

विहारार्थः शालाः स्वः;) At the same time, Sūdra (heterodox ?) mendicants like the Sākya and Ājīvika were prohibited from usurping the dues and privileges of the Brahmacāris who were entitled to fees and feeding on śrāddha ceremonies.

The above shows clearly how the state was gradually advancing its claims to interfere in matters of ethico-religious discipline. Of course, in earlier days this interfering tendency was of no great moment and the anti-monastic legislation shows the popular tendency against the evils of the monastic propaganda. They were, however, the germs which under Aśoka were elaborated into that bid for ecclesiastical supremacy too well-known to be mentioned here.

Taxation.—While the king's power rose to its zenith and the government took upon itself the burden of furthering the material interests of the subjects in all possible ways, the expenses of maintaining the highly organised administrative machinery were derived from the enormous sources at its disposal. As we have already pointed out, the series of successful wars and conquests added to the sources of regal income. The vast areas of unclaimed forest-land came under the direct authority of the crown together with all its mineral and vegetable products. The ordinary land-tax was raised from the $\frac{1}{6}$ or $\frac{1}{10}$ mentioned in some of the Dharmasūtras (see Gau. Ch. X and Sānti Ch. 67) to one sixth or one fourth or even to one third in times of emergency. The old *Bali* continued to be regularly levied. Excise duty on liquor were imposed (as proved by the evidence of some Jātakas). Tolls were levied on articles of merchandise and the amount was enhanced. Taxes were imposed on artisans, mechanics, or fishermen and even those who derived their living from the exploitation of mines, forests, hills or other unclaimed natural sources, though these as well as

certain classes of poor earners were exempted by the Dharmasūtras. Forced labour became a source of income and a regal privilege. Monopolies were established. A number of occasional taxes and dues which had arisen through custom were legalised and enforced. Road-cesses or those on animals of burden were imposed and last of all, the state derived vast sums from the failure of heirs, the ownership of lost articles, fines levied in law-courts and other sundry items. We have some information on these heads from the Greek accounts and occasionally, the Jātakas point to the growth of some of these taxes. But, by far the greatest source of information is the Arthaśāstra which enumerates the following main sources of revenue, e. g. urban-areas, land, mines, rivers and irrigation, forest, cattle and commerce.

(1) Land Tax—included the various items mentioned in the Arthaśāstra,* e.g., tax paid in cash by the whole village, or in kind known as the *Pinḍakara*, or *Saḍbhāga*; various other occasional dues which included presents to the king (*aupāyanika*), nazars to him on the birth of an heir (*utsaṅga* of which we have a forerunner in the *khīramūla* of the Jātakas), requisitions exacted from villagers for the army on the march (*Senābhaktam*). In addition to these, there was the share of grains from cultivators who tilled royal lands, the produce of crown farms, taxes levied on those who used the water of canals together with the interest on grains lent and various

* The land policy of the Kautilyan government is an interesting study and has given rise to great divergences of opinion. Many scholars mainly accepting a contemporary Greek testimony have regarded land as royal property. But, a careful analysis of the Arthaśāstra evidence shows that as yet there was no such theory. The *Brahmadeya* was enjoyed by the Śrōtrīyas who were empowered to make gifts and sale of it provided the land did not go to the unprivileged class. The *A-karada* landholders were holders of freeholds and were the owners of land held by hereditary right. They were full owners subject to the payment of tax to the king. The *Karada* tenants of the crown were settlers on the crown land or the royal demesne and paid rent. Villages, too, held land belonging to the community as a whole. The *Karada* tenants held for life and were not empowered to make a gift or sale of their plots.

other such items. For the realisation of land-tax, land was classified according to its productivity, fertility and non-dependence on the water of canals or wells. The productivity was ascertained first and then the royal share fixed. In towns probably taxes were levied on houses and house-owners.

II. Mines and Monopolies—Next to land-tax, mines and monopolies brought a vast income. All mines were royal property and were worked by officers under the Ākarādhyakṣa with his assistants in charge of gold mines (Suvarṇādhyakṣa), or the manufacture of base metals (Lohādhyakṣa). The government had also a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of salt (under Lavaṇādhyakṣa).

III. Commerce in the produce of royal farms and factories. This was a great source of income. The manufacture of gold and silver was under the state supervision.

IV. Forests—These also produced considerable income. Probably, the earliest to impose royal rights on forests and forest produce were the Nandas. Forest officials zealously guarded regal rights and stringent game-laws punished encroachments on these.

V. Customs, tolls, etc.—These again proved a good source of revenue. Sale markets were under royal supervision and taxes were levied on the sale of articles. Nothing could be sold except in markets. Duties were levied on merchandise coming from abroad (See chapter on *Sūlkavyavahāra*).

VI. Taxes on occupations, professions, guilds and wage-earners. —Artisans had to pay taxes in addition to working for the king for specified periods. Guilds of workmen probably paid in a lump. Similarly, owners of shops had to take out a license and to pay dues. Slaughter houses had to pay to the king. A portion of the income of courtesans went to the king.

VII. Excise duties on liquor was also a source of revenue. Wine-

houses were controlled as in the time of some of the Jātakas by royal officers and the preparation of liquor (except on some specified days) was a royal monopoly. Gambling houses or those for dicing also brought some income to the royal coffers.

VIII. Income from fines levied on offenders condemned to pay fines or fines in lieu of sentences of death or mutilations.

IX. Income from property lapsing to the king on failure of heirs, lost articles, treasure-troves etc.

X. Income from various miscellaneous items, e.g.,

(1) Taxes on maritime ports.

(2) Ferry-dues.

(3) Passports for moving from one place to another.

(4) Tax on animals of freight or loads.

(5) Road-cesses.

Lastly, in addition to these, villages supplied fighting men materials, or labourers or otherwise served the king.

These sources enriched the royal coffers and made the king almost free from popular control. In addition to these, the king was empowered to ask additional taxes or enhanced rates of payment in times of emergency. These were known as *Prāṇayas* and may be favourably compared with the "Benevolences" exacted by medieval English kings. The ways of realising them are described in detail in the chapter on *Koṣābhisāngarahanaṇa*.

Character of Administration.—The duties which in lieu of these, the regal government took upon its own shoulders, were an ample return for the people's allegiance. They were not merely those of police but comprised almost everything which men could expect of a political organisation. Equal protection for all, the furtherance of everyone's objective in life and an equitable opportunity to every class, section, or individual—was what the State

afforded to the ruled. The kingly government held out hopes to all, and did everything to help its subjects in realising their ends in life. It certainly did not believe in the dogma of equality and as such did not try to sweep away the institutions and traditions of the past. Yet, it followed the principles and maxims of the past too closely to recognise the right of the subject to live and the duty of the state in helping him to live. Elsewhere we have discussed the character of the government and its functions, but before we go on to other topics, we advance some more facts with a view to prove the decidedly paternal character of the government which, as it grew into being, compensated the subject for the gradual decay of older democratic ideals and principles. The dominance of the ideas of governmental paternalism is apparent not only from the duties which the *Arthasāstra* writer inculcates but also from the main heads of expenditure. In regard to the former, the theorist repeatedly calls upon the ruler not only to render aid to the various arts and industries, to maintain the widow and the orphan but to treat subjects as if they were the king's children (तान् पितेव अनुगृह्णीयात्—see Ch. on *Janapadaniveśa*, *Upanipātapratikāra* & *Nāvadyakṣa* etc.). The heads of expenditure disclose clearly the activity of the ruler to further the prosperity of the subject. Prominent among these, may be mentioned the following items *e.g.*

(1) Active aid to agriculturists by granting them land for life, loans of corn and money at nominal interest, and remission of taxation in times of distress (Ch. on *Janapada-niveśa*).

(2) Aids to traders by helping them to import foreign manufactures or finding out markets for their goods (Ch. on *Panyā-dhyakṣa*).

(3) Pensions and grants to Śrotriyaś, lay-teachers of science,

skilled artisans and those who taught the science of vārttā (Ch. on *Bhṛtyabharanīyam*).

(4) Maintenance of the aged, the infirm, the widow without children and the orphan—not to speak of the wives and children of those officers and servants of state who laid down their lives for the king.

(5) Active measures for famine-relief and medical aid in times of epidemic and pestilence. In regard to the former, we have not only periodical distributions of grain and food, the introduction of new plants, emigration, and various other temporary measures, but we find an alertness on the part of the government to do everything in its power. Half of the grain annually produced in royal farms or received from subjects was kept in reserve for the use of the people in times of distress (अतोऽर्थं रक्षेत् आपदर्थं जानपदानाम्—Ch. on *Koṣṭhāgārādhyakṣa*).

Economic Considerations.—From all that has been said about the details of the administration, the sources of taxation or the items of expenditure, it will be easy to determine the character of the state. It is apparent that the rulers of those days centred their main attention upon the material basis of existence. In their hands, the socio-economic ideas of the Vedic period attained their complete realisation and the concepts of sacerdotalism passed to the background. As wealth and material resources were the basis of everything, the greatest attention was paid to strengthen the hands of the government, by tapping as much as possible the natural sources of profit and by augmenting the revenue of the king in all possible ways. Directly and indirectly, the government interfered in the economic activities of its subjects, the main object of this policy being to enrich the central authority and to protect the exploitation of the masses by the capitalistic sections. In return,

it took up many of the duties of a culture state and thus came to the relief of the subject. To sum up—

First of all (as we have shown in the chapter on taxation), many of the unclaimed natural sources of wealth like the forest and the mine were appropriated in the name of the King.

Secondly, active measures were taken to produce many of the necessities of life in the royal factories and these were sold for the benefit of the people. In some cases, these became government monopolies (*e.g.* the manufacture of salt, intoxicating liquors and mineral products), while in other instances they were placed under government control (*e.g.* the manufacture of gold articles under the *Sauvarṇika*). In most cases the products of government factories passed to the market and enjoyed a sort of preference.

Last of all, the government not satisfied with direct production, reserved to itself some extraordinary powers of supervision and control in the interests of the King and the community. Thus, in cases of neglect to agriculture, the state reserved to it the right of temporarily taking over the cultivation of fields. It protected, moreover, the producer or the wage-earner from capitallistic tyranny. Thus, as stated already, prices and profits were laid down, weights and measures were regulated, cornering was checked, usury was regulated, associations of merchants or other capitallistic bodies suppressed, and last of all, the guilds were brought under control and their extravagant claims put down. In some of these we find but the logical continuation of a policy, the germs of which we easily discover in the *Dharmasūtras* (where we find the denunciation of cornering and usury—See *Vaśiṣṭha* and *Gautama D.S.* : chapters on *Rajadharma*). As part of a socio-economic legislation, we find also the promulgation of edicts against slavery or child labour. In the chapter on *Dāsakalpa*, we note the slave's rights to inherit property, his

redress against his master's cruelty and his right of demanding manumission. We find also the law that no children were to be sold, nor any below eight years put to hard work.

State Socialism ?—These efforts on the part of the Maurya government mark a remarkable epoch in the history of political and economic thought in antiquity. Indian statesmen and theorists were ushering in an era of social reform otherwise unknown and unrivalled in the ancient world and they were not only anticipating but tackling with problems, now made so prominent before us by the socialistic thinkers of the day. Every unbiassed observer is sure to find in all this not only an attempt to check capitalistic exploitation, but also a clear step towards the appropriation—if not complete nationalisation—of many of the instruments of production in the interests of the governed.

The Arthaśāstra government has consequently been characterised by some writers as an attempt at 'state socialism'. This has gained support from some quarters, while others have ridiculed it as a mere patriotic effort by harping on the despotic nature of royalty and the lack of details on the items of expenditure which were left more or less to the moral discretion of the King. Between these two extreme views it is difficult to ignore the significance of the ideals of the Arthaśāstra writer which approach the social scheme put forward by the modern socialist. Thus, in common with the latter the Indian theorist laid down the following principles. As stated already, he inculcated

(a) that the protection of the subject's life and material prosperity was the prime consideration of the government or of the state which existed for the benefit of the ruled.

(b) that this being the primary object of the state, it had the right of appropriating natural resources for the common benefit

and of checking the exploitation of the masses by capitalistic sections.

While these two are the cardinal maxims of a modern socialist, he differs in many respects from the Indian thinker. He harps constantly on the principle of social equality and denounces all sorts of privilege, social or economic. He has, moreover, little faith in kingly government and is intent upon reorganising the social fabric on the sole basis of equitable remuneration of labour to the entire exclusion of capital or privilege. Here we meet with a fundamental difference, and an impartial examination shows clearly that the Indian system had no faith in equality (which was made impossible by the existence of ethnic differences side by side) and that there was no attempt to put down privilege which was to the Indian the basis of social existence. In India, moreover, there was only a desire to suppress capitalistic exploitation but neither an attempt nor a desire for exterminating capitalism. Labour was protected, but there was never an attempt to make labour the sole basis for remuneration.

The word socialism, again, is too vague and has been applied to designate various types of social idealism and as yet it remains undefined. In its loose sense it has been applied even to the despotism of Napoleon III in France or the centralised autocracy of the German empire under the iron chancellor Bismarck, who ushered in an era of social legislation to win over the working classes to the Empire.

The socialism of Kautilya, if at all we are justified in applying that expression with regard to his ideals, was quite a different thing. He was a believer in monarchy and in progress under the King's government. He was not averse to social inequalities or privileges. The utmost that he advocated was to transform a regal

government into an organisation for social reform and welfare. He strengthened the hands of the King by the appropriation of the resources of nature, yet he never advocated the abolition of private property or the complete nationalisation of all the instruments of production. Monopolies existed as in many despotic systems and they were allowed to subsist. With all this, however, he was not without faith in private effort. Co-operation of all sections and classes with duties and profits regulated under the paternal care of the King's government was all that he advocated.

On all these counts we are averse to borrowing from the terminology of the West and prefer to regard the Kauṭilyan system as a Paternal government which was to lead to the harmonious co-operation of classes and to social solidarity—an ideal nearly approaching that of the early Utopians who advocated socialism. We cannot say what would have been its logical culmination if the empire lasted for a few centuries, but, anyhow, in spite of the wreck of the empire, its ideals influenced political life deeply.

Political and legal aspect of the Monarchy.—Having discussed the character and the ends of the state, we go on to discuss the legal and political aspects of the monarchy. On these heads, too, misconceptions exist and many have attempted to prove the preponderance of theocratic ideals. Their views are, however, open to serious objections and it is easy for all to see that the theorists of the Arthaśāstra school including Kauṭilya made political necessity the sole justification for monarchy. Kauṭilya nowhere speaks of the divine rights of the King or the parallelism between the King's functions and those of the divine rulers, but constantly reminds the King that protection was his primary duty and loyalty was his most valued asset. Theoretically, too, the King derived his right of taxation from the protection he granted to subjects and this contractual nature

of royalty is apparent from the King's liability to make good the loss of his subjects caused by theft or robbery. Undoubtedly, many of these ideas were inherited from the past and continued to have acceptance even when royalty became all-powerful.

Monarchy came to be associated with a number of legal privileges, which are apparently derived from those found in the Dharma-sūtras. As before, the King had the following privileges in the Arthaśāstra :—

e.g. (a) He could not be made a witness (राजश्रोत्रियग्रामभृतकवर्जं Kau. P. 175).

(b) His property could not pass to others by prescription (..... न भोगिन हरेयुः...राजश्रोत्रियद्रव्याणि च Kau. P. 191).

(c) He had the escheat to property without heir (अदायादकं राजा हरेत्).

(d) He was entitled to all lost or stolen articles without claimants (नाष्टिकं च राजधर्म्यं स्यात् Kau. P. 190).

(e) He was entitled to the service of artisans for specified periods (विष्टि).

(f) He was entitled to treasure-troves (शतसहस्रादूर्ध्वं राजगामी निधिः Kau. P. 202).

Law of Treason.—While regal authority was thus strengthened, the King's safety and personal security as well as reputation were ensured by the promulgation of the Law of Treason. The development of this is very interesting and what impresses us most is the strange parallelism between the Kautilyan laws of treason and the provisions of the same law under the Plantagenets. The law of treason was remarkable on account of the cruel punishments awarded and on account of the fact that it did even override the privileges of order. Under the head of treason we have a number of offences *e.g.*

(a) coveting the kingdom, (b) violation of the purity of the harem, (c) incitement to rebellion of forest-tribes or other enemies, (d) injury to fortifications, the country or the army. (राज्यकामुकमन्तःपुर प्रधर्षकमटव्यमितोत्साहकंदुर्गराष्ट्रदण्डकोपकं वा शिरोहस्त-प्रादौपिकं घायतेत् । ब्राह्मणं तमपः प्रवेशयेत् Kau. P. 227).

The punishment for offences under all these heads was the cruel death of the culprit by burning. In the case of the Brahmin he was simply thrown into water.

Punishments were also inflicted on those who slandered the King or divulged his secret. Their tongue was cut off.

Royal rights were also jealously guarded and Game laws as stringent as those of the Normans came to existence.

The system under As'oka.—Under Aśoka, the same system was continued by the monarch, who took, as we know from his inscriptions, the pompous title of "Beloved of the Gods" (*Devānāmpriya Priyadarśī*).† His surviving records and monuments show that his vast empire was divided into at least four viceregal domains, in addition to the region directly under the King with capital at Pāṭaliputra. These viceroyalties had their head-quarters at Taxila, Ujjain, Suvarṇagiri and Tosali and were in charge of Kumāras of the royal blood or of officials bearing the title of Mahāmātra or Ārya-putra (*Ayaputa*).

The Viceroys were supposed to rule according to Imperial orders,

* By the Statute of Treasons 1352 (25 Edward III St. 5) the following offences were regarded as constituting treason :—

- (a) Compassing the death of the King, Queen or the heir to the Throne.
- (b) Violating the Queen, the king's eldest unmarried daughter or the wife of his eldest son.
- (c) Levying war against the King in his realm or adhering to his foes.
- (d) Counterfeiting his seal or money or importing false money.
- (e) Slaying the Chancellor, Treasurer or Judges in the discharge of their duty.

† According to some, the title was also assumed by Aśoka's predecessors. It is also interesting to note that 'Priyadarśana' is an epithet used by the author of the *Mudrā-rākṣasa* to describe Candragupta Maurya.

but in reality exercised considerable personal authority. In the big cities, Town-councils or Assemblies existed but more often they were powerless against the Viceroy. In many provinces discontent existed as we can easily gather from the Kalinga edicts, and if we are to believe in the *Divyāvadāna*, the westernmost viceroyalty was almost in perpetual revolt, this being due to the ethnic differences of the Western peoples and the survival of their republican tradition.

The *Prādeśikas** were probably subordinates of the Viceroys and under them were minor officials like the *Rajjukas* (*Rājuka*) and *Yutas*. The *Rājukas*† seem to have exercised magisterial powers as in the *Arthaśāstra*, while spies (*Prativedakas*) remained as active as before. Perhaps, their activity increased with the religious propaganda of Aśoka, and the creation of the *Strīmahāmātras* empowered them even to pry into the private life of the people, especially the richer and more influential class.

The *Dharma-mahāmātras* were an innovation of the King, and, as we know from the records, were entrusted with the superintendence of the moral education of the people. We have no evidence eitherway, but it is not improbable that they were very unpopular with the orthodox sections who resented royal interference in religion.

The *Paṇḍit* (or the *Paṇḍit*) was however maintained by Aśoka, though the rulings of the *Paṇḍit* had no binding force and under Aśoka most probably its real power was almost nil. The king remained legally irresponsible. The tide of kingly prerogative

* The *Prādeśikas* were, according to Kern and Senart, local governors. Bühler regarded them as local princes under the imperial suzerain authority. Thomas derives the word *Prādeśika* from *Prādeśa* (report) and inclines toward the identification of these with the *Pradeśtri*.

† *Rājuka* or *Rajjuka* comes from *Rajju* or cord to bind with. Probably, the *rajjukas* combined the duties of land survey with criminal justice and award of punishment. The *Arthaśāstra* mentions the *cora-rajjukas*.

had been waxing high since the sixth cen. B.C. The influence of foreign ideals* added but to its vigour and power. Already practically absolute, regal authority became the more so when under the influence of decayed Hellenism the sacerdotal idea (absent in the Arthaśāstra) was revived and on the model of the Greeks the Maurya Emperor took the style and title of 'Beloved of the Gods', i.e. "King by the grace of the gods." Foreign historians see in it only the influence of Divine Kingship and regard it as the outgrowth of our peculiar Indian mentality. In reality, however, it shows the influence of foreign ideals, and the truth of the statement becomes apparent when we remember that Alexander was deified by the decayed Hellenes as 'the son and chosen of Apollo', and that in the 2nd cen. B.C. a Selucide, actually assumed the pompous surname of 'Theos'.

The Dharma idealism† added but another invigorating strain, and to the historian the reign of Aśoka marked the height of regal despotism—a fact, which is odious to many Indians. Yet, if that was the climax, it marked also the decay. The Empire reached its zenith undoubtedly, but, from the very moment of its height, the downward march began. The Imperial fabric began to feel the influence of disrupting forces. With the influence of *Dharma*, came the opposing tide of repentance and the vast edifice which had been raised by a process of centuries fell to the ground.

Republican Life and its survival—While the empire rose to its zenith, and reaped the advantages of the Greek conquest of the borderland, the republics had a hard time for their life and pros-

* The style of Aśoka's edicts is similar to that of the Persian King. This as well as other resemblances between the Persian and Indian styles of architecture led Dr. Spooner to believe in the great influence exerted by the Persian monarchy on the Maurya Empire.

† Aśoka's creation of officials for religious purposes was also the logical sequel to the policy of interference in the Arthaśāstra. There, too, we have the Devatādhyakṣa and the promulgation of penal laws against non-brahmin ascetics.

perity. Menaced by the foreign conqueror in their rear, they had to submit, and when the Yavana power declined, they transferred their allegiance to the Emperor of the Easterners. Probably, timely submission saved them from annihilation and gave them a lease of life on conditions of submission and military aid. Their value was understood by the Empire-builders of the 4th century and Kauṭilya, a firm believer in monarchy, went so far as to extol the value of republican aid to a conqueror aspiring after universal dominion. In his eyes, their help was superior in value to the gain of an army or an ally (सङ्गलाभो दण्डमित्रलाभानामुत्तमः : Kau. Bk. XI. ch. I), and he calls upon the conqueror to secure the services of these corporations. In short, his policy was similar to that pursued by the kings of Mediæval France towards the republican cantons of Switzerland.

In the days of Kauṭilya, a large number of republics existed, the more important of them apart from those of the west being the Kambojas, and the Surāṣṭras who lived by agriculture or by the occupation of arms (like the members of the Mediæval military orders or the republican Swiss in French service) while the corporations of the Licchavis, Vṛjis, Mallas, Madrakas, Kukuras, Kurus and Pañcālas lived under chiefs claiming the title of "Rājā."

From the meagre details preserved in the Arthaśāstra, we know little about the constitution and government of the Saṅghas. But this much is clear that the Saṅghas possessed seals or badges, issued money and had a central treasury. Some families were distinguished by greater privileges and had the distinctive title of Rājā (Rājaśabdin?). These families possessed great influence within the Saṅgha and there seems to have been great rivalry among such families. The position of these families is not dissimilar to that of

the prominent ruling houses in Mediæval Venice, Genoa or Florence. The affairs of the Saṅgha, however, were entrusted to the Saṅgha-mukhyas who were most probably elected leaders backed by parties. The existence of such parties is clear from the chapter on Saṅgha-vṛtta and Kauṭilya advises kings to take advantage of party-jealousies. In many respects, the account in the Arthaśāstra bears a close resemblance to that in the Śāntiparva (ch. LXXXIV) where Śrīkṛṣṇa speaks of the difficulties of Saṅgha-mukhyas faced with the turbulence of party leaders.

A systematic account of the states mentioned by Kauṭilya is lacking, but in the light of later history we must conclude that many of the more important communities survived and maintained their political existence. As in the days of Megasthenes, the republican tradition retained its full vigour. In fact, as Megasthenes clearly states, there was a duel between republicanism and monarchy, and in certain isolated localities republics existed side by side with monarchies. The evidence of the Avadāna-śataka, which quotes the opinion of travellers, supports this. (**केचिद्देशा गणधीनाः केचिच्च राजाधीनाः** See Avadānaśataka II. 103, St. Petersburg Edition).

More definite evidence is also available in the days of Aśoka, who enumerated the allied and feudatory communities into whose territories his preachers were allowed access. Thus, in the Rock Edicts of Aśoka, we find mention of the following communities some of which, we have reason to believe, were under republican government.

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|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| (a) The Yonas | } on the North-western frontier |
| (b) the Kambojas | |
| (c) the Gāndhāras | |

- (d) the Rāṣṭrikas and the Bhojas
 (e) the Petenikas, the Andhras and the Pulindas } in the South
 (f) The Nāvakas and the Nāvapaṅktis.
 (and according to Mr. Jayaswal the other Aparāntas).
 (Aśokan Rock Edict. XIII)

The Yonas were a settlement of Greeks long settled on the border and were neighbours to the Kāmbojas. Little is known about the Nāvakas and Nābhapaṅktis, but Mr. Jayaswal considers them with some reason to have been situated near the Gāndhāris. (Jayaswal—Hindu Polity Pt. I. sec. 130-135). The Rāṣṭrikas, the Bhojas and the Petenikas belonged to the south. The Bhojas were probably intimately connected with the Bhaujyas, and their descendants, the Mahā-bhojas as well as the Mahārathis gained the position of feudatories to the Andhra Emperors. (For Aparānta coins, see Cunningham's A. S. I. Vol. XIV.) We shall discuss them in detail in connection with the Andhra Empire.

Political Speculations in Kautilya.

Having discussed the rise and fall of the Empire, as well as its institutions, we pass on to the main currents of political thought and ideal which meet our eyes during this period. The Greek accounts, the Arthaśāstra of Kautilya and the Edicts of Aśoka are our sole sources of evidence during this period, but on this head we find very little help from the foreigners or the edicts of the great Emperor.

The State in Kautilya :—The Arthaśāstra of Kautilya, however, throws a flood of light on the political ideas of the imperialistic thinkers of the period. That work attributed, not without reason, to the minister of Candragupta, is probably the last of many such books, and is one of the earliest systematised treatises on the art of government representing the high-water mark of a materialistic counter-reaction to the spiritual propaganda of the preceding age.

In Kautilya we meet not only with a dominance of ethico-political ideas, but notice a decided tendency towards the emancipation of politics from the influence of religion and ethics. But, there is a lack of definition and an utter absence of abstract speculation as to the nature of the state. Only in one or two places Kautilya gives us a clue as to his views. This may be due

to the fact that the Arthaśāstra is a practical treatise on the art of government and was written with the express object of establishing a paramount ruling authority, capable of protecting the people and helping them in attaining prosperity in an age which had not yet forgotten the traditions of Persian rule in the Punjab and had witnessed the horrors caused by the daring inroad of the Greeks under Alexander. Such being the case, we can expect but little of theories or abstract ideas. Kauṭilya's views were mainly those of a practical statesman. Consequently, nowhere does he define the state, or dwell on its character. It is only incidentally that he gives us information as to its constituent elements and its real ends and it is from these that we have occasional glimpses into his views on the state of nature or the origin of the state.

Kauṭilya seems to lay stress on the human element of the state. Thus, in one place he says—"The state after all consists of the people; without them, the territory is as useless as a barren cow (पुरुषवद्वा राज्यम्, अपुरुषवा गौर्वन्येव किं दुह्येत.—Arthaśāstra, p. 295.) In another place, in emphasising the duty of a conqueror to look to the interests of men settled in the conquered territory, he says that a territory without subjects (bereft of good government) is neither a Janapada nor a kingdom (न ह्यजनो जनपदो राज्यं जनपदं वा भवतीति.—Kau., p. 403.).

These statements show that Kauṭilya, like his great contemporary Aristotle, regarded the state primarily as an association of human groups and created mainly in their interests. This association of individuals to form a state he attributed to man's social ideas, *e. g.*, preservation of life and property and to secure opportunities of progress. The state of nature he regarded as one of war (as in ch. 67 Śānti-parvan) dominated by (*Mātsya-nyāya* or

the tyranny of the strong over the weak.* To end this (as he himself describes it in connection with Danda and in another place puts it into the mouth of one of his discoursing spy propagandists)—the people selected king Manu to save themselves from *Mātsya-nyāya*.†

After thus describing in brief that the state was primarily an association of human groups united together for protection, he goes on to devote his best attention to the consideration of the physical requisites, which are to serve as bases for a well-ordered and prosperous state. Herein lies his excellence over most political thinkers of antiquity and his views show how much prominence he gives to economic and material considerations in conceiving the requisites of a state. According to him, the territory must be capable of supporting the population, and enabling the people to have room for expansion, capable of supporting the people of neighbouring regions in distress, endowed with natural wealth, peopled by men hating the enemy, free from sterile rocky soil, not abounding in ferocious animals, capable of maintaining large herds of cattle and other animals, containing mineral resources and pastures, capable of easy defence, having a free supply of water and not dependent on nature (rains), having excellent land and river communications, productive of commodities, endowed with a labouring element and peopled by patriotic honest men :

e.g., स्थानवान् आत्मधारणः परधारणश्चापि स्वार्त्तः स्वाजीवः, शत्रुद्वेषी शक्यसामन्तः पङ्कपापाणोषरविषमकण्टकश्रेणोव्यालनृगाटवीहीनः, कान्तः सीता-

* अशौतो हि मात्स्यायमुद्भावयति । बलीयानवर्षं हि शसते दण्डधराभावे । तेन गुप्तः प्रभवतीति । (Kau., p. 9).

† मात्स्यायाभिभूताः प्रजा यन् वैवस्वत राजानं चक्रिरे । भान्यध्वभागं पथ्यदध्वभागं हिरण्यं चाक्ष भागमेव प्रकल्पयामासुः । तेन भूता राजानः प्रजानां योगक्षेमग्रहाः, तेषां किञ्चिददण्डकरा हरन्ति योगक्षेमवद्वाच प्रजानाम् । (Kau., p. 23).

खनिद्रव्यहस्तिवनवान्, गव्यः पौरुषेयो गुप्तगोचरः पशुमान् अदेवमाहूको वारि-
स्थल पथाभ्यामुपेतः सारचित्तवहुपण्यो दण्डकरसहः, कर्मशीलकर्षको बालि-
शस्त्राम्यवरवर्णप्रायो भक्तशुचिमनुष्य इति जनपदसम्पत् । (Kau. P. 256)

The Kautilian state was essentially a monarchical state. Kautilya's sympathies were with monarchy, which in his eyes was the best form of government, since in it there was neither the strife of sections nor the dominance of class interests. The wise rule of a benevolent king ensured happiness for all and guaranteed the safety of social existence. The king was thus the chief necessity for a state.

Next, Kautilya analyses the state (Janapada) like his predecessors, the Epic thinkers, into its seven elements, *e.g.*, Svāmī, Amātya, Durga, Rāṣṭra or (जनपद), Koṣa, Daṇḍa and Mitra.* Of these again, he clearly distinguishes between the ruler, and the state (राजा राज्यम् इति प्रकृतिसंज्ञेः), *e.g.*, the governing element and the governed. But in spite of this seeming differentiation the two appear to be identified with each other. They are inseparable. Their best interests and the chief aim of their existence seem to be the same. The king as the head of the government was the supreme head of the state. He was the symbol of unity and legality. All authority emanated from him. It was he who directed the energies of the people to their proper channels.*

But though the king was conceived as being of the vital importance to the working and existence of the government machinery, he in his turn depended on the prosperity of the elements.

* स्वामी च सम्यग्निः स्वसम्पद्भिः प्रकृतिः सम्यादयति । स्वयं यच्छीलतच्छीलाः प्रकृतयो भवन्ति उत्तमानि पमादे च तदायत्तत्वात् । तस्मात्कटस्थानीयो हि स्वामीति । (P. 306). This indeed is but an echo of the Epic idea that the moral and intellectual prosperity of subjects depended on the king and he created the age (कालीवा कारणं राज्ञो राजा वा कालस्य कारणम् । इति ते संशयो माभूत् राजा कालस्य कारणम् ॥

e.g. अरिर्वर्जाः प्रकृतयः समैताः सशुणोदयाः ।
 उक्ताः प्रत्यङ्गभूतास्ताः प्रकृता राजदम्पदः ॥
 सम्पादयति सम्पन्नाः प्रकृतीरात्मनानृपः ।
 विद्वद्वाचानुरक्ताश्च प्रकृतीर्हैन्यनात्मवान् ॥ (P. 257).

The two, the ruler and the State, were thus closely identified. The king was a necessity for the people but he existed for them and them only. His happiness lay in their prosperity.

Verily says the author :—

प्रजासुखे सुखं राज्ञः प्रजानां च हिते हितम् ।
 नात्मप्रियं हितं राज्ञः प्रजानां च प्रियं हितम् ॥ (P. 39).

So much for the unity of the ruler and the ruled in the state: Again, when we leave these theoretical considerations and go through the details of administrative measures and regulations we are bound to conclude that the active welfare of the subject was Kautilyas' objective and his state did not rest with mere police measures. Presumably, the state conceived by Kautilya was a paternal state, which tried to assist all the sections of the community in their self-realisation by active help. The agriculturist, the trader, the student, the workman or the pauper all received their proper quota of help from the government.* We may, therefore, define the Kautilyan state as an institution for the well-being of the community and its head, the king, was entrusted with the duty of helping his subjects in the fruition of their worldly aims.

This extreme devotion to the material welfare of the country and of the subject made Kautilya sacrifice some of the moral

* Elsewhere I have discussed the functions of the government as conceived by Kautilya. (see my article on the 'Governmental ideals in Ancient India, published in the Calcutta Review 1922 and also my Kautilya—His Social Ideal and Political Theory.' The state in India, as conceived by Hindu thinkers was more social than political. The king not only protected life and property, but did everything to foster the prosperity of the classes. He was the guardian and protector of all and did everything possible for them.

and ethical principles which had gained ground in those days.* These characteristics he shared along with his fore-runners—the previous authors of the Arthaśāstras. But here, too, he shrank from the extreme consequences of such a policy. He recognised ‘organic laws and principles’ which existed prior to the establishment of royal authority or the state. His disregard for moral considerations, (if any), stopped after a while. He would consent to the confiscation of the property of Pāṇḍas or of wealthy widows. He would justify secret attacks on enemies—nay, he would, often following his predecessors, advocate assassination, but he will not go beyond that. He will not consent to the unrighteous usurpation of the throne by ministers, nor to the violation of the sacred institutions of property or family, and constantly warns kings against the obliteration of social distinctions or tampering with the sacred rules of Aryan morals and ethics.

e.g. तस्मात्स्वधर्मं भूतानां राजा न व्यभिचारयेत् ।
स्वधर्मं सन्धानो हि प्रेत्य चेह च नन्दति ॥ (P. 8).

* Kautilya has often been compared with Machiavelli and recently many Indian writers have joined in his denunciation. Undoubtedly, both have some common resemblances. Both stand for the unity of their motherland and advocate out of necessity a policy of unmoral politics and inhuman diplomacy, provided the end is attained. As a result both these men, though sincere patriots, have suffered in the estimation of posterity.

Yet there are differences which cannot be ignored. Kautilya with his deep sympathy for the masses looks more to the solution of the primary problems of existence. He is a social philosopher and his suppleness enables him to devise a scheme of orderly government without sacrificing the interests of the governed. He shows deep insight into the real problems of man and is more of a social thinker than a believer in kingcraft. The latter art commended itself to him only because political life is the basis of social progress. In politics, he was not averse to the unmoral usages of the age since the conditions left no other way out. Left to himself, he would have chosen a better course. The same justification may be advanced for the other great man, but we are bound to notice that his outlook is narrower and his attention centred on the problems of Italian Union which was the sole remedy for Italian suffering. In worldly wisdom, in the knowledge of men and matters, and in the ways of outwitting enemies both can claim the same amount of pre-eminence. But the Indian has this advantage over his rival that with all the qualifications of the latter, he was a man of broader outlook and had a rare genius which made him go to the solution of the greatest problems of man.

Again व्यवस्थितार्थमयादः कृतवर्णार्थमस्थितिः ।

तस्या हि रक्षितो लोकः प्रसौदति न सौदति ॥ (P. 8).

To speak in brief, he limits the sphere of royal authority or of state interference to those matters which concerned the material aspects of life directly, reserving to the individual complete freedom in matters of his higher self-realisation. The state was thus with him, not the highest existence, nor the king the supreme ruler of man's destinies. They were but the means to a greater and higher end.

It may appear idle to dilate on the merits or demerits of his system, yet a few more words may not be out of place here to mark out the leading features of his political genius, the system he conceived or the means he advocated. Undoubtedly, he was the noblest exponent of the political ideals of monarchy in Ancient India. His genius attempted a synthesis of the ideas and theories of the past and he succeeded in devising a system in which the interests of the governor and the governed were identified and the authority of the executive power devoted solely to the prosperity of mankind. His genius conceived the ideal type of a paternal monarchy out of the traditions and principles of the past and his soul delighted in the prospect of a national king, having the same language, manners and customs as the ruled and living only in their interest—an ideal attained only in the 19th century (Arthaśāstra P. 403).

A believer in the institutions and traditions of his country, he was not averse to the happiness of mankind in the interest of an individual or a ruling section. He wished life and love to all and believed in human happiness through the co-operation of communities and interests. A Brahmin and conservative by nature, he was the foremost in raising his voice against slavery (when his contemporary, the noblest representative of pagan wisdom—

Aristotle, was justifying it) and did all that was possible to break the fetters of the slave.

The ends he advocated were just and noble; nor were his means ignoble or inhuman. He advocated unity—yet war was never his sole objective; unnecessary cruelty was never his guiding principle. He recognised the real place of 'force' in political existence, but he was averse to making it the object of his worship. In diplomacy too, he was not unwilling to outwit a crafty enemy, but beyond that he never made his way. His king was not to be an incarnation of craftiness, but one self-disciplined and above the frailties of ordinary men. Loyalty was to be the king's noblest asset and his only reward was to live for others.

The Asokan State Ideal : The Reaction and the Collapse.—

Under Candragupta and his son Bindusāra, the Kautilyan system continued. But under Aśoka there came a change. At first, the Emperor carried on the traditional policy of his fathers but, after his conquest of Kalinga, there came a break with the past. The conqueror became penitent for his past cruelties. Repentance racked his frame and according to a tradition turned him into a disciple of a Buddhist monk. Lust for conquest vanished and made room for a violent reaction in favour of pacifism. It is doubtful whether Aśoka embraced Buddhism out and out, but anyhow it is clear that he came under the influence of forces which implanted in his mind a tender regard for the moral elevation of his subjects and at the same time a hatred for conquests or a rule by the sword. His kingly ideal changed. He lost sight of his primary political duties and turned a moral elevator of mankind. As his idealism waxed high, he regarded himself responsible for the good of his subjects not only in this world

but in that beyond. He came to believe in a moral obligation subsisting between him and his subjects who were his children and endeavoured to emancipate himself from this indebtedness.

(सर्वमुनिसे मम पजा.....अथ पजाये इक्षामि इकं किंति सवेन हिदसुखेन हिदलोकिक पाललोकिकाये युजेवुति ! मुनिसेपि इक्षामि इकं)

Non-violence became his watch-word and toleration the keynote to his policy. Enforcing these at home, he thought of converting the world to his creed. His messengers went abroad and he himself thought of the regulation of discipline in the Buddhist order. Consequent upon these, the state became something more than a material or an ethical state. It tended to become a theocracy in which the royal position too was something extra-political—something divine. 'Devānām Priya'—'Dear unto the Gods' stood apart in divine isolation and sent forward his messengers and envoys whose trumpet blast sounded the passing away of the era of war and aggression and hailed the dawn of universal peace.

His energies were no longer confined to the bounds of his empire and he ceased to identify himself solely with his state or with his people. The imperial concept of duty too changed. No longer confined to the safety and protection of his subjects, its place was taken by something wider, something nobler and grander yet dreamy and incapable of realization—the propagation of *Dhamma* and the realisation of the noble idea of *Dhamma-vijaya*. This became its keynote. (See R. E. XIII.) In truth, the centre of interest shifted. The sphere of royal activity no longer remained confined to the narrow limits of politics but passed all bounds and corresponded with the whole world. The claims of world love (R. E. XIII) became predominant, the old paternal ideal lost its narrower significance and the older imperial traditions were swept away to make room for a new age and a

new world. Politics, government and king were all merged in the new movement. The state became an organisation for the universal moral propaganda—an agency not only for the preaching of universal brotherhood but also for the mental and moral elevation of mankind,—a celestial dream in which the state lost itself.

Great and glorious as this revolution was in the history of mankind, it gave rise to significant consequences. On the one hand, it ushered in the dawn of the spiritual conquest of the civilised world by the glorious traditions of Indian culture. Indian teachings spread throughout the Western world. Indian missionaries passed to the farthest bounds of the known world and India became great in the eyes of nations. Alexander's debt was paid but in quite a different manner. The Hellenes had succeeded in their mission of violence. In return, the brethren of the conquered repulsed violence by pacifism.

If such was the victory won in one sphere, in the other it meant disaster. The vast manifestation of energy exhausted the source of propagation. The edifice of the Empire became weak and tottered to its fall. Its defensive forces were neglected and consolidation stopped. The ideal of the secular state was lost sight of altogether. The machinery of government lacked motive force and gradually crumbled to dust. Discontent raised its head outside forces assailed and ruin was complete.

Wars of succession, the hatred of parties and the clash of conflicting religions sapped the last resources of the Empire and when the strong hand of a ruler like Aśoka was removed, the foreign foe again made his appearance on Indian soil. Her happy plains were swamped by successive races of savage conquerors. For nearly four centuries the plain of Hindustan became their hunting ground. The continuity of Indian political evolution was checked and India

(especially the North) had to wait till time exhausted the barbaric virility of the foreign ruler and gave her a respite to raise her head and reorganise her forces again.

In simpler language the disastrous results may be thus summarised. There was, first of all, a break in the continuity of development. Had the Empire retained its vigour, its institutions would have remained, modified perhaps to suit the needs of contemporary society. But with the irruption of foreign hordes, the struggle for existence arrested the normal development of the political machinery or the ideal.

Secondly, the fall of the empire checked the tendency towards the separation of politics from ethics and religion. The revival of Dharma idealism practically reversed the current of progress, and exercised an influence which continued for centuries and did not lose its force upon the ideals of a later age.

Consequently, the ideal of a secular state vanished and even when there came an opportunity for reconstruction, the state came to be associated more with a coercive central authority maintaining peace and order than an organisation which devoted most of its energies to the material progress of humanity.

These were the chief characteristics of the state as we find in the later Dharmaśāstras of which the earliest was the Manu-samhitā. The Smṛti writers all dwell upon the evils of anarchy and emphasise the need of coercion to maintain an ideal which evolved itself out of the reaction. The king was fast transformed into something like divinity and gradually the ideals of despotism became more and more prominent. The paternal ideal indeed continued to subsist but it came to be masked by other factors. The Arthaśāstra tradition was swept away and a purely secular ideal became a thing of the past.

Republican Thought and Idealism.

From the secular idealism of Kauṭilya or the pacifism of the great Emperor Aśoka we pass on to a consideration of the political aims and aspirations of the sturdy republicans of the North-Western borderland, who dared to check the progress of the world-conqueror whose genius had laid low the mightiest empire of Asia. To these sturdy mountaineers, nothing was so valued as their independence and self-governing institutions. Assailed by the greatest conqueror of antiquity, they refused to buy peace through submission. By his ravages, Alexander thought of striking terror into their hearts, but their spirit was not broken. Their armed hosts were defeated, they were massacred by thousands, many more were sold to slavery*, yet they could not be made to reconcile themselves to an existence of abject political serfdom.

It cannot be said that they achieved any striking military success. The real history of the war has not come down to us, yet, coloured as the accounts are, they form a brilliant chapter in the history of India, showing as they do that the vigour and obstinacy of these frontier tribes were sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of the Greeks. Their resistance alone broke the spirit of the Greeks and compelled the conqueror to retire without attempting a further eastern march.

No reliable accounts are preserved about them, except the admiring references of their enemies. Yet these are their greatest tributes and hold them up to posterity for their love of free government and of liberty. To them, the empire was a crime, and submission

* The story of the Hellenic invasion of N. W. India does not throw any favourable light on the manners and methods of those who claimed a position of cultural pre-eminence in the ancient world. The Indians were dealt with rather savagely. First came Alexander's treacherous massacre at Massaga. Then came needless slaughter and reduction to slavery. In the territory of Sambus 80,000 were sold as slaves while on the suspicion of revolt, Sambus was crucified and the Gymno-sophists cruelly hanged. *Arrian*, pp. 119, 159, 254, 306 and 313).

to the foreigner, the highest sin. Even the gymnosophists among them, the recluses, without earthly attachment, were not behind their warring brethren in this respect. The Greeks relate, how in the person of the naked and old Dandanius the world-conqueror found his 'more than a match' (*Megasthenes*, Frag. LV.). This naked recluse scoffed at the greatness of the conqueror, spurned his offers of reward and asked him to come to him if he wanted anything. With a love of nature, purer and brighter than that of the Greek citizen or of Rousseau, he preferred his free life rather than accept the proffered gifts of a foreigner who did nothing but disturb the peace of the world by his insolent greed and inhuman hankerings. The greatest conqueror of the world he looked upon as an outlaw who, however great he might have been, deserved nothing more than a grave's length of the earth's surface (*Mc. Crindles' Arrian*, p. 387). Even Kalanos (Kalyāna), who alienated the sympathy of his brethren, took exception to the riches of Alexander and treated with contempt his empire, which, in his eyes, was no better than "a piece of dry and shrivelled hide." Another sophist went so far as to take exception to the ideas of Sokrates since they had "too much deference to the laws and subjected their lives too much to their requirements." (*Arrian*, pp. 314-15).

To the Gymnosophist or the Bracmanoi, life offered no charm. Rather than live a life of submission, they preferred death. "The Bracmanoi", the Greeks relate, "yielded up few prisoners" (*Arrian*, pp. 143-44), and, as "they were men of spirit," they called upon the neighbouring princes to die rather than submit. Nothing could break their spirit and far from accepting mercy, they were eager to die, the earlier the better. (*Arrian*, pp. 313-14; Alexander's conversation with the ten Gymnosophists).

This was not all. They further disillusioned Alexander's men

when the latter claimed for their master the position of the son of Zeus. Greece had bowed to him and, Sparta excepted, everywhere Alexander had been accepted as a god. It was only on the Indian border that his divine pretensions were ridiculed. The Gymnosophists not only repudiated his claims but reminded him that, the son of a mortal, he was to taste death and that, of his empire nothing will remain to him but a few feet of the earth's surface to receive his body.*

* This is sufficient to open the eyes of those who find nothing but divine monarchy in India and claim for their countrymen nothing but an exclusive patent for obedience and veneration for their ruler.

Note on The Kautiliya

Since its discovery in 1905, the Kauṭīliya has furnished us with so much information on the Hindu art of government and has given rise to so many controversies, that we ought to devote some more attention to its contents and to the divergences of opinion among scholars on many points. In this section, the following topics will be dealt with :

- (a) The traditional date of the book and objections to its acceptance. Relation of the Kauṭīliya to the Epic tradition.
- (b) The socio-ethical outlook of Kauṭīliya and his classification of the Sciences.
- (c) Kauṭīliya's theory of the origin of kingship.
- (d) His aim and object in writing the Arthaśāstra.
- (e) His supposed contempt for traditional morality.
- (f) His imperialism and his views on inter-statal morality.
- (a) In regard to this topic, a detailed discussion is unnecessary in view of the fact that a considerable amount of polemical literature is already in existence. From the time when Hillebrandt objected to

the acceptance of the fourth century B.C. date to the present day, European and Indian scholars have done much to controvert one another's views. The chief objections to the accepted traditional date of the Kauṭilya, as pointed out by Jolly or Winternitz, may be briefly summarised as follows (See Jolly's *Arthaśāstra*, Lahore, 1923, and Winternitz on Kauṭilya, Calcutta Review, 1924):—

(1) The repeated occurrence of Kauṭilya's name in the third person.

(2) The absence of Kauṭilya's name or work in Megasthenes's account and in the Mahā-bhāṣya of Patāñjali.

(3) The discrepancy between the Arthaśāstra account and that of Megasthenes. The lateness of the Arthaśāstra is further proved by the deviations of the Arthaśāstra account from the information supplied by the Greeks. Thus, as pointed out by some scholars, Kauṭilya speaks of mining monopolies, the employment of superintendents to manufacture coins, enumerates the names of more metals and alloys (including mercury) other than those known to the Greeks; he also speaks of premia on coins, taxes on gambling houses and liquors, and imposts like the roadcess, not mentioned in the Fragments. Furthermore, Kauṭilya speaks of written documents in direct opposition to the Greeks, who say that Indians did not know writing. Again, according to the Greeks, land belonged to the king but this is not supported by Kauṭilya's book.

(4) The late composition of the book is proved by the comparative evidence of literature. On this head, we have the occurrence of a verse of Bhāsa in the Arthaśāstra, similarity between some of the Arthaśāstra laws and those in the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Kauṭilya's knowledge of the Purāṇas and of the Kāmasūtra, details about more advanced political and social life compared with those in the

Epic, Kauṭilya's knowledge of astrology, the influence of planets and of metallurgy, mining, alchemy and architecture.

(5) Lastly, there is clearer evidence, supporting the late composition of the work, which is furnished by the occurrence of words like *Suruṅgā* (borrowed from Gr. *Syrinx*) and *Cīna* (*Cīnaputtāḥ* and *Cīna-bhūmijāḥ*), with which country the Indians were not acquainted before the second century B.C.

Many of these objections have already been answered by men like Jacobi. Mr. Jayaswal, a scholar and a lawyer, has weighed the force of these evidences and has not only refuted the arguments of Jolly but has furnished additional data for the fourth century B.C. (*Hindu Polity*, Pt. I, Appendix C). Winternitz's objections to the fourth century B.C. date elicited a spirited reply from Dr. N. Law, whose arguments have been summarised in his rejoinder (See Law's *Essays on Indian History and Culture*). Under such circumstances, the author of these pages would not have taken further trouble to give his own views here which were destined to appear in the second volume of his *Kauṭilya*. But as the publication of that book has been delayed and as the date of the *Kauṭilya* is an important topic, it has been thought necessary to give a summary of his objections to the third century A.D. date proposed by Drs. Jolly and Winternitz.

In regard to (1), no scholar ought to take the objection seriously. The use of the author's name in the third person is a peculiar Indian practice which has come down even to the present time.* We find the same practice with Patañjali, who calls himself Gonardiya, with poets like Rājaśekhara calling himself Yāyāvariya, not to speak of vernacular poets like Kavir, Nānak and a host of others. In this

* Cf. Kulluka on Manu.

1. 2. प्रायेणाचार्यनामिषं श्रेष्ठं यत् स्थाभिप्रायमपि परोपदेशमिव वक्ष्यन्ति ।

century even an Indian poet of worldwide reputation uses his own name in the third person.

Again, the meaning of the name Kauṭilya, signifying crookedness, does nothing to prove the imaginary character of the author. We have still worse names like Sunahśepha or Piśuna in India, and Butcher, and Hog, among Europeans.

(2) The absence of Kauṭilya's name or work in the Greek accounts proves nothing. The original work of Megasthenes is lost and even if we had got it, there could not have been any occasion for his mentioning Kauṭilya's name.

(3) The supposed discrepancies between the Arthaśāstra and the Greek accounts should not be taken seriously. The information supplied by Megasthenes was partly from what he saw and partly from what he heard from others. It cannot be expected that Megasthenes' short stay in India enabled him to know all the secrets of the administration or that his informants always spoke the truth to a hated Yavana. Moreover, in all ages, foreign accounts are coloured by the imagination of the composer. Megasthenes, moreover, cannot claim an absolute patent for truth as his accounts are disfigured by silly stories about gold-digging ants, stones floating in rivers or men with enormous ears and one eye on their forehead, which were all hearsay or the product of his Greek imagination. A foreigner, moreover, living at the royal camp, could not be expected to know or even to guess some of the details about the administration, like the monopoly of mines which were not situated in the capital.

Again, the arguments based merely on the conjectural discrepancies between the Arthaśāstra and the Greek accounts, should not have been advanced at all. There are more elements of similarity than of difference (see Dr. Law's article referred to above)

and in many cases discrepancies arise out of ignorance or the working of the Greek imagination. The ignorance of the Greeks cannot be cited as an evidence, especially where we have traditional Indian evidence to the contrary to advance. Thus, in regard to mining monopolies, the author has tried to prove that such monopolies were created by the avaricious Nandas. In regard to the manufacture of coins, we have no evidence to disprove it and the Greeks themselves clearly state that the Indians had coined money even at the time of Alexander. In regard to some other points we stand on surer grounds. Gambling-houses existed in India even in Vedic times and it cannot be regarded as improbable if the exacting government of the 4th century B.C. imposed a tax on gambling-houses. This latter course is rather natural, especially when we find the government so energetic as to regulate even the sale of meat or enforce the keeping of implements for putting down fire (*Milinda-Pañha*). In the case of taxes on liquor, we have surer evidence and the Jātakas speak of the Chāṭi-kahāpaṇa. (*Kauṭilya*—by the Author). The Greek statement about the Indian ignorance of the art of writing may be similarly dismissed and it is disproved by facts. In the 3rd century B.C. Aśoka issued his edicts written in Brāhmi and Kharosthī. No sane man can pretend that the two alphabets were invented all on a sudden. Another such Greek statement that the land belonged to the king deserves a similar treatment. Land in India never belonged to the king and on this we have the almost unanimous testimony of the Smṛtis and the Mīmāṃsā books. It was still less so in the 4th century B.C. The evidence of the Kauṭīliya tallies with general Indian evidence, it should be accepted and the Greek evidence summarily rejected as pure fabrication like the stories of gold-digging ants or of one-eyed men.

(4) The arguments here are flimsy and hardly stand a critical

examination. A common *śloka* occurring in Bhāsa and in the Kauṭīliya proves nothing and the more so because there existed in India a mass of floating literature from which successive generations borrowed. Such is presumably the case in regard to the resemblances between the Kauṭīliya and the Yājñavalkya Smṛti. Here the chances are that the borrowing was *vice versa* and the author of the Yājñavalkya Smṛti borrowed from the Kauṭīliya as well as from the floating legal tradition, much of which is incorporated in the legal chapters of the Arthaśāstra. The author of this book has pointed out instances of such borrowing in his introduction to the *Kātyāyanamata-Saṅgraha* (Calcutta University, 1925). Kauṭīliya's knowledge of the Purāṇas does not prove the late composition of his book, but rather it establishes the antiquity of the Paurāṇic literature, which is clearly alluded to by the mention of the Bhaviṣya in the Āpastamba Dharmasūtra, (II. 24.6) which is regarded by most scholars as a work of the 5th Century B.C. if not earlier. Similarly, the mention of the Vaiśika chapter of the Kāmasūtra proves nothing but the high antiquity of the Kāmasūtra literature which is yet to be investigated.

Next, Kauṭīliya's knowledge of astrology and planetary influence cannot be advanced against the antiquity of the work. Belief in planets and stars is a characteristic of all ancient societies, and in India some of the later Brāhmanas as well as the Jātakas bear testimony to it and the author of this volume has identified a Jātaka verse in the Kauṭīliya (see Art. on Religion and Belief in Ancient India—*Journal of the second Oriental Conference*). Similarly, the high metallurgical knowledge displayed in the Kauṭīliya ought not to make out a case against the antiquity of the Arthaśāstra, and this plea should not be entertained at all except on the assumption that the Indians had no knowledge of the extraction of metals.

Facts disprove this contention. The art of extracting metals is as old as the Vedic period. The later *śamhitās* speak of eight or nine metals and alloys and the Greeks themselves speak highly of the quality of Indian steel. In regard to mercury, we have no clear evidence either way and it should not be taken seriously. Such is also the contention on the ground of architectural development. Facts nullify the value of such suggestions, since within half a century of Kauṭilya's time, the great edifices of Aśoka were constructed and this could not rise all on a sudden.

(5) Lastly, we are to discuss the value of the argument advanced on the basis of the occurrence of the two words *Suruṅgā* and *Cīna*. The similarity between Skt. *Suruṅgā* and Gr. *Syrinx* was pointed out long ago by Weber in the *Indian Antiquary* (1873, p. 144 Col. 2. Art. on Greek words in Sanskrit literature). Assuming for argument's sake that the word *suruṅgā* is borrowed from the Greeks, it is impossible to understand why that should be an argument to establish the late composition of the Arthaśāstra. The Indians came in contact with the Greeks before and after Alexander. Even denying the existence of a Graeco-Indian intercourse before Alexander, would it be unnatural to hold that the word *Suruṅgā* became wellknown to the Indians, on account of the marvellous success of the mining tactics of the Greeks against Sangala, and against Sambus and the Molloi, some of whose citadels were easily captured* by them entering through tunnels. In our own days, the great war has helped in large borrowings of words from the vocabulary of one nation to that of another in course of

* Read Curtius Rufus's account of the conquest of the capital of Sambus. The Greeks constructed a tunnel up to the middle of the city and the Indians were bewildered to find "armed men rising out of the ground in the middle of their city." (McCrindle's *Invasion of India*, p. 254). Weber attributes the occurrence of *Suruṅgā* to the bellico-political relations between the Greeks and the Hindus.

a few years (cf. *Poilou*, *Camouflage*, *Sabotage* etc. in the English language).

The meaning of the word *Cīna* requires investigation. At present we have no means of ascertaining as to who were designated by this name or to which country it was applied. To identify off-hand *Cīna* with the country of China (supposed to derive the present name from the T'sin dynasty) and then to argue that there was no direct intercourse between India and China, in the fourth century B.C. and then to make out a case against the traditional date is based on a series of 'a priori' assumptions. Rather than do this, it would be reasonable to hold that *Cīna* was the country which bordered on India and was familiar to Indians on account of the already existing trade relations and was so called as it was ruled by T'sin princes, who were already powerful in the 7th century B.C. (See Schoff's *Periplus* p. 126).

The arguments against the fourth century B. C. thus all fail, and in the absence of direct evidences to establish a late date, it is but natural to stick to the traditional date of the work. The internal evidences in the book strongly support Kautiliya's authorship and we have three statements to that effect; viz., in the end of the introduction (p. 6: *Kautiliyena kṛtaṁ śāstraṁ* etc.), in the middle (p. 75: *Kautiliyena narendrārthe* etc.) and in the end (p. 429: *Yena śāstram ca śāstram ca Nandarājagatā ca bhūḥ | Amarsenoddhṛtānyāsu tena śāstramidam kṛtam*). While in addition we have two or three passages where the author uses verbs of the first person (p. 235) (*vakṣhyāmaḥ*).

This fourth century B.C. date is thus not only supported by Indian tradition, but its non-acceptance militates against the current of general evidence supplied by Indian social and political literature.

In what age, except that preceding Aśoka, can we expect penal laws against the Śākyaas and Ājivikas? Certainly not after Aśoka, when Buddhism stood so high. In what later age can we expect a dissertation on the political *mandala* except that before the establishment of the Mauryas? In what age, moreover, can we expect customs like *niyoga*, or the divorce and remarriage of women, accepted in society? Certainly not after the Brahmanical reaction under the Sungas, but before it. Again, when we carefully analyse the social picture and the political ideals in the book, we are bound to come to the conclusion that the Arthaśāstra describes a stage of social evolution which succeeded the age of the great monastic propaganda and which saw the movement for imperial unity going on in full vigour. The book, as we have it, represents the current of thought of the fourth century B.C. Of course, it is not impossible that there may be later additions or interpolations, but there is no one competent to swear against these.

As to the relation between the Epic tradition and the Kauṭīliya, there are potent arguments which make Kauṭīliya an inheritor of the maxims and lessons of the Epic. Kauṭīliya's book is based on the accepted canon of political guidance, discussed at great length in the Śānti-parvan. There may be later additions or rehandlings in course of which later materials or the names of foreign invaders were put in, but still the Epic describes a simpler political life. The idea of imperialism or the war of the Maṇḍala is absent in the Epic chapters. But at the same time the Epic contains the floating tradition or the parables which Kauṭīliya utilises and for the explanation of which we must go to the Epic. Kauṭīliya bases all his directions upon these and he sees no reason for explaining his own standpoint, because the maxims and principles of the Epic were already too well known. This is the case with the account of

Mātsyanyāya, of the election of Manu to kingship, or the mention of *Vaitasi Vrtti*. Kauṭilya knew, moreover, the parables and the teachings of the Epic and he makes a free use of its lessons. He alludes to the destruction of Rāvaṇa through violence to women, he alludes to the evils of dice-play and mentions the cases of Nala and Yudhiṣṭhira. In some of his political maxims we find the same influences. One instance can be easily cited, namely in his dissertations on the importance of *Kāla* or proper time, he alludes to the war between the crow and the owl and the success of the latter during the night. Clearly it is a direct allusion to the lessons of the Sautika-parvan. Kauṭilya's indebtedness is further proved by verses borrowed either from the Epic or from the floating tradition embodied later in the Epic. Thus, it is reasonable to hold that the political canon embodied in the Śānti-parvan existed prior to Kauṭilya and the latter fully utilised it.

(b) The socio-ethical outlook of Kauṭilya requires definition. No one among Indian political thinkers has been so misunderstood as the author of the Arthasāstra. He was neither a revolutionary cutting at the root of the existing social fabric nor a bigot of the no-change school. His aim was to ensure human happiness through the agency of the monarchical state and he strove hard to define the functions and duties of the king so as to bring these into line with the material requirements of his subjects.

He belonged to the Artha school and so emphasised the importance of *Artha* in human life. *Artha* was of highest importance since *Dharma* and *Kāma* depended on it (अर्थ एव प्रधानः, अर्थमूलौ हि धर्मकामौ Kau. p. 12). Apart from the attainment of the three namely, *Dharma*, *Kāma* and *Artha*, the material objectives of human aspiration depended on the realisation of the four,

viz. maintenance of those already possessed, aspiration for those not yet attained, enhancement of those attained and the proper enjoyment or distribution of things attained. The *trivarga* or the three main objectives are allied to each other and over-attention to one or either of the three destroys the balance of life. Hence proper attention should be paid to each of these. Even joy has its place in life according to Kauṭilya and nobody should think of shunning joys in life.*

Next men are to learn their conduct in life from the śāstras and thereby to discipline themselves. Overgreed or excess of passion makes man forget himself in society and causes troubles to others and these in the long run destroy the happiness of all.†

Self-discipline, again, is according to Kauṭilya the primary condition of success in life whether for ordinary individuals or for kings. Next to is knowledge which is to be acquired through association with the learned (वृद्धसंयोगेन प्रज्ञाः) and last of all comes the effort to attain the objective through exertion (utthāna).

Discipline again is either spontaneous, or comes through a course of training (कृतकः स्वाभाविकश्च विनयः). At the root of both stands the principle of regulation or coercion which thus is the basic element in ordered life or progress (विनयमूलो दण्डः प्राणभृतां योगक्षेमावहः). Daṇḍa, therefore is a primary principle in human progress and serves as the basis even of the *vidyās*. To gain their objectives men (especially kings) should always hold the rod of punishment (लोकयात्रार्थी नित्यसुद्यतदण्डः स्यात्). Punishment however should be requisite to the occasion, neither greater

* धर्माधीनोऽपि कर्म संवेत । न निःसुखः स्यात् । सन् वा विवर्गमन्योन्यानुवन् । एकीकृत्यासिचितो धर्मार्थकालानामितरी पीडयति ।

† एवं वश्येन्द्रियः परस्त्रीद्रव्यहिंसाय वर्जयेत् । स्वप्रसीत्यनदृतमुद्धतमेवत्वमनर्थसंयोग'च ।—Kau, p. 12.

nor less than that required by circumstances (यथाहं दण्डः पूज्यः p. 9 and (दण्डमूलास्ति सो विद्याः)

The science of *Danda*, together with *Ānvīkṣikī*, *Trayī* and *Vārttā* constituted, according to Kaṭilya, all the sources of knowledge. Each of these helped man in deciding his line of conduct and in pointing out the way to success. According to Kaṭilya, the *Trayī* or the Vedas teach men to discriminate *Dharma* from *Adharma*. *Vārttā* teaches the road to attain material objectives while *Dandanīti* helps in discriminating true policy from impolicy by laying down the line of demarcation between right and wrong. Lastly *Ānvīkṣikī* enables man to apply his reason in order to weigh the forces on either side, gives him wisdom enough to choose the line of success and helps to maintain his mental balance in times of success or disaster. It is, in his words, the light of all knowledge, the means of all undertakings, the basis of all Dharma and as such it is the imperishable essence of all (knowledge).*

Kaṭilya's enumeration of the sciences explains his own standpoint. He appears before us as a rationalist emphasising the high importance of reason and speculative philosophy and at the same time a believer in the traditional canon laid down in the *Trayī*. The Vedas are objects of veneration for him, as well as the *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas*, since they embody the lessons of the past. His faith in the past makes him reject the extreme opinions of the materialistic *Bārhaspatyas* or the teaching of unscrupulous kingcraft emanating from the School of *Sūkra*. In him, there

* धर्माधर्मौ तथ्याम् । अर्थानर्थौ वार्त्तायाम् । नयानयौ दण्डनीत्यां वलावले चैतर्था हेतुभिरन्वीक्षमाना लोकलोपकरोति व्यसनेऽभ्युदये च बुद्धिमवस्थापयति प्रज्ञावाक्प्रक्रियैश्चारय' च करोति ।

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानां उपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।

आययः सर्वधर्मानां शशदान्तीक्षणी मता ॥ Kau. p. 7.

is no violent break with the past or a revolutionary tendency to destroy. He is for maintaining the natural order of men and of the castes and he stands forth as the champion of Varna and Āśrama. As he himself says :—

तस्मात् स्वधर्मे भूतानां राजा न व्यभिचारयेत् ।
 स्वधर्मं सन्दधानो हि प्रेत्य चेह च नन्दति ॥
 व्यवस्थितार्यमर्यादः कृतवर्णान्ममस्थितिः ।
 त्रय्या हि रक्षितो लोकः प्रसौदति न सौदति ॥

With a synthesis of the ideals of the past and an attention to the requirements of the present he stood for a well-ordered and regulated social life and pleaded for the authority of a paternal king enforcing and guiding social co-operation. Conservative as he was, he pleaded for justice and protection to all. Inequalities of treatment indeed existed, yet in his own archaic society Kauṭilya pleaded for better principles and practices. Averse to the extreme teachings of kingcraft, he denounced the demoralisation of princes, or the unscrupulous seizure of the throne by crafty ministers. He wished to ensure impartial justice, inveighed against judicial tortures, vindicated the natural rights of womanhood, inspite of the reactionary tendencies of the age, admitted men of the lowest castes into the pale of the Hindu society and in that age of darkness and violence wished to abolish slavery altogether. (For further details see my Kauṭilya—Vol. I.)

(c) **Theory of kingship.** — As to kauṭilya's theory of the origin of kingship, already something has been said, but an additional discussion is here necessary to refute the erroneous views of some writers who pretend to find in the Kauṭīliya, the divine nature of the royal office. As we have already said, Kauṭilya like some of his Epic predecessors, regarded the state of nature

as a state of war. (See II, pp. 55 and 56). According to what he puts in the mouth of his propagandist spies, he clearly accepts the theory of the origin of monarchy in election. The first king among men was Vaiyasvata Manu who was elected to save men from Mātsya-nyāya. Clearly here he follows the tradition which is found even in the Rigveda (see ante pp. I. 83 & 84) and later on we have in the Epic, the same story of Manu's election (Śanti, Ch. 67). Not only does he regard kingship as arising out of election, but he emphasises the contractual relationship between the king and the people which as we have already seen found favour with the Epic thinkers as well as the Dharmasūtra writers.

For a clear understanding of Kautilya's position a consideration of the above passage is necessary. It runs as follows :—

मात्स्यन्यायाभिभूताः प्रजा मनुं वैवस्वतं राजानं चक्रिरे । धान्यषड्भागं
पण्यदशभागं हिरण्यं चास्य भागधेयं प्रकल्पयामासुः । तेन भूता राजानः प्रजानां
योगक्षेमवहाः तेषां किल्बिषमदण्डकरा हरन्ति ।तस्मात् षष्ठ्यष्टभागमा-
रण्यका अपि निवपन्ति “तस्यैतद् भागधेयं योऽस्मान् गोपायतीति” । इन्द्रियम-
स्थानमेतत् राजानः प्रत्यक्षहेडप्रसादाः । तानवमन्यमानान् देवोऽपि दण्डः सृशति ।
तस्माद्राजानो नावमन्तव्याः ।

i.e. “The people tormented by Mātsya-nyāya, made Manu their king [in the remote past]. They assigned to him a sixth part of grain and a tenth part of articles of trade and gold, as his share (to be paid by people). Maintained by these (nourished—Bhrta—note the same word is used by Bodhāyana) kings [following Manu] exert in maintaining the safety and prosperity of their subjects and partake of their sins if they violate the principle of just punishment or taxes. Such being the facts, even hermits pay to the king the sixth part of their gleanings, on the ground ‘that he who protects them is entitled to this share on account of his

protection.' As the king is the visible awarder of rewards and punishments, he performs the functions of Indra and Yama. If men insult kings, [without reason] they are sure to be visited by divine anger. Hence no one should insult kings.'

By no stretch of imagination can this passage be taken to prove Kautilya's belief in kingship as a divine institution. He speaks of election and of the royal share as being paid in lieu of the king's protection. The same argument put in the mouth of hermits makes it clearer. Towards the end, the king's functions are compared to those of Indra and Yama and here we have only an allusion to the parallelism of their duties. The reference to Daiva anger makes out no case in favour of the divine nature of royalty and it is the natural mode of expression in a country where the influence of the Karma theory made men always alive to the supreme dispensation of divine justice, even when the mundane agents failed in their duties.

That Kautilya looked upon monarchy as a human institution, and that he believed in a real contractual relation subsisting between subjects and the king is proved by various other circumstances. All throughout, he warns kings against the evils of misgovernment and speaks of the loss of their authority through the revolt of subjects. Nowhere does he speak of the duty of subjects to obey a monarch unconditionally. The king's happiness again depends on the prosperity of his subjects and the king is bound to make good the loss to his subjects caused by thieves and robbers. Loyalty of subjects was the highest asset of the king (अनुद्योगे सार्वगुणं) and he was to live solely for them. Under these circumstances, to speak of Kautilya as a believer in divine kingship would be nothing but hopeless perversion of truth, caused by sheer ignorance.

(d) Kautilya's ideas about the functions of the state have

already been discussed with a view to interpret his scheme of good government in terms of modern political thought, but nothing has yet been said as to his real political ideal or the objective which impelled him to compose his celebrated treatise.

Kautilya's treatise is an Arthaśāstra and is to be differentiated from works devoted to the attainment of Dharma, Kāma or Mokṣa. In it, he concentrates his attention on the realisation of material objectives and yearns after the social happiness of man through a political discipline ensuring life and property, regulating the scope of activity of individuals and classes, and giving each individual all proper chances for gaining their objectives. The aim of his work, as he himself says was two-fold, *e.g.*

(I) guidance of princes (esp. of the Maurya King) in the ways of acquiring land (kingdoms)

(II) maintenance and protection of subjects.

The object of the Arthaśāstra was to guide men in *lābha* and *pālana* (*पृथिव्या लाभपालनोपायः शास्त्रमर्थशास्त्रम्*—Artha is nothing but the material objective of man—more especially in regard to men living on earth—*मनुष्याणां वृत्तिरर्थः मनुष्यवतीभूमिरित्यर्थः* pp. 1 and 424).

So far as *pālana* is concerned, we have already given its true significance especially with Hindu Political thinkers. The king was not to remain satisfied with performing political duties, but he had to concentrate his attention on the ways and means of their realising true material happiness. According to Kautilya, the king to ensure *pālana* or good government had to devote his attention to the following, after completing his own education and self-discipline, *e.g.* Maintenance of the social order as laid down in the *Śruti* and traditional canon; creation of ministers; constitution of the Higher Executive Body (also spiritual guides); constitution of an Advisory Council; appointment of Judges; employment

of spies and diplomatic agents ; selection and employment of officers for revenue collection ; arrangements for police ; proper keeping of accounts and audit ; appointment of officials and superintendents to carry on the work of supervision ; constitution of law courts ; maintenance and organisation of the army and navy with a view to protection of life and property and protection from foreign invasion ; active help to the cause of education, industry and commerce ; maintenance of the poor and the indigent ; safety of the people from famine, pestilence or flood ; regulation of wages of labourers ; of prices and profits of merchants so as to put an end to exploitation by capitalists ; eradication of menaces to peace ; measures for enforcing administrative laws ; suppression of corruption of officials and Judges and of Treason.

Furthermore, to ensure the real happiness of the people, due attention was to be paid to improve the economic resources of the state. The king's share was to be collected, natural sources of profit were to be tapped and the revenue properly applied to maintain internal peace and prosperity (Cp. Kautilya's views on Vārtā—*कृषिपाशुपाल्ये वणिज्या च वास्ती*.....*तथा स्वपक्षं परपक्षं च वशौकरोति कोशदण्डाभ्याम्* p. 8).

This is the brief summary of Kautilya's aims objectives and means of good government which is repeated for the convenience of our readers.

But good government was not the only ideal of the great teacher nor the sole lesson which he intends for his disciples. With him it was the starting point for higher ambitions. His ideal king was to be an empire-builder and his book was to serve as a manual for the guidance of such ambitious Princes. More than half of the book is devoted to the ways and means of

realising this high ambition. From the sixth book, the rest of the work deals with a consideration of the time, place, and circumstances as well as the means which enable a prince to entertain the idea of world-conquest and the means of realising it.

In the sixth book (on Maṇḍala-yoniḥ) Kautilya discusses the agencies that influence human actions (*Daiva* and *Mānuṣa*) and the conditions of political equilibrium which we shall discuss very soon. In the chapter on *ṣāḍguṇyam* he enquires into the nature of the relations of states with regard to one another and defines the "Six-fold policy" of peace and war, inertness and movement, alliance or dubious attitude (सन्धिवियहयानासनसंश्रयदैवीभावाः षाड्गुणं) p. 261) and enunciates general rules which guide the relations of states. After this section, he devotes himself at great length to the calamities of kingdoms, the causes thereof and the ways of averting them (on *Vyasanādhikārikam*). The ninth book discusses the time, circumstances and the conditions favouring offensive operations (अभियासं कर्म). The tenth book (*Śāṅgrāmikam*) is devoted to the ways and means of waging war, the eleventh discusses the means of winning over political corporations (*Saṅgha-vṛttam*), the twelfth (*Ābaliyasam*) instructs weak kings as to their attitude to the conqueror, while in the thirteenth we have the means of capturing fortresses, and in the fifteenth (*Tantra-yukṭi*) explanations of technical terms. The fourteenth book is devoted to magical rites and charms for granting success in various objectives.

The reasons which impelled Kautilya to devote so much of his attention to war and conquest and to look to the establishment of an Imperial authority are not far to seek. The movement for the unification of North India was going on in his time and such a unification was made desirable by the daring inroad of the Greeks

under Alexander who brought home to Indians the horrors of foreign conquest. Other factors influenced his mind and he recognised the necessity of reviving the All-India empire which alone was destined to give peace to the country (compare his allusion to the Cakravarti-ksetram, pp. 338, e.g. देशः पृथिवी, तस्यां हिमवत्-समुद्रान्तमुदीचीनं योजनसहस्रपरिमाणं अतिथिक्चक्रवर्त्तिक्षेत्रं). In his eyes, India was naturally destined for her prosperity and progress to remain under one Imperial power—a fact which has been demonstrated many times by the subsequent history of the country.

Yet, there were hinderances to it. The ancient world hardly knew any stable political equilibrium. States and peoples could not easily make up their differences, nor submit to one government without prejudicing their own interests or sacrificing their own political sentiments, while natural causes contributed to their mutual hostilities. Kaṭilya tried to investigate the nature of these and laid down the conditions determining the existence of natural friendship or hostility, the means of maintaining the safety of a prince in the circle of states and the ways of attaining paramountcy in it.

In this unstable political condition, states were liable to devote their attention to the two objectives namely, maintenance of security (*kṣema*) or acquisition (*Yoga*), and on these desires depended peace (*śama*) and activity (*vyāyāma*) respectively. Again, states were liable either to remain in a stationary condition or else to progress or decay (*Kṣaya*, *Vṛddhi* or *Sthāna*). Improvement in political condition depended on strength (*Bala*) and this was of three varieties i.e. strength arising out of political wisdom or diplomatic sagacity (*Jñānabala—mantra-śakti*), natural resources (financial and military resources) and military activity (*utsāha-śakti* and these lead to three kinds of success (*Siddhiḥ—Sukham*).