation can prove nothing, since no tradition of Peter's residence in these parts is come down to us; on the contrary, much discussion has been raised on the tradition of Peter's journey to Rome, and as there is in the human mind a tendency to symbolical meaning, a point of connexion has been found in the Apocalypse, so that this interpretation would easily gain acceptance. But indeed, whoever forged an epistle under the name of Peter would have supported himself by a more familiar tradition, and not have transported Peter to Babylon. If Peter sent salutations from his wife in Babylon, it perfectly agrees with what we are told in 1 Cor. ix. 5, that she accompanied Peter on his missionary journeys.

P. 374, l. 3, "an epistle," (note.) "Although Schwegler has expressed himself, in the second volume of his work on the post-apostolic age, with so much confidence on the spuriousness of this epistle, yet we attach little or no weight to most of his reasons. He adduces as one mark of spuriousness, that the writer says and reports nothing about himself in a

more definite manner. But if there had been more distinct allusions to Peter's character and history, they would doubtless have been regarded as a sign that some other person wished to pass himself off for Peter. And certainly, whoever had any motive for assuming the part of Peter, would have been induced to avail himself for this object of whatever he knew of the person and character of this apostle, and several things of this kind must have been known to any Christian who might forge such an epistle. But in this epistle we really find many marks by which Peter might make himself known in an unobtrusive manner, but quite different from those which another person would have chosen who wished to act Peter's part. Among such marks we reckon that Peter (v. 1) describes himself as a witness of the sufferings of Christ. From the stand-point of Peter this would appear very natural. But any forger of such an epistle, wishing to compile one after the pattern of the other apostolic epistles, would have chosen the resurrection of Christ, his miracles, or the transfiguration, as in the Second Epistle, rather than his passion. The author writes also as an eye-witness, before whom the image of a suffering Christ presented itself, as a pattern for Christians in times of persecution. Schleiermacher, in his *Introduction*, p. 408, has very properly directed attention to ch. i. 8, in which the author does not make himself known, designedly, as one who had seen and personally known Christ, but, from an immediate consciousness that he stood in such a relation to Christ, writes to those who stood in no such relation. The reference to Christ's *descensus ad inferos* Schleiermacher regards as a mark of genuineness; for he thinks that whoever forged such an epistle, would not have placed himself on such slippery ground; 'for evidently here is something which was not passed over in the common public teaching of Christians, and yet strikes us as something foreign to the New Testament representations.' To this reason I cannot attach importance. A person might indeed have a motive, by writing under the name of an apostle, to give circulation to an opinion different from the current representations; and that opinion was not so foreign to the Christian thinking of the first ages as to Schleiermacher's. But when Schwegler reckons the introduction of this doctrine as one of the marks of a Pauline element in the epistle, foreign to Peter,

as a deduction drawn and doctrinally formed in the Pauline circles from the Pauline principle of the universality of the Christian salvation, I can by no means agree with him. For this was not the universal application of this doctrine. Marcion had given to this doctrine, existing long before in other circles, a modification corresponding to his peculiar system. (See my Church History, vol. ii. p. 811, 2d ed.; vol. ii. p. 146. Eng. Trans. in the Standard Library.)

"And it may be questioned, whether without such an authority as that of Peter, this statement, which certainly agrees well with the Christian system, would have soon found such general acceptance. But the complete formation of such a representation is well suited to the stand-point of an apostle who had himself been an eye-witness of the death and resurrection of Christ. It was exactly to a person who had witnessed those great events, that such a question was most likely to occur to which the answer is given in this statement. It is possible that the apostle, when in company with Christ after his resurrection, had made an inquiry on this subject, although we would not maintain that the doctrine was derived from such a source. And what Peter experienced in his early ministry among the Gentiles, and what he said on that occasion in the family of Cornelius, might form a point of connexion for his reflecting on such an agency on the part of Christ as is indicated in that passage. But it is to be remarked, that this topic is touched very cursorily, and by no means presented with that prominence and earnestness which might be expected from one who sought to gain acceptance for it by employing the authority of an apostolic name."

P. 374, l. 19, "heathen populace," (note.) "Schwegler has controverted this view, and maintains that this epistle could only have been written under the Emperor Trajan; a position of the Christians is here implied which they were first placed in by that emperor's well-known rescript. But I cannot help pronouncing both the assumptions on which this writer proceeds, and the inferences he draws from them, to be wholly unfounded. The Neronian persecution proves, indeed, that the Christians were already the objects of popular hatred. It could not fail but that popular hatred would show itself in their conduct towards the Christians. Although Christianity was not yet designated a *religio illicita* by an express

enactment, yet it would follow of itself from the constitution of the Roman polity that the propagation of a religion which would involve the downfal of the religion of the State, would be illegal and worthy of punishment. As soon as it came to light that the Χριστιανοὶ were a *genus tertium*, Christianity must appear, even prior to any special legislation respecting it, as a *religio illicita*. Though Nero's persecution was only occasional and transient, yet what took place in the metropolis of the empire must operate injuriously on the condition of Christians in the provinces. Everything which happened from this time to Trajan's first rescript, testifies of preceding persecutions against the Christians, in which by the new law of Trajan, only a more legal arrangement had been made. We dare not allow ourselves to infer too much, from the gaps in our knowledge of ecclesiastical history. The manner also in which persecutions are spoken of in ch. iv. 4, serve to mark them as new. How can any one who allows that the Apocalypse was written before Trajan's accession, fail to perceive the existence of earlier persecutions? Rev. vi. 9; xvii. 6; xx. 4. This last passage is peculiarly important, since it points to something more than a mere popular infliction of punishment, which would not have been satisfied with merely beheading the Christians. It appears from that passage that it was already established in the administration of Roman law, to apply this capital punishment to Christians—and hence we perceive the great gaps in our historical knowledge."

P. 376, l. 5, *after* "apostolic spirit," *add*, "As the object for which this epistle must have been written, perfectly corresponded to the circumstances of the times, there is nothing in its composition which would lead us to infer that the writer had forged it with a conciliatory design. A person of this description would hardly have put such a restraint on himself, and expressed himself so guardedly, that one part of his object—which according to this supposition was his principal object—could only be discovered by a careful investigation. The peculiar characteristic of Peter, his occupying a stand-point between Paul and James, is indeed apparent in the epistle; but the points of contact with the Pauline element are also visible, as Paul had already exerted a preponderating influence on the formation of the Christian ideas, especially among those who used the Greek language. But

we must here distinguish what is peculiarly Pauline from what was deduced in common from the same original source, and in the handling of dogmatical points we need not expect such strikingly marked mental peculiarity in this apostle, as in a Paul or a John. Since this epistle, as a hortatory circular, is a counterpart of the Epistle to the Ephesians, we cannot think it strange if no references occur in it to special local circumstances, as in the other Pauline epistles, but that every thing is more general. We might anticipate that this would be the case in such an epistle.

"The expectation of the end of all things as impending, is suitable to the apostolic age, and the events in Nero's reign must have tended to awaken this expectation."

P. 386, last line, *for* "did wholly," *read* "did not wholly."

P. 388, l. 12, "the form of the Grecian mind," (note.) "But when Schwegler, from the obscure expressions of Polycrates quoted above, deduces the fact that John had assumed the high-priestly dress as overseer-general of the churches in Asia Minor, and then, again concludes, what on such a supposition would be a fair inference, that one who thus acted and placed himself in such a relation to Judaism, could not be the author of the Gospel under his name—he adopts a method, according to which it is only requisite to find proofs for a system formed on arbitrary assumptions and combinations, and according to which all separate traditions are only so far to be thought credible, as they serve to support such a system. This single feature is literally adhered to, though it stands in contradiction to everything else we know of that age. Where can we find anything bearing an analogy to it unless something isolated in the uncritical and credulous Epiphanius? It may indeed be admitted that the Christian feasts became changed into the Jewish; for this there was a medium in the spiritualization of the Old Testament,—Theocracy proceeding from Christianity. But it was altogether different with the priesthood. The principles of Christianity connect themselves with the idea of a priesthood only so far, that Christ is regarded as the only High Priest, and all believers are derived from him as the universal priesthood; hence no such relation can be found as that which existed on the stand-point of the Old Testament cultus—(*vide* pp. 128, 156). Moreover, as Christianity still moved in the forms of Judaism, this prin-

ciple was employed in the formation of church relations. The position of James among the Jewish Christians cannot here be adduced as a proof, but goes rather to establish the opposite; for great as was the reverence in which he was held, we find no trace of his being invested with anything like the Jewish priesthood. For even Hegesippus is far from placing him in such a relation to the Christian church, although from his ascetic, Ebionitish stand-point,—which we are by no means justified in making identical with the Jewish Christians, and cannot ascribe even to Polycrates—he says, that James in virtue of his sanctity wore not a woollen, but a linen garment like a priest, and that in virtue of this priestly sanctity he alone was allowed to go into the holy place of the Temple. *Τούτῳ μόνῳ ἐξῆν εἰς τὰ ἅγια εἰσιέναι, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐρεοῦν ἐφόρει, ἀλλὰ σινδόνας.*—Euseb. ii. 23. With all the Jewish colouring the idea of the universal Christian priesthood is the only one brought forward in the Apocalypse. In *The Testament of the twelve Patriarchs*, which has so strong a Jewish impress, the view predominates that Christ is the true High Priest who has made an end of the Old Testament priesthood. I. 6, *Μέχρι τελειώσεως χρόνων ἀρχιερέως Χριστοῦ.* From him a new priesthood was to go forth among the Gentiles, which may probably be understood of the universal priesthood established by him, though we cannot with certainty decide on the sense of the passage. L. c. 9, *Ποιήσει ἱερατείαν νέαν κατὰ τὸν τύπον τῶν ἐθνῶν εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη.* If John had applied the high priesthood to the constitution of Christian churches, what a powerful influence it would have exerted in modifying it, and how much earlier would the Hierarchical element have been diffused! Manifold traces of so early a transference of the Old Testament stand-point to the constitution of the Christian church, must everywhere have met us. What was not developed till the third century, must have appeared as the original arrangement. We see indeed, afterwards, a Jewish hierarchical element in internal conflict with the original Christian consciousness. But it is quite unhistorical to attempt deducing from that ancient Ebionitism, which belongs to a totally different stage of development, this new form of the Jewish spirit, which arose of itself, after the Jewish stand-point had been long relinquished, and Christianity had

attained an independent development. To apply to every mixture of Judaism or Christianity the common name of Ebionitism, and distinguish them into various kinds and stages of development, must inevitably lead to the most mischievous perversions of history."

P. 390, l. 4, "Rev. ii. 2," (note.) "We find no reason that will justify us in asserting, with Schwegler, that these words refer to Paul, and in concluding that in Lesser Asia an Ebionitish spirit prevailed in opposition to the apostolic authority of Paul. The disapprobation here expressed is directed not against one, but against several. Of what kind these were, we must learn from the subsequent contents of the Apocalyptic Epistles, and thus we shall be led to quite a different conclusion from that mentioned in the text. Schwegler adduces in proof of his explanation the words of Paul in 1 Cor. xvi. 9; according to this, we must suppose that the judaizing party of whom Paul speaks in that passage had at last obtained the victory in the Ephesian church, and on that account were praised by the author in that epistle. But this is a manifest perversion of the words; for according to the connexion, they relate only to the enemies of Christianity. Rather, in that passage the name of false apostles is used to designate false teachers who aimed at being held in great repute, as in 2 Cor. xi. 9, where no one who pays attention to the connexion, would imagine that the earlier apostles were intended."

P. 391, l. 4; "a seducer of the people like Balaam," *add*, "The opposition against this germinating gnostic Antinomianism must have called for the most scrupulous adherence to the decrees of the apostolic convention at Jerusalem. The greater freedom which the apostle Paul had approved in theory, here took so mischievous an Antinomian direction, as to throw suspicion on that freedom itself. Thus, in the whole of the following age, the unscrupulous eating of the flesh offered in sacrifices was regarded as a mark of gnostic Antinomianism."[1]

[1] In this way we account for the opposition of Justin Martyr, who by Baur and his school is set down as an Ebionite, although the influence of the doctrinal system in the Pauline epistles and the Gospel of John cannot be unnoticed in his writings against those who maintained that the eating of flesh offered in sacrifice was harmless. And we know not how Schwegler (i. p. 175) can find in the passage referring to the subject

P. 396, l. 10, *after* "of John," *add*, "We certainly cannot acknowledge this book as the work of the apostle, but it bears witness to the existence of a Johannean doctrinal type, just as the Epistle to the Hebrews could not proceed from the apostle Paul, but indicates that its author was a person who enjoyed close intimacy with the apostle. We reckon among these marks the agreement in the doctrine of the Logos which no refinements can remove, (i. 17; iii. 14; xix. 30;) the designation of "*living water*," (vii. 16;) and several other things in the perhaps excessively symbolical expressions. Notwithstanding the strongly marked Jewish element, there breathes throughout the book a spirit quite different from the Ebionitish, such a spirit as could not have issued from the impure elements of that age without the creative breath of the transforming Spirit of Christ. Who can help acknowledging this in the description of the exaltation of glorified believers, and of their salvation, in the seventh chapter, of the glory of the perfected theocracy in the one-and-twentieth chapter, in the representation of the universal priesthood, and in the Apocalyptic epistles? We find no traces whatever in the book, of Jewish nationality, or a special distinction of Christians of Jewish descent; for if 144,000 chosen out of the twelve tribes are mentioned in ch. vii. 4, yet, an innumerable multitude of glorified saints out of all nations and tongues are afterwards described. And in ch. xiv. 3, the 144,000 appears as the first-fruits of Christians out of all nations who were the most advanced in the Christian life, from which it may seem that such designations in this book are not to be taken exactly according to the letter. Lastly, in the interpretation of this latter passage, I cannot agree with what Bleek has lately suggested, that only such persons are here pointed out who had kept themselves free from all the impurity connected with heathenism. If only this had

in *Dial. c. Tryph.* f. 253, *ed. Colon.* an attack on the adherents of the Pauline doctrine, or a mode of thinking directed against the apostle Paul himself. If it is to be concluded that what Justin says contradicts Pauline principles, and that he himself, consciously and designedly, was an opponent of Paul, then many of the Fathers who often cite Paul, must be regarded as anti-Pauline Ebionites. But this construction can with less reason be put on that passage, since Justin, in the words that follow soon after, but which are not quoted by Schwegler, shows against whom he is speaking, namely, the Gnostics.

been intended, it would hardly have been brought forward so prominently by the author. In this passage I can only find those persons represented who led a single life in undivided devotedness to the Lord alone, to whom their whole life was consecrated. Of any polemic tone directed against the apostle Paul not a trace can be found in the book; it cannot be taken as a proof of this, that in ch. xxi. 14, according to the twelve tribes of the theocratic people, only twelve apostles are mentioned as the foundations of the New Jerusalem. I must rather agree with Bleek that these words are rather against, than for the notion that the author wished to be regarded as one of the apostles, of which no mark exists from which it could be inferred. And if it is remarkable that any other person than the apostle John should designate himself so simply as the servant of Jesus Christ and write with such confidence and earnestness to the churches, it is to be taken into consideration, that in the vision which was in part intended for himself, he might believe that he had received a call to write in such a tone even though his own personal stand-point had not given him this importance in the Christian church. And if he himself had been an immediate disciple of the Lord, this alone would have secured him special respect."

P. 398, l. 6, "Presbyter John who was his contemporary at Ephesus," (note.) "If the Presbyter John were the author, the early substitution of the apostle of the same name might be easily explained. It would easily happen that the other John would be forgotten for the apostle, and particularly since a book which announced itself as prophetic would create reverence for itself from its character, and there would be less disposition to doubt that the author who styles himself John was the apostle. Lastly, it is worthy of observation that Polycrates, in Eusebius v. 24, where he quotes all John's titles of honour, does not distinguish him as a prophet, although such a predicate, if he believed that he could employ it, must have availed much. The position of the words in the most ancient testimony for the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse, in *Justin M. Dial. c. Tryph.* Ned. f. 380, is very striking. Ἐπειδὴ καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνήρ τις, ᾧ ὄνομα Ἰωάννης, εἷς τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ Χριστοῦ προεφήτευσε, &c. If we do not venture to regard the words εἷς τῶν ἀποστόλων as an interpolation, though examples of such interpolations might be

pointed out elsewhere in the book, yet all that is absolutely certain amounts to this, that the Apocalypse proceeded from a person of the name of John; and that this was the apostle, Justin might have inferred from the name. This is the best explanation of what is remarkable in the position of the words."

P. 401, l. 9 from bottom, *for* "reputation," *read* "refutation."

P. 403, l. 5, *after* "experienced" *add*, "The whole development of the church from Justin Martyr testifies the existence of such a Gospel which operated powerfully on men's minds. It cannot be explained from any single mental tendency in the following age, nor from the amalgamation of several. Indeed, this production existed as a representation of a higher unity, as a reconciling element to the contrarieties of that age, and could exert an attractive power over minds of so opposite a kind as a Heracleon, a Clement of Alexandria, an Irenæus, and a Tertullian. Where could we in that age find a man who was raised above its contrarieties by which all were more or less affected? And a man of so superior a Christian spirit must have crept on in the dark and made use of such a mask, instead of appearing openly in the consciousness of all-conquering truth and with a feeling of his mental superiority. Such a man, so exalted above all the Fathers of that century, need not have shrunk from the conflict. He must certainly have placed more confidence in the power of truth than in these arts of darkness and falsehood. And how can it be shown, that such a man, if we contemplate him from the stand-point of his own age, would have been restrained by no reverence for sacred history, by no scruple, to falsify a history, the contents of which were holy to him, by arbitrary fictions for a definite purpose, by peculiar falsehoods which must find their justification in their object? And how imprudently he must have acted if in order to attain his object, he presented the history of Christ in a manner which stood in diametric opposition to universal tradition! Truly only from an apostle who stood in such a relation to Christ as a John, who had received into his own breast the impression and image of that unique personality, could proceed a work which stands in such a relation to the contrarieties of the post-apostolic age! It is a work of unalloyed and simple formation. The divine in its own essence contains this power of composing differences; but never could

such a fresh, originally powerful production proceed from a designed, cleverly constructed composition of differences. The Gospel of John, if it did not proceed from the apostle John and point to that Christ whose manifestation gave birth to it, would be the greatest enigma in the world."

P. 414, l. 17 from bottom, *after* "ages" *add*, "We must oppose ourselves to a rigid dogmatic mode of conception which refuses to acknowledge historical conditions in the developing process of revelation, and the process of a genetic development; but we must also protest against a false pragmatism which would explain by means of historical conditions what can only be understood as the result of the influence of Christ's Spirit; which converts what is original into something derived, and the apostolic, by a transposition effected by the most outrageous arbitrariness, into something post-apostolic, and the fundamental error of which consists in this, that for the genuine historical Christ who is presupposed by the whole developing process of the Christian church, it substitutes an undefined phantom."

P. 416, l. 3, *after* "latter" *add*, "If we do not invert the order of things, and regard those words which could come from no human spirit, which bear on them the undeniable marks of inimitable originality, words of inexhaustible contents, in which the striving of a sound mind can only be for ever penetrating deeper and deeper—if we do not regard such words as nothing more than a reflection of the tendencies that first flowed from that original spirit."

P. 419, l. 20 from bottom, *for* "taking it," &c., *read*, "taking it in an *empirical* sense, those works which are actually performed on the stand-point of the Law are not such as correspond to its spirit and requirements."

P. 425, l. 8, *after* "of each individual" *add*, "Paul, indeed, says in 1 Cor. xv. 46, that in the development of humanity, the ψυχικὸν must go before the πνευματικὸν—that human nature as derived from the earthly man must first develop itself, and the heavenly man must enter into the train of development, and penetrate it with a new divine principle of life. But certainly it was not Paul's intention so to be understood, as if, in virtue of that earthly constitution of human nature, sin must form a necessary transition-point, that sinlessness might first proceed from Christ, which would stand

in direct contradiction to what we have observed respecting the Pauline views. In this passage according to the connexion, a contrast is not principally intended between the idea of a being under subjection to sin, and a sinless one, but between one subjected to death, and one raised above death. It is only affirmed here, that the first man wanted the divine life-giving spirit which first proceeded from Christ, which will allow nothing heterogeneous to remain along with it, but communicates to whatever it comes in contact with, an unchangeable divine life. It certainly follows that man must advance to the higher stand-point of a divine life, exalted above the domain of death. But it by no means follows that sin was something placed in the very constitution of human nature; that sin must form a necessary transition-point for that progressive development and that exaltation of human nature which afterwards would be accomplished through redemption, and which without could not have been prepared. We must rather consider it to be Paul's doctrine, that man was destined to be raised to the height intended for him by a perfectly pure development not defiled by sin. After sin had made its appearance, as something which ought not to have come forth, redeeming grace manifested itself in opposition to it, as free compassion towards those who had incurred the guilt of sin; and it is the work of grace not merely to restore what had been injured by sin, which ought not to have come into being, but also to raise man to that higher stage for which, by his free acting, he ought to have made himself worthy. But still the restoration of the original likeness to God which had been marred by sin, (Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv. 24,) always remains the principal point of the work to be accomplished by redemption. The old man is not implanted in the original nature of the first man, but was first produced from sin striving against the original nature. The new creation is represented as a renovation, a restoration of the original. Paul recognises in man—and in fallen man, (Acts xvii.,) certainly so much more in the original man—an 'offspring of God,' which was destined to develop and manifest itself, and to form everything out of itself, without sin, which stands in contradiction to it. According to all this, sin appears as something that ought to have remained far away from the course of human development."

P. 425, l. 22 from bottom, *after* "race" *add*, "everything would crumble down into isolated, separate particles, an atomic multitude, a mere nominal whole—a view refuted by the unprejudiced contemplation of history and life."

P. 430, l. 22 from the bottom. Insert the following paragraph:—"We must here take notice of Paul's trichotomy of human nature. We find, indeed, only one passage where it is expressly mentioned, (1 Thess. v. 23,) but there are several others in which it is indicated. Though among the Greeks the term ψυχὴ was employed to denote the animal principle of life in distinction from the νοῦς, as the νοῦς corresponds to the λογικὸν, (the rational principle,) yet we cannot suppose such a mode of conception in Paul, which results from a comparison of all which can be found in his writings referable to this subject. The ψυχικὸς, the man in whom the ψυχὴ alone predominates, who is in a state corresponding to this, cannot receive and understand the things revealed by the Spirit of God. All these things must appear to him as foolishness, for he wants the sense, the organ by which to appropriate them; 1 Cor. ii. 14. The πνευματικὸς, on the other hand, is the man in whom such an organ, such a sense is developed; with a sense allied to the divine he is able to perceive it. Certainly we are not to suppose that by the predicate πνευματικὸς the πνεῦμα of human nature as opposed to the ψυχὴ, and as the predominant principle, is intended. Without doubt we must rather refer it to the πνεῦμα θεῖον as actuating man. But yet we may conceive of the πνευματικὸς in Paul's sense, as the person in whom what in human nature is the πνεῦμα finds its natural development. We shall have to consider it as the organ corresponding to the divine πνεῦμα, which receives its influences, and is destined and adapted to spread through the whole of human nature. If in 1 Cor. xiv. 14, by πνεῦμα is to be understood a power indwelling in human nature, not merely something communicated to man, the χάρισμα πνευματικὸν as something personified, we can make good use of this application of the word. In the moments of the highest elevation or inspiration, when the discursive power is in abeyance, the πνεῦμα is supreme. This, as the receptive organ for the inspiration of the divine πνεῦμα, is then alone developed. Thus, under the term πνεῦμα we shall comprise what is innermost, and deepest, and highest

in man, the side of the spirit turned towards the eternal and divine—the power to become conscious of God and divine things—the capacity for a knowledge of God, and the higher self-consciousness grounded in that; while by the term ψυχὴ we understand all that belongs to the knowledge of the world and the lower self-consciousness. In man's original state the πνεῦμα as the organ of the Divine Spirit was in communion with it as its natural, undisturbed life, and the ψυχὴ was the natural organ of the human πνεῦμα; the divine and the human were in harmonic unison. But after this connexion had been broken by sin, the πνεῦμα, by the predominance of the ψυχὴ, separated from connexion with its great original and altogether kept under, was prevented from acting and manifesting itself. Thus was formed the ψυχικὸς, who with all his cultivation wants the sense for the divine, whose intellectual egoism, not less than the sensual rudeness of the man who in a narrower sense is called σαρκικὸς, stands in contradiction to the divine things which the Spirit of God reveals—both are only two forms of the worldly-minded. The ψυχικὸς remains fettered with his consciousness to the world, confined within its limits; he has no sense for the supersensual and denies its reality, which finds no point of connexion in his merely psychical being, in which the pneumatic is altogether suppressed.

"In special relation to what Paul calls the πνεῦμα stands that, which he designates 'the inner man.' The contrariety between the inner and outer man by no means corresponds to the contrariety between the body and soul, spirit or reason and sensuality. We have seen, that according to Paul's doctrine, evil may have its seat in the intellect. There is such a thing as a reason estranged from God and ruled by egoism. But Paul never speaks of an evil residing in the inner man: the idea of the inner man only appears in reference to the Divine.

"When the higher God-related nature of man begins to make itself free from the power of the ungodly principle,—to attain a consciousness of its own peculiar being, and to be sensible of its bondage, then the inner man, hitherto oppressed by the burden of worldliness, rises up. This inner man recognises in the divine law what corresponds to his own nature, and rejoices in it. But he is not yet strong enough to overcome

the predominant power of sin in the outer man, and thus to bring the law into actual practice ; Rom. vii. 22. He attains to new power through the divine life communicated by Christ when Christ dwells in the heart: Eph. iii. 16, 17. The sufferings to which the outer man is subject, only serve to free and to renew the inner man more and more ; 2 Cor. iv. 16. This opposition between the inner and the outward man is to be so understood as that all which belongs to the world must be regarded as something outward to the inner man. Evil has its ground in this, that man turns away from what is innermost to him, from his relation to God, and surrenders himself to the world over which he might be exalted by virtue of the life in God, and in consequence, man becomes continually absorbed into the world, secularized and alienated from God. Earthly accretions oppress the true inward essence of the spirit, and keep the inner man in a state of insensibility. In proportion as man retires into the depths of his inward being from the distraction of worldly things, the greater is his inward strength ; the power of the inner man whose life is in God gains the ascendency."

P. 432, l. 12, *after* "attracted" *add*, "We cannot regard this disunion as one in which man, in conflict with his better knowledge and his delight in goodness, is carried away by his own passions and lusts to surrender himself to vice. If it were so, Paul, who was blameless in legal righteousness, and had been brought up in strict legal discipline, could not have spoken as he did, from his own experience. But for man on this stand-point, it is not enough for him to be free from flagrant vices. Higher requirements of purity in heart and life are brought home to his consciousness, and in accordance with these he forms holy resolutions which he is unable to fulfil. How often, for example, might Paul have been overcome by the force of his choleric temperament."

P. 437, l. 4 from bottom, *after* "Paul terms ἀποκάλυψις" *add*, "But to understand that general revelation of God, a mind susceptible of the Divine was required. The original consciousness of truth in reference to religion and morals was kept under by the predominance of the principle of sin. As in the life of individuals, so in the life of the human race, a connexion exists between the earlier and later critical periods by virtue of which one is conditionated by the

other. Thus by the continual working of sin and idolatry from generation to generation, that original consciousness of God becomes increasingly obscured. This it is, this criminal want of freedom, which Paul means by being given up to sin and delusion. The Mosaic law corresponds indeed to the law written on the heart by virtue of which death may be acknowledged to be the desert of sin. Rom. i. 32. But since this consciousness is so much obscured by the dominion of sin, Paul makes a marked distinction between the stand-point of the theocratic people to whom the law was revealed as given by God, in which the commanding, judging, and condemning voice of God denounced all evil,—and the stand-point before, and apart from, that law. Thus Paul, in Rom. v. 13, 14, affirms that the objective connexion between sin and death was the same from the beginning, but that this objective connexion must through the positive law be made subjective by entering clearly into the human consciousness. What on the stand-point of nature left to itself is only something lying at the basis of the consciousness, is thus brought out into vivid consciousness. The maxim expressed in its absoluteness in Rom. v. 13, '*Where there is no law there is no transgression*,' becomes relative in its application. The Divine imputation of sin is regulated by the given degree of the knowledge of the law. Thus Paul, in Acts xvii. 30, which words we must regard as perfectly corresponding to the apostle's general train of thinking, speaks of the times of ignorance among the heathen as an object of the Divine forbearance, which agrees with what he says in Rom. iii. 25, respecting leaving sins unpunished in times past, through the Divine long-suffering. This is of importance in its application to the various circumstances of nations who have not yet reached a state of moral development. But although Paul distinguishes from each other the positive Divine law, and the inner moral law of nature, yet he always bears in mind the connexion between the two, and the Mosaic law appears to him as the representative of the eternal theocratic law, that law which God has stamped on the inner man, as appears from the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. Hence we must maintain against those who imagine that where Paul speaks of the law, he only refers to the Mosaic law in a narrower

revealing to him his guilt, it appears to him at the same time as the representative of the Divine law, as manifested, although less clearly, in all mankind, and applicable to all. As long as the law retained its validity, it denounced a curse on all who did not observe it; while the observance of it was the only means for participating in the kingdom of God, and attaining everlasting life. Hence, the curse it denounces must first be removed, in order that the Abrahamic blessing referring to the Gentiles might be fulfilled for all mankind. Gal. iii. 14. Hence also, the revelation of the ὀργὴ θεοῦ among the heathen, to accomplish which is the work of the law, Rom. iv. 15, must precede, and they must be convinced that only through Christ they can be freed from this wrath, in order to be made partakers of redemption. From that law of the conscience must also proceed the sense of disunion in the inner man, and the feeling of the need of redemption, without which Christianity can find no point of connexion and entrance into the soul, and this point of connexion Paul everywhere assumes in reference to the heathen."

P. 444, l. 8, *for* "xvii." *read* "xviii."

P. 444, l. 15, *after* "suffering" *add*, "Adam and Christ,—the first and the second man,—these are in Paul's estimation the two poles on which the history of the world turns. As by the one sin and death entered, so by the other, righteousness and eternal life. As the one was the progenitor of the earthly humanity laden with sin and subject to death, so the other was the creator of an exalted humanity, formed altogether according to his image. As Adam was the representative of the whole of the human race who were descended from him, so is Christ the representative of the whole, as far as they are willing to enter into communion with him. And now there are two important points to be distinguished in the life of Christ; one is, his appropriating to himself human nature as subject to sin and death; the other, his revealing in it his divine life, and perfectly realizing in it the law of holiness. In a twofold respect he has rendered satisfaction to the law, enduring what on account of its sentence of condemnation it threatened fallen sinful mankind, and fulfilling what it required of mankind. In two respects Christ appears as the representative of the whole of mankind, and has conducted himself as such in his suffering and acting; all who belong

to him, and as belonging to him wish to appear before God, must appropriate what he has done and suffered for them. With a reference to these two distinguishing points, the doing and the suffering of Christ, we wish now to consider more attentively Paul's expressions respecting the work of Christ. In reference to the former," &c. p. 445, l. 4.

P. 459, l. 10, *after* "life could proceed" *add*, "It is evident that Paul attaches no foreign meaning to the passage in Gen. xv. 6, but only from the special case develops a general idea contained in it, a general law lying at its base. It is the law, according to which all depends, for the right relation of man to God, on the surrender of the soul to him through faith—this inward act of the spirit by which the whole direction of the life is determined to God and from God, which Paul presents in opposition to the religious externality of the Jewish stand-point, which would, even in reference to Abraham's position in the theocracy, lay the greatest stress on the work or external rite of circumcision. The meaning also of the Old Testament passage is no other than this, that God accepted the Faith, the believing confidence of Abraham, as a proof of the right state of his disposition,—regarded him on account of it as a צדיק, and established him in the whole relation that was founded on it. Paul lays a stress upon the fact that it was so imputed to him by God, and he thus presupposes what he might as a general truth, that Abraham was as little as ever a sinless and, in that sense, a righteous man, and hence he concludes that what was wanting to him in subjective righteousness would be compensated by the πίστις which so availed before God, that he, on account of it, was treated as a righteous man. He also distinguishes expressly (following the historical references) the object of faith in Abraham, Rom. iv. 18, from what is the object of faith in Christians, but also brings forward the analogy between the two. The faith of Abraham had relation to the Divine omnipotence in raising the dead to a new life, and in granting a numerous posterity to one who was past age; the faith of Christians has relation to what also is opposed to sensible appearances—that a man laden with sins should appear before God as righteous, that the spiritually dead are awakened to a new life, and as a pledge of this, which also can only be an object of faith, that act of the Divine omnipo-

tence by which Christ who died for the sins of the world has been raised to a life exalted above all death."

P. 460, l. 19, "Do this, and thou shalt live," (note.) "Here also we must distinguish between the literal meaning of the words in their direct historical reference, and the general idea lying at their basis; likewise between the *νόμος* as an external theocratic state-law, and the *νόμος* according to its internal meaning as an expression in a particular form of the eternal moral law, the law for the universal kingdom of God both in the letter and spirit. In the one case, we speak of the commands of the state-law as such, which the citizens are really able to fulfil, and the living happily in the earthly theocracy is made dependent on such fulfilment; in the other case, we speak of the fulfilling of the moral law, the internal theocratic law, to which satisfaction can be given by nothing less than universal unconditional obedience, and the endless life of blessedness in the universal kingdom of God which is made dependent on such an obedience. This is a condition which no man in the present state is able to fulfil."

P. 463, l. 10, "principle of corruption," (note.) "See Gal. v. 22, 23. It is worth while to compare what Aristotle says in his *Politics*, iii. 13, that an individual cannot belong to a state as a member, if by his preeminence he is raised above the whole body; *ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἀνθρωποῖς εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον.* For such persons the laws are not; they are the law themselves: *κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος.* Hence ostracism in states that would endure no inequality. A remarkable prophecy for the kingdom of God and Christianity."

P. 466, l. 4 from bottom, *after* "living God" *add*, "It is quite impossible to join together both significations of the word *στοιχεῖα* as Baur has done, p. 594. If Dr. Baur had fully understood the connexion of my ideas, he would not have made the objections in p. 595. I find no difficulty whatever in Paul's sometimes placing heathenism on a level with Judaism, and sometimes below it. This is the case with my own view, nor do I need Dr. Baur's instructions on that point. But this I have felt to be a difficulty, that Judaism as the groundwork of religious development given by God, should be compared with heathenism. And certainly there is a logical distinction between the two explanations. The being

in bondage to the elements of the world,—the dependence of the human mind on nature, the externality of religious service—this formed the common error before the existence of Christianity, and was first taken away by its influence. This is the stand-point of sin through which man has become the slave of nature. This is nothing caused by God. Hence in heathenism arose the worship of nature, idolatry. The Jews, through the Divine Revelation imparted to them, were preserved from such a sinking into the limits of nature; but Divine Revelation itself condescended to this stand-point of humanity, above which it can only be raised by redemption, in the education of the theocratic people, and theism itself has adopted this mode of employing nature and external things; theism in sensible forms. Here then, with what is common, is also a contrariety. But it is altogether a different matter, if in reference to a divine education of man, I placed Judaism and heathenism on a level with one another as constituting the rudiments of religious knowledge. This I cannot help considering as un-Pauline."

P. 483, l. 9, *for* "This quality . . . . human nature," *read*, "This quality, which is closely connected with the whole existence of the theocratic point of view already developed in the Old Testament, as is evident from the ideas conveyed by the terms שִׁפֵל רוּחַ, לִבְּנִשְׁבָּר וְדַכְּא, עָנָו, עָנִי, forms the basis of the contrariety between the Christian and the ancient view of the world. It serves to mark this contrariety when the word (*ταπεινὸν* or *humile*) which on the ancient standpoint was wont to be employed in a bad sense, is converted in the Christian ethics into a designation of what constitutes the basis of all higher life, and of all true nature. As from that stand-point of predominant self-consciousness and self-confidence *ταπεινὸν* was used to mark a mean slavish disposition, so on the other hand *μεγαλοψυχία*[1] was used as the symbol of true elevation of soul, a certain pride of self-consciousness, which stands in diametric opposition to the essence of Christian humility. Something bearing an affinity to that ethical idea of revealed religion is found in a reflection of Herodotus, that the self-exaltation of human greatness is punished in history by the judgment of God, who humbles the great and

[1] Δοκεῖ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων, αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν, ἄξιος ὤν. Eth. Nicomach. lib. iv. c. 7.

lofty, and exalts the little. *Φιλέει ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα καλούειν, οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρονέειν μέγα ὁ θεὸς ἄλλον ἢ ἑωυτόν.* Lib. vii. c. 10, § 3. What lies at the basis of the view of history taken by Herodotus, appears elevated to an ethical and religious contemplation, when Plato, speaking of the manner in which God reveals himself in history, says, "*δίκη* always accompanies Him who punishes the deviations from the divine laws; and whoever would be happy, let him follow in dependence on the divine justice humble and orderly."[1] Here *ταπεινότης* is marked as the disposition, in virtue of which a man submits himself humbly to the Divine laws, in contrast to the pride of the wicked, who, forsaken by God, is visited by punishment. And Plutarch, who perhaps had that passage of Plato in his thoughts, makes a similar use of it, when he says that "wickedness, when checked by punishment, can scarcely be made sober-minded, humble, and God-fearing."[2] Yet in both passages we have not the whole idea of humility, but only a part of it—humility in reference to God as a judge. The consciousness of dependence," &c. p. 483.

P. 486, l. 15 from bottom, "the term *σοφία*," (note.) "Also in Plato (see the *Republic*, iv.) *σοφία* takes the rank elsewhere assigned to *φρόνησις* among the cardinal virtues. Aristotle (in the *Greater Ethics*, i. 35) makes a distinction; wisdom relates to the eternal and divine; *φρόνησις* to what is useful to man. This corresponds to the manner in which Aristotle marks off the department of ethics, the contrast made by him between the divine and the purely human. But such a contrast is not in accordance with the Christian stand-point, which demands that everything human should be referred to the eternal and the divine, and the *συμφέρον ἀνθρώπῳ* is grounded on this. The true prudence which joins itself to wisdom, is that which from hence gives the direction to the whole life, and forms its plan accordingly."

P. 492, l. 8, "is conformable to these views," *add*, "When Paul proceeds from this agreement of the inward and the outward, and regards that which appears outwardly as one with

[1] Τῷ δ' ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός. Ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος ξυνέπεται ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος. De Legib. lib. iv. ed. Bipont. vol. viii. p. 185.

[2] Ἀνακρουομένη τῷ κολάζεσθαι κακία μόλις ἂν γένοιτο σύννους καὶ ταπεινὴ καὶ κατάφοβος πρὸς τὸν θεόν. De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 3.

the Divine reality which should be expressed in it, we must never forget how emphatically he opposes every kind of making religion a matter of mere outward show, which he looked upon as something belonging to the Jewish standpoint—how he represents the Divine life as developed in every individual from within, through the faith that refers immediately to Christ himself."

P. 496, l. 17, "Eph. v. 26," *add*, "And yet, according to what has been said above, it is certain that Paul derives everything from faith. If any one had wished to refer to the power of an outward, sensible ceremony,—an element belonging to the senses,—what is to be deduced from an internal appropriation through faith, Paul would have applied to baptism what he said of circumcision, that it was a return to the element of the world, a putting the *σαρκικὸν* in the place of the *πνευματικόν*. But he speaks, in the passages we have quoted, of the whole of the Divine transaction in which *πίστις* is included, as the subjective element from which everything proceeds. And it is a common figure of speech, to state one principal element for the whole and all its elements; in this instance, the most outward is adduced, by which the whole is brought under observation, the closing point of the whole, which presupposes all the other elements, including the most internal."

P. 503, l. 13, *after* "in its consummation" *add*, "This requires our attentive consideration. At the time of which we are speaking, the church comprised the whole visible form of the kingdom of God; everything else stood in opposition to it; and yet the kingdom of God is destined for universal sovereignty,—to appropriate everything as its organ; as everything in humanity depends upon it, the kingdom of God must stamp its impress on the race, before it can find the realization of its true idea. Such an universal sovereignty in reserve for the kingdom of God, Paul certainly acknowledged; but the thought was then, and must have continued to be, not familiar to his mind, that such a supremacy of the kingdom of God was to be formed by that developing process which Christ compares to leaven, through the natural connexion of causes and effects under the Divine guidance. It was, as we have already proved, the necessary and natural view for this stage in the development of Christianity, that

this supremacy of the kingdom would be brought about under other conditions than those of earthly existence by the second advent of Christ. Hitherto, therefore, there could be no visible appearance of the kingdom of God beyond the pale of the church. Another relation of the ideas of the kingdom of God and of the church to one another must be formed when the kingdom of God had more effectually exerted its power as leaven in the development of the human race—when, by a natural instrumentality, preparation was made for what, to Paul, appeared as something that must be realized in an immediate manner by a new external event—when the kingdom of God, which entered the world first of all in the form of the church, had appropriated to itself all other things which belonged to the organism of human life. Then the idea of the kingdom of God, in its earthly form of appearance, would become more extended than that of the church, which hitherto it had not been."

P. 504, note 1, *after* "below" *add*, "Although the view taken by St. Paul of the world of spirits is represented to us and more fully developed in the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, which may be explained by their being written in the later period of his ministry, and the contradictory opinions that had then arisen; yet this cannot be considered as a mark of anything un-Pauline, for it can easily be proved that such a view of the various orders in the world of spirits was always held by the apostle, and that the relation of men to a world of good and evil spirits was always present to his mind. Rom. viii. 38, ἄγγελοι, ἀρχαὶ, δυνάμεις of this or the other world; 1 Cor. iv. 9; xii. 4. Also in 1 Cor. xv. 24, by the universality with which he expresses himself, he can hardly be supposed to mean only the ἀρχαὶ, ἐξουσίαι and δυνάμεις of this world, but must, at least, include certain invisible regions. The manner is characteristic in which Paul joins together the evil in the visible and invisible world as one, and subjects the evil angels to the judgment of those who are one with Christ, to reign and judge with him. As to the passage in 1 Cor. xi. 10, I have often seriously doubted, with Dr. Baur, the genuineness of the words διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους, since these words, after a sufficient reason has already been given for the injunction, seem a superfluous addition to the διὰ τοῦτο. I have also been led to the same supposition

as Dr. Baur, that the words may have been brought as a gloss into the text, from the stand-point of a representation derived from the apocryphal Book of Enoch, relative to the intercourse of the fallen angels with the daughters of men; Gen. vi. 2. 'Women ought to be veiled, as a protection against the temptations and plots of the evil spirits.' Yet I do not venture to speak on this point with such confidence as Dr. Baur, for I can attach a meaning to those words which will be very agreeable to Paul's mode of viewing such subjects. Paul, always mindful of the connexion between the visible and invisible world, contemplates the angels as witnesses of the devotions of the church. Angels and men, as members of one kingdom of God that exists under one head, unite together in common acts of devotion to God. Now the women ought to be afraid to appear before such eyes in a manner which is inconsistent with the natural proprieties of the female sex, and which would mark a perversion of the female character. We must certainly attach a symbolic moral meaning to the veiling. Also in 1 Cor. ix. 23 we find an example, though not perfectly analogous, where a clause with *ἵνα*, as marking a special object, is added to an assertion for which a sufficient reason had already been given with *διά*."

P. 504, l. 13, to p. 505, l. 7, "Accordingly," &c. "We here come to the important idea of a pre-existent Divine Being, who, through Christ, became manifested in time—the idea, to designate which we may, for brevity's sake, use the term *Logos*, though this distinct form of designating such an idea belongs only to a peculiar doctrinal type of the New Testament. Also on this subject we must maintain, in opposition to the arbitrary, unhistorical, destructive theories of a certain mode of thinking in our day, which is necessitated to find in all things only the human spirit seating itself in its self-reflection on the throne of God—that not a foreign element from without was introduced in the development of the doctrine that proceeded from Christ—also, that not from without, through many influences, has that been developed at which the idea of Christianity aims, and for which Christ only gave the first impulse—but we must here deduce everything from

and principle. We must only distinguish the successive preparatory stages to show how what was contained originally in his divine and human consciousness, and given in his self-revelation, was developed in the consciousness and the preaching of those who testified of him.

"As, in the doctrine promulgated by Christ himself, we find the fulfilment and explanation of the Old Testament standpoint alike given, but in the developing process of apostolic Christianity, fulfilment and explanation are seen apart in successive stages, and we behold the unfolding of Christianity from its closest connexion with the Old Testament to its perfectly independent development when it threw aside the Old Testament covering; so also we must distinguish between the conception of the person of Christ, which was connected with the predominant Old Testament idea of the Messiah, and deduced from it, and the appearance of the Divine Word "become flesh," first of all anointed with the fulness of the Divine Spirit before he came forward as the Messiah, then known as the pre-existent Son of God who appeared in time and manifested his glory, the medium of transition from the historical revelation of the Divine to the pre-historical and super-historical. There is here a progressive organic development, of which the members reciprocally conditionate one another; but everything leads back to what was in the historical Christ, and to his original self-revelation. The first three Gospels and the Acts correspond to the first standpoint: and in the former there are not wanting intimations which denote or imply that higher idea of the Son of God as it was developed by Paul and John; Matt. xi. 27; xxii. 44; xxviii. 18, 20. The total impression given by the Christ of the first three Gospels would lead any one who receives it with a susceptible disposition to recognise a Divine form, letting himself down from heaven to earth. Several pregnant single expressions, as when he said, "In this place is one greater than the temple," Matt. xii. 6; and if we take into account what the temple was to the Jewish religious sentiment, and what he must be on the first stage of theocratic development, we shall also be led to recognise such a Christ in the first Gospels, or we cannot hesitate to charge him with impious self-idolatry, or we must apply the scalpel of an arbitrary criticism, and let the whole be dissolved into some-

thing as unsubstantial as a mist. The predicate *υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, the Messiah, appearing as a man, who realized the original type of humanity, and exalted human nature to the highest dignity, and the predicate *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*, which in Christ's lips denoted something more than the common Jewish idea of the Messiah, refer reciprocally to one another, and imply the distinction as well as the combination and the unity of the Divine and human in him.

"But the development of theology from the Old Testament stand-point also favoured this revelation of the higher image of Christ; and to what resulted from the developing process of the divine appearances in the Old Testament, ideas which sprung up on the soil of Grecian philosophy were afterwards to be joined, in order to render accessible to the human mind these visible presentations of the Divine. The Messianic idea of the Old Testament had already in some special features (as in Isaiah lx. 6) been exalted from the earthly to the super-human Divine, and shown how this ideal of the theocratic King in his essence must pass beyond the limits of a mere human appearance. It was an idea which, though at first representing itself in historical earthly forms of appearance, yet was pregnant with a significance which necessarily tended to the super-earthly and the heavenly. The revelation of God in the Old Testament led to the visible presentation of a WORD forming the connexion between the Creation and the eternal, hidden essence of God, and this Word pointed to the idea of an eternal self-revelation of God as a pre-supposition of the whole creation, in which it had its root, and without which no thought from God or leading to God could arise in the human soul. It is a prevailing error to deduce all this from the influence of Grecian philosophy. It is true, that Platonic and Stoical ideas of a Logos afterwards gave Philo points of connexion for Grecising such an idea; but certainly, although such an idea had formed itself from the Old Testament דָּבָר, he was not under the necessity of selecting such a word to indicate that idea. In Philo himself we must carefully distinguish what he received from the traditions of Jewish theology, and what he made of that theology from the stand-point of his Græco-Jewish religious philosophy. The conception that was derived from the religious development of the Old Testament, and then through the Alexa-

drian theology brought into connexion with the ideas of the Grecian philosophy, formed a natural transition-point from *legal* Judaism, which placed an infinite chasm between God and man, to the Gospel, which was to fill up this chasm, since it revealed a God communicating himself to mankind, and establishing a fellowship of life between himself and them."

P. 507, l. 10 from bottom, *after* "of late years" *add*, "As when a denial of God, which degrades man, adorns itself with the name of Humanism, which in its true sense applies only to which exalts man to the consciousness of his true dignity consisting in the image of God and destined for eternal life, and can alone enable him to realize this dignity.

"It has been maintained, indeed, that the Christology which we here attribute to Paul, is only to be found in the Epistles to the Colossians and Philippians, and this is urged as a proof of the un-Pauline character of these epistles; but we must maintain in the face of all such critical pucrilities, that in the larger and universally acknowledged Pauline epistles the same Christology forms the ground-work, which appears in a more striking, because antithetic form, in the Epistle to the Colossians. The words in the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians, ver. 4, *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν*, manifestly contain the idea that God sent out his Son from himself, and that therefore he was with him before he appeared in the world; as when Paul says in the sixth verse, *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, it is implied that the Spirit sent into the hearts of believers came forth from the depths of the Divine Being, and in consequence effects the connexion of believing souls with God. Here the words of Paul in 1 Cor. viii. 6, are particularly applicable, where he points out the characteristics of the Christian stand-point in the religious consciousness. 'But to us there is one God the Father, from whom all existence proceeds, and we are for him, (he is the end of our existence,) for his glory: and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things were brought into existence, and we are through him.' This passage cannot be otherwise understood, than that the *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα* corresponds to the *ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα*, and both therefore are equally comprehensive, and thus the *ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ* refers itself back to the *ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν*. Accordingly, the passage affirms that,

as all existence proceeds from God, so through Jesus Christ as the one Mediator, in relation especially to the pre-existent divine nature in him, all things were introduced into actual existence, and as Christians are conscious that God alone ought to be the end of their being, so the realization of this destiny is accomplished through Christ by virtue of the new creation that proceeds from him. So Paul here combines in one view of the Lord Jesus Christ, the divine and the human, contemplates him in reference to these two great points, as the mediating Being, by whom the whole universe was at first called into existence, and by whom not only the original Creation, but *that* creation is brought into being which is destined to realize the end of the first.[1]

"The exposition of this passage admits of less doubt than that of 1 Cor. x. 4, where Paul represents the water from the rock, and the manna which was given to the Jews in the wilderness, as a symbol of the communion with Christ effected by the Lord's Supper. 'They all drank of that spiritual rock that followed them,' says Paul, 'and that rock was Christ.' Now, this would not imply the Messianic pre-existence, if we understand it to mean—the rock represented Christ: was a symbol of him. But it certainly agrees better with Paul's strain of ideas if we take it in this sense:—that Christ himself was the rock who furnished the manna and water to the Jews, as he now communicates himself in the Supper. Now, if we are not justified from any other quarter in assuming the idea in Paul's writings of such a Messianic pre-existence, we must content ourselves with such a dilution of his meaning in that passage as is offered in the first interpretation. Likewise, if in 1 Cor. x. 9 *κύριον* is the genuine reading, but *Χριστὸν* a correct gloss, this necessarily indicates that when Paul said of the Jews in the wilderness *ἐπείρασαν τὸν Χριστὸν*, he implied that Christ was acting among them according to his Divine nature. The words in 2 Cor. viii. 9, ('For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that

[1] Baur (p. 627) would limit the *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα* to all things which relate to reconciliation and redemption; but this is absolutely impossible, as will be evident to every unprejudiced person on an examination of the context. The words in 2 Cor. v. 18, where the limitation plainly proceeds from the connexion, are not at all parallel to the passage before us.

ye through his poverty might be made rich') are also certain evidence that Paul's views were such as we have stated. It is impossible to understand these words as Baur (p. 628) has explained them in order to do away with their obvious inference; 'That Christ was poor, *i. e.* lived in poverty and a lowly condition, although as Redeemer, through the grace of redemption which we owe to him, he was rich enough to make us rich.' Certainly, the 'being rich' forms a contrast to the 'being poor,' but the riches of his grace would form no such contrast. To be rich in grace, and to live in poverty and a lowly condition, are perfectly compatible. And it is here intended to exhibit Christ as a pattern of self-sacrifice and self-denial, that men may learn to give up what they might otherwise enjoy, in order to help others. But how could this agree with such an exposition? We know not how to understand it, when Baur, who cannot deny this reference of the words, will not acknowledge what is implied, but thinks they may thus be explained:—'That we must show the same self-sacrificing disposition as Christ, who was poor and in a lowly condition, though he was so exalted above us by the riches of his grace.' Where is the contrast, and where is the example of self-sacrifice? Although the word *πτωχεύειν* in itself, according to the Greek usage, only denotes 'being poor,' yet in the words 'for our sakes he was poor,' and in the contrast *πλούσιος ὤν*, it is necessarily understood that he was before rich, and for our sakes became poor. The words cannot be understood in any other sense than this: He who was rich in divine glory, has on our account taken part in our poverty; he has entered within the limits and wants of our earthly existence, in order that by means of this his self-humiliation we might partake of the riches of his divine life, which without it we could not have done. Again, when Paul in Rom. viii. 3, says, 'God sent forth his Son' *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, these words imply the pre-existence of the Son of God, *οὐκ ἐν σαρκί*. The passage in Rom. ix. 5, can certainly not be made use of, in an isolated form, to prove from it Paul's doctrinal views, since it requires for its interpretation an appeal to Paul's mode of thinking elsewhere, and has, undeniably, great difficulties. Yet we must admit we cannot feel satisfied with the explanation that Paul must have ended the sentence with the words, 'from whom, according

to the flesh, Christ came,' without adding anything more—he who was so fond of contrasts, and whom the consciousness of the glory of Christ, of which he was always full, would here prompt to the expression of a contrast. He must, in truth, have felt himself compelled to express more strongly what he brought forward as the culminating point of the whole—the last end of the theocratic development which was to proceed from the Jews, and we cannot think that he would have ended in so bald a manner. Neither can we admit, that the Doxology to God the Father could be joined in this way without any intermediate link, and this whole doxology would be uncommonly heavy, and quite un-Pauline. Hence we must regard it as the most natural exposition according to which the last words form a contrast to the preceding *κατὰ σάρκα*, and give emphasis to the meaning of the great preeminence which accrued to the Jews from the Messiah's being born of them. "He who is God exalted over all," (exalted above all that is named in the preceding clauses,) or perhaps still better thus, avoiding the encumbrance of the *ὁ ὤν*, 'The Being exalted over all, be praised as the Divine Being for ever.' We certainly admit that Paul would not have conferred the title *ὁ θεὸς* simply upon Christ, but it is something different when in reference to his deemed communicated nature he calls him *θεός*. And as he now attributes such exaltation to him, and represents him as the Being in whom all the communications of divine blessing to mankind are concentrated, he might be well induced to ascribe the doxology to him. That this does not occur elsewhere, cannot serve as a proof that Paul could not once have done this in a peculiar connexion. The words of Paul in Rom. i. 4, contain nothing inconsistent with this view. He there refers to the Son of God in his twofold relation,—in his state of humiliation, when he had subjected himself to the limits of earthly humanity, and as he went beyond it when the dignity attached to him as the Son of God was revealed, so that his divine essence unveiled itself free from the limits of nature by which it had hitherto been kept back. The Son of God, who according to his earthly appearance was born of the posterity of David (the Messiah peculiarly belonging to the Jewish people), by means of the indwelling spirit of holiness (the divine nature peculiar to him) was proved to be the Son of God by his resurrection, or

in virtue of his resurrection, (for this event was indeed the beginning of his emerging from the limits of an existence subjected to nature,) in order that henceforward, in correspondence to the essence of the Son of God, the πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης in him, he might operate with a power raised above all limits, invisible and divine—the theocratic King and Redeemer belonging equally to the whole human race.

P. 508, l. 3, "in vogue respecting spirits," *add*, "although, as we have proved, the same doctrinal view lay at the basis of what he has expressed in his earlier epistles. When Paul, in 2 Cor. iv. 4, describes Christ as the image of God, in whom the glory of God is mirrored forth, the same train of ideas is implied, which, more fully unfolded by an antithetical reference, meets us in the Epistle to the Colossians."

P. 508, l. 20 from bottom, *after* "among mankind" *add*, "With this view also is connected the manner in which Paul expresses himself in Phil. ii. 5—9, 'That whereas Christ found himself in a state of divine existence, he did not so value that equality to God and divine existence, nor was he eager to let it come forth that he might make a show with it, but on the contrary, he renounced it when he entered into the dependent relations of a creaturely human existence, and was born as a man like other men, although under the covering of this visible form was hidden something exalted above human nature and the whole created universe. The exaltation which followed this self-humiliation, and by which the obedience rendered by him in the form of a servant was rewarded, cannot be referred to that in which according to his divine essence he was already exalted above all, but only to the man who had come forth from that act of self-humiliation; who as a man, conscious of his divine nature, carried this act of self-inanition to the highest pitch. If we carefully discriminate the ideas, we shall find here no contradiction which would oblige us to drag in gnostic ideas, of which we do not perceive the least trace; there is, indeed, nothing more than what we have already found in 2 Cor. viii. 9; Rom. viii. 3.

P. 522, l. 9, *after* "world" *add*, "Paul here treats of an eternal election and predestination antecedent to the creation of the world, but not of an analogous reprobation, since the former, but not the latter, has an eternal ideal basis. Repro-

bation relates only to a temporal appearance; those in whom the divine idea fixed in Christ is not realized, hence appear as the excluded from their realization, in other words as the reprobate."[1]

P. 530, l. 9 from bottom, *after* "work for believers" *add*, "Yet this does not forbid our supposing that the spirit of Paul, comprehending all things to the last closing point of the development of redemption and salvation in one vast contemplation, might have raised itself above the limits of the proposition lying immediately before him, and taken in the final result, which would resolve all disharmony into perfect unison. And it would be the most natural construction to suppose an interval between what is stated in 1 Cor. xv. 23, and in the following verse, and in this interval those developments might take place which would contribute to bring on the last end of universal restoration: first of all, the resurrection and perfect blessedness of believers; and then the general resurrection of all, freed from sin, exalted to a divine life, when God shall be all in all. But it is worthy of notice how immediately Paul comes to the ἔπειτα. It appears that here he wished rather to give hints, than to express and develop."

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[2] Vol. i. p. 1. "INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON THE SOURCES OF THIS HISTORY. The manner in which criticism has been recently applied to this part of history induces us to premise a few words on its sources as an introduction to the following investigations. A few notices from other quarters excepted, we must, in order to examine the true state of the facts for this history, carefully compare two sources with one another; namely, the *Epistles* of the apostles and their companions,—(which as soon as we can ascertain their genuineness are the surest sources)—and the narrative respecting these times, known by the name of *The Acts of the Apostles*. As we are prepared to prove the credibility of the latter afterwards in detail, we wish here only to see, in passing, whether

[1] Employing the scholastic terminology in a Pauline sense, we may say that the *voluntas signi*, not the *voluntas beneplaciti*, is here pointed out.

[2] By an oversight, these paragraphs were not placed in the printer's hands early enough for insertion in the proper place.—TR.

some marks of the confidence to be placed in this source may not be discovered.

"In the latter part of the book itself, from chap. xvi. 10, we meet with a striking peculiarity,—the author in several passages speaks in the first person plural, including himself among the companions of the apostle Paul, and therefore an eye-witness of part of the events contained in the history. This is a very important indication of the rank which we must allow to this document as a source of historical information. It may indeed be objected, as has actually been done by Dr. Von Baur (in his work, *Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi*: Stuttgart, 1845), that the author of the Acts belonged to a later period, but in order to deceive, adopted this phraseology, since he wished to be regarded as the companion of the apostle Paul, and to act the part of Luke. But this assumption no unprejudiced person can adopt. For then, how can it be explained that the author, from the first, gives no sign of the part he wished to act, and in which it was so important for him to be acknowledged, so that where he first begins to adopt this style he drops no hint who he is, and how he happened to be in Paul's company? This really looks in itself, and especially according to the analogy of the apocryphal writings of that age, as unlike one who wished to write under the name of another, as we can imagine. The manner in which the author of the Acts at once, without anything leading to it, begins to express himself in this associated form of address, bears undeniable marks of the absence of design.

"And for whom did the author compose this work? As by the introductory words it is connected with the Gospel of Luke, and professes to be the second part of that work on the primitive history of Christianity, it is evident that it was primarily written for the same object which the author of the Gospel states in his introduction,—in order to furnish an individual, Theophilus, with exact and certain knowledge of that history; and this certainly does not agree with his wishing to act the part of any other person than he really was. Here again it may be objected—these writings were not really composed for such a Theophilus, but he who wished to forge this work under the name of a companion of the apostle Paul chose this garb for his fabrication. But the introductory words of Luke's Gospel are by no means suited to give us the

impression of such a design, but correspond in a simple natural manner to the object which a Christian writer might have who lived under the relations of that fresh age of Christianity. And further, why should he in those words (Luke i. 2,) have stated that the accounts of eye-witnesses formed the main sources of his narrative, when in consistency with the part he wished to act he ought to have described himself as an eye-witness? Or must we refer those introductory words only to the Gospel, and not at the same time to the Acts? But if persons are resolved to find a fabrication undertaken for a special purpose, will it not be most natural to admit that the author from the first had the whole plan of his *fraus pia* in his mind, and hence in the introductory words to the first part of his work had made preparation for what he intended to exhibit in the second part?

"Now, if this supposition of a designed fabrication cannot be applied to that personal form of the narrative in the Acts, this peculiarity can be explained in only one of two ways. Either the same person speaks here from whom the whole history proceeded, or it is the account of another individual, whom the author, in making use of various sources for his work, embodied in this original form with his own composition. If we suppose the first, it is evident that this work proceeded from one who was an eye-witness of part of the events he describes, and a missionary companion of the apostle Paul, who stood in close connexion with him. And this will predispose us to judge favourably of the sources which the author might make use of, for those transactions in which he was not an eye-witness, as well as of the general fidelity of his narrative. We shall not allow ourselves to be persuaded that such a person, instead of wishing to give pure history, only aimed at compiling from the materials before him a fiction, even though for a good object. But if we adopt the second alternative, it follows, that at least an important portion of the narrative is founded on the report of a trustworthy eye-witness. From a single example of the use of such a report, it is apparent that the author wished to employ, and did employ, good sources of information. And by this single example, that at the place in which he incorporated this account in his history, he left this form of personal narrative unaltered, he shows that he was disposed to alter the materials

which he made use of in his work, too little for historical art, for unity of historical composition, rather than too much for the fidelity of the narrative. It is plain how deficient he was in historical art, and that, therefore, we must expect to find in this work rather the raw material from the sources within his reach, than an historical composition artificially moulded and framed according to one point of view. 'It is plain how far we should be from expecting that such a person would have constructed the speeches he reports, in accordance with the stand-point and character of the speakers, after the example of the classical historians, with creative art, and how little such an artificial style and ability can be attributed to him.

"Both suppositions have their difficulties, which in either case can find their solution only in the peculiar character of the historian, and in the whole method of his work. In the first case, the carelessness and awkwardness which allowed him to admit these foreign accounts without altering the unsuitable form of the narrative, is very strange. But if we adopt the second supposition, it still remains very striking and awkward, that he should appear speaking in this form all at once without notice; without saying anything about the manner in which he came to be one of Paul's companions; how by turns he is associated with him and separated from him. But in both cases we shall be led to similar conclusions in reference to the origination and character of this historical collection.

"Whether the introductory words of Luke's Gospel refer or not to both parts of the work, at all events we can apply what is there said to the Acts, that according to Luke i. 2, he made use of the reports of the original eye-witnesses of the Christian history, and of the first publishers of the Gospel, which would perfectly agree with the character of Luke, to whom ecclesiastical tradition attributes both works, the physician whom Paul, in his epistle written from Rome, names as his fellow-labourer. Indeed, if we refer these words in the Gospel to the Acts, this would not prove that the account in which he uses the first person proceeded from himself; for on that supposition he would himself belong in part to the eye-witnesses. Yet it is questionable, whether these words really belong to both parts, and whether the author, when writing the Gospel, had already planned that continuation of it."

P. 1, ch. i. *Begin* with the following paragraph :—"The Christian church, as a community, proceeding from a new principle for the transformation of the world, and destined to introduce this new principle into humanity, presupposes, as the basis of its existence, that Person who was himself in his whole being and manifestation that world-transforming principle, without whom the existence of the church itself would be a monstrous lie. But in order to explain the commencement of the existence of the church, there was a necessity for that unparalleled event affecting all succeeding ages, by which this objective principle passed into the consciousness of men, henceforth to form the central point of a new internal life-communion, and on which the being of the church rests. This event was the miracle of the first Pentecost, which, in its essential nature, is repeated wherever a creation of the Christian life, either in individuals or communities, takes place. If all the great epochs in the development of the church point us to a beginning which marks the boundary between the old and the new, where first that which constitutes the peculiarity of the new epochs comes forth into manifestation, certainly the greatest epoch, from which all the others proceeded, cannot be thought to want such a beginning; and historical traditions here harmonize with what the idea of the thing itself would lead us to anticipate. And however much the explanation of particular points in that tradition may be disputed, the historical reality of the fact on the whole remains unshaken and raised above all mythical attempts at explanation, and its truth is shown by itself, as well as by the results which were consequent on this beginning.

"The historical development," &c.

ANTIGNOSTIKUS;

OR

THE SPIRIT OF TERTULLIAN,

AND

An Introduction to his Writings:

A MONOGRAPH DESIGNED TO BE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND MORALS IN THE FIRST AGES.

BY

DR. AUGUSTUS NEANDER.

Veritas non in superficie est, sed in medulla et plerumque occulta manifestis.—TERTULLIAN.

TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND EDITION (*Berlin* 1849) OF THE ORIGINAL GERMAN.

DEDICATION.

To my dear Friend,

DR. JULIUS MÜLLER, OF HALLE.

IT gives me pleasure to dedicate my works, as they appear, to those persons who are peculiarly dear to me; and openly to express, in times so strongly tending to isolate and divide, the consciousness of cordial fellowship in mind and heart with those whom I know to be one with myself, not merely on the ground of our common Christianity, but in their theological principles; and there is no one to whom I believe that I stand so near in this respect as yourself, my much-loved friend. May a gracious God enable us to maintain this unity, and by the purifying influences of his Spirit, may it become more decided and more refined. I thank Him with all my heart, that he has preserved you for ourselves and his militant church, amidst the ravages of that epidemic which has been so threatening in your city, a representative of the true *via media*, so much required in these difficult, distracted times. May He preserve you still by his guardian providence, and strengthen you in soul and body, that you may long act as a living pattern and a wise guide to our beloved youth, even after we who are more advanced in life

are called away. May you, as hitherto, be enabled to exemplify, both by word of mouth and by your writings, the harmony and consistency of child-like, humble Christianity, with sound philosophy and true liberty of thought; to warn from the abyss of all-devouring unbelief, and from the bondage of human opinions, whether novel, or old ones revived; to contend for the preservation of that genuine freedom in heart and mind which Christ has gained for us; and to exemplify for our guidance the humility of faith and knowledge, combined with simplicity in disposition, thought, and language. I name those qualities in you which, in relation to the manifold errors of our times, I esteem most precious, and which appear to me peculiarly important and salutary for the education and guidance of our youth; although I am as sensible as you can be, that man is not to be the object of eulogy and homage, but that in knowledge and practice we all are, and ever shall be before God, beggars and poor sinners.

Most cordially yours,

A. NEANDER.

BERLIN, 1*st July*, 1819.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

As the diseased state of my eyesight continues to be such that I am obliged to make use of the eyes of others, and have thus been prevented from carrying on my Church History as vigorously as I could have wished, my attention has been turned to the progressive perfection of works that have long since appeared,—a labour which I could more easily accomplish by means of such aid. Taking into consideration the important place occupied by Tertullian in the development of the Western Church—and of Christianity as exhibited in that church; and generally, the rank this father holds among the original minds of all ages; and moreover, the peculiar interest I have always taken in the strongly marked peculiarities of this distinguished man;—on all these accounts I have felt very desirous that a labour of love, which was undertaken four-and-twenty years ago, should not remain before the public with all its defects in substance and form, or, on account of them, sink into oblivion. Though some copies of the first edition remain still unsold, yet my publisher, zealous for the interest of literature, was equally ready to gratify my wish that this work should appear in a new and more complete form.

There *was* a time of darkness, self-called enlightenment, which, in the contraction and obscurity of unconscious mental poverty, looked down with an air of pity on the greatness of earlier ages; it could not understand so striking a phenomenon as that of the new world of Christianity revealing itself to this man of rugged, wayward spirit, and fancied that by taking some paradoxical expressions of this eminent father

on philosophy and reason, torn from their connexion, it could form an estimate of his whole character, thus judging of the fruit by the hard shell that protects it. But this time has passed away. We look upon Schleiermacher, that great teacher of our nation, from whom it has still much to learn in reference to the development of the future, as the great man, of whose multifarious merits it was one to have contributed materially to this issue. And the true German mind, of which one essential tendency is to penetrate deeply into divine things, after throwing off the foreign yoke and awakening to self-consciousness, turned away from the poverty-struck superficiality of the period that had just closed, with earnest longing for the inspiration of a nobler spirit in the earlier ages of the church. It showed itself capable of understanding the manifold phases of Christianity, even those which bear the least resemblance to the spirit of our own age and country, and of contemplating them with affection. In that morning-dawn of a better time, to which, through that common fault which requires each one of us to smite upon his breast, the succeeding development did not correspond, this book first appeared. Since then that stand-point to which we have alluded, though apparently overcome, has come back still more poverty-struck, though with imaginary wealth, and assuming a far greater boldness of dogmatism on everything that surpassed the comprehension of little, common-place, cloddish souls. In place of that so-called vulgar rationalism, in which there was still an honourable remnant of a recognition of the super-mundane and divine—some sense of the religious and the moral—from a consequential carrying out of the same principles, there has proceeded what would designate itself as more sublime, but which is, in fact, a far more vulgar thing—*the Gospel of the Apotheosis of Humanity*, which is only another name for Atheism, and of which, after several decenniums have been spent in constructing its theory, the mischievous effects might easily be foreseen; and at last, entering more into actual life, ever since the outrages of the disgraceful 18th of March, it has, to the shame and injury of our nation, been continually making fresh manifestations of its destructive and pernicious effects, which threaten to annihilate all the higher goods of humanity.

I have endeavoured to enrich this new edition, and to improve both its form and contents. The alteration in the title will indicate in what direction I have particularly aimed to enrich this work; and several new investigations will be observed on the interpretation, and readings in difficult passages. It is my opinion, that for a better edition of so peculiar a writer, in whom there is so much obscurity, and who certainly was not understood, even at an early period, far more can be gained by carefully studying his mode of thinking and language, and thus learning to restore the original reading, than by any collation of manuscripts. Soon after the publication of the first edition, the well-known review appeared, by the late Dr. V. Cölln, a man who, in all that he undertook, performed something peculiar and able in its kind. This review was very unfavourable both to the author and his work. Dr. V. Cölln did not perceive what I aimed at in this work, and applied a wrong standard by which to judge it. Yet, in several points, I must acknowledge him to be right, of which this new edition will give evidence; several things I have maintained against his objections; several things, from my theological stand-point, I could not take notice of. There was a momentary misunderstanding between myself and the writer; but this was soon cleared up by his review of my Church History. After this, he surprised me one Sunday morning by a visit. Up to that time we had been, personally, total strangers. We soon entered into a close theological conversation, in which certainly the difference of our theological stand-points was distinctly brought out; but yet, the consequence was, that on parting we cordially shook hands, with the consciousness of a communion of heart that carried us above the important theological differences that existed between us. I did not then apprehend that we should so soon lose the highly esteemed man, who might yet have rendered so much service to science.

According to another conception of the nature of historical art, and of what belongs to understanding a writer—the representing an image of the man—perhaps many persons will think that the truth is wanting in this and the other part of this representation. It will appear to them that I have not sufficiently brought under notice the strange excrescences, the eccentric, and the monstrous. But I must regard the

business of the historian as resembling that of the painter—to let the soul of the man, the idea that animates him, appear in his physiognomy. This it is which gives the key by which we rightly understand the caricature by which the appearance of the soul and the idea is obscured; but to represent the caricature, should always be a subordinate, and not a principal object. To recognise the divine impress in the appearance, to develop it clearly from its temporary obscuration, this alone can be an office worthy of the historian, and for the sake of which alone it is worth the labour to write history. Whoever thinks otherwise, I leave him to enjoy his opinion.

May a gracious God accompany with his blessing this book in its new dress; and especially may it serve to make the beloved youth who have devoted themselves to the study of theology, better acquainted with the image of this great and influential father of the church and with the developing process of Christian truth in that early age.

I must conclude with again expressing my special thanks to my young friend Candidate SCHNEIDER for the fidelity and skill with which he has assisted me, both in planning one part of this edition and in conducting the whole through the press, as my eyes would not allow me to correct it. It must have been to him a more difficult task, because the whole was written after my dictation by different persons.

Meanwhile, as far as my defective eye-sight and the additional labour which it occasions in my regular duties will permit, I have endeavoured to proceed with my Church History, and it will always be my most ardent wish to accomplish it, with God's help, for which, at my advanced age, only a little time now remains.[1]

A. NEANDER.

BERLIN, 1*st July*, 1849.

[1] Dr. Neander died July 15, 1850.—TR.

INTRODUCTION.

THE special claim on our attention of the Christian Father with whose character and works we are about to be occupied, arises from his being the first representative of that peculiar form of the Christian and theological spirit which has prevailed in the Western church through all succeeding ages :—that form in which the anthropological and soteriological element predominates. In Tertullian we find the first germ of that spirit which afterwards appeared with more refinement and purity in Augustine ; as from Augustine the scholastic theology proceeded, and in him also the Reformation found its point of connexion. In Tertullian we see all this foreshadowed, and he constitutes a peculiarly important turning-point in the development of the church—the boundary-line, so to speak, between two distinct epochs. As a central point, round which everything else turned, we may regard the appearance of Gnosticism,—the first notable attempt to introduce into Christianity the existing elements of mental culture, and to render it more complete on the hitherto rather neglected side of theoretical knowledge ; it was an attempt of the mind of the ancient world, in its yearnings after knowledge, and in its dissatisfaction with the present, to bring within its grasp and to appropriate the treasures of this kind which Christianity presented. The peculiar mental tendencies in the church were distinguished from one another by the relation in which they stood to Gnosticism. On the one hand, there was a tendency which was directly opposite to Gnosticism, and repelled those elements of culture which Gnosticism would have blended with Christianity : to the predominant

speculative tendency of Gnosticism it opposed the aims of practical Christianity, attaching itself with all its might simply to the facts of Christianity, and rejecting with a firm religious realism all idealistic subtleties. On the other hand, there was a tendency, which in its striving after knowledge approximated to Gnosticism, recognised a real mental want which lay at its basis, and sought to satisfy it by substituting for a false gnosis a true one, founded on Christian principles. Both tendencies were chargeable with one-sidedness and defect, and it was needful to supplement and balance one by the other, in order to further the sound development of Christian truth. The former of these tendencies led to an error directly opposite to Gnosticism; the other was itself infected with what was erroneous in Gnosticism. As we must regard the great Origen as peculiarly the representative of the second tendency, so we recognise in Tertullian the representative of the first. The unyielding powerful exhibition of what was peculiarly Christian, with an unceremonious rejection of all foreign ingredients, in sharp hostility to the existing world, forms the marked distinction of Tertullian's spirit. But this clearly shows us the striking one-sidedness of his nature, which disturbed and obscured his conception of Christianity, the principles of which are designed not to repel the world, but to appropriate and transform it. Where this latter effect is not produced, a rough nature such as Tertullian's cannot properly experience the spiritualizing influence of Christianity. To Gnosticism Montanism stood in the most direct contrast, and of this Tertullian is the most important representative, for his mental course was greatly influenced by it, and he first wrought it out into a system. Rightly to understand the spirit of Tertullian we must be well acquainted with the nature of Montanism, and its position in the developing process of Christianity.

There is a time when the divine supernatural principle of Christianity, after it has first manifested itself as such in all its purity and directness, must enter into combination with human culture; the supernatural must become continually more natural, and the age of revelation and miracles must be succeeded by that of operations carried on by the agency of the human mind as animated by the divine life: towards the formation of such a process that tendency is opposed, which

would retain for ever in an equal degree the element of the supernatural—of inspiration, where the mind can be only passive. On this side Montanism is opposed to Gnosticism as the other extreme. We perceive in it a tendency disposed not to appropriate the world and the natural, but to repel and abjure them—to make the opposition perpetual between the supernatural and the natural, though Christianity aims at overcoming this opposition and effecting a harmony between them. Montanism therefore leads to a predominant ascetic element; and from what has been said, it is easy to perceive the alliance between the spirit of Tertullian and Montanism. Although we can find no ground whatever for denying the historical personality of a Montanus, yet we must consider it as a point of extremely little importance in relation to the mental movements that proceeded from Montanism. The appearance of Montanus in Phrygia only gave an accidental impulse to those tendencies which had long been forming in the progressive development of the church, and was the occasion of their being drawn together and fixed in one point; and hence the effects were far greater than could have been expected from his personal character. He was only the unconscious organ, through which a peculiar mental tendency, which had developed itself in various parts of the church, expressed itself with clearer intelligence and greater strength. A point of union was given to the scattered elements. And such likewise was the relation of Montanism to Tertullian. By means of it, what had long been maturing in his religious character and in his peculiar religious development, was held more consciously, and expressed with greater force. Hence we are more disposed to seek the point of connexion for Tertullian's Montanist tendency in what already belonged to his character, than to explain his passing over to Montanism from external circumstances and inducements.

During the same period, that perversion of the Christian spirit and the intermixture of the Old and New Testament stand-points was becoming more developed, from which Roman Catholicism afterwards arose. Montanism was, indeed, on one side, involved in such a perversion, and leaving the Christian stand-point, wandered back to that of the Old Testament; but on the other hand, by bringing forward an Old Testament prophetic order, it formed a check against

mingling the Old Testament priesthood with the Christian stand-point. The free operation of the Spirit, though more in an Old Testament than a New Testament form, was opposed to the stiff traditional tendency. On this side, Tertullian, as the representative of Montanism, formed an opposing force to the increasing hierarchical element. In this respect he constitutes an important link in the development of the church. By means of the great influence he exerted through the relation in which he stood to Cyprian, who called him his teacher, he brought it about, that the montanistic element in a form corresponding to the ecclesiastical spirit was continued in the development of the Western church.

To all these points we must pay attention, while we take a nearer view of Tertullian as he displays himself in his writings.—

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS, born in the latter part of the second century, was the son of a centurion in the service of the Proconsul at Carthage. Though belonging to the higher ranks of society, he must have received a good literary education; for his writings bear marks of extensive reading and a variety of historical and antiquarian knowledge. He was sufficiently master of the Greek language to be able to write treatises in it. If we are disposed to learn from Tertullian's own writings his precise rank and profession, we not only meet with the characteristics of a rhetorical education, which indicate that in his youth he had been occupied with rhetorical exercises; but in the whole method of his argumentation and controversial tactics we easily recognise the advocate of earlier days, who involuntarily transferred the habits of the pleader to ecclesiastical polemics, attempting to draw together as many reasons as possible for the point he wished to establish, without any great nicety in the selection. We may indeed be disposed to attribute this to the peculiarities of his mental structure and character, his natural tendency to push to an extreme whatever he took in hand; but if we notice the juridical cast of his language, and the comparisons borrowed from legal science, we shall find a palpable mark of his earlier studies. And, indeed, this may be confirmed by an account of Eusebius, who would hardly have been led to it only by a supposition deduced from the writings themselves. We find a Roman jurist, Tertyllianus,

or Tertullianus, of whose writings some fragments are preserved in the Pandects. Now if it could be made out as probable that this person lived in the same age as the Christian Father, yet in the silence of antiquity on the point, it could never be inferred that the Jurist and the Father were identical: for the sameness of the name proves nothing, since the names Tertius, Tertullus and Tertullianus were by no means uncommon among the Romans. Nor would the similarity of language in those fragments and in the writings of the father be a satisfactory proof, since this may be easily accounted for by the common juridical phraseology.

Tertullian, in his first years, was a heathen. He speaks of himself as one of those men who were once blind without the light of the Lord.[1] Carthage, his native place, was one of those large cities which, at that time, were the seats of great moral corruption. Probably Tertullian, as a heathen, had not been preserved free from the infection, as may be inferred from his own confessions.[2] And whoever thus passed over to Christianity, from the corruption of the heathen world, could testify with so much greater force, from his own experience, of the transforming power of the Gospel; and as others who were especially called to place in the strongest light one aspect of Christianity—the opposition of nature and grace—were led to a personal knowledge of it through a sharp struggle in the development of their life, such as a Paul, an Augustine, and a Luther; so was this the case with Tertullian, the first convert after Paul who represented the Christian stand-point on this particular side. He reflected with abhorrence on his heathenish life and its pleasures; as, for example, when describing the abominable nature of the cruel gladiatorial shows, he says, "No one, who has not been a spectator of these scenes, can adequately describe them. I would rather fail in describing, than think of them again."[3] From its opposition to his earlier life, we may also account for the ascetic direction of his Christian seriousness,—a direction which, generally speaking, is very natural, both for the first development of an individual after his conversion, and

[1] "Cæci sine Domini lumine."—*De Pœnit.* cap. 1.

[2] "Ego me scio neque alia carne adulteria commisisse, neque nunc alia carne ad continentiam eniti."—*De Resurrect. Carnis*, cap. 59.

[3] De Spectaculis, cap. 19.

for the first development of the church, while forming itself in the midst of the heathen world, and in opposition to it. There are lovely natures, in whom whatever is beautiful in man becomes heightened by the divine life which Christianity brings, and in whom Christianity appears still more attractive from being placed in forms of such natural loveliness. And there are rugged and angular natures, in whom, when, after many conflicts, they have made their way to the Christian life, the rude and rugged in their dispositions is overcome and smoothed down by the power of Christianity. But there are others in whom, though they have been deeply impressed by Christianity, yet the rugged and the angular, the harsh and the rude of their natural character still remain and operate. The treasure of the divine life here appears in an unpleasing form, which would easily repel a superficial observer from their society. To this latter class Tertullian belongs. When he commends Christian patience, and contrasts with it his natural *impatientia*, and speaks of the difficulty of attaining such a virtue, he gives us an insight into his natural disposition.[1]

It cannot be proved from any passage in Tertullian's works that he belonged to the clerical order before he went over to Montanism. It is, indeed, certain, that in the treatise *De Anima*[2] he speaks of himself as one of the presbyters who were engaged in church government and preaching.[3] But he had written this book when a Montanist; and the case might very well be, that he had been chosen for their presbyter by the schismatic Montanist church, at Carthage. But Jerome says expressly that he was first of all a presbyter in the *Catholic* church. We have no reason for doubting the truth of this statement, since in itself it is by no means improbable that a man of Tertullian's zeal, knowledge, and talent, would be chosen to be a presbyter.[4] But we are not distinctly in-

[1] De Patient. cap. 1. "Ita miserrimus ego, semper æger caloribus impatientiæ.

[2] Cap. 9.

[3] "Disserueramus. Post transacta solennia dimissa plebe" (as if, after the service was ended, the congregation was dismissed, and merely the clergy left behind) "nobis."

[4] Nothing to the contrary can be inferred from his speaking in the person of the laity in his *De Monogamia*, c. 12, and *Exhort. Cast.* c. 7, for it may be supposed that in those passages he speaks *communi-*

formed of what church Tertullian was presbyter. It would be most natural to suppose that it was the church in his native place, Carthage; for he speaks of himself in various treatises, composed at different times, as a resident at Carthage. From one passage in his book *De Cultu Fœm.*, nothing more can be gathered than that he once visited Rome,[1] which a resident at Carthage might often have occasion to do. Jerome seems certainly to attest that Tertullian filled an ecclesiastical office at Rome, since he says, that by the envy and insults of the Roman clergy, he was prompted to pass over to Montanism. But it may be questioned whether this account has a historical foundation. There was always a strong disposition to explain the transition from the Catholic Church to an heretical party by external considerations; and Jerome, especially, could never get over what he had suffered from the pride and jealousy of the Roman clergy, and it was a favourable opportunity to utter complaints respecting them, and to trace earlier disagreements to that source.[2] The statement of Eusebius about Tertullian is too short and too obscure to enable us to draw any certain and definite conclusion from it.[3]

The most valuable memorials of Tertullian's inward and

cative from a foreign stand-point. And in the passage *De Oratione*, c. 15, "Nos vel maxime nullius loci homines," it need not be admitted though it would be possible, that Tertullian wrote this treatise before his entrance into the clerical order, when not a Montanist; but Tertullian might at that period, when hierarchical ideas were not so prevalent, speak thus even as a cleric.

[1] Cap. 6.

[2] When the late Dr. V. Cölln, in his review of the first edition of this work (*Hallesche Literaturzeitung Jahrg.* 1825, Nov. 8, 507), in opposing what is here said, adduces the partiality of Jerome for the Romish church, he does not appear to me to have made out a contradiction. Jerome might have a high esteem for the Romish church, and yet lament the pride and envy of the clergy, as is seen in his later writings.

[3] We mean the words already quoted, Ἀνὴρ τά τε ἄλλα ἔνδοξος καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐπὶ Ῥώμης λαμπρῶν. These words can hardly be understood to mean, "One of the most distinguished Latin ecclesiastical historians," though that injudicious translator, Ruffinus, may have so understood it (*inter nostros scriptores admodum clarus*); they may be taken to mean "one of the most distinguished men in Rome." But we are not obliged to admit that Eusebius here refers to the distinguished place Tertullian held in the church at Rome. Judging from the connexion, it may refer to the respect in which he was held when yet a heathen, and that he refers to him as one of the most respected jurists in Rome.

outward life, and his influence on his own age and succeeding ages, are his writings. In them we see a man who, whatever he seized, embraced it with his whole soul, with ardent affection, and hence was inclined to reject or assail as vehemently whatever opposed, or seemed to oppose, the object on which his heart was set. And what he thus laid hold of, or rather what laid hold of him, was Christianity. By that, and for that, he was inspired, as every unprejudiced person must feel, who will take the pains necessary to understand a man belonging to a different age from the present. The new creation effected by Christianity could not, indeed, all at once pervade him. That fierce, powerful, unbending Punic-Roman nature, which had grown up in heathenism, contained much that was repugnant to the spirit of Christianity. That subduing spirit came to him in a form with which he was unfamiliar, and could not be admitted without a struggle. Tertullian's mind had acuteness, depth, and dialectic dexterity, but no logical clearness, repose, and arrangement; it was profound and fruitful, but not harmonious; the check of sober self-government was wanting. Tertullian, though an enemy of philosophical speculation, which seemed to him to be a falsifier of the truth, was not destitute of a speculative spirit; but it wanted the scientific form. Feeling and imagination prevailed above the purely intellectual. An inward life filled with Christianity, outran the development of his understanding. A new inward world was opened to him by Christianity; feelings and ideas poured themselves into his living ardent soul, which he wanted adequate words to express. The new superabundant spirit first formed his language. The African Latin was, in this case especially, a foreign material, which was deficient in imagery. Hence the struggle between living feelings and conceptions, and a language which hampered and confined the living spirit.[1]

Of Tertullian it especially holds good, that he can be under-

[1] Niebuhr, who knew how to estimate every kind of excellence, and although he has only, by-the-by, spoken with admiration of Tertullian, yet opposes the notion of a peculiar dialect of the African school of which Apuleius and Tertullian are to be considered the representatives. "The notion," he says, "that their language has anything provincial in it is quite erroneous. Its only peculiarity is that it abounds in words and expressions taken from the ancient Latin writers." (*Vide Lectures*

stood only from within—that we must possess a mental consanguinity with the spirit which dwelt in him, in order to recognise in the defective form, that higher quality which it contains, and to set it free from that confined form, which is always the business of genuine historical composition. Among the characteristics of Tertullian must be reckoned a vivacity and quickness of perception, which often suggested ingenious combinations which sometimes misled him, and caused him to substitute plausible appearances for substantial proofs.

Tertullian, in the latter part of his life, joined the sect of Montanus. As we have already remarked, it has been attempted, very erroneously, to explain this change by outward causes, instead of accounting for it by an internal congeniality of mind. If we go through his writings according to the various subjects of which they treat, the relation of the earlier writings of Tertullian to those in which he advocates Montanistic views will be most clearly exhibited. We propose, therefore, to divide Tertullian's writings, according to their subjects, into three classes, and in each class to point out their distinction. In the first class we comprise those writings of Tertullian which are apologetic and polemic in reference to heathenism; those which relate principally to the relation of Christians to the heathen, to the Christian mode of life as contrasted with that of the heathen, and to the sufferings and conduct of Christians in times of persecution. We connect these writings with one another on account of the similarity in the circumstances of the time which called them forth, and which occasioned many points of similarity in their contents.

on the History of Rome, edited by Dr. L. Schmitz, vol. iii. p. 271, London, 1849.) Certainly we can find no provincialism in Tertullian, which might be attributed to the use of the Punic language.

PART I.

THE FIRST CLASS OF TERTULLIAN'S WRITINGS.

THOSE WHICH WERE OCCASIONED BY THE RELATION OF THE CHRISTIANS TO THE HEATHEN, AND REFER TO THE VINDICATION OF CHRISTIANITY AGAINST THE HEATHEN—ATTACKS ON HEATHENISM—THE SUFFERINGS AND CONDUCT OF CHRISTIANS UNDER PERSECUTION — AND THE INTERCOURSE OF CHRISTIANS WITH HEATHENS.

SECTION I.

THE WRITINGS OF THIS CLASS COMPOSED BY TERTULLIAN BEFORE HE JOINED THE MONTANISTS.

TERTULLIAN'S conversion took place probably at a favourable time for the Christian church. The violent outbreaks of the popular fury under the Emperor Marcus Aurelius declined of themselves. This sovereign, who sought to maintain the state-religion, and to suppress the religious party which threatened to endanger it, was succeeded by Commodus, who gave himself little concern about the ancient Roman constitution; and, as Dio Cassius reports, was disposed to be more favourable to the Christians, owing to the influence of his mistress Marcia.[1] But as long as the laws passed by the Emperor Trajan against Christianity as a *religio illicita* were not expressly repealed, the Christians could never reckon on any permanent and general repose in the Roman empire. Their tranquillity was always liable to be disturbed by any slight shocks from without. Occurrences of this kind happened in various parts under the reign of the Emperor Commodus; the civil wars which, when Didius Julianus had

[1] *Vide* Dr. Neander's General History of the Christian Religion and Church, vol. i. p. 163. St. Lib. Ed.—TR.

purchased the imperial sceptre of the Prætorians in A.D. 193, were soon excited by the dissatisfaction of the legions. General calamities always kindled afresh the popular hatred against the Christians, as the enemies of the gods, as Tertullian himself says;—"As a pretext for their hatred of the Christians, they employ the vain allegation that the Christians are the cause of every public calamity. If the Tiber overflows the walls, if the Nile does not irrigate the fields, if the skies are shut, if the earth quakes, if there is a famine or a pestilence, immediately the cry is raised, '*Christianos ad leonem!*'"[1] The passions that were excited by the civil wars turned against the Christians, who were always hateful to the popular fanaticism. Moreover, after the Emperor Septimius Severus had entirely conquered his competitors for the imperial throne, Piscennius Niger, in the east, and Claudius Albinus, in Gaul, A.D. 197, various public festivities gave opportunities for numerous attacks on the Christians. They could take no part in the heathen diversions with which their victories were celebrated, nor in attending the unbecoming theatrical exhibitions and the cruel gladiatorial combats, nor in the various modes of flattering the emperors, such as presenting incense to their busts, sacrificing or swearing by their genius; and thus they appeared as enemies of the Roman gods, or of the Cæsars, and the empire.[2] Or if only some stricter Christians would not join in festivities that in themselves contained nothing anti-Christian, because they believed that they saw something heathenish in them,—as for example, not lighting up their houses at a general illumination,—this was enough to draw forth the public hatred against the Christians belonging to any city.[3]

[1] Apologet. cap. 40.

Augustin quotes an ancient saying, "If God withholds the rain, the fault is with the Christians." "*Non pluit Deus. Duc ad Christianos.*" Augustin in Ps. lxxx.

[2] "Hostes populi Romani, principum Romanorum, irreligiosi in Cæsares."

[3] Clemens of Alexandria wrote about this time the first books of his Stromata, for he brings down the chronology only to the death of Commodus, (lib. i. fol. 337, ed. Paris;) but had he written under the reign of Septimius Severus, he would probably have fixed upon the accession of that emperor as the *terminus ad quem*, and he says, (lib. ii. fol. 414,) "We have daily before our eyes copious streams of the blood of martyrs; we behold them burnt, crucified, beheaded," Ἡμῖν δὲ

And when the populace or an unfriendly governor took advantage of such an opportunity to seize the Christians and throw them into prison, they might always, according to the existing laws, be punished with death. To Christians who were thus languishing in the prisons, and had martyrdom in prospect, Tertullian felt himself impelled by Christian love to address words of consolation and encouragement. Large supplies of bodily refreshments were conveyed into the prisons in the name of the whole church and of individuals, who vied with one another in expressions of love towards their suffering brethren and the witnesses to the faith. Tertullian was at this time far from casting reproaches on these blameless indications of brotherly love with that gloomy severity which he afterwards showed as a Montanist. Only it justly appeared to him important, that above the bodily necessities of those confessors, their spiritual necessities—at a juncture when the last conflict, and, even before that, so many subtle, concealed, and still more dangerous temptations might assail them—should not be neglected. "Along with those means of bodily nourishment"—he said to them—"which your mother the church, from her stores, and individual brethren from their private property, send to you while in prison, receive from me something which may serve for the sustenance of your souls. It profits not that the body be nourished while the soul is famished; rather if the weak be taken care of, that which is stronger ought not to be neglected."[1] Tertullian was far from the fanatical reverence for martyrdom, which could not see in confessors frail men still subject to sin. Although he acknowledged the work of the Holy Spirit in their being able to overcome the fear of death and martyrdom, by the power of faith, yet he well knew that they had not yet wholly overcome the world—that after each separate victory, if they were not watchful over themselves, the still more dangerous temptations of self-love threatened them, and on that account he held it necessary to warn them of their danger. "Before all things," he said to them, "ye blessed martyrs, grieve not the

ἄφθονοι μαρτύρων πηγαὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν θεωρούμεναι παροπτωμένων, ἀνασκινδαλευομένων, τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτεμνομένων.

[1] The existing reading is, *Si quod infirmum est curatur, æque quod infirmius est, negligi non debet;* but the sense requires that we should read—*quod firmius;* thus in c. 4, we find *caro infirma* opposed to *fortiori spiritui.*

Holy Spirit, who has entered the prison with you; for if he had not entered with you into the prison you would not be here to-day. Hence, strive that he may abide with you here and lead you hence to the Lord. The prison is also an abode of the evil spirit, where he meets those who belong to him. But on this account ye are come to the prison, that ye may tread him underfoot in his own abode; for outside of the prison ye have already combated with him and trodden him underfoot. Might he not therefore say, Ye are in my kingdom, I will tempt you by low passions and dissensions.[1] Let him flee your countenance, let him hide himself in the deepest abyss, palsied and stiffened like a serpent rendered harmless by enchantment. Nor let him succeed so well in his kingdom, as to involve you in strife; but may he find you fortified and armed with concord, because to maintain peace among yourselves is to make war with him."[2] To give force to his exhortation Tertullian avails himself of the high position which the confessors at that time held in the church. Those who on account of their offences had been excluded from church-communion, and longed after restoration to it with deep sorrow, were wont to have recourse to the powerful intercession of these revered confessors, who sometimes took upon themselves to grant them reconciliation with the church, by furnishing them with the so-called *libellos pacis*, a prerogative which, from the want of insight, from ill-judged sympathy, or from spiritual pride, was sometimes abused to the injury of church-discipline and order. To this power of the martyrs to grant reconciliation to others, Tertullian alludes when he says—"Those who have not this peace in the church are wont to implore it from the martyrs in prison. On this account you ought to have it yourselves, and cherish and guard it, in order that when required you may be able to impart it to others." Here also we find a mark of a mind not yet imbued with Montanism; for this, as we shall afterwards see, would have led Tertullian to pass a much more severe judgment on this prerogative exercised by the martyrs.

[1] The reading *inediis* must relate to the attempt made to force the imprisoned Christians to apostasy by starvation; but this would be quite foreign to the connexion, nor would the predicate *vilibus* justify it. Certainly some such word as tædiis, adiis, or scidiis is required.

[2] "Pax vestra bellum est illi."

Their entrance into prison he considered as a call to free themselves from everything which had hitherto burdened their souls; to renounce more completely all earthly things, as they had now taken leave of their parents. In what Tertullian says of the world as a real prison, from which they would be freed, we recognise, indeed, that rude opposition to the world which forms a point of connexion for Montanism; but we must also take into account, how the heathen world, as it then stood, must have presented itself to him, in contrast with that which was realized to Christians. "Henceforth," said he, "you are separated from the world: how much more from all the things of the world. And let it not agitate you, that you are separated from the world. For if we only reflect, that this world itself is a prison, we must think that ye are rather come out of a prison than entered into one. The world has greater darkness with which it blinds the hearts of men. It imposes heavier fetters,—fetters which bind the very souls of men. The world holds more criminals, —namely, the whole human race. Darkness is in the prison, but ye yourselves are light. It has fetters; but in God's sight ye are free. Its air is noisome; but ye are a sweet-smelling savour. Ye are waiting for the judge; but ye shall judge the judges themselves. He may be troubled there who sighs after the pleasures of the world. Outside the prison, the Christian has renounced the world; but within the prison he has also renounced the prison. It matters not in what part of the world ye are, who are out of the world. And if you have lost many pleasures of life, yet it is a profitable traffic to lose something in order to win what is greater: I will not yet say anything of the reward to which God invites the martyrs. Let us, meanwhile, compare life in the world and life in the prison, whether the spirit does not gain more in the prison than the flesh loses. But verily, the flesh loses nothing that it absolutely needs, through the care of the church and the love of the brethren, and over and above that, the spirit gains what is always useful for the faith. Thou seest no strange gods; thou dost not meet their images; thou partakest not of the festivals of the heathen in the daily intercourse of life; thou wilt not be touched by the foul steam of their sacrifices; thou art not struck by the shouts of the theatre—the cruelty, the rage, or the licentiousness of those who frequent it; thine

eyes do not settle on the places which are devoted to public voluptuousness. Thou art free from vexations and temptations, and even from persecution itself. The prison is to the Christian what the desert was to the prophets. The Lord himself frequently retired into solitude, that he might pray more freely and withdraw from the world: lastly, he manifested his glory to his disciples in solitude. Let us discard the name of prison, and call it retirement. Though the body is shut up, though the flesh is detained, yet all things are open to the spirit. Walk about in the spirit, not placing before you shady groves or long porticoes, but that way which leads to God. The leg feels nothing painful in the stocks, when the soul is in heaven. The soul leads the whole man with it, and transports it whither it will. But where thy heart is, there will thy treasure be. Let then our heart be where we wish to have our treasure." He then reminds them, that as combatants for the kingdom of God, in virtue of thy Christian's military oath taken at baptism, they were armed from the first for perpetual warfare with the world. "Let it be allowed," he says, "that the prison is somewhat burdensome to Christians; yet we were called to fight in the service of the living God, when we first responded to the words of our oath. No soldier takes luxuries with him to war; he marches to battle, not from his sitting-room, but from light and narrow tents, where all hardness and inconvenience and unpleasantness is to be met with." To this image of a military life he adds the image of the prize-fights common in that age. "Ye are about to enter a noble contest in which the living God is the umpire; the Holy Spirit is the overseer; the crown is eternity; the prize is an angelic life, a citizenship in heaven, everlasting glory." They have Christ for their leader; they are anointed with his Spirit, and are thus led to the contest. As the athletæ prepared for their conflicts by a severe discipline, so he wished them to regard the prison as a training for the final conflict. He reminds the Christians in prison of the sacrifices which men[1] can make for merely temporary

[1] In mentioning how much men could endure for the sake of glory and honour, he adduces also the example of Peregrinus Proteus, who voluntarily died on the funeral pile, and the way in which he speaks of it shows how very far he was from supposing that this person ever belonged to the Christian church; and it also serves to show the unhistorical element in Lucian's well-known account of him.

objects, and this leads him to notice the occurrences of the existing period. "An individual can suffer *that* for the cause of man which he dreads to suffer for the cause of God. Of this, the present times furnish us with evidence. How many persons have sacrificed their rank, their worldly condition, their very life for the sake of one man; either by himself when they took sides against him" (by the victorious Septimius Severus, when they had been earlier on the side of Piscennius Niger), "or by his opponent when they fought for his party" (they were condemned as adherents of Severus by Piscennius Niger, when he had the upper hand in Africa).

The festivities at the celebration of the victories of the Emperor Septimius Severus might have occasioned Tertullian's polemical tract *De Spectaculis*, on the propriety of Christians joining in the spectacles of those times. But this is not a certain chronological mark, since the frequent recurrence of such exhibitions renders a special reference to any particular time unnecessary. A subject is here treated of which enters deeply into the relations and life of the Christians of that age,—the general question which is frequently repeated under other relations—How far the Christian may venture to place himself on a level with the world, and adopt its existing manners and forms of life, and how far this can be done without doing violence to Christian principles and to the Christian spirit. Such questions must often have been brought under discussion, at that time, when Christianity had to take root in a world which had been developed entirely from the stand-point of heathenism. Frequent collisions must have occurred in the intercourse of daily life between what was Christian and what was heathenish. Here then was a liability to error in two directions; either by a too absolute rejection of what only required to be purified from the heathenish element and to be ennobled by Christianity, or, on the other hand, by too pliant an accommodation to the present, to the injury of the purity of the Christian life. The development of Christianity at this early period accorded more with the former tendency; but still a conflict existed between the advocates of the two tendencies. Tertullian, in consequence of his whole character as we have already described it, had a strong leaning to the former; and it is more correct to affirm that in his original Christian character there

was something allied to Montanism, than to find a mark of Montanism in it when such a tendency showed itself. This general difference of ethical views found a specific application in the opinion held respecting public spectacles. On many things relating to them there could not well be any difference among Christians. To sacrifice men to a cruel diversion, as in the gladiatorial fights, was revolting from the first to Christian feeling. But in many kinds of shows the question could not be so easily decided. Yet we must never forget how all this was at that time connected with heathenish mythology, and heathenish morals; how much that violated Christian demeanour and Christian feeling must have been always present, of which Tertullian's treatise gives evidence; and how little could the possibility be entertained of a transformation, by which these spectacles could become anything else according to a Christian mode of viewing them, which could not possibly separate the idea of the thing and its existing form of realization. It was, as Tertullian says, one of the marks by which the transition from heathenism to Christianity was known, when a person, who before had eagerly resorted to the spectacles, at once renounced the practice.[1] The strict, joyless life to which men devoted themselves as Christians, was, as the same Tertullian says, what terrified many people more than the fear of death.[2] Hence, also, it might happen that owing to the rough ascetic form of Christian life many misapprehended Christianity, and many were repelled from it, who might easily have been won over to it had it revealed itself to them in its own genuine character, elevating and adorning all that is human. Many heathens interpreted that strict life of the Christians in the same way as in later times the greater moral earnestness of vital Christianity is interpreted by worldly-minded men who call themselves Christians. They were disposed to account for this self-denial of all earthly pleasure by the predominant tendency to the future world. No wonder, if they despised a life that was to them so destitute of joy. Hence they endeavoured to account so readily for the Christian contempt of

[1] Cap. xxiv. "Atquin hinc vel maxime intelligunt factum Christianum de repudio spectaculorum."

[2] Cap. ii. "Plures denique invenias, quos magis periculum voluptatis, quam vitæ, avocet ab hac secta."

earthly life.[1] Others who were more favourably disposed towards the Christians, and approached nearer to them, endeavoured to point out to them that even from their standpoint they need not scruple to take part in worldly amusements. It is worthy of notice how such heathens endeavoured to enter into the Christian mode of thinking, in which many things must have still appeared strange to them; and here we shall perceive how at a later period the part of heathenism was acted over again by a worldly Christianity. "To enjoy such great outward delight with the eyes and ears, is quite compatible with religion, which has its seat in the soul and conscience; it can be no sin, and argues no want of reverence towards God, to enjoy such delight in the proper time and place, by which God cannot be offended." "Christians themselves say that the good God has granted all his gifts to men for their benefit. Why should not man enjoy his gifts which are made use of in the arrangement of the spectacles?" There were also other Christians who did not consider the unconditional prohibition of spectacles as justifiable. To admit such a prohibition, they asked for a passage of Holy Writ which expressly contains it. Certainly the laity are here referred to; and hence it is plain, as also appears from many other passages in Tertullian, that this class of persons occupied themselves diligently with the reading of the Bible, and in everything relating to faith and morals submitted only to the declarations of Scripture. Tertullian calls the faith of such persons either too simple or too scrupulous;[2] the latter term refers to their painful conscientiousness, which allowed them to receive nothing which could not be proved by the express words of Scripture; the former epithet relates to their great simplicity in always requiring the letter of Scripture instead of looking to the principle and spirit, and deducing the special from the general. This was a reproach which many Christians of those times justly merited, who always adhered so closely to the letter, which gave rise to many misapprehensions in the Christian ethics of that day. Tertullian quotes on this

[1] Cap. i. "Sunt qui existiment Christianos, expeditum morti genus, ad hanc obstinationem abdicatione voluptatum erudiri, quo facilius vitam contemnant, amputatis quasi retinaculis ejus, ne desiderent, quam jam supervacuam sibi fecerint."

[2] Cap. iii. "Fides aut simplicior aut scrupulosior."

subject the language of a light-minded man who opposed those strict views of life, which he regarded as a wanton joke:[1] "The sun scatters its beams on the impure without becoming defiled; yea, God himself looks down from heaven on the wicked without being defiled; why then should Christians be afraid lest they should lose somewhat of their purity by joining in the public shows?" From the connexion in which these words stand, we may suppose that this was said by Christians; but they must have belonged to the most light-minded class. Yet it is possible that it was said by a heathen who wished to ridicule the Christian strictness of life. Yet on comparing it with another passage,[2] it seems probable that Tertullian here means the Christians. As he had noticed that those reasons in behalf of the public shows made an impression on the Catechumens, a class of persons most easily disposed to waver, and even on those who were no longer novices in Christianity,[3] he was induced to compose this treatise *De Spectaculis* for their instruction and preservation. He also animadverted on all the arguments brought forward either by heathens or Christians in vindication of the public shows.

Tertullian acknowledged one truth which lay at the basis of what the heathens said; the truth that was founded in that original and universal consciousness of God, to which in general he impressively bears witness. He traces the error that allied itself to this truth from the want of the more complete knowledge of God and of his moral government, which was first imparted by revelation, as well as the knowledge of the disorder brought into the creation by sin. "No one denies," he says, "(for what nature reveals of itself can be hidden from no one,) that God is the creator of the world, and this world is created good, being intended for the service of man. But since they do not completely understand God—since they know him only from the works of nature, not from personal communion; not as a God nigh at hand, but only afar off—they cannot know how he has commanded to use what he has created, nor what inimical power has perverted

[1] Cap. xx. "Suaviludius quidam."
[2] De Corona Mil. cap. vi. "Suaviludii nostri."
[3] Tertullian plainly distinguishes both classes for whom his treatise is designed, when he says at the beginning; "Dei servi, cognoscite, qui cum maxime ad deum acceditis; recognoscite qui jam accessisse vos testificati et confessi estis."

the use of the divine creation." Hence Tertullian always insisted on distinguishing the creation as it was originally, and as disturbed by the entrance of sin.[1] "As to the gold, the brass, the silver, the ivory, wood, and all other materials which are employed in making idols, who has placed them in the world excepting God the creator of the world? But was it for the purpose that such things should be worshipped instead of himself? Does there, indeed, exist what has sinned against God, and has not proceeded from him? But since it has sinned against God, it has ceased to belong to God; and in the very fact of ceasing to belong to God, it sins against him. Man himself, the originator of all sins, is not only God's work, but God's image; and yet he has apostatized both in soul and body from his Creator. "We recognise here that important principle of Christian ethics, in applying which Tertullian was only hampered by his one-sided ascetic tendency—the principle, namely, that Christianity always connects itself with the original nature of man, and leads it, freed and purified from the perversion of sin, to its true development and realization corresponding with its idea.

He then proceeds to examine the apologies made by Christians for attending the public shows. When he proceeds to combat the objection, that public shows are not expressly prohibited in Holy Writ, an opportunity most naturally offered for pointing to the new source of revelation, which was added to the Scriptures, and especially to that completion of the Christian ethics which was professedly given by the new prophets. As a Montanist, he would hardly have omitted this. But now he satisfied himself with refuting his opponents by distinguishing between what was contained in Holy Writ, according to the letter, and what according to its general principles. He met them with the fundamental maxim, that in general rules the application to particular cases may be ascertained, and that the general rule always forms the ground-work of the particular case.[2] He then appeals to the vow taken by every Christian at baptism, to renounce the devil, his pomps, and his angels, and, therefore, to renounce idolatry and everything connected with it. He endeavours to

[1] *Institutio* and *Interpolatio naturæ.*

[2] "Generaliter dictum intelligamus, cum quid etiam specialiter interpretari capit, nam et specialiter quædam pronuntiata generaliter sapiunt." Cap. iii.

prove that these spectacles originated in idolatry. But with all his dread of even the most distant approach to idolatry, Tertullian was very far from superstitious solicitude ; he well knew how to distinguish the exterior from the interior. "In reference to the place, there is nothing forbidden," he says, —"the servant of God can enter, not only those assemblies of theatrical exhibitions, but even the temples themselves, without danger to his faith, if only a simple cause unconnected with the special purposes to which the places are devoted, lead him thither. For even the streets, the markets, the baths, the stables, and our very houses, are not free from idols. Satan and his angels have filled the whole world. Yet all this, as long as we are in the world, does not separate us from God ; we are separated from him only so far as we are contaminated by the sins of the world. When, therefore, I enter the Capitol, or the Temple of Serapis, as an offerer or worshipper, I forsake my connexion with God ; so likewise, when I visit the circus or the theatre as a spectator. The places, in themselves, cannot defile us ; only the purposes to which those places are devoted." He therefore aims to show that the habit of frequenting these public spectacles is inconsistent with the state of mind belonging to a Christian. "God has commanded us to act towards the Holy Spirit as being in his nature tender and delicate, with tranquillity, gentleness, and peace, not with wrath, anger, and bitterness. How can such a spirit harmonize with shows?" And after he had further contrasted the feelings excited by the shows with the motions of the Holy Spirit, and shown that they were irreconcilable, he says—"Thence they go on to fury, and madness, and dissension, and to whatever is unlawful for the priests of peace." He here alludes to the universal priestly calling of Christians, the consciousness of which in the church afterwards became overpowered by a transference of the idea of the Old Testament priesthood.

He placed the unchangeable rule of moral conduct founded on the divine word, in opposition to the subjective arbitrariness in the moral judgments of the heathen. "In no place, and at no time, is that excused which God condemns ; in no place, and at no time, is that lawful which is not lawful always and everywhere. This is the integrity of truth, and the completeness of discipline due to it, and the uniformity of

reverence, and the fidelity of obedience,—that it changes not its opinion, nor varies its judgment. That which is really good or bad, cannot be anything else. All things stand firm in the truth of God. The heathen, with whom there is no completeness of truth, because God is not their teacher of truth, interpret good and evil according to their own will and pleasure; in one place that is good which in another place is evil, and what is evil in one place is good in another. All things are of the devil which are not of God, or which displease God. All this is that pomp of the devil, against which we make our vow in receiving the sign of faith. And of what we abjure we ought not to partake, neither in word, nor deed, nor sight, nor prospect. But do we not renounce and rescind that sign in rescinding its testimony?"[1] He then appeals to the judgment of the heathens themselves, in whose eyes abstinence from the shows was one mark of a Christian. "No one," he says, "goes over to the enemy's camp, unless he has thrown away his own arms—unless he has deserted the standard and oaths of his own chief—unless he has made a covenant to perish with them. Will he think concerning God at that very time when he finds himself in a place where there is nothing of God? Will he have peace in his soul, who is contending for the charioteer?" He here alludes to the violent and eager contests for the *factiones circenses*.[2] Will he learn modesty, who is staring at the buffoons? In all the show, nothing more offensive is to be met with, than the careful adorning of men and women. The chief concern of every one who goes there, is to see and to be seen. But while the tragedian is vociferating, will he meditate on the exclamations of a prophet? and during the melodies of an effeminate player, will he be meditating on a Psalm? and during the contests of the athletæ, will he say that we are not to return a blow? and can he be moved to pity, whose attention is fixed on the bites of bears, and the sponges of them that fight with nets? May God avert from his people such a love of destructive pleasure. For what is it, to go from the church of God to the church of the devil? to weary those hands in applauding a player which thou hast been lifting up to God? to give a testimony

[1] Cap. xx.

[2] Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, p. 287. Ed. 2. (Circus.)—Tr.

to a gladiator with a mouth that has said Amen to the Holy One? to say '*for ever and ever*' to any being save to God and Christ?" A remarkable passage, from which we learn that already fixed liturgical forms had been adopted, and that the congregation joined in the usual doxologies.[1]

As warning examples of the pernicious influence on Christians of visiting the public shows, Tertullian adduces several facts which are very explicable on psychological principles. A Christian female had been induced, probably against the voice of her conscience, to visit the theatre, which heretofore had appeared to her as Satan's seat. Much that she saw and heard was likely to hurt her Christian feeling. Her conscience reproached her. She fell into a state of melancholy. She believed that she was possessed by one of those evil spirits who made their habitation there. She was looked upon as a demoniac. The usual exorcism was employed, in order to drive the evil spirit out of her. But they detected the cause of her melancholy, the impressions that continued to operate unconsciously in her soul, when the evil spirit, which they wished to drive out from her, (*i.e.* herself, regarding herself as one with the evil spirit,) answered—"I had a right to take possession of her, for I found her in my own place." It was natural for Tertullian, from his stand-point, not to distinguish, in such an occurrence, between the objective and the subjective. He passed over the means by which such a result was obtained, and found in it only a proof that the theatre was Satan's peculiar seat. And if only the moral means are taken into account, he had a positive right to draw such a conclusion. So likewise it may be easily explained, when another Christian female was punished in a dream, because she was present at the performance of a tragedy. Whether

[1] "Ex ore quo Amen in Sanctum protuleris, gladiatori testimonium reddere? *εἰς αἰῶνας ἀπ' αἰῶνος* alii omnino dicere nisi Deo et Christo?" It has been thought that Tertullian by the word *sanctum* meant the body of the Lord in the Eucharist, and that he alluded to the manner of celebrating that rite when it was said to the recipient, *Corpus Domini*, and he answered, *Amen*. But as the sequel shows, Tertullian rather alludes to the Amen of the doxologies. We must therefore suppose the words in truth to be—"sanctus Deus," *ἅγιος κύριος*; also *εἰς αἰῶνας ἀπ' αἰῶνος* is the close of a doxology. These words were also used for congratulating the victorious gladiators, *ἀπ' αἰῶνος εἰς αἰῶνας νικήσεις*; just as they were accustomed to cry out to the insane Commodus. Dio Cass. lib. lxxii. § 20.

her death, which happened five days after, was in any way connected with the impressions made by the dream, or whether this was only an accidental connexion, we cannot decide for want of a more exact knowledge of the case. But Tertullian easily saw in it a divine punishment. Further, he appealed to instances of persons who, having begun to visit the theatre, relapsed into heathenism; and, indeed, in many such cases, the effect might be that men became shaken in their Christian principles, their moral perceptions were blunted, they gave themselves up to many strange impressions, and thus were gradually prepared for apostasy from Christianity.

Tertullian, after giving all these examples, made the following application:—"What has light to do with darkness? what has life with death? We ought to hate these gatherings and assemblies of the Gentiles, since there the name of God is blasphemed,—there the lions are daily called for against us,—thence are persecutions decreed,—and thence are temptations sent forth." Perhaps we have here an indication of the time in which Tertullian wrote the treatise, the commencement of the persecution that followed the celebration of the victories.

Lastly, he contrasts the joys that the Christian gains with those that he gives up. "What else is our desire, but that of the Apostle; to depart from the world, and to be received with the Lord? Where our desire is, there is our delight. Suppose that thou art to pass this life in delights. Why art thou so ungrateful as not to be content with, and not to acknowledge, so many and such great pleasures which God bestows upon thee? For what is more delightful than reconciliation with God our Father and Lord? than the revelation of truth? than the discovery of errors? than the pardon of so many past offences? What greater pleasure than a disgust for pleasure itself? than a contempt for the whole world? than true liberty? than a pure conscience? than a blameless life? than no fear of death? than to tread under foot the gods of the Gentiles? to cast out demons? to perform cures? to seek for revelations? to live unto God?" In these expressions, which refer to miraculous powers and to special revelations, we can see nothing absolutely Montanistic, but only a mark of that predominant leaning towards the supernatural, which afterwards connected itself with Montanism. "These

are the pleasures,—these the shows of Christians, holy, everlasting, gratuitous. . . . . If knowledge, if literature delight thee, we have enough of books, enough of verses, enough of maxims, enough also of song, enough of sounds; not fables, but verities, not cunningly wrought, but simple strains. Wouldst thou have fightings and wrestlings? Behold immodesty cast down by chastity, perfidy slain by fidelity, cruelty crushed by compassion, impudence eclipsed by modesty. Such are our contests in which we gain the crown. Wouldst thou also somewhat of blood? Though hast Christ's."[1] Then follows a view of the final triumph of the kingdom of God at the general resurrection.

In what Tertullian says of the joy felt at the everlasting punishment of the enemies of God, we do not, it must be allowed, recognise the genuine spirit of Christian love. We see the selfish feeling mingling with the divine, the flame of human passion blending with the ardour of faith. We discern a rude unbridled fancy, which gratifies itself in depicting the sufferings of the ungodly. Here Tertullian shows us what he was by nature, and still not sufficiently transformed by the Spirit of Christ; and we also see how this age of rude opposition to the heathen world had its peculiar temptations and trials for the inner Christian life, so that Christian love was forced to give way to a hatred that transferred itself to the other world. He closes with the words, in which the confidence of his faith is so beautifully expressed:—"To behold such shows, thus to exult, what practor, or consul, or priest, shall, of his own bounty, bestow upon thee? And yet we have them now in some sort present to us, through faith in the imagination of the spirit. But what are those things, which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man? Greater joys, methinks, than the circus, and both the theatres, and any race-course."[2]

To Tertullian this subject appeared so important, that he was desirous to extend his influence to those Christians whose mother-tongue was the Greek, and therefore composed a treatise upon it in that language.[3]

[1] Cap. xxix.

[2] Cap. xxx. "Et tamen hæc jam quodammodo habemus per fidem spiritu imaginante repræsentatu."

[3] *De Corona Mil.* cap. vi. "Sed et huic materiæ propter suaviludios nostros græco quoque stilo satisfecimus."

We have already remarked that a general principle was involved in this controversy respecting the public shows,—the general opposition of the moral judgment respecting the relation to all civil and social institutions and customs whatever that were grounded or appeared to be grounded in heathenism, the opposition of a tendency of the religious spirit either more rudely opposing things as they were, or disposed to accommodate itself to them. The general opposition, which lay at the basis, was treated of by Tertullian after he had composed the former treatise, in another work entitled *De Idololatria*. The opposition which is here discussed, relates not merely to that which exists in heathenism, but to all that is worldly. It is a question which continually recurs, What can Christianity appropriate, and what must it entirely reject? One party set out from the principle that no one ought to be afraid to confess his faith before the heathen, and that everything should be most carefully avoided which might occasion a commingling of heathenism and Christianity. The other party proceeded on the principle that occasion ought not unnecessarily to be given to the heathen to show ill-will to the Christians as persons dangerous to existing civil arrangements. The Christians, in their opinion, ought to fall in with established institutions, provided they were not expressly contradictory to the Divine law. Tertullian belonged, as we have already remarked, to the stricter party, and though he might go too far in many things, since he brought forward references to the religion of heathenism, where they had long vanished from actual life, where only a learned antiquarianism such as he possessed could discover them, yet he shows in a most striking manner the supremacy of the Christian faith in his esteem, how ready he was to sacrifice everything to it, and how he was filled with abhorrence of unfaithfulness to this profession. In this controversy we again perceive how the laity held fast to the Scriptures and freely used them, as the only rule of life. Thus, the milder and more liberal party, who were opposed by Tertullian, appealed to the words of the Apostle Paul, "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he is called." 1 Cor. vii. 20. The principle here involved was this—that a Christian is not at liberty to separate himself from the relations in which he has been placed by the historical development of Divine Providence—that

Christianity is designed not to effect any sudden revolutions, nor to place itself in any rude opposition to the existing development of society, but to enter into all the forms of human life, in order to imbue them with a new spirit. It was certainly the right law for the development of Christianity which those persons adopted who appealed to these words of the apostle—a law which Tertullian's spirit and the Montanism that was allied to it were not able to recognise. But in truth, it was easier to express the right rule, generally, in theory, than to carry out its practical application. That general maxim, in the sense intended by Paul, had its necessary limitations. Such relations were meant which allowed an abiding in God to be possible, which involved nothing contradictory to the laws of the Gospel; and for the right application of the maxim, it was always of importance correctly to distinguish between what was, and what was not, reconcilable with Christian principle. Of this Tertullian was fully aware, and in this part of the argument he was right, as we shall see.

He begins with giving a wider extent to the idea of the renunciation of heathenism, since he reckons as belonging to it, the renunciation of all sins connected with heathenism, for he regarded heathenism as the kingdom of evil spirits. "Since all sins whatsoever," he says, "are in their spirit contrary to God, and there is nothing contrary in its spirit to God which is not accounted to belong to dæmons and unclean spirits, whose servants the idols are,—without doubt, whosoever committeth sin, committeth idolatry, for he doeth that which pertaineth to the masters of idols." In this passage we perceive the genuine moral spirit of Tertullian, which in its consequential development necessarily led him to dispute the distinction that arose from confounding the Old and New Testament stand-points—the distinction between sins against God and other sins, according to which the so-called sins against God, such as denying the faith in times of persecution, were reckoned among the *peccata mortalia*.

He then proceeds to what is strictly idolatry. "Most persons," he says, "imagine that idolatry is simply to be understood in these ways only; if a man either burn incense or offer sacrifice, or make a libation, or bind himself to any sacred rites or priestly offices." He maintains, on the contrary, that whoever in any manner contributes to the promo-

tion of idolatry, whoever furnishes materials for it, is guilty of participating in idolatry.—Thus, whoever manufactures idols as a sculptor, painter, goldsmith, or weaver, is an idolater. Many persons who had gained their livelihood by such trades, had embraced Christianity. It was now required of them that they should relinquish the trade they had hitherto carried on, and turn to another.

When such persons objected that they could support neither themselves nor their families in any other way, Tertullian replied, "It is spoken too late. Thou oughtest to have considered this beforehand, after the example of that most prudent builder who first reckons the cost of the work, and his own powers, lest, failing when he has begun, he should afterwards be put to shame." He then quotes those words of Christ, which at all events could only stand in an indirect relation to what he wished to prove, that Christ called the poor "blessed," a passage which relates only to poverty of spirit; but allowing that bodily poverty was here spoken of, this would only serve to prove that a man should not dread poverty, and might even feel happy in it, if he was obliged to renounce his property for the Lord's sake. He appeals to Christ's words in the Sermon on the Mount, which are directed against anxiety about food and clothing, where he points to the lilies of the field; but these words can only be opposed to want of trust in God, which might keep back a person, on passing over to Christianity, from giving up a trade inconsistent with it. He quotes the words of Christ addressed to the young man, that he should sell all that he had and give to the poor—which words can be considered only as an exhortation to every one to deny earthly things for the sake of the kingdom of God, for which purpose they were originally uttered. Further, he remarks on the words, "No one putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,"—"Parents, wives, children, will be left for the sake of God. Dost thou doubt concerning trades and business and professions, even for the sake of children and parents? It was plainly shown to us that pledges and crafts and business must be abandoned for the Lord's sake, at the very time when James and John, being called by the Lord, left both their father and the ship; when Matthew was made to rise from the receipt of custom; when even for a man to bury his father was too

much tardiness for faith. No one of those whom the Lord chose for himself said, I have not whereon to live. Faith fears not hunger; it knows that it must despise even hunger for God's sake, not less than every kind of death. It has learned not to regard the life—how much more, the meat! How few have fulfilled these things! But the things which are hard with men, are easy with God. Yet, concerning the kindness and clemency of God, we must not so flatter ourselves, as to indulge our wants, even to the borders of idolatry." But this was the very point in dispute, whether the manufacturing of idols was in itself a thing to be condemned. Tertullian appears to have considered as forbidden, not merely the images of false gods, but all representations of religious objects. The party to which he belonged, referred to the prohibition of the use of images in the cultus of the Old Testament, from which followed, not merely the prohibition of idol images, but all representations of the objects of religious reverence. It was from this application of the Old Testament, that they were influenced to make no image or representation of Christ. But their opponents, on the other hand, to show that this prohibition was not unconditional even in the Old Testament, adduced the instance of the brazen serpent, set up by Moses himself. But Tertullian regarded this only as a well-founded exception on account of the typical meaning of that image; and he justified it by the Divine command expressly given to Moses. Only in such cases could it be justifiable to represent the objects of religion.[1] Thus we find already a decisive contrariety in the various judgments formed respecting the use of religious images, and we see how Tertullian transferred the positiveness (*positivismus*) of the Old Testament stand-point to that of the New Testament, which thus gives him a point of connexion with the Montanist mode of thinking.

He maintained that since by the baptismal vow the service of false gods was renounced, the making of images was contradictory to it. But his opponents said,—it is one thing to make images, and another thing to worship them. It might be, that those persons who held this opinion regarded the false gods not as evil spirits, but as beings of the imagination, and rose to a higher objective view of art and mytho-

[1] Cap. v.

logy, believing that the objects of heathen mythology might be represented as objects of art; such might be the case with the painter Hermogenes, who will be noticed in the sequel. A mode of contemplation this, which, after the historic conception of the course of religious development in heathenism had been formed from the Christian stand-point, might be well founded, and in its scientific reference would occupy a higher stand-point than Tertullian's; but it may be questioned whether such a mode of contemplation would be natural at this stage of Christian development,—whether, in this early age, when Christianity and heathenism were so diametrically opposed to one another as two hostile powers, it could have been formed and maintained, without injury to the warmth and genuineness of Christian feeling. That Christian feeling is beautifully expressed in the words of Tertullian,[1]—"Canst thou deny with the tongue, what thou confessest with the hand?—pull down by words what thou buildest up by work?—preach one God, thou who makest so many? I make, (says one,) but I do not worship. As if there were any reason why he dare not worship them other than that for which he ought likewise not to make them,—namely, the sin, in either case, against God. But verily thou dost worship them, who makest them that they may be worshipped. And thou worshippest them not with the spirit of any worthless savour of sacrifice, but with thine own; nor at the cost of the life of a beast, but of thy own life. To these thou offerest up thy mind, —to these thou makest libations of thy sweat,—in homage to these thou kindlest thy wisdom. Thou art to them more than a priest, since it is through thee that they have a priest. Thy diligence is their glory. Deniest thou that thou worshippest thy own workmanship? But they deny it not to whom thou sacrificest that richer, better gilded and more perfect victim, thy own salvation!" Tertullian laments that the makers of images were actually chosen to clerical offices.[2]

When his opponents, as we have already remarked, appealed to the words of the apostle Paul, "Let every man abide in the same calling, wherein he was called.... Let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God,"—Tertullian could, on the other hand, point out the necessary limitation they implied. He lays open the fallacy of their argument

[1] Cap. vi. [2] Cap. vii.

when he says,[1] "According to that interpretation we may all abide in our sins; for there is not one among us but has been found a sinner, since Christ came down for no other cause than to deliver sinners." Lastly, Tertullian exposes the subterfuge that persons who gave up this trade could not support themselves, since the arts which serve for making and adorning the images of false gods, might be made use of in some other way. He could appeal to the fact, that the splendour and luxury of that age furnished more occupation than superstition did, for skill and manual labour.[2] He then proceeds to notice the profession of the astrologers[3] which had been rejected by the whole church as incompatible with the principles of Christianity. He here makes use of the Jewish tales and the Apocryphal Book of Enoch, in order to set forth astrology as a forbidden art, and states that the fallen angels were its discoverers, and communicated it to men. In the edicts of the emperors which banished astrologers from Italy, he found an unconscious testimony to the truth. Yet even this art had found advocates on the Christian standpoint. An astrologer who had embraced Christianity would not give up his art, because he believed that it contained a higher wisdom. He appealed to the circumstance that God had employed astrology as a means to bring the astrologers to Christ, and that they were the first who had done homage to him; in whatever way that phenomenon was understood by them, whether a star had appeared in the natural course of the heavenly bodies, or was to be regarded as a miraculous appearance. "What then?" answered Tertullian. "In truth, that science was allowed even to the days of the Gospel, that Christ being born, none should thenceforth interpret the nativity of any one in the heavens. For therefore did they then offer to the infant Lord the frankincense, and myrrh, and gold, as the close of the sacrifices and of the glory of this world, which Christ was to take away." In these words we perceive the idea that forms their ground-work, that with Christ all other forms of worship and all worldly glory would come to an end; that at his appearance they would all pass away. That Christ makes an end of all worldly glory, was a

[1] Cap. v.
[2] "Frequentior est omni superstitione luxuria et ambitio."
[3] "Astrologi, mathematici."

sentiment that Tertullian, agreeably to his stand-point, as we shall see, presented more in an ascetic negative manner, than in the form of positive adoption. The command given to the Magi not to return by the same way they came, Tertullian explains allegorically, as meaning that they were commanded to give up their vocation.

The office, also, of a schoolmaster or teacher of rhetoric and literature, appeared to him not very compatible with the profession of Christianity, since in discharging such an office it was necessary to teach the heathen mythology and to join in the heathen school-festivals. Yet it is remarkable that even the rugged Tertullian, who was disposed to repel everything that stood in connexion with heathenism, felt himself compelled to acknowledge the necessity of historical information, and of the appropriation of the culture that had proceeded from classical antiquity, for the service of Christianity. He was obliged to admit that Christians could not dispense with that general culture which was needful both for the study of the Scriptures, and the intercourse of daily life.[1] Hence Tertullian permitted the children of Christians, since they could acquire literary instruction in no other way, to resort to heathen schools, as the Christian instruction previously communicated to them would sufficiently protect them against the poison of heathenism, and the scholars could more easily than the teachers abstain from taking part in the heathen festivals and usages. Would not Tertullian, had he admitted Infant-baptism, have been induced to mention it here, especially with his notions of the effects of Baptism? Now, as we recognise here a certain liberality of thinking in Tertullian, the question arises, Why did he not go further and call upon Christians to dispense with heathenish schools for their children, by founding schools of their own in which heathen literature would be explained from a Christian standpoint, and thus the children of Christians might be preserved from all danger of the infection of heathenism; while such schools would also have furnished means for the spread of Christianity? But in this part of the church the disposition

[1] "Quomodo quis instituerctur ad prudentiam interim humanam vel ad quemcunque sensum vel actum, cum instrumentum sit ad omnem vitam literatura? Quomodo repudiamus secularia studia, sine quibus divina non possunt."

to contemplate ancient literature from a hostile point of view was still too great to allow the plan to be entertained of appropriating it in this manner to the service of Christianity. It was otherwise in the Alexandrian church, where already such attempts had been made.

Towards *commerce* Tertullian was not favourably disposed, on account of the love of gain and the dishonest practices which he often saw prevalent among the merchants of Carthage. He required of Christians absolute truthfulness, and regarded all oaths as not permissible; for in consequence of that literal interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount which was then common among Christians, Tertullian found in it several positive commands, and among others that relating to the oath, which hence he held as absolutely forbidden. But he not merely condemned in commerce the immorality attached to it, but was disinclined to the thing itself; it appeared to him only as a means of accumulating wealth, and the motives to engage in it must be un-Christian. Another point of view was required, proceeding from the positive recognition of the multiplicity of earthly relations, and from the difference in the callings of men founded in their moral organism, in order to assign to commerce its right place, and to acknowledge its importance for realizing that sovereignty over nature which would subserve the kingdom of God. But the Christian stand-point had not yet reached so far, and Tertullian especially was incapable of it, since in his mind only the negative view of the renunciation of earthly goods prevailed, and not their positive appropriation as means for realizing the kingdom of God. Still he did not venture absolutely to forbid Christians to engage in commerce. But he unconditionally denounced traffic in those articles which were used for the temple-service. Incense was one of these things, though he himself made the objection, that this might be employed for other purposes than those of the idolatrous worship,—in the healing art, and by Christians to show their regard towards their departed friends in the burial of the dead. It was his opinion that as a contractor for supplying the public victims, if he joined the Christian church, would never venture to carry on this branch of trade, so a dealer in incense could not, as long as he engaged in that traffic, be admitted to church-communion.

There were instances in which slaves who were the property of the state, and were employed in a certain trade, became converts to Christianity. What was to be done if this occupation was inconsistent with Christian principles? Tertullian soon arrived at a decision.[1] "No man can serve two masters. If thou wilt be the disciple of the Lord, thou must take up thy cross and follow the Lord."

It was also a controverted point, whether Christians might accept magisterial offices. One party maintained the affirmative, provided they could, by permission or contrivance, be free from partaking in idolatrous worship; just as Joseph and Daniel, who kept themselves pure from idolatry, held offices and dignities in Egypt and Babylon with all their insignia. But Tertullian found much that was doubtful in this question.[2] "Let us allow, then," said he, "that a man may successfully contrive to move in some honourable office, and bear the name only of the office, and neither sacrifice, nor lend his authority to sacrifices, nor contract for victims, nor commit to others the care of temples, nor look after their revenues, nor exhibit shows at his own and the public expense, nor preside over their exhibition, nor make proclamation or edict for any solemnity, nor even take an oath; nor again, as respects acts of power, pass judgment on the life or honour of any,[3] (for thou mightest allow of this in pecuniary matters,) nor sentence to punishment, nor enact the sentence beforehand, nor put any man in bonds, nor shut up any in prison, nor inflict torture upon any, if, indeed, it be credible that such things can be done." Tertullian rightly believed that a magistrate could not avoid all this, and, therefore, the assumption of such an office appeared to him not compatible with the Christian calling. For since he, like many Christians, had in view only the stand-point of the Gospel, not that of justice, he referred what is laid down in the Sermon on the Mount as a law for the disposition to the outward act; he knew not how to judge correctly respecting the relation of the outward act in its manifoldness to the one animating principle of love: he held that all those offices

[1] Cap. xii.

[2] Cap. xvii.

[3] "De capite alicujus vel pudore." To explain the obscure term "*pudore*" we may refer to Apologet. cap. iv. "In pudoris notam capitis pœna conversa."

which rendered it necessary to inflict pain on others were contradictory to the injunctions of the Sermon on the Mount, and to the essence of Christian love; and hence he believed that the assumption of such offices was forbidden to Christians. But in addition, another scruple arose in Tertullian's mind, owing to his excessive dread of all outward contact with heathenism; that many of the insignia of the magistrates in the Roman state, the purple mantle, &c., were also worn by the heads of the college of priests, and involved a reference to heathenism. "No man can be accounted clean in unclean things." To meet the proofs brought from the Old Testament, the appeal to the example of a Joseph or a Daniel, Tertullian urges the necessity of distinguishing between the Old and New Testament stand-point. "Know that old things are not always to be compared with new ones,—barbarous with civilized customs, things begun with things completed, things pertaining to slaves with things pertaining to free men. For these men were in their estate servants; but thou, who art no man's servant, inasmuch as thou art Christ's alone, who has also freed thee from the captivity of the world, oughtest to act by the Lord's rule." It is striking to observe how Tertullian, on the one hand, failed in mingling the Jewish and Christian stand-points; and, on the other hand, deeply penetrated by what was peculiarly Christian, sharply distinguished the two stand-points: we may also notice the opposition of these two contending elements in Montanism. In Tertullian's marking the progressive development from the Old to the New Testament, we find the germ of the Montanist idea of the various stages of development in the kingdom of God. But had Tertullian been at that time a Montanist, he would have been induced to give greater prominence to ideas that were peculiar to Montanism. We find here, as everywhere in Tertullian's writings before he became a Montanist, only the germ of his later Montanist views. He thus proceeds to apply the example of Christ to the life of believers, in reference to the renunciation of all earthly glory. "That Lord walked in humility and lowliness, having no certain home, for he said, 'The Son of Man hath not where to lay his head;' unadorned in dress, or he would not have said, 'Behold, they that wear soft clothing are in kings' houses;' finally, in visage and aspect without beauty, as Isaiah foretold. If he exercised

no power over his own people, to whom he rendered a lowly service; if, finally, he avoided being made a king, though conscious that he was a king; he gave to his people the fullest pattern in thus censuring all the pomp and pride of dignity and power. Who should more have used these honours than the Son of God? What fasces, and how many, would have attended him! What purple would have glistened on his shoulders! What gold would have gleamed from his head, if he had not decided that the glory of the world was foreign to him and his followers! What, therefore, he would not have, he rejected; and what he rejected, he condemned; and what he condemned, he assigned to the pomp of the devil." Hence he draws the conclusion, that "by the baptismal vow, the Christian has renounced all earthly glory." The passage before us is worthy of notice in many respects. We perceive how the idea of the appearance of Christ in the form of a servant was made so prominent, that it is represented in the contrast between the outward appearance of Christ, and his inward glory. Christ was not esteemed comely, but the reverse, for which he literally interprets the passage quoted from Isaiah. Yet this interpretation was rather formed out of the idea, than out of an exegetical misunderstanding. But this is not a mere peculiarity of Tertullian, but the prevalent conception of the first Christian age, corresponding to the stand-point of the Christian consciousness primarily developing itself in opposition to the heathenish deification of nature, and the predominant æsthetic element in heathenism—the stand-point of the oppressed Christian church, which still appeared in the form of a servant, and found its greatest satisfaction in contemplating the servant-form of Christ. Moreover, it is important for the history of Christian ethics to observe how Tertullian was moved by the idea of the imitation of Christ in his servant-form to regard earthly power, might, and glory as excluded by this imitation, and not suitable for Christians. Accordingly, it was thought that all this belonged only to heathenism, and must present itself in an attitude of opposition to the Church. Christians, therefore, would have to walk on earth continually in poverty and lowliness, opposed by the powers of the world, till Christ, by his personal advent, should destroy the might and glory of the world. Here was a truth which, at a later period, was forgotten by the

church when it grasped at earthly power and glory; but a truth only partially apprehended in correspondence to the first stand-point of Christianity, developing itself in opposition to the world. The church, as a church, was bound always to follow the pattern of the servant-form of Christ; but it was not inconsistent with its doing so, that Christianity should become an animating principle for earthly power and glory in the form of a state. Tertullain did not here distinguish (what is everywhere apparent in the conception of the ethical principles of Christianity, and is necessary for understanding the Sermon on the Mount) what must be exemplified in the disposition of Christians under all the relations of life, and the manifold ways in which this must be exhibited—the imitation of Christ in his servant-form, in the denial of earthly power and glory as it respects the disposition, and yet the outward appropriation of that power and glory, proceeding from the same disposition, according to a definite vocation.

With the question respecting civil offices, the question respecting the propriety of the military profession for Christians is naturally connected. What Tertullian and a party among the Christians urged against it, was the same which moved them to forbid the assumption of civil offices by Christians; and the remarks we have made on that point are equally applicable to this. But there was also a party who maintained the opposite, and appealed to the examples of Joshua, the wars of the Jewish nation, the soldiers who came to John the Baptist, and the believing centurion of the Gospels. Tertullian, on the other hand, said—"There is no agreement between the divine and the human sacrament, the standard of Christ and the standard of the devil, the camp of light and the camp of darkness. One soul cannot be bound to two masters, to God and to Cæsar." In reference to the examples quoted, he answered—"Afterwards the Lord disarmed every soldier in disarming Peter." This last sentence is an example, how a passage of Scripture may be falsely applied, if no account be taken of the connexion, occasion, and circumstances; for that passage refers not to every use of the sword, but only to the misuse of it, by a wilfulness which rebelled against the Divine arrangement.

Besides, in certain particular employments, Christians in the daily intercourse of life might easily, in various ways,

come into contact with heathenism. There were days which had a religious reference, and also a particular significance in social and civil life: the first days of the month—the *Kalendæ*, on which debts were to be paid;—the *Matronalia*, or feast of the Roman matrons, on the first of March, when wives used to receive presents from their husbands;—the *Kalendæ Januariæ*, the beginning of the year, which was in many respects important as the commencing point of civil life. Now, one party said,—We must not in such outward things affect to be distinguished from the heathens; we may do as others do in such usages as are not necessarily connected with religion, and which may be regarded as merely civil; we must give no occasion that the name of God be blasphemed.' 1 Tim. vi. 1. They might very justly desire that Christians should observe whatever was in itself free from criminality in civil and social institutions and usages, in order that no ground of complaint might exist against Christianity as if it were a religion that interfered with civil order; but the real question in dispute was, whether these things which they pleaded for complying with, belonged to the *Adiaphora;* and Tertullian was justified in drawing attention to the necessary limitation of their favourite maxim,—to do nothing by which the Christian name would be evil spoken of,—that is, to the distinction between well-grounded and groundless causes of offence.[1] "The blasphemy which is by all means to be avoided is, in my opinion, this:—if any one of us lead a heathen to blaspheme with good cause, either by deceit, or injury, or contumely, or by any other cause of just complaint for which our name is deservedly attacked, so that the Lord also is deservedly wroth." That such occasions ought to be avoided, Tertullian and his opponents are agreed; the only point to be settled between them is respecting things in themselves indifferent. Of these he takes no account whatever; he expresses himself as if here there could be no medium,—nothing but the direct opposites of things commanded and things prohibited; all compliance in things indifferent appeared to him nothing less than a denial of the faith, as he says, "A Christian should never let it be possible that he should be taken for a heathen; let him openly confess himself a Christian, and instead of the Kalends, fix another time for the payment of his debts."

[1] Cap. xiv.

Tertullian appeals on this question to the words of Paul, "Do I seek to please men? for if I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ." Gal. i. 10. But on the other side an appeal might be made to passages in which Paul says of himself, "I have made myself servant to all, that I might gain the more .... I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some." 1 Cor. ix. 19, 22. "Even as I please all men in all things, not seeking my own profit, but the profit of many, that they may be saved." 1 Cor. x. 33. Persons might deviate from the right standard either on one side or the other. The connexion of the passages thus set in array against one another, will teach us what is right. In reference to the last quoted passages, Tertullian says, "Did he, forsooth, please men by keeping the feast of Saturn or the Kalends of January? or by patience and meekness, by gravity, by gentleness, by sincerity? Was he made an idolater to idolaters? a heathen to heathens? a worldly man to the worldly?" But certainly Tertullian might have been met by the example of Paul, who to the Jews became a Jew, by the observance of Jewish customs, and to the Gentiles a Gentile, when he appealed at Athens to the altar of the Unknown God.

Among the subjects of controversy was the custom of decorating and illuminating dwelling-houses at the celebration of victories in honour of the emperors. There were many Christians who saw nothing heathenish in it. They not only felt no scruples, but held themselves bound to unite in these manifestations of joy as faithful and obedient subjects and citizens. But Tertullian, on the other hand, says, "The Lord says, 'Let your works shine;' but now-a-days it is our taverns and gates that shine; thou wilt now find more doors of heathens than of Christians without lamps and laurels." His opponents said, it was an honour shown, not to false gods, but to a man. We should "give to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." Tertullian replies, "It is well that he added, 'and to God the things that are God's.' Wherefore also the Lord required that the tribute-money should be shown him, and asked, concerning the image, whose it was. And when he had heard that it was Cæsar's, he said, 'Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's,' that is, *render to Cæsar* the image of Cæsar, which is on the money, and to God the image of God, which is in man; so that thou givest

unto Cæsar money,—unto God thine own self; for if all things are Cæsar's, what will be God's?" Though Tertullian's remarks show his deep acquaintance with the words of Christ, yet they were not sufficient to defeat his opponents, for even they did not deny that the whole inward life of man must be regulated by a reference to God; the obligation, even in this case, to give to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, to show him due honour, was certainly deduced from the obligation to do all things to the glory of God. As a warning example, Tertullian mentions, that when the servants of a Christian, during his absence, on a proclamation unexpectedly issued for a general rejoicing, had adorned his house with garlands, he was severely punished by a night vision; an event which might be easily explained on psychological principles. This warning, which was communicated to one by a supernatural vision, was designed for all. "As respects the honour due to kings and emperors," says Tertullian, "we have the rule sufficiently laid down, that we ought to be, according to the precepts of the apostle, subject to magistrates and princes and powers with all obedience; but this within the bounds of religious duty, and so long as we are separated from idolatry." But this is the very question, Whether in those usages there was anything impious?—which his opponents could, not without reason, deny. Tertullian expresses himself admirably, as he generally does when he refers to the depths of Christian experience, in the following passage,—"Let those, therefore, who have no light, light their lamps daily: let those over whom fires are hanging, fix to their door-posts laurels hereafter to be burnt. To them such things are fitting as proofs of darkness and omens of punishment. Thou art a light of the world and a tree that ever flourisheth. If thou hast renounced the temples, make not thy own gate a temple. I have said too little; if thou hast renounced brothels, give not to thine own house the appearance of a new brothel."

Nevertheless, Tertullian knew how to separate, in many merely civil solemnities, the original significance (which might be quite compatible with Christianity) from the superadded heathenism. The solemnities observed when a youth was received into the class of Men, when the *toga prætexta* was exchanged for the *toga pura*, or at a betrothment, a wedding, or the giving of a name,—these a Christian might attend

without scruple. In the case of these being accompanied by heathen usages, even sacrifices, it would be enough if the Christian were merely invited to the domestic or civil festival, and only took part in those while merely an idle spectator of the rest.

Tertullian also required of Christians in their daily conversation a strict abstinence from everything which might appear to involve a recognition of false gods. Many Christians from mere habit, without thinking, and even perhaps without rightly understanding the meaning of the words, made use of the heathenish phrases of protestation, *Me Hercule, Me Dius fidius.* A heathen disputing with a Christian, said to him, "The wrath of Jupiter be upon thee;" the latter in the heat of temper rejoined, "And upon thee also!" "The believer ought in such a case," says Tertullian, "to laugh, not to become furious; yea, according to the commandment, thou oughtest not to curse again, even by God, but plainly to bless in God's name, that thou mayest overthrow idols and proclaim God, and do what Christianity requires." This is characteristic of Tertullian's painful conscientiousness. When a Christian gave alms to a heathen beggar who wished him in return the blessings of his gods, Tertullian sees in this a tacit denial of the faith, in case the Christian let it pass and did not declare that he had not relieved him on account of the false gods, but of the true God by whom only he wished to be blessed. He supposes his opponent to say, "But God sees that I do it for his sake." "But he equally sees," replies Tertullian, "that I was unwilling to show that I did it for his sake, and that I have in some measure rendered what he has commanded an offering to an idol. Many say, no one is bound to avow himself. Nor, as I think, to disown himself; for disown himself he does who dissembles when treated as a heathen in any matter. And indeed, all disowning is idolatry, even as all idolatry is disowning, either in deeds or words." Here the two extremes stand opposed to one another. If Tertullian's conscience in such matters was too narrow, there were others whose conscience was too wide—who satisfied themselves too easily by mere appearances. And, indeed, we detect here a twofold sophistical self-deception, by which men quieted themselves as to their sins, and a twofold injustice, which for vain reasons they disregarded. It is remarkable, how far sophistical rea-

soning, in the suppression of conscience, could go in connexion with the alienation of the religious and moral element, how no hesitation could be felt to increase criminality, to atone for one act of injustice by committing another.[1] Cases occurred of this kind—that a Christian who found himself in want of money, wished to borrow money of a heathen and gave him a pledge for it. He drew up a note in the form desired by the heathen, in which he bound himself by a heathen oath to repay the money lent in a given time. But he considered himself as not bound by his word, because he regarded an oath taken in the name of the gods as a nullity, and thought himself guilty of no idolatry, because he had only written down words dictated to him by another, and because in doing so, he had shown that he regarded an oath taken in the name of the gods as absolutely null and void.[2] It might be, that the Christian at first, when necessity led him to seek for a loan, intended to repay it at the right time; and that he, at first, justified himself in that sophistical manner only in reference to the acknowledgment of the gods, but afterwards, when he could not repay the money, added a second self-deception to the first, when he asserted the nullity of an oath taken in the name of the gods, and then made use of this assertion, in order to clear his conscience from the charge of taking a part in the worship of the gods. Tertullian lays open the sophistry of this twofold self-deception. He says, that when one person writes what another dictates to him, as if it proceeded from himself, he thereby makes it his own, equally whether he expresses his sentiments by word of mouth or in writing. Yet he lays peculiar stress only on one point, which is indeed in close connexion with the subject of writing —namely, that such conduct is a practical denial of the faith. The acknowledgment of the gods appeared to him as a heavier sin than the dishonesty. The lighter sin, he says, cannot exclude the greater. We here perceive the injurious conse-

[1] To this the words of Tertullian refer; "Sed est quædam ejusmodi species in facto et in verbo bis acuta et infesta utrinque, licet tibi blandiatur, quasi vacet in utroque, dum factum non videtur, quia dictum non tenetur."

[2] When the other person demanded the money, he argued that the note was not drawn up in the ordinary legal form, and hence not legally binding. "Scire volunt scilicet tempus persecutionis (the time of judicial proceedings) et locum tribunalis et personam præsidis." Cap. xxviii.

quence of that distinction between sins against God and sins against our neighbour, which misled Tertullian, although in another place, as we have seen, he expresses himself in a manner which would do away with the erroneous principle it involves. It was his desire, that when a Christian was under the necessity of seeking for a loan, he should in no case be induced to furnish a bond in this form; but that rather the love of his Christian brethren should relieve him from his difficulties; or, whatever might happen, he should break off that negotiation which could only afford him relief by a denial of the faith. "Let us pray to the Lord," he says,[1] "that the necessity of such a contract may never press upon us; and should it chance to do so, may he grant to our brethren the means of assisting us, or to ourselves firmness to rid ourselves of all such necessity, lest these writings which deny our religion, standing in the place of our words, be brought forward against us in the day of judgment, sealed with the seals, not of advocates, but of angels."

The persecutions which befell the Christians in North Africa from well-known causes, induced Tertullian about this time to compose his Apology for Christianity and Christians; it was distinguished by spirit and force, and addressed to the African governors. He himself names Septimius Severus as the then reigning emperor. He had first of all written an Apology addressed to the Gentiles generally, and not particularly to their rulers, without a distinct official object; this formed his two books *Ad Nationes*, which have come down to us, but in a mutilated state. These he re-wrote, gave the whole more force and compactness, and a special purpose, by commending the Christians who were the victims of the popular hatred to the protection of the magistrates. The Christians at that time were frequently attacked by the soldiers for the purpose of extorting money from them, frequently seized by infuriated mobs, and dragged before the tribunals, or denounced by their domestics and slaves. "Daily," says Tertullian, "we are beset, daily betrayed; we are surprised most of all in our assemblies and gatherings." The tribunals were conducted according to the laws that were in force since the time of Trajan. When the accused denied the faith and sacrificed to the gods, they obtained a pardon.

[1] Cap. xxiii.

In the opposite case they were condemned according to the laws. Capital punishment was indeed intended by the laws of Trajan, but it was not always inflicted, as it was not distinctly expressed in the edict. In carrying out the law there was ample scope allowed for the gentleness and humanity, as well as for the cruelty and fanaticism, of individual magistrates. Not a few told the Christians, that provided they complied externally with the requirements of the law and sacrificed to the gods, they might adhere to their religion as heretofore; they might believe and think as they pleased, for that was no concern of the State. Others adjudged the Christians to milder punishments, to imprisonment, deportation, or labour in the mines: they wished to try whether they might not by these punishments be reclaimed to obey the laws. Others, from a misdirected humanity, that they might not be compelled to inflict capital punishment on persons otherwise innocent, or from a cold despotic severity, because they wished thoroughly to vanquish the "*inflexibilis obstinatio*" of the Christians, used newly invented modes of torture, in order to force them to abjure the faith.

The African magistrates would listen to no public defence of Christianity; and there was no cause existing which could induce them; for since the statements made by Pliny, those magistrates who were not inoculated with the popular fanaticism were fully aware that the Christians were free from every other crime excepting that of professing a *religio illicita*. But in reference to this crime, no fresh examinations were necessary. Hence Tertullian says to them in his introduction, "Let the truth be permitted to come to your ears in the way of private writings. She asks no favour for her cause, because she wonders not at her lot; she knows that she lives as a pilgrim upon earth,—that among strangers she easily finds enemies; but she has her birth, her home, her hope, her favour, and her glory in heaven. One thing meanwhile she longs for—not to be condemned unknown." Tertullian only desired that persons would give themselves the trouble to examine what Christianity really was. "It is an evidence of ignorance," says Tertullian, "which, while it is made the excuse, is the condemnation of injustice, when all who formerly hated Christianity because they were ignorant what it was they hated, as soon as they cease to be ignorant, cease to

hate. From being such, they become Christians, as experience shows; and they begin to hate what they were before, and to profess what they hated, and are as numerous as we are publicly declared to be. Men cry out that the State is besieged; the Christians are in the fields, in the forts, in the islands. They mourn as for a loss that every sex, age, condition, and even rank is going over to this sect. And yet, they do not, by this very means, they do not, advance their minds to the estimation of some latent good." But it might be said, as the heathens were often heard to say, "that it is in the very nature of evil to spread itself further by infection." Tertullian replies, "Nevertheless, that which is really evil, not even those whom it carries away dare to defend it as good. Nature has poured over every evil, either fear or shame. But what like this is found among Christians? None is ashamed, none repents, unless that he was not such long ago. If he be pointed out as a Christian, he glories; if accused, he makes no defence; when questioned, he confesses of his own accord; when condemned, he gives thanks." Persons who were involved in prejudices, and judged superficially, easily satisfied themselves with saying that this was the effect of an insane fanaticism, or a blind self-will. But Tertullian had a right to reply that they were not justified in attributing, without examination, such great effects among so many men of various sorts to such causes, merely because the matter was unknown to them.

He depicts the blind confusion shown in the judgments of the heathen on the Christians, along with which they were often forced to bear witness to the character and effects of Christianity. "The generality indulge a hatred of this name with closed eyes, so that in bearing favourable testimony to any one they mingle with it reproach of the name. 'A good man is Caius Sejus, but he is a Christian!' Another says, 'I marvel that that wise man Lucius has suddenly become a Christian.' No one reflects whether Caius be not good and Lucius wise, because they are Christians, or Christians because they are wise and good." Tertullian here distinguishes the various stages of moral development even among heathens, and the various stand-points of conversion. He is far from attributing the same degree of moral corruption to all the heathen; he acknowledges that for some, the moral

element already developed in them was the medium of their transition to Christianity; that inasmuch as they were wise and good, they became Christians; as to others, on the contrary, everything in their moral development originated in the transforming power of Christianity. "They praise," he goes on to say, "what they know; they revile what they know not; and what they know, they spoil through what they know not. Whereas it were more just to prejudge things unseen by things seen, than to precondemn the seen through the unseen. Others distinguish those whom they knew as vagrant, worthless, and wicked before they passed over to Christianity, by the very thing which redounds to their praise. In the blindness of their hatred they fall upon commending them. What a woman! how voluptuous! how gay! What a youth! what a rake! what a gallant! They have become Christians. Thus is the name used to denote the cause of their reformation. Some even barter their own interest for this hatred, being content to suffer injury so that they have not at their homes what they hate. The husband no longer jealous turns out of doors his wife now chaste. The father hitherto patient has disowned his now obedient son. The master once lenient has banished from his sight his now faithful slave. Whoever is reformed by this name, offends."[1]

Yet many among the heathen felt themselves compelled to do justice to the moral lessons of Christianity with which they had become acquainted through their intercourse with Christians themselves. But it happened then, as has since been repeated among those who call themselves Christians, that their knowledge of this morality was very imperfect; they knew it not in that peculiar significance and power, which it had in connexion with the faith of the Gospel. They found in it only separate moral precepts, in which they saw nothing more than human—no mark of a supernatural revelation. And certainly there was reason in this, according to their superficial and isolated view of morality. They might easily believe that they could find something similar in their

[1] Cap. iii. In the first book *Ad Nationes*, cap. iv., Tertullian says, "They wondered at men suddenly made better, and yet knew better how to wonder than to understand." "Emendatos repente mirantur, et tamen mirari quam assequi norunt."

own philosophers by means of that inner law of the moral nature of man. "Unbelief," says Tertullian,[1] "confounded by the goodness of this sect, (which has now become well known by the experience and commerce of life,) regards it not as a thing of divine origin, but rather as a kind of philosophy. The philosophers, it says, advise and profess the same things, innocence, justice, patience, sobriety, chastity." Tertullian first of all shows that Christianity in its relation to the world differs from all philosophies, and calls forth a totally different conflict with it. "Why then," he says, "when we are likened to them in discipline, are we not made equal to them in the freedom and impunity of their discipline? or why are they not also, as being our equals, forced to the same offices as those, for not fulfilling which we are put in peril? Who compels a philosopher to sacrifice, or to take an oath, or to expose useless lights at noon-day? Nay, they even openly demolish your gods, and write books against your superstitions, with your approbation."[2]

But this was the great difference, which Tertullian well understood, that the philosophers sought to propagate their convictions only among the speculative,—that they allowed the popular and state religion, the *theologia civilis*, to remain undisturbed; while Christianity, on the contrary, spread first of all among the people, and aimed at making the true knowledge of God the common property of all men. "Every Christian artisan," says Tertullian, "has found God and shows him to thee, and shows thee also practically what thou seekest in God; although Plato says that the Creator of the world cannot easily be found, and that when he is found, it is impossible to make him known to all."[3]

In order that Tertullian might answer that assertion made by many of the heathen, in an effective and convincing manner, two things were requisite; that he should prove the connexion clearly apprehended and developed, between the ethical and dogmatic in Christianity,—that the ethical element

[1] Cap. xlvi.

[2] As for instance, Seneca *De Superstitione*.

[3] Plato in Timæus (ed. Bip. tom. ix. p. 303). *Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.* These words are frequently referred to by the Apologists of that age, and must have appeared remarkable to them, since they saw that effected by the Gospel which Plato held to be impossible.

in Christianity, as it represents itself in the life, can only be properly understood in connexion with the root of the faith of the Gospel,—and show how this leads to the supernaturally divine in Christianity; next, he would have to consider the better systems of Grecian philosophy in their relation to Christianity, distinguish between what had an affinity and what was opposite to it, and then demonstrate how by the connexion with the religious principle what was apparently similar was yet something different. As to the first point, in the life of Tertullian the religious and ethical were very closely connected; but he was deficient in that philosophical reflection which would render this connexion intelligible to all persons. This reflection probably was not developed till a later period. As to the second point, Tertullian was too much imbued with a polemical tendency against philosophy, and especially the Grecian, to be capable of such an investigation. It was otherwise with the Alexandrians, but who had partially erred in another direction, in not sufficiently discerning what was opposed to Christianity in the heathen philosophies, as well as what was allied to it. By the entire constitution of his mind Tertullian was disposed to recognise in what was original and intuitive in human nature its derivation from God, and to deduce from the instrumental activity of man in science, art, and culture, the falsification of what was genuine and original. Thus he regards philosophy as the falsifier of the original truth, whether that truth proceeded from an immediate consciousness of God, or from the traditionary contents of an older revelation. With all the one-sidedness and unfairness of Tertullian's judgment on philosophy, of which frequently the crudest part only has been brought forward, as if that were enough to characterise a man of his depth, we cannot fail to perceive a truth lying at the basis;—that religion is certainly the most original fact in humanity; that it everywhere proceeds from a revelation of God to man, whether we take this idea in a wider or narrower sense; that it has its original seat in the disposition, where man is most receptive, where the spirit will appear only in its self-active autonomy, and form everything from itself;—and from it the obscuration or denial of the original truth must be deduced. Tertullian was deeply penetrated by this consciousness, though the form in which he expresses it often appears harsh. "Philosophers,"

he says,[1] "affect the truth, and in affecting corrupt it, as men who catch at praise. Christians seek the truth impelled by an inward necessity, and retain it in its integrity as men anxious for their salvation." If we do not confine ourselves to the letter, but distinguish what is the groundwork of Tertullian's one-sided conceptions, we cannot fail to perceive a truth in his statements, in reference to the relation of religion and Christianity to philosophy. Tertullian must, indeed, have passed an unfair judgment on the stand-point of the philosophers, but if we set out from the second member of the contrast, we can from that form an opinion respecting the first. It is evident that Tertullian commences the finding of truth from the stand-point of religion, in Christianity from a subjective element, from a sense of want in the soul of a personal connexion with God as the fountain of salvation; while among the philosophers the objective interest of knowing, the gratification of the intellectual faculty, formed the ruling principle. But divine wisdom imparts itself only to the disposition that is impelled by a sense of want to seek after salvation.

After contrasting the efficacy of Christianity in actual life with the opposition between theory and practice in many philosophers, he says[2]—"What have the philosopher and the Christian in common with one another? the disciple of Greece and of heaven? the man of words and the man of works? the builder and the destroyer of the gods?" But it might be objected—"Even among Christians, as among philosophers, persons are to be found whose lives are inconsistent with their principles." Tertullian replies—"Then they cease to be accounted Christians among us; but these philosophers, notwithstanding such practices, retain among you the name and reputation of wisdom." He expresses himself still more strongly in the first book of his *Ad Nationes* respecting those unworthy Christians whose lives formed an objection to religion itself:—"Such persons have no part in our public assemblies, nor in the Supper; by their delinquencies they again become yours; nor do we at any time mix ourselves with

[1] Cap. xlvi. "Philosophi adfectant veritatem et adfectando corrumpunt."

[2] "Quid simile philosophus et Christianus? Græciæ discipulus et cœli? famæ negotiator et salutis? verborum et factorum operator? *Rerum* (most probably the true reading is *deorum*) ædificator et destructor?"

those whom your power and cruelty have compelled to deny the faith. And yet we should more willingly tolerate those who against their will have deserted our religion, than those who have done so of their own accord." We find here a sounder judgment in moral distinctions than is shown in the common distinction between sins against God and sins against men, according to which the former are reckoned *peccata mortalia*. Nor is it affirmed that those who, on account of such sins, had been excluded from church-communion, could never again be received into it; and so far we discover nothing Montanistic.

As viewed from the stand-point of a mind held in the fetters of nature, or, to use Paul's language, "in bondage under the elements of the world," (Gal. iv. 3,) the state comprises in itself all the goods of humanity, and in this form the highest good must find its realization,—hence religion was an affair of the state. Of liberty of conscience and religion, and in general of the rights of men as such, no account could be taken. Such ideas were first of all introduced, and their supremacy effected, by Christ, who redeemed the spirit of humanity, and released it from its ancient fetters. Tertullian was among the first by whom this truth was powerfully expressed. After showing how the human mind felt compelled to ascend from the worship of the gods to one Supreme Being, he claims subjective freedom for the various stand-points of religious conviction, and says, "Let one worship God, another Jupiter; let one raise his suppliant hands to heaven, another to the altar of Fides; let one in his prayer (if ye think this of us) tell the clouds, another the panelled ceilings; let one devote his own life, another that of a goat, to his god. See to it, whether this does not deserve the name of irreligion, to wish to take away the freedom of religion, and to forbid a choice of gods, so that I may not worship whom I will, but be compelled to worship whom I do not will. No one, not even a human being, will desire to be worshipped by any one against his will."

According to the views prevalent among Christians in his time, Tertullian saw in the false gods so many evil spirits. Heathenism appeared as the kingdom of evil. It opposed the Christian consciousness too strongly as a real power in every-day life, to allow of coming to the conclusion that these gods

were only beings of the imagination. Those real powers which opposed the kingdom of God, appeared as evil spirits. Now it happened that, by the influence of the Christians, cures were performed on men who were in states of disease that were attributed to possession by evil spirits. When such circumstances were preceded by internal mental conflicts, Christianity here produced a crisis. They were indebted to it for freedom from the power of the dæmons who had taken possession of their souls. Victory over the dæmons was regarded as a victory over the gods of the heathen who had been identified with them. It happened also, in virtue of peculiar psychological influences, that the dæmoniacs themselves, who felt themselves one with the dæmoniacal element within them, spoke in the name of the gods,—that those who had regarded themselves before as *θεόληπτοι*, being moved by the power of Christianity, or struck by the powerful influences of a Christian, believed that they were possessed, from a confusion of heathen and Christian notions. The god in them declared his identity with the evil spirit, and acknowledged the superior power of Christ. To such facts Tertullian appealed, as attesting that the gods were evil spirits, and demonstrating the power of Christ equally over evil spirits and the gods.[1] "When commanded by any Christian to speak, that spirit shall as truly confess itself a dæmon, as elsewhere falsely a god. . . . . If, on the one hand, they be truly gods, why feign themselves dæmons? . . . . . Therefore is your divinity subject to the Christians, nor can that be accounted deity which is subject to man." He could appeal to the fact, that by such phenomena many had been led to Christianity, since they believed that they obtained in them a proof of the power of Christ over the kingdom of dæmons as identified with the kingdom of the gods. Tertullian says, "These testimonies of your own gods are wont to make men Christians, since by believing them to the utmost, we believe in Christ our Lord." Thus Tertullian, in rebutting the reproach that the Christians were the enemies of mankind, dwells on the great obligations of heathens to Christians as their liberators from the power of evil spirits, with whom so many evils, both for body and soul, had originated. "And who would snatch you from those hidden foes who are everywhere making havoc of your souls

[1] Cap. xxiii.

and your health,—from the incursions of the dæmons, I mean, which we drive away from you without pay or reward ?"[1]

Moreover, the pure political offences,—the *crimen majestatis* so dangerous in those times, when Christians failed in due reverence towards the emperors (they were said to be *irreligiosi in Cæsares, hostes imperatorum Romanorum*) because they would not sacrifice with the other citizens for the health of the emperor, and especially because they would not pay the usual marks of honour at the festivals in honour of their victories, which appeared to them to contain something idolatrous, or at least, unbecoming. To vindicate the Christians against this charge, Tertullian says:[2]—"Therefore we sin against the majesty of the emperors, because we do not subject them to their own creatures; because we make not a mockery of our services for their health's sake, not thinking it to be in hands soldered with lead. But ye are full of reverence (*religiosi*) towards the emperor, who seek it where it is not to be found, who ask of those who cannot give it, passing *Him* by, in whose power it is. . . . . For we pray for the health of the emperors to the eternal God, the true God, the living God, whom even the emperors themselves would rather have propitious to them than all the rest. They know who has given them dominion. They know, as men, who has given them life. They feel that he is God alone, in whose power alone they are, to whom they are second, after whom they are first, before all and above all gods. And why not? since they are above all men, who as living surely stand before the dead. They reflect how far the powers of their empire avail, and thus they understand God. They acknowledge that they prevail through Him against whom they cannot prevail. In a word, let the emperor conquer heaven, carry heaven captive in his triumph, send his guards to heaven, impose taxes on heaven. He cannot; and he is great because he is less than heaven; for he himself is of Him, of whom is both heaven and every creature. Thence he is an emperor whence he was a man before he was an emperor; thence came his power whence came his breath. Thither we Christians looking up with outspread, because innocent hands; with bare head, because we blush not; finally, without a prompter, because we pray from the heart; we are

[1] Cap. xxxvii. [2] Cap. xxix. xxx.

always praying for all emperors, that they may have a long life, a secure government, a safe home, valiant armies, a faithful senate, a righteous people, a world at peace, and all that man or emperor can wish for. These things I cannot ask of any other being than of Him from whom I know that I shall obtain them, since it is He who alone supplies them, and it is I to whom the obtaining of them is due,—I, his servant, who alone give Him reverence; who for his religion am put to death; who offer a rich and larger victim which He himself has commanded,—the prayer proceeding from a chaste body, from an innocent soul, from the Holy Spirit; not a grain of incense of the value of an *as*, tears of an Arabian tree, not two drops of wine, nor the blood of a discarded beast that longs to die; and after all these foul things, an impure conscience; so that I marvel when the victims are examined before you by the most wicked priests, why the hearts of the beasts rather than of the sacrificers themselves are examined." Tertullian also argues, that Christians, from the motive of self-interest, would be led to feel concerned for the welfare of the emperor, and the empire of which they were members, since they would be affected by the general commotions and changes. Tertullian would attach more importance to this consideration, because he shared in the general belief that the Roman empire would be the last, and that its dissolution would be succeeded by the final catastrophe, and the termination of all earthly things. In the apostolic age, a longing for the second advent of Christ was the prevailing sentiment; but now, on the contrary, it was looked at from a point of view which prompted the wish for a longer period of preparation, and the existing generation were anxious to be spared those fearful events, which they apprehended would precede the final catastrophe. This serves to explain why Tertullian mentions, as an object of the prayers of Christians, the delay of the end of the world, *mora finis*; which was connected with the prayer for the preservation of the Roman empire. It may be questioned whether this is not a mark of Antimontanism, since Montanism required its disciples to prepare themselves for the appearance of the millennial reign as an event near at hand.

While the fidelity of Christians in the capacity of citizens is asserted by Tertullian, we also find a spirit of true Christian

freedom, which, while it submits to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, gives no creature the honour which is due to God alone. "Augustus," he says, "the founder of the imperial government, would not have himself called Lord, for this also is a name of God. I will by all means call the emperor Lord, but only when I am not compelled to call him Lord instead of God. Otherwise I am free before him; for I have only one Lord, the almighty and eternal God, the same who is his Lord also. He who is the father of his country, how can he be its lord? But a title of natural affection is more pleasing than one of power. Even of a family men are rather called the fathers than the lords. So far is it from being due to the emperor to be called a god, which cannot be believed, with a flattery not only most disgraceful, but dangerous also, as if when thou hadst one emperor, thou wert to call another so." He shows that the Christians, although they could take no part in those idolatrous and unseemly ceremonies, did not feel a less sincere interest in everything that concerned the welfare of the emperor.[1] "It is on this account, then, that the Christians are public enemies, because they offer to the emperors no vain, nor lying, nor inconsiderate honours; because, being men of true religion, they celebrate their festivals rather by sympathy of the heart than by wantonness. A mighty homage truly! to bring fire-places and couches out of doors, to feast in the open streets, to metamorphose the city into a tavern, to make mud with wine, to run about in troops to violent and shameless deeds, to the enticements of lust. Is it thus that public joy is expressed by public disgrace? Do those things become the holidays of princes, which on other days are unbecoming? . . . . How justly do we deserve condemnation! For why do we discharge our vows and our rejoicings for the Cæsars, in chastity and sobriety, and righteousness? Why do we not overshadow our door-posts with laurels? why do we not encroach on the day with lamps?" He contrasts the fidelity of the Christians, their honest sympathy, with the hypocritical demonstrations of joy made by those who, under this outward show, concealed their conspiracies against the emperor;—he here evidently refers to events in his own times.[2]

[1] Cap. xxxv.

[2] The defeat of Piscennius Niger in Syria, of Clodius Albinus in Gaul,

What Tertullian says in order to vindicate the Christians from the charge of a dangerous political tendency (on account of which all secret associations and clubs were everywhere forbidden), strikingly marks the process by which Christianity was developed in that age. He appeals to the peculiar spirit of Christianity, by which men became altogether estranged from taking an interest in political events. We must here distinguish between what is founded on the very nature of Christianity in its opposition to the stand-point of the ancient world, and what was nothing more than a one-sided bias, which was rife at that particular stage of Christian development, and afterwards subsided into a harmonious adjustment; a bias which, having been once checked, repeated itself in later manifestations as something morbid. Christianity must certainly destroy that all-absorbing one-sided passion for politics which was peculiar to the stand-point of the ancient world, since it subordinated the state to the idea of the kingdom of God as the highest good, removed the narrow limits of political life in which all human things were enclosed, imparted to men the consciousness of belonging, as members, to a kingdom of God which united this world and the next, and was designed to embrace the whole of humanity. At first, this tendency in opposition against the former stand-point was necessarily so developed, that through the interest felt for the kingdom of God, for the other world and the general well-being of mankind, the interest in political matters was chilled and repressed; it contributed to this state of things

followed by the persecution of the remains of the Piscennian party in various parts, particularly those who had consulted a soothsayer relative to a hostile design against the emperor, (*Ad Nat.* lib. i. cap. 17.) "Adhuc Syriæ cadaverum odoribus spirant, adhuc Galliæ Rhodano suo non lavant," (the blood that had been shed could not be washed away by the Rhone.) *Apolog.* cap. xxxv. "Sed et qui nunc scelestarum partium socii aut plausores quotidie revelantur, post vindemiam parricidarum racematio superstes, (who remained concealed in the first inquiries after the enemies of Septimius Severus, and were now discovered,) quam recentissimis et ramosissimis laureis postes præstruebant, quam elatissimis et clarissimis lucernis vestibula nebulabant (they darkened the entrance-hall by the multitude of lights in broad day)? Eadem officia defendunt et qui astrologos et aruspices et augures et magos de Cæsarum capite consultant." (Compare Ælii Spartiani Vita Severi, cap. ix. xv.) Indeed Tertullian was not aware that many who had suffered punishment for high treason, had been sacrificed to the avarice and suspicion of the emperor, and of the Prætorian præfect, Plautianus.

that political life in that age had been formed on a soil opposed to Christianity, and was rooted entirely in heathenism; hence Christians felt themselves necessarily estranged from it. The community formed by Christianity was like a close corporation in relation to the state, and not till a later period could the appropriation of the state form itself out of this opposition as a peculiar form of representation for the kingdom of God. Thus, Tertullian says, "It were meet that this sect were accounted among the lawful factions, a sect by which no such thing is done as is wont to be apprehended from unlawful factions . . . We who are insensible to all that burning for glory and greatness, have no need of banding together, nor is anything more foreign to our taste than public affairs. We acknowledge one commonwealth of all mankind—the world." From the antithetical stand-point of Christianity to the world at that time, it appeared to Tertullian almost as a matter of necessity that the state was heathenish, and in opposition to the Christian church. It never entered his thoughts that the masters of the Roman empire might actually become Christians. As we have seen above, he thought that earthly power and glory would be always inconsistent with the servant-form of the Christian life in imitation of Christ. Hence, he says,[1] "But the Cæsars also would have believed in Christ, if either Cæsars had not been necessary for the age, or if Christians could have been Cæsars." He describes in glowing terms the numbers of the Christians, and the violence of the persecutions raised against them, and then asks,[2]—"And yet, what retaliation for injury have ye ever marked in man so banded together, so bold in spirit, even unto death? though a single night with a few torches might work ample vengeance, if we held it lawful to balance evil by evil."

But however plainly the lives of Christians evinced that they were free from all political designs, yet to persons who could not comprehend the principles which animated the Christians and held them together,—who, looking at them with the eyes of worldly policy, explained everything by outward appearances,—the close and intimate fellowship of Christians had the air of something suspicious.[3] "It is the exercise of this sort of love which, with some, brands us with a mark of evil. 'See,' say they, 'how they love each other,' for they

[1] Cap. xxi. [2] Cap. xxxvii. [3] Cap. xxxix.

themselves hate each other; and, 'See how ready they are to die for each other,' for they themselves are more ready to slay each other. But whereas we are denoted by the title of 'Brethren,' on no other, as I think, do they brand this name than because among themselves every title of consanguinity is, from affectation, falsely assumed. But brethren we are even of your own, by the law of nature our common mother, although ye have little claim to be called men, because ye are bad brethren. But how much more worthily are they both called and esteemed brothers, who acknowledge one Father, that is, God—who have drunk of one spirit of holiness—who from one womb of common ignorance have come forth into the one light of truth .... Therefore, because we are united in mind and soul, we do not hesitate to have our goods in common."

While some persons imputed the intimate union of the Christians to some political object, there were others who reproached them for an opposite reason, that they lived as if already citizens of a celestial country, and took no interest in sublunary concerns. They called the Christians men who were utterly unprofitable for the business of life. Here again it is proper to distinguish between what is founded in the nature of Christianity and belongs to the opposition which it must necessarily stand in to heathenism, and what in a one-sided bias formed in the primary stages of Christian development. From the stand-point of heathen social life, the tendency to the unworldly, the future, and the heavenly, which was impressed so strongly on the Christian life, must have appeared as an erroneous estrangement from earthly life. It must have formed a reproach to the heavenly dispositions and seriousness of Christians—a charge which, at a later period, might be repeated from the stand-point of a secularized Christianity,—that it rendered men useless for real life.[1] But we must allow a measure of truth to be contained in this objection in reference to that one-sided ascetic opposition to the world, in which the Christian principle was at first manifested. This tendency is shown in the words of Tertullian, when, wishing to prove that persecution could not injure Christians, he says,[2] "But in truth we are in nowise harmed; for we have in this world no concern but to depart out of it as quickly as we may." But we do not see this ascetic spirit

[1] "Homines infructuosos in negotiis." [2] Cap. xli.

prominent in the picture which Tertullian gives of the Christian life, for the purpose of refuting that accusation; and this we may also regard as the mark of a non-Montanist spirit. "We are said to be unprofitable in the common concerns of life. How can this be said of men who live with you, have the same food, dress, furniture, the same wants of daily life? For we are not Brachmans, nor the gymnosophists of India, dwelling in the woods and exiles from life. We remember our obligations to God our Lord and Creator; we reject no enjoyment of his works; certainly, we refrain from using them immoderately or wrongfully. Wherefore we live with you in this world, not without a forum, not without shambles, not without your baths, taverns, shops, inns, markets, and other places of traffic. We voyage, moreover, with you, serve in your armies, labour in your fields, and trade with you."

When Tertullian endeavours to prove to the heathen the existence of one God, his favourite argument is the immediate witness in the mind and consciousness of men; as on all occasions, in accordance with his ardent temperament, animated by religion, he appeals rather to the immediate and original, than to the mediate and derived. From the depth and fulness of a living consciousness of God, he points to the only true God, whose existence is as undeniable as it is incomprehensible. "What we worship is the one God, who through the word by which he commanded, the reason by which he ordained, the power by which he was able, has framed out of nothing this whole material mass, with all its furniture of elements, bodies, and spirits, to the honour of his majesty; whence also the Greeks have applied to the universe the name of κόσμος. He is invisible, though seen; incomprehensible, though made present to us by grace .... therefore he is true and so great. The immeasurable is known only to itself. This causes God to be conceived of while yet he cannot be conceived. His greatness causes him to be at once known and unknown to men. And this is the sum of their offending, who will not acknowledge him of whom they cannot be ignorant. Will ye that we prove him to be from his own works, so many and such as they are, by which we are maintained, by which we are supported, by which we are delighted, by which also we are terrified? Will ye that we prove it by the witness of

the soul itself, which although confined in the prison of the body, although straitened by evil training, although unnerved by lust and sensual desires, although made the servant of false gods, yet when it comes to itself again, as from a surfeit, as from sleep, or as from some ailment, and regains its soundness, it names God by this name only, because peculiar to the true God.—"Great God,' 'Good God,' and, 'Which may God grant,' are words in every one's mouth. It invokes him also as a judge;—'God sees'—'I commend to God'—'God will recompense me.' O the testimony of the soul, by its very nature, a Christian! Finally, in pronouncing these words, it looks not to the Capitol, but to heaven, for it knows the dwelling-place of the living God; from him and thence it descended."[1]

We see that Tertullian in all his writings testifies of the living God, not a being constructed out of general ideas, but known by experience from his own self-revelation. The original self-revelation of God to the immediate consciousness of man, which involuntarily comes forth in his life, and the special revelation by grace, which, connecting itself with the former, completes and confirms it,—the combination of these two forms the solid religious realism of Tertullian, the antithesis of the Alexandrine intellectualism.

Tertullian appealed to the fact, that all religions proceed from distinct personalities. And thus he regards the revelation of God in Christ, and the peculiar relation to God in which Christ represents himself, as constituting the peculiarity of Christianity. He appeals moreover to the fact that Christ did not enter on his mission among the rude tribes of mankind, and by his mental superiority over them appear in a supernatural light, but that he had given the impression of his divine nature to a cultivated and even over-refined generation. He says, "We say, and openly say, and while ye torture us, mangled and bleeding we cry out, 'We worship God through Christ; believe ye him a man?—by him and in him God wills to be known and adored.'" After Tertullian had contrasted Christ with other founders of religions who had appeared among barbarous nations, he says, "He opened to a knowledge of the truth the eyes of men already polished and blinded through their very refinement."

[1] Cap. xvii.

Tertullian was convinced by his own experience that faith in the divinity of Christ was intimately connected with the essence of Christianity; he appealed to the practical influence of this faith. "Examine," he says, "whether that divinity of Christ be true; if it be such as by the knowledge of it any one is transformed to goodness."

We know that the doctrine of the resurrection of man in a glorified personality was a special stumbling-block to the heathen. Tertullian appeals first of all, as a proof of the destiny of man to eternal life, to the immediate consciousness of the nature of man as allied to the Deity. He calls men to a deeper self-knowledge.[1] "Shalt thou, a man, a name so great,—if thou knowest thyself as thou mayest from the Pythian inscription—thou the lord of all things that die and rise again,—shalt thou die to perish for ever?" He then points out the analogies to the resurrection that are scattered over the whole field of nature, showing that everywhere a new life comes forth from death. He sees throughout nature a harmony amidst the strife of opposites. Among these he reckons the antithesis of death and life.

Tertullian closes this powerful argument for the truth of Christianity in words well befitting so noble a testimony:—"Go on, ye good governors, so much better in the eyes of the people if ye immolate the Christians to them. Rack, torture, condemn, grind us to powder; for your injustice is the proof of our innocence. . . . . Nor yet will your cruelty, though increasingly refined, be of any advantage to your cause. It is rather an allurement to our sect. Our numbers increase in proportion as you mow us down. The blood of Christians is their seed. Many among yourselves exhort to the endurance of pain and death . . . . yet their words do not gain as many disciples as Christians gain who teach by deeds. That very obstinacy which ye reproach us with, is a teacher. For who is not incited by the contemplation of it to inquire, What is the reality which can produce it? And who that has inquired, does not join us? And who that joins us does not long to suffer? . . . Hence it is that we thank you for your judgments; such is the rivalry between divine and human things; when we are condemned by you, we are acquitted by God."[2]

The same Tertullian who, of all the Christian Fathers in

[1] Cap. xlviii.

[2] Cap. l.

the primitive age, has most emphatically testified of the evil adhering to human nature, and its need of redemption, has also expressed in the strongest terms the consciousness of the original, ineffaceable alliance to the divine in human nature. As on the former side he was obliged to recognise what stood in opposition to Christianity; so on this side he found a point of connexion for it. He who so often and so broadly exhibited the opposition between the supernatural and the natural, was yet led by that consciousness to recognise the supernatural as corresponding to the peculiar and true (though disturbed by sin) nature of man. Christianity thus appeared to him as that by which the proper nature of man attained to its true self-consciousness and to its true rights. Hence he could describe the human soul as Christian by nature. In his Apology[1] he has appealed to the *testimonia animæ naturaliter Christianæ*, by which he specially intended the involuntary manifestations of an universal consciousness of the Deity, the consciousness of one God. A pregnant sentiment, which might be carried out to a far greater extent than was done or could be done by Tertullian! It was indeed the office of an apologetic to point out, that Christianity corresponds to the essential necessities and postulates of the *anima naturaliter Christiana;* the supernatural verifies itself as the truly natural. It was nothing new, when for apologetic purposes a point of connexion for Christianity was sought in that consciousness of God which existed previously in the human mind. A believer in Christianity possessed the consciousness that it could bring over to itself all the religious stand-points, and that the educated heathen who were converted to Christianity must make use of the means by which they had themselves been brought to embrace it in order to lead others in a similar way to follow their example. The novelty consisted in the peculiar manner in which Tertullian made use of this method. Philosophy had developed among the Greeks the universal religious consciousness with freer reflection, had raised itself in many respects above the religious and ethical stand-point of the people, and had prepared the way for Christianity by the spiritualizing of religious ideas, by giving greater prominence to a religious consciousness, and by

[1] Cap. xvii. In his book "*De Testimonio Animæ*," cap. v., he lets us know that *the Apology* was written earlier.

combating the popular superstitions. The Grecian apologists in particular availed themselves of this mode. Like Justin Martyr and Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian's contemporaries, they made collections of the expressions (genuine or spurious) of the ancient philosophers and poets, in order to employ them as testimonies against the popular religions from the standpoint of heathenism. Tertullian, who appealed by preference to the original and immediate, was disposed to regard culture, science, and art as falsifications of the original; he wished rather to adduce the immediate power of the undeniable sense of Deity as it expressed itself involuntarily without reflection in the life,—the *testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ.* Certainly it may be said that if philosophy had raised itself on many sides above the common religious stand-point, yet in other respects it knew not how to indicate clearly the truth that lay at the basis of the popular religious consciousness though mixed with error.

In order to marshal against heathenism these testimonies of the immediate consciousness of God, Tertullian composed his little treatise *De Testimonio Animæ*, "*The Witness of the Soul.*" "I call in," he says, "a new witness, yea, one more known than all literature, more active than all learning, more public than all publications, greater than man altogether, for it is that which forms the whole of man. O soul, stand forth in the midst, whether thou art a thing divine and eternal, according to most philosophers, and so much the more not an utterer of falsehood; or, as seemed to Epicurus alone, by no means divine because mortal, and therefore who oughtest so much the more to speak the truth; whether thou art received from heaven, or conceived on earth, or fitly framed of parts or atoms; whether thou badst thy beginning with the body, or art sent into the body after it is formed; from whatever source and in whatever manner thou makest man a rational being, most capacious of understanding and knowledge. I summon thee not such as when, formed in the schools, exercised in libraries, nourished in the academies and porches of Athens, thou utterest thy crude wisdom. I address thee as simple, and rude, and unpolished, and unlearned,—such as they have thee, who have only thee; the very and entire thing that thou art, in the road, in the highway, in the weaver's factory. I have need of thy inexperience, since in thy expe-

rience, however small, no one puts faith. I demand of thee those truths which thou bringest with thyself into man, which thou hast learnt to know either from thyself or from the Author of thy being. Thou art not, as I know, a Christian; for a Christian is wont to be made, not born. Yet now Christians demand a testimony from thee who art a stranger, against thy own friends, that they may blush even before thee, for hating and scoffing at us, on account of those very things to which thy own consciousness testifies. It pleases not when we announce him as the only true God from whom are all things, and to whom the universe is subject. Bear witness to this if thou knowest it to be so; for we hear thee saying openly and with full liberty, not allowed to us, both at home and abroad, 'Which God grant,' and, 'If God will.'"

Tertullian not only appeals to the testimony of the soul respecting the being of one God, but he believed that he could point out in those involuntary expressions the consciousness of the divine attributes. He appeals to the recognition of the goodness of God in those expressions which were heard in every-day life—"the good God," "God doeth good." When the philosophers asserted that the representation of the wrath of God among Jews and Christians was gross Anthropopathism, Tertullian objected to them, that maintaining the divine origin of the soul, they must acknowledge some truth to lie at the basis of the general expressions of fear in reference to God, and of the appeal to God's judgment. He mentions such expressions as "God sees all things;" "I commend the matter to God;" "God will recompense it;" "God will judge between us." He appeals to the fact that even in the temples of the gods the soul felt itself compelled to bear witness to the one God as a judge. He says, "In the very temples themselves thou callest upon God as thy judge. In thy own forum thou appealest to a judge in another place. In thy own temples thou allowest a foreign God. O testimony of truth, which amongst the very dæmons makes thee a witness for the Christians!" Tertullian likewise believed that he could adduce a testimony of the soul to the fall of man, as when persons are heard saying, 'God is good, but man is evil." "By this contrast," says Tertullian, "thou utterest indirectly and covertly the reproach that man is therefore evil because he has departed from the good God." Every-

where the voice of original nature appeared to Tertullian more powerful than the diversified opinions of men. It was his belief that the voice of this original nature could not utter falsehood. Whatever the philosophers might think concerning the origin and nature of the soul, they must acknowledge this voice. To the Epicureans he opposed the testimony of the original consciousness respecting the unchangeable nature of the soul. But the fact was, that Tertullian's ingenuity sometimes stood in the way of his finding what was natural and simple, and occasioned his attributing a false meaning to those phrases of every-day life by arbitrary interpretations.[1]

Of these revelations of the religious consciousness, Tertullian says—"Nature is the preceptress, the soul is the disciple. Whatsoever the one has taught, or the other has learned, has been delivered to them by God, who is, in truth, the preceptor of the preceptress herself. What notion the soul is able to form respecting its original teacher, it is in thy power to judge from that soul which is within thee. Perceive that which causes thee to perceive." He appeals to the divine in the soul, which displays itself in a certain power of divination. We see how, on this side, Tertullian does not reject an accommodation between the natural and supernatural. Prophecy in revelation will find its point of connexion in an indwelling divining element of the soul. Tertullian says—"Reflect on that, which in forebodings is a prophet; in omens, an augur; in coming events, a seer. Strange, if being given by God to man, it knows how to divine! Equally strange, if it knoweth him by whom it is given! Even when compassed about by its adversary, it remembers its author, and his goodness, and his decree, and its own end, and its adversary himself. So it is a strange thing (is it?) if, being given by God, it sings the same things which God has granted his people to know!" Tertullian calls these "utterances" (*eruptiones*) the teaching of a congenial nature, and the silent deposits of an innate consciousness. But it then happened, as we have often seen it repeated since, that those who could not resolve to know the

[1] This is shown in a very striking manner when Tertullian finds a witness for faith in a future resurrection in the jocular expression of common life respecting a deceased person, used by others who knew not of his death, as of one still living, "*Abiit; jam et reverti debet.*" "He is gone—then he is to return."

power of truth in an immediate consciousness, endeavoured to account for the utterances of such an universal consciousness from external sources—from the influence of opinions gradually put into circulation, which passed from the educated to the populace.[1] To such persons Tertullian replies—"Certainly the soul existed before letters; the living Word before the book; the sense before the style; and man himself before the philosopher and the poet. Is it to be believed that before books and their publication, men lived mute, without utterances of this kind? No one (I suppose?) spoke of God or his goodness! no one of death! no one of the shades below! . . . . . If thou doubtest concerning thy own writings, neither God nor nature speaks falsely. That thou mayest believe both nature and God, believe the soul; thus it will come to pass that thou wilt believe thyself. . . . . Thou art a fool, if thou ascribest such things to this language (the Latin) only, or to the Greek, which are held to be near akin, and deniest the universal language of nature. The soul descends not from heaven on the Latins and Greeks alone. Man is one in all nations; the soul is one, though the voice is various; the spirit is one, the sound is various; there is a language peculiar to each nation, but the matter of all languages is common. God is everywhere, and the goodness of God is everywhere; the dæmon is everywhere, and the malediction of the dæmon is everywhere; the calling down of the divine judgment is everywhere; death is everywhere, and the consciousness of death is everywhere, and the testimony is everywhere. With good reason, therefore, is every soul both a culprit and a witness; as much a culprit in respect of error as it is a witness of truth. In the day of judgment it will stand before the tribunal of God, and have nothing to say in its defence. 'Thou didst preach God, and didst not seek after him; thou spakest as a Christian, and didst persecute Christians.'"

[1] "Dicet potius, diventilatis in vulgus opinionibus, publicatarum literarum usus, jam et quasi vitium corroboratum taliter sermocinandi."

SECTION II.

TREATISES OF THE SAME CLASS WRITTEN BY TERTULLIAN AFTER HE BECAME A MONTANIST.

In the period that has hitherto come under our notice, comprising the first years of the reign of Severus, no new laws, as we have already remarked, were passed against the Christians, nor were they subjected to any persecutions, excepting in some particular districts, as in proconsular Africa and Egypt, arising out of local circumstances, and on the ground of former edicts. In other provinces, since the close of the bloody persecutions under the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, or since the accession of Commodus, ever since the beginning of the eightieth year of the second century, the Christians had enjoyed uninterrupted peace. But in the year 202, the Emperor Septimius Severus passed a law, which seriously affected the condition of the Christians generally, for it prohibited, under severe penalties, passing over either to Christianity, or to Judaism,[1] a proof that, notwithstanding the existing laws, Christianity had continued to spread. Since, according to these laws, Christianity was already declared to be a *religio illicita*, there was no necessity, strictly speaking, for issuing a fresh edict. This new law really was less comprehensive than preceding ones, since it only denounced punishment on any new transition from the state-religion to Christianity; its operation was only to put limits to the further spread of Christianity. This law, accordingly, presupposed that Christianity, though forbidden by the laws, was, in fact, tolerated, and that the emperor hitherto had allowed that toleration; and this agrees perfectly with what Tertullian himself tells us, that Christians were to be found among senators and their wives, and that the emperor knew and tolerated it, and even so far interested himself on their behalf, as to oppose the tumultuary attacks of the people on the Christians.[2]

[1] Ælius Spart. c. 17. "Judæos fieri sub gravi pœna vetuit, idem etiam de Christianis sanxit."

[2] "Sed et clarissimas feminas, et clarissimos viros Severus sciens hujus sectæ esse, non modo non læsit, verum et testimonio exornavit et

An incident which occurred about this time, in a district unknown to us, might have been dangerous, especially under these circumstances, to the repose of the Christians, as this law had now appeared, which certainly did not occasion a general persecution against the Christians. When the emperor, on one occasion, (we cannot certainly determine when,) distributed a sum of money, a so-called *donativum*, among the soldiers, they appeared, in order to receive the present, in festive garments adorned with laurels. There were Christians among the soldiers, who felt no scruples about complying with the general custom. But an opinion was also spread widely, as it appears, among the Christians, that it was unbecoming for Christians to wear garlands on their heads. This was owing, in part, to the opposition against heathenism, since the wearing of garlands was connected with many heathenish festivals; and in part to the notion that this use of flowers, which were destined for other purposes by the Creator, was absolutely unnatural. Such a view Tertullian had already expressed in his Apology,[1] and this view we find in one of the Greek fathers, belonging to quite a different school from that of Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria.[2] It so happened that one of the Christians appeared with a laurel-garland in his hand. He was immediately known to be a Christian, on account of his military disobedience, and likewise his public declaration that he was a Christian, and was thrown into

populo furenti in nos palam restitit."—*Ad Scap.* c. iv. "But moreover Severus, knowing that certain most illustrious women and most illustrious men were of this sect, not only did not harm them, but even honoured them by his own testimony, and openly withstood the people when they were mad against us." Tertullian also gives here one reason why the emperor was favourably disposed towards the Christians, which was probably correct. A Christian named Proculus had anointed the emperor with oil in an illness, and prayed for him. The emperor regained his health, and attributed his recovery to the prayer of the Christian, and thus became favourably disposed towards Christianity. Tertullian calls this Proculus, "*Procurator Euhodiæ;*" this may mean overseer of the public roads; but probably Euhodia was a proper name, and Proculus, a slave, and steward (*οἰκόνομος*) in the house of a Roman lady of rank, Euhodia; as it is well known there were many Christians among the slaves in the early ages. When Septimius Severus became emperor, he allowed these slaves to come to him, and took many of them into his own service at the palace.

[1] Apolog. cap. xlii.

[2] Pædag. lib. ii. cap. 8.

prison. Many Christians were dissatisfied with the conduct of this brother in the faith. It was still the duty of Christians, they said, to avoid all culpable occasions of presenting Christianity in an unfavourable light, and to accommodate themselves to every existing regulation which did not contradict the law of God. And in what passage of Holy Writ (for that was the only authority to which they could bow) was it said that no man was allowed to wear a garland of flowers or laurels? Such a person had, uncalled-for, taken the liberty to raise a disturbance about a thing perfectly indifferent in itself, and it was to be feared that this occurrence would affect the condition of the Christians generally in that district, and that the peace they had enjoyed so long—for upwards of twenty years—would run the risk of being destroyed.[1]

As the affair came to be much talked about, Tertullian stood forth to vindicate the soldier's conduct, and was induced to represent the practice of wearing garlands as inconsistent with Christianity, in his treatise *De Corona Militis*. According to the principles which Tertullian held before he embraced Montanism, he must have defended the conduct of that Christian soldier and opposed his adversaries. The strictness of Montanism here combined itself with his former habits of thinking. Tertullian appears here only still more zealous against his opponents, and endeavours to deduce all their errors from the same spirit which led them to attack Montanism. As a Montanist, Tertullian necessarily judged differently from other Christians respecting the duty of self-preservation and of martyrdom. While they held it a duty in times of persecution to use every means for self-preservation which were not inconsistent with the Christian faith, the Montanists saw in whatever conduced to such an end, a denial of the faith, a disinclination to comply with the appointments of Divine Providence. The Montanist perceived in the various tendencies of the argumentation employed on the stand-point of the church, that way of thinking which did not allow full scope to the motions of the Holy Spirit, but set arbitrary bounds to them, whether in charisms or in martyrdom.[2] From this Montanist stand-point, Tertullian attacked the

[1] "Tam bonam et longam pacem periclitari."

[2] "Plane superest, ut etiam martyria recusare meditentur, qui prophetias ejusdem Spiritus sancti respuerunt."

bishops who had endeavoured to check the spread of Montanism. When such persons in times of persecution sought by every means to obtain rest for their flocks—when they themselves evaded the fury of the fanatical populace, and for a while betook themselves to flight, as they were the special objects of persecution,—in all this the Montanist Tertullian saw nothing but cowardice. He taunts them with being lions in peace, and deer in war; as to the former expression, it may refer either to their bold style of speaking when no danger was at hand, or to their forwardness in ecclesiastical polemics, especially in their controversies with the Montanists.

The demand made by his opponents, to point out a passage of Scripture in which the wearing of garlands on the head was forbidden, must necessarily have perplexed Tertullian. Only his deficiency in sound logic, combined with his ingenious dialectic and propensity to exaggeration, could have seduced him to employ the retort, that when they maintained that the use of garlands was permitted, because it was not forbidden in Scripture, they might as well say it was not permitted, because it was not expressly commanded in Scripture. He laid down as a maxim—"*Whatever is not expressly permitted, is forbidden;*" a kind of arguing of which other examples may be found in Tertullian. The principle of what he here asserts would be, that the Holy Scriptures are a code of special precepts, positive and negative, in order to determine precisely every action; which would approach very nearly to the false positivism of Montanism; yet it would be doing Tertullian injustice, if we attempted to deduce a principle from such a single instance of extravagant assertion; and expressions of an opposite kind are to be found in other parts of his writings.

In defect of Scriptural proof, Tertullian appealed to *Tradition*. But he had to deal with opponents who would not pay much regard to the authority of tradition unsupported by the testimony of Scripture.[1]

We here see two opposite stand-points first brought into collision with one another; a scene which has been often repeated;—on the one side an appeal to Holy Writ alone; on the other, an appeal to tradition. Thus we may here find the

[1] "Etiam in traditionis obtentu exigenda est auctoritas scripta," (*De Cor. Mil.* cap. iii.) was their watchword.

first germ of the opposition between the Protestant and Catholic stand-points. The appeal to tradition as the transmission by the living word must indeed be the first and original one, since the apostles aimed to produce and propagate faith in the Gospel by the preaching of the word, and their writings were added as an accompaniment, and as called forth by special occasions. As long as they operated by the instrumentality of the living word, it was right to adhere to that. But this habit was involuntarily continued to times in which the living word of the apostles no longer existed; and then it was possible for many things of a foreign and non-apostolic character, which were said to be apostolic, to be mingled with the original tradition. When this mixture and confusion was perceived, those who had attained to a consciousness of it felt compelled to escape from this troubled source to the objective word, which became a substitute for the personal presence, the oral teachings of the apostles. Thus it came to pass, as we have seen, that a party was formed who set up the *auctoritas scripta* in opposition to tradition, and would only admit proofs from the former on points of faith and morals. We might be disposed to say, that one side was entirely in the right, and the other in the wrong. But it may be questioned whether we are justified in such a decision. The party who would only admit proofs from Scripture, might still go too far if they believed that they must adhere only to what is literally expressed in Holy Writ,—if they did not distinguish between what is contained according to the letter, and what according to spirit and principle, in the Scriptures,—if they did not acknowledge that the truths promulgated by the apostles were not left as so much dead stock, but were to continue their influence by a living development. By indulging such one-sidedness they might ignore the right of tradition as the witness of a continued process of Christian development under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. They might overlook the significance of Christian observances and customs as far as these were the natural expression of Christian consciousness in its historical development; as, for instance, in the case now before us,—although the use of garlands was not expressly forbidden in the writings of the New Testament, yet the Christian usage which forbade such a practice might have its right, as drawn from the

sound developing process of the Christian life. But on the other side, those who appealed to tradition alone did not attentively consider the various elements which, under the name of tradition, were collected together and placed in juxtaposition to the *auctoritas scripta*. It is to be observed, that a distinct idea with clear consciousness was not formed at first of tradition, but this idea had been transferred from practice to theory in an arbitrary and unconscious manner. The two elements and ideas contained in tradition were not separated; a propagation of the truth originally announced by the apostles, and a continued development of the principles which it contains in thought and life: a tradition which related to the substance of the truth, as such,—and a tradition which related to the expression of that truth in the actual life of the church: then the unchangeable and the changeable in tradition were not distinguished, the former being what had really proceeded from the pure development of Christian principles, and the latter being what had been formed from the commixture of accidental or foreign elements. To make such a separation, a higher criterion was required, and this could with right be found only in the sure apostolic word of the *auctoritas scripta;* so that even at that time, though there was more right on the side of those who would only admit the *auctoritas scripta*, yet on both sides there was a portion of right and of wrong—the contrariety was not altogether simple and absolute, but one that called for an adjustment that should ratify what was true, and correct what was erroneous, in each.

Tertullian, in arguing against those who wished to adhere simply to the letter of Scripture, and were in danger of making a mere legal code out of it, had truth on his side when he traced back tradition and usage to an internal necessity, and found in it the expression of what was founded on the essence of Christianity, of the Christian consciousness or the Christian reason. The *ratio* must justify what was given to tradition. There must be an inward consciousness of the reasons for holding what is founded on tradition and usage. "That reason," says Tertullian, "will support tradition, custom and faith, thou wilt either thyself perceive, or learn from some one who has perceived it. Meanwhile, thou wilt believe that some reason there is to which submission is due."[1] He

acknowledges also the analogy between this importance of tradition in religious matters and the universal law of all human development, as is evident when he appeals to it, saying, that even in civil affairs, where no law exists, custom occupies the place of law. Hence it comes to the same thing, whether men adhere to the plainly expressed law, or to the observance of custom; both are in a similar manner an expression of the *ratio*, and on that their validity rests.[2] Thus we find here the correct mean between the positive and the rational. But the positive is nothing else than the *ratio* historically developed and expressed. Tertullian proceeds from this view of a living perpetual development of the Christian Spirit, which must not be enclosed in the arbitrary limits of what is in practice at any one time. Hence he maintains that something new may be instituted by virtue of the same Spirit from whom the old proceeded, since a new insight may be granted to a person by the revelation of the Holy Spirit. "If law," he says, "be founded in reason, then will all that is founded in reason, by whomsoever brought forward, be law. Dost thou not think that any believer may have the power to conceive and to establish a thing, so it be agreeable to God, conducive to true religion, conducive to salvation, as the Lord says, 'And why, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?' (Luke xii. 57,) and this not as touching judgment only, but every opinion also on things coming under examination. So also says the apostle, 'If in anything ye be ignorant, God shall reveal it unto you.'" (Philipp. iii. 15.) And he appeals to the instance of Paul, who, when he had no express command from the Lord, interposed his own opinion, (1 Cor. vii. 25, 40,) since he was conscious of following the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Accordingly Tertullian maintains that when a person can adduce no express word of Holy Writ, it is allowable to appeal to what he knows to be true by the illumination of the Holy Spirit.

No objection can be made from the genuine Christian stand-point to what Tertullian says, when he ascribes to the Christian *ratio* the right to distinguish between the true and false elements in tradition. But he sets out on the assumption

[1] Cap. iv. "Consuetudo autem etiam in civilibus rebus pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex, nec differt an scriptura an ratione consistat, quando et legem ratio commendet."

that tradition first of all requires to be obeyed on its own account. He assumes that it rests as such upon the *ratio*, and that the only point of importance is, to bring into the consciousness the *ratio* that lies at its foundation.[1] Hence arise the two stand-points; first, the belief in the authority of tradition; then, the examination of the *ratio* that lies at the basis. We here see in Tertullian the germ of the Augustinian principle of the relation of *fides* to *ratio*.

In this development of Tertullian's, the influence of Montanism cannot be concealed. Hitherto apostolic tradition had been understood only as a literal transmission of the things announced and ordained by the apostles, although not set down in writing; tradition was made use of only for holding fast what had been once given,—a conservative principle; but through Montanism a new element was added to the progressive development. It was the Montanist principle, that the Paraclete, combining himself with what was unchangeable in the foundation of the church-tradition by new illuminations, carried forward the life of the church in progressive development. Montanism therefore must pass over the opposing limits of the letter of Scripture as well as of tradition, which could admit nothing new.

Tertullian endeavoured to convict his opponents of inconsequential reasoning, by proving to them that they observed many things which could not be shown to be of apostolic prescription from the written records of the faith. Our former remarks will apply to the examples adduced by Tertullian against these adversaries. He appeals to the form of renunciation twice expressed at baptism. This was certainly not an observance enjoined by the apostles. It was perhaps gradually formed from Christian usages in which the idea of baptism had been expressed. But here the essential and the accidental are to be distinguished. The act of such a renunciation of the kingdom of evil certainly belongs to the essence of baptism and regeneration; but this form of expression was by no means necessary, or binding on successive ages, and not to be relinquished without injury to the idea. Then there was the trine immersion of baptism, as symbolically making

[1] Cap. ii. "Plane, ut ratio quærenda sit, sed salva observatione, nec in destructionem ejus, sed in ædificationem potius, quo magis observes, cum fueris etiam de ratione securus."

the reference to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This, too, was a symbol that arose out of the Christian idea, but not necessarily connected with it. So likewise the gradually extended confession which was made at baptism. Moreover the tasting a mixture of milk and honey by the newly baptized,—a symbol that was taken from the pure Christian idea, being a reference to becoming a child again by regeneration, or to being made inheritors of the true Canaan flowing with milk and honey. The use of such symbols showed how the element of the Christian life filled their souls—how entirely they were penetrated by Christian ideas; yet the symbol was by no means necessary; it was only an accidental expression of Christian truth. Then there was abstaining from the use of the bath for a week after baptism; this proceeded from a consciousness of the higher reference to holiness contained in that water-baptism, which they felt compelled to distinguish from all other purifications. But here a false element might be introduced, the perversion of baptism, the false representation of a magical power in water-baptism. Further, the Lord had instituted the Holy Supper in connexion with a common meal, and all in an equal manner partook of it; but in Tertullian's time it was partaken of at the meetings of the Christians held before daylight, and received only from the hands of the presidents of the church. What Tertullian here reports, in part existed only in post-apostolic times, and arose not from an ideal cause, but gradually from the pressing influence of altered circumstances. Originally, the administering of the bread and wine was only something connected with the common meal which was held as an imitation of that last supper of Christ with his disciples; it was only one ingredient in the whole of the festival, which, as the meal dedicated to the Lord, was designated "the meal of brotherly love." This connexion corresponded both to the original institution, and to the complete idea of the holy act. It was only a relative necessity brought on by the increased size of the Christian communities, that led them to take one constituent part out of the whole, which was put in lieu of it, and designated the Eucharist. At a later period misapprehensions of the nature of the Holy Supper were connected with this deviation from the original institution that had been occasioned by circum-

stances. Further, all Christians, originally, in virtue of their universal priesthood, were capable of performing sacred services; but in consequence of the necessary organization in the form of the Christian community, the right of the universal priesthood was committed to those whom the church chose to be the organs of their guidance. Hence arose the false notions of a peculiar priestly dignity attached to such persons. Then the custom came in, that on the anniversary of the death of their relations persons should partake of the Holy Supper in commemoration of their fellowship, not to be destroyed by death, with those who died in the Lord, and present a gift on the altar in their name, and that the deceased should be especially referred to in the devotions that accompanied the celebration of the Supper. In the same manner oblations were offered at the celebration of the anniversary of the death of the martyrs, as their true birth-day, a custom which originally implied that the martyrs were also men who stood in need of redemption.[1] All this beautiful symbolising of Christian ideas proceeded from the depths of Christian feeling; yet it afterwards furnished a point of connexion for the false notion of the Sacrifice of the Mass. Again, on the Lord's day it was counted unlawful to fast or to worship on the knees; also full fifty days were marked from the celebration of the resurrection to the commemoration of the effusion of the Holy Spirit. All this was a beautiful expression of the Christian consciousness. It testified what power faith in the resurrection of Christ had over the minds of believers—how they were penetrated by the conviction that the resurrection of Christ must needs be the centre of the whole Christian life, and the festival of that event one of the highest joy, accompanied by the consciousness that Christ had thereby raised men who were sunk down to earth, in fellowship with him to heaven. On this account men were not to fast, but to pray standing upright when they celebrated the commemoration of Christ's resurrection and ascension even to that of the corroborative fact of the effusion of the Holy Spirit. But all this was only a single symbol of what must always fill the whole of the Christian consciousness. Tertullian says, "We feel pained if any of the wine or even of our bread be spilled upon the

[1] See Neander's General History of the Christian Religion and Church, vol. i. pp. 462—464. Stand. Library ed.—Tr.

ground." There is implied in this a beautiful Christian sentiment, the consciousness of the thanks due to God for his earthly gifts, which ought to be something sacred to Christians; perhaps also there is a reference to the consecration of the bread and wine in the Holy Supper. Nevertheless, it cannot be concealed, that the perversion of what was originally a symbolical expression passed into a painful superstition. What we have here remarked, is strikingly exemplified in the last instance Tertullian adduces of tradition, the custom prevalent among Christians of marking the forehead with the sign of the Cross in all their travels and movements, in coming in and going out, in all the daily employments of life, such as dressing and washing. A genuine Christian idea was implied in this practice, that the whole life of the Christian in all its separate acts must be sanctified through the consciousness of redemption, through a reference to Christ the crucified as the Redeemer. The consecration of the Cross was to be extended to everything. This would indeed have been the perfection of the Christian life, if what this symbol represented had met with its true fulfilment. But it came to pass, that what originally proceeded from the inward Christian life and was a sensible expression of it, afterwards degenerated into a mere mechanism, so that a supernatural sanctifying power was ascribed to the outward act in and for itself, and thus it served rather to obscure the idea of Christianity than to make it the ever-present centre of the Christian life. These instances given by Tertullian of what was regarded in his time as having the authority of tradition, are suited to elucidate our remarks on the various elements of which tradition was composed.

Tertullian wished to prove by internal grounds, what was allowed by Christian usage. But since he wished to find reasons for prohibiting what in itself was permissible, he was obliged to have recourse to many unsound arguments. He wished to show that crowning with garlands was something unnatural. But even as a Montanist he would by no means renounce all pleasures of the senses. He says, "All substances are pure as being the creatures of God, and in this their character, fit for the use of all; but the application of the very use makes the difference. For even I kill a fowl for myself no less than Socrates did for Æsculapius; and if the

odour of any place offends me, I burn something from Arabia, but not with the same ceremony, nor in the same dress, nor with the same outward show which is employed upon idols." But he requires that all natural productions should be made use of agreeably to the laws established by the Creator, in a manner corresponding to their original destination. He attributes every perversion of nature, every abuse of her productions, to Satan and sin. To support this view he refers to Rom. viii. 20, in which nature is described as subject to vanity through the sin of man. By means of Christianity nature regains her original rights; all things are restored to their natural use. Tertullian has here recognised correctly the principle of Christian morals, and the depth of his mind is shown in his knowing how to institute an inquiry on a subject so external and isolated in connexion with the highest truths. But the arbitrary manner in which he conducts it, lays him open to the charge of sophistry. He errs in his application of a correct principle, since he determines in an arbitrary manner, what is natural, and what is unnatural. He does not acknowledge the freedom with which man is called to use the productions of nature, and to use them as symbols for the spirit. The idea of the natural is formed by him in too mechanical a manner. Flowers are intended only to gratify the senses of sight and smell; this alone is their natural use. To make them into garlands as symbols of joy and festivity appeared to Tertullian to be a perversion of nature, an act of sacrilege against their Creator. Here we perceive the contraction of the ethical spirit which would narrow Christian freedom by arbitrary maxims in the appropriation of the world. We impute this to what might be designated by the name of pietism. As belonging to the passages in which Tertullian, who sometimes was overcome by a Jewish element, most clearly marks the peculiarity of the Christian stand-point in relation to the Old Testament, we may quote the words, where, appealing to the typical character of the Jewish cultus, he says, "But if they were figures of ourselves—(for we are both temples of God, and his altars, and lights, and vessels)—this also they foreshowed in a figure, that men of God ought not to be crowned."[1]

The question respecting this *corona militaris* led him to

[1] Cap. ix.

discuss the question whether military service in general was allowable for Christians. He declared himself against it on very similar grounds to those he had made use of before his transition to Montanism. The unconditional obedience to one man, to whose service the soldier surrendered himself, appeared to him as something unchristian; and not less unchristian he considered it that man should thereby be released from all the bonds of nature which Christianity held sacred, though in subordination to Christ. He says,[1] "Do we believe that a human sacrament may supersede a divine one, and that a man may pledge his name to another lord after Christ? and renounce father and mother, and all that are nearest to him?—whom the law teaches should be honoured and loved next to God; whom the gospel also has in like manner honoured, only not valuing them more than Christ." After making an erroneous application (as we have noticed above) of Christ's words in Matt. xxvi. 52, "*He that useth the sword shall perish by the sword*," he adds, "And shall the son of peace act in battle, whom it will not befit even to go to law? Shall he administer bonds, and imprisonment, and tortures, and punishments, who may not avenge even his own injuries?" Tertullian is still bewildered in that misapprehension of the precepts in the Sermon on the Mount, and of the law of Christian love, for want of understanding the relation love bears to justice and right, of which we have spoken above. These were manifest defects, which could only be remedied by the progressive development of Christian morals and the progressive pervasion of earthly relations by Christian principle. In order to prove the irreconcilableness of the *militia Christi* and the *militia seculi*, he says, "Shall he keep his military station for any other than for Christ? or on the Lord's day, when he does not do it even for Christ?" (This is an allusion to the times for fasting and prayer, for which, Wednesdays and Fridays were particularly chosen, and which by a common metaphor, being regarded as the watch-hours of the Christian soldier, Tertullian here calls his *stationes*. The *statio* in Cæsar's service was inconsistent with his *statio* in the service of the one Lord Christ. But even on a Sunday the Christian soldier must omit his watch-service, which appeared to be a desecration of that day, when even the *stationes* of the

[1] Cap. xi.

Christian *militia* were not allowable.) "And shall he keep watch before those temples which he has renounced? And shall he sit at meat where the apostle would not have him?" (*i. e.* in idol-temples.) Here also we perceive a misunderstanding in the interpretation of Paul's words, for he is not there (1 Cor. viii. 10) speaking of eating in idol-temples, simply as such, but of partaking of the sacrifices offered to idols. "And shall he defend by night those whom in the day-time he has put to flight by his exorcisms," (this refers to the exorcising of evil spirits, whom Tertullian identified with the false gods,) "leaning and resting upon a spear wherewith Christ's side was pierced?" (The watch-service before the heathen temples.) "Shall he also carry the standard, the rival of Christ? And shall he ask for a watchword from the emperor, who has already received one from God? Shall he when dead be disturbed by the trumpet of the trumpeter, who expects to be awakened by the trump of the angel? Shall the Christian be burnt according to the rules of the camp, whom Christ has freed from deserved fire?" (Here we see the reason of the disinclination to burn the dead among Christians.)

Yet in one respect Tertullian expresses himself more mildly than in his earlier pre-montanist writings. In those he appeared to disapprove of military service in general for Christians; although speaking objectively on the varieties of calling which Christians had to carry on with the heathen, he reckons among others, military service. He now distinguishes the two cases,—when a person being a Christian chooses the military life, or, when at his conversion to Christianity he is actually engaged in that vocation. In favour of the latter remaining in his calling, it was usual to adduce the example of the soldiers whom John baptized; of the believing centurion whom Christ commended; and of Cornelius, who was converted by Peter. And these examples appeared to have had some weight with Tertullian. Such persons, he declared, must either leave the army immediately on their baptism, as many had done; or at all events they must take care to do nothing contrary to the divine law, which could not be allowed even in military service; or lastly, they must suffer for the cause of God, to which likewise believers in the capacity of citizens were pledged. "A Christian is nowhere

anything else. The Gospel is one; and Jesus is the same. In his sight the believing citizen is a soldier" (namely, in respect of his calling and duties as a *miles Christi*), "and the believing soldier[1] is a citizen;" (he has the same duties, and cannot excuse himself for neglecting them on the plea of his military profession.)

Tertullian justly observes, that if the necessity of any worldly relation or calling could furnish an excuse for the neglect of any Christian duty, the entire sanctity of Christian morals would soon be destroyed; for every voluntary act might easily find an apology in the pressure of outward circumstances.[2] He touches particularly on the inducement held out at that time for wearing laurel crowns, the donative to the soldiers on account of their victory, (probably that over the Parthians,) and says in this connexion—"The same laurel is denounced in the distribution of the donative. Evidently it is not a gratuitous idolatry, since it sells Christ for certain pieces of gold, as Judas did for pieces of silver. Shall this be the meaning of, 'Ye cannot serve God and mammon;' to give the hand to mammon, and to apostatize from God? Shall this be the meaning of, 'Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's;' not to render the man to God, and to take the denarius from Cæsar? Is the triumphal laurel composed of leaves, or of corpses? Is it adorned with plates, or with the ashes of the dead? Is it bedewed with ointments, or with the tears of wives and mothers? perhaps even of some Christians, for Christ is among the barbarians." This last expression very well suits the victory over the Parthians, for Christianity at an early period had spread itself in the provinces of the Parthian empire.

Another occasion on which crowns of laurel were used, was to adorn slaves when they obtained their freedom. In passing his judgment on this use of them, Tertullian proceeds from an ideal point of view, and manifests that the reference to the highest good was ever present to his thoughts. In opposition to the ancient stand-point, on which earthly freedom was the

[1] Cap. xi. The *miles* here must evidently be *fidelis*, not *infidelis*.

[2] "Cæterum subvertit totam substantiam sacramenti causatio ejusmodi ut etiam voluntariis delictis fibulam laxet; nam et voluntas poterit necessitas contendi, habens scilicet, unde cogatur." Cap. xi.

highest good, he regards all mere outward earthly freedom as only apparent and valueless; and true freedom only that which has its foundation in the inner man, and proceeds from redemption. But similarly to what we have already remarked, in combating the excessive valuation of earthly freedom, he falls into the opposite extreme, since he does not acknowledge the importance of earthly freedom, even as a subordinate good in connexion with the highest good, the only true and essential freedom. That defect in his views is to be seen throughout, which was founded on the complete one-sidedness in his conception of the development of the Christian life,—a one-sidedness which corresponded to the general character of this first stage in the development of the church, and shows that he had not yet found the right adjustment of the relation of all earthly things to the divine. "Earthly freedom," he says, "gives crowns. But thou art already redeemed by Christ, and that at a great price. How can the world set free another's servant? Though it seems to be freedom, yet is it seen also to be servitude. In the world all things are imaginary, and nothing real. For even then thou wast free from man, being redeemed by Christ; and now, though made free by man, thou art Christ's servant. If thou thinkest that the freedom of the world is true liberty, so that thou even distinguishest it by a crown, thou hast returned to the service of man, which thou thinkest to be liberty; thou hast lost the freedom of Christ, which thou thinkest to be servitude."[1] It is Tertullian's leading idea, that on the highest stand-point the antagonism of freedom and dependence is lost. True freedom is inseparably connected with dependence on Christ, and only in this dependence on him is to be found freedom and independence in relation to all created objects. Hence the ideas of freedom and dependence, according to the common judgment of the world, were, in Tertullian's opinion, no reality, but a mere semblance. The Christian, as he

[1] "Coronat et libertas sæcularis. Sed tu jam redemptus es a Christo, et quidam magno. Servum alienum quomodo sæculum manumittet? Etsi libertas videtur, sed et servitus videbitur. Omnia imaginaria in sæculo, et nihil veri. Nam et tunc liber hominis eras, redemptus a Christo, et nunc servus es Christi, licet manumissus ab homine. Si veram putes sæculi libertatem, ut et corona consignes, redisti in servitutem hominis; quam putas libertatem; amisisti libertatem Christi, quam putas servitutem." Cap. xiii.

thought, had entirely renounced this stand-point. With a consciousness springing up in his own soul of this Christian freedom, Tertullian beautifully says—"So far must the Christian be from putting this work of idolatry on his own head, yea, I might even say on Christ, if so be that *Christ is the head of the man*, which head is as free as Christ himself, not obliged to wear a veil, far less a bandage. Moreover, the head which is obliged to wear a veil, the head of the woman being already occupied by a veil, has not room for a bandage. She bears the burden of her own subjection. If she ought not to be seen with her head uncovered *because of the angels*, much more, having her head crowned, will she offend those who are, perhaps, at the same time wearing their crowns." It is evident that Tertullian understands the words *διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους*, 1 Cor. xi. 10, to be used respecting good angels. Before their sight the woman must appear with a veil as a sign of humility, of her natural dependence on the man. But if she would displease the angels by rejecting this mark of dependence, how much more if she stood before them (who already wear a heavenly crown) with the proud ornament of a wreath.

Tertullian closes this book with words which testify how, in the contemplation of the least important things, the reference to Christ was the central point that determined the whole style of his contemplations.[1] "If, for these things, thou owest thy head to him, who for thee wore a crown of thorns, pay him, if thou canst, with such a head as his own was when he offered it up for thine; or wear not a crown of flowers, if thou art not able to wear one of thorns; if thou art not yet able to wear (the true) crown of flowers," (the martyr's crown, the *testimonium floridum*.) "Preserve undefiled for God what is his own. He shall crown it if he will. Yea, he does will;

[1] The agreement is remarkable in men of such different characters as Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria, as to their peculiar modes of contemplating an object in itself of such little importance. Clement says (lib. ii. p. 181), "The living image of God is not to be crowned like dead idols." He has a similar reference to Christ's crown of thorns, (lib. ii. p. 182,) "It is foolish that we who have heard that Christ was crowned with thorns, despising the honourable sufferings of the Lord, should be overcome by flowers"—*ἀλόγιστον ἀκηκοότας ἡμᾶς τὸν κύριον*

he even invites thee to it. 'To him that overcometh,' he saith, 'I will give a crown of life. Be thou' also 'faithful unto death. 'Fight thou' also 'the good fight,' for which the apostle, with good cause, trusted that there was 'laid up for him a crown.' ... Why condemnest thou to the garland and the wreath that head which is designed for a kingly crown? for Christ Jesus has 'made us kings unto God and his Father.' What hast thou to do with a perishing flower? Thou hast a flower 'out of the rod of Jesse,' on which all the grace of the Spirit of God has rested,—a flower incorruptible, unwithering, everlasting, by choosing which the good soldier (the soldier who, despising the crown of laurel, meets martyrdom) has been promoted to honour in the ranks of heaven." Although Tertullian did not belong to those who, like the Alexandrian fathers, recognised in Pagan antiquity a preparation for Christianity, yet he also found in the myths and symbols of the ancient religion a shadowy image of divine truth, inasmuch as Satan, from whom he deduced these religions, appeared to him as the imitator of the true, the mimic of the divine. From this stand-point he also thought, in his Apology, that he could detect in the myths a counterfeit type of Christian truth.[1] He adduces, as one instance, the Persian mysteries of Mythras. "Blush ye," says Tertullian, "his fellow-soldiers who shall now stand condemned, not by him, but by any soldier of Mythras, who, when he is initiated in the cavern, the camp, in very truth, of darkness, when the crown is offered him, (a sword being placed between him and it, as if in mimicry of martyrdom,) and then fitted on his head, is directed to put it aside from his head, and to remove it, perhaps, to his shoulder, saying that Mythras is his crown." In this Tertullian finds a counterfeit imitation of Christian self-denial, since the Christian knows no other crown than Christ.

When Tertullian wrote the treatise *De Corona Militis*, he had already formed the design of discussing in a separate work,[2] the question whether a Christian might lawfully save himself from persecution by flight. This design he carried into effect. The immediate occasion of writing it was a ques-

[1] Cap. xi. "Sciebant et qui penes vos ejusmodi fabulas æmulas ad destructionem veritatis istiusmodi præministravcrunt."

[2] "Sed de quæstionibus confessionum *alibi* docebimus."—*De Cor. Mil.* cap. i.

tion proposed in a social meeting by one Fabius, a member of the catholic church, whether it became a Christian to flee from an impending persecution. It was the general principle practically adopted by many pious Christians, that this was entirely accordant with the doctrine and spirit of the Gospel. This gave rise to a dispute, since many of the persons present maintained it, but Tertullian held the contrary opinion. And since the warmth of the debate would not allow him to state all his reasons, he composed, in the first instance for his friend Fabius, his work *De Fuga in Persecutione*—(On Flight in Persecution).

Probably the point here brought under discussion was only a question disputed between the Montanists and their opponents. Among the Montanists themselves there could be no dispute respecting it. According to their general ethical tendencies and principles, it was already decided; for an enthusiastic over-valuation of martyrdom and an inclination towards it belonged to the essence of Montanism; and in this respect a tendency that had existed at an earlier period in the church had fixed itself in Montanism; and the predominant passivity, the quietism which belonged to the very nature of Montanism, did not admit of the employment of human means, to contravene a divine dispensation, which could only be met, it was believed, by absolute resignation. The Montanist spirit was characteristically expressed in the mysterious oracular voices of the Montanist prophets, as quoted by Tertullian in this treatise. "Wilt thou be made publicly known? it is well for thee, for he who is not made public among men, will be so before the Lord;" *i. e.* will be denounced before him as one who has denied him. "Be not ashamed; justice brings thee forth into public." "Why art thou ashamed, since thou bearest the glory of it? An opportunity is given since thou art seen by men." "Be unwilling to die on your beds, in miscarriages or in soft fevers; but wish to die in martyrdom, that He may be glorified who suffered for you." We recognise in these passages that enthusiastic tendency of Christian feeling for which the sick-bed and the pains of a natural death were something mean and despicable; as if the genuine Christian resignation, the disposition to imitate the sufferings of Christ, could not be maintained on a sick-couch or a death-bed as well as in a martyrdom. This contempt of what was

natural to man, stands in contradiction to the impress of the Christian spirit. For the Montanists, therefore, no examination was here required; a positive authority had already decided the question for them. The new utterances of the Paraclete had for them the same authority as the expressions of Holy Writ. And as at a later period the advocates of the stand-point of the Roman Catholic church employed as an argument in its favour, that what among others who call themselves Christians was still disputable, could no longer be so among those who regarded the authority of the church, but had been decided in a manner raised above all doubt; so without question Tertullian wished to make use of this for the advantage of Montanism among those who were not disposed to acknowledge the new prophets, when he says of his opponents, that "they were deservedly in doubt respecting other things, since they did not acknowledge the Paraclete who led into all truth."[1] We here see what is shown in many other respects, that many things have passed over in a milder and modified form, into Roman Catholicism from Montanism, which represents one side of an ultra-catholic stand-point. But Tertullian, when he wrote this, had so much greater reason for wishing to represent Montanism in a favourable light, since he was discussing the question with persons who do not appear to have belonged to the decided violent opponents of that system.[2] Hence it may be accounted for, that Tertullian does not exhibit so much vehemence in this treatise as in his other writings against the opponents to Montanism. Yet we perceive the sectarian spirit of Montanism, which regarded the refusal to acknowledge the new prophets as a denial of the Holy Spirit, and which would only acknowledge the full operations of the Holy Spirit, in those quarters where these new revelations of the Paraclete were received. According to this Montanist view, the true power for martyrdom was wanting to others, because they did not surrender themselves to the operations of the Holy Spirit which were poured forth in all their fulness over the churches by the new prophets. This is very manifest from the closing words of the book, to which we shall come in the sequel.

[1] "Qui si forte Paracletum non recipiendo, deductorem omnis veritatis merito adhuc etiam aliis quæstionibus obnoxii estis." Cap. i.

[2] As we may infer from the expression, "si forte," &c

Tertullian, in this inquiry, sets out from the question, Are the persecutions against the church an operation of the evil spirit, as many persons maintained, but which the Gnostic Basilides (only on another side) as well as Tertullian impugned, —or are they, either immediately or mediately, a work of God, and take place under his direction? He endeavours to prove, that although persecutions proceed from Satan, yet he can effect nothing against the will of God, and can only act as his instrument. They take place, as he thinks, for a two-fold object; to prove and purify true believers, and to make a separation between them and those who are only apparent believers. The former operation of persecutions he thus describes: "When is God more trusted but when he is more feared? and when is that but in times of persecution? The church is struck with amazement. Then faith is more anxious in its undertakings and more regular in fasts, and watchings, and prayers, and humility, in diligence, in love, in holiness and in sobriety." Tertullian only sees weakness of faith, when in times of impending persecutions Christians hold their meetings less frequently and use greater caution in order to escape the notice of the heathen. He says to them, "Know you not, that God is Lord of all? and if it be God's will, you will suffer persecution; if it be not his will, then the heathen will be silent. Only believe:—thou believest in that God without whose will not a sparrow falls to the ground. I think that we are of more value than many sparrows." But Tertullian's opponents certainly need not submit to this reproach of weakness of faith. They could assent to everything which Tertullian says of Christian confidence in divine guidance, and yet maintain that they must do their part, as much as in them lay, not to awaken the suspicion and wrath of the heathen, and to maintain peace in the churches. The manner in which Tertullian applied a principle correct in itself, could not justify the conclusion, that men were to leave everything in God's hands, and make no use of human means. This sentiment was certainly connected with Montanist quietism. Tertullian quotes expressions of his opponents in which they appeal to the necessity of doing their utmost while exercising trust in God. "I do my part," says the representative of the opposite system, "I flee, lest I should perish if I denied the faith. It depends on God to bring me back again from flight

when he pleases."[1] But Tertullian, who judged differently from the party he opposed respecting the relation of human action to the Divine will, charged them with the want of true faith in God, which would impel believers, not to flee, but to commit everything to God, while they remained with confidence. He says, "Do we not acknowledge the power of God, that, as he can bring us back from flight, so also, if we do not flee, yea even if we walk in the midst of the people, he can protect us? How is this, that thou, in order to flee, givest God the glory of being able to bring thee back from flight; but thou dost not give him the glory when thou testifiest of him that thou doubtest of the power of his protection? Why dost not thou rather say with steadfast trust in God, I do what is my part; I do not depart; God, if he pleases, will protect me."

But yet his opponents might answer in an evangelical sense, "I distrust not God's almightiness, but my own weakness. I know, indeed, that he can give me power to remain steadfast and faithful to him under all tortures; but I do not venture to request this of him that he would grant me such power, until he places me in a situation from which I have no other means of escape. The example of my Lord admonishes me not to tempt my God, as long as other means of deliverance are left me. If I find no deliverance in human means, then I know upon whom I must depend." This has been the principle of all thoughtful Christians, who hence have looked upon it as a punishment of insolent pride, when a Christian, who exposes himself to danger, afterwards falls a victim to it.

In order to show the uselessness of fleeing from persecution, and that no one can avoid what is God's will, Tertullian adduces an example that, in reality rather tells against him. One Rutilius had often saved himself by flight, and also endeavoured to purchase the connivance of the officers who were sent in pursuit of him. At last he was unexpectedly seized, and brought before the governor. He underwent torture, but recovered, and had strength sufficient to die on the funeral pile. It is evident that this example might have been justly adduced in favour of the lawfulness of flight. Since this Rutilius (it might be said) had not trusted himself too

[1] "Quod meum est, fugio; ne peream si negavero. Illius est si voluerit, etiam fugientem me reducere in medium." Cap. v.

much, nor tempted God; but had humbly acted according to the Lord's directions in Matt. x. 23; the Lord granted him strength when he stood in need of it.[1]

Tertullian, in order to set aside the rule drawn from Christ's words, that "a man, if persecuted in one city, should flee to another," applies the hermeneutic canon, that no words are to be taken in an unlimited universality, but that much depends on the circumstances under which, and the persons to whom, and the particular reference with which, anything is said;[2] and he correctly perceives that the directions which Christ at first gave to his apostles in reference to their preaching, were modified by the circumstances of the times, since it was of the last importance for all future ages that the apostles should lay the foundation of the church by preaching the Gospel. He knew how to avail himself of the fact that the direction the apostles received, "not to enter the cities of Samaria, nor go the way of the Gentiles," could only belong to the first period of their ministry. We see that Tertullian could discover what was true in the historical references of exposition, when he was not led away by some party interest. But though, on other occasions, he was aware that a more general maxim might be drawn from what was at first said with a peculiar, restricted reference; yet here he makes no such application of the passage, but, involved in the immediate interest of controversy, confines himself to the temporary meaning of the words, which, moreover, he explained in far too limited a manner. He maintains, that as soon as the Gospel had been published in Judea, the rule lost its application, and as a proof he adduces the example of Paul. That apostle, while this rule was still in force, saved himself by flight from Damascus; but at a later period, no danger, however threatening, could deter him from undertaking his last journey to Jerusalem. But Tertullian did not take into consideration what he himself deemed necessary for the right understanding of Scripture—the peculiar circumstances under which this happened; that Paul was assured of a special Divine call, and satisfied with obeying this, left the event to God. And those persons who pleaded for the liberty of fleeing in

[1] "Quia præceptum adimplevit, fugiens de civitate in civitatem."

[2] That the "sensus Domini et personas suas habuerit et tempora et causas." Cap. vi.

times of persecution, certainly never imagined that it would be lawful in contravention of a divine call.

His opponents appear to have appealed to the example of Christ, who prayed to God that, if possible, the cup of suffering might pass from him. Tertullian replied—It would be allowable for them to pray to God as Christ did, that they might be spared the cup of suffering, not fleeing, but enduring the conflict, and withal saying like him—"Not our will, but thine be done." But however just this might be, his opponents were not silenced by it, since they would agree with Tertullian, that men should commit all things to God's will and be ready to subordinate their own to it.

Further, his opponents appealed to the passage in Eph. iv. 27, according to the version used in the African churches, "Ne locum malo detis." Tertullian justly remarked, that this passage referred to a totally different subject,—the moderating of anger, that persons might not be drawn into sin by the evil spirit.[1] But his opponents drew from this passage—and perhaps not without reason—the general position, that we must not at any time *τόπον διδόναι τῷ διαβόλῳ*,—that we must not wilfully fall into temptations which it is in our power to avoid. They further appealed to Eph. v. 16, according to the existing ancient Latin version, "Redimendum tempus quia dies nequam sunt;" which passage—contrary, indeed, to the connexion—they thus explained: that by Christian prudence, persons should try to escape persecution, and preserve their lives. Tertullian more correctly understood it to mean, that by a wise course of conduct, they should, as it were, purchase the time as it passed away, as an opportunity for the practice of goodness.

From the question respecting flight in times of persecution, Tertullian passed to another, closely connected with it. Taking advantage of the corrupt state of the Roman functionaries at that period, it had become usual for whole Christian societies or individuals to pay the police or military who were sent after the Christians a certain sum of money, to leave them unmolested. The question might very properly be raised, whether Christianity allowed the employment of an evil instrument for a good object,—whether the peace of the church might be purchased by bribery. In reference to this

[1] Yet it is doubtful whether Tertullian had here in view μηλον

subject, Tertullian says—"How unworthy is it of God and his salvation that thou shouldst redeem that man with money, whom Christ has redeemed with his blood. . . . . The Lord has redeemed him from the evil angels, from spiritual wickedness, from the darkness of this world, from eternal judgment, from perpetual death. But thou makest terms for him with an informer, or a soldier, or some paltry officer, in an underhand, stealthy manner,—for him whom Christ purchased and manumitted before all the world." However beautifully this is expressed, Tertullian confounds things totally distinct; what relates to earthly arrangements, and what belongs to a far higher order. The Christian can, certainly, without detriment to his inward freedom, which is elevated far beyond all the shackles of earthly relations, submit to worldly arrangements in things that relate to the outer man. Yet it is very different when the point in question relates to an immoral disgraceful means, which may with truth be described as inconsistent with the exalted dignity of a Christian. Tertullian's remark involves the requirement, that Christians should only employ such means for their repose as correspond to their own dignity—that they should seek to obtain only a legal freedom for the exercise of their worship. Thus Tertullian might protest against a practice by which Christians promoted and made use of immorality, and led others into an immoral course by a neglect of duty and receiving bribes.[1] Here he could appeal to the example of Paul, who would not employ bribery in order to gain his release from the governor Felix. He also could justly call it disgraceful for Christian congregations, when in the list of the head of the police, among those who bargained for following a forbidden, immoral or disgraceful calling, even Christian churches could be found.[2]

Tertullian, who as a Montanist was at issue on many points with the clergy, was disposed to represent the clergy, and especially the bishops, in an unfavourable light, of which we have already seen an instance. And in this treatise he

[1] "Miles me vel delator vel inimicus concutit, nihil Cæsari exigens, imo contra faciens, cum Christianum, legibus humanis reum, mercede dimittit." Cap. xii.

[2] "Nescio dolendum an erubescendum sit, cum in matricibus beneficiariorum et curiosorum inter tabernarios et lanios, et fures balneorum et aleones et lenones, Christiani quoque vectigales continentur." Cap. xiii.

reproached them for setting a bad example to their flocks, by timidly forsaking them in times of persecution. "But when those who stand at the head" (*i. e.* the deacons, presbyters, and bishops) "flee, how can the laity understand in what sense the Lord says, that his disciples should flee from one city to another? When the leaders flee, who of the common soldiers will listen to those who exhort them to stand their ground in the field of battle?"[1] It might certainly happen that in many cases the clergy absconded through cowardice; but the bishops, as we have remarked above, might have good reason for withdrawing themselves awhile from their congregations, in order to preserve themselves for them and to obtain rest. But Tertullian, owing to his Montanist principles and the warmth of his temperament, was not capable of discriminating in such cases the difference of circumstances. He particularly reproached the clergy for employing those unworthy means which we have already noticed, and which he terms *nummaria fuga*,[2] in order, as they said, to procure rest for their congregations? "Did the apostles," he says ironically, "give this form to the episcopacy with foresight, in order that they might securely enjoy their rule under the pretence of procuring peace? Such a peace, forsooth, did Christ procure when he returned to the Father, which is to be redeemed from the soldiery by presents at the saturnalia!"[3]

To the question, How then can we hold our religious assemblies, our meetings for worship? he answers, "Certainly in the same manner as the apostles, who were safe through their faith, not through their money. Guard thyself by wisdom, not by bribery; for thou wilt not be safe before the people, though thou hast bought thyself off from the military." Indeed these instances of bribery only increased the exactions on the Christians, since many persons employed it as a means to extort money from them. The practice which on moral grounds could not be sanctioned, proved to be equally objectionable on the score of prudence. "There-

[1] Cap. xi. [2] Cap. xii.

[3] "Hanc episcopatui formam apostoli providentius condiderunt, ut regno suo securi frui possent sub obtentu procurandi *pacem*," (this last word has evidently fallen out, as the following sentence shows.) "Scilicet enim talem *pacem* Christus ad Patrem regrediens mandavit a militibus per Saturnalitia redimendam." Cap. xiii.

fore employ only for thy safeguard, faith and wisdom; if thou makest no use of them, thou mayst lose thy redemption; and if thou dost use them, thou wilt not want thy redemption. Lastly, if thou canst not hold meetings by day, thou hast the night, when the light of Christ is luminous against it.[1] Thou canst not go about to individuals; let the church consist of three. Better not to see the multitudes that compose thy church for some time, than dispose of them by auction."

Tertullian concludes in the spiritual pride of the Montanist party, who regarded all other Christians as belonging to the world, and believed that they alone were spiritually minded and possessed the Holy Spirit. "On this account," he says, after apologizing for the severity of his requirements, "the Paraclete was necessarily the leader into all truth, the exhorter to all endurance. They who receive him understand neither to flee nor to redeem themselves, having him who will be our advocate—as he will speak when we are examined, so he will assist us in suffering."

These continued persecutions induced Tertullian to urge the obligation of steadfastly confessing the Christian truth, not as in his writings before mentioned in controversy with a party in the church, for here he had to treat of a subject in which he agreed with the members in general of the church, though in opposition to the Gnostics. But among these there were in this respect various opinions which Tertullian knew hardly how to distinguish, from the stand-point of his enthusiastic zeal for martyrdom and his passionate polemics. Some contended, like a Heracleon or a Basilides, only against an excessive veneration for martyrs, and an over-valuation of martyrdom as an external and isolated act. It was far from their intention to restrict in general the duty of confession. But others, as the Pseudo-Basilidians whom Irenæus describes, and those against whom the treatise of Tertullian we are about to mention was directed, were really compelled, by the opposition which they made between the esoteric and exoteric stand-point, to represent confession before the heathen world as something not obligatory, and even useless, by which a person surrendered himself to death without necessity. The multitude, they thought, could understand nothing at all of

[1] "Habes noctem, luce Christi luminosa adversus eam," is evidently the correct reading.

higher truth; it must be kept concealed from them. Everything depended on internal devotion, not on external confession. A blood-thirsty God could not be the true God. Tertullian says of such persons, that on first hearing them, as they manifested their sympathy with suffering Christians, it might have been supposed that they belonged to the better-disposed among the heathens who testified their regard for the Christians. We see from these words of Tertullian that there were persons among the heathen who, untouched by the popular fanaticism, and not entangled in the principles of the Roman law, following a better feeling, witnessed with regret the persecutions against the Christians. Since those Gnostics accommodated themselves to the common church views in order to gain an entrance for themselves, they said,—"Christ has died once for us in order to free us from death. If he should desire that we should die again for him, does he expect his salvation from our death? How should God, who rejects the blood of animals in sacrifice, desire human sacrifices? Certainly he would rather have the repentance of a sinner than his death."

Also here we recognise Tertullian as the representative of Antignosticism, of the erroneous tendency diametrically opposed to the Gnostics. Here is exactly that over-valuation of martyrdom, which regarded it as a second baptism—the *baptismus sanguinis*, as Tertullian calls it. This was connected with a twofold error, the false view of repentance, and of martyrdom. In all three points there was the same fundamental error of externality and of isolation, which arbitrarily seized upon one specific point out of the whole. The view on which the whole was founded was, that by baptism, an individual received, once for all, a complete remission of sins—that he became at once a pure man throughout. Whoever did not preserve this purity, but defiled it again by sins into which he fell after baptism, would require a new satisfaction for the divine justice, and a new purification, since he had lost by his own negligence, that which had been granted him through the redemptive sufferings of Christ, in connexion with his baptism. Now, by the sufferings of martyrdom, the new satisfaction required is perfectly rendered, and the fallen person receives again complete purification; henceforward he is a newly baptized man, and, as such, is raised after death to Paradise,

instead of being, like others, in the intermediate state of Hades. Now, if baptism were placed in the right relation to regeneration, as an act embracing the whole life, with all the individual points of repentance, faith, and baptism taken in together, it would have followed that this was not a final act concluded at once, but that the subjective appropriation of the objective salvation given through Christ, must advance through the whole Christian life, and martyrdom would be viewed in connexion with this purifying process of the whole life. The former view of martyrdom, simply as a new baptism, Tertullian might have had before his passing over to Montanism; the latter is connected, as we have seen, with that generally spread and fundamental error of externality. But it was something different when Tertullian says that God came to the help of human weakness, and since he foresaw that many would perish after baptism, he left them one means of help in martyrdom. Still there appears to be something contained in this which could only be said from the Montanist standpoint. It is presupposed that those who sinned after baptism, that is, committed *peccata mortalia*, must perish; that no sure help could be promised them by repentance, as the church party maintained, but only in the second baptism of martyrdom. But here we find the strictly Montanist doctrine of the second repentance, as we shall develop it further in another section.[1]

[1] Cap. vi. "Prospexerat et alias Deus imbecillitates conditionis humanæ, adversarii insidias, rerum fallacias, seculi retia, etiam post lavacrum periclitaturam fidem, perituros plerosque post salutem, qui vestitum obsoletassent nuptialem, qui faculis oleum non præparassent, qui requirendi per montes et saltus et humeris essent reportandi. Posuit igitur secunda solatia et extrema præsidia, dimicationem martyris et lavacrum sanguinis exinde securum .... Proprie enim martyribus nihil jam reputari potest, quibus in lavacro ipsa vita deponitur." The image of the shepherd who carries the lamb on his shoulders would be employed by the opponents of Montanism for the vindication of a repentance referring to all the sins committed after baptism, and sufficient for obtaining absolution, and so far this passage would support the opinion that this treatise was written by Tertullian before he became a Montanist, if we could so understand it, that by the "*lavacrum sanguinis*" the person who had sinned after baptism obtained the privilege of being restored to the absolute purity of the baptismal garment. But Tertullian in this passage speaks of God's having left this way for the weakness of men, since they would otherwise *perish*; it implies, therefore, that for the sins committed after baptism, and dissolving the

But the Gnostics found, since the convictions of men are often determined by their inclinations, more easy entrance because they made the conflict easy for lukewarm Christians in a trying time; for it was a time of bloody persecution. "Some," says Tertullian, "are proved as Christians by fire, others by the sword, others, again, by wild beasts. Others hunger in prison after martyrdom, which they have already endured by blows and tortures. We ourselves are watched from afar." On this account he considered it necessary to counterwork their influence on weak Christians, for whose safety he wrote his treatise entitled, "*The Antidote to the Scorpion's Bite*" (*Contra Gnosticos Scorpiace*). What is here said of persecutions, is indeed a chronological mark of the time in which Tertullian must have already passed over to Montanism; as he also says himself, that he wrote this book after his manifestly Montanist work against Marcion. Since he here treats of a subject in which he agreed with all parties in the church, and wrote against their common adversaries, he had no occasion to make special mention of Montanist authorities and principles.

Tertullian appeals to the enforcement of the duty of confession before the world contained in the Sermon on the Mount. To the objection that that discourse was addressed only to the apostles, and that no general obligation resting on all Christians could be deduced from it, Tertullian replies—that although these words primarily referred to the apostles, yet they applied, equally with the communication of the Holy Spirit, to all Christians who were the fruits of the apostolic labours. Now it was a point of importance in Montanism, to testify of the connexion between the apostolic and the succeeding age, as regarded the operations of the Holy Spirit, to oppose that broad line of demarcation which had been placed between the apostolic age and the following, and not to put so restricted an aim to the promise of the Paraclete; meanwhile this was not by any means so characteristically Montanist, that it might not have proceeded

baptismal covenant, no help could be left, which Tertullian before he was a Montanist could not say. The shepherd who carries the lamb on his shoulders, is therefore the Redeemer who comes to aid sinners that have fallen after baptism, by their martyrdom. Cap. xii. "Sordes quidem baptismate abluuntur maculæ vero martyrio candidantur."

simply from the suggestion of the Christian spirit in Tertullian. Those Gnostics, who, by adopting the principle of a deeper hidden sense of Scripture, opened the door for all kinds of arbitrary meanings, maintained that in those passages which treated of the duty of confession, another kind of confession was intended than that before earthly rulers. These passages related to the confession of the soul, ascending after death through the kingdom of the Demiurgus, the regions of the various star-spirits, into the kingdom of light or into heaven,—the confession that it must courageously make before the higher powers that would obstruct it in its way, in order by its magical power to obtain a free passage from them. Only those souls who were not afraid freely to confess Christ before these powers of the star-world, would be received by him into his kingdom. Such expressions of Christ, they said, were totally misunderstood by carnal men. Tertullian, in answer to these absurdities, says—"If this were an allegory, or a parable, the reality must be something different from what is expressed in the words. But now we see everything which is indicated by such expressions, actually come to pass. Behold, we are hated of all men for his name's sake, as it is written. We are betrayed by our nearest relatives, as it is written. We are dragged before rulers and examined; we are tortured and confess, and we are executed; and all this, as it is written." "This is the perversion of faith," he says, "not to believe what is proved, and to take for granted the unproved." He speaks forcibly against such principles of interpretation as would make Holy Writ the sport of human caprice. "Who ought to know," he asks, "the marrow of the Scriptures better than the school itself of Christ? than those whom the Lord chose for his disciples, in order to teach them all things, and whom he ordained as our teachers that we might learn all things from them? To whom should he have unfolded the figurative meaning of his discourses but to Peter, James, and John, and afterwards to Paul?" In order to put the apostle Paul on a level with those apostles whom Christ allowed to witness his transfiguration, he describes him as having been raised by Christ to Paradise during his lifetime (2 Cor. xii. 2), to which others could only be admitted by martyrdom. "Do they write otherwise than as they thought; teachers of falsehood, not of truth?" It is

remarkable, how Tertullian misunderstood the passage in 1 John iv. 18, and referred the fear which is there said to be cast out by love, not to the fear which has for its object God and his punishments, but the fear of man, which might lead to a denial of Christ. The misunderstanding of this passage, which is to be found in other parts of his writings, perhaps may be accounted for on the ground that the idea of such a love as is there described, was not congenial to his spirit.

Tertullian guards against a too indefinite application of the apostle Paul's words respecting obedience to governors, by introducing the limitation which is laid down by Paul himself in Rom. xiii. 7, that we should "render to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom;" in other words, "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's;" but "Man belongs to God alone," and therefore must be dedicated to him alone. Peter indeed commanded to "honour the king," but only so far as he kept within the proper limits of his office—as he stood aloof from claiming divine honours. Father and mother also are to be loved, but not to be set on a level with God. And a man is not to love himself more than God.

After adducing the examples of the martyrdom of Peter and Paul, he concludes with these powerful words,—"If a Prodicus or a Valentinus had been present, and had suggested that there was no need to confess before men because God did not thirst for human blood, nor Christ require any recompense for his sufferings as if he himself must obtain salvation by them, immediately those words would have been heard from the servant of the Lord which were addressed by the Lord to Satan, 'Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence unto me.'" (Tertullian confounded in his memory Matt. xvi. 23, and Matt. iv. 10; "For it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.")

It was probably at the beginning of the reign of the Emperor Caracalla, about the year 211, that the persecution of the Christians by the proconsul Scapula induced Tertullian to write an apologetic and hortatory address to that functionary. He begins in the following manner:—"It is not that we are terrified, or greatly dread those things which we suffer from ignorant men; seeing that we have joined ourselves to this sect, taking of course upon ourselves its condi-

tions, and approach these contests, having pledged our very lives; desiring to obtain those things which God has promised in return, and fearing to suffer those things which he threatens to a contrary course of life. Finally, we conflict with all your cruelty, rushing of our own accord to the charge, and rejoice more when condemned than when acquitted. We have sent you this memorial, not fearing for ourselves, but for you and all our enemies, not to say our friends. For so our religion commands us, to love even our enemies, and to pray for them who persecute us, that this our goodness may be perfect and peculiar, not common; for to love friends is common to all; but to love enemies belongs to Christians alone. We then who grieve for your ignorance, and pity human error, and look foward to future things, and behold the signs of them that daily threaten, are under the necessity of forcing ourselves in this manner to lay before you things which you will not hear publicly.

"We worship one God, whom ye all know by nature; at whose lightnings and thunders ye tremble, in whose benefits ye rejoice. But other beings ye think to be God, whom we know to be dæmons." We perceive here that Tertullian presupposes the consciousness of one God as undeniable by all men. He then appeals to the right of universal liberty of conscience, which, as we have already seen, was first distinctly recognised by means of Christianity, and says,—"Yet it belongs to man's natural right and privilege that each should worship as he thinks fit; nor does the religion of one man injure or profit another. But it is no part of religion to compel men to religion, which ought to be taken up voluntarily, not of compulsion, seeing that sacrifices also are required of a willing mind. Thus, although ye compel us to sacrifice, ye will render no service thereby to your gods; for they will not desire sacrifices from unwilling givers, unless they be contentious. But our God is not contentious. Finally, the true God bestows his gifts equally on the profane and on his own people."

Tertullian holds up as warning examples to the proconsul, the misfortunes which had befallen many persecutors of the Christians in Africa. Well might many of these persecutors —for similar examples frequently occur in the history of the

the conviction that they had roused against themselves the anger of a powerful Divine Being by their persecution of Christianity. Tertullian saw in the public calamities which followed the persecutions of the Christians, divine judgments, and announced them as such to the proconsul, whose conviction, however, was not effected by this means. The burial-places of the Christians were special objects of the popular fury; for as a *secta illicita* they had no legal right to possess them, and from their meetings at the graves they were wont to return with invigorated energy of faith. Thus at an outbreak of popular fury the cry was raised, "Away with the areas of the Christians!" by which was meant their places of interment. When a season of sterility followed, Tertullian saw in it a fulfilment of that demand in a different sense. "When they cried out concerning the open spaces of our burying-place, 'Let there be no *areæ*,' there were no *areæ* to themselves, for they gathered not their harvest."[1] In a nocturnal phenomenon of a fire on the walls of Carthage, and a former thunderstorm, Tertullian beholds the sign of a special divine judgment, and says, "All these are the signs of the wrath of God which we must necessarily, as we are able, proclaim and teach, while we pray that it may be only local; for the universal and final judgment they shall feel at its own time, who in any other way interpret these samples of it." He adds, alluding probably to a severe illness which the proconsul suffered, "We wish that to yourself it may be a warning, that immediately after your condemnation of Mavilus of Adrumetum to the beasts, your affliction followed, and now from the same cause the stoppage of blood,"[2] (or, the warning by blood.) "But remember, we who fear thee not wish not to terrify thee; but I would that we could save you all, by warning you *μὴ θεομαχεῖν*." He calls upon him at least to exercise as much humanity towards the Christians, as after all the strictness of the laws was permitted him. For according to the laws that existed since the time of the Emperor Trajan, those who avowed themselves Christians, and would not let it be thought that they would be untrue to their faith, were condemned to death. Tortures were only

[1] "Areæ non sint, arcæ ipsorum non fuerunt, messes enim suas non egerunt."

[2] "Et nunc ex eadem causa interpellatio sanguinis." Cap. iii.

to be applied, as in other cases, in order to extort a confession from suspected parties who denied that they were Christians. Tertullian appealed to the fact, that the President of Leon in Spain, although a persecutor of the Christians, yet in conformity with the ancient edicts used only the punishment of the sword.

As the Christians often met with worse treatment from the cruelty or fanaticism of the populace than they would have suffered by legal infliction, many magistrates relaxed the strictness of the laws in their favour. Tertullian adduces examples of this sort: persons who were otherwise noted for harshness manifested their regret at being obliged to act in such matters, and sought to aid the Christians by various expedients; for instance, there was one who, when a Christian was dragged before his tribunal by the populace, let him go, telling him that it would be a breach of the peace[1] if he complied with the popular demand. To another a Christian was sent with a written specification of his offence, (*elogium*,) from which he saw that he had been suddenly seized and arrested by the military. He tore the document in pieces, saying, that according to his instructions (*secundum mandatum*) it was illegal to receive an accusation without the name of the accuser. There is a reference here to Trajan's rescript, which contained such a prohibition; and we learn from this incident that it was the general rule in such cases. Further, Tertullian gives an account of a proconsul in Lesser Asia in the reign of the Emperor Commodus, before whose tribunal when he began to persecute the Christians, all the Christian inhabitants of the city appeared. Alarmed at their numbers, he sentenced only a few to death, and said to the others, "*Miserable men! if ye wish to die, ye have precipices and halters!*"[2] Tertullian then goes on to say,—"If the same thing should be done here, what wilt thou do with so many thousands of human beings, so many men and women, of every sex, of every age, of every degree, giving themselves up to thee?

[1] "Qui Christianum quasi tumultuosum civibus suis satisfacere dimisit." A different interpretation is possible according as the word *tumultuosum* is taken as the neuter or the masculine. We have explained it in the former sense. According to the second the passage would mean, he regarded him only as a noisy turbulent person, and without troubling himself any further would leave him in the hands of his fellow-citizens.

[2] Ὦ δειλοί εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνοὺς ἢ βροχοὺς ἔχετε.

How many fires, how many swords would be needed! What will Carthage itself, which thou must decimate, endure, when every man recognises there his own kinsfolk and comrades, when he beholds perchance men and matrons of thy own rank, and all the chief persons, and even the kinsfolk and friends of thy own friends? Spare then thyself, if not us; spare Carthage, if not thyself; spare the province which as soon as thy design was perceived, became exposed to false accusations both from the soldiery and from each man's private enemies. We have no master save God alone. He is before thee, and cannot be hidden; but he is one to whom thou canst do nothing. But those whom thou thinkest to be thy masters are men, and must themselves one day die. Yet this sect shall never fail, for know that it is the more built up when it seems to be stricken down. For every one who beholds so much endurance, being struck with some misgiving, is kindled with the desire of inquiring what there is in the cause, and when he has discovered the truth respecting it, forthwith he follows it himself."[1]

[1] Cap. v.

PART II.

THE SECOND CLASS OF TERTULLIAN'S WRITINGS.

WRITINGS WHICH RELATE TO CHRISTIAN AND CHURCH LIFE, AND TO ECCLESIASTICAL DISCIPLINE.

SECTION I.

PRE-MONTANIST WRITINGS.

We begin this series with Tertullian's beautiful treatise *De Patientia* (On Patience). The predominant spirit of love and gentleness which animates this work, strikes us at once as not corresponding to the harshness of Montanism.* Yet we cannot accept this as a proof that it belongs to the pre-Montanist class; for even as a Montanist there were intervals in Tertullian's life in which the peculiarly Christian element gained the ascendancy over the gloom of Montanism; or possibly he might have passed from a more rugged to a more moderate Montanism. Still we shall find in this work some certain marks of pre-Montanism. The peculiar subject of it necessarily brings out more prominently the characteristic distinction of the pure Christian stand-point. This treatise is important in the history of Christian ethics; for it is the first which discusses at length the nature of a virtue that occupies an important place among the cardinal virtues of Christianity, and forms a striking feature in that new ethical spirit which emanated from Christianity, and is closely connected with the peculiarities of the Christian faith. If we trace back the idea of this virtue to that of the ancient group of cardinal virtues, it will correspond to *ἀνδρεία* or *fortitudo*. It is the more passive in relation to the predominantly active, which is the fundamental idea of the term, but both are one in the ethical outline of the Christian stand-point,—that one

surrender of the life to God which is the same in doing and suffering; both are one in the outline of the Christian conflict with the world, of the victory over the world which evinces itself in doing and suffering. Both are included in the New Testament idea of *ὑπομονή*. But on the ancient stand-point of self-complacency and self-sufficiency the idea of active conflict was predominant; in that virtue the passive element was suppressed; as the idea of humility was altogether foreign to antiquity. But in the Christian mode of contemplation, the passive element is rendered more prominent in connexion with humility, surrender to God, and a holy love. It is among the leading principles of Christianity that Christ by suffering overcame the world, and that believers, following his example, must overcome by suffering. The condition of the church at that period aroused the consciousness of the call to overcome by suffering, and how the suffering church had in times past overcome the world. But suffering is naturally connected with doing. Of that peculiar leading principle of the Christian disposition we find an animated delineation in this treatise. It certainly owes nothing to the peculiar temperament of Tertullian. His naturally rugged unbending disposition must have disposed him rather to self-willed action, to a proud defiance of his lot; according to his own peculiar nature he might most readily be hurried away into self-willed impatience and precipitate action; it was only by a hard, unremitting conflict that he could become master of his rude refractory nature. He felt this himself, as he says,—"I confess before God my Lord, that I venture, rashly enough, if not shamelessly, to write concerning patience, for the practice of which I am altogether unfit, as a man in whom there is no good thing; whereas it is fitting that they who attempt to set forth and commend anything, should first themselves be found in the practice of that thing, and should direct the energy of their admonitions by the authority of their own conduct, so that their word need not blush for their deficient deeds. And I wish that blushing would bring its own remedy, so that the shame of not showing forth in ourselves that which we go about to advise for others, might school us into showing it forth; were it not that the greatness of some good things, as well as of evils, so overbears our powers that the grace of the Divine Spirit can alone work in

us for the comprehension and performance of it. For that which is the most good is the most in God's hands, and no other than he who possesses, dispenses to each as he will."

As to these words a question arises, whether, as Rösselt and Von Cölln think, they have an impress of Montanism. Certainly we must admit that they contain more than the expression of the general Christian sentiment, that all good proceeds from the operation of the Holy Spirit that animates believers. They contain, no doubt, a distinction of degrees; the higher the kind of good is, so much more must the divine agency predominate. There are, moreover, in the Christian life many gifts of grace of so high a kind, that nothing in them depends on human self-activity, but everything on the divine influence—without human agency they proceed alone from the will of God—he imparts them to some, and not to others. This is certainly more than would be admitted by the general Christian consciousness of that period. We find here a human passivity which corresponds to the Montanist view of inspiration, in which man remains altogether passive, and to the Montanist tendency in general, which causes the human to retire before the divine. Yet we are by no means authorized to maintain that the admission of certain individual gifts of grace, of such a kind, is explicable only from Montanism. If, in this treatise, we find no other marks of Montanism, but rather those of an opposite kind, we must attribute what has been quoted, to those sentiments in Tertullian before he became a Montanist, that showed a certain affinity to the spirit of Montanism, and afterwards furnished a point of connexion for it. We recognise in it the peculiar tendency of the Christian spirit in Tertullian, which, being rooted in his whole Christian personality, would have made him the forerunner of Augustine, if that peculiar tendency which the transforming power of the Divine Spirit had allowed to be specially prominent, had not been still more developed in him by the influence of Montanism. This is also shown by the mode in which Tertullian, in this treatise, describes faith as the operation of God, in the words, "His quibus credere datum est."

While Tertullian, therefore, expresses the consciousness how far he was from corresponding to the ideal which he wished to describe, he says—"It will be a consolation to me, to reason

about that which it is not permitted to enjoy; like those sick persons who, while they lack health, know not how to be silent about its blessings. In like manner, I, wretched man as I am, ever sick with the fever of impatience, must needs sigh for and invoke, and discuss that healthy state of patience which I possess not, when I call to mind, and in the contemplation of my own weakness ruminate on the thought, that the good health of faith and soundness in the Lord's religion are not easily attained by any one unless patience lend her aid." Tertullian well knew how to distinguish Christian patience from the cold resignation of a stoic, and from the stupid unfeeling equanimity of a cynic. "This doctrine," he says, "represents God himself as the example of patience, first, as the Being who scatters the dew of his light equally over the just and the unjust, who suffers the offices of the seasons, the services of the elements, and the tributes of the whole creation to come alike to the worthy and the unworthy. . . . . And this instance, indeed, of divine patience being, as it were, afar off, may perchance be reckoned among those things that are too high for us. But what shall we say of that which has, in a manner, been *handled* among men openly in the world?"[1] Thus Tertullian recognises here, as also in other references in the revelation of the divine attributes antecedent to Christianity, a pointing to the fuller representation of the image of God in Christ.

In the incarnation of the divine Logos, and the act of his self-humiliation from the beginning, Tertullian sees an image of *patientia*, and the whole life of Christ appears to him as the continuous revelation of that principle from which his appearance in humanity itself proceeded. "God suffers himself to be conceived in the womb of a mother, and abides the time; and being born, endures to grow up into youth; and being an adult, is not eager to be known, but puts a further slight upon himself, and is baptized by his own servant, and repels the attacks of the tempter by words only. When from the Lord he became the Master, teaching man to escape death, having well learned the forgiving spirit of offended patience, 'he strove not, he cried not, nor did any one hear his voice in the streets; a bruised reed he broke not, the smoking flax he quenched not.' . . . . . He rejected none who wished

[1] Cap. iii. init.

to adhere to him ; he despised no one's table or house. He poured out water to wash his disciples' feet. He despised not publicans and sinners. He was not wroth with the city that refused to receive him, when even his disciples wished that fire from heaven should hastily descend on the insolent town. He healed the unthankful, and gave place to those who laid snares for him. This were but little, if he had not had even his betrayer with him, without constantly pointing him out. But when he was delivered up, when he was led as a sheep to the sacrifice, he opened not his mouth any more than a lamb under the hands of the shearer. He whom, if he had wished, at one word, legions of angels from heaven would have attended, would not approve of a disciple's avenging sword. The patience of the Lord was wounded in the person of Malchus. . . . . He who had purposed to hide himself in the form of a man, imitated nothing of man's impatience. Herein especially, ye Pharisees, ye ought to have recognised the Lord : such patience as this no man could exercise. The greatness of these proofs of patience, is for the nations a cause for refusing belief, but for us a reason and a building up of faith." An ingenious thought ! Those who from the stand-point of faith contemplated the life of Christ, recognised in that *patientia* as it was never found in humanity before Christ, the true impress of the divine, the moral glory of the Divine Being revealing itself beneath its covering ; and thus the servant form of the sufferer who bore all sufferings patiently, the self-emptying of divine power in *patientia*, becomes an incentive to unbelief for those who can only recognise the divine in superhuman rank and power, and who are not at home in the sphere of Christian contemplation.

Tertullian describes *patientia* as the soul of the genuine imitation of Christ, as well as the Christian cardinal virtue which distinguishes the New Testament stand-point from that of the Old. He finds this particularly expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. He recognises in that discourse a higher law substituted for that of the Old Testament, which fulfils in a higher manner whatever it takes from the Old Testament. As first by Christ the living image of *patientia* had been given, so first by Christianity was the requirement made for such a cardinal virtue ; in place of that law of retaliation, which the Old Testament allowed to exist, that

perfect love, which endures all things, which expels all *impatientia*, and even the wish for retaliation, was appointed. In this reference, Tertullian says—"Christ has appointed patience as a help for enlarging and fulfilling the law, because this alone had been wanting to the doctrine of righteousness. For in times past they demanded eye for eye and tooth for tooth, and rendered with usury evil for evil. Patience was not yet upon earth, for faith was not; impatience, meanwhile, made use of the opportunities of the law; it was easy while the Lord and Master of patience was absent. But when he afterwards appeared, and joined the grace of faith with patience, from that time it has not been lawful to provoke even by a word, nor to say—'*Thou fool!*' without *danger of the judgment*. . . . . The law has gained more than it lost; for Christ says—'Love your enemies, and bless them that curse you, and pray for your persecutors, that ye may be the sons of your Father in heaven.'"

Tertullian further points out, that patience must manifest itself in the renunciation of all earthly things. "Covetousness consists not only in the desire for that which is another's, for that which appears to be our own is another's; for nothing strictly speaking is ours, since all things are God's, whose also we are ourselves. We seek what is another's when we bear impatiently the loss of what is another's. Whoever is disturbed by impatience for a loss, by preferring earthly to heavenly things, sins immediately against God; for the spirit which he has received from God, he distrusts for the sake of earthly things. Let us willingly, therefore, lose the things of earth, and keep heavenly things. Let the whole world perish, if only I gain patience." "Nor is that kind of impatience excusable," he says, in another part, "when we have lost our friends, and some feeling of sorrow is pleaded for. Regard must be paid to the apostle's injunction, 'Let us not sorrow as others that have no hope,' (1 Thess. iv. 13,) and rightly. For if we believe in Christ's resurrection, we believe in our own—we, for whom he both died and rose again. Therefore, since the resurrection of the dead is certain, there is no room for grief on account of death, no room for the impatience of grief. For why dost thou mourn, if thou dost not believe that thy friend has perished? Why dost thou impatiently bear his being taken away for a while who thou believest

will return? What thou thinkest death, is setting out on a journey. He who goes before is not to be grieved for, but longed for, and this longing is to be tempered with patience. For why dost thou feel excessively for his departure whom thou wilt soon follow? Impatience after this sort is a bad omen of our hope, and is treachery towards our faith. And we injure Christ when, as his people are called away, we do not take it with equanimity, as if they were objects of pity. 'I desire,' says the apostle, 'to be taken back and to be with the Lord.' How much better does he show the wish of Christians! Therefore, if we grieve impatiently for those who have obtained their wish, we do not wish to obtain it ourselves."[1]

Tertullian then points out how the spirit of Christian patience should be manifested in the treatment of fallen brethren, who by grievous sins had broken the baptismal covenant.[2] "We must not remain a single day without patience. And since it guides every kind of salutary discipline, what wonder if it ministers also to repentance that comes to the succour of the fallen, when in the case of a matrimonial separation for some cause which allows a man or woman to continue in a state of widowhood—this (patience) waits, this desires, this prays for their salvation as for those who will one day repent. How much good does it bring to both!—it hinders the one from adultery, it improves the other. Thus it appears in those holy examples of patience in the Lord's parables. The patience of the shepherd seeks and finds the wandering sheep. For impatience would easily despise a single sheep. But patience undertakes the labour of seeking, and the patient bearer carries the neglected sinner on his shoulders. The patience of the father also receives and clothes and feeds that prodigal son, and excuses him to the impatience of the angry brother. He therefore who had been lost is saved because he repented, and his repentance was not lost because it met with patience. For what is love, the highest pledge of faith, the treasure of the Christian name which the apostle eulogises with all the powers of the Holy Spirit, unless trained by the discipline of patience?"

The passage we have quoted on repentance is of special importance in deciding the question whether Tertullian wrote this work as a Montanist. We have already seen that from

[1] Cap. ix. [2] Cap. xii.

the stand-point of Montanism the *peccata mortalia* committed after baptism were regarded as incapable of ecclesiastical absolution. Now, if in the above passage the contrary is implied, this would be a certain sign that the treatise was composed before Tertullian joined the Montanists. But two exceptions may be taken against this conclusion: first, it may be said that in that passage the repentance spoken of is not for *peccata mortalia*, but for the so-called *peccata venalia*; or, secondly, it may be maintained (as has been done by Nösselt and Von Cölln) that the reference is not to the absolution of the church which might be granted for such sins, but only to the possibility of divine forgiveness. The Montanist never denied that even those persons who had sinned so grievously after baptism must be exhorted to repent. According to their views there was therefore always room for the manifestation of *patientia* in their conduct towards the fallen; only the divine forgiveness of sins which they had once trifled with, could not be again promised,—absolution in the name of the church could not be imparted to them.

But as to the first supposition, it is evident that not merely small sins, but the so-called *peccata mortalia* are here spoken of; for adultery is expressly named, which belongs to the latter class. Moreover, Tertullian describes in general the sins of that class which without repentance must issue in the perdition of those who commit them. As to the second supposition, the manner in which Tertullian expresses himself implies the certainty that salvation may be attained through repentance. The whole tone of his discourse proves that he is speaking of the succour rendered by patience, by which the fallen are led to repentance, and at last made partakers of the forgiveness of sins. It appears that Tertullian wished to contrast the *patientia* in the matter of repentance, with the *impatientia* of the too strict. The impatience of the elder brother in the parable reminds him of the want of forbearing patience in too strict a party; and it is worthy of notice that he adduces as instances of patience exactly those parables the application of which to the point agitated in the church on the subject of repentance, he combated in his later Montanist writings. Still, it has been objected, that the Montanist doctrine, which allows of only one marriage, is to be found here. But this is by no means the case. It only amounts to

this, that when married persons have separated on account of adultery committed by one of them, the party separating is not justified in contracting a new marriage. *Patientia* is to be here evinced on the part of the husband or wife who has to lament the want of conjugal fidelity in the other party, by not contracting a new marriage, but still seeing in the fallen an object of conjugal affection, praying for their salvation and being ready to be reconciled on their repentance. Without being a Montanist, Tertullian could believe that this might be inferred from the passages in the Gospels compared with 1 Cor. vii. 11. Such a view would harmonize better with the stern character of his piety, which led him on all occasions to take the more rigid side, and with his ideal conception of the marriage union among Christians; so that instead of our being obliged to explain and defend his statements on the ground of his Montanism, we should rather find in this earlier tone of his sentiments a point of connexion for his later Montanist opinions. The same explanation may be given, when Tertullian commends as an effect of *patientia*, that a widow declines marrying again, without rendering it necessary to suppose that he regarded such a second marriage as in itself unchristian. He simply classes this among those things which denote a higher degree of Christian perfection, but can by no means be considered as absolutely enjoined. This applies also to his high estimate of celibacy, connected with a misconception that early arose from a too literal interpretation of the blessing pronounced by Christ on those who abstained from marriage for the kingdom of heaven's sake. The same may be said of his representing *patientia* in the ascetic life as evincing a higher stage of Christian perfection. This also was a tendency of the Christian life preceding Montanism, which, as we have already remarked, might have been easily produced in the first opposition of Christianity to the world. On the other hand, we find a mark of non-Montanism in the manner of his describing the operation of *patientia* in times of persecution. "The patience of the flesh fights in persecutions. If flight urges, the flesh fights against the discomforts of flight. If even the prison oppresses, the flesh is in chains, the flesh is in the stocks, the flesh is on the bare ground, and in that poverty of light and in that penury of the world. But when the Christian is led forth to the trial of felicity, to the

opportunity of the second baptism, to the ascent itself of the divine seat, no patience is of more value than that of the body." Tertullian here describes the successive stages in which *patientia* verifies itself under persecution. The highest stage is that of martyrdom. But he does not require that a Christian should give himself up to martyrdom. He considers even flight under persecution, by which the Christian at once fulfils the duty of preserving his life and of keeping the faith, as a Christian act, by which *patientia* is proved. A Montanist would certainly not thus have expressed himself.

Had Tertullian been at this time a Montanist, could he have omitted, as he described the progress from the Old Testament to the New in *patientia*, to mention what was allied to it in the Montanist connexion of ideas, the still further progress in it made by the new revelations of the Paraclete? He closes the treatise with a beautiful and graphic delineation of patience and its agency :—"She fortifies faith, guides peace, aids love, promotes humility, waits for penitence, affixes the seal to a full confession;" (no doubt ἐξομολόγησις is here spoken of as belonging to church-repentance, and Tertullian would hardly have so expressed himself if he had not admitted a repentance which would lead to absolution; if, therefore, he had not at that time assented to the current church principles;)—"she controls the flesh, preserves the spirit, bridles the tongue, holds back the hand, treads underfoot temptations, drives away scandals, consummates martyrdom, consoles the poor man, moderates the rich, strains not the weak, wears not out the strong, delights the believer, invites the heathen, commends the slave to his master, and his master to God; adorns the woman, approves the man; is loved in a boy, is praised in a youth, is honoured in the aged, is beautiful in every sex, in every age. Come now! if we can describe her looks and demeanour. Her countenance is tranquil and placid; her forehead clear and contracted by no wrinkle of grief or anger; her eyebrows cheerfully unknit, her eyes directed downwards in humility, not in grief; her mouth is sealed with the honour of taciturnity; her colour, such as belongs to the unanxious and the innocent; her head is frequently shaken at the devil with a smile of defiance; her bosom is covered with a white garment, fitting close to the body, not blown about nor soiled; for she sits on the throne

of his most mild and gentle spirit who is not gathered in the whirlwind, nor darkens in the cloud, but is of tender serenity, open and simple, whom Elias saw at the third time. (1 Kings xix. 11.) For where God is, there is his foster-daughter, Patience. When, therefore, the Spirit of God descends, Patience is his inseparable companion. If we admit her not with the Spirit, will he always remain with us? Nay, I know not whether he will continue any longer—without his companion and handmaid he must necessarily feel pained at all times and in all places. Whatever his enemy inflicts, he cannot bear it alone, wanting the instrument of bearing it. This is the method, this the discipline of patience, this a work celestial and truly Christian; not like the patience of the nations of the earth, false and shameful." After contrasting divine patience with its caricature in the endurance practised by the wicked, he concludes with saying, "Let us love the patience of God, the patience of Christ. Let us repay to him what he has himself paid for us. Let us offer to him the patience of the spirit, the patience of the flesh, we that believe in the resurrection of the flesh and of the spirit."

In respect of that mild and liberal spirit which was at the greatest remove from the Montanist stand-point, the treatise on Prayer (*De Oratione*) is most akin to that on Patience (*De Patientia*). When we distinguish in Tertullian's life epochs of a freer and milder, as well as of a more severe and contracted spirit, we must either suppose that his stern and rough nature was at first more completely subdued by the transforming spirit of Christianity, but that it afterwards revived, was the means of leading Tertullian in his conceptions of Christianity to Montanism, and under that system attained to still greater vigour;—according to these internal marks we should place the treatise on Prayer in this class of Tertullian's writings, let it follow the treatise on Patience, and regard both as productions of this first epoch;—or, we must admit, that Tertullian at a later period had stripped off his Montanism and had become more mild and liberal in his Christian disposition; then these two treatises would belong to the later epoch. We might deem the latter supposition to be psychologically probable, if it only had a historical basis. Meanwhile it is questionable whether we are justified in distinguishing according to such internal marks, various

epochs in the Christian development of the man; whether we ought not rather to assume that there were some special moments when the transforming principle of Christianity had the ascendency—as in the life of every one certain moments may occur when the Christian spirit penetrates more freely and manifests itself in a more generous effusion. However that may be, this treatise on Prayer is an important memorial of a spirit not confined within the limits of Montanism. He was impelled by his living zeal for internal practical Christianity, to compose this work, especially in order to exhibit by an analysis of the Lord's Prayer the essence of Christian prayer, to point out the importance of prayer for Christians, to describe the right disposition from which Christian prayer must proceed, and to warn against several superstitious tendencies of heathen and Jewish origin which had mingled with Christianity.

"Our Lord Jesus Christ," so Tertullian begins, "prescribed for us, the disciples of the New Testament, a new form of prayer. For it behoved in this case also, to lay up new wine in new skins, and to sew a new piece on a new garment." The peculiar character of the Christian standpoint must, as Tertullian thinks, be especially apparent in the method of prayer. Here we see how he distinguished the two stand-points of religious development in Judaism and Christianity. He says that in part the Old Testament standpoint was altogether removed, as in the instance of Circumcision; in part its defects supplied, as in other parts of the law; in part fulfilled, as in prophecy; and in part carried on to completion, as in the Christian faith itself.[1] He therefore assumes here a continuous development of the faith from the Old Testament to the New. All has been transformed from the carnal to the spiritual. These are the ideas by which Tertullian rises above himself, and had he pursued them to their logical consequences he would have been led to a more correct conception of many particulars, and preserved from that mingling of the Old and New Testament stand-points which already had become too prevalent. He considers John the Baptist as the transition-point from the Old Testament

[1] "Ceterum quicquid retro fuerat aut demutatum est, ut circumcisio; aut suppletum, ut reliqua lex; aut impletum, ut prophetia; aut perfectum, ut fides ipsa." Cap. i.

development to the New. He had drawn up a particular form of prayer for his disciples, suited to his peculiar standpoint; yet everything connected with John was only a preparation for the appearance of Christ, and in him must everything terminate. So because John's form of prayer belonged only to such a preparative transition-point, it could not be retained. Referring to this, he says of the relation of John's stand-point to Christ's appearance generally, that "the whole work of the forerunner with the Spirit itself must pass over to the Lord." We find here already the germ of those peculiar views which Tertullian afterwards developed more fully as a Montanist, that as the operation of the Divine Spirit in John was only preparatory and fragmentary, this Spirit departed from him when He appeared in whom dwelt the fulness of the Spirit, and hence it happened that he who by the illumination of the Spirit had at first testified of Jesus as the Messiah, became perplexed about him. But had Tertullian been at this time a Montanist, he could not, when treating of the various stages of development, have omitted to mention the last, perfecting the whole by the revelations of the Paraclete.

Tertullian then proceeds to consider the directions relative to praying that precede the Lord's Prayer, and the prayer itself in its separate parts. He first notices the exhortation to pray in secret. This should serve, as he says, to press upon us the belief that the eye and ear of Almighty God is present in secret, and to promote that modesty of faith which would cause us to offer our devotions to him alone whom we believe to see and hear everywhere. He then comes to Christ's injunction not to use many words in prayer, which is connected with the preceding, that men should not apply to the Lord with a host of words, since it cannot be doubted that he will provide for his own people of his own accord. He discovers heavenly wisdom in presenting such a rich fulness of thought in so few words. We may, he says, call the Lord's Prayer in fact an epitome (*breviarium*) of the whole Gospel.

He then goes on to the Lord's Prayer itself. "This," he says, "begins with a testimony to God, and the dignity of faith. That we can call God our Father is gained for us by faith, for it stands written, 'To them who believe on him he gave power that they should be called the sons of God.' How

very frequently has the Lord called God our Father; yea and has taught us to call no one father on earth but only Him whom we have in heaven. . . . . The name of God the Father had been disclosed to no one; even Moses who asked concerning it, heard in truth another name. To us it has been revealed in the Son. For now is the Son a new name of the Father."[1] He then appeals to the words of Christ, "I am come in the Father's name," John v. 43; and, "Father, glorify thy name;" and, "I have manifested thy name unto men," John xvii. 6. "We pray therefore that this name may be hallowed. Not as if it became men to wish well to God, as if there were any other from whom it could be wished for him, or that he suffered unless we so wished. Evidently it is becoming that God should be blessed everywhere and always, by every man, for the remembrance always due of his benefits. . . . . When has not the name of God been holy and sanctified by himself, since he of himself sanctifies others. To whom that company of angels ceases not to say, Holy, holy, holy! Wherefore we also, aspiring to be angels if we so deserve, learn that heavenly address to God, and the source of future glory. Thus much as regards the glory of God. On the other hand, as to our petition when we say, 'Hallowed be thy name,' we pray that it may be hallowed in us, who are in Him, and at the same time in others also, whom the grace of God yet awaits, that we may obey this command in praying for all, even for our enemies. . . . . 'Thy will be done in heaven and in earth.' Not that any one can hinder the doing of his will, and that we pray for success to his will, but we pray that his will may be done in all men." Tertullian says, that this would be the meaning even if we took the words heaven and earth figuratively for flesh and spirit. Although it is to be understood simply, yet is the sense the same, that God's will may be done in us on earth, that it may

[1] "Jam enim Filius novum Patris nomen est." In the first edition I considered an emendation necessary of this, certainly, rather obscure expression. I proposed to read, "Jam enim Filius Patris nomen est." Yet I now consider this correction as not necessary or sufficiently justified. The words of Tertullian may be so understood that since Christ has revealed himself to men simply as the Son of God, and as father and son are correlative ideas, the new specific relation of God as father to those who become his children through Christ his Son, was thereby introduced.

hereafter be done in heaven also. "But what does God will, excepting that we should walk according to his rule? We pray therefore that he would supply us with the substance and power of doing his will, that we may be saved both in heaven and earth, because the salvation of those whom he has adopted is the sum of his will. This is that will of God which the Lord has administered by preaching, working, and enduring. For thus he himself said, *he did not his own will, but his Father's;* without doubt, what he did was the will of the Father, to which as to an example we are now called that we may preach, and work, and endure, even unto death. That we may be able to fulfil these things the will of God is necessary." In these words he no doubt means to call attention to the necessity of divine grace. "When we say, 'Thy will be done,' even in this we wish well to ourselves, because there is no evil in God's will, even though according to the deserts of each, it be otherwise inflicted. By this saying we forewarn ourselves for endurance. The Lord also when he had wished to exhibit in his own flesh the infirmity of the flesh with the reality of suffering, 'Father,' said he, 'let this cup pass away;' then recollecting himself, 'not my will, but thine be done.'

"Also the prayer 'Thy kingdom come,' is to be understood like 'Thy will be done,' namely, in ourselves. For when does not God reign, in whose hand is the heart of all kings? But whatever we wish for ourselves, we presage in him." Thus he refers the doing of God's will to the coming of his kingdom. Here a remarkable contrast is presented in Tertullian himself. We have seen that in his Apology he distinctly specifies as an object of the prayers of Christians the delay of the consummation of all things, on account of the expected severe tribulation, and their dread of the divine judgment. But here, on the contrary, he combats the notion of the adoption of such a prayer by Christians. Whatever stood in contravention of that petition in the Lord's Prayer on the coming of God's kingdom, appeared to him as absolutely unchristian. "Wherefore, if the appearing of God's kingdom belongs to the will of God and to our earnest expectation, how can some pray for a lengthening out of the age, when the kingdom of God, for which we pray that it may come, tends to the consummation of the age? We wish to reign earlier, and not to serve longer.

Even if it were not prescribed in the prayer, about praying for the coming of the kingdom, we should, of our own accord, offer that petition, hastening to the fruition of our hope. . . . . Yes, Lord, let thy kingdom come with utmost speed! The wish of Christians, the confusion of the heathen, the joy of angels, for which we struggle; yea, more, for which we pray." We here recognise in Tertullian, who at different periods of his life advocated both this view and the other, a contrariety of disposition and sentiment. Here the prevailing tone is the confidence of child-like faith and of child-like love. The believing soul, in yearning, devoted love, unmixed with fear, presses forward to the end, the appearing of Christ. But in the other mode of contemplating the future, the soul is strained and put upon the rack with images of terror. The awfulness of the interval which separates the present from the last glorious future, presses too powerfully on the soul to allow of her surrendering herself to the joyful prospect that forms the final aim of all her aspirations. The child-like relation is disturbed and infringed by the legal stand-point.

Tertullian finds a peculiar revelation of the divine wisdom in the construction of the Lord's Prayer, that "after heavenly things—that is, after the name of God, the will of God, and the kingdom of God—there is a place found for a petition relating to earthly wants." "Yet," he adds, "the petition for daily bread may be understood spiritually. For Christ is our bread, because Christ is life, and bread is life;" that is, Christ is for the life of the soul what bread is for the life of the body. If these words are so understood, two things are contained in them; the petition for continuous spiritual communion with Christ as the true bread of the soul, and for an inseparable union with him, for which the Lord's Supper is a medium, and (secondly) a justification for always participating in the Holy Supper, and thus to be continually placed in this peculiarly sanctifying connexion with the body of Christ, of which the supper is the medium, and which Tertullian distinguishes as something specific[1] from that divine vital communion with Christ which ought to exist throughout the whole life of a Christian. From this passage two things are evident, that Tertullian distinguishes the manner in which

[1] Cap. vi. "Itaque petendo panem quotidianum perpetuitatem postulamus in Christo et individuitatem a corpore ejus."

Christ communicates himself in the supper by a certain bodily contact, from the supernatural spiritual communion with him as embracing the whole Christian life, and yet (secondly) that he by no means admitted the penetration of the bread and wine by the body and blood of Christ; for he thus describes the participation of Christ in the supper: "Tum quod et corpus ejus in pane censetur."[1] Thus he explains the words of the institution. We notice this in passing, because we are prepared to consider in the sequel more fully, Tertullian's doctrine of the supper in connexion with the general development of this doctrine.

From the communicative love of God to which the preceding petitions refer, Tertullian passes to the grace of God in reference to sin, to which the following petitions correspond. "It follows, that having noticed the liberality of God, we should also supplicate his clemency. For what would bodily nourishment profit, if we are reckoned in reference to them as a bull for sacrifice? The Lord knew that himself only was without sin. He teaches, therefore, 'Forgive us our debts.' Prayer for forgiveness is a confession, for he that asks forgiveness, confesses transgression. Thus is repentance shown acceptable to God, because he prefers it to the death of a sinner .... For the completeness of so brief a prayer, that we may pray not only for the remission of sins but for their turning away, it is added, 'Lead us not into temptation,' that is, suffer us not to be led by him who tempts .... This is explained by the next clause, 'but deliver us from the evil one.'" After this explanation of the Lord's Prayer, Tertullian says, "God alone can teach us how he would have us pray. The sacred duty therefore of prayer, ordained by himself, and animated by his Spirit even at the time when it proceeded from his divine mouth, ascends by its own right to heaven, commending to the Father what the Son has taught."

Respecting the state of the disposition that is suitable for prayer, he thus speaks:—"The exercise of prayer ought to be free, not only from anger, but from all disorder of mind whatever, being sent forth from such a spirit, as is the Spirit to whom it is sent. For a polluted spirit cannot be acknowledged by a Holy Spirit, nor a sad spirit by a joyful one, nor

[1] "Panis est corpus Christi—corpus Christi censetur in pane."

a fettered spirit by a free one. No one receives an adversary; no one admits any save a compeer."

From what he says respecting the internal state of the disposition necessary for prayer, he takes occasion to enter his protest against many superstitious practices which had found their way among Christians from the Jews and heathens, such as washing the hands before every prayer. "What reason is there," he asks, "in entering upon prayer with the hands indeed washed but with the spirit foul? when even for the hands themselves spiritual cleanliness is necessary, that they may be lifted up pure from falsehood, murder, cruelty, poisonings, idolatry, and other defilements, which, being conceived by the spirit, are brought to maturity by the labour of the hands. This is true cleanness; not that which many superstitiously observe, using water before every prayer and even washing the whole body. But the hands are pure enough which we have once washed with the whole body in Christ;" that is, if we only preserve the purification granted to the whole man through Christ, henceforth every thing will be pure. The hands require no special purifying. In all this we recognise the pure Christian element of Tertullian's spirit in contrast to the other element of externality, which we elsewhere observe in him, and which on many points prevailed in Montanism. The internal free Christian spirit in Tertullian expresses itself here emphatically against the activity that loses itself in outward acts and stands opposed to the rational worship of Christianity. "Such things are to be set down, not to religion, but to superstition, being affected and forced, and belong rather to an over curious than rational service, certainly to be restrained because they put us on a level with the Gentiles."[1] He therefore marks that element of externality in religion as heathenish, and adduces another example of such a mixture of heathenism in prayer —the practice of throwing off the *pænula* or over-cloak before prayer,—or sitting down as the heathen are accustomed when they perform their devotions on their seal-rings before their idols.[2] As the hypocritical and artificial which

[1] "Hujusmodi enim non religioni sed superstitioni deputantur, affectata et coacta et curiosi potius quam rationalis officii, certe vel eo coërcenda, quod gentilibus adæquent."

wishes to gain acceptance with God and man, easily joins itself to the simple and genuine, so there were at that time many, who by their outcries and outward gestures made a show of their devotions. Tertullian declared himself strongly againt all this—"The publican who, not only in his prayer but in his looks, was humble and dejected, went down justified rather than that most impudent Pharisee. God as he is the beholder, so also he is the hearer, not of the voice, but of the heart.

As Christ the crucified, risen and ascended to heaven, is the central point of the Christian system, so from the first these were regarded as the two most essential points of the Christian life—as rooted in Communion with Christ; to follow the Crucified in repentance and self-denial; in him and with him to die to self, the world, and sin, in order to rise in and with him to a new divine life. This was also the central point of the Christian festivals. A general fast corresponded to the remembrance of the sufferings of Christ as an expression of repentance, and a preparation for the festival of the resurrection and for communion on the following Sunday, and the succeeding fifty days dedicated to the remembrance of the risen and ascended Saviour, till the effusion of the Holy Spirit. That was at first the only regular church fast, in support of which Matt. ix. 15 was erroneously appealed to, and in the mode of keeping this fast, various usages existed in different churches. The Montanists wished to prescribe several laws relative to fasts, but met with warm opposition in the existing spirit of Christian freedom. Tertullian here showed himself not yet disposed to Montanism.

Among the Christians of the primitive age, the beautiful custom existed of closing all their meetings for prayer with the kiss of brotherly love and of peace. The common elevation of their hearts to the Lord issued in fusing their hearts together, and in giving this token of love and peace. But now

crum alicujus dei inter libellos conditum gestare, eique diebus certis thure et mero et aliquando victimis supplicare." How similar to later superstitions in reference to the saints and the Virgin! As the images of the false gods were so common on the seal-rings, Clement of Alexandria in his *Pædagogus* forbids Christians expressly wearing such rings. According to Clement, Pythagoras in order to counterwork the superstition that cleaves to objects of sense, had spoken against the seal-rings ornamented with images of idols. *Δακτύλιον μὴ φορεῖν, μηδὲ εἰκόνας αὐτοῖς ἐγχαράσσειν θεῶν.* Strom. v. f. 559.

there were for individuals freely chosen days for fasting and penitence. If at such seasons they joined in the general devotions, many believed that they could not partake of this brotherly kiss as a token of joy—that it was not suitable to days of fasting and penitence. Tertullian blamed this scrupulosity, so foreign to the unprejudiced Christian mind. He beautifully terms that Christian brotherly kiss the seal of prayer (*signaculum orationis*). "What prayer," he says, "is perfect, if separated from the holy kiss? . . . . What sort of sacrifice is that from which one returns without peace? And whatever the reason for our conduct may be, it cannot be more powerful than the observance of the precept by which we are commanded to conceal our fasting. But by withholding the kiss we are known to be fasting." In remembrance of the passion of Christ and its preparatives, Wednesdays and Fridays were appointed for prayer-meetings; and many persons, according to their peculiar wants, were accustomed as a self-imposed duty, without any legal compulsion, to fast for a certain time.[1] At these prayer-meetings the Lord's supper was also celebrated. But many of those who fasted believed that this participation of the highest joy was incompatible with fasting, and since at that time, according to the original institution, all the members of the church partook of the holy supper, those who did not partake of it, were known to abstain on account of their fasting. This also Tertullian disapproved of, for the same reasons as those just mentioned, and expressed himself pointedly against it. "Does then the Eucharist relax a service devoted to God, or does it not the more bind to God? Will not thy station be more solemn, if thou standest at the altar of God?" (In this passage the metaphor of the idea of an altar which is connected with that of a sacrifice, and which for the first time appears here, is worthy of notice.) Tertullian then recommends a method for uniting the two, not to withdraw from the communion, and yet not to interrupt the fasting on account of the holy supper. They might receive (he suggests) the Lord's body, and not allow themselves to partake of it, but keep the consecrated bread by itself, and partake of it after their fast

[1] On the *dies stationum*, so called from its analogy to the *statio militaris*, as Tertullian himself describes it; "Statio de militari exemplo nomen accipit, nam et militia Dei sumus."

was over. This passage is in several respects a remarkable one. We observe here a custom of which we frequently find traces in Tertullian, and which is founded on a peculiar conception of the relation of the thing represented to the symbols of it in the holy supper. However Tertullian might otherwise have thought, yet we notice here, at all events, that externality, in virtue of which that was transferred to the outward element which should only have been expressed of the whole of the sacred ordinance in the harmonious combination of all its parts. In consequence, to the bread once consecrated, an indwelling, inalienable efficacy was ascribed. Hence the custom of taking away the consecrated bread as the Lord's body from the communion service, and laying it up at home. We also see here, the participation of one element of the holy supper separated from participation of the other.

When Tertullian in this treatise speaks of usages which differed in different churches, he passes judgment with a moderation which would little suit the legal spirit of Montanism. It is true, he even already approved of the custom, that not merely married women, but virgins should appear veiled in the church.[1] But on this point he spoke with a discretion which he could not have shown had he been a Montanist who depended not on his own intelligence, but on the divine utterances of the Paraclete. And while as a Montanist he must have appealed in the examination of a disputable opinion to this divine decision, he here appeals only to the authority of Holy Writ and exegetical reasons.[2] On this

[1] To this custom we shall have occasion to refer in our notice of Tertullian's book on the subject, that we may not interrupt the connexion here, nor repeat what has been already said. We would here notice a difference in the explanation of the passage in 1 Cor. xi. 5, in relation to a view taken of it by Tertullian, which we have already given. We remarked above that he regarded this as a symbol of the feeling of dependence in the female sex, by which they were to honour the presence of the good spirits; but here he understands by the angels, the evil angels, the fallen spirits, and applies to them the representation which was taken from Gen. vi. 2, and had been spread more widely by the Book of Enoch; this sign of dependence and shame would protect the virgins against the plots of the fallen spirits, since such had once mixed with the daughters of men.

[2] How could he as a Montanist, whilst following the utterances of the Paraclete, say, "In so great a variety of usages it would appear impudent, if so inconsiderable a man as I am were to examine these things

occasion the liberal spirit of Tertullian declares itself against that reverence for tradition which stood in the way of the progressive church development. "But let no one think that she" (the married woman) "ought to be moved by the rule of a predecessor. Many persons surrender their own understanding and its firmness to the practice of others." We here see Tertullian coming forward as the opponent of the bishops, who appealed to the authority of their predecessors. In this manner it was possible to oppose the pretensions of the Bishops of Rome, who were accustomed to appeal especially to the authority of their predecessors.

Tertullian showed this moderation still more in his judgment on another difference of usage, in which, however, he might speak in a more decided tone, since he had the whole Western church in its favour. The celebration of Sunday, as we have already remarked, as the day dedicated to the resurrection of the Lord, was distinguished in this way, that no fasting was allowed upon it, and persons prayed not kneeling but standing upright. In addition, it was also believed that persons should abstain from all labour on Sundays, a regulation based on the Old Testament stand-point of a day specially dedicated to God, which is quite at variance with the original Christian conception of it; this appears from the words of Tertullian:—"We ought to guard against every posture of painfulness, and to forbear offices, putting off even business, lest we give place to the devil." Tertullian therefore regarded the temptation to labour on Sunday as proceeding from Satan. But in many parts of the East there was still in connexion with Judaism a special regard paid to the Sabbath, and it was kept in the same manner as Sunday. In the Roman and other Western churches, on the contrary, no scruple was felt to fast on the Sabbath, but that day was sometimes preferred for the purpose, by way of opposition to Judaism. Now as some members of Oriental churches where that regard for the Sabbath still prevailed, settled down among Western communities, and continued their wonted custom, or wished to introduce and establish it as the only right one, controversies arose

afresh after the holy apostle; but yet it is not impudent if it were only agreeable to the doctrine of the apostle."—"Varietas observationum efficit, post sanctissimum apostolum nos vel maxime nullius loci homines impudenter retractare, nisi quod non impudenter, si secundum apostolum retractemus."

respecting it. To those who were warmly interested in the dispute, it seemed very evident that there was something Jewish in placing the Sabbath and the Sunday on a level, and they did not hesitate to load their opponents with a variety of consequences deducible, as they affirmed, from the practice. But Tertullian, with greater liberality of mind, gave it as his opinion that "the Lord will grant his grace that they may either yield or hold their own opinion without offence to others."[1]

Tertullian recognises that characteristic of the Christian stand-point which is shown in its freedom from the elements of the world, in reference to prayer, when he asserts that prayer is not confined to any time or any place. "Concerning times of prayer nothing at all is prescribed, unless simply to pray at all times and in every place. But how in every place, when we are prohibited in public? 'In every place,' he says, where opportunity or necessity has given occasion. For that is not reckoned contrary to the precept which was done by the apostles, who in prison prayed and sang praises to God, and the prisoners heard them (Acts xvi. 25); and in the case of Paul, who in the ship celebrated the Eucharist[2] in the presence of all."[3]

In reference to the time for prayer, Tertullian declares that it is not necessarily confined to any time whatever, but still that it would be beneficial to have something determined in this respect, as a requirement to withdraw sometimes from worldly business to prayer. He considered it to be best to adhere to the three daily hours of prayer customary among the Jews, (the third, sixth, and ninth hours, or nine, twelve, and three o'clock,) and which occur in the New Testament; besides, according to ancient usage, prayer at the beginning of the day, and at night. Tertullian, agreeably to the Christian principle of transforming all earthly things by a reference to the divine, desired that all transactions of earthly life should be sanctified by prayer. Although this might become mere

[1] "Dominus dabit gratiam suam, ut aut cedant aut sine aliorum scandalo sententia sua utantur." Cap. xviii.

[2] The Lord's supper is not referred to in Acts xxvii. 35; but the freedom of Tertullian's mind in so understanding it is worthy of notice.

[3] "Non enim contra præceptum reputatur ab apostolis factum, qui in carcere, audientibus custodiis, orabant et canebant Deo, apud Paulum,

mechanism, yet there is an important Christian principle involved, from which this requirement proceeds. He says that believers ought not to bathe or take food, without first praying, for which he gives this reason,—"The refreshment and nourishment of the spirit are to be esteemed before those of the flesh, and the things of heaven before those of earth."[1] "Dismiss not without prayer, a brother who has entered thy house. 'Thou hast seen,' saith he, 'thy brother, thou hast seen thy Lord.' Especially a stranger, lest he be an angel. Neither should he partake of earthly refreshment before heavenly from the brethren who receive him."[2]

He points out in what manner prayer is the true spiritual sacrifice of Christians. "This is the spiritual victim which has abolished the ancient sacrifices. 'To what purpose,' saith He, 'is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me?' (Isa. i. 11.) But what God requires, the Gospel teaches. 'The hour cometh, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth. God is a Spirit.' We are the true worshippers and the true priests, who, praying in the spirit, sacrifice in the spirit the prayer peculiar and acceptable to God, which he has required and which he has provided for himself. This, devoted by the whole heart, fed by faith, tended by truth, complete in innocence, pure by chastity, crowned by love, we ought to bring up to the altar of God, with the train of good works, amid psalms and hymns; to obtain all things for us from God. For what has God denied to the prayer offered up in spirit and in truth—that prayer which he has required? We read, and hear, and believe how great are the proofs of its efficacy." We recognise in these expressions the great Christian idea of the universal priesthood and the universal sacrifice; we see how far the writer still was from holding the notion of a peculiar priesthood and a sacrifice corresponding to it in the presentation of the Holy Supper, and hence are led to put a modified sense on his reference to an altar in connexion with the Eucharist.

He develops in a very beautiful manner the peculiar power

[1] "Priora etiam habenda sunt spiritus refrigeria quam carnis, et priora cœlestia quam terrena." Cap. xxv.

[2] Tertullian informs us that often after praying, Christians sang the hallelujah and similar psalms, in the closing words of which those who were present responded.

of Christian prayer according to the peculiarity of the Christian stand-point. "Prayer in ancient times delivered from flames, and wild beasts, and hunger, and yet had not received a form from Christ. But how much more largely does the Christian prayer operate! It does not place the Angel of the Dew in the midst of the flames, (Dan. iii. 28,) nor shut the mouths of lions, (Dan. vi.) nor bring the dinner of rustics to the hungry, (2 Kings iv. ;) the grace vouchsafed takes away no sense of suffering, but it arms with endurance men who are suffering, feeling, and grieving; by its power it enlarges grace, that faith may know what it obtains from the Lord, knowing what it suffers for the name of God. In time past prayer brought down plagues, routed hostile armies, prevented beneficial rains. But now the prayer of righteousness turns away all the wrath of God, keeps watch for enemies, supplicates for persecutors. Is it wonderful that that could extort celestial waters, which could bring down fires? Prayer is the only thing that conquers God. But Christ knew that it could work no ill. He has conferred upon it all power for good. Therefore it knows nothing unless to call back the souls of the departed from the way of death itself, to renovate the weak, to heal the sick, to purge the possessed, to open the prison-doors, to loosen the bonds of the innocent. It washes away sins, it repels temptations, it extinguishes persecutions, it consoles the feeble-minded, it delights the magnanimous, it brings back travellers, it stills waves, it confounds robbers, it nourishes the poor, it controls the rich, it raises up the fallen, it props the falling, it preserves the standing. Prayer is the bulwark of faith; our arms and weapons against the adversary, who watches us on every side. Therefore, let us never walk unarmed. By day let us remember our station, by night our watch. Under the arms of prayer let us guard the standard of our general; praying let us await the trumpet of the angel." He then points out the symbols that are to be found throughout nature of the creation praying to the Creator, and says, "All the angels pray. Every creature prays. The cattle pray, and the wild beasts, and bend their knees, and issuing from their stalls and dens, not meaningless look up to heaven. And the birds now rising soar towards heaven, and extend the cross of their wings for hands, and utter sounds which seem a prayer." In this passage several expressions may offend a

sober understanding and a classical taste; but it is based on the truth of a symbolic conception of the life of nature from the depths of Christian feeling, the effort of the spirit to conceive itself symbolically in nature. Tertullian closes with the words, "What more then can I say concerning the duty of prayer? Even the Lord himself has prayed, to whom be honour and power for ever and ever."

We now proceed to Tertullian's work "On Baptism." It strictly belongs to the class of his dogmatic writings; but since it contains many particulars relating to subjects of Christian and church life, and stands in close connexion with another work belonging to this division, we have determined to place it here.

Tertullian was induced to compose this treatise for the purpose of vindicating the necessity of baptism for all Christians, and at the same time he wished to discriminate its true import; what was necessary as a preparation for it, and what belonged to its right administration. He wished to qualify all believers for rightly understanding their faith, and for giving a just account of it. The general principle respecting the relation of dogmatic knowledge to faith, which passed from him to Augustine, was applied by him in reference to this particular subject. First of all, men ought to submit themselves to the divine institution in humble faith, in order to experience in themselves the divine power which lies in it; and then they should advance to an insight into the necessity of such a divine institution for the object to be attained by it;—first of all the *credere*, then the *intelligere*.[1] Tertullian had specially in view the instruction of catechumens, who ought to come with a right consciousness to baptism. As to the vindication of the necessity of baptism, this was acknowledged on the whole as a divine institution for all ages, not only in all parts of the church, but by almost all sects. Even the Gnostics, with whom the variance was greatest, agreed for the most part on this question. Baptism was to them especially important as a medium of communion with Christ; of freedom from the kingdom of the Demiurgus, as well as from the power of the hylistic principle. There was only a small party who by their opposition against nature and

[1] Cap. x. "Non intelligentes, quia nec credentes. Nos porro quantula fide sumus, tantulo et intellectu possumus æstimare."

everything natural that was taken from the kingdom of the Demiurgus, and by their spiritualizing idealist tendency, were impelled to a rejection of outward baptism.

It is doubtful whether the Quintilla who came forward at Carthage as an opponent of outward baptism and thus occasioned Tertullian's vindication of it, really proceeded on Gnostic principles. She belonged to a sect of Cajanites. According to some this was identical with the Gnostic sect of the Cainites. The name is no argument for the identity; for it would be far more natural to suppose that the once existing sect of the Cajanites had been mistaken for that of Cainites, than that the name Cainites had been altered to Cajanites, since the name Cain was universally known, and the sect named after him was, on account of name, peculiarly odious. But as the Cainites were of a wild fanatical spirit, insulting all morality, it is not probable that Tertullian would think such a sect deserving of a special refutation. But if any one should say, as it might be said, that the refutation of the reason alleged against baptism by this sect was only regarded by him as a secondary matter, and that he only availed himself of this opportunity to discuss the whole doctrine of baptism in a separate treatise, still it is very surprising that he makes no allusion whatever to the other abominable tenets of this sect. Moreover, it is not probable that a female belonging to such a sect should have met with so much favour among the Christians at Carthage; we must then admit that she had gained access by keeping back the peculiarities of her sect, and by pretending an adherence to the views prevalent in the church, in order to clear the way for herself. And certainly it cannot be denied that the Gnostics often misled persons by such means. The same explanation must also be given of the reasons against baptism brought forward by this female, since they contain nothing necessarily Gnostic. The appeal to Abraham's being justified by his faith, is quite contradictory to the spirit of that sect; for this anti-Jewish tendency chose for its heroes exactly those persons who are represented in the Old Testament in the worst light, as the strong spirits who would not submit themselves to the rule of the limited Demiurgus; and the persons commended in the Old Testament were rejected by it. A Cainite female would indeed have acknowledged Paul as

the only genuine Apostle, and have stigmatized the rest as Judaizing corrupters of the doctrine of Christ. But we cannot be certain that all the reasons which Tertullian mentions against the necessity of baptism, proceeded from Quintilla. Probably she gave only the first impulse to a controversy on the subject which was afterwards taken up, and pushed further by others. Many of Tertullian's expressions indicate that opponents of the necessity of baptism, of various kinds, had appeared; perhaps many who did not intend absolutely to reject baptism, but only, when the matter was once mooted, felt impelled to cast doubts on its necessity. If, on the one hand, in consequence of externality in the conception of baptism, of confounding baptism and regeneration, an unconditional necessity for salvation in an unintelligible manner was attributed to baptism, and too much was ascribed to the outward element; yet, on the other hand, a one-sided tendency to separate the outward from the inward, an undervaluation of outward baptism, might be called forth by it, and probably the whole opposition against baptism which we notice in this book, and in which we find nothing allied to Gnosticism, is only to be accounted for as the reaction of such an opposition. But yet it is to be remarked that Tertullian in his treatise *De Præscriptionibus Hæreticorum*, compares the Cajanites to the Nicolaitanes in the Apocalypse, as those who had held the eating of meat offered to idols, and impure habits, to be matters of indifference; which would tell against the conception given throughout of the character of the Cajanites, unless Tertullian has in that last passage done them injustice; and perhaps the same tendency which caused them to appear against externality in the case of baptism, also led them to oppose the prohibition against eating meat offered in sacrifice.

Such arguments as the following were used by the persons whom Tertullian opposed:—Christ himself never baptized; none of the apostles besides Paul were baptized:—Paul himself says (1 Cor. i. 17), that Christ sent him not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel; Paul teaches not that man is justified and obtains salvation by baptism, but by faith; Abraham also was justified by faith alone.

Tertullian would have been more successful in proving that although justification and a divine life are received by faith

yet baptism has its necessary place in the connexion of the process of Christian development, if he had possessed clearer views of the relation of faith and regeneration to outward baptism, of the relation of the inward reality to the outward appearance, of divine things to their representative signs. But for this purpose certain mental activities were required which in that age were very imperfectly developed, and for which Tertullian's mental constitution was not fitted. In that age generally, and especially in Tertullian, there was a much greater predominance of the vital energy of feeling, than of the discriminating, sifting activity of the understanding. Hence Tertullian was disposed to blend in his intellectual apprehension what had been combined and indissolubly incorporated with his feelings in the experience of his religious life; and when he found in the New Testament such phrases as "the bath of regeneration" and the like, he did not make use of the necessary means in order to lead back what is here popularly expressed to the thought contained in it, but adhered to the outward. Thus, he was now fixed on the standpoint of an error diametrically opposite to the one-sided internalism which he combated, and hence his argumentation necessarily took a false direction when he wished to prove that water could produce such great effects.

Tertullian recognises as the characteristic of Christianity, which is shown even in baptism, the union of the simple with the sublime, simplicity with divine power, the divine in the most unpretending form; as, on the contrary, in the heathen cultus might be seen a pomp of manifold pretensions without internal significance. "Nothing," he says, "so hardens the minds of men, as the simplicity of the divine works which appears in act, and the glory which is promised in the result; as here also, a man going down into the water without expense, and, whilst a few words are uttered, being washed, with so much simplicity, without pomp, without any new preparations, rises again not much or at all cleaner,—on which account his gaining eternity is thought incredible. I am mistaken if the rites and mysteries pertaining to idols do not build their credit and authority on their equipments, their outward show and sumptuousness. O wretched unbelief! which denies to God his essential attributes, simplicity and power." Tertullian makes the ingenious remark, that what

gives a point of connexion for unbelief, belongs to the peculiar impress of the divine. What arouses minds of greater depth to faith, is the prop of unbelief to the superficial. He says further, "If we are not to believe because it is wonderful,—on that account we ought rather to believe. For what else should the divine works be, unless above all wonder? We ourselves also wonder, but because we believe. But unbelief wonders and believes not. For it wonders at simple things as foolish, and at magnificent things as if impossible." We here recognise in Tertullian the forerunner of the profound reflection of a Pascal. What depth and truth of idea in his strong, original language which we cannot fully express in a translation; the great but (by the superficial) often unacknowledged truth, the divine paradox, the foolishness of the divine wisdom, as Paul terms it, the admiration of wisdom first and last, the unsusceptibility for it of the spirit of unbelief! Such and similar expressions, as we still find them in Tertullian, are often cast at him as a reproach by shallow and superficial minds, and he has been charged on account of them with the grossest misology. But when Tertullian so strongly presents the hyperbolical, the super-rational and the supernatural, he recognises not the less the union between the divine and the truly rational—that God performs all things *ratione*, that everything divine rests upon *ratio*.[1]

We must also be careful to distinguish the deep truth lying at the basis of what Tertullian says, from the erroneous addition in the application he makes of it, owing to that tendency to externality in the opposition, carried by him to an extreme, with one-sided spiritualism. Thus he would point it out as wonderful that in the simple rite of baptism, the element of water can produce such great effects, and in attempting to show that it was prefigured in the Old Testament, loses himself in mystical frivolities. He distinguishes in baptism two essential ingredients; one negative, the forgiveness of sins, the purification from sin, the preparatory work: secondly, the positive,—the restoration of the divine image, the internal transformation, the participation of a divine life by the communication of the Holy Spirit. But however far Tertullian loses himself in the magical when treating of the supernatural

[1] *De Fuga in Persecut.* cap. iv. "Quid enim divinum non rationale?" *Contra Gnost. Scorp.* cap. viii. "Nihil Deus non ratione præcipit."

effects of the water, yet he remarks correctly, that the forgiveness of sins is obtained by faith.[1]

He then comes to the question,[2] What relation does the baptism of John bear to Christian baptism? And this question he answers with peculiar acuteness. This baptism is related to the Christian as the earthly to the heavenly. The baptism of John could impart nothing heavenly, but could only prepare for the heavenly. It related only to repentance, which stands in the power of man. This baptism could not impart forgiveness of sins and the Holy Spirit. That, none but God could do. The Lord himself said that the Holy Spirit would not come down, till he had ascended to the Father. The divine in John was not his baptism, but the gift of prophecy; and even this spirit, after the transference of the whole Spirit to the Lord, so far left him, that he sent to inquire whether that very personage whom he had announced, whom he pointed out as "he that should come," was really the Christ. (Matt. xi.) We here find Tertullian's view of the relation of John the Baptist to Christ, which we have already seen indicated, still further developed. It is evident in what manner Tertullian distinguished the divine and the human in him whom Christ described as the greatest of prophets. In this view of the passive relation of man to the Divine Spirit, who makes use of him as an organ for a definite purpose, and again withdraws from him, we recognise, as in other ideas of Tertullian, that which was allied to Montanism in his style of contemplation, although by no means in itself montanistic; and there is, after all, this truth at the basis, that the prophet who stood on the boundary line between the two dispensations might rise, at the greatest elevation of his inspiration, to a height of contemplative vision, which nevertheless he was unable constantly to maintain.

The baptism of repentance was therefore a preparation for the forgiveness of sins and sanctification which must follow through Christ. Repentance goes before,—the forgiveness of sins follows after—this it is, 'to prepare the way.' In answer to the objection that the apostles were never baptized, Tertullian maintains that they had received John's baptism as preparatory. But apart from that, he thinks that the manner in which Christ personally admitted them into his com-

[1] "Ablutio delictorum quam fides impetrat." [2] Cap. x.

munion, was in their case an equivalent for baptism.[1] He perceives correctly that as long as Christ was on earth there could be no church and no Christian baptism, that this institution could not be introduced till after the completion of the work of redemption, the resurrection and glorification of Christ, and the impartation of the Holy Ghost; till then there could only be a preparative baptism corresponding to that of John, and even that performed by Christ's disciples was no other.[2] Then he guards himself against the objection, that inasmuch as Christ, while he was on earth, for all the cures he performed required only faith, therefore afterwards only faith and not baptism was needed. On the contrary, he says, after the actual institution of baptism, it was needed as the seal appointed by Christ, as it were, the garment in which faith was attired.[3] Moreover, had Tertullian only confined himself to what he had said respecting baptism as an ordinance of Christ,—respecting its connexion with the historical development of Christ's work—and respecting it as the *obsignatio* and *vestimentum fidei*—had he only further developed what was contained in all this, he would have been more in accordance with truth than in attempting to show how much water could effect as a vehicle of divine power.

He then touches on the question of the validity of the baptism administered among heretics, on which he also wrote a treatise in the Greek language; and he maintains the principle held by the African church, that all religious ceremonies can possess their objective validity only in that one visible church which was divinely instituted, and endowed with the operations of the Holy Spirit. He maintains this principle in such a manner as would hardly have been possible after his separation from the universal church as a Mon-

[1] Cap. xii. "Primæ allectionis et exinde individuæ cum illo familiaritatis prærogativa compendium baptismi conferre posset."

[2] Cap. xi. "Sed ne moveat quosdam quod (Christus) non ipse tinguebat. In quem enim tingueret? in Spiritum sanctum, qui nondum a Patre descenderat? in ecclesiam quam nondum apostoli struxerant? Itaque tinguebant discipuli ejus, ut ministri, ut Joannes ante præcursor, eodem baptismo Joannis, ne qui alio putet, quia nec exstat alius nisi postea Christi, qui tunc utique a discentibus dari non poterat, utpote nondum adimpleta gloria Domini, nec instructa efficacia lavacri per passionem et resurrectionem."

[3] Cap. xiii. "Addita est ampliatio sacramento, obsignatio baptismi vestimentum quodammodo fidei."

tanist.[1] We must here particularly notice, that if Tertullian had elaborated on his pre-montanist stand-point that external idea of the church already to be found in Irenæus, yet in this treatise we find an intimation which would lead to a more spiritual form of this idea, when he says, "But since both the testimony of faith and the promise of salvation are confirmed by three, the mention of the church is necessarily added, since where the Three are, that is, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, there is the church which is the body of the Three." Taking these words as our guide, we shall obtain the idea of the church as the community founded on faith in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; a community originating in an internal principle; therefore not according to the formula in Irenæus, "*Ubi Ecclesia, ibi Spiritus*," but "*Ubi Spiritus, ibi Ecclesia.*"

According to a mode of conception very widely spread in his day, Tertullian distinguishes between the *imago* and the *similitudo Dei:* the first includes the unalienable capabilities of man, such as the reason and the free will, for realizing likeness to God; secondly the *similitudo*, or the actually formed likeness to God in a divine holy life;—in other words, the *potential* and the *actual.* According to Tertullian's view, man has lost the latter through sin, by which he is cut off from communion with God, and from participation in a divine unchangeable life; by baptism he is freed from the corruption of nature, and restored to his original purity and likeness to God. He pronounced only that person blessed who preserved the purity communicated to him through baptism. Not that Tertullian ever thought that any man could go on through life in absolute sinlessness; but he meant that such sins were avoided by which the original baptismal grace might be lost, the *peccata mortalia.* But where this original purity was lost, he supposed only one expedient to be left by which it could be regained, namely, that *baptismus sanguinis*, the significance of which in Tertullian's Christian scheme we have

[1] "Hæreticos extraneos testatur," he says, cap. xv. "ipsa ademtio communionis." According to this definition, the Montanists might have been called heretics. Indeed this is not altogether convincing, since not all the churches refused communion with the Montanists—since even the Romish church, up to a certain period, accorded to them brotherly communion. In general, the relation of Montanism to the church was a more transient one.

already described. Now this may be so understood as if Tertullian allowed, for cases in which the original baptismal grace had been lost through sins, no other possible means of restoration than the cancelling of sins by martyrdom. From that it would follow that he was attached to those more stringent principles respecting repentance which were among the peculiarities of Montanism, as we have already remarked, and therefore he must have been a Montanist when he wrote this treatise. But we are by no means obliged to understand the passage in this sense, and if other indications of Tertullian's non-Montanism at this period can be found, this passage alone will by no means support the opposite view, that he had embraced Montanism. These words do not necessarily imply more than that whoever had forfeited baptismal grace by his sins, could regain it in a full sense, and be restored to the same purity and innocence only by martyrdom, which had the power, as in the case of catechumens to serve instead of water-baptism altogether, so also in the case of the lapsed after baptism to serve instead of a second baptism. But this view was held by many others besides the Montanists.[1]

Tertullian next proceeds to the question, *By whom is baptism to be administered?* and he answers; first of all, the *summus sacerdos*,—the bishop; then the presbyters and deacons; yet not without the authority of the bishop, on account of the honour of the church, on maintaining which authority depends the maintenance of the peace of the church. "Otherwise laymen also have the right; for that which is equally received may be equally given, unless the word disciples denote at once bishops, or presbyters, or deacons. The word of the Lord ought not to be hidden from any; wherefore baptism, which is equally derived from God, may be administered by all. But how much more is it incumbent on the laity to keep themselves within the bounds of reverence and modesty! Since these things belong to those of higher estate, let them not assume the office of the bishopric set apart for the bishop. Emulation is the mother of schisms. The most holy apostle

[1] As a proof of this we may quote the following passage from Cyprian, who was certainly not then a Montanist: "Aliud est ad veniam stare, aliud ad gloriam pervenire, aliud pro peccatis longo dolore cruciatum emundari et purgari diu igne, aliud peccata omnia passione purgasse, aliud denique pendere in diem judicii ad sententiam Domini, aliud statim a Domino coronari." Ep. lii.

has said, 'All things are lawful, but all things are not expedient.' Let it suffice to use such things in thy necessities, when the circumstances of place, or time, or person, are compulsory; for then is firmness in him that aids admissible, when the case of him that is in danger is urgent, for he is guilty of the perdition of a man if he shall forbear to do that which it is in his free power to do." These words are on many accounts worthy of notice, as determining Tertullian's Christian stand-point, and his position in the development of the church. He belonged, as we have already had occasion to remark, to a boundary-epoch, as likewise did Montanism. Thus he stands at the boundary between the original free constitution of the church, in which the idea of an universal priesthood was dominant, and that of a separate hierarchy. When he distinguishes the bishop as *summus sacerdos*, there is implied that a transference was already made of the idea of the Old Testament priesthood to the Christian stand-point, that the presbyters were regarded as Christian priests, and the bishops also took precedence of them in a manner corresponding to the position of the High Priest on the Old Testament stand-point. Such a view did not originate with Tertullian, but was adopted by him from the views already held by the North African church of his times. But on the other hand, the idea of the universal Christian priesthood still maintained its place, partly in Tertullian's mind, partly in the consciousness of the laity, so that he himself was obliged to acknowledge it as an existing power. The passage before us shows this. Tertullian presupposes that in virtue of the universal Christian priesthood, all believers who had been baptized had also a right to baptize others, just as all who received the word of God when they became Christians, dared not to conceal it, but were called to announce it to others. Thus he considers the right of administering baptism as belonging to the community of Christians in general, but which, in virtue of the ecclesiastical organization, is first of all committed to the bishop, then to the presbyters and deacons, who exercise this right under the authority of the bishop. To this arrangement the laity ought to submit themselves; but in cases of necessity, when the other organs who agreeably to the established order should exercise this right, are wanting, they might administer baptism, and in certain cases would be

bound to do so. We know indeed that Tertullian, while he allowed this universal right of the laity, made a point of guarding against a wilfulness in the exercise of it to the injury of ecclesiastical order, thereby to prevent divisions which might arise if the laity were disposed to contest with the clergy the exercise of such a right. We can, in this, notice some traces of a re-action of the consciousness of the universal priesthood in the laity against the hierarchy which was then forming. But in what Tertullian says of the duty of the laity, to administer baptism in cases of necessity, we detect the error which has already been animadverted upon, of attaching undue importance to the outward rite, since the sentiment is implied that whoever wanted outward baptism would remain excluded from salvation.

Tertullian expresses himself in very strong terms against the right of females to baptize or to teach.[1] "How very credible must it appear, that he should give the power of teaching and baptizing to a female who would not allow a married woman even to learn,[2]—'*Let them be silent, and ask their own husbands at home.*'" Could Tertullian have spoken thus as a Montanist? Was it objected to Montanists that they had for teachers a Maximilla and a Priscilla? It might be answered, indeed, that even the Montanists acknowledged the validity of the principle that in general women ought not to speak publicly in their assemblies. Only they maintained, that as the operations of the Divine Spirit were confined to no rule, so also not to this. By the extraordinary operations of the Divine Spirit, prophetesses might be excited whom they were bound to acknowledge and honour in their calling; and they appealed to 1 Cor. xi. 5, where the apostle implies that there was nothing blamable in prophetesses speaking in public.[3]

[1] Cap. xvii.

[2] "Qui ne discere quidem constanter mulieri permisit."

[3] As a Montanist Tertullian says, *De Virginibus Velandis*, cap. ix. "Non permittitur mulieri in ecclesia loqui, sed nec docere, nec tinguere, nec offerre, nec ullius virilis muneris, nedum sacerdotalis officii sortem sibi vindicare;" and lib. v. *c. Marcion.* cap. viii. "Præscribens (Paulus Apostolus) silentium mulieribus in ecclesia, ne quid discendi duntaxat gratia loquantur. Cæterum prophetandi jus et illas habere jam ostendit quum mulieri *etiam prophetanti* velamen imponit." Thus also argues Irenæus, who was no Montanist, (for Tertullian expressly distinguishes him from the Montanists, *Adv. Valent.* cap. v.) against the Alogi, the

But could Tertullian have expressed himself so unconditionally against the teaching of women, without guarding himself against the objection which might be made to the Montanist prophetesses—without mentioning the prophetesses as an exception to the rule?

Tertullian shows his zeal for practical Christianity, in speaking against the too easy administration of baptism without a suitable preparative trial. "But they whose office it is, know that baptism is not to be rashly granted. 'Give to every one that asks thee,' comes under its own head, and belongs to almsgiving. That saying is rather to be considered, 'Give not that which is holy to the dogs, nor cast ye your pearls before swine;' and, 'Lay hands suddenly on no man, lest thou be a partaker of other men's sins.' If Philip so easily baptized the eunuch, let us recollect that the manifest revealed approbation of the Lord intervened. . . . But Paul was baptized suddenly. Yes; for his host Simon knew that he was a chosen vessel. God's approval ushers in its own claims. Every desire (of man) may deceive and be deceived.[1] Wherefore the delaying of baptism is more advantageous according to the condition and disposition of each person; also their age; but especially in the case of children."

Tertullian also makes us acquainted with his position on the boundary line between two stages of Christian development, by his judgment respecting infant baptism. We have every reason for holding infant baptism to be no apostolic institution, and that it was something foreign to that first stage of Christian development. At first, baptism necessarily marked a distinct era in life when a person passed over from a different religious stand-point to Christianity, when the regeneration sealed by baptism presented itself as a principle of moral transformation, in opposition to the earlier development. But it was very different, when, from the midst of an already existing church-life and of a Christian family-life, the individual life was to be formed in communion with Christ. The objective consecration by communion with Christ, which passes from the collective body to the individual, must be the preparative in order to lead the individual to Christ. "Regene-

Ultra-antimontanists. "Apostolus scit viros et mulieres in ecclesia prophetantes."

[1] "Omnis petitio (hominum) et decipere et decipi potest."

ration must unite itself as something gradual to the first movements of the conscious life which was sanctified by the connexion with a Christian collective-life. Infant-baptism proceeded at first from this idea, as it is represented in the words of Irenæus, that *Christus infantibus infans factus, ut infantes sanctificaret.* But Tertullian, whose opposition testifies that infant baptism could not then be regarded as an apostolic tradition, came forward as the antagonist of this new institution, and peculiarly urges that other important point in baptism which relates to the subjective appropriation of the individual, the personal conviction intelligently expressed, the personal faith, the personal obligation. Thus, at that time there was a conflict between two parties, and from what Tertullian says on the subject, we become acquainted with the arguments urged on both sides. When it was objected that infant baptism is nowhere mentioned in Scripture, its advocates replied, that as the Redeemer during his bodily presence on earth had reproved those who would not let the little ones come to him, and granted them his blessing, so he would still operate in a spiritual manner. Why then should not children be brought to him in like manner that he may bless them?

Tertullian replies:—"Let them come when they grow up;—let them come when they learn; when they are taught whither they are coming; let them become Christians when they are able to know Christ. Why does the innocent age hasten to the remission of sins?" It is remarkable, that the very person who, as we shall afterwards see, was the first who distinctly developed the doctrine of original sin, could express himself in this manner. We may also here discern the conflicting elements of a dogmatic mode of thinking gradually expressing itself more sharply. "Men," he goes on to say, "will act more cautiously in worldly matters, so that to one to whom no earthly substance is committed that which is divine is committed. Let them know how to ask for salvation that thou mayst seem to *give to him that asketh.* . . . . They who know the weight of baptism will rather dread its attainment than its postponement; a perfect faith is secure of salvation." No doubt, what Tertullian means to say is this:—The catechumen has no cause for hastening to baptism, so that he should fear if death should overtake him before he has received baptism, lest he should not

be a partaker of salvation; for where the right faith exists, and a person who has the desire to be baptized, is prevented in a manner that involves no blame on his part, he is certain of salvation in virtue of his faith. On the contrary, a person has reason to dread receiving baptism too hastily, since when he has once lost baptismal grace, no means of compensation is left him. We see how exactly the perversion of baptism, which made so great a difference between sins before and after baptism, promoted the delay of baptism. From this point of view Tertullian argued;—that those persons should rather defer it, who by their peculiar circumstances were exposed to peculiar temptations, as those who were unmarried or the widowed. "Let them wait until they either marry or are confirmed in continence."[1]

But still it may be said, that Tertullian did not absolutely reject infant baptism; all he meant was, that in general baptism should not be hastened, but deferred to a riper age. But this would not forbid that in cases of necessity children must be baptized as the only means of securing their salvation. In favour of this view might be adduced what, as we have seen above, Tertullian said respecting baptism in cases of necessity being administered by laymen, when he presupposed that those who in such cases of necessity made no use of their right to baptize, hazarded the perdition of the unbaptized. Then it might be said, Tertullian cannot have been thinking of adult catechumens, since he supposes the opposite respecting them, that provided their faith was of the right kind, they would suffer no detriment for the want of baptism, not involving their personal blame. Therefore he can refer only to children in whom no faith could yet exist. But on the other hand, Tertullian expresses himself as the unconditional antagonist of infant baptism too sharply, and presupposes too distinctly the necessary connexion between faith and baptism, to allow of our imposing such a limitation on his language.

[1] "In quibus tentatio præparata est tam virginibus per maturitatem quam viduis per vacationem, donec aut nubant aut continentiæ corroborentur." From this passage it might be inferred that Tertullian at that time held second marriages to be lawful, and therefore had not yet adopted Montanist views. But this would not be a correct conclusion; for the Montanist spoke only of a second marriage *after baptism*. It was only Christian marriage, sanctified by religion, which they regarded as not dissolved even by death.

He also examines the question, what seasons are peculiarly suited for the celebration of baptism. At that time Christians were far from the narrowmindedness of later ages, in which it was thought necessary to confine baptism to certain seasons. He says, "Every time is the Lord's; every hour, every season is suitable for baptism; if there be a difference in its solemnity, there is none as to its grace. Only on account of the special reference in which the events celebrated at Easter and Whitsuntide stand to the significance of baptism, these two festivals appeared to him the most suitable seasons for baptism. The preparatives for baptism were prayer, fasting, and the confession of sin. New temptations awaited the baptized. Without temptation no one can enter the kingdom of heaven. Christ himself was tempted after baptism. It might be said that fasting ought to be practised immediately after baptism. But this would interfere with the joy for the salvation obtained. He closes with a beautiful address to the newly baptized. "Therefore, ye blessed ones, whom the grace of God waits for, when ye ascend from that most holy laver of the new birth, and spread your hands for the first time in your mother's presence with your brethren, ask of the Father, ask of the Lord, who supplies goods, graces and diversities of gifts. 'Ask, and ye shall receive,' he says; for ye have sought, and ye have found; ye have knocked, and it has been opened to you." Only I beseech you, that when ye ask, ye will also remember the sinner Tertullian."

The treatise on Baptism naturally leads us to one on a kindred subject, that on Repentance (*De Pœnitentia*). In both works the subject of baptism is handled, but under different aspects. In the former, Tertullian speaks, as we have seen, against the over-hasty administration of baptism; in the latter, against an improper delay of it. But the first of these writings is devoted entirely to the question of baptism; everything else is subordinate. The second, on the contrary, treats only in passing of baptism as far as its introduction is required by the main subject, which is nothing else than an exhortation to true repentance in reference to sins committed after baptism. Such was the object for which Tertullian composed this treatise. On the one hand, he wished to summon the catechumens to prepare themselves for baptism by true repentance, in order that they might be properly

receptive of the operations of grace at baptism, and not be in danger of requiring afterwards a second baptism by forfeiting by their sins the baptismal grace. On the other hand, he wished to admonish those already baptized who had relapsed into sin, to recover themselves quickly, and not to shrink from the humiliation of a public confession, which would conduce to their restoration, and at the same time to guard against despair, as if they were beyond the possibility of rescue. Probably Tertullian felt himself particularly called upon to combat that stricter party who altogether excluded the lapsed after baptism from the hope of absolution, and the forgiveness of sins. The chronological relation of the two treatises is determined by the opposite reference of their contents. Repentance for sins committed after baptism, presupposes baptism. Had Tertullian, when he composed the work on baptism, already experienced that many catechumens on account of the want of a right disposition to prepare for baptism, were constantly putting it off; or at least, had he been led to direct his attention to such a fact, he could not have omitted, when he expressed his opinion against the over-hastiness for baptism, to have warned against the opposite error. On the other hand, it is evident that as Tertullian in his earlier composed treatise on baptism, had declared himself against a too early baptism, and had only at a later period become acquainted with the opposite error and abuse, he must have felt compelled in that second work to have warned against that also. Such is the mutual connexion of the two treatises.

First of all, he represents repentance as the preparation for baptism, "that the house of the heart might be purified and prepared for the coming of the Holy Spirit, that he might willingly enter with celestial gifts." Then he proceeds to consider the true idea of repentance. The idea of repentance and sin are intimately connected. As the whole depth of the consciousness of sin and guilt was wanting to the ancient world, so also was the full idea of repentance. This rendered it the more needful to treat of the nature of sin first of all, as a preparative for the right idea of repentance. Here Tertullian was obliged to guard against the superficial conception which does not detect the essence of sin equally in

was always disposed to take peculiar cognisance of sins of the flesh, which are open to the eye of man; and, on the other hand, to veil, or to pass a gentle sentence on, the more hidden and deeper sinful tendencies of egoism—an ethical error which we have often seen spread widely in the church. On the contrary, Tertullian says—"Both flesh and spirit are things of God; the one formed by his hand, the other made perfect by his Spirit. Seeing, then, that they equally pertain to the Lord, whatever in them sins, in an equal manner offends God."[1]

Moreover, the superficiality of the ethical spirit was shown in this, that men conceived of sin only in the outward act, without tracing it to its internal root in the directions of the will. Now it is the peculiarity of the Christian stand-point, that it recognises sin in the innermost depths of a will estranged from God, whence all individual manifestations of it proceed. In reference to this Tertullian remarks, that sin, although it does not come into visible act, may still be present in the tendency of the will; that the guilt of man is not lessened, though the sinful tendency may not have an opportunity for carrying out the sin, whether of omission or commission, which proceeds from the tendency of the will. "It is plain," he says, "that sins not only of deed but of will must be avoided and cleansed by repentance. For if human littleness judges only by deeds, because it is no match for the coverts of the will, we must not be careless of the sins of the will before God. God is sufficient for all things. Nothing, whence any sin proceeds, is hidden from his sight. . . . . The will is, in truth, the source of the deed. . . . . The will is not acquitted of the sin when any difficulty prevents its perpetration, for the will to sin is imputed to the will."

Tertullian pointed out that the Sermon on the Mount distinguishes the Gospel from the external Law, by the reference of the judgment passed on transgressions to the tendency of the will. "It is most idle to say, I willed, but I did not do it. But thou must needs do, because thou willest; or not will, because thou doest not. But thou passest sentence by the confession of thy own conscience.

[1] Siquidem et caro et spiritus Dei res est, alia manu ejus expressa, alia afflatu ejus consummata. Cum ergo ex pari ad Deum pertineant, quodcunque eorum deliquerit ex pari Dominum offendit." Cap. iii.

For if thou desiredst a good thing, thou wouldst have longed to do it, and so since thou doest not a bad thing, thou oughtest not to have desired it. Turn which way thou wilt, thou art fettered in guilt, because thou either hast willed evil or hast not fulfilled good."

Thus the connexion of the ethical and the religious, in Tertullian's supernatural theism, is exhibited when he brings forward the sentiment, that it is important to will what is good, not because it is good, but because it corresponds to the will of God. "I consider it audacity to dispute concerning the goodness of a divine precept; for we are not bound to obey because it is good, but because God commands." These words, taken apart from their connexion, may, indeed, be so understood, as if the difference between good and evil was only an arbitrary distinction made by God, so that something else might be good if God so willed it. Such a conception would certainly turn the will of God into caprice, and not be pervaded with the consciousness of the internal necessity of the moral, and its being one with the essence of God and with his holiness, as that on which morals are grounded. But we should be doing Tertullian palpable injustice if we were disposed to ascribe such views to him. Yet we may consider it as the opposition against the other equally false view of a one-sided rationalist stand-point, which would say—"God wills the good, because it is good;" so that the good is represented as something antecedent to the will of God, and placed in an outward relation to it. Tertullian expresses himself very pointedly in opposition to a creaturely egoism and Eudæmonism, as appears when he says—"For the maintaining of obedience, the majesty of the divine power precedes; for the authority of the commander precedes the usefulness of him who serves." His meaning appears to be, God is not to be obeyed for man's selfish interest, but for God's sake; true morality has reference to the glory of God. How far Tertullian was from a false irrational supernaturalism, which transformed the will of God into caprice, and admitted an opposition between the divine and the truly rational, is evident from his words quoted above, on the relation of God to the *ratio*; and in the beginning of this very treatise we find an important passage relating to it, where he says of those who occupied the stand-point of the ignorance of heathenism

previous to Christianity, "From the reason of the thing they are as far distant as from the Author of reason himself; for reason is a thing of God, seeing that God, the Creator of all things, has provided, ordained, and disposed nothing without reason, and has willed that nothing should be handled or understood without reason. Therefore, those who are ignorant of God, are also ignorant of that thing which is his; so that floating over the whole business of life without the helm of reason, they know not how to avoid the tempest that threatens the age." It is evident, then, that, according to Tertullian, true reason is in Christianity.

He distinguishes between the first and the second repentance; that he regards sins committed after baptism as so much more criminal and punishable, is, in his case, not an arbitrary assumption, nor is it necessarily connected with his errors in his conception of baptism; but it rests with him on the principle, that in proportion to the degrees of knowledge and grace imparted to any one will be his criminality in the neglect of them. As we have already seen, he presupposes an original universal sense of God as lying at the foundation of humanity, and distinguishes this from the higher standpoint of Christian consciousness; he says—"Even those who know not the Lord, no exception protects from punishment; since God being clearly manifested, and to be understood from his heavenly gifts themselves, cannot be unknown, how dangerous is it, that being known, he should be despised! Now he despises him who, having obtained from him the understanding of good and evil, in taking up again what he understands ought to be shunned, and which he has already shunned, insults his own understanding, that is, the gift of God. . . . . He shows himself not only rebellious, but ungrateful against the Lord. Moreover, he sins not lightly against the Lord, who, having renounced his enemy, the devil, by repentance, and having by this token put him in subjection to the Lord, again exalts him by returning to him, and makes himself a cause of triumph, so that the evil one, having recovered his prey, rejoices against the Lord. . . . . Does he set the devil before the Lord? He seems to have made a comparison between them who has known both, and to have pronounced a solemn judgment that he is the better whose he has chosen to be again."

We find everywhere in religion and morals the contrasts of a one-sided externality and of a one-sided spiritualism. As there are those who, in their moral judgments, refer everything to the outward act, so, on the contrary, there are others who make a false separation between the will and the deed—who, though they justly assert that everything depends on the will, are not willing to acknowledge that the right will verifies itself in action,—that where this is not the case, the right will must be wanting. Of such persons Tertullian speaks when he says, "Some affirm that God has enough,[1] if he be reverenced in heart and mind, though this be not done in the outward act; and so they sin without prejudice to their fear of God and faith; that is, they defile the marriage bed without prejudice to chastity, and mix poison for a parent without prejudice to filial piety! Thus, also, they will be thrust down to hell without prejudice to their pardon, when they sin without prejudice to their godly fear!"

Although Tertullian, as we have seen in the foregoing treatise, was very much entangled in the external idea of baptism, yet this was in his case modified by his genuine Christian spirit, his deeper conception of the nature of baptism in relation to regeneration. He always gave prominence to its inner nature as his genuine Christian spirit gave him an insight into it, although he did not clearly understand the relation of that inner nature to the mediating outward element. Thus, in this work he combated a practically injurious conception, which, indeed, found its support in that externality, and could not be thoroughly eradicated excepting by a clearer understanding of the inward to the outward in baptism. That same practical Christian interest which moved him to oppose infant baptism, made him become an opponent in this treatise of an erroneous delay of baptism. The same externality which mingled itself with infant baptism, which was the origin of baptizing persons at the point of death (*nothtaufe*), promoted in another way the longer delay of baptism. There were, in fact, persons who remained longer in the class of catechumens, that they might for a longer time indulge their sensual inclinations, under the notion that when in danger of death they submitted to

[1] "Satis Deum habere si corde et animo suscipiatur, licet actu minus fiat." Cap. v.

baptism, they should at once be purified and fitted for eternal life. Tertullian wished particularly to influence the catechumens who were enthralled in this delusion, and thereby prevented from rightly preparing for baptism. He says to such —"How foolish, how unjust it is, not to fulfil repentance, and yet to expect the forgiveness of sins! that is, not to pay the price, and yet to stretch forth the hand for the goods! For at this price the Lord has determined to grant forgiveness; by the payment of this repentance, he offers impunity to be purchased. If, therefore, those who sell first examine the money which they agree to take, lest it be clipped or scraped, or base, we believe that the Lord will first test our repentance before he grants us the goods of eternal life." As the catechumens imagined that the Christian life need not be entered upon in real earnest till after baptism, Tertullian endeavoured by various illustrations to make it evident, that the time of preparation for baptism in the class of catechumens must be verified as such by a moral course of conduc "For what slave, after he has been changed into a free ma charges himself with his theft and desertions? What sold when discharged from the camp makes satisfaction for s brands? The sinner ought to lament his sins before he receives forgiveness, for the time of repentance is the same as that of danger and fear." When an appeal was made to the grace of the divine forgiveness of sins at baptism, Tertullian replies—"I do not deny the divine gift; that is, the blotting out of sins is entirely secured to those who are about to enter the water; but to obtain that, men must labour for it. For who will furnish to thee, a man of such faithless repentance, a single sprinkling of any water? It is easy for thee to come hither by stealth, and for him who is overseer in this business to be cheated by thy affirmations. But God provides for his own treasure, nor suffers the unworthy to creep in. What, finally, does he say? 'There is nothing covered which shall not be revealed.' Whatever darkness thou shalt spread over thy deeds, God is light." There were some, who, after the manner of the Jews, imagined that God's promises being once given must be fulfilled, even to the unworthy; that her grace was necessarily connected with the outward baptism and the outward confession. "Some make God's free bounty a bounden service; but if he does it,

being necessitated, and therefore against his will, he gives us, instead of a sign of life, a sign of death."[1]

Tertullian appeals to experience. Many after baptism had apostatised from Christianity, or on account of their offences had been excluded from the communion of the church. "For do not many afterwards fall away? is not that gift taken away from many? These are they in truth who creep in unawares, who having undertaken the engagement to repent, build on the sand a house that is about to fall." Of course, the proper effects of Christianity are not manifested in such persons, who have no idea of the nature of justification, nor of what Christ should be to them. "Is there one Christ," Tertullian asks, "for the baptized and another for the hearers? Is there a different hope or reward? a different fear of judgment? a different need of repentance? That laver is the seal of faith, which begins with the faithfulness of repentance and s commended by it. We are not washed that we may cease sin, since we are already washed in heart." Tertullian pre- nposes that a man must come to baptism as one who has eady renounced sin, and has been purified in heart by true repentance; and then says, "If we first cease from sinning when baptized, we put on innocency of necessity, not of free will. Which, then, excels in goodness? he that is not permitted, or he that is not disposed to sin? he that is com-

1. According to the received reading, "Quodsi necessitate nobis symbolum mortis indulget, ergo invitus facit"—some understand by *symbolum*, a bond, χειρόγραφον, and *symbolum mortis indulgere*—to free from deserved death, to forgive sins. But it is a question whether this explanation is justifiable in reference to the word *symbolum*. The explanation is more plausible that baptism itself, for which on many accounts the word *symbolum* is used, is called *symbolum mortis*, inasmuch as baptism is a symbol of spiritual death in the mutation of Christ—the συνθάπτεσθαι and συνεγείρεσθαι τῷ Χριστῷ. But this does not suit the following clause, "Quis enim permittit permansurum id quod tribuerit invitus;" for this *enim* does not mark a conclusion from the *invitum fecisse*, but a confirmation or explanation of the preceding clause; but the preceding was *ergo invitus facit*. Accordingly it must lie in the following clause, "Quis vero," &c. Every difficulty is removed and all becomes clear, if we admit that here (of which there are many examples elsewhere) the position of the clause has been altered, and that we should read, *Quodsi necessitate, ergo invitus facit; symbolum mortis nobis indulget.* Baptism, which should be to us *symbolum vitæ*, becomes then *symbolum mortis*. If these words are read interrogatively, no advantage seems to me to be gained by it.

manded, or he that is delighted to be free from crime? Then we need not keep our hands from theft unless the stiffness of the bolts prevents us . . . . if no one devoted to the Lord leaves off sinning unless bound by baptism. But I know not whether if any one be thus minded, he does not sorrow more because he has ceased to sin, than rejoice because he has escaped from it. Wherefore it behoves hearers (*audientes*—catechumens) to desire baptism, not to take it too soon."

He then proceeds from the repentance preparatory to baptism to the repentance after baptism. He would have no one misled into security. Whoever has been once rescued from danger, let him guard against falling into it again. But since the adversary never ceases to lay snares for men, since he threatens them with new temptations, there is need also of guarding against despair, if a man has fallen after his first deliverance. "Let a man be loath to sin again, but let him not be loath to repent again; let him be loath to put himself in peril again, but not to be delivered again. Let none be ashamed. If the sickness be renewed, the medicine must be renewed; thou wilt show thyself grateful to the Lord, if thou dost not refuse what the Lord offereth; thou hast offended him, but thou mayst yet be reconciled."

What Tertullian here says of repentance after baptism is a clear proof that he was at this time no Montanist. He speaks expressly of such gross sins by the commission of which, according to Montanist principles, all hope would be lost of readmission into the communion of the church.[1] It may be said that the Montanists even to such persons, did not deny all hope of salvation. But Tertullian encourages them to this hope in such a manner as it would have been impossible for him to adopt on Montanist principles.[2] It is as if he

[1] This lies in the words, "Observat (diabolus) si qua possit aut oculos concupiscentia carnali ferire, aut animum illecebris sæcularibus irretire, aut fidem terrenæ potestatis formidine evertere (apostasy from Christianity, the *thurificati* and *sacrificati* in times of persecution) aut a via certa perversis traditionibus detorquere (hæresis)."

[2] It certainly cannot be proved when Tertullian says, (cap. x.) to those who were ashamed of a public confession of sin before the church, "An melius est damnatum latere, *quam palam absolvi?*" cap. x., that the latter clause refers to church-absolution; for since the *damnatum* refers to the judgment of God alone, so also may *absolvi.*

designedly wished to defend the milder principles against the stricter party.[1] He adduces precisely those arguments, of which he combated the validity at a later period as a Montanist. He appeals to the exhortations to repentance in the epistles to the Seven Churches in the Apocalypse. "The Lord admonishes all to repentance, though with threatenings. But he would not threaten the impenitent, if he were not willing to pardon the penitent. This might be doubtful, if he had not elsewhere demonstrated the abundance of his clemency. Does he not say, 'He who has fallen shall rise again, and he who has turned away shall return.' This is he who 'will have mercy rather than sacrifice.' The heavens rejoice and the angels there, over the repentance of one man. Ho! sinner, be of good courage; thou seest where they rejoice at thy return." He appeals to the parables of the lost piece of silver, the lost sheep, and the prodigal son. In reference to the last, he says, "Whom are we to understand by this Father? verily God!—none so much a father,—none so fatherly in love. He will receive thee as his son, though thou hast wasted what thou didst receive from him; though thou returnest naked, he will receive thee because thou returnest." He only requires that the repentance should be sincere, coming from the heart,—that the outer life should not stand in contradiction to the feelings of penitence,—that the internal disposition should manifest itself by works. We only notice as erroneous that certain forms, in which pain for sin is to be expressed and self-humiliation manifested, are prescribed and

Yet Tertullian as a Montanist would certainly not have expressed himself so distinctly respecting the acquittal of sinners. And though the *valam* may be understood of a judicial act of God, such as will take place at the last judgment, yet it would be used more naturally for a public church-absolution, especially as the topic in hand is, confessions made to the church, and not mere confessions of the heart before God. Also the antithesis between *damnatum* (understanding this of the divine judgment) and *absolvi*, since according to Tertullian's views at that time, which agreed with the prevalent church doctrine, the admission into the kingdom of God was connected with absolution by the bishop, (the true internal repentance as in this instance being presupposed, and the acquittal by God,) and with admission into the visible church.

[1] This treatise may very well be the epistle mentioned by Pacian, Bishop of Barcelona, in which Tertullian, before he passed over to Montanism, vindicated the principles of the catholic church of that age respecting repentance after baptism. See his *Ep.* 3, *Bibl. Patr. Lugd.* t. iv.

considered as necessary expressions of the state of the soul—since all this might be more or less unreal, and this methodism, prescribing to all persons one definite form for expressing their feelings, might easily lead to the artificial and the untrue. There was also another error which was connected with the errors already mentioned in the ideas formed of baptism and regeneration,—a peculiar satisfaction rendered to the offended divine justice for sins committed after baptism, on which Tertullian first imposed the name *satisfactio*, —penance viewed in the light of a voluntary self-torture. This was the juridical point of view of *Pœnitentia*, the source of a variety of errors which were developed from it, down to the system of indulgences.

In reference to the shame which held many persons back from a public confession of sin, which Tertullian regarded as belonging to the self-humiliation of repentance, he says, in a true Christian, not Montanist sense, while exhibiting the nature of that brotherly communion which was still experienced in that age,—"Among brethren and fellow-servants where there is a common hope and fear, a common joy and sorrow and suffering (because there is a common spirit from the common Lord and Father), why regard *these* (or, according to another reading, *thy own*) as something different from thyself? Why shun the partners of thy fall, as if they rejoiced over it? The body cannot rejoice at the hurt of one of its members; all must grieve together and labour together for its cure. Where there are two believers, the church is; but the church is Christ.[1] Therefore, when thou fallest on thy knees to thy brethren, thou handlest Christ, thou supplicatest Christ. In like manner, when they shed tears over thee, Christ suffers, Christ intercedes with the Father. That is ever easily obtained which the Son asks for." This passage, like those mentioned above, bears strong marks of a free spiritual conception of the nature of the church, as proceeding from communion with Christ, in opposition to that mode of contemplating it which was rapidly gaining ground, which placed in the foreground the idea of the outward organism of the church, and made communion with Christ dependent upon that.

We now pass on to the two books of Tertullian addressed

[1] Cap. x. "In uno et altero ecclesia est, ecclesia vero Christus."

to his wife, *Ad Uxorem, lib. duo.* Though he wished to bequeath these to his wife as exhortations for the promotion of the Christian life, yet he had, doubtless, the design to contribute to a more general interest, and to bring to a decision questions on Christian morals which were then agitated in reference to the marriage relation. We find in these treatises, as in the preceding, many things allied to the spirit of Montanism which yet all must distinguish from what was strictly montanistic. Among these we class the view of single life as a higher stage of Christian perfection. What reasons does Tertullian adduce in its favour? He appeals to Paul's language in 1 Cor. vii. 9, Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατεύονται, γαμησάτωσαν· κρεῖσσον γάρ ἐστι γαμῆσαι, ἢ πυροῦσθαι.[1] He finds in this passage that Paul is far from pronouncing marriage as good in itself, but only permits it in comparison with something worse, as a safeguard against the temptations of the flesh. He thinks that the apostle only permits marriage; that he does not absolutely forbid, but by no means enjoins it; that he marks it as a lower stage of the Christian life. The apostle even wished that all could follow his own example, that of celibacy. As to the exposition of this passage we must allow, with all respect for the temperate spirit of Paul, who with all his preference for a life devoted only to the advancement of the kingdom of God, and freed from all earthly ties, was still more enlightened in the distinction of objective and subjective, —yet we must allow that from the stand-point of an expositor of Scripture in that age a recommendation of a single life might be easily found in it. Not to infer this from it, and yet to do no violence to Paul's words, would require a higher stage of historical and Scriptural knowledge, and a philosophical distinction of the various stages of the development of Christianity. To attain to such a philosophical insight, more would be requisite than we can expect from the age of Tertullian. Certainly his view of the higher perfection of the single life did not proceed from an erroneous view of this passage, but was founded on the whole connexion of his ethical stand-point; but this being presupposed, he would easily believe that he found a confirmation of his view in Paul's words. Now certainly the over-valuation of the single life is connected with a view which knew not how to under-

[1] Lib. i. cap. iii.

stand the higher spiritual meaning of marriage as a peculiar form of revealing the kingdom of God as known by Christianity,—a view which fixed the attention on the sensuous element in marriage dissevered from its connexion with its higher and spiritual relations. But it is evident even from these two books how deeply Tertullian recognised the significance of the higher Christian communion in marriage, and that to his apprehension the communion of the divine life constituted the true essence of Christian marriage. First of all, he says, after depicting the evils of a mixed marriage, and endeavouring to show that a true Christian marriage can only be formed between Christians,—"What will her husband sing to her, or what will she sing to her husband? She may hear, yes, she may hear something from the theatre, from the tavern, from the brothel! But what mention of God? what invocation of Christ? Where will be the nourishing of faith by the occasional reading of the Scriptures?" (that is, in their Christian conversations with one another, will they be led to take up the Scriptures in order to nourish their faith?) where will be the refreshment of the spirit? where the Divine benediction?" He then describes the blessedness of a Christian marriage,—"How can we find words to express the happiness of *that* marriage which the church effects, and the oblation[1] confirms, and the blessing seals, and angels report, and the Father ratifies! What a union of two believers, of one hope, one discipline, one service! Both brethren, both fellow-servants, no distinction of spirit or of flesh. Together they pray, together they prostrate themselves, and together keep their fasts, teaching one another, exhorting one another. They are both together in the church of God, in the feast of God; they are together in straits and in refreshments. Neither conceals from the other, neither avoids the other, neither is a burden to the other; freely the sick is visited, the needy is supported; alms without torture, sacrifices (the gifts presented at the altar) without scruple; daily diligence without hindrance; no using the sign" (of the cross) "by stealth; no hurried salutation" (of fellow-Christians), "no silent bene-

[1] *Oblatio* denotes the presentation of a common gift in the name of the newly married couple, which was mentioned in the prayers of the church at the celebration of the supper, and by which the joint communion of the newly married was confirmed.

diction. Psalms and hymns resound between the two, and they vie with each other which shall sing best to their God. Such things Christ seeing and hearing, rejoices. To these he sends his peace. Where the two are, there he is himself; and where he is, the evil one is not."

It has been laid to Tertullian's charge,[1] that in his eulogy on Christian Marriage there is a want of real earnestness; that what is individual in marriage is not rendered prominent, but everything is merged in the general Christian character, which is applicable to every kind of union; that the relation to the wife is no other than might exist towards every other Christian female.—To this we must reply, that certainly his expressions contain everything that is required to adorn a Christian marriage, this relation being apprehended in its specific meaning. What is natural in this relation is presupposed, and as such is adorned and sanctified by a divine life. The highest spiritual unity of two personalities separated by the distinction of sex is here described as realized by communion in the divine life. The sentimentality of natural feeling is indeed foreign to Tertullian. Christ is to him, with fellowship and brotherly love founded in him, the animating principle of all the relations of life. This cannot be urged as a charge against him, for it belongs to the essence of the Christian stand-point. Still we cannot deny that although the principle is to be found in Tertullian from which married and family life may acquire their true ethical importance and position in Christianity, yet in himself there were many obstacles to the right application of this principle. We always perceive in him the disturbing and contracting influence of that one-sided ascetic element in the predominant negative tendency in reference to earthly relations. From this point of view all earthly connexions must be regarded as so many checks to the divine life which longs to divest itself of all that is earthly. He sees in marriage nothing which could be transferred in a glorified form to another world. The idea was floating in his mind that according to the promise of Christ all this must be stripped off in the angelic life of the other world. Hence, even while here below, the earnest longing of Christians must be directed beyond all earthly

[1] By Hauber. *Stud. u. Krit.* 1845. Heft 3.

limits.[1] We learn this from the manner in which he decides from that one-sided point of view of the wish to leave descendants. He calls it, "Liberorum amarissima voluptate;" "That most bitter pleasure of children." "Also this," he says, "is, with us, hateful. For why should we long to bear children, since if we have them we wish to send them before us on account of the threatening tribulation, we ourselves also longing to be taken away from this most wicked world, and to be received by the Lord, which was the wish of the apostle." Here is a strong expression of a Christian principle of action which is inseparable from the essence of Christianity, and which was particularly vigorous in the first age of the church, the longing beyond earthly things after that heavenly fatherland in which the spirit finds its true home. And certainly that other world was not to a Tertullian a mere external thing, but became to him an internal reality such as belongs to the essence of Christianity. This also was the root of his earnest longing. But the other principle, of the appropriation of all other relations for that divine life of the other world, was not felt by him so forcibly. He had an overpowering consciousness of the perpetual antagonism between the higher world of the future, and the present world "lying in the wicked one." We must always bear in mind that Tertullian, as we have before remarked, believed that this antagonism in earthly relations must last, till all things should be made new by the second advent of Christ. In connexion with this subject we must notice another reason which he gave why Christians should not wish for children. "Offspring are necessary, forsooth," (he says in an ironical tone,)[2] "to the servant of God. We are so sure about our own lot, that we have leisure for children!" We notice here, as in many passages, the keynote of legal fear is sounded rather than that of child-like love. To corroborate such a sentiment in Christians in reference to offspring, Tertullian adduces the woe uttered by Christ in the prospect of the approaching tribulations on "those who should be with child." Matt. xxiv. 19. A specimen this of the injurious influence of grammatolatry in

[1] Lib. i. cap. 1. "Cetorum Christianis seculo digressis nulla restitutio nuptiarum in diem resurrectionis repromittitur, translatis scilicet in angelicam qualitatem et sanctitatem."

[2] The word *nimirum* expresses the irony.

Scripture, against which the rules elsewhere developed by Tertullian on the exposition and application of the Bible contain a preservative!

In everything that has hitherto come under our notice, we recognise what is akin to Montanism, but by no means what is absolutely montanistic. We may add what he says as an example of the relation of flight to martyrdom in times of persecution. "Even in persecutions it is better to flee as is permitted from city to city, than being seized and tortured to deny the faith. . . . . And on this account are they blessed who are enabled to depart from this life with a glorious confession." It is evident that Tertullian here contemplates *that* Christian stand-point on which a man, in the consciousness of his weakness, escapes from persecution by flight, as quite inferior to that heroic faith which boldly meets and even longs for martyrdom. As he regards single life as praiseworthy in and for itself, and the highest stand-point of Christian perfection, but wedded life as something inferior, so he decides in a similar manner on the relation of the two stand-points of Christian conduct under persecution. But still he recognises flight under persecution as not absolutely unchristian, but a thing permitted to Christians. In accordance with the views then prevalent among Christians, he acknowledges in those words of Christ in Matt. x. 23, an authority for it, though he afterwards explained the passage differently. Here we have a proof of non-Montanism. This is also the place for noticing the passage respecting the different stages in the religious and moral development of mankind, in which Tertullian distinguishes the stand-point of the still unbridled nature in the patriarchal age before the law, —that of legal correction and restraint,—and still higher, that of the perfection introduced by the Gospel. Here we have the germ of those views that were afterwards developed in Montanism, but still there is wanting the stage added by Montanism of the higher development introduced by the Paraclete. Had Tertullian at this time been a Montanist, he would certainly not have neglected to mention this.

Of these two books addressed to his wife, the first contains his exhortation that after his death she should remain unmarried, to which he was prompted by the pre-eminence he gave to a single life. Yet he finds a special reason for it—

namely, that a connexion dissolved by the will of God ought not to be restored by the wilfulness of man. "The husband being dead by the will of God, the marriage also is dead by the will of God. Wouldst thou restore a relation to which God has put an end? Why, by renewing the bondage of matrimony, dost thou refuse the freedom offered to thee?" As to the first expressions, the thought they contain, if carried out, would indeed lead to Montanist Quietism; but, taken as they stand, they amount to no more than what any one might say from a Christian stand-point, if he wished to regard the dissolution of the first marriage by death as an admonition to form no new marriage union. The last quoted words contain certainly that ascetic view of all earthly unions as limitations of the freedom of the divine life, which we have already noticed. In the second book he adds a limitation to the exhortation against the formation of a second marriage, only expressing his desire that his wife should wed no one but a Christian. He therefore allows the second marriage to be a christian act, which was contradictory to the views of the Montanists. But he finds the prohibition of a mixed marriage in the words of Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 19, since he lays an emphasis on the words *μόνον ἐν κυρίῳ*. He explains this *in nomine Domini, quod est indubitate Christiano*. And certainly Tertullian was so far right, that although these words do not refer merely to the point that no marriage ought to be formed between a heathen and a Christian, yet that sentiment is necessarily contained in the idea of *ἐν κυρίῳ*. But there were many persons, as Tertullian states, who had pleaded in vindication of the practice of mixed marriages, that Paul himself had approved of such in that part of his epistle. On the other hand, Tertullian justly remarked that a marriage now first contracted was one thing, and a mixed marriage was another, and which became mixed from one of the parties embracing Christianity. Only to such a relation could Paul's words refer, as could easily be proved from the reasons adduced by the Apostle. Rightly understanding Paul, he thought that, when by the conversion of one party the marriage became mixed, God might grant to the Christian party, if faithful, the means, not only of being preserved from the injurious influence of the other, but of operating beneficially on that other party. "For a person who has been called by some divine manifestation of

grace to the possession of a heavenly power, infuses fear into a heathen, so that he does not strive against her, does not wish to know too much of her, and is less disposed to be over curious. He perceives great things, has seen proofs; knows that she has become better." What Tertullian means to say is this, the manner in which a wife has been connected by special divine influences to Christianity, the heavenly power with which she appears armed, all this will operate to fill her husband with awe in her presence. What Tertullian says against forming a mixed marriage, proves how deeply he understood the Christian stand-point of marriage, how very much he was impressed with the conviction that without mental communion no true marriage could exist; and the central point of this mental communion was in his view the religious element, communion with Christ as common to both, and the communion of the higher life founded upon that. From this point of view also, the approval of the church, the religious element, appeared as necessary to the ratification of a marriage. We refer to his words already quoted. And hence he considers a mixed marriage, which must be destitute of this consecration, as unchristian, dissevered from connexion with the church, or, as he terms it, *nuptias de ecclesiâ tollere.* This is evident also from the way in which he describes the injurious effects of a mixed marriage, of which we have already noticed several, in speaking of his conception of Christian marriage in general. He warns the Christian female of the dangers she will subject her religious life to, by concluding a marriage with a heathen; to what interruptions and troubles and perplexities she will be exposed. "When the wife wishes to observe a day of special devotion, the husband appoints it for the baths; if a fast is to be kept, the husband makes a feast on the same day. If she wishes to leave home for a religious object, never does household business fall more upon her hands. And who would allow his wife, for the sake of visiting the brethren, to go about from street to street the round of strange cottages, even the poorest? Who would willingly bear her being parted from his side, for nightly meetings, if needs be? Who would, without anxiety, endure her being away all night, at the solemnities of Easter? Who without his own suspicions would let her go to that feast

creep into a prison to kiss the chains of a martyr? yea, and to meet any one of the brethren with the kiss? to offer water for the saints' feet? to wait upon them with their food and drink? to long for them, to have them in her thoughts? If a stranger brother come, what lodging could he expect in an alien's house? If a present is to be made to any, the barn and the fruit-stores are closed." He adds several other things which belonged to the daily Christian life, and we are thus informed of many important points relative to the history of Christian customs. He says, "Canst thou keep it secret when thou markest thy bed or thy body with the sign of the cross, when thou blowest away anything unclean with thy breath," (where we notice a Jewish element in the distinction of clean and unclean, the fear of external defilement, as in tasting of meat offered to idols,) "when thou risest in the night to pray? Wilt thou not appear to be practising a kind of magic? Will not thy husband know what thou tastest in secret before all food, and if he knows it to be bread, will he not believe it to be that which is reported? And will any man bear with these things, not knowing the reason, without a groan, without a suspicion that it is not bread, but poison?" This evidently refers to the practice of which we have spoken before—that of taking home a portion of the consecrated bread, keeping it by itself and taking it while fasting. If the heathen husband noticed that the wife ascribed a sanctifying and protective power to this bread, he might be more easily induced to suspect the use of charms. He then appeals to the fact, which very probably came under his own observation, that heathen husbands would sometimes allow their wives liberty on these points, in order to ridicule them, or to use it as a means of accusing them, or to exercise constant control over them through dread of being accused. He must have been acquainted with many examples, as he intimates, of persons who were thus kept in constant mental torture, or who were induced to apostatize. How are we to account for it, that Tertullian should make no mention here of infant baptism? Had he regarded this as an institution belonging to Christianity in general, would he not have stated that the heathen men would not allow their Christian wives to have it administered to their children?

All mysterious formalities were foreign to the Christian

spirit as it proceeded originally from apostolic Christianity. As it appears from the words of Paul (1 Cor. xiv.), the social meetings of the Christians were so conducted that they operated beneficially on the heathen, who attended them for the purpose of being further instructed in Christianity. At a later period other views prevailed—it was supposed that there were certain mysteries of Christianity, especially in what stood in connexion with the Holy Supper, which must be withdrawn from the gaze and cognisance of unbelievers. Hence proceeded the distinction of *missa catechumenorum* and *missa fidelium*. From this point of view, it was an offence to Tertullian, that by means of mixed marriages sacred things would be divulged to the heathen, and thus profaned. He here made an erroneous application of our Lord's words—"Cast not your pearls before swine." Instead of being pleased that the knowledge of Christianity gained by the heathens in their daily intercourse rendered them more forbearing towards it, Tertullian is always suspicious, lest sacred things, by being thus laid open to the heathen, should be profaned.[1]

Tertullian laments that wealthy Christians particularly were seduced, by their love of earthly things, to marry heathen women, by whom their earthly interests would be promoted.[2] He avails himself of this to express his aversion to the opulence of Christians, a sentiment which was in harmony with the whole of his character, and which found its warrant in several of our Lord's sayings too literally interpreted.

We may here mention two writings of Tertullian, *De Cultu Feminarum* (On the Dress of Women), in which there is at least no sign of Montanism, although no certain sign of the opposite. They contain an exhortation to Christian females, that in their outward appearance they should distinguish themselves as Christians before heathens of their own sex, and exhibit a spiritual seriousness and Christian demeanour, by keeping at a distance from the infection of splendour and useless extravagance, which at that period were so prevalent in

[1] "Hoc est igitur delictum, quod gentiles nostra noverunt, quod sub conscientia istorum sumus, quod beneficium eorum est, si quid operamur. Non potest se dicere nescire, qui sustinet, aut si celatur, quis non sustinet, timetur."

[2] Lib. ii. cap. 8.

great cities. These two books are independent of one another, and were composed at different times. Tertullian was averse from art as well as from ornament. He is the representative of those ethical views which we find advocated at a later period by the Puritans and Quakers. To him everything that went beyond simple nature appeared as an invention of the evil one, as a falsification of the original divine model. "For those things are not the best by nature," he says, "which do not proceed from God, the Author of nature, but are evidently from the devil, that falsifier of nature." He distinguishes, as in his book *De Spectaculis*, the natural use of things from the unnatural, to which work he also here refers. On this subject, as we have already seen, these observations were applied to the general question, how far the Christian ought to place himself on common ground with the world. Many persons thought, that as Christianity is an affair of the inner man, the only important concern was internal Christian virtue, of which God is the witness. The Christian on his conversion must remain unaltered in all outward relations. The Christian female, therefore, was not required to renounce the prevalent manners in reference to ornament and show, in order that Christianity may not appear to interfere with the social relations and manners of the world, and thereby occasion be given to blaspheme the Christian name. In all this there was a portion of truth. The difficulty was to fix the exact boundary, beyond which it would be improper to pass on either side. It was necessary, not only to treat the question on general principles, but to take into account the various circumstances. But Tertullian opposed an erroneously applied general principle by another principle, which, though in itself correct, was too general without entering into the different cases, when he says, in order to do no injury to the Christian faith—"Therefore, let us not put away the ancient vices; let us also retain the same manners if the external appearance be the same; and then truly the heathen will not blaspheme. A great blasphemy, indeed, if it be said—Since she has become a Christian, she goes about more needily! Will she not be afraid to appear poorer, since she has become richer; and to appear meaner, since she has become more adorned? Must Christians walk according to the good pleasure of the heathen, or of God?

Only let us wish that we may not be justly the cause of blasphemy. But how much more blasphemous it is, if ye, who are called the priestesses of modesty,-go about decorated and painted after the manner of the immodest?" Tertullian, in so many respects the forerunner of Augustin, appears such in the judgment he passes on the virtues of the heathen; and although this is done with a rude exaggeration, which does not discriminate the connexion of all the various steps of moral development, the relationship that subsists between all parts of morality; yet there lies at its basis the truth of a deeper perception of the unity of the ethical and the religious, of the entireness of the ethical form of life as it proceeds from Christianity. Tertullian notices this in reference to chastity; that though something of this kind was found among the heathen, yet the whole was not of a piece, like the chastity of Christians, which presented itself in the whole form of life, embracing equally the inward and the outward. He says, "For though we may believe that among the Gentiles there is a certain kind of chastity, yet it is evidently imperfect and disordered, and though it may in some measure retain its hold on the mind, yet it is dissipated in the extravagance of dress. . . . . Let them see, that since they do not hold fast all goodness, they easily mingle with evil the good which they do hold."[1] Against that appeal to the inward apart from the outward, he says, "Perhaps it will be said, It is not necessary for me to be approved by men; I require not human testimony. God is the searcher of hearts. We all know that; but yet we recollect what the apostle has said—'Let your honesty (*probum vestrum*) be known unto all men.' (Phil. iv. 5.)[2] And why? unless that wickedness may gain no access to you, and that ye may be an example and a testimony to the wicked. Or why is it said—'Let your works shine?' Or why does the Lord call us 'the light of the world?' Why does he compare us to 'a city set upon a hill,' if we are not to shine among those that are in darkness, and to be conspicuous among the sunken? This it is which makes us the light of the world, namely, our goodness. But goodness, at all events true and complete goodness, loves not darkness, but rejoices to be seen, and exults even in being pointed at. It is not enough that Christian chastity

[1] Lib. ii. cap. 1.

[2] Lib. ii. cap. 13.

should simply *be*, it must be *seen*. For so great ought to be its fulness, that it should flow over from the mind into the manners, and rise up from the conscience into the countenance, and look upon public life as on its own household furniture, and so be serviceable to preserve the faith for ever." He thinks that all such effeminacy should be shunned, by which the power of the faith may be enervated. He aims to show how little such outward decoration becomes the lot of Christians who are exposed to the fetters and tortures of persecution.

He gives us an insight into the life of Christian females when he endeavours to prove from the only occasions which they had to appear in public, that they had no reason whatever for indulging in ornamental dress.[1] "What cause have you to go into public decorated, seeing that you are removed from those things that would require it? For you neither go about to the temples, nor inquire after the public shows, nor do you know the heathen feast-days. All the pomps are designed only to gratify the wish to see and to be seen, or to indulge extravagance, to feed the appetite for glory. But you have no causes for appearing in public except such as are grave; either to visit a sick brother, or to present a sacrifice," (partaking of the Communion,)[2] "or to hear the word of God. These are serious and sacred occasions, which require no extraordinary and flowing dress, but a becoming one.[3] And if the duty of friendship and of kind offices to the heathen calls you, why not appear with your own proper weapons, so much the rather when you have to do with strangers to the faith? Let there be a distinction between the handmaids of the devil and those of God, that you may be an example to them, and that they may be edified by you, that God may be magnified in your body (as the apostle says); but he is magnified by chastity, and by a dress that accords with chastity."

The manner in which Tertullian expresses himself in the first of these books,[4] on the canon and inspiration of the

[1] Lib. ii. cap. 11. [2] "Sacrificium offertur." See above.

[3] This passage, according to the received reading, has been corrupted by a transposition of the clauses and the change of *sed* into *et*. It stands, "cui opus non sit habitu extraordinario et composito et soluto." Evidently it should be, "et soluto, sed composito."

[4] Lib. i. cap. 3.

Scriptures, is worthy of notice. He had appealed to the apocryphal Book of Enoch, in which the acts of adorning the person, of astrology, and the like, are attributed to communications from fallen spirits. But the Book of Enoch was regarded by others as a forgery, not belonging to the collection of the Holy Scriptures. Tertullian, on the other hand, maintains, according to an erroneous explanation of the passage in 2 Tim. iii. 16, that every writing which tends to edification is inspired by God, and particularly that writing which testifies of Christ. "But since Enoch in the same writing has predicted respecting the Lord, what belongs to ourselves is not by any means to be rejected by us." The sentiment that lies at the basis of what Tertullian here says, is, that Christ is the central point of Holy Writ, and of all inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But this shows what an indistinct idea he had of the marks of Divine inspiration, and consequently of what belonged to the Holy Scriptures. The critical incompetence and logical caprice of Tertullian are shown in his taking for granted what was first of all to be proved, that the Book of Enoch was as ancient as it professed to be.

SECTION II.

MONTANIST WRITINGS.

We make our transition to this division with a treatise in which Tertullian not merely declares a second marriage, as in his first book *Ad Uxorem*, to be unadvisable, but altogether as a Montanist plainly and absolutely condemns it—his treatise *De Exhortatione Castitatis*. And yet in other respects Montanism is only slightly indicated in this book, and there is no express appeal to the new revelations, one passage alone excepted, which has been noticed by Rigaltius. Tertullian has here used designedly a tone of moderation, because he wrote to an individual in the very bosom of the catholic church, whom he wished to convince from his own stand-point. For everything here brought forward he was certainly pre-

pared by those views on single life which we have already noticed in his first book *Ad Uxorem*,—both what he supposed was to be found in many passages of Paul's Epistles, and the consequences deduced from them by his own peculiar logic. He writes to a person whom he wished to exhort not to marry again after the death of his first wife. This book is, on the whole, distinguished by a gentleness and quietness unusual to Tertullian in controversy; there is a sobriety of development, without those outbursts which he was wont to indulge in. This peculiarity be explained by the character of the work being hortatory rather than controversial. Tertullian is animated by the desire not to crush an opponent, but to win a friend to the acknowledgment of principles which appeared to himself as the only correct ones. This is perceptible in the gentle unpretending manner in which the treatise begins. He guards himself against the reproach of laying down the law to his friend on a point which he ought to determine by his own belief and conscience. He supposes, that through the weakness of the flesh, he might be carried away to act differently from what the Gospel and the Spirit would require of him, and therefore that it might be an advantage if in such a conflict his own faith were aided by the counsel of a friend. But it is also not less evident that Tertullian sets out from that point of view of which we have already spoken, namely, that a single life belongs to the perfection of holiness; though other reasons are added.

Man, created after the image of God, ought to be continually advancing in likeness to God, in being holy as God is holy. But as a part of this holiness, Tertullian from his ascetic point of view reckons the suppression of sexual desire. He makes three distinct stages. First, refraining from marriage from the first, as something founded in nature; secondly, by the mutual consent of married persons to practise abstinence from the time of their baptism; or resolving from that time not to enter on the married state; thirdly, not to marry again after the first marriage has been dissolved by the death of one of the parties. Here in his opinion another consideration was added to the motives for sanctification, the recognition of the Divine will which was manifested by the death of one of the parties, and resignation to this will which he distinguished by the name of *modestia*. This was, in fact,

an argument which Tertullian employed before he joined the Montanists, which shows how the quietism inherent in Montanism had already allied itself to Tertullian's peculiar disposition. Yet we may easily perceive that against a person who was disposed to find in such an event the expression of the Divine will, many reasons might be found for disputing it, and that other signs might counter-indicate what was the Divine will. It also appears that by the person to whom the treatise was addressed, or by others; a subjective indication of the Divine will would be opposed to the objective.

One person might say,—It is God who has produced in me the need and desire to form a new marriage. In truth, as the appeal to that objective expression of the Divine will, so the appeal to the subjective would be deceptive, unless other signs were added. Every desire that rises in a man's bosom might be interpreted as the voice of God; there needs first of all a criterion in order to distinguish the Divine indication from the bodily impulse. This did not escape Tertullian's notice, and he has said many admirable things on the necessity of self-examination in virtue of the possession of reason and freedom, which in another direction might be applied to the enthusiastic tendencies of Montanism. "It is not the mark of a good and solid faith thus to refer all things to the will of God. And thus every one flatters himself that nothing is done without God's command; and we do not understand that anything depends upon ourselves. Lastly, every transgression may be excused, if we maintain that nothing is done by us without the will of God. By such a dogma the whole scheme of religion is overturned, if he produces by his will what he does not approve, or if there is nothing which God does not approve. . . . . After we have learned both from his precepts what he wills and what he wills not, there still remains to us free-will to choose one or the other, as it is written, 'Behold, I have placed before thee good and evil.' . . . therefore our will is to will evil, when we are contrary to the will of God, who wills good. Do you moreover ask, Whence does this will come by which we will anything contrary to the will of God? I answer, and not unadvisedly, from ourselves. Man must correspond with the progenitor of his race. . . . . As he, from whom the development of the race and sin pro-

ceeded, sinned freely, so also sin is a free act in all his descendants."[1]

It is remarkable that Tertullian, the forerunner of Augustin in the doctrine of human depravity and of grace, should so distinctly represent free-will as the lever of all moral development, and that he regards it as so important to shun and keep off everything which might serve in any degree to furnish an apology for sin as an act of un-freedom, or to deduce its origin from anything save the free-will. Against the appeal made to the temptation of Satan, from whom evil thoughts and resolutions proceed, he maintains, "It is only the work of the devil to tempt what is in thee if thou willest. But when thou hast willed, it follows that he has subdued thee, not by having worked the willing in thee, but having gained possession of thy will."[2]

But it was very difficult for Tertullian, to refute the arguments adduced by his opponents, from Paul's express permission to conclude a second marriage. Though there has been a disposition to find in all that he has said on this topic nothing but sophistical perversion, yet we must maintain that many profound truths, though falsely applied, form the basis of his reasonings. Tertullian thought that everything depended, not only on recognising the universally known, revealed will of God, but also that which was more secretly indicated. We find therefore, first of all, that distribution maintained by him with a reference to ethics, which afterwards was applied in a totally different way to dogmatic subjects, the distinction between a hidden and a revealed will. But by the hidden will of God he by no means understands a will not expressed by divine revelation, but that which cannot be known by a mere superficial observation of the mind, but which is to be understood by deeper entrance into the connexion of the divine word, and which can only be learned by close reflection and a careful comparison of single expressions.

If we wish to understand the relation in which Tertullian

1 "Porro si quæris, unde venit ista voluntas, qua quid volumus adversus Dei voluntatem, dicam; ex nobis ipsis; nec temere; semini enim tuo respondeas necesse est, siquidem ille princeps et generis et delicti Adam voluit quod delicuit." Cap. ii.

2 "Ita diaboli opus unum est, tentare quod in te est, an velis. At ubi voluisti, sequitur ut te sibi subigat, non operatus in te voluntatem, sed nactus possessionem voluntatis." Cap. ii.

placed the new revelations of the Paraclete to that hidden will of God, we shall find that according to his view, what every one could discover in Holy Writ by deeper reflection, was brought to the consciousness, and expressly marked as the special will of God, by the new revelations. Now Tertullian maintains, that what was allowed only as a conditional permission in reference to a certain stand-point of human weakness, cannot be the unconditional will of God,—the will of God in itself, the highest in itself, which belongs to the true Christian ideal. In this assertion lies the truth that there cannot be a twofold Christian morality, a higher and a lower, but only one stand-point of Christian perfection, which all Christians are to aim at. According to that, the distinction which was then continually gaining ground in the church, between the law or command for all Christians, and that which only belonged to the counsels of Christian perfection, would vanish; there would be no difference between what was commanded and what was permitted, so that the higher stand-point of Christian perfection must also take account of what was permitted for Christian principle. The permissible, according to Tertullian, was only what was allowed temporarily, in reference to a certain standard of human weakness, which yet could not correspond to the Christian ideal. We must acknowledge that Tertullian in this respect had truth on his side, though he erred in his explanation of Christian perfection, and erred also, in taking no account of the multiplicity of the peculiar relations of life, and the unity of the moral ideal in this multiplicity. Here lies the great difference between Tertullian and the apostle Paul, who in a certain preference for single life, as dedicated without interruption to the process of spreading the kingdom of God, agreed with Tertullian. In this last respect he found a point of connexion with the apostle Paul for his opinion; but in another respect he was incapable of correctly appreciating the wisdom of the apostle in distinguishing the objective and the subjective in morals with so much discretion and mental freedom. But we also recollect the hindrances in his own and later times, as we have already remarked, to a correct historical understanding of the apostle.

The manner in which Tertullian explains those expressions of the apostle Paul in their mutual relation, is important for

the purpose of understanding his idea of inspiration in connexion with the whole of his montanist views. He distinguishes between what the apostle delivered as his merely human advice, and what he delivered with divine authority as the command of the Lord, in virtue of his illumination by the Spirit. He compares that passage in which Paul says that he thinks that he also has the Spirit, with what Paul delivered as the express word of the Lord, and finds the same in both, the peculiarly divine, in contrast to the merely human delivered as human opinion.[1] He distinguishes the general agency of the Holy Spirit in all Christians from his peculiar specific influence on the apostles. To the latter he ascribes the fulness of spiritual gifts, while he acknowledges only individual gifts in other Christians. "The apostles," he says, "had the Holy Spirit in a peculiar sense, since they had him perfectly in the works of prophecy, and in the working of miracles, and in the gift of tongues, and not partially like the rest." We shall examine in the sequel what Tertullian understood by the gift of tongues. At present we only remark, that as a Montanist he attached great importance to the supernaturally wonderful and the ecstatic. Accordingly he has distinguished in the writings of the apostles between the merely human and the immediately divine, uttered with a higher authority. If, in his idea of inspiration, he is so far correct, that he applies the influence of the Holy Spirit not to everything equally, but distinguishes different gradations; yet he falls into an error connected with his montanistic supernaturalism, in making so strong a contrast between the divine and the human in the apostles, and does not acknowledge the harmonious cooperation of the divine and the human. So also, he erroneously limits to certain expressions, while excluding the rest, what the apostle says of his own consciousness of being animated of the Holy Spirit. Proceeding from that false point of view, he maintains that what Paul had delivered in his apostolic capacity as *consilium*, thereby acquired the authority of a *præceptum*. Here again the truth involved is the opposition against the distinction between *consilia* and *præcepta*.[2]

[1] Distinguishing between, "hominis prudentis consilium," and "Spiritus Sancti consilium."

[2] "Factum est jam non consilium divini Spiritus, sed pro ejus majestate præceptum."

The prohibition of second marriages is reckoned by Tertullian among the peculiarities belonging to the New Testament stand-point, in distinction from the Old. It belonged to the merits of Montanism to have given greater prominence to this distinction in opposition to the common mingling of the two stand-points, although Montanism, on the other hand, had gone back to the Old Testament stand-point, through that which should have been a progressive development of Christianity, through a new legal code, and through a new order of prophets who were placed at the head of church government. Here, also, in this book, montanistic ideas form the groundwork, though not so clearly expressed and developed. On the Old Testament stand-point, the process of spreading the kingdom of God was the leading object in the increase of the human race. On the New stand-point the extensive development of God's kingdom was rendered more prominent by increasing holiness. The existing generation of mankind were required to receive the kingdom of God, and to be thoroughly imbued with its principles. No increase in the numbers of mankind

1. Tertullian, especially as a Montanist, considered the world as near at hand.[1] "Now, at the end of the times God has confined what he before relaxed; he has recalled what he formerly allowed; there was reason for propagation at the first, and for pruning at the last; beginnings are always unfettered, the endings are contracted. So a man plants a wood, and suffers it to grow, that at a proper time he may cut it down. The wood is the old state of things, which by the new Gospel is pruned and lopped; the axe is now laid at the root of the tree. So also that rule, 'Eye for eye, tooth for tooth,' has waxed old since the time of youth is come." He recognises, therefore, in the Sermon on the Mount, the contrast of the new Christian stand-point to the juridical-theocratic stand-point, which in the Old Testament was adapted to the rudeness of the people, who require to be trained and educated. He

[1] Tertullian quotes the words of Paul in 1 Cor. vii. 29, *ὁ καιρὸς συνεσταλμένος ἐστὶν τὸ λοιπόν*, according to the existing North African version, and understands them to mean, "Only a short time remains for the duration of the world," and contrasts them with the words in Genesis respecting the multiplying of the human race. "Tempus jam in collecto esse, restare, ut et quì uxores habent tanquam non habentes agant."

describes the new stand-point as that of youth.'[1] As, therefore, a childhood and youth of development are here assumed, the stand-point of ripened manhood is joined to them, to which the progressive revelations of the Paraclete must lead.

To this distinction between the Old and New Testament stand-points, in contrast to the increasing mingling of one with the other, may be traced the manner in which Tertullian enforces the idea of the universal priesthood. Indeed, we cannot believe that this view was first rendered prominent by Montanism, and that Tertullian was led to adopt it by his Montanism. We have already seen how this view corresponded to the original Christian spirit, but was constantly threatened to be overpowered by a new priestly tendency that was then springing up. Tertullian himself sometimes, when his polemic interest in conflict with the laity led him to it, came forward as its opponent; but certainly Montanism, as far as it placed the free movements of the spirit in opposition to hierarchical and traditional tendencies, contributed to invigorate the consciousness of the Christian priesthood, and this effect we can recognise even in Tertullian.

The advocates of second marriages appealed to the passages in Tit. i. 6, and 1 Tim. iii. 2, and [illegible] it is only required of bishops and deacons, that a person should only enter once into the marriage state, it follows that this limitation cannot be required of other Christians. Tertullian combats this by the application of the universal idea of the priesthood to all Christians generally, and says—"We are fools if we believe that what is not lawful for priests is lawful for the laity. Are not we laics also priests? It is written, 'He has made us kings and priests to God and his Father.' Only the authority of the church has made a difference between clergy and laity, and the dignity is consecrated by the session of the clerical order. Where there is no session of the ecclesiastical order, thou offerest (*offers*, partakest of the Supper) and baptizest (*tinguis*); thou art priest for thyself alone. But where there are three there is a church, even though they are laics, for 'every one lives by his own faith, nor is there respect of persons with God,' since, according to what the apostle says, 'not the hearers of the law shall

[1] "Jam senuit ex quo juvenuit," one of those antitheses in which Tertullian delights.

be justified' by God, 'but the doers.'"[1] We here find the same views which are exhibited in his book on baptism before he embraced Montanism, that all Christians being partakers of the same original priesthood, are able and authorized, not only to publish the word, but to administer the sacraments—that only the necessity of an ecclesiastical organization in the fellowship of similar brethren, laid the foundation for the distinction of clergy and laity, to whom, except in cases of necessity, individuals must submit themselves. Here again we must observe that spiritual apprehension of the idea of the church, in conflict with other elements of Tertullian's mind, as the basis of that common reference to Christ which is closely connected with the idea of the universal priesthood. From this universal right to the priesthood, Tertullian infers the universal capability in reference to those religious and moral requirements which are incumbent on all. "If, then, thou hast a priestly right when needful, thou must also have a priestly mode of life. As one who has married twice, dost thou baptize? or administer the Supper? How much more criminal it is when a layman who has been married a second time acts as a priest, when a priest himself, thus marrying, loses the right to act as priest! But thou sayest—allowance must be made for necessity. No necessity can be allowed for which can be avoided. Do not involve thyself in a second marriage and thou wilt not be under the necessity of administering what is not lawful for a man who has married a second time. God wills that we should be all so constituted that we may everywhere be fitted for attending to his sacraments—one God, one faith, and one discipline. How, then, can priests be chosen from the laity, unless the laity observe what is required of the priestly order?" From this language we must infer that the clergy, unless there had been special preparatory institutions for them, were wont to be taken from the body of the laity.

Tertullian, in his attack on second marriages, proceeds on two opposite principles, a contradiction that we have already remarked in him. On the one hand, he sets out from the deeper spiritual idea of marriage, which Christianity has imparted, as a spiritual communion; he regards as its essence a higher spiritual unity by which the sexual difference is

[1] Cap. vii.

equalized, which must, therefore, lead to investing it with a high moral significance, and would certainly check his exalting celibacy above the married life. On the other hand, his one-sided ascetic tendency led him into error, and disposed him to depreciate marriage on account of the sensuous element,—to distinguish celibacy as in a special sense an object to be aimed at, and, on the other hand, to regard marriage only as a necessary defect; so that the argument against second marriages is at the bottom a recommendation of celibacy. We can only explain his employing such contradictory lines of argument, by the fact, that owing to his erroneous opposition against what belonged to the bodily senses, he could not perceive the unity between the spiritual and corporeal connexion, and hence, notwithstanding all the admirable things he has said on the Christian idea of marriage, he had evidently not attained to a perfect understanding of this ethical idea.

As the ascetic opposition against married life in general forms the basis of the prohibition of second marriages, it is shown very strongly when Tertullian pronounces a single life blessed, because it is altogether free from that sensuous element which he brands as having some affinity to *stuprum*. Hence he infers, if what was said against marriage generally was valid, how much more would it be applicable, when a person, having made use of the indulgence granted by God (which Tertullian regarded as a condescension to human weakness), when his wife was snatched from him, should desire to marry again. It was not enough for such a person to have sunk below the first stage of perfection; he sank from the second to the third, and would at last sink deeper still, since he was not satisfied with the allowance appointed by God for satisfying his sensuous desires.

That one-sided ascetic tendency of renouncing the present world and striving after the future, appears also here very characteristically, when he pronounces the desire of posterity to be a thing unworthy of a Christian, a state of thraldom with the world, in these words,—"Shall a servant of God long for heirs, who has disinherited himself from the world? And who would desire to marry again who has not had children by the first! It will then be his first object to live longer, while the apostle hastens to his Lord." He adds

ironically, "Certainly such a man will be the most free from ties in persecutions, the most steadfast in martyrdom, the most prompt in communicating relief, the most moderate in his gains. Lastly, he will die in peace, leaving children who will celebrate his obsequies. Will persons of this kind be actuated by concern for the public welfare,—lest states should come to ruin, if they retain no offspring,—lest laws, and rights, and commerce fail; lest the temples fail; lest there should not be those who exclaim, 'Christiani ad bestias!'" Here we perceive the strong antipolitical feeling of ascetic exaggeration, the want of a correct insight into the respective provinces of religion and ethics, which in some measure justified the accusation brought by the heathen against the Christian life, which Tertullian aimed to repel in his Apology.

From this point of view he also adduces as a proof that it could not be conformable to Christian interests to contract a second marriage, the instance of a person who designedly chose for his second wife one who was not thought likely to have children; but he was mistaken, and became a second time a father as well as a husband. This was looked upon by Tertullian as a divine judgment.

From the same point-point he occupied in reference to the doctrine of morals, Tertullian explains Paul's statement of the opposition between flesh and spirit as wholly relating to the opposition between the spirit and sensuality. This lies at the basis of his whole scheme, according to which everything depends on freedom from the dominion of the senses.

Since Tertullian proceeds on an outward conception of the idea of marriage, and regards the wife only as an assistant for the outward relations of life and the management of domestic concerns, he wishes to prove that as the warrior and traveller can dispense with such help, this must always be the case with the Christian as a *miles* and *peregrinus*. He says, "I know with what excuses we colour the insatiable cupidity of the flesh. We pretend the necessity of aids, the management of the house, the government of the family, the care of the presses and keys, the inspection of the spinning, the purchase of food, and domestic cares." He then adds ironically, "Only the houses of married men prosper! The families of the unmarried, the affairs of eunuchs, the fortunes of soldiers, or of those who travel without wives—all come to nought. But

are not we soldiers? but of a higher warfare, even as we are under a greater leader. And are we not travellers through this world?"[1]

But as Tertullian, on the one hand, gave undue prominence to the outward sensuous element of marriage, in order to confirm his exhortation, that a person after the first marriage had been dissolved by death, should not contract a second; so, on the other hand, he proceeds in exactly an opposite direction to argue from the peculiarly Christian and spiritual element in the conception of the idea of marriage as a communion of souls, that such a connexion can only be formed once between two persons, and is indissoluble even by death itself. It is the culminating point of the idea of marriage which he here presupposes. He says,—"In a second marriage two wives beset the same husband, one in the spirit, the other in the flesh. Nor canst thou hate the earlier one, for whom also thou must entertain a more sacred affection as being now taken to God." And he strengthens this argument by alluding to the Christian custom of celebrating the memory of deceased wives or husbands, adding, "for whose spirit thou prayest, for whom thou givest annual oblations. Thou wilt therefore stand before God with as many wives as thou commemoratest in prayer, and thou wilt offer for two, and commend both to God by the priest ordained to monogamy, or even consecrated as a celibate, and surrounded by virgins and the once married."[2]

But these two elements in the conception of marriage stand directly opposed to one another in Tertullian. The right union and blending of the two elements was wanting; and this was connected with the general defect in the ethics of Tertullian and the Montanists, by whom the divine life was not rightly understood as the transforming and exalting principle of the earthly and sensuous. Hence he indulged the thought of dissevering the spiritual element altogether from the sensuous; as in later times from this ascetic separation proceeded the unnatural relation of the *συνείσακτοι*, or *subintroductæ*.[3] Thus even at that time Tertullian says,—"A partnership of domestic burdens is necessary. Have a

[1] Cap. xii. [2] Cap. xi.

[3] See Neander's General History, &c., vol. i. p. 385, (Stand. Lib. ed.) —Tr.

spiritual wife; take a widow, adorned with faith, dowered with poverty, guarded by age; you will have married well. To have even more wives of this kind is acceptable to God."[1] Thus friendship occupied the place of wedded love.

From that point of view such an idea of the spiritual perfection of celibacy had already developed itself in Tertullian, that he claimed for the unmarried, as for the martyrs, the right to enter Paradise immediately after death. From such an idea, joined to that of a special priesthood, which was founded on not regarding the divine life as an universal transforming principle for all men, the opinion was probably formed that celibacy peculiarly belonged to the dignity of the priesthood; thus Tertullian says,—"How many men and women are reckoned among the ecclesiastical orders for their continence, who preferred a marriage covenant with God. . . . and devoted themselves as sons of that chastity, killing in themselves the concupiscence of lust, and all that which could not be admitted into Paradise. Hence it is to be taken for granted that those who wished to be received into Paradise ought to abstain from that which in Paradise is unknown."[2]

It is especially deserving of notice that in the above passage females are mentioned among the ordained: whence it follows that the same significance was ascribed to the ordination of deaconesses as to every other ordination. Thus the Montanist spirit must have led to priestly celibacy, and we shall be obliged to regard this as one of the effects of Montanism on the development of the church. This appears in the strongest light in an expression of the Montanist prophetess Prisca or Priscilla, to which Tertullian appeals; the passage is wanting in the common codices, and no doubt was left out on account of the offence which it would give to those who looked at it from the common orthodox standpoint, and it was first edited by Rigaltius.[3] "Also by the holy prophetess Prisca it was thus announced that only a holy

[1] Cap. xii.

[2] Cap. xiii. "Quanti igitur et quantæ in ecclesiasticis ordinibus de continentia censentur."

[3] Cap. x. "Item per sanctam prophetidem Priscam ita evangelizatur, quod sanctus minister sanctimoniam noverit administrare. Purificantia enim concordat, ait, et visiones vident, et ponentes faciem deorsum etiam voces audiunt manifestas tam salutares quam et occultas."

minister knows how to minister holy things. For he brings purifying things into agreement; he speaks," (the Spirit,) "and they see visions, and when they lower their countenances they also hear distinct voices, as salutary as they are hidden." It is evident that here true holiness and purity are regarded as inseparable from celibacy.

We have already seen, that even in heathenism Tertullian sought out correspondences to Christianity, proceeding on the idea, that Satan was a copyist and mimic of the divine; this rested on the belief that what in other religions is merely a confused and undefined longing, or a caricature, points to the pure element of truth in Christianity. Thus Tertullian attempts to prove from the practice in heathen sanctuaries the importance of single marriages.[1] In such comparisons the main point is to distinguish between what is in analogy with Christianity, and what is in opposition to it,—a task to which Tertullian was not always competent.

We proceed from this treatise to another in which Tertullian handles the same subject—his work *De Monogamia*.

We find in this work the same ideas and arguments as in the former,—many topics are less fully discussed, but yet there are several new ideas and developments. The special difference between the two treatises is this—that in the first Tertullian proceeds more on the common Christian standpoint, and scarcely ever on that of Montanism; while in the other, Montanism is more warmly and earnestly avowed. He here describes the opponents of Montanism as *carnally minded, psychici*, because they would not acknowledge the new gifts imparted by the Holy Spirit,—their carnal mind being incapable of acknowledging the new revelations of the Holy Spirit. This carnal mind caused them to become opponents of the new higher stages of the development of the Christian life, to which the church was to be advanced by the new effusion of the Holy Spirit, and allowed them to retain their sensual desires in opposition to the new strict requirements of the Christian life. Thus, he says, "The things of the Spirit do not please the psychici, who do not receive the Spirit." The Montanists, on the other hand, he describes as those who by the acknowledgment of spiritual gifts become spiritually minded, and who hence are properly denominated *spiritales*.[2]

[1] Cap. xiii.

[2] De Monog. cap. i.

When Montanism prescribed new laws for the Christian life—as for instance, the law in reference to second marriages, it was charged with venturing to prescribe things which could not be deduced from holy writ nor from church tradition, and that contrary to Christian freedom it imposed new legal burdens on men. Tertullian appeals in its defence to the promise in John's Gospel of the Paraclete, who should reveal new truths which men at first could not apprehend. We know, indeed, from Irenæus, that there were persons who, when the Montanists appealed to these passages, asserted that the whole Gospel was spurious.[1] But in Tertullian we find not the least trace of this, that it had ever entered any one's thoughts to dispute the genuineness of the Gospel to which the Montanists appealed; and it is certainly most unhistorical, if the modern opponents of the genuineness of that Gospel have really thought that in those words respecting the Paraclete there was an implied allusion to Montanism. In those words nothing whatever can be found which is not satisfactorily accounted for, in its application to the apostles alone as such, whose office it was to develop the germ of the truth contained in Christ's words, and to bring out into clear consciousness what was concealed therein: there was nothing, in short, in these words, which referred to a later age of the church. Whoever had been induced by the controversies of the Montanist age to attribute similar things to Christ, would certainly have expressed himself very differently. Nothing can be found in those words which has not its point of connexion and its analogy in Christ's promises in reference to the Holy Spirit in the other Gospels. Nor can it be imagined, that a later writer could have so transported himself back to the first stage of the development of Christianity, in order that he might be able to speak in this manner on the relation of the doctrine of Christ as it was delivered by himself, to the development deduced from it by the apostles. Tertullian, certainly, was very far from thinking that those words must literally relate only to the new revelations of the Paraclete in his own times. He well knew that these words primarily related to the apostles; only he thought that this application of them was not exhaustive, but that they might be applied

[1] Iren. iii. 11. The so-called *Alogi*. (See Neander's General History, vol. ii. pp. 222, 301. Stand. Lib. ed.—Tr.)

equally to the progressive development of the Christian life by the further effusion of the Holy Spirit. And certainly we must allow that Tertullian is right in the general principle affirmed by him, that what was said to the apostles in a narrower sense, must be applicable in certain respects to Christians of other times, as well as in reference to the application of this special passage to the progressive development of Christian consciousness under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Only it is of importance, correctly to distinguish between the sense in which these words peculiarly apply to the apostles, and the meaning of their general application to the post-apostolic times; and likewise clearly to understand the idea of that progressive Christian development—the relation it stands in to the original divine words that proceeded from Christ and the apostles. These were points which came under discussion in the controversy with Montanism, and with these its leading errors were connected.

It was justly objected to the Montanists that by such an application of the words to the post-apostolic times, the church was surrendered to the caprice of those persons who appealed to new revelations, and under this pretext propounded new doctrines that were sufficient to adulterate Christianity. What was Tertullian's reply? "The spirit opposed to Christianity is apparent from the diversity of preaching, first adulterating the rule of faith, and then the rule of life; for the adulteration of what is first in order must precede; that is, the adulteration of the faith is before that of the precepts for the life. It is necessary that a man should be a heretic concerning God, and then concerning the rule of life. But since the Paraclete has many things to teach which the Lord has reserved for him, according to his promise, so he will, in the first place, testify of Christ, on whom we believe, with all those doctrines which relate to God as the Creator, and will glorify him; and being thus understood concerning the rule of faith, he will then reveal many things which relate to discipline, since the perfection of the pure doctrines will be a pledge for them, although they are new, because now revealed,—although burdensome, because not even now are they borne; yet they originate in no other Christ than in him who truly said that he had many other things which would be taught by the Paraclete which were not less burden-

some than these, for those persons by whom, at that time, they were not yet borne."

Tertullian, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that doctrine is the original, from which ethics are the deduction; the adulteration must make its first appearance in the former. By their agreement with the original scheme of doctrine the new revelations will be proved to be genuine. Certainly Tertullian was right in asserting that important corruptions of ethical points must have their root in the dogmatical scheme of Christian consciousness; nevertheless, the case might exist that the connexion of what was erroneous in the ethical element, with the erroneous in the dogmatical element, might not be palpable to those who adopted it, so that the error was prominent only on the ethical side. It might join itself outwardly to one of the foundations of the universal Christian tradition, and what was novel in it might be represented as the completion of moral instruction, and yet might be at variance (without its abettors being conscious of the fact) with the fundamental principles of the universal Christian tradition. A person might set out from the same faith in God and Christ, professing or really intending to honour [illegible] and yet the new ethical precepts propounded by him might be injurious to the Christian faith. So that, in fact, the criterion which Tertullian laid down for deciding on the divine in the new revelation was absolutely erroneous. With all that outward adherence to acknowledged Christian doctrine, the new revelations substantially and essentially contradicted them. This certainly applied to the pretended new revelations made by Montanus and his new prophets and prophetesses. That which, in annexing itself to the unchangeable first principles of Christianity, ought to

[1] "Non minus istis onerosa, (quam) illis, a quibus nondum tunc sustinebantur." I have translated this passage according to an emendation which seemed to me necessary. According to the received reading *isti* stands opposed to *illis*, consequently *isti* must mean the Christians of those times, *illi* the apostles; but that cannot possibly be correct. We must understand *istis* as neuter, and the word can then refer to what is now revealed by the Paraclete, in relation to what was then revealed new to the apostles, and what to them appeared not less burdensome than the new revealed by the Paraclete appeared burdensome to the men of that age. It is evident from the connexion that the comparison refers to the object, not to the subject, and therefore this emendation is absolutely necessary.

have served for the completion of its moral instructions, was, in fact, something that in its spirit contradicted the contents (rightly understood) of those first principles. Christ as the Redeemer was not glorified by it, but rather the doctrine respecting him in that character which lay at the foundation of Christian morals was injured. In setting up that criterion for the new revelations, Tertullian had in view particularly the falsification of the Christian truth by Gnosticism. But Montanism deviated in an opposite direction in the falsification of Christian truth, and its errors were most prominent in the ethical department. Its errors in dogmatics were in many respects less apparent and conscious. In dogmatics there was the erroneous application of the idea of the progressive development of Christianity, and the erroneous explanation, as well as erroneous use, of that promise of the Paraclete, when, namely, the completion of the Christian morals was not considered as something proceeding from within, agreeably to the essential nature of Christianity, under the guiding influence of the Holy Spirit, but as something from without, by a new authority in addition to the original fundamental tradition of the church. Inasmuch as the apostles had not attained earlier to a consciousness of the real contents of the truth announced by Christ, and this consciousness was to be obtained by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, Christ spoke of new revelations, by which they would first know what at that time they were not able to apprehend. But now, that consciousness having been once attained by the apostles, it was to be spread by their instrumentality, by their word. This, therefore, remained the necessary instrumentality for all further revelations of the Holy Spirit, and these could only relate to more completely understanding and applying the contents of the truth announced by the apostles. Tertullian's error consists in this, that he speaks of new revelations which are not deduced from the existing Word, but added from without, and which, by the divine authority accrediting them, demand to be acknowledged in the church. Further, Tertullian maintained, as things had been revealed to the apostles which before they were not able to bear, so it need not excite wonder if, by the new revelations of the Paraclete, such things should be commanded which men had hitherto not been able to bear. "It

was only the fault of the flesh that these things appeared burdensome.[1] But the analogy will not hold good; for Christ spoke not of separate outward commands which the apostles, on account of their carnal weakness, could not formerly bear; but of such truths as they could not yet understand, because they had not yet attained to the requisite stand-point of the spiritual life. Thus all the further progressive development could only be determined by the general stand-point, and it would only cast an obscurity over Christian ethics if separate strict commands were imposed from without, as a new burden. In the sphere of Christianity, all things must become new by an all-animating spirit; this being present, everything else would follow. The Montanist ethics which would impose on the weakness of the flesh separate ascetic precepts, proved itself in so doing to be a legal system foreign to Christianity. What here professed to be something spiritual,—*spiritale*, rather deserved the name of ψυχικόν in the biblical sense of the term.

It is remarkable how Tertullian determines the relation which the stand-point of the *Spiritales* in their idea of marriage bears to that of the *Psychici* on the one hand, and to that of the heretics, that is, of the Gnostics, on the other. The ethics of the *Spiritales* he considers to occupy the right mean between these two opposite tendencies. The one, according to Tertullian, disown marriage entirely, as they disown the Creator from whom it proceeds; the others exalt marriage above all propriety, and desire a multiplication of marriage.[2] Certainly Tertullian opposes throughout the Gnostic stand-point, which is connected with the hatred of nature and with dualism. He acknowledges marriage as a relation implanted in human nature by the Creator, of which the highest significance has been attained through Christianity. But however far he withdraws in theory from the Gnostic stand-point, yet in dissevering as he does the sensuous and the spiritual in marriage, and in exalting, as a consequence, the single above the married life, he is driven to results which, in practice, border on Gnosticism. He agrees with

[1] Cap. iii. "Sed an onerosa monogamia, viderit adhuc impudens infirmitas carnis an autem nova, de hoc interim constet."

[2] Cap. i. "Hæretici nuptias auferunt, psychici ingerunt; illi nec semel, isti non semel nubunt."

the Gnostic ethics in regarding the divine life too much in mere opposition to what relates to the senses in man, and not as a transforming, elevating principle. He maintains that even if the Paraclete had not granted so much indulgence to the flesh as to allow marriage, but had prescribed the single life, this would not have been introducing anything new.[1] He here appeals to the example of Christ.[2] If now Tertullian did not, like a Clement of Alexandria, find in the specific relation of Christ to mankind and to the church the reason why he could not enter into the marriage relation, he would be induced to place celibacy on the highest stand-point in the example of Christ, agreeing in this point with Tatian. And he found a confirmation of this view in those misunderstood words of Christ respecting the blessedness of a single life, in which from a very early period it has been believed that a *consilium evangelicum* relating to it was to be found.

The controversy on the obligation of monogamy was carried on partly on exegetical grounds, partly on grounds taken from the idea of marriage. As to the first, the opponents of Montanism appealed to the law relating to the Levirate marriage,[3] as a proof that a second marriage generally could not be forbidden; but Tertullian urges in reply, the difference between the Old and New Testament stand-points. When his opponents reproached the Montanists with a fresh intermingling of the Law and the Gospel, and combated them with the necessary distinction of the Old and New Testament stand-points, Tertullian charged them with self-contradiction and inconsequential reasoning, since, when it would answer their purpose, they would appeal to Christ's abrogation of the law, and at another time, as in the point now before us, they would avail themselves of an appeal to the Old Testament.[4] This accusation was, indeed, not altogether unfounded; it

[1] Cap. iii. "Illud enim amplius dicimus, etiamsi totam et solidam virginitatem sive continentiam Paracletus hodie determinasset, ut ne unis quidem nuptiis fervorem carnis despumare premitteret, sic quoque nihil novi inducere videretur."

[2] Cap. v. "Quando novissimus Adam, id est Christus, innuptus in totum quod etiam primus Adam ante exsilium."

[3] Cap. vii.

[4] Cap. vii. "Et quoniam quidam interdum nihil sibi dicunt esse cum lege, quam Christus non dissolvit, sed adimplevit, interdum quæ volunt legis arripiunt."

proceeded from confused ideas respecting the nature of the law and the relation of the Law and the Gospel to one another. But Tertullian was also on this subject involved in similar confusion. He maintains that in the law a distinction is to be made between what has been abrogated by Christ and what is to remain in force, or rather is to be carried to greater completeness; in reference to which Christ says, that he came not to destroy the law but to fulfil. Under the first head he understands the yoke which even the fathers were not able to bear.[1] He understands this only of the ritual of the law, and considers all the rest as belonging to the ethical element. In consequence of making this distinction, he was more liable to include in the fulfilling of the Law something which belonged to the legal stand-point, and not to place in due prominence what was peculiar to the Gospel; this would not have been the case, if he had applied the contrast between the Law and the Gospel to the whole form of the law, to the different relation of the ethical to the religious. As to any argument that might be drawn from the Levirate law, it could not, in his opinion, be made use of on the Christian stand-point, because the spreading of the kingdom of God no longer depended on the propagation of the race. - He remarks in reference to the progressive development in the requirement of continence, what we have already quoted from his first work on this subject.

But his deep conception of what is peculiar to Christianity comes to view when he says that this prescription could admit of no application on the Christian stand-point, because all Christians are in the relation of brethren to one another. As Tertullian proceeds on the erroneous assumption (from a misunderstanding of Lev. xxi. 14) that a second marriage was forbidden to priests in the Old Testament, he applies this adroitly to the universal priesthood of all Christians:—"But Jesus, the great high-priest of the Father, clothing us with himself (because 'they who are baptized in Christ, have put on Christ'), 'has made us priests to God his Father,' accord-

[1] Cap. vii. "Plane et nos sic dicimus decessisse legem, ut onera quidem ejus, quæ secundum sententiam apostolorum nec patres sustinere valuerunt concesserint quæ vero ad justitiam spectant, non tantum reservata permaneant verum et ampliata, ut scilicet redundare possit justitia nostra super scribarum et pharisæorum justitiam."

ing to John." And here he makes, though incorrectly, an application full of Christian sentiment, of the passage in Matt. viii. 22,—"For the Lord calls back the young man hastening to his father's burial, in order to show that he calls us to be priests, whom the law forbids to be present at the burial of their parents. . . . . Therefore are we bound to observe this interdict? By no means. For our only Father lives, and our mother the church, nor are we ourselves dead who live unto God, nor do we bury our dead, because they, too, live in Christ."[1] He also makes use of this idea of the universal priesthood against his opponents when they argued, that, according to the passages already quoted from Paul's epistles, monogamy was only required of those who were to be chosen to clerical offices, and hence it followed, no such prescription was laid upon others. He says—"Whence are the bishops and clergy? Are they not from all? But if all were not bound to monogamy, whence could monogamists be taken for the clergy? Must there be a separate order of monogamists, out of which to make a selection for the clergy?"[2]

Now it is evident, that although on one side the idea of an universal priesthood might be favoured by Montanism, yet the prominence obtained by this idea is by no means to be considered as an effect of the montanist spirit, but rather as a reaction of the original Christian spirit in opposition to the hierarchical tendency. We learn this from Tertullian himself, since he objects to his opponents, who were, no doubt, laymen of the catholic church, that when duties were in question, they affected to know nothing of this universal priesthood, but when they wished to make good their rights against the clergy, they could vaunt about the universal priesthood. He says—"When we exalt and inflate ourselves against the clergy, then we are all one, then we are all priests, because 'he hath made us priests to God and the Father.' But when we are called upon to practise an equality of sacerdotal discipline, we doff the priestly *infula*, and drop into a lower rank!"[3] Here also he endeavours to rebut the appeal made

[1] Cap. vii. [2] Cap. xii.

[3] Cap. xii. "Sed cum extollemur et inflamur adversus clerum, tunc unum omnes sumus, tunc omnes sacerdotes, quia sacerdotes nos Deo et Patri fecit. Cum ad peræquationem disciplinæ sacerdotalis provocamur deponimus infulas et impares sumus."

to Paul's words in 1 Cor. vii. as in his first treatise on the same subject; he maintains that where Paul shows indulgence towards those who are weak in the flesh, he marks this as spoken, not according to the Lord's authority, but after human judgment. But where he says that he wishes all might be as he was in reference to the single life, he adds—that he believes that he had the Holy Spirit; and Tertullian considers this as equivalent to the passage where Paul appeals to the word of the Lord. He concludes from this, that Paul, by virtue of the authority of the Holy Spirit, revoked what, according to mere human judgment, he had yielded to carnal weakness.[1] Moreover, Tertullian contrived to weaken the force of the passages from Paul's epistles which were brought against him, by an arbitrary exposition, and maintained, that where Paul speaks of a second marriage, he assumes that the first had been contracted with a heathen before conversion, and had been dissolved by death.[2] But he imagined that a marriage contracted with a heathen did not correspond to the idea of Christian marriage, for the whole life of Christians is reckoned by faith.[3] Tertullian gives peculiar prominence in marriage, as connected with his own manner of viewing the subject which we have developed from his former work, to the religious element of its sanctification; as he defines Christian marriage to be such an union as exists when God joins two into one flesh, or when he seals the union where he finds it already formed, that is, in the case of heathens who have embraced Christianity. Tertullian, as we have remarked, always proceeds upon this idea of marriage as an indissoluble union, founded in a communion of divine life. Even before his transition to Montanism, he held it as corresponding to Christian principle, that the party who separated from the other for the only legitimate cause allowed by the law of Christ, could form no new marriage. He now thinks—"If the separated party who, on account of wrath, hatred, or enmity, and their causes, injury or insult, or any complaint whatever, has separated herself in soul and body from her husband, remains bound to an enemy (not to call him a

[1] Cap. iii. [2] Cap. xi.

[3] "Quia ante fidem soluto ab uxore non numerabitur post fidem secunda uxor, quæ post fidem prima est; a fide enim etiam ipsa vita nostra censetur."

husband), how much more does she remain bound who, neither by her own fault nor her husband's, but by an event according to the will of God, is not separated from matrimony, but only left, and after death belongs to him to whom when dead she still owes union."[1] Thus Tertullian concludes that the connexion of the wife with such a person must continue for ever in spirit, that no other union can take its place, but that it becomes transformed into a higher communion. For confirmation, he makes use of the manner in which a Christian woman was wont to celebrate the memory of her deceased husband, and says—"She prays for his soul, and solicits, meanwhile, refreshment for him, and a participation in the first resurrection,[2] and makes offerings on the annual return of the day of his death. For unless she did this, she would repudiate him as far as lay in her power." This he places in connexion with the Christian conception of eternal life, and of a personality to be glorified in an endless life. He is imbued with the Christian view of the future, that no personal relation of the higher life will be destroyed, but that all will arise in a glorified form, and endure throughout eternity. Tertullian's genuine Christian spirit is evinced in a remarkable manner when he says, "Or are we to be nothing after death, according to Epicurus, and not according to Christ? But if we believe in the resurrection of the dead, we shall also remain bound to those with whom we shall rise again, and shall give an account of one another. But if, 'in that world they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels in heaven,' shall we on that account not be bound to deceased partners, since there will be no restoration of marriage? So much the more shall we be bound, because we are destined for a better state, we are to rise to a spiritual partnership, in which we shall recognise ourselves and those who belong to us. How, finally, shall we sing the praises of God for ever, if the sense and memory of this obligation does not remain to us? if not merely in substance, but in consciousness, we are transformed?[3] We, therefore, who shall be with

[1] Cap. x.

[2] This mode of expression belongs to the eschatology of Tertullian and the Montanists. The representation of Hades, in which the departed saints are admitted to a foretaste of future blessedness, and then the resurrection to happiness during the millennial reign.

[3] I have translated these words according to an emendation of the text which seemed necessary. The text as it stands is, "si substantia

God, shall be with one another, since we shall be all one with God." He then remarks, what was suggested to him by a comparison of the different parables of Christ respecting the unity of believers and the various degrees of reward in eternal life, that then one communion of eternal divine life would unite all together, though various degrees would exist in it. "Although the reward will be various, although there are many mansions[1] belonging to the same father, they have laboured for the one denarius of the same wages, that is, eternal life, in which God will not separate those whom he has joined more than he has forbidden them to separate from one another in this lower life. But since this is so, how shall she be free for another husband who belongs to her own for the future? . . . . She will have one husband in the spirit and another in the flesh. This will be adultery; the consciousness of one woman will be divided between two men. If one is separated from her in the flesh, but remains in heart, there where even the thought without carnal connexion completes the adultery by means of desire, and the marriage by the will,—so far he is still her husband, possessing that by which he became such, that is, the soul, in which, if any other shall dwell, it will be crime. But he is not excluded, if he departs from the lower intercourse of the flesh. The husband is more honoured, the purer he becomes."[2]

His opponents believed that they had found an important support for their opinion in Rom. vii. 2.[3] "For the woman which hath an husband is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth, but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband." Tertullian meets them with

non conscientia reformabimur?" But Tertullian could not intend to say this; he wished certainly to represent, that man would take with him into a higher state the consciousness of what he was in this life; that although the man himself is transformed and elevated, yet the identity of consciousness continues. But certainly here has been a falsification of the original reading by the transposition of the negation, and such falsifications of the text by the transposition of the words are sometimes to be met with both in Tertullian and Origen. The original reading will have been, "si non substantia, sed conscientia reformabitur." [In Semler's edition the passage reads thus, "Ceterum quomodo gratias Deo in æternum canemus si non manebit in nobis sensus, et memoria debiti hujus? Substantia non conscientia reformabitur."—Tr.]

[1] Tertullian, like the ancients generally, understands the words μοναὶ πολλαί, in John xiv. 2, as expressing a difference of quality.

[2] Cap. x. [3] Cap. xiii.

the acute objection, that Paul here speaks only from the stand-point of the Mosaic law, but in the same passage says that the law is no longer binding on Christians.[1] He thinks that this permission given by Paul might be in all cases a condescension to human weakness. He adduces the example of the circumcision of Timothy, of Paul's vow at Jerusalem, how he condescended to the weakness of men, becoming all things to all men, only that this could not be applied to this instance without injury to the apostle's veracity. We here notice a mixture of formal and material accommodation which generally was very injurious to the doctrine of veracity.

Tertullian also applies to the idea of marriage, what appears to him of the greatest importance in the relation of Christ and Christianity to all the forms of human life—namely, that through him as the Redeemer in every respect, and especially in regard to matrimony, God's original plan in the creation, which had been disturbed and checked in its development by sin, would be realized;—that as from him, the divine λόγος, the idea that was originally expressed in the creation proceeded, so this, after its realization had been checked by sin, and condescension under the law to the hardness of man's heart had become necessary, is restored altogether to its original state by him the Incarnate Logos. To this he refers the Pauline expression *ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν Χριστῷ*; that through him the beginning and end are everywhere brought together; beginning and end become one in him.

But what Christ himself made preparation for, founded, and aimed at, was, according to Tertullian's doctrine, first brought to its full realization by the new revelations of the Paraclete. Thus the Christian idea of all condescension to human weakness, which hitherto had not existed, obtained its full and perfect development. Hence the Paraclete, in his new revelations, is the restorer of the original divine plan in all the extent of the idea. Thus Tertullian says of his influences in relation to matrimony, that he is *restitutor* rather than *institutor*.

In Christ's bringing back all things to their original state, Tertullian reckons his freeing religion from the ceremonial

[1] It is a remarkable instance of arbitrary interpretation of Scripture, neglecting the connexion, when he understands the words in Rom. vii. 4, *σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, of the *corpus Christi quod est ecclesia*.

law. He says: "And so much are all things recalled in Christ to what they were in the beginning, that faith is brought back from circumcision to the original uncircumcision: and freedom in the use of meats, with the exception of eating of blood, as it was in the beginning, and in durability of marriage, as it was from the beginning, and a prohibition of divorce, which was not from the beginning." Thus, in Tertullian's words, it is implied that the same principle of restoration of the original, the same principle of setting free the religious and moral elements from the limits within which they had hitherto been confined, was to be applied to the taking away the law of the Sabbath, the restoration of equal value to all days alike, and likewise to the realization of matrimony. Tertullian himself was not aware of all the consequences which would flow from the sentiments he avowed in their consequential development, as is evident when we compare many of his confined views with this principle. And here a limitation at once appears, which he arbitrarily made, when, in the abrogation of the distinction of meats, according to that apostolic decree, he believed an exception must be made as to eating of blood.

Speaking of the relation of Montanism to Christianity as hitherto developed, he says: "The new law has taken away repudiation; it had something to take away. The new prophecy has taken away the second marriage, which was not less a repudiation of the former. But the hardness of the heart more easily gave way to Christ than the weakness of the flesh. This requires more for its vindication from Paul than the other from Moses, if it really can employ him for its vindication, since it seizes him when indulgent, but rejects him when he prescribes, since it eludes his leading thoughts and his constant will."[1] This passage indicates the manner in which Tertullian explains the language of Paul's writings. He thinks that that weakness will only last till the revelation of the Paraclete, to whom those things were deferred by the Lord which could not then be borne; but this intolerableness no longer serves any one for an excuse, since he is come by whom strength is given to bear it.[2] It appears from this

[1] Cap. xiv.

[2] "Tempus ejus, donec Paracletus operaretur, fu t in quem dilata sunt a Domino, quæ tunc sustineri non poterant, quæ] m nemini competit portare non posse, quia per quem datur portare posse, non deest."

that Tertullian supposed a more elevated operation of the Holy Spirit in reference to practice as well as to knowledge. He not only assumed a progressive illumination of the Holy Spirit, by which new and higher spiritual requirements were revealed, but also a more elevated communication of divine power through the same, by which the weakness of the flesh would be overcome, and the will made capable of accomplishing what before it could not accomplish owing to that weakness. In Tertullian's opinion, the same influence of the Holy Spirit was needed to know and to perform what in consequence of the weakness of the flesh men had hitherto been unable either to know or to perform. But this greater influence of the Holy Spirit still remained, according to Tertullian, dependent on, or conditioned by, the operation of the free will. He appealed on this point to the words of Christ, who added to his commendation of celibacy, "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it:" that is, let him depart who cannot do it. That young man went away who could not receive the command to divide his possessions among the poor, and was left by the Lord to his own will. Nor will severity be imputed to Christ on account of the want of free will in any one. - He appeals to that passage so often quoted from Deut. xxx. 15, "See, I have set before thee this day life and good, death and evil:" and adds, "Choose what is good; if thou canst not because thou wilt not (for that thou canst if thou wilt he shows by proposing both to thy will), thou must depart from Him whose will thou doest not."

Here we must again remark that the same individual who so staunchly advocated the principle of grace, at the same time expressed himself in strong terms against its unconditional operation, and firmly maintained the freedom of the will.

We must also notice, that where Tertullian adduces Mary the mother of Jesus as an example of a single marriage, he assumes that she, who must have been a virgin in order to serve as an instrument for the birth of Christ, after he was born, bore children only to one husband. He was therefore an advocate of the later heretical opinion, that the so-called brethren of Jesus were the later-born sons of Mary. But it is remarkable that the ascetic spirit which afterwards regarded this opinion with aversion, could not induce Tertullian, although he felt such a tendency strongly, to find anything doubtful in it; or there must have been other grounds which

led to such a conclusion, and influenced him so strongly, that doubt on the opposite side could have no effect upon him.

As we have seen, Tertullian, in the treatises written before he became a Montanist, had come forward as an advocate of milder maxims respecting repentance, according to which, no one who had broken the baptismal vow by any sins whatever would be excluded from absolution, provided he gave signs of sincere repentance. But as the harsher element of his Christian character which led him to Montanism acquired increasing influence over him, he combated the views he had formerly advocated, and wrote in consequence his book *De Pudicitia,* which we now wish to examine. He himself speaks in this book of such an alteration in his views. He informs us that he was moved to appear as an advocate of the opposite side of the question, since many of his earlier expressions had been quoted against him. As he says, "This treatise will be directed against the Psychici, against the associates of my former way of thinking, who on that account will reproach me so much the more with levity." Probably he refers particularly to the manner in which he expressed himself in the treatise *De Pœnitentia.* He now sought to vindicate himself against the charge which was brought against him on that account. He appeals to the necessity of the advancing development of knowledge, and says, "That a person should separate himself from a society is not in itself an evidence of crime, as if it were not easier to err with numbers, when truth is loved by a minority." The principles to which Tertullian was attached at an earlier period were therefore those of the majority of the church. What Montanism taught respecting the various stages of progressive development in reference to the church generally, was applied by Tertullian to the various stages in the development of individuals. "I am not ashamed," he says, "that I am freed from error; I am rejoiced that I am freed from it, because I am conscious of being better and more modest. Let no one be ashamed of progress. Even in Christ knowledge has its ages, through which even an apostle passed." He then appeals to what Paul says, in 1 Cor. xiii. 11, of his progress in knowledge from childhood to manhood; not indeed in reference to the various steps of Christian knowledge, but of knowledge in the most general sense, for the purpose of comparing the subordinate stages of knowledge in temporal life with the higher stages in eternal life.

The controversy which is here handled relates to two points: first, the general question whether the church possesses power to impart absolution for all sins committed after baptism, or only in reference to the class of smaller offences; secondly, the special question, whether sins of unchastity (*stuprum* and *adulterium*), apostasy to idolatry, and murder, belong to the category of *peccata mortalia*, to which no church absolution can reach. In reference to these two points, Tertullian maintained on the first, not by any means, as a Montanist, that in such sins sincere repentance was utterly impossible, or that, on the supposition of their committal, no hope of forgiveness was left for them. He by no means wished to withdraw from parties who were guilty of them the sympathy of Christian love, but rather demanded that it should be shown to them, and that they should be exhorted to repentance: only he maintained that after such persons had once forfeited the forgiveness of sins, gained for them through Christ, and imparted at baptism, the divine counsel respecting them could be known to no one without a new supernatural revelation, and the church would not be at all justified in pronouncing their absolution, and admitting them again to communion. The power to bind and loose cannot refer to this class of sins, the so-called *peccata mortalia*, according to the apostle John's designation.[1] If now any person were to make the objection—"It is indeed in vain to exhort to repentance if it remain without fruit—if forgiveness of sins cannot be imparted,"—Tertullian would reply: "Their repentance *might* be so much the more efficacious, if it were accompanied not with that false confidence in absolution, that false security and assurance, but with true humility; if they were not led astray to attribute too much to man, but exhorted to place their only confidence in God, to seek help from Him alone. Vain," he says, "will such a repentance appear from the stand-point of those who want human absolution for their repentance" (that is, in vain from the stand-point of the Psychici, who do not distinguish between the absolution of the church and the divine forgiveness of sins,

[1] To the opinion, that such sinners should be exhorted to repentance, although absolution could not be granted to them, Tertullian's expression relates, respecting the shedding of tears apart from reconciliation to the church. "Jejunas pacis lacrymas profusuris, nec amplius ab ecclesia quam publicationem dedecoris relaturis." Cap. i.

and who therefore suppose, that in denying the one the other is denied also); "but as to our stand-point, we who believe that God alone forgives sins, and that in every case—the sin unto death alone excepted—such an act of repentance cannot be performed in vain. For since repentance is referred to God alone, and prostrates itself before him, this will be more efficacious in obtaining pardon, because the penitent seeks it alone from God, because he does not believe that human absolution is sufficient for his offences, and because he would rather blush with shame before the church than have communion with it; for he stands before its doors, and admonishes others by the example of his shame, and calls for the tears of the brethren, and returns after gaining more than communion, namely, the sympathy of the brethren. And if he does not here reap peace, yet he sows it before the Lord. He does not lose fruit, but prepares for it."[1]

The second point relates to the special question, what sins belong to the *peccata mortalia*, and particularly whether sins of unchastity are to be reckoned among them. Even those persons, who reckoned joining in idolatry, apostasy to heathenism, and murder, among the *peccata mortalia*, still believed that the same severe judgment could not be passed on this class. But in consequence of the ascetic tendency of Tertullian and Montanism, he attached a peculiar criminality to these sins.[2] All violations of chastity especially, he placed in one class as *peccata mortalia*.[3] Every indulgence of the sexual passion, marriage excepted, appeared to him alike. Those alone who had indulged in unnatural lusts were distinguished from other persons who transgressed the laws of chastity, and according to Montanist principles were not admitted within the walls of the church among the class of *pœnitentes*, but were obliged to stand outside the doors, and were at a later period designated *χειμαζόμενοι*.[4]

[1] Cap. iii.

[2] Cap. v. "Idololatram quidem et homicidam semel damnas mœchum vero de medio excipis, idololatriæ successorem, homicidæ antecessorem, utriusque collegam? Personæ acceptatio est, miserabiliores pœnitentias reliquisti."

[3] Cap. iv. "Ceterum si adulterium et si stuprum dixero, unum erit contaminatæ carnis elogium. Nec enim interest nuptam alienam an viduam quis incurset, dum non suam fœminam, sicut nec locis refert, in cubiculis an in turribus pudicitia trucidetur."

[4] Cap. iv. "Reliquas autem libidinum furias i apias et in compora et

Tertullian casts it as a reproach on his opponents, that since they permitted marriage to be so often repeated as a preservative against incontinence, they ought to have been so much stricter in judgment upon it. As from the Montanist point of view it appeared that a true marriage could be only once contracted, and was an absolutely indissoluble union,—even the *digami* would be numbered among these violators of chastity.[1] But from the predominance of the religious element in the consideration of matrimony, as we have already seen in the former book, the first marriage was assumed to be one contracted between two believers. The religious element was here so influential, that a union formed without the concurrence of the church was regarded as illicit. He says, "With us also, secret connexions, that is, those which are not first made known in the church, are in danger of being judged like adultery and fornication."[2]

The second question is the principal topic discussed in this book. It was peculiarly important for Tertullian to maintain the strictness of the judgment passed on sins of unchastity. A declaration of the Roman bishop, who had expressed himself unfavourable to the Montanist strictness, and had openly accorded absolution to those who had been guilty of such offences, on the condition of their repentance, appears to have been the immediate occasion of this controversy. Probably the Roman bishop had already assumed a tone of superiority, which sprang up early in the Romish church, grounded on the assumption that there was the source of pure tradition. We may draw this inference from the sarcastic, irritating tone in which Tertullian expresses himself respecting the declaration of the Roman bishop: at the beginning of his treatise he says, "I hear that an edict, and that a peremptory one, has been set forth. The *Pontifex Maximus*, forsooth, the Bishop of bishops, says, 'I forgive the sins of *mœchia* and *fornicatio* to those who have professed repentance.'"[3] It is doubtful indeed whether Tertullian

in sexus ultra jura naturæ, non modo limine, verum omni ecclesiæ tacto submovemus, quia non sunt delicta, sed monstra."

[1] Cap. i. "Et ideo durissime nos infamantes Paracletum disciplinæ enormitate digamos foris sistimus, eundem limitem liminis mœchis quoque et fornicatoribus figimus, jejunas pacis," &c.

[2] Cap. iv.

[3] Cap. i. Tertullian alludes to this in cap. xiii. "Bonus pastor et benedictus papa concionaris."

quotes the words as they were uttered by the Roman bishop—whether he did not designedly give them in this form from his own stand-point, in order more strongly to mark the presumption of the man who claimed the power of forgiving sins.

In reference to the principal point in dispute between the two parties, the extension of the power committed to the church to bind and to loose, there was at the bottom, as we have already remarked, an error common to both—the want of a right understanding of the relation of baptism to regeneration, the notion of a magical remission of sins at baptism, the assumption that the forgiveness of sins through Christ in a full sense referred only to sins committed before baptism, and that for sins committed after it a special satisfaction was to be rendered, and in virtue of it a new announcement of absolution was required. At this point a difference arose. Tertullian allowed this only in reference to smaller offences. He denied the existence of any such power in the church in reference to the so-called *peccata mortalia*. He charged his opponents with attributing to men a power that belonged only to God, though in truth this was not founded on the views they entertained respecting the Power of the Keys. The representatives of the church stand-point regarded the bishop and the priests not as men, but as organs of a power committed by Christ to the church. But Tertullian set out from a point of view, according to which Christ had not delivered any such power to the church, certainly not to the bishops, and hence, if they arrogated to themselves such a power, it must have appeared to him as venturing to assume a power which belonged to God alone.

The bishops regarded themselves here as the successors of the apostles, and Peter, in consequence of the power delivered to him to bind and loose, as the representative of the apostolic and episcopal power: Tertullian, on the contrary, maintained that the bishops were the successors of the apostles only in reference to the exercise of their office as teachers, not in reference to the spiritual power delivered to them. Such power was committed to the apostles only for themselves as peculiar organs of the divine power, in a sense in which the bishops were not, by virtue of the supernatural gifts entrusted to them, which gave them an insight into the inner man, so

that they could discern the quality of the repentance in an infallible manner. If the bishops wished to be successors of the apostles in this respect, they must prove it by similar instances of divine power, the ability to work miracles and to foretell future events. What Christ said to the apostle Peter, related only to himself personally, and just so far as he partook in a special manner of the influences of the Holy Spirit; but not at the same time, in his person, to those who exercised a certain office in the church, but only to those who were *spiritales homines* like himself. Although it is plain, he says, that the apostles themselves could impart such forgiveness, which power to forgive sins could proceed only from God, not from men, it would follow that they did not do this in virtue of their office as teachers, but of a special power imparted to them.[1] "For they raised the dead, which God alone can do; and restored the diseased, which none but Christ could do; yea, they also inflicted punishments, which Christ would not do. For it did not become him to be severe who came to suffer . . . . Show me, then, thou successor of the apostles, examples of thy prophetic power, and I will acknowledge the divine power in thee, and claim for thyself the power of remitting offences of this kind; but if thou hast only obtained the gifts of office, to preside over not a government but a ministry, who or what art thou to forgive sins, thou who showest thyself to be neither prophet nor apostle, and wantest that power which is needed to forgive sin?"

To meet the appeal made to the words of Christ to Peter, he says, "Who art thou, who overturnest and changest the manifest intention of the Lord who addressed these words personally to Peter?" He had said that all was spoken to him personally, not to a plurality as to the church. But even Peter, he maintains, never exercised such a power of forgiving *peccata mortalia;* he only made use of the power to loose in reference to sins committed before baptism, since he first of all incorporated believers by baptism into the kingdom of God; he made use of his power to bind in reference to the punishment of Ananias. Tertullian moreover applies the

[1] Cap. xxi. "Itaque si et ipsos beatos apostolos tale aliquid indulsisse constaret, cujus venia a Deo non ab homine, competeret non ex disciplina, sed ex potestate fecisse."

power of binding and loosing in a quite different sense to what Peter first determined, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, respecting what was to be abrogated or retained in the Mosaic law; in all this, there was evidently nothing of that power which bishops must possess as Peter's successors. "What has this to do with the church,—thy church especially, O Psychic? For according to the person of Peter that power will belong to the *spiritales*, to an apostle or a prophet. For the Spirit is in a peculiar and most exalted sense the church, in which Spirit is the trinity of the divine essence, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He assembles the church which the Lord has constituted of three. And thus, accordingly, the whole number of those who are joined to one another in this one faith, are recognised as a church by its author and consecrator; and so the church will forgive sins; but the church of the Spirit by a spiritual man, not the church as a number of bishops. For this is the prerogative and authority of the master, not of the servant; of God himself, not of the priest." We see that Tertullian here opposes to the externalized idea of the church as constituted by the succession of bishops that more spiritualized idea of a church constituted by an internal fact, the effusion of the Holy Spirit on the prophets. Hence, such an idea as this of the church could be formed,—where Christ is, and where the Holy Spirit is, there is the church. Where two or three are united to one another in the name of Christ and in the communion of the Holy Spirit, there is the church. We have therefore obtained the idea of a church forming itself from within, by means of a common spiritual fact, and thus the idea of the invisible church. The earlier Catholic element of Tertullian was therefore converted into an opposite Protestant one, by the revolution that Montanism effected in his mind. This would have been correct, if Tertullian had understood by that influence of the Holy Spirit, the general influence inseparable from Christianity, as it is understood to exist in all true believers. But such was not the case. He understands by it the extraordinary effusion of the Holy Spirit, as whose organs he regarded the new prophets, and who were to be believed only on account of their authority. Here then, one element of exter nality is opposed to another, one Jewish element to another. Instead of the influence of the Holy Spirit conveyed through

the succession of bishops—through the ordinary church organs—we have it conveyed through the extraordinary effusion of the Holy Spirit, and by the appearance of the extraordinary organs excited by it, namely, the prophets. The mixture of the Jewish and Christian stand-points in the idea of a prophetical class is set in opposition to the mixture of those stand-points in the idea of the priesthood.

Lastly, although Tertullian ascribes the right of forgiving sins to the *ecclesia Spiritus per spiritales homines*, yet he expressly adds, that it had made no use of this right on account of the practical injury that might ensue, in order that men might not feel secure in their sins. We here recognise the moral motive to counterwork the false confidence in absolution, of which Tertullian well knew the injurious consequences. He quotes a Montanist oracle. "But, you say, the church has the power of forgiving sins. This I acknowledge, and affirm so much the more, because I hear the Paraclete saying in the new prophets, 'The church can forgive sins, but I will not do it, lest they should commit other offences.'" He here opposes the genuine prophetic spirit to the false. "But how," he says, "if a pseudo-prophetic spirit had declared this? But such an one would have shown himself more as a destroyer, who would have recommended himself by his indulgence, and seduced others into sin. Or if he had longed to appropriate this according to the Spirit of Truth; then the Spirit of Truth can grant pardon to fornicators, but will not do it to the injury of several." Tertullian's zeal was roused to protest against human pretensions in reference to the forgiveness of sins, and against everything which could seduce believers into security in sin, and against the manifold injurious influence which the confessors and martyrs exerted in this direction. Such persons, who to ordinary Christians appeared as super-earthly beings, were frequently called upon for their intercession, by those who had been excluded from the communion of the church on account of their vices. Many of them acted as if they thought that the impartation of reconcilement with the church was absolutely in their power. Through want of knowledge or reflection, or through spiritual pride, they were frequently misled into false steps. But they were already held in such great veneration, that whoever infringed on

their authority, was almost certain of being regarded in an unfavourable light. It was, therefore, peculiarly praiseworthy and salutary in Tertullian to come forward against this excessive veneration. But his manner of expressing himself discovers his irritability,—"But," he says to the Psychic, "thou pourest forth this power on thy martyrs. As every one in virtue of the confession puts on chains as yet not oppressive, under the new name of *custodia*, immediately the adulterers resort to them, the fornicators present themselves, already the prayers resound, the tears of every polluted person stagnate around, and none more easily purchase access to the prisons than the very people who have lost it to the church."[1] Tertullian, who indeed was easily hurried into passionate opposition on any subject whatever, and who, on account of the influence we have noticed, was prejudiced against these confessors, and had to contend against the adversaries of Montanism among them, but whom we cannot exactly blame for exposing these things, indicates that these gatherings of a multitude of both sexes in the prisons at night, and in an excited state, without any oversight, were attended with injurious effects on their morals. He gives us to understand that the excessive veneration which nourished spiritual pride and false security, was dangerous even to the confessors themselves, of which we find many instances. He says, "Men and women were defiled in the darkness, of which advantage was taken for the indulgence of their lusts, and they seek peace from those who are put in peril for their own. Others take refuge in the mines" (the confessors who are sent to labour in the mines), "and return thence as communicants, where now another martyrdom is necessary for the new sins committed after the first martyrdom" (*i.e.* the tortures endured for the faith). "For who is there on the earth and in the flesh without sin? Who is a martyr, an inhabitant of this world, a suppliant for the denarius, subject to the physician and the money-lender?" (that is, that he has still need of Christ as the physician for the sins that still cleave to him, and that he has to render an account of the interest gained on the talents entrusted to him.) He imagines a case, that one really suffering as a martyr should find himself in the near prospect of death. "Yet," he says, "who permits a man

[1] Cap. xxii.

to give what belongs to God alone, by whom that is condemned without excuse, which the apostles, who, as I know, were themselves martyrs, did not believe they could pardon?" He further addresses the martyr: "Who has paid another's death by his own, except the Son of God? For he in the very time of his passion liberated the malefactor. For he came for this purpose, that he, himself free from sin and holy in all things, might die for sinners. Hence thou who wouldst imitate him in forgiving sins, if thou hast not sinned thyself, thou mightest suffer for me. But if thou art a sinner, how will the oil in thy lamp suffice for thee and for me? I have the means by which I can prove Christ. If Christ on this account is in the martyr, that the martyr may pardon adulterers and fornicators, let him tell the secrets of the heart in order to forgive sins; then he would be Christ. For so the Lord Jesus Christ showed his power."[1] Thus Christ on earth, as a proof of his power to forgive sins, appealed to his miracles, when he forgave the sins of the paralytic. Tertullian introduces the opponents of the stricter theory of repentance as saying,[2] "God is good and merciful; mercy is preferred by him to sacrifice; he would rather have the repentance of a sinner than his death; he is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe. Hence, also, the sons of God ought to be merciful and pacific, forgiving one another, as Christ forgave us; not judging, lest we should be judged. 'To his own master he standeth or falleth. Who art thou that judgest another's servant? Forgive, and it shall be forgiven thee.'" "Such," he says, "are the prattlings of these persons, with which they offer adulation to God and flatter themselves, which tend more to enervate than to strengthen discipline." On the other hand, he maintains, "We must also collect the expressions of every Scripture of a contrary kind. Though God is good, yet he is also just." He appeals to those passages of the Old Testament in which God rejects intercession for certain sinners, and to passages which speak of a jealous God. He maintains that those expressions which refer only to the forgiveness of wrongs committed against men would be falsely applied to sins, as sins against God. But Tertullian on this point has not sufficiently entered into the ideas of his opponents. What they intended appears to be this,—No one has a right to determine beforehand the limits

[1] Cap. xxii. [2] Cap. ii.

of the Divine compassion, to reject from church communion, or to pronounce a sentence of condemnation on any class whatever of sinners who show signs of repentance. No one can look into the heart; every one must leave this to God, it remains for him to pass the decisive judgment; and meanwhile, all persons who, as far as man can judge, manifest true repentance should be admitted, in dependence on the Divine mercy, to absolution and church communion. Tertullian says further, in vindication of the stricter discipline, in answer to that objection,—"that repentance is not in vain, and the church discipline is not too severe. Both honour God; that will more easily attain its object,-because it does not flatter itself; and that will render more efficient aid because it does not arrogate too much to itself."

The controversy was also waged on exegetical grounds. One party appealed to several parables of Christ in proof that no one who repented would be rejected by Christ. The parable of the shepherd who carried the lost sheep on his shoulders was one very familiar to Christians. For as, first of all, in domestic life, the use of representations of religious objects occupied the place of images borrowed from the heathen mythology, so Christians were accustomed to have the figure of the shepherd carrying back the lost sheep on his shoulders upon their cups, and thus it was more readily suggested to contrast with Montanist severity,—the image of the good shepherd who was always ready to seek after the lost sheep, and to admit them again to the fold. It was repugnant to the ascetic spirit of Tertullian, that they should ornament their cups with such an image taken from the Gospels, and he has not failed to express his vexation on account of it.[1]

Tertullian, on the contrary, maintains, that for correctly understanding this parable, it is of importance to know the occasion of its being delivered, and for what purpose it was uttered by Christ, in order that persons may not arbitrarily interpret it from the stand-point of the present, to suit their own particular views. He says: "According to the order of nature, according to the order of the ear and of language, and what sound thinking requires, we make the rule, that those things are always answered which are called for." He

[1] Procedant ipsæ picturæ calicum vestrorum, si vel in illis perlucebit interpretatio pecudis, etc. Cap. vii.

means, that the murmuring of the Pharisees because Christ received publicans and sinners, gave occasion for those words of Christ, Such a reference would have been quite foreign to the occasion, if Christ had alluded on this occasion to the sins of Christians, since these formed no part of the topic of discourse, and as yet it might be said that there were no Christians. It is therefore evident, that in this parable those sinners who first received the Gospel, and of whom Christ rejected none, were intended; and that it could only refer to sins committed before baptism. But, correct as Tertullian was in the immediate exegetical reference of this parable, as well as in the hermeneutical canon which he here makes use of, yet he ought not to have forgotten the rule laid down by him elsewhere, that the immediate historical reference of the words does not exclude a general application to all times, and a variety of cases. His opponents might concede all that he maintained, and yet could assert the propriety of making such an application. They could say with justice, that this parable was available for all times, and applicable to all cases, for the purpose of showing the disposition with which Christ always meets every sinner who wishes to be carried by him, and surrenders himself with a penitent heart. The same remark applies to the use that his opponents made of the parable of the prodigal son, and of others of the same kind: the controversy might in all cases have been easily settled by distinguishing between the literal meaning and the ideal spiritual reference—between the exposition and the application.

His opponents appealed, moreover, to the passage in 1 Cor. v. 6, compared with 2 Cor. ii. 6, and maintained that Paul had granted forgiveness of sins and readmission to church communion to the person who had been excommunicated on account of a *peccatum mortale*, when he gave signs of repentance; and on the supposition of the identity of the two cases, the evidence they adduced was certainly striking. But Tertullian disputed that supposition. He acutely pointed out—a view which has found advocates in recent times—that the case mentioned in the second epistle was probably quite distinct from that in the first epistle. The case mentioned in the second epistle was that of an insolent person who had set himself up against the authority of Paul, of whom notice had been already taken in the first epistle. But there is nothing whatever said which refers to the case of the *incestuosus*.

The controversy is then carried on to the First Epistle of John. His opponents appealed to that passage in this epistle in which it is said of those who confess their sins, that the blood of Christ cleanses from all sin. They understand this of the continued appropriation of the forgiveness of sins through Christ. Certainly, an erroneous and too indefinite a use might be made of this passage, to the injury of practical Christianity. It might be justly maintained that these words in the sense of the apostle could not be referred to those sins which are irreconcilable with abiding in the Christian principle of life—those sins to which the present dispute related. Tertullian guarded himself with Christian zeal against such an abuse of the passage, and says, "We shall always and in every way commit sin, if the blood of Christ cleanses us always, and from all sin; or, if not always, not even after believing, and if not from sin, not even from *fornicatio*." But from what point did he set out? He had before said that God is light, and that in him is no darkness, and that we lie if we say we have communion with him, and walk in darkness. "But if we walk," he says, "in the light, we have fellowship with him, and the blood of Jesus Christ our Lord cleanseth us from all sin." Do we sin, therefore, if we walk in the light? and are we cleansed if we sin in the light? By no means; for he who sins is not in the light, but in darkness. Hence he shows how we shall be cleansed from sin, walking in the light, in which sin cannot be committed. "Therefore," he says, "we are so cleansed not that we may sin, but that we may not sin. For, walking in the light, and not having fellowship with darkness, we shall be cleansed, not laying aside sin, but not committing it. For this is the power of the blood of the Lord, that those whom he has purified from sin, and placed in the light, he preserves pure, if they persevere to walk in the light."

Tertullian here speaks in the consciousness of the close connexion between the objective and the subjective in redemption,—the consciousness that the appropriation of redemption in faith, and communion with Christ, cannot exist without progressive sanctification; and hence he combats those persons who thought that what is said by John respecting the forgiveness of sins could apply to the class of sins to which this treatise refers. But when his opponents appealed to those passages in the epistle of John in which he speaks of a continued confession of sins by Christians, Ter-

tullian replies, that John would contradict himself, when in one passage he says that whoever is born of God sinneth not, and on the other hand requires of believers that they should always confess their sins, unless the different kinds of sins are distinguished from one another. By this distinction alone can such a contradiction be avoided. Here he makes the distinction between the *peccata venialia* and the *peccata mortalia*. Of the sins that still cleave to believers he says, that there are some sins into which men daily fall, to which we are all subject.[1] "For to whom does it not happen, either to be angry unjustly, and later than the setting of the sun; or to raise the hand against some one, or hastily to speak evil of another, or to swear rashly, or to break a promise, or to lie, either from shame or the pressure of circumstances? How much are we tempted in business, in the fulfilment of duties, in trade, in daily life, in seeing or in hearing! So that if there were no pardon for such offences, no one would obtain salvation. For these, therefore, there will be pardon through Christ the intercessor with the Father." From these sins he distinguishes those which are absolutely destructive of the foundation of the Christian life,—among which he names, murder, idolatry, fraud, denial of the faith, blasphemy, adultery, and incontinence. With the above-named catalogue of *peccata venialia* we can compare another passage where Tertullian mentions those errors on account of which a person would be excluded from church communion for a time, without being for ever separated from it. "If a man has been present at the shows or gladiatorial games, if he has partaken of food at heathen feasts, or engaged in a trade connected with the service of idols, or has uttered expressions of denial or blasphemy,—if on such an account he has been put out of the flock, or has perchance separated himself from church communion by anger, pride, or emulation, or, as often happens, by resenting the administration of discipline, such a one ought to be sought for and brought back." Tertullian, who, as we have seen, explains the lost sheep according to the exegetical connexion as meaning a person who has not hitherto believed, makes the distinction between the primary exposition and the application, since he declares that it may also be referred to the cure of erring Christians.

If we compare what Tertullian says on that distinction of

[1] Cap. xix.

sins, with the meaning of the passage in John's epistle, we shall not find it altogether correct as exposition. When John says, that "whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin," (iii. 9,) he certainly had in his mind no such distinction of degrees; and doubtless, what Tertullian describes as *peccata quotidianæ incursionis*, would not have corresponded to what John terms (according to the idea) as being *born of God*. The apparent contradiction in John can only be removed by distinguishing what is founded in the principle and idea, from the life in its practical manifestation, which falls far short of the idea and the principle. Only when we apply this distinction, and separate what may be mingled as fluctuating and disturbing the Christian life in its actual manifestation, from that which is irreconcilable with the universal animation by the idea, and the general predominance of the principle, can we establish the propriety of a distinction allied to that of Tertullian. Yet we must always say that he has laid down this distinction in far too external and arbitrary a manner, that he has kept particulars too much in view, instead of observing the general relations of the Christian life. But this was a defect of that age of the church to which he belonged.

As to the second point which was discussed in this controversy,—the question whether *mœchia* and *fornicatio* come under the category of *peccata mortalia*,—Tertullian had reason for exposing the arbitrariness of the moral judgment, which attributed a heavier guilt to the denial of the faith wrung from persons by tortures, than to the sin of those who yielded to the allurements of sensual desires. When he wishes to point out the heavy guilt attached to sins of unchastity, he speaks in strong terms of the superiority of Christianity in relation to the Old Testament stand-point. "What excuse canst thou have by appealing to ancient times? When indulgence was allowed to adultery, they were not then called 'the body of Christ,' 'members of Christ,' or 'the temple of God."[1]

As Tertullian maintained that there was a connected progressive development of the religious consciousness from the Old Testament, through the preaching of the apostles down to the new revelations of the Paraclete, it was his opinion that those persons who denied the last, were incapable of rightly understanding the Holy Spirit in the apostles. He

[1] Cap. vi.

says, "Those who received another Paraclete in the apostles and by the apostles, whom they have not acknowledged in the later prophets, do not possess him even in the apostles."[1]

Although Tertullian expresses himself so strongly[2] on the peculiar nature of the Christian stand-point in relation to that of the Old Testament,—on the contrast between the moral law as developed by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, and the special theocratic law of the Mosaic stand-point; yet we find in this treatise an obscurity, which we have already alluded to, in the application of his conception of the law. He thus understands the saying of Christ, that he came not to destroy, but to fulfil the law: "The burdens of the law were until John, but not the remedies, (that is, they were after John;) the yoke of works was thrown off, not of moral prescriptions: freedom in Christ serves not to the injury of purity of morals.[3] There remains the whole law of piety, of holiness, of humanity, of truthfulness, of chastity, of justice, of mercy, of benevolence, of modesty."[4] Tertullian here expresses himself as if the *lex operum* related only to the ceremonial law, and the abolition of the law only to that; as if the moral law had not entered into a new relation to believers; as if, in this respect, the conception of the law had not undergone a revolution.

Tertullian's assertion is worthy of notice, that Christ's manner in reference to the forgiveness of sins during his ministry on earth, was not applicable to the point under discussion; for the Christian stand-point did not begin till after Christ had effected everything for the salvation of men, and the effusion of the Holy Spirit. "No one was perfect before the method discovered by faith; no one was a Christian before Christ was taken up to heaven; no one was holy before the Holy Spirit sent down from heaven had established the method of the Christian life."[5]

Tertullian believed that it was his duty to come forward as the champion of the Montanist ascetic severity, as he had already shown himself in relation to the subject of matrimony.[6] He wished to do this in reference to the recent

[1] Cap. xi. [2] Cap. vi.

[3] "Onera enim legis usque ad Joannem, non remedia; operum juga rejecta sunt, non disciplinarum; libertas in Christo non fecit innocentiæ injuriam."

[4] Cap. vi. [5] Cap. xi.

[6] He alludes to his work *De Monogamia* in the following words: De modo quidem nubendi jam edimus monogamiæ defensionem."

institution of fasts. On this account he wrote his treatise *De Jejuniis adversus Psychicos.* The Montanists wished to lay down as law many things which hitherto had been considered as open, and to introduce several institutions that were quite novel. The new prophets wished to fix, by an express law, the fasts on the *dies stationum*, which hitherto had been quite voluntary, and to extend these fasts longer than to the ninth hour, or three P.M., which hitherto had been usual; and they fixed on two weeks in the year for the meagre diet which had before been adopted only by the ascetics called the *Xerophagiæ.* At this period, however, the genuine apostolic spirit of Christian freedom opposed itself to the new arrangements of Montanism, as we learn from the arguments of his adversaries that were combated by Tertullian. It was the same spirit which afterwards was obliged to give way to the preponderance of the Jewish legal tendency that was allied to Montanism and formed its basis, but which at the Reformation came forth in victorious counteraction. His opponents maintained that the fasts ought to be left to every one's voluntary choice, and not be prescribed by an authoritative regulation; that they necessarily depended on individual necessities and circumstances. The apostles had prescribed no general law relative to fasts; and the observance of the *dies stationum* ought to be left free. They appealed to the fact that Paul, in his epistle to the Galatians, speaks of the observance of certain days as a relic of Judaism. Isaiah had declared that the Lord required not such fasts, but works of righteousness; and the Lord himself had at once put an end to all scruples in reference to meats, by the words, "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man, but that which goeth out of the mouth, this defileth a man," Matt. xv. 11, which he confirmed by his own practice. They recognised in the life of Christ the type of Christian liberty, the opposite of all legal asceticism. They appealed to the fact that he ate and drank freely of all things, and by those who occupied an ascetic legal stand-point was called a gluttonous man and a winebibber. They also availed themselves of Paul's words, "But meat commendeth us not to God; for neither if we eat are we the better, neither if we eat not are we the worse." 1 Cor. viii. 8. We must only, they said, believe with all our heart, and love God and our neighbour. All depends on this, not on fasting. They regarded the new fasts as somewhat

Jewish, and even as partaking of heathenism. They classed the Xerophagiæ with the abstinence practised in the heathen worship, as in that of Isis and Cybele. They justly charged the advocates of these fasts with a descent from the pure moral stand-point, and with a leaning to what was Jewish and heathenish. Yet they were not perfectly true to their own principles, and could not altogether keep clear of the influence of the Jewish element and an undue regard to externals in religion, since they still recognised *one* general fast as founded on divine authority, and necessary for all; contrary to the Pauline principle of the observance of days, they regarded this as occupying the place of the Old Testament fast-days—namely, the period for commemorating the sufferings of Christ. They appealed on its behalf to the misunderstood passage in Matt. xi. 13, as if Christ spoke of such a fast in reference to his own sufferings.[1] In their controversy with Montanism these words were frequently on their lips, "The law and the prophets were until John," Luke xvi. 16.[2] Thus they referred to the difference between the Old and New Testament stand-points, and accused the Montanists of confounding them in a two-fold manner, in respect of the law and the prophets, as far as they wished to introduce what belonged to the legal stand-point which had been taken away by Christ, and as far as they wished to establish an order of prophets after the manner of the Old Testament, on whom the guidance of the church was to depend, and attached special importance to the prophetic gift as requisite for the continued development of the church;—since with John the whole prophetic order had ceased, and since in Christ all things were fulfilled, a succession of prophets was no longer required. But Tertullian might be right in the charge he brought against them, that when it suited them they acknowledged what these words ("The law and the prophets were until John")[3] signified. No doubt, he meant that his opponents here argued inconsequentially, since they reproached the Montanists with confounding the Old and New Testament

[1] Cap. i. "Certe in evangelio illos dies jejuniis determinatos putant, in quibus ablatus est sponsus, et hos esse jam solos legitimos jejuniorum christianorum, abditis legalibus et propheticis vetustatibus."

[2] Cap. ii.

[3] Cap. ii. "Ubi volunt enim, agnoscunt quid sápiat; lex et prophetæ usque ad Joannem."

stand-points, and yet, on the other hand, fell into the same error, and, when it suited their purpose, forsook the New Testament, and went over to the Old. They blamed the Montanists for innovations which contradicted the traditions of the church. The Montanists were charged with framing arbitrary, heretical ordinances, and compared to those erroneous teachers whom Paul opposed in his Pastoral Epistles, the teachers of a false abstinence; or if they appealed to the new revelations from which they had received these new doctrines, it was asserted that these revelations were not those of the Holy Spirit, but of the Evil Spirit falsifying the truth; these prophets were false prophets—organs of Satan. As to the latter point,[1] Tertullian replied, that Montanism announced the same God and the same Christ, embraced the universally received fundamental doctrine of God and Christ, and agreed in all things with the rule of orthodoxy.[2] And in another passage, he says, "Thou sayest, O Psychic, that it is the spirit of the Devil; and how should such an one enjoin services for our God, which are offered to no other being than our God? Either maintain that Satan makes common cause with our God, or that Satan is to be regarded as the Paraclete." The unsatisfactoriness of this vindication may be easily perceived from what we have already remarked. The Montanist ethics might be joined to the generally received Christian doctrines, and yet be at variance with them in their fundamental principles; the Montanist asceticism, for example, by no means harmonized with the right application of the idea of Christ, and the correctly developed consciousness of Redemption. And the spirit of Satan could, indeed, mingle with, and bedarken what proceeded from the Spirit of God, as is sufficiently indicated by what Tertullian himself says of Satan's being (*Affen Gottes*) a mimic of the Almighty. The view of the relation of the new revelations of the Paraclete to tradition, Holy Scripture, and *Ratio*, as Tertullian expresses it in this book, is remarkable. When tradition cannot appeal to the authority of Scripture, it stands in greater need of "*Ratio*" for its confirmation, that the ground of such an institution, as it is handed down by ecclesiastical tradition,

[1] Cap. ii. "Novitatem igitur objectant, de cujus illicito præsciebant, aut hæresim judicandam, si humana præsumptio est aut pseudoprophetiam pronuntiandam, si spiritalis indictio est dum quaqua ex parte anathema audiamus, qui aliter adnuntiamus."

[2] Cap. i.

may be demonstrated to that rational principle which requires a satisfactory account of everything, until the authority of the new revelations of the Paraclete is added, and the established practice is either confirmed or improved by the divine authority. The "*Ratio*" is, therefore, only something intermediate in the guidance of the church, until what has been hitherto fluctuating is established by the authority of divine revelation. Tertullian ascribes to the new revelations of the Paraclete an authority equal to that of the declarations of Holy Writ.[1] It is evident from what he says, that the appearance of the new prophets was psychologically founded in the state of feeling among Christians occasioned by the events of the times. It was the period of the persecutions under the emperor Marcus Aurelius, of various widespread calamities, such as earthquakes and pestilences, which were regarded as omens of the final tribulation and conflict of the church which would precede the second advent of Christ. It was requisite that the church should be prepared by the new admonitions and warnings of the Paraclete to meet that decisive event in a suitable manner. It was the duty of Christians by self-denial, renunciation of the world, and conquest over the flesh, to prepare themselves—by a life of self-mortification, corresponding to repentance, to second their prayers to God for deliverance, and thus to seek to turn away his wrath in the day of visitation; as Tertullian says, "Since the Holy Spirit, in whatever lands, and by whatever men he wills, has announced, so he has ordained, since he saw beforehand the impending trials of the church, or the general calamities of the world, that as Paraclete (that is, as Advocate, in order to reconcile the Judge by prayer) he will employ such events as means for the exercise of sobriety and abstinence." And in another passage he says, that without those extraordinary revelations, Christians, by observing the state of the persecuted church, might learn the necessity of such a strict mode of living. "If," he says, "our opponents are really right in asserting that since the days of John the Baptist no new prophetic voice was to be expected, yet we ought to be prophets to ourselves in this respect. I do not say for the purpose of appeasing the wrath of God, nor to win his protection or his favour, but that we may fortify ourselves

[1] Cap. x. "Sed quia eorum, quæ ex traditione observantur, tanto magis dignam rationem afferre debemus, quanto carent scripturæ auctoritate, donec aliquo cœlesti charismate aut confirmentur aut corrigantur."

against the circumstances of the last times, that we may practise every kind of lowliness of mind, if any one has to train himself for prison, or to endure hunger and thirst, or to accustom himself to deprivations and meagre fare; that the Christian may enter into prison such as he would wish to come out of it; that he may undergo no punishment there, but only a discipline; that he may find there not the tortures of the world, but his own duties; then he will proceed more confidently from imprisonment to victory, having nothing of the flesh, so that the engines of torture will have no materials to work upon." This passage is peculiarly characteristic of the one-sidedness of Tertullian's ethical stand-point, in its connexion with his peculiar disposition, which was determined by the circumstances of the age. He sees in Christians only combatants with incessant persecutions; the whole of life was only a training for the last conflict, a training for death which met the Christian under these persecutions. It was needful voluntarily to impose that on himself which would ultimately be imposed on him by a power from without. Such views would naturally create a sad and gloomy image of the Christian life. That mode of contemplating the Christian life which is not dependent on temporary circumstances, but founded in the very nature of Christianity, could not make its way as a world-transforming principle along with this one-sidedness. It is also evident that the childlike relation to a reconciled God, founded in the consciousness of redemption, must yield to the consciousness of the divine wrath in judgment, which men sought to propitiate by self-torture. This sentiment is expressed, or rather caricatured, by Tertullian when he says, "I must not only comply with God's will, but flatter him." That is, in his opinion, do more than he has commanded me by voluntarily imposing such chastisement on myself. Here we have the false representation which results from the separation of the negative and positive elements, the appropriation of the world, and the conquest over the world in the service of God; as if over and above the service of God in the observance of his *præcepta*, there was still a perfection, consisting in the voluntary performance of certain proofs of self-denial. But from his own stand-point he sees in his opponents only the predominance of the carnal mind, which made them unreceptive of the divine, unreceptive equally of the new revelations, and of progress in overcoming carnality. It appeared to him perfectly consequential, when they set

limits on all sides to the agency of the Divine Spirit, both in reference to the new revelations of the prophets, and to the progressive development of the moral element. "But again," he says, "ye place boundary-stakes about God both in reference to his grace and to the discipline of life; both as to spiritual graces, and to religious solemnities, so that the performance of duties has ceased, and the reception of his benefits, and ye deny that he still imposes services, because the law and the prophets were until John." And in another passage Tertullian wishes to prove, that among the Psychics all is of a piece; their rejection of fasts perfectly agrees with the whole of their mental tendency—they do not accuse sin (that is, their judgment is so lax respecting sins of unchastity), and, therefore, they do not require fasts to atone for them; they do not long for the knowledge of revelation, for which they ought to endeavour to prepare themselves by means of the xerophagiæ; and they do not fear peculiar conflicts, which they ought to avert by the *stationes*. Tertullian was desirous of convincing his opponents, that in attacking the ascetic severity of the Montanists, they declined into still greater laxity of morals. This gave him occasion to expose many of the shades of the Christian life in those times. We admit that we cannot regard the accusations of so vehement a disputant as unquestionable evidence; yet, as we elsewhere observe one extreme called into action by another—an erroneous contempt of the world by an erroneous secularization of Christianity—so it might have happened in the present instance. It may be imagined that if one party erred in an undiscriminating abandonment of the world, the other would err in a too accommodating, self-indulgent conformity of Christianity to the world. It is, indeed, probable that, though Tertullian, from his ascetic stand-point, would be in danger of falling into one-sided exaggerations in his account of the practical aberrations of the other party,—though he might withhold the lights and bring forward the shadows,—yet not everything which he states with so much distinctness could be a fabrication, but must have at least a basis of truth.

In his Apology he had presented the Agapæ of the Christians in a very favourable light; likewise, in his treatise *Ad Uxorem*, he had made honourable mention of these feasts; but now, regarding them with an ascetic spirit, he finds them quite unworthy of the name. In a sarcastic tone, he alludes to the revelry indulged in at these meetings, and the licen-

tious conduct between the sexes that accompanied them.[1] Whether there was any foundation for these charges, and to what extent, the data are wanting for us to judge; but, at all events, from comparing Tertullian's language at an earlier and a later period, it is evident that his judgment, taken in its whole extent, was unjust: yet he could with propriety mark it as a disreputable custom that the clergy were distinguished by a double portion, a custom in behalf of which it was usual to adduce 1 Tim. v. 17.[2] We observe the same inconsistency in Tertullian at two different periods of his life, in the manner of his speaking in this treatise of the emulation of the Christians in their demonstrations of love towards the confessors in prison. In his pre-montanist writings, in his exhortation addressed to the martyrs, he was ready to acknowledge the Christian love and the concern for the bodily relief of the sufferers that was shown by their brethren; but in the present treatise, he regards it in quite a different light. The unfairness of a rugged ascetic tendency cannot be concealed; although it might be that he found cause for just censure when Christians suffered themselves too readily to be fascinated by those who professed to suffer for the cause of the Gospel; when by the manner in which they treated them, and made them presents, they led to the practice of much deception; when they cared for the bodily comfort of the prisoners in such a way as was not suited to prepare them for the last conflict, but might probably injure the souls of many. He says, "It is plainly your employment to provide eating-houses for uncertain martyrs in the prisons, that they may not miss their wonted way of living, that life may not be wearisome, that they may not take offence in the new school of abstinence which *your* Pristinus (no *Christian* martyr) never attempted." This is a passage which suggests many inquiries and remarks. Tertullian speaks of "uncertain martyrs" (*martyribus incertis*). He therefore implies that it was doubtful whether they were really Christian martyrs, or whether they were not imprisoned on some other account, and only pretended that they were suffering for the cause of the Gospel in order to take advantage of the love and benevolence of Christians. What we are

[1] Cap. xvii. "Apud te agapé in cacabis fervet; fides in culinis calet spes in ferculis jacet. Sed majoris est agape, quia per hunc adolescentes tui cum sororibus dormiunt; appendices scilicet gulæ lascivia atque luxuria est."

[2] What Tertullian says is confirmed by the Apostolic Constitutions, lib. ii. cap. 8.

told in the Peregrinus Proteus of Lucian serves to confirm this view; for though this history is a fiction, yet it must be founded on an image drawn from the life. By the manner of designating Pristinus, Tertullian evidently makes a contrast between the *vester* and the *christianus* martyr. Hence it appears, that although by the opposite party he was regarded as a martyr, Tertullian believed that he ought not to be acknowledged as a Christian martyr. Not that we are to understand by this, that this person merely pretended to be a Christian in order that he might be maintained and cherished by the Christians—for he would hardly have endured from this motive to expose himself to torture; but Tertullian so designated him, because he could not discover the Christian disposition in him, and supposed that he had not faithfully confessed Christianity, but had appeared in a state of intoxication before the tribunal, and enervated by previous excesses, would soon be put to the torture. When Tertullian makes it so heavy an accusation that they had tried to fortify this man against the torture by *merum condîtum tanquam antidotum*, his ill-will is very apparent, and can only serve to throw suspicion on the credibility of his whole statement. Such medicated wine was usually given to condemned malefactors in order to deaden the feeling of the torture to which they were subjected. Yet, a person, as a genuine Christian, might feel himself compelled, after the example of his Saviour, to refuse such a means of producing insensibility, in order that, confiding in God's strength, he might drink the cup of suffering in full consciousness, and with undisturbed presence of mind.[1]

Tertullian, who certainly was aware that the essence of genuine Christianity consists in all-pervading love, objected to the opposite party that they made the appeal to love only as a pretence, in order to avoid the privations required of them. He says, "And we know what are the recommendations for carnal conveniences, how easy it is to say, 'I must believe with all my heart, love God and my neighbour as myself; for on these two commands hang all the law and the

[1] Such medicated wine was offered to Bishop Fructuosus of Tarragon in the Valerian persecution, and he took no offence at it, though he believed that he did not require this assistance, and would not break his fast on a Wednesday for it before the appointed time. "Cumque multi ex fraterna caritate iis offerrent, ut condite permixti poculum sumerent, ait; Nondum est hora solvendi jejunii. Agebatur enim hora diei quarta siquidem in carcere (Fructuosus and his two deacons) quarta feria stationes sollenniter celebraverant."

prophets, not in the emptiness of the lungs and intestines.'" Certainly, the appeal that everything depends on love is often made by those by whom its importance is least felt, in order to dispense with the means of grace and virtue, which they erroneously believe they can do without, and strive against the imposition of many a duty that is troublesome to them. But we have no reason to follow here the charges brought by Tertullian, and we may well recognise in these words the reaction of a free Christian spirit against the ascetic materializing of religion.

It is remarkable that Tertullian, who, as we have seen in many instances, was not deficient in correct hermeneutical principles, and a sound exegetical tact, when he was not hampered by a particular party bias, could here, where such a bias overruled his judgment, explain the passages of the New Testament which were brought against him in so forced a manner, in order to find what he wished in them. This is shown, for example, in his interpretation of Rom. xiv. 17, 20, which appeared to have been used by his opponents, not without reason, in favour of their views. He quotes the words of Paul in Rom. xiv. 20: "For meat destroy not the work of God." "What work of God?" he asks; and replies: "It is that of which he says, It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine." Thus, in defiance of the connexion, he could find exactly in these words a confirmation of the notion that such abstinence was a work of God. When, further, it was objected to him, that the kingdom of God was not meat and drink, nor in all those outward things, according to Rom. xiv. 17, and 1 Cor. viii. 8, he thus replies, "The kingdom of God is indeed not meat and drink, and meat commendeth us not to God, (thou canst not believe that this is said of meagre diet, but rather of rich and choice viands;) for when he adds, 'For neither if we eat are we the better, neither if we eat not are we the worse,' so this rather touches thee, who thinkest that thou hast some advantage if thou eatest, and that something is wanting to thee if thou eatest not, and on that account blamest these regulations." Tertullian would therefore find in these passages only this sentiment, that no worth should be attached to eating, as was done by his opponents, and so he would make use of them in recommendation of fasting. But this argument could only affect his opponents if they had made the mere non-observance of fasts a principal thing in religion. But, according to the sense and spirit of that passage, they only

combated the tendency which attributed to certain modes of abstinence such importance in relation to the kingdom of God. In the same way, he appealed erroneously to the passage in the sermon on the mount, in which Christ pronounces blessed those who hunger and thirst.[1]

When his opponents discovered in the introduction of new fast-days a Jewish observance of days and times,[2] Tertullian makes a reply from which we may learn how little he entered into the full meaning of those words, and of the contrast made by the apostle between the Jewish and Christian stand-points. It was his opinion that these words referred only to the observance of *Jewish* feasts, and not to such as were substituted for them, and in correspondence with the Christian stand-point. His view of the celebration of Sunday, which we have already noticed, is founded on a notion of this kind. He charged his opponents with inconsistency, when they still celebrated Christian festivals confined to certain times, as he says; "For if in Christ there is a new creation, there must also be new festivals; or if the apostle has abolished all religious celebration of times, of days, and months, and years, why should we celebrate the Paschal feast yearly in the first month? Why do we spend fifty days from that time in all joyfulness?" On this occasion, also, Tertullian objects to his opponents, that they felt no scruple in turning the Sabbath into a fast-day, which he, as a Montanist, considered lawful only for the Easter Sabbath. The importance which he attached to this difference forms one of the distinctive marks between the spirit of this book and that which we have noticed in the treatise *De Oratione*.

His opponents might have easily answered this objection by adverting to the distinction of the different sense in which the festivals were celebrated from the stand-point of Judaism and from that of Christianity; in reference to the celebration of the feasts, as well as in reference to the new Montanist fasts, they might have adhered to the stand-point of Christian freedom, which was confined to no particular times. Yet, otherwise, there was a correct conception of the relation of festivals to the Christian consciousness, when Tertullian in another passage says, in reference to the commemoration of the sufferings of Christ, "Although we should always commemorate the sufferings of Christ, without distinction of hours, yet we do so more impressively when the act is asso-

[1] Cap. xv. [2] Gal. iv. 10.

ciated with the name of *statio*. For even soldiers, who are never unmindful of their military oath, still obey it more strictly when they mount guard." The leading thought here is, that the consciousness of the redeeming sufferings of Christ must animate the whole of the Christian life, but that the *dies stationum* were instituted in order to give special prominence to an event that ought always to be present to the Christian consciousness. The error only lay in supposing that the exercises of devotion on the *dies stationum* were better suited to represent the consequences of the sufferings of Christ than what might take place in the whole course of Christian life.

Tertullian, in vindicating himself from the charge of arbitrary innovation, appeals to similar new institutions on the part of his opponents' solemn assemblies connected with fasts. Thus he says,—"But it is well that the bishops should be in the habit of enjoining fasts on all the people; I do not mean for the purpose of collecting alms,[1] according to your capacity of apprehension, but for some object of anxiety relating to the church." We here perceive the objection which Tertullian brings against his opponents, as if they could submit to those deprivations only for charitable purposes, but were unable to comprehend the spiritual meaning and importance of fasting. He concludes thus,—"Why, then, if you at the command of one man all join in such an act of humiliation (ταπεινοφρόνησιν) before God, do you blame us for a similar union in feasts and xerophagiæ and *stationes?* unless, perhaps, we offend against the decrees of the senate, and the imperial edicts which are opposed to private meetings." We notice here a sarcastic tone, in Tertullian's insinuation, that his opponents were too accommodating to the civil law, too timorous in their obedience. Further, then, he appeals to the holding of representative synods, which were opened with united prayer and fasting, in Achaia, where the ancient spirit of league had influenced the mode of managing ecclesiastical affairs. He himself had attended such assemblies, and had come forward to vindicate them when they were attacked, probably as innovations.

When the opponents of Montanist acts of abstinence compared them to those of the heathen, Tertullian was not careful to repel the charge; he admitted the analogy, and made

[1] The bishops were accustomed, when the necessities of the church were urgent, to appoint fast-days, on which what was saved by abstinence was to be employed for the relief of the poorer Christians.

use of it for his object. He even appealed to the heathen fasts and penitentiary processions, especially as they were practised in that part of Africa. He gives a striking description of them. "Even the heathen know every kind of self-humiliation; (omnem ταπεινοφρόνησιν.) When the heavens are torpid and the year is dried up, bare-footed processions are announced, the magistrates lay aside their purple, the fasces are reversed, they invoke, they prepare a victim. Moreover, in some colonies, according to an annual custom, they are veiled in sackcloth, and, sprinkled with ashes, importune their idols. The baths and taverns are closed to the ninth hour; one fire burns publicly on the altars, nor is water kept in the dishes."[1] While his opponents availed themselves of such comparisons, in order to charge the Montanists with addiction to heathen practices, Tertullian, on the contrary, sees in these very practices a caricature of the truth, which attains its right position in Christianity. This is the leading idea which we have already found in Tertullian, and which we have seen applied by him to the relation between the heretics and the catholics. Everywhere the original precedes the falsification. Error is a false imitation of truth; the misunderstood, falsely applied religious element is the groundwork of superstition; as he says in his own style, "The devil is a zealous imitator of divine things."[2] There is, indeed, in what Tertullian says, a great truth, according to which, in all earlier religious stand-points there is a foreboding of Christianity,—a consciousness of truth at the basis which leads to Christianity. But the question is, what is the truth that everywhere lies at the basis, and what is its caricature? What forms the point of connexion with Christianity, and what the point of opposition to it? In order to be fully competent to resolve these questions, a clear consciousness of the peculiar nature of Christianity is absolutely necessary. But that clear, and consequentially developed consciousness on the peculiar relation of Christianity to Judaism and heathenism was wanting to Tertullian, and hence he failed in the right application of that truth. Certainly in the usages of heathenism to which he appealed, there was a religious truth at the basis, a consciousness of disunion with God, the need of re-

[1] Cap. xvi.

[2] Cap. xvi. "Hinc divina constabat, quam diabolus divinorum æmulator imitatur. Ex veritate mendacium struitur, ex religione superstitio compingitur."

conciliation and redemption. But this feeling was not correctly understood. The need could not attain its full satisfaction: the nature of this need and its satisfaction were only to be found in Christianity. The consciousness of received redemption, and the child-like relation to God founded upon it, was necessary to remove all those circumstances and usages which proceeded from a feeling of disunion with God; and a beclouded, disturbed state of Christian consciousness might be traced in Montanism to its contact in some points with heathenism and Judaism. It is deserving of notice that Tertullian is disposed to find a ταπεινοφροσύνη even among the heathen. The use of this word in a religious sense peculiarly marks the contrast between the Christian and the ancient world; but where the feeling of disunion with God was strong in the heathen world, as was especially the case in the religious forms derived from the East, and in the last times of the declining ancient world—there those acts of self-renunciation were practised, which, nevertheless, as they were not connected with the consciousness of redemption, and proceeded from fear, not from love, were something totally different from what corresponds to the Christian idea of ταπεινοφρυσύνη. Here again we detect a fundamental error of Tertullian and of Montanism.

At this time a controversy arose, similar to that which is treated of in Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, *on the veiling of females*, especially in the public meetings of the church. All the churches, Greek and Roman, agreed in allowing married women to appear veiled in their assemblies. This was considered as necessary, in accordance with the rule laid down by the apostle Paul. It was thought that in those passages of the Epistle which contained an application of general principles of Christian prudence to certain temporal and local relations, directions might be found which would be available for all ages. There were, indeed, a variety of circumstances which would induce the apostle to communicate that advice. But a distinction in the custom existed in reference to virgins. In Greece, and some parts of the East, virgins as well as married women were allowed to be veiled in public; which probably arose from early heathen customs.[1] Some persons

[1] As appears from Tertullian's words, *De Virg. Veland.* cap. ii. "Per Græciam et quasdam barbarias ejus" (bordering districts into which Christianity had found entrance—allowing the reading to be correct—among tribes not belonging to the Roman Empire) "plures ecclesiæ vir-

maintained that the word γυνὴ in Paul's Epistle denoted the female sex in general; others, that it meant only married women. Virgins who had resolved not to marry were everywhere veiled; but in those countries they laid aside the veil in the Christian assemblies. Tertullian justly spoke against this practice, as flattering the vanity of the virgins by thus distinguishing them in public meetings, and as exposing them to dangerous temptations. "Do the virgins," he asked, "adorn the church, or does the church adorn the virgins, and commend them to God?" Hitherto, a difference of usage in this respect, as in many other outward things, had existed without disturbing Christian union. But now the Montanists, in consequence of the utterances of their prophets, required the virgins to be veiled, and on the other hand the Roman church wished the ancient usage handed down from the early Roman bishops to be regarded as an universal law.

Tertullian, who already in his book *De Oratione*, and afterwards in a Greek work, had handled this subject, composed a polemical discourse upon it in the Latin language. However unimportant in itself the subject might be which was here discussed, it gave Tertullian an opportunity of setting forth in connexion with it many important points of the Montanist system. He was, as we have already seen on several occasions, as a Montanist, an impugner of a one-sided traditional tendency in the church, which mechanically held fast to what had been once established. He did not satisfy himself with the authority of mere establishment; he would not be overruled by the authority of this or the other church which boasted of its ancient traditions; internal grounds weighed more with him than mere establishment. He required the *ratio* along with the tradition. And now the new revelations of the Paraclete came as a reinforcement, by which what was formerly doubtful was decided, and the church was carried on to a higher stage in its development. But here, as was evident from many indications, he had to combat with the arrogant claims of the Roman church. He alludes sarcastically to persons who appealed to the authority of their predecessors, the succession of the Roman bishops. When the Roman church advanced claims for special consideration as an *Ecclesia Apostolica*, he gave its advocates to understand that there were other *Ecclesiæ Apostolicæ*, who had even greater right to

gines suas abscondunt. Est et sub hoc cœlo institutum istud alicubi ne quis *gentilitati* Græcaicæ aut barbaricæ consuetudinem illam adscribat."

speak; as he says, "I have appealed to those churches, which were founded by the apostles themselves, or by apostolic men, and, I think, earlier than certain people;" which no doubt refers to the high antiquity claimed by the Roman church. Speaking against the appeal to tradition, he says that against the truth no other rule can make itself valid: no length of time, no authority of persons, no privilege of certain districts; and he intimates that there is no such thing as pure tradition; that, unconsciously, elements of falsehood will mingle with tradition, and thus, in course of time, falsehood will be strong enough to make head against truth itself. "Hence," he says, "a custom set on foot by ignorance or simplicity, in course of time acquires the force of habit, and thus maintains itself against the truth. But our Lord Jesus Christ calls himself the Truth, not Custom. And if Christ be always, and before all, equally is truth eternal and ancient. Let those persons consider this, to whom that is new which in itself is old. Not novelty, but truth, refutes heresies. Whatever contradicts truth is a heresy, even though it be an ancient custom." Here we find, if we develop the full meaning of this language, the principle that true tradition is that which proceeds from Christ: whatever springs not from that source is polluted; what comes forth as a novelty against an ancient error can justly defend itself by the inward might of truth against anything erroneous that in length of time has acquired the supremacy. The idea of heresy is here far too widely extended, if heresy and error are deemed identical; but yet this idea is brought within narrower limits, if we connect with it the antithesis including the reference to Christ, and that which, as we shall afterwards see, Tertullian distinguishes as the essence of the Gospel.

Tertullian thought that the new, as opposed to the old and established, was no mark of the heretical; but, according to his view, to designate the heretical as such, this mark must be added, that a doctrine made its appearance in opposition to the original fundamental truth warranted by the preaching of the apostles in all the churches. Now, in what does Tertullian place this foundation of the genuine apostolic tradition, from which no one may venture to swerve? He gives such a list of essential doctrines, not a system of definite ideas, but pure facts, the facts of the announcement of salvation which have Christ for their central point. "Belief in one God almighty, Creator of the world, and his Son Jesus Christ, born of the

Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, who rose again the third day, ascended to heaven, now sits at the right hand of the Father, will come to judge the living and the dead, by whom also is the resurrection of the dead." This he terms "the sole, immovable, and unalterable rule of faith."[1] All progressive development of Christianity must proceed on this foundation; but while this is firmly retained, still there must be a progressive development effected by the illumination of the Holy Spirit: there must be no standing still. "Only let this law of faith remain," he says, "and other things relating to discipline and Christian conduct will allow the novelty of correction, the grace of God continuing to work even to the end. For what would this be, if, while Satan works continually, and adds daily to the inventions of evil, the grace of God were to cease, or leave off to advance? On this account, the Lord has sent the Paraclete, that since human mediocrity cannot receive all things at once, it may, by little and little, be directed and led to perfection, by that substitute of the Lord, the Holy Spirit." And he appeals to Christ's promise of the future influences of the Paraclete, as being threefold, namely, the perfecting of the moral element, the unfolding the meaning of holy writ, and the purer knowledge of truth generally.[2] He acknowledges that the supernatural, as well as the natural, must follow the law of successive development. Here he appeals to the unity that pervades the works of God, the *one* law, as in the development of the natural creation, so in the new creation of which revelation is the instrument. "Nothing," he says, "is without its age: all things wait their time. 'There is a time for everything,' says Ecclesiastes. See how the creation itself by degrees advances to fruit. There is first the seed, and from the seed the shrub arises, and from the shrub ascends the tree; then the branches and leaves acquire strength, and the whole formation of the tree is completed; then the swelling of the bud, and the flower breaks forth from the bud, and from the flower the fruit opens; and this last is for some time rude and mis-shapen, but gradually growing according to its proper age, it acquires mellowness. Thus also it is with righteousness (for there is the same God of righteousness and of the creation): at first it was in the

[1] "Regula fidei sola immobilis et irreformabilis."

[2] "Quæ est ergo Paracleti administratio, nisi hæc, quod disciplina dirigitur, quod scripturæ revelantur, quod intellectus reformatur, quod ad meliora proficitur."

rudiments, nature fearing God; then through the law and the prophets it advanced to infancy; thence through the Gospel it grew up to youth; and now by the Paraclete it is arrived at maturity. For he alone is to be named and honoured as a master by Christ. For he does not speak from himself, but only what things are committed to him by Christ. He is the only forerunner, for he is the only one who comes after Christ." (Without doubt, Tertullian means to say, that the only appeal must lie to the preceding revelations of the Paraclete, whose office it is to carry on the development of Christian truth: that the only appeal is to the authority of this divine *antecessor*, and not to the authority of men as forerunners, such as the Roman bishops.) "They who have received him, prefer truth to custom. They who hear him who still prophesies, and not merely in ancient times, veil the virgins." In this last passage is contained an opposite view to those who maintained that with John the Baptist the series of prophets was closed.

From what has been said it appears that Tertullian had a right conception of perfectibility as a progressive development of Christianity. This progression was regarded by him as depending on the unchangeable peculiar nature of Christianity. Progressive development was not a development passing beyond the bounds of Christianity, but moving within them. His view was only erroneous in this respect, that what should have been regarded as something proceeding from the peculiar nature of Christianity was made to depend on the authority of an order of prophets who assumed the supreme guidance of the church. This was afterwards committed by the catholic church to the collective body of bishops, and thus the Montanist conception passed over to the catholic, which was specially developed by Vincentius Lerinensis. It is also deserving of notice, how the individual who has often been regarded as the representative of the most uncompromising supernaturalism, and who, by single overwrought expressions, justified the opinion, endeavoured, as we have seen, to bring the supernatural into unison with the natural, the kingdom of grace into harmony with the kingdom of nature. Thus he appeals to the harmony subsisting between holy writ, nature, and Christian discipline. "Scripture," he says, "founds the law, nature testifies to it, and discipline requires it."

As he found in an original consciousness of God the unconscious foreboding of Christianity, and a point of connexion for it,

so he thought in general, that what was deduced from the nature of man as the offspring of God,—what had transpired in its development previous to Christianity,—must point to Christianity, and stand in unison with it. "By virtue of the silent consciousness of nature, the divinity of the soul itself, without men being conscious of it, has brought this into the use of language, as also many other things which, according to Scripture, are to be done and said, as we shall be able to show elsewhere." Tertullian, who, as we have seen, when he vindicates customs or manners which in his opinion have a sound internal right, the *ratio* for themselves,—agree with the spirit of Montanism,—or were confirmed by an express oracle of the new prophets, makes the authority of tradition independent of holy writ, here rather opposes the authority of Scripture to tradition, to which an appeal was made. "Interpret thy Scriptures, which custom knows not, for had it known them, it would never have existed."

Chronological data lead us to place in the series of works which Tertullian composed when a Montanist, his treatise *De Pallio*, although it contains no internal marks of Montanist views, which is not surprising, since the subject of it is in no way connected with Montanist controversies: it is a vindication of the philosopher's mantle (τριβών, *pallium*), which was ridiculed by the people of Carthage as a foreign Greek fashion, accompanied by a satirical discourse against the extravagance, luxury, and corrupt morals of that degenerate capital. This mantle was the distinctive dress of heathen philosophers and ascetics. By means of this dress, when they appeared in public,[1] they attracted much attention, collected around them troops of those who were eager after knowledge or novelty, and were able, if it were not their aim to indulge in mere showy declamation, to disseminate on such occasions salutary lessons. Those persons among the heathen who were distinguished by this dress, continued to wear it after they became Christians; and Christians who were ascetics assumed it in order to attract the attention of the multitude, and to take advantage of it, that they might be able to present Christianity as the new philosophy derived from the barbarians of the East to the groups that gathered around them. We may compare this with the conduct of the Jesuits in the East

[1] Thus Justin Martyr tells us that when a person saw him in the philosopher's mantle, he saluted him with the words, φιλόσοφε χαίρε, and sought to converse with him on higher subjects. *Dial. c. Tryph. init.*

Indies, who represented themselves to be Saniahs from the West; which, if nothing else were added inconsistent with the truth, might in itself be a blameless external accommodation.

Tertullian represents the *pallium* as justifying itself in preference to the *toga*, the dress of people of business, against the charge of a life not generally useful, and saying, "I am wont at every corner of the street, or before every altar, to teach remedies for depraved manners, which may confer soundness on public affairs, both for cities and empires, more than thou canst effect." In reference also to the use which, as we have remarked, Christians were accustomed to make of the *pallium*, Tertullian closes his treatise with these words: "Thus the *Pallium* speaks. But I confer upon it fellowship with a divine institute and doctrine. Rejoice and exult, O Pallium! a better philosophy has now honoured thee, since thou hast begun to be worn by Christians."

It might be supposed that Tertullian composed this treatise shortly after his conversion to Christianity, and that he had put on the ascetic dress as a Christian. But against this supposition there is a chronological mark which obliges us to place the composition of this treatise in the time when Caracalla and his brother Geta had already received the dignity of Augusti from their father Septimius Severus, when the empire was in a peaceful state, before the breaking out of the war with the Britons, about A.D. 208. And it is certain that Tertullian had been converted to Christianity at least ten years before. The supposition also that he assumed the ascetic dress on his passing over to Montanism, has the chronology against it, since he appears as a Montanist in writings of an earlier date. The opinion of Salmasius that the clergy at that time wore a peculiar dress, and that this was the *pallium*, is destitute of any proof; and it is in nowise probable that Tertullian at his entrance into the clerical order, began to wear the *pallium*. It is most probable that he adopted the ascetic mode of living at some later period of life, induced by external or internal causes, perhaps by the death of his wife, since he was resolved never to marry again.[1]

[1] It must be recollected that the words *φιλόσοφος* and *ἀσκητὴς* were at that time synonymous, so that the dress of the philosophers was also the dress of the ascetics. See *Artemidor. Oneirocrit.* lib. iv. cap. 33, from which passage we may learn what belonged among the heathen to the life of an ascetic. *Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἔμελε δὲ αὐτῷ ὄντι ἀνδρὶ ἀσκητῇ οὔτε γάμου, οὔτε κοινωνίας, οὔτε πλούτου.*

PART III.

THE THIRD CLASS OF TERTULLIAN'S WRITINGS.

THE DOGMATIC AND DOGMATIC-POLEMICAL TREATISES.

SECTION I.

TREATISES OF THIS CLASS COMPOSED BEFORE TERTULLIAN BECAME A MONTANIST.

It seems most suitable to begin our review of this class of Tertullian's writings with that work in which, without entering into the substance of the controversy,—into the discussion of any particular doctrines with heretics,—his object is to prove that they were not justified in propounding any new doctrines, and thus to construct a formal argument against all heresies; this work, in accordance with juridical phraseology, he entitled *Præscriptio adversus Hæreticos*. Here the question arises whether decisive marks of Montanism or Anti-Montanism are to be found in this book, or at least such as will determine with some probability to which class it belongs. In the first place, it is evident from his own words, that he composed this work before his other writings in controversy with particular heretics or any particular teachers of heresy: for he says at the close of it,—"But now we have argued generally against all heresies, that they ought to be kept back by certain and just and necessary rules, from making use of the Scriptures in their disputes. As to the rest, if the grace of God favour us, we shall give a special answer to some of them."[1] Certainly, these words cannot apply to the short notices respecting heresies that follow in some manuscripts, but only to all his

[1] Cap. xlv. "Sed nunc quidem generaliter actum est nobis adversus hæreses omnes certis et justis et necessariis præscriptionibus repellendas a collatione scripturarum. De reliquo, si Dei gratia adnuerit, etiam specialiter quibusdam respondebimus."

writings against them; but the misunderstanding of these words gave rise to the opinion, that something was wanting here, which was supported by that unsuitable piece added by some foreign hand, which by internal evidence disowns Tertullian's authorship. As that appears so clearly, the objection made by some, and lately by Von Cölln,[1] amounts to nothing, that Tertullian in some of those polemical writings speaks of this book as if he had then first resolved to compose such a work at some future time;[2] when he says, for instance, in one of these writings, that another book would accomplish the task of refuting the heretics on the ground of their novelty. As Tertullian personifies such a book,—introduces it as acting,—he might also speak thus of a writing already composed, whether by a foreign hand or his own; especially, if Tertullian in that passage refers to this as a reason why he entered on the actual discussion of particular heresies,—that he wished not to expose himself to the suspicion of distrusting his own cause, by always having recourse to that formal incompetence of heretics to make use of Scripture, and therefore intimates that he had already written a book, which might clear him from such an imputation. But indeed, though it is clear that he composed this work before his other dogmatic-polemical writings, it does not appear from that, that this was written before he embraced Montanism; for it would be possible that all his writings of this class without exception were subsequent to that event. It is conceivable, that at an earlier period he had employed his pen only on subjects of apologetic and practical importance, and that Montanism had awakened in him a more dogmatic and polemic tendency. The *Prescription* itself might have been used by the Montanists, and contains in itself no mark whatever of being non-montanist; for, as we have seen, Montanism wished to ally itself to apostolic tradition, and to the rule of faith unanimously adopted in all the churches. It was only on this foundation that he maintained a progressive development of Christian knowledge and of Christian life, as we have proved. Tertullian in this book allows free inquiry as long as it is

[1] In his review of the first edition of this monograph.

[2] *Contr. Marc.* lib. i. cap. 1. "Sed alius libellus hunc gradum sustinebit adversus hæreticos etiam sine retractatu doctrinarum revincendos, quod hoc sint præscriptione novitatis. Nunc quatenus admittenda congressio est, in tardum ne compendium præscriptionis ubique advocatum diffidentiæ deputetur, regulam adversarii prius prætexam, ne cui lateat, in qua principalis quæstio dimicatura est."

kept within the limits of universal dogmatic tradition. Only, such an investigation must be confined to a subject which will leave the rule of faith uninjured.[1] And in another place he says,—"As long as its form remains in its proper order, thou mayst seek as much as thou pleasest, and discuss and give full scope to thy curiosity, if anything appears to thee to hang in doubt, or to be involved in obscurity."[2]

Though in the application and carrying out of such a prescription against heretics, we can find nothing that in itself is at variance with the character of Montanism,—though it is evident that Tertullian as a Montanist could feel no scruple in making use of such a prescription,—yet in the manner of discussing it in this book, we must recognise many things that bear evidence of a non-Montanist spirit. When Tertullian spoke of what might be doubtful and disputable, when he asserted that by merely expounding the Scriptures the heretics could not be mastered, who made everything doubtful,—a person so filled with the Montanist spirit and Montanist ideas, must have been strongly predisposed to appeal to the new oracles of the new prophets, by which so many things hitherto doubtful would be decided, and so many uncertain things be converted into certainties. It can hardly be imagined that he could be very far from making such an appeal. And although in this treatise it was only his business to maintain the standpoint which he and the Montanists occupied in common with the church against the heretics, namely, opposing their pretensions by the universally acknowledged authority of apostolic tradition, yet it is not psychologically probable that he could have refrained from making at least some allusion to the new revelations which were so important to him in every respect. He says that if any one should meet with something uncertain and obscure, of which he desires a solution, he ought to apply to the learned among his Christian brethren;[3] but no trace can be found of any mention of the new prophets, such as a Montanist must have felt himself compelled to make. And yet it belonged, according to

[1] Cap. xii. "Quæramus ergo in nostro et a nostris et de nostro, idque duntaxat, quod salvâ regula fidei pofest in quæstionem devenire."

[2] Cap. xiv. "Ceterum manente firma ejus in suo ordine, quantum libet quæras et tractes et omnem libidinem curiositatis effundas, si quid tibi videtur vel ambiguitate pendere vel obscuritate obumbrari."

[3] Cap. xiv. "Est utique frater aliquis doctor gratia scientiæ donatus, est aliquis inter exercitatos conversatus, aliquid tecum, curiosius tamen quærens," &c.

Tertullian's opinion, to the office of the Paraclete in the new order of prophets, to cast light on the meaning of holy writ. Still more strongly must a Montanist have been induced to make such a reference, when the subject under consideration is the promise that the Paraclete should lead into all truth, and reveal what the men of that age could not yet apprehend. Certainly Tertullian might as a Montanist, in controversy with the Gnostics, who accused the apostles of ignorance and error on many points, have adverted to the distinction between the earlier stand-point of the apostles when unenlightened, and their later stand-point when enlightened by the Holy Spirit, and to the promise made to them of the Paraclete;—for, as we have already seen, it was not denied from the stand-point of Montanism, that that promise referred in a certain sense to the apostles, and was fulfilled to them, although in a wider sense it was applied to the new era of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the new prophets. But Tertullian as a Montanist would hardly have so expressed himself on this occasion, as to take no account of that further application of the promise which was so important to him, and which would have aided the accusations of the opponents of Montanism, who were unwilling to admit the further application of that promise. On this account we are desirous of looking more closely at these passages in Tertullian. He says against the Gnostics, who appealed to Christ's words, "Seek, and ye shall find," to show that Christ himself required seeking and inquiring, that it must have been very different when Christ spoke these words to the apostles, who at that time had not yet partaken of the illumination of the Holy Spirit by which they would know all things, from the present state, when the apostles might be regarded as teachers who had been made acquainted with all things through the illumination of the Holy Spirit. "At last he commanded that they should go to teach and baptize the nations, since they were about to receive the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, who should lead them into all truth. . . . . But if the apostles, who were destined to be teachers, were themselves to obtain a teacher in the Paraclete, much more will the direction, "Seek, and ye shall find," be inapplicable to us, to whom the doctrine was to come directly through the apostles, as it did to the apostles through the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Tertullian, in this passage, makes use of the rule, which he applies, according to his varied polemical bias, sometimes on one side, and sometimes

on the other, that what was primarily said by our Lord in reference to the apostles, must admit of universal application to Christians generally in all ages; but the manner in which he here expresses it, shows very plainly that at this time he had no intention of making a special application of this promise to the new revelations of the Paraclete.

"Indeed," he says, "all the words of the Lord which have come down to us through the hearing of the Jews, are set forth for all; but most of them being directed to particular persons, do not possess for us the property of an exhortation, but are an example."[1] It is evident that Tertullian, since he felt himself compelled to mention the possible general application of these words, could so much the less have omitted to represent the special value which these words must possess from the stand-point of the Montanists in reference to the new revelations. He would in this way, as happens here, have, in fact, expressly contradicted his own Montanist principles. Moreover, in contradiction to Montanism, he refers expressly to the apostles the words of Christ, that he had still many things to say which the men of his age[2] could not apprehend. Also, we might here mention two other things as marks of non-Montanism, though without attaching any great importance to them. Tertullian expresses himself in one passage[3] as if Peter was called the Rock on which the church is built, and the power to bind and loose was given him by Christ; but as a Montanist, he disputed, as we have seen, the application of these words to the apostle Peter and Roman bishops as his successors. He maintained that these words referred to Peter only as a man specially enlightened by the Holy Spirit, and to all *spirituales homines* equally with him. Nevertheless, by what Tertullian here says, such a general reference of these words is not excluded. Then, too, we may here notice the manner in which he regards the Roman church and the Roman bishops, by which we recognise in him a man reverencing the Roman church as the *ecclesia apostolica* for the West, and still maintaining a friendly relation to the Roman bishops. We know, indeed, that as a Montanist he was involved in a violent schism with the Roman church, yet we would not confidently pronounce this to be evidence of the non-Montanism of this treatise; for although as a Montanist he was in many respects an opponent of the Roman bishops and resisted their pretensions, yet he might

[1] Cap. viii. [2] Cap. xxii. [3] Ibid.

forget all this when engaged in conflict with their common enemies.

But for the later post-montanist origin of this work, what occurs in it in reference to Hermogenes has been adduced; for Tertullian, as a Montanist, violently attacked him, and, as we see, many things which he says against him are connected with his own Montanism. In the *regula fidei*, which Tertullian quotes, one of the recensions of the essentially apostolic doctrine which form the basis of the so-called Apostles' Creed, in the doctrine of the creation of the universe from nothing, a reference has been supposed to Hermogenes as the impugner of this doctrine. But we are of opinion that such a reference cannot with any certainty be proved to have been intended; for as in the whole contest opposition to the Gnostics is treated of, and this opposition is a leading topic throughout the work, everything said by Tertullian in it is fully accounted for. But certainly in two passages there is an express reference to Hermogenes, yet we cannot consider the fact that Tertullian appears in this treatise as an opponent of Hermogenes, as a proof that it was not written till after Tertullian had embraced Montanism; for as we must have already noticed in many instances, that tendencies and ideas which Tertullian had adopted before that event were taken along with him into Montanism; so before he passed from his Christian stand-point to Montanism, he might have been an opponent of one who assailed the creative power of God by a doctrine borrowed from the schools of Grecian philosophy, which appeared to him to injure the simplicity of the Gospel; and the opponent of one who, from the stand-point of a cold objectivity hateful to Tertullian's glowing Christian feeling, was not afraid as a painter to borrow objects for his art from the heathen mythology. We know too little respecting the chronology of the life of Hermogenes and the exact date of Tertullian's passing over to Montanism, to adduce anything against such a supposition.

This treatise of Tertullian's was occasioned by the immediate necessities of the much-agitated church, as it was developing itself in conflict with heretics. It was matter of experience that men and women who had belonged for a considerable time to the church, had acquired great reputation in it, and hitherto had appeared examples of firmness in the faith, were brought under the influence of the sects that were spreading around them; and in consequence, many of the

weaker believers were surprised and disturbed. The thought might well arise in such persons' minds,—"Must not these sects have right on their side, in virtue of which they obtain access to so many, and to persons of such character?" As Tertullian says, "There are people who are struck with astonishment at certain persons who have been caught by heresy, and are built up to ruin."[1] Heretics gain an entrance for themselves, first and chiefly, by appealing to holy writ; from this at first they deduce their doctrine, and wish thence to carry on the warfare they have commenced against the church. The less the multitude are acquainted with the historical records of religion, the less are they exercised in the right interpretation of them; and the greater their deficiency in the right principles of interpretation, so much more easily are they the prey of heretics. On this account Tertullian was anxious to furnish believers, if possible, with a preservative against heresies that would be independent of the interpretation of scripture. And since experience had proved that nothing was gained by an exegetical dispute in which men proceed on different assumptions and principles, and the weak, who saw that heretics could always adduce reasons for their opinions, were thereby led astray, Tertullian thought that he must seek out another method of refuting heretics, and of establishing believers. He says, "Our adversaries urge the Scriptures upon us, and by this their boldness they unsettle some; and in the actual conflict they weary out the strong, they capture the weak, they dismiss the undecided with scruples." "What," he exclaims, "wilt thou gain, who art most practised in the Scriptures, when if thou defendest anything it is denied by thy adversary, and if thou deniest anything it is defended? Thou wilt lose nothing but thy voice in the debate, and gain nothing but worthless praise on account of the blasphemy of thy opponent.[2] But he, if there be any such person, for whom thou enterest into discussion of the Scriptures, that thou mayest confirm him when wavering,

[1] The words of Paul in 1 Cor. viii. 10, seem to have suggested to Tertullian this singular phraseology; and he also appears to use the word *ædificare* in an ironical sense.

[2] Dr. Neander in his translation follows the reading in Semler's edition, "Nihil consequeris, nisi vilem de blasphematione laudem;" but other editors read the latter cause, "nisi bilem de blasphematione," omitting "laudem," which is adopted in Mr. Dodgson's translation, Oxford, 1842, "thou wilt gain nothing but vexation from their blasphemy." Vide *Tertull. Opera, ed Semler*, vol. ii. p. 17.—Tr.

will he incline to truth, or rather to heresies? By this very thing he is moved, that he sees thou hast made no progress, since on both sides the affirming and denying are on a par; by this equal altercation he goes away more doubtful than ever, not knowing what is to be regarded as heresy."

Before we follow Tertullian any further in his polemics, the question meets us, whether he writes from his own personal experience; whether he was moved to compose this treatise by an immediate necessity arising from the state of the church's development at that period, and had in view a particular sect, or class of sects, with which the Western church was especially called to combat—whether a definite image was presented to his mental vision, or whether he had in his mind all the heresies he was acquainted with, and had combined the various marks which suited the different sects without distinction, because he wished rather to animadvert on what was common to all these heresies in their opposition to the church, rather than to take account of their distinctive peculiarities. One thing is undeniable, that though Tertullian alludes in passing to other heresies, yet the image of the Gnostics, whom the church had then especially to combat, to whom Tertullian's practical spirit formed the most striking contrast, and against whom, or their teachers, several of his writings were specially directed, stood present to his mind. But then it is doubtful whether he had in view all the classes of Gnostics, or chiefly a certain section of them, by whom the Western church was peculiarly annoyed. When Tertullian deduces all heresies from the Grecian philosophy, we must consider that he was acquainted with speculation only in the form of Grecian philosophy, and that when he found any peculiar speculative views he believed that these could be deduced from no other source than one of the schools of Grecian philosophy. The truth that lies at the basis of his remarks is the formation of the Gnostic system from a mingling of foreign speculative and Christian elements. Likewise what Tertullian says respecting particular speculative questions, with which the heretics as well as the philosophers interested themselves, suits the Gnostics entirely, but not the leading tendency of Gnosticism, that of Marcion. Yet Tertullian, who saw in Gnosticism only the common element of opposition against the simple Christian truth and the doctrine of the church, had certainly neither the ability nor the disposition to investigate and understand the peculiar

points in which Marcion differed from the other Gnostics. Everywhere he saw only the derivation from the one source of philosophical schools. It is evident how much he erred in making use of this assumption, and how little he was capable of understanding the peculiarities of Marcion's mind, when he deduced Marcion's doctrine of the one, good, holy, merciful God, who only redeems and blesses, but never punishes; the God of love,—a doctrine which certainly was formed only from a one-sided exaggeration of the peculiar Christian view of the Divine attributes,—it is evident how he erred, I say, when he deduced this from the school of the Stoics, and traced back the idea to the Stoic ἀπάθεια. When Tertullian says of the heretics, that they were continually appealing to Christ's words, "Seek, and ye shall find," and calling for continued investigation; this applies more correctly to the speculative Gnostics, than to the more practical Marcionites; or we must so understand it, that they said this only in opposition to unconditional dependence on church tradition;—that they referred only to continued inquiry after what was the original, unadulterated doctrine of Christ which they wished to purify from the adulterations of the Jewish element in the traditions of the church. When Tertullian says in the passages we have quoted respecting the heretics, that they gained a ready entrance for themselves by appealing to holy writ, he only asserts what will apply to all the Gnostics. Although it was not true earnestness with which they so zealously appealed to the Bible, yet it is certain that they frequently employed quotations from the Bible in order to gain an entrance for their doctrines. Especially they made use of the parables which could be most easily employed with exegetical arbitrariness in the absence of sound principles of interpretation, for the purpose of insinuating strange doctrines. Tertullian, as well as Irenæus, informs us that the heretics adopted such means. But it was the school of Marcion in which the New Testament biblical element prevailed in opposition to that of tradition, and which was actuated by real earnestness to prove their doctrines from the New Testament records, as far as they received them, and which proceeded uprightly on the principle, to acknowledge nothing as Christian doctrine which could not be derived from that source. The Marcionites were also most capable of gaining access by this method; it was very difficult to carry on an exegetical dispute with them, because in many points they had the truth on their side, and

could reproach their opponents with mingling a Jewish element with primitive Christianity, and with not understanding and examining the whole depth of primitive Christianity. The Marcionites also had spread more extensively than any other sect, in the Western church, and could call forth a man of Tertullian's eminence to the conflict. When he disputes with adversaries who charge part of the apostles with ignorance of true Christianity, and appeals to the fact that Peter himself was accused by Paul of a Judaizing corruption of Christianity,[1] we find here a trace of Marcion. But one passage in which Tertullian describes the conduct of the heretics, is peculiarly important for deciding the question, what party he chiefly had in view in his polemics. He says,[2] "I will not omit a description of heretical conduct, how worthless, how earthly, how human it is; without dignity, without authority, without discipline; corresponding to their faith. First of all, it is uncertain who is catechumen, who is a believer among them; they all alike approach[3]—they pray alike;" (that is, they all take part in the same prayers, there are no special prayers for the catechumens and for the baptized; at the prayers preparatory to the Supper the catechumens were not dismissed;) "also the heathen, if they come in, they will cast that which is holy to the dogs, and pearls before swine;" (this no doubt refers to the celebration of the holy supper, at which heretics and heathens were allowed to be present; Tertullian does not allow the reality of the holy supper among heretics, nor that the body of the Lord is with them). "The neglect of discipline they regard as simplicity; and the atten-

[1] Cap. xxiii. "Proponunt ergo, ad sugillandam ignorantiam aliquam Apostolorum, quod Petrus et qui cum eo erant, reprehensi sint a Paulo."

[2] Cap. xli.

[3] "Pariter adeunt." It is doubtful whether we are here to supply *ecclesiam* or *eucharistiam, sacram cœnam*:—whether the meaning is, they come in the same manner to church at the public assemblies, there is no particular place appointed for the baptized and the catechumens, all remain assembled together; the catechumens are not dismissed at the celebration of the communion, when the prayers begin;—or, whether the meaning is, they are equally admitted to the celebration of the supper. But this cannot be understood as if the catechumens actually partook of the holy supper along with the baptized. Such a custom, to admit unbaptized persons to partake of the holy supper, certainly could never have existed. Taken in this sense, the explanation must be untrue. But it may be understood to mean, that all persons were permitted to be present at the celebration of the supper, as in all that follows the reference is to the supper; and thus the meaning will amount to the explanation first given.

tion we pay to it they call cajolery ;[1] they make peace with all indiscriminately," (that is, they hold church communion with all, without distinction,) "it signifies nothing to them what differences of doctrine are found among them, provided they unite in impugning the one truth. All promise knowledge. The catechumens are perfect before they are taught : even the female heretics, how forward ! who venture to teach, to dispute, to practise exorcisms, to promise cures, perhaps even to baptize ! Their ordinations are rash, careless, inconstant. At one time they appoint neophytes ; at another time, men bound to the world," (that is, who are connected with certain state offices ; for already a law of the church existed, that no one bound *muneribus publicis* should venture to enter the clerical calling, since it was presumed that the undertaking of such worldly business was quite inconsistent with that vocation ;) "sometimes our apostates, that they may bind them to themselves by the glory (of station), since they cannot by truth. Nowhere is promotion easier than in the camp of rebels, since simply to be there is a merit. Therefore one man is bishop to-day, another to-morrow ; to-day he is a deacon, who to-morrow will be a reader ; to-day he is a presbyter, who to-morrow will be a layman ; for even on laymen they confer priestly offices."

It is evident that Tertullian in this passage had principally some one definite party in his thoughts whose general features he has delineated ; at least, what he says will not apply to all the Gnostics. Many of them aimed at establishing in opposition to the Catholic hierarchy that was then forming, a hierarchy of another kind, a more intellectual hierarchy. Among them, the line of demarcation was very strongly marked between the consecrated and the unconsecrated, and the different ranks. Certainly, a striving after simplicity could not be asserted of the majority of them ; there was too much pomp and show. The first part of Tertullian's description would suit exactly only that party whose image, as we have seen, must have been vividly present to him while composing this treatise. It was Marcion's school, which, as it was opposed to the intermixture of Jewish and Christian elements in the Catholic church, was not less so to the hierarchy that was springing up, to the injury of the universal Christian priesthood. This it was that wished to restore everywhere the

[1] "Simplicitatem volunt esse prostrationem disciplinæ, cujus penes nos curam lenocinium vocant."

original apostolic simplicity, and accused the church of having disturbed it. But if, on the one hand, Marcion's school was justified in its opposition to the rising hierarchical element that threatened to overpower the original universal priesthood of Christians, yet on the other hand it was likely to carry its opposition too far, when it insisted that everything was to be literally retained as it was understood to be laid down in the Pauline Epistles, in which, notwithstanding, various stages of development may be distinguished; and hence this school set itself against all historical development, even what might proceed from a sound Christian element. We recognise here specifically the opposition among the Marcionites to the newly-formed separation of the various parts of divine worship, that in which all the unbaptized might take a part and that which only the baptized would have a right to attend,—the distinction between what was afterwards called the *missa catechumenorum* and the *missa fidelium*. As we may perceive by the language of the apostle Paul in 1 Cor. xiv. 23, originally every one without distinction might frequent the meetings of the church, and remain as long as he pleased; there was no distinction of classes, according to which some might remain while others would be obliged to withdraw. Facilities were given, that those who were not Christians might derive instruction from what took place in Christian worship. It was desired, as appears from the language of Paul, that thus those who were without the pale of the church might be induced to enter it. But afterwards it gave offence for the unbaptized to join in all the devotions of the faithful, and particularly to be present at the celebration of the holy supper. It became customary to dismiss all the unbaptized, not excepting the catechumens—all persons, in short, who were not authorized to be communicants—before offering the prayers that were introductory to the celebration of the supper. Marcion, who was always zealous for the preservation of apostolic simplicity, who looked on the new arrangements with a suspicious eye, and quickly detected anything hierarchical, set himself against this separation of the two parts of divine service. In his opinion, the holy supper could not be desecrated by the presence of the catechumens; and he was desirous that for the future they should take a part in all the devotions. We know from Jerome's quotation in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, ch. vi. 6, that Marcion thus explained that verse,—that catechumens should share in all good things with

Christians who were already baptized; which he referred to the full participation in the whole of the public service. Certainly, Marcion could not with perfect justice appeal in this respect to the pattern of the apostolic church; for since that time another relation had been constituted, which, indeed, might have given occasion to this new arrangement of the two parts of public worship. In the apostolic church, the celebration of the holy supper was of itself separated from that part of worship in which all the unbaptized could join; for it was then not connected with the service which was held in the morning, but closely connected with that common meal of believers which was taken in the evening, the agape; and in this naturally none but those could join who had already been incorporated in the church by baptism. But the case was altered when the supper was separated from the agape, and made a part of the morning service. This probably gave occasion to that separation between the *missa fidelium* and the *missa catechumenorum*, which was opposed by Marcion. Without doubt also, we recognise in what Tertullian says in the passage quoted from the *Præscriptio* respecting the non-separation of the catechumens and the baptized, a mark of Marcionite views. So likewise in all that is said of the want of a proper distinction between the priests and the laity. The spirit of Marcion led him, no doubt, to uphold the principle of the universal priesthood. Yet we by no means maintain that Tertullian, in the whole of this delineation, was thinking only of the Marcionite party. Although he borrowed from the Marcionite party the outlines of the picture he has here drawn, still he would not be satisfied with that; but as he was disposed to combine all that was heretical, in its opposition against the church, into one picture, a picture which he would readily distort into caricature, he would easily introduce into this general picture several other traits which were borrowed from other very different appearances among the sects. What he says of the position of females in the church may, indeed, have occurred in other gnostic parties; but it hardly suits the Marcionite sect, since Marcion, who adhered firmly to Paul, would have strictly observed the injunction that women should keep silence in the churches. But may we not discern, in the reproach which Tertullian casts, in the conclusion, on the heretics, a trace of what is not montanist? For could the Montanist, who had prophetesses at the head of his party,—who found females in his churches that boasted of

divine visions and dreams, from whom disclosures respecting the invisible world and healing of diseases were sought;—could such a person have thus expressed himself in controversy?

From all that has been said, it will therefore appear that Tertullian, among the various heretics, had the Gnostics especially in view; that he brought together all that was gnostic without distinction, and yet in many of his references, the Marcionite sect was particularly present to his mind.

Now, as Tertullian aimed to satisfy those persons who had been stumbled at the withdrawal of Christians of both sexes from important stations in the church, he was obliged to explain the phenomenon which had occasioned their surprise. He urged that all Christians, however advanced, still remained men liable to sin, and therefore, if they were not watchful over themselves, might yield to temptation. He would allow no respect of persons. We recognise his untrammelled spirit, which, as we have seen in other instances, would not bow to the authority of the martyrs. He says, "What then, if a bishop, if a deacon, if a widow, if a virgin, if a teacher, if even a martyr, were to fall from the rule of faith; on that account, shall heresies appear to occupy the place of truth? Are we to prove the faith by the persons, or the persons by the faith? No one is wise, no one faithful, no one great, except a Christian. But no one is a Christian unless he persevere to the end. . . . . Do we wonder concerning his churches, if they are deserted by some, since these things which we suffer show us to be Christians, after the example of Christ himself." He adduces the example of Saul, and David, and Solomon, and then adds, "For it was reserved for the Son of God alone to remain without sin." He then goes on to remark, that the fall of such persons had probably been for a long time preparing in their internal state; that those persons who appeared to belong to the number of true believers, did not really belong to them in their internal character. Men might be deceived by the outward appearance; God alone sees the interior, and knows his own. Thus he regards the rise of heresies as a sifting process, in order to separate the genuine and spurious elements among Christians. He looks upon that which to others appeared rather as injurious and dangerous, as advantageous on the whole for the development of the church. He recognises the fact, that as evil in general, without losing its character of criminality, must serve for the development of the kingdom of God according to a higher law of the universe, so also heresies

in particular, without being less objectionable in themselves, may be of service, according to a higher law, for the purification of the church.[1]

But, however excellent everything is which Tertullian here says in order to satisfy the minds of the weak, and however correct his remarks on the relation of heresies to the purification of the church, yet he was too much implicated in a fierce opposition to all heretical tendencies, and in the one-sidedness of the church element, to be able to explain sufficiently the phenomenon which had occasioned the astonishment and perplexity of his weaker brethren. That those heresies could find access to such persons in whom it was least to be expected, was not merely and in every case to be accounted for by a deficiency in firm faith; but the ground of it lay in a defect belonging to the conception of Christianity to which the persons alluded to had been accustomed: it lay in a defect of the stand-point of the church, and a relative correctness of the heretical tendency in its controversy with the church, a real spiritual necessity, to which those heretical tendencies, though in a delusive manner, promised satisfaction. Thus, what has been said will find its application in the spread of gnostic tendencies, especially as they were exhibited by the Marcionite party. This phenomenon, that even persons from whose faith and mental abilities it might have least been anticipated should be carried away by heresies, ought to have led the adherents of the church stand-point to a strict self-examination, whether such an event was not owing to some defect and blemish in that stand-point itself; as at all times the circulation of erroneous tendencies should arouse all who are conscious of standing in the truth to such a self-examination. But, as we have said, Tertullian was too confident of the full and entire correctness of the church stand-point, to which he then adhered—was too much attached to extreme views—to be capable of forming a free judgment respecting heresies in relation to the Catholic church. At a later period, many defects of the common church stand-point were exposed to his view by Montanism, to which he had attached himself, but on a side which was allied to the one-sided peculiarities of his own character; so that in order to have appreciated the relative

[1] Cap. xxx. "Oportebat enim hæreses esse, nec tamen ideo bonum hæresis, quia esse eas oportebat, quasi non et malum oportuerit esse. Nam et Dominum tradi oportebat, sed væ traditori, ne quis etiam hinc hæreses defendat."

correctness in certain heresies, it would have been needful for him to occupy a quite different stand-point, at the furthest remove from his own peculiar character.

The Gnostics, in justification of their going beyond the common belief of the church in their inquiries, appealed to the words of Christ, "Seek and ye shall find," which, indeed, refer to a seeking of altogether a different kind than that arising from a speculative interest; and the language of Tertullian leads us to understand that even among the adherents of the church there was a party disposed to free inquiry who appear to have made use of these words against a mere traditional faith resting on authority.[1] As was his wont, he indulges first of all in an exaggeration, in order to prove to his opponents that they had no right to appeal to that passage. He so narrows the meaning of these words as to make them apply only to the time when they were uttered, and to the Jews to whom they were addressed. He supposes that since it was still uncertain who was the Messiah, and even John the Baptist had wavered in his faith, these words were uttered to the Jews to encourage them to search the Scriptures, which testified of the Messiah. But afterwards he enlarges the reference of these words, and allows that they were said to the apostles before they received the Holy Spirit. But after the effusion of the Holy Spirit, by whose illumination all the truth was revealed to the apostles, there was no more need of seeking; from them the fixed doctrine was received. But at last he felt himself compelled to admit an universal application of these words for all ages; only he subjoins in reference to this case the hermeneutical rule so often laid down by him, that these words, like any other words of Scripture, should not be applied in a manner perfectly indefinite. Nothing in the divine word, he says, is to be literally applied, without regard to the special sense and the special reference. In his opinion, all seeking must have a limit; when that is reached, seeking is at an end. Christianity is something quite definite; in reference to it there can be no such thing as a perpetual seeking, a seeking without aim and object. He means to say, that men must seek till they have found what will give satisfaction to the real necessities of the spirit; and this is no other than definite Christian truth. Suppose a man to have

[1] Cap. viii. "Venio ad illum articulum quem et nostri prætendunt ad ineundam curiositatem, et hæretici inculcant ad importandam scrupulositatem."

found this, and faith occupies the place of seeking. Thus Tertullian sets his face against a seeking and a doubting on religious matters without rule or limit, and points to the needfulness of a firm truth in which the religious element of the spirit shall find repose. Yet he is very far from wishing to set a limit to all further inquiry. He distinguishes between the interest arising from the impulse of faith, and that arising from the desire of knowledge. He allows free inquiry, provided the divine truth received by faith be held fast, within that boundary. After the words which we have already quoted in another connexion, he adds, "The Lord says, 'Thy *faith* hath saved thee,' not practice in the interpretation of the Scriptures." And what he describes as the limit of all seeking, the *regula fidei*, refers to the historical fundamental facts of revelation and redemption.[1]

As we have remarked above, Tertullian designed in this work, as its principal object, to establish a sure method of warding off and refuting all heresies, so that it would not be necessary to meet them on the uncertain ground of Scripture interpretation. This design, as developed by Tertullian, is not perfectly novel: he occupies a middle position between Irenæus and that later development of the church, of which Vincentius Lirenensis is the type. As in the doctrine of tradition laid down by Irenæus we find the germ of what was further matured dialectically by Tertullian, so in the work before us we find the germ of the whole doctrine of Vincentius Lirenensis on the criteria of truth, to be obtained independently of the exposition of Scripture. Unquestionably, tradition by the living word was the original source of knowledge of the Christian faith; but this source could only retain its purity as long as the living word of the apostles continued to be heard. When this was silent, and recourse to it was no longer possible, tradition was exposed to perversion and obscurity from various quarters, and then the fixed, written word of the apostles, not so exposed as oral tradition to falsification, occupied the place of their living presence for succeeding generations. But as many errors were continually arising from inattention to the different stages of historical development, so that what rightfully had its place in an earlier stage, was carried into a later without conscious discrimination, where it no longer had a rightful

[1] We shall have more to say in another connexion, respecting this *regula fidei*.

position, it happened likewise, in reference to tradition, that men, being once accustomed to this source of knowledge, believed that they must still continue to draw from it, without taking into account the difference of the times. Moreover, the unanimous tradition of the essential truths of the Gospel might with justice be deduced in part from the original communication, which might be traced back to the instructions of the apostles, and in part might be considered as the expression of the universal Christian consciousness. But another criterion was really needed in order to testify to this as the unchangeable essence of Christianity, since historical tradition, as the expression of the Christian consciousness, is subject to disturbances. When the idea of the church became divested of its internal spiritual character, the idea of tradition would be also made dependent on the authority of the church, deduced by the succession of bishops from the apostles, and thus becomes deteriorated like the former. Irenæus expresses the conviction that this *regula fidei* may be obtained equally as well by the sound independent exposition of holy writ as from tradition. To him it was something certain in itself. Both sources of knowledge proceeded independently, side by side, with equal rights. But Tertullian went a step further. He made the tradition of the apostolic church, and of the church in general, a standard of Scripture exposition. He denied from the first the competence of heretics to propound a new doctrine, and to expound Scripture according to their mind, as far as they did not agree with the apostolic church, or with the whole church as derived from it, but wished to set up something new in place of what was original and ancient. The opposition of the new against the ancient, of individual judgment against universal consent, these are the *præscriptiones* which testify against the heretics. Tertullian can speak of one *præscriptio*; but also of several *præscriptiones* into which this one may be divided.

"This is the question," says Tertullian,—"To whom does the faith itself belong? Whose are the Scriptures? From whom, and by whom, and when, and to whom is the doctrine delivered by which men become Christians? For wherever the true Christian rule and faith shall be shown to be, there will be the true Scriptures and expositions, and all the true Christian traditions." Everything leads back to the apostles, who delivered the same doctrine to those whom they placed

at the head of the churches; in these churches the same doctrine has been taught from generation to generation; hence it has spread along with the church, and by its duration, and by its agreement with them, the whole church is an apostolic one. Communion with this apostolic church is, therefore, according to Tertullian, an evidence that a person is in possession of the original doctrine, the genuine canon and the pure interpretation of holy writ. He maintains that since man has withdrawn himself from the original truth, he has an interest in falsifying holy writ. In this respect there is sometimes reason for complaining of the arbitrary criticism of the heretics; but cases have also occurred in which injustice has been done them, since persons have gone on the presumption that a various reading which has been found among the heretics, was fabricated by them in favour of their system.

When the Gnostics, especially the Marcionites, appealed to the contrariety between the apostles themselves, Paul and Peter,—Tertullian remarked, on the other hand, that these apostles did not publish a different faith, but only represented the same faith in a different form, in consequence of the difference in their spheres of labour.[1]

But when his opponents adduced in evidence the dispute between Paul and Peter at Antioch, Tertullian at first refuted this by a remark indicative of a more unfettered spirit, since he candidly admitted Peter's error, but only maintained that this would not justify persons in inferring an opposition in his doctrine to that of Paul. But he did not remain faithful to his unprejudiced view. Perhaps it did not proceed so much from an excessive reverence for the apostles, which was afraid to acknowledge an error in them, but must be accounted for from Tertullian's manner in controversy of always pushing matters to an extreme, and not making the slightest concession to his opponents, that he afterwards put this construction on the affair; namely, that both Peter and Paul acted on the same principles; Peter became a Jew to the Jews, as Paul when he censured Peter became a Gentile to the Gentiles. Thus he allowed himself to be misled; although otherwise he belonged to the advocates of a strict truthfulness, he here in some degree relinquished it, through an erroneous extension of the idea of accommodation, in order that he might sanction in an equal manner the conduct of both the apostles.

[1] Cap. xxiii.

The parties with whom Tertullian had to contend, especially the Marcionites, urged against the authority of tradition, that the churches might have misunderstood the truth that had been announced to them, and probably mixed errors with it. They appealed, as Tertullian says, to passages in the Pauline Epistles, as in the Epistle to the Galatians, in which the churches are reproached for their apostasy from the original truth. They inferred, not without plausibility, what has happened once may happen again; hence tradition is not a certain witness. Tertullian, on the other hand, could appeal to the continued operation of the Holy Spirit in the extension and development of the general Christian consciousness; yet that did not exclude an intermixture of perplexing errors. "Well, then!" says Tertullian, "all the churches must have erred; the Holy Spirit can have taken care of not one to lead it into the truth; he, who was sent for this purpose by Christ, who was sought from the Father that he might be the teacher of truth. This Steward of God, this Vicar of Christ, must have neglected his work—suffering the churches to have understood for a while differently, to have believed differently from what he announced by the apostles." Then he brings forward their agreement as an evidence of truth: "Is it probable," he asks, "that so many churches, and so great, should have adopted the same erroneous faith?"[1] He justly appeals against those who spoke as if they were the persons by whom Christianity was first brought to light—that, on such a supposition, the whole church must hitherto have existed to no purpose.[2] He here again applies the principle which he had frequently made use of, that the truth is everywhere the original, and that error first existed as a counterfeit of truth.[3] But we have already remarked that Tertullian probably erred in the application of this, in itself a correct principle. We are here obliged to say, that the most original of all is certainly the truth: but although the original ground of truth remains firm, the disturbing element of error may soon mingle with it, and then the power of the original truth will again make itself felt in the reaction against the error of later origin. Hence this rule can never be so mechanically applied, in order to distinguish error and truth in the church from one another.

[1] Cap. xxviii. [2] Cap. xxix.

[3] "In omnibus veritas imaginem antecedit; post rem similitudo succedit."

SECTION II.

MONTANIST WRITINGS.

As we have seen, Tertullian wished, after he had furnished in his book on Prescriptions a general preservative against heretics in general, to commence an attack on particular heretical doctrines and sects. We have already remarked, that in combating the Gnostics in that work, he had chiefly in view the school of Marcion. It was natural, therefore, that his first special polemical treatise should be directed against the same class. But we have no longer that work in the form in which, as Tertullian himself says, it was originally composed; for we learn from his own words, that he at first published it in a form with which he was afterwards dissatisfied. He revised it, but the work in this revised state was circulated against his will, before it had received the final amendments.[1] Hence, at a later period, he was moved to recompose this polemical treatise entirely, and to send it forth as quite a new work.[2] And in this state the five books against Marcion have come down to us. The work in this form was completed by Tertullian, not immediately after the *Præscriptio*, but when he had written several dogmatic and dogmatic-polemic treatises. This explains what would otherwise be inexplicable, that Tertullian, in his work against Marcion, mentions his treatise on the Resurrection as already written, and in the latter book he mentions the work against Marcion, and the treatise *De Anima*, as already written. Further, he mentions also the treatise *De Carne Christi* as also written. But if we turn to this latter, we find mention in it of a work against the Gnostics, and his book *De Testimonio Animæ*, as already written; on the other hand, he speaks of his book on the Resurrection as being still to be written, but in this latter work he mentions, as we have remarked, his book *De Anima* as already written. And if we go back to this book *De Anima*, we find his book

[1] Lib. i. cap. 1. "Primum opusculum quasi properatum pleniore postea compositione rescideram."

[2] "Si quid retro gestum est nobis adversus Marcionem jam hinc viderit. Novam rem aggredimur ex vetere."

on the Origin of the Soul, (*De Censu Animæ,*) as well as the books against Hermogenes and Marcion, mentioned as already written; and he notices therein a work against the Gnostics, —against their doctrine of the Demiurgos, as still to be written, which perhaps may refer to his book against the Valentinians. Thus we are taken back to the work against Hermogenes (*Adversus Hermogenem*), as the first written. These apparently conflicting statements can now be easily explained. If we bear in mind the various forms of the work against Marcion, it is very evident that he might have composed it in one of the first forms, before other treatises, which yet were followed by that work in its present and most finished state. If we compare these citations from his own writings, both those that are lost and those that have come down to us, we shall not only be able to perceive the chronological order in which these works succeed one another, but we shall be able to follow Tertullian in his mental workshop, and examine how the thought of one work succeeded that of another, and what was the connexion of ideas in the preparation of his various works. First of all, we shall obtain by this comparison, a confirmation of what we have remarked respecting the relation of the work on the Prescriptions to the order of this class of Tertullian's writings. In his work against Marcion in its present form, he appeals to the method by means of which he was wont to refute the heretics briefly in *the Prescription.*[1] From this it may be presumed that he had made already more than an occasional use of this method. Further, in his work *De Carne Christi,* he says expressly, after the incidental use of such a Prescription, "but we have already elsewhere made use of these Prescriptions against all heresies, in a more complete manner."[2] Also in his work against Hermogenes, he appeals to the Prescription with which he had been wont to oppose the heretics. But, as is evident from what has been said, the work against Hermogenes was the first work, or at least, with the books against Marcion, one of the first works which Tertullian composed against the heretics. Therefore, what could induce him to speak of such a habit as that alluded to above, if he had not already been occupied with a special book on that subject?

[1] "Solæ in præscriptione adversus hæreses omnes de testimonio temporum compendium figere."

[2] "Sed plenius ejusmodi præscriptionibus adversus omnes hæreses alibi jam usi sumus."

Thus it will appear, that Tertullian, after composing his work on the Prescriptions, was led, in addition to that, to write against Marcion. A cognate controversy followed this closely, the work against Hermogenes, who, if not in other points, yet in dualism agreed with the Gnostics. But with Hermogenes he had to contend on a special subject, to him of no small importance,—the relation of the soul to God. On this account he was induced to compose his work *De Censu Animæ*, which has not come down to us, but the contents of which may be gathered from the treatise *De Anima*. "Since in his work *De Censu Animæ* he treats of the marks of the relationship to God in the soul, he was led, probably, to enlarge upon one of these marks, the *testimonia animæ naturaliter Christianæ*, of which we have already spoken, and was the origin of his work *De Testimonio Animæ*. With the question concerning the soul was also connected the question respecting the history of the soul, the original condition of man, the various destinies of souls after death, the preeminence of the state of the martyrs, the distinction of Hades, of the general receptacle of the dead, and of the seat of perfect happiness—of Paradise. This led to the composition of his work *De Paradiso*, which has not come down to us. Further, he proceeded from particulars to generals, and occupied himself with an examination of all questions relating to the origin and nature of the soul; this gave rise to his work *De Anima*. Moreover, as he always kept in view the controversy with the Gnostics, he combated the sect of the Valentinians in a separate treatise. Thus he must have been led to attack particularly the doctrine of this party on the peculiar constitution of the body of Christ, and, generally, the reality of the whole human appearance of Christ, against all the varieties of Docetism. And in consequence of the connexion between the doctrine of the identity of the body of Christ with the true human body, and the resurrection as founded on the reality of the death and resurrection of Christ, he was induced to vindicate the doctrine of the resurrection, especially against the Gnostics. After having extended his polemics so far, he returned to take up the controversy with Marcion again, and to give completeness to his first work. Thus we see that this series begins with the work against Hermogenes, and closes with the work against Marcion. According to this order we wish to review the works of which we have given the titles, and shall speak first of the treatise against Hermogenes.

Tertullian's controversy with Hermogenes is of service, in order to mark the relation in which Christian Theism presented itself to the consciousness of the ancient world. The history of the religious and philosophical development of the human mind before and after the appearance of Christianity, bears testimony to the fact, that the idea of an unconditional creative act of God, of an absolute freedom or almightiness of God as the ground and cause of all existence, is indissolubly connected with revealed religion, and is foreign to reason left to itself, which strives in that direction to explain all things from itself. The stand-point of antiquity that most nearly corresponds to the religious interest was that of a kind of dualism, when man, on one hand, could not raise himself above the contemplation of nature, but yet, on the other hand, maintained the idea of a freely acting, designing, personal, self-conscious God, as the highest intelligence. Thus, God was viewed as a Creator or Maker, conditioned by a pre-existent matter, and two causes were recognised in the development of the universe, the power of nature and of divine providence—an irreconcilable contradiction. Such a conception, we think, is to be found in the original doctrine of Plato. But the later Platonism struggled to surmount this contradiction, and to reach a monism through a theory that aimed at explaining all; in place of the acting God, the Absolute, was introduced the ὄν, out of which by virtue of an indwelling necessity everything was developed to the last being in existence; according to this conception the Hylé only appeared as the limit of this development. The Socinians had right on their side when they combated the opinion, that the doctrine of a creation in the Christian sense belongs to the truths of natural religion, which may be ascertained by reason alone, and maintained that this doctrine belonged only to revealed religion.[1] They could appeal, not without reason, to the testimony of the history of religion, as well as that of Grecian philosophy. On the other hand, it cannot be objected that Paul in the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans has

[1] "It can hardly admit of a doubt that Socinianism taught, not a creation out of nothing, but rather a creation out of pre-existent matter. For although the Racovian catechism is silent on this point, and appears designedly to handle the doctrine of creation very superficially, and F. Socinus has not explained himself upon it, yet we possess other witnesses who express themselves with all the openness that can be desired."—*Der Socinianismus, &c. dargestellt von Otto Fock.* Kiel. 1847, p. 480.—Tr.

described faith in one God, who created all things, as independent of revelation, and arising from the contemplation of the universe; nor is it necessary to take refuge in the forced explanations of the Socinians in order to dispute this. Paul certainly assumes here, that God as Creator reveals himself in his works, but at the same time assumes as necessary a corresponding receptivity in the human mind to admit this revelation, by virtue of which the outward revelation becomes an inward one; and he teaches us that when the internal principle of religion was oppressed by worldly-mindedness, even that outward revelation could no longer find a point of connexion in man. We have seen in the modern development, that as natural reason rebelled against the theism of revelation, in order to explain everything from itself, although at first it allowed that doctrine of a creating God to remain as something founded in the religion of reason, yet the same principle in the modern history of the human mind has driven it beyond these limits, even to deny this, in order to resign itself entirely to a pantheism that denies everything supermundane, only to find itself repeated everywhere, and to regard everything as only its own work. Hence, as that doctrine of the creation enters into the consciousness first of all with Christianity, this difficulty must oppose itself to the acknowledgment of Christianity where there is not an unconditional submission to the new principle of the universe. There was no need of speculative thinking as it was developed in the old world to find here a stone of stumbling; it was difficult for educated minds to follow the bold soaring of faith, in order to rise above the whole system of nature to an act of absolute freedom as the ground and cause of all existence. Thus Tertullian says that many weaker believers would rather agree with the philosophers that God had created all things out of a basis of existing matter. Hence it cannot be surprising if a thoughtful man like Hermogenes, who had passed over from heathenism to Christianity, although embracing the doctrines of Christianity, yet, in consequence of his speculative tendencies, revolted at the Christian doctrine of the creation, and endeavoured to mingle Hylozoism, to which his whole intellectual development had been habituated, with Christianity. It was possible for such a person sincerely to exercise faith in Jesus as a Redeemer and to receive the other doctrines of Christianity, while he was stumbled at that one point, and, proceeding on his precon-

ceived opinions, endeavoured to prove that even in Holy Writ the doctrine of the creation from nothing (which must besides have been misunderstood if a negative assertion was converted into a positive one) was not expressly laid down. But, indeed, the whole peculiar system of Christianity separated from that one fundamental truth could not remain in its purity, or be consistently recognised in its true significance. Tertullian was penetrated with this conviction when he entered the lists against Hermogenes.

Hermogenes was probably, as might be inferred from his name, of Greek descent, and had settled as a foreigner in Carthage. If the former particular be correct, it is easily accounted for that the lessons of Greek philosophy exerted so great an influence over his habits of thought. He was an artist, and in the numerous comparisons which he employed to make his doctrine intelligible it is not difficult to recognise the painter. Tertullian, as we have already perceived by many indications, was no friend of art, although we are not justified in asserting that he held painting to be in itself an art not becoming the Christian profession. The contrary is evident from his book, *De Idololatria*, as we have seen, and we cannot say that as a Montanist he had become more strict in this respect. And although Montanism could not be favourable to art, yet no proof can be found that it must have denounced the art of painting as unchristian. But Hermogenes might have extended the practice of his art, which for him was characteristic in relation to his times, beyond the bounds which Tertullian regarded as necessary for the Christian stand-point. He appears already to have risen above the subjective opposition of the Christian consciousness of his times to heathenism, and advanced to an objective mode of contemplating mythology, so that he felt himself at liberty to employ his art in the representation of mythological subjects. And thus perhaps we may recognise in the artist and the thinker the stand-point of a man in whom the fervour of Christian feeling was not predominant. In both respects Tertullian must have been the opponent of Hermogenes; and he regarded him also as culpable on another account—that after the death of his first wife he had married again several times. Perhaps he had already engaged in controversy with Tertullian on that point, since he endeavoured to prove from holy writ the lawfulness of a second marriage, in opposition to

the prohibition of Montanism.[1] Perhaps Hermogenes belonged to those opponents with whom Tertullian had to contend as a vindicator of the Montanist principle of Monogamy; it may have been that he stood at the head of this Antimontanist party.

Hermogenes came forward as an opponent of the Gnostic emanation-doctrine, and of the church doctrine of the creation of the universe out of nothing. He endeavoured to show there could be no such world, that it must be the work of a perfect holy God, and that it required the admission of a pre-existent material conditionating the divine creation, in order that the existence of evil in a world created by a perfect God might be accounted for. The question now arises, whether Hermogenes was induced, first as a Christian, to reflect more on the origin of evil, a subject which then called forth so much thinking, and whether he was then first led, since neither the church doctrine, nor that of the Gnostics, appeared to give a satisfactory solution, to adopt the platonic doctrine of the Hyle; or whether he brought this doctrine with him from his earlier philosophic stand-point, and only sought to find new proofs for it from the Christian stand-point. When we recollect the affinity of the doctrine of Hermogenes to the neo-platonic system, and observe how this subject alone appears to have occupied his Christian thinking, we shall be more inclined to adopt the latter view. According to several expressions, indeed, it may appear that Hermogenes only adhered to the original platonic Dualism, and thought that there was an independent Hyle which was first organised by an act of God for the formation of the universe; but when we compare with one another all the fragments in which his

[1] Tertullian's obscure expressions from which we learn this, are the following, (I. i.) "Pingit illicite, nubit assidue, legem Dei in libidinem defendit, in artem contemnit." It is doubtful how we are to explain the *pingere illicite*. Must we understand by it that Tertullian regarded painting as in itself unlawful? Yet we are not justified in doing that, for the reasons given in the text; and when Tertullian afterwards says that Hermogenes despised the law of God because it was opposed to his art, yet Tertullian could not mean that the divine law condemned painting generally. We are therefore inclined to believe that what he regarded as unlawful in the art of painting, as practised by Hermogenes, was, that he selected subjects for his art from the heathen mythology. On the other hand, Tertullian might believe himself justified in quoting passages from the Old Testament, and thus the words, "legem in artem contemnit," retain their meaning, and the other words, that he made use of the law for the vindication of his art, will refute his having quoted passages of the Old Testament in vindication of his repeated marriages.

speculative views are presented to us, we shall rather recognise the speculations of the later platonism, and lying at the basis, the transition from Dualism to Monism. We must separate the more mythical and the logical conceptions from one another, although it is questionable how far this was consciously effected by Hermogenes himself.

Hermogenes maintained, that if God had been Lord from all eternity, he must have had materials for the exercise of his sovereignty; and this was no other than matter. He believed that the divine attributes must be regarded as eternally active in a creation. He maintained that this was not at all inconsistent with the unity of God, the *μοναρχία*, since God and matter were totally distinct from one another; to matter he ascribed only absolute passivity, as he regarded God as the only creative cause of all things. He described matter quite in the platonic style as entirely undefined, and predicateless, the *ἄπειρον*. It must be entirely undefined and predicateless in order that all things may be made out of it by the divine determining power. Hence it is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, though forming the basis of the corporeal world; neither good nor evil. If it were good, it would require the formative power of God; if it were evil, it would have remained entirely unsusceptible of such an operation of God. If matter were not indeterminate between the corporeal and the incorporeal, it would be already corporeal, and it could only be regarded as resting, not in motion; but now we must ascribe to it a motion though unregulated, undetermined, and chaotic. Hermogenes availed himself of the comparison of water boiling in a vessel and bubbling over on all sides. He affirmed, in support of his opinions, that the doctrine of creation out of nothing was nowhere expressly taught in holy writ, and he believed that his idea of matter was expressed by the תהו ובהו of Genesis, and by the *γῆ ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος* of the Alexandrine version. When Hermogenes, as a proof of his doctrine, adduces that in order to conceive of God as Lord from all eternity, it is necessary to presuppose a material of which he is Lord, we may infer from this that he therefore conceived of no beginning in the exercise of this sovereignty, and this sovereignty consists in the formative influence of God on the material from which the creation proceeds. Hermogenes could not imagine any absolute commencement of creation. In fact, from his whole doctrine, it appears that he did not suppose that first of all a

material existed as chaos from which creation first proceeded; but that he believed that these two factors were working together from all eternity, the creating God and the material which lay at the basis of creation, constituting the condition and limits of it. He, no doubt, thought that only by a process of mental abstraction could the universe, as organised by God, be distinguished from the Hyle that constituted its basis, and an idea be formed of such a Hyle, as far as an idea could be formed of anything so indefinite, a so-called λόγος νόθος in platonic phraseology. Thus the idea presented in revelation of a creative teleological act of God, must have secretly vanished from Hermogenes, and have given place to that of a development destined by an imminent necessity, as in the new platonic philosophy. Hermogenes must have believed that from eternity God operated in a formative manner on matter, and not by a transient activity; as he says,—"God does not create the universe out of matter by pervading it, but by appearing to it and approaching it: as beauty by its mere appearance operates and wounds the soul of him to whom it appears, and as the magnet attracts the iron on approaching it." Hermogenes maintained that the formation of matter by God is an infinite task, and that there is always a remainder that resists the formation. Thus, he says, as the whole is known by its parts, is matter known as what forms the basis of the universe: in part what it can become by the divine formative power, and in part what there is in it which resists formation. The ancient chaos, amidst all the beauty and order in the world, still ever lets itself be known as lying at the basis: it appears even through the restored order.

Thus Hermogenes could say, under one point of view, that matter has served God to be a manifestation and mirror of himself by means of the creation he has educed from it; and under another point of view, that this world is a mirror of matter; which appeared to Tertullian a contradiction, since he could not distinguish these various points of view. According to the doctrine of Hermogenes, that in matter which resists the formative power, can only be overcome by degrees, and is the basis of what is defective and evil; the necessity of evil lies in this, that the formation of matter is an endless task. He maintained that matter partook of formation, not as a whole, but in its parts.[1] He says that parts of it had all from all; in every part there was the whole; so that the whole

[1] Cap. xxxviii. "Unde nec tota fabricatur sed partes ejus."

can be known from the parts.[1] "The motion of matter," he says, "before it was arranged, was that of one part flowing into the other; a restlessness which could not be settled on account of the too great contradiction in itself. But it continues in order that it may be arranged by God."[2] Yet, as in matter all opposites meet, and hence the most contradictory theory can be asserted of it, so Hermogenes ascribes to it on the one hand a restless motion, full of conflicting tendencies, and, on the other hand, a sluggish motion. But when this matter received formation and was arranged, it ceased from its nature and its original quality; yet, according to what has been said, the basis of it still shone through.[3]

Hermogenes wished that every appearance of the causality of evil should be kept at a distance from God, since he placed the cause of evil out of God. If other persons from the stand-point of the church doctrines wished to account for evil from the free-will of the creature: he, on the contrary, held that the cause of evil would by that means be placed in God by whom that free-will was given. From the stand-point of his speculative reason, he thought that his all-comprehending Monism could not allow the distinction between God's willing and permitting. In accordance with the Christian stand-point he rejected that explanation of evil, that it existed necessarily as the antithesis of good, in order that good itself might become matter of consciousness.[4] He maintained that this would deprive good of its independence. But on the other hand, he himself did away with the true significance of the contrariety of good and evil. Since he traced evil back to a necessity of nature, he injured the doctrine of the almightiness of God. The doctrine of redemption met here with an insuperable difficulty, and such a conception was logically in contradiction to the teleological contemplation of history, as it proceeded from a system which substituted an iron necessity in the place of a teleological conception. We here recognise in Hermogenes a man moved on the one hand

[1] Cap. xxxix. "Partes autem ejus omnia simul ex omnibus habent, ut ex partibus totum dignoscatur."

[2] Cap. xliii. "Stetit autem in Dei compositionem, et inapprehensibilem habuit inconditum motum præ tarditate inconditi motus."

[3] Cap. xliii. "At ubi accepit compositionem Deo et ornata est, cessavit a natura."

[4] Hermogenes, as the opponent of the assertion,—"Mala necessaria fuisse ad illuminationem bonorum ex contrariis intelligendorum." Cap. xv.

by the religious impressions of Christianity, and on the other hand attached to another soil by his speculative habits. We shall see that although in Tertullian the pure speculative interest, and the speculative element, were not sufficiently powerful to enable him to enter such a mode of thinking as that of Hermogenes, yet from the stand-point of a religious Christian interest, he understood how to combat with him, and to prove the irreconcilableness of his preconceived notions with the doctrines of Christianity, with which he wished to combine them.

When Tertullian says, referring to Hermogenes, that the philosophers are the patriarchs of heretics, and reproaches him with having changed from a Christian to a philosopher, there is certainly so far truth in the allegation, that the doctrine of Hermogenes resulted from a mingling of philosophy and Christianity—of the speculative and the religious interest. He maintains against Hermogenes, that although the doctrine of the creation out of nothing was not expressly laid down in holy writ, yet it was an obvious inference, since no antecedent material was mentioned in connexion with the creation of God, which otherwise would have been the case. He endeavours to prove to him, that his doctrine, although he maintained the unity of God, was irreconcilable with it; for God was truly acknowledged as God, if he were not acknowledged as the eternal, sole originator, and ground of all existence, with whom nothing else could compete. As soon as anything else was placed as originally near him, it was claiming for that something else what belonged to God alone, and, in fact, destroying the idea of the one God. He maintained against him, that the doctrine of the creation out of nothing was absolutely necessary in order to maintain in its integrity the idea of the divine almightiness, which was denied when God, in order to create, was made to depend on something out of himself.[1] He maintains, that by this scheme of a creation, conditionated by something out of himself, God would be subjected to a necessity. He says against him, that although he appears to admit no other Christ, he yet changes him into another, since he recognises him in another manner: in fact, he charges him by denying creation out of nothing, with taking away the idea of God altogether.[2]

[1] Cap. viii. "Jam non omnipotens, si non et hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre."

[2] "Etiam in hoc necessitati subjicis Deum, si fuit aliquid in materia,

The doctrine of redemption seemed to him to be so closely connected with that of the creation, that the full recognition of Christ as the Redeemer could not exist, unless the idea of God as the almighty Creator were presupposed in all its fulness. He endeavours to prove against Hermogenes that the idea of incomplete and progressive formation is inconsistent with the idea of something unoriginated. Only in the created, which has a beginning, can the idea of a continued development from the imperfect to the perfect find its application.[1] He maintained against him that a contradiction was involved in the idea of evil without a beginning, that in the idea of evil it was absolutely necessary to think of a beginning and an end.[2] In fact, the view taken by Hermogenes of an endless task of the formation of matter, if logically carried out, was at variance with a teleological contemplation of the world, and many doctrines of Christianity belonging to it; with everything, in short, that related to the final issue of redemption and the renovation of the world. In his opinion, the idea of unchangeability was inseparable from the idea of the unoriginated and eternal, and thus he could not conceive how matter could be transformed into any thing else. It was also not apparent, how a transformation, a conquest of evil is possible if this is regarded as an original nature.[3] He objected to Hermogenes, that if evil is unoriginated,[4] but the λόγος not unbegotten, but begotten, it cannot be conceived how evil can have been overcome by him,—how the good can be stronger than the evil.[5] He, therefore, perceives correctly that there is an intrinsic contradiction, to regard evil as something unoriginated and absolute, and yet to speak of a necessary victory of good over evil; that, therefore, in this respect also, the doctrine of redemption is irreconcilable with such a scheme. When Hermogenes maintained that as God from all eternity was to be conceived of as Lord, and, therefore, a material on which to exercise his sovereignty, and an eternal

propter quod eam formaret," cap. xlii. And, "Libertas non necessitas Deo competit, malo voluerit mala a semet ipso condidisse, quam non potuerit non condidisse." He maintained that God would still be the author of evil, although he brought it forth from another material, whether he so willed it, or was obliged so to act from weakness.

[1] Cap. xxviii. [2] Cap. xi. [3] Cap. xii. [4] Cap. xii.

[5] Cap. xviii. "Proinde si malum quidem innatum est, natus autem sermo Dei, non scio, an a bono malum possit adduci, validius ab infirmo, ut innatum a nato."

exercise of this sovereignty must be assumed, Tertullian replied, that God was certainly God from all eternity, but not Lord; for there was a distinction in the two ideas; God is the name of a being, but the name Lord is not the designation of being but of power. The being must be regarded as eternal; but this was not the fact with the idea of Lord, which bears a relation to something without.[1] This remark was founded on the distinction of the absolute and relative attributes of God. Formally, indeed, the difficulty might thus be removed, but, certainly, it was not so in reality. Tertullian did not by this means show how the almightiness of God could be conceived of otherwise than perpetually active, which was one of the difficulties that Hermogenes felt in the supposition of an absolute beginning of creation. Tertullian perceived, indeed, how by the doctrine of Hermogenes, respecting the manner of God's operation on matter, the Christian idea of creation, and especially the idea of God acting for the realization of an object was lost, although his mind had too little of the formally speculative to enable him to develop this in clear distinct conceptions. He objected to Hermogenes, that God had created all things, not by mere appearing, but by acting.[2] "Greater is his glory, if he laboured. At last, he rested on the seventh day from all his works." He then adds, "but both in his own manner,"[3] in order to guard against a false anthropopathism, with which his language might be charged. While Tertullian maintains against Hermogenes that it is irreconcilable with the idea of one God, to attribute to another something of that which belongs to him alone, he himself supposes the objection. "Then, thou wilt say to me, we shall have nothing of that which belongs to God alone," and thus he would be led to a Deism, which places an infinite impassable chasm between God and his creatures, an incommunicability of the divine being; but here his deep Christian views, which were as much opposed to Dualism as to Pantheism and Deism, are perceptible in his manner of guarding against such a conclusion, and which maintained the participation of the Divine Being founded in redemption, and the divine communion of life between God and the redeemed. "We have, indeed, and shall have, something that is God's, but what is communicated

[1] Cap. iii.
[2] Cap. xlv. "Operatione Deus universa constituit."
[3] "Utrumque suo more."

to us by him, what we have not of ourselves. For we shall be gods if we become worthy to be those of whom he has declared, 'I said ye are gods,' and God stands in the assembly of the gods, by virtue of his grace, not of our nature."[1] To the doctrine of Hermogenes, of a material out of which all things were created, he sets in opposition the indwelling wisdom of God, or the Reason—the λόγος—as the ideal ground of all existence, the aggregate of all ideas which were realized in the creation of the universe.[2] This is connected with the doctrine of the Logos, of which we shall speak particularly, when we are led to it by Tertullian's controversial writings.

Tertullian characterises Hermogenes, who was living[3] when he wrote this book, in the following terms. "In the picture he has drawn of the original matter of creation, he has given a portrait of himself,[4] devoid of elegance, a confused medley, a chaos of uncertain, hasty, and violent movements." While in this sketch we acknowledge Tertullian's wit, it may be questioned how far it corresponded with truth. Hermogenes may have been a restless fanciful man; but of the stupidity, at least, which Tertullian ascribes to him we find no trace, as far as we can learn his mental character from the fragments of his writings that remain. He may have been a man of well-regulated mind, though not superior to Tertullian in mental opulence.

Tertullian had still another subject to discuss with Hermogenes. Hermogenes maintained that God had formed all things without distinction from matter, and made no exception even as to the essence of the soul. It was a view widely spread, and derived from the Jewish theology, which distinguished what was founded in the nature of the first man, from what was owing to a special divine communication—to the influence of the divine spirit; this view was the germ of the later distinction between the *dona naturalia* and *dona gratuita*. From this point of view, the soul was regarded as originally mortal, and it was supposed, that by the communication of the divine spirit it was first made

[1] Cap. v. "Imo habemus et habebimus, sed ab ipso, non a nobis. Nam ut Dei erimus, si meruerimus illi esse, de quibus prædicavit: Ego dixi vos dii estis, et stetit Deus in ecclesia deorum; sed ex gratia ipsius, non ex nostra proprietate."

[2] Cap. xviii. [3] Cap. i. "Ad hodiernum homo in sæculo."

[4] Cap. xlv. "Nisi quod Hermogenes, eundem statum describendo materiæ, quo est ipse inconditum, confusum, turbulentum ancipitis et præcipitis et fervidi motus documentum artis suæ dum ostendit ipse se pinxit."

partaker of immortality. Hence it was inferred that through Christ immortal life was again communicated to man through communion with God. This view, which we find presented in the crudest form by Tatian, which also forms the basis of the doctrine of the Gnostics respecting the nature of the Psychici, was at all events akin to the anthropology of Hermogenes; but as to its exact nature, many questions and doubts occur for want of sufficient data. The doctrine of Hermogenes may be so understood as to mean that in the first man there was no communication of the divine spirit, and, therefore, somewhat different from what is supposed in the above representation; and that he regarded sin as the necessary transition for a soul derived from matter, and destitute of all alliance to the Divine Being, and that sinlessness was first possible by means of the second creation of man through Christ: from all which it would follow, that human nature was so planned, that by virtue of its original constitution sin must be manifested in it, and then in opposition to the prior supremacy of sin, the new divine life from Christ would be revealed, and the originally mortal soul by this divine communication of life would be raised to immortality and sinlessness, which was then denoted by the term ἀφθαρσία. But then the point of connexion for this higher impartation to their souls, would have been wanting, of which all who were of the same lower nature would partake, and it would be difficult to discover how Hermogenes could explain the different reception given to the Gospel among men. Logically it would have led to the admission of an unconditional and irresistible grace. For the decision of this question much depends on the explanation of one passage in Tertullian's controversy with Hermogenes. He says, that contrary to the authority of Scripture, he had substituted, in Gen. ii. 7, for *flatus* the words *spiritus Dei*, in order to maintain that the soul was derived from matter rather than from the spirit of God, since it is incredible that the spirit of God could fall into sin, and then into condemnation. Tertullian accuses him of falsifying that passage of Scripture since here mention is not made of the *spiritus Dei*, but of something subordinate, the *flatus Dei*. Thus he explained the πνοὴ ζωῆς, and thus he had read it in his Latin translation of the Bible. The question is, what view of Hermogenes is here presupposed? Did he deny here in the original state of man every kind of connexion with the Divine

Spirit? since otherwise, when man in this connexion allowed himself to be seduced into sin, the Divine Spirit must have appeared as if liable to be tempted to sin, which was what Hermogenes objected to the Gnostic doctrine of emancipation. Then would the view of Hermogenes be that which we have explained. But in this case must Hermogenes, who found in Genesis a decisive authority, have so understood the passage, as not signifying the communication of anything divine to man, but only an animal principle of life, by which he became a living being; and in this case Tertullian could not have accused him of making something higher out of the lower,—of having put *spiritus* instead of *flatus*, but he must rather have blamed him for not having given a sufficiently high sense to the predicate in that passage. Hence the words of Tertullian are decisive against such a construction, and we must rather understand his meaning to be the following:—Hermogenes maintained that in that passage where he explained the πνοὴ ζωῆς as meaning *spiritus Dei*, the reference was not to the original nature of man in itself, to that which dwelt in it as peculiarly belonging to it, but to that which was imparted to it as something from without. To the first man, in his original condition, the divine spirit was imparted for the exaltation and support of his nature; he was thereby made capable of immortality; but by his guilt this connexion with God was dissolved, and he was deprived of the *spiritus Dei*; and now the souls derived from matter, being stripped of everything divine, fall a prey to death. Thus Hermogenes would have agreed with the doctrine of Tatian. But still the same difficulty would remain for him,—the injury done to man's capability of receiving redemption. This Tertullian believed must be maintained against him, and the recognition of something undeniably and inalienably divine in the soul be proved against him, and in order to refute the argument of Hermogenes, he made use of the distinction between the *spiritus* and the *flatus Dei*. He wished to show that not an absolutely divine nature, but one allied to the divine, was the inalienable possession of man. On this account he wrote against Hermogenes his book *De Censu Animæ*, (on the Constitution of the Soul,) which has not come down to us, but the contents of which we may infer from what he mentions in his work *De Anima*. In maintaining against Hermogenes this alliance or relationship of man to God, Tertullian appealed to the undeniable and inalienable marks of it. Among these

he reckoned the natural immortality of the soul, freedom of will, reason, the indications of a native consciousness of God, a power of prognostication which he distinguished from the supernatural prophetic gift, and the dominion over nature.[1] Moreover, Tertullian quotes, in the twenty-second chapter of this book, what he had written in his work *De Censu Animæ* on the soul as allied to God.[2]

This special object led Tertullian afterwards to a general inquiry respecting the soul, in which he proposed to discuss all the questions relating to the nature, the various powers, and the destiny of the soul, that were agitated between philosophers and Christians, heretics and the orthodox—his work *De Anima*. Here he entered on a field of inquiry for which his mental constitution and education had little fitted him, that of pure philosophic investigation. Consequently, this work contained many things—much that was unsatisfactory. It was very different, when in the course of these discussions he entered on purely religious topics, or what were in strict connexion with them; here we find real profundity. Opposing the new light of Christian truth to the inquiries of philosophers, respecting the nature of the soul, he says,—"To whom can the truth be known without God? by whom is Christ sought for without the Holy Spirit? and on whom is the Holy Spirit bestowed without the sacrament of the faith?"

The manner in which Tertullian justifies the Senses against the objections of the Academics to the deceptions they practised, is remarkable and characteristic. His strong realism is here prominent, and leads him to detect in such views the germ of Docetism. "It is not the senses," he maintains, "that are guilty of deception, but the causes which allow objects to assume such an appearance to the senses; and the judgment of the soul is to be blamed, if it lets itself be determined by them. But even the causes do not lie, for they act in correspondence to the law of nature. In nature there is no lie, for everything expresses what it must express from its stand-point." What must so happen is no lie. If, therefore, the causes are free from reproach, much more are the senses, to which the causes are antecedent; hence, especially truth, credibility, and freedom from error, are ascribed to the senses,

[1] Cap. xxii. "Animam Dei flatu natam, immortalem, substantia simplicem, liberam arbitrii, rationalem, dominatricem, divinatricem."

[2] "Dedimus illi et libertatem arbitrii et dominationem rerum et divinationum interdum, seposita quæ per Dei gratiam obvenit ex prophetia."

because they announce nothing else but what that law has prescribed to them, which so operates that something else is announced by the senses than what takes place in reality. "What art thou doing, bold Academic?" he says; subvertest the whole condition of life, thou destroyest the whole order of nature, thou makest the very providence of God blind, since thou constitutest the senses as deceitful and lying masters for understanding, inhabiting, managing, and enjoying all his works." And a little further on, he says, "We cannot doubt the evidence of those senses, lest we should doubt their credibility as regards Christ,—lest it should be said that he falsely saw Satan fall like lightning from heaven, or falsely heard the voice of the Father testifying of himself," &c.[1] He connects with it the controversy against Marcion, saying,—"For thus Marcion would rather have believed Christ to be a spectre, refusing to acknowledge the truth of his having a real body."

This work is very important in reference to Tertullian's anthropology, and to the construction of the anthropology of the Western church in general, to which he gave the first impulse. As we have remarked, Tertullian's materialism and realism could not be separated, so that we shall not be much surprised at his attributing to the soul a corporeity of a higher kind. The literal interpretation of the parables of Christ, the application of all the separate traits in them, especially in the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, strengthened him in this view. He imagined that the soul possessed various limbs, like the human body. To that he referred the idea of an inner man. And with that was connected, though it stood in no necessary connexion, the notion of an internal sense of the soul, of internal organs of sense, by means of which he accounted for seeing and hearing in ecstatic states, as in dreams; with such an internal sense, he supposed, that Paul saw Christ's form, and heard his voice.[2] But certainly this notion was not necessarily connected with the assertion of a material constitution of the soul. Origen, who was very far from such a view as the latter, accounted for the Scriptural visions from an internal sense. In the form of this view of the soul's materiality, appeared also Tertullian's very influential doctrine, that became offensive by this connexion in which it was represented by him, though nowise connected with this speculation,—namely, the doctrine that the

[1] Cap. xvii. [2] Cap. ix.

soul of the first man was the source of all other souls which were developed in the continuation of the race, and that the soul of the first man was propagated along with the body, the so-called *propagatio animarum per traducem*,[1] Traducianism. Thus he imagined that Adam's soul was at first uniform: it had not yet developed that multiplicity of properties which might be educed from the individualising of all those germs of humanity that were existing in Adam.[2] Not without reason he could recognise a deeper connexion in the development of the human race, a deeper unity (which he explained by means of that Traducianism) in the expression of family peculiarities, in the propagation of qualities and propensities.[3] Thus Tertullian opposed his Traducianism to an atomistic, nominalist theory of the development of mankind. In this manner he also explained the propagation of a sinful tendency from the first man. Thus he made it apparent how in the first man the nature of all his posterity was vitiated, since the development of the whole race depended on (or was conditionated by) the conduct of its progenitor. Hence the idea of *vitium originis*. As a consequence of the first sin Tertullian regarded the worldly-mindedness which has been transmitted from the first man to his descendants. "How is it to be wondered at that man should return to his original material, and be condemned for his correction to build upon the earth and in the work itself he should bow towards the earth, since he has communicated the spirit received from thence to his whole posterity?" The corruption of nature has become, as he says, a second nature, having its own god and father, namely, the author himself of the corruption.[4] Thus he maintained the connexion of an evil spirit with every man from his birth, which was corroborated by the ceremonies of the heathen;[5] a view which afterwards led to the use of exorcism at baptism in the North African church. Here the coarse and confined conception of the ages preceding Christianity as held by Tertullian, in contrast with the more liberal and enlarged view of the Alexandrians in relation to the divine education of the race, is strikingly exemplified in the fact that Tertullian

[1] Cap. xix. "Anima velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adam."

[2] "Apparet, quanta fuit, quæ unam animæ naturam varie collocavit," cap. xx.; and, "Uniformis natura animæ ab initio in Adam," cap. xxi.

[3] Cap. xxv. "Unde, oro te, similitudine animæ quoque parentibus de ingeniis respondemus, secundum Cleanthis testimonium, si non et ex animæ semine educimur?"

[4] Cap. xli.

[5] Cap. xxxix.

could so little understand the importance of Socrates in the history of mankind, that he adduced the Dæmon of Socrates as a confirmation of his opinion that every man was attended by an evil spirit from his birth. But deeply as he was penetrated with a sense of the corruption of human nature, equally deep was the consciousness, as we have already learnt from many of his expressions, of the undeniable and inalienable relation of the soul of man to God. Thus, when speaking of that original corruption, he adds, "Yet, there is in the soul that original good, divine and genuine, and which is properly natural to it. For what comes from God, is not extinguished, but rather obscured; it cannot be extinguished, because it is of God. Therefore, as light when hindered by some obstacle remains, but does not show itself if the density is so great as to obstruct it, so also what is good in the soul is oppressed by the evil, according to its peculiar nature, and is inactive the light being hidden, or shines through when it finds liberty. So there are some very bad and some very good, and nevertheless all have one sort of soul. Thus also in the worst there is something good, and in the best something of the worst. God alone is without sin, and Christ is the only man without sin, because Christ is also God."[1] He then appeals to the marks given in revelation of that which is originally divine in the soul,—"Thus," he says, "the divinity of the soul breaks out into presages owing to its pristine goodness, and the consciousness of God is expressed by such attestations as 'God is good,' 'God sees,' 'I commend thee to God.'" From the connexion of these two factors, evil, and what was originally allied to God, he explains the responsibility of man, and establishes the consciousness of guilt. On this account there is no soul without guilt, because none are without the seeds of goodness. Hence he accounts for the original consciousness of truth in its partial illumination before the Christian era, which he calls the *sensus publicus naturæ*. This consciousness of truth was to be found especially among the better class of the philosophers; but he accuses philosophy of having disturbed and mutilated this *sensus publicus* by its arbitrary sophistry.[2] Yet he designates Seneca on account of

[1] Cap. xli.

[2] Cap. ii. "Sed et natura pleraque suggeruntur quasi de publico sensu quo animum Deus dotare dignatus est. Hunc nacta philosophia ad gloriam propriæ artis inflavit præ studio eloquii quidvis struere atque destruere eruditi."

his agreement with Christian truth as *sæpe noster!*[1] He adopted, what as we shall afterwards see was not unimportant for his Christology, not the common Dichotomy, but maintained that the vital principle of the body, the ψυχὴ, was the same in all living beings, only endowed with higher or lower powers. In what was generally termed νοῦς he recognised only the highest power of the same soul, which also forms the vital principle of the body. He says, "By the *animus*, or *mens*, which the Greeks call νοῦς, we understand nothing else than the inborn, ingrafted, and native suggestion of the soul, with which it acts and judges, which having always with itself, it moves in itself, it appears to be moved by it as if by another substance."[2] He sanctions the distinction between a ψυχὴ λογικὴ and ἄλογος, but maintains that what is denoted by the latter epithet, is not an original faculty. He regards all that is contradictory to the reason in man, all irrational passions and desires, as the effects of the original corruption. "The natural," he says, "must be regarded as the rational, which was originally implanted in the soul—namely, by the rational Creator. For how should that be otherwise than rational which God created by his command?—to say nothing of what he communicated in a peculiar sense by his breath. But the irrational must be regarded as something subsequent, which happened through the suggestion of the serpent, that which proceeded from transgression, and which has since grown in and with the soul, as something natural, because it happened immediately at the beginning of nature." Yet he declares himself opposed to the platonic intellectualism, since he is not willing to consider the θυμικὸν and the ἐπιθυμητικὸν as in themselves opposite to the λογικὸν, but recognises a rational anger, and a rational direction of the appetitive faculty. The unity of the divine and human was also brought forward by him, and as a proof he made use of the original type of humanity in Christ, in whom he thought might be recognised a holy anger against ungodliness, and a holy appetitive faculty; as he says,[3] "Behold, this whole trinity is to be found in the Lord;—the rational faculty which teaches and argues,—by which he makes level the paths of salvation; the indignant faculty by which he inveighed against the Scribes and Pharisees; and the appetitive faculty by which he desired to eat the Passover with his disciples." And as he would very justly regulate the Christian doctrine of morals by the contemplation of

[1] Cap. xx. [2] Cap. xii [3] Cap. xvi.

the moral archetype in Christ, he says,—"Therefore in ourselves we must not consider the indignant and the appetitive faculties as always belonging to the irrational, since we are certain that they were rationally exercised by the Lord." We recognise here his religious realism as opposed to the excessive dread of Anthropopathism, and to the evaporation of the idea of God, when he would find in God something corresponding to anger in man in his wrath against evil, and to human benevolence in his longing for the salvation of men. As an example of that wrath, as it might be found in Christians, he quotes the words of Paul in Gal. v. 12, and displays an ethical and exegetical freedom from prejudice, in not shrinking from the natural exposition of these words, and finding nothing repulsive in it.

We see, therefore, that Tertullian recognised equally the receptivity of redemption and the need of redemption. In connexion with these truths, he also viewed the doctrine of regeneration. After speaking of the two factors in human nature, the originally divine and the disordered undivine, he says,[1] "When by faith the soul comes to regeneration, transformed through the second birth by water and the power from above, it beholds all its light, after the covering of its pristine corruption has been taken away. It is received by the Holy Spirit into his communion, as in the first birth by the evil spirit. The body, which is given as a dowry to the soul when it has espoused the Spirit, is no longer the servant of the soul, but of the Spirit." With his Traducianism was connected the notion of a sanctifying influence arising from Christian parentage, and thus he understands that passage in 1 Cor. vii. 14. He understands this of a twofold sanctification, that of descent, and that of education. This again is of importance in relation to his view of infant baptism. Had he admitted such a rite, this would have been the place for mentioning it as a third, additional factor. But he expressly distinguishes this preparatory sanctification from that which is accomplished at a later period through baptism—namely, regeneration. He understands the apostle to mean by ἅγια in that passage, *designatos sanctitati ac per hoc etiam saluti*, and adds, "For otherwise the apostle would have remembered the word of the Lord, that no one can enter the kingdom of heaven unless he is born again of water and Spirit, *i. e.* he will not otherwise be holy." "Hence," he says, "every soul will belong to Adam

[1] Cap. xxxi.

until it has entered into communion with Christ." Now it may be said, this passage is an evidence that Tertullian regarded infant baptism as necessary. But had that been the case, he would have expressed himself very differently. And it is to be observed that he considers birth and education equally as the preparatory *sanctificatio*, and then allows baptism to follow. Likewise the passage we before quoted from the same book shows that he considered faith to be a necessary element in baptism and regeneration.

To the Gnostic doctrine of the original differences in men, Tertullian opposed the doctrine of free-will (which he derived from what was undeniably allied to the divine in man), and the power of grace operating upon it. When the Gnostics quoted in support of their doctrine those words of Christ, that "a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit, nor can a good tree bring forth evil fruit," and that "men do not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles;" Tertullian replies, "According to this notion, God could not raise up children to Abraham from these stones, nor could the generation of vipers bring forth fruits meet for repentance; and the apostle must have been mistaken in Eph. v. 8, and ii. 3,—but the holy Scriptures are never self-contradictory. For the corrupt tree will bring forth no good fruit unless it is grafted, and the good tree will bring forth bad fruit unless it is cultivated. And the stones will become children of Abraham, if they are fashioned to Abraham's faith; and the generation of vipers will bring forth fruits meet for repentance, if they have discharged the poison of evil. Such will be the power of grace, which is stronger than nature, since the power of free-will in us is subjected to it; and as that is natural and changeable, so nature turns whither it turns." This passage may certainly be so understood as if an irresistible power were ascribed to grace in the transformation of the free-will, and we might find in it the spirit of Montanism, which was disposed to maintain the unconditional sovereignty of the divine, and ascribe to the human soul only a passivity in relation to it. We should then be obliged to regard Tertullian as the first representative of the doctrine of a *gratia irresistibilis*. But this clashes with the express manner in which he elsewhere asserts the self-determining power of free-will. And even here he appeals to the fact, that in his controversy with Hermogenes and Marcion he had maintained the *αὐτεξούσιον*. In order to adjust this discrepancy, must we say that Tertullian

had already, like Augustin, pleased himself with the idea of free-will, and believed that he could so express himself, since the form of free-will always remains unhurt, and man is not conscious of any stringent necessity? But yet we are not justified to attribute this artificial conception to Tertullian, since none of his expressions give a point of connexion for it, and we must rather explain this obscure passage according to his general doctrine. When, therefore, he expresses himself so strongly on the power of grace, we must presume that he did not mean to ascribe to grace any unconditional compelling power over the free-will. And Montanism itself presupposes that, upon the whole, the operations of the Divine Spirit are conditionated by the direction of the free-will; since it attributed a passivity to the human mind only in the case of prophetic inspirations, and certain extraordinary charisms.[1]

This latter conception of such an operation of the Divine Spirit with the passivity of the human soul, we also recognise in Tertullian's manner of expressing himself respecting the vacillation of mind shown by John the Baptist.

Tertullian seeks for explanations respecting the nature of the soul not merely in reason and holy writ, but also in the new revelations and visions: from these latter he obtains vouchers for the material constitution of the soul. That visions should be frequently beheld by the female sex, may be easily accounted for; and the demand for such phenomena would be in proportion to the value attached by the enthusiastic tendency which sought for the explanation of such things in new revelations and sights. There might be, indeed, magnetic states in which persons sought for something divine. It is very explicable, that among them who during religious services, and in consequence of the impressions they then received, fell into such states, the visions would have that for their object with which their minds had been occupied in a waking state, and to which the discourse, or portion of scripture read, had referred. Tertullian says, "There is at the present day among us a sister who has received the charism of revelations, and who in the church, on the services of the Sunday, is put in an ecstasy by the Spirit. She converses with angels, sometimes even with the Lord; she sees and hears holy things; she knows the hearts of some, and administers remedies to those that long for them. When the scrip-

[1] See Neander's General History of the Church, vol. ii. pp. 346—352. St. Lib. ed.—Tr.

tures are read, or the psalms are sung, or exhortations are given,—then materials are furnished for her visions." When the service was concluded, and the congregation was dismissed, then the clergy were accustomed to ask her more exactly respecting her visions, from one of which they believed that they could learn the peculiar nature of the soul; and to this Tertullian appeals. According to Tertullian's opinion, the acknowledgment of the new revelations finds its reward in this, that the persons who do thus acknowledge them, and place no limit to the continued operations of the Holy Spirit, are made partakers of these new miraculous gifts. We must always bear in mind, that Montanism forms the boundary-line in the stage of the development of the church where the supernatural and the eccentric predominated, when the power of the divine life appeared as altogether new, and seized hold of the rude mass. Thus Tertullian asserts that the greater part of men were taught by the visions of God; a statement which agrees with many declarations of Origen. We offer the following as an explanation. Christianity entered into close conflict with the ancient principles of heathenism; men who were as yet strangers to Christianity, saw themselves surrounded by its operations, from which they received manifold and unconscious divine impressions. Adhering to their former stand-point, they strove against these impressions; but they were overcome by a higher power. Impressions were made upon them in visions and dreams, with superior power, which they were not conscious of, or rejected by opposing efforts; and when the connexion of the development of their life remained hidden, when they overlooked the various intermediate links, and only were conscious of the last result, everything must have worn to them the aspect of the supernatural.

Among Tertullian's deep reflections must be reckoned the idea of the emblematical in the works of God. As the kingdom of grace was typified in the kingdom of nature, so is nature parabolised in reference to the kingdom of God. Thus he sees in the transition from sleep to waking an emblem of the transition from death to the resurrection. He says, "For God willed to effect nothing in his arrangements without an emblem, according to the Platonic example, especially to

easily supported by images and parables, as in words so in things."[1]

Tertullian, as we have remarked, had written before this work one on Paradise, which we have already given an account of. He now treats in this book on the soul, of something which he had touched upon in that work. As in the book on the soul he had dwelt on its future destiny, so he also stated the doctrine of the intermediate state of the dead in hades. The opponents of the doctrine that there was likewise such an intermediate state for believers were, as we may conclude from Tertullian's words, not merely the Gnostics, but also others, probably the same persons who opposed Chiliasm; for a relationship of ideas existed between an intermediate state, or hades, for some before they reached heaven, and an intermediate state in the development of the kingdom of God generally, the millennial reign of Christ on earth, which would form the transition-point to the new heavenly order of things. Now, the doctrine of hades, not less than the doctrine of Chiliasm, belonged to the points for which the Montanists zealously contended. Their opponents maintained that by the descent of Christ into hades, believers were freed from the necessity of entering such an intermediate state, and were taken to heaven immediately on their decease. Tertullian, on the contrary, maintained that Christ, according to the law of human development, was obliged to enter into hades, and that in so doing he placed in communion with himself the prophets and patriarchs of the old covenant. But, as long as the earth remains in its present form, heaven is still closed against believers. And he regards hades as the common intermediate state, where there is a presentiment of happiness and of punishment, and whence every person, according to the measure of his purification from all sin, will be raised, earlier or later, to a participation in the millennial reign. Every sin, even the least, must be atoned for by a delay of the resurrection; and from this tenet afterwards arose the idea of a purifying punishment, an *ignis purgatorius*.[2] With it was also connected the already developed juridical conception of repentance, to which was added the doctrine of washing away sins by baptism.

[1] Cap. xliii. "Voluit enim Deus, et alias nihil sine exemplaribus in sua dispositione molitus paradigmate Platonico plenius humani vel maxime initii ac finis lineas quotidie agere vobiscum, manum porrigens fidei facilius adjuvandæ per imagines et parabolas sicut sermonum, ita et rerum."

[2] Cap. xxxv. "Modico quoque delicto mora resurrectionis expenso."

Tertullian only made an exception in favour of those who had been perfectly purified by the baptism of blood, that is, martyrdom. These alone were to be exempt from hades, where they had nothing to atone for, but were raised, not at once to heaven, but only to that state of exalted happiness in paradise which Tertullian has described in his last work. He adduces, in confirmation of it, a vision of the Montanist female martyr Perpetua.[1] Thus Montanism was aided in the glorification and recommendation of martyrdom; and Tertullian appeals in this connexion to a characteristic oracular sentence, strongly marked by the ethical spirit of Montanism, that contempt of what was purely human, namely, "Perceive the difference between a heathen and a believer in death: if thou diest for God as the Paraclete admonishes, not in gentle fevers and on beds, but in martyrdom; if thou takest thy cross and followest the Lord, as he himself commands; thy blood is the key of paradise."

In Tertullian's explanation of the parable, Luke xii. 58, in which by *the adversary* he understands the heathen, what he says is important in aiding our conception of the relation in which Christians stood to the heathen. "For the heathen man is our adversary, who walks in the same way of common life. But we must go out of the world, if it were not allowable to associate with them. He commands, therefore, that thou shouldst show benevolence towards him. 'Love your enemies,' he says, 'and pray for them that despitefully use you,' lest, provoked by some injury in the intercourse of business, he should drag thee to his judge." It is to be remarked, how distinctly Tertullian places the seat of sin in the soul and impugns the erroneous view of the scriptural idea of the flesh. So also his ascetic tendency did not misapprehend the Christian mode of viewing human nature, in opposition to the oriental contempt of the body. By means of the connexion of the doctrine of the resurrection with his whole style of thinking, he well distinguished what was obstructive in the present relation of the body to the soul, and the higher destiny of the body as the organ of the soul in a transformed state. He says, "If this body, according to the Platonic doctrine, is the prison of the soul, but, according to the apostolic doctrine, a temple of God in communion with Christ; yet in the meanwhile it obstructs the soul by its enclosure, and darkens it, and pollutes it by the concretion of the flesh; hence, the light

[1] Cap. lv.

in it is more obscure, as if passing through horn. Beyond a doubt, when by the stroke of death it is forced out from the concretion of the flesh, and by this very straining is purified, certainly, from the stretching of the body it bursts forth unimpeded into its own pure and unmixed light, immediately recognises itself in the freedom of its nature, by its very liberty becomes sensible of its divine origin, as awaking from sleep it turns from images to truths." Hence he deduces the higher intuitions and forebodings of the soul in the article of death.

After Tertullian in his book *De Anima* had attacked the Gnostic anthropology on several sides, he entered on the discussion of one of the principal points at issue between the Gnostics and the catholic church. This related to the recognition of the purely human in Christ. By the Gnostics, who laid the greatest stress on the divine in Christ, this was either altogether denied or very much injured; in part, by an absolute Docetism; or, if they did not venture so far, by explaining the sensible human appearance of Christ as only an optical deception; still assuming that the body and bodily appearance of Christ had only an apparent likeness to the bodies and bodily appearance of other men; that Christ appeared in a body of a finer form, differing from gross earthly matter,—a *σῶμα ψυχικὸν*, as the Valentinians called it. To maintain the purely human in Christ, particularly against this last view, Tertullian composed his work *De Carne Christi*. His Christian realism formed the sharpest contrast to Gnosticism. He was far from conceding, like the Alexandrians, any point whatever to the Gnostics; he rather felt himself impelled to carry his antagonism to the highest pitch. Tertullian, in reference to Marcion's aversion from the purely human in Christ, says that he was ashamed of the care taken of an infant in its swaddling clothes. "This reverence of nature, O Marcion, thou despisest. Thou hatest man as he is born, even as thou wert born thyself: and how canst thou love any one? But thou mayst see to it, whether thou art displeased with thyself or wast born in any other way, Christ at least loved man in his uncleanness. For his sake he descended from heaven; for his sake he proclaimed the Gospel; for his sake he lowered himself with all humility even to death, the death of the cross: certainly he loved him whom he redeemed at so great a price."[1] We here see how deeply Tertullian, by the idea of

[1] De Carne Christi, cap. iv.

the sanctification by Christ of all that was naturally human, —how deeply on this side he had imbibed the spirit of the Gospel; although, owing to other influences which we have noticed, he was hindered from carrying this into the doctrine of morals, which ought by means of it to have received its peculiar Christian form. To the notion of an etherialised body of Christ he opposes the impression which Christ made by his appearance among men, so that we detect in the Gospels not a single trace of wonder respecting it, but rather astonishment that he who appeared like men in general, in so unassuming a form, could yet speak and act as he did, thus forming such a contrast between his works and the manner of his appearance. Tertullian appeals to such expressions as those in Matt. xiii. 54. While carrying to the utmost extent his opposition to the denial of the purely human, as held by the Gnostics, and urging the idea of the form of the servant in Christ, he was quite disposed to abjure the idea of the beautiful which was so prominent in the æsthetical religion of heathenism, and to present the holy and divine in contrast to the beautiful; he maintained, as we have already remarked in his other writings, that Christ was rather ill-favoured in his appearance. Several assertions of the Jews respecting our Lord appeared to him to confirm this view.

Tertullian recognises the necessity of paradoxes in teaching Christianity. He appeals to what the apostle Paul says respecting the foolishness of the divine wisdom (*τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, 1 Cor. i. 25). This foolishness, he says, cannot be the doctrine of one God; it cannot be the moral precepts of Christianity, inasmuch as they are approved by the reason of the heathen; it is the doctrine of the self-renunciation of the Divine Being, the appearing in the form of a servant. "Certainly," he says against Marcion, as far as he did not acknowledge the true humanity, the birth, and sufferings of Christ, "certainly this was something foolish, if we judge God according to our mind. But look round, Marcion; hast thou not read, 'God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise?' What are these foolish things? Are they the conversion of man to the worship of the true God, the rejection of error, the teaching of justice, chastity, patience, compassion, and innocence? All these are not foolish. Seek, therefore, concerning what he has said this; and if thou thinkest thou hast found it, then it will be not foolish to believe in a born God, born indeed of a virgin, appearing in the

flesh, who was tossed about by that humiliation of nature. Some one may say that these things are not foolish, and that there are other things which God has chosen as an opposition to the wisdom of the world." In what Tertullian here expresses, much truth is contained in opposition to that tendency which would rob Christianity of its peculiar essence, that always appears as foolishness to the wisdom of the world; which would confine it within a certain circle of so-called deductions of reason, and reduce it to a kind of deism or of elevated morality. But yet we must make one or two remarks by way of correction. First, although Christian morals, on one side, could challenge the approbation of the general ethical stand-point occupied by the best philosophers of antiquity, yet still Christian morality had its "foolishness," its paradoxes which were founded on the paradoxes of the Christian faith; and although at first only the doctrine of the incarnate God and the crucified Saviour appeared as foolishness in Christianity, yet the same tendency of natural reason which opposed this as foolishness, advanced further in its consequential development, and even the doctrine of the one personal God, in the sense recognised by revelation, was marked as foolishness. Moreover, it is Tertullian's manner to present the truth so abruptly as to reject all those intermediate steps which might bring it near to the human understanding; although in Tertullian's writings, as we have already seen in many instances, the germ of such intermediate steps between the supernaturally divine and the natural is to be found. In the present case, he renders only one aspect prominent—that of the apparent foolishness under which the divine presents itself to the unenlightened wisdom of reason; while the other aspect is kept in the background, in which this foolishness verifies itself as the highest wisdom. But without such a combination, this language might be abused, in order to attribute what is really foolish and monstrous to the Gospel; as it appears when Tertullian says, comparing Marcion with the heathen, "And yet it would be easier, according to worldly wisdom, to believe that Jupiter became a bull or a swan, than for Marcion to believe that Christ became truly a man." And here it may be proper to notice those words for which Tertullian has often been reproached, but which sound worse than they mean if taken in their connexion: "*Credibile est, quia ineptum est; certum est, quia impossibile.*" It may be easily perceived that the faith, the

certainty of Tertullian, has a quite different ground from the *ineptum* and *impossibile*, and he was perfectly conscious of this ground. In order to form a right judgment of so original a writer, we must compare with such expressions (on which his ardent mind seized as a bold antithesis in maintaining a really profound truth) those other expressions in which he so emphatically urges the importance of the *rationale*. Among these harsh extravagancies must be reckoned that which Tertullian uses in this controversy in reference to the Divine Being, that he can change himself into all things, and yet remain the same. In proof of this assertion he adduces the appearance of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove; where again he has been misled by the direct literal interpretation. But he justly acknowledges that the true Christ cannot be understood without the union of opposites, the combination of the divine and the human.[1] In a very characteristic manner Tertullian exclaims, addressing Marcion, "Why dost thou by a lie divide Christ? He was the whole Truth."[2]

It is deserving of notice that Tertullian, in order to prove that Christ was really born of the Virgin, appeals to John i. 13; but he adopts the reading ὃς ἐγεννήθη, since he refers the passage to Christ. This is no doubt an ancient reading, which was prompted by a dogmatic interest, as we find it likewise in Justin and Irenæus; and the quotation of these words, in which a sense so foreign to the original connexion is introduced, certainly goes to prove, that Justin Martyr was acquainted with the Gospel of John. Tertullian, also, to whom the correct reading was known, held it to be impossible that this passage could refer to believers. He thought that this could only be in a gnostic sense, according to their doctrine of pneumatic natures, and he accounted for that original reading as a gnostic falsification of the text. Yet, in the preceding chapter, he explains it of regeneration, and assumes, therefore, the correctness of the common reading; only he maintains that if these words refer to all believers, they must so much the more be applied in a higher sense to Christ.

In illustration of Tertullian's peculiarities, we will here quote his parallel between heretics and heathens, as far as to both there was the stone of stumbling, and they made the same objections against it. "Is there any other difference

[1] Cap. v.

[2] "Quid dimidias mendacio Christum? totus veritas fuit."

between them than this, that the heathen believe through unbelief, but the heretics through believing do not believe?" That is, the open unbelief of the heathen, which on their stand-point was necessary, since the Gospel must appear to them as foolishness, is faith, inasmuch as by their very unbelief they testify practically of the truth of the Gospel which foretold their unbelief; but the faith of the heretics is only apparent, it is concealed unbelief; they agree in unbelief with the heathen.[1]

Tertullian held it to be quite necessary, in order to a right acknowledgment of Christ as the original pattern and Redeemer of human nature, that these characteristics should be regarded as existing in him in their full extent. "Because," he says, "if Christ had been also celestial according to the flesh, those who were not celestial according to the flesh could not be compared to him. If, therefore, as Christ is, so are they who are made celestial, and they carry the earthly substance of the flesh, it is demonstrated, that Christ himself was celestial in earthly flesh, as they are who are compared to him." And in reference to the passage in Rom. viii. 3, where he gives *evacuavit*, as equivalent in meaning to *κατέκρινε*, he says—"It would not have corresponded to Christ's design to destroy sin in the flesh, if he had not been in that flesh in which was the nature of sin, nor would it have been to his glory. For what great thing would it have been, if in a better flesh belonging to another, that is, not a sinful nature, he had removed the stain of sin?" Therefore he thinks that for the honour of Christ, as far as the original type of morality was to be realized through him, the identity of the body of Christ was requisite with that which had hitherto been subject to sin.

But Tertullian, in his opposition against Docetism, in order to do full justice to the doctrine of Christ as the Redeemer of men and the original type of humanity, thought it necessary not merely, as had hitherto been done, to maintain the identity of the human body of Christ, but extended this to the human soul in him. And this is the specific novelty which

[1] Cap. xv. To render the explanation of these very singular phrases somewhat easier, it might be supposed that a negative had been dropped, and that we ought to read, "Ethnici non credendo non credunt, at hæretici credendo non credunt." Yet I do not venture to maintain that this is the correct reading, although it is evident that the words as they stand in the text could only perchance be intelligible to a person who pleased himself, like Tertullian, with conceits and paradoxes.

was propounded by Tertullian on this subject ; for it was only by degrees that everything belonging to the doctrine of the God-man in all its parts became distinctly apprehended : at first, only an appearance of the divine λόγος, or of God the Father himself in a human body, was conceived to have taken place. In Tertullian's predecessor, Irenæus, we see, indeed, the recognition of a soul in Christ corresponding to the human soul at times presenting itself, but certainly in a very obscure and often unconscious manner. Tertullian first developed this point with perfectly clear consciousness, wrought it into systematic connexion with his whole doctrine, and made it a distinct article of faith. His more exact reflection on the peculiar nature of the human soul to which his work *De Anima* relates, and his peculiar conception of it, led him to develop this subject more fully. When others spoke of an *anima* or ψυχὴ in Christ, they had no occasion to think of the peculiar nature of the human soul in Christ, but might understand it of the principle of animal life, of the *anima* connected with the body. This could not be the case with Tertullian ; for, as we have seen, he admitted only a Dichotomy in man, and when he spoke of Christ's soul, he could only mean the specifically human, the rational soul. To develop his doctrine on this subject more fully, an inducement was presented by a peculiar point in controversy in contradiction to the Valentinian doctrine,—namely, the notion that Christ did not appear with the common human identical body, but that from the ψυχὴ itself an apparent form recognisable by the common human senses was formed ; therefore, that the ψυχὴ itself was transformed into a body of a higher kind. Such a view Tertullian makes the object of his attack in the work *De Carne Christi*, and this occasioned his asserting the necessary identity of the human soul in Christ. "It is"—he says, in opposition to that view—"a false distinction, as if we were separated from the soul, since all that we are, is the soul. Lastly, without the soul we are nothing, not deserving the name of a man, but of a corpse ;" which was connected with Tertullian's view of one soul in opposition to that Dichotomy. "If Christ," he says, "came only to free our soul, then must it be also our soul which he bore in himself—that is, our form, which also may be the hidden form of our soul. When the Valentinians asserted, that Christ appeared in that form only in order to lead men to a consciousness of their soul as an entity separate from the body, to be

raised to an life, he replied, "On this the Son of God came down, and entered into a soul,[1] not in order that the soul may know itself in Christ, but that it may know Christ in itself." Against the assertion that the soul, which was concealed from itself, must be first led to a knowledge of itself, Tertullian brings forward those testimonies of a higher self-consciousness and consciousness of God, to which he was so partial, and says, "So far is the soul from not knowing itself, that it knows its Creator, its Judge, and its State. Before it has learnt anything concerning God, it names God; before receiving information concerning his judgment, it learns to commit itself to God; even hearing nothing more frequently than that there is no hope after death, it wishes good or evil to every deceased person." He then refers to his treatise *On the Witness of the Soul*, in which he has developed this train of thought more fully.

As Anthropology is closely connected with Christology, Tertullian was led by the controversy respecting the true constitution of Christ's body to another point in which he was at issue with the Gnostics, the question respecting *the Resurrection of the Body*. By the same mental tendencies and the same principles by which the Gnostics were led to dispute Christ's possessing a real body, they were prompted to direct their polemics against the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. It was the same tendency to undervalue the body, the view common to all who believed in a Hyle, which, as the cause and seat of all evil, was destined to destruction. The doctrine of a bodily resurrection might be more easily attacked since the more crude and literal conception of it, as it was currently received, laid it open on many sides, and presented occasions for starting difficulties of various kinds. Hence, it was the policy of the Gnostics, if in society they met with an unarmed Christian, to begin their attacks on the doctrine of the church at this point, where it was most vulnerable. They well knew, said Tertullian, how difficult it would be to gain an entrance for faith in any other god than the God of the universe, who was known to all by nature through the testimony of his works; so they took care to begin rather with questions relating to the resurrection, since it was more difficult to be-

[1] The words are *animam subiit*, whereby Tertullian without doubt wished to mark the union of the Son of God with the soul, or his self-renunciation, when he entered into this form of existence, although of the manner in which this took place no clear account has been given.

lieve in a resurrection of the body than to believe in a God. "There are," Tertullian says, "many uneducated persons among Christians, and very many doubtful and simple in their faith; very many who require to be instructed, directed, and fortified." It was a part also of the tactics that were constantly employed in the controversy respecting the peculiar truths of revelation, that the Gnostics appealed to positions taken from the surface, as universally acknowledged truths, under the name of *sensus communis*, the expressions of the sound human understanding; such judgments, which might be valid for the lower department of every-day experience, they wished to be received as absolute truth for all things. Tertullian says, that the Gnostics made use of this method because all the uneducated judge only according to the *communes sensus*, and the doubtful and simple are unsettled only by these *communes sensus*. "For," he says, "the very simplicity recommends the *communes sensus*, and the sympathy of sentiment and the familiarity of opinions, and therefore they are regarded as more trustworthy, because they express things naked and open and known to all." He himself was very far from refusing to acknowledge that peculiar department in which the *sensus communis* might assert its rights; he even appealed himself, as we have seen, to the truths belonging to the general consciousness, and aimed at finding in them a point of connexion for the peculiar truths of revelation, as he says: "It is indeed possible to judge according to the *communis sensus* in divine things, but for a testimony to the truth, not for the support of falsehood—for what agrees with the divine arrangement, not for what is against it. For certain things are known by nature, such as the immortality of the soul to very many persons, and our God to all." But he knew also the limits of this department, the ground of the error which proceeded from it when the *sensus communis* is made the unlimited measure for everything. He knew that the tendency of the spirit which attaches itself to what lies on the surface, in doing so, renders itself unsusceptible of deeper and higher truths; that to know these requires a deepening of the spirit, as he says, after speaking of the superficial judgments on which the heretics relied, "But the Divine reason is in the marrow, not on the surface, and generally is jealous of what is obvious." Moreover Tertullian adduces another frequent method of the heretics in their intercourse with believers—that at first they will

not divulge their real opinions, but guard against being thought to be the opponents of the church doctrine of the resurrection; only they maintain them in another, a spiritual sense; then they appeal to expressions of holy writ, which treat of the spiritual resurrection that takes place even in earthly life, and this they use as a point of connexion, to make a transition to an attack on the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Tertullian says, "By this contrivance they are accustomed often to deceive our people in conversations, as if they themselves admitted a resurrection of the body. Woe, they say, to him who shall not rise in this body; lest they should immediately repel them if they at once rejected the resurrection of the body. But in their own silent thoughts they understand it so,—Woe to him who while he is in this body does not know the mysteries of the heretics; for this, in their esteem, is the resurrection." [1]

Although Tertullian had set up a general rule, that in disputing with heretics persons ought not to meddle with the interpretation of the scriptures, yet he maintained that they should take from them what they had in common with the heathen, so that they must prove their positions from holy writ, which they could not do.[2] Still he thinks, "If heresies are necessary for sifting the faith, there must be given in holy writ a point of connexion for false interpretations on which the heresies support themselves." There is always, Tertullian says, some truth at the bottom. Since the truth revealed in the divine word must pass into the consciousness of mankind by a free process of development, and everything depends upon a free appropriation of divine truth, hence also a point of connexion for errors must be given by means of the one-sided conception of truth. Holy writ was constructed for a process of development and purification, by which the consciousness of divine truth should penetrate mankind. This is the truth confirmed by history, that forms the groundwork of Tertullian's remark. Here the order of the new prophets as necessary for the guidance of the church found its point of connexion in Tertullian's meditations. The church required, as he rightly perceived, not the letter excluding all differences of interpretation and avoiding every point of connexion for error; it was needful that heresies should also find a point of

[1] Cap. xx.

[2] Cap. iii. "Aufers denique hæreticis quæ cum ethnicis sapiunt ut de scripturis solis quæstiones suas sistant; et stare non poterunt."

connexion for sifting the genuine and the spurious. In the Catholic church, at a later period, a constant external appeal to a living ecclesiastical authority was deemed necessary to secure the certain interpretation of the silent word, and to guard against the caprice of private opinion: for such a standard Tertullian substituted the new order of prophets. Since heresy, by means of such points of attachment, is always making fresh encroachments, and at last will even attack those passages which seem to serve best for its refutation, he thought that to guard against it the new revelation by the Paraclete was required. In reference to this he says, "But since it behoves the Holy Spirit not to be silent, in order that heresy may not overwhelm such passages of holy writ, ... now at last he has driven away all ambiguities and all parables such as they are fond of, by the open and plain publication of the whole truth, through the new prophecy which has been poured forth from the Paraclete. If thou drawest from these fountains, thou wilt thirst for no other instruction; no burning desire of questions will consume thee."[1] Indeed, the same reasons which rendered necessary the rise of heresies in the sifting process of the church, and the construction of the sacred scriptures in such a manner as would give points of connexion for these heresies—the same reasons existed (according to the laws of the wisdom that guided the development of the church) why no such decisive authority should be given, as Tertullian wished to establish, though in contradiction to the truth expressed by himself.

As the Gnostics made it a part of their system to pour contempt on the earthly body, Tertullian, in opposing them, endeavoured to set forth its dignity. The Gnostics availed themselves of the ambiguity of the term Flesh in holy writ to apply all that was said of it to the body. Tertullian proves against them, from the connexion of holy writ, that by the term σὰρξ, human corruption and not mere corporeity is often intended.[2]

As we have already seen, Christ appears to Tertullian as the original type according to which the first man was formed.[3] Thus he recognises the connexion between the original and the new restorative creation. He would have made still further advances in Christian ethics, if his ascetic tendency had not hampered him in carrying out this train of thought.

[1] Cap. lxiii. [2] Cap. xlvi.

[3] "Quodcunque enim limus exprimebatur, Christus cogitabatur homo futurus."

From the idea of the resurrection Tertullian thought it might be proved that in all the passages relating to it, not the soul but the body is spoken of, since the resurrection presupposes death. Likewise in reference to Christ, the resurrection must be understood not of the soul, but of the body. In accordance with his ideas which we have already explained, he distinguished two things in Christ. What Christ said of his being troubled at the approach of death, was to Tertullian only a sign of the soul that was present in him. He appealed to the fact that even the human soul was not affected by death, of which he believed its continuous activity in dreaming might be taken as a proof.

When the Gnostics made use of the passages of scripture which speak of the resurrection in a spiritual sense, in order to explain everything relating to it in a spiritual and figurative manner, Tertullian maintained that this spiritual sense itself presupposed a sense referring to an actual resurrection, as an image always supposes something real at the basis to which it refers. "Otherwise," he says, "the images themselves could not be distinguished, if the truths also were not announced, according to which the images were drawn. If everything is an image, what is that of which it is the image? Of what use is it to hold out a mirror, if there is no face opposite?" Tertullian endeavours to show that the dignity of the soul and the body are closely connected. It serves him as a proof of the dignity of the body, that it is destined to be the organ and vehicle of this God-related soul. "Has God entrusted the shadow of his own soul, the breath of his spirit, to the most common vessel, and is it to be condemned because he has put it in so unworthy a place?" He appeals to the close connexion of the bodily and the spiritual in the whole of human life, and then goes on to show how Christianity everywhere appropriates the bodily as a point of connexion for the supernatural and divine; how everything which comes to the spirit is transmitted through the body. He observes, as founded in the peculiar nature of Christianity, that there must be the same principle of glorification for all natural things, which appropriates them for its own divine operations; but it follows from what we have already remarked on many occasions, that owing to his peculiar mental constitution, he was not capable of distinctly keeping apart the natural and the divine, the material and the spiritual. He says, "The flesh is washed, that the soul may be cleansed from

spots. The flesh is anointed, that the soul may be consecrated," (this refers to the use of oil at baptism, as a symbol of the universal Christian priesthood;) "the flesh is marked with the sign of the cross, that the soul may be protected; the flesh is shaded by the imposition of hands, that the soul may be enlightened by the spirit," (all which refers to the sacred ceremonies connected with baptism;) "the flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ, that the soul may be fattened by God."[1] That mode of contemplating the Holy Supper is here implied, according to which, as the body is sanctified by a certain contact with Christ, so the soul by spiritual communion is made partaker with the divine λόγος, of a divine life. We ought to compare what Tertullian says of baptism in this and other passages already quoted, with the following words in this very treatise: "The soul is not sanctified by the washing, but by the answer."[2] He here distinguishes the operation that relates to the body, which is brought by baptism into connexion with the risen Saviour, and the spiritual influence on the soul, which he marks as effected through faith, or the confession. Here, too, we perceive that Tertullian everywhere supposes a baptism received with consciousness and joined with a confession. In another passage, he says of the dignity of the body as it must appear from the Christian stand-point, "Was it not their bodies which Paul, in Rom. xii. 1, exhorts to present to God as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God? But how as living, if they perish? how as holy, if they are profane? how as acceptable to God, if they are condemned?"

We have already seen what a forced interpretation Tertullian gives to the words in 1 Cor. xv. 50, which the Gnostics made use of to impugn the current doctrine of the resurrection. And in this controversial work he adopts at first that interpretation, and understands the words to mean the carnal disposition, which cannot be made a partaker of the kingdom of God. Yet he afterwards brings forward the correct interpretation, that this body in its present form—without experiencing a transformation—cannot attain to the happiness of the kingdom of God.

The Gnostics, not without reason, opposed to the current doctrine of the resurrection Paul's contrast in 1 Cor. xv.; they appealed to the comparison of the seed-corn, from which

[1] Cap. viii.

[2] Cap. xlviii. "Anima enim non lavatione, sed responsione sanciturr."

they inferred that not the same body that died, but one of a higher kind would rise again. Tertullian, on the contrary, maintained that according to that comparison, from every seed-corn the peculiar fruit corresponding to its kind would spring up after its dissolution, and he held himself justified in inferring the identity of the dead and risen body; the same nature, quality, and form. But this was the very point to be determined,—in what to place the identity. This Tertullian settled in too narrow and contracted a manner, not corresponding to the meaning of the apostle. By this mode of conceiving it, he was involved in many difficulties from which he could not well extricate himself, and had no resource left but asserting that with God all things were possible, and that the wisdom of God was foolishness to the world.[1] But it was better when, in the restoration of the members of the body, he distinguished the inferior use, which they served in the earthly state, and the destiny of a higher kind which would be suitable for a higher existence: on this point he says, "Thou hast received, O man, a mouth for eating and drinking; why not rather for speaking, that thou mayest be distinguished from other animals? why not rather for proclaiming God, that thou mayest be a superior to thy fellow-men?"[2] We perceive the genuine Christian interest of Tertullian in the importance he attaches to maintaining the identity of the whole personality of man in its transformation in the higher existence, and the connexion between this world and the next. "If I do not remember that I am the same person who gained the reward, how can I praise God? How shall I sing a new song to him if I do not know that I am the person who owes him thanks?"[3]

Lastly, we may also recognise the true Christian spirit of Tertullian in his opposition to a coarse, carnal conception of the happiness of the future world. He who, as a Montanist, was a zealous advocate of Chiliasm, was at the same time an opponent of a gross sensual form of it, and of that literal interpretation of the promises of the Old Testament by which it was supported. He came forward as the antagonist of a coarse Eudæmonism. He says, "It is absurd enough to imagine that God would invite us to obedience by promising

[1] Cap. lv.

[2] Cap. lxi.

[3] Cap. lvi. "Si non meminerim, me esse, qui merui, quomodo gloriam Deo dicam? quomodo canam illi novum canticum, nesciens me esse qui gratiam debeam?"

the fruits of the field, and the sustenance of this life, which he grants to the irreligious and blasphemous provided only they are men, since he rains on the evil and the good, and sends his sun on the just and the unjust. It is, indeed, a happy faith, if those things are to be obtained which the enemies of God and Christ not only use, but abuse, honouring the creature more than the Creator. Thou wilt reckon onions and truffles among the good things of the earth, because God has said, 'Man shall not live by bread alone.'"[1] He here declares the unbelief of the Jews from their carnal interpretation of the promises, and says, that since they only hoped for the earthly, they would lose the heavenly.

And in this treatise we may also observe the altered direction of Tertullian's mind, as to the point just mentioned, inasmuch as the end of the world was no longer represented by him as an object of dread, and of prayer for its delay, but of the most ardent longing for all believers. He says, "Our desires sigh for the destruction of this world." This longing anticipation of Christ's second advent belongs to the characteristics of the Montanist stand-point in Tertullian, but without our being justified in asserting that he was first turned by Montanism from that direction which we find in his Apology; this alteration in his views might be accounted for by the progress of the development of his Christian life, with which Montanism had afterwards been combined.

As we have already noticed in Tertullian a disposition to investigate the connexion between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace, to discover analogies and anticipations in nature of truths that relate to the kingdom of God, it is not surprising that he sought to find in nature analogies for the resurrection; thus he says: "Look now at the examples of the divine power. Day dies into night, and on all sides is buried in darkness. The glory of the world is dishonoured; everything that exists is covered with blackness; all things are rendered mean, silent, and torpid; there is a general mourning; a cessation of all business. Thus the lost light is mourned for. And yet again it revives with its own ornament and dowry with the sun, the same as before, whole and entire, slaying its own death, night; bursting its sepulchre, the darkness; coming forth the heir to itself, until night revives with its own accompaniments. The rays of the stars are rekindled, which the morning glow had extinguished:

[1] Cap. xxvi.

The absent constellations are brought back, which the destruction of time had taken away. The mirrors of the moon are re-adorned, which the monthly number had worn away. The winters and summers revolve, and springs and autumns, with their own powers, habits, and fruits. Earth receives instructions from heaven, to clothe the trees after they have been stripped, to colour the flowers afresh, again to bring forth the herbage, to exhibit the same seeds that had been taken away, and not to exhibit them before they are taken away. Wonderful procedure! from a defrauder to become a preserver; that she may restore, she takes away; that she may guard, she destroys; that she may retain entire, she injures; that she may increase, she consumes." He thus concludes his description: "Nothing perishes but for salvation. Therefore, this whole revolving order of things is an attestation to the resurrection of the dead. God wrote it in his works before he wrote it in his word. He has predicted it by the agencies [of nature] earlier than by [inspired] voices. He has sent nature as thy first teacher, to be followed by prophecy, that being a disciple of nature thou mayest more easily believe prophecy; that thou mayest receive as soon as thou hearest what thou seest already on all sides; nor doubt that that God will be the reviver of the body whom thou knowest to be the restorer of all things."[1]

From what we have already remarked respecting the chronological relation of this class of Tertullian's writings, we must introduce here his treatise against the Valentinians. In his work on the resurrection he describes the conduct of the heretics just such as is attributed to the Valentinians in this book. It is a striking contrast between the heretics of Marcion's school, who strove after apostolic simplicity, and the mystic obscurities of the Valentinians, which Tertullian compared to the awful Eleusinian mysteries. He says of them, that they attracted men, as did those of Eleusis, by their great mysteriousness and large promises, and by the strained expectation in which they kept those who were about to be initiated. He draws the following vivid picture of the manner in which they sought to draw off the simple-minded from the church. "If you ask in good faith, they tell you with a serious look and contracted eyebrows, that it is a profound subject. If you press them more closely, they affirm the common faith, but in most ambiguous terms. If

[1] Cap. xii.

you intimate that you know their doctrine, they deny that they know anything. If you come to close quarters with them, they scatter about a foolish simplicity by their overthrow."[1]

When these heretics thought they could raise themselves above the simple-minded in the church, Tertullian urged against them, that true wisdom rests upon simplicity. He says, "On this account we are abused by them as simple, as if simplicity must stand in contradiction to wisdom, though the Lord connects them both together. 'Be wise as serpents, and harmless as doves.' . . . . . Moreover, the face of the Lord looks on those who seek him in simplicity—certainly not the wisdom of Valentine, but of Solomon. Also the apostle tells us, conformably to the word of God, to become children again, (1 Cor. xiv. 20;) that is, children in malice. . . . . Hence simplicity alone can more easily know and manifest God; cleverness alone can agitate and betray." He blames the Valentinians for an intellectual pride, which led them to despise the practical as belonging only to the Psychici. "And on this account they think that acting is not necessary for them; and they observe no law of discipline, since they avoid the necessity of martyrdom." On this point we have already spoken in our notice of Tertullian's *Scorpiace*.

[1] The words "Fatuam simplicitatem sua cæde dispergunt" are very obscure, and their interpretation is disputable. Formerly, the following interpretation appeared to me the best: "When they must suffer a defeat, they impart to their adversaries a foolish simplicity;" that is, when they must submit and cannot maintain their ground against the objections of their adversaries, they assume an air of importance, as if their opponents were too foolish and simple to understand their mysteries. A second interpretation which I then proposed was this,—If they suffer a defeat, they assume the appearance of a foolish simplicity, they profess to be too foolish and simple to understand the objections of their opponents; they pretend to be dumb in order to be excused from answering. Of these two interpretations, I must now give the preference to the former; but that which I have followed in the text seems to me to correspond more exactly to the words. I take *dispergere* to mean, to scatter a hostile force, to drive asunder; and the *fatua simplicitas* is the contrast to that simplicity connected with wisdom of which Tertullian afterwards speaks. The common *simplices* in the church, the *rudes*, to whom, as we have seen, Tertullian wished to give the means of protection in conflict with the Gnostics, are the *fatui* who were not equal to the conflict with the Gnostics. Instead of these being able to defeat the Gnostics, owing to their *fatuitas*, they suffered a defeat from the Gnostics. The Gnostics, who wished to give them no account of their mysteries, thereby relieved themselves from the embarrassment, and put their enemies into perplexity by the objections they made to them.

Further, Tertullian remarks that the difficulty of reaching the true sense of the doctrine of the Valentinians, owing to their affectation of mystery, and their dissimulation, is increased by the contradictory opinions that exist in their school. Certainly, in this party of the Gnostics especially there were manifold shades of opinion; for the deeply poetical and speculative cast of Valentine's fundamental ideas occasioned their being further modified and developed by his disciples, and hence, from the same general principles, many different tendencies arose. Sometimes the disciples, in the bold flight of their speculation, disregarding the boundaries of human knowledge, attempted to soar above their master. And so it might have happened, that if a person wished to dispute with the Valentinians about their doctrine, a Valentinian, when certain reputed Valentinian doctrines were impugned, might sincerely say, that it was nothing to him, such were not his doctrines. To this Tertullian refers when he says, "And thus we foresee, that they, even when they set on one side their usual dissimulation, will answer on certain articles with uprightness—'That is not so,' or, 'I understand it differently,' or, 'I do not admit that.'" As the chronological position of this treatise has already served for proof that Tertullian when he composed it was already a Montanist, so it is very evident that this was the case from a passage where Tertullian thus designates two writers, *Miltiades, ecclesiarum sophista*, and *Proculus noster*. We certainly meet here with a contrast; the *ecclesiarum sophista*, is opposed to *noster*,—by the former is denoted the Catholic church in opposition to Montanism, while *noster* is a mark of Montanism. Miltiades was a rhetorician of the Catholic church, who had written against the Montanist idea of inspiration. Perhaps the predicate *sophista ecclesiarum* as the designation of one who had written on the side of the Catholic church against Montanism, had a secondary reproachful meaning. But Proculus was a zealous advocate of Montanism.

As Marcion was the individual among the Gnostics with whom the church had chiefly to contend, Tertullian had directed his efforts principally against him; and after the work we have just mentioned was finished, renewed the controversy afresh; for his work already in circulation against Marcion, as we have remarked, did not satisfy his own requirements, and he therefore composed a new treatise against him, in five books. It is evident from his own statement

that this was in the fifteenth year of Septimius Severus, that is, in A.D. 208. The relation in which these two men, who were both distinguished by strongly marked peculiarities of character, stood to each other, is remarkable. In their general character, and especially in the tendency of their disposition, they bore a close affinity to one another. Both had found their complete satisfaction in Christianity; were attached to it with their whole souls, animated with zeal for the blessing that the Gospel had brought to humanity, compared with which all else appeared as nothing;—both were resolved to stake everything for that which to them was the highest and their all. In the minds of both an entirely new world had been developed by Christianity. They were the living witnesses of the new creation in humanity which had been brought forth by Christianity; and if the image of these two men had only come down to us as a fragment saved from the ruins of an age whose history had perished, and we knew nothing further of Christianity and its operations, the contemplation of it would indicate that something extraordinary had once happened in history, and had been capable of effecting a prodigious revolution. These men, by the affinity of their characters, might have been closely united; but history often teaches us, that by accidental misunderstandings, owing to a difference in the course of development, by contrarieties in the process of education, men who were intimately allied in mental endowments, and therefore suited to cooperate, have been widely separated, and even violently counteracted one another. Thus Marcion and Tertullian, if contemporaries, might have been violent antagonists, and Tertullian, although separated by an intervening period from Marcion, was yet in his writings his most vehement opponent. Thus would Marcion have been opposed to Tertullian had he been his contemporary, or lived after him. Yet both these men would have better understood one another, if they could have gained their knowledge of their respective characters otherwise than through broken rays in the mirror of the development of the age.

Marcion and Tertullian were allied by their rugged one-sidedness,—an ardent love which seized on its object with all their soul, and was disposed to repel everything else,—a tendency which rendered them more alive to contrasts than to similarities. A full deep current of sentiment predominated in both. Everything proceeded with them from cordial living feeling. Marcion in this tendency differed from all the

other Gnostics, in whom the intellectual element took the lead, and on this side of his character he is not so much akin to the Gnostics as to those who were diametrically opposite.

the rugged one-sided tendency of his feelings led him to a mode of conception which found an accidental point of connexion in certain existing speculations, and thus tended to give a unity to his intellectual views which would otherwise have been wanting. Hence it is evident how very much Tertullian must have misunderstood Marcion, when he looked on the speculative element as his chief characteristic, and thought that he must explain his system, like those of the other Gnostics, as formed from a mixture of foreign philosophy with Christianity. Tertullian was distinguished from Marcion in this respect, that there was added to the ascendency of feeling a dialectic element developed by his early education, but which followed submissively the tendency of his feelings, in an irregular unscholastic manner. Tertullian, too, was far more speculative than Marcion, only his speculations were always governed by his feelings, and were destitute of a scientific form.

To both the revelation of God in Christ was all in all, but in Marcion there was a striving to go back to the original fountain, and to get rid of the intervention of all authority or tradition whatever. In this respect he is the representative of a Protestant spirit, although not rightly understanding itself, and sometimes wandering into the opposite direction. Tertullian, on the other hand, developed himself in dependance on the church tradition of his times (the North African church especially), and though he had zealously studied the holy scriptures, yet his conceptions of Christianity had from the first been determined by that ecclesiastical medium through which it had been presented to his religious spirit. As this medium had already been infused by a mixture of the Old Testament stand-point with that of the New, so Tertullian's views were affected by the same cause. Marcion, on the other hand, commenced his course with opposing that mixture in its incipient stage. It was his endeavour to recognise and restore Christianity in its original purity, freed from all Jewish elements. But he erred in the opposite extreme, since he was misled into the notion of an absolute contrariety between the two stand-points; and as Christianity necessarily presupposes the revelations of the Old Testament, and those revelations that lead from the Old Testament to

the New can only be rightly understood in their organic connexion, it follows that by this separation of the Old Testament from the New, he was prevented from rightly understanding the latter. This erroneously imagined contrariety so far misled him that he failed to understand many important points of Christianity itself. In this respect Tertullian came much nearer than Marcion to a correct apprehension of Christianity, though, on the other hand, he erred in mingling the two standpoints. Tertullian had this advantage, that he knew how to distinguish the Old and New Testament revelations in their organic connexion, as well as the revelation of Christ in the organic connexion of all its original representatives, in the various and mutually supplementing representations contained in the writings of the apostles. Marcion, on the contrary, attached himself with stubborn one-sidedness, to a single doctrinal type, that of the apostle Paul; and as each single doctrinal type of the New Testament can only be rightly understood when viewed as one of the constituent parts in the representation of the whole, Marcion, by severing this connexion, and setting up the Pauline type against all the rest, as if they were spurious, and this the only one in which Christianity could be recognised, was led into a misunderstanding of Paul's doctrine, and consequently of Christianity as contained in it. In both these individuals we perceive a one-sided tendency of the ethical spirit, and neither of them rightly apprehended how Christianity was fitted to be an elevating transforming principle for everything belonging to human nature. But the principle that was at the root of this tendency did not entirely pervade Tertullian: it was opposed by the influence of the Christian spirit, which he had imbibed more fully from the study of the New Testament as a whole. There were in his character, as we have seen, some contradictory elements. In Marcion, on the other hand, the opposition against nature was developed by logically carrying out his theoretical principle, in consequence of his mutilated conception of Christianity,—the contrariety between creation and redemption,—since according to his notions the God who had revealed himself in Christ was not the Creator and the God of Nature. In both individuals we perceive a one-sided unbending supernatural element. But there is this difference,—in Marcion this element had no counterpoise; the practical tendency was carried out to its theoretical consequences by means of the contrariety just noticed between God

in Christ and the God of Nature and History: hence Christianity became an isolated fragment, for which no preparation had been made, and without any point of connexion in either nature or history. In Tertullian, on the contrary, the supernatural element was softened by his more comprehensive view of Christianity. He not only recognised in the earlier succession of revelations, a preparation and point of connexion for Christianity, but also applied the law of successive development in other instances. He was disposed, indeed, with Marcion, to see nothing in the heathen world but the kingdom of Satan, and to regard its earlier culture as only an antagonism to Christianity; yet Satan, according to his views of the universe, was not the same as the Evil Principle of Marcion; he was only a spirit fallen from God; who, against his will, was kept dependent on the Supreme Being, and could only act within the limits of that dependence: he could not annihilate the laws of the original creation, but was held in restraint by them; he could only in a false manner imitate the works of God, and obscure the original: in such views Christianity found a point of connexion. Though Tertullian was disposed to look upon philosophy only as a falsifier of truth, yet he recognised an original undeniable truth in the universal consciousness of mankind, which Marcion, on the contrary, as he regarded reason only as the work of the Demiurgus, dissevered from all connexion with Christianity. Tertullian could perceive in nature and history a prophetic foreshadowing of revelation and of Christianity—an introductory medium of communication. According to Marcion's conceptions, as we have said, there was no transition-point, no link connecting the earlier development of the human mind with Christianity; Christ suddenly appeared; suddenly the divine life appeared in individual human souls. Here the recognition of intermediate stages and transitions gave Tertullian the advantage. But after the new life from the perfect God—the divine life in humanity,—had once entered the souls of individuals, it was self-sufficient; it had everything in itself which was requisite for its development and progression; in communion with Christ all is given; every one has enough for himself, and requires no other aid. Here Tertullian stands below Marcion. As soon as the reference to the external authority of the church was admitted by him as the intervening medium for the reference to Christ, and the development of his Christian consciousness was once rendered dependent on such

an external authority, there followed in the train a dependence on another external authority, that of the pretended new prophetic order. Tertullian, it is true, differed from Marcion in recognising reason as the work of the same God as Christianity, and in admitting a connexion between the earlier developments of reason and Christianity; but yet he did not ascribe to reason the capability of developing Christianity in an independent manner, and deducing everything from it which was requisite for the continued development of the church. Here the reconciliation and harmonious union between reason and the supernatural, as it was effected by redemption, was not recognised by him; and hence he required new revelations to be added from without, in order to carry forward the development of Christianity and of the church to its final completion. Such, we believe, is the correct view of the relation of these two eminent men to each other; and we now pass on to the examination of particulars.

The antagonism between Tertullian and Marcion appears, when Tertullian, impugning Marcion's doctrine of the distinction between the Demiurgus and the God of Christ, (the doctrine of a hitherto wholly unknown God, who suddenly revealed himself in Christ,) testifies of the indisputableness of one God and of an universal consciousness of God, and says, "Hence I should maintain most firmly, that He is no God, who is to-day uncertain, because hitherto he has been unknown; since respecting whatever Being it is certain that he is God, from this very fact we infer, that he was never unknown, and therefore not uncertain. For, as the Creator of all things, he was equally known as they were; since for this very reason they were manifested, that God might be known. For when, at a later period, Moses first appears to have introduced into the temple of letters the God of the universe, yet the birth-day of the knowledge of the Creator is not to be reckoned from the Pentateuch. . . . . Lastly, the great majority of mankind, who never knew the name of Moses, (to say nothing of his writings,) knew the God of Moses; and even when idolatry overshadowed so large a part of the world, they still spoke of him by a peculiar name as God, and as the God of gods, and said, 'If God grant,' and, 'As God pleases,' and, 'I commend thee to God.' See, then, whether they knew him, of whom they testify that he can do all things; and they owe this to no books of Moses. The human soul is older than prophecy. The consciousness of God is the dowry of the soul

from the beginning; it is one and the same among the Egyptians and the Syrians, and in Pontus. For souls call the God of the Jews their God. . . . . God will never be concealed; God will never be wanting; he will always be understood; he will always be heard; he will also be seen in whatever manner he wishes. All that we are, and all in which we are, form a witness of God. Thus he is proved to be God and the only one, since he is unknown to none."[1] Thus, according to Tertullian, it belongs to the idea of God, that it requires no proof. He is necessarily presupposed. He marks the relation in which the universal consciousness of God stands to Revelation in the following manner:—"We maintain that God is first known from nature; then he must be known more fully by instruction: according to nature, by his works; according to instruction, by announcement."[2] In his opinion, the heathen could not be called to account for their ignorance of God, if God were unknown by nature, and never revealed as in the Gospel, and if he could not be known by all. But it is due to the Creator, to know him by nature, since he can be known by his works, and men ought to be incited thereby to seek a fuller acquaintance with him.[3] Even idolatry, according to Tertullian, testifies that God reveals himself by the works of creation; for without marks of the Divine in the creation, he believed that the deification of nature could not arise. Turning from the constellations which gave rise to Sabæism, to lesser things, he says, "I will descend to lower objects. Will a flower out of the hedges, —I will not say from the meadows; a little shell from any sea,—I do not say from the Red Sea; a little feather from a moor-fowl,—I do not say from the peacock;—will either of these things announce to thee a vulgar artificer as the Creator?" He then turns to the animal creation, to the bees and smaller insects, and notices the impress of the Divine in their structure and habits; so that the Divine greatness is revealed in the smallest objects, as, according to Paul, God manifested his power in human weakness.[4] When this world appeared to the Marcionites to be unworthy of a perfect God, and hence they believed that they discerned in it another God than the perfect one revealed through Christ, Tertullian describes them as persons who wished to sit in judgment on the Supreme

[1] Lib. i. cap. 10. [2] Lib. i. cap. 18. [3] Lib. v. cap. 16.
[4] Lib. i. cap. 14. "Sic magnitudinem in mediocritate probari docens, quemadmodum virtutem infirmitate secundum apostolum."

Being; since they said, "God ought not to make it thus," and, "He ought rather to make it thus,"—just as if any one knew what is in God, except the Spirit of God. "But those who have the spirit of the world, and by their wisdom do not know God in his wisdom, fancy themselves wiser than God; since, as the wisdom of the world is foolishness to God, so the wisdom of God is foolishness to the world. But *we* know that the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. And thus God is peculiarly great when he appears little to men, and then he is especially the best, when to men he does not appear to be good; and then he is most of all One, when to men he appears two or more." The creation appeared to Tertullian as a revelation of God, which presupposes a Spirit to whom he reveals himself. "First of all," he says, "the goodness of the Creator is shown therein, that God is unwilling to be unknown to all eternity; that is, there should be nothing by whom God can be known. . . . . For what is so good as the knowledge and enjoyment of God?" Tertullian notices as belonging to the peculiar essence of Christianity, its alliance to nature, the appropriation of the natural for the Divine; and he discerns in this a testimony to the unity between Creation and Redemption, to the identity of that God from whom the creation proceeds, and who has revealed himself in Christ. "But," he says of this God, "he has not up to the present time blamed the water of the Creator with which he purifies his people, nor the bread by which he represents his own body,[1] nor the oil with which he anoints his people, nor the mixture of milk and honey with which he nourishes his children;[2] even for his own sacraments requiring aims of the Creator." "The God of Marcion," he says elsewhere, "rushes into a world that is not his own, snatching man from God, the son from the father, the pupil from the instructor, the servant from his master; that he may make him impious to God, undutiful to his father, ungrateful to his instructor, unfaithful to his master." He then says that Christ was baptized with strange water, to a strange God; that he lifted his hands towards strange heavens, to a strange God, and prostrated himself on a strange earth

[1] The words "quo ipsum corpus repræsentet," are important in reference to Tertullian's views of the Holy Supper.

[2] An allusion to the symbolical practice, the meaning of which we have before explained, which Tertullian expresses by the phrase *quos infantat*, which is used respecting the first food given to infants, and is therefore a symbol of the childhood of the new life.

to a strange God,—gave thanks for strange bread to a strange God, and communicated under the name of charity and love, strange blessings from a strange God.

Tertullian earnestly controverted Marcion's doctrine of the divine attributes. Marcion's dualism respecting God was connected with a dualism respecting the divine attributes. A justice that revealed itself in punishment appeared to him irreconcilable with the idea of love and goodness, and especially the idea of punishment was irreconcilable with the idea of the perfect God of love and compassion. Here too we perceive the unyielding one-sidedness of his nature. The idea of the love of God as it shines forth in the Gospel had so taken possession of his soul, that the idea of punitive justice, as exemplified in the judgments of God in the Old Testament, —the idea of the wrath of God, appeared to him to be completely excluded. The idea of redemption had so filled his soul, that there was no room left for the idea of punishment. Certainly this one-sidedness was promoted and even acquired an appearance of truth, by means of that crude anthropopathism which was favoured by some Christians, at least in their language, who insisted on the idea of God's punitive justice to the prejudice of his love. Tertullian, therefore, in his polemics against Marcion, was required to prove that the idea of God's punitive justice was well founded and in harmony with the nature of love; he had to vindicate the idea of divine wrath, as well as the expressions connected with it in the Old Testament. He says, "For it was not sufficient for goodness to be self-commended, when oppressed by an adversary. For though it is commendable by itself, yet it cannot be preserved by itself, because it is conquerable by an adversary; unless some power producing fear should preside, which may compel even those who are unwilling to desire and to guard goodness." The ideas of law and punishment appeared to Tertullian to be necessarily connected,—punishment as a protection for law,—and from that the idea of divine wrath appeared inseparable. "For how can it be, that God should give commands which he will not maintain? that he should forbid sins which he will not punish, because he will not judge? because he is a stranger to all notions of severity and punishment? For why does he prohibit the commission of that which when committed he does not take cognisance of? For that is tacitly permitted which is prohibited without punishment; and certainly he prohibits nothing to be done, except-

ing what he dislikes to be done. He would be esteemed most stupid who would not be offended with a deed which he does not love to be done; for offence is the companion of frustrated desire. But if he is offended, he must feel anger; if he feel anger, he must be avenged: for vengeance is the fruit of anger; and anger is due to an offence; and an offence, as I said, is the companion of a frustrated will." The expression is indeed harsh. Tertullian was often at a loss for the right expression corresponding to the idea, in the consciousness of the rectitude of his religious realism, so as to retain the pure spiritual conception: his language easily falls into a material element. But we need only compare what he says in other places respecting the *ratio* in God, in order to prevent the misapprehension that might arise from this source. He says against Marcion, "I maintain this maxim, that as all things are natural, so they are rational with God." When the Marcionites asserted that it was impossible to speak of the wrath of God, without attributing human passions to God, Tertullian rejoined, that in general it is not possible to think of God except according to human analogy, and that everything must be regarded as one thing in God and another thing in man. The same is true of the love and goodness of God. He desires an elevated anthropopathism, founded on the fact that man was made after the image of God, and bears in his spirit the image of God. Hence, instead of bringing God down to man, we should raise man to God, restore the image of God in man, and transform the human into the divine. We take these sentiments from the following words of Tertullian, directed against Marcion:—"How is it that thou thinkest there is something human in God, and why not regard all as divine? Him whom thou dost not deny to be God, thou confessest not to be human; if indeed, by confessing him to be God, thou hast prejudged that he is different from every species of human condition. Moreover, since thou acknowledgest that by the breath of God man became a living soul, it is perverse enough that thou wouldst rather place the human in God, than the divine in man; and rather transfer the image of man to God, than of God to man. And therefore this image of God is to be thought to be in man, because the human mind has the same emotions and feelings which God has; although man has not such as God has; for according to the essential nature of the being, their state and effects differ. For why do we esteem the contrary feelings, I mean those of gentleness,

patience, pity, and the mother of them all—goodness, to be divine? And yet we do not possess these in perfection, for God alone is perfect." We here observe in Tertullian the advocate of that which is the truth in anthropopathism, which rises from the true image of God in the spirit of man, to the contemplation of that which is above all those limitations and defects which adhere to the image, even to the original in God himself. When spiritual language fails in naming the divine attributes, he guards against the error of falsely humanizing the divine, by what he says on the relation of the image to the original. Tertullian charges Marcion with a want of consequential reasoning, when he only ascribes redemption and forgiveness of sins to the most high God; yet this presupposes guilt on the part of man, which separates him from this God. He says, "To whom did Christ reconcile all things, making peace by the blood of his cross, unless that Being whom all had offended, against whom they had rebelled by transgression, and to whom they belonged? They might have been brought into union with an entire stranger, but they could only be reconciled to him to whom they belonged." A little further on, in the same chapter, he says, "We cannot believe that trespasses are forgiven by him, against whom they had not been committed." Moreover, Tertullian opposed Marcion with the idea of justice under a form according to which it did not show itself first in punishment, not as a correlative idea of evil, but as lying at the root of the whole creation; justice shown in giving to every creature its own, so that all were kept within due bounds, the regulative justice in nature, the *justitia architectonica*, as it has been termed. He endeavours to prove that goodness and justice have been connected from the beginning in the works of God, and says, "His goodness has created the world; his justice has regulated it. . . . . It is the work of justice, that a separation has been pronounced between light and darkness; between day and night; between heaven and earth; between the higher and the lower waters; between the gathering of the seas and the mass of the dry land; between the greater and the lesser lights, diurnal and nocturnal; between male and female; and between the tree of the knowledge of death and of life; between the world and paradise; between water and land animals. As goodness has conceived all things, so justice has distinguished all from one another; all is arranged and disposed according to its dictates. . . . . Thou canst not, there-

fore, suppose that God was to be distinguished as judge only since evil began, and thus degrade justice by making it appear to be the cause of evil. For in this manner we have shown that it made its first appearance with goodness the originator of all things, so that it must be regarded as something indwelling in God, belonging to his essence and not accidental, since she was found in the Lord as the mistress of all his works. But as evil broke forth afterwards, and the goodness of God thenceforward had to deal with an adversary, then justice also had another office to perform." In the anthropopathisms of the Old Testament, of which Marcion made use to accuse the Demiurgus, Tertullian saw the wise condescension of God educating man for his salvation. He saw in them the preparatory steps for the culminating point of the divine condescension, in the incarnation of the Son of God. In the Old Testament theophanies he recognised the same actual subject, the divine λόγος who was afterwards to appear as man; and hence he accused Marcion of an inconsistency in regarding the theophanies under the Old Testament as unworthy of God, and yet in being willing to believe in that highest instance in the person of Christ crucified. But indeed the real humanity would be denied by Marcion through his Docetism. Tertullian says against him, "What you reprehend as unworthy of God, that will be assigned to the Son of God who was seen and heard, and sojourned on earth, the mediator and servant of the Father, in powers a God, in lowliness a man; so that he conferred as much on man as he took from God; all, in short, which according to you dishonours my God, is a sacrament of human salvation. God lived with man, that man might learn to act divinely; God acted with man as if with his equal, that man might act with God as with *his* equal. God became little that man might be most exalted. Thou, who art ashamed of such a God, I know not whether thou really believest that God was crucified." Tertullian maintained against Marcion, "God could not enter into intercourse with men without appropriating human feelings and affections, by which he might attemper the force of his majesty, which would be insufferable to human littleness; things unworthy of himself, but necessary for man, and in that view worthy of God; because nothing is so worthy of God as the salvation of man." As, according to Tertullian's conceptions, all the revelations and manifestations of God pointed to Christ, as he only recognised in the λόγος the revealing and revealed God,

so the name of the Father was to him the designation of the hidden God exalted above all creatures, the majesty unapproachable by a created spirit: hence he says to the Marcionites, "Whatever you require worthy of God, you will have in the Father, and unapproachable, and at rest, and (if I may say so) the God of philosophers." Tertullian remarked as a characteristic of Marcion, which was shown in his rejection of the Old Testament and his Docetism, that all his movements were sudden (*omnia subito apud Marcionem*), there was an impatience of spirit which would allow of nothing gradual or interventional; Tertullian, on the contrary, regarded gradual progression, successive development through various intervening steps, as a mark of the divine procedure. In this way he explains the relation of the Old Testament to the New. Hence, it was his opinion that the predominant revelation of divine wrath and punishment ought to precede the revelation of predominant divine love; or, as he expresses it, the revelation of the *severitas Dei*[1] must precede the revelation of the goodness of God. The difference in the temporal development of the divine attributes is not to be wondered at; or that God should appear milder after taming the rudeness of mankind, after having before appeared stricter, as was requisite, before that rudeness was tamed. Tertullian's phraseology is original, and not easily rendered in other terms, but his general drift is plain—that the revelation of God must be modified by the different states of mankind before and after redemption. Thus he says, that after the hardness of the people had been overcome, the hardness of the law also could be overcome.[2]

Tertullian opposed that tendency in Marcion which led him to prefer what was sudden. "I cannot believe," he says, "that anything comes suddenly from God, because nothing comes from him which has not been previously arranged. But if arranged, why not foretold, that it may be proved to

[1] Lib. ii. cap. 27.

[2] Tertullian's words are, "post duritiam populi, duritia legis edomita;" the meaning is,—It required first the *duritia legis* in order to check the hard-heartedness of the people, but after this had been brought about, the hardness of the law might be relaxed, and exhibit greater mildness. Thus an excellent and genuine Tertullian sense is given to the words. The emendation *edomitam*, according to which the passage would mean, "after the hard-heartedness of the people had been subdued by the hardness of the law," appears to me now not very necessary; and the present reading corresponds more to Tertullian's peculiar phraseology.

be arranged by the prediction, and to be divine by the arrangement?" What Tertullian means to say, is this:—God acts everywhere according to the connexion of a divine order, according to a plan made in his own counsels; but it is on this account requisite that it should appear in the gradual announcement by which one thing prepares the way for another. As Marcion endeavoured to prove a contrariety between the Old and New Testaments, between the God of the Creation and the God of the Gospel, Tertullian, on the other hand, endeavoured to show that in Christ himself such contrarieties might be found. But he regards the higher unity which reveals itself in these contrarieties, as belonging to the marks of the divine; thus he says of God,—"During so long a period he hid his light from men, and yet he says, that a light is not to be covered, but placed on a candlestick, that it may give light to all; and forbids us to curse again, and much more to curse at all. And he denounces a woe on the Pharisees and Scribes. Who is so like my God as his own Christ?" To the antitheses brought forward by Marcion he presents as parallel the contrarieties that exist throughout the world. "His own world acknowledges his antitheses, by the contrarieties of the elements, and yet it is arranged with the highest wisdom. On this account, O most inconsiderate Marcion, thou oughtest to have shown one God of light, and another of darkness, and then you would more easily prove that there was one God of goodness, and another God of severity. But the antithesis in Revelation is from the same Being whose is the antithesis in the world."

Marcion asserted that the prophecies which referred to Christ were not needed; that Christ required not the earlier prophecies to prove that he was the Redeemer; his own ministry furnished sufficient evidence. Tertullian disputed this assertion, and he was induced to disparage the evidence arising from Christ's miracles, and thus addresses Marcion: "Thou sayest, that there was no order of that kind necessary, because he immediately proved himself by the facts themselves, by the instances of his miraculous powers, to be the Son, the messenger and Christ of God. But I will deny that this alone is sufficient evidence, since he himself afterwards gave it up; for in saying that many would come, and do signs and wonders, even so as to seduce the elect, he showed the rashness of faith in signs and wonders, as things most easily performed by false Christs." This is by no means

a satisfactory reply to Marcion, for he was certainly very far from attributing so much importance to miracles, if taken in an isolated form. He regarded the manifestation of Christ as a whole, though his Docetism prevented him from understanding it fully. Doubtless he contemplated the self-revelation of Christ in the totality of his whole agency, which included the miracles. He spoke of the divine impress that ought to suffice for conviction, as the immediate impression of Christ in the image of his life had beamed forth upon himself, and so deeply affected him; and thus certainly he could not be touched by Tertullian's argument, which was directed against quite another stand-point of an external atomistic supernaturalism.

The controversy with Marcion related especially to anthropology and Christology. Tertullian had to prove against Marcion the original alliance to God in human nature, the image of God which formed its basis. When Marcion maintained that the Demiurgus could not impart power to the first man by which he could overcome the might of the Hyle and of evil, Tertullian wished to prove to him that the destinies of man were determined by his own free-will, that he was placed on a turning-point, from which, according to the direction of his free-will, his exaltation or degradation must follow. "God alone," said Tertullian, "is good by nature; . . . in order that the goodness for which man was created, and for which a capacity was given him, may become his own, since it can only be brought about through the medium of the free-will. Thus goodness, since it becomes the property of man through free-will, is, in a sense, natural to him."[1] Tertullian, in defending the importance of the law against Marcion, says, "But the law, of which thou complainest, has made known the goodness of God, since it has aimed to conform man to it, to surrender himself to communion with God, in order that he may be distinguished from all other creatures that are destined to his service. Man alone can boast that he has received a law from God. Reason and freedom are intended to distinguish man from all the rest of the creation." Law and freedom appeared to Tertullian to be intimately connected. "Man," he says, "must be subject to Him who has subjected all other things to him."[1] As soon as God

[1] Lib. ii. cap. 6. "Ut ergo bonum jam suum haberet homo, emancipatum sibi a Deo, et fieret proprietas jam boni in homine, et quodammodo natura." Lib. ii. cap. 4.

had granted free-will to man, he was obliged to leave him to himself in the exercise of it. Hence it follows, that he himself refrained from the use of the free-will which he had granted to man, that is, that he was obliged to hold back his Prescience and his Omnipotence, by which he could have interfered, that man, who had begun to misuse his freedom, might not fall into danger."[1] Therefore he here supposes a self-limitation of God to be necessary in order that man may be entirely left to the use of his free-will. In order to explain how man could be tempted to sin, as the image of God, without injury to the divine essence, Tertullian, in opposition to Hermogenes, urges, that not the spirit of God, but a breath of God, was communicated to man—*afflatus non spiritus*, something allied to God, but not the essence of God itself. Tertullian was so filled with a sense of the dignity of man that he places him, according to his nature, above the angels. By his free-will he could have raised himself above the angels, so that the angels might serve him; and hereafter, if he continues in goodness, he will judge the angels. He has the peculiar distinction that angels were spirits formed out of matter, as, Tertullian believed, may be inferred from Psalm civ. 4. He makes the sin of the first man to consist in not subordinating his will to the divine will. "God," says Tertullian, "gave space for the conflict, that man might crush the enemy by the same freedom of will by which he had succumbed to him." The words, "Adam has become like one of us," Tertullian refers to what man would become by redemption, the fellowship with God obtained through Christ, the future participation of the divine nature. Tertullian also places the mark of the originally and undeniably divine in man, as resulting from the divine afflatus, in the fact that the soul is immortal, endowed with freedom and self-determination, often anticipating the future, rational, and capable of insight and science; yet in all these particulars the soul only appears as an image of God; it does not rise to an equality with the essence of God. According to that ingenious explanation of the words of Christ respecting the tribute-money, of which we have already spoken, he says, speaking against the doctrine that not the God of Christ, but the Demiurgus was the creator of man, "Let Marcion's god seek a coin for himself, Christ commands the denarius of man to be rendered to his own Cæsar, not to another's," that is,

[1] Lib. ii. cap. 7.

as he thinks, the impress of God, the image of God in man must be given to that God whom it represents." [1]

Tertullian finds in Marcion's Docetism, a denial of the veracity of Christ.[2] When Marcion reproaches the Demiurgus with falsehood, Tertullian rejoins,[3] "If thou sayest that the Creator ever lied, there is far greater falsehood in thy Christ, whose body was not a real one." He avails himself of the doctrine of the Holy Supper against Marcion's Docetism. "Christ could not have called the bread his body, *i. e.* an image of his body,[4] if he had not had a real body." This is also important in relation to Tertullian's doctrine of the Supper, as already explained; as when in his book *De Anima*[5] he makes use of the expression *Vini sapor, in sanguinis sui memoriam consecratus;* but with which we must compare other passages in which the realist element is more prominent in the language, as *opimitate dominici corporis vesci.*[6]

He says, moreover, that if the humanity of Christ were not real, the belief in his divinity would waver. "Then Christ would not be God, for why might he not wear the mere semblance of God? Shall I believe him in reference to his interior being, who has deceived me in reference to his outward? How can he be esteemed truthful in secret who is openly found fallacious!"[7]

Marcion regarded John the Baptist as a Messenger of the Demiurgus, who was to direct to a Messiah totally different from Christ. He recognised nothing of the baptism of Christ by John; as indeed his own Gospel begins after that event, with the entrance of Christ into the synagogue at Capernaum.[8] In his Gospel he found only the mission of John's disciples to ask Christ whether he was the promised Messiah, and this served him as a proof that John was altogether a stranger to Christ, and that he did not acknowledge him as the true Christ. On the other hand, Tertullian, in connexion with his doctrine of the passivity of man under the operations of the Holy Spirit, explains that occurrence in the manner we

[1] Lib. iv. cap. 38. [2] Lib. i. cap. 11. [3] Lib. ii. cap. 28.
[4] Lib. iv. cap. 40. [5] De Anima, cap. 17.
[6] De Pudicitia, cap. ix. [7] Lib. iii. cap. 8.
[8] The main object of the present work will not allow me to take fuller notice of the latest critical inquiries respecting Marcion's Gospel. Yet I must remark, in passing, that I neither consider as proved the opinion that that document originated in a designed mutilation of Luke's Gospel, nor can acknowledge it as the original foundation of the third canonical Gospel.

have already noticed; that John at an earlier period, as an instrument of the Holy Spirit, had already pointed to Christ; but when Christ appeared with the fulness of the Spirit, the prophetic call of John was at an end, and all preceding fragmentary operations of it were concentered in Christ. It was necessary," he says, "that the portion of the Holy Spirit which according to the form of the prophetic measure had operated in John to prepare the way of the Lord, should now depart from John to return to the Lord, since in him was the sum of the whole. Therefore John was now a common man, and one of the multitude." He maintained against Marcion, that John took offence at Christ's ministry, not as a prophet, as if in this capacity he had announced another Messiah, but as a man; that is, what was merely human in John became prominent, when the prophetic had retired, which was only something communicated to him, and to which he stood in a passive relation. Marcion had recognised as belonging to the characteristics of Christ, his love of children, (Luke ix. 46,) and contrasts it with 2 Kings ii. 23. Tertullian says, on the other hand, that this was altogether an unfounded antithesis; for in the Gospel, children of the tenderest years, in their first innocence, before the development of consciousness, *infantes*, are spoken of; but in the other passage, youths who already might have committed crime. This also is important, if we compare it with the passages already quoted in reference to Tertullian's views of Original Sin and Infant Baptism. Children of that age, according to his opinion, were to be gradually led by instruction to Christ, but by no means to receive baptism.

We have already remarked that Marcion adhered to only one of the doctrinal types of the New Testament, the Pauline, and regarded all the other apostolic tendencies as mere Judaizing falsifications of Christianity. Tertullian, on the contrary, maintained that there was a harmony between all the types of doctrine in the New Testament. This led to some remarkable developments. Marcion appealed to the dispute between Paul and Peter at Antioch, and adduced that occurrence as a proof that Peter had mixed foreign Jewish elements with the original doctrine of Christ. We have already remarked that Tertullian in his solution of this difficulty was not always consistent. Here he takes such a view of the affair, as if Peter was perfectly right, and that the error was on Paul's side. He proceeds from this point of view, that Paul was then in

the first glow of his conversion, which seems to imply that this conference preceded the apostolic convention at Jerusalem. Now Tertullian says, "If, therefore, Paul, who was then, as a new convert, full of glowing zeal[1] against Judaism, believed that there was something blamable in (Peter's) conduct, namely, that he placed himself on an equal footing with Jews;[2] —he, who afterwards was willing to be all things to all men that he might win all; to the Jews, as a Jew; to those that were under the law, as under the law. Wilt thou make the reproach of conduct which afterwards was agreeable to the reprover himself, a reason for suspecting departure from God in reference to doctrine?" Such a view as the following seems to form the groundwork of this passage:—Paul, in the first glow of his conversion from Judaism, was violently opposed to it, and was unwilling to be on amicable terms with it; on this account, from this first stand-point of his violent opposition to Judaism, he blamed Peter's yielding to the Jewish Christians. But afterwards, when by progressive development his spirit had become milder, he himself approved of Peter's principle, and acted upon it. This view contains a palpable misapprehension, which is connected with the attempt to justify Peter entirely. But no such alteration can be pointed out in Paul. His conduct was by no means that of a new convert; and his method of being all things to all men without compromising the truth, was altogether different from that weakness which made Peter practically unfaithful to principles he had formerly avowed. Still the view is deserving of notice which is implied here, of the manner in which the Holy Spirit operated in the apostles, without detriment to their peculiar characters, and to the psychological conditions of their development. Tertullian acknowledges that in the animation of Paul by the Holy Spirit, his own peculiar character might mingle with those influences, and only by degrees become transformed and enlightened. As Paul was of an ardent temperament, and his conversion was effected by a violent crisis, so he was

[1] Lib. i. cap. 20. "Ferventer adhuc ut neophytus."

[2] Tertullian's words are, "passivum convictum." This *may* mean living together with Jews and Gentiles without making any distinction. But this was the very thing which Paul longed for, and which he noted as wanting in Peter, as Tertullian himself perceived. Thus the words cannot be taken in Tertullian's sense. Or we must suppose *reprehendere* to mean, to miss with disapproval, which is too harsh even for Tertullian. Hence nothing remains but to understand *passivus convictus* as I have explained it in the text.

at first more ardent and violent in his opposition against Judaism, and it was not till a later period that his fiery zeal became more temperate. It is evident that this view of Tertullian's has important consequences in reference to the doctrine of Inspiration. It is doubtful whether Montanism had any influence on this freer view, since, as we have seen, that system made different stages in Inspiration : and since, in the highest stage, that of Prophecy, it maintained a pure passivity of the human spirit, on all the other stages the peculiar character and self-activity of the human factor must have been more prominent. But in truth, the idea of Inspiration had not at that time been elaborated in a logical form ; and hence it might happen, as is shown in Irenæus, that on the one hand, persons might adopt the mechanical supernaturalist conceptions of the Jews ; and on the other hand, in contemplating the apostles with whom they were connected by the continuity of Christian consciousness, and in studying their writings to the immediate impression of which they yielded without embarrassment, they were led to different conclusions ; and in particular cases, at least, were not yet pressed under the yoke of a dogmatic idea. Unquestionably Tertullian very much misunderstood the character of Paul, when he regarded him as a new convert, at first so dependent on the older apostles, and anxiously careful that he might not appear to preach a different Gospel from themselves.

When Marcion adduced the words of Paul in 1 Cor. xv. 50 against the church doctrine of the resurrection, Tertullian no longer vindicated against him the forced exposition which we have already noticed. He only made use of the distinction between two epochs in the resurrection. The first he placed in the participation of the millennial reign on earth, and then, after its close, the transformation of the saints who were raised in order to be capable of enjoying the kingdom of heaven to all eternity. This was connected with the Chiliasm which was a point of dispute between Tertullian and Marcion. Tertullian regarded the millennial reign, as we have already seen, as a transition-point from the earthly development of mankind to the higher heavenly form of existence. For what believers had suffered on earth in the cause of the Gospel, or had been destitute of, owing to voluntary ascetic renunciation, they were not to be indemnified on the same earth.[1] Accord-

[1] Lib. iii. cap. 24. "In compensatione eorum, quæ in seculo vel despeximus vel amisimus, a Deo prospectam."

ing to the measure of their diversified moral states believers were to attain, sooner or later, to a participation in this kingdom through the first resurrection. We have already remarked that Tertullian combated the Jewish notion that the seat of this millennial reign would be Jerusalem restored to its ancient splendour; yet we do not venture to suppose that he had attained to the stand-point of a purely spiritual conception; on this subject especially, he mixed the spiritual and the sensible in a remarkable manner. By another kind of literal interpretation of Scripture, he formed a strange representation after another fashion, of a material Jerusalem as the seat of the millennial reign. He imagined, (in doing which he was strengthened by the visions of the Montanist prophets,) that a city actually descending from heaven was to be the seat of this kingdom; and yet he placed its happiness in the enjoyment of all kinds of spiritual blessings. He refers to an earlier treatise written by him, *De Spe Fidelium*, in which, probably, he more fully developed these ideas in a two-fold contrast against a material Jewish conception that appeared to him too gross, and another conception that appeared to him too spiritual.

In ethics both Tertullian and Marcion were defective in the same respect. Christianity could not be exhibited by them as a transforming elevating principle for all human things, as its nature required, owing to the predominance of a one-sided ascetic element. Yet in Tertullian this defect was not so striking, in consequence of his unmutilated conception of Christ and of Christianity, as founded on the former; while in Marcion the error appeared carried out consequentially both in theory and practice. Hence, though Tertullian attacked Marcion in this quarter, he could not do it without inconsistency. This will be seen if we notice how Tertullian depreciates matrimony, and yet objects to Marcion that by condemning matrimony he injured the object of God's goodness in the propagation of the human race, the spread by that means of the kingdom of God.[1] Thus he blames Marcion that he makes Christ contradict himself when he condemns matrimony, and yet blesses children.[2] To him this latter fact

[1] Lib. i. cap. 29. "Quomodo enim salvum hominem volet, quem vetat nasci, de quo nascitur auferendo? Quomodo habebit in quo bonitatem suam signet, quem esse non patitur? Quomodo diligit, cujus originem non amat?"

[2] Lib. iv. cap. 23. "Quomodo videri potest parvulorum dilector, quorum totatarum corruptivus est?"

appeared to correspond to the nature of God, who in Genesis has blessed the propagation of the race. He also attacks the unconditional contempt of earthly goods which was required by the Marcionite dualism. He explains the woe pronounced on the rich in Luke's recension of the Sermon on the Mount, as not referring to riches in themselves, but to the faults accidentally connected with their possession. "It is not unworthy of God," he says, "to bestow riches, by which the rich obtain many enjoyments, and are able to accomplish many works of love and righteousness."

From the Montanist stand-point Tertullian required of Marcion that he should point out the operations of God's Spirit in his societies by definite marks, that the Spirit should predict the future, reveal the secrets of the heart, and unfold the divine mysteries. "Let him give utterance to a psalm, a vision, or a prayer; only let it be inspired by the Spirit of God, in ecstasy, if the interpretation of the tongue be added."[1]

This passage is peculiarly worthy of observation, in order to explain Tertullian's idea of the gift of tongues. Since he ends with "an interpretation of the tongue," he must be understood to refer in what preceded to speaking in tongues; therefore, uttering psalms, visions, and prayers in an ecstatic state, was in his opinion speaking in tongues. Of a discourse in foreign languages we discover here no trace, and "the interpretation of the tongue," in Tertullian's sense, can only mean that when a person in such an ecstatic state had spoken in a manner unintelligible to others, he or another person—a point which we must here leave undetermined—repeated what had been uttered in language that would be generally understood. Moreover, Tertullian required of Marcion that he should point out prophetesses among his holy females. We recognise here another characteristic mark of Montanism, that females also (for which they appeal to the words in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, *γυνὴ προφητεύουσα*,) partook of the prophetical gift; although otherwise, as a general rule, they were not allowed to speak in the meetings of the church. It is worthy of notice how Tertullian applies the Montanist idea of *ἔκστασις* or *amentia* to the transfiguration of Christ according to Luke's narrative (Luke ix. 28—36), and finds in that event a confirmation of it. When it is said of Peter, "He knew not what

[1] Lib. v. cap. 8. "Edat aliquem psalmum, aliquam visionem, aliquam orationem, duntaxat spiritalem, in ecstasi, *i. e.* amentia, si qua linguæ interpretatio accessit."

he said," he finds in that a mark of the withdrawment of sound consciousness—in other words, of the ecstatic state; and he connects with it the remark, that when man is filled with the divine glory, the simply human must retire and be overpowered.[1] This must have been the case with Peter in consequence of the impression made upon him by that divine appearance. As a proof that Peter must have been in such a state, Tertullian avails himself of the fact, that he knew Moses and Elias, of whom he could have seen no likenesses among the Jews, and therefore must have gained a knowledge of them in a supernatural manner;—an instance this, of the acuteness with which Tertullian could lay hold of anything which served to support his opinions.

It now only remains to speak of Tertullian's dispute with the Patripassians, and of the position he occupied in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. Certainly we should not be justified in ascribing to Montanism an important influence in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, or more especially the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He found this doctrine developed in the same form in which he left it. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit did not proceed from Montanism, but was taken by that system from the church-doctrine. In Montanism there were two distinct stages of development; the first, in which the Old Testament spirit prevailed, and God the Father himself was introduced as speaking through the medium of the new prophetic voices; the second stage, in which a peculiarly Christian form prevailed, and the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, is introduced as speaking; and where Montanism connects the doctrine of the new revelations of the prophetic spirit, with the promises of Christ respecting the Paraclete in the Gospel of John. The doctrine of Montanism respecting the new era of the Holy Spirit only occasioned its being more frequently treated of, since from the operations of the Holy Spirit a transition was made to his nature. But it was no new doctrine which proceeded from Montanism; it was only necessary to defend it in the district where Montanism first arose and spread against the Monarchians; and it so happened that the new

[1] Lib. iv. cap. 22. "Utramne simplici errore an ratione quam defendemus in causa novæ prophetiæ gratiæ exstasin, id est amentiam, convenire? In spiritu enim homo constitutus, præsertim cum gloriam Dei conspicit, vel cum per ipsum Deus loquitur, necesse est excidat sensu, obumbratus scilicet virtute divina, de quo inter nos et psychicos quæstio est."

oracles occupied themselves with this doctrine, and that these Monarchians were the opponents of Montanism. Tertullian appeals in several passages of the treatise *Adversus Praxean* to the new disclosures made by the Paraclete; thus, he says, Christ poured out the Holy Spirit, the gift received from the Father, the announcer of the truth of the one divine original Being, but also the expositor of the relation of the Trinity (this Tertullian understands by the word *οἰκονομία*), when any one receives the utterances of his new prophecy, the guide into all truth which is contained in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, according to the holy doctrine of Christianity. Elsewhere he says,[1] "For we, who through the grace look into the times and causes of all that is said in the Holy Scriptures, who are especially the scholars of the Paraclete, and not of men, we determine two, the Father and the Son, and now three with the Holy Spirit, according to the relation of the economy (in the sense already given)." Tertullian himself could truly attest that he had always held this doctrine of the Trinity even before his passing over to Montanism, as he says,[2] "We have always believed (and now more than ever, since we have been better instructed by the Paraclete who leads into all truth), in one God, but yet under the dispensation which we call *οἰκονομία*, and the Son, his Word, who came forth from him, by whom all things were created, and without whom nothing is made." A comparison with the pre-Montanist writings of Tertullian will confirm this statement. In one of his earliest writings, the Apology, Tertullian, in order to lay before the heathen the doctrine of Christ, sets out with stating that God had created the universe by the Word, and reason, and power. In order to make this clear to educated heathens, he appeals to the doctrine of the Stoics, of the Word or Spirit of God penetrating the whole universe. So also by Christians the *spiritus* is marked as the peculiar essence of this λόγος, whence we must conclude that the name *spiritus* in Tertullian denotes the essence of God. The name of Word he refers to the speaking, doubtless the creative speaking, of God, as the expressed ideas of God are carried out in reality, since the λόγος, as a substantial personality, proceeded from the free essence of God. The name of *ratio* he considers as referring to the fact that God arranged all things in idea, and designed the divine plan of the universe; the name of power is used,

[1] Adv. Praxean, cap. xiii. [2] Cap. ii.

because all things were accomplished by it. Thus we find here the threefold climax, *ratio*, *sermo*, and *virtus*, which corresponds to the distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, and προφορικός. He says, "We have learned that this came forth from God, and by this coming forth was begotten," and in virtue of the unity of essence he is called Son of God, and God. "For God is a spirit; and when a ray is sent forth from the sun, a portion from the totality, the sun will be in the ray, because it is a ray of the sun, and the essence is not separated, but extended. So is spirit from spirit, and God from God, and light kindled from light. The source of the material remains whole and unimpaired, although you take many offshoots of the quality;—so that which came from God, is God and the Son of God, and both are one. Thus also spirit from spirit, and God from God, made another in measure not in number,—in degree, not in state."

We find here, as we shall show in the sequel, the same doctrine with similar illustrations, which Tertullian received and further developed from the preceding development of the church doctrine, as we find it, for instance, in Justin Martyr, and as we shall find it again on his own Montanist standpoint: God, imminent with his reason, with which he arranges the plan of the universe; the same reason reveals itself in the hypostatic word, by means of whom the divine ideas are realized, as reason and language are related to one another; there is one divine essence in both by virtue of the unity of essence; there is a constant connexion between the two. Thus Tertullian could say, *unus ambo*, without meaning to denote by that phrase a strict numerical unity; inasmuch as one divine essence is in both, the *una substantia*, but yet in different measure, in the original source, and the λόγος derived from it,—a divine being, but in a different measure of participation. Since Tertullian was destitute of the idea of the nature of pure spirit, and could not free himself from a refined materialism, it may be explained how he could so view the subject, and so express himself without any difficulty. Only here we find nothing yet mentioned of the Holy Spirit; but we must not infer that he was destitute of this doctrine. In giving an account of the essentials of Christianity, he must have presented the doctrine of the λόγος to the heathen in connexion with the doctrine of Christ; but he had here no occasion to develop at the same time the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He then passes on to the doctrine of the Incarnation

of the λόγος, which he thus develops; this ray of God, as he had hitherto been always announced, descended into a certain virgin, and was made flesh in her body, and was born as a man united with God. "The flesh furnished with the divine nature is nourished, grows up, speaks, teaches, acts, and is Christ."

Tertullian here expresses himself as if the divine λόγος had only appeared in a human body, which he had assumed by means of the Virgin Mary; but we have seen that he expressly distinguished from the body, a rational human soul which the λόγος appropriated, and we are not justified in maintaining that Tertullian had not yet been sensible of the need of such a definite idea. By the term *caro* he by no means understood merely the body, but as he himself expressly defined it, the whole man; it is only questionable how much he intended by it. If we may venture to assume that he was already an opponent of the Trichotomy in human nature, it would at once follow that he reckoned a rational human soul as an essential part of man. But it is evident that his Christian consciousness made it necessary for him to admit a peculiar combination of the λόγος with humanity, the entrance of it into the peculiar essence of human nature, a kind of self-renunciation. Tertullian, who, as we have seen on other occasions, recognised in the Hellenic mythology a foreshadowing of the truth to be realized in Christianity, or a caricature of it, made such an application here of the myths respecting the sons of the gods. He could here find exhibited in a fantastic form, what would be historically the pure idea in Christianity. If he could not make his views out with perfect clearness, yet this lay at the foundation of what he says in his own way. So in his pre-Montanist book, *De Præscriptione*, there is a representation of the essential articles of faith, the *regula fidei*, in which he says, "that before all things the Word came forth, who is called his Son, who was variously seen by the patriarchs, and always heard in the prophets; lastly, he descended by the spirit and power of God the Father[1] into the Virgin Mary, and was made flesh in her womb, and being born of her, acted as Jesus Christ; that is, the Word then descending and uniting itself to humanity, made the person of Jesus Christ, and he sent the power of the Holy Spirit, who was to occupy his place."[2]

[1] He marks here the divine operation in effecting this—God the Father himself.

[2] De Præscrip. cap. xiii.

Thus we already find here the mention of the Paraclete. In his book against Hermogenes, in opposition to the doctrine of a preëxistent substance, he maintained the doctrine of the *σοφία*, as the substance dwelling in God, out of which he formed all things,—the same with that idea we have mentioned of the *ratio*, which comprised all the divine ideas in itself, the ideal and spiritual basis of the universe. "From this," says Tertullian, "he created, since he created by it and with it . . . Who would not rather commend this as the fountain and origin of all things? an element of elements, not placed under him, not different in situation, not repulsive in appearance, but innate, and his own, and well adjusted, and decorous. What element would God require, his own or another's? Finally, when he perceived it (the *σοφία*,) necessary for the creation of the world, he created and begat it in himself." He here appeals to the passage in Prov. viii., the *ἐκτήσατο ἐμὲ*, where the Alexandrian version reads *ἔκτισε*. He afterwards says, that God the Father alone is without origin and unbegotten, but his wisdom was begotten and brought forth[1] ever since it began to exert itself in the thoughts of God for the creation of his works. We recognise here the same idea which we have developed in the quotation from the Apology. The latter is characteristic as similar, as referring to a too simple abstract conception of the Deity, the other is akin to the Neo-platonic idea of the *ὄν*. Afterwards, when opposing Hermogenes, who maintained the existence of an underived substance, he urged strongly that God the Father was alone underived, unbegotten, that the *σοφία*, inasmuch as it became the hypostatic *λόγος*, had a beginning.[2] Thus he also says in opposition to the doctrine of the preëxisting Hyle maintained by Hermogenes,[3] that according to the statements of revelation the *σοφία* was first of all brought forth by God, and then the *λόγος* was begotten, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing has been made. We also find this subordination in the book against Marcion, when he

[1] *Generare* and *condere* are here used as synonymous; at that time there was not so much care in the choice of expressions, since the word *κτίζειν* in the Alexandrian version occasioned the use of this expression. As a proof of this we might quote some of Tertullian's own expressions. He says of *σοφία* in his book against Hermogenes, "Genita, id est facta, quia et filios facimus, licet generemus. Nihil interest facta an nata sit abyssus;" both denote the beginning.—*Adv. Hermog.* cap. xxxii.

[2] Adv. Hermog. cap. xxxii. [3] Cap. xlv.

terms the λόγος, as begotten [1] before all creation, the *primus fructus Patris*, and describes him as his servant, as far as he serves him as the organ for everything which through him he wished to effect. [2] Thus in the passages already quoted, he describes the λόγος as the being to whom all the Theophanies of the Old Testament are to be referred, which were a type of his future incarnation. He says that Christ had always acted in the person of God the Father, and calls him the Word of God, which, by being allowed to proceed out self, became his Son.

As a Montanist Tertullian was disposed to vindicate the doctrine that he had already embraced of the *una substantia in tribus*, of the *unitas substantiæ*, at the same time with the οἰκονομία, to develop it still further, and to establish it in controversy in a dogmatic direction which stated the doctrine of the μοναρχία, to the exclusion of the οἰκονομία, which appeared irreconcilable the one with the other. There were two branches of this direction which accompanied the common conception of the doctrine of the Logos in the fathers of the church, and were opposed to it. Both directions were indeed two different forms in which the principle of Monarchianism appeared, but yet stood in more direct opposition to each other than to the doctrine of the church; since these two forms of conceiving the same general view proceeded from totally opposite interests. The adherents of the one were animated by a predominant dialectic monotheistic interest; they only wished to hold fast the unity of God; the doctrine of a divinity of Christ appeared to them quite irreconcilable with it, and Christ was not so much to their religious consciousness as to prevent their readily sacrificing that doctrine. It only seemed important to them to retain something divine in Christ, as a man especially enlightened and guided by God from his first development, on which account they called him the Son of God. In these persons the understanding was the leading faculty. On the other hand, there were persons of an entirely different mental tendency, in whom a very different interest was joined with their Monarchianism, that of practical Christianity,—the interest of Christian consciousness, wishing to have only God in Christ without any distinction. The Subordination doctrine of the church did not satisfy them on this point for the expression of their Christian consciousness. God the Father,

[1] Prolatus.

[2] Adv. Marc. lib. ii. cap. 4.

they thought, was the one divine subject who appeared, veiling himself with a body, in Christ. We must here take into consideration that in the common Christian consciousness the doctrine of a rational human soul in Christ had not been developed; so much more *easily* could they admit an undivided Christ in the God veiled with a body, appearing without the intervention of anything else whatever. These persons were generally called Patripassians. They would come into with the other class of Monarchians, or with the advocates of the church doctrine of subordination. Only individuals in whom Christian feeling and what was immediately practical predominated, could be satisfied with such a view. We recognise here men without education, who came forth from the midst of the laity, and the revolt of the immediate Christian consciousness of the uneducated laity against a theology pervaded by reflection and dialectic distinctions. The words of Tertullian in his work against Praxeas point to this fact, when he says, "All simple persons, I will not say ignorant and illiterate, who form always the majority of believers, (since the rule of faith brings them over from the many gods of the world to the one true God—not understanding that the unity is to be believed but in connexion with his *οἰκονομία*,) are alarmed at the *οἰκονομία*; they take for granted that the number and arrangement of the Trinity is a division of unity, though unity deriving trinity from itself is not destroyed, but administered by it." These are the same persons whom Origen describes, who knew no other God besides Christ, and would not admit any distinction in Christ. It is evident how unfounded is the opinion of those persons who would adduce the prevalence of such a view as evidence against the original existence of John's Gospel; and who suppose that the doctrine of the Logos was introduced by this Gospel as a composition of a later period. The multitude of the laity who adopted such a representation could not have occupied themselves further with the Gospel of John, nor in general with the exact study of the scriptures; at least, they gave themselves no concern about the more speculative elements of that Gospel, in consequence of their peculiar mental constitution. We see further from Tertullian's book against Praxeas, that persons of this class made use both of John's Gospel and of the Apocalypse, and explained the passages in them according to their own views.

It may be easily explained, that an individual should come

forth from the ranks of the laity as an opponent of the distinction commonly admitted in the church, between the hypostasis of the Father and of the λόγος, or the Son, and yet at the same time be an advocate for the true doctrine of the divinity of Christ; and it is equally explicable that such an individual should find acceptance among the laity. Such a person was Praxeas, who at the same time was engaged in controversy with Montanism in Lesser Asia. He betook himself to Rome, whether on account of other concerns, or that he was moved by a polemical interest against Montanism, in order to prevent its gaining the influential voice of the Roman church in favour of the new prophets. His influence was greatly increased by his having been led from prison as a confessor. Tertullian endeavours to depreciate the sufferings of Praxeas in the cause of Christianity; but what he says deserves little credit, proceeding, as it does, from so prejudiced an opponent. He calls Praxeas a man inflated with vanity, for boasting of his sufferings, though he had endured nothing more than a short imprisonment.[1] It is worthy of notice that Tertullian the Montanist generally appears as an opponent of the great reverence paid to confessors and martyrs, of which we have seen many examples; and it may agree very well with this fact, that such confessors as Praxeas raised their voice against Montanism, and by their influence damaged the cause. In Rome Praxeas met with no contradiction; whether it was, that the respect in which he was held as a confessor prevented his doctrine from being suspected or attacked, or whether he was so honoured as a defender of the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, that all other points were readily overlooked; whether, appearing as a defender of the doctrine of the divinity of Christ against one class of Monarchians in Rome, such as Theodotus, he was regarded as the advocate of the true interests of Christian piety; or whether the undefined state of doctrine in the Roman church at that time, in which practical interests were objects of greater concern than exact dogmatical distinctions, rendered him assistance. As a confirmation of the last-named supposition, it may be urged that the Artemonites declared that the older Roman bishops had agreed with their doctrine, and that Zephyrinus, the successor of Victor, was the first who introduced an alteration in the doctrine. At all events,

the favourable reception which Praxeas met with at Rome cannot be adduced as evidence that the Jewish-Christian element, a dogmatic tendency allied to Ebionitism, had prevailed in Rome from the earliest times; for to this tendency nothing could be more opposed than the doctrine which maintained that the Father himself suffered: in one word, Patripassianism. Even the simple fact of the favourable reception Praxeas met with at Rome, proves that the tendency which would have only God undivided in Christ, and was diametrically opposite to the Jewish element, prevailed in the Roman church. That church had hitherto shown itself unfavourable to Montanism; but the Roman bishop, probably Victor,[1] was on the point of admitting the Montanist societies in Lesser Asia to the communion of the church; yet by the description which Praxeas gave of the disturbances caused by Montanism, and by holding up to him the authority of his two predecessors, who had shown themselves unfavourable to Montanism, he was induced to retrace his steps. Praxeas betook himself from Rome to Carthage,[2] and from the cause

[1] Unfortunately Tertullian, in the passage to which we refer, has not expressly named the Roman bishop. If it was Victor, then his two predecessors were Eleutherus and Soter. We do not know what circumstances could make Victor (a man of an unbending temper, and animated with the hierarchical spirit) favourable to Montanism. It suits his characteristics that he would not contradict his two predecessors, and that hence Praxeas moved him to declare himself against the Montanist societies, by throwing into the scale the authority of his predecessors. To a man over whom tradition had so much influence this would be an important consideration. It would also well agree with this, that at that time the controversies respecting Monarchianism first arose in the church of Rome; on the one side were those who maintained the substantiality of the person of Christ as distinct from the Father, but gave up the doctrine of his divinity, regarding him only as a man under the special illumination of the Holy Spirit; and on the other side were those who, like Praxeas, wished to acknowledge only the divine essence of the Father in Christ. But the chronology of Montanism makes it possible, that by this bishop we are to understand Eleutherus, so that his two predecessors were Anicetus and Soter; and then, in the overtures of peace from the martyrs who came from Lesser Asia belonging to the churches of Lyons and Vienne, under the persecution of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, and in the efforts of the peace-loving Irnæus, we shall find the reasons why Eleutherus was more indulgent towards Montanism. [See Neander's General History, &c. vol. ii. p. 220. Stand. Lib. Ed.—Tr.]

[2] It depends on the interpretation of Tertullian's words where he narrates this, (cap. i.) whether we determine the place to be Rome or Carthage. His words are, "Fructicaverant avenæ Praxeanæ hic quoque superseminatæ, dormientibus multis." We may explain the *hic quoque*

already stated, found an easy entrance for his doctrine, which suited the common stand-point of the simple and uneducated laity. But one person appeared against him, and, as Tertullian says, induced Praxeas to put forth a recantation.[1] But such an explanation coming from an opponent cannot be taken as sure testimony respecting the matter of fact: we need to have the words of Praxeas before our eyes, in order to decide whether he really retracted the doctrine he had promulged, or whether he only guarded himself against a certain explanation of it, or supposed consequences attributed to it by its opponents. When this happened Tertullian had not yet joined the Montanist party; in the meantime, however, he declared himself in their favour, and now saw in Praxeas an opponent on two points, his Montanism and his doctrine of the Trinity. He must also have noticed that the doctrine of Praxeas had imperceptibly been gaining ground, and thus he was moved to appear against him with a special treatise.

From Tertullian's allegations against Praxeas, a two-fold construction of his doctrine may be obtained. In several passages it seems as if Praxeas admitted in no respect a distinction in God previous to the appearing of Christ, but referred the title of *Son of God* only to the temporal appearance of Christ, to the *caro* in which God the Father himself appeared. According to other passages, it seems that he admitted a certain relative distinction between the λόγος or the Son, and the Father previous to the appearing of Christ, that distinction, namely, in reference to the Divine Being in his self-revelation in the theophanies of the Old Testament, as when he represents the Monarchians as saying in reference to those theophanies, "God the Father made himself into a Son;"[2] that is, when he presented himself in such forms of

thus:—Also here, as in that parable, the tares have been scattered among the good corn; or, which is more probable, the *hic quoque* is to be connected with *dormientibus multis*, since also here, as in that parable of Christ's, many sleep, and this circumstance is taken advantage of, for sowing the tares among the wheat. According to either interpretation it would be supposed that, as in the foregoing clause, the reference is only to the residence and agency of Praxeas at Rome. But the connection renders it very probable that the *hic* forms the antithesis to Rome, mentioned in the preceding part; and that Tertullian expresses himself as if he had written from the very spot where these things had transpired. Hence we are led to conclude that it was Carthage.

[1] "Denique caverat pristinum doctor de emendatione sua."

revelation. Thus Tertullian ascribes to them in this respect, the doctrine that the Father acted in the name of the Son.[1] We must therefore admit, either that Tertullian in some passages had not represented the doctrine of Praxeas with sufficient exactness, or that among his adherents a different modification of it found currency according to their degrees of mental culture; that the more rude adhered to the first mode of representation, and the educated class to the second. Since, as we have seen, these Patripassians used the Gospel of John, it renders it more probable that they explained the idea of the λόγος in their own way, and referred this idea to an original distinction in the Divine Being, antecedent to Christ's temporal appearance, so that the appellation of Father, as concealed in himself, and of λόγος as revealing himself, belonged to one and the same subject. These Patripassians appealed, as Tertullian says, to the passage in Luke i. 35, and argued that as the power of the Highest must be the Highest himself in the exertion of his power, so the Son of God must be God himself.[2] When it was objected to the Patripassians that suffering was transferred by them to God the Father himself, they defended themselves by replying, these sufferings were confined to the human substance in Christ.[3] Yet the force of this defence was weakened from their stand-point, because they did not attribute to Christ a perfect human nature, consisting of soul and body. They endeavoured to parry this objection by saying that the Father did not suffer, but that he suffered in conjunction with the Son, *compassus pater*, referring the suffering only to what was human in the manifestation of the Father.

In his controversy with Praxeas, Tertullian found it necessary to develop more fully the doctrine of a substantial pre-existing λόγος, who appeared in Christ as a man,—a doctrine which, as we have seen, had been formed at an earlier period. In his method of attempting to make the doctrine of the Logos capable of distinct contemplation, he appears as the forerunner of Augustin and the schoolmen, who availed themselves of the analogy with the human spirit. Only a variation in the construction of this doctrine makes a difference conformably to the subordination-theory of those times, and the Homoousion theory of a later period. He

[1] Cap. xvii. "Patrem in filii nomine egisse." [2] Cap. xxvi.
[3] Cap. xxix. "Non enim ex divina, sed ex humana substantia mortuum dicimus."

supposed that the Supreme Being, as the original type, must be thought of according to the analogy of the human spirit which is the image of God. As the reason dwells in the spirit of man, and speech in the reason, by which it afterwards reveals itself, so is his λόγος originally in God as *ratio* or reason; but the revelation of this is already prepared in the creation, by which the *ratio* becomes *sermo*, since before the whole creation the λόγος emanates into substantiality as the creating reason, by which the divine ideas existing in the *ratio* become realized. Hence Tertullian thinks, we ought not to say "the *sermo* was with God," but "the *ratio*,"—that thus the term λόγος should be here understood. He considers it as the fault of the simple-minded to use *sermo* instead of *ratio*.[1] "Although," he says, "God had not yet sent his λόγος, he had him within himself, in and with his reason, since he thought in silence, and arranged within himself what he was about to express by his *sermo*. For after thinking and arranging with his own reason, he made it *sermo*." "In order that thou mayest understand more easily," he adds, "learn previously from thyself, in order that from the image and likeness of God thou mayest know the reason which thou hast also in thyself, since thou art a rational being; for man is not a mere creature of God, but animated by his breath. Behold, when thou takest counsel with thyself in silence, by means of the reason, how this very thing takes place within thee. Speech meets thee with every movement of thy thoughts, with every stroke of thy feelings. Whatever thou thinkest is *sermo*, whatever thou judgest is *ratio*." "Thus," he says, "the *sermo* is in thee as a second self, by which thou thinkest speakest, and speakest thinkest." He then infers from this analogy, "In how much more perfect a manner must this be in God, whose image thou art!" Owing to the relationship between the words reason and wisdom, he considers himself justified in applying here all that has been said of the divine σοφία. He then says, "For as God at first willed to realize what he had arranged in himself with the reason and language of σοφία, in certain substances and their forms, he produced first of all the *sermo* having in itself its inseparables, *ratio* and σοφία, that all things might be created by that which had devised and arranged them." "Then the *sermo* itself

[1] Cap. v. "Jam in usu est nostrorum per simplicitatem interpretationis Sermonem dicere in primordio apud Deum fuisse, cum magis rationem competat antiquiorem haberi."

assumed its splendour and ornamental sound, and a voice, when God said, '*Let there be light.*' This is the perfect birth of the *sermo*, when it came forth from God. . . . Hence he made for himself an equal, when he came forth from him as his first-born Son." When it was objected[1] that the appellation "*Word*" marks the comparison itself as something unsubstantial and impersonal, as it can be nothing else among men, Tertullian answered, Nothing empty and unreal can come from God, since he himself is the most real being. It is evident that in Tertullian's mind the ideas of materiality and reality were interchanged, as when he says, "Who will deny that God is a body, although God is a spirit?—for a spirit is a body of its own kind, in its own form. But if those invisible things, whatever they are, have in God their own body and their own form, by which alone they are visible to God, how much more must what issued from his own substance, not be without substance. Whatever then is the substance of the *sermo*, that I call person, and claim for it the name of Son, and whilst I acknowledge the Son, I maintain that he is second to the Father." When it was objected to him, perhaps by the Patripassians, who were the enemies of such speculative modes of thought, that thereby he would fall into a doctrine of emanation resembling the Gnostic, and that persons would apply the idea of emanation to the λόγος, Tertullian replied, that it was no argument against such a mode of contemplation, that it was also found among heretics; that heresy would rather borrow of the truth what it transformed into falsehood:—a favourite idea of Tertullian's, that the truth was the original, and error only a false imitation of the truth. In this idea of a προβολή, it appeared to him only of importance that the λόγος was not separated in a Gnostic manner from the Father, but recognised as continuing in unity with the Father, who alone could reveal him. He avails himself of similar comparisons as before, when he appeals to the authority of the Paraclete, and therefore to the utterances of the Montanist prophets, "proceeding as the stalk from the root, as the stream from the fountain, or as the ray from the sun." Thus, according to the representations already developed, he supposes the divine essence, the essence of the *spiritus* in the Son, as derived from the Father, but on that account existing in a different measure in him. He

[1] Possibly the Patripassians made this objection against this doctrine of the Logos.

says, that according to measure[1] (*modulus,*) the Son is different from the Father, for the Father is the whole substance, but the Son a derivation, and part of the whole. He quotes the words in John xiv. 28, "The Father is greater than I;" which therefore he does not apply to the distinction of the divine and the human in Christ. When the Monarchians made the objection, that on his principles there would be two gods, he was forced to admit this,[2] but according to his own opinion the unity of God consists in the unity of the *Divina substantia*, which is the same in the Father and the Son, although they are numerically distinct from one another. He maintains, that although the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are each to be called God, yet, in opposition to Polytheism, the idea of One God must be firmly retained. It is the duty of Christians to let their light shine in the heathen world; otherwise, by an acknowledgment of a plurality of gods, they might escape martyrdom.[3] He appeals to the example, and it is remarkable how clearly he apprehended the Pauline doctrine on this subject, when he says that when he mentions God the Father and the Son together, he calls the Father alone God, and the Son Lord; but when the Son is introduced alone, he calls him also God. As a proof of the last assertion he appeals to the doxology in Rom. ix. 5, of which he has given, as we think, the correct interpretation. The ray of light by itself alone may be called the sun, but when the sun is named, the ray is not likewise called the sun.[4]

As Tertullian distinguished the divine and the human in Christ more sharply from one another, in consequence of his doctrine of a rational human soul in Christ, he would be naturally prompted to arraign the Patripassians. On this point especially they represented God as capable of suffering, since they did not acknowledge a true human nature in Christ, but made the incarnation to consist only in the assumption of a human body. In this very treatise he says, (although he usually speaks only of the *caro* in Christ,) in reference to Christ's commending his spirit into the hands of the Father,[5] "This is the voice of the flesh and of the soul, that is, of the man; not the voice of the Word and of the Spirit, that is, of

[1] Cap ix. [2] "Si tam durus es, puta interim." [3] Cap. xiii.

[4] "Solum autem Christum potero Deum dicere, sicut item apostolus, *Ex quibus Christus; qui est,* inquit, *Deus super omnia benedictus in æcum omne.* Nam et radium solis scorsum solem voco; solem autem nominans, cujus est radius, non statim et radium solem appellabo."

[5] Cap. xxx.

the divine nature." Yet he does not make this point prominent in his controversy against the Patripassians, because the of this doctrine was greatly lessened in his esteem, when compared with the importance of the acknowledgment of the divine λόγος, as personally distinct from the Father and subordinate to him. The Patripassians appeared to him to deserve this name, because they attributed to God the Father, who is infinitely exalted above all such contact, the entrance into a human form, and the participation of human sufferings by virtue of his connexion with man. From this point of view, Tertullian calls it *blasphemia*, to attribute suffering to the Father, instead of the Son. The λόγος was, in his opinion, always the agent in all the theophanies of the Old Testament, who condescended to intercourse with men, and who had already made preparation for what he would at last perfectly accomplish in virtue of his humanity. By those preliminary manifestations, men were prepared to receive more easily his incarnation.[1] "Thus he already was capable of human affections, since he must have assumed the substance of man, body and soul, when he asked Adam, Where art thou? as if not knowing where Adam was;—repenting that he had made man, as if he had not known before what he would become;—tempting Abraham, as if he knew not what was in man. Although the heretics lay hold of anything as unworthy of God, for the destruction of the Creator, not knowing that these things met in his Son, who also was subjected to human passions, and thirst, and hunger, and tears, and birth, and death."[2] As Tertullian calls God the Father, who represents the essence of God in his concealment, the God of philosophers, so he distinguishes the λόγος as the being in whom from the beginning the incarnate revelation of the divine nature was foreshadowed. When in the Old Testament it is said, (Exod. xxxiii. 20,) that whoever sees God must die, Tertullian compares with it the passages in which the appearance of God in the theophanies is spoken of, which he refers to the λόγος, as the former passage to God the Father. "God has, indeed, been seen," he says,[3] "but according to the capacities of men, not according to the plenitude of the divinity. . . . . There is therefore one who was seen, and another the invisible; for we must understand the invisible to be the Father, according to

[1] Cap. xvi. [2] Ibid.

[3] Cap. xiv. "Verum quidem Deum, secundum hominum capacitates non secundum plenitudinem divinitatis."

the plenitude of his majesty; but we acknowledge as visible the Son, according to the measure of his derivation; as we cannot gaze at the sun in the totality of its ; are able to bear a ray on account of the softened of the part which reaches the earth. When the Patripassians asserted that invisibility suited the Divine Being, and visibility suited sensible appearances, and hence took occasion to maintain that the same invisible God the Father visibly appeared in the form of human nature, it was important for Tertullian to appropriate the predicate of absolute invisibility in the sense assigned to God the Father, and to the λόγος alone the attribute by virtue of which he could enter into visible appearance; the same in the theophanies and afterwards in the incarnate appearance.[1] From this stand-point it appeared to him as absurd as a denial of the distinction between the hidden God exalted over all, and the λόγος by whom alone he reveals himself and comes into contact with the creation, to transfer that condescension to human affections, that self-renunciation in the form of humanity, and those sufferings, to the Father himself. He then describes the doctrine of his opponents, in order to expose their absurdity: "Therefore after a time, the Father was born and the Father suffered; God himself, the Lord omnipotent, is announced as Jesus Christ."[2] Elsewhere he quotes 1 Tim. vi. 16, and describes God the Father as dwelling in inaccessible light, and on the other hand the Son as capable of suffering, and accessible;[3] "yet," he adds, "Paul could not witness his appearing in the light of his glory without danger to his eyesight; and Peter, James, and John could not experience it without falling into a state of unconsciousness;"—according to the Montanist notion already mentioned, that human consciousness must fail before the almightiness of the divine in its manifestation. And then he adds, "Since they could not bear the glory of the Son, I believe that they would have died on the spot had they seen the Father." He says of the birth and sufferings of the Son, "Even of the Son these things could not be believed, if they were not written; perhaps they would not have been believed of the Father, even had they been written."[4] Thus it appeared to him as a downright contradiction, as absolutely irreconcilable with the essence of the Father; and we perceive

[1] Cap. xiv.
[2] Cap. ii.
[3] Cap. xv. "Ut et contraria ipsi Filio ascriberemus, mortalitatem, accessibilitatem."
[4] Cap. xvi.

from one such expression how the meaning of the words *credo quia ineptum*, of which we have before spoken, is to be limited when they occur in the writings of a man so disposed to use rash and extravagant language. It appeared to him impossible that the Father himself could descend from heaven; and appear on earth; but we must take into consideration that his representations were never altogether free from material images. He says:[1] "Thou hast the Son on earth, the Father in heaven. This is no separation, but only a divine arrangement. But we know that God is also in the abysses and is everywhere present, but by his might and power. The Son also, as inseparable from him, is everywhere. Yet it pleased the Father in the *οἰκονομία* itself that the Son should be on earth, but himself in heaven. Hence the Son looking up, prayed and requested the Father; whence he taught us to pray, standing up and saying, *Our Father who art in heaven*, though he is everywhere, though he chooses heaven to be his seat." The Patripassians, who troubled themselves very little with Dialectics, and in whom feeling was predominant, were wont to reply to the objections made against their tenet, that the Father himself had appeared on earth, by the saying which simple-minded believers among the laity employed to rebut all difficulties which were raised against their firm convictions, *With God all things are possible*. "But," says Tertullian, "that nothing is difficult for God, who does not know this? What is impossible in the world is possible with God; and God has chosen the foolish things of the world, in order to confound the wise. We read 'all things.' Therefore, say they, it was not difficult for God to make himself at the same time both Father and Son, contrary to the mode in human things." But although Tertullian so readily repelled the objections which were brought against him in matters of faith, yet he says here, "We use this sentence so inconsiderately in our nasty assumptions; as if whatever we can imagine God can do, he will do it." But the question is, whether he has done a certain thing, or not. It did not occur to him to add another mark of what might be thought to be possible with God; but we might well deduce such a mark from what he has himself said in other passages on the relations of *ratio* to God. Although he distinguished God the Father as the Almighty who can undergo no limitation, from the Son as submitting to all self-limitation, yet he felt no hesitation in

[1] Cap. xxiii.

attributing almightiness to the latter?[1] The Son of the Almighty was equally almighty with God, as the Son of God.[2] If, on the one hand, his material conceptions tended to keep Tertullian attached to the subordination-theory, yet the predicate of almightiness was at variance with it, and the tendency of such predicates was to destroy the subordination-theory.

Tertullian was the first, who in the controversy with the Monarchians introduced prominently the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Praxeas appears not to have meddled with it. As the whole doctrine of the Trinity has its central point in the historical Christ, and all speculation upon it sets out from a reference to him, the first subject of discussion was the doctrine of the Logos. It is possible that Tertullian, from the tendency which Montanism gave to his religious reflections, had been induced to occupy himself as we have seen, at an earlier period, with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. If he did not make available the doctrine of a human soul in Christ, in the controversy with Patripassianism, (which might have induced him to employ it,) yet the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was too important not to be introduced into the discussion. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit was in his view a necessary element in the *οἰκονομία* which was to support the *μοναρχία*. He extends the doctrine of the Unity of the Divine Being, of the *una substantia*, expressly to the Holy Spirit, with a relative subordination and a difference of degree as in reference to the Son of God. He denominates the Holy Spirit the *tertius gradus* in the Trinity, and says of him, that he is derived from the Father through the Son; therefore the Son is the medium for the becoming (*Werden*) of the Holy Spirit—that mode of conception which prevailed still longer even when the subordination-theory was checked. He made use of comparisons;[3] the Holy Spirit was the third after the Father and the Son, as the fruit is the third after the root and the stalk; and the brook from the main stream is third from the fountain; and the end of the ray is third from the sun. By these comparisons Tertullian had in view, not only the distinction of degrees, but the medium of origination, expressed by *per*. Adhering to the literal interpretation, he

[1] Cap. xvii.

[2] Cap. xvii. "Cum et filius omnipotentis tam omnipotens sit Dei filius, quam Deus Dei filius."

[3] Cap. viii. "Sicut tertius a radice, fructus ex frutice; et tertius a fonte rivus ex flumine; et tertius a sole apex a radio."

appeals to the language of Christ in those last promises respecting the Paraclete in John's Gospel; where the Spirit is expressly distinguished as a third from himself and the Father.[1] The subordination-theory of that age agreed with the post-Nicene orthodoxy in the rigidly literal interpretation of these words torn from their connexion, and in the manner of torturing them for a dogmatic object. In the monologue of God at the creation of man in Genesis, Tertullian finds a reference to the Son and Holy Spirit; he says,[2] "With whom did he make man, and to whom did he make him like? With the Son, who was to assume human nature, and with the Spirit, who was to sanctify man." Thus he here finds in the creation a prefiguration of what the λόγος and the Holy Spirit would effect in humanity; thus he considers the λόγος as the original type of man. "He it was," he says, "according to whose image man was made, even according to the image of the Son, who, since he was about to be man, might more certainly and truly call that man his image, who was then formed out of the dust of the earth, but the image and likeness of himself." So he calls the Holy Spirit "the third name of the Deity, the announcer of the one *monarchia*, and likewise the interpreter of the *œconomia*, if any one will receive the utterances of his new prophecy, and the leader into all the truth which is in the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, according to the Christian sacrament."[3]

Tertullian, therefore, applies the idea of unity of essence combined with that gradation, to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He maintains against the Patripassians the possibility of uniting the doctrine of the Monarchy with this Trinity, saying, "As if thus one were not all, as all are from one by unity of substance."[4] After using the comparisons we have quoted above, taken from the relations subsisting in natural objects, he adds,[5] "Nothing is alienated from its original source whence its properties are derived. Thus the Trinity is constituted; which, running through interwoven and connected gradations from the Father, offers no obstruction to the Monarchy, and yet protects the state of the Economy." "I hold," he says,[6] "one substance in three connected exist-

[1] Cap. ix. [2] Cap. xii. [3] Cap. xxx.

[4] Cap. ii. "Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitatem."

[5] Cap. viii.

[6] Cap. xii. "Teneo unam substantiam in tribus cohærentibus."

ences." Thus he says against the Monarchians, "who made both (the Son and the Father) one and the same"[1]—"the Son can without injury be called the one God, whose Son he is. For he who has the Son, does not cease to be himself the one God whenever he is named without the Son. But he is named without the Son when he is designated preeminently as the first person. Hence there is one God the Father, and beside him there is no other." Appealing to the passage in John x. 28, Tertullian says, "The word *one* is here in the neuter, and relates not to the singular, but to unity, likeness, conjunction, to the love of the Father who loves the Son, and to the obedience of the Son who obeys the Father's will. When he says, "I and the Father are one," he shows that there are two whom he equalizes and joins."[2] "The being one," he says, "relates to unity of substance, not to numerical singularity."[3] We here see how Tertullian, in reference to this doctrine, as well as to other points of Christian development, forms the transition-point between the stages of development, and ancient and a modern period,—between the earlier subordination-theory and the more sharply defined theory of the unity of essence in the Trinity. He had an indistinct perception of the real importance of the doctrine of the Trinity for the development of the religious principle effected by Christianity, although he was not capable of developing it with intellectual clearness. The idea was floating in his mind, that as the doctrine of a self-revealing and self-communicating God, who fills up the chasm between himself and the creation, distinguishes the Christian stand-point from the legal Monotheism which retains the infinite chasm between God exalted over all, and the creation, so the doctrine of the Father, Son, and Spirit marks what is characteristically Christian in distinction from the theology of the Old Testament. On this point he says, "But it is a peculiarity of the Jewish faith so to believe in one God, that thou art unwilling to reckon the Son with him, and after the Son, the Spirit. For what other difference can there be between us and them? What is the object of the Gospel? What is the substance of the New Testament, fixing the law and the prophets until John, unless henceforth the Father, Son, and Spirit, believed in as three, constitute one God? Thus God

[1] Cap. xviii. "Ambo unus atque idem, et Filius et Pater."
[2] Cap. xxii.
[3] Cap. xxv. "Ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem."

willed to renew the Sacrament, that men in a new manner might believe in him as one through the Son and Holy Spirit."

We have now only to mention, in this class of his writings, Tertullian's "Treatise against the Jews," (*Adversus Judæos.*) No decisive internal evidence of Montanistic views is to be found in this work; but its object, a vindication of Christianity against the Jews, an object of so general a nature, which was unconnected with the points in dispute between the two parties, and was one on which all Christians must think alike, — naturally gave no occasion to introduce the peculiarities of Montanism. Yet an external chronological mark may be supposed to furnish evidence that Tertullian was already a Montanist when he wrote this work. It is quite certain that he wrote the work against Marcion in a Montanist spirit. Now the third book of that work contains a great many passages which are to be found word for word in the treatise *Adversus Judæos.* But since these passages in the third book against Marcion, where they stand, are necessary for the connexion, but are not so in the treatise *Adversus Judæos*, we must conclude that Tertullian borrowed these passages from a work already written. But this argument falls to the ground if it should appear that those passages are forced in here in so unnatural a manner, that it is impossible not to detect a foreign hand which has thus dragged them from their natural connexion in the book against Marcion. So that the last part of the treatise, from the beginning of the ninth chapter, appears to be for the greatest part a compilation borrowed from the above-named source. Consequently, the treatise *Adversus Judæos* is only to be regarded as Tertullian's as far as the beginning of the ninth chapter; and since it is only a fragment, we are less able to decide whether it was written by Tertullian when a Montanist, or not.

A dispute between a heathen converted to Judaism, and a Christian, gave occasion to this treatise. As there was a want of equanimity in the disputants, and, on account of their excited feelings, they could arrive at no satisfactory result, Tertullian resolved to supply this defect by a written, undisturbed exposition of the argument; if, indeed, such were the real facts of the case, and the alleged occurrence was not invented by way of embellishment.

The manner in which he explains himself on the gradual

progressive development of Christian moral doctrine, is, indeed, very similar to his Montanist disquisitions, but yet contains nothing which could have been said only by a Montanist. "The primordial law given to Adam and Eve, in Paradise," he says, "was the origin of all the precepts of God. . . . . The law of Moses was the work of the same God who had before begun to train the righteous. What wonder is it, if he who had made regulations, should increase the discipline? if he who had begun, should go on to complete?"[1] In pointing out the fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies, he says, "In whom besides have all nations believed, except in Christ, who has already appeared?" Then after enumerating many nations (where we find some extravagant expressions, as for instance, "places in Britain inaccessible to the Romans have been subdued to Christ," although Tertullian, in what had already transpired down to his own times, had witnessed the capability existing in the character of the Gospel to reach all nations without distinction,)—"In all these places, the name of Christ who has already appeared rules; before him all gates are open, before him the iron bolts are broken, and the folding-doors of brass are open. Although these things are to be spiritually understood, inasmuch as the hearts of men are blocked up by the devil, but unbarred by faith in Christ. Who can reign over all nations, excepting Jesus the Son of God, of whom it is declared that he shall reign over all nations for ever? . . . . . The reign and name of Christ is extended everywhere; everywhere he is believed in; he is reverenced by all the nations above-mentioned; everywhere he reigns; everywhere he is adored. To all men everywhere he is equally imparted; a king receives from him not greater favour, nor any barbarian less joy. . . . . to all he is equal; king to all, judge to all, God and Lord to all." When Tertullian applies the passage so often used by the anti-Montanists—"the law and the prophets were until John"—to the fact that with the appearance of God the whole prophetic order had ceased, it might be regarded as rather un-Montanist. But all he means to say is, that the *Jewish* prophetic order, whose office it was to point to the future Messiah, had come to an end; which even a Montanist

[1] "Nec adimamus hanc Dei potestatem, pro temporum conditione legis præcepta reformantem in hominis salutem." To this principle the Montanists appealed in vindication of the new laws which their new prophets wished to prescribe.

might say, since he believed that from the baptism of Christ all the gifts of the Spirit were transferred to *him*.

Jerome[1] quotes a work written by Tertullian in vindication of Montanism, which treats of Ecstasy, in seven books, of which the seventh is directed against Apollonius. According to the account of the author of *Prædestinatus*, lib. i. Hær. 26, this last book was equally directed against Apollonius and the Roman bishop Soter. The supposition that the Roman bishop, Soter, had already declared himself against Montanism, is certainly not impossible, if it could be ascertained that Eleutherus was that contemporary of Praxeas who by him had been induced to alter his opinion of the Montanists.[2] But the compiler of that catalogue of sects is confessedly a writer not to be depended upon, as appears in his representing John as writing against Tertullian. Yet what he quotes from that work is too precise to allow of our regarding it as absolutely false. According to that account he had in that book vindicated the Montanists against false accusations, and sought to diminish the points in dispute, appealing to the fact, that the Montanists kept Easter with the Roman church, as well as the same sacraments; the only points of difference were, second marriages, and the recognition of the Montanist prophecies respecting the last times. As to the first, it would appear that the Montanists, in fixing the celebration of Easter, had withdrawn from the custom of the churches in Lesser Asia; and certainly this is confirmed by what we have [illegible], p. 415, respecting the celebration of Easter. If the first part of the treatise *Adversus Judæos* proceeded from Tertullian, and was written by him as a Montanist, it would follow that the Montanists did not regard Christ's last Passover as strictly a Passover, but reckoned it as taking place on the 13th of the month Nisan, and the 14th as the day of the crucifixion.[3] This opinion, which agrees with John's Gospel, might be referred to Lesser Asia. As to the second point, if Tertullian regarded these as the only remaining points of difference, we should infer that the Montanist tendency had, in the course of time, become not more rigid, but milder, and this might allow us to ascribe a treatise like that on Prayer to the later

[1] De Vir. Illustr. cap. liii.

[2] See Neander's General History of the Church, vol. ii. p. 221. Lond. Lib. ed.—Tr.

[3] Adv. Judæos, cap. viii. "Die prima azymorum, quo agnum ut occiderent ad vesperam a Moyse fuerat præceptum."

times of Tertullian, when he was more moderate. Yet we must never forget the uncertainty of the source from which we derive our information.

It is certainly conceivable, that as there were many gradations between the most violent opponents of Montanism, the Alogi, and the decided adherents of Montanism, Tertullian, who, from a mental tendency only akin to Montanism, had passed over to the most decided Montanism, after his tone of thinking had become more moderate, might adopt less extreme views, though still retaining many things from the influence of Montanism; and this would agree with the accounts already quoted. It might serve as a confirmation of this, that a small congregation of Tertullianists existed at Carthage, who united themselves neither to the Montanist party nor to the Catholic church, till the time of Augustin, who saw it gradually dwindle away.[1] But we cannot regard this as a certain proof.

[1] Augustin De Hæres. H. 86. "Postmodum (Tertullianus) etiam ab ipsis (Cataphrygis) divisus, sua conventicula propagavit."

APPENDIX.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LATTER PART OF TERTULLIAN'S TREATISE "ADVERSUS JUDÆOS."

Semler has already brought under notice the suspicious character of this work (see the 5th vol. of his edition of Tertullian, pp. 221—245), and it lies in any person's power to convince himself of the spuriousness of the latter part, by comparing it with the passages borrowed from the third book of the treatise against Marcion. In order to exhibit the relation of the two, let us compare some passages which are found in both works, according to the connexion in which they are respectively placed. Tertullian, at the beginning of the ninth chapter *Adv. Jud.*, wishes to prove that the birth of Christ was foretold by the prophets, and first of all he quotes the passage from Isaiah vii. word for word. With this citation, Tertullian's work, left incomplete by some accident, appears to have closed. But as Tertullian in his third book against Marcion endeavoured to prove that the Messiah announced by the prophets, the Messiah of the Demiurgus according to Marcion, was no other than Jesus Christ, some one thought that he might very well make use of this argumentation to complete that fragment. Lib. iii. c. Marcion, at the end of cap. xi. "Itaque," &c.—Then the challenge to Marcion, cap. xii. init. to carry out his antithesis between the Messiah of the Demiurgus and Christ in that passage of Isaiah—"Provoca, nunc, ut soles, ad hanc Esaiæ comparationem Christi." His premises, "Primo . . . inquis. dehinc." . . . The conclusion, "Porro, inquis." The interpolator, who had this before his eyes, begins with, "*Itaque* dicunt Judæi; provocemus." . . and closes with, "*Porro* inquiunt." For Marcion, who hardly knew anything of Hebrew, the argument that Jesus was not called Immanuel, might suit very well, and it was necessary for Tertullian to remind him of the idea contained in the word Immanuel. But it is by no means suitable when the unskilful interpolator puts this objection into the mouth of a Jew. And yet in the preceding context he had spoken not merely of proselytes from the heathen, who might easily have learned the meaning of that name from their Jewish teachers, but of Jews generally. Then again, it is very proper, when Tertullian, alluding to the savage habits of the people dwelling in the region of Pontus, says to Marcion,—"Aliud est, si penes Ponticos, *barbaricæ* gentis infantes;"—but these words are not so suitable when applied to the Jews in the treatise *Adv. Judæos*; "*Aliud est si penes vos.*" Marcion charged the Demiurgus with promising an impossibility,—the birth by a virgin; "Sed et virginem, inquit, natura parere non patitur, et tamen creditur

prophetæ." Tertullian answers: "Et merito." But how could such an objection, which brings in question the credibility of the prophet, befit the lips of a Jew? "Sed et virginem, inquiunt, parere natura non patitur, et tamen credendum est prophetæ." The Jews would rather from the first have attacked the correctness of the translation. In the book against Marcion, the following is quite proper: "Denique et Judæi." Where he means to say, Lastly, the Jews may be refuted in their erroneous exposition of the passage by the same argument which repels your attack on the authority of the prophet. But in the treatise *Adv. Judæos*, where Tertullian must go on to say to the same persons, "Demque si" . . . these words are inapplicable. Tertullian in his book *Adv. Marc.* thus argues in reference to the passage in Isaiah: "But something wonderful like a child born of a virgin;" which suits the connexion, for thus the way is cleared and the attention excited to what follows, how such extraordinary things could be foretold of a child,—namely, that it was only of a child born in so wonderful a manner. "In signum ergo disposita virgo et mater merito creditur, infans vero bellator non æque" (this would not be very wonderful if it were rightly understood, not literally, but in a spiritual sense). "Nec hoc utique in signum est malitiæ non assentaturi" (the holy innocence of the child) "et hoc enim infantiæ est, sed accepturi virtutem Damasci," &c., namely, that in this manner it might be predicted of such a child of whom it could be said it would, in the spiritual sense afterwards investigated, &c. The interpolator of the treatise *Adv. Jud.* seems here not to have understood Tertullian's obscure expressions. In the "accepturum virtutes Damasci," which rightly understood according to Tertullian, must point to something extraordinary, but yet to no such miracle, no "novitas monstruosæ" as a child born of a virgin; he thought, even in opposition to what was natural, that he must find a "*mirabile signum*" in the innocence of the child. Where Tertullian has connected the genitive "accepturi" (scil. infantis) with the preceding, the interpolator turns it into "acceptorum," and concludes, "hoc est mirabile signum."

Tertullian applies the passage in Isaiah to the coming of the three magi, "This was the homage of Damascus, for Damascus belonged to Arabia, the homage of the kings of Arabia; for the magi were, or symbolically represented, kings (nam et magos reges fere habuit oriens)." Hence Tertullian says to Marcion, he should only restore its original form to the gospel of truth, since he avowedly rejected the history of Christ's childhood, and let the narrative of the magi retain its place—then he would find all fulfilled. "Redde evangelio veritatis, quæ posterior detraxisti. Maneant orientales illi magi," *i. e.* they should be allowed to remain and not be struck out. But the interpolator in a most absurd manner has admitted into his compilation words that only suited Marcion, without altering them to suit their different reference, and thus no suitable meaning can be extracted from them. What can this mean? "Immo reddite veritati" (*veritas* surely refers only to the gospel history) "quæ credere non vultis." Then—"Maneant orientales illi magi." Where should they remain? Pamelius thought that "maneant" here stands for "expectant;" but even this makes no good sense; and generally, on comparing these two passages, every attempt at explanation must fail. In the treatise *Adv. Judæos*, cap. x. it was said,

the Messiah, appearing as a teacher and as operating with divine power, must correspond to the predictions of the prophets. Then of both references it is said, "Sed de utraque titulo sic disponam; itaque specialiter dispungamus ordinem coeptum." But no one can tell how the *sic* here agrees with the *itaque specialiter*. But if we compare the passage in the third book of Marcion, we shall easily see how the discrepancy arose, since the middle clause which maintains the connexion was left out, since it certainly did not suit the contents of the treatise *Adv. Judæos*. In the book *Adv. Marc.* it reads thus: "Sed de utroque titulo *sic* disponam, *ut quoniam ipsum quoque Marcionis evangelium discuti placint de speciebus doctrinarum et signorum, illuc differamus quasi in rem præsentem;* hic autem generaliter expungamus ordinem coeptum." The interpolator satisfied himself with merely substituting for the adversative *autem*, which when the middle clause is left out is no longer suitable, an *itaque*, which yet forms no proper connexion, and instead of *generaliter*, perhaps led by the *speciebus* which happened to meet his eye, set down *specialiter*, in order to indicate that he only wished here to have to do with one *species*, namely the *predicatio*. In the fourteenth chapter of the treatise *Adv. Judæos*, taken from ch. vii. of the third book *Adv. Marc.* with the introduction, so that from this introduction the clauses that only suited the book against Marcion are thrown out, but what is retained by no means is as well connected as in the reference to the intermediate clauses. In the *Adv. Marc.* it is,—"Discat nunc hæreticus ex abundanti cum ipso licebit Judæo, rationem quoque errorum ejus, a quo ducatum mutuatus." In the *Adv. Judæos*,—"Discito nunc ex abundantia erroris vestri ducatum." Neither the *ex abundanti*, nor the *ducatum* is so suitable here as in the other work.

THE END.

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