

THE PROBLEM OF THE HOUR.

A LECTURE

ON THE RECRUITING OF

ANGLO-INDIAN AND EURASIAN REGIMENTS.

BY

W. C. MADGE.

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PREFACE.

The Lecture contained in the following pages was written at the request of the Board of Directors of the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association, and delivered at a large Public Meeting called by the Association and held at the Dalhousie Institute, Calcutta, on the 20th February 1885. It is published in this form for circulation throughout India, in the threefold hope of rousing the domiciled Anglo-Indian and Eurasian Community to further concerted and sustained efforts for the establishment of Local Corps, of awaking the sympathy and securing the help of the whole body of Europeans residing in India, and of impressing the Government with a sense of the earnestness of the community, the reasonableness of its pleadings, and the necessity of the reform for which it asks.

W. C. MADGE.

Calcutta, 21st February 1885.

ANGLO-INDIAN AND EURASIAN REGIMENTS.

At the Dalhousie Institute, Calcutta, under the auspices of the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association, Mr. W. C. Madge, the Secretary, delivered a lecture on the above subject. There was a large attendance, and the chair was taken by the Rev. W. H. Bray, the President of the Association, who briefly introduced the lecturer. Mr. Madge said:—

Our subject is the Recruiting of Anglo-Indian Regiments. Not the enlistment of Local Corps of Englishmen brought out for foreign service in India, but regiments raised from domiciled Anglo-Indians and Eurasians, living in India, and maintained for service in this country, which is their home. To be considered fully in all its bearings, such a subject must be looked at from three points of view, the Political, the Economic, and the Sentimental.

I. Let us begin with the Political—which claims priority of attention in such an empire as British India. Many sensible men, who plainly see that British rule in this country is an unmixed blessing for its people, yet strangely fail to realise that this blessing is of a moral even more than of a material complexion, and that its moral quality inheres in every necessary part of the political fabric by which that rule is upheld. If it is good and right for England to be in India, it is also good and right for as much English principle, English feeling and English habit to sway in the country as can be got to come or stay here. There may be harm to the people and danger to the State from the growth of any class of evil disposed persons of English descent. But if England were to leave India to-morrow, she could leave behind her no better legacy than a community of her own descendants, fired by her own national instincts, living up to her own moral and social standards, and illustrating in their persons the power of a good descent against very trying surroundings. Free institutions are glorious things to plant in India—but men who are the sons of free ancestors are better.

The peril which Lord Valencia, more than 100 years ago, foresaw from the growth of a Eurasian community, and which Lord Canning faced a century later, were very different aspects at the two periods.

The East India Company's policy of repression and monopoly presented to the alarmed politician of 1750 but one view of a trouble which that policy gave no hope of either suppressing or uprooting. For the calm statesman of 1859, fresh from the spectacle of the struggles of an unconquerable cause, asserting itself grandly yet gently against the havoc that had threatened it, the danger had found a new key and another interpretation. The memory of the past success of right over wrong gave faith in the present and gilded the future with hope. There could be danger only from neglect of what was necessary. To be improving, upbuilding, restoring, was to be in harmony with eternal laws. This was the policy that had made Britain Great, and was the only policy that could succeed in that Greater Britain of which India forms a part. Where Lord Valencia saw only the necessity of preventing Englishmen from settling here, and of exporting Eurasians to England, Lord Canning recognised the duty and privilege of educating them into faithful witnesses for English political morality.

It was not because he underestimated the evil, which he faced, that Lord Canning took a different view of it from that of Lord Valencia. Hear his own words in his great minute of 1859:—"It might be long," he says of the Eurasian body, "before it would grow to what would be called a class dangerous to the State; but very few years will make it, if neglected, a glaring reproach to the Government. On the other hand, if cared for betimes, it will become a source of strength to British rule and of usefulness to India. The Eurasian class have an especial claim upon us. The presence of a British Government has called them into being. They serve the Government in many respects more efficiently than the native can serve it, and more cheaply and more conveniently than Europeans can do so."

If Lord Canning took a truer estimate of the evil than Lord Valencia, it is because hope is always a truer interpreter of Providence than despair. But she is so only because she always inspires to action. The evil, unless worked upon, will remain unchanged, or increase. It is still the little rift within the lute, whose future discord may mar the harmony of the empire. It is still the rock ahead on which the domestic peace of the country may one day be stranded. It is still the cloud no bigger than a man's hand, which may some day burst in a thunderstorm. The cure of the evil is to find out the proper place of the Eurasian in the body politic.

There is a growing consensus of opinion among thoughtful men that a local force will furnish one happy solution of the difficulty.

That Lord Canning specially advocated the recruitment of Eurasian Regiments I cannot pretend to affirm. Indeed, he approved of the Amalgamation of the Company's with the Queen's Forces, and of the abolition of the old Local European Army. Most likely, that measure had, like all big Indian reforms, its secret history; and if we could get a glimpse of its secrets, perhaps we should hear about the grave political danger of exiling Englishmen from home influences and English associations, and settling them permanently in this country. Let us hope that this argument about separating men of English blood from English associations will be kept in view when dealing with Anglo-Indian and Eurasian claims to be treated as British soldiers, and not as native sepoys. But the question of Eurasian employment had not, at the time of the amalgamation, come into the true perspective in which the later maturing of political antagonisms has placed it; and there is no want of harmony between the abolition of the old Local European Force in 1859 and the creation of new Anglo-Indian regiments to-day.

The Company's European Army was a foreign force in India. Divorced in a certain sense from the national life, separated to that extent from healthy political influences and sympathies—at a time, too, when India was more distant in every way from England than she is to-day—and still further isolated in 1859 by the abolition of the Company's Raj—it might any day grow into a Pretorian Guard of the most unpleasant kind. But a regiment of Eurasians and domiciled Anglo-Indians must always be a domestic corps, a corps essentially loyal by the necessity of its position, and always existing under conditions that would be the very guarantees of its faithfulness and efficiency. I am far from saying or hinting that Eurasian soldiers would not be willing—for I know that they would be most anxious—to serve wherever the standard of England was raised throughout the world. But in meeting the argument that political danger may lurk in the constitution of any separate British force that may be raised in India, I think it fair to point out that, in this country, an Eurasian regiment would always be a domestic and not a foreign force. Sharing all the hopes and dangers of Englishmen, it would still be fighting, when it had to fight, in defence of its homes and all that makes home sacred to men of English blood and English feeling.

If we grant that Anglo-Indian and Eurasian soldiers can fight and are worth recruiting—and these are points touching which you shall presently hear some facts—there is no escape from the conclusion that the formation of such regiments is the Indian Military Problem of the day.

Who can say that the horizon of India shall always be clear ? or that a time may come when British troops will not be needed in her defence ? One fear that has often haunted people possessed of political foresight is that many British regiments, and perhaps all of them, may some day suddenly be needed for urgent service in other lands. In that day, should it ever come, what advantage could be greater than having in hand the nucleus of a Local Anglo-Indian force which could be readily enlarged, if not indefinitely, still sufficiently to be of real use ? In any such crisis, every Englishman, every Anglo-Indian, every Eurasian will be a volunteer, if not a militiaman or a soldier of the line. In such an emergency, with all its unavoidable embarrassments, and all its undefined anxieties, will it, or will it not, be an advantage to have the germ of a local army, which shall be ready to expand ? Whether will it be better, then, to have a few trained regiments ready at hand, the very experience of whose constitution and discipline will have suggested practical lessons for future guidance—forming, indeed, a beaten pathway in a wilderness—or to go about like raving Antonies, stamping the ground for legions to arise at our call ?

By every consideration that makes us Englishmen in heart and life, by every influence that makes us loyal to the Throne, I beg of you to use every lawful endeavour, I beg of you to leave no single stone unturned, to win over public opinion and persuade the Government to give us what our best political instincts have long been demanding, regiments in which our sons shall serve the Queen !

II. Let us now consider the Economic aspect of the subject. For we must all feel that, however desirable any project may be or seem, its chances of success in this practical age are in the exact ratio of its fitting in with simple commercial principles. The main consideration we have to take into account is the relation of this project to the law of demand and supply.

Under the head of demand, it is unnecessary to do more than point to the 50,000 British troops maintained in India. In whatever respects people may differ as to the manner of their recruiting, or its cost, you may be sure they would not be kept up if they were not needed. Here, at least, are 50,000 sound economic reasons for maintaining British soldiers in India. Not to make too much of any possible prospects of foreign war, which may call for an increase in the British Indian army, the fact that the highest military authorities regard the Volunteer Corps of India as ranking among her substantial guarantees for domestic peace conclusively shows that the demand for effective soldiers is not decreasing.

It is under the head of supply that the difficulties of the reformer begin, for he has to show—firstly, that a supply of the material wanted can be had; secondly, that the material is of the proper quality; and thirdly, that it will not exceed the proper cost.

Firstly.—As to the available quantity of the material wanted that is to say the extent of the local supply, I shall invite your attention to two classes of figures. The first contains a statistical return of the Eurasian population throughout British India, based on the census operations of the various provinces.

Year.	Provinces.	Males between. 18 & 35.	Total. Males.	Total pop- ulation. including females.
1871	Madras	4,944	13,359	26,450
1872	Bombay	790	1,864	4,226
1872	N.-W. Provinces	504	1,213	2,701
1868	Panjab	631	1,727	3,379
1869	Oudh	184	490	985
1872	Bengal	3,790	20,279
1872	Central Provinces	252	1,352
1871	Maisur	545	2,919
Total		11,640	18,385	62,295

These figures show a total of 62,295, souls, of whom 11,640 were men, between 18 and 35 years of age. The figures do not include some 28,000 souls in Bombay variously known as Indo-Portuguese and Goanese. Again, the Central Provinces report states that many Eurasians were included among Europeans. This kind of accidental under-estimating has probably occurred in other provinces. Moreover, professing to be the statistics of Eurasian populations, these returns will not include many domiciled Anglo-Indians, persons of English parentage living permanently in India, who would be available as soldiers.

But I have promised you another class of figures, into the details of which I need hardly go, but the character of which will, I am sure, impress itself on your minds and help you to draw some natural inferences. In 1879 the Association conceived the idea of taking a careful census of the whole domiciled population, and appealed to the various Local Governments to co-operate with its local Committees. This reckoning was not a very formidable task, because the community dwell mostly in cities, and could be spotted by friendly organizers in peaceful times as easily as they were shot down by unfriendly critics in the mutinies. I am sorry to say most Local Governments fought rather shy of the task. But the Panjab Government, with its constitu-

tional non-regulation dash, went at the business, and finished it first, and found out its difficulty afterwards. This rough and ready census of the Panjab showed that the Eurasian population was larger by something like one third than had been previously reckoned. The inference which I wish you to draw from this fact is that the Eurasian population of India was accidentally under-estimated at the latest census dates, from 12 to 15 years ago. It has also doubtless greatly increased in the interval. The death-rate is high, but its birth-rate is higher. Take into account, together with this increase, the number of the domiciled Anglo-Indian population omitted from these returns, and the Eurasians included as Europeans, with the normal growth of these classes in the intervening years, and then, instead of having to deal with a population of from 60,000 to 70,000, as then estimated, we have now to deal with a population of from 80,000 to 100,000, of whom from 20,000 to 25,000 at least can bear arms. It does not, of course, follow that all these 25,000 men, or even 12,000 of them, are willing and ready to enlist, or that any fanciful proportion of them must make good soldiers. But we can only proceed step by step in any rational argument, and all that I claim to make of these figures, thus far, is that they afford as complete an answer as can possibly be given to the question whether any satisfactory number of Eurasians and domiciled Anglo-Indians capable of bearing arms can be had on any terms in India. The answer is they can.

I know that this position has been contested. So true a friend of our community as Archdeacon Baly has doubted, and officially expressed his doubt, whether recruits can be had in India in any appreciable numbers. Now, as a matter of fact, it is well known to the military authorities that domiciled Englishmen and some Eurasians, who are the sons or grandsons of Englishmen, and are reckoned as Europeans, have always been enlisted in British regiments in India. While I have heard on good authority of applicants for enlistment who have been rejected not, so far as I know, because they were disqualified, but because they were not wanted, I have not heard that recruits actually wanted for any British regiment could not be secured.


I can only add that, when mere rumours of the formation of Anglo-Indian and Eurasian Regiments were afloat in 1879, a number of fine young fellows from 20 to 30 came to me within a few days and offered to enlist; and earnestly, and with apparent sincerity, declared that many others like them were willing to serve. No public intimation of any kind had then been made. Nevertheless I gathered from what reached me in this way on that occasion that a very good

company indeed could easily be raised within a week in Calcutta, and that a regiment could be raised in a very little time if the Government were anxious to raise it.

You will observe that no capital is now being unfairly made of the rush for service that took place during the mutinies. The mutinies did not afford a true test of the attractions of military service for Eurasians in time of peace. The excitement of war conspired with the general disorganization of civil society throughout Northern India to bring into the field the flower of the East Indian middle classes, all of whom or many of whom might not nowadays be tempted to enlist. But it shall not always be a time of profound peace. Moreover, the inherited military instincts of large sections of the Eurasian community are, I think, imperfectly understood by some writers, who have studied them as some scientific men study specimens of beetles and grass-hoppers in boxes, knowing little and caring less for their real feelings and aspirations before they were served up for inspection.

As one who has studied the subject with something deeper than a theoretical interest, I venture to affirm that, if recruits were invited on reasonable terms, a very good class of recruits could be had, and furthermore that, if admission into the commissioned ranks were guaranteed for a reasonable proportion of young men, who were qualified for the honour by birth and education, and proved their fitness for such advancement by any reasonable test that might be devised after any reasonable period of probation, an unmistakeably good class of material would be attracted to any regiments that might be raised.

I hope I shall not prejudice the question of establishing Eurasian regiments by this passing reference to the admission of meritorious persons from the ranks into commissioned grades. I have merely referred to such a provision as a means of attracting to any local corps that may be raised a class of young men who might not perhaps otherwise be attracted to it. And those who know the history of the domiciled Anglo-Indian and Eurasian community know how many officers they have, from the dawn of their history, down to the present day contributed to the army. But the question of establishing such corps as those we are now advocating stands on its own foundation. And, whether the Government can see its way or not to holding out such distinctions as an occasional commission, to be fairly won by a limited number, there can be no reason to doubt that recruits will be forthcoming in sufficient numbers to make the experiment a success. The question whether members of the domiciled community will really enlist can only be solved by enlisting. It is not fair—it may also be



foolish—to theorize in the dark. Probabilities point to their enlisting readily enough.

We have next to take into consideration the quality of the material available, supposing it to offer in sufficient quantity.

If the mutinies did not, as has been admitted, furnish a fair criterion of Eurasian taste for enlisting, what candid person will deny that they afforded constant, abundant, convincing proof of Eurasian taste for fighting? It would be foolish, in the midst of an economic argument, to indulge in rhetorical flourishes on this subject, but, speaking to an unbiassed public, I do appeal from the comical nonsense sometimes spoken about Eurasians to the fighting services of the class, as well as to the deliberate opinions which careful and competent military critics have based on their own experience of facts.

Throughout the mutinies, Eurasians (not to speak of domiciled Anglo-Indians) stood side by side with Englishmen, fighting for a cause which was equally dear to both, and which in the face of a common foe, and in the daily presence of death, recognized no finespun distinctions between its devoted heroes and martyrs. The onus of proof, if any be needed, lies on those who argue from blind prejudice against all the known facts of the matter. Rest assured that if, in all the sad story of 1857, there had been 50 traitorous or cowardly Eurasians, who had betrayed any trust confided to them—indeed, if there had been 40, if there had been 30, if there had been 20, if there had been 10—not only would they have been pilloried in histories written by scornful Englishmen, but their names would have been execrated by an indignant Eurasian community.

Colonel Wooldridge, who raised and commanded the German Legion in the Crimean war, and held an important post of observation at Puna during the mutiny, submitted a scheme for the employment of Eurasians to the Government of India in 1877, from which I quote the following remarks :—I have made it my business, during a residence of sixteen years in this country, to occupy my leisure hours in the study of this much-neglected people. * * * I can vouch for their personal courage. * I cannot say that, as a rule, their bodily proportions are equal to those of the inhabitants of a northern clime, but their activity and intelligence compare favourably with the robust frame of the Europeans, and *there are, moreover, thousands who, after a few months' training, with regular food and proper exercise, may compete with any soldiers in the world.*

It is incorrect to say that Eurasians do not make good soldiers. They have done so before, and shall do so again. Major O. Barnes

Commandant of the Lahore Light Horse, has given the following evidence about his men :—

“ The qualities to make a good soldier are courage, strength, intelligence and docility. Many a gallant officer could testify if he would, to ‘ the pluck of that half-caste boy ’ or ‘ how straight his trumpeter went in that charge. ’ The instances in which they have not behaved well are rare. As for their strength, I may mention that in the games, where they always took part with the British soldiery, they very fairly held their own. One man we had in the regiment was for some years almost without a rival in many garrisons. As for their intelligence, I think there was no Eurasian in the regiment who could not read and write : and their docility was so marked that there was seldom a regimental defaulter among them. As non-commissioned officers, they were strict and reliable, and compared well with British non-commissioned officers. It is not fair to compare them with native troops ; they are altogether a superior class ; better educated, and far more trustworthy. I believe there is not a native regiment in the service in which some breach of discipline is not committed every day under the very noses of the non-commissioned officers, of which no notice is taken, and that when detachments are away from British officers slackness ordinarily reigns supreme. With Eurasians this was not the case. When an order was given, the non-commissioned officers saw that it was obeyed.”

I wish to snatch no partial praise from a generous mind. This testimony, offered in answer to some ungenerous accusations, may possibly have had a little extra impulse from kindly indignation. But in its main purport it is true, and the literature of the subject is full of equally telling testimony, and State records are not wanting in thrilling proofs of its truth. The history of the early Indian Fusilier and Horse Artillery regiments is one on which Englishmen will always look back with pleasure and pride. It is one continuous story of success, in the face of tremendous odds, a story of success, illustrated by deeds of personal daring and personal endurance which have doubtless been equalled in other lands, but have been surpassed nowhere. These regiments were composed for the most part of Englishmen. But gradually there grew up in and around their camps and barracks children who had the blood of this country in their veins, the earliest making of the Eurasian community. As these children grew up a proportion of them, varying, according to different estimates, from 10 to 15 per cent., were drafted along with European recruits into the corps in which their fathers had served.

Of the veterans who served their country in those long past days, not many now survive, but with singular unanimity they all declare that, in the essential attributes of the successful soldier, there was little perceptible difference between the Englishman and the Eurasian. If there was any difference at all, the Eurasian seemed to have the advantage in education and in intelligence. The only doubt which I have ever heard expressed in connexion with the qualifications of these Eurasian soldiers of the olden time, is the doubt whether, if they had been enlisted by themselves, they would have proved as successful as they did with the companionship of English soldiers. I am quite prepared to discuss these doubts on any basis of facts to which they may bear any relation, as, for instance, the experience of the temporary Eurasian corps raised in 1858, which was not intended to last, and did not survive its design. But it is futile to enter into the discussion of theoretical questions of this kind, which have not been raised. It is enough to know that, when domiciled Anglo-Indians and Eurasians have been banded together, they have done well. To those who may persist in harbouring doubts whether Eurasians will get on well by themselves as soldiers, the only answer now possible is this—do not give your doubt a chance of coming true. There is no need to attempt the experiment which you fear. Give us the sort of composite regiments that have done so well in the past. Nobody asks for the kind of boon which you hesitate to give. The fact that Eurasians have rendered good military service in the finest British regiments that have ever served in India is a good ground for enlisting Anglo-Indians and Eurasian corps to-day. There is only one other consideration bearing on the quality of Eurasian soldiers on which it may be necessary to say a word. Some people seem to take mortal offence if they hear it hinted that an Eurasian is as good as an Englishman. Every man is entitled to his own opinion on this as on every other question. So much depends on particular circumstances. "Do not generalize," is the only sensible answer to make alike to the man who declares that Englishmen are superior to Eurasians and to the man who insists they are not.

You must all, whether Englishmen or Eurasians, hold it to be unreasonable and ungenerous to say in regard to two men who have acquitted themselves honourably and equally well in any given task, that one of them would be sure to fare worse than the other in some other business in which nobody asks them to be linked together or contrasted.

As an Eurasian, I have no hesitation in saying that the most thoughtful and candid amongst us are painfully conscious of many important qualities in respect of which our people compare unfavour-

ably with Englishmen born in a colder climate, and bred, in the most impressible years of their life, in the bracing air of English society. But as a matter of fact, if experience has any meaning, these differences do not prevent their fighting equally well; and their bearing on any other question, which prejudice or even excessive candour may raise, is wholly irrelevant to the matter which we are considering here to-day.

Let us now look at the cost of the imported European, as contrasted with that of the locally recruited Anglo-Indian or Eurasian soldier. Every British soldier costs £100 before he lands in India. Any body of 500 men imported to India, whose place can be supplied by 500 men recruited in the country, means a dead loss of £50,000 to start with, or about five and a half lakhs of rupees. But do you suppose that this loss stops here? The 500 men who would have been recruited here would, as a matter of course, have been acclimatized men. The imported men have to undergo a process of seasoning. What that means let the hospital statistics declare. In a statement submitted by the Association to the Government in October 1883, which was based on the Army Medical Department Report for 1880, it was shown that, although the men sent out from England to India are all picked men, and in spite of all the special precautions taken to keep them in health in this country, the death-rate of British troops in India was higher than in any other foreign command, being 24·6 per thousand, against a death-rate of only 7·1 per thousand in the United Kingdom itself.

Now realize for a moment what this awful figure means. It means for one thing that, among a certain class of men, of whom special care is taken, between 3 and 4 men die off in India for 1 that dies in England. Should we not talk of their being killed off instead of their merely dying? for, however lamentable the fact, and however unavoidable, it is none the less undeniable. Surely, apart from every consideration of finance, we here alight upon a moral ground for any change which promises to any extent to diminish this heavy comparative mortality.

The admissions into hospitals in India largely exceed those in any other place garrisoned by British troops. While the average annual strength of the British troops in India in 1880 was 50,136, no less than 87,616 admissions took place into hospitals. That is to say, speaking loosely, every man went into hospital once, and more than half went in twice. The deaths numbered 1,236. There were returned home as invalids 1,073, while there were constantly non-effective from sickness 3,475. The mere death rate, high as that is, does not show the whole loss of the Treasury. If we add the 1,498 men invalided and sent

home, and the 1,072 discharged as invalids, to the 1,226 who actually died in hospital, we have a total of 3,806 which raises the death-rate of 24.6 per thousand to a composite loss rate of 77.6 per thousand. I have only to add that the year 1880, to which the figures relate, was not an exceptionally bad one, for, taking the returns of the ten previous years, from 1870 to 1879, we find that, though the average deaths for that period were 19.2, the average composite loss rate was 77.6 per thousand.

Considering the hospital charges for the sick in India, the cost of all the machinery of ministration needed to tend the sick and dying, and the passage home of invalided men, who will venture to deny that the initial cost of £100 per man must be raised to a dead loss of £100 more for every man sent back? At a moderate computation, therefore, if a regiment of 500 men could be raised to take the places of 500 invalids discharged and sent home, the State would save £100,000 by the transaction. Of course you could not by sleight of hand thrust 500 acclimatized men recruited in India into the place of the very 500 men who are sure to get killed off, or invalided, or sent home. But it is a fair demand to make for any experiment that promises a certain and large saving, whatever its precise dimensions may be, that it ought to be tried. The margin of saving lies between the minimum of £50,000 and the maximum of £100,000 in every body of 500 men. In the case of every 500 men, the former sum must be saved, because it represents expenses incurred before the soldier lands in India, and this sum may range to any figure up to £100,000, or even go beyond it.

It may doubtless be urged in answer to this calculation that the initial loss of £100 per man is an average charge based on the total cost of many arrangements made in England which could not be much reduced in consequence of any paltry reforms in India. There is some force in this contention. But some of its seeming strength is purely fictitious. The largest single element in the cost of an imported soldier is the charge for his passage out, and surely that is incurred for man by man, and cannot be hidden away among vague arrangements. Again, it is hardly fair to call a reform paltry, until you have tried how far it can go. To a grave proposal to save £100 at least, and it may be much more, per head, on say 5,000 or it may be 10,000 British soldiers in India, it is not a sober answer to say that somebody (name unknown) has made up his mind that no more than 100 or 500 good recruits could be picked up in India. Such an answer could only be honestly possible after the experiment had been made. Theories are expensive at £100,000 a piece. Where there is any large and

annually recurring expenditure on any scheme of which the main object is to turn out so many men, its cost can only be estimated at so much a head; and the whole thing ceases to be economically justifiable the moment a doubt is raised as to the possibility of procuring equally serviceable men at lower cost. To persist in any such scheme is to maintain a monopoly, and every monopoly is a conspiracy to benefit some person, or serve a minority, known or unknown, at the expense of the majority, the nation.

It must not be imagined from these remarks that any one in India—and least of all the persons in whose name I am speaking to-day—grudges any cost incurred on account of the English soldier. It has been said that every Englishman in India is worth his weight in gold. If it is good for India that British rule should continue here, every British soldier, at any rate, is worth his weight in gold. But that is surely because of the service he can render; and this estimate must be passed on to every one who can render the like service. The British soldier is needed in increasing numbers in many distant points of an Empire on which the sun never sets, and at a time when a sufficient number of soldiers cannot be obtained in England, it is a waste of valuable material to kill it off in this country.

One more argument on this question of cost, and I shall have done with the economic side of the subject. It is said that the feeding and housing of local regiments on the scale of European troops would be indefensible. The argument is a serious one, deserving of careful analysis. On the sound economic ground that, in the nature of things, imported material must be more expensive than local material, members of the "Native Civil Service," as it is called—to which domiciled Anglo-Indians and Eurasians are equally eligible with natives—get only two-thirds of the pay of Covenanted Civilians brought out from England, even while holding the same offices. The arrangement gets a little mixed when a native gentleman belonging to this country gets into the Covenanted, and an Anglo-Indian from Oxford or Cambridge gets into the Native Civil Service. Still there is something that must be respected in the argument. Anglo-Indians and Eurasians would be glad to get into the Native Civil Service on the appointed terms. But then it must not be forgotten that the salaries of Civilians leave something, it may be a good deal, above the margin of the lowest cost at which an English, an Anglo-Indian or Eurasian life can be kept alive in India. Does the soldier's pay leave much, or anything, above this margin? If it does, I make no doubt that Anglo-Indian and Eurasian soldiers will gladly serve on any pay on which it is practicable for them to live decently in India. As natives they cannot and

will not live, and it is absurd to ask them, when they are expected to comport themselves like Englishmen.

The question of housing Eurasian soldiers is one that can only have arisen because there are persons supposed to be of mixed descent who are attached to the bands of native regiments, and live in huts. It is not for me to say what any admixture of English blood can or cannot do for a man. This I do believe, that there are some people of mixed descent—whether of English and native, or of some other European and native parentage, it is sometimes hard to distinguish—who have sunk very near the native level of living. But no one can say that the Eurasian soldier of the future should be recruited mainly from persons of this class. Certainly the class of Eurasian soldier who was formerly received freely into the Company's European army did not belong to this condition of men. But let the facts be ascertained and represented in figures. Political economy is a goddess who avenges insults offered to her laws in startling ways. If the normal level of the class required as soldiers is much above the hut line of the native labourer, to reduce them to that line is not to save money but to degrade them socially, and deprive them of that which in part makes up their value as soldiers. And to what purpose is this novel experiment to be tried, when barracks exist in abundance in which Anglo-Indians and Eurasians could easily be housed, as men of that kind have always been?

III. It only now remains to consider, in a few closing words, what I have ventured to call the Sentimental aspect of this interesting and important subject.

All of us recognise the importance of material considerations in a world in which dreaming will not make our fortunes—and in a stage of civilisation in which Providence is often on the side of big battalions. But it will be an evil day for India, as for the world, when sentiment is banished from the counsels of the State—and the kindly feeling, which alone enables men to realise the divine in the human, is shut out from the control of human affairs.

Are the pluck and vigour of the British soldier all beefsteak and beer? Is there no sentiment of national pride and personal emulation in their fibre? More than this, the instincts that shrink from ~~cruelty~~ ^{ardice} and cruelty on the field, and move to chivalry in the presence of womanhood, are they attuned to calculations of material gain and material loss, or are they strung to tones whose only meaning is a moral one? All of sentiment that the Eurasian has inherited from his British ancestry, and the Anglo-Indian cherishes in this country in memory of England, tends to make the domiciled Christian community, taken as a whole, resemble their English countrymen in India.

You know perhaps, or some of you, that thoughts have sometimes been entertained of enlisting Eurasians as sepoys. The inlying idea of any proposal of this kind, I should imagine, would be to invent a sort of missing-link between British and native soldiers.

The irony of fate could scarcely wear a more cynical mask than she puts on in this singular proposal. When we have asked for civil appointments that have been intended for Englishmen, we have been given to understand that we are not English. The defect has occasionally lain in the colour of our face, and has sometimes been detected in the style of our "backbone." When we have sought to enter preserves that have been reserved for natives of India, we have been given to understand that we are not Indians. But when men are wanted to fight like Englishmen, the word is passed on to them that they shall be received as the Englishmen they really are, and allowed to fight to their heart's content, but must put up with native pay, and perhaps go by the name of sepoys. It is unnecessary to say anything more of any such proposal than that it is a sad mistake.

To deprive the Eurasian soldier of the sympathy and intimate companionship of the British soldier, so long as any British soldier existed in India, would be suicidal. Such a course might demoralise him, to begin with, and might end in alienating him, from the British Army, to identify him with which is the purpose of all true military reform, that takes any cognisance of the Eurasian as military material at all.

This is no mere question of money, or fair remuneration. Members of the domiciled community, whether Anglo-Indians or Eurasians, would possibly be willing enough to serve for less than the pay of the imported soldier, if for less it were possible for men to live who have been born with English notions and bred in descent Christian habits. I do not pretend to say that they would take to gratuitous skinning from any inborn relish for the process. But they could take to it on compulsion from duty, as men of English descent have borne many things before, which did not pointedly aim at their own degradation. But anything which tends to make the Eurasian soldier an out-cast from the British Army, and to separate him from its special traditions, will not only inflict on him a cruel social degradation, which he has done nothing to deserve, and for which there is no valid political or financial pretext, but—and this is the whole point of the argument—will directly tend to disqualify him for the very duty for which he is wanted, as a British soldier in India.

It is possible, it may even become easy, to bear up against degrading external conditions. It is not so easy, it is sometimes impossible, to be stout-hearted under self-conviction. The man who consents to

his own injury, when it is wholly unmerited, and equally unnecessary may soon begin to forfeit his self-respect. It may be doubted whether the proper class of men would ever seek service under improper conditions. It would be a matter of grave concern whether men of the right sort, who did so under pressure of necessity, could continue to maintain their self-respect. In a letter to the Government on this subject, the Association, which has opportunities of testing the feelings of the community on the subject, has not hesitated frankly to say that any experiment made on wrong conditions would court failure.

Here then, as often happens in life, we find that healthy sentiment is only another name for common sense. Right feeling and true wisdom are always allied, and in the name of both, we plead with our country, which commits the safe-keeping of her honour to the hands of her sons,—let us also share this precious burden, for, as one of your poets has declared—

“O England! who are these if not thy sons?”

At the close of the lecture the following resolution was proposed and carried:—

“That this meeting resolve on submitting a petition to the Government of India, expressing an earnest hope that the Government, on consideration of the statements which have been presented to this meeting will feel justified in applying to the Secretary of State for India to move Parliament for early sanction to the establishment of at least one Local Anglo-Indian and Eurasian regiment, by way of an experiment, and if practicable of more than one such regiment, as a measure in harmony with the general policy of the Government, and specially calculated to provide suitable occupation for a growing section of the domiciled Christian community, and also likely to effect some saving in the military estimates.”

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(13 Jan)