by some of the lists other attributes, which may or may not be subsumed under those already mentioned, e.g. knowledge of the *arthaśāstra* (science of man's material concerns), *dhanurveda* (science of archery), military arrays (*vyūha*) and weapons (*astra*), and reading of portents.

Duties: Religious; The aforesaid qualities are required in the royal priest in view of the duties he is called upon to perform. He is entrusted with the supervision of all religious, as well as socio- or politico-religious ceremonies for the royal family or the State, which make it of paramount importance that he should be thoroughly versed in the Vedic *mantras* and the attendant rites. His personal officiation at the ceremonies by the utterance of *mantras* and performance of all other minutiae of the rituals may not have been needed in all cases, for there were the subordinate priests (*ṛtviks*) for the purpose. General attention to the strict conduct of the whole ceremonial and participation in its more important functions were his look-out. Vasiṣṭha, the royal priest in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, for instance, conducts Daśaratha's *Putreṣṭi* sacrifice,[1] the many *saṃskāra* rites of the four princes,[2] and Rāma's coronation, in which he appears as personally anointing and crowning Rāma.[3] Dhaumya, the *Purohita* of the Pāṇḍavas, officiates at the *śāntika* and *pauṣṭika* ceremonies for the achievement of their objects and their general welfare on the eve of their departure to live *incognito*.[4] The more important of the rituals are performed by him on the occasion of Yudhiṣṭhira's coronation, which leads us to infer that upon him rested the most onerous of the duties.[5] At the *Rājasūya* of the same prince, Vyāsa officiates as the *Brahman* priest and Dhaumya as *Hotṛ*.[6] As already pointed out,[7] the *Purohita* ought to have filled the

Purāṇa, cxxxix. 16, 17; *Garuḍa-Purāṇa*, cxii. 12; *Kāmandakīya*, iv. 32; *Śukranīti*, ii. 78-80; *Yājñavalkya*, i. 313; *Nītivākyāmṛta* (by Somadeva Sūri), xi. 43, 44 (*purohita-samuddeśa*); cf. *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 156.

[1] *Rām.*, i. *sargas* 8 ff. Here Vasiṣṭha is expressly mentioned as officiating as *Brahman* priest.

[2] *Ibid.*, i. 18. 21-4. Cf. *Raghuvaṃśa*, iii. 18 for the performance of Raghu's *saṃskāra* rites by the royal priest.

[3] *Rām.*, vi. 128.

[4] *MBh.*, iv. 4. 51, 52, with Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary.

[5] *MBh.*, xii. 40. 1 ff. [6] *MBh.*, ii. 33. 32-5.

[7] See the first paragraph of this chapter.

first position; but an exception seems to have been made in favour of Vyāsa, in view perhaps of his relationship to the Pāṇḍavas and his deeper scholarship.[1] In the horse-sacrifice performed by the emperor Bali, his *Purohita* Śukrācārya figures as its *Brahman* priest.[2] Garga was asked by Vasudeva to perform the naming ceremony of his sons Balarāma and Śrīkṛṣṇa because he was the domestic priest of the Yādavas and versed in sacred lore and astrology.[3]

Tutorial; The *Purohita* is sometimes appointed to be the prince's tutor (*guru*) for instructing him in the *śāstras* and conducting the necessary rites up to *cūḍā-karaṇa*[4] (tonsure). It is the *Ācārya* who performs his *upanayana* (investiture with the sacred thread) and thereby undertakes his education thenceforward.[5] The *Purohita* at times happens to be both the *Guru* and the *Ācārya*, as instanced in the case of Vasiṣṭha completing all the rites of Daśaratha's sons up to the *upanayana* inclusive.[6] Śukrācārya, the domestic priest of Hiraṇyakaśipu appears as appointed by the king to conduct the education of his sons Prahlāda and others in the first capacity of *Guru*.[7]

Punitory The royal priest nowhere appears as a judge in a court of justice. According to Āpastamba,[8] cases of non-observance on the part of *Brāhmaṇa* householders of penances prescribed by the *Ācārya* for breaches of caste-rules according to sacred law were referred by the king to his *Purohita* for trial. The latter issued a fresh order for compliance with the proper penances, and, if this order was still disobeyed, the offenders were brought to reason by penalties other than corporeal punishment and servitude. The *Purohita*, according to Vasiṣṭha again, has to share with the king penances for certain

[1] Sudharman was the *Purohita* of the Kauravas (*MBh.*, xii. 40. 5, with Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary).
[2] *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, viii. 23. 14.
[3] *Ibid.*, x. 8. 1–6.
[4] *Manu*, ii. 142; *Yājñavalkya*, i. 34.
[5] *Manu*, ii. 140; *Yājñavalkya*, i. 34. For the duties of *upādhyāya* (sub-teacher) and *ṛtvij* (sacrificial priest), see *Manu*, ii. 141, 143, and *Yājñavalkya*, i. 35.
[6] *Rām.*, i. 18. 22–5, with Rāmānuja's commentary.
[7] *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, vii. 5. 1 ff.
[8] *Āpastamba*, ii. 5. 12–16.

prescribed cases of miscarriage of justice, viz. if the latter sets free a criminal deserving punishment, or punishes an innocent man.[1]

Negotiatory; The *Purohita* is appointed at times to carry on negotiations between the sovereign and other parties for various purposes, political or otherwise. King Drupada of Pañcāla, for instance, sent his *Purohita* as *dūta* to the Kurus with a political message,[2] and, on a previous occasion, to the Pāṇḍavas, to ascertain particulars about their parentage with a view to his daughter's marriage.[3] To cite a later instance, Śuddhodhana sent his *Purohita* to Daṇḍapāṇi to negotiate the marriage between the latter's daughter and Gautama.[4]

Political. The royal priest is never a minister (*mantrin*) *ex officio*, either in the Vedic period or later, though there is no bar to the combination of the two functions in the same person except the practical difficulty it involves. The duties attached to each of these offices are heavy enough, and their amalgamation would but make it impossible for a single person to perform the combined duties efficiently. The two offices appear separate from the lists of offices of the Vedic period;[5] and there is no evidence on record pointing to their identity in earlier times. The Vedic state-council was not so exclusive as it was in later times, and, even if it were so, the presence of the *Purohita* there, as also in the secret conclave of the later epic and the Paurāṇic periods, might not have been productive of any positive evil; but the practice appears to have been otherwise. So far as the evidences go, nowhere is he seen to occupy, or recommended to have, a seat in the state-council, though the use of the same name *Sabhā* both for the royal court and the state-council may give rise to this misleading impression. The non-didactic portions of the *Mahābhārata* show the kings arriving at important decisions in matters of State without much regard for Brāhmaṇic or ministerial advice, and much less, if at all, for that of their *Purohitas*.[6]

[1] *Vasiṣṭha*, xix. 40–43. *MBh.*, v. 5. 18.
[2] *MBh.*, i. 193. 14–17.
[3] *Lalitavistara* [transl. by R. L. Mitra (Bibl. Indica)], ch. xii, p. 203.
[5] See the chapter 'Evolution of the Principal State-Officials'.
[6] See the chapter 'The State-Council'.

The didactic parts of the epic recommend complete dependence[1] of the sovereign upon his *Purohita*. We are not in a position to infer from this recommendation, as Prof. Hopkins has done,[2] that it indicates the wholesale subjection of the sovereign to the former's will in all matters, including political. Had it been so, references of political questions by the king to the members of the state-council, regarded by Hindu statesmen from very early times as of paramount necessity for the conduct of government, would not have found a place in the works on polity. The royal priest was no doubt much respected by the king, and his opinions also carried weight in the latter's estimation. But versed as the *Purohita* was in the rules of polity, he knew well the limits to the range of his duties, which would have rendered it a transgression on his part to thrust his political views upon the sovereign, and to try to deflect him from the course incumbent on him by the resolution of the state-council. It is true that the king could consider any resolution after it had been passed, and suggest to the councillors any alteration that he might think fit, and that according to Yājñavalkya the resolution had actually to be referred to the royal priest for his opinion. This does not mean, however, that under the rules an opening was left for the king at this stage of deliberation to decide upon any course of action he liked, or give effect to the advice of the royal priest in opposition to the resolution of the council. The reference of the resolution to the royal priest was, it should be held, not for giving him an opportunity of setting it aside, or changing it as he pleased, but for judging of the time and place of the contemplated action and such other matters connected therewith from the astrological point of view. Under the circumstances, though the royal priest exercised much influence with the king, yet he was debarred under the constitution from prevailing over him to follow in political matters decided on by the state-council a course of action that ran counter to the advice of the political councillors. So long as the state-council existed, able to exercise its prescribed powers, it cannot be fairly held that

[1] e.g. *MBh.*, i. 170. 77, 78. [2] *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 155.

the monarch was but a puppet in the hands of the royal priest in State matters.[1] The causes of extension of the authority of the *Brāhmaṇas* are to be sought not so much in the influence, directly exerted upon the king by the royal priest, to which there was a constitutional bar, as in the powerful hold of the *Brāhmaṇas* upon the intellect of the nation, of which the king and his ministers were but individual members. Anything that would tend to detract from that authority would as a rule be repulsive to their thoughts and feelings as well as to the public opinion reared and moulded under the Brāhmanic culture. The interference of the royal priest, therefore, in the business of the state-council for the preservation or extension of Brāhmanic interests was not necessary in view of the wider and more powerful forces that were at work outside the council to procure the very same objects.

Conclusion.

The above limit to his constitutional powers does not mean that the personal influence wielded by the royal priest and the reverence commanded by him were not very great. He and all his *confrères* were looked upon as divinities[2] in human form. As a depositary of knowledge and wisdom, he was recommended to be the king's guide, confidant, and companion.[3] He was looked upon as a source of strength to the State, and his very appointment to the *Purohita*-ship, not to speak of his active participation in the duties attached to it, were regarded as conducive to the prosperity of the realm.[4] Side by side with this reverence for the domestic priest is found a counter-current of feeling—not perhaps very strong—tending to belittle him. He is put in *Manu*[5] in the middling rank of the states caused by activity (*rajas*), and his position is looked upon as a curse in the *Mahābhārata*.[6] But on the whole his influence predominated and grew ever greater.

[1] For the basis of the above inferences, see the chapter 'The State-Council'.

[2] This point has been adverted to in the last chapter.

[3] *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 152; *Baudhāyana*, i. 10. 18. 7, 8.

[4] Cf. *Vasiṣṭha*, xix. 4. [5] *Manu*, xii. 46.

[6] *MBh.*, xiii. 93. 130; Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, i. 128, and *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 164.

CHAPTER IV

REGAL SUCCESSION

THE selection of the eldest son as successor to the kingdom appears to have been the normal mode of disposition in ancient times. A review of the lists of kings of the Solar and Lunar dynasties as given in the epics and *Purāṇas* shows that the eldest son as a rule succeeded his father as heir to the kingdom, while deviations are noticed in cases in which the eldest son became civilly dead or legally incapable through physical defects. Among the six sons of Nahuṣa of the Lunar Race, the second, named Yayāti, succeeded to the kingdom in place of the eldest, Yati, who had turned an ascetic.[1] Pāṇḍu became king because his elder brother Dhṛtarāṣṭra was blind, when the succession became open.

The normal mode of disposition.

In Rāma's case, the normal rule had almost been carried into effect when Daśaratha proposed to have Rāma formally declared as his successor in the presence of the priests, nobles, and the people, who cheerfully assented to the proposal. The installation of Bharata as crown-prince to the exclusion of Rāma, the eldest brother, at Kaikeyī's instance is an exception to the normal rule. This deviation was only possible for the reason that Rāma himself, the subject of the exclusion, instead of making any protest like Lakṣmaṇa, voluntarily gave up his right. Otherwise, the citizens would have risen in revolt against the commission of an act not sanctioned by practice. There had been such an outburst of active opposition when Yayāti, a king of the Lunar Race, declared his intention to make Puru, his youngest son, heir in supersession of

Rāma's case no deviation from the normal rule.

Instances of people's opposition to deviations.

NOTE.—For Prof. Hopkins' writings on the subject, see *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 139-44, and for Paṇḍit Jagannātha Tarkapañcānan's, see Colebrooke's *Digest*, i. 414-20 [reprinted separately in the *Asiatic Annual Register*, ii. (1800), 345 ff.].

[1] *Harivaṃśa*, xxx. 1-3.

the eldest, Yadu. The citizens in a body headed by the priests came to the king and protested against his action, 'A younger son cannot overstep the elder; this we make known to thee; see that thou do thy duty.' The king mollified them by saying, 'A son who disobeys his father is looked upon by sages as no son at all. All my sons have slighted and disobeyed me, whereas Puru alone has carried out my wishes. The sage Śukra also enjoined me to declare as heir the son who would obey me. Hence I entreat you to have Puru installed as heir.' The people were convinced, and submitted, saying that, as Puru was obedient to him and Śukra had sanctioned the king's action, they had nothing to say. This shows that the king could not make an arbitrary disposition of his kingdom. The king's will was not law in this matter, and the people retired, not because of his will, but because of his reasoning, which convinced them.[1]

The account of Devāpi and Śantanu in its epic form[2] may be cited to show the strength of the people's decision in its conflict with the will of a king to interfere with the established rules of succession. Pratīpa, a Kuru king, had three sons, Devāpi, Bālhīka, and Śantanu. The eldest suffered from skin-disease (*tvagdoṣa*), but he was much beloved by all. The king desired to install him as his heir-apparent, and made all preparations therefor; but the people opposed. The priests, the seniors, and the inhabitants of the city and the country in a sudden uprising objected to have a leper as sovereign, and they succeeded in making good their objection without a word of displeasure on the part of the king. The youngest son, therefore, was installed as heir-apparent, while the eldest son retired into the woods, the second son having already left the realm,[3] and having been adopted by his maternal uncle.

[1] *MBh.*, i. 85. 17–35; v. 149. 2–13; *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, iv. 10. 1 ff.; *Vāyu-Purāṇa*, xciii. 74–87; *Harivaṃśa*, xxx.

[2] *MBh.*, v. 149. 14–29.

[3] There are several accounts of Devāpi and Śantanu. In the *Ṛg-Veda*, x. 98. 11, the brotherhood of the two persons does not appear. The *Nirukta* account (ii. 10) relates that Śantanu got himself anointed, whereupon a drought ensued. This was attributed by the *Brāhmaṇas* to his having superseded his elder brother. Śantanu therefore offered the kingdom to Devāpi, who declined it, but, acting as domestic priest, obtained

Vasiṣṭha's speech to Rāma in the *Rāmāyaṇa* corroborates the above mode of disposition of the kingdom. 'Among all the descendants of Ikṣvāku, the first-born becomes king; you are the first-born, O Rāma, and should be consecrated to the kingdom. A younger brother should not be installed as king to the exclusion of the elder. You should not reject this prescriptive law followed by your family.'[1] Vasiṣṭha's speech.

Even if this speech be taken as pointing to a practice confined to the Ikṣvāku dynasty, and not general in its application, it cannot but be admitted that this practice has been followed by the dynasty for no less than fifty-five generations.

Manthara's words addressed to Kaikeyī regarding Rāma's consecration agree with Vasiṣṭha's speech. 'Rāma will be king and his son after him. Kaikeyī! Bharata will be excluded from the royal race. All the sons of a king do not remain in the kingdom. If they are made to do so, it leads to a very great harm. Therefore, kings commit the affairs of government to their eldest sons, or to others qualified (i.e. according to the commentary, the competent younger sons, if the eldest son be incompetent).'[2] Among the sons, the senior, it appears, is chosen as heir by his father, the reigning sovereign, for, according to Manthara's assertion, all the sons together cannot get the kingdom without giving rise to a very great harm. In support of her statement that harm ensues if all the sons remain in the kingdom, she points out that 'Rāma, after his installation as king, will either banish Bharata or kill him'.[3] Manthara's notion of succession

Kaikeyī's statement that 'Bharata also will surely receive the hereditary kingdom from Rāma after the lapse of a hundred years' does not appear to point to any regular succession of the brothers to the kingdom every hundred Kaikeyī's statement.

rain for him. The epic and later accounts give two divergent stories. According to one, Devāpi was passed over for his leprosy, while according to the other, for his asceticism in youth. *V. I.* i. 378; also Hopkins, *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 140 n. I quote here only one reference to Devāpi's exclusion through asceticism, viz. *Bhāgavata*, ix. 22. 12, 13. Though there are differences in the accounts, their bearing, if at all, is on the one or the other rule of succession.

[1] ii. 110. 35–7. [2] ii. 8. 22–4. [3] *Ibid.*, 27.

years by rotation, but to Kaikeyī's confident expectation, born of her good opinion of Rāma's nature, that, ruling, as he will do, the kingdom with paternal benignity towards his younger brothers, he cannot but install Bharata as his heir, be it at the end of even a hundred years.[1] The ruling of a kingdom by brothers in rotation has, so far as we see, nowhere been recorded as having taken place in the dominions of the Solar and Lunar kings in ancient times; and there is no reason to suppose that Kaikeyī is pointing to an actual mode of succession instead of a mere sanguine expectation.

Pandit Tarkapañcānan's inferences.

Pandit Jagannātha Tarkapañcānan draws out some rules of succession inferentially from the royal succession in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and from the silence of Miśra and other legal authorities on the point. Daśaratha, he argues, declared to commit his kingdom to Rāma, in the presence of Vasiṣṭha and many other sages, as well as the citizens at large, which, according to him, shows that he had the power to give away the whole of his kingdom to the eldest son to the exclusion of his other virtuous sons. But, afterwards, excluding Rāma and the rest, he gave away the entire kingdom to Bharata, as a boon to Kaikeyī. This also, according to him, points to the king's power of giving away his kingdom to a younger son in supersession of the eldest without any offence on the part of the latter. Such a disposition of the kingdom by a king according to his own sweet will is held by him to have the tacit sanction of judicial authorities like Miśra and others; for the gift of a kingdom is not included by them in their lists of invalid gifts.

He puts forward one other argument in support of the king's power of disposition of his kingdom, not only to one of his sons, but also to others mentioned below. He starts with the proposition that a father has absolute power to give away even the person of his son, from which he draws the inference that it is not proper to assert that the father cannot, without the assent of the excluded son (or sons), give away

[1] ii. 8. 16, and Rāmānuja's commentary thereon. Pandit Jagannātha Tarkapañcānan's remarks (Colebrooke's *Digest* i. 417) are obscure, and it is difficult to be certain what inferences he draws from the passage.

immovable property not yet owned by him (or them). The inference is pushed to its farthest logical limits. The king, he argues, can, in exercise of his aforesaid absolute power, give away the kingdom to his daughter's son, or other remote heir, or even to a stranger, to the exclusion of his sons though devoid of offence, there being no special prohibition nor usage to the contrary. But no father, he adds, who distinguishes right from wrong would be so disposed.

In all these cases of exclusion of virtuous sons, the king their father is bound to make provision for their subsistence.[1]

In the last three cases of disposition by a subordinate king of his kingdom, viz. to a daughter's son, remote heir, or stranger, the paramount sovereign has, according to Paṇḍit Jagannātha, the right to interfere. He can, of his own accord, set aside the dispositions, and give the whole kingdom to one of the sons of the subordinate king without meaning any injury to the rest; for a paramount sovereign is equal to a father. But if the paramount sovereign be asked by the excluded sons to do them justice, and he sets aside the disposition, but, without choosing a particular son as king, leaves the matter to be disposed of according to law, then, in the opinion of the aforesaid author of the *Digest*, it does not appear consistent with the reason of the law that one of the sons should take the whole kingdom without the assent of the rest.[2]

The above position of Paṇḍit Tarkapañcānan does not appear to be sound law for the following reasons: Criticism of Paṇḍit Tarkapañcānan's inferences.

(1) From the constitutional point of view[3], the promise of

[1] For details regarding 'subsistence', see subsequent portions of this chapter.

[2] The paragraph, which I have made out as above, is extremely obscure. Its context alone helps to some extent to clear up its meaning.

[3] To understand the legal significance of the chapters bearing on this subject, we should not study the passages apart from their relation to the general trend of the whole argument and apart form the context and the special circumstances in which the passages occur. The conversation between Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa is a better index to the main points at issue than the conversation of Rāma with his mother. To his mother, Rāma merely speaks words of obedience and consolation governed by his sacred relationship to them. To Lakṣmaṇa, he applies arguments which may satisfy a logical mind that is fully alive to legal rights, which the latter is

Daśaratha to Kaikeyī regarding kingship is itself invalid. That promise cannot override the constitutional law of succession. It is purely a private domestic matter, which can have no influence on such an important public matter as the succession to the throne.

Paṇḍit Tarkapañcānan supposes that Kaikeyī secured the succession of Bharata in supersession of the legal heir-apparent, Rāma, on the strength of the promise of which she took an undue advantage, and the legal inference he draws from this is that the king has constitutionally the power to give effect to his mere wishes, whims, or promises regarding the succession in contravention of the normal constitutional practice. Was Bharata's succession really brought about by the promise of Daśaratha to Kaikeyī? I hold that it was not so. If we consider all the circumstances in that truly complex situation from the strictly legal standpoint, we shall find this incontrovertible, fundamental fact standing out clear and definite from the maze of confounding events, viz. that it was Rāma's willing and cheerful resignation of his right to the crown-princeship that really paved the way for another. For that crown-princeship, Rāma alone was pre-eminently eligible by both nature and custom; and unless the legal incumbent, of his own accord, gives up the right, the way is barred for anybody else. What led Rāma to this voluntary self-sacrifice is another matter, which belongs to the domain of morality and religion, and has no constitutional significance whatever. The whole epic, indeed, is based on this supreme act of self-sacrifice on the part of Rāma—a self-sacrifice which was not forced upon him by the mandate of an autocratic sovereign, but was the spontaneous outcome of Rāma's unfettered, individual decision which placed some things higher than an earthly kingdom. The credit of this self-sacrifice belongs wholly and exclusively to Rāmacandra, the hero of the epic, who took upon himself the load of untold suffering to save his father from the sin of violating his 'plighted troth'. This

even prepared to assert by force of arms. In the light of what has been explained above are to be interpreted passages like those, which may otherwise be misleading: ii. 20. 30; 21. 30.

lends its charm and ethical value to the epic, of which it is indeed the starting-point. To ignore this is to forget the very basis on which the epic rests, and is to misunderstand utterly the character of the hero.

To sum up: Daśaratha was legally incompetent to make or keep any promise in respect of succession. When Kaikeyī extorted Daśaratha's sanction to Bharata's succession, Rāmacandra was the only person who could secure its observance, and he cheerfully sacrificed himself to prevent his father's fall from truth. To regard him as the victim of Daśaratha's absolute power both as father and sovereign, as the learned Paṇḍit supposes, is, I repeat, to misunderstand the epic and to lose sight of the real point of the law.

(2) The people at large as a constitutional factor have been altogether ignored.

(3) The legal authorities are silent on regal succession. They treat of the validity or otherwise of gifts of various sorts, but omit, as Paṇḍit Tarkapañcānan mentions, to speak of 'the gift of a kingdom by a king'. The instances of succession furnished by ancient Sanskrit literature, so far as I see, give us cases which only to a small extent make up for the silence of the legal texts. Nearly all of them illustrate the devolution of kingdom on the eldest or other sons of the retiring or deceased sovereign, and not on daughter's sons, other remote heirs, or strangers. The silence of legal authorities cannot be construed into a support of Paṇḍit Tarkapañcānan's position, while the absence of recorded instances of such cases leaves us quite in the dark as to what the law was.

(4) The inference from the premiss that a father, as having 'power to give away the person of his son', has also by implication power to give away immovable property (even supposing that the kingdom is an immovable property to which the son has a prospective right) without his consent may be sound logically, but not legally; for law is often a negation of logic.

(5) The attribution of powers of disposal, in two different classes of cases, to the paramount sovereign, who is said to

stand *in loco parentis*, is a very far-fetched extension of the previous inferences, in support of which again no law or example has been quoted.

Professor Hopkins' conclusion.

The position as it now stands agrees with the conclusion drawn by Professor Hopkins: 'If there are two (or more) sound sons, the king had no allowed right to select other than the eldest as heir, and, if he exceeded his right in this regard, the people openly and threateningly called him to account for his departure.'

As to the order of succession, therefore, no ancient work, so far as I see, throws any light on any other than the very first group of heirs, viz. the king's sons.

Legal disabilities to succession.

As regards legal incapacity arising from physical defects, we meet with examples of blindness and leprosy operating as grounds for exclusion from the throne. The case of Dhṛtarāṣṭra is an instance of the former disability[1] and Devāpi of the latter.

Criticism of Professor Hopkins' opinion regarding legal disabilities.

Professor Hopkins holds that these physical defects were not felt to be an infrangible legal bar, drawing this inference, I suppose, from the following facts regarding Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Dyumatsena (father of the well-known Satyavat, husband of Sāvitrī[2]): Dhṛtarāṣṭra after his brother Pāṇḍu's death wielded political power virtually as a king for some time, and Yudhiṣṭhira was consecrated to *Yauvarājya* (crown-princeship) a year after his father Pāṇḍu's decease.[3] This consecration to crown-princeship is an anomaly, and appears to have been dictated by policy on the part of Dhṛtarāṣṭra and his sons. Yudhiṣṭhira ought to have been installed as a full-fledged king, and not as a mere crown-prince or successor to a kingdom not yet to hand. The tender age of the heir of the deceased king was no bar to his coronation. Janamejaya, for instance, was a mere child at his father's death, and yet

[1] 'Dhṛtarāṣṭras tv acakṣuṣṭvād rājyam na pratyapadyata' (i.e. Dhṛtarāṣṭra did not get the kingdom for his blindness) *MBh.*, i. 109. 25.

[2] *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 144; also p. 143.

[3] See *MBh.*, i. 139. 1 ff. Prof. Hopkins regards it as an act of righteousness on Dhṛtarāṣṭra's part to have Yudhiṣṭhira installed as crown-prince. He does not seem to notice that by this the latter was given less than his due.

he was installed *as king*.[1] Yudhiṣṭhira's consecration to the crown-princeship does not relatively imply kingship in Dhṛtarāṣṭra. He was never formally crowned as such, and whatever power he wielded as king of the whole ancestral kingdom was reserved to himself partly by force and cleverness and partly by his relationship to Yudhiṣṭhira, who, out of respect, was reluctant to oppose his uncle's will. The slow process in which the right law asserted itself and the seeming submission of the people for some time to Dhṛtarāṣṭra's yoke should not be construed into an acknowledgement that congenital blindness was not an infrangible legal disability. In disputes between princes and kings, there is no tribune for administering a speedy justice; and if the law remains in abeyance for a time, the abeyant state of things should not be mistaken for the lawful one. It is therefore incorrect to hold that Dhṛtarāṣṭra reigned as sovereign of the paternal kingdom in spite of his physical defect.

It is equally incorrect to draw the same conclusion from facts regarding Dyumatsena. He was king of the Śālva[2] kingdom, became blind in course of time, and was dethroned by a usurper. The minister after some time slew the usurper, upon which the people went to the forest hermitage, where the king had taken refuge, to fetch him to his dominions, saying, 'Blind or not, he will be our king.' The account says that he had already been restored to sight, about which the people knew nothing.[3] It was therefore actually a case of restoration to kingdom of a king without any physical defect. Even if the king had been blind at the time of his restoration, it would not have constituted an illustration sufficient to justify Professor Hopkins' inference. It does not speak of either congenital blindness or even blindness prior to accession to the throne. The king appears to have reigned after he had turned blind and before he was dethroned. This only shows that a physical defect of the kind arising subsequently

[1] *MBh.*, i. 44. 5–7.

[2] It was near Kurukṣetra (see *MBh.*, iv. 1, 1 ff.), comprising portions of the territories of Jodhpur, Jaipur, and Alwar. (Mr. N. L. Dey's *Geographical Dictionary*, 2nd ed., in the press.)

[3] *MBh.*, iii. 293. 7–9; 298. 3–9.

to the opening of succession cannot deprive a king of the kingdom already vested in him.[1]

Provisions for excluded princes.

We now turn to the question of the sons who though virtuous are excluded from the throne to make room for the eldest. It has been already stated that the king their father is bound to make provision for their subsistence. This subsistence does not mean 'barely enough to support life', for a man may support life on leaves, roots, and the like; nor does it mean an 'appanage, that would enable him to live like the brother upon whom has devolved the kingdom'. The subsistence should, therefore, mean enough for a decent living.[2]

Though this is the general rule, we find some provision made for the excluded princes. The descriptions in the *Purāṇas* relating to the devolutions of kingdoms are generally silent as to such provisions, mentioning the name of the crown-prince as such and either only stating barely those of the other princes or giving their total number without reference even to their names. We have to gather our information, therefore, from the occasional cases in which the descriptions either in the *Purāṇas* or other Sanskrit works are more detailed.

The kind of provision most considerate towards the excluded princes is found in the case of dispositions in favour of Rāma's sons and nephews. The two sons of Bharata were installed kings of Takṣaśilā and Puṣkalāvata in Gāndhāra conquered by Bharata,[3] the two sons of Śatrughna, kings of Madhurā and Vaidiśa, the former having been subjugated by Śatrughna,[4]

[1] Kings Kalmāṣapāda and Kalaśa were not deprived of their vested kingdoms on account of disabilities. (See *MBh.*, i. 176, for Kalmāṣapāda, and *Skanda-Purāṇa, Nāgara-Khaṇḍa*, xlix, for Kalaśa.) Veṇa was attacked with leprosy, for which he also was not deprived of his vested kingdom. (See Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India*, p. 336, referring to the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*. The *Skanda-Purāṇa, Nāgara-Khaṇḍa*, lxxxiii, alludes to the disease, and, unlike the above account, describes it as having proved fatal to Veṇa.).

[2] See Colebrooke's *Digest*, i. 419, 420.

[3] *Rām.*, vii. 101. 11; for the conquest of Gāndhāra by Bharata, see *ibid.*, 4–11.

[4] *Rām.*, vii. 108. 9–11; for the conquest of Madhurā by Śatrughna, see *Ibid.*, lxix. 36 ff.; lxx. 1 ff.

while the two sons of Lakṣmaṇa, kings of two cities in Kārupatha newly subdued by Bharata and Lakṣmaṇa.[1] In the case of Rāma's two sons, Kuśa and Lava, the former, the first-born, obtained Southern Kośala, comprising Ayodhyā, while Lava, Northern Kośala with its chief town at Śrāvastī.[2] From this it appears that Rāma's nephews were given regions that were accretions to the paternal kingdom. Only as regards Vaidiśa we do not find when it was subdued, but all the other places were newly conquered. Rāma's nephews therefore obtained regions, not as mere estates from which to draw their appanages, but as kingdoms of which they were consecrated kings; but these regions were not part of the ancestral kingdom. In regard to Rāma's sons, the younger was given a portion of the hereditary kingdom while the elder the remainder. The portion of the elder was of course the more important, being superior in extent and riches, and containing the metropolis of the former empire. The most striking feature of this provision is division of the ancestral kingdom. Kuśa does not obtain the ancestral kingdom *in toto*, but has to part with a portion, of which his brother is installed the king.[3]

A second kind of provision is met with in some accounts of Yayāti's sons. It has been already explained how the youngest of them, Puru, succeeded his father to the exclusion of his elder brothers. To these excluded princes were allotted portions of the empire, where they ruled, but under the control of Puru. It is not clear whether they were placed there as viceroys of Puru, or as tributary princes.[4] Some of

[1] *Rām.*, vii. 102; for conquest of Kārupatha by Bharata and Lakṣmaṇa, see *ibid.*

[2] *Rām.*, vii. 107. 17.

[3] This kind of provision appears to have been made for the sons of King Ikṣvāku (*MBh.*, xiv. 4. 3, 4), as also for those of King Uparicara (i. 63. 29–32).

[4] The *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* (ix. 19. 21–3) mentions the following allotments, viz. south (i.e. of the empire) to Yadu, west to Turvasu, south-west to Druhyu, and north to Anu. *Puru was installed emperor of the 'whole world' and the elder brothers were placed under his control.*

The *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* (iv. 10. 16–18) mentions in substance the same arrangement, but is not so explicit. Some of the *Purāṇas* refer only to the allotments to the sons without alluding to the superior control of Puru, e.g. *Vāyu*, xciii; *Harivaṃśa*, xxx.

the accounts are silent as to the superior control of Puru over his brothers, from which we may hold that the elder brothers were independent of the youngest. If this was the case, it was the same as that in regard to Rāma's sons and nephews. Had it been otherwise, i.e. Puru holding the superior control, we can differentiate it as a second kind of provision for the excluded princes.

A third kind of provision is one in which no portion of the kingdom is given to the princes as appanage. They live jointly with their royal brother, the State bearing all their expenses. We notice this in the case of the five Pāṇḍavas.

The evidence of the *Rāja-Dharma-Kaustubha* on regal succession.

Though the ancient texts do not furnish express rules for regal succession, the *Rāja-Dharma-Kaustubha*,[1] a later Sanskrit work, enters into a discussion of the subject thus:

(1) Of the many classes of sons of a king, viz. *aurasa*, *kṣetraja*, *dattaka*, *kṛtrima*, *gūḍhotpanna*, *apaviddha*, *kānīna*, *sahoḍha*, *krīta*, *paunarbhava*, *svayaṃdatta*, and *dāsa*, the last three are excluded from kingship, the remaining nine have right to inherit the throne in the order of their enumeration.[2]

(2) If the eldest son of the senior queen be junior to that of a junior queen, the former cannot be superseded.

(3) Of the two princes born of two queens at the same moment, the son of the senior queen will have preference.

(4) Of twins, the first-born obtains priority.

(5) and (6) A prince with organic defect is always excluded from the throne, giving place to the one next to him in seniority. The latter's line continues on the throne in spite of the existence of able-bodied sons of the excluded prince. Provision should be made for the maintenance of the excluded princes and their families.

Terms of kingship.

Kingship held for a certain term appears to have been the practice in a few countries in early times. There were octennial, triennial, annual, and even diurnal tenures, at the

[1] The manuscript is in my possession. The subject is dealt with in the beginning of pt. iii.

[2] This statement is based on the *Kālikā-Purāṇa*, lxxxviii. 34–7.

end of which the monarch was either deposed, put to death, or passed through some substituted ceremony. The reign of the ancient Spartan 'kings' appears to have been limited to eight years, the term being perhaps determined by the octennial cycle of the early Greek calendars, which attempted to reconcile solar and lunar time.[1] The same seems to have been the term of regal office of the king of Cnossus in Crete. At the end of each period, the king had to renew his sacred powers by intercourse with the godhead at the oracular cave on Mount Ida, without which he forfeited his throne.[2] A triennial tenure of kingship was in vogue among the chiefs of the Remon branch of the Ijebu tribe of Lagos in Southern Nigeria.[3] Traces exist of a custom of killing the kings of Hawaii at the end of a year's reign,[4] while the Sacaea festival at Babylon perhaps points to a similar practice among the Babylonian kings.[5] The still more dreadful diurnal tenure of kingship seems to have been the practice in a certain kingdom which still exists. In Ngoio, a province of the ancient kingdom of Congo in West Africa, the custom is that the person who is consecrated king should be put to death on the night after his coronation. The head of the Musurongo possesses the right of succession, but does not exercise it, and the throne stands vacant.[6] In cases like this, it may be naturally supposed that people would be reluctant to exchange their life for a short-lived glory on the throne, and the supply of kings would be very meagre, or nil. To maintain a regular supply, traces exist in legends of a custom of compelling men to accept the fatal sovereignty.[7] In some races and at some periods of history, the fear of death was not so great as we suppose, and the recruitment of candidates for the fatal crown was at no time a difficult matter. In many places, the rigour of the acceptance of the deadly crown was softened by the appointment of nominal kings during the substituted temporary abdications of the real kings, who would otherwise have been

'Nominal kings.

[1] Sir J. G. Frazer's *Golden Bough*, third ed. (henceforth indicated as *G.*), pt. iii, pp. 58–68.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 71.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 113.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 117, 118.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 113–15.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 134–47.

put to death.[1] The nominal kings were sometimes relations of the royal family—even the king's sons, and were in many instances put to death.[2]

Kings killed when old or feeble.

Among many peoples there were no fixed terms of kingship, and sovereigns were killed on approach of old age or failing health, e.g. to name only a few, among the people of Congo, Fazoql on the Blue Nile, Unyoro and other parts of Africa, the Ethiopians of Meroe, the Shilluks of the White Nile.[3]

Indian examples: duo-decennial tenure of regal office in Quilacare near Cape Comorin.

The tenure of regal office was fixed at twelve years in the province of Quilacare, about twenty leagues to the north-east of Cape Comorin. There, an old traveller[4] records, a great festival was held every twelve years in honour of an idol. The kings of the province had no more than twelve years to reign, i.e. the intervals between the festivals. On the day of the jubilee, there assembled there innumerable people, and much money was spent in giving food to *Brāhmaṇas*. A wooden scaffolding was made, spread over with silken hangings. After bathing at a tank with ceremonies and music, the king came to the idol, prayed to it, mounted on to the scaffolding, took some very sharp knives, and began to cut off his nose, ears, lips, all his members, and as much flesh off himself as he could, until through loss of blood he began to faint, when he finished himself off by cutting his throat himself. During this sacrifice to the idol, the next candidate, who wished to reign during the ensuing twelve years and undertake similar martyrdom for love of the deity, had to be present. And they raised him up from his place as king.

Duo-decennial tenure of kingship at Calicut.

The Zamorin (lit. god on earth) of Calicut on the Malabar coast had also to cut his throat in public at the end of a twelve years' reign. This practice was modified towards the end of the seventeenth century, according to Alexander Hamilton, who did not personally witness the festival, but heard from

[1] *G.*, pt. iii, pp. 148-59.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 160-95.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 14-46.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 47, quoting Duarte Barbose, *A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar in the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century* (Hakluyt Society, London, 1866), pp. 172 ff.

a distance the sound of guns fired day and night in connexion with the ceremony, of which he has left an account.[1]

Mr. W. Logan, with the help of the reigning sovereign of Calicut, examined, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the records of these festivals as preserved in the royal archives. From his description, we can have an accurate conception of the modified practice that was in vogue up to 1743, when it took place for the last time.[2] It was known as *mahā-makha* (Great Sacrifice). It took place every twelfth year, when Jupiter was in retrograde motion in the sign of the Crab, and lasted twenty-eight days. The ceremony was observed with great pomp at the Tirunavayi temple on the north bank of the Ponnani River. From its western gateway a straight road ran for half a mile to a high ridge with a precipitous bank, on which were three or four terraces. On the topmost terrace the king took his stand on the last day of the festival. The plain below swarmed with troops numbering about forty thousand, gathered there to defend the king. The road cutting across the plain from the temple to the king's stand was kept clear. It was barred by palisades on each side, and long spears, held by strong arms and projected through the palisade on either hand, met in the middle of the road, making a glittering arch of steel. When all was ready, the king waved his sword, and a large chain of massy gold enriched with bosses was placed on an elephant at his side. This served as a signal, and the very moment a stir might be seen near the gate of the temple. A number of swordsmen decked with flowers and smeared with ashes stepped out of the crowd. They had just partaken of their last meal on earth, and were receiving the blessings and farewells of their friends. A moment later, they were coming down the lane of spears, winding, and writhing, and stabbing right and left at the spearsmen. One after another they fell, some nearer the king, some farther off.

[1] Alexander Hamilton, 'A New Account of the East Indies,' in Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, viii. p. 374. (*G.*, pt. iii, pp. 47, 48.)

[2] W. Logan's *Malabar* (Madras, 1887), i. 162–9. The writer describes in particular the ceremony of 1683 when fifty-five men perished in their attempt to kill the reigning sovereign in the manner described above. (*G.*, pt. iii, pp. 49–51).

The example from Bengal criticized.

The next example cited by Dr. Frazer is from Bengal under its Muhammadan rulers. Here, he has evidently been misled.[1] The extract from the *Tuzak-i-Bābarī* upon which he bases his statement does not in fact refer at all to any ceremony like that at Calicut.

The story of Vikramāditya. Its affinity with the custom of fatal kingship for a term criticized.

The legend about King Vikramāditya of Ujjain, the ancient capital of Malwa, has it that once on a time an arch-fiend with a number of devils at his command took up his abode in the city and began to devour the people. The city was fast losing its inhabitants. To stop it, the principal citizens requested the fiend to reduce his daily rations to one man only, who would be duly delivered up to him. The demon agreed, but stipulated that the person so delivered should mount the throne and exercise royal powers for a day. The names of the citizens were entered on a list, and every day one of them in his turn ruled from morning to night and was devoured by the fiend. Now, it happened that a caravan of merchants from Gujrat halted on the banks of a river not far from the city. They had a servant, who was no other than

[1] *G.*, pt. iii, p. 51. The example has been cited from H. M. Elliot's *History of India as told by its own Historians*, iv. 260, 261 (extract from the *Tuzak-i-Bābarī*). The *Tuzak* says, 'It is a singular custom in Bengal that there is little of hereditary descent in succession to the sovereignty.... Whoever kills the king, and succeeds in placing himself on the throne, is immediately acknowledged as king. All the amīrs, wazīrs, soldiers, and peasants instantly obey and submit to him.... The people of Bengal say, "We are faithful to the throne; whoever fills the throne, we are obedient and true to him." As, for instance, before the accession of Nusrat Shāh's father, an Abyssinian (Muzaffar *Shāh* Habsh*ī*), having killed the reigning king, mounted the throne and governed the kingdom for some time. Sultan Alauddīn killed the Abyssinian, ascended the throne, and was acknowledged as king. *After Sultan Alauddīn's death, the kingdom devolved by succession to his son*, who now reigned.' John Dowson, the editor of Elliot's work, wrongly thinks it to have been the custom among the Muhammadan rulers of Bengal to succeed to the throne by killing the reigning sovereign, and parallels it with the Malabarian custom just now described. (See Elliot, *op. cit.*, p. 260 n.) This has evidently misled Dr. Frazer. The above instance from Bengal is no custom at all. It is but a disorderly state of royal succession. Any one who happened to have had power in hand, and managed to kill the ruler, was obeyed by the State officials and the people, because they had no other alternative. It would be observed also that Sultan Alauddīn was succeeded by his son in the normal way. Had there been a custom like that of Malabar, a ceremony for killing Sultan Alauddīn ought to have been held. In fact there was no such ceremony that we hear of, and it was never observed by any of the Muslim rulers of Bengal.

Vikramāditya. To be brief, the next day, a potter's son was being carried in great pomp to the royal palace to rule for a day and die. Vikramāditya, on entering the city, saw the spectacle and proposed to accept the fatal sovereignty in his stead. The demon came to devour him as usual, and, after a terrific combat, was compelled by Vikramāditya to quit the city, never to return. Thenceforth Vikramāditya was accepted as sovereign by the people.[1]

It is difficult to gauge the amount of truth round which the legend has grown up. According to Dr. Frazer, the persistence of bloody rites at Ujjain, of which he gives an account, raises a presumption that the tradition of the daily sacrifice of a king there is not purely mythical.[2] Reminiscences of defunct customs survive in a diluted form in legends. The present story, however, does not speak of any fatal periodical ceremony *attached to kingship by the custom of the country*. Its principal point is *the daily slaying of a man*, of whom kingship is but an accident, an office that is fixed upon him after his selection to meet death in his turn. The difference between this story and the accounts noted already is very great; indeed, so great that it makes the question of affinity between them a matter of doubt. If this difference be the effect of extreme dilution of the ancient custom, of which the legend is supposed to be a reflection, Dr. Frazer is right. If not, it is risky to base on it the inference drawn by him.

Nominal king at Bilāspu.

It seems to have been the custom at Bilāspur in the Central Provinces that after a rājāh's decease, a *Brāhmaṇa* ate *khir* (a preparation of milk) out of the dead king's hand, and occupied the *gadi* for a year. At the end of the period, he was given presents and dismissed from the territory, apparently never to return. The spirit of the dead rājāh was believed to enter into the *Brāhmaṇa* after he had eaten the *khir*, for he was carefully watched and not allowed to go away.[3]

A similar custom is believed to be in vogue in the hill states about Kangra in the Punjab.[4]

[1] *G.*, pt. iii, pp. 122, 123. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 124.
[3] *G.*, pt. iii, p. 154, quoting *Punjab Notes and Queries*, i, p. 86, article 674 (May, 1884).
[4] *Ibid.*

The custom of banishing the *Brāhmaṇa* who represents the dead king at the beginning of the ensuing reign may, according to Dr. Frazer, be a substitute for putting him to death.[1]

The ideas that probably underlie the institutions.

Primitive peoples sometimes believe that their safety, and even that of the world, are bound up with the life of the king, whom they regard as a human incarnation of the divinity. Naturally, they take the greatest care for his life, to prevent the enfeeblement of his powers and their final extinction in death. The only way to avert these, they believe, is to kill the man-god on the very appearance of symptoms of decay and replace him by a vigorous successor to whom the soul of the former king is transferred before it is seriously impaired or has departed for good. Natural death means to them voluntary departure of the soul from the body and its refusal to return, or, more commonly, its extraction therefrom, or detention in its wanderings by a demon or sorcerer. Even capture of the soul of the dying man-god and its transference to the successor would not serve their purpose, for it would be enfeebled by the weakness and exhaustion of the body it leaves, and could but drag out a miserable existence in any new human frame supplied to it. Violent death of the king on the appearance of signs of decay was supposed to avert all these evils, and was preferred to a natural one. Some peoples appear to have thought it unsafe to wait for even the first symptom of decay, and have adopted a fixed term short enough to ensure full vigour of life during its continuance. In some places, this belief has been carried to an extreme, giving rise to such institutions as diurnal destruction of the king.[2]

Whether the ancient Indo-Aryans had such institutions.

Of the Indian examples cited above, two appear to belong to the Dravidian races of Southern India. The one regarding Vikramāditya cannot be safely relied on, while the other from Bengal is wide of the mark. The instances of nominal king-

[1] *G.*, pt. iii, p. 154. In Cambodia and Siam, the temporary king ruled for three days. For details of the institutions in these and other places, see *G.*, pt. iii, pp. 148–59.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 9. 10, 46. The motives for regicide reproduced here are doubted by Mr. Andrew Lang in his *Magic and Religion*. The one suggested by him, viz. old age as such, does not, I think, explain all the cases.

ship of Bilāspur and the hill-states about Kangra may imply preceding fatal kingships, of which they are relics; but from them it does not appear clearly whether they relate to Aryan or non-Aryan races. The ideas that are supposed to underlie the institutions have about them an archaic stamp and may date back to a remote antiquity, though the times when their accounts were recorded are recent. We do not find traces of such institutions in early Sanskrit literature in connexion with the many cases of succession that are described at length. In one place in the *Rāmāyaṇa* already noted, Kaikeyī, in course of her conversation with her maid-servant, seems at first sight to speak of kingship termed for a hundred years; but it is capable of another interpretation, which appears to be the right one in view of the fact that nowhere within the ancient Indo-Aryan political system do we meet with any such custom.

CHAPTER V

THE EDUCATION OF THE PRINCE

The importance of king's education in view of his responsibilities.

THE heavy responsibilities devolving on the monarch make it of paramount necessity that he should be thoroughly educated and trained in the art of government.

The Hindu king was ordinarily of the *Kṣatriya* caste.

From the hierarchy of the four castes and their respective duties, it follows that the warrior-caste should always supply the society with competent rulers. The exercise of the regal powers is not within the competency of the other three. The duties of the *Kṣatriyas* comprise, according to the *Kauṭilīya*, *adhyayana* (study), *yajana* (performance of sacrifice), *dāna* (making gifts), *śastrājīva* (military life), and *bhutarakṣaṇa* (protection of beings).[1] The last two items of duty are not prescribed for any of the other classes in a normal condition of society,[2] though, under abnormal conditions and in exceptional cases, taking up arms or pursuit of the military profession by the other castes is met with in literature.[3]

NOTE.—It is not my object to give an historical survey of the training of the ancient Hindu princes, but only to bring out a few of its aspects.

[1] I. iii, p. 7.

[2] The occupations of a *Brāhmaṇa* are: (1) *Adhyayana* (study), (2) *Adhyāpana* (teaching), (3) *Yajana* (performance of sacrifices), (4) *Yājana* (officiating at others' sacrifices), (5) *Dāna* (making gifts), and (6) *Pratigraha* (acceptance of gifts from proper persons). Those of a *Vaiśya* include (1), (3), (5), as also *Kṛṣi* (agricultural), *Pāśupālya* (cattle-rearing), and *Vaṇijyā* (trade). Cf. *Manu*, x. 75 ff.

[3] Cf. *MBh.* xii. 78. 34—'The *Brāhmaṇa* by taking up arms does not incur sin in three cases, viz. self-protection, quelling robbers and compelling the other castes to betake themselves to their duties.' In the *Kauṭilīya* (IX. ii, p. 343), however, a quotation from the previous *Ācāryas* as well as Kauṭilya himself speaks of soldiers belonging to all the four castes. The *Mahābhārata* (xii. 166. 34) allows a *Vaiśya* to use weapons in particular circumstances. Cf. *Śukra.*, ii. 276–80 (Prof. Sarkar's transl., S.B.H.); Hopkins, *J. A. O. S.*, xiii, pp. 76 ff.

In the pre-epic period, we naturally find lesser hardening of caste-divisions and greater mingling of caste-occupations. See *V.I.*, ii. 249, 251, 260, 263, 334, 390; also *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, iv. 19. 16; *MBh.*, xiii. 30, and ix. 40 for attainment of *Brāhmaṇa*-hood by lower castes.

Kauṭilya's assumption.

Kauṭilya, in dealing with the education of the monarch, goes upon the assumption that he is a *Kṣatriya*. As an orthodox *Brāhmaṇa*, he cannot but hold the opinion; and if Candragupta Maurya, whom he supported, was not really of *Kṣatriya* birth, he must have claimed to be and passed as such after his victories as a warrior and assumption of sovereignty,[1] on the supposition, of course, that the *Kauṭilīya* is really to be attributed to the minister of Candragupta.[2]

The lines of his education.

The education of the prince is entrusted to competent tutors from his infancy. After the ceremony of tonsure, which is generally performed in his third year,[3] he is taught the

[1] On scanning the dynastic lists of Hindu kings, we meet as a rule with monarchs of *Kṣatriya* blood up to the time of Mahāpadma Nanda, whose reign according to the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, iv. 24. 4, 5, marked the end of *Kṣatriya* rule and the beginning of *Śūdra* kingship. Cf. *Bhāgāvata-Purāṇa*, xii. 1. 8. This prophecy that there will be *Śūdra* kings after Mahāpadma Nanda has been fulfilled to this extent, that thenceforth India has seen many a monarch belonging to castes other than *Kṣatriya* and the supremacy of kings of foreign or non-Aryan descent. The Kāṇva dynasty (72–27 B.C.), for instance, established by the *Brāhmaṇa* minister Vāsudeva was of *Brāhmaṇa* blood. The caste of Candragupta Maurya is somewhat obscure, and if he be taken to have been related to the Nanda dynasty, he was no doubt a *Śūdra* with all his successors. But as one body of evidence points to his *Śūdra* origin, another, including the orthodox opinion of Kauṭilya as to the proper caste for kings, points the other way. The truth may perhaps be reached if we bear in mind that, on many occasions, the business of kingship has preceded *Kṣatriya*-ship rather than the latter preceding the former. This is an instance of the assimilative power of Hindu society by which clans or families, like some of the Hindu ized Bhars and Gonds who succeeded in winning chieftainship, to cite an example of a recent date, were readily admitted into the frame of Hindu polity as *Kṣatriyas*. (See V. Smith's *Early India*, 3rd ed., pp. 322, 413.) So, whatever may have been the real origin of Candragupta Maurya, he seems to have ranked as a *Kṣatriya* (*ibid.*, p. 408). The caste of the rest of the ancient Hindu monarchs is more or less obscure, but it seems that Puṣyamitra and his successors were *Kṣatriyas*, also the famous Harṣa, so far as it can be guessed from his relationships. It appears that, in many cases, the deviations from the orthodox rule that a ruler must be a *Kṣatriya* were placed out of sight by the veneer of assumed *Kṣatriya*-hood. In some of the *Saṃhitās*, a *Śūdra* king is specially out of favour, though, of course, the wielding of sceptre by a *Brāhmaṇa* or *Vaiśya* does not receive its approval. The *Manu-Saṃhitā* enjoins a *Brāhmaṇa* not to dwell in a country where the rulers are *Śūdras* (*Manu*, iv. 61); cf. the *Viṣṇu-Saṃhitā* (lxxi. 64; Foy, *Die königliche Gewalt*, p. 8; Fick, *Die sociale Gliederung*, pp. 83, 84; Roth, *J. A. O. S.*, 16. ccxliii.

[2] For arguments against this view see Keith, *J. R. A. S.*, 1916, pp. 130–7; J. Jolly, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, lxviii. 355 ff., and elsewhere.

[3] Cf. *Raghuvaṃśa*, iii. 28.

alphabet (*lipi*) and arithmetic (*saṃkhyāna*); and after investiture with the sacred thread, which takes place in the case of a *Kṣatriya* in his eleventh year,[1] he becomes qualified to commence higher studies—the curriculum including:

(i) *Trayī*, and *Ānvīkṣikī*, (ii) *Vārttā*, and (iii) *Daṇḍanīti*:[2] the subjects under (i) being taught by eminent scholars (*śiṣṭāḥ*); those under (ii) by superintendents of government departments (*adhyakṣāḥ*) having not merely a theoretical knowledge but also a thorough practical experience of the subject, and those under (iii) by theoretical masters of statecraft (*vaktāraḥ*) as well as by practical statesmen (*prayoktāraḥ*).

Besides these subjects, he had to hear daily from competent professors the *Itihāsa*, which, as has been noted formerly, comprehends (a) *Purāṇa*, (b) *Itivṛtta*, (c) *Ākhyāyikā*, (d) *Uḍāharaṇa*, (e) *Dharmaśāstra*, and (f) *Arthaśāstra*.[3]

Along with these, he was also given lessons in the military art comprehending (i) *Hastividyā*, (ii) *Aśvavidyā*, (iii) *Rathavidyā*, and (iv) *Praharaṇavidyā*, i.e. the subjects bearing on elephants, horses, chariots, and weapons respectively.

During the period of studentship the prince has to live the austere life of a *Brahmacārin*, observing celibacy and undergoing the hardships involved in the study of the different subjects. His daily routine, as Kauṭilya records it, allots the forenoon to the military exercises noted above, the afternoon to the hearing of the *Itihāsa*, and the rest of the day and night to receiving new lessons (*apūrva-grahaṇa*), revising the old ones (*gṛhīta-paricaya*), and trying to master those not clearly made out.[4]

The necessity for this rigorous discipline was well realized by the ancient Hindu statesman; for the prince could not be

[1] *Manu*, ii. 36; *Yājñ.*, i. 14; *Āśvalāyana-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, i. 19; *Śāṅkhāyana-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, ii. 1; *Pāraskara-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, ii. 2; *Gobhila-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, ii. 10; *Hiraṇyakeśi-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, i. 1; *Khādira-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, ii. 4; *Āpastamba-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, iv. 10.

[2] For explanation of the subjects, see Chap. IX.

[3] For explanation of the subjects, see *Ibid.* Cf. Hopkins, *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 110–12 for parallels in the epics.

[4] For the above information, see *Arthaśāstra*, I. v. p. 10. The *Kāmandakīya* and all the writers on polity lay great stress on the *vinaya*, i.e. discipline of the prince and the cultivation of his latent faculties; cf. *Raghuvaṃśa*, iii. 29.

a competent ruler without this period of disciplined probation. The success of a well-educated and self-controlled sovereign is thus indicated by Kauṭilya:

> Vidyāvinīto rājā hi prajānāṃ vinaye rataḥ,
> Ananyāṃ pṛthivīṃ bhuṅkte sarvabhūtahite rataḥ.

(A king, well disciplined by education and bent on his subjects' government and the good of all living beings, can enjoy the whole earth without a rival.)[1]

The period of studentship lasts up to the sixteenth year, after which the prince performs the ceremony of *godāna* on the eve of his *Return from School* and enters into the next stage of his life by marriage.[2]

On completion of education, the prince is associated with administration.

The prince now enters upon a more practical stage of his life, in which he is gradually brought into contact with all the difficult problems he will have to handle in his future position as king. He seems to have been charged with responsible duties in government departments, where he worked as a subordinate under the head of the particular department in which he was placed for the time being.[3] When found competent, he was made a commander of an army, or an heir-apparent associated with the reigning sovereign in the work of administration.[4]

Kauṭilya's correctives for an erratic prince.

Kauṭilya discusses at length the steps to be taken by the king to correct a prince turning rebellious or morally perverse,[5] and also the means to be adopted by the latter if treated in a cruel and unbecoming manner by the former. He does not accept the opinions of other authorities on these points *in toto* and suggests proper education and discipline of the prince from his very infancy, constant contact with wholesome influences, and timely dissuasion from evil as the means of bringing him round. When these fail, he may be confined

[1] *Artha.*, I. v, p. 11. (Cf. *Kāmandakīya*, i. 37. 63. 65). Here Kauṭilya gives examples, by way of warning, of sovereigns who ruined themselves by yielding to temptation.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 10. [3] *Op. cit.*, I. xviii, p. 35.

[4] *Ibid.*, I. xvii, p. 34; cf. *Matsya-Purāṇa*, ccxx. 2. 3. 7, 8; *Agni-Purāṇa*, ccxxv. 2. 4. 21, 22; ccxxxviii. 9.

[5] e.g. Sagara banished his son Asamañjas, who had caused some children of the city to be drowned. (*MBh.* xii. 57. 8).

and kept under surveillance in a definite place. If this also proves abortive, he may be exiled. Extreme cases of rebellious attitude in a prince may justify, according to Kauṭilya, even the sacrifice of his life for the good of the State.

If the reigning monarch takes an unjustifiably hostile attitude towards a good prince, Kauṭilya advises the latter to take measures which are to be passively protective at first, rising to the more severe steps.[1]

[1] *Arthaśāstra*, I. xviii, pp. 35, 36.

CHAPTER VI

THE ROYAL DUTIES; THE KING'S DAILY ROUTINE OF WORK

King's duties and the literature thereon.

THE manifold duties that devolve on a king after his accession to the throne are treated of in a good many Sanskrit works both printed and manuscript. The lists of duties furnished by the works vary of course as to their details, but agree generally as to certain main points. They touch on personal duties under which may be classed moral discipline and such other virtues, together with the study of the *Vedas* and the sciences and arts, conducing to the improvement of his intellect and physique. These duties go towards making the sovereign a better man, while his public duties as enjoined by the *Śāstras* have a direct bearing on his relations with the people at large. They cover a very wide range, and the numerous lists of royal duties in the Sanskrit works generally reiterate one or other of his obligations regarding the following, viz. the law of the four castes, the maintenance of the four *stages of life* (*āśramas*), consultation regarding the affairs of the State, and adherence to the principles of the works on government (*nīti-śāstras*) in daily practices, the appointment of competent ministers and other officials, the officiation of competent priests (who were often associated with public functions), the supervision of the duties of the officials, the inspection of the finance, the administration of justice, inquiries into the economic state of the country, and the undertaking of works for the economic welfare of the people, the inspection and maintenance of the army, foreign relations, encouragement of learning, protection of the needy and helpless, and the establishment and maintenance of institutions of public utility.[1]

[1] For royal duties, the following works may be consulted: *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* v. 4. 4. 5; ix. 3. 3. 10, 11; xi. 2. 7. 17; ix. 4. 1. 1, 13; xiii. 1. 5. 4; xiii. 2. 2. 7; &c. *Manu*, vii. 2-3, 35, 80, 88, 111-12, 142-4, 203;

The duties are heavy and numerous, and the conscientious monarch who undertakes to follow the injunctions has to work very hard to discharge properly his responsibilities. Many of the aforesaid duties have religious sanctions at their back, making the task all the more heavy for one who wears the crown.

King's ideal, daily routine according to Kauṭilya.

The traditional ideal daily routine of a monarch for the performance of his heavy duties is laid down in a good many works going back to an ancient date. The one given by the *Arthaśāstra* divides the day and night into sixteen equal parts and allots to each part a particular item of his duties:

Day—(1) 6 a.m. to 7.30 a.m. is devoted to looking after the defence of the country and the supervision of the finances;

(2) 7.30 to 9 to the supervision of the affairs of the townspeople and provincials;

(3) 9 to 10.30 to ablution, dining, and study;

(4) 10.30 to 12 to the collection of State dues from the heads of the departments (*Adhyakṣas*);

(5) 12 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. to correspondence with absent ministers;

viii. 41–2, 46, 172, 303–9; ix. 253; x. 80, 119 (protection of the people under his care); vii. 54–9, 60–8, 81 (appointment of officials); vii. 146–83, 205–16; ix. 294–9 (consultation); vii. 79, 145 (giving audience); vii. 37–8, 79, 82–6, 88, 134–6, 145; viii. 395; ix. 313–23; xi. 4, 21–3 (encouragement and honour to *Brāhmaṇas*); viii. 27–9 (support of the helpless); vii. 127–33, 137–9; x. 118, 120; viii. 401–3 (financial and economic duties): vii. 14–34: viii. 302–3, 310–11, 335, 343–7; ix. 252–93, 312; viii. 1–8, 43; ix. 233–4; viii. 9, 10, 18, 19, 40–4, 126–9, 170–5; ix. 249 (judicial duties); vii. 78–9, 145 (appointment of priests, and sacrifice); vii. 39–42, 43, 44–53; ix. 301–11 (personal duties); vii. 69–76, 99–100, 201–3, 222: ix. 25, 223: x. 115, 119 (military duties); *Āpastamba*, ii. 10. 25. 1–15; ii. 10. 26. 1–17; *Gautama*, viii. 1 ff.; xi. 1–31; *Vasiṣṭha*, xix. 1–20, 22–48; *Baudhāyana*, i. 10. 18. 1–20; *Viṣṇu*, iii. 2–98; *Yājñavalkya* (M. N. Dutt's ed.), i. 309–68; *Parāśara* (*ibid.*), i. 56–9; *Śaṅkha* (*ibid*), i. 4; *Hāruta* (*ibid.*), ii. 2–5; *Atri* (*ibid.*), i. 14, 17, 22–4, 27, 28, 29.

The following *Purāṇas* speak also of royal duties: *Matsya-Purāṇa*, ccxv–ccxxvii; *Skanda-Purāṇa*, *Nāgara-Khaṇḍa*, xii. 6 ff. (scanty); *Bhāgavata*, iv. 14. 14–20; 20. 13–16; *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa*, xxvii; xxxiv. 113–17; xviii. 1 ff.; *Agni-Purāṇa*, ccxx, ccxxii–ccxxv, ccxxvii, ccxxxiii–ccxlii; *Garuḍa-Purāṇa*, cxi–cxiii; *Devī-Purāṇa*, ix. 10 ff.; *Bṛhaddharma-Purāṇa*, *Uttara-khaṇḍa*, iii; *Kālikā-Purāṇa*, lxxxiv, lxxxv; cf. also *Kāmandakīya-Nītisāra*, i; *Śukranītisāra* (Prof. B. K. Sarkar's transl., S. B. H.), pp. 4, 6, 7, 11, 23, 36, and 53.

(6) 1.30 to 3 to amusements or self-deliberation;
(7) 3 to 4.30 to the inspection of elephants, horses, chariots, and infantry;
(8) 4.30 to 6 to consultation with the commander-in-chief and evening prayers at nightfall;

Night—(1) 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. to interview with the secret agents;
(2) 7.30 to 9 to ablution, supper, and study;
(3), (4), and (5) 9 to 1.30 a.m. to entering the bed-chamber amid sounds of trumpets, and sleep;
(6) 1.30 to 3 to waking amid trumpet-sounds and calling to mind the *Śāstric* injunctions and the duties of the ensuing day;
(7) 3 to 4.30 to convening the council and sending out secret agents on their errands;
(8) 4.30 to 6 to receiving benedictions in the company of his tutors, and domestic and sacrificial priests, interview with the physician, head-cook, and astrologer, and entering the court after perambulating a cow with her calf, and a bull.

The above divisions of the time-table, however, admit of alterations to suit the capacity of a particular monarch. The routine does not leave much leisure to the king, but keeps him occupied with some State business or other, the greater part of the day. There are only three hours during which he is set free from the cares of the State (9 to 10.30, and 1.30 to 3). His labours come to a close at 7.30 in the evening, after which he has seven hours and a half at a stretch, of which about six hours are devoted to sleep. The rest of the day and night (viz. 24 − 10 hours, i.e. 13½ hours) is divided among the various State engagements. It should be noted that these hours do not all impose upon the monarch brain work or physical worry of the same intensity. The time, for instance, from 4.30 a.m. to 6 a.m. is of comparative rest, as also a few other time-divisions and their fractions during which his work is more passive than the rest of his working hours. The time expressly set apart for study recurs twice during day and

night. Though it adds to the volume of his intellectual work, the period allowed to it is short, considering that it is to be snatched from the hours of ablution and dinner. However, the sort of life implied by the routine is one of much stress and strain and pressure of work, explaining the necessity of disciplined life essential to kingship.

The second division of time in the morning (7.30 to 9) is an important one, devoted as it is to giving audience to the public and considering a variety of matters affecting the people at large. The king is enjoined to make himself easily accessible to the petitioners and attend personally to the subjects of their applications in the following order, instead of entrusting everything to his officials:[1]

(1) Deities (*devatā*), (2) abodes of ascetics (*āśrama*), (3) heretics (*pāṣaṇḍa*), (4) *Brāhmaṇas* versed in the *Vedas* (*śrotriya*), (5) lower animals (*paśu*), (6) sacred places (*puṇyasthāna*), (7) minors, as also (8) the old, (9) the diseased, (10) the distressful (*vyasanin*), (11) the helpless, and (12) women. The above order of business may, however, be changed owing to importance or urgency of a particular item.[2]

It is practically the same as in *Manu*, *Yājñavalkya*, and some *Purāṇas*.

The routine as set forth in the *Saṃkitās* is in substance almost the same as the one in the *Arthaśāstra*. 'Manu's[3] version is as follows:

'Having risen in the last watch of the night, having performed (the rite of) personal purification, having with a collected mind offered oblations in the fire, and having worshipped Brāhmaṇas, he (king) shall enter the hall of audience which must possess the marks (considered) auspicious (for a dwelling).'—vii. 145.

'Tarrying there, he shall gratify all subjects (who come to see him) by a kind reception and afterwards dismiss them; having dismissed his subjects, he shall take counsel with his ministers.'—vii. 146.

'Having consulted with his ministers on all these (matters), having taken exercise, and having bathed afterwards, the king may enter the harem at mid-day in order to dine.'—vii. 216.

[1] *Arthaśāstra*, I. xix, pp. 38, 39.
[2] *Ibid.*, 39.
[3] Buhler's version in *S. B. E.* xxv.

'Adorned (with his robes of state), let him again inspect his fighting men, all his chariots and beasts of burden, the weapons and accoutrements.'—vii. 222.

'Having performed his twilight-devotions, let him, well-armed, hear in an inner apartment the doings of those who make secret reports and of his spies.'—vii. 223.

'But going to another secret apartment and dismissing those people, he may enter the harem, surrounded by female (servants), in order to dine again.'—vii. 224.

'Having eaten there something for the second time, and having been recreated by the sound of music, let him go to rest and rise at the proper time free from fatigue.'—vii. 225.

'A king who is in good health must observe these rules; but, if he is indisposed, he may entrust all this (business) to his servants.'—vii. 226.

Yājñavalkya's account[1] runs thus:

'Having risen up early in the morning, he (king) should personally look after the work of collection and disbursement; next he should attend to law-suits, after which he should bathe and take his meal at ease.'—i. 327.

'He should then deposit in the treasury the gold brought by persons engaged in the work and then see the secret agents, after which he should with his ministers send the envoys on their errands.'—i. 328.

'Thereafter he should enjoy his leisure alone or in the company of ministers. Next, he should take counsel with his commander-in-chief after the inspection of the army.'—i. 329.

'Then after evening adoration, he should listen to the confidential reports of the secret agents. He should then enjoy singing and dancing, take his meal and study.'—i. 330.

'He should then go to sleep amid sounds of trumpets and get up from bed similarly, when he should cogitate the scriptural injunctions and all his duties.'—i. 331.

'Then with respectful welcome, he should send secret emissaries to the dominions of other kings as well as his own, after receiving blessings from his sacrificial priest, domestic priest and teacher. Next, he should see his astrologers and physicians and confer on the Brāhmaṇas learned in the *Vedas*, kine, gold, land, houses and their furniture.'—i. 332, 333.

The time-table in the *Agni-Purāṇa*[2] corresponds in its main features:

'Pushkara said, "I shall relate to you the daily routine of

[1] M. N. Dutt's version. [2] CCXXV. 1–17.

the king. It is called *ajasra-karma*, i.e. incessant work. When there are only two *muhūrtas* (48 minutes) before the break of dawn, the king should get up from bed amid music and singing of panegyrists and see the secret emissaries so privately that no body can recognize them when on duty as his men. Next, he should attend to his income and disbursement and then after attending the calls of nature, he should go to his bathing-house. There, after cleaning the teeth and taking bath, he should perform the *Sandhyā* service, repeat prayers and worship Vāsudeva. He should then make sacred offerings to the fire and worship the manes of his ancestors. take blessings from the *Brāhmaṇas* and make gifts of gold and kine. Then after decorating his person and smearing it with unguents he should see the reflexion of his face in a mirror as also in clarified butter kept in a gold receptacle. Then he should hear the auspicious or inauspicious nature of the day, take the medicines prescribed for him by the royal physicians, touch the auspicious articles, make obeisance to his superiors and then enter his hall of audience where, Oh Highly Fortunate, he should receive the *Brāhmaṇas*, the ministers and the officers of the court as also such of his subjects as would be announced by the usher. Then having heard the reports of works, he should determine the steps to be taken, and then proceed to adjudicate law-suits, after which he should consult his ministers on important matters. A king should take counsel neither with a single minister nor with too many; nor with the ignorant and untrustworthy. He should carry into action those schemes that have been well thought over and will not therefore injure the State. He should not betray his secrets by looks and gestures, for the wise can gather others' intentions from those outward signs. A king, following the advice of his astrologers, physicians, and ministers, attains prosperity, for the latter are the custodians of the former's welfare. Council dissolved, the king should take physical exercise with a discus or sword, or on a carriage. Then he should bathe in a tank free from aquatic animals, and see that the God Viṣṇu has been duly worshipped, that the sacrificial fire has been duly lighted and offerings made to it, and that the *Brāhmaṇas* have been properly honoured with presents. Then having decorated his body, he should make gifts, and next take his meal which has been duly tested. Then he should take dressed betel and rest awhile on his left side. Then, after the inspection of the army, armoury and store-house, he should peruse the *Śāstras*. He should then finish his evening prayer and send the secret agents to the works

previously thought over by him. Thereafter, he should take his supper and enter the seraglio. The king being well protected should do this every day amid songs and sounds of musical instruments."'

The *Devī-Purāṇa*[1] gives a similar programme of royal duties.[1] A portion of this routine up to the holding of court in the assembly-hall (the differences in details being excepted) is represented in the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*[2] as being followed by Kṛṣṇa in his capital at Dvārakā. The *Raghuvaṃśa* refers to the traditional routine upon which Mallinātha makes his commentation, adding some details.[3] Daṇḍin, in his *Daśakumāra-carita*, parodies the *Kauṭilīya* routine but hands down the tradition:

The routine is followed in part by Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*. It is also given in the *Raghuvaṃśa*, and also in the *Daśakumāra-carita* where Daṇḍin parodies the *Kauṭilīya*.

Day.—'The king risen from his bed in the *first of the eight divisions of the day* hears reports concerning his income and disbursement after having washed his face in a hurry and devoured a handful or half-handful of food. The cunning heads of government-departments of a king, who does not hear them attentively, rob him of double his wealth and multiply thousandfold the four hundred means of collection of wealth enjoined by Cāṇakya.

In the *second division* of the day, the king passes his life distressfully with his ears burnt so to speak by the hubbub of mutually quarrelling subjects. The judges decree or dismiss the cases of the suitors at will, bringing sin and disrepute upon their master, and wealth to themselves.

The *third division* is the time for bathing and eating. So long as his food is not fully digested, his fear of being poisoned does not leave him. After his meal, he stands up, in the *fourth division*, with his hands stretched out for gold.

In the *fifth division*, he suffers great pain from consultation with his ministers. Then also the ministers individually or collectively grow indifferent, and turn at will to their evil design the good or bad quarters of things, the reports of envoys and secret agents, the practicability or otherwise of actions, as well as the states of undertakings due to time and place, and are supported by the 'circles' of friendly, inimical, and neutral kings bringing their master under their control by secretly, and in the guise of peace-makers, inflaming the anger of people within and outside the kingdom.

[1] ii. 69-76. [2] x. 70. 4-17. [3] xvii. 49.

In the *sixth division* (3¾ *daṇḍas*, i.e. 1½ hrs.) he engages either in amusements or conversation.

In the *seventh* comes the inspection of the military force composed of its four elements.

The *eighth* is devoted to consultation with his commander-in-chief regarding military matters.

Night.—Having performed the *Sandhyā* service, he sees the secret agents in the *first division of the night*. Through them the very cruel uses of weapons, fire, and poison are to be provided for.

In the *second*, after meal, he commences religious studies like a Brāhmaṇa versed in the *Vedas*.

In the *third*, he goes to bed amid sounds of trumpets, while the *fourth* and the *fifth* find him asleep—fast asleep, because of the incessant mental worry by which he enjoys the pleasure of sleep like an ascetic.

In the *sixth*, he cogitates the *Śāstras* and his own duties.

The *seventh* is devoted to the sending of secret informants on their duties after consultation. They by their sweet words gain wealth from the sender as well as the person to whom they are sent, and increase it by commerce through routes where they have not to pay any tolls, and roam about by skilfully creating works where there are none.

In the *eighth*, the priest and others come to him and say, &c.'

It is also found in Megasthenes.

The regular round of the king's daily duties is fragmentarily referred to by the Greek ambassador Megasthenes: 'The king may not sleep during the daytime.[1] . . . He leaves his palace . . . for the purpose of judging causes. He then remains in court for the whole day, without allowing the business to be interrupted, even though the hour arrives when he must needs attend to his person—that is, when he is to be rubbed with the cylinders of wood. He continues hearing cases while the friction, which is performed by four attendants, is still proceeding. Another purpose for which he leaves his palace is to offer sacrifice.'[2]

The traditional programme of diurnal duties, as we find it, is the result of evolution through centuries dating back to the Vedic times. The discharge of heavy responsibilities of the

[1] Cf. the Vedic injunction, '*mā divā svāpsīḥ* (or *suṣupthāḥ*)' found in several *Gṛhya Sūtras*, *Brāhmaṇas*, &c.

[2] See Megasthenes, Fragm. XXVII.

king ought to follow a method; and the method that was recommended to the monarch was one matured by the wisdom of statesmen. The monarch could no doubt alter it to suit himself, but the freedom was hedged in by limits which he could not overstep. The considerations by which the programme was framed are briefly stated in a *śloka* of the *Mahābhārata*,[1] viz. equable pursuit of *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma* (for explanation of these terms, see *supra*).

The general principles to guide the monarch in the regulation of his duties are found in both the *Rāmāyaṇa*[2] and the *Mahābhārata*,[3] and also in a Vedic injunction by Dakṣa with which the later developments seem to have a relation of direct descent. The general principles behind the routine.

The injunction is as follows:

Pūrvāhne cācared dharmaṃ madhyāhne 'rthamupārjayet,
Sāyāhne cācaret kāmam ity eṣā vaidikī śrutiḥ.[4]

(Forenoon is for religious duties, midday for acquisition of wealth, and evening for diversion: such is the Vedic saying.)

[1] ii. 5. 20. [2] ii. 100. 17 (cf. *MBh.*, ii. 5. 29). [3] ii. 5. 85.
[4] *Vide* Nīlakaṇṭha's comment on *MBh.*, ii. 5. 20.

CHAPTER VII

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL STATE-OFFICIALS

THE next point for our consideration is the officers and departments of the State. In this connexion we may note the following passage of the *Kauṭilīya*:

Kauṭilya's reference to eighteen *Tīrthas*.

> Evaṃ śatrau ca mitre ca madhyame cāvapec carān,
> Udāsīne ca teṣāṃ ca tīrtheṣv aṣṭādaśasv api,[1]

where Kauṭilya advises the stationing of secret agents in the surrounding states, whether inimical, friendly, or neutral, to watch the movements not only of the people but also of the *eighteen* functionaries. This recognition of *eighteen Tīrthas* in a State is traditional and appears to be of very early origin. Not only is it referred to in the above passage as a matter of general familiarity, but also in the *Mahābhārata*, where Nārada asks Yudhiṣṭhira, 'Seekest thou to know every thing about the *eighteen Tīrthas* of the foe and *fifteen* of thy own, by means of three and three spies all unacquainted with one another?'[2] These *eighteen Tīrthas*, according to Nīlakaṇṭha, the commentator of the *Mahābhārata*, are:

Enumeration of *tīrthās* in the *Mahābhārata*.

(i) *Mantrin*—Councillor,
(ii) *Purohita*—Priest,
(iii) *Yuvarājan*—Crown-prince,
(iv) *Camūpati*—Commander-in-chief of the army,
(v) *Dvārapāla*—Chamberlain,[3]
(vi) *Antarveśika*—Superintendent of the ladies' apartments,
(vii) *Kārāgārādhikārin*—Overseer of prisons.
(viii) *Dravyasaṃcayakṛt*—Steward,

[1] I. xii, p. 21; the word *Tīrtha* also occurs at I. iv, p. 9.
[2] *MBh.* ii. 5. 38.
[3] For the translation of some of the names, I have received suggestions from Prof. Hopkins, *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 128.

(ix) *Kṛtyākṛtyeṣv arthānāṃ viniyojaka*—Corresponding to *Sannidhātṛ*[1] in the *Kauṭilīya* list (see *infra*, p. 170),

(x) *Pradeṣṭṛ*—an officer combining both executive and judicial powers in the *Kauṭilīya*,

(xi) *Nagarādhyakṣa*—overseer of the city,

(xii) *Kāryanirmāṇakṛt*—Engineer,

(xiii) *Dharmādhyakṣa*—Judge,

(xiv) *Sabhādhyakṣa*—Overseer of the assembly,

(xv) *Daṇḍapāla*—Guardian of punishment,

(xvi) *Durgapāla*—Overseer of forts,

(xvii) *Rāṣṭrāntapāla*—Protector of the frontiers, and

(xviii) *Aṭavīpāla*—Guardian of the forests.[2]

The eighteen *Tīrthas*, according to the commentary on the passage in the *Rāmāyaṇa*,[3] differ only as to the two officers *Vyavahāranirṇetṛ* and *Senādhyakṣa*, the *Mahābhārata* mentioning *Sabhādhyakṣa*, and *Aṭavīpāla*, whom the former identifies with *Rāṣṭrāntapāla*. The existence of eighteen *Tīrthas* is echoed in works like the *Pañcatantra*,[4] *Raghuvaṃśa*,[5] and *Śiśupālavadha*.[6]

The *Tīrthas* according to the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Pañcatantra*, *Raghuvaṃśa*, and *Śiśupālavadha*.

[1] His principal duty was to exercise a check upon the following officials: (1) *Kosādhyakṣa*, (2) *Panyādhyakṣa*, (3) *Koṣṭhāgārādhyakṣa*, (4) *Kupyādhyakṣa*, (5) *Āyudhāgārādhyakṣa*, and (6) *Bandhanāgārādhyakṣa*.

[2] For another reference to the eighteen *Tīrthas*, see *MBh.*, xii. 69. 52; cf. *Nītiprakāśikā*, i. 52.

[3] The *Rāmāyaṇa* gives us some light on this point in the dialogue between Rāma and Bharata in ii. 100. 36.

> Kaccid aṣṭādaśānyeṣu svapakṣe daśa pañca ca,
> Tribhis tribhir avijñātair vetsi tīrthāni cāraṇaiḥ.

This *śloka* also mentions the eighteen *Tīrthas* explained by the commeniator as follows: '(i) Mantrī, (ii) purohitaḥ, (iii) yuvarājā, (iv) senāpatiḥ, (v) dauvārikaḥ, (vi) antaḥpurādhikṛtaḥ, (vii) bandhanāgārādhikṛtaḥ, (viii) dhanādhyakṣaḥ, (ix) rājājñayā, ājñāpyeṣu vaktā, (x) prādvivākasamjño vyavahāraprasṭā, (xi) dharmāsanādhikṛtaḥ, (xii) vyavahāranirṇetā sabhyākhyaḥ, (xiii) senāyājīvitabhṛtidānādhyakṣaḥ, (xiv) karmānte vetanagrāhiṇaḥ, (xv) nagarādhyakṣaḥ, (xvi) rāṣṭrāntapālaḥ ayam evāṭavikaḥ, (xvii) duṣṭānāṃ daṇḍanādhikārī, (xviii) jalagiri-vana-sthala-durgapālāḥ.

Etāny eva svapakshe mantri-purohita-yuvarājāu hitvā ca pañcadaśa. Ekaikasmin viṣaye tribhis tribhir abhijñātaiḥ parasparam itaraiś cābhijñātair etāny aṣṭādaśa 'tīrthāni vetsi kaccit. Svadeśe 'py etair nyāyato vyavahāraḥ pravartyate na veti vicāraṇīyaṃ paradeśe ceti bhāvaḥ.'

[4] iii. 67–70 (F. Kielhorn's ed.). [5] xvii. 68. [6] xiv. 9.

The lists, it should be noted, mention the names of individuals as representatives of either the respective classes of officials or government-departments to which they belong, except when the individual stands by himself, e.g. *Yuvarājan*.

Kauṭilya's list of Tīrthas.

The *Kauṭilīya*,[1] in a similar context as the passages in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, recommends the appointment of spies to watch in the king's own State the following people:

(1) *Mantrin*, (2) *Purohita*, (3) *Senāpati*, (4) *Yuvarājan*, (5) *Dauvārika*, (6) *Antarveśika*, (7) *Praśāstṛ*, (8) *Samāhartṛ*, (9) *Sannidhātṛ*, (10) *Pradeṣṭṛ*, (11) *Nāyaka*, (12) *Pauravyāvahārika*, (13) *Kārmāntika*, (14) *Mantriparişadadhyakṣa*, (15) *Daṇḍapāla*, (16) *Durgapāla*, (17) *Antapāla*, (18) *Āṭavika*.

Agreement of the lists.

On comparing this with the previous list from the *Mahābhārata*, they appear to agree *in toto*, *Praśāstṛ* corresponding with *Kārāgārādhikārin*, *Samāhartṛ* with *Dravyasaṃcayakṛt*, *Sannidhātṛ* with *Kṛtyākṛtyeṣv arthānāṃ viniyojaka*, *Nāyaka* with *Nagarādhyakṣa*, *Pauravyāvahārika* with *Dharmādhyakṣa*, *Kārmāntika* with *Kāryanirmāṇakṛt*, *Mantriparişadadhyakṣa* with *Sabhādhyakṣa*, the rest having correspondence even in names. As we proceed, we shall find that the agreement in names is supported by more or less similarity of functions.

The Tīrthas exhaust roughly the whole sphere of work of a State.

The reason for this traditional division of the State into eighteen *Tīrthas* probably lies in the fact that they exhaust, roughly at least, the whole sphere of work of a State and meet its indispensable requirements—providing for the deliberation of State-questions and assistance to the sovereign, both secular and spiritual, for his personal safety and convenience, for the administration of justice in the country, for its internal peace and external security, for the collection of State-dues and their application, and lastly for the supply of material needs of the people by the exploitation of its natural resources—by manufactures, commerce, and industries. The information gathered through secret agents regarding these *Tīrthas* is sufficient for ordinary purposes to show the inner workings of a State and the direction of its policy.

[1] *Kauṭiltya*, I. xii, p. 20.

We find some of the officials existing in the Vedic period, a few among whom having the same designations as those in later times. Some officials of the Vedic times figure among the lists of *Ratnins* found in several early Sanskrit works:

The *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā*[1] and *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*[2] mention (1) *Brāhmaṇa*, (2) *Rājanya*, (3) *Senānī*, (4) *Sūta*, (5) *Grāmaṇī*, (6) *Kṣattṛ*, (7) *Saṃgrahītṛ*, (8) *Bhāgadugha*, and (9) *Akṣāvāpa*, excluding *Mahiṣī* (king's first wife), *Vāvātā* (king's favourite wife), and *Parivṛktī* (king's discarded wife), whom we need not notice for our purposes.

The *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*[3] enumerates all the above officers, adding *Go-vikartana* and *Pālāgala*, while the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* puts *Rājan* for *Rājanya* (perhaps implying the same person), gives *Grāmaṇī* the name of *Vaiśya-Grāmaṇī*, adds *Takṣa-Rathakārau*, and inserts *Go-vikarta* without interfering with the rest. The *Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā*[4] only substitutes *Go-vyaccha* for *Govikarta* in the above list and omits *Takṣa-Rathakārau*.

The eight *Vīras* (i.e. heroes, friends of the king) figuring in the *Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa*[1] are *Purohita*, *Mahiṣī*, *Sūta*, *Grāmaṇī*, *Kṣattṛ*, and *Saṃgrahītṛ*, adding nothing to the previous lists.

The two persons *Brāhmaṇa* and *Purohita* are perhaps the same, signifying the royal priest. It does not appear clearly whether *Rājanya* is a government-official or not. *Senānī* is the Commander of the Army, *Sūta* the Royal Equerry. It seems that *Sūta* was not a mere private servant of the king's household, but an official charged with the State duty of looking after the management of all the horses kept for the king's personal use as well as for military purposes. In later times, when differentiation of duties had progressed a good deal, we find his place occupied by the *Aśvādhyakṣa* (Superintendent of Horses) in the *Kauṭilīya* list.

[1] i. 8. 9. 1 ff. [2] i. 7. 3. 1 ff. [3] v. 3. 1. 1 ff.

[4] *Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā*, xv. 4. The lists quoted by Weber in his *Über den Rājasūya* (pp. 21, 22) differ in a few places from those cited above, but add no official with a new designation. Stray references to the above officers occur in many other places, as will be evident from the *V. I.*

[5] *Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa*, xix. 1. 4.

Grāmaṇī is the Village-Headman. His importance as a State-official is realized only when we bear in mind that in early times he had military duties to perform, for which he might be called a Troop-leader.[1] It is not clear whether he is the headman of a particular village, in which case his importance would be considerably diminished. It is probable that he is the head of all the village-headmen in the realm.

Kṣattṛ is the Chamberlain.[2] It is difficult to define his duties, which may have been like those of the official called 'Chamberlain' in the later lists.

Saṃgrahītṛ appears in the *Kauṭilīya* with manifold duties. He has to attend to the collection of revenue and the checking of accounts, to the operations of the land-survey and the statistical department. He is principally connected with the collection of revenue and may therefore be termed 'Collector-General'.[3]

Bhāgadugha is variously translated into 'dealer out of portions', 'distributor of food'. Sāyaṇa renders it by 'tax-collector' in some places,[4] and by 'carver' in others,[5] thus making him either a revenue-officer or a court-official. In view of the existence of a principal collector of taxes in the Collector-General (*Saṃgrahītṛ*), if the term is so understood, the rendering by 'Treasurer' appears to be more reasonable, for otherwise there will be an overlapping of functions. The office of a treasurer is found in the later works.

Akṣāvāpa[6] was the 'superintendent of dicing'. It may be

[1] See *V. I.*, i. 96.

[2] *Ibid.*, ii. 200.

[3] Messrs. Macdonell and Keith are not sure about the functions of *Saṃgrahītṛ*, whom they render by 'charioteer or treasurer'. The clear definition of his duties in the *Kauṭilīya* leaves no doubt that he was a revenue-officer, but this evidence, of course, is not cogent for the Vedic period.

[4] *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā*, i. 8. 9. 2; *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, i. 7. 3. 5; iii. 4. 8. 1; and *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, v. 3. 1. 9.

[5] *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, i. 1. 2. 17. See *V. I.*, ii. 100, 200, 416, and cf. the next note as to the difficulty of defining the functions of these early officials.

[6] Messrs. Macdonell and Keith remark that he may either be a professional dicer who plays with the king or watches his play, or a public officer who superintends the gambling halls of the State and collects the revenue, as was regularly done later on. Early English history shows similar evolution of household officers into ministers of state; see *V. I.*, ii. 200.

that the officer, like the rest, was at first a private servant of the royal *entourage*, but later on he was a public official superintending the gambling halls and collecting revenue therefrom. Officers with similar functions are found in subsequent times, e. g. the *Dyūtādhyakṣa* in the *Kauṭilīya*.[1]

It is doubtful whether *Govikartana* signifies a 'huntsman', or 'slayer of cows'.[2] *Govikartana* is replaced by *Govyaccha* in the list of one text. Sāyaṇa interprets that term where it occurs in the list of victims at the Puruṣamedha as a 'driver out of cows', while the *St. Petersburg Dictionary* as 'tormenter of cows', Weber[3] as a 'knacker of cows', and Eggeling[4] as 'one who "approaches" cows', but this use of the word does not in all probability explain the sense of *Govikartana* as a *Ratnin*.

If, however, he could be taken either as a huntsman or a 'superintendent of the slaughter-houses' (by giving the word '*go*' the wider signification of 'cattle'), we find officers with like functions in the *Kauṭilīya* under the names of *Śūnādhyakṣa*[5] and *Vivītādhyakṣa*.[6] Slaughter of cows was looked down upon by the Hindus from comparatively early times, but earlier, cows were regularly slain for guests.[7] If there was a post for the purpose, it must have ceased to exist as soon as cow-slaughter came to be looked upon with aversion.

Of the *Takṣan* and *Ratha-kāra*, the *Takṣan* (carpenter)[8] had perhaps to do all those works in wood that did not fall within the range of duties of the *Ratha-kāra*. The latter officer was in special charge of the construction of chariots, which played a principal part in the wars of those days. The *Kauṭilīya* mentions a superintendent charged with several duties, including the construction of chariots for various purposes, military and other.

Pālāgala is a courier—the predecessor, I think, of such important officers as ambassadors in later times.

The *Ratnins*, among whom figure the aforesaid officers,

[1] III. xx. pp. 197 ff.
[2] *Indische Streifen*, i. 82, n. 11.
[3] *Kauṭilīya*, II. xxvi. 122,
[4] See *V. I.*, ii. 145-7.
[5] *V. I.*, ii. 200.
[6] *S. B. E.*, xliv. 416.
[7] *Ibid.*, II. xxxiv. 140, 141.
[8] See *V. I.*, i. 297.

were called the 'king-makers', i.e. though not kings themselves, yet they assisted in their consecration as kings. They no doubt wielded much power in those days, of which, as I have already noted, the making of offerings in their respective houses is an indirect proof. Weber says that 'they had a hand in the choice of the king through palace-intrigues'.[1] Whatever might have been the means, the fact remains that they were important personages in the State.

[1] *Über den Rājasūya*, p. 23.

CHAPTER VIII

THEORIES OF THE EVOLUTION OF KINGSHIP AMONG THE INDO-ARYANS

SECTION I.

MAN'S desire to probe into all problems, however obscure, prompts him to frame hypotheses for the explanation of phenomena even where the means of direct perception of the conditions that bring them about are absent. These hypotheses are very useful inasmuch as they often enable him at length to find out the right cause for the phenomenon of which an explanation is sought. Many of the present acquisitions to the domain of human knowledge had to pass through this hypothetical stage before they could be accepted as established theories after their passage of the necessary tests.[1] We make hypotheses of all sorts in our daily life, and these fulfil more or less satisfactorily the objects for which they are framed. The hypotheses of systematized thought, however, have to be tested as accurately as possible till they satisfy all the demands made upon them as explanations of phenomena.

The usefulness of hypotheses which after satisfying the necessary tests develop into theories.

The tests are not the same in all cases, but vary with the nature of the phenomenon required to be explained. A physical reality that admits of observation, accurate mathematical calculation, and quantitative measurement, that repeats itself and can be subjected to experiments, will necessarily allow application of various tests which may not be possible for one of a different kind.

The tests vary.

The phenomenon with which we are at present concerned is the evolution of kingship, i.e. how the supreme political power in a community first fell into the hands of a single man, giving rise to the primitive monarchy in the place of the previous

The phenomenon to be explained.

[1] The word 'theory' is sometimes loosely used for 'hypothesis', but, logically, a theory is an established hypothesis.

political organizations, such as government by elders, or still laxer systems, such as the leaderless unions of little bands of Bushmen for hunting or plunder.

It should be particularly noted that the 'rise of kingship being a single' expression does not in the strict logical sense stand for a single effect from a single cause. It is a general expression for several phenomena which, from the logical standpoint, are different and attributable to different totalities of conditions. To make it clear by an example: the expression 'rise of kingship' resembles the word 'death' in its relation to causes. Just as logically there cannot be *death in general*, but must always be some particular kind of death, e.g. death caused by a bullet should be distinguished from that by drowning, similarly kingship reached through military prowess should be distinguished from that secured by any other means. From this, it will be clear that one particular hypothesis for the rise of kingship can speak of only one of the many ways thereto, and many such hypotheses propounding different ways need not be mutually exclusive; for they are concerned with really different phenomena, though classed under the same general expression. Any two or more of these ways, if their nature permits, may work in combination through the same king, their strength being increased through this combination, while there may be others that may not be operative even in neighbouring localities or in distant parts of the same country.

It should also be kept in view that we are here concerned (i) with the primitive ways of elevation to the throne and not with those utilized by subsequent aspirants thereto, (ii) with the determination of such of the ways as were operative among the primitive ancestors of the Indo-Aryans.

The tests for verifying the hypotheses.

Many hypotheses have been framed to account for the first rise of kingship. The tests applicable to them must needs differ at least in some respects from those for verifying hypotheses about a different element of reality. The first rise of monarchy does not admit of observation, calculation, or experiment. It may be objected that, as history is said to repeat itself, the emergence of kingship should admit of

experiments on the new monarchies that come into being. It should be borne in mind that these repetitions have only superficial and nominal resemblance, and take place in conditions far from identical with the primitive conditions of the first monarchies. If China, for instance, relapses into a monarchy, would it be such an exact replica of the past verity that inference from its observation might be applicable *in toto* to the latter? Far from it. Many elements and forces, political, social, religious or otherwise, now at work might not at all have come into existence then, or, even if existent, were not perhaps in the same state of relative strength and development. This makes a good deal of difference. The present totality of conditions might be taken as a possible road to the throne, but this might not, or perhaps owing to essential differences could not, be one of those resorted to by the first kings. If we leave aside this example from a modern civilized country, and turn for one to the lowest savages now on earth, we would not perhaps fare better. Many of the conditions operative among them may approach in similarity those of the past, and may thus have a suggestive or explanatory value; but it would be hazardous to treat them as reproductions of the particular conditions of the past and to take them as eligible for experiments. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this point hereafter; suffice it to say that the rise of monarchy does not by its very nature admit of experiment. What, then, are the means of verifying the hypotheses relating thereto? The answer lies perhaps in these conditions of a valid hypothesis:

(1) It should be reasonable, self-consistent, and in harmony with the laws included in the contemplated system of reality.

(2) It should furnish a basis for rigorous deductive inference of consequences.

The first condition requires that the new supposition should be in agreement with the accepted laws. It may happen that a supposition inconsistent with the received conceptions is proved to be true, demanding thereby a revision of the latter. This was the case with the new Copernican hypothesis of the heavens, which conflicted with the accepted Ptolemaic theory,

but instead of being rejected, had to be substituted for the latter. Such instances are rare, and the probability of such a radical revision of the received conceptions is perhaps growing less with the advance of science.

These conditions will be followed throughout the subsequent portion of this chapter for the rejection or acceptance of the hypotheses, some of which, as will be found hereafter, were discussed long ago and found faulty, while some others already obtain as 'theories'. The rejected hypotheses will be but referred to in passing, those newly propounded, if any, will be discussed, while the 'theories' will be recorded, not without a critical eye thereon.

SECTION II.

Whether the Sanskrit and Buddhist literatures contain any hints on the evolution of kingship.

The *Mahābhārata*, as pointed out by Prof. Hopkins,[1] speaks of a three-fold origin of kings according to the more ancient *Śāstras* (codes), viz. (1) good family (*satkula*), (2) personal bravery (*śūratva*), and (3) skill in the leadership of armies (*senā-prakarṣaṇa*).[2] The prince Duryodhana cites the above śāstric passage to justify his installation of Karṇa to the throne of the Aṅga kingdom, in order to make him eligible to fight Arjuna by putting the former on a par with the latter in a tournament.

The *Mahāsammata* in the *Jātakas*.

The tradition about the *Mahāsammata* (Great Elect) in the *Jātakas* relates that he was the first king in the *Vivaṭṭa*[3] of the first *Kappa* (cycle), elected by the people from among themselves to remove the want of a ruler, which they had keenly felt.[4] The elect was 'handsome, auspicious, commanding, altogether perfect.'[5]

The above legend is much more detailed in the *Mahāvastu Avadāna*: 'Then, O, *Bhikṣus*! the men (lit. beings) hastened and assembled; after doing so, they held a consultation: "Let us elect that person from among us here present, who happens

[1] *J. A. O. S.*, xiii. 99, 100. [2] *MBh.*, i. 136, 35.

[3] Third division, in which the process of renovation of the world begins.

[4] See Ṭīkā on the word 'devadhammā' of a verse in the '*devadhamma-jātaka*' in the *Jātaka*, i. 132; also R. C. Childers's *Pāli-English Dictionary*, under 'Mahāsammata'.

[5] See the *Jātaka* (transl. by W. H. D. Rouse and ed. by E. B. Cowell), ii. 242 (*ulūka-jātaka*).

to be pleasing to all (*sarva-prāsādiko*) and hailed of all as lord (*sarva-maheśākhyo*), so that he may punish those deserving punishment, and support those worth supporting, and exact a share of paddy from each of our paddy-fields." Then, O, *Bhikṣus*! the men elected the person who was pleasing to all and hailed by all as lord, (saying): "Do you punish among us that person who deserves punishment, and support him who is worth supporting; we shall elect you as the foremost of all beings; and shall give you a sixth of the produce of each of our paddy-fields." Elected (*sammato*) as he was by a large (*mahā*) collection of people, he was termed the Great Elect (*Mahāsammata*).'[1]

The *Mahāsammata* in the *Mahāvastu Avadāna*.

This Buddhist tradition emphasizes the selection by the

[1] My best thanks are due to Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍit Haraprasād Śāstrī, M.A., C.I.E., for kindly drawing my attention to the passage in the *Mahāvastu Avadāna* (ed. by É. Senart, 1882), i. 347, 348. It is as follows: 'Atha khalu bhikṣavaḥ te satvā saṃdhāvensuḥ saṃnipatensuḥ saṃdhāvitvā saṃnipatitvā sammantrensuḥ. Yaṃ nūnaṃ vayaṃ bhavanto yo asmākaṃ satvo sarvaprāsādiko sarva-maheśākhyo ca taṃ sammanyemaḥ yo asmākaṃ nigrahāraham ca nigṛhṇīyā pragrahāraham ca pragṛhṇeyā deśaye cāyam svakasvakeṣu śālikṣetreṣu śālibhāgam. Atha khalu bhikṣavaḥ te satvā yo sānaṃ (p. 348) satvo abhūṣi sarva-prāsādiko ca sarva-maheśākhyo ca taṃ sammanyensuḥ. Bhavān asmākaṃ satvaṃ nigrahāraham ca nigṛhṇātu pragrahāraham ca pragṛhṇātu; vayaṃ te sarva-satvānām agratāye sammanyema svakasvakeṣu śālikṣetreṣu ṣaṣṭham śālibhāgam dadāma. Mahatā janakāyena sammato ti mahāsammato ti saṃjñā udapāsi. (Up to this translated above). Arahati śālikṣetreṣu śālibhāge ti rājā ti saṃjñā udapāsi. Sammak rakṣati paripāleti mūrdhnābhiṣiktaḥ ... saṃjñā udapāsi. Mātāpitṛsamo naigama-jānapadeṣu tti jānapadasthāma-vīrya-prāpto ti saṃjña udapāsi tenāham rājā kṣatriyo mūrdhnābhiṣikto jānapadasthāma-vīrya-prāpto ti. (Translation of the remaining portion of the passage: 'Worthy as he was of the share of the produce of paddy-fields, he was called king. For protecting and maintaining adequately, he was called a 'Kṣatriya be-sprinkled on the head' [(Kṣatriyo mūrdhnābhiṣiktaḥ). The lacuna here has been supplied in the light of the subsequent portion of the passage]. Being like father and mother to the people of the town and the country, he was called the 'repository of strength and energy to the people' (Jānapada-sthāma-vīrya-prāpto).

There is a brief allusion to this tradition and some of its details in the *Catuḥśatikā* by Āryadeva (ed. as a Memoir of the A. S. B. by Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍit Haraprasād Śāstrī, M.A., C.I.E, who has kindly drawn my attention to this passage also), ch. iv, p. 461.

The legend of the election of Manu as their king by the people to avert a state of anarchy, together with its attendant reference to a sixth of the produce and such other dues payable to the king, is mentioned in the *Kauṭilīya* (I. xiii, p. 22) for insertion in dialogue between spies.

This selection of the king looks very much like the 'social contract theory as applicable to monarchies' when supposed to have been historically applied.

Review of the above legends.

people at large of a competent ruler and ignores the aspiration and exertion on the part of the would-be ruler himself to make his way to the throne by dint of his virtues. This has given an artificial appearance to the elevation of the first king to the throne. What seems more plausible is that the person who towers over his fellows in the qualities more appreciated in a particular society, as, for instance, ability in sea-faring in the race living on the sea-coast, or strength, fleetness of foot, sureness of mark, &c., in a community of hunters, becomes gradually their chief.[1] It is not probable that the people felt the want of a ruler because they suffered the pinch of hunger for a few days, and met together to choose the best among themselves as their head. Such deliberate and collective choice of a ruler may have been possible in later stages of evolution, when kingship had already become a firm institution of the society, and when the vacant throne was felt as ominous and undesirable. The 'natural' races may not have felt it much, for living in small, detached, headless groups was so far in harmony with their temper as not to have been to them a source of inconvenience and anxiety. They had not yet, moreover, any experience of the conveniences of corporate life under a chieftain likely to excite their cravings therefor by contrast with their chiefless condition. The only truth, therefore, that the legend may furnish is that the first Elect had extraordinary personal virtues which influenced his elevation. The account from the *Jātakas* does not, however, mark out any special virtue or combination of virtues. He is no doubt described as 'commanding', which may be taken to suggest that he was brave, physically strong, and so forth; but an all-round perfection is next claimed for him, which is fatal to all suggestions as to the reality in its legendary megalogue.

The account from the *Mahāvastu Avadāna* fares little better in this respect. The first Elect is recognized by all as lordly, which enables him to reward and punish. The Elect is also 'pleasing' and hence popular to the people. It is not specified what words and deeds gained him popularity before his selection, and in what circumstances those words were

[1] Cf. Prof. F. Ratzel's *History of Mankind*, i. 131.

uttered and deeds done. The only facts that stand out are that the Elect was already recognized as a great lord by all; and hence the advantages that could be expected from such a man could be used for the people's benefit. He was expected to be just, and, as he was 'pleasing', it may be inferred that he had given indications to the people that he would not be unjust in the use of his lordship, but would administer justice among the people properly, which would be one of the factors for maintaining his future popularity. Justness alone could not perhaps have gained chiefship for a person devoid of other virtues; at least, as will appear from subsequent discussion, no one has yet claimed this power for it. The qualities denoted in the epithet *maheśākhya* probably include bravery, physical strength, military skill, and so forth, attributes, as will be shown, sufficient, especially when found in conjunction, to secure chieftainship for their possessor.

Hints from the *Mahā-bhārata*.

The hints from the *Mahābhārata* are much more definite and tangible. The qualities mentioned are *good family, personal bravery, and skill in the leadership of armies*. The first attribute is comparatively obscure; for the elements upon which the nobility of a family was considered to depend are not enumerated. They may have been wealth, seniority of stock, or any other factors, taken separately or combined. The second and the third attributes are clear enough. There is nothing in the three qualities that stands in the way of their union in the same person. The object, therefore, of making three-fold the origin of kingship seems to be that each of these, operating in isolation from the other two, may secure for its possessor the rulership over a community. It is not clear how far back this tradition of the three-fold origin of kingship dates. It is cited from the *śāstras* obviously more ancient than the time of their citation, though it cannot be asserted that the tradition was as old as the rise of the first Aryan kings.

Herbert Spencer's mention of the

The second and the third attributes are mentioned by Herbert Spencer[1] along with other king-making qualities of primitive times. The political headship, in his opinion, was

[1] See his *Principles of Sociology* (1902), ii. 333-4.

second and the third attributes. His enumeration of the above as well as other attributes.

acquired by one whose fitness asserted itself in the form of superior prowess, greater physical strength, stronger will, wider knowledge, quicker insight, greater age, larger wealth. The first-named quality includes both personal bravery and military skill—the very attributes mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. Good family may, as I have already said, depend upon various factors, among which wealth may be reckoned as one. I have some doubt as to whether wealth alone could procure kingship. It may create an influence which may not be in the direction of political headship. Spencer says that wealth (largeness of possessions) is an indirect mark of superiority and a direct cause of influence, and confirms his views by instances, two of which need be noticed: 'With the Tacullies, any person may become a *miuty* or chief who will occasionally provide a village feast',[1] and 'among the Tolewas in Del Norte County, money makes the chief'.[2] Wealth combined with one or a few personal virtues may be of help to the operation of the latter, but whether, unaided, it can achieve the aforesaid end is a question about which I have doubts. Even if the reports of the above two instances be correct, we cannot, I think, apply them to the early societies without further evidence showing that the temper of the primitive savage was such that it could unhesitatingly welcome a man, though devoid of all recommendations but that of wealth, to the chiefship of his community. There may be positive hindrances to the transpiration of such a state of things; for it is very likely that a *man possessed of wealth along with other virtues* may be the rival of the *man with mere wealth*. It would not be difficult for the former to beat the latter down and secure for himself what was passing into another's hand.

Whether unaided wealth is sufficient?

Should we suppose that the primitive man of wealth was always endowed in those days with some or other of the aforesaid qualities, we have to make another assumption—that the acquisition of possessions by heredity had not yet begun.

[1] *Op. cit.*, ii. 334. The manifestations of the abstract qualities or their combinations may be various, and impossible to be exhaustively enumerated.

[2] *Ibid.*

If this be true, the wealthy man would always be a maker of his own fortune and hence endowed with many qualities involved in its acquisition, which may count among them some of those requisite for elevation to the headship.

The greater experience generally accompanying old age commanded deference in early societies, though old men with senile incapacity were killed or left to die. The most energetic senior of a tribe could wield political superiority. Seniority.

Of bravery, skill in leadership, and superior bodily strength, the first and the third may often be found together; and these when joined with the second become a powerful combination. The remaining attributes of stronger will, wider knowledge, and quicker insight could be more effective when co-operating with one or some of the qualities already mentioned; and it would be perhaps difficult for them to make headway in absolute isolation from one or other of the above group of attributes. The other qualities.

The actual operation of the above qualities may imply the existence of many subsidiary ones, e.g. the leadership of armies requires endurance. It contemplates also the creation of many favourable circumstances, the timely use of those already favourable, the occurrence of many unexpected events helping the purpose in view, and so forth. All these taken together would be the totality of conditions constituting the cause for the elevation of a person to the throne. The attributes, single or grouped, as the case may be, are the dominating forces in the field and have therefore been specially mentioned. War and unrest may be favourable for the play of some of them, while peace or other states of affairs for the rest.

Thus far about the personal attributes. There may be other forces which may also be specially mentioned and which may be said to lie more in the beliefs or institutions of the early societies than in the men availing themselves of those forces; though of course the utilization of the forces may require the possession of particular attributes by those men.

Such a force may lie, for instance, in the patriarchal institution. When men, says Herbert Spencer, passed from the patriarch The patriarch

becomes a chief.

hunting stage into the pastoral and wandered in search of food for their domesticated animals, they fell into conditions favouring the formation of patriarchal groups. The growth of simple groups into those compound and doubly compound acknowledging the authority of one who unites family headship with political superiority has been made familiar by Sir Henry Maine and others as common to early Greeks, Romans, Teutons, Slavs, and Hindus.[1] The joint undivided family, wherever its beginning is seen in the Aryan communities, springs universally out of the patriarchal family, a group of natural or adoptive descendants held together by subjection to the eldest living ascendant, father, grandfather, or great-grandfather. In the more extensive assemblages of kinsmen constituting the joint family, the eldest male of the eldest line is never the parent of all the members, and not necessarily the first in age among them. There is always the impression that the blood of the collective brotherhood runs more truly and purely in some one line than in any other. Among the Hindus, the eldest male of this line, if of full mental capacity, is generally placed at the head of the concerns of the joint family. If he is not deemed fit for his duties, a worthier kinsman is substituted for him by election and the longer the joint family holds together, the more election gains ground at the expense of birth. The whole process may be described as the gradual transmutation of the patriarch into the chief, the general rule being that the latter is elected with a strong preference for the eldest line. Sometimes he is assisted by a definite council of near kinsmen, and sometimes this council takes his place. On the whole, where the body of kinsmen formed on the type of the joint family is a purely civil institution, the tendency is towards greater disregard of the claims of blood. But in those states of society in which the brotherhood is a political, militant, self-sustaining group, we can perceive from actually extant examples that a separate set of causes comes into operation and that the chief as military leader sometimes more than regains the privileges lost through the decay of the tradition connecting him with the common root of all the

[1] Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 342, 343.

kindred. Thus all the branches of human society may or may not have been developed from joint families, but wherever it was an institution of the Aryan race,[1] we see that the patriarch could rise into political headship.

The 'maternal system' is held by some to have preceded the paternal, but there are doubts as to this priority. 'If patriarchal reasons are enough to account for the custom as we find it', says Sir Frederick Pollock, 'we can hardly assume that in a given case it was formerly matriarchal, merely because, for all we know, it might have been so. This would be to assume the very thing to be proved, namely, that the society in question was in fact maternal at some earlier time.'[2] The matriarchate.

Under this system, however, women have no personal power. If it at all confers political power on any person, like the paternal system, it is on a male rather than on a female. In many societies, again, in which this system is the rule, an exception is made in the case of the political head.[3]

Spencer mentions another influence as the origin of political headship. It operates alone in some cases and conjointly with that of military prowess in other cases. But 'that this arises as early as the other can scarcely be said; since until the ghost-theory[4] takes shape, there is no origin for it. But when belief in the spirits of the dead becomes current, the medicine-man professing ability to control them and inspiring faith in his pretensions is regarded with a fear which prompts obedience.'[5] Spencer has not elaborated the hypothesis by showing the various steps by which the medicine-man can acquire political superiority. He also remarks that the The influence of the medicine-man as an origin of kingship.

[1] See Sir Henry Maine's *Early History of Institutions* (1905), pp. 115–18. I have retained his language as far as possible, with changes or omissions for the sake of brevity or adaptation to the present context, in order to allow him to state his own case with its necessary details. (See also his *Ancient Law*, ch. v, and its Note on patriarchal theory by Sir Frederick Pollock.)

[2] See Note K on ch. v, Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 178.

[3] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., xvii. 889; H. Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 344, 345.

[4] I.e., the fear of the ghosts of powerful men. Where many tribes have been welded together by a conqueror, his ghost acquires in tradition the pre-eminence of a god. (See H. Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 363.)

[5] H. Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

operation of the influence of the medicine-man depends upon the ghost-theory which comes into being later than the 'attribute'-origin of chieftainship, but how much later he does not state. The supposed aid of supernatural powers as a strengthener of political authority already acquired by some means or other cannot be denied. But how a magician (medicine-man) can make his way to the throne requires to be shown. This has been done by Sir James Frazer in his *Golden Bough* with an industry in the compilation and presentation of materials that is indeed admirable. We shall postpone our remarks on it until we have glanced over his whole position.

SECTION III.

The hypothesis expounded by him may be summarized thus:

Belief of the primitive man that he can secure material blessings by influencing the god incarnate in the king or others.

1. Ancient kings commonly combined in themselves both the administrative and priestly functions, and, in addition, the divine functions, for they were looked upon as gods incarnate. They were expected to confer upon their subjects blessings which lie beyond the reach of mortals. Thus rain and sunshine in proper seasons, growth of crops, removal of epidemics, in short, freedom from all scourges of humanity and bestowal of the essentials of public welfare were supposed to be dependent upon their will. A primitive man hardly perceived the difference between the natural and the supernatural, and conceived the world as worked to a great extent by personal beings moved by appeals to their hopes, fears, and compassion. Guided by this belief, he thought he could influence the course of nature by prayers, threats, and promises directed to none other than the god incarnate in the king, or, as he sometimes believed, in himself or any one of his fellow men.

Kingship through proficiency in magic.

2. Along with the view of the world as worked by spiritual forces, the primitive man had another and probably still older conception that contemplated nature as a series of events occurring without the intervention of any personal agency. Such a conception was involved in the 'sympathetic magic' that played such an important part in those days. In early

society, the king was a magician, and he appears to have risen to the throne by his proficiency in the black or white art.

3. The principles involved in 'sympathetic magic' are two: 'Sympathetic Magic' and its branches explained.

(i) Like produces like, i. e. an effect resembles its cause.

(ii) Things once in physical contact continue to act on each other from distant places after the severance of the contact.

The accompanying table shows the branches of sympathetic magic, with their alternative names and the principles upon which they are based.

Sympathetic Magic
(Law of Sympathy)

Homoeopathic or Imitative Magic (Law of Similarity)	Contagious Magic (Law of Contact)

4. The magician infers from the first principle, the law of similarity, that he can produce any effect he likes by imitating it; and from the second, the law of contact, that whatever he does to a material object affects equally the person with whom it was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not. In practice, the two principles are often combined.[1]

5. From another point of view, sympathetic magic is divided into Private and Public, the former being practised for the benefit or injury of individuals, and the latter for public well-being, or injury to public enemies.

6. As examples (mostly private) of 'homoeopathic magic' (see the table, *supra*), Sir J. Frazer cites the uses of an image, which is subjected to magical treatment in the belief that sufferings caused to it will produce like sufferings to the intended enemy, and its destruction will cause his death. This practice was very widely diffused all over the world, and still persists. Only a few instances are described, viz. its practice among the American Indians, Malays, and Arabs of North Africa, as also in Torres Straits, Borneo, China, Japan, Australia, Burma, Africa, ancient and modern India, Egypt, Babylon, Scotland.[2] The magical image is also used in various countries for various ends, viz. to get offspring, procure Examples of private homoeopathic magic of image and other things.

[1] For what precedes about magic, see Sir J. Frazer's *Golden Bough* (henceforth referred to as '*G.*'), 3rd ed., pt. i, vol. i, pp. 50–4.

[2] *G.*, pt. i, i. 55–70.

love, ensure food-supply, maintain domestic harmony, heal diseases, and so forth.[1]

7. Not merely images, but also various animals and objects, the tides, sun, moon, and stars, are magically treated to yield homoeopathically the desired results.[2]

Taboos come under sympathetic magic.

8. Not merely positive precepts, but also negative ones, i.e. prohibitions, form part of this magic, the latter being termed *taboos* and the former *sorcery*. Through these also operate the two principles of similarity and contact. To cite instances: Camphor-hunters of Malay refrain from pounding their salt fine. The reason is that owing to the resemblance of salt to camphor, they believe that by the taboo they ensure that the grains of the camphor he seeks for will be large like their coarse salt. The infringement of the taboo would make the camphor fine like the pounded salt they use.

9. In most parts of ancient Italy, women were forbidden by law to carry their spindles openly, for any such action was believed to injure the crops. The belief probably was that the twirling of the spindle would twirl the corn-stalks.[3] Hence, the taboo.

Examples of *private* contagious magic.

10. The second branch of sympathetic magic, viz. 'private contagious magic' is equally widespread. Only a few instances need be noted: it is customary in many parts of the world to put extracted teeth in a place where they might come into contact with a mouse or a rat, in the hope that through sympathy the teeth of their former owner would become firm and excellent like those of the rodents. This belief obtains in Africa, Europe, America, India, &c., with more or less modifications. Similarly, there are superstitious practices in various countries based on beliefs in sympathetic connexion between a wound and the weapon which inflicted it, a person and his clothes or foot-prints, and so forth.[4]

The 'public magician'. His elevation to

11. Thus far we have noticed instances of homoeopathic or contagious magic practised for private ends, i.e. for the benefit or injury of individuals. But side by side with this may be found the practice of public magic for the good of the whole

[1] *G.*, pt. i, i. 70–111. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 136–174. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 111 ff.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 174–214.

community or for the injury of the inimical ones. The magician ceases to be a private practitioner and rises into a public functionary. He has to direct his attention to the properties of drugs and minerals, the causes of rain and drought, of thunder and lightning, the changes of the seasons, the phases of the moon, the diurnal and annual journeys of the heavenly bodies, the mystery of life and death and such other things, a knowledge of which is necessary to make up his peculiar outfit. He is expected, by his magical rites, to secure objects of public utility—supplying food, healing diseases, making and stopping rain, controlling the sun and wind, averting epidemics and other scourges of society, and so forth. The means that he adopts are the same sympathetic magic with its two branches. The examples have been imported from a large number of countries and peoples all over the world.[1] The evolution of such a class of functionaries is of great importance to political and religious progress in early society. The public welfare being believed to depend on the performance of magical rites, they attain to a position of much influence and power, and may readily step up to the rank of chiefs or kings. The profession draws to it the ablest men of the tribe, who, as in other professions, drive to the wall their duller brethren by dint of their superior intelligence. This superiority depends for the most part, however, on a command over the fallacies that impose upon their credulous and superstitious clients. Thus the ablest members of the profession become more or less conscious deceivers, though it is by no means the case that a sorcerer is always an impostor. He often sincerely believes in his own wonderful powers; but this sincerity renders him weaker than his roguish fellow-practitioners. It leaves him unarmed to meet the many perils that beset him. When his incantations fail, he is not ready to make plausible excuses like his knavish colleagues; and before he invents one, he may be knocked on the head by his disappointed and angry clients.[2] The result is that at this

sovereignty, a benefit to early society.

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 244–331.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 214. Among the Latukas of the Upper Nile, for instance, the unsuccessful rain-maker is often banished or killed. (*G.*, pt. i, i. 346.)