

Letters from
INDIA

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AS WRITTEN HOME BY
TAYA & MAURICE ZINKIN

FOREWORD BY
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M.V.O.

PUBLISHED BY THE
CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL CENTRE
ON BEHALF OF THE CONSERVATIVE
COMMONWEALTH COUNCIL



C.P.C. NUMBER 157

PUBLISHED BY THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL CENTRE

2-8 VICTORIA STREET, LONDON, S.W.1 AND

PRINTED BY THE THANET PRESS

MARGATE

FIRST PUBLISHED IN JULY 1956

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FOREWORD

THE AUTHORS of this assessment of Indian thought form an imposing team. Maurice Zinkin works for a famous business house at Bombay. Taya Zinkin, his versatile wife, is the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent for India.

After a brilliant career at Cambridge Mr. Zinkin became Assistant Collector in Bombay districts. During the last War he was first Under-Secretary ARP, Bombay Province, and was later seconded to the Finance & Commerce and Industries & Civil Supplies (until 1947) branches. Author of *Asia and the West*, he will shortly publish *Development for Free Asia* (Chatto & Windus). His equally able wife studied medicine at the Sorbonne and researched in bio-chemistry at Wisconsin; she has written for the *Guardian* and *The Economist* since 1950, and latterly for *Le Monde*.

From time to time Mr. Zinkin has written letters to me for the benefit of the Asia Sub-Group of the Conservative Commonwealth Council: and this small book represents a compression of his interpretation in which he was ably assisted by his wife.

As the Zinkins have themselves emphasised, their task has not been to paint a picture of India such as we in this country might have wished to see emerging after the great milestone was set up on 15th August, 1947. From our point of view India has not always been the perfect political partner. What they have attempted is to interpret Indian thought and reasoning with accuracy. Where so many strands of race, society and language are concerned this is no simple task. The views which are elaborated are therefore not necessarily our views or the Zinkins' views. They are the views of Indians; and it is right and indeed necessary that we who desire nothing more than to see our Commonwealth develop in loyalty to and sympathy with a great central theme, should continually inform ourselves as to the

reactions of enlightened opinion on the Indian sub-continent.

Sometimes I feel that Mr. and Mrs. Zinkin have analysed Indian thought with greater care and devotion to detail than Indians themselves have yet attempted! It will also be appreciated that in this country we have to balance the Indian view against that of her neighbour, Pakistan. Particularly is this necessary where the case of Kashmir is involved. Indeed one hopes that one day Pakistan may find equally brilliant exponents to record her internal and foreign policies.

Bearing this in mind, this commentary is a remarkably analytical and complete presentation of the labyrinth of influences which make up India's approach to the Commonwealth and world affairs.

We have to thank the Editor for so much hard work in piecing a number of separate letters together into a consecutive narrative and in undertaking the spade work required in presenting this very valuable little book.

BIRDWOOD

*Chairman, Full-Member States Group
Conservative Commonwealth Council*

March, 1956

THE NEW INDIA

TO UNDERSTAND PRIME MINISTER NEHRU and the 380 millions of the Indian Union as they present themselves to us and the rest of the world, we must first see them in their vast homeland as they are now evolving, nine years after attaining sovereign independence. What is already clear is that the Union is going to be a community unlike any other, which may very well, if it succeeds, have a stronger attraction for the more backward and uncommitted peoples of the world than either the West or Soviet Russia.

THE SOCIAL IDEAL

It is going to have a society firmly based on the village, on the peasant and the self-employed. There is only one such society in the Western world, and that is France. In France it does not work, first, because she is, incompatibly, also trying to be a great power (India, very carefully, has no such ambitions in terms of physical power); secondly, because there it so often takes the form of protection of inefficient privilege—the small shopkeeper who can only live by tax evasion, the vineyard-owner who must have the State buy his alcohol. In India, with the exception of some village industries, notably the handloom weaver, protection of the inefficient is not a part of the policy. On the contrary, the policy is to take a peasantry and an artisan who are at present of low productivity, and to use modern science and techniques to give them high productivity. Even higher productivity could possibly be obtained by displacing them in favour of large farms and larger factories, but that is not politically practicable. Indeed, it would probably involve revolution.

In fact, India is being turned into a property-owning democracy beyond the wildest dreams of any British Conservative. By the time tenancy reform is finished, in, say, five years' time,

about three-quarters of the agricultural population will own their own land. In shopkeeping, almost every shop is separately owned; there are no chain stores, distributing costs being so low that there is probably no room for any. The village industries are all being revived in a way which emphasises the individual artisan, and the merchant-moneylender is being replaced by State-financed co-operatives. The craftsman is also being given protection against machine industry by discriminatory taxation, State organisation of marketing, favouritism in State purchases—occasionally even by reservation of certain sorts of production for him. Finally, very large State assistance for, and initiative in, rural co-operatives is now proposed, to enable them to perform more of the functions of moneylender and trader than they can hope to at present.

The end of this policy is a society rather like the dream of so many Continental European peasant parties—one in which everyone will own his own land or shop or loom, also his own house. (Even the untouchables are, in one state after another, being given the freehold of their huts.) The exceptions will be mainly Government servants, industrial employees and such landless labour as may be left after land reform and *Bhoodan* (Land Gift Movement). And even they are being given more security than is normal in the West: to dismiss either a civil servant or a factory hand is now a major operation. The concept of a man having a freehold in his job is very congenial to Indian ideas, and has established itself almost without opposition in the last few years.

A society of this sort will obviously have great respect for small property. The Government is highly sensitive to, say, peasant complaints about unjust land acquisitions, and fairly sensitive even to small-shopkeeper complaints about harassment. But the contrary is likely to apply to big property. In nineteenth-century Europe, it will be recalled, the big, bad capitalist, and still more the big, bad banker, was even more the *bête noire* of the farmer than he was of the industrial worker. In India to-day, the Imperial Bank, which represents a third of their whole banking system, can be nationalised with hardly a squeak; but, except on the smallest of scales, no attempt has been made to introduce the co-operative farming on which the Plans, both the first and the second, set so much store.

LOWER MIDDLE CLASS

In such a society, the Government is likely to be very tender with the lower middle class, for this class is much larger than it might appear to be in Western eyes. Absolute levels of income and education are still so much lower than those to which the Westerner is accustomed that he tends to regard everybody as poor. India's small farmers, shopkeepers and artisans, however, do not have proletarian attitudes. They do not feel themselves to be disinherited, they regard themselves as the backbone of society and all incomes are so much lower in India that one should look upon the great majority of them—everybody perhaps with from £2 10s. to £10 a week—as lower middle class, both in their place in their society and in their attitude to it.

The Government is not likely to show any similar tenderness towards the upper middle class. (Now that the Princes and zemindars have gone, India no longer has any *upper* class in the European sense. There is no equivalent either of the British or of the Italian nobility; Indian society begins with Kensington.) Of this lack of tenderness one can be sure, not only on the basis of the current mood in India, but also from a knowledge of nineteenth-century European conservatism, with its dislike of urban money and ostentation. A Poona Brahmin's view of a Bombay millowner is not unlike a nineteenth-century Prussian junker-bureaucrat's attitude to a Ruhr coalmine-owner.

All Indian parties are socialist in theory; and theory is rapidly being translated into practice. Socialism is being interpreted as equality, but an equality in which the lower middle class remains Orwellianly more equal than the working class, while no one else is allowed to be more than a very little more equal than the lower middle class. For instance, in the 1955 Budget, the tax on middle incomes was raised with the greatest delicacy, whereas that on higher incomes was pushed up very sharply not only through a stiffening of the rates of taxation, but also through the withdrawal of *all* earned income allowance above a certain level and the taxing of hitherto untaxed perquisites. There is a sustained pressure for the reduction of top salaries in Government service (one which is slowly but surely gaining ground), and an equally steady (and praiseworthy) tendency to raise clerks' and teachers' salaries. The Indian Taxation Enquiry Commission talks of having a top income after tax of not more than thirty times the

average income, i.e. about £3,000 p.a. Leading Congress members have also talked about an income ceiling, and one that is decidedly lower than £3,000. People take time to get used to such ideas, but most democratic electorates rather like them when they do.

THE 'SOCIALISTIC PATTERN'

It will readily be seen from the above what is meant in India by the 'socialistic pattern'. It is a combination of equality with State enterprise in most of those things which a man cannot do by himself, or with one or two workers—railways, electricity, steel-works. The only function left to large-scale capitalist enterprise is to make those goods which cottage industry cannot make, and where the need to respond to consumer tastes quickly is too great to permit of the inflexibility of State enterprise. Soap, most cloth, small tools, and better-class housing are good examples. For a capital market as limited as India's, it is a considerable field, especially as in cases where its own know-how is limited, the State may well welcome, particularly, foreign private enterprise—either alone, as with the oil refineries, or in partnership with the Government, as in the Rourkela steel plant. But it means that private large-scale industry, which already employs much less capital than the Government, may, after a couple of 5-year Plans, employ, say, only a quarter as much (or the opposite of the British position), and that at the same time it will also employ only a fraction, perhaps also one quarter, as many people as are independent artisans or employed by independent artisans. In other words, private capitalist enterprise will be profitable: the constant expansion of the economy under the impulse of a succession of 5-year Plans should ensure that. But whereas in the West it is central to society—the real engine of social advance; and where it languishes, as in France and Italy, society languishes with it—in India it will only be marginal.

The engine of advance is to be the State, but only very partially, and mainly in heavy industry and utilities, the State acting by itself. Mainly it is the State as helper, opening schools and training centres, running community projects, doing research, financing co-operatives, assisting with marketing, making it possible in a hundred ways for the little man to meet the modern world, whether by providing the handloom-weaver with a dye-

house, an emporium in Bombay, a new design and some yarn on credit, or by consolidating the peasant's holding, joining with him in providing a school and a village road, lending him the money to buy sulphate of ammonia, or teaching him the Japanese method of rice-growing.

This is a socialism which has in some ways more resemblance to that very conservative party, the French Radical Socialists, than to British Labour or the Russian Communists. The Congress has to win its elections in the villages. It can afford neither British Labour's concentration on the urban electorate nor the traditional Marxist contempt for the peasant and the handicraftsman as classes well down the way to death.

Equality is to be not only economic but also social. Any attempt to enforce untouchability has been made a criminal offence; discrimination against women is forbidden by the Constitution and their rights in marriage and inheritance are being made equal to those of men through a whole series of reforms in Hindu Law. Each successive Plan sets aside large sums of money for the specific purpose of helping the untouchable, the aboriginal and the underprivileged generally to catch up with those who have been historically more fortunate. There is a good deal of 4th August, 1789 (the French day of the abolition of privileges), about India to-day.

ANTI-TOTALITARIAN

Basically, Indians are more anti-totalitarian than they are anti-colonial. They love freedom of discussion and have a real horror of governmental violence. The use of the Preventive Detention Act, for example, has now declined to a stage where there are only a few dozen people in gaol. This is undoubtedly the result of public pressure: the number of people the Executive could easily consider itself justified in detaining is certainly very much larger. Despite the Press Act, large sections of the Press continue to abuse Congress leaders and to accuse them of all sorts of personal misbehaviour, frequently quite untruthfully, without anything happening to them. Public sympathy, too, is always on the side of the rioter against the policeman, of the student against the university authorities—although at the stage when violence turns to sabotage and arson, the public tend to swing in favour of the Government, e.g. in the big riots in Bombay.

The reason why neither this general bias in favour of freedom nor the traditional tolerance of Hindu culture have very much effect in making India anti-Communist is, perhaps, lack of experience. India has been insulated from atrocities for a hundred years, and the only outside rule of which it has recent experience was our own, to which, in retrospect, more and more people are willing to ascribe patience and good intentions. Sardar Panikkar's *Asia and Western Dominance* has extremely little criticism and surprisingly much praise of British rule in India, and Mr. Nehru is said to have recommended everyone to read it. India has none of the intimate experience of what totalitarianism means that we have. There have been no White Russian refugees, and hardly any German Jews. Indians have no idea of what the German occupation meant in Europe, and simply cannot take in liquidation on the German, or the Russian, or the Chinese scale. It will be remembered how many people in England found it difficult to believe in Russian and Nazi concentration camps in the '30s.

Communist denials, therefore, which seem to us quite perfunctory and merely for the record, tend to be accepted as truth in India.¹ The Iron Curtain is a very great advantage to the Communist countries: only a limited number of Indian visitors go to either Russia or China, and hardly any of them speak either Russian or Chinese. They see the material progress of Soviet Central Asia and the law and order of China, and even non-Communists are impressed, especially as most Indians tend to regard Czarism as even more backward than it was, and to overstate the anarchy of China under Chiang Kai Shek. They do not see executions and forced labour camps any more than British visitors to Germany before the War saw Dachau. They do see that in Russian Central Asia the local people are allowed positions of at any rate apparent authority, and that China is becoming a considerable power. And even conservative Indians would like to see their country a power, and the coloured everywhere accepted as equals.

¹It is significant that Mr. Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin have done Communism much damage. If Mr. Khrushchev says it, it must have happened.

II

NEAR NEIGHBOURS

THERE IS A TENDENCY among British right-wing newspapers to take the opposite side to India in any case in which India is involved with another country. This is seriously affecting the enormous goodwill we have built up in India. That is not to say that Conservatives, like so many Socialists, should treat Mr. Nehru as their own Minister for External Affairs, to be followed right or wrong. It is one of India's misfortunes that so many Socialists do take this view, thus turning Mr. Nehru into a British party-political figure. A great deal of the criticism levelled against India may really be intended for the British Labour Party. All the same, the time has come to ask Conservatives whether they are not allowing emotional predispositions to influence them unduly against India. These predispositions range from the feeling that Hindus are idol-worshippers to a resentment against the Congress as the party that broke the Indian Empire, and are greatly strengthened by the Indian tendency, which Indians say they have taken over from us British, to moralise on every possible occasion. They are the major obstacle to good understanding between Britain and India.

This is not to argue that India is right in every dispute she has with her neighbours; there are often two sides to most disputes; but we must understand the case India has in the various local disputes with Pakistan, Portugal and Ceylon.

HYDERABAD

The main technical justification for India's police action (in September 1948) was that the Nizam by smuggling arms had broken his standstill agreement. He *had* smuggled arms and this was undoubtedly a breach of the agreement. On the other hand, the Nizam had grievances about the way in which various local authorities in India had prevented supplies from coming to his

State. The legal point, however, seems less important than the facts.

First, that an independent and quite possible hostile State in the middle of its territory was an intolerable position for India to accept; the main lines from Bombay and Delhi to Madras, for example, both run through Hyderabad. Secondly, that the desire for the independence of Hyderabad was in fact confined to the Muslim minority of 14 per cent and a few people in Hyderabad city and that it was being enforced on the rest of the population with very considerable violence which had led to a large exodus of refugees to India.

Thirdly, that Hyderabad had always been run almost exclusively for the benefit of its Muslim minority, even primary education was in Urdu, though Urdu is not the mother tongue of any of Hyderabad's major peoples; many officials could not speak the local languages at all.

Fourthly, that the Nizam's authority was so unpopular that it had already led to a major Communist revolt in about a third of the State which it took India much money and many lives after the police action to suppress.

JUNAGADH

Legality was on the side of Pakistan, to which the Nawab had acceded. Subsequently, his prime minister brought in Indian troops, actually with the Nawab's permission; but such an invitation was presumably without legal validity once he had acceded to Pakistan. The following, however, might be said for India:—

1. Junagadh is not contiguous with Pakistan, and Viceroy Mountbatten had made it clear that contiguity should be taken into account in accession.
2. It is tightly bound up, economically, with the rest of Saurashtra, and a good deal of its territory was enclaves within other states in Saurashtra, so that a Pakistani Junagadh would have been awkward.
3. Above all, Junagadh has an overwhelming Hindu majority (85 per cent). On Jinnah's own principle that Muslims and Hindus were two nations, Pakistan should not have accepted the accession of Junagadh, which, it must be remembered, happened over two months before the Kashmir crisis.

4. Junagadh had shown itself an aggressor before India took over (15th February, 1948) by asserting its claims to certain small states, which had acceded to India but which it claimed as its feudatories, by force.

KASHMIR

This was the other way round from Junagadh. The Maharaja acceded to India, but 80 per cent of the population is Muslim. The pro-Indian arguments run as follows:—

1. India did not try to get the Maharaja to accede, whereas Jinnah did try to get the Nawab of Junagadh to accede.
2. The accession of the Maharaja (27th October, 1947) was only accepted when the tribesmen were on the outskirts of Srinagar. Baramulla had shown conclusively that they were incapable of exercising the self-restraint expected of regular troops; if they had entered Srinagar, there would have been rape and murder on a large scale. There is nothing to suggest that this would not have included Muslims, and even if Muslims had been excluded, India could not be expected not to try and save the lives and honour of Hindus.
3. Whereas no Hindu in Junagadh is known to have wanted to go to Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference did support India. The Sheikh was Kashmir's major leader, and the National Conference its biggest party. They had quite sound reasons for wanting to go to India: they thought India would give them more autonomy than Pakistan would, and that India was more likely to permit their land reforms. (This involves no opinion on whether the Kashmiris of the Valley would or would not vote for Pakistan to-day. They might, but there have been periods since 1947, 1948 for example, when they almost certainly would not have.)
4. Junagadh has no area with a Muslim majority, except, possibly, for one or two towns; in Kashmir, Jammu, south and east of the River Chenab, has both a non-Muslim majority and is contiguous with India.
5. Jinnah should not have accepted Junagadh on his own two-nation principle. India made no such breach of its own

principles when it accepted Kashmir. Its own principle, which is being steadily applied to its Muslim minority, is that religion does not govern nationality. Partition was accepted by India on the basis not that Muslims were a separate nation, but that certain areas had shown a clear desire to secede and that India did not want any involuntary subjects. The same idea was said to lie behind Nehru's original offer of a plebiscite in Kashmir: if the Kashmiris wanted to leave, in principle they could. It was not a recognition of any rights in Pakistan.

CANAL WATERS

Here the issue has not been whether or not certain areas in Pakistani Punjab which are already irrigated should now go dry. As the World Bank's award made clear, it is a question of whether they should get their water from elsewhere in Pakistan and thus prevent at some later stage part of Sind and Baluchistan from being irrigated, or whether they should get their water from India, thus preventing parts of East Punjab and the Rajasthan desert from being irrigated. Moreover, the area involved is not the whole of West Pakistan's irrigated land, but only about 5 million acres—a quarter.

EVACUEE PROPERTY

Much more property was left behind by Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan than by Muslims in India. The Pakistani idea that the issue should be settled by private exchange was impracticable. It was never safe, and probably would still not be safe, for Hindus and Sikhs to go back to West Pakistan to settle their property affairs. They have not even been able to do so to get their movable property. On the other hand, Pakistan probably cannot afford to pay the difference between the value of the two sets of property, which is probably not less than £400 m.—especially as so much of the Hindu and Sikh property has apparently been allowed to deteriorate. On the other hand, again, whereas India has seen to it that the property left behind by Muslims has gone to refugees from Pakistan, a great deal of the property left behind by the Hindus and Sikhs has gone to locals who simply moved in or took over, and whom the Government of Pakistan appears never to have been able to eject, possibly because of administrative difficulties.

EAST BENGAL REFUGEES

Both India and Pakistan are ashamed of what happened in the Punjab in 1947, and want only to forget it. India's cause of grievance, apart from property, is not the Punjab, but what has been happening in East Bengal. In 1947 Bengal was quiet, but since then four million refugees have come from there to India, against well under a million going the other way; and the flow into India continues at the rate of a quarter million a year or more, while the flow the other way has stopped. These refugees crowd into West Bengal where there is no room for them, and create the most appalling problems of unemployment, squalor and unrest in Calcutta. They come partly because of bad economic conditions in East Bengal, but mainly because Pakistan treats them as second-class citizens, both in such relatively harmless ways as insisting that the President must be a Muslim, and in such serious ways as giving them quite inadequate police protection against hooligan attacks (even, sometimes, it is said, against the molestation of women), severe discrimination against them over employment, and the enforcement upon them of separate electorates.

GOA

Before Independence, except for an incident or two in 1946, no one in India really bothered about Goa. Goans in India were tepidly loyal supporters of the British Raj; only a few were Congressmen. Goa, therefore, got a low priority, and, in any case, everybody took it for granted that the French and Portuguese were on the Indian sub-continent by our favour, and that when we went they would.

Between 1947 and, say, 1952, as a logical consequence of their pre-Independence attitude, Indians took it for granted that since we, the invincible British, had gone, it was only a matter of time and of finding a face-saving formula in the case of the less formidable French and Portuguese. During the two years after 1952, opinion began to heat up when it was found that the French, having given up Chandernagore without difficulty, were being less helpful over Pondicherry. Talk of the French constitution, plebiscites and assimilation annoyed the Indians. To them the people of Pondicherry were visibly Indian in religion, dress, language, culture and, above all perhaps, colour. Talk of them as

French was to Indians a mockery, and they were deeply suspicious of plebiscites in an area where there had been considerable pro-French hooliganism, and considerable economic advantages—smuggling, customs privileges in French colonies—in staying separate. The Indian view was simple. If anybody voted for France, it did not mean that he was French, only that he was a traitor. So India put the economic heat on; the hooligans changed sides; the French gave in. India now has to take special measures to bolster up Pondicherry's economy, and there seems to be some discontent there. But in the recent elections, nobody suggested that the transfer to India was not right, and what happened in that case confirmed Indians in the belief that talk of assimilation to a European mother-country was a mere fraud, and made Goa the more conspicuous as being the only place left.

Up to the mass *satyagraha* (non-violent march) of 15th August, 1955, they therefore turned to Goa with confidence. Surely, now, the Portuguese would see the signs of the times and give up their anachronism. Gradually, however, it dawned on the Indians that Portugal would do no such thing. Sometimes their reaction was to dub the Portuguese fifteenth century; sometimes they showed signs of understanding what Goa meant to Portugal historically, and answered by pointing out that it was taken by conquest and that its Christians were created by the Inquisition; sometimes they were moved to impatience and demanded police action, or condemned the Goans as cowards who would not work for their own freedom. Individual *satyagrahas*, and even the mass one of 15th August, were partly expressions of this impatience. By 16th August, the failure of the mass *satyagraha*, its consequences within India and on world opinion, had made Indians think again. It had not lessened their determination to have Goa. On the contrary, as Nehru put it, the 'iron has entered into their soul'. The most surprising people now felt passionately about Goa.

What they have now realised, however, is that Goa is not going to be as easy to get as Pondicherry, and so they are casting about for means of getting it. Their first reaction was to say that Mr. Nehru had made a mess, and to feel that something stirring needed to be done against the Portuguese. On second thoughts, they feel, first, that Mr. Nehru has more or less purged his error by admitting it; secondly, that the use of violence by India would not be compatible with India's principles (this is not, of course,

a universal feeling—all Indians do not believe in non-violence—but it is widespread); thirdly, that mass *satyagraha* will not do as a means of conducting international relations—the Communist and Socialist attempts to continue have been flops, though that could change if the Indian police had to shoot anybody; fourthly, that they will have to take the long, slow way of economic sanctions, which affect the Goans rather than the Portuguese. Most people give these economic sanctions two years to take effect. If they do not, public opinion could take another swing, which might mean a serious loss of support for the Congress, and might even mean an even more serious movement of feeling against the Western powers as supporters of the Portuguese than has already occurred. Many of the West's best friends in India are also keen hungerers after Goa. They are anti-Communist because they are nationalists and democrats; the same reasons move them to consider the Portuguese régime in Goa intolerable.

Economic sanctions may be slower to work than Indians think. The Portuguese can, if they are prepared to make sacrifices, supply Goa, whatever Indian dockers may do, though Daman and Diu must be feeling the strain. Smuggling, however, may be finally stopped when India builds its thirty miles of barbed-wire fence; it has already been much reduced. India's real weapon is that the jobs for the Goan middle class are in India, and they cannot in the long run expect to be Portuguese and nevertheless come to India, which has too few jobs for its people, to get work. If India were shut to them, neither Portugal, nor Angola, nor Mozambique could fill the gap. India could probably start revolt immediately by sending the Goans back to Goa, but that, it is felt, would create too much hardship. India therefore waits for the younger generation and their parents to turn subversive, because boys growing up cannot find work. And that may take more than two years. India cannot rely solely on nationalist feeling unaided by some such stimulus, partly because so many Goans have the best of both worlds—the rights of an Indian citizen and also of a Portuguese citizen—and partly because so many of the people who would normally agitate in Goa—the educated, the students, those who find dictatorship stifling—go to India.

Britain is expected to be understanding. Indians do not expect us to say that they should have Goa. They do expect us to under-

stand what they feel about it, and to appreciate that they have a case; just as they, despite their anti-colonialist instincts, have been restrained about Cyprus, have never supported the Communists in Malaya and have given us our regular meed of praise for the Gold Coast and Nigeria.

Next, they expect us to realise that they have shown great self-restraint; that they could have used force, and have not, in spite of the shock of 15th August. Nobody in India believes that anybody would intervene if they invaded Goa; they therefore expect to be given full credit for not doing so. Many people understand Britain's embarrassments in this connection. They realise Portugal is our oldest ally. They are beginning to appreciate that if we support India too much over Goa, it might have repercussions in Gibraltar, or Cyprus or Fermanagh. But when they read about the 'historical, geographical and strategic' considerations which Mr. Macmillan said affected self-determination, they are encouraged to feel that they should have Goa without a plebiscite.

Goa is an admirable example of the damage done in India by what Indians regard as the un-understanding hostility of much of the British Press. When one newspaper compared Nehru to Hitler and another doubted India's capacity to govern itself, Indians began to think that the British Right was hopelessly hostile. Perhaps surprisingly, the effect on India of the loudly-expressed Communist support has been limited, and would have been negligible had it not been for Mr. Dulles' famous gaffe; but they are bitterly affected by what they interpret as British dislike and joy at their misfortune. India, as we have already said, gets a bad right-wing press in Britain, if only because Mr. Nehru is the darling of the Left, and because he stands for so much in the English Radical tradition which the typical Conservative does not like—moral lectures, for instance, and telling other people to be pacific. Goa reminds Indians of this bad press on a point where they feel particularly sensitive.

One may perhaps conclude, where perhaps one should have begun, by pointing out that the Indian case on Goa is really a very good one. The majority of Goans are Hindus and the Catholic minority is more like the Catholics of Bombay than those of Lisbon. The language of Goa is Konkani; more Goans speak English than Portuguese. The whole economy of Goa

rests upon the fact that Goans are treated as Indian citizens in India and upon Goa's being able to buy and sell in India with freedom. Goa is the natural port for a large Indian hinterland. Geographically and historically Goa has never been anything but a part of Maharashtra. There is in fact no test of nationalism which has been applied in Europe over the last 100 years by which Goa is not a part of India and it is no more possible for Portugal to destroy this fact by calling Goa a province than it was for Bismarck to destroy the French feeling of Alsace-Lorraine by allowing them deputies in the Reichstag.

CEYLON

One can understand the Ceylonese worries about their very large Indian minority, whom they tend to find foreign and unassimilable, and who have certainly remained very Indian, in spite of their many years in Ceylon. On the other hand, these people came to Ceylon originally at our invitation; most of those there now were born there, and the economy of Ceylon is completely dependent upon them. The Ceylonese cannot really expect to keep them as labourers for twenty or thirty years, and then send them home. If they want Indians to run their tea estates, their docks, their sanitation and so on, it is not unreasonable for India to demand that they shall also make them citizens. Were all the Indians to depart, even over a period of five years, Ceylon, including all British interests there, would be ruined.

BURMA AND NEPAL

China was told three years ago that India regarded Burma's defence as part of her own. She was also told that India would deem any intervention in Burma on the plea of the need to suppress Kuomintang troops there as quite unacceptable. And it has always been clear that Nepal's border is to India the same as her own.

III

COMMONWEALTH ATTITUDE

DESPITE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF OPPOSITION on the fringes by a rather odd collection of extreme left-wingers and extreme right-wingers, the Commonwealth is generally considered in India to be what the authors of 1966 *And All That* called 'a good thing'. On the other hand, the Empire is considered, almost universally, to be 'a bad thing', though some people are more willing than others to admit that even 'bad things' must be allowed time to die or to reform.

The reason for this attitude, which to any Conservative mind will seem somewhat odd, are in fact quite simple. In India, the Commonwealth means, above all, Great Britain. The latter is the one country in the world with whose attitudes most educated Indians have the most sympathy. After all, they had very much the same sort of education. If Earl Attlee or Sir Anthony Eden see things the same way as Mr. Nehru, the educated Indian's belief that Mr. Nehru is right is deepened. If they see things a different way, then their belief in Mr. Nehru is perhaps a little shaken. This is particularly true if they find themselves diverging from the *New Statesman and Nation* wing of the Labour Party. Many Englishmen, of course, react similarly when they find themselves diverging too much from India.

The goodwill for other countries is not nearly so clear-cut as that for Great Britain, and tends to depend very much on their attitude to Indians. Contrary to our European belief, relatively few Indians wish to emigrate, and, except for one or two areas like Gujerat, hardly any of the educated are happy away from India. They therefore feel perfectly friendly towards Canada, which has been generous with its Colombo Plan assistance, and which allows them an annual quota of emigrants, however small, and whose Mr. Lester Pearson is a foreign minister whose attitudes are very much after their own hearts—he is persistently

quoted with approval in the Press. They feel reasonably friendly to New Zealand, to which nobody particularly wants to go, and which has also been generous under the Colombo Plan.

They feel rather less well disposed towards Australia, which has been helpful under the Colombo Plan and which takes Indian students quite freely, but which is perpetually grating on Indian pride by its insistence on its whiteness. If Australia were to give Indians a quite small quota of emigrants a year, it would be a great contribution to Commonwealth relations, and the number of applicants for the quota would not be particularly large.

South Africa, of course, represents to them everything they hate, and so long as we and the Americans continue, as they see it, to support South Africa at United Nations, however good our legal case may be, they will have doubts about the sincerity of what we say about freedom and democracy. One would not go quite so far as to say that they feel that if we can stomach South Africa they can stomach China and Russia; but there is no doubt that in India, and equally in Pakistan and Ceylon, Dr. Malan and Mr. Strijdom have been Communism's most effective advocates.

THE COLONIAL EMPIRE

For the Empire, Indians have only suspicion. Where there is obvious progress towards self-government, as in the Gold Coast or Nigeria or Malaya, they have nothing but praise, and they recognise quite freely, as in the last Nigerian constitutional crisis, that the faults are frequently not ours. The pattern of the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Malaya is the pattern they followed themselves, and when they see it happening elsewhere they are reminded of the Britain of 1947, which is of course, in India the high spot of British history—the final proof that even great powers can act in a moral and generous way.

Criticism comes where there is a conflict or apparent conflict between the interests of white settlers and those of the natives. Our attitude tends, naturally, to be to identify ourselves with the settlers, and to share something of their fears at the possibility of the submergence of their children and their culture in the black sea around them. Equally naturally, Indians tend to identify themselves with the natives, if only because they have heard the arguments about trusteeship and unfitness to govern oneself applied to themselves, and therefore discount them completely.

However much one may, as an Englishman, believe that there was a long period of time in the nineteenth and early twentieth century when these arguments expressed at least one side of the truth for India itself, one must recognise that in an independent India very few educated people will be prepared even to consider them seriously for a good many years to come. One day Indians may regard their experience under British rule to have been as useful to them as we now consider the Norman Conquest to have been to us; but for that to happen the British Raj will have to become as much an historical event as the Norman Conquest.

AFRICA

Indians apply quite simple standards to Africa. They have themselves taken the plunge and given the vote to their illiterate, though that means that the educated minority may be swamped by the ignorance of the peasant and the agricultural labourer. They therefore do not see why any other standard should be applied in Kenya and Rhodesia. Indeed, their attitude is rather that of the pamphlet *Mr. Lyttelton's Swan Song* by J. H. Huizinga of the *Manchester Guardian*. His point was that a Rhodesian or Kenyan settler cannot, in a modern world, expect to remain an aristocracy . . . governing a mass of disfranchised natives, and that he must take the same way as did Britain's own aristocracy with its working classes in the nineteenth century. If the settler does take the plunge, he argues, he will be rewarded with continuing leadership, as the British nobility was. If he does not, he will be swept away, as the more timorous Continental nobilities have been. The argument obviously has force, but whereas to us it would be arguable, to an Indian it appears to be a self-evident principle. The whole of his experience during the past fifty years teaches him that there is only one way to deal with a nationalist movement: take a chance and give it power, and the reward for doing so will be friendship. Few people in India, however, stop to consider whether their own experience can be exactly applied to African conditions, and particularly whether Africa is not perhaps still in 1900 rather than in 1947.

They are not influenced in this by any special consideration for the interests of Indians in Africa. India's policy has always been that Indians overseas must make themselves citizens of the country in which they live. There is indeed a great deal of

contempt in many circles in India for the unfortunate Indian in Africa, who is seen as not identifying himself adequately with the natives, and not turning himself quickly enough into a Kenyan or Rhodesian, or whatever it may be. It should, however, be added that quite a few people in high positions in India have relations in Africa, and that the humiliations to which those relatives are subjected have considerable political importance. It is a great strain on the loyalty to the Commonwealth of a senior government official, who deals with Ministers as his equals in London or Washington, to find that his sister or sister-in-law is humiliated because of her colour in Durban or Nairobi.

The talk of Indian imperialism in Africa is nonsense. On the contrary, Indian opinion wants the Indians in Africa to make themselves one with the Africans, just as it wants Indians to be Ceylonese in Ceylon, Malaysians in Malaya and Burmese in Burma. Indeed, there is a strong tendency to despise the Indians in Africa for thinking too much of their money and their own separate interests; in short, for behaving as a minority instead of as Kenyans or Tanganyikans, or whatever it may be. On the other hand, neither the Government of India nor Indian opinion in general will ever accept that a white face makes a man worth more than one vote. Feeling about colour discrimination goes deep into their hearts and minds: where any political privileges are to be given, they think they should be given to the backward, just as they give them to their own untouchables and aboriginals. They therefore tend to feel that the whites should obtain leadership by displaying the capacity for it, and not through special privileges. The South African doctrine of *apartheid* is anathema.

COLONIAL TROUBLES

Nevertheless, Indian opinion has no sympathy with violence. It is anti-Mau Mau and anti-Malayan communist. They were doubtful for a time about Dr. Jagan. As and when it was proved to their satisfaction (which was not easy) that he was a Communist, their sympathy for him became very limited indeed. They think that Colonial leaders should be democrats, and should acquire responsibility with power. They also think that the proper means of resistance is non-violence. The pattern, in fact, should be that of Gandhi and Nehru. But they are always inclined to believe that if there is trouble, some failure of the

Imperial power must have caused it. If there is Mau Mau, they think it is because the land grievances of the Kikuyu were not redressed and wages in Nairobi were too low. If the constitution is suspended in British Guiana, it is merely a sign of the impatience one expects from Sir Winston Churchill! If he were only willing to wait, it would probably turn out that PPP was not so bad after all! If the Africans oppose Central African confederation, then it must be because of the Southern Rhodesian colour consciousness; and confederation should not be imposed on them, and so on. This is perhaps not an attitude confined to Indians. When Europeans hear that the Nagas are demanding independence, many blame not the foolishness of the Nagas but the clumsiness of the Government of India.

COMPARATIVE STANDARDS

When Indians look at colonial rule, they do so with much more understanding and much more awakened imagination than they do in the case of foreign communism or fascism. Even here, however, there is a distinction to be drawn. The French are usually regarded as being rougher in their dependencies than we are in ours, but until the last few months it is our rather than French actions which aroused indignation, because the former follow a pattern the Indians know whilst that of the French is quite unknown. They thought the deposition of a Moroccan sultan unwise, but then forgot about it; whereas when we deposed the Kabaka of Buganda, they disapproved with all the fury of a Fenner Brockway. And even now, they are much milder about Algeria than they would have been if the same troubles had occurred in Uganda.

The result is rather paradoxical. The sincerity of the Western world's belief in freedom and democracy tends to be judged primarily on how we behave in the Colonies. They dislike racial discrimination even more than totalitarianism, their touchstone for Western policy being whether or not we discriminate. That this rather than self-government is the key is shown by their attitude in cases where racial discrimination is not an issue. They never get upset about Malta or Cyprus. Equally, they never get upset about Russian imperialism in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The reason is undoubtedly the same lack of imagination that prevents their understanding how given to terror Communist




ABOVE: Canadian External Minister, Mr. Pearson, with Sri Deshmukh, then Indian Finance Minister, in New Delhi. BELOW: Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev touring a farm in the Coimbatore district during their visit to India in 1955.






Her Majesty the Queen entertaining the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Buckingham Palace during the Commonwealth Conference in London in February 1955. Mr. Nehru is second from the right in this unique family circle.





ABOVE: The inauguration of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, April 1955. BELOW: Leaders of the Ministerial Delegations to the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan discussing the progress of the Plan in one of their Committee Sessions in New Delhi.





Two examples of recent development in India. LEFT: The launching of the Jalaganga at the new shipyard at Vizagapatam. BELOW: Villagers laying drainage pipes in one of the Community Project areas. Enthusiasm for this type of scheme has been aroused by the Community Development Programme.



régimes are. The Maltese, the Cypriots, the Czechs and the Poles are all white, and Indians are usually incapable of seeing 'colonialism' as something which can happen to white people, although the dilemmas created by the existence of white settlers and the importance of white enterprise in Africa resemble those created by the Anglo-Irish in Ireland and the Bohemian Germans in Czechoslovakia. To the Indians, colonial rule largely means the British Empire. Not even the Communists know that Lenin's illustrations of imperialism were largely drawn from the interests of France and Germany in Russia.

The British Empire is judged on its own standards. In the short run, thought not in the long run, we tend to suffer from the fact that those standards are so high. The Griffiths trial in Kenya aroused a great deal of shocked horror in India: partly it was the reflection of the horror aroused in large circles in Britain, partly it was the general anti-colonial feeling, but more than either of these it was the feeling that it was not in the tradition of Great Britain to behave like that, and that there must be something wrong with an administration under which such a thing could happen. There would have been no corresponding horror if a similar, or even worse, revelation had been made about the French in Indo-China, the Chinese in Korea or the Russians in Eastern Germany. They, too, tend to be judged by their own standards.

Indians always remember that our declared object in all our Colonies is self-government, and that the policy of a series of Conservative governments before the War was the paramountcy of native interests, and that even our present policy is partnership. They judge us accordingly. They sympathised with the Kabaka not because they regard an independent Buganda as practicable or desirable, but because they thought that the real reason for his deposition was his objection to an East African federation dominated by the Kenya settlers.

In contrast, their sympathy with the Action Party in Nigeria over the Lagos issue was very tempered indeed. They argued with *The Economist* that the then Colonial Secretary took too strong a line, but they were not prepared to take sides on what was an internal issue rather than a 'colonial' one. Even Northern Rhodesia's policy on Indian immigration has aroused relatively little excitement, and Indians refused to get worked up about

British Guiana. To judge from the newspapers, Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham, during their visit to India, charmed those they met, and their speeches were studiously moderate; but people felt that the issue was neither one of racial discrimination nor one of whether or not British Guiana should be self-governing. True, they sided with the British Labour Party about the suspension of the Constitution, but no reputable newspaper criticised Mr. Nehru's decision not to raise the matter at United Nations. They would have been out of order in doing so, but, after all, there was no hesitation in taking up Morocco and Tunis, and our own and Australia's vote against alleged UN competence on the racial question in South Africa aroused a great deal of bitterness in India. They feel that racial discrimination is one of the dominant issues of our time, and that it is legal pettiffogery to treat it as a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

India itself in the places where it has difficulties with backward tribesmen acts upon the policy of patience which it recommends to London. The Naga demand for independence is much more ridiculous than that of Buganda and has been accompanied by considerable violence, yet the Nagas are normally arrested only for specific acts of violence, not for sedition, and this although they live on a ticklish border. Moreover, when on one occasion the extension of settled administration into the North East Frontier areas next to China produced a massacre of an Indian party by Dafla tribesmen, the ring leaders were caught and punished, but there was a firm refusal to use such indiscriminating measures as, say, bombing, against the Dafla villagers as a whole.

In the long run, one can be optimistic about India's reaction to our Colonial policy. Whatever hesitations or restrictions the facts occasionally impose upon us, no British government will ever depart from the policy that the eventual end of a Colony is some form of self-government, and that no distinction shall be made between the Queen's subjects on grounds of race, colour or creed. Whatever the temporary setbacks, Indians, like other people, are bound to appreciate that that is our policy and that on the whole we stick to it. As that happens, the bond which binds India more closely to Britain than to any other Western country will tighten, for it is largely based upon the belief that Britain alone in the past had the courage and generosity to give freedom to people to whom it could have been denied.

IV

WORLD POLICY

WE WESTERNERS divide the world into free and Communist. Indians see it less simply. They see the committed free, the uncommitted free, and the merely 'reactionary', as well as the Communist. In the merely 'reactionary' they include all colonial régimes and also, e.g., South American dictatorships—in other words, all régimes resting on the apathy rather than on the participation of their peoples. A communist régime only works if the people participate. That is why they have so much more terror and propaganda than an old-fashioned dictatorship.

It is a major Indian belief, first, that 'reactionary' régimes must in due course become either free or communist; secondly, that the sooner they become free and settle the argument, the less there will be for the free and Communist worlds to quarrel over; and, thirdly, that India's non-alignment provides them with a position they are likely to find more attractive than any other. It may tempt them away from our side, but it also draws them away from the other side.

COMMUNISM

Indians may be prepared to accept the disappearance of democracy if the reward is modernity, and if the power passes into the hands of the professional middle class. India is a country run by its professional middle classes, and that makes it easier for them to understand the ways of thought and working of communist régimes. Communist cadres are always middle-class intellectuals, if not by birth, then by their positions as cadres and their training as communists. That the intellectuality and professional knowledge are often of a pretty low order does not matter: the mirror may distort, but the clerk or lawyer can see his image in it. What the professional middle-class Indian is totally allergic to is what he (inaccurately) calls a 'feudal' or 'colonial' government, a govern-

ment where power lies with big business and the landed classes, who use it to support the *status quo*. They think that these people have no future and their governments no support. To help them would be to ask for a Communist revolution, because people would have no alternative: Communism, they think, would then be the only way of getting the changes they so desperately desire. This attitude is general. It applied against King Farouk in Egypt and against the French in Algeria. It would apply against the present Government of Peru, if the average Indian knew anything of Peru. The reason why it applied more strongly against Bao Dai or Chiang is only that their countries were nearer and that what was happening could be an immediate threat to India's peace. Therefore, they were sufficiently well reported for sides to be taken.

AMERICA AND ASIA

One can only be sure of stopping communism in Asia if India and America work together, and at present they are at cross purposes. First, there is the difference in the attitude to life: Indians are patient, Americans impatient; Indians are compromisers, Americans perfectionists; Indians regard a proportion of failure as inevitable, Americans have behind them a long history of success. Secondly, there is a different judgment of the facts. Many Americans presumably believe that the Chinese Nationalists could really return to the mainland. Many Indians are unaware of the progress achieved on Formosa. Mr. Dulles says that any retreat on Formosa would destroy the faith of Asians in the U.S.; Indians believe it would greatly increase that faith. And so on. Thirdly, there is a different conception of what would be good for Asia. Both India and America genuinely desire for Asian countries what would be good for them; in both cases purely selfish interests are sufficiently minor for us to ignore them without substantially distorting the picture.

The most important difference is perhaps the third. Both of them want Asia to be free and independent and increasingly less poor. To the Americans, however, no régime can be worse for the people of a country than a communist one. They would therefore rather support anybody, however unrepresentative, than let a country go communist. Indians do not share the view that nothing could be worse than Communism. To them the

great event of our times is the revolution which is transforming the countries of Asia from peasant economies, rooted in the ancient life and culture of their villages, into modern States. They would prefer this change to happen through democracy and in liberty, as it is happening in India itself. But if it cannot be achieved that way, they would rather have it through communism than not have it at all. In other words, to most Americans Chiang is better than the communist; to most Indians, the communist is better than Chiang. Indians see no hope for the future in a régime of his type, no hope that it can effect the revolutionary changes they consider necessary.

Indians have shot at American policy towards, say, Bao Dai with a double-barrelled gun. They argued that it was wrong to support him because his people did not want him, and that communism would expand more quickly the longer he and his like were supported. Because of this combination of attitudes, it is reasonably easy for Indians to believe what is impossible for most Americans to believe, viz., that a communist revolution may happen with the support of the people. Possibly this belief has something of the smugness of people who feel themselves to have been lucky. One notices how often Nehru stresses the fact that though India's development has been democratic and should continue to be so, this is the result of India's special historical circumstances; others in less fortunate positions, like the Chinese, can perhaps not hope for so pleasant an evolution. That is not quite how he puts it, but it is basically what he means. A country may be so oppressed, so torn by class and civil war, so lacking in a middle class, that the growth of stable democracy is impossible, and the people will support communism as the least bad of the available ways out of their miseries.

This attitude makes most Indians feel that if what is desired is to give expression to the will of the people, then one should accept a Communist government of China, and probably of Viet Nam, but not of Cambodia or Laos. When the Americans help people whom the Indians think unrepresentative and 'feudal', the latter consider it improper interference in the affairs of Asia. Many of Nehru's complaints against America are explicable in these terms. It is not, Indians feel, for America to decide whether or not it is in the interests of a given Asian country to go communist; if they are foolish enough to want it,

they should be allowed to do so. This attitude obviously has its dangers, but it is understandable. For example, many Britishers have disliked America's aid to Franco, despite its obvious strategic advantages. We should not have liked it much if they had supported Marshal Graziani for fear of Italian communism. Rightly or wrongly, Indians look on people like Chiang with the same distaste as we look on Graziani.

By contrast, Russian aid for Communist China enhances their standing with the Indians. The Communists there are thought to have the people behind them. Therefore, Russian help is for an undeveloped country, to be approved in the same way as American aid to India is approved. They nevertheless keep a sharp look out to see if the Russians are actually controlling anything. Any sign of a 'colonial' relationship would enormously damage the Communist cause in Asia; but they must see it for themselves, not be told about it by us.

So long as Indians think that principle requires that Chiang and his like should not be supported and Americans think otherwise, so long will any sort of common policy be almost impossible. But as various other mutual points of dispute are slowly narrowing, perhaps one should not be unduly pessimistic. For example, in Cambodia and Laos, both Indian and American opinion is in favour of the present régimes. American opinion also seems to be as enthusiastic about the Burmese régime as Mr. Nehru is. In South Korea, now that the Indians have watched for some time the Americans behaving with Syngman Rhee like a man who has got a tiger by the tail, they are more and more inclined to cheer for the man and to hope he can hold on. In Thailand, though Indians do not approve of Pibul, they are beginning to think that the Thais are really frightened of China, that perhaps the Thais quite like the *status quo* and that perhaps Pibul is just as good as any possible alternative. The real difficulty is the American alliance with Pakistan. India welcomes economic aid to Pakistan. Pakistan is a neighbour and its stability is an Indian interest. But military aid large enough to upset the balance of power would cut straight across India's vital interests.

CHINA

Most Indians believe that the Chinese Government has so many important jobs on its hands at home that it would really be very

silly for it to complicate its problems by deliberate external aggression, and they see both the aid to Viet Minh and the intervention in Korea as largely reflexes against too close an American approach to their borders. This view, it should be noted, is held by many people who do not regard either of those Chinese actions as moral or justified. It is an interpretation of facts, not a moral judgment. Its importance is that they therefore believe that, if unprovoked, a Chinese attack on Burma, or even Cambodia or Thailand, is unlikely.

Mr. Nehru's visit to China confirmed his belief in both democracy and neutrality. He thought the Chinese had a good case in Formosa. He also naturally thinks that India gets things done just as effectively and quickly its own way, without 'liquidating' people or cutting them off from all but Government information. He would like to see some of the Chinese energy and enthusiasm in India, but that would be the only Chinese thing he would ever want to adopt.

Incidentally, the visit cut the ground from under the feet of the Indian Communist party. Admiration for Chinese-Communist achievements, and allegations that the Americans were hounding the Chinese, were part of their stock in trade. When Mr. Nehru said formally that some things in China were good and some bad, that anyway India's way was better for India and that however good China's case in Formosa it would be wrong for her to go to war over it, he left the Indian communists with very little to say. (Their position is also being considerably undermined by all the people who go to Russia on delegations and come back talking about how much inequality there is in Russia and how few strikes.)

China only gets praised in the context of its non-recognition at the United Nations, and Nehru regularly points out to his public that both Russia and China have only achieved what they have achieved by methods quite unacceptable to Indians. The real hero of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China was definitely Sir Anthony Eden.

SEATO

It was precisely their interpretation of the Chinese that made Nehru and much Indian opinion alarmed about any effective SEATO. They thought that the Chinese were a people led into

aggression by fear, but that, left alone, China might settle down. They were afraid that a SEATO would endanger rather than protect Thailand and Burma, and might lead to an anticipatory Chinese attack on those countries, which none of the Western powers involved would be able to prevent; and that it would in any case greatly increase tension in the region.

The region in question happens to be India's own backdoor. Other people exercising their judgment—and this is much more a matter of judgment of facts than a moral issue, though Nehru's way of putting it obscures this—at India's backdoor, against her will and judgment, naturally arouses a certain amount of Indian hostility, if only because India feels that her risks in S.E. Asia are so much greater than the United States', and that her interests there and her understanding of the region are very much greater.

Of course, it is possible to counter by saying that just as the USA does not adequately consider the Indian point of view, the latter in its turn does not sufficiently consider that of Thailand—the only country really concerned, since the Philippines has a military alliance with the USA in any case. The Indians do not fully appreciate the reality of Thai fears and the fact that they may genuinely have a different attitude from themselves. This incomprehension is partly attributable to a distaste for Pibul as a war-time collaborator and dictator. Nehru is said to feel this personally. This again may seem illogical, in view of the praise given to Subash Chandra Bose, but Bose is felt to be a man who took great risks for his country, Pibul merely a man who gets on the right waggons—Japanese or American—at the right time.

Briefly, SEATO remains unacceptable to Indians, first, because they would like to see whether the Chinese can now behave; secondly, because they do not see how it adds any strength that was not there before; thirdly, because they feel the risk is subversion, not invasion, and they fail to see how SEATO can be the right answer to subversion. If, however, it could mean, as was earlier suggested, large economic aid without strings in this region, that undoubtedly, India would welcome. It is the military SEATO to which they object, though their objections are tempered by a considerable feeling that it is mainly a gesture to placate the Americans. It seemed to involve neither bases nor staff arrangements, nor a promise to do more than consult. They do not see how there was any greater military strength than there was

before, with the arrangements the USA already had with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Pakistan and, to some extent, Thailand. It is not appreciated how loose some of these arrangements were, nor that SEATO involves a much more definite notice against aggression to the Communists than anything hitherto.

INDO-CHINA

Thinking in terms of subversion rather than invasion, Indians tended to draw the conclusion from Indo-China that Western arms aid, where it can be interpreted as colonialism was not a very effective protection against subversion. They would much rather see a large economic programme, preferably of the SUNFED (Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development) type. They never forget that the Indonesians dealt with their communist revolution in the middle of their difficulties with the Dutch, or that the Burmese Government at its weakest was able to hold its communists, whereas the French failed completely in Indo-China. Nor do they forget that had we not gone in 1947, Congress would to-day probably have been Communist allies. In other words, they think the only way to deal with Communism is for there to be enough people in a country who are anti-communist by conviction, and for there to be enough in the way of gradual improvement and reform to offer to the electorate for the latter to prefer those to the communists. Whereas in America, and to some extent in Britain, we tend to look on the Indo-China agreement as a defeat for democracy, most Indians look on it as a draw, or perhaps slightly better than a draw. If the Vietnamese should, in due course, vote for Communism, then Indians would regard it as their right; but everybody, on the other hand, expects Cambodia and Laos to stand out. Certainly, any attack on them would, in Indian eyes, be a very different proposition from the Chinese aid to Viet Minh. Indeed, it was made clear when Chou visited Delhi that India regarded Thailand, Laos and Cambodia as outside China's sphere of influence, and would take the gravest view of any interference with their freedom.

FORMOSA

Indian opinion on Formosa has been somewhat ambivalent. Most

Indians felt that it would not be proper for China to follow up the Geneva Asian conference by attacking Formosa, although many would since have excused the Chinese by talking of the 'provocation' of SEATO. (Needless to say, their view that such untenable positions should nevertheless be tolerated rather than have a breach of peace applies also to Goa, as they eventually came to see.) China might have a right, but it should not exercise it by force. One surmises, however, that if she had chosen to do so, Indian feeling about it would have been rather tepid.

On the other hand, Indians have never regarded Formosa as worth a war. So they will be anti-American over the off-shore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, simply because they are standing temptations to the Communists; but they cheerfully accept the kind of tacit cease-fire in the Formosa Strait sought by the British. If the Chinese were to attack, they would, however, consider such action understandable, if undesirable. Indian advice at Peking has certainly been all for peace. Indeed, if Formosa can be got out of the way as an issue, and America can accept the Stassen idea of large economic aid in Asia, Indian and American policies might again come into line. Indians have been all for economic aid; they do not even mind military aid when it is given to somebody as obviously willing as the Philippines. What they do object to is what they consider to be ineffective provocation.

INDONESIA

Indian relations with Indonesia are cordial rather than close. The Indonesian Government is somewhat to the left of Nehru, just as the former Ceylon Government was to the right. But in general, on such points as Asia for Asians, and anti-colonialism, their attitudes coincide, just as Ceylon's, or for that matter normally Pakistan's, do.

India's sympathies are with Indonesia over New Guinea, partly because very few people realise that there are large differences between the people of New Guinea and those of Indonesia, and partly because Indians feel that if within Asia a trustee is required it should be an Asian and not a European power. It has also been noticed that Australian support of the Dutch has very largely been based on frankly strategic grounds.

V

PANDIT NEHRU

IT HAS BECOME British and American practice to talk always of 'Mr. Nehru's policy', or of pleasing or annoying Mr. Nehru. Nobody talks in quite the same way about annoying President Eisenhower or pleasing Sir Anthony Eden. This insistence on Mr. Nehru personally represents a profound misapprehension of how Indian politics works. What Mr. Nehru says is of importance, not because he is an individual who has something to contribute —though, of course, he has—but because he controls one of the world's potential great powers, a country which has one-sixth of the world's population in one of the world's most strategic positions. Mr. Nehru matters because he is the Foreign Minister of India, and will remain so as long as he represents Indian opinion, and represents it correctly.

Admittedly, he can sometimes give Indian public opinion a lead, or form into words what is only subconscious in their minds. That is his greatness. But if it is not in their minds, or if they refuse to accept the lead, as has happened, there is nothing Mr. Nehru can do. For any other foreign minister this would be obvious; the reason it is not always so with him is precisely the sensitiveness with which he identifies himself with public opinion. He has an extremely responsive mind, and when public opinion moves he moves with it. Over the last few years he has never been out of tune for more than a fortnight, and that perhaps only once, when he was being unduly critical of America for crossing the 38th parallel. More recently, what he said about the American alliance with Pakistan had the support of every section of opinion, from the Hindu Mahasabha to the Communists. He probably said as much as he did and as strongly as he did to take the wind out of both extremists' sails. If he had not said it, they would have, and the Indian public would have followed them.

AID TO PAKISTAN

Two years ago one would have said it was not merely very difficult but quite impossible for Mr. Nehru to turn for military assistance to the Russians. Such a step would be incompatible with the whole of his past and would undermine the whole of his policy. Now one cannot be sure. In recent months the offence caused, by Western lack of sympathy over Goa, notably by Mr. Dulles description of it as a province of Portugal, and by reports of the increase in military aid to Pakistan, has been so deep that one can no longer be absolutely sure that India will never turn to the Communists for arms. Mr. Nehru is highly responsive to his electorate. If people get so annoyed with America and so alarmed about Pakistan that their eyes turn naturally to Moscow, he will try and turn their eyes back to the middle path; but if they refuse he will accept that the will of his people is his supreme law.

This may seem a gloomy view and certainly there is still plenty of room for hope. There was originally surprisingly little anti-Americanism either about India's protests on military aid to Pakistan or in public feeling in general. America was then recognised to be acting, not out of anti-Indian feeling, but to protect her own interests, and several times Mr. Nehru carefully stressed the great value to India of the American economic aid she had received. Neither he nor his party would like to see economic aid stopped, or have any objection to its being given to Pakistan.

The change in opinion has happened over the last few months, since the shooting of Satyagrahis on 15th August in Goa and since the American press has begun persistently to report that America is increasing both the quantity and modernity of the arms given to Pakistan.

FOREIGN POLICY

The success of Mr. Nehru's policy, and the position it has attained for India in the world, rests really on two facts. The first is that India is genuinely not involved. It does exercise independence of judgment—sometimes, from our point of view, rather perversely, but sometimes also with usefulness and effect. The second is that Britain and the USA, and even occasionally the USSR and China, will often listen to Mr. Nehru and modify

their policy to meet his views, sometimes to their own very considerable advantage.

If the aid given to Pakistan is stepped up any further and if the Baghdad Pact should become central to British policy, thus making Britain also a military ally of Pakistan in a real and not only a technical sense, Mr. Nehru's foreign policy would be shipwrecked. India would no longer be uninvolved. The Indian public would compel him to judge all international disputes as they affect India's own interests. This has already partly happened as a result of Goa. It would happen very much more seriously if Pakistan got in considerable number jet bombers or modern tanks. Hitherto neither India nor Pakistan has had any but the smallest quantities of the most modern arms. A quite limited number of such arms, therefore, given to Pakistan could alter the balance drastically against India. The result would be that independence of judgment might be replaced by getting level with Pakistan as the basic feature of Indian policy; and, inevitably, the effort, and quite possibly the loss of the right to be independent in judgment, involved in getting level would be debited to England's and America's account, since it would seem to Indians that it was English and American actions that had brought about a situation so alarming to them.

INDIAN REALITIES

Nehru's policy is governed by certain stubborn facts as well as by public opinion. The most important is that India is a potential, not an actual, great power. Its present military strength ranks it with Sweden or the Netherlands; but its 380 million people, its strategic position, its traditional influence in the Indian Ocean, the importance of its example to other ex-colonial and to colonial peoples, make it one of the world's major influences. The Prime Minister of India cannot get away from his influence, even if he wanted to. He could not retire into Himalayan aloofness like a Swiss.

He can also never get away from the limitations of his physical power. Hindus are tolerant people; they rarely desire to enforce their views; they do not often have even the desire to convert others to their outlook. That there is truth, some truth, in every point of view is to them basic. (In the present cold-war context, this is politically very important.) But even if they had as

passionate a desire to spread their viewpoint by force as the Communists have, the fact remains that India does not have the strength to do so.

India and Mr. Nehru can sometimes have great importance as a moral force, because it is vital to both world camps not to alienate India too much; because her passions are relatively restrained, while her position on the edge of the world sometimes enables her to perform useful mediatory functions; because so many countries in Asia and Africa feel that Mr. Nehru expresses their point of view with more eloquence than they can command; because, too, India is a member of the Commonwealth, and so large a part of British and Canadian public opinion is susceptible to Mr. Nehru's arguments.

What India under Nehru cannot do at this stage is to provide great *independent* physical strength. Admittedly, were India a member of an alliance prepared to provide unlimited quantities of modern weapons and technical assistance, it could be just as formidable a power as Russia has made China. But that would tend to involve just as close an alignment of India's policy with that of the providing power (which, on that scale, could only be in the free world the USA) as there broadly is between China's policy and Russia's. For Mao that might be all right. He is the head of a totalitarian state; his disputes with Russia can be carried on in private; the Korean War enabled him to present China to its people as being under immediate threat; he and the Russians share a common ideology. For Nehru it is not possible. He is the head of a very free-discussion democratic state; his disputes with America are carried on with intolerable publicity; his people are sensitive about the independence of their foreign policy, and on certain issues Indian and American attitudes are still wide apart; both are democracies, but they have very different views on, for example, whether Chiang or Mao is more undemocratic, or as to how difficult it is peacefully to co-exist with the Communists. An American military alliance for India is just not on.

Nehru and India are therefore in a position where their natural rôle is mediation. They do not hold the immediate balance of power; they see wrongs on both sides; they are not, like Germany and Japan, one of the objectives of the cold war. Yet their good opinion is something for which both sides might be prepared to sacrifice something—the Russians perhaps a good deal more than

two or three years ago, the Chinese quite a lot, the Americans perhaps about as much, and we even more. So India jockeys about between, talking of neutrality, criticising the West publicly—because in the West criticism can affect action—but not criticising the 'East', except privately, because only private criticism has an effect on totalitarian states.

ASIA

Some Americans may talk as much as they like about Mr. Nehru not being the leader of Asia and about the merits of Syngman Rhee or Chiang Kai Shek, or even Magsaysay, but the fact remains that India all by herself is bigger than the whole of the rest of non-Communist Asia put together, and, of the other countries, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon normally follow Mr. Nehru's lead in cold-war matters, while in Indo-China there is internal strife. South Korea, the Philippines and Formosa are virtually American protectorates, and in any case add up to only 40 million people.

Apart from India, the only two countries of importance in the struggle for the loyalties and sympathies of Asia are Japan and Pakistan. Japanese attitudes are, of course, of the deepest importance, and our policy must be directed to seeing that Japan is on our side; but Pakistan, whatever it may occasionally be inclined to do in order to satisfy its feelings over Kashmir, in fact almost always goes the same way as Mr. Nehru. At the United Nations, unless it particularly wants something from the USA, it virtually votes as India does. This does not mean it is following Mr. Nehru's lead. Mr. Nehru's importance in Asia, as in India itself, is quite largely his enormous capacity for reflecting and formulating public opinion in a moving way. His frequent woolliness is itself a reflection of public woolliness. If Mr. Nehru should be objecting to discrimination against people because they are coloured, or to too much talk of Christian values as against Asiatic despotism, or if he insists on the resurgence of Asia, it is difficult to see how Mr. Mohammad Ali, himself a non-Christian, coloured and Asian, could disagree with him.

VI

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

WHEN ALL WAS SAID AND DONE, the effect of the recent Bulganin-Khrushchev visit was not large. The latter's vulgarity annoyed more of the educated people than the nice things said about India's case in Goa and Kashmir pleased. And the crowd forgets. They used to cheer the Kaiser in London before 1914. The people whom it has affected are the Indian communists.

THE INDIAN COMMUNISTS

Part of the stock-in-trade of every communist party is that life is, in some special way, more wonderful in the Communist countries, and that they can offer better relations in these countries than anybody else. Both these cards have been trumped. India has now seen enough communist visitors—Bulganin and Khrushchev being only the most important of a long series—to doubt whether there is anything very special about them, and as China and Russia in turn have so far gone out of their way to be nice to Nehru, the claim that the communists could do better has become merely laughable. Everybody believes Mr. Nehru persuaded Marshal Bulganin to remove the Russian veto on the entry of the twelve non-communist countries to the United Nations. Nobody believes Mr. Ajoy Ghosh would have such influence. Even over trading with the Communist countries, the Indian communists have been outbid. Mr. Nehru is willing to set up State trading corporations to deal with them all, and the Russians have just sold him a million tons of much-needed steel. What more could the local communists offer.

Secret instructions from Moscow, which order for the present a collaboration with Nehru so unquestioning that it is liable severely to affect their chances at the 1957 elections—just now, they are very ineffective as an opposition—also say that they should keep their cadres ready for when the time will be ripe for

the overthrow of India's bourgeois Government; but most cadres require rather more than that to keep up their enthusiasm.

WEST AND EAST

What is disturbing is not the visit, but the fact that it has brought to the forefront that there are less points of actual dispute between the Russians or Chinese and the Indians than between us and the Indians. This came out particularly sharply over the Dulles-Cunha statement on Goa, but it applied to many of the points Khrushchev was hammering at.

One has to forget for the moment the perpetual statement of Indian policy in moral terms, which on the whole helps us: despite the grumbles about 'colonialism' and racialism, people here never forget that we, or the Americans, are democracies, and the Russians and Chinese are not. But let us look at Indian interests. What does India want, not as an exponent of peace on earth and the brotherhood of colours, but as a power, a country with specific interests of its own to serve?

GOA

This Portuguese-held territory represents India's one major nationalist demand. It is universally and bitterly felt, and most strongly very often amongst those who are most on our side. India's leading anti-Communist publicist has recently urged taking Goa by force.

The Russians and Chinese have no difficulty in giving India wholehearted support on this. China wants Macao. Portugal is a member of NATO. We, on the other hand, not only have great difficulty in supporting India; most British right-wing opinion and much American Republican opinion is clearly, and sometimes offensively, on Portugal's side. Every Communist visitor to India hammers away at Goa—Madame Sun Yat Sen, in her ladylike way, just as much as Bulganin and Khrushchev. Although Nehru has said that Goa is a touchstone by which other powers' attitude to India will be judged, it shows how truly neutral they are trying to be that Goa is still in fact not quite so.

PAKISTAN

India has one major international dispute, with Pakistan. This covers, in addition to Kashmir, evacuee property, debt, the

treatment of the Hindu minority in Bengal, and so on. In this dispute, Western, and especially right-wing, opinion has tended to be on the side of Pakistan. They have seen the weaknesses in India's case over Kashmir, but they have been less ready to recognise the strong points of that case; they ignore India's grievance over evacuee property, the debt, and the treatment of Hindus in East Bengal. The Hindus are still coming into India at the rate of a quarter-million a year, and the terrible resulting strain on West Bengal is one of the main reasons why Calcutta is so Left. Moreover, some Western newspaper or other can be relied upon to remind India regularly about Junagadh and Hyderabad.

What was always felt here as Western favouritism of Pakistan has now been followed up by military alliances by both the US and ourselves with the one country Indians think might attack them, the one country the strengthening of whose armed forces might compel them to divert money from the Five-Year Plan to defence, the one country also in which every now and then somebody is sure to get up and threaten them with war.

Contrast with this the Russian and Chinese behaviour. To them, Pakistan is an 'American stooge', so they can be as unfriendly as they like—support India over Kashmir or encourage the Afghans in their intransigence. Once again, it shows how tight are the bonds between India and ourselves that nobody there is happy over the encouragement of the Afghans, and many people are not very pleased even about Kashmir.

THE BANDUNG POWERS

India has one moral belief which runs strongly into her interests. This belief is that all peoples have an equal right to govern themselves, and that colour cannot make a man or people inferior. This is a very deeply-held belief, and one with the second half of which at least we who believe that men are equal in the sight of God need not quarrel.

It is also, however, a perfectly legitimate Indian interest. As colonial peoples become free, they are likely to join neither the Russians nor the Atlantic powers but the Bandung powers. Most of those who were at the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in April last were dependent territories before the War, and it is a club which the Sudan and the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Malaya

are likely in due course to wish to join. As this in fact happens, and the geographical area these powers control and their votes at the United Nations go up, their ability to impose their collective will on the Great Powers in all the issues which are not vital to us or to the Communists greatly increases. Since India is a leader of these powers, though laying no claim to exclusive leadership, her hands are inevitably strengthened.

So, too, with racialism. This affects India's interests in two ways. First, she has considerable minorities in South, Central and East Africa whom she considers to be discriminated against in varying degrees as being Indian or brown. Secondly, since most world power is still in white hands, every 'coloured' power, however free itself, wants all colour discrimination elsewhere eliminated, otherwise it feels it is liable to be treated as being in some way second-class. Be it noted that on this issue, as on 'colonialism', countries like Pakistan and Ceylon, which are allied with us or where we have bases, take the same view as India.

Once again, neither of these affect the Russians and Chinese as they do us. On the one hand, Communist theory requires them to condemn 'colonialism' and racialism. They may discriminate against Kazakhs, or run Tibet and Czechoslovakia ruthlessly; they nevertheless feel no need to produce a theory by which it is right for one country to rule another because of the backwardness of the other; and one must remember that such a theory, which was used against the Indians so recently, threatens Asian self-respect more than the practice. Secondly, in India at least, people do not look on Tibet or Czechoslovakia as examples of a colonial relationship. Tibet, on the whole, they accept as part of China, and they are only just beginning to realise the horror of what has been happening in Czechoslovakia. Even if they were to realise it fully, they would not feel so strongly. It is white against white: the Russians claim no racial superiority. And the actual oppressors are local communists and therefore, to them, not at all easily distinguishable from, say, Franco, whom the Americans accept so wholeheartedly.

Therefore, when Khrushchev attacked 'colonialism' so uninhibitedly, they may deplore his vulgarity; they still accept that that is really his attitude. Or, when in the United Nations, the Russians vote against South Africa and we vote for her, it is at least a small mark in the Russians' favour.

FOREIGN POLICY

Finally, India has a foreign policy which Russia and China can quite cheerfully support, and which for us is very awkward, or at least we are inclined to think so. Again, leaving out the morality the Indian view is:

1. The underdeveloped countries are too poor to be able to defend modern defences against a major power.
2. If they take military aid to make up this deficiency, they become dependent on the giver of the aid. This means, in the long run, the encouragement of communist subversion, since the government in question will both look to the giver of the aid for support and will be less responsive to public opinion because it has that support. Therefore, the opposition will inevitably become an opposition not merely to the government but to the aid-giver. This helps communism and Russia rather than hinders them. Indians would point to the Jordan riots and the Pakistan Awami League's attacks on their Government's foreign policy as examples of this.
3. What the underdeveloped countries really require is not military but economic aid. The real risk of communism, Indians feel, lies in poverty and the authoritarian relations of a traditional society. As people realise they need neither always be poor nor for ever come under the authority of their land-owners and chiefs, they will revolt; and the obvious leaders of such a revolt could be the communists. Therefore, the revolt must be anticipated, by helping them to develop and to produce a middle-class leadership which will not think in the traditional categories, *now*.
4. The underdeveloped countries, in their transition to the modern world, have in any case to face many internal strains. Indians think that they should not have added to these the strains of taking sides in the cold war. Foreign policy can only be bi-partisan in countries under tension if it is neutral; otherwise, if one local interest supports one side, the other will in due course support the other. They do not want getting rid of Pibul Songgram, or the Shah of Iran, or Nuri es Said—all of which could one day happen—necessarily to involve a change in foreign as well as internal policy for the countries concerned.
5. Lastly, Indians consider that war would now be suicide, and

that, therefore, one must think not in terms of the rights and wrongs of the different sides but of how they can be brought together. They will urge the Chinese to be peaceful over Formosa or the Arabs to accept Israel, as well as urging us to let China into the United Nations. Like everyone else, they have much greater difficulty in accepting this principle where they themselves are concerned—in Goa or Kashmir—but they have refrained from using force in Goa, and they are willing to talk endlessly to Pakistan over Kashmir. They do not necessarily ask more of others. They like Geneva Conferences to be held; they do not expect them always to succeed.

This foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment for the other underdeveloped countries as well as themselves, and for perpetual mediation by the underdeveloped *bloc* between the Great Powers, can be defended by strong arguments. The quality of the arguments, however, is not the difficulty. The difficulty is that it is a policy which at the moment suits the Russians better than it does us. For this there are two reasons. The first is that the countries concerned, if they were not neutral, might join us; they would not in any case join the Russians. The Indian answer would be that this is a short-term not a long-term view, and that the alliance of many of these countries is a military liability, not an asset; but we are very concerned with the short-term aspect, and our soldiers presumably think otherwise about the military advantages. The second, and more important, reason is that the Communists are happy if India is neutral; they will even accept India's being friendly with both sides. (If they do not, and if they become optimistic, as they perhaps will, their relations with India could deteriorate sharply; reactions to Russian statements suggesting that India was almost an ally were not favourable.) We, on the other hand, or at least the Americans, have persistently wanted India to be on our side; we have naturally worked against Indian attempts to increase their area of non-alignment, and demand of India that she at least takes a moral stand and recognises that the Communists are the source of all world tension. This would be directly against the Indian conception of their mission, and also, though to a lesser extent, against their view of the world situation. Over Formosa and recognition, for example, their sympathies are very clearly with China.

STATES REORGANISATION


India is one, but also many. The oneness is apparent to any outsider in Hinduism and the women's clothes, arranged marriages and the liberal tradition. But on this one theme there are many variations, linguistic, religious, and economic. Some people eat mainly rice, others wheat. Some favour cross-cousin marriage, others do not; some still have purdah, others are matriarchal.

When the Indian provinces were set up under the British, very little notice was taken of this diversity. The boundaries of Madras and Bombay were historical accidents, not even administratively particularly convenient. When the Bengal Presidency was split up in 1911, no special care was taken to see that all Bengali-speaking areas were left in Bengal. Above all, many linguistic groups were quite arbitrarily split between British and Princely India, the chief anomaly being Hyderabad, where an Urdu-speaking and Muslim minority ruled over a Telugu, Marathi, and Kannada speaking Hindu majority.

So long as the language of the educated was English, only the educated mattered, and the provinces necessarily followed the Centre's lead, it was not very important where the Provincial boundaries lay. But as soon as power began to pass to the people as a whole, who did not speak English and who had local as well as all-India loyalties, provincial boundaries immediately became important. Mahatma Gandhi, with his usual political insight, saw this straightaway, and the territorial organisation of the Congress Party has been largely based on language since the early 1920's. Sometimes, too, the Secretary of State saw the importance of language, as when Orissa and Sind were created; sometimes he thought language was outweighed by other factors, as when he refused to agree to a separate Andhra.

The Secretary of State's dilemma still faces the Government of India. Next to the loyalty to India itself, the most important loyalty people have is to their own linguistic group; this is especially so because the social structure is usually the same throughout a linguistic group, and rather different as soon as one gets across the linguistic border, and because the language areas are homogeneous. There is mixture at the border, but no solid mass of people speaking another language within any particular group.

On the whole, therefore, the reorganisation of India so that



The suggested units of the 15 new States and 7 'Union Territories' (underlined) as envisaged in the draft States Reorganisation Bill.

everybody who speaks the same language will be together is generally acceptable, with the obvious exception of Hindi, which is spoken by so many that it has to be split up. The re-organisation of the States which has been made necessary by the absorption of the Princely States into the body politic, by the need to get rid of such tiny units as Bhopal, and by the inter-group stresses in certain multilingual States, is, therefore, in general to follow linguistic lines—the separation of Vidarbha from Madhya Pradesh so that it may be included in Maharashtra for example, or the creation of a larger Mysore to include all Kannada-speakers, or the splitting up of Hyderabad.

There are, however, two difficulties in following this principle to its logical conclusion. The first is the fear that States based on language may attract to themselves too much local loyalty, thus impairing the unity of India. The second is that certain border areas, usually quite small, do not have a clear majority of one language, or if they do, there are other reasons why it is inconvenient to follow that majority, economic, as in Cachar, or traditional, as in Kolar, or the claim that the majority is immigrant, as in Devicolum and Peermade. Finally, there are the special cases of Bombay and the Punjab. Bombay is part of Maharashtra, and the majority of its population would like to go to Maharashtra, but a large minority, notably the Gujaratis, fear that they might not be treated completely as equals in Maharashtra, and their fears have been increased by the great riots of January. In the Punjab, the problem is the Sikhs, who are afraid that in a State with a large Hindu majority they might lose their individuality; the Hindus, on the other hand, do not want a Punjabi-speaking State, not because they do not speak Punjabi—they do—but because for them it is not a literary language as it is for the Sikhs, and they would therefore be somewhat handicapped if it were to become the language of administration and higher instruction.


The Punjab problem has been solved by the device of regional councils. The idea is that there would be one Ministry, High Court and Public Service Commission for the whole area, but beneath this one Government there would be Regional Councils, one for the Punjabi-speaking, largely Sikh area, the other for the Hindi-speaking, overwhelmingly Hindu area, which will deal with those problems where linguistic loyalties are most important,

like education and development, at least in an advisory capacity.

To get a solution which satisfies everybody is terribly difficult, and Delhi's haverings have been the result, not of weakness, but of an honourable desire that every Indian citizen should have his wishes considered in a matter which touches him so nearly. The major error has been the failure to realise the depth of Maharashtrian feeling over Bombay, for which the weakness of the Maharashtrian leaders themselves is largely to blame; and it looks as if even that may in due course be corrected.

At the time of writing, the exact final shape of India's map is still uncertain. It is, however, already clear that, however bitterly people may feel about particular boundary issues and however willing they may be to riot over them, the feeling of the unity of India will always prevail in the end. Even the occasional violence is an attempt to enforce a local desire upon India as a whole, not a sign of separatism.

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POSTSCRIPT BY THE AUTHORS

OUR PURPOSE in these letters home has not been to defend Indian policy—which is primarily for Indians to do—but to explain it, and to make clear that if the Communists play their cards properly, as it is beginning to look as if they conceivably might, there are many possible dangers for us.

We do not think that these dangers can be exorcised by aid, though the failure to give aid may do harm. The Russian speed over their steel plant has been contrasted with the haggling over ours, and the million tons of steel the Russians are selling to India have been bought from Russia after we, for perfectly good business reasons, could not sell. Again, if the Americans cut off aid for political reasons, or if the Russians give the really difficult know-how, as for oil-prospecting, and we do not, there would be damage.

But these are secondary points. The real danger is that our policy, and the policy India follows because of her interests as well as her emotions, will conflict in a way that will cause more and more rows. Perhaps to some extent the conflicts are unavoidable, but if they are not to do irreparable damage, the British Press and the American Congress must show the same patience, friendliness and understanding that the British Government does. One cannot demand more, and we think it will be enough. That it is possible is not certain. What is certain is that if that much is not forthcoming, relations will deteriorate slowly but seriously, with or without Russian visits.

