

Kauṭalya gives another description. He distinguishes between the Brāhman, the Kshatriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra troops, and maintains that the first is, on account of lustre, superior to that subsequently mentioned in this order of enumeration.<sup>1</sup>) Kauṭalya, however, expresses his dissent. He holds that the enemy may at any time win over the army of Brāhmaṇs by means of prostration, but the army of Kshatriyas, being trained in the art of wielding weapons, is better, and so also the army of Vaiśyas or Śūdras if they have great numerical strength. (The ideal army, however, according to Kauṭalya,<sup>2</sup> is the hereditary one that has come down to the king directly from his father and grandfather, which is ever pliant to his will, which has the sons, wives and dependants of its soldiers well-contented, which is not averse to making long sojourns, endowed with a power of endurance, which has fought many battles, which is skilful in the handling of all fighting implements, which is free from duplicity with the king in weal or woe, and which is composed of soldiers of the Kshatriya caste.

The seventh and last component of the State according to Hindu polity is Mitra or ally, two kinds of whom are acknowledged by Kauṭalya, namely, *sahaja* and *kṛtrima*. The latter or the acquired ally is one who is resorted to for the protection of wealth and life. The former whose

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 343.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256

friendship is derived from the time of his father and grandfather and who is situated close to the territory of the immediately neighbouring enemy is obviously a natural (*sahaja*) ally. It is scarcely necessary to add that the *sahaja* is vastly superior to the *kritrima* ally. And if to the characteristics of the *sahaja* we add the qualities of being ever pliant, free from duplicity and capable of making preparations for war quickly and on a large scale, as Kauṭalya does, we obtain the ideal *mitra* or ally of the Hindu polity.<sup>1</sup>

The above is a brief description of the principal characteristics of each one of the seven constituents of *rājya* or State. As these constituents have been designated *prakritis* or natural elements, it is plain that according to Hindu polity we cannot conceive of a whole and entire State without these seven components. They, in fact, denote the nature of a State. It would be interesting to determine how far this structure of a Hindu State stands the test of the definition of the State given by the modern authors of Political Science. Many are these authors, but we will select only three of them as being perhaps the best known on this side of India. They are Stephen Leacock, the writer of the 'Elements of Political Science,' J. K. Bluntschli, author of 'The Theory of the State' and Raymond Garfield Gettel, who has written 'Introduction to Political Science.' The

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid*, loc. cit.

first and the third of these authors lay stress on four essential factors of a State, namely, (1) a Territory, (2) a Population, (3) Unity and (4) Organization. Bluntschli admits these as essential, but adds one or two requisites of his own. Leaving aside the consideration of Bluntschli's view for the time being, let us see what the four indispensable factors of a State emphasised by the other two authors exactly mean. Let us first concentrate our attention on the physical elements, which include Territory and Population. The idea that there can be no State without the possession of a definite part of the earth's surface is so firmly imbedded in present political thought that it is scarcely necessary to say much about this fundamental requisite of State existence. The Hebrews constituted themselves into a State only on their conquest of Palestine but their modern descendants, being scattered abroad and dissociated from the occupation of any particular territory, can scarcely be thought to form a State. Of course, ideas may vary in regard to the extent of the area over which a State may extend. But there can be no two opinions as to a State being inconceivable without a definite territory. Equally necessary is a population, the second of the physical elements. It goes without saying that a territory must be inhabited to form a State. From the age of Aristotle up till the time of Rousseau, the authors of Political Science have made an attempt to fix definitely the number of

individuals that a State may comprise. This, however, is now considered to be exceedingly absurd. Nevertheless it has never been denied that an uninhabited portion of the earth, taken in itself, cannot form a State.

The two other essential characteristics of the State according to the modern political science fall under Sovereignty, and are distinguished into Unity and Organization. ✓Unity means that the territory and population constituting a State must form a political unit. What is here insisted upon is that the State must be a political unit though it need not be a geographical one. The island of Haiti is no doubt a geographical unit but as it has been split up into two separate republics, it cannot represent the unity presupposed by a State. Similarly the so-called States of North America are not so many separate States from the viewpoint of political science, because they form parts of the wider political organization called the United States of America which themselves form one State. ✓Unless the community forms one coherent whole politically, both in its internal and external relations, there can be no State. ✓The fourth requisite of the State is Organization, which presupposes the distinction between the governors and the governed, the rulers and the subjects. Even granting that we have a population inhabiting a definite territory, and, being disconnected from the rest of the world, is in a sense a unit, it cannot be organized into a State until authority



is exercised by some of them over the rest. This submission may be given by mutual consent or exacted through compulsion. But unless there are settled relations of control and obedience, there would be no State.

The above, in short, is the definition of the State emphasised by the modern authors of political science. Let us now see how far it fits the State described by the Hindu authors of polity. Let us first confine ourselves to its physical characteristics which, as we have seen, comprise territory and population. It is scarcely necessary to state that both these requisites are covered by *janapada* which is the third *prakṛiti* of a *rājya*. It has been pointed out above that from the different characteristics specified by Kauṭalya, *janapada* denotes both territory and population; and, in fact, as this Sanskrit word has both these senses, Kauṭalya was in a way compelled to use one single term though he meant both these things as is obvious from the different attributes mentioned by him of *janapada*. Thus when he says that a *janapada* should be free from miry, rocky and saline tracts and also from wilderness, tigers and wild beasts and that it should abound in fertile lands, timber and elephant forests, we have, evidently a *janapada* in the sense of 'territory': and, further, when in the same breath, he tells us that it should be hostile to the foe or should be inhabited by hard-working peasants and contain men who are pure-hearted and devoted to

the king, there can possibly be no doubt as to this *janapada* standing for 'population' also. No reasonable doubt need therefore be entertained as to the third *prakṛiti*, namely, *janapada* being co-extensive both with Territory and Population which form the physical constituents of the State from the standpoint of modern political science.

But what becomes of the other two essential characteristics, namely, Unity and Organization? Unity, we have seen, means that this state should denote one political unit. Is that idea involved in the composition of the Hindu State? This is the question that we have now to consider. The very first *prakṛiti* is *svāmin* which means 'the lord or the sovereign.' This itself shows that the territory of which he is the lord must denote an independent entity, not forming part of a wider political unit. Similarly both this *svāmin* and his *janapada* are spoken of as *śākya-sāmanta* or powerful enough to repel the neighbouring kings. How is this possible unless *svāmin* and *janapada* form part of an independent political organization. Then, again, the last *prakṛiti*, according to Hindu polity, is *mitra* or ally, who is possible in the case of an independent State only.) The different types of allies have been minutely described by Kauṭilya, and those who have read his work can scarcely entertain any doubt about their being allies of independent kings whose authority is supreme in their State. (All these considerations point to the conclusion that this idea of unity as

understood by modern political science is certainly involved in the very conception of the Hindu State. The fourth requisite of the State, namely, organization, need not detain us very long. This organization, as has been shown, presupposes the distinction between the governors and the governed. And it is hardly necessary to add that the enumeration of the *prakritis* clearly shows who are the governors and who are the governed. Obviously the *svāmin* or the lord and his *amātyas* or officials are the persons who are invested with this authority, and the *janapada* who form the population denotes the individuals who render obedience. Again, Organisation does not simply presuppose the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, but shows also the method by which authority is exercised by the former over the latter. ) It is not enough to distinguish between the sovereign and the subjects, but Organisation must denote also the way by means of which the State can enforce its will. (This is beautifully indicated by the fourth, fifth and sixth of the *parkritis*, namely, *durga*, *kośa* and *danda*. ) If the sovereign authority expresses a will which the subjects at any time are in no mood to carry out, the former can administer it through the instrumentality of *danda* or army which alone guarantees the execution of its orders. But there can be no effective army, unless the State coffers are full and money is forthcoming not only for the payment of soldiers and its officers but also for mili-

tary appliances and equipment. It is, however, conceivable that a king may have a long purse, but that his subjects may be so disaffected or that a civil war may break out with such virulence that the army itself may cease to be reliable. Occasions may therefore arise which make it advisable for a king to flee to a place of safety for the time being till he is able to rally the discordant elements to his standard and assert his authority again. And what places other than fortified strongholds can offer this safety ? \*The fourth requisite of the State, namely, Organization, must therefore be taken to point to not only to the distinction between the governors and the governed, that is between *svāmin* and *amātya* on the one hand and *janapada* on the other, but also to the different means which enable the former to exact obedience from the latter, such as, forts, treasury and army.

It has been mentioned above that all the four essentials of a State specified by Professors Leacock and Gettell have also been specified by Prof. Bluntschli, but that the latter mentions also a fifth requisite on which he lays great stress<sup>1</sup>. According to his view, the state is not a lifeless instrument, a dead machine, but a living organism not of a lower but of a higher kind. In other words, in his opinion, the State (1) is endowed with spirit and body, (2) has members with various special functions, and (3) develops and grows. This or-

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<sup>1</sup> *The Theory of the State*, p. 18 and ff.

ganic nature of the state, says the Professor, has not always been understood, and it is the special merit of the German school of historical jurists to have recognised it. An oil painting is something other than a mere aggregation of oil and colour, and likewise the state is not a mere collection of external regulations. Let us now see whether this notion of the organic nature of the state, if not exactly in this form, at least somewhat like it, was known to Hindu political thought or not. The seven *Prakritis*, it is worthy of note, have been called limb-like elements of the state<sup>1</sup>. These limbs, of course, suggest the body (politic). Kāmandaka who follows Kautalya scrupulously explains it by saying that they constitute a state consisting of seven limbs which are mutually serviceable. This is expatiated upon by the commentator Śaṅkarārya by saying that this state is like a chariot consisting of several parts which are contributory to one another. The state was therefore conceived of as an organism like a chariot composed of parts fitted and subservient to one another. It may, however, be argued that the state is thus likened to a machine which is a dead and not a living organism—not an organism which has spirit and body. Is the state anywhere compared to such a spiritual organism in the books of Hindu Polity? It may therefore be worth while to turn our attention to another

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<sup>1</sup> *Arthasāstra*, p. 257; *Nitisāra*, Canto IV, v. I.

simile indulged in by Kauṭalya elsewhere. “A *svāmin* says he, “when he is endowed with rich qualities, enriches the *prakṛitis* (the elements of the state) with his own richness. Of whatever character he is, of that character the *prakṛitis* become; because their progress and decline are dependent upon him. A *svāmin* is, indeed, their *kūṭa-sthānīya* or (Immutable) Spirit.”<sup>1</sup> Practically the same idea is expressed by Kāmandaka when he says that “A king like an inner soul (*antar-ātmā*) pervades this movable and immovable universe (only) when he controls the *prakṛitis* (the seven elements of the state; or the eight primary elements of creation).”<sup>2</sup> It is quite clear from this simile that the state is here looked upon by the authors of the Hindu polity also as a living spiritual organism, where the *svāmin* was the soul and the other six *prakṛitis* or natural constituents the body of that state. The simile even goes still further, for Kauṭalya admits that as *svāmin* is the spirit of the body politic, the latter grows or declines with him. Prof. Bluntschli also admits that the state, as a living organism, also develops and grows. This characteristic of the state does not thus seem to be lost sight of even by Kauṭalya. But the Professor, we have seen, also notices a third characteristic, namely, that the state, as a living organism has members with various special func-

<sup>1</sup> *Arthasāstra*, p. 320.

<sup>2</sup> *Nītisāra*, Canto IV, v. 75.

tions. It is true that there is nothing in Kautalya which expresses that idea. Manu, however, has the following: "Yet in a state composed of seven limbs, which is upheld like the triple staff (of an ascetic), there is none more important (than the others), by reason of the importance of the qualities of each for the others. For each part is particularly qualified for (the accomplishment of) certain objects, (and thus) each is declared to be the most important for the particular purpose which is effected by its means."<sup>1</sup> The second of these verses clearly shows that each prakṛiti has its special function, exactly as insisted upon by Prof. Bluntschli. The first verse, again, shows the paramount necessity of each *prakṛiti* in the organic whole of a *rājya*. Both these verses clearly express the conception of integration and differentiation involved in the organic unity of the state.

We must, however, notice the difference in the standpoint of both Hindu theorists and Prof. Bluntschli. When the latter speaks of a state in this connection, he means principally the national state of which the national spirit and the national will, apart from the average spirit and the average will of the multitude, form the spirit and the will of the state. When Kautalya, however, refers to a state, he has in view any kind of state, whether or not it is restricted to one race, nation, or

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<sup>1</sup> *Manu-smṛiti*, Chap. IX, vs. 296-7.

people. The development of nationalism seems to be the chief goal according to modern political science, but in the time of Kauṭalya the Chāturanta State or the Imperial State over the whole Aryandom was looked upon as constituting the most coveted state according to Hindu polity. We have discussed, above, the passage where Kauṭalya considers Svāmin to be the spirit of the state. There he makes it also quite plain that so long as a king is possessed of the best qualities, he can make all the other *prakṛitis* rich and prosperous, although they are weak and impoverished. The same idea he has expressed elsewhere. Nay, Kauṭalya goes even one step further, and observes that *rājā rājyam = iti prakṛiti-samkshepaḥ*, that is, the *prakṛitis* in epitome mean 'the king is the state.'<sup>1</sup> This remark of his cannot, however, be taken to be identical with the famous dictum of Louis XIV: L'état c'est moi, because the latter evidently implies that not only unlimited but also arbitrary power was centred in him. This is just what Kauṭalya could not have intended. ✓ Though he looks upon monarchy as the best type of the state, he tells us in at least two places that after all this king was a servant of the state.<sup>2</sup> Unlimited power, no doubt, was centred in one single individual according to Kauṭalya, but its arbitrary use

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<sup>1</sup> For a different interpretation see Śaṅkarācārya's gloss on *Kāmandakiya-Nītisāra*, Canto VIII, v. 4. I am indebted to Mr. Harit Krishna Deb for drawing my attention to this.

<sup>2</sup> This point has been developed in Lecture V.



could never have been contemplated, or even tolerated. ) Kauṭalya, like other writers of the ancient Hindu polity, is never wearied of impressing on the mind of the king the paramount necessity of controlling the *śatru-shaḍ-varga*, that is, the six passions,—*kāma*, *krodha*, *lobha* and so forth, which are the six enemies of the king. He even cites instances of rulers who have destroyed themselves, their families and their kingdoms by falling a prey to one or more of these malevolent affections.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, in describing the qualities of the *svāmin*, Kauṭalya not only exhorts him to free himself from passions of the type just referred to but also lays stress on the fact that he must see through the eyes of the aged ministers about him and follow just that course of conduct that may be approved by them.<sup>2</sup> The king is thus clearly advised not to allow caprice or any kind of arbitrary feeling to take possession of his mind in determining and pursuing the policy of his state. It is possible to contend that this after all is an exhortation to the kings, which had no bearing on real political life and which must more often have been observed in the breach. Was it so really? Was it not in a way forced upon the king by the circumstances of the period? For it must be remembered that slightly before the time of Kauṭalya, India was split up into a number of tiny, independent

<sup>1</sup> *Arthaśāstra*, pp. 11-2

<sup>2</sup> The king should be not only *vṛddhopadeś-āchāra*, but also *vṛddha-darśin* (*Arthaśāstra*, pp. 257-58.)

states, each of which was ready to pounce upon its neighbours at the least favourable opportunity. In these circumstances it was absolutely necessary for every king, not only to develop the qualities of manliness and diplomacy so far as foreign relations were concerned but also lead a life of public righteousness and unselfishness to ensure a good and peaceful government at home. Whether in any particular kingdom the people were disaffected with their ruler or not was a point which the neighbouring princes were always careful to watch and detect. For the discontent of the subjects was looked upon as a serious flaw, almost a calamity, in a state, and invariably determined the foreign policy of its neighbour in regard to the extension of its boundary. Those who have read Book VII of the *Kauṭaliya* know it full well. But for those who have not studied this work, the following stray passage may be selected from it. The question is raised : which enemy should be marched against, an enemy strong but of wicked character or an enemy weak but of righteous character ? Kauṭalya answers it by saying that the former should by all means be attacked, for though he is strong, his subjects will not help him, but, on the contrary, will either put him down or go over to the other side. "When a people are impoverished," says he, "they become greedy ; when they are greedy, they become disaffected; and when they are disaffected, they voluntarily go to the side of the enemy or destroy their own mas-

ter.”<sup>1</sup> It will thus be seen that both public opinion and actual environments proved an effectual barrier against any king employing in an arbitrary manner whatever power he possessed and howsoever unlimited it might be in some cases. The home policy of a king has therefore been well enunciated by Kauṭalya, when he says that “in the happiness of his subjects lies the happiness of a king, in their welfare, his welfare. The king shall consider as good, not what pleases himself but what pleases his subjects.” This policy was in a way forced on the king, especially in the period slightly prior to Kauṭalya. That the king should rule firmly, justly and righteously was the universal understanding of the people. And the political firmament of the time was in such a state of extreme tension that the king, if he was a wise ruler, could not afford to displease his subjects. On the contrary, he was compelled to use his physical, mental and spiritual powers to their very best, to keep them contented and well-disposed, and so develop the resources of his kingdom as to give him the richest treasury, the most loyal and efficient army, and the most impregnable forts, not only to ward off attacks of his adversaries but also to be on the alert to pounce upon a weak and mismanaged state, and extend the bounds of his own dominions. This no doubt proved an effective check to the maladministration of any state.

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<sup>1</sup> *Arthasāstra*, p. 277 ; also p. 259.

The ideal thus seems to have had some righteous aspect. And this was perhaps the reason why this universal conquest was associated with the performance of sacrificial rites and ceremonies such as the Rājasūya, Vājapeya and Ásvamedha, which imparted a religious character to it.

The *prakritis* enumerated by the political thinkers of Ancient India are intended to describe the nature of the state. Modern political science, no doubt, gives the definition of the state, but it is curious that it makes no attempt to set forth the exact nature of it. 'Territory' and 'population may be looked upon as elements of the state, but 'unity' and 'organisation' can scarcely be so described. The last two are not concrete things. They are characteristics, but not elements, of the state. They are useful for framing its definition, but not for describing its composition. Hindu polity not only tries to describe the nature of the state, but does it apparently with some exactitude and thoroughness. They not only fulfil the modern definition of the state, but even enable us to determine in what respects this definition is perhaps somewhat deficient. The modern political thinkers think of the state statically and not dynamically. Their definition describes the state rather internally than externally. Hindu polity, on the other hand, looks at the composition of the state as a whole, that is, perceives it not as a thing in itself but as one political entity among and in relation to many. This is evident from

the fact that one of the constituents of the state is *Mitra* or ally, who can figure only in the international sphere. This *Mitra* is the *Svāmin* of another state. This foreign but important aspect of it is made prominent by Hindu theorists whenever they describe the state.

## LECTURE IV.

### DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATES.

In this Lecture we shall attempt to survey the different types of states that were known to Ancient India and differentiate them one from the other. In the previous Lecture it was pointed out that monarchy was the norm of the Hindu state. The first question that therefore arises is: whether any forms or types of monarchy were recognised. Of course, there were the paramount sovereign and feudatory or tributary princes. The distinction between the two was always clearly indicated by the titles and epithets that were coupled with their names. They became practically stereotyped in the post-Gupta period. Thus the rank of the supreme ruler was indicated by the titles: *parama-bhaṭṭāraka mahārājādhirāja Parameśvara*; and that of the feudatory chieftain by *samadhigata-pañchamahāśabda mahāsāmantādhipati*. In the period preceding it, the distinction between a subordinate chief and an overlord was indicated by other titles, which varied with ages and with dynasties. They could, however, be hardly looked upon as constituting two distinct types of monarchy. But what was the state of things in the political India of the pre-Mauryan period? This is the question that we shall here first attempt to

tackle. There are five hymns in the Śukla-Yajurveda (XV. 10-14) in which a deity is addressed in five of the different ways in which the kings were styled in those days. Along with this mode of address five directions and five different classes of gods have been specified. Thus Rājan is associated with the east and the Vasus; Virāt, with the south and the Rudras; Samrāt with the west and the Ādityas; Svarāt with the north and the Maruts; and Adhipati with the upper direction and the Viśvedevas. As no distinct countries or tribes have been mentioned here, the specification of the directions seems scarcely to have any value. Such is not, however, the case with a passage in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa, which specifies different titles of kings prevailing in different countries. The passage in question relates to the coronation of Indra.<sup>1</sup> The Vasus inaugurated Indra in the eastern direction for *sāmrājya*; hence the kings of the Prāchyas, we are told, are inaugurated to *sāmrājya* and called Samrājs. Then the Rudras inaugurated Indra in the southern region; hence all kings of the Satvats in the southern region are inaugurated to Bhaujya and called Bhojas. Similarly, the Ādityas inaugurated him in the west to *svārājya*; hence all kings of the Nīchyas and Apāchyas in the western direction are inaugurated to *svārājya* and are called Svarājs. Then the Viś-

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<sup>1</sup> *Mit. Br.* VIII. 14 (Haug's Text, pp. 203-4).

vedevas inaugurated him to *vairājya* in the northern region; hence the peoples (*janapadas*) living in the northern region beyond the Himālayas are inaugurated to *vairājya* and are called Virājs. Then the Sādhyas and Āptyas inaugurated Indra in the middle region to *rājya*; hence the kings of the Kuru-Pañchālas together with the Vaśas and Uśīnaras are inaugurated to *rājya* and are called Rājans. Then the Maruts and Āngirases inaugurated him in the upper region to *pārameshṭhya*, *māhārājya*, *ādhipatya* and *svāvaśya*, which, be it noted, are not associated with any countries or peoples.

If we now carefully consider the passage referred to above, an impression is produced on our mind that the terms *Samrāj*, *Bhoja*, *Svarāj*, *Virāj* and *Rājan* were so many different titles of the ruler prevailing in the different parts of the country but denoting the same status. That they were royal titles belonging to the specific countries is shown also by the use of the term *Bhoja*, which is in no way connected with the root *rāj*, and yet is found, like *Rāshṭriya*, as a title of some early southern kings, in some cave-inscriptions of Western India. In this connection the following passage from the same Brāhmaṇa (VIII.15) deserves to be further considered: *sa ya—ichchhed=evamvit kshatriyam* = (1) *ayam sarvā jitir=jayeta*; (2) *ayam sarvān lokān vindeta*; (3) *ayam sarveshām rājñām śraishṭhyam=atishṭhām paramatām gachchheta—sāmrājyam Bhaujyam svārājyam vairājyam pārameshṭhy-*



*am rājyam mahārājyam* = *ādhipatyam*; (4) *ayam samuntaparyāyī syāt*—*sārvabhaumaḥ sārva-yusha ā = ntād = ā = parārdhāt prithivyai samudra-paryantāyā eka-rāṭ = iti*. If we leave aside the first five words of this passage, we shall find that the term *ayam* is repeated four times and divides the various conquerors into four classes. (The first two of these may be set aside, because they have not received any distinguishing names or epithets. This much, however, is certain that they were chieftains and petty rulers. The third class evidently represents those who were overlords, those who had obtained suzerainty over minor chiefs. In this class are included not only the Samrājs, Bhojas, Svarājs and Rājans, but also Parameshthins, Mahārājas, Adhipatis and so forth. As these latter, here as elsewhere, have been mentioned without any reference to any particular countries or peoples, it seems that they were general designations of royal authority. But in this list of royal ranks, the highest is that represented by *Samanta-paryāyī*, who is possessed of the whole earth (*sārvabhauma*), is the master of the totality of living beings (*sarva-yusha*),<sup>1</sup> and is the sole ruler (*eka-rāṭ*) of the earth bordered by the ocean, up to its frontiers, and as far as (and including) its second half. *Samanta-paryāyī* thus seems to denote a universal ruler.)

<sup>1</sup> That the word *āyus* in the Vedic times signified also 'the totality of living beings' may be seen from *Rig-Veda*, II, 38, 5; and VII, 90, 6.

Whether the royal titles mentioned in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa were accepted in these their imports and significances all over India even during the Brāhmaṇa period is not certain. The term *Svārājya* e.g. occurs in the Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa,<sup>1</sup> where it is explained as *ya evam vidvān Vājapeyena yajati, gachchhati svārājyam, agram samānām paryeti, tishthante = smai jyaishthya*. The word *jyaishthya* here seems to indicate the sovereign power not of some supreme monarch, but rather of some supreme elder or president of a republic; and *Svārājya* of this text apparently denotes the same thing denoted by the *Vairājya* of the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa. Again, the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa<sup>2</sup> lays down that the Rājasūya sacrifice is that of a Rājan, and Vājapeya that of a Samrāj, and that the latter is of a higher status than the former. Be that as it may, this much is certain that even in the Brāhmaṇa period three distinct grades were recognised in the monarchical rule, namely, that of the feudatory chieftain, the overlord, and the universal monarch.

It is rather curious that Samrāj and similar titles of suzerain power are nowhere traceable in Brahmanical, Buddhist or Jaina literatures during the post-Brāhmaṇa period ending with the beginning of the Christian era. As regards Samantaparyāyī, this term also is not met with in this period. But there are other terms indicative of

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<sup>1</sup> I, 3, 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> V, 1, 1, 13; XIV, 1, 3, 8.

universal power which seem to have sprung up at this time and replaced it completely. Such terms are Sārvabhauma, Chāturanta and Chakravartin. The first of these is found mentioned in the Āpastamba Śrauta-sūtra (XX. i. i) alone. But the remaining two are of more frequent occurrence, being traceable in all literatures. The Dīgha-Nikāya<sup>1</sup> of Pāli Buddhism has a Sutta entitled *Mahā-Sudassana-suttanta* setting forth the exploits of king Sudassana. He is therein designated as Chāturanta and Chakravartin, and described as subjugating the earth up to the borders of the four oceans. Similarly, the Jaina scriptural text of the Kalpasūtra<sup>2</sup> tells us that Trisālā had fourteen great dreams just as she was conceiving Mahāvīra in her womb and that when the interpreters of dreams were called in, they predicted that her son if he obtained a kingdom would be a Chāturanta Chakravartin and if he retired from worldly life, a Jina. Similarly, in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta<sup>3</sup> Buddha compares Tathāgata to a Chakravartin. Kauṭalya also speaks of the universal monarch as a Chāturanta or Chakravartin. Chapter I of Adhikaraṇa VI. of the Arthaśāstra<sup>4</sup> ends with verses, two of which, as we have already seen, clearly imply that a Chāturanta is one who subjugates the whole earth. Similarly, in another

<sup>1</sup> (PTS.), Vol. II, p. 160 ff.

<sup>2</sup> (Ed. by H. Jacobi), pp. 52-3, § 74 and 80; SBE., Vol. XXII, pp. 246-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Dīgha-Nikāya* (PTS.), Vol. II, pp. 141-2.

<sup>4</sup> P. 259.

place he thus describes the extent of a Chakravartin's domain<sup>1</sup>: *deśaḥ prithivī ; tasyām Himavat-samudr-āntaram = udīchīnam nava-yojana-sahasra-parimāṇam tiryak*<sup>2</sup> *Chakravarti-kshetram*.

“The territory (to conquer) is the earth; the space intervening between the Himālayas and the ocean on that (earth), which is nine thousand *yojanas* in extent, running northwards (*udīchīna*) obliquely (*tiryak*), is the sphere of a Chakravartin.”

This passage has not been properly understood and consequently not properly translated. Kauṭalya evidently has here the whole Bhāratavarsha in view. In his opinion he whose dominion extends over the whole of this country is the Chakravartin. And while defining the limits and extent of this Bhāratavarsha, he shows his indebtedness to the Purāṇa. Precisely these limits and this extent have been specified in the Vāyu-Purāṇa (Cap. 45, vs. 80-7) and also the Matsya-Purāṇa (Cap. 114, vs. 9-15). Thus both these Purāṇas tell us that this country, which is surrounded by the seas, stretches from Cape Comorin to the source of the Ganges and is one thousand *yojanas* from south to north (*dakṣiṇ-ottaram*), but is nine thousand *yojanas* in extent, running northwards obliquely, and that he who conquers it whole is known as Samrāj.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 340.

<sup>2</sup> I have here adopted the reading of Śaṅkarārya from his gloss on *Kāmandakiya-Nīṭisāra*, Canto I, v. 39, as it suits better the texts of the Purāṇas referred to below.

In his translation of the passage from the *Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta*<sup>1</sup> where Tathāgata is compared to Chakravartin, the late (Prof. Rhys Davids remarks that there could not have been any Chakravartin in India before the time when the Maurya king Chandragupta raised himself to power. This view will hardly commend itself to the impartial students of Hindu polity. For, in the first place, so far as we know, Chandragupta never made himself master of the whole of India. Even his grandson, Aśoka, who added Kalinga to the dominions of his imperial family, had not subdued the four tiny states of extreme South. Nor anywhere in his epigraphic records does he assume the title of Chakravartin. It must not however be thought that the title of Chakravartin had really fallen into desuetude about this time. For Khāravēla who flourished about the beginning of the Christian era calls himself the Chakravartin of Kalinga.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, corresponding to the Chakravartin of the early Buddhist period we have Samanta-paryāyī of the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa,<sup>3</sup> which names more than half a dozen of kings who had subjugated the whole earth and were consequently entitled to the use of that epithet. There is therefore nothing to prevent us from supposing that universal monarchs were known to India prior even to the time of Chandragupta, the founder of the Maurya dynasty

<sup>1</sup> SBE., Vol. XI, p. 92, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> H. Lüders' *List of Brāhmī Inscr.*, No. 1346.

<sup>3</sup> VIII, 21.

We have seen that curiously enough, the regal titles of the Brāhmaṇa period are not traceable in the literatures ranging between 500 B.C. and 100 A.D. Some of them are however to be met with in later times., e.g. in the Amarakosha. Thus the terms *virāj*, *svarāj* and *samrāj* occur in this lexicon, but with varying significations. Thus *virāj* is given as a synonym of *kshatriya*, and *svarāj* as another name of Indra. (*Samrāj* is explained as denoting apparently, three different things:—(1) the performer of the *rājasūya*, (2) controller of *rājans*, and (3) lord of a *mandala*), that is, denoting the universal monarch, suzerain, and feudatory chieftain. The special terms, however, employed in this lexicon, indicative of these ranks, are Chakravartin, Adhīśvara and Maṇḍalesvara. In still later times, these and other terms denoted the different grades of monarchy corresponding to their incomes. Thus the Śukranīti<sup>1</sup> gives the following table :

Sāmanta,	from	1	to	3	lacs of silver	Karshas.
Māṇḍalika,	„	4	„	10	„ „ „ „	„
Rājan	„	11	„	20	„ „ „ „	„
Mahārāja	„	21	„	50	„ „ „ „	„
Svarāj	„	51	„	100	„ „ „ „	„
Samrāj	„	1	„	10	Crores of „	„
Virāj	„	11	„	50	„ „ „ „	„
Sārvabhauma	„	51	&	crores upwards.		

It will be seen from the above discussion that what are generally supposed to be the different

<sup>1</sup> I, 182 and ff.

types of monarchy are really different grades in monarchy. But were there, as a matter of fact, any forms of monarchy? An old Jaina canonical text refers in one place to the countries which are tabooed for a Jaina monk to visit. One of these is *do-rajja*, which means, of course, a rule of two kings.<sup>1</sup> Kautalya also refers to it as *dvai-rājya*, and remarks that such a government perishes through mutual hatred, partiality and rivalry.<sup>2</sup> This must be the reason why a Jaina monk is advised not to reside in such a country. *Do-rajja* must have been something like the State of Sparta ruled by two kings. In fact, Diodorus speaks of Alexander sailing up the Indus and coming to *Tauala*, "a city of great note, with a political constitution drawn on the same lines as the Spartan; for in this community the command in war was vested in two hereditary kings of two different houses, while the council of elders ruled the whole state with paramount authority."<sup>3</sup> This no doubt represents one type of *dvai-rājya*, but Kautalya speaks of another which consisted of the joint rule of father and son or of two brothers.<sup>4</sup> According to this type, the rule remained with two kings of one and the same house. The joint coins of Lysias and Antialkidas,

<sup>1</sup> *Āyaraṅga-Sutta* (PTS.), II, 3. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Arthaśāstra*, p. 325. But from a variant noticed below it appears that this was the view, not of Kautalya, but of his teacher.

<sup>3</sup> Mc. Crindle's *Ancient India, Its Invasion by Alexander the Great*, p. 296.

<sup>4</sup> *Arthaśāstra*, p. 325, footnote.

Strato I and Agathocleia, Stratos I. and II., Azas and Azilises, Vonones and Spalahores, Chashṭana and Rudradāman I. clearly indicate conjoint rule of another type in Ancient India.<sup>1</sup> Of these Vonones and Spalahores indicate the *dvai-rājya* of two brothers, and, Azas and Azilises, Stratos I and II and Chashṭana and Rudradāman, that of father and son or grandson.

A third type of monarchy which is somewhat akin to the Samgha form is that hinted in a verse of the *Arthaśāstra*,<sup>2</sup> namely, *kulasya vā bhaved = rājyam kula-samgho hi durjayah*. What Kauṭilya means is that a kingdom may sometimes belong, not to any ruler individually, but to a royal family collectively. The sovereignty of such a kingdom is then vested in a kula-samgha, to adopt his phraseology. Two instances of this monarchical Samgha are known. Before the Māuryas came to power, the country of Magadha, we know, was ruled over by the Śiśunāga and Nanda dynasties. The last but one prince of the former was Kālāsoka, and the Mahāvamsa tells us that after him the kingdom was held by his ten sons, not successively but jointly. Similarly, in regard to the latter dynasty the Purāṇas inform us that the Nandas

<sup>1</sup> *Ind. Ant.*, 1923, p. 279.

<sup>2</sup> P. 35. In my opinion, *kula* of this verse signifies 'a family,' not 'a clan.' The first verse describes an alternative in the enjoyment of sovereignty, namely, that it may go to the eldest son in a royal family. If it cannot be held by one single prince, the other alternative must naturally be that it might be shared collectively by all the members of that family. *Kula* must therefore mean here 'a family,' and not 'a clan.'



consisted of one father and eight sons who exercised collective supremacy over their empire.<sup>1</sup> These are obviously instances of the *kula-saṃgha*, where the kingdom is held, not by one member, but all the members, of a royal family.

So much for monarchy; and we shall now proceed to consider the other forms of sovereignty that were known to Ancient India. A study of Pāṇini's Sūtras tells us that up till his time at any rate there were many countries named after the Kshatriya tribes which were settled there. This conclusion is confirmed also by epigraphic and numismatic evidence though of a somewhat later period. The Kshatriyas were the fighting and ruling tribes, and it is therefore natural that districts and provinces conquered and occupied by them should be called after them. But what further about these Kshatriya tribes? Were they invariably of a monarchical constitution? Was the political power always centred in the hands of only one or more or all members of the ruling family of the tribe? Here Kātyāyana comes to our help, who, while commenting on a Sūtra of Pāṇini, tells us that the Kshatriya tribe may be *ekarāja* 'possessed of Individual Sovereign' or a *saṃgha* 'having Collegiate Sovereign.' Now, what is this word *saṃgha*? It does not denote a mere collection, a promiscuous conglomeration, which is really signified by *saṃghāta*, but rather a combination of individuals for a definite pur-

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<sup>1</sup> Car. Lect., 1918, pp. 82-3.

pose, a corporation.<sup>1</sup> It will be easily seen that there can be as many classes of Samghas as there are kinds of purposes with which they are started. Thus if we have a fraternity composed of persons devoted to a particular set of religious beliefs,—we have a religious Samgha, the most typical example of which is the Buddhist Samgha. We may also have a Samgha for the purpose of trade and industry, that is, a trade or craft guild, or Śreni as it has been specifically called in Sanskrit. A third class of Samgha is āyudha-jīvin as Pāṇini calls it or śastropa-jīvin as Kauṭalya styles it, both expressions meaning ‘a corporation of men subsisting on arms.’ This Samgha denoted tribal corporations of fighting people, who were seldom settled permanently in any province or country. But whenever they were settled, no doubt temporarily, over any tract of land, they subsisted not only upon their arms but also upon agriculture. This is the reason why Kauṭalya<sup>2</sup> speaks of them as vārtā-śastr-opajīvinah. They also developed a patriotic feeling for the country where they were so settled, and hence kings have been directed by Kauṭalya<sup>3</sup> to seek the aid always of such fighting corporate tribes as belonged to his *janapada*. That they were not however entirely bereft of their migratory habits may be seen from the fact that Kauṭalya<sup>4</sup> recommends kings in the case of turbulent

<sup>1</sup> *Car. Lect.*, 1918, p. 141 and ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 345.

<sup>2</sup> *Arthasāstra*, p. 378.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 379.

Saṅghas either to expel them altogether from his kingdom or divide and settle them in the different parts of the country. So far as this fighting character of the Saṅgha was concerned, they had generally a tribal constitution of their own, which was akin to the democratic form. But it can scarcely be considered to be political, as they seldom had any political sway over any tract of land.

It is true that (the Saṅghas described above had no political character, but we can certainly have a political Saṅgha or a corporate body of individuals for the purpose of governing or ruling over a territory. And it is this Saṅgha which Kātyāyana has in view when he contrasts it with an ekarāja Kshatriya tribe. It is difficult to translate it by any single English word, but the term 'republic,' as understood in classical political philosophy, makes the closest approach to it. There is a passage in the Aṅguttara-Nikāya<sup>1</sup> which specifies a list of rulers from the king downwards. In the concluding portion of it, we are told that one class of rulers was Pūga-gāmanika, Chiefs of the Pūgas, and below them in rank are the Chiefs of Kulas. About the last we are told that they by turn exercised rule (ādhipatya) over the Kulas. This is another form of the Kula-saṅgha; but the word *Kula*, be it noted, here signifies not 'a family' but 'a clan.' Unfortunately, this Sanskrit term has both the

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<sup>1</sup> (PTS.), Pt. III, pp. 76 and 160.

senses, and we must therefore be careful in finding out which sense at any particular time is intended. The Kula-saṃgha of the *Kauṭalīya* denotes the corporation consisting of the members of a royal family. But the Kula power referred to in the passage from the *Āṅguttara-Nikāya* denotes the rule of a clan. A typical example of this last is furnished by the *Śākya*s, to whose race Buddha belonged. The *Kuṇāla-Jātaka* describes a feud between the *Śākya*s and their neighbours the *Koliya*s.<sup>1</sup> This account affords us a few glimpses into the nature of the *Śākya* state. It appears that their settlements consisted of serfs and labourers, the attendants, village-headmen (*Bhojaka*), councillors (*Amātyas*) and Viceroy's (*Uparājas*). As regards the ruling class it seems to have been divided into families, the heads of which were all called *Rājans* or kings. Their sons were consequently known as *Kumāras* or princes. "A single chief—how, and for what period, chosen, we do not know—was elected as office-holder presiding over the sessions, and if no sessions were sitting, over the state."<sup>2</sup> It was such an office-bearer who was the ruler or *Jeṭṭhaka* of the Kula, as we are informed by the *Āṅguttara-Nikāya*. There can be no doubt that this was a kind of political rule, because the *Śākya* clan, as we are told, had their viceroys, councillors and village-headmen.

<sup>1</sup> *Jāt*, Vol. V, p. 412 and ff.

<sup>2</sup> Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p. 19.

The second form of the Samgha rule is represented by the Puga or Gana, which according to Kātyāyana, the author of a Smṛiti, is an aggregation of families (*kulānām tu samūhas=tu Gaṇaḥ sa parikīrtitaḥ*). The religious Samghas were often constituted after their political prototypes. The founder of Jainism was a Kshatriya born in a suburb of Vaiśālī, capital of the Licchavi Gana, and himself related to a Chief of this Gana. It was, therefore, quite natural that he should have formed his congregation after the model of the Gana which he knew best. We know that the Jaina Samgha was split up into a number of Ganas, the Ganas into Kulas, Kulas into Śākhās, and Śākhās into Sambhogas. It is quite certain that the political Gana was similarly divided into a number of Kulas, and it is possible that these Kulas were further divided into Śākhās, and Śākhās into Sambhogas, exactly as was the case with the Jaina Samgha. Chapter 107 of the Śāntiparvan throws further light on this subject. The members of a Gana are there said to be exact equals of one another in respect of birth and family, and it is expressly stated that if quarrels broke out amongst the Kulas, the Elders of the Kulas should by no means remain indifferent, otherwise the Gana would be dissolved. This also clearly shows that Gana in its specific sense denoted the rule of a federation of families, whether they belonged to one clan or one tribe. We further learn that

a select few were appointed by a Gaṇa from among themselves called Mukhyas or Chiefs, as we also learn from the Kauṭaliya. They constituted a sort of cabinet, and were in charge of the department of espionage and of all state affairs of a highly confidential character. Though the real power, as a rule, lay in the hands of a few only, every member of the Gaṇa was styled Rājan. Kauṭalya distinguishes between two kinds of Saṃgha, one of which alone is a political corporation. He styles it *rāja-śabd-opajīvin*, that is, (an organization), the members of which live upon the title Rājan. The members themselves have been called by him *rāja-śabdins*. This receives support from the *Lalitavistara*<sup>1</sup> which says about the Lichchhavis that ' *ekaika=eva manyate ahaṃ rājā ahaṃ rāj=eti*, that is, "every one thinks 'I am king; I am king'" when none of them singly or properly was. What this exactly means it is difficult to say. But it seems that every member of such a Saṃgha assumed the title of a king and exacted, from the people of his domain, land and such other taxes as were due to a king only. He thus subsisted on the title of a king that he bore, though his power was limited to a small tract of land. The individual members may not each be a 'king' in the real sense of the term, but that they together formed a political Saṃgha can scarcely be doubted. One Sutta of the *Majjhima-Nikaya*<sup>2</sup> introduces us to

<sup>1</sup> Lefmann's Ed., p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Pt. I, p. 231.

a discussion between Buddha and a Jaina monk called Sachchaka. In the course of the discussion the former asked whether Pasenadi, king of Kosala, or Ajātaśatru, king of Magadha, had power to banish, burn, or kill a man in his dominions. At the time of the discussion some Lichchhavis were present; and, pointing to them, Sachchaka replied that if the Saṅghas and Gaṇas, like the Lichchhavis or the Mallas, had this power in their own kingdom, certainly Pasenadi and Ajātaśatru did possess it. (This indicates that the Saṅgha had much less political power than a king.) And when even this little power possessed by the Saṅgha is divided and perhaps subdivided among its numerous members, it is ridiculous to say that each member was a real Rājan or king though he may call himself to be so for the purpose of eking out a living.

Various are the examples of the Gaṇa state. Kautālya mentions no less than seven, namely, Lichchhavis, Vṛjīkas, Mallakas, Madrakas, Kukuras, Kurus and Pañchālas. In another place in his work he speaks of the Vṛishṇi Saṅgha also. The first of these is the Lichchhavis who were practically the same as the Vṛjīakas.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately for us we possess better and more detailed information about them, and are in a position to know something definite about the constitution

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<sup>1</sup> It is possible that the Lichchhavis and Vṛjīakas were two clans of one tribe. See *Majjhima-Nikāy-aṭṭhakathā* on *Mahāsihanāda-sutta*.

of their state. Let us cull together all the pieces of information bearing on this point that are available. The preambles of the Jātakas<sup>1</sup> tell us in two places that there were as many as 7,707 Lichchhavi kings, staying at Vaiśālī to administer the affairs of the state. The Kalpa-sūtra of the Jainas, however, speaks of them as only nine.<sup>2</sup> The discrepancy can perhaps be explained by saying that the latter number represents the Chiefs of the Kulas or clans, who formed the cabinet. Each Kula thus roughly comprised 855 members who styled themselves Rājans,—which is not a big number considering that the Kulas were divided into Śākhās and the Śākhās into Sambhogas and that according to the Hindu custom all brothers are entitled to a share in the paternity. As time rolled on, these numbers must have increased, and this seems probably to be the reason why the Mahāvastu<sup>3</sup> speaks of the twice eighty-four thousand Lichchhavi kings residing in Vesālī. One Jātaka<sup>4</sup> further informs us that there were as many Uparājas or Viceroys, Senāpatis or gene-

<sup>1</sup> III. 1; IV, 148.

<sup>2</sup> *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXII, p. 266.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. I, p. 271. This shows to what impoverished condition the Lichchhavis must have been reduced in later times. This brings another instance to my mind. At Ghaṭiyālā in the Jodhpur State, Rājputānā, there were as many as twenty Jāgirdārs, though it was an insignificant village, and it was therefore no wonder if some of them came to serve us when I was encamped there in January, 1907 (*Prog. Rep. Archæol. Surv., West Ind.*, 1906-7, p. 34). Yet they took pride in calling themselves Jāgirdārs.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. I, p. 504



rals, and Bhāṇḍāgārikas or Treasurers staying with the kings at this capital, that is, 7,707 each.<sup>1</sup> This number seems to be somewhat excessive, but, considering the pride of the title each inherited, a Lichchhavi king must have been compelled to maintain this office staff for the sake of his prestige in spite of his slender income. That the Lichchhavis were proud and jealous of their title of Rājan is evident from the fact that they had their coronation ceremony performed. We read of there having been a special *pushkariṇī* or tank in Vesālī, the water of which was used to sprinkle their heads while being crowned. The tank was considered very sacred, and was therefore covered with an iron net so that not even a bird could get through, and a strong guard was set to prevent any one taking water from it. When and how many of the Lichchhavis at a time were crowned is not clear. But it seems probable that on the death of a Lichchhavi king it was his sons, succeeding to his title and property, who were crowned kings. This information of the Lichchhavis (Vṛijjis) of being in large numbers and composed of the old and young agrees well with the description given by Buddha at the beginning of the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*. The same text tells us that they carried out business together, which consisted in enacting nothing not already established, abrogat-

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<sup>1</sup> *Car. Lect.*, 1918, p. 149 and ff.

ing nothing already enacted, and acting in accordance with their ancient Institutions as established in former days. This points to the whole tribal body of the Vṛijis, exercising the function of a legislative assembly. The *Aṭṭhakathā* and *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, which are commentaries on the Buddhist Pali canon works, afford us some interesting glimpses into the manner in which Law was administered in their state. When a culprit was found, we are told, he was in the first place sent to an officer called *Viniśchaya-Mahāmātra*. If he was found guilty, he was transferred to the *Vyavahārika*, then to the *Śūtradhara* (Rehearser of Law maxims), *Aṣṭa-kulika* (officer appointed over eight *kulas*), *Senāpati* (general), *Uparāja* (Viceroy), and finally to *Rājan* (king). The *Rājan* consulted the *Paveṇipolthaka* or "book of precedents," and inflicted a suitable punishment.<sup>1</sup> Of these the *Uparāja* and *Senāpati*, we have seen, stayed with their *Lichchhavi* master in *Vesāli* along with the *Bhāṇḍāgārika*. These, being the superior officers, the *Lichchhavi* kings, kept with themselves in the capital town, leaving in their respective patrimonies their subordinate staff, such as the *Viniśchaya-Mahāmātra*, *Vyavahārika* and so forth.

It will be seen that the *Gaṇa* was a tribal oligarchy, a federation of clans. What appears to be the case is that each clan had its separate

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 154-6.

autonomy, corresponding to the *kula-saṃgha* of the second type adverted to above, and that all clans formed themselves into a tribal Saṃgha or confederacy for self-preservation and common tribal good. This is what, I think, we have to understand by a Gaṇa. There were many Gaṇas spread all over India, especially North India. Kautalya, we have seen, mentions eight of them. Of these, two were settled in East India. They are the Lichchhavis or Vṛjikas and the Mallas. The former held Videha and parts of Kosala and had their capital at Vesālī, which has been identified with Basarḥ in the Muzaffarpur District of Behar. The capital of the Mallas was Kusināra or Kasia in U.P., thirty-seven miles east of Gorakhpur. Of the remaining five the Kurus were settled round about Indraprastha near Delhi, and the Pañchālas round about Kampilya or Kampil between Budaon and Farrukhabad in U.P. The Madrakas occupied the country between the Rāvi and the Chenāb in the Panjāb. There thus remain the Kukuras and the Vṛishṇis. The former were descendants of Kukura, son of Andhaka Mahā-Bhoja, and must therefore have been known also as Andhakas and Bhojas.<sup>1</sup> Vṛishṇis were the descendants of Vṛishṇi, younger brother of Andhaka. It appears from a passage in the Mahābhārata<sup>2</sup> that both these clans which are there called Andhaka-

<sup>1</sup> F. E. Pargiter's *Anc. Ind. His. Tradition*, pp. 105-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Sāntiparvan*, Chap. 81.

Vṛishṇis formed one Saṁgha—a conclusion which is supported also by a Sūtra of Pāṇini, and that whereas Kṛishṇa as a Saṁgha-mukhya or Chief represented the Vṛishṇis, Babhru and Ugrasena represented the Andhakas. We are further informed that these clans included the Yādavas, Kukuras, Bhojas and so forth, that they each consisted of the two divisions, *lokas* and *lokeśvaras*, the people and the rulers, and that their joint rule was known by *rāja-śabda*, that is, it was a *rāja-śabdin* Saṁgha, as Kauṭalya would call it. From the Mahābhārata passage it is also clear that quarrels had arisen between the two parties even in the time of Kṛishṇa. And though they were quieted by him for the time being, it appears that they afterwards became so acute that the league was dissolved. This seems to be the reason why Kauṭalya speaks of the Kukuras and the Vṛishṇis separately. That there was this divorce effected between the two may be seen from the fact that later, Vṛishṇis had their own coinage—coinage struck in the name of Vṛishṇi-rājanyā-Gaṇa<sup>1</sup> alone, without any reference to the Kukura or Andhaka clan. Coins of other Gaṇas also are known, such as of the Mālavas, Yaudheyas, and so forth, but in the legends on them they are, as a rule, referred to simply as the Mālavas and the Yaudheyas, but sometimes with the political designation Gaṇa. But in no case does the

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<sup>1</sup> J.R.A.S., 1900, pp. 420-1.

phrase *rājanya-gaṇa* occur as on the coins of the Vṛishṇis. What could be the significance of the term *rājanya* prefixed to Gaṇa here? Some interesting light is thrown on this point by Pāṇini's Sūtra referred to above, namely, *rājanya-bahurachana-dvandve* = (A)ndhaka-Vṛishṇishu (VI. 2.34). The insertion of the word *rājanya* in this aphorism clearly shows that there were some members of the Andhaka and Vṛishṇi groups who were not *rājanyas*. Now the term *rājanya* has been explained in the Amarakosha by *mūrdhābhishikta*, which signified 'a consecrated king.' Evidently this means that the Andhakas and the Vṛishṇis contained amongst them some who were not Kshatriya scions of crowned kings, that is, they contained *lokas* as well as *lokeśvaras*, to borrow the expression of the Mahābhārata passage adverted to above. But as Gaṇa is composed of Kshatriyas who could become kings, it was thought necessary to insert the word *rājanya* after Vṛishṇi on the coins, in order to exclude the proletariat.

The Greek historians who wrote accounts of Alexander's invasion of India make mention of several Samghas and even offer remarks in the case of some in regard to their constitution. One such tribe in the Punjab may be noticed here. It was settled on the lower Chenāb called Sambastai by Diodorus and Sabarcae by Curtius. In regard to this people they say that they were a powerful Indian tribe, obeying their elders and dwelling in cities where the form of government was demo-

cratic and not regal.<sup>1</sup> This means apparently that the tribe was divided into a number of clans, each one of which stayed in its own city and ruled according to the Kula democratic form. We are not here told that the different clans united themselves into a Gaṇa, dwelling in one single capital town for the common weal of the federation. If this Greek account is not untrustworthy, it points perhaps to a state of things which prevailed before the various clans of the Sambastai or Sabarcae tribe formed themselves into a Gaṇa confederacy.

It deserves to be noticed that some of the Gaṇas noted above were originally monarchical in form. Such were, for instance, the Kurus and Pañchālas in the sixth and fifth centuries before Christ. The Jātakas in early Pāli literature clearly give us to understand that they were not *Samgha* but *ekarāja* Kshatriya tribes, that is, tribes each governed by one ruler.<sup>2</sup> Though they were thus originally monarchical, they seem to have become oligarchic in the fourth century B.C. when Kauṭalya lived. What may have happened is that at one time in the history of this clan the sovereignty came to be divided equally among the members of the royal family as was the case with the sons of Kālāśoka of the Śiśunāga dynasty and that each one of these brothers may have develop-

<sup>1</sup> J. W. Mc. Crindle's *Ancient India: Its Invasion by Alexander the Great*, pp. 252 and 292.

<sup>2</sup> *Car. Lect.*, 1918, p. 164 and ff.

ed a separate clan in his own name. The political power thus came to be centred in the hands of a few families who ultimately constituted the Gaṇa. Another instance of a monarchical tribe, becoming non-monarchical in form, is furnished by the Yaudheyas who seem to have occupied the Eastern Panjab. It is well-known that the Yaudheyas are spoken of by Pāṇini as an *āyudha-jīvin* Saṁgha, 'a corporation subsisting on arms.' But then from his Sūtra IV. I. 178 it is clear that they were one of the very few *āyudha-jīvin* tribes which had a political character and that, in this particular, they had a monarchical constitution. About the beginning of the Christian era, however, they seem to have acquired greater political power and also glided into a Gaṇa. Of the Yaudheyas we have not only coins ranging between 50 and 350 A.D., but also an inscription found at Bijayagaḍh near Byānā in the Bharatpur State.<sup>1</sup> Though this is but a fragment, enough of it has been preserved to show that it is a record of one who was Mahārāja and Mahāsenāpati and also a leader (*puraskṛita*) of the Yaudheya Gaṇa. The title Mahārāja must have belonged to him as a mere member of the Gaṇa. But, as the designation Mahāsenāpati shows, he must have been elected their general and remained so in the year 371 A.D., the date of the inscription. And as the word *puraskṛita* indicates, this Gaṇa did not

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<sup>1</sup> *Corp. Inscr. Ind.*, Vol. III. p. 252

reserve the executive power to its whole self, but delegated it to a cabinet of Mukhyas. As the Yaudheyas were an *āyudha-jīvin* Saṃgha and developed their fighting qualities to such an extent as to adopt the epithet of *vīra*, as is clear from the Junāgaḍh inscription of Rudradāman,<sup>1</sup> it is intelligible that he who was their Senāpati should particularly be looked upon as a leader.

The name of the tribal oligarchy, as we have seen, is Gaṇa. But the word Gaṇa does not seem to have acquired this exclusive sense before the first century B.C. The earliest instance of the use of this term in this specific sense is furnished by the coins of the Mālavas, which contained this word in this sense in the legends. If we, however, go to an earlier period, we find that the terms *Saṃgha* and *Gaṇa* have been used synonymously to denote 'a corporation in general.' The word, that seems to have been employed specifically to denote the tribal oligarchy prior to the Christian era, was Pūga, which, for instance, is met with in Pāṇini V.3.112. In the Dharma-sūtras and the Dharma-śāstras, Pūga and Gaṇa have been used perfectly synonymously. That Pūga was possessed of some political character is shown by the Vinayapiṭaka laying down that no female thief shall be consecrated as nun without the permission of the Pūga if she happens to fall within its jurisdiction.<sup>2</sup> Again, if we consider carefully the passage from

<sup>1</sup> *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. VIII, p. 44., ll. 11-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Bhikkhunī-Pātimokkha*, saṃghādidesa, 2.



the Aṅguttara-Nikāya referred to above, we shall find that the ruler of a higher order than the Chief of a Kula is therein specified to be the Pūga-gāmaṇika, which the commentator explains by Gaṇa-jetṭhaka (Chief of a Gaṇa). No reasonable doubt need therefore be entertained as to Pūga being used in earlier times to denote the tribal oligarchy for which in later times the word *Gaṇa* was specifically used.

We do not know to what earliest period the existence of this political Saṃgha can be traced. There is however a hymn in the *Ṛigveda*<sup>1</sup> which says: "As the kings (*rājānaḥ*) assemble together in the Samiti, the plants (*oshadhi*) gather together in him who is called a physician, one who heals disease and destroys demon." This hymn seems to refer to the rule of a State, not by a single king but by several. There are passages even in the Atharva-Veda which refer to the members of an oligarchy.<sup>2</sup> As Gaṇa is a system of government which is tribal in character, it is not at all impossible that it may have come down from the *Ṛigvedic* period. But as we are not treading here quite on *terra firma*, we shall not lay much stress upon it. As regards the late period up to which the Gaṇa form of state persisted, we may here note the fact that Varahamihira, who flourished<sup>3</sup> in the sixth century A.D., speaks in his work

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<sup>1</sup> X, 9. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Zimmer's *Alt Indischen Leben*, pp. 165 and 176.

<sup>3</sup> Chap. IV, c. 24; Chap. XIV. v. 14.

entitled *Bṛihatsaṃhitā* not only of Gaṇa-rājyas, that is, kingdoms of the tribal Gaṇas in Southern India, but also of Gaṇa-Puṅgavas or Heads of Gaṇas such as the Mālavas, Kaulindas and Śibis.

Side by side with Gaṇa or tribal oligarchy, there were other forms of the political Saṃgha flourishing in Ancient India. We have in this connection to take note of a twofold kind of democracy, one styled Nigama which was confined to a town and was a citizens' democracy, and the other Janapada which extended over a province and was tribal in character. We are not here referring to the power which the people of towns and provinces, called Paura and Jānapada respectively, sometimes wielded in the administration of a country, and which is often alluded to in the epics, law books and epigraphic records, but which was seldom of a political character. We are here referring to those cities and countries, which enjoyed political autonomy as attested, for instance, by the coins they issued. Long, long ago Sir Alexander Cunningham picked up some coins from the Punjab, which were nearly of the time of Alexander. Bühler was the first to point out that they had on the obverse the word *negāmā* and on the reverse various names, such as Dojaka, Tālimata, Atakatakā and so forth.<sup>1</sup> Bühler rightly took *negamā* to stand for the Sanskrit *naigamāḥ*, but wrongly understood it in the sense

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<sup>1</sup> Car. Lect., 1918, p. 175 ff ; 1921, p. 6.

of 'a guild.' The word *naigamāḥ* may mean 'traders' or 'merchants,' but never 'a guild,' for which we have the term *śreṇi*. It is natural to take this word in the sense of 'a body of citizens' for which we have the authority of the works on Hindu law. The Nārada-Smṛiti specifies organizations such as the Naigamas, Śrenis, Gaṇas and so forth; and this term *naigama* has been explained as *paurāḥ* or citizens. The law-giver Yājñavalkya too speaks of Naigamas side by side with Śrenis, Pāṣaṇḍis and Gaṇas, and the commentary Bālaṁbhaṭṭi explains it by *nānā-paura-samūhāḥ*, that is, aggregations of the manifold citizens. No doubt need, therefore, be entertained as to the coins of Sir Alexander Cunningham being the civic coins struck by the people of the cities of Dojaka, Tālimata and so forth. This no doubt reminds us of similar coinages of the Phocæa, Cyzicus and other Greek cities, and further points to the fact that the Naigama or civic autonomy was as conspicuous among the Hindus of the old Panjab as among the Greeks on the western coast of Asia Minor. That a province autonomy, or Janapada as it was called, was not unknown to India is clear also from a study of coins. Thus we have one type<sup>1</sup> bearing the legend: *rājāṇa-janapadasa* = (coin) of the Rājanya people. Rājanya here does not signify a Kshatriya or the Rajput title Rāṇā, as is generally supposed, but rather, a people

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 1918, pp. 172-4; 1921, p. 7.

named Rāṇā, such as the Rāṇās of the Panjab hills<sup>1</sup> or Rāṇās of the Goa territory. The second class of coins, we may note, contains the legend : *Majhimikāya Śibi-janapadasa* = (coin) of the Śibi people of the Madhyamikā (country). There were two peoples of the name of Śibi, one in the Panjab and the other in south-east Rājputānā. The latter have thus been distinguished from the former by the specification of their country Madhyamikā, the province round about Nagari in Mewār, Rājputānā. As issuing coins is an indication of political power, this Janapada may rightly be considered as a democracy and hence one distinct form of the political Saṃgha. The existence of the Janapada State in India is traceable to a still earlier period. Thus in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa we have a passage which refers to the different forms of kingly power. This we have considered above. There we are told that the kings of the Prāchyas, of the Satvats, and so on, are, when crowned, designated respectively Samrājs, Bhojas, and so forth. But that the Janapadas called the Uttara-Kurus and Uttara-Madras are styled *Virājāḥ* when they are consecrated to sovereignty.<sup>2</sup> Janapada is here contrasted with Rājan, and must therefore denote

<sup>1</sup> J.R.A.S., 1907, p. 409; 1908, pp. 540-1. J. Ph. Vogel's *Antiquities of Chamba State*, Pt. I., p. 110 f.

<sup>2</sup> What is meant by the coronation of the Janapada democracies? Probably it refers to the consecration of their Presidents when elected.

a country democracy. And it is quite possible that the title *Virājāḥ* mentioned above must be taken to mean 'kingless, without king,' as was first pointed out by Martin Haug. But as Rājanyas, Śibis, Kurus and Madras are names of tribes, the Janapadas represented by them seem to be tribal democracies.

We thus perceive that there were many types of republics in Ancient India, tribal and civic, and it may now be asked: what was the procedure which governed their deliberations. It is a pity that no treatise of polity, or, for the matter of that, no work of literature exists which has preserved for us either the constitution or the rules of debate which controlled these political corporations. Fortunately for us we have some rules preserved for the Buddhist Saṅgha in the Vinaya Piṭaka. This code of procedure must have been the same for all Saṅghas, whether political, commercial or religious. Let us therefore try and understand what the set of rules was for the Buddhist Saṅgha. The first point to note is the order of precedence according to which seats were assigned to the Bhikshus.<sup>1</sup> There was a special officer *Āsana-prajñāpaka*, whose duty was to see that they received seats according to their dignity and seniority. The deliberations are commenced by a mover who announces to the assembled members what motion he is going to propose.

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<sup>1</sup> *Car. Lect.*, 1918, p. 180 and ff.

This announcement is called *Jñapti*. Then comes the second part of the procedure which consists in putting the question to the Saṅgha whether they approved the motion. It may be put once or thrice. In the former case the Karma or formal act is called *Jñapti-dvitiya*, and in the latter, *Jñapti-chaturtha*. We will give an instance to explain what it means, and quote it from the *Mahāvagga*. Buddha lays down the following rule in regard to the *Upasampadā* ordination. "Let a learned competent Bhikkhu," says he, "proclaim the following natti before the Saṅgha:

"Let the Saṅgha, reverend Sirs, hear me. This person N.N. desires to receive the *upasampadā* ordination from the venerable N.N. (i.e. with the venerable N.N. as his *upajjhāya*). If the Saṅgha is ready, let the Saṅgha confer on N.N. the *Upasampadā* ordination with N.N. as *upajjhāya*. This is the natti." Now what follows is *Karmavāchā*, which is placing the motion before the Saṅgha for discussion and execution (*Karma*), and is in every case accompanied by the formal repetition of the *Jñapti* (*Natti*). In the present case the *Karmavāchā* is repeated thrice. I therefore quote here what follows.

"Let the Saṅgha, reverend Sirs, hear me. This person N.N. desires to receive the *upasampadā* ordination from the venerable N.N. The Saṅgha confers on N.N. the *upasampadā* ordination with N.N. as *upajjhāya*. Let any one of the venerable brethren who is in favour of the

npasāmpadā ordination of N. N. as upajjhāya be silent, and any one who is not in favour of it speak.

“And for the second time I thus speak to you : Let the Saṃgha (etc., as before).

“And for the third time I thus speak to you : Let the Saṃgha, etc.

“N. N. has received the upasāmpadā ordination from the Saṃgha with N. N. as upajjhāya. The Saṃgha is in favour of it, therefore it is silent. Thus I understand.”

It will be seen that the above motion has been thrice put to the assembly, and that we have here three Karmavāchās and one Jñapti. It is thus Jñapti-chaturtha Karma. A Karma or official act of the Saṃgha to be valid must comprise one Jñapti and one or three Karmavāchās. When a motion was placed before an assembly and all those who were present remained silent, it was said to be carried unanimously. But if any discussion or difference of opinion arose, the matter was decided by *Yebhuyyāsikā*, that is, the vote of the majority. This voting was by ballot, and was done by the distribution of tickets or *śalākās* as they were called; and the Bhikshu who collected them was designated *Salākā-gahāpaka*. If any member of the Saṃgha was too ill or disabled in any other way to attend a meeting, he could give an absentee vote known as *Chhanda*. Nay, if it was feared that enough Bhikshus might not be forthcoming for any particular meeting, they se-


cured the necessary quorum by sending the Gaṇapūraka, who necessarily was the 'whip.' These details are enough to show that the code of rules, which regulated the business of the Assembly, was of a highly specialised and developed character, such as is observed by the political bodies of the modern civilised age. When I first expressed these views in 1918 in one of my Carmichael Lectures before the Calcutta University, I was afraid that they would not be regarded as sober and cautious conclusions, but rather as prompted by a patriotic bias. Fortunately for me, no less a statesman and scholar than Lord Ronaldshay thinks that I have handled this topic not only in an interesting but also in a scholarly manner, and agrees that "the description of the procedure given in the Buddhist books shows how remarkable is the resemblance between that of the assemblies of two thousand five hundred years ago and of those of the present day."<sup>1</sup> What is noteworthy is that practically none of the terms technical to Saṃgha debate have been anywhere explained by Buddha. Had he himself been the inventor of them, it would have been imperatively necessary for him to explain their meaning *in extenso*. Evidently he borrowed these terms, which were already well-known in his time and which therefore called for no explanation. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the various techni-

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<sup>1</sup> *India: A Bird's Eye View*, p. 34.



cal terms and rules of procedure which the Buddha adopted for his religious Sangha were those which were already in vogue with the institutions of a democratic type, whether political, municipal or commercial, for the transaction of their business.



## LECTURE V.

### ORIGIN OF THE STATE.

We have seen what conception the Hindus of Ancient India had of the State, its nature and types; and we shall now examine what theories they formed in regard to its origin. Kauṭalya, we have seen, observes in one place that *rājā rājyam = iti prakṛiti-saṅkṣhepaḥ*, that is, the *prakṛitis*, put in a nutshell, mean: 'the king is the State.' The king, being the soul of the body politic, thus represents the State. The Hindus seem to have hardly developed any republican form of political government which was ~~not~~ tribal in character. This is the reason why monarchy was the norm of the State according to almost all the political thinkers of Ancient India. When we, therefore, have to consider the various theories propounded about the origin of the State, they are really theories about the origin of kingship. Then again we have to remember that no work on Hindu polity prior to the age of Kauṭalya has been recovered. There must have been systematic treatises of an earlier age setting forth these theories with fullness and self-consistency. Kauṭalya's Arthaśāstra, however, as we have seen, aims at handling the practical side of politics, that is, acquisition and administration of a

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<sup>1</sup> VIII. 12 (Haug's text, Vol. I, p. 201; trans., Vol. II, pp. 514-5).

kingdom, and refers to theoretical discussions only by the way and very briefly. Similarly, we have such works as the Brāhmaṇas, and some parts of the Buddhist literature, which throw occasional lights on such matters. But we have the Mahābhārata which throws a somewhat greater light on the subject. We have here not only multifarious theories, but also somewhat fuller details of each. But even these cannot be reasonably expected to approach the character of a system. Nevertheless, it is not only interesting but highly profitable that such scattered rays as have been incidentally emitted by these works should be brought to a focus. When these scraps of information are pieced together, they will be found to fling an agreeable surprise on us, because they contain many elements which are supposed to have been first thought of and developed by the political thinkers of the west. Here too it has to be borne in mind that these resemblances are traceable, not *in toto*, but only in some (though important) elements.

(The earliest discussion about the king's origin that is traceable is contained in the Brāhmaṇas. The subject in hand in these Vedic compositions is: the sovereignty of Indra. But man makes gods after his own image, and consequently the celestial sovereignty of the divine Indra was but a reflex of the earthly sovereignty of the human king. Thus (the 'Aitareya Brāhmaṇa has the following about Indra when it treats of the Mahā

bhisheka ceremony: "The gods, headed by Prajāpati, said to one another (pointing with their hands to Indra): 'this one is among the gods the most vigorous, most strong, most valiant, most perfect, who carries out best any work (to be done). Let us install him (to the kingship over us).' They all consented to perform just this ceremony (*mahābhisheka*) on Indra." This is the passage we have from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa in regard to the origin of Indra's sovereignty. Indra, it is clear, derived this sovereignty from the election of the gods, Prajāpati, being one, though the chief, of these electors. (This bears resemblance to the social contract theory of the western political thinkers, in that he was elected to kingship by the class of beings to which he belonged. The most important feature, however, of the theory is conspicuous by its absence, namely, the governmental pact entered into by both the parties.) So this is a theory of social contract which is yet in an inchoate condition and has not become full-fledged. As regards the other account of the origin of Indra's kingship, it occurs in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa. There we are told that Prajāpati created Indra as the youngest (in years) among the gods, and sent him to the celestial world, saying: 'Be thou the lord of these gods.' The gods asked: 'Who art thou? We indeed are superior to thee.' Indra returned, and informed Prajāpati of what they had said. Now at that time there was on Prajāpati that

lustre (*haras*) which is found in the sun. 'Give this to me,' said Indra, 'so that I may become the lord of these gods.' 'And what (*kaḥ*) shall I be on giving this?' interrogated Prajāpati. 'Remain this (that is, *kaḥ*) which thou hast uttered,' rejoined Indra. They know him by great name who know that Ka is, indeed, Prajāpati.<sup>1</sup> Here it will be seen that Indra owes his sovereign position entirely to the will of Prajāpati, and is even endowed with his lustre. The notion of kingship involved in this account thus tallies pretty closely with the theory of the divine origin of sovereignty) as we shall see presently.

It will thus be seen that both the conceptions of the origin of kingship had been to some extent evolved even so early as the time of the Brāhmaṇas. It is not, however, possible to trace the germs of any one of them to an earlier period. It is true that there are texts in the Vedic Saṁhitās where kings have been identified with one or another of the Vedic deities. But, in the first place, none of them had acquired the position of Supreme God as Prajāpati did in the Brāhmaṇa period or Viṣṇu in the epic, as we shall see shortly. Again, a king obtained the identity of a god, not as king, but as the performer of a sacrifice. And in fact, such a performance conferred this unique exaltation on any sacrificer, be he a Rājanya, a Brāhmaṇ or even a Vaiśya.

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<sup>1</sup> *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, II. 2, 10, 1-2.

Very little of political thought is traceable in Buddhist literature, whose main object was not to expatiate on things mundane, but rather to describe whatever contributed to the spiritual growth of an individual. ✓The Dīgha-Nikāya of the Southern Buddhists, however, gives the story about the origin of monarchy in its description of the origin of the world. Practically the same story, either in full or in an abbreviated form, we find repeated not only in the Mahāvastu, a canonical work of the Northern Buddhists, but also in the post-canonical literature of such widely separated countries as Ceylon, Burma, and Tibet. (The story in the Dīgha-Nikāya, which is called the *Aggaññasuttanta* or a book of Genesis' shows that the sovereignty originated in a social contract) To begin with, human beings, we are told, were made of mind, and were self-luminous. They fed on rapture, and traversed the air in abiding loveliness. Sooner or later the savoury earth had arisen over the waters. Colour it had, and odour and taste. They set to work to make the earth into lumps and feast on it. As they did so, their self-luminance vanished away; and the sun, the moon, the stars, night and day, the months, the seasons and the airs became manifest. They continued, however, enjoying the savoury earth. Sooner or later, evil and immoral customs became rife among them, and the savoury earth dis-

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<sup>1</sup> Rhys Davids' *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, Vol. IV, p. 77 and ff.

appeared. Then the outgrowth of the soil and the creepers appeared, and they lost each in succession through their evil and immoral customs. Lastly, appeared rice without powder, without husk, which they took away every evening only for it to grow ripe again the next morning. But from evil and immoral customs powder and husk enveloped the clean grain, and where they reaped there was no re-growth now. There was thus a break, and the rice-stubble stood in clumps. They then divided off the rice fields, and set up boundaries round them. Now, some being of greedy disposition, watching over his own plot, stole and made use of another plot. They caught and reprimanded him. A second time he did so; and yet a third. They now took him and smote him with the hand, with clods, and with sticks. In this manner theft, lying, reviling, and assaulting made their appearance. Thereupon those beings gathered themselves together, and, after taking counsel, selected the most handsome, gracious and capable individual from amongst them, addressing him thus: ‘(Come now, good being, do punish, revile and exile those who well deserve to be punished, reviled and exiled. We will contribute to you a proportion of our rice,†)’ He consented and did so; and they gave him a proportion of their rice. Because he was chosen by the whole people (*mahājāna-saṁmata*), he was called *Mahā-saṁmata* (the Great Elect.) Because he was the lord of the fields, (*khettānaṁ patīti*) he

was called Kshatriya (Noble). And because he delighted others by observing the established law (*dhammena pare rañjetīti*), he was called Rājan.

Let us now consider the leading features of this theory. The first in importance, of course, is the contract between the king and the people, the second is the state of society immediately preceding it, and the third is the state of nature. As regards the first of these items, there can be no doubt that there was a governmental compact according to this story. (The Kshatriya or Rājan, who denotes the ruler, was *mahā-sammata*, or actually elected by the people, to censure and banish those who deserved to be censured and banished. For this they promised to pay him a portion of their paddy. That this was not a one-sided contract is clear from the fact that the ruler so elected consented to do this duty, and actually received a portion of rice from them. There can thus be absolutely no doubt as to this being a governmental compact.) But what was the state of things before the king was elected and authority transferred to him? From here the story does not present any features, having any close correspondence to those of the Western Theory. For according to the story, men no doubt appear to be living in aggregation, but whether they had framed an actual code of laws for the preservation of their society is not clear. (We are simply told that the rice fields belonging to one man were demarcated from those pertaining to another, and



that when, inspite of this setting up of boundaries, one man encroached upon the plot of another, he was at first admonished but afterwards seized and beaten. This cannot be taken as indicating that there was in existence any definite code of law which they drew up for the purpose. This rather points to their following general principles which were inherent in human nature itself. In other words, it bears some resemblance to Locke's state of nature.) There is thus no clear evidence that there was any social compact which preceded the governmental compact. The third part of the story relates to the formation of the human beings and the worldly objects. (There was nothing vile, sordid or corrupt about them to begin with. This was the state of nature before any society or government was organised, which was therefore one of peace and freedom. During this period they do not seem to have been subject to any laws of human creation or enforcement.) But be it noted that they could hardly be called human beings in this their original condition, as they were all made of mind and were self-luminous.

It is necessary to remember in this connection that there will scarcely be found any theory propounded in Hindu books of polity and scriptures which will be exactly identical with the Social Contract theory of the Western theorists in all its three essential factors. Sometimes one, and sometimes two, of these factors are traceable, but

nowhere in the Mahābhārata, Purāṇa or Arthaśāstra has been found any Hindu theory which is exactly co-extensive with that of the West in all respects.) This difference is natural and even desirable, because the Hindu mind worked in different environments and in a different direction. But what seems to be a most important thing here to insist upon is that there should be clear evidence of a governmental compact drawn up between the two parties, that is, between the people and the ruler elected. In this respect the story of the Dīgha-Nikāya entirely agrees and indicates a great advance upon the account of the origin of kingship furnished by the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. The latter stops with the election of the king, and gives us no inkling as to the formation of any contract. The story of the Dīgha-Nikāya, however, unmistakably indicates that there was this contract between the king elected, that is, Mahāsammata, and the people.

Let us now turn to the Mahābhārata, and see what further notions of kingship are found propounded in it. It is true that the final recasting of the Mahābhārata has been attributed to the 4th century A.D., if not later. Nevertheless, there are reasons to suppose that most of these theories were probably broached before the time of Kauṭilya. What these reasons are will be specified in their due place. But as we have just discussed the Social Contract theory, we shall try to see first what sort of theory on this subject has

been mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. Strangely enough, there is only one theory found in this work, encyclopaedic though it is, which refers to the Social Contract. It is narrated in Chapter 67 of the *Śāntiparvan*. In this Chapter is found the following stanza :—

etay-opamayā dhīraḥ saṁnameta baliyase

Indrāya sa praṇamate namate yo baliyase ..  
which, as we have seen in Lecture 1, may safely be taken as being of Bhāradvāja's composition. It may not be, therefore, unreasonable to hold that the view set forth in this Chapter is that originally promulgated by this Hindu theorist.

Let us now see what this view exactly is. (Formerly men, we are told, being without a king, met with destruction, devouring one another like fish in water. They then assembled together, made certain compacts (*samayāḥ*) for inspiring confidence among all classes of the people, and lived for some time. This was, however, soon found unbearable, and they proceeded to Brahmā in a body (*sahitāḥ*), saying "Without a king, oh divine lord, we are going to destruction. Appoint some one as our king. All of us shall worship him, and he shall protect us." Thus solicited, Brahmā pointed to Manu, but Manu would not assent to the proposal. "I fear," said he, "all sinful acts. To govern a kingdom is exceedingly difficult, especially among men who are always false and deceitful in their behaviour." But the men said unto Manu : "Don't fear, the sins that

men commit will touch those only that commit them. For the increase of your treasury, we will give you a fiftieth part of our animals and precious metals and a tenth part of our grains. A fourth part of the merit which men will earn under your protection will also be yours. Strengthened by that merit so easily obtained by you, do you protect us, oh king, like Indra protecting the deities." Thus addressed, Manu agreed and, *he made his round through the world, checking sins everywhere and setting all men to their respective duties*. Thus we are told that those men on earth who desire prosperity should first elect and crown a king for the protection of all.

Let us now examine the principal constituents of this theory. Human beings, we learn, were fighting with one another, by each person taking for himself all that he could. (The state of nature was therefore a state of war, which was, for the time being, silenced by men drawing up a Social Compact which ensured peace and amity for some time. Soon after, however, confusion arose again, and they were compelled to give their liberty into the hands of a sovereign by means of the governmental compact.) It is scarcely necessary to add that this view of the origin of the State bears a remarkably close correspondence with that propounded by Hobbes, as it agrees with it in all its three main factors. This, therefore, perhaps is the only Hindu theory, which practically harmonizes with that of a Western theorist. It is true,

there are some points of difference even here, but they are not of much consequence. Thus before the governmental compact was negotiated for, the human beings, we are told, had gone to the god, *Brahmā*, beseeching him to appoint some one to rule over them, whereupon *Brahmā*, we are told, pointed out *Manu*. There is, no doubt, this new element introduced into the theory, which gives the impression that the king was of divine creation. But this is a mistake, because, as a matter of fact, *Manu* refused to be the king when addressed by *Brahmā*, and cannot possibly be taken as being ordained as king by that god. And if afterwards *Manu* was prevailed upon to become the ruler, it was the result of successful negotiations with him by the people themselves, which alone culminated in the formation of the Social Contract. Similarly, it is true that the human beings were ready to absolve him from the responsibility for their sins, but that does not mean that this was a one-sided contract. For *Manu* agrees to give and actually gave protection in lieu of the tenth part of the grain and the fiftieth part of the merchandise promised by them. And we are distinctly told that he made a tour round the world, setting people to their proper duties and thus checking sins everywhere. It is thus clear that *Manu* after all had to perform, as a stipulation of the Contract on his side, some duty, namely, the duty of protection, which was all that the human beings had wanted and which was the

sole object with which they were seeking for a king.

Let us pause here for a while and turn more attention to (the second factor of the Social Contract Theory, namely, Social Compact) Chapter II of the Bhīshmaparvan gives us a picture of the people of Śāka-dvīpa which is very interesting at the present stage of our enquiry. The same picture we find depicted in Chapter 49 of the Vāyu and Chapter 122 of the Matsya Purāṇa. The description contained in the Vāyu is perhaps the most lucid and succinct.) A translation of the important verses may, therefore, be given here :

And there is no mixture amongst them caused in social (*varṇa*) or religious orders (*aśrama*). And through non-deviation from law (*dharma*) the people are intensely happy. There is no greed or deceit amongst them. How can there be any malice, fault-finding tendency or want of fortitude ?.....Amongst them there is no levying of taxes, no chastising rod (*daṇḍa*), no chastiser (*daṇḍika*). Being conversant with law they protect one another by their own law (*dharma*) alone.

Whether Śāka-dvīpa was a real or fabulous country, and whether there was this system of government actually prevalent amongst its people, may perhaps be doubted. But (it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that here we are furnished with an example of a community the

members of which lived in amity and peace apparently in accordance with some Social Compact which they had drawn up. This can scarcely be called a republic, because there was no *danda*, no *dandika*

In Chapter 72 of the *Sāntiparvan*, we are introduced to a dialogue between king Purūravas and the Wind-god Mātariśvan. The greater portion of this chapter is devoted to the glorification of the Brāhmanas and the honours which other castes ought to shower on them. But just at the end of the chapter the Wind-god pithily sums up for Purūravas the duties of a king as follows: “He who dispels fears obtains great merit. There is no gift in the three worlds, comparable to the gift of life. The king is Indra. The king is Yama. Similarly the king is Dharma. The king assumes (different) forms. The king sustains and supports this whole (world).” Here evidently the king is not merely compared to the gods, but is actually called Indra, Yama and Dharma combined in one.) This is another theory of the origin of kingship that we have to note. We are no doubt apt to be tempted to compare it with the theory of the Divine Origin of Kingship in the West. (But we must be careful in using the term, ‘divine,’ which, according to the western theorists, always means that which belongs to Supreme God. Indra, Yama and Dharma cannot possibly be designated as such. For Indra and Yama are, after all, Regents of the Quarters, and Dharma,

if not identifiable with Yama, was, no doubt, a deity that figures prominently in the Sūtra period. But none of these either separately or jointly can be called the Supreme Deity.) The Sanskrit word *deva* can stand for both a minor deity or Supreme God, and when anything relating to, or coming from a *deva*, a minor deity though he may be, has to be expressed in English, we are compelled to use the word 'divine' which, strictly speaking, signifies 'emanating from or connected with Supreme God.' Perhaps it will be better to use the word 'superhuman' or 'quasi-divine' in this connection to denote an origin or connection with minor deities, reserving the word 'divine' to denote essence or relationship with Supreme God. We thus find that Chapter 72 of the Śāntiparvan suggests really the superhuman origin of kingship.)

In between these two theories of the origin of kingship is that mentioned by Kauṭalya, which, curiously enough, combines the superhuman origin of kingship with that of the Social Contract. This theory he unfolds in connection with the desirability of finding out how the people are disposed towards the king. A king is thus instructed how to espy his subjects, whether in the capital town or the country, and counteract any discontent that may be created, fostered and circulated about him. He is, therefore, advised to send his spies to all places, where people congregate, and divide the former into two parties. A spy representing one party may be asked to



say openly as follows: "We hear that this king is endowed with all good qualities. And no good quality is seen in him inasmuch as he oppresses citizens and provincials by levying fines and taxes." The (spy) speaker and those of the people who would applaud his view, we are told, should be opposed by a spy of the other party who should address them as follows: "People, afflicted with anarchy consequent upon the *Mātsya-nyāya* or the practice of the bigger fish swallowing the smaller, first elected Manu, son of Vivasvat, to be their king. (They allotted one-sixth of their grain and one-tenth of their merchandise as his share. Subsisting on this wage, kings become capable of giving safety and security to their subjects and of removing their sins. Hence hermits also offer one-sixth of the grains gleaned by them, saying 'it is a share due to him who protects us.' (Again), the kings, being visible dispensers of punishments and rewards, are a notable dwelling-place of Indra and Yama. Whosoever set them at naught are visited by superhuman (*daiva*) punishment also. Hence kings should never be despised.")

It is not at all difficult here to differentiate between the two theories of the origin of kingship. So far as the story of Manu being elected king and his being allotted a portion of grains as his wage is concerned, the theory of the Social Contract is evidently alluded to. (The original state of nature is here one of anarchy, and the sub-

sequent governmental compact is intelligible enough though somewhat left implied. In fact, what Kauṭalya states so far is an epitome of what has been set forth in chapter 67 of the Śāntiparvan. But what follows this represents in some measure the idea of the superhuman character of the kings. The very fact that they are looked upon as an abode of Indra and Yama as specified in chapter 72 of the Śāntiparvan and the further belief that any disregard shown to them is visited with preternatural chastisement show clearly that here we have also a different element to take note of. And if we carefully read even chapter 67 of the Śāntiparvan where the story of Vaivasvata Manu has been detailed, we find one passage at the beginning of it which is interesting. It is true that it has been put in there almost incidentally and has no connection with the story, or even perhaps with its moral. Nevertheless it is of some importance, as it occurs in a chapter which sets forth the Hindu Theory of Social Contract. The passage is as follows: "The Śrutis declare that in crowning a king, it is Indra that is crowned (in the person of the king). A person who is desirous of prosperity should worship that king as he should worship Indra himself." This is exactly the popular view specified by Kauṭalya. The king, though he becomes the ruler under the social contract, comes on account of his sublime position to be backed up by the two Regents of the quarters and is thus endowed with a super-

human character. He thus becomes Devānām-priya or Beloved of the gods, which was no doubt the epithet borne by kings in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era.

Let us now see how the theory of the quasi-divine character of kingship was carried one step forward. This is clearly perceptible in chapter 68 of the Śāntiparvan, which treats of the discourse between Vasumanas, king of Kōsala and Brihaspati. The chapter opens with a query which Yudhisṭhira puts to Bhīshma, namely, why the Brāhmaṇs have said that the king, who is the lord of men, is a god. Bhīshma answers by giving a short account of the discourse which Brihaspati delivered to Vasumanas on the subject. The former expatiates upon the horrors that arise when there is no king and when anarchy reigns supreme. "The duties of all men," says, he, "may be seen to have the root in the king. It is through fear of the king only that men do not devour one another." And he goes on dilating upon this subject till he comes to describe the personality of the king himself. "Who is there," continues he, "that will not worship him, in whose existence the people exist and in whose destruction the people are destroyed? (That man who even thinks of doing an injury to the king, without doubt, meets with grief and fear and goes to hell hereafter. No one should disregard the king by taking him for a man, for he is really a high divinity in human form.)" The last of these

verses is : *na jātv-amantavyo manushya iti bhūmi-paḥ, mahatī devatā hy-eshā nara-rūpeṇa tishṭhātī*. This is practically identical with verse 8 in Chapter VII of the Manu-smṛiti, which we shall discuss later on. But, to resume the thread of Bṛihaspati's discourse, "The king assumes five different forms according to five different occasions. He becomes Agni, Āditya, Mṛityu (Destroyer), Vaiśravaṇa (Kubera), and Yama. When the king, deceived by falsehood, burns with his fierce energy the sinful offender before him, he is then said to assume the form of Agni. When he observes through his spies the acts of all persons and thus what is for the general good, he is then said to assume the form of Āditya. When he destroys in wrath hundreds of wicked men with their sons, grandsons and relatives, he is then said to assume the form of Mṛityu (Destroyer). When he restrains the wicked by inflicting upon them severe punishments and favours the righteous by bestowing rewards upon them, he is then said to assume the form of Yama. When he gratifies with profuse gifts of wealth those that have rendered him valuable services, and snatches away the wealth and precious stones of those that have offended him, indeed, when he bestows prosperity upon some and takes it away from others, he is then, oh king, said to assume the form of Kubera on earth." Then we are told that no person who is possessed of cleverness should ever spread evil reports about the

king. Fire, being impelled by the wind and thus blazing forth among articles inflammable, may leave a remnant, but the wrath of the king leaves nothing to the person that incurs it.

Now, what do we gather from the epitome just given of the discourse of Bṛihaspati on the origin of kingship? The chapter itself, as we have seen, begins with the query: why the Brāhmaṇs have said that the king, who is the lord of men, is a god. This is an important point to remember. It consists of two parts. First, that the king is a god and the second that the Brāhmaṇs have said so. It is thus clear that the Brāhmaṇs were in no way opposed to the doctrine that the king was a god. What sort of god he is has been well described by Bṛihaspati. Here the king has been compared to Fire, the Sun, Death, Kubera and Yama. And we are told in what respects he resembles each one of these deities. But be it noted that he is nowhere said by Bṛihaspati to be an abode of one or more of these gods, but on the contrary, asserted to be a mighty deity in human form. He is thus not a *devānām-priya* but rather a *deva*, whose function is manifold and who performs duties, not of one single, but of as many as five, deities, three of whom alone are the Regents of the Quarters. This represents one step in advance in the development of the notion regarding the superhuman origin of kingship. To put it briefly, the king is represented to be not the abode of any gods, but rather a god.

himself. We must, however, remember that the king has yet been in no way connected with the Supreme God.

Perhaps one step further in this direction is represented by the theory propounded by Manu. Manu adopts practically the view which Brihaspati enunciates to Vasumanas, and, in fact, one of the verses contained in the latter, we have seen, is found in the *Manu-Smṛiti* also, with a slight change. That verse, so far as the latter work is concerned, is as follows: (A king, though an infant, must not be despised, because he looks a human being; verily, he is a great deity in human form." How the king is looked upon as a deity is explained by Manu almost in the same manner as Brihaspati has done. "Through his (supernatural) powers," says Manu, "he is Fire and Wind, he Sun and Moon, he Yama, he Kubera, he Varuṇa, he great Indra.) Fire burns one man only, if he carelessly approaches it; the fire of a king's (anger) consumes the (whole) family, together with its cattle and its hoard of property. He, in whose favour resides Padmā, the goddess of fortune, in whose valour dwells victory, in whose anger abides death, is formed of the lustre of all (gods). The (man), who in his exceeding folly, hates him, will doubtless perish; for the king quickly makes up his mind to destroy such (a man)."<sup>1</sup> It is thus clear that this view of

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Nārada-smṛiti*, Cap. XVIII, v. 26 and ff.

Manu is practically identical with that of Bṛihaspati. But he adds just a new point to it. As there was no king, says Manu, creatures dispersed in all directions; and for their protection the Supreme Lord created a king, taking for that purpose the eternal particles of Indra, Wind, Yama, the Sun, Fire, Varuṇa, the Moon, and Kubera, who are all except one the Regents of the Quarters. And further, Manu tells us, just because a king has been formed of the particles of these gods, he surpasses all created beings in lustre and nobody on earth can gaze on him. This is a new feature which we find added by Manu apparently to Bṛihaspati's theory of the origin of kingship. According to the latter the king is merely a deity. But Manu holds, that the king is not only a deity but also a creation of the Supreme God. For the first time therefore we find a trace of the real divine origin of kingship similar to that propounded by the Western thinkers.

It may now be asked whether the Hindu mind stopped here or whether it developed still further this notion of the divine origin of the king. We have therefore to take cognisance of another theory propounded in Chapter 59 of the Śānti-paryan. Yudhisṭhira begins by asking Bhīṣma a most sensible question. "Whence arose the word '*rājan*'", he interrogates, "which is used on earth?" Possessed of hands, arms and neck like others, having an understanding and senses like