

made a skilful, and on the whole a moderate, use of the opportunities which we have given him in the legislative councils of influencing Government and affecting the course of public business, and of recent years, he has by speeches and in the press done much to spread the idea of a united and self-respecting India among thousands who had no such conception in their minds. Helped by the inability of the other classes in India to play a prominent part he has assumed the place of leader, but his authority is by no means universally acknowledged and may in an emergency prove weak."

In face of these observations about the politically minded classes of India it is rather unkind of the authors to insinuate later on that in the interests of the foreign merchant, the foreign missionary and the European servants of the state it is necessary that the Government of India should yet remain absolute and that, in the provinces as well, important branches of the administration should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the popular assemblies.

To sum up, while we are prepared to concede that the conditions of the problem may justify the withholding of absolute autonomy, — political, fiscal, and military, — for some time, there is nothing in them which can in any way be deemed sufficient to deny full political, and, if not complete, at least substantial fiscal autonomy to the Indian people at once.

VI

THE PUBLIC SERVICES IN INDIA

The governing consideration, therefore, in all these cases [speaking of German colonies] must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or Governments.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

"The War Aims of the Allies" Speech delivered to delegates of the Trades Unions, at the Central Hall, Westminster, January 5, 1918.

UNTIL now the European servants of the British Government have ruled India quite autocratically. The powers delegated to and the discretion vested in them have been so large that they could do almost anything they liked. They could make or mar the fortunes of millions; they could further their happiness or add to their misery by the simple fiat of their will. The only limitation on their power was their own sense of duty and justice. That some of them did let themselves go is no wonder. The wonder is that the instances of unbridled oppression and tyranny were not more numerous than they have actually been. Speaking of the European services generally, we have

nothing but admiration for their general character. The particular branch of the Public Services that has been all along entrusted with the general administration of the country is known as the Indian Civil Service. It is recruited in England and is overwhelmingly European in personnel. On April 1, 1913, only forty-six of the 1319 civilians on the *cadre* were natives of India.

Speaking of the executive organizations that have so far ruled India, the eminent authors of the Report for the reorganization of the Government of India remark that it may "well be likened to a mere system of official posts, actuated *till* now by impulses of its own, but affected by the popular ideas which impinge on it from three sources — the British Parliament, the legislative councils and the local boards." The sentence would have been correct if in place of "but affected" the authors had said "and affected but little." "The system," they add, "has in the main depended for its effectiveness on the experience, wisdom and energy of the services themselves. It has, for the most part, been represented by the Indian Civil Service which, though having little to do with the technical departments of government, *has for over 100 years in practice had the administration entrusted to its hands, because, with the exception of the offices of the Governor General, Governors, and some members of the executive councils, it has held practically all the places involving superior control.* It has been in effect much more of a government corporation than of a purely civil service in the English sense. It has been made a reproach to the Indian Civil Service that it regards itself as the Government; but a view which

strikes the critic familiar with parliamentary government as arrogant is little more than a condensed truth." [The italics are ours.]

The Indian Civil Service has thus developed all the characteristics, good and bad, of a caste. It has been a powerful bureaucracy, as exclusive, proud, arrogant and self-sufficient, — if not even more so, — as the original Brahmin oligarchy of the land, except that while the Brahmin oligarchy had ties of race, religion and culture with the rest of the population, the Indian Civil Service is almost entirely composed of aliens. The ancient Brahmins were, however, kept in check by the military caste. The mutual jealousies of these two castes afforded some kind of protection to the people in general. But in the case of the British Indian Civil Service, the military have given entire support to their civilian fellow-countrymen and have been completely under their will. •

The Brahmins of India have left a monumental record of their labors. They produced great thinkers, writers, legislators, administrators and organizers. In their own time they were as wise, energetic and resourceful as any bureaucracy in the world has ever been or will ever be. Yet the system of life they devised cut at the roots of national vitality. It dried almost all the springs of corporate national life. It reduced the bulk of the population to a position of complete subservience to their will, of blind faith in their wisdom, of absolute dependence on their initiative. It deprived the common people of all opportunities of independent thought and independent action. It brought about a kind of national atrophy. And this, in spite of the fact that they began by im-

posing a rigorous code of self-denial on themselves and their class. For themselves they wanted nothing but a life of poverty and asceticism. Their economic interests were never in theory or in practice in conflict with those of the rest of the body politic.

A Brahmin was forbidden to engage in trade or otherwise accumulate wealth. His life was a life of strict self-abnegation. This cannot be said of the Indian Civil Servant. He receives a handsome salary for his services, expects and receives periodic promotion until he reaches a position which, from an economic point of view, is not unenviable. After retirement he is free to engage in trade and otherwise accumulate wealth. But over and above this, what distinguishes an Indian Civil Servant from an old Brahmin bureaucrat is the fact that in India he represents a nation whose economic interest may not always be in harmony with those of the people of India. He is thus supposed to be the guardian of the interests of his countrymen, and is expected to further them as much as he can without altogether endangering the safety of British rule in India. Looked at from this angle, we have no hesitation in saying that the work of the Indian Civil Service, too, has in its way, been monumental. As a rule, they have proved capable administrators, individually honest, hardworking and alert. They have organized and tabulated India in a way, perhaps, never done before. But after all has been said in their praise, it cannot be denied that they have done India even more harm than the Brahmin oligarchy in its time, did, by the support they lent to economic exploitation of the country by men of their own race and religion. Now, in this latter respect, we

want to guard against being misunderstood. The Indian Civil Service has, in the course of about a century, produced a fairly good number of men who have honestly and fearlessly stood for the protection of Indian interests against those of people of their own race and religion. In doing so they have sometimes ruined their own prospects of promotion and advancement. Whenever they failed in their self-imposed task, and more often they failed than not, they failed because the authorities at the top were forced by considerations of domestic and imperial policy to do otherwise. On the whole, the defects of the bureaucratic administration were more the defects of the system than of the individuals composing it.

The Indian Civil Servant, like the old Brahmin, is autocratic and dictatorial. He dislikes any display of independence by the people put under his charge. He discourages initiative. He likes to be called and considered the *Mai bap* (mother and father) of his subjects. On those who literally consider him such he showers his favors. The others he denounces and represses. This has, in the course of time, led to national emasculation. That is our chief complaint against the Indian Civil Service. Of the other services we would rather not speak. They have by no means been so pure and high-minded as the I. C. S., nor perhaps so autocratic and dictatorial. The number of men who misused their powers and opportunities to their own advantage has been much larger in services other than the I. C. S. Yet they all have done a certain amount of good work for India; whether one looks at the engineering works designed and executed by them, or the researches they have made in the

science of healing and preventing disease, or the risks they have run in preserving order or maintaining peace one cannot but admire their efficiency and ability. The grievances of the Indian Nationalists against the Public Services in India may be thus summarized:

(a) That the services monopolize too much power and are practically uncontrolled by and irresponsible to the people of the country.

(b) That the higher branches of the services contain too many foreigners

(c) That these are recruited in England, and from some of them the Indians are altogether barred.

(d) That even when doing the same work Indians are not paid on the same scale as the Europeans.

(e) That the Government has often kept on men of proved inefficiency and of inferior qualities.

(f) That, considering the economic conditions of India, the higher servants of the Government are paid on a scale unparalleled in the history of public administration in the world.

(g) That the interests of the services often supersede those of the country and the Government.

(h) And last, but not least, that by the gathering of all powers of initiative and execution in their hands they have emasculated India.

As regards (a) we have already quoted the opinion of the eminent authors of the report. The principle laid down in the announcement of August 20, and the scheme proposed are supposed to do away with the element of irresponsibility. It is obvious that with the introduction of the principle of popular control into the Government, the power of individual servants of the executive will not remain what it is now, or has

been in the past. Much that is vested in and done by the service will be transferred to public bodies elected by popular vote. This will naturally affect (b) and (c) also. We will here stop to quote again from the Report:

"In the forefront of the announcement of August 20 the policy of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration was definitely placed. It has not been necessary for us, nor indeed would it have been possible, to go into this large question in detail in the time available for our inquiry. We have already seen that Lord Hardinge's Government was anxious to increase the number of Indians in the public services, and that a Royal Commission was appointed in 1912 to examine and report on the existing limitations in the employment of Indians . . . The report was signed only a few months after the outbreak of war, and its publication was deferred in the hope that the war would not be prolonged. When written, it might have satisfied moderate Indian opinion, but when published two years later it was criticised as wholly disappointing. Our inquiry has since given us ample opportunity of judging the importance which Indian opinion attaches to this question. While we take account of this attitude, a factor which carries more weight with us is that since the report was signed an entirely new policy toward Indian government has been adopted, which must be very largely dependent for success on the extent to which it is found possible to introduce Indians into every branch of the administration."

The authors of the Report then proceed to state the limitations of the process, subject to the general remark that at the present moment there are few Indians (we do not admit this) trained in public life, who can replace the Europeans, and thus to alter the

personnel of a service must be a long and steady process. They admit that:

"If responsible government is to be established in India there will be a far greater need than is even dreamt of at present for persons to take part in public affairs in the legislative assemblies and elsewhere; and for this reason the more Indians we can employ in the public services the better. Moreover, it would lessen the burden of Imperial responsibilities if a body of capable Indian administrators could be produced. We regard it as necessary, therefore, that recruitment of a largely increased proportion of Indians should be begun at once."

In the next paragraph they state why, in their judgment, it is necessary that a substantial portion of the services must continue to be European. Their reasons may be gathered from the following:

"The characteristics which we have learned to associate with the Indian public services must as far as possible be maintained and the leaven of officers possessed of them should be strong enough to assure and develop them in the service as a whole. The qualities of courage, leadership, decision, fixity of purpose, detached judgment and integrity in her public servants will be as necessary as ever to India. There must be no such sudden swamping of any service with any new element that its whole character suffers a rapid alteration."

On these grounds they make the following recommendations:

"I. That all distinctions based on race be removed, and that appointments to all branches of the public service be made without racial discrimination" (Paragraph 315).

"II. That for all the public services, for which there is recruitment in England open to Europeans and Indians alike, there must be a system of appointment in India, . . . and we propose to supplement it by fixing a definite percentage of recruitment to be made in India."

"III. We have not been able to examine the question of the percentage of recruitment to be made in India for any service other than the Indian Civil Service. The Commission recommended that 25 per cent. of the superior posts of that service should be recruited for in India. We consider that changed conditions warrant some increase in that proportion, and we suggest that 33 per cent. of the superior posts should be recruited for in India, and that this percentage should be increased by $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. annually until the periodic commission is appointed which will re-examine the whole subject . . . We have dealt only with the Indian Civil Service, but our intention is that there should be in all other services now recruited from England a fixed percentage of recruitment in India, increasing annually."

Now we must admit that this is certainly a distinct and marked advance on the existing situation. The Indian Constitutional party, however, wants to have the percentage of recruitment in India fixed at 50 per cent., retaining at the same time the annual increase suggested. In our opinion, this difference is not material, provided the number of posts to which the rule of percentage is to be applied is substantially reduced. We may state our position briefly

We are of the opinion that the system of administration in India is much more costly than it should be, considering the sources and the amounts of Indian revenues. Unless the industries of the country are developed we can see no new sources of increased

taxation. Consequently, to us, it seems essential that some economy should be effected in the various departments of the administration. The only way to effect that economy is to substantially reduce the number of posts on which it is considered necessary to retain a certain percentage of Europeans. In speaking of the machinery of the Government of India, the authors of the Report say:

"We think we have reason for saying that in some respects the machinery is no longer equal to the needs of the time. The normal work of the departments is heavy. The collective responsibility of the Government is weighty, especially in time of war. There is little time or energy left for those activities of a political nature which the new situation in the country demands. A legislative session of the Government of India imposes a serious strain upon the departments, and especially on the members in charge of them. But apart from the inevitable complexities of the moment, the growing burden of business, which results from the changing political conditions of the country, is leading to an accumulation of questions which cannot be disposed of as quickly as they present themselves. We find the necessity for reforms admitted, principles agreed upon, and decisions taken, and then long delays in giving effect to them. Difficulties are realized, enquiries are started, commissions report, and then there is a pause. There is a belief abroad that assurances given in public pronouncement of policy are sometimes not fulfilled. On this occasion, therefore, we have taken steps to guard against such imputations, and to provide means for ensuring the ordered development of our plans."

PRESENT CAUSES OF DELAY

"267. The main fault for the clogging of the machine does not, we think, lie altogether with its highly

trained engineers. What is chiefly wanted is some change of system in the directions of simplicity and speed. *How does it happen that announcements are made that arouse expectations only to defeat them?* We know that it is not from any intention of deluding the public. We suggest that it is because the wheels move too slowly for the times; the need for change is realized, but because an examination of details would take too long, promises are made in general terms, which on examination it becomes necessary so to qualify with reservations as to disappoint anticipations, and even to lead to charges of breach of faith. We suspect that a root-cause of some political discontent lies in such delays. Now, so far as the provinces are concerned, we believe that our proposals *for freeing them to a great extent from the control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State will improve matters. But the Government of India are in the worst case.*" [The italics are ours.]

These observations raise an apprehension in our mind that it is proposed to add to the strength of the services under the Government of India. We, for ourselves, do not see how it can be otherwise. With the steady admission of the popular element into the Government of India the activities of the latter are likely to increase rather than diminish; the secretarial work of the different departments will expand rather than contract. The question of questions is how to meet the increased cost.

The remedy is the same as was suggested many years ago by Sir William Hunter, the official historian of India. He said:

"If we are to give a really efficient administration to India, many services must be paid for at lower rates even at present. For those rates are regulated

in the higher branches of the administration by the cost of officers brought from England. You cannot work with imported labor as cheaply as you can with native labor, and I regard the more extended employment of the natives, not only as an act of justice, but as a financial necessity. If we are to govern the Indian people efficiently and cheaply, we must govern them by means of themselves, and pay for the administration at the market rates for native labor."

Now, whatever may be said about the necessity of maintaining a strong European element in the departments which require initiative, courage, resourcefulness and all the other qualities of "leadership" they are certainly not a *sine qua non* for efficiency in secretarial work. We can see no reason why, then, the different secretariats of the Government of India cannot be manned mainly, if not exclusively, by Indians. Their salaries need not be the same as those now paid to the Europeans engaged in these departments. May we ask if there is any country on earth where such high salaries are paid to the secretarial heads of departments as in India? Secretaries to the Government of India in the Army and Public works and Legislative departments receive 42,000 Rs. each (\$14,000, or £2800 a year); Secretaries to the Government of India in the Finance, Foreign, Home, Revenue, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry and Education departments get Rs. 48,000 a year each (\$16,000 or £3,200); Educational Commissioners from 30 to 36,000 Rs. (\$10,000 to \$12,000).

These secretarial officers are not of Cabinet rank. Besides their salaries they get various allowances, and

the purchasing value of the rupee in India is much higher than that of 33 cents in the United States or of 16d. in the United Kingdom, the exchange equivalents of an Indian rupee. The same remarks may be made about Provincial Secretariats. We do not ignore the fact that a European who cuts himself away from his country and people for the best part of his life cannot be expected to give his time, energy and talents for the compensation he might accept in his own country, nor that, if the best kind of European talent is desired for India, the compensation must be sufficiently attractive to tempt competent men to accept it. In Paragraphs 318 to 322, both inclusive, the Secretary of India and the Viceroy have put forward a forceful plea for improvement in the conditions of the European Services by (a) increment in their salaries, (b) expediting promotions, and (c) grant of additional allowances, and also by bettering the prospects of pensions and leave. We are afraid the only way to obtain the concurrence of Indian public opinion in this matter, if at all, is by restricting the number of posts which *must* be held by Europeans. The *cadre* of services to which the rule of percentage is to apply must be reduced in strength, and if Europeans are required for posts outside these they should be employed for short periods and from an open market. For example, it seems inconceivable to us why professional men like doctors, engineers and professors should be recruited for permanent service. Nor is there any reason why the recruitment should be confined to persons of British domicile. The Government of India must be run on business principles. With the exception, perhaps, of the higher posts in the I. C. S. and in the

Army, all other offices should be filled by taking the supply on the best available terms for short periods and from open market. By reducing the number of higher posts to which the rule of percentage should apply, the Government would be reducing the number of Indian officers who could claim the same salary as is given to their European colleagues. In our humble opinion, the latter claim is purely sentimental, and the best interests of the country require that the administration should be as economical as is compatible with efficiency. The strength of the different permanent services should be reduced as much as possible and the deficiency made up by the appointment of the best persons available at the price which the administration may be willing to pay, whether such persons be European, Indian or American. Take the Indian Educational Service, for example. The members start with a salary of 6000 Rs. a year (\$2000 or £400) and rise to about 24,000 Rs. a year (\$8000 or £1600). In the United States, to the best of our knowledge, few professors, if any, get a salary higher than \$7000 or 21,000 Rs. a year. High-class graduates of Harvard, Yale and Columbia start their tutorial careers at \$2000 to \$3000 a year, many at \$1500 a year. These men would refuse to go to India on a similar salary. On the other hand, if a salary of \$4000 to \$10,000 were offered to a select few, the services of *the men at the top* might be had for a short period. Surely, in the best interests of education, it is much better to get first-class men on high salaries for short periods than permanently to have third-class men beginning with smaller salaries and eventually rising to high salaries and ensuring to

themselves life long pensions. What is true of the Educational Service is similarly, if not equally, true of the Medical, the Engineering and other scientific services. At the present time we have men in these technical services who received their education about twenty or twenty-five years ago and whose knowledge of their respective sciences is antiquated and rusty. Apothecaries, absolutely innocent of any knowledge of modern surgery, are often appointed to the post of Civil Surgeons. No sensible Indian desires that the present incumbents should be interfered with, except where it is possible to retire them under the terms of their service. All engagements should be met honorably. What is needed is that in future there should be a radical departure in the practice of appointing non-Indians to responsible posts in India. We do not want to deprive ourselves of the privilege of being guided in our work by European talent, nor should we grudge them adequate compensation for their services. What we object to is (1) racial discrimination; (2) excessive power being vested in individual officers; (3) the employment of more than a necessary number of persons of alien origin; (4) the crippling of the country's resources by burdening its finances with unnecessary pensions and leave allowances, (5) the continuance of men on service lists long after their usefulness has disappeared; (6) the filling of appointments by jobbery, as is now done in the so-called non-regulation provinces. We, in the Punjab, have been "blessed" by the rule of several generations of Smiths, Harrys and Jones. Those who failed to pass the I. C. S. joined the *cadre* by the back door and received the same emoluments as those who entered

it by competition. It is they who block the avenues of promotions and not the sons of the soil.

COST OF ADMINISTRATION

On the subject of the cost of administration it will be instructive to compare the annual salaries allowed to the highest public servants in India, the United States and Japan.

The President of the United States, who ranks with the great royalties of the world in position, gets a salary of \$75,000, without any other allowance. The Prime Minister of Japan gets 12,000 yen, or \$6000. The Viceroy and the Governor General of India gets 250,000 rupees, or \$83,000, besides a very large amount in the shape of various allowances. The Cabinet Ministers of the United States get a salary of \$12,000 each, the Japanese 8000 yen or \$4000, and the Members of the Viceroy's Council, \$26,700 each.

In the whole Federal Government of the United States there are only three offices which carry a salary of more than \$8000. They are:

The President of the General Navy Board	\$13,500
Solicitor General	\$10,000
Assistant Solicitor General	\$9,000

All the other salaries range from \$2100 to \$8000. In the State Department all offices, including those of the secretaries, carry salaries of from \$2100 to \$5000. In the Treasury Department the Treasurer gets \$8000, three other officers having \$6000 each. All the remaining officials get from \$2500 to \$5000. In the War Department there are only two offices which have a salary of \$8000 attached: that of Chief of

Staff and that of Quartermaster General. The rest get from \$2000 to \$6000. In the Navy Department, besides the President of the General Board mentioned above, the President of the Naval Examination Board gets \$8000 and so does the Commandant of the Marine Corps. All the rest get from \$6000 downwards. In the Department of Agriculture there is only one office carrying a salary of \$6000. All the rest get from \$5000 downwards. The Chief of the Weather Bureau, an expert, gets \$6000. In the Commerce Department four experts get \$6000 each, the rest from \$5000 downwards.

In Japan the officials of the Imperial Household have salaries ranging from \$2750 to \$4000. Officials of the Higher Civil Service get from \$1850 to \$2100 a year; the Vice-Minister of State, \$2500; Chief of the Legislative Bureau, \$2500; the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, \$2500; and the Inspector General of the Metropolitan Police, \$2500, President of the Administrative Litigation Court, \$3000; President of the Railway Board, \$3750; President of the Privy Council, \$3000; Vice-President of the Privy Council, \$2750, and so on.

When we come to India we find that the President of the Railway Board gets from \$20,000 to \$24,000 and that two other members of the Railway Board get \$16,000. Secretaries in the Army, Public Works, and Legislative Departments get \$14,000. Secretaries in Finance, Foreign, Home, Revenue, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry Departments get \$16,000. The Secretary in the Education Department gets \$12,000; Joint Secretary, \$10,000; Controller and Auditor-General, \$14,000; Accountant-General, from

\$9,000 to \$11,000; Commissioner of Salt Revenue, \$10,000; Director of Post and Telegraph, from \$12,000 to \$14,000.

Among the officers directly under the Government of India there are only a few who get salaries below \$7000. Most of the others get from that sum up to \$12,000.

The United States includes forty-eight States and territories. Some of them are as large in area, if not even larger, than the several provinces of India. The Governors of these States are paid from \$2500 to \$12,000 a year. Illinois is the only State paying \$12,000; five States, including New York and California, pay \$10,000; two, Massachusetts and Indiana, pay \$8000, one pays \$7000, and three pay \$6000. All the rest pay \$5000 or less. There is only one territory, the Philippines, which pays a salary of \$20,000 to its Governor-General.

In India the Governors of Madras, Bombay and Bengal each receive \$40,000, besides a large amount for allowances. The Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab, the United Provinces, Bihar and Burma get \$33,000 each, besides allowances. The Chief Commissioners receive \$11,000 in Bihar, \$18,700 in Assam, \$20,700 in the Central Provinces, and \$12,000 in Delhi. The Political Residents in the native States receive from \$11,000 to \$16,000, besides allowances.

In Japan the governors of provinces are paid from \$1850 to \$2250 per year, besides allowances varying from \$200 to \$300.

The Provincial services in India are paid on a more lavish scale than anywhere else in the world. In Bengal the salaries range from \$1600 for Assistant

Magistrate and Collector to \$21,333 to Members of the Council, and this same extravagance is also true of the other provinces.

Coming to the Judiciary, we find that Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States get a salary of \$14,500 each, the Chief Justice getting \$15,000; the Circuit Judges get a salary of \$7000 each; the District Judges, \$6000. In the State of New York the Judges of the Supreme Court, belonging to the General Sessions, get from \$17,500 and those of the Special Sessions from \$9000 to \$10,000 each. City Magistrates get from \$7000 to \$8000. In India the Chief Justice of Bengal gets \$24,000; the Chief Justices of Bombay, Madras and the United Provinces, \$20,000 each. The Chief Judges of the Chief Court of the Punjab and Burma get \$16,000 each and the Puisne Judges of the High Courts the same amounts.

The Puisne Judges of the Chief Courts receive \$14,000. In the Province of Bengal the salaries of the District and Session Judges range from \$8,000 to \$12,000. District Judges of the other provinces get from about \$7000 to \$12,000. The Deputy Commissioners in India get a salary in the different provinces ranging from \$6000 to \$9000 a year. The Commissioners get from \$10,000 to \$12,000.

In Japan the Appeal Court Judges and Procurators get from \$900 to \$2500 a year. Only one officer, the President of the Court of Causation, gets as much as \$3000. The District Court Judges and Procurators are paid at the rate of from \$375 to \$1850. It is needless to compare the salaries of minor officials in the three countries. Since the Indian taxpayer has to pay so heavily for the European services engaged in

the work of administration, it is necessary that even Indian officers should be paid on a comparatively high scale, thus raising the cost of administration hugely and affecting most injuriously the condition of the men in the lower grades of the government service. The difference between the salaries of the officers and the men forming the rank and file of the government in the three countries shows clearly how the lowest ranks in India suffer from the fact that the highest governmental officials are paid at such high rates.

In New York City the Chief Inspector gets \$3500 a year, Captains, \$2750; Lieutenants, \$2250; Surgeons, \$1,750; and Patrolmen, \$1,400 each. In Japan the Inspector General of the Metropolitan Police gets \$2500. The figures of the lower officials are not available. But the minimum salary of a Constable is \$6 50 a month, besides which he gets his equipment, uniform and boots free. In India the Inspectors General get from \$8000 to \$12,000, the Deputy Inspectors General from \$6000 to \$7200, District Superintendents of Police from \$2666 to \$4800, Assistants from \$1200 to \$2000, Inspectors from \$600 to \$1000, Sub-inspectors from \$200 to \$400, Head Constables from \$60 to \$80, Constables from \$40 to \$48.

We have taken these figures from the *Indian Year Book*, published by the *Times of India*, Bombay. We know as a fact that the Police-Constables in the Punjab are paid from \$2.67 to \$3.33 per month — that is, from \$32 to \$40 per year. The reader should mark the difference between the grades of salaries from the highest to the lowest in India as compared with the United States and Japan. While in India the lowest

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In New York City the Chief Inspector gets \$3500 a year, Captains, \$2750; Lieutenants, \$2250; Surgeons, \$1,750, and Patrolmen, \$1,400 each. In Japan the Inspector General of the Metropolitan Police gets \$2500. The figures of the lower officials are not available. But the minimum salary of a Constable is \$6.50 a month, besides which he gets his equipment, uniform and boots free. In India the Inspectors General get from \$8000 to \$12,000, the Deputy Inspectors General from \$6000 to \$7200, District Superintendents of Police from \$2666 to \$4800, Assistants from \$1200 to \$2000, Inspectors from \$600 to \$1000, Sub-inspectors from \$200 to \$400, Head Constables from \$60 to \$80, Constables from \$40 to \$48.

We have taken these figures from the *Indian Year Book*, published by the *Times of India*, Bombay. We know as a fact that the Police-Constables in the Punjab are paid from \$2.67 to \$3.33 per month — that is, from \$32 to \$40 per year. The reader should mark the difference between the grades of salaries from the highest to the lowest in India as compared with the United States and Japan. While in India the lowest

officials are frightfully underpaid, the highest grades are paid on a lavish scale. In the other countries of the world this is not the case.

EDUCATIONAL DEPARTMENT

In the United States (we quote the figures of New York) the lowest grade school teachers get a salary of \$720, rising to \$1500 a year. In the upper grades salaries range from \$1820 to \$2260. Principals of elementary schools receive \$3500 and assistants \$2500. In the High Schools salaries range from \$900 to \$3150, in training schools from \$1000 to \$3250. Principals of High Schools and Training Schools receive \$5000 and the same salary is paid to the District Superintendent. The Commissioner of Education in New York gets \$7500.

In Japan the Minister of Education, who is a Cabinet Minister, gets \$4000, and the lowest salaries paid to teachers range from \$8 to \$9 per month. In the United States College Professors make from \$3000 to \$5000 per year, a few only getting higher sums. In Japan salaries range from \$300 to \$2000. Coming to India we find that while the Administrative officials and even the College Professors get fairly high salaries, the teachers in the schools are miserably underpaid.

Even the *Times of India*, an Anglo-Indian newspaper published in Bombay, has recently commented on the colossal difference between the salaries allowed at the top and those allowed at the bottom. Yet recently the Secretary of State has been sanctioning higher leave allowances to the European officers of the Indian Army.

The Secretary of State for India in Council has approved, with effect from January 1, 1919, the following revised rates of leave pay for officers of the Indian Army and Indian Medical service granted leave out of India:

INDIAN ARMY

					per annum
On appointment.	£200
After completion of	3	years' service	.	.	250
"	6	" "	.	.	300
"	9	" "	.	.	350
"	12	" "	.	.	400
"	15	" "	.	.	450
"	18	" "	.	.	500
"	21	" "	.	.	550
"	24	" "	.	.	600
"	27	" "	.	.	650
"	29	" "	.	.	700

• INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.

On appointment	300
After completion of	3	years' service	.	.	350
"	6	" "	.	.	400
"	9	" "	.	.	450
"	12	" "	.	.	500
"	15	" "	.	.	550
"	18	" "	.	.	600
"	21	" "	.	.	650
"	24	" "	.	.	700

VII

THE INDIAN ARMY AND NAVY

The real enemy is the war spirit fostered in Prussia. It is an ideal of a world in which force and brutality reign supreme, as against a world, an ideal of a world, peopled by free democracies, united in an honourable league of peace.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

"The Destruction of a False Ideal"
Speech delivered at the Albert Hall on the
launching of the New War Economy
Campaign, October 22, 1917

When the Indian troops first arrived in October, 1914, the situation was of so drastic a nature that it was necessary to call upon them at once to re-enforce the fighting front and help to stem the great German thrust. Their fine fighting qualities, tenacity, and endurance were well manifested during the first Battle of Ypres before they had been able to completely reorganize after their voyage from India.

LORD FRENCH, the First Commander-in-Chief of British forces on the Western front

The full story of the Palestine victory still remained to be told, BUT WHEN THE RECORD OF THAT GLORIOUS CAMPAIGN WAS UNFOLDED, ACROSS THE PAGE OF HISTORY WOULD BE WRIT LARGE THE NAME OF INDIA.

LORD CHELMSFORD, the Governor-General of India, on September 26, 1918.

As is usual in our history, we have triumphed after many sad blunders and in the end we have defeated Turkey almost single-handed, though our main forces have throughout the war been engaged with another foe. In fact, IT IS TO INDIA THAT OUR RECENT VICTORY IS DUE. . . .

MAJOR GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE in *The New York Times*, November 6, 1918.

The present Governor of the Punjab (his precise designation is Lieutenant Governor), who is the most reactionary, self-complacent and conceited of all the provincial rulers of India, has in the course of his appeals for recruits for the present war said more than once that the right of self-government carries with it the responsibility of defending the country. The distinguished authors of the Report have also remarked in one place that so long as the duty of defending India rests on Great Britain, the British Parliament must control the Government of India. Now let us see what the facts are.

(1) The first thing to be remembered in this connection is that during the whole period of British rule in India, not a penny has been spent by Great Britain for Indian defence. The defence of India has been well provided for by Indian Revenues. On the other hand India has paid millions in helping Great Britain not only in defending the Empire, but in extending

it.¹ Whatever protection has been afforded to India by the British Navy — and that has by no means been small — has been more than repaid by India's services to the Empire in China, Egypt, South Africa and other parts of the world. As to the military forces of India, they consist of two wings: (a) the British and (b) the Indian. The pre-war Indian army consisted of 80,000 British and 160,000 Indians. Indian public opinion has for decades been protesting against the denial to Indians of officers' commissions in the Indian army, as also against the strength of the British element therein. Every British unit of the Indian army from the Field Marshal to the Tommy is paid for his services by India. India pays for these services not only during the time they form part of the Indian army but also for their training and equipment. It pays all their leave, transfer and pension charges. It even pays for whatever provision is made in England for their medical relief, etc. In the line of the military and naval defence of India, Great Britain has not done as much for India as she has done for the dominions and self-governing colonies. Under the circumstances it is adding insult to injury to insinuate that India has in any way shirked the duty of providing for her defence. We will say nothing of India's services during the war.

In the military defence of India, the contribution of the Punjab has always been the greatest. If the British provinces are considered singly, it will be found that the Punjab has been supplying the largest number of units for the Indian army, not only in the

¹See chapter on "How India has helped England make her Empire," in *England's Debt to India*, by the present author.

ranks of the fighters, but also in the ranks of auxiliaries. During this war, too, the Punjab made the largest contribution of both combatants and non-combatants. Yet, if we compare the civil status of the people of the Punjab with that of other provinces, we will find that they have been persistently denied equality of status with Bengal, Bombay and Madras. The Punjab peasantry, which supplies the largest number of soldiers to the army, is the most illiterate and ignorant of all the classes of Indian population. Their economic and legal position may better be studied in Mr. Thorborn's *The Punjab in Peace and in War*. The Municipal and Local Boards of the province do not possess as much independence as has been conceded in the other provinces. The judicial administration of the province is as antiquated as it could possibly be under British rule. Instead of a High Court we have still a Chief court.² Captains and Majors and Colonels are still performing judicial functions as magistrates and judges. The trial by jury in the cases of Indians is unknown. Until lately the Punjab was stamped with the badge of inferiority by being called a non-Regulation province. Even in this report the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy have spoken of it as a backward province. It will thus be seen that the contribution of the Punjab to the military strength of the Empire has in no way benefited her population in getting better opportunities for civil progress or greater civil liberties. But recently the President of the Punjab Provincial Conference uttered hard words against the Provincial administration's policy of repression and coercion. He said that their "cup of disappointment,

² It has now been converted into a High Court.

discontent and misery, in the Punjab, at any rate, was full to overflowing."

So much about the discharge of obligations for military defence carrying with it the right of self-government. The Indians have no desire to shirk their responsibility for the military defence of India; nor do they want to balk their contribution to the Imperial defence. Their demands in this respect may be thus summarised:

- (1) That the Indian Army should be mainly officered by the Indians.
- (2) That as much as is possible of the arms and ammunition equipment, and the military stores required for the Indian army be produced in India.
- (3) That the strength of the British element be considerably reduced.
- (4) That the nature of the Indian army, which is at present one of hired soldiers, be converted into that of a National Militia with a small standing army and a great reserve.
- (5) That in order to do it, some kind of compulsory military training be introduced. All young men between the ages of 17 and 21 may be required to undergo military training and put in at least one year of military service.
- (6) That as a preliminary step towards it the existing Arms Act be repealed and, under proper safeguards, the people be allowed to carry and possess arms in peace and war, so as to be familiar with their use.
- (7) That slowly and gradually, as funds can be

spared from the other demands more urgent and pressing, an Indian Navy be built.

Having explained the position of the Indian Nationalist in this matter, we will now see what Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford say on this matter in their report. In Paragraph 328 they state the "Indian wishes" and point out that "for some years Indian politicians have been urging the right of Indians in general to bear arms in defence of their country"; and that "we have everywhere met a general demand from the political leaders for extended opportunities for military service," but that the subject being more or less outside the scope of their enquiry and "requirements of the future" being dependent "on the form of peace which is attained," they "leave this question for consideration hereafter with the note that it must be faced and settled"

In Paragraph 330 they deal with the question of "British Commissions for Indians."

"The announcement of his Majesty's Government that 'the bar which has hitherto prevented the admission of Indians to commissioned rank in His Majesty's Army should be removed' has established the principle that the Indian soldier can earn the King's commission by his military conduct. It is not enough merely to assert a principle We must act on it. The services of the Indian army in the war and the great increase in its numbers make it necessary that a considerable number of commissions should now be given. The appointments made so far have been few. Other methods of appointment have not yet been decided on, but we are impressed with the necessity of grappling with the problem. We also wish to establish the principle that if an Indian is enlisted as a private in a

British unit of His Majesty's Army its commissioned ranks also should be open to him."

The "other methods of appointment" that have been announced since the report was signed are far from satisfactory. It has been said that the responsibility for this niggardly policy in the matter of admitting Indians to the Commissioned ranks of the army rests with the Home Government and that the Indian Government's recommendations were much more liberal. Now, as practical men, we fully realize that for some time to come, at least until British suspicion of India's desire to get out of the Empire is completely removed by the grant of responsible government to India, India's military policy and the Indian army must be controlled by the British executive. On that point all the parties in India are agreed. But it is absolutely necessary that some steps be at once taken to remove the stigma of military helplessness from India's forehead. Let the British retain the control and the command, but let us share the responsibility to some extent and let our young men be trained for the future defence of their Motherland. To deprive them of all means of doing that, to charge them with neglect of that paramount duty and then to urge it as a disqualification of civil liberties, is hardly fair.

VIII

THE EUROPEAN COMUNITY IN INDIA

The old world, at least, believed in ideals. It believed that justice, fair play, liberty, righteousness must triumph in the end, that is, however you interpret the phrase, the old world believed in God, and it staked its existence on that belief. Millions of gallant young men volunteered to die for that divine faith. But if wrong emerged triumphant out of this conflict, the new world would feel in its soul that brute force alone counted in the government of man; and the hopelessness of the dark ages would once more fall on the earth like a cloud

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

"No Halfway House" Speech delivered
at Gray's Inn, December 14, 1917.

A WHOLE section of the Report has been devoted to a consideration of the claims of the European Community in India. It is said:

"We cannot conclude without taking into due account the presence of a considerable community of non-official Europeans in India. In the main they are engaged in commercial enterprises; but besides these are the missions, European and American, which in furthering education, building up character, and in-

culcating healthier domestic habits have done work for which India should be grateful. There are also an appreciable number of retired officers and others whose working life has been given to India, settled in the cooler parts of the country. When complaints are rife that European commercial interests are selfish and drain the country of wealth which it ought to retain, *it is well to remind ourselves how much of India's material prosperity is due to European commerce.*" [The italics are ours].

We have no desire to raise a controversy over the assumption which underlies the last statement in the above extract. The authors are themselves cognizant of it when they remark, later on, that the "benefit" which India has received by her commercial development in European hands is "not less because it was incidental and not the purpose of the undertaking." These are matters on which the Indian Nationalist may well hold his own opinion and yet endorse the spirit of the following observations:

"Clearly it is the duty of British Commerce in India to identify itself with the interests of India, which are higher than the interests of any community, to take part in political life, to use its considerable wealth and opportunities to commend itself to India, and having demonstrated both its value and its good intentions, to be content to rest like other industries on the new foundation of Government in the wishes of the people. No less is it the wish of Indian politicians to respect the expectations which have been implicitly held out; to remember how India has profited by commercial development which only British capital and enterprise achieved; to bethink themselves that though the capital invested in private enterprises was not borrowed under any assurance that the existing form of government would endure, yet the favourable

terms on which money was obtained for India's development were undoubtedly affected by the fact of British rule; and to abstain from advocating differential treatment aimed not so much at promoting Indian as at injuring British commerce."

We must say that the last insinuation is perfectly gratuitous. Nor is it correct to say even by implication that the non-official European community has hitherto abstained from taking part in politics. The fact is that Indian politics have hitherto been too greatly dominated by the British merchant both at home and in India. The British merchant doing business in India had to submit to the prior claims of the British manufacturers in Great Britain in matters in which their interests did not coincide, but otherwise their interests received the greatest possible attention from the Government of India. In proportion to their incomes derived from India by the employment of Indian labour on terms more or less guaranteed to them by the Indian Government's special legislation they have made the smallest possible contribution to the Indian Revenues; yet they have been the greatest possible hindrance in the development of Indian liberties. They have all the time owned a powerful press which has employed all the resources of education and enlightenment, all the powers of manipulating facts and figures in maintaining and strengthening the rule of autocracy in the country. We do not propose to open these wounds. But we cannot help remarking that so far they have exercised quite a disproportionate influence in the decisions of the Government of India. Those of them who are domiciled in the country are our brothers and no Indian

has the least desire to do anything that will harm them in any way. Their importance must, in future, be determined not by their race or colour or creed but by their numbers, their education and their position in the economic life of the country. They must no longer lord it over the Indians simply because they are of European descent. They should claim no preferences or exemptions because of that fact. As an integral part of the Indian body politic they are entitled to all the consideration which they deserve by virtue of their intellectual or economic position. They should henceforth be Indo-British both in spirit and in name. They will find the Indians quite ready to forget the past and embrace them as brothers for the common prosperity of their joint country.

As regards the other European merchants who are not domiciled in India but are there just to make money and return to spend it in their native land, they are no more entitled to any place in the political machinery of the Indian Government than the Hindus who trade in the United States or in England. So far every European, of whatever nationality he might be, has occupied a position of privilege in India. He was granted rights which were denied to the sons of the soil. Every German or Austrian or Bulgarian could keep or carry any number and kind of arms he wanted without any license, while the natives of India, even of the highest position, could not do so unless exempted either by virtue of their rank or by the favour of the Administration. Jews and Armenians, Turks and Russians, Scandinavians, Danes, Italians and Swiss all enjoyed the privilege. When charged with any serious offence punishable by im-

prisonment for more than six months, they could claim trial by a jury having a majority of Europeans on it, while no Indian outside the Presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras had that right. Even there, the jury trying an Indian could include a majority of Europeans. In the famous trial of Mr. B. G. Tilak in 1908, the jury was composed of seven Europeans and two Parsees. It is obvious that these discriminations in favour of the Europeans must cease and that no European not domiciled in India should enjoy a position of special privilege. Indians are noted for their hospitality and chivalry. Their own codes of honor effectively prevent them from doing any harm or injury to a foreigner. Every European doing business in India or on any other errand is a guest of honor and entitled to that treatment, provided he does not assume racial superiority and look down upon the people of the country and take advantage of their being subjects of a European power. No Indian will be so foolish as to injure the commercial development of his country by scaring the foreign trader or the foreign capitalist. All that he wants is freedom to lay down the terms on which that trade will be carried on consistently with the interests of India's millions. What he stands for is equality and reciprocity. As other peoples are free to name the conditions on which the foreign trader may do business in their countries, so must the Indians be. Nothing more and nothing less than this is demanded.

As regards the citizens of the British Empire also, the same right of reciprocity is demanded. We are glad that the representatives of the Dominions have

recognized the justice of that claim, and expressed their willingness to concede it.

Coming to the Missions, European and American, the advice given is rather gratuitous. The Indians have left nothing undone to show their gratitude to them for the good work done by them in spite of the fact that they, too, in the past, have not hesitated to use the fact of their race and colour for the benefit of their propaganda. The person of a religious man is sacred in the eyes of an Indian, regardless of his particular creed. The Christian missionary has so far enjoyed a unique position of safety and freedom in the country even to a greater extent than the Hindu or the Moslem priest. The latter have often quarrelled amongst themselves, but the former they have always respected and honored. There is absolutely no reason to think that this is likely to change in any way by the grant of political liberty to the Indians.

It is possible, however, that, with the growth of free thought in India, religious teachers of all denominations may not continue to be the recipients of the same honour as has been paid to them in the past by virtue of their religious office. Dogmatic religion, whether it be Hinduism, Mohammedanism or Christianity is in a state of decay. In that respect India is feeling the reaction of world forces and no amount of political coercion or repression can stop it. In my humble judgment the average Indian has thus far been more tolerant of and more considerate to the Christian missionary than the latter has been to the Indian. Even in the matter of gratitude the Christian missionary may with advantage learn from the Hindu. The instances are not rare in which all the hospitality,

respect and honor which a Christian missionary has received during his stay in India have been repaid by the latter's freely traducing the character of the Indians in his home land. To no small degree is the Christian missionary responsible for the feeling of contempt with which the Indian is looked down upon in America and other countries of the West. We do not object to his speaking the truth, but it is not the truth that he always speaks. Of gratitude, at least, he gives no evidence.

The European Community in India is divided into two classes: (a) pure Europeans, who number a little less than 200,000 in the total population of 315,000,000. (178,908 in the British provinces and 20,868 in the native States.)

(b) Anglo-Indians, hitherto called Eurasians, who number about 83,000 (68,612 in British territories and 15,045 in the Native States). Thus the whole European community in India is less than 300,000.

IX

THE NATIVE STATES

THE Native States of India constitute one of the anomalies of Indian political life. They are the honored remnants of the old order of things — an order in which personal bravery, resourcefulness and leadership with or without capacity for successful intrigue enabled individuals to carve out kingdoms and principalities for themselves and their legal successors.

In the case of some of these Native States the genealogies of the ruling houses go back to the early centuries of the Christian era by historical evidence and to pre-Christian times by tradition. Their origin is somewhat shrouded in mystery. In popular belief they are the descendants of gods — gods of light and life, the Sun and the Moon. Next to the Royal family of Japan, they are perhaps the only houses among the rulers of the earth which can claim such an ancient and unbroken lineage of royalty with sovereignty of one kind or another always vested in them. There have been times in their history when the royal heads of these states had no house to live in and no bed to sleep on, much less a territory to rule and an army to command. This was, however, a part of their royalty. In struggles against powerful enemies, sometimes of their own race and religion, but more often foreign aggressors of different blood and creed,

they were many a time worsted and driven to extreme straits of poverty and helplessness. In peace or in war, in prosperity or in misery, they never gave up the struggle. Their right to lead their people and to rule their country they never yielded for a moment. It is true that sometimes they submitted to the superior power of the enemy and accepted a position of subordination, though in one case, at least, even this was done only for a short time under the Moguls. In the darker days of Indian history, when the military devastation of foreign invaders left nothing but tears and blood, ruin and ashes, defeat and misery in their track, these houses kept the lamp of hope burning. For full ten centuries they carried on a struggle of life and death, sometimes momentarily succumbing before the overwhelming force of their adversaries, but only to rise again in fresh vigor and life to reclaim their heritage and preserve their own and their country's independence.

The *Sessodias* of Mewar called the *Ranas* of Mewar (Udaipur) and the *Rahtores* of Marwar (including Jodhpur, Bikaner, Rutlam, Kishangarh and Alwar) have written many a glorious page of Mediaeval Indian history and dyed it with their own blood as well as that of their adversaries. Not only their men but their women have made themselves immortal by their bravery, chivalry, purity and self-immolation. The one thing which distinguishes the Indian Rajput from the peoples of other lands is that he has never waged war against the poor, the helpless and the defenceless. Numberless men gave their lives freely and ungrudgingly not only in protecting the lives of their own women and children but also in doing the same service to the

women and children of their enemies. The Rajput never fought an unfair fight. He never took advantage of the helplessness of his enemy and always gave him right of way and the use of his best weapons for a free and fair fight in the open. Anyone desirous of knowing their deeds may read them in that poem in prose, known as the Annals of Rajasthan by Col. Todd. Col. Todd has drawn a most faithful and thrilling picture of Rajput bravery and Rajput chivalry in a language worthy of the best traditions of English literature. Here and there in matters of minor details his authority has been questioned, otherwise the results of his monumental labors still remain the best picture of Rajput India. The Rajput States of India are thus the objects of reverent honor to the 220 million Hindus of that country. Next to the Rajput States comes the native ruling family of Mysore as the representative of a very ancient Hindu Kingdom. The Mahratta States are the remnants of the Mahratta Empire and the Sikhs those of the Sikh Commonwealth. The biggest of all the Indian Native States, Hyderabad, arose out of the ruins of the Mogul Empire and is supposed to be the most powerful guardian of Moslem culture and tradition. From this description the reader will at once see why the Native States are so dear to the peoples of India and why the Indian educated party has always stood by the Native States, whenever either their treaty rights or the personal dignity and status of their chiefs was threatened by the British authorities. Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation by lapse was so much resented by the people of India that it had almost cost the British their Indian Empire. Only in the Native States do

the Indians see remaining traces of their former independence. That fact alone covers all the defects of native rule or misrule in the States, in their eyes. Some of these Native States have been so well administered that in education, social reform and industrial advancement they are far ahead of the neighboring British territories. But their chief merit lies in the fact that ordinarily the people get enough food to eat and are seemingly happier than British subjects. This fact has been noticed by several competent observers of contemporary Indian life, among them the Right Honorable Mr. Fisher, President of the Board of Education in England. In his book *The Empire and the Future* he has observed:

“My impression is that the inhabitants of a well governed native state are on the whole happier and more contented than the inhabitants of British India. *They are more lightly taxed*; the pace of the administration is less urgent and exacting; their sentiment is gratified by the splendor of a native court and by the dominion of an Indian government. They feel that they do things for themselves instead of having everything done for them by a cold and alien benevolence.” (Italics are ours)

But after all that is favourable to the Native States of India has been said, their existence in their present form remains a political anomaly. As at present situated, they are an effective hindrance to complete Indian unity. Although “India is in fact as well as by legal definition, one geographical whole,” yet these Native States, occupying about one-third of the total area of the country and with a population of about 70 million will, for a long time, prevent its becoming

a homogeneous political whole. Thus a circumstance which was hitherto looked upon as a piece of good luck will operate as a misfortune.

"The Native States of India are about 700 in number. They embrace the widest variety of country and jurisdiction. They vary in size from petty States like Rewa, in Rajputana, with an area of 19 square miles, and the Simla Hill States, which are little more than small holdings, to States like Hyderabad, as large as Italy, with a population of thirteen millions."¹

The general position as regards the rights and obligations of the Native States has been thus summed up by the distinguished authors of the joint Report (Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu):

"The States are guaranteed security from without; the paramount power acts for them in relation to foreign powers and other States, and it intervenes when the internal peace of their territories is seriously threatened. On the other hand the States' relations to foreign powers are those of the paramount power, they share the obligation for the common defence; and they are under a general responsibility for the good government and welfare of their territories."

As regards the assimilation of the principles of modern life, it is remarked in the same document:

"Many of them have adopted our civil and criminal codes. Some have imitated and even further extended our educational system. . . They have not all been equally able to assimilate new principles. They are in all stages of development, patriarchal, feudal or more advanced, while in a few states are found the beginnings of representative institutions. The characteristic features of all of them, however, including

¹ *The Indian Year Book* for 1918, p. 81.

the most advanced, are the personal rule of the Prince and his control over legislation and the administration of justice."

Under the circumstances the question of questions is how these territories are going to fall into line with the British controlled area in the matter of the development of responsible Government. We will once more quote the opinion of the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy, who say:

"We know that the States cannot be unaffected by constitutional development in adjoining provinces. Some of the more enlightened and thoughtful of the Princes, among whom are included some of the best known names, have realised this truth, and have themselves raised the question of their own share in any scheme of reform. Others of the Princes — again including some of the most honored names — desire only to leave matters as they are. We feel the need for caution in this matter. It would be a strange reward for loyalty and devotion to force new ideas upon those who did not desire them; but it would be no less strange, if out of consideration for those who perhaps represent gradually vanishing ideas, we were to refuse to consider the suggestions of others who have been no less loyal and devoted. Looking ahead to the future we can picture India to ourselves only as presenting the external semblance to some form of 'federation.' The provinces will ultimately become self-governing units, held together by the central Government which will deal solely with matters of common concern to all of them. But the matters common to the British provinces are also to a great extent those in which the Native States are interested — defence, tariffs, exchange, opium, salt, railways and posts and telegraphs. The gradual concentration of the Government of India upon such matters will therefore make it easier for the States, while retaining

the autonomy which they cherish in internal matters, to enter into closer association with the central Government if they wish to do so. But though we have no hesitation in forecasting such a development as possible, the last thing that we desire is to attempt to force the pace. Influences are at work which need no artificial stimulation. All that we need or can do is to open the door to the natural developments of the future."

In Paragraphs 302 to 305 the authors of the Report state the process by which this development may be expedited. Disavowing any intention of forcibly altering treaty rights, they propose to classify the States into (a) those that have "full authority over their internal affairs," (b) those "in which Government exercises through its Agents large powers of internal control," (c) those who are really no more "than mere owners of a few acres of land." It is further pointed out that hitherto the

"general clause which occurs in many of the treaties to the effect that the Chief shall remain absolute Ruler of his country has not in the past precluded and does not even now preclude 'interference with the administration by Government through the agency of its representatives at the Native Courts.' We need hardly say that such interference has not been employed in wanton disregard of treaty obligations. During the earlier days of our intimate relations with the States British agents found themselves compelled, often against their will, to assume responsibility for the welfare of the people, to restore order out of chaos, to prevent inhuman practices, and to guide the hands of a weak or incompetent Ruler as the only alternative to the termination of his rule. So too, at the present day, the Government of India acknowledges as trustee, a responsibility (which the Princes themselves desire

to maintain) for the proper administration of States during a minority, and also an obligation for the prevention or correction of flagrant misgovernment."

And also that:

"the position hitherto taken up by Government has been that the conditions under which some of the treaties were executed have undergone material changes, and the literal fulfilment of particular obligations which they impose has become impracticable. Practice has been based on the theory that treaties must be read as a whole, and that they must be interpreted in the light of the relation established between the parties not only at the time when a particular treaty was made, but subsequently."

On these grounds it is proposed to establish a Council of Princes to which questions which affect the States generally or are of concern to the Empire as a whole, or to British India and the States in common, may be referred for advice and opinion. So long as the Princes do not intervene either formally or informally in the internal affairs of British India, we have no objection to the scheme. On the other hand, we do hope some method will be found by which, with the consent of the parties interested the smaller principalities scattered all over the country may, for administrative purposes, be merged either in the British area or in the bigger Native States which possess full power of autonomy over their internal affairs. In the long run it will be comparatively easy to convert the latter to an acceptance of the modern principles of government if the number of Native States is reduced and their people achieve that solidarity which comes by community of interests and ideas. In this connection it is a happy augury for the future that some of the

highest Chiefs like those of Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, Indore, Kashmir, Bikaner, Jodhpore, Alwar, and Patiala are alive to the importance of marching with the times. The people of British India owe them a great debt of gratitude for the moral support they have given to their claim for responsible Government by coming out openly and freely in favour of the proposed advance. We are sure that these Princes will in due time take measures to bring their own territories in line with the British provinces and thus strengthen the ties that bind them to their own peoples as well as to the other people of India. After all, there can be no manner of doubt, as the authors of the report predict,

“that the processes at work in British India cannot leave the States untouched and must in time affect even those whose ideas and institutions are of the most conservative and feudal character.”

It is the path of wisdom and sagacity to recognise the world forces that are at work. No amount of ancient prestige can prevent the people from coming into their own. “The age of despotism is gone and the autocrats of today must sooner or later hand over their powers to the people. The more they conciliate them the longer perhaps they may be able to lead them. They may continue as leaders for a long time, but as autocratic dispensers of favours and fortunes they cannot remain, perhaps not even for their life time.

In our judgment this part of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report is no less important for the future of Indian democracy than the others that directly deal with

British India, and we hope that whatever might be the policy as regards the existing States the new law will make it impossible for the Government of India and the Secretary of State to create any new States in the future. It is monstrous to transfer millions of human beings from one kind of political rule to another like so many cattle, as was done in 1911. The present rule of any Indian Maharaja may be as good or as bad as that of a British Governor or Lieutenant Governor, but the latter has in it greater democratic potentialities than the former, for the mere fact, if for no other, that, while the British are more or less amenable to world opinion, the rulers of Native States are not. It is inhuman, and not in accord with modern ideas of right and wrong to reward somebody's loyalty by giving him power of life and death over numerous fellow beings, otherwise than in due course of law. Even the mighty British Government is not the owner of the bodies and souls of its subjects in India. How, then, can it assume the right of abandoning them to the absolute rule of a single individual, however worthy or loyal he may be? We hope this stupid way of rewarding loyal services may be ended by an express provision to that effect in the statute which will be passed relating to the reorganization of the Government of India.

In this connection the following observations made in a leading editorial of the *Servant of India*, Poona (February 16, 1919), are worthy of attention:

"A hundred years ago, it was decidedly in the interests of British rule, and probably also in the interests of the people of India generally, that the small, ill-governed, and eternally fighting states of India

should come under the suzerainty of a single powerful power. It may be regarded as a historical misfortune that this power happened then to be foreign, though many regard this contact with a virile civilization as the making of India. This suzerainty could then be established duly by entering into treaties with these states and guaranteeing them certain rights and privileges. But these treaties have now assumed in the eyes of the descendants of the original princes an air of inspiration; they have become a kind of perpetuity. They always come in the way of any improvement. When any new policy is proposed to them, they are always prepared to say, 'This is not in the bond.' One may be allowed to speculate as to how many of these Highnesses would have survived to this day to put forward this claim in the absence of the suzerain power. Thrones in ancient days were as unstable as they are becoming now in Europe. It is hardly possible that the present popular wave in Europe would not have touched our Native States. The subjects of the states would have clamoured for a recognition of their rights, and they would have had their way. But now the princes feel quite secure. Have they not got their treaties? As a result there is no political life at all in the Native States. The most ardent advocate of Home Rule would be most violently against migration to a Native State. The real problem of the Native States is how to get over the treaties when they conflict with the interests of their subjects. The questions discussed at the Chiefs' Conference leave us comparatively cold, as they entirely neglect the people most concerned. The questions of the rights of the chiefs and their salutes or precedence

are in our opinion of a very secondary importance. A renowned statesman in Europe gave at the utmost a life of a dozen years to the most solemn treaty between two countries, for in that period circumstances alter and the solid foundation for the treaty cracks. Is it not high time that the treaties with the chiefs should be revised after over a hundred years? It would indeed redound to their credit if the chiefs themselves come forward to submit to such readjustment. Perhaps their autocratic and irresponsible power may have to suffer some diminution. But if they consent to that diminution so as to give it to their subjects in the modern democratic spirit, the real power and influence of the Native States will increase incalculably. It is in this direction we wish to see a solution of the problem of the Native States which are nowadays working as a brake on our national progress."

X

THE PROPOSALS

There are epochs in the history of the world when in a few raging years the character, the destiny, of the whole race is determined for unknown ages. This is one.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

"Sowing the Winter Wheat" Speech delivered at Carnarvon, to a meeting of constituents, after becoming Prime Minister, February 3, 1917

PART II of the Report contains the scheme which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford propose for the solution of the problem which they had set themselves to solve in Part I. In giving their reasons for a new policy they observe:

"No further development (on old lines) is possible unless we are going to give the people of India some responsibility for their own government. But no one can imagine that no further development is necessary. It is evident that the present machinery of government no longer meets the needs of the time; it works slowly and it produces irritation; there is a widespread demand on the part of educated Indian opinion for its alteration; and the need for advance is recognised by official opinion also." [Italics are ours.]

The new policy sketched by them is, in their judgment, "the logical outcome of the past. Indians

must be enabled, in so far as they attain responsibility, to determine for themselves what they want done

“... such limitations on powers as we are now proposing are due only to the obvious fact that time is necessary in order to train both representatives and electorates for the work which we desire them to undertake; and that we offer Indians opportunities at short intervals to prove the progress they are making and to make good their claim, not by the method of agitation but by positive demonstration, to the further stages in self-government which we have just indicated.”

That is the only basis on which they maintain they can hope to see in India “the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the Empire as a whole.” With these and a few more prefatory remarks about the educational problem and the attitude of the ryot and the enunciation of the general principles on which their proposals are based they proceed to formulate their scheme, starting first with the provinces.

I

The proposals relating to Provincial Government may be noticed under the following heads:

(a) *Financial devolution*: It is proposed that henceforth there should be a complete separation of the provincial finances from those of the Government of India; that, reserving certain sources of revenue for the Government of India, all others should be made over to the Provincial Governments with the proviso that the first charge on all Provincial revenues will be a contribution towards the maintenance of the Government of India, considered necessary and demanded

by the latter. A certain amount of power to impose fresh taxes and to raise loans is also conceded to the provincial Governments subject to the veto of the Government of India.

(b) *Legislative devolution*: "It is our intention," say the authors of the report, "to reserve to the Government of India a general overriding power of legislation for the discharge of all functions which it will have to perform. It should be enabled under this power to intervene in any province for the protection and enforcement of the interests for which it is responsible; to legislate on any provincial matter in respect of which uniformity of legislation is desirable, either for the whole of India or for any two or more provinces; and to pass legislation which may be adopted either *simpliciter* or with modifications by any province which may wish to make use of it. We think that the Government of India must be the sole judge of the propriety of any legislation which it may undertake under any one of these categories, and that its competence so to legislate should not be open to challenge in the courts. Subject to these reservations we intend that within the field which may be marked off for provincial legislative control the sole legislative power shall rest with the provincial legislatures." It is not proposed to put a statutory limitation on the power of the Government of India to legislate for the provinces, but it is hoped that "constitutional practice" will prevent the central Government interfering in provincial matters unless the interests for which the latter is responsible are directly affected.

(c) *Provincial Executive*: Article 220 gives the Governor the power to appoint "one or two additional

members of his Government as members without portfolio for purposes of consultation and advice."

These, in substance, are the proposals of the Secretary of State and the Government of India for the future government of the provinces into which India is divided. Some of these latter and some other tracts are expressly excluded from the operation of these recommendations. It will be at once observed that this is neither autonomy nor home rule. It is a kind of hybrid system with final powers of veto and control vested in the Government of India. The provision as to Provincial Legislatures make it still more complicated.

"Let us now explain how we contemplate in future that the executive Governments of the provinces shall be constituted. As we have seen, three provinces are now governed by a Governor and an Executive Council of three members, of whom one is in practice an Indian and two are usually appointed from the Indian Civil Service, although the law says only that they must be qualified by twelve years' service under the Crown in India. One province, Bihar and Orissa, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor with a council of three constituted in the same way. The remaining five provinces, that is to say, the three Lieutenant-Governorships of the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma and the Chief Commissioner-ships of the Central Provinces and Assam are under the administration of a single official Head. We find throughout India a very general desire for the extension of Council government. . . . Our first proposition, therefore, is that in all these provinces singleheaded administration must cease and be replaced by collective administration.

"In determining the structure of the Executive we have to bear in mind the duties with which it will

be charged. We start with the two postulates; the complete responsibility for the government cannot be given immediately without inviting a breakdown, and that some responsibility must be given at once if our scheme is to have any value. We have defined responsibility as consisting primarily in amenability to constituents, and in the second place in amenability to an assembly. We do not believe that there is any way of satisfying these governing conditions other than by making a division of the functions of the Government, between those which may be made over to popular control and those which for the present must remain in official hands. . . . We may call these the 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects respectively. It then follows that for the management of these two categories there must be some form of executive body, with a legislative organ in harmony with it. . . .

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"We propose therefore that in each province the executive Government should consist of two parts. One part would comprise the head of the province and an executive council of two members. In all provinces the head of the Government would be known as Governor. . . . One of the two Executive Councillors would in practice be a European qualified by long official experience, and the other would be an Indian. It has been urged that the latter should be an elected member of the provincial legislative council. It is unreasonable that choice should be so limited. It should be open to the Governor to recommend whom he wishes. . . . The Governor in council would have charge of the reserved subjects. The other part of the government would consist of one member or more than one member, according to the number and importance of the transferred subjects, chosen by the Governor from the elected members of the Legislative council. They would be known as ministers. They would be members of the executive

Government but not members of the Executive Council; they would be appointed for the life-time of the legislative council, and if reelected to that body would be re-eligible for appointment as members of the Executive. As we have said, they would not hold office at the will of the legislature but at that of their constituents.

"The portfolios dealing with the transferred subjects would be committed to the ministers, and on these subjects the ministers together with the Governor would form the administration. On such subjects their decision would be final, subject only to the Governor's advice and control. We do not contemplate that from the outset the Governor should occupy the position of a purely constitutional Governor who is bound to accept the decisions of his ministers."

(d) *Provincial Legislatures*: "We propose there shall be in each province an enlarged legislative council, differing in size and composition from province to province,* with a substantial elected majority, elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary."

The questions of franchise and special and communal representation have been entrusted to a special committee the report of which is shortly expected. The same committee will also decide how many official members there will be on each Legislative Council. It is provided that the Governor shall be the President of the Council and will have the power to nominate a Vice-president from the official members. As to the effect of resolutions it is said that "we do not propose that resolutions, whether on reserved or transferred subjects should be binding."

The classification of the reserved and transferred

subjects was also left to a special committee which has since concluded its labours and whose report is awaited with interest.

Legislation on reserved subjects:

“For the purpose of enabling the provincial Government to get through its legislation on reserved subjects, we propose that the head of the Government should have power to certify that a Bill dealing with a reserved subject is a measure ‘essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of the province or of any part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsibility for the reserved subjects.’ . . . The Bill will be read and its general principles discussed in the full legislative council. It will at this stage be open to the council by a majority vote to request the Governor to refer to the Government of India, whose decision on the point shall be final, on the question whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved subject. If no such reference is made, or if the Government of India decide that the certificate has been properly given, the Bill will then be automatically referred to a Grand Committee of the council. Its composition should reproduce as nearly as possible the proportion of the various elements in the larger body . . . the grand committee in every council should be constituted so as to comprise from 40 to 50 per cent of its strength. It should be chosen for each Bill, partly by election by ballot, and partly by nomination. The Governor should have power to nominate a bare majority exclusive of himself. Of the members so nominated not more than two-thirds should be officials, and the elected element should be elected *ad hoc* by the elected members of the council on the system of the transferable vote.”

“On reference to the grand committee, the Bill will be debated by that body in the ordinary course, if necessary referred to a select committee, to which

body we think that the grand committee should have power to appoint any member of the legislative council whether a member of the grand committee or not. The select committee will, as at present, have power to take evidence. Then, after being debated in the grand committee and modified as may be determined, the Bill will be reported to the whole council. The council will have the right to discuss the Bill again generally, but will not be able to reject it, or to amend it except on the motion of a member of the executive council. The Governor will then appoint a time limit within which the Bill may be debated in the council, and on its expiry it will pass automatically. But during such discussion the council will have the right to pass a resolution recording any objection which refers to the principle or details of the measure (but not, of course, to the certificate of its character), and any such resolution will accompany the Act when, after being signed by the Governor, it is submitted to the Governor General and the Secretary of State."

Provincial Budget: . . . the provincial budget should be framed by the executive Government as a whole. The first charge on provincial revenues will be the contribution to the Government of India; and after that the supply for the reserved subjects will have priority. The allocation of supply for the transferred subjects will be decided by the ministers. If the revenue is insufficient for their needs, the question of new taxation will be decided by the Governor and the ministers. We are bound to recognise that in time new taxation will be necessary, for no conceivable economies can finance the new developments which are to be anticipated. The budget will then be laid before the council which will discuss it and vote by resolution upon the allotments. If the legislative council rejects or modifies the proposed allotment for reserved subjects, the Governor should have power to insist on the whole or any part of the allotment originally provided, if for reasons to be stated he certifies

its necessity in the terms which we have already suggested. We are emphatically of opinion that the Governor in Council must be empowered to obtain the supply which he declares to be necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities. Except in so far as the Governor exercises this power the budget would be altered in accordance with the resolutions carried in council."

Modification of the Scheme by the Government of India.
"After five years' time from the first meeting of the reformed councils we suggest that the Government of India should hear applications from either the provincial Government or the provincial council for the modification of the reserved and transferred lists of the province; and that, after considering the evidence laid before them, they should recommend for the approval of the Secretary of State the transfer of such further subjects to the transferred list as they think desirable. On the other hand, if it should be made plain to them that certain functions have been seriously maladministered, it will be open to them, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, to retransfer subjects from the transferred to the reserved list, or to place restrictions for the future on the minister's powers in respect of certain transferred subjects. . . . But it is also desirable to complete the responsibility of the ministers for the transferred subjects. This should come in one of two ways, either at the initiative of the council if it desires and is prepared to exercise greater control over the ministers, or at the discretion of the Government of India, which may wish to make this change as a condition of the grant of new, or of the maintainance of existing, powers. We propose, therefore, that the Government of India may, when hearing such applications, direct that the ministers' salaries, instead of any longer being treated as a reserved subject, and, therefore, protected in the last resort by the Governor's order from interference should be specifically voted each year by the legislative council;