



Hale Bicentennial Publications

THE GREAT EPIC OF INDIA



174.E

THE GREAT EPIC OF INDIA

Its Character and Origin

BY

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PREFACE.

THE sub-title of this book places analysis before speculation. In recent studies of the great epic this order has been reversed, for a method calling itself synthesis has devoted itself chiefly to dwelling on epic uniformity, and has either discarded analysis altogether or made it subject to the results of "synthetic" speculation.

The best way, of course, to take up the historical investigation of a literary product the origin of which is well known is to begin with the source and afterwards to study the character of the completed whole. But if the origin be unknown, and we wish to discover it, we must invert the process, and begin our study with an examination of the character of the work. When the results of our analysis become plain, we may group together those elements which appear to have existed from the first, and thus, on the basis of analysis, reconstruct the past. To begin with a synthesis (so called) of whatever is preserved in the product, and so to postulate for the beginning exactly what we find to be the completed whole, is a process that leads us only to the point from which we started. As vaguely incorrect as is the designation synthesis for the method so called is the method itself, which thus does away with all analysis. Analysis is an examination of constituents. As a method it is, like any other, obnoxious to error, but it is not on that account an erroneous method. It is in fact, as turned upon history, nothing but inevitable critique; and synthesis without such critique becomes merely the exploitation of individual opinion, which selects what pleases it and rejects, without visible cause, what is incompatible with the synthetic scheme.

In the case of the great epic of India, the peremptory demand that we should reject the test of analysis is the more remarkable as the poem has never been completely analyzed. The literature mentioned in it has been ably collected in the well-known memoirs of Professor Holtzmann, who has also indicated what in his opinion may be supplied from allusions; but the poem has not been thoroughly examined to see what literature it reflects from the age of the later Upanishads or Vedic schools; it has not received a careful investigation from the metrical side; its philosophy has been reviewed only in the most haphazard fashion; and its inner relation to other epic poetry has been almost ignored. Yet critic after critic has passed judgment on the question of the date and origin of this poem, of which we know as yet scarcely more than that, before a definitive answer can be given, the whole huge structure must be studied from many points of view. And last of all the synthesist comes also, with his ready-made answer to a problem the conditions of which have not yet been clearly stated.

Thus far, indeed, the synthetic theory has not succeeded in winning over a single scholar to accept its chief conclusions, either as regards the contention that the epic was composed 500 B. C., or in respect of the massed books of didactic material and their original coherence with the narrative. Though the results of the method have not proved to be entirely nugatory, yet they are in the main irreconcilable with a sober estimate of the date and origin of the epic; but the hypothesis is, in truth, only a caricature of Bühler's idea, that the epic was older than it was thought to be. In its insistence upon the didactic element as the base of the whole epic tale it bears a curious resemblance to a mediæval dogma, the epitaph of which was written long ago. For there were once certain ingenious alchemists who maintained that the Legend of the Golden Fleece was a

legend only to the multitude, whereas to the illuminati it was a didactic narrative teaching the permutation of other metals into gold; on the tomb of which brilliant but fallacious theory was finally inscribed: λόγος ὅς ἐστι τῇ μὲν τόλμῃ μέγας τῇ δ' ἀποδείξει κενός.¹

But though this theory has failed as a whole, yet, owing to the brilliant manner in which it was first presented by its clever inventor, and perhaps also to its sharing in the charm which attaches to all works of the imagination, it has had a certain success with those who have not clearly distinguished between what was essential and adventitious in the hypothesis. The Rev. Mr. Dahlmann, to whom we owe the theory, has shown that epic legends and didactic motif are closely united in the epic as it is to-day; but this is a very different proposition from that of his main thesis, which is that complete books of didactic content were parts of the original epic. One of these statements is an indubitable fact; the other, an historical absurdity.

This historical absurdity, upheld by the Rev. Mr. Dahlmann in a rapidly appearing series of somewhat tautological volumes, is of much wider application than has perhaps occurred to the author. For in the later additions, which the Rev. Mr. Dahlmann regards as primitive parts of the epic, are found those sections which reflect most clearly the influence of Buddhism. If these sections revert to 500 B. C., all that Buddha as a personality stands for in the history of Hindu religious thought and practice belongs not to him but to his antecedents, and therewith vanishes much of the glory of Buddha. Though the author has not publicly recognized this obvious result of his theory, yet, since it is obvious, it may have appeared to some that such a darken-

¹ Almost identical, in fact, is the verdict on the synthetic argument delivered by the veteran French critic, M. Barth: "conclusion audacieuse . . . théorie absolument manquée" (*Journal des Savants*, 1897, pp. 337, 448).

ing of the Light of Asia added glory to the Light of the World, and this is possibly the reason why the synthetic theory has been received with most applause by the reviewers of religious journals, who are not blind to its bearings. But however important inferentially, this is a side-issue, and the historian's first duty is to present the facts irrespective of their implication.

On certain peculiarities (already adversely criticised by disinterested scholars) characteristic less of the method of investigation than of the method of dialectics which it has suited the Rev. Mr. Dahlmann to adopt, it is superfluous to animadvert in detail. Evidence suppressed by one seeker, in his zeal for truth as he sees it, is pretty sure to be turned up by another who has as much zeal and another method; nor has invective ever proved to be a satisfactory substitute for logic. As regards the claims of synthesis and analysis, each method has its place, but analysis will always have the first place. After it has done its work there will be time for honest synthesis.

The material here offered is by way of beginning, not by way of completing, the long task of analyzing the great epic. It is too varied for one volume, and this volume has suffered accordingly, especially in the chapters on philosophy and the interrelation of the epics. But the latter chapter was meant only as a sketch, and its worth, if it has any, lies in its appendix; while the former could be handled adequately only by a philosopher. The object of these and other chapters was partly to see in how far the actual data rendered probable the claims of the synthetic method, but more particularly to give the data without concealment or misstatement. For this reason, while a great deal of the book is necessarily directed against what appeared to be errors of one sort or another, the controversial point of view has not seldom been ignored. Pending the preparation of a

better text than is at present available, though Dr. Winternitz encourages the hope of its eventual appearance, the present studies are intended merely as signboards to aid the journey toward historical truth. But even if, as is hoped, they serve to direct thither, they will be rendered useless as they are passed by. Whether they are deficient in their primary object will be for travellers on the same road to say.

JANUARY, 1901.

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ABBREVIATIONS.

As most of the references in this volume are to the Mahābhārata, all numbers without alphabetical prefix refer to this epic (Bombay edition, or with prefix C. to Calcutta edition); but when necessary to distinguish a reference to the Mahābhārata from a reference to the Rāmāyana, I have prefixed M., which therefore does not refer to Manu, but to the great epic. To bring the two parallel editions of the epics into line, I have used R. or RB. for the Bombay edition of the Rāmāyana also (rather than for the Bengal text), and for clearness I employ G. for the Gorresio (Bengal) text thus:—

M. or MB., Mahābhārata, Bombay edition.

R. or RB., Rāmāyana, Bombay edition.

C., Mahābhārata, Calcutta edition.

G., Rāmāyana, Gorresio's edition.

Other abbreviations, such as those usually employed to indicate native texts, or, for example, ZDMG. and JAOS. for the Journals of the German and American Oriental Societies respectively, require no elucidation for those likely to use them. Those using the old edition of RB. must add one to all references to sargas after vi, 88, and two to all after vi, 107. Sanskrit words usually anglicized have so been written.

THE GREAT EPIC OF INDIA.

CHAPTER ONE.

LITERATURE KNOWN TO THE EPIC POETS.

PARADOXICAL as it may seem, the great epic mentions post-epical as well as prae-epical works. To solve the paradox it is necessary to assume that the text has been interpolated, a fact admitted as a last recourse even by him who holds that the epic was originally what it is to-day. But interpolations to be referred to when everything else fails will not suffice. A large part of the present epic is interpolation, some of it self-interpolated, so to speak. For, not content with receiving accretions of all sorts, narrative and didactic, the Bhārata, in default of other sources of interpolation, copied itself. Thus the same story, hymn, and continuation are found in iii, 83, 116 ff. and ix, 38, 39 ff. The matter of xii, 223 is simply enlarged in 227, while xii, 248-9 repeats xii, 194 and then reappears again in xii, 286. An example of reproduction with variations is found in ix, 51, 50, as compared with iii, 133, 12 ff. In one case a youthful prodigy encounters venerable sages and teaches them the Veda; in the other a priest and king are instructed, but with the same setting of proverbial lore. So xii, 185 is a reproduction of iii, 213, 1-19; xii, 277 (8), of xii, 175, etc.

It is not strange, therefore, that a work thus mechanically inflated should have absorbed older literature. But to understand the relation between the epic and the older literature copied by the epic it is essential to know the whole literature referred to as well as cited. In this chapter, then, beginning with the Vedas, I shall follow the course of revealed and

profane literature as far as it is noticed in the epic itself, reserving, however, for the two following chapters the Rāmāyaṇa and the philosophical systems.

The Vedas.

Allusions to Vedic literature, veda, chandas, mantra, ṛuti, are naturally common in every part of the Mahābhārata, but except in the didactic or later epic these are usually of a general character. It may be assumed that the bulk of Ṛuti or revealed works, if not all of it, was composed before the epic began. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see which portions of this hereditary literature are especially mentioned, and particularly important to observe how the epic cites from older works. Even the fact that it does cite verbatim the words of the holy texts is of historical moment when it is remembered that in other places even women and slaves are exhorted to hear the recital of the epic.¹ We find indeed in the course of the epic narrative that a woman is taught Vedic mantras,² but the mantras are from the Atharva Veda, which, without being particularly slighted, is less regarded than the older Vedas, as is shown by this incident; for no woman would have been taught Rig Veda verses, for example.

The Vedas are all mentioned by name, though the Atharva Veda is not always recognized in the formal enumeration. The order of precedence is not fixed, though its peculiar holiness, vimala, is not the reason why the Sāma Veda in the Gītā and Anuṣāsana heads the list.³ Usually the Rig Veda stands at the head and the Atharva, if mentioned, at the foot, though the order Rk, Yajus, Atharvan, Sāman, and even Atharvan, Sāman, Rk, Yajus is found; but the last order occurs only in the didactic or later epic. The four together comprise the vedaḥ caturmūrtiḥ, or fourfold Veda, which, in

¹ Compare i, 62, 22; 95, 87; iii, 85, 103; xii, 341, 116, etc.

² Tatas tām grāhayāmāsa sa dvijaḥ Mantragrāmam . . . atharvaṇīrasi ṛutam (v. l. atharvāṇīrasi), iii, 305, 20.

³ For in v, 44, 28, it has this epithet, yet stands last in the list: "Not in R. V., nor in Y. V., nor in Atharvas, nor in the spotless Sāmans."

distinction from the threefold Veda, is often joined with the "Veda of the bow." The epic even has *caturveda* as an epithet of a man, — "one that knows the four Vedas" (= *cāturvāidyā*), — as earlier *triveda*, *trāividya*, is used in the same way of one learned in the three (*cāturvidyam* is a pseudo-epic term for the Vedas).¹

The tradition of "lost Vedas"² and "divided Vedas" is well known. There was at first but one Veda, but after the *Kṛta* age men became men of three, men of two, men of one, and men of no Vedas, *triveda*, *dviveda*, *ekaveda*, *anṛk*, iii, 149, 14–29, and v, 43, 42, *ṣāstreṣu bhinneṣu* being Vedas; *bhinnās tadā vedāḥ*, xii, 350, 42 (by *Apāntaratamas*). The last passage is peculiar in the use (çl. 41–47) of *vedāḥkhyāne* *ṣṛuṭiḥ kār्या*, and in the name of Kali as *kṛṣṇa* (as well as *tiṣṭa*).³

The Veda is either recited, declared, or made, *sṛṣṭa*, *kṛta*. The latter word contradicts the dogma declared in the well-known words: *na hi cchandāṁsi kriyante nityāni cchandāṁsi*, "the Vedas are not made, they are eternal;" but the sense is

¹ The word *triveda* remains the usual form (*tritayaṁ sevitaṁ sarvaṁ*, ix, 64, 21). Besides *caturveda* as an epithet of a god (illustrated in PW.) we find in the late passage iii, 313, 110 ff.: *paṭhakāḥ pāṭhakāḥ cāi 'va ye cā 'nye cāstracintakāḥ sarve vyasasino mūrkhā, yaḥ kriyāvān sa paṇḍitaḥ; caturvedo 'pi durvṛtaḥ sa cūdrāḍ atiricyate, yo 'gnihotraparo dāntaḥ sa brāhmaṇa iti smṛtaḥ*. On the order of names referred to above: the lead of the *Atharva* is found also in the *Mahābhāṣya* (IS. xiii, p. 432); the epic passage is xiii, 17, 91. The name is here *atharvaṇa* or *ātharvaṇa*, xiii, 93, 136; 94, 44. Examples of the usual order are *ṛco yajūṁṣi sāmāni*, i, 1, 66; ix, 36, 34; xii, 252, 2 (*ṛco yajūṁṣi sāmāni yo veda na sa vāi dvijaḥ*); *ṛgvedaḥ sāmavedaḥ ca yajurvedaḥ ca atharvavedaḥ ca*, ii, 11, 32; iii, 189, 14, *atharvaṇaḥ*. In v, 18, 6–7, it is said that the name *Atharvāṅgiras* will eventually belong to the *Atharva* Veda. The word *sāmāni* is not restricted to this Veda. Thus *Dhāumya*, a *Purohita* and, therefore, as *Weber* has shown, presumably an *Atharvan* priest, sings incantations of destruction, *sāmāni rāudrāṇi yāmyāni* (*gāyan*), ii, 80, 8. On the expression *atharvavede vede ca*, see below. For the order of names, compare my *Ruling Caste*, p. 112; and see *Holtzmann*, *Das Mahābhārata*, iv, p. 5; for further passages (for the AV. in particular), *Bloomfield*, *SBE*. xlii, p. liii.

² On this aeonic occurrence (xii, 210, 16 ff.), compare *vedaḥṣṛuṭiḥ prapaṣṭā*, xii, 346, 9, the story in 348, and the quotation in the text below. The modified *vṛata*, rules, *vikriyante vedavādāḥ*, are referred to in xii, 233, 38.

³ The former as *Kali* is still starred in pw. The latter is masculine in R. vi, 35, 14 (also starred as such in pw.). The word occurs also in xii, 341, 86.

not opposed, as the maker is God (vedakartā vedāṅgo veda-vāhanah, iii, 3, 19), who only emits the Vedas as he does all else when the new aeon begins. The more decided "make" is found of seers, however, in the Harivaṅṣa, mantrabrāhmaṇa-kartāraḥ, mantrakṛtaḥ,¹ seers and descendants of seers, just as there is a Mahābhāratakṛt and Itihāsasya kartā, or ποιητὴς ἐπῶν, though he too is divine.² The gods who are credited with the making of the Vedas³ are Fire and Sun, as All-God (above), or especially Brahman, and in the later epic Vishnu. It was Brahman who "first recited the Vedas," vedān jagāu, v, 108, 10. With a natural inversion, "Brahman created brahman" (whereas in reality brahman created Brahman), according to another passage, xii, 188, 1-2. Compare: ya ime brahmaṇā proktā mantraṁ vāi prokṣaṇe gavām ete pramāṇam bhavata utā 'ho na, v, 17, 9-10. The Self-existent, according to xii, 328, 50, created the Vedas to praise the gods, stutyartham iha devānām vedāḥ sṛṣṭāḥ svayambhuvā. Kṛṣṇa, who is kṛtāgama, in xiii 149, 97, takes the place of the more general term. Compare xii, 340, 105:

yadā vedaḥrutir naṣṭā mayā pratyāhṛtā punaḥ
savadāḥ saḥrutikāḥ ca kṛtāḥ pūrvaṁ kṛte yuge
(atikrāntāḥ purāṇeṣu ḥrutās te yadi vā kvacit),

and nirmītā vedā yajñāḥ cāu 'śadhibhiḥ saha, ib. 341, 66, with xiii, 145, 61, āgamā lokadharmāṇām mār्याdāḥ pūrvanirmitāḥ.⁴

¹ jāyanti 'ha punaḥ punaḥ Mantrabrāhmaṇakartāraḥ dharme praṇiṭhile tathā, H. 1, 7, 56.

² Kṛṣṇa Dvāipāyana, also called Kuruvaṅṣakara, xii, 347, 13; xiii, 18, 43-44. The recitation of the Vedas is a matter of scientific study. When they are "loudly recited in the proper way," saḥkṛṣya, they fill (other) winds with fear, and therefore should not be recited when a high wind is blowing, xii, 329, 23-56.

³ For the gods and especially for the part of Brahman in creating the Vedas and the transfer of his office to Vishnu in the epic, see Holtzmann, ZDMG. xxxviii, p. 188, and Das Mahābhārata, iv, p. 6.

⁴ The v. l. sarva is wrong. The word āgama usually refers to Veda, but not always. Compare xiii, 104, 156, āgamānām hi sarveṣāṁ ācāraḥ creṣṭha ucyaṭe; i, 2, 38, itihāsaḥ creṣṭhaḥ sarvāgameṣv ayam; xii, 59, 139, āgamah purāṇānām. It means any received work, particularly the Vedas.

In late passages the two earliest forms of the text (the latest forms are unknown) together with the accents of the texts are especially mentioned.¹

In the important numerical analysis of xii, 343, 97-98, the Rig Veda is said to "have twenty-one thousand"; while the Sāma Veda has "one thousand branches"; and the ādhvaryava or Yajus has "fifty-six and eight and thirty-seven (one hundred and one) branches." Probably "twenty-one branches" is the real meaning in the case of the Rig Veda. Here too are mentioned the gītis, songs or verses (a rather unusual word) found in the branches in their numerous divisions, cākhābhedaḥ, cākhāsu gītayah.²

It is evident from this statement that, as Weber says of the passage in the Mahābhāṣya, we are dealing with a period when the number of Yajur Veda schools is greater than that recognized in the Caranavyūha, which gives only eighty-six. Another verse of this book recognizes ten thousand ṛcas: "This ambrosia churned from the wealth of all the dharmā-khyānas, the satyākhyāna, and the ten thousand ṛcas," xii,

¹ ṛgvedaḥ padakramavibhūṣitaḥ, xiii, 85, 90; atharvavedapravarāḥ pūga-yajñīyasāmagāḥ saṁhitām irayanti sma padakramayutām tu te, i, 70, 40. Gālava, Bābhavyagotra, Pāñcāla, the grammarian, through the especial grace of the deity and being instructed in the method of Vāmadeva, became a shining light as a krama specialist, xii, 343, 100 ff.; lakṣaṇāni svarāstobhā niruktaṁ surapañktayah, xiii, 85, 91 (together with nigrāha and pragraha); svarākṣaravyaḥ janahetuyuktayā (girā), iii, 297, 20.

² The verse translated above is ekaviṁśatisāhasram (ṛgvedam mām prakṣate). Twenty-one thousand what? Not stanzas, for the Rig Veda has only half so many (Müller, ASL. p. 220). On the other hand, the passage agrees closely with one in the Mahābhāṣya (IS. xiii, p. 430), where the corresponding words are "twenty-one fold," after *varṇa* (school): ekaṣatam adhvāryucākhāḥ, sahasravartmā sāmavedaḥ, ekaviṁśatidhā bāhvr̥cyam (a word implied in Mbh. xv, 10, 11, "Sāmba the bahvr̥caḥ"), navadhā ātharvaṇo vedāḥ. The epic text, closely corresponding, is: ekaviṁśatisāhasram ṛgvedam . . . sahasraçākhaṁ yat sāmā . . . ṣaṭpañcāṣatam aṣṭāu ca sapta triṁśatam ity uta yasmin cākhā yajurvede, so 'ham ādhvaryave smṛtaḥ, pañcakalpam atharvāṇaṁ kṛtyābhīḥ paribṛmhitam kalpayanti hi mām viprā atharvāṇavidas tathā. There can scarcely be a doubt that for the text above we should read ekaviṁśatiçākhaṁyam, as the parallel suggests, for the text as it stands is unintelligible. I regret that Weber has not noticed the epic passage, so that I cannot cite his opinion.

247, 14, where the commentator says that this is a general number, implying a fraction over 10,580.¹

In the account of the later epic we have a parallel to that of the Vāyu Purāṇa, where the latter, lxi, 120 ff., is accounting for the successive editions of the Vedas :

āvartamānā ṛṣayo yugakhyāsu punaḥ punaḥ
 kurvanti saṁhitā hy ete jāyamānāḥ parasparam
 aṣṭācītisahasrāṇi ṛutarsīṇām smṛtāni vāi
 tā eva saṁhitā hy ete āvartante punaḥ punaḥ
 ṛitā dakṣiṇam paṇḥānam ye śmaṇāni bhejire²
 yuge yuge tu tāḥ cākhā vyasyante tāiḥ punaḥ punaḥ
 dvāparesv iha sarveṣu saṁhitāḥ ca ṛutarsibhiḥ
 teṣāṁ gotreṣv imāḥ cākhā bhavanti 'ha punaḥ punaḥ
 tāḥ cākhās tatra kartāro bhavanti 'ha yugakṣayāt

The eighty thousand Vedic seers here mentioned are those of the Harivaṅṣa (loc. cit.): ye ṛūyante divam prāptā ṛṣayo hy ūrdhvaretasaḥ mantrabrāhmanakartāro jāyante ha yugākṣaye. They are mentioned elsewhere in the Vāyu Purāṇa, viii, 184, and in the epic itself, ii, 11, 54, in the same words :

aṣṭācītisahasrāṇi ṛṣīṇām ūrdhvaretasām,

a verse found also in the Mahābhāṣya (IS. xiii, p. 483).

¹ Compare further the daṇa pañca (ca) yajūnsi, learned from Arka by the author of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, in xii, 319, 21. The word carana, in the sense of school, occurs in xii, 171, 2, prṣṭaḥ ca gotracaraṇam svādhyāyam brahmacārikam; xiii, 63, 18, na prched gotracaraṇam. The mantras of the special septs are referred to in the late hymn to the Sun (Mihira), iii, 3, 39: (tvām brāhmanāḥ) svaçākḥāvihitāir mantrāir arcanti. The commentator cited above gives as his authority for the number of stanzas in the Rig Veda a lame couplet of the Çāṅkhalaka: ṛcām ḍaṣasahasrāṇi ṛcām pañcaçatāni ca ṛcām açitih pādaç cāi'tat pārāyaṇam ucyaata, iti.

² They are referred to, but not as Veda-makers, in Yāj. iii, 186, and in Āp. Dh. S., ii, 9, 23, 3-5 (as being mentioned "in a Purāṇa"). Yājñavalkya calls them the aṣṭācītisāhasrā munayaḥ punarāvartinaḥ . . . dharmapravartakāḥ. The Purāṇa referred to by Āpastamba may be the one cited above, though in another form, since the words have a different application. There is here a praçamsā of the ūrdhvaretasas: aṣṭācītisahasrāṇi ye prajām iṣira ṛṣayaḥ dakṣiṇenā'ryamaṇaḥ paṇḥānam te śmaṇāni bhejire, etc. Compare Praçna Up. i, 9, ta eva punarāvartante tasmād ete ṛṣaya prajākāmā dakṣiṇam pratipadyante.

Divisions of Veda.

Reference is seldom made to *Samhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa*, or *Āraṇyaka*. The "peruser of *Samhitā*," *saṁhitādhyāyin*, is alluded to in i, 167, 8, and xiii, 143, 56. The word is used also of the epic, *Vyāsa's Samhitā*, the fifth Veda. In xii, 201, 8, *saṅgha* may be used in the same sense of collection, but it probably means a quantity. I will give the passage, however, as it enumerates the usual (i, 170, 75, etc.) six *Vedāṅgas*, though in an order constrained by the metre (they and the *Upāṅgas* will be discussed below, under *Upavedas*):

ṛksāmāsāṅgāṇi ca yajūṁṣi cā 'pi
 cchandaṁsi nakṣatragatiṁ niruktam
 adhitya ca vyākaraṇaṁ sakalpaṁ
 çikṣāṁ ca, bhūtaprakṛtiṁ na vedni,

"Although I have studied collections of hymns and chants and the sacrificial formulas, and also prosody, astrology, etymology, grammar, ritual, and phonetics, I do not know the First Cause of being."

Brāhmaṇas are mentioned in xii, 269, 33-34, as the source of sacrifice, and in iii, 217, 21, "the different *Agnis* named in the *Brāhmaṇas*," *brāhmaṇeṣu*. In xiii, 104, 137, "rites declared in the Veda by *Brāhmaṇas*," the word means priests. Possibly *Gītā*, 17, 23, *brāhmaṇāḥ* (and *vedāḥ*) may be works, as the epic is not particular in regard to the gender of these words (*purāṇa*, *itihāsa*, and *mahābhūta* are both masculine and neuter). *Yājñavalkya's Ātapatha Brāhmaṇa* alone is named, with all its latest additions (*kṛtsnam sarāhasyaṁ sasaṅgrahaṁ sapariçeṣaṁ ca*), xii, 319, 11, and 16. So ib. 24, 25, and 34: "I resolve in mind the *Upanishad* (BA.) and the *Pariçeṣa* (the last part), observing also logic, the best science, *ānvikṣikī parā*, and declare the fourth transcendental science or science of salvation, *sāmparāyikā*, based on the twenty-fifth (*Yoga*) principle." ¹ Other *Brāhmaṇas* may be implied in the

¹ In the expression, loc. cit., çl. 10, *vedaḥ sakhilāḥ so 'ttaraḥ, uttara* refers to the *Upanishads* (not to the philosophy). The *Khila Supplement* is mentioned again in the *Harivaṇṣa* (Holtzmann).

list at xii, 337, 7 ff., Tāṇḍya, Kāṭha, Kaṇva, Tāittiri.¹ As "prose works," gadya, this class of works is perhaps recognized in iii, 26, 3, in the words: "The thrilling sound of yajūṇṣi, ṛcaḥ, sāmāni, and gadyāni" (as they were recited).

Whether pravacana, exposition, means Aṅgas or Brāhmaṇas or perhaps Sūtras, I do not know. The (Upanishad) word occurs in a verse found also in Manu, where the commentator explains it as Aṅga, to which the objection may be made that the Aṅgas have already been mentioned. But the passage is not without importance as showing how the didactic or later epic adds elements to the simpler statement of the earlier law-books. In xiii, 90, 36, the pāṅkteyas, or men who may be invited to sit in the row at a funeral feast, are not only the agryāḥ sarveṣu vedeṣu sarvapravacanēṣu ca of Manu iii, 184, and the list of iii, 185, triṇāciketāḥ pañcāgnis trisuparṇaḥ ṣaḍaṅgavid (v. l. brahmadeyānusantānaḥ chandogo jyeṣṭhasāmagāḥ) in 90, 26, but, among others, the atharvaçiraso 'dhyetā, 29 (a rare word); "those who cause the Itihāsa to be read to the regenerate," 33; those who are "acquainted with commentaries," bhāṣyavidas (or know the Mahābhāṣya?),² and are "delighted with grammar," vyākaraṇe ratāḥ, 34; those who "study the Purāṇa and the Dharmaśāstras"; those who "bathe in holy pools," ye ca puṇyeṣu tīrtheṣu abhiṣekakṛtāḥ, 30 (a practice not extolled by Manu, whose view seems to be that of Agastya, asti me kaçcit tīrthebhyo dharmasaṁgayaḥ! xiii, 25, 5). The bhārata vidvān, xiii, 76, 18, is naturally extolled in the epic, and yet even with this latitude we must see in the list above a distinct advance on the position held by the early law-makers, to whom it was not enough for a man to recite the epic (not to speak of grammar and bhāṣya-knowers as being ipso facto pāṅkteyas) to be deemed worthy of invitation. Even Vishnu's Smṛti is here exceeded, and Manu and the Sūtras have nothing in any degree parallel. Even if we say that the list is on a par with

¹ The Tāittiri dispute is referred to in xii, 319, 17 ff.

² But bhāṣya may mean any reasoned exposition, bhāṣyāṇi tarkayuktāni, ii, 11, 35.

Vishnu alone, although it really exceeds it in liberality, we thereby put this epic passage on a par with a law-book later than any that can be referred to the Sūtra period, later than Manu also and probably Yājñavalkya.¹

Almost as rare as the mention of Brāhmaṇas is that of Āraṇyakas. In the passage cited above, xii, 343, stanza 98 has as elsewhere the singular, gāyanty āraṇyake viprā madbhaktāḥ. So ib. 340, 8: "Hari sings the four Vedas and the Āraṇyaka" (as forest, e. g., ib. 337, 11, āraṇyakapadodbhūtā bhāgāḥ); and in xii, 349, 29-31, the Krishna religion has "mysteries, abstracts, and Aranyaka." Compare also v, 175, 38, ṣāstre cā 'raṇyake guruḥ. "a man of weight in code and esoteric wisdom"; xii, 344, 13, āraṇyakam ca vedebhyaḥ (yathā), where the kathāmṛtam or essence of story of the expanded Bhārata, Bhārataḥkhyānavistara of 100,000 ślokaś,² is compared to the Āraṇyaka as the essence of the Vedas (a simile repeated at i, 1, 265). The word is in fact generalized, like Upanishad. But as a literary class it is found in the plural in xii, 19, 17, vedavādān atikramya ṣāstrāṇy āraṇyakāni ca . . . saram dadṛṣire na te, "they ran over the words of the Vedas, the Śāstras, and the Āraṇyakas, without discovering their inner truth." Here Veda does not connote Āraṇyaka.

Upanishads.

The Upanishads are alluded to in the singular, collectively, or distributively in the plural. They are generally grouped with the Aṅgas and are called Upanishads, rahasyas, mysteries, Brāhma Veda, and Vedānta; while like the Āraṇyakas they are logically excluded from the Veda of which they are supposed in ordinary parlance to form part.³ The

¹ Vishnu, ch. 83; Manu, loc. cit.; Yāj. i, 219; Āp. ii, 17; Gāut. xv; Vas. xi. I doubt whether the "Atharvaṇas-reader" can imply the Ṣaṇas-vow, but even this is a comparatively late touch, Bāudh. ii, 14, 2, in this regard.

² Note that the number of verses show that the Harivaṇas already existed when this passage was written. Compare ib. 340, 28.

³ I mean that in the current phrase vedāḥ sāṅgāḥ or sapaniṣadāḥ the sa should differentiate as much as it does in the parallel phrase ṛgvedāḥ sayā-

word *upaniṣad* has two distinct but current meanings in the epic. It means on the one hand mystery, secret wisdom, essential truth, essence, as in xiii, 78, 4, *gavām upaniṣadvidvān*, "wise in cow-mysteries," and in iii, 207, 67 = xii, 252, 11, *vedasyo 'paniṣat satyam, satyasyo 'paniṣad damaḥ*, "truth is the secret wisdom (essence) of the Veda, patience the essence of truth." So in the common phrase, *vedāḥ ca sopaniṣadaḥ*, xiii, 85, 92, etc., the word may mean mysteries. This I think is the explanation of the employment of the word *mahopaniṣad* in vii, 143, 34-35, where Bhūriṣravas devotes himself to *prāya* before death in battle. He is a muni here and desires to ascend to the world of Brahman, so he sits down in Yoga contemplation and meditates the "great *Upa-niṣad*," *dhyāyan mahopaniṣadam yogayukto 'bhavan munih*. On comparing the scene where Droṇa is in the same situation, vii, 192, 52, we find that he says *om*, and this mystery of *om* is probably the meaning of *mahopaniṣad*, which cannot be a work here, as is *mahopaniṣadam* in xii, 340, 111. But in other cases *Upanishad* is clearly a literary work, even standing in antithesis to the mysteries with which it is sometimes identical, as it is in the form *upaniṣā* in the Pāli scriptures.¹

jurvedaḥ, or in *yad etad ucyate ṣāstre se 'tihāse ca chandasi*, xiii, 111, 42. But it is very likely that the term was used to mean "including" (as part of the Veda). On the use of singular and plural referred to above, compare *sa rājā rājadharmāṇḥ ca brahmopaniṣadam tathā avāptavān*, xv, 35, 2; *sāṅgopaniṣadān vedān viprāḥ cā' dhīyate*, i, 64, 19, etc. For *Vedānta* and *Vedāntāḥ*, meaning *Upanishads*, compare iv, 51, 10, *vedāntāḥ ca purāṇāni itihāsam (!) purātanam*; xiii, 16, 43, (*Ṣiva*) *yaṁ ca vedavido vedyam vedānte ca pratiṣṭhitam . . . yaṁ viçanti japanti ca*; H. 3, 10, 67, *purāṇeṣu vedānte ca*. I may mention here also the works called *Nisads*, which are referred to (or invented) only, if I mistake not, in xii, 47, 26, *yaṁ vākeṣv anuvākeṣu niṣatsūpaniṣatsu ca gṛṇanti satyakarmāṇaṁ satyaṁ satyeṣu sāmāsu*.

¹ Kern, SBE. xxi, p. 317. Compare for the use of the word, xii, 245, 15, where it is said that the *Upanishads* inculcate the four modes of life, *caturthaḥ cāu 'paniṣado dharmāḥ sādharmaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ*; and xiii, 84, 5, where it is said that *Vedopaniṣadas* inculcate that earth, cows, or gold must be the sacrificial fee. As we find *vedāḥ sarahasyaḥ saśaṁgrahāḥ* and *vedavedāṅgabhāgyavit*, xii, 325, 22-23, so in viii, 87, 42, reference is made to "all the Vedas, with Tales as the fifth Veda, together with *Upavedas*, *Upanishads*, mysteries, and abstracts" (*saṁgraha*). Nārada is said to be *vedopaniṣadām vettā itihāsa-purāṇajñah . . . ṣaḍaṅgavit* and *smṛtimān*, ii, 5, 2 ff. The use in iii, 251, 23,

Upavedas and Upāṅgas.

The Upavedas or subsidiary Vedas are three in number, Āyur Veda, Dhanur Veda, and Gāndharva Veda. To these is added in other works Sthāpatya Veda, but this term is not recognized in the epic, and the commentator on vii, 202, 75, recognizes only three, those just given, or Medicine, Archery, and Music; but the fourth, Architecture, is known (only in the epic introduction), as Vāstuvidyā.¹ Authors are assigned to these and other works in xii, 210, 20, Bṛhaspati being the originator of all the Vedāṅgas; Bhṛgu's son, of Nītiçāstra, law; Nārada, of music; Bharadvāja, of the science of arms (particularly archery); Gūrgya, of tales of the doings of seers (devarçicarita); and Kṛṣṇātreya, of medicine (cikitsita). They are all contrasted with other Nyāya-tantrāṇi, which like these were created at the beginning of the acon as an aid in understanding Brahman (expounded by hetu, āgama, and sadācāra, or reason, faith, and common consent of good men, ib. 22). It is noteworthy that Nārada, not Bharata, is found in this connection, and that Kṛṣṇātreya takes the place elsewhere given to Bharadvāja.

Of the first of these subsidiary Vedas, the epic naturally gives little information, though burdened with much medicinal knowledge which may be referred to some uncited work on medicine. Native scholars imagine that the corresponding Upanishad passages imply the circulation of the blood, also thought to be recorded in xii, 185, 15, prasthitā hrdayāt . . . vahanti annarasān nādyah: "The veins convey (all over

would suggest that Upanishad is a sort of Sūtra, for here a spirit is summoned by means of "mantras declared by Bṛhaspati and Uçanas; by those declared in the Atharva Veda; and by rites in the Upanishad," yāç co 'paniçadi kriyāḥ. I am not certain how to interpret paṭhyase stutibhiç cāi 'va vedopaniçadāḥ gaṇāiḥ xii, 285, 126.

¹ Thus the architect, sūtradhāra, sthapati, is vāstuvidyāviçārada, i, 51, 15 (the sūtrakarmaviçārada of G. ii, 87, 1). Architectural Çāstras are mentioned in i, 134, 10-11. As a fourth to the three is elsewhere set the Arthaçāstra. These as a group are added to the other vidyās (see note below on the sixty-four arts and fourteen sciences). But in the epic, Arthaçāstra is not grouped with the Upavedas.

the body) the food-essences, starting from the *hṛdaya*" (heart or chest). But a direct citation is the allusion, under the cover of an "it is said," to the constituents *pitta*, *śleṣman*, *vāyu* (also *vāta*, *pitta*, *kapha*), which make the threefold body, *tridhātu*, according to the *Āyurvedins*.¹ In the epic *Khila* and in the *Kaccit* and eleventh chapters of *Sabhā*, both late additions to the epic,² the science of medicine is said to have eight branches (ii, 5, 90; 11, 25). Possibly in iii, 71, 27, *Çālihotra* may represent the veterinary science of iv, 12, 7.

The *Dhanur Veda*, literally *Veda* of the bow, is often joined with the regular *Vedas*, as is to be expected in epic poetry, ix, 14, 21-22, etc. It is called also *iṣvastra*, weapons, and is said to be fourfold and to have ten divisions. In the *Kaccit* chapter just referred to it is said to have a *Sūtra* like other *Vedas*, and at the time this was written it is very probable that such was the case, though, as I have shown elsewhere, the knight's study of *Dhanur Veda* consists in practice not in study of books. This *Bow-Veda*, archery, is opposed sometimes to the four *Vedas* alone, sometimes to the *Upanishads* and *Brāhma Veda*, while on the other hand it is associated with various *Sūtras*, arts, and *Nītiçāstras*. The priority of *Dhanur Veda* in the phrase *dhanurvede ca vede ca*, found in both epics, is due partly to metrical convenience and partly to the greater importance of this *Veda* in the warrior's education:³ *na tasya vedādhyayane tathā buddhir ajāyata yathā 'sya buddhir abhavad dhanurvede*, "His intelligence was more developed in learning how to use a bow than in perusing holy texts," i, 130, 3; *dhanur-*

¹ xii, 343, 86-87: *pittam śleṣmā ca vāyuḥ ca eṣa saṁghāta ucyate, etāṁ ca dhāryate jantur etāṁ kṣīṇāṁ ca kṣīyate, āyurvedavidas tasmāt tridhātum mām pracakṣate*. Compare vi, 84, 41, cited in *PW.*, and also xiv, 12, 3, *çitoṣṇe cāi 'va vāyuḥ ca guṇāḥ . . . çarirajāḥ*, whose equality is health (*N. kaphapitte*). Some notes on epic anatomy will be given later.

² The lateness of the *Kaccit* chapter I have discussed elsewhere, *Am. Journ. Phil.*, vol. xix, p. 147 ff. A noteworthy statement on disease is that of xii, 16, 9, which attributes all mental disease to the body and all bodily disease to the mind, *mānasā jāyate çāriraḥ (vyādhiḥ)*, "bodily ailment arises from mental (ailment)."

³ The same is partially true of *atharvavede vede ca*, xiii, 10, 37, etc.

vedaparatvāt, ib. 4.¹ It is the Kṣatra Veda or knightly science par excellence, R. i, 65, 23 (with Brahma Veda).

The science of music, Gāndharva Veda, consists according to iii, 91, 14, in the knowledge of singing, dancing, chanting, and playing on musical instruments, gītām nr̥tyām ca sāmā ca vāditrām ca, not including apparently the Naṭasūtra or manual for actors mentioned by Pāṇini. The seven musical scales, vāṇī saptavidhā, ii, 11, 34, are a branch of study. The three notes of the drum are spoken of² and the names of the notes of the regular scale, gamut, are given. Further citations in this regard will be made hereafter.

These Upavedas are associated with the chief Vedas (vedāḥ and upavedāḥ, vii, 202, 75, etc.), much as are the Vedāṅgas, Upanishads, and Tales, and are distinguished as well from the Ṣāstras and Sūtras mentioned in the passage already noticed, ii, 11, 32-33, though Ṣāstra is a general term including Upaveda. The Aṅgas are the customary six mentioned above, and are generally referred to as in i, 104, 12, vedām ṣaḍaṅgam pratyadhīyata; or without number, as in i, 156, 5, brāhmaṁ vedam adhiyānā vedāṅgāni ca sarvaḥ, nītiṣāstram ca sarvajñāḥ.³ These again have their subsidiary branches, Upāṅgas, vedāḥ sāṅgopāṅgāḥ savistarāḥ, iii, 64, 17; Uṇas' and Brhaspati's ṣāstra with Aṅgas and Upāṅgas, i, 100, 36-38. The similarity of phrase in iii, 99, 26 and elsewhere, vedāḥ sāṅgopaniṣadāḥ, might suggest that Upāṅgas were Upanishads, but they are more probably a species of Upavedas. The term is

¹ This Veda is constantly mentioned, e. g. i, 130, 21; 221, 72; iii, 37, 4; ix, 6, 14, ḍaṣṇāṅgam yaç catuṣpādām iṣvastram veda tattvataḥ, sāṅgāns tu caturo vedān samyaḥ ākhyānapaṇcamān. The phrase dhanurvede ca vede ca occurs, for example, in i, 109, 19. In R. v, 35, 14, Rāma is described as "trained in the Yajur Veda . . . and skilled in dhanurvede ca vede ca vedāṅgeṣu ca (the Yajur Veda only, to which Vālmiki belonged, is here mentioned). Elsewhere the science takes its proper place, as in M. iii, 277, 4, vedeṣu sarahasreṣu dhanurvedeṣu pāragāḥ, where the plural is noteworthy.

² iii, 20, 10, triṣṣāmā hanyatām eṣā dundubhiḥ. The vīṇā madhurālāpā, sweet-voiced lyre, is spoken of as gāndharvam sādhu murchatī (= murchayantī), iv, 17, 14. The gāndharvam is the third note of the seven, xii, 184, 39 = xiv, 50, 53.

³ Compare brāhme vede ca pāragāḥ contrasted with astrāṇām ca dhanurvede, vii, 23, 39. So Brahma Veda, R. i, 65, 23 (above), not as AV.

one associated with Jain rather than early Brahmanic literature, and is not explained by the commentator.¹ Vedas, Purāṇas, Aṅgas, and Upāṅgas are sometimes grouped together, as in xii, 335, 25 (vedeṣu sapurāṇeṣu sāṅgopāṅgeṣu gīyase, the prior pāda found again, e. g. in 342, 6). The Aṅgas commonly mentioned in particular are the calendar-knowledge, Jyotiṣa, and etymology, Nirukta. The latter word, indeed, generally means only an explanation of the meaning of a word, but it occurs also as the title of a specific literary work in xii, 343, 73, where we find mentioned not only "Yāska's Nirukta," together with Nāighaṇṭuka, but vocabularies and lexicographies.² A curious contemplation of Krishna as the divine sound in xii, 47, 46 analyzes him grammatically, "with joints of euphony and adorned with vowels and consonants."³

Astronomical similes are not infrequent. Thus Arjuna storms about "like Mars in his orbit."⁴ An indication that one science as a specialty is not much regarded is seen in the

¹ The later Upāṅgas are the Purāṇas (and upa-); Logic, nyāya and vāi-geṣika; Philosophy (including Vedānta), mīmāṃsā; and Law-books (including Sāṅkhya-yoga and epics), dharmacāstra. The epic use, as will be seen from the citation above, differentiates Purāṇas from Aṅgas and Upāṅgas. For the later meaning, see Weber IS. i, p. 13.

² ib. 83, 88: nāighaṇṭukapadākhyāne, niruktaṁ vedaviduṣo vedaṣabdārthacintakāḥ. The common meaning, "explanation," may be surmised in xii, 340, 50, caturvaktro niruktagaḥ (in both editions), where the avagraha is certainly required, "inexplicable," despite Tāitt. Up. ii, 6.

³ In xiii, 17, 111 (where siddhārtha, according to Nīlakaṇṭha, is siddhānta), Śiva is siddhārthakārī siddhārthaḥ chandovyākaraṇottaraḥ. Kalpa and Jyotiṣa are united, kalpaprayoga and jyotiṣa, in xiii, 10, 37. In ii, 4, 18, Kālāpa and Kāṭha are mentioned; in R. (not G.) ii, 32, 18, the Kāṭhakālāpās (after the ācāryas tāittirīyāṇām in 15). M. and G. (only) have Čāṇḍīlya and Kāuṇika (with Gārgya in G.) in the same list, and M. has Tittiri (with Yājñavalkya). In M. they are vedavedāṅgapāragāḥ; in R., vedapāragāḥ. R. calls Trijaṭa (Piṅgala) a Gārgya in 29 (Āṅgīrasa in G.; cf. R. 33).

⁴ viii, 19, 1, vakrātivakragamanād aṅgāraka iva grahaḥ. Compare budh-aṅgārakayor iva (a battle-phrase). The Vedāṅgas and Upavedas are often grouped together, as in i, 1, 67, where cīkṣā, phonetics, is grouped with nyāya, rules, and cikitsā, medicine. In i, 70, 40-44, the same passage where pada and krama are mentioned (above), çabda (saṁskāra), cīkṣā, chandas, nirukta and kālajñāna are found with philosophy. A priest who is cīkṣākṣaramantra-vit gets gold niṣkas, etc., iii, 23, 2; 36, 42.

fact that the cultivator of the Upaveda medicine and of the Aṅga astrology are both excluded from society, although it should be added that the man intended is one who "lives by the stars," *nakṣatrāir yaç ca jīvati*. Such a fortune-teller is classed with rhapsodes and physicians, xiii, 90, 11. The difficulty of reconciling the data of astrology (fortune-telling) and the theory of Karma is alluded to in iii, 209, 21: "Many are seen to be born under the same lucky star, but there is a great difference in their fate." The most surprising astronomical statement in the epic is to the effect that stars are really very large and only appear small on account of their distance.¹ The *kālajñāna* or "knowledge of time," already mentioned, is attributed especially to Garga, who, as Weber, *Lectures*, p. 237, has noticed, is associated with Kālayavana: "Kālayavana who is endued with Garga's (brilliancy or) power," xii, 340, 95. This same Garga is credited not only with having *kālajñānagati* and *jyotiṣām vyatikrama*, "thorough knowledge of times and mastery of science of stars," ix, 37, 14-16, but also with *kalājñāna*, or the fine arts. That the epic has a different order of planets from that of the third century A. D. has already been observed by Jacobi.²

The Upavedas, however, pass the Vedic stage. There remains a word to say on the older Sūtras, to which may be added an account of those more frequently mentioned Sūtras and other treatises which are quite beyond the Vedic pale.

Sūtras.

A Veda-sūtra, apparently a *Çrāutasūtra*, but perhaps only Veda in general,³ is mentioned once, in xii, 341, 63. *Grhya-sūtras* are not mentioned by name, but may be implied in the word Veda, as will be seen in the quotation given below. The *Dharmasūtras* are apparently implied in one passage of

¹ *dīpavad viprakṛṣṭatvāt tanūni sumahānty api (tārārūpāni)*, iii, 42, 34.

² ZDMG. vol. xxx, p. 307; Holtzmann, *Das Mbh.* vol. iv, p. 114.

³ The Supreme Lord says that the god who gives him a share gets by the Lord's grace a corresponding (Veda-arranged) sacrificial share in (i. e. according to) the Veda-sūtra.

the thirteenth book, where a Sūtrakāra in one verse corresponds to Vedas in the next, in a passage cited from the Māit. Saṁhitā and Law-books (see below); and in another, where aṣaknuvantaḥ caritum kiṁcid dharmeṣu sūtritam, "unable to do what is *sutrit* in the laws," xii, 270, 36, must refer to the general class of legal Sūtras. The Gītā, 13, 4, mentions the Brahmasūtra, which is probably nothing but an equivalent of Vedasūtra, that is, equivalent to Veda in general; but it may be one of the late marks of this poem (the Brahmasūtra being otherwise unknown before the Hari-vaṅṣa) and mean the philosophical Sūtra.¹ Sūtrakāras and Sūtrakartars, "who will arise," are mentioned prophetically a few times in the didactic epic.²

Profane Sūtras are jumbled together in one of the latest stanzas of the Kaccit chapter, ii, 5, 120, to which I have alluded before: "Dost thou understand the Sūtras on elephants, horses, chariots, catapults, and the Dhanurveda Sūtra?"

As early as Pāṇini there were Sūtras of all sorts and the mention of such works has only the special value of indicating that the epic belongs to a time when Sūtra meant works which were probably popular and not written in aphoristic style. They were doubtless the same as the various Ḍāstra and other treatises to which reference is often made. Some of these works are called Ḍāstras and are grouped with the fine arts mentioned above as known to Garga. Arthaḍāstra and Kāmaḍāstra, by-names of the epic itself, are mentioned in the late introduction to the whole work. The fine arts, kalās, are mentioned or implied in three places. First the slave-girls of Yudhiṣṭhira are said, at ii, 61, 9-10, to be "versed in dancing and songs," sāmāsu, and "skilled in the

¹ In xii, 327, 31, there is mentioned a Mokṣaḍāstra, inspired by gāthāḥ purā gītāḥ, a treatise which is based on verses recited (by Yayāti) in regard to proper behavior, and it is partly philosophical.

² xiii, 14, 101-104, granthakāra, sūtrakartā (bhaviṣyati), granthakṛt; 16, 70, sūtrakartar. In xii, 245, 30, svaḍāstrasūtrāhutimantravikramah, sūtra may be the thread (a brahma-sūtra as elsewhere), but in the connection seems more likely to mean Sūtra.

sixty-four," which must imply the sixty-four kalās. Then Garga, who knows *kālājñāna* and omens, *utpātas*, is also acquainted with *kālājñāna catuṣṣaṣṭyaṅga*, xiii, 18, 38, which shows that the fine arts were not exclusively for women and slaves; as is also indicated by the passage xiii, 104, 149 ff., where, as befitting a king to know, are mentioned treatises on logic (or behavior?), on grammar, on music, and the fine arts; and to hear, Legends, Tales, and adventures of the saints.¹ It is interesting to see that these "sixty-four arts," still typical of culture, are proverbial in India to-day. A Marathi proverb says *caudā vidyā va cau-ṣaṣṭa kalā*, "fourteen sciences and sixty-four arts."²

Dharmaśāstras.

But if *Sūtra* literature, except in the few instances cited above, is practically ignored, all the more fully is *Śāstra*³ and particularly *Dharmaśāstra* literature recognized; which I may say at the outset shows that the later epic was composed under the influence of *Dharmaśāstras* rather than of *Dharmasūtras*.

The general term *Nītiśāstra*, code of polity, has already been noticed. A number of such codes is recognized, xii, 138, 196, and *Dharma(śāstras)* are cited not infrequently;

¹ *yuktiśāstram ca te jñeyam śabdaśāstram ca, Bhārata, gāndharvaśāstram ca kalāḥ pariññeyā, narādhipa; purāṇam itihāsaś ca tathā khyānāni yāni ca, mahātmanām ca caritam śrotavyam nityam eva te.* The *yuktiśāstram* is not explained. According to PW., it is a manual of etiquette, but perhaps logic; possibly the unique system of logic and rhetoric developed by *Sulabhā* in xii, 321, 78 ff.

² *Manwaring, Marathi Proverbs, No. 1175.* This is late. Cf. *Yājñ.* i, 3; and *Vāyu Purāṇa*, lxi, 78-79. In the latter passage, the four Vedas, six *Aṅgas*, *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya*, *Dharmaśāstra* and *Purāṇa* make the "fourteen *vidyās*" or "eighteen" including the three *Upavedas* and the *Arthaśāstra*.

³ Or *Smṛti*, but this word seems of wide bearing. Just as *āgama* (above) includes more than *Veda*, so *Smṛti* includes all tradition. In xii, 200, 30, *mahāsmṛti* and *anusmṛti* seem to be interpreted by the commentator as *Samhitā* and *Vedāṅgas* (with *Manu* and others) respectively, but his first words may refer to the inferred *Veda* of the preceding *japaka* (the reciters of both go ipso facto to heaven). Besides *Manu* (above), *Yama*, *Aṅgiras*, *Bṛhaspati*, *Uṣanas*, and *Parāśara* are specially cited as law-givers.

while a general rule is given as a Dharma-çāsana, e. g., i, 72, 15:

Three fathers have we, for e'en thus
Law's statute says, 't is meet
 To call our sire, and who saves life,
 And him whose food we eat.

Manu's Dharmaçāstra is referred to under that name only in one of the latest books of the pseudo-epic. In the early books his Rājadharmas are once mentioned, iii, 35, 21, which might imply a chapter of our present code, but otherwise only his Dharmas are referred to, though generally merely an ipse dixit of Manu is cited, which, however, is often a dictum opposed to the actual words of the extant Manu text. The epic poets do not always recognize Manu as in any wise supreme, often not even as prominent. A typical example is furnished by iii, 150, 29: "Gods are upheld by Vedic sacrifices; men are upheld by the laws (not of Manu but) of Uçanas and Bṛhaspati."¹ But in xii, 336, 39-45, a primeval code, anuçāsana, of 100,000 ślokas, gives rise to the "laws which Manu the self-existent will declare and Uçanas and Bṛhaspati," where there is a clear reference to the code of Manu; as in the next stanza, where are mentioned the "laws of the Self-existent, the Çāstra made by Uçanas and the opinions of Bṛhaspati" (a çāstram sāṅgopaniṣadam, 54).²

The mere order of names, however, is no more indicative of priority than in the case of the Vedas mentioned above. Another list of Rājaçāstra-praṇetāras at xii, 58, 1-3, 13, begins with Bṛhaspati and Uçanas (Kāvya, cited with two gāthās at xii, 139, 70), and then follows Prācetasas Manu, Bharadvāja, and Gāuraçiras, with the gods between. So in the next section, 59, 81 ff., Çiva reduces Brahman's work,

¹ So in iv, 58, 6, Bhāradvāja was "equal to Uçanas in intelligence, to Bṛhaspati in polity," naya; ix, 61, 48: "Have you not heard the instructions, upadeça, of Bṛhaspati and Uçanas?"; xii, 122, 11: "You have perused the opinions, matam, of Bṛhaspati, and the Çāstra of Uçanas," as the authorities generally recognized. Bharadvāja has three rôles in the epic, as archetypical jurist, physician, and teacher of arms, according to the passage.

² Compare xii, 59, 80, ff.

which in turn is reduced by Indra, as the bāhudantaka, and then by Kāvya Yogācārya, a work which embraced Itihāsas, Vedas, and Nyāya (141) or laws.

More important is the fact that references to Manu's laws in the early books are seldom verifiable in our present code, while references in the didactic epic more often than not correspond to passages of the extant text.¹ Hence it may be inferred that that part of the epic which agrees most closely in its citations with our code is later than that portion which does not coincide, or, conversely, that the text of Manu was shaped into its present form between the time of the early epic and that of the didactic epic. In the first period, when Manu's Dharmaśāstra was unknown, Manu was merely a name to conjure with. The verses thus ascribed to Manu were not all put into the code when it was formed and for this reason the earlier citations are not generally found in our text. Some of them were adopted, however, and the later epic writers therefore agree more closely with the Śāstra as it is to-day; though no one who understands how works are enlarged in India will expect to find all the quotations verified, even in the later epic, for there is no reason to suppose that the code was exactly the same two thousand years ago as it is to-day. But in fact, out of eleven quotations from Manu in the thirteenth book, there is only one which does not correspond with our Manu text, and this is of a general character, to the effect that a grāddha with tila is undecaying, "said Manu."

¹ So in the Rāmāyaṇa there are two evidently interpolated chapters at iv, 17 and 18. Rāma in the subsequent chapters is incidentally charged (with great truth) with having violated every knightly rule in slaying Vāli. To offset this clear case of sin on the part of the divine hero, a formal charge and defence is inserted (just the procedure in the Mahābhārata!) in chapters which metrically belong to the classical period, so close is the adherence to vipulā rule. Just here it is that *Manunā gītāu ślokāu* are cited, viz., Manu, viii, 318 and 319 (inverted order), almost verbatim. Elsewhere Manu is a sage merely, not a cited law-giver, as here, iv, 18, 30-31 (without reference to Manu in G.). These chapters need no further proof than the reading to show their true character. They are simply banal, especially Rāma's speech, as well as contradictory in substance to the preceding and following chapters.

In a previous discussion of this subject in the *Journal Am. Or. Soc.* xi, p. 239 ff. (where will be found more data on the subject of legal literature in the epic),¹ in order not to force my argument I included as unverified a quotation at xiii, 65, 3, "Manu said that the highest gift is something to drink," *pāṇīyam paramam dānam*, because it was in connection with Tīrthas. In this I was certainly over-scrupulous, for the words could easily refer to the passage I there cited from Manu, iii, 202, *vāry api ṣṛaddhayā dattam akṣayāyo 'pakalpate*, "even water given with faith fits for immortality." I can now add to this another quotation, xiii, 67, 19, *toyado . . . akṣāyān samavāpnoti lokān ity abravīn Manuḥ*, "a giver of water obtains imperishable worlds." Further, I rejected as unverifiable the statement that Manu said the king gets a fourth part of the sin of the people (instead of the usual sixth), although, as I pointed out, this proportion actually occurs in Manu, only it is for a specific occasion. Nevertheless as Manu, viii, 18, says *pādo rājānam arhati* (or *ṛchati*), it is clear that the quotation *caturtham* etc. in xiii, 61, 34 cannot be said to be "unverifiable." It is simply a free rendering verbally of a statement actually found in Manu.²

We have here the incontrovertible fact that, while the other books of the epic before the thirteenth in giving quo-

¹ For example, the fabulous books of divine origin of xii, 59, 80 ff. (like the origin of Nārada's law-book), called *Bārhaspatya*, etc., according to the *diadochos*; the "law and commentary," *savāiyākho dharmah*, of xii, 37, 10, etc. (pp. 254 and 248), and other points to which I may refer the reader without further remark than the references already given.

² Besides the quotation given above from the thirteenth book and verifiable in our present code, I may add iii, 92, 10: "By Manu and others (it is said that?) going to Tīrthas removes fear," *manvādibhir mahārāja tīrthayātrā bhayāpahā*, if this be the meaning, which is rather doubtful. In any case it only adds one more to the unverified citations from the early books, but it may mean only that Manu and others have journeyed to Tīrthas. Compare also xii, 266, 5, *sarvakarmasy ahimsā hi dharmātmā Manuḥ abravīt*, "Manu the righteous proclaimed that one should not injure (animals) at any ceremony." From the context, killing cattle at a sacrifice is here reprobated. This is a perversion for sectarian purposes of Manu's rule v, 43, *nā 'vedavihitān hiṁsām ṛpady api samācaret*, to which perversion some color might be given by the following verses, which speak harshly of all injury to living creatures. I think no other quotations from Manu will be found in the epic.



tations from *Manu* agree with our present text of *Manu* only in one third to one half the instances, the thirteenth book has eleven citations, of which ten agree with the statements of our code. To this must be added the fact that only the thirteenth book recognizes "the *Çāstra* declared by *Manu*." I do not know any other literature where such facts would not be accepted as of historical importance, and they have been so regarded here by competent scholars. In the opinion which I first set forth in 1885, the late Professor Bühler in general concurred, though inclined to believe that the authors of the twelfth and thirteenth books did not know the identical *Çāstra* which we have to-day. As Professor Bühler's position has not always been cited with the reservations made by him, I will cite his own words: "It remains indisputable that the author or authors of the first, twelfth, and thirteenth Parvans of the *Mahābhārata* knew a *Mānava Dharmaçāstra* which was closely connected but not identical with the existing text," *Manu* p. lxxix, and again: "The answer which we are thus obliged to give to the question whence the author of our *Manu-Smṛti* took his additional materials agrees very closely with Professor Hopkins' hypothesis," p. xci. Nevertheless, despite this admission, Professor Bühler, by a line of argument which is based chiefly on the lack of absolute identity, assumes finally that the authors of the epic "knew only the *Dharmasūtra*," ib. p. xcviii. The arguments other than the lack of total identity are, first, that *Manu* shows an acquaintance with the epic because he says that in a former kalpa the vice of gambling has been seen to cause great enmity; in regard to which Professor Bühler says: "This assertion can only point in the first instance to the match played between *Yudhiṣṭhira* and *Duryodhana*," p. lxxx. But why not to the story of *Nala*, as Professor Bühler himself suggests, or any other story of dicing resulting in "enmity" which may have preceded our epic? Another argument is, that legends referred to in the *Çāstra* are found in the epic, ib. But it is of the very character of the epic that it contains many ancient legends, gathered from all sources. It does not follow in the

least that Manu took them from the epic. On the other hand it is important to observe that in no such passage does Manu refer a single one of them to an epic source. Thirdly, it is claimed that the passages parallel in epic and *Çāstra* often have verses in a different order, with omissions, etc., that, in short, they are not actual copies one of the other. But Professor Bühler himself has shown that "the existing text of Manu has suffered many recasts," p. xcii, so that we do not know the form of the *Çāstra* to which the epic explicitly refers and from which it cites as the *Çāstra* set forth by Manu. For my part, it still is impossible for me to believe that when the pseudo-epic, in particular the *Anuṣāsana*, refers to *Çāstras*,¹ and cites correctly from "Manu's *Çāstra*," it really knows only *Sūtras*.

A *Mānava Dharmāçāstra*, specifically, must from the evidence be regarded as older than the later epic but later than the early epic, which knew only a mass of royal and general rules, dharmas, generally ascribed to Father Manu but different from those in our extant *Çāstra*. With this result too agrees the fact that the metrical form of the extant code is distinctly earlier than that of the later epic. Not unimportant, finally, is the circumstance that the extant code only vaguely refers to epic Tales, but recognizes neither of the epics, only legends that are found in the epics. In all probability the code known to the later epic was not quite our

¹ In xii, 341, 74, are mentioned "teachers in *Dharmāçāstras*," *ācāryā dharmāçāstreṣu*; in xiii, 61, 34, Manu's *anuṣāsana*; in xiii, 47, 35, "the *Çāstra* composed by Manu," *manunā bhīhitam çāstram*; in xiii, 45, 17, "those that know law in the law-books," *dharmāçāstreṣu dharmajñāh*, in reference to the subject discussed in Manu iii, 52-53; iv, 88. Similarly, xiii, 19, 89. In most cases here *Çāstras* are the authority, which in iii, 313, 105, are set beside the *Vedas* as two standard authorities. In the face of these citations it is difficult to understand Bühler's words, "the authors . . . knew only the *Dharmasūtras*," especially as the words contradict what he says in the same essay on a different page, "the authors . . . knew a *Mānava Dharmāçāstra*" (loc. cit. above). It has seemed to me that the great scholar was unduly influenced in his final word by his general desire to put back the epic as far as possible. Professor Holtzmann, who has collected the material, loc. cit., p. 115 ff., is of the opinion that "our *Mānavaadharmāçāstra* is certainly much later than the older parts of the *Mahābhārata*."

present code, but it was a code much like ours and ascribed to Manu, a *Çastra* which, with some additions and omissions, such as all popular texts in India suffer, was essentially our present text.

Vedic Citations in the Epic.

We have now reached and indeed already passed, in the notice of some of the works mentioned, the point where the epic impinges on the earlier literature. Before going further I will illustrate the statement made at the outset that the epic cites freely or parodies Vedic documents. The free rendition in Veda-like verse of the older hymnology is not uncommon. Thus in v, 16, the opening hymn is not strictly Vedic, but it is very like a collection of Vedic utterances put into popular form and these verses are called *brāhmā man-trāḥ*, çl. 8. Apart, however, from such instances of more or less exact imitation of general Vedic verses,¹ we find a number of verses plainly imitative of extant Vedic passages or almost exactly reproducing them. This applies to reproductions or imitations² of the chief Vedic literature from the *Rig Veda* to the *Sūtras*, as will be seen from the following examples:

Rig Veda x, 117, 6,

mogham annam vindate apracetāḥ

¹ There are, of course, also a vast number of verses such as *gāur me mātā vṛṣabhaḥ pitā me*, introduced, as here, with the fiat *imām crutim udāharet*, xiii, 76, 6-7; or with the more usual tag, *iti crutiḥ*, as for example, *agnayo māṇsakāmāç* (starred in pw.) *ca ity api çrūyate crutiḥ*, iii, 208, 11; or with *smṛta*, as in *açvināu tu smṛtāu çūdrāu*, xii, 208, 24; as well as such phrases as that of xiv, 51, 28, *yas tam veda sa vedavit*, all of which reflect the literature of the earlier periods.

² The Vedic work most frequently referred to is the *Yajur Veda Hymn*, *trīsāuparnam brahma yajuṣām çatarudriyam*, xii, 285, 138; *sāmavedaç ca vedānām yajuṣām çatarudriyam*, xiii, 14, 323; *tad brahma çatarudriyam*, vii, 81, 13; *vede cā 'sya samāmnātām çatarudriyam uttamam*, vii, 202, 120; *çṛṇan brahma param Çakraḥ çatarudriyam uttamam*, xiii, 14, 284. It is imitated over and over again, and some of the epic hymns call themselves by the same name, a fact alluded to in the words: *vede cā 'sya vidur viprāḥ çatarudriyam uttamam*, *Vyāseno 'ktaṁ ca yac cā 'pi upasthānam*, xiii, 162, 23.

Mbh. v, 12, 20,

mogham annam vindati cā 'py acetāḥ

Böhtlingk, Spruch 4980.

Rig Veda vii, 89, 2,

ḍṛtir na dhmāto, adrivaḥ

Mbh. iii, 207, 47; xii, 95, 21,

mahāḍṛtir ivā 'dhmātaḥ

(pāpo bhavati nityadā, iii, 207, 47)

Rig Veda i, 10, 1,

gāyanti tvā gāyatrīṇo arcanti arkam arkiṇaḥ

brahmāṇas tvā çatakrato ud vaṇçam iva yemire

Mbh. xii, 285, 78,

gāyanti tvā gāyatrīṇo arcanti arkam arkiṇaḥ

brahmāṇam tvā çatakratum ūrdhvaṁ kham iva
menire

Holtzmann, Das Mahābhārata, iv, p. 12; also for the following
parallel, p. 13:

Rig Veda x, 129, 1-3,

nā 'sad āsīn no sad āsīd tadānīm . . .

no rātriā ahna āsīt praketaḥ . . .

tama āsīt tamasā gūlham agre

Mbh. xii, 343, 8,

(nidarçanam api hy atra) nāsīd aho na rātrir āsīn na sad āsīn
nā 'sad āsīt, tama eva purastād abhavad viçvarūpam

Compare also with Rig Veda, i, 13, 4, asi hotā manurhitah, Mbh.
ib. 10-11,

tvam agne yajñānām hotā viçveṣām hito devānām mānuṣānām
ca jagata iti, nidarçanam cā 'tra bhavati, viçveṣām agne yajñānām
tvam hote 'ti, tvam hito devāir manusyāir jagata iti

Rig Veda x, 14, 1,

vāivasvataṁ saṁgamanam janānām

Mbh. xiii, 102, 16,

vāivasvati saṁyamant janānām

Further, with Rig Veda i, 164, 46, *ekam sad viprā bahu-dhā vadanti*, and x, 114, 5, *viprāh . . . ekam santam bahu-dhā kalpayanti*, may be compared Mbh. (v, 16, 2, and) i, 232, 13, *manīṣiṇas tvām jānanti bahudhā cāi 'kadhā 'pi ca*. In xv, 34, 11, *devayānā hi panthānāḥ ṣrutās te yajñasaṁstare*¹ is an allusion to Rig Veda x, 18, 1; while in xii, 312, 5, *dyāvā-prthivyor iti eṣa . . . vedeṣu paṭhyate*, the citation of a Vedic phrase is acknowledged; whereas in the epic phrases *mā rīriṣaḥ* and *bhuvanāni viṣvā*, vii, 201, 77, no indication of Vedic origin is given.

Tāitt. Saṁhitā i, 16, 11, 1; Çat. Br. i, 5, 2, 16,

ye yajāmahe

Mbh. iii, 180, 33,

idam āṛṣam pramāṇam ca ye yajāmaha ity api

Compare iii, 31, 22, *yasya nā 'rṣam pramāṇam syāt*, etc. Aufrecht, *apud* Muir, OST. i, 137. Also Tāitt. S. ii, 5, 1, 1 is repeated verbatim Mbh. xii, 343, 28, as shown by Weber, Ind. Stud. i, p. 410.

Māit. Saṁhitā i, 10, 11,

stry anṛtam

Mbh. xiii, 40, 12 and 19, 6-7,

striyo 'nṛtam iti ṣrutih; anṛtāḥ striya ity evaṁ vedeṣv api hi paṭhyate; anṛtāḥ striya ity evaṁ sūtrakāro vyavasyati.

Compare Bāudh. Dh. S. ii, 3, 46, with Bühler's note, and Manu ix, 18, *striyo 'nṛtam iti sthitiḥ* (v. l. *ṣrutih*). The double reference in the epic, *Sūtrakāra* and *Vedāḥ*, may point to the same place, or the writer may have had in mind a *Sūtra* passage parallel to *Bāudhāyana*, if not *Bāudhāyana* himself, whose text here is corrupt.

¹ In the preceding verse is cited an *açvamedhaçruti*, apropos of the *açva-saṁjñāpana*: *lokāntaragatā nityam prāpā nityam çarirāṇām*. With the text cited above, compare *dvār etiāu pretya panthānān*, etc., xii, 329, 30. The Upanishada would suffice to explain some of these phrases.

Atharva Veda? Mbh. xiii, 98, 30,

oṣadhyo raktapuspāḥ ca kaṭukāḥ kaṇṭakānvitāḥ cātṛuṇām
abhicārārtham ātharveṣu nidarṣitāḥ; viii, 69, 83-86, tvam ity
atra bhavantāḥ hi brūhi . . . tvam ity ukto hi nihato gurus
bhavati . . . atharvāṅgirasī hy eṣā ṇrutinām uttamā ṇrutih . . .
avadhena vadhaḥ prokto yad gurus tvam iti prabhuḥ.¹

Āit. Brāh. i, 1,

agnir vāi sarvā devatāḥ

Mbh. xiv, 24, 10 (read vedasya ?),

agnir vāi devatāḥ sarvāḥ, iti devasya cāsanam

Mbh. xiii, 84, 56,

agnir hi devatāḥ sarvāḥ, suvarṇam ca tadātmakam

Holtzmann, *loc. cit.* p. 14.

Çat. Brāhmaṇa in Mbh. xii, 343, 13-15,

yajñās te devāns tarpayanti devāḥ prthivīm bhāvayanti, Çata-
pathe 'pi brāhmaṇamukhe bhavati, agnāu samiddhe juhoti yo
vidvān brāhmaṇamukhenā 'hutim juhoti, evam apy agnibhūtā
brāhmaṇā vidvāṅso 'gnim bhāvayanti.

On this and other citations from Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas, compare Holtzmann, *loc. cit.*, p. 14 ff., with especial reference to verses cited by Weber, Lectures, p. 137-138; IS. i, p. 277. To these I may add a passage reflecting the Bṛhad Āraṇ. Up. of this Brāhmaṇa, Up. 1, 5, 14 (where the chief verbal identity is in ṣoḍaṣayā kalayā), expressly said to be from the Ṛṣi's "more extended" exposition of the subject: viddhi candramasaṁdarce sūkṣmayā kalayā sthitam, tad etad ṛṣinā proktaṁ vistareṇā 'numīyate, Mbh. xii, 242, 15-16 (compare ṣoḍaṣakalo dehaḥ; and 305, 4). The commentator refers the passage to this Upanishad, as cited.

¹ According to xiii, 163, 53, tvāṁkāra (to superiors) is vadha, and is employed only in speaking to equals, inferiors, pupils, etc. Compare Chānd. Up. vii, 15, 2. Echo arose in the mountains (compare Callimachus, Ep. xxviii) from the care with which Çuka addressed his superior Vyāsa with *bho, bho*, xii, 334, 25-26.

The citations in the Rāmāyaṇā I have not examined, but have noted by chance two; Rig Veda i, 22, 20; Kaṭha Up. iii, 9; Māitri, vi, 26: tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam (sadā paṇyanti sūrayaḥ); G. vi, 41, 25, tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam (nihato gantum icchāmi); and satye sarvam pratiṣṭhitam in Mahānār. Up. 22, 1; satye lokāḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ, R. ii, 109, 10.

Upanishads in the Epic.

Sporadic parallels between the epic, generally the Gītā, Anugītā, and Ānti, and various Upanishads have often been noticed. As illustrative material all these passages are valuable, but they give no evidence that the epic has copied, if the mutual resemblance is only of general content or is given by similar or even identical verses, when these are not connected as in the supposed model. As this material has been put together by Holtzmann, *loc. cit.*, p. 21 ff., I may refer the reader to his parallels,¹ while pointing out that it is historically of little importance whether the oldest Upanishads are cited if we can satisfy ourselves that the epic draws on Upanishads of the second and third period, not only sporadically but connectedly. In regard to the earliest works, it is enough to refer to the passage condensed from the Brhadāranyaka and cited above. This is the only one of the oldest Upanishads certainly cited, though the Chāndogya, Āitareya, and Kāuṣītaki have many parallels with the epic, as have among the later works of this class the Kena, Muṇḍaka, Praṇa, and a few others. Oddly enough, the Māitrāyaṇa has been scarcely compared,² but I purpose to show that this and the earlier Kāṭhaka were certainly copied by the later epic poets.

¹ Not all the "Vedic" verses are here verified, e. g., Tāitt. iii, 7, has prāṇo vā annam. This is cited in the epic as Vedic: annam prāṇā iti yathā vedeṣu paripaṭhyate, xiii, 95, 22. The Gītā distributes older material, e. g., Çvet. iii, 17 = Gītā, 13, 14, but the following pāda, navadvāre pure dehī, is found in Gītā, 5, 13, etc.

² The verse dve brahmaṇī (as duly recorded by Holtzmann) was located by Hall, and Bühler has compared two more verses with xii, 330, 42-43 (Manu, p. 212), while Telang has illustrated the Gītā with general parallels.

The Çvetāçvatara Upanishad.

This may be loosely copied, but, except for one parallel, the mutual passages are common to this and other sources. I cite as exemplifying a possible copy (though the Upanishad itself is a copy of the older Kāthaka):

UPANISHAD.

EPIC.

iii, 8 = V. S. 31, 18,

tamasah parastāt; nā 'nyaḥ pan-
thā vidyate ayanāya.

iii, 10,

tato yad uttarataram tad arūpam
anamayam, ya etad vidur amṛtās
te bhavanti.

iii, 13,

aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣaḥ, see be-
low.

iii, 18,

navadvāre pure dehī haṁsaḥ, see
below.

iii, 19-20,

sa veti vedyam . . . aṇor aṇi-
yān, etc.

iv, 2 and 19,

tad eva çukram tad brahma;
yasya nāma mahad yaçaḥ, see
below.

iv, 5,

ajām ekām lohitaçuklakṛṣṇām.

iv, 6,

Birds and pippal, see the passage
from Droṇa, cited hereafter.

iv, 17 and 20,

na samdrçe; hṛdā maṇiṣā, see be-
low.

v, 44, 29 and 24,

tamasah parastāt; nā 'nyaḥ pan-
thā ayanāya vidyate.

v, 44, 31,

anāmayam tan mahad udyatam
yaço (Kāṭha, vi, 2, mahad bhayam
vajram udyatam) vāco vikāram
kavayo vadanti yasmin jagat
sarvam idam pratiṣṭhitam ye tad
vidur amṛtās te bhavanti (com-
pare B.A.U. i, 5, 1; Chānd. iii, 12,
2; Kāṭha, vi, 9).

v, 43, 53; 46, 31 (Gītā, 10,
15),

yo veda vedyam na sa veda sa-
tyam; aṇor aṇiyān (Kāṭha i, 2,
20). In 44, 29, aṇiyo rūpam kṣu-
radhārāyā samam (Kāṭha, iii, 14).

v, 44, 25 and 26,

ābhāti çuklam iva lohitam ivā
kṛṣṇam (followed by āyasam
arkavarṇam with v. l., athāñja-
nam kādravam vā); Mahānār.,
ix, 2; also Chānd. viii, 6, 1. On
account of the varied reading in
the same verse the three first
colors may be the only original,
but even here the reference is to
Prakṛti in the Upanishad and to
Brahman in the epic.

These are the best examples of sporadic parallels to be found in the Upanishads. I turn now to the Kāthaka.

The Kāthaka or Kātha Upanishad.

From the Kātha, iii, 10, indriyebhyaḥ parā hy arthā, arthebhyaḥ ca param manaḥ, manasas tu parā buddhir, buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ, and ii, 19, nā 'yaṁ hanti na hanyate, the Gītā, 3, 42, haṣ indriyāṇi parāṇy āhur indriyebhyaḥ param manaḥ, manasas tu parā buddhir, yo buddheḥ paratas tu saḥ (the Sa is higher than intellect); and in 2, 19-20, it inverts and modifies the na jāyate and hantā cen manyate hantum stanzas. Less precise in rendering, but important on account of the Gītā modifications, are two other stanzas. Kātha i, 22, has vaktā cā 'sya tvādr̥g anyo na labhyaḥ, etc., a triṣṭubh, whereas Gītā, 6, 39, has tvad anyāḥ saṁçayasyā 'sya chettā na hy upapadyate, a ḡloka (compare M. ii, 15, 1, saṁçayānām hi nirmoktā tvan nā 'nyo vidyate bhuvi, addressed to Krishna). The Kātha is older also in the stanza ii, 15,

sarve vedā yat padam āmananti, tapāṁsi sarvāṇi
ca yad vadanti

yad icchanto brahmacaryāṁ caranti, tat te padam
saṅgrahēṇa bravīmi,

as compared with Gītā, 8, 11,

yad akṣaram vedavido vadanti, viṣanti yad yatayo
vitarāgāḥ

yad icchanto brahmacaryāṁ caranti, tat te padam
saṅgrahēṇa pravakṣye.

Other parallels will be found between Kātha ii, 7,

āçcaryo vaktā kuçalo 'sya labdhā, āçcaryo jñātā
kuçalānuçīṣṭaḥ,

and Gītā, 2, 29,

āçcaryavat paçyati kaçcid enam, āçcaryavad vadati
tathāi 'va cā 'nyaḥ, etc. ;

between Kātha vi, 1 and Gītā, 15, 1 (the idea developed in xii, 255, 1 ff.); and in a few more instances, such as tasya

bhāsā sarvam idaṁ vibhāti, Kaṭha v, 15, and ekaḥ sūryaḥ sarvam idaṁ vibhāti, Mbh. iii, 134, 8.¹

But it is not necessary to dwell upon these, as the third chapter of the Upanishad is epitomized in a section of Čānti. The later feature begins at the start, xii, 247, 1 ff. The vikāras, modifications of Prakṛti, do not know the kṣetrajña, or spirit, but he knows them. Then follows the image of the Upanishad iii, 2 ff. The senses are subservient steeds, and the spirit is the driver who controls them, saṁyantā. After this general imitation follow the three stanzas of Kaṭha iii, 10, 11, 12, one of which appears in the Gītā (above),² but with the substitution of amṛta for puruṣa in the second stanza, and evam for eṣa in the third. Then a general likeness follows between the Upanishad's next stanza ("restrain mind in knowledge, in self") and the epic, which says "sinking the senses with mind as the sixth in the inner self," "endowing the mind with wisdom," "one that is not mastered (by the senses) gets the immortal place." The instruction is a mystery, to be repeated to Snātakas (compare Kaṭha, iii, 17), and besides containing the gist of former wisdom, "is recited in the Upanishads" vedānteṣu ca gīyate, 247, 16, 19, 21. I think there can be no doubt that the epic section is an abbreviation of Kaṭha iii, perhaps under the influence of the Māitrāyaṇa, as shown below. A preceding section may be compared with Kaṭha v, 1-2, where the city of eleven doors is followed by a reference to the haṁsa, lord, R. V. iv, 40, 5. The epic (see under the "group of seventeen"), like the later Upanishad, admits only "nine doors," and says in xii, 240, 32, the haṁsa lord, iṣa, and controller, vaṣī, enters the city of nine doors, because it is controlled, niyataḥ, by the senses.

Other stanzas reflecting the last chapters of this Upanishad

¹ Compare in the Up., ib. 9 and 12, agnir yathāi 'kaḥ and ekaṁ rūpam bahudhā yaḥ karoti, with eka evāgnir bahudhā samidhyate, just preceding in the epic. Gītā, 13, 30, may be a modification of Kaṭha vi, 8. The Gītā stanza, by the way, is repeated verbatim in xii, 17, 23.

² The last of the three verses is cited again in Vana in a copy of the Māitrāyaṇa Upanishad, which substitutes bhūtātmā for gūḍho 'tmā, and jñāna-vedibhiḥ for sūkṣmadarṣibhiḥ. See the next paragraph.

are found mingled with copies from other Upanishads in the last chapter of the Sanatsu-jāta Parvan. In every case where evidence exists it points to the epic being a copy of the Upanishad. Thus in BAU. v, 1, we read pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idaṁ pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate, pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evā 'vaṣisyate, which in the epic, v, 46, 10, appears as pūrṇāt pūrṇāny uddharanti pūrṇāt pūrṇāni cakrire haranti pūrṇāt pūrṇāni pūrṇam evā 'vaṣisyate. Again the stanza of Kāṭha vi, 9,

na sādṛṣye tiṣṭhati rūpam asya, na cakṣuṣā paçyati
kaçcanāi 'nam
hr̥dā manīṣā manasā 'bhikṣpto, ya etad vidur amṛtās
te bhavanti

is modernized already in Çvet., iv 17 (idem) and 20, hr̥dā hr̥diṣṭham manasā ya enam evaṁ vidur amṛtās te bhavanti, and this in the epic, v, 46, 6, appears as

na sādṛṣye tiṣṭhati rūpam asya, na cakṣuṣā paçyati
kaçcid enam
manīṣayā 'tho manasā hr̥dā ca, ya enam vidur amṛ-
tās te bhavanti,

or, as ib. 20,

na darṣane tiṣṭhati rūpam asya . . ,
ye pravrajeyur amṛtās te bhavanti.

The section begins with an explanation of the çukram brahma which is mahad yaçañ and tad vāi devā upāsate, a phrase, prior pāda, metrically borrowed from the licence of the Upanishads, where the epic usually writes upāsante to avoid di-iambus.¹ Here çukram brahma and mahad yaçañ are from Kāṭha v, 8; vi, 1; Çvet. iv, 19 (yasya nāma mahad yaçañ). Below, çl. 9, the Açvattha and its birds may be drawn from Kāṭha vi, 1, and, after the pūrṇam stanza cited above, çl. 11,

¹ The later Upanishads resort to a similar device. Thus in the Yoga-tattvop. i, 6 (alle gute Dinge sind drei): trayo lokās trayo vedās trayañ saṁdhyās trayañ surāḥ, trayo 'gnayo guṇās triṇi (sthitāḥ sarve trayākṣare).

tasmdā vai vāyur āyataḥ . . . tasmiṇḥ ca prāṇa ātataḥ, is a parallel to *Kaṭha vi, 2*.¹ Then follows, in the epic, *ḥl. 15*:

*aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo 'ntarātmā, līṅgasya yogena
sa yāti nityam
tam iḥam idyam anukalpam ādyam, paçyanti mūḍhā
na virājamānam,*

which appears *ib. 27* as:

*aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo mahātmā, na dr̥çyate 'sau
hr̥di saṁniviṣṭaḥ
ajaç caro divārātram atandritaç ca, sa taṁ matvā
kavir āste prasannaḥ,*

with which *Kaṭha iv, 4* (*matvā dhīro na çocati*) may be compared, and especially *iv, 12*:

*aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo madhya ātmani tiṣṭhati
iḥāno bhūtabhavyasya na tato vijugupsate,*

and *Kaṭha vi, 17*:

*aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo 'ntarātmā, sadā janānām
hr̥daye saṁniviṣṭaḥ
taṁ svāc charitrāt pravṛthen muñjād iva-iṣikām dhāir-
yeṇa (taṁ vidyāc çukram)*

The last words are found in the epic, *44, 7*, as:

*ta ātmānam nirharanti 'ha dehān, muñjād iṣikām iva
sattvasaṁsthāḥ,*

while just before *46, 27*, is found in *ḥl. 25*:

*evam yaḥ sarvabhūteṣu ātmānam anupaçyati
anyatrā 'nyatra yukteṣu kiṁ sa çocet tataḥ param,*

which is like *Īcā 6-7* in contracted form.

¹ There is here a general resemblance, noticeable chiefly because of the correlation of one idea with the next following, interrupted in the epic by the *pūrṇa stanza*. With *44, 27*, "His form is not in stars, lightning, clouds, wind, moon, sun," compare *Kaṭha v, 15*, "Not there the sun shines, moon, stars, nor lightnings."

The Māitri Upanishad in the Epic.

Especially instructive is the form in which the Māitri or Māitrāyaṇa Upanishad appears in the epic. In the case of many of the Upanishads there is lacking any characteristic mark sufficiently peculiar to identify the Upanishad when it appears in epic form. But the Māitri, as is well known, contains some special stanzas and above all some special terms not found elsewhere except in still later Upanishads. It is, therefore, more easily identified, and the possibility that we are dealing with material common to the age of the older Upanishads is not so great. In all probability it is a later Upanishad. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads*, p. 312, successfully maintains this view, and in his *Geschichte der Philosophie* i², p. 24, groups it with the Praṇa and Māṇḍūkya as belonging to the group of "later Prose Upanishads," regarding it not only as later than the old prose, but even as later than the metrical Upanishads, from both of which earlier groups I have given epic parallels in the list above.

This Māitri Upanishad is found reflected in the epic at iii, 213, and in a later imitation in the twelfth book. The former epic section is based entirely on the Upanishad, and the preceding sections appear to be due to an expansion of the same material. The order followed is in general that of the Upanishad.

The teaching is called brāhmī vidyā, iii, 210, 15. There is an introductory systematization, the assumption of the universe (as Brahman) consisting of five elements,¹ earth, water, light, wind, air, which have as their characteristics (in inverted order), sound, touch, color, taste, smell, so related that earth has all five; water, four; light, three; wind, two; air, one (sound), making altogether fifteen in combination in all created things (210, 17; 211, 8). With these five "guṇas" begins a group of seventeen: cetanā or manas, mind,

¹ In 210, 17, these are given in reverse order, but in 211, 8, in their usual epic order, bhūmir āpas tathā jyotir vāyur ākāṣam eva ca (reversed, kham vāyur agnir āpas tathā ca bhūh).

as sixth; intellect as seventh; egoism as eighth; the five senses; ātman, soul, the fourteenth; and the three guṇas, rajas, sattvam, tamas. This is "the group of seventeen," which has as its designation the Unmanifest (avyakta); to which are added objects of the senses and the manifest and unmanifest, making the category of twenty-four.¹

This is the introductory chapter of the discourse, and its likeness to the Māitri Upanishad consists in the initial discussion of the elements (which, however, are not called fine elements, tanmātra, as they are in the Upanishad, iii, 2, mahābhūtāni and guṇas),² and the statement that this is a brāhmī vidyā, like MU. ii, 3, brahmavidyā. As an indication of the age of the discourse, it may be observed in passing that, in 211, 9, the fifteen guṇas are said to be properly correlated in the remarkable verse:

anyonyain nā 'tivartante samyak ca bhavati, dvija

where the use of bhavati for bhavanti (subject, pañcadaṣa guṇāḥ), though declared by the commentator to be an archa-

¹ Otherwise the commentator. Objects of sense and action-organs are not included in the seventeen: ity eṣa saptadaṣako rācīr avyaktasamjñakāḥ, sarvāir ihe 'ndriyārthāis tu vyaktāvyaktāiḥ susamvṛtāiḥ caturviṇṣaka ity eṣa vyaktāvyaktamayo guṇaḥ (210, 20-21). Guṇa is obscure. The entirely different group of seventeen in xii, 276, 28, casts no light on the subject, but in xii, 330, 46, a similar verse has (in B) sarvāir ihe 'ndriyārthāiḥ ca vyaktāvyaktāir hi samhitāḥ (v. l. samjñitāḥ) caturviṇṣaka ity eṣa vyaktāvyaktamayo guṇaḥ, which gives the needed guṇaḥ for guṇaḥ and makes the construction somewhat clearer, though the latter passage is such a careless imitation of the one above that in making up the previous list of seventeen, ātman, ahaṁkāra, and manas are all omitted from the list (buddhi being represented by mahad yat param ācayāt) and $5 + 1 + 5 + 3 = 17$! The first group is similar to the group of seventeen in the Vedānta-sāra, though there the organs of action and the breaths are included with the organs of sense, buddhi and manas. The formal definition of vyakta and avyakta in iii, 211, 12, repeated in xii, 330, 49, with grhyate for sṛjyate and with slight v. l. in xii, 189, 15, is that vyakta, the manifest, is what is comprehended by the senses, while avyakta is what is supersensuous, comprehended only by the "fine organs" (liṅga-grāhyam atīndriyam). If the reading guṇa be retained above, it will imply the interpretation of all the constituents as guṇas.

² That is, here, as synonym of dhātu or the elements, which after the dissolution of the universe appear in every newly formed body, dhātavaḥ pāñcābhautikāḥ, iii, 211, 11; xii, 184, 1.

ism, is really a late carelessness. It is further to be observed that though in this introduction, and incidentally in a preceding section, iii, 207, 72, the organs of sense are given as five, yet in iii, 211, 24, they are spoken of as six,¹ in a figure which not only reproduces the exact language of the *Gītā*, 2, 60 and 67, but contains the imagery of the *Māitri Upanishad* (ii, 6, *rathaḥ ṇṇarām, mano niyantā, prakṛtimayo 'sya pratodah*):

saṇṇām ātmani yuktānām indriyānām pramāthinām
yo dhīro dhārayed raṇṇm sa syāt paramasārathiḥ
indriyānām prasṛṣṭānām hayānām iva vartmasu
. . . indriyānām vicaratām, etc.

This image of the senses to be kept under control like horses held in check by a charioteer is indeed too general to have any bearing on the relation of the epic to the *Upanishad* (it occurs, as said above, in the *Kaṭha Upanishad*, for instance, and again in the epic in purely Buddhist form at i, 79, 2-3 = *Dhammapada* 222-223) and might pass unnoticed, were it not that the corresponding section of the twelfth book brings the two into somewhat closer relationship. As already observed, the teaching of the *Vana* in 210 and 211 is more or less closely reproduced in xii, 330, which, however, omitting the stanzas in regard to the six senses, condenses them in the statement that one is "tossed about" by the effects of evil actions, but then closes with a stanza, 58, which has direct reference to transmigration and is in turn omitted from the end of iii, 211, *paribhramati saṁsāraṁ cakravād bahuvedanaḥ*,

¹ So both groups of organs, those of sense and of action, are sometimes counted as making not ten but eleven, including the thinking faculty, as in xiv, 42, 12. Compare the same image and number in xii, 247, 2 (above), *manahṣaṣṭāir ihe 'ndriyāiḥ sudāntāir iva saṁyantā*, etc. In the passage above, iii, 211, 13, the sense-organs, *indriyāṇi*, are defined as apprehenders of objects of sense, *grāhakāṇy eṣāṁ ṇṇabādādinām*. The word is derived from *Indra*, xii, 214, 23, *tribijam* (*apapāṭha nṛbijam*), *indradāivatyam tasmād indriyam ucyate*, with a preceding description of the seeds, the ten chief *ḍhamanyaḥ*, the three humors, *vāta*, *pitta*, *kapha*, and other medicinal intelligence, with especial weight on the heart-artery, *manovahā*, and its action as known to *Atri*.

that is, "like a wheel he revolves through transmigrations." Just so the Māitri Upanishad, ii, 6, says first that the senses are horses and then, after developing the figure, concludes with anena (pratodena) khalv īritah paribhramatī 'dam çarīram cakram iva mṛtpacena, "thus goaded he revolves in bodily form like a potter's wheel."

The next chapter of the teaching, iii, 212, discusses the three guṇas as (in general) in Māitri, iii, 5. The section before this in the Upanishad, iii, 4, is a close prose prototype of the Çānti verses (omitted in iii) just preceding the group of seventeen (the rest of the section, xii, 330 being parallel to iii, 211). This (xii, 330, 42) verse begins asthithūnaṁ snāyuyutam . . . carmāvanaddham (just as in the Upanishad, carmaṇā 'vanaddham), and in 28-9, koṣakāra iva suggests (against the commentator and Deussen) that in the Upanishad, the ending koṣa iva vasunā should be interpreted accordingly, "filled like a cocoon with (deadly) wealth." The next chapter of Vana, the special chapter under consideration, begins with the question how the vital flame can combine with earth-stuff to make the incorporate creature, and how air causes activity. To which the answer is that the flame enters the head and directs the body, while air acts by being in the head and in the vital flame. This is like the opening of the Upanishad where it says, ii, 6, that the spirit is fire. The answer continues: "All is established upon breath;" which is identified with spirit, Purusha, intellect, buddhi, and egoism. Then follows a disquisition upon the different kinds of bodily airs or breathings. These are named as the usual five, but are incidentally referred to as ten, which makes it necessary to understand with the commentator that the other five are those called nāga, kūrma, krkala (sic), devadatta, and dhanamjaya, besides the usual (in-) breathing, with-breathing, off-breathing, up-breathing, and through-breathing, which are specifically mentioned.¹

¹ iii, 213, 16, ḍaçaṇṇānapracoditāḥ. The ten are named as above in the Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, 99, Böhrtlingk's Chrest. p. 264. The (usual) five are prāṇa, samāna, apāna, udāna, vyāna. The same thing occurs in xii, 185,

This also corresponds to Māitri ii, 6, where the five breaths are associated with the vital flame (Agni Vāiṣvānara as *Puruṣa*).

After the breaths are discussed, there is a passing reference to the eleven (not sixteen) *vikāras*, or transformations by which the spirit is conditioned like fire in a pot;¹ just as Māitri iii, 3, has first *yathā 'gninā 'yaspindo 'nyo vā 'bhibhūtaḥ*, etc., and then the transformations, *guṇāni* (= *vikāras*). The corresponding passage in *Ṣānti*, here 242, 17, has *karmaguṇātmaṁ* for *nityaṁ yogajitātmakam*, but then both passages continue with the stanza:

devo² yaḥ saṁsthitas (v. l. *saṁṣṛitas*) tasminn, ab-
bindur iva puṣkare
kṣetrājñaṁ taṁ vijānihi (v. l. *'iyāt*) nityaṁ yoga-
jitātmakam,

“Know that the divine being who stands in the body like a drop of water on a lotus, is the spirit eternal but overcome by its association.” The epic texts vary in the next stanza, but the sense is the same, to the effect that the individual life-spirit, *jīva*, though conditioned by the three *guṇas*, has the characteristics (*guṇas*) of the *ātman*, while *ātman* again is one with the Supreme *Ātman* (*parātmakam*, 213, 21). The third version of the passage, found in xii, 187, 23–25, explains the individual spirit, *kṣetrājña*, as *ātman* conditioned by the *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*, and as Supreme *Ātman* when freed from

15, where the phrase above reappears in a copy of this section. In xii, 329, 31 ff. (and elsewhere) the *prāṇas* are seven personified creatures, *Udāna* born of *Samāna*, etc., as winds, *pra*, *ā*, *ud*, *saṁ*, *vi*, *pari*, and *parā* (*vahas*). Compare also xii, 184, 24, below.

¹ *ekādaṣavikārātmā kalāsambhārasambhṛtaḥ mūrtimantaṁ hi taṁ viddhi nityaṁ yogajitātmakam*, *tasmin yaḥ saṁsthito hy agniḥ nityaṁ sthālyāṁ ivā'hiṭaḥ ātmānaṁ taṁ vijānihi nityaṁ yogajitātmakam*, 213, 18–19.

² In xii, 246, 29, *deva* may be *jīva*, *devaṁ tridhātum trivṛtaṁ suparṇaṁ ye vidyur agryāṁ paramātmataṁ ca*, but on the other hand there may be a textual error here of *devo* for *dehe*. Compare xii, 187, 24, *tasmin yaḥ saṁṣṛito dehe hy abbindur iva puṣkare*. The Supreme Spirit is *devo* (*nirguṇaḥ*), xii, 341, 101, as in *Ṣvet. Up.* i, 8 (here called, 99, *yaḥneṣv agraḥaraḥ*).

them;¹ with a varied reading of *nityaṃ lokahitātmakam* and *viddhi jīvaguṇān* in the following verses; 26, however, being almost the same as iii, 213, 22:—

sacetanaṃ jīvaguṇaṃ vadanti
 sa ceṣṭate ceṣṭayate ca sarvaṃ
 (t)ataḥ paraṃ kṣetravido vadanti
 prākālpayad (v. l. prāvartayad) yo bhuvanāni
 sapta,

“They say that the individual spirit is characterized by intelligence; it moves and causes all to move.² The wise say, that he who caused the many creations to form is still higher (or the Highest).”

The reading in xii, 187, 23 brings the passage into still closer connection with the Upanishad. The latter, at iii, 2, has *ātmā bindur iva puṣkare* followed by *sa vā eṣo 'bhībhūtaḥ prākṛtāir guṇaiḥ*, while the epic has *abbindur iva puṣkare* preceded by *ātmā kṣetrajña ity uktaḥ saṃyuktaḥ prākṛtāir guṇaiḥ*, where the Vana version keeps (what is here lost) the image of the fire in the pot. Then the stanza above, *sacetanam*, etc.,³ closely reproduces the words as well as the thought of the Upanishad, ii, 5: *cetanene 'daṃ ṇarīraṃ cetanavat pratiṣṭhāpitam pracodayitā vai 'ṣo 'py asya* (compare *acetanaṃ ṇarīram*, ii, 3). The fact that the epic Vana is not based on the lotus-phrase of earlier Upanishads but is following the Māitri is shown even more clearly in the phraseology of the following stanza, 213, 23, which at this point does not correspond to *Ṣānti* above, but to a later chapter,

¹ For the text, see the end of the last note. A passage in xii, 316, 15-17 combines freely the two traits mentioned above: “The fire is different from the pot, *ukhā*; the lotus is different from the water, nor is it soiled by touch of water,” etc.—a fact which is said to be “not understood by common people,” as in the example below.

² The commentator says that as individual soul the *ātman* is active, and as the Lord-soul causes activity (compare xii, 47, 65, *yaḥ ceṣṭayati bhūtāni tasmāi vāyvatmane namaḥ*); but the Highest is above both these. In xii, 242, 20, *jivayate* takes the place of *ceṣṭayate*.

³ C. has *acetanam* in the Vana passage, but both texts in both the *Ṣānti* passages have *sacetanam*, xii, 187, 26; 242, 20.

xii, 247, 5. The Vana passage says: "Thus in all beings appears the *bhūtātman* (conditioned spirit), but it is seen only by the subtile intellect;" whereas the Çānti passage has not *bhūtātmā samprakāṣate*, but *gūḍho 'tmā na prakāṣate*, "concealed it is not apparent," that is, it has the text of the Kāṭhaka.¹ But in Vana there is the characteristic *bhūtātman* of the Upanishad, which says at iii, 3: "(Pure) spirit is no more overcome (by environment) than fire is overcome when the mass of iron (enclosing it) is hammered; what is overcome is the *bhūtātman*, which is *abhibhūta*, overcome, because it is bound up with (the transformations);" and further, iii, 5: "Filled with the effect of the *guṇas* (which condition it) the *bhūtātman* is *abhibhūta* (the same etymological tie), overcome, by them, and so enters different forms."² A few more passages contain this word *bhūtātman*. Of these, two

¹ See the analysis above, p. 30, note 2.

² The etymological connection between *abhibhūta* and *bhūtātman* may have suggested to the commentator his explanation of *bhūtātman* as an epithet of *mahātman* in xiii, 34, 15, where he says that *mahātman*s are called *bhūtātman*s because they have overcome or controlled their thoughts (*bhūta* = *vaçikṛta*). In the epic, *bhūtātman* appears as incorporate spirit in xii, 201, 1, where "how can I understand *bhūtātman*?" is to be thus interpreted; and as intellect, *buddhi*, in the reabsorption process described at xii, 313, 12, *mano grāsati bhūtātmā*. Differently employed, the combination appears in *Gītā*, 5, 7, where one is said not to be contaminated by action if one is *sarvabhūtātmabhūtātmā*, which, as is shown by parallel passages, is not to be divided into *sarvabhūtātma* and *bhūtātmā*, but into *sarvabhūta*, *ātmabhūta*, *ātmā*, where *sarvabhūtātmabhūta* means one with all, or the All-soul. Compare xii, 240, 23, *sarvabhūtātmabhūtasya vibhor bhūtahitasya ca devā 'pi mārge muhyanti*; xii, 47, 82, *sarvabhūtātmabhūtāya . . . namaḥ*. *Bhūtātman* means also elemental spirit, as in xii, 208, 17-19, where it is said that before the disembodied *jīva*, or spirit, secures a new resting place (*āyatana*, body), it wanders about as a *bhūtātman*, "like a great cloud." So in xii, 254, 7, the *bhūtātman* of *Yogins* wanders through space and has seven subtile *guṇas* (according to the commentator, the fine elements, intellect and egoism), like *sattvātman*, ib. 6; but here, too, it is the *bhūtātman*, "standing in the heart," ib. 12. I observe, by the way, that the citation above, "the gods are con-founded at the track of him who is identical with all created things" (compare the *anirdeçyā gatiḥ*, "indescribable course, which the *mokṣiṇaḥ* foresee," xii, 19, 15), shows, as does xiii, 113, 7, *apadasya padāiṣiṇaḥ*, that in xiii, 141, 88, *padam tasya ca vidyate* should be changed to *na vidyate*, as in C. 6477 (*sattvaṁ sarvabhūtātmabhūtastham* is found in xii, 210, 36). Compare *Dhammapada* 420, *yassa gatiṁ na jānanti devā*.

or three deserve particular attention. In xii, 240, 21, it appears in a stanza like one to be cited presently, where another Māitri word is found, but here the text says merely that the bhūtātman (ceases to be conditioned and) enters Brahman, where it "sees self in all beings and all beings in self." In çl. 11 of the same chapter the bhūtātman appears as the controller of mind in the same simile of the wild horses noticed above, but with a different turn: "Mind, as a charioteer his horses, directs the senses; and the bhūtātman which is seated in the breast directs mind; as the mind, restraining and letting out the senses, is their lord, so the bhūtātman in respect to the mind." In xiv, 51, 1, on the other hand, the mind itself is called bhūtātman, because it rules the mahābhūtas. Finally the same term is used of Vishnu in xiii, 149, 140, where it is said:¹

eko Viṣṇur mahad bhūtam prthag bhūtāny anekaçaḥ
trīṇ lokān vyāpya bhūtātmā bhunkte viçvabhug
avyayaḥ,

"Vishnu as one is a great spirit (bhūta), and separately is all beings; he, permeating, enjoys the three worlds as bhūtātman, he the all-enjoyer, indestructible."

It is clear from these passages that bhūtātman is not used in one strict sense in the epic, but its signification varies according to different passages. In one case it is a free spirit of elements,² but in another the conditioned spirit in the

¹ The quotation here given may be the one cited in PW. from ÇKDr. s. bhūtātman I, 1. But compare also xii, 207, 8, where the Lord Govinda is bhūtātmā mahātmā. In the "Secret of the Vedāntas" (Upanishads) the Intelligence as Lord bhūtakṛt, maker of elements, is called Bhūtātman, xii, 194, 7 = 248, 4, and 14 as Buddhi.

² Hence called sūkṣma, fine. This seems to be the sense in xii, 203, 6-7: "As no one has seen the back of Himālaya or of the moon, but cannot say it is non-existent, so the fine bhūtātman which in creatures has a knowledge-soul, jñānātmavān, cannot be said not to exist because it has not been seen." With this jñānātmā compare, by the way, what is said of the soul, ib. 240, 22, yāvān ātmani vedātmā tāvān ātmā parātmani (just after the verse cited in the text 240, 21, above, on bhūtātman): "The soul is as much in the All-soul as there is knowledge-soul in itself."

body.¹ It is the latter meaning which applies both in the Upanishad and in the epic imitation of it. In these cases bhūtātman is the ātman, spirit, not as being pure Puruṣa, but as being in connection with and conditioned by bhūta, that is, imprisoned in matter. It is apparently a popular (not philosophical) term for spirit in general, and when used in philosophy answers to the ordinary philosophical jīva, incorporate spirit. It is not found in other (old) Upanishads.

But there is still a closer parallel between the epic and the Upanishad. After the verse cited above, it is said, iii, 213, 24-27, that salvation is attained by peace of mind and by perceiving self in self, and that this purified spirit by the aid of the lighted lamp (of knowledge), seeing self as *free of self*, becomes released.² Here again we have a peculiarly Māitri word in *nirātman*, "free of self," that is, free from the delusion of subjectivity. But the two works are here evidently identical. First, just as the epic says that one must have peace of mind, prasāda, and be pure, and then becomes nirātman, so in ii, 2-4, the Upanishad, after an allusion to samprasāda, the same peace of mind, says that one becomes pure and *nirātman* (çuddhaḥ pūtaḥ çūnyaḥ çānto 'prāṇo nirātmā). The sign of this peace is explained as when one sleeps sweetly, iii, 213, 25 = xii, 247, 11.³ In the epic the word nirātman occurs again in much the same way, xii, 199, 123, çāntībhūto nirātmavān, like the collocation above in the Upanishad.

¹ Compare what is said, Māit. Up. iii, 2. "The bhūtātman is affected by ignorance, and so gives itself up to objects of sense," it is said in xii, 204, 5.

² "For self is the friend of self, and even so self is the foe of self," V, 34, 64; Gītā, 6, 5.

³ Samprasāda is suṣupti, unconscious slumber. Unconscious existence is the goal of the soul, for the conditioned spirit, jīva, "glorious, immortal, ancient" is a part of this unconsciousness, and on becoming pure enters it. In a preceding section this samprasāda, or unconscious existence, is declared to be the body of the universe: Yaḥ samprasādo (am, C.) jagataḥ çarīram, sarvān sa lokān adhigacchati 'ha, tasmin hitam (hi sam, C.) tarpayati 'ha devāṅs, te vāi tṛptāḥ tarpayanty āsyam aśya, xii, 246, 33, where the sense seems to be that the reabsorption of the universe pleases the mouth of unconsciousness; that is, the mouth of Time as Lord of all, a metaphor from the preceding verses. So samprasāda is a spirit at peace, in Chānd. Up., cited on the next page.

Another passage reads: "The spirit (ātman, but conditioned) knows not whither it goes or whence, but the inner-spirit, antarātman, is different; it sees all things; with the lighted lamp of knowledge¹ it sees self in self. Do thou, too, seeing self in (or with) self, become freed from self, become all-wise" (nirātmā bhava sarvavit, xii, 251, 9-10). This verse, is in fact, only a different version of the "lighted lamp" verse above. This latter, in turn with its environment, must be compared in the original with the Upanishad to see how close are the two. But for this purpose I take, not the samprasāda passage referred to above, which is parallel to Chānd. Up. viii, 3, 4, but one from the sixth book, where the Upanishad, vi, 20, has

tadā 'tmanā 'tmānaṁ dr̥ṣṭvā nirātmā bhavati,

whereupon follows a stanza cited, ity evaṁ hy āha, as:

cittasya hi prasādena hanti karma ṣubhāṣubham
prasannātmā 'tmani sthitvā sukham avyayam aṇute

In the epic, iii, 213, 24, this whole stanza (ṣloka) appears, cittasya hi prasādena, etc., *in exactly the same words*,² and then, after the definition of prasāda and the injunction that one must be viṣuddhātmā, of purified soul, as explained above, come the words, ṣl. 27, *dr̥ṣṭvā 'tmānaṁ nirātmānaṁ sa tadā vipramucyate*.

When this stanza is repeated in the Upanishad at vi, 34, it is preceded by the verse yaccittas tanmayo bhavati, so that together we have:

yaccittas tanmayo bhavati guhyam etat sanātanam

(i. e., the guhyam of Dhammapada 1, mano setṭhā manomayā; compare Praṇa Up. iii, 10, yaccittas tenāi 'sa prāṇam āyāti)

¹ Here jñānadīpena (compare Gītā, 10, 11) diptena; above, pradīptene 'va dīpena manodīpena. Compare dīpavad yaḥ sthito hṛdi, Māitri, vi. 30 (and 38).

² In the corresponding Čānti chapter, in which I pointed out above the simile of the six senses as horses, and gūḍho 'tmā for bhūtātmā, this verse is found in a different form, cittaprasādena yatir jahāti 'ha ṣubhāṣubham, vii, 247, 10.

cittasya hi prasādena hanti karma çubhāçubham
which the Anugītā takes up xiv, 51, 27, and 36, in inverse
order:

27, yaccittam tanmayo 'vaçyam, guhyam etat sanā-
tanam

36, prasāde cāi 'va sattvasya prasādam samavā-
pnuyāt

If all these points be compared, first the general order of discussion, then the peculiar words which are used in the same way in both texts, and finally the identical passage just given, it is clear that one of these texts must have followed the other. The dispersion of the epic chapter over different books certainly makes it seem more likely that it is a copy than an original. This opinion is strengthened by the late features added in the epic, the freedom in metre, almost exclusively characteristic of the later epic, and the late Vedānta grouping of seventeen at the beginning. For this group is not the old Sāṅkhya group, which occurs often enough elsewhere in the epic, but a modification of it as in the Vedāntasāra.

The citation in the Māitrāyaṇa of the stanza cittasya hi prasādena from some source might be referred to the epic, but it seems more likely that this, like a dozen other "some one says" verses in the same Upanishad, is a general reference, and it is quite counterbalanced by the fact that the Vana version in the epic adds a hidden reference to its source in the words *māitrāyaṇa-gataç caret*, a strange expression, which is found only in this verse and in its repetition in the twelfth book;¹ while the speaker in the last verse of the Vana chapter confesses that what he has been teaching "is all a condensed account of what he has heard."²

¹ iii, 213, 34; xii, 279, 5; with a slight varied reading in xii, 189, 13.

² yathā çrutam idam sarvam samāśena . . . etat te sarvam ākhyātam, iii, 213, 40. I suppose no one will lay any weight on the statement of xii, 247, which copies Vana here (see above), that (12-14) this is a "secret not handed down by tradition," anātihiyam anāgamam (ātmapratyayikam çāstram), but an ambrosia "churned from dharmākhyānas, satyākhyāna, and the ten

It is perhaps worth noting further that in the Upanishad vi, 20-21, one sees the real soul and becomes isolated (where the goal is kevalatva), whereas in iii, 211, 15 of the epic, the result of this same seeing of self truly is brahmaṇaḥ saṁyogaḥ, union with Brahman; which carries on the antithesis already noticed between the Sāṁkhya tanmātras of the Upanishad and the omission of the same in the epic. This special designation of tanmātra in iii, 2 is complemented by the viṣeṣas mentioned in vi, 10, and is important as showing that the Upanishad, as a Upanishad, is late, for none of the older Upanishads has either of these terms. Its priority to the epic, however, may be urged on still another ground than those mentioned above. The Upanishad quotes stanzas freely, and it is scarcely possible that if the epic and Manavīc verse cited above on p. 27 had existed in verse the prose form of the Upanishad would have been used. As Müller says in his note on the Upanishad passage: "Part of this passage has been before the mind of the author" (of Manu together with the epic poet). So perhaps, too, with the recognition of the eleven (vikāras) in v, 2. The epic has both groups, eleven vikāras and also the system's sixteen, as I shall show in a later chapter. As compared with the epic, moreover, the Upanishad is distinctly earlier in knowing Yoga as "six-fold," vi, 18, whereas the epic makes it "eightfold," xii, 317, 7 ff. as does Patañjali, ii, 29.

I think another circumstance may point to the fact that the epic refers directly to the sixth chapter of the Upanishad. The word *tatstha* is not, indeed, used in a pregnant sense in the Upanishad. It is simply an ordinary grammatical complex in the sentence vi, 10, puruṣaḥ cetā pradhānāntahsthaḥ, sa eva bhoktā . . . bhojyā prakṛtis, tatstho bhuñkte, "Prakṛti is food; when *standing in it* (Prakṛti), the Puruṣa enjoys." But in the epic, xii, 315, 11, we read sa eṣa (puruṣaḥ) prakṛtistho hi *tatstha* ity abhidhīyate, "Puruṣa is designated as *tatstha* when he is in Prakṛti." As the expression *tatstha* thousand Rks," for this applies only to paçyaty ātmānam ātmani, seeing self in self, not to the exposition.

occurs only in this Upanishad, according to Col. Jacob's Concordance, it seems very likely that the epic verse alludes to the tatstha = prakṛtistha of the Upanishad, where Puruṣa is expressly puruṣaḥ cetā, and the epic also follows, 14, with cetanāvāns tathā cāi 'kaḥ kṣetrajña iti bhāṣitaḥ.¹

In Up. vi. 15 and Mbh. xi, 2, 24 occurs Kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni; and in the companion-piece to the image of the body as a house, cited above from Up. iii, 4, as the same with xii, 330, 42, namely, Up. i, 3, occurs anīṣṭasamprayoga = Mbh. xi, 2, 28, but I do not think that these universal expressions taken by themselves are of any significance.

On the other hand I cannot regard as unimportant the following stanzas, beginning with the extraordinary, unsyntactical, verse found in the epic, xii, 241, 32, —

śaṇmāsān nityayuktasya ṣabdabrahmā 'tīvartate

compared with 237, 8 (Gītā 6, 44, jīñāsūr api yogasya, etc.),

api jīñāsamāno 'pi ṣabdabrahmā 'tīvartate

and with xiv, 19, 66,

śaṇmāsān nityayuktasya yogah, Pārtha, pravartate

and with Māitr. Up. vi, 28,

ṣadbhir māsāis tu yuktasya nityayuktasya dehinaḥ

anantaḥ paramo guhyaḥ samyag yogah pravartate

and with Māitr. Up. vi, 22 = Mbh. xii, 233, 30,

dve brahmaṇi veditavye ṣabdabrahma param ca yat

ṣabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ param brahmā 'dhigacchati,

The last stanza occurs only here and in this Upanishad (excepting later copies).² The first is a meaningless compound of

¹ It may be noticed here also that in *cāitanya* the vocabulary of the pseudo-epic is that of the Upanishad in its later part, vi, 10 and 38 (the word is found else only in late Upanishads). Compare: acāitanyam na vidyate (the tree has a jīva), xii, 184, 17; cetanāvatsu cāitanyam samam bhūteṣu paçyati, "the sage sees one and the same soul in all conscious creatures," xiv, 18, 33. The term is unknown to the Gītā and early epic.

² With the var. lec., dve vidye veditavye, Mund. Up. i, 4; Brahmapindū Up. i, 17. Compare a sort of parody in xii, 100, 5, ubhe prajñe veditavye rjvi vakrā ca, Bhārata. The dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe of BAU. ii, 3, 1, are perhaps the first pair, though there it is higher and lower Brahman in a meta-physical sense.

the "six months" stanza and the "two brahman" stanza. The second is a theoretical advance on the latter, which says that when one is thoroughly conversant with the word-brahman he gets to the highest Brahman. The later Yogin does not think this necessary, and emends to "even one desirous of knowledge (of Yoga, in Gītā) surpasses the word-brahman," while the "six months" stanza in the epic is adjusted to the occasion (nityayuktasya of the MSS. is to be read in the Upanishad as in the epic). Here again, the Māitrāyaṇa alone has this stanza, nor does nityayukta occur elsewhere except in the same way in the Gītā, 8, 14, nityayuktasya yoginaḥ.

In my opinion these parallels together with the cittasya hi prasādena stanza above indicate that the epic has copied from the sixth chapter of the Upanishad as well as from the earlier portions.¹

The Vedic period, then, is represented in the epic down to a pretty late stage of Upanishads. The tanmātra era of philosophy, the trinitarian era of philosophy, these are represented by the Upanishad and by the epic; but only the latest philosophical and religious chapters of the epic recognize tanmātras (the name) and the trinity, as only the later Upanishads recognize them.

Of still later Upanishads, it is possible that the pseudo-epic may know

The Atharvaçiras Upanishad.

The title is applied to Nārāyaṇa, xii, 339, 113, and the commentator explains it as referring to the Upanishad.² But we must, I think, rest content with the certainty that the epic cites (a) the Brhadāranyaka Up., (b) the Kāthaka, (c) the

¹ The general lateness of the Upanishad is shown by its recognition, v, 2, of the trinity (Muir *op. Holtzmann*), which is also recognized in the later epic.

² On this and on i, 70, 39-40 in the Çakuntalā episode, bhāruṇḍasāmagitā-bhir atharvaçiraso 'dgatāḥ . . . atharvavedāpravarāḥ, compare Weber, IS., vol. i, pp. 383-4. See also above, pp. 8 and 9 (note 1).

Māitrāyaṇa, or, in other words, copies at least one of each of the three kinds of Upanishads, old prose, metrical, and later prose.

Āçvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra.

In this Sūtra i, 15, 9, occurs a stanza which is found also with varied readings in the Kāuṣītaki and BA. Upanishads (ii, 11; vi, 4, 9, respectively) as a single stanza. This is cited in the epic as Vedic, the reading following that of the Sūtra and adding one stanza, which clearly belongs to the citation, i, 74, 63-64:

vedeṣv api vadantī 'mam mantragrāmaṁ dvijātayah
jātakarmaṇi putrāṇāṁ tavā 'pi viditaṁ tathā
aṅgād aṅgāt sambhavaṣi hṛdayād adhi jāyase
ātmā vāi putranāmā 'si sa jīva çaradaḥ çatam
jīvitaṁ tvadadhīnam me santānam api cā 'kṣayam
tasmāt tvam jīva me putra susukhī çaradaṁ çatam ¹

The general conclusion to be drawn from these citations is twofold. First, the epic, synthetically considered, post-dates the latest Vedic works. Second, the final redactors were priests, well acquainted with Vedic literature. Of these points there can be no doubt; nor is a third open to serious objection, namely, that the restriction of philosophical citation to philosophical chapters does not prove anything in regard to the date of the epic that preceded the insertion of these chapters.

Purāṇas and Itihāsas.

Whether the Purāṇas, ascribed to Romaharṣa (*sic*) in xii, 319, 21, precede or follow epic literature, is not a question that can be answered categorically. Nothing is commoner than the statement made by some epic character that a story was heard by him long ago in a Purāṇa.² But most of the

¹ Āçvalāyana is mentioned only in the pseudo-epic, xiii, 4, 54. On this and his mention of the epic, see below, and Holtzmann, loc. cit., p. 27, with other supposed references to Sūtras.

² For example, xiii, 84, 59, mayā çrūtaṁ idaṁ pūrvam purāṇe. For the relation between the extant Purāṇas and the epic, compare Holtzmann, loc. cit., p. 29 ff. There is no earlier allusion to an extant Purāṇa (SBE. ii. p. xxviii)

extant Purāṇas are in their present shape certainly later than the epic. Nevertheless, before the great epic was completed the eighteen Purāṇas were known, since they are mentioned as a group xviii, 5, 46 (not in C.) and 6, 97. Further, a Vāyu Purāṇa is referred to in iii, 191, 16:

etat te sarvam ākhyātām atitānāgatām tathā
Vāyuproktam anusmṛtya Purāṇam ṛsisamstutam.

This statement, however, implying that the Purāṇa treats of future events, though illustrated in this instance by the epic's account of later ages, scarcely tallies with the early epic use of the word, which regularly connotes *atīta*, the past, but not *anāgata*, (account of) things to be; yet it corresponds exactly to the ordinary contents of the later Purāṇas. On the other hand, the pseudo-epic contains this later sort of Purāṇa, known as Purāṇa as well as ākhyāna and mahopaniṣada, where future events are described.¹ It is to be remarked, moreover, that this reminiscence of Vāyu's Purāṇa, a work which is referred to again in the Harivaṅṣa, is contained in the Mārkaṇḍeya episode, which long interpolation is itself virtually a Purāṇa. That some of the verses in the extant Vāyu are like some in the epic proves nothing in regard to the relative age of either.² There is no real iden-

than that in Āp. Dh. S., ii, 9, 24, 6, where a Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa is cited, the words having an epic strain, perhaps to be filled out with *vijārthāḥ svaṛge (jīvantī yāvad) ābhūtasamplavāt*. See also above, p. 6. On the Purāṇas as depositories of Vedic Ṛuti, see the quotation above, p. 4, and compare H. 3, 33, 5, etat te kathayīṣyāmi purāṇam brahmasaṇimitam nānāṛutisamāyuktam.

¹ xii, 340, 95-125, future avatars, conquest of Kālayavana, etc., called mahopaniṣadam (sic, neuter), in čl. 111, purāṇam in 118 and 124, ākhyānam in 125. Closely united are "praise and Purāṇas" (known to Sūtas) in xii, 53, 3 (not like the *stutiṣāstra*, praise-treatises, of the late passage, ii, 452, where, however, B. 11, 35, has *stutiṣāstrāṇi*).

² Even the Garuḍa and Vārāha Purāṇas may precede the final revision of the whole epic, though the evidence for references is far from conclusive; but on the other hand our present Purāṇas may have been so changed as not to agree in any detail with Purāṇas that once bore these names. The arguments are given by Holtzmann, loc. cit. The epic passages supposed to refer to the Purāṇas are H., 3, 33, 5 (above) and i, 31, 3. The epic declaration i, 2, 386, that it is the base of all Purāṇas, presupposes a goodly number already in existence; but this statement is as late an addition to the poem

tity in the account cited from the Vāyu Purāṇa and the extant Vāyu Purāṇa. In the description of the Kali age, for instance, where the epic (in the part said to be from the Vāyu Purāṇa) has, 190, 64, *Īṣṭrā dharmam pravakṣyanti, brāhmaṇāḥ paryupāsakāḥ*, the Vāyu, lviii, 41, says *Īṣṭrācār-yāḥ ca brāhmaṇāḥ*, and where the epic, ib. 97, has *utsādayi-ṣyati mlecchagaṇān*, the Vāyu, ib. 78, has *mlecchān hanti*, but here there is nothing characteristic. On the other hand, the most striking features in the epic account, the eḍukas, and Kalki, with the heavy taxes laid upon priests, çl. 62, 65-67, 93 ff., are not found in the Vāyu at all. Noticeable also is the fact that the epic account not only has more than the Vāyu, but has contradictory statements. Thus in çl. 58, the Vāyu declares one of the signs of the evil age to be that girls less than sixteen will bear children; while in the epic the sign is that girls of five or six will bear and boys of seven or eight will beget children: *pañcame vā 'tha ṣaṣṭe vā varṣe kanyā prasūyate, saptavarṣā 'ṣṭavarṣāḥ ca prajāsyanti narāḥ tadā*, 190, 49. Taken altogether, the epic account seems to be an extended and exaggerated reproduction of that in the Vāyu Purāṇa, but it is impossible to say whether it is really based on the extant text or not. The Puranic version, however, does not seem to be taken from the epic account, and as the latter is expressly said to be from the Purāṇa it is reasonable to suppose that the Mārkaṇḍeya episode was inserted into the epic after the Vāyu Purāṇa was written, though this must remain only a supposition.

Another long intrusion in the same third book of the epic, this time in the Tirtha stories, iii, 110 ff., leads to a result somewhat more definite in respect of the relation between the particular story intruded into the epic and the Padma

as is the mention of the eighteen. I suppose most scholars will accept the "eighteen Purāṇas" as actually referring to eighteen, and I am inclined to do so myself. At the same time the number is more or less conventional in the epic (see the groups of eighteen spoken of below), and even in the period of the Upanishads literary works may have been grouped in eighteens: *yajñarūpā aṣṭādaśakṛtāḥ avaram yajñ karma*, with Deussen's remark on *ukta* and attempt to explain the number, Mund. Up. i, 2, 7.

Purāṇa. Here, according to the acute investigation of Dr. Lüders, *Die Sage von Ṛṣyaṣṛṅga*, the epic account in its present form is based upon that of the Purāṇa. Dr. Lüders thinks indeed, p. 103, that there was an earlier epic form of the story which antedated the Puranic account. But it is at least certain that the present epic form is subsequent to the present Puranic form, and that the tale is drawn from popular sources that antedate in all probability all the literary versions in Sanskrit.

Leaving the modern Purāṇa, as it is described, e. g., in Vāyu Purāṇa, iv, 10,

sargaḥ ca pratisargaḥ ca vañṣo manvantarāṇi ca
vañṣānucaritam ce 'ti purāṇaṁ pañcalakṣaṇam,

and turning to the meaning of the word in the epic, there is no essential difference between atīta, ākhyāna,¹ purāṇa and itihāsa. Together with the more general kathā, all these words mean ordinarily an old tale, story, legend or incident. Rarely is Purāṇa itself used of cosmogony, but a case occurs in xii, 201, 6, where the phrase tad ucyatām purāṇam refers to the origin of earth, heaven, creatures, wind, sky, water, etc. The birth of Asuras and Suras is a Puranic topic in i, 65, 38. When not an adjective to ākhyāna, which is a common function of the word, it is an equivalent substantive. Thus the Nandinī tale is an ākhyānam purāṇam, i, 175, 2, while in xii, 343, 2, hanta te vartayiṣyāmi purāṇam, the word in the phrase takes the place of Itihāsa; as it does in i, 196, 14, ṣrūyate hi purāṇe 'pi Jaṭilā nāma Gāutamī.

From remote antiquity these Purāṇas or tales of old were associated with Itihāsas, legends, whether cosmological or not (the distinction is quite artificial). They were narrations, kathās, composed partly in prose and partly in verse, gāthās. Kathā itself is entirely non-specific, and may be a causerie rather than a tale, as in ix, 38, 16, where are mentioned reli-

¹ Synonymous with this is the word upākhyāna. Thus the Çakuntalā episode and Namuci myth, ix, 48, 33, bear the name upākhyāna, and in v, 18, 16, and 19 it is synonymous with ākhyāna. The Fowler's tale is a dharmākhyāna, iii, 216, 36 (compare a reference to many such, p. 5, above).

gious conversations,¹ citrāḥ kathā vedam prati. A legend, such as that of Agastya, is a kathā divyā, iii, 100, 2. The mahopaniṣadam alluded to above is a kathāmṛtam, the essence, sāra, of hundreds of upākhyānas, xii, 340, 127. So the Śvetadvīpa story is a kathāsāra, xii, 336, 16.

But the especial characteristic of the old legend is that it relates the story of great kings or gods² and their acts in the past. In iii, 298, 7, Dyumatsena is solaced "by the help of tales of former kings," citrārthāiḥ pūrvarājñām kathācayāiḥ, according to the recommendation in the epic itself: "Comfort those afflicted in mind with tales of the past," yasya buddhiḥ paribhavet tam atītena sāntvayet, i, 140, 74; an instance being the story of Nala, kīrtana, itihāsa, itihāsaḥ purāṇaḥ, as it is indifferently called, iii, 79, 10, 11, 13, 16.

The word itihāsa may also have the meaning "saying," rather than "legend." Thus in iii, 30, 21:

atrā 'py udāharanti 'mam itihāsam purāṭanam
iṣvarasya vaçe lokās tiṣṭhante nā 'tmano yathā,

where itihāsa is equivalent to pravāda, a proverbial saying (in this instance repeated in çl. 25 and in other parts of the epic). But ordinarily the word means a tale, of which the hemistich just cited is the stereotyped introduction, as in iii, 28, 1 and passim.³ It is important to notice that, as itihāsa is used for proverb and gītā gāthā is also used in the same way,

¹ So a philosophical discourse of religious content, mokṣadharma, is an Itihāsa, xii, 334, 42; and the tale of a good Brahman is a kathā on duty, xii, 354 ff.

² The tale of Atharvan finding Agni when the latter disappeared is an Itihāsa purāṭana, iii, 217 and 222. In iii, 183, 46, purāvṛttāḥ kathāḥ punyāḥ, are "tales of kings, women, and seers." With purāvṛtta as adj. compare kathayanti purāvṛttam itihāsam, xii, 18, 2; as a noun it is not uncommon, rājñām purāvṛttam, "a tale of kings," etc., as is illustrated sufficiently in PW. (compare vṛttānta). Khāṇḍava's burning is a pūrāṇī kathā ṛṣisamatutā, i, 223, 16. "Men, snakes, and demons" is the subject of a "divine tale," kathā divyā, in iii, 201, 4.

³ A word of analogous formation is āitihiya, equivalent to traditional report, Veda. It is found, e.g., in xii, 218, 27 and 247, 13, and G. v, 87, 23, as one of a group of sources of knowledge besides anumāna and pratyakṣa. Compare itivṛtta, as legend, in i, 1, 16.

for example, the na jātu kāmah proverb, i, 75, 49-50, so the phrase to introduce a tale, Itihāsa, may substitute gāthās, as in iii, 29, 35, atrā 'py udāharantī 'mā gāthāḥ . . . gītāḥ. Such gāthās refer to action or to ethical teaching (compare the same formula for both, loc. cit. and ii, 68, 65). A difference may be imagined in the element of song of the gāthā, but this is illusory. The gāthās are indeed said to be sung, as in the case just cited (çl. 34-44 are the gītā gāthāḥ), but singing is too precise a translation. As shown above, even the Āraṇyakas are "sung," and in point of fact the gāthās are synonymous with çlokas and are recited. Stanzas of Purāṇas are thus said to be sung.¹ Conversely, gāthās are not always sung, iii, 135, 45, atrā 'py udāharantī 'mā gāthā devāir udāhṛtāḥ; while ib. 54 is another illustration of the word gāthā meaning only a current proverbial çloka. But in this case it is woven together with the legend of Dhanuṣākṣa, whose direct curse not succeeding in slaying his enemy, he destroyed the mountain, in the life of which was bound up the life of the invulnerable foe. Hence they say "man can never escape his fate:"

ūcur vedavidah sarve gāthām yām tān nibodha me
na diṣṭam artham atyetum iço martyaḥ² kathaincana
mahīṣair bhedayāmāsa Dhanuṣākṣo mahidharān

Such gāthās³ are even incorporated into the law-books: "Verses recited by Yama" are cited (by those that know antiquity and the law) "in the law-books" on the sin of selling a son or daughter, xiii, 45, 17.⁴

¹ Compare Tirtha gāthā and Tirtha çloka, iii, 88, 22; 89, 17; 90, 6; "the çloka sung in a Purāṇa," purāṇe çrūyate gītāḥ çlokaḥ, v, 178, 47; purāṇaḥ çloko gītāḥ, iii, 300, 33 (a proverb on fame); Holtzmann, loc. cit., p. 29 ff.

² The reading amartyaḥ in B. would require api. C. has martyaḥ. The proverb appears in a different form, v, 40, 32, na diṣṭam abhyatikrāntuṁ çakyam bhūtena kenacit.

³ In the Rāmāyaṇa also, eti jīvantam ānando naram varṣaçatād api is given as a kalyāṇi or pāurāṇi gāthā lāukiki, v, 34, 6; vi, 126, 2 (G. 110, 2).

⁴ atra gāthā Yamodgītāḥ kirtayanti purāvidah dharmajñā dharmāçāstreṣu nibaddhā dharmasetuṣu, yo manuṣyaḥ svakam putram vikriya dhanam icchati kanyām vā jivitārthāya yaḥ çulkena prayacchati, saptāvare, etc.

The best known example of the last case, gāthās recited by a divinity, is found in the Harigītās (plural), xii, 347, 11, that is the Bhagavad Gītā (Upanishad).¹ Here the "singing" is that of the Āraṇyakas. As Vedāntas are Upanishads (above, p. 9), so we find in xii, 247, 21, yat tan maharṣibhir dr̥ṣṭam (= Veda), vedānteṣu ca gīyate, "what is revealed in the Veda and sung in the Upanishads."

✓ Such tales and legends are said to be the epic itself, which is called indifferently an Itihāsa, a Purāṇa, or Kṛṣṇa's Veda.² As the Chāndogya Upanishad applies the title "fifth Veda" to the Itihāsapurāṇa, so the epic claims the same title:

itihāsapurāṇaḥ pañcamo vedānām, Chānd. Up., vii, 1, 2, 4
 (So each is a Veda in Çat. Br. xiii, 4, 3, 12-13.)
 adhitya caturo vedān sāṅgān ākhyānapañcamān, vii, 9, 29
 sāṅgopaniṣadān³ vedāṇc catur ākhyānapañcamān, iii, 45, 8
 vedān adhyāpayāmāsa Mahābhāratapañcamān, i, 63, 89 and
 xii, 341, 21.⁴

In the opening stanzas⁵ of the great epic it is described as a Samhitā, collection, a grantha, book, a Purāṇa, an ākhyāna, an Itihāsa, a Kāvya, a poem containing various Çāstras, full of Vyākhyās (vāiyākhya) or narrations, and Upanishads. It is true that it is also called a Dharmaçāstra, yet this represents but one side of its encyclopædic nature, as it is besides Arthaçāstra, Dharmaçāstra, and Kāmaçāstra, i, 2, 383. When the character of the work as a whole is described, it is in

¹ bhagavadākhyānam, ib. 2; here a recitation about the Lord, not by the Lord. But the Gītā is a recitation by the Lord, gītā bhagavatā svayam, ib. 349, 8.

² i, 62, 16-18, idam purāṇam . . . itihāsam . . . kārṣṇam vedam vidvān. So the imitation of the Gītā in the twelfth book is called "Kṛṣṇa's Religion," Sātvato dharmah (see below).

³ The other form occurs, e. g., iii, 206, 2, sāṅgopaniṣado vedān adhite.

⁴ Compare also v, 43, 41; ix, 6, 14 (as above), and vedāṇc cā 'dhiyāge sāṅgān setihāsaṇ, i, 60, 3; itihāsapurāṇeṣu nānāçikāṣu bodhitāḥ vedavedāṅgatat-tvājñāḥ, i, 109, 20; vedeṣu sapurāṇeṣu ṛgvede sayajurvede . . . purāṇe so-paniṣade tathāi 'va jyotiṣe āyurvede tathāi 'va ca, xii, 342, 6-9; ye 'dhiyate setihāsam purāṇam, xiii, 102, 21; yad etad ucyate çāstre setihāse cā chandasi, xiii, 111, 42.

⁵ i, 1, 16, 40, 55, 61, 72.

terms of epic story, not of didactic code. Even the Hari-vaṅṣa poet does not fail to distinguish the two elements. He boasts that the epic is an ākhyānam bahvartham ṛuti-vistaram, but still says that it is the Bhārati kathā, Bhārata story, the root of which is the dramatic episode of the Rāja-sūya, which led to the development of the story (H. 3, 2, 13 ff.). So another poet proclaims: "I will relate the great good fortune of that great-hearted king the Bhārata, whose brilliant Itihāsa, story, is called the Mahābhārata," i, 99, 49. The reason that Kṛṣṇa Dvāipāyana spent three years in making the epic was not only that he wished to do a good thing but that he wished to "extend the glory of the Pandus and other warriors."¹

Constituting a small but important part of the various tales told in the epic are found genealogical verses, anu-vaṅṣa-śloka (or gāthās), which commemorate the history of the race of valiant kings and great seers of the past. I shall speak of them again hereafter. Here it suffices to say that such verses are either sung by professional rhapsodes, or recited by narrators. The rhapsodes, however, were quite distinct from the Brahmans, who recited the epic stories. For a priest to be a professional story-teller or a rhapsode was as bad for him as to be a juggler or a physician.²

Drama.

There remains only one class of literature which may doubtfully be included under the head of literature known to the epic poets, the drama. Whether there was already a literary drama is, however, chiefly a matter of definition. It is conceivable that the story-tellers and rhapsodes may have developed dramatic works before any such works were written, that is, became literature in a strict sense, and that

¹ i, 62, 27-28.

² xiii, 23, 15, gāyanā nartakāḥ cāi 'va plavakā vādakās tathā kathakā yodhakāḥ cāi 'va rājan nā 'rhanthi ketanam; ib. 90, 11, among apāṅkṛteyaś are kuçilavaś, rhapsodes, and idol-makers (above, p. 15). A priest is insulted on being called a professional eulogist, bandin, i, 78, 9-10.

the ākhyāna may have been dramatically recited. But it is also true that the early epic does not mention the play or drama. Nevertheless a kind of drama existed before the epic was ended. Compare iv, 16, 43:

akālaññā 'si, sāirandhri, ṣāilūṣi 'va virodiṣi

From the expression "thou weepst like an actress" one might hastily conclude that we have here a reference to real drama. But pantomime expresses weeping, and no mention of real drama occurs in the epic except in the passage ii, 11, 36, where Drama is personified:

nāṭakā vividhāḥ kāvyāḥ kathākhyāyikakārikāḥ,

which is anything but an early verse.¹ In the Harivaṅṣa, on the other hand, which probably dates from a time posterior to our era, we find not only pantomime, abhinaya, but even the dramatic representation of the "great Rāmāyaṇa poem," in which the vidūṣaka, or stage-jester of the regular drama, takes part, H. 2, 89, 72; 92, 59.

But even abhinaya, or pantomime, is not mentioned in the epic proper under that name and no technical dramatic term is found anywhere in it. This is the more surprising as the manner in which the epic is told gives abundant opportunity to introduce both the terms and allusions to dramatic representation. Shows of dances are frequently mentioned, but the spectators never hear the players even when mentioned as naṭas, a doubtful word which might be actor and may be pantomimist. Not to speak of the absence of cāubhikas and

¹ Dramatic recitations are of course another matter, and pantomime must be separated from drama. According to Fick, *Soziale Gliederung*, p. 188, the same relation exists in the Jātakaṣ, where also naṭa and nāṭaka do not yet mean actors but pantomimes, as "dramatic performances are nowhere described." This is, in my opinion, the state of affairs in the epic prior to the writing of the late additions (see the allusion below). ii, 11, 36, belongs clearly to an interpolated scene, and the fact that real drama, nāṭaka, is mentioned only here in the whole epic till the Harivaṅṣa, should show its age. He who refers the passage to 500 B. C., must ignore its uniqueness and the fact that the rest of the epic knows no such word. See my *Ruling Caste*, p. 329, and also Professor Rhys Davids' interesting note on the *Brahma-jāla Sutta*, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, p. 7 (with my note below, p. 57, on *prekkhā*).

others elsewhere mentioned as actors, and of the dramatic *viṭas*, *çakaras*, and *vidūṣakas*, when groups of people of this grade are given,¹ even the *granthika* appears only as a rhapsode processional singer, and the characters are described merely as "seing," *paçyanto naṭanartakān*, ii, 33, 49; i, 218, 10, etc. The expression "stage" and the various vague terms for actors can be referred to mimes with perfect propriety and in the absence of everything that would indicate real drama ought perhaps to be so referred. In the expression "God treats men as men do a doll on a string," iii, 30, 23, the reference must be to the sort of Punch and Judy show which is still performed in town and village. Even in xii, 36, 25, *raṅgastrī*, "stage-woman," may perhaps most reasonably be explained as the equivalent of the actress mentioned above. Like the *Harivaṅça*, the *Rāmāyaṇa* speaks of theatrical exhibitions, *nāṭakāny āhuḥ* (or *cakruḥ*), R. ii, 69, 4; G. 71. 4. Rhapsodic drama is alluded to also in the *Mahābhāṣya*, where, as Weber has shown, the actors are seen and heard and tragedies are presented in costume. But the *Mahābhārata* neither alludes to such dramatic plays nor does it notice the *Naṭasūtra*.² All that is heard seems to be songs and instru-

¹ Such groups are frequently found in lists of persons who are not eligible, and are generally regarded as vulgar or dangerous, but in all these groups among dancers, singers, rhapsodes, etc., no technical word of the regular drama is found.

² Compare Weber, IS. xiii, p. 487; Holtzmann, loc. cit., p. 78 ff. The latter scholar says "die ganze dramatische Literatur ist später als das Mahābhārata." He means therewith, I presume, the received drama of Kālidāsa and others. There is certainly in the epic nothing like the *nāṭakikṛta Rāmāyaṇa* of the *Harivaṅça*. The chronological value of the *Mahābhāṣya* data would be greater if one knew to which century they reverted, but Weber himself warns against taking them as of certain worth for any time earlier than the end of the eighth century A.D., loc. cit., p. 320. A Punch and Judy show is implied in v, 39, 1, *sūtraprotā dārumayī 'va yoṣā*. The *Sūtradhāra* appears only in i, 51, 15, where he is a *sthapati*, or architect, and a *Sūtaḥ pūrāṇikah*. The application of the name here is apparently to the *sūtra*, lines or plans, drawn up by the architect (xii, 10, 383, but B. has *mudrā* for *sūtra*, 299, 40). Lists of *naṭānartakagāyanas* are found in iii, 15, 14; xii, 69, 60; *raṅgāvata-rapa*, ib. 295, 5. In i, 184, 16, though *naṭas* and *Sūtas* come with dancers and praisers and boxers, *niyodhakas*, only praisers are heard (*Sūtas*, 188, 24). So

ments: "The musicians sounded their instruments together; the dancers danced also; the singers sang songs," *nanṭur nartakāḥ cāi 'va jagur geyāni gāyanāḥ*, i, 219, 4.

The conclusion seems inevitable that the technical nāṭaka with its *vidūṣaka*, etc., that is, the drama in its full form, was unknown to the epic proper. What was known was clearly pantomime. Dramatic recitation like that of the *Bhāṣya* may be inferred only if one ignores the facts mentioned above, which is possible if the (non-hearing but) seeing of shows be taken as a general expression. On the other hand, the *ākhyāna*-reciters may have been dramatic without the setting noticed in the *Bhāṣya*. They are heard rather than seen. I have already noticed the fact that *Nārada* is the representative of *Bharata* as the genius of music, and that the latter is not known to the epic in his later capacity.¹

in ii, 4, 7, (with *vāitālikas*); and in the *dānamahākratu* at xv, 14, 17, which is *naṭanartakalāsyāḍhyaḥ*. A dance-hall, *nartanaḡālā*, *nartanaḡāra*, is mentioned in iv, 22, 3, 16, and a *prekṣāḡāra*, "hall for seeing," is made according to *Çāstra* rule in i, 134, 10-11, a temporary affair for a joust, helped out with *mañcas*; a *samājavāṭa* (more elaborate) in 185, 16; while "spectators at an arena," *prekṣakāḥ* . . . *rañḡavāṭa* *iva*, iii, 20, 27, are alluded to. Other stage-words, *rañḡabhūmi*, etc., occur occasionally without specific application to acting. The use to which *prekṣā* and *samāja* are put, when they are explained in the epic, should make one hesitate to translate the same words in *Manu* more specifically than "shows and meetings," and the same is true of *prekḡhā* in *Pāli*.

¹ The pseudo-epic, xiii, 33, 12, says that some priests are thieves, some are liars, and some are *naṭanartakas*, which the commentary illustrates by saying that *Vālmiki* and *Viçvāmītra* are examples of the thief, while *Bharata* and others are examples of *naṭanartakas* (*Nārada* is an example of the liar, as he is *kalahapriyaḥ*). Here, and in the quotation above, *naṭanartaka* is one, "actor-dancer." For the part played by dolls in the early Hindu drama, see Professor *Pischel's* illuminating essay, *Die Heimat des Puppenspiels* (1900). He also gives references to previous literature on the drama.

CHAPTER TWO.

INTERRELATION OF THE TWO EPICS.

OF the two early epics of India, the Mahābhārata, the great epic, is traditionally attributed to a distributor, vyāsa, who is also credited with the distribution or editing of the Vedas and of several other works. Different editions and former declarers are also noticed. In other words, there was no one author of the great epic, though with a not uncommon confusion of editor with author, an author was recognized, called Vyāsa. Modern scholarship calls him The Unknown, or Vyāsa for convenience.

But if the great epic lacks an author with a real name, the little epic, the Rāmāyaṇa, is the work of a definite personality. Here there is no question of disputed authorship, only of more or less plainly marked interpolation and addition. The great, mahā, Bhārata-epic is really, as it is designated, a collection, Saṁhitā, the reputed author of which, corresponding generally to the parallel figure in Greece, yet out-Homers Homer; while beside the huge and motley pile that goes by Vyāsa's name stands clear and defined the little Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, as (in this respect) besides Homer's vague Homeric stands the distinct Argonautika of Apollonius.

“ (As the relation between the two Hindu epics, especially in point of age, has often been discussed, I do not purpose to repeat all the details here, but to take up the study of the great epic from a new point of view.) For the reason why so much theorizing in regard to relative age has been spent on the epics without satisfactory result — *adhuc sub iudice* — is that hitherto there has been no recognition of the underlying unity of epic speech. Hence discussions in regard to the possibility of totally different origins of the two epics and the

different ages they represent, while their common base has been ignored.

On regard to the final growth of each, it may be said at once that neither epic was developed quite independently of the other. The later Rāmāyana implies the Mahābhārata, as the later Mahābhārata recognizes the Rāmāyana of Vālmīki. It is not, then, a question of absolute separation, but only of the length we may go in separating.

Neither epic has a definitive text. The question therefore naturally arises whether there is any use in arguing about the original form of either poem. In regard to the Mahābhārata, this question has been answered negatively by Dr. Winternitz, who holds that all work on the epic is useless till we have the text of the Southern recension, of which he has lately published, in the Indian Antiquary, some interesting specimens. But it is doubtful whether the publication of the whole Southern version would result in a text any more definitive than that of the Rāmāyana. At most we should have two versions, more or less independent of each other, each showing omissions and interpolations as viewed in the light of the other. This would be of considerable value indeed, as proving that the text has been freely altered, a conclusion inevitable even without this support, but based with its aid on objective reality. Nevertheless, though the Southern recension would be thus valuable, its absence does not preclude the possibility of obtaining provisional data of importance from the Northern recension alone, either in regard to its relation to the Rāmāyana or in respect of its own development. Such data must finally be checked in detail by a comparison with those of the alternate text; but as a whole they suffice to cast much light on several moot points, and in themselves are useful in demonstrating that the great epic is the result of the labors of different writers belonging to different schools of style and thought; a result diametrically opposed to the view of the method calling itself synthetic, and likely to be rather twice-

proven than disproven by the eventual publication of the Southern text.

In regard to the texts of the Rāmāyana, I need only refer to the invaluable essays of Professor Jacobi, seconded by the recent analyses of Dr. Wirtz and Dr. Lüders,¹ especially as this epic is not the chief object of consideration in this volume. It is, however, obvious that exactly the same conditions obtain here as in the case of the great epic, and it may be added that if there were a third epic the same conditions would obtain there. There is no fixed epic text because Hindu epic poetry was never fixed. All epic poems were transmitted at first orally, and the various rewriters treated them exactly as the rhapsodes had previously done, altered and added as they pleased. Reconstruction of the original text is therefore out of the question. All that can be done is to excise the most palpable interpolations in each traditional rendering.

Neither of the epics, as such, is recognized before the late period of the Grhyaśūtras, and the first epic recognized here and in other Sūtras is the Bhārata. The question has often been raised which epic is the older. In our present state of knowledge it may be said that this question cannot now and probably never can be answered in one word. In the first place, it will always be idle to speak of either epic as the older without specifying whether one means the present text or the original text; for that these, in the case of either epic, are convertible terms is an idea refuted by even a superficial acquaintance with the poems. Assuming, however, that the question implies priority of epic *qua* epic as a new genus of literature, and whether this form first arose as Rāmāyana or (Mahā) Bhārata, this too cannot be answered categorically, because parts of the latter are older than the former, and the former is older than the mass of the latter, as will be shown. Personally I have no doubt that the Pandu (pandava) form of the great epic is later than the Rāma epic; but, since one was

¹ Das Rāmāyana (together with special studies mentioned hereafter), by Professor Jacobi; Die Westliche Rezension des R., by Dr. Hans Wirtz; Die Sage von Rṣyaçṅga, by Dr. Heinrich Lüders, Gött. Nachr. 1897, p. 77.

a slow outgrowth from a Puṣṭjāb Kuru epic, and the other, of unknown antecedents, was developed far to the East, in much more polished form, while only the Bhārata is recognized in Vedic literature, I have as little doubt that there was a Bhārata epic before there was a Rāmāyaṇa, whereof also I shall speak again in a subsequent chapter. Here I wish merely to notice, in passing, the ridiculous claim that the Rāmāyaṇa dates from the "twelfth or thirteenth century" B. C. This claim has been made not only by Hindus but by Occidental scholars. Whether there was a Rāma story at that period or (just as well) twelve or thirteen centuries earlier no man can know. But that Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa can lay claim to no such age the slightest historical consideration will show, not to speak of an examination of the almost classical metre of the poem.

✓ (The Mahābhārata besides giving the Rāma story as an episode, Rāma-upākhyāna, has four direct references to the Rāmāyaṇa) (apart from an allusion to Great Itihāsa). The first is the citation of a verse actually found, as Professor Jacobi has shown, in the extant poem of Vālmīki, *api cā 'yam purā gītaḥ ṣloko Vālmīkinā bhuvi*, vii, 143, 67 (R. vi, 81, 28).¹ The second is the citation of a verse from Bhārgava's Rāmacarita (Bhārgava being, as Professor Weber has shown, a title of Vālmīki), which agrees in sense and words closely enough with R. ii, 67, 11, to indicate that the Mahābhārata poet of this passage, xii, 57, 40, had in mind this or the original form (for it is to be noticed that the name is not fixed) of this verse in the Rāmāyaṇa,² and to make improbable the synchronous collection of the former epic at xii, 67, and 68 (cf. ṣl. 15) :

M. ṣlokaḥ cā 'yam purāgīto Bhārgavena mahātmanā
 bhāryā Rāmacarite nṛpatim prati, Bhārata,
 bhāryā prathamam vindet tato bhāryāṁ tato
 dhanam
 bhāryāṁ asati lokasya kuto bhāryā kuto dhanam

¹ *Maṇu Smṛiti* vii, 28, 11, *avadyāḥ sarvabhūtānāṁ pramadāḥ ksamyā-*
ṣaṇ.

² But it is shown a common source, as I thought previously, AJP. xx, p. 34.

R. arājake dhanam nā 'sti nā 'sti bhāryā 'py arājake
idam atyāhitam cā 'nyat kuto satyam arājake

The third and fourth cases refer to the Rāmāyaṇa without mention of the poet: iii, 147, 11, "Hanumat is very renowned in the Rāmāyaṇa;" xviii, 6, 98 (repeated in the Harivaṇṣa): "In the Veda (which is) the beginning (of literature), in the holy Rāmāyaṇa (which is) the end, and in the Bhārata (which is) the middle, in all (literatures), Vishnu is besung."¹ The Harivaṇṣa adds three more references, two to Vālmīki, and one to a dramatic representation of the Rāmāyaṇa. Vālmīki in these passages and perhaps in i, 55, 14, as Professor Holtzmann surmises, is credited with being a poet. This is also implied in xiii, 18, 8-10. Everywhere else, and he is mentioned several times, ii, 7, 16; iii, 85, 119; v, 83, 27; xii, 207, 4, he is recognized only as a saint.

✧ In this material, which I recapitulate here only for a view of the chief data,² the most striking fact is the antithesis between the notices of the Rāmāyaṇa as found in the early and later Mahābhārata. The Rāma story is referred to over and over, and the whole tale is told independently at iii, 273, ff., but until we come to the much expanded Droṇa and the didactic epic, references to the poem are merely to the Rāma tale, references to the reputed author are merely to a saint recognized as an ascetic but not as a poet. Even as a saint the evidence is conflicting, for, though usually a Vishnu adherent, in the passage cited above from the Anuśāsana, Vālmīki is a Śivaite. The individual allusions prove, therefore, nothing in regard to the general priority of Vālmīki as the first epic poet. They prove only that the Mahābhārata was not completed before Vālmīki wrote, just as the mention of the

¹ vede Rāmāyaṇe punye (may go with the next word) Bhārata, Bharata-ṛṣabha, ādāu cā 'nte ca madhye ca, Hariḥ sarvatra giyate. The last clause may be taken more indefinitely, "in V., R., and M.; in the beginning, end, and middle, everywhere." But such correlation is common (e.g., vede ke gr̥ntah smṛtah, R. ii, 24, 28) and seems to me to be implied here.

² Weber, Ueber das Rāmāyaṇa, first collected it; Jacobi, Das Rāmāyaṇa, added to it; Holtzmann, Das Mahābhārata, iv, p. 60 ff., has briefly summed it, with other references (omitted here) and independent additions.

Vāyu Purāṇa in the Mahābhārata shows only that there was a Purāṇa of that name not before the Bhārata's beginning but before its end. They show also that no antipathy or wish to suppress Vālmīki's name influenced the Bhārata poets, who, therefore, had they simply retold or epitomized a poem recognized as Vālmīki's would probably (as it seems to me) have mentioned his name in connection with the Rāma-upākhyāna.

Professor Jacobi is of the opinion that a verse of inferior form in the episode points to borrowing because it is inferior. But a great poet is more apt to take a weak verse and make it strong than is a copyist to ruin a verse already excellent. Further, the subject-matter of the Kāvya and episode is treated differently in several particulars (details, loc. cit.), which points to different workings-over of older matter rather than to copying or condensing. Professor Jacobi also emphasizes the fact that the great epic cites Vālmīki but Vālmīki does not cite or refer to the Bhārata. This holds good for the great epic only from a "synthetic" point of view, which Professor Jacobi of course rejects. The normal attitude of a Hindu toward his sources is silence. He is rather careful not to state than to proclaim that he is treating old material, so that there is nothing surprising in Vālmīki's not speaking of a predecessor. Moreover, in the later Rāmāyana, which unquestionably betrays acquaintance with the Mahābhārata, there is no more recognition of the latter than there is in the earlier part of the poem; a fact which weakens considerably the argument of silence as applied to that earlier part.

✓ Apart from vii, 143, 67, the Mahābhārata knows the poet Vālmīki only in the twelfth and thirteenth books; whereas it knows everywhere the Rāma tale, a poem called the Rāmāyana, and a saint known not as a poet but as an ascetic called Vālmīki. It gives the Rāma-episode as it gives other ancient tales handed down from antiquity without having been assigned to a specific author. The Rāma-upākhyāna stands to the Rāmāyana somewhat¹ as the Nala-upākhyāna stands to

¹ Emphatic, of course, as the example is a great exaggeration in difference of age and style.

the Nāiṣadha, in that it is an early tale of unknown authorship which a poet made his own. Long before there is any allusion to Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa, the base of the great epic, the substance of the Bhārati Kathā, is recognized in Hindu literature; while the latest addition to the great epic refers to Vālmīki himself as a man who is to be, that is, who is already, famous, yaças te 'gryam bhaviṣyati, xiii, 18, 8-10. Between these extremes lies the Rāmāyaṇa.

The Rāmāyaṇa recognizes Janamejaya as an ancient hero, and knows Kurus and Pāñcālas and the town of Hāstinapur (ii, 68, 13). The story of the Pandus, the gist of the present epic, is presumably later than the story of Rāma; the former everywhere recognizing the latter as an ancient tale.¹ We must therefore on these data make the following distinctions:

(1) The story of Rāma is older than the story of the Pandus.

(2) The Pandu story has absorbed the Bhārati Kathā.

(3) The Bhārati Kathā is older than Vālmīki's poem

Although we have but two ancient Sanskrit epics, there is no reason to suppose that epic poetry began with the extant poems in our possession. As was remarked above, the Mahābhārata alludes to the "Great Itihāsas," which may perhaps imply other poems of epic character and considerable extent.² Nor can it be supposed that epic poetry was suddenly

¹ ii, 76, 5, asambhave hemamayasya jantōs tathā 'pi Rāmo lnlubhe mrgāya; iii, 11, 48, Vāli-Sugrīvayor bhrātror yathā strīkāṅkṣiṇoḥ purā; ix, 31, 11, Rāvaṇo nāma rākṣasaḥ, Rāmeṇa nihato rājan sānubandhaḥ saḥānu-gaḥ; so ix, 55, 31; sometimes interpolated, as when Rāvaṇa and Indrajit are mentioned in i, 155, 44, but not in C., which omits all 41-44 (after 6081). Other references will be found in iii, 25, 8; 85, 65, etc. Compare Holtzmann, loc. cit., p. 62 ff. According to xii, 340, 85 ff., Rāma comes at the beginning of the last era; Krishna, at the beginning of the present era (Rāma's two adjutant monkeys are here Ekata and Dvita). Rāma is recognized here as an incarnation of Vishnu, and also in iii, 99, 40.

² I say perhaps only, for "great" is a word often used without reference to extent. Thus the mahad ākhyānam of xiii, 2, 1, is only a philosophical fable (about a snake and Karma), 83 śloka long.

invented by one poet. (The numerous "ancient tales" of epic character must have furnished a large body of epic phrase as well as fable, out of which and on the basis of which arose our present epics.) This is rendered probable also by the fact that such brief epic verses as are preserved in other works, although not always from the extant epics, yet have the same character as the verses of the Bhārata and Rāmāyaṇa. Furthermore, as said above, the epic itself admits that the present text is not an original work.¹

We cannot suppose then, even if one epic could be shown to be prior to the other, that this prior epic was the first work in epic versification. We must let pass the statement of the Rāmāyaṇa itself that Vālmīki invented the *çloka* verse, for, though Vālmīki may have been the first to set out to write an epic in *çlokas*, it is scarcely worth while to discuss such a palpable bit of self-glorification as that in which the later Rāmāyaṇa here indulges.² As the two Greek epics were both based to a certain extent on the general rhapsodic phraseology of the day, so the two Hindu epics, though there was without doubt borrowing in special instances, were yet in this regard independent of each other, being both dependent on previous rhapsodic and narrative phraseology.

I cannot, in short, think that such a very large number of identical phrases as I shall enlist below can owe their identity simply to one poet's copying of another. For the similarity goes too deep, into the very grain of the verse. The exposition, I fear, will be tiresome in its study of minute detail, but it is necessary to a full understanding of the conditions of the problem.

¹ i, 1, 26: ācakhyaḥ kavayaḥ kecit sampratyācakaṣate pare ākhyāsyanti tathāi 'vā 'nye iti hāsam imam bhuvī (cited by Holtzmann).

² So with the tale of the two rhapsodes who "sang" the poem with musical accompaniment, after it had been composed and taught to them (so that in the first instance it was recited as a narrative). But all this is the product of a later age making up its own fictions and myths, such as the singing sons Kuça and Lava made out of *kuçilava*, an ordinary word for rhapsode. That Vālmīki could not have "invented the *çloka*" is shown by the presence of an earlier form of *çlokas* in the Brahmanic literature retained in Mbh.

A characteristic of the common basis of epic verse may be traced back to the *Rig Veda*. This consists in a rhetorical duplication of a dissyllabic iambic noun, which favors the diiambic close of the octosyllabic pāda or verse, as in these first three examples, or of the twelve-syllable pāda, as in the last example:

rtāvānā jane-jane, RV. v, 65, 2
 yac cid dhi tvam gr̥he-gr̥he, ib. i, 28, 5
 haskartāram dame-dame, ib. iv, 7, 3; vii, 15, 2
 sa dar̥cataçr̥ir atithir gr̥he-gr̥he
 vane-vane çriçriye takvavir iva
 janam-janam janio nā 'ti manyate
 viça ā kçeti viçio viçam-viçam, ib. x, 91, 2

With the last, compare also RV. i, 123, 4, where gr̥ham-gr̥ham, dive-dive, agram-agram stand at the start, not at the end. Sometimes a whole pāda consists of only such composita, as in x, 97, 12, aṅgam-aṅgam parus-parus (cf. v, 53, 11; x, 163, 6). In the *Rig Veda*, again, pure adverbs thus duplicated are never found at the end of the pāda; only such nominal adverbs as those above, the nearest approach to pure adverbs so used being idam-idam, a pronominal adverb closing a pāda at vii, 59, 1.¹ In the epic, however, the forms are usually adverbs, usually at the end,² usually in çlokas; in the *Rig Veda*, never pure adverbs, usually at the beginning or in the middle, seldom at the end of the pāda, and usually not in çlokas, but in gāyatrī and especially in jagatī or triṣṭubh verses. The first examples given above are, therefore, rather the exception than the rule as far as their position goes. But I think we may see in them the precursors of the epic formulæ used in closing the hemistich. The *Veda* puts the form where it best shows the iterative intensity; the epic puts it where it best helps the metre. Thus:

¹ Compare the list of such composita in Professor Collitz's paper, Abhandl. d. V. Orient. Congress, 1881, p. 287.

² Exceptions of course occur, as in M. vii, 7, 53, punaḥ punar abhaṣyanta sin̄hene 've 'tare mṛgāḥ; R. iv, 43, 53, ahany ahani vardhante. So upary upari sarveṣām and sāmūnām, Nala 1, 2; and R. v, 13, 10, respectively.

punaḥ-punar mātarā navyasi kaḥ, RV. iii, 5, 7

punaḥ-punar jāyamānā purāṇī, RV. i, 92, 10

niḥṣvasya ca punaḥ punaḥ R. i, 54, 5

(niḥṣvasya) pratyavekṣya punaḥ punaḥ, M. ix, 29, 49

The epic uses this metrical convenience constantly, sometimes too often, as in ix, 32, 6, 8, 9, where punaḥ punaḥ is repeated three times. Other adverbs of the same sort in both epics are prthak prthak, muhur muhuḥ, ṣanāiḥ ṣanāiḥ. In a word, both epics close the hemistich in this antique Vedic manner, though the epic style has somewhat changed the relation of the phrase to the pāda.¹

Like these stereotyped terminals in their epic application is the countless number of verses ending with the same diiambic form, vocative, nominative, or oblique case, of one compound, and the less frequent (because less needed) common form of the prior pāda's pathyā ending, such as mahābala, paramīta, arinidama (prior, mahābāho, °prājña, °vīrya, mahārāja, rājendra); pratāpavān, paravīraha, mahāmṛdhe, raṇājire, raṇamūrdhani, raṇakarkaṣaḥ, the oblique cases of mahātman (constantly used), and such diiambic phrases as balād balī, suto balī. All of these are used in the same way in both epics, most of them repeatedly. In some, the word passes back of the diiambus and leads us toward the whole pāda-phrase though not quite reaching it. Of such sort are raṇakarkaṣaḥ (above), yuddhadurmada, saṁgrāmaṁmūrdhani, (Varuṇaḥ) satyasamgrah, nāma nāmataḥ, ṣatruṇiṣūdana, akutobhayāḥ, krodhamūrechitaḥ. In others, the word falls short, but the position of the adjective is fixed and it is generally preceded by the same combination as in (cāpam, gadām, or dhanur) udyamya vīryavān, and the common final mānada.²

¹ And also extended it in the form gate gate (instead of the noun) in daṣāhe vāi gate gate, xiii, 107, 43. Of epic phrases, I have noted also ḡhe ḡhe, M. ii, 15, 2; R. v. 23, 20; and (passim) pade pade, yoge yoge, raṇe raṇe, and in M., jane jane and, in the more unusual initial position, māsi māsi (Vedic and M. ix, 37, 4), kāle kāle, ix, 37, 23. Of the phrases quoted above, muhur muhuḥ occurs often; ṣanāiḥ ṣanāiḥ, e. g., M. ix, 29, 104; R. ii, 40, 22 and G. vi, 111, 13; prthak prthak, e. g., M. ix, 37, 23; G. vi, 54, 59; 77, 1.

² Among those mentioned, paravīrahā is converted into hantā in triṣṭubh,

From these compounds, not only in form but in fixed position common to both epics, we may pass to cases like (svatejasā, often) svena tejasā, where the pāda ends with two words which take in more than the diiambus, for example, bibhra-tīm svena tejasā, jvalantīm svena tejasā, the former in M. xii, 325, 2; the latter in R. vi, 107, 11 and G. 80, 33.

The fixed form is shown most conspicuously in similes that are common to both epics, and are of the mechanical form instanced in the last two sorts of examples, namely in diiambic or more than diiambic terminals. Thus there are fixed phrases which are different except for the terminal, which again is common (as a fixed terminal) to both epics, for example:

dandāhata ivo 'ragah,	in M. and in R.
pañcaçirṣā ivo 'ragah,	" "
dandahasta ivā 'ntakah,	" "
pāçahasta ivā 'ntakah,	" "
vyāttānanam ivā 'ntakam,	" "
jvalantam iva pāvakam,	" "
didhaksur iva pāvakah,	" "
vidhūma iva pāvakah,	" "
pataṅgā iva pāvakam,	" "
çalabhā iva pāvakam,	" "

Such phrases are common not only to the two epics but to outside literature. Thus the iva pāvakah formula appears in the Dhammapada, 71, as bhasmācchanno va pāvako (epic, bhasmapanno ivā 'nalah), and the same is true of a limited number of whole pāda-phrases, not only in pure proverbs, but

R. iv, 31, 5 (°ghna is a common side-form); pratāpavān is perhaps least common in R., but it serves with vīryavān; for example, in R. vi, 69, 109; 76, 21, 27, ff., where follow a quantity of mahābalas. Like vīryavān is vegavān with vegitah (vegena in the prior pāda). M. has ativīryavān, as in iii, 283, 7. The simple form is rare in any other position, e. g., G. v, 2, 23; 3, 71. As a terminal it occurs in R. about forty times in the sixth book, uncounted often in M. The common Mahābhārata terminal mārīṣa, I have not noticed in the Rāmāyaṇa. It appears to belong to later diction and indicates an epic recasting, as does, e. g., the late tatrābhavāt of R. ii, 106, 30.

in current similes and metaphors, like *kalām nā 'rhanti ṣoḍa-ḥīm*, xii, 277, 6; *Manu*, ii, 86; and Buddhistic, *Dh. P.*, 70, *kalām nā 'gghati soḷasim*; or *māṇsaḥṇitalepanam*, *Dh. P.*, 150; *Manu*, vi, 76; *Mbh.* xii, 330, 42 (*Māit. Up.* iii, 4).¹

In some cases the variety of *pādas* constructed on a common terminal is very large, such as the various forms of what appears most simply as *gantā 'si Yamasādanam*, *yāto 'si Yamasādanam*. Thus both epics have *yiyaśur Yamasādanam* and *anayad Yamasādanam*, along with other forms more peculiar, *Yamasya sādhanam prati*, *R.* vii, 21, 1; *prāhiṇod Yamasādanam*, *prāhiṇon mṛtyulokāya*,² *ṣarāir ninye Yamakṣayam*, *M.* ix, 26, 29, *ninye vāivasvatakṣayam*, *M.* vii, 26, 53, *gato vāivasvatakṣayam*, *G.* vi, 82, 183, *yāmi vāiḥravaṇālayam*, *G.* vi, 82, 167; *nayāmi lokam* (with *Yamasya* omitted, *triṣṭubh*), *M.* viii, 85, 31; *nayāmi Yamasya gehābhimukham*, *R.* vii, 68, 20; *gamiṣyāmi Yamasya mūlam*, *R.* v, 28, 17; *mṛtyupatham nayāmi*, *G.* vi, 36, 118; *mṛtyumukham nayiṣye*, *M.* viii, 42, 11; *mṛtyumukhāgatām (āneṣyāmaḥ)*, *G.* iv, 45, 9. Evidently in these cases the ancient phrases *Yamasādanam*, *Yamakṣayam*, are built upon in several ways, and then the desire for variety leads to the pulling away of the base of the old-fashioned phrase, and the superstructure is shifted to a new base, generally in the later epic, the double meaning of *kṣaya* helping in *anayat kṣayam*, ix, 27, 48. Like changes occur in the

¹ There are also clear traces of dialectic influence in the adaptation of some of these standing phrases. On this subject I shall speak more fully below. Here I will illustrate what I mean by one example from the *Rāmāyaṇa*. There is a common phrase which begins *tam āpatantam sahasā*, or some similar final word, the first two referring to a masculine noun (weapon). When we find, in *R.* vi, 67, 47, this same phrase used of a neuter noun, *tad āpatantam*, we are justified neither in assuming that the poet was wholly indifferent to grammar nor in agreeing with the commentator that the masculine form is an archaism countenanced by Vedic usage, *punstram āṣam*. It is simply a case of borrowing a convenient grammatical form (not Sanskrit, but Prākṛit), for *āpatantam* is a regular patois neuter participle. Forms of this sort are adopted into the epic merely for metrical reasons, showing that they were borrowed from the common speech of the day when convenient; which shows again that the epics (both are alike in this particular) were written in Sanskrit and not made over from Prākṛit originals.

² See for references, Appendix A, s. v.

sutumulaṁ yuddham phrases, generally ending with lomaharṣanam, but occasionally in a new setting, Yamarāṣṭravivardhanam, as in M. vi, 79, 60; ix, 10, 61; 11, 5, etc.; in triṣṭubh, °vardhanah, vii, 145, 97.

Especially is the monotony varied in the conventional phrases of conversation. Both epics have etac chrutvā tu vacanam, tasyāi 'tad vacanam ṣrutvā, idaṁ vacanam abravīt, ṣrutvā tu vacanam tasya; and again the phrases are shifted, tatas tad vacanam ṣrutvā, tad etad vacanam ṣrutvā (old and rare), G. iv, 38, 46; ṣrutvā tāsām tu vacanam, M. ix, 35, 52; idaṁ vacanam uktavān, G. v, 68, 24; and in many other ways, too tedious to recount.

Herewith we come to the pāda phrase, which fills the whole half-verse with the same locution, as in palāyanaparāyaṇah, parasparaṇighāṁsavah. In the Am. Journal of Philology, xix, p. 138 ff., I cited verses of the Mahābhārata which are full of such phrases. Such passages are also easily found in the Rāmāyaṇa, of which I will give but one instance, vi, 71, where ḡl. 67 alone contains four such phrases: tam āpatantaṁ niḡitaṁ ḡaram āḡiṇiṣopanam, ardhacandreṇa ciccheda Lakṣmaṇah para-vīrahā (with others following). Here the whole ḡloka with the exception of the proper name consists of iterata. In the Rāmāyaṇa, too, we find, as often in the Mahābhārata, two iterata enclosing a verse that is new, as in iv, 11, 18, where the independent verse is sandwiched between the iterata tasya tad vacanam ṣrutvā and krodhāt samraktalocanaḡ, which arrangement is found again, ib. 73. In G. iii, 57, 15, the hemistich consists of two whole phrases, roṣasamraktanayana idaṁ vacanam abravīt. In G. vi, 27, there are nine iterata in the first eighteen ḡlokas. I mention this that there may not seem to be any distinction in this regard in the two epics. Both have many chapters which teem with verbal or whole pāda-iterata, the later the more.¹ Noticeable are their

¹ The cumulative style is characteristic, naturally, of later sections. So, for instance, in the late fourteenth chapter of the thirteenth book, within the compass of about thirty ḡlokas, 249 ff., we find sarvābharaṇabhūṣitam, sarvabhūtabhayāvaham, ḡkratulyaparākramaḡ, triḡlkhāṁ bhrūkuṣiṁ kṛtvā,

extent and variety. There is hardly a field in which Vyāsa and Vālmiki do not echo the same words. General descriptive epithets and phrases that paint the effect of grief and anger, or the appearance of city and forest; the aspect of battle and attitude of warriors, with short characterization of weapons and steeds, are all as frequent as the mass of similes found in both epics in the same words. In the last category, identical similes are drawn from gods, men, animals, and physical phenomena. Again, both poets, as shown above, use the same phrases of speech, as they do also of noises, and of the course of time; and finally there are many didactic verses, almost or quite the same in both epics.

In the list of parallels given elsewhere¹ I have incorporated such examples as I have noticed of identical or nearly identical phrases and verses. Illustrative additions are occasionally added, not to add weight to the general effect, for the number of cases of actual identity is sufficiently large, but to supply material for fuller treatment of this whole subject eventually. The three hundred examples here registered include also some cases where verbal identity is not quite complete, such as

M. iv, 19, 29,

prabhinnam iva mātāṅgam parikīrṇam kareṇubhiḥ

G. v, 14, 28,

kareṇubhir mahārāṇye parikīrṇo yathā dvipah

and I have not perhaps been thoroughly logical in the admission or exclusion of such cases; but in general I have sought to establish an equation not only in the thought but in the expression of the thought, and for the most part have omitted such parallels as did not tend to bring out the verbal identity.²

pāṇaḥṣtam ivā 'ntakam, dvitīya iva pāvakaḥ (to which one text adds vidhūmam iva pāvakam) all common iterata of both epics, but far in excess of the usual number; as in G. vi, 27 (above).

¹ Appendix A.

² I have omitted, for example, such cases as iii, 30, 42, karmanā tena pāpena lipyate nūnam iṅvaraḥ; G. vi, 62, 22, vidhātā lipyate tena yathā pāpena karmanā (R. vi, 83, 23 quite otherwise), though I have no doubt that the tirades against God and duty (G. 15 ff.) in each epic (as in this case) belong together. Some few proverbs are also entered.

Those I have collected were gleaned incidentally from a field which I traversed with other objects in view, and I have no doubt that these parallels could be largely increased by a close and systematic comparison of the two epics throughout. The alphabetical arrangement followed is merely for convenience of reference. I should have been glad to group the examples according to their content also, that I might have shown more fully the varied fields they occupy, but, as this would have taken too much space, the remarks made above on this subject and the former grouping made in a preliminary study of the question two years ago¹ must suffice.

I will suppose that the reader has now read Appendix A. He will have noticed in so doing that, just as the Uttara Rāmāyaṇa, as well as the real poem of Vālmīki, is recognized in the pseudo-Bhārata,² so in the expressions āsīd rājā Nimir nāma, ekāntabhāvānugataḥ, and yasya prasādam kurute sa vāi taṁ draṣṭum arhati, we have a direct copy on the part of the Uttara Rāmāyaṇa³ not only of the early epic but of the pseudo-epic's episode of the White Country and even of the very words employed in the description of the Whites (Islanders, to retain the usual name, though only country is really meant; Kashmere, I think). There are several such passages in the Uttara reflecting the great epic in its earlier

¹ AJP. xix, p. 133 ff., 1898.

² Thus the story of Rāma çūdraghātīn, as told in R. vii, 75-76 (G. 82-83), killing Çambaka or Çambūka is recognized with an "I have heard," çrūyate, xii, 153, 67 (where Jambūka takes the place of Çambūka).

³ So in the prakṣipta passage after R. iii, 56, where Sītā demands signs of the god Indra, and he appears with the devalīṅgāni: "He touched not earth with his feet, winked not, had dustless garments and unfaded garlands," as in Nala 5, 12-24, which the prakṣipta clearly copies. So, too, in the same book, iii, 60, not in G., evidently an artistic improvement on the preceding sarga, in çl. 26, Rāma says: (dr̥ṣṭā 'si) vṛkṣāir ācchādyā cā'tmānaṁ kim māṁ na pratibhāṣase, as Damayanti says (Nala 11, 9: dr̥ṣṭo 'si) āvārya gulmāir ātmānaṁ kim māṁ na pratibhāṣase; and in çl. 17, Rāma cries out: açoka çokāpanuda . . . tvannāmānaṁ kuru kṣipram priyāsamdarçanena māṁ, as Damayanti, 12, 104, and 107: viçokāṁ kuru māṁ kṣipram açoka priyadarçana satyanāmā bhavā 'çoka açokaḥ.

parts as well. Compare for instance the division of Indra's sin as related in M. v, 13 with R. vii, 85 and 86. It will be necessary only to cite M. v, 13, 12,

rakṣārtham sarvabhūtānām viṣṇutvam upajagmivān
and from ib. 13-15,

teṣāṃ tad vacanaṃ śrutvā devānām Viṣṇur abravīt
mām eva yajatām Ākrah pāvayisyāmi vajriṇam
punyena hayamedhena mām iṣṭvā pākaṣāsanah
punar eṣyati devānām indratvam akutobhayah

as compared with R. vii, 85, 18, 20-21, which give exactly the same words.

But this correlation exists not only in the later parts of both epics and in the later part of the Rāmāyaṇa and an earlier part of the Bhārata. It is just as easy to reverse the positions, as for instance in the account of creation at R. iii, 14 (G. 20) and M. i, 66. This passage is instructive as an example of the way complete passages were roughly remembered and handed down with shifting phrases, omissions, and insertions:

M. 66, 58,

dhṛtarāṣṭrī tu haṁsāṅ ca kalahāṁsāṅ ca sarvaṇaḥ

R. 14, 19,

dhṛtarāṣṭrī tu haṁsāṅ ca kalahāṁsāṅ ca sarvaṇaḥ

M. ib.

cakravākāṅ ca bhadra tu janayāmāsa sāi 'va tu

R. ib.

cakravākāṅ ca bhadraṃ te vijajñe sā 'pi bhāmini

G. 20, 20,

dhṛtarāṣṭrī tv ajanayat dhaṁsān jalavihāriṇaḥ
cakravākāṅ ca bhadraṃ te sārāsāṅ cāi 'va sarvaṇaḥ

M. 59,

ṣukī ca janayāmāsa ṣukān eva yaṣasvinī
kalyāṇaguṇasampannā sarvalakṣaṇapūjitā

G. 21,

ṣukī ṣukān ajanayat tanayān vinayān vitān
kalyāṇaguṇasampannān sarvalakṣaṇapūjitān

[R. 20,

çukī natām vijajñe tu natāyām vinatā sutā]

M. 60,

navakrodhavaçā nārīḥ prajajñe krodhasambhavāḥ
mṛgī ca mṛgamandā ca harī bhadramanā api

R. 21,

daçakrodhavaçā, *Rāma*, vijajñe 'py ātmasambhavāḥ
mṛgīm ca mṛgamandām ca harīm bhadramadām api

G. 22,

tathā krodhavaçā nāma jajñe sā cā 'tmasambhavān
mṛgīm mṛgavatīm cāi 'va çārdulīm kroṣṭukīm tathā

M. 61,

mātaṅgī tv atha çārdulī çvetā surabhir eva ca
sarvalakṣaṇasampannā surasā cāi 'va bhāminī

R. 22 (and G.) a, do., but acc. ; b,

sarvalakṣaṇasampannā surasām kadrukām api

M. 62 = R. 23 almost exactly, and the following verses agree much in the same way, until one passage which I will cite entire, as follows:

MAHĀBHĀRATA (i, 66, 67-68):

RĀMĀYAṆA (iii, 14, 27-28):

tathā duhitarāu rājan
surabhir vāi vyajāyata
rohiṇī cāi 'va bhadraṁ te¹
gandharvī tu yaçasvinī
vimalām api bhadraṁ te
analām api, *Bhārata*,
rohiṇyām jajñire gāvo
gandharvyām vājinaḥ sutāḥ
sapta piṇḍaphalān vṛkṣān
analā 'pi vyajāyata
(70, b) surasā 'janayan nāgān
kadrūḥ putrāns tu pannagān

tato duhitarāu, *Rāma*,
surabhir devy ajāyata
rohiṇīm nāma bhadraṁ te
gandharvīm ça yaçasvinīm

rohiṇy ajanayad gāvo
gandharvī vājinaḥ sutān

(see 31, below)

surasā 'janayan nāgān,
Rāma, kadrūç ca pannagān
(29) manur manuṣyān janayat
(31) sarvān puṇyaphalān vṛkṣān
analā 'pi vyajāyata

The last verse in R. gives the origin of the four castes (Ruling Caste, p. 74, note), where G. has manur manuṣyān . . .

¹ bhadrā tu, in C.

janayāmāsa, Rāghava. G. has virtually the same text, inserting Rāma and omitting the mention of Analā's birth, giving only her progeny. In the last verse G., like M., has *sapta piṇḍaphalān vṛkṣān* (but) *lalanā* (sic) 'pi vyajāyata. There is here the same substitution of Rāma and Bhārata observable in the late Kaccit chapter.¹

In my *Proverbs and Tales*² I have shown that a scene of the Rāmāyaṇa is exactly duplicated in the Harivaṇṣa. Another similar case is found in H. 13,666 ff.; G. vi, 19, 12 ff. (both full of *iterata*):

HARIVAṆṢA:

(see verses below)

vartamāne mahāghore
saṁgrāme lomaharṣaṇe
mahābherimṛdaṅgūnām
paṇavānām tathāi 'va ca
ṣaṅkhūnām paṭahānām ca
sambabhūva mahāsvanah
hatānām svanatām tatra
dāityānām cā 'pi nisvanah
also,

turaṅgamakhurotkīrṇam
rathanemisamuddhatam

and further,

ṣastrapuṣpopahārā sā
tatrā 'sīd yuddhamedinī
durdarṣā durvigāhyā ca
māṇṣaṇitakardamā

RG.:

turaṅgakhuravidhvastaṁ
rathanemisamuddhatam
vartamāne, etc. (= M.).

tato bherimṛdaṅgūnām
paṭahānām ca nisvanah

also,

hatānām stanamānānām
rākṣasānām ca nisvanah

(see the first verse, above)

and further,

ṣastrapuṣpopahārā sā (v. l. ca)
tatrā 'sīd yuddhamedinī
duṣprekṣyā durvigā cāi 'va
māṇṣaṇitakardamā

R. here (sarga 44) has *samutthitam* in ḡl. 10, but in the following, *paṇavānām ca ni(h)svanah*, as in H., and *hayānām stanamānānām* (with *ca* for *sā* in the first pāda of the last stanza). The only important variant is in the last verse, 15, where, instead of the stereotyped pāda of G. and H., stands:

durjñeyā durniveṣā ca ṣaṇitāsṛavakardamā

¹ AJP. vol. xix, p. 149.

² *ib.*, vol. xx, p. 35. I showed here a score of proverbs common to both epics, most of which had been previously noticed. Another, not noticed, is *ahir eva aheḥ pādān vijānāti na saṁṣayaḥ*, R. v, 42, 9; *ahir eva hy aheḥ pādān paṣyati 'ti hi naḥ ṣrutam*, M. xii, 203, 13. See also the note below, p. 83, note 2.

HB. has a few slight changes, 3, 58, 66 ff., with samutthitam like R. (*R.* indicates the Bombay text only.)

The identity of R. iv, 40, 20 ff., with the geographical passage H. 3, 46, 42 ff. = 12,825 ff., can be established on sight: G. 19, nadīm bhāgarathīm cāi 'va sarayūm káuṣikīm api = H., where R. 20, has ramyām for cāi 'va in G. and H.; but for api, R. and H. have tathā. The next stanza, G. 20, mekalaprabhavaṁ ḡṇam, agrees only in this text with H. 44. The next verse in H., gomatī gokulākīrṇā tathā pūrvā sarasvatī is in G. 24 (in acc.); ib. b in G. reads: nadīm kālāmasīm cāi 'va tamasām ca mahānadīm, where HC. and R. both have mahī(m) kālāmahī(m) cā 'pi (cāi 'va, HB. kālānadī). So R. and HC. give the Māgadhas the epithet mahāgrāmāḥ and add pāuṇḍrā vaṅgās tathāi 'va ca, where G. has māgadhaṇḍaṇḍakūlāṇḍ ca vaṅgān aṅgāns tathāi 'va ca (12,831, G. 25), and HB., ḡ. 49, Māgadhaṇḍaṇḍa mahāgrāmān aṅgān vaṅgāns tathāi 'va ca. G. 26, a, b, c are identical with H. 12,830, c, d, and 12,831, a; with a slight v. l. in HB. 48. There are here the usual aberrations from any fixed text, but on the whole the two passages are identical.

Another passage, G. i, 24, 9, 11-12, appears to be one with (M. iii, 52, 15 and) M. iv, 70, 10-12 (after the first verse, it agrees with R. 21, 10-12):

MAHĀBHĀRATA:

mā dharmyān ninaṇaḥ pathaḥ¹
eṣa vighrahavān dharma
eṣa vīryavatām varah
eṣa buddhyā 'dhiko loke
tapasām ca parāyaṇam (v. l. 'aḥ)
eṣo 'straṁ vividhaṁ veti
trāilokyē sacarācare
na cāi 'va 'nyaḥ pumān veti
na vetayati kadācana
na devā nā 'surāḥ kecin
na manuṣyā na rākṣāsāḥ
gandharvayakṣaspravarāḥ
sakīrnaramahoragāḥ

RĀMĀYAṆA (G.):

anṛtam mā vacaḥ kārṣir
mā dharmyān ninaṇaḥ pathaḥ
eṣa vighrahavān dharma
eṣa vedavidām varah
eṣa vīryavatām ḡreṣṭho
vidyājñānataponidhiḥ
divyāny astrāny aḡeṣeṇa
vedāi 'ṣa Kuṣikātmaḡaḥ
devāḡ ca na vidur yāni
kuto 'nye bhuvi mānāvāḥ

¹ This pāda alone appears in iii, 52, 15. iv, 70, 10 has the following verses; G. has both. R. omits G.'s 9 entirely.

Here R. in the Bombay edition has in general the reading of M., but it omits the first verse and Kuçikātmajāḥ, while it has the late astrān for astrāṇi, with other variations:

eṣa vighrahavān dharma eṣa vīryavatām varah
eṣa vidyā 'dhiko loke tapasaḥ ca parāyaṇam
eṣo 'strān vividhān vetti trāilokye sacarācare
nāi 'nam¹ anyah pumān vetti na ca vetsyanti kecana
na devā na 'rṣayah kecin nā 'marā na ca rākṣasāḥ
gandharvayakṣapraravārāḥ sakimnaramahoragāḥ

Besides these parallels I have previously² compared the extended identity of H. 3, 60, 2 ff., and R. vi, 58, 24 ff.; and three passages already noticed by others, where the great epic seems to have an older form, viz., i, 18, 13 and G. 1, 46, 21; iii, 9, 4 and R. ii, 74 (G. 76); i, 175 and R. i, 54 (compare Holtzmann, *loc. cit.*) Other parallels noticed by Holtzmann are: the creation, xii, 166 and R. ii, 110; Ganges, iii, 106 and R. i, 39 (later); Ilvala, iii, 96, 4, and R. iii, 11, 55; Rṣyaçrṅga, iii, 110 and R. i, 19 (see now Lüder's essay); also a couple of passages in both later epics, origin of poem, i, 1, 57 and R. i, 2, 26; Skanda, xiii, 85 and R. i, 37, which approximate closely with i, 136, 1 and R. vii, 65, 10, and a few more less striking cases in both later epics.³

A review of these parallels, proverbs and tales, shows that whereas the former may be said to occur universally, in any part of either epic, of the latter (apart from the Rāma tale itself), as far as formal identity goes, by far the greater part is found where either one or both versions occur in later additions to the poem (R. i and vii, M. i and xii ff.), thus:

M.	R.	M.	R.
i, 1, 57, and i, 2, 23		v, 13 and vii, 85	
i, 18 and i, 46 (G.)		v, 141 and i, 2	

¹ Here enam is astra(gaṇam) understood (?).

² AJP. xx, p. 34 ff. Holtzmann's *Das Mahābhārata*, already cited, both adds to and is complemented by the matter given there and here.

³ I do not include parallel tales without parallel phraseology, as, for example, the allusion in xii, 57, 9, to the tale of Asamañjas told in iii, 107, 39 ff. and in R. ii. 36, 19 ff.

M.	R.	M.	R.
i, 66 and iii, 14		xii, 127 and vii, 37	
i, 175 and i, 54		xii, 153 and vii, 76	
(ii, 105 and ii, 100, Kaccit)		xii, 166 and ii, 110	
iii, 9 and ii, 74		xiii, 85 and i, 37	
iii, 53 and vii, 55		H.	R.
iii, 96 and iii, 11		Khila	iv, 40
iii, 106 and i, 39			vi, 19
iii, 110 and i, 19			vi, 44
iv, 70 and i, 24 (G.)			vi, 58

That is, parallel tales are rare in the older, three times as frequent in the later books of each. The additions to one epic are thus on a par with the additions to the other in their mutual obligations.¹ This illustrates again the facts previously observed in regard to the two epics by Jacobi and myself respectively, namely that the Uttarakāṇḍa has many tales of the middle district (Jacobi, R. p. 205), and that the early Mahābhārata shows familiarity with the customs of the Puṇjāb, while the didactic parts show no familiarity with the holy land, but all the numerous tales with scarcely an exception are laid in Kosala and Videha and on the banks of the lower Ganges (AJP., xix, p. 21). In other words, the two epics in their later development belong to the same locality and probably to about the same time. It is in this later development, then, that the two epics copy each other.² The common tales that remain, apart from this phase of the poems, are few, and such as may be easily attributed to the general stock of legendary tradition.

¹ It must not be forgotten, however, that the Rāmāyana, apart from the first and last books, refers to episodes known only from the Mahābhārata. For example, when Sita says she is as devoted to Rāma "as Damayanti Bhāimī to Nāisadha," Nāisadhaṁ Damayanti 'va Bhāimī patim anuvratā, R. v, 24, 12. Then when, ib. 34, 28-30, Rāma is described as satyavādī, āditya iva tejasvī, and kandarpa iva mūrtimān (all in one description, as in Nala), which is probably the borrower?

² So the later G. agrees more closely with M. in many of the cases in Appendix A. But there is no uniformity in this regard, and R. has parallels enough to refute the idea that similarity is due solely to G.'s later copying.

When we have peeled off the outer layer (and in it are included with one exception, if it be an exception, all the references to Vālmīki in the great epic), we have left two epics, one of which is a complete whole, the other a congeries of incongruous stories grouped about a central tale; both built on the same foundation of phrase and proverb and in part over the same ground of literary allusion; both with heroes of the same type (whose similarity is striking);¹ and both arranged on the same general plan, a court-scene, where the plot is laid, a period of banishment in a forest-scene, followed by a city-scene,² where an ally is gained, and then by battle-scenes. One of these epics claims priority, but the claim after all is not that the great poet invented epic poetry, but that he first wrote an epic in śloka verse in a Kāvya or artistic style. As the Rāmāyaṇa is mainly in ślokas of a more refined style than the Mahābhārata and the Kāvya or artistic element is really much more pronounced, and as, further, it is highly probable that epic poetry was first written in the mixture of rougher śloka and tristubh characteristic of the Mahābhārata, this claim, so stated, may in general be allowed, without impugning the relatively greater age of the other epic.

Professor Jacobi admits that the metre of the Rāmāyaṇa is more refined, but the explanation he gives is that it was a product of that East where poetic art was first developed. In a subsequent chapter I shall show that those parts of the great epic which from a metrical point of view agree most closely with the Rāmāyaṇa are the later parts. Here I would merely raise the question whether the dictum that poetic art was refined in the East before the great epic arose, is not based on the style of the Rāmāyaṇa alone? Products of the same part of the country are Buddhistic and Upanishad verses, with which agrees the versification of the Mahābhārata much more closely

¹ Not merely as being central figures. See for details the article by Professor Windisch, cited in Das Mahābhārata iv, p. 68. The similarity of exploits is increased as we take the whole epics, which plainly have influenced each other in their final redaction.

² Owing to Rāma's oath he does not actually enter the city, but he finds his ally there, as do the Pandus at Virāṭa's town.

than does that of the Rāmāyana. The Purāṇas also are in general rather that of the great epic. The distinction then is not sufficiently explained by geographical relations. On the other hand the metrical refinement of U. the Upanishads, B. the early Bhārata, B.² the late Bhārata, R. the Rāmāyana, and K. Kālidāsa is in the order U., B., B.² R., K., with B.²=R. in some cases, which looks to a progressive development.¹

Another moot point in connection with this geographical inquiry is whether the Rāmāyana was written by a poet who really knew anything about Ceylon, where Lāṅkā, the seat of action in the Rāmāyana war, is usually supposed to be. Professor Jacobi has expressed the opinion that Lāṅkā is not Ceylon, and that, further, Vālmīki did not know the littoral at all, but he was a riparian poet. Unless the allusions in the poem are all interpolations, I cannot accept this view. In the first place, the language of both poems on this point is identical, the images are the same, and they are couched in the same words. If, then, they are all later additions to Vālmīki's poem, they must be copied from the Māhābhārata; which opens a vista (of later Rāmāyana imitating an earlier epic) which Professor Jacobi would scarcely accept. But accepting some copying, there still remains enough sea-scape in the Rāmāyana to show that no poet who did not know ocean could write as does Vālmīki. In both texts, for example, occurs this splendid onomatopoeic description of the rising waves of full flood, which, as the poet repeatedly says, accompanies the filling of the moon:

parvasū 'dīrnavegasya sāgarasye 'va nihsvanah

where the swell and filling and very hiss of the gombing breakers is reproduced with a power that it is hard to ascribe to a riparian poet. But I must refer the reader to a special

¹ Vālmīki's work holds indisputable right to the title *ādikāvya*, or "first elegant poem," a title which the great epic imitates in claiming to be a *kāvyaṃ paramapūjitam*, "highly revered elegant poem," to which title it won a right after the more refined versification of the pseudo epic had been added to it.

paper on this subject for further illustration of our Vālmiki's intimate acquaintance with the sight and sound of ocean¹—or, if not our Vālmiki, to whom shall we assign the double text?

Again, from the first dawn of critique it has been urged that widow-burning is not practised or known (as sometimes stated) in the Rāmāyaṇa, but it is practised in the Mahābhārata. Yes, in the first book and the twelfth and following books, just as conversely, in the Rāmāyaṇa, the queens announce that they are “devoted” and will die on the pyre with their husband ii, 66, 12, or lament that being “not suttee” they “live an evil life” in not thus dying, v, 26, 7. Does this not imply widow-burning? And if it be said (with truth) that these are interpolations—well and good, but so are Ādi and Çānti interpolations. Both epics ignore the custom,² except in their later form.

One more observation is necessary in this summary account of the mutual relations of the two epics. I have instanced the use of the word *māṛiṣa* in the Mahābhārata as typical of influences not so often to be seen in the Rāmāyaṇa. In the former, as a constant term of address, it is a link connecting this epic with the classical period; and yet it will not do to build too much on the fact that this link is wanting in the

¹ AJP. vol. xxi, p. 378. Among the tributaries of Ayodhyā are mentioned the inhabitants of Malabar, and “sea-men,” in R. ii, 82, 8, where the senseless *kevalāḥ* must be corrected to the reading of G. 88, 7, *Keralāḥ*. The sea-men, *sāmudrāḥ*, may be merchants or the name of a people. The Keralas, or Malabar people, are here expressly “Southerners.” They are mentioned also among the lists of people in R. iv, 40 ff., which takes in the whole of India (41, 12, Pundras, Colas, Pāndyas, Keralas) and mentions the Yavanas and other outer tribes: “Look among the Mlecchas, Pulindas, Çurāsas, Prasthalas, Bharatas, Kurus with Madrakas, Kāmboja-Yavanas (enipd.), and the towns, pattanāni, of Çūkas,” 43, 11-12 (compare M. vi, 87, 10). Also Yavadvīpa, R. iv, 40, 31, that is Java, is mentioned. I fail to see that the Rāmāyaṇa, without such a priori excision as may also be applied to the Mahābhārata, shows less geographical knowledge or hearsay than does the latter poem.

² Elsewhere in the epic, the widow is as much recognized as in Manu, who also knows no suttee. Compare Ruling Caste, pp. 172, 371, and a paper On the Custom of Dying to redress a Grievance, JAOS. xxi, p. 146 ff.

Rāmāyaṇa. Such an example shows only that the *Mahābhārata* has been in this instance retouched. Similar cases are found in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, one of which I have already cited.

For example, later Sanskrit poetry describes women adorned not only with the *nūpura* or anklet (alluded to in both epics), but also with the *kāñcī* or gold girdle set off with bells. Probable as was the adornment in early times, this name for it does not occur in early literature, and so far as I know it does not occur in the great epic (frequently as women's adornment is described) till the time of the pseudo-epic, where, xiii, 106, 56, and 107, 67 we find *kāñcīnūpuraṣabda*, just as we find the same collocation in R., for example, v, 4, 11; 18, 20; G. iii, 58, 26 (*çuṣubhe kāñcanī kāñcī*); v, 12, 44. The later epics must have suffered this experience in many cases, another being offered just here by the use of the rare *vallakī*, xiii, 106, 49, and in vii, 6,665, but not here in B. 154, 25, where *jarjhara* takes its place. Just so in G. iv, 33, 26 is found this same *vallakī* (sic), but it is not found in the corresponding verse of R. iv, 33, 21. In sum, chance lateness of this sort is evidence only for the epic as we have it, tampered with by a thousand diadochoi. It can never show that one epic was produced before the other. So *niryāṇa* for "death," xv, 37, 40, is indicative of the age or origin of xv, 37, not of the *Mahābhārata*;¹ of R. v (13, 41), but not of the epic as a whole.

So, while we must admit that *Vālmīki's* mention of Kurus, Janamejaya, and Hāṣṭinapura, as against his non-mention of Pandus and Indraprastha, looks as if he knew not the latter, we must remember at the same time that *Vālmīki's* poem in turn has, quite apart from vocabulary, certain indications of an age not recognized by the poets of the latter epic, of which I will mention particularly two.²

¹ Here, xv, 37, 43, *tathāgata* seems to mean "dead," but it may be taken in its usual sense of "in such a state," as in R. ii, 109, 34, oddly near the Buddhist: *yathā hi coraḥ sa tathā hi buddhas tathāgataṁ nāsukam atra viddhi*.

² Minor points of lateness (in either epic) are frequently apparent. Those in Mbh. are perhaps more common, but not in proportion to its extent. In R. may be noticed ships holding one hundred men each and palaces having

The date of the Allahābād banyan cannot be carried back with any certainty to a very early date, though mentioned by Hwen Thsang.¹ Now the place where this tree ought to be is most elaborately described and praised in the great epic, iii, 85, 80 ff., but the existence of such a tree is not even mentioned; whereas the other fig-tree at Gayā is praised as holy beyond words, for, in the epic interpretation of the modern akṣay bai (baṭ), its fruit is imperishable.² This is particularly remarkable as in M. iii, 85, 65, Āṅgaverapur is especially famed as the place "where Rāma crossed." But the Rāmāyaṇa knows the Allahābād tree, ii, 55, 6 and 24. The mention of this tree at Prayāga, as against its non-mention in the Mahābhārata, and the latter's mention of Rāma point to an earlier date for the Mahābhārata Tīrtha stories than for R. ii, 55, and perhaps shows that at this time the Rāma story was known, but not just as we have it.

//The word Sanskrit in its present meaning is found in the Rāmāyaṇa but not in the Mahābhārata. The bare statement, however, that the word Sanskrit in this sense is not found in an older period but occurs in the Rāmāyaṇa, does not give quite all the facts. The great epic knows the word but only in its earlier meaning, "adorned," "prepared," asaṃskṛtam abhivyaktam bhāti, iii, 69, 8; saṃskṛta and prākṛta,³ "initiated and not initiated," iii, 200, 88 (with priests who are suvedāḥ and durvedāḥ); saṃskṛtā mantrāḥ, xiii, 93, 56. This is also the sense in R. iii, 11, 57, where bhrātaraṃ saṃskṛtaṃ kṛtvā itself (in M. iii, 96, 10, chāgaṃ kṛtvā susaṃskṛtam) is joined

(as in the drama) eight courts instead of three (as in the other epic), R. ii, 84, 8; 57, 17 and 24; iv, 33, 19.

¹ Cunningham, Ancient Geography of India, p. 389.

² This, or "makes the giver immortal," is the epic interpretation, not (as now) that the tree itself is immortal. Compare iii, 84, 83, tatrā 'kṣayavaṇo nāma triṣu lokeṣu viçrutah, tatra dattam pitṛbhyas tu bhavaty akṣaram ucyaṭe. So in iii, 87, 11, and 95, 14 (with iii, 87, begins a recapitulation of Tīrthas already mentioned); vii, 66, 20, where it is (vaṭaḥ) akṣayakaraṇaḥ, as also in xiii, 88, 14. Here is found the proverb on Gayā, as in R. ii, 107, 13, with v. l., and in M. iii, 84, 97, etc., as given in Spruch 1474 ff.

³ As to this word in R., compare strivākyaṃ prākṛtaṃ çrutvā, iii, 40, 5 (akṣam, comp.), with references in PW. s. v.

with the preceding *saṁskṛtam vadan*, the former in the *Mahābhārata* version being "cooking" (*saṁskṛtya* = *paktvā*) and the latter not used, which looks as if the *Rāmāyaṇa* version were later. Several cases in the *Rāmāyaṇa* do indeed show the older sense, but there are others, such as v, 30, 17, cited by Weber, and again by Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, ii, p. 157, in which *saṁskṛtā vāk* means Sanskrit, in that it is the "cultivated speech."¹ In this case also the *Rāmāyaṇa* is later than the *Mahābhārata*, though the latter epic recognizes dialects, *deçabhāṣās*, iv, 10, 1; ix, 45, 103, etc., and seems (in its introduction) to use the expression *brāhmī vāk* or "holy speech," exactly in the sense of the *Rāmāyaṇa*'s *saṁskṛtā vāk*. For in this instance a woman recognizes a king because his "form and clothes are regal and his speech is the holy speech," *rājavad rūpaveṣāu te brāhmīm vācam bibharṣi ca*, i, 81, 13. But these cases show only that when the *Ilvala* tale was rewritten and the much adorned fifth book of the *Rāmāyaṇa* was composed, *saṁskṛtam vad* and *saṁskṛtā vāk* were used nearly in the modern sense; yet in showing this they indicate again that in our estimate as to the relative age of the epics nothing can be absolute or universal, but all must be stated relatively and partially. If it be said that this judgment lacks definitiveness, the reply is that it accords with the facts, which do not admit of sweeping statements.²

¹ Also Jacobi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 116 (PW. s. *saṁ-kar*). Other cases show regard for grammatical nicety in the use of language (Jacobi, loc. cit.).

² For the metrical position of the two poems, see Chapter Four. I regret that Professor Jacobi's long-expected book on the epics is not yet out, as it is sure to contain much valuable matter. As it is, I have had to rely, in citing his opinions, on the work cited above, and a review in the GGA., 1899, p. 809 ff.

CHAPTER THREE.

EPIC PHILOSOPHY.

Sukhād bahutaram dūḥkham jivite nā 'tra saṁcayaḥ, xii, 331, 16.

"There is no doubt that there is more sorrow than joy in life."

Epic Systems.

IN the preceding chapters I have shown that from a synthetic point of view the epic as we have it, judged solely by the literature it recognizes, must be the product of a comparatively late period. In this chapter it is my purpose to sketch as briefly as possible the salient features of the great systems of philosophy expounded in the later epic. To regard them as identical is impossible. To see in them a philosophic chaos, out of which are to arise future systems, is equally impossible. Some of them belong to the latest epic and they have their unity only in the fact that they are all colored by the dominant deistic view of an age that, having passed from pure idealism into dualism, sought to identify the spirit of man with that of a personal God and equate this god with the two separate factors of dualism; a dualism which was not that of spirit and matter but of conditioned being, conscious intelligence, as opposed to pure being or spirit (soul), conscious intelligence being itself the only origin of matter, which is merely a form of mind.¹

The importance of a review of this sort lies in the historical background it furnishes to the epic, which represents the last of six approved systems traceable in it: (1) Vedism or orthodox Brahmanism; (2) ātmanism or Brahmanism (properly

¹ See on this point some pertinent remarks by Dr. Everett in the twentieth volume of the *Journal of the AOS.*, p. 309. It is a common error to speak of Sāṅkhya dualism as setting spirit and matter in antithesis, whereas, according to the system, matter is only a development of self-consciousness.

Brahmanism, but this term connotes a different idea), that is, an idealistic interpretation of life; (3) Sāṃkhya, the dualism spoken of above; (4) Yoga, the deistic interpretation of Sāṃkhya; (5) Bhāgavata or Pāṇḍupata, different but both sectarian interpretations of Yoga; (6) Vedānta or Illusion-idealism. Some of the epic writers support Sāṃkhya; some, Yoga; some, the sectarian interpretation; some, the Māyā, Illusion-theory. Besides these are approved sporadically Vedism and Brahmanism, not to speak of a number of theories not approved.

Heretics.

In the Gītā it is said, 4, 40: "The ignorant and unbelieving man who has a soul of doubt is destroyed; *neither this world nor the next exists*,¹ nor happiness, for him who has a soul of doubt." The italicized words are those which, at xii, 133, 14, are put into the mouth of the Nāstika, the negator or repudiator of scripture, spirit, or duties. According to epic interpretation, one saying *nāsti*, in refusing a gift to a priest, is a "negator" no less than he who refuses assent to the orthodox belief. But ordinarily Nāstika is used in the latter sense and connotes a dissenter from received opinion in regard either to the existence of transcendental things or to the authority of hallowed tradition.² Such an unbeliever is threatened with a sudden enlightenment hereafter: "If your opinion is that this world does not exist and that there is no world beyond, the devils in hell will soon change your ideas on that subject."³ Any number of these unbelievers is known, who deny everything there is to deny. In ii, 31, 70, an unbelieving or heretic

¹ *nā 'yam loko 'sti na paro na sukham saṃcayātmanah*. Compare Kaṭha Up., ii, 6, *ayam loko nāsti para-iti mānī, punaḥ punar vaçam āpadyate me (Yama)*.

² Neglect of Vedic ordinances or denial of Veda is *nāstikya*, par excellence, according to xii, 270, 67, and xii, 12, 5 (the latter): *vedavādāpaviddhān tu tām viddhi bhṛçanāstikān* (also *anāstika*, ib. 4), for "rejecting the Veda & priest cannot attain heaven," ib.

³ Literally, will "make you remember;" *yad idam manyase, ahaṃ, itā 'yam astiti kutaḥ paraḥ, pratismārayitāras tvām Yamadūtā Yamakṣaya*, xii, 136, 19.

king is mentioned among those who pay tribute (in conjunction with a tributary "city of the Greeks"); while in iii, 191, 10, it is said that in the golden age to come there will be "people of truth," where previously had been established the schools of heretics; from which it may be inferred perhaps that Buddhists or Jains are meant, as irreligious heretics would not have religious orders.¹ The Lokāyata or Lokāyatika (doubtful in i, 70, 46) is perhaps less a Buddhist (like Cārvāka, who appears only as a pretended Brahman Parivraj, or priestly mendicant, and friend of the foe) than a devotee of natural science, as Professor Rhys Davids maintains. The doubter's scriptures are not, however, referred to Bṛhaspati. The code of this ill-reputed sage, whom we have seen as a law-giver, is often enough alluded to, generally in connection with that of Uṇanas. The worst that is said of Bṛhaspati's teaching is that it is drawn from a study of the female intellect, which is full of subtilty and deceit. But he is here only one of many authors of Arthaśāstras, xiii, 39, 10. As a teacher he is extolled.² Materialists and other heretics without special designation appear to fill the whole land. Thus in xii, 19, 23, are mentioned rationalistic Pundits, hetumantaḥ, hard to convince, who are by nature befogged and stubborn, and deny the existence (of a soul). These are opposed to those good men who are "devoted to ceremonies and know the Pūrvaśāstra" (mīmāṃsā?). "These fools," it is added, "are despisers of immortality and talkers in assemblies of people; they wander over the whole earth, being fond of speaking and learned in revelation."³ Others are cited to illustrate the unbelief that consists in a denial of the soul's unity, ekāntavyudāsa. These believe in a soul possessed of desire and hate. An apparent allusion to Jains may be found in the description of the priest who "tramped around Benares astounding the people, clothed

¹ ācramāḥ sahapāṣaṇḍāḥ sthitāḥ satyaajanāḥ prajāḥ (bhaviṣyanti).

² xii, 325, 23. His teaching in xiii, 113, is Buddhistic (5 = Dh. P. 132, and 7 is like Dh. P. 420). On Lokāyata, see Davids, p. 169 of op. cit. above, p. 55.

³ vāvadūkā bahuṣrutāḥ. The denial in *nāi 'tad asti* must from the context refer to the existence of the soul. For anṛtasyā 'vamanṭāraḥ in B. must, I think, be read amṛtasyā.

in air, clothed like a madman;"¹ but we must be careful not to identify the characters of the epic too quickly with special names. This madman priest, for example, would seem to be rather a Çivaite Brahman than a Jain, and *digvāsas* is applied to Vidura in his last state and to Nala in his distress.² In the same way, the brown and yellow robe does not necessarily refer to a Buddhist, any more than does the statement that one goes to heaven who builds a Vihāra, xiii, 23, 99; for these terms are common property. "What makes you so glorious?" asks one woman of another, who replies: "I did not wear the yellow robe, nor bark-garments, nor go shorn or with matted hair," xiii, 123, 8. Here quite possibly Buddhists may be referred to; but when I read that Çiva's devotees are of two sorts, householders, and those "whose sign is tonsure and the yellow robe," māuṇḍyaṁ kaṣāyaḥ ca, xiii, 142, 22; and see that the yellow robe is also worn as a sign of grief, Nala, 24, 9; R. vi. 125, 34, and that "the wearer of the yellow robe" is excluded from Çrāddha, xiii, 91, 43, I am by no means sure that even in the most tempting passage this robe indicates a Buddhist, unless, indeed, for some of these passages we may assume that Çivaite and Buddhist were already confused. But xii, 18, 32, "those who cast off the Vedas and wander about as beggars shaved and wearing the yellow robe," refers distinctly to Buddhists, as I opine. Similarly, the remark "they that are *budhas*, enlightened, are devoted to Nirvāṇa," xii, 167, 46, may be put beside the buddhas of xii, 160, 33, who "have no fear of return to this world and no dread of another;" but in the latter section, and in many others, "enlightened," budha and buddha, refers to Brahmans; and Nirvāṇa in epic teleology usually means bliss, for example the bliss of drinking when one is thirsty, or the bliss of heaven.³ In short, we see here

¹ caṅkramīti diḥaḥ sarvā digvāsā mohayan prajāḥ . . . unmattaveṣaṁ bibhrat sa caṅkramīti yathāśukhaṁ Vārāṇasyāṁ, xiv, 6, 18, and 22; compare 5, 6.

² To the author of Das Mbh. als Epos, etc., *digvāsas* necessarily implies digambara (as Jain), p. 224.

³ In the epic, nirvāṇa is used in both of its later senses, bliss and extinction, brahmanirvāṇa, bliss of Brahman, like the nirvāṇa, bliss, attained by

and in a passage cited further on, that Buddhists are sometimes referred to, but we must not call every beggar a Buddhist. The late passage xiv, 49, 3-12, shows that when the *Anuṅṛtā* was written, probably not before our era, these infidels were fairly rampant. The list of them is quite appalling and we may perhaps believe that the "believer in nothing" is a Buddhist and the "shaven and naked" mentioned in the same place is a Jain; while the *svabhāvam bhūtacintakāḥ* are perhaps materialists. The "course of right is varied" and the view of the author is here that of tolerance. Some of these philosophers deny a hereafter, some doubt all things, some hold the *vyāmiṣṭra* doctrine of revolution (often mistranslated as evolution) of the universe, and according to the commentator some are adherents of the atomistic theory, *bahutvam*. Contests of these *hetuvādins*, rationalists, are not discountenanced, but enjoyed as a philosophic treat at the king's court or at a great sacrifice, as in xiv, 85, 27, where "talkative philosophers, eager to outdo each other, discussed many rationalistic arguments."

With all this liberality there is often no quarter given to the heretic, especially the *Pāṣaṇḍa*,¹ who appears to be pre-eminently a despiser of the Vedas. The reason is the natural one that he who despises the priest's authority naturally despises the priest. "The reason why I was born a jackal," says a character in xii, 180, 47-48, "is that I was a *Punditkin*, *paṇḍitaka*, who was a rationalist, *hāituka*, and blamer of the Vedas, being devoted to logic and the useless science of reasoning (a telling phrase, repeated in xiii, 37, 12-14), a proclaimer of logical arguments, a talker in assemblies, a reviler and opposer of priests in arguments about Brahman, an unbeliever, a doubter of all, who thought myself a *Pundit*."² The *Pāṣaṇḍa*

drinking. On this subject much that is misleading has lately been published, owing to a false historical point of view. But the goal of extinction is also lauded. Thus, in xii, 242, 11-12, one attains to that where going he "grieves not, dies not, is not born, nor reborn, and exists not," *na vartate*.

¹ v. l. in xii, 218, 4; xiii, 23, 67 (other references in PW.); apparently a foreign or dialectic word; especially Buddhists, according to N.

² *ākroṣṭā cā 'bhivaktā ca brahmanākyeṣu ca dvijān . . . mūrkhāḥ paṇḍi-*

and reviler of the Vedas are closely associated, as in xiii, 23, 67, and 72, and like those who here "sell or write down the Vedas," they go to hell. In short, any denial is usually permitted save the denial of the Vedas. The more surprising is it that elsewhere (see below) the Vedas are openly repudiated; but this is only one of the inconsistencies with which the epic teems.

Authority.

What then was authoritative? Characteristic of the contradictory views presented in the epic is the fact that in one place the very authority, *pramāṇam*, which is insisted upon as the only valid authority, is in another rejected as altogether delusive, and this not by heretics, but by the authors of the respective essays whose combined publications issued in one volume form the pot-pourri of the complete epic.

The reason for this is obvious. Several forms of religion are advocated in the epic and each has its own test. Oldest and most widely represented is the biblical test. Over and over again we are assured that scripture is authoritative and those who will not accept scripture as the *pramāṇam* or test-stone of philosophy are damned. But beside these vigorous expressions of orthodoxy stands the new faith, which discards altogether the old scripture as an authority. For sacrifices and rites the Vedas are well enough; they are there authoritative. If one wishes to perform rites one must naturally go to the ritual. Such *ṣāstrapramāṇya* and *vedapramāṇya* rules,¹ admitting the necessity of rites at all, remain valid, simply because there are no others. But in all higher matters, as for one who sees no use in rites, the scriptures are but a mass of contradictions.²

tamānikah (hence reborn, as a *krōṣṭar*). Compare *Kaṭha Up.* ii, 5, *svayamdhīrāḥ paṇḍitammanyamānāḥ*; *Mund. Up.* i, 2, 8; *Māitr. Up.* vii, 9. The passage in *Anuśāsana* cited above is a repetition of all these epithets in characteristically free form. Compare, e. g., *ṣl.* 13, *ākroṣṭā cā 'tivaktā ca brāhmaṇānām sadāi 'va hi* (here *paṇḍitamāni*).

¹ xiii, 84, 20, and 37.

² One of the minor epic contradictions is that referred to above, p. 46, in regard to the "two brahmans." The orthodox, but not too liberal man, says:

The old view is best represented in the saying that Veda, Dharmaçāstras, and ācāra, custom, are the recognized authorities in every matter, as in iii, 207, 83; xiii, 84, 20, and 37. The confused rule of the Veda is referred to in xii, 19, 1-2: "I know the highest and other Çāstras and the double injunction of the Veda, 'Do acts and abandon them.'" "Untrue, according to casuistic reasoning, is the word of the Veda — but why should the Veda speak untruth?" says Vyāsa, xiii, 120, 9, when inculcating the late notion that a small gift is as efficient as a great sacrifice in procuring salvation, a theory that is certainly untrue in the light of the Veda. "Logic has no basis, the scriptures are divided; there is not one seer whose opinion is authoritative," pramāṇam. "The truth about right is hidden in a cave; the only path is that pursued by the majority," iii, 313, 117.¹ "Deceitful is the Veda," it is said in xii, 329, 6. Both scripture and argument, tarka, are useless in comparison with the enlightening grace of God, which alone can illuminate the "mysterious hidden communication of truth," xii, 335, 5. Such holy mysteries must, indeed, be kept from those who are "burned with books of philosophy," tarkaçāstradagdha, xii, 247, 18.

In the matter of the Veda, the new faith discounts its value by setting beside it the recent books of later cult, exactly as modern sects take as authoritative their own scriptures. Bhīṣma's words, being inspired by Krishna, are "as authoritative as the words of the Veda," vedappravāda iva (pramāṇam), xii, 54, 29-30, and Veda, Purāṇa, and Itihāsa are all reckoned as authoritative in xii, 343, 20. But the Gītā is the only authority of the Bhāgavatas, Gītā, 16, 24. Compare also the tirade in xiii, 163, 2-9: "Immediate perception or biblical authority, āgama, what is convincing proof, kāraṇa,

dve brahmaṇi veditavye çabdabrahma param ca yat, çabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ param brahmā 'dhigacchati, xii, 233, 30, "when one is thoroughly conversant with the Veda he attains to Brahman;" but the devotee "even by desire of wisdom surpasses the Veda," api jijnāsamāno 'pi çabdabrahmā 'tivartate, ib. 237, 8.

¹ mahājana, if this be the meaning here; apparently only usage is meant: mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ.

in these? Answer: "There is many a text to increase doubt. Rationalists say that perception is the only proof. They are children who think themselves wise and believe only in denial, *nā 'sti*. Recourse to 'cause' amounts to nothing." But though philosophy is really interwoven with religion, we may leave for the present the Bhāgavatas and Īvaites to their religion which is "freed from philosophy," xiii, 14, 198, and consists in identifying the All-god with their special gods (viii, 33, 51 "one God of various forms"), to consider the more strictly philosophic view of authority.

Only one view is held by the real philosopher: "Through inference we learn the truth."¹ Traditional wisdom, *āmnāya*, as was shown above, is not always recognized, though it is generally admitted. "In *āmnāya* are established the Vedas; from *āmnāya* come the Vedas."² . . . Universal opinion says that an *āmnāya*-declaration is truth, and there is no authority at all, *gāstratā*, when that which is not authoritative is allowed to stand against the recognized authority of the Vedas," xii, 269, 33; 261, 9-10. Thus "inference together with scripture," *anumāna* and *ṛuta*, are the two most substantial tests of truth, xii, 205, 19 and 210, 23, *hetvāgama*; for "all that is Vedic is the word of God," xii, 269, 10.³

The third authority is the one scorned above, perception, *pratyakṣa* (xiv, 28, 18, *pratyakṣataḥ sādhayāmaḥ*, and often, as cited below in the course of this chapter). In the mystic religion of the Yogin this *pratyakṣa* becomes the intuitive insight of the seer and is the only test of truth, answering to "second sight."⁴ The *Harivaṅṣa* inveighs against the "doubters and curious speculators" who accept any authority save faith, 3, 4, 8 ff.

¹ *anumānād vijānīmaḥ puruṣam*, xiv, 48, 6; xii, 206, 23.

² The commentator becomes confused, and rendering *āmnāya* by *Veda* renders *vedāḥ* by *smṛtayaḥ*!

³ *sarvam āraṣaṁ vyāhṛtaṁ viditātmanah* (= *paramēśvarasya*). The commentator cites *Bṛh. Up. ii, 4, 10, niḥśvasitam*, in support of plenary inspiration as here inculcated.

⁴ The curious result is thus reached that the crassest materialist and most exalted mystic reject all proofs save *pratyakṣa*. Only one means by "autopsy" (physical) perception and the other means insight.

Besides these three, to wit, biblical authority, inference, and direct observation, the fourth "proof by analogy" may be implied in the late conversation of Drāupadī, where, after a passing reference to the āṛṣam pramāṇam and pratyakṣa, is added "and thy own birth is the proof by analogy," upamānam, iii, 31, 11-33. Elsewhere the epic stands philosophically on the Sāṃkhy-yoga basis of three reliable proofs only.

This result is fully borne out by the terminology. The Vedānta philosophy of the epic is not called by that name. Nyāya may possibly be known, but it is doubtful whether the word ever refers to the system, or the system, except perhaps in one or two late passages, is ever recognized. A brief survey of the facts will make this clearer.

Vedānta.

If the philosophical system were known as such the use of the name would occur as such. But Vedānta seems everywhere to mean Upanishads or what is the same thing, Āraṇyakas.¹ No Vedānta system is alluded to, Vedānta may refer to Sāṃkhya in xii, 196, 7 (where it takes the place of the latter in antithesis to Yoga, as the commentator thinks), but the word more naturally means the teaching of the Upanishads, as usual.² The passages cited above in the chapter on literature exhibit the characteristic usage. Thus in Gītā 15, 15, vedāntakṛd vedavid eva cā' ham, where Telang rightly takes the reference to be to the Āraṇyakas. So in viii, 90, 114, vedāntāvabhṛthāplutaḥ, where Karna appeals to Arjuna

¹ So, for example, in yad uktam vedavādeṣu gahanam vedadarṣibhiḥ, tadanteṣu yathā yuktam krama(karma)yogena lakṣyate, xii, 233, 28 (= tad uktam vedavādeṣu . . . vedānteṣu punar vyaktam, 239, 11), a mystery (viz., gambhīram gahanam brahma, 224, 48).

² sāmkyayogāu tu yāv uktāu munibhir mokṣadarṣibhiḥ, sannyāsa eva vedānte vartate japanam prati, vedavādāḥ ca nirvṛttāḥ cāntā brahmaṇy avasthitāḥ, three hemistichs, of which the first is repeated in the next śloka, where alone it seems to belong. Conversely, in Gītā 18, 13, the word Sāṃkhya is taken by the commentator to mean Vedānta, because here we have a grouping of five karmahetavaḥ not recognized in Sāṃkhya. It may be said once for all that the commentator is often useless in philosophical sections, as he wishes to convert Sāṃkhya into Vedānta on all occasions.

to observe the law of fighting, since the latter knows the law of fighting and is thoroughly acquainted with the holy scriptures, i. e., he is a moral man (not a Vedānta philosopher). So in ii, 53, 1, kings who are declarers of all the Vedas and versed in the Vedānta, paryāptavidyā vaktāro vedāntāva-bhṛthāplutāḥ. Durgā is Sāvitrī, vedamātā tathā vedānta ucyate, "mother of the Vedas and famed (not in philosophy but) in the Upanishads," vi, 23, 12. A Gandharva is "wise in the knowledge of Vedānta," xii, 319, 27, and asks questions about Veda and logic, which are answered in Sāṅkhya terms (vedya is puruṣa, for example). The priest who at xii, 349, 56 is said to transmit the knowledge of the Gītā, knows the Jyestha Sāman and the Vedānta; and he who knows the names of Vishnu is Vedānta-learned, xiii, 149, 123. Again in xiv, 13, 15: "Whoso would kill me (Kāma) by vedāir vedāntasādhanāḥ, power derived from the mysteries of the Veda." I know in fact only two passages where, perhaps, Vedānta might be fairly taken as referring to the philosophy. One of these is in a triṣṭubh verse which has been interpolated (out of all syntactical connection) in xiii, 69, 20, and even here, late as is the verse, it is perhaps more probable that the word is to be taken in its usual sense.¹ The other is found at xii, 302, 71, where the "island of Vedānta" is a refuge to the saints. The "Secret of the Vedānta" cited below is clearly "Upanishads." The Brahma Sūtra I have spoken of above, p. 16.

Mīmāṃsā does not occur as the name of a philosophical system. I have referred to the Pūrvaçāstravids above, but the word is obviously too general to make much of, though it is used as if it applied to the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, for the Pūrvaçāstravidaḥ are here, xii, 19, 22, kriyāsu niratā nityam dāne yajñe ca karmanī. This implication is not absolutely necessary, however. The old name for the system, Nyāya, does not seem to be used in the sense of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

¹ vedāntaniṣṭhasya bahuçrutasya, supposed to be governed by vṛttim (dvijāyā) 'tierjeta (tasmāi) in the next stanza!

Nyāya.

The argumentative group of five, explained according to the padārtha in xii, 321, 80 ff., consists of sāukṣmya, sām̐khyakramāu, nirṇaya, and prayojana, which recall, especially in the definition of the last, the corresponding section in the formal Nyāya. The epic gives the following definitions:

1. Sāukṣmya, subtilty, is where knowledge, in respect to objects of knowledge which are divided, comes from distinction and the intellect rests (on this distinction).

2. Sām̐khyā or sām̐khyā, reckoning, is reckoning the value of weak and valid points and arriving at some conclusion.

3. Krama, order: when it is decided which should be said first and which last, they call that kramayoga, the application of proper sequence in an argument.

4. Nirṇaya, ascertainment, is a conclusion that the case is so and so, in cases of duty, desire, gain, emancipation, after recognizing them according to their differences.

5. Prayojana, motive: *where inclination is produced by ills arising from desire or dislike and a certain conduct is followed, that is motive.*

As has been remarked by Mr. K. Mohan Ganguli in his translation, this final definition of prayojana is almost identical with that given by Gāutama i, 24, yam artham adhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam: "If one sets an object before one's self and acts accordingly, that is motive." So the epic, prakarṣo yatra jāyate, tatra yā vṛttis tat prayojanam, as rendered above. Similarly, the epic definition of nirṇaya is like that of Gāutama in i, 40: "The conclusion reached after hearing what can be said for and against (on both sides) after doubting." The other members of Gāutama's syllogism, i, 32, seem to have no connection with the above. The speech to be delivered, it is declared in this passage of the epic, must be nyāyavṛttam (as well as reasonable, not casuistical, etc., sixteen attributes in all).¹

¹ No explanation is given of the eighteen merits with which the speaker begins. The sixteen attributes may be compared (numerically) with the sixteen categories of the Nyāya.

We may compare further in the late list of Pundits at i, 70, 42, those with *nyāyatattvātmavijñāna*, possibly "versed in psychology according to the *Nyāya-tattva*;" and i, 1, 67, *nyāyaçikṣā*, *Nyāya*-system, opposed to *Vedādhyātma* but also to *cikitsā*, etc. Also xii, 19, 18, referred to above, p. 87: "Some, rejecting unity, attribute to the *ātman* desire and dislike," a *Nyāya* view. Finally, in xii, 210, 22, *nyāyatantrāṇy anekāni* (declared by various people), "systems of logic," is typical of all remaining cases. *Nyāya*, then, usually means logic, but occasionally, in the pseudo-epic, the special Logic-system known to us as *Nyāya*.¹

Vaiçeṣika.

This word is used as an adjective, of *guṇas*, etc., in the sense of excellent; but the system is unknown in the main epic though it is referred to in the passage cited above, in i, 70, 43-44, and also in ii, 5, 5 (*vākya*) *pañcāvayavayukta*, another proof of the lateness of the *Kaccit* section,² whether the five *avayavas* here mentioned be terms implying *Nyāya* or *Vaiçeṣika*. *Kaṇāda*'s name appears first in the *Harivaṇṣa* (see below, p. 98, and above, p. 89).

The Four Philosophies.

In xii, 350, 64 ff. (compare 350, 1, *pracaranti*) it is said that there are four current philosophies, *jñānāni*, the *Sāṃkhya*yoga, *Pāñcarātra*, *Vedāranyaka* (or *Vedāh*), and *Pācupata*. *Kapila* declared the *Sāṃkhya*; *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the

¹ For the ordinary use, compare *tāis tāir nyāyāih*, such arguments, *passim*. All speculation is *Tarka*. Compare the remarkable statement, xii, 15, 26: "There are minute creatures whose existence can be argued by *tarka* (so small that) an eyelid's fall would be the death of a number of them."

² The former passage, after mentioning those endowed with *nyāyatattvātmavijñāna* adds *nānāvākyaśamāhārasamavāyaviçārādāih, viçesakāryavidbhic ca . . . sñhāpanākṣepasiddhāntaparamārthajñātām gatāih . . . kāryakāraṇavedibhih*, which may refer to either system. The passages have been cited by the author of *Das Mahābhārata als Epos*, etc., p. 226, who admits that the five "*avayās*," as he call them twice, imply the *Vaiçeṣika* system.

Yoga;¹ Apāntaratamas is called the Teacher of the Vedas ("termed by some Prācīnagarbha"); Īva declared the Pāṇu-pata religion; Vishnu, the whole Pāñcarātra. "In all these philosophies Vishnu is the niṣṭhā, or chief thing."²

Kapila and his System.

Although it is said, as quoted above, that there is no seer whose authority is authoritative, this is merely a teaching of temporary despair. Kapila is authoritative in all philosophical matters and his name covers every sort of doctrine. He is in fact the only founder of a philosophical system known to the epic. Other names of founders are either those of mere gods or disciples of Kapila. Bādarāyaṇa and Patañjali³ are unknown even as names, and Jāimini and Gāutama appear only as sages, not as leaders of speculation. Āṇḍilya (otherwise said to be known in the epic) is respectfully cited on Yoga, not as founder but as recommending Yoga concentration.⁴ As

¹ See the note on this verse just below. As Yoga-teacher of Dāityas, Ākra is mentioned, i, 66, 43. Both Vishnu and Īva are credited with being Yoga-lords (loc. cit. by Holtzmann, Das Mbh. im Osten und Westen, p. 110).

² In the Vāsudeva religious philosophy of Krishnaism, as expounded in xii, 345, 7 ff., some people, after death, become paramāṇubhūtas, very fine sprites, and enter Aniruddha; then as manobhūtas, or mental entities, they enter Pradyumna; thence they go to Īva (Sāṁkarṣaṇa). Such people are "the best priests and Sāṁkhyas and Bhāgavatas." Finally, devoid of all unspiritual constituents, trāigunyahīna, they enter Paramātman (Kṣetrajñā, nirguṇātmaka), or Vāsudeva. These are the four forms of God. The name of God is immaterial. Rudra and Vishnu are one being, sattvam ekam, divided in two, xii, 342, 27 (they are synonyms like brhad brahma and mahat, 337², paryāyavācākāḥ ṣabdāḥ; Vishnu may be called Īva and Brahman may be called Intellect).

³ In the Sarvadarṣanasamgraha it is said that Patañjali māde (atha yogānuṣāsanam, i, 1) an anuṣāsaṇa, or secondary collection (as *anu* is explained) based on earlier Puranic materials. The verse attributed in this connection to the Yājñavalkya Smṛti (158, 17; p. 239 of Cowell's translation) has caused the Petersburg Lexicon to postulate, s. v., another Smṛti of the same name. I think it is a mere lapsus for Vyāsa's Smṛti, for the verse cited ("Hiraṇyagarbha, and no other ancient, is the declarer of Yoga") occurs, xii, 350, 65. It has occurred to me that this verse might imply Patañjali, and the "no other" be a distinct refutation of his claim, the epic preferring divine authority; but this is perhaps too pregnant.

⁴ prthagbhūteṣu sṛṣṭeṣu caturthācramakarmasu samādhāu yogam evāi-tac (maduktam vākyam) chāṇḍilyaḥ ṣamam abravīt, xii, 254, 14.

a teacher of unconditioned Brahman, Ātreya is lauded in xiii, 137, 3; and in xii, 319, 59, a list of teachers of the twenty-fifth (spiritual) principle is given as having instructed the Gandharva Viçvāvasu: Jāigīṣavya, Asita Devala, Parāçara, Vārsaganya, Bhṛgu, Pañcaçikha, Kapila, Çuka, Gāutama, Ārṣiṣeṇa, Garga, Nārada, Āsuri, Pulastya, Sanatkumāra, Çukra, Kaçyapa, seventeen mixed gods, saints, and philosophers, of whom two are important besides Kapila, namely Āsuri and Pañcaçikha, his pupils; while one system (explained below) is referred also to Asita Devala.

There seems to be no reason to doubt that Kapila was a real (human) philosopher, and not a mere shadow of a divinity. The fact that his name is also given to divinities proves the opposite as little as does his deification, for it is customary to deify sages and for divinities to have sages' names. A perfect parallel to the use of Kapila in this way is afforded by Kaṇāda, which, as far as I know, occurs first as an epithet of Çiva as supreme god, in the Harivaṇça 3, 85, 15-16:

yam āhur agryam puruṣam mahāntam
 purātanaṁ sām̐khyanibaddhadṛṣṭayah
 yasyā 'pi devasya guṇān samagrāṇs
 tattvāṇc caturviṇcatim āhur eke
 yam āhur ekam puruṣam purātanaṁ
Kaṇāda-nāmānam ajam maheçvaram
 dakṣasya yajñāṁ vinihatya yo vāi
 vināçya devān asurān sanātanaḥ

Kapila's treatise is repeatedly declared to be oldest, but he is not only the oldest, he is the supreme seer, identical with Agni, with Çiva also, and with Vishnu. He is said to have got his wisdom from Çiva.¹

¹ "Of the treatises declared by metaphysicians that by Kapila is the earliest," xii, 351, 6; agniḥ sa Kapilo nāma, sām̐khyayogapravartakaḥ, iii, 221, 21. Hall gives a later v. 1, sām̐khyasāstrapravartakaḥ, Sām̐khyasāra, p. 18, where most of the epic allusions are collected. As supreme seer, xii, 350, 65; Çiva, xii, 285, 114, where the commentator interprets Sām̐khyas as Vedānta (as often); xiii, 17, 98, and xiii, 14, 323, Çiva as Kapila. Kapila is identified with Vishnu in iii, 47, 18; Gītā, 10, 26, etc.; with Prajāpati in xii, 218, 8-10, where

I have noticed only one passage, xii, 269, 9, where Kapila is presented in the light of adverse criticism from the point of view of orthodox Brahmanism. On seeing a cow led out for sacrifice, Kapila, filled with compassion, cried out O ye Vedas! an exclamation of reproof against the Vedas, as inculcating cruelty to animals. At this he was attacked by the inspired cow with a long discourse, challenging him to show why the Vedas should be regarded as authoritative in any regard, if not in regard to the slaughter of animals.

Kapila appears in this tale as a teacher of unorthodox non-injury and maintains to the end (so that his view is presented as really correct) that not the sacrifice of animals but the "sacrifice (worship) of knowledge" is the best. Elsewhere also we find the same antithesis between the old orthodoxy and the new science of thought, which not only disregards Vedic ceremonies but condemns them (xiv, 28, 7 ff.).

The best evidence of the authority of Kapila is given not by express statement but by implication in the praise of other systems, which, an important point, are by the same implication looked upon as distinct from that of Kapila, although his name is used to uphold them. Thus Kapila's own system is called generally the Sāṃkhyayoga, or specifically the Kāpilam.¹ The Sāṃkhyayogins are said to be the models even in teaching of other tendency, as in xii, 347, 22, and nothing better can be said of the Bhāgavatas, here extolled, than that their system is "equal to the Sāṃkhyayoga," not, be it

he is called the supreme seer, incorporate in Pañcaçikha (the first pupil of Āsuri, who in turn was a pupil of Kapila). In xii, 387, 8, Kapila is Çālihotra-pitā amṛtaḥ, father of Çālihotra, the veterinary sage (above, p. 12). Kapilaḥ prāha: prītaç ca Bhagavān jñānaṃ dadāu mama bhavāntakam, xiii, 18, 4. The Harivaṇṣa, 8, 14, 4, and 20, speaks of Kapila as the "teacher of Yoga, the teacher of Sāṃkhya, full of wisdom, clothed in Brahman, the lord of ascetics." Compare the supreme spirit as Kapila, xii, 340, 68.

¹ "He learned the whole Yoga-çāstram and the Kāpilam," xii, 326, 4; Viriñca iti yat proktaṃ Kāpilam jñānacintakāḥ sa Prajāpatiḥ eva 'ham, xii, 343, 94 (Kapila, 95). Also Sāṃkhya kṛtānta, Gītā, 18, 18.

observed, the same, but as good as the system of Kapila.¹ Amid a list of heroes in xiii, 75, 24-25, we find placed beside battle-heroes, gift-heroes, moral-heroes, etc., only Sāṃkhya and Yoga heroes, enrolled to represent philosophy.² As between the two, the implication contained in the words at Gītā 5, 5, "the Yoga gets as good a place as the Sāṃkhya," is that it is the Sāṃkhya which is the norm. Sāṃkhya is cited alone as the one system of salvation in i, 75, 7: "Salvation he studied, the unequalled system of Sāṃkhya." In contrast with Veda and Vedāṅga, it is the one type of philosophy: "He became learned in the Atharva Veda and the Veda, in the ritual also, and a past-master in astronomy, taking the greatest pleasure in Sāṃkhya," xiii, 10, 37; "Vedas, Aṅgas, Sāṃkhya, and Purāṇa," xiii, 22, 12.

The two systems are often separated. Yogapradarṣināḥ stands parallel to Sāṃkhyānadarṣināḥ, xii, 314, 3-4. "The rules both of Sāṃkhya and Yoga" are mentioned, xii, 50, 33. Nārada "knew the difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga," ii, 5, 7. Āunaka is "rapt with metaphysics, adhyātma, skilled in Yoga and in Sāṃkhya," iii, 2, 15. The difference is explained in the Gītā as: "The double point of view, niṣṭhā, of the Sāṃkhyas, who have jñānayoga; of the Yogins, who have karmayoga." Sometimes Sāṃkhyajñāna on the one hand is opposed to Yoga alone on the other, xii, 315, 18.³ Sometimes the Āstra is that of the Yoga, as opposed to jñāna of the Sāṃkhya, xii, 319, 67; yogaçāstreṣu, 340, 69, etc. Nevertheless, they are, says the Gītā, essentially one system. And so often we find that Vedic practices and the existence of God are claimed for Sāṃkhya and Yoga, as if they were one system. The same is true of the practice of austerities or asceticism. "The many names of God are declared in the Rig Veda with

¹ Sāṃkhyayogena tulyo hi dharma ekāntasevitaḥ, xii, 340, 74.

² So in viii, 33, 49, Yoga and Sāṃkhya (Ātmanah) represent philosophy.

³ Compare xiii, 149, 189: yogo jñānam tathā sāṃkhyam vidyāḥ śūpādi-karma ca. In the passage cited above, the interesting arisṭāni tattvāni are grouped with yoga and sāṃkhyajñāna (as objects of research). They are explained elsewhere, xii, 318, 8, as "signs of death," appearing to one if he cannot see the pole-star or his reflection in another's eye, etc.

the Yajur Veda, in Atharva (and) Sāmāns, in Purāṇa with Upanishads, in astronomy also, in Sāṃkhya and in Yoga-cāstra, and in Āyur Veda," to give the bizarre group of xii, 342, 8. "Both gods and demons practise austerity, tapas, which has been argued out, yuktitah, of Veda and Sāṃkhyayoga," xii, 285, 192.¹

Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

But it must be noticed that the claim for the identity of Sāṃkhya and Yoga comes from the Yoga side, which is deistic and seeks to make the Sāṃkhya so, exactly in the way the Vedānta commentator seeks to make the Yoga passages Vedantic. The distinctive mark of the Yoga, as given above from the Gītā, 3, 3, is, if we translate it in the natural original sense, application to work as opposed to application to understanding; in other words the Yoga laid stress on religious practices, the Sāṃkhya on knowledge.² It may be that Yoga also, like Sāṃkhya, was originally atheistic and that deistic Yoga was a special development. Nothing could be falsier, however, than the supposition that the Yoga and Sāṃkhya differ only in method, or the epic assumption that both are a sort of Vedānta inculcating belief in Brahman as the All-soul. Even the Gītā recognizes the distinction between the two schools in saying that the system that recognizes the All-soul ("one entity eternal, undivided, in all divided existences") is better than the one that recognizes "separate and distinct entities in all existent beings," 18, 21-22, clearly referring to the fundamental difference between Brahmaisism³ and Sāṃ-

¹ It may be observed of the terminology that as Yoga means Yogin as well as the system, so Sāṃkhya means system or a philosopher of that system. Typical of the pseudo-epic is the circumstance that here Sāṃkhyayogāu are personified as two beings along with Nārada and Durvāsas, xiii, 151, 45.

² Compare the use in xiii, 84, 40, where it is asked: *kena vā karmayogena pradhāne 'ha kena vā* (can I be purified), i. e., "by application to holy works." Compare *kṛtyoga*, xiii, 83, 18.

³ As Vedānta is commonly used of Čaṃkara's interpretation, I employ Brahmaisism to connote a belief in the All-soul without necessarily implying a concomitant doctrine of illusion, *Māyā*.

khyāism. The practical difference is that formulated at xii, 317, 2 ff., where it is said: "There is no knowledge like the Sāṃkhya, no power like the Yoga; these are both one in practice, ekacaryāu, because both destroy death. Foolish people regard them as distinct, but we recognize them as one. What the Yogas see is seen by Sāṃkhyas; who sees Sāṃkhya and Yoga as one sees truly," a passage copied from the Gītā, 5, 4-5, and repeated with varied readings in xii, 306, 19.

Though the pseudo-epic is so like the Gītā, its relative lateness, I may observe in passing, is shown *inter alia* by the use in this passage of *yogam* as a neuter noun, xii, 317, 27, *etad dhi yogam yogānām*,¹ as in xiii, 17, 19; one of the many little points ignored in the unhistorical synthetical method.

This passage, in its admission under cover of fools' opinion, shows clearly that the two systems could be regarded as identical only by insisting on the objective of each. Both systems gave emancipation, therefore they were one. But one way was that of pure science or knowledge, the other was that of pious work (*yoga*, *tapas*) added to this science, a practical divergence that existed quite apart from the question whether the goal was really the same.

But the epic in other passages, despite its brave pretence, is not content with Sāṃkhya science or even with Yoga work. On the contrary, the religious devotees named above throw over both systems. It is true they keep the name, just as these philosophical systems themselves pretend to depend on the Vedas, or as European philosophers used to claim that their systems were based on orthodoxy. But this only shows how important and fully established were these philosophical systems when the sects arose that based salvation on faith and the grace of a man-god, while still pretending to philosophy. They could not unite, for the true Sāṃkhya did not teach Brahmaism, but *kevalatvam*, or absolute separation of the individual spirit from everything else, an *astitvam kevalam*, or existence apart from all, not apart in Brahman.

¹ Repeating *yoga eṣa hi yogānām* in 307, 25.

No less irreconcilable with the earlier belief is the later sectary's view of action, *pravṛtti*, as due to God. For the older sage was intent on escaping action, which the system regards as due not to spirit but to the inherent quality of its antithesis, *Prakṛti*. But in the religious substitution of a personal Lord, *Īṣvara*, as synonymous with the Supreme, it is taught that "the Lord created *pravṛtti* as a picturesque effect" (after electing *nivṛtti* for himself)!¹ Here the roots of the Karma doctrine are cut by the new faith of the quasi monotheism which is reflected in the later pseudo-epic.²

Fate and Free-Will.

Another side of speculation presents a varied field of belief. Is there such a thing as free-will? The later epic fixes responsibility in turn on the Lord, man himself, *puruṣha*, luck, *haṭha*, and Karma, xii, 32, 12, ff.; where Karma is finally recognized as the only agent, as otherwise God would be responsible for sin; and if man were the sole agent there could be none higher than man. As luck would absolve a man, only Karma is left, associated with Time in a sort of dual fatalism, *karmasūtrātmaka*. Obviously Fate, as Time is here, really undermines the theory of Karma quite as much as does the interposition of the Lord or any other foreign factor. So in xii, 224, 16 ff. and 226, 13 and 21 ff., we find first the reflex of the Upanishads and *Gītā*, "he who (in imagination) slays and he who is slain are both ignorant," and then: "The deed causes the deed; but the deed has another creator, Fate, Time. Fate or *what will be will be* is the cause." "Sorrow lies in thinking 'I am responsible'; for I do that which the ordainers ordained when I was born."³

¹ *pravṛttidharmān vidadhe kṛtvā lokasya citratām*, xii, 341, 90.

² This is the "fourfold God," worshipped by the *Ekāntins* as having one, two, three, or four forms, identified with Krishna, his son, grandson, and brother, as named above, p. 97. He is maker and non-maker, and takes *Prakṛti*'s function in "sporting:" *yathe 'cchati tathā rājan kṛdate puruṣo 'vyayaḥ*.

³ So 224, 31; 226, 8; 227, 34 and 35: *kālāḥ pacati . . . kālāḥ kalayati prakṛtiḥ*, 226, 12: "Whatever state one obtains he must say *bhavitavyam*," "it was fated," i. e., independently of Karma. For *kāla* from *kal*, cf. *Gītā*, 10, 30.

Elsewhere Fate is the Divine power, *dāiva*, opposed to human effort and to nature, *svabhāva*, the latter having the implication of the Karma doctrine. Each of these factors is upheld by one or another theorist, while others claim that they all work together, xii, 233, 19, repeated at 239, 4-5. In other places the same Fate that is elsewhere made responsible is scorned, *dāivam klibā upāsate*, "only eunuchs worship Fate;" and "there is no Fate, all depends on one's own nature;" the Karma doctrine, *svabhāvataḥ*, xii, 139, 82; 291, 13.¹

Sāṃkhya is Athelistic.

In the "one-soul" doctrine just referred to, God himself is energy, *kāryātman*, the soul of all, the saviour, "the Light which Yogins see," the Ego, eternal, without characteristics of any sort, *aham ca nirguṇaḥ*, xii, 47, 54, 63, 69-70; xiv, 25, 7. He exists "alone with wisdom," till he makes the worlds, each succeeding æon, xii, 340, 71-72, just as sunrise and sunset follow each other, *ib.* 75. On the other hand, the epic declares with all plainness that the Sāṃkhya system is devoid of a belief in a personal supreme God. In xii, 301, 1 ff., the question is raised, What is the difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga? The answer is: "Sāṃkhyas praise the Sāṃ-

¹ According to xii, 239, 20, Time is the origin and controller of all things, *prabhavaḥ . . . saṃyamo yamaḥ*, and all things produced by duality exist according to their own nature, *svabhāvena*. The nature of the individual spirit is often rendered by this word, as such a spirit is conditioned by its former acts. Below is cited a case where it is a factor of the body, distinct from organs, mind, and spirit. An interesting critique of heretics leads up to xii, 238, 3 ff. (where the word connotes nature as understood by Buddhists and materialists): *yas tu paçyan svabhāvena vinā bhāvam acetanaḥ puçyate sa punaḥ sarvān prajñayā muktahetukān, yeṣāṃ cāi 'kāntabhāvena svabhāvāt kāraṇam matam, pūtvā tṛṇam iṣikām vā, te labhante na kimcana . . . svabhāvam kāraṇam jñātvā na çreyasḥ prāpnuvanti te, svabhāvo hi vināçāya mohakarmamanobhavaḥ*, "He is a fool who teaches that nature alone exists, or that cause of change is inherent in nature alone" (nature is without intelligence and, çl. 9, only intelligence gives success; hence nature without intelligence would result in nothing; the final opinion given in çl. 6 on *svabhāva* and *paribhāva*). C. has a curious v. l. (for *pūtvā*, etc.) *grutvā nṛṇām rṣiṇām vā*.

khya system; Yogas the Yoga system. The pious Yogas say, How can one be freed when one is without a personal God (anīṣvaraḥ); while the Sāṁkhyas say that one who knows truly all earthly courses becomes unaffected by objects, and would clearly get released from the body in this way alone. This is the exposition of release given by the very intelligent Sāṁkhyas. But one should take as the means of release that explanation which is given agreeably to his own party. . . . The Yogas rely on immediate perception (of truth), while the Sāṁkhyas determine according to their code. For my part, I approve of both,¹ for either system followed according to its code would lead to the highest course (emancipation). Purity, penance, compassion toward all creatures, and keeping vows, are found equally in both (systems), but the (philosophic) exposition is not the same in both." The last words, darṣanam na samam tayoh, "the exposition is not the same," can point here only to the essential difference just indicated by the speaker, namely, that one admits and one denies God. And it is to be noticed that this is the end of the explanation. There is not the slightest hint that the anīṣvara or atheistic Sāṁkhyas believe in God (a personal Lord, Īṣvara).

It must also be remembered that the very term here used to describe the Sāṁkhya belief, far from being admitted as one that connotes a belief in Brahman, is reprehended, not only in the pietistic question above (which may fairly be put categorically as "it is impossible to be saved if one does not believe in a personal God"), but also in the Gītā, which links together as a "creed of devils" the denial of "reality, basis, and personal God," asatyam apratiṣṭhaṁ te jagad āhur anīṣvaram, Gītā, 16, 8, an expression which would have been impossible had the anīṣvara doctrine been accepted as simply a formal modification of deism, implying a belief in a background of Brahman.

I do not think that anīṣvara can possibly mean here "not

¹ The Yoga has the immediate perception of the mystic: pratyakṣahetavo yogāḥ sāṁkhyāḥ cāstraviniṣcayāḥ, ubhe cāi 'te mate tattve mama (Bhīṣmasya), pl. 7.

having the senses as master," as it does in xii, 247, 7, where it is opposed to *indriyāṇāṃ vaṣyātmā*; a passage mistranslated by the author of *Nirvāṇa*, p. 96, as "Without the Lord one attains the place of immortality," though it clearly means: "Not having (the senses as) a master one attains the immortal state, but being subject to the senses one obtains death."

In the theistic religion, the personal God not only supplants the old explanation of spirit, but even takes the place of *Prakṛti*, the unmanifest unknown Source of the *Sāṃkhya*, and creates everything, as does egoism in the pure dogma of the *Sāṃkhya*, as "the name made by egoism, which is synonymous," *ahamkāra-kṛtaṃ cāi 'va nāma paryāyavācakaṃ*, xii, 340, 62. So to the sectary the name is ever indifferent. As to-day he accepts Christ as his own divinity under another name, so he did of old. The passage in the *Gītā* is well known, which establishes the principle. In xiii, 14, 318, it is said: "In the *Sāṃkhya* system the All-soul is called *Puruṣa*," i. e. the *Sāṃkhyas* recognize only *Puruṣa*, but we say that their *Puruṣa* is our All-soul. The twenty-fifth, *Puruṣa*, is thus identified with wisdom, *vidyā*, xii, 308, 7 ff. In a preceding section, 308, 119, *Hiraṇyagarbha* is intellect, and is called *Virīṇca*, *Aja*, etc., "called by many names in the *Sāṃkhya* *Çāstra*."

Yoga as Deistic and Brahmaistic.

The ancient Yogin tales in the epic show that there are important differences between the older and later view of Yoga. To stand on one leg for years and keep quiet long enough for birds to nest in one's matted locks was the "discipline" of the primitive Yogin as he is represented in these tales. But the Yogin of the later epic regards all such practices as crude and unsatisfactory. His discipline is an elaborate course of breathings and mental confinement in bodily postures described as customary in the *Yoga* *Çāstras*. So many breathings at such a time and so many at another, minute attention (in a sitting posture) to concentration and meditation, the

whole paraphernalia of Patañjali, exercised for a "limited time,"¹ not a word about standing on one leg for years. The difference is more than superficial, however. The one-leg Yogin strove for one thing only, supernatural powers. Tale after tale recounts what powers he gained by these exercises, and these powers were his goal. He was deistic but he had no thought of "entering Brahman," only of controlling the powers terrestrial, celestial, and elemental. On death his goal is to be a spirit free and powerful, enjoying good things. On the other hand, the Yogin of the pseudo-epic discipline learns all these powers, but "he who practises them goes to hell," because his goal was not to be a thaumaturge but to be released. Both experienced the *apunarbhavakāma*, "longing not to be born again," but the first desired *bala*, or Yoga "lordship," *aiçvarya*, and all his efforts were directed to that end; while the last desired lordship only as a means soon to be rejected for something higher, release, *mokṣa*, or *kevalatva*, isolation,² and eventually the recognition of *ekatva*, unity, of intellect, mind, senses, and universal soul, *ātmano vyāpinaḥ*, xii, 241, 2-3.³

The Brahmaistic Yogin is an advance on the deistic Yogin. The latter recognizes only isolation, *kevalatva*. So under the influence of Vishnuism a lecture which teaches Brahman isolation appears revamped as pantheistic Brahmaism.⁴

In xii, 317, 16 ff., the Yogin meditates on the eternal Lord-Spirit and Brahman, *taṣṭhuṣaṃ puruṣaṃ nityaṃ . . . iṣāṇaṃ brahma ca*, the Yogin being in concentration and trance, *saṁyama*, *saṁādhi*: "Like a flame in a windless place, like a

¹ xii, 241, 22 ff. *evam parimitaṃ kālam* (six months) *ācāraṇ āsīno hi rahasya eko gacched ākṣarasāmyatām*. Cf. *pratibhā*, *apavarga*, 317, 14.

² The chapter xii, 280, shows that *mokṣa* may be simply isolation or independence and does not necessarily connote absorption.

³ The whole *Yogakṛtya* is comprised here in this union as "the highest knowledge."

⁴ The compilers are not averse to this practice; it is a common Hindu method of improvement. Either the text is rewritten and interpolated or it is allowed to stand and another section is prefixed or added of the same content differently treated. The rule is that the improvement precedes the original.

mountain peak (compare *kūṭastha*), he beholds Brahman, which is like a fire in great darkness." Then "on abandoning his body without a witness," this Yogin, after attaining in life his powers over the breathings and elements, *rudrapradhānas*, and wandering about with the "body of eight characteristics," enters into the Lord-Spirit who is isolated, *kevalam yāti*, for "this is the Yogin's Yoga; what else would have the sign of Yoga?"¹ So ends the chapter, without a suggestion that the Yogin is to be identified with Vishnu.

In the imitation and improvement of this passage, thrust before it in the text, the Yogin's release does not end matters, though Vishnuism is inserted rather clumsily, as will be seen from an analysis of the whole section, 301, 11 ff. "Cutting off the five faults by Yoga, people freed of sins obtain that place (or condition), *tat padam*, like as big fishes cut through a net and get the water (the fish is not identical with the water, *tat padam* is place or condition, freedom). Even as strong animals, *mṛgāḥ*, cut the net, so they would get a clean road when they are freed from all their bonds. Endued with strength, *Yogas*, on cutting thus the bonds made by greed, go the clean way that is highest and auspicious. . . . Those without power are destroyed, those that have power are released, *mucyante balānvitāḥ*. . . . On acquiring Yoga-power one can oppose the many objects of sense, *vyūhate viṣayān*, as an elephant opposes a great stream. By Yoga-power made independent, *avaçāḥ*, Yogins enter *Prajāpatis* and seers and gods and the elements, as their lords. Not Yama nor the End-maker (differentiated here, often as one), though angered, nor Death, fearful in prowess, not all these lord it over a Yoga of unmeasured energy. A Yogī could make himself many thousands when he has got his power, and with these could wander over earth. Such an one could take the objects of sense and then perform hard austerity and again reduce it, as the sun does his beams of light, *tejogūṇas*. The Yoga who holds to the power and is lord of bonds obtains in release, *vimokṣe*, the fullest lordship, *prabhaviṣṇutva*. These powers

¹ *etad hi yogam yogānām kim anyad yogalakṣaṇam*, 317, 27.

obtained through Yoga have been obtained by me. For elucidation I will now tell thee again, O King, also about the subtle powers.¹ Hear from me, O Bharata, the subtle signs of the soul in concentration, *samādhāna*, and in respect to contemplation, *dhāraṇā*, O lord. As an archer by being attentive, *apramatta*, with concentration hits the mark, so the Yogin, properly intent, doubtless obtains release, *mokṣa*. As a man intent, *yukta*, with intent mind would go up a ladder, steadily fixing his thoughts on the vessel full of oil (in his hands), so the Yoga here, intent, O King, steadily makes spotless his soul (till) it looks like the image of the sun.² As the steersman with concentration, *samāhita*, would guide a ship on the ocean, so by applying self-concentration with intentness, *ātma-samādhānaṁ yuktivā yogena*, he that knows the true, *tattva*, gets a place hard to attain, *durgam āsthānam*, after leaving his body here. As a charioteer with concentration yoking, *yuktivā*, good horses, quickly brings the knight to the desired place, *deṣam iṣṭam*, so, O King, the Yogin with his mind concentrated in contemplation quickly gets the highest place, *paraṁ sthānam*, just as the arrow when released, *mukta*, finds its mark. The Yogin who stands steadily seeing self in self destroys sin and gains the unalterable place, *padam*, of those who are pure. The Yogin who properly joins, *yuṅkte*, with his soul (self) the subtle self in the navel, throat, head, heart, chest, sides, eye, ear, and nose, quickly consuming his Karma, good and bad, though mountainous (in size), having recourse to highest Yoga is released, if he wishes."

This is the end of the discourse for the present. Nothing is said of the Yogin's emancipation being other than a release from bonds. The conversation turns to the question of food and means of restraint of the senses, the hard path of auster-

¹ These words are perhaps the mark of interpolation here.

² *sneha-pūrṇe yathā pātre mana ādhāya niṣcalam, puruṣo yukta ārohet sopānam yuktamānasah, yuktas tathā 'yam ātmānam yogaḥ pārthiva niṣcalam karoty amalam ātmānam bhāskaropamadārṇavam*. In 317, 22, *tāilapātraṁ yathā pūrṇaṁ karābhyāṁ grhya pūruṣaḥ sopānam āruhet bhītas tarjyamāno 'sipāṇibhiḥ saṁyatātmā bhayāt teṣāṁ na pātrād bindum utsrjet tathāi 'vo 'ttaram āgamyā ekāgramanasas tathā*, etc.

ities which makes the subtle soul shine forth, but he who follows it "is released from birth and death, ill and weal." "This," it is then said, "is what has been set forth in various Yoga-Āstras; in the twice-born is admittedly the highest Yoga practice," *kṛtyam*, çl. 57.

Thus far the śloka and the final stanza seems to show that this is the end. But to this are tagged on five triṣṭubh stanzas, with which the chapter now concludes: "That highest Brahman-made Brahmán and Lord Vishnu, the boon-giver, O great-souled one, and Bhava, and Dharma, and the six-faced (god), and the sons of Brahmán, tamas, rajas, sattva, and highest Prakṛti, and Siddhi the goddess wife of Varuṇa, and all energy, tejas, and patience, and the pure lord of stars in the sky with the stars, all the all-gods, the snakes, and manes, and all mountains, the terrible seas, all rivers with forests and clouds, Nāgas and nagas, troops of genii, spaces, the angel hosts, males and females—one after the other attaining, the great great-souled Yogin would enter soon after he is released. And this narration, O King, is auspicious in that it rests on the god who has great vigor and intelligence. Such a great-souled Yogin, overpowering all mortals, acts, having the self of Nārāyaṇa" (according to the commentator, makes all things as being identical with Nārāyaṇa).¹

It is true that a view which ignores every indication of interpolation may insist that literature is to be treated without critique, overlook the patchwork, and concentrate emphasis on this last *nārāyaṇātmā* to offset the whole teaching preceding, which is that the soul gets isolation, not absorption into Brahman. But even then Nārāyaṇa is not philosophical Brahman. In the following chapter, which is a new discussion, 302, 55, the Kāpilāḥ Sāṃkhyāḥ are also led to emancipation, in which teaching ātman rests on Nārāyaṇa, Nārāyaṇa rests on emancipation, but emancipation has no support (the same word as above of the narration which rests on Nārāyaṇa), *mokṣam saktam tu na kvacit*; though the Sāṃkhya philoso-

¹ *yogi sa sarvān abhībhāya martyān nārāyaṇātmā kurute mahātmā*, 301, 62.

phers are finally conducted through an unfinished sentence eighteen *çlokas* long¹ to Nārāyaṇa, who bears them to the Highest Soul, when they become fitted for immortality, and return no more, çl. 78.

These are chapters of a sectarian cult, which seeks to include in its embrace all systems of philosophy,² and does so *vi et armis*. The more precious and reliable are those expositions which show the systems still but slightly twisted from their original form. This last is a system called Vedānta, 302, 71, as I have already remarked, but in point of fact it, i. e., this last chapter, not the preceding exposition, is an exposition of Yoga twisted into sectarian Brahmaisism. The soul eventually enters Vishnu, who is unconditioned Brahman, and does not return; but it enters by *jīva* and *videha mukti*, in Yoga style. That is, before death the real soul enters Vishnu, leaving behind in a man not soul but only mind and senses. Shortly after, however, one is really "released and gets peace." This, it is said, is the Sāṃkhya system which is identical with eternal Brahman (302, 96-101; compare 106, *amūrtes tasya . . . sāmṅhyam mūrtir iti çrutiḥ*). The Sāṃkhya system, which is at first said to be faultless (çl. 4), is in çl. 13 declared to have faults as well as virtues, the same being true of Veda and Yoga; that is, this teaching is put forward as an improvement on the old, though the accepted base is the Sāṃkhya. It is pretended that the teachers teach as do the Kāpilas, who are endued with knowledge and "clarified by ratiocination," *kāraṇāir bhāvitāḥ çubhāḥ*, çl. 17.

Difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

As has been shown above, the epic itself teaches that the great difference between the two systems is that the Sāṃkhya does not believe in a personal God, while God is the supreme

¹ xii, 302, 24-52. Compare 5-17 also one sentence. These interminable sentences are marks of the late style of the pseudo-epic.

² In çl. 108 it is said that this Vedānta (çl. 71) Sāṃkhya embraces all the knowledge found in Sāṃkhyas and Yoga (*sāmṅhyeṣu tathāi 'va yoge*), the Purāṇa, the great Itihāsas (pl.), Arthaçāstra, and the world (*Lokāyata*?).

belief of the Yogin. A further difference is found by the commentator in the words of xii, 240, 8, where it is said: "Vishnu in stepping, Çakra in power, Agni in the digestive organ (etc.) wishes to enjoy," *bhoktum icchati*, a stanza wedged between the statements that bodies come from earth, etc., and that ears, etc., are organs of sense. What is apparent is that experience is here shifted from pure spirit to the corresponding divinity.¹

So far as I know, the difference of opinion is nowhere in the epic stated to involve a distinction between the two systems, and in this chapter the subject of active and experiencing spirit is not further touched upon. I doubt, therefore, the validity of the commentator's explanation as applied to the epic, but his words are worth citing: "In the Yoga system the spirit is not active but experiences only, while in the Sāṃkhya system the spirit neither acts nor experiences. In this passage the poet repudiates the first doctrine, and expresses approval of the second" (by naming *devas* as "enjoyers," and thus showing that it is only a false imagination of the spirit when it thinks itself an "enjoyer").²

According to the epic, all activity resides in *Prakṛti*, the Source alone, while experience resides in spirit but only as the latter is conditioned by its environment, *prakṛtisthaḥ*, so that when it is in the body the highest spirit is called enjoyer and active, but it is not really so, *kurvaṇṇ api na lipyate, na karoti na lipyate*. This is the explanation of the *Gītā*³ (which denies that there is any speculative difference between the two systems), and is found often enough elsewhere.⁴ So God as a conditioned being, spirit, enjoys the *guṇas*, as in xii, 340, where the twenty-fifth principle, though "without

¹ As in *Māit. Up.* vi, 10, *bhoktā puruṣo bhojyā prakṛtiḥ*, "enjoy" is sometimes sensuously rendered, "Spirit is the eater, *Prakṛti* the food." Ordinarily "enjoy" is experience.

² *yogamate, ātmā bhoktāi 'va na tu kartā; sāmṅkhyamate tu, na bhoktā nā 'pi karte 'ti; tatrā 'dyaṃ dūṣayati*, etc.

³ *Gītā*, 3, 27; 5, 7; 13, 20, etc.

⁴ Compare xii, 247, 1-2: "The spirit supervises modifications (he knows them, they do not know him), he does what is to be done (only) in conjunction with the senses and mind, the sixth" (like a charioteer, as above).

characteristics," is *guṇabhuj* or enjoyer of *guṇas* as well as the superior creator of *guṇas*, *guṇasraṣṭā guṇādhikah*, *ḥl. 28*.¹ So *Īva* is *ṣaṣṭibhāga* (below). "Like a lamp giving light know the *jñānātman*, knowledge-spirit, *Puruṣa*, to be in all creatures. It makes the ear hear; it hears; it sees. The body is the *cause* (of perception), but this (soul) is the doer of all acts," *xii, 210, 40*. Here the last clause, *sa kartā sarvakaṛmaṇām*, means that soul acts only as modified by *Prakṛti*. In *xii, 222, 17 ff.*: "Whoso thinks himself an actor, faulty is his judgment. Activity is nature only, the only factor," *svabhāva eva tat sarvam* (one becomes *vitṛṣṇa*, *ḥl. 30*, when one knows the difference between the Source and its modifications). In *xii, 304, 45*, the Source does every act, and it alone enjoys, *aṇāti*. Opposed to this is the Brahmaistic view, which holds that "the inner soul, *antarātman*, alone smells, tastes," etc., as an entity separate from elements (below).

A practical difference may be found in the attitude of the two systems toward austerities, though it is stated that this exercise is common to both. Nevertheless it cannot be supposed that the "knowledge-philosopher" admitted as much *tapas* as did the *Yogin*, whose practical discipline was almost wholly a "razor-edged path" of austerity. The practice is occasionally reprehended, as in *xii, 221, 4*, where it is said that fasting is not meritorious, as it is injurious to the soul's discipline, *ātmāntropaghātaḥ*, a view which is of course contradictory to the mass of teaching in the epic, for example, *ib. 233, 23*, where penance is the means of "attaining to the being that creates the universe." The "difference between *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga*," as admitted and explained in the late passage *xii, 237, 29 ff.*, is mainly a practical one, in that "the *Sāṃkhya* keeps aloof from objects of sense, controls the senses, and is alike to all creatures, friendly to all, indifferent to all things,² injures no creatures, and so attains to Brahman;" whereas that *Yoga* is released "who, transcending supernatural power, ceases" (from activity). The *Yoga* is thus described in one

¹ The twenty-fifth, not the twenty-sixth principle, is here God.

² *sarvabhūtasadrū māitraḥ samaloṣṭācmaḥkāśānāḥ*, *38*, a standing epithet.

verse: *yogāiçvāryam atikrānto yo niṣkrāmati mucyate*, 237, 40. The dependence of the Sāṃkhya on knowledge alone is here merely implied, though the following image of the saving "ship of knowledge" makes it clearer, but the whole passage is a late attempt to interpret Sāṃkhya by another norm.¹

One further practical difference between the systems is pointed out by the commentator at xii, 241, 34, where, after asceticism is described, it is said that a man of low caste or a woman seeking virtue "may attain the highest course by this path" (of the Yoga). The commentator takes pains to remark that this applies only to the Yoga, and not to the Sāṃkhya. A little farther on, in 247, 16, where the same system is still taught, but on the intellectual side, not on the ascetic side, it is, expressly stated that the *Īśāstra* should be told only to men of the higher castes, *Snātakas*.²

It is expressly charged against the Pāçupata sect that it is subversive of caste: "I, Rudra, formerly for the first time invented the mysterious Pāçupata religion, beneficent to all, facing in all directions, one that takes years or only ten days³ to learn, one which, though blamed by the unintelligent (because it is) here and there opposed to the rules of the *Īśāstra* and those of the Orders, *varṇāçramakṛtāir dharmāir viparītām*

¹ *brahmāṇam abhivartate*, a late carelessness, repeated with *cā 'dhigacchati*, çl. 36 and 41. The four-faced Brahman and the highest Brahman, respectively, is the commentator's ready explanation ("masculine by Vedic licence"). The same sort of thing is found in another later passage, where a double carelessness appears, *brahmāṇam adhigatvā* (sic) ca, iii, 83, 73. Part of the above description is a copy of the *Gītā*, *nirmamaç cā 'nahamkāro nirdvandvaç chinnaśaṃçayaḥ nāi 'va krudhyati na dveṣṭi*, 237, 34, as in *Gītā*, 5, 8; 12, 13 (= 2, 71); 18, 53, *brahmabhūyāya kalpate*.

² See below the passage inculcating pure Yoga (the twenty-sixth principle), where it is said, xii, 319, 89, that it is a doctrine of emancipation for all, and knowledge is to be got from all, for all castes are Brahmans, all are born of Brahman, and all castes are equal; and compare ib. 188, 10 ff., *na viçeṣo 'sti varṇānām*, etc. In 251, 21, *ātmaññānam idaṃ guhyam*, as in the earliest Upanishads. A "God without characteristics" is responsible for the democratic equality of the "no caste" view. So Çivaism teaches that castes are only indications of position, *brāhmaḥ svabhāvaḥ* is everywhere equal, and all men are children of the one God who created them, xiii, 143, 50-3.

³ Instead of ten days, says the commentator, the *Gāuḍas* read "five days."

kvacit samam, is nevertheless appreciated by those of perfected wisdom, *gatāntas*, and is really superior to the Orders" (*atyāçramam*, xii, 285, 194-195). In the preceding stanza, this *Pāçupata* is contrasted with the gods' and demons' religion of austerity, the latter being "drawn from the Vedas and *Sāmkhya* and *Yoga* by logic,"¹ another mark of difference in the views urged in the epic, not, as often, concealed under a pretended unity, but openly stated.

Sects.

I would say a word here in regard to the sects recognized in the epic, though, except for their philosophy, I do not intend to touch further on them. The epic commentator sees in the epithet *pañcamahākalpa*, applied to Vishnu, a reference to the scriptures, *āgamas*, of five diverse sects, *Sāuras*, *Çāktas*, *Gāṇeças*, *Çāivas*, and *Vaiçnavas*. The epic in reality recognizes only the first and last two, for the allusion to shadow-worship (which the commentator explains as a *Left-hand* rite) though interesting, does not imply necessarily a body called *Çāktas*, and *Gāṇeças* are unknown, the god himself belonging only to the pseudo-epic introduction, and very likely interpolated there, as has been shown by Dr. Winternitz. Even *Durgā* seems to be a late addition to the epic as she appears hymned. But the *Çāivas* are known as having a religion called *Pāçupata* (above) and the *Vaiçnavas* and *Sāuras* are known in two late passages, xviii, 6, 97 and vii, 82, 16, under these names. I suppose only the synthetic method would claim that the whole epic recognizes the titles of sects so sporadically mentioned. The older Vishnuite sect-name is *Pāñcarātra* or the more personal "devotees of the Lord," *Bhāgavatas*, and *Bhagavadbhaktas*, even these being rather

¹ Rudra says to Dakṣa: *bhūyaç ca te varam dadmi tam tvaṁ gr̥hṇiṣva sūvrata, prasannavadano bhūtvā tad ibāi 'kamanāḥ çṛṇu; vedāt śaḍaṅgād uddhṛtya sām̐khyā-yogaç ca yuktitaḥ tapaḥ sutaptaṁ vipulaṁ duçcaraṁ devadānavāiḥ*, xii, 285, 191-192; and then as above, in contrast, the *Pāçupata* system, which has overthrown the older systems (Rudra destroys Dakṣa's sacrifice).

rare. The last, for example, is found in i, 214, 2 (with *bhāikṣas* or *cāukṣas*). The same passage that calls Vishnu *pañcamahākālpa* gives him the titles of *Prācīnagarbha* (below) and *Kāuṣika* and identifies him with the *Atharvaçiras Upanishad*, xii, 339, 113–125. Though the god is here Vishnu, I venture to think the last epithets were originally applied to *Çiva*. The “white men” of the White Island, or rather country (*dvīpa* = the *dig uttarā* or more exactly *uttarapaççimena*, “in the Northwest,” 336, 8–10; 337, 21 ff.) must be Kashmere Brahmans, who are often almost as white as Europeans and whose religion was the worship of *Çiva* (as a god of culture and letters) in monotheistic form, which is here perverted. The location “Northwest” and “far North” can scarcely be anywhere else than Kashmere, where alone “northern white men,” *çvetāḥ pumānsaḥ*, 336, 10, were to be seen.¹

The Different Schemata.

The philosophical schemes elaborated in the epic show three distinct groupings, which must belong to different systems. These are the *Sāṃkhya*, the *Yoga*, and a third system, which follows a different series of topics. All three differ essentially from Vedism and Brahmaism, as this latter, in turn, differs from what we call Vedānta. Both of the latter are represented, making six systems, as said above; but of these there are full schemata or topica in three cases at least,² indicating what for convenience I shall call scholastic differences, the three schematizing systems being here termed schools. It is unnecessary to point out that no one set of teachers, much less the one poet of the unhistorical method, would have inculcated six systems, or elaborated three schools, especially as the topics of two of these schools imply a fundamental difference between them.

¹ The “Sea of milk” in the *Purāṇas* is said to surround a Himālayan mountain, *Krāuñca*. The second (earlier) account of the “white men” in the epic is quite *Sāṃkhyan*, God is *Purusha*, etc.

² Compare also the rather rare recognition of pure Vedānta *Māyā-Brahmaism*, and above in the first chapter the philosophy copied from the *Upanishads* without identification of soul with sectarian god.

Common to all three schools is the distinction between the First Cause or Source as manifest and unmanifest. The manifest, or known, is all that is born, grows, ages, and dies, while the unmanifest, or unknown, is "the opposite,"¹ that is, it is devoid of these four marks, lakṣaṇas. Further, Sāṃkhya and Yoga both admit two selves, ātmans, it is said, which are declared "in the Vedas and in the Siddhāntas."² The first is that born with the four marks, that is, those of the manifest, and has four objects (caturvarga, virtue, pleasure, gain, emancipation). This is the manifest self, born of the unmanifest; it is awakened, buddha, but has not the highest intelligence, cetanā; it is the conditioned sattva soul, in distinction from the pure knowing soul, kṣetrajña, though both are attached to objects of sense. "Both systems admit twenty-five topics," a statement to be reviewed below.

The Unmanifest is that which cannot be known, avedyaṃ, which has no padanyāsa, leaves no track, and is therefore beyond knowledge, xii, 205, 18; avedyaṃ avyaktam, xii, 319, 42. Kapila calls it the ἀρχή, ādya, and says he uses the term First Cause, Source, Prakṛti, merely to escape a regressus ad infinitum. It is therefore merely a name, saṃjñāmātram. It is used of the That: "One could never reach the end of causation, nāi 'vā 'ntaṃ kāraṇasye 'yāt, even if one went unceasingly like an arrow from the cord, yathā bāṇo guṇacyutaḥ, and swift as thought. Nothing is more subtle than the

¹ So in xii, 217, 9-10, it is said that Prakṛti creates and has three guṇas, while spirit's marks are "the opposite" (for the threefold guṇas are only his "turban," cf. 12).

² xii, 237, 27, 31, siddhānteṣu. Siddhānta is mentioned also in i, 70, 44. In the present passage the commentator takes the Vedas and Siddhāntas as Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā. Another late expression in this section describes the effulgent jīva-yoked car as having all the Tantras as its goad (sarvatantrapratodaḥ, xii, 237, 11, straddles the pādas), where the commentator says Čāstra, and is probably right, as we have Nyāyatantras mentioned, which are doubtless works on logic. Compare with the passage above, xii, 206, 28, avyaktātmā puruṣo vyaktakarmā so 'vyaktatvaṃ gacchati hy antakāle; xii, 109, 125, caturbhir lakṣaṇair hīnaṃ tathā ṣaḍbhiḥ ṣaḍodaḥṣāḥ puruṣaṃ tam atikramya ākāṣaṃ pratipadyate (the six are ills and the sixteen are breaths, organs, and mind, according to the commentator), but the four are here said to be cetanā and three proofs.

unmanifest That (çl.18); nothing is coarser. Finer than fine, greater than great is That, the invisible end of all things," xii, 240, 28 (29 = Çvet. Up. iii, 16; Gītā, 13, 13). It is a term used in both philosophies, and is simply equivalent to the invisible unknown First Cause. From its synonym Prakṛti, First Cause, it may be called simply the Source. So also Brahman is avyaktam. Usually this term is defined in such negatives as in *neti neti*, a superabundance of which appears in this definition: "Brahman has *not* been explained by mantras; with the world of experience it has *not* anything in common; it has *not* sound, touch, *not* form; it is *not* comprehended; *not* manifest . . . not female, not male, not neuter (as in 251, 22), *not* being, not not-being, not being-and-not-being . . . not perishable,"¹ an imitation of older matter.

This "Unknown," which forms the common basis of the great philosophical systems, in the Sāṃkhya connotes potential egoism, becomes known first as Ego or self-conscious intellect, and out of this egoism is developed the whole created universe; over against which stands the pure unconscious spirit, the real Ego. This, in outline, is the whole plan of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, which admits nothing outside of pure Ego and self-conscious Ego, and ascribes all apparent other to modifications of egoism. There are here twenty-four principles over against the pure spirit Ego as the twenty-fifth.²

On the other hand, besides these, the Yogin's system superadds one exalted spirit as Supreme Spirit, or God, the twenty-sixth principle.

The Pāṇḍupatas and Bhāgavatas have a different system of categories, but teach that the Supreme Spirit as a personal God becomes manifest; in the latter sect, as a god-man.

Common to the three schools is the belief in the three constituents of the Unmanifest, called *guṇas*; but these are sometimes treated as constituents and sometimes as attributes.

¹ *na san na cā'sat sad-asac ca tan na . . . tad akṣaram na kṣarati 'ti viddhi.* In 251, 22, Brahman is *asukham* as well as *aduḥkham*, "not joy, not sorrow."

² Prakṛti is devoid of the highest intelligence, *acetaṇā*, and only when supervised by spirit creates and destroys. Purnusha has millions or 1,400,000 courses, xii, 315, 12; ib. 2; 281, 36.

The Guṇas.

The Unknown becomes known as a result of energy, *tejas* or *rajas*, rousing itself and rousing conditioned being, *sattva*,¹ out of the equilibrium which is maintained between these two and inertia (dulness, darkness, *tamas*). These are the three constituents of the conscious Ego, and consequently of all things except pure spirit. That is to say, energy, inertia, and existence (conditioned being), characterize all things, and life begins with energy moving *sattva* as well as itself. A moral interpretation of these strands, *guṇas*, as they are called, makes being, as compared with the other two, represent the true and real and good; inertia, the stupid and bad; while energy may be good or bad, but is never the best, as that is devoid of all activity (quietism).² These *guṇas*, constituents, are, to use a term taken from their grammatical application, themselves *guṇated* or characterized by the presence of certain qualities, a meaning often found employed in the case of *guṇa*. Thus in xii, 334, 2, one abandons fourfold faults, eightfold *tamas* and fivefold *rajas*. What is of most importance, however, from the historical rather than the philosophical point of view, is that in these groups there is no uniformity in the teaching of the epic. Thus in xii, 314, 21 ff., not five, as above, but over twenty faults are given as characteristics, *guṇas*, of *rajas*. In the same way, *sattva* has in xii,

¹ *Sattva* (compare *satyasya satyam*) is being, but not absolute being, which is free from consciousness of self. We may best render the "three strands" or inherent constituents of creation (everything except pure spirit) by energy, inertia, and conscious-existence, which exist potentially in the undeveloped and actually in the developed universe. I am aware that the *guṇas* are translated differently by high authorities, but must for the present refrain from further discussion of the interpretation.

² Compare *Gītā*, 17, 26: "*Sat* is employed in the meaning of *existence* and of *good*" (commentator wrong). The *avyakta* (unknown undeveloped) is *guṇated* as much as is *vyakta*, only the equilibrium not being disturbed the *guṇas* are merely potential, *avyaktaṁ triguṇaṁ smṛtam*, xiv, 30, 24. In regard to "darkness," it must be remembered that in the older philosophies, darkness, *tamas*, is not a quality but a substance (only the *Nyāya* regards it as absence of light). See the argument in the *Aṭhūka* chapter of the *Sarvadarśana*.

342, 13, eighteen guṇas, while in 314, 17 ff., nearly double this number are given it, including most of the former group but placed in a different arrangement. Again in xii, 302, 14-16, sattva has ten (unexplained) guṇas; rajas, nine; tamas, eight; buddhi, seven; manas, six; nabhas, five; but then, again, buddhi has fourteen; tamas, three; rajas, two; sattva, one.¹ This merely means that each strand has certain attributes.² The same list, for instance, is given in the Anugītā, xiv, 38, 2 ff., as *indications* of sattva. It seems unnecessary to enumerate these varying characteristics. The gist of them all is found in Gītā, 14, 9 ff.: sattva belongs to pleasant things, rajas to activity, tamas to apathy. So in xii, 194, 30, a touch of joy is characteristic of sattva, and "if anything is joined to joy there is the condition, bhāva, of sattva" (only five are given here); while in 35 there are five līṅgas or signs of energy, rajas, and in 36, five guṇas of tamas (= 286, 25 ff., with v. l. = 248, 19 ff.) As tejas, energy, is attributed to Brahman, the term falls into comparative desuetude, being replaced by the less moral rajas, while tejas is left as a virtuous characteristic: dhūtapāpmā tu tejasvī . . . ninīṣed brahmaṇaḥ padam (said of the good man), and Brahman is tejomayam, xii, 241, 9 and 13. So tejas is a good quality, Gītā, 16, 3.³

In this conception, sattva is as much of a bond as are the other two guṇas. Knowledge and pleasure are the attachments with which it binds the soul; while rajas binds with action and tamas with heedlessness, laziness, sleep, the signs of inertia, Gītā, 14, 6-8.

¹ The eighteen guṇas of sattva, to give an example, are *prītiḥ prakāśam udreko laghutā sukham eva ca, akārpaṇyam asamrambhaḥ santoṣaḥ śraddadhānatā, kṣamā dhṛtir ahiṃsā ca śāucam akrodha eva ca, ārjavam samatā satyam anasuyā tathāi 'va ca* (those in italics reappear in the longer list, 314, 17-20).

² The Hindu conception is not quite uniform in regard to the guṇas, but there is, I think, no reason for confounding essential constituents with attributes. Joy and sorrow are not the guṇas themselves but their objective signs in the moral world. The true opposites are tejas and tamas, light and darkness, as energy and inertia physically, and as goodness and badness morally.

³ But rajas often keeps its pure tejas sense, as in xiv, 88, 9, *rajaḥ paryāyakāraṇam*, rajas is energy.

The Source, Prakṛti, is the combination of the three guṇas, represented as a female productive power. As a lamp lights thousands so the Source modifies herself into the many guṇas (characteristics) of spirit. She does it of her own will and desire, and for the sake of sport.¹

According to the proportion of guṇas in a creature, it has a high, middle, or low place, xii, 315, 3-4; Gītā, 14, 18. Evidently, therefore, the Yoga-god must be without guṇas, so nirguṇa is predicated of him and of Brahman, nirguṇasya kuto guṇāḥ, xii, 306, 29, as say the guṇadarṣinaḥ, but as God must be everything he is also "with guṇas" as well as "without guṇas," a contradiction which is on a par with God's being being and not being being and being neither being nor not-being, the common tangle of metaphysics.² In fact, religious philosophy is hopelessly at sea, not only in regard to the question of a conditioned God but also in regard to the guṇas of the spirit. It is universally admitted that energy and inertia must be dispensed with in order to a full attainment of pure spirithood, xiv, 51, 25. But when spirit has sattva alone or is in sattva alone, sattvam āsthāya kevalam, is it one with this being or not? Some say, "and they are wise," that spirit and sattva have unity, kṣetrajñasattvayor āikyam, but this is wrong. Still, they cannot exist apart. There is unity and diversity, as in the case of the lotus and water-drop, the fish in water, the fly in the Udumbara plant, ekatvanānātvaṁ, xiv, 48, 9-11.³ In xiii, 108, 7, sattva must be "washed out"

¹ prakṛtir guṇān vikurute svacchandena 'tmakāmyayā kriḍārthe tu, xii, 314, 15-16 (prakṛtis tathā vikurute puruṣasya guṇān bahūn).

² God is nirguṇa and guṇātman and nirguṇa alone and triguṇa, etc., xii, 339, 3 ff.; xiii, 137, 3. Guṇa-made are all existences, Gītā, 7, 13; God is not in them, they are in him, ib., 12. They do not affect God, xii, 340, 22 (in 20 it is said that those devoid of rajas and tamas attain to God, presumably retaining sattva; but elsewhere sattva must also be lost, e. g., 335, 30); viddhi bhāvan madācṛayān, xiv, 54, 2; avyaktāt utpanno mahān ātmā ādir guṇānām, 40, 1.

³ Here Telang is obliged to render sattva as goodness and as nature, according to the verse, e. g., unintelligent sattva, 40, 9, and 12, where the spirit enjoys sattva. Sattva, however, is always conditioned existence or a conditioned being, abstract or concrete. It is the highest, because it may be free

of the soul of pure Yogins, along with rajas and tamas. In these cases we have simply an attempt on the part of theology to utilize the terms of atheistic philosophy, which naturally leads to confusion. For the terms (applicable to Prakṛti) of Sāṃkhya are incompatible with the philosophy which substitutes God for both Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

When the guṇas are called ātmaguṇas, as in xiv, 12, 4, it is to distinguish them as mental from the bodily constituents, guṇāḥ ṣarīrajāḥ, with which they are compared. As the three constituents of the body, ṣītoṣṇe vāyuḥ ca (= kapha, pitta, vāta) give a healthy condition when in equilibrium, so the three ātmaguṇas, when equal, produce a healthy condition. Here the three are merely essential elements in a tridhātu or threefold entity. Thus elements are called, as the constituents or factors, dhātavaḥ, inherent in the Source, dhātavaḥ pāñcabhāutikāḥ, iii, 211, 9 ff., just as the essential constituents of a king's concern are called guṇas, xv, 6, 6.

Plurality of Spirits.

The passage just cited from the Anugītā on "unity and diversity" reflects an important section in Ṣānti. Here, xii, 816, 3 ff., a difference is established between Unmanifest Prakṛti and spirit, the former being affected by guṇas, incapable of escaping from them, and inherently ignorant; the latter being both pure and contaminated, because he is associated with the Unmanifest. Causing creation he is called creator. Because of his observing as a spectator and of his

from rajas and tamas, but is itself, though "good," not "best." This is what is in the Hindu's mind, but the distinction between this existence and that of God or Brahman is much like that between the highest knowledge of man and that non-knowledge knowledge of God. Both are attempts to release the infinite from the limitation of any definition. To say *He is* is to put Him in a class, hence we cannot say *He is*, but of course we cannot say "*He is not.*" *He is* pure knowledge but this is a limitation; hence *He* knows without knowing and exists without existing, totally indefinable. The difference between the early Upanishad and epic philosophy in respect of conditioned Ātman, is that only the latter uses technical Sāṃkhya terms, just as the later Upanishads use them.

being without a second, *ananyatva*, and of his false opinion (of himself), *abhimāna*, *Yatis* (*Yogas*) regard him (the same spirit) as both eternal and non-eternal, manifest and unmanifest: "This is what I have heard said; but those who have the religion of compassion and abide by knowledge alone, say that there is unity in the Unmanifest but a plurality of spirits." Here the last authorities are clearly the *Sāṃkhyas*, who are characterized in the epic not only as "devoted to knowledge," but as especially moral and compassionate.¹ The section concludes: "Purusha, spirit, and the Unmanifest (masculine) are different. The latter is called eternal but is not eternal. Spirit's connection with the Unmanifest is that of the grass blade in its sheath, the fly and the *Udumbara*, the fish in water, the fire in the pan, the lotus and water-drop; there is connection but not identity. This is the *Sāṃkhya* view, the best estimate, *parisāṃkhyāna*."

So in xii, 351, 1, the question is raised in regard to one or many spirits, only to be answered with the statement that there may be many spirits, but they all have the same birth-place. The answer is really assumed in the question,² so that the passage is of interest chiefly as showing a full recognition of the fact that *Kapila* taught (as above) the doctrine of multitudinous spirits without a common source. This is brought out more distinctly in the following statement, viz., that *Vyāsa* (the *Yoga*) teaches that all spirits have a common source, although *Kapila* and other metaphysicians have declared *Çāstras* in which a plurality of spirits is inculcated: "In the discussion (of this subject) by *Sāṃkhya-Yogas* there are many spirits assumed in the world and (these philosophers) will not grant that one spirit (exists as the sole source). (But

¹ ib. çl. 11: *avyaktāi 'katvam ity āhur nānātvam puruṣās tathā sarvabhūtadayāvantah kevalam jñānam āsthitāh*. It is worth noticing how frequently the *Sāṃkhyas* are called "those who have compassion and knowledge," a Buddhist inheritance apparently, though this is a suggestion liable to seem antiquated.

² *bahavaḥ puruṣā brahmann utāho eka eva tu, ko hy atra puruṣaḥ creṣṭhaḥ ko vā yonir iho 'eyate*, "Are there many spirits or only one? Which is the best? or which (spirit) is the source?"

this is a mere assumption) and, as a sole source of many spirits is declared (to exist), so will I explain that spirit which is superior to conditions (or has superior characteristics) to be the All. . . . This hymn [Rig Veda, x, 90], the Puruṣa-Sūkta expounded in all the Vedas as right and true, has been considered by (Vyāsa), the lion among sages. Āśtras with rules and exceptions, utsargenāpavādena, have been proclaimed by sage metaphysicians beginning with Kapila. *But Vyāsa has proclaimed spirit-unity, puruṣāikatvam, and his teaching in brief will I declare.*"

Nothing could show more clearly the absurdity of denying the variegated beliefs reflected in the epic, or the ancient foundation of the Kāpila, not in Brahman but in a plurality of spirits devoid of a common source. In Vyāsa we have a revolt against Kapila, not in absolute rebuttal, but in a denial of his chief principles and in an attempt to show that the time-honored system could be interpreted in accordance with a belief in a personal God.¹

Another point of importance is the decision with which the heretical view is attacked: "Unity is a proper view, separateness is an incorrect view," *ekatvaṁ darṣaṇaṁ nānātvam adarṣaṇam*; again: "The view that the Supreme Soul is one with the individual soul is the correct view; the view that they are separate is an incorrect view," *anidarṣaṇam* (the commentator says there is another reading *anudarṣaṇam*, which he interprets as a following or later view, xii, 306, 35-37).²

¹ Here the author of Nirvāṇa, p. 97, suppresses the fact that Vyāsa's view is placed in antithesis to Kapila's, and, leaping over the intervening verses, says that Sāṁkhya-Yoga in this passage teaches only a common source of souls. It is indeed said at the end of the text that Sāṁkhya-Yoga is Vishnuism (see just below), but no notice is taken of the fact in Nirvāṇa that the special passage under consideration presents the matter quite differently. The passage above almost seems to imply that Vyāsa is to be regarded as a philosophical teacher especially, perhaps as the author of a philosophical work (Holtzmann opposed, iv, p. 111); possibly of the Vyāsagrantha of i, 70, 45 (commentator opposed). In any case, Vyāsa's teaching, though not that of Bādarāyaṇa, claims to improve on Kapila's view.

² Compare Katha, iv, 11: (He perishes) "who sees, as it were, separateness here," *ya iha nāne 'va paśyati* (the separateness is here that of any part of

Of course the Sāṃkhya-Yogas, being the models, are credited with the view expressly said to be not theirs. So in the exposition above from xii, 351, after Vyāsa has been distinctly opposed to the Sāṃkhya-Yogas and his view is explained to be that the different souls (created by Brahman) at last are absorbed into their one source, the "subtile entity appearing as four" (Aniruddha, etc.), it is calmly said that this is Sāṃkhya and Yoga, xii, 352, 12-13, 23. But occasionally this flat self-contradiction is avoided, as it is in the second passage cited above, by saying that while Sāṃkhya-Yogas generally hold a view not quite orthodox, the wise among them think otherwise. Thus: "That twenty-fifth principle which the Sāṃkhya-Yogas as a whole, sarvaṇa, proclaim to be *higher than intellect*, buddheḥ param, the wise declare is a (personal) Lord, conditioned and not conditioned, identical both with Puruṣa and with the Unmanifest . . . and *this is also the opinion of those who being skilled in Sāṃkhya-Yoga seek after a Supreme*," paramāiṣiṇaḥ, xii, 306, 31-33. In other words, such Sāṃkhya-Yogas as admit that the twenty-fifth topic is a Supreme Being say that he is our personal God.

The Twenty-fifth Principle.

In the passage cited above, xii, 306, 33, the spirit is denominated Pañcaviṃśatika, the twenty-fifth principle. This is the last Sāṃkhya topic. But: "The wise say that the twenty-fifth creation is a topic and that there is something apart from the topics and higher." Here stands the implication of the twenty-sixth principle, in contradiction to the preceding, as appears still more plainly in the next section, where 307, 43 ff., it is expressly said: "Counting up the four-and-twenty topics with Prakṛti, the Sāṃkhyas recognize a twenty-fifth principle which is apart from the topics; this twenty-fifth principle is said to be the soul without Source or un-Prakṛti-soul, aprakṛtyātmā, when it is enlightened, budhyamāṇaḥ; and when it thus recognizes self, it becomes pure and apart, Brahman from the whole). On the Yoga anudarṣanam, see the note above, p. 97.

yadā to budhyate 'tmānam tadā bhavati kevalaḥ. This is the correct view according to the topics. Those knowing this attain equableness. From direct perception one could understand Prakṛti from guṇa and topic and so one can judge from things without guṇas. There is something higher than the destructible. They who do not agree to this have a false view and do not become emancipated but are born again in manifest form. The unmanifest is said to be the All. But the twenty-fifth principle is not part of this 'all,' asarvaḥ pañcaviṅśakaḥ. They that recognize him have no fear."

Here there is not an indication of any principle higher than the Sāṃkhya twenty-fifth, except as the commentator reads Brahman into the word self as "soul," but the word is used of jīva in the preceding verse, and of Brahman there is not a word. The "thing to be known" is the "twenty-fifth principle" as opposed to the Unmanifest, which is here the "field" of knowledge. The view of a Lord-principle is distinctly opposed: "It is said that the Unmanifest comprehends not only the field of knowledge (as has just been stated in çl. 38) but also sattva and Lord; the Sāṃkhya-system holds, however, that the twenty-fifth principle has no Lord and is itself the topic that is apart from topics" (that is, the twenty-fifth principle is the supreme principle), 307, 41-42.

This whole chapter, xii, 307, 26 ff., gives as close an approach to Sāṃkhya as is found in the epic. It is called, çl. 42, the Sāṃkhyadarçana, parisāmkhyānudarçana. That is to say,

Sāṃkhya is Saṃkhyāna.

Even in the *Anugītā, xiv, 46, 54-56, we read: "The organs, the objects of sense, the five gross elements, mind, intellect, egoism, the Unmanifest, and Spirit (these are given in nominative and accusative) — on counting up all that properly, according to the distinction of topics, tattva, one gets to heaven, released from all bonds. Counting them over, one should reflect on them at the time of one's end. Thus one that knows the topics is released, if one abide by the ekānta,

doctrine of unity." So in xii, 316, 19, *sāṅkhyadarśanam* *etat te paraśaṅkhyānam uttamam*, "the Sāṅkhya system is the best enumeration;" *evam hi paraśaṅkhyāya sāṅkhyāḥ kevelatām gatāḥ*, "the Enumerators by thus enumerating attain separateness." In the same way the Yogin gradually emancipates himself by *paraśaṅkhyāya*, enumerating the steps of abstraction, xii, 317, 16. The same thing is found in *Gītā* 18, 19, where *guṇasaṅkhyāna* or "enumeration of *guṇas*" is equivalent to Sāṅkhya. Even more strongly is this shown when Yoga and Sāṅkhyāna are antithetic, like Yoga and Sāṅkhya, as in xii, 314, 3 ff., where the *saṅkhyānadarśinaḥ* are opposed to *yoga-pradarśinaḥ*; and in xiii, 141, 88: *yukto yogam prati sadā prati saṅkhyānam eva ca*.

The Sāṅkhya Scheme.

As I have shown above, this system stops with the twenty-fifth principle. This fact sometimes appears only incidentally, as when in xiv, 48, 4, we read: "By ten or twelve suppressions of breath one attains to that which is higher than the twenty-four."¹ In its environment this verse is as significant as it is grotesque; but it is simply carried over from an older account: "Turning the senses from the objects of sense by means of the mind, one that is pure and wise should with ten or twelve urgings urge the soul to that which is beyond the twenty-fourth principle," xii, 307, 10-11. Here, at the outset of the chapter discussed above, it is evident that no twenty-sixth is contemplated. The conditioned soul is to be urged to associate itself with the pure soul and abstain from the other elements which condition it. This pure soul is declared to be the "inner self standing in the breast," *antarātmā hrdayasthaḥ*, *çl. 19*, which in Yoga contemplation appears like a bright fire. "It has no source, *ayoni*; it stands in all beings an immortal thing, and is not seen, but may be known by intelligence, *buddhidravyeṇa drçyeta*. He makes the worlds,

¹ The commentator says ten or twelve, *vā 'pi* may mean *and*, i. e., twenty-two. He gives the exercises.

standing beyond darkness, and he is called *tamonuda*, *vita-maskā*, the smiter of darkness," 24. So much for the Yoga doctrine, where the inner soul is that "which surpasses the twenty-fourth," and is then treated (as given above) as neuter *tad* or masculine, but without recognition of the Lord-Soul as twenty-sixth.¹ Then follows the *Sāmkhya-jñāna* (*parisāmkhyānadarṣanam*), 307, 26 ff.: "It is the system of the *Prakṛtivādins* and starts with highest *Prakṛti*, which is the Unmanifest. From this is produced the Great One (neuter), intellect, as the second; from the Great One, egoism, as the third; and the *Sāmkhyātmadarṣināḥ* say that the five elements come from egoism. These together are the eight (forms of) the Source, called the eight sources (because productive). The modifications are sixteen. There are five gross elements, *viṣeṣāḥ*, and five senses (or the sixteen are the five gross elements and ten organs with mind).² These (twenty-four) are all the topics, *tattvas*, as explained in the enumeration of the *Sāmkhyas*. Inversely as it created them the inner soul, *antarātman*, also absorbs them, as the sea absorbs its waves. The Source is a unit at absorption and a plurality at creation, *ekatva*, *bahutva*. The Source itself has the principle of productivity, *prasava*. Over this field³

¹ This section, like the one cited above (to which it is a parallel), ends with *yoga eṣo hi yogānām*. The next verse (though in the middle of a chapter) has the Upanishad mark of a closed account, *yogadarṣanam etāvat* (as in *Kaṭha*, *etāvad anudarṣanam*). The soul appears as a smokeless fire, *vidhūma*, as in *Kaṭha*, iv, 13, *adhūmaka*; it is *anubhyo aṇu*, as *Kaṭha*, ii, 20, etc. The point of view is wholly that of *Ātmaism* to the very end without a trace of *Vishnuism*. It is, however, an intruded section, for the opening of the chapter marks a repetition, the questioner saying: "Now you have told me all about oneness and separateness, but I should like to hear it all again" (just as the *Anugītā* is marked).

² So the commentator explains *cl. 29-30*, *etā prakṛtayaḥ cā 'ṣṭāu vikārāḥ cā 'pi ṣoḍaśa*, *pañca cāi 'va viṣeṣā vai tathā pañce 'ndriyāṇi ca*, *etāvad eva tattvānām sāmkhyam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ*. But see below.

³ Instead of "field" we find also the "pasture": "When the senses (*indriyāṇi* *pramāthini*, as in the *Gītā*) return from the pasture, *gocarāḥ*, and rest at home, then shalt thou see the highest self with the self, the great all-soul" (self), xii, 251, 6. The principle of productivity, *prasava*, is synonymous with *Prakṛti*. Thus we have *prakṛtijā guṇāḥ* (*Gītā*), and *prasavajā guṇāḥ*, xiii, 85, 105.

stands the Great Soul as the twenty-fifth, called the *kṣetrajña*, field-knower, also the male, *Puruṣa* (*avyaktike praviṣṭe*, 38). The field is the Unmanifest, the knower of the field is the twenty-fifth principle." Then follows the extract given above. It is clear that here the twenty-fifth principle (*Puruṣa*) is not a lower principle than a twenty-sixth (not recognized at all). Still more remarkable is the following exposition:

In xii, 311, 8 ff.: "There are eight sources and sixteen modifications. Metaphysicians explain the eight as the Unmanifest, the Great One (masc.), egoism, and earth, wind, air, water, and light. These are the eight sources. The modifications are (the five perceptive organs) ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose; the five (great elements), sound, touch, color, taste, smell; the five (organs of action) voice, hands, feet, and two organs of excretion. [These differences, *viśeṣāḥ*, are in the five great elements, *mahābhūtas*; and those organs of perception are *saviśeṣāṇi*, that is, differentiated.] Mind, say the metaphysicians, is the sixteenth." The bracketed stanza¹ interrupts the description (as in the scheme above) with a statement of the "differences" appertaining to the gross elements (as distinct from the fine elements, which have only one characteristic apiece, and are *aviśeṣa*).

Both these schemes² give the Aphorism's list, whereby the *tattvas* of the *Sāṃkhya* (the *Yoga* is here expressly included, çl. 8) appear as follows:—

Eight productive forms of <i>Prakṛti</i> .	{	The Unmanifest
		Intellect
		Egoism
		Five (fine) elements (not here named collectively; called <i>tanmātras</i> elsewhere).

¹ ete *viśeṣā rājendra mahābhūteṣu pañcasu buddhindriyāṇy athāi 'tāni saviśeṣāṇi*, *Māthila*, 311, 14.

² Compare xiv, 40, 1 ff., where the same creations appear.

Sixteen modifica- tions.	{	5 Organs of Perception (<i>buddhīndriyas</i> , gl. 14).
		5 Organs of Action (not here named collectively; called <i>karmendriyas</i> elsewhere).
		1 Mind.
		5 Gross elements (<i>viṣeṣas</i> , <i>mahābhūtas</i>).

But to the scheme at xii, 311, there is appended the following incongruous account, thus, gl. 16 ff.: "From the Unmanifest is produced the Great Soul, *mahān ātmā*, which the wise say is the first creation, and call the *prādhānika*. From the Great One is produced egoism, the second creation, which is called *buddhyātmaka*, that is, identical with intellect. From egoism is produced mind, *bhūtaguṇātmaka*, identical with the elemental constituents, called *āhaṃkārika*, that is, egoistic, the third creation, *sargaḥ*. From mind are produced the great elements, *mahābhūtāḥ* (sic),¹ the fourth creation, called *mānasa*, mental. The fifth creation comprises sound, touch, color, taste, and smell, which is called elemental, *bhāutika*. The sixth creation is the ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, called *bahucintātmaka*, that is, identical with much thought (matter is only a form of mind). The seventh creation is the group of organs (of action) after the ear, called organ-creation, *āindriya*. The eighth creation is the up-and-across stream (of breaths) called *ārjavaka*, that is, upright. The ninth is the down-and-across, also called *ārjavaka*. These are the nine creations, *sargāṇi*, and the twenty-four topics, *tattvāṇi*, declared according to the system of revelation (*ṣrutinidarṣanāt*)." So this scheme ends without hint of a twenty-sixth principle, but with productive mind and a substitution of *ātman*, soul, for intellect.

A more striking substitution is found in xii, 204, 10-11, where, instead of the received order as given above, the list from Source to the senses is as follows:

¹ As remarked above, organs and elements are called indifferently *indriyāḥ* or *indriyāṇi*, *mahābhūtāḥ* or *mahābhūtāṇi*, as shown here and elsewhere. So in this passage, *sargaḥ* and *sargāṇi*. Compare *tattvān*, above, p. 98.

The Great Unknown, or Unmanifest, *avyaktam*, *mahat*

|
Knowledge, *jñāna*

|
Intellect

|
Mind

|
Senses

In the following section, 205, 16 ff., intellect active in mind is mind. It is mind which is freed from the *guṇas* and, *ib.* 9, mind, as a form of knowledge impeded by the *guṇas*, produces intellect, which must be withdrawn into mind again for one to attain the highest. In these cases, there can be, from a synthetic point of view, no unsystematic interpretation of intellect and knowledge and mind, but a loose¹ exploiting of *Sāṃkhya* in terms of Brahmaism, because elsewhere the *Sāṃkhya* scheme is fully recognized. So carelessly are the terms employed that, while in one part of the exposition knowledge is Brahman and mind is a part of it, related to it as *jīva* is to *Ātman*, in another part we are told that this knowledge comes from something higher, the Unmanifest. Again, Brahman is not the Unmanifest but in the Unmanifest, *xii*, 319, 1. There is no substitution for egoism in the above, for this is recognized in another stanza which enumerates as the "group called *bhūtas*," (created) spirit (!), Source, intellect, objects of sense, the organs, egoism and false opinion, 205, 24.² Here

¹ These *para* ladders (compare *Gītā*, 3, 42; *Kaṭh.* iii, 10) are found everywhere and often contradict the regular schemes: "Soul is higher than mind, mind than senses, highest of creatures are those that move; of these the bipeds; of these the twice-born; of these the wise, of these those that know the soul, *Ātman*; of these the humble," *xii*, 298, 19 ff.; "Objects are higher than senses, mind higher than objects, intellect higher than mind, the great *Ātman* higher than intellect," *xii*, 247, 3 ff. (in 249, 2 *para mataḥ* for *mahān parah*); "The unmanifest is higher than the great; the immortal is higher than the unmanifest: nothing is higher than the immortal" (*ib.*). The stages in *xiv*, 50, 54 ff., are space or air, egoism, intellect, soul, the unmanifest, and spirit!

² This is called the *samūho bhūtasamjñakah*, or "group of so-called created things," which is noteworthy as containing *Puruṣa*, spirit, and *abhimāna*, false opinion, as a distinct factor.

the source of the Source and of Purusha alike is Brahman, a view utterly opposed to the passages cited above.

The Anugītā, which, as already indicated, also has the schemes above, continues in xiv, 42, with a parallel to xii, 314, on the relation of the elements to the individual, as organ, to the object, and to the special deity concerned with each action. At the opening of the eighth chapter of the Gītā adhyātma is called the individual manifestation. It is literally that connected with the self or soul, and is often used as a noun in the sense of metaphysics (xii, 194 and 248, etc.).¹ In xii, 314, 4 and 14, it is said that an explanation as the Sāṃkhyas represent it, yatha saṃkhyānadarṣiṇaḥ, is given of the manifestations according to the individual, vyaktito vibhūti, which differs somewhat from that in the Anugītā. The scheme is as follows, starting with the elements and with ākāṣa, air, as the first bhūta in the latter account:

adhyātma	Air ear	Wind skin	Light eye	Water tongue	Earth nose	elements organs of sense objects
adhibhūta	sound	touch (ob- ject of)	color	taste	smell	
adhidāivata	Dīgas	Lightning (Pavana)	Sun	Soma (Water)	Wind	divinities
adhyātma	feet	pāyu	npastha	hands	voice	organs of action activities
adhibhūta	going	excretion	nanda (çukra)	doing, acts	speaking	
adhidāivata	Vishnu	Mitra	Prajāpati	Indra	Fire	divinities
adhyātma	Mind		Egoism		Intellect ²	mental powers activities
adhibhūta	thinking (mantavya, saṃkalpa)		abhimāna		understanding, or thinking	
adhidāivata	Moon		Rudra, or In- tellect		Kṣetrajña, or Brahman	divinities

¹ Compare the use of these terms in BAU. iii, 7, 14. On adhyātma in this sense, compare also xii, 331, 30, adhyātmaratir āsino nirapekṣaḥ . . . ātmanāi 'va sahāyena yaç caret sa sukhi bhavet.

² buddhiḥ śadindriyavicāriṇī, "directing the six senses" (usually a function of mind, which is here pañcabhūtātmacāraṇam), xiv, 42, 29, and 31. The function of intellect is here mantavyam, which in Çānti is given to mind. Rudra in the preceding group in Anugītā is replaced by buddhi in Çānti, where buddhi is both adhyātma and adhidāivata. The adhidāivata of intellect is spirit, kṣetrajña, in Çānti: Brahman, in the Anugītā. It is apparent that we have here (a) rather late matter, (b) worked over by two sets of revisors.

This scheme is unknown in the older Upanishads. Even egoism thus appears first (with some variations) in Praṇa, iv, 8 (Deussen). Compare xii, 240, 8, above, where Fire is the divinity to digestion, not to voice, and Sarasvatī is assigned to the tongue. When, as often happens, no egoism is mentioned, it is because the intellect ("the twelfth" as it is called in the very passage which gives thirteen above, xiv, 42, 16, and in the Pañcaçikha schemes given below) is held to imply egoism. The frequent omission, however, seems to point to the fact that there was originally no distinction, or, in other words, that intellect was primarily regarded as necessarily self-conscious as soon as it became manifest at all.

The Twenty-Sixth Principle.

Clearly as most of the schemes given above reveal the fact that the twenty-fifth principle, or in other words pure Ego, was regarded as the culmination of the group of systematized categories, the intrusion into this scheme of a new principle, overlapping the twenty-fifth, is here and there made manifest. This new principle is the one denied in the Sāṅkhyan scheme, namely that of a personal Lord, īṣvara, which is upheld in the contrasted Yogin scheme. This twenty-sixth principle is explained in xii, 308; after the speaker says he has disposed of the Sāṅkhya system. Here the male conditioned spirit bewails his intercourse with the female Source, and the fact that associating with her he has not recognized that he has been "like a fish in water," a foreign element in combination with matter, and consequently is reborn again and again, çl. 24-26; but now he becomes enlightened, buddha, and will reach unity, as well as likeness with the Lord-spirit, the indestructible, 27-40. The twenty-sixth principle is thus recognized not only as the one eternal principle, but as a personal spirit, ayam atra bhaved bandhuḥ, 27. Then follows another exposition, which is based on the system of Nārada, received by him from Vasiṣṭha, who in turn received it from Hiranyagarbha, 309, 40. This system is both Yoga and Sāṅkhya, the systems being double but the teach-

ing being identical (*yad eva ṣāstraṁ Sāṃkhyānām yogadarśanam eva tat*, 308, 44), the claim usually made when Yoga is advocated. A huge *Ṣāstra* is that of the Sāṃkhyas, "as say *viduṣo janāḥ*," and one "to which, along with the Veda, Yogins have recourse." In other words, the Yoga teaching is based on Veda and on the Sāṃkhyas as a precedent system. Then follows the admission: "In it (the Sāṃkhyas system) no principle higher than the twenty-fifth is recognized," (*asmin ṣāstre*) *pañcaviṃśat param tattvaṁ paṭhyate na, narādhipa*, whereas: "The Yoga philosophers declare a *budhyamāna* or individual spirit and a *buddha* or Lord-Spirit to be in accordance with their principles, the latter being identical with the former, except that it is fully enlightened," *ḥl. 48*.

Here also is a perfectly clear and frank statement, which may be paraphrased thus: "In older Sāṃkhyas philosophy the highest principle recognized is that of the pure individual Ego; in the Yoga philosophy this Ego is identified as individual spirit with the fully enlightened Lord." Hence Yogas (and not Sāṃkhyas) speak of *budhyamāna* and *buddha* as two but identical, *budhyamānaṁ ca buddhaṁ ca prāhur yoganidarśanam*, *ḥl. 48*. Elsewhere the twenty-fifth principle is itself the Lord: *aham puruṣaḥ pañcaviṃśakaḥ*.¹

After this introduction the speaker, *Vasiṣṭha*, proceeds to describe this Yoga philosophy in detail. The Lord-Spirit "divides himself into many," *ātmānam bahudhā kṛtvā*, and becomes the different *abuddhas*, or imperfectly enlightened spirits conditioned by *Prakṛti*. Thus he becomes conditioned, *guṇān dhārayate*, and "modifies himself" without true knowledge of himself, *vikurvāṇo budhyamāno na budhyate*. In this condition, then, he becomes creator and absorber of what

¹ Compare xii, 340, 43, personal God is the twenty-fifth. He is the witness devoid of *guṇas*, and of *kalās*, *ib. 23*; "the twenty-fifth, beyond the twice twelve *tattvas*," *ib. 24*. In this passage the Unmanifest is resolved into *Puruṣa*, 340, 30-31. This is worth noting as being in direct contradiction of the theory of unchanging eternal *Prakṛti*, as enunciated in xii, 217, 8: "Both *Puruṣa* and the unmanifest Source are eternal, without beginning and without end." In 335, 29-31, Source is both born and indestructible. Compare H. 3, 85, 16, as cited above, p. 98.

he has created. The conditioned cannot understand the unconditioned; it is the Un-understanding, *apratibudhyakam* (sic, 309, 4). The conditioned spirit can understand the Unmanifest but "he cannot understand the stainless eternal buddha, which is the twenty-sixth principle," *śaḍvinṇaṁ vimalaṁ buddhaṁ sanātanaṁ*, though the latter "understands both the twenty-fifth and the twenty-fourth principles," 309, 7. "This twenty-sixth principle is pure unmanifest Brahman, which is connected with all that is seen and unseen," ib. 8. "When the conditioned spirit recognizes the pure Highest Intelligence, then he becomes clear-eyed, *avyakta-locanaḥ*, and free of the Source" (*tadā prakṛtimān*, sic, read *apra*?). The twenty-sixth is this Highest Intelligence; it is "the topic and that which is apart from all topics," ḥl. 10 and 13. "The conditioned spirit attains likeness with the twenty-sixth principle when it recognizes itself as the twenty-sixth," *śaḍvinṇo 'ham iti prājñaḥ*, ḥl. 16. "That *separateness* of spirits which is part of the exposition of Sāṁkhya is really (explained by) the conditioned spirit when not fully enlightened by the (fully) enlightened twenty-sixth," *śaḍvinṇena prabuddhena budhyamāno 'py abuddhimān, etan nānātvam ity uktam sāmkhyaçrutinidarṇanāt*, ḥl. 17. The continuation of this teaching points out that unity with Brahman is attained by the individual spirit only when it no longer has any consciousness (of self), *yadā buddhyā na budhyate*, ḥl. 18.

In this passage the attempt to reconcile the doctrine of the Sāṁkhya individual spirits, *nānātvam*, "than which there is nothing higher," with the doctrine of unity, *ekatva*, is as plain as a reasonable historian could expect to find it. "Thus it is," the account concludes, "that one must understand the (two theories of) *separateness* and unity," *nānātvāikatvam etāvad draṣṭavyam ḡṣṭradarṇanāt*, ḥl. 22. And then occurs a very pretty lapsus. The images of the fly encased in the plant, *maçakodumbare*, and the fish in water, *matsyodake*, are constantly employed in Sāṁkhyan philosophy, as shown above, to illustrate the fact that spirit is different from the Source, though externally united. Our good Vasiṣṭha, how-

ever, brings these images in to illustrate the difference, anyatvam, between the individual spirit and Brahman: "The difference between the fly and plant, between the fish and water, is to be understood as the combined separateness and unity of these two," as if, from the historical connotation of these images, they were essentially different, whereas according to the exposition they are essentially one. But this is of a piece with the use of vikurvāṇas, a Sāṅkhya term applied to the modifications of the Source, when used above, of Brahman.

This Yoga doctrine, as explained above, is to be taught (not to the man that bases his philosophy on the Veda, na¹ vedanīṣṭhasya jauasya . . . pradeyam, but) "to any one that desires it for the sake of wisdom and receives it with submission," çl. 32.

The Yoga doctrine as here represented stands midway between Sāṅkhya and Brahmaism. The former side has been fully illustrated. In regard to the latter it will have been noticed that while the personal Lord-Spirit is a form of Brahman, and Brahman in turn is identified with the pure essence of every individual spirit, it is merely said that Brahman is connected with the visible as well as with the invisible, dr̥ṣyādṛṣye hy anugatam, 309, 8. The Brahman here represented is not the All, but a pure Supreme Spirit into which fractional spirits, parts of Brahman when he "made himself many," are reabsorbed. Of the identity of the objective world with this Brahman there is no word; neither is there any hint that the objective world is illusion, except that at the beginning of the preceding section, 308, 2 ff., the general opinion, āhuḥ, is cited that "the Unmanifest is ignorance," avidyā, as opposed to the twenty-fifth principle as wisdom, vidyā.² Elsewhere "the Source is knowledge," jñāna, but also avedyaṃ avyaktam, as opposed to (jñeyo) vedyah puruṣah, 819, 40.

¹ But nā, v. l., N., "to one wise in the Veda it may be imparted or to," etc. Those excluded are given in the following verses as liars and other evil-doers, a long list.

² But ib. 7., the Source as unmanifest is vidyā; the highest is Vidhi (compare pradhānavidhiyogasthaḥ of Çiva, xiii, 14, 423), the Creator.

This doctrine of the twenty-sixth principle belongs only to the later part of the pseudo-epic. The passage given above is found virtually repeated in xii, 319, 56, and 70 ff. Here as *Prakṛti* the chief-thing, *pradhāna*, does not know spirit, so spirit does not know Supreme Spirit. "The one that is different (spirit), seeing and yet not seeing, looks upon the twenty-sixth, the twenty-fifth (pure spirit) and twenty-fourth. But the twenty-fifth also does not recognize the twenty-sixth, who recognizes him, and having a false opinion of himself thinks that no one is higher than he" (so 316, 4). And further: "The twenty-fourth should not be accepted by wise men (as the twenty-fifth), any more than, because of mere association, the fish should be identified with the water it has entered (74). The twenty-fifth on realizing that it is different (from the twenty-fourth) becomes one with the twenty-sixth and recognizes (the latter). For though The Best appears different from the twenty-fifth, the saints regard this as due to the conditioned nature of the twenty-fifth and declare that the two are really identical. Therefore, being afraid of birth and death, and beholding the twenty-sixth, neither *Yogas* nor *Sāṃkhyas* admit that the twenty-fifth is the indestructible."

Here again, with the new notion that *jīva* is destructible (in *Paramātmān*) there is the attempt to foist on the *Sāṃkhya* the belief which has been formally denied to them. Similarly in the *Aniruddha* theology, of the personal Lord *Govinda*, who is said to "create the elements," xii, 207, 7 ff., it is said: "From him whom *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* philosophers declare as Highest Soul, *Paramātmān*, and who is called the Great Spirit, *mahāpuruṣa*, is derived the unmanifest, *avyaktam*, of which he is the base, *pradhānam*. From the unmanifest Lord, *Īṣvara*, came the manifest, and he is *Aniruddha*, called the great Soul. As egoism he created *Brahmān* and the elements, and then the *guṇas*," xii, 341, 28-33.

In this copy of the preceding passage there is also no notion of *Vedānta* as implying *Māyā* or illusion. Significant is the fact that the present teaching is represented in the fol-

lowing stanzas, 319, 84-86, as being newly inculcated, and especially designed for those who desire emancipation, in contrast to the Sāṃkhyas and Yogas, who are content with their own doctrines, dharma.

It is thus clear that Sāṃkhyā is merely a name to appeal to, and stands in this regard on a footing with Veda, an authority claimed for the most divergent teaching.

Māyā, Self-Delusion.

The "illusion" theory of the universe is a development from the simple idea of delusion, often self-delusion. The ordinary (non-philosophical) epic māyā is a trick of delusion. Gods indulge in it to overcome their enemy. The illusion-god par excellence, Vishnu as Krishna, thus deludes his enemies by making them think the sun has set when it has not, or by parallel magic tricks.¹ This, in my opinion,² is the only meaning in the older Upanishads, *Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpāḥ*, Bṛh., ii, 5, 19 (from the Rīg Veda), "Indra multi-form through tricks of delusion;" *na yeṣu jihmam anṛtaṁ na māyā ca*, "in whom there is naught crooked, nor untrue, nor any trick," Praṇa, i, 16. Magic seems to be the meaning (parallel with moha) in *Māitrī*, iv, 2, where occurs the *indraajāla-māyā* of Mbh. v, 160, 55.

In *Gītā* 7, 14-25, māyā is a divine, *dāivī*, delusion caused by the *guṇas*, *guṇamayī*, characterizing people wicked and foolish; in 4, 6, it is a psychic delusion, *ātmanāmāyā*, which causes the unborn God by means of *Prakṛti* to appear to be born (not, be it noticed, which causes the not-soul to appear to be real). It occurs in one other passage, 18, 61, where it is the equivalent of moha in the preceding stanza (as in *Māitrī* Up., above). In all these passages, although it is possible to read into māyā the meaning given it by *Çaṃkara*, for example, yet the simpler meaning suffices of either trick

¹ This is called indifferently māyā (*chadma*) or *yoga*, v, 160, 54-58; vii, 146, 68, etc.

² In this interpretation of māyā I am forced to differ from that of Deussen, who holds that māyā is Vedantic Illusion (i.e., the not-soul appears through divine Illusion to be real) even in the earliest scriptures.

or delusion (false understanding) applied to the relation of individual soul and God, and this is probably the meaning, because *māyā* as illusion plays no part in the development of the scheme. Guṇa-made delusion is the regular Sāṅkhya Prakṛti-made ignorance; it is not Prakṛti's self.

The expression used above of Krishna's *māyā* that it is "divine," has no special philosophical significance. The same phrase is applied to Duryodhana's water-trick, *dāivīm māyām imām kṛtvā*, ix, 31, 4. When, too, Krishna in the *Gītā* says that he is born by *ātmamāyā*, it must be remembered that in describing the parallel situation in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, where Vishnu is born as Rāma, the word *chadman*, disguise, cover, is used as the equivalent of *māyā*, G. vi, 11, 32.

In a very interesting critique of the new doctrine of mokṣa, that is, salvation without Vedic sacrifices, an orthodox objector is represented as saying: "This doctrine of salvation has been brought out by miserable idle pundits; it is based on ignorance of the Veda and is a lie under the guise of truth. Not by despising the Vedas, not by chicanery and delusion (*māyayā*) does a man obtain great (Brahman). He finds Brahman in brahman" (Veda).¹

Similarly, when Drāupadī philosophizes in iii, 30, 32, her opening words show that she reveres as the chief god the Creator, who, like other creatures, is subject to transmigration, 32, 7, and is in no respect an All-god, though a later rewriting of the scene mixes up Bhagavat, Īṣvara, and Prajāpati.² This god, she says, has deluded (*moha*) her husband's mind

¹ As the section is occupied in advocating the one-soul (All-soul), *āikātmya*, doctrine, it is clear that *māyā* is here merely delusion or deceit, xii, 270, 50-51. The words of the text are : *ṣṛiyā vihināir alasāih paṇḍitāih sampravartitam, vedavādāparijñānaṁ satyābhāsam ivā 'nṛtam . . . na vedānāṁ paribhavān na cāthyena na māyayā mahat prāpnoti puruṣo brahmaṇi brahma vindati*, xii, 270, 17, 19. Kapila, to whom the remark is addressed, admits "the Vedas are authoritative," *vedāḥ pramāṇaṁ lokānām*, 271, 1, but, 43, insists that, though "everything is based on the Veda," the cruel animal sacrifices therein enjoined are objectionable (as cited above), and upholds the thesis that "knowledge is the best means of salvation," *jñānaṁ tu paramā gatiḥ*, 271, 38 — this by the bye.

² The revision appears clearly at the end in Drāupadī's conversion. Compare the comments, AOS., *Proceed.*, March, 1894.

and in deluding men generally, mohayitvā, the Lord shows the power of his delusion, māyāprabhava, which deludes them by ātmamāyā (the same expression as that of the Gītā, cited above), making them kill each other as blind instruments of his will, which act without volition, just as a stone breaks another in the hands of a man. Man proposes, but God disposes¹ by means of a trick, chadma kṛtvā, 30, 36, "playing with men as children play with toys." "Fie, fie," says her husband, "don't speak so of the Lord, through whose grace the faithful gets immortality," 31, 42; "for these things are divine mysteries (devaguhyāni, rewards of good and evil), since the divinities are full of secret tricks," gūḍhamāyā hi devataḥ, 31, 35-37. The Ṣāstras and faith, not magic, māyā, or sinful works, give faith in Krishna, v. 69, 3-5.

Again, in the account of the Pañcakālajñas, the visiting Hindus, who look with awe on the service paid to the One God, say that they could hear the hymn, but could not see the god, because, as they suppose, they were "deluded by the god's māyā," mohitās tasya māyayā, xii, 337, 44-48. God in the following is called the mahāmāyādhara, as he is also called by the rather modern epithets cāturmahārājika, saptamahābhāga,² xii, 339, 3 ff. Here māyā is truly illusion, as it is said in 340, 43-45: "God is he by whom this illusion (of visible God) was created," māyā hy eṣā mayā sṛṣṭā yan mām paçyasi, Nārada; but it is not illusion embracing the world of objective things, even in this late account (careless enough, for example, to construe iti vāi menire vayam, 337, 38). There is at least no passage in the epic which says bluntly that "Prakṛti is māyā," as does Çvet. Up. iv, 10. On the contrary, the great mass of epic philosophy, though it teaches that the sinner is deluded "by Vishnu's hundred māyās," 302, 59, teaches also that this delusion is merely a confusion of mind in respect of the relation of the pure soul to the conditioned soul. It does not teach that those things which condition the soul are an

¹ anyathā manyante puruṣāḥ tāni tāni ca . . . anyathā prabhuḥ karoti vikaroti ca, iii, 30, 34.

² He is also called Ākhaṇḍala, which in xii, 337, 4, is still an epithet of Indra.

illusion, but that they are eternal substance, either in themselves or as parts of Brahman. Take for instance the long account in xii, 196 to 201. It is not suggested that the sinner divest himself of illusion. He goes into moha, that is he becomes confused, and again he enters Brahman, 197, 10; or "enjoys bliss," *ramate sukham* ("if he does not wish the highest, because his soul is still tinged with desire, *rāgātmā*, he attains whatever he desires").¹ Knowledge is Brahman, and hence one must be free of all delusion to be Brahman indeed, and truly immortal,² but the objective world is seldom an illusion of Brahman. Moreover, the *avidyā* of God is clearly an afterthought. According to one section in *Çānti*, God creates the world "at the point of day" through *avidyā* or ignorance. First *mahat* was born, "which quickly became mind" (where mind and not intellect is *vyakta*, manifest), which is "characterized by desire and doubt."³ This same account in its first form is found in 232, 32, without *avidyā*: "The Lord, *Īṣvara*, sleeps during the cataclysm sunk in meditation, *dhyāna*; but, when awakened at the close of night, he transforms the eternal, *vikurute brahmā 'kṣayyam*, and produces the Great Being, whence mind, one with the manifest." The following section simply picks up this account, repeats it in almost the same words, but slips in *avidyā* to explain the expression "creates." The alteration is the more marked as

¹ Some very grotesque conceptions are expressed here. In 200, 25, the *jīva* soul goes to *Ātman*; or goes to heaven and lives separately. When as a flame the spirit ascends to heaven, *Brahmán* like a courteous host says "Come, stay with me," *makes it* (or him) *conscious* and then swallows him!

² "Sorrow is the end of joy as night is the end of day, joy is the end of sorrow, as day is the end of night" (these succeed each other and each has its end); "only knowledge ends not, for knowledge is Brahman," xiv, 44, 18, 20-21; 47, 1. Not till 52, 9, i. e., after the *Anugītā*, is finished, is *Māyā* a factor here. Previously there is only the *ghoramoha* or horrible misunderstanding of truth, xiv, 45, 4, etc. In xviii, 3, 36, *Indra's māyā* is an optical delusion.

³ xii, 233, 1 ff. Here is to be noticed a contradiction in epic psychology. Mind in this passage has *prārthanā* and *śiṣṭā*, that is it desires, whereas elsewhere desire (the unexplained "seventh," xii, 177, 52) is an attribute of egoistic intellect. Desire is born of imagination, *saṁkalpa*, xii, 177, 25; it is destroyed by avoiding this, 302, 56; but, "remove mind from *saṁkalpa* and fix it on self," 241, 17.

many texts make no division of chapters here. In either case the account of creation goes right on, first, 232, 32, stated as (Īṣvaraḥ):

pratibuddho vikurute brahmā 'kṣayyaṃ kṣapāksaye
srjate ca mahad bhūtaṃ tasmād vyaktātmakam
manah

and then as:

brahmatejomayaṃ cūkraṃ yasya sarvaṃ idaṃ jagat
ekasya bhūtaṃ bhūtaṣya dvayaṃ sthāvara-jāṅgamaṃ
aharmukhe vibuddhaḥ sa srjate 'vidyayā jagat
agra eva mahad bhūtaṃ āṇu vyaktātmakam manah.

As the seven creators¹ mentioned in the following stanza, 233, 3, are explained as intellect, mind, and the five elements, it is clear also that egoism as a distinct factor is omitted. The seven cannot create apart, so they unite and make the body which the "great beings," bhūtāni mahānti, enter with Karma. The ādikartā, First Creator, is Prajāpati, who acts without Māyā, ḥl. 13.² In short, while sometimes recognized, Māyā is generally unknown in the epic, because the epic lacks unity, being now and then Vedantic, but generally Yogaistic.

Pāṇcaçikha's System.

In the presentation above I have analyzed the three different religious philosophies advocated in the pseudo-epic; the Sāṃkhya, which holds to spirit and Source as distinct immortal entities; the Yoga, which adds the Supreme Spirit; and the personal religion of Nārada and others, which makes of the Paramātmā or Supreme Spirit a modified form of Brahman known as Aniruddha, etc., and identified with Krishna. In xii, 352, 13, the Paramātmā doctrine is declared to be the

¹ mānasa, "mind-creatures," the same epithet as that applied to the eternal Deva in xii, 182, 11. Compare BAU. ii, 5, 7; Gītā, 10, 6.

² sarvabhūtāny upādāya tapasaḥ caranāya hi ādikartā sa bhūtānāṃ tam evā 'huḥ prajāpatim. The commentator explains "by means of Māyā" (BAU. ii, 5, 19), but there is not even the suggestion of the Māyā doctrine here. The etymology in ḥl. 11 (te . . . çarirāçrayaṇaṃ prāptāḥ tato puruṣa ucyate) seems to be owing to a confusion with puriçayam puruṣam iḥsate, Praç. v. 5.

opinion of some Pundits only, in distinction from that of the knowledge-philosophers, who are said to hold to unity of soul. However this passage may be interpreted,¹ it is evident that it distinctly sets over against each other the Yoga and Brahman interpretation. Paramātman is identified with Vishnu the "unconditioned, All-soul spirit." The religion taught is expressly opposed, as something higher, to Sāṃkhya and Yoga (çl. 7-8), and by comparison with other schemes is of Pāñcarātra character. A preceding section states that the same religion is identical with the doctrine taught to Arjuna in the Gītā, 349, 8, and (as already noticed) it is here called "the Krishna religion," Sātvata dharma, which has mysteries, abstracts, and an Āmṛyaka (ib., 29-31). It was handed down through the seers, and a priest who was acquainted with the (Jyeṣṭha) Sāman (and) Vedānta. His name was Jeṣṭha (sic). Then it disappeared, to be promulgated again in the Harigītā, ib. 46 and 53. In it, Vishnu as God is adored in one, two, three, or four forms (the usual group is meant, Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Vāsudeva).² The disciples are called "those devoted to one God," ekāntinas, and it is hard to find many of them (durlabhāḥ, 349, 62, compare Gītā, 7, 19). They are identified with the Pāñcarātras (so 336, 25), a sect

¹ The words seem to indicate the antithesis not of three but of two beliefs: *evam hi paramātmānam kecid icchanti paṇḍitāḥ, ekātmānam tathā 'tmānam apare jñānacintakāḥ, tatra yaḥ paramātmā hi sa nityam nirguṇaḥ smṛtaḥ, sa hi Nārāyaṇo jñeyaḥ sarvātmapuruso hi saḥ*. The commentator, however, may be right in taking ātman to refer to Sāṃkhyas and ekātmā as brahmābhinam (Vedānta), though the single subject would make it more natural to take ekātmānam ātmānam as "one spirit which is alone." Vishnu here is the mantā mantavyam, "the thinker and the thought," and the eternal fore-cause, pradhāna, çl. 17-18. In çl. 22, God plays, kridati, in his four forms (as often).

² Çiva, on the other hand, has eight forms (the Puranic view), which, according to the commentator (though mūrti may imply the incorporations, Rudra, Bhāirava, Ugra, Iṣvara, Mahādeva, Paçupati, Çarva, Bhava), are the five elements, sun, moon, and Puruṣa, iii, 40, 8. Such divisions are often unique and apparently arbitrary. See below on the eight sources. "Indestructible Brahman" (like Sattva) is eighteenfold according to (xii, 342, 13) H. 3, 14, 13, aṣṭādaśavidham (or nidham). Eight and a thousand (only pseudo-epic) are Çiva's names, against Vishnu's even thousand. The "worlds" are eight (see below), or seven, or twenty-one, according to the passage.

the teaching of which is here identified not only with that of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, but also with that of Vedāraṇyaka, ib. 349, 81, and with the religion of the "white men" and Yatis, *çvetānam Yatinām ca*, ib. 85. Compare 336, 19, the white men's religion, and *Sātvata Vidhi*, declared by Surya.

The difference between religion and philosophy is obliterated in India, and the Pāñcarātra sect is exalted as a development of the Bhagavadbhaktas, as the latter are represented in the Gītā, clearly an indication of posteriority; while their philosophy is rather contrasted than identified with that of the Sāṃkhya.

Three exponents are given, which embody the same terminology, and may be called the Pāñcaçikha system.

Pāñcaçikha Kāpīleya (interpreted as a metronymic!) appears in xii. 218, 6 ff., and 320, 2 ff. His punch-name is elaborately amplified in the former passage, where, 218, 10 ff., he is an incorporation of Kapila and the first pupil of Āsuri. In *Pāñcasrotas*, where there is a Kāpila mandala, he holds a long "session," *satra*, having "bathed in the *pāñcasrotas*" (five rivers of the mind? cf. *Çvet.* 1, 5), and being versed in the *Pāñcarātra* (doctrine), and being called in consequence not only *pāñcarātraviçārada*, but also

pāñcajñāḥ pāñcakṛt pāñca-guṇaḥ pāñcaçikhaḥ (smṛtaḥ), epithets which are duly interpreted by the omniscient Nīla-kanṭha. He also (below) has the epithet *Pāñcarātraḥ*, which is the only one that need concern us, as the interpretation of the others is more guesswork. Pāñcaçikha is regarded, then, as the teacher of the new sect of *Pāñcarātras*.¹

His doctrine rests on the ancient foundation of "disgust with birth, disgust with acts, disgust with all things," *sarva-nirveda*, and is, in short, the religion of ennui, which consists

¹ The seven *Citraçikhandins* are referred to as the author of the *Pāñcarātra Çāstra* in 336, 27; 337, 3, *çāstram citraçikhandijara*. These are the seven *Prakṛtis*, personified as the seven old sages, whose names are given below, p. 170, to whom is added Manu to make the "eight sources," 336, 29. In the hymn at xii, 339, the god is called *Pāñcakāla-kartapati*, *Pāñcarātrika*, *Pāñcagni*, *Pāñcayajña*, *Pāñcamahākālpa* (as also *Citraçikhaṇḍin*).

in a little more than mere indifference. The literal meaning is that one "finds oneself out of," or is sick of, the round of birth and death. Nirvāna is attained by nirveda.¹ This disgust and the rejection of that untrustworthy delusion, anācāvāsiko mohañ, which leads to religious practices and the hope of rewards, xii, 218, 21-22, is the starting-point of the system, which, synthetically considered, should culminate in Krishna-Vishnu, as the be-all and end-all, as in other cases.

The analysis of the system is preceded by a most interesting and historically important review of certain fallacies, as follows. The unbeliever says: "One who relies on tradition (the scripture) says that there is something beyond after the destruction (of the body), as being obvious and seen by all; but such an one is refuted by the fact that death of self is negation, deprivation, of self, anātmā hy ātmano mrtyuḥ. Death is a weakness induced by age. Through delusion one imagines a soul, and this is erroneously regarded as the "something beyond" (or higher). For practical purposes one may assume what is not true (that there is no death of the soul), just as one may say that "the king never dies," ajaro 'yam amrtyuḥ ca rājā 'sāu. But when something is asserted and denied and no evidence is given, on what should one base a judgment? Direct observation (evidence of the senses) is the base of received teaching and of inference. Received teaching is destroyed by direct observation, and (as evidence) inference amounts to nothing."

The last sentence reads in the original, 218, 27:

pratyaksaṁ hy etayor mūlaṁ kṛtāntāitihyayor api
pratyaksenā 'gamo bhinnañ kṛtānto vā na kiñcana

The commentator takes kṛtānta as anumāna and āitihya as equivalent to āgama; though in 240, 2, anāgatam anāitihyaṁ katham brahmā 'dligacchati (where the commentator says that āgata is pratyakṣa and anumāna), "How can a good man

¹ Compare xii, 189, 16-17: "One cannot know the unknown (if faith be lacking); keep the mind on faith; hold it to the vital air; the vital air to Brahman; nirvāna is attained by nirveda;" Gītā, 6, 23, nirvinnacetāsā yogo (yoktavyo niçcayena ca); Mund. Up. i, 2, 12, brāhmano nirvedam āyāt.

attain to Brahman not known to tradition nor revealed in the Veda?"¹ and in G. v, 87, 23, *āitiḥyam anumānam ca pratyakṣam api cā 'gamam, ye hi samyak parīkṣante*, it is distinguished from the latter. The word *āgama* is of sufficient importance to note the epic's own definition given in xii, 270, 43: *āgamo vedavādās tu tarkaṣāstrāṇi cā 'gamaḥ*, "Received (scriptural) teaching includes the words of the Veda and philosophical codes;" a remarkable definition in view of the fact that some of the latter are heterodox, and that *āgama* is currently used as equivalent to right tradition. The *tarka-vidyā* is elsewhere differentiated from logic, *ānvīkṣikī*, though both are called useless, xiii, 37, 12, when not extolled, as often!

The next stanza continues: "Enough of making assumptions based on this or that inference. In the opinion of (us) unbelievers there is no other 'spirit' than the body."

For clearer understanding of the historical value of this I must give the exact words, 218, 28:

yatra yatrā 'numāne 'smin kṛtam bhāvayato 'pi ca
nā 'nyo jīvaḥ ṣarīrasya nāstikānām mate sthitaḥ

Here *kṛtam bhāvayataḥ* in the meaning of *bhāvanayā'lam* (N.) is even more careless than the following genitive with *ṣarīrasya*; but both are indicative of the slovenly style which belongs alike to the *Purāṇas* and the pseudo-epic.

The unbeliever (according to the commentator) continues with a stanza almost unintelligible in its *Sūtra*-like conciseness, which can be given only by the original:

reto vatakanīkāyām gṛtapākādhivāsanam
jātiḥ smṛtir ayaskāntaḥ sūryakānto 'mbubhakṣanam

"The seed in the banyan-flower (accounts for the delusion of soul); butter (is only another form of grass); rum (is but fermented rice). Memory (and other 'psychic' functions are identical with the) creature born.² (The 'soul' is like the)

¹ Just below, 240, 3, the expression *manasaḥ ce 'ndriyāṇām ca āikāgryam* may be noticed as a repetition phrase of iii, 200, 25.

² I take *adhivāsa* in the sense of *adhivāsa*, home: (consider) the origin of ghee and fermented (liquor); N. paraphrases, *adhivāsītāt* (add in pw.).

magnet (which moves iron not by psychical but by physical potency).¹ The burning-glass (makes fire, and so the fiery, active, soul is but a physical phenomenon). (The fire's devouring of water (is typical of the so-called appetite or desire of the soul),” or, in other words: Desire and enjoyment are no proof of a superphysical entity, any more than in the case of a fire gratifying its thirst for water.

The denial of the soul-doctrine next calls forth the following refutation:

“A passing away (of something not physical occurs) in the case of a dead being. Supplication of the gods (proves the existence of incorporeal entities). (There would be besides) in the case of the dead a cessation of acts [the Karma doctrine would have to be given up].² This is the proof. (Then again) things incorporate cannot be causes, *hetavaḥ*, for there is no identity of that which has form and that which has no form,” 218, 30–31.

After this, other sceptics, who the commentator rightly (as I think) says are Buddhists,³ are introduced with a new argu-

Jātiḥ smṛtiḥ, “birth and memory,” would seem to imply that memory argues a former birth, as in *Patañjali's Sūtra*, iv, 9. This would be an argument on the other side, as if the stanza were writ to prove the opposite. I follow N., though inclined to think that the words really ought to be put into the mouth of the believer (tree, butter, memory, etc., show soul). See the next note.

¹ But compare the (orthodox) view as explained in xii, 211, 3: “As senseless iron runs toward a magnet; so conditions born because of one's nature and all else similar” (are attracted toward the soul). The passages seem curiously related, as just before stands, *çl. 2*, *yathā 'çvatthakaniḥkāyāṃ antar bhūto mahādrumaḥ niṣpanno dṛçyate vyaktam avyaktāt sambhavas tathā*, “birth from the unmanifest is as when a great tree born in a flower coming out is seen clearly.” Compare *BAU. iii, 9, 28*; *Çvet. Up. i, 15*, etc.

² This, like the appeal to the existence of divinities, is a presumption of what is to be proved. Of course, the unbeliever believes neither in metempsychosis nor in gods, but he is not allowed to say any more. In xii, 304, 47, the argument for the existence of the Source and the spirit is that both are inferable from effects (as seasons are from fruits, 306, 27). In the latter passage, the spirit “inferred by signs,” *liṅgas*, is called *pañcaviṇçatima* (*takāralopa āṛṣaḥ*!).

³ Interesting, both as showing how the epic repeats itself and Buddhism, are xii, 175 and 277 (where several *pādas* are identical with those in the *Dhammapada*), and xiii, 118. The *ahiṇsā* doctrine is carried on here in xiii, 114, 6, which repeats xii, 246, 18, with a varied reading that shows the futility

ment against the existence of soul: "Some say the cause, *kāraṇa*, of successive rebirth is ignorance, *avidyā*, desire, confusion of mind, and the practice of faulty acts; ignorance being the field watered by thirst, and acts being the seed planted in it, all of which cause rebirth. They say that (ignorance) is concealed (in the body) and is burned away, and that, when the mortal part is destroyed, another body is born from it and they call this the destruction of being. But (in answer to this), how can it be just the same man in this (new body), since he is different in form, in birth, in good, and in aims? For (if there is no soul) all would be disconnected. (Further) if this is so, what pleasure would there be in gifts, wisdom, or the power gained by religious practices? For another entity would get the fruit of what this man practises, since one man by means of another's nature, *prākṛtāṇi*, would be made wretched or blessed here on earth. (In this matter) the decision in regard to what is invisible (must rest on) what is visible. If you kill a body with a cudgel would another arise from it? Even so the separate consciousness would be a different consciousness, not the original one. This destruction of being (spoken of above, *satvasamkṣaya*) would be repeated like seasons and years; [there would indeed be no end to it, for if it is argued that destruction of consciousness ever results in a new consciousness, then destruction of being would result, not, as the Buddhists teach, in annihilation, but in new being; so there would be no escape from rebirth. If one says, however, that there is a conditioned soul, it can be only a physical bond of unity] like a house, growing gradually weaker through repeated aging and dying (consisting, as such a 'soul' must) of (mortal) senses, thoughts, breath, blood, flesh, bone, all of which perish and revert in due order to their original bases. And, further, (such a theory) would refute the practice of the world in

of relying on the commentator, who thinks that the elephant in the following stanza of *Chāṇḍī* is Yoga! *Yathā nāgapade 'nyāni padāni padaḡāminām, sarvāny eva 'pidhiyante padajātāni kaurjare, evam sarvam ahinsāyām dharmārtham apidhiyate* (in xiii, *evam loke'v ahinsā na nirdiṣṭā*).

respect of obtaining advantage from gifts and other religious acts, since both the words of the Veda and the practice of the world (show that acts are performed) for this purpose (of gain). There are many proofs to be found in the mind, but what with the iteration of this and that cause no clear light is obtained, but men doubt and turn to some one explanation, till their intellect becomes fixed on one point and rots there like a tree. So all creatures, made wretched through (desiring) useless objects, are led away by received teaching, āgamāḥ, like elephants led by their keepers. Thus, desiring objects that bring endless pleasure, the dried-up many get instead a greater sorrow on being forced to abandon the bait and enter the power of death."

The argument is the familiar one that a man gets sorrow through desiring heaven, for after his Karma is exhausted he sinks down again to a lower level. So heaven is a bait which attracts men; but as it is only a temporary pleasure followed by pain, one suffers from it all the more (*nessun maggiore dolore che ricordarsi*). All this implies unconscious existence as the best goal.

To this it is said, 219, 2, in the words of the great Upanishad: "If there is no consciousness after death,¹ what difference does it make whether one has wisdom or not, or is careful or not?" Then Pañcaçikha replies with a long exposition of his system, 219, 6 ff., of which I give the chief points:

It is not a system of annihilation, *ucchedaniṣṭhā*, nor one of the soul's separate existence, *bhāvaniṣṭhā*. The (visible) man consists of body, senses, and perception, *cetas*. The foundations are the five elements, which are independent and make the body. The body is not of one element, but of five. The aggregate causing activity is knowledge, heat, and wind.² From knowledge come the senses and their objects, separate existence, *svabhāva*, perception, *cetanā*, and mind; from wind come the two vital breaths; from heat come gall and other

¹ *yadi na pretya saṁjñā bhavati*; compare *tāny (bhūtāni) evā 'nuvinaçyati, na pretya saṁjñā 'sti 'ti*, BAU. II, 4, 12.

² 219, 9; compare below.

bases, dhātus. The five senses, indriyas, hearing, touch, taste, sight, smell, derive from the mind, citta, and have its characteristics. Eternal cetanā is threefold when united with discernment, vijñāna. This they call sukhaduḥkha and the opposite. Sound, touch, color, taste, smell, the forms (mūrtayaḥ, containing these as objects), make a group of six constant constituents, guṇas, to make knowledge perfect. Dependent on these are acts and visarga (?), and judgment in regard to the meaning of all topics. This they call the highest seed, ūkra; it is intellect, the great undeteriorating (substance). This collection of attributes is not soul but is not-soul, anātman. The true teaching is contained in Renunciation-Ūstras, which enjoin renunciation of all. Having explained the six jñānendriyas, organs of knowledge, Pañcaṅkha explains the "organs of action, which are five, with bala, power, as the sixth," çl. 20. There are twelve organs, five organs of knowledge with mind as sixth, and five of action with power as sixth. The eleven organs (with mind) one should renounce by means of the intellect. Ear, sound, and mind (citta, in 23 and 34; manas in 22) are necessary in hearing.¹ Thus for all the senses there are fifteen guṇas (3×5). There are also the three guṇas called sattva, rajas, tamas. Ear and sound are forms of air (space); so with the five others. In the ten senses there arises a creation (entity) simultaneous with their activity; this is (the eleventh), mind, citta. The intellect is the twelfth. In deep sleep, tāmase, there is no annihilation (of personality), although there is concerned no such creation simultaneous with the senses (the co-operation being a popular fallacy). (In deep sleep) in consequence of one's former waking experience, and because one is conditioned by the three guṇas, one imagines that one has material senses, although one can perceive only subtile senses. But though one imagines this, one does not really

¹ Compare Gītā, 18, 18 (threefold urges to action), knowledge, object, knower, jñānaṁ jñeyam pariñātā trividhā karmacodanā; threefold action, organ, act, agent, kāranaṁ karma karte 'ti trividhaḥ karmasaṁgrahaḥ; in 14, the five kārāṇāni or karmaṇaḥ hetavaḥ are object, adhiṣṭhāna, agent, organ, action, and the dāiva (said to be Sāṁkhya, but interpreted as Vedānta).

co-operate (with the senses. Hence it may be inferred that a soul exists independent of mental processes). But the deep-sleep consciousness is a finite and darkened pleasure. Even the result one derives from traditional teaching, āgama, though not sorrowful, is also merely darkness, revealed lies, as it were.¹ Spirit, kṣetrajña, is the being, bhāva, standing in mind; it is immortal, flowing as a stream to the ocean. For the destruction of existence, satvasaṁkṣaya (the expression used above) is (in Upanishad language) as when rivers run into other rivers and to the ocean, losing their individuality, vyakti (equivalent to form) and name. Consequently, when the individual spirit, jīva, is united (with the ocean of being) and embraced on all sides, how could there be consciousness after death? (219, 43). As the creature that spins out of itself, wrapping itself in its web-house, stays there overpowered, so is the soul; but when freed, it abandons its misery, and then its woe is destroyed, like a clod falling on a rock. As the deer leaves its old horn, and the snake its skin, without looking behind, and a bird leaves the falling tree and flies away unattached, so the freed soul abandons its woe, and leaving pleasure and pain, *without even a subtle body*, goes the perfect way (47-49 repeats 45).²

For a Sāṁkhya philosopher Pañcaçikha teaches very extraordinary things, the most advanced Brahmaism, which fails only of being Vedānta in its lack of Māyā. Three sets of philosophers are here refuted, — the materialist, the Buddhist,

¹ The commentator reads atha tatrā 'py upādatte tamo 'vyaktam ivā 'nṛtam, çl. 38, which is perhaps better "hidden falsehood." The meaning is, as explained above, that the joy given by Vedic teaching is a perishable heaven resulting in sorrow (darkness) and the teaching is not the highest truth. Compare, on the other side, the same reproach, Māit. Up. vii, 10, satyam ivā 'nṛtam paçyanti.

² Compare Praç. Up. v, 5; Muṇḍ. Up. 1, 7 and iii, 1. The first image is clearly not that of a spider (which is not destroyed by its web), but of a silkworm, though the commentator (and PW.) take ūṇanābhi as a spider, which comparison is common. Compare xii, 286, 40, ūṇanābhīr yathā sūtram viññeyās tantuvad guṇāḥ (as in BAU. ii, 1, 20). But the silkworm is also common. Compare xii, 304, 4, koçakāro yathātmānaṁ kiṭaḥ samavarundhati sūtratantugūṇāir nityaṁ tathā 'yam agūṇo guṇāḥ dvandvam eti ca nir-dvandvaḥ, etc.

and the orthodox Vedist. The terms used are those of the Sāṃkhya, jīva and kṣetrajña rather than ātman (sthito manasi yo bhāvaḥ sa vāi kṣetrajña ucyate, ḡl. 40), but this spirit is only part of Brahman.¹

Another point to be noticed is the absence of tanmātras. Before passing to the numerical analysis of the Pāñcarātra scheme into thirty elements, I would point out also that as in Gītā, 7, 4, so ib. 13, 5-6, there are gross elements, egoism, intellect, and mind (= 8), but also ten organs and five objects of sense plus avyakta (= 24 topics), to which are here added, Gītā, 13, 5-6, desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and also body, perception, courage (saṃghāta, cetanā, dhṛti) or thirty-one elements of "modified Prakṛti."

The Thirty-one Elements (Pāñcaçikha).

Here there is a formal group of particles called kalās, not sixteen but thirty, but one (God) super-added makes thirty-one topics, the same number ascribed by tradition to the Pāçupatas. A most minute description is given in xii, 321, 96-112. This scheme is as follows:²

In order to act, the organs "await the outer constituents," guṇas. In perception, color, eye, and light are the *three causes, and so in all cases* where are found knowledge and the object of perception, (similar) causes of knowledge exist; between knowledge and the object intervenes the guṇa, constituent, mind, wherewith one judges. [The organs and mind make eleven.]³ *The twelfth is intellect*, another constituent, wherewith one decides in the case of doubtful things to be

¹ The attribute of Jagatprakṛti applied to Nārāyaṇa in the Pāñcarātra hymn, xii, 330, 89, "the god who is the Source of the world," gives the vital difference between this teaching and that which inculcates a Prakṛti distinct from pure soul.

² I italicize below without extended comment the points of contact with the scheme just given.

³ This must be supplied from the context. In the scheme at xiv, 42, 16, "mind must be recognized as belonging to both, and intellect is the twelfth," only ten organs are recognized, as here, and bala as a separate organ is unknown.

known. The thirteenth constituent is *sattva*. (It is real) for one is argued to be an individual having much or little *sattva* (hence it is a real constituent, a *guṇa*). The fourteenth constituent is egoism (when one says 'I am an agent'), with which one gets the notion of mine and not-mine. Then there is a fifteenth constituent, which is different from the others and is called the totality of the mass of separate factors, *prthakkalāsamūhasya sāmāgryam* (i. e., *the general disposition*). The sixteenth, a different constituent, is a sort of complex, *saṁghāta iva* (because it consists, says the commentator, in the union of the three factors of ignorance; the sixteenth is therefore *avidyā*, or ignorance itself), wherein are combined the Source and the individual manifestation, *vyakti*, which are respectively the seventeenth and eighteenth constituents, *guṇāu*. The nineteenth is the unification of doublets (opposites), such as pleasant and disagreeable, age and death, etc. The twentieth constituent is Time, the origin and destruction of all things. This complex, *saṁghāta*, of twenty, and in addition the seven constituents consisting of the five gross elements added to [the origin and relation of] being and not-being, (making twenty-seven, is to be added again to) three more constituents, *vidhi, śukra, bala* (cause, seed, power).¹ That is called the body in which these twenty and ten are all together. The Source (fore-cause) of these *kalās*, factors, one philosopher recognizes to be the Unmanifest; another, dull of insight, recognizes (as such) the Manifest. Metaphysicians recognize a Source of all beings, whether it is the Unmanifest or the Manifest or a double or quadruple source. This unmanifest Source becomes manifest by means of the *kalās* (the factors just enumerated). The individual is the Source so made manifest. From conception to old age there is an uninterrupted momentary splitting up of the factors (particles) of the body, although too minute to be observed (in detail). But this passing away and coming into existence of

¹ According to the commentator, these are right and wrong as originating false ideas, *vāsanā*; that which incites to wrong ideas; and the effort leading to the attainment of wrong ideas. But see the scheme above.

the separate particles goes on from stage to stage just like the course of a lamp's light. There is, therefore, no connection between the individual existent creature and his members. All creatures are born by the union of particles, *kalās*, as it were,¹ just as fire is produced by the union of sunlight and *fire-stone*, *maṇi*, or by sticks (rubbed together).

This exposition is given for a practical purpose, as is seen in the last paragraph. One should recognize no *own*, as all creatures are one, distinct from the physical parts. The "body of particles," as it is called in xii, 322, 25, reverts to the unmanifest Source, but the self or soul is but part of the same soul in any other body of particles. The doctrine is none the less that of *Pañcaçikha* because it is taught by *Sulabhā* to *Janaka*, though it is the latter who professes himself the disciple of *Pañcaçikha*, "the venerable beggar who belonged to the family of *Parāçara*," xii, 321, 24. For *Janaka* does not really understand, and so *Sulabhā* is enlightening him. *Pañcaçikha* is here said to be a *Sāṃkhya* leader. There is an imitation and would-be improvement in this late discourse (the metre shows the lateness) of *Gītā*, 3, 3, *loke 'smin dvividhā niṣṭhā*. Here çl. 38, the "point of view," is made treble, *trividhā niṣṭhā dṛṣṭā*; not that emancipation is got by knowledge or action, as in the *Gītā* passage, but by the third (and best view), that of *Pañcaçikha*, who "rejected both these two," 321, 40. The doctrine is that the *vāiçeṣikaṃ jñānam* or most excellent way, çl. 23, leads one to live a life of renunciation. All depends, says the king, on whether one is bond or free; the pure and good devotee may still be active; asceticism is not requisite; a king is as good as a beggar. "The bond of royalty (says the king in conclusion), the bond of affection, I have cut with the sword of renunciation, which has been sharpened on the anvil of emancipation," ib. 52. But his antagonist intimates that he has not learned the true religion, which is renunciation in deed as well as in thought. As a system, the doctrine of *Pañcaçikha* is said to be *sopāyaḥ*

¹ The commentator says that "this expression, (*kalānām*)*iva*, has no meaning, and is merely used to fill up the verse," 321, 124.

sopaniṣadaḥ sopāsaṅgaḥ¹ saniṣṭayaḥ, çl. 163, a detailed philosophical exposition.

In xii, 276, 4 ff., there is a third exposition, oddly combined with the Sāṃkhya schedule, while at the end it shows resemblance to that just given. It is referred to Asita Devala, who in xiii, 18, 18, is said to have received glory from Çiva (Çiva is Sāṃkhyaprasādaḥ, xiii, 17, 63), who "gives the goal of Sāṃkhyayoga," xiii, 14, 198. In this scheme Time creates the five gross elements. Impelled by Being and Soul, Time creates beings out of these elements, which with Time make a group, *rāçi*, of six. To these are added *bhāva* and *abhāva*, making the "eight beings, *bhūtāni*, of beings." When destroyed, a creature becomes fivefold (elements) because of these. The body is made of earth, *bhūmimayo dehaḥ*; the ear comes from air (space); the eye from the sun; the breath from the wind; the blood from water. The five senses are the "knowledges" (organs of knowledge, *jñānāni*). Sight, hearing, smelling, touch, taste, are five, distributed fivefold over five. Their constituents, *tadguṇāḥ*, are color, smell, taste, touch, and sound, apprehended in five ways by the five senses. These, their *guṇas*, the senses do not know, but the spirit knows them (this is a correction of the statement that objects of sense are apprehended by the senses). Higher than the group of senses is *citta*, perception; higher than *citta* is mind; higher than mind is intellect; higher than intellect is spirit. A creature first perceives, *cetayati*, different objects of sense. Then pondering, *vicārya*, with the mind, he next determines, *vyavasyati*, with the intellect. One that has intellect determines objects of sense apprehended by the senses. Perception, the (five) senses as a group, mind, and intellect are, according to metaphysicians, the eight *jñāneन्द्रियाः*, organs of knowledge. *There are five organs of action and bala is the sixth organ of action*, çl. 22. Sleep-sight is the activity of the mind when the activity of the senses is suspended. The states, *bhāvas*,² of *sattva*, *tamas*, and *rajas*

¹ *upāsaṅga* for *upāsaṅgaḥ*? N. defines as *dhyānāṅgāni yamādini*.

² This word means being as entity (and so is equivalent to *guṇa*, constitu-

(joy, success, insight, virtue, being the causes of one being endowed with *sattva*), which are associated with activity, whatever their cause of activity, *vidhi*, are retained (in sleep) by memory. There is an agreeable and constant immediate passage between the two states, *bhāvayoh* (that is the passage is immediately perceptible between waking and sleeping). The organs and the states are called the seventeen constituents, *guṇas*. The eighteenth is the eternal incorporate one in the body, *dehī çarīre* (spirit).

Here fourteen organs are added to the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, etc., for there are "eight organs of knowledge" and six of action (elsewhere there are only five organs of knowledge). Of the group of seventeen I have already spoken, and note here only the intrusion of *citta* between senses and mind. The account proceeds not very lucidly: There conconcorporate constituents bound up in body in the case of all incorporate creatures cease to be conconcorporate on the separation of the body; or the body made of five elements, *pāñcabhāutika*, is a mere (temporary) union, *saṁnipāta*. The one and the eighteen *guṇas* with the incorporate one and with heat, *uṣman* (the internal heat of the stomach, says the commentator), make the complex, *saṁghāta*, of twenty composed of five elements, which (twenty) the Great One, *mahān*, with wind supports. The death of each creature is caused by this (wind). On destruction, the creature enters the five elements, and urged by its good and evil, assumes a body again; and so on from body to body, urged by Time the *kṣetrin* (spirit) goes, as if from one ruined house to another.¹

The *viṅṣo saṁghātaḥ pāñcabhāutikaḥ* or complex of twenty composed of five elements in this passage is the same with the *viṅçakaḥ saṁghātaḥ* of the preceding, 321, 109. But there

ent) or existence and so state of being. It often adds nothing to the meaning. For example in xiii, 141, 85, "*bhāva* of self" is the same with self: *ātmany evā 'tmano bhāvaṁ samāsajjeta vāi dvijaḥ*, "put self in self."

¹ *viçirṇād vā (= iva) gṛhād gṛham*. The analysis above, 276 (5), 30: *ekaç ca daça cā 'ṣṭāu ca (= 19) guṇāḥ, saha çarīriṇā (dehin in çl. 28) uṣmaṇā saha (besides heat) viṅço vā saṁghātaḥ pāñcabhāutikaḥ, mahān saṁdhārayaty etac çarīraṁ vāyunaḥ saha*. Compare the first scheme above.

Time is the twentieth, and the twenty are the bodily *guṇas*. Nevertheless, the employment in each, not only of the group of twenty but also of *bala* and *vidhi*, as found above, points to a common basis.¹ In none is there a trace of Vishnuism.

The Secret of the Vedānta.

The united systems of philosophy called "Secret of the Vedānta" and exploited in xii, 194, 248 ff., and 286, which in the following pages I shall designate as A, B, C, present a curious mixture, which on careful analysis show clearly that they are three different versions of an older Sāṃkhya tract, which is worked over into Brahmaism. There is no clear recognition of egoism, though the commentator so interprets the "maker of *bhūtas*" in C 9, and, as I have said above, I think it doubtful, both from these and other passages, whether the earlier Sāṃkhya recognized Intellect as other than self-conscious. One of the present three schemes introduces the *Bhūtātman* as *deus ex machina*. They all differ slightly and have the *Pañcaçikha* terminology to a certain extent. In their threefold form they offer an instructive example of how the epic copies itself. They all begin with the same request to the instructor to give a metaphysical, *adhyātma*, lecture. The first and last versions represent *Bhīṣma* as teacher and *Yudhiṣṭhira* as pupil; the other, *Vyāsa* as teacher and *Çuka* as pupil of the same lecture. The two *Bhīṣma* lectures do not agree so closely with each other throughout (though more alike at first)² as do the *Vyāsa* and second *Bhīṣma* version,

¹ Compare with this *saṃghāta* or vital complex the *jīvaghaṇa*, *Praçṇ.* v. 5.

² The closer agreement begins with A 9 as compared with B 9 and C 10; "sound, ear, and holes, this triad is born of air; touch, action, skin, are born of wind; color, eye, digestion, are called the threefold light, *tejas*." Here B and C have "vital airs" for skin, and *jyotis* for *tejas*. In the next group, where A has taste, *kleda*, tongue, B and C both have *sneha*. Again "mind as the sixth" organ appears in A 11 but is omitted in B 11 and C 12, to reappear in B 17, C 15. In all these versions, body, with smell and object, is of earth alone, *bhūmiguṇaḥ*, *loc. cit.* Besides these triads, B and C give sound, *ghoṣa*, (*çabda*) from air, smell alone as *bhūmiguṇa* in B, all composite matter, *saṃghāta*, as earth-*guṇa* in C; breath (C) or touch (B) from wind, etc.

which lie nearer together in place. It will be necessary to treat these chapters rather fully if we wish to get a clear idea of the manufacture of epic philosophy.

Coming, then, to details, the *glokas* are intermingled in such a way that part of one *gloka* in one discourse is part of another in another version. Thus, after the introductory stanza, which names the five elements with but trifling variations, A has: "Whence they are created thither they go, again and again, the great *bhūtas*, from other *bhūtas*, like waves of ocean; and as a tortoise, stretching forth limbs, retracts them again, so the *Bhūtātman* again withdraws the *bhūtas* he has created." In B, the expression "like waves of ocean" comes in the first stanza, replacing the expression "origin and destruction" in A. In C, as regards this expression, the reading is as in A, but the important lines of the tortoise and *Bhūtātman* appear here thus: "As a tortoise here, causing his limbs to stretch forth, retracts them, so the smaller *bhūtas* in respect of greater *bhūtas*;" while B has: "As a tortoise here, stretching forth limbs, retracts them again, so the great *bhūtas*, *mahānti bhūtāni*, modify themselves in the smaller" (younger); and this is repeated, *ib.* 14, in a stanza omitted in the other versions with the momentous alteration: "As a tortoise here, his limbs outstretching, withdraws them, even so *the Intellect*, having created the group of senses, withdraws them."

The next change is in A 8, where, after stating that the "maker of *bhūtas*" put the gross elements differently in all beings, the teacher here adds "but the *jīva* spirit does not see that difference," which in the other versions appears without mention of *jīva*, with *viṣayān* in C for *vāiṣamyam*. Of the new group of eight sources found here, I have spoken elsewhere. All the versions have the following stanza A 17, B 16, C 18:

guṇān (A, C, guṇāir) nenīyate buddhir, buddhir eve-
'ndriyāṇy api (C, ca)
manahśaṣṭāni sarvāṇi (A, bhūtāni), buddhy (A, tad)
abhāve kuto guṇāḥ,

that is, Intellect directs the *guṇas*; the senses are intellect

and their constituents could not exist without it. A and C make the intellect subservient to the *guṇas*! C, as if to explain the *guṇas*, inserts "tamas, sattva, rajas, time, and act," while in 13 it has a verse (mingling cases), "sattva, rajas, tamas, *kāla* (nom.), and *karmabuddhi* (nom.), and mind, the sixth, in these (bases) the Lord created." B, too, has an addition: "Mind, intellect, and nature, *svabhāva*, these three are born of their own sources; they do not overpass the *guṇas* on arriving at that which is higher than the *guṇas*" (13, *na guṇān ativartante*). So in 816, 2, *guṇasvabhāvas tv avyakto guṇān nāi 'vā 'tivartate*. But in 249, 8 ff., the continuation of B, the intellect, identified with the *bhāvas* (states produced by *guṇas*) does overpass them, "as the sea does the shore." The image here is so conventional, *saritām sāgaro bhartā mahāvelām ivo 'rmimān* (compare A, 23 ff.; C, 23 ff.) that there is no doubt what has happened. The constant unchanging epic simile is that one remains, not over-stepping, "as the sea does not overpass its shore." In other words, there is in this passage an intrusion of the Yoga idea¹ that the soul can overpass the *guṇas* (compare *Gītā*, 14, 21, and xii, 252, 22), and so the ancient simile is introduced without its negative, making the absurdity shown above.²

B alone adds, in 249, 3, "the intellect is soul," *ātman*,

¹ Compare xii, 205, 17: "Mind abandoning *guṇas* attains freedom from *guṇas*" (above). *Guṇas* and *bhāvas* are here the same thing, for the latter are the result of the presence of the former. They (or the eight sources) "carry the universe but rest on God," 210, 28, 36. This is a Lord-system, though "Lord" is a form of ignorance: "elements, senses, *guṇas*, three worlds, the Lord himself, are all based on egoism," 212, 18-19.

² *svabhāva*, nature, is distinct from *sadbhāva*. One is temporary, the other is eternal, xiv, 28, 22; *Gītā*, 8, 3. The three texts in describing the modification of intellect "called mind when it desires," A 20; B (249), 2; C 20, have slight variants; "that with which it sees is eye, hearing it is called ear," A 19; B 4; C 19, where B and C have *çṛṇvati*, etc., but A the verb throughout. In A 13 (and the corresponding verses B 18, C 19) "the mind doubts," *saṁçayaṁ kurute*, "the intellect decides," *adhyavasānāya*. Compare 249, 1, *mano viçṛjate bhāvaṁ buddhir adhyavasāyini, hṛdayam priyāpriye veda, trividhā karmacodanā*. "The intellect is the chief thing in that which is to be made" (B 15), suggesting egoism, but C 14 has *kṛtane* and A has no subject at all.

which is in line with the tendencies at work here. So in 249, 20, there is a stanza which must be compared step for step with the parallel passages: "Soul, ātman, puts forth intellect, but never (read *nā 'pi*) *guṇas*; the *guṇas* do not know soul, but soul, *sa*, knows *guṇas* always, and it is the observer and in proper order occupies itself with them. Know that this is the difference between intellect and spirit (*kṣetrajña* for the preceding ātman), one creates *guṇas*, one does not create *guṇas*; both being different but joined by the Source, united as a fish to water, or fly to udumbara, or as sheath to grass-blade. Intellect truly creates *guṇas*, but the spirit, the Lord, superintends, as the *guṇas* modify themselves; all that is part of its own nature, that intellect creates *guṇas*; as a spider does his thread, so that creates *guṇas*."

In A, 38 ff.: "See the difference between intellect and spirit, *kṣetrajña*; one creates *guṇas*, one does not create *guṇas*; as the fly and udumbara so are they joined; both being different, but joined by the Source; as a fish and water are joined so are they; the *guṇas* know not the soul, ātman, but the soul, *sa*, knows the *guṇas* always. But being an observer of the *guṇas* (the spirit) imagines them created (by himself). The soul, ātman, with the senses and intellect as the seventh, which are moveless and ignorant, illuminates the object, *pada*, like a lamp. Intellect truly creates the *guṇas*, the spirit, *kṣetrajña*, looks on; this is their connection. There is no support for the intellect and spirit. *Mind* creates intellect but never creates the *guṇas* . . . A Yogi in his proper nature creates (*śṛjate*) *guṇas*, as a spider his web."¹

C 33 begins as in B, "Know that this is the difference," down to the image of the fish; then, omitting the fly, etc., goes on as in A: "The *guṇas* know not the soul, ātman, but the soul knows *guṇas* always, but, being an observer of the *guṇas*, it imagines itself the creator. There is no support for the intellect . . .² the intellect, *buddhir antara*, with the

¹ Unique. *Mind* here is for ātman in B.

² A senseless addition is found here, followed by *śṛjate hi guṇān sattvaṁ kṣetrajñaḥ paripaśyati* (as in A). *Sattva*, itself a *guṇa*, rests on *rajas*, xii,

senses, which have no eyes and are ignorant, makes the senses luminous like a lamp (the intellect alone sees, the senses are like lamps) . . . this is even the fulfilment of its nature that (intellect creates) *guṇas* as a spider his thread; the *guṇas* should be recognized as a web."¹

A Sāṃkhya text is here changed into a later philosophy, with soul substituted for spirit, and the Yogin making *guṇas*. Hence also the intellect is grouped with senses as ignorant instruments of the soul, while Mind is creative soul. Even apart from the philosophical modifications here visible, it is difficult to see how the synthetic method can account for these three

213, 12, *sattvaṃ ca rajasi sthitam, jñānādhiṣṭhānam avyaktam buddhy-ahamkāralakṣaṇam tad bijam dehinām āhuḥ*. Compare 215, 25, *jñānādhiṣṭhānam ajñānam vijñānānugataṃ jñānam ajñānenā 'pakṛṣyate*. But we have in *ācraṇo nā 'sti sattvasya* a phrase in which *sattva* is equivalent to conscious buddhi. The varied readings show clearly that the text has been tampered with. In *ācraṇo nā 'sti sattvasya guṇāḥ cābdo na cetanā* in 240, 14, followed by *sattvaṃ hi tejaḥ sṛjati na guṇān vāi kathamācāna* there is still another parallel to our text. So in 241, 3 ff., *sattva* is buddhi, higher than *citta*, as it is said "merge *citta* in *sattva*" (247, 5 and 9, the Yogin's *sūksmā buddhiḥ*). Elsewhere *citta*, by the way, is an organ "lower than mind," 276, 16. The version in 104, 44, is *ācraṇo nā 'sti sattvasya kṣetrajñāsya ca kaṣṭhāna, sattvaṃ manaḥ saṃsṛjate na guṇān vāi kadācāna* (after the words *sṛjate hi guṇān sattvaṃ*), where *manas* must represent *ātman* in the version above. The form *guṇāḥ cābdo na cetanā* appears, a scribe's error apparently, in 286, 36, as *guṇasargeṇa cetanā*, before the meaningless words: *sattvaṃ asya sṛjanty anye guṇān veda kadācāna*. The epic *sattva* is well known: "One is fitted for Brahman existence as *sattva* gradually departs," i. e., as circumscribed *jīva* becomes pure. Compare also 217, 21-25 (210-217 are a professed *adhyātma* of Nārāyaṇa), where it is said that *jīva* quits *rajas* and goes about like sound but in a body, and then gets established in Source, and finally leaves even that body and enters "end of body which rests on nothing," *nirācraṇa*.

¹ Other common metaphors and similes are that of the cocoon (pp. 36, 151), the "bonds of hope," *ācāpāṇa*, *Gitā*, 16, 12; the net, xii, 242, 7 ff.; but unique is the weaver of xii, 217, 36: "As a weaver passes the thread through cloth with a needle, so the thread of transmigration is fastened with the needle of desire, *saṃsārayati* (*saṃsārasūtra*) *trṣṇāsūcya*. Compare foam-like body and bird-like soul, xii, 322, 7; as well as the elaborate river-metaphors (taken from the battle-epic), where the bank is truth, waves are untruth, desire is a crocodile, and the river of the unmanifest goes into the sea of transmigration, iii, 207, 72; xii, 251, 12 ff. (*Dh. Pad.*, 251, n' *atthi mohasamāṃ jalam n' atthi saṃhāsamā nadi*).

conversations. From an historical point of view the problem is of course simple.

The question asked above, "What would become of the *guṇas* in the absence of intellect?" is taken up and continued at the end of the discussion: "When the *guṇas*, the strands spun by intellect, are dispersed, *pradhvastāḥ*, they do not cease to be, *na nivartante*; a cessation, *nivṛtti*, is not perceived. This is beyond the sphere of what is immediately perceptible (but) it is ascertainable through reasoning, *anumāna*. So some decide, while others say they cease to be, *nivṛtti*. Let one consider both views and decide as one thinks best, loosening the firm knot of the heart (an Upanishad phrase) caused by a difference of judgment," 194, 50-52. B and C have "their activity, *pravṛtti*, is not perceived," for "a cessation is not perceived."

The Yogin, who according to the teaching of this lecture can overpass the *guṇas*, is said in the last section, in a supplement, xii, 252, ff., to surpass even the destruction of *guṇas*, *atīkrānta-guṇakṣaya*, and reach the highest goal.

Details of Philosophical Speculation.

It has been shown thus far that there are not only three religious philosophies in the epic, but also three formal systems, one inculcating the twenty-five, one the twenty-six, and one the thirty-two categories.

These broad differences are sufficient to show how entirely lacking in any uniform plan or scope is epic philosophy as a whole, and also to prove that the epic does not represent a preliminary chaos of opinions, but reflects at last three perfected and systematized schemes of philosophy. I turn now to some details of speculation, incongruous for the most part, reflecting different interpretations and different views; but in some cases noteworthy not so much for their lack of harmony with other epic schemes as for the uniqueness of views found only in one or two passages of the pseudo-epic, amid a mass of theories covering the same general subject.

The Sixty Constituents of Intellect.

This group, one of the most elaborate in the epic, is obtained by an "enumeration," *parisaṃkhyāna*, which analyzes the elements, xii, 256, 1 ff. They are thus distributed: "Earth has ten, firmness, weight (*gurutva*), hardness (*kāṭhinya*), the function of productivity, scent, density (also *gurutva*, but explained as *prathamānatā*, *piṇḍapuṣṭiḥ*), ability (to hold scents), compactness, support, endurance. Water has ten, coolness, taste, moistness, fluidity (*dravatva*), adhesiveness and softness (? *snehasāumyatā*), tongue, dispersion, also, and softening (*ṣrapaṇa*) of earthy things (these make nine, but the commentator supplies 'freezing' from *ca*, 'and,' which I render 'also'! Probably *bhāumānām* contains an old error). Fire, ten, dangerousness, light, heat, cooking, brightness, pain, passion (and is) swift; (it has) sharpness and ever upward flaring. Wind (air), ten, tempered touch, (it is) the organ of speech, *vādasthāna*; (it has) independence, power, speed, emission (of secretions), activity, movement (of breath), life (*ātmatā*, of the vital airs), and birth. The characteristic constituent of air (space) is sound; (it has also) comprehensiveness, openness, non-support, non-suspension, unmanifestness, steadfastness (*avikāritā*), non-resistance (*apratighātītā*), mentality, and changes (*bhūtatvaṃ vikṛtāni ca*, 'that is, it causes hearing and apertures in the body,' N.). Thus related are the fifty constituents (*guṇāḥ pañcāṣaṭam*), which are the essentials of the five elements." To these are added nine constituents of mind and five of intellect, as follows: "Courage, reasoning, memory (so the commentator renders *upapatti* and *vyakti*, perhaps individuality), creation (*visarga*, rendered 'loss of memory' by the commentator), imagination, patience, good, evil, and swiftmess, are the nine characteristics of mind. The destruction of the pleasant and the unpleasant (in deep sleep), judgment (*vyavasāya*), concentration, doubt, and insight are recognized as the five characteristics of intellect." The two last, *samīcya* and *pratipatti*, are rendered by the commentator in just the opposite meanings, namely knowledge in

doubtful matters and the application of other proofs as well as direct perception. In the light of explanations current elsewhere in the epic, where "doubt-making" is an attribute of mind, and judgment that of intellect, "doubt," which is here clearly attributed to intellect, must indeed, from a syncretical point of view, be interpreted by its opposite, or one may fall back on the remark cited below, that this is all nonsense. From an historical point of view, however, the statement may stand beside the many other inconsistencies of the epic.

The section closes with a query on the part of the listener as to how intellect has five constituents and how the five senses are reckoned as attributes, *katham pañcendriyā guṇāḥ*; to which the answer is the stanza: *āhuḥ saṣṭim buddhiguṇān vāi bhūta-viṣṭā nityaviṣaktāḥ, bhūtavibhūtiḥ cā 'kṣarasṛṣṭāḥ putra na nityam tad iha vadanti*, "They say that the constituents of intellect are sixty. These are distinguished by the elements;¹ (but) are always attached (to the intellect). The manifestations of the elements are created by that which is indestructible. They say that that is non-eternal." "That," it is added, "which has been declared to you here is foolishness, *cintākalilam*, and unorthodox, *anāgatam*. Learning the whole truth in regard to the meaning of elements, gain peace of intellect by acquiring power over the elements" (*bhūtaprabhāvāt, Yogi-power*).

The sixty may be got by adding the five *guṇas* of intellect to the five elements plus their fifty characteristic constituents; but the commentator says the true count is seventy-one, five elements with their fifty constituents added to mind and intellect with their nine and five constituents respectively.

Two views are given. One is that there are fifty and nine and five constituents of five (elements), one (mind), and one (intellect) = 71. The other is that intellect has sixty constituents, five of its own, fifty of the elements (as parts of intellect), and the elements themselves (which are different

¹ The commentator paraphrases *bhūta-viṣṭāḥ* with *pañca bhūtāny api buddher eva guṇāḥ*, "the five elements are constituents of intellect."

from the constituents). The latter view is repudiated as unorthodox, and the final injunction is given to turn from this calculation to *Yogi-discipline*.

This unorthodox enumeration is represented elsewhere by the title of *Çiva*, who is called *ṣaṣṭibhāga*, xiii, 17, 72, and perhaps also by the mysterious *manoviruddhāni* in the enumeration of the psychic colors explained below. Seven hundred *vyūhas*, or forms of activity, are traversed by the soul on its way through red and yellow, to white, when it courses above the eight worlds. Then follows, xii, 281, 46:

aṣṭāu ca ṣaṣṭīm ca ṣaṭāni cāi 'va
manoviruddhāni mahādyutinām

"The eight (worlds) and the sixty and the hundreds (of *vyūhas*) are impediments to the mind of the illuminate." The sixty are here explained as constituents of existence still adhering to the white soul. The commentator, however, gives an entirely different explanation from the one above, and though much the same in regard to the last two cases, his interpretation is not quite uniform. In the former case, the god enjoys *tattvas* or topics, experienced as stated at the beginning of the *Māṇḍūkya*, in unconscious slumber, wakefulness, and ordinary sleep, each of the latter being the real or illusionary fine and gross elements added to the nineteen "doors of enjoyment," soul, five breaths, and the usual thirteen (ten organs, mind, intellect, and egoism); while two of the sixty are attributed to dreamless slumber, *cetas*, soul, and subtilest capacity. In the latter case, the three states are surpassed by a fourth state, to which the impeded white soul cannot attain. The impediments are much the same as those above, but include ignorance, desire and acts (the triad mentioned above), and the states themselves.

The Seventeen.

In the exposition given in xii, 276, 6 ff., above, p. 156, there is a group of seventeen with an added spirit, making eighteen in all. Further there are "eight beings of beings," which re-

mind one of the "eight sources," but instead of the usual group we find here the gross elements, Time, being, and not-being (egoism is not a factor here at all).¹

The group of seventeen plays an important part in epic categories, but it is clear from a comparison of the cases that there is no symmetry of system in the explanation. It is in short, as is the case in other instances, a Sāṃkhyan term used because it is an old term, but explained differently in different cases. One form we have just examined; another I gave in the first chapter, above, p. 33, where was shown a late group of seventeen, containing most of the elements of the same group in the Vedāntasāra, five elements, mind, intellect, egoism, five organs of sense, spirit, ātman, and the three guṇas or constituents of all that is not pure spirit.

On the other hand the Sāṃkhyan group, as in Aphorisms iii, 9, may be understood of the bodily constituents (ten organs, mind, intellect, and five elements) in a praise of Īśa who created the "seven guardians and ten others who guard this city,"² vii, 201, 76. The city here is the body, as in the Upanishads and Gītā (Āvet., 3, 18; G. 5, 13), elsewhere called "house," as in v, 33, 100, "this house of nine doors, three pillars, five witnesses, under control of the spirit."³

¹ This exposition is called "silly talk," duṣṭapralāpāḥ, xii, 280, 23, because it does not recognize that the course of transmigration may be brought to an end. For it is taught in the following chapter that not knowledge, penance, and sacrifice, but only self-restraint, can result in the attainment of Vishnu, the supreme God. For as a goldsmith purifies gold in fire so the soul is purified by many rebirths or by one alone. Hari creates, whose self consists of the eleven modifications, ekādaśavikārātmā, the sun is his eye, his mind is in the moon, his intellect is in knowledge, etc., and the guṇas are essentially of God, 281, 9, 11-12, 19-21, 24. Here, as I have elsewhere pointed out, eleven modifications take the place of the regular sixteen, evidently the organs and mind without the elements.

² In conjunction with the two birds (spirits) and pippal trees (vikāras), mānasāu dvāu suparṇāu vācācākhāḥ pippalāḥ sapta gopāḥ daśa 'py anye ye puram dhārayanti. Compare for the birds and pippal tree Muṇḍ. Up. iii, 1; Āvet. iv, 6.

³ The five senses, mind, intellect, egoism, and the gross body, make the nine; the pillars are restraints, ignorance, desire, action; the house is the body; the witnesses are the senses, says the commentator, who at Gītā, 5, 13, gives a different explanation of the nine. The witness (as in popular style, i,

Another passing allusion is found in xii, 280, 4, "freed from the seventeen," where (since the context excludes objects of sense, *guṇas*, and the "eight") the seventeen are explained by the commentator as five breaths, mind, intellect, and ten organs (the eight being objects of sense and *guṇas*). Another passage alluding to the seventeen is taken in the same way: "Who are free of the seventeen, the *guṇas*, and acts, the fifteen *kalās*, particles, being abandoned,¹ they are released," xii, 335, 40. So again in xii, 352, 15-16: "The highest spirit is not affected by fruits, as the lotus leaf is not affected by water; but the other, the active spirit, *karmātman*, is bound by the bonds of salvation² and it is bound also by the group of seventeen," where *rāçi*, group, is used as in the first example above, though the group is a different one.

It follows that the epic is not consistent with itself but interprets the "group of seventeen" in different ways.³

74, 31, *hr̥di sthitah*) is sometimes made sixfold, as the spirit and five senses, xiii, 7, 5. Various poetical modifications occur: "A house, *agārakam*, of one pillar, nine doors," xii, 174, 59; a city, xii, 210, 37; nine doors again (still differently explained by the commentator) in xii, 240, 32, where the spirit is *haṁsa* (compare 246, 29-31). A very elaborate working-up of the body-city, with senses as citizens, *buddhi* as Lord, etc., will be found in xii, 255, 9 ff. The *haṁsa* passage reflects the Upanishads: 240, 29 = *Çvet.* iii, 16; 30 = v. 1. of *Çvet.* ib. 20; 31 has the unique *dvāidhibhāva* (*ātmanah*) of *Māitri*, vii, 11: 32 = later form of *Çvet.* iii, 18. On p. 45, I gave *kālāḥ pacati* in *Strīp.* as accidental or universal. Not so here, however, where *Māitri* vi, 15, *kālāḥ pacati . . . yasmiṁs tu pacyate kālo yas taṁ veda sa vedavit*, appears complete (with the v. l. *taṁ vede 'ha na kaçcana*) in 240, 25. So too *çl.* 17 = *Kaṭha* iii, 15; and 26 = *Çvet.* iv, 19; while in 15, *manīṣā manasā viprah paçyaty ātmānam ātmani* (*evam̐ saptadaçaṁ dehe vṛtaṁ soḍaçaḥkārīḥ guṇāḥ*) there is a direct copy of the older form, *Çvet.* iv, 17, etc. *Çl.* 19, 20, 21 copy the *Gītā*.

¹ *ye hināḥ saptadaçaḥkārīḥ guṇāḥ karmābhīr eva ca, kalāḥ pañcadaça tyaktās te muktā iti niçcayaḥ*. Here the commentator takes *guṇas* as *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. On the fifteen *kalās*, see below.

² *Mokṣabandhāḥ*, perhaps *moha* should be read, unless *mokṣa* implies desire.

³ There are of course other groups of seventeen. Thus in xii, 269, 25-26, *Agni* is seventeenth in the sacrificial group, plants, cattle, trees, withes, butter, milk, sour milk, ghee, land, points of compass, faith, time (are twelve), the three Vedas, the sacrificer (are sixteen), and seventeenth is Fire, the house-lord.

The Sixteen (A) Particles.

What has happened in the mixture just described is obvious enough. The fifteen kalās, mentioned above as something to be abandoned, imply a sixteenth kalā, the not-to-be-abandoned psychic entity itself. The impediments are called indifferently kalās and guṇas, the former being the old designation, as in Muṇḍ. Up. iii, 2, 7, "the fifteen kalās disappear." Here as in Brh. Āraṇ., i, 5, 15, the sixteenth is the soul; but in Praç. Up. vi, 2-5, the soul is the source of the sixteen, sa puruṣo yasminn etāḥ ṣoḍaça kalāḥ prabhavanti, Puruṣa makes them, each from the preceding: "breath, faith, five elements, sense, mind, food, energy, austerity, hymns, sacrifice, the world, and the name (individuality)," and they all flow back into Puruṣa in reverse order. In xii, 47, 53 ff., (where the sāmkyātman is yogātman, māyātman, vīçvātman, goptrātman) God is "the Sāmkyas' Seventeenth, having three-fold soul (tridhātman, awake, dreaming, in dreamless sleep), standing in soul, enveloped in the sixteen guṇas." The sixteen in xii, 210, 33 are the eleven organs and five objects of sense, which come from (1) the Unmanifest, producing (2) act-born intellect, which produces (3) egoism, whence come, one out of the other, (4) air, (5) wind, (6) light, (7) water, (8) earth, the eight fundamental sources on which the universe is established (vs. 29, the sixteen modifications, ten organs, five objects of sense, and mind). Compare also above the "freed from six and sixteen." So in xii, 242, 8 = xiv, 51, 31, where every creature has a body, mūrti, and "consists of sixteen," murtimān ṣoḍaçātmakah. The Upanishadic kalās and the Sāmkyas groups have united, and in turn are affected by other later groups. In xii, 240, 13, there is a group of sixteen "always in the bodies of incorporate creatures," the five senses and the five objects of sense, the svabhāva or individual nature, intellect, cetanā, and mind added to two vital breaths and to spirit itself; while in 302, 24, svabhāva and cetanā are apparently not included in the "sixteen guṇas" which encompass the body; or, if the sixteen be interpreted as including

them, then in both cases we have a group of sixteen quite distinct from that in the previous section, where organs and objects of sense make the number. Further, in the former of the two last sections, *cetanā* is distinct from *manas*, with which it is elsewhere identified (see the section cited on p. 84 from the third book). Compare also the account of creation in xii, 233, 10 ff., already referred to, where the seven *mahātmanas*, intellect, mind, and the elements, unite to make body as a base for spirit, *ṣarīraṃ ṣṛayaṇād bhavati, mūrtimat ṣoḍa-ṣātmakam*, 233, 12, into which enter *mahānti bhūtāni*. The elements are the gross, as they are described in ṣl. 8 (*guṇāḥ sarvasya pūrvasya prāpnuvanty uttarottaram*), and there seems no reason for differentiating them from the Great Beings, though the commentator takes them as intellect and *tanmātras*, and the sixteen as gross elements and eleven organs, explaining the whole process as the creation of the *līṅga* in the *sthūla* body.

The group of sixteen plus a seventeenth, as given in the scheme above, is a combination of two schedules, one the regular seventeen of the Aphorisms, the other an earlier group of sixteen only, in which the sixteenth is the permanent spiritual part as contrasted with the fifteen impermanent parts, like those of the moon, xii, 305, 4.

The Sixteen (B) or Eleven Modifications.

The epic (as already cited) gives the modifications as eleven in number. Apart from the usual explanations of these eleven, there is a passage, xii, 253, 11: "Three higher *guṇas* are in all creatures, besides the five gross elements, with mind, which is essentially analytic, *vyākaraṇātmakam*, as the ninth, intellect the tenth, and the inner soul, *antarātmān*, as the eleventh." Here the commentator explains the three as ignorance, desire, and action (*avidyā, kāma, karma*, ṣl. 9), though in the text *bhāva, abhāva*, and *kāla*, are given as three additions (ṣl. 2), with other departures from the scheme already recognized in what precedes. But apart from this special case, the fact remains that in some parts of the epic, as in iii,

218, 18 (p. 37), xii, 281, 20, only eleven modifications are admitted.

On the other hand, sixteen modifications, eleven organs and five elements, as in the regular Sāṃkhyan system, are fully recognized, as in xii, 311, 8 ff., and elsewhere.

There is, therefore, no uniform epic interpretation of the modifications.

The Eight Sources.

As given above from xii, 210, 28 and 311, 10, the *mūla-prakṛtayaḥ* or eight fundamental procreative powers are the Unmanifest, intellect ("born of activity," the result of the equilibrium being disturbed by *tejas*, energy), egoism, air, wind, light, water, and earth; or in other words (the fine elements being ignored, as usual), the five elements and self-conscious intellect as the first manifest production of the unmanifest produce everything. But in *Gītā*, 7, 4, the "eight sources" are these elements plus mind, self-consciousness, and intellect. The terminology, it may be observed, is already broken up in the *Gītā*. In this passage "another source," *prakṛti*, is the *jīva* *abhūtā*, which is the same with one of the "two spirits," *puruṣas*, in 15, 16, one of which is 'all beings,' with a "third spirit," the Lord, *Īṣvara*, *paramātmān*, added in 17, who is not identified with the *akṣara* but is "higher." When, however, egoism is rejected in favor of spirit, as in the "Secret of the Vedānta," then the group of eight appears as the six senses " (the five senses which are perceptive, *viññānāni*, with mind as the sixth), intellect and spirit. Other groups of eight, like the last, seem to be based on this early grouping of productive elements. They are assumed in xiii, 16, 54, where *Ṣiṣa* is "the eight sources (above 'eight forms'), and he who is above the sources," and they are personified in the personal creation of xii, 341, 80 ff., as "eight sages," who are sources, though created from the elements:

Maricir Aṅgiraḥ cā 'triḥ Pulastyaḥ Pulahaḥ Kratuḥ
Vasiṣṭhaḥ ca mahātmā vāi Manuḥ Svāyambhuvas
tathā

jñeyāḥ prakṛtayo'ṣṭau tā yāsu lokāḥ pratīṣṭhitāḥ

Compare 210, 28, *mūlaprakṛtayo hy aṣṭāu jagad etāsv avasthitam*. As already noticed, the system requires that the elements here should be "fine," and this is occasionally expressed (see p. 129), but elsewhere the fine elements are ignored in this group of sources. Then the five (gross) elements are productive, which leaves only eleven modifications.

The Vital Airs and Senses.

In xii, 302, 27, there are seven breaths, the usual five and in addition an *adhaḥ anilaḥ* and a *pravahaḥ*. Instances where ten and five vital breaths are mentioned have already been given. So with two, which are often the only airs recognized, as in xii, 240, 13. These are all old groups,¹ and represent as varied opinions in the epic as in earlier literature.

Generally speaking, plants are ignored in the elaborate analysis of categories, but they are specifically mentioned at times. Thus in xii, 183 ff., there is an account of creation. Water was the first creation after space. Water pressing made wind. The friction of wind and water made fire which became solid and thus formed earth. There are five sense-making elements in all created things. Trees do not appear to possess them, but they really do. They have space or how could leaves come out? They have heat as is shown by withering. They have ears, for at the sound of thunder they lose leaves, and sound is heard only with ears. They have eyes for a withe can wind its way, and there is no path without sight. They can smell, for good and bad smells, of incense, etc., make them flourish or decline. They taste, for they drink water. So all creatures have the five elements. The earth-element is seen in skin, flesh, bone, marrow, sinew; the fire-element, in energy, wrath, sight, heat, and digestive fire; the air (or space) element in ear, nose, mouth, heart, and stomach (usually not as here, 184, 22, but in all the apertures); the water-

¹ Even the ten are recognized in *Çat. Br. xi, 6, 3, 5, daçe 'me puruṣe prāṇā ātmāi 'kadaçaḥ* (called *rudrāḥ*). These can scarcely be the organs, for as such they would include the *karmendriyas*, which do not "depart" at death. The names are given above, p. 36. Compare the *rudras* of xii, 817, 5.

element in slime, bile, sweat, fat, blood. There are five vital airs (winds) which cause a person to move, 184, 24-25:

prāṇāt prāṇiyate prāṇī vyānād vyāyacchate tathā
gacchaty apāno 'dhaḥ cāi 'va 'samāno hr̥dy avasthitāḥ
udānād ucchvasiti ca pratibhedāc ca bhāṣate
ity eva vāyavaḥ pañca ceṣṭayanti 'ha dehinam

The five senses belong to the five elements; one smells by reason of the earth-element; tastes because one has the element of water; knows color through the eye as the fire-element; knows touch through the wind. Smell is of *nine* sorts; taste is of six sorts; color (and form), of *sixteen* sorts (color as distinguished from form is of six sorts, white, black, bright-red, yellow, blue, yellow-red); wind has a double characteristic, sound and touch; touch is the characteristic of wind and is of many sorts, viz., twelve; air (space) has but one characteristic, sound. But there are *seven* sorts of sound (the gamut) called ṣaḍja, ṛṣabha, gāndhāra, madhyama, dhāivata, pañcama, niṣāda. Whatsoever sound of drum, thunder, etc., is heard is contained in this group of seven sounds (notes).²

The more extended account of airs in the next chapter gives ten vital breaths or airs, though it describes but five, nāḍyo daṣapṛāṇapracoditāḥ, xii, 185, 15 (as noticed above, p. 36, with the correspondence in the third book). In xiv, 50, 42 ff., the same (duplicated) account says smell is of *ten* sorts; color (form), of *twelve* sorts; sound of *ten* sorts (the gamut and also "sounds which are agreeable, disagreeable, and com-

¹ This is the later view that apāna is the anus wind, pāyūpāsthe 'pānam, Praṇa Up. iii, 5.

² On the six colors mentioned together in the Rig Veda, and the light of thirty-four kinds, see my article on Color Words in the Rig Veda, Am. Journal of Phil. iv, p. 190. Seven recitations or notes are recognized in the Chānd. Up. ii, 22, 1; the roaring note is the Agni note; the unclear is Prajāpati's; the clear or definite is Soma's; the soft smooth, is Vāyu's; the smooth strong, is Indra's; the heron-note is Bṛhaspati's; the inharmonious, is Varuna's. The names here are indefinite and apply vaguely to seven divinities. They are found also in other early literature. The epic names have no analogy in the Upanishads till the Garbha. On the other hand the epic grāma, gamut, is late. Compare above, p. 13, vāṇī; also saptatantrī viṇā, iii, 134, 14, "the seven-stringed lyre," called ṣaḍgrāmarāgādisamādhīyuktā, in H. ii, 89, 68.

fact"), although the two descriptions are almost identical. Each, however, has added new factors. The *Anugītā* list betters the careless text above, whereby the sound called "Fifth," *pañcama*, stands in the sixth place (xii, 184, 89).

The Five Subtile Elements. Gross and Subtile Bodies.

The word for subtile element, *tanmātra*, is late and, as I think, its equivalent is not often to be understood. The earlier schemes were content with "elements"; the later, or a divergent interpretation, introduced fine elements, *sūkṣmāṇi*, the latest have the classical term *tanmātrāṇi*. Of course the commentator often interprets fine elements where none is mentioned. Thus, in xii, 205, 15, "as the elements disappear on the destruction of the *guṇas*, so intellect taking the senses exists in mind," where subtile forms may be inferred, as they may be in xiv, 51, 13, where *viṣvasṛj* is doubtful (v. l.). In xii, 252, 21, *aviṣeṣāṇi bhūtāni*, and in xii, 311, 8 ff., where the modifications of the five elements are again elements (above, p. 129), fine elements are recognized. In xiii, 14, 423, *viditvā sapta sūkṣmāṇi śaḍaṅgaṁ tvāṁ ca mūrtitaḥ*, "knowing thee as having in bodily form the subtile seven, and having six limbs," the commentator may be right in analyzing the seven as intellect, egoism, and five *tanmātrāṇi*, as he does in the case of the Yogin's *līṅga*, soul, also said to have "seven *sūkṣmas*," xii, 254, 7.¹ Elsewhere there are eight (powers?) characteristics of the subtile body of the Yogin, xii, 317, 6.

But it must have caused surprise in the many schemes given above, that a clear indication of this theory is so often lacking where it would be most in place. The elements are simply *mahābhūtās* (sic, or *bhūtāni*). Only the latest part of the epic has the technical word, i, 90, 13-14, where the

¹ Perhaps, however, the sevenfold knowledge of the Yogin is meant as in *Sūtra*, ii, 27. The passage above, xiii, 14, 423, is a copy of xii, 254, 15, where the seven are explained as senses, objects, mind, intellect, *maḥat*, the unmanifest, spirit (the six are here explained as all-knowing, content, knowledge without beginning, independence, ever-clear sight, endless power).

spirit, kṣetrajña, is connected with the tanmātras before birth in the body; and xiii, 14, 202, where the order of Īva's creation is "mind, intellect,¹ egoism, the tanmātras, and the organs."²

In xii, 202, 18 ff., when the soul leaves the body and takes another, it is said: "A man leaving his body enters another unseen body. Abandoning his body to the five great (gross) elements, bhūteṣu mahatsu, he takes up a form also dependent on these, tadācraṇam³ cāi 'va bibharti rūpam. The five (senses) exist in the five great elements and the five objects of sense, in the senses." Here there is another body, but it is composed of the same great elements and no other elements are recognized. The new body is called a līṅga,⁴ but so is the old, crotṛādiyuktaḥ samanāḥ sabuddhir līṅgāt tathā gacchati līṅgam anyat, "possessed of hearing and other senses and having mind and intellect he passes out of one body to another," çl. 14.

Elsewhere it is said that the beings that pass out of the gross body pass into a subtile, sūkṣma, body, and are called sūkṣmabhūtāni sattvāni, "fine beings," which "wander about like sunbeams," superhuman, atimānuṣāni, xii, 254, 1-3 (sattva is bhūtātman). The passage in xii, 345, 14 ff. has already been referred to. Here the sun is the door (as in the Içā) and the dead become paramāṇubhūtāḥ, then manobhūtāḥ, and then

¹ Here mati stands for buddhi, as it does in xii, 202, 21, sarvāṇi cāi 'tāni manonugāni, buddhim mano 'nveti matiḥ svabhāvam, "the senses follow mind, mind follows intellect, intellect follows the pure entity (here equivalent to paramāḥ svabhāvaḥ of 203, 1).

² The word tanmātra occurs only in late Upanishads, according to Col. Jacob's Concordance (his reference s. pañca° includes Māitri, iii, 2). To the last, Garbe, in his Sāṅkhya-Philosophie adds (p. 239) Kaṭha, iv, 8, referring to Regnaud, Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la philosophie de l'Inde, ii, 31, 32. This is an error. The Kaṭha knows nothing of tanmātras. Praṇa must be meant, where mātṛās are mentioned, iv, 8.

³ Compare tan-mātram, but in the passage cited, tad must refer grammatically to the great elements.

⁴ So in xii, 307, 18, the Yogin, still in his gross body, becomes quiet as a lamp in a windless place, shines like a lamp (or is like a stone or piece of wood). When he shines forth and is nirlīṅgaḥ and moveless, he would not be reborn. Here līṅga seems to be merely a distinguishing mark.

trāigunyahīnāḥ, and enter Vāsudeva (nirguṇātmaka), the sarv-āvāsa (compare Īcāvāsyā), the home of all (or dwelling in all). We may compare Vāsudeva derived from sarvabhūta-kṛtāvāsa, xii, 348, 94. The Yogin soul, "clothed in seven subtile things," has also been referred to above, p. 39.

In these cases there is evidence of a general belief in a subtile body, but evidence against a general belief in subtile elements, negative, of course, but rather strong when the elements called great beings (not necessarily gross, implying antithesis of subtile)¹ are said to be the constituents of the second body. I add another similar case where no mention is made of subtile elements, though the elements and the subtile post-mortem body are discussed, since it is an interesting passage in itself and also offers a particularly convenient opportunity for the introduction of the idea of subtile elements, but no such idea is suggested.

The discussion begins with an account of creation, explains the five elements, and proceeds with an argument in regard to the psychic agent. Life, it is said, is invisible and the question comes whether there is any vital, jīva, spirit, and how it survives apart from the body, when the latter "passes into the five elements" (i. e., into the gross elements, tasmin pañcatvam āpanne jīvaḥ kim anudhāvati, xii, 186, 10). "When a man's body has been eaten by birds, or has fallen from a cliff, or has been burned, how can life come to him again, kutaḥ saṁjīvanam punaḥ, 13. If the root of a cut-down tree does not grow again, but only the seeds of the tree grow, how can the man (cut-down) reappear? The seed alone, which has been started previously, that remains in existence; the seed comes from a seed, but dead men perish when they die," 15.² "No," says the teacher, "there is no destruction of the vital spirit, jīva. The vital part of a man, prāṇī, enters another body; the body

¹ The application of great in mahābhūta is expressly said to be (not in antithesis to subtile, but) on account of their unlimited character, amitānām mahāḥabdo yānti bhūtāni sambhavam, tatas teṣām mahābhūtaḥabdo 'yam upapadyate, xii, 184, 8.

² Compare BAU. iii, 9, 28, retasa iti mā vocata . . martyaḥ svit mṛtyunā vṛkṣaḥ kasmān mālāt prarohati. With the fire-simile, cf. Çvet. i, 13.

alone is destroyed. The vital spirit supported by the body, *çarīrāçrīto jīvaḥ*, is not destroyed when the body is destroyed; for it is like the flame when the wood is burned" (implying that though invisible it exists). "Just so," says the objector, "it is like the flame, but no flame is apprehended when the wood is used up, and I regard such a fire, when the wood is used up, as destroyed, since it has no visible course, nor proof (*pramāṇa*), nor thing to hold to," *saṁsthāna*. To this the answer is: "The fire is not apprehended, because it has disappeared into air without a support. So the vital spirit, on abandoning the body, exists like air,¹ but like fire it is not apprehended, because of its subtilty, *sūkṣmatvāt*; the vital breaths are upheld by fire and this fire must be regarded as the vital spirit. When breathing is restrained, the breath-upholding fire is destroyed. When the bodily fire is destroyed, then the body (*deham, n.*) becomes senseless and falls and becomes earth, *yāti bhūmitvam*; for earth is the place it goes to, *ayana*. Breath and fire go to air, for these three are one; the pair (of other elements) is fixed on earth. These (elements) assume form only in connection with bodies (either mobile or immobile, 187, 9-10). . . . The five senses are not universally found² (and the body's resolution into elements does not affect the soul); the inner soul alone carries the body, it alone smells, tastes, hears, etc. The inner soul is (not local but) found in all the parts of the body, presiding over that (mind) which has five (characteristics), in that (body) which consists of five (elements) . . . The soul does not die when the body perishes."³

This is *Paramātmāna* doctrine, *ib.* 23, and since from the

¹ xii, 187, 6, *jīvo hy ākāçavat sthitaḥ* (*sarvagato nityaḥ ca, comm.*), reminds one of BAC. iii, 2, 13, *ākāçam ātmā*, only the strange Buddhistic assumption (of Karma alone remaining) is here carefully guarded against, though the preceding simile suggests the soul's fate to be that in the Upanishad.

² Literally: "In respect to what you are saying (whether the operation of mind and senses indicates an agent) there is no general application of the five," 187, 19.

³ *mithyāi 'tad āhur mṛta ity abuddhāḥ: daçārdhatāi 'vā 'aya çarīrabhedat*, 187, 27.

beginning of the discussion where the elements are introduced, 184, 1 ff., to the close as given above, there is every opportunity to introduce the fine elements, it is evident they have no place in this system. We must either assume, therefore, that they are known in some parts of the epic and are not known in others, owing to a difference historically, or that they are taught and not taught in different passages, owing to a fundamental doctrinal difference. The synthetic interpreter is welcome to either horn of this dilemma.

The orthodox popular belief, which of course is also taught in the epic, is that one can go to heaven with a "divine form," as in xviii, 3, 42. In xvii, 3, 22-28, one goes to heaven "with his (human) body." The reason may be that explained in the words¹ "because of God's residence in them, the gross elements are eternal." These life-breaths and so forth exist eternally even in the other world, for a Çruti says so, in the words: "Even when gone to the other world the life-breaths of incorporate beings always (exist)," xv, 34, 10 (text, above, p. 25).

The body comes, according to the epic, from earth alone or from various elements. According to the scheme given above from xii, 184, 4, the body is made of earth. So the ear comes from air; the eye from the sun, etc., xii, 276, 11, *tasya bhū-mimayo dehaḥ*. Compare xii, 240, 7, "from earth the body, from water the fat, from light the eyes." Here wind is the support of the two vital breaths, *prāṇāpānāçrayo vāyuḥ*, and air (or space) is in the holes, *kheṣv ākācam*, of corporate beings, a scheme of creation which attributes the "great beings" (elements) to the "first creation" of a personal creator*.

In xii, 306, 5, the characteristics of male and female parents are traditionally² three each, as inherited by the offspring:

¹ *mahābhūtāni nityāni bhūtādhipatisaṃçrayāt*, xv, 34, 5.

² *çuçrūma . . . vede çāstre ca paṭhyate*. It is added: "Authoritative is what is declared in one's own Veda, *svavedoktam*, and what is read in the Çāstras," a restriction as to the Veda not elsewhere admitted.

bone, sinew, marrow from the father; skin, flesh, and blood from the mother. But in çl. 24 it is said that skin, flesh, blood, fat, bile, marrow, bone, and sinew are all eight produced by the male,¹ çukreṇa prākṛtāni. Here tradition is set aside for the sake of the new philosophy.

The growth of the body is described in xii, 321, 114 ff., the seed and blood, male and female, uniting produce a flake, kalala, which becomes a bubble, budbuda, which develops into a lump, peçī. From this lump come the limbs; from the limbs, nails and hair. At the end of the ninth month, "name and form (individuality)" are born.²

Besides one subtile body, the epic may recognize two, as do the Vedāntins and later Sāṃkhya philosophers (Garbe, Sāṃkhya Phil., p. 267). But the following text, I think, scarcely supports this interpretation of the commentator: "When the spirit in a body is out with rajas, it would wander about, like sound, with a body; having a mind unaffected by the result of action (the spirit) is established in Prakṛti because of its freedom from affection."³ The commentator thinks that when the spirit is in Prakṛti it has a very minute body, different from the span-long or thumbkin body.⁴ This is his explanation also of the unfinished sentence in xii, 254, 13. In 12 one sentence ends with the statement that unclarified spirits "do not see the bhūtātman in bodies." Then in 13, "those who are devoted

¹ Apparently a clear contradiction of the preceding, but excused by the author on the plea of understanding the inner meaning, and not the words alone, of Veda and Çāstra, granthārthatattva!

² The same process is described in late Sāṃkhya texts (Garbe, p. 273). Compare the Garbha Upanishad. "Name and form" is a phrase sometimes amplified: "The Lord creates name and form and acts," xii, 233, 25-26 (as in Bṛh. Up., i, 6, 1, nāma rūpaṃ karma, which may be referred to here, yaduktam vedavādeṣu . . . tadānteṣu).

³ rajovarjyo 'py ayaṃ dehi dehavāṇ chabdavac caret, kāryāir avyāhata-matir vāirāgyāt prakṛtāu sthitaḥ, xii, 217, 21. The next half-stanza, ādehād apramāḍac ca dehāntād vipramucyate, is interpreted by the commentator to mean "the three bodies (sthūla-sūkṣma-kāraṇa) being abandoned, the soul (without body), because of its mental freedom, is released definitively."

⁴ The subtile body is "span-long" in xii, 200, 23; "the size of a thumb," it wanders by reason of its connection with the liṅga, v, 46, 15, and 27; xii, 285, 175, aṅguṣṭhamātrāḥ puruṣā dehasthāḥ. See above, p. 32.

to Yoga-Çāstra, desirous of seeing that soul, — (things) without breath, (things) without form, and what (things) are like thunderbolts.” Here the commentator takes the three, anucehvāṣāni, amūrtāni, yāni vajropamāny ‘pi, as bodies devoid of intelligence, sūkṣma or subtile bodies, and, thirdly, bodies indestructible even in the æonic destruction, or kāraṇa-çarīrāni, with atikrāmanti, overpass, to be supplied in the text. If anything is supplied it is “they see,” but the passage is clearly without sense as it stands and probably represents a later and awkward interpolation of the three bodies.

The Colors of the Soul.

The color of the soul is assumed through its union with the body, in the same way as when one near a fire gets a red color, xii, 202, 17. The incorporate spirit, dehin, is said to be without color, but it is tinged with the fruit of acts, and so is said to attain to color, varṇa, which is of course specifically “darkness.” “But when the creature by means of knowledge puts off darkness, born of ignorance, then appears eternal Brahman” (pure, without color, 201, 26). “As wind,” it is said, “becomes colored with dust and so itself colors all the air (space), thus the spirit, jīva, without color, because of acts’ fruits becomes color-tinged,” xii, 280, 9 ff.

This simple idea of pure white soul (as in Çvet. Up. iv, 1) being darkened by contact with impure darkness-born not-soul, and eventually becoming clear and colorless again, is worked up into a confused theory of spirit-color in the next chapter, where jīva, spirit, has six colors, ṣaḍjīvavarṇāḥ, xii, 281, 33, as follows: “Spirit has six colors, black, yellow-green (or grey), and blue, the middle color; red, more helpful and good, bright yellow, and, best of all, white. White is best, spotless, without sorrow, leading to success. . . . The course creatures take is made by their (spiritual) color. Color is caused by one’s former acts (Time, as often, represents the Karma). The dark color leads to a low course and hell. After hell the spirit attains yellow-green (harit = dhūma). When jīva is endowed with sattva it casts off tamas (darkness) by means

of intelligence, and after blue attains to red and lives as a human creature." Then the spirit attains to yellow as a god, returns to hell, and goes on in the same way to white, finally surpassing the three states (*guṇas*).¹ The inner meaning of this passage, according to the commentator, is that when the spirit has the three *guṇas*, *tamas*, *rajas*, *sattva*, in quantitative proportion to this sequence, the result is that the spirit is black; but in the order *tamas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, yellow-green (or grey); *rajas*, *tamas*, *sattva*, blue; *rajas*, *sattva*, *tamas*, red; *sattva*, *tamas*, *rajas*, yellow; *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, white. The whole theory, which is alluded to again in 292, 4 ff., seems to be an elaboration of the simple thesis of the preceding section given above. In the passage following, the "higher color" is gained by "pure acts," *varṇotkarṣam avāpnoti narah puṇyena karmanā*. The identification of light with heaven ("bright-yellow gods," above) is as natural as that of darkness with hell. Thus xii, 190, 1 ff., after it is said that "truth is light and darkness is lies," we read: "Light is heaven and darkness is hell; man gets a mixture of both in this life, truth and lies." Compare Patañjali's Aphorisms, iv, 7: "Yogin's work is neither white nor black." I see no support in the text for the elaborate explanation of the commentator, as recorded above.

In xii, 303, 46, there are "three colors, white, red, and black, with which are affected all things in *Prakṛti*." Here these are set parallel to the *guṇas* (red apparently corresponding to energy, *rajas*), as signs of the soul, which goes to hell if it is *tāmasa*, humanity if *rājasa*, heaven if *sāttvika*; apparently an intermediate view between the six colors and the simple antithesis of pure and impure, white and dark. The tricolored being is known in a phrase common to epic, v, 44, 25, and Upanishad, *Ṣvet.*, iv, 5.²

¹ The commentator, instead of taking the states to be *guṇas*, takes them as waking, sleeping, and deep slumber, ending in *turya*, the fourth state.

² Epic text, xii, 303, 46: *çuklalohitakṛṣṇāni rūpāṇy etāni trīṇi tu sarvāṇy etāni rūpāṇi yāni 'ha prākṛtāni vai*. *Ṣvet. Up.* iv, 5: *ajām ekām lohitaçukla-kṛṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ* (Müller gives the varied readings in his note, *SBE.*, vol. ii, p. 250). For v, 44, 25, compare above, p. 28.

The Five Faults of a Yogin.

In xii, 241, 3 ff., the faults of Yoga as known to the seers, Kavis, are desire, wrath, greed, fear, and sleep, *kāma*, *krodha*, *lobha*, *bhaya*, *svapna*, two added to an ancient trio. In xii, 301, 11, the five Yoga faults to be "cut off" are registered as *rāga*, *moha*, *sneha*, *kāma*, *krodha*. In xii, 302, 55, the "path-knowing Kāpila Sāṃkhyas" give as the five faults, *kāma*, *krodha*, *bhaya*, *nidrā*, *çvāsa*. In xii, 317, 13, the five faults are simply the actions of the five senses. See also the list above, p. 119.

Patañjali, ii, 3, recognizes five *kleṣas* "to be abandoned" (*heyāḥ*), *avidyā* 'smitā *rāga* *dveṣā* 'bhiniveṣāḥ. Five to be "cut off" and "to be abandoned" are also recognized in the Dhammapada, 370, *pañca chinde*, *pañca jabe*. In the epic the "five" are known as such, but different expositions explain them differently.

Discipline of the Yogin.

The perfected Yogin, who, by means of the sevenfold *dhāraṇās*, methods of fixing the mind, has overcome seven, the elements, egoism, and intellect, attains to "complete and faultless illumination," *pratibhā*, in which state he surpasses the *guṇas* and performs miracles. These technical terms of the Yoga are only two of many found in the later epic. *Pratibhā*, *upasargas*, the eightfold power, the various comfortable "sittings," calculated to induce concentration of thought, e. g., *vīrāsana*, the *codanās*, "urgings" (by which one controls the breaths), the "pressing of breaths" into the heart-canal, or into the space between the brows, the fixed hours of exercise in mental discipline — all this Yoga-machinery is as well known to the epic rewriters as to Patañjali. That the epic here precedes the Sūtra-maker may be inferred from the fact that in the matter of "faults" (above) and in other technical terms it does not always follow the latter, though it has the Sūtra terminology to a certain extent. But, on the other hand, there can be little doubt that the epic-writers were steeped in Yoga-terms and used to Yoga-

practices of extreme refinement, for they reveal a very intimate acquaintance with Yoga-technique. Over against these adepts, or scientific Yogins, stand the vulgar ascetics, whose practices consist simply in the austerity of painful posturing. The latter forms are antique, and continue, of course, through the whole epic, as indeed they continue till now in India; but in contrast with those who practise the scientific rules of the skilled Yogin, the "one-legged, up-arm" ascetic belongs to the vulgar cult, inherited as "Veda-enjoined penance," where the wretch is not so much engaged in control and samādhi, graduated concentration, as in mortifying himself to get power or win God's grace. Even Vishnu thus stands by his "eight-finger-high-altar," and performs austerities, "standing on one leg, with upturned arm and face;" and it is the worshippers of such gods who retain as their sole means of winning divine grace the same sort of practices. No sharper contrast can be imagined than the two disciplines, that of the votary and that of the scientific student of psychology (whose theology rests in Brahmaism), as presented in the epic.¹

The Destructible and Indestructible.

Both spirit and the Source according to the Sāṃkhya system are eternal and indestructible, xii, 217, 8; Gītā, 13, 19. They are therefore not created things. But spirit in other passages is a "created thing" and so is the source, xii, 205, 24. For according to the Brahmaistic interpretation, both of these are destructible so far as their entity goes. The twenty-fifth is reabsorbed and the twenty-fourth is also absorbed into Brahman, xii, 308, 7 ff. See above, pp. 134, 137. "Lord Time's Retaking" pratyāhāra, is the name given to the cosmic reabsorption as explained in xii, 234, 1 ff. The universe becomes subtle and metaphysical, adhyātma. All things are first burned and enter the condition of earth, till earth looks bare

¹ The chief chapters to be compared will be found in Čānti (237, 241, 317; also pp. 44, 107, above), but for details I must refer to a paper read at the Meeting of the Oriental Society in April, 1900 (to be published in the Journal, vol. xxii).

as a tortoise shell. Then water takes up earth; fire, water; wind, fire; air, wind; mind, air (with sound, etc., i. e., manifest mind passes into unmodified mind); the moon, as samkalpa or fancy, swallows mind, citta; then Time swallows this as knowledge.

Up to this point the retroaction is at least intelligible but it is interrupted here by a revealed text: *kālo girati vijñānam kalam balam iti çrutih, balaṁ kālo grasati tu, taṁ vidyā kurute vaçe*, "Time swallows knowledge, *power swallows Time, and Time swallows power*; then Wisdom overpowers Time." Finally: "The Wise One puts into himself the sound, *ghoṣa*, of air or space." That is unmanifest, highest, eternal Brahman, "and so Brahman alone is the recipient of all creatures."¹

The Gods and the Religious Life.

The orthodox Brahman's insistence on the four stadia of life is found in the normal attitude of the poets. Opposed to this is the direct teaching that these stadia are quite unnecessary, xii, 327, 26-27: "In the first stadium one can be perfected, what use is there of the other three?" Compare iii, 297, 25, *mā dvitīyam*, etc.

In some passages the god Brahman is indestructible and self-created; in others he is a creation; in some he is below Vishnu, in others above him; in some, he is below Çiva; in others above him.² Brahman, again, appears as the equal of

¹ çl. 17: *evam sarvāṇi bhūtāni brahmāi 'va pratisaṁcarah*. This absorption is the counterpart to the personal creation of Brahman (see p. 142), from the "Seed made of Brahman-glory, whence all the world," 283, 1. I do not pretend to understand the final process of reabsorption described above: *ākāśasya tadā ghoṣaṁ taṁ vidvān kurute 'tmani, tad avyaktam param brahma tac chāçratam anuttamam*. The eternal sound here implicated in Brahman may be that "Word without beginning or end, Wisdom, uttered by the Self-existent, from which, as Veda-sounds, the Lord (as cited in the note, p. 178) in the beginning creates names, forms, and acts," xii, 283, 24-26.

² In xii, 340, 116, Brahman knows that Vishnu is greatest; but in xii, 285, 185, Vishnu is unable to comprehend the greatness of Çiva. Compare on the mixed ideas concerning Brahman, Holtzmann's essay, ZDMG. xxxviii, p. 167 ff. I cannot agree with the author in the opinion that Brahman is the chief God of the "older epic," but only of the older tales incorporated into the epic.

the other two gods in the trinitarian theosophy, which is represented in the epic, but only sporadically and in its latest additions.¹ He is sometimes looked upon as the chief of all gods, but his supreme attributes are in other passages taken by his later rivals. Three stages are clear, with a top story added last of all. The earliest tales received into the epic know no god higher than Brahman, the later pseudo-epic knows no god equal to (a Pācupata) Īiva. Between the two lies the mass of the epic teaching, where supremacy is given to a sectarian Vishnu. The very latest additions to the epic adopt a synthetic view and make of this religious olla podrida one harmonious whole, where all three great gods are one.

Arjuna is a form of Vishnu. He is taught this with wonder and great amaze in the sixth book. But our amazement at his amazement is still greater, for this doctrine, apparently so new to him, was revealed to him long before, in the third book, and on that earlier occasion he appeared fully to appreciate the fact that he was divine and identical with Krishna, facts which in the sixth book he has totally forgotten.²

Heaven and Hell. Death.

Inconsistent as is the Karma doctrine with the notion of heaven and hell, the Hindu, like Pindar, successfully combines the two beliefs by imagining that metempsychosis follows the

¹ For the usual caturmūrti, compare iii, 203, 15; vii, 29, 26; xii, 335, 8. In iii, 272, 47, is found the only definite expression of the late trinitarian belief in a trimūrti, an interpolated section (compare my *Religions of India*, p. 412); though it may be implied in i, 1, 32 and xiii, 16, 15, but only here till we reach the *Harivaṅṣa*, 2, 125, 31. It appears first in the later Upanishads, or in late additions, as in *Māitri* v (as distinguished from the close of iv), above, p. 46. Among other religious novelties the pseudo-epic introduces Citragupta, Death's secretary, xiii, 125, 6; 130, 14 ff. In several points, such as in this and in grammatical peculiarities, the *Anuṣāṣana* shows itself later in some parts even than *Çānti*, all ignored, of course, by the synthesist.

² Compare iii, 12, 16. In this passage, Arjuna exalts Krishna as the supreme Lord of the universe, and Krishna in turn identifies the two: *yas tvām dvestī sa mām dvestī*, etc., ib. 45 (Vishnu says the same thing almost to Rudra in xii, 343, 133; *yas tvām vetti sa mām vetti*, *yas tvām anu sa mām anu*). Arjuna's godhead is proclaimed to him in iii, 41, 35, 43; 47, 7. On the hymn, iii, 12, compare Lassen, *Ind. Alt.*, i, p. 489.

penalty of hell, or reward of heaven. The two views stand sometimes separate, however, and the hero is promised an abode in Indra's heaven without any allusion to metempsychosis; or one is promised a high or low birth hereafter without allusion to the older teleological fancy. Ordinarily in the former case, the rule is that a good man goes to heaven and a bad man goes to hell, as in the Upanishads, e. g. *Mund.* i, 2, 10, and in the epic generally. But in one exegesis quite a different view is taken. The idea here is that a fairly good man goes first of all to hell; while a man who on the whole is rather sinful than good goes first of all to heaven. Afterwards the good man goes to heaven and the bad man goes to hell.¹

The popular notion of the Yogin is not at all that of absorption into Brahman. "Grieve for the living, not for the dead; this pious hero after his death, like a Yogin, has become a being with a human body and shines glorious like a king."² In heaven there are cool breezes and perfume, no hunger, thirst, toil, old age, nor sin, but "eternal happiness," in heaven, which is here, in contrast to hell, the "highest place," xii, 190, 13-14. So in the *Sabhās*. The Yogin "revels in joy, knows no sorrow, and rides around on high in a heavenly car, attended by self-luminous women," xiii, 107, 130 (compare the *rāmāḥ sarathāḥ* of *Kaṭha Up.* i, 25). * This is the happiness of a Yogin after death, a view of course diametrically opposed to that of the philosophy taught elsewhere, for it is taught as final, not as preliminary.

In various passages it is taught that a good man should aim at attaining to heaven. This too is not put forth as a half-view with a reservation, as in the case of the Upanishads. But in other cases it is expressly just such a half-view.³ Heaven is

¹ *bhūyiṣṭham pāpakarmā yaḥ sa pūrvam svargam acnute*, etc., xviii, 3, 14.

² *tām āndavīm ātmatanum . . . gataḥ*, vii, 71, 17. Compare xii, 332, 53, *vāyubhūtaḥ pravekeyāmi tejorāciṁ divākaram* (not here to the moon, which changes): "In the form of wind I shall enter the sun" (to live with the seers); *yatra nā 'vartate punaḥ* (50), "whence there is no return."

³ Here it may be objected: But this is for warriors, and even in the Upanishads those that worship *Prajāpati* as matter instead of spirit are materially blessed. This raises the question again which I touched upon at the outset.

here a good place for good but unintelligent people, but it is scorned by the philosopher. "I have done with heaven, away with thee, heaven, whither thou hast come," says an enlightened king; "let the priest receive my merit if he wishes," xii, 199, 77-78. The priest, orthodox, is recognized as still striving for heaven and likely to go to hell, in the old way: "Hell is where priests go," it is said rather bluntly, ib. 14-15, *nirayaṁ nāi 'va yātā tvaṁ yatra yātā dvijaṣabbhāḥ, yāsyasi Brahmanāḥ sthānam*. For of all the heavens of all the gods it is said, "these are but hells to the place of the Highest Soul," xii, 198, 6.

All kings but one go to Yama's heaven in the Sabhā account;¹ in the battle-scenes most of them go to Indra's heaven. But in vi, 16, 20, they go to the Brahma-world. Again, the heaven one goes to depends either on one's *guṇas* (as explained above), or, according to where one dies (*Tīrtha*), or, as a third explanation, according to the place in the body through which the soul escapes at death. If it goes through the feet, one goes to Vishnu's place; if through the arms, to Indra's place; if through the crown, to Brahmān, etc., xii, 318, 1 ff. (with *viçvedevān* in 5, common in the pseudo-epic).

Death, it may be observed, is usually a male; but in vii, 53, 17 and xii, 258, 16-21, a female. There are here two accounts which, though together opposed to the view held everywhere else, are of critical value, not on this account (for a poet may perhaps be allowed to unsex death), but on account of their being almost identical, two versions of one tale, one bearing traces of greater antiquity than the other.²

In one part the warrior auditors are taught the deepest mysteries, in another they are taught what is not taught in the Upanishads except as introduction to true teaching. Synthetically considered, the epic teaches nothing systematic in these varying expositions.

¹ Yama's home is here a heaven of delight, elsewhere in the epic it is a hell of horrors.

² The account in Droṇa is here the later of these two similar scenes, as has been shown by Holtzmann, *ZDMG.* xxviii, p. 218. In philosophy, death is the dissyllable *Ego* as opposed to the eternal, immortal, three-syllable non-ego, or *mama* versus *namama* ("this is mine" is a thought deadly to truth, and untruth is death), xii, 13, 4 and xiv, 13, 8 (identical passages).

The Cosmic Egg and Creations.

According to the old belief, the universe comes from a cosmic egg. The philosophical schemes, of course, discard this egg, but we hear of it in the popular accounts often enough and meet it in the first verses of the epic. Occasionally, however, in the personal creation, which stands in so sharp contrast with the more philosophical schemes, this becomes a subject of controversy. Thus in xii, 312, the "Unmanifest" is a person, who first creates plants as the food of all incorporate things. "Then he produced Brahmán, born in a golden egg. Brahmán lived in the egg a year. Then he came out and put together the four forms of all beings, and earth and heaven above—as it is said in the Vedas, *dyāvāprthivyoḥ*¹—and then the middle space. After this he created egoism, a being, *bhūta*, and four sons besides, who are the fathers' fathers. The gods are the sons of the fathers; by the gods the worlds were filled. Egoism, he that stands in the highest, created fivefold beings, earth and the other elements." Several verses follow on the impossibility of the senses acting alone ("the organs do not perceive, etc. Mind alone sees. Mind is the lord of the senses," etc.).² Here the egg-born creator is acknowledged in a scheme which is a mixture of mythology and philosophy. But in xiii, 154, 16 ff.: "Some fools say that Brahmán was born of an egg . . . but that is not to be regarded. How could the unborn be born? Air-space is the egg, according to tradition, and out of that was born Brahmán, the forefather. (He required no support, for he is) personified consciousness, the Lord. There is no egg; there is Brahmán . . . the unmanifest eternal Creator Lord" (15). This passage is not merely an allegorical interpretation of the egg-myth; for in the former, Brahmán creates space after he is born of the egg from which he is born, while here the egg is space. The number of crea-

¹ That is, the Vedic form implies the truth of heaven and earth as here stated.

² In this passage, etc *viçeṣā mahābhūteṣu*, 312, 12, repeats the first half-stanza of 311, 14, cited above, p. 129.

tions in philosophy I have already discussed. They are given as nine, or again as five.¹

The Grace of God.

The belief in the saving grace of God is found only in the later Upanishads. It asserts that one sees the Self (or Lord) by the grace of the Creator, *Kaṭha Up.*, i, 2, 20 ff.; *Çvet.*, iii, 20; vi, 21; *Muṇḍ.*, iii. 2, 3. One is chosen, and cannot get salvation by knowledge alone. This general view is that maintained by the epic poet, who says: "The Vedas and Orders, though established on various opinions, *nānāmata-sa-māsthitāḥ*, unite in worshipping Spirit as the personal God by whose grace one is saved." So again: "That man can see Him, to whom He gives His grace," *yasya prasādam kurute sa vāi taṁ draṣṭum arhati*, xii, 337, 20, (a verse found also in the pseudo-Rāmāyaṇa). The grace of God is here the chief element of salvation, opposed to what is recognized as the severer school of those who attain salvation scientifically either by knowledge of soul or of God. This older system in the Upanishads is represented by those who are saved by knowledge alone; in the epic, by like-minded men, who have worked out a system or science of salvation, and depend wholly on this science, *jñāna*, or on ascetic practices, *tapas*, *yoga*, super-added to this science. Both of these are recognized as older systems in the epic, compared with the grace-of-God theory, and practically they are thrown over by the adherents of the latter school, who, however, differ from their ancestors in the Upanishads by a clear mark of lateness, in that they specify that the God whose grace saves is Krishna alone. Salvation not through knowledge, even of God, not through the grace of God, but through the grace of the man-god is the saving way, the easier way, or as it is called in the *Gītā*, the "less troublesome way," 12, 5.

Side by side stand in the epic these two great modern modi-

¹ These are the modifications of God, *avidyāsargas* and *vidyāsargas*, five in number in xii, 303, but when the account is repeated in 311, nine in all.

fications of the older Upanishads: there, knowledge, wisdom, *jñāna*, *vidyā*, contrasted with the later grace of the "Creator-Spirit," at most recognized as *Īva*. Here, the *Sāṃkhya*-Yoga system, contrasted with the later Krishna cult. "I will release thee from all thy sins, grieve not," says the man-god, *Gītā*, 18, 66. But the Yogin replies: "Sink or swim, let one put his trust in science alone," xii, 237, 1 and 238, 1, and claims that he is purified not by Krishna but by Yoga knowledge, rejecting even the purity induced by bathing in the sacred pools (for his purity is "obtained by knowledge"), which elsewhere in the epic are said to purify from all sin.¹ But inasmuch as the Yogin's science postulated what the *Sāṃkhya* denied, a personal God, the former became a bridge between the atheist and the devotee, a bridge, however, occasionally repudiated by the latter, who does not always, as usually, claim that he is thus philosophic, but exclaims: "By *Sāṃkhya* and by Yoga rule I meditate the way of God and find it not," xii, 352, 7-8.

The irreconcilable difference between the *Sāṃkhya* and the faith of the Krishnaite could be removed only by modifying one of these extreme views. Either the atheistic (or even Brahman) philosopher had to win over the adherents of the man-god to renounce him and return to the "ship of salvation of knowledge," or the devotee, having admitted that the Yogin's Spirit was God, had to identify his Krishna with that *Purusha* *Īvara*. Late as are all the purely philosophical chapters of the epic, they still show which power prevailed.

¹ There is of course, further, the *Īvaite*, who worshipped not Krishna but another as the highest God, not to speak of those that remained true to Vedic tradition and went for salvation no further than sacrifices and gifts. There are also, within the group of philosophers, those who recognized only the earlier twenty-five principles, and those who recognized twenty-six, as explained above. There is also the fractional sectary, who regarded Krishna as the "half of the fourth" of the "root-abiding *Mahādeva*" (as *tatstha*, p. 44, he creates existences, xii, 281, 61-62). All these divergent beliefs are represented in startling and irreconcilable antagonism in an epic concerning which the unhistorical view is dass es ächte zu einer einheitlichen Auffassung abgerundete Elemente sind, welche das Epos bietet, *Nirvāṇa*, p. 84!

Faith absorbed unfaith. The religious philosophy of the epic is a successful attempt to uphold Krishnaism not only against the science of atheism, but against a deistic science that postulated God but saw no godship in Krishna ; a science which in its turn is technically elaborated, a long advance on the vague speculations of the Upanishads, but not yet as uniform as in the completed system. Krishnaism stands to Sāṃkhya-Yoga chronologically as stands the later grace-of-the-Creator theory to the earlier knowledge of the Upanishads. But both epic Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Krishnaism are later even than this modification of Upanishad teaching. Latest of all is trinitarianism. Side by side stand all these creeds, each pretending to be a definitive answer, each forming part of the contents of a poetic vessel, into which have been poured the vinegar and oil of doubt and faith ; but :

ὄξος τ' ἄλειπά τ' ἐγχέας ταὐτῷ κύτει
 διχοστατοῦντ' ἂν οὐ φίλῳ προσενέποις.

CHAPTER FOUR.

EPIC VERSIFICATION.

alamkṛtaṁ ṣubbāiḥ ṣabdāiḥ
samayāir divyamānuṣāiḥ
chandovṛttāiḥ ca vividhāir
anvitaṁ viduṣāṁ priyam

A Tale adorned with polished phrase
And the wise lore of gods and men,
With verses turned in various ways
Replete, a joy to scholars' ken.

Epic Versification.¹

The poetry of the epic is composed in metres, chandas, of three sorts. The first is measured by syllables, the second by moræ, the third by groups of moræ. These rhythms ran the one into the other in the following course. The early free syllabic rhythm tended to assume a form where the syllables were differentiated as light or heavy at fixed places in the verse. Then the fixed syllabic rhythm was lightened by the resolution of specific heavy syllables, the beginning of mora-measurement. The resolution then became general and the number of moræ, not the number of syllables, was reckoned. Finally, the moræ tended to arrange themselves in groups and eventually became fixed in a wellnigh unchangeable form. Part of this development was reached before the epic began, but there were other parts, as will appear, still in process of completion. Neither

¹ I wish to acknowledge in beginning this chapter on epic metres the great help afforded me by Professor Cappeller of Jena, who put at my disposal a manuscript on the metrical forms in the epic, in which all the metres were located and the tristubhs of the first three books were analyzed seriatim. I need hardly say that this loan has materially lightened the labor of preparing the following sketch, a loan the kindness of which was the more appreciated as it was entirely unsolicited, though most gratefully received.

The mass of the great epic (about ninety-five per cent) is written in one of the two current forms of free syllabic rhythm; about five per cent in another form of the same class; and only two-tenths of a percent in any other metre. The two predominant rhythms, *gloka* and *triṣṭubh*, are in origin the oldest Indic or pre-Indic rhythms, while of the others some are in turn early developments from the first epic rhythms. For convenience of reference, before discussing these rhythms in detail, I give a list of all those used in one or both of the two epics according as they are free syllabic (*gloka*, *triṣṭubh*), fixed syllabic (*akṣaracchandas*),¹ *mora*-metre (*mātrācchandas*), and group-rhythms (*ganacchandas*).

gloka: a stanza of two verses (hemistichs) of sixteen syllables each, restricted to a certain extent as to the place where heavy and light syllables (or long and short vowels) are permitted. Originally the stanza consisted of four verses of eight syllables each and many traces of this division, by independent "quarters," pādas, survive in the Mahābhārata.

triṣṭubh: a stanza of four verses of eleven syllables each, arranged with very little restriction (and consequently of various types) in the Mahābhārata; reduced to one prevailing type in the Rāmāyaṇa. Increased by one heavy syllable in each pāda, this metre is called jagatī, but the two types are interchangeable in the same stanza. Fixed types of this metre are common in verse form, but rare in stanza form² except as given in the next group (of four-verse stanzas).

¹ The fixed syllabic is called also varṇavṛtta, "syllabic verse" (vṛtta = versus).

^a That is, pure in the form (a) and (b), $\cup - \cup - \cup \cup - \cup - \cup (-)$; (e) $- - - - -$, $- \cup - - \cup - -$; (f) $- - - - -$, $\cup \cup - \cup - -$. These are called (a) upendravajrā; (b) vaṇṇastha(bila); (e) cālīni; (f) vātorṃi; or (a) and (b) with the opening $- - \cup -$, called (c) indravajrā and (d) indraṇṇā, as they have eleven or twelve syllables, respectively. When (a) and (c) or (b) and (d) are mingled, the stanza is called upajēti.

		with the verse fixed as
	rathoddhatā, a triṣṭubh	— — — — —
	bhujamgāprayāta, a jagatī	— — — — —
	drumavilambita, a jagatī	— — — — —
	vāiṣṇadevī, a jagatī	— — — — —
akṣaracchandas	rucirā, an atijagatī ¹	— — — — —
or	praharṣiṇī, an atijagatī	— — — — —
varṇavṛtta	mṛgendramukha, an atijagatī	— — — — —
	asambādhā, a ṣaṅkavari ²	— — — — —
	vasantatilakā, a ṣaṅkavari	— — — — —
	mālinī, an atīṣaṅkavari	— — — — —
	ṣārdūlavikṛidita, an atidhṛti	— — — — —

mātrācchandas (ardhasamavṛtta) { puspitāgrā and āupacchandāsika, stanzas of two verses, each verse having sixteen and eighteen moræ in prior and posterior pāda, respectively, the moræ being arranged in syllables more (puspitāgrā) or less (āupacchandāsika) fixed.

aparavaktra and vāitāliya, the same in catalectic form, each pāda being shortened by two moræ.

mātrāsamaka, a stanza of four verses, each verse having sixteen moræ.

ganacchandas { (āryā, āryāgīti, upagīti), stanzas of two verses, each verse containing eight groups of moræ, the group of four moræ each, but with the restriction that amphibrachs are prohibited in the odd groups, but may make any even group and must make the sixth group, unless indeed this sixth group be represented (in the second hemistich) by only one mora or four breves; and that the eighth group may be represented by only two moræ. The metre is called āryāgīti when the eighth foot has four moræ; upagīti, when the sixth foot irregularly has but one mora in each hemistich.³

¹ That is, a jagatī with one syllable over, atī, or with thirteen syllables in the pāda. The second atijagatī above is sometimes called praharṣaṇī.

² That is, having fourteen syllables in the pāda, fifty-six in the stanza. The atīṣaṅkavari and atidhṛti have fifteen and nineteen syllables in the pāda, respectively. *

³ Brown, Prosody, p. 17, points out that this metre is almost that of Horace, Odes, iii, 12: miserar | est neq a- | mori | dare lu- | dum nequē | dul- | ci mala | vino, etc.; and sic te | diva po- | tens Cypri | sic fra- | tres Hele- | nae | lu- cida | sidera, etc., save that the sixth group is here of two moræ.

Āloka and Triṣṭubh.**THE PĀDAS.**

The number of verses in a *āloka* or *triṣṭubh* stanza may be decreased or increased by one or two, respectively; but in the great majority of cases, two in a *āloka* and four in a *triṣṭubh* constitute a stanza. Sometimes, however, where one or three hemistichs make a stanza, it is merely a matter of editing. Compare, for instance, i, 90, 22; i, 93, 19-21 with 3,682-83; iii, 4, 17 with 234; iii, 111, 14 ff., with 10,040, ff. But, on the other hand, no arrangement can always group the hemistichs into uniform stanzas. Thus in xii, 350, 49 ff., five *triṣṭubh* hemistichs follow three *āloka* hemistichs. A stanza of three hemistichs is apt to close a section, as in vii, 54 and 187. In G. vi, 49, 55, there is one hemistich in excess because 53 a-b were added to the original, and this is doubtless the cause of many such cases; though it is also true that a half stanza is often found where there is no reason to suspect a later addition. Six *pādas* in a *triṣṭubh* occur occasionally.

But in the case of the *āloka*, the *pādas* are metrically linked in pairs, while *triṣṭubh* *pādas* are metrically independent. The *āloka*, therefore, is a couplet. Its two halves are metrically disjunct and may be treated as independent wholes. Each hemistich is a complete verse. The two halves of this verse, the quarters, *pādas*, of the whole stanza, are sometimes knit together into euphonic combination and a syntactical whole. But, relatively speaking, this is seldom the case. The unity consists rather in the fact that one half of the verse is metrically different from the other and cannot be substituted for it, whereas in the *triṣṭubh* any *pāda* can be substituted, if the sense permits, for any other.¹ The different fall of the *āloka* *pādas* may be seen very well when the words are almost identical:

¹ In some forms of the *triṣṭubh*, however, there is a restriction in the final syllable anacrusis of the first and third *pādas*, not found in the second and fourth *pādas*. In such cases (discussed hereafter) the *triṣṭubh*, like the *āloka*, consists of two parts (hemistichs) and the perfect independence of the *pāda* is modified. This does not affect the free epic *triṣṭubh*.

amitrānām bhayakaro mitrānām abhayamkaraḥ
 çalabhā iva kedāram maçakā iva pāvakam
 nā 'tantri vidyate vīpā nā 'cakro vidyate rathaḥ
 rukmapuṅkhāir ajihmaḡrāi rukmapuṅkhāir ajihma-
 gāiḥ (G. vi, 20, 26 and 19, 68) ¹
 kiṁ nu me syād idaṁ kṛtvā kiṁ nu me syād akur-
 vataḥ
 yato dharmas tataḥ Kṛṣṇo yataḥ Kṛṣṇas tato jayaḥ
 paçyan çṛṇvan sṛṇan jighraṇaṁ aṇṇaṁ gaçchan svapaṇ
 çvasan
 japate japyate cāi 'va tapate tapyate punaḥ

The final syllaba anceps of all pādas indicates, however, that the çloka, like the triṣṭubh, originally permitted the same metrical fall in both pādas, and such we know to have been the case in the older metre from which the çloka derives. The Mahābhārata retains this identical measure here and there, as in

tad vāi devā upāsate tasmāt sūryo virājate,

but such cases, usually reflecting or imitating the older verse of the Upaniṣhads, as in this example, v, 46, 1, are regularly avoided, even by the substitution of irregular or dialectic forms. Thus in viii, 84, 12, where the same verb is employed,

Duryodhanam upāsante parivārya samantataḥ

The çloka verse (hemistich) does not often indicate its unity by its form. Generally its prior half, or the pāda (to retain this word for the division of eight syllables), is not united with the posterior pāda. Verses that do unite the two usually give lists of objects, which is the ordinary case in the early epic, though the later epic does not hesitate to make freer use of this unit-verse. But on the whole, though common enough in post-epical writing, this is by no means typical of the epic itself. The great bulk of the poem does indeed furnish a goodly number of examples, but relatively speaking cases like the following are rare:

¹ The other verses are found in R. vii, 36, 22; 7, 3; ii, 39, 29; M. iii, 62, 10; vi, 23, 23; 29, 8; xiii, 14, 159.

mahāmaṇiṣṭhīlāpattābaddhaparyantavedikāṃ, ii, 3, 32
 āikyasaṃyoganānātvasamavāyaviṇādaḥ, ii, 5, 3
 vyaṃ hi devagandharvamaṇṣyoraḡarākṣasān, iii, 53, 29
 jambvāmralodhrakhadirasālavetrasamākulam, ib. 64, 4
 ṇinḥaṇḍulamātamaḡavarāharkṣaṃḡāyutam, ib. 39
 badareṇḡudakāḡmaryaplakṣāṇvatḥabibḥitakāiḥ, ix, 37, 61
 ḡadāmusalanārācaḡaktitomarastayā, ix, 46, 66
 dṛṇyate hi dharmarūpeṇā 'dharmam prākṛtaḡ caran,
 xii, 261, 6
 ajāyata mahārājavanḡe sa ca mahādyutiḥ, xiii, 10, 35
 sa bhavān daṇḡdasamḡyogenā 'nena hṛtakilbiṣaḡ, G. iv, 17, 58
 bhavadbhīr niḡcayas tattvaviḡḡānakuḡalāir mama, G. iv,
 32, 5.¹

The hemistich of the ḡloka is also generally independent of the rest of the stanza in sense as well as in metre, but it is not infrequently united with it syntactically, as in vi, 19, 12,

na hi so 'sti pumāṇl loke yaḡ saṃkruddham
 Vṛkodaram
 draṣṭum atyugrakarmāṇaṃ viṣaheta naraṣabham
 Not a mortal on earth exists, who deep-incensed
 Vṛkodara,
 Mighty, a chief of awful strength, could a mo-
 ment behold in war.

So samalamḡṛtam: ḡṭam, in the first chapter of Nala, 11; krodhasya ca vinigrahaḡ: kāryaḡ, xii, 330, 10; asaṃbhāvyam vadham tasya Vṛtrasya vibudhādhipaḡ: cintayāno jagāmā 'ḡu, R. vii, 85, 15, etc. Inside the hemistich, the pādas are frequently euphonically independent (hiatus);

Prajaṅgho Vāliputrāya abhidudrāva, R. vi, 76, 22.
 na kimcid abhidhātavyā aham, R. vi, 118, 10
 mā vināḡam ḡamiṣyāma² aprasādyā 'diteḡ sutam,
 R. vii, 35, 63

¹ R. (Bombay) has cæsura between pādas and avoids both these forms (saṃyogāt in 18, 64, for saṃyogena, etc.).

² G. here, 38, 113, has the future imperative, ḡamiṣyadhvam. Other examples of hiatus may be seen in R. v, 60, 8; vi, 60, 8; vii, 11, 42, etc., besides the ample collection of Böhtlingk for the first four books.

Sāumitraṁ sampariṣvajya idam vacanam abravīt,
 R. vi, 23, 1
 nihanyād antaram labdhvā ūlūko vāyasān iva, R. vi,
 17, 19
 caraṇāny aṇarānyāni ācramāṇi kṛtāni naḥ, R. vii, 6, 5

In G. the hiatus is usually avoided, but it is sometimes kept here, as where R. vii, 21, 19 has gorasaṁ gopradātāro annaṁ cāi 'va (adrākṣīt) and G. rectifies the grammar but keeps the hiatus, gopradātṛṅ ca annam.¹ In the last book of the poem, hiatus in G. is more common than in the earlier epic; for example, G. has the hiatus of R. vii, 6, 40, svadhītaṁ dattam iṣṭaṁ ca āiṣvaryaṁ paripālitaṁ. On the other hand, within the pāda attempts are sometimes made to avoid hiatus at the expense of form, as in R. vii, 109, 4, brahmam (cf. 88, 20) āvartayan param. Contrast is often the cause of hiatus, both in the pāda, as in apāyaṁ vā upāyaṁ vā, R. iii, 40, 8, and in the hemistich, as in hīnam mām manyase kena ahīnam sarvavikramāḥ, R. vi, 36, 5.² So in the Mahābhārata, satyanāmā bhavā 'çoka, açokaḥ çokanāçanaḥ, iii, 64, 107. The latter epic otherwise presents the same phenomena:

yeṣāṁ mūtram upāghrāya api bandhyā prasūyate,
 iv, 10, 14
 upāvartasva tad brahma antarātmani viçrutam, v,
 43, 59.
 viveça Gaṅgāṁ Kāuravya Ulūpi, xvii, 1, 27
 devā 'pi mārge muhyanti apadasya padāiṣiṇaḥ, xii,
 270, 22
 anāhūtaḥ praviçati aprīto bahu bhāṣate, v, 33, 36, etc.

There is nothing peculiarly epic in hiatus. It is found in precedent and subsequent poetry. Its occurrence in the

¹ R. in the second hemistich has grhāṅ ca grhadātārah (acc.) svakarma-phalam aṇataḥ, aç for bhuj, as in M. iii, 32, 6.

² Emphasis also may cause hiatus, as in dharmātmā iti, R. i, 21, 7; na tu vaktum samartho 'haṁ tvayī ātmagatān guṇān, R. iv, 8, 5; or it may be employed to save the life of a word, as in dakṣiṇārthe 'tha ṛtvigbhyah, xiii, 93, 25 (the commonest hiatus is this before y, as in sarve ca ṛtavaḥ; kārayasva rpe; anye ṛkṣavataḥ, etc.).

Mahābhāṣya, as in *ṣayānā vardhate dūrvā āsinam vardhate viṣam*, IS., xiii, p. 461, may be epic.

The cadence of the *ṣloka*, like that of all other poetry, depends on the sense, and the *cæsura* cannot be determined by rule. In most cases there is a *cæsura* at the end of the *pāda*, but it is frequently shifted, as in *kvā 'rjunaḥ nṛpatiḥ? ṣighraṁ samyag ākhyātum arhatha*, R. vii, 31, 11. A complete sentence seldom exceeds the limit of a stanza, and when it goes further it may be set down as a mark of lateness. Quite anomalous in epic style are those long sentences, usually relative, which, as in *Gītā* 2, 42-44 and 6, 20-23 run through twelve or fourteen *pādas*. Still more awkward are the sentences found in the later epic. Thus in xii, 302, occurs a sentence, not of fourteen *pādas* as in the *Gītā*, but of fourteen *ṣlokas* (5-17): yet this is surpassed in the same section by a sentence of thirty *ṣlokas*, which even then has no finite verb and in reality never comes to an end at all (24-52). Such monstrosities, however, belong only to the pseudo-epic.

Like the *ṣloka*, the *triṣṭubh*, in euphony and sense, may be a couplet, the first two and last two *pādas* making a unit, as in iii, 118, 20 c — d, *anyāñ ca Vṛṣṇīn upagamya pūjām: cakre*; vii, 2, 33 a — b, *na tv evā 'haṁ na gamiṣyāmi teṣām: madhye ṣūrānām*. Euphonic unity is illustrated by the elision in vii, 163, 14 of a in *adr̥ṣyanta* at the beginning of the *pāda* after o; by *tāñ cāpy: upopaviṣṭān* between c — d in i, 191, 19; and by the complete hemistichs:

yadā 'crauṣam Bhīmasenā 'nuyātenā 'ṣvatthāmnā parama-
mastram prayuktam, i, 1, 213
sa-Karṇa-Duryodhana-Ṣālva-Ṣālyā-Draupāyāni-Krātha-
Sunītha-Vakraḥ, i, 187, 15 (compare in *ṣloka*;
Bhīṣma-Droṇa-Kṛpa-Draupī-Karṇa'rjuna-Janār-
danān, viii, 20, 3; *bahuṣo Vidura-Droṇa-Kṛpa-*
Gāṅgeya-Sṛjījayāḥ, ix, 61, 20)
uddhūtalāṅgūlamahāpatākadhvajottamānsākulabhīṣa-
ntam, iv, 54, 27.

Ordinarily, however, disjunction and not conjunction of *pādas* is the rule. Thus between b — c, iii, 132, 5, a + a, and

even between a — b and c — d. Here also hiatus appears even in the pāda, as in i, 1, 214 b, svastī 'ty uktvā agram astreṇa çāntam (so must be read); or in i, 74, 30 c, ahaç ca rātriç ca ubhe ca saṁdhye. It may then be expected between pādas, as in

yadā 'vamaṁsthāḥ¹ sadṛçaḥ çreyasaç ca, alpiyasaç
ca, i, 88, 3 a — b
vanaspatīn oṣadhīç cā 'viçanti, āpo (= apo) vāyum,
i, 90, 11 a — b
santi lokā bahavas te narendra, apy ekāi 'kaḥ, i, 92,
15 a — b

So in Yājñaseni: ekāmbārā, ii, 67, 34 a — b; utsahāmi: āyusmān, iii, 192, 67 c — d; putri: Ikṣvāku, ib. 70 c — d; tapaç ca: amātsāryam, v, 43, 20 a — b; ācāryeṇa: ātmakṛtam (text -ṇāt), v, 44, 14 a; apo 'tha adbhyaḥ salilasya madhye, v, 46, 3 a. B. occasionally rejects (betters) the text of C., as in vi, 129 c — d, stands na cā 'pi te madvaçagā maharṣe, 'nugrahaṁ kartum arhā hi me matiḥ, where B. 3, 61, has na cā 'dharmam, etc. So in viii, 4, 340, paçcād vadhiṣye tvām api, sampramūḍha, aham, etc., where B., 85, 33, has mūḍham. Both, however, continue with ahaṁ haniṣye 'rjuna ājīmadhye, and in the next verse both have prasahya asyāi 'va in c — d.² Other cases are: çatruhanātā: uvāca, viii, 85, 30 c — d; mudam ca lebhe ṛṣabhaḥ Kurūṇām, ix, 17, 18 d; uttāna-āsyē na havir juhōti, xii, 246, 27 a; bibhēti: açradddheyam, xiv, 9, 27 c — d; Madam nāma asuraṁ viçvarūpam, xiv, 9, 33, c (from the text in B., nāmāsuram, and in C. 251, Madam nāmānam); Tilottamā cā 'py atha Menakā ca: etās, H. 2, 89, 71 a — b. Examples from the Rāmāyaṇa are given by Böhtlingk, or may be seen in the conjunction of mahārathasya: Ikṣvāku, R. vi, 14, 12 a — b; abhyupetya: uvāca, R. vi, 59, 45 c — d. In both metres, to

¹ The first foot consists of five syllables.

² B.'s reading in iii, 112, 15 d, caliteva cā 'sīt for caliteva āsīt, 10,065, may be to avoid hiatus. In ii, 63, 6 d = 2,116, both texts have acintito 'bhīmataḥ svabandhunā, where hiatus may be assumed, though not necessarily, as also in iii, 197, 18 b, na (vāi) vāsam pitaro (a)sya kurvata. Ib. 15 a — b, both texts have hiatus; ukṣāṇam paktvā saha odanena asmāt kapotāt prati te nayantu (give you for).

avoid hiatus, irrational particles are often inserted. A good example is: *purā kṛtayuge tāta hy āsīd rājā hy Akampanaḥ*, vii, 2,029, where B., 52, 26, omits the first *hi*.

Rhyme.

Connection of *pādas* by rhyme is not uncommon. It is less noticeable in *çlokas* than in *triṣṭubhs* on account of the alternate trochaic and iambic cadence employed in the former, and some, for example, may think that in iii, 65, 65-66,

vasāsva mayi kalyāṇi
prītir me paramā tvayi . . .
ihāi 'va vasatī bhadre
bhartāram upalapsyase

the rhymes of the nameless queen are practically unfelt,¹ but this is scarcely possible when alternate rhymes occur, as in R. ii, 88, 7 :

prāsādavaravaryesu
çītavatsu sugandhiṣu
uṣitvā Merukalpeṣu
kṛtakāñcanabhittiṣu

In çl. 13 of the same section, three successive *pādas* end in -am; in 14, two end in -ā; and in 23-25 seven end in -ām, or -ām, with some inserted besides :

bāhuvīryābhirakṣitām
çūnyasamvaranāraksām
ayantritahayadvipām
anāvṛtapuradvārām
rājadhānīm arakṣitām
aprahṛṣṭabalām nyūnām
viśamasthām anāvṛtām

So in *triṣṭubhs*, rhymes are both irregular and regular, as in R. iv, 24, 13,

¹ Compare, however, the affected initial assonance (with the same difference) in R. iv, 33, 62 :

Tārāyā cā 'py anujñātas
tvarayā vā 'pi coditaḥ

*acintanīyam parivarjanīyam anīpsanīyaṁ svana-
veksanīyam*

and in R. vi, 78, 55, where three pādas end in *-dhāni*, *-bhāni*, *-kāni*, respectively; the same (in *-tāni*, *-jāni*, *-nāni*) appearing also in a puṣpitāgrā stanza, R. v, 20, 36. In R. iv, 28, 41, we find:

*pramattasamṇāditabarhiṇāni
saçakragopākulaçādvalāni
caranti nīpārjunavāsītāni
gajāḥ suramyāni vanāntarāni
navāmbudhārāhatakeçarāni
dhruvam pariṣvajya saroruhāni
kadambapuṣpāni sakeçarāni
navāni hr̥ṣṭā bhramarāḥ pibanti*

In the following passage the effect of rhyme is given by simple repetition of the whole word, R. iv, 28, 25 (not in G.):

*nidrā çanāiḥ keçavam abhyupāiti
drutaṁ nadī sāgaram abhyupāiti
hr̥ṣṭā balākā ghanam abhyupāiti
kāntā sakāmā priyam abhyupāiti*

words put into the mouth of love-sick Rāma (kāmapradhānaḥ, as he is called) by some late poetaster, who, not content with the last stanza, adds to it (27):

*vahanti varṣanti nadanti bhānti
dhyāyanti nr̥tyanti samāçvasanti*

Compare also in the same section, weak rhymes in *-tānām*, *-vānām*, *-kānām*, *-rānām* (at the end of the pāda in 31). This reaches its height in the ridiculous (late) section R. v, 5, where the same word is repeated at the end of each pāda till even 6 is a relief, where occurs the alternation: *-pañko*, *-pañkaḥ*, *-lānko*, *-çānkaḥ*. But elsewhere in R., e. g., ii, 16, 47, three pādas of a triṣṭubh end in *-am*, the other in *-am(d)*; and in the preceding stanza three pādas end in *-āiḥ*, though jagatī pādas are here interchanged with triṣṭubh.

Foot may rhyme with foot or with alternate foot in the

çloka, just as pāda rhymes with pāda, that is, either with a modification of the precedent syllable, thus, x, 15, 34,

evam kuru
na cā 'nyā tu

or even with alternate rhyme, as in R. v, 59, 24,

pativratā
ca suçronī
avaṣṭabdhā
ca Jānaki

but the same sound may also be repeated without any such precedent difference, as in x, 15, 14,

adharmāç ca
krto 'nena

Such light fundamental rhymes cannot be said to be produced without design. They are, in fact, the vulgar rhyme of the common proverb, such as is conspicuous in all popular sayings. Compare for instance the following Marathi proverbs:

- (a) icchi parā
yei gharā
- (b) jyātse kuḍe
tyātse puḍhe
- (c) svarga loki
vāitaranī
- (d) zase zhāḍa
tase phala¹

Alliteration.

Alliteration, according to the native rhetorician Daṇḍin, is affected rather by the Gāuḍas than by the Vidarbhas, the

¹ (a) what is wished for another will come to one's own house; (b) evil is in front of an evil man (honi soṭi qui mal y pense); (c) in heaven the river Vāitaranī (the river of death precedes the joy of heaven); (d) as is the tree, so the fruit. Manwaring, Marathi Proverbs. The earlier anuṣṭubh shows the rhyme better on account of the iambus in the prior pāda, e. g., RV. v, 86, 5:

arhantā cit puro dadāhe
aṇḍeva devāṃ arvate.

latter preferring cognate sounds to mere repetition. The reference is rather to classical affectations than to epic style, where alliteration is a common trick, but is not so overdone as it is in the works of later poets. A great deal of it is probably unconscious, or at least required and almost unavoidable. Still, the later epic writers certainly affect the anuprāsa which Daṇḍin says is not liked by the Vidarbhas. Thus in vii, 118, 16,

mudā sametaḥ parayā mahātmā
rarāja rājan surarājakalpāḥ

and in viii, 94, 54,

nihatya Karmāṁ ripum āhave 'rjunāḥ
rarāja rājan paramēṇa varcasā
yathā purā vṛtravadhe çatakratuḥ

So in ix, 35, 24,

deçe deçe, tu deyaṇi dānāni vividhāni ca

and in iii, 63 21,

jagrāhā 'jagaro grāhāḥ

or iii, 64, 118,

kā 'si kasyā 'si kalyāṇi, kim vā, etc.

Cf. iv, 14, 12,

kā tvam kasyā 'si kalyāṇi, kuto vā, etc.

or iii, 64, 99,

phalapuspopāçobhitāḥ

The taste for jingling is clearly seen in such examples from both epics as the following:

Tāro 'bravit tatas tatra, G. v, 1, 49
çayānām çayane çubhe, R. v, 10, 50
pralināmīnamakaram, vii, 146, 3
Kuruçreṣṭha Kuruçetre kuruçva mahatīm kriyāṁ,
ix, 37; 57.

Alliteration is sometimes built on a foundation of older phrase, such as bhīmo bhīmaparākramāḥ, Rāmo ramayatām varāḥ. Thus in R. vii, 42, 22-28,

mano 'bhirāmā rāmās tā
Rāmo ramayatām varah
ramayāmāsa dharmātmā

A good deal of this is due to the later revisors. Thus R. v, 56, 51 (also a pun in sa lilam), not in G.,

sa lilaṅghayiṣur bhīmaṁ salilaṁ lavaṇārṇavam
kallolāsphālaṁ lāntam utpāṭa nabho hariḥ

As it is quite impossible to tell what proportion of such verses reverts to the original epic, it must suffice to show that epic poetry as we have it, while not attaining to the perfected abominations of classical works, nevertheless employs alliteration to portray situations. Thus the rāudrarasa in R. vi, 65, 41,

rāudraḥ ṣakaṭaṣakrākṣo mahāparvatasam nibhaḥ

where the "harsh thunder-sound" is well given by ṣakaṭaṣakrākṣo. Admirable, too, is the phonetic imitation of motion, stumbling, falling, and dying in Mbh. vii, 146, 86:

babhramuḥ caṣkhaluḥ petuḥ, sedur mamluḥ ca, Bhārata

The rhapsode's clay is moulded variously, but it is the same stuff, the last example being a studied improvement, to suit the situation, of viii, 19, 2:

vicelur babhramur neṣuḥ petur mamluḥ ca, Bhārata,

repeated in 21, 16, with varied reading, but leaving (tresuḥ) petur mamluḥ ca (sānikāḥ), and varied in 19, 15 with the fatal *māriṣa* of the later poets (here in place of Bhārata).¹ The examples given above show both the Northern and the Southern style used in both epics.

That Vālmiki was copied by his successors goes without saying. The pseudo-Rāmāyaṇa shows, e. g., vii, 32, 64:

¹ One of the signs that the completed Mahābhārata is posterior to the Rāmāyaṇa. Compare A. J. Phil., vol. xix, p. 142. It is a Buddhistic term, māriṣo, foreign to the Rāmāyaṇa but current in the Mahābhārata and later Sanskrit works. The word, be it noted, is as old as one pleases, but its stereotyped employment in the Bhārata puts that whole work from a synthetic point of view on a par with other non-Buddhistic literature using it.

sa tu bāhusahasreṇa balād grhya daṣṇanam
babandha balavān rājā Balim Nārāyaṇo yathā,

and this atrocity in G. v, 32, 45 (not in B.):

suvarṇasya suvarṇasya suvarṇasya ca bhāvinī
Rāmeṇa prahitaṁ devi suvarṇasyā 'ṅuriyakam,¹

where the poetaster alliterates the whole word in an attempt at pathetic repetition. Though this is not in B., yet the latter countenances iii, 39, 18, where "words beginning with R" frighten Rāma's victim:

ra-kārādīni nāmāni Rāmatrastasya Rāvaṇa
ratnāni ca rathāḥ cāi 'va vitrāsaṁ janayanti me.

Similes and Metaphors. Pathetic Repetition.

On epic similes and metaphors an interesting essay remains to be written. As these subjects lie quite apart from a study of the verse itself, I shall at present make only one or two observations touching on the significance of these figures. First of all, the presence in the epic of rūpakas, metaphors, of this or that form, no more implies acquaintance with a studied *ars poetica* than do such phenomena in other early epic poetry. The pseudo-epic has a disquisition on rhetoric, as it has on every other subject, but rhetoric is older than Rhetoric, and I cannot see that illustrations of later norms found in the epic prove acquaintance with those norms.

In the rewritten Gītā, unquestionably one of the older poems in the epic, though not necessarily an old part of the epic, we find that the current dīpo 'nivāstasthaḥ simile is introduced as a "traditional simile," upamā smṛtā, 6, 19. Such stock similes belong to neither epic, but to the epic store in general, as may be seen by consulting the long list of identical similes in identical phraseology common to both epics. But the epics lack the more complicated figures of classic form, just as they lack the later complicated *yamakae*. What they have

¹ Compare G. iv, 42, 12 = 44, 12 (aṅguliyaṁ, sic, in the latter), where the ring is "engraved with the mark of Rāma's name" (as arrows are marked in M.). So R. v, 36, 2, (aṅguliyaṁ) Rāmanāmāṅkitam.

in abundance is (a) the simile; (b) the simple metaphor; (c) the double metaphor. They have also a most atrocious mixture of metaphor and simile, as in R. vi, 41, 45, *te tu vānaraçārdulāḥ çārdulā iva daṇṣṭriṇaḥ*, "those ape-tigers like fanged tigers." The simile is sufficiently illustrated in Appendix A. I note only that it may be doubled, Rāhur *yathā candram iva*, "he, like Rāhu, him, as if the moon" (overcame). Illustrations of the double metaphor are found, for example, in xiii, 107, 33, *sarasvatīm gopayānaḥ*, keeping silence ("herding fluency"); xiv, 90, 95, *svargāgalaṁ lobhabījam*, "heaven's bar has greed as its seed!"

For my present purpose it is necessary only to point out that the later part of the epic exceeds the earlier epic in involved metaphor. Nothing, for example, in the early epic is quite equal to xiii, 107, 26, where after mentioning billions, *sāgara*, in 21, the poet adds:

*āvartanāni catvāri tadā padmāni dvādaça
çarāgniparimāṇaṁ ca tatṛā 'sau vasate sukham,*

which means that one remains in bliss fifty-one padmas of years, sixteen plus the aggregate of the (five) arrows (of Love) into the (seven)¹ flames = 35 (+16).² But parallels almost as extravagant (including the *gopay* simile above) have been noticed by Professor Lanman in the interesting essay referred to in the last note. Not so striking, though in style more rhetorical than is found in the love-passages of the early epic, is the metaphor of iv, 14, 25:

*ātmapradānavarṣeṇa saṁgamāmbhodhareṇa ca
çamayasva varārohe jvalantam manmathānalam,*

"O graceful maid, quench the mind-shaker's (Love's) glowing fire with the rain of self-surrender and the water of union."

¹ PW., s. *çarāgni*, says three fires. But compare *yad agne te çivam rūpam ye ca te sapta hetayah*, i, 232, 10, and *saptārcis*, passim: and *Muṇḍ. Up. ii, 1, 8*. Besides, the result is 35 and one multiple is 5, so the other must be 7 (flames).

² These high numbers, while not confined to the pseudo-epic (Ind. Streifen, i, p. 97 ff.), receive fresh additions there in names of numbers before unknown. Compare xiii, 107, 33, for example, where occur the *çāṅku* and *patākā*: *tathā çāṅkupatāke dve yugāntam kalpam eva ca, ayutāyutam tathā padmāṁ samudraṁ ca tathā vasat*. On similes, cf. Lanman, JAOS. xx, p. 16.