herein lies the pathos of the situation—of the sons of the soil.

No reason, even specious, has been made out for the avoidance of enquiry into the above-mentioned matter of the Law Courts, or of the relations of the Government of India and the Heads of the Departments directly administered by them. The Commission has coolly refrained from even the mention of such other Departments as the Law, the Military, the Foreign, each under the control of a Member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General. All these should have been enquired into. Nor have the relations of the Local Governments and the Heads of the various Departments subordinate to them, like the Public Instruction, the Police, the Foreign, (each Local Government has also such a Department) the Judicial, and others been enquired into.

The Foreign Department does not deal only with the affairs of such States as are really situate *without* the boundaries of India, but it deals also with the 700 odd Native States and only the most determined optimist or the rosiest-hued official apologist can assert that it is perfection. Further the Chief Commissionerships are annexes of this Department and are directly controlled by the Governor-General. Surely an enquiry here would have been fruitful of results. The Military Department, the cause of so much bitter feeling and public quarrel between the late Lord Kitchener, Lord Curzon, and Lord Middleton (then Mr. Brodrick, Secretary of

State) ending in the resignation of his high office by Lord Curzon, should not have been left severely alone. It is true that, later, another Commission, under the Presidency of Lord Nicholson, sat at Simla in the Viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge, but its findings have been treated as a dead secret and nobody outside the charmed circle knows anything about it. The repeated attempts to drag its findings into light, both in the Governor-General's Legislative Council and in the Parliament have proved wholly abortive.

An enquiry into the Law Department would have shown that it has continued to be the Cinderella of the family since the days of Macaulay, its first head, and has not yet come into her own, other Departments continuing to usurp her heritage.

All this is very far from being satisfactory or hope-inspiring. No real progress towards honest Decentralisation by a genuine association of the people with the government of the country, with ever accelerated pace, is possible, unless and until the limitless Statutory powers of the Secretary of State over the Central and Local Governments in India are very considerably abrogated. My purpose in pointing out all these shortcomings is that some future Commission of Enquiry should not be permitted to have its scope so narrowed, but should make a *full* and *genuine* enquiry into the *entire machinery* of administration, as was done in the olden days when the East India Company's Charter had to be renewed periodically. It is for such a wide Commission that the National Congress has been pressing for years.

Still more necessary and very urgently needed is a Retrenchment Commission. Expenditure has been going up by leaps and bounds. Salaries are being increased, special allowances are being granted, highly-paid posts are being multiplied, and taxation is becoming ever more burdensome, while the economic condition continues to be deplorable.

THE VICEROY.

Coming now to the main thesis of this chapter, we find that in dealing with the powers of the Supreme Government, its constitution and its machinery, the very first factor that attracts attention is the Viceroy, his qualifications, his status and his powers.

There does not seem to be much danger of this, the finest post in the British Empire, becoming a preserve of the Indian Civil Service. So far there has been only one departure from the invariable practice, and the chances are few indeed of that departure becoming a precedent. The magnificent political patronage involved is not likely to be surrendered by either of the powerful parties ruling England. The Viceroy will continue to be a nominee of the party in power for the time being. Both parties have, however, recognised that the post is not to be made a party-question in the American sense of 'spoil to the victors,' which would spell ruin to any serious and proper administration of this country. It goes without saying that the post is a reward for recognised party help, and it will continue to be bestowed only on those who have rendered conspicuous service to the party that happens

to be in power when the post falls vacant, and are also otherwise fully qualified by administrative and political experience. But some queer notions of dignity prevent a commoner being appointed. Lord Curzon's case seems to be decisive on the point. If the choice of the Prime Minister falls on a commoner, he will be ennobled before being sent out. Another point is that no Viceroy-designate is likely to repeat the mistake of Lord Curzon, who, while accepting ennoblement, did not wish to be exiled from the House of Commons. He found that after years of almost kingly dignity, he was no longer fit to stand the rough and tumble of the House of Commons. Such superior positions cannot but tell on the moral fibre of a man, and the shadow of "the divinity that doth hedge a king" comes, in however modified a form, to unfit him for the ordinary heckling of the House of Commons politics, quite as effectually as if he had been born an aristocrat.

Coming back to the question of the class from which such exalted personages are to be chosen, there is little danger of their ever being chosen from the Royal family. The political and other reasons against such a step would overwhelmingly be against any English Cabinet making such a choice. But it is necessary to say something about this subject from the Indian point of view, as suggestions to that effect have been made, from time to time, by persons in this country, of diametrically opposed political views. Neither radical, nor conservative, neither plebian nor aristocrat, neither Hindu nor Mussalman has realised what

the establishment of such a miniature Royal Court would mean to India as a whole. They have been simply led away by the glamour of the idea, added to, perhaps, a semiconscious feeling that the 'pseudo-aristocrats' of the Indian Civil Service would not then be able to hold their heads so very high as they do now in the absence of genuine aristocracy from their own land, and who give themselves such annoyingly superior airs not only where the "native" is concerned, but also in their dealings with men from their own land whether official or merchant, journalist or traveller, if they have the misfortune to be out of the charmed circle of the I. C. S. Its snobbery is limitless. These bad manners are not of recent growth; but are of fairly old standing. J. S. Buckingham, in his *Plan for the Future Government of India*, to give only one instance and that too from a rather later day pamphlet, published in 1853 (2nd edition), animadverts strongly on the wide-spread evil. For Europeans to come suddenly, he says:—

> From a society composed wholly of Europeans, to one in which they are surrounded chiefly by dark-skinned Asiatics—greatly their inferiors in rank, emolument, and position is to beget in them a supercilious contempt for a race so different from their own, and whom they seem to think they are specially appointed to overrule and command; and this haughtiness of disposition towards the Natives is daily fostered by the examples and customs by which they are surrounded. (P. 26.)

Every psychologist knows that this sort of bumptiousness is not the outcome of any inherent evil special to the English character, but merely the vulgar manifestation of the exuberant feelings of the successful man; of the top-dog in the battle of life.

Because we dare not retaliate as we do when we meet with such behaviour in persons of our own hue and political standing, therefore the continuing sore.

From the point of view of the good of the sweating and teeming millions of India, nothing could be more retrograde than such an appointment, if English party politics could ever compose their differences to the extent of sinking their beneficial rivalry and agreeing to set up a simulacrum of a Royal Court with a Prince of the blood Royal to preside over its destinies. Apart from the inevitable fact that in Oriental surroundings, it is sure to attempt to eclipse the rather thin splendour of the English Court itself, which could not be tolerated, it would be financially ruinous to poverty-stricken India. If this is not enough argument to check the ardour of the champions of Royalty, we might remind them here that the Viceroy is a hard-worked official with a splendid training behind him and not a merely superfluous ornament, whose functions are purely social. Now, how many Royal Princes are there, who could be trusted to have even average abilities or average application to business? Bagehot, an undisputed authority, says on this point of Royal ability:

"He can be but an average man to begin with; sometimes he will be clever, but sometimes he will be stupid; in the long run he will be neither clever nor stupid; he will be the simple, common man who plods the plain routine of life from the cradle to the grave. His education will be that of one who has never had to struggle; who has always felt that he has nothing to gain; who has had the first dignity given him; who has never seen common life as in truth it is. It is idle to expect an ordinary man born in the purple to have greater genius than an extraordinary man born out of the purple; to expect a man whose place has always been

fixed to have a better judgment than one who has lived by his judgment; to expect a man whose career will be the same whether he is discreet or whether he is indiscreet to have the nice discretion of one who has risen by his wisdom, who will fall if he ceases to be wise.

Theory and experience both teach that the education of a Prince can be but a poor education, and that a Royal family will generally have less ability than other families. What right have we then to expect the perpetual entail on any family of an exquisite discretion, which, if it be not a sort of genius, is at least as rare as genius? (*The English Constitution*, Ch. iii)

It is nearly half-a-century since Bagehot wrote, and his delineation of Royalty is as true to-day as it was when he wrote. The English Royalty alone has improved since his day, largely because, as has been most happily described, the British Empire has become a crowned Republic.

A Royal Court will be a hindrance rather than a help to the good government of the country. Court influence, as we see in highly-civilised and largely-democratic Europe, even in the 20th century, is not always an unmixed blessing:—

What these influences are everyone knows; though no one, hardly the best and closest observer, can say with confidence and precision how great their influence is.—(Bagehot.)

These sinister influences, as Bagehot calls them, come to the surface off and on when one *camarilla* is exposed by another *camarilla*, causing horrible scandal and intense bewilderment as they did in Germany some years ago, and very recently in Russia and have done in every European Court from time to time.

The time of the Court, unfitted for business will, then, be naturally taken up wholly with the frivolous ceremonials and the fripperies of Government to the detriment of incessant, unpleasant, hard, vast,

complicated and miscellaneous daily work which must be done if chaos is not to be produced. In fact, as it is, the present social functions of even a non-Royal Viceroy take up too much of his time and are unfortunately tending day by day to become quite as important factors as his administrative functions. It is necessary to raise this warning voice in time before it also becomes a 'burning' question. The question is already beginning, to be asked by the taxpayer, whether all this lavish display is right and proper, while famine after famine is laying the land desolate and killing off peasants and cattle by the million, to say nothing of the vast havoc caused by such ever-present diseases, as cholera, plague and malaria. He naturally asks: Who are the people that benefit by all this extravagance and display? The social amenities of gubernatorial life are for a handful, who are not of the land. These entertainments are the preserves of the European official and non-official populations of the hill and plain capitals, and sometimes a stray Native Chief. How does it benefit the teeming millions of India who have to provide the wherewithal for these grand shows? India is only the poorer for these costly social displays. Sir Frederick Lely has some acute remarks in his *Suggestions for the Better Government of India* on this point. He says (p. 15):

> I may note in passing that the Governor should never visit a town without making a not excessive but tangible gift to the public. A Budget Grant of, say, Rs. 25,000 in all every year for this purpose would be of *infinitely more political use than the sumptuary allowance for diners and dances to Europeans.* (The italics are mine.)

The author has touched here a very sore point of the Anglo-Indian administration of India, and while not meaning it, has shown how very English and insular are the surroundings of the Governors and how the Indians are wholly excluded from them. Incidentally this also raises the whole question of the extravagant sumptuary allowances to these highly-paid Heads of the Administrations. It is an ever-increasing burden, and there seems to be no check upon it. Why should it not be abolished altogether, or at least reduced to reasonable dimensions? Do the Governors-General, the Governors, the Lieutenant-Governors in Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, etc., get any, and if so, what allowances over and above their salaries, and for what purposes?

The question of salary naturally comes in here. The Governors-General of Canada, Australia, South Africa, each receive only £10,000 a year. Even the Emperor's own uncle received that much only as the Governor-General of Canada. Surely this is ample emolument; and there is not a shadow of reason or justice for burdening poverty-stricken India with fully double that rate. The household arrangements of the Indian Viceroy, and the Governors, which are probably on a more magnificent scale than in any other possession of the Crown, also badly call for the pruner's hands. For all this lavishness and display is due to a fancied necessity of vying with the fabled gorgeousness of the 'barbarous' Orient, and certainly not to any inherent necessity of the case.

Before going on to deal with the qualifications, powers and functions of a Viceroy, some remarks might be made about the tenure of his office. No legal limit is fixed to the term of office, but a custom has grown up which fixes it at five years; and this is the case not only for the Viceregal term of office but also of many others, for instance, the Subordinate Heads of Administrations, the Executive Councillors, and so on. It was not so in the earlier days. Five years is too short a period for any new man, however clever and hardworking he may be, to get at the heart of his new duties sufficiently to leave his impress on them when the time for his relinquishing of them comes. The statutory life of the House of Commons till very recently was 7 years, which means that the life of the Executive was also 7 years. If this was found advantageous up to only a few years back in England, where the incomers do not come into wholly new surroundings nor are they wholly new men—the case frequently being that they had previously filled that very office or had been in any case in the Cabinet and knew something of the inner working and the policy governing their particular departments, though might not have had anything to do with it actually, much more should it be advantageous in India. For both these conditions are absent in the Indian employment. The person appointed knows nothing of the work he is going to do. He only brings a trained intelligence and a wide experience to bear upon the work. He has to learn painfully, laboriously, all the minutiæ not only of his own department but

also of every other. He has to gather special experience before he becomes fit to deal with the complex work of the departments to fit himself for his duties as the Prime Minister, correlating and controlling the whole vast machinery of the Government. Then, again, none of these appointments go again a second time to the same person, much less a third time, as they often do in England. Taking all these factors into consideration, it would seem to be the wisest course to copy the practice of the United States of America which fixes the time-limit at four years for the Presidentship, and if the President has proved himself to be a wise and capable head, he is elected for a second term of four years. A further equally wise, constitutional practice has grown up of not permitting a third term. Why should not such a good practice be adopted in India also? For all those offices in which, according to present practice, the tenure is limited to 5 years, it should get restricted to 4 years, with the distinct understanding that if the holder of it has proved himself to be a wise, progressive and sympathetic Governor or Minister he should be re-appointed for a further 4 years' term, by the Crown, *on a petition by the Legislative Council concerned.* Such a change will not only reduce the admitted evil of too rapid changes of portfolios but will have for us also the inestimable advantage of a quicker removal of unsympathetic or incapable holders of these exalted offices and of permitting of the lengthening of the tenures of such as

have proved, in their first term, that the good of India and of Indians is their first consideration. It cannot be said that this lengthening of the term of office would destroy the freshness of view of the holder of the office. There can be such a thing as too much freshness of outlook! Let us be given the very best man possible for the work and then let him be allowed time to deliberately work out his ideas and not forced either to be in a hurry, or kept merely marking time as one is sure to do who feels that there is not time enough for him to carry through any work which he may set his hand to and which may be unpleasant or distasteful to a successor, who, unable to shove it aside and forced to go on, is almost sure to bungle it.

We may now take up the important questions of the qualifications, powers and functions of a Viceroy. We may take it that the jobbery that used to be perpetrated in the earlier days in the appointment of Governors and Governors-General is a thing of the past; but India feels and resents, that even now the British Cabinet does not fully realise its tremendous responsibility in the matter and does send out men who do not bring credit to their patrons and their country. A few concrete examples taken from the days when the sovereignty of India had not been assumed by the British Crown—for it may be unwise to name later instances—would bring home to those who have not made any particular study of Indian History in the British period, of the sinister influences deflecting the choice of Ministers from men fit for

such exalted positions, to men who are a scandal. Very unpleasant tales are told not only about the lesser lights, like Chief-Commissioners, Lieutenant-Governors, and Governors, but even about such exalted persons as Viceroys!

Buckingham says:—

Lord Moira, it is now well-known, was sent out at the request of the Prince Regent, to enable him to repair a shattered fortune, ruined chiefly by advances to that profligate prince for the most unworthy purposes; though the embarrassments of the noble lord were so great, that all his allowances as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief were insufficient to pay even the interest of his debts; and, on his return from India, his carriage and horses, the only visible property he had, were seized by his creditors, and he died at last in debt and exile, as Governor of Malta. His successor, Lord Amherst, was selected by Mr. Canning from personal, rather than public, motives; and when he plunged the country into the first Burmese War, and exhausted the Indian Treasury, Mr. Canning admitted in the House of Commons that, though he was deemed sufficient for the task of ruling such an empire in a state of peace, the contingency of war had not been calculated on. Sir William A'Court, afterwards Lord Heytesbury, was chosen by Sir Robert Peel, as being one of his political party; but though approved by the Court of Directors, he was recalled by the Whigs just on the point of his embarkation, and Lord Auckland, one of their family compact, though highly objectionable to the India Directors, as being thought deficient in ability, was sent out instead—chiefly, it is believed, because he was poor as a nobleman, and India was a fine field for repairing or making a fortune. The Marquis of Tweeddale at Madras, Lord Falkland at Bombay, and other Governors that might be named, owed their appointments entirely to their political connections with the Government of the day, the question of their fitness weighing only as a feather in the balance, compared with political and family considerations. (*Plan for the Future Government of Indies* pps. 18-19.)

This same pamphlet (pps. 49-50) has the following quotation taken from William Howitt's work, *Colonisation and Christianity*, about the peccadilloes of Lord Amherst:—

Yet, amidst all the poverty and wretchedness, behold such contrasts as the following: Even so recently as 1827, we find some tolerably regal instances of regal gifts to our Indian represent-

atives. Lord and Lady Amherst, on a tour through these provinces, arrived at Agra. Lady Amherst received a visit from the wife of Hindoo Rao, and her ladies. They proceeded to invest Lady Amherst with a present sent for her by the Baiyza Bai. They put on her a turban, richly adorned with the most costly diamonds, a superb diamond necklace, ear-rings, anklets, bracelets, and amulets of the same, valued at £30,000 sterling! A complete set of gold ornaments, and another of silver, was then presented. Miss Amherst was then presented with a pearl necklace valued at £500, and other ornaments of equal beauty and costliness. Other ladies had splendid presents the whole value of the gifts amounting to £50,000 sterling! In the evening came Lord Amherst's turn. On visiting the Rao, his hat was carried out and brought back on a tray covered. The Rao uncovered it and placed it on his Lordship's head, overlaid with the most splendid diamonds. His Lordship was then invested with other jewels to the reputed amount of £20,000 sterling! Presents followed to the members of his suite. Lady Amherst took this opportunity of retiring to the tents of the Hindu ladies, where presents were again given: and a bag of Rs. 1,000 to her ladyship's female servants and Rs. 500 to her interpreters.

Out of the loot of Sindh General Napier received £70,000 as his share and the well paid post of the Governor of that Province which he had conquered against the wishes of his superiors. Every raid and annexation provides rich loot and decorations both to the civil as well as the Military powers.

These are the "gold and diamond diggings" which the appointment of a Governor-General opens to the successful occupant of this lucrative post: and thus it is that political and family interests and intrigues are so rife on every vacancy to obtain this rich prize, whether the individual be fit or unfit for the duties of his high and important station. It goes without saying that the theory is that England will send out the very best man it can. But even if the theory is not vitiated in practice, as shown in the quotations, above, it must be pointed out at

once that this Superman will not be the man for work if he is wanting in humanity, in genuine sympathy. Hard-grainedness, mere intellectual brilliance, efficiency—fetish-worship is not wanted. What is wanted is transparent sincerity, whole-hearted sympathy. On the intellectual side, over and above his other current equipments, he must be a sound financier and businessman. He must be an economically-minded man, and up-to-date in the real (as apart from the book-taught theorists') workings of the Political Economy that is being actually practiced by the various Nations of the West. He must possess enough strength of character and honesty of purpose to keep steadily before himself the good of India and not allow himself to be made a party to its hurt. Of few Indian Viceroys can it be said that they have not succumbed to the interested pressure of either the Imperial Services here or the European tradesman, whether here or in England. Is he to be largely only a costly and decorative representative of the Majesty of Britain, with no real powers; or is he to be something more than a mere mouthpiece of the Secretary of State for India, for the time being? Is he to exercise his own personal judgment or to be a mere delegate for the carrying out of the policy of the English Cabinet? These questions have become necessary, for it seems that the increasing trend of opinion is to regard a Viceroy as a person without much voice. It is not meant that there should be no control; but the incessant, harassing control, against which every Viceroy who was strong has complained and to which every Viceroy who

was weak has succumbed, should be put a stop to. What is contended is, that the subordination should not be *undue* and that the man on the spot advised and aided by Native Indian opinion through enlarged Executive and Legislative Councils, should be trusted more, and that if he is overruled, as sometimes he may have to be, the world should be given an opportunity of judging for itself. A Lord Elgin weakly announces in Council that he is but a mandatory of the Secretary of State as also his Executive Councillors, and that they must carry out at all hazards the policy enunciated at Home irrespective of its suitability to Indian conditions; or a Lord Lytton upsets Indian Financial stability with a grim famine stalking in the land, or a Lord Minto has to face a huge deficit, under similar famine conditions, because under the fiat of a Secretary of State for India—though he be the honest and conscientious Lord Morley—the revenues of India have to be surrendered to the all-devouring maw of the Army to the tune of 45 lakhs; and when papers are asked for, they are refused under the too common plea of State necessity!

The evil has been of long-standing. So far back as the reign of the Duke of Argyle at the India Office, this doctrine of the *complete* subordination in *all* matters of the Government of India to the Home Government, was laid down unequivocally by that statesman in a despatch to the Indian Government. It was re-affirmed later by the Marquis of Salisbury during his reign at the same office. Now, such a doctrine even when not rigidly adhered to—as it is not,

one must recognise, in India—is fatal to all efficient and progressive administration. The reduction of the Viceroy and his Ministers to the status of merely intelligent telegraph operators at the other end of the wire would be supremely ludicrous were not the action pregnant with terrible consequences for the future of the British Rule in India. Which Colonial Secretary would dare to lay down these principles and apply them to any British Colony? The Colonial Office dare not open its lips even in cases of such flagrant injustice as is meted out to the Asiatic subjects of the King by such recently conquered and annexed Colonies as those of South Africa, even when one of the ostensible reasons, by an irony of fate, given by Mr. J. Chamberlain for going to war with the Transvaal, was the savage and oppressive way in which they treated the Indian emigrants! Under the present regime their condition is very much worse than it was before the terrible war, which was undertaken to right their wrongs! It was fondly hoped in India that the Royal Decentralisation Commission will point out some effective way out of this scandalous state of affairs but, as has been pointed out above, we were once more doomed to disappointment and the fond hope was shattered.

The only means of bringing about this eminently just Indian demand is to abolish the India Council and to put the India Office on a footing similar to that of the Colonial Office and allow India to be governed *in* India. A comparative study of (1) the Letters Patents creating the various Governors-Generalship, (2) of the

Commissions appointing the Governor-General and, finally, (3) the Instructions issued to each, will show us our manifold disabilities.

One more suggestion, before dealing with the Indian 'Cabinet.' Why should not the Viceroy and the Heads of the Provincial Governments have Indians as Joint or Assistant Private Secretaries?

THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

We may turn our attention now to the Executive Council of the Viceroy. I have already said above that the term of office of the Members of this Council should be limited to four years but open to one more re-appointment if the Legislative Council petitions for such. While on the subject I may point out the extreme inadvisability of the present practice of not making the term of office of the Imperial and Provincial Ministers co-extensive with that of the Imperial or Provincial Head. His political demise should invariably be followed by that of his Councillors. No Viceroy or Governor should have the power to appoint Ministers for his successor, as they invariably do now. All Ministers should be bound to put their resignations in the hands of the succeeding Viceroy or Governor within a month of his taking office. This will give the necessary free hand for the appointment of a cabinet homogeneous in its political connection, and not one whose integral parts are ever warring against each other. The importance and in fact the necessity of such a constitutional practice will be fully admitted when it is remembered that unlike the Colonial Governors, the

Indian Governors hold the position occupied by the British and Colonial Prime Ministers and are not merely ornamental Heads.

Another and no less important point is, that they should have no prospects of further preferment under the patronage of the Viceroy. Indeed, it is scarcely appropriate that gentlemen appointed to these high offices by the King should look to any lower authority for further preferment. At present the inducement that a Viceroy can offer to *every* Member of his Executive Council to be subservient to him is by titles and decorations, but these are not sufficiently solid—though attractive enough—to appeal overmuch to these high and responsible officers; but the case of *some* of the Members who belong to the Indian Civil Service, for instance, is very different. The five Lieutenant-Governorships, under the patronage of the Viceroy, are sufficiently dazzling bribes for any but those who have the most robust conscience and the most exquisite sense of duty. It is an open secret that under the guidance of masterful Viceroys, very divergent despatches are sent 'home' to the Secretary of State. With but a trifling change in the *personnel* of his 'Cabinet,' a succeeding Viceroy, if differently minded from his predecessor, can always get a 'hundred' reasons recorded for a change of policy. This temptation would be removed from the path of both by the raising of the status of the Provincial Administrations to that of Governorships, and by sending young men of outstanding merits from the public life of England as Governors.

Sir George Chesney is perfectly justified in his contention about the probable misuse of this great power, seeing what human nature is as a rule. He quotes Mill approvingly:—

> The advisers attached to a powerful and perhaps self-willed man ought to be placed under conditions which make it impossible for them, without discredit, not to express an opinion, and impossible for him not to listen to and consider their recommendations.

That this fear is not wholly hypothetical is borne out by what little is known to the outside world of at least two of the Viceroyalties, namely, those of Lords Lytton and Curzon. Such an uncompromising and cautious bureaucrat as the late General Sir George Chesney would not have voiced it if there had been wanting solid reasons for such a damaging statement. Mr. S. S. Thorburn, who rose to the highest rungs of the official ladder short of the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, has also some very strong comments on this state of affairs in his work, *The Punjab: In Peace and in War.*

It is, of course, not proposed to touch in any way the final power of veto with which the Viceroy is invested; but it is necessary that his powers of initiating a new line of action should be limited by some well-devised constitutional checks for those cases where he wishes to act in *opposition* to the advice of his responsible Ministers and his Legislative Council, and the question is not one of merely suspending by the power of veto some course of action. Some very well-known and most flagrant abuses of this power might be cited as instances here. The repeal of the cotton duties by Lord Lytton in the teeth of the almost unanimous opposition

of his Executive Council, under the disingenuous plea of Free Trade, by which nobody was deceived except perhaps the late Sir John Strachey, but really to catch Lancashire votes for his party, as was openly alleged in that very Council meeting itself, was one. Later, again, India has been made to smart under another grievous fiscal injustice, that of the Cotton Excise Duties under Lord Elgin; yet again another burden was cast on poor India by Lord Lansdowne anxious to carry favour with the Services in the shape of the ruinous Exchange Compensation Allowance, and the juggling with the Currency of the country, causing an artificial Government-created depreciation of the silver held in the country which some day is sure to result in a terrible crash.

As the shears have to be applied to the lavish expenditure of the Anglo-Indian Government all round, it is necessary that the emoluments of these Ministers should also be somewhat reduced. A reduction of Rs. 1,000 per month is not too much to ask for. The pay could well stand at Rs. 5,000 a month instead of Rs. 6,000 as at present. It might well be allowed to be a little lower than that of the British Ministers, which is only £5,000 a year. It will still be equal to that of the Chief Justices of the Indian High Courts, except that of Bengal, and whose pay too might now be very well put on the same level.

Sir George Chesney, in his *Indian Polity* (p. 139), has pleaded hard for the appointment of a Private Secretary to each one of the Executive Councillors and

one of the reasons advanced is that he has so many social duties to fulfil that he ought to be relieved of the drudgery of writing letters himself, accepting the engagements or refusing them, so as to be able to devote more attention to his official duties! It would be more to the point that the distracting social duties be lessened rather than helped to keep their hold on the Ministers! If a Private Secretary is a necessity under these circumstances, one can only say that the cogency of the arguments advanced does not appeal to one's reason. The depleted Finances of India can scarce bear to be saddled with this additional burden on such a frivolous plea; and if one might venture on a suggestion, it may be said that it would be to the benefit of the country—and in fact to their own health also—if such an absorbing round of social engagements were to be left to their womenfolk who are such martyrs to *ennui* in this country. His further contention that these Members exercise greater powers than the Provincial Governors and that therefore their emoluments and status should be higher than those of these Governors can only be ascribed to his bias due to his having been such a Member himself. The illogicality of the position would be easily brought home to readers if the counter suggestion were made to exalt the emoluments and status of the Secretary of State for Ireland or for India over that of the Irish or Indian Viceroy who, while exercising far less power, are certainly the most showy part of the machine.

We might, with advantage, go on now to offer some

criticisms on the functions of these Ministers and their numbers. At present there are only six. Originally there were only three. A Law Member was added later, then recently a Commercial Member, and only the other day an Education Member, while the post of the Member for Public Works has been abolished. Under the arrangement suggested here there would be eight, an addition of two to the present number or rather of only *one*, as the Commander-in-Chief has always been a Member, though an extraordinary one.

1. Minister of Finance and Revenue.
2. ,, ,, Justice.
3. ,, ,, War and Marine.
4. ,, ,, The Interior.
5. ,, ,, Commerce and Industry.
6. ,, ,, Foreign and Feudatory Affairs.
7. ,, ,, Education and Public Health.
8. ,, ,, Agriculture, Fisheries, Forests, and Irrigation.

It has been customary in India to attach Revenue to Agriculture, but, as I point out lower down (p. 78) this arrangement does not work for the benefit of the tillers of the soil. The attention of the Officer in charge being fixed more on the best means of raising an ever-increasing revenue than of improving agriculture and the lot of the cultivator. It is a better arrangement to combine income and expenditure under one head and thus enable the Minister of Agriculture to devote his attention solely to agricultural improvements and the condition of the peasantry.

THE WAR MINISTER.

With regard to the War Minister, affairs even now are in a very unsettled state. The unfortunate controversy between Lords Curzon and Kitchener was decided in favour of the Military power as against the supremacy of Civil control. It was a badly selected time for such a momentous controversy with such a strong-headed and popular hero of the time, fresh with the laurels won in the Boer War. It was but a repetition of, in its day the equally memorable and momentous controversy between two no less strong men—Governor-General Dalhousie and Commander-in-Chief Napier; but *then* the Civil power triumphed, and Napier had to go. The Conservative Ministry dared not risk their position in the country by accepting the Curzonian proposals which would have inevitably ended in the resignation of Lord Kitchener. So the interests of India were sacrificed to the exigencies of politics and Lord Curzon's resignation was light-heartedly accepted which, of course, left the position of that party in the country unaffected. It would have been very different if Lord Kitchener had resigned; all the Jingo element of the country would have been flying at the throats of the Cabinet Ministers of that day. Now that the Military Supply Membership too has been abolished, the Commander-in-Chief alone is left to represent, or rather to play the dictator, in all Military matters. Every right-thinking and constitutionally-minded person will see that this is a far from desirable

arrangement and sure to break down under the stress of a great war.

The breakdown was staved off by the five peaceful years that followed since the previous sentences were written. But the terrible strain of the Great European War hopelessly broke down the Indian Army system. It was responsible for the horrible Mesopotamia scandals and though the Governments both of England and India tried to draw a veil over it all, they did not succeed, and, under the heckling of the House of Commons enough truth came out to make it necessary for the Indian Commander-in-Chief to resign, and for a Commission of enquiry to be appointed. Politically, this has saved the situation and the Report of the Commission has been treated as a secret document on the plea that it might help the Germans to know our weaknesses in that region!

Not one civilised modern State keeps up such an anomalous state of affairs. Even in India it is clear that the present arrangement is more or less tentative and not final, awaiting a definite solution. (See the *note* to Sir John Strachey's *India*, 4th Edition, p. 497, by Sir Thomas W. Holderness, Permanent under-Secretary of State for India, as also Chesney's *Indian Polity*, pps. 134-138, where there is a good deal of discussion over the old point of view.) It may sound absurd to suggest that the practice of England itself in the matter be followed and a Civilian Head of the Department installed; but what might reasonably be accepted is the suggestion

of following the Continental system with regard to the post. Let the portfolio of War be held by a senior Army man, but—this is the crux—let him be dissociated from the *actual command* of the Army. That should be the business of officers on the active list. Abolish the post of the *Commander-in-Chief* with its dual duty, of actual command of the Army, and that of a Minister of War. Let the whole of the affairs of the Army be under a responsible Minister of War, and while the actual command of the Army will be centred in a General Staff and an Army Council as holds good in England, in France, in Germany—the direction of the policy will be the sole charge of the Minister advised by a mixed Council of Civil and Military experts as in England. It may look over-bold in an Indian—and withal, not an expert—to venture into such highly disputed regions, but, after all, it is the lay public that is most interested in seeing that peace and security are firmly established, and all disturbing inimical elements kept well cowed, but, at the same time, with the utmost economy possible.

It will be noticed that in the designation of the "Minister of the Interior" for the "Home Member," I propose to follow the sensible practice of the Continent and of the British Dominions—Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, etc.—rather than the English practice whose only recommendation seems to be long-standing usage; in India, especially, the designation is a misleading one, suggesting duties connected with England, such as 'Home

Charges,' 'Home Government' and so on, and which is obviated by the use of the word "Interior."

THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

With regard to the suggestion of appointing a separate Minister of Foreign and Feudatory affairs, it is necessary to say a few words. By present practice it is the Viceroy who is his own Minister in this Department and he is assisted by a Permanent Secretary, whose status is higher than that of the Permanent Secretaries of the other Departments. This is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. If there is any department which requires a special and minute knowledge of affairs running back to hundreds of years, it is this. No Viceroy, however sympathetic and quick of understanding, can ever hope to deal adequately with the numerous and complicated cases always arising in this department, even if he had the requisite time to devote himself wholly to it which certainly he has not. What is the result? The proud and touchy Princes are left to the mercies of an irresponsible subordinate who, if things go amiss, naturally takes shelter behind the broad back of the Viceroy. This always keeps things in a ferment in scores of States at a time, among the 700 and odd feudatories. The Foreign Office also controls the administration of all those tracts of the country which are directly under the Government of India as, for instance, the Chief-Commissionerships. This is not as it should be. The Foreign Office should confine its attentions to those affairs only which are really "foreign and feudatory." The duties which

are *foreign* to this department should be allocated to their own proper departments. Lord Hardinge, finding that the duties were too heavy for one Secretary, split up the Department into two, each under its own Secretary. The new Secretary is designated the Political Secretary and is charged with the affairs of the Native States. This is a step in the right direction and it is to be hoped that it will soon be completed by the appointment of a separate Minister.

I might just refer here to what I shall deal with, at greater length, in a later Chapter, *viz.*, the extreme advisability of suppressing the Political Departments under the various Provincial Governments and concentrating the whole work of dealing with the 700 and odd feudatories in one Imperial Department and of reorganising the Indian Political Service into one homogeneous body like the I. C. S. or, better still, the amalgamating of the two into one large body and the consequent complete eliminating of the superabundant military element from it, which has become wholly unnecessary under the present changed circumstances. This would be a very welcome innovation to all those Feudatories who are, at present, under Local control and subordination, and who will unquestionably feel that their status has been raised in some way which will be the first step in some future federation of all these states. This is one more reason why this department, like every other, should also be under its own separate Minister, for the work will have grown to be much heavier and more complicated: the relations of the Viceroy

with it being similar to what they are with the other departments. The Viceroy, in fact, ought not to be in direct, personal charge of any portfolio, but simply the controlling, supervising, co-ordinating and unifying head of the whole machinery of administration. In short, he should be the Prime Minister of the Cabinet responsible for the *policy* of the administration and its larger details but not for the daily work of the Government; his interference being in no case carried to the extent of diminishing Ministerial responsibility for the efficient working of the Departments concerned.

It might be questioned why I propose the name Foreign and Feudatory. It is simply because I regard it as an anomaly that the Feudatories should be regarded as Foreign. I have not space here to dwell longer on this subject and, indeed, it is not necessary; for all that I have got to say about this, I shall say in my Chapter on *The Indian States*.

THE EDUCATION MINISTER.

To one unaccustomed to the Continental system, it might look odd to combine Education and Sanitation. But it is so in Germany, in France, and in many other States. And, indeed, on a closer inspection it does not look so very queer. 'A sound mind in a sound body' is a world-old truism, and it is only in the fitness of things that the improvement of the physical and mental health of the people should be under one direction. The Government of India has done wisely in combining them under one Minister. Some might urge that the combined duties would prove too heavy

a burden for a single shoulder to carry. It will not be so. There will not be work enough for two such officers, for the real work of these Departments ought to be, and should be done, by the Provincial Governments, and the work of the Supreme Government should be more or less merely advisory and unifying and not of active interference. In connection with this, the suggestion that the I. M. S., with its Military organisation, should be replaced wholly as far as its Civil work is concerned, by a Provincial Civil Medical Service recruited largely in India is worthy of serious consideration. Its present monopoly of all the higher posts in the line, to the exclusion of the Medical Graduates of the Indian Universities and the consequent stunting of the growth of Medical knowledge in the country by the want of this spur to ambition, should not be permitted to remain unremedied any longer.

THE PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT.

The suggestion to abolish the Public Works Department will probably come as a surprise to most persons, but it is a very old suggestion and was made by such an expert as the late Sir James Caird. It is to be found quoted in A. K. Connell's *The Economic Revolution of India and The Public Works Policy* (p. 190). I give it here in full as it exactly expresses what I wish to convey :—

> **The very costly Department of Public Works, as a General Office connected with the Viceregal Government, should be closed ; each Province should carry on its works as found most desirable., and as its finances admitted. Native Engineering talent should be cultivated and full scope given to it. Of the large body of officers employed in the Public Works Department in India, nearly four-**

fifths are English, and the native employees are generally kept in the most subordinate positions. Native Engineering talent has thus not only received little encouragement, but has been kept down by the present system. The existence of it is undoubted, but the men who would have been found to direct, in former times, are gradually disappearing. They were the hereditary leading masons who still in Native States keep their pre-eminence. Their merit and artistic taste have been always appreciated by the English Engineers and Contractors, and their special skill in Irrigation Works in a country, the chief art of which for ages has been the economical use of water, is fully recognised. This class of men, working in conjunction with the Native Banker, who manages the accounts, might become native contractors, either of whole or sections of work, and take the place of the more costly European. The elaborate account of English book-keeping and correspondence required by the Public Works Department, for which they were not fit, has excluded their practical and useful assistance from being taken full advantage of, and has necessitated the introduction of an entirely new class of Overseer, in the native of Bengal. If, instead of a Central Department attempting to deal with all India, each Province was left to its own guidance and responsibility, local wants would be listened to, local interests and sympathy would be aroused, Public Works would not be prematurely urged, and those most urgently needed would be first attended to. The local gentry and heads of villages would be called on to take a share in Local Administration, and Native Engineers and Contractors would be consulted and employed. This would raise their position and admit the development of the talent kept dormant under our present arrangements. Not only would the State be served by a much less costly instrumentality, but there would be gained also that continuity of design which is so liable to be broken by the change of European Engineers, obliged by the climate to seek health at Home. The costliness of the present system prevents many useful wants from being undertaken; the money goes so short a way. A change of this kind would tend to great economy, and would bring out as coadjutors with us in the administration of India the most ingenious class of native talent, better capable of aiding in the development of the country than even that large body of native officials now found so indispensable in the Judicial and Revenue Departments.

The wasteful nature of the Public Works Administration of the Government of India is very clearly brought out in the above extract, and the remedy suggested, namely, the total abolition of the Imperial Department, though a drastic one, is the only remedy

for the prevention of extravagance and waste necessarily leading to the crippling of urgent works of a local nature. The abolition of the Department would naturally lead to the abolition of the costly and imported supervising Imperial Service. Some little beginning has been made towards this very desirable condition of affairs by the abolition of the office of the Member of Public Works. But the root of the evil remains untouched. The Imperial *Department* of Public Works has not been abolished but handed over to the Member for Revenue and Agriculture. This estimable gentleman will henceforth be an expert thrice-over! (1) As a revenue expert, his duties will be to see that the last pie possible is squeezed out from land; (2) as an agricultural expert, his duties will be to ensure that the peasant becomes as prosperous and wealthy as possible; and, finally, (3) as an engineering expert, his duties will be to spend as much money on Public Works as he can wheedle his colleague, the Finance Minister, to allocate to the Public Waste Department, as it is facetiously (and not altogether incorrectly) dubbed by irreverent wags.

The evidence of Mr. Jacob (pp. 98-120) and his note (pp. 192-194) in Vol. X. *Minutes of Evidence* of Hobhouse's Royal Decentralisation Commission, should be carefully studied by everyone interested in the mending or ending of this Department. The Report of the Commission (pp. 75-88, Vol. I), while pointing out the necessity for further Decentralisation, has not even touched this, the *crucial* point in the

whole business. Now that the wise step of abolishing the Public Works Member has been taken, it only remains to complete it by abolishing the Imperial Public Works Department itself, and thus give us the full benefit of that step.

THE RAILWAY BOARD.

There might be a doubt as to how the Railways are to be managed by the Provincial Governments, seeing that their interests and workings are largely Imperial and only in a minor degree Provincial. This objection is easily met by pointing out that the Railways would continue to be very largely Imperial concerns and under the control of the Railway Board brought into existence by Lord Curzon, which, again, is attached to the Ministry of Commerce and is not under the Ministry of Public Works; so the abolition of this portfolio will in no way touch Railway interests to their harm. With regard to the composition of this Board, I would suggest that one with a first rate experience of Railway matters in the United States on it would be an invaluable acquisition; for, admittedly, the United States Railways, both as regards the comfort of the passengers and the interests of trade, are unsurpassed in their management. For this the Board should not be composed wholly of Europeans: there should be at least two Indians also on it.

THE CANAL BOARD.

A similar Board is even more necessary for canals. The pressure—political, strategic and commercial—is so overwhelming for new, and ever new, Railways

and that too on costly broad-gauge principles, that unless there is a very strong and representative Canal Board to fight for the development of water-borne internal traffic by canals and rivers, for water storage and for irrigation canals, the interests of agriculture and of inter-provincial trade, are bound to continue to suffer. Irrigation Commissions and Inspectors-General of Irrigation without such a backing are only voices in the wilderness. Such a Board should be insistently demanded by our Legislative Councils, and should form a part of the proposed Ministry of Agriculture.

THE HOME DEPARTMENT
OR
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR.

To come to the 'Home' Department, it will be seen from the evidence of Sir H. H. Risley and the Memorandum on the Constitution and Duties of this Department in the tenth volume of the Decentralisation Report, that it is not only overwhelmed with an ever-increasing amount of work proper to the department, but also with a great deal of work which is certainly extraneous to it. Since the report of the Commission was issued, there has been some redistribution of work owing to the creation of the Ministry of Education and Sanitation, and the burden of matters outside the legitimate scope of its functions has been considerably diminished. But there still remains a very large amount of work, which comes within the sphere of a properly constituted Ministry

of Justice, and there is no good and serious reason why this should be delayed much longer.

An outsider, with only a general knowledge of affairs pertaining to the department, can but suggest remedies of a general nature. The full working out of the scheme of redistribution of functions can only be undertaken by a departmental committee.

However, I attempt here a list of those main heads of business which are dealt with in the 'Home' Department now, but which properly belong to the Department of Justice.

(1) Escheats and intestate property.

(2) Jails, Reformatory Schools and Penal Settlements.

(3) Registration.

(4) Copyright.

(5) Law and Justice.

(6) Judicial Establishments.

Fancy the last two being under the 'Home' Department!

Now that Bengal has been raised to a Governorship, a proposal is made in some quarters that like the High Courts in every other Province, the Bengal High Court should also be brought under the executive control of its own Provincial Government and removed from that of the Government of India. This would be a most regrettable retrograde step. What is really wanted, in the interests of genuine British justice, is still further to enhance the prestige of the High Courts by not only handing over to them the

full executive control of all Law Courts subordinate to them, and the abolition of the various Provincial Judicial Departments, or, to be quite accurate, of handing these over to the subordination of the High Courts, but —and here is the kernel of the situation—of attaching all the High Courts to the Government of India, under the Minister of Justice.

MINISTERS OR MEMBERS.

It should go without saying that every one of these Ministers should be appointed with a single eye to his fitness for the special work he has to do and that vested rights or personal predilections should not be allowed to sway the choice for these offices of prime importance. Yet it becomes necessary to say this, because it has not always been so in the past. To give an instance of such open jobbery, it is only necessary to mention the Public Works Department. Its Head was never an expert but a Civilian from either Bombay or Madras alternately. A fat berth had to be provided for one of these gentlemen irrespective of the efficiency of the Department!

It will also have been noticed that I propose the designation of 'Minister' for all these 'Members.' The former word is more dignified, is in universal use, and fits their present position — that of responsible administrative Heads of Departments — while the latter does not. The word 'Member' came into use in those early days when his was a merely consultative post and not an executive one as it has gradually grown to be. It is but right that this modern status

of full responsibility should be publicly notified by the requisite change to the higher designation.

INDIAN MINISTERS AND SECRETARIES.

We come now to the very important question of the appointment of Indians to these high offices. This demand, though made by the Indians for a long time past, has only now become a question of practical politics through the transparent honesty and generosity of Lord Morley, backed up by a no less sympathetic and sagacious Viceroy like Lord Minto, both alike determined to do their best to see that the Queen's Gracious and Motherly Proclamation should be literally fulfilled and that the bar sinister of race be wiped off. But this concession, though a very great one, is very far from satisfying our legitimate demands in this matter. One membership is but the bitters before dinner serving only to whet the appetite and not to satisfy it. We want much more substantial fare of the purpose. We want that *not less than* one-half of the Ministers—Imperial and Provincial—shall be native Indians and, further, that *not less than* one-fourth of the higher grades of the Secretariats shall be manned by Indians. The present state of affairs by which while theoretically admissible to every one of these posts—they are, for all practical purposes, kept wholly out of them, is absolutely indefensible. We further want that *not more than one-half* of the Ministers shall be Englishmen chosen from among the ranks of men trained and educated in the public life of England, so that India may have the benefit of a wider outlook and

larger experience of the outside world. More, the elected representatives of the people should have some voice in the selection of the Indian members of the Executive Councils and for that purpose a principle of election or of veto, or any other helpful devise should be adopted. Further, this eminently desirable charge should be brought about at once and not merely promised for some never-nearing future.

As is but natural, and, in fact, in the fitness of things, these various proposals for bringing the government of the country more into touch with the governed are being treated with a perpetual dustwind of flippant and shallow gibes and malicious contempt by the blindly self-interested Anglo-Indian Press. It remains to be seen whether they can throw sufficient dust in the eyes of the British electorate and intimidate the British Ministry from doing us this elementary justice.

Further, the people's representatives should be able to exercise some sort of veto on the appointment of the English Members of the Ministry. If the antecedents of the gentleman proposed to be appointed by the Viceroy as one of his Ministers, are such that the appointment would be obnoxious to the people, their representatives in the various Legislative Councils ought to have the power to prevent such an appointment.

ADVISORY BOARDS.

We may now take up the question of Advisory Boards to be attached to each of these Ministries

and in making this suggestion we are not so very odd as some might think. There is precedence for such a step in the various Occidental States and even England itself. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, after an experience of their great utility in France is now advocating the creation of such Boards in England, in all those Departments where they do not exist now including even the Foreign, from which the Parliament even is most jealously excluded. That such Boards would immensely strengthen the hands of the various Ministers by bringing them into closer touch with the tendencies of the times than could otherwise be the case from their isolated position, there is no doubt. They would help them to see where action was imperative and where the ground was to be allowed to lie fallow. They would be feelers warning them of dangers ahead. The shortcomings of bureaucracies all over the world are well understood by all who have to live under them, but none, so far as I know, has voiced their limitations so clearly and so trenchantly as Bagehot, and I will take the liberty of quoting a few sentences from him on the subject of their deficiencies in support of the proposition I have advanced about providing some sort of help, in, as well as control over their actions. He says :—

It is an inevitable defect, that bureaucrats will care more for routine than for results ; or, as Burke put it, 'that they will think the substance of business not to be much more important than the forms of it.' Their whole education and all the habit of their lives make them do so. They are brought young into the particular part of the public service to which they are attached ; they are occupied for years in learning its forms ; afterwards, for years too, in applying these forms to trifl-

ing matters. They are, to use the phrase of an old writer, 'but the tailors of business; they cut the clothes, but they do not find the body.' 'Men so trained must come to think the routine of business not a means but an end—to imagine the elaborate machinery of which they form a part, and from which they derive their dignity, to be a grand and achieved result, not a working and changeable instrument. The very means which best helped you yesterday, may very likely be those which most impede you to-morrow—you may want to do a different thing to-morrow, and all your accumulation of means for yesterday's work is but an obstacle to the new work.' 'Not only does a bureaucracy thus tend to under-government in point of quality, it tends to over-government in point of quantity. The trained official hates the rude, untrained public. He thinks that they are stupid, ignorant, reckless—that they cannot tell their own interest—that they should have the leave of the office before they do anything.' 'A bureaucracy is sure to think that its duty is to augment official power, official business, or official members, rather than to leave free the energies of mankind; it overdoes the quantity of government, as well as impairs its quality. The truth is, that a skilled bureaucracy—a bureaucracy trained from early life to its especial vocation—is, though it boasts of an appearance of science, quite inconsistent with the true principles of the art of business. That art has not yet been condensed into precepts, but a great many experiments have been made, and a vast floating vapour of knowledge floats through society. One of the most sure principles is, that success depends on a due mixture of special and non-special minds—of minds which attend to the means, and minds which attend to the ends. The success of the great joint-stock banks of London—the most remarkable achievement of recent business—has been an example of the use of this mixture. These banks are managed by 'a board of persons mostly *not* trained to the business, supplemented by, and annexed to, a body of specially trained officers, who have been bred to banking all their lives.' 'If it is left to itself, the office will become technical, self-absorbed, self-multiplying. It will be likely to overlook the end in the means; it will fail from narrowness of mind; it will be eager in seeming to do; it will be idle in real doing.'

EXPERTISM.

Expertism and experts, that is to say, all the highest grades of all the Services in India manned exclusively as they are by imported agency, are the constant theme of praise in the Anglo-Indian Press, and, of course, in all the gubernatorial speeches and writings, but a

couple of quotations from two such foremost men of England as Viscount Esher and Viscount Haldane, may bring some commonsense to our rulers in this land.

Speaking about Mr. Churchill, at that time Naval Minister, Viscount Esher says:—

He is, however, by the exigencies of his position, largely at the mercy of experts. As a rule, experts are the most fatuous people in the world. An expert believes in his own specific. If he did not, he would not be an expert. These people are specially mischievous when they are engaged in crushing originality in a soaring mind. It was by the advice of experts that millions of money were spent by Lord Palmerston in fixed defences. It was by the advice of experts that Trincomalee was fortified and, before the fortifications were completed, was abandoned. It was by the advice of experts that the breakwater at Singapore was begun, and, again, by their advice, left unfinished. It is by the advice of experts that millions are being sunk at Rosyth, and before long it will be by the advice of experts that Rosyth is declared to be an unsafe anchorage for the British fleet. By the advice of experts fresh anchorage along the east coast will be erected, and more millions spent on fixed defences, which will, in their turn, prove to be useless. (*The Influence of King Edward and other Essays*, p. 164.)

If an equally well-informed and equally trenchant criticism could be made about the way things have been done in India, it would be an even more woeful tale of wastefulness, extravagance and incompetence.

Listen now to Viscount Haldane. He says:—

Again, there is a large class of skilled work, some of it requiring long training, and even initiative, which is done better by competent permanent officials than by statesmen even of a high order. But when we come to the highest order of work, it is different. There is a common cry that this, too, should be left to the expert. There is no more complete misinterpretation of a situation. The mere expert, if he were charged with the devising and execution of high aims and policy, would be at sea among a multitude of apparently conflicting considerations. What is the relation of a particular plan to a great national policy and to far-reaching principles and ends? Questions like these must always be for the true leader and not for the specialist. (*The Conduct of Life*, p. 23.)

Finally one more quotation—this time from an Indian bureaucrat, Mr. Bernard Houghton, who served out his term of 30 years in the Indian Civil Service in Madras and Burma. He says:—

> Most bureaucrats seem to require from the people they govern a sort of reverent respect—reverence for their supreme wisdom, respect for the admirable manner in which they conduct the affairs of the nation. They are shocked at the display of any feelings incongruous with this attitude. A nation in their estimation, is best conceived of as a number of schoolboys working and playing happily under the supervision of benevolent and very wise schoolmasters. (*Bureaucratic Government*, p. 113.)

Can one hope that people, under the rule of a *system* which breeds such a mentality as that depicted by Mr. Houghton, ever arrive at the full stature of manhood?

Speaking of that breeding-ground of bureaucracy—the Secretariats—he observes:—

> The Secretariats are the very apotheosis of clerkdom, and they tend to *infuse* in those who labour in them a clerk's mean outlook on public policy. For this reason the fact naively admitted by Lord Curzon, that Lieutenant-Governors and other high officials are usually drawn from among the secretaries, and spend their early career in "devilling" in secretariats, has a certain sinister significance. Men so trained, and brought up in such surroundings, naturally tend to perpetuate the evils of a bureaucracy. So far from taking broad and generous views of the aspirations of the people, they are more likely to place in the forefront official views and official interests, and to regard official convenience as outweighing the public good. (pps. 81-82.)

If all this is true for Europe and England, it is true with a tenfold greater significance for India. For though the enormous *personnel* of the Indian bureaucracy is largely composed of native Indians, all its heads and the superior grades are filled with the foreign element; and hence most of our difficulties; for how can a person, short of an angel, enter into all

the thoughts and feelings and aspirations of a people whom he dominates over for a few decades sighing all the time for the land of his birth? Ever talking of the "land of regrets" and "land of exile"—and never of the "land of promise," as it is to us—in every after-dinner speech, how can such a person command our whole-hearted affection and inspire real genuine trust? He may, and does, if at all liberal-minded and sympathetic, have our respect and our gratitude, but the fine flavour of sentiment will surely be wanting.

Width of outlook is not for the expert, nor the self-denial which will be only too glad to part with power and make over to the ward, who has gained his majority, his property that was in trust. In the fine peroration to his book, Bernard Houghton exclaims:—

> Though the Indian Civil Service were manned by angels from heaven, the incurable defects of a bureaucratic Government must pervert their best intentions and make them foes to political progress. It must now stand aside and, in the interest of that country it has served so long and so truly, make over the dominion to other hands. Not in dishonour, but in honour, proudly as ship-builders who deliver to seamen the completed ship, may they now yield up the direction of India.

Will his brethren in the service listen to these wise words of his—is the question of the moment. It is because of this that we demand men with House of Commons experience as heads of every one of our Provinces and as Executive Councillors.

REPORTERS-GENERAL.

There are a number of Imperial officers, known variously as Commissioners, Directors, Directors-General, and Inspectors-General. The report of the Decentralisation Commission has tried to steer a middle

course with regard to these, for, while the Government of India was strongly in favour of retaining all these offices, the Provincial Governments were far from being enamoured of them. Downwards from the Bombay Government, which expressed open hostility, there was not one Provincial Government which did not find itself opposed to them, and expressed its opposition in more or less strong terms. The Commission makes various suggestions for limiting their activity to mere *reporting* and strongly deprecates all attempts on their part at *directing*. In fact, the only argument that can be advanced for their retention is that they serve, or ought to serve, as the eyes and ears of the Supreme Government; their designation then, if it is to correspond to the duties now expected of them, should be that of *Reporters-General*. But the main contention, that such officers are a costly, nay, even mischeivous superfluity, is scarcely met by a change in their designation and functions. For the purpose of keeping the Central Government *au courant* with all that is going on in the various Provinces in these different departments, can be far better served by having Annual Conferences of the Provincial Ministers and Departments combined with the Imperial Minister. An over great development of inspecting agencies inevitably tends to concentrate attention on the smooth working of the *machine* to the detriment of the *interests* that machine exists to serve. They should all be abolished.

SUPREME COURT.

To round out and complete the Imperial Govern-

ment, it is essential that a Supreme Court of Law and a Central University be established at Delhi.

There has been for many years a demand for a Supreme Court both from lawyers as well as litigants. A few of the reasons might be summarised here. The Privy Council is much too far away not only geographically, but also from the consciousness of the people. A more accessible and, therefore, visible supreme dispenser of justice would appeal strongly to the imagination of the people and, at the same time, produce the solid good of lessened costs. Of course, it is not meant that the powers of the Privy Council ought or should be diminished in any way. What is meant is—to put it somewhat crudely—that it should be open to litigants to appeal to a nearer court. But for the heavy costs and uncertainties of a trial in England, a good many of the conflicting judgments of the diverse High Courts here, which produce confusion and even consternation, would get promptly unified. This would be possible only with an easily available Central Court. A Supreme Court would also be sufficiently high to serve as a sort of Hague tribunal for settling differences between the suzerain power and the vassal Indian States, and among these States themselves. From every point of view it seems desirable that such a Court with ample powers, almost co-extensive with that of the Privy Council, should be established in India.

Nine Lords Justices, including the Lord Chief Justice—to give them the necessary higher designation

than those of the High Court Judges—would be ample, at any rate, in the beginning. The Lord Chief Justice should be selected from among those judges in England who hold judgeships of a rank not lower than that of a British High Court Judge. Of the eight Lords Justices, four must be Indians who have served for not less than five years on the Provincial High Court Benches, and four Barristers who have put in at least five years as Indian High Court Judges, or have held in England, Judgeships, higher than those of the County Court. Their salaries might be fixed at Rs. 5,000 for the Judges, and Rs. 6,000 for the Chief.

CENTRAL UNIVERSITY.

Without a *non-territorial* university *complete* in all its Faculties—which means not less than two-hundred Professors, Readers, Lecturers, etc., and ten thousand students—Delhi, the capital of India, will continue to be in intellectual darkness and a standing reproach to the Central Government. I lay stress on the non-territorial character of such a university, and in support of my contention and in reputation—complete and utter—of Lord Curzon's imposition of territorial limits under the plea of discipline which has so filtered down now that a boy finds it a very difficult task to transfer himself even from one District to another, to say nothing of from one Province to another, I need but cite two of the most eminent educational authorities in England, namely, Viscount Bryce and Viscount Haldane.

The Prussian Government founded the University of Bonn immediately after the recovery of the left bank of the Rhine

from France in 1814, and the University of Strassburg immediately after the recovery of Alsace in 1871, in both the cases with the view of benefiting these territories, and, of drawing them closer to the rest of the country by the efflux of students from other parts of it, an aim which was realised. Indeed, the non-local character of the German universities, each serving the whole of the lands wherein the German tongue was spoken, powerfully contributed to intensify the sentiment of a common German nationality throughout the two centuries (1648 to 1870) during which Germany had virtually ceased to be a state. (Bryce: *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, Vol. I, p. 280.)

The awakening has come to the old universities late. They are now doing very fine work, but they ought to have been able to develop it much sooner. Some stimulus has been wanting. Had their students lived under a national system, where there were many universities, and where the scholar was free to move from one to another to seek the Professor of his choice instead of being tied up in his academic domicile of origin, the teachers would have been stimulated, and things would probably have moved far more rapidly under the development of the rivalry of talent . . . . . When I compare the state of things in Oxford and Cambridge with that in the universities of Germany, I am impressed with one point in particular in which the latter seem to me superior. In Germany, the student is free to go from time to time, in the course of his under-graduate career, to study under a Professor of his own choice in another university. (Haldane: *The Conduct of Life*, pp. 85-86.)

After two such powerful condemnations of the method, the spirit and the aim of education in England and the correspondingly high praise of the German system, no words of mine are needed for condemning the spirit that animates our educational arrangements—I cannot call it a *system*—and the bureaucratic methods giving rise to the hidebound rules and regulations. But to deal at all adequately with the question, education requires at least a long chapter, if not a whole book by itself, and so, after touching on one more essential point, I pass on to matters more germane to this chapter.

I have also laid stress on the view that the univer-

sities should teach every subject that is being taught in the universities of the West. There are a number of very important subjects, which are conspicuous by their absence from the curricula here. But I will rest content with mentioning one subject only, namely, the necessity of giving military training in all educational institutions. One more quotation from Lord Haldane's *Conduct of Life* will be enough for my purpose. He says:—

> The Officers' Training Corps differs widely from the old volunteer or cadet corps, which used to be all that our universities contributed to the defence of their country. Five years ago, when I was at the War Office, we came to see that it was waste of splendid material to aim at the *production of nothing higher* than this from among university students, and that what we needed most was to get from them a reserve of educated men who had had sufficient training as officers to be available in the event of war. We appealed to the universities new and old, but not until we had carefully prepared our plans. The officers' training corps of the modern university is wholly different from the old university volunteer corps. And the reason is twofold. It has now been shaped for the accomplishment of a definite end, the training for the duties of command in great emergency of educated young men who will, *even in time of peace, put their* obligations to their country before their love of ease and amusement. The second reason is that this training is given, not as of yore, under the drill sergeant, not even under the ordinary officer, but under the direction and supervision of the picked brains of the British army—the new General Staff. Such training based on the best scientific methods, therefore, takes its place *naturally within the sphere of work of the university, and expands and completes the work of that university.* (P. 93. The italics are mine.)

All the world knows now that, had it not been for this prescient action of Lord Haldane, England would not have been able to raise the enormous number of officers required for its armies, whose numbers had to be multiplied a hundredfold all of a sudden in face of the terrible emergency of the Great European war

which burst out in July-August 1914. The impossibility of fully utilising the immense man-power of India—about which so much is talked of in England—is simply due to this one factor and one only, namely, the unwillingness of the Government persisted in for well-nigh three centuries to give us any military training beyond that of mere soldiers in the ranks, and that too on conditions that compare very unfavourably with those of the British Army.

FISCAL AUTONOMY.

Is India, "the brightest jewel in the British Crown," to remain for ever a mere Dependency or at once take her natural place as a Self-Governing Dominion along with the other Dominions of Great Britiain—this question has after well-nigh half a century of agitation become a 'burning' one now. It further profoundly hurts our self-respect that there is imminent danger of our being ruled in the future not only by Great Britain but,—and here is the dreadful sting—by it in conjunction with her adult daughters, the Overseas Dominions, every one of whom has been treating us so very shabbily.

Now, the only remedy for all this is self-government, government on colonial lines or, to give it its latest, most popular and convenient name—Home Rule; though the phrase that would perhaps most accurately indicate the situation is *Responsible Government*, and which might replace all the others. Our English rulers jib at the phrase when used in connection with peoples other than themselves, especially if

they happen to be of a darker hue, so it might be helpful to the cause to use a phrase which will not act as a bogey. And what is Home Rule at bottom? The power of the purse, for the person who holds the purse strings rules the roost. The power to raise and to spend money in whatever way may seem best to us for our national interests. The power of the Secretary of State, whether with or without his Council, over Indian finance must be handed over, with certain political safeguards if deemed necessary, to our Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils.

How jealously fiscal autonomy is safeguarded from even the remotest approach of the Secretary of State for the Colonies will be brought home to my readers by a quotation which I give below. A few explanatory words are, however, needed to make clear the situation. The British Government has always been averse to its colonies levying export and import duties even for revenue purposes, and much more so to a frankly protective tariff. The question came to a head, so far back as 1859, on Great Britain objecting to the Canadian customs tariff imposing very heavy duties. The Secretary of State, on the protest of the Chamber of Commerce, at Sheffield, calling attention to the damage which would result from such duties to trade in England, objected to the duties. The objection elicited this outspoken reply:—

The Minister of Finance has the honour respectfully to submit certain remarks and statements upon the Despatch of His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, dated August 1913, and upon the memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of Sheffield, dated August 1, transmitted therewith.

It is to be deeply regretted that His Grace should have given to so great a degree the weight of his sanction to the statements in the memorial, without having previously afforded to the Government of Canada the opportunity of explaining the fiscal policy of the province and the grounds upon which it rests. The representations upon which His Grace appears to have formed his opinions are those of a provincial town in England, professedly actuated by selfish motives; and it may be fairly claimed for Canada, that the deliberate acts of its legislature, representing nearly three millions of people, should not have been condemned by the Imperial Government on such authority, until the fullest opportunity of explanation had been afforded. It is believed that nothing in the Legislation of Canada warrants the expressions of disapproval which are contained in the Despatch of His Grace, but that on the contrary due regard has been had to the welfare and prosperity of Her Majesty's Canadian subjects.

From expressions used by His Grace in reference to the sanction of the Provincial Customs Act, it would appear that he had even entertained the suggestion of its disallowance: and though, happily, Her Majesty has not been so advised, yet the question having been thus raised, and the consequences of such a step, if ever adopted, being of the most serious character, it becomes the duty of the Provincial Government distinctly to state what they consider to be the position and rights of the Canadian Legislature.

Respect to the Imperial Government must always dictate the desire to satisfy them that the policy of this country is neither hastily nor unwisely formed; and that due regard is had to the interest of the Mother-Country as well as that of the Province. But the Government of Canada acting for its Legislature and people cannot, through those feelings of deference which they owe to the Imperial authorities, in any manner waive or diminish the right of the people of Canada to decide for themselves both as to the mode and extent to which taxation shall be imposed. The Provincial Ministry are at all times ready to afford explanations in regard to the Acts of the Legislature to which they are party; but subject to their duty and allegiance to Her Majesty, their responsibility in all general questions of policy must be to the Provincial Parliament, by whose confidence they administer the affairs of the country; and in imposition of taxation it is so plainly necessary that the Administration and the people should be in accord, that the former cannot admit responsibility or require approval beyond that of the local Legislature. Self-Government would be utterly annihilated if the views of the Imperial Government were to be preferred to those of the people of Canada. It is, therefore, the duty of the present Government distinctly to affirm the right of the Canadian Legislature to adjust the taxation of the people in the way they deem best, even if it should unfortunately happen to meet the disapproval of the Imperial Ministry. Her Majesty

cannot be advised to disallow such acts, unless her advisers are prepared to assume the administration of the affairs of the Colony irrespective of the views of its inhabitants.

The Imperial Government are not responsible for the debts and engagements of Canada. They do not maintain its Judicial, Educational or Civil Service; they contribute nothing to the internal government of the country, and the Provincial Legislature, acting through a Ministry directly responsible to it, has to make provision for all these wants; they must necessarily claim and exercise the widest latitude as to the nature and extent of the burthens to be placed upon the industry of the people. The Provincial Government believes that His Grace must share their own convictions on this important subject; but as serious evil would have resulted had His Grace taken a different course, it is wiser to prevent future complication by distinctly stating the position that must be maintained by every Canadian Administrator. (A. B. Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, pp. 1160-1162.)

Every word of this wise and weighty pronouncement on the ultimates of true Responsible Government, and the limits of control by the Mother Country over the Daughter Countries, should be studiously meditated upon both by our leaders and by our British rulers.

SIMLA EXODUS.

Very little needs to be said against the abiding evil of this pernicious system of the Government of a vast Empire from an isolated hill eyrie, except to record the bare fact here. The matter has been discussed *ad nauseum* but the almighty Government continues obdurate. Simla should be only what it was meant to be—namely a place for a holiday resort for the tired Viceroys to spend a week in—

> On the hills like gods together
> Careless of mankind,

and not in reality *the* capital of India. The permanent location of the Military Department there and its resulting evils have been mercilessly dragged into light

by the heart-rending muddle of the Mesopotamian campaign, as delineated in the pages of Lord George Hamilton's Commission Report. Let Delhi be the one and the *only* capital of India from which Secretariats are never moved and *where only* the meetings of Executive and Legislative Councils are held.

THE PROPER RELATION BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

This subject belongs properly to the chapter on the *Provincial Governments*, where details will be gone into; but before winding up this chapter, it is necessary that the general principles that ought to govern the situation should be stated. It goes without saying that the Provincial Governments should be allowed as free a hand in the administration of territories under their charge as possible, consistent with the overlordship of the former. The supervision should not be close and minute, deadening all responsibility and killing out all initiative. The wish to interfere should be at a minimum, and no needless harassment should be caused by incessant watching and constant meddling on the part of the higher authority. It should be just enough to prevent harm to the wider interests of the country as a whole; which interests may have been overlooked in the intensive and, therefore, narrower outlook of Provincial patriotism. The example of New Zealand might be pointed out here, whose separate independent existence is an asset of such tremendous significance to the British Empire. If it had allowed itself to be swallowed up in the Australian

Commonwealth, all its powers for striking out new paths would have been suppressed by the iron laws of uniformity. At present it is always willing and ready to try all sorts of administrative, legislative and economic experiments, by which the outer watching world is only the gainer. If things go wrong, harm has not been done on such a scale as to cause widespread damage; but if any of the experiments succeed, they can be modified and adapted to suit the exigencies of other climes and different administrations. The United States of America is another case in point. *The American Commonwealth*, by Viscount Bryce, has some very illuminating remarks on the relations between the Federal and the State Governments, and they should be laid to heart by the people who hold our destinies in their hands. I would strongly plead, therefore, that the routine net of dull, respectable mediocrity be not wound tight round the Provincial Administrations choking out all initiative; but that the utmost freedom compatible with the safety of the Empire be allowed to these, to experiment unflinchingly and tread out new paths for themselves and for others.

It is also necessary that a clearer demarcating line be drawn than exists at present between the respective spheres of activity appertaining to the Supreme Government and to the Provincial Governments. A clear and precise Administrative Code should be compiled, which would lay down and define the separate spheres of the activity of each and put a stop

to the eternal haggling and wrangling that goes on between the Subordinate Administrations, trying to safeguard some privilege, and the Superior Government trying to filch it away from it; and if there is any doubt or dispute after this, the final deciding authority should be the Supreme Court, as it is in Canada, in Australia and the United States, to which all such constitutional questions are referred for decision.

In any fixing of the respective spheres of action of the two, the fact should never be lost sight of, that the huge centralised Supreme Government cannot afford to make risky experiments; and that, by the very nature of its being it is forced to play a different rôle, namely, that of a regulariser, a controller; and that it cannot take up the other rôle of an experimenter, of a pioneer. This function is best left to the Subordinate Governments, who, in fact, should be encouraged to go ahead and try new methods and make experiments; in short, attempt to be as progressive as possible. Even if they make mistakes, these will not be fatal and, being confined to a small area, would be easy of rectification. The attempt to pin them all down within the straight-laced jacket of official uniformity, and reduce them to one dead level of mediocre respectability, is a serious and almost irreparable loss to living and progressive rule. Petrifaction and running into well-worn ruts should be actively discouraged and not fostered. Not respectability but advancement should be the standard for judgment. The innovations of a Local Government, if shown to be of wider applicability—