

THE

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
SINCE 1834.

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and whose countries laid intermingled with our own, external wars—carried on beyond our natural limits and boundaries; adding new and more warlike races to our peaceable millions; thereby making our Eastern Empire heterogeneous; advancing our frontiers to unknown difficulties and embarrassments; and subjecting the safety and security of India to the whims, caprices and predatory habits of less civilized neighbours, on whom it is almost impossible to establish any restraining influence and to whom religious bigotry and love of independence render our rule hateful. Thus, during the last Charter Act, war has not only been the chronic characteristic of the Indian Government; but war of a kind and a danger such as never was before known in India.

These wars were not necessary for the safety,—they have retarded the improvement, and diminished the happiness of the Natives of India, whilst they have exhausted the resources of the Government; but they were the natural result of the system established in 1818 for it wanted the responsibility and the “correctives” which keep human rulers at peace. There is now no second opinion concerning the criminality and wickedness of the Afghan war. It was an unprovoked attack on the independence of well-disposed neighbours, and a revolutionary effort to change their ruling dynasty for the supposed benefit of India. But its reverses and disgrace; its cost of eighteen millions sterling, and its loss of an army 12,000 strong, were all thrown away on a Government without responsibility. The Scinde war quickly followed the Afghan war. A desert impassable for an army, and behind which were all our resources, separated and defended British India from Scinde. But the Indian Government resolved to obtain “command over the navigation of the Indus,” and under the delusion that it would lead to a great and profitable commerce with Central Asia, it coerced the Ameers into treaties they could not fulfil, and conditions that were intolerable because disgraceful to them. It deposed them, seized their country and their treasures, became itself the victim of a miserable fraud, and in annexing Scinde gained a large annual pecuniary loss; which is a charge on the industry of the Natives of India. It did more, however, than acquire a worthless state; it committed a great political error. By annexing

...brought itself into contact with  
s, residing in mountain fastnesses, and laid itself open to  
ack in its front. . Worse still, it alarmed the Government  
Punjab in the very crisis and agonies of its history.

death of the remarkable Prince, who had so long ruled that  
country with wisdom, energy, and foresight, was followed by civil war.  
and at this juncture the Indian Government thrust itself in the way  
the contending factions; and by its aggressions on their neigh-  
bours, by its collection of troops on their frontiers, and by its occu-  
pation of neutral territory, alarmed them for their own safety.  
The Army in a state of revolt was led to the Sutlej to be slaugh-  
tered by the English, and it was not till four severe general actions  
had been fought on the south bank of the Sutlej in seven weeks,  
that our army could venture across that river. These battles  
cost us considerably dearer in the ratio of casualties than the  
battle of Waterloo. Instead, however, of retiring into its own  
territories, the Indian Government undertook the administration of  
country it had not conquered. Its mismanagement brought on  
her sanguinary war; the discomfited army again rallied around  
leaders, and gave employment to a British force of not less than  
thirty-five thousand men, during the greater part of a year. At  
length the military insurrection was put down; the infant Prince  
punished for our misdeeds by dethronement and banishment; and the  
Punjab placed under the sole management of European officers.  
But has this conquest made India more secure? Not at all. It has  
only increased the danger. On the Western frontier it is a continua-  
tion of that of Scinde; it lies between us and the unforgiving Aff-  
ghans; and our army in advance (placed in the territory of subordi-  
nate but discontented Afghan chiefs) is in a constant state of petty  
warfare.

What yearly amount of pecuniary burthen our recent territorial  
acquisitions may have brought on the Indian finances, it is very  
difficult to discover, so ill made out are the Finance Accounts laid  
annually before Parliament; but in each case the burthen is un-  
doubtedly great. The revenues of the Punjab are *assumed*, by the  
Court of Directors, to be £1,300,000; and the average of its  
civil charges has already reached £1,120,000; leaving an apparent



surplus of £180,000 per annum. But this is apparent only. For despondingly wrote the Court of Directors to the Governor-General in Council, on the 3rd of June, 1852, the £180,000 "include none of the charges of the regular troops, nor the expenses of barrack accommodation." Now the average of military charges throughout India exceeds 56 per cent of the net revenue; and in the Punjab, a newly conquered country, where there is an army, probably 50,000 strong, the military charges can hardly be less than one million sterling; a sum that will make the Punjab a charge and a burden of about £800,000 a year on the general revenues of India.

Equally difficult is it to make out the actual cost of Scinde; its "probable" expense the Directors admit to be	£480,000
Deduct Revenue	£280,000
Probable charge or loss in Scinde	<u>£200,000</u>

So, too, Sattara, which to its own Prince yielded a large surplus; it was annexed in the hope of gain to the general revenue; its annexation has proved a loss

Its expenses in 1850-1 were	£240,623
Its receipts	<u>£205,240</u>
Actual loss by Sattara	<u>£35,383</u>

"We certainly were not prepared," says the Court to Lord Dalhousie, in reviewing these figures, "to find that the annexation of Sattara would entail a charge upon the general resources of India." Those who knew the system better, were, however, less credulous than the Court of Directors; they were prepared for what has happened.

But scarcely at peace beyond its natural limits on the North-west, the Indian Government has rushed into war beyond its natural limits on the East. A mountainous country separates Bengal from Burmah, across which troops cannot be marched. The Burmese have nothing to do with India. They are not formidable or dangerous. There is no hostile Persia beyond Burmah. There is no Russia to urge a warlike people on to attack India from this side. To go to war with Burmah, the Indian Government is obliged to take to the sea. Yet not only is it engaged in a war with Burmah, costing £120,000 a month and probably far more; but, by annexing Pegu, it indicates its

intention, either of never being at peace, or of going on advancing its frontiers to the borders of Siam. At the close of the war of 1815, England might as rationally have annexed Normandy, as India now annex Pegu. For, as in Europe, England possesses limits which nature itself—which ethnology, geography, history, have all united to assign to it; so also in India. There, too, we have boundaries unmistakably fixed by nature. But, as in the West, so in the East, these are now abandoned; and besides the cost of past wars, and of the present war, the Natives of India will have to bear the burthens of future wars; as inevitable as Kaffir hostilities, unless a thorough change in our system be now adopted.

Applying, then, the test of Peace to the last twenty years, what opportunity, what means, what chances, can a Government, occupied more or less with war for fifteen of those years, have had of working out the improvement and the happiness of the Natives? No man can serve two masters. No Government—above all, no Foreign Government,—can recompense a people for the misery, the cost, and the burthen of war. War requires all the energy, all the mind, all the money, a Government can avail itself of. What war, during the greater part of the currency of the present Charter Act, has had the benefit of in India, the Natives have been deprived of. They have not had the energy, the mind, or the money of the Government applied to their improvement or happiness.

## II. FINANCES.

And the effect of this deprivation is to be seen in the state of the Finances of India; PECUNIARY PROSPERITY being the second great test of good government everywhere.

In England a deficit in the Treasury is the most heinous of all Government offences. No Administration can survive for three years a want of equilibrium in our receipts and expenditure, no matter how caused. We regard, too, other countries in Europe as comparatively strong or weak according to their financial position; and we are continually inferring danger to the stability of order in Austria from the disorders of its Treasury. Turn to India, and what, during the

last fourteen years do we find? Deficit—deficit—deficit. Here it is in detail.

	DEFICIT	SURPLUS
1838-9 . . . . .	£381,000	
1839-40 . . . . .	2,138,000	
1840-1 . . . . .	1,754,000	
1841-2 . . . . .	1,771,000	
1842-3 . . . . .	1,346,000	
1843-4 . . . . .	1,440,000	
1844-5 . . . . .	583,000	
1845-6 . . . . .	1,495,376	
1846-7 . . . . .	971,202	
1847-8 . . . . .	1,911,791	
1848-9 . . . . .	1,473,115	
1849-50 . . . . .		£354,187*
1850-1 . . . . .	631,173	

In the greater part, therefore, of the twenty years of the present Charter Act, the deficit of the India Government has been as chronic as the state of war. In 13 years, it will be seen, that it has amounted, in the face of an increasing revenue, to the amazing sum of £15,541,470; all provided for, of course, by loans and debt; agencies adverse to, not promotive of, the improvement and happiness of the people.

When the present system of Government was framed in 1833, the military charges of India were about eight millions sterling, or 49 per cent of its net revenue. Twenty years of anticipated "improvement and happiness" have now almost elapsed, and the military charges now exceed twelve millions sterling, and eat up 56 per cent of the net revenue. In other words, the large cash balances that were in the Treasury in the early part of the year 1838, and the increase of revenue that has concurrently been going on, have not only been absorbed by military charges; but it is those charges which have produced this continuous state of deficit, and which have augmented the Indian debt from £30,000,000, as it stood when the Act passed, to £50,000,000, as it will stand when the Statute, that was to do so much good to India, will expire. Out of twenty years, fifteen years of war; in thirteen years a deficit of 15½ millions sterling; twenty millions sterling added to the debt. These are the first results of the legislation of 1833, which arrest our path in clearing the way for legislation in 1853.

\* The surplus this year arises out of the accidental increase of the revenue from the Opium monopoly.

### III. MATERIAL IMPROVEMENTS.

Of course, a system of government which in the last twenty years has gone on increasing its military expenditure from eight to twelve millions sterling, and thus adding to its debt, has had little to spend on what are, in such a country as India, the next evidence of good government—PUBLIC WORKS. Lord Auckland, the first Governor-General after the enactment of 1833, commenced his administration by recognising the construction of roads, bridges, harbours, tanks, and irrigation works, as a primary duty of the Indian Government. But, having recognized the duty, his Lordship immediately proceeded to disable himself from discharging it, by beginning that career of warfare which is still going on. So, that out of a revenue exceeding 21 millions sterling, the rate of government expenditure on public works has, according to Mr. Campbell,\* been  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, or less than £500,000 a year, spread over a country as large as Europe, for British India contains an area of 1,291,602 square miles. And of this half million, by far the greater part is spent on the favoured and no doubt very important North-Western Provinces. They yield a net-revenue of four and a half millions sterling, and of it have seven and a half per cent spent on improvements. Whilst on Madras, with a net revenue of nearly four millions, only one half per cent is so laid out; though in Madras the land assessment falls far heavier on the cultivators than in any other part of India, though the soil pants for moisture, and though whole rivers of fertilising waters run to waste for want of irrigation works. Bengal contributes more than eight millions sterling net, and receives one per cent back in the construction of roads &c., and Bombay the same per centage on its net revenue of £2,300,000. Here stands the account for 1849-50; the year in which there was a small surplus

	POPULATION	SQ MILES	NET REVENUE.	PUBLIC WORKS.
BENGAL	41,000,000	225,000	£ 8,500,000	£ 92,200
N. W. PROV.	23,000,000	85,000	4,500,000	348,000
MADRAS	22,000,000	140,000	3,779,000	14,919
BOMBAY.	10,405,000	120,000	2,337,000	24,743

And of these sums so debited against public works, some portion is, it must be borne in mind, spent on barracks and purely military

\* *Modern India*. Mr. Campbell is a writer favourable to the existing Indian administration, but in the statistical papers just put into circulation by the Court of Directors, the total average expenditure on public works, during fourteen years, amounts to the sum of £271,604.

undertakings. The figures, too, include the cost of superintendence which has sometimes wasted 70 per cent. of the outlay.

#### IV. CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE.

But, in spite of war, deficit, and want of roads, bridges, harbours, and public works,—in spite of this, the CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE may have improved during the last twenty years? Try the Act of 1833, then, by this test. There can be none better or surer. In India, however, it is necessary to recollect, the British Government is more than the Ruler and Governor of the people, it is their Landlord also. Thus it is doubly bound to them. It has its duties as Proprietor, as well as its obligations as Administrator to perform; it has Tenants, as well as Subjects to look after, to care for, and to protect; it acts directly, as well as indirectly on the cultivation and on the cultivators of the soil; and it is immediately, as well as mediately responsible for its state and their condition. Remembering this, first let us go to our oldest provinces, where there is what is called a permanent land settlement; permanent, however, only to the middle man; fluctuating beyond even Irish fluctuation, to the cultivator. “In the fertile districts of Lower Bengal,” says a thoroughly well-informed writer in the *Calcutta Review*, No XII.

“So bountifully intersected by noble rivers fed by tributary streams and rivulets, which spread perennial verdure and luxuriance over fields and plains, and constituting links of communication, stimulate and promote the alacrity and bustle of traffic,—there is to be found a community leading a life such as to call forth sympathy and commiseration. The community we allude to, is that of the Bengal Ryot. The name is familiar here as one expressive of an ignorant, degraded, and oppressed race.”

“To whatever part of Bengal we may go, the Ryot will be found, ‘to live all his days on rice, and to go covered with a slight cotton cloth.’ The profits which he makes are consumed in some way or other. The demands upon him are almost endless, and he must meet them one by one. This prevents the creation of capital, and prolongs the longevity of the Mahajan [or usurious money-lending] system. The districts of Bengal are noted for fertility and exuberance of crops; and if the Ryots could enjoy freedom and security, the country would exhibit a cheering spectacle. But their present condition is miserable, and appears to rouse no fellow feeling, no sympathy, in those by whom they are surrounded. The monthly expense of a Ryot is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 rupees;\* and if he has a family, it must be proportionately higher. We do not believe that there are in all

\* A rupee may be reckoned as 2 shillings of English money.

the districts five in every hundred, whose *whole* annual profits exceed one hundred rupees!

"In many instances the earnings of a Ryot are not sufficient for his family; and his wife and sons are obliged to betake themselves to some pursuit, and assist him with all they can get. He lives generally upon coarse rice and dholl; vegetables and fish would be luxuries. His dress consists of a bit of rag and a slender chudder; his bed is composed of a coarse mat and a pillow; his habitation, a thatched roof and his property, a plough, two bullocks, one or two lotahs and some *bijchan*. He toils 'from morn to noon, from noon to dewy eve;' and despite this he is a haggard, poverty-smitten, wretched creature. This is no exaggeration; even in ordinary seasons, and under ordinary circumstances, the Ryots may often be seen fasting for days and nights for want of food."

"The inability of the Ryot to better his degraded condition, in which he has been placed by the causes we have named, is increased by his mental debasement. Unprotected, harassed and oppressed, he has been precluded from the genial rays of intellectuality. His mind is veiled in a thick gloom of ignorance."

And the consequence of this condition of the Bengal Ryot, is, to quote the language of the Court of Directors, (3 June, 1852), "there has been a diminution in the total receipts from land in the old provinces of Bengal since 1843 44."

Such are the results of the Zemindary system. Turn next to Madras, where the Ryotwary prevails. There, the India Government does not place the cultivators at the mercy of great speculators in land and farmers of taxes, with power to rack, torment, and sell them off; and render them the slaves of money-lenders. There, it acts the part of landlord directly; annually fixing the rent of the minute portions into which the soil is subdivided; annually collecting these petty sums from its yearly patch-work settlements. And what are the results there? "The Madras men with whom I have talked," writes Mr. Campbell,"\* candidly admit that at the present time the state of things is most unsatisfactory—that the people are wretchedly poor, the land of little value; that the difficulty is to get people to cultivate it on any terms, and that the cultivation is kept up by forcing, by government advances, &c. &c." And what are these, "&c. &c." too common place to name? Cruelties at which humanity shudders; and of which the Madras Petition lately presented to Parliament gives the following example as occurring in the year 1850.

"That at the dittum [the fixation of rent] settlement of the previous year, on their [the Ryots] refusal to accept the dittum offered

to them by the Tehsildars of six different talooks, because it included lands that had been relinquished, and others which were not liable to assessment; and because the lands bearing assessment were then re-measured with new ropes, shorter by one cubit than the legal measure; some of them were compelled, *by imprisonment and corporal punishment of various kinds*, to put their names to the dittums; and when others ran away from their talooks to avoid the like treatment, the curnums of the villages forged the names of those who had absconded to the dittums that were assigned to them; they who remained complained to the collector, who said the dittums should not be altered, and refused redress; and when the jumma-bundy came round, on their refusal to pay the excess of the assessment, the houses of the Ryots were stripped of their roofs; their ploughs, ploughing cattle, grain seed, and forage for their grazing cattle, were seized by attachment and sold by auction; some Ryots were arrested as security for the balance still unpaid from the proceeds of the auction; the houses of others were broken into and plundered by the peons, who were paid batta from the proceeds of the sales; their herd cattle were not permitted to graze; and their families prohibited taking water from the tanks and wells for domestic purposes."

Nor is even this all: "The abuses of the whole system," (again we quote from Mr. Campbell,) "and especially that of remissions, is something frightful; the opportunities of extortion, speculation, chicanery, and intrigue of all kinds are unbounded; while the reliance of the Madras collector on informers by no means mends the matter." So bad indeed is the system, he adds, that "if the collector were one of the Prophets, and remained in the same district to the age of Methuselah, he would not be fit for the duty." This is the state of things actually affecting—this the system under which now exist seventeen out of the twenty-two millions of people in the Madras Presidency; contributing nearly four millions sterling to the Government, which thus treats it and them.

In Bombay, where a sort of composite system prevails, things are not much better. "The receipts\* have fallen off, and the country generally speaking is not prosperous." The cost of collection is enormous; not less than 55 per cent.; the surveys are partial and incorrect; settlement there is little or none; while whole classes are exempted, others are squeezed and oppressed to make up, if possible, yearly falling off receipts.

Mr. Saville Marriot passed nearly half a century in the Civil Service of Bombay, terminating his career in its highest office, that of

\* *Modern India.*

the Council of the Presidency, and, in 1846,\* he thus summed up the fruits of his minute observation and wide experience, in almost every province of Western India :

"In elucidation of the position that this country (India) is verging to the lowest ebb of pauperism, I would adduce a fact pregnant with considerations of the most serious importance ; namely, that of late years a large portion of the public revenue has been paid by encroachment upon the capital of the country, small though that capital is in itself. I allude to the property of the peasantry, which consists of personal ornaments of the precious metals, and jewels, convertible, as occasions require, to profitable purposes and accommodation in agricultural pursuits, most frequently in the shape of pawn till the object has been obtained. I feel certain that an examination would establish that a considerable share of this and other property, even to cattle and household utensils, has been for ever alienated from its proprietors to make good the public revenue. In addition to this lamentable evidence of poverty, is another of equal force, to be seen in all parts of the country, in the numerous individuals of the above class of the community wandering about in search of the employment of hirelings, which they are glad to obtain even for the most scanty pittance. In short, almost everything forces to the conviction that we have before us a narrowing progress to utter pauperism."

Where Rent and Taxation are thus destroying Capital—defined by Political Economy to be the fund for the employment of Labour—well indeed might Mr. Marriott add, when examined before a Parliamentary Committee in 1848, that the condition of the cultivators was "very much depressed, greatly depressed, and I believe declining."

The Bombay Government received a revenue of £500,000 a-year from its Collectorate of Guzerat, and after an absence of fourteen years, Mr. Giberne returned to it, as Judge, in 1840. Everywhere, he told the Commons' Committee on Cotton Cultivation in 1848, he remarked deterioration, and amongst all classes :

"I did not see so many of the more wealthy classes of the natives. The aristocracy, when we first had the country, used to have their gay carts, horses, and attendants, and a great deal of finery about them ; and there seemed to be an absence of all that \* \* \* \* The Ryots all complained that they had had money once, but they had none now."

And in a private letter dated 1849, "written by a gentleman high in the Company's Service," and quoted in a pamphlet† published in 1851, the decay of Guzerat is thus described :

\* "*India - The Duty and Interest of England to inquire into its State*," p. 12.

† "*Letters on the Cotton and Roads of Western India*," p. 15.



"Many of the best families in the province, who were rich and well to do when we came into Guzerat, in 1807, have now scarcely clothes to their backs . . . . Our demands in money on the Talookdars are more than three times what they originally paid, without one single advantage gained on their parts. Parties from whom they have been compelled to borrow at ruinous rates of interest enforce their demands by attachment of their lands and villages; thus they sink deeper and deeper in debt, without the chance of extricating themselves. What then must become of their rising families?"

In the North-West, however, things are not so bad. But why? Because, there alone the revenue administration has to some extent followed native footsteps, recognized native rights, and is carried on through the ancient native village system, swept away in Bengal and Madras. But even there, where the assessment does leave to all a profit, so defectively has it been carried out, that some have a very small, if others have a larger one. And already the revenue even there is declining. "If," wrote the Court of Directors, on the 3rd of June, 1852, "the amount received from the new territory be deducted from the last two years, there will appear a deterioration in the land revenue from the old territory of the North-Western Provinces, as compared with the first average, of £80,000, and in 1849-50, there was no improvement as compared with that average" All, therefore, is not so bright as it seems even in the North-West; superior as it is to the rest of India.

But it is on India as a whole that attention must be fixed; and how sad the condition of the cultivator is in Bengal, with a population of 40 millions, how far worse it is in Madras with its 22 millions, and how bad it is in Bombay with its 10 millions, the evidence thus briefly produced (to be followed hereafter by detailed examination) will give some general idea of. It is not merely cultivation that is depressed, it is society itself that is being gradually destroyed. The race of native gentry has already almost every where disappeared; and a new danger has arisen—that in another generation or two, the cultivators\* will not be worth having as subjects.

\* It will seem from the following extract of a reply made by Governor Higginson, who knows India well, to an address from the inhabitants of Faioq in the Mauritius, that in his opinion, the condition of the natives of India will be "immeasurably" improved by their settling in that island, and their working as negroes in sugar plantations.

"It is very gratifying to me to learn that the measures which have been adopted to secure a more adequate supply of labour here, met with your approval. In

For moral debasement is the inevitable consequence of physical depression. This prospect may be deemed "satisfactory" by the persons responsible for it. But to India it is ruin and destruction; to England it is danger and disgrace.

## V. LAW AND JUSTICE.

The state of the LAW, the forms of legal procedure, and the ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE—these form another test by which to try the legislation of 1833. And these, in the case of that Act, are a special and peculiar test. For Law Reform was not only declared to be one of its most prominent objects; but it contained large and costly provisions to advance that priceless object. "I believe," said Mr. Macaulay, the ministerial orator in passing the Act of 1833 through the House of Commons; "I believe that no country ever stood so much in need of a Code of Laws as India; and I believe that there never was a country in which the want might be so readily supplied." And what Mr. Macaulay so strongly believed to be so needful, and so confidently held to be so easy of execution, he afterwards tried to furnish. For, as member of the Law Commission established under the Act of 1833, he prepared a Code of Criminal Law. That Commission was appointed in 1835, the year after the passing of the Charter Act. The statute is now on the point of expiration. Twenty years have nearly elapsed. But India still awaits the fruits of its labours. The Code prepared by the Commission was first submitted to the Supreme Government in May 1837, it was sent back for revision; it was returned in the October following. It was then sent home to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control; it was next returned to India with Home observations and criticism. Calcutta considered it once more, and sent it back to London; and finally, after eleven years' deliberation, it reached India in 1848. And it has been lying snug and dusty on the shelves of the Council ever since. The Act

the absence of a native population to cultivate our soil, our attention should be directed not only to obtaining a sufficiency of labour for our more immediate wants; but also to the more valuable and permanent benefits to be gained by inducing the natives of India who now come here and carry their earnings back after a few years to settle in the Colony; and from my own experience of both Countries I can affirm that by adopting this as their future home, they will by their own industry, improve their social and physical condition immeasurably beyond what they can ever hope to attain in their own country."

of 1833 has not therefore produced that Code of Laws, "the want of which might be so readily supplied;" instead, it has imposed on India an enormous cost under this head, hitherto without result.

Mr. J. B. Norton of the Madras Bar, in his recently published Pamphlet, *The Administration of Justice in Southern India*, states the Salary alone of the Law Commissioners to have already reached the enormous total of £170,000; but without any advantage whatever to the Natives of India.

"Possibly a considerable amount of useful information has been collected; and certainly sundry very heavy blue books have been brought forth—a proposed Criminal Code proved an abortion, and was strangled at its birth. What few Acts have been produced, are drafted in the loosest and most unlaywerlike fashion, so that almost upon every occasion when they have become the subject of discussion in the Supreme Court, a "coach and horses" have been easily driven through any given section: but, up to the present time no Code, worthy of the name, has been prepared for all India; although it might have been imagined, that to any man wishing to illustrate his name, and hand it down immortal to Posterity, such an object would have been sufficient incentive to his ambition, even if he were not lured by the additional bait of £10,000 per annum, paid monthly, and with the strictest regard to punctuality. But the truth is, the office, from which so much has been expected, has been a mere job. From Mr. Macaulay down to Mr. Bethune, we have never had a lawyer of any practice appointed. Theoretical men, having influence with the Ministry of the day, have been from time to time nominated. They have come out here at a comparatively advanced age, with the world before them where to choose, totally ignorant of the character and habits of the Natives, of their existing Laws and innumerable customs, and consequently unable to form any correct estimate of the wants and exigencies of the country.

"During the few months which Mr. Jackson, the Advocate General of Calcutta, filled the office, he succeeded in pushing through a small but important body of Laws; and we have now unquestionably a ripe and able lawyer of large practice at the helm—but although there can be little doubt that Mr. Peacock's drafts will be workman-like, it remains to be seen whether he will not be overwhelmed with the enormous amount of knowledge which he must necessarily acquire, before he can safely proceed to legislate for a country to which he is a stranger; and whether the habits of the Special Pleader will yield to the more enlarged requirements of the Legislator: but the appointment of a practical lawyer is an instalment of what is due to us; we must take the good the Gods provide us, and be thankful for it.

"But it is not after all, the state of the substantive Law, defective as that is, which is the main subject of just complaint; it is the miserable system under which it is at present administered; and the

still more frightful prospect which aways this unhappy country, if the British Legislature will still turn a deaf ear to our necessities. It is to the awful results of this feeble and insufficient system of judicial administration, the utter inability of the Judges to control the proceedings before them; the unnecessary swelling of the records, the prolongation of trials, and the increased repetition of litigation, which arise from the want of power in the Bench, and are permitted to reign unchecked, that we have all along pointed; for which we emphatically demand a speedy and effectual remedy; certain that if it be not extended to us *now*, we may look in vain for it for the next five and twenty years, unless indeed in the mean time, the evil should have become so intolerable, as to rouse even the unenergetic listless Hindoo to such an extent, as to endanger the continuance of our rule in India."—pp. 127-8-9.

Then, as to the actual state and administration of civil law. In the Regulation Provinces there is nothing worthy of the name of law; but, to a system unworthy that sacred name, are appended cumbersome legal forms and a legal tax. To enter into the courts of what is called justice, it is not only necessary that you should have a plaintiff, but money to pay (not lawyers but) the government. So that to all the Company's subjects who cannot commence the search of justice by paying a tax to the government, the doors of the courts are closed; for them there is neither law nor justice. And having money, what, when admitted, do they find? Judges, as Mr. Campbell confesses, a scandal to the British name.

"When a Collector is old enough, he is made a Judge. It seems to be considered that if, at this time of life a man is fit for anything, he is fit for a Judge; and if he is fit for nothing, better make him a Judge and get rid of him. The judicial department being in a less satisfactory state than any other, is less sought after, and, the ill effects of mismanagement being less immediately startling, the principle that, in a choice of evils, any man will do for a Judge seems to have become established. Some who mismanage their districts are said to be promoted to be Judges against their will."

Judicial proceedings are rendered intricate by the multiplication of technical forms, by the rigid exaction of nice, obscure, puzzling, pedantic, and expensive rites and ceremonies; in short, intricacy and obscurity are intentionally created. The courts indeed profess to give every man the law of his own religion or country, or where the litigants are of different tribes, according to the custom of the country or the law of the defendant. But on this variegated basis a large and complicated legal system of constructions, undigested and unarranged, has been reared, and it is left to the administration of men not

educated as lawyers; but laymen, who, grasping at the shadow, lose the substance of justice; who have no equitable jurisdiction to mitigate the harshness of legal forms; who scarcely speak or understand the language of the country, and who, consequently, are quite unable to discriminate as to the value of testimony. The result is—petty suits, and the complaints of the poor and helpless repelled by expense; opening for fraud, perjury and forgery; a number of appeals such as no other country on the face of the world can furnish; a complete revolution of the rights and institutions of the country; and, adds Mr. Campbell, “a lamentable demoralization of the people.”

For fifteen years has the criminal law, as administered by the Company's courts, been condemned by Government itself. It is just as fit for the Christian people of this realm as for the Hindoo subjects of the Queen in India. Its foundations are Mahomedan; and, though in the case of Hindoos the opinion of the Mahomedan assessor attached to the court, may be dispensed with, the effect is not to introduce a better system of law, but to place the criminal at the mercy of the judge's discretion without any law at all: the judge being, as a general rule, quite incompetent to exercise any discretion, and wholly innocent of a knowledge of any law, Christian, Mahomedan, or Hindoo.

## VI. POLICE.

If there be little or no criminal law, there is, however, a POLICE. But it has, we quote the declaration of 1252 British and other Christian Inhabitants of Calcutta and Lower Bengal in their Petition to the House of Commons, “not only failed to effect the prevention of crime, the apprehension of offenders, and the protection of life and property; but it has become the engine of oppression and a great cause of the corruption of the people.” In a population of forty millions scattered over an area larger than France, there are ten thousand police; and of the practical bearing of the system on the condition of the people, the Petitioners give the following illustration:—

“That in case of the apprehension of an offender, and in order to prosecute him, it is necessary for the injured party and his witnesses to go before the magistrate, but this may be a journey of from fifteen or less, to fifty miles or more, in consequence of the extent of this district, and when arrived at the magistrate's office, he may be detained days or weeks from a variety of causes; that in

fact a magistrate's compound in the Lower Provinces often presents the spectacle of hundreds of persons thus kept in detention for weeks; and if the offence is of a grave character, or beyond the jurisdiction of a magistrate, he and his witnesses may be required to take a second journey of the same distance to the sessions, and be there detained days or weeks waiting for a trial. At the sessions also, hundreds of persons are constantly detained at great distances from their homes. That to avoid these inconveniences, the population render little or no aid to the police for the enforcement of the law, but on the contrary they are generally averse to do so, and hence has arisen a practice which is a great reproach to the police system, namely, that witnesses generally and prosecutors often are made prisoners, kept under arrest, and sent to the magistrate, and afterwards to the sessions in actual custody. That from this state of the law and police result the following among other evils; persons robbed deny the fact of a robbery, or if they complain, the persons who could be witnesses deny all knowledge of it, the immediate interests of these classes being arrayed by reason of the state of the law and jurisdiction against the objects of law and justice. Often under these circumstances the native policeman to do his duty employs the means of terror, and torture is believed to be extensively practised on persons under accusation, and the injured party for not assisting him becomes an offender. All the evil passions are thus brought into play, and ingenuities of all kinds, both by people and police, are resorted to. Another result is the constant device of proving a true case by witnesses who knew nothing about the matter; justice is supposed thus to be satisfied, but convenient perjury becomes familiar, and perjury loses its criminal character among the people. Thus, and in a thousand other ways, the law and police operate to corrupt the people and spread corruption; moreover the very circumstances which repel the honest, attract those who have revenge to gratify, rivals to injure, enemies to destroy; and for these and other dishonest purposes the police and criminal courts are resorted to, and police and law under the present system are terrible evils.

"That a further aggravation of evil results from some powers possessed by the native police, which practically are magisterial, such as the power of receiving confessions, and in all cases of taking (though not on oath) the deposition of witnesses, which powers are exercised by the serjeant (Jemadar) in the absence of his immediate superior (the Darogah), and thereby practically the course of criminal justice takes its direction from them, and thus the police control the magistrate's functions, instead of his superintending and controlling the police."

In Madras (perhaps fortunately) no attempt has been made at a regular police; but, though the extortions and cruelties suffered in Bengal from its police are unknown in Madras, great and serious crimes, particularly gang robberies, flourish in that Presidency. In

Bombay the police, much the same as in Madras, is reported by the authorities to be in a state of "comparative torpor;" and in consequence violent crimes are very prevalent. In one Presidency there is, we see, a police more oppressive to the people than the criminals; in the other two Presidencies there is so little police, that there is an excessive amount of the most heinous offences. Tried then by the tests of law, justice, and crime, the Legislation of 1833 has not resulted in "the improvement and happiness of the natives of India."

## VII EDUCATION.

Measure the system of 1833 by the wand of EDUCATION, short as we may choose to make it, and the result is worse still. So paltry an item of expenditure is Native Education, that it does not even constitute an item in the yearly Finance Accounts laid before Parliament. It is, therefore, impossible to say what per centage of a net revenue of twenty one millions sterling, is spent on this means of promoting the improvement and happiness of the Natives. But this is well known, that, whereas in Hindoo times every village community had its school, our destruction of village societies or municipalities has deprived the Natives of their schools, such as they were, and has substituted nothing in their stead, except perhaps in the North Western Provinces. For the ten millions of people in the Bombay Presidency, there is a grant of £12,500 a-year for their education. In the town of Madras there is a Collegiate Institution languishing on £3000 a year. This absorbs one half of the educational allowance for that Presidency, containing a population of twenty-two millions. The other half has never been laid out; and "there is not," say the people of Madras, in their Petition to Parliament, "a Government school over all the 140,000 square miles, comprising the Madras territories." In short, out of these 22 millions of people the Indian Government yearly educates 160! And when in Bengal the richer natives do send their sons to England for education, the young men, returning competent for, are refused Government employment on the same terms and on the same rank as Europeans. Within the last five years a Hindoo young gentleman carried off several medical prizes at University College, and received the diploma of M.D. The Court of Directors, and individual Directors were applied to by some of the most eminent of the retired public servants of India to give Dr. Chutterbutty a con-



mission as Surgeon in a Native Regiment, but the request was refused. And by gentlemen, too, who, it stands in evidence, have at home spent out of Indian Taxation during the last twenty years, the enormous sum of £53,000 in public banquets and more select house dinners. It is not by such educational expenditure, or by such treatment when native gentlemen do educate themselves, that "the improvement and happiness of the natives of India" can be promoted.

### VIII. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATIVES.

And the insufficiency of this Test of Education naturally brings us to another, viz. the EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVES. In our earlier Indian career, Natives were employed in the most important and confidential posts of our Government. Our regiments were officered by Natives; in many places we had Native agents and representatives; everywhere we were then obliged to make use of native talent. But in those days Indian patronage was not valuable, and Indian salaries were at least moderate. But, gradually this use of native ability was displaced, and every post of profit, of trust, of value transferred, at enormous addition to the cost of Government—to Englishmen, until at last it became part and parcel of our established policy. The legislation of 1833, however, attempted to remedy this monstrous injustice, by enacting that none should be excluded from any office by reason of religion, place of birth, descent, or colour. But so far from the enactment having remedied the wrong, "this provision," was according to Mr. Campbell, "a mere flourish of trumpets and of no practical effect whatever as far as the natives are concerned." Indeed, according to him, it has been prejudicial rather than advantageous to native employment; "for," he adds, "the only effect has been to open to Europeans offices originally intended for natives."

The division between the Covenanted and Uncovenanted services is still kept up; though the covenant itself is absurd and ridiculous, now that the East India Company has nothing to do with trade. And the purpose for which it is maintained is to draw an artificial line by means of which the Natives may continue, however educated, able, and competent, to be excluded from all high and lucrative employment. The Act of 1833 declares that religion, birth, and colour shall not exclude any man from any office. But the Government of India refuses to allow any native, Hindoo, Mahomedan, or Parsee, admission into



its covenanted service. Thus, it defeats by a rule of its own, the provision of the legislature of 1833, which particularly aimed at promoting "the improvement and happiness" of the natives of India, by employing them in the public service; and by their employment, reducing the cost of Government. Some few thousands—3000 or 4000 out of 150,000 millions—do indeed get small posts, worth on an average some £30 a year. But any real share in Government administration, trust, and responsibility, is denied the people of India. Yet, in Lord Grey's work on the *Colonial Administration of Lord John Russell's Government*,\* he is found boasting, how, on the Gold Coast of Africa, the Governor summoned its chiefs into council; and how, out of "this rude Negro Parliament," England is there creating an African nation.

"I am persuaded I do not overrate the importance of the establishment of this rude Negro Parliament, when I say that I believe it has converted a number of barbarous tribes, possessing nothing that deserves the name of a Government, into a Nation, with a regularly organised authority and institutions, simple and unpretending, but suited to the actual state of society, and containing within themselves all that is necessary for their future development; so that they may meet the growing wants of an advancing civilisation."

But in India, a people "learned in all the arts of polished life, when we were yet in the woods,"† less favoured than the Fantees of Cape Coast Castle, are proscribed as a race of incompetent, helpless incapables, and condemned to everlasting inferiority in lands which their forefathers made famous.

#### IX. POPULAR CONTENTMENT.

Are they the people of India content with the working of the legislation of 1833? It would be strange if they were; and they are not. They do not rebel; they do not resist; they do not rise against the Indian Government; as do the Natives in

\* Vol. II. p. 258-6.

† "This multitude of men does not consist of an abject and barbarous populace; much less of gangs of savages like the Guaranies and the Chiquitos, who wander on the waste borders of the Amazon or the Plate; but a people for ages civilised; cultivated in all the arts of polished life when we were yet in the woods. There are to be found chiefs of tribes and nations—an ancient and venerable priesthood, the depositories of their laws, learning and history; a nobility of great antiquity and renown; a multitude of cities; merchants and bankers, individuals of whom once vied with the Bank of England, whose credit often supported a tottering state; millions of ingenious manufacturers and mechanics; millions of the most diligent, and not least intelligent tillers of the earth."—*Burke on Fox's India Bill.*

adjoining States still governed by their own Princes. For, under British rule the power of the Government is too strong and well organised for a successful resort to these violent modes of manifesting public opinion. But now that the opportunity has arisen—now that there is a chance of improvement, they petition Parliament. And what say their petitions? That they are happy and prosperous? That they are satisfied with the results of the Act of 1833? That they regard its renewal with contentment and hope? Nothing of the sort. The very reverse. Listen to the language that comes from Madras :—

“That the grievances of your Petitioners arise principally from the excessive taxation, and the vexations which accompany its collection; and the insufficiency, delay, and expense of the Company's courts of law; and their chief wants are, the construction of roads, bridges, and works for the supply of irrigation; and a better provision for the education of the people. They also desire a reduction of the public expenditure, and a form of local government more generally conducive to the happiness of the subject and the prosperity of the country; and to these main points your Petitioners beg the consideration of your honourable House, respectfully applying in behalf of themselves and their countrymen for those remedies and reforms which, in the wisdom of your honourable House, may be deemed expedient and practicable.”

The people of Madras complain that the whole framework of society has been overthrown to their injury, and almost to their ruin.

“That notwithstanding this decided testimony to the superiority of the village system as regards the prosperity both of the revenue and the cultivator, the Court of Directors ordered the village system to be superseded by the Ryotwar, as before stated by your Petitioners; and, with a professed view to remedy the evils attending it, issued orders which declared that the labour of the Ryot should be henceforward free from compulsion; that private property in lands on this side of the Peninsula should be acknowledged, and that the over-assessment should be reduced; but, however well intentioned those orders may have been, Ryotwar is still the curse of the country, the over-assessment continues unaltered, the Ryots are compelled to cultivate at the pleasure of the Tehsildar, and the acknowledged right of private property in no way prevents the oppression of the owner, nor his gradual and sure pauperization. That while your Petitioners apply to your honourable House for a return of their old revenue system on the broad ground of justice to the cultivators, they beg to point out a few particulars in which the change will be advantageous to the Government :—1. It will be relieved from the loss and corruption entailed by the Ryotwar system; 2. It is secured from all loss arising from unequal land tax; 3. The rent will not depend upon

the correct assessment of the cultivation ; and, 4. The charge of collection will be considerably decreased ; yet even were there no immediate advantage likely to accrue to the Government, your Petitioners would represent that a lighter and more reasonable assessment, coupled with the removal of the vexations and oppressions accompanying the present mode of collection, would ensure a much larger cultivation and thereby the revenues of the State would be improved ; and that the people of India are therefore entitled to seek and to obtain from the paramount authority of the Imperial Parliament the necessary and equitable redress of the weighty and multiform grievances brought upon them by the introduction of the system under which they groan ; and their claims to the mode of redress they have pointed out are rendered still stronger by the fact, that a settlement by villages nearly resembling that which your Petitioners seek for themselves is actually now in full operation in the north-western provinces under the Bengal Presidency, where the leases are held on a term of thirty years duration."

They complain that salt, the only condiment for their tasteless rice, and without which neither they nor their cattle can live, is a Government monopoly.

They complain that not only are they taxed for their shops in towns, and for stalls and sheds on road-sides ; but for each tool and implement, of their trades ; nay, for their very knives, "*the cost of which,*" they tell Parliament, "*is frequently exceeded six times over by the Moturpha [Tax] under which the use of them is permitted.*"

They complain that in order to raise revenue from ardent spirits, the Government is forcing drunkenness on them ; "a vice," they add, "forbidden by Hindoo and Mahommedan law."

They complain, that spread over 140,000 square miles in the Madras Presidency are only 130 post-offices ; that throughout that extent of country there are scarcely 3000 miles of roads practicable for bullock carts ; that these roads are mostly without bridges, impracticable in wet weather, and tedious and dangerous in the dry season. They complain of the state of the Law, of the Police, and of almost every department of administration which can contribute to good government ; and they earnestly entreat to be heard personally, on their complaints, before Parliament.

So, also, the Bombay Petitioners. They express their belief 'that it will be found easy by your honourable House to devise a constitution for India which, while it shall contain all the good elements of the existing system, shall be less cumbersome, less exclusive, less secret, more directly responsible, and infinitely more efficient and more acceptable to the governed.'

They object to the cost of the present system :—

“ Your Petitioners submit that the cost of administration in India is unnecessarily great, and considerable reductions might be made, without the slightest detriment or injury to any one save the patrons or expectants of office, by abolishing sinecure offices, and retrenching the exorbitant salaries of many highly-paid officers, whose duties are so trifling, or involve comparatively so little labour or responsibility, that they might with advantage be amalgamated with other offices, or remunerated in a manner commensurate with the nature of the duties to be performed.”

They claim a greater share of employment for the people of India in the conduct of their own affairs :

“ Your Petitioners respectfully submit that the time has arrived when the natives of India are entitled to a much larger share than they have hitherto had in the administration of the affairs of their country, and that the councils of the local governments should, in matters of general policy and legislation be opened, so as to admit of respectable and intelligent natives taking a part in the discussion of matters of general interest to the country, as suggested by Lords Ellenborough, Elphinstone, and others.”

Equally strong and decisive is the Bengal Petition:—

“ It might appear paradoxical to deny its prosperity in the face of the vast increase which has taken place in the foreign commerce ; but it is undeniable that, contemporaneously with this increase, crimes of a violent character have increased, and law and police are also regarded as affording little security either for rights of persons or property. Hence the limited application of British capital to agriculture and mines, and the limited employment of British skill in India (the former being confined to a few valuable articles, such as indigo, for the cultivation of which the soil and climate are so superior as to afford the profits almost of a monopoly, silk, and a few others), and hence also small capitals can rarely be employed in India. The planter or capitalist in the interior never or rarely leaves his capital when he himself quits the country in consequence of its insecurity, and from this cause results the high rate of interest of money. Landholders pay twenty-five and thirty per cent., and the ryot or cultivator is in a worse relation than of servitude to the money-lender. Your Petitioners therefore think that inquiry ought to be instituted by Parliament into the state of the country, in order to provide some probable remedy for the evils adverted to.”

If contentment, therefore, be a test of good government, the Act of 1833 has signally failed.

#### X. HOME CONTROL.

Another test yet remains. The Act of 1833 was proposed as a substitute for a Constitution. If we cannot, it was then argued by

Mr. Macaulay, on behalf of Lord Grey's Government, safely entrust the people of India with popular rights and privileges, we will at least have a constituency at home bound by their own interests to watch over and protect them ; a constituency which, to use his exact words, "*shall feel any disorder in the finances of India in the disorder of their own household affairs.*" Has this anticipation been realized—has this intention been fulfilled ? No ; disorders there have been for fifteen years in the finances of India ; but those disorders have not been felt in the "household affairs" of the proprietors of East India stock. Despite Indian deficits, English dividends of ten and a half per cent have been regularly maintained and "well and truly paid." And thus India has lost that English security for good government which Mr. Macaulay announced it was a design of the Act of 1833 to establish.

But it is unnecessary, in this general summary, to pursue the enquiry further. Enough has been sketched, though in outline only, to make rational, benevolent, and patriotic men hesitate when asked to consent to a renewal of the Act of 1833 ; enough has been stated, to make them doubt whether the present system of government is even capable of improvement ; enough, we believe, to convince all impartial men that a new plan of Indian administration must be cast.



## INDIA REFORM.

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## FINANCES OF INDIA

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*Asiatic Annual Registers.*

*Reports of Select Committees of the House of Commons, on affairs  
of the East India Company, 1810—1832—1852.*

*Campbell's Modern India.*

*India, by John Dickinson, Jun.*

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THE historian Mill is rebuked by his commentator for having said that India is beneficial to England only if it "affords a surplus revenue which can be sent to England. If the revenue of India is not equal to the expense of governing India, then is India a burthen and a drain upon England." Who, says Dr. Wilson,\* will venture to "maintain a proposition so contrary to the fact? Regarding our connexion with India, even only in the paltry consideration of how much money we have made by it, the assertion that we have profited solely by its surplus revenue; that is, that in five years out of six we have realized no profit at all, is palpably false. In every year of our intercourse with India, even in those in which the public revenue has fallen far short of the expenditure, there has been a large accession to English capital, brought home from India. What are the profits of Indian trade? What is the maintenance of 30,000 Englishmen, military included? What is the amount of money annually remitted to England for the support of relations, the education of children, the pensions of officers, and finally, what can we call the fortunes accumulated by individuals in trade, or in the service of the Company, which they survive to spend in England, or bequeath to their descendants? What is all this but additional capital remitted from India to England; additional, largely additional, means of recompensing British Industry. It is idle, then, to talk of a surplus revenue being the sole source of the benefits derivable from India. On the contrary, it is, and it ought to be, the least even of our pecuniary advantages, for its transfer to England is an abstraction of Indian capital, for which no equivalent is given; it is an exhausting drain upon the resources of the country, the issue of which is replaced by no reflux; it is an extraction of the life blood from the veins of

\* Mills' History of India, by J. Wilson, vol. vi. p. 671.

national industry, which no subsequent introduction of nourishment is furnished to restore."

All this is unquestionably true, and in this very truth lies our danger. India may be indirectly pouring treasures into the lap of England, may be enriching individuals, whilst its finances are in a state of exhaustion. The "fortunes accumulated by individuals" if thrown again into the public treasury, in the shape of loans bearing interest, may arrest the progress of decay for a time, but it is obvious, that the application of such a remedy, if long continued, must, in the end, make the disease mortal.

Is the revenue of India then equal at this moment, to the expense of governing India? Has it ever been equal to that charge?

These are questions of vital importance, not only to India, but to England; for the interests of the two countries are now so closely linked, that the credit of the one cannot be affected—as Sir R. Peel informed us in 1842,\* when proposing the Income Tax—without a serious reaction upon the other. To the solution of these questions we shall therefore apply ourselves, taking for our guides the official documents which have from time to time been laid before Parliament.

The most sanguine expectations of the great financial results which were to follow, from territorial acquisitions in India, appear to have been entertained from the very commencement of our rule. Clive, when he had come to the determination of demanding a grant of the Dewanee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, from the King of Delhi, instructed his agent in England to invest all the money that could be raised, in India stock, upon the strength of the high dividends which were to accrue to the East India Company, from these possessions. He described Bengal as a country of "inexhaustible riches." "The East India Company," he said,† "shall be the richest Company in the world; they have now a territory which will give them an income of more than two millions sterling,—their civil and military expenditure shall never exceed £700,000 in time of peace, or £1,000,000 in time of war." Nor in saying this did Clive speak unadvisedly.

\* "Depend upon it, if the credit of India should become disordered, if some great exaction should become necessary, then the credit of England must be brought forward to its support, and the collateral and indirect effect of disorders in Indian finances would be felt extensively in this country."—*Sir Robert Peel's Speech on the Budget, 1842.*

† *Malcolm's Life of Clive, Vol. II. p*



He found himself in a country possessing a soil of unsurpassed fertility, in the highest state of cultivation, teeming with an industrious population, a section of which then possessed unrivalled manufacturing skill, with a busy traffic carried upon a magnificent river, and with the public Treasury full to overflowing. Moreover, he knew that during the whole period of the Moghul Government, Bengal had contributed a clear million sterling per annum to the imperial treasury.

But Clive had soon proof of a melancholy fact, which vitiated his financial calculations, and has vitiated all similar calculations, viz. that in India our charges grew faster than our receipts. In four years from the date of his promise—that Bengal would yield a surplus income of a million sterling—the Government there reported an empty treasury, and their total inability to meet the demands against it. They spoke, at the same time, in pathetic terms, of “the incontestable evidence they had furnished to their honourable masters of the exaggerated light in which their newly acquired advantages had been placed.” At the end of another four years, viz. in 1773, the Company was obliged to apply to Parliament for a loan of £1,400,000, and in the year 1780, the Government of Warren Hastings complained that the revenue of India was utterly inadequate to meet the expenditure, and that no resource remained but to borrow to the utmost extent of their credit.

From 1765 to 1784, we had several exhausting wars, but no extension of consequence to our territory. In 1790, we had war with Tippoo, which ended in the cession to us of half of his territory, and in a pecuniary mulct of upwards of three millions sterling. In 1792-3, there was a surplus of revenue over expenditure in *India* of upwards of a million sterling; and in that year we find the Minister for India\* basing a magnificent financial scheme upon the assumption that this surplus was to be permanent; £500,000 a year was to be appropriated towards the liquidation of the Indian debt; an equal sum was to be paid into the British Exchequer; and the remainder to be divided amongst the proprietors of India Stock. But at the very moment that the Minister was thus dealing with a local surplus, the Directors were, with his consent, raising a loan of two millions under the name of additional capital, in order to keep their treasury afloat at home. In

\* Speech of Mr Dundas on Indian budget, 25th February, 1794.

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the three following years—although they were years of peace—the surplus gradually declined; and in the fourth year, viz. in 1797-8, it was converted into a deficit. In that, and in the following year, the Indian Government was obliged to raise more than three millions\* by way of loan, and when Lord Wellesley entered into the war with Tippoo in 1799, he with difficulty obtained money to carry on the public service at 10 and 12 per cent interest. Nothing daunted by the conversion of an imaginary surplus into a heavy deficit, or by the annihilation of his financial fabric, the Minister renewed his predictions of a triumphant result.

“It is satisfactory to reflect,” he said, “that in India, the only inconvenience produced by the war has been upon the treasuries to a certain degree; but this effect it may be presumed will not be permanent. New sources of wealth have been opened, from which there is every reason to hope a full compensation will eventually be derived for the pecuniary sacrifices that have been made.”†

The result of the war of 1799 was to give us possession of another large slice of Tippoo's territory. In 1800 we acquired territory from the Nizam valued at £600,000 a year, in commutation of a subsidy of £400,000. In 1801 we took from the Nabob of Oude territory estimated to yield £1,300,000, in lieu of a subsidy of £760,000. In 1802 we took all the territory of the Nabob of Arcot, all the territory of the Rajah of Tanjore, the petty principalities of Furruckabad and Tanjore, and in the same year the Peishwah ceded to us a territory in Guzerat of the annual value of upwards of £200,000.

These great territorial acquisitions produced their usual result, viz. a conviction that henceforth we were to revel in riches, and in reviewing the state of the finances in 1803 we find the Indian Minister again employed in the pleasing task of apportioning an imaginary surplus of a million and a half sterling‡. This bright prospect, indeed, he said, would depend “altogether on peace.” Nevertheless, “I venture to express it as my firm conviction that with our prospects in respect of revenue the Indian surplus would more than cover the extraordinaries of a war expenditure. I see no reason why any

* Increase of debt—1798 . . .	£1,557,174
1799 . . .	1,962,881

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£3,520,055

† Mr. Dundas's speech on the Indian Budget, 12th March, 1799.

‡ Lord Castlereagh's speech on Indian Budget, 14th March, 1803.

fresh loan should be contracted abroad, but, on the contrary, I conceive a sinking fund to the extent of one million may be annually applied to the discharge of the Indian debt—not that the debt, he said, was a real incumbrance—there were advantages, in many points of view in having a permanent debt in India in some degree proportionate to its present extent.” This was said in March; in June intelligence was received of the breaking out of the Mahratta war.

The confidence of the Minister, however, in his estimates remained unabated. “I trust I shall satisfactorily prove,” he said, “that no very material disappointment is to be feared in the year to which these estimates apply, and that as to future years the stability of the power and the resources of the British empire in the East is now such that unless events should occur against which no human foresight can provide, the only serious inconvenience to be apprehended is the procrastination of the liquidation of the Indian debt.”

It was shrewdly remarked during the debate, that “all that related to the past, in the Minister’s speech—all that was certain—was dark and gloomy; all that concerned the future—all that was uncertain—was fair and brilliant.” At the very moment that the Minister for India was propounding a plan for the liquidation of debt out of an imaginary surplus, and assuring the House of Commons that we should get through the war without incurring fresh debt, the Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, was borrowing all the money that he could get at eight per cent interest, to make up a heavy deficit and to provide for the war. But even these favourable terms failed to fill the treasury; this very loan was at a heavy discount, the establishments in arrears, and the credit of the Government so low, that unless the chief mercantile houses at Bombay, at the instance of the late Sir Charles Forbes, had come forward to prop it, the operations of the great Duke—then General Wellesley—would have been paralyzed. He tells us, indeed, that he was on one occasion compelled to levy a contribution on one of the enemy’s towns in order to find means for paying his troops.\*

When Lord Wellesley entered upon his administration in 1798, the charges in India exceeded the revenue by the sum of £118,746; when he quitted it in 1805, there was a surplus charge of £2,268,608; and whilst the revenues, from large territorial acquisitions, had increased from upwards of eight, to upwards of fifteen millions, per annum, the debt had increased from seventeen to thirty-

\* Letter to Major Malcolm, 13th March, 1804.

one millions and a half. He resigned his trust, however, with confident predictions of enduring peace, and of financial prosperity, and strange to say, we find his cautious brother, then Sir Arthur Wellesley, lending himself to the delusion, that augmented territory would inevitably bring with it augmented wealth; after an elaborate examination of Indian finance in 1806, we find him expressing his conviction that "the revenues of that great empire would be found to afford ample means of restoring the finances, and that there would be in that year, the first of peace, a surplus, after providing for every demand, of upwards of £700,000."\* The minister chimed in with this sanguine note; there was already a surplus, he said, of £800,000, and by necessary attention to the expenditure, he had no doubt it would produce such a surplus as would be sufficient for a speedy liquidation of their debts; and this was said in support of a Bill, then before the House, to authorize the Company to borrow two millions in England upon bond; and with a letter from the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, before him, in which he stated that "an inquiry into the state of the finances of India afforded the most discouraging prospect, that unless some speedy measures were taken to reduce the expenditure, to meet with effect the contingency of war, the consequences would be serious; that the regular troops were little short of five months, and many other departments still more in arrear."

In the next year (1808) we have the same minister moving for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the causes of the "*considerable deficit* in the territorial revenues of India, and to investigate the nature and extent of that deficit."† In 1811 the Company again came to the Parliament for the loan of a million and a half, and when they applied for assistance to a like amount, for the third time, in 1812, they expressed their grievous disappointment, that there should have been an excess of charge over revenue in India, even in the third year of peace, of upwards of a million sterling. This first chapter in the financial history of India ends with the year 1813, when the affairs of that empire again came under the consideration of Parliament. From 1765 to 1814, the East India Company had a common treasury for territory and commerce, so that it was impossible to ascertain exactly how the accounts stood

\* Speech on India Budget, July 8, 1806. Do. of Mr. R. Dundas, July 30, 1807.

† Speech of Mr. R. Dundas on India Budget, March 11, 1808.

between the two branches, whether commerce had derived aid from the territorial revenue, or whether the revenue had been assisted by the profits of trade. By the Act of 1813, they were required to keep separate accounts of the two concerns, so that from that year a new financial era commences.

With the exception of a few months war with the Rajah of Travancore, and a demonstration against Ameer Khan, India had enjoyed profound peace from 1806 to 1813. We have seen the Directors complaining that the charges in India greatly exceeded the Revenue in the third year of peace. Most rigorous efforts were made in subsequent years to keep down the expenditure; the interest of the debt was reduced from eight to six per cent; there was, nevertheless, an annual deficiency in the last five years of peace, which amounted on the average to £134,662.\*

Lord Hastings assumed charge of the Government of India, in October, 1813, and thus describes the state in which he found the finances:—

“The treasuries of the three Presidencies were in so impoverished a condition, that the insufficiency of funds in them to meet any unusual charges excited considerable uneasiness. At that period the low credit of the bonds which had at different times been issued as the securities for monies borrowed, made eventual recourse to a loan seriously discouraging in contemplation. As twelve per cent discount on the above securities was the regularly computable rate in the market—when no immediate exigency pressed upon us, the grievous terms to which we must have subscribed for a new supply of that nature in an hour of alarm, could not be disguised by any foresight.”†

A local surplus of revenue over the charges—he says—had been obtained, by a false economy, and it had no permanence. In order to find the necessary means for carrying on the war with Nepaul, in which he was almost immediately engaged, he put his hands into the pockets of our ally and friend the Nabob of Oude, and drew from thence two millions and a half sterling.

Large acquisitions of territory were the results of this war, and of the war in which we were subsequently engaged with the Mahrattas. And Lord Hastings, after summing up all the events of his trium-

\* Report of Select Committee, August 1832, p. 42.

† Lord Hastings' summary of his administration, appendix to Report of Select Committee, August 1832.

phant government, thus expresses himself on the financial prospect in India :

"After revolving every circumstance with the coolest caution, I cannot find any reason why subsequently to the year 1823, an annual surplus of not less than four millions should not be confidently reckoned upon. This ought naturally to increase, for the causes which will augment the receipt, have nothing in their tendency to require further charges."

The "causes," however, which were to blight this fair prospect were then "looming in the distance," and in less than two years, instead of a surplus of four millions, we were involved in the most pinching financial difficulties, the consequence of the first Burmese war, difficulties which obliged us again to have recourse to our native allies. Amongst the first who felt our friendly embrace, was the unfortunate King of Oude, from whose coffers we extracted another million and a half, upon loan at five per cent, the interest in his own country being twelve—abusing him at the same time for his mismanagement, whilst depriving him of the only means by which he could have reformed it. Scindiah, the Raja of Nagpore, the Raja of Putteala, and even our prisoner, the ex-Peishwah Bajee Rao, contributing to our necessities, and from these friends in need we drew a supply of about £800,000.\* The Burmese war ended in 1826, with the cession to us of Tannaserim and Arracan, and an increase to the public debt to the amount of thirteen millions, and in 1832, the six intervening years having been years of peace, the affairs of India again came under the consideration of Parliament.

We have seen a succession of Indian ministers expressing from year to year, during almost a whole period of the Company's Charter from 1793 to 1813, their confidence that the Indian Revenue would be found equal to all emergencies; that although in time of war, the English Exchequer might be obliged to forego its claim to participate in the Indian surplus; yet that the ways and means would be equal to the demands of a war expenditure, that some progress might even be made in reducing the debt, and we have seen that period wind up with an increase of debt to the extent of twenty millions!

These results had taught ministers prudence, and there was ab-

\* When Runjeet Sing heard of the demand on the Raja of Putteala for money on loan, he laughed, and asked "If this was the gratuitous protection that he and other Sikh chieftains had obtained at the hands of the British Government."



solite silence in Parliament upon the subject of Indian finance during the whole time of the next Charter, viz., from 1813 to 1833. In that interim great acquisitions of territory had been made, and it wound up with a further increase to the public debt of upwards of 17 millions.

With the Act of 1833, another financial era commenced. India which, during the preceding twenty years, had been largely helped from the Company's commercial treasury, was thrown entirely upon its own resources, with an additional demand upon them of upwards of £600,000 for dividends to proprietors of India Stock; and strange to say, it was under these discouraging circumstances that the Indian Minister ventured to revive the note of financial triumph:

"With respect to the competency of India to answer all the just demands upon its Exchequer, no reasonable doubt can exist (said Mr. Grant.) A steady, progressive revenue, a territory almost unlimited in extent, a rich soil, and an industrious people, 'are sufficient pledges that our treasury in the East will, under wise management, be more than adequate to meet the current expenditure.' Our political position in that quarter has been improved, and our Empire been consolidated during the continuance of the present Charter; it is, I think, no extravagant conjecture that the financial condition of our Indian dominions will gradually advance." \*

In the twenty years that have elapsed since this opinion was given we have had another vast augmentation of territory, with its usual accompaniment, an enormous increase of debt. Nothing daunted, however, by these results, we find the Indian Minister, in the face of an hourly increasing debt, and of an actual deficit of nearly a million sterling, only in the last session of Parliament, whilst admitting that the average annual excess of charge over revenue within the last twenty years had been upwards of a million, and that the debt had increased twenty-two millions within the same period, actually congratulating himself and the House upon the financial prospects of India. "True it is," he said, "that we have had some enormously expensive wars; but then see, on the other hand, how expansive the revenues have been." "There cannot be a doubt," said Mr. Herries, "that India will be able to fulfil any expectations that may be formed of her. We are now at peace, and may well expect that the future resources of India will have an opportunity of developing themselves undisturbed by the miseries of war." At the moment

\* Mr. Grant to Court of Directors.



that this sentence was falling from the lips of the Right Honourable gentleman, we opened our batteries against Rangoon, and thus began the first act of a second Burmese war. We shall probably finish it with the usual results, viz., the annexation of territory that will not pay, an increase of some millions to our debt, and by sowing the seeds of another war.

It has been shrewdly observed that "our Indian prosperity is always in the future tense. We are to be reimbursed and enriched some day or other by the territorial acquisitions made in time of war, and in the mean time we are increasing our debt at the rate of two millions a-year."

The public debt of India, bearing interest, as it stood before we commenced our career of conquest and annexation, was—

In 1792.....£7,129,934

After commencing that career, it stood as follows :

In 1814 .....26,970,786

In 1829 .....39,377,880

In 1850 .....50,847,564

To which last mentioned sum must be added five millions supplied from the commercial treasury of the Company, in aid of the India finances during the currency of the Charter, which ended in 1834.

The average annual deficiency in the last five years of the

Charter—*years of peace*—which terminated in 1814,

was.....£134,662

In the next five years, principally war, which ended in

1818-19 ..... 736,853

In the five years of peace, which ended in 1823-4 ..... 27,531

In the five years ending in 1828-29—three of war .....2,878,031

In the ten years ending 1849-50 .....1,474,195

Our questions seem to be answered by these figures—they prove that the Revenue of India, in our hands, has never been equal to the expense of its government. They prove, moreover, that the whole financial history of India has been a history of delusions ; arising out of a notion that territory would be as profitable to us foreigners as it undoubtedly was to its native owners. Under this impression we have gone on step by step—not only aggrandizing ourselves by conquests from enemies, but by exactions from friends, until we have

made ourselves masters, not only of all India, but of much beyond India; and we are now in a fair way of carrying our dominions to the frontier of China.

Every step was to be the last, and every war was wound up with confident predictions of peace, and financial prosperity, and we are at this moment in the "future tense." The estimated deficiency for the past year, 1851-2, was 78,84,678 rupees—upwards of £780,000—in the second year of peace; and we are now again in the midst of a war expenditure, the full result of which will only be known some years hence.

It is only justice to the Court of Directors to say, that up to a very late period they had not lent themselves to the delusion that the Revenue of India was equal to the charge of its government; for while Mr. Grant, at the expiration of the last Charter, was expressing himself with confidence as to the competency of the Indian revenue, to answer all demands that might be made upon it; the Directors were preparing prospective estimates, by which they calculated that if the benefit, which the finances of India had derived from the commercial treasury of the Company was to be continued, there would still be an annual deficiency of £453,823, and if deprived of that aid, of £813,209. Strange to say, in correcting this estimate, the same minister admitted that there would be either a deficiency of £123,253, or of £560,924,\* and we have seen that the actual deficiency has considerably exceeded that amount.

That wars have been the main cause of our financial disappointments there can be no doubt; nevertheless, our predecessors, the Moghul Emperors, had many more wars than we have had, and were yet in financial prosperity. The century from the accession of Acbar in 1566 to the deposal of Shah Jehan, 1668, was a period of almost uninterrupted wars. The military establishments of the Moghuls were larger than ours; their expenditure was enormous, but all was "managed with so much economy, that after defraying the expenses of his great expedition to Candahar, his wars in Balk, and other heavy charges, and maintaining a regular army of 200,000 men, Shah Jehan left a treasure, which some reckon at near six, and some at twenty-four millions in coin, besides his vast accumulations in

\* Report of Financial Committee, August, 1832.

wrought gold and silver, and in jewels.”\* Our dominion has lasted for nearly a century; we are already in debt fifty millions; our debt is hourly increasing, and we have no “accumulations” of coin or jewels. It is not, therefore, merely wars, but the expensive European element which we employ in wars, and which pervades the whole of our administration, that eats up our finances. The 40,000 European soldiers, whom we employ, cost more than the 200,000 native horse employed by our predecessors.

The pay and allowance of the European officers of a Sepoy regiment, are double the amount of the pay of the men. We start with a demand upon the Treasury of about three millions, for charges defrayed on account of the Indian territory at home, charges arising entirely from that element. We have nearly a thousand Europeans employed in the civil administration, besides Supreme Courts—Ecclesiastical establishments—an Indian navy—territory out of India—Aden, Penang, Burmah—charges involving many millions, now falling upon the revenue of India, from which our predecessors were altogether free. It is no longer matter of surprise then, that they should have been able to pay their way, and to save, notwithstanding their prodigal expenditure, and that we should find the same amount of revenue altogether insufficient to meet our demands upon it.

It is not matter of surprise that we foreigners should be able to manage the mighty concerns of our Indian empire with less economy, than those who have made India their own country. The irrepressible tendency of charge to outgrow revenue in India, has been felt and lamented from our earliest acquisition of dominion. Clive ascribed the disappointment of his hopes of a large surplus of revenue from Bengal to this cause:—“Every man,” he said, “that is permitted to make a bill, makes a fortune,” and we find the Court of Directors upon more than one occasion animadverting upon it:—

“We have contemplated with much solicitude,” they said, (more than twenty years ago)† “the very unsatisfactory present state of your finances, and we have carefully and minutely examined the causes which have led to it. We observe that it has been brought

\* Elphinstone’s India, vol. 2, p. 435.

† Letters to Bengal, 19th May, 1830. Lords’ Paper, 151, of 1830.

about less by the pressure of occasional, and extraordinary expenditure, than by *continual progressive augmentations of charge in every department.*"

And again, as late as last year, the Court says :

"In our letter in this department of 19th August, 1846, we shewed that the expense of the civil establishments in Bengal had risen between the years 1830 and 1841, from 64 to 89 lacs of rupees per annum, and in our letter 9th October, 1850, No. 39, we pointed out that between February 1844, and December 1848, the net increase of civil salaries and establishments has exceeded 36 lacs of rupees per annum. Those additional charges necessarily augmented the annual deficit when it occurred."

It is not then merely from a war expenditure, that our finances are embarrassed, but from increased charges in all departments, and particularly in the European element in all departments; an increase which constantly progresses in spite of every effort to arrest it—not merely an increase of current expenditure, but an increase of dead weight upon the Revenue, in the shape of pensions, retiring allowances, &c. In 1839-40, the charge under this head, including off reckonings was £488,701; in 1849-50, it had increased to £614,303.

Two things are however confidently asserted: one, that our revenues have kept pace with our debts. The other, that those revenues have always been ample to satisfy the demands of a peace expenditure. But the official accounts tell us, that in 1792-3, before we commenced our career of territorial aggrandisement, the Revenue of India was £8,276,650, the debt £7,129,934, or less by more than a million sterling than the annual revenue; that after we had to all appearance finished that career, the revenue was £19,576,089, the debt £50,847,564, or equal to more than two and three-quarter years of the revenue."

The opinion that the "Indian revenues under ordinary circumstances are not only ample to cover all necessary expenditure, but sufficient to yield a considerable surplus towards the liquidation of debt contracted in war,"\* appears to be founded upon a fact, and upon an assumption—the fact that "in the three years prior to the

\* Letter from the Court of Directors, June 1852. Appendix to Commons' Report, p. 484.

expedition to Afghanistan, there was an average surplus of upwards of a million sterling—the assumption, that the opium revenue will continue to be as productive as it has been for the last eight years. If, however, we look narrowly into the sources of this surplus, we shall find them to have been in a great measure casual and precarious.\* We had a surplus of nearly a million sterling in the year 1793-4, but this gradually melted away, and was converted into a deficit in 1797-8, although these were years of profound peace. From 1806 to 1814, we had a long interval of peace, but no surplus revenue. From 1818 to 1824, and from 1826 to 1836 we had peace, and although the finances of India had been assisted from the commercial revenues of the Company, to the extent of nearly five millions, yet the revenue was found insufficient to meet the demands of a peace expenditure, and in 1834-5, the deficit amounted to £194,477.

But from 1834 to 1836, “a rapid reduction was effected in the debt of India, by the application of a portion of the Company’s commercial assets to that object,”† and it was in the reduction of a charge for interest upon debt, effected by this adventitious aid, that the foundation of a surplus was laid. The surplus amounted in three years to £3,470,054, which was almost wholly made up by reductions in charge for interest, increase in the revenue from opium—and from the Government bank at Madras.‡

It was not then from any increase in the permanent sources of revenue, but from adventitious aids, and from precarious and casual receipts, that a surplus was created in those three years. There was, indeed, an actual decline in the permanent sources of revenue in the

\* Tucker on India Finance.

† Appendix to Commons’ Report, 1852, p. 485.

	1834-5.	1835-6.	1836-7.	1837-8.
Interest upon debt	1,774,153	1,655,287	1,345,619	1,365,382
Opium revenue	728,517	1,399,009	1,439,031	1,487,291
Government Bank, Madras	“	86,612	12,599	9,297
Total surplus for three years			£3,470,054	
From reduction of interest upon debt			956,171	
From increase of opium revenue			2,139,780	
From Madras Bank			108,508	
			£3,204,459	

three years, which, upon the whole, yielded a surplus;\* and there was a gradual decline in the surplus itself, from £1,441,512 to £780,310, before the Affghan war had commenced; so that if our relations with China had been disturbed a few years earlier, there would have been an almost† uninterrupted stream of deficits from 1797-8 to the present day; for the surplus, as we have shewn, mainly arose from the Opium Revenue, and that revenue was reduced by two-thirds in the second year of the war with China.

We are told, moreover, that there has been a diminution in the total receipts from land in the old provinces of Bengal within the last five years—a deterioration also in the land revenue from the old territory of the North-West Provinces; an increase in the land revenue of Madras, not equal, however, to the loss sustained by the abolition of the transit duties in that Presidency; an increase in the land revenue of Bombay more than counterbalanced by increase of charge; and if we compare the average receipts from the sale of salt, and customs combined,—a moiety of which consists of a tax upon salt,—for the six years ending with 1844-45, with the receipts in the six years ending in 1850-51,‡ we shall find a deterioration in the revenue of the latter period of about £100,000 a-year,§ whilst a comparison of the yield

\* Revenue, exclusive of opium :

1834-5 . . . . .	£13,036,908
1835-6 . . . . .	13,580,748
1836-7 . . . . .	13,018,804
1837-8 . . . . .	12,800,837

† There was a surplus in 1820-21 of . . . . .	£135,898
in 1821-22 of . . . . .	£412,876
in 1830-31 of . . . . .	£110,199

but these sums are greatly exaggerated, by the conversion of rupees into sterling money, at an artificial rate of exchange.

‡ Total revenue from customs and salt :

From 1839-40 to 1844-45 . . . . .	£19,288,397
Average . . . . .	3,214,732
Ditto, 1845-6 to 1850-51 . . . . .	18,726,386
Average . . . . .	3,121,064*

§ Total collection from salt and customs from 1841-42 to 1844-45	£16,175,599
from 1846-47 to 1850-51	15,572,288
Decrease . . . . .	603,311

\* Appendix to Commons' Report, 1852, pp. 276. 450, 451.

from opium for similar periods, taking the three years from 1835-6 to 1838-9, instead of the three years of the Chinese war, when the opium revenue was unnaturally depressed, gives an average increase in the last six years of very nearly a million sterling.

It is indeed a melancholy fact, revealed to us by these papers, and of which the Indian authorities appear to be quite aware, that the opium revenue\* is the great regulator of the Indian exchequer. Whether there be a surplus, or a deficit, depends entirely upon the demand for this drug in China; so that, if anything were to occur to deprive us of the millions which it now yields, we should be utterly unable to pay our way, even in time of peace.

"The fluctuations," say the authorities, "in the increase from opium for the last ten years, shew to what extraordinary vicissitudes this source of revenue is subject, and how incumbent it is to regulate the charges of Government without depending too much upon the opium receipts. In the four years from 1838-9 to 1841-2, owing to the state of our relations with China, the income from opium scarcely averaged 80 lacs per annum. \* \* \* \* In the succeeding six years, from 1842-43 to 1847-48, the income will have averaged nearly 230 lacs per annum. \* \* \* \* Had the net receipts from opium continued at their average rate during the fifteen years prior to 1842-43, instead of being augmented to the extent already stated, your Government must have borrowed seven crores more than it has done to supply the annual deficiency." Again, four years later, in June 1852, they observe: "In 1849-50, the net revenue from opium greatly exceeded that of any former period, it having amounted to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  crores of rupees (£3,309,637), and thus a surplus in the finances of India was realized sooner than could have been expected."

We have seen that the surplus which existed in the three years preceding the Affghan war, was produced mainly by a large and rapid increase in the receipts from opium. The revenue from that source, indeed, in three years, exceeded the amount of the surplus by nearly a million sterling; and in the three years ending in 1850-51, it exceeded the opium revenue in the three years of the surplus by upwards of four millions. No stronger proof can be afforded that the

\* Total revenue from opium :

From 1835-6 to 1837-8, and from	
1842-3 to 1844-5 . . . . .	£9,746,619
Average . . . . .	1,624,436
Ditto, from 1845-6 to 1850-1 . . . . .	15,571,577
Average . . . . .	2,595,262



solvency of India depends entirely upon a source of supply, which may be cut from under us by renewed altercations with China, or by a change in the policy of that empire. A revival of hostilities with China would bring the revenue at once down from three millions, its present amount, to three hundred thousand pounds, its amount when our war with China was at its height.\*

Are we then warranted in thinking favourably of the financial condition of a country, which is dependent upon a precarious source of income for means to pay its way in time of peace? and which, while constantly liable to war, has no resource, when war occurs, but to add to its debt by loans raised at high interest?

We are keen enough in detecting flaws in the financial state of our neighbours, and from constantly recurring deficits and increase of debt, we augur unfavourably of the financial condition of Austria and France. *Deficits have been the rule, equilibrium in the finances of India the rare exception, for a century*; and yet we argue from the exception against the rule, and venture to say, "that the resources of India, under ordinary circumstances, are not only ample to cover all necessary expenditure, but sufficient to yield a considerable surplus towards the liquidation of debt." We say this, and confess, in the same breath, that the main stays of our exchequer—the land revenue and the salt revenue—are either in a languid or a stagnant state; and that one-sixth of our revenue rests upon the most precarious foundation. We act, moreover, as if our resources were inexhaustible, and our credit unbounded; but the very fact that the salt revenue—which, as it hits every one, and the poorer classes harder than the rich, and is therefore a gauge of the capability of India to bear more taxation—is

SURPLUS.		REVENUE FROM OPIUM.	
*1835-6 . . .	£1,441,512 . . . .	£1,399,009	
1836-7 . . .	1,248,224 . . . .	1,439,031	
1837-8 . . .	780,318 . . . .	1,487,291	
Total . . .	£3,470,054	£4,325,331	
1848-49 . . .		2,667,902	
1849-50 . . .		3,309,637	
1850-51 . . .		2,700,662	
		£8,678,201	
Increase . . .		4,352,870	

*Appendix to Commons Report, p. 276.*



rather on the decline than otherwise, is proof that no other tax would be productive : and another fact, viz. that the principal creditors of India are not the people of India, seeking a safe investment for their surplus capital in Government securities, but the servants of the Government, or the European community in India,\* is proof that our credit is extremely limited. The public servants in India pour their savings yearly into the public Treasury, under a conviction that if the finances of India should be embarrassed, the national exchequer will come forward to their aid ; but the public of India appear, from the comparatively small amount of stock which they hold, to feel no such confidence.

It is indeed a significant fact, that in times of emergency we can raise no money for the public service of India at a lower rate than 5 per cent. Proposals have frequently been made to transfer a portion of the Indian debt to England, by borrowing in the home market upon better terms, but those always have been put aside, and it has been found impossible to raise even so small a sum as a million and a half for railroads, without a guarantee of from 5 to 4½ per cent. Would there be this shyness in investing money in Indian securities, if our financial system was as sound, and our credit as good as it is often asserted to be ?

It is obvious that our finances can never be in a safe state, or our credit stable, so long as we are dependent upon a precarious source of revenue, for the means of meeting a peace expenditure, and upon loans, when we engage in war.

It has always been matter of regret to the most far-seeing of our Indian statesmen, that no financial provision should have been made in times of peace for the eventualities of war. "I have again and again," said Sir Thomas Munro,† "urged the expediency of lowering our land revenue, and of establishing a fixed and moderate assessment, because I am satisfied that this measure alone would be more effectual than all other measures combined, in promoting the improvement both of the country and the people. India should, like England, be relieved from a part of her burdens, whenever the state of affairs may permit such a change. The remission granted in time of peace, might be again imposed in war, and even something additional. Every state should have the means of raising extraordi-

\* See Appendix to Commons' Report, p. 406.

† Life, vol. iii. p. 389 ; vol. ii. p. 255.

nary taxes in time of war. If it has not, it can only meet its expenses by reductions in times of peace, a resource which must soon fail, as it cannot, without danger, be carried beyond a certain limit.\*

Having always lived beyond our income, we have never been able to relieve India of any of her burdens. Nay, we have rather increased than diminished them; if we have abolished some vexatious taxes which were laid on by our predecessors, and done away with a system of transit duties of our own devising, we have, on the other hand, imposed a salt tax, which obliges the people to pay four, five, and in some cases ten times as much for a necessary of life as they did under their native rulers, a tax from which none can escape, but which is felt most by the very poorest classes. We have, moreover, invented a stamp tax, a source of revenue unknown to native governments, which is, in fact, a tax upon justice, as it is from stamps used in legal proceedings that this source of revenue is mainly fed.

All attempts to extend the range of our taxation, or to innovate in taxation, have signally failed. It is well known that the natives of India,—the most patient on the face of the earth under burdens to which they are accustomed, revolt at once when attempts are made to impose new taxes upon them. Numerous instances of this occurred under the Native Governments, and our efforts to impose a tax upon houses at Benares, and a police tax at Bareilly, were met by a stubborn resistance, which ended in the defeat of the Government, after a good deal of blood had been spilt. A similar resistance was experienced upon our attempt a few years ago to double the price of salt in the Bombay territory, as a substitute for the tax upon trades and professions which we had abolished.

"The natives of India," said the great statesman† to whose authority we have so often referred, "are too intelligent and acute

\* A striking proof of the danger of a reckless reduction of establishments in time of peace was afforded when Lord Hastings took charge of the government of India, in 1813. He found the army so reduced in numbers, as to be incapable of discharging their ordinary duties. Many Sepoys had demanded their discharge, in consequence of the heavy duties imposed upon them. Deep discontent prevailed in the native army, and a tone was assumed by native powers in their intercourse with the British Government, which was quite unprecedented. See Lord Hastings' summary of his Administration. Appendix to Report of Committee of House of Commons, August, 1832.

† Sir Thomas Munro.

to overlook any sources from whence the public revenue could with propriety be increased, and whenever they appear to have neglected the establishment of a productive tax, it will probably be found upon examination to have proceeded from attention to the prejudices of caste and religion."

If the Native Governments, therefore, were contented with a tax upon salt, not equal to a fourth of our impost, it was because they found that taxation could not be carried beyond a certain limit, and that a high tax upon land and a high tax upon salt were incompatible; that the one must be paid at the expense of the other. We cannot increase the price of salt; we cannot count confidently upon the maintenance of the opium revenue at its present standard. We cannot impose fresh taxes; we cannot with safety, even in time of profound peace, reduce our military establishments below a certain level. What, then, under these circumstances, are our financial prospects? "Very gloomy," say the Indian authorities,\* "if we look only at the years of deficit; but if we look at the years of peace and of surplus, they are not discouraging. It is obvious, indeed," they say, "that the ordinary revenue of India is more than sufficient to meet ordinary demands upon it." But what would be the condition of an individual who in framing an estimate of his income and expenditure, should leave no margin for contingencies? Nations which are taxable, and whose credit is extensive, need not, in times of peace, make provision for such contingencies; but India, as we have seen, does not come within either of these categories; its income is fixed,—to a certain extent, precarious,—and its credit limited; and what must be the result if we continue to build expectations upon years of peace and of surplus, when excess of charge has been the rule, excess of revenue the rare exception, for the greatest part of a century?

"The restoration and re-establishment of peace upon a basis which we trust will prove lasting, will immediately bring the total expenditure within the revenue, and lead to a surplus in the next year."† This was the official language immediately after the first Sikh war; but the expectation was no sooner formed than crushed,‡ by a diminution in the receipts of 60 lacs, and an increase in the charges of 18 lacs, making a difference, the wrong way, of £700,000.

The strong hope expressed that all financial difficulties had "at

\* Appendix, p. 480.

† Appendix, p. 436.

‡ Appendix, p. 448.

length been overcome by the establishment of peace throughout India," at the end of the first Sikh war, was disappointed by the breaking out of the second; but the same sanguine expectations were revived of enduring peace and financial prosperity the moment that contest was over. "This result will prevent the recurrence of such expensive and devastating wars as have lately prevailed."\* The ink was hardly dry upon this sentence when the second Burmese war broke out, and with the news came "Estimates of the Revenues and Charges of India for the year 1851-2," from which it appears that the deficiency in that year amounted to 78,84,678 rupees, or upwards of £780,000.†

This was the deficit at the end of the second year of peace, and with this deficit we entered into another war. We have seen that a surplus revenue which had arisen in 1793-4 was converted into a deficit in three years, though these three were years of peace. We have seen that it was not until after twenty dreary years of deficits that a momentary surplus again appeared; that after ten years of uninterrupted peace,—principally by adventitious aids, and by precarious receipts—a surplus again was produced, that this surplus was gradually diminishing before it was extinguished by the breaking out of the Affghan war. From the year 1834-5 to the year 1850-51, the finances of India were assisted by adventitious receipts to the extent of upwards of twelve millions sterling.‡ These extra sources of supply are now completely exhausted, and India is thrown, for the first time, entirely upon its fixed revenues for means to meet its expenditure. We start then with an acknowledged deficit of upwards of £700,000, with a war, which cannot fail to add largely to that deficit, and with an increase of permanent charge of upwards of three millions. If we compare the financial state of India in the year 1850-51 with its state in 1837-8, the last year of the surplus, we have the following results:

Increase of revenue	£4,341,210
„ of charge	5,800,237
„ of debt	17,452,028
„ interest upon ditto	841,352

\* Appendix, p. 486.

† Appendix, p. 486.

‡ From commercial assets . . . . . £11,252,897

    Sundry receipts . . . . . 1,566,883

---

12,819,780

See account in Appendix, p. 276.

If this increase of revenue had arisen from sources which are under our control, or if there was any reasonable prospect of our being able to reduce the charges even to a level with the receipts, our financial position would still be worse now than it was in 1837<sup>48</sup>, when we had less revenue and lower charges. But the increase arises principally from opium,\* a source of revenue which may be snatched from us at any time, and from the acquisition of territory which does not pay its expenses.

Within the last twelve years we have enlarged our territory by 167,013 square miles, which carries a population of 8,572,530 souls. Our principal acquisitions have been Scinde, the Punjab, and Sattara, the civil charges† of which go far to absorb the revenues, and which, including military charges, entail a heavy burden upon our finances. Scinde, when under its native princes, paid us a tribute of three lacs of rupees a-year, and Lahore a tribute of twenty lacs; if we add these to the total excess of charge over revenue, we shall find that

* OPIUM RECEIPTS . 1837-8 . . .	£1,487,291
1850-51 . . .	2,700,662
	<hr/>
	1,213,361

† Comparative statements of revenues and charges for the years

	1837-8.	1850-1.	INCREASE.
Revenue	£14,288,128	£18,629,328	£4,341,210
Charges	13,507,237	19,308,047	5,800,237
Debt	33,355,536	50,807,564	17,452,028
Interest on debt	1,504,723	2,346,075	
Surplus	780,318	Deficit 678,709	Deficit 841,352

REVENUE.	CIVIL CHARGES.	MILITARY CHARGES.
Punjab . . . . . R.1,30,05000	96,22000	40,00000*
Scinde . . . . . 27,00000	20,00000	* 20,00000
Sattara . . . . . 20,00000	27,00000	
Total . . . . . 1,77,00000	1,43,22000	60,00000
		1,43,22000
	Total Charges . . . . .	2,03,22000
	Excess of charge . . . . .	26,22000
	Add Tribute . . . . .	23,00000
	Net loss . . . . .	49,22000

\* The military charges of the Punjab are not stated in the accounts, although there are three times as many men located there as in Scinde. We have set down the Military expenses at twice the amount of those of Scinde.

we are financially the worse for these acquisitions, to the extent of at least half a million a year, for it is a great mistake to suppose, that the current charges for troops cover our military expenditure. Every increase of territory involves an immense outlay, for buildings, stores, pensions, retiring allowances, and casualties: particularly casualties amongst European troops, as every English soldier is supposed to cost £100, from the time of his enlistment, until he commences active service in India. The increase of payments in England, on account of territory, from £1,974,665, the sum at which it stood in 1837-8, before we entered upon our last period of war, to £2,352,800, the amount expended in 1850-51, is proof of this fact.

If peace therefore had continued, we should have entered upon our new financial career, with an additional demand upon our resources—additional as compared with the demand of 1837-8—of £841,352 increase of interest upon debt—of £500,000 excess of charge in our newly acquired territory—and of £4,458,885 excess of general charges.\* Of the total increase of charge in 1850-51, viz. £5,800,237, £3,265,921 arose in the military, and £2,534,316, in the non-military departments—no expectation is held out of any reduction in the charges; and from the fact that the fixed military charges had actually increased rather than diminished in the second year of peace,† there would appear to have been no prospect of a reduction in general charge even had peace been procured, and experience has taught us, that the charges of India have invariably increased faster than the receipts.

What then are our ways and means to meet these extraordinary demands? It is acknowledged that what we may call our permanent sources of revenue, land, salt, and customs are either on the decline, or stagnant, and that where there is a languid increase in those

* Increase of charge in 1850-51 over 1837-8 . . . . .	£5,800,237
Deduct increase of interest £841,352, and for territory 500,000	
remainder . . . . .	4,458,885

† Military charges:—

1847-48 . . . . .	£9,167,037
1848-49 . . . . .	9,025,060
1849-50 . . . . .	9,406,417
1850-51 . . . . .	9,933,545

branches, as in Madras and Bombay, the charges grow faster than the revenue. It is in the opium revenue only that there is vitality, and when we find that there have been fluctuations in the receipts from that source, within the last few years of nearly two millions sterling,\* when we recollect that a deadly blow might be struck at this source of supply, by renewed hostilities with China, or by internal regulations in that empire, we shall see the full danger of our present financial position, our solvency depending as it does even in time of peace, exclusively upon the produce of the opium revenue. It was by an increase in that produce of no less than £641,734 in the year 1849-50, that a momentary equilibrium was established in the finances, an equilibrium that was disturbed in the following year by a corresponding fall in the receipts, and which we should not have been able to re-establish had peace continued, even if we could have secured as large an average receipt from that source for the next seven years, as it yielded in the preceding seven. But we have again a war expenditure to provide for, and when we recollect, that the first war in Burmah, which lasted only two years, cost India 15 millions, we cannot expect to come out of the present one without a serious addition to our present burdens. We are now masters not only of all Hindostan but of much territory out of Hindostan—we have seen, that *whilst we have not trebled our revenues, we have increased our debt more than six fold, and we are at this moment adding to that debt in order to make good deficiencies of income.*†

We seem, therefore, to have been imitating the example of the man “greedy of acres” in this country, who borrows money at five per cent in order to purchase an estate which will barely yield him three. We have been urged on in this “earth hunger,” first,

\* Opium revenue :—

1847-48	. . .	£1,559,428
1848-49	. . .	2,667,902
1849-50	. . .	3,309,637
1850-51	. . .	2,700,662

† Total revenue from opium for 1844-45 to 1850-51	. . .	£17,616,536
Average	. . .	2,516,876
Revenue of 1850-51	. . .	2,700,662
Deficit of 1850-51	. . .	678,709
Do. of 1851-2, Rs. 78,84,078	. . .	710,000



by a notion that extension of territory is the necessary consequence of a successful war; secondly, that territory must needs be as profitable in our hands as in the hands of its native owners. Clive was of a different opinion; he thought that Oude would be more profitable to us financially and politically in the hands of its own sovereigns than if placed under our direct rule; he therefore reinstated the Nabob Sujah ud Dowlah in his dominions after the victory of Culpac in 1765, although the attack made upon us by the Nabob had been unprovoked, we having undertaken to protect his territory from all enemies, the Nabob paying the expense; and it was the opinion both of Clive and Hastings — certainly very competent judges — that the extension of our territory beyond the Bengal provinces would be a burden instead of a benefit. Looking at the question merely with reference to finance, the soundness of their opinion cannot be questioned. The more territory the more debt, and why? because we foreigners cannot make territory as profitable as its native owners. Our management is wasteful, and we are enormously cheated. Cheating the revenue is a vice common in all countries, and especially so in a government so emphatically foreign as our Government in India. A striking proof of this is afforded in the present financial state of the Punjab. The Punjab, after supporting an army of 100,000 men, and a splendid court, gave Runjeet Sing a large surplus revenue. We hardly realize enough from it to pay a couple of regiments, in addition to its civil charges. The same story may be told of Scinde, of Sattara, and it is doubtful whether any territorial acquisition that we have made since we first obtained possession of Bengal has yielded as much under our rule as it paid to us in tribute. Our Eastern settlements, Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, *exclusive of the pay of the troops*, cost India upon the average more than £100,000 a year.\* The territory we took from the Burmese in 1826, including the military charges, costs as much more. † Aden is a drain upon us to the extent of £11,154.‡ The charge of these outlying settlements is thrown upon India. We cannot relieve the people of India from any of their burdens, because money is required for the maintenance of possessions which India has no more to do with than it has with Java or Japan. We have just

\* Appendix, p. 463.

† Revenue.

‡ Appendix, p. 293.



taken the territory of Pegu—a preliminary only to the absorption of the whole of Burmah, nay, to a much wider stride, for we are informed by an influential paper,\* and which echoes English opinion in India, that “every one out of England is now ready to acknowledge that the whole of Asia, from the Indus to the sea of Ochotzk, is destined to become the patrimony of that race which the Normans thought six centuries ago they had finally crushed, but which now stands at the head of European civilization. We are placed, it is said, by the mysterious but unmistakable designs of Providence in command of Asia, and the people of England must not lay the flattering unction to their souls that they can escape from the responsibility of this lofty and important position by simply denouncing the means by which England has attained it.”

The people of England will do well then to be on the alert, and ascertain before they assent to this “lofty and imposing position,” who is to pay for the enterprise? If forgetful of every obligation, they were to endeavour to saddle India with war charges, it would be to no purpose, for India is already sinking under her own burdens. The most sanguine view that could be taken of Indian finances before we came into collision with the Burmese war, was that “if we managed well and kept out of wars, we were in no immediate danger of bankruptcy.”† That this danger is much aggravated by the war‡ in which we are now engaged, is proved by the fact—that the first Burmese war, although it lasted little more than two years, added thirteen millions to the Indian debt. It is not, therefore, a little surprising to find it treated by the Indian authorities as an expedition that might for a time arrest a reduction in charges; but which would not entail any additional expenditure.§ This sanguine view, has however since been corrected, and it has been asserted with some triumph,|| that the war expenditure will not

\* Friend of India, January 6, 1853.

† Campbell's Modern India, p. 418.

‡ The great Duke's opinion, which has been adduced in favour of this war, depended of course, upon the case that was put before him. If he had been reminded that the first Burmese war cost fifteen millions—that thirty millions have been spent in subsequent wars—that the revenues of India were inadequate to meet the demands of a peace establishment; we cannot doubt that his language would have been “then suit your resentment to your convenience, make reprisals on the Burmese, but don't plunge into a war, which may bring you to the verge of bankruptcy.”

§ Appendix to Report of Commons, p. 480.

|| Debate in the House of Commons on the Burmese war.

exceed £30,000 a month. This would be serious enough, if it was to last only for a few months of war; but experience has taught us, that a war expenditure does not cease with the establishment of peace. Every acquisition of territory involves the necessity of a permanent increase to the army particularly in that inordinately expensive branch of it, the European, and the remoter the acquisition from the metropolis—the greater the increase. Since 1837, the last year of peace, we have added 16,000 men to our European force, at a cost of more than £500,000 a year.\*

We have said enough to shew that the financial history of India, has been a history of delusions from our first acquisition of empire in the East, and that the revenues of India have never been sufficient *unaided* to meet the demands of a peace establishment.†

We have shewn that the more territory we get the heavier are our embarrassments. In the year 1792, the year in which we first began to extend our dominion, we had a surplus revenue of nearly a million; the debt in that year was not equal to the annual revenue,‡ nor the interest to one-sixteenth of the revenue. After having enormously increased our territory, we have an annual deficit of upwards of a million sterling, and it would now take the revenue of more than two years and a half to cover the debt, and the interest of the debt is now equal to one ninth part of the revenue, notwithstanding a reduction of more than one half in the rate of interest at which we raised our loans.§

\* European troops of all arms,

1837 — 27,814

1850 — 43,579

† “Between the years 1814 and 1834, the finances of India had assistance from the commercial profits of the Company, to the extent of five millions, and from 1834 to 1850-1, to the extent of twelve millions.

†	REVENUE.	DEBT.	INTEREST.
1792-93	8,276,770	7,992,348	526,205.
1850-51	18,629,338	50,847,564	2,346,075.

§ The rates of interest have been gradually reduced from twelve to ten, to eight, to six, to five, and notice is now given that they will in future be four per cent. It is a significant fact, that this reduction in the rates of interest upon our loans has been made whilst the general rates of interest in India remain undiminished. Twelve per cent, and even much higher rates, still obtain in

Every year we are obliged to borrow in order to find the means of paying the interest of our debt, and in comparing our present revenue with the revenue as it stood before we began our career of conquest, we are to remember that that branch of it which though subject to great vicissitudes, is upon the whole the most flourishing, viz., the opium, would have been just as large as it is now, if we had never added an acre to our territory; for it is mainly the produce of our ancient possessions. It may be, at no distant period, the unpleasant duty of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to renew those applications for loans in aid of the finances of India, which, as we have seen, were not unfrequently made in the early part of the century;—such a prospect, however disagreeable, is before us. We can scarcely suppose that the people of England will look with satisfaction upon any increase of their burthens to make up for the embarrassments of Indian finance, but to this they must soon come, unless greater responsibility be laid upon the Indian Government, and greater wisdom mark the administration of our Indian empire.

the general transactions of the country. Our Indian Government borrows at lower rates, because its creditors in the main are Europeans, who, seeking for secure remittances to the mother country, have the choice between the Government funds in India, and the Government funds in England, and therefore freely lend their money to the Indian Government, provided they can realize one or two per cent more for it than they could get from the Government of England. It is clear that, if the credit of the Government in India was national, they could only borrow at the national rates of interest, and to these rates they would be driven should their demand for money ever exceed the savings or the profits of the European community.

## INDIA REFORM SOCIETY. — On Saturday,

the 12th of March, a MEETING of the Friends of India was held in Charles Street, St. James's Square, with a view of bringing public opinion to bear on the Imperial Parliament in the case of India, so as to obtain the attention to the complaints and claims of the inhabitants of that vast empire. H. D. SEYMOUR, Esq., M.P., having been called to the chair, the following Resolutions were agreed to by the Meeting:—

1. That the character of the alterations to be effected in the constitution of our Indian Government at the termination of the East India Company's Charter Act, on the 30th of April, 1854, is a question which demands the most ample and serious consideration.

2. That although Committees of both Houses of Parliament have been appointed, in conformity with the practice on each preceding renewal of the Charter Act, for the purpose of investigating the nature and the results of our Indian Administration, those Committees have been appointed on the present occasion at a period so much later than usual, that the interval of time remaining before the expiration of the existing powers of the East India Company is too short to permit the possibility of collecting such evidence as would show what alterations are required in our Indian Government.

3. That the inquiry now being prosecuted by Committees of the Legislature will be altogether unsatisfactory if it be confined to the evidence of officials and of servants of the East India Company, and conducted and terminated without reference to the petitions and wishes of the more intelligent of the natives of India.

4. That it is the duty of the friends of India to insist upon a temporary Act to continue the present Government of India for a period not exceeding three years, so that time may be given for such full inquiry and deliberation as will enable Parliament within that period to legislate permanently for the future administration of our Indian Empire.

5. That in order to obtain such a measure, this Meeting constitutes itself an "India Reform Society," and names the undermentioned gentlemen as a Committee.

T. Barnes, Esq., M.P.  
W. Beaumont, Esq., M.P.  
J. Bell, Esq., M.P.  
W. Biggs, Esq., M.P.  
J. P. B. Blackett, Esq., M.P.  
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Lieut.-Col. J. M. Caulfield, M.P.  
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W. H. Clarke, Esq.  
J. Crook, Esq., M.P.  
J. Dickinson, Jun., Esq.  
M. G. Fielden, Esq., M.P.  
Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. F. Fitzgerald,  
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H. D. Seymour, Esq., M.P.  
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J. B. Smith, Esq., M.P.  
J. Sullivan, Esq.  
G. Thompson, Esq., M.P.  
P. Warren, Esq.  
J. A. Wise, Esq., M.P.

Correspondence on all matters connected with the Society to be addressed to the Hon. Secretary, by whom subscriptions will be received in aid of its object.

JOHN DICKINSON, Jun., Hon. Sec.

Committee Rooms, Clarence Chambers, 12, Haymarket,  
April 12th, 1853.

# INDIA REFORM.


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No. III.

## NOTES ON INDIA,

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OF BOMBAY.



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# NOTES ON INDIA.

BY DR. BUIST OF BOMBAY.

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FROM the reports of the Committees of April last it would appear that the Act of 1784 encumbered with the various deteriorations it has suffered by each successive enactment is about to be extended, with little alteration, to 1874.

For the next twenty years the natives of Hindostan are as heretofore to be in a great measure excluded from public employment in their own country, although pronounced by Act of Parliament equally eligible for this as Europeans, and proved by the testimony of the Duke of Wellington, Lord William Bentinck, the Earl of Ellenborough, Sir George Clarke, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Holt Mackenzie, and all the ablest statesmen of the age, eminently qualified for office. We are to have, till the close of the present century, a constitution continued to us which was framed near the end of the last; we are to have three separate sets of government for India, the principal function of each of which seems to be, to thwart and retard the operations of the others; the Leadenhall Street division costing £130,000 a-year, being merely the minister of patronage, and place of record, without one atom of power beyond this, save that of suggesting, criticising, and obstructing; the Board of Control costing £25,000 a-year, managed by a chairman, appointed without any necessary qualification to the office, whose average tenure of service has, since 1820, fallen short of two years, void of all responsibility, endowed with absolute power, governing in secret, and presenting to Parliament, when asked for information, collections of papers so disgracefully vitiated and garbled as to mislead, in place of enlightening, and whose main contributions to the policy of India during the past twenty years have been wars, which have cost thirty millions sterling. With three governments in India, costing half a million sterling annually amongst them, so completely under



a parcel of clever clerks at home,\* as to be compelled to send home particulars of every thing they say or do, to be commented on, checked, or controlled, by parties incapable, from position, of forming a correct opinion on what they decide; and finally, in India, we are to have Indian education neglected, improvement thrown aside, irrigation and the means of communication overlooked, though to neglect such as these we have, since the last Charter Act, been indebted for famines which have swept nearly two millions of human beings away, and caused a loss to the revenue of above eight millions sterling, a sum, if properly expended, sufficient to have averted for ever the calamities by which, in a few years, its loss has been occasioned. Against things so monstrous as these, in reference to which Parliament seems deaf or unheeding, it has been resolved to appeal through the Press to the people of England, in the firm belief that were they aware of the tremendous responsibilities they were incurring by the mismanagement, of which they are the authors, they would afford India such redress as she is entitled to seek from their hands, the refusal of which may yet be productive of such fearful consequences.

History contains no record of anything so strange, or so reprehensible, as the neglect with which Englishmen treat the interests of the British Empire in the East. The disfranchisement of Gattton or old Sarum occupied ten times the attention, and was listened to with a hundred times the anxiety, that is bestowed upon an empire which contains an area equal to half that of Europe.

#### WHAT IS INDIA?

India occupies from the 7th to the 32nd parallel, from the 67th to the 90th meridian. Its boundary line is 11,260 miles in length, or half the circumference of the globe. It comprises an area of 1,309,200 square miles, ten times that of France, of which 800,758 belong to England, 508,442 to native subsidiaries or allies. It extends from the sea level to an altitude of 27,000 feet, and its climate varies from that of the torrid zone to that of the arctic regions—where the huge Himalayas rise far within the line of perpetual snow. On its western marches along the Indus from the sea

\* Lord Ellenborough's evidence.



to the borders of the Punjaub are regions where rain hardly ever falls, where the houses are built of unburnt bricks, and a shower once in five years is a rarity. On its eastern frontier, under the same parallel, in the Kassia Hills, and at a similar distance from the sea, the average fall is from 3 to 400 inches during the three summer months: as much is often measured in forty-eight hours as suffices England for a year. It has rivers, double the size of the Danube or the Rhine, shrunk up at one season of the year, so as to be almost un-navigable, swelled out at another season so as to become vast inland seas, the one shore hardly visible from the other, carrying as much solid matter annually to the ocean as would build up an English county from beneath low to above high water mark.

#### POPULATION.

The races by which these vast regions are occupied, are as strange and diversified in character as are the features of the country and the climate; they are of every form, hue, and faith, from the huge Patan or Beloochi, to the short but active Goorka, and diminutive man of Malabar; from the Todawars, who dwell on trees, and feed on reptiles and vermin,—the Khoonds, slaughtering their hecatombs of children,—the Arab, dark as the Ethiopian, and the Ethiopians themselves in abundance; the Parsee and the Mogul, scarcely distinguishable from the Englishman in point of hue—to the learned Brahmin, studying the stars, calculating eclipses, and constructing astronomical instruments, compared to which those of modern times are but toys in point of size. The distinguished astronomer Jayasinha, Rajah of Ambhere, nearly two centuries ago had observatories constructed at Delhi, Benares, Muttra, and Oujein, each possessed of equatorials of such size as to allow above three inches and a half to the degree, each degree being divided into minutes: the gnomons of the sun dials were from a hundred to a hundred and twenty feet in length. The bodily and the moral maladies which afflict a community of such mass and diversity of material, are almost equally frightful in point of character and magnitude. Famines occurring almost decennially, some of which within our time, have swept their millions away. In 1833, fifty thousand persons perished in the month of September in Lucknow; at Khanpoor twelve hundred died of want; and half a million sterling was subscribed by the

bountiful to relieve the destitute. In Guntoor two hundred and fifty thousand human beings, seventy-four thousand bullocks, a hundred and fifty-nine thousand milch cattle, and three hundred thousand sheep and goats, died of starvation. Fifty thousand people perished in Marwar; and in the North West Provinces, half a million of human lives are supposed to have been lost. The living preyed upon the dead; mothers devoured their children; and the human imagination could scarcely picture the scenes of horror that pervaded the land. In twenty months' time a million and a half of people must have died of hunger or of its immediate consequences. The direct pecuniary loss occasioned to government by this single visitation exceeded five millions sterling—a sum which would have gone far to avert the calamity from which it arose, had it been expended in constructing thoroughfares to connect the interior with the sea coast or districts where scarcity prevailed, with those where human food was to be had in abundance; or on canals to bear forth to the soil, thirsty and barren for want of moisture, the unbounded supplies our rivers carry to the ocean. India has indeed been the birthplace or the cradle of the most frightful maladies that have ever visited the earth: a hundred and fifty thousand persons perished of cholera betwixt its appearance on the Ganges in 1816, and the time it reached Western India the year after. In 1820 it swept away one-fourth of the whole population of the Mauritius; before 1831, fifty millions of human beings are supposed to have been destroyed by it in various parts of the world. The plague of Marwar in 1837 carried off ten thousand, one-fourth of the population in a few months; and in 1849 the Mahamurree swept away one-fourth of the inhabitants where it prevailed, in Gurhwal 88 per cent died of those attacked. \*

The crimes of India are nearly as frightful as its maladies. The existence of Thuggee, the practice of which is represented in the frescoes of Ajunta as having prevailed above two thousand years ago, has become known to us within the present century, and is scarcely yet extinguished. Infanticide, by which tens and hundreds of thousands of female children must have perished since it first became known to us sixty years ago, has been extinguished barely two years since. The extinction of widow-burning, is of somewhat older date within our territories, but the practice still prevails upon our borders. Ten years ago the existence of a fraternity of plunderers, consisting of

nearly three hundred persons, was discovered in the populous city of Bombay. It had prevailed for a quarter of a century, netting a clear gain, as shewn by well kept books, of from fifty to eighty thousand pounds a-year, or above a million in all, in the course of the establishment of the confederation. Ship burning was a branch of business with them, and at Bombay and Calcutta together above three hundred vessels mostly of the largest size, worth close on nine millions sterling, had been destroyed by the incendiary since 1781. Within the last twelvemonth it has come to light that regular armies of depredators, recognized by native chiefs who share their spoils, exist in some of our oldest North West Provinces, who disperse themselves every autumn over the country in brigades and detachments, carrying their ravages into the hearts of our best-ordered cities, and returning in April with their plunder, to be divided over the country; these crimes having escaped detection from the sympathy of the Natives being with the criminals rather than with the Law, or from their natural timidity deterring them from making disclosures.

In governing India, England makes herself responsible for the welfare of an empire which contains a hundred and fifty millions of people, yields a gross revenue of about thirty millions sterling a year, maintains an army of nearly four hundred thousand men, of whom forty thousand are Europeans, at a charge of upwards of twelve millions a year, and affords appointments as covenanted servants or commissioned officers to ten thousand English gentlemen, who receive incomes from the age of eighteen to the end of their days, averaging in one case a thousand, and in the other four hundred pounds a year. The army of Bengal alone, comprising 23,247 Europeans, 138,255 native soldiers, with 3,405 British officers, or 164,908 in all, costs a third more than that of France, though less than half as numerous. France contains thirty millions of people, the Bengal presidency close on fifty. The sea-borne commerce of India is worth above thirty millions sterling. She draws seven and a half millions of imports from, and sends nearly a similar amount of exports to, England. Eight thousand square-rigged vessels reach and quit her three principal shipping ports annually, bringing or bearing with them above a million of tons of merchandize, and receiving above two millions sterling annually of freight; with

nearly 100,000 country craft of a burthen of about a million and a half tons.

#### NATURAL PRODUCTS AND MANUFACTURES.

This mighty country yields, or may be made to yield, every variety of produce made use of in manufactures. It rests on the East and West, on vast regions of volcanoes; on the North it is walled in by ridges of rock salt. Its soil abounds in Soda, and supplies Nitre for the world. The alum stones of Cutch, in the Punjab, are inexhaustible. Even minerals of the most trifling apparent value yield sums that are enormous; the Wells of Rangoon produce 90,000 tons of mineral oil annually, which at a shilling a hundred weight, realises £90,000: a single mountain in Bengal sends forth £80,000 worth of Mica every season, and the Chinese purchase £10,000 worth every year of the cut Agates and Jaspers of the Rajpeepla Hills, though the produce is now reduced to a fraction of what it was wont to be; so plentiful are the stones deemed precious in England, that the finest heliotropes unworked, are sold in the Bombay Bazaar for twenty shillings a hundred weight.

The Koh-i-noor, now allowed to be a fragment of a diamond still more magnificent and its sister in splendour, and almost its rival in size—the Darya-i-noor, each reckoned worth a king's ransom,—are the produce of its mines, which so far as we know may still contain gems as magnificent as any they have rendered up. Iron and coal, the more homely, but to man the much more valuable products of the earth, are abundant: the latter seems restricted to a limited locality, the former is universal. The vegetable and animal are still more magnificent than the mineral products of India. The Palm in all its glorious forms; the Teak, the Tamarind, the Banian, and a thousand other trees, fringe its sea-board; the Acassia covers the most rainless of its plains, and the magnificent Deodar, prince of pines, with a girth of from fifteen to twenty feet, and an altitude of two hundred, clothes, with its kindred, its mountain lands, from a height of six to twelve thousand feet. Its Indigo or Sapanwood, and our other dye-stuffs, supply the markets of the world. Not less famous are its gums and gum resins and its other drugs, than are its dyes; and most wonderful of all, from the white poppy alone a milky juice is drawn by manual labour, drop by drop, which yields

six and a half millions pound weight of opium, and produces a revenue to Government of upwards of three millions sterling a year. The animal creation presents representatives of every living thing moving on the earth or in the waters, from the huge leviathan found in multitudes in its seas, the elephant, the lion, the tiger, and the monkey, to the beetle and the ant levelling forests through which the strongest and most ferocious have failed to make their way. Whales abound on its shores, drawing after them fleets of American whalers, and the fins of the sharks which pursue and destroy them, exported for the use of the gourmards of China, realize in their raw state from £30,000 to £40,000 a year.

Its indigenous manufactures, now fast hastening to decay, were once on a scale of magnificence worthy of its raw produce. The correct forms of ships—only elaborated within the past ten years by the science of Europe—have been familiar to India for ten centuries : and the vessels which carried peacocks to Ophir for king Solomon, were probably the same as the fishing craft of the present day, which furnish the models the American and English clipper and yacht builders are aspiring after. The carving of its woodwork, the patterns, colours, and texture of its carpets, shawls and scarfs, admired for centuries, have, since the Great Fair of the world been set forth as patterns for the most skilled artificers of Europe to imitate. From the looms of Dacca went forth those wonderful tissues that adorned the noblest beauties of the Court of Augustus Cæsar, bearing in the eternal city the same designation sixteen centuries ago as that by which cotton is still known in India ; and the abundance of Roman coins and relics up to our time occasionally exhumed, yet preserve traces of the early commercial connection between the two most wonderful nations in the world—those of the Cæsars and the Moguls. The rarest gifts Bengal could offer its native princes or its foreign conquerors, were the muslins known as “the running water,” or “the nightly dew,”—being when wet scarcely distinguishable from either ; and since the advent of the English, a single piece, twenty yards in length, and one and a quarter in breadth, weighing no more than fourteen ounces, has been sold for twenty-five pounds,—a sum equal to the requital of three Dacca spinners and weavers for a twelvemonth.

The elaborate stone carving of Central India, Rajpootana and Goozerat; the embossed and enriched silver work of Cutch and Agra; the microscopic paintings of Delhi and Lahore; the carvings in sandal wood, and the filligree of Trichinopoly; the inlaid work of Mooltan and Bombay are up to this hour the marvels of the world.

The most singular monuments of Indian art can only be seen in the country; and amongst a people at once eminently devotional and martial, temples, tombs, fortresses, palaces, and weapons of war, supply subjects of special wonder. The Hills of Western India, over the space of five thousand square miles, are penetrated by hundreds of caves, approaching in size, in richness and beauty of architectural decoration, the finest cathedrals in Europe. These have been hewn out in absence of the aid of gunpowder, and fashioned without natural adjunct or addition of masonry, into their present form, covered with rich and elaborate sculptures by the hand of man. The caves are grouped together so as to furnish places of worship, halls of instruction, and domiciles for the professors and their pupils, exactly on the plan of the universities which came into existence in Europe two thousand years after those of India were forgotten; indicating an amount of civilization and demand for knowledge in the East twenty-four centuries ago, such as scarcely exists in these regions in modern times. Or passing down to a later age, there is the huge mountain of Aboo, 5000 feet high, covered and surmounted by one vast mass of temples, constructed from the seventh century of our era down to the present date. The hills of Paulitana, are literally crusted over with temples of the finest arabesque, cut in the hardest stone. The ruined city of Beejapoor contained sixteen hundred mosques. The dome of the Mausoleum of Ibrahim Adil Shah, is a third larger than that of St. Paul's: the mosque to which it belongs is 450 feet in length and 150 in breadth: while the Taj-Mahal of Agra, the monument erected by the Emperor Jehangeer over his wife, the "light of the harem," built of the purest white marble, and inlaid with the richest mosaic, stands unrivalled amongst the Mausoleums of the world.

As for weapons of war, the cannon of India could have taken in and discharged the largest sixty-eight pounders of modern warfare,



were the trunions knocked off. The gun at Moorshedabad is seventeen feet long, with a bore of eighteen inches ; that of Dacca twenty-two feet long, with a bore of fifteen inches,—it weighed twenty-one tons, and threw shot of four hundred weight. The great gun at Agra is a brass fifteen-hundred-pounder, twenty-three inches bore—it weighs eleven tons, and is worth five thousand pounds as old metal : while two out of half a dozen of large guns at Beejapoor threw shot of half a ton and a *ton and a quarter* respectively. The damask rifles and damask sword blades of Goozerat beat anything Europe can boast of ; and the wootz steel, from which these are manufactured, is deemed so excellent in England as to be used mainly for surgical instruments. The ruins of desolate cities point to the greatness of the Empire before Europeans sought its shores as traders, and seized its soil as conquerors. Gour, the former capital of Bengal, covers an area of seventeen square miles, and once boasted of a population of above a million of inhabitants. Beejapoor while flourishing contained nearly a million of inhabited houses, occupied by more than three millions of people. Rajmahal, the city of a hundred Kings, is now a miserable village inhabited by a few paper-makers. Mandoo, the capital of the Patan sovereigns of Malwa, surrounded by a wall twenty-eight miles in circuit, occupies an area of twelve thousand English acres : the Jummah Musjid, built of white marble, is the finest specimen of Affghan architecture in existence : it now supplies the lair of the wolf and the tiger : Bhali-bibura, in Kattiwar, Behut in the Northern Doab, Lamkassa at the base of the Himalayas, Palibothra near Patna on the Ganges, and Cannouj in the province of Agra, have scarce left sufficient traces behind them to mark their boundaries.

#### PUBLIC WORKS.

The irrigation of the country, so long neglected by the British Government, and from which such magnificent results have within the last twenty years been derived, was an object of anxiety to the rulers of India five centuries ago. The Emperor Feroze constructed about the year 1350 a magnificent canal, for the purposes of irrigation, from the base of the mountains to the neighbourhood of Delhi, two hundred miles in length, by means of which a vast tract of country was made fertile as a garden, and above a million of people provided

with bread. Two centuries after this, the illustrious Akbar devoted himself to the construction of new canals for the purpose of irrigation, and the clearing out of those formed by his predecessors, and which had fallen into decay. He made the subject a regular part of the system of government, and left a canal act behind him, which has come down to our times, providing for a complete series of arrangements and a large array of officers for their extension and management. The Shah Jehan, seventy years later, took up with enthusiasm the plans of his predecessor, and was nobly seconded in his efforts by Ali Murdan Khan, celebrated over the East for his skill and taste in architecture. The success of their labours was magnificent; tradition still enlarges on the vastness of the returns derived from the canals brought into existence by them, which were such as from a single canal to pay for the maintenance of twelve thousand horsemen. The permanent establishment maintained for police purposes, consisted of five hundred horsemen, and a thousand footmen, armed. It is mentioned by Ferishta that during the earlier of these excavations, vast collections of giants' bones were discovered, and in our time the extension of the canal system in the same quarter has disclosed in these, the skeletons of numberless extinct animals; the Mammoth and Mastodon, the Bramatherium, and Sevatherium, and the other kindred contributions, which Colvin, Durand, Cautley, and Falconer, have made to our Indian paleontology. Our first canal operations commenced little more than thirty years ago, and in 1821, the waters which had five centuries before been made to visit the city of Delhi, were after fifty years suspension re-introduced through their former channels.

From the Jumna canal, now in use, Government derives a revenue of £25,000 a year from a total investment of £90,000; from the Western Jumna canal an investment of £140,000, a direct revenue of £44,000 a year arises. Lands previously comparatively barren are maintained in a state of constant productiveness for a water rent of a shilling an acre. The population maintained in the irrigated districts is very nearly double, mile for mile, of that of those not irrigated. A careful computation made by authority shows, that in the famine year of 1837, the gross value of the saving effected by the eastern Jumna Canal, was half a million sterling; one tenth of this being revenue, or fifty thousand pounds, direct gain to the public treasury.



The united Jumna Canals saved at the same period, above two millions sterling to the Common-wealth. On the Canals in the North West Provinces, completed between 1821 and 1848, Government expended £557,000, and drew in direct Canal revenue £546,000. By this an area of nearly 1,300,000 acres of ground previously sterile, have been made to yield produce worth two and a half millions annually, and to support upwards of six hundred thousand human beings. The Sutledge Canal now in progress is expected to water 624,000 acres, and to yield government a revenue of £55,447, on an expenditure of a quarter of a million, or nearly twenty per cent. It has been estimated by the Bengal Engineers, that water and land available for the purpose of irrigation in these neighbourhoods would, on an expenditure of two millions, afford a permanent return of £578,150 annually, or close on thirty per cent., and that a surface of nearly nine millions of acres, or above ten thousand square miles, might thereby be brought into cultivation. The present Governor-General most strongly recommended the Court of Directors to borrow for such improvements as these, so long as money could be had at five per cent, and made to realise from fifteen to forty. *In place of acting on counsel so judicious, the Court have directed the most stringent retrenchments to be made; any surplus that may accrue to be applied to the liquidation of their debts—they have not even left the returns on existing canals to be expended on others; and the intervention of private enterprise is out of the question where nothing can be done without the sanction of government, and government takes five years to answer a letter.* The most magnificent of all the works of this sort is the Grand Ganges Canal, navigable for nearly 900 miles, and on which a million and a quarter is proposed to be sunk. It is expected to yield a return of £400,000 a year, of which £180,000 will be direct revenue: it will fertilise no less than five millions and a half of acres of land now in a state of comparative sterility—increase the gross produce by upwards of seven millions sterling annually in value, and relieve a population, of above six millions, of all fear of those frightful famines by which the country was wont to be decimated;—yet millions on millions might be expended on irrigation in India with assurances of profit equal to what they afford.

The principal canal for watering the Baree Doab will leave the Ravee some miles from Shahpore, following the line of the highest level, right through the centre of the Doab, and will rejoin the river about sixty miles above Mooltan, a little above its junction with the Chenaub. Two branches will flow off from the main trunk to the south, both limited by the Sutlej, one watering the country in the direction of the Sobraon, the other in that of Kussoor; one branch to the north irrigates the land around Lahore, and so along to the southward of the Ravee between the river and the main canal. The length of the trunk and its branches is no less than 450 miles, and it will serve the purposes both of navigation and irrigation. The work will cost, it is believed, half a million sterling: it will irrigate about 545,000 acres at present in a state of complete sterility. It will cost for its maintenance about £20,000 a year, and yield a free return of £120,000, or twenty-four per cent on outlay after meeting all charges,—thus repaying the cost within five years, and leaving us a clear increase of £120,000 on our revenue from this single department.

The Madras Government has within these six years spent thirteen lakhs of rupees (£130,000) on works of irrigation on the Godavery, and have already received twenty lakhs (£200,000) in direct return in the shape of increase of land revenue. Of course at the outset, while the works were in progress, the receipts were inconsiderable. The average revenue for a period of six years before the work began was nineteen lakhs—it is now thirty lakhs of rupees (£300,000): so that a third more than the entire original outlay having been already refunded to the treasury, Government will hereafter draw from the improved districts ten lakhs a year, or two-thirds of the whole sum originally expended, of net increase of revenue. The increase of the land tax is a small fraction of the actual gain: the native goods exported by sea from the irrigated districts sprung up at once from seven (£70,000) their previous average, to thirteen (£130,000) lakhs; and though the tremendous floods of 1849 reduced them, they now promise to maintain themselves at above fourteen lakhs (£140,000). Before this much could be contributed to the public purse, at least five times as much must have been taken out of the soil by the cultivators,—expended probably on their own sustenance,

partly devoted to the purchase of such luxuries as they could not previously afford, and in part it is to be hoped set aside as accumulated capital, but all constituting the solid and substantial wealth of the State. We probably do not overrate the fruits of the expenditure of thirteen lakhs (£130,000) at a half million sterling annually in all—representing, at five per cent, a permanent capital of ten millions added to the value of our empire; or a return of four hundred per cent, annually on the adventure. Talk of improving a country by railways requiring a guarantee for their construction of five per cent, the longest of which will scarcely penetrate so far into the interior as the length of some of our arid river deltas!—where the productive lands, or lands capable of being rendered such, abut on the sea shore, or are penetrated by navigable streams, and which in either case provide water-carriage, so that the produce may be transported from the fields where it grows to a place of shipment. Talk of California—with its countless robberies and murders, its weekly conflagrations, its universal rapine and brutality—yielding wealth such as the diggings of a single delta supply, with twenty deltas on our hands yet unexplored.

This is no case of conquest or of rapine—of dominions ravished, through violence and deluges of blood, from the hands of their original possessors. No question of right can ever be raised—no claim of compensation or groan of grievance emitted. No people have been coerced or enslaved—no native nobility reduced or expropriated: our grounds of congratulation are genuine as they are unalloyed, the only thing we have to blush for is, that we should so long have neglected these, and still neglect seizing other, sources of wealth so enormous—of good so unalloyed.

Our wants at the outset are most moderate—all we desire is investigation: we have a noble corps of engineers to rely upon—we have scores and scores of other officers capable of acting as surveyors almost as efficiently as engineers, and hundreds on hundreds of European soldiers willing and able to share in the more laborious and less intellectual parts of the toil. All we want to begin with is a survey of, and report on, every river delta in India: for Madras this has been accomplished; in Bombay it yet requires to be begun. With estimates of the outlay and return once before us, Government

has only to select the improvement to be begun with,—or if too timid to attempt to improve the revenues of the country, to place their improvement within the reach of those willing to undertake it. Even in the midst of universal distrust, roguery, and mismanagement, it would not be a very difficult matter to induce capitalists at home to embark in enterprises assuring them of a twenty per cent return, and leaving about as much more to be acquired by the rulers of the land, who would in this case have so kindly and cordially at least consented to allow their dominions to be improved but that the interminable delays of correspondence intervene.

#### COST OF THE CHIEF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES OF INDIA.

The Government of India consists of two divisions, the Court of Directors and the Board of Control in England, and the Supreme and Local Governments, the India House and Board of Control in India: the principal part of it is at home, and this again is divided in two. In the hands of the Board of Control rests absolutely and entirely the administration of Indian affairs, it consists of a President and Secretaries, two members of the Administration,—the first receiving £3,500 a year, the others £1,500 each—all selected without the slightest consideration of their knowledge of the affairs of India; their average tenure of office for the last thirty years having been about twenty-seven months at a time, and some score of permanent irresponsible clerks, on whom they must be absolutely dependent for information and counsel. The cost of the establishment amounts to about £25,000 a year.

The Court of Directors, in whose name the country is governed, consists of twenty-four gentlemen—six of whom go out of office annually, to return to it next year. They exercise the entire initial patronage in sending out young men to India; in seniority services, mediocrity or dulness rising as rapidly as merit, or more so if they be helped by interest which the others are without. The patronage the Directors exercise in India is limited and, like that which they influence, which is extensive, is generally mis-used. The Court of Directors have not one particle of power in the administration of affairs conducted in their name, when they differ from the Board of Control, though the charges of the India

House amount to from a hundred to a hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year,—their dinner bills for the past eighteen years being set down in the accounts as an extra item of £53,000!

The Indian part of the administration is conducted by a Governor-General and Council, with Governors and Councils at Madras and Bombay; a Governor without a Council for Bengal, and another for the North West Provinces. The Punjaub is managed by a Board of Administration; Scinde, and British Burmah, by individual Commissioners. The Governors, supreme and subordinate, are appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Control or Ministers of the day, though the nomination *pretends* to emanate from the Court of Directors. The Governor-General has generally secured some distinction before his appointment, but this by no means invariably happens, and the most commonplace and mediocre men are occasionally deemed perfectly qualified for the most important and lucrative appointment under the Crown. For the Governors of the minor Presidencies, and for all the Commanders-in-Chief, no qualification whatever is deemed requisite—interest suffices for all, and industry and exertion on the spot are occasionally regarded by the nominees just as superfluous as previous qualification. The Governors without councils, and the Commissioners, are appointed by the Governments of India from distinguished members of the public service, and the country under them has been found well managed in proportion as they have been left unrestricted. The Councils—consisting in one case of five, and in the two others of three, members, of whom in all cases the Commander-in-Chief is one—are nominated by the Court of Directors, and being for the most part selected from the Secretariat, always filled with the *élite* of the service, are generally men of ability,—with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief, who may be so or not just as it happens. He is generally worn out with age, and almost always devoid of experience: fortunately he for the most part spends the bulk of his time at a distance from the Presidency—rarely entering the council-room.

The emoluments of these functionaries are as follows:—Governor-General £24,000 and five Councillors £9,600 each, (20) Secretaries, amongst them £73,068; Governor-General's office and establishment £15,231; expense of visiting the Upper Provinces £53,252;—making the general charge of the Supreme Govern-

ment £206,771. This takes no account of the Commander-in-Chief, except in his civil capacity of councillor. The Government of Bengal costs £432,970; and £103,715 is set down for public offices at the Presidency. Bombay charges, to which those of Madras closely correspond, consist of salaries to the Governor £12,000 and three Councillors £6,000 each; Governor's office establishment £9,977; Governor's tour in the Deccan £2,399. Public offices at the Presidency and in Scinde £70,124; Miscellaneous charges £15,265; so that the total charges of the Bombay Government and Secretariate establishment alone, exceed a hundred and thirty thousand pounds a year. The Governor of Bombay's pleasure tours to the Hill station of Mahabuleshwur, and his country residence at Dapoorie, courteously termed his visit to the Deccan, costs it would appear close on £2,400 a year; and the charges under this head during the present administration exceed £12,000—or about the sum assigned annually for the whole educational purposes of the Presidency.

Some idea of the cost of Governments without councils may be formed from that of the North West Provinces, set down at something under £10,000 a year. The Board of Administration for the Punjaub, including all expenses, costs under £54,000 a year; and the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner of Scinde, including establishments and contingencies, manage that province for about £10,000 a year.

It was admitted by the majority of witnesses examined before the Parliamentary Committee last Session, that councils at the minor Presidencies were wholly superfluous, and that competent Governors, without Councils, would manage infinitely better than with them: and it was openly or tacitly allowed on nearly all hands, that they were maintained mainly to enable the Ministry of the day to confer from time to time a gift of £60,000, (the emoluments of a five years' administration) taken from the treasury of India, with a further sacrifice for councillorships—maintained to permit of the appointment of incompetent Governors of £36,000 a year,—on any of their personal or political friends.

But monstrous as is this piece of extravagance, it is exceeded by the lavishness by which Commanders-in-Chief are required. These officers invariably belong to the Queen's service, and are in the



majority of cases *effete septuagenarians*, to whom no one would commit the drill of a militia corps. Sir Richard Armstrong, Commander-in-Chief at Madras, requires to be carried about in an easy chair. The faculties of Sir John Grey, late Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, were so far gone that he forgot the names of his own aides-de-camp, and never could be made to comprehend when he should write his name at length,—when only put his initials, to a document. The rule as to antiquity, is not however absolute: and the seniority system is made occasionally to bend in favour of a “pet officer.” Sir William Gomm was at the bottom of the list of Lieutenants General when the baton of authority was conferred on him,—much junior to the Commanders-in-Chief of Bombay and Madras, the former of whom, Sir Willoughby Cotton, resigned his command in consequence. Sir Hugh Gough had not been two months Lieutenant-General at all when he was appointed to the Madras command in June 1841; and when he had held this two years and two months, he was in August 1843 raised to supreme authority, though junior to Sir Thomas MacMahon, the Bombay Commander-in-Chief, to make room for the Marquis of Tweeddale, on whom it had been determined to confer the office both of Governor and Commander-in-Chief. Not one of the present Commanders-in-Chief, of whom the youngest, however, is allowed to be a man of ability, when appointed to commands in India, had ever been in the country, or could know anything of its geography, its climate, its people, its languages, its religions, or its government; or had ever seen a native soldier when placed over sepoy armies numbering close on three hundred thousand men, with seven thousand English officers; many of the officers men of great experience and the highest talent, few of them beyond the prime of life, and possessed of all the qualifications for those highest commands they are prevented by the injustice of their country from filling, of which those placed over them are for the most part conspicuously devoid.

The Commander-in-Chief in India receives £8,000 a year as his military salary, and £10,000 as member of council: the Commanders-in-Chief at the minor Presidencies receive half these sums, in each of these capacities, besides having all their travelling, personal, and other charges defrayed by the state,—these amongst them amounting to about half their salaries; the three very old gentlemen costing

the country altogether somewhere about fifty thousand a year. The Commander-in-Chief of India, rarely crosses the threshold of the council room, unless when sworn in, and pockets in the course of his five years' administration £50,000 for his services as councillor, it not being *possible* for him, residing as he does a thousand miles from the council room, to perform one atom of councillor's service : and the Commanders-in-Chief at the minor presidencies are very nearly in the same position. If they do sometimes enter the Council Chamber when the agreeable nature of the weather induces them to remain at the seat of government, the value of their services is on these occasions quite on a par with those of the Commander-in-Chief of India.

Lord Keane proceeded for Afghanistan in November, 1838, and returned to the presidency in February 1840 : during these sixteen months he received £8000 as member of council Bombay,—above £5000 as Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, and £600 for house rent ; besides his field allowances, prize money, and other contingencies, as Commander of the Armies of Afghanistan, and the reward afterwards of a Peerage and a Pension of £2000 a year for himself and his descendants for two generations. Sir Hugh Gough was about this time still more fortunate. He had just been relieved from the command of the forces at Madras, by the arrival of Sir Samuel Whittington in January 1841, when he was placed in charge of the expedition to China in the following March. By the demise of the officer just named he was appointed Commander-in-Chief and Member of Council for Madras in June, and from this time until September 1842 he received £8000 as Member of Council ; having never during all this time been within two thousand miles of the Council Chamber. He drew besides £5000 as Commander-in-Chief, £600 as house rent, and the field and other allowances, the prize money, etcetera, as Commander of the Chinese expedition. He was subsequently rewarded by a baronetcy. In July 1843 the Marquis of Tweeddale was appointed Governor of Madras ; and as his interest at the Horse Guards was unbounded, it was determined that he should have the appointment of Commander-in-Chief as well as that of Governor, an arrangement permitted by the retirement of Sir Jasper Nichols from sheer old age, from supreme command, to which Sir Hugh Gough was promoted. In the course of the present Charter



Act, close on half a million will have been expended,—£10,000 annually for twenty years, on the Commander-in-Chief of India, and half that sum for each of the other Commanders-in-Chief—or £400,000 in all, on civil services by Commanders-in-Chief which it was utterly impossible for them ever to have rendered.

Now the people of England have a perfect right to dispose of their own money as they think fit, and if they choose to bestow on any piece of antique military mediocrity with friends at Court, a yearly stipend double of the whole official allowances of the late Duke of Wellington, no one has any right to complain; but it is not very worthy conduct on the part of a great nation to waste in a pitiable fashion like this, taxes raised from the earnings of fifty millions of poor native wretches living in huts not fit for an English pigsty, and whose average income falls short of three pence a day.

With administrations costing such an enormous amount of money with which, even as matters now stand, men of experience and ability are in the majority of cases entrusted, and for which the first administrative talent in the country can always be secured, it might be supposed that the less interference there was allowed from home the better, and that the Governments of India might, like those of Her Majesty's Colonies, be left to do their own work in their own way. Nothing in the world can be more remote from fact, and a Governor-General who in salary, travelling charges, and office allowances, costs the country £70,000 a year, is treated exactly as if he were the head clerk over the old factory at Fort William, in charge of prints and piece goods, and not at all above cribbing a piece of calico from his employers should it fall in his way! Every step he takes must be explained to the people at home; a copy of every letter he writes or receives, or minute he makes, must be sent to London. A detailed narrative of everything that is said, written, or done, by the Supreme or Subordinate Governments, must be forwarded home to be commented on or criticised by "the clever Clerks" of Cannon Row or Leadenhall Street, who hold the nominal rulers of India in the most absolute subjection to their pens. So frightful is the minuteness insisted on that it becomes physically impossible for these gentlemen to peruse the documents on which they are supposed to decide. The papers sent by the Cape occupy close on 200 folio volumes annually of from 500 to 1000 pages: and a single revenue

despatch is quoted by a late President of the Board of Control as having 45,000 pages of accompaniments! The from-ship-to-ship despatches of the Bombay Government will annually print out to 60 volumes of 1,500 pages folio—or as much as would make 240 vols. 8vo. of ordinary sized print!

#### CHANGES IN THE STATE OF INDIA SINCE 1833.

A general view has been given at the outset of the countries and interests for which Parliament is about to legislate, by once more re-enacting the Bill of '33, which, in all its essential particulars was a repetition of that of 1784. Why, in the course of the last eighteen years the changes that have occurred in the East are so stupendous as of themselves to demand a total alteration of the law. Since 1834, we have added the Punjaub, Scinde, Sattara, and Pegu, to our dominions, and the addition of the rest of Burmah, if not of the whole Peninsula, is inevitable. We have ravaged Afghanistan, disarmed Gwalior, and made young Holkar half a British Prince; and seem likely to annex Oude, the Nizam's and the Guicowar's dominions, almost immediately.\* The reigning sovereign of Travancore—a high caste and orthodox Hindoo—has the Bible read in all the schools in his dominions,—the liberality and enlightenment of his administration in this and other matters putting that of the British Government to shame. Steam communication has come into existence, and diminished the distance betwixt India and England to one-third of what it was in 1834, measuring the interval by time. Communications formerly conveyed, irregularly and uncertainly, on an average of about a hundred days, now pass with perfect punctuality once a fortnight in an average of twenty-eight days, which before five years are out will be reduced to twenty; and long before 1874 arrives we shall have the Electric Telegraph conveying intelligence instantly to all parts of India. Since 1834 the press has been liberated, and newspapers, till then in a state of most slavish degradation, now enjoy more freedom in India than in England: are conducted with as much pro-

\* "I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of any just opportunity for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of States which may lapse in the midst of them."—*The Marquis of Dalhousie in 1848.*

piety and independence; and would, but for the monstrous system prevailing around, have been productive of as great benefit to the state. The value of our commerce has been tripled, and the number of European merchants residing in India quadrupled; while a perfect net work of steam communication connects the chief ports of India with those of the whole South Eastern Ocean. Joint Stock Banks, deemed dangerous to the state twenty years ago, are now prevalent everywhere; and the education of the natives, the very idea of which filled Leadenhall Street with alarm, is now a recognized portion of our system. The Missionaries give the following abstract of the stupendous results of their labours accomplished within the past twenty years,—results destined to be immeasurably outdone in the twenty to which we now look forward:—

“At the commencement of the year 1852, there were labouring throughout India and Ceylon the agents of 22 Missionary Societies. These include 443 missionaries, of whom 48 are ordained natives; together with 698 native catechists. These agents reside at 313 missionary stations. There have been founded 331 native Churches, containing 18,410 communicants, in a community of 112,191 native Christians. Missionaries maintain 1,347 Vernacular Day Schools, containing 47,504 boys, together with 93 boarding schools, containing 2,414 Christian boys. They also superintend 126 superior English Day Schools, and instruct therein 14,562 boys and young men. Female education embraces 347 Day Schools for girls, containing 1,159 scholars; but hopes more from its 102 girls' boarding schools containing 2,779 Christian girls. For the good of Europeans 71 services are maintained. The entire *Bible* has been translated into *ten* languages, the New Testament into *five* others, and separate gospels into *four* others. Besides numerous works for Christians, 30, 48, and even 70 *Tracts* have been prepared in these different languages suitable for Hindus and Mussulmans. Missionaries maintain in India *twenty-five* printing establishments. This vast missionary agency costs £178,000 annually, of which one-sixth, or £33,500, is contributed by European Christians resident in the country. By far the greater part of this agency, it is stated, has been brought into operation during the last twenty years. Bengal Proper, has 89 missionary stations, 103 missionaries, 130 native catechists, and 14,775 native Protestant Christians, of whom 3,500 are communicants. It has 140 Vernacular schools containing 6,470 boys, and 22 boarding schools with 790 boys, and 22 English schools giving tuition to 6,005 boys. It has also 24 day schools for girls, containing 659 pupils, and 29 boarding schools with 830 girls. Madras is far in advance of Bengal, even when we include the North West provinces with the latter. There they have 121 missionary stations, 179 missionaries, 405 catechists, and 76,591 native Christians. In the educational branch they are just as far ahead, having

849 vernacular schools, with 24,445 boys and other seminaries in proportion."

The *Friend of India* thus sums up the prospects that await us :—

"No arrangement should be made by Parliament for the general or the subordinate Government without bearing distinctly in mind that within five years from the present time, the whole of India will be united by a net work of electric telegraphs, which will entirely alter the character and complexion and the exigencies of the administration. The government about to be conferred on India should be suited by anticipation to the coming age of electric speed. When there is a daily communication between the most distant provinces in the empire and the central authority, when throughout India, the references which are made in the morning will be answered before the evening, and the business of the day will be completed within the day, the Governor-General and his Council will be almost as intimately informed of all proceedings at the distant presidencies as they now are of those in Calcutta. The telegraph will communicate such an impulse to the movements of the whole machine of Government, and bring the minor presidencies so constantly under the eye of the head of the Government, that the old lumbering councils at Bombay and Madras, consisting of four members, will be altogether out of date. We vote the councils to the tomb of the Capulets. They keep up, it is said, the traditions of Government. They cannot too soon become traditions themselves. Of the three objections which were raised against the change, not one is insuperable; the first was, that there had always been a council, but this objection will cease as soon as the council is abolished; the second, that there was a Supreme Court at those presidencies, and it required a council to prevent its damaging the Company's Government, but the element of antagonism which is assumed to belong to a Crown Court may be neutralised by amalgamating it with the Sudder Court, and making the same judge preside in both. The third was, that there was a separate army, and that it was therefore necessary that there should be a council, and that the Commander-in-Chief should sit at it, though the Commander-in-Chief at these presidencies never does attend the council except to be sworn in and be enabled to sign a bill for £833 a month. We are not sufficiently acquainted with the organization of the army to be able to point out the mode in which this objection could be obviated, but we will engage to find a dozen able men in the army who could. But this difficulty should not be allowed to stand in the way of bestowing on the minor presidencies, the inestimable boon of an administration vested in the best man whom the public service can supply, and totally unfettered by venerable and traditionary councils whom the Governor may at any time overrule."—*Friend of India*, December 23.

ERRATUM.—In No. II. "Finances of India," page 14, line 10, for "are double," read "are equal to."

# INDIA REFORM.

172, A. 1201. (4).


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No. IV.

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IMPERIAL

## THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA.

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"I would sacrifice Gwalior, or any frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our character for scrupulous good faith."—*The Duke of Wellington, in 1802.*

"Where there is a total failure of Heirs, it is probably more consistent with right, that the people should elect a sovereign, than that the principality should lapse to the Paramount State; that State, in fact, having no rights in such a case, but what it assumes by virtue of its power."—*Lord Metcalfe, in 1837.*

"I cannot for a moment admit the doctrine, that, because the view of policy upon which we have formed engagements with Native Princes may have been, by circumstances, materially altered, we are not to act scrupulously up to the terms and spirit of those engagements."—*The Earl of Auckland, in 1838.*

"I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of any just opportunity for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of States which may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests, we sincerely believe, will be promoted thereby."—*The Marquis of Dalhousie, in 1848.*

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INCLUDING in the term British India, all the territories over which the British Government exercises direct authority, legal control, military protection, or political influence, the country so designated may be roughly estimated to contain an area of 1,300,000 square miles, and to be inhabited by 150 millions of people. Of that great area, however, not one half is immediately subject to the administration of the East India Company. For the Native Princes of India still rule, with more or less power, over possessions occupying 717,000\* of these 1,300,000 square miles. But this moiety of the surface contains only one-third of the entire population, or some 53 millions of inhabitants. These native Principalities sometimes consist of great blocks of country, situate in the most fertile and desirable portions of India, as the Deccan, Mysore and Berar in the South—Oude and Nepaul towards the North-West and North—Guzerat in the West; where Governments of considerable pretensions and strength still survive. Or of confederacies or congeries of smaller States lying

\* These, and the figures which follow, are taken from the *Statistical Papers relating to India*, recently printed for the Court of Directors of the East India Company," and since ordered for its use by the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr. Bright.



compact with each other, but distinct and separate as a whole from our territories; as in Rajoopatana, in the protected Sikh States of the Cis Sutlej, in the Hill States bordering on Nepaul, in Bundelcund, in Cuttack, and in the petty chieftainships of Guzerat; where the territories are subdivided amongst clusters of chiefs or rulers of the same race, inheriting the same traditions, and possessing the same feelings, each restrained from making war on the other, each treated on the same general principles by the Indian Government, and all connected by historical or family links with each other. In our relations with these native States, we have bound them strictly down to the exclusion of Americans and Europeans from their service. Except strips in Travancore, Guzerat and Cutch, we have everywhere excluded them from the sea coast. Except in other three cases about to be mentioned, we have established our paramount authority over them. We are, consequently, no longer their allies, but their superiors; they have ceased to be our equals, and are now our dependents. The excepted cases are, 1. Nepaul, whose Sovereign is only bound to accept our mediation in his quarrels and disputes with the adjoining little State of Sikkim; 2. Dholpore, a small State on the Chumbul, with half a million of people; and 3. Tipperah, a wild, jungly tract, on the North-Eastern frontier, near Muneepoore, little known or cared for; with neither of which have we any relations at all, and which, therefore, retain a shadow of the independence everywhere else extinguished. With all the other States of India, we have either *Subsidiary* or *Protective* relations.

But though our relations with native powers may, in general terms, be so classified, these subsidiary and protective relations are not uniform treaties, but arrangements varying in details according to the circumstances under which they were formed, always indeed aiming at the same end—our general supremacy,—but by different means and modes, and thereby creating distinct and separate rights and interests, to be determined by the special provisions out of which they arise, and not merely by general considerations of our own policy.

Under the subsidiary system, the British Government provides a regular military force for the protection of the Native States; some times defined and special in amount and extent, as in the Deccan and Guzerat; at others, general and indefinite, as in Oude. And the



Native Governments pay the price of this protection, in some instances—as in Guzerat, Gwalior, the Deccan, Indore, and Oude—by cessions of territories ; in others—as in Mysore, Travancore, Cochin, and Cutch—by annual subsidy. Under the protective system, the obligations of protection on the part of the superior and of allegiance on the part of the inferior, are uniform in all the treaties ; in some cases, however, the dependent state is subject to the payment of tribute, whilst in others it is exempt from any such charge. Both systems, have three points in common :—1. The relinquishment by Native States of the right of self-defence ; 2. of maintaining diplomatic relations ; 3. The arbitrement of all disputes amongst each other by the paramount power. Usually under the protective system, the British government has no right of interference in the internal administration of Native States ; but this restriction is only contained in one-half the states affected by subsidiary treaties. Under neither, are the Native Governments debarred from maintaining, for internal purposes, a separate military force. On the contrary, in some instances they are required to keep up a large army of their own, that we may use it when we deem it necessary.

The Subsidiary States represent, more or less, the larger historical divisions still left on the map of India, they are :—

SUBSIDIARY STATES OF INDIA.	POPULATION.	REVENUE.	TRIBUTE.
		£	£
Cochin . . .	280,000	48,000	24,000
Cutch* . . .			20,000
Guzerat . . .	320,000	660,000	
Gwalior . . .	3,228,512	322,000	180,000
Deccan† . . .	10,666,080	1,500,000	350,000
Indore . . .	815,000	220,000	
Mysore . . .	3,000,000	690,000	240,000
Berar . . .	4,600,000	490,000	80,000
Oude . . .	2,900,000	1,400,000	
Travancore . .	1,000,000	410,000	80,000

All are large, populous, fertile, and civilised states : all occupy important positions in India ; two of them, the Deccan and Berar, being the great cotton field of India—whence, however, we get

\* The Court of Directors appear not to have any particulars of the population or revenues of Cutch ; at least none are given in their *Statistical Papers*.

† In using the term Deccan, the dominions still left the Nizam are referred to. And the same limitation is applicable to the other subsidiary States. The old titles are used in speaking of the restricted territories now under Native rule.

little or no cotton. Over five of them, the British Government has the right, in case of misrule, of assuming the management of their internal affairs—viz. Cochin, Mysore,\* Berar, Oude, and Travancore. But Cutch, Guzerat, Gwalior, the Deccan, and Indore, are not subject to any such controul. And it is only when their internal disasters are likely or certain to produce internal consequences hazardous to the general tranquillity, that any right to restore order (not to subvert the State) can accrue to the paramount power.

The protected States—the smaller and less advanced, but still more ancient subdivisions of India—are in numbers nearly 400. Generally, their chiefs are absolutely independent in matters of ordinary internal arrangement; but in some few there is a concurrent, in one or two an appellate, British jurisdiction.

These States, subsidiary and protected, (including Nepaul, Dholpore and Tipperah) occupy, we have said, 717,000 square miles of territory, and their population exceeds fifty-three millions. They yield a revenue of upwards of ten millions sterling a year; they (or rather such of them as are liable) pay subsidies or tribute to the British Government of one million sterling, about a tithe of their gross taxation; and—besides contingents commanded by British officers and available to the British Government of 32,000 men, for which some of them pay—their aggregate military resources comprise 12,962 artillery, 68,303 cavalry, and 317,653 infantry;—in all 398,918 men, exclusive of their contingents; a force more than 100,000 stronger in numbers than the army of the British Government in India. The military armaments of all India consist, therefore, as follows:

1. Army of the British Government (Royal, European, and Native) maintained at the cost of its 100 millions of subjects	289,529
2. Native contingents commanded by British officers and available by the British Government	32,311
3. Native contingents, not so commanded, but so available	4,000
4. Armies of Native princes, many of which are at the service, when required, of the British Government, paid for by fifty-three millions of people	398,918
	<hr/> 726,758

\* Owing to the alleged incompetency of the Rajah, this right is at present exercised in Mysore.

Thus, it appears that the Native States of India, possessing only 53 millions of people, and a revenue not exceeding 10 millions sterling, maintain military establishments of their own, 435,229 strong, against the British Government's army of 289,529 men, provided for out of a net revenue of 21 millions, paid by a population of 100 millions. Of the cost of the Native Armies we know nothing. But, the burthen of so vast a force as 435,229 men, falling, as it does, on comparatively so small a population, and on States comparatively so poor, must, it is obvious, be very oppressive in its financial effects. Its direct pecuniary weight is, however, probably its least evil. For here are nearly half a million of the picked men of this population withdrawn from those industrial and intelligent pursuits which develope the resources, create the capital, and promote the improvement of a people and a country. Here is an enormous amount of taxation needful to maintain such a force, expended by these States in a manner relatively unproductive. And here are war establishments maintained in States not permitted to make war—positively prohibited from using the armies they keep up, except in their own territories, and against their own people.)

No doubt, part of this great military force of the Native States is in reality Police; and the cost of that portion, whatever it may be, represents the expenses of civil administration, of the maintenance of order and tranquillity, of the enforcement of law, and the collection of revenue, rather than the burthen of military establishments unnecessarily maintained. But, a very large part cannot be so classified; and in respect of it, the population of Native Principalities would, it is obvious, be greatly benefited by a considerable reduction of their armies. The army of the Indian Government, in number 289,529, costs about twelve millions sterling. But its cost affords no means of estimating the expense of the 435,229 men to the Native Princes. Their pecuniary burthen is, of course, very much less than that of the British army. But then it falls on a population and a revenue not much more than one half that which bears the greater cost. So that, in all probability, the military expenditure of Native States is quite as oppressive, *per capite*, as the military expenditure of the Indian Government.

Now, as we are masters of India in consequence of, and maintain our supremacy over it by, our own army of 289,526 men, costing twelve millions sterling, and as by virtue of that supremacy, we have prohibited

in India all other wars than our own, this additional army of 435,229 men can only be of use so far as it promotes the good civil government of the Native States which maintain it; that is in its police capacity. As an element of warfare it is dangerous and mischievous. It would, therefore, be a wise and prudent policy in the British Government to assist the Native States in reducing this enormous force which eats up so great a part of their revenues. And this may be done in a variety of ways. First, by setting the Native Rulers the good example of peace. Next, by giving our own subjects the benefits of tranquillity in large reductions of our own military establishments. Thirdly, by relieving Native Allies from engagements to maintain for our use, when we require them, military forces. And fourthly, by allowing Native Princes to have the advantage in their domestic government of their own contingents. The two first modes involve general considerations, not necessary to pursue here; powerfully as such inducements to reduce their armies would by their influence react on Native States. The other two, however, are special, and need explanations.

In some cases, as we have already stated, Native States are required by the Indian Government to maintain large separate military forces that, in the event of war, these forces may be available to the Indian Government against what that Government deems to be their common enemy, but rather, to speak more correctly, in defence of its general supremacy. Now this obligation might be advantageously revised, insisting, of course, on a reduction of Native armies to the extent of its relaxation. Some years ago the Indian Government, in one instance, did indeed make an offer of this sort; but it was coupled with a demand for a pecuniary contribution that rendered it illusory. It was in the case of one of the Bundelcund Chiefs, the Rajah of Dutteah, who, in a well administered little territory of 850 square miles, having a population of 120,000, and a revenue of £100,000 a-year, maintains an army 6000 strong. In 1840, the Indian Government proposed to release him from the engagement under which he is bound to have that force at its disposal; but as it required, in exchange for the release, a considerable annual tribute, and wished to introduce a local force of its own into his territories, the Rajah would not pay the price or run the risk. So Dutteah still continues burthened with 6000 soldiers. To attempt reductions in this way is, of course, really to obstruct and hinder any being made; for, in this instance, the Rajah of Dutteah would have

lost his power and prestige in his own country had he yielded to those terms.

In some parts of India there are, no doubt, special reasons for encouraging the military spirit of Native States, as in Rajpootana; whence good faith and a little generosity on our part could always, in times of danger, draw powerful military assistance. If, remarked the late Colonel Tod, the very highest authority in every thing that respects the Rajpoot States: "If the spirit of the treaties be upheld, it is no exaggeration to say that, within a few years of prosperity, we could oppose to any enemy upon this one only vulnerable frontier at least 50,000 Rajpoots, headed by their respective princes, who would die in our defence. This is asserted from a thorough knowledge of their character and history. The Rajpoots want no change; they only desire the recognition and inviolability of their independence; but we must bear in mind that mere parchment obligations are good for little in the hour of danger. It is for others to decide whether they will sap the foundation of rule by a passive indifference to the feelings of race; or whether, by acts of kindness, generosity, and politic forbearance, they will ensure the exertion of all their moral and physical energies in one common cause with us." But even in Rajpootana the Indian Government have opportunities quite consistent with all due encouragement to Rajpoot military spirit, to lessen the burthen of military expenditure in these little States. At the head of the Rajpoot Confederacy is the Rana of Mewar or Odeypore, who still possesses "nearly the same extent of territory which his ancestors held when the Conqueror of Ghuzni first crossed the blue waters of the Indus to invade India."\* He rules over a million of hardy and attached subjects, and pays, out of a revenue of only £140,000 a-year, a tribute of £20,000 to the Indian Government. His regular army consists of 1200 horse and 4200 foot. But, in addition, the Indian Government compels him to contribute a large sum annually for the maintenance of the Malwa Bheel Corps, which, though only raised for the pacification of some rude tracts in Joudpore, is still kept up long after those districts have been pacified. First, then, the Indian Government takes a tribute of £20,000 a-year from the Rana; next, it is entitled to use all his forces in case of war; and lastly, it imposes a heavy military contribution on him for purposes of its own, insisting on the

\* *Tod's Annals of Rajapootana*, vol. i. p. 212.

payment after those purposes have been realized. Here, then, there is ample opportunity for the Indian Government to mitigate the pecuniary pressure of military expenditure on this State. And well does the Rana of Odeypore merit relief at its hands. For, despite the smallness of his resources, he has spent more than a million sterling upon one great work—the magnificent lake of Rajimunder. Whilst in the last twenty years, our whole expenditure over all India, on all our public works, scarcely reaches four millions, out of the gross revenue received during the same period of above 367 millions sterling.

So also in the protected Hill and Sikh States, lying between our territories and Nepaul on the north, and between us and the Punjab on the north-west. There, too, it may be desirable to sustain the military spirit of the population. But no such motives are applicable to the Cuttuck Mehals on the south-west; where Rajahs, ruling over a population of about 700,000, maintain armies more than 60,000 strong. Nor in Bundelcund, where, besides the Legion, to which its larger princes are compelled to contribute, there are not less than 30,000 armed men in the service of the Native Princes. Here, also, the policy of our Government ought to aim at reduction of military armaments.

Much, too, might be accomplished even in the subsidiary States. Take, for example, a case in Southern India—that of the Nizam of the Deccan. The territories of this Prince extend over 96,337 square miles, and contain a population of upwards of 10 millions, paying a revenue somewhat under two millions sterling. In the first place, he is compelled to contribute to the British army a subsidiary force of 10,628 men; and, for its payment, the Northern Circars, Guntoor, and the ceded Mysore districts, (which fell by treaty to him on the destruction of Tippoo), are in possession of the Indian Government. In return for this contribution, we undertook to protect the Deccan against external enemies. But the only enemies dangerous to the Deccan, after Tippoo's death, were the Peishwa and his Mahrattas. That Prince was deposed more than 30 years ago, his country annexed to British India, and his Mahrattas are now our subjects. Nevertheless, though there are now no external enemies (ourselves excepted) to protect the Nizam against, he is still compelled to contribute this subsidiary force of 10,628 men to our Indian army. But that is not all. The Nizam is

next made to maintain a Contingent, as it was originally called, or an auxiliary force, as it is now termed, of 8,094 men, equipped after European fashion, commanded by British officers, and entirely at the disposal of the British Resident; but over this second army, the Nizam has no real power; and, in point of fact, it is a British force in the heart of his country. Nevertheless, for it he is obliged to pay. Now its cost is about £350,000 a year; and when that sum is deducted from his revenue of £1,900,000 a year, this Prince has only left £1,550,000 wherewith to discharge the general expenses, military and civil, of his government. The Nizam is then charged with two British armies:—

1 The British subsidiary force . . . . . 10,628

2 The auxiliary force . . . . . 8,094

In all, 18,722 men, from whom he derives no aid whatever in ruling his own State. To govern his 96,337 square miles of territory and his 10 millions of people, he therefore, keeps besides,

3 An Army of Irregulars . . . . . 16,890

4 A miscellaneous force of Arabs, Sikhs, } 9,811  
Patans, &c. . . . . }

or 26,701 men: not a large army, when the extent and populousness of his dominions are considered. But the consequence of nearly one-fifth of his revenue being required to pay the second British army is, that the remaining four-fifths are quite insufficient to enable him to carry on the ordinary services of his administration. Hence, the Nizam is always largely in arrear in his payments to the second British army,—that is, the auxiliary force of 8,094 men,—and to his own military establishments also. And thus the British Government has not merely pecuniary claims against him, but indulges in complaints that the affairs of the Deccan are ill administered—that it is disorganised, revolutionary, and dangerous; and, though it is expressly excluded by treaties from interference in its domestic administration, and there is evidence to show that the Nizam's subjects are happier and more prosperous than their neighbours under British rule;—the British Government threatens, as a choice of evils, to assume the management of the country. Whereas the true solution of the difficulty,—as we trust is now seen—clearly lies in a revision of the military burthens we have imposed on this Prince; inasmuch as such revision would increase the Nizam's pecuniary ability to improve his administration.



In like manner, the embarrassments of the principal subsidiary State of Western India—that of the Guicowar of Baroda, or Guzerat—arise from our military exactions. First of all we charge\* him for a subsidiary force of about 5000 men; next we compel him to keep up and maintain for our use a contingent of 3000 cavalry; and then we make him pay for 750 Irregular Horse stationed in the British district of Ahmedabad. In addition, the Guicowar is obliged to have an army of 6000 men for his own administration; besides a police corps of 4000. Thus, out of a revenue of £600,000, this Prince has to keep an armed force of 14,000 men; nearly 4000 of whom are for our, and not his, purposes. The consequence of which state of things is, that the principal anxiety of the Guicowar is to get rid of that liability; and believing in the corruptibility of the Bombay government, it is notorious he has spent large sums in bribery at Bombay with that view. Some of the intrigues and corruptions arising out of these compulsory armaments are thus referred to by Mr. Chapman in his recent pamphlet, *Baroda and Bombay, their Political Morality*.

“The Guicowar, a partner in the [banking] House in which Baba Nafra was manager, as well as sovereign of the country, was under certain treaty engagements with the British Government for the maintenance, out of his revenues, of a body of cavalry called ‘the Guzerat Irregular Horse.’ The abolition of this engagement had long been an object with the then reigning prince. \* \* \* Intrigues were, therefore, set on foot at Bombay at considerable cost, with the view to obtaining its abrogation through the corrupt favour of the several members of the Government. Motee Purshotum, whom the Guicowar believed to be secretly in favour with the members of the Government, was one of the principal agents in the business; he was sent to Bombay; Gopallrow Myrall, the virtual minister of the Guicowar, was the soul of it; Baba Nafra was also deeply concerned, and was afterwards interdicted the Residency for his share of it. The sums allotted by the bribers to the different members and officers of Government, but never alleged to have been received by them, were as follows:

To Sir James Carnac . . . . .	Rupees 1,000,000
„ Mr. Willoughby . . . . .	250,000
„ Mr. Reed . . . . .	60,000
„ Shree Crustna . . . . .	36,000
„ Dr. Brown and all the minor parties . .	110,000

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1,456,000

A total equivalent to £120,000.

\* It is to pay for the subsidiary force, that certain districts in Guzerat, and the Ahmedabad farm, have been ceded by the Guicowar to the British Government.



"It is extremely difficult to imagine that parties who had been so long in communication with the Government of Bombay should have ventured on an attempt of this character, of which even the machinery must have been very costly, and the danger in case of repulse or detection great, if they had not believed, from what they had seen, that, notwithstanding all the professions of the British Government, their object could really be effected by Khuptut."\*

These intrigues, carried on by a Native well known at Bombay, Dackjee Dadajee, occurred in 1843. At a later period they were renewed; but, though Col. Outram laid a mass of proof of their existence before the Bombay Government, it refused to take any steps in defence of its own honour.

The truth is, that, under our present system, the decline of a Native State dates from the moment we become closely connected with it, and this decline arises chiefly from the inordinate military establishments directly or indirectly imposed on them. Yet now that in all directions the Native States are more or less embarrassed, the doctrine of their absorption or annexation is boldly and openly preached by servants† of the Indian Government, and has been avowed and acted on by Lord Dalhousie himself. "We are Lords Paramount, and our policy is to acquire as direct a dominion over the 717,000 square miles still possessed by Native Princes, as we already have over the other half of India." This is the new law of our Indian Empire, as laid down by the present Governor-General.

Opposed to it there is, however, a succession of great authorities, all agreed on the impolicy of subverting the Native states on general principles touching our own safety. Let us listen then a little to the wisdom of men who, though dead, yet speak:—

#### *The Duke of Wellington.*

"In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves

\* The word Khuptut, as here used by Mr. Chapman, means bribery.

† Particularly by Mr. Campbell, of the Bengal Civil Service, in his recent publications which, valuable for their, perhaps indiscreet, frankness, too frequently indulge in a tone of morality, popular enough in the State of Mississippi, but as yet unsanctioned by public opinion in England.

at the expense of the Mahrattas, we increase this evil; we throw out of employment and means of subsistence all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded, or served, in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies, at the same time that by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionally decreased."

*Sir Thomas Munro.*

"Even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be that the Indian army, having no longer any war-like neighbours to combat, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, and that the native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and for want of other employment to turn it against their European masters. But even if we could be secured against every internal commotion, and could retain the country quietly in subjection, I doubt much if the condition of the people would be better than under their native princes. The strength of the British Government enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression unknown in those States; but these advantages are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of independence, of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable. The natives of the British provinces may, without fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, meerassadars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace: none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil, or military government of their country. It is from men who either hold, or who are eligible, to public office, that natives take their character; where no such men exist there can be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most *abject*\* race in India. No elevation of character can be expected among men, who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of Subalidar (captain), where they are as much below an (English) ensign as an ensign is below the Commander-in-Chief; and who in the civil line can hope for nothing beyond some petty judicial or revenue office, in which they may by corrupt means make up for their slender salary. The consequence, therefore, of the

\* It is a significant coincidence to find the Report of the Commons' Committee on Indian Cotton Cultivation still using in 1848 this very term "*abject*," as descriptive of the Ryots of the British Provinces, thirty years after Sir T. Munro thus applied it.

conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, to *debase the whole people*. There is, perhaps, no example of any conquest, in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as British India. Among all the disorders of the native states, the field is open for every man to raise himself, and hence among them, there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise, and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects. The existence of independent native states is also useful in drawing off the turbulent and disaffected among our native troops."

*Sir John Malcolm.*

"I am decidedly of opinion that the tranquillity, not to say *the security of our vast Oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which are dependent upon us for protection*. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides the other and great benefits which we derive from those alliances, their co-existence with our rule is of itself a *source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost*. They shew the possibility of a native State subsisting even in the heart of our own territories, and their condition mitigates in some degree the bad effects of that too general impression, that our sovereignty is incompatible with the maintenance of native princes and chiefs. \* \* \* \* \*

I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, *the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule*. Considering as I do, from all my experience, that it is now our policy to maintain as long as we can all Native States now existing, and through them, and by other means to support and maintain native chiefs and an aristocracy throughout the empire of India; I do think *that every means should be used to avert what I should consider as one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire, viz. the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule*. There are none of the latter who can venture to contend against us in the field. They are incapable from their actual condition of any dangerous combinations with each other, and they absorb many elements of sedition and rebellion. It is further to be observed on this part of the subject, that the respect which the natives give to men of high birth, with claims upon their allegiance, contributes greatly to the preservation of the general peace. Such afford an example to their countrymen of submission to the rule of foreigners—they check the rise of those bold military adventurers, with which India has, and ever will abound, but who will never have the field widely opened to their enterprises, until our impolicy has annihilated, or suffered to die of their own act, those high princes and chiefs, who, though diminished in power, have still the hereditary attachment and obedience of millions of those classes, who are from habits and courage alike suited to maintain or to disturb the public peace."

*Sir Henry Russell.*

"The danger that we have most to dread in India lies entirely at home. A well conducted rebellion of our native subjects, or an extensive disaffection of our native troops, is the event by which our power is most likely to be shaken; and the sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by every enlargement of our territory. The increase of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, is an increase not of our strength but of our weakness; between them and us there never can be community of feeling. We must always continue foreigners; and the object of that jealousy and dislike, which a foreign rule never ceases to excite."

And to these voices from the grave may be added authorities who, happily, are still amongst us, for our instruction and guidance.

*Mr. Elphinstone.*

"It appears to me to be our interest as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied governments; it is also our interest to keep up the number of independent powers: their territories afford a refuge to all those whose habits of war, intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of remaining quiet in ours; and the contrast of our Government has a favourable effect on our subjects, who, while they feel the evils they are actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater ones from which they have been delivered. If the existence of independent powers gives occasional employment to our armies, it is far from being a disadvantage."

*Lord Ellenborough.*

"Our Government is at the head of a system composed of native States, and I would avoid taking what are called rightful occasions of appropriating the territories of native states; on the contrary, I should be disposed, so far as I could, to maintain the native States, and I am satisfied that the maintenance of the native States, and the giving to the subjects of those States the conviction that they were considered permanent parts of the general Government of India, would materially strengthen our authority. I feel satisfied that I never stood so strong with my own army as when I was surrounded by native Princes; they like to see respect shown to their native Princes. These Princes are sovereigns of one-third of the population of Hindostan; and with reference to the future condition of the country, it becomes more important to give them confidence that no systematic attempt will be made to take advantage of the failures of heirs to confiscate their property, or to injure in any respect those sovereigns in the position they at present occupy."

*Mr. Shepherd, an East India Director.*

"Throughout the short period of the wonderful rise of the British power in India, our Governments have adopted, generally, a system

of decided conciliation towards the native princes, chiefs, and people. The former were found the best instruments for conciliating towards us the goodwill of their subjects. We managed generally so to combine their interest with our own, that they soon perceived that the success of our Government proved the best source of benefit to themselves, and thus they became, in a manner, constituent elements of our system of Government. The language of Mr. Elphinstone was, "that the British Government is uniformly anxious to promote the prosperity of its adherents, it being a maxim of its policy that the interests of such persons should be as dear to it as its own."

"I attribute to this system the first and more early co-operation of the natives generally in our progress. A perseverance in the same course of moderation and forbearance, a cautious abstaining from interference with the native religion, a scrupulous regard to the maintenance of our honour and good faith, an impartial administration of justice, and, in fact, the general kind and benevolent treatment of all classes, did not fail to win the confidence of the people at large. An immense native army, second to none in efficiency and discipline, and whose attachment and fidelity have stood the test of no ordinary temptations, have also been the fruits of this system. And at length we have the amazing spectacle of a vast country, consisting of 600,000 square miles, and containing upwards of 100 millions of inhabitants, governed through the medium of a handful of Englishmen.

"May it not be fairly questioned whether a system of universal conquest and assumption of territory would have been equally successful? and if so, whether it is prudent, even were it just, to deviate from this successful course? I am the last person to wish to derogate from the importance of 'British bayonets' in India; without them we could have neither gained, or retained, our magnificent empire. I am, however, equally persuaded that a bare dependence upon physical force, either in early or later times, although it might, no doubt, have maintained the security of our factories on the coast, and fully vindicated our national power, yet under it, the civilizing influences of the British rule could never have been extended, and the range of our cannon must have continued to be the boundaries of our territory."

*The Hon. Mr. Melville, an East India Director.*

"The supreme Government of India has declared that an adoption is of no power or effect until it has 'received the sanction of the sovereign power, with whom it rests to give or to refuse it;' and even Sir George Clerk, who declares himself in favour of recognizing the adoption, admits that an adoption is only valid if sanctioned by the paramount power; viz. the British Government. This seems the chief reason for refusing to sanction the adoption, and I must therefore examine it in some detail.

"In the first place, I think we ought to lay aside the European feudal terms, which run through the papers, of 'lord paramount' and of 'suzerain,' and of regarding Sattara as 'a fief,' as unsuited to

a question of adoption under the law and custom of India. 'Parallels of this sort rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or to adorn, than supply analogies from whence to reason.' But these terms mislead us also, by assuming the existence in India of a system of order, and of regulated right in the relation between one great Emperor and other minor sovereigns, which, I believe, never existed, and certainly not for the last century. On the contrary, any system of rights is entirely at variance with the lawlessness and anarchy which prevailed, when our political connection with India commenced. The only law then recognized was the law of the strongest. On this ground, it seems to me visionary to talk of rights held under the Emperors, or the Mahrattas, and derived by us from them.

"Nevertheless, it is stated that we are lords paramount in relation to Sattara, first, as successors to the Emperors; I have just now shown, however, I think, that there was no paramount sovereignty for us to succeed to. We have conquered a large portion of the territories which the Emperors once possessed, not from them, but from other powers who had seized them. We are thus become the predominant or paramount power in India, and able to throw our weight into the scale of justice and order when any dispute is likely to disturb the general peace. In this sense we may be said to be successors to the Emperors, but not to any constitutional prerogatives, which confer on us rights as lords paramount.

"Again, if we have any claim to succeed to such rights from the Emperor, we must either have obtained them from him by grant or treaty, or have received some formal submission from other sovereigns, or else some implied grant or submission of the kind. If so, where and when did all this occur? But there is no trace to be found of any such grant, or of any such submission; and a mere general rumour or impression, such as is described by the members of the Bombay Government, should not surely be allowed for a moment to affect that great and obvious principle of public law expressed by the writers of Europe, that "one party to a treaty cannot be allowed to introduce subsequent restrictions which he has not expressed."

#### *General Briggs.*

"If you do away with the right of adoption with respect to the Princes of India, the next question will be whether, in the case of estates which you yourselves have conferred on officers for their services, or upon other individuals for their merits, they should be allowed to adopt. Here you are treading on delicate ground. If you are to do away with the right of individuals to adopt, you will shake the faith of the people of India; you will influence that opinion which has hitherto maintained you in your power; and that influence will thrill through your army; and you will find some day, as Lord Metcalfe more than once said, 'we shall rise some morning, and hear of a conflagration throughout the whole empire of India, such as a few Europeans amongst millions will not be able



to extinguish.' Your army is derived from the peasantry of the country, who have rights; and if those rights are infringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity of that army. You have a native army of 250,000 men to support your power, and it is on the fidelity of that army your power rests. But you may rely on it, if you infringe the institutions of the people of India, that army will sympathise with them; for they are part of the population; and in every infringement you may make upon the rights of individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men who are either themselves in the army, or upon their sons, their fathers, or their relatives. Let the fidelity of your army be shaken, and your power is gone."

But there are other reasons against this new theory of subversion, besides the advantage thus authoritatively described as resulting to our own power, and its stability, from the maintenance of Native States. We have, it is true, become the predominant power in India, but our supremacy is not without its correlative obligations and duties. On the contrary, it is a superiority limited and restricted within the stipulations and provisions, and controlled and checked by the words and language of treaties. "I would," wrote General Wellesley, half a century ago, to his more ambitious and peremptory brother, the then Governor-General,—“I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every other frontier in India ten times over, in order to preserve our character for scrupulous good faith.” “What!” he nobly asked of his relative, “what brought me successfully through the last campaign but strict adherence to British good faith; and what success could I hope for in any future operations, if I were to tarnish that faith?” Forty years passed away; but in 1842 Lord Auckland (a great offender in some respects,) still repeated the Great Duke’s language: “In viewing this question,”—the right of the widow of the Rajah of Kishengur to adopt a son without authority from her deceased husband:

“I would at once put aside any reference to the prerogatives claimed and exercised by the Emperor of Delhi, or of any *supposed rights* which it has been thought might be assumed by us, because they were habitually enforced by those Sovereigns, or by others, who have at different times held supreme rule within the various provinces of the Empire. I would look only to the terms and spirit of the treaties or engagements which we have formed with the several states of India—and bring forward no other demand than such as, in reference to those engagements, may be indisputably consistent with good faith.”

Again, when an attempt was made to deprive the Rajah of Oorcha of his rights as an independent Prince, on similar grounds, Lord



Anckland, rejecting the flimsy pretences, thus grasped the substance of justice :—

“I cannot for a moment admit the doctrine that, because the view of policy upon which we may have formed engagements with Native Princes may have been by circumstances materially altered, we are not to act scrupulously up to the terms and spirit of those engagements.”

Lord Metcalfe went even further: for he argued that even in a *casus omisus*, native law and practice, and neither our supremacy nor our power, ought to prevail :—

“Where there is a total failure of heirs, it is probably more consistent with right that the people should elect a Sovereign, than that the principality should lapse to the Paramount state, that State, in fact, having no rights in such a case but what it assumes by virtue of its power.”

Lord Dalhousie, however, has reversed this sound policy. According to him, our supremacy, wherever an apology or an excuse can be raised, has to over-ride our treaties, has to interpret their language, and to decide all their difficulties; and “it is only in this way,” says his admirer, Mr. Campbell, “that we can hope gradually to extinguish the Native States which consume so large a portion of the revenue of the country,” as if they were robbing us of something we were justly entitled to.

Revenue is then the motive for this change. But revenue does not always include profit. “By incorporating Sattara with our possessions we shall increase the revenue of our State,” joyfully, if immorally, anticipated Lord Dalhousie in 1848. “We were not prepared to find that the annexation of Sattara would prove a drain on the general revenues of India,” gravely and sadly replied the Court of Directors, after four years experience of these expectations, in 1852. Nor is the loss to the general revenues of India arising from the absorption of Sattara an exceptional case. The King of Oude was formerly bound to pay us a tribute of £700,000; in lieu of it we took from him a territory yielding £1,125,000; but, after twenty years possession of it, the revenue was found to have declined at the rate of £10,000 annually; and this decline, the Court of Directors last year stated, is still going on. So, too, with Coorg—it is a loss; Scinde is a loss; the Punjab a bottomless pit of expense.

By these annexations, however, a large body of Englishmen do, no doubt, gain. Patronage is increased, employment is increased, sala-

ries are increased; at the cost, however, of the general revénues, and to the impoverishment of the people. "Five Native States," writes Mr. Sullivan,\* "have fallen within the last ten years. If we put on one side of the account what the Natives have gained by the few offices that have been lately opened to them, with what they have lost by the extermination of these States, we shall find the net loss to be immense, and what the Native loses the Englishman gains. Upon the extermination of a Native State, an Englishman takes the place of the Sovereign, under the name of Commissioner; three or four of his associates displace as many dozen of the native official aristocracy, while some hundreds of our troops take the place of the many thousands that every Native Chief supports. The little Court disappears—trade languishes—the capital decays—the people are impoverished—the Englishman flourishes, and acts like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the banks of the Thames." Nor is this all. Native Princes and their Courts not only encourage native Trade and native Arts, but under them, and because of their very weakness, public spirit and opinion flourishes: all that constitutes the life of a people is strengthened; and though the Government may occasionally be oppressive, heavier far is the yoke of "our Institutions." When in Oude—where, contrary to what he was told to expect, he was surprised by finding a well cultivated country and a flourishing people, as also, we may add, did a German traveller only a year or two back—Bishop Heber asked an intelligent Native if he wished to become a subject of the British Government? His reply was—"Of all misfortunes keep me from that!"

Moreover, Lord Dalhousie's new rule "that on all occasions where heirs natural shall fail, the territory should be made to lapse," involves a complete revolution in our dealings with Native States. For hitherto the very reverse has been our policy. Down to his Vice-Royalty we not only confirmed the Hindoo practice of adoption,†

\* In his pamphlet, *Plea for the Princes of India*. Effingham Wilson, 1853.

† It will perhaps be useful here to explain the *rationale* of the practice of adoption; and that we cannot do better than in the language of General Briggs:—"A Hindoo's land and property are equally divided amongst the children of the person dying, and would be equally divided, in case of no direct heirs, amongst all collateral heirs. But to prevent division, and, in fact, the extinction of the in-

where heirs natural failed, but we pressed and forced the practice on dying Princes even where it was indifferent to them.

In 1826 Dowlut Row Scindiah, Rajah of Gwalior, was ill and childless. Colonel Stewart, the Resident at his Court, and his assistant, passed months in urging him to adopt an heir; they reasoned, they argued, they insisted, they even annoyed and irritated the sick prince: for the pride of Scindiah had been broken. After the downfall of the Peishwa, in whose defence his sword had not been drawn, the glory of the Mahratta race was, he felt, gone, and he was no longer the same man. So, careless of the future, he repulsed all their entreaties, replying—"After my death you will be masters of every thing, and may do as you please;" in March 1827, he died, heirless. But Lord Amherst did not—as Lord Dalhousie now says we are bound in "all" such cases to do—seize on Gwalior as a "lapsed" fief. On the contrary—he disclaimed any right "to regulate the Gwalior succession;" eagerly and gracefully he recognized the boy whom Scindiah's favourite wife\* adopted after his death. The reign of the youthful Sovereign was, however, brief; he, too, died in 1842; childless also. Again the widow adopted; again her adoption was recognized by the British Government, and the adopted boy is still Rajah of Gwalior. Nor when Lord Ellenborough subsequently broke the power of the army, did he ever think of absorbing the State, though he had then a plausible excuse for extinguishing it.

As at Gwalior and with Scindiah, so at Indore and with Holkar. Mulhur Row Holkar died in 1834 without any male child. A popular movement raised Hurree Holkar to the throne; his elevation was at once recognised by the British Government. In 1841, he was ill and childless; the Governor-General pressed him to adopt an

integrity of estates, a person is permitted to adopt out of his collateral heirs, one person to inherit the whole property. And not only is he permitted to do so; but after his death, in case of failure, his widow may: because a man in the vigour of life may be suddenly killed or taken away, without having adopted, or without the hope of having an heir of his own; and his widow is permitted in that case to adopt, in order that the estate may be preserved in its integrity and disputes at law avoided. And a very convenient thing it is."

\* In this case the right was exercised, not by the eldest, but by the second wife, who, said Scindiah to Col. Stewart, when teased about the eventualities of his succession, "was a woman of sense."

heir. Unlike Scindiah, Holkar did so, and on his death, in 1844, the adoption was confirmed by the Paramount Power. Here also the young Rajah lived only a few months; and, in 1845, Lord Hardinge, then new to Indian rule, wished to make the choice of a successor "bear the appearance of a free act of grace on the part of the British Government." But he never talked of absorbing the State of Indore, because the Rajah had died leaving no "heirs natural." The Resident, however,—by what was afterwards censured as his "precipitation," but what was really his strong sense of the obligation of this right of adoption,—defeated Lord Hardinge's design, and the accession of the reigning Holkar "assumed," to use his Lordship's language, "more the form of a succession by legitimate right."

Nor are Gwalior and Indore the only recent cases. In Bhopal in 1820, the succession, on a vacancy without heirs, was at once filled up by the Local Representative, the late Sir John Malcolm, without even any reference to the Supreme Government—to the intense delight of the Puthans, who, to show their gratitude, offered him their swords and their lives. So also in Dutteah in 1840, in Ooreha in 1842, in Kotah in 1828, in Banswarra in 1842, in Odeypore\* in the same year, in Doongerpore in 1846, and later still in Kerowlee. In all these States, under Lord Dalhousie's law, the Chiefs having died "without heirs natural," "the territories should have been made to lapse." But in all the opposite course was pursued. The right of adoption was recognized and the States were preserved.

If, then, this new theory, of what may be termed painless extinction, is hereafter to be acted on by the British Government, a fundamental change in the constitution of Indian policy will be commenced, and India is a country in which experiments on society are very dangerous.

But even if our Supremacy would justify, either in law or morals, this theory and practice of subversion, look at the enormity of the operation, divide and detail it as the Indian Government may. The greater part of India is still in the possession of Native Princes; they yet retain 700,000 square miles of territory; they yet

\* Judging from a reply made by Sir C. Wood recently to Mr. Otway, Lord Dalhousie's rule has not to prevail in Rajpootana, because there the Native Dynasties are so ancient. The more correct reason would probably have been because they are conjointly so strong.

possess a population of 53 millions of subjects, a revenue of 10 millions sterling; armies 400,000 strong. All will not yield without a struggle. We may be able to annex the Nizam's dominions—to absorb Oude—to subvert the Guicowar, without much bloodshed or great difficulty. But not the Rajpoot Princes, not the Bundelcund Rajahs, not the Protected Sikh and the Hill States. There, we shall have to encounter brave soldiers, attached subjects, and a love of independence, preserved, in a remarkable manner, for centuries. This policy is, therefore, essentially a warlike policy,—it has bloodshed, and devastation, and conquest in prospect; it is an expensive policy,—warfare is ever costly and burthensome; it is also an ambitious policy, an aggressive policy, an intolerant policy, unworthy of the English crown and people, and contrary to the statutable enactments of Parliament itself.

But, suppose it at last carried out; suppose the British Government masters of all India, administering, or trying to administer, the affairs of 1,300,000 square miles of varied and diversified territory—ruling, or endeavouring to rule, 150 millions of people, still more varied and diversified, directly and immediately. How frightful the responsibility—how enormous the risk. At best we could only hope for safety; success would require centuries to realize. But should the attempt fail—should we, in grasping at too much, lose all. Where then would be our Oriental “Mission,” for which policy excuses, and philanthropy reconciles itself to, these acts of injustice?

To those who, like Mr. Campbell and Mr. Thoby Prinsep,\* allege that our Indian difficulties arise from our not being complete masters of the whole area of India, and who, like Lord Dalhousie, argue in favour of losing no opportunity of subverting Native States, and annexing their territories to our dominions, may then be replied:—

1. Considerations for our own safety, arising, in the judgment of the eminent authorities already quoted, from the maintenance of the authority of our Native Allies.
2. The limited and restricted character of our Supremacy, and the tendency which an avowal of our intention to disregard those limitations and restrictions has to degenerate our Government to one of mere unlicensed and uncontrolled power and force.

\* In his pamphlet, *The Indian Question* in 1853.

3. The moral advantages of a strict adherence to good faith, of a generous interpretation of treaties, and of a liberal course of policy towards our inferiors.
4. The risk, as experience warns us, that we run of only increasing our financial difficulties by extensions of our territories.
5. The magnitude of the task of adding to our dominions a greater area than that we already rule.
6. The evil effects which the immense extension of patronage at home, consequent on the further employment of European agency in our new acquisitions, may produce by increasing the power of home authorities.
7. The danger to England as well as to India which a successful resistance in any one case may originate and produce.
8. The injustice, the slaughter, and the cost of pursuing such a policy.
9. The hopelessness of promoting the improvement and happiness either of our old or our new territories by such means.

It is idle to urge that the countries and subjects of native princes would be benefited by the change. Such an argument, used as a rule of policy, would justify almost any aggression, and might, with equal validity, be applied to the destruction, as to the extension of our Indian Empire. There are, no doubt, Native States in India where few evidences can be seen of intelligence, spirit, or improvement in their governments. But the unhappiness and misery of their people is too large an inference to deduce from a state of apathy and indifference on the part of these Courts; caused chiefly, it may be, by our interference with the proper sphere of their duties. For even in ill ruled Native States the princes are under the controul, to a large extent, of native public opinion, of native public spirit, and, when necessary, of native public resistance; wherein lie their subjects' security. Nor is it to be forgotten, as evidence of the actual condition of the people of such States, that they are not *adscripti glebæ*—they are not slaves. No extradition law follows them into our provinces; they may emigrate from oppression; they may fly from misrule; they may find, if they can, happiness and prosperity in the adjoining British territories. But, even from those principalities most seriously charged by us with bad government, the Ryots do *not* fly. On the contrary, there is a steady flow of emigration from British provinces,