

Q. Do you remember being with General Burgoyne, soon after the last council, 9.  
upon a visit to an out post near Fort Anne?

A. I perfectly recollect it.

Q. Had General Burgoyne a considerable escort of Indians with him? 10.

A. He had.

Q. Did part of that escort, on a scout from that post, fall in with and take 11.  
a part of the enemy, who were laid in ambush for the purpose of killing or taking  
the general, and those who were with him?

A. They did.

Q. What were the sentiments of the captain taken on that occasion respecting 12.  
his treatment from the Indians?

A. He said he was treated with much humanity, and I perfectly remember that  
prisoners brought in on many other occasions by the Indians, declared that they had  
been used with the same degree of humanity.

Q. Does your Lordship remember General Burgoyne's receiving at Fort Anne, the 13.  
news of the murder of Miss M'Rea?

A. I do.

Q. Did General Burgoyne repair immediately to the Indian camp, and call them to 14.  
council, assisted by Brigadier General Frazer?

A. He did.

Q. What passed at that council?

A. General Burgoyne threatened the culprit with death, insisted that he should 15.  
be delivered up; and there were many gentlemen of the army, and I own I was  
one of the number, who feared that he would put that threat in execution. Mo-  
tives of policy, I believe alone, prevented him from it; and if he had not pardoned  
the man, which he did, I believe the total defection of the Indians would have en-  
sued, and the consequences, on their return through Canada, might have been  
dreadful; not to speak of the weight they would have thrown into the op-  
posite scale, had they gone over to the enemy, which I rather imagine would  
have been the case.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne's restraining the Indian parties from 16.  
going out without a British officer or proper conductor, who were to be respon-  
sible for their behaviour?

A. I do.

Q. Do you remember Mr. St. Luc's reporting discontents amongst the Indians, 17.  
soon after our arrival at Fort Edward?

A. I do.

Q. How long was that after enforcing the restraints above mentioned? 18.

A. I can't exactly say; I should imagine about three weeks or a month.

Q. Does your Lordship recollect General Burgoyne's telling Mr. St. Luc, that 19.  
he had rather lose every Indian, than connive at their enormities, or using lan-  
guage to that effect?

A. I do.

Q. Does your Lordship remember what passed in council with the Indians at 20.  
Fort Edward?

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A. To

A. To the best of my recollection, much the same exhortation to act with humanity, and much the same rewards were offered for saving their prisoners.

21. Q. Do you recollect the circumstance of the Indians desiring to return home at that time?

A. I do, perfectly well.

22. Q. Do you remember that many quitted the army without leave?

A. I do, immediately after the council, and the next morning.

23. Q. Was it not the general opinion that the defection of the Indians, then and afterwards, was caused by the restraint upon their cruelties and habits of plunder?

A. It was.

24. Q. Had you reason to believe that the expedition to Bennington was much desired by General Reidesel, and that it was his wish to have it conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Baume?

A. It was always imagined in the army, that it was his wish, and that Colonel Baume was appointed to the command of it in compliment to him.

25. Q. Did you know the corps of British, commanded by Captain Frazer, which made part of that expedition?

A. They were volunteers from the British regiments, and also stood very high in the opinion of the army, from their gallant behaviour on all occasions.

26. Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne's visiting the detachment after it was assembled, and conferring with Colonel Baume?

A. I do.

27. Q. Did Colonel Baume appear satisfied with the strength of his corps?

A. I conversed with Colonel Baume, and with several officers under his command, and they appeared perfectly satisfied, at least I heard no complaint from them; the only anxiety they expressed was, lest the destination of that corps should become known to the enemy.

28. Q. Does your Lordship remember General Burgoyne's receiving, in the night, a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Baume, expressing he found the enemy in greater force than he expected?

A. I do.

29. Q. Do you remember Sir Francis Clarke, General Burgoyne's aid du camp, being sent with orders to Colonel Breyman to march immediately to support him?

A. I do.

30. Q. Did you communicate the same order to General Reidesel at the same time?

A. I did.

31. Q. Was Colonel Breyman the nearest corps for the purpose of that support?

A. It was.

32. Q. Did Brigadier General Frazer at all times treat your Lordship with great confidence?

A. I was often with General Frazer, and he frequently talked without reserve upon matters which he was not particularly bound to conceal. There were certain matters of intelligence which it would have been improper for him to mention to any body. In this case I cannot boast so much of his confidence, as to suppose that he would have opened his mind to me on matters which he would have concealed from the rest of his friends.

Q. Have you not frequently been present when General Burgoyne and General Frazer discussed the object of the campaign, and conversed freely on the circumstances of the time? 33.

A. I have.

Q. Did your Lordship ever, in presence or absence of General Burgoyne, hear General Frazer express a disapprobation of passing the Hudson's River? 34.

A. I never did?

Q. Do you know or believe that the idea of forcing our way to Albany was prevalent throughout the army? 35.

A. In every conversation I had with different officers of the army, I never remember once to have heard it doubted, but that we were to force our way.

Q. Did the army pass the Hudson's River with alacrity? 36.

A. It is impossible for any army to have been in higher spirits than they were at that time, or more desirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy.

Q. Do you not conceive, that to have remained posted behind the Hudson's River, at the time the army passed it and advanced, would have cast a damp on the spirits of that army and a reflection on their General? 37.

A. From the eagerness of the army to advance and the great uneasiness that was discernible through it on every delay, I apprehended that it could not have been otherwise; and I think that General Burgoyne's character would not have stood very high either with the army, this country, or the enemy, had he halted at Fort Edward.

Q. Do you recollect the march up to the enemy on the 19th of September? 38.

A. I do.

Q. Will you please to describe it? 39.

A. The army marched in three divisions; the German line flanking, the artillery and baggage pursued the course of the river through the meadows, and formed the left hand division; the British line marched parallel to it at some distance through the woods, and formed the centre division; General Frazer's corps, with the grenadiers and light infantry of the Germans, were obliged to make a large detour through the woods, and formed the right hand division or column. Beyond this, on the right, there were, as I understand, flanking parties of light infantry and Provincials?

Q. Was the country, over which the army passed, intersected with a deep ravine? 40.

A. It was one of the deepest I ever saw.

Q. Which column was first attacked? 41.

A. The advanced party, consisting of the picquets of the centre column, being sent forwards,

forwards, under the command of Major Forbes, to explore the way by which that column was to pass, fell in with a considerable body of the rebels, posted in a house and behind fences, which they attacked, and after a great deal of fire, the detachment nearly drove in the body of rebels; but on finding that the woods quite round them were filled with the enemy, they were obliged to retire to the main body.

42. Q. Was the march so performed that when General Burgoyne formed the line of the British infantry, General Frazer's corps were ready upon their right to support them?

A. General Frazer, on hearing the fire of Major Forbes's party, detached two companies to support them, which came up just after that engagement was over; and on their appearance the enemy finding that our troops were in strength, quitted the post they had before occupied, and, immediately after this, the whole line was formed with the utmost regularity. I would explain, that when I speak of the line, I do not include the left hand column which was composed of Germans, and which did not come into the line or into action till late in the day.

43. Q. How long did the action last?

A. From three o'clock, I think, till very near eight.

44. Q. How long were the 20th, 21st, and 62d regiments engaged?

A. During the greatest part of that time.

45. Q. Was the action well disputed by the enemy?

A. It was, very obstinately.

46. Q. Was your Lordship near the person of General Burgoyne during that action, except when you were employed to carry orders?

A. Yes.

47. Q. Were not different attempts made by the General's orders to charge the enemy with bayonets, and did not those attempts fail by the heaviness of the enemy's fire and thickness of the woods?

A. There were many attempts made for that purpose, and they all failed except the last, when the British troops finally drove them out of the field.

48. Q. When part of the German troops did get into action that day under General Reidesfel, how did they behave?

A. I heard their behaviour spoke of in the highest terms; they marched up to the enemy with great coolness and steadiness, and gave them, as I was told, three volleys by word of command from their officers.

49. Q. Can your Lordship speak to the loss sustained by the three British regiments, the 62d in particular?

A. The loss was very considerable; but I don't recollect the numbers.

50. Q. Were those three British regiments in a condition to have attacked the enemy the next morning?

A. Their numbers were so reduced, that I apprehend they were not.

51. Q. From the loss of killed and wounded, particularly of officers, would it have been desirable to have brought those three regiments into action for the next ten days?

A. In less than ten days the state of those regiments certainly would not have been



been much mended; I therefore apprehend, that if they were not in a condition to be brought into action the next morning, their inability would have still continued for those ten days.

Q. Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy's entrenchments before the redoubts were constructed that commanded the plain near the river, would not all the bateaux, stores, and hospitals have been exposed to attack? 52.

A. It certainly would have been so.

Q. Do you recollect the scarcity of forage on the west-side of the river? 53.

A. I do perfectly.

Q. Would not the bridge of boats, constructed for the purpose of foraging to the east side, have also been exposed before the redoubts, above mentioned, were raised? 54.

A. They certainly would, had it not been for those redoubts and a work called the *Tête du pont*, which was raised for the protection of the bridge.

Q. Do you recollect how long it took to raise those redoubts, to throw the bridge, and raise the *Tête du pont*? 55.

A. If I recollect right, the bridge itself was finished in one night; the making and completing the other works took some days.

Q. Does your Lordship remember General Burgoyne mentioning to you in confidence, the receipt of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, and his hourly expectation of his attacking the Highlands, and his opinion that his success there must dislodge the enemy without attacking their entrenchments? 56.

A. I perfectly recollect the General's mentioning all this to me.

Q. Was you near General Burgoyne in the action of the 7th of October? 57.

A. I was.

Q. Do you recollect what orders you carried? 58.

A. I do.

Q. What were they? 59.

A. The first orders I recollect to have carried, were to post fifty men under the command of a captain of the 20th regiment, to the left of the detachment of the army, in order, in some measure, to join them to the advanced works of General Fraser's camp, and, in case of any accident, to protect the detachment, should they find it necessary, to retire thither.

The next orders I carried were to Major General Phillips, at the end of the action, acquainting him, that as that detachment seemed much disordered from the enemy having turned both their flanks, that it was necessary to draw it as soon as possible back to the camp, which seemed menaced with an attack; the care of this General Burgoyne committed to General Phillips, while he himself returned to the camp, in order to take proper measures for its defence. On our return thither the works of the camp were actually attacked as General Burgoyne had foreseen, and I was then employed to collect what troops I should meet, and to order them to those parts where they were most wanted. Soon after this, the enemy having got round the right of our camp, we expected an attack upon our rear, and I then was dispatched with orders from General Burgoyne to Brigadier General Hamilton, for all the works in

the

the rear of the camp, which had been previously constructed, to be manned with such soldiers as he could spare from the defence of the front.

60. Q. Does your Lordship know what orders Sir Francis Clarke was charged with, at the time he received his wound?

A. I met Sir Francis Clarke as I was searching for General Phillips, and acquainted him with my orders, telling him at the same time, that as the thickness of the wood might prevent my finding General Phillips directly, I wished he would assist me, in order that no time might be lost in delivering those orders; that was the last time I saw Sir Francis Clarke, and I believe that soon afterwards he received the wound of which he died?

61. Q. Was it dark before General Burgoyne had a certainty that Col. Breyman was killed, and his post carried by the enemy?

A. It was so dark that the officer, who I believe first brought the intelligence of it, seeing a number of men round the fires of that camp, took them for Germans, and was not convinced of his error till he was fired upon by them, as they proved to be a party of the enemy who had forced the works.

62. Q. Did General Burgoyne use any efforts to rally the Germans who were returning from the action, and to persuade them to recover Colonel Breyman's post?

A. He certainly did his utmost endeavours for that purpose, which however were ineffectual from the darkness of the night, and the entire confusion in which they were.

63. Q. Were any other troops at hand that could have been spared for that purpose?

A. There certainly were not; every regiment was occupied in defence of its own lines which were not certainly overmanned.

64. Q. In the heat of the action do you recollect seeing General Reidesel about the time that the Germans, on the left of the British artillery, were giving way?

A. I do.

65. Q. Was not General Reidesel exerting himself to restore order in his troops?

A. General Reidesel appeared to me to have behaved, on that occasion, in every way as became a brave and intelligent officer.

66. Q. Was the retreat of the army in the night of the 7th made in good order, and a new position taken by the time it was day-light?

A. It certainly was.

67. Q. Was the army under arms the whole day of the 8th, and in continual expectation of action?

A. They were, and indeed were cannonaded during the greatest part of that day, and the advanced corps in particular, who were posted on a hill, were under almost a continual fire from the riflemen of the enemy.

68. Q. Do you recollect the circumstance of General Fraser's funeral on the afternoon of that day?

A. I do, perfectly well; the redoubt in which he was buried was very heavily cannonaded during the ceremony, and even previous to this they fired at those who attended

attended the corpse on its way thither, which I suppose was accidental, and proceeded from the enemy's seeing a number of people together.

Q. Who were the chief persons who attended that funeral? 69.

A. All the generals of the army, their aid du camps, and I believe all those who were not attached to any particular post, which at that time were very few.

Q. Was the retreat of the army on the night of the 8th, and on the day and part of the night of the 9th, made in good order? 70.

A. It was made in perfect good order.

Q. What was the weather on the day of the 9th? 71.

A. Exceeding wet. 72.

Q. What was the state of the troops, in point of fatigue, when they arrived at Saratoga?

A. They certainly must have been much fatigued, from the length of time they had been under arms, and more particularly so from the badness of the roads, occasioned by the rains.

Q. When it was day-light the next morning, did you see any part of the enemy upon the plain at Saratoga, on the ground where our artillery was afterwards posted? 73.

A. I don't recollect.

Q. Does your Lordship recollect seeing a corps of the enemy on the other side the Hudson's River opposite to Saratoga? 74.

A. Perfectly well; and they seemed in force.

Q. Do you remember the circumstance of a battery opening from that corps? 75.

A. I do perfectly well. The general, General Phillips, and several other gentlemen were at dinner. We were all obliged to remove, from finding ourselves in the range of that battery.

Q. We being in the range of that battery, must it not necessarily have commanded the ford on the Hudson's River? 76.

A. It certainly did command that ford.

Q. Do you recollect Lieut. Col. Sutherland being sent with a detachment of regulars and provincials from Saratoga, to cover a party of workmen employed to repair bridges, and render the road practicable? 77.

A. I perfectly recollect it.

Q. Do you recollect for what reason Colonel Sutherland and the regulars were recalled? 78.

A. I understood it was on the apprehension of an action.

Q. Does your Lordship recollect different scouts bringing reports of the enemy's being in possession of the country between Saratoga and Fort Edward, on both sides of the river? 79.

A. I do.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne's mentioning, in confidence to you, different ideas of forcing the ford over Hudson's River; of cutting away by the enemy's right, and attempting a rapid march to Albany; or by a night march to gain the fords above Fort Edward? 80.

A. I do perfectly remember that he mentioned to me all those ideas.

Q. Did

81. Q. Did you ever hear of an offer made by General Phillips to make his way to Ticonderoga with a body of troops?  
A. No.
82. Q. In the intimacy in which you lived with Major General Phillips, myself, and the officers in General Phillips's family, do you not think you should have heard of such an offer had it been made?  
A. I apprehend that I should have heard of it.
83. Q. Did your Lordship hear of General Phillips offering to attempt an escape through the woods, with one or two guides, for the purpose of putting himself at the head of the troops at Ticonderoga, for the future defence of that place?  
A. I heard it mentioned since I came to England, in some common conversation; but I never heard it hinted at while I was in America.
84. Q. The day before the council of the generals and field officers was called, can your Lordship speak of the state of things in general at Saratoga?  
A. The state of our army was certainly as bad as possible. Their numbers were few, their provisions short, and their position not a good one, owing to the nature of the country, which rose to the distance of some miles, one hill overtopping that which was next to it.
85. Q. Do you know any officer of that army who, in that situation, thought we had a right to more than honourable terms?  
A. Our situation, in the apprehension of every one there with whom I conversed, did not entitle us to more.
86. Q. Did the army in general look on the terms obtained, namely, the power of serving their country in other places, to be advantageous as well as honourable, and more than they had a right to expect?  
A. I believe they certainly did; and that few persons in the army expected so good terms as those which were granted.

*Examined by other Members of the Committee, and by General Burgoyne occasionally.*

87. Q. Did the Indians leave the army till after the battle of Bennington?  
A. Great numbers did, and at many different times.
88. Q. Were not some Indians on the expedition to Bennington?  
A. There were.
89. Q. Was the expedition originally sent out to Bennington?  
A. My situation in the army not entitling me to be in the council of war, and not being employed on that expedition, I was of course not entrusted with the orders that were given to Col. Baume.
90. Q. Have you reason to suppose that General Reidesel or Colonel Baume had a particular knowledge of that part of the country, so as to make it particularly proper to give Colonel Baume the command of that expedition?  
A. I believe there was no officer in that army of sufficient rank to have commanded such an expedition, who ever had been in that particular part of the country.

Q. The

Q. The intention of the expedition being, as appears by the papers on the table, 91.  
to sound the disposition of the people of that country, was that part of the country  
peopled with Germans, as many other parts of the country are?

A. I can't exactly speak to the description of the people of that country, as I  
was never there myself; but there were employed on that expedition numbers of  
provincials, many of whom were of that very country; and I apprehend that the  
common soldiers of a regular army are not the immediate people who are expected  
to sound the minds of any country to which they are sent.

Q. As your Lordship mentioned the alacrity with which the army passed the 92.  
Hudson's River, did the army in general think themselves at that time inadequate to  
the purpose of forcing their way to Albany?

A. The opinions of an army, who cannot be acquainted with the intelligence that  
has been received, are often erroneous. The army was in high spirits, and did not,  
I believe, doubt of reaching Albany.

Q. Did the General then doubt of reaching Albany?

A. I really don't know. 93.

Q. Were the rebels' entrenchments completed on the 19th of September?

A. I never saw the entrenchments at all. 94.

Q. How was our army employed between the 19th of September and the 7th of 95.  
October?

A. The army itself was employed in strengthening its position.

Q. Did it take the army eighteen days to strengthen its position before it made any 96.  
movement?

A. I can't exactly say. They were working all the time.

Q. What works were executed in that time?

A. There were numbers of redoubts erected; the tête-du-pont; lines before the 97.  
camp; outworks to the lines, in which guards and picquets were placed; and bat-  
teries.

Q. How many redoubts were erected?

A. I think in all there must have been five or six. 98.

Q. Was the erecting those works full employment for eighteen days?

A. I am not an engineer, or I certainly should endeavour to answer that question. 99.

Q. Were all those works necessary, in your opinion, for an army that meant to 100.  
march forward and attack the enemy?

A. They were necessary in our particular situation, being within half a mile of the  
enemy, to whom we were opposed, and being inferior in numbers.

Q. Does your Lordship know whether the enemy thought it necessary to fortify 101.  
themselves with redoubts?

A. I don't know what the species of their fortification was; but I have been  
always told that great labour had been employed on their works; and what small part  
I saw of them convinced me of it.

Q. Had you not information from deserters or friends what the enemy was 102.  
doing?

A. My situation in that army did not entitle me to receive that intelligence. When  
any person came to me to inform me that he had been employed in gaining such in-  
telligence, my duty was to bring him to the General.



103. Q. Was it not a matter of notoriety in the army, that the enemy received reinforcement between the 19th of September and the 7th of October?  
A. The manner of receiving intelligence in an army seldom transpires; the army might guess, but I believe they knew nothing.
104. Q. Was it not understood that the rebels had suffered a much greater loss than the king's troops on the 19th of September?  
A. It was.
105. Q. Was not the whole, or nearly the whole, of the rebel army engaged?  
A. I don't know; I apprehend the whole was not engaged.
106. Q. Was our army in general, in your apprehension, in as good a condition on the 20th of September as the rebel army, who had suffered much more?  
A. The rebel army was so numerous that their loss was not equally felt with ours.
107. Q. What number had you reason to suppose the rebel army consisted of on the 19th of September?  
A. I always understood they were very numerous. I never heard their numbers exactly.
108. Q. Was not the scarcity of forage foreseen by every body?  
A. Those with whom I conversed did not foresee it to the extent in which we experienced it.
109. Q. Was it prudent, in your Lordship's opinion, to bring, or attempt to bring, upwards of fourteen hundred horses to attend the army, in a country so destitute of forage?  
A. I never heard that the horses in our army were thought too numerous. On all occasions a scarcity of them was complained of.
110. Q. Do you know how many horses were allowed for the baggage of each regiment?  
A. I don't know.
111. Q. Does your Lordship know how many horses were employed about the train of artillery?  
A. I don't recollect; but the returns are on the table.
112. Q. Was the heavy artillery brought back from Stillwater, on the retreat of the army to Saratoga?  
A. We had lost some small part of it, and the rest was brought to Saratoga.
113. Q. Did the bringing back of that artillery delay that retreat or not?  
A. An army with cannon certainly cannot march so rapidly as one without cannon; but cannon always creates a delay which armies have been content to put up with.
114. Q. Was it necessary, in your opinion, in the situation in which the army retreated, to make their retreat as expeditious as possible?  
A. The army appeared to me that it did make its retreat as expeditious as possible.
115. Q. Would the leaving of heavy artillery behind, in your opinion, have made a difference of four miles in the march?  
A. I can't conceive that it would. The enemy were in force behind us; not having numbers to contend with them, it would have been a very desperate circumstance to have abandoned our cannon, in case of an attack.

Q. Were the heavy artillery, in effect, of any use in that retreat? 116.

A. I don't recollect as it happened, that they were of any other use than that of their not being turned against us.

Q. Might not those cannon have been spiked, and their trunnions have been knocked off, to have rendered them useless? 117.

A. I understand that the spikes in cannon are easily removed, and that it is not an easy matter, I believe almost an impossibility, with any tools that are carried in an army, to knock off the trunnions of brass cannon.

Q. Might not the retreat have been accelerated by leaving behind a great part of the baggage? 118.

A. I don't think it would. I do not remember that we were stopped on account of any particular impediment.

Q. Does your Lordship know at what time intelligence was received in General Burgoyne's army of the failure of Colonel St. Leger's expedition? 119.

A. I think it must have been in the month of August.

Q. Was not that before the passing of Hudson's River? 120.

A. I don't recollect the exact date of receiving that intelligence.

Q. Was it in the month of August? 121.

A. I cannot tell. I heard of it some time after by accident.

Q. Was there any heavy artillery with the army, properly so called? 122.

A. There was none of the heavy sort; we had medium twelve-pounders, and two twenty-four pounders, which we took from the enemy at Quebec, which were very much lighter than those twelve-pounders.

Q. From the state of the fatigue of the troops, when they arrived at Saratoga, do you apprehend they could have continued their march though there had been no artillery? 123.  
By Gen. Burgoyne.

A. The army was certainly very much fatigued. I believe they could have got but very little further. They certainly were not in a state for a long march.

Q. If the battle expected at Saratoga had been on the plain, would not the heaviest artillery we had have been one of our best dependencies? 124.

A. It certainly would; it would have given us a manifest superiority in that particular.  
By General Burgoyne.

Q. If the army had not been provided with the number of horses they had, by what means would their provisions or bateaux have been transported in places where the river was not navigable? 125.  
By General Burgoyne.

A. The transportation of the bateaux and provisions could not certainly have been carried on.

Q. Were there not such places on the Hudson's River between Fort Edward and Albany? 126.

A. There were.  
By General Burgoyne.

Q. Is it not at any rate a principal object with every army, and of a retreating one in particular, to preserve their artillery if it be possible, even at the expence of some labour and delay; and for the use they might be of to them afterwards, as well as on the retreat? 127.  
By other members

A. I apprehend the cannon are seldom abandoned, but through absolute necessity.

128. Q. Whether in general you can inform the committee, whether the army had a confidence in the general?

A. They certainly had a confidence in the general, and I do not believe that they have altered their opinion.

129. Q. Did the army then in general, and the officers in particular, entertain a favourable opinion of the general's conduct, capacity, and attachment to them in the various scenes in which he was engaged, and more particularly on very trying occasions?

A. I don't recollect that any officer, with whom I have had conversation, has ever expressed himself in different terms, and I believe there never was an army more deservedly pleased with the conduct of their general.

130. Q. Whether the army expressed any dissatisfaction at the general's return home; that is, whether they thought he came with any purposes not friendly to them, or looked on themselves as deserted by him?

A. I was not with the army when General Burgoyne came away; but I have conversed with many officers who have come from it, and they express no dissatisfaction on that head, much less looked on or considered General Burgoyne's intentions as inimical to them.

131. Q. What was the state of the American artillery, and how was it served?

A. Except on a few occasions, I do not remember their having made much use of their cannon; I thought on those occasions that they served them slowly, but not ill.

132. Q. Whether all circumstances considered at the time of the affair of Saratoga, the retreat of the army was practicable, either with or without artillery?

A. I thought it was impracticable.

133. Q. Whether after the convention at Saratoga you went to Albany?

A. Yes.

134. Q. Whether you had any opportunity of observing the nature of the country, if it was strong or woody, clear or open?

A. Very strong and woody, and a great number of hills.

135. Q. What was the distance?

A. I don't exactly recollect; about thirty-two miles.

136. Q. Was the situation of Albany a strong situation, or was it commanded by hills round it?

A. The situation of Albany was in a bottom very much commanded.

137. Q. If the army had penetrated to Albany, from whence might they have drawn their subsistence, if the country had been against them?

A. I don't know enough of the country to answer that question.

138. Q. Must they not have drawn their subsistence from New York?

A. I apprehend so, if they were not masters of the Mohawk country.

139. Q. Had you any opportunity of observing the extent of clear or cultivated country round Albany?

A. I can't very justly describe it, not having gone out of the town of Albany, from the time I came into it, till I embarked for New York.

Q. Do

Q. Do you think that, circumstanced as the army was after the engagement of the 19th of September, it would have been more advantageous to have returned than to have stayed and fortified the camp?

A. As matters have turned out, it certainly might; but I believe no one thought so at that time. [Withdraw.]

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MAJOR FORBES called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. WAS you major of the 9th regiment, and present with that regiment in the action near Fort Anne?

A. I was.

Q. What was the behaviour of the enemy on that occasion?

2.

A. At half past ten in the morning, they attacked us in front with a heavy and well-directed fire; a large body of them passed the creek on the left, fired from a thick wood across the creek on the left flank of the regiment; they then began to re-cross the creek, and attack us in the rear: we then found it necessary to change our ground, to prevent the regiments being surrounded; we took post on the top of a high hill to our right. As soon as we had taken post, the enemy made a very vigorous attack, which continued for upwards of two hours; and they certainly would have forced us, had it not been for some Indians that arrived and gave the Indian whoop, which we answered with three cheers; the rebels soon after that gave way.

Q. What command had you on the 19th of September?

3.

A. I commanded the picquets of the British.

Q. Was you attacked on the march, and with what degree of vigour?

4.

A. I was attacked with great vigour from behind railed fences, and a house, by a body of riflemen and light infantry.

Q. Was you wounded in that affair?

5.

A. Very early in the day.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne bringing up the British line to support you, and forming at the first opening of the wood?

6.

A. I do.

Q. Did General Fraser's corps arrive precisely in time to occupy the heights on the right of the British line when the action began?

7.

A. It did, and two companies of light infantry came to my support.

Q. Where did General Burgoyne post the 9th regiment?

8.

A. As



A. As soon as they came out of the wood, they filed off to the right, and were drawn off at a small distance from the left of General Frazer's corps, with orders to occupy two houses, one company in each, and defend them to the last extremity.

9. Q. Had you an opportunity in that situation to observe the stress of the action?

A. I had while we remained in that position.

10. Q. What was the progress of it?

A. The twenty-first and sixty-second regiments were drawn up on our left, and were attacked about three o'clock on the same ground where the picquets had been attacked. About that time I heard a great deal of firing to my right with the advanced corps; an officer came up to General Burgoyne, and acquainted him that the enemy were endeavouring to turn the left of the sixty-second regiment, on which he dispatched an aid-de-camp with orders to the twentieth regiment to form on the left of the sixty-second; immediately after, some companies of the light infantry came to occupy the ground the ninth were drawn up on; the ninth were then ordered behind a deep ravine, to form a corps-de-reserve. I saw nothing of the action after that.

11. Q. What was the strength of the ninth regiment on that day before they sustained any loss?

A. On the 15th of the month the weekly return was given in, and, to the best of my recollection, they were two hundred and fifty and odd rank and file fit for duty.

12. Q. What was the strength of the other regiments in the British line?

A. I cannot speak with any certainty, as I did not see the returns; but on talking with different commanding officers: the four British regiments were about one thousand one hundred, and the advanced corps about one thousand two hundred.

13. Q. Where was the twenty-fourth regiment?

A. With the advanced corps.

14. Q. Where was the forty-seventh regiment?

A. Six companies of the forty-seventh regiment that were with that army, were employed as a guard to the bateaux and provisions, and two with the advanced corps.

15. Q. Where were the other two companies of that regiment left?

A. One at Fort George, and another on an island in Lake George.

16. Q. Of the eleven hundred which composed the line on that day, do you know how many were lost and disabled in the action?

A. I have heard the surgeon of the hospital say, that there were more than five hundred of the whole in the hospital, but I can't speak to how many of the line.

17. Q. Can you say how many were killed?

A. I can't.

18. Q. Can you say how many officers were killed and wounded?

A. I can't immediately.

Q. Were



Q. Were the British troops in a condition to have attacked an enemy in intrenchments after the action? 19.

A. After the action of the 19th, I went to the hospital to get my wounds dressed, and did not join the regiment till the 8th of October; I can't therefore give an opinion of my own: but I have heard several officers say, they did not think it would have been prudent or right from the loss they had sustained the day before.

Q. Did the regiments begin to be increased in their strength from the recovered men to any considerable degree in less than eight or ten days? 20.

A. Not that I know of. I was at the hospital at the time.

Q. Being in the hospital, had you occasion to know that the regiments were stronger from the receipt of their recovered men on the 7th of October, than they were at any time between the 19th of September and that day? 21.

A. I know that several men were discharged from the hospitals so far recovered as to enable them to do their duty.

Q. At what time did the troops arrive at Saratoga? 22.

A. About eight o'clock at night on the 9th.

Q. Do you know how long the troops had then been under arms, and without repose or regular refreshment? 23.

A. From the 7th in the morning.

Q. Had they been in action, or in continual expectation of action, during that whole time? 24.

A. I was in the front of the army, and I heard a great deal of firing in the rear, and we constantly expected and looked for an attack.

Q. Did the battery of the enemy on the other side of the river at Saratoga command the fort on that river? 25.

A. It did.

Q. Was the ground such on our side as would have enabled our artillery to have silenced that battery? 26.

A. It did not appear to me that it could.

Q. Had the passage of the ford been effected, and the army have proceeded towards Fort Edward, on the east side of the river, must they not necessarily have passed Batten Hill? 27.

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Do you remember the ford at Batten-Hill? 28.

A. Yes.

Q. Would it have been possible for the army to have passed that ford without artillery to cover them, and the enemy posted on the other side? 29.

A. Certainly not. I had an opportunity of seeing the twentieth regiment pass that ford without an enemy to oppose them, and they took a considerable time, owing to the depth of the water, the rapidity of the current, and the stones being remarkable slippery, so that several of them fell into the river.

Q. Was you present at all the councils of war to which the field officers of the army were called at Saratoga? 30.

A. I was.

Q. Do

31. Q. Do you remember whether General Burgoyne stated the difficulties of the time, and that he mentioned his readiness to undertake any measure they should think for the honour of the British arms ?  
A. I do remember it.
32. Q. Was the council unanimous to treat with the enemy on honourable terms ?  
A. They were.
33. Q. When the first terms proposed by General Gates were read to them, were they unanimous to reject them ?  
A. They were.
34. Q. After it was decided by a majority of the council that the treaty could not be suspended without breach of faith, were not the council then unanimous to sign it on that day ?  
A. As the majority of the council had given it as their opinion that the public faith was pledged, the council thought that there was no time to be lost, and that it ought to be signed immediately.

*Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occasionally.*

35. Q. Do you know or apprehend that the rebel camp was completely entrenched on the 19th of September ?  
A. I don't know.
36. Q. Had you any reason to believe from information that they completed their entrenchments afterwards ?  
A. I understood they had—I don't speak from authority.
37. Q. Had you reason to think that the rebels received considerable reinforcements between the 19th of September and the 7th of October ?  
A. I did not hear that they had.
38. Q. Supposing the rebels to have received reinforcements, could any accession of strength to our army from the recovery of any number you can suppose of the 500 that were in the hospital, be equal to a reinforcement of even 500 men received by the enemy ?  
A. I cannot take upon me to say.
39. Q. From being in the hospital yourself, how many of the 500 do you judge joined the army ?  
A. I can't pretend to say.
40. Q. Do you judge in your own opinion, putting all the circumstances you can together, whether the enemy were more likely to be forced on the 20th of September or a day or two after, than on the 7th of October ?  
A. It is impossible for me to judge—I did not know their strength on the 19th of September, or what reinforcements they received before the 7th of October.
41. Q. Did you apprehend the army might have made their retreat good to Canada immediately after the action of the 19th of September ?

A. That

A. That depended entirely on circumstances.

Q. Judging from the circumstances you then knew, what is your opinion? 42.

A. I was not more acquainted with the circumstances of the 19th of September than with those of the 7th of October.

Q. If the army had had three weeks more provisions when they began their retreat, would not that have been a material circumstance to them towards making good their retreat? 43.

A. The army could have defended themselves longer in their entrenchments at Saratoga if they had had more provisions.

Q. Had you known, immediately after the action of the 19th of September, that a letter had been received from Sir Henry Clinton, mentioning his intention to attack the highlands about that time, would you have thought either a retreat or an immediate attack on the enemy advisable? 44.  
By General Burgoyne.

A. Certainly not.

Q. Do you know whether a council of war was called on the 20th of September, or immediately after the engagement of the 19th of September? 45.  
By other Member.

A. I don't know that there was.

Q. Did the army in which you served, in its approach to Albany, expect a co-operation from Sir William Howe on the North River? 46.

A. We did.

Q. Do you believe if the army under Sir William Howe, instead of going by sea up the Chesapeake to Philadelphia, had operated upon the North River to effect a junction with General Burgoyne's army, considering also the panic that prevailed after the taking of Ticonderoga, that the army under General Burgoyne would have been made prisoners? 47.

A. I should think not.

Q. Did you expect any great opposition from the rebel army after the taking of Ticonderoga? 48.

A. I did not.

Q. Upon what grounds did you so positively expect a co-operation with Sir William Howe's army? 49.

A. From General Burgoyne's orders.

Q. Did you ever see General Burgoyne's orders? 50.

A. Every day during the campaign.

Q. By what orders of General Burgoyne did you expect a co-operation? 51.

A. Early in October General Burgoyne gave it out in orders that there were powerful armies of the King's then co-operating with ours.

Q. Did not those orders give spirits to General Burgoyne's army? 52.

A. Situated as our army was, every prospect of reinforcement must certainly give us spirits.

Q. Did you ever hear of any co-operation before those orders of General Burgoyne's in October? 53.

A. It was generally talked of in the army, but not by authority.

Q. Whether, if the operations of Sir Henry Clinton on the North River had taken place in time, it would not have been looked on as a very advantageous co-operation with General Burgoyne's army? 54.

K

A. It



- A. It might have been attended with very good consequences.
55. Q. What situation in general, and particularly with regard to provisions, was General Burgoyne's army in, at the time you mentioned those encouraging hopes of co-operation in his orders?
- A. The army was put on short allowance at that time.
56. Q. Whether in military affairs a powerful diversion, if well executed, is not known often to answer very effectually the purposes of co-operation?
- A. Certainly very good effects have accrued from powerful diversions.
57. Q. If there had been a council of war on the 20th of September, or immediately after the engagement of the 19th, should you have known of it?
- A. I think I must have heard of it.
58. Q. Whether, considering the circumstances of Sir William Howe's having carried his army to Chesapeak Bay, you supposed, or ever heard it supposed, that Sir Henry Clinton would have attempted his operations up the North River sooner than he did, or previous to the arrival of his reinforcement from Europe?
- A. Not knowing Sir Henry Clinton's strength, or his orders, nor the force the enemy had to oppose him, it is impossible for me to answer that question.
59. Q. What effect had it on the spirits of General Burgoyne's army when they found there was to be no co-operation between that army and the army of Sir William Howe?
- A. We never knew but that there was to be a co-operation.

[Withdrew.]

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CAPTAIN BLOOMFIELD, of the Artillery, called in, and examined by  
General Burgoyne.

1. Q. IN what capacity did you serve in the campaign in America in 1776 and 1777?
- A. I was major of brigade of the royal artillery.
2. Q. Was you employed by General Phillips, on your return to England, after the campaign of 1776, to solicit a further supply of artillery for the service of the ensuing campaign?
- A. On my leaving General Phillips at St. John's, in the month of November, 1776, I was charged with a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, wherein he recommended

it to make a demand of a further supply of artillery and stores for the complete equipment of an additional number of gun-boats for the service of Lake Champlain in the ensuing campaign, and likewise for the boats themselves to be sent out in frame-work. Sir Guy Carleton, on perusing the letter, disapproved of the boats being sent out, but approved of the demand of the stores and artillery agreeable to General Phillips's request, and they were accordingly sent out in the beginning of the year 1777.

Q. At what time did you join the army in the campaign of 1777? 3.

A. I joined the army at Ticonderoga on the 23d of July.

Q. Did you live in the family of General Phillips, and had you occasion to know his sentiments respecting the artillery department? 4.

A. I did chiefly live with the general, and had frequent occasion to know his sentiments on the subject of the artillery in the course of my duty as brigade-major.

Q. Did you know, or had you reason to believe, that the proportion of artillery employed that campaign was according to the opinion and recommendation of General Phillips? 5.

A. I can have no doubt but that an officer of General Phillips's rank and extensive experience must have determined that point.

Q. What was the distribution of the artillery after the enemy evacuated Ticonderoga? 6.

A. The light brigade of artillery proceeded with the army by the way of Skenesborough; the park brigade and stores were conveyed across Lake George in bateaux.

Q. Was not a considerable portion of artillery of the heaviest kind either left at St. John's, sent back from Ticonderoga, or disposed of in vessels? 7.

A. It was: there were left at Ticonderoga six heavy twelve-pounders, one light twelve-pounder, four light three-pounders, four royal mortars and twelve cohorns. Left on board the Royal George, two heavy twenty-four-pounders, two thirteen-inch mortars, two ten-inch mortars, four eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars and eight cohorns. Sent back to St. John's in the Radau, fourteen heavy twenty-four-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers. Left at Fort George, four medium twelve-pounders, two light six-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers, two royal howitzers. With Colonel St. Leger's expedition to Fort Stanwix were sent two light six-pounders, two light three-pounders, four cohorns. Left at St. John's, four light six-pounders, five light three-pounders, four cohorn mortars: that was the distribution of artillery that remained after the army had quitted Fort George. The quantity of artillery brought forward with the army were four medium twelve-pounders, two light twenty-four-pounders, eighteen light six-pounders, six light three-pounders, two eighteen-inch howitzers, four royal howitzers, two eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars.

Q. Was not that park artillery, tho' consisting of some twenty-four-pounders and some twelve pounders, properly field artillery? 8.

A. They certainly were, and have ever been considered as such on all field services. Heavy artillery is of a distinct nature, and considerably heavier than guns of the same calibre which we had in the army.



9. Q. Have you ever known a less proportion than the brigaded artillery, which was attached to the line and to the advanced corps, allotted to the same number of troops?

A. The proportion of field artillery certainly should vary both in quantity and nature according to the variety of circumstances under which the army is to act; the usual allotment of light field pieces are two to each battalion; and from a calculation of the number and strength of General Burgoyne's army, I do not conceive that our light field artillery exceeded that proportion.

10. Q. What do you apprehend was the proposed use of artillery in the country in which we were to act?

A. To dislodge the enemy from such posts as every where present themselves in that part of the country, and from which it may be impossible to dislodge them without artillery of a more considerable calibre than light six-pounders.

11. Q. Do you remember the position which the enemy evacuated at Schuyler's Island?

A. I do perfectly.

12. Q. Had that position been maintained, would not artillery of the heaviest nature we had have been particularly serviceable?

A. Provided the post could not have been turned, and the enemy had made use of every advantage which the ground gave them, I have no doubt but the park artillery would have been absolutely necessary.

13. Q. Had the passage of the Hudson's River, or of Batten Kill been disputed, would artillery of that nature have been serviceable?

A. Doubtless it would.

14. Q. Had the enemy taken a position at the Forks of the Mohawk River, would artillery of that nature have been serviceable?

A. From the imperfect manner in which I saw that ground, it appeared capable of being made extremely defensible, and, of course, that sort of artillery would have been serviceable.

15. Q. Had the army reached Albany, and it had been found expedient to fortify a camp there for the winter, would artillery of that nature have been necessary?

A. There can be no doubt of it.

16. Q. What do you apprehend to be the chief use of howitzers and small mortars in the field.

A. I apprehend they are of infinite service against all kinds of log work, abatis, and against entrenchments. The small mortars are particularly useful against redoubts and other works where the enemy are confined within a small space.

17. Q. Are not log works a species of fortification peculiar to that country?

A. I never saw any elsewhere.

18. Q. Was the carrying forward the artillery from Lake George to the place where the army crossed the Hudson's River any impediment to the transport of provisions?

A. The transport of our artillery and stores were constantly made by horses attached

attached to our department, and therefore I do not conceive it did in any manner interfere with the transport of provisions—I mean to confine myself in this answer to the transport from Fort George to the Hudson's River; for after crossing the river we had some oxen and horses attached to the service of the artillery, which I believe were before employed in bringing forward provisions and bateaux.

Q. What time did it take to bring forward the park artillery from Fort George 19.  
to the bridge of boats over the Hudson's River?

A. The light brigade and the artillery of the park, with their proper proportion of stores and ammunition, had their horses, carriages, and drivers constantly attached to them; it therefore required no more time to carry those stores than was necessary for the carriages themselves to pass from Fort George to the Hudson's River; but with respect to the reserve which was afterwards transported by water in bateaux, I believe two days with all our carriages would easily have conveyed them to the Hudson's River.

Q. Do you remember the position of the King's troops from the time of the 20.  
attack on the 19th of September to the attack on the 7th of October?

A. Yes.

Q. Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy's en- 21.  
trenchments without previously constructing redoubts on the heights that commanded the plain, would not the bateaux, provisions and hospital have been left open to an attack from the enemy's right?

A. They would have been left exposed undoubtedly.

Q. Were not the largest guns we had the properest pieces of artillery for those 22.  
redoubts?

A. I think it was a service that was exactly adapted to them.

Q. Do you remember the disposition made by General Burgoyne on the 7th 23.  
of October?

A. I do.

Q. At what time was you wounded in that attack? 24.

A. I believe in about twenty minutes after it commenced.

Q. What circumstance of the action did you observe before you was wound- 25.  
ed, particularly respecting the artillery and the enemy's advancing under the fire of the artillery, and what happened to the troops posted immediately on the left of the artillery?

A. The ground on which the artillery was posted was a clear spot, in a great measure surrounded by woods, the skirts of which on our left was distant about two hundred yards where the attack first began. The two medium twelve-pounders were posted on a small eminence, nearly in the center of this cleared spot between the German picquets and a detachment of the Hesse Hanau regiment. On the enemy's column approaching, the fire of the twelve-pounders and the four sixes was immediately directed towards the enemy's column, notwithstanding which, they drew up along the skirts of the wood behind trees, and after driving in the Germans, kept a pretty warm fire of musketry on the guns and the troops posted about them; soon after this I heard a firing on the right towards

towards a cleared spot, separated from us by a wood on which the light infantry were posted on very commanding ground. On their retreating, as also the twenty-fourth regiment who was drawn up in the wood on our right, the enemy made their appearance on an eminence on our right, and cut off the retreat of the artillery—At this moment I received my wound, and therefore can give no farther account of the circumstances of that day's action.

*Examined by other Members of the Committee.*

26. Q. What was the number of horses in general employed for the artillery after the march from Ticonderoga?

A. The whole number of horses detached with the British artillery, previous to the passing the Hudson's River, was about four hundred.

27. Q. How many would have been necessary for the field pieces attached to the battalions only?

A. Eighteen six-pounders at four horses each; six three-pounders at three horses each, and two royal howitzers at three horses each: the remainder were for park artillery, ammunition, and stores of all kinds to accommodate the army on its march.

28. Q. Was the forage for these horses procured in the country on their march, or brought from a distance?

A. A quantity of oats was brought forward from Canada, but with respect to other forage they were under the necessity of collecting it in the neighbourhood of the encampment.

29. Q. How many waggons might the bringing on that quantity of oats employ?

A. I believe the quantity of oats after passing Fort Edward was so trifling that I don't believe it loaded one waggon.

30. Q. After the army arrived at Fort Edward, did any delay or not arise to its forward progress from bringing on the park artillery, waiting for horses and drivers for that purpose, or to provide forage?

A. The park artillery remained at Fort Edward no longer than was necessary during the time the army remained in that neighbourhood: I do not know of any delay whatever from the want of horses and drivers. Had the park artillery moved forwards sooner, no end could have been answered by it, before the bridge was thrown over the Hudson's River.

31. Q. Were there any gun-boats sent out to Quebec for the campaign 1776?

A. There were.

32. Q. Were there a sufficient number sent out, in your opinion?

A. It appeared that the naval force was superior to that of the rebels, from the event of that engagement; and therefore I conclude, that for the uses of that campaign there were a sufficient number.

33. Q. Did you apprehend, before the event of the action on the lakes, that the number was sufficient, and went out in time?

A. We



A. We had received very exaggerated accounts of the rebel force on the lakes, and therefore uncommon exertions were used to render our force as formidable as possible; and probably some time was lost, and the campaign in some degree retarded, from that circumstance.

Q. Would the campaign have been retarded so long if a greater number of gun-boats had been sent out? 34.

A. Certainly not.

Q. What number of artificers were sent to Canada for the campaign in 1776? 35.

A. I don't immediately recollect the exact number; but I think Colonel Christie engaged about two hundred. I know of no others being sent out.

Q. Do you know of more being asked for by the artillery or engineers, as necessary for the campaign? 36.

A. I did hear of some such intention; but at this distance of time I cannot particularly answer that question.

Q. Whether the number of artificers sent out for that campaign were, in any degree, sufficient for the purpose of carrying it on? 37.

A. Certainly not. We were under the necessity of collecting all the artificers that could be met with in Canada for the armament of St. John's only, most of the bateaux being built by private contract.

Q. Were not the operations of that campaign considerably retarded, for want of the number of artificers that were asked for and not granted? 38.

A. Had the number of artificers been greater, there can be no doubt but the work would have gone on much faster. With respect to the artificers being demanded, I have already said I do not recollect the number.

Q. Were there not horses necessary for conveying the stores and ammunition necessary for the field train; and how many? 39.

A. The best answer to that question will, I apprehend, be a state of the number of horses actually attached to the several brigades of artillery, since the allotment of stores and ammunition were exactly proportioned to the number of pieces which they accompanied.—

[The brigade attached to the advanced corps of light artillery consisted of eighty-five—]

Q. How many horses might have been spared, if the heavy park of artillery had not attended the army? 40.

A. It would have made a difference of two hundred and thirty-seven horses.

Q. Was the army furnished with carts to have employed those two hundred and thirty-seven horses? 41.

A. I really cannot answer that question of my own knowledge.

[Withdraws.]

Answer interrupted going into the detail.

Jovis

*Jovis 3<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1779.*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KINGSTON called in, and examined by General Burgoyne.

1. Q. IN what capacity did you act in the campaign of 1777?  
A. As deputy adjutant general of the province of Quebec; I acted as adjutant general of the army under General Burgoyne, and also as secretary to General Burgoyne.
2. Q. Did not that double capacity, and the confidence with which General Burgoyne treated you, lead you to the knowledge of the material circumstances attending that campaign?  
A. I looked on myself to be in the entire confidence of the general.
3. Q. Did General Burgoyne give any orders for the augmentation of artillery destined for this expedition, after his arrival in Canada?  
A. There was no such order went through me; nor did I hear of any such order being given.
4. Q. Have you reason to believe that the proportion of artillery employed was according to the opinion and recommendation of Major General Phillips?  
A. I believe General Burgoyne had the greatest confidence in General Phillips's knowledge and abilities; and I believe the proportion of artillery to have been arranged between General Phillips and Sir Guy Carleton, because I don't know of any directions given by General Burgoyne upon that head.
5. Q. What were the orders given, at the opening of the campaign, respecting the incumbrances of baggage?

*[The witness refers to the orderly book, which he had with him.]*

Read the orders.

They are the original orders, written by myself at the time.

*[Reads.]* "Extracts from orders issued by Lieutenant General Burgoyne at Montreal, dated 30th May, 1777.

"The regiments destined for the expedition under General Burgoyne are to leave in their respective stores their blanket coats, legging, and all baggage that can be spared during the summer months; the officers are depended on not to encumber the service with more baggage than shall be absolutely necessary for a campaign where the movements may be expected to be sudden and alert; the portion of bateaux to each regiment will be regulated on those principles."

6. Q. Were those orders afterwards enforced?

A. Orders



A. Orders were issued again to the same purport, dated Skenesborough House, July 12.

[Reads.] "It is observed that the injunction given, before the army took the field, "relative to the baggage of officers, has not been complied with; and that the regiments in general are encumbered with much more baggage than they can possibly be supplied with means of conveying, when they quit the lake and rivers; warning is therefore again given to the officers, to convey by the bateaux, which will soon return to Ticonderoga, the baggage that is not indispensibly necessary to them; or upon the first sudden movement, it must inevitably be left upon the ground. Such gentlemen as served in America the last war may remember that the officers took up with soldiers' tents, and often confined their baggage to a knapsack for months together."

Q. Have you a letter from General Burgoyne to General Reidesel, on the subject 8. of the incumbrance of baggage?

A. I have an extract of it, taken from the original letter in the letter-book. It is as follows:

*Extract of a Letter from Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne to Major General Reidesel, dated Headquarters at Skenesborough, the 18th July, 1777.*

"Je vous supplie de faire en sorte, que l'esprit de l'ordre par rapport à le renvoye des baggages des officiers à Ticonderoga aye lieu.

"Les baggages des officiers Britanniques sont deja renvoyés, et il n'en reste à plusieurs qu'une petite tente, et un valise. C'est réelement pour l'intérest de l'officier à la fin, que je suis si porté à cet article."

#### TRANSLATION.

"I request you to take measures that the spirit of the order respecting the sending back officers' baggage to Ticonderoga may have due force.

"The baggage of the British officers is already gone, and many of them have only retained a small tent and one cloak bag. It is really for the interest of the officers, in the end, that I am so pressing upon this subject."

Q. When the contract was made for horses and carts at Montreal, was it the 9. general opinion of the persons of best intelligence consulted, that the number was more or less than necessary for the service on which we were going?

A. In general conversation on that subject I remember to have heard it said, that though they were insufficient, we might expect to find additional supplies in the country. I have extracts of letters here that passed between General Burgoyne and General Phillips on that subject. They are extracted from the original letter copy-book.

See Appendix.

Q. Have you the returns, or extracts of the returns, of the strength of the army 10. at all the different periods of the campaign?

L

A. I

A. I have extracts from the returns.

11. Q. What was the strength of the regular troops, at the highest, at the opening of the campaign, rank and file, fit for duty?

A. The first returns I received on the first of July,

The British were 3576 fit for duty.

Germans 2919 do.

6489

I speak solely of the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne.

12. Q. What were the numbers of the artillery, and the corps under Lieutenant Nutt, attached to the service of the artillery?

British artillery 257

Germans 100

Recruits under Lieut. Nutt 154

13. Q. Were there any other troops in the army that could be called regulars?

A. There were Canadians, Provincials, and Indians; but I never considered them as regulars, because they were not disciplined.

14. Q. Can you state about what was the number of the Canadians?

A. The Canadians were 148 the highest number.

15. Q. The Provincials?

A. I would be understood to speak to the opening of the campaign the first of July. They were low then, and increased afterwards. They were then 83.

16. Q. The Indians?

A. Between three and four hundred. It was very difficult to collect what their number was exactly.

17. Q. Was the army ever so high in numbers, Provincials and Indians excepted, as at that period?

A. I believe it never was. On the 3d of September additional companies joined the British, to the amount of about 300 men; but from killed and wounded, and the garrison left at Ticonderoga, the army was at no time equal to its first number.

18. Q. What was the force left at Ticonderoga?

A. The first garrison consisted of 462 British, rank and file, 448 Germans, rank and file; making 910 in the whole.

19. Q. Do you remember the difficulties which attended moving the wounded to Ticonderoga, after the action at Huberton?

A. I remember to have heard they were very great. Different propositions were made for the removing them, such as biers and hand-barrows, which were so very inconvenient, that I remember to have been told that the wounded would rather be left where they were than move in the then state of their wounds by such conveyances.

20. Q. Do you know what were General Burgoyne's motives for detaching General Reidesel with a large corps of troops to the country in the neighbourhood of Castleton?

A. I don't remember to have been present when General Reidesel received his orders or instructions; but I understood it was to create an alarm towards the Connecticut, to give encouragement to the loyal inhabitants, if any such there were, and to protect those that were wounded at Huberton or thereabouts.

Q. Was

Q. Was the removal of those wounded effected long before General Reidesel was recalled from Castleton? 21.

A. I believe not; for I am not quite certain that the whole were moved when General Reidesel returned to the army at Skenesborough, a day or two before the first division of the army moved towards Fort Anne.

Q. Have you any papers written by General Burgoyne between the time he was at Montreal and the time he left Skenesborough, explanatory of the motives on which he acted? 22.

A. I have. They are extracts from the original letter-book. See Appendix.

Q. Are you acquainted with any facts that will ascertain whether, on the army's arriving at Fort Edward, it was forwarder in its progress towards Albany, in point of time, than it would have been had it taken the route by Ticonderoga and Lake George? 23.

A. In answer to that question I have to say, the army, by taking that route, was a-head of the transport of provisions, which, for the greater part, went from Ticonderoga by the route of Lake George.

Q. At our first arrival at Fort Edward, and previous to the roads being mended, in what proportion did provisions arrive at our camp? 24.

A. Very little more than for the immediate consumption.

Q. Have you the memorandum-books of Sir Francis Clarke? 25.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know them to be his hand-writing? 26.

A. I am fully convinced of it, having seen him enter many of the articles in these books.

Q. Has there been any alteration or addition since you had them? 27.

A. None.

Q. What was the character of Sir Francis Clarke respecting his accuracy? 28.

A. I never saw an officer more attentive to the duties of his station than Sir Francis Clarke, and always found him exceedingly accurate in the remarks he made.

Q. Are there any memorandums respecting the arrival of provisions at that time? 29.

A. There are several.

Q. You will read two or three? 30.

A. [Reads.]—"Fifth August. Victualling of the army out this day, and from difficulties of the roads and transports, no provision came in this night."

"Sixth August.—At ten o'clock this morning, not quite enough provisions arrived for the consumption of two days."

Q. Was it in general understood, from the combined intelligence received by General Reidesel, while he was detached to Castletown, and that received by General Burgoyne from the Provincials in his camp, that there were many well affected inhabitants towards Bennington, who would shew themselves on the approach of troops; and that there was dejection and submission among the party attached to the congress in that country? 31.

A. I did hear several reports to that purpose.



32. Q. Have you the original rough draft of the expedition to Bennington, as presented to General Burgoyne from General Reidesfel; with General Burgoyne's alterations and additions?

A. I have the original rough draft of the proposals for the expedition to Bennington; but not being present at the time, I can't say whether those proposals were delivered by General Reidesfel or not; but I know of alterations made in those proposals by General Burgoyne, from a knowledge of his hand-writing.

See Appendix.

*Note,* The witness delivered in to the Committee the original rough draft of the Instructions, with a fair copy.

33. Q. Whether you have reason to know that all the erasures and alterations in that plan were made before the expedition took place?

A. I believe they were, from the reading of it.

34. Q. Do you remember taking this plan to General Phillips the day General Burgoyne went to Fort George to inspect the transport of provisions?

A. I do remember it very well; it was the rough draft I took.

35. Q. What were General Phillips's sentiments upon it?

A. I remember General Phillips and I had a long conversation on the slowness of the arrival of the transport of provisions; and he said he looked on this as a very good idea; that he saw no objection, and asked me if I knew of any.

36. Q. Do you remember shewing the plan to General Frazer?

A. I do very well.

37. Q. What did he express on the subject?

A. He desired me to leave it with him till the afternoon for his consideration. He came himself to my tent the next morning early; he expressed himself to me in a manner that conveyed a disapprobation of the Germans being employed in it. I think I observed to him that since the honour gained by the advanced corps at Hubbardston, I believed General Reidesfel was desirous of having the Germans employed. I mentioned to General Frazer my ideas of provisions being obtained by that expedition, and the army thereby enabled to get quicker on to Albany than waiting for the slow transport from Fort George. General Frazer said something about Germans, which I don't recollect; which brought this remark from me. I desired General Frazer, from the friendship he had for General Burgoyne, if he saw any real objection to this plan, to express himself fully and freely to General Burgoyne himself; that the scouts of the army and the guides were attached to his the advanced corps, and he might, through them, perhaps know more of the nature of the country than I did; and therefore I pressed him to mention his objections, if he had any, to General Burgoyne. I think he said, but am not quite certain, "the Germans are not a very active people; but it may do." I pressed him at parting to go to General Burgoyne, if he thought it would not do. He said No, and went off.

38. Q. Were not many of the Provincials in the army of the country about Bennington, and towards the Connecticut?

A. I can't pretend to say they were from that country; but I understood many of them were well acquainted with that country.

Q. Do



Q. Do you remember Captain Sherwood in particular?

39.

A. I do very well.

Q. Was he of that country?

40.

A. I understood he was of that neighbourhood.

Q. Did you ever hear Colonel Skeene, or any other Provincial, consulted on an expedition into that country, express any apprehension of its success?

41.

A. I never did. Sir Francis Clarke told me he had received favourable accounts from Colonel Skeene; and I believe after part of the expedition had taken place.

Q. Are there any memorandums of Sir Francis Clarke's, respecting the expedition to Bennington?

42.

A. Yes.

Q. Is there any that marks the distance between Batten Kill and Bennington?

43.

A. Yes; it is his hand-writing.

[Reads.] "From the mouth of Batten Kill, East, for two miles; then strike off South East for about fifteen miles to Cambridge; and so on about twelve miles to Bennington."

44.

Q. Have you the original letters, written from Colonel Baume to General Burgoyne, while he was on the expedition?

A. They are here.

[He delivered them in to the Committee.

See the Appendix.

Q. Is there any memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke's marking the time when Colonel Breyman was ordered to march to support Colonel Baume?

45.

A. [Reads.] "15th August. Express arrived from Sancoick; at five in the morning; corps de reserve ordered to march.

"16th August. During the night, express arrived from Sancoick with an account of the repulse this evening of a detachment of ours on an expedition.

"Sunday, 17th August. The general went up to the twentieth regiment, advanced on the road to Sancoick, and met the corps de reserve, the men of that expedition returning all day."

Q. Do you recollect what time of the day it was General Burgoyne met Colonel Breyman on his return on the 17th?

46.

A. I think it was sometime between one and three o'clock.

Q. Have you the instructions given by General Burgoyne to Colonel Skeene on that expedition?

47.

A. Here is a copy of them.

Q. Is there any memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke's, of any intelligence received from Colonel St. Leger about this time?

See the Appendix.

A. There is of the 12th of August.

[Reads.] "This morning received intelligence of an action near Fort Stanwix."

Q. After the failure of the expedition to Bennington, can you speak to the efforts made for forwarding provisions?

49.

A. I know that very great efforts were made both before and after. I understood that General Burgoyne and General Phillips had been both at different times at Fort George to forward the provisions, and I believe subsequent to the ill news from Bennington. The quarter-master-general, (I mean Captain Money) was sent by

by General Burgoyne to Fort Edward, and I believe to Fort George, to collect all horses and teams possible, and to make every exertion to bring forward the provisions.

50. Q. Have you the calculation, made by the commissary-general, of the carriages and horses necessary for different given quantities of provisions?

See the Appendix.

A. It is here. I believe it is the original.

51. Q. Did the march of the artillery from Fort George to the bridge of boats over Hudson's River, interfere with the transport of provisions?

A. I have had many conversations with General Phillips and the quarter-master-general about the transport of provisions, and never remember to have heard from them, or any other person, that the march of the artillery interfered in any manner with the transport of provisions.

52. Q. About what time did the additional companies arrive?

A. The 3d of September.

53. Q. What was the state of the army when we passed the Hudson's River?

A. My return goes to the 1st of September.

British, fit for duty under arms, 2635 rank and file.

Germans

— 1711

The 300 additional did not join the army till the 3d of September, so that this return is exclusive of them.

54. Q. What was the strength of the artillery and Lieutenant Nutt's corps at that time?

A. I believe there was very little variation in either of them from the former return.

55. Q. Have you General Burgoyne's application to Sir Guy Carleton for a garrison from Canada for Ticonderoga, before he passed the Hudson's River?

See the Appendix.

A. I have extracts from letters of General Burgoyne to Sir Guy Carleton, the 11th of July, 1777, and the 29th of July, 1777.

56. Q. Was there any considerable alteration in the strength of the army between the return of the 1st of September, and the action on the 19th?

A. There was a skirmish or two, but the loss was not material in that interval.

57. Q. In the course of the service, did you ever know any instance of a day of action, where there was not some deductions from the effective strength upon paper, for baggage guards, bat-men, care of the sick, and other indispensable regimental contingencies?

A. I apprehend there must always be deductions of that sort.

58. Q. In the service of our campaign, was there not a considerable additional deduction for the care and defence of the bateaux and movable magazines?

A. It must of course make an additional drain from the army.

59. Q. Was not all we had of the forty-seventh regiment appropriated to that particular service?

60. A. It generally was; I believe always so.

Q. These deductions considered, about what number do you compute the British line to have consisted of on the day of the action of the 19th.

A. I

A. I believe the four regiments of the line engaged that day amounted to little more than one thousand one hundred men on the spot under arms in the action.

Q. What loss did the British sustain in that action? 61.

A. Killed, wounded, and prisoners, rather more than less than five hundred.

Q. Can you speak particularly to the loss of the line? 62.

A. I believe about seventy-six killed rank and file, and between two hundred and forty and two hundred and fifty wounded, and about twenty-eight or thirty missing and prisoners.

Q. Do you recollect the strength of the 20th regiment when they made their last charge on the enemy? 63.

A. I do very well. I was by General Phillips when the orders were given for that charge; he was then in the front of the line: the ranks appeared to be very thin, the regiment were much fatigued with the length of the action, but moved on to the charge with spirit.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne going up to the sixty-second regiment immediately after the firing ceased, and the report that was made to him by the commanding officer of the state of that regiment? 64.

A. I remember it, and the officer reporting the great loss they had sustained in the action; I saw them, and they appeared to be very considerably reduced in number.

Q. Do you remember the officer mentioning that they had not above fifty or sixty men in the regiment? 65.

A. I can't speak positively to that; but in my own judgment they did not exceed that number.

Q. Were not both the field-officers wounded? 66.

A. Colonel Anstruther and Major Harnage were both wounded, and a great many other officers were killed and wounded, and the regiment suffered greatly.

Q. To what degree did the men of the artillery suffer in that action? 67.

A. I think, but am not quite certain, that the number that were with four guns amounted to forty-eight. I saw Captain Jones, who was a very gallant man, and commanded those four guns, killed, and some other officers wounded, and I believe about thirty-six of the men were killed and wounded. I should in justice to the artillery say, that I think it is not in the power of men to keep a better fire, both of round and grape-shot, than was successively maintained for several hours that day.

Q. From your experience in the service, do you conceive it would have occurred to any officer, to engage troops, if he could possibly avoid it, in the situation in which the British line was the day after that action? 68.

A. The experience of an officer of my inferior rank does not lead to much; but I should have been sorry to have given orders to those regiments, after the gallant sufferings of that day, to have attacked an army reported, both from our spies and our prisoners, to be very near if not more than four times the number of our whole force: add to this, the country was a very thick wood, and the

the situation of the rebel camp, I believe, could not by any means be reconnoitred within that space of time.

69. Q Do you remember General Burgoyne receiving a letter from Sir Henry Clinton the day but one after that action, informing him, that he intended about that time an attack on Fort Montgomery?

A. I do remember his receiving a letter from Sir Henry Clinton about that time; it was the 22d of September.

70. Q Do you imagine that any officer knowing of that letter would have entertained thoughts of immediately renewing an attack upon the enemy?

A. As far as an opinion of an officer of my inferior rank goes, I should not have thought of it, nor did I hear any officer of any rank express such an idea at that time.

71. Q From what you knew of the country, did you not believe that a successful attack from Sir Henry Clinton during the time we lay at that camp, would either have dislodged General Gates entirely, or have obliged him to detach considerably from his army?

A. I remember our scouts giving information, that a bridge was laid over the Hudson's River, very near the enemy's camp; and it was the opinion of some very confidential men that were employed in that army in that capacity, and were much under the direction of General Fraser, that on the approach of Sir Henry Clinton's army, the army of Mr. Gates could not stand us, but would cross the river, and go towards New England. Whether the idea was right or wrong, I can't tell.

72. Q Did you ever hear such persons, or any others, express an idea, that the enemy would have taken the same measure on our advancing to attack them without that co-operation?

A. I don't remember to have heard any such thing.

73. Q Do you imagine that any officer knowing of Sir Henry Clinton's letters, would have thought it proper to retreat after the action of the 19th of September?

A. I never heard any officer express an idea of that sort. I don't know what officers might be within the knowledge of such a letter; but I lived intimately with General Phillips, General Fraser, and with Mr. Twiss, the engineer; whether the letter was in their knowledge or not, I don't know: but I never heard them express such an idea.

74. Q Did you ever hear any officer of that army, though unacquainted with the letter, before or since the time, express a disapprobation of the measure of remaining in that camp without either attacking or retreating?

A. Neither then or at any time while I remained in America, and of course not since.

75. Q From your conversation with the chief engineer, and from other circumstances, have you reason to know, that every possible means were used after the action of the 19th, to obtain a knowledge of the ground on the enemy's left?



A. I had frequent conversations with the chief engineer on that subject. I believe his attention was given to that point almost every day, and a knowledge of that ground I understood to be very difficult to be obtained.

Q. Was not the right of the enemy deemed impracticable.

76.

A. I had no opportunity myself of seeing the right of the enemy; but I understood from others, that the position was too strong to be attacked with any prospect of success.

Q. Were there not frequent consultations held between General Burgoyne, General Phillips and General Frazer, previous to the movement up to the enemy on the 7th of October?

77.

A. I understood there was scarce a day passed without such consultation; I believe no day after the action of the 19th.

Q. Did you conceive that the chief purpose of that movement was to attain a knowledge of the left of the enemy's position, and if expedient to attack them there?

78.

A. I understood it was.

Q. Did it appear to you, that the force left in camp, under General Hamilton, was more than sufficient to keep the enemy in check?

79.

A. I don't think it was.

Q. From the intimacy and confidence in which you lived with General Burgoyne and General Frazer, do you imagine any disagreement of opinion could have subsisted between them without your knowledge?

80.

A. I think I must have heard of it.

Q. Do you know any instance, but more especially respecting the periods of passing the Hudson's River, the action of the 19th of September, and that of the 7th of October, wherein General Frazer expressed a disapprobation of General Burgoyne's measures?

81.

A. I do not; but I would beg leave to observe, that upon the plan to Bennington, General Frazer had expressed a different opinion, with respect to employing the Germans. At the time of passing the Hudson's River, and after it was crossed, I had a great deal of conversation with General Frazer: he seemed to express satisfaction in the manner in which the troops had passed.

Q. In the action of the 7th of October, after the German troops on the left of the artillery had given way, did you observe General Phillips and General Reidesel in person?

82.

A. I was with General Phillips at different times, and I saw General Reidesel more than once; they were both very active, and exerted themselves very much to form the broken troops, and to make the retreat as regular as the circumstances would permit.

Q. What was the last time you saw Sir Francis Clarke in that action, and do you know what orders he was carrying?

83.

A. It was after the retreat was become very general. Sir Francis Clarke asked me, if I had given any orders to the artillery to retreat? I told him, that as there was a major-general of the artillery in the field, who was confessed by the army to be a very excellent officer, I would not take on myself, as ad-

M

jutant-

jutant-general, to give orders to any part of the artillery. Sir Francis Clarke told me, that a disposition had been made for a general retreat, and that he was going with orders from General Burgoyne to bring off the artillery. About the instant we were parting, a very heavy fire came upon us from the enemy, and I have since had reason to believe, that Sir Francis Clarke received his wound at that time.

84. Q. On the day of the 8th, do you remember the enemy forming a line in the meadows, and making a demonstration of attacking us?

A. I do remember it very well, and that there was a great deal of cannonading from the enemy.

85. Q. Do you remember also a cannonading in the afternoon, about the time of General Frazer's funeral?

A. I think I shall never forget that circumstance. General Frazer, I understood had desired to be buried privately, in one of the redoubts that had been raised for the protection of our magazines and stores; as the corpse was passing by, General Burgoyne, General Phillips, and I believe General Reidesel, and several other officers, out of respect to General Frazer's memory, and to do him honour in the eyes of the army, notwithstanding his request, attended his funeral into the redoubt. The enemy were in this instance, I thought, very defective in point of humanity; they pointed a gun or two at that very redoubt, and kept up a brisk cannonade during the whole of the funeral service, which was performed with great solemnity and very deliberately by Mr. Brudenel, the chaplain. I never saw so affecting a sight.

86. Q. Do you remember on the march to Saratoga seeing a corps of the enemy at work on the plain of Saratoga?

A. I do very well; a working party, and what appeared to be a battalion or more drawn up as a covering party.

87. Q. Was that the corps that afterwards took post on the opposite side of the river?

A. I believe it was the same corps I saw afterwards passing the ford.

88. Q. After the arrival of the army at Saratoga, was Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland detached with a command to cover a party of workmen to repair bridges and roads, in order to continue the retreat on the west side of the river?

A. He was ordered with a party to repair bridges and roads on the west side.

89. Q. Do you remember on what account Colonel Sutherland and the party were recalled?

A. I believe it was on information given by our scouts, that the enemy were preparing to attack us in great force.

90. Q. Have you further reason to know that a general attack on that day was really intended by the enemy?

A. There was particular caution sent round to all the troops to be prepared for that attack, as it was expected it would be attempted under cover of a very thick fog then prevailing. After the convention had taken place, a general officer in the rebel service acquainted me, that such an attack was intended,

and from information, I believe from deserters, or from their own scouts, that our army was exceedingly well prepared to receive them, that they would be very much exposed when they came on the plain to our artillery, he not only retreated with his command, but sent word to another general officer to retreat also. The other general officer was his senior; but he had taken that upon him, from the fear of the consequences of such an attack, of which he sent word to General Gates, who approved and confirmed his order.

Q. Previous to the council of war to which the field officers were called, do you remember it being determined in the council of the generals, to try a night march, abandoning the carriages and baggage, and orders being given for the delivery of as much provisions as the men could carry? 91.

A. I do remember such a determination very well.

Q. What prevented the execution of it? 92.

A. I understood there were such difficulties in getting out the provisions, that the delivery of the necessary provisions could not be accomplished.

Q. Had we intelligence the next day from different scouts, that the enemy was in possession of the country in force, on both sides the Hudson's River, between us and Fort Edward? 93.

A. I understood, from some of the scouts that we had been accustomed most to depend on, that the enemy were so posted.

Q. Have you reason to know that the intelligence General Burgoyne stated to the council of war on this subject was true? 94.

A. I was assured by one of the general officers who conducted us towards Boston that troops of theirs were in the position that our scouts had given us information of.

Q. Did you learn at the same time at what period those posts were taken up by the enemy, whether before or after our arrival at Saratoga? 95.

A. I have extracts of minutes made at that time, from the mouth of the general officer I mentioned.

[Reads.]—"When the king's army was returning to Saratoga, a brigade of fifteen hundred men were posted on the east side of the Hudson's River, to dispute the ford, and two thousand men more were posted between us and Fort Edward, on the same side of the river."—Fourteen hundred more also were posted opposite to Saratoga, a little above the other party I mentioned before, to prevent our passing the Hudson's River. Fifteen hundred of those I have mentioned were posted on or before the 5th of October. The others, I remember very well now to have heard, were posted previous to the 7th of October.

Q. Have you an extract of the last council of war at which the field officers assisted? 96.

A. The extract is true, excepting the names of the officers, and the votes they gave. I have the original paper, with the names of the officers that composed the council; and I believe their opinions. [The extract produced. See Appendix.]

Q. Did you ever hear of a proposal made by General Phillips, to make a way from Saratoga to Ticonderoga with a body of troops? 97.

M 2

Never

A. Never with a body of troops; but I remember to have heard General Phillips make an offer, which I thought a very spirited one, to risk his life in attempting, with one or two of our best guides, to find a passage to Ticonderoga, and do his utmost for the defence of that garrison, as an artillery officer, should the enemy attack that fortress after the convention should take place.

98. Q. Have you the return of General Gates's army, signed by himself?  
A. I have; but I have forgot to bring the original. I have the extract.

For the original return, see the Appendix, No. XVI.

[Reads.] "Copy from General Gates's return, from his camp at Saratoga; 16th October, 1777."

" Brigadiers	—	—	12
" Colonels	—	—	44
" Lieutenant Colonels	—	—	45
" Majors	—	—	49
" Captains	—	—	344
" First Lieutenants	—	—	332
" Second Lieutenants	—	—	326
" Ensigns	—	—	345
" Chaplains	—	—	5
" Adjutants	—	—	42
" Quarter-masters	—	—	44
" Paymasters	—	—	30
" Surgeons	—	—	37
" Mates	—	—	43
" Serjeants	—	—	1392
" Drummers	—	—	636
" Present fit for duty	—	—	13,216."
I understand these last are rank and file, because the others are mentioned before.			
" Sick present	—	—	622
" Sick absent	—	—	731
" On command	—	—	3875
" On furlow	—	—	180."

I believe that the men on command were explained to me by General Gates to have been detached from his army, in the rear and upon the flanks of the king's troops, previous to the convention.

99. Q. Do you apprehend that that return includes the corps that were on the other side of the Hudson's River, immediately opposite to Saratoga?

A. I do recollect the name of one of the general officers who was on the other side of the Hudson's River, included in Mr. Gates's return, and therefore I imagine the men under his command are included also. When I say one, I do not mean to have understood that the other two general officers, the one who was stationed with a party opposite to Saratoga, and the one who was stationed on the same side of the water, between us and Fort Edward, are not also included in General Gates's return.



Q. Do the returns to which you referred of our army state the effective strength, 100. at the time of signing the convention?

A. They do state the rough number, collected at that time, of men present and under arms.

State the numbers.

The British appeared to have been	1905	101.
Germans	1594	

I can't be answerable for the correctness of those numbers, as they were taken in a great hurry.

Q. Can there possibly be a mistake of many hundreds?

102.

A. I can state from a monthly return of the first of November, fit for duty,

British	—	—	2086	} Rank and file.
Germans	—	—	1633	

There might be people recovered from their wounds who were discharged from the hospital, and had joined the corps; or there might have been a mistake in the return, just before the convention, in the confusion of the army at that time.

Q. Do you remember what passed respecting the military chest, while the treaty of Saratoga was depending?

103.

A. I do remember that it was strongly recommended to the commanding officers of corps to take sums of money from the paymaster general, on account of subsistence then due to their regiments; and I believe a great deal of money was so distributed, and regularly accounted for to the paymaster general on the subsequent settlement of the pay of the army.

Q. What became of the rest of the money in the military chest?

104.

A. It was taken by the paymaster general to Albany.

Q. Did any part of it fall into the hands of the enemy?

105.

A. Not a shilling that I ever heard of.

Q. Was any proportion of it lost, embezzled, or secreted?

106.

A. If any such thing had happened, I think the paymaster general would have applied to me immediately. Never having heard, then or at any time after, of any loss having been sustained, I do not believe there was any loss suffered in the retreat or after it.

Q. Was the secret service account, during the campaign, kept by you?

107.

A. It was.

Q. Could you produce the several articles of that account, if called on for it?

108.

A. I have either a copy of it at home of my own, or from the paymaster general.

Q. Did General Burgoyne ever appropriate any part of that expenditure to the extraordinaries of his own expences, or to any other purpose for his own use?

109.

A. Never that I know of.

Q. Must not you have known it if it had been so?

110.

A. Certainly.

Q. Were there not occasions where General Burgoyne paid, from his own purse, expences that, in the opinion of others, he might have been justified in placing to the public account?

111.

A. I

- A. I remember to have been told by other gentlemen, that expences of that sort General Burgoyne had been at, ought to have been charged in that manner.
112. Q. What was the nature of those expences?
- A. They were presents to people who had distinguished themselves, and in acts of charity to women who had lost their husbands, and other occasions which it was very proper for a general officer to give, and very proper to put into a public account.
113. Q. Had not General Burgoyne, from his situation, all the expences attending a Commander in Chief?
- A. He certainly had, from being obliged to keep a public table for the entertainment and refreshment of officers and others coming to head quarters, on duty or business; and I know those expences to have been very great, from the exceeding high price of all the articles of life in that part of the world.
114. Q. Did General Burgoyne ever receive more than the appointment of a lieutenant general?
- A. Never.
115. Q. Was there not a board of general officers appointed at Cambridge, to inspect all the accounts of the campaign; and did not General Burgoyne regulate the payment of the battalions by the report of that board?
- A. There was such a board, and the payments were regulated according to the report of that board.
116. Q. Upon the whole of what you know of General Burgoyne's receipts and expences, do you believe he was, in his own purse, a gainer or a sufferer in the campaign 1777?
- A. I really believe his appointments were not equal to his expences in that campaign.

*Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occasionally.*

117. Q. What were the numbers of the effective British, at the opening of the campaign 1777, including officers and non-commissioned officers?
- A. I have not those returns; but they were sent to the Commander in Chief, and my extracts are for the rank and file.
118. Q. Can you answer that question with respect to the Germans?
- A. My extracts are the same both for the British and the Germans.
119. Q. What was the greatest number of Provincials in the army at any time in the campaign?
- A. I believe the only question that has been asked respecting them was at the beginning of the campaign; they were then eighty-three. On the first of September they amounted to about six hundred and eighty, which was the greatest number they ever amounted to.
120. Q. What do you mean by Provincials?

A. I

A. I understand them to be inhabitants of that country, assembled under officers who were to have had different commissions, provided they had ever amounted to certain numbers.

Q. Do you include Canadians under the name of Provincials?

121.

A. I believe, in the former part of my evidence, the Canadians were stated to be one hundred and forty-eight, and distinguished from the Provincials.

Q. Was General Burgoyne's second order of the twelfth of July, relating to the baggage, strictly complied with?

122.

A. I conceive it was the duty of the commanding officers of regiments to enforce an observance and obedience to the general orders.

Q. Was it actually enforced in such a manner to the degree you thought it should have been?

123.

A. I am not quite positive whether there was not another order issued afterwards.

[Question repeated.]

124.

A. I never had any report made to me by a commanding officer of any corps, of that order not being complied with.

Q. What was your own ocular observation of the quantity of baggage carried with the army; and did it appear to you that that order could have been fairly complied with?

125.

A. I own I don't recollect, not hearing any complaint nor attending to it. The quarter master general of the army must naturally know more of the baggage than the adjutant general.

Q. Do you know what allowance of waggons was made to a regiment?

126.

A. I don't recollect any waggons that we had to allow.

Q. Was none of the baggage brought down in wheeled carriages?

127.

A. Several officers, I believe, bought waggons and carts of the country people for their own use; but I do not remember any of the king's carts or waggons being appropriated to the carriage of officers' baggage. It might be, but I don't recollect it.

Q. Can you say, in a general way, how many horses might be employed in carrying the baggage of the army, including officers' horses?

128.

A. I never had any information upon that subject; it did not belong to my department, and I had much business on my hands.

129.

Q. How was the regimental baggage carried?

A. I believe chiefly in bateaux.

Q. How was it carried when there was no water-carriage?

130.

A. I can't speak to that point, having had no information on that subject; and when I speak of bateaux, I speak generally, having had no information on the subject.

131.

Q. Can you say, in a general way, how many women attended the army?

A. I had really so much to do that I had not much leisure to pay much attention to the ladies; and I know very little of their beauty or their numbers.

Q. Would not the feeding of two thousand women be a considerable object with respect to the provisions of the army?

132.

A. I



A. I should have been very sorry to have had two thousand women to have experienced that.

133. Q. How many women were there, if not two thousand?

A. I would wish to give the house every information in my power, w<sup>h</sup> I can speak with any degree of accuracy or tolerable guess. I have seen the commissary of provisions return, and I think the number of women returned, as victualled from the stores, were very very few.

134. Q. Do you think that a corps of dragoons mounted would have been of great use to the army?

A. I own, I very much wished those few dragoons we had could have been mounted, because, though in that part of America that I saw they might not have been necessary or useful to have made a charge, I think those light dragoons might be always applied to very useful services.

135. Q. How many had you of those dragoons?

A. They are included in the strength of the Germans, and I really do not remember their particular number.

136. Q. If none or less of the park of artillery had been brought forward, would there not have been horses to have mounted those dragoons?

A. I believe there might have been horses enough taken from the artillery, or from the provision train, to have mounted those dragoons, if it had been thought more expedient to have employed the horses in that manner; but they were hired or contracted for, for the special purposes of carrying provisions, and bringing on the artillery, and never meant by the persons who furnished the contract for the dragoon service.

137. Q. If a smaller quantity of baggage had been carried, might not the officers have spared some of their baggage horses for mounting the dragoons?

A. I never met with an officer who had horses to spare. I know Sir Francis Clarke and myself wished to buy horses to carry our own servants; cared very little what expence we were at, and yet I could not obtain any.

138. Q. Do you know of any corps or party finding their way back to Canada?

A. I never heard of any corps finding its way there; and I understood from the guides who were with us, previous to the convention's taking place, that if that was attempted, we must break into small parties, and go by what is called Indian paths.

139. Q. Supposing there was a small party that found its way to Canada by Indian paths, do you think it would have been possible for an army to have done the same?

A. My idea of that must be founded upon the report of those guides who had served us very faithfully as scouts upon former occasions, and who informed me that we must break into very small parties, to have any chance of making our way through the woods to Canada; and I remember that when General Phillips offered to attempt to find his way to Ticonderoga, it was talked of and looked on to be as desperate as gallant.

140. Q. If any party did make its way to Canada, do you not suppose it must be



be that party of provincials that ran away while they were employed to repair roads, and that were never heard of afterwards?

A. I remember some were reported to have run away who were making roads, and it is likely to have been that party.

Q. When you mentioned the highest number of provincials, did you mean 141. that they were all armed?

A. I know that they were not all armed. We had not arms for them.

Q. Of those that were armed, some respectable persons excepted, were they 142. much to be depended upon?

A. A very great part of them were such as I should have placed very little dependence upon.

Q. Before the army left Canada, was there not a strict order, that not more than 143. three women a company should be suffered to embark?

A. I do know there was such an order issued, and I never heard any complaint of its having been broke through. I don't recollect the date of that order, or I would have turned to my book, and stated to the house, upon the first question relative to the number of women that were employed on our expedition.

Q. Is it not the custom in all armies victualled from the king's stores, to prohibit the delivery of provisions to any women over and above the number allowed by order? 144.

A. It was customary in all places where I served in the last war, and very strong and peremptory orders were given on that subject to the commissaries in our army.

Q. Do you not then believe, that all women who followed your army were 145. fed from the ration of the men they followed, or found their provision in the country?

A. I remember, upon asking the commissaries how there came to be so few women in the provincial returns, I was told, it was the custom for them to be supplied out of the men's rations.

Q. Were the women conveyed on baggage carts or horses, or did they walk 146. a-foot?

A. I never heard of the women's being conveyed on baggage carts or the king's horses.

Q. If the women neither employed the king's horses, nor consumed his provisions, do you think they were more of impediment, or of comfort to the king's troops? 147.

A. I never understood from my conversation with the commanding officers, or others, that the women were any impediment.

Q. If after the taking of Ticonderoga there was any doubt in the army in which 148. you served, of their being able to reach Albany?

A. I don't remember to have heard any doubts expressed upon that subject, meaning soon after the taking Ticonderoga.

Q. Was it generally understood in the army, that it was well supplied with 149. all the necessaries, appointments for war, and articles proper for forwarding the expedition to Albany?

A. I always understood that the army had been very well supplied with every thing.

150. Q. Do you believe, if the secretary of state had ordered the army under General Howe to co-operate with the army under General Burgoyne for the North River, with a view to have formed the junction of the two armies, that the disaster which befel General Burgoyne's army could have happened?

A. If a junction could have been formed, I should apprehend that Mr. Gates's army might have been dislodged, and that the misfortune at Saratoga would not have happened. This is only matter of opinion.

151. Q. Do you apprehend, that if the army under Sir William Howe had operated on the North River, with a view to effect a junction, that such a junction would have taken place?

A. I had an opinion while in America, that if the expedition which came up the Hudson's River under General Vaughan, could have been there about the time of our action of the 19th of September, that Mr. Gates would have found it difficult to have kept his army together, if he had not crossed over the Hudson's River towards New England. But this is mere matter of private opinion.

152. Q. If you are of opinion, that the troops under General Vaughan would have had so powerful an effect, even so late as September, what effect do you think Sir William Howe's army, assisted by all the fleet and craft, would have had as early as the beginning of July, immediately after the impression which took place among the enemy after the defeat at Ticonderoga?

A. I did not know what force there was under the command of General Vaughan, nor do I even now know; but I should think most certainly, that a great army upon the Hudson's River near Albany, would have contributed very much to our making our way to Albany.

153. Q. Have you ever considered what were the causes of the failure of the expedition under General Burgoyne, and to what do you impute it?

A. I looked upon our force not to be equal to the forcing our way to Albany without some co-operation.

154. Q. Where then did you expect that co-operation?

A. I had no where to expect it from, but up the Hudson's River from New York; and the success of Colonel St. Leger's expedition would have been of use certainly.

155. Q. If General Washington's army had not been diverted, would it not have impeded, or stopped the progress of any army up the Hudson's River.

A. I don't know the strength of General Washington's army, nor the nature of the country between Albany and New York; and therefore I cannot form any judgment of what would have happened.

156. Q. Are you not of opinion that there are very strong passes or posts on that river?

A. I found them very strong between Ticonderoga and Albany, and from reports of military men of high reputation in the service, I have understood there were many very strong posts between New York and Albany.

157. Q. From whence is the account of the strength of Mr. Gates's army taken?

A. From

A. From a return voluntarily given by General Gates to me for my own satisfaction when at Albany, and that return was signed by General Gates.

Q. Have you that return?

158.

A. I gave it to General Burgoyne; I saw it to-day; he has it.

Q. Was it by consent of General Gates that the soldiers after the convention retained their cartouch-boxes?

159.

A. They retained their belts, and I really don't recollect whether their cartouch boxes were in general retained or not: but talking with Mr. Gates when the king's troops marched by with the accoutrements on, Mr Gates asked me (we had been old acquaintance formerly) whether it was not customary on field days for arms and accoutrements to go together? I told him, there was nothing said in the convention that I had agreed to with him relating to the accoutrements, and that he could have no right to any thing but what was stipulated in that treaty. He replied, "You are perfectly right;" and turned to some of the officers in their service by, and said, "If we meant to have had them, we ought to have inserted them in the convention."

*[Withdrew.]*

REMARKS

*Review of the Evidence; its several Parts compared with the  
prefatory Speech and Narrative; and additional Remarks and  
Explanations.*

THE noble Lord who is at issue with me upon this occasion has, in a great measure, deprived me of the benefit of a reply, properly so called, because he has produced no defence. His Lordship certainly has been accused by me in many instances of a very serious nature. If he is really willing that his political, and my military conduct should be tried by facts alone, I certainly have not shewn less inclination than his Lordship for that test; but, taxed as I avow he has been by me, with proceedings derogatory to the obligations which ought to subsist between man and man, I really expected, as I believe did the House of Commons and the public, to have heard from him some justification in those respects. Instead of that, the noble Lord, in opening the subjects to which he proposed to call evidence, touched so slightly upon the branch of the enquiry in which we are parties, that a stranger would hardly have thought there subsisted a dispute between us. His Lordship contradicted nothing that I have alledged respecting his conduct or my own; he stated no circumstance of blame against me, except he meant as such the enterprize of Bennington, which he qualified with the epithet "fatal," and pronounced to be the cause of all the subsequent misfortunes. He passed entirely over the transactions at Saratoga. Of forty officers or more, belonging to the Convention troops, then in England, one only was proposed to be called on his Lordship's part, *viz.* Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland, of the 47th regiment, upon parole from the Congress, and acting with a corps of the Fencible Men in North Britain; but, upon further reflection, his Lordship thought proper to dispense with the attendance of this officer; and the only witness under order of the House was Mr. Skene. No man was better qualified to give an account of the proceedings at Bennington; and I heartily lament that the public is deprived of his testimony.

The conduct  
of Lord G.  
Germain,  
during the  
enquiry.

But although I am thus left in possession of the evidence, uncontroverted by the noble Lord, I avail myself of my right of closing the cause, for the following purposes: first, to collect from the minutes (which, in an enquiry of this nature, are unavoidably prolix and disarranged) the scattered parts, and apply them to facts, under distinct and separate heads. Next, to examine whether the facts (which, from the silence of the noble Lord, I am to assume as admitted by him) are in any respect invalidated by the cross examination of the witnesses by other gentlemen. And  
O  
lastly,

Claim of G.  
Burgoyne to  
close the  
cause.

Mode of pro-  
ceeding.



lastly, to explain such circumstances, and answer such new and collateral objections, as have been pointed at in the same cross examination, and were omitted, or only slightly noticed in my opening, because they did not exist, or were not deemed possible objects of blame or cavil. In pursuing these purposes, I shall consider the proofs precisely in the order of the facts to which they are produced.

Insinuation  
of having  
acted unfair-  
ly by Sir Guy  
Carleton,  
overthrown  
by his own  
evidence.

Though the first circumstance I took notice of in my opening, *viz.* my conduct respecting Sir Guy Carleton, was rather an insinuation than an allegation against me, I thought it right that it should be the first overthrown by evidence; for while it remained in any degree of force, it gave a general tinge, as it was meant to do, to my whole cause. I could not but expect even the virtuous prejudices of the human heart to be against me, whilst it was possible to be conceived that in absence of the commander in chief, to whom I had acted second; whose attention I had constantly experienced; and with whose confidence I was then honoured; I had practised unmanly and adulatory intrigue to supersede him in a favourite object of command.—There are few worse modes of betraying a superior officer to be found upon the records of dishonour; and whoever reflects upon the degree of odium with which the most palliated acts of that species have been received by mankind, will not wonder at or condemn my impatience, in applying my first questions to Sir Guy Carleton to that particular object. Clear as my justification stood by the letter formerly referred to, (No. II.) I shall be forgiven for obtaining, though with some redundancy, a full and satisfactory confirmation of my innocence, from the verbal testimony of the party whom I was supposed to have injured.

See Sir Guy  
Carleton's  
evidence, qu.  
1, 2, 3.

Aspersions  
from the pa-  
per, No. III.

refuted.

It may be proper here to observe, that the abovementioned aspersions, to which I have so often adverted, and at which I have strove in vain for due terms to express my indignation, was not the only one cast upon me respecting Sir Guy Carleton. When impartial and candid men revolted at the insinuation of my treachery, my presumption and insolence (a lesser but still a calumnious charge) was pointed out in that part of the paper (No. III.) that treats of the force to be left in Canada, and the disposition of it. I am pleased with the questions in the cross examination of Sir Guy Carleton, marking the prescribed distribution of the troops, &c. (38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43.) because that enquiry affords me an opportunity of justifying myself in a point which I have not taken notice of before. The posts, and the troops which I imagined would be necessary to occupy them, were specified merely to shew that the number of 3000 was indispensably requisite for the defence of the province. The whole of that detail concurred with General Carleton's requisitions for reinforcement, and with my reasoning upon those requisitions; and when I assert, as I now do, that I never presumed to suggest the necessity or propriety of forming a detail of posts, (thus given for information)

information) into precise orders for the general upon the spot, I am sure the secretary of state will no more contradict that assertion than he has done any other I have made.

When in the same paper I confidentially communicated my reasons for preferring certain corps to others, I was actuated by the same principle of offering every opinion that could conduce to make the intended service effectual. I thought it a just claim in an arduous undertaking, to have my own choice of the troops; and I am persuaded Sir Guy Carleton never took ill of me, either that claim, or a subsequent one in the same paper, of being held free from any imputation of delay, till I should be clear of the province of Quebec. With an unfeigned confidence in Sir Guy Carleton, I thought it a precaution fully justifiable, to secure myself against others, in the numerous and complicated departments under him, who might be found less equitable than he is.

No. III.

Apology for specifying corps.

I know I have before complained of the production of these secret communications; but after so many precedents as the last Session furnished, of withholding parts of correspondences from Parliament, upon the plea that they might affect individuals, the noble Lord's silence upon those complaints, gives me a right still to comment upon the sinister purposes that are to be ascribed to the production of that paper at length, rather than by extract. Those purposes were various; but it must be confessed one, and only one, good effect may result from a review of them, viz. It may serve as a salutary caution to any officer, who shall for the future be admitted into consultation with the same minister, how he commits himself by an opinion of men and things.

The next point that I entered upon previously to my narrative, was the tenor of my orders, and I believe it was generally expected that the noble Lord would have taken some notice of the fact I alledged, *that every discretionary latitude which I had proposed was erased, while the plan was in his hand.* As his Lordship had so much commented upon the nature of peremptory orders, as a general question, in my absence, it would have been fair in him to have reasoned upon them after that important and decisive circumstance was laid open.

Remarkable circumstance respecting the construction to be put upon my orders.

The general idea of *forcing a way to Albany*, which the army at its outset conceived, by reasoning upon the apparent principles of the campaign, without participation of the letter of the orders is clear, from the general tenor of the evidence. I wished, it is true, to have heard more copiously the sentiments of Sir Guy Carleton, because he had full participation of the orders. From the temper and judgment that always direct his conduct, he declined giving an opinion at the bar upon what might become a question in the House. But I have since (upon request) received his permission to publish a letter from him to me, dated soon after the Convention of Saratoga,

The general opinion of the army upon forcing away to Albany.

## REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

toga, which is in the Appendix No. X. and with this reference I close my review of the prefatory matter which I laid before the Committee.

*Review of the first Period.*

Most of the circumstances stated in my Narrative respecting the first period of the campaign, were, from their nature, to be established by written testimony; and the papers, No. VII. and VIII. in the Appendix, were added to those before produced for that purpose; but the returns of the troops, No. XI, are moreover authenticated by the proper official authority, the adjutant general, and the detail of the artillery, by the Major of brigade in that department.

Strength of  
the army.

Proportion  
of artillery.  
Evidence of  
Capt. Blom-  
field, from  
quest. 4. to 9.

From the evidence of the latter, is also confirmed all that I advanced respecting the opinion and recommendation of Major General Philips, for the proportion of artillery employed; for the moderate quantity of it, comparatively with the principles and practice of other services, and for the great expected use of artillery in the country where we were to act.

The uses of  
it. Captain  
Blomfield  
from question  
10 to 17.  
Evidence of  
Lord Balcarras,  
from  
question 14.  
to 19.  
Lord Balcarras's cross  
examination,  
quest. 93, 94.

Had these opinions been merely speculative, the intelligence of the persons from whom they came would have given them sufficient authority. But fortunately they are verified by facts; for it appears from a multitude of evidence, that the enemy made the true use of local advantages: they fortified every pass or proper post: the nature of the country, and the necessity of keeping the banks of rivers, made it impossible to turn those posts: had I wanted therefore artillery, I could not have proceeded any given ten miles, but at a heavy expence of my best troops. When it was found that I was provided with that forcible arm, the enemy invariably quit-  
ted their entrenchments, either to retreat, or fight upon ground where they supposed artillery could be least effectually employed. I am to thank the honourable member, whatever his intentions might have been, who by his cross examination placed the expediency of carrying the train I did, in so clear a view.

Lord Balcarras,  
quest. 8.  
Lord Harrington,  
question 4.

The only remaining fact of the first period to which verbal evidence is applicable, viz. The impossibility of following the enemy further than they were followed in their precipitate retreat from Ticonderoga, is established by Lord Balcarras, and by Lord Harrington.

*Review of the second Period.*

March from  
Skenesboro-  
rough to Fort  
Edward.

In entering upon the evidence which respects the first transaction of the second period, viz. the march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward, I cannot help observing



observing how much of the blame imputed to me has been occasioned by misrepresentation from persons whose business it was to decry my actions; and by uncommon mistakes in the geography of the country by those to whom my actions were misrepresented. By the cross examination of Lord Balcarras, it must be supposed, that the persons who suspected I erred in not taking the route by *South Bay* after the success at Ticonderoga, did not know where *South Bay* was. They seem equally ignorant of the situation of *Pitch-pine Plains*, by the question immediately following the former one; and it must have been a surprise to the enquirers to find that the route which they were inclined to approve, was precisely that which the main body of the army took under me in person, and with such effect, as to come up with the rear of the enemy and drive them from their fortified post at Skenesborough, with the loss on their part of five armed vessels and all the rest of their water-craft.

Mistakes in geography.  
Lord Balcarras, quest. 90.

Question 91.

But it may be said, this part of the cross-examination, though incomprehensible in point of geography, still applied to the question taken notice of in my narrative, viz. "Whether it would not have been more expedient to return to Ticonderago, and take the route by Lake George, than to proceed, as I did, by the Pitch Pine Plains to Fort Edward?"

I shall not recapitulate the various motives I have before stated in support of that preference, having publickly in my favour the opinion of an officer so enlightened in military science, and so well acquainted with the country as Sir Guy Carleton;\* and never having heard a difference of opinion in any other officer of a like description, to rest much more upon a subject so supported by reasoning and by success, might be construed an attempt to divert the attention of my examiners from points less defensible. I therefore shall only add two short remarks; the one, that the fact of gaining considerable time by allotting the whole service of the water-craft to the transport of provision and stores over Lake George, instead of employing great part of it for the transport of the troops is incontestably proved by the evidence of Captain Money and Lieutenant Colonel Kingston: the other, that to have reached Fort Edward with the troops sooner than the 29th of July (the day that the first embarkation of provisions arrived at Fort George) would not only have been useless, but also highly impolitic; because the subsistence of the troops at Fort Edward, before the arrival of that embarkation, must have been brought by land carriage through much difficult road all the way from Fort Anne, when, on the contrary, by remaining in the neighbourhood of Skenesborough till the passage of Lake George was effected, exclusively of the considerations of covering the removal of the hospital of Huberton, and alarming the Connecticut by the position of General Reidesel's corps, the army was commodiously supplied by water-carriage.

Sir Guy Carleton, quest. 9, 10.

Considerable time gained by the army taking the route to Fort Edward by land.

Captain Money, quest. 4 to quest. 11. Lieut. Col. Kingston, quest. 23.

\* See also the map of country.



The next circumstance for examination, according to the order of the Narrative, is the transport of the magazines of provisions, &c. from Fort George; and it is highly incumbent upon me to shew the difficulties of that operation, because, if they were avoidable, it must be acknowledged one of the principal grounds upon which I vindicate the plan of the expedition to Bennington will fail me.

But I am persuaded, every candid examiner will first indulge me in a short pause.

The charges brought against the Lt. General's conduct at this part of the campaign.

It will be recollected, that this is the only part of the campaign upon which the noble Lord has laid his finger, as judging it productive of the subsequent events. The cross-examination had already been pressed upon the same ideas. Such want of knowledge of the nature of transport in that country has been betrayed; so much prepossession of unnecessary delays has appeared; such emphasis of question has attended every circumstance of my conduct at this period, that I shall stand acquitted of prolixity, if I preface the application of the subsequent evidence by a more comprehensive and complete survey of the difficulties and anxieties of my situation than I thought was necessary before.

Survey of his difficulties and anxieties

Feeding the army.

The combination of arrangement for feeding the army might, in fact, be stated to have extended even to Ireland; for some part of the supply depended upon the victualling fleet which was prepared in that country, according to my requisition before I left London, and had not reached Quebec when the army took the field. The tediousness of the navigation from Quebec to the mouth of the Sorel need not be again described. The next embarrassment was to manage the conveyance for that part of the supply which came from Montreal, and which was much the greatest, without interfering with the transport which with equal necessity was to be expedited up the Saint Lawrence to Lake Ontario, for the service of Colonel St. Leger's expedition, and the immense stores (then necessarily upon the move also) for the winter maintenance of the upper country. To these might be added a list of chances and inconveniences, incident to the carrying places between Chamblée and Saint John's; the uncertainty afterwards of the passage over Lake Champlain, and Lake George; the laborious and slow operations of drawing the boats over the isthmus which divides the two Lakes. These together make a system of embarrassments and disappointments hardly to be conceived by those who have not experienced them.

But although the whole of this arrangement (the furnishing the upper country excepted) was made under my direction, I have been content to date my difficulties from the lodgement of the supplies at Fort George; and I have touched the other parts only to shew more perspicuously the unfairness of judging of an American campaign upon European ideas. How zealously soever a general, in such an undertaking as mine, may be served by the chiefs of departments (and much praise is due from

from me upon that score) for one hour he can find to contemplate *how he shall fight his army, he must allot twenty to contrive how to feed it.*

The behaviour of the Indians is a circumstance too material to be passed over in a review of the anxieties in this part of the campaign. I had discerned the caprice, the superstition, the self-interestedness of the Indian character from my first intercourse, even with those nations which are supposed to have made the greatest progress towards civilization: I mean with those called the domiciliated nations near Montreal. I had been taught to look upon the remote tribes who joined me at Skenesborough, as more warlike; but a very little time proved that, with equal depravity in general principle, their only pre-eminence consisted in ferocity. The hopes I had placed in their wild honour, and in the controul of their conductors, which, as I stated before, at first had been promising, were soon at an end; and their ill-humour and mutinous disposition were manifest soon after my arrival at Fort Edward. The apparent causes of their change of temper were the resentment I had shewn upon the murder of Miss Macrea, and the restraints I had laid on their disposition to commit other enormities; but I never doubted that their evil passions were fomented, and their defection completed by the cabals of the Canadian interpreters. Rapacity, self-interest, and presumption are the characteristics of these men, with some few exceptions. The acquisition of the Indian language has usually been a certain fortune to a man with an artful head and a convenient conscience.

Behaviour of  
the Indians.

Lord Har-  
rington from  
quest. 6 to 23.

To check the old practices of speculation in these men, Sir Guy Carleton, with great judgment, had given the superintendency of the Indian department to Major Campbell and Captain Frazer, gentlemen of the highest integrity. The British officers employed solely in the military conduct of that department, were also selected with equal propriety. The interpreters had from the first regarded with a jealous eye a system which took out of their hands the distribution of Indian necessaries and presents; but when they found the plunder of the country, as well as that of the government, was controuled, the profligate policy of many was employed to promote dissention, revolt, and desertion.

I take this occasion to acquit Monsieur St. Luc of any suspicion of his being concerned in these factions; but I believe he discerned them. He certainly knew that the Indians pined after a renewal of their accustomed horrors; and that they were become as impatient of his controul as of all other, though the pride and interest of authority, and the affection he bore to his old associates, induced him to cover the real causes under various frivolous pretences of discontent, with which I was daily tormented, but to which I constantly attended: and though I differed totally with Saint Luc in opinion upon the efficacy of these allies, I invariably took his advice in the management

St. Luc.