

mentes there will never be an end. And seeinge the substance of this booke (I meane the Holy Bible) is spent in reportinge thinges incredible to flesh and blood, such as the reason of man rejecteth and scorneth, among which these concerning divels, their nature, power, entrance into men, &c. are some; and that this is it which letteth man from imbracing it as a word of truth; and that sundry of these incredible and impossible thinges to reason, we evidently see with our eyes, and our selves of our own knowledge know to be most true, why should we not be fullye perswaded of the divine and certaine truth of the other incredible thinges there reported? And that all those also in their time we shall as certainly see fulfilled, as we have already in part seene these? Thus, methinketh, the fulfillinge of many sayinges in the scriptures, in this worke of God, should be a motive and inducement to many, to give that credit unto them, which percase before they did not; yea surely, if man will but give eare to his reason, wherewith God hath indued him, and discusse or debate hereof, after this sayde manner, it will perswade him hereunto.

I doe not saye that this is effectuall, or of power, and sent of God to that ende, to worke savinge faith in man; for I knowe "faith cometh by hereinge, and how shall they beleve in him of whom they have not hearde?" but this I meane, that he which before thought basely, and gave no regarde or credit to the holy worde of God, by this rare worke of his, and serious meditation thereof, may well be brought to think more reverently of the worde, and to be perswaded of the truth therof, where before he doubted, and so brought to the historicall faith, as we call it, where beinge, happily he will not reste, but therby be drawen to give eare unto the worde preached, and so be brought to that faith, the end whereof will be the salvation of his soule; whereof, if this worke of God be an occasion to any, oh howe will such bless God for the same, and joye in this, that the sounde there of came to his eare!

Thus we plainely see howe this worke of God sarveth to confirm the authority and truth of the holy scriptures, I meane, howe it som what helpeth to perswade us incredulous men to beleve, or more stedfastly to beleve, that the are devine, and certainly true, in that we see many things spoken of in them, and very incredible to flesh and blood, as well as otheis there mentioned, fulfilled before our eyes, and to be most true.

Seinge then no hurte, but much good, as we have heard, cometh by this worke, why should any be offended with us for bearinge witness to this worke? and why doe any stand up, and set themselves against this work, indeavoring to annihilate the same? Certainly in so doing, they are not only injurious to man, hindring him of the good fruite he might reape thereby, but also adversaries to God and his glory, prophauinge, and not hallowinge or sanctifyinge this his name. Christ Jesus, to such as he cured, was wont say; "be it unto thee as thou belevest; thy faith hath made thee whole; goe in peace, thy sinnes are forgiven thee; synne no more, least a worse thinge come unto thee;" and to many, "see thou tell no man of this I have donne unto thee;" yea sometimes he straightly charged others that they should "tell no man what was done." But to him out of whome he had cast out the divell, he saide, "goe shewe what greate thinges the Lorde hath donne unto thee, and howe hee hath compassion on thee." It is also to be observed, that we reade not the same or like speech to this, used to any besides of all those that Jesus healed, whereby it may seeme that the Lorde Jesus would not have this worke in any case smothered, and kept close, no not for a time, but rather set as a candle in a candlestick upon the table, that it may give such light unto men as we have already seene; and no marvaile, considering the wordes followinge of our Saviour; "Goe shew" (saith he) "what greate thinges the Lorde hath donne unto

thee." Are there greate thinges to be looked upon in this worke we speake of, even by the testimony of Christ himself? Whoe then, and where is he, if Somers, the 7 in Lancashire, and the rest, were possessed and dispossessed, that dare stand up to darken and obscure the saide worke, whereby the people of God be kept from beholding the greate thinges of the Lord, and so hindred from the greate good they might reape thereof, and God from his glory? If it be evident, that upon these persons this worke of God hath bene wrought, who seeth not how contrary minded such are unto Christ?

Of the 70 disciples whom Jesus sent forth by there preaching and miracles, to prepare and make away for him selfe, and his ministrie, it is saide, that when they had accomplished this worke, "they returned againe with joye, sayinge, Lord, even the devils are subdued to us, through thy name." In this subjection of the spirits unto them, above all the greate workes and miracles they wrought, they rejoiced; wherein howsoever they exceeded, whereupon Christ reproveth them, sayinge, "In this rejoyce not that the spirits are subdued unto you, but rather rejoyce because your names are written in heaven." Yet marke that he doth it so, as that he denieth not, but that they might rejoyce therein, but rather indede aloweth and commendeth the same, so that we keepe a measure, and make it not our cheife joye, the which should be, that our names are written in heaven, whereof the other giveth no assurance, forasmuch as it may fall into a reprobate.

And, truly, how can they which heare of the aforesaide worke of God but rejoyce, when they see the Lorde Jesus subduing Satan unto men; when we see, by praier and fastinge, devills cast out of men; when we see God performing his promise, the scripture before our eyes fulfilled, and our Christian brethren also delivered from the torments of Sathan; if wee turne our eye either to God or man, can wee chuse but rejoyce, and blesse God for such a worke? Greatly then are they to blame, and farre from that affection they should have, who are disquieted and offended here with; and most faultie of all shall they be, who, when the worke shall be made manifest to there consciences, (as I trust by this treatise it is), shall yet notwithstanding lift up there heele against it.

#### THE END.

---

*The Dutie of a King in his Royal Office, shewing how it is to be used in the Administration of Justice and Politick Government in his Kingdomes. Likewise declaring,*

The true glory of kings.  
 The difference between a king and a tyrant.  
 The authoritie and true use of parliaments.  
 The diseases of the church, and the remedie.  
 Generall advices in behalfe of the church.  
 Paritie incompatible with a monarchie.  
 Of the nobilitie and their formes.  
 The laudable customes of England.  
 Admonition for making warrs.  
 The right extention of king craft, &c.

Written by the High and Mightie Prince James, King of Great Brittain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the true, ancient, Catholicke and Apostolicke Faith, &c.

Lord Orford has expressed some doubts of this Tract being genuine; but it is humbly presumed, that the very first sentence contains the most conclusive internal evidence that it was composed by the British Solomon. Indeed the whole Tract is composed in his majesty's very best manner, exhibiting that extraordinary mixture of learning and pedantry, sense and folly, reason and prejudice, vanity and prudence, which most deservedly procured James the character of the wisest fool in Christendom. The truth, however, is, that Lord Orford never took the trouble to look at the Tract of which he impeached the authenticity; for a single glance would have shewn him that it is no other than an extract from the Basilicon Doron, or Precepts concerning the Art of Government, addressed by James to his Son; a work which Dr Robertson thus characterizes:—"Notwithstanding the great alterations and refinements in national taste since that time, we must allow this to be no contemptible performance, and not to be inferior to the works of most cotemporary writers, either in purity of style or justness of composition. Even that vain parade of erudition with which it abounds, and which now disgusts us, raised the admiration of that age; and as it was filled with those general rules, which speculative authors deliver for rendering a people happy, and of which James could discourse with great plausibility, though often incapable of putting them in practice, the English conceived an high opinion of his abilities, and expected an increase of national honour and prosperity, under a prince so profoundly skilled in politics, and who gave such a specimen both of his wisdom and of his love to the people."—ROBERTSON, *ad ann.* 1599.

THE state of monarchie is the supremest thing upon earth; for kings are not only Gods lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon Gods throne, but even by God himselfe they are called gods. There be three principall similitudes that illustrate the state of monarchie: one taken out of the word of God; and the two other out of the grounds of policie and philosophie. In the scriptures, kings are called gods; and so their power, after a certaine relation, compared to the divine power. Kings are also compared to fathers of families: for a king is truly *parens patriæ*, the politike father of his people. And, lastly, kings are compared to the head of this microcosme of the body of man.

Kings are justly called gods; for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth. For, if you will consider the attributes of God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a king. God hath power to create or destroy, make or unmake, at his pleasure; to give life or send death, to judge all, and not to be judged nor accountable to none; to raise low things, and to make high things low at his pleasure, and to God are both soule and body due. And the like power have kings: they make and unmake their subjects; they have power of raising and casting down; of life and of death; judges over all their subjects, and in all causes, and yet accountable to none but God only. They have power to exalt low things, and abase high things, and make of their subjects like men at the chesse; a pawne to take a bishop or a knight, and to cry up or down any of their subjects, as they do their money. And to the king is due both the affection of the soule and the service of the body of his subjects. And, therefore, that reverend bishop here amongst you, though I heare, that by divers he was mistaken, or not well understood, yet did he preach both learnedly and truly anent this point concerning the power of a king; for what he spake of a kings power in *abstracto*, is most true in *divinitie*: for to emperours, or kings that are monarches, their subjects bodies and goods are due for their defence and maintenance. But if I had been in his place, I would only have added two words, which would have cleared all for, after I had told as a divine what was due by the subjects to their kings in generall, I would then have concluded as an Englishman, shewing this people, that, as in generall all subjects were bound to relieve their king; so to exhort them, that, as we lived in



a settled state of a kingdome, which was governed by his own fundamentall lawes and orders, that, according thereunto, they were now (being assembled for this purpose in parliament) to consider how to help such a king as now they had; and that according to the ancient forme and order established in this kingdome: putting so a difference between the generall power of a king in divinity and the settled and established state of this crown and kingdome. And I am sure that the bishop meant to have done the same, if he had not been straited by time, which, in respect of the greatnesse of the presence, preaching before me, and such an auditory, he durst not presume upon.

As for the father of a familie, they had of old, under the law of nature, *patriam potestatem*, which was *potestatem vitæ et necis*, over their children or familie (I mean such fathers of families as were the lineall heires of those families whereof kings did originally come;) for kings had their first originall from them, who planted and spread themselves in colonies through the world. Now a father may dispose of his inheritance to his children at his pleasure; yea, even disinherit the eldest upon just occasion, and preferre the youngest, according to his liking; make them beggars or rich at his pleasure; restraints or banish out of his presence, as he finds them give cause of offence, or restore them in favour againe with the penitent sinner: so may the king deal with his subjects.

And, lastly, as for the head of the naturall body, the head hath the power of directing all the members of the body to that use which the judgement in the head thinks most convenient. It may apply sharpe cures, or cut off corrupt members, let blood in what proportion it thinks fit, and as the body may spare, but yet is all this power ordained by God *ad edificationem, non ad destructionem*; for although God have power, aswell of destruction as of creation or maintenance, yet will it not agree with the wisdom of God to exercise his power in the destruction of nature, and overturning the whole frame of things, since his creatures were made, that his glory might thereby be the better expressed: so were he a foolish father that would disinherit or destroy his children without a cause, or leave off the carefull education of them; and it were an idle head that would, in place of physicke, so poyson or phlebotomize the body as might breede a dangerous distemper or destruction thereof.

But now, in these our times, we are to distinguish between the state of kings in their first originall, and between the state of settled kings and monarches that do at this time governe in civill kingdomes: for even as God, during the time of the Old Testament, spake by oracles and wrought by miracles, yet how soone it pleased him to settle a church, which was bought and redeemed by the blood of his only Sonne Christ; then was there a cessation of both, he ever after governing his people and church within the limits of his revealed will. So in the first originall of kings, whereof some had their beginning by conquest, and some by election of the people; their wills at that time served for law: yet how soone kingdomes began to be settled in civillie and policie; then did kings set down their mindes by lawes, which are properly made by the king only; but at the rogation of the people, the kings graunt being obtained thereunto, and so the king became to be *lex loquens*, after a sort binding himselfe by a double oath to the observation of the fundamentall lawes of his kingdome: tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect aswell the people as the lawes of his kingdome; and expressly by his oath at his coronation: so as every just king, in a settled kingdome, is bound to observe that paction made to his people by his lawes, in framing his government agreeable thereto, according to that paction which God made with Noe after the deluge—"Hereafter seede time and harvest, cold and heate, sommer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease, so long as the earth remains." And therefore a king, governing in a settled kingdome, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his lawes. In which case the kings conscience may speake unto him, as the poore widow said to Philip of Macedon; "Either



governe according to your law, *aut ne rex sis.*" And though no Christian man ought to allow any rebellion of people against their prince, yet doeth God never leave kings unpunished when they transgresse these limits; for in that same Psalme where God saith to kings, "*Ios Dei estis,*" he immediately thereafter concludes, "But ye shall die like men." The higher we are placed, the greater shall our fall be. "*Ut casus, sic dolor;*" the taller the trees be, the more in danger of the winde; and the tempest beates sorest upon the highest mountaines. Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their lawes; and they that perswade them the contrary are vipers and pests, both against them and the commonwealth. For it is a great difference between a kings government in a settled state, and what kings in their originall power might do in *individuo vago*. As for my part, I thank God, I have ever given good prooffe, that I never had intention to the contrary; and I am sure to go to my grave with that reputation and comfort, that never king was in all his time more carefull to have his laws duely observed, and himselfe to governe thereafter, then I.

I conclude then this point touching the power of kings with this axiome of divinity, that as to dispute what God may do is blasphemie; but *quid vult Deus*, that divines may lawfully, and do ordinarily, dispute and discusse; for to dispute *a posse ad esse* is both against logicke and divinity: so is it sedition in subjects to dispute what a king may do in the height of his power: but just kings will ever be willing to declare what they will do, if they will not incurre the curse of God. I will not be content that my power be disputed upon; but I shall ever be willing to make the reason appear of all my doings, and rule my actions according to my lawes.

A prince, as he is clothed with two callings, so much the more ought he to be carefull of the discharge of them both; that, as he is a good Christian, so he ought to be a good king, discharging his office in the points of justice and equitie, which, in two sundrie wayes, he must do: the one, in establishing and executing (which is the life of the law) good lawes among your people; the other, by your behaviour in your own person, and with your servants, to teach your people by your example; for people are naturally inclined to counterfeite (like apes) their princes manners, according to the notable saying of Plato, expressed by the poet:

— — — — — *Componitur orbis*  
*Regis ad exemplum, nec sic inflectere sensus*  
*Humanos edicta valent, quàm vita regentis.*

For the part of making and executing of lawes, consider first the true difference betwixt a lawfull good king and an usurping tyrant, and ye shall the more easily understand your dutie herein: for *contraria juxta se posita magis clucescunt*. The one acknowledgeth himselfe ordained for his people, having received from God a burthen of government, whereof he must be countable: the other thinketh his people ordained for him, a prey to his passions and inordinate appetites, as the fruits of his magnanimitie. And, therefore, as their ends are directly contrary, so are their whole actions, as meanes whereby they presse to attaine their ends. A good king thinketh his highest honour to consist in the due discharge of his calling; employeth all his study and paines to procure and maintaine, by the making and execution of good lawes, the well-fare and peace of his people; and, as their naturall father and kindly master, thinketh his greatest contentment standeth in their prosperity, and his greatest surety in having their hearts; subjecting his own private affections and appetites to the weale and standing of his subjects, ever thinking the common interest his chiefest particular; whereby, the contrary, an usurping tyrant, thinking his greatest honour and felicitie to consist in attaining *per fas, vel nefas*, to his ambitious pretences, thinketh

never himselfe sure, but by the dissention and factions among his people, and counterfeiting the saint while he once creepe in credit, will then (by inverting all good lawes, to serve only for his unruly private affections) frame the common-weale ever to advance his particular, building his surety upon his peoples miserie; and in the end (as a stepfather and an uncouth hieeling) make up his own hand upon the ruines of the republicke: and according to their actions, so receive they their reward. For a good king (after a happy and famous reigne) dieth in peace, lamented by his subjects, and admired by his neighbours; and, leaving a reverent renowne behinde him in earth, obtaineth the crown of eternall felicitie in heaven. And although some of them (which falleth out very rarely) may be cut off by the treason of some unnaturall subjects, yet liveth their fame after them, and some notable plague faileth never to over-take the committers in this life, beside their infamie to all posterities hereafter. Whereby, the contrary, a tyrannes miserable and infamous life, armeth in the end his own subjects to become his burdeaux: and although that rebellion be ever unlawfull on their part, yet is the world so wearied of him, that his fall is little meaned by the rest of his subjects, and but smyled at by his neighbours. And, besides the infamous memory he leaveth behinde him here, and the endlesse paine he sustaineth hereafter, it oft falleth out, that the committers not only escape unpunished, but, farther, the fact will remain as allowed by the law in divers ages thereafter. It is easie then for you (my sonne) to make a choice of one of these two sorts of rulers, by following the way of vertue to establish your standing; yea, in case ye fell in the highway, yet should it be with the honourable report and just regret of all honest men.

And therefore, to return to my purpose anent the government of your subjects, by making and putting good lawes to execution, I remitte the making of them to your owne discretion, as yee shall find the necessity of new-rising corruptions to require them: for, *ex malis moribus bonæ leges natæ sunt*; besides, that in this country, we have already more good lawes then are well excute, and am only to insist in your forme of government anent their execution. Only remember, that, as parliaments have been ordained for making of lawes, so yee abuse not their institution, in holding them for any mens particulars: for, as a parliament is the honourablest and highest judgment in the land (as being the kings head court) if it be well used, which is by making of good lawes in it; so is it the injustest judgment-seat that may be, being abused to mens particulars; irrevocable decreits against particular parties being given therein under colour of general lawes, and oftentimes the estates, not knowing themselves whom thereby they hurt; and therefore hold no parliaments but for necessity of new-lawes, which would be but seldome; for few lawes, and well put in execution, are best in a well-ruled common-weale. As for the matter of fore faultures, which also are done in parliament, it is not good tiggling with these things; but my advice is ye fore fault none but for such odious crimes as they make them unworthy ever to be restored againe; and for smaller offences, yee have other penalties sharpe enough to be used against them.

And as for the execution of good lawes, whereto I left, remember, that, among the differences that I put betwixt the formes of the government of a good king and a usurping tyrant, I shew how a tyrant would enter like a saint, while he found himselfe fast under-foote, and then would suffer his unruly affections to burst forth. Therefore see yee contrary, at your first entry to your kingdome, to that *Quinquennium Neronis*, with his tender-hearted wish, *vellem nescirem literas*, in giving the lawtull execution against all breakers thereof, but exception: for, since ye came not to your reigne *precario*, nor by conquest, but by right and due descent, feare no uproares for doing of justice, since yee may assure your selfe, the most part of your people will ever naturally favour justice; providing always, that yee doe it only for love to justice, and not for satisfying any particular passions of yours under colour thereof, otherwise, how justly that ever the offender deserve it; yee are guilty of murder before God;

for yee must consider, that God ever looketh to your inward intention in all your actions

And when yee have, by the severity of justice, once settled your countries, and made them know that ye can strike, then may yee thereafter, all the days of your life, mixe justice with mercie, punishing or sparing, as ye shall finde the crime to have been wilfully or rashly committed; and according to the by-past behaviour of the committer: for if otherwise ye loose your clemency at the first, the offences would soone come to such heapes, and the contempt of you grow so great, that, when yee would fall to punish, the number of them to be punished would exceed the innocent, and ye would be troubled to resolve whom at to begin; and, against your nature, would be compelled then to wracke many, whom the chastisement of few in the beginning might have preserved. But in this my over-deare-bought experience may serve you for a sufficient lesson; for, I confesse, where I thought (by being gracious at the beginning) to winne all mens hearts to a loving and willing obedience, I, by the contrary, found the disorder of the country and the losse of my thanks to be all my reward.

But as this severe justice of yours upon all offences, would bee but for a time (as I have already said) so is there some horrible crimes that ye are bound in conscience never to forgive; such as witchcraft, wilfull murder, incest, (especially within the degrees of consanguinity), sodomy, poisoning, and false coine.\* As for offences against your owne person and authority, since the fault concerneth your selfe, I remit to your owne choise to punish, or pardon therein, as your heart serveth you, and according to the circumstances of the turne and the quality of the committer.

Here would I also eike another crime to be unpardonable, if I should not be thought partall; but the fatherly love I beare you will make mee breake the bounds of shame in opening it unto you. It is then, the false and unreverent writing or speaking of malicious men against your parents and predecessors. Ye know the command of Gods law, "honour your father and mother;" and consequently, sen you are the lawful magistrate, suffer not both your princes and your parents to be dishonoured by any; especially, sith the example also toucheth your selfe, in leaving thereby to your successors, the measure of that which they shall mette out againe to you, in your like behalfe. I grant we have all our faults, which privately, betwixt you and God, should serve you for examples to meditate upon, and mend in your person; but should not be a matter of discourse to others whatsoever.

And sith yee are come of as honourable predecessors as any prince living, repress the insolence of such as, under pretence to tax a vice in the person, seeks craftily to staine the race, and to steale the affection of the people from their posterity. For how can they love you, that hate them whom of ye are come? Wherefore destroy men innocent young sucking wolves and foxes, but for the hatred they beare to their race? and why will a colt of a courser of Naples, give a greater price in a market, then an asse-colt, but for love of the race? It is, therefore, a thing monstrous, to see a man love the child and hate the parents: as, on the other part, the infaming and making odious of the parent, is the readiest way to bring the sonne in contempt.

And, for conclusion of this point, I may also alledge my owne experience. For, besides the judgments of God, that with my eyes I have seene fall upon all them that were chiefe traitors to my parents, I may justly affirme, I never found yet a constant bidding by me in all my straites, by any that were of perfitt age in my parents dayes, but only by such as constantly hold by them. I meane, specially by them that served the queene my mother: for so that I discharge my conscience to you, my son, in revealing to you the truth, I care not what any traitor or treason-allower think of it.

\* It will be observed, how naturally the King places the imaginary crime of witchcraft, against which he had himself written his *Demonologie*, in the very van of enormity.



And although the crime of oppression be not in this ranke of unpardonable crimes, yet the over common use of it in this nation, as if it were a vertue, especially by the greatest ranke of subjects in the land, requireth the king to be a sharp censurer thereof. Be diligent to trie, and awfull to beate downe the hornes of proud oppressors; embrace the quarrell of the poore and distressed, as your own particular, thinking it your greatest honour to repress the oppressours; woo for the pleasure of none, neither spare ye any paines in your owne person, to see their wronges redressed, and remember of the honourable stile given to my grandfather of worthy memory, in being called "the poore mans king." And as the most part of a kings office standeth in deciding that question of *meum* and *tuum* among his subjects; so remember, when ye sit in judgment, that the throne ye sit on is Gods, as Moses saith, and sway neither to the right hand nor to the left: either loving the rich, or pitying the poore. Justice shoulde be blinde and friendlesse; it is not there ye should reward your friends, or seek to crosse your enemies.

Here now, speaking of oppressours and of justice, the purpose leadeth me to speak of hieland and bordour oppressions. As for the hielands, I shortly comprehend them all in two sorts of people: the one that dwelleth in our maine land, that are barbarous for the most part, and yet mixed with some shew of civility; the other that dwelleth in the isles, and are all uterly barbares, without any sort or shew of civility. For the first sort, put straitly to execution the laws made already by me against their over lords, and the chiefs of their clannes; and it will be no difficulty to danton them.<sup>1</sup> As for the other sort, follow forth the course that I have intended, in planting colonies among them of answerable inland subjects, that within short time may reform and civilize the best inclined among them; rooting out, or transporting, the barbarous and stubborne sort, and planting civility in their roomes.\*

But as for the bordours, because I know if ye enjoy not this whole isle, according to Gods right and your lineall discent, ye will never get leave to brooke this north and barrenest part thereof; no, not your owne head whercon the crowne should stand; I need not in that case trouble you with them; for then they will be the middest of the isle, and so as easily ruled as any part thereof.

And that ye may the readier with wisdom and justice governe your subjects, by knowing what vices they are naturally most inclined to, as a good physician, who must first know what peccant humours his patient naturally is most subject unto, before hee can begin his cure: I shall therefore shortly note unto you, the principall faults that every ranke of the people of this country is most affected unto. And as for England, I will not speake by guesse of them, never having been among them; although I hope in that God, who ever favoureth the right, before I die, to be as well acquainted with their fashions.

As the whole subjects of our country (by the ancient and fundamentall policie of our kingdome) are divided into three estates; so is every estate hereof generally subject to some speciall vices; which in a manner, by long habitude, are thought rather virtue than vice among them; not that every particular man, in any of these rankes of men, is subject unto them; for there is good and evill of all sorts; but that I meane,

<sup>1</sup> Very severe laws were made in the reign of James VI. for restraining the rapine and inroads of the High-landers and Borderers. The landlords and chieftains of clans were declared responsible for the peaceable demeanour of their kinsmen and vassals, and obliged to lodge hostages for maintaining good order, or delivering up offenders to public justice. See the Scottish acts of parliament for the year 1602.

\* James made a fair experiment to civilize the Hebrides, by planting in the island of Lewis a colony, selected chiefly from the inhabitants of Fife; but these undertakings, as they were called, did not use sufficient precautions for defending their new possessions, and were surprised and expelled by the islesmen, under the command of their chieftain M'Leod.

I have found by experience, these vices to have taken greatest hold with these ranks of men.

And first, that I prejudice not the church of her ancient priviledges, reason would she should have the first place, for orders sake, in this catalogue.

The naturall sicknesses that ever troubled, and beene the decay of all the churches, since the beginning of the world, changing the candlesticke from one to another, as John saith, have beene pride, ambition, and avarice: and now last, the same infirmities wrought the overthrow of the popish church, in this country and divers others. But the reformation of religion in Scotland, being extraordinarilie wrought by God, wherein many things were inordinately done by a popular tumult, and rebellion, of such as blindly were doing the worke of God, but clogged with their owne passions and particular respects, as well appeared by the destruction of our policie, and not proceeding from the princes order, as it did in our neighbour countrey of England, as likewise in Denmarke, and sundrie parts of Germanie; some fiery spirited men in the ministry got such a guiding of the people at that time of confusion, as finding the gaste of government sweete, they began to fantasie to themselves a democratick forme of government; and having (by the iniquitie of time) been over well baited upon the wracke, first of my grandmother, and next of my own mother; and after usurping the libertie of the time in my long minoritie, settled themselves so fast upon that imagined democracie, as they fed themselves with the hope to become *tribuni plebis*: and so in a popolare government, by leading the people by the nose, to beare the sway of all the rule. And for this cause, there never rose faction in the time of my minoritie, nor trouble sinysue, but they that were upon that factious part were ever careful to perswade and allure these unrulie spirits among the ministrie, to spouse that quarrell as their owne, where-through I was oftentimes calumniated in their popolare sermons, not for any evill or vice in me, but because I was a king, which they thought the highest evill.\* And because they were ashamed to professe this quarrell, they were busie to looke narrowly in all my actions; and I warrant you a moate in my eye, yea, a false report, was matter enough for them to worke upon; and yet, for all their cunning, whereby they pretended to distinguish the lawfulness of the office from the vice of the person, some of them would some-times snapper out well grossely with the truth of their intentions; informing the people, that all kings and princes were naturally enemies to the libertie of the church, and could never patiently beare the yoke of Christ: with such sound doctrine fed they their flockes.\* And because the learned, grave, and honest men of the mi-

\* James was often the theme of the ministers' denunciations, even while he himself sat in the congregation. On one occasion he was so far provoked as to command the preacher either to speak sense, or to come down from the pulpit. "I tell thee, man," answered the divine, incensed at the interruption, "I will neither speak sense, nor come down." Another time he had the pleasure to hear a zealous preacher denounce a solemn curse upon every man, horse, and spear, who should assist the king against the Earl of Gowrie. His favourites were usually compared to Haman, his wife to Herodias, and he himself to Ahab, Herod, and Jeroboam; but the most celebrated insult was offered by Mass David Black, who declared in his sermon, that all kings were the *devil's barnes*, all ministers cormorants, and Queen Elizabeth an atheist. Being called before the privy council, he declined to answer to any temporal jurisdiction for words spoken in the pulpit, and his brethren making common cause with him, excited a popular tumult, in which the kings person was endangered. But the consequences were favourable to James's cause; for the conduct of the clergy disgusted all thinking persons, and justified the king in taking strong measures for repressing their insolence.

\* The claims of the church, and her independence upon the crown, were strongly contested in a conference between the king and the commissioners of the General Assembly of the kirk, in 1596.

"In the month of September, the commissioners appointed by the last General Assemblée, and some others of the ministrie, convened at Couper, understanding certainly that the popish lords were returned to the country, and what purposes they had with their favourers and assistants, thought good to direct some of their number to the king, to crave that these dangerous enterprises may be prevented. Masters Andrew Melvill, Patrick Galloway, James Nicolson, and James Melvill, came to Falkland, and were admitted into the kings ca-

nisterie were even ashamed and offended with their temeritie and presumption, preassing, by all good meanes, by their authoritie and example, to reduce them to a greater moderation; there could be no way found out so meeke in their conceit, that were turbulent spirites among them, for maintaining their plottes, as paritie in the church: whereby the ignorants were emboldened (as bairds) to crie the learned, godlie, and modest out of it: paritie, the mother of confusion, and enemie to unitie, which is the mother of order. For if, by the example thereof, once established in the ecclesiasticall government, the politicke and civill estate should be drawne to the like, the greate confusion that there-upon would arise may easily be discerned. Take heed therefore (my sonne) to such puritanes, verie pestes in the church and commonweale; whom no deserts can oblige, neither oathes or promises binde; breathing nothing but sedition and calumnies, aspiring without measure, rayling without reason, and making their owne imaginations (without anie warrant of the word) the square of their conscience. I protest before the great God, and since I am here as upon my testament, it is no place for me to lye in, that ye shall never finde with any hie-land or border theeves greater ingratitude, and more lies and vile perjuries then with these phanaticke spirits; and suffer not the principalls of them to brooke your land, if ye like to sit at rest; except ye would keepe them for trying your patience, as Socrates did an evill wife.

And for preservative against their poyson, intertaine and advance the godly, learned, and modest men of the ministry, whom of (God be praised) there lacketh not a sufficient number; and by their provision to bishopricks and benefices (annulling that vile act of annexation, if ye finde it not done to your hand) yee shall not onely banish their conceited parity, whereof I have spoken, and their other imaginary grounds, which can neither stand with the order of the church, nor the peace of the common-weale and well ruled monarchie; but ye shall also re-establish the old institution of three

binet. Mr James Melvill, their mouth, shewed that the commissioners appointed by the General Assembly, to watch in so dangerous a time, had convened with certain of the brethren at Couper. The king interrupted him, and challenged the meeting as seditious, and without warrant; and said, they made themselves and the countrey conceive fear where there was none. Mr James began to reply after his milde manner; but Mr Andrew taketh the speech from him, and howbeit the king was in anger, yet he uttered their commission, as from the mightie God; called the king Gods silly vassal; and, taking him by the sleeve, said this in effect:—"Sir, we will humbly reverence your majestie alwayes, namely, in publicke, but we have this occasion to be with your majestie in privat, and you are brought in extreem danger, both of your life and of your crown, and with you the country and kirk of God is like to be wracked, for not telling you the truth, and giving you a faithful counsel; we must discharge our dutie, or else be enemies to Christ and you: Therefore, sir, as diverse times before, so now I must tell you, that there are two kings and two kingdomes. there is Christ, and his kingdom the kirk, whose subject King James the Sixt is, and of whose kingdom he is not a king, nor a head, nor a lord, but a member; and they whom Christ hath called and commanded to watch over his kirk, and govern his spiritual kingdom, have sufficient authority and power from him so to do, which no Christian king nor prince should control nor discharge, but fortifie and assist, otherwise they are not faithful subjects to Christ. Sir, when you were in your swadling clouts, Christ reigned freely in this land, in spite of all your enemies. His officers and ministers convened and assembled for ruling of his kirk, which was even for your welfare also, when the same enemies were seeking your destruction; and have been by their assemblies and meetings since, terrible to these enemies, and most steedable for you; will ye now, when there is more then necessity, challenge Christs servants, your best and most faithful servants, for their convening, and for the care they have of their dutie to Christ and you; when as you should rather commend and countenance them, as the godly kings and emperours did? The wisdom of your counsel, which is devillish and pernicious, is this, that you may be served with all sort of men to come to your purpose and grandour, Jew and Gentile, Papist and Protestant. Because the ministers and Protestants in Scotland are too strong, and control the king, they must be weakened and brought low, by stirring up a party against them, and the king being equal and indifferent, both shall be faine to flee to him: so shall he be well settled. But, Sir, let Gods wisdom be the only true wisdom, this will prove meer and mad follie; for his curse cannot but be light upon it; so that, in seeking both, you shall lose both whereas, in cleaving uprightly to God, his true servants shall be your true friends, and he shall compel the rest counterfitely and lyingly to serve you, as he did to David."—*CALDERWOOD'S History of the Church of Scotland*, 1704, p. 329.



estates in parliament, which can no otherwise be done. But in this I hope (if God spare my dayes) to make you a faire entry: alwayes where I leave, follow ye my steps

And to end my advice aenent the church estate, cherish no man more than a good pastor, hate no man more than a proud puritan; thinking it one of your fairest stiles to be called a loving nourish-father<sup>1</sup> to the church; seeing all the churches within your dominions planted with good pastors, the schooles (the seminary of the church) maintained, the doctrine and discipline preserved in purity, according to Gods word, a sufficient provision for their sustentation, a comely ordour in their policy, pride punished, humility advanced, and they so to reverence their superiours, and their flockes them, as the flourishing of your church in piety, peace, and learning may bee one of the chiefe points of your earthly glory; being ever alike at war with both the extremities, as well as ye repress the vaine Puritan, so not to suffer proud papall bishops: but as some for their qualities will deserve to bee preferred before others, so chaine them with such bonds as may preserve that estate from creeping to corruption.

The next estate now that by order commeth in purpose, according to their ranks in parliament, is the nobility, although seconde in ranke, yet over-far first in greatnesse and power, either to doe good or evill, as they are inclined.

The naturall sicknesse, that I have perceived this estate subject to in my time, hath been, a fecklesse,<sup>2</sup> arrogant conceit of their greatnesse and power; drinking in with their very nouris milke, that their honour stooode in committing three points of iniquity; to thrall, by oppression, the meaner sort that dwelleth neate them, to their service and following, although they hold nothing of them; to maintaine their servants and dependers in any wrong, although they be not answerable to the laws (for any body will maintaine his man in a right cause) and for any displeasure, that they apprehend to be done unto them by their neighbour, to take up a plaue feide against him; and (without respect of God, king, or common-weale) to bang it out bravely, he and all his kinne, against him and all his; yea, they will thinke the king farre in their common, in case they agree to grant an assurance to a short day, for keeping of the peace; where, by their naturall duty, they are obliged to obey the law, and keepe the peace all the dayes of their life, upon the perill of their craigges.<sup>3</sup>

For remedey to these evils in their estate, teache your nobility to keepe your lawes as precisely as the meanest: feare not ther carping or being discontented, as long as ye rule well; for their pretended reformation of princes taketh never effect, but where evill govenement piceddeth. Acquaint your selfe so with all the honest men of your barrones and gentlemen, and be in your giving accesse so open and affable to every ranke of honest persons, as may make them pearte without scarring at you, to make their own suites to you themselves, and not to employ the great lords their intercessours; for intercession to saints is papistry: so shall you bring to a measure their monstrous backes. And for their barbarous feides,<sup>4</sup> put the lawes in due execution made by me there-aenent, beginning ever rather at him that yee love best, and is most obliged unto you, to make him an example to the rest. For ye shall make all your reformations to begin at your elbow, and so by degrees to flow to the extremities of the land. And rest not, untill ye roote out these barbarous feides, that their effects may be as well smoared downe, as their barbarous name is unknowne to any other nation. For if this treatise were written either in French or Latine, I could not git them named unto you but by circumlocution. And for your easier abolishing of them, put sharply to execution my lawes made agaiust guns and trayterous pistolets;<sup>5</sup> thinking in your heart, tearing in your

<sup>1</sup> Nourice-father, i. e. nursing-father.

<sup>2</sup> Feckless, ineffectual.

<sup>3</sup> Craigges, throats.

<sup>4</sup> The feuds were the family wars, the *fehde* of the German chivalry.

<sup>5</sup> James had a particular aversion at pistols. When the war in the Palatinate was commenced, Wilson tells

speech, and using by your punishments, all such as weare and use them, as brigands and cut-throates.

On the other part, eschew the other extremitie, in lightlying and contemning your nobility. Remember how that error brake the king my grandfather's heart. But consider that vertue followeth ofttest noble blood: the worthinesse of their antecessours craveth a reverent regard to be had unto them: honour them therefore that are obedient to the law among them, as the peeres and fathers of your land: the more frequently that your court can be garnished with them, thinke it the more your honour; acquainting and employing them in all your greatest affaires; sen it is they must be your armies and executers of your lawes; and so use yourselfe lovingly to the obedient, and rigorously to the stubborne, as may make the greatest of them to thinke that the chiefest point of their honour standeth in striving with the meanest of the land in humility towards you, and obedience to your lawes: beating ever in their eares, that one of the principal points of service that ye crave of them, is, in their persons to practise, and by their power to procure due obedience to the law; without the which, no service they can make can be agreeable unto you.

But the greatest hinderance to the execution of our lawes in this country, are these heritable sheriffdomes and regalities, which, being in the hands of the great men, doe wracke the whole country. For which I know no present remedy, but by taking the sharper account of them in their offices; using all punishment against the slothfull, that the law will permit: and ever as they vaile, for any offences committed by them, dispoone them never heritable again: preassing, with time, to draw it to the laudable custome of England, which ye may the easier doe, being king of both, as I hope in God ye shall.

And as to the third and last estate, which is our burghes (for the small barones are but an inferior part of the nobility and of their estate) they are composed of two sorts of men, merchants and craftsmen; either of these sorts being subject to their owne injuries.

The merchants thinke the whole commonweal ordained for making them up; and accounting it their lawfull gaine and trade, to enrich themselves upon the losse of all the rest of the people, they transport from us things necessarie, bringing back sometimes unnecessarie things, and at other times nothing at all. They buy for us the worst wares, and sell them at the dearest prices: and albeit the victualls fall or rise of their prices according to the abundance or scantnesse thereof; yet the prices of their wares ever rise, but never fall: being as constant in that their evill custom, as if it were a settled law for them. They are also the special cause of the corruption of the coyne, transporting all our own, and bringing in foraine, upon what price they please to set on it. For order putting to them, put the good lawes in execution that are already made anent these abuses: but especially doe three things. Establish honest, diligent, but few searchers; for many hands make slight work; and have an honest and diligent treasurer to take count of them. Permit and allure forrain merchants to trade here; so shall ye have best and best cheap wares, not buying them at the third hand. And set every yeare down a certaine price of all things; considering, first, how it is in other countries; and the price being set reasonably downe, if the merchants will not bring them home on the price, cry forrainers free to bring them. And because I have made

us of Colonel Gray, "an old German commander, one that affected huff in the time of peace, and wore it in the face of the court; which the king seeing him in, and a case of pistols at his girdle (which he never well liked of) he told him merrily, He was now so fortified, that if he were but well victualled, he would be impriguable." Wilson *apud* Kennet, II. p. 789.

\* This excellent suggestion was not carried into force until the consequences of the insurrection in 1745, enabled government to pass the *Jurisdiction Act*, as it is called, taking away all the heritable sheriffdoms and regalities.

mention here of the coyne, make your money of fine gold and silver; causing the people be payed with substance, and not abused with number: so shall ye enrich the commonweale, and have a great treasure laid up in store, if ye fall in wars or in any straits. For the making it baser will breed your commoditie; but it is not to be used, but as at great necessitie.

And the craftsmen thinke, we should be content with their work, how bad and dere so ever it be; and if they in any thing be controlled, up goeth the blew blanket.<sup>1</sup> But for their part take example by England, how it hath flourished both in wealth and policie, since the strangers craftsmen came in among them. Therefore not only permit, but allure strangers to come here also: taking as strait order for repressing the mutining of ours at them, as was done in England at their first in bringing there. But unto one fault is all the common people of this kingdom subject, as well burgh as land; which is, to judge and speak rashly of their prince: setting the commonweale upon foure props, as wee call it; ever wearying of the present estate, and desirous of novelties. For remedie whereof (besides the execution of lawes that are to be used against unreverent speakers) I know no better meane, then so to rule, as may justly stop their mouths, from all such idle and unreverent speeches: and so to prop the weale of your people, with provident care for their good government, that, justly, Momus himselfe may have no ground to grudge at; and yet so to temper and mix your severitie with mildnesse, that as the unjust railers may be restrained with a reverent awe, so the good and loving subjects may not only live in suretie and wealth, but be stirred up and invited by your benigne curtesies, to open their mouthes in the just praise of you: so well moderated regiment. In respect whereof, and therewith also the more to allure them to a common amitie among themselves, certain dayes in the yeare would be appointed, for delighting the people with publike spectacles of honest games, and exercise of arms: as also for convening of neighbours, for entertaining friendship and heartlines, by honest feasting and merrines. For I cannot see what greater superstition can be in making playes and lawfull games in May, and good cheere at Christmasse, then in eating fish in Lent, and upon Fridayes, the Papists as well using the one as the other; so that always the Sabboths be kept holy, and no unlawfull pastime be used.<sup>2</sup> And as this forme of contenting the peoples minds hath bin used in all well governed republicks, so will it make you to perform in your government, that old good sentence,

*Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci.*

Ye see now (my son) how for the zeale I beare, to acquaint you with the plain and single verity of all things, I have not spared to be something satyrick, in touching well quickly the faults in all the estates of my kingdom. But I protest before God, I do it with the fatherly love that I owe to them all; only hating their vices, whereof there is a good number of honest men free in every state. And because, for the better reformation of all these abuses among your estates, it will be a great help unto you, to be well acquainted with the nature and humours of all your subjects, and to know particularly the estate of every part of your dominions; I would therefore counsell you, once in the year, to visit the principal parts of the country ye shall be in for the time: and, because I hope ye shall be king of more countries than this; once in the three years to visit all your kingdomes; not depending on vice-royes, but hearing yourself their complaints; and having ordinary counsels and justice-seats in every kingdom of their own countrymen; and the principall matters ever to be decided by yourselfe when ye

<sup>1</sup> The Blue Blanket, anciently called the banner of the Holy Ghost, is the standard of the craftsmen or mechanicks of Edinburgh, who are understood to be bound to arise in arms whenever it is displayd. It is a pennon of blue silk, said to have been anciently brought from the Holy Land.

<sup>2</sup> See his Majesty's Book of Sports.



come in those parts.\* Ye have also to consider, that ye must not only be carefull to keep your subjects from receiving any wrong of others within, but also ye must be carefull to keep them from the wrong of any forraigne prince without; sen the sword is given you by God, not only to revenge upon your own subjects, the wrongs committed among themselves, but, further, to revenge and free them of forraigne injuries done unto them. And therefore wars upon just quarrels are lawfull: but above all, let not the wrong cause be on your side.

Use all other princes as your brethren, honestly and kindly; keep precisely your promise unto them, although to your hurt; strive with every one of them in courtesie and thankfulness; and as with all men, so especially with them, be plain and truthfull; keeping ever that Christian rule, "to doe as ye would be done to:" especially in counting rebellion against any other prince, a crime against your own selfe, because of the comparative. Supply not, therefore, nor trust not other prince's rebels; but pitie and succour all lawfull princes in their troubles. But if any of them will not abstaine, notwithstanding whatsoever your good deserts, to wrong you or your subjects, crave redress at leisure; heare and doe all reason; and if no offer that is lawfull or honourable can make him to abstain, nor repair his wrong-doing, for the last refuge, commit the iustnes of your cause to God, giving first honestly up with him, and in a public and honourable forme. But, omitting now to teach you the form of making warr, because that art is largely treated of by many, and is better learned by practise then speculation, I will only set downe to you here a few precepts therein. Let, first, the justnesse of your cause be your greatest strength; and then omit not to use all lawfull means for backing of the same. Consult therefore with no necromancier nor false prophet upon the successe of your wars; remembring K. Sauls miserable end; but keep your land cleane of all southsayers, according to the command in the law of God, dilated by Jeremie. Neither commit your quarrell to be tried by a duell;† for, besides that generally all duells appeareth to be unlawfull, committing the quarrell, as it were, to a lot, whereof there is no warrant in the scripture, since the abrogating of the old law: it is specially most unlawfull in the person of a king, who, being a public person, hath no power therefore to dispose of himselfe, in respect, that to his preservation or fall, the safety or wrack of the whole commonweale is necessarily coupled, as the body is to the head.

Before yee take on war, play the wise kings part, described by Christ; foreseeing how ye may beare it out with all necessarie provision: especially remember, that mony is *nervus belli*: Choose old experimented captaines, and young able souldiers; be extreamly strait and severe in martiall discipline, as well for keeping of order, which is as requisite as hardnesse in the wars, and punishing of sloath, which at a time may put the whole armie in hazard; as likewise for repressing of mutinies which in wars are wonderfull dangerous. And looke to the Spaniard, whose great successe in all his wars hath onely come through straitnesse of discipline and order; for such errours may be committed in the wars as cannot be gotten mended againe.

Be in your owne person walkrife, diligent, and painfull; using the advice of such as

\* This conceit of discharging in person the office of a judge, gave offence in England, and obviously tended to interrupt the course of the common law of the country.

† Although James disapproved of duels, and would hardly have been induced to have adventured his own sacred person, even for the defence of his rights, he indulged his loving subjects with the privilege of fighting in the lists for value received in the Exchequer. "The 13 of March, ane angill combat foughtin betwixt Adam Bruntfield and James Carmichael. The said Adam Bruntfield challengit James Carmichael, for murthering of his unwhyle brother, Stephen Bruntfield, capitane of Tantallon. The said Adam purchasit ane licence of his Majesty, and faucht the said James, on Bernbougle Links, before five thousand gentlemen; and the said Adam being bet ane young man, and of a mean stature, slew the said James Carmichael, he being as abill a lyke man as was living."—Birrel's Diary, ad ann. 1592.

are skilfullest in the craft, as ye must also doe in all other. Be homely with your souldiers as your companions, for winning their hearts, and extreemely liberall, for then is no time of sparing. Be cold and foreseeing in devising, constant in your resolutions, and forward and quick in your executions. Fortifie well your camp, and assaile not rashly without an advantage; neither feare nor lightly your enemy. Be curious in devising stratagems, but alwayes honestly; for of any thing, they work greatest effects in the wars, if secrecy be joyned to invention. And once or twice in your owne person hazard yourselfe fairely; but, having acquired so the fame of courage and magnanimity, make not a daily souldier of yourselfe, exposing rashly your person to every perill; but conserve yourselfe thereafter for the weale of your people; for whose sake ye must more care for yourselfe then for your own. And, as I have counselled you to be slow in taking on a war, so advise I you to be slow in peace making. Before ye agree, looke that the ground of your wars be satisfied in your peace, and that ye see a good surety for you and your people; otherwayes, a just and honourable war is more tolerable then a dishonourable and disadvantageous peace.

But it is not enough to a good king, by the scepter of good lawes, well executed, to governe, and by force of armes to protect his people; if he joyn not therewith his vertuous life in his owne person, and in the person of his court and company; by good example alluring his subjects to the love of vertue, and hatred of vice.

And therefore (my sonne) sith all people are naturally inclined to follow their princes example (as I shewed you before) let it not be said, that ye command others to keep the contrary course to that, which in your own person yee practise; making so your words and deeds to fight together; but by the contrarie, let your own life be a law-booke and a mirour to your people; that therein they may read the practise of their owne lawes, and therein they may see, by your image, what life they should leade. And this example in your own life and person, I likewise divide in two parts: The first, in the government of your court and followers in all godlinesse and vertue: The next, in having your own minde decked and enriched so with all vertuous qualities, that therewith yee may worthily rule your people: For it is not enough that ye have and retaine (as prisoners) within yourselfe never so many good qualities and vertues, except ye imploy them, and set them on work for the weale of them that are committed to your charge: *Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit.*

First, then, as to the government of your court and followers; king David sets down the best precepts, that any wise and Christian king can practise in that point. For as ye ought to have a great care for the ruling well of all your subjects, so ought ye to have a double care for the ruling well of your own servants; since unto them ye are both a politick and oeconomick governour. And as every one of the people will delight to follow the example of any of the courteours, as well in evil as in good, so what crime so horrible can there be committed and over-seen in a courteour, that will not be an examplare excuse for any other boldly to commit the like? And therefore in two points have yee to take good heed anent your court and household: First, in choosing them wisely; next, in carefully ruling them whom ye have chosen.

It is an old and true saying, that a kindly aver will never become a good horse: for albeit good education and companie be great helps to nature, and education be therefore most justly called *altera natura*: yet is it evil to get out of the flesh, that is bred in the bone, as the old proverbe saith. Be very warie then in making choice of your servants and companie;—*Nam turpius ejicitur, quam non admittitur hospes*: and many respects may lawfully let an admission, that will not be sufficient causes of deprivation.

All your servants and court must be composed partly of minors, such as young lords, to be brought up in your companie, or pages and such like, and partly men of perfitte

age, for serving you in such roomes, ought to be filled with men of wisdome and discretion. For the first sort, yee can do no more, but choose them within age, that are come of a good and virtuous kinde, *in fide parentum*, as baptisme is used. For though *anima non venit ex traduce*, but is immediately created by God, and infused from above: yet it is most certaine, that virtue or vice will oftentimes, with the heritage, be transferred from the parents to the posteritie, and runne on a blood (as the proverbe is) the sickness of the mind becomming as kindly to some races, as these sicknesses of the body, that infects in the seede. Especially choose such minois, as are come of a true and honest race, and have not had the house, whereof they are descended, infected with falsehood.

And as for the other sort of your company and servants, that ought to be of perfect age; first, see that they be of good fame, and without blemish; otherwise, what can the people think, but that ye have chosen a companie unto you, according to your owne humour, and so have preferred these men, for the love of their vices and crimes, that ye knew them to be guiltie of? For the people that see you not within cannot judge of you, but according to the outward appearance of your actions and companie; which only is subject to their sight. And next, see that they be indued with such honest qualities, as are meete for such offices, as ye ordaine them to serve in; that so your judgment may be known in imploying every man according to his gitts. And shortly, follow good king David's counsell in the choice of your servants, by setting your eyes upon the faithful and upright of the land to dwell with you.

But heere I must not forget to remember, and according to my fatherly authoritie, to charge you to preferre specially to your service, so many as have truely served me, and are able for it: the rest, honourably to reward them, preferring their posteritie before others, as kindest: so shall ye not only be best served, (for if the haters of your parents cannot love you, as I shewed before, it followeth of necessitie their lovers must love you); but further, ye shall kyth your thankfull memorie of your father, and procure the blessing of these old servants, in not missing their old master in you, which otherwayes would be turned in a prayer for me, and a curse for you. Use them therefore, when God shall call me, as the testimonies of your affection towards me; trusting and advancing those farthest, whom I found faithfullst; which ye must not discern by their rewards at my hand, (for rewards, as they are called *bona fortune*, so are they subject unto fortune) but according to the trust I gave them; having oftentimes had better heart then hap to the rewarding of sundry. And on the other part, as I wish you to kyth your constant love towards them that I loved, so desire I you to kyth, in the same measure, your constant hatred to them that I hated: I meane, bring not home nor restore not such as ye finde standing banished or fore-faulted by me. The contrary would kyth in your over great contempt of me, and lightnesse in your own nature: for how can they be true to the sonne, that were false to the father?

But to returne to the purpose anent the choice of your servants; ye shall by this wise forme of doing, eschew the inconvenients, that in my minoritie I fell in anent the choice of my servants. For by them that had the command where I was brought up, were my servants put unto me; not choosing them that were meetest to serve me, but whom they thought meetest to serve their turne about me; as kythed well in many of them at the first rebellion raised against me, which compelled me to make a great alteration among my servants. And yet the example of that corruption made me to be long troubled thereafter with solicitors, recommending servants unto me more for serving in effect their friends that put them in, then their master that admitted them. Let my example then teach you to follow the rules heere set down; choosing your servants for your owne use, and not for the use of others. And since ye must be *communis parens* to all your people, so choose your servants indifferently out of all quarters; not respect-



ing other men's appetites, but their own qualities. For as ye must command all, so reason would ye should be served out of all, as ye please to make choice.

But specially take good heed to the choice of your servants, that ye preferre to the offices of the crown and estate; for in other offices ye have only to take heede to your owne weale; but these concern likewise the weale of your people, for the which ye must be answerable of God. Choose then, for all these offices, men of known wisdom, honestie, and good conscience; well practised in the points of the craft that ye ordaine them for, and free of all factions and partialities; but specially free of that filthy vice of flattery, the pest of all princes, and wack of republickes. For since, in the first part of this treatise, I forwarned you to beware with your own inward flatterer *Φιλαντία*, how much more should ye beware with outward flatterers, who are nothing so sib to you as yourself is; by the selling of such counterfeit wares, only preassing to ground their greatnesse upon your ruines? And therefore be careful to preferre none, as ye will be answerable to God, but only for their worthnesse. But specially choose honest, diligent, meane, but responsall men, to be your receivers in money matters. meane I say, that ye may, when ye please, take a sharpe account of their intromission, without perill of their breeding any trouble to your estate: for this oversight hath been the greatest cause of my mishriving in money matters. Especially, put never a forramer in any principall office of estate; for that will never faile to stirre up sedition and envie in the countrymen's hearts, both against you and him. But (as I said before) if God provide you with more countries then this, choose the borne-men of every countrie to be your chiefe counsellors therein,

And, for conclusion of my advice anent the choice of your servants, delight to be served with men of the noblest blood that may be had: for, besides that their service shall breede you goodwill and least envie, contrarie to that of start ups, ye shall oft finde vertue follow noble races, as I have said before, speaking of the nobilitie.

Now as to the other point, anent your governing of your servants when ye have chosen them; make your court and companie to be a paterne of godlinesse and all honest vertues, to all the rest of the people. Be a daily watchman over your servants, that they obey your laws preciseli; for how can your laws be kept in the countrie, if they be broken at your eare? Punishing the breach thereof in a countie more severely then in the person of anie other of your subjects: and, above all, suffer none of them, (by abusing their credite with you,) to oppresse or wronge anie of your subjects. Be homlie or strange with them, as ye think their behaviour deserveth, and their nature may beare with. Thinke a quarrelous man a pest in your companie. Be careful ever to preferre the gentlest natured and trustiest, to the inwardest offices about you; especially in your chamber. Suffer none about you to meddle in any mens particulars; but, like the Turkes Janissares, let them know no father but you, nor particulars but yours. And if any will meddle in their kin or friends quarrells, give them then leave: for since ye must be of no surname nor kinne, but equal to all honest men, it becometh you not to be followed with partiall or factious servants. Teach obedience to your servants, and not to thinke themselves over wise: and, as when any of them deserveth it, ye must not spare to put them away, so, without a seen cause, change none of them. Pay them, as all other your subjects, with *præmium* or *pæna*, as they deserve; which is the very ground stone of good government. Employ every man as ye think him qualified, but use not one in all things, lest he wax proud, and be envied by his fellows. Love them best that are plainest with you, and disguise not the truth for all their kinne: suffer none to be evill tongued, nor backbiters of them they hate: command a hartly and brotherlie love among all them that serve you. And, shortlie, maintaine peace in your court, banish envie, cherish modestie,

\* i. e. dismiss them.

bannish deboshed insolence, foster humilitie, and repress pride: setting down such a comlie and honourable order in all the points of your service, that when strangers shall visit your court, they may, with the queen of Sheba, admire your wisdom in the glorie of your house and comlie order among your servants.

But the principall blessing that ye can get of good companies, will stand in your marrying a godly and virtuous wife; for shee must be nearer unto you then anie companie, being "Flesh of your flesh, and bone of your bone," as Adam said of Hevah: And, because I know not but God may call me before ye be readie for mariage, I will shortlie set down to you here my advice therein.

First of all, consider, that marriage is the greatest earthly felicitie or miserie that can come to a man, according as it pleaseth God to blesse or curse the same. Since then, without the blessing of God, ye cannot look for a happie successe in marriage, ye must be carefull both in your preparation for it, and in the choice and usage of your wife, to procure the same. By your preparation, I meane, that ye must keepe your bodie cleane and unpolluted, till ye give it to your wife, whom to onlie it belongeth. For how can ye justlie crave to be joyned with a pure virgine, if your body be polluted? Why should the one half be cleane, and the other defiled? And, although I know fornication is thought but a light venniall sin by the most part of the world, yet remember well what I said to you in my first book anent conscience, and count every sinne and breach of God's law, not according as the vaine world esteemeth of it, but as God, the judge and maker of the law, accounteth of the same. Heare God commanding by the mouth of Paul, to "abstaine from fornication," declaring, "that the fornicator shall not inherite the kingdome of heaven:" and by the mouth of John, reckoning out fornication amongst other grievous sinnes, that debarres the committers, amongst "dogges and swine, from entrie in that spirituall and heavenly Jerusalem." And, consider, if a man shall once take upon him to count that light which God calleth heavie, and veniall, that which God calleth grievous; beginning first to measure any one sinne by the rule of his lust and appetites, and not of his conscience; what shall let him to do so with the next, that his affections shall stirre him to, the like reason serving for all; and so to go forward till he place his whole corrupted affections in God's roome? And then what shall come of him, but as a man given over to his owne filthie affections, shall perish into them? And because we are all of that nature, that sibbest examples touches us neerest, consider the difference of successe that God granted in the marriages of the king my grandfather, and me your owne father: the reward of his incontinencie (proceeding from his evill education) being the suddaine death, at one time, of two pleasant young princes; and a daughter only borne to succede to him, whom he had never the hap, so much as once, to see or blesse before his death: leaving a double curse behind him to the land, both a woman of sexe, and a new borne babe of age, to raigne over them. And as for the blessing God hath bestowed on me, in graunting me both a greater continence, and the fruits following thereupon, your selfe, and sib folkes to you, are (praise be to God) sufficient witnesses: which, I hope the same God, of his infinite meicy, shall continue and increse, without repentance to me and my posteritie. Be not ashamed then, to keepe cleane your body, which is the temple of the Holy Spirit, notwithstanding all vaine allurements to the contrary: discerning truly and wisely of every vertue and vice, according to the true qualities thereof, and not according to the vaine conceits of men.

As for your choice in marriage, respect chietly the three causes, wherefore marriage was first ordained by God; and then join three accessories, so farre as they may be obtained, not derogating to the principalls.

The three causes it was ordained for, are, for staying of lust, for procreation of children, and that man should by his wife get a helper like himself. Derer not then to marrie till your age; for it is ordained for quenching the lust of your youth. Especi-

ally a king must humbly marrie for the weale of his people. Neither marrie ye, for any accessorie cause or worldly respects, a woman unable, either through age, nature, or accident, for procreation of children; for in a king that were a double fault, as well against his own weale, as against the weale of his people. Neither also marrie one of known evil conditions, or vicious education; for the woman is ordained to be a helper, and not a hinderer to man.

The three accessories, which (as I have said) ought also to be respected, without derogating to the principall causes, are beautie, riches, and friendship by alliance, which are all blessings of God. For beautie increaseth your love to your wife, contenting you the better with her, without caring for others; and riches and great alliance do both make her the abler to be a helper to you. But if, over great respect being had to these accessories, the principall causes be over seen (which is over oft practised in the world) as of themselves they are blessings, being well used, so the abuse of them will turn them into a curse. For what can all these worldly respects avale, when a man shall find himself coupled with a divell, to be one flesh with him, and the half-marrow in his bed? Then (though too late) shall he find that beautie without bountie, wealth without wisdom, and great friendship without grace and honesty, are but faire shewes, and the deceitfull masques of infinite miseries.

But have ye respect, my sonne, to these three speciall causes in your marriage, which flow from the first institution thereof, *et cætera omnia adjiciuntur vobis*; and therefore I would ratherst have you to marrie one that were fully of your own religion; her ranke and other qualities being agreeable to your estate. For although that, to my great re-grate, the number of any princes of power and account, professing our religion, be but very small, and that therefore this advice seemes to be more strait and difficult, yet ye have deeply to weigh and consider upon these doubts, how ye and your wife can be of one flesh, and keep unitie betwixt you, being members of two opposite churches: disagreement in religion bringeth ever with it disagreement in maners; and the dissention betwixt your preachers and hers will breed and foster a dissention among your subjects, taking their example for your familie; besides the perill of the evill education of your children. Neither pride you that ye will be able to frame and make her as ye please: that deceived Solomon, the wisest king that ever was: the grace of perseverance not being a flower that groweth in our garden.

Remember, also, that marriage is one of the greatest actions that a man doth in all his time, especiallie in taking of his first wife. and if he marrie first baselie beneath his ranke, he will ever be the less accounted of thereafter. And, lastlie, remember to choose your wife as I advised you to chuse your servant; that she be of a whole and clean race, not subject to the hereditarie sicknesses, either of the soule or the body. For if a man will be carefull to breed horses and dogs of good kinds, how much more careful should he be for the breed of his own loines? So shall ye in your marriage have respect to your conscience, honour, and naturall weale in your successours.

When ye are married, keepe inviolable your promise made to God in your marriage; which standeth all in doing of one thing, and abstaining from another; to treat her in all things as your wife and the halfe of your selfe; and to make your bodie (which then is yours, but properlie hers) common with none other. I trust I neede not to insist here to dissuade you from the filthie vice of adulterie: remember only what solemn promise ye make to God at your marriage; and since it is onlie by the force of that promise that your children succede to you, which otherwaies they could not do, equitie and reason would ye should keep your part thereof: God is ever a severe avenger of all perjuries; and it is no oath made in jest, that giveth power to children to succede to great kingdomes. Have the king my grandfathers example before your eyes, who, by his adulterie, bred the wreck of his lawfull daughter and heire, in begetting that bastard, who unnaturallie rebelled and procured the ruine of his own soveraigne and



sister.\* And what good her posterity hath gotten sen-synce of some of that unlawful generation, Lothuell his treacherous attempts can bear witness.† Keep precise then your promise made at marriage, as ye would wish to be partaker of the blessing therein.

And for your behaviour to your wife, the scripture can best give you counsel therein. Treat her as your owne flesh, command her as her lord, cherish her as your helper, rule her as your pupill, and please her in all things reasonable; but teach her not to be curious in things that belongs her not. Ye are the head, she is your bodie: It is your office to command, and hers to obey; but yet, with such a sweet harmonie, as she should be as readie to obey, as ye commande, as willing to follow, as ye to go before your love being wholly knit unto her, and all her affections lovingly bent to follow your will.

And, to conclude, keep speciallie three rules with your wife: first, suffer her never to meddle with the politick government of the common-weale, but hold her at the economick rule of the house; and yet all to be subject to your direction. Keepe carefullie good and chaste companie about her; for women are the frailst sexe; and be never both angrie at once; but when ye see her in passion, ye should with reason daunt her; for both when ye are settled, ye are meepest to judge of her errors; and when she is come to her self, she may be best made to apprehend her offence, and reverence your rebuke.

If God send you succession, be carefull for their vertuous education: love them as ye ought, but let them know as much of it as the gentlenesse of their nature will deserve; containing them ever in a reverent love and fear of you. And in case it please God to provide you to all these three kingdomes, make your eldest sonne Isaac, leaving him all your kingdomes, and provide the rest with private possessions. Otherwaies, by dividing your kingdomes, ye shall leave the seede of division and discorde among your posteritie, as befell to this ile, by the division and assignment thereof, to the three sounes of Brutus, Locine, Albanact, and Camber. But if God give you not succession, defraud never the nearest by right, whatsoever conceit ye have of the person; for kingdomes are ever at Gods disposition, and in that case we are but live-tenants, lying no more in the kings nor peoples hand to dispossesse the righteous heir.

And as your companie should be a paterne to the rest of the people, so should your person be a lampe and mirrour to your companie; giving light to your servants to walke in the path of vertue, and representing unto them such worthie qualities as they should preesse to imitate.

I need not to trouble you with the particular discourse of the four cardinall vertues, it is so troden a path; but I will shortly say unto you, make one of them, which is temperance, queene of all the rest within you. I meane not by the vulgar interpretation of temperance, which only consists in *gustu et tactu*, by the moderating of these two senses, but I meane of that wise moderation, that, first commanding your selfe, shall, as a queen, command all the affections and passions of your minde; and, as a physician, wisely mixe all your actions according thereto. Therefore, not only in all your affections and passions, but even in your most vertuous actions, make ever moderation to be the chiefe ruler. For although holnesse be the first and most requisite quality of a Christian, as proceeding from a feeling feare and true knowledge of God, yet ye remember how, in the conclusion of my first booke, I advised you to moderate all your outward actions flowing therefra. The like say I now of justice, which is the greatest vertue that properly belongeth to a kings office.

\* James Stuart, Earl of Murray, natural son of James V. and finally Regent of Scotland.

† Francis Stuart, Earl of Bothwell, son of John Prior of Coldingham, a natural son of James V. His repeated treasons disturbed a great part of James's reign.

Use justice, but with such moderation, as it turne not in tyrannie: otherwayes *summum jus est summa injuria*. As, for example, if a man of a known honest life be invaded by brigands or thieves, for his purse, and in his owne defence slay one of them, they being both more in number, and also known to be deboshed and insolent livers; whereby, the contrarie, he was single alone, being a man of sounde reputation; yet because they were not at the horne, or there was no eye-witnesse present that could verifie their first invading of him, shall he therefore lose his head? And likewise, by the law-burrowes in our lawes, men are prohibited, under great pecuniall paines, from any waies invading or molesting their neighbours person or bounds; if, then, his horse breake the halter, and pasture in his neighbours meadow, shall he pay two or three thousand pounds for the wantonnesse of his horse, or the weaknesse of his halter? Surely no. For lawes are ordained as rules of virtuous and sociall living, and not to be snares to trap your good subjects; and therefore the law must be interpreted according to the meaning, and not to the literall sense thereof, *Nam ratio est anima legis*.

And as I said of justice, so say I of clemencie, magnanimitie, liberalitie, constancie, humilitie, and all other princelie vertues, *Nam in medio stat virtus*. And it is but the craft of the divell that falselie coloureth the two vices that are on either side thereof, with the borrowed titles of it; albeit, in verie deed they have no affinitie therewith; and the two extremities themselves, although they seeme contrarie, yet growing to the height, runnes ever both in one. For *in infinitis omnia concurrunt*; and what difference is betwixt extreame tyrannie, delighting to destroy all mankind, and extreame slacknesse of punishment, permitting every man to tyrannize over his companion? or, what differeth, extreame prodigalitie, by wasting of all to possesse nothing, from extreame niggardlinesse, by hoarding up all to enjoy nothing, like the ass that, carrying victuals on her back, is like to starve for hunger, and will be glad of thistles for her part? And what is betwixt the pride of a glorious Nebuchadnezzar and the preposterous humilitie of one of the proud puritans, claiming to their parity, and crying, "we are all but vile wormes;" and yet will judge and give law to their king, but will be judged nor controlled by none? Surely there is more pride under such a ones black bonnet then under Alexander the Great his diademe, as was said of Diogenes in the like case.

But above all vertues, study to know well your own craft, which is to rule your people. And when I say this, I bid you know all crafts: for, except yee know every one, how can yee controule every one, which is your proper office? Therefore, besides your education, it is necessary ye delight in reading, and seeking the knowledge of all lawfull things; but with these two restrictions: first, that ye choose idle houres for it, not interrupting therewith the discharge of your office; and next, that ye studie not for knowledge nakedly, but that your principal end be, to make you able thereby to use your office; practising according to your knowledge in all points of your calling: not like these vain astrologians, that study night and day on the course of the stars, only that they may, for satisfying their curiositie, know their course. But since all arts and sciences are linked every one with other, their greatest principles agreeing in one, (which moved the poets to faine the nine muses to be all sisters) studie them, that, out of their harmony, ye may sucke the knowledge of all faculties; and consequently be on the counsell of all crafts, that ye may be able to containe them all in order, as I have already said. For knowledge and learning is a light burthen, the weight whereof will never presse your shoulders.

First of all then, studie to be well seene in the scriptures, as I remembered you in the first book, as well for the knowledge of your own salvation, as that ye may be able to containe your church in their calling, as *custos utriusque Tabule*; for the ruling them well is no small point of your office; taking special heed, that they vague not from their text in the pulpit: and if ever ye would have peace in your land, suffer them not

to meddle in that place with the estate or policy ; but punish severely the first that presumeth to it. Do nothing towards them without a good ground and warrant ; but reason not much with them ; for I have overmuch suffeited them with that, and it is not their fashion to yeeld. And suffer no conventions nor meetings among church-men, but by your knowledge and permission.

Next the scriptures, studie well your own lawes ; for how can yee discern by the thing yee know not ? But presse to draw all your laws and processes to bee as short and plaine as ye can ; assure your selfe the long-somnesse both of rights and processes breedeth their un-sure loosenesse and obscurity ; the shortest being ever both the surest and plainest forme ; and the long-somnesse serving only for the enriching of the advocates and clerkes with the spoile of the whole country. And therefore delight to haunt your session, and spie carefully their proceedings ; taking good heed if any habery may be tried among them, which cannot over severely be punished. Spare not to goe there, for gracing that far any that ye favour, by your presence to procure them expedition of justice ; although that should be specially done, for the poore that cannot waite on, or are debarred by mighty parties ; but when ye are there, remember the throne is Gods and not yours, that ye sit in, and let no favour, nor whatsoever respects, move you from the right. Ye sit not there, as I shewed before, for rewarding of friends or servants, nor for crossing of contentuurs, but only for doing justice. Learn also wisely to discern betwixt justice and equity ; and for pitie of the poor, rob not the rich, because he may better spare it ; but give the little man the larger coat if it be his ; eschewing the error of young Cyrus therein : For justice, by the law, giveth every man his owne ; and equity, in things arbitrail, giveth every one that which is meetest for him. Be an ordinary siter in your secret counsell ; that judicature is only ordained for matters of estate, and repressing of insolent oppressions. Make that judgment as compendious and plaine as ye can ; and suffer no advocates to be heard there with their dilatours, but let every party tell his own tale himselfe ; and weary not to heare the complaints of the oppressed, *aut ne rex sis*. Remit every thing to the ordinary judicature, for eschewing of confusion ; but let it be your own craft, to take a sharp account of every man in his office. And next the lawes, I would have you to be well versed in authenticke histories, and in the chronicles of all nations, but specially in our own histories (*ne sis peregrinus domi*) the example whereof most neerely concerns you. I meane not of such infamous invectives, as Buchanans or Knoxes chronicles ; and, if any of these infamous libels remaine untill your dayes, use the law upon the keepers thereof \* For in that point I would have you a Pythagorist, to think that the very spirits of these archibellouses of rebellion have made transition in them that hoards their books, or maintaines their opinions ; punishing them, even as it were their authors risen again. But by reading of authentick histories and chronicles, ye shall learne experience by theoricke, applying the by-past things to the present estate, *quia nihil novum sub sole* ; such is the continuall volubility of things earthly, according to the roundnesse of the world, and revolution of the heavenly circles, which is expressed by the wheeles in Ezechiel's visions, and counterfeited by the poets in *rota fortunæ*. And likewise, by the knowledge of histories, ye shall know how to behave your selfe to all embassadors and strangers ; being able to discourse with them upon the estate of their owne country.

And among all prophane histories, I must not omit most specially to recommend

\* There is an affecting account of Buchanan's last illness, during which some of his friends visited him, with the purpose of requesting he would soften some passages of his history then printing, which were likely to incense the king. "Is not what I have said true ?" said the dying author—They answered in the affirmative. "Then," rejoined he, "I will stand his feed and that of all his kin.—I am going shortly where very few kings are admitted." Yet we must sympathize with James's feelings towards those works in which his mother was so severely censured.



unto you the Commentaries of Cæsar, both for the sweet flowing of the stile, as also for the worthinesse of the matter it selfe: For I have ever bin of that opinion that of all the cōmmon emperours, or great captaines that ever was, he hath farthest excelled, both in his practice and in his præcepts, in martiall affaires. As for the study of other the all arts and sciences, I would have you reasonably versed in them, but not pleasing to be a passe-master in any of them; for that cannot but distract you from the points of your calling, as I shewed you before: and when, by the enemy winning the towne, ye shal be interrupted in your demonstration, as Archimedes was; your people (I think) will look very bluntly upon it. I grant it is meet ye have some entrance, specially in the mathematicks; for the knowledge of the art military, in situation of campes, ordering of battels, making fortifications, placing of the batteries, or such like. And let not this your knowledge be dead, without fruits, as S. James speaketh of faith, but let it appeare in your daily conservation, and in all the actions of your life.

Embrace true magnanimity, not in being vindictive, which the corrupted judgments of the world thinks to be true magnanimity; but by the contrary, in thinking your offender not worthy of your wrath, empyring over your own passion, and triumphing in the commanding your selfe to forgive; husbanding the effects of your courage and wrath, to be rightly employed upon repelling of injuries within, by revenge taking upon the oppressours, and in revenging injuries without, by just wars upon forraign enemies. And so, where ye finde a notable injury, spare not to give course to the torrents of your wrath. The wrath of a king is like to the roaring of a lion. Foster true humility, in hanningish pride, not only towards God, considering ye differ not in stuffe, but in use, and that only by his ordinance, from the basest of your people, but also towards your parents. And if it fall out that my wife shall out live me, as ever ye think to purchase my blessing, honour your mother: set Beersheba in a throne on your right hand, offend her for nothing, much lesse wrong her; remember her,—*Quæ longa decem tulcrit fastidia menses*; and that your flesh and blood is made of hers; and begin not like the young lords and lairds, your first wars upon your mother; but presse earnestly to deserve her blessing.\* Neither deceive your selfe with many that say, they care not for their parents curse, so they deserve it not. O invert not the order of nature, by judging your superiours chiefly in your own particular! but assure your selfe, the blessing or curse of the parents hath almost ever a prophetick power joyned with it: and if there were no more, honour your parents, for the lengthning of your own dayes, as God in his law promiseth. Honour also them that are *in loco parentum* unto you, such as your governours, up-bringers, and præceptours: be thankfull unto them, and reward them, which is your duty and honour.

But on the other part, let not this true humility stay your high indignation to appeare, when any great oppressours shall presume to come in your ptesence; then frowne as ye ought. And in case they use a colour of law in oppressing their poor ones, as over-many do, that which ye cannot mend by law, mend by the withdrawing of your countenance from them; and once in the yeare crosse them, when their errands come in your way, recompensing the oppressour, according to Christs parable of the two debtours. Keep true constancy, not only in your kindness towards honest men, but being also *invicti animi* against all adversities; not with that stoicke insensible stupidity, wherewith many in our dayes, pressing to win honour, in imitating that ancient sect, by their inconstant behaviur in their own lives, belyes their profession. But although ye are not a stocke not to feel calamities, yet let not the feeling of them so over-rule and doazen your reason, as may stay you from taking and using the best resolution for remedy, that can be found out.

King James's own first and last warfare was with his mother.

Use true liberality in rewarding the good, and bestowing frankly for your honour and weale; but with that proportionall discretion, that every man may be served according to his measure; wherein respect must be had to his ranke, deserts, and necessity. And provide how to have, but cast not away without cause. In speciall charge not by your liberality the ordinary rents of your crown, whereby the estate royall of you, and your successours, must be maintained, *ne exhaustas fontem liberalitatis*; for that would ever be kept *sacrosanctum et extra commercium*. other wayes, your liberality would decline to prodigality, in helping others with your and your successors hurt. And above all, enrich not your selfe with exactions upon your subjects; but thinke the riches of your people your best treasure, by the sins of offenders, where no prevention can availe, making justly your commoditie. And in case necessity of wars, or other extraordinaries, compell you to lift subsidies, do it as rarely as ye can; employing it only to the use it was ordained for; and using your selfe in that case, as *fidelis depositarius* to your people. And principally, exercise true wisdom, in discerning wisely betwixt true and false reports; first, considering the nature of the person reporter; next, what intresse he can have in the weale or evill of him of whom he maketh the report; thirdly, the likely-hood of the purpose it selfe, and last, the nature and by-past life of the dilated person; and where ye finde a traitler, away with him. And although it be true, that a prince can never without secrecy doe great things, yet it is better oft-times to try reports, then by credulity to foster suspicion upon a honest man. For since suspicion is the tyrants sicknesse, as the fruits of an evill conscience, *potius in alteram partem peccato*; I meane, in not mistrusting one, whom to no such un-honesty was knowne before. But as for such as have slipped before, former experience may justly breed prevention by fore-sight.

And, to conclude my advice anent your behaviour in your person, consider that God is the author of all virtue, having imprinted in mens mindes, by the very light of nature the love of all morall vertues; as was seen by the vertuous lives of the old Romans, and presse then to shine as far before your people in all vertue and honesty, as in greatnesse of ranke; that the use thereof, in all your actions, may turne, with time, to a naturall habitude in you; and as by their hearing of your lawes, so by their sight of your person, both their eyes and their ears may leade and alume them to the love of vertue and hatred of vice.

---

*The Prince, or Maxims of State. Written by Sir Walter Rawley, and presented to Prince Henry.*

*Sabere and Silere.*

---

This compendium of the art of government was one of the tracts which Sir Walter Raleigh composed, during his long imprisonment. We have elsewhere remarked his intimacy with the promising young prince, to whom he inscribed this as well as some of his other works. See Vol. II. p. 199. The piece was first printed at London in 4to. 1648.

**The Contents.**

Of Government.  
 Of Policy.  
 Of Monarchy.  
 Of Aristocracy, or Senatory State.  
 Of Free State, or popular State.  
 Of Tyranny.  
 Of Olygarchy, or the Government of a few.  
 Of a Common-wealth.  
 Of Causes of States, and Common-wealths in generall.  
 Of founding a State.  
 Of Causes preserving a State or Common-wealth.  
 Of Mysteries or Sophismes.  
 Of Axioms or Rules of preserving a State.  
 Rules for preserving of a Kingdome, Hereditary, or Conquered.  
 Kingdomes hereditary are preserved at Home by the ordering of a Prince.  
 Kingdomes new gotten, or purchased by Force, are preserved by 10 Rules.  
 Rules politique of Tyrants.  
 Sophismes of a barbarous and professed Tyranny.  
 Sophismes of the sophisticall, or subtill Tyrant, to hould up his State.  
 Of Preservation of an Aristocracy.  
 Of Preservation of an Olygarchy, by Sophismes, or Rules.  
 Of Conversion of States in generall.  
 Causes of Conversions of States are of two Sorts, Generall and Particular  
 Particular Causes of Conversion of State are of two Sorts.  
 Of Sedition.  
 Causes of Sedition are of two Sorts.  
 Of Alteration without Violence.  
 A Method, how to make Use of the Booke before, in the Reading of Story.  
 Old Age is not ever unfit for publique Government.  
 Example of the like Practise in Charles the Fifth.  
 Of Observation for the Affirmative and the Negative.  
 Of Defence of David in marrying Abishag.

***Politick Nobility.***

Of Adoniah aspiring to the kingdome.

***Observations.***

Of wayes of such as aspire to the kingdome, and manner to discern them.

**Of GOVERNMENT.**

Government is of two sorts. 1. Private of himselfe. Sobriety. Of his family; called oeconomy.

2. Publique of the common-wealth, called policy. A man must first governe him-



selfe, ere he be fit to governe a family; and his family, ere hee bee fit to beare the government in the common-wealth.

### *Of Policy.*

Policy is an art of government of a common-wealth, and some part of it according to that state, or forme of government, wherein it is settled for the publique good.

State is the frame or set order of a common-wealth. or of the governours that rule the same, specially of the chiefe and soveraigne governour that commands the rest.

The state or soverainty consisteth in 5. points.

1. Making or annulling of lawes. 2. Creating and deposing of magistrates. 3. Power over life and death. 4. Making of warre or peace. 5. Highest or last appeale. Where these 5. are, either in one or in more, there is the state.

These 5. points of state rest either in; 1. One monarchy or kingdome. 2. Some few chiefe of men for vertue and wisdom, called an aristocracy. 3. Many, called a free state or a popular state. These three sorts of government have respect to the common good, and therefore are just and lawfull states.

These 3. degenerate into 3. other governments. 1. Monarchy. 2. Aristocracy. 3. Popular estate.

Into, 1. Tyranny. 2. Oligarchy, or government of a few, rich or able. 3. Commonwealth, or government of all the common and baser sort, and therefore called a common wealth, by an usurped nick-name.

These all respect their owne, and not the publique good, and therefore are called bastard governments.

#### *1. Monarchy.*

A monarchy, or kingdome, is the government of a state by one head or chiefe, tending to the common benefit of all.

Monarchies, or kingdomes, are of 3 sorts touching the right or possession of them; viz.

1. Hereditary, by discent, as the English, French, &c.  
2. Elective, by suffrage of the other orders, or some of them, as the Polonian.  
3. Mixt, or of both kinds; viz. by discent, yet not tyed to the next of blood, as the ancient Jewish state

Monarchies are of 2 sorts touching their power or authority; viz.

1. Intire, where the whole power of ordering all state matters. both in peace and warre, doth by law and custome appertaine to the prince. as in the English kingdome, where the prince hath power to make lawes, league and warre, to create magistrates, to pardon life, of appeale, &c. Though, to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a suffrage in making lawes; yet ever subject to the princes pleasure, nor negative will.

2. Limited, or restrained, that hath no full power in all the points or matters of state, as the military king, that hath not the soverainty in time of peace, as the making of lawes, &c., but in warre onely, as the Polonian kings.

#### *2. Aristocracy. or Senatory State.*

An aristocracy is the government of a common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdom and other vertues for the publique good.

Aristocracies are of 3. sorts, viz. where the senators are chosen, for 1. vertue, riches, and the common good, as the Venetian.

2 Vertue and the publique good, without respect of wealth, as sometimes the Roman when some of the senators were fetched from the plough, and some from the schooles.

3. Vertue and wealth, more respecting their private then the publique good, which inclineth towards an oligarchy, or the government of the richer or nobler sort, as in Rome towards the end.

### *3. Free State, or Popular State.*

The popular state is the government of a state by the choiser sort of people, tending to the publique good of all sorts; viz. with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort.

In every just state, some part of the government is, or ought to be, imparted to the people; as in a kingdome, a voice or suffrage in making lawes; and sometimes also in levying of armes, (if the charge bee great, and the prince forced to borrow helpe of his subject.) the matter rightly may bee propounded to a parliament, that the tax may seeme to have proceeded from themselves. So consultations, and some proceedings in judiciall matters. may in part bee referred to them. The reason, least seeing themselves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they mislike the state or kind of government; and where the multitude is discontented, there must needs bee many enemies to the present state. For which cause, tyrants, (which allow the people no manner of dealing in state matters,) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other meanes, whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in Rusland, Turkey, &c.

### *4. Tyranny.*

A tyranny is the swarving, or distorting of a monarchy, or the government of one tending not to the publique good, but the private benefit of himselfe and his followers; as in the Russe and Turkish government, where the state and wealth of other orders are employed onely to the upholding of the greatnesse of the king, or emperor. This is the worst of all the bastard states, because it is the perverting of the best regiment, to wit, of a monarchy, which resembleth the soveraigne government of God himselfe.

### *5. Oligarchy, or the Government of a Few.*

An oligarchy is the swarving, or the corruption of an aristocracy; or the government of some few that are of the wealthier or nobler sort, without any respect of the publique good. The chiefe end of these governours is their owne greatnesse and enriching; and therefore their manner is to prepare fit meanes to uphold their estates. This state is not wholly so bad as is the tyranny, and yet worse then the commonwealth, because it respecteth the good of a few.

6. *Common wealth.*

A common-wealth is the swarving or depravation of a free or popular state, or the government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other orders.

These two states, to wit, the oligarchy and common-wealth, are very adverse the one to the other, and have many bickerings and dissensions betweene them. For that the richer or nobler sort suppose a right of superiority to appertaine unto them in every respect, because they are superior, but in some respects onely, to wit, in riches, birth, parentage, &c. On the other side, the common people suppose there ought to be an equality in all other things, and some state matters; because they are equall with the rich or noble, touching their liberty; whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour as touching government and fitness thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are rich, noble, free, &c. but because they are wise, vertuous valiant, &c. and so have fit parts to governe a state.

These severall states are sometimes mixed and inter-wrought one with the other, yet ever so as that the one hath the preminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So, in the Roman state, the people had their *Plæbiscita*, and gave the suffrage in the election of magistrates: yet the senate, (as the state stood,) for the most part swayed the state, and bare the chiefe rule. So, in the Venetian state, the duke seemeth to represent a monarch, and the senate to bee his counsell, yet the duke hath no power in state matters, but is like a head set on by art, that beareth no braine; and so that state is senatoricall or aristocraticall.

*Causes of States and Common wealths in generall.*

Causes of states or of common wealths are of 3. sorts, viz. 1. Founding or settling a state were to bee considered. 2. Preserving a state. 3. Changing and altering a state. 1. Measure. 2. Parts and their qualities.

*Founding a State.*

In founding a state are to bee considered 2. things: 1. Proportion. 2. Parts.

Proportion is a just measure or mediocrity of the state, whereby it is framed and kept in that order, as that neither it exceed nor bee defective in this kind: to wit, so that a monarch bee not too monarchicall, nor strict or absolute, as the Russe kings; nor aristocraticall, that is overmated or eclipsed by the nobility, as the Scottish kingdom; but ever respective to the other degrees. That an aristocracy bee not too magnificent nor intire to it selfe, but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government, as the Venetian, and sometimes the Roman, allowed the people to elect certaine magistrates out of themselves, to have a tribune, to make *Plæbiscita*, &c. So a free state or common-wealth, that it bee not over popular, viz. that it depress not too much the richer, wiser, nor learned sort, but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and misteries of that state. The reason, because the moderate states in their severall kindes, (as all other things that obsesse the meane,) are best framed for their continuance, because they give lesse cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the wealth, honour, and liberty which they see in others, that governe the state; and so are lesse subject to stirres and commotions, and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set.



*Parts.*

The parts of the state, or those magistrates that beare place or sway in the publique government

Parts, or partakers of publique government, are, 1. Counsell or senate, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to warre and peace, magistrates, &c. in admitting of whom there ought to bee a more speciall care that they bee men expert in matter of policy, because it is their trade and vocation, as men use to choose pilots and masters of shippes, such as know the art of navigation, and not husbandmen &c.; and so the contrary.

2. Magistrates and officers, which are to bee executioners of that which is consulted and found to bee expedient for the common-wealth, wherein are to bee observed the kinds of magistrates, that they bee such as fit that kind of government; the time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be chosen.

3. Judges; to determine in civill and criminall matters, where are to bee observed, out of whom they are to bee chosen, what kinds are necessary, and the manner of judgement and judiciall proceeding.

In magistrates are to be observed, 1. Kinds of magistrates, as, 1. Civill. 2. Ecclesiasticall. 1. Superiour, which are to be such, and of that kind, as agree with the state; as consuls for a yeare, and not perpetuall dictatours in a senatory state; prætors and censors, that oversee manners and orders of the people.

For a kingdome, lieutenants of shires, marshals, masters of horse, admirals, &c.

Inferiour, as conservatours of peace, constables, &c.

Overseers of youth, that take care of their education for civil and warlike exercise.

Clarkes of the market, that provide for the quantity and prize of victualls.

Ediles for buildings, streets, bounds.

Quæstours or treasourours to keepe and dispencc the publique records.

Actuaries, or recorders, which keep the publique records.

Gaolers, to keepe prisons and prisoners.

Surveyours of woods and fields, &c.

2. Ecclesiasticall, as bishops, or pastours, elders, wardens.

2. Time of magistrates, whereof some are perpetuall, some for a time, viz. for more yeares, a yeare, halfe a yeare, according to the necessity of the common-wealth, and not perpetuall, or at least not hereditary in a kingdome. Yearely in an aristocracy, or halfe yearely in a free state.

3. Manner of choise, by whom and how to bee chosen, where especially they are to bee chosen by suffrage, and not by lot

*Causes preserving a State or Common-wealth.*

In preserving of states, two things required. 1. Mysteries or sophismes. 1. General to all states. 2. Particular for every severall state. 2. Rules or actiones. 1. General for all states. 2. Particular for every state.

*Mysteries or Sophismes.*

Mysteries or sophismes of state, are certaine secret practizes, either for the avoiding of danger, or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present state, as it is set or founded.

State mysteries are of two sorts: First, Generall, that pertaine to all states; as, first, to provide, by all meanes, that the same degree or part of the common-wealth doe not exceed both in quantity and quality. In quantity, as that the number of the nobility, or of great persons, be not more then the state or common-wealth can beare. In quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more then that is meet for that degree; for, as in weights, the heavier weights beare downe the scale; so in common-wealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in quality and quantity, overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations and conversions of state. Secondly, To provide by all meanes, that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreames, viz. of nobility and gentry, and the base, rascall and beggerly sort. For thus maketh the state constant and firme, when both the extreames are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggerly sort together, it is not to bee feared. To these two points, the particular rules or sophismes of every common-wealth are to be applied.

2. Particular, that serve for preservation of every common-wealth in that forme of state, wherein it is settled in a kingdome. That the nobility may be accustomed to beare the government of the prince, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the princes eye, it is expedient to call them up at certaine times to the princes court, under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence, and to have their children, especially their eldest, to bee attendant upon the prince, as of special favour towards them and theirs, that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince, and be as hostages for the good behaviour and faithfull dealing of their parents, especially if they bee of any suspected note. To that end serves the Persian practize in having a band or traine of the Satrapes children, and other nobles, to attend the court, which was well imitated by our traine of Henchmen, if they were of the noble sort. Again, sometimes to borrow smale summes of his subjects, and to pay them againe, that he may after borrow greater summes, and never pay: So in an oligarchy, least it decline to a popular state, they deceive the people with this and the like sophismes, viz. they compeell their owne sort, to wit, the rich men, by great penalties, to frequent their assemblies for choosing of magistrates, for provision of armour, warlike exercise, making an execution of lawes, &c. By that meanes seeming to beare a hard hand over the richer; but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to bee absent, and to neglect those assemblies under pretence, that they will not draw them from their businesse and private earnings: yet withall to cite thither some few of them, viz. so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort, to make a shew, that they would have the people, or poorer sort, partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies with the tediousnesse of consultations, greatnesse of fines, if they should misdoe; to the end to make them unwilling to come againe, or to have to doe with those consultations; by which meanes the richer sort doe still governe the state with the peoples liking and good contentment.

#### *Axioms.*

Axioms or rules of preserving the state, are, 1. Generall, that serve for all common-wealths. 2. Particular, that serve for every severall state.

#### *Generall Rules.*

1. The first and principall rule of policy to be observed in all states, is to professe, and practize, and maintaine the true worship and religion of Almighty God, prescribed

unto us in his word, which is the chiefe end of all government. The axiom, that God bee obeyed simply without exception, though he command that which seemeth unreasonable and absurd to human policy, as in the Jewes common-wealth, that all the men should repaire yearely to one place to worship God four times, leaving none to defend their coast, though being beset with many enemies; not to sow the seventh yeare, but to suffer the ground to rest untilld without respect or fear of famine, &c.

2. To avoid the causes of conversions, whereby states are overthrowne that are set downe in the title of conversions; for that common-wealths, (as naturall bodies) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and state thereof, and are so cured by contrary medicines.

3. To take heed, that no magistrate bee created or continued contrary to the lawes and policy of that state. As that in a senate, there bee not created a perpetuall dictator, as Caesar in Rome. In a kingdome, that there be no senate or convention of equall power with the prince, in state matters, as in Poland.

4. To create such magistrates as love the state as it is settled, and take heed of the contrary practize, as to advance popular persons in a kingdome, or aristocracy. And, secondly, to advance such as have skill to discerne what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present state.

5. To that end, to have certaine officers to pry abroad, and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort, agreeable to the present state; but desire rather to bee under some other forme or kind of government.

6. To take heed that magistracies bee not sold for money, nor bribed in their offices, which is specially to bee observed in that common-wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort: for if the magistrate gaine nothing but his common fees, the common sort and such as want honour take in good part, that they bee not preferred, and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private businesse; but if the magistrate buy and sell matters, the common people are doubly grieved, both because they are debarred of those preferments, and of that gaine which they see to grow by them, which is the cause that the Germaine oligarchies continue so firme, for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the richer sort are by that meanes freed and secured from being under the poore.

7. To take heed that the state, as it is settled and maintained, bee not over strict, nor exced in his kind, viz. that a kingdome be not too monarchiall, nor a popular state bee too popular: For which cause, it is good that the magistrates sometimes yeeld of his right touching honour, and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts, though inferior for place and office. And sometimes popularly with the common people, which is the cause that some common-wealths, though they bee very simply and unskillfully set, yet continue firme, because the magistrates behave themselves wisely, and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour: And, therefore, some kind of moderate popularity is to be used in every common-wealth.

8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaking and altering of lawes, as of other rules which concerne the continuance of every severall state; for the disease and alteration of a common-wealth doth not happen all at once, but grows by degrees, which every common wit cannot discerne, but men expert in policy.

9. To provide, that that part be ever the greater in number and power which favours the state, as now it stands. This is to bee observed as a very oracle in all common-wealths.

10. To observe a meane in all the degrees, and to suffer no part to exced or decay overmuch. As first, for preferments, to provide that they bee rather small and short, then great and long: And if any be growne to over much greatness, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the sophistes are to be tractised, viz. to doe



it by parts and degrees; to doe it by occasion or colour of law, and not all at once. And if that way seive not, to advance some other, of whose vertue and faithfulness we are fully assured, to as high a degree, or to greater honour; and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that those of the middle sort (as before was said) bee more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the sophismes of a popular state, viz. to send him on embassages, and foraine negotiations, or employ him in some office that hath great charges and litle honour, &c. To which end the Edileship serves in some common-wealths.

11. To suppress the factions and quarrels of the nobles, and to keepe other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions.

12. To encrease or remit the common taxes and contributions, according to the wealth or want of the people and common-wealth. If the people bee increased in wealth, the taxes and subsidies may bee increased. If they be poore, and their wealth diminish, specially by dearth, want of traffique, &c. to forbear taxes and impositions, or to take litle, otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The sophismes that serve for impositions are these, and other of like sort, to pretend business of great charge, as warr, building of ships, making havens, castles, fortifications, &c. for the common defence; sometimes by lotteries and like devices, wherein some part may bee bestowed, the rest reserved for other expences; but pincely dealing needs no pretences.

13. To provide that the discipline and training of youth of the better sort bee such as agreeth with that common-wealth: As that in a kingdome, the sonnes of noble-men to bee attendant at the court, that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the prince. In the senatory state, that the sonnes of the senators bee not idly, nor over daintily brought up, but well instructed and trained up in learning tongues and martiall exercise; that they may bee able to beare that place in the common-wealth, which their father held, and contrary wise in a popular state.

14. To take heed, least their sophismes, or secret practizes for the continuance of that state bee not discovered, least by that meanes they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used and with great secresie.

### *Particular Rules.*

Rules and Axioms for preserving of a Kingdome, hereditary or conquered.

*Kingdomes hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering,*

1. Himselfe, viz. by the tempering and moderation of the princes power and prerogative. For the lesse and more temperate their power and state is, the more firme and stable is their kingdome and government, because they seem to be further off from a master-like and tyrannical empire; and lesse unequal condition to the next degree, to wit, the nobility, and so lesse subject to grudge and envy.

2. Nobility, viz. by keeping that degree and due proportion, that neither they exceed not in number more then the realme or state can beare, as the Scottish kingdome, and sometime the English, when the realme was overcharged with the numbers of dukes, earles, and other nobles; whereby the authority of the prince was eclipsed and the realme troubled with their factions and ambitions. Nor that any one excell in honour, power or wealth, as that he resemble another king within the kingdome; as the house of Lancaster within this realme. To that end not to load any with too much honour or preferment, because it is hard even for the best and worthiest men to beare

their greatnesse and high fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all states. The sophismes, for preventing or reforming this inconvenience, are to bee used with great caution and wisdom. If any great person bee to bee abated, not to deale with him by calumination, or forged matter, and so to cut him off without desert, especially if hee bee gracious, among the people, after the Machivilian policy, which, besides the injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger toward the prince. Nor to withdraw their honour all at once, which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party, and a commiseration in the people, and so greater love, if hee bee gracious for his vertue and publique service. Nor to banish him into foraine countries, where he may have opportunity of practizing with foraine states, whereof great danger may ensue, as in the example of Coriolanus, Henry the Fourth, and such like. But to use these and the like sophismes, viz to abate their greatnesse by degrees, as David, Joab, Justinian, Bellisarius, &c. To advance some other men to as great or greater honour, to shadow or overmate the greatnesse of the other. To draw from him, by degrees, his friends and followers, by preferments, rewards, and other good and lawful meanes; especially, to be provided that these great men bee not employed in great or powerful affaires of the common-wealth, whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the state.

3. People: (viz) so to order and behave himselfe, that hee bee loved and revered of the people. For that the prince need not greatly feare home conspiracies, or foraine invasion, if hee bee firmly loved of his owne people. The reason; for that the rebell can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise, nor any refuge, being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their prince: but the common people being once offended, hath cause to feare every moving, both at home and abroad. This may bee effected by the prince, if hee use meanes and art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred and contempt; (viz) if hee seeme as a tutor, or a father, to love the people and to protect them, if he maintaine the peace of his kingdome; for that nothing is more popular nor more pleasing to the people then is peace.

4. If hee shew himselfe oftentimes graciously, yet with state and majesty to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliants, and such like.

5. If hee sit himselfe sometimes in open courts and place of justice, that hee may seeme to have a care of justice among his people. If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that city, which hee maketh the seat of his empire, and so make it sure and faithful unto him, which is fit to bee in the middle of his kingdome, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the sunne in the middle of heaven, both to divide himselfe more easily into all the parts of his dominions, and least the furthest parts at one end move, whilst the prince is in the other, if hee goe in progresse many times to see his provinces, especially those that are remote.

6. If hee gratifie his courtiers and attendants in that sort, and by such means, as that hee may seeme not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with monopolies, and such like.

7. If hee commit the handling of such things as procure envy, or seeme grievous to his ministers, but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himselfe, as the French kings, who, for that purpose, as may seeme, have erected their court at Paris, which acquitteth the prince from grudge and envy, both with the nobles and the people.

8. If he borrows sometimes summes of money of his people, though he have no need, and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part, by his exchequer or other officers.

9. If hee avoid all such things as may breed hatred or contempt of his person, which may bee done, if hee shew himselfe not too light, inconstant, hard, cruell, effeminate, fearefull, and dastardly, &c. but contrariwise, religious, grave, just, valiant, &c.

Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machivilian policy ; with feare, the better meanes, to keepe the people in obedience, then love, and reverence of the people to wards the prince.

10. If the prince bee well furnished with warlike provision, which is to be rumored and made knowne abroad, if it be knowne that hee is revered and obeyed by his people at home.

11. If hee provide so much as lieth in him, that his neighbour kingdom grow not over much in power and dominion ; which, if it happen, he is to joine speedily with other princes, who are in like danger to abate that greatnesse, and to strengthen himselfe and the rest against it : An oversight of the Christian princes towards the king of Spaine.

12. If hee get him intelligencers, by reward or other means, to detect or hinder the designs of that prince with whom hee hath differences, if any thing be intended against his state : Or at least have some of his own living abroad about that princes court under colour of embassage, or some other pretence ; which must bee men of skill and dexterity to serve for that turne.

13. To observe the lawes of his countrey, and not to encounter them with his prerogative, nor to use it at all where there is a law ; for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts, especially if it tender to take from them their commodities, and to bestow them upon other of his courtiers and ministers.

14. To provide especially, that that part which favoureth the state as it standeth, bee more potent then the other that favoureth it not, or desireth a change.

15. To make speciall choice of good and sound men to beare the place of magistrates, especially of such as assist the prince in his councils, and policies, and not to leane over much to his owne advise, contrary to the rule of Machivill, who teacheth that a prince can have no good counsell except it be in himself ; his reason, because, if he use the counsell of some one, he is in danger to be overwrought and supplanted by him ; and if hee counsel with more, then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinion. As if a prince of great or meane wisdom could not take the judgment of all his counsellors in any point of policy, or of so many as himselfe thinketh good, or to take it either by word or in wrighting ; and himselfe then in private peruse them all, and so, after good and mature deliberation, make choice of the best, without any distraction or binding himselfe to the direction of one ; for the proverb is true, that two eyes see more than one ; and, therefore, the advises and consultations of a senatory state are compared by some to a feast, or dinner, where many contribute towards the shot, by which meanes they have more variety of dishes, and so better fare ; and yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his health and appetite.

16. The prince himselfe is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice, and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity, whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten, as in the example of Solomon ; which may seem the reason why our kings of England had their Kings Bench, in place of publique justice, after the manner of the ancient kings that sate in the gate ; where, for better performing this princely duty, some special causes may be selected, which may thoroughly bee debated, and considered upon by the prince in private, with the helpe and advice of his learned counsell, and so be decided publickly, as before is said, by the prince himselfe : at least, the prince is to take account of every minister of publique justice, that it may be knowne that he hath a care of justice, and doing right to his people, which makes the justicers also to be more carefull in performing of their duties.

17. To be moderate in his taxes and impositions ; and when need doth require to use the subjects purse, to doe it by parliaments, and with their consents, making the cause apparent unto them, and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them. Finally,



so to use it, that it may seem rather an offer from his subjects, than an exaction by him.

18. To stop small beginnings; unto this end, to compound the dissensions that arise amongst the nobles with caution, that such as are free be not drawn into parts, whereby many times the prince is endangered, and the whole common-wealth set in a combustion; as in the example of the barons warres, and the late warres of France, which grew from a quarrell betwixt the Gusion faction and the other nobility.

19. To stirre up the people, if they grow secure, and negligent of armour, and other provision for the common-wealth, by some rumour or feare of danger at home, to make them more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldome to be used, least it bee supposed a false alarme, when there is need indeed.

20. To have speciall care, that his children, especially the heire apparent, have such bringing up as meet for a king (viz.) in learning, specially of matters pertaining to state, and in marshall exercise, contrary to the practize of many princes, who suffer their children to bee brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting, &c. which, by reason of their defects afterwards, is a cause of mis-government and alteration of state.

## *2. Kingdoms new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these meanes.*

1. If they have beene subjects before to his ancestors, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions as have his owne country, it is an easie matter to retaine such countries within their obedience, in case the princes blood of the said country bee wholly extinct; for men of the same quality, tongue, and condition, doe easily shole and combine themselves together, so much the rather, if the people of that country have served before, and were not accustomed to their owne liberty, wherein specially is to bee observed, that the lawes and customes of that purchased country bee not altered nor innovated, or at least it bee done by little and little. So the Burgundians and Aquitaines were annexed to France. The reason, because partly they have bin accustomed to serve; and partly, for that they will not easily agree about any other to bee their prince, if the blood royall be once extinguished. As for the invasion of a foraine country, whereunto the prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living, it is not the part of a just civill prince, much lesse a prince Christian, to enforce such a country; and, therefore, the Machivellian practises in this case, to make sure worke, by extinguishing wholly the blood royall, is leud and impertinent: The like is to bee said of murdering the natives, or the greatest part of them, to the end hee may hold the rest in sure possession; a thing not onely against Christian religion, but inhumane justice, cruell, and barbarous.

2. The safest way is, (supposing a right) that some good part of the natives bee transplanted into some other place, and our colonies, consisting of so many as shall be thought meet, be planted there in some part of the province; castles, forts, and havens, seised upon, and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the Babylonian monarch, which transplanted 10. tribes of the Jewes; and of the Romans in France, Germany, Britany, and other places. The reason: 1. For that, otherwise, forces of horse and foote are to be maintained within the province, which cannot bee done without great charge. 2. For that the whole province is troubled and grieved with removing and supplying the army with victuals, carriages, &c. 3. For that colonies are more sure and faithfull than the rest. As for the natives that are removed from their former sences, they have no meanes to hurt, and the rest of the natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may bee so served, if they

attempt any thing rashly, are content to bee quiet. The Turkes practise in Asia, where the chiefe grounds and dwellings are possessed by the souldiours, whom they call *Timariotæ*. That the prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase, especially for a time, till things be well settled; especially if the province bee great and laige, as the Turke in Greece. The reasons. 1. Because the presence of the prince availeth much to keepe things in order, and get the good-will of his new subjects. 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the princes presence, if they bee oppressed by the lieutenants and inferiour governours; where it will bee convenient, for the winning the peoples hearts, that some examples bee made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression. 3. Because, being present, hee seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted, and so may quickly give remedy to it, which, being absent, hee cannot doe, or not doe in time.

3. If the prince himselfe cannot bee present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of governing, or new purchases, bee committed to such as bee sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the princes favour, and not to natives or other of their owne subjects, that are gracious there for their nobility, or vertue; especially if the province bee great, and somewhat farre distant, which may soone seduce the unsettled affections of those new subjects. As for such governours as depend wholly upon the princes favour, being not borne but created noble, they will not so easily suffer themselves to bee wonne from their duty; and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers to keepe them in subjection, and not for any good-will.

4. To have the children of the chiefe noblemen, and of greatest authority, hostages with them in safe keeping; the more the better: for that no bond is stronger than that of nature to containe the parents and allies of obedience, and they the rest.

5. To alter the lawes, but by degrees one after another, and to make others that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present government.

6. To keepe the people quiet and peaceable, and well affected so much as may bee, that they may seeme, by being conquered, to have gotten a protectour rather than a tyrant; for the common people, if they enjoy peace, and bee not distracted, nor drawne from their businesse, nor exacted upon beyond measure, are easily contained under obedience; yet, notwithstanding, they are to bee disused from the practice of armes, and other exercises, which encrease courage, and bee weakened of armour, that they have neither spirit nor will to rebell.

7. If there bee any faction in the country, to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part, and to combine with it, as Cæsar in France.

8. To looke well to the borders and confining provinces, and if any rule there, of great or equall power to himselfe, to joine league with some other borderers, though of lesse strength, to hinder the attempts (if any should bee) by such neighbour prince; for it happeneth often, that a country infested by one neighbour prince, calleth in another, of as great or greater power to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it: So the Romans were called into Greece by the *Ætolians*; the Saxons by the Brittaines, the Danes by the Saxons.

9. To leave their titles and dignities to the natives, but the command and authority wholly his owne.

10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise too often the sophismes of policy, especially those that appertaine to a tyrannicall state, which are soone detected by men of judgement, and so bring discredit to the prince, and his policy among the wisest and better sort of his subjects, whereof must needs follow very evill effects.

The sophismes of tyrants are rather to be knowne then practised, (which are for the

supporting of their tyrannicall states) by wise and good princes, and are these, and such like as follow.

*Rules Politique of Tyrants.*

Rules practised by tyrants are of 2 sorts; viz. 1. Barbarous and professed, which are proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of themselves, without other helpe, as in the Turkish and Russe government.

2 Sophistical and dissembled; as in some states, that are reputed for good and lawfull monarchies, but inclining to tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet settled, nor have power sufficient of themselves, but must use the power and helpe of others, and so are forced to bee politique sophisters.

*1. Sophismes of a barbarous and professed Tyrant.*

1. To expell and banish out of his countrey all honest meanes, whereby his people may attaine to learning, wisdom, valour, and other vertues, that they might bee fit for that estate and servile condition; for that, in these two, learning and martiall exercise, effect two things most dangerous to a tyranny, viz. wisdom and valour, for that men of spirit and understanding can hardly endure a servile state. To this end, to forbid learning of liberall arts, and martiall exercise, as in the Russe government. so Julian the apostate dealt with the Christians. Contrarywise, to use his people to base occupations and mechanicall arts, to keepe them from idlenesse, and to put away from them all high thoughts and manly conceites, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunke, and of other base and lewd conditions, that they may bee sotted, and so made unfit for great enterprizes. So the Egyptian kings dealt with the Hebrews; so the Russe emperor with his Russe people; and Charles the Fifth with the Netherlanders, when he purposed to enclose their priviledges, and to bring them under his absolute government.

2. To make sure to him and his state his military men, by reward, liberty, and other meanes, especially his guard, or prætorian band, that, being partakers of the spoile and benefit, they may like that state, and continue firme to it, as the Turke his janizanes, the Russe his Boyarens, &c.

3. To unarme his people of weapons, money, and all meanes, whereby they may resist his power, and to end, to have his set and ordinary exactions, once in two, three, or four yeares, and sometimes yearly, as the Turke and Russe, who is wont to say, that his people must bee used as his flock of sheep: viz. Their fleece taken from them, least it overlade them, and grow too heavy; that they are like to his beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow; and if there bee any of extraordinary wealth, to borrow of them in the mean while, till the tax come about, or, upon some devised matter, to confiscate their goods. as the common practise is of the Russe and Turke.

4. To bee still in warres, to the end, his people may need a captaine, and that his forces may be kept in practise. as the Russe doth yearly against the Tartar, Polonian, and Sweden, &c.

5. To cut off such as excell the rest in wealth, favour, or nobility, or bee of a pregnant or aspiring wit, and so are fearfull to a tyrant, and to suffer none to hold office, or any honour, but onely of him, as the Turke his Bashaes, and the Russe his Ruezzes.

6. To forbid guilds, brotherhoods, feastings, and other assemblies among the people, that they have no meanes or opportunity to conspire or conferre together of publique



matters, or to maintaine love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a tyrant, the Russe practice.

7. To have their beagles or listners in every corner and parts of the realme, especially in places that are more suspect, to learn what every man saith or thinketh, that they may prevent all attempts, and take away such as mislike their state.

8. To make schisme and division among his subjects, viz. to set one noble man against another, and one rich man against another, that, through faction and disagreement among themselves, they may bee weakened, and attempt nothing against him; and by this meanes, entertaining whisperings and complaints, hee may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both when need requireth; so the Russe made the faction of the Zemsky and the Oppressinie.

9. To have strangers for his guard, and to entertaine parasites, and other base and servile fellows, not too wise, but yet subtile, that will be ready for reward to doe and execute what he commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust; for that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a tyrant.

All these practises, and such like, may be contracted into one or two, viz. to beleave his subjects of will and power to doe him hurt, or to alter the present state. The use is caution, not imitation.

2. *Sophismes of the sophisticall, or subtile Tyrant, to hold up his State.*

1. To make a shew of a good king, by observing a temper and mediocrity in his government and whole course of life; to which end, it is necessary that this subtile tyrant bee a cunning politician, or a Machivellian at the least, and that hee bee taken so to be, for that it maketh him more to bee feared and regarded, and is thought thereby not unworthy for to governe others.

2. To make shew not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent, and not terrible in his speech, and gesture, habite, and other demeanour.

3. To pretend care of the commonwealth, and to that end, to seeme loath to exact tributes and other charges, and yet to make necessity of it where none is: To that end, to procure such warre as can bring no danger towards his state, and that might easily be compounded, or some other chargeable businesse; and to continue it on, that hee may continue his exaction and contribution so long as hee list, and thereof to employ some part in his publique service; the rest to hoord up in his treasury, which is sometimes practised even by lawfull princes; as Edward the Fourth in his waies against France, when, having levied a great summe of money throughout his realme, especially of the Londoners, hee went over seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an account, by open speech and publique writing, of the expense of such taxes and impositions as hee hath received of his subjects, that hee may so seeme to bee a good husband, and frugall, and not a robber of the commonwealth.

5. To that end, to bestow some cost upon publique buildings, or some other worke, for the common good, especially upon the ports, forts, and chief cities of his realme, that so hee may seeme a benefactor, and to have a delight in the adorning of his countrey, or doing some good for it.

6. To forbid feasting and other meetings, which increase love, and give opportunity to conferre together of publique matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses. To that end, the curfew bell was first ordained by William the Conquerour, to give men warning to repaire home at a certaine houre.

7. To take heed, that no one grow to bee over great; but rather many equally great, that they may envy and contend one with another; and if hee resolve to weaken any of this sort, to doe it warily and by degrees; if quite to wrack him and to have his.

life, yet to give him a lawfull triall after the manner of his country; and if hee proceed so faire with any of great power and estimation as to doe him contumely or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto honour, which great spirits doe most desire, and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace, than to any thankfuinesse, or acknowledging the princes favour for their pardon or dismission; true in atheists, but not in true Christian nobility.

8. To unarme his people, and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arme with them such and so many as hee shall thinke meet, and to commit them to such as are sure men.

9. To make schisme or division under-hand among his nobility, and betwixt the nobility and the people, and to set one rich man against another, that they combine not together, and that himselfe, by hearinge the griefes and complaints, may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter against them both, when it listeth him to call them to an accompt.

10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, especially about womens matters, by attempting the chastity of their wives or daughters, which hath beene the ruine of many tyrants, and subversion of their states; as of Tarquinius, by Brutus; Appius, by Virginius; Pisistratus, by Harmodius; Alexander Medicis, Duke of Florence; Aloisus of Placentia, Rodericus, King of Spaine, &c.

11. To that end, to bee moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely, that hee bee not seene; for that men, sober or watchfull, or such as seeme so, are not lightly subject to contempt, or conspiracies of their owne.

12. To reward such as achieve some great or commendable enterprise, or doe any speciall action for the commonwealth, in that manner as it may seeme they could not be better regarded in case they lived in a free state.

13. All rewards and things gratefull to come from himselfe; but all punishments, exactions, and things ungratefull, to come from his officers and publique ministers: and when he hath effected what hee would by them, if hee see his people discontented withall, to make them a sacrifice to pacifie his subjects.

14. To pretend great care of religion, and of serving of God, (which hath beene the manner of the wickedest tyrants) for that people doe lesse feare any hurt from those whom they thinke vertuous and religious, nor attempt lightly to doe them hurt, for that they thinke that God protects them.

15. To have a strong and sure guard of forraigne souldiers, and to bind them by good turnes, that they having at least profit, may depend upon him and the present state; as Caligula, the German guard, where the nobility are many and mighty. The like is practised by lawfull kings, as by the French king.

16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault or case with them, that for that cause they bee forced to defend the tyrant for their owne safety.

17. To take part, and to joine himselfe, with the stronger part; if the common people and meane degree bee the stronger, to joine with them; if the rich and noble, to joine with them; for so that part with his own strength will bee ever able to overmatch the other.

18. So to frame his manners and whole behaviour, as that hee may seeme, if not perfectly good, yet tollerably evil, or somewhat good, somewhat bad.

These rules of hipocritical tyrants are to be known, that they may bee avoided and met withall, and not drawne into imitation.

*Preservation of an Aristocracy.*

Rules to preserve a senatory state are partly taken from the common axioms, and partly from those that preserve a kingdome.

*Preservation of an Oligarchy, by Sophismes, or Rules.*

1. In consultations and assemblies about publique affaires, so to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their common assemblies and counsels; but to impose a fine upon the richer sort, if they omit that duty. On the other side, to pardon the people if they absent themselves, and to beare with them under pretence, that they may the better attend their occupations, and not bee hindered in their trades and earnings.

2. In election of magistrates and officers, to suffer the poorer sort to vow and abjure the bearing of office under colour of sparing them, or to enjoin some great charge as incident to the office, which the poore cannot beare; but to impose some great fine upon those that bee rich, if they refuse to beare office, being elect unto it.

3. In judicall matters, in like manner, to order that the people may be absent from publique trials, under pretence of following their business. But the richer to bee present, and to compell them by fines to frequent the court.

4. In warlike exercise and armes, that the poore sort bee not forced to have armour, horse, &c. under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to bee drawne from their trades by martiall exercises; but to compell the richer sort to keepe their proportion of armour, horse, &c. by excessive fines, and to exercise themselves in warlike matters, &c.

5. To have speciall care of instructing their children in liberall arts, policy, and warlike exercise, and to observe good order and discipline. For as populous states are preserved by the frequency and liberty of the people, so this government of the richer is preserved by discipline and good order of governours.

6. To provide good store of warlike furniture, especially of horse and horsemen, and of armed men, viz. pike, &c. which are proper to the gentry, as shot and light furniture are for a populous company.

7. To put in practise some points of a populous state, viz. to laide no one man with too much preferment; to make yearely or halfe yeares magistrates, &c.; for that the people are pleased with such things, and they are better secured by this meancs from the rule of one; and if any grow to too much greatnesse, to abate him by the sophismes fit for this state.

8. To commit the offices and magistracies to those that are best able to beare the greatest charges for publique matters, which both tendeth to the conservation of this state, and pleaseth the people, for that they reape some reliefe and benefit by it.

9. To the same end, to contract marriages among themselves, the rich with the rich, &c.

10. In some things which concerne not the points and matters of state, as electing magistrates, making lawes, &c. to give an equality, or sometimes a preferment to the common people, and not to doe, as in some olygarchies they were wont, viz. to sweare against the people, to suppress and bridle them; but rather contrary, to minister an oath at that admission, that they shall doe no wrong to any of the people; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the commons, to shew some example of severe punishment.

For other axioms that preserve this state, they are to bee borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a populous and tyrannicall state, for the strict kind of olygarchy is kinne to tyranny.



*Preservation of a Popular State, Sophismes. Rules or Axioms.*

1. In publique assemblies and consultations, about matters of state, creating of magistrates, publique justice and exercise of armes, to practise the contrary to the former kind of government, to wit, an oligarchy; for, in popular states, the commons and meaner sort are to bee drawne to those assemblies, magistracies, offices, warlike exercises, &c. by mulets and rewards, and the richer sort are to bee spared, and not to be forced by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these exercises.

2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath beene in some popular states; but rather to preferre them in all other matters that concerne not the state and publique government.

3. To elect magistrates from among the commons by lot or balloting, and not to choose any for their wealths sake.

4. To take heed that no man beare office twice, except it bee military, where the pay and salery, &c. is to bee reserved in their owne hands, to bee disposed of by a common councill, &c. and to see that no man bee too highly preferred.

5. That no magistracy bee perpetuall, but as short as may bee, to wit, for a ycare, half a ycare, &c.

6. To compell magistrates, when their time expireth, to give an accompt of their behaviour and government, and that publique before the commons.

7. To have publique saleries and allowance for their magistrates, judges, &c. and yearly dividends for the common people, and such as have most need among them.

8. To make judges of all matters, out of all sorts, so they have some aptnes to performe that duty.

9. To provide that publique judgments and trials bee not frequent, and to that end, to inflict great fines and other punishments upon pettifoggers and dilatours, as the law of requitall, &c. because, for the most part, the richer and nobler, and not the commons, are indicted and accused in this commonwealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the state, whereby many times the popular state is turned into an olygarchy, or some other government. Hereto tendeth that art of civill law made against accusers and calumniatours: *Ad Senatos Consultum Turpilianum, lib. 1. de Calumniatoribus.*

10. In such free states as are popular, and have no revenue, to provide the publique assemblies bee not after, because they want salery for pleaders and oratours; and if they bee rich, yet to bee wary, that all the revenue bee not divided amongst the commons; for that this distribution of the common revenue among the multitude is like a purse or barrell without a bottom; but to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue bee stored up for the publique affaires.

11. If the number of the poore increase too much in this kind of state, to send some abroad out of the cities into the next country places, and to provide above all that none doe live idly, but bee set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their farmes and coppisholds such decayed citizens.

12. To bee well advised what is good for this state, and not to suppose that to bee fit for a popular state, that seemeth most popular, but that which is best for the continuance thereof: And to that end, not to lay into the exchequer, or common treasury, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrated things, which, except it bee practised, confiscations and fines of the common people would bee frequent, and so this state would decay by weakening the people.

*Conversion of States in Generall.*

Conversion of a state is the declining of the commonwealth, either to some other forme of government, or to his full and last period appointed by God.

*Causes of Conversions of States, and of two Sorts, Generall and Particular.*

*Generall*, (viz.) 1. Want of religion; viz. of the true knowledge and worship of God prescribed in his word, and notable sinnes that proceed from thence in prince and people, as in the examples of Saul, Uzziah, the Jewish state; the four monarchies, and all other.

2. Want of wisdom, and good counsell to keepe the state, the prince, nobles, and people in good temper and due proportion, according to their severall orders and degrees.

3. Want of justice, either in administration (as ill lawes, or ill magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should be, or there bestowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.

4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintaine and defend itselfe; viz. of provision, as armour, money, captaines, souldiours, &c. Execution, when the meanes or provision is not used or ill used.

2. *Particular*: To bee noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the commonwealths.

*Particular Causes of Conversion of State are of two Sorts.*

1. *Forraine*: By the over greatnesse of invasion of some forraine kingdome, or other state of meane power, having a part within our owne, which are to bee prevented by the providence of the chiefe, and rules of policy for the preserving of every state. This falleth out very seldome for the great difficulty to overthrow a forraine state.

2. *Domestique*: Sedition or open violence by the stronger part. Alteration without violence.

*Sedition.*

Sedition is a power of inferiours opposing itselfe with force of armes against the superiour power, *Quasi ditio secedens*.

*Causes of Sedition are of two Sorts. 1. Generall. Liberty, Riches, Honour.*

*Liberty*.—When they that are of equall quality in a commonwealth, or doe take themselves so to bee, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these three.

*Riches*.—Or when they are so unequall in quality, or take themselves so to bee, are regarded but equally, or with lesse respect, then those that bee of lesse defect in these three things, or in any of them:

*Honour*.—1. *In the Chiefe*: Covetousnesse, or oppression by the magistrate or higher power, viz. when the magistrates, especially the chiefe, encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the publike or private calamity, whereby the

governours grow to quarrell among themselves, as in olygarchies, or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrell against the chiefe, as in kingdomes. The examples of Wat Tyler, Jack Straw, &c.

2. *In the Chiefe*: Injury, when great spirits, and of great power, are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to be, as Coriolanus, Cyrus minor, Earle of Warwick. In which cases, the best way is to decide the wrong.

3. Preferment, or want of preferment, wherein some have over much, and so wax proud and aspire higher; or have more or lesse, they deserve as they suppose; and so in envy and disdain seek innovation by open faction, so Cæsar, &c.

4. Some great necessity or calamity; so Xerxes, after the foile of his great army; and Senacheris, after the losse of 185 in one night.

2. *Particular*.—1. Envy, when the chiefe exceed the mediocrity before mentioned, and so provoketh the nobility and other degrees to conspire against him; as Brutus, Cassius, &c. against Cæsar.

2. Feare, viz. of danger, when one or more dispatch the prince, by secret practice or force, to prevent his owne danger, as Artabanus did Xerxes.

3. Lust or Lechery, as Tarquinius Superbus, by Brutus; Pisistratida, by Armodius; Appius, by Virginus.

*Chiefe*—4. Contempt, for vile quality and base behaviour, as Sardanapalus, by Arbaces; Dionisius the younger, by Dion.

*Other degrees*.—5. Contumely; when some great disgrace is done to some of great spirit, who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as Caligula, by Chæreas.

*Other degrees*. 6. Hope of advancement, or some great profit, Mithridates, Anobarsanes.

#### *Alteration without Violence.*

Causes of alteration without violence are; 1. Excesse of the state; when by degrees, the state groweth from that temper and mediocrity, wherein it was, or should have been settled, and exceedeth in power, riches, and absolutenes in his kind, by the ambition and covetousnesse of the chieffes, immoderate taxes and impositions, &c. applying all to his owne benefit without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth itselfe into another state or forme of government, as a kingdome into a tyranny, an olygarchy into an aristocracy.

2. Excesse of some one or more in the commonwealth; viz. when some one or more in a commonwealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or vertue, and so, by permission and popular favour, are advanced to the sovereignty; by which meanes popular states grow into olygarchies, and olygarchies and aristocracies into monarchies. For which cause, the Athenians, and some other free states, made their lawes of *ostracismos*, to banish any for a time that should excell, though it were in vertue, to prevent the alteration of their state; which, because it is an unjust law, 'tis better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the meanes, that none should grow to that hight and excellency, then to use so sharp and unjust a remedy.

#### *A Method how to make Use of the Booke before in the Reading of Story.*

David being seventy yeares of age, was of wisdom, memory, &c. sufficiente to govern his kingdome; 1. Reg. chap. 1.



*Old Age is not ever unfit for publique Government.*

David being of great yeares, and so having a cold, dry, and impotent body, married with Abishag, a faire maide of the best complection through his whole realme, to revive his body and prolong his life; 1. Reg. chap. 1. verse 3.

*Example of the like Practice in Charles the Fifth.*

David being old and impotent of body, by the advice of his nobles and phisitions, married a young maid called Abishag, to warm and preserve his old body.

*Observation.*

Whether David did well in marrying a maide; and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marry a young woman; or, on the other side, for an old woine and decrepite woman to marry a young and lusty man.

*For the Affirmative.*

Arg. The end of marriage is society and mutuall comfort; but there may bee society and mutuall comfort in a marriage betwixt an old and young party: *Ergo* it is lawfull.

Ans. Society and comfort is an use and effect of marriage; but none of the principall end is of marriage, which are:

1. Procreation of children, and so the continuance of mankind. 2. The avoiding of fornication.

As for comfort and society, they may be betwixt man and man, woman and woman, where no marriage is, and therefore no proper ends of marriage.

*The Negative.*

Arg. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends for which marriage was ordained by God, is no lawfull marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent and young party, hath no respect to the right end for which marriage was ordained by God: Therefore it is no lawfull marriage.

2. No contract, wherein the party contracting bindeth himselfe to an impossible condition, or to doe that which he cannot doe, is good or lawfull. But the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young party bindeth him to an impossible condition, to doe that which hee cannot doe (viz.) to performe the duties of marriage; Therefore it is unlawfull.

For the same cause, the civill law determineth a nullity in these marriages, except the woman know before the infirmity of the man, in which case she can have no wrong, being a thing done with her owne knowledge and consent, because *Volenti no fit iniuria*. In legem Julian. de adulteris leg. Si uxor, &c.

It provideth further for the more certainty of the infirmity, that three yeares bee expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men, that have beene infirme at

the first, by reason of sicknesse, or some other accident, afterwards proved to bee sufficient: *De repudiis leg. in causis.*

*Defence for David in marrying Abishag.*

1. It was rather a medicine then a marriage, without any evill or disordered affection.
2. It was by the perswasion of his nobles and phisitians.
3. It was for the publique good to prolong the life of a worthy prince.
4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid, who was made acquainted with the kings infirmity, and to what end shee was married unto him; who if shee did it for the common good, and for duties sake, having withall the guift of continency, shee is to bee commended; if for ambition, or some vaine respect, it is her owne, and Davids fault.

*Politick Nobility. Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdome.*

First, tooke the advantage of Davids affection and kindnesse towards him, and made him secure of any ill dealing.

Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his father as unfit for government.

Thirdly, blazed his title and right to the crowne.

Fourthly, got him chariots, horsemen, and footmen, and a guard, to make shew of state.

Fifthly, being a comly and goodly person, made a popular shew of himselfe, and his qualities.

Sixthly, joyned to himselfe in faction Joab, the generall of the army, who was in displeasure for murdering of Abner and Amasa, and feared that David would supply Benajah into his place, and so was discontented. And Abiather the high priest, that was likewise discontented with David, for the preferment of Zadoch.

Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates, under pretence of a vow and offering at the fountaine of Raguell, in the confines of Judea.

Eighthly, made a shew of religion by sacrificing, &c.

Ninthly, made himselfe familiar with the nobles and people, and entertained them with feasting.

Tenthly, drew into his part the chiefe officers of the court, and servants to the king, by rewards, familiarity, &c.

Eleventhly, disgraced and abased the competitour, and such as hee knew would take part with him, and concealeth his ambition and purpose from them.

Twelfthly, had Jonathan a favorite of the court, and neere about the king, to give him intelligence, if any thing were discovered, and moved at the court, whilst himselfe was in hand about his practise.

*Observations. Wayes of such as aspire to the Kingdome, and Markes to discerne them.*

First, they wind into princes favour, by service, officiousnesse, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulness, thereby to make him secure of their practises.

2. They take advantages of princes infirmities, age, impotency, negligence, sexe, &c. and worke upon that by disabling the prince, and secret detracting of his person and government.

3. They blaze their title and claime to the crowne, (if they have any) with their friends and favourers.

4. They provide them in secret of extraordinary forces and furniture for the warres, make much of good souldiers, and have a pretence (if it bee espied) of some other end, as for the kings honour, or service, and to bee in readines against forraigne enemies, &c.

5. They make open shew of their best qualities and comelines of their person (which, though it be vaine as a dumbe shew, it is very effectuell to winne the liking of the popular sort, which, according to the rule of the election of kings, in the Bees common-wealth, thinke that *Forma est digna imperare*) activity nobility, ancestry, &c.

6. To have their blazers abroad to set out their vertues, and to prepare their friends in every province.

7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto them, of the chiefe peeres, and men of best quality, such as are mightiest, and most gracious with the souldiers, and the military men, and most subtil and politique, especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the state.

8. To have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinary matter in some convenient place, not too neare, nor too farre off, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspicion.

9. To take up a shew and pretence of religion more then before, and beyond the practise of their former life.

10. They use popular curtesie (which in a great person is very effectuell) feasting, liberality, gaming, &c.

11. To bee over uberall, and winne to them by guifts, familiarity, &c. the chiefe officers of the court and governours of shires.

12. To have some neere about the prince, to keepe them in credite, and remove suspicion, if any rise.

13. To disgrace such as they know to bee sure and faithfull to the prince and present state, or to the competitor, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all meanes they can, and to conceale the designes from them, least they bee discovered before they bee ripe.

14. To have some spie neere about the prince, to advertise them if any inkling of suspicion arise whilst themselves are practising.

Note the practises of Absolon: 2. Sam. chap. 16. and of Cyrus minor, in Xenophon, *Περικλέα πρῶτος*, cap. 1.

### Politicall Prince.

David being a most worthy and excellent prince for wisdom, valour, religion, and justice, and so highly deserving of the common-wealth, yet growne into age, grew withall into contempt, and had many, both of his nobles and common people, that fell from him; first with Absolon, then with Adoniah, who afflicted the kingdome, and rebelled against him: For remedy wherof, hee stirred up himselfe to publique actions, which might shew his vigour and sufficiency to manage the affaires of his kingdome.

1. After the victory against Absolon, he forced himselfe to forbear mourning, and shewed himselfe to his discontented army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his sone.

2. After the victory, hee caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole:



nation, to bring him home with honour to Jerusalem, which was a renewing and re-establishing of him; 2. Sam. 10. 12.

3. He gave an experiment of his power and authority, by deposing a person of great authority and estimation, to wit, Joab, general captaine of the army, and advancing Amasa to his place.

4. Hee sent kind messengers to Jerusalem, and to other chiefe and head townes, and specially men of Judea, his contributes, putting them off their alliance with him, with these words, that they were of his own flesh and blood, with protestation of his speciall love and affection towards them, to pvoke them with like kindnesse and affection towards him.

5. Hee assembled a parliament of his whole realme, and tooke occasion upon the designing of his successour, to commend unto them the succession of his house, and the continuance and maintenance of Gods true worship and religion, then established, and gave a grave and publique charge to his successour, now designed, touching the manner of his government, and maintaining of religion, 1. Chron. 12. 13.

6. Hee sheweth his bounty and magnificence in congesting matter for the building of the temple, as gold, silver, brasse, &c.; and caused it to bee published and made known to the parliament and the whole nation, 1. Chron. 22. 13.

7. Hee revived the church government, and set it in a right order, assigning to every church officer his place and function.

8. Hee suppressed the faction of Adoniah, and ordained Solomon his successour, 1. Reg. 1. 22. By these meanes, he retained his majesty and authority in his old age, as appeareth by th' effect, for that being bedrid, he suppressed the faction of Adoniah, (which was growne mighty, and was set on foote) with his bare commandment, and signification of his pleasure, and so he died in peace.

*A Discourse of the State of Spaine, written in the yeare 1607, by Sir Charles Cernewayles, Knight, Ambassadour for his Majestie of Great Brittain to the King of Spayne.*  
MSS.

The king possesseth, at this present, Spaine entirely, wherein are contained 14 kingdomes and principalities: Portugall, Algarve, Granada, Andalusia, Murcia, Valentia, Cataluna, Arragon, Navarra, Biskay, Galicia, Leon, Castilla the New, and Castilla the Old.

For Italy, he hath the kingdome of Naples, that of Sicilye, and the dukedome of Millan, which, in riches, in number of subjects, and in revenue, exceedeth divers kingdomes.

In the Low Countryes he possesseth a title in reversion to the dukedomes of Brabant, Lymburche, and Lunenburgh; and entitleth himselfe in like manner to six earledomes, viz. Flanders, Holland, Zelande, Artois, Namur, and Zutphen; to four signiories, namely, Friseland, Groynighen, Henault, and Malii.

In the West Indies he hath Nova Espana, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, with other islands.

The seate of government in Peru, he hath changed to Lyma, and that of Mexico to Lemysten.

In the East Indies, beyond the islands of Cabo Verde, and that of St. Thomas (from whence comes the sugar) having passed the Cape Bona Esperanza, he holdeth Mozambique, a place of great import for the traffique of the East.

He hath the kingdome of Ormus, and many other fortresses in the rivers of all that

ocean sea, to the Gulph of Bengala, and from thence to Scian, Canton, and the confines of China.

He holdeth moreover the islands of Molucca, and those of the Phillipinas, by means whereof he is master of all the ocean sea, in such sort, as departing from Spain towards the west, and passing the Straight of Magellain towards the Phillipinas, and, the Moluccas, and taking their way by the sea to the Gulph of Bengala, after Ormur; and, lastly, to the Cape of Esperanza, turning themselves towards the islands of St Thomas, and the Straits of Gibraltar. In this sort they go about the circle of the whole worlde.

Besides all these estates, he is possessed of many other places of much importance, which are as necessities and adjuncts to his dominions; as the islands of Terceiras to his kingdome of Portugal, the Canaries to Castile, Mayoica, Minorca, and Sardenia to Aragon, divers places to Tuscany to the kingdome of Naples, the marquessate of Tinal, and to the state of Millan, Oian and de Pegnou, in Affrica to Castile, Tanger, Arzila, Mesagen, and Ceuta to the crowne of Portugall, and the earledome of Burgundye which should most aptly have been reckoned with his other signiories in the lowe countries.

The isles of Mayoica, Minoica, and Serdena, are not of such strength, but they may easily be possessed by an enemy, that was able with a potent army to assault them.

The West Indies they possesse not so strongly, but they may have cause to feare; for although the naturall Indians, they have not much occasion to make doubt, being in their owne disposition cowardlye, and without all experience, and leaders to direct them, yet hath their such a multitude of people transfered themselves thither out of Spaine, to the much dispeopling of their owne countrey, and multiplied so abundantly there, as what with discontents given them from their own countrey, with confidence of their multitude there, and the great distance from Spaine, were there added unto it any hope of assistance of some other powerfull prince by sea, they may, without any great difficulty, become moved to make such a revolt, as will be hard for the king of Spaine to suppress.

Hercunto the Spaniard gives what remedy he can, having forbidden the building of any fortresses or strong places in those countries, whereunto his enemies or rebells might have retreat; prohibiting the planting of vines wherewith to make wine, of olive-trees for oile, the making of linnen and silkes, and such other necessities, and not permitting any other nation to have commerce with them, whereby to hold them in a continual necessity of his yearly assistance and hope from Spaine.

In the East Indies, although they possesse little, but the very extremities and out-sides of the land, notwithstandinge, by means of the fortresses that there they have builded, they hold their owne, and the rather, by reason of the navigation and commerce that they have in those seas, which, before the Hollanders in those late yeares gave them disturbance, were wholly in their power. For by means of that navigation they may with the more facility relieve, strengthen, victuall, and put garrisons in every one of the said places that they are possessed of, having so digged away the earthe near unto those fortresses, that they have accesse unto them by water, and herewith have so invironed them, as they have put them almost all into the form of ilandes.

Those places are in greatest perill to receive hurt from the Turke, who being disposed to send a great navie by the Sea, or by the Persian Gulph, may disturb their navigation, and besiege their fortresses of most importance, overthrowing their traffique of pepper and other spices, which from those partes are transported to Spaine. And this, by experience of these few yeares, we find not to be of any great difficulty to a potent army, considering that the Hollanders, with those few ships which they have adventured thither, have already in a manner destroyed all the Portugall traffique for spices, which is the chiefe commodity of that navigation.

Touching the Low Countries, of some part whereof for the present the archdukes are the proprietarie la. and possessors, who are now, with consent of the king of Spaine, in treaty for a peace with the other estates united, and have assented to relinquish their title and interest to those parts, that by them are withheld from their obedience, I will say nothing, but leave them to such successe as so suddaine and so unexpected a motion may with time produce; the same having, in the understanding and judgement of man, so many and so various dependancies, as to decipher them all, would rather require a whole volume than a short discourse.

Only this, by way of divination; if a peace it prove, to Spaine it is not very likely to be for the present either honorable or advantageous; and to the estates, for the time to come, neither safe nor durable. If a warr continued, it may in time become the ruine of the one, or the impoverishing and envassaling of the other.

The townes in Affrica, in fear of such fortune as they suffered at Thunis and Gollotta, places so important and neare to the kingdome of Spaine, which were taken from them by the enemy, they keepe with great care and providence, as those whom the losse of these townes have made more circumspect and regardfull of the rest that be in their possession.

The revenue of the crown of Spaine, some nine or tenn yeares passed, amounted unto fourteen millions and        ducatts; whereof Spaine yeilded seven millions, viz. Castile five millions, Portugall one million, and 60,000 ducats, Aragon and Catalugna 200,000; Granada, Murtia, and Valentia 200,000; out of Majorca, Minorca, and Sardeyna, the king hath yearly 200,000; out of Sicylia 700,000; out of the state of Milan 900,000; out of the kingdome of Naples one million and 200,000; out of the townes he hath in Toscan 10,000; out of the Low Countries he had 720,000; out of the East Indies one million and 600,000; and out of the West Indies        which in the whole amount to the aforesaid somme of fourteen millions and 566,000. But in the year 1598, upon an accompt then made of the particularities, whereof I am possessed, the revenue of Portugall, Navarre, Aragon, Catalugna, and his other estates in Italy, viz. Naples, Sicylia, and Millan, and his townes in Affrica, and other parts not accompted, in regard, that from none of them there comes any thing to the king's purse, the same being spent within those several estates, in maintenance of his viceroyes, governors, and garrisons, and in the multitude of pensions he giveth there, and in other partes of Italy. It appeareth that the king's yearly revenue, by all manner of wayes and meanes, amounted to above 9,743,624 ducatts; his assignations, out-rents, and charges, ordinarie and extraordinarie, in that yeare, came to the somme of 11,352,834; so as his yearly charge exceeded his receipts the somme of 1,609,210 ducatts. But this was then helped by an ayde of six millions yearly, during the space of eight yeares, granted unto his majesty by the cortea, which are assembled in the nature of our parliament in England. These being now expired, and the kingdome of Spaine so exceedingly impoverished, and unable for so great a burthen, they have by a late parliament abated, and newly granted two millions and a halfe yearly, to be paid for the space of eight yeares; some also, which (the estate of things continuing as it doth,) it is verily thought, they will not in any sorte be able to performe. Moreover, it is to be considered, that sithence the former accompts made, the debts of the king are greatly increased, which are thought at this day to amounte to 160 millions at the least, for which he pays interest for some after the rate of one for fourteen, others one for twentie, and some at one for thirty; besides other great sommes due to pensioners, his garrison soldiers, and to those of whom he hath taken victual, munition, and other necessities for his navies, and his fortresses in Barbary, and other places. Neither is it of small consequence to the king, that these revenues and treasure are managed, for the most part, by people marked with the spots of untruth and unfaithfulness, as those that more respect their particular interest then the publique



good; and would the king purpose a generall conection of them all, such is the estate and people, as hardly he should find any to serve him in those places. And for particulars, if any such fall out, as lately that of the earle of Villa Longa, and Ramirez de Prada, it extendeth not to the taking away of their lives, but only to banishment, imprisonment, and confiscation of their goods, so as the same being not publique nor exemplary, gives unto the rest the more encouragement to continue their falsitie, to the prejudice of the crown.

Lastly, the rents and revenue royall, have annexed unto them two notable incommodities, which denies them certainty. The first, in regard that the most of them are founded upon impositions, and those so exorbitant, that they have already, and go on daylie wasting and consumeing their people, and especially those of Spaine, where it is not possible that they should long be able to bear the burthen of so great sommes of money, as for the passed and present are laid upon them. The other, which is of more importance, is, that the most of his majesties revenue in Castile, Portugall, and the Indies, resteth upon the safe navigation of his yearly fleets, which being both subject to stormes, and to disturbance by enemies, can never promise any assuredness. Neither are these two perils to be avoided, either by undertaking of these navigations in times more seasonable, for then their certaine times of returne being knowne, they should be in greater danger to fall into the hands of their enemies; or by encreasing their number of shippes of warr, such being their general want of masters and mariners, as they hardly find a number sufficient enough to sail those they yearly sett forth for the present; so as were there a convenient number of ships of warr continually attendant upon the coasts of Spaine, for the space of two years only, to keepe in the king's navy, (which is gathered and compounded out of divers distant places,) from issuing out, and assembling themselves, and by that meanes also stoppe the passage into the Indies, and prohibit all strangers that should endeavour to bring in corne, munition, cordage, and other necessities into Spaine, this kingdome being in so great want in itselfe, and not aided by the purse of Genoa, and that of the Fulkers, which, in a case of such dispar, to be repaid, (by all probability would be denied,) must of necessity come to utter ruin, or be inforced to receive any condition, that would be required to be imposed upon them; for the strength of this great monarchie consists only in the riches drawne out of the Indies, in the soldiers of Spaine, and the captaines of Italy; the first failing, the second would want armes, and the third legs.

The Spaniard, although he be exceeding patient of heat, cold, hunger and thirst, yet where there is none, or little hope of reward, his disposition is not to be forward to adventure; the Italian lesse, who, having no love at all to the Spaniards person, will never put himselfe in peril, but in hope of his purse. And in their Indies, their people receiving not, for so long a time, the necessities which yearly they are inforced to expect from Spaine, would be compelled to cast themselves into other armes, and receive such lawes, as those princes that shal be masters of the navigation, and of the seas, shal impose upon them.

The cavalerey of Spaine consisteth of five thousand in ordinary pay, armed lightly with launce and targett; who, as well in regard of their little experience and practise, as the quality of their horses, which are weak and of little worth, are of no great account. Besides these, there are some in continuall pay, that are bound upon occasions to attend the king's person for his guard; also there are 1600 armed with launce and targett, and accustomed to attend the sea coasts along the Mediterranean Sea, to withstand, upon occasions, the incursions of pirates and Moores, wherewith they are often infested.

The forces of the king by sea consist of eighty gallies, ordinarily held in readiness at his charges, whereof eight in Portugall, twenty in Spaine, twenty four in Naples, twelve in Sicilya, and sixteen in Genoa. But these, by reason of the avarice and atten-

tiveness to their owne gaine, in the king's ministers, so evil in order, as, were they put to a sudden service, there would be found of serviceable vessels, a much smaller number; neither can he give any present remedy to it, without abatement of some other charges, which do necessarily serve for the defence of his estates, and without putting much disorder, in his other occasions, that more import him. Upon these other seas, nearer home, and about Portugall, for defence against pirates and other enemies, the greatest number that this yeare of 1607 his majesty could put to sea, consisted of eighty ships, whereof thirty were gallions; and for the furnishing thereof, such was the want both of mariners and souldiers, as the king was enforced to proclaime, not only much pay before hand, but an hidalgement and other exemptions, to whatsoever would serve him in that navy. And all that notwithstanding, had they not been furnished by the opportunity of the returne of the Spanish soldiers at that instant out of Italie, and the taking out of others, out of divers garrisons, so as in the castle of Lisbon itselfe, they left not above forty soldiers, they had not had sufficient to saile and man their number. Of the gallies before-mentioned are for the instant commanders of those in Naples, the marquesse of Santa Cruz; of those in Cicilya, Don Pedro de Leyva; of those in Portugall, Conde de Elda; and of those in Spaine, Don Pedro de Toledo, marquess of Villa Franca; of the other navy of shupps and gallions, Don Luys Fojudo.

These forces, and all other of the king, both by sea and land, suffer two mortall oppositions, which makes them of lesse esteeme with their enemies, and so little or none effect to their friends or themselves, which are softness and slowness growing, out of a naturall tarditie in the nation, out of the irresolution of the king and his counsaile, out of a difficulty to provide money, and the distance of the kingdome and partes from which they are to be assembled, which breeds a great delay in their conjunction, and by consequence much abatement to their power, and impediment to the successe of their enterprises.

Having thus, in a kind of generalltie, runne over the estate of this king, held throughout the world so potent, in regard that the countries of Spain and Italy are the sinews and foundations of his strength and forces, I hold it best to enter into a distinct consideration both of the one and the other countrey.

In Spaine, there are three sorts of people; the churchmen, the laitie, and the Moors.

The churchmen are there either exceeding rich, or extremely poor: the last are oft-times, to susteyne their lives, enforced to labours and industry, unproper for men of their vocation: the other are devided into archbishops, bishops, canons, and other dignities. In Spaine, there are eight archbishoppricks, forty bishoppricks; in Portugall, three archbishoppricks, and nine bishoppricks; besides infinite monasteries, religious houses of great revenue, and very rich in plate. other chantries and benefices also of yearly value. To all the benefices in Spaine, the king hath the nomination and presentation, and liberty to impose upon them what pensions he thinks convenient, to be by him distributed to other churchmen, at his pleasure: he hath also power to translate and transfer from one bishopprick to another, and by that meanes holdeth the prelates of his realme in much obedience, as well in regard of the favour and benefit they receive from him, as in hope of others in the future. If any need they have of ayd or help, they resort not for it to Rome, but to the king; as also, in any grievance they receive from Rome, they repaire to him only for assistance; and he patronises and defends them from the injury of such as would oppress them; and in regard thereof, finds it not difficult to drawe from them, upon every his occasion, great sommes of money; which in outward shewe they willingly depart from, in hope by his majestie to be raised to higher dignities or better bishoppricks, or at least to be protected, and kept safe and without molestation, in those that already they are possessed of.

The layetie of Spaine are devided into nobility and commonaltie. Of the nobility,

those that are licensed to cover their heads before the king are called *grandees*; and of those there are for the present about forty dukes. These, in the time of the king deceased, were much held under, as those upon whom he seldom bestowed any charge or office in Spaine of any great importance; and if any they had out of Spaine, they were for short time, and often changed, so as they could not have leisure to acquire any great power or amitie. He was accustomed to sow distastes and dissensions amongst them, and to keep their vassals disarmed, who being by them, on the other side, much pilld and oppressed, conceived great hatred against them. And albeit they use all manner of exactions upon their tenants; yet were they then, and are now, in the time of the king that reigneth (notwithstanding the large number of ducatts that they putt into the reckoning of their revenues), in a manner all exceedingly indebted, and their lands engaged.

The third sort, which are the Moors, are infinite, and being dispersed through all the parts of the kingdom, do daily multiply; and the Spaniard continually diminish and decrease in their number, as those who are continually sent into the Indies, Flanders, Italy, and other parts, where the king employs soldiers. Those Moores never string out of Spaine, where, by their labours, their industrie, and their frugall manner of living (as well in victuals as apparell), they grow exceeding rich, and increase daily, as well in reputation and courage, as in number, to the great perill of the Spaniard, were that people assisted by the force of any foreign prince's power. Neither find they any remedy to this evil, in regard that so long they have suffered it to grow upon them; for albeit they have in their counsailes of state, divers times, consulted about the driving of that whole generation out of Spain, yet, upon mature deliberation, it hath been found to be impossible to be effected, without a plunging the whole kingdom into manifest danger, which should serve little to other end, than to hasten an evil, that with temper (although, perhaps, can never be wholly avoided), yea at least may be a long time deferred. This people, although, sithence their last rebellion, dispersed into all parts of Spain, and for avoiding the like, in time to come, mixed in all places with the Spanish nation, and inforced to leave their habitations and situations of any strength, wherein in former times they lived together, and to dwell now in places plain and open, and separate from their companions, yet is there great number abiding at this day in the kingdom of Granada, Valentia, and other parts nearest unto Africa: and for this reason only, the Biscayne reckon themselves the noblest and least corrupt people of all Spain, in regard they have neither had, nor have, any mixture with that base and infidelious generation.

The Spanish nation in generallie is not valorous of their own nature, nor much adventurous, further furth than vain glory, and desire of getting putts them forward; for it is universally noted in them, that in the service of the night, or such other, where the same is not in view of their generall, and where their fear of perill is greater than their hope of booty, they for the most neglect the office of their hands, and put their greatest confidence in that of their feete; neither are they at home disciplined, or exercised in any such sort, as whereby to get either experience or dexterity in the use of martiall weapons; yet falls it out often, that the *of Spaine*, taken from the plough, and other labourers, prove better soldiers, and of more use, than those that are drawne out of their garrisons in Italy and other places; for those last apply all their studies rather how to robbe and spoile, and to serve themselves of the commodities of the people, amongst whom they are placed, than to any other industry of military exercise; and being disused and unaccustomed to travail and labour, and growne rich and able to live, do rather covet to enjoy with ease what they have formerly gotten, than with pain and perill to adventure that and their lives, in doubtfull chance of warr. The other, accustomed to labour, and newly drawne from it, not much given to ease and pleasure, having nothing of their own whereto to trust, with



desire to gett and necessity to have p of more use and commoditie for that life and kind of service. The Spaniard universally are much inclined to religion and devotion, but that with such unmeasurable superstition, and aptness to believe false miracles and feigned fables of the of any person whatsoever, as what with the inclination, and the extreme licentiousnesse of their lives, they have a great facility of disposition to fall into any heresie or opinion whatsoever, were they not restrained by that dreadfull office of the inquisition, which with great reason is held on foote, and maintained in supreme authority by the king and estate, who are not ignorant of the disposition of their people. The whole kingdome, but especially Castile, is exceedingly over-burthened with charges and impositions; whereof the people incessantly complaine, but without releife: for the king, though he cannot but both hear it and feele it, yet hath no power nor meanes to redresse it: for albeit the tallages and charges laid upon them be excessive, yet are they not by many degrees equivalent to what the crowne have neede of.

Spaine, as also Italie, is invironed on three parts with the sea, on the fourth (which divideth it from France), with the sharp and steep Pirenean mountains. On this side it remains safe, in regard of the straightness of the countrie, of the great sterility, and of the strength of the fortresses built upon the confines, Perpignan and Salsee, townes towards the Mediteranean seas, and St Sebasian, and townes towards the ocean; over and besides these, more within the country, there is Pampeluna, the principallest and antientest city of Navarre, of great strength, and in a manner inexpugnable. Neither are the French in those parts as yet so recovered of their weakness they were fallen into, in their late long warres, that they can give any great cause of fear of their invasions; and should they attempt any such matter, then are the *de Espagnia*, who otherwise are neither compellable to the warre, or the least charge thereof, either in person or purse, necessitated to arme themselves and their vassals, and with all their forces, to concurre in the defence of the crowne of their country. On the parts towards the sea, they are apt enough to receive notable damage, if at one instant they were assaulted with two armies, the one on the coasts of the sea Mediteranean, the other on those of the Ocean: and albeit, that towards the south, the situation makes them strong, having in all that coast but one haven, which is that of Cartagena, and that reasonable-well fortified. Notwithstanding, in regard that Affrique is so neare to them, they should not only be enforced with a care of defending themselves against their outward and forraigne enemies, but against the Moors their neighbours, whom they know to be continually attendant, both to take and use their advantage. And more perilous would such an invasion be unto them, if it were executed with speed and celerity: for Spain itself yielding no soldiers, either accustomed or exercised in armies, their ayd must be drawne from their kingdomes and estates, subject to that crowne, which, as well in regard of the slow provisions made in Spaine, as of the great distance of the places, would both give time to their enemies to hurt them within the country itselfe, and also to cut of such assistance and succour as should come unto them. Towards the north, Spain hath two partes of especiall importance, St Andrew and the Groyne: the last might have been entered and possessed by our countriemen in the year 1588, if their designe had not been for another place; and would have been of exceeding consequence to our nation, as from whence wee might continually have inquieted Spaine, and disturbed their navigations into their Indies, and other places under the king's obedience. These two places the Spaniard hath now well fortified, and better garnished; the like whereof he hath done in four of his havens towards the west; for, finding by experience that they were not able to shew their face to the English, who in time of warre accustomed continually to shoare those coasts; in the latter time, as soon as they discovered the English fleets, their custom was to drawe their ships into the havens, to disarinish them of

all their necessities left, and some time to drown them, lest they should come into their enemies hands, or be consumed by them with fire. To these doubts and difficulties the kingdom hath not any remedy to apply, except they were able to set forth yearly two several navies; the one of a sufficient number of gallies in the ocean, by Gibraltar and Mediterranean Sea; the other of ships and galleons in the great ocean. But there carryeth an impossibility to be accomplished, such being their want, both of all their necessities for shipping, such of soldiers fit for sea service; whereunto the Spaniard in his own nature hath none aptness; and such especially, that of mariners, and expert masters and pilots, as with great difficulty (as formerly I have said) they find wherewith to serve and sail those they have at the present.

Spaine is at this day divided into three severall governments, of Arragon, Castile, and Portugall, not unconformable to that old division of that kingdome into three provinces, Tarraconensis, Betica, and Lusitania. The kingdome of Arragon, in times past, enjoyed a kind of immoderate and unbridled libertie; (having their parliaments, which absolutely governed all;) they possessed themselves of all the revenues, and gave unto the king, only by way of donative or benevolence, 200 crownes; neither were they in any sort tied to disburse that somme, but only at such times as the king came into their country to hold his parliament. They constituted magistrates that had supream authority, which commanded the procurators of the king himselfe, and oftentimes condemned the king in a pecuniary recompence, or to silence in cause of great importance. Such were the power and authority of the lords of that state, as they made whatsoever they had a will unto a law; which gave them liberty and means to committ infinite disorders, drawing women by violence out of their owne houses, depriving the mothers of their children, and pulling them from their very breasts, with many other monstrous and exorbitant actions. And if at any time the king attempted to temper any of those lawes, immediately all the grandees and people would put themselves in arms, under the feigned pretence of defending their liberties. In this estate stood this kingdome, in such time as Don Antonio de Perez, secretary to the king deceased, and his procurator in Arragon, being by the fury of the people delivered out of the prison of the inquisition, whether the king, fallen into some suspition of him, had committed him: so practised both with the nobility and commonalty of that estate, as he drew them to an open and great rebellion, and by that meanes wrought the ruin of his country. The king at first would have contented himself, if the Arrogoneses would have delivered into his hands the said Antonio de Perez, and some few of the principall heads and movers of the rebellion; but that being denied unto him, necessitated for the conservation of his royall authority and dignity, he resolved upon force; and gathering an army, whereof it was expected that he would have made Don Hernando de Toledo, duke of Alva, his generall, he preferred therein Don Alonso de Vargas, doubting that the other, being a grandee of Spaine, and neere allied to many of the nobility of that kingdom, would not so absolutely execute his commandments as D. Al. de Vargas, being neither of great lineage, nor having any alliance within that state. The Arrogoneses shewed as little courage in defending, as they had demonstrated temerity and inconsideration in rebelling; for although they were provided of an hoast, of number and power sufficient to have resisted, and (as very probable it is, considering that the Castilian armie was compounded of new and inexperienced people) might have prevailed against their enemies, or at least, by temporising, drawne the king to some good conditions. Yet came they no sooner in the sight of the king's forces, but they committed themselves to such safety as their heeles might procure them, abandoning their hoast, and presently after the city of and leaving the same in prey to the Castilians. By this means took the king occasion to diminish, or rather wholly to overthrow, the liberties of that kingdome; severely punishing the heads of that rebellion, some with depriving them of their lives, some with banishment, and others with

perpetuall imprisonment and total confiscation of their goods. Their justices and magistrates he deprived of their authority, and enforced them to accept of a Castilian viceroy ; whereas, in former times, they elected and appointed such as pleased themselves. The administration of the revenues of the crowne he likewise took from them, and appointed them to the building and maintaining of a citadell in which is scituated in a place so imminent, as it commandeth the whole city. The king keeps there also continually a garrison, who, living licentiouslye, have spoiled the same of their greatest wealth and ornament ; and which is most of note of all others, such was the king's prudence and policy, as he drew those that were to be the cheife observers and defenders of their former lawes and liberty, or to become in open parliament the confirmer and establisher in perpetuity of all such lawes and orders as he had made to overthrow them. All this notwithstanding, such is the memory of their ancient liberties and priviledges fixed in the hearts of the people ; and so many are the discontents of former de and such that suffered death, banishment, and confiscation of their goods, for former de as if ever there came apt occasion, by any publick commotion within those kingdomes, it is to be doubted, that they will once againe, to the danger of the king's estates, make prooffe of their fortunes.

Having thus briefly runne over the estates and parts of Spaine, I am now to say somewhat of the king's dominions in Italy, namely, of Naples, Sicily, and Milan, which may well be accompted the best and greatest part of Italy : Albeit, in regard of the continuall charges the king is inforced unto, to continue that people, (so desirous to shake off the yoke of their subjection in their due obedience,) yet gives it both strength and great reputation unto him ; from thence he draws captains and soldiers in great abundance ; and by means of the estate of Milan, confining upon Germany, serves himself of apt conveyance of them into the Low Countries.

The kingdome of Naples is much more apt to receive hurt, by forces by sea, than by armies by land, as that which is almost wholly invironed with the sea, and situated upon the coasts of the Adriatique sea, and the dominions of the Turke ; but the number of the havens there being very small, and those that are, either strongly fortified, landed up, or well blocked and defended, the peril on that side is not great ; besides, they may, upon every occasion, gather people out of the states confines, sufficient to defend themselves against any suddain invasion. On the land side, that kingdome bordereth, from the one sea to the other, upon the state of the church, and is on that part made sure, with strong and well provided fortresses : for that kingdome being to the sea of the church, the Spaniard is not without feare, that some pope, not well affectioned to the crowne of Spaine, might make some attempt to repossess the church of that kingdome : for prevention whereof they seek, by all means possible, to affectionate the pope unto them, to have always a strong party in Rome, as well of cardinals, as principall Romans, to hold strong and well provided their fortresses upon the confines ; to alienate their minds from, that the popes should affect that kingdome ; and whensoever any such humour should possess them, to remove it with putting them in doubt of danger in their own estates.

Sicily is a fruitfull countrie, well peopled, rich, and so abundant of corne, as oftentimes, upon occasions of dearth, it not only relieveth Spain, sustaineth Malta, but also divers parts of Italy : on the east part, it is fortified with many strong places and fortresses ; on the north, with a continued circuit of mountains, that run along those coasts ; on the side towards Africa, what they want of ports or place for shipping there ; and were the island with any great forces, stands aptly to be aided and succoured by the kingdom of Naples, from whence, being so neare, may be drawne many gallies by sea, and as much force, both on horseback and on foot by land, as shall be needful, without the help of the king's gallies, that for such purposes remains in Genoa.

The state of Milan, heretofore much travailed and troubled by the French, (as well



in regard of their nearness thereunto, as of the titles and pretences they make unto it,) is now more sure than heretofore, as well in regard the king hath with the Catholick cantons of the Switzers and Grisons, obliged to the defence of his states in Italy; of his neare alliance with the duke of Savoy, and of the fortresses lately built, and other provisions made by the Conde of Fuentes, to stop the passage, by the way of the Grisons, (all which deny unto the French the easy entrance into that estate,) which in times past they were wont to find. Moreover, the king may, upon any such attempt, with great facility, drawe soldiers out of Germany, and by the way of Genoa (that city being so much at his devotion) receive upon any occasion supplies, as well out of Spaine, as from his kingdomes of Naples and Sicily.

The king, to keep his state in Italy quiet and in peace, bendeth not only his care to defend them from attempts of strangers, but to preserve them also from receiving any offence or motion by the princes of Italy; for this cause, finding those estates for the present so well ballanced, as one of them hath not much advantage of the other, by meanes whereof his forces there are bekemen, as it were the beame that rules the weight, and thereby gaineth both the reputation and authority (if any question doe arise among them) to become the arbiter, and to rule the right, as shall best agree with his owne utility or assurance. He endeavours to hold them all weak and disunite, to cut from them all hope of forraigne ayde, without which he knoweth, that of themselves they are not of power to do any thing of moment; and for that cause hath made many attempts, but of late more strongly than ever, to conclude a league with the Grisons, with purpose to cut off all possibility of the entry of strangers into Italy. He suffers not these princes to increase their strength, with adding any other estate unto that, which already they possess. Much against his will became the pope possessed of Ferrara, and with great vigilancy he attendeth, that he do not the like with Urbin. He obligeth many of the best princes with yearly pensions; giving to the dukes of Urbin, and of Parma, and to him of Modena and Regio, and to divers others. He likewise draweth unto him out of every state, some principall personages, in whom is discerned most spirit and activity, depriving their owne princes of them, and by their means gathering unto him many of the best soldiers of every principality, and appropriating them to his own service in the Low Countries: By that meanes he spoiles, I take, of all military men, and makes it the more easy to endure his yoke, and of less force to attempt any thing against his estates. To hold them disunite, he hinders by all possible meanes their conjunctions by alliances, as not many years sithence he did that of the duke of Parma, with the neice of the duke of Florence, and of late that of the prince of Mantua, with a daughter of the duke of Savoy: He endeavours to devide their friendship and entercourses; forbears not to sow discords and dissensions, gives increase to all occasion of distasts; and removes all meanes of trust and confidence amongst them; well knowing, that, in their division and seperation, consists the security of his estates. To particularise the opinion held of every of these princes and estates, and the courses taken with them, may make me seem long and tedious: Yet hold I it not unnecessary to touch them briefly. Of the duke of Florence, the king of Spaine is very jealous, in regard of his preferring in her marriage, the daughter of the duke of Lorraine, before the daughter of the archduke Charles, married sithence to the king of Polonia; and of some encounters that have been between Spaine and him, about the election of the popes, wherein for the most part the duke's faction became opposite to that of the king of Spaine: But most especially for the covert ayd he was thought in time of warres to give unto Mr Esdignieres, and impeding by that means the duke of Savoy proceeding in Provence: For the designe he hath often made shew to have about Piombiu, and his late alliance with France, which makes him now to behold wholly French: Howbeit the king, knowing the greatness of that prince in Italy, the commodity and aptitude of his estates, which goeth almost overthwart the

whole of it. Of what importance his port of Leghorne is for all occasions of the kingdom of Naples, and for other respects of great moment, averreth in all that he may his conceits and suspicions, and hold good termes with him. On the other side, the duke, considering how far his forces are inferior to those of the king, who hath divers townes of much importance in Toscane itself, that he is feuditarie unto him for the state of Sienna, that his estate bordering upon that of the king, might receive much trouble and prejudice, if he should enter into terms of enmity with him, endeavoureth by all means possible, so far as may agree with his reputation and friendship to France, to give him satisfaction, and hold him contented; notwithstanding that, now of late, there is by his means made a new alliance between Savoy and Mantua.

The duke of Mantua, although in time past, were inward with the king of Spaine, deceased; yet before his death stood not altogether in so good termes, neither do with the king that now is, as well in regard of his alliance with the duke of Florence, which moves the Spaniard to imagine, that he hath made a change of his former dependency; as also for having built the fort of Cassall, which, without the privity of the king or any of his ministers, he erected in the state of Montserrat; and neither have these sinister conceits wanted their increase by some rumours spread, and suspicions conceived, that he gave secret aid unto Mr Esdiguieres, the French king's lieutenant in Dauphine, with money. The duke also, who in former times (as well in regard of his alliance with the house of Austria, as his own particular interest, depended wholly upon the crowne of Spaine) hath by degrees withdrawne himselfe from it, and fearing least the duke of Savoy, persuaded by the king, and assisted by his forces, would attempt to dispossesse him of his fair and rich state of Montseratt, hath in doubt thereof, joined himselfe with the duke of Florence, and attends the fortification of those places, wherein (as the Spaniard say) he hath received from the duke much help both in advise and money.

The duke of Savoy, although so nearly joyned in alliance with this crowne; yet in his late warres with France, having received so leane assistance, as gave him occasion, rather to think that the king sought to hold him in warre to weaken him, than in any sort to advance his designes, or to add unto him any further greatness, joined with the little success he hath, at his personal being in Spaine, in any thing he either intended or required, and the now ample issue the king hath, (which hath cut off all hopes from the dukes of Savoy,) is in his inward thoughts not the least discontented; as also for some late discontentments his sonnes, at their last being in Spaine received, by the hands of the duke of Lerma, the king not therein manifesting his knowledge. Whereover insued (after the opinion of grave men in their estate) the death of his eldest sonne P. of Piedmont, D. Felipe, which discontentment he hath lately shewed apparently by the imprisonment of Roucas Sic. of estate; and the imprisonment of Mr d'Albiny, governor of Sayoy, by reason of some advices they gave unto Spaine, tending the duke's alienated minde from the king's service; although for some other respects, and not to loose the reputation of so great and potent an ally, he covereth his thoughts, and dissembleth what he thinks, in the meane time strengthening himself with alliance of suspected princes, as of late with Mantua.

Some other princes there are, that (as formerly upon occasions hath been said) are obliged to the king by yearly pensions, and other respects, as the dukes of Urbin, Parma, and Modena, and Regio. To the duke of Urbin he giveth, not with any purpose to use the service of his person, having never employed him in any his services, but partly to the end, that other princes should not increase their strengthes, by entertaining him in theirs; and partly to serve themselves of the commodities of his estate, which yields victuals in great abundance, and is not void of soldiers and other things of much importance.

The duke of Parma rest obliged by the investiture of Parma and Placentia; neither



is there any likelyhood of his disunion; for these two cities being members of the dutchy of Milan, might with no great difficulty be drawne from him by the king, if he should carry himself in any other sort than he doth; or should the king withdrawe his favour, it would minister fit occasion to the church to recall that investiture, that they gave into that house; moreover, their long and continued service holds them in great observancy and union with this crowne.

The duke of Modena and Regio is held in termes of observancy by the same means, and for the same reasons, that the duke of Urbin.

The state of Genoa in generality, although much affected to the French, and abhorring the Spaniard, especially those of the meaner sort, hath been drawne, though not to an absolute subjection, yet to an observance of the strictest nature. The king of Spaine having for many years endeavoured to impoverish the publique, and enrich the particulars of that commonwealth, whom, having their money upon great and excessive interest, he hath possessed of principalities and baronies in the kingdome of Naples, and of his rent corne and liberall pensions in Sicily and Milan, and of many lands and rents in Spaine itselfe. The most of their treasure and substance resting in the hands and power of the Spaniards, and many of them in his service, they are become wholly obedient to his will; and whensoever the popular multitude should shew a contrary inclination, he hath a bridle ready to restraints them, having alwayes in their haven a good number of gallies, armed and provided for all events; as also the marquisat of Final, bordering upon their port and jurisdiction, wherewithall to curb their attempts, and cut off all former ayd, that by sea or land to them can be ministred.

The commonwealth of Luca, although the state they possesse be of small importance, yet the same desiring to live under the shadow of the king's protection, he receives, and from them, as a people recommending themselves unto him, as well for his own utility of having at his devotion that city, (which, in regard of the situation, is of great importance,) and for increasing his reputation, and to prevent that it fall not into the hands of any other enemy prince; as also by serving himselfe thereof, the better to restraints the duke of Florence, to whom that city is so near a neighbour.

To the seigniourie of Venice, albeit the king hath neither much affection, nor much confidence; the one in regard of having possessed themselves of some places, belonging as well to the estate of Milan, as to the emperor and archduke of Austria, the other of their confederation with the kings of Great Britain and France, and with the commonwealth of the Switzers and Grisons; and the same not a little increased by their late opposition against the pope Paul the Fifth, in the year 606 and 607; and especially by their joyning with France to unknit the league and confederacy made lately with the Grisons, by the C. of Fuentes; yet, knowing their forces both by sea and land to be great, their treasure much, and their strength and intelligence in Italy such, as without an union and conjunction with them, there can be no attempts of any importance atchieved in Italy, adding thereunto, that without their assistance, his own sea forces would not be of power to defend his estates from the Turke.



---

*The Praise of King Richard the Third. By Sir William Cornwallis. 1617.*

---

Sir William Cornwallis was elder brother of Sir Charles Cornwallis, whose name has so frequently occurred in the Tracts of this reign. Sir William, like his brother, was a man of distinguished talents, but employed them solely in retirement, and in study. His Essays frequently occur in catalogues; the best edition, according to Grainger, is that of 1632. They are written in imitation of Montaigne, but want the sprightliness of the French essayist. In the following preface, Sir William Cornwallis affects a paradoxical defence of Richard III. A more serious vindication of the last Yorkist monarch has been, in our days, attempted by Lord Orford and Mr Malcolm Laing. But the prejudice which we imbibe against Richard, in our poetical studies, is too deep to be erased, even by proof of its injustice.

---

That princes are naturally ambitious, and that ambition makes them to effect their desires, rather than to affect the equitie of their designs, may more truly then safely be avowed. For all of them, I thinke, were the record of their actions indifferent, might be taxed of this vice. But this excuse cleares not the accused; yet it testifies, that princes erre against nature, if they aspire not. Wee hold (not without reason) that if the bill of the plaintiffe be stuffed with frivolous assertions, that the complaint savoureth more of malice then of wrong. Why should not the same axiome be a motive to cleare this wronged prince, whose accusers lay to his charge the anguish his mother felt, when he came into the world? then which accusation what can be more frivolous, it being a punishment hereditary to all women, from the first? His being toothed as soon as borne, seemes to me rather a blessing then any imputation, as being a presage of his future worthinesse, and, as all nurses will confesse, an ease of much paine and danger. But he was crook-backt, lame, il-shapen, il-favoured. I might impute that fault to nature, but that I rather think it her bounty; for she being wholly intentive to his minde, neglected his forme, so that she infused a straight mind in a crooked body, wherein shee shewed her carefull providence. For oftentimes, the care to keepe those parts well formed, with-drawes mens mindes from better actions, and drownes them in effeminate curiositie. His lamenesse turned to his glory; for with those imperfect limbes he performed actions most perfectly valiant.

How rightly his father<sup>1</sup> claimed, his brother<sup>2</sup> obtained the scepter, is sufficiently knowne, and therefore superfluous and impertinent; and also how his brother, dusked his right (if right) by abrogating the oath, which hee sware at Yorke, that his coming in armes was onely for that dukedome.<sup>3</sup> But to dilate how variable and inconstant the people of those times were, shall be more necessary and effectually, that knowing their inconstancy, their traditions (like themselves) may the lesse be beleaved; so light-headed, so foolish, so irreligious, as their opinion, (for what else are the thoughts of ignorance but opinion?) made them breake their oath to their prince,<sup>4</sup> and to such

<sup>1</sup> "Richard duke of Yorke, father of Edward the Fourth, George duke of Clarence, and Richard the Third."

<sup>2</sup> "Edward earle of March, eldest sonne of Richard duke of Yorke, after the king, by the name of Edward the Fourth."

<sup>3</sup> "For the dukedome of Yorke, as his right, from his father duke of Yorke."

<sup>4</sup> "King Henry the Sixt."

a prince as they did not shame to dislike, onely because hee was too good. Him they abandoned, deposed, after restored; not as desiring, (being guilty of their owne fault) but onely that it stood with the liking of Warwick, the childe of their love. If then they were such, (as indeede they were) and that those relations wee have must come from that people, it were better, (I thinke) to bury their traditions, then refute their objections, were not our age, apt to erre, infected with this folly.

For his brother K. Edward;<sup>2</sup> though his vices seem not to adde vertues to this condemned prince, yet questionlesse they do; making all his ill-estimated actions of another nature. He obtained the crowne, but rather fortunately then wisely, were not all wisdome thought folly, to which fortune lends not successe. For I thinke, lust, or if you will terme it love, could not more have prevailed with the most licentious creature, then at once to breake the bonds of amity, discretion, and policy; and all to enjoy a woman, in respect of his height, base: a widow<sup>3</sup> and of his enemy, without bringing him either alliance, or riches; props most pertinent to his new erected buildings. Wherein, besides his breach of regall discretion, with his chieftest friend the earle of Warwick, (whom he had sent into France, to treat of marriage betweene him and the lady Bona,<sup>4</sup> wherein being deluded, he became his mortallest enemy) his abuse to God was more abominable; being before betrothed (as his owne mother constantly affirmed) to the Lady Elizabeth Lucy: in testimonie whereof he had laid such earnest,<sup>5</sup> as should have bound any common man, much more a king, to performance. How soone the wrath of God followed this his irreligious inconstancie, his being driven from the seate-royall into exile; the birth of his sonne in a sanctuary; (having no place else of freedome in his fathers kingdome) the miserie of all his partakers, sufficiently testifie. In which generall miserie, who did more truly follow him, who more faithfully ayded him, then his now disgraced brother? whereas his other brother Clarence,<sup>6</sup> not only left him, but joyned in marriage<sup>7</sup> with the daughter of his principall enemy, and holpe to expulse him; with what love, what constancie, his indeavours, his adventuring his life to restore him, doth witnesse.

Never was he noted, all the life of K. Edward, to thirst after the kingdome; never denied he any commandement of his prince, but performed all his employments discreetly, valiantly, successefully. The suspition of helping his brother Clarence to<sup>8</sup> his end, was but a suspition, since the kings old displeasure awaked by a new prophesie, was undoubtedly the cause; if otherwise (when he after repented him) hee would have misliked of Gloucester; it being naturall to sinne, but unnaturall to ease others of their crimes. For the killing of the heire of the house of Lancaster at Tewksburie,<sup>9</sup> (if so) seemes to me, rather the effect of love to his brother, then cruelty to the prince; for he was an enemy, yea, the chiefe and principall enemy of the contrary faction. Yet it cannot be proved the action of Richard, but that it was an act wished by the king to be done, and executed in both their presences, by the duke of Clarence, the marquesse Dorset, the Lord Hastings, and others.

The death of Henry<sup>10</sup> the Sixt in the tower, can no way belong to him, since the same reason that cleareth his brother, fitteth him; he being able, if desiring his death,

<sup>1</sup> "Richard Nevile, earle of Warwick, surnamed the king-maker."

<sup>2</sup> "King Edward the Fourth."

<sup>3</sup> "Lady Eliz. Gray, widow of Sir John Gray, knight; afterward married to king Edward the Fourth."

<sup>4</sup> "Lady Bona, neece to the French king Lewes the Eleventh, and daughter to Lewes duke of Savoy."

<sup>5</sup> "For he had got her with childe."

<sup>6</sup> "George duke of Clarence, second brother of king Edward the Fourth."

<sup>7</sup> "He married Isabell, daughter of Richard Nevill, earle of Warwick."

<sup>8</sup> "Hee was drowned in a malmsey butt in the Tower."

<sup>9</sup> "Edward prince of Wales, son of King Henry the Sixt, slaine after the battle of Tewksbury."

<sup>10</sup> "The death of Henry the Sixt in the Tower."



to have effected it by a more unworthie hand. And indeed this accusation hath no other prooffe, then a malicious affirmation. For many (more truly) did suppose that he died of meere melancholy and grieve, when hee had heard of the overthrow of his friends, and slaughter of his sonne. But if it were true, though it spots him with bloud, yet it confirms his love to his prince; which love was so coldly requited, as might have moved a true lover of rewards more then of vertue, to have altered his endeavours; whether it were a jealousy of the nobilitie of his blood, or of the height of his spirit, whether the abundance of affection to be led by a woman, or that hee was defective in all brotherly affection, certaine it is, he rather imployed him, then rewarded his imployments. Contrary, the queenes kindred, dayly to rise meerely without desert, but that they were of her kindred; and their basenesse being thus sodainly exalted, not only to plucke from him promotions, due to his deserts, but to envie the duke, and contend with him; how insupportable it must be to so magnanimous a spirit, whose memory beare wnesse of their unworthinesse, his owne worth, any like spirit may imagine.

Thus continued this unequall contention, untill the king, sent for before the great<sup>1</sup> King of kings, to make an account of his greatnesse, left his body to testifie the worlds folly in contending for worlds, when one little part of the earth must containe them. His successour,<sup>2</sup> at that time very young, was wholly possessed by the mothers bloud, whom the now<sup>3</sup> protector had great reason to feare, being ever his mortall enemy, and now most strong, by being most neerly allied to this prince: therefore jealous of his owne preservation, of the safetie of the common-weale, and of the ancient nobilitie, with great reason and justice he executed them, whom, if he had suffered to live, were likely enough to have beene the destruction of him, it, and them. But the deed accomplished, stirred up no little feare in the queene-mother, and her faction: for the queenes taking sanctuary with her younger sonne<sup>4</sup> Richard Duke of Yorke, without any cause that he knew, drave Gloucester to suppose that they doubted of their right, and put him in possibility of obtaining his owne: wherein by ambitious<sup>5</sup> Buckingham hee was assisted, who then related to him afresh the unlawfull marriage of his brother, that being unlawfull, consequently his children were bastards, and so undoubtedly the crown was lawfully his; to which discourse he annexed protestations of furtherance, though (perhaps) an earthly spirit would not have been moved with these motives, but rather have desired safety, then soveraigntie: yet in a true heroicke spirit, whose affect is aspiring, they could not but be imbraced, using the wings of time to bring him to that height. Be not obstinate (mortalitie) against this climbing axiome, for hourly you commit worser errors, more grovelling, more base. Were it not common in every dayes issue, it were admirable to note the impudencie of man, who at this instant condemnes actions, which himselfe would instantly accomplish, were hee permitted by occasion. The queene-mothers feare, his own right, Buckinghams ayde, and his owne jealousy to erect a prince, too young to governe himselfe, much lesse others, but was likely to be governed by his mother, and her kindred, the protectors mortallest enemies, men of meane birth, not inured to government, such as were like to destroy the ancient peeres, to fortifie their new nobility, could not but draw a true discerning spirit to favour himselfe, to protect the ancient nobility, to defend the people from being wasted and oppressed by the ambition and tyrannie of new unexperienced statists, and

<sup>1</sup> "The death of Edward the Fourth."

<sup>2</sup> "King Edward prince of Wales, son to king Edward the Fourth."

<sup>3</sup> "Richard duke of Gloucester made protector."

<sup>4</sup> "Richard duke of Yorke, younger son of Edward the Fourth."

<sup>5</sup> "Henry Stafford, duke of Buckingham."



to respect his owne preservation, rather then others. For well he saw hee could not live, unlesse he were a king: that there was no safety, but in soveraignty. Should I put thee in choyse (condemning reader) whether thou wouldest not be, rather then be a king, thou wouldest perhaps answere no: but that answere should proceede, rather from the knowledge of thy want of power to royallize thee, then through the abundance of thy modestie. No, no, it is a desire befitting the most worthie desirer; and were all mens affections so high, their actions would not prove so unworthy.

The state being thus in labour with inovation, the peeres in counsaile about their infant kings coronation, all busie, yet dissenting in their businesse; in a councill holden at the Tower, Hastings lord chamberlaine<sup>1</sup> was apprehended, and no sooner apprehended, but executed. The not leisurely proceeding by forme of law, may seeme to plead Hastings innocencie, the protectors cruelty. But they that consider the nature of the people of that time, apt to sedition, greedy of innovation, and likely to be glad of so pittifull a colour (for Hastings was a man growne very popular) will hold the protector in that action very judiciall, and, if guilty of any thing, of discretion and policie: but could Hastings be innocent, whom<sup>2</sup> Commynes reporteth to be a pensioner of the French king, Lewis the Eleventh, the only subtil prince of that time? Hee, of all others, that most affected tyrannie, and was naturally the mortall enemy of this kingdome? Or was he fit to be a statesman or counsailor, who, being corrupted by the bribes of an enemy, had dissuaded his master, the late king Edward the Fourth, from assisting the oppressed lady,<sup>3</sup> the heire of Burgundie, against Lewis the French king, whereby that lady was driven to seeke ayde else-where, who, otherwise, was likely to have married with the duke of Clarence, or some other English prince, and so to have united that dukedome to this crowne, to the eternall benefit and security of both countries; who gloried in his private revenges, who not only enticed his master, but accompanied him in all sensuality: who, in the deflowring of mens wives,<sup>4</sup> and such other his unprincelike actions, was his perpetuall attendant, and sometimes (as it is thought) would begin to him? Doctor Shaws<sup>5</sup> sermons not a little illustrates the malice of his accusers: for, I thinke, no man that is discreet, will imagine this prince so indiscreet as to have witnesse that he commanded that sermon, and gave instructions what should be said: Then how do our chronicles report it for truth, were not their malice greater then either their truth or their judgement? But they are historians, and must be beleevd.

Alas, poore men! how would they be beleevd, whose greatest authorities (as a learned and honorable<sup>6</sup> knight writeth) are built upon the notable foundation of heare-say; men that have much ayd to accord differing writers, and to picke truth out of partiality. But it is not mentioned, that Shaw ever executed this action, with alleaging him to be the cause. It is likely indeed, that Shaw, being ambitious, gaping after preferment, supposing some such intent in the protector (as he had a reaching head) was bold to set his rethorick to sale, to publish his fancies: but seeing his hopes vanish into smoke, and his expectation deluded, seeing the protector neither rewarded, nor regarded his rethorick, he soone after languished and died: a just example to teach theologians so boldly to intermeddle with princes affaires, before they bee commanded: for (doubtlesse) had the protector set him a worke, he would have payed him his hire. But if it were so, that he commanded the sermon (as that is yet unproved) was that an offence to make the people so publikely partakers of his right; yea, to prostitute his cause to their judgements? For charging his mother with adulterie was a matter of no such

<sup>1</sup> "William Lord Hastings, chamberlaine to Edward the Fourth."

<sup>2</sup> "Philip de Commynes, Lord of Argenton, in his history."

<sup>3</sup> "Mary, sole daughter and heire of Charles Duke of Burgundy, after married to Maxmilian the emperour."

<sup>4</sup> "Shores wife."

<sup>5</sup> "D. Shaws sermon at Pauls crosse."

<sup>6</sup> "Sir Philip Sidney, in his defence of poetry."

great moment, since it is no wonder in that sexe: and surely hee had more reason to adventure her fame then his kingdome, because of two evils it is wisdome to chuse the least. If it were true, it was no injustice to publish it; what could be expected from him but true justice, who was so impartiall, that he would not spare his owne mother? if untrue, good faith, he was therein too blame, and her innocencie the more meritorious; but certaine it is, the people approved his right; for he was crowned with such consent, and so great applause both of peeres and people, that if wee will judge by the outward behaviour (the onely marke our judgements may or can leuell at) we must determine them so contented, as no actions which might testifie the satisfaction of theire mindes, were omitted: surely, if ever the unjudiciall multitude did any thing judicially, it was in receiving this prince, whom his chiefe disgracers cannot but acknowledge for valiant; then who was more meet to restraine domesticke, to subdue forraigne seditions? for these civill dissensions had almost wasted and made desolate this populous nation; discreet he was and temperate, (two so rare and excellent qualities, as he that truly possesseth them meriteth the possession of a diademe;) for in these vertues, joyned with that cardinall vertue fortitude, (whereof also he had a very large portion) consisteth the soule of soveraintie, which whosoever wanteth (be hee awhile never so powerfull) his owne greatnesse so crusheth him, that hee forfeiteth all in a moment: most liberall he was, desiring rather to want, then to suffer worth unrewarded; and this liberalitie is the onely true nurse, and fosterer of vertue; vertue unrewarded being unsensible, our flesh being governed, advised, yea mastered, by our senses; this worthie, this princely ornament some calumniators have sought in him to deface, alleadging, that his liberality to some proceeded from his extortion from others; but even those cannot denie him to have beene politicke and wise; then is it likely that a prince of his wisdome and policie could not discern betweene the worthy and unworthy? and to take from undeservers to bestow upon deservers, must be acknowledged a vertue.

He was neither luxurious, nor an epicure, not given to any ryot, nor to excesse, neither in apparell nor play; for, had he been touched with any of these vices, doubtlesse they which object lesser crimes, would not have omitted these; then (without question) he was largely interested in vertues, (their contraries) but those (through malice) are either not registered, or (if registered) so infamed, as if all his vertues had a vicious intent; yet, to acknowledge the vertues of the vicious, is such a right, that what historian willingly omitteth them, therein becometh vicious himselfe. But in all that I have hitherto among the vulgar observed:

*Culpatur factum, non ob aliud, quam exitum:*

They approve, or disprove all things by the event; which, though sometimes it proveth like the cause, yet it is more often governed by the will of the divine Providence. And surely, but that the gracious goodnesse of God to manifest the weaknes of humane policie, overthrew his designes, tooke from him his kingdome; and, contrary cyther to mans hope, or our merit, united by a blessed and happy conjunction<sup>2</sup> the two dissenting factions, to the true establishing of sweet peace and prosperitie of this desolate kingdome; for, otherwise, had he lived to have left issue to have succeeded him, such might have beene his and their merits, that fame would have beene no more injurious to him then to his predecessors the fourth Henry and Edward, whose raignes were polluted with much more royall blood; for he omitted nothing, that in wisdome, or true policie, might secure himselfe, or establish peace or good lawes in this kingdome.

<sup>2</sup> "The two dissenting factions of Yorke and Lancaster united by the marriage of Henry the Seventh to Elizabeth, eldest daughter to Edward the Fourth."

His statutes are extant; what can be found in them not becomming a king? what, not befitting the service of God? the worship of religion? the good of his countrey? yea, I have heard of some, accounted both good lawyers and good statists, say, that in those three years of his government, there were more good statutes for the weale publike enacted, then in 30 years before. He was no taxer of the people, no oppressor of the commons, though he came to manage an estate whose treasure was exceedingly exhausted; no suppressor of his subjects, to satisfie either licentious humours, or to enrich light-headed flatterers. But (alas) who robs vertue, but ingratitude, detraction and malice? What a curse is it to mortalitie, that no fashion of life, no merits, no regards, can free princes from discontentments in their life, and infamy after death? Who is it that heares of any one so endued, so loden with vertues, that judgeth him not happy? yet he is defamed; and by whom? even by those for whom he cared, laboured, and omitted nothing that might profit, committed nothing that might prejudice them.

This, the charge and commandement that he gave presently after his coronation, to the lords and gentlemen (whom hee sent home into their countries,) that they should in their countries see justice duely administred and impartially, (that no wrong nor extortion should be done to his subjects,) doth testifie; this, his lawes and all his actions approve: yet neyther the care of his countrey, his lawes, nor actions, are thought to be sufficient to plead his equitie and innocencie; for malicious credulitie rather embraceth the partiall writings of indiscreet chroniclers, and witty play-makers, then his lawes and actions, the most innocent and impartiall witnesses.

It is laid to his charge (as a maine objection) that he was ambitious. Let us examine the truth of this accusation. Was he ambitious, who was onely content with the limits of his owne country? who sought to be rather famous for instituting good lawes, then for atchieving great conquests? No, no, he wanted nothing to make him an accomplished prince, but that hee was not ambitious enough; for had hee imitated that worthy, King Henry the Fifth, who, in a like unsettled estate, led out the nobilitie and people to make wars upon forraine enemies, to make conquest of France, and to embrue their warlike swords (lately bloudied against one another) in the bloud and bowels of strangers, he might (perhaps) have had a fortunate successe; for he wanted not the like title, he was no lesse valiant, no lesse politicke. So might he have re-conquered that kingdome and those territories which, by the pusillanimity of some of his predecessors, were given away and lost; and (peradventure) so busied the stirring heads of the nobilitie and people, that they should have had no leasure to think upon any innovation or part-taking at home; so might he happily have secured himselfe, and enlarged the bounds of his conquests, beyond any of his ancestors. What lets or obstacles could hinder him from those glorious enterprises? His subjects were warlike, trained up in armes; somewhat too much exercised in bloud, because it was in their owne. His neighbors, the French, were governed by<sup>1</sup> a king who had some policie, but so little valour, that he would rather yeeld to any capitulation, then heare the sound of an adversaries drumme. So that his people, being unused to wars, were easily to be conquered by that nation which had so often beaten them in the height of their daring.

The Scots, their colleagues, hee had already been victorious over: his name among them was growne terrible. For in the time of his brother, he wan from them many castles and holds; but principall hee conquered<sup>2</sup> Barwick, the chiefe and principall towne upon their frontiers, a place of speciall importance, either to make easy our entrance into that kingdom, or to keep them from invading ours: so that I cannot justly accuse him of any crime so much, as that his ambition stretched not farre enough. To justifie his adversaries accusation, in this time chanced the death of his two young<sup>3</sup> ne-

<sup>1</sup> "Lewes the Eleventh."

<sup>2</sup> "Barwicke, won from the Scots by Richard the Third."

<sup>3</sup> "The death of Prince Edward and Richard Duke of Yorke, in the Tower."



phews in the Tower, whose deaths promising quiet to him, and wholly imposed upon him, how truely I have reason to doubt; because his accusers are so violent, and impudent, that those vertues (which in other men are embraced, for which they are esteemed as gods) they impute to him rather to be enamellers of vices, then really virtues: his humilitie they terme secret pride; his liberalitie, prodigalitie; his valour, crueltie and blood thirstinesse: yet in these dayes their partial opinions are thought to be of validity sufficient to make prooffe of any imputation: but if it were so, that their deaths were by him contrived and commanded, the offence was to God, not to the people: for the depriving them of their lives freed the people from dissension. And how could he demonstrate his love more amply, then to adventure his soule for their quiet? But who knoweth, whether it were not Gods secret judgement, to punish the fathers transgression in the children? and if it be so, complaine of their fate, not Richards crueltie: (for in these fatal things it fals out, that the high-working powers make second causes unwittingly accessarie to their determinations) yet, in policie, princes never account competitors (how young soever) innocent, since the least colour of right provokes innovating humours to stirre up sedition, which (once kindled) threatens the subversion both of princes and subjects.

And if some wise and politike princes have imprisoned and put to death such as have beene reputed their heirs and successors, because some factious heads (weary of good government, and hoping for authoritie by alteration) have sought to establish them before their times; (as commonly giddy-brained people doe more reverence the suns rising then his fall) had not King Richard great reason to deprive them of their lives, who were not to succeed him, but (in many mens judgments) had most right to be invested before him with the diadem? And (indeed) the removing such occasions of civill wars, in a well-ruled common-wealth, is most profitable, most commendable; being no crueltie, but pittie, a jealousie of their subjects, and a zealous regard of their own safeties. And (indeed) if we duly consider how much the duty we owe to a country exceeds all other duties, since in it selfe it containes them all, that for the respect thereof, not onely all tender respects of kindred, or whatsoever other respects of friendship, are to be laid aside; but that even long-held opinions (rather grounded upon a secret of government, then any ground of truth) are to be forsaken: since the end whereto any thing is directed, is ever to be of more noble reckoning, then the thing thereto directed, that therefore the weale-public is more to be regarded, then any person or magistrate that thereunto is ordained: The feeling consideration hereof moved K. Richard to set principally before his eyes the good estate of so many thousands, over whom he had raigned, rather then so to hood-winke himselfe with affection, as to suffer his realme to runne to manifest ruine.

If any man shall object that his course was strange and unlawfull, let him know that new necessities require new remedies, and for him there was no remedie but this one. Then, if for this action he ought to be condemned, it is for indiscretion in the managing; for as safely might he have had the realmes generall consent, in disposing of their lives as of their kingdome. Had he held a secret execution best, hee might have effected it more secretly; but he rather chose a middle way, content to let the people know it, holding their knowledge equal with their consents: and it should seem, the people (though they were at that time very factious) yet approved thereof; for wee find not that in any action, either inward or outward, they shewed any dislike. And (truely) such is the difference betweene the thoughts and actions, the disposition of princes and subjects, that I hold no subject sufficiently judiciall to censure them: their courses so unlike, that what is meet, expedient in a prince, in a lower fortune is utterly unmeet, unexpedient. Therefore let no servile condition adventure to condemne them, since all such eyes lose their faculty, if they but gaze against the sunne of majestie. It is sufficient for us to know how to obey; this nature commandeth and exacteth of us: