

wished to have done, the power of the Mahrattas in India would have sunk at once. Mr. Hastings, previous to the capture of Gualier, had proposed to form a strong detachment in Gohid, for the purpose of advancing into the province of Malwa, the country of Sindia, the Mahratta General. In this the Governor General was overruled; although he had every reason to believe, that in the conduct of that branch of administration he was to meet with no opposition. If the detachment had been formed, as Mr. Hastings had proposed, the capture of Gualier ensured us the utmost success in its operations.

General Goddard had earnestly pressed the Governor-General and Council to invade the province of Malva, which would have diverted the attention of Sindia from Guzzerat; and one campaign would have finished the war with honour and advantage, on our side. An event which no Member of Board more earnestly wished to see accomplished than Mr. Hastings; particularly as Hyder Ally Cawn had, in July, 1780, invaded the Carnatic, where our forces were utterly unprepared to receive him.

On the 19th of September an express arrived in Calcutta from the Secret Committee of Fort St. George, informing the Supreme Council that the flower of their army had been cut off or taken prisoners by Hyder Ally, and that Sir Hector Munro, with the part of the forces under his command, had retreated to the mount with loss of his baggage and of part of his artillery. This intelligence was accompanied by advice, that a considerable French fleet, with land forces on board, were on their way to India.

This important intelligence left little room for deliberation, and at the first meeting of the Board, the Governor-General proposed that Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take the command of the army at Madras. That a reinforcement of Europeans should be sent to the coast by sea, with a supply of fifteen lacks of Rupees; and that a large detachment of Seapoys should be formed to march to the Carnatic as soon as the season would permit. That an instant offer of peace should be made to the Mahrattas upon terms so advantageous to them, as almost to ensure their acceptance of them. The season was so far advanced that the embarkation of troops would be attended with difficulty and danger. But the Governor-General, justly considering that every risk was to be run, when probably the very existence of the Company would depend upon their arrival, despised every inferior consideration. Mr. Francis opposed the embarkation of the troops, and would only agree to seven lacks of Rupees being sent from Bengal. However all these motions were carried by the majority; and Sir Eyre Coote, with six hundred and forty Europeans, fifteen lacks of Rupees, and a great supply of provisions arrived at Madras, in less than two months, computed from return of the army under Sir Hector Munro, at the mount on the 14th of September, to the arrival of the last ship of the fleet, the Duke of Kingston, at Fort St. George, on 5th of November. It will undoubtedly reflect great honour upon Mr. Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote, that they had spirit enough to afford such extraordinary aids to the Presidency of Fort St. George, at a season in which the navigation

from Bengal to Madras had hitherto been interdicted on account of the dangers which attended it.

I have related as briefly and as clearly as I was able, the rise and progress of the Mahratta war, from the 12th of December, 1777, to the close of the year 1780. Upon what ground or suggestion this war can be attributed to Mr. Hastings, let every man judge who reads this account.

The occasion of the war was planned and executed without the knowledge or previous consent of the Governor-General, who had no other participation in it than by providing by an extraordinary exertion for the support of the measures undertaken by the Presidency of Bombay if they succeeded, and for its preservation if they failed. The Court of Directors have warmly approved of the exertions made by the Government of Bengal. Colonel Goddard arrived seasonably for the preservation of Bombay, and for the redemption of the national honour, which had without it been irretrievably lost. Our success in every part, after the Mahrattas had rejected all reasonable terms of accommodation, gave the Governor-General the strongest hopes of speedily terminating it by such advantages as should have amply recompensed the Company for the expenses which had attended it, and the calamities with which it had commenced. In the midst of our successes, another and more interesting occasion called for the exertion of the Government of Bengal. The preservation of Fort. St. George depended upon their resolutions. The misfortunes upon the coast cannot be attributed to Mr. Hastings. If the

general opinion is to have weight, the invasion of the Carnatic might have been prevented by the assembly of our army in the month of June. If the concession of the Nizam to Mr. Holland may be credited, (and it is confirmed by evidence of the most public notoriety) that invasion was the sole effect of a confederacy formed at his instigation, and dictated by his resentment of the infringements made by the Select Committee of Fort St. George, on his rights obtained by the treaty subsisting between him and the Company, and his natural apprehension of hostilities, intended by that Government against him.

When Mr. Hastings proposed to conclude a treaty of peace with the Mahrattas, he recommended to the Board to form the treaty in Calcutta, to send it executed by the Supreme Council, to Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, who had repeatedly offered himself as mediator between our Government and the Mahrattas. This treaty was rejected, and the reason was obvious; Hyder Ally Cawn had cut off a third of our army. He had taken Arcot, when he was proclaimed Nabob of the Carnatic. He had boasted that he would prevent the English army from moving from the mount, and that he was to be joined in a month by three thousand French regulars from the islands, when he would commence the siege of Fort St. George. The French fleet, six sail of the line, and five frigates appeared on the coast of Coromandel. Under these circumstances, the Mahrattas deeming our situation a desperate one, rejected all treaty, except upon the most disgraceful terms to us.

"Sir Eyre Coote took the field on the 23d of January,

1781. On his march to Pondicherry, he repeatedly offered battle to Hyder Ally Cawn.

His detachments were upon all occasions successful, against every superiority of numbers. The army under his command was the finest that ever took the field in India, in point of discipline and numbers, and completely provided with artillery and military stores. The men were eager to revenge the late defeat and destruction of their companions. The French fleet, after appearing off Madras, on the 29th of January, went off without even making an attempt to destroy the ships in that road, in which they must have succeeded. The fleet had not a single soldier on board, except their marines, and on a report that Sir Edward Hughes was returning from Bombay to the coast of Coromandel, quitted the coast on the 16th of February, and returned to the islands. Hyder Ally thus disappointed, will not be able to maintain his ground in the Carnatic. In addition to the army under the command of Sir Eyre Coote, Colonel Pearse was advancing from Bengal, with ten battalions of Seapoys and twenty pieces of cannon. This force would arrive in the neighbourhood of Madras in the month of June.

The Mahrattas at the commencement of this campaign, had been defeated in a general action by General Goddard, who the day after took the Fort of Bassein. Lieutenant Colonel Carnac, advancing at the head of twelve battalions of Seapoys, to the province Malwa, has had the good fortune to gain a complete victory against an army of 30,000 men, commanded by Sindia in person, the effect of which must be greatly

beneficial to General Goddard's designs. Gualier was garrisoned by our troops, and by that means a safe communication was preserved with the dominions of our ally the Vizer. Our forces in Bengal were so stationed as to prevent all danger from an invasion should it be attempted. These favourable circumstances make an honourable peace with the Mahrattas a probable event.

In this review of the rise and progress of the Mahratta war, let it be remembered that the main design of marching an army across India, was not to assist the Presidency of Bombay in the execution of their original plan, but to support them in the consequences of it to us, and to protect the interests of the East-India Company, from the effects of a connection, well known to be formed between the ruling member of the Mahratta state and the avowed agent of the King of France. General Goddard very opportunely arrived at Surat for the preservation of Bombay. The Governor-General, who saw in as strong a light as any other member of the Board, the disadvantages even of a successful war with the Mahrattas, (however great the necessity might be of retrieving our military reputation) should the operations be continued beyond one campaign, proposed to them the most equitable terms of peace; and in a letter which he himself drew up to the Committee at Bombay, the Supreme Council observe, " Having given full powers to Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude a peace with the Mahrattas, we have only to repeat, that we look to the issue of that commission as our primary object, and the

"termination of all our political views on your side of India, if it shall prove successful." To Colonel Goddard, the Board observe, "Our first desire is to obtain peace."

When Ragonaut Row had escaped from Madjee Sindia, and had joined General Goddard, who consented to give him personal protection, the Supreme Council approve of its being continued to him, provided he shall "not attempt to defeat the effect of your negotiations, to which you are to give your entire attention without regard to any other consideration." With such proofs of Mr. Hasting's sincere disposition to accommodate our differences with the Mahrattas, what are the grounds to suppose he was less inclined to a pacification than Mr. Francis, or any other member of the Board? The Governor-General was not at all involved in the disgrace which the gentlemen of Bombay had incurred by their ill-timed expedition; on the contrary, the Court of Directors had conveyed to him, by an express over land, their approbation of the part which he had taken in their affairs. The answer of the Poona Durbar to our proposals, was conveyed in few words. "They would only consent to a peace on these conditions." "That we should give up the person of Ragobah, and cede the island of Salsettee to them." Was it even proposed by any member of the Supreme Council to purchase a peace by such concessions? It was not. The war was therefore a war of necessity on our part, and from this moment it ought to have been prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Thwarted and opposed as the Governor-General was, the brilliant successes

which have attended our arms will fully prove, what our Government when united, may be capable of.

That I might not break in upon the narrative of the Mahratta war, I have passed over the other transactions of Government, during that period. The resolution to commence hostilities against the French, on the 7th of July, 1778, before any regular advices of a rupture had been received from England, reflects honour upon every member of the Supreme Council in proportion to the responsibility which each incurred by so spirited a measure. The celerity with which two ships of 40 guns each were fitted out, and joined Sir Edward Vernon before Pondichery, arriving there against the monsoon, in less than two months from the day when they were ordered to be equipped, the plan formed for the defence of the river, when the destination of the Toulon fleet was unknown, the reinforcements ordered to be raised for the army, the disposition of our forces, and the assembly of the militia, are substantial proofs of the attention of the Governor-General and Council, to the preservation of the valuable empire committed to their charge, and the spirit which animated all ranks of men living under their Government.

Why the French missed so favourable an opportunity of attacking us on the Malabar coast we know not, but it would have been a very poor satisfaction to his country if Mr. Hastings had stopped the march of the army destined for the preservation of Bombay, at so critical a period, either on account of the expense attending it, or to add still more to the security of Bengal, already well secured, if that place had been

attacked the following year. The majority of the Supreme Council therefore, determined at this time that their army should advance; and the Governor-General had the strongest and best founded expectations of carrying the projected alliance with Moodajee Boosla into execution; which was intended effectually to preclude the French nation from territorial possessions in every part of India.

The temporary agreement between the Governor-General and Mr. Francis, and the extraordinary event it produced, are facts, the elucidation of which is disagreeable. Certain it is some agreement was made as to the conduct of the war, as certain that Mr. Hastings as well before as in the meetings which he had with Mr. Francis, insisted that as the whole responsibility of the war with the Mahrattas was, by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, thrown upon him, he should have the entire conduct of it, and as certain that the persons in Mr. Hastings's confidence understood that was agreed to.

The Governor-General's plan for carrying on the war was confessedly the best that could have been proposed. The operations of a small army, the last campaign, had put us in possession of an extensive country, had considerably added to our military reputation, and during the rains, that very season in which Mr. Francis contended nothing could be done, Major Popham took the important fortress of Gualier. By Mr. Francis's opposition to the Governor-General's plan our army, which was formed the last campaign, was distressed for pay, and continued inactive when it might have moved with great effect; that army

which must have so completely divided the forces and the attention of the Mahrattas, and made us successful in every quarter.

The plan which Mr. Hastings proposed for carrying on the Mahratta war exactly corresponded with one drawn up by an excellent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, of whom Mr. Francis himself had the highest opinion. This gentleman had travelled to Poona by land, and his sentiments were certainly a strong confirmation of the propriety of the Governor-General's propositions. The great expenses of the war are doubtless to be lamented, but there are seasons when great expenses are absolutely necessary, nor can a Government, like ours, hope to be secure, if in time of war we are contented to guard our frontier only. This we must do at a considerable expense, and with the loss of reputation; but by invading the dominions of our enemies, we have kept them at home, we have deprived them of resources for carrying on the war, we have infused such a degree of spirit into the native troops in our service, that they look upon themselves as invincible when headed by British officers; and the conquest which we have made, would have amply repaid us for all our expenses, had the invasion of the Carnatic not taken place.

The Governor-General would have had no difficulty in extending the influence of the Company through all the countries now dependent upon the Mahrattas, if the native powers of India had had the same opinion of the continuance of his authority, as was universally entertained of his superior abilities and good fortune. But unfortunately, Mr. Hastings, notwithstanding his

utmost efforts, could never efface those ideas which had so generally been conceived from Benares to Dehly, and in the Deckan, of his speedy removal from the Government of Bengal.

Before Sir Eyre Coote's arrival, it was universally given out by the friends of Mr. Francis, that he would undoubtedly take a decided part against Mr. Hastings. These declarations so often repeated, made a deep impression upon our allies, and were attended with very serious consequences. I will mention one that immediately occurs to me.

When our military establishment was considerably increased, in consequence of the war with France, Mr. Hastings thought it reasonable that Cheyt Sing, the Raja of Benares, and a vassal of the Company, should pay a proportion of an expense incurred for our common defence. This he fixed at five lacks of rupees per annum, and the Raja was with some difficulty prevailed upon to advance this sum, but he positively refused to continue the payment beyond the first year, and in this resolution, he was confirmed by a knowledge of Mr. Francis's sentiments, who disapproved of any compulsion being used for the continuance of the payment. The intrigues of the Raja's vackeel in Calcutta, previous to the General's arrival, were very well known, but as Sir Eyre Coote supported the authority of the Governor-General, the Raja was obliged, not only to pay five lacks of rupees for another year, but in addition to it, the expenses incurred by the march of two battalions to Benares, for the purpose of enforcing the payment, if he should continue obstinate. If the Raja had not received the most positive

assurances from his agent in Calcutta, that Mr. Francis was on the point of succeeding to the Government, he never would have reduced Mr. Hastings to the necessity of taking so violent a measure, for the support of his own authority and the Company's interests.

If the expectation of a change in Bengal had been productive of no effects, more detrimental to the public service, than the contemptible opposition of the Raja of Benares, it had been fortunate; but independent of the great relaxation of Government, in our own provinces, which was, and always must be the consequence of it, such an expectation very essentially interfered, with the only plan by which the Mahratta war could be brought to a speedy, and successful termination. The Rajas of Jaynagur, Narva, Bundelcund, &c. were all, I can affirm from the best authority, eager to throw off their dependence upon the Mahrattas, the slightest assistance from us would have enabled them to do it; the successful operation of Major Popham's little army has very probably produced this effect, if a peace is not yet concluded.

Our political influence was extended immediately upon Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair. Every power in India has an agent in Calcutta, and these men regularly transmit to their principals the intelligence of the day. Influenced by the intelligence thus received they have universally dreaded, and expected Mr. Hastings's removal, and have been deterred from taking part with so unsteady a Government.

Mr. Francis will excuse me for observing that he is responsible for the fatal consequence which followed,

from the opinion of a change in the Government being so universal. The paragraphs of the general letters, from the direction which reflected most severely upon Mr. Hastings, were industriously circulated; Mr. Francis, in the most unreserved manner, expressed his certainty of succeeding him in a few months, nor could all the efforts of Mr. Middleton at Lucknow, or Mr. Graham at Benares, obviate the bad effects which such positive declarations produced throughout Indostan. I affirm nothing can be so detrimental to the interests of the British nation in India, as a divided or unsettled administration in Bengal, and whatever system the Court of Directors may adopt in future, or whomever they may think proper to employ, they ought to give the ruling members every public support in their power. The hands of Government should be strengthened by every possible means. Prosperity attended the confidence which they placed in Mr. Hastings, and reverse of fortune, the diminution, or more properly the annihilation of his authority.

I now beg leave to offer a few remarks upon the state of our affairs in India.

Our situation is indeed so very alarming, that there are many men who will believe, and many more who will affect to believe them irretrievable; I must confess that it will require all the abilities, the integrity, and the firmness of the Governor-General, with every possible degree of support that can be given from home to restore Bengal to its former prosperity, but that Mr. Hastings will effect this if he is treated with that confidence which his great and important services entitle him to expect, I have not the smallest doubt.

What was our situation in Bengal, when Mr. Hastings arrived there in 1772 ; and what is it at this time ? To bring this subject to one point of view, I must recapitulate what I have already observed. At the former period, the Company's debt at interest was above one hundred and twenty lacks. The Court of Directors the season before had been drawn upon for one hundred and twenty lacks. There was no prospect of providing future investments but by an increase of the bond-debt, as our civil and military expenses were barely defrayed by the annual revenues. In one year only what a change was effected. The alliance with Sujah Dowlah brought such an ample supply of treasure into Bengal that every service was fully provided for and the bond-debt reduced. Until this period, our foreign connections only served to accelerate the ruin of our provinces by draining them of the little specie that remained in them.

No one good effect was experienced from our alliance with Sujah Dowlah before Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair ; an entire brigade kept at Allahabad, which was paid by the exportation of silver from Bengal, was a ruin.

A very considerable sum was saved by the reduction of the stipends paid to the Nabob and his Ministers. In this particular, where the interest of the Company was concerned, Mr. Hastings paid a pointed attention to the orders of the Court of Directors. At the season when the Supreme Council arrived, our investment was so considerably increased, that two extra ships, the *Anson* and the *Northumberland*, were sent home. The following year we obtained a clear additional

revenue of twenty-four lacks from Benares, and the expense of at least a third of our army was defrayed by the Vizier. These beneficial advantages are the result of Mr. Hastings's treaty of 1773; a treaty which the majority of the Supreme Council decried in all its parts the first month of their arrival. China, Bombay and Madras, have been supplied with treasure to a very considerable amount, and the annual investment from 1774 to 1779, was considerably above a million sterling each year. The bond-debt was entirely paid off, and a large balance of cash in our treasury. I had forgot to mention the erection of public granaries, by which the return of famine, which so depopulated that country, is totally prevented.

A series of events which I have already related brought on the Mahratta war; a war in Europe obliged us to increase our military establishment very considerably, to provide a marine force, to reinforce Sir Edward Vernon, and for the defence of the river. These exertions were attended with additional expense but they were absolutely necessary, and have been fully approved of at home. The French, contrary to their usual policy, missed the fairest opportunity which they ever could have had to regain their influence in India. Why they were so remiss we know not, but what would Mr. Hastings have deserved had he taken no steps to counteract their intrigues at Poona, and in consequence of them two regiments and a hundred French officers had landed at Choule. When our successes against the Mahrattas gave us every reason to expect an honourable peace, the Carnatic was invaded. This was a fresh demand upon Bengal for men,

money, and provisions. The exertions of the Governor-General and Sir Eyre Coote have saved Fort St. George. After so many great drains from our treasury, after supporting an expensive war against the Mahrattas, and affording Bombay such effectual assistance in cash, provisions, and stores, after doubling our investment for many years, that debt which, when Mr. Hastings came to the chair, was above one hundred and twenty lacks, was on the 15th of December last only sixty-six lacks of current rupees, and we had eighty-eight lacks of goods in the Company's ware-houses.

I have already stated my reasons for supposing that we are now at peace with the Mahrattas. An accommodation with Hyder Ally, or his entire overthrow must soon follow. When these events have taken place, our military establishment may be considerably reduced; the Presidency of Bombay must support its expenses from the revenues arising from their late acquisitions. The Carnatic cannot recover itself for many years. Before its invasion the country was almost ruined, and the Nabob either wanted, or pretended to want, money for his private expenses.

The Government of Bengal must supply Bombay and Maḍras with cash, as it has constantly done, if their own resources are inadequate to their disbursements. And from the revenues of Bengal must the interest of their bond-debts be paid. This I contend can easily be done if some care is taken to prevent Bengal from being unnecessarily drained of its specie, and if foreign trade is properly encouraged. To effect these points the Court of Directors must fix upon some equitable mode, by which the private fortunes

of their servants can be remitted to England. At present they are under an absolute necessity either of sending their fortunes home in cash, which is ruinous to Bengal; or of lending their money to foreigners, by which means the Company's sales in England must be essentially injured.

If foreigners should once be under the necessity of bringing bullion to Bengal to purchase cargoes, such a flow of treasure to our exhausted provinces would amply compensate for a trifling diminution of the public sales in England; and if the Company's servants are restricted from lending money to foreigners, they must either bring bullion to Bengal, or relinquish the trade altogether. I can say from my own knowledge, that it is from necessity, not choice, the Company's servants supply them with cash. But an equitable mode of remittance, once fixed, by the Directors, dismissal from the service should be the punishment of any man who should lend money to foreigners or to foreign companies.

Perhaps the Court of Directors do not know the extent to which this trade is now carried on. Four Portuguese ships have sailed from Bengal this year. I came to Lisbon in one of them. Her cargo was valued at five lacks of rupees. The others were still more valuable. Some of these ships were taken up in India, the captains and owners borrowed as much money as they wanted to purchase both ships and cargoes, on the following terms; The lenders to receive 12 per cent. interest, and two shillings for each current rupee at Lisbon three months after the arrival of the ship. Prejudicial as this trade may appear to

the Directors, it is not half so ruinous to Bengal as the remittance of fortunes in silver would be. The Dutch and Danish Companies, as well as individuals of both nations, have borrowed large sums last year, and the season preceding, upon the terms above mentioned.

The trade to Suez, should if possible, be again opened; it is advantageous to Bengal in every point of view, and can never interfere with the Company's sales in England. Mr. Hastings deserves the highest credit for his encouragement of this trade, and for his attempts to establish a regular communication with our native country by this route. We owe the early capture of Pondicherry entirely to it.

I own I depart from the line of my profession when I presume to hazard opinions upon commercial subjects, but as I have been fifteen years in Bengal, and have not been an unconcerned spectator of the various changes which have happened in that time, I may be excused for declaring my sentiments upon a subject of such importance.

Arts, agriculture, and commerce, have greatly increased since my first arrival in India. The riches of Bengal are its manufactures. For them there will always be a market, and while we increase in population we must increase our manufactures. Mr. Hastings, it must be recollected, succeeded to the Government at a most unfavourable period. The loss by the dreadful famine of 1770, has been estimated at four millions of people; and from my own observations in various parts of Bengal I do not think this an exaggerated account,

However I may be mistaken when I speak of trade, I will venture to affirm, that our affairs in Bengal are much more alarming in appearance than in reality.

Let us suppose that by the time the war in India is at an end, and a general peace has been established in Europe, the bond-debt in Bengal amounts to 200 lacks of rupees. This is not so large a sum as was in fact owing when Mr. Hastings came to the chair. The bond-debt was then 120, and the Directors had been drawn upon for above 100 lacks of rupees only the season before; I hope it will be recollected that this great debt was contracted in times of the *most profound peace*; and the greatest part of it even before the famine. Dreadful as was that calamity its effects were more severely felt after Mr. Hastings's accession to the Government than at the time it happened. It is a fact that the collections in the year of the famine, and the year after, were higher than in either of the two preceding ones.

The interest of 200 lacks of rupees will be 16 lacks a year. All our establishment upon a peace will be considerably reduced; and if the Governor-General is properly supported, the Government of Bengal will acquire a vigour, to the want of which, and not to the Mahratta war, we owe our present misfortunes. .

To pay the interest of this debt let us examine our funds, and compare them with those of 1772. I will suppose the actual collections from Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, to be only what they were at that period.

The savings under the different heads of tribute to the King, stipends to the Nabob, his ministers and dependents, are at least 50 lacks of rupees a year.

The Vizier pays 70 lacks of rupees annually towards our military expenses.

We shall receive annually from Cheyt Sing 24 lacks of rupees.

When our dominions and our influence, at least an influence advantageous to the Company, were bounded by the banks of the Carumnassa, our military expences were 105 lacks of rupees a year.

Our connection with Oude, now so profitable, was a most disadvantageous one before Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal. To the Company it was ruinous, although it answered the interested purposes of certain individuals perfectly well.

Can one good reason be given for the very curious deputation to Sujah Dowla, in 1768, against the opinion of Mr. Verelst, at that time the Governor of Bengal, or for keeping the third brigade at Allahabad until the middle of the year 1769 at the Company's expence.

The transactions of that period are worthy the public attention—I may enlarge upon them hereafter.

At a peace our military expences can and will be reduced to 110 lacks of rupees a year.

The interest of our debt, supposing it 200 lacks, will be 16 lacks a year.

When Mr. Hastings came to the Government the Company owed something more than 120 lacks.

Upon comparing the accounts of 1771, and they are applicable to a former period, with those at a so much wished for peace, the balance will be 133 lacks a year in favour of the Company, as appears by the following statement.

EXPENCES IN 1771.

	Rupees
Military, - - - - -	105
Interest of bond-debt, - - - - -	10
Paid in tribute, stipends, &c. but retrenched by Mr. Hastings }	50
Total,	165

EXPENCES AT A PEACE.

Military, - - - - -	110
Interest of debt, - - - - -	16
Total,	126
Credit in favour of the Company, - - -	
Difference of Disbursements, - - -	39
Paid by the Vizier, - - - - -	70
By the Raja of Benares, - - - - -	24
Total,	133

While arts, manufactures, and commerce, are encouraged in Bengal; while the natives continue happy under our Government, and attached to it as the great body of the people are; while population increases, as it has done the last seven years, Bengal must be a most valuable country to Great-Britain; but it can only yield its tribute by increase of the annual investment.

Mr. Hastings has been very severely charged with

disobedience of orders—Upon this subject I must add a few words. I do not mean to justify the Governor-General's conduct by pleading precedent for it, yet I am reduced to the disagreeable necessity of contrasting it with the conduct of his predecessors in power in Bengal.

I affirm that it had long been reported, Mr. Hastings was to be dismissed the service, that Mr. Francis was to succeed him; and the reinstatement of Messrs. Bristow, Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn were connected with Mr. Francis's accession to the Government. This report, circulated for months throughout Indostan, obliged Mr. Hastings to adopt measures which were by no means agreeable to the natural humanity of his temper, or to that regard to the just claims of individuals which he is known to possess. He assigned his reasons to the Directors for keeping them out of office, and if they were not approved, he of course expected to be dismissed from the service. To those who served in India I appeal, whether it is not absolutely necessary to strengthen the hands of Government by every possible means, and to impress the natives with an idea of its stability; that the reinstatement of Mr. Bristow, Mr. Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn, would have had a contrary effect is universally known.

When General Richard Smith was Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces in Bengal, and third member of the Secret Committee and the Council, he wrote the following letter to the Secret Committee, 24th November, 1767, and forced Mr. Verelst to do an act of greater severity than Mr. Hastings was ever

guilty of in the whole course of his political life. I must affirm here, that the East-India Company was saddled with the expense of an establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature, in consequence of the discussions which this famous letter produced.

"The nature of the intelligence transmitted from Calcutta to Sujah Dowlah is without limits. The Nabob is almost as well acquainted with the Parliamentary proceedings as I am ; how far the importance and dignity of the Company, and the weight and influence of administration is lessened in his esteem by such communication may be easily conceived. Whilst a Vackeel is so ready and so sure a channel to communicate intelligence, few men will be found so hardy as to maintain a direct correspondence with the Nabob, but there is a man who has obliquely offered so great an insult to *our President*, that was I present at the Board, I would move for the exertion of our authority to its utmost extent to free the settlement from so dangerous an inhabitant ; I mean Mr. Bolts ; and the enclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Zentil, where he asserts an absolute falsehood, which tends to lessen *that essential dignity and necessary influence of our President*, is surely deserving of your severest resentment."

I approve highly of General Richard Smith's arguments ; if he had known how *the essential dignity and necessary influence of Mr. Hastings*, would have been affected by carrying the Director's order into execution respecting Mr. Bristow, he would upon his own principles have concurred in the disobedience of them, had he been a member, of the Supreme Council in December, 1779.

Three poor Armenians, the trading agents of Mr. Bolts, a keen trader himself, who perhaps wanted to come in for some share of the plunder of Oude and Benares, were afterwards seized, and treated with too much rigour. Most men of Bengal attributed General Smith's conduct to private motives. It is strictly justifiable upon public grounds; however I must add in this place, and I can prove it, that our connection with Sujah Dowlah at that time was ruinous to the East-India Company, in as great a degree as it was advantageous to a few individuals in power.

The Directors, most positive orders have been repeatedly disobeyed or evaded during my residence in Bengal. Two very particular instances I will now mention.

As soon as the Court of Directors were informed of the pernicious salt monopoly, they sent positive orders to Bengal to abolish it immediately on the receipt of their letter. In defiance of this order, the monopoly was continued almost two years longer, and the profits arising from it were divided amongst the members of the council, General Richard Smith (Commander-in-Chief at that time,) and the principal civil and military servants in Bengal.

The Directors had positively prohibited their servants in Bengal from drawing upon them except for a certain amount, and a rate of exchange much more favourable than the present. Yet by a resolution of the council in October, 1769, bills were drawn upon them at a very unfavourable exchange for the Company, to the amount of one million and sixty thousand pounds sterling. I affirm that three-fourths of the money paid into the

treasury in Calcutta might have been borrowed upon bond until the Directors' pleasure was known.

Let these instances of disobedience be compared by my fellow proprietors and the public, with the charges brought against Mr. Hastings.

I will here quote General Richard Smith's sentiments upon the subject of disobedience of orders.

In his minute of the 25th of September, 1769, when he proposed opening the Company's treasury, and granting bills upon the Directors, he says, "Although the Court of Directors, orders are strong in prohibition, yet I think we shall be *fully warranted* to deviate from those orders, and I do not think I should perform my duty to the Company as a member of their administration, if I did not enter this my opinion upon the public records."

Upon another occasion, 24th November, 1767, General Richard Smith writes to the Secret Committee, whose orders he was bound to obey in the same degree as Mr. Hastings is those of the Directors. "My zeal for the welfare of the state I serve would, on occasions of great emergency, induce me not only to hazard my commission, but even subject my life and honour to the sentence of a general court-martial, rather than the *public service* should suffer by delay. Whenever I act *contrary to their orders*, it is not that I entertain the most distant idea of disobedience or *independence*, but from a conviction that *at this distance from the Presidency, their orders and the welfare of the state may happen, they have happened to be incompatible, and, whenever I take upon me to deviate from their orders, it is not from independent authority*

" I presume, because I know I am totally responsible to them for such a deviation."

This is the language of a sensible man. It is manly language. It is the language of Mr. Hastings ; but in the Governor-General's case, the arguments operate with ten-fold force when we consider the situation of Mr. Hastings and General Richard Smith ; the former could only receive answers from *his superiors* in fifteen or eighteen months, the latter in as many days.

I will now mention a few essential points in which Mr. Hastings pointedly obeyed 'the orders of the Directors. He employed Nundcomar by their orders.

He reduced the Nabob's stipend from thirty-two to sixteen lacks of rupees. He abolished nominal pensions to a large amount. He suspended Mahomed Reza Cawn from his office ; he brought him to a trial before the Council for his former conduct ; and to the justice, the impartiality, and the attention of Mr. Hastings, Mahomed Reza Cawn has always declared, he was indebted for his life, which the villany of Nundcomar would have deprived him of. In November, 1773, Mr. Hastings received the thanks of the Directors for his great attention to their orders, and for his other eminent services.

Soon after the majority of the Supreme Council arrived in Bengal, they asserted that Mr. Hastings had made 40 lacks of rupees, or £400,000 from the revenues of Bengal in less than three years. The despicable character of the man on whose information this declaration was grounded, the well known moderation of Mr. Hastings, his active and vigorous administration, the state of his private fortune at that time

or at present; which any man may know that chooses to inquire, are solid proofs of the falsity and the folly of this assertion. Are the great servants of the Company who preceded Mr. Hastings in high stations, although not in the chair, willing to put their integrity to this test; will they declare the amount of their private fortunes?

I do affirm, that if public and repeatedly asserted declarations have any weight, the amount of the private fortunes of three gentlemen of high station, who left Bengal in the course of the year 1769, or in January, 1770, equalled the amount of all the private fortunes that have been accumulated during Mr. Hastings's government of ten years from the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, by the civil and military servants of the Company.

If we were to judge from vague reports, what character could be sheltered from calumny. I can recollect perfectly well, that in the years 1768 and 1769, it was universally said in Bengal, that a mint was established at Allahabad; that the good rupees, which were so absurdly sent from Bengal and Bahar to that place were all recoined into base rupees; called *Viziry*; that our troops sustained a very heavy loss by being obliged to receive their pay in this base money. That twenty-six lacks of *sicca* rupees were annually sent from Bengal for the payment of the King's tribute, but that his Majesty actually received it in *viziry* rupees; and that a very considerable share of the profits arising from this coinage, which was said to be unauthorized by the Governor and Council, centered in the Commander-in-Chief, General Richard

Smith. It does not however follow that this was the fact. I have been long enough in India to know that men, who are deprived of the means of making money themselves, are very apt to exaggerate when they state the advantages of their superiors. It is very possible to investigate this matter thoroughly ; and I must observe, that Mr. Hastings has been accused of peculation upon much more slender ground.

Upon the subject of presents received, which was one of the modes by which Mr. Hastings was accused of having made the enormous sum of £400,000 I shall make but one observation : That, upon a reference to the Governor-General's Durbar charges, it will be found he has brought to the Company's credit the sums which he received, and has drawn the amount of the presents he made from the treasury. This rule was observed, I believe, by his predecessors. In the consultations of the 8th of December, 1769, and since printed in the Reports of the Secret Committee of 1773, I find, that General Richard Smith made the Mogul, Shaw Allum, a present to the amount of £2000 sterling, *when His Majesty honoured him with a visit* to Sujah Dowlah, Bulwant Singh, and a string of *et ceteras*. Presents, for which he received from the Company one lack twenty-four thousand six hundred and six Souant rupees, or £16,000 sterling. I do not see the presents which he received in return brought to account ; but if the invariable custom and usage of the country at that time to men of high rank and station was dispensed with, out of delicacy to his feelings, and he received no presents from the King, Suja Dowlah, &c., his liberality was a very unnecessary waste of the public money.

The execution of Nundcomar has been again brought forward. The ingenious *English* writer of *A Letter from Calcutta* has, without any foundation, quoted the most respectable authority for calling his death a murder. My observations upon it will be very short.

Nundcomar was employed by Mr. Hastings on his first arrival in Bengal at the express desire of the Court of Directors. Mr. Hastings's choice of the man excited very general surprise, as the cause was not known. Nundcomar's villany was detected in the affair of Mahomed Reza Cawn, and Mr. Hastings ceased to employ him. On the arrival of the Supreme Council he gave in the curious information which I have already mentioned. It is remarkable, that when Lord Clive and the Secret Committee of 1765, were invested with inquisitorial powers, Nundcomar gave in an information against Mr. John Johnstone and other servants of the Company, similar to that which he afterwards gave in against Mr. Hastings, and upon a full enquiry, the information was found to be void of the smallest foundation. Mr. Hastings commenced a prosecution against him. The majority and Mr. Joseph Fowke visited him in confinement; an attention which, of course, attracted the notice of every man in Indostan, and induced Nundcomar to suppose that he should be protected at all events by the Supreme Council.

I now come to the forgery. In 1762 a Gentoo was condemned to be hanged for this crime. The sentence was respited; and His Majesty was pleased to pardon the criminal; but I believe it was understood that the royal mercy would never again be

extended to a similar offender. Be that as it may, Nundcomar, when he committed a forgery many years after this period, accompanied with the most aggravating circumstances, well knew the consequence if he should be detected. A lawyer, in 1772, was said, and truly, I believe, to have received ten thousand rupees for suppressing his knowledge of the affair. Nundcomar was well acquainted with the nature of our laws. He had a hundred causes before the Mayor's Court at different times. Before his prosecutor complained, he offered to settle the affair for fifty thousand rupees. He repeated the offer after Nundcomar was in jail. Was Nundcomar's refusal supposed to be the result of conscious innocence? Was there a man in Bengal questioned the fairness of his trial, or the characters of the jurymen who found him guilty? Was he not universally deemed the most unprincipled of all the intriguing natives of Bengal? I am not an advocate for the judges; but, as a most illiberal and unjust motive has been assigned for their conduct, their desire to screen Mr. Hastings from the effects of his information, I must assert, and I do it in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Hastings was not concerned either directly or indirectly in the apprehension, the trial, or the execution, of Nundcomar.

The judges might have respited the execution of the sentence; I wish with all my heart they had; but something may be urged in their favour upon this head. It was the first grand cause that came before them. I was at Berhampore, about 100 miles from Calcutta, at the time of Nundcomar's trial and execution. It was the common subject of conversation amongst men of all

ranks. I have heard the sentiments of several natives, then, and since, upon it. At the time, they very generally observed that Nundcomar, though he was undoubtedly guilty, was too rich a man to be hanged ; and since his death, it was said he depended upon the interference of the Supreme Council, or he would have compromised the affair before his trial. Might not the judges be supposed to have acted as they did, from a desire to impress the natives with an idea of the justice and the impartiality of the Supreme Court ? Would not the same set of men, who think Mr. Hastings capable of so villainous an action as influencing the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature, or those judges of being influenced upon such an occasion ; would they not have concluded that Nundcomar, if his execution had been respited, had obtained that favour by improper means ?

In this review of the transactions in Bengal I have avoided as much as possible every expression which may be supposed to convey a personal reflection. It is from necessity, not from inclination, that I have been obliged to contrast his conduct with any man's. However strong the provocation may have been, Mr. Hastings has upon all occasions attended solely to his own justification. It has been the fate of the Governor-General, whose liberality of sentiment can only be equalled by his moderation, or rather by his contempt of money, to be engaged in a perpetual course of party contention. No man could less merit such a fate. With integrity that has defended him against the most tempting offers of private advantage, with abilities and application that have surmounted the greatest difficulties, he

has been reduced to the painful necessity of defending himself from the extraordinary charges of private rapacity, and a want of zeal for the interest of his employers. To the first I shall only observe, that he has now been almost ten years at the head of the administration in Bengal, a period much more than sufficient to answer the private views of any man, if to accumulate money was his object. To the last, I shall oppose the very flourishing state in which the Supreme Council found Bengal, and in which it continued, until foreign wars; and what is still worse, a continued opposition to the Governor-General exhausted our treasury, and diminished or almost annihilated the necessary power of Government.



POST SCRIPT.



THE arrival of the *Belmont* enables me to carry on this review to the 31st of May last.

The Nizam remained inactive. In the latter end of April he expressed his wishes to join us in an alliance against Hyder Ally Cawn. On this account Mr. Holland remained at Hynicabad, although he had intended to quit it on account of his health. The Nizam's conduct is politic. Hyder aspired to the sub-ship of the Deccan, and had applied to the King for sunnuds, through Nuzeph Cawn.

The engagement with the Raja of Berar promises to be followed with the most important and beneficial effects. Colonel Pearse, in his march through Cuttac, received every assistance he stood in need of from the Naib of that province, and his camp was amply supplied with provisions. It is supposed he would be joined at Ellore by 2,000 of the Berar horse; the remainder of that army was on its return to Naigpoore, except that part of it which was to act in conjunction with our forces against Guramundela. It is impossible to detail the negotiation which brought on this agreement, but it reflects great honour upon Mr. Hastings. Mr. Wheler, who entirely concurred in opinion with him, and Mr. Anderson, through whose agency it was concluded, No chout, as has been represented, was

either given or promised, and our superiority appeared through the whole course of the negociation.

On the same day, the 2nd of April, an agreement was signed between the Ambassador of the Nabob of Arcot and the Supreme Council on the part of the Company. By this agreement the whole revenues of the Carnatic are appropriated for the service of the war. Credit being given to the Nabob's creditors for the actual collections from those districts which had been previously assigned to them. The utility of this agreement will forcibly strike every impartial person.

Lieutenant Colonel Camac's night attack on the camp of Madjee Sindia was attended with very favourable consequences. Many of the chiefs who were compelled to join him had come over to us; and an overture for a pacification had secretly been made by Sindia himself. His army was dispersed, except about 7000 horse under Ambajee Punt, which were surprised and totally defeated by Captain Bruce, the officer who had so great a share in taking the fortress of Gualier. These successes and the alliance with Modajee Boosla gave us the fairest hopes of a speedy accommodation with the Mahrattas, and their junction with us against Hyder Ally Cawn; events which Mr. Hastings most anxiously wishes to accomplish.

Provincial courts of justice had been established, agreeably to the Governor-General's plan, and a control vested in the Chief Justice. The Company and the natives, after six months' experience, have sensibly felt the good effects of this regulation. To

the former it is a very considerable saving; to the latter it has insured an impartial and not an expensive distribution of justice.

The former mode of collecting the revenues has been abolished. An increase of 39 lacks or £390,000, is expected from this regulation; which is Mr. Hastings's plan, formed in 1773, and the propriety of it confirmed by eight years experience of the former defective system.

The revenue from salt will be 30 lacks of rupees or £300,000 sterling this year. The gentleman Mr. Hastings has placed at the head of his business, whose abilities and integrity have never been exceeded in Bengal, has made this declaration, and the authority is incontestible; so that the additional resources from the revenues of Bengal may fairly be estimated for this year at £690,000.

The cargo of the *Belmont* is valued at 16½ lacks or £165,000 prime cost; the *Neptune*, which was obliged to return to Bengal, had 14½ lacks or £145,000 on board; and there remained in the Company's warehouses in Bengal, goods to the amount of 59 lacks or £590,000.

The investment for 1781-2 is fixed at 90 lacks or £900,000 and was providing when the *Belmont* sailed; so that for the ships of this season, there will be goods to the amount of one million, six hundred thousand pounds in Bengal.

The Company's dispatches by the *Belmont* will prove what exertions the Government of Bengal is capable of when unanimity reigns in its councils.

On the 6th of July Sir Eyre Coote gained a decisive

victory over the army of Hyder Ally Cawn. In four days after the action Colonel Pearse's detachment, consisting of 7000 seapoys, 100 European artillery, 20 pieces of cannon, 100 disciplined cavalry, and 2000 Berar horse, would join Sir E re Coote ; General Meadows, with 3000 Europeans, might be expected to arrive at Madras in September ; so that we have every reason to believe that our next dispatches will be of the most favourable nature, both from Bengal and Fort St. George.

THE END.

172. C. (63-12) 13.01.11

BIJOYA BATIKA.

THE WONDERFUL FEVER PILL.

It is the only infallible remedy for and invaluable preventive of all sorts of chronic fever. Even in the most difficult and long standing cases, this medicine ensures immense good. For chronic fever, high or low, fever accompanied by enlargement of both spleen and liver or by cough, brain fever, &c., *Bijoya Batika* is strongly recommended. In all countries and climates, on all men, women, and children, *Bijoya Batika* confers equal benefit. No emigrant ship should sail without *Bijoya Batika* in her medicinal store. No soldier, planter and employer of labour in frontier countries, in malarious or marshy districts, and in the Terai should be without it, if he values his own life and the lives of those under him. For every Coolie Depot, Tea Garden, Silk or Indigo Factory, and Hospital, *Bijoya Batika* is particularly recommended. In short, every body who does not consider himself proof against chronic fever, cough, loss of appetite, debility, headache, giddiness in the head, &c., should make *Bijoya Batika* his inseparable companion.

Box. No. of Pills.		Price.		Postage.		Packing.		V.P. Comn	
		Rs.	As.	As.	As.	As.	As.		
No. 1	... 18 ...	0...	10	... 4	... 2	... 1			
No. 2	... 36 ...	1...	3	... 4	... 2	... 1			
No. 3	... 54 ...	1...	10	... 4	... 3	... 1			
No. 4	... 144 ...	4...	4	... 4	... 3	... 1			

Commission for one dozen box No. 1 is one Rupee; box No. 2 One Rupee and eight annas; box No. 3 two Rupees. Postage annas six, eight and twelve respectively.

V. P. P. charges extra. No Commission on purchase of less than a dozen boxes is allowed.

TESTIMONIALS.

(1) Mr. M. Bathars, Magistrate, Ngape, Burma, writes.—

Kindly send me per V. P. P. one box No. 4 of your "Bijoya Batika" containing 144 Pills at 4-4 per box. This is the 3rd lot that I have been getting these pills, which are the very thing for Malaria Fever of Burma climate.

(2) Babu Sreenath Gupta, Deputy Magistrate, Khulna (Bengal) writes :—

Several years ago, I found your Bijoya Batika very efficacious in my own case in allaying fever, which was accompanied with a deep abscess and which, the doctor who attended me could not abate. Since that, I have been a great advocate of the medicine. I have also found it useful as a general tonic. It keeps the bowels in regular order and prevents cold and fever.

(3) Mr. B. Singha, Principal, Rampore State High School, (Rohilkhand,) writes :—

Please send at your earliest possible convenience another box of your excellent Bijoya Batika. The one you had sent me before had a magical effect upon cases

which would not yield to Allopathic, Homœopathic and Unani (Hakimi) treatment, though these were successively given a fully fair and free trial. I have already recommended this sovereign cure-for-ague of yours, to many of my friends and acquaintances.

(4) Dr. Suresh Chandra Mittra, L. M. S., in charge of the S. P. Charitable Hospital, Gobardanga, 24-Parganahs, Bengal, writes :—

I have much pleasure to say that I have found your Bijoya Batika efficacious in cases of fever of malarial origin. In obstinate and protracted cases where quinine fails, it succeeds well. Please send me another box No. 3 of your excellent Pills.

(5) Mrs. Rogers of Lahore, (the Punjab) writes :—

Fever pills (Bijoya Batika) possess wonderful powers. I was suffering from fever for nine months and nothing could cure me until I used these pills. It should also be added as a matter of great satisfaction, that the use of these inexpensive Fever-pills has saved me from the hands of the extremely expensive Allopathic system of treatment.

(6) A. A. Shaw, Esqr., from 1, St. John's Road, Bangalore, South India, writes:—

I have derived much benefit from your Bijoya Batika. I shall feel obliged if you would send me another box, size No. 2, at 1-3 per return V. P. Post and oblige.

To be had of Messrs. B. BASU & CO.
79, Harrison Road, Calcutta.

TOOTH POWDER.

This novel preparation surpasses all others of its kind in strengthening teeth and removing all sorts of affection of the gums. It has cured thousands of painful and inflamed gums, of shaky teeth, and of the most obstinate gum-sores, emitting blood and pus at every rub. Besides its unrivalled usefulness, it is sweet to the taste, and delightful to smell. Its use always leaves an agreeable fragrance in the mouth for all day long and thus it has become a great favourite to the ladies here and abroad.

Each Box annas five ; postage annas 4 ; packing, one anna, and if taken per V. P., one anna more for M. O. commission ; if 4 boxes are taken in one parcel, the packing only 2 annas ; postage and M. O. commission annas seven. Liberal commission allowed to wholesale dealers.

TESTIMONIALS.

1. Babu Peary Lall Halder, M. A., B. L., the famous Vakil and Attorney-at -Law, Calcutta High Court, thus writes :—

One of my relatives had a bad attack of gum-ulceration for which he became restless with agony. Blood and pus used to come out of the affected part and the patient was subject to excruciating pain. For some time he was under the treatment of a famous physician of

Calcutta, with no good result. Various household medicines were tried, but they proved equally futile. At last, he has completely got rid of this malady by using the famous Tooth Powder of Messrs. B. Basu & Co.

2. The late well-known Doctor Bepin Behary Maitra, M. B., wrote from 45, College Street, Calcutta :—

The Tooth Powder sent by you is the best of its kind I have ever used. A little quantity of it is sufficient to cleanse, and perfume the mouth completely. Henceforth I will order for your Tooth Powder for my daily use.

To be had of Messrs. B. Basu & Co.,
79, Harrison Road, Calcutta.

FULELA.

—:o:—

The matchless hair-oil, called the Fulela, is not only a fragrant hair-oil but also a medicine.

The fragrance of Fulela is such that, when used, it permeates the atmosphere all around, and the gentle breeze wafting it to a distance makes the passers-by pause and look about for the source of this wonderful perfume.

Fulela stimulates the pores and makes the hair thick, soft and glossy like silk. It prevents the hair falling off and is a specific for baldness. Fulela keeps the brain cool. In these days of mental strain, it is really a boon for the educated classes. After an

arduous mental labour use a little Fulela, and you will at once get refreshed and feel equal for more exertion. Nothing is equal to Fulela to keep the spirits cheerful and buoyant.

PRICE—One phial Re. 1 one each; packing charge, As. 2; postage, As. six; V. P. P. commission one anna.

Two Rupees commission paid for every dozen phial purchased or in other words a dozen phial may be had for Rs. 10 ten, packing charge, V. P. P. commission, and postage, &c., Rs. 3-2 three and annas two only. Six phials of Fulela may be had for Rs. 5 five only, packing, postage, &c. one Rupee and ten annas only. No commission allowed for less than half a dozen phials.

TESTIMONIALS.

(1) Honourable Mr. Sarada Charan Mittra, M. A., B. L., Judge, High Court, Calcutta, writes thus:—

"I have used your oil Fulela. It is excellent both as regards scent and as a cooler of the brain. It is better than similar oils."

(2) That well-known Vakil and Attorney of the Calcutta High Court, Babu Hirendra Nath Dutta, M. A., B. L., writes:—

"I have used two phials of your Fulela. It has effectively stopped the falling away of hair—the precursor to baldness. Even after a good bath the fragrance of Fulela lingers long behind."

To be had of Messrs. B. Basu & Co.,

79, Harrison Road, Calcutta.

SOLE AGENTS, KOLKATA.

172. c. 63. (3)
A

NARRATIVE

OF THE

LATE TRANSACTIONS

AT

BENARES.

BY

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRETT, (SUCCESSOR TO MR. ALMON)

OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

1782.

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INTRODUCTION.

ONE of the most stirring events of the Indian history in the eighteenth century, is the one in connection with Chait Sing, the Raja of Benares. The historic Hall of Westminster resounded with the narration of this event when the famous Irish orator, Edmund Burke, raised his thundering voice on behalf of the people of India and impeached the great administrator, Warren Hastings before the august Assembly of the Lords. Every reader of Indian history is acquainted with the fact, how the financial embarrassment of the government of Warren Hastings compelled him now and then to have recourse to questionable means of raising money, and how the indirect refusal of Chait Sing to submit to one of those unjust demands, ended most disastrously to the Raja. The following pages furnish the reader with an account of those occurrences, as given by Mr. Hastings to Mr. Wheler and the Council of Fort William, in explanation of his conduct. In these pages the writer, Mr. Hastings, professes "to deliver all the past transactions and occurrences with the strictest and most faithful regard to truth," and tries to justify the extraordinary measures he adopted in relation to the Raja, on the ground that the Raja had been dilatory, evasive, shuffling and unwilling to pay the subsidy

promised to the British Government, and also that he was aiming "at the total subversion of the Company and the erection of an independency on its ruins."

How far Mr. Hastings succeeded in justifying his actions in this narrative is well known to the students of Indian history. However, the narrative has a special merit of its own which makes it acceptable even to the most inveterate enemy of Mr. Hastings. In it the reader finds a graphic account of the affairs at Benares towards the latter end of the eighteenth century, recorded in a forcible, lucid and convincing style which evokes the admiration of every student of history.

The publication of such a valuable book, the merit of which is all the more augmented by its rarity, requires, therefore, hardly any apology from its publisher. The publisher hopes, on the contrary that the work will meet with the most cordial recognition at the hands of the public, which it justly deserves.

THE BANGABASI OFFICE

Calcutta, March, 1905.



THE PUBLISHER.

to
EDWARD WHEELER, Esq.

Esq. Esq. Esq. AND COUNCIL.

Fort William.

GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE now the honour to send you the Narrative, which I promised in my letter of the 18th October, of the transactions and events which passed during the course of the late insurrection of this province.

I had begun it at the time of the date prefixed to it, but the busy scenes which followed, both while I was at Chunar and after my return to Benares, hindered me from prosecuting it till a few days before the date which I have subjoined to it. I did not choose to alter the introduction, although written at such a distance of time from that in which the body of the work was executed, and even from the existence of the events which are recorded in the latter, because I found it not easy to give it a new form, without a

total omission of what had been already produced, while my mind was animated by the recent, and actual scenes on which it was engaged. To an anxious and most feeling solicitude, not more for the issue of the impending contest, than for its consequences on my own reputation: in the consciousness of the rectitude of my own intentions, I had allowed myself to use an appeal, the most solemn and most sacred that could bind my relation to truth, or impress the conviction of it on the hearts of others: nor could I, consistently with my own sense of its obligation, withdraw it, or coldly place it after the narrative already written, and written under the check which I had imposed upon it. I know not whether I shall be clearly understood; if I am not, yet let this endeavour to explain a seeming impropriety in the construction of this performance be accepted for its apology.

I have only to add my hope, that as I have received the most cordial support in the past events from you, my respectable, and most respected associates in the administration; and as it has been my unvaried study to prevent your suffering any embarrassment from them, my conduct in them may also receive its first reward, in the testimony of your approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

BENARES,	}	(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.
31st Dec. 1781.		

MR. HASTINGS'S NARRATIVE OF
THE LATE TRANSACTIONS
AT
BENARES.

Chunar, 1st. of September, 1781.

IN whatever manner the scene may close in which I am now engaged, the calamities with which it opened will not fail, in their first impression, to influence in some degree the minds of all men in forming their judgment of it. In the following Narrative, if I can trust to my own sentiments, or if those who shall read it will credit this declaration of them, I shall less study to efface that impression than seek to divest my mind of all partial bias, and to deliver all the past transactions and occurrences with the strictest and most faithful regard to truth; in which if I fail I fail unknowingly: and may the God of Truth so judge me, as my own conscience shall condemn or acquit me of intentional deception!

The motives and objects of my journey were various: with these the design of my transactions at Benares

had but a remote and secondary connection. I left Calcutta on the 7th of July. At Buxar, Rajah Cheit Sing paid me the customary duty of respect, by advancing to that place which lay the nearest to the boundary of his Zemidary. He brought with him a great fleet of boats, which, as I afterwards learned, were crowded with two thousand armed and chosen men. This circumstance was noticed by many of the gentlemen who accompanied me, and was certainly a deviation from the established rules of decorum; not only such as are observed from vassals to their superiors, but even such as pass between equals. An instance of this will be remembered by many to have happened at Benares, in the year 1773, in the meeting which took place there between the late Vizier Suja ul Dowla and myself. He had left his capital with a large retinue; but hearing that I came unattended, he dismissed his followers, and met me with a state as humble as mine.

I received the Rajah with civility, and without any expression of displeasure. I left Buxar the next morning, and received a second visit from the Rajah in my boat. After a short space, he desired to speak to me in private. The particulars of our conversation I do not exactly remember: I can only relate the substance of it. He professed much concern to hear that I was displeased with him, and contrition for having given cause for it, assuring me that his Zemidary and all that he possessed were at my devotion: he expressed his fears of Oossaun Sing, who had been some days in my suite, and of the intrigues of his relations; and he accompanied his words by an

action either strongly expressive of the agitation of his mind, or his desire to impress on mine a conviction of his sincerity, by laying his turban on my lap. I replied, that I had not seen Oossaun Sing, nor concerned myself about him, nor should I descend to be a party in his family disagreements; that my business was with him, and with him only: that what he heard, or might have conjectured of my displeasure, was true; and I entered into a full discussion of the causes of it; that I had been already once deceived by his oaths and protestations, and should not suffer my purpose to be changed, or my duty to be over-ruled, by any verbal concessions, or declarations which were made with little cost, and for the observance of which I had no pledge nor warrant to credit them. He pleaded his inability to answer my charges against him, admitted that he was in every respect faulty, but desired that I would forget the past, and form my opinion of him on his future behaviour: I declined any further conversation on the subject, and he took his leave.

As the preceding conversation was accidental, and made no part of the plan which I had concerted in my own mind for my conduct with the Raja, I kept no minutes of it, nor should have thought it deserving of a place in this narrative, but for the weight which he has since given to it, and that it might not be imputed to me as a designed suppression, if I made no mention of it, I shall proceed to relate the subjects to which it alluded, and add the purposes which I had in contemplation concerning them.

On the first intelligence of the war with France, in July, 1778, it was resolved in Council, that Rajah Caeit

Sing should be required to contribute an extraordinary subsidy for the expense which this new exigency had imposed on our Government ; and the sum was limited to five Lacks of Rupees for the current year. After many excuses, and protestations of inability, he at length consented, with a very ill grace to the payment, and with a worse discharged it. The next year the same demand was repeated, and he attempted in like manner to elude it, affecting to borrow money in small sums, and to sell his plate and jewels to raise the sum ; nor was it paid at last till he had reduced the board to the extremity of ordering two battalions of Sepoys to the neighbourhood of Ramnagar, and quartering them upon him, with their pay charged to his account until the whole payment was completed.

Early in the following year, about the month of May, he deputed Lalla Saddanund, who was his Buxey and the confidential manager of his affairs, on a private commission to me, to solicit my forgiveness for his past conduct, and to give me assurances, confirmed by oath, of his future submission to the orders of my Government, and compliance with my advice. I accepted his excuses, and promised him an oblivion of all that had passed exceptionable in his conduct, and my future protection and every good office in my power, so long as he adhered to his professions : requiring only as the pledge of their sincerity, that he would immediately notify his ready and unreserved consent to the demand which would be made upon him, this being the period for it, of the subsidy for the current year, and that he would use no delay in discharging it. I at the same time explained to Saddanund the nature of the demand, its conformity

to the customs of all States in times of extraordinary emergency, and assured him that, though he must expect a repetition of it every year so long as the war lasted, yet it could not be justly drawn into a precedent for enacting an increase on his regular and stipulated rent; and so far as it could depend upon me, I gave him the strongest assurances, and I believe very solemn asseverations, that it should not. Saddamund vowed the fullest obedience on the part of his master: the demand was accordingly made; and the Rajah answered it with a liberal and unreserved declaration of his acquiescence. I expected the immediate payment of the whole sum according to his engagement, and I placed a reliance upon it so far as to destine the appropriation of it to the support of the detachment, which was then acting in the Province of Malva, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Camac, not apprehending any policy which could warp him from the strong obligation of such an engagement, and from the evident interest which he had in fulfilling it. I was mistaken. The first payment was made in different periods in the course of a month, amounting to about a lack of rupees; and there, as I recollect, he stopped, and even descended to the meanness of writing to solicit the forbearance of the remainder, that it might be included in the regular payment of the ensuing year, which was then approaching. I am not possessed at this time of the materials for ascertaining the dates of the demand, and of his letter written in acquiescence of it, nor the dates and correspondent sums of the subsequent payments but I desire that these may be inserted by the Secretary as a note to this page of the

Narrative. * It is sufficient to say that the demand was made, and the whole payment consequently due, in July, that it was not until the month of October, nor until the same constraint was practised to compel his obedience as had been used in the preceding year, by an order for the advance of two battalions of Sepoys for that purpose, that the balance of the subsidy, which was two lacks and a half of rupees, was discharged. In the mean time the resident received an order from the board to remit the money, as he received it, by bills to the Pay-Master of Lient. Col.-Camac's detachment; but these from the lateness of the receipts were not sent until the detachment had suffered the extremity of distress from the want of money, and very great desertions; all which calamities I charge to Rajah Cheit Singh's account, as it is certain that my reliance on his faith, and his breach of it were the principal causes that no other provision had been made for the detachment, and that it suffered such want in consequence.

It is with the greatest tenderness that I recur to the past dissensions in our Government; but I am compelled to it on this occasion for the elucidation of the conduct of this man, which had the appearance of being invariably guided by the reports which were made to him of the state of my influence. When

July	—	—	—	—	100,000
August	—	—	—	—	50,000
September	—	—	—	—	100,000
20th of October	—	—	—	—	250,000
					<hr/>
					500,000

he deputed his *Buxey* Saddamund to me in the manner I have mentioned, an apparent harmony had taken place in our councils, with the general expectation of its being permanent. The powers of our Government whenever united, and if I may use the term, consolidated by such an event, will ever recover the respect which is due to them, especially from those who have rendered themselves obnoxious to its terrors. The subject which produced the subsequent contest between Mr. Francis and myself originated a little before the departure of Saddamund from the presidency, but was not perhaps either generally known, or known to have grown into a decided breach, till the latter end of July. A reference to the proceedings of that period will prove the grounds of this supposition. It was the prescribed duty of Cheit Sing's Vakeels to furnish him with every little anecdote which bore any relation to the state of our Government: I believe that the deliberate manner in which he made the first payment of the subsidy of that year was dictated by the doubts suggested of the firmness of my authority, and I am morally certain that his subsequent excuses and delays in the payment of the residue of the subsidy were caused by the belief that I was no longer able to enforce it, and possibly (for such was the report) that a few months would close the period of my administration altogether. That I had his solemn promise in the manner which I have recited, to pay the subsidy, I as solemnly affirm; and his letter assenting to the payment, which is recorded in our consultations, is a strong presumptive evidence of it; and that he evaded

the performance of his promise, that he attempted to, the utmost of his power to elude it altogether, is also proved by the record of the dates of the different payments, the minutes of the Board relating to them, and the order of the Board for the march of a detachment for the purpose of compelling him to perform it. That this order had a principal effect in bringing him to a compliance I believe ; but I also attribute a share of it to the approaching departure of Mr. Francis, which was publicly and generally expected.

I owe it in candour to the gentleman, whose name I have reluctantly repeated in this digression, to obviate any inference which might otherwise be unwarily drawn from it, by declaring that I mean not, by the most distant hint, to impute any of this policy to him, and in my heart do totally and deliberately acquit him of any concern in it, however, in the instant resentment of disappointment, I may have suffered my mind to catch such a suspicion, although I believe that if I have, it has been sacredly confined to my own breast.

This was the first direct charge which I had to prefer against the Rajah : the second was similar in its quality and principle. On the second of the month of November, 1780, a resolution passed the Board, that a letter should be written to the Nabob Vizier, advising him to require from the Nabob Feyz Oolla Cawn the number of troops stipulated by treaty, expressed, as they were then understood to be 5,000 horse ; and that the like demand should be made on Rajah Cheit Singh for all the cavalry in his pay, which he could spare for our service. At that time we stood in need of every aid that could be devised to repel the

multiplied dangers which surrounded us : the Rajah was supposed to maintain a very large and expensive force ; and the strength of his cavalry alone was estimated at two thousand. I had formerly experienced their utility in the war with the Sineassies, in which they were successfully employed, and liberally rewarded. The demand was formally made, both in a letter from myself, and in person by the Resident, Mr. Fowke, in the easy and indefinite terms mentioned above. His answers were evasive, pleading, as I recollect, for I am not in possession of them, the scantiness of the establishment, its employment in enforcing the collections, and the danger of these failing, if the detachments were withdrawn. At length a more peremptory order was sent to him, and repeated by the present Resident, Mr. Markham. The number required was 2000, and afterwards reduced to the demand of 1500, and lastly to 1000 ; but with no more success. He offered 250, but furnished none.

These instances of contumacy and disobedience, criminal as they were in themselves, and aggravated by the extreme and known distresses and dangers of the superior state, to which he owed not only personal fealty, but every voluntary aid which all the resources of his Zemidary could contribute, appeared to me of less consideration as such than as they were evidences of a deliberate and systematic conduct, aiming at the total subversion of the authority of the Company, and the erection of his own independency on its ruins. This had been long and generally imputed to him. It was reported that he had inherited a vast mass of wealth from his father Bulwant Sing, which he had

secured in the two strong fortresses of Bidjeypoor and Luteespoor, and made yearly additions to it; that he kept up a large military establishment both of cavalry, of disciplined and irregular infantry, and of artillery; that he had the above and many other fortresses, of strong construction and in good repair, and constantly well stored and garrisoned; that his Aumils and tenants were encouraged and habituated to treat English passengers with inhospitality, and with enmity; that he maintained a correspondence with the Marattas, and other powers, who either were or might eventually become the enemies of our state; and if the disaffected Zemidars of Fyzabad and Bahar were not included in the report, which I do not recollect, we have had woeful proofs that there was equal room to have suspected the like intercourse between them; and lastly, that he was collecting, or had prepared, every provision for open revolt, waiting only for a proper season to declare it, which was supposed to depend either on the arrival of a French armament, or on a Maratta invasion.

This design had been greatly favoured by the unhappy divisions of our Government, in which he presumed to take an open part. It is a fact, that when these had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence, by the attempt to wrest from me my authority in the month of June, 1777, he had deputed a man, named Sumboonaut, with an express commission to my opponent; and the man had proceeded as far as Moorshedabad, when hearing of the change of affairs which had taken place at the presidency, he stopped, and the Rajah recalled him.

• It may, perhaps, be urged in favour of Rajah Cheit Sing, that he was justifiable by the principle of good policy in seeking a state of independency; that we had no natural right to his vassalage, having acquired it, with all our other rights of dominion, by no other charter than the successful spirit of enterprize. Were this truly the case, it would reduce the relation between us to the primitive law of nature; and it would be equally incumbent on us on that ground alone to use every means to confirm and perpetuate his subjection, as it would be allowable in him to emancipate himself from it. But something more, I apprehend, was due, both as a political and even moral obligation from him. His father, Bulwant Sing, derived the degree of independency which he possessed during the latter period of his life, from the protection and intervention of our Government. His son, Cheit Sing, obtained from our influence, exerted by myself, the first legal title that his family ever possessed of property in the land, of which he, till then, was only the Aumil, and of which he became the acknowledged Zemidar, by a Sunnud granted to him by the Nabob Sujah ul Dowla, at my instance, in the month of September, 1773. On the succession of the Nabob Assof ul Dowla, the rights of sovereignty, which were held by him over the Zemidary, were transferred by treaty to the Company. Those rights were indisputably his, and became, by his alienation of them, as indisputably the Company's; and every obligation of fidelity and obedience, which is due from a Zemidar to the superior magistrates by the constitution of Hindostan, became as much the right of the Company from Cheit Sing,

as they had been due to his former sovereign, with the additional ties of gratitude for the superior advantages which he was allowed to possess with his new relation. The unexampled lenity of our Government, in relinquishing to him the free and uncontrolled rule of his Zemidary, subject to a limited annual fine, and the royalties of the mint, administration of justice and police, ought to have operated as an additional claim on his fidelity ; but evidently served but to stimulate his ambition, and perhaps to excite in his mind an opinion that he possessed an inherent right of self-dependency.

I considered Cheit Sing as culpable, in a very high degree, towards our state, and his punishment, of which I had given him frequent warnings if he did not amend his conduct, as an example which justice and policy required, equally for the reparation of the wrongs which its dignity had sustained, and for the future preservation of its authority. I was resolved to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distresses, and to exact a penalty, which I was convinced he was very able to bear, from a fund which I was also convinced he had destined for purposes of the most dangerous tendency to the Company's dominion. In a word, I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency.

Those who have been accustomed to regard Cheit Sing as a vassal, or tributary prince, may revolt at the idea of treating him with such indignity, and call it an oppression. They will suppose nothing due from him to the Company but the payment of his

stipulated tribute, and *that* the pledge of his exemption from every other claim. I suspect too that the deeds, which passed between him and the Board on the transfer of his Zemidary to the Company in 1775, are by many understood to bear the quality and force of a treaty of optional conditions between equal states. To such I reply, that such an opinion is itself criminal to the state of which he was a subject, and that he was himself amenable to its justice if he gave countenance to the belief. He paid no tribute to the Company, but a fixed annual rent. The deeds by which he held his Zemidary, and the Company their claim to their portion of its revenue, were a *Sunnud*, or grant, and a *Potta*, or lease, executed on the part of the Company; and a *Cabuleeat*, or agreement, and *Kistbundec*, or account of payments to be made by instalments, on his part. These, excepting the special privileges allowed to the Rajah of the Mint, the Cutwallees of Benares and Jownpoor, the Foojdarree and Aumeeny; that is, so far as they relate to the Zemidary alone, are drawn precisely in the same forms as instruments of the same denominations interchanged with the Zemidars of Bengal. I refer to the instruments themselves, which will make a number in the Appendix to this Narrative, in which it will be seen on how different a tenure, and how infinitely below independency, he really held his Zemidary. The *Sunnud* and *Cabuleeat* are exact counterparts of each other. The former prescribes the revenue which was to be paid, and the duties which were to be performed, as the conditions on which the Rajah was confirmed in the possession of

his Zemidary; and of these conditions the 'Cabuleeat is a pledge or engagement for the performance. In the first, the "government and sovereignty" of the Zemidary, transferred by the Nabob Assof ul Dowla to the Company, are stated as the basis of it. The Zemidary is confirmed to him: a strict "observation and execution of the duties incumbent on him;"—"to behave with moderation and kindness to the "Reyots and people; to promote the cultivation and "increase of the inhabitants and produce of the lands;" to preserve the peace, and "punish the disturbers of it;" and to pay a yearly rent of 2,340,249 Mahidar rupees, in monthly payments, agreeable to the Kistbundy; are most strictly and positively commanded and enjoined:—And the officers of the Zemidary are commanded to regard him as the Zemidar, "and to "acknowledge his authority in the several acts appertaining thereunto." I must observe that, in the translation of the Sunnud, the yearly revenue is in one place, through the negligence of the translator, expressed by the word tribute: but it is not on the translation, nor on the will of the translator, that the rights of the Company depend. I affirm the word to be false, as it is inconsistent with the proper term "revenue," immediately following in the same translation, and with the same term "revenue," occurring in the translation of the Cabuleeat or agreement.

The Cabuleeat also sets off with stating the Company's sovereignty as the basis of the agreement; and acknowledges the grant made by the Company to Rajah Cheit Singh, of the Zemidary and other privileges recited in the Sunnud. And it proceeds

to express, that "it shall be his duty to do every thing that may be needful and usual for the interest and security of the country; to provide for the welfare of the inhabitants; to be attentive to the increase of cultivation and improvement of the revenue; to use his endeavours "to expel robbers," &c., and to pay the annual revenue of Government, "in the manner prescribed by the Sunnud."

To obviate misapprehensions I think it proper to remark, that in the above recital I have abridged the text where it was too prolix and involved for literal quotation, and given the substance in the closest sense of it; but where I have used the original words of the translations, I have marked them with inverted commas as such. The copies in the Appendix will shew with what fidelity I have conformed to the text in both instances.

I have dwelt with a greater stress, and with a more minute exactness on the foregoing subject, because it is on this point that the justice and propriety of my conduct must wholly turn. If Rajah Cheit Sing possessed the Zemidary of Benares in his own right, and with an inherent and exclusive authority; if he owed no allegiance to the Company, nor obedience beyond the payments of a stipulated tribute, I am liable to condemnation for exacting other duties from him, and for all the consequences of that exaction, and he is guiltless. But if the Company, possessing the acknowledged right of his former Sovereign, held an absolute authority over him; if in the known relation of Zemidar to the sovereign authority, or the power delegated by it, he owed a personal allegiance

and an implicit and unreserved obedience to that authority; at the forfeiture of his Zemidary, and even of his life and property, at the discretion of those who held or fully represented the sovereign authority; if, in corroboration of the general and implied obligation, he was bound to it by written engagements and specific conditions I am warranted in my assertion of the rights of Government, which were fully and wholly delegated to me; and he alone is responsible for his opposition to them, and for all the consequences which have attended that opposition.

Whether I have exercised the power vested in me with justice, and with moderation, will appear from the preceding relation, and the following parts of this narrative.

Before I quit this digression, I must further trespass on the patience of the Board, and of those for whose judgment it is ultimately written, by a more pointed application of the above to my own personal conduct and character.

I will suppose for a moment that I have erred, that I have acted with an unwarranted rigour towards Cheit Sing, and even with injustice. Let my motive be consulted: I left Calcutta impressed with the belief that extraordinary means were necessary, and those exerted with a strong hand, to preserve the Company's interests from sinking under the accumulated weight which oppressed them: I saw a political necessity for curbing the overgrown power of a great member of their dominion, and for making it contribute to the relief of their pressing exigencies.

If I erred, my error was prompted by an excess of zeal for their interests operating with too strong a bias upon my judgment. But rare are the instances in which the judgment suffers the bias of such an operation; and much stronger is the presumption, that acts prompted by an unmixed attention to the public interests are founded on just principles, than that they are the result of a misguided judgment.

Possibly it may be suspected, and may God forgive those who know me, and countenance the suspicion, I have no title to an exemption from it with others, that I was influenced by a secret and mercenary interest. I have heard of the practice of holding out the terrors of authority, and the denunciations of disgrace, dismissal, and war, as the instruments of private rapacity. Though the charge, if true, is capable of positive conviction, yet I know of no direct evidence which could refute it where it were false; for no man can be conscious of the recesses of another's mind. I can therefore only offer such presumptive proofs of my intention as the nature of it will admit, and accident has provided. These are my own early and confidential declarations, and the attestations of those to whom they were made. In a point of such public moment, independently of the near interest which I have in establishing the truth of it, Mr. Wheler will pardon my appeal to him, although in one light it may tend to involve him in a participation of the reproach of those who may regard every severity shewn to Cheit Sing as criminal, however founded. He will doubtless recollect the conversation which I had with him on the subject, on the eve of my departure from Calcutta; our

mutual opinion of Cheit Sing's past conduct; mine* of the justice and policy of exacting an exemplary punishment for it by a large pecuniary mulct; the sum to which I then declared my resolution to extend it; my conviction of his ability to pay it; and the two alternatives on which I had resolved, if he refused to submit to it. He will also remember that I bespoke his confidence in the means which I should use for this end, and his support in the issue of them. I entreat him to give me his formal and circumstantial attestation of these facts, and that he will permit it to be inserted in this part of my narrative.

" I have the pleasure to comply with the Governor-General's request, and will cheerfully record in this place what I at present recollect to have passed between us at the time, and on the circumstances which he mentions. I will remember, that on the eve of the Governor-General's departure from Calcutta, the conduct of Cheit Sing, late Rajah of Benares, was a principal subject of a confidential discourse between us, and that he bespoke my support of the measures which he intended to pursue towards him.

" The Rajah's offences were declared to require early punishment, and as his wealth was great, and the Company's exigencies pressing, it was thought a measure of policy and justice, to exact from him a large pecuniary mulct for their relief. The sum to which the Governor declared his resolution to extend this fine, was forty or fifty lacks. His ability to pay it was stated as a fact that could not admit of doubt, and the two alternatives on which

“ the Governor declared himself to have resolved,
“ if Cheit Sing refused to comply with the requisition,
“ were, to the best of my remembrance, either a
“ removal from his Zemidary entirely, or by taking
“ possession of his forts, to obtain out of the treasure
“ deposited in it the above sum for the Company.

EDWARD WHEELER.”

After such an appeal it would be as superfluous as indelicate to call on the aid of other testimonies, if all that were required were no more than to ascertain that I did hold such a conversation as that which I allude to with him. The conclusion will be much strengthened by its agreement with declarations made by me on the same subject, and nearly at the same point of time, to others. I shall therefore require similar attestations from Major Palmer, my military Secretary, and from Mr. Anderson, my appointed assistant on this deputation. With these references, and their result, I shall make my last and solemn appeal to the breast of every man who shall read this; whether it is likely, or morally possible, that I should have tied down my own future conduct to so decided a process and series of acts, if I had secretly intended to threaten, or to use a degree of violence, for no other purpose than to draw from the object of it a mercenary atonement for my own private emolument, and suffer all this tumult to terminate in an ostensible and unsubstantial submission to the authority which I represented. Whether it is likely, or morally possible, that I should have chosen to irritate the feelings of my colleague in office, and expose myself to all the effects of his

indignation, by so wanton and unnecessary a deception; or lower my own dignity and character, and afford so base an example to my inferiors, by pretending to make them privy to acts which I never meant to perform, and from which I could not depart with any possible show of reason, but the manifest sacrifice of my integrity? A man actuated by such a motive, and possessing the trust which I held, would have used a cover to his venality: he would not have compromised himself by positive declarations of what he would do, much less by detailing his intentions in a series of trials as they might successively fail; but would have been content with distant and indefinite intimations and suggestion, which obviously left his actions open to enquiry and variation; which could not subject him to the imputation of inconsistency, if they were productive of no effect; and which he might use as justifications, if his artifices should chance to operate with the effect ostensibly portended by them.

I now return to my narrative.

I arrived at Benares on the morning of the 14th of August; the Rajah some hours later. I forbade his coming that evening to my quarters as he had intended, and required him to defer his future visits until he should receive my permission, as I had some previous matters to settle with him, of which he would be informed by the Resident, whom I should depute to him the next morning for that purpose.

My narrative will be best continued, nor will the thread of it be broken, by the following copy of my report of my proceedings, and the consequences which

attended them to Mr. Wheler, then the only effective member of the Board.

TO EDWARD WHEELER, ESQ.

" SIR,

" I arrived at Benares on the 14th instant. My transactions with the Rajah being of a most important nature to the present and future interest of the Company, I have determined to inform you of them without delay, in the order in which they have occurred.

" The first step which I judged it necessary to take, as the ground on which my future proceedings with the Rajah were to be conducted, was to recapitulate in writing the several instances of his conduct which for some time past have repeatedly drawn upon him the severe reprehensions of the Board, and to demand a clear and satisfactory explanation.

" The paper I sent to the Rajah by the hands of Mr. Markham, who was directed to require an immediate answer. Late in the evening his answer arrived. The following are copies of both :

" To Rajah CHEIT SING."

" It is about sixteen months since Lalla Sadda-
nund, your *Buxey* and confidential servant, came to Calcutta, charged with an express commission and authority to make excuses, for your past conduct, and to give me assurances, confirmed by oath, of your future submission to my advice and the orders of my Government. As a test of your

" sincerity, I required an immediate and unreserved
" acquiescence in the demand, which at the same
" time was made to you in the name of the
" Governor-General and Council, of a subsidy of
" five lacks of rupees for the expenses of the war.
" With this demand you ostensibly complied, in your
" answer to my letter; and the *Buxey* promised me
" verbally in your name, and in terms so strong as
" amounted to the fullest assurance, that there should
" be no delay in the payment. Relying on this agree-
" ment and promise, I gave orders to Mr. Fowke, who
" was then Resident at this place, to receive the money,
" and remit it to Colonel Camac, for the pay of the
" army which had been ordered to march towards
" the Province of Malva, and I made no other pro-
" vision for it. Such was my confidence in your
" faith, but you deceived me; and after having
" made the first payment of a few rupees, either con-
" sulting the temper of the times, or conforming
" to a premeditated design, you by shifts and pretexts
" withheld the remainder until the army, for whose
" use it was intended, was reduced to the last state
" of distress: many hundreds deserted, and had an
" enemy at that time appeared against them, their
" total destruction had been inevitable. In all this
" time daily application was made to you by the
" Resident, and I wrote repeated letters to you, but
" you paid no regard to either. Besides this, I required
" in the name of the Governor-General and Council
" by letter, and ordered Mr. Fowke to repeat the
" requisition in person, that you should furnish a body
" of horse to assist and act with the armies of the