

ON FIRMNESS


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ON FIRMNESS

BY A SOJOURNER IN INDIA

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I.

THE TEST OF A FIRM POLICY

THERE are not many men who can write with authority upon Indian affairs, because the knowledge of most of us is conditioned by a particular point of view or a particular field of experience, whilst few know more than a fraction of that big country. My reason for writing is not that I have had more experience than others, but that to one who has spent a good deal of time in India, the history of the past few years has been both a comedy and a tragedy, of a character to invite and justify all the thought which may be brought to bear. The comedy has appeared when we have said that we must be firm, and when Indians have responded, not by doing what we wish, but by saying that they must be firm, and the firmnesses have collided instead of proceeding towards what ought to be a common goal. The tragedy is that the attitudes of antagonism, which the collision provokes, have rendered a solution of the great human problem, in which we and Indians are so intimately concerned, more difficult and more remote. This aspect has been made no lighter by the other.

Our supreme need is a policy which will be successful in addition to being firm, and success depends upon the correctness of the preliminary reckoning before firmness comes into operation. It is necessary to ensure that the object of the policy is practicable, that the forces at work are understood, and that the resources are adequate to guide and keep these forces in the right direction. How often in history has not firmness miscarried when

these requirements have not been fulfilled ?

It seemed to me worth while to approach the subject from this point of view, and I am making the attempt in the hope, that even if the conclusions should not seem as clear to others as they seem to me, the effort may still serve in some way towards a verification of the reckoning.

The object of our policy in India is the establishment of self-government for Indians, within the British Empire, under the form of a parliamentary type of government, which is to be attained by successive stages, the rate of progress to be dependent on the co-operation received from Indians and the sense of responsibility developed. The first of these stages has been the introduction of dyarchy ; the next is, or was, to be decided in the light of the experience gained during the decade allotted to the first.

When we survey the reception of this policy in a broad way, we cannot say that it has been other than disappointing. Neither the co-operation, nor the sense of responsibility shown by the Indians invited to co-operate, nor the support won generally by the policy in the country can be said to have corresponded with the hope which inspired its inception. On the contrary, the dominant attitude has been one of opposition, and this attitude has not seemed amenable to reason, or, at any rate, to the reasoning we have been able to apply. Instead of support there has been an advocacy of rival programmes, of a visionary and unpractical character in our eyes, and a continuance with steady vigour, both in the press and on the political platform, of what we regard as a misrepresentation of British aims and actions, but which is placed before the Indian public as a legitimate

interpretation from the Indian point of view ; and this interpretation has obtained a readier acceptance from the public addressed than utterances from the British side. As people are prone to believe what they want to believe, that is not a favourable index of the trend of feeling. Also, in what may be regarded as test cases, in which special measures have been deemed necessary in order to cope with a special manifestation of disorder, although Indians have been apprehensive of the consequences of the disorder, the support in the country has been uncertain and limited, whereas the opposition has been indiscriminate, widespread and clamant. The British appeal to reason has failed to make the desired impression, not because of a weakness on the merits or in the exposition, but, apparently because it has been British.

This adverse attitude is not new. It was in evidence before the reforms which preceded dyarchy, and was one of the causes of the advance to dyarchy from the preceding regime. The noteworthy fact is that the attitude has not weakened with the spread of education, nor has it yielded to the promise held out under dyarchy, which was designed to appeal in particular to the educated class. Whatever stress may be laid on protests from individual loyalists, or from representatives of the humbler classes, whose interests depend especially upon us, or upon the moderating influence of less extreme associations, or upon the disintegrating operation of dissensions amongst the leading factions, or upon abatements from time to time which have encouraged the hope that an era is in view of more amenability to reason—it cannot be said that India, as represented by educated Indians, is being won over to the

willing acceptance of British guidance under a policy which was expressly designed to win it over. The opposition has been, rather, on the ascending grade, and has become more forcible with the opportunities which were intended to abate it. It seems, further, to have awakened a disturbing echo in the country at large, which has been made manifest in an unfriendly or hostile or insulting demeanour towards Europeans, in a disregard or calculated evasion or open challenge of the authority of government, in a greater tendency to disorder, especially in religious or sectional disputes, and in an increase of crime.

The opposition does not appear to be directed against the form of government in prospect, but against the continuance of the British control which we deem essential to the policy. Indians want to get rid of that encumbrance in order to have self-government at once ; but instead of proceeding in what seems to us the simplest and most reasonable way, that is, by complying with our conditions, they have proceeded by way of challenging those conditions. Yet it is not reasonable to charge a people or a class, who display sense and shrewdness, in their own way, if not in ours, in the daily affairs of life, in a wholesale fashion with being merely perverse. Nor is an inflated ambition sufficient to account for the symptoms in the political field--if only, because the ambition and the shrewdness in operation together ought to have established a very strong claim in a very short time, had the programme been accepted with that object.

What the symptoms indicate most directly is a sentiment of antagonism to British dictation or control or guidance, in however modified a form, which has

proved too strong for the inducements of the policy. That is an unwelcome indication, because, we are conscious of goodwill on our side, and of having given proof of the goodwill both in the tenor of the British administration and in our efforts to conciliate Indian feeling. We are loath therefore to acknowledge the inspiration of a sentiment of the kind. We are also puzzled by inconsistencies in its manifestation. It is not in evidence necessarily as against the individual, whose impartiality is still appreciated, nor does it hinder Indians from resorting to the United Kingdom in order to prepare themselves for a career in India, nor did it prevent India from responding to British necessities in the war. These exceptions, however, serve only to indicate that the sentiment is not carried to an extreme always, or in all cases; they do not necessarily disprove its existence, or its active operation.

The natural reaction of this active operation is a change from goodwill to impatience on our side. We are beginning to look upon Indians as an ungracious, unresponsive and unreasonable people. Some of us may begin to wonder whether we had not better give them what they want and leave them to settle their difficulties and disagreements by themselves; other whether we had not better give up the idea of promoting self-government altogether. But these solutions are tantamount to relinquishing the problem. Before we fall into either course we ought to try to probe the sentiment, in order to see if it can be dissolved sufficiently to permit of a united effort; and I can see no better way of trying to probe the sentiment than by attempting to step behind the outlook of an Indian, in order to appreciate his point of view. Why does he rebel against our guidance?

Unfortunately it is not easy to average out the Indian point of view. It is the average Indian whose well-being is at stake, but the people of India are too numerous and too diverse to bring within the focus of an average. I propose therefore to take the average man in the English-educated class, and to justify the selection on the ground that it is the point of view of those who are rising from the masses to this class which is of immediate importance. For if we cannot win over the recruits to English education there is the less hope of reason, from our point of view, prevailing either with other educated Indians or with the masses.

Let us cover the ground work by reflecting that India, the India of the majority of the population, is of an old and strongly established vitality. Religion, custom, convention, ways of thought, habits of life, temperament have been in process of development, in an enclosed environment, for a time beside which our own life as a nation is brief—a fact of which Indians are fond of reminding us—and the duration of our rule in the country no more than an episode. Upon this old framework of life our ideas impinge. These ideas are the outcome of a different growth, European not Asiatic, of an enclosed environment also, but temperate not tropical, insular not continental, and of a racial character which offers a very vivid contrast to Indian tradition. The contrasts are such that the relative conceptions clash. The Englishman consults a timetable; the Indian, an astrologer. The Indian wears a loincloth; the Englishman a suit of clothes, but he cannot do without a mechanical fan. Each in all such detail is apt to be critical of the practice of the other. The traditional diet of the one is beef, which is an offence

to the religion of the other, if he be a Hindu. The ideal of the one is triumphant energy; that of the other, relief from the necessity for effort. A witness in a case, to an Englishman, means someone who has seen something happen; whereas to an Indian it means someone who will support his credibility, and in order to substantiate this support, in compliance with our rules, must claim also to have seen what he states. Differences in the relations of the sexes are a standing obstacle to social intercourse, and, equally, a standing subject of criticism on either side. These contrasts and antagonisms need not be laboured. Their tendency in accumulation must be to bring the question home to the Indians mind, not as to the suitability of our conceptions for the regulation of our own life in our own country, or even in his, but as to their adaptibility by us for our regulation of the life of Indians in India.

Our conceptions have a vigour of their own to set against the vitality of the Indian tradition. They are maintained against the assimilating influences of India by a steady flow of human material, which passes through, but does not settle in the country. Had we thrown in our lot more with Indians by settling and breeding in India, another Bernier might have had occasion to comment on the Indianization of the English—as Bernier commented on the Indianization of the Moguls—but, in that case, our ideas would have become Indianized to correspond, and there would have been an accumulating stock of British-Indianized experience and British-Indian home interest in India, which would have had a softening effect on the new importations; whereas no such softening process is in operation. As the notions of the individual become toned down in the

course of his sojourn he makes way for the new draft, and so the loss of vigour is replaced. Our experience is of the nature of the corporate experience of a company ; it is sufficient to safeguard our administration in the application of our ideas, but operates by a designed adjustment instead of through a naturalized adaptation.

These ideas, with their imported vigour, assault the old structure not directly but by undermining. We have not proselytized in religion—although at one time we thought of doing so—nor do we interfere with custom, save in extreme cases ; but by our education, by our personal example and precept, by our literature, perhaps by our laws and administrative system, we have brought our philosophy and practice to bear, consciously or unconsciously, in all our relations with Indians. In every such relation the Indian has had to reconcile his temperamental inheritance with an influence that is inevitably subversive.

Let us now turn to the outlook of an Indian of the English-educated section. He seeks our instruction because it is the best road to a career ; whether in the service of the government, or in a profession, or in business or in public life. The acquisition of the learning, through the medium of a foreign tongue, requires an abnormal effort ; the cost of the education, although it is not expensive, is a matter of consideration, very often of sacrifice, to his family. The original value of the lessons taught is probably attenuated as they filter down through an Indian educational staff, whilst the principles inculcated carry no religious sanction. The lessons, however, in so far as they are absorbed, conflict with much that he has been taught to hold sacred in his home life. He is obliged to compromise

with this life, because he has to reckon with his women-folk and priests ; he must be able to marry his daughters in later life, and he cannot afford to expose his family to the multiple inconveniences attendant on too open a breach with convention. How he effects the compromise it is not easy to judge—he must, I suppose, accustom his mind to work in separate departments.

In the pursuit of his career he has to cope with the foreign corporation which regulates the affairs of his country. In so far as his prospects depend on his relations with the members of this corporation he has to secure their confidence. The process is less natural and therefore less easy than it would be with his own people. He is conscious of differences in temperament and outlook, more uncertain of his ground, more apprehensive of creating a wrong impression, under a different sort of constraint in the expression of his thoughts. Moreover, Englishmen have not the same individual characteristics and, in the public service, are apt to pass rapidly from one place or appointment to another, so that the effort at adjustment is recurrent. The Indian knows that they profess tolerance of the background of his life, but the very tolerance may be irksome, notwithstanding habituation. It seems to me that there must be a certain strain, a sense of constraint, in all these processes ; in the acquisition of knowledge through an unfamiliar language, in the adjustment of the lessons to the home tradition, and in the maintenance of relations with those upon whom the Indian's prospects in life depend. For those who succeed there are compensations, but the market is overstocked and many do not succeed. For them and for their relatives there must be a sense of wasted effort.

Let us turn to the social side. Having adapted himself to English social requirements, so far as he may be in a position to do so, the Indian finds that the average Englishman in India wishes to live his own life. The Englishman's leading interests, more so perhaps since communications have improved, are his own home concerns, or his work or his personal ambitions. His term in India is a period of service or occupation to be prolonged only until he is in a position to retire. His chief concern is to get through his work, in order to have time for relaxation amongst his own people. His social intercourse with Indians is restricted and intermittent. The Indian, even if he has been to England, finds himself no nearer intimacy with the Englishman in India—I am speaking throughout of relations on the average—than if he had not been, whilst he is less fitted himself to live in Indian surroundings.

Besides, in our literature and talk we have ridiculed the efforts of the Indian to master our language or adopt our clothes and habits. We have reproached him with being imitative when he has sought to follow our model, and with learning by rote when, if the essentials miss his grasp, that is the only way in which to achieve learning; and so to the sense of strain and constraint there may be added a feeling of resentment.

A composite feeling of this sort supplies material ready for an advocacy of the unfavourable aspects of our rule, and as the educated class expands, so does the volume of the feeling upon which this advocacy works. India may be wealthier as a whole than in the past, but with the growth of population, there seems to be not enough to go round; and as there is not enough in

particular to meet the wants of the average English-educated Indian, it is easy to impress him with the poverty of the masses, and with the supplanting of home industries by our imported products. He is led to question the material advantages of our rule. He sees Englishmen occupying high positions, with incomes that, in his eyes, are magnificent, and he becomes ready to reproach us with managing India as a commercial concern for the benefit of our trade and the employment of our people in his country, and to attribute our efforts at conciliation to self-interest. He covets both the power and the income. As our administration continues, the tale of errors, from which no government is exempt, receives additions, furnishing new material for the criticism to work upon, whilst the peace and order of our rule recede into the background of years of familiarity. The Indian's attention is directed to the debt we ourselves acknowledge to Indian literature and philosophy. He magnifies the ancient glories of India, the spirituality of its ideals compared with the materialism attributed to us. He is, perhaps, uneasily aware of the unsettlement caused in his life by the weakening of the religious sanction, unreplaced in our secular education. He wishes to think that the best in his country is better than the best in ours, and so the force of his inherited tradition is re-invigorated, whereby the vested interests of conservatism resume their sway. He hears or reads of the ambitions and struggles of other nationalities for independence, and compares the relation between his country and ours; he calls the relation subjection and regards the subjection as a reproach. He learns also about our home troubles and embarrassments, and the effort we have to make to

maintain our position amongst other nations ; therewith his respect diminishes. He becomes familiar with the use as weapons against us of the principles we inculcate, and with the adoption of our methods of political warfare in order to meet us on our own ground. That is the aspect of our political model which is brought home to him. When some of his people resort to revolutionary violence, which we stigmatize as crime, their motive is presented to him as patriotism, and their endurance of punishment as a sacrifice. When concessions are accorded he is taught to attribute them to the pressure brought to bear. Then as power is tasted by those to whom he listens, their advocacy is reinforced, and the appeal to Indian patriotism is made with greater emphasis. This appeal, whether genuine or artificial or another name for an appeal to Hinduism, awakens a more general response than an appeal to Hinduism alone. The notion, perhaps, gains ground, that the independence of India will be a source of greater pride if it is wrested from us than if it is acquired as a gift. And so the Indian becomes ready for the doctrine that so long as we hold the main controls he cannot come into his own ; that it is necessary to concentrate on getting rid of us, without allowing a regard for consequences to weaken his endeavour, in the name of Indian patriotism.

The response of course varies. The currents do not travel all at the same speed, and there are backwaters ; but the backwaters do not mean that the general flow is not in the one general direction ; and when the volume is increased, the flow moves faster in that direction, but with more eddies and broken water.

It is a pity that the working of complex impulses in a complex movement cannot be photographed, so as

to avoid the misconceptions of a personal impression. For the personal impressions of Englishmen differ widely about India. We find it difficult to imagine how we should feel, if a body of men, insignificant in proportion to our numbers, of a different race, of different habits, with a civilization that they thought superior to ours, and a belief that it was their mission to raise us to a higher level, had made it their business to take up their residence in our country and regulate our affairs. We find this difficult to imagine because we have had no like historical experience. Since our last invaders were absorbed, we have been jealous of any sort of foreign influence and sooner or later we have cast it out. We have ruled other peoples; we have not been ruled by them. That is our historical tradition. And if an Englishman finds it difficult to place himself in imagination under corresponding conditions, it is a great deal more difficult for him to imagine how such conditions appeal actually to an Indian. He has to reckon not only with differences of temperament and tradition but also with baffling symptoms, the outcome of an Indian nature reacting to an English influence. There is, besides, a natural repugnance to the recognition of "an antagonistic movement amongst an exceptionally submissive people, a people so easily governed hitherto, that we are unwilling to believe that an adverse movement can acquire a real momentum. It is as if we in this generation had failed in some way to maintain what our fathers had established. The effort is uncongenial as well as difficult.

The attempt I have made must nevertheless serve as a working estimate of the way in which the movement gains impetus from the play of advocacy and response

amongst the educated class. But the response has not come solely from the educated class. It has come also with a disconcerting readiness from multitudes who are not interested in the grievances of that class. Why too should the leaders devote themselves to the movement? They include men who could make their fortunes in a profession, or could win almost any administrative position they might covet, upon our terms. Amongst all the mixed motives at work it would be idle to deny the existence of a genuine element in the devotion of many to what they regard as a national cause. Nor am I satisfied with the causation of any wide-spread discontent amongst the masses on the land, seeing that the mistakes of our earlier land policy have been long compensated by a scrupulous attention to the interests of the rayat. Nor with the complaints of labour, because the causes of complaint have been steadily ameliorated, and the readiness with which seasonal or permanent employment is sought on account of the money to be earned can be testified by many. Nor do I believe that applications or misapplications of historical parallels or events like the Japanese war, or other matter of the sort which can be turned to account in the advocacy, take a real hold as a compelling force against us upon the imagination of the masses. We must, I think, still look for some common underlying impulse capable of converting all opportune material to its use.

We get nearer the mark, I think, in the revolt of India against Western civilization of which a great deal has been written. But Western civilization matters no more to the Indian than Chinese or Ethiopian, so long as it is not impressed upon him. What is impressed upon him, and what he sees mainly of Western civilization, is

the British way of doing things. He has this in all the detail of our domestic administration, detail of which the original intention is easily obscured and the practical advantage very often not immediately apparent. The Indian accommodates himself, not because he understands or appreciates, but because he has to fall in with the British way. The accommodation is alien to his temperament, but the resistance is overcome. What then follows? Very much, it seems to me, what happens when a foreign body impresses itself upon an organism and threatens to penetrate the tissues. If the body be not assimilated, it causes irritation, and as the irritation accumulates relief is sought by trying to expel the body. In a mass of humanity, however loosely organized, a parallel process is conceivable; a disturbing element in the general life; a consequent disturbance, obscured, it may be, by the play of conscious action, but at work beneath the surface; an accumulating irritation, which finds issue in time in a more or less unreasoned impulse to get rid of the disturbing cause; in other words, a reaction of temperament. Such a reaction is natural. It seems natural, further, that in the relief from the distracted conditions which preceded our rule, the sense of uneasiness should have been dimmed at first, and that amongst a submissive people under a strong political control it should have been slow thereafter in finding expression. But it may have been none the less surely at work in establishing a common motive, and it explains the irrationalities and inconsistencies of the movement.

Whether we call it a revolt against Western civilization or a reaction of temperament, we cannot, I am afraid, avoid the unflattering truth that Indians have had too much of us. We are in the position of a once-recognized

authority whose wisdom and eloquence have lost their magic, so that he has ceased to be an oracle, and has become a bore, or even an obsession. He may be as wise as he ever was, but his wisdom is ineffective, because people no longer wish to have it. That is a common enough experience and a prosaic conclusion. But as the welfare of one-fifth or so of the human race depends upon our wisdom, we cannot let the conclusion rest. What have we done to bring this fate upon us, and what are we to do having incurred it?

What we have done, in my humble judgement, has been to challenge evolution with inadequate resources. I hesitate to use the word evolution, but is anyone, except at Dayton, prepared to argue that it is unlikely that Indian life has adapted itself to Indian conditions during all these centuries? Unlikely that the adaptations have prevailed because, in spite of their deficiencies in our eyes, they have had some inherent virtue of suitability? Can we be sure that in the caste system itself there has been no such virtue, or that it is yet exhausted? How can we judge when we have avoided the influences of the environment ourselves? We have been moulding the Indian character for a century, and have succeeded in arousing a reaction which defeats our effort. Will it not be wise to recognize that even if we know more about the working of Providence than Job, when he was answered out of the whirlwind, we have not yet mastered all its ordinances, nor are we yet able to set their dominion on the earth? If we realize this we obtain at any rate a fresh starting point. We may next realize that we cannot win success for a policy by assuming a function beyond our competence. Perhaps, also, that in listening to what Mr. A. says to-day, or

Mr. B. to-morrow, amongst Indian politicians, and showing that they are wrong, or in devoting our attention to the changing aspects of Indian politics, we are not necessarily becoming able to grapple with a movement that is instinctive, rather than intellectual. We may succeed in changing the symptoms, the gestures or the words, without deflecting the real cause. And if it be rash to bring evolution into the argument, I would say that the phraseology does not matter. What matters is that we appear to have a human force against us of greater power than we seem able to overcome.

II

OUR FUNCTION IN INDIA

LET us turn back, then, and reflect upon our right function in India. I should say that from the time when we took the first step in the direction of a course which was to lead us eventually to envisage self-government in India, our function has been educational, with a defined object. I should date that step back to the Charter of 1833, in which the principle was laid down of the admissibility of Indians to a share in the administration. That first step, whenever we may choose to date it, but long before our present policy was determined, marked an orientation of our tenure which was not realized at the time nor for many years to come. Therewith we entered upon the conversion of our rule from a dispensation which, for all that we knew, might be permanent, into an educational episode; and it became our business, not to turn Indians into Englishmen, but to bring the best out of them as Indians, to enable them to make the most of their qualities, so that when the management of their affairs should pass to them, they might be able to make the most of their inheritance. For it is their inheritance, not ours, that they will have to develop. If justification should seem to be needed for this statement, it is to be found in the fact that Indians cannot break away from their own past and their own environment so easily as they can break away from the impression made by us. It will be to their advantage to make the most of both, but if the

one cannot be fitted in by them with the other, of the two it is the impression left by us that will go.

Let us, next, try to sort out the work we have done in relation to this function, so that we may be able to judge the right consequent adjustments. In that work we have to sort out what will be of use to Indians in their future development, as distinguished from what has been of use to us for the purposes of our tenure but may not be of like value to them.

Let me review our work summarily. It includes the restoration and maintenance of peace; the establishment of law, and of justice, so far as we have been able to ensure it, under the law; the consolidation of the country by communications and by a centralized system of government; the development of its material resources; the improvement of the well-being of the people in their health and sanitation and by insurance against famine; the introduction of enlightening and liberalizing influences by opening a way of entry for our own knowledge and experience and the knowledge and experience of other peoples.

In all this, on the material side, we have given Indians the benefit of our progress and powers of organization. On the spiritual side—I lay stress on this—we have brought certain principles and aims to bear, which to us are of paramount value; the principles or aims, for example, of fair play; of release from oppression; of relief from social degradation; of succour in and against affliction; of respecting the rights of others as we would wish to have our own respected. The performance may have been imperfect, perhaps not so altruistic as our descriptions are apt to imply, and the assertion of these principles or aims may have been slow

at the commencement; but they entered into our work upon the establishment of our position, and, in so far as they have entered into it, what I would call the humane impulse has been given scope.

I should say that our fundamental contribution in this work has been the pacification. That contribution secured for a distracted India a breathing time, an opportunity to her people of recovering and collecting themselves for a fresh start, by deliverance from the forces of aggression and misrule. The deliverance may have been effected by our own aggression—as Indians also are ready to remind us—but the benefit in substance has been assured; and the benefit is unquestionable, inasmuch as relief from destructive influences is a necessary preliminary to advance.

Next to that contribution I would rate the scope we have been able to give to what I have called the humane impulse. It is not easy, I find, to treat this aspect of our work in the simple and unstrained way in which it is, essentially, susceptible of treatment. It may seem also incongruous to bring a subject of the kind into a question of practical politics; but it is not out of place, seeing that one of the reproaches levelled against our rule has been its predominant materialism. This impulse is the last great acquisition of what is now humanity in its struggle upwards, through the ages, from the primæval cell; not in evidence in earlier phases of the struggle, little in evidence in earlier phases of human existence, but gaining ground and beginning to obtain recognition as men made good their ascendancy over other organic life, and reached the stage at which they have to cope mainly with each other; not the perquisite of a race, nor at variance with the specializations of

nationality, but a common source of inspiration to the nations in contributing, according to their aptitudes, to the utilization of their heritage; of transcendent practical importance, because, without it, men cannot hope to emerge at last from the world-old struggle, nor can they make the most of their inheritance, now that they have won the earth. It is not our claim that we originated this impulse in India; in fact, Indians claim that it originated for the world with them, but the religion in which it was most in evidence in their history passed out of India. In so far as we have encouraged its activity, we must have been on the right side with the best potential human development.

In the third place I would put the enlightening or liberalizing influences for which we have opened the way, inasmuch as a knowledge of the progress of other races is of assistance to a people in adjusting its own progress to the best purpose whether for itself or for the world. Enlightenment is linked up with the humane impulse, but is subsidiary to it.

These contributions are definitively of absolute value. By comparison, I would class as of relative value the institutions and forms under which we conduct our own national life. These have been developed in accordance with our particular progress and requirements, but we are on debatable ground in regard to their application to stock other than our own, because it is not the forms that determine the life of a people so much as the spirit which animates the forms, and the reaction of the one upon the other, and we cannot be sure of imparting the spirit when we implant the forms. Even though our forms have been adapted to suit Indian conditions, the adaptation is still

relative to our tenure of government. We have been at hand to infuse the right spirit of working. But can we be sure that the infusion which we have supplied will continue to operate as a leaven when the tenure itself passes? It is upon the assumption that it has entered permanently into the life of the country and will have the virtue of propagating itself, that our policy is based.

Our material and mechanical improvements seem to me to lie between these two main classes. Our achievements in engineering, irrigation, drainage, famine insurance and the like, serve to show Indians what can be done for the welfare of their country, and in that way they have an enlightening value; but they show mainly what we ourselves have been able to do. I would class them as purchasable emblems of progress which a people, if it has not advanced sufficiently to be able to furnish for itself, can still obtain, if it wishes, and if it is prepared to pay for the assistance.

Our work may be classified on these general lines, but the vital question in regard to it, is not what we have actually achieved, but whether we can usefully continue to attempt more. That depends on the methods at our disposal. Yet us consider for a moment the scope of these methods. Our educational function has been in operation not only through the laws we have prescribed and the systems we have introduced, but also through our individual example and precept in anything we have attempted or in any recommendation we have made to Indians. Of these methods—example, precept and prescription—the scope of example seems to me to stand on a footing of its own. Whilst in what we recommend to Indians or prescribe for them we must have regard to

Indian characteristics, in what we do ourselves we can accomplish most in the style in which we can work best. If the example be worth anything to India, it is the best performance in our own best style that is worth most. That performance is, also, worth maintaining to the finish, in order that the impression left by it may be unimpaired. It happens in India that we are in a favoured position for upholding a standard of our own, because of our detachment, which enables us to envisage and treat Indian questions with a freedom from the ties which hamper their consideration and treatment by Indians, and which hamper us also in our own country. In one way our detachment has led to the reaction against us. Had we become Indianized we should have been less foreign to the people, and so less exposed to the reaction, but, as we have resisted Indianization, we are in a position to make the most of an asset, which seems to me to be more distinctive than any particular degree of energy or resource or power of organization, or other quality of that kind. It is this asset which has enabled an Englishman, for example, as a Magistrate, to hold the scales even between Hindus and Mohammedans ; or, as a Revenue Officer, between landlord and rayat ; or, as a Chairman of a District Board or Municipality, before these items of administration were taken out of his hands, between an influential individual or interest and the general public. He has been able to contribute an independence of vision and a freedom of action which Indians are not equally in a position to contribute for themselves. And in this contribution there is a justification for our presence in the country which is less to be found in services that Indians may be able, sooner or later, in a greater or less degree, to supply themselves.

There follows a decided answer to the old vexed question, whether an Englishman in India is justified in adopting Indian methods as against Indians. Clearly not ; the methods we employ ought to be our own, and they ought to be the best methods by our standard. But the question also arises, whether, by entry into the field of political negotiation, which is not far removed from that of political intrigue, we have not lately been forfeiting our independence. That is a difficult question to answer, but it has a relevant bearing upon our policy. We ought to make sure of a position in which our best standard, for what it may be worth to Indians, can be maintained by us, so long as we remain.

But whereas in what we do ourselves we ought to be right in asserting our own model at its best, and making the most of our detachment, it does not follow that we are right in impressing upon Indians that our model is the right and only model for them to follow. A people may tire of preaching as much as an individual. An Indian will often praise an Englishman for effecting an improvement in some locality in the face of a vested interest, but if he be told that it is his business to do the same, he may listen politely, but will make his own reservations. So also a people, if it be told too much, when it wishes to construct a tribal lay, in any of the nine-and-sixty ways of which every single one is right, that some other style than its own is the only proper style, it may, instead of thinking about the instruction, be thinking chiefly of how best to get the instructor removed. The limit of the service of precept is very easily over-stepped, and I am inclined to think that we have already over-stepped it. I do not ignore the importance of warning Indians that they must not go

too far in challenging our political prescription, although even a warning loses effect by repetition ; but am thinking rather of a tendency, which is not uncommon amongst us, to assume that our way of progress is the only way of progress, and of our endeavour, which has not been unpersistent, to impress this assumption upon them.

Before we go on to the scope of prescription, which lies mainly in the political or administrative field, I propose to consider how our impact, by way of example and precept rather than prescription, has operated upon two aspects of Indian life of more abiding importance perhaps than politics. I mean religion and social custom. Religion is a delicate subject to handle because of the antagonisms of belief, but it so permeates Indian life that our impact upon it has a penetrating expansion. Besides, the living principle in religion is not belief, but trust ; the trust of humanity in a greater Being, which has set it on the passage of this life to solve the problems that may come before it. Unfortunately men cannot take advantage of that fundamental unity, because they have enshrined their trust in multiple beliefs ; and the championship of their shrines they have put above even humane considerations. The loyalty to the belief is such that the individual is apt to lose his religion if the formula of his creed fails him. The shrines are not only multiple but changing, mankind being driven to adjust them by the penalty which attends all failures of adjustment ; but the adjustment is a people's own concern. The test is in the conduct of the life which the trust enshrined in the belief inspires.

Our policy in India has been not to interfere with religion beyond the excision of actual inhumanities in

the practice. With this exception our impact has operated, in part, through the liberalizing influence which we have helped to introduce, and, in part, through our attitude towards religions other than our own. But the championship of belief, which animates the variations of our own creed, has animated also our attitude towards the religions of India. We have been interested in them as a field for scientific investigation or because of the administrative reaction of dissensions between their adherents, rather than because of their potentialities for Indian believers. Either loyalty to our own creed, or indifference—for religion does not enter into our lives as it enters into the lives of Indians—or perhaps, the difficulty, at bottom, of finding a common platform that is not too empty, has stood in the way of a recognition of these potentialities. So the operation of the liberalizing influence has been accompanied by a neutrality of a critical rather than an encouraging trend, with a deadening rather than invigorating effect upon the inspiration of religion in the daily life. Indians may be able to draw advantage from this influence for themselves, but we cannot do more than supply the material, and this we have already done. On the other hand, our attitude, with, I suppose, its inevitable trend, has operated against the very enlightenment of which advantage might be taken, because the reaction against our rule extends so as to embrace the influences we have brought to bear.

Our attitude towards the social framework has been more definitely iconoclastic. The prevailing conception, when we had established ourselves and had time to look about us, was, I think, that it was part of our mission to disintegrate caste and remove its disabilities.

I am speaking, not of our policy, which was fundamentally the same as our policy towards religion, but of the average unofficial attitude. Our attention was focussed rather on those disabilities, than on the values to be found, in both the Hindu and Mohammedan social structures, to set against the limitations; unifying forces, for example, for each community all over India, controls and disciplines for the individual and, in the case of caste, specialized breeding. The younger generation may think that controls and disciplines are outworn and that breeding does not count, but that is too sanguine. What we contemplated in lieu of the existing organizations I do not know; I do not think the average Englishman had very clear ideas on the subject. That point has ceased to be material since it became our business not to seek to mould Indian conditions, but to place Indians in a position to mould them for themselves. This again we have done by the introduction of that same liberalizing influence, of which Indians can take advantage, if they wish; we cannot force the process. In the meanwhile there is the same reaction in operation, and the enlightenment might work more freely in custom as well as in religion, if it were not conditioned by that adverse influence. I should say, then, that in the spheres, of both social and religious progress, we have done as much work as we could hope, as an agency of education to accomplish. The best we can do now, in order that the work may be of use, is to endeavour to get rid of the reaction which stands in the way of its utilization.

III.

OUR POLITICAL PRESCRIPTION.

LEAVING the further implications of these thoughts for the moment, let us turn to the political field. In this field our work is in the sphere mainly of prescription ; and it is in this sphere that the greatest difficulty lies, because the course is not plain as in the scope of example, nor avoidable as in that of precept. If we contemplated a permanency of administration we could stereotype the forms which suit our own methods. But permanency is not our programme. We have to lay down lines which Indians will use after us, and to judge, not only the most suitable direction for them, but also the sort of permanent way they will be able to keep up. That is one of the consequences of the orientation of our tenure. But whether a railway is to be built for a local purpose, or a house constructed for a family, or a scheme planned for a people to live under, those who will have to use the work ought to be taken into consultation, in regard to the design. If we fail to lay out the right course in India, the country may fall back into the distracted state in which we found it and our pacification be wiped out as if it had not been effected. We are bound to see to the laying out of the course, but if we cannot bring Indians into consultation, whether owing to the mood of the moment or to practical difficulties, there is a danger of error in the alignment because it will have been one-sided.

There is the more danger of error from this cause, because we have to consider the material interests in

India of our own people. These interests have been built up legitimately during the period of our rule in business ventures and investments, and we are justified in seeing that they are safeguarded. Besides our concern for the protection of these interests there is also a sentimental attitude to be reckoned with on our side. There is little doubt, I think, that when we established our dominion in India, we looked upon the country in the light of an estate and took pride in it as such. Having secured the estate we desired to be good landlords, but considered that the tenants ought to be contented with what we thought fit to do for their good. I do not feel at all certain that when we call India a Dominion now, with a capital letter, we have altogether changed our point of view. To say that I am not certain is an understatement. It would be more true to say that I believe that to most of us average Englishmen the words "estate" or "possession" or "Dominion" in regard to India are practically synonymous. I believe that Indians think them to be so, and that the thought lies near the bottom of their resentment.

The attitude is not entirely sentimental. We think also, I believe, that our interests are wrapped up with our dominion so that they must stand or fall together. But is this so? If we should be able to establish a stable government in India, there ought to be other methods of protection. During our relations with India there must have been established bonds of union, which may be difficult to define with precision only because they have settled down so deep that they will not be in evidence until they are disturbed. There are reciprocal advantages in the connection which do not depend

entirely on the exact terms of relation. Is it not possible then, that we might do more towards safeguarding British interests in India, if we carried our principles to their direct conclusion, and made a relation of free engagement the goal of our effort rather than a relation of dominion? Goodwill ought to be a better friend than dictation.

Moreover, I am not sure that, just as Indians may be showing a sure racial instinct in not wishing to have British influences impressed too persistently upon them, so we should not be showing a sure instinct in not wishing to have the Asiatic influence too intimately amongst us or carrying too great weight in our counsels. I say this apart from the incongruity of the position, when wishes expressed in the Empire happen to collide with wishes expressed in the Commonwealth, and we have to accord recognition equally and impartially to both, and yet without a split amongst our own people.

I am not questioning the impracticability, at the time when our political scheme was in contemplation, of taking Indians into consultation before the alignment was determined, but propose to consider the bearing of that determination. The procedure actually followed was, I believe, to prescribe the alignment; then, to have the details worked out in consultation, informally at first and then more formally, with Indians; and finally, to present the result, in the form of dyarchy, in the hope that it would receive agreement.

The fact that dyarchy did not receive the agreement hoped for I have attributed to the stronger force of a reaction against our rule. But it is worth while considering more closely why the system has not done more in face of the reaction. As I tried before to get

behind the outlook of the average English-educated Indian, so I propose now to try to appreciate that of the average Indian in politics. I conceive this to be an even more uncertain task, because it has been more difficult in the past few years than it used to be, to get Indians in that class to express their views freely to an Englishman, and, vice versâ, for an Englishman to express his views to an Indian. The Englishman is, as it were, labelled, whilst the Indian may wish to avoid being labelled. Each suspects the other of speaking to a brief—as indeed it is the business of the Englishman to do—and as free speaking cannot be one-sided, it is not easy to penetrate the real attitude of mind. I propose, nevertheless, to make the attempt, and to select the outlook not of the older men but of the younger; because their outlook has a stronger appeal, seeing that they will have to bear the brunt of what may now be decided for them, in conditions which may be more crucial even than the present for India.

My impression is that when the younger men entered the new Councils they expected to do something for their fellow countrymen. That at any rate was the observation I registered at the time. The spirit seemed to be the right spirit, although not undiluted with other impulses. But they found that they could do little, partly for economic reasons, partly because the administration was already doing what it could, and what it was doing was in accordance with commonsense, although not super-humanly free from misconceptions or from failures in the execution. The departments which had been transferred to the control of the Councils were departments in which any material advance

depended upon the finding of money. Our previous administration had been deterred by the same impediment from making the progress in education and other directions which it would like to have made ; and when these branches of administration were made over to the Councils, the Councils had the alternatives before them that had faced us ; namely, either of obtaining money by retrenchment in the branches concerned with the primary functions of government, such as the maintenance of order, or of imposing more taxation. On the one side they had the public against them, with its objection to taxation, on the other, the government in its responsibility to Parliament ; and, of the two, the government offered the line of least resistance. But as, again, the government had common sense in its favour, there was not much headway to be made. Consequently any ideas the new members may have entertained of inaugurating a new era for India proved illusory. No doubt the ideas were too sanguine, but it was natural to visit the dissipation of the illusion upon us.

Let us consider what scope there was for giving effect to a disappointment of the kind, operating on a back-ground of an already active opposition. Not the least prominent of the considerations which led to the constitutional advance, was the pressure which the opposition had been able to exert in the councils under the preceding regime. This pressure operated by the threat of forcing issues to a point at which the government might be compelled either to give way or to use the official majority vote ; but, as the use of the vote was unpopular, the government was loath to resort to it and preferred to bargain, and the bargaining was

found to result in embarrassment to the administration. Under the new system the majority vote has been replaced by the process of certification; whilst the pressure has been relieved in respect of the transferred departments. But the pressure can be applied, directly or indirectly, in respect of the departments reserved, and with more force than heretofore, inasmuch as the members of the opposition are more numerous, and in a stronger position as accredited representatives of an electorate. On the other hand, the change of method—from the majority vote to the certificate—has not made the assertion of its overruling power by the government more popular; so that it has not been relieved of the bargaining or of the consequential embarrassment. This embarrassment is entailed, because the government can only bargain with the currency of the administration, which is trust property rather than its own. Not being the government of a party, in respect of the reserved subjects, it has no partisan proposals of its own to bargain with against other partisan proposals. It may be able as between other than government proposals, subject to its responsibility to Parliament, to give precedence or preference to one or the other in return for support to the government in something else. But, as a rule, it can only tender small change in order to make safe more valuable coin. The process is not bargaining in the proper sense of the term. In the voting of supplies, for example, for the reserved departments, when items are disallowed by a Council in the government estimates, the particular cuts may not seem sufficiently grave to justify the certificate, whilst the jettison of minor items serves to facilitate the passage of the main allot-

ments. But as the estimates are made with a view to economy and to the avoidance of friction the reductions are not immaterial, and must have a tendency, sooner or later, to affect the strength or the efficiency or the spirit of services of particular importance. So also, when legislation is promoted by the government, the sacrifice of a provision here or there may seem worth making in order to ensure the passage of the bill in its main features, but its efficacy as an enactment cannot be quite the same. Projects of administrative importance may be disallowed in their entirety, and yet not afford a case for certification. Nor are the opportunities of the opposition limited to legislation and the budget. They have been enlarged in the ways of interpellation and resolution, and *can* be used, if the opposition so wishes, for the mere purpose of harassment. The scope of this harassment is not limited to the burden of supplying information, which is not a light burden, because the demand may be encyclopædic, or to the preparation of replies to resolutions, which may or may not be moved or may ultimately be withdrawn—it can also be brought to bear upon what still is a wide flank to defend, notwithstanding the transfer of departments. For as long as the government, as a British Government, takes part in the detail of administration, it may be called upon to explain or to justify or to defend any act or proposal, whether done or proposed by itself or by any official in its service, which can be attributed to it on the side of its responsibility to Parliament; and this liability has a reaction which is not all to the good in the services. It may be a tonic for an official to know that whatever he does will have to be justified in the face of adverse

criticism, possibly of misrepresentation, so that he has to think before he acts ; but an overdose of the tonic leads to apathy or to too much thinking when action may be all-important.

In all these ways opportunities, which can be used and have been used—to the recognized credit of the Councils—beneficially, can equally be used for the purposes of opposition and with the effect of embarrassment, notwithstanding agreeable personal relations between the leaders of the opposition and the leaders on the government side. The opportunities can, also, be used without constitutional responsibility, because the effect on the working of the reserved departments is the business of the government on the side of its responsibility to Parliament, whereas the Councils, in respect of that working, owe no constitutional responsibility either to Parliament or to the electorate. Nor is the opposition responsible in a Parliamentary sense, since it cannot take over the duties of the government under the constitution. There is an ultimate responsibility to the people, which operates, or should operate, to deter the opposition from going too far to the detriment of the public interest. But the line is indefinite and debatable, and it is easy and tempting to overstep the limit.

There is also a responsibility for the future of self-government in India, which the members of the opposition owe mainly to themselves. But here the line is debatable again. Opposition is not ruled out under dyarchy ; it could hardly be ruled out, seeing that opposition is a cardinal factor in the parliamentary government which Indians have set out to learn. It is limited under the Indian system by the fact that it

has not been made responsible in the parliamentary sense ; but it is arguable from the Indian point of view that Indians are not to blame for the irresponsibility, seeing that the constitution was prescribed for, not framed by, them. It is also arguable that effective opposition does not disprove capacity to govern ; nor indeed does it under the parliamentary system. Their case, then, may be that they ought not to be held incapable of governing merely because they have used their powers of opposition to the full ; although they have used them to an extent which, wherever the line ought to be drawn, has not been in accordance with our anticipations.

Here I think we arrive at something which, on the top of a feeling predisposed to opposition, has a great deal to do with its persistence. Indians hold that the system is a training in obedience rather than in responsibility, and that it does not really help them to learn to govern. They do not find the opportunities they seek in the transferred departments. They look upon these as something given them to occupy themselves with, mainly in the way of distributing funds left over from more pressing demands, whilst the government, still a British government, is conducting the really responsible work. Behind the elaboration of the system they see the hand of the British executive working the machine, with controls that are more disguised and by forms of pressure that are more indirect, but which are welcomed the less, because they seem to have the effect of putting Indians in the wrong, as soon as they endeavour to assert their powers according to their lights.

They are too impatient. But I do not think it can

be denied that from the point of view of an instruction in responsibility, the responsibilities under the system are not clearly defined. They are not clear to myself and I cannot help thinking that they may not be clear to Indians also. On the reserved side the chain is theoretically direct from Parliament downwards ; but the Councils, who are not responsible to Parliament, have powers of intervention, and the intervention has shown a tendency to expand. On the transferred side, the Councils are theoretically responsible to the electorate, but the Ministers, by whom they are represented in the Governments, are not the nominees of the Councils on the side of that responsibility, but of the Governors in their responsibility to Parliament ; and even if the Ministers were elected by the Councils they would still have to work with the Governors, and the orders issued would, I suppose, be still in the name of both. To whom then are the Ministers actually responsible ? Upon them seems to centre the task of arbitrating between the responsibility to Parliament and the responsibility to the electorate, subject to the penalty that if they fail to satisfy the embodiment of the one, they must, I suppose, resign ; if they fail to satisfy the embodiment of the other, their salaries are refused, and the system, by the retransfer of the transferred departments, ceases, to that extent, to operate. From an Indian point of view the hand of the British executive is then in the open directing the machine. The effect of the opposition has been to expose the action. The sacrifice of a Minister is, I suppose, worth it. In the meanwhile what do the people understand about the relative responsibilities ? To the masses, who do not think constitutionally, the Governors, the Executive

Councillors, the Ministers and the Councils are still, I suppose, all one *Sarkar*. The simplest plan, then, is to explain to them that the fall of the Minister is a protest against the over-bearing inequity of the British *Raj*.

I do not suppose that the average Indian in politics formulates his ideas in such detail or, very possibly, on such lines to himself. He is probably too immersed in one eddy or another of the political current to think out his own views. But I put it forward as the sort of influx of ideas that may help to impel the volume of the already broken water forward.

The reception, however, and the treatment which have been accorded to the policy, although they have a bearing of first-rate importance upon the likelihood of its success, are not the final test. Let us suppose not that the treatment were to change now, because after the history of the past few years it might be a matter of doubt whether the change was due to a change of tactics or to a genuine conversion. Let us suppose that it had been favourable from the commencement; that the opposition had been such as to obtain practice in the parliamentary game, but ready to stop as soon as it might be indicated that it was going too far; the acceptance of our coaching such as to secure an orderly progress; in fact, that the political intelligence of the country had been anxious to learn to play the game in accordance with our instruction. Let us next reflect that progress towards self-government under dyarchy is conditioned by advances on parallel lines; on the side of those who represent the people, through the electorate, in learning the responsibilities of government, and on the side of people, in gaining political understanding; and that

the rates of progress on these lines ought more or less to correspond. In India there are heavy odds against the correspondence. With the advantages of an administration in running order, their own natural acumen and the assistance of a corps of trained administrators to protect them from mistakes, the representatives of the people ought to have been able to claim in a very few years that they were fit to assume larger responsibilities with more freedom from British control. The country would have been free from the disturbing influences of political strife, the administration would have been smooth and progressive, the impression made by the Government upon the people would have been not less and possibly more favourable than it had been before. The people would have had no new cause for political dissatisfaction and equally no need to concern themselves about the new system. Their natural apathy towards politics would not have been stirred. Seeing how few of them understand the language in which the work of the governments is conducted, how few have a vote, and how many of those who vote do not realize what the responsibilities of voting mean—their progress in political understanding could hardly have been appreciable. But as there is no exact gauge of the progress of millions in political education, if it were to be maintained in ten years time that the people had made as much progress as could have been anticipated, it would be difficult to resist the contention. It might also be argued, and with reason, that the furtherance of the education might be left to those by whom it is already governed in the main, to be continued through the press and the other agencies at their disposal. Consequently there would

have been a justifiable claim on the one side for a substantial grant of further powers, with nothing on the other of a tangible character to set against the claim. In such circumstances the claim would probably have been admitted, although in the country there could have been no mastery worth the name of the controls of the representative system.

But would not this mastery be soon gained? I think not. There are two apathies to be reckoned with and a natural human motive, of considerable strength, against a rapid disturbance of either. I should put it at a couple of generations before any such mastery could be looked for. Men can understand the politics of a village or of a township without being able to read or write, but to follow what their representatives are doing over a wider and more distant field they must have the means of acquainting themselves with bigger questions. Men of an age to exercise judgment, say twenty years, are mainly uneducated in India. We have been doing what we could to advance education for nearly a century; but of some sixty-three millions of men of twenty years and upwards in British India, excluding Burmah, still about fifty-two millions cannot read and write their own language, whilst more than sixty-one millions out of the sixty-three do not understand the language in which the business of the governments is conducted. The percentage of those educated in one or other of their own languages has risen from 14.5 to 15.7 to 17.8 in the last three decades, but allowing for a favourable progressive rate it must take still a few decades before the majority of the adult male population will have the elements of education. The last census report indicates that progress is slow because

literacy is not needed by the mass of the population in their daily occupation ; it has to be imposed " on an indifferent if not unwilling people." Progress needs teachers also, and it must cost money.

Those who know English have increased by fifty-one per cent., but in the same report it is remarked that the figures are too small for percentages of this sort to be anything but misleading. Amongst Mohammedans the proportions literate in one or other of their own languages and in English are about three-fourths and two-thirds of the relative proportions amongst Hindus. The salient fact is that education, whether in an Indian language or in English, is the acquisition of Brahmins and a few castes of professional or trading proclivities to an extent altogether out of proportion to the mass of the population. These castes form a sort of aristocracy of intellect in India, as judged by our education, and they have the support, at any rate to a considerable extent, of social position.

Now, it is from such castes that Indians interested in politics are drawn, the masses, Hindu or Mohammedan, being as indifferent towards politics as they are towards education. These same castes over the greater part of India man the administrative services, control the press, and control education. They grasp the political machine. It does not seem to me to be in human nature that, having won powers from us, they should be anxious to submit themselves at once to another form of restraint. I am not ignoring the steps taken by the Councils for the spread of primary education, or the impulse amongst the better-educated to remove a disability which is a drag upon the progress of the people and a disadvantage to the reputation of their country. What I wish to lay stress upon is

that it is a long step to the removal of that disability, and a long step again to the development of a faculty of judgment in political affairs ; that it will fall to the press in a great measure to bridge the interval ; and that there is a motive to be reckoned with, of no inconsiderable force, against the influence of the press being exerted in the direction of allowing the hard-won regulation of the progress to pass out of the hands of those who had wrested it, after a prolonged struggle, from us. The anxiety to spread education may not be coupled with an anxiety to enable the masses to obtain a control over the political machine. It may indeed be argued that it is inadvisable in their own interests that the masses should obtain such a control before they are really fitted to use it. I should say, therefore, upon all these grounds, that the people are unlikely to obtain a grasp of the machine in a constitutional way in any time less than, at least, two generations, and I do not feel sure that this is not an under-estimate. I cannot help thinking that it is ideal rather than practical to base a policy upon a more sanguine assumption ; no less ideal than the notion that the wearing of *Khaddar* will solve the industrial problem for India, or that *Swaraj* will be safe without provision for the defence of India, or that the future of India will be secured by the sacrifice as a propitiatory offering either of Indians or of ourselves.

What then the system headed for, given a favourable reception, was the passing of power to what I have called an aristocracy of intellect, in the name of government of a parliamentary type, but without the popular control which is the safeguard of the system. The representatives of the people would

have become their masters rather than their leaders, which is as demoralizing a position for a class as it is for an individual. It may be argued by the Indians to whom the powers would be committed, that ours also is the government of a class, and that they know better what the people want than we can expect to know. That may or may not be true, but the restraint of public opinion in our own country operates against the tendency to deterioration with our government in a way in which it could not be expected to operate with them. It seems to me to be ideal, again, to presuppose a sort of superhuman abnegation as a permanent restraint. Nor is a government dependent on such an abnegation the object of our policy.

This is a theoretical conclusion of a sort that does not necessarily command practical attention. But there is a practical side to it in India. The abuses of uncontrolled power grow as rapidly and rankly as anything else, in a tropical climate. It was these abuses that led largely to our annexations, and we have never been able to relax our effort in the struggle against them. Rapacity, corruption, neglect and oppression have still to be combated. The humbler subordinates look still, for their remuneration, less to their pay than to what they can make. Caste itself spreads a wide shield of protection and recognizes no distinction of official rank; the same caste may furnish a constable or the head of a police force; the same family may furnish a clerk on a few rupees a month or an administrator or judge on many hundreds. An Englishman working under an Englishman need pay no regard to social or family considerations in seeking to restrain corruption, whereas under an Indian he finds it more difficult, and

it is less easy again for an Indian under an Indian. A Kayasth for example, is at a disadvantage in showing up a Brahmin ; nor does he like to show up a member of his own caste, still less if the latter has high official connections. The poor man in turn prefers to pay rather than make trouble. All this is commonplace knowledge to anyone who has had to control subordinates in any capacity in India. It may well be that an uneasiness under the restrictions of British supervision furnishes one of the motives in the movement to get rid of our control. On the other hand, what the agriculturist respects, I suspect, as much as the impartiality of our justice is our ability to keep order. It is the experience, not of recent years only, that when authority seems to him to be relaxed, he takes advantage of the opportunity to satisfy old grudges against his neighbours and then turns his attention to the property of shopkeepers. If pressed too hard by those under the authority over him he is more likely to take the law into his own hands than to set to work to study his constitutional position. Moreover, because of his ignorance it is easy to appeal to his feelings ; and the appeal, which has been made with effect against us, is not likely to be neglected by rival sections amongst those in power, for it is not to be supposed that there will be no rival sections or that they will not make use of an appeal at their disposal. But experience, again not of recent years only, has shown that it is more easy to arouse mob feeling than to quell it ; and the spirit of disorder rapidly grows. The history of organized crime can often be traced back to a neglect of petty depredations, which has encouraged and enabled the criminals to combine. The warrior, unfortunately also,

has no respect for the clerk. Those amongst us who win his respect are the men who can fight and lead rather than those who can write. The clerks—I am using this term in the old general sense—wish to become warriors; but they will have to acquire discipline and cohesion under fire, and these lessons take as long to learn as they have been forgotten or ignored. The mastery of our political armoury as against us does not mean a mastery of a different quality in a field not equally secured against violence. There is, therefore, a very practical risk, long before the constitutional control can develop, whether that take two generations or less or more, not, I suppose, of our pacification being altogether undone; but of our having to maintain in power an authority that owes responsibility no longer to us, but to a people not as yet competent to enforce the responsibility in a constitutional way, and whom in turn the authority could not control. That system broke down with the Native States.

That is one alternative, on the supposition of a favourable reception at the outset. The other and perhaps more probable alternative is that the attitude although favourable at the outset would not continue favourable. If, after the first test of good behaviour, the grant of powers were not such as to satisfy the aspirations encouraged, the pre-existing opposition would be resumed, only a little later instead of a little earlier—whilst the resistance would be weaker by reason of such concessions as might actually be made. Thereafter would be the prospect of an indefinite prolongation of the sort of control that is in operation now.

Is not, then, that control adequate? In theory it is sound. It begins with influence; when the influence

fails, it operates by certification ; and when the opposition is not amenable to either, the experiment is closed down by the retransfer of the transferred departments to the government in its responsibility to Parliament, and if necessary by dissolving the Councils. But, in fact, the control depends for its efficacy upon influence, for when the influence is ignored, the Government, in its responsibility to Parliament, carries on the administration in spite of, not with the assistance of, the constitution. Now influence, according to a statesman with a reputation for clear vision, is not government ; it was found to be inadequate for the political requirements of the people he led and had to be discarded. It was found to be inadequate also in the earlier days of our relations with the Native States, when we were safeguarding the chiefs against the consequences of their actions without having assumed the authority necessary to prevent misgovernment. Where influence fails us now is that it is liable to challenge as soon as the opposition chooses to oppose. The Government is then preoccupied in combating the opposition and embarrassed in the work of administration. Moreover, when influence fails us in the Councils, it fails us also in the country, because we have no adequate defence against the weapon of propaganda with the weapon of social persecution in reserve. We cannot cover the same field nor make the same impression nor can we safeguard our adherents from social penalties. We are then thrown back on the secondary controls, which have the devastating effect of inflaming rather than stemming the reaction against us.

The real weakness of the system is the friction which it engenders. This friction has a twofold operation. So long as we take part in the detail of administra-

tion we have to defend that exposed flank of which I have spoken ; whilst at the same time we are supplying fuel to the reactionary flame, because it is the intimacy of our association that has brought about the reaction.

IV.

THE END OF AN EDUCATION.

Is our educational function then played out in the political sphere, as in the spheres of religion and social life? Have we to decide that we must relinquish the function, almost as soon as it has been embodied in a formal pronouncement? I think so, for the following reasons. To begin with, I doubt whether Indians are learning the best lessons in politics under our instruction. They are learning the forms of parliamentary practice in the Councils; but behind these forms, so far as my limited observation goes, the lessons that are being most readily absorbed are on the side of the liability of the representative system to abuses, in the way of electioneering trickery, wire-pulling, intrigue, jobbery, with rumours of bribery, on a free, if not very liberal scale—which I should hesitate to say were unfounded—rather than on the side of its virtues. It may be that these ailments are as persistent a feature of the system as disease has been of the human race; but the readiness with which they seem to be taking hold is at least not promising. I think it is true also that irresponsibility is being learnt in a larger measure than responsibility.

Next, in the actual work of administration, if we have not taught Indians the best we have had to teach in the two or three generations during which we have had the pick of their brains for the public service—during

which also we had command of the situation and they were ready to learn—can we expect to teach much of greater value now? There ought to have been furnished a sufficient basis of experience in administrative practice to enable the country to carry on. It seems to me that our instruction must live in this field too by what we have done rather than by what we can still do.

Moreover our administration is a specialized product. It has been developed to suit the purposes of a handful of administrators of a foreign race in the supervision of a large native establishment in the government of a vast indigenous population. The members of this handful need long periods of leave in order to recuperate in a cooler climate, so that the organization has to provide for changes in the tenure of appointments every three or four years. But, in fact, owing to exigencies of one sort or another the changes are more frequent. It is not unusual for an English official at some period or other of his service to be moved from appointment to appointment not every three or four years, but every three or four months. For one reason or another, at any rate in some localities, this liability to change has extended to the Indian staff also, so that the supervizing staff generally is more or less in a process of flux. The machine has therefore to be such that any member of the staff, wherever he may be and for however limited a time, may be able to turn his particular handle and produce the out-turn required; and he must be able to do this without dependence on the establishments under him, because it is his business especially to direct and control their work. These requirements have several consequential effects. They put a premium on uniformity, so that time may not be wasted in learning new codes

or systems of work ; but the uniformity carries with it the disadvantage that local custom must be adapted to the code, when the code cannot be adapted so as to cover all variations in the custom. They involve an elaboration of checks which can be more or less mechanically applied. They also involve the commitment of as much as possible to writing, in order that an official when he joins an appointment may be able to pick up the threads of the questions with which he will have to deal, and be able to inform the official next above him. Further, in order that instructions may not be misapplied by people of a different race using our language, the rules of guidance must be such as will leave the least possible opening for misinterpretation ; whilst all that the establishments do must be registered so that it may be possible to check what they have done. Again, the statistical net is thrown wide, because it is not easy to forecast precisely what information will afford a practical return, whilst a maximum of information is needed by administrators who are not natives of the country. There has resulted an accumulation of correspondence, reports, registers, returns of work done, records, statistical compilations, codes, rules, circular orders ; of which the tendency is to further elaboration. For when any defect has been brought to notice, it is natural to add a column to a register or a paragraph to a rule in order to provide against its recurrence. On the other hand, it is a formidable undertaking to determine what detail can be omitted without sacrificing some check for which it may have been introduced or forfeiting information of some potential value. Naturally, as the administration grows more intricate more checks are required ; whilst

the establishments resist the reduction of work and prefer growth, because of the employment it affords to those about them.

The responsibility of and to Parliament has also a far-reaching implication. Centralization holds the machine together, but makes it cumbrous. It has not been easy, however, to decentralize, in order to simplify the working, when the responsibility to Parliament ramifies through the system to the limits; when a filament, at the extreme, reaches out to grasp a constable, for example, when he uses his powers to prevent the commission of a nuisance in a public place. Again, the wearisome procedure of the courts and of the processes of appeal are to be attributed, I think, in origin, to an anxiety to leave as little as may be to chance in the administration of justice in the fulfilment of this responsibility. The resulting technicalities afford a means of livelihood to the legal profession, and the reaction produces an expensive and protracted litigation. What the litigant saves on the judge he has to pay to the lawyer or to the process server, and he has to stand a longer trial.

The general effect of these specialized requirements is a highly organized machine, a remarkable achievement in its kind, paternal in the intention of the design, but neglectful of the human element. If A knows that B can do job X better than job Y, and that C can do job Y better than job X, and that each can be trusted to carry on with general guidance, but that D can only do job Z and needs watching at that—then A can make the best use of all three and concentrate his supervision upon D. But if he knows little of any of them, and if the exigencies of the service require that the work should be

allotted less discriminately, this simple principle of administration cannot be employed ; and the restrictions have to be adjusted to the level of the least competent. Moreover if A, or B or C or D for that matter, can be kept at their work, not so long as to fall into a groove, but long enough to turn experience to account, there is a saving to all four of the energy lost in the repeated assimilation of the previous history of local or departmental questions, and a greater profit from the experience acquired. D's errors also can be brought home to him before he passes on to repeat them in another place.

There is a loss again in relations with the public. I hesitate to use the word prestige because of its debased significance, but prestige rightly considered—as the influence carried by informed judgment—seems to me to stand to administration very much as credit stands to business. When established it economises the application of the machine in a good many ways and in a good many transactions. But it takes time for the judgment to be so informed that a course can be steered clear of local pitfalls and that the confidence of the public may be won ; just as it takes time to learn the bearings of local questions so as to be able to do them justice. There is room still for the paternal aspect, but a machine cannot be paternal. Thus, in the very elaboration of the system there are losses of economy and advantage. We have to aim at the target, so to speak, with a burst from a machine gun, when, with the individual shot, there might be a smaller score but there would be a saving in ammunition. It is doubtful if so complicated a weapon is needed for the less specialized requirements of an indigenous administration.

Thirdly, I do not think we can say that the faculty of government or of administration is undeveloped in India. We ought not to confine our view to the period immediately preceding our rule. For many times that period Indians had managed their own affairs, whether with or without the superimposition of a foreign control. They have ideals in their literature on the subject of the duties of government, which may not be entirely good, judged from a modern standpoint, but neither can they be called entirely bad. Amongst the governments of the past, whether imperial or state, there have been instances of good government, by a rougher standard, which were not lacking altogether even at the level at which we stepped in to assume control. The relative proportions of good, average and bad may not, indeed, have been widely different from the corresponding proportions which have ruled in Europe. Nor can we say that the faculty is not exhibited to-day, whether we regard the estates and business ventures managed by Indians in British India, or the posts held by them in our administration, or the governments controlled by them in Native States.

On the top of all such considerations is the fact that Indians do not appear to want to be instructed any more by us. I do not think that they can be treated like perverse children who do not know what is good for them and must be made to continue to learn, whether they like it or not. I should say that Indians had rather reached the stage at which it is of no use to attempt to force more education upon people to whom it is unwelcome; and that wisdom is to be found in accepting the situation.

If we can reconcile ourselves to the relinquishment of

the educational rôle, we gain several consequential advantages. We are no longer under an obligation to train Indians for a specific type of government. Instead of seeking to give them simultaneously a national government and a government that depends upon our training, we can simplify our aim by seeking to give them a national government only, under whatever form they may be able to manage to the best advantage. A national government is what they want most themselves. Instead, again, of undertaking to dictate and direct their political destiny, we can set them to work it out for themselves, as we and most other nations in the world have had to do. We can relieve our control of its educational embarrassment and base it on indispensable requirements. We can relieve Indians, also, and ourselves, in a great measure, of the friction that stimulates the reaction which animates the Indian movement, and which stands in the way of their uniting with us for a common purpose.

What then are the indispensable requirements? I should base them on our fundamental contribution; and define the control as that which is required to ensure the defence of India from invasion and its protection from internal aggression, until Indians are in a position to safeguard themselves in these respects. That necessitates, until the same point is reached, the administration of foreign and inter-state relations. But, again, we could not undertake these responsibilities and let misgovernment prevail under the protection accorded. There is a moral obligation to see that the authority which we hand over is not abused. There is also the practical consideration, based on our previous experience with the Native States, that the evils which result from

misgovernment cannot be confined to the unit in which they prevail, but cause detriment in various indirect ways to the well-being of the units about it. The control ought therefore to be such as will ensure freedom from oppression and a reasonable standard of good government within each unit of administration. Further, as these units must be placed on a stable basis, before they can be united in a stable combination, it is necessary for us to retain the administration of the imperial functions until the combination, whatever form it may take, can relieve us of these functions. Finally, it rests with us to safeguard the legitimate interests of our own people in India.

These requirements could be fulfilled without the clash between the responsibility to Parliament and the responsibility to the electorate in India which is invited under dyarchy. That distinction seems to me, on the whole, to be artificial and unfortunate, because the effect of laying stress upon it is to encourage contention, whilst the implication that the Indian people and the British Parliament do not desire the same thing, that is, the most suitable government for Indians, is untrue. Under the control I contemplate, the local governments, whatever their forms of constitution might be—and these ought to vary to suit local conditions—would be free to administer their domestic affairs without interference, so long as they did not fall below a certain standard; whilst in the imperial government, in its function of asserting this standard and in the management of imperial as distinguished from local concerns, the responsibility would be undivided, however it might be defined. Indian opinion would be consulted in any appropriate constitutional way, the Secretary of State

would be advised and would advise, and the decision of the British Government, with whom the final authority rests for the time being, would be binding. The British personnel in India would be concentrated, and its functions adjusted to the requirements of the central administration and control, but the local governments could have British assistance if they wished.

This naked structure does not seem to me to be indecent, so as to need any sort of disguise. The embarrassing process of permitting a decision to be made in the name of one responsibility and over-ruling it in the name of another, would disappear. The control, so to speak, would be vertical instead of horizontal; and our own withdrawal would be effected, not by recession on the local and imperial planes simultaneously, with a consequent weakening of the higher control when it ought especially to be strong, but by a withdrawal to the maximum extent on the local plane immediately, to be followed by a withdrawal on the imperial plane, so soon as a duly constituted Indian government could take our place.

V.

A READJUSTMENT.

I propose to assume now that just as the orientation of our tenure changed from a permanency to an educational episode, so it is to be changed again, forthwith, to the direction of placing Indians in a position to make the most for themselves of what our administration has been able to do. It seems to me that before we proceed upon this direction Indians ought to be taken into consultation, seeing that they are the people to whom their own future is of most concern. But upon what points should they be consulted, and how?

The issue which dominates all others is as to whether the combination of the future is to be an All-India combination, or a British-India combination only. If it is to be an All-India combination, the Native States must be brought within the system. In that case the constitution of the units, and the political constitutions under which they will be governed, must be adjusted to the purposes of a joint association. If it is not to be a common system, the units need only be adjusted in British India to the purposes of a combination confined to that territory.

Let us consider, first, the factors relevant to either combination in respect of the units at present constituted in British-Indian territory; that is, their promise of stability as units, their suitability for Indian administration, and the prospect which they afford for the growth of popular control. Our units, that is to say, the existing provinces, were determined, in part, by the

divisions of the Empire preceding our own ; in part, by the acquisitions of aggressive communities or military adventurers upon the breakup of that Empire ; in part, by the conveniencies or inconveniencies of our own administration. I say inconveniencies for the reason that in our earlier period the only way to provide for the administration of territory annexed was by adding it to one of the existing presidencies, with the result that the Presidency of Bengal became unwieldy. When provision was made for the constitution of new units as Chief Commissionerships in 1854, a convenience was substituted for an inconvenience, but except, and, in a sense, even in the reunion of Bengal in 1912, considerations of an administrative bearing have been the dominating factor in the constitution of the units as they now stand. Considerations of race have not been ignored, but they have been subordinated to these other considerations, and were notably so subordinated in the constitution of Behar and Orissa which accompanied the reunion of Bengal. A contributory cause is perhaps to be found in the conception that it was our business to consolidate India by political organization ; and, in so far as distinctions of race seemed to stand in the way, that it was part of our mission to dissolve this obstacle, just as it was part of our mission to disintegrate caste—which owes its origin to race—in order the better to weld India into one nation. Race, however, when localized and established, is still the most stable basis of nationality ; more stable primarily than the requirements of a specialized administration, which will cease to be so specialized when it passes from us into Indian hands. On the other hand race can also be a strong disruptive force. Racial ambitions have been kept in

check under our regime not by our institutions, but by the power behind the institutions. That is, however, of the nature only of a temporary restraint; the more lasting cure is to give these impulses scope in the most natural and peaceful way, that is, in the development of their own national or sub-national life. They cannot be given full scope, in the sense that every tribe should form a separate unit, because that would be found to be incompatible with political combination. Also their geographical limits are uncertainly defined. But more scope can be given than has been allowed in our delimitation of units, and the fuller the scope the greater is likely to be the stability of the unit.

That is one consideration. Another is that our major provinces have, owing to the growth of population, begun to suffer from the unwieldiness which necessitated relief in 1854. The expansion of the body of the vessel has made the neck too narrow, so that there is a greater volume of work to go through than the governments can get rid of with despatch. It seems to me to be a tenable proposition that there is an efficiency unit in government as there is an economic unit in industry; the limit being that at which the business of the state can be conducted with the maximum of economy in the overhead establishment, combined with the maximum of knowledge and despatch, and the maximum of advantage to be gained from the organization of large rather than small man-power and resources. A state on the small side may find it difficult to maintain its independence amongst more powerful neighbours; in a state on the large side the interests to be regarded may be so diverse, the problems so numerous and complex, that the governing agency is unable to deal

with them to the best advantage of the governed. I should say that in our larger units we have passed the best limit, even for our perfected machine. The staffs at headquarters have been increased since dyarchy, but the increases, I believe, have been no greater than would serve to meet the additional claims of work in connection with the Councils. If we hand over units which are becoming unwieldy, even under our system, to indigenous administrations, whether these administrations continue or change the system, we shall be passing on a task which is many times more complex than any indigenous administration in India has had to cope with for generations. We shall be trying the future administrations too high.

Moreover the units we should thus hand over do not present the most favourable conditions for the growth of popular control. The conditions which are most favourable are those in which the people to be governed are of the same race, the same customs and the same language, so that they have common interests and a common medium of communication. Size is equally a factor of importance, because the greater the area and population and the larger and more complex the issues, the more difficult is it for the individual to understand what is being done in his political world. Such conditions are far from approach in our major provinces. Again, some races or tribes within the same provincial units are more backward than others; yet they have a claim, no less than the more advanced, to be allowed to work out in time for themselves their political salvation. If such backward races are too small to stand alone, they ought to be associated, so far as geographical conditions permit, with other races on a similar level of progress.

It seems to me that there is a pretty strong case on all these grounds for a consideration of a readjustment of existing units, and that the right time for the consideration is when the transfer of constitutional powers is to be undertaken. Let us look at the matter now from the other point of view. Just as nature has been at work upon the original stocks and the influxes by immigration to establish different racial strains, so it has been at work to enclose India within defined boundaries, and yet to lay down no frontiers within those boundaries of a character to prevent inter-communication. By nature, the country, from the Himalayas to the sea, seems to have been adapted for one big organization. The very process of our expansion, by which, upon each acquisition of territory, the need for stability and peace beyond our borders impelled us forward—in spite of our own notions of our own interest from time to time—until we reached the natural limits of the country, is an evidence of this adaptability; no less than our own work in political consolidation and the imperial expansions which preceded ours. But India cannot become a political whole in an All-India system, held together by Indians, unless the two systems, now held together by us at the top, can be fused. If the obstacles to the fusion seem insoluble at the moment, it is worth while reflecting on the way in which the pressure of events has overruled some previous anticipations. When we were impelled by this pressure to assume the supreme control, and proceeded to construct our political edifice in British India, we built for an indefinite duration of British rule. That was, if I am not mistaken, in Dalhousie's contemplation; when the circuit of the territory was rounded off by

him before the Mutiny. He did not foresee, nor did those who supported him in England, that the steps taken twenty years earlier for the free admissibility of Indians to the administration, for the prescription of English education, in part to facilitate their admission, and for the freedom of the press, would lead under the pressure of events to the recognition of a right to self-government—just as our first acquisitions of territory led on to the imperial expansion—and that they would lead to this recognition in rather less time than it had taken since Plassey, in Dalhousie's day, to complete the Empire. The current upon which we and Indians are embarked may again not be held back by the obstacles which seem to be deterrent now.

Let us scrutinize these obstacles more closely. For an All-India organization it is necessary that the units to be associated in the organization should not be too numerous for association, or too disparate for a relatively stable balance, or too divergent in constitution to be conveniently combined. In British Indian territory, leaving Burmah, Aden and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands out of account, there are thirteen units; in Native State territory there are close on seven hundred. These respective territories do not form compact, separate areas, but are intermingled. To the 230 odd millions who populate British India, three units contribute between forty and fifty millions apiece; one between thirty and forty millions; two about twenty millions; one about fourteen millions; one between seven and eight millions; one about two millions and the remaining four under half a million each. To the seventy odd millions who populate the Native States, one unit contributes about thirteen millions; one about

six millions ; three between three and four millions ; three between two and three millions ; eleven between half a million and a million, and the remaining multitude from the neighbourhood of half a million down to a few hundreds each. These extraordinary diversities exist largely because we made them so ourselves. Were we back in the first half of the last century—when we obtained territory by grant or conquest, took it over in lieu of a payment for defence, divested chiefs who had opposed us of portions of their acquisitions, let others stand in less or more important chiefships because they had not opposed us, and so on—we could reconstitute the country on very different lines. We could lay it out in compact units or groups with the maximum regard to race, to geographical limits, to facility of government and the growth of popular control, to relative balance and adaptability for association. At that time we could have done all this. As we may regard the matter now it is one of the great lost opportunities of history, but we had not the foresight. Even now the practical difficulties in the way of a readjustment of administrations are not insurmountable, seeing that they have been surmounted since the beginning of the present century, both on the Native State and on the British Indian side. Were we free to split up the larger Provinces, to group States situated together in some form of subordinate association, to add territory to States of sufficient standing isolated within the British Indian area, to group the smaller chiefships, enlarged by the absorption of British territory intervening ; or, in alternative, to absorb them, with some suitable compensation for the prerogatives of the Chiefs—on some such lines we could form units that would not be

so prohibitively divergent. Had we, also, time at our disposal, we could proceed gradually, beginning with the simplest cases, not undertaking more than could be managed at a time, avoiding too general a disturbance of conditions, and gaining experience as the process advanced. The programme is not impracticable as an essay in adjustment. The difficulty for us is that we are no longer free to undertake it. The real obstacles lie in our engagements with the Princes or Chiefs, and in the right of those who have a claim to represent the people in British India to express their views.

The issue does not seem to me, then, now to lie with us, but with the rulers on the side of the States, and the representatives on the side of British India. Our function is none the less defined. Whatever form the decision of the protagonists might take, it is our business to see, first, that the indispensable control could be exercised so long as it is indispensable; secondly, that as the people, whether in Native State or British Indian territory, are not yet actually in a position to safeguard themselves, their interests should not be submerged; and, thirdly, that the interests of our own people should, also, be sufficiently protected.

I cannot judge how the conception of an All-India union will appeal; but, without a union, Indians can never hope to speak for India as a whole. I should like to suppose that it will exercise some appeal; but it is to be assumed in a question of practical politics, that the Princes and Chiefs would need compensation for the surrender of an exclusive relation under their engagements; and would require to have their territorial units, whether individual or grouped, placed on such terms with the units in British Indian territory, that

their dignity and the importance of their interests could be upheld in a union. The process of levelling these units up involves the process of levelling the others down. There must then be a sacrifice on both sides. The practical gain on the British Indian side, as distinguished from the more theoretical advantages of better adjusted units, would lie in the acquisition of strength from the association of the States, the more splendid position of India as a whole, and the greater prospect of freedom from British interference; for with a multitude of petty states distributed amongst British Indian territory there would be a great many points of contact, entailing occasions of disagreement with the authority to which the interests of such states are committed. It is possible, if a union were envisaged, that some of the minor chiefs would be willing to surrender their prerogatives as rulers for a suitable rank, with a suitable estate, as landed nobility. There is scope, it seems to me, for negotiation on both sides.

Even if negotiation were not destined in all cases to obtain success, the problem would, I should say, still not be unapproachable; because exceptions, whether proceeding from inability to agree, or from a practical difficulty in some local arrangement, or from the circumstances of some backward community, too isolated to be associated with other backward communities—would not, so long as they were exceptions, make a material difference to the union. It should be practicable to make provision for exceptions, and it might be that at some later date the present difficulties in the way of association would prove soluble.

If the question of areas could be solved, the assimilation of constitutions sufficiently for the purposes of association does not seem to me to be impracticable, if approached from both sides ; but, to avoid the implications of terms, I would prefer to deal with this point by metaphor. Whether broad-based upon the people's will or upon something other than their will the pyramid of state has usually imposed upon it an apex. Sometimes it has had two apices, sometimes a platform ; but these exceptions have been apt to revert to the more complete and satisfying form. The apex has been sometimes termed an Emperor, sometimes a King, sometimes a President, sometimes a Prince, sometimes a Governor. Even in other than state associations the pyramidal form persists, and has imposed upon it a point under the designation also of President, or of Chairman, or Mayor, or Leader, or Boss, or the simple Headman of a village.

There are other equally persistent features in all associations ; the layer of the Council, or Committee or Board of Directors, or Corporation upon which the point rests ; the layers or strands for the maintenance of records and transmission of orders, and for the execution of the orders, the layers of subordinate associations and so on. The Chairman, the Committee and the Secretary are the first cares in general of any association, and at the end it falls usually to the Secretary to wind up its affairs. Indeed, an administrative service, for such comfort as this may afford to Civil Servants in India, has been the most stable feature of all, and has outlived many changes of constitution—from the earliest known government right down to the Bench of Magistrates who perhaps owe it to the Town

Clerk that they are not pilloried in *Truth*. The term bureaucracy is applied when the Town Clerk sits upon the Bench. When a Civil Service stands by to save a Prime Minister from trouble, it is not so objurgated. In British Indian territory it is possible that the relations are confused. But the differences between one form of constitution and another lie rather in the relative authority, subordination and responsibilities of the constituents than in the constituents themselves. It is the essential business of the authority at the top to hold the balance even between rival interests; and it is, I believe, in history, the inability to maintain this balance, so that one interest or another has obtained too established a predominance, rather than the temporary oppression of the tenant himself, that has brought obloquy in the past on a designation in which we take a great deal of pride ourselves.

Whilst, therefore, in British Indian territory Indians would see the bureaucracy demolished, it does not follow that the heads need be diminished in the Native States. On the contrary. When a pyramid is to be imposed upon a group of pyramids, it will stand firm if all are pointed or all are truncated, or even if one or two only are truncated; but not if a considerable number are truncated. And as the points are constitutionally irremovable in India—except by a consent which cannot be predicated—the simplest way out of the difficulty is to fashion all in that style. It does not matter what the apices may be called in the British Indian units, provided only that they have sufficient stability to support the mass above them; but, for an Indian association they ought, I think, to bear an Indian rather than a British designation. Their

stability seems to me essential, not only for the support of the superstructure, but also for the intermediate necessities of British control, because it is easier to fix the responsibility for good government upon an individual than it is upon a body which can shift the responsibility by going out of office. He ought to be so held to that responsibility that it could not be shifted to a Mayor of the Palace, or to a bureaucracy, or to a group or section. It would be his business to see that, until popular control developed, the government carried on by those to whom it might be entrusted was in the interests of the people.

This stability could be assured by making the tenure of the authority dependent upon the capacity to fulfil the obligations. It need not be hereditary. It would have at first to be by selection, but it might in the fullness of time become elective. Subject to this stability, there is room for that elasticity in the adjustment of other relative responsibilities, which is needed to suit the relative stages of progress of the peoples to be governed. On the Native State side there has already been a movement towards an approach to assimilation. It should not be impracticable on both sides to carry the approach forward to such a common plane as would permit of a common stable association.

The safeguarding of British interests in India does not seem to me, either, to present impracticable difficulties. These interests should be susceptible of sufficient definition to be included in the responsibilities of those to whom the British Indian units were committed. Besides this there is another potential safeguard. It would be necessary for the imperial functions to reserve areas, lines of communication,

frontiers possibly and chief ports, for imperial administration. To these must be added such territories as, for exceptional reasons, could not be included in the association. To these, again, it should be practicable to add, if necessary, specific areas in which British interests sufficiently predominate to justify exclusive treatment; and even if areas of this character were permanently reserved for British administration they need afford no more cause for anxiety in the future, than is afforded in the case of existing French or Portuguese territories in India.

VI.

A CONVENTION

NEITHER, then, in respect of the readjustment of territories, nor of the assimilation of constitutions, nor of the safeguarding of British interests does the problem seem to be inherently insoluble. We, both British and Indians, have before us the possibility of a magnificent achievement, and, between us, a common ground in our desire, at any rate, to give Indians an Indian Government and in their desire to have one. We have, however, prescribed a solution which has not been welcomed by Indians, and instead of meeting on the common ground we are established in opposite camps. We say that they ought to accept our prescription: they say that we ought to change our attitude; and the brain-power which ought to be concentrated upon the problem, is occupied in disputing the approach. Yet all the time a magnificent conception is waiting for us, within our view, a noble yet pathetic figure, beckoning to us to make an end of arguing and proceed to business. And all we have to do, in order to reach the common ground, is to realise what we probably do, most of us, actually, individually admit: namely, on our side, that we are not infallible; on the Indian side, in British India, that some outside control is indispensable until India can stand upon her own feet; and, on the side of the Princes and Chiefs, that the conception of an All-India union is worth, at least, an effort at negotiation. It is not the nature of the problem which bars the approach to the common ground, but the pre-conceptions.

Can we not shake off ours and offer to Indians the option of attempting a big project, which we let slip ourselves not, in the life of a people, so very long ago? Can Indians not shake off theirs, in order to turn the opportunity to account? Or will history have to record perhaps the miss of a century once more, against, this time, whichever of us is in fault?

An offer has been made. It is in contemplation, if I interpret the announcement of the Secretary of State correctly, to elicit the opinion of the Legislative Assembly upon the present constitution, with a view, if grave and glaring defects disclose themselves, to an acceleration of the review by Royal Commission which has been timed for the end of the first decade. At this review, whenever it may be held, everything is to be thrown into the melting pot; but the acceleration of the process is dependent upon evidence of a sincere and genuine desire everywhere among the responsible leaders of Indian thought to co-operate with the British Government in making the best of the present constitution. In the meanwhile, if those who criticise the British Government can produce a constitution carrying behind it a fair measure of general agreement among the great peoples of India, it will receive a most careful examination by the Government of India, the Secretary of State and the Royal Commission, whenever that body may be assembled.

Here then is an opening. What is it worth? Waiving points of minor importance, it seems to me that the condition of a sincere and genuine desire to co-operate is of doubtful omen. The fact cannot be ignored that amongst the responsible leaders of Indian thought are men who are committed, under one formula or another,

to the attainment of a government independent of British control in the shortest possible time ; nor the fact that the prospect of an acceleration of the Royal Commission has been won by obstruction rather than by amenability. Can we then entertain a sincere and genuine expectation that there will be a sincere and genuine desire amongst these leaders everywhere to co-operate for any other purpose than to succeed the more rapidly in ridding the constitution of British control ? Let us avoid any risk of a suspicion of guilelessness and assume a truce.

What then follows ? We shall still be faced by the dilemma with which dyarchy has always been confronted ; namely, either that if, after this change of attitude, the powers transferred are not such as to satisfy the demand, the obstruction will be resumed, with a weakened resistance on our side in proportion to the transfer made ; or that, if the demand be satisfied, even that weakened restraint will go, without a restraint worth the name on the popular side to replace it.

This is not a new dilemma. It is, in fact, the culmination of a prolonged process by which, as may be read in the Montague-Chelmsford report, advice invited from Indians developed into criticism, criticism into opposition, this sequence led to the Morley-Minto reforms, these reforms to dyarchy ; and by which dyarchy in turn is leading to an acceleration of the next advance. The fault of the process is that of those in any business who wish to pass on the management, but to continue to take part in it. A management may be transferred upon conditions, but if the conditions include the continued active interference of the higher control in the detail of the work, the business will not run smoothly. The functions are distinct. The effect of the fault in India

has been that we have not been able to stabilise the higher control, nor have Indians been obtaining the freedom from British interference which is their ambition. If we wish to stop the run we must stabilise the control ; but we must also fix the limit of its application, so as to permit of the greatest freedom subject to the terms of the arrangement. The hope to be derived from the announcement is that not dyarchy only, but the whole process of which it is the latest phase will be thrown into the melting pot, and that the real issues will emerge.

But, again, the announcement predicates a measure of general agreement among the great peoples of India, whilst confining the consultation to British India only. It is not intended, of course, to be implied that the people of the Native States are not among those great peoples. But neither can they be treated indefinitely as if the destiny of India was not also their concern. In both England and British India we and Indians are apt to use the language of an assumption that whatever we may settle between us about the business of the country does not concern the third partner. That is not a true assumption. The third partner is concerned as representing 70 millions of people, on account of the reaction of any thing done in British India in regard to the affairs of the whole country upon the interests of these millions. The assumption is too weak to carry us along, and if we rest upon it we shall find ourselves in an insecure position once again.

It follows that a revision of policy, if it is to be confined to British-India only, will not meet the case. If we do not envisage the problem as one that concerns the whole of India, we shall find it forced upon us in circumstances in which, being committed in regard to British-India,

we shall be embarrassed in the reconciliation of the interests of the Native States. The future of the States ought then to be brought within the range of the revision.

In my humble judgment a Royal Commission is not the best procedure for undertaking a revision. Let me repeat that the main issue is one in regard to which the two great Indian interests have first to satisfy each other ; and, if they can satisfy each other, then to satisfy the British interest that the edifice which they may wish to construct is one that we can guarantee, until it shall be consolidated and complete ; just as we shall have to satisfy them that our control will be adjusted to this purpose. The representatives of these three interests are in the position of a jury rather than of witnesses before a court ; their business, like that of a jury, will be to reconcile their different points of view and come to a finding on the facts, in order that they may present a verdict to Parliament. The analogy might, I think, be carried further with advantage, to the point of requiring them, but within a definite time, either to agree upon a verdict or to declare that there is no hope of agreement.

A round-table conference, which has sometimes been advocated, does not seem to me to be a sufficiently representative way of determining the fate of so many millions of people. It implies a comparatively small and secret discussion between prominent opponents, in which there is a danger of interests being subordinated to the political mood or needs of the moment, or the influence of the most dominant personality. There is also a danger, to which such a conference is only less subject than a Royal Commission, of the settlement being repudiated or challenged afterwards in circles outside.

Besides, what is wanted is the most searching test possible of ideal or unpractical or partisan proposals, and I can conceive of no more searching test than their submission to criticism from as many points of view as can be brought to bear together. What is also needed is the focussing of the knowledge and experience available from these different points of view upon the common purpose. What has hampered us, on the Indian as well as on the British side, in the past, has been the relativity of the knowledge and experience we can respectively command. On the British side, in our own country, we command a worldwide outlook and an experience of the application of principles of government to many different races, but we do not command a knowledge at first hand of Indian conditions; on the British side, in India, we know more of Indian characteristics and Indian administrative requirements, but have not that broader outlook, nor are we qualified to speak for Indian aspirations; on the Indian side, in British India, Indians know or ought to know their own requirements, but have not had our practice in constructive statesmanship, nor do they command as yet a proved experience in the responsibilities of government; on the Indian side, in the Native States, there has been responsibility of government, but not the kind of responsibility towards which the aim of Indians in British India has been directed. The best way to remedy these relative deficiencies is to pool the contributions by bringing together as many contributors as it may be possible to collect, subject to the limitations of a practical discussion.

For these reasons I would advocate a convention, to be assembled for a period of—shall we say six

months? I advocate a convention the more strongly because of those very divergencies of interest and points of view, both as between us and Indians, as between the Native States and British India, and as within British India itself, which may seem at first sight to be prohibitive. Probably before the war they would have been actually prohibitive, but the practicability of conferences or conventions on a big scale has been established since the war, with, I suppose, even more complex and divergent interests to be reconciled than are presented by this problem in regard to India.

The first question, in envisaging a convention, is as to the aggregate number of delegates, which ought not to exceed a manageable limit, but within that limit ought to afford as full a representation as it is possible to arrange. As to what is a manageable limit it is for those who have experience of conferences on a big scale to say. I will assume a maximum of 150. Of this aggregate I will assume one-fifth for the British representation, the remainder to be allotted between the States and British India in proportion to their respective populations, that is, in the proportion of about 1 to 3. Seeing that the result must come by agreement as between the three main interests, not by a majority of the aggregate of votes, the relative weight of numbers is not material. I will also assume, in order to make the most of the aggregate, that authorities on finance or defence or constitutional points on which expert opinion may be valuable, will not be included among the delegates, but will be attached for consultation by any party requiring their advice.

In regard to the selection of the delegates I will take the case of British India first, as being the most complex.

The legislatures are the bodies from which the delegates ought to be and can most conveniently be drawn. By the legislatures I mean the Council of State, the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Councils. I include the Provincial Councils partly because the field of selection ought to be as large as it can conveniently be made, and partly because, although the two central bodies are constituted in respect of their elected members by direct election in the Provinces, the elections are independent, the functions distinct, and the representation of the points of view ought not to be confused. Unfortunately the legislatures as at present constituted, do not reflect the whole body of political opinion, in as much as at the last elections, in spite of the Swaraj entry, there was still a considerable section of opinion committed to boycotting the constitution. The best way to remedy this deficiency is to let the prospect of a convention be before the electorates at the ensuing elections for the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Councils. That is, at any rate, the most that can be done in order to bring the whole body of political opinion to bear. The proposal will not avail in regard to the Council of State, the elections for which have taken place, but that cannot be avoided.

The Legislatures include 784 elected members, from British India, not including Burma, of whom 32 are contributed by the Council of State, 101 by the Legislative Assembly, and 651 by nine Provincial Councils, including Coorg. The figures may not be exactly accurate, but are sufficiently so for the purpose of calculation. These members represent constituencies arranged either on a communal basis, such as Non-Mohammedans and Mohammedans, or Non-Brahmins

and Indian Christians in Madras ; or on a racial basis, such as Sikhs, Mahrattas, Europeans, Anglo-Indians ; or on a special basis, such as Commerce and Industry, Landholders, Universities and others. Of these groups the Non-Mohammedan and Mohammedan representatives include respectively 375 and 217, leaving 192 for the minor interests, out of the total of 784. The nominal total of Non-Mohammedans is 410, but from this I have deducted 28 seats reserved for Non-Brahmins in Madras and 7 for Mahrattas in Bombay, which are more appropriately included among the minor interests.

No minor interest will be neglected if at least one delegate be allotted to each such interest, however small. But if such interest in each Provincial Council be allotted a delegate, the representation of the minor interests will absorb a disproportionate share of the total. This difficulty can be avoided by grouping interests of the same description on the Provincial Councils. I would not propose to group those for the central legislatures, because the distinction between the Council of State, as a body of Elder Statesmen, and the Legislative Assembly, as a popular body, is worth keeping intact.

Assuming a figure of 150 for the maximum aggregate, of which one-fifth is to be reserved for the British delegation, there remain 120 to be divided between the Native States and British India, of which the respective shares in proportion to the populations are 30 and 90. I propose to adopt, subject to a minimum of one for each minor interest or provincial group of interests, a proportion of one delegate to five elected members for the central legislatures, and of one to fifteen for the Provincial Councils, a difference which the consideration due to the central bodies seems to me to justify. In order to

eliminate fractions in the result a unit will be added for each remainder of not less than 3 or 8.

The calculation works out as shown in the following table. More detailed figures for the Provincial Councils will be found in the Appendix.

| INTERESTS. | ELECTED MEMBERS. | | | | DELEGATES. | | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|
| | Council of State. | Legislative Assembly. | Provincial Councils. | TOTAL. | Council of State. | Legislative Assembly. | Provincial Councils. | TOTAL. |
| Non-Mohammedan | 17 | 48 | 310 | 375 | 3 | 10 | 20 | 33 |
| Mohammedan | 10 | 30 | 177 | 217 | 2 | 6 | 13 | 21 |
| Minor Interests | *5 | †23 | 164 | 192 | 3 | 6 | 17 | 26 |
| TOTAL | 32 | 101 | 651 | 784 | 8 | 22 | 50 | 80 |

* European Commerce (2), Sikhs (1), General Population (2).

† Europeans (8), Landowners (7), Indian Commerce (4), Sikhs (2), General Population (2). As the European interest numbers 8 it is allotted 2 delegates.

The total of 80 leaves a margin of 10, from which, without exceeding the limit of 90, provision may be made, to any extent and in any way thought proper, for delegates from units in British India in which there are no Provincial Councils.

Subject to whatever principle be deemed suitable in regard to these units, the choice of delegates would be

by election amongst the representatives of the interests concerned ; a single representative would be his own delegate ; two would have to decide between them. In detail, for the Council of State, the Non-Mohammedan group would elect three delegates, the Mohammedan group two, the three Minor Interests one apiece. For the Legislative Assembly, the Non-Mohammedan group would elect ten, the Mohammedan group six ; amongst the Minor Interests, the Europeans two, and the other interests one apiece. For the Provincial Councils, the Non-Mohammedan group in each council would elect for that council, so also the Mohammedan group ; so also, amongst Minor Interests, the non-Brahmins, the Mahrattas and the Sikhs, who each appear in one council only ; but other Minor Interests of the same denomination, appearing in more than one council, such as landowners, who appear in seven of the councils, would be grouped for the election of delegates on behalf of their interest as a whole.

There would still remain two classes unrepresented, which are in a position to make contributions of an independent value. I refer to Indians in the Judicial and Administrative Services under the Government ; and not to retired members of these services, who are not ineligible for election, but to those in active service who have the most up-to-date experience. Their contributions include respectively a trained capacity to judge questions from different points of view, and a trained experience in administration. These two classes have had the largest share of the hard, practical work of the public service, and have maintained a level of competence in the performance which is an asset of a very valuable implication on the Indian side. Their

contributions are of a kind which do not depend upon the exercise of a vote, and could, I think, be brought to bear to the best effect, if representatives of these services were not merely to be attached, like experts, for consultation when required, but were to be free to attend meetings of, at any rate, the British-Indian delegation, and to offer suggestions or points of view which might otherwise escape attention. It ought not to be difficult to arrange a selection by agreement between the leaders on the British and British-Indian sides.

The classification of delegates into Non-Mohammedan, Mohammedan and Minor Interest sections—which follows the principle of representation in the legislatures—affords a simple method of defining agreement. The definition I would suggest is that a proposal should not be held to have the agreement of the British-Indian delegation, unless it carried the assent of two-thirds of the delegates in each of the sections.

In regard to the Native States the crucial question is as to whether the Princes and Chiefs would be prepared to send delegates to the convention. My assumption is that they would be willing, if invited, to accept the invitation, for the reason that acceptance does not commit them to agreement, but only to a discussion as to the possibility of agreement. Assuming two-thirds again as the test of a substantial body of opinion, I should say that the convention would be worth holding, if rulers controlling two-thirds of the Native State interest, measured in proportion to the aggregate population of the States, were prepared to accept. If the remainder should wish to stand aloof, there is room for their treatment as exceptions, without straining the provision for exceptions too far. As to the way in which

acceptance should be ascertained I am not competent to express an opinion. It is a question which might be laid before the Chamber of Princes, or might be dealt with better in some other way. Given the consent of two-thirds of the ruling interest as defined, the choice of delegates by the rulers themselves ought to offer no special difficulty ; nor does the appointment of delegates to represent the British Government interest from the fields of selection in the United Kingdom and India.

If the acceptance of the Princes and Chiefs to the extent of the two-thirds proportion should not be accorded, a convention might still be held with the British Government delegates on the one side, and the three sections of delegates from British India on the other, with the object of devising a constitution for British India only ; but the prospect of an All-India union disappears.

The definition of agreement as between the three main interests might follow the definition proposed for agreement as between the three sections of the British-Indian interest ; namely, that a proposal should not be held to have the agreement of the convention, unless it carried the assent of two-thirds of the British Government and two-thirds of the Native State delegations, along with the agreement of the British-Indian delegation as already defined.

The number of 150 is, probably, on the large side for the best practical discussion, but whilst the convention in full session would ventilate the subject as a whole and discuss the proposals mooted before it, the work in preparing the proposals would be done by committees of the interests and sub-interests concerned, and in a practical way also by informal consultations. That

restricts in a large measure the liability to unconcentrated and indefinite discussion. It is difficult, it seems to me, to reduce the aggregate, without either forfeiting the representation of recognised minor interests, or giving them a representation which would limit unfavourably the proportion available for the larger Non-Mohammedan and Mohammedan interests. Subject to that consideration the relative differences in the balance of numbers do not matter under the definition of agreement proposed.

My object in elaborating this scheme is not to put forward a claim that it is a perfect scheme, far from it, but to show that the practical difficulties in the way of a convention are no less surmountable than the preceding obstacles in the way of a solution of the problem, although, like the last fences in a long course, it will not do to rush them. It may seem to many, I daresay, nevertheless, that the conception of a settlement by convention is no less ideal than any other conception on the market. That may be, if the political acumen of Indians is no more than political acumen. If they lack statesmanship; if they should be unable to approach a business issue in a business way, or to see more than one side of that issue; if, in fact, after the steam has been allowed to evaporate, common sense is not likely to emerge in the process of discussion, or if, in an assembly of a hundred and fifty, it is beyond the capacity of a Chairman to keep the discussion within bounds—then the notion of a convention is fantastic. But, then, the conception of self-government for Indians, for which corresponding faculties are needed, becomes also fantastic. Instead of pre-supposing disabilities, I would say let the doubts be put to the proof. Take

off the leading-strings for the occasion. There could not be a better gauge of the ability of Indians to manage their affairs than the way in which they deal with the preliminary question of the constitution under which they will manage them.

Let us, however, for those who anticipate a failure, rate the prospect of a settlement by agreement among the three parties to a convention as an extreme on the sanguine side. And let us rate at the other extreme, the prospect that a convention will lead to no more profitable result than a babel of discordant advocacy. Between these two extremes lies the prospect of a thorough and informing ventilation of a complex question, such as, even if it should prove unfruitful at the time, ought yet to clarify the issues, and so prepare the ground for a settlement, given more favourable conditions, at some future date. Is not such a result worth entertaining?

I will anticipate a criticism, which may be made upon this essay, that it contains no reference to Hindu-Mohammedan dissension. The omission is deliberate; for the reason, in the first place, that Hindus and Mohammedans have succeeded in living together for long periods in the past, not merely without giving annoyance to each other, but on friendly terms of association, and that they do so live now for the greater part of the time over the greater part of India. Outbreaks occur in one locality at one time, elsewhere at another, and their specific danger is that when they occur they are apt to spread. But they are confined, as a rule, to particular occasions in the year, and if it is known that the authorities are on the alert they do not, even on these occasions, ordinarily take place. In all the rioting which occurs or

has occurred in India, the Hindu-Mohammedan motive occupies a comparatively small place. Secondly, the reference in an earlier chapter to the liability to disorder when authority seems to the disorderly elements to be relaxed, covers this particular class of disorder also. When authority is resolute, when Hindus and Mohammedans, or any others with a quarrel to foment, know that provocation or aggression will be punished, they are not willing as a rule to bring trouble upon themselves.

APPENDIX

(I) Details for Non-Mohammedan and Mohammedan interests in the Provincial Councils.

| INTERESTS. | | | | ELECTED MEMBERS. | | | | | | | | | DELEGATES. | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|------------|-------|--|------------------|---------|---------|-------------------|---------|-----------------|----------------------------|--------|--------|------------|---------|---------|-------------------|---------|-----------------|----------------------------|--------|--------|
| Non-Mohammedan | Mohammedan | TOTAL | | Madras. | Bombay. | Bengal. | United Provinces. | Punjab. | Bihar & Orissa. | Central Provinces & Berar. | Assam. | TOTAL. | Madras. | Bombay. | Bengal. | United Provinces. | Punjab. | Bihar & Orissa. | Central Provinces & Berar. | Assam. | TOTAL. |
| 37 | 13 | 50 | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| 39 | 27 | 66 | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 |
| 46 | 39 | 85 | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 33 |
| 60 | 29 | 89 | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 20 | 32 | 52 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 20 |
| 48 | 18 | 66 | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 |
| 40 | 7 | 47 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 |
| 20 | 12 | 32 | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| 310 | 177 | 487 | | | | | | | | | | | 20 | 13 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 |

NOTE.—One delegate is allowed for the Mohammedan representatives in Central Provinces and Berar, although they number only 7, in order that they may not be unrepresented.

(2) Details for Minor interests in the Provincial Councils.

| INTEREST. | ELECTED MEMBERS. | | | | | | | | | DELEGATES. | |
|--------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|-------------------|---------|-----------------|----------------------------|--------|--------|------------|--------|
| | Madras. | Bombay. | Bengal. | United Provinces. | Punjab. | Bihar & Orissa. | Central Provinces & Berar. | Assam. | Coorg. | | TOTAL. |
| Non-Brahmins | 28 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 28 | 2 |
| Mahrattas | — | 7 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7 | 1 |
| Europeans | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | 2 | 12 | 1 |
| Anglo-Indians | 1 | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3 | 1 |
| Sikhs | — | — | — | — | 12 | — | — | — | — | 12 | 1 |
| Indian Christians | 5 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5 | 1 |
| Landholders | 6 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 | — | — | 32 | 2 |
| Universities | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | 6 | 1 |
| Planting Interests | 1 | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | 5 | — | 7 | 1 |
| Commerce & Industry | 5 | 7 | 15 | 3 | 2 | — | 2 | 1 | — | 35 | 2 |
| Mining Interests | — | — | — | — | — | 2 | 1 | — | — | 3 | 1 |
| General Urban Population | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 1 |
| Jama | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9 | 9 | 1 |
| Non-Jama | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 4 | 4 | 1 |
| TOTAL. | 48 | 20 | 28 | 11 | 19 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 15 | 164 | 17 |

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