tice were condemned. India was saved from abominations disgraceful to the English name, and the hands of Cornwallis, Minto, Bentinck, and Auckland, have swayed an empire where Cheyt Sing was despoiled and Nuncomar was executed."

How far "the most absolute despotism" has really and truly "been qualified and tempered by the genius of representative government" during the last twenty years, will, of course, be doubted by those who regard the Affghan war as a crime, the acquisition of Scinde as a stupid injustice, the conquest of the Punjaub as a doubtful policy, and the Burmese war as an abomination,—will be denied by those who have witnessed a gradual deterioration in the condition of the people of India, who know the actual state of the administration of justice in India, and who have seen the gentry disappear, and individual wealth diminish. The improved tone of morality in the English mind and character during the last seventy years, rather than "the genius of representative government," which, exhausted by the mighty efforts it made during Hastings' impeachment, has never been able since to rouse itself to continued and systematic attention to the affairs of India—this improved tone of morality at home and the more complete organization of the internal government of India itself have, no doubt, corrected to some extent the larger faults of the Indian Government. But even these influences and agencies have failed to prevent the Company's Government perpetrating acts of wrong which would not be endured here in England.

Sir Robert Peel's large and disinterested vision long ago saw that in this respect our Indian "despotism" required some better correctives than the mere "genius of representative government;" he saw that it needed the substance of law rather than the mere reflex of liberal institutions from home; and that power so great ought, in its application to individuals, to be made subject and responsible to the examination and controul of independent judicial authority. So long ago as 1833, that great man (whose loss India will now feel as England has felt it), advocated the establishment of some

tribunal to decide in those personal questions on which the Indian Government now does as it pleases, uncontrolled by Parliament.

In England there is, the law assures us, no Wrong without a Remedy; in India, the following examples will illustrate, there is a large class of Wrongs, for which there is not even the pretence of Remedy. Here, in extréme cases the subject can prosecute his claims on the Queen's Government by a Writ of Right. There the subject's only hope are letters and remonstrances, sometimes unanswered, almost universally unheeded. Redress in India for this class of Injustice is not, therefore, a right to which the subject is entitled, but a favour to be reached by influence and solicitation. Thus the "despotism" of the Government and the servility of the people are promoted; and the suitors tired and worn out by the fruitless prosecution of their cases in India, turn to England, where, believing Justice to be found, they only experience disappointment. With these remarks, the reader will be better able in 1853 to appreciate in the following instances the want of such a Tribunal as Sir Robert Peel deemed necessary in 1833.

HOW THE COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT USES NATIVE STIPENDIARIES.

Of all countries of Southern India, the Carnatic is most intimately connected with the early progress of our dominion and with the growth of our empire. The Company's earliest settlement, Fort St. David, was situated in this kingdom, and its position below the Ghauts, on the coast of Coromandel, brought us at once into connexion with its Mahomedan rulers. There we were met by, there we resisted, and thence we finally expelled French influence. It was our success in the Carnatic that cost Dupleix his fortune, and Lally his life. At its capital, Arcot, Clive won his youthful fame, and by Lawrence and him our adopted pretender

to its throne, Mahomed Ali, was established as Nabob. It was in the Carnatic, that Hyder Ali took such terrible vengeance on its unhappy people for our faithlessness—a vengeance that roused to its highest pitch the eloquence of Burke. It was in the Carnatic that our influence, as our arms, competed with enemies then more formidable to our power than even the French, Hyder and his son Tippoo. Gradually we acquired the supremacy we sought; as usual, however, it brought embarrassments and difficulties, other than political, on the Prince immeshed in it. Of the debts and loans of the Nabobs of Arcot, there is a parliamentary literature of their own. For many years a very costly commission and establishment were maintained at home to enquire into them, and large retiring pensions are still paid to its surviving members and officers. Of their legality, of their classification, of their liquidation, a volume of Oriental romance might be written. At last they were paid off, or their future payment secured by Carnatic Bonds; but long before their arrangement or discharge, the Carnatic had ceased to exist as a State, either in an independent or a dependent form; its Nabob had been removed from the capital, practically deposed, and consigned to a convenient prison, still mis-named *the Palace* of Chepauk, situated under the guns of Fort St. George.

It was from no great belief in the goodness of his title, but from a very deep sense of the Company's reputed interests, that British valour made Mahomed Ali Nabob of the Carnatic. His elevation, however, realized its main design, the abatement of French, and the extension of British influence in Southern India. The Company guaranteed, of course, the dominion they had secured to him. They provided a military force for the defence of the Carnatic, and he bound himself to pay its cost. The result of this relation was the now familiar one; the Nabob undertook (by the Treaty of 1787) to pay an amount larger than either his revenue or his then acknowledged liabilities permitted him to discharge with regularity; and his want of punctuality was attributed to his misgovernment. The deeper and

deeper he sunk into debt, the more and more the Company insisted on ampler and better security. This, our first war with Tippoo furnished us with an opportunity of taking. In 1792, Lord Cornwallis imposed a new Treaty on the Nabob. There were, however, a sense of justice and a glow of generosity in Lord Cornwallis's mind, rarely found in Governors-General. He insisted on having full authority, to use when necessary, over the Carnatic; but he reduced the tribute of the Nabob from 15 to 9 lacs of Star Pagodas,* and he especially renounced all power over "the Jaghires or family estates belonging to the Prince's family, amounting to Star Pagodas 2,13,911, which, on condition of the good behaviour of their possessors, the Jagheerdars, and of their fidelity to the Nabob and the Company, shall (he engaged) be continued to them, subject to the pleasure of the said Nabob only." Thus, in extending the real power of the Company over the Carnatic, that great and successful statesman improved the pecuniary position of the Nabob, and conciliated his Court. Three years afterwards—1795—Mahomed Ali died, and was succeeded by his son, Omdut ul Omrah.

Towards the close of the century, Lord Clive was the titular Governor of Madras; Mr. Webbe, chief Secretary of the Government, was, however, the real Governor. Of the latter, the Duke of Wellington pronounced an opinion that he was one of the ablest men the Duke ever knew. Lord Clive, a much inferior person, not unnaturally, was much influenced by Mr. Webbe, who to great abilities added what Lord Clive also wanted, large experience of India, and the unscrupulous rapacity which then accompanied it. On his way to Calcutta, Lord Wellesley, the next Governor-General, touched at Madras. There he discharged his mind of the resolution he had taken, whilst at the Cape of Good Hope, to punish Tippoo for his really childish, but, no doubt, in intention, dangerous philandering with the French Revolutionists of the Mauritius, whom Lord Wellesley hated

* One lac, or 100,000 Star Pagodas are £40,000. A Star Pagoda is eight shillings.—This coin has been superseded by the Company's Rupee.

with so fierce a hatred; there too he acquired—or, perhaps, propagated—suspicions against Omdut ul Omrah. Tippoo was quickly destroyed, and Mysore (a small part excepted), partitioned. Then Lord Wellesley and Lord Clive turned round upon the Nabob of the Carnatic. They charged him with sympathy for and secret intercourse with his co-religionist, Tippoo, with whom indeed Lord Cornwallis had advised him to keep up a friendly correspondence; though aid or assistance he had none to give to that Prince. Establishing their own charge by their own evidence and their own commission, Mr. Webbe being on it, they pronounced themselves released from the obligations of Lord Cornwallis's Treaty of 1792, and they were about to treat Omdut ul Omrah as a public enemy, when death terminated that unhappy Prince's troubles; but not their determination to annex the Carnatic. They denied that his son, Ali Hussein, inherited his throne; but they decided that though a boy, not of age, he had succeeded to the position of public enmity to British authority imputed to his father. The unhappy lad, like the late Rajah of Sattarah, had the spirit to refuse a nominal throne, and accept of a life of ease and infamy, on the condition of signing a Treaty handing over the Carnatic territorially, in vicarious liquidation of his father's alleged offences against the Company. There was no Benares 1000 miles off in those days, to receive and retain the Company's State prisoners. So he — the grandson of Mahomed Ali, the Company's own Nabob!—with whom on those terms of disgrace they were willing to treat as lawful heir, was declared to be an impostor. An heir more phant, as well as more legitimate, was next sought and found in another grandson; and with this lay figure of a Sovereign, the Treaty of 1801 was made. By it, the Carnatic, its territories, its revenues, and rights, were vested in the Company; the Nabob receiving as his share of the spoil, one-fifth* of the net revenue of the State he surrendered up.

* It would appear, from the mode in which the Carnatic Finance Accounts are now made out and delivered to that Prince, that the present Nabob does not receive the one-fifth of the net revenues to which he is entitled under the Treaty of 1801.

Thus fell the Carnatic. All that now remains of its former native greatness is to be seen in the beggarly and ruinous palace of Chepank. There lives the nominal Nabob, still ludicrously treated with salvos of artillery in his visits to the Governor of Madras, still received and fraternally and publicly *hugged* as an anointed Prince on State occasions; still held sacred and exempt from the jurisdiction of British law; but not suffered to stir an inch from the bounds prescribed for his airings, without leave first asked and obtained *in writing* from his jailers without occupation, without employment, without hope, without object in life, a miserable pensioned puppet; relieving the tedium of life by exhibitions of dancing girls and other such follies, his palace, a prison, girt by a tumble-down native town, where dwell in famine and filth the crowd descended from that Court and those servants of the State, whose career of activity, ambition, and honourable occupation finally and equally closed in 1801 with that of their Sovereign.

These men were the Jagheerdars for whom Lord Cornwallis so considerately and nobly provided in the Treaty of 1792. They held their Jaghires, or great fiefs, in what was called Altumgha Enaum, or as we would say in Fee Simple; and so complete and independent were their possession, that by the Treaty of 1801, the value (star pagodas 2,13,421) of these private estates had to be deducted from the gross revenue of the Carnatic, in estimating the fifth of the net revenue assigned to the Nabob. Their existence, as private property, was thus distinctly recognized. The Jaghires themselves were, however, for reasons of public safety, assumed by the Company. But by the ninth Article of the Treaty, the Company charged itself with a suitable provision for the families and the Courts of the two preceding Nabobs, and undertook to distribute it in such manner as the Nabob, then acknowledged, should judge proper. No sooner however was this Treaty signed, than the Company, by an explanatory article which they alone signed, shuffled out of the liability to the full extent of the annual value of the Jaghires they had just acquired, by declaring that they

were at liberty to exercise a discretion as to "the extent of the provision to be made for the support of the family and the principal officers of the two Nabobs, Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah."

This "discretion," they quickly did exercise. On the 29th Sept. 1801, Lord Clive fixed by a Minute of Council the amount of the pecuniary provision (which had to be provided under the ninth article of the Treaty of 31st July 1801) at rupees 6,98,473, or star pagodas 1,99,564. Thus was at once acquired for the Company a profit of star pagodas 13,857 on the Jaghires which, though granted in fee simple, the Company assumed: a proceeding, at which Lord Cornwallis's noble nature would have blushed. And this sum of rupees 6,98,473, (or about £70,000) had to be divided amongst men, who, in addition to these hereditary Jaghires, had enjoyed all the high offices of the Native Court which was extinguished, and to whom all other similar channels of employment were now closed. It had too to be divided amongst families accustomed to the comforts and luxuries of civilized life. It was not therefore a very magnificent fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the Treaty. But at all events it was then deemed a certainty and a permanence; and in that there was some comfort.

It has proved otherwise. The amount of these stipends was duly paid to the persons entitled to them as long as they lived; and, after their deaths, for some years their descendants succeeded to the stipends without question, and as a matter of right. Gradually, however, the Madras Government has gone on reducing them, until in 1851 their aggregate annual amount only reached star pagodas 85,714. To some persons and families, their allowances have been reduced one-third, to others one-half, in some cases by two-thirds. Concurrently, the families dependent on the stipend have gone on increasing. Nearly all the stipendiaries are consequently in debt and embarrassment; some of the descendants of the last Carnatic monarchs starving on one rupee, or two shillings a-month; others eking life out by netting and embroidering; one family, great-grandchildren

of Mahomed Ali, reduced from the position of stipendiaries, as was their father, are existing on charity; and the whole of these unfortunate people are now in the direst apprehension that, on the deaths of the present recipients, no further allowances will be made to their families. In short, the whole colony dependent on Chepank, composed of Mahomedan gentlemen of rank and condition, is at present living in a dread of future starvation.

Now these families either have, or have not, rights under the Treaty of 1801. There is nothing in the language of that Treaty which restricts the obligations of the ninth Article to the heirs of those then living, or their immediate descendants. The Jaghires were hereditary, and held in fee-simple; they were recognised by the Treaty of 1792; their annual value, as there settled, is deducted, under the Treaty of 1801, from the gross revenues of the Carnatic, as an amount the Company had no right to; and by every rule of justice, the money equivalent assigned for the Jaghires by the Company ought to be as lasting a tenure as the Jaghires themselves—that is perpetual. Of the Treaty of 1801, the Company has still the benefit; so ought the Nabob to have. It is in full force. Why, then, are not the meaner parties affected by it, as much entitled to its permanent advantages as the greater powers who contracted it?

If, however, in the opinion of the Indian Government, these persons have no permanent rights under the Treaty, it is the refinement of cruelty not to announce to them their actual position—not to warn them against the approaching termination of their allowances—not to define in the most accurate manner the legal duration of their stipends. At present, they are left in suspense; hung between heaven and earth; the victims of a policy which is not avowed. And why is it not avowed? Because it is too unjustifiable to avow. Turn to what account of the transactions of 1801 that you will, there you will find all, equally those who praise and those who condemn the acquisition of the Carnatic, uniting to laud the liberality which provided for the support of the families and courts of our own Nabobs. Yet, fifty

years have scarcely passed away, and some of the descendants of those Princes are starving; others are in want; all in dread and apprehension of the future.

Can any man say that this is a just or an honourable fulfilment of the terms on which the Company became complete masters of the Carnatic? Will any one contend that this is creditable or honourable to the British Crown and People, for whom the Company are Trustees of India? But for this wrong there is no remedy.

HOW THE COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT DESPOILS DEPOSED NATIVE PRINCES.

In the destruction of the Native States in India, there is less to be said against the overthrow of the Peishwa than against any other. The authority of those Princes over the principal members of the old Mahratta confederacy was an usurped power; they held in captivity the family of Sevajee, the founder of Mahratta greatness; they maintained their authority by superior intrigue rather than intelligence; they were mischievously disposed towards, rather than, like Scindia and Holkar, openly hostile to British power; and they encouraged for their own purposes Pindarri robbery and freebooting. Baji Row, the last of the Peishwas, too, wanted even the ordinary courage of his family; he was cowardly, treacherous, cruel, and superstitious; he had, too, been party to an assassination of extraordinary atrocity in itself, and of unpardonable insult to the British Government. So when he surrendered to the arms of Lord Hastings, none except his Court and Sirdars regretted his fall. By his destruction the Company's Government not only got rid of a dangerous enemy, but added 50,000 square miles of territory in the very heart of their dominions, and four millions of the bravest people of India to their strength. Despite his public offences

and his personal faults, Baji Row was, however, nobly treated by Lord Hastings; he settled £100,000 a year on the ex-Peishwa, allowed him to choose his own residence, to exercise jurisdiction over his followers and guards, and permitted him to carry away camel loads of his treasures. So that for the thirty years he survived his loss of power, Baji Row had at least all the wealth and splendour of a prince, and was able to quiet his fears of the other world by the largeness of his offerings to Hindoo shrines and holy places in this.

From his camp fled the heir of the rightful Mahratta Princes, Pertaub Shean, the head of all the Mahrattas. What to do with him became at once a great question. Lord Hastings left it to Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone to give him either a large estate or a small principality. "At the time I had to decide," Mr. Ephinstone afterwards wrote to Lord Hastings, "the Mahrattas showed no disposition whatever to quit the Peishwa's standard, and it appeared not improbable that the dread of the complete extinction of their national independence, and, still more, of the entire loss of their means of subsistence, would induce them to adhere to Baji Row, that could never have been produced by affection to his person or interest in his cause." Therefore, for British interests, did Mr. Elphinstone carve out the little state of Sattarah, and over it make Pertaub Shean Rajah. Taught wisdom in his misfortunes, that Prince in his prosperity governed Sattarah so admirably, that to testify their sense of his government and his fidelity, the Court of Directors presented him with a sword of honour. After an admirable reign of nearly twenty years he became the victim of Brahminical intrigues and of British credulity; and on the ground of imputed intrigues which, if real, would have been ridiculous and contemptible, it was resolved in 1839 to unmake the Rajah whom we had made in 1819.

Beloved and honoured by his people, the Rajah could have made a strong resistance; and as any disturbances in India, at that particular juncture, when the Government had rushed into the Affghan war, might have proved infectious, the Resident was directed by the Bombay Government to inform the Rajah, "that all property belonging to him, bonâ fide,

private, and not appertaining to the State, would, on his peaceable submission, not be interfered with." Thrice was this offer repeated to the Rajah and afterwards reduced to, and confirmed in, writing. He accepted it; peaceably submitted, surrendered all his property, public and private, into the hands of the Resident, left for Benares with only the jewels his two wives happened to wear at the time, regulating his suite, however, according to the large means he had thus secured.

Pertaub Sheau was not a penniless Prince when the Company thus found and used him for its own purposes. Though holding them captives, the Peishwa had always respected the private landed estates of the House of Sevajee, and these he possessed when raised to the Raj. Following Mr. Elphinstone's good advice, he separated as a ruling Prince his public from his private treasury, and throughout his reign kept each quite distinct, and managed them by different officers. As in public, so in private affairs, he was prudent and economical; like our own most gracious Sovereign, he invested his personal savings principally in the purchase of land, bought his Osbornes and his Balmorals, and in the course of twenty years had added largely to his territorial property; he had also considerable wealth in jewels and other personalty, as well as a large sum in ready money, the value of the whole not being less than £300,000.

Relying on the promise that all this property would not be interfered with, he allowed not fewer than 1,200 attached friends and dependents to follow him into exile and confinement at Benares. But from the hour he left Sattarah to the day of his death, not one rupee was the Rajah permitted to receive from this guaranteed source. Every thing he left behind—jaghires, villages, houses, farms, gardens, jewels, money, clothes, all—were confiscated. In vain he demanded their restoration; in vain he quoted and appealed to the promise made to him,—in vain he prayed for justice. His complaints were unheeded; his supplications were turned aside. Baji Row, the Rajah's usurping minister, was surrounded in his exile by the riches Lord Hastings had permitted him

and by the virulence with which he urges them against me. It is true, that he has with a clumsy solemnity, staked his public reputation, on the purity of his motives; but in doing so, he has overlooked what others cannot fail to perceive: namely, the *deep personal interest he must have in establishing the charges he has preferred; for if I be innocent, then Mr. Hume is guilty*—guilty of the serious offence of repeating accusations, alike the most grave and the most trivial, against his fellowman, upon evidence which has been twice weighed by Parliament, and twice rejected.

I am desirous, however, of avoiding Mr. Hume's acrimony of expression. I am not unwilling to give him credit, for being ignorant of the real motives which actuate him; and I am inclined to plead in his favour, *that pertinacity of will*, which is too often the misfortune, and not the fault, of advanced age.

I propose referring in the notes to the sources for procuring complete information, on the various subjects under discussion; and in refutation of the first charge of the massacre of innocent people, I shall content myself with an array of the positive testimonies, to establish the piratical character of the Sarebas community, and the specific acts of piracy committed by it.*

* Papers presented to the House of Commons relating to Piracy; Foreign Office, 5th Feb., April, 11th June, 15th

1. Mahomed Kassim—Piracy thirty years ago.
2. Mr. Windsor Earl, 1836.
3. Monsieur Cornet de Groot, 1839—Secretary-General to the Netherland Colonial Minister.
4. Sir James Brooke, 1839, 1840.
5. Captain Keppel, 1843, 1844.
6. The Rajah Muda Hassim, 1843, 1844.
7. Mr. Church, 1843—Resident Councillor of Singapore.
8. Tay Song Que—Commander of a Chinese vessel.
9. Colonel Butterworth, 1844 — Governor of Singapore.
10. Dawich } Commanders of Prahus from the
11. Mahdout } N.W. coast of Borneo.
12. Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane.
13. The Sultan of Borneo } Subsequently to the
14. The Pangeron Makota } action of 1849.
15. Mr. Louis Jackson—Civil Service of Bengal, 1849.

August.—Notices Historiques sur les Pirateries, 1816 to 1845—Presented to both Houses of Parliament, July 1851—Additional Papers respecting the operations against the Pirates, presented to both Houses, 1851—Borneo Piracy: Further Correspondence, presented to the House of Commons, 30th June, 1852—In continuation of Papers presented 23rd March, 1852—Colonial Office: No. 378, 6th June, 1851—Admiralty: presented to the House of Commons, 11th Feb. No. 53; 15th April, No. 239—Vide Note signed D. B. Woolsey, 1851; 15th November; 16th November, 1852—Hansard's Reports, 10th July, 1851—Edinburgh Review, July, 1852—"Visit to the Indian Archipelago," by Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel, R.N. Chap. 9 to 14.

16. Mr. Urban Vigors, 1852.
17. Siup—captured after the action.
18. Abang Bit } Sarebas Men.
19. Abang Buyong }
20. Asin—A Chinese formerly of Sambas.*
21. The decision of the Court of Admiralty in Singapore.†

To this list, I may add, that in 1850 I received the approval of her Majesty's Ministers, with instructions from Lord Palmerston, to repeat the same measure when it should again become necessary.‡

I need scarcely tell Mr. Hume, that *a fact cannot be more than proved*, and if this fact be not established, there has not been, nor can there ever be, an established fact in the world.

On the second charge, of the unnecessary sacrifice of life, I reply:

That there is no testimony whatever in support of it; as Mr. Urban Vigors, who was formerly asserted to be an evidence in its favour, has now stated as follows: "No man (writes this gentle-"man), can entertain a greater horror of unneces-"sary bloodshed than I do; and yet, I do not for

* The Parliamentary Papers will furnish more depositions than are here noticed.

† If the decision of a Court of Justice on a simple matter of fact is not conclusive, where is the safety of the subject? where the right of property to be insured?

‡ Parliamentary Papers: F. O. Moved for, but not yet presented to the House of Commons, 1853.

were at liberty to exercise a discretion as to "the extent of the provision to be made for the support of the family and the principal officers of the two Nabobs, Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah."

This "discretion," they quickly did exercise. On the 29th Sept. 1801, Lord Clive fixed by a Minute of Council the amount of the pecuniary provision (which had to be provided under the ninth article of the Treaty of 31st July 1801) at rupees 6,98,473, or star pagodas 1,99,564. Thus was at once acquired for the Company a profit of star pagodas 13,857 on the Jaghires which, though granted in fee simple, the Company assumed: a proceeding, at which Lord Cornwallis's noble nature would have blushed. And this sum of rupees 6,98,473, (or about £70,000) had to be divided amongst men, who, in addition to these hereditary Jaghires, had enjoyed all the high offices of the Native Court which was extinguished, and to whom all other similar channels of employment were now closed. It had too to be divided amongst families accustomed to the comforts and luxuries of civilized life. It was not therefore a very magnificent fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the Treaty. But at all events it was then deemed a certainty and a permanence; and in that there was some comfort.

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and his personal faults, Baji Row was, however, nobly treated by Lord Hastings; he settled £100,000 a year on the ex-Peishwa, allowed him to choose his own residence, to exercise jurisdiction over his followers and guards, and permitted him to carry away camel loads of his treasures. So that for the thirty years he survived his loss of power, Baji Row had at least all the wealth and splendour of a prince, and was able to quiet his fears of the other world by the largeness of his offerings to Hindoo shrines and holy places in this.

From his camp fled the heir of the rightful Mahratta Princes, Pertaub Shean, the head of all the Mahrattas. What to do with him became at once a great question. Lord Hastings left it to Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone to give him either a large estate or a small principality. "At the time I had to decide," Mr. Ephinstone afterwards wrote to Lord Hastings, "the Mahrattas showed no disposition whatever to quit the Peishwa's standard, and it appeared not improbable that the dread of the complete extinction of their national independence, and, still more, of the entire loss of their means of subsistence, would induce them to adhere to Baji Row, that could never have been produced by affection to his person or interest in his cause." Therefore, for British interests, did Mr. Elphinstone carve out the little state of Sattarah, and over it make Pertaub Shean Rajah. Taught wisdom in his misfortunes, that Prince in his prosperity governed Sattarah so admirably, that to testify their sense of his government and his fidelity, the Court of Directors presented him with a sword of honour. After an admirable reign of nearly twenty years he became the victim of Brahminical intrigues and of British credulity; and on the ground of imputed intrigues which, if real, would have been ridiculous and contemptible, it was resolved in 1839 to unmake the Rajah whom we had made in 1819.

Beloved and honoured by his people, the Rajah could have made a strong resistance; and as any disturbances in India, at that particular juncture, when the Government had rushed into the Affghan war, might have proved infectious, the Resident was directed by the Bombay Government to inform the Rajah, "that all property belonging to him, bonâ fide,

private, and not appertaining to the State, would, on his peaceable submission, not be interfered with." Thrice was this offer repeated to the Rajah and afterwards reduced to, and confirmed in, writing. He accepted it; peaceably submitted, surrendered all his property, public and private, into the hands of the Resident, left for Benares with only the jewels his two wives happened to wear at the time, regulating his suite, however, according to the large means he had thus secured.

Pertaub Shean was not a penniless Prince when the Company thus found and used him for its own purposes. Though holding them captives, the Peishwa had always respected the private landed estates of the House of Sevajee, and these he possessed when raised to the Raj. Following Mr. Elphinstone's good advice, he separated as a ruling Prince his public from his private treasury, and throughout his reign kept each quite distinct, and managed them by different officers. As in public, so in private affairs, he was prudent and economical; like our own most gracious Sovereign, he invested his personal savings principally in the purchase of land, bought his Osbornes and his Balmorals, and in the course of twenty years had added largely to his territorial property; he had also considerable wealth in jewels and other personalty, as well as a large sum in ready money, the value of the whole not being less than £300,000.

Relying on the promise that all this property would not be interfered with, he allowed not fewer than 1,200 attached friends and dependents to follow him into exile and confinement at Benares. But from the hour he left Sattarah to the day of his death, not one rupee was the Rajah permitted to receive from this guaranteed source. Every thing he left behind—jaghires, villages, houses, farms, gardens, jewels, money, clothes, all—were confiscated. In vain he demanded their restoration; in vain he quoted and appealed to the promise made to him,—in vain he prayed for justice. His complaints were unheeded; his supplications were turned aside. Baji Row, the Rajah's usurping minister, was surrounded in his exile by the riches Lord Hastings had permitted him

to carry away from Poonah. Pertaub Shean, the rightful Prince, was denied in his confinement the use of his own property. Wealth was showered on the usurper, who had resisted to the uttermost. Poverty was the doom of the legitimate heir, who had submitted in peace.

At Benares the deposed Rajah had, of course, an allowance, but so small in amount, that it proved wholly insufficient for the reasonable maintenance of his family. In consequence, the Prince was obliged to submit to great personal discomfort and deep humiliation; he continued throughout the remnant of his days to be hampered and embarrassed by debts and liabilities; and at last he died deeply involved, leaving his wives, his adopted son, and five hundred followers in the greatest poverty. So that by his deposition and the subsequent annexation of Sattarah has the Company's Government gained a territory, yielding a large public revenue (less, however, than the cost of its administration); but in violation of the most solemn promises, the Company confiscated £300,000 of this unhappy man's private fortune. And when lately appealed to by nine Proprietors of India Stock, on behalf of the creditors and the family of Pertaub Shean, all the answer those gentlemen—Mr. Hume at their head—got from the Directors was, that "the Court of Directors cannot consent to re-open a question long since decided." And for this wrong, also, there is no remedy.

HOW THE COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT TREATS NATIVE MERCHANTS.

When Mahomedan intolerance drove the last remnant of the old Fire Worshippers, or Parsees, from Persia, they found a home in Guzerat, where they soon became eminent in agricultural and commercial pursuits. Whilst Surat remained, under native rule, a great and flourishing city,

containing some 400,000 inhabitants, they were foremost amongst its merchants and bankers. On its decay and depopulation, under British dominion, they enriched, by transferring their enterprise and their capital to, Bombay; and there Parsee mercantile houses have continued to possess the greater part of the home, and no small share of the foreign trade.

Prominent amongst them was the family of Merjee; it consisted of two brothers, Pestonjee Merjee and Viccajee Merjee, trading under the designation of Pestonjee Viccajee. From small beginnings this firm rose to great importance; until the partners not only possessed the confidence, but were also employed by the Bombay Government. As far back as 1817, they were entrusted by Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone with the fiscal management of a great part of the Northern Konkan, then just conquered from the Peishwa. During our war with that Prince, they advanced large sums for the payment of our troops, and in this connexion won praises from all the British authorities. Throughout a great portion of our new acquisitions they constructed at their own expense bungalows for travellers; in Candeish they cleared a great jungle; in most of the new British towns they established banking establishments; but especially they devoted their attention to promote and increase the growth, cultivation and trade in cotton. In this enterprise, they opened up roads in that portion of Berar which belongs to the Nizam, supplied the peasantry with capital, furnished them with means of carriage, erected screws and presses; and with such effect, that between the years 1825 and 1836, they increased the production of Berar cotton from 120,000 lbs., worth £2,500, to 48,000,000 lbs. of the value of £600,000. The firm of Pestonjee Viccajee was, therefore, it will be seen, no ordinary commercial establishment; it had achieved great public results, and deserved well of the Company's Government, whose subjects its members were.

In prosecution of their cotton trade, Pestonjee Merjee went in 1835 to Hyderabad, the capital of the Deccan, carrying with him letters of recommendation from the Bombay Go-

vernment to the Resident at the Nizam's court; and there, in the British town which surrounds the Residency, he established himself. Actively engaged in promoting the cultivation of the Berar districts, the Nizam's Government availed itself of his abilities. It forced on the house the management of the revenue affairs of nearly the whole valley of Berar; and under their just and protecting influence, waste lands were brought under culture, the growth of cotton was still further extended, the revenues were regularly paid, and the condition of the country greatly improved. As was to be expected, the Native Government got gradually into the debt of Pestonjee Viccajee; still down to 1838, the account was not (in comparison with future advances) largely overdrawn; the balance against the Nizam being only £56,000.

In that year the Affghan war—the origin of so many ills and woes—was declared; and its enormous demands on the Indian Treasuries pressed heavily on the pecuniary means of the Company. Under the Treaty of 1802, (concluded after the destruction of Tippoo Sultan) the Nizam was obliged to keep up a contingent of 9,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry for the use of the British Government. This force is,* substantially, part of the British army, disciplined in the same manner, commanded by British officers, paid through the British Resident. Of so little use is it to the Nizam, that to carry on the internal administration of his country, he is obliged to maintain a great army of Rohillas, Arabs, Affghans, and Sikhs of his own. Now in 1838, that prince had not sufficient available funds to keep up the pay of the contingent, which takes one-fifth of his whole revenue, without being of any service to him; and the Company, with the Affghan war to provide for, had, of course, no money to spare.

In this dilemma the firm of Pestonjee Viccajee was requested, with the full knowledge and approbation of the Resident, by the Nizam's Government, to stand between it and the British authorities. They did: they supplied funds to pay the Contingent, and by doing so, saved the Deccan from disorders, and the Company from embarrassment in Southern

* See *India Reform, No. IV. The Native States of India, pp.* 10 *and* 11.

India. The advances, once began, continued. The firm drew bills on their correspondents where the different brigades were stationed; these bills were handed by the Nizam's minister to the British officer in command; and by him, their proceeds were applied in payment of the Contingent. The amount so advanced had by June, 1843, reached the enormous sum of £687,000. Much of it was supplied to Pestonjee Viccajee by friends and correspondents who confided in them; and in 1841 the firm, urged by their creditors, very properly requested, as English bankers under the circumstances would long before have done, the Nizam's Government to give them a tangible security for these and future advances. The request was complied with: a mortgage of part of the Berar revenues was made to them; it was delivered to the British Resident; he placed it on the records of the Residency, and gave Pestonjee Viccajee an authenticated copy; for, (to use his own words), "the satisfaction of their creditors." The Resident was consequently a party to this mortgage; he retained the deed, avouched its sufficiency, and in effect, if not in form, guaranteed the transaction.

In 1845, though the debt had, by their excellent management of the mortgaged districts, been then reduced to some £300,000, Pestonjee Viccajee became desirous of drawing the account to a close, and resolved to make no further advances. This determination gave great umbrage to the Nizam's government, which was thus thrown on its own resources to provide directly and regularly, for the Contingent's pay. Nevertheless, applied to by the Nizam for a personal loan, they accommodated him. Scarcely, however, had they done so, when the possession of the mortgaged districts was demanded from them; and, that being refused, their agents and people were expelled by force, sixteen of them being killed and fifteen more wounded.

Against this injustice Pestonjee Viccajee appealed to the Resident. General Fraser forwarded the appeal to the Supreme Government; but, though the Company had in reality been the recipient of the sums advanced; and though its representative had officially registered and recognized the

mortgage, the Supreme Government, without assigning any reason, refused to interfere. The consequence was, that in 1848, this great House was obliged to stop payment, receiving, however, the utmost sympathy and consideration from its creditors. From that time Pestonjee Viccajee continued to prosecute their claims both at Hyderabad and at Calcutta; with no success, however. The Nizam's Government would not pay the settled and admitted balance of £260,000; and the Supreme Government, which had received the money and which was the only power to enforce justice, would not condescend to listen to their subjects' entreaties and reclamations.

In March 1851, the agents of the House sought in England the justice denied them in India. They waited on Mr. Herries, then President of the Board of Control, and on the Chairman, the Deputy-Chairman, and others of the East India Directors. At these interviews their claim was fully recognized, the utmost sympathy was expressed for their painful situation, and the impression produced was that their case would receive support. At last came the official reply to their Memorial; it simply stated that "the instructions of the Court would be communicated through the Governor of India." The agents again privately appealed to the Home authorities; were assured that letters would be written both by the President of the India Board and the Chairman of the Court of Directors to the Governor-General of India, in their favour, and that with the result they would have reason to be satisfied.

Thus inspired with hope, they hastened to Calcutta, there to receive this favourable answer. Instead of it, the Court of Directors had instructed the Governor-General, "not to interfere for the realization of any such claims!" By these instructions, Lord Dalhousie was of course bound. He, however, was equally full of verbal professions; he received the agents, voluntarily stated that he had no prejudice against them, and assured them that if he were to receive instructions from the Court of Directors, he would be ready to obey. So, again,

a second time, the agents (sons of Pestonjee and Viccajee) have come to England in search of justice.

In 1848, a single peremptory word from the British Resident at Hyderabad would have saved Pestonjee Viccajee from this ruin. That word was not uttered: they were allowed to be wrongfully ousted from the mortgages of which they were in lawful possession. For six years they appealed in vain for assistance and help in the recovery of their acknowledged claim from the Supreme Government. Then they extend their pursuit of justice to England. Here they are encouraged to expect it on a return to Calcutta. And there they find, instead of the promised support, the stereotyped refusal to enforce what is right, and remedy what is wrong.

Motives for the refusal to act, in 1845, it is needless to impute. But this is clear, that so long as Pestonjee Viccajee would supply funds to pay the Contingent, they were kept in possession of the districts: immediately they ceased their advances, they were allowed to be ejected. And this is how the Company's Government treats native merchants. The House of Pestonjee Viccajee was rich, almost "beyond the bounds of human avarice;"—its aged partners are now about to be turned out penniless on the streets of Bombay. Who is to blame? Can any one doubt that it is the Company's Government? Yet for the recovery of this debt, for the satisfaction of this wrong, the law has provided no remedy.

HOW THE COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT BEHAVES TO OLD ALLIES.

Coorg, nearly opposite Baicul and not far from Tellicherry, is, or rather was, a little Principality, perched on the range of mountains that look down upon Malabar and the western coast of India. Towards the close of the 18th century, it became a country of very considerable political importance; for it

alone, of its neighbours, maintained its complete independence against the victorious career of Hyder Ally, and from its position greatly impeded and obstructed his ambitious designs. A pass connecting the Coast Provinces with Mysore, runs through the Coorg Hills; and so long as this pass was in the possession of an adverse Prince and a brave independent people, Mysore might become assailable from the East India Company's Western Capital, Bombay. Hence Hyder and his still more implacable son, bent every effort to conquer Coorg; at times they were nearly successful; once they had captured and imprisoned the Rajah; but fortune more or less protected him, until Tippoo brought down on himself the just anger and the irresistible arms of Lord Cornwallis.

Of the Rajahs of Coorg, before they had thus acquired the enmity and persecution of Hyder Ally and Tippoo little is known, except that they had, for centuries, ruled over a brave mountainous people, whose attachment and fidelity to their sovereigns became conspicuous when those successful Mahomedan usurpers of Mysore attacked their little State. It was however against desperate odds that the Rajah of Coorg resisted assaults, in which religious fanaticism against a Hindoo Prince, joined with a strong desire to possess a country so important to the safety and defence of Mysore, redoubled the animosity against Coorg independence; and severe were the sufferings both of the Rajah and his people in their gallant and determined resistance. Their sovereign's cruel imprisonment at Seringapatam did not abate the ardour of his subjects; the mountaineers held out firmly and heroically, even when the Rajah was in their oppressor's hands; and the commencement of Lord Cornwallis' war against Tippoo found the Rajah still in possession of the greater part of his own country. He at once risked all the dangers of Tippoo's success, and boldly volunteered co-operation with the British. It was then—26th October, 1790—our first Treaty with Coorg was signed; and in it both parties "jointly call God, the Sun, the Moon, and the World" "to witness that pledge of their perpetual friendship." The Rajah entered heartily into the war; not only did he allow the Bombay army to pass through

his dominions, but, when distressed for provisions, he supplied it with grain and cattle, refusing all pecuniary compensation. He joined Lord Cornwallis before Seringapatam, shared in all the dangers of the campaign, was foremost in every fight, and almost worshipped the British soldiers for their indomitable courage in those desperate encounters. The preliminary articles of peace were nearly concluded when Tippoo's desire to reck his vengeance on the Rajah risked everything; Lord Cornwallis insisted on Tippoo recognising the complete independence of Coorg, for he was resolved to protect so faithful and useful an Ally. Irritated almost to madness by being thus disappointed of vengeance, Tippoo refused; and it was only when Lord Cornwallis had again pointed his guns against Seringapatam, that his obstinacy gave way. Grateful for these services, Lord Cornwallis undertook never to interfere in the internal affairs of Coorg, and commuted a large money payment, insisted on by the Bombay authorities, for an elephant which the Rajah was yearly to present to the East India Company.

Equally faithful to the English alliance, and equally useful in the campaign, was the Rajah of Coorg in our second and final war with Tippoo; and it is not too much to say that without his energetic co-operation, the Bombay army could not have reached Seringapatam in 1799. "The Rajah of Coorg," wrote Lord Wellesley, in 1799, "has seconded my views and the exertions of the Company's servants on this occasion, with a degree of spirit, energy, and fidelity, which confirm the high character he had justly obtained in the late war." He and his brother and successor were in fact our firm and steadfast friends—when their friendship was of value; and with their throne the son of the latter Prince inherited their feelings and policy.

In so remote and difficult a country as Coorg this youthful Rajah had but little intercourse with Europeans; his life was passed principally in its field and hill sports; and over subjects bold and hardy he ruled with all the fire and spirit of a mountain chief. Of what went on internally the British Au-

thorities outside knew little; but a succession of disputes occurred between the Rajah and the Resident of Mysore, in which the Prince spoke and wrote with a courage and fearlessness to which Residents in India are but little accustomed. The origin of these disputes was the marriage of one of the Rajah's sisters with a man of an inferior position. On the death of this man's first wife, to save the family from the supposed humiliation of his contracting an inferior marriage, a second sister was given him, and he was handsomely supported at the Rajah's expence. Dissatisfied, however, with his want of power, he committed a most barbarous murder, fled towards Mysore; and on the frontiers cut down two of the Coorg people who attempted to prevent his escape. In Mysore, unfortunately, he was received and protected by the British authorities, and into their ears he instilled the vilest calumnies against the Rajah. That Prince demanded the extradition of the murderer; the demand, being refused, was repeated more vehemently. Discussion with the Madras Government followed; it proposed to send a Commissioner to Coorg to arrange the dispute; but the Commissioner appointed never reached its capital, Macara. One of his native suite, however, did; and was instantly arrested by the Rajah, who refused to surrender him unless his brother-in-law was first given up. To this request the British Government would not listen, and from it the Rajah would not recede. So in the beginning of 1834 a Proclamation was issued deposing the Rajah, and an army advanced into Coorg to carry out the Proclamation. This was done, though not without some little difficulty; in April 1834 the Rajah surrendered; all his treasures were seized, Coorg was annexed, and after some little delay he and his family were sent state prisoners to Benares.

At Benares the Rajah was at first placed upon a most inadequate allowance, but, on the representation of Colonel Carpenter, the British officer in charge of him, it was increased to £6,000 a-year; the Government of India having, of course, by his deposition, gained the whole revenues of Coorg. At Benares the Rajah supported his exile with dignity and firmness; for fourteen years he and his family

were in charge of Colonel Carpenter; and the result of their intercourse has been thus authoritatively recorded by that distinguished officer:

"*Minute recorded by Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter, Agent to the Governor-General of India, Benares, 1st January, 1848.*

"The period for my departure from Benares and return to Europe having arrived, I cannot part with his Highness the Rajah of Coorg, without giving him a testimonial of the sentiments with which he has inspired me.

"Since the Rajah quitted his palace at Coorg, in April, 1834, he has been under my charge, and I have infinite satisfaction in recording the quiet, peaceable, and exemplary behaviour of His Highness during the long period of nearly fourteen years that I have been a constant observer of his conduct, and which has been several times favourably noticed in my various reports to the Supreme Government.

"I am aware that *subsequent to the Rajah's deposal* numerous charges of cruelty and oppression, whilst he reigned in Coorg, have been brought against him; but I am bound in justice to declare, that during the whole time he has been under my care, no evidence of a cruel disposition has ever been exhibited; on the contrary, his manners and habits are mild and gentle in the extreme, and he has invariably won the regard and esteem of all parties with whom he came in contact since he quitted Coorg. Unfortunately, previous to that event, he had never seen more than half a dozen European officers in his life. The Rajah is a perfect specimen of an innate gentleman, though naturally reserved and shy, so that it becomes necessary to know him well to appreciate his many good and amiable qualities: he is particularly susceptible of attention and kindness.

"In conclusion, I earnestly recommend him and his family to consideration, and heartily and sincerely bid him farewell, with my best and warmest wishes that comfort and happiness may attend them in every situation, and under all circumstances. The Rajah's numerous children are especial objects of care and anxiety to him, owing to the extreme difficulty of providing for their future welfare, more particularly the little girl he is in the habit of dressing in the European style. Any kindness to her is peculiarly gratifying to the Rajah, and he is very desirous that she shall be educated and brought up as if she was an European: whatever arrangements he may wish

to make for the future provision of the child, will, I trust, receive the assistance and support of my successor, as far as it may be in his power to grant it."

In time the Rajah himself not only professed Christianity, but resolved to bring up his favourite daughter —the child thus referred to by Colonel Carpenter—in the faith and nurture of England. With this view, as also to prosecute claims about to be explained, he solicited and obtained permission from the Supreme Government of India to visit this country for twelve months; and, accompanied by the young lady, and a proper suite, he arrived in London in the beginning of 1852. On his arrival here, he unexpectedly found his chief design encouraged and promoted in the highest quarters. The Queen graciously condescended to become sponsor for the child; assigned her guardianship and education to a lady of rank and eminent fitness; and in due course of time the little girl was separated from the Rajah, for the purpose—to use his own language—of being "brought up with English habits and notions." Thus parted from his little favourite, the Rajah's attachment for her seems to have increased, and in dread of the approaching permanent separation, he requested an extension of his leave of absence from Benares. This request the Court stiffly and curtly refused.* The Rajah renewed his application with still greater warmth; first, on the ground of his unwillingness to leave his child, about whose position he laboured under some degree of uncertainty, and also for the purpose of arranging, if possible, his private affairs.

"My natural feelings as a father," he wrote to the Secretary of the East India Company, on the 17th January, 1853, "towards my daughter, lately become a Christian, whom I must leave behind me in England, when I return to India, induce me to wish to prolong my stay for a time, as the separation, when it takes place between me and my child will be, in all human probability, a separation for ever. And, although I would not give way to any anxiety on the subject of my daughter's future comfort and happiness, when Her

* *Secretary of the East India Company to the ex-Rajah of Coorg, 24th Dec.* 1852.

Majesty has so graciously condescended to care for both her spiritual and temporal concerns—for which I feel, and shall ever feel, most grateful—yet I may permit myself to indulge in some sorrow at the near prospect of taking leave of her.

"My visit to England was determined upon in order to bring my daughter to be baptized, educated in the Christian faith, and brought up with English habits and English notions; and was projected by me solely with the view of gratifying this, the earnest desire of my heart, without having any reason to hope for any distinguished patronage for myself or child. The spontaneous act of condescension on the part of Her Most Gracious Majesty was necessarily unlooked for by me, and was of a character to call forth, as it did, both my surprise and my gratitude. I do, therefore, earnestly desire to remain some time longer in the same country where my child is, and where I can still see her."

In this tender appeal to their sympathies, the Court however, could* "see no sufficient ground for any extension of leave of absence," and insisted that the afflicted father should "no longer delay to procure a passage to India." Becoming, however, more and more dissatisfied with the conduct of those in whose charge his daughter was placed, the Rajah did not obey this order to return to Benares, and the consequence is, that the Court of Directors have, at last, resolved to stop payment of his allowance—or, in other words, to starve both him here and his family at Benares, into compliance.

But for the Rajah's wish to remain longer in England, there is another and a more serious reason. The allowance he now receives from the Government of India may, we see, be stopped or diminished, whenever it pleases the Governor-General or the Court of Directors. Now, before her Majesty would assume the responsibility of the young Princess' education, it became, and very properly, necessary to provide a fund to defray its cost, and for the young lady's subsequent maintenance in England. The Rajah thereupon bound himself by deed with trustees—Lord Hardinge and Sir J. W. Hogg—to pay £400 a year on her account. Before leaving her, he is, however, desirous of securing this annuity to his child

* *The Secretary to the ex-Rajah, Feb.* 10, 1853.

for her own life, and not merely for such a length of time as he may live, or may possess his present allowance from the Government of India. He therefore, seeks to remain until he can give the Queen this additional guarantee for his daughter's independent support. But this he can only do by a settlement of his own pecuniary affairs; and these require some explanation to comprehend the full gravity of the conduct of the Court of Directors.

The uncle and father of the Prince now in London, were both prudent and economical Sovereigns; and so well did they rule their mountainous principality, that they were able to invest not less, we believe, than nearly ten lacs of rupees (or about £100,000) in the Company's Funds, all of which the Rajah inherited; receiving, through his Commercial Agents at Madras, the dividends thereon, regularly to the period when the disputes already referred to commenced.

The pecuniary claims of the Rajah are two—one derived from his father, the other from his uncle, the prior Rajah. His father, Rajah Ling Rajundur Wadeer, invested a large sum of money in the Madras 5 per cent loan, and on that Prince's death, the present Rajah inherited it, and received the dividends down to 1831, when it was converted into the Company's 4 per cent paper in his own name. His uncle had also invested a much larger sum in his only child, a daughter's name; but, on it, the dividends were paid first to his brother Rajah Ling, and then to his nephew the ex-Rajah, who, by his cousin's death unmarried, became her heir also. The dividends on both these sums continued to be paid to the ex-Rajah until the commencement of the disputes with the British authorities. Then their payment was suspended; and, after the unhappy Prince's deposition, it was absolutely refused. A prisoner and exile at Benares, dependent on the bounty of the Indian Government, the ex-Rajah was not, of course, in a position favourable to the prosecution of his claims; he made, however, several representations on the subject, but though he stands in their own books as a public creditor, to the extent of upwards of £90,000, he was informed the Indian Government did not recognise their liability to pay

their debts in his case; and from 1832 to 1853, this portion of their public debt has, in point of fact, been repudiated. Before leaving Benares the Rajah, however, informed the Governor-General that he would take active measures to bring the subject before the Home authorities; but here they refuse to listen to his case, and refer him back to India, where they will not "recognise" it.

The Rajah has a large family and being, as Colonel Carpenter states, a man of strong paternal affection, he desires to leave them a competence. For means to do so he has naturally turned to his private property vested in the territorial debt of India. There he stands as a public creditor; but from a period commencing two years' previous to his deposition, and while he was a reigning Prince and their Ally, down to this hour, the Indian Government have repudiated payment of the dividends thereon; and though for nineteen years he has addressed reclamation after reclamation against this injustice, his petitions, he says, "*have only been passed over in silence.*" He now asks the Court of Directors to restore this property to him, that he may make a permanent settlement on the Queen's *protegee*, and provide for his other children at Benares. And the Court refer him to that Local Government by which, for these nineteen years, his letters have remained unanswered!

Upon such conduct, the worst that can be said is, that it wants the boldness, the straightforwardness, and the formal honesty of Louis Napoleon in confiscating the Orleans property. The Indian Government deprive the unhappy Prince of the dividends on private savings invested in the Company's funds, and refuse him all explanation of this act of arbitrary power; and when he appeals to the Home Government, they will not listen to his complaint, because it is not transmitted through a Local Government that will not correspond with him on the subject! And for a Wrong like this, there is in our Indian System—in that "most absolute despotism," which, according to Lord John Russell, "is qualified and tempered by the genius of Representative Government"—no Remedy.

Note to Tract No. IV.

"THE NATIVE PRINCES OF INDIA."

In confirmation of the statement contained in this Tract as to the resumption proceedings of the British Authorities in Sattarah, we are now enabled to quote the following.

"Feb. 2, 1853.

"I have been informed from Bombay that the Company's Government have lately appointed an 'Enam Committee' to inquire into the tenure and nature of enams, [rent-free grants of land], jagheers, &c. Under this pretence the local authorities have extended their injustice in a measure which is not the less short of usurpation of the rights and enjoyments of private individuals, than the usurpation of sovereignties.

"The authorities have demanded the papers and sunnuds [grants], from all Enamdars [*rent-free holders*], jagheerdars, &c., upon which they hold and enjoy their enams [grants] and jagheers [estates]. The latter, however ready to produce their deeds, have been molested by an arbitrary search in their houses, in order to take away *all other papers, documents, &c.* appertaining to the Enam, or to whatever other matters there might be of private concern. To convince you of the fact, I will herein give you the instance of the shameful treatment met with by Khundeyrow and Rowbah at the hands of the authorities. Khundeyrow and Rowbah are in the possession and enjoyment of their Enam village, Boregaun. There they were called upon by the authorities to give up all the papers, records, documents, they may possess and lay them before the Enam Committee. This was an encroachment upon the concerns of private individuals, and, therefore, Khundeyrow and Rowbah of right remonstrated against the arbitrary demand, with the exception that they were ready to produce the Sunnuds and other documents appertaining to the same, by which they hold their Enams. Notwithstanding this offer, the authorities forcibly entered their houses, and took away to Poonah all the papers, records, &c. found therein, loaded in several carts. The ancient practice was to demand to see the sunnuds, take copies thereof, and return the originals to their holders. Among the papers were printed books and pamphlets which Rowbah had taken with him from Benares, and which related to the unfortunate case of His Highness the Rajah. In these books, there were copies or translations of certain papers which were proved to have been fabricated for the unjustifiable inculpation of his Highness. Upon this, the Mumlutdar [the paid local native authority], accused Khundeyrow and Rowbah of having kept papers in their houses relating to the transactions of Government, and even threatened to imprison them, which however the Mumlutdar did not do.

"This treatment of entering forcibly the houses of Enamdars, and searching and taking away all and every paper relating to whatever matters they may have, is not only suffered by Khundeyrow and

Rowbah, but by every Enamdar, in face of the integrity and paternal protection, avowed, of the British rule. If inquiry is to be made in respect to Enams only, nothing more could be wanted than a handful of papers including the sunnuds by which enams are held. If they are not produced, or if the right of holding the enams, is not established by the individuals, it is a matter of inquiry and investigation. But this arbitrary and unjustifiable treatment, as enforced by the Company's Government at present will no doubt teach the people to consider what they have to expect from the British rule.

" This is the case with those who hold sunnuds and other documents to prove the grant of the enams. But you must be well aware that there are several Zemindars, Enamdars, and Hukdars, [owners of dues], as well as Bara Bullottee, [the municipal village officers], who enjoy their rights, however trifling they may be, for one, two, and three hundred years, and who know very little of sunnuds or documents; or perhaps they may have lost them. These individuals are told they will be allowed to enjoy their Enams or rights, provided they produce their sunnuds; if not, such Enams will be seized, or permitted only for their lives. What would you think the condition of the people must be under this rule? Instead of confiding in the British Government for protection, such treatment must lead the people to open their eyes, and the result is not known at this time. The Company's Government, instead of giving protection, itself becomes the usurper of individual rights and property."

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INDIA REFORM.

No. VIII.

PUBLIC WORKS.



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I.

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II.

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III.

NOTES ON INDIA. BY DR. BUIST, OF BOMBAY.

IV.

THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA.

V.

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IX.

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X.

NATURE OF THE INDIA QUESTION, AND OF THE EVIDENCE UPON IT.

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INDIA REFORM.

PUBLIC WORKS.

If the twenty years just expired had produced no other results in India than to show that under the despotic rule of civilised conquerors, the material improvement of that country has decreased and fallen far below the level which it held under ruder governors, they would deserve to rank as an era of disgrace and shame in the annals of the nineteenth century.

We know from history and the testimony of eye-witnesses, that India before our conquest was traversed in all directions by works of irrigation and canalization. The productions of the soil, fostered by those artificial improvements, had a continual increase, the surplus of which was enabled to find a market at a distance. A broad and comprehensive system of intercommunication favoured the progress of internal trade. By stimulating agriculture and enriching the people, it enabled them to bear taxation. External commerce profited by the opening, and naturally produced interchange. Under British rule, the broad thoroughfares which stretched over India were permitted to decay. Trade diminished—where there were roads, they were effectually closed by transit duties and internal customs regulations. The productions of the country gradually decreased—works of irrigation and canalization, instead of being a source of revenue, became a drain upon the purse of those who could no longer find a profitable market for their produce. They fell into disuse, and thus the territories of India—which in

almost the whole of their extent might be made as fertile as Lower Egypt—offered to the world the spectacle of a country without roads, in most parts lying waste, giving feeble sustenance to a population that daily sinks into a lower state of physical degradation. Were the object of the present government of India to cripple instead of foster the productive powers of the country under its charge, it could not have acted with more method or foresight than by neglecting to give the people the means of extended intercommunication, increased trade, and material improvement.

When Turgot was appointed superintendent to the poorest province in the kingdom of France (Limoges), he found it surrounded by barriers which impeded the natural interchange of commodities with neighbouring departments. The roads within had fallen into disrepair; the poor, no longer able to bear taxation, were ripe for revolution. Turgot opened the custom-houses, made the roads, and in the course of a few years the poorest province in France became the happiest and most contented, and for a moment the richest. Promoted to the highest power in the state, Turgot endeavoured to extend throughout the kingdom the benefits which he had so happily imparted to a single province. He failed, and France was overturned by the revolution. India no longer groans under the system of internal customs; transit duties have at length been abolished, but there are no roads—no works of irrigation, no bridges in number or importance commensurate with the immensity of the territory which is under our sway, or the number of the people which inhabit it. It is high time that a change should be made ere a catastrophe is unavoidable.

That India in the olden time was covered with works of public utility is matter of notoriety. There were numerous roads planted with trees along their sides for many miles throughout the whole of Hindostan*—the works of ancient Mahommedan emperors, who, if they did not sanction or encourage foreign commerce with the same vigour as Christian rulers, were fully alive to the advantages of internal traffic.

* Briggs, Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 146.

Their system of amelioration was also vastly broader than ours; for irrigation—an important part of the process of agriculture in India—and the most ancient mode of increasing the fertility of the country,* "was so rigidly attended to, that the fees for wells and artificial reservoirs were always deducted from the produce of every village before the government claim was paid." Throughout the whole of Central and South India especially, these works existed in vast numbers. "From Ganjam to Cape Comorin the most extraordinary remains of tanks are found that it is possible to conceive; the native governments carrying their operations upon that point so far as to divert whole streams like the Vyjahaur into one or more reservoirs."† In Candeish, where fertile cotton ground exists, and along the banks of the river Taptee, these works to an almost unexampled extent are traceable, but have nearly disappeared or fallen into disuse.‡ The Delta of the Godavery is covered with such ruins, and generally throughout Madras one-fifth alone of the ancient fertilising works are now in use,§ though that province is dependent more than any other on the benefits of irrigation, which, where they are extended, have never failed to produce increased revenue. Indeed, the richness and productiveness of land from the slightest measure of improvement is evident to the commonest understanding. Nor can we give a stronger instance than that which is exhibited in the countries on both banks of the Tomboodra, where the richness and fertility which they present, being solely the effect of the noble works constructed by the ancient Hindoo princes, may, when contrasted with the unprotected borders of the same river where such works are not in action, be adduced as a practical illustration of what is to be expected from the embankment of streams and other works of irrigation.‖

Unable to preserve, the East India Company has failed as signally in creating or producing fresh improvements. The roads, avenues, and caravanserais, now scarcely traceable; the tanks and reservoirs, left to perish, have been most imperfectly, or in

* Brown, Ev. Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 270. † Brown, *Ibid.*, p. 270.
‡ Giberne, *Ibid.*, p. 209. § Madras Petition to Parliament.
‖ Memorial of Bombay merchants, 1850.

nowise replaced by newer works; and everywhere the presence of a ruin tells the tale of ancient splendour and modern weakness.

That these are not the vain assertions of captious opposition is proved by the admission of all the friends of those who now endeavour to perpetuate abuses. Does not Mr. Mangles, their strenuous supporter, admit "that the sums expended in physical improvements are disproportionately small; that they should be made much larger, and that the application of such increased amount to the improvement of communications and means of irrigation, whether annually out of revenue or by special loans, would probably become the most profitable of the Company's investments."* Does not he accuse the East India House of supineness, and convict it of neglect, when he "is quite ready to admit that the government of India has not done what he thinks might and ought to have been done in public works."

Is Mr. Marriott friendly to them when he says, "The duty of the government is to attend to making roads and irrigating land. They are practically both sovereign and landholders, and ought to expend a portion of the rent and a portion of the taxes."†

We might multiply examples of partisans of the Indian government shrinking from palliation of a system which tends to India's ruin; but need we further go than quote the author of a recent pamphlet, whose pride impels him to confess that "money has been spent on wars, and not on works."‡

In truth, it is of great advantage to get at these admissions, for were we forced to trust for information as to what the Company expends upon the various branches of establishment to the accounts which they deign to publish, we should seek in vain to give complete or lucid information.

The accounts of the East India Company are a sort of labyrinth from which it is not easy to find an exit. So disordered amongst others is the department to which has been entrusted the labours of making roads, canals, and works of irrigation, that it remains impossible to ascertain, after the most careful investi-

* Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 402. † *Ibid.*, p. 424.

‡ Prinsep, India Question, pp. 74—5.

gation that can be made, how much has actually been spent upon them since the renewal of their charter in 1834; nor are the sources elsewhere laid open for public information more trustworthy or complete. The maps of India which have recently been published, however much they may impose by their appearance upon observant eyes, are entirely unsafe to show the number and direction of those public ways by which, since 1834, the carriage transport of agricultural produce and of merchandise have, or ought to have, been rendered practicable; for most of them either do not exist at all, or are only serviceable under certain happy conditions of season and of weather.

But however confused and faulty the accounts and maps of the East India Company, we shall not fail to draw even from their discrepant and overcharged details the most powerful conclusions as to the supineness of the government, and expose the reckless and culpable mode in which they have conducted their affairs.

And first, let us endeavour to extract what has really been the outlay throughout the whole of India, upon public works; for the confusion in which these all-important facts are involved, has been made the means, and taken advantage of, in the Court of Proprietors within the walls of Parliament, and in two recent publications emanating from the India House, to magnify the total sum expended into one so large as will (so it is asserted) remove the stain of half a century's neglect of those mighty means, the speedy use of which alone can give a reasonable hope of the improvement of millions of our Asiatic subjects, on whose behalf a degree of interest has, at the eleventh hour, been awakened in this country never, it is hoped, again to slumber.

This attempt to overcharge the picture of Indian wealth and happiness will be found too flimsy to avert the public eye from the evils which lie beneath, and which, as early as 1830, elicited from Sir Robert Peel words which are still too true not to command attention:—

"On the commercial part of the question, I refrain from giving an opinion, whilst, on that which I admit to be the most important of all—the welfare of the people of India—I cannot too strongly urge the propriety of endeavouring, whilst keeping them

under British rule, to atone to them for the suffering they endured, and the wrongs to which they were subjected, in being reduced to that rule; and so afford them such advantages, and confer on them such benefits, as may in some degree console them for the loss of their independence."*

Here then are the figures from which we have to draw conclusions as to the present and past expenditure on public works in India. They are taken from three sources; firstly, the statements annually prepared at the India House, and printed by order of the House of Commons. Secondly, the statistical papers printed in 1853, for the Court of Directors; and thirdly, the Blue Book on public works in India, published in August, 1851, by order of the House of Commons:—

	£	s.	d.
It appears, from the first of these statements, that the outlay on public works, exclusive of repairs, was, for the fourteen years ending 1850—51, 277,11,516 rupees, averaging per annum	197,936	0	0
From the second statement,† that the expense incurred during the same fourteen years, for roads, bridges, embankments, canals, works of irrigation, tanks or wells, exclusive of superintendence, 380,24,631 rupees, averaging per annum	271,604	0	0
From the third,‡ that the whole outlay during ten years for works of all kinds in the civil department, but not corresponding ones, was 346,09,297 rupees, averaging per annum	346,092	0	0

Such glaring discrepancies in accounts, of which the whole were published by authority, suggest that a remedy should be found in future, by legislative enactment. Meanwhile, the very grave question naturally arises, under what head, in the annual amounts laid before Parliament, are debited these enormous differences, varying from 73,668*l.* to 148,000*l.* per annum on a gross calculation, thus vitiating not only these but a large portion of the remaining charges in those parliamentary statements. If mystification was the object, no more successful means could possibly be devised for its accomplishment. One great fact, however, remains without

* Speech of Sir R. Peel, Feb. 9, 1830. † P. 89. ‡ P. 208.

dispute, when we contemplate these figures. It is that inclusive of repairs and supervision the Indian treasury has actually expended on public works throughout the whole of its gigantic territories no greater sum than 346,092*l.* per annum up to 1848.

If now we seek to find what has been spent on supervision, we may obtain a slight idea of the actual disbursement on public works of every kind. But here the cleverness of the East India Company in publishing accounts might slightly baffle us, if we had not other means of approximating to what we seek; for in no single instance can we find it specified:—

First. What has been the expense incurred in superintendence.

Secondly. What on repairs.

Thirdly. What in sums, which are lost completely to the public, from the defects of the present system, involving, as we shall show, the utter incompetency of those to whom have been confided many costly and scientific works.

That the outlay under the first of these heads has been enormously great may be inferred from the review of its amount in the Presidencies of Bombay and Bengal, respecting which we are happy in discovering that the Company's own servants have recorded their opinions. In the report on public works in India,* above referred to, Sir George Clerk, then Governor of Bombay, thus records his intimate conviction of the value of the civil department of public works:—

"My objections to the continuance of the Road and Tank Department have been formed after much observation of its defects; these, among others, are inutility and costliness. These my objections, are insuperable, because founded on its enormous waste of public money during ten years, and on its entire disregard, during the whole period, of that important means of fertilising our territories, which was one of the two purposes for which ostensibly it was instituted, and which, it is quite evident, it has never been capable of applying."

"The expense of the department for superintendence was stated by the chief engineer, in 1844, to have been, for the nine years of existence, 72,792*l.* Within the same period, the total expenditure

* India Public Works, 1851, p. 149.

on tanks has been 4200*l.*, a great portion of which has been lost by the failure of the works. The value of the department was, therefore, to be sought only in the road branch of its services; in this the charge for superintendence had been about 50 per cent. on the work performed."

True it is that two statements of the expenditure for the years 1845 and 1846 are brought forward in the same book, to show that the charge for superintendence averaged only 23 per cent. for those years, but we have reason to know, that had the series for nine years laying on the same shelf of the India House been referred to in elucidation of this point, more than three times this amount would, in some instances, have met the eye.

That a disproportionate outlay, for superintendence, has been incurred at Bengal, is placed beyond a doubt. Again, referring to the report we have just quoted,* we find an entry as to the expenses of the Agra and Bombay road, which is as follows:—

AGRA AND BOMBAY ROAD.

	£	s.	d.
Before sanctioned	19,005	0	0
Add expenditure to Nov., 1847, as follows:—			
New work of Road	19,431	0	0
Superintendence	13,110	0	0
Repairs and contingencies	4,754	0	0
	37,295	0	0

Making for the cost of supervision, in this instance, 26 per cent.

From the above, and only data as yet placed before the public, on which to calculate the cost of superintendence, it would therefore seem under the most favourable review of the above expenditure, that 33 per cent. is the average amount in Bengal and Bombay. Taking it to be no higher in Madras than in the two other presidencies, we must extract 33 per cent., or one-third, for supervision, from the total expended on public works, which is thus reduced to 230,667*l.* per annum.

Considerable as is this item in the disbursement for public works, we are grieved to add that, in the review to which we shall now proceed, of what has been lost to the public from a defective

* India Public Works, p. 148.

system, involving the incompetency of those to whom the execution of so many of these works has been confided, the conviction is forced upon us, that a fearful addition to it has been so occasioned, in support of which may be quoted, from the Blue Book already referred to, the premature destruction of numerous bridges, owing to defective construction. Of the extent in other parts of India to which the public has suffered, from the like misappropriation of the fund set apart for public works, an opinion may be formed from the following extracts of a dispatch from the Court of Directors, under date, 1850, to the Government of India, the contents of which seem generally applicable to the whole of the territories under our charge.

"The letter," says the Court, "dated 3rd January, 1849, transmits a general report of the Board Department from its establishment to the 1st May, 1848, and the orders passed thereon by the government.

"The whole of the proceedings referred to in these letters lead to the following conclusions.

"The roads, in some instances, from want of previous survey, and other causes, have not been well planned with respect to the line, so that a road on a new line becomes desirable, and even necessary for permanent traffic.

"They have been carried below the level of the tanks, when they might have been carried above it, and embankments have been broken and bridges carried away by inundations, which, on the higher line, would have been comparatively innocuous.

"They have been constructed without due provision for their permanent maintenance, so that either the entire road has gone to decay, or one portion of it has become unserviceable, while another portion was in progress of construction.

"The reports of all the superintendents dwell much on the necessity of having properly qualified assistants, capable of enduring the climate, and conversing with the natives. The local experience of the ryot, it is observed, is often of great value, and is lost to those who cannot communicate with him in his own language.

"The want of properly qualified subordinates, and in addition to the want of qualification, in the frequent illness and

frequent removal, and change of European assistants, is strongly dwelt on by all the authorities who have recorded opinions on the subjects previously noticed. These circumstances are placed most prominently forward as a principal cause of all the failures and disappointments, the combined costliness and inefficiency, which have been experienced in a greater or less degree in all the subjects of our previous examinations.

"Bridges, embankments, annicuts, though essentially connected with, and indeed component portions of roads, and canals of irrigation, are severally in themselves great branches of practical engineering, and in all these, separately considered, the inefficiency of subordinate agency has been experienced, to which may be added: The delay in passing estimates, whereby the sanction for emergent work is frequently not given till it is too late in the season to execute it."

Such is the judgment passed on the public work departments in each of the presidencies by the authorities at home.

Other testimony might be quoted to the wasteful expenditure for superintendence during the period under review, much of which we are justified in ascribing not to the want of timely and urgent representations on the part of the local governments directed to its prevention and remedy; but to the delayed and still imperfect training of the natives (except by fits and starts under an Elphinstone, a Malcolm, a Bird, but let us hope with more enduring fruits under a Thomason) for filling some of the higher grades in this department of the public service; for it is undeniable that one engineer officer might, with the aid of a sufficient number of qualified native assistants, exercise efficient supervision over a greater range of territory, whilst others in charge of less considerable works, which might, as in the case of the judicial department, be confided to native supervision, could be made available for those more important undertakings so frequently delayed or not commenced for the want of scientific European officers to conduct them.

For seventeen years past, according to the statistical papers laid before Parliament, the amount expended for works of improvement throughout India was 2,888,332*l.*, a sum which elsewhere has

been swollen to five million sterling. Of this a large portion must be placed to the account of obligatory repairs, as much an essential condition of receiving the revenue as the Ryots' expenses of cultivation. Another still larger portion is expended on works which are never undertaken except as a pecuniary speculation, certain to return an usurious interest for the money so expended. Such works are not to be placed in the same category as those like roads and bridges which benefit the public without being of the same direct advantage to their authors; particularly because such works of irrigation do not diminish, but rather increase the necessity for roads, while they at the same time create a capital for their formation. Deducting therefore that portion of it applied to obligatory and unavoidable purposes, it will be found from the statistical papers already referred to, that the annual amount allotted for roads and bridges, dwindles down, exclusively of superintendence, to 137,555*l.*, one-third of which being required for their repairs, there remains 90,000*l.*, equivalent to one-half of 1 per cent. of the net revenue, as the measure of gratuitous outlay per annum for construction of roads and bridges throughout India. Nor can we discover anything to show that during peace the expenditure on public works throughout India has been greater than it was during war. On the contrary: It seems that during the first five years of the present charter (we quote the statistical papers already referred to), the expenditure for public works throughout India, exclusive of repairs, was on an average 105,798*l.* per annum; which, compared with the general average for the last seventeen years, already quoted, will show a decrease for those years of 31,755*l.* per annum. This result has been carefully kept out of sight in the official reviews of Indian affairs. These being the only five consecutive years in which there was no war, *the public works may be said to have been literally starved for the sake of swelling a boasted surplus, at the very moment when money should have been more bountifully laid out upon their vigorous prosecution.*

BENGAL AND THE NORTH WEST.

HAVING thus exposed the short comings of the East India Company upon the grand total of its expenditure, if we condescend to enter into details, we find the case against them gaining greater strength and consistency. The neglect and indifference exhibited generally become more glaring as we get to details; for here at least we have been able to do for ourselves what the East India Company should have done for us, viz., separate from the grand total of expenditure on public improvement what has actually been disbursed on *bonâ fide* works for the amelioration of the people's lot—such as canals, embankments, and roads, and bridges,—and what on civil and political buildings which are not conducive to the increased prosperity and welfare of our Indian population. We are still unable, however, to distinguish what has been disbursed upon repairs and supervision severally, though we get the total upon that double item.

The grand total of expenditure on public works in the Bengal and North-west Presidency, inclusive of works, salaries, establishments, &c., within the civil department, is stated in the Report on India Public Works, to be, for ten years ending 1848—9	£2,236,532
Or at the rate of £223,653 per annum.	
Eliminating all other items but those under the heads of roads and bridges, and including repairs, we find the sum expended upon these to be, during the same period . .	£944,850
Or at the rate of £94,485 per annum.	
Eliminating all the items but those under the heads of canals, embankments, and irrigation, we find the sum expended upon these to be, during the same period . . .	£519,228
Or at the rate of £51,922 per annum.	
Eliminating all other items but those under the head of civil and political buildings, we find the sum expended upon these during the same period	£396,206
The remainder, being for supervision alone, we find to be .	£376,248
Total	£2,336,532

Roads, bridges, canals, embankments, and irrigation, have thus cost in Bengal and the North West for ten years up to 1848-9, 1,464,078*l.*, out of a net revenue of 130 millions, or at the rate of about 146,407*l.* per annum, for a population of sixty-four millions, which yields a net revenue of thirteen millions sterling per annum.

But let us now proceed to examine in detail what has actually been done for Bengal and the North West with such a very small sum of money.

The great result of the efforts made by the East India Company up to the present time has been to produce one incomplete line of communication between Calcutta and Delhi, and to make two abortive attempts at communication with the great cotton fields of Western India. Throughout the remaining portion of the territory under their charge, there may be numerous tracks for a few miles on either side of a military or civil station, or bridges may exist here and there; but where there are tracks even passably kept in order, there are usually no bridges, and where bridges do exist, the roads remain unmetalled, and the bridge consequently unapproachable.

The works of intercommunication in Bengal and the North West being in this state, it may be easily conceived with what astonishment a speech made by the Chairman of the East India Company on the subject in 1850 must have been received throughout the whole of India. It elicited at the time the following observations from the "Friend of India:"—

"The previous mail brought us the report of a speech delivered by the Chairman of the East India Company relative to the expenditure of Government in India on public works; and we will venture to affirm that no statement from the India House has ever been received in this country with greater astonishment and incredulity. It appears that some Proprietor had ventured to give utterance in the Court to that opinion regarding the culpable indifference of the rulers of India to works of public utility, which is universally entertained in this country. On this, the Chairman deemed it necessary to rebuke him for his ignorance and presumption. He told the Proprietors that the roads in the

Bombay Presidency, more especially in the cotton districts, were in most excellent order. He then proceeded to assert that from 1838 to 1846, a period of nine years, no less a sum than 2,282,894*l.* had been laid out in roads, bridges, and embankments. Within the same space, 970,000*l.* had been assigned for the Ganges canal, 50,000*l.* for the embankment of the Godavery, and 1,500,000*l.* for railways. Thus, in nine years, the expenditure of the East India Company on public works amounted to 4,862,894*l.*, besides other sources of outlay belonging to the same category. This was exclusive of the cost of convict labour on the public roads, which he believed would increase the amount one-fourth.

"Here we are informed that in nine years the Government of India, independent of the expenses of the Ganges Canal, the labour of convicts on public works and the district roads, has laid out 228 lakhs of rupees on roads, bridges, canals, and embankments. The sum expended in this latter department was recently given to the public through the report of the Embankment Committee. It amounted in ten years to 192,21,000 rupees, leaving 208 lakhs to be accounted for in roads, bridges, and canals. The only road at this Presidency deserving the name is the grand trunk road from Calcutta to Meerut; a magnificent undertaking, though its magnificence appears chiefly by comparison with the wretched paths in other parts of the country which are dignified by the name of roads. We have made it our business carefully and diligently to notice every public work which has been executed at the expense of the State in India during the period under review;—from their extreme rarity, indeed, they can scarcely escape notice—and we are sure we can appeal to every one who reads this letter, whether, if he were told that even one-half this sum had been expended in these objects between 1837 and 1846, he would not consider that a very unusual and unreasonable demand has been made on his faith. When we are told of hundreds of lakhs having been expended on roads, bridges, &c., we naturally inquire where are the roads? Throughout the east of Bengal, they are in so utterly disgraceful a state, that it is a misnomer to call them roads. We question whether they will

stand a comparison with those which existed in England at the revolution of 1688. With the exception of one or two roads in the two provinces of Bengal and Behar, there is nothing but the vestiges or the tradition of roads. The high road which runs from Calcutta through Santipore, to Moorshedabad, Rajmahal, and Monghyr through three hundred miles of country, even the poorest and most niggardly of civilised governments would be ashamed to own. The lower provinces present the aspect of an estate in Chancery, or in the hands of an insolvent landlord. And where are the bridges, which have been erected during this period? Where can a single bridge be pointed out which has cost even 50,000*l.*? The bridge on the great trunk road at Mugra, within forty miles of Calcutta, was washed away by the floods four years ago, and has not been replaced to this day,—because the treasury was said to be empty. The immense traffic of this road, the great artery of this Presidency, has long been carried over a bridge of ricketty boats, which cost less than 100*l.*, and hundreds of carts are daily taxed for the use of it. And where are the canals which have been excavated during this period of nine years?

"As to the one-fourth additional sum, which is said to have been laid out in district roads, not one farthing has been drawn from the Imperial revenue. A small annual sum has been obtained from a tax on ferries, and appropriated to this object; but the whole amount of expenditure last year on the district roads of thirty-two zillahs, and in a country more populous than England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, did not exceed the paltry sum of 28,000*l.*! Even the arrears of the old Ferry Fund, which was pledged to local improvements when it was established, have been carried to the credit of the State, to the extent of 70,000*l.*, and every effort to recover them for the roads have hitherto proved ineffectual."

The great trunk road from Calcutta has been but just completed, with the exception of the bridges over the Soane and Jumna, though it has been marked out since 1795. For the period during which these works proceeded, the estimates were continually overstepped. Floods destroyed the work in numerous places, where

the carelessness or ignorance of overseers had left the causeways unprotected. The deficiencies in the execution were, in fact, so glaring, that the superintendent, Captain Willis, reporting to the Court, recapitulated the following list of causes contributing to the non-completion of the road:—

"The ignorance of overseers; the increase of work from unprecedented floods in 1845; the delay in passing estimates; the ignorance of accounts of one executive officer; the dilatoriness of another; the increase of the superintendent's charge; the alteration of limits, causing delay in transfer of duty; the absconding of workmen from unhealthy districts; and the illness of many overseers." *

Here was one of the most important works ever undertaken in India intrusted to incompetent men, and a general looseness of administration, visible from the highest place, where the estimates were to be passed, to the lowest, where the workmen absconded, on the plea of ill health. The wonder was that under such circumstances the work should ever have been completed. It appears from General Briggs' evidence,† that even where the road was finished, something had to be done to it afresh every year, yet it was unfit for carts to travel on, and was never used in that way until quite lately, on the whole distance between Benares and Calcutta. The bridges were the last thing attended to in the making of the communication, so that instead of methodical proceeding, pieces of road were constructed here and there between streams, and were consequently of no use whatever. Nay, so great had been the early carelessness of the Company, that up to 1831, no drains were built at the sides to carry off the water, so that after every monsoon there was a necessary expenditure of 4000*l.* to keep in order the almost neglected portions of what ought to have been a frequented road; and this in a country where the least foresight would have dictated caution and prudence; for it is well known that the ground between Benares and Calcutta is extremely difficult, about 120 miles of it being subject to inundations from the periodical swelling of the Damsdur and other rivers—streams one day, and impassable torrents the next. The disgraceful careless-

* India Public Works, 1851, p. 146. † Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 402.

ness of these proceedings was completed by the entire absence at the time, when no bridges existed, of all means of passing rivers by boats, or when the torrents no longer flowed, of removing the obstacles in the shape of stones and rubbish, which entirely impeded passage of any kind. In 1831, the only bridge on the road was that on the Kharamassa, made by the charity of an individual in Benares, at the cost of 20,000*l.*

Under such circumstances it was not extraordinary that the expenses vastly exceeded the estimates. The expenditure up to April, 1845, was 384,148*l.*; in the three years succeeding, it was increased by 105,010*l.*, making a total expenditure, up to 1848, of 489,110*l.* The estimate made in 1846 for completing the works, was 1,030,250*l.*; thus, in two years, 880,000*l.* were added to these estimates. The road is now completed after a fashion, the bridges on the Jumna and Soane being not even commenced, under pretext that a railway is about to be built, of which the works are proceeding at less than snail's pace. By this means the important town of Delhi remains without any convenient mode of passing the important traffick which comes through it from east and west, and the military post of Meerut is cut off from improved communication.

Of the great Deccan road, which is ultimately to join Calcutta and the cotton districts about Oomrawutty, and extending from Mirzapore to Jubbulpore and Nagpore, only 240 miles between Mirzapore and Jubbulpore are completed; for though the track is carried on to Nagpore, it is unfit for vehicles at all times and for every sort of traffic in bad weather.

In 1840 it was determined to improve, or rather make the road between Agra and Bombay; the improvements to comprise the removal of the principal obstructions in the Ghaut, jungles and passages of river, nullahs, or mountain streams. The track passed through Indore 370 miles, thence to Akberpore, on the Nerbudda, 51 miles, on to Sindwa, 43 miles, and thence to Bombay, 270 miles, making a grand total of 734 miles. Major Drummond was commissioned to survey the line from Agra as far as the Nerbudda, and the Government, on the 30th June, 1840, sanctioned an estimate of 12,000*l.* for improving the nearest part of the road

between the Chambul river and Supprie, 115½ miles, and between Indore and the Nerbudda river, 76 miles, so as to be practicable for wheeled carriages. An increase in the width of the Ghauts, or passes, from ten to fourteen feet, was also authorised in 1843. Notwithstanding these laudable exertions, after the expenses of the survey had been gone to, it appeared that in 1848 no material portion of the road or track had been improved, and an estimate being then called for, it was discovered that upwards of 70,000*l.* would be required to complete one distance of 93 miles, under the charge of the civil engineer, to bridge a portion of the road between Soonghur and Dhoolia, and to metal the road in Candeish. This estimate so frightened the East India Company, that the works were declared too costly to be undertaken, and a sum of 3294*l.* only was sanctioned, for converting into a fair weather road the line between Sindwa and the Nerbudda, and for the maintenance of the present line of road within the Bengal Presidency. This portion from Agra to Akburpore on the Nerbudda, was projected at a proposed cost of 12,000*l.*, but in November had cost 35,495*l.*, 19,431*l.* having been spent on new work to replace the old; this new work costing, in fact, more than the first estimate for the entire road. The sanction of the Court of Directors is now asked for an annual expenditure of 2870*l.**

From Agra to Delhi there may be a road, but there are neither drains nor bridges on it. An estimate for spending 1488*l.* in providing both these necessaries on a distance of 102 miles, seems to have met with approval, but as yet not to have been carried out. However, this perhaps will be considered less necessary on account of the completion on the other side of the Jumna of the grand trunk road, from Allahabad to Delhi, which, as we have said, has but just been finished.

If, however, the indirect communication with Calcutta is likely to be long incomplete, should the present arrangements of the Company remain in force, it is still more likely to be constructed than the direct road between Calcutta and Bombay. It will hardly be credited, that at this moment there is no road from

* Public Works, India, 1851, p. 148.

Calcutta to Bombay practicable to carriages. In 1837-38, the Bombay Government suggested that the road through Raipore and Oolabareah, about 1200 miles, direct to Calcutta *vid* Ahmednuggur, should be improved, in order that the overland communication with England might be made easy to travellers, and rapid for the conveyance of the mails. The resident at Nagpore reported that the Rajah, through whose territory this road would pass, was willing to subscribe 2000*l.* towards the completion of the road. The plans submitted were two,—first, for the construction of a road at all times practicable for wheel-carriages for travellers, and for a transit of trade between Bombay and Calcutta; second, to facilitate the conveyance of mails between the capitals, by rendering the line of communication practicable for horsemen or foot-runners. Of the 1200 miles, 232 had been made practicable for horsemen and dawk runners, by means of a grant of 2036 rupees, and 968 miles remained. As the plans involved a large outlay, the Court were desirous that no portion of the line should be commenced until a more satisfactory survey could be made, and an estimate of the expense submitted; but as the main road to Bombay could not be completed for some years, the Government were authorised to take immediate steps for forming a road for horsemen and dawk runners from Ahmednuggur to Midnapore, which would be practicable throughout the year. The Court subsequently informed the Government that they could not sanction the construction of an extensive road, and directed that their exertions be confined to the discovery of the best route, on which such improvements only should be made as the transit of the mails imperatively required.* It is needless to remark that the discovery has never yet been made, and that the communication between Calcutta and Bombay is still on the antiquated footing of dawks as far as Aurungabad. That this system is one involving frequently the highest consequences is evident from an episode of the time when the Company carried on that glorious and destructive war on the Sutlej.

During the campaign of 1846, 100 officers were required to be

* Public Works, India, p. 127.

sent from Calcutta, 1500 miles, to the field of action. Palanquins were the only conveyance. On that occasion, however, bearers were posted at different stations to carry three persons daily; and assuming twelve bearers to be posted at every station, and eight miles between each, it must have required 7200 men to carry them. Of the 100 only 30 arrived before the campaign was over. They were going to the Sutlej to join Lord Hardinge.*

The whole of the Bombay and Calcutta road within the Bengal Presidency is impracticable to carriages, the line, like all customary routes, being worn into the appearance of a track, on which, says Mr. Chapman, the mode of travelling is as bad as can be imagined. The very poorest classes subsist during the journey on little more than the food they bring from home. The classes next above them spend from a farthing to a penny per mile; and another class from a penny to threepence and fourpence per mile. The quickest travelling is four miles an hour.†

Such being the state of the main trunk roads in the Presidency of Bengal and the north-west, it may be easily conceived that district roads are in yet smaller number, and in a far worse state. It does not appear, even from the evidence of the East India officials themselves, that there is a single continued line of intercommunication which is fairly practicable in fine weather. The only boast which the Company seems to be able to make is, that the roads in Assam are in a better state of repair than the rest, and that on the line from Gowahatty to the Kulling river, one of the most frequented roads in Assam, and important in a military point of view, there is a permanent road passable throughout the year to horsemen and cattle over 32 stone bridges and 118 wooden ones.

But if roads and bridges in the Presidency of Bengal may be said not to exist at all, perhaps it may be discovered that more attention has been paid to navigation. Roads may have been neglected, yet canals have been improved and multiplied. The Company have planned and partially advanced, but not yet completed, the Ganges Canal suggested in 1836 by Captain Cautley, and having for its object the making of the waters of the

* Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 146. † Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 340.

Ganges available for navigation on the eastern side of the Doab. This noble work, when it is completed, will be the only claim on the part of the East India Company to the gratitude of the people of the North-west Provinces; but even in the progress of this work we discover the hesitation, poorness of spirit, and want of vigour of the administration. The canal was planned to leave the Ganges at Kunkul, pass near Meerut and Coel, and finally join the river Esau near Mynpooree. The length of the main line was 453 miles. Branches to Futtyghur, 160 miles; to Boolundshuhur, 70 miles; Etawah, 172; and Cawnpore, 42½ miles, make a grand total of 898½ miles. The estimated amount for completion was 666,522*l.*, exclusive of the sum which would be required for an aqueduct over the Solani River, which is to be avoided by a circuitous route if required. The works were of an expensive kind; it was necessary first to convey the water from the Ganges at Kunkul, to Roorkee, a distance of 20 miles, by an expensive series of works estimated at 196,437*l.*, of which 86,366*l.* was for the aqueduct over the Solani. The 230 miles from Roorkee to Cawnpore, the canal having a mean breadth of 150 feet, was estimated at a cost of 283,628*l.*; the rest of the total sum being counted on to complete the branches. The works were commenced and progressed, when, in 1842, a sudden stop was put to them by order of the Governor-General; but they were resumed in June of the same year, when, at first, 20,000*l.*, and in 1844, 30,000*l.*, were sanctioned for annual expenditure. The amount expended up to the 1st of April, 1848, being about 200,000*l.* or 25,000*l.* a-year, in a Presidency which produces a net revenue of 13,000,000*l.* per annum.

With the exception of the Ganges Canal the Company has spent in ten years, up to 1848, no more than 310,000*l.* on a gross computation, the greater part of which was for embankments to protect property from inundation, some for the purposes of irrigation, and the rest for improving the Doab Canal, making plantations on the Delhi Canal, and generally keeping in order those two great and ancient works.

Since then, it is true, some progress has been made with the public works on the Punjaub, for which, at the demand of

Lord Dalhousie, the Company were prevailed upon to sanction in 1849, an annual expenditure of five lacs of rupees; but we know that the haste with which this large sum of money was granted arose from paramount motives of policy. The Court of Directors itself stated, in a letter of the 5th December, 1849, that it noticed "as a strong ground for giving the utmost practicable encouragement to the proposed measures of irrigation in the Punjaub, the circumstances narrated by Major Napier in reference to the extension of the Huslee Canal that, surrounded by the most luxuriant cultivation, the canal villages and their inhabitants bore every appearance of comfort and ease; there was scarcely a discharged soldier to be found in them, as the cultivation afforded ample occupation for the population, whilst the poor villages in the dry tracts between Lahore and Kussoor, with their small patches of cultivation, hardly wrought from wells more than 60 feet deep, were full of the discharged Khalsa." *

In the absence of all other motives than those of the immediate improvement of the people of the country, the question naturally suggests itself: What has become of the plan for joining by canals the Hooghly and the Ganges, and that for the repair of the Mofussil canals, so loudly called for—and for that of Rajmahal, the cost of which is only estimated at 380,000*l.*, and which, by superseding the changeableness and uncertainty of the Nuddea rivers, would reduce to 208 miles the journey of 528 now forcibly performed by the Soonderbund route; and, finally, what has been done towards making the Rohilcund Canal? And is it not notorious (as the petition of the Calcutta missionaries and ministers states) that in the immediate vicinity of Calcutta the two canals by which, during eight months of the year, the great majority of boats approach or leave the commercial capital of India, are utterly inadequate to the traffic of which they are the channels.

* Public Works, India, 1851, p. 212.

MADRAS.

Nowhere throughout India are the changes in the aspect of a country, incident to droughts and floods, more marked than in Madras. The Godavery, rising near Bombay, passes for several hundred miles through an open country, watered chiefly by the south-west monsoon, and after passing the mountainous region of the Circars, enters the alluvial country of its own formation, 60 miles from the sea. The stream divides itself about 35 miles from the coast, extending on the west till it reaches the Delta of the Kistnah, on the Colair Lake, about 40 miles, and, stretching on the east 32 miles to the shores of Coringa Bay. This river has the advantage of lofty banks thrown up by the waters on each side of it, which form ridges of 7 to 18 feet higher than the level of the land at 2½ miles distance on either side, thus facilitating the turning of the waters by the formation of dams across the streams. The distant waters of the Godavery, those of the Kistnah, and Tomboodra, rise and fall with the monsoons, or after local rains, at one time laying enormous tracts in water, at others feebly dribbling, in comparison, along its channels, to the sea. A little lower down, the Coleroon and Cauvery form fertile deltas, and by their rise and fall dry up or inundate miles and miles of ground. To regulate and take advantage of these natural phenomena should be the part of a good government. The custom of the ancient rulers was to authorise such works as, by stopping at their highest point the waters of the rivers when the rains had swelled them, rendered them available when the currents fell. They then, by sluices, annicuts, or vast embankments, turned the water into fields, thus fertilising, throughout the year, land which could not otherwise be cultivated, the heat and drought combining to render them unproductive. This they did with most effect on the river Cauvery. Of all the ancient works of which the traces are still preserved throughout Madras, and the results of which in former

times was to make the people rich compared with what they are at present, four-fifths at least have disappeared. Embankments which confined the waters are broken through. The channels through which the waters were of old directed have been choked up, and nature has resumed the sway which art had wrested from it. The Delta of the Godavery was capable of being made the richest and most productive throughout Madras. For forty years the channels of the stream which pours its waters through the Delta, had been neglected. From fertile, rich, and populous, the country became impoverished in produce and in people. The land which, in 1803, returned revenue to the amount of 206,000*l.* produced no more in 1844 than 177,000*l.*, decreasing thus in its productive power by 29,000*l.* per annum. Its population fell in a corresponding ratio from 700,000 souls in 1828, to 400,000 in 1848,* a gradual decline alone attributable to the culpable neglect of the East India Company. The embankments by which the crops in the lower grounds were protected from destruction by the floods, had fallen to decay. The partial dams which stopped the streams, and led the water from the river to the surface of the land, were gone. The surplus channels, for leading off superfluous waters, were choked, and there were no roads to permit the conveyance of produce to the markets and the coast, through a country impassable during rains. The consequences, fatal as they were from year to year, failed to rouse attention in the authorities. One year a portion of the entire crop of large tracts was destroyed by the floods; another year saw losses similar in character and extent, from the continued dryness of the weather, and the non-rising of streams which, if properly attended to, would suffice in any case to irrigate land ten times the extent of the Delta. At other times half the district might be suffering from local floods, whilst the remainder perished from a prevailing drought. So great was the neglect to which the streams were left, that the river-banks were swept away, and the channels consequently changed during every flood; and in the lower part of the South Godavery the whole town of Maddepollem was washed away. This neglect was the more extraordinary, as it appears that the perfect irrigation of the whole district was the simplest thing

* Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 270.

in the world; that nothing was wanted but to ascertain the lines of channels, and plan the various masonry-works; the facilities for leading the water of the Godavery from its bed to the surface of the country being so great, that an annicut or embankment could easily have been constructed at a small expense, where it would command 2000 miles of the Delta in the Rajahmundry district alone. It is estimated that this district which only yielded, in 1844, 600,000*l.*, is capable of producing at least 4,000,000*l.*, allowing the produce of sugar cultivation alone at the rate of three-quarters of a ton per acre for 300,000 acres. Yet, with these prospects in anticipation, and these facilities in the execution, very shame alone induced the Government in 1848 to sanction the outlay of 50,000*l.* on these improvements; the urgency of which had been reported on in glowing terms by Major Cotton. The work has now been just completed by the building of an annicut right across the bed of the Godavery, with locks, head-sluices, &c., the result of which will be the fertilising of 1,300,000 acres of land, rendered fit for the cultivation of rice and sugar, whilst there seems no reason why the waters should not be led all the way to the Kistnah, the channel terminating at that river, at 15 feet above high water. An extent of 500 square miles would thus be added, and with 500 more available upon the Colair Lake, make one single annicut at the cost of 50,000*l.*, irrigate 3000 miles of country; the highest freshes of the Godavery giving ninety times as much as would be required for the whole of this alluvial tract. The works sanctioned on the Kistnah will also be advantageous when they are completed.

That these works were not produced earlier passes comprehension; when we consider, that under the do-nothing system, water was paid for at the rate of two shillings per 800 cubic yards; that 42,000 cubic yards of water per hour were flowing useless to the sea, worth, at the above-mentioned rate, 50*l.* per hour, or 1200*l.* per diem; which, for 240 days (the portion of the year in which the district was not supplied at all), would produce 288,000*l.* a-year.*

It could not be urged by the authorities that the result of these improvements was problematical, for ample experience had already

* Reports on Irrigation of the Delta of the Godavery, p. 35.

been obtained between 1839 and 1843, by opening of channels on the Godavery in the Woondy talook; the result of which had been an increase to the yearly revenue of 1700*l.*, at the trifling cost of 700*l.*, or 256 per cent. on the outlay.*

When such considerations as these failed to rouse the authorities, we need not wonder that the anticipation of famine, consequent upon their neglect, had no effect upon them.† Yet it is computed that the consequence of imperfect irrigation in Rajahmundry, during twenty years previous to 1845, was the loss of no less than 100,000 lives.

It is well known that rice may be selling at Madras at double its ordinary value, and be a drug at Tanjore, yet there are no means of equalising the market.

"The native merchant—inert"—says Mr. J. Thomas, of the Madras Civil Service, "waits for the monsoon." But, in truth, it is difficult for the native merchant to do otherwise. So long as roads are not made to facilitate trade, so long will famine desolate the whole of India.

Instead of finding the simple remedy of good roads for the future avoidance of such catastrophes, the Government officials can start no more refined idea than that of Government granaries. "Private enterprise," they say,‡ "is powerless to meet these emergencies. Although the trade is under British rule perfectly free, rice sells in seasons of scarcity in one district at eight or ten measures the rupee, and in another adjoining at half that cost. One explanation of this circumstance is, that there is neither enterprise nor capital in the corn trade at present adequate to meet the large and extraordinary demands of the market where famine prevails.

"The magnitude of the evil, entire districts being involved in suffering at the same moment, destroying even thousands in a few weeks . . . preclude the hope that private enterprise will be sufficient to meet the emergency.

"In the recent famine in the Madras Presidency in 1832-3, rice was at that period abundant, and comparatively cheap in Canara,

* Reports on the Irrigation of the Delta of the Godavery, p. 41.

† *Ibid.*, p. 44. ‡ Appendix to Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 502.

Malabar, and elsewhere, in our own provinces, when the famine was at its height in Guntoor, and yet no supplies reached that province." *

Nor could it, when there were no means of intercommunication. Roads are the only mode of averting famine, and it is folly to accuse the native dealer, when the egregious fault is in the Government. The erection of magazines would not avert a famine, but still further complicate the over-centralising system which reigns in India.

Had these glaring facts been insufficient to impress the Government with the necessity of attention to their own advantages, the irrigation of Tanjore, and its productive working, should have urged them to exertion. In truth, no more striking instance can be given of the benefits attending the simple care of keeping up a portion even of ancient works than is visible on the Cauvery. It appears that, inclusive of all improvements in the embankments, irrigations, and communication of that river, the sum of 390,000*l.* had been expended up to 1847, that is, at the rate of 8600*l.* a year. During that time the revenue increased from 314,000*l.* a year to 493,000*l.* a year, making a total increase of 170,000*l.* a year, so that with this expenditure of about 8600*l.* a year, the revenue benefited to the extent of 180,000*l.*, or altogether, 4,150,000*l.* in forty-five years.

Notwithstanding this evidence, nothing has been done to extend the advantages of irrigation to the neighbouring Coleroon, of which, says Major Cotton, at least a hundred millions of cubic yards per day are permitted to run to waste, which, if employed, could be forced to the providing of grain sufficient for two and a half millions of people. Such being the slender disbursement in the best watered provinces of Madras, it must be trifling indeed in districts which are more neglected, and, as a natural consequence, contribute in a far less degree to the revenue. The results are, immense tracts of land lying waste, whilst numerous large rivers roll their surplus waters to the sea along a coast, in length a thousand miles on the eastern side of the peninsula, dooming reclaimable land to sterility, and causing

* Appendix to Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 502.

in great part periodical famines, decrease of trade, diminished population, and pestilence.

There is no doubt that the unwillingness of the Company to disburse even the smallest sums for the prosecution of public works has been owing to the fact, that what has been expended was unsystematically applied, and the execution of it entrusted chiefly to the Tehsildars (native collectors), almost irresponsible officers, having unlimited power, which they use in compelling the supply of labour and materials below the market price, in diminishing the quantity actually furnished by short measurement of the work performed, and in delaying the settlement of accounts indefinitely.* It is a certain fact, that want of workmen is one great obstacle in Madras.† Of the carelessness of management and ill conduct of subordinates, the following is a not unfrequent instance :—

"That the Board may understand,"‡ says Major Cotton, "the state of things in the Rajahmundry division in respect of the execution of works, I may mention the circumstances of the Bhoopiah head-sluice. Last year, when I visited the spot, just as the freshes began, I found it had been built some weeks, and left unplastered, unprovided with shutters, and without any protection by fascine work, or anything else, from having the earth washed away from the wing walls by the heavy rush of the water in the highest freshes to which it would be exposed, as it could not be shut. In the work itself, every brick that came to hand had been used, burnt or not, so that many of them had dissolved under the first rains that had fallen. As the destruction of the sluice in this state appeared inevitable, if there was any continuance of freshes, I gave orders for the immediate transport of rough stones to place round the wing walls and below the apron; gave particular instructions where they were to be put, and left orders with the surveyor where they were to be sent. I also directed the shutters to be made, which could easily be done in a few days. When I returned after the monsoon, I found the shutters had not been made, and the stones that had been sent

* Petition from Madras.

† Cotton's Reports on Irrigation of the Godavery. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

down had been left on the bank near the sluice, but not one been applied to the work. Thus this large new work had been in imminent danger, and has escaped from the river, having remained only one or two days at its full height."

Without commenting further upon this, we need but add the concluding words of Major Cotton:—"This was not at all a case of persons being particularly inefficient; on the contrary, they were rather better than ordinary."

This neglect and dishonesty is the more disheartening when it is known that an impost is annually levied upon the Ryots for the repair of the river runs and channels, these being a distinct charge consolidated on the land assessments for the use of the water.

We have dwelt thus long upon the subject of irrigation in the Presidency of Madras, as it is the question on which most stress must certainly be laid. But, in truth, amelioration in this one branch of public works is comparatively useless without the benefit of roads or inland water communication. Some feeble attempts by individuals have shown that the waters of the Godavery were navigable for an immense distance inland; and we have it, on the authority of Major Cotton, that not a single fall is to be found in the passage of that river through the Circars; but though teak rafts and flat-bottomed boats annually make their way down to Coringa, the navigation of the Godavery is but a myth, nor is there any mode of inland water communications in the Presidency except it be the Backwater round Cochin, of which not one tithe the use it might be put to has yet been made. Roads then are the more necessary in Madras, that there is a total want of any other mode of intercommunication, but truth compels us to assert, that throughout the greater part of it there is no parallel to the neglect and recklessness with which this branch of public works has been attended.

In the number of principal or trunk roads set down in the Return of Public Works, printed by the House in 1851, as eleven, very few are finished; not one is in an efficient state of repair. The only road constantly in good order is from Fort

St. George to the head-quarters of artillery at St. Thomas's Mount a distance of eight miles. The longest road, from Madras to Calcutta, 900 miles, has never been completed. A few miles from Madras it is not distinguishable from paddy-fields; and piece goods have to be brought on the heads of coolies to Nellore, 100 miles on this very road. Fifty miles farther, it passes over a wide swamp, causing carts and travellers to skirt its edge in mud and water, as well as they can, during six months of the year. On another portion of the line, near Rajahmundry, a gentleman was lately four hours in travelling seven miles on horseback. Part of this road has been at various times repaired, but these portions have afterwards been totally neglected and fallen into ruin. For the most part the road is unbridged, and in the places where the bridges have been constructed they have been neglected till the approaches have been wholly cut away by the rains leaving the bridges inaccessible. The whole of the Delta of the Godavery is impassable in rains.

From this road there is another branch to Hyderabad and Nagpore, twenty-two miles long. The money expended on it has been thrown away; it is never in a fit state for traffic; and such is the general condition of all the trunk roads, with the exception of that leading to Bangalore, which alone is practicable for post-carriages at the rate of four or five miles an hour.

That the country is in an equally desperate state as regards district roads is certain. The district of Cuddappah, 13,000 miles square, has nothing that deserves the name. There are tracks, impassable after a little rain, and everywhere carts when used carry half their proper load, and proceed by stages of half the usual length. While the trunk road from this district is so notoriously bad, that the military board use it as a trial ground to test the powers of new gun carriages, which are pronounced safe if they pass through this ordeal. Thus is one of the finest cotton-fields of India, kept down by the state of its roads and communications with the coast, its natural outlet for commerce.

There are few districts in which country roads, as distinguished from the chief trunk roads, have received any attention whatever,

and to all but those few the description of Cuddappah is applicable.

The Collectorate of Salem, which is flat, has alone received considerable improvement, at the cost of 4000*l.*, but is still without main roads of communication with surrounding districts. The entire extent of road practicable for bullock carts, scarcely exceeds 3000 miles for this entire Presidency, without bridges, impracticable in wet weather, tedious and dangerous in the dry season.

The roads in Bellary, are in a wretched state. Mysore, which borders for 200 miles on the south boundary, is traversed by excellent roads, feasible not only for country carts, but for spring carriages; but in Bellary, no corresponding roads are made to meet them, and consequently, not only the town, but the whole district of Bellary is cut off from the advantages which are offered by an open and easy communication between the Mysore territories, and the ports on the western coast, and the whole southern Peninsula.

Canara is almost entirely locked up, the country having probably less prospects than others, of internal improvement, from its natural obstacles. Whilst throughout the rest of the territory, and even in those fertile spots of Tanjore and Rajahmundry, where irrigation-works have been carried out, there are neither roads nor bridges passable throughout the year. Yet we are informed that the total expense incurred in the Presidency of Fort St. George, for ten years, ending 1847 inclusive, on the repairs and constructions of works of irrigation, and on roads, bridges, and ghauts, was 825,118*l.*, or at the rate of about 82,000*l.* a year.

BOMBAY.

In the Presidency of Bombay, where the want of roads has been most severely felt from the total absence of all other modes of intercommunication, and where the requirements of ordinary traffic rendered it more particularly incumbent on the Government to make the most necessary improvements, the dilatoriness and neglect which it has shown exceeds even that which marks Bengal. Here in truth it was not one trunk road that was required, but two or three main arteries of communication were wanting to serve the traffic of the cotton district. Yet it will be found, and is scarcely credible, that the only line leading into the interior, which is for 72 miles, bridged, metalled, and kept in order, is that which starting from Bombay, proceeds through the Bhore Ghaut, no greater distance than to Poonah. This, the greatest highway to the East for the internal commerce of the Presidency comprises the enormous gradient of 1 in 9 on the Ghaut, which is almost as prohibitive as a high customs duty. Whilst such is the best road, the second is about 250 miles of the main trunk line from Bombay to Agra, which is incomplete. The Thull Ghaut Pass, which is on this line, is indeed improved to a gradient of 1 in 20, but the road as a whole is in a very bad state. Colonel Grant says of it in his work, entitled "Cotton and Indian Railways," that in 1850 it was so bad from Bhewndy to the foot of the Ghauts, that a new line was being surveyed. The same authority informs us that to Nassic at the other side of the pass, the road is neither metalled nor bridged, whilst as regards the roads from Nassic towards the cotton districts, they are for the most part cleared tracks, on which the draught is excessive. Such is the state of the second cartway passing into the interior from Bombay. These, however, are the great cotton roads of the Presidency leading to Candeish and to Berar, which were they ever passable or equal to the traffic which they serve—traffic by the way which is now at its smallest limit—the roads within those

cotton districts or converging to them—would still continue to render comparatively useless. As for the Agra road, the following letter, dated Bombay, Dec. 3rd, 1851, is sufficient proof of the truth of our statement:—

"We have repeatedly before remarked upon the want of good roads as being the fatal bar to any material increase of trade in other parts of the Bombay Presidency; and nowhere else in the world, probably, would this want of means of transit to, from, and within regions of great natural resources be tolerated, as it is here with apparent indifference. The reason is, that the natives alone really witness the obstacles to an extension of trade,—the business of Europeans is confined to Bombay, and they make the most of the produce they find there, leaving the question of supply entirely to the natives.

"We have but one made road worthy of the name—that through Candeish to Agra,—and even that is in some parts almost impassable for laden carts; yet from this road branches off these bullock tracks by which the bulk of the produce of the fertile valley of Berar finds its way to Bombay, and our own province of Candeish yields a gross revenue of nearly a quarter million sterling, of which so small a pittance is allowed for outlay on roads, that it has been insufficient even to keep in repair those "fair weather" tracks which have from time to time been made. It is true a railroad to pass through the country alluded to is contemplated; but so far only twenty-six miles of it has been actually determined on, viz., from Bombay to Callian, the only part of the whole distance in which trade is comparatively independent of a good road, having water carriage."

Another letter from Bombay, 25th June, 1852, is equally to the point, and gains importance from being founded on the official report of an important and highly efficient engineer officer:—

"No previous season has shown more palpably how seriously the want of roads impedes the trade of the country. Berar, for instance, has produced this year the finest cotton crop we have seen for very many years, if ever; the quality of much of it is superior to the best Broach, and the cultivation of such cotton can be almost indefinitely increased in that province:—but to

what purpose, so long as it cannot be conveyed to the coast where alone it can be converted into money? A large portion of the crop is still in the districts, and will not reach Bombay until November and thereafter; much of it, in fact, will not be despatched until the following crop is being picked, owing to the difficulties of transport over the wretched bullock tracks which alone are available for two-thirds to three-fourths of the journey to Bombay. Even the high-road which serves for the remainder of the distance is in many parts in a disgraceful state; and, in a very interesting report by Captain Wingate, Revenue Survey Commissioner, just printed by Government, that officer describes it as 'the frightful and thoroughly execrable road from the Thull Ghaut through the Concan,' and adds that its supersession by such a road as has been made down the Ghaut itself is a 'measure which is urgently required for the accommodation of the vast and increasing traffic on the most important line of road in our Presidency, with the single exception of that by the Bhore Ghaut.'

"This report of Captain Wingate's to which we allude has reference to a contemplated survey and reassessment of the province of Candeish which is contiguous to Berar. The vast importance of this measure will be judged of from the following statistics which we extract from the report, and which will probably not be deemed out of place here, nor fail to be of interest as showing how truly our trade with the interior may be said to be yet in its infancy. The whole Province of Candeish contains 12,078 square miles, of which it is estimated that the arable portion is 9772. Of this arable area, 1413 square miles are cultivated, and 8359 waste. The population of the whole province was 785,991 according to the census taken in 1851. The number of villages in the whole province is 3837, of which 1079 are now uninhabited. The soil of Candeish is stated to be superior in fertility to, and yields heavier crops than, that of the Deccan and Southern Mahratta country (already surveyed by Captain Wingate, and which produces our 'Comptah' cotton). Although so much of the country now lies a waste, 'the traces of a former industry are to be seen in the mango and tamarind trees, and the many ruined wells which are still to be met with in the neighbourhood of

almost every village.' Of the five-sixths of the arable land—the five millions of square acres—now lying waste, Captain Wingate further remarks, 'Nearly the whole is comparatively fertile, and suitable to the growth of exportable products, such as cotton, oil, and seeds,' and he strongly urges upon Government the policy of great liberality in fixing the new rates of assessment so as to encourage the immigration of new settlers, the great obstacle to an extended cultivation being a want of population, while in some other parts of the Presidency there is almost a redundancy. The operations of this important survey will be commenced as soon after the monsoon as possible."

Candeish and Berar do not bear the palm from Guzerat, where not a single made road and not a single bridge exist. The state of things in that province is thus described by the author of letters on the cotton and roads of Western India.

A gentleman, high in the service of the East India Company, wrote home, August, 1850:—

"I was very much surprised to read so bold an assertion by Sir James Hogg, that we had roads in Guzerat. Why, there is not a single mile of made road in the length and breadth of the whole land. You should send us out a few questions to answer and return to you, which would completely remove such ideas from the minds of the people."

Before this suggestion reached England, such questions had been sent out to another resident in Guzerat, and I will presently give the answers to them; but must first cite one or two more letters from the above gentleman. Extract of letter (written in the dry season), 27th of January, 1848:—

"We left Broach soon after one o'clock in the day, but did not reach this place, Kim Chokee, until seven p.m.—It is a good twenty miles, and such a country that any pace beyond a walk is almost impossible—holes and deep ruts the whole way. It is a perfect disgrace to our Government to leave the means of internal communication in such a state, particularly when the material for road-making is at hand. An attempt was made some years ago to form a road from this Chokee to the river, a distance of two miles, by raising the black earth about two feet above the

usual level of the plain. Even this was a great improvement; but since first constructed it has been left to nature, and will of course in a few years be as bad as before any money was expended on it."

Extract of letter, September, 1849:—

"I sincerely hope before many years to see the immense resources of this rich country more developed. Up to the present period *nothing* has been done to improve it. A few rupees to mend a broken bund that may have cost lacs, only granted after quires of correspondence, or when it is too late to save a noble work from entire destruction."

Extract of letter, May, 1850:—

"Though in the Deccan and Concan money had been expended on roads, still in Guzerat, which furnishes the largest amount of revenue, we had not a single mile of road or any other facility for inland transit. I could give you a few good examples of the obstacles to our trade by the want of anything in the shape of roads or crossings to the many small streams up which the high spring tide flows. During a late trip I made to the Dhollera Bunder, I wanted to go from one post to another only five cos distant, yet I had to travel ten cos, and was in the saddle from daylight until three p.m. At one place I counted some twenty carts of merchandise all stuck in the mud, owing to the spring tide having overflowed a considerable track of rather low ground; I rode through it with difficulty. At another place I was obliged to halt for some hours to allow the tide to run out. All this took place at localities I have frequently ridden over without a particle of mud or water. Merchandise from Dhollera to the north had to make a circuit of twenty cos, or two days' journey, owing to these obstacles. I reported them to the collector."

In Guzerat, in fact, though the cotton fields may none of them be more than twenty-five or thirty miles from the shipping ports, still these twenty-five or thirty miles of track are as bad as bad can be; and, in addition, for want of adequate piers on the Nerbudda, Myhee, and Taptee rivers, cotton has to be rolled through the mud to reach the Bombay market.

Now it is important to observe, that when a motion was made in the Court of Proprietors, with a view to the improvement of the roads in Guzerat, the proposition was met by a remark from the Deputy Chairman that no province required them less. The Chairman himself said the same thing in Parliament distinctly. There is no foundation whatever for these remarks. In the immediate vicinity of Surat, Broach, and Tankaria Bunda, and in our own territories, there are no made roads and the fact was altogether lost sight of, that whilst from places within 100 miles of Dhollera, near 100,000 bales of cotton found their way there, the most serious impediments existed to the transit from that place to Bombay, there being no roads or bridges within our own territory; and the difficulty being aggravated by this, that as sufficient time was often wanting to prepare cotton for exportation between the ripening of the harvest in February and the setting in of the south-west monsoon, there were material obstacles to the timely transport of the crops to the seaboard vessels leaving Dholera after the 15th of May, which therefore stood but little chance of reaching Bombay that season. Indeed, whole fleets might be yearly seen frequently forced to refuge in the numerous rivers between Surat and Bombay, and all this for want of common passable roads.

Bombay, it must be borne in mind, is the only harbour throughout Western India which admits of the ingress and egress of ships at all seasons of the year. Another immense advantage which it possesses is, that it is the nearest seaboard to the magnificent cotton-field of Berar which yields, and is capable of yielding to an almost unlimited extent, the very best indigenous cotton, superior in whiteness, and for retention of the dye, to any which has yet found its way into this country, admirably adapted therefore for the home and European markets. As early as 1837 these advantages had been set forth with becoming vigour by the Committee of Commerce and Agriculture of the Royal Asiatic Society, and urged with all the weight, which was inherent in so important a society. It said—

"There is no question whatever, that the production of cotton would, with good roads to the interior, go on increasing rapidly,

for the stimulus to cultivation would be as great from decreased expenses as it has lately been from increased prices.

"Thus, with proper management we might reasonably expect to see the exports of the country in this staple alone, swelling at the rate of 100,000 bales per annum, and amounting probably, at no distant period, to a million of bales. And what would be the consequence in other respects? Besides benefiting the revenue, and improving the condition of the people of India, such a trade would give employment to a vast amount of British shipping (400,000 tons), at the same time that it created a greater demand for the manufactures of the mother country.

"Upon the trade in salt, the effect of improved means of communication probably would be equally great. The first cost of this article is but trifling, amounting in general to less than an eighth of the sum paid for its transportation to the market of Oomrawutty. Anything therefore, which reduced the latter, would, to an almost equal extent, affect the price of this great necessary of life to the consumer in Central India, who at present, from being forced to supply himself with it by means of a slow and laborious land-carriage of 600 miles, finds it one of the most expensive articles of food. There can be little doubt, therefore, that a reduction of fifty per cent. in its price, which might be effected by good roads, would at least double the quantity consumed, and that instead of the trade in it being limited to 200,000 bullock loads, it would soon exceed twice that amount.

"Nor is it in cotton and salt alone that an improvement of this kind would take place. Every description of raw and bulky produce, such as wool, hemp, and dye-stuffs, suffers in an equal degree by the present state of things; the effect of which, in many cases, may be estimated as doubling and trebling their price, between the place of cultivation and the sea coast, where a large market for them alone exists. Great, therefore, as the field unquestionably is for improvement in India in the mode of cultivating and preparing its products for market, and beneficial as the introduction of new articles of produce, suited to the wants of Europe, as well as to those of the native population would be, the simplest, surest, and most important step towards bettering the

condition of the people, and increasing the resources of the country, will be, facilitating the means of internal traffic."

Such was the appeal made sixteen years ago, not by a Chamber of Commerce, or a like association, at any of the great manufacturing towns in this country,—not by the British inhabitants of Bombay, including in like manner the patriotic and most influential of all classes of the natives, as well as Europeans, of that settlement, but emanating from an enlightened section of the Royal Asiatic Society, consisting of a Mount Stuart Elphinstone, a Johnston, a Holt Mackenzie, an Ellis, a Briggs, a Malcolmson, and a Gore Ouseley. The only reply vouchsafed to their representation was, that it would be brought to the notice of the Government of India, and that the abstract statement on the same occasion applied for, of the roads executed in the preceding twenty years, could not be supplied, arrangements having been subsequently made for the supersession of the gratuitous services of these patriotic gentlemen from which such advantages had been contemplated. The result has been—and can we wonder at it?—that produce has decreased, and that particularly with reference to that of Berar, during the last seven years, a notable falling off is visible up to the present time in the exports of the cotton staple alone.

Reviewing and deeply lamenting the very little, in the way of improving these great commercial thoroughfares, which had been effected over the intervening space of ten years, Mr. Williamson Ramsay, the late experienced and energetic revenue commissioner of the Deccan, re-awakened the authorities of this country by the publication of two letters in 1846, addressed to Lord Wharncliffe, a warm advocate of every measure directed to the improved access with the El Dorado of Berar. The Notes from Khamgaum, of about the same date, on which he based this fresh appeal to the public, stated as follows:—

"The soil throughout the greatest portion of the province is uncommonly rich and fit for cultivation of cotton. The only obstacles to the almost unlimited production of the staple are, primarily, the difficulty of transport from the place of cultivation to the Bombay market.

"To give an idea of the extent to which the first of these at present operates, it is necessary to state that the price of transport amounts to from 5 to 8 rupees per bullock-load, between Khamgaum and Bombay; or allowing three bullock-loads to the candy of 784 lb. avoirdupoise, to 15 to 24 rupees per candy. Taking the price of cotton at, say 20 rupees per load, or 60 rupees per candy, it will give about an average of 32½ per cent. upon the first cost. But this is not all. The time occupied on the route between Berar and Bombay is very great. A laden bullock travels only at the rate of from six to nine miles a day, and often from lameness, fatigue, and other causes, is obliged to remain stationary for days together. About sixty days therefore are required to effect the transit between the place of cultivation and the coast; and as the cotton of Berar does not appear in the local market much before February, and is not cleaned and prepared before April, it requires the utmost exertion to bring any portion of it to Bombay previous to the setting in of the south-west monsoon; while it invariably happens that large quantities are caught on the road by the rain, and if not destroyed, are greatly damaged by becoming wet, mouldy, and black. Besides, in such cases numbers of the cattle used for transport are killed from overwork, as in addition to the anxiety felt to push them on to the utmost to avoid the effects of the rain, the cotton with which they are laden, from absorbing quantities of moisture, becomes double its original weight, and actually crushes the animal to the ground. It frequently happens, therefore, owing to this and other causes I have mentioned, that hundreds of their carcases are to be met with just previous to the monsoon, strewed along the paths they have traversed."

Reviewing the seven years intervening since the representation just quoted, although we are permitted to record the complete facilities which have recently been added to the ascent of the Thull Ghaut, and the construction of a Moorum road from its summit in the direction of Agra, it must be obvious that as far only as to Chandore is such improved main artery subservient to the traffic with Berar; the cart road from that place in the direction of Khamgaum not having been commenced, while below

the Thull Ghaut, and through the Concan, it is bad, to a degree of which an opinion may be formed from the last official report, dated in 1852, of Captain Wingate of the engineers, now employed in revising the assessment of Candeish, in which he states:—

"The Candeish carts are fast appropriating the traffic of the Brinjarries,* and will doubtless succeed in doing so to a much greater extent, whenever the frightful and thoroughly execrable road from the Thull Ghaut through the Concan is superseded by such a road as has been made over the Ghaut itself, a measure which is urgently required for the accommodation of a vast and increasing traffic, on the most important line of road in our Presidency, with the single exception of that by the Bhore Ghaut." He goes on to say, "These facts account for the cultivators of Candeish being able to pay higher rates than elsewhere. But while fully admitting this, I am satisfied that the present rates are much too high; and for reasons already given, I am of opinion that a very liberal reduction is required."

Similar testimony is borne by another public functionary, Mr. Green, who observes: †—

"Liberal and admirable as the new assessment is, and essential as it undoubtedly was, as the first step towards any improvement in Candeish, it is clear that something much greater still must be accomplished. It is altogether impossible that a people raising merely bulky and coarse agricultural produce, should ever be able to pay a money revenue of any amount; and their abundant crops cannot have a ready and remunerative sale, unless the means of internal communication are sufficiently improved."

From the foregoing it demonstratively appears that about two-thirds of the mainway through our own territory, from Kassaley-bunder towards Khamgaum, a total distance of only 250 miles, is in the same wretched and inefficient state as at the commencement of the present charter; and here it calls for observation that so far from the assertion made in Parliament in the debate, June, 1850, being untrue, "that all the stories about the carriage of cotton on bullocks' backs were unfounded," it appears by the official

* Native hereditary carriers.

† Concise Remarks, &c., Bombay, 1832, p. 44.

and published account of 1852, that 62,115 bullocks were employed last year in the conveyance of cotton down the Thull Ghaut; 22,930 more laden with grain, and 35,119 with salt, not to mention miscellaneous traffic to a much larger amount of tonnage, having for a great part been so conveyed.

Of the western provinces generally, it may be said, that the greatest want of the means of transit prevails throughout the whole of them. The country, from Bombay to Oomrawutty and Nagpore, and from Poonah towards the Godavery, came into our possession in 1818, and efforts were made by Mr. Elphinstone, who was then commissioner, to improve the transit, but great difficulties were found from the price of making the roads; the expense and difficulty there was in getting permission from the Court of Directors in England to expend the sums which were recommended for making these roads. Roads were, however, made, but hardly any bridges, and the consequence was that the roads were isolated between rivers, and as there was no means of passing those rivers conveniently on carts, the traffic was merely between one river and another on carts; the trade of the country is therefore not much changed since that; still, a great number of pack bullocks are employed in conveying the merchandise of the country. These roads, Lieut.-Gen. Briggs says, are after all only improved cart-tracks, or Collector's road.*

The accounts of the roads in the South Mahratta country, in a letter published in December, 1850, are curious:—"From Belgaum to Dharwar is a made road, not a real one," on which says the Collector, "There are many serious obstacles. To the ports on the coast north of Coomptah, from the larger and increasing cotton districts north of Dharwar in the Nizam's country, and the Sholapore and Belgaum collectorates, the roads which did exist are entirely neglected. Fifteen miles from Koombarlee Ghaut to Chiploon, which were anciently paved, are none the better for it now, and though a new road was surveyed and reported on in 1828, it has never been made. To Veejyegurh, the roads are mere tracks, though the harbour is deep. The Bengal and home authorities were shamed into making a line of narrow 'rough

* Briggs, Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 138.

road,' that is, a mere cleared track unsafe for carts and not to be attempted by carriages, from the interior to Viziadroog, an excellent harbour. The only improvements, in fact, are those lately undertaken, by which the Phoonda, and two other Ghauts between that and Bombay will be passable."

There is a road 70 miles long, from Belgaum to Vingorla, on the coast, which is entirely unbridged, besides being made to run through the steepest portion of a Ghaut, called the Rhani Ghaut.

An intelligent officer observed of this road: "I am afraid I should fail in attempting an estimate of the loss arising from such bad and impracticable roads as this in the transportation of military stores. It was supposed to undergo annual repairs, but one season it was not touched, and consequently became impassable; so much so that the cartmen had to make the road passable with small pickers, which they invariably carry, and combining together, they get over the ground with difficulty. As each cart crosses, the bullocks are taken to drag a loaded cart out of the river, and in this manner they ascend the Ghaut, by adding bullocks as required, and returning to bring up carts in the rear: the loss of time thus occasioned is lamentable. From the want of bridges, even foot-passengers are cut off for days."

The Dharwar road is the last we need mention, within this Presidency, that has any pretensions to the name. It was recently constructed from Dharwar to Sirsee, and thence to Coomptah, on the coast; but, as usual, it wants bridges. Yet here, as everywhere else in India, experience shows that neglect of public works has produced decline of revenue, and that material improvement has increased it.

"Guzerat, before it came into our possession," says the writer of "Letters on the Cotton and Roads of Western India," "had more opulent inhabitants than the contiguous populations of Candeish and the Deccan, and were remarkable for their amiable and hospitable manners. The liberality of the native rulers in devoting part of the land revenue to public works, *according to its original design*, powerfully contributed to their prosperity. But a change of masters imported a change of circumstances—the

deterioration of the condition of the people followed in the train of British sovereignty, and with this, I am sorry to say, an entire cessation of expenditure in public works."*

But deterioration of the people is not alone the result of want of roads. The system produces, as a consequence still more to be deplored, the prevalence of local famines, one of which was felt with great severity during the monsoon of 1823, in the country between Poonah and Candeish. It appears from undeniable evidence that whilst grain was so plentiful in Candeish as to sell at 8 shillings a quarter, it had risen at Aurungabad to 34 shillings, and at Poonah to 64, and then to 76 shillings a quarter. The monsoon had stopped the tracks between Candeish and Poonah, and all the agonies of famine were felt by the inhabitants of one well-peopled district, whilst in another, not distant 300 miles, the finest grain was purchaseable for next to nothing.

Such fatal consequences, such reckless loss of human lives, was the more unpardonable, as in the whole of India the smallest instalment of public work in roads is sure to pay over and over again the cost of its formation.

A few years before 1848, Mr. J. A. Turner ventured to suggest to the Court of Directors the making of the road from Bombay to Coomptah on the coast, or rather the improvement of a distance of six miles on a road already traced.† After a considerable delay, the road was sanctioned, but remained impassable for carts; but the effect of the road as far as Sirsee was quite remarkable. When it was finished, in 1840-41, 101 carts travelled upon it the first year, and in the two years afterwards 443 carts. Incomplete as the road was, the traffic of the port of Coomptah, during three years, had increased from 160,000*l.* to 400,000*l.*, and the Customs had increased from 4662*l.* per annum to 18,015*l.* on imports and exports; but though the custom duties of that place increased from 4662*l.* to 18,015*l.* within three years, still 40 miles of road, available only for pack bullocks, which could be constructed for moderate expense out of the profits of the revenue, remain unmade.

The Bhore Ghaut and Jubbulpore roads are also instances of great, too great, profit on public works. Constructed in 1828, the

* Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 270. † Briggs, Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 82.

tolls on it have risen exceedingly high since that time, as much as from 500*l.* to 3000*l.* in the course of six or eight years.

The Jubbulpore road between Jubbulpore and Benares, served in the first year after it was constructed, for less than 400 carts; a person was then placed to ascertain the number, and in three years after that, in 1838, the traffic had amounted to 6000 carts.*

There may, however, be difficulties in making roads in India. Lord Ellenborough bore testimony to their cheapness in his speech of May 3, 1833, and a gentleman of experience on this point, in a pamphlet on the cultivation of cotton in India, tells us:—

"Roads are to be made in India for a less sum than in any other country; 800*l.* per mile would pay for any road; and the small amount held up, as an additional reason why Government are to blame for not having constructed them.

"I speak advisedly, however, when I affirm that the above estimate is much too high, and that India might be covered with roads for 450*l.* per mile, and I would willingly contract to execute any number of miles at that rate. The great trunk road has been constructed for less than this per mile."†

Lieutenant-General Briggs on the same point says:—

"I superintended the construction of a road made entirely by natives, for the Rajah of Sattarah; it was 36 miles long, 18 feet wide, with drains and small bridges for the whole distance, and the expense did not exceed 150*l.* a mile. There is plenty of material at hand all over India, no deeper than five feet below the surface." As for the difficulty of preserving them when made.—"There is no difficulty in retaining the roads in India, any more than in other countries; it has been asserted, I know, that in consequence of the heavy rains the roads would be washed away; but if they are properly made, and culverts built to carry off the water, that would not happen. There is a road on the Bhore Ghaut which was once almost a complete swamp, and was impassable during the rain altogether, till the raised road was made, and it has lasted for upwards of thirty years.

* Briggs, Cotton Rep., 1848.

† On the Cultivation of Cotton in India, pp. 32-5. By E. Money, 25th Nat. Beng. Inf. London, 1852.

It is as good as any in England, and that is one of the parts of the country where they used to say it was impossible to make a road."

It is evident from what precedes, that Bombay is nearly as badly off for roads as Bengal; and that up to the present time, the countries within the reach of its ports, noted for the growth of cotton, are so crippled by the bad state of intercommunications, that that production which might have been immense is absolutely null. So miserably inadequate indeed are the existing means of communication with the interior, that the benefit derived from them may be said not to be felt, and to be immeasurably small when compared with those which might be derived from their extension.

"Yet the Bombay government has made about 550 miles only of road, in thirty years,"* says Mr. Williamson. The expenditure on works of irrigation, and on the construction of roads and bridges for ten years, ending 1845-6, was only 399,276*l.*,† this Presidency being one, on which as we have shown, the cost of superintendence was enormously high.

That roads, canals, and irrigation in our Indian possessions may still be classed among the category of wants, now remains beyond a doubt; that from the absence of the first and second of these wants, the people have been kept in a state far lower than it concerns the safety of the country that they should remain, is evident; for they have been cut off from markets, where not only the produce of the interior would find a profitable outlet, but the British goods, which at present are imported in proportion of two-thirds less to India than to other countries more favourably conditioned, would gain in value and increase in number; and furnish to the natives at prices not above their means, comforts, which at present are denied to them; they have been reduced to the tremendous sufferings of local famines, by the impossibility of equalising prices on the commonest articles of food, from want of intercommunication. They are kept ill-clad, ill-fed, and abject in every degree, by the same cause, which closes to British enterprise a

* Mr. Williamson's evid., Cotton Rep., 1848, p. 170.

† India Public Works Rep., 1851, p. 208.

population three times as great as that of all other countries put together which we supply with manufactures, out of Europe and the United States; and the effects of such a state of things must be to foster discontent and inspire hatred of our rule.

From the absence of irrigation, vast tracts which might be fertilised, remain barren, and are profitless, notwithstanding the known results of such improvements in producing increase of revenue; results which might become still greater were the benefits attending roads through irrigated districts more fully felt and thoroughly attended to.

These wants, however, will never be supplied so long as the present system remains in force. Neglect, recklessness, delay, misappropriation of funds to swell revenue, instead of furthering improvement, are proved against the Company. A vast reform will be required. Where great thorough lines of intercommunications are required, railroads must be made, and that speedily—not at the present creeping pace; roads to meet the most important internal lines must be bridged, metalled, and completed; canals be fitted for navigation as well as irrigation; and whilst the profit obtained from completed works is devoted to necessary repairs and fresh improvements, the niggardly expenditure of the present day must be changed for one commensurate with the importance of our Indian territories. Let us, in fine, initiate some new system of policy which shall have for one of its objects the material improvement of India, upon which not only depends the future welfare of the people of that country, but the prosperity of that greatest of English interests—British manufactures.

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INDIA REFORM SOCIETY.

On Saturday, the 12th of March, a Meeting of the Friends of India was held in Charles Street, St. James's Square, with a view of bringing public opinion to bear on the Imperial Parliament in the case of India, so as to obtain due attention to the complaints and claims of the inhabitants of that vast empire. H. D. Seymour, Esq., M.P., having been called to the chair, the following Resolutions were agreed to by the Meeting:—

1. That the character of the alterations to be effected in the constitution of our Indian Government at the termination of the East India Company's Charter Act, on the 30th of April, 1854, is a question which demands the most ample and most serious consideration.

2. That although Committees of both Houses of Parliament have been appointed, in conformity with the practice on each preceding renewal of the Charter Act, for the purpose of investigating the nature and the results of our Indian Administration, those Committees have been appointed on the present occasion at a period so much later than usual, that the interval of time remaining before the expiration of the existing powers of the East India Company, is too short to permit the possibility of collecting such evidence as would show what alterations are required in our Indian Government.

3. That the inquiry now being prosecuted by Committees of the Legislature will be altogether unsatisfactory, if it be confined to the evidence of officials and of servants of the East India Company, and conducted and terminated without reference to the petitions and wishes of the more intelligent of the natives of India.

4. That it is the duty of the friends of India to insist upon a temporary Act to continue the present government of India for a period not exceeding three years, so that time may be given for such full inquiry and deliberation as will enable Parliament within that period to legislate permanently for the future administration of our Indian Empire.

5. That, in order to obtain such a measure, this Meeting constitutes itself an "India Reform Society," and names the undermentioned gentlemen as a Committee.

T. Barnes, Esq., M.P.
J. Bell, Esq., M.P.
W. Biggs, Esq., M.P.
J. F. B. Blackett, Esq., M.P.
G. Bowyer, Esq., M.P.
J. Bright, Esq., M.P.
F. C. Brown, Esq.
H. A. Bruce, Esq., M.P.
Lieut.-Col. J. M. Caulfield, M.P.
J. Cheetham, Esq. M.P.
W. H. Clarke, Esq.
S. Crawford, Esq.
J. Crook, Esq., M.P.
J. Dickinson, Jun., Esq.
M. G. Fielden, Esq., M.P.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. F. Fitzgerald, K.C.B., M.P.
M. Forster, Esq., M.P.
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R. Gardner, Esq., M.P.
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H. D. Seymour, Esq., M.P.
W. D. Seymour, Esq., M.P.
J. B. Smith, Esq. M.P.
J. Sullivan, Esq.
G. Thompson, Esq., M.P.
F. Warren, Esq.
J. A. Wise, Esq. M.P.

Correspondence on all matters connected with the Society to be addressed to the Hon. Secretary, by whom subscriptions will be received in aid of its object.

JOHN DICKINSON, Jun., *Hon. Sec.*

Committee Rooms, Clarence Chambers, 12, Haymarket,
April 12th, 1853.

राष्ट्रीय पुस्तकालय, कोलकाता

INDIA REFORM.

No. IX.

THE

STATE AND GOVERNMENT

OF

INDIA UNDER ITS NATIVE RULERS.

By J. SULLIVAN, ESQ.

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IMPERIAL

INDIA REFORM.

THE STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF INDIA UNDER ITS NATIVE RULERS.

We threaten to appropriate the territories of the Native Princes, our allies, upon the strength mainly of our own virtues, and of their vices. All Native Governments, we say, are bad; all Native Governors are tyrants and sensualists. Their subjects are groaning under oppression, and we are bound to relieve them; all who wear turbans are worthless—all who wear hats are worthy. There was no good Government in India until the advent of the Anglo-Saxon; it is the Anglo-Saxon who has taught the Indian the arts of civil life, and who shows him what Government ought to be. The ruins of the tombs and temples of ancient Greece and Rome are worthy of all admiration; they are proofs of the genius and taste of the people who created them: the more magnificent ruins of Ancient India are monuments only of ostentation and selfishness. "I contemplated those ruins," said Lord Ellenborough, "with admiration of our predecessors, "and with humiliation at our own short-comings." "You "might as well be humiliated by the sight of the Pyramids," was the retort of Lord Aberdeen.

What is deserving of all praise in the West, is not praiseworthy in the East. When we see great works of utility and ornament in the West, we pronounce them to be evidence of prosperous and tranquil Governments; but similar works in the East seem to lead us to a different judgment. At this moment we are dependent for millions of our revenue upon magnificent works of irrigation, constructed by our predecessors, the country is strewed with the remains of similar

works. We pass them without notice, and dwell upon our own comparatively puny efforts at imitation.

We found the people of India, it is said, abject, degraded, false, to the very core. Mussulman dominion had called into full activity all the bad qualities which Hindooism has in itself a fatal tendency to generate. The most indolent and selfish of our own Governors have been models of benevolence and beneficence when compared with the greatest of the Native Sovereigns. The luxurious selfishness of the Moghul Emperors depressed and enfeebled the people. Their predecessors were either unscrupulous tyrants, or indolent debauchees. Nor were their successors, the Ghilji Sovereigns, any better.

Having the command of the public press in this country, and the sympathy of the public mind with us, it is an easy task thus to exalt ourselves at the expense of our predecessors. We tell our own story, and our testimony is unimpeachable; but if we find any thing favourable related of those who have preceded us, the accounts we pronounce to be suspicious. We contrast the Moghul conquests of the fourteenth century with the "victorious, mild and mer-"ciful progress of the British arms in the East in the nine-"teenth." But, if our object was a fair one, we should contrast the Mussulman invasion of Hindostan, with the contemporaneous Norman invasion of England—the characters of the Mussulman Sovereigns with their contemporaries in the West—their Indian wars of the fourteenth century with our French wars, or with the Crusades—the effect of the Mahomedan conquest upon the characters of the Hindoo, with the effect of the Norman conquest upon the Anglo-Saxon, when "to be called an Englishman was considered as "a reproach—when those who were appointed to administer "justice were the fountains of all iniquity—when magistrates, "whose duty it was to pronounce righteous judgments were "the most cruel of all tyrants, and greater plunderers than "common thieves and robbers;"—when the great men were inflamed with such a rage of money, that they cared not by what means it was acquired—when the licentiousness was so

great that a Princess of Scotland found "it necessary to wear "a religious habit in order to preserve her person from "violation."*

The history of the Mahomedan dynasties in India is full, it is said, of lamentable instances of the cruelty and rapacity of the early conquerors, not without precedent, however, in contemporary Christian history; for when Jerusalem was taken by the first Crusaders, at the end of the 11th century, the garrison, consisting of 40,000 men, "was put to the "sword without distinction; arms protected not the brave, "nor submission the timid; no age or sex received mercy; "infants perished by the same sword that pierced their "mothers. The streets of Jerusalem were covered with heaps "of slain, and the shrieks of agony and despair resounded "from every house." When Louis VII. of France, in the 12th century, "made himself master of the town of Vitri, he "ordered it to be set on fire; in consequence of this inhuman "order, 1300 persons who had taken refuge, perished in the "flames." In England, at the same time, under our Stephen, war "was carried on with so much fury, that the land "was left uncultivated, and the instruments of husbandry "were destroyed or abandoned:" and the result of our French wars in the 14th century, was a state of things "more hor-"rible and destructive than was ever experienced in any age "or country." The insatiable cruelty of the Mohamedan conquerors, it is said, stands recorded upon more undeniable authority, than the insatiable benevolence of the Mohamedan conquerors. We have abundant testimony of the cruelty of contemporary Christian conquerors, have we any evidence of their benevolence?

As attempts are thus systematically made, in bulky volumes, to run down the character of Native Governments and Native Sovereigns, in order that we may have a fair pretext for seizing upon their possessions, it becomes necessary to shew that we have a Christian Roland for every Native Oliver: that if the Mussulman conquerors of India were cruel and rapacious, they were matched by their Christian contempo-

* Henry of Huntingdon, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, and Eadmon.

raries. It is much our fashion to compare India in the 15th and 16th centuries with England in the 19th, and to pique ourselves upon the result. "When we compare other coun-"tries with England," said a sagacious observer,* "we usually "speak of England as she now is, we scarcely ever think of "going back beyond the Reformation, and we are apt to regard "every foreign country as ignorant and uncivilized, whose "state of improvement does not in some degree approximate "to our own, even though it should be higher than our own "was at no distant period." It would be almost as fair to compare India in the 16th with England in the 19th century, as it would be to compare the two countries in the first centuries of the Christian era, when India was at the top of civilization, and England at the bottom. India had gradually declined in civilization, from the date of the invasion of Alexander, up to the time of the first Mussulman conquest; but we have abundant testimony to prove, that at that date, and for centuries before it, her people enjoyed a high degree of prosperity, which continued to the breaking up of the Moghul Empire early in the 18th century.

THE STATE OF INDIA AT THE TIME OF GREEK INVASION.

"All the descriptions of the parts of India visited by the "Greeks," Mr. Elphinstone tells us, "give the idea of a "country teeming with population, and enjoying the highest "degree of prosperity." There were 1500 cities between the Hydaspes and the Hyphasis. Palilothra was eight miles long, and one and a half broad, defended by a deep ditch and high rampart, with 570 towers and 164 gates. The numerous commercial cities and posts for foreign trade, which are mentioned in the Periplus attest the progress of the Indians in a department which more than any other shews the advanced condition of a nation. Arrian mentions with admiration that

* Sir Thomas Munro.

all the Indians were free. The army was in constant pay during war and peace; the arms and horses were supplied by the State; they never ravaged the country. The Greeks speak of the bravery of the Indian armies opposed to them, as superior to that of other nations with whom they had to contend in Asia. They spoke of the police as excellent. In the camp of Sandracotus, consisting of 400,000 men, the sums stolen did not amount to more than about £3 daily. Justice was administered by the King and his assessors. The revenue was derived from the land, which was said to belong to the King: it amounted to one-fourth of the produce. The fields were all measured, and the water carefully distributed for irrigation; taxes were imposed upon trade, and an income-tax levied from merchants and traders. Royal roads are spoken of by Strabo, and mile stones; the war-chariots were drawn by horses in time of war, and by oxen on a march. The arts, though simple, were far from being in a rude state. Gold, gems, silks, and ornaments were in all families; the professions mentioned shew all that is necessary to civilized life. The number of grains, spices, &c. which were grown, afford proofs that the country was in a high state of cultivation. "Their institutions were less rude, their conduct to "their enemies more humane, their general learning much "more considerable, and in the knowledge of the being and "nature of God, they were already in possession of a light "which was but faintly perceived, even by the loftiest intel-"lects in the best days of Athens."*

In the time of Avoca, a Hindoo Sovereign, who reigned some centuries before the Christian era, his edict columns bear testimony to the extent of his dominions, and the civilized character of his Government; since they contain orders "for establishing hospitals and dispensaries through-"out his empire; as well as for planting trees and digging "wells along the public highways;" and fifty-six years A.C. another Hindoo Sovereign, Vicbrermadiytia, is represented to have been a powerful monarch, who ruled a civilized and populous country.

* Elphinstone's History of India, vol. i.

Writers, both Hindoo and Mussulman, unite in bearing testimony to the state of prosperity in which India was found at the time of the first Mahomedan conquest. They dwell with admiration on the extent and magnificence of the capital of the kingdom of Canouij, and of the inexhaustible riches of the Temple of Somnath.

Many of the Sovereigns of each of the Mussulman dynasties were men of extraordinary character. The prudence, activity, and enterprize of Mahommed of Giuzni, and his encouragement of literature and the arts, were conspicuous; "he shewed so much munificence to individuals of eminence, "that his capital exhibited a greater assemblage of literary "genius than any other monarch in Asia has ever been able "to produce. If rapacious in acquiring wealth, he was "unrivalled in the judgment and grandeur with which he "knew how to expend it."

His four immediate successors were patrons of literature and the arts, and acceptable to their subjects as good governors. Can we say as much for their contemporaries, William the Norman and his descendants, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries? It is generally supposed that the conquest of India by the Mahomedans was an easy task, but history tells us that none of the Hindoo principalities fell without a severe struggle; that some of them were never subdued, but remain substantive States at this moment, and that Shahab-u-Deen, the first founder of the Mahomedan empire in India, towards the end of the twelfth century, was signally defeated by the Rajpoot Sovereign of Delhi.*

One of his successors, Koortub-u-deen, who erected the Koortub Minar, "the highest column in the world," and near it a mosque, which for grandeur of design and elegance of execution, was equal to any thing in India, was generally beloved for the frankness and generosity of his disposition, and left a permanent reputation as a just and virtuous ruler.

Sultana Rezia "was endowed," says the historian Ferishta, "with every princely virtue, and those who scrutinize her

* Elphinstone's History of India, vol. . p. 547—606; vol. ii. p. 90.

" actions the most severely, will find in her no fault," but " that she was a woman." She evinced all the qualities of a just and able sovereign. History does not make quite such favourable mention of our King John, or of Philip of France, her contemporaries. Jueal-u-deen, of the same dynasty, was celebrated for his clemency, his magnanimity and love of literature.

The Hindoo kingdoms of Carnata and Tellingana were re-established about the middle of the 14th century. The first, with its capital, Bijanuggur, "attained to a pitch of power " and splendour not perhaps surpassed by any previous Hindoo " dynasty;" and such was the mutual estimation between the Hindoo and Mussulman Sovereigns of the Deckan, that inter-marriages took place between them, Hindoos were in high command in the Mussulman army, and Mussulmen in the Hindoo, and one Rajah of Bijanuggur built a mosque for his Mahomedan subjects.* In the reign of Mahomed Toglak, A.D. 1351, there was an admirably regulated horse and foot post from the frontier to the capital. That capital, Delhi, is described as a most magnificent city, its mosques and walls without an equal on the earth.

The public works of his successor, Feroz Shah, consisted of 50 dams across rivers to promote irrigation, 40 mosques and 30 colleges, 100 caravanseries, 30 reservoirs, 100 hospitals, 100 public baths, 150 bridges, besides many other edifices for pleasure and ornament, and, above all, the canal from the point in the Jumna where it leaves the mountains of Carnal, to Hansi and Hissar, a work which has been partially restored by the British Government. The historian of this monarch expatiates on the happy state of the ryots under his government, on the goodness of their houses and furniture, and the general use of gold and silver ornaments amongst their women. He says, among other things, that every ryot had a good bedstead, and a neat garden. He is said to be a writer not much to be trusted; but the general state of the country must no doubt have been flourishing, for Milo de Conti, an Italian traveller, who visited India about A.D. 1420, speaks highly of what he

* Elphinstone, vol. ii. pp. 203.

saw in Guzerat, and found the banks of the Ganges covered with towns, amidst beautiful gardens and orchards. He passed four famous cities before he reached Maarazia, which he describes as a powerful city, filled with gold, silver, and precious stones. His accounts are corroborated by those of Barbora and Bartema, who travelled in the early part of the 16th century. The former in particular describes Cambay as a remarkably well built city, situated in a beautiful and fertile country, filled with merchants of all nations, and with artizans and manufacturers like those of Flanders. Cæsar Frederic gives a similar account of Guzerat, and Ibn Batuta, who travelled during the anarchy and oppression of Mohammed Tagluk's reign, in the middle of the 15th century, when insurrections were reigning in most parts of the country, enumerates many large and populous towns and cities, and gives a high impression of the state in which the country must have been before it fell into disorder.

Abdurizag, an ambassador from the grandson of Tamerlane, visited the South of India in 1442, and concurs with other observers in giving the impression of a prosperous country. The kingdom of Candeish was at this time in a high state of prosperity under its own kings; the numerous stone embankments by which the streams were rendered applicable to irrigation are equal to any thing in India as works of industry and ability.

Baber, the first sovereign of the Moghul dynasty, although he regards Hindostan with the same dislike that Europeans still feel, speaks of it as a rich and noble country, and expresses his astonishment at the swarming population and the innumerable workmen of every kind and profession. Besides the ordinary business of his kingdom, he was constantly occupied with making aqueducts, reservoirs, and other improvements, as well as in introducing new fruits, and other productions of remote conquerors. His son, Humayon, whose character was free from vices and violent passions, was defeated, and obliged to fly from Hindostan, by Shir Shah, who is described as a prince of consummate prudence and ability, "whose measures were as wise as benevolent," and

who, notwithstanding his constant activity in the field, during a short reign had brought his territories into the highest order, and introduced many improvements into his civil government. "He made a high road extending for four "months' journey from Bengal to the Western Rhotas near "the Indus, with caravanserais at every stage, and wells at "every mile and a half. There was an Imam and Muezzim "at every mosque, and provisions for the poor at every cara-"vanserai, with attendants of proper castes for Hindoos, as "well as for Mussulmen. The road was planted with rows "of trees for shade, and in many places was in the state "described when the author saw it, after it had stood for "eighty-two years."*

It is almost superfluous to dwell upon the character of the celebrated Akbar, who was equally great in the cabinet and in the field, and renowned for his learning, toleration, liberality, clemency, courage, temperance, industry, and largeness of mind. But it is to his internal policy that Akbar owes his place in that highest order of princes whose reigns have been a blessing to mankind.† He forbad trials by ordeal, and marriages before the age of puberty; and the slaughter of animals for sacrifice. He also permitted widows to marry a second time, contrary to Hindoo law. Above all, he positively prohibited the burning of Hindoo widows against their will. He employed his Hindoo subjects equally with Mahomedans, abolished the capitation tax on infidels, as well as all taxes on pilgrims, and positively prohibited the making slaves of persons taken in war. He perfected the financial reforms which had been commenced in those provinces by Shir Shah. He remeasured all the lands capable of cultivation within the empire; ascertained the produce of each begah;‡ determined the proportion to be paid to the public; and commuted it for a fixed money rent, giving the cultivator the option of paying in kind, if he thought the money rate too high. He abolished at the same time a vast

* Elphinstone's History, vol. ii. p. 151. † Ib. p. 280.

‡ More than half an acre.

number of vexatious taxes and fees to officers. The result of these wise measures was to reduce the amount of the public demand considerably. His instructions to his revenue officers have come down to us, and show his anxiety for the liberal administration of his system, and for the ease and comfort of his subjects. The tone of his instructions to his judicial officers was "just and benevolent;" he enjoined them to be sparing in capital punishments, and unless in cases of dangerous sedition, to inflict none until he had received the Emperor's confirmation. He forbad mutilation, or other cruelty, as the accompaniment of capital punishment. He reformed and new modelled his army, paying his troops in cash from the treasury, instead of by assignments on the revenue. Besides fortifications, and other public works, he erected many magnificent buildings, which are described and eulogized by Bishop Heber. System and method were introduced into every part of the public service, and the whole of his establishments present "an astonishing picture of magnificence and good order, where unwieldy numbers are managed without disturbance, and economy is attended to in the midst of profusion."

Akbar appears with as much simplicity as dignity. European witnesses describe him as "affable and majestical, mer-" ciful and severe; temperate in diet, sparing in sleep, skilful " in making guns, casting ordnance, and mechanical arts, cu-" riously industrious, affable to the vulgar, loved and feared " of his own, terrible to his enemies." Can we say as much for his great contemporaries,—Elizabeth of England, or Henry the Fourth of France?

The Italian traveller, Pietro del Valle, who wrote in the last year of the reign of Jehanger, Akbar's son, A.D. 1623, bears this testimony to the character of that prince, and to the condition of the people under his rule:—"Generally all "live much after a genteel way, and they do it securely; as "well, because the king does not prosecute his subjects with "false accusations nor deprive them of anything when he sees "them live splendidly and with the appearance of riches (as is

"often done in other Mahomedan countries), as because the "Indians are inclined to those vanities."

But the reign of Shah Jehan, the grandson of Akbar, was the most prosperous ever known in India. His own dominions enjoyed almost uninterrupted tranquillity and good government; and although Sir Thomas Roe was struck with astonishment at the profusion of wealth which was displayed when he visited the Emperor in his camp in 1615, in which at least two acres were covered with silk, gold carpets and hangings, as rich as velvet embossed with gold and precious stones could make them, yet we have the testimony of Tavernier that he who caused the celebrated peacock throne to be constructed, who, at the festival of his accession, scattered amongst the bystanders money and precious things equal to his own weight, "reigned not so much as a king over his subjects, but rather as a father over his family." His vigilance over his internal government was unremitting, and for the order and arrangement of his territory, and the good administration of every department of the State, no prince that ever reigned in India could be compared to Shah Jehan.

All his vast undertakings were managed with so much economy, that after defraying the expenses of his great expeditions to Candahar, his wars in Balk, and other heavy charges, and maintaining a regular army of 200,000 horse, Shah Jehan left a treasure, which some reckoned at near six, others at twenty-four millions in coin, besides his vast accumulations in wrought gold and silver, and in jewels.

His treatment of his people was beneficent and paternal, and his liberal sentiments towards those around him, cannot be better shewn than by the confidence which he so generously reposed in his sons.*

So stable was the foundation upon which this prosperity rested that the empire continued to be in a flourishing condition for a large portion of the long, intolerant, and oppressive

* Elphinstone, vol. ii. p. 399.

reign of Aurungzebe, and notwithstanding the misgovernment which followed in the next thirty years, under a series of weak and wicked princes, and the commotions which attended the breaking up of the empire, the enormous wealth which Nadir Shah was enabled to carry away with him when he quitted Delhi in 1739, is proof that the country was still in a comparatively prosperous condition.

Among many distinguished Princes of the Deccan in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Mulik Amber, the Regent of Beejapore, holds a distinguished place, both as a warrior and a statesman. He is described to have been a man of uncommon genius. He made his regency respected at home and abroad. He abolished revenue farming—substituted a fixed money assessment for a payment in kind—revived the village establishments, where they had fallen into decay. By such means the country soon became thriving and prosperous, and although his expenditure was liberal his finances were abundant. For upwards of twenty years he was the bulwark of his country against foreign conquest. Though almost constantly engaged in war, this great man found leisure to cultivate the arts of peace. He founded the city of Kirkee, built several splendid palaces, and introduced a system of internal administration, which has left his name in every village far more venerated as a ruler, than renowned as a general.*

Of the character of the Hindoo Sovereigns who were the contemporaries of the Mussulman Emperors in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries we know nothing; but we know that their territories had attained to a pitch of power and splendour which had not been surpassed by their ancestors. We know also that the principal administrators of the Mussulman dynasties, with rare exceptions, were Hindoos—that they were entrusted with the command of armies, and with the regulation of the finances.

The "robber," Sevajee, who entered upon the scene in the

* Grant Duff, vol. i. pp. 94-6.

latter part of the sixteenth century, and who shook the Moghul Empire to its foundation during the reign of Aurungzebe, was an able as well as a skilful general. His civil government was regular, and he was vigorous in exacting, from his provincial and his village officers, obedience to the rules which he laid down for the protection of the people. His enemies bear witness to his anxiety to mitigate the evils of war by humane regulations, which were strictly enforced. Altogether, this robber hero has left a character which has never since been equalled or ever approached by any of his countrymen. None, however, of his military successes raise so high an idea of his talents as the spirit of his domestic administration,* and the effect of these appear to have been permanent for nearly eighty years after his death, viz. in 1758. We have the following interesting account of the state of the Mahratta Territory from the pen of Anquetil du Perron :—

"On the 14th of February, 1758, I set out from Mahé for Goa, in order to proceed to Surat, and, in all my routes, I took care to keep specimens of the money of all the states I passed through, so that I have examples of every coin that is current from Cape Cormorin to Delhi. From Surat, I passed the Ghats, the 27th of March the same year, about ten in the morning, and when I entered the country of the Mahrattas, I thought myself in the midst of the simplicity and happiness of the golden age, where nature was yet unchanged, and war and misery were unknown. The people were cheerful, vigorous, and in high health, and unbounded hospitality was an universal virtue : every door was open, and friends, neighbours, and strangers, were alike welcome to whatever they found. When I came within seven miles of Aurungabad, I went to see the celebrated pagoda of Ellora."†

Sevajee had several worthy successors; amongst them were the Peishwahs, Ballajee, Wiswanath, and his son Bajee Rao Bullal. This latter is said to have united the

* Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas, vol. ii.

† Extracted from page 376 of the "Gentleman's Magazine" of 1762, headed "Brief Account of a Voyage to India, by M. Anquetil du Peron."

enterprize, and vigour, and hardihood of a Mahratta Chief with the polished manners, sagacity, and address, which frequently distinguish the Brahmins of the Concan. He had the head to plan and the hand to execute. To assiduous industry, and minute observation, he superadded a power of discrimination that brought him to fix his mind to points of political importance. He was a man of uncommon eloquence, penetration, and vigour, simple in his habits, enterprizing and skilful as a military leader, and at all times partaking of the fare and sharing the privations of the meanest horseman.

His successor, Ballajee Rao, was a man of considerable political sagacity, of polished manners, and of great address, though indolent and voluptuous, he was generous and charitable, kind to his relations and dependants, and an enemy to external violence; amidst the distractions of war, he devoted much of his time to the civil administration of his territory; in his reign the condition of the whole Mahratta population was much ameliorated, the system of farming the revenues was abolished, the ordinary tribunals of civil justice were improved, and the Mahratta peasantry "have ever since blessed the days of Nana Lahish Puweshwar."* Although the military talents of Mahdoo Rao, who succeeded him, were conspicuous, yet his character as a sovereign is entitled to far higher praise. "He is deservedly celebrated for his firm support of the weak against the oppressive—of the poor against the rich—and, as far as the construction of society admitted—for his equity to all." He prevented his revenue officers from abusing their authority by vigilant superintendance, and by readily listening to the complaints of the common cultivators, and at that time, the Mahratta country, in proportion to its fertility, was more thriving than any other part of India. The preference shown in promoting officers who could boast of hereditary rights encouraged patriotism and applied national feeling to purposes of good government. Mahdoo Rao was assisted in his government by his minister, "the celebrated Ram,"

* Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas, vol. ii. p 160

Ram Shastree, a pure and upright judge, whose conduct would have been considered admirable under any circumstances. The benefits which he conferred on his countrymen were principally by example. The weight and soundness of his opinions were universally acknowledged during his life, and the decisions of the Punchayets which gave decrees in his time are still considered precedents. His conduct and unwearied zeal had a wonderful effect in improving the people of all ranks; he was a pattern to the well disposed; the greatest man who did wrong stood in awe of Ram Shastree, and although persons possessed of rank and riches did, in several instances, try to corrupt him, none dared to repeat the experiment, or to impeach his integrity. His habits were simple in the extreme; it was a rule with him to keep nothing more in his house than sufficed for the day's consumption.* And such was his sterling virtue and stern sense of justice, that when asked by Ragonauth Rao, what atonement he could make for his participation in the murder of his nephew, the Peishwah Nasrain Rao, the brother and immediate successor of Madhoo Rao: "The sacrifice of your own life," was the reply of the virtuous and undaunted Shastree; "for your "future life cannot be passed in amendment, neither you nor "your government can prosper; and for my own part, I will "neither accept employment nor enter Poonah, whilst you "preside in the administration." He kept his word, and retired to a sequestered village near Waee.† The murdered Nasrain Rao, a youth of eighteen, was affectionate to his relations, kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him.

The celebrated Hyder Ali was the contemporary and antagonist of Madhoo Rao, by whom he was more than once signally defeated; but Hyder turned these failures to account, and, like the Czar Peter, "submitted to be worsted that he "might learn to be superior." By usurpation from his sovereign, the Rajah of Mysore, and by subsequent conquests, he made himself master of a territory 400 miles in length from north to south, and near 300 miles in breadth from east to

* Grant Duff, vol. ii. p. 208. † Ibid. p. 250.

west, with a population of many millions, an army of 300,000 men, and a revenue computed to amount to £5,000,000. Although almost constantly engaged in war, the improvement of his country and the strictest executive administration formed the constant objects of his care. The manufacturer and the merchant prospered in every part of his dominions; cultivation increased, new manufactures were established, and wealth flowed into the kingdom. Against negligence or malversation he was inexorable; the officers of revenue fulfilled their duty with fear and trembling; the slightest defalcation was summarily punished. He had his eye upon every corner of his own dominions, and in every Court of India. The minutest circumstance of detail was known to him; not a movement in the remotest corner could escape him; not a murmur or intention of his neighbours but flew to him. His secretaries successively read to him the whole correspondence of the day, and although unable to write himself, he dictated in few words the substance of the answer to be given, which was immediately written, read to him, and dispatched. He possessed the happy secret of uniting minuteness of detail with the utmost latitude of thought and enterprize. As his perseverance and dispatch of business were only equalled by his pointedness of information, so his conciseness and decision in the executive departments of a great government, are probably unprecedented in the annals of man.*

He bequeathed to his son, Tippoo Sultan, an overflowing treasury, which he had filled; a powerful empire, which he had created; an army of 300,000 men, that he had formed, disciplined, and inured to conquest; and a territory which, as contemporary historians and eye-witnesses assure us, had in no way deteriorated under the sway of his successor.

"When a person, travelling through a strange country, "finds it well cultivated, populous with industrious inhabi-"tants, cities newly founded, commerce extending, towns "increasing, and every thing flourishing, so as to indicate "happiness, he will naturally conclude it to be under a form

* For this character of Hyder, see Colonel Fullarton's View of the Interests of India, and Wilks' History of India, vol. ii.

"of government congenial to the minds of the people. This "is a picture of Tippoo's country, and this is our conclusion "respecting its government. It has fallen to our lot to tarry "some time in Tippoo's dominions, and to travel through "them as much, if not more, than any other officer in the "field during the war; and we have reason to suppose his "subjects to be as happy as those of any other sovereign; "for we do not recollect of any complaints or murmurings "among them; although, had causes existed, no time would "have been more favourable for their utterance, because the "enemies of Tippoo were in power, and would have been "gratified by any aspersion of his character. The inhabi- "tants of the conquered countries submitted with apparent "resignation to the direction of their conquerors; but by no "means as if relieved from an oppressive yoke in their "former government; on the contrary, no sooner did an op- "portunity offer, than they scouted their new masters, and "gladly returned to their loyalty again."* "Whether from "the operation of the system established by Hyder, from "the principles which Tippoo adopted for his own conduct, "or from his dominions having suffered little by invasion for "many years, or from the effect of these several causes "united, his country was found everywhere full of inhabi- "tants, and apparently cultivated to the utmost extent of "which the soil was capable, while the discipline and fide- "lity of his troops in the field, until their last overthrow, "were testimonies, equally strong, of the excellent regula- "tions which existed in his army. His government, though "strict and arbitrary, was the despotism of a strict and able "sovereign, who nourishes, not oppresses, the subjects who "are to be the means of his future aggrandisement; and his "cruelties were, in general, inflicted only on those whom he "considered as his enemies."†

It would be a great mistake, however, to suppose that all this prosperity was created either by Hyder or his son. Their sway, which did not last for half a century, was too short for

* Moore's Narrative of the War with Tippoo Sultaun, p. 201.

† Dirom's Narrative, p. 249.