

respect to the other 6 marches, one would conceive that 4 paras. at a medium, or rather more than 11 British miles, was a sufficient allowance for a body of 12,000 men formed in a hollow square; ordinarily prepared for action; and occasionally engaged in it. Allowance is also to be made for delay, on the score of the sick and wounded men, that were carried; and no less on the score of the baggage cattle, contained *within the area* of the square.\* But on the other hand, we may perhaps, calculate upon more than ordinary vigour and exertion, on so animating an occasion, as that, which, in the event of a successful termination, would not only restore to their country and friends, those who took part in the glorious enterprise of THE RETREAT, but confer IMMORTALITY on them and their country. Allowing them, then, to have surpassed the ordinary exertions of mere soldiers, under such circumstances; and to have made 12 miles one day with another, during the 8 marches (for the first can only be reckoned a movement), this rate, under such a disposition must be allowed to be high, when little more than 14 miles, was an ordinary march, at times when neither hostility, nor interruption of any kind occurred. (It is also to be considered, that 5 of these marches, were made, without any interval of halt.) There are then to be reckoned  $34\frac{1}{2}$  parasangas for the eight complete marches; and with the 9th short one, nearly  $35\frac{1}{2}$ ; which brings the account to the end of the 9th march; and if 2 parasangas, or 6 miles be allowed to bring them to the foot of the hills, on the 10th day (as it was *early* on the march); there are to be reckoned in all  $37\frac{1}{2}$  parasangas from the

\* Delay may be inferred from the remarks of Xenophon, on the defects of the square, in retreating before an active and powerful enemy. (Lib. HL. c. 21.)

*Zabatus* : which are equal to about 104 British miles by the road, or about 80 G. miles in *direct* distance, from the influx of the Zab, to the southern foot of the ridge of hills ( which we shall beg leave to name hereafter, the hills of *Zaco*, from a town, or large village, situated on the opposite, or northern side of the ridge.\* )

It is fortunate for the illustration of this critical part of the ground, that certain European gentlemen have gone over it, and noted the character of it. One of these, Mr. John Sullivan, has most obligingly communicated his notes, taken during a journey from Constantinople to Baghdad, in 1781. The observations of the Abbé Sestini, who accompanied him; and who has published an account of the journey ( in Italian ), have also been referred to. And finally, those of Dr. Howel, who returned from India to Europe, in 1788. These gentlemen severally remark the chain of hills, which obstructs the road between Mosul and Jezirah; not only on the score of delay and inconvenience, but as affording shelter to robbers.

In point of general situation, this chain lies about midway between Mosul and the point of junction of M. *Masius* with the *Carduchian* mountains, where the Tigris issues from the great valley of Diyarbekir; and where, it may be supposed, the river, by tearing away the base of the mountain, has formed the lofty cliffs, which afterwards arrested the progress of the Greeks, along the northern bank of that river.

The town of Jezirah ( ibn Omar ) situated on the Mesopotamian side of the Tigris, regulates the whole suite of positions,

\* In Strabo, page 745, the *Sacopodes* are synonymous with the *Adiabeni*. By its situation, the present territory of *Zaco* may have been a province of *Adiabene*; which was comprehended generally between the Tigris and the *Caprus*.

geographically, between Mosul and the abovementioned *defile*, through which the Tigris passes. It is satisfactorily determined, by the reports of Mr. Sullivan and others, as given in the accompanying note, which is extracted from the account of the geographical construction before mentioned. Its general position is  $46\frac{1}{2}$  G. miles to the east, northerly, from Nasebin; 72 to the N. W. of Mosul.\*

The ridge of Zaco took Mr. Sullivan four hours to cross, in a *tahkt rewan*, or litter; and its southern flank, towards Mosul, being about  $17\frac{1}{2}$  hours from Jezirah, 23 from Mosul, may be placed at 41 G. miles from the latter. And as the conflux of the Tigris and Zab, is placed by the construction, 42 below Mosul, the aggregate distance will of course be 83 G. miles: being only 3 miles more than arises on the calculation of the marches of Xenophon.† (See page 151.) Whether we have *under-rated* the marches, or *over-rated* the distance on the construction; it must be allowed that the agreement is

\* Mr. Sullivan and the Abbé Sestini, reckoned Jezirah 22 hours from Nasebin (*Nisibis*), and to the northward of east. Dr. Howel reckoned 19 hours, and Mr. Ives was told 21. Adopting the report of Mr. Sullivan,  $46\frac{1}{2}$  G. miles are allowed.

Between Jezirah and Mosul, Messrs. Sullivan and Sestini reckoned at a mean 39 hours; and Mr. Ives was told, 40. The road being both difficult and circuitous, and the ridge of Zaco also lying in the way, only about 72 G. miles can be allowed: and the intersection of these two lines, places Jezirah in latitude  $37^{\circ} 12' 30''$ ; lon.  $42^{\circ} 1' 20''$ : and in a bearing of E.  $14\frac{1}{2}$  N. from Naesbin.

The mountains of Karadjy-dag, (or *Masius*) according to M. Niebuhr, close on the course of the Tigris, and the greater mountains of Kourdistan; at about 11 G. miles to the N. W. of Jezirah.

† In both these cases regard is to be had to the *bend* of the Tigris, at Mosul: in other words, the line must not be taken *direct*, but *through Mosul*. It may be observed, that the *proportions* of the *direct* distance, differ, on the two portions of  $17\frac{1}{2}$ , and 23 hours. The cause is, that the Zaco hills intervene in the first; and that the road is, on the whole, rougher than in the second portion.

near; and may to some appear to prove too much: but as the *data* for both, have been exhibited to the reader, he will be enabled to exercise his own judgment, both on the calculation, and on the application of the result.

It will now be proper to extract the several descriptions given, of the ridge of Zaco; as well as those of the ground in general, between it and Mosul; as they greatly illustrate this part of the retreat.

The country begins to open, and is generally flat, from about 10 to 15 miles south of Mosul: and continues so, northward, to the aforesaid ridge; which, as before remarked, is a projection from the *Carduchian* mountains, pointing to the westward, or W. S. W.; whilst the mountains themselves extend from E. S. E. to W. N. W.; or nearly parallel to the course of the Tigris: and at 17 or 18 miles distant from the line of the road between Zaco and Mosul. But to the northward of Zaco, they gradually approach the Tigris, until at last, they encroach on it, and form the strait and cliffs, before-mentioned.

But the plain in question, is narrowed to about 12 miles, generally, by ridges of a lower order of mountains (or hills) which run parallel to the *Carduchian*, and are connected, endwise, with those of Zaco: and which approach so near to the Tigris, opposite Mosul, as to reduce the plain to a *strip* of about 4 miles, only. This is the general character of the plain, through which the Greeks had been marching, for the last five days. But from Mosul eastward and south-eastward, it expands to a great extent; and terminates in the great plain of *Arbela* and *Gaugamela*, the scene of Alexander's warfare with Darius, in ASSYRIA.



Thus it appears, that the country along the Tigris, from a point considerably below Mosul, to the hills of Zaco, is open, and generally flat. Mr. Sullivan, in his way southward, after descending the Zaco ridge, says, "We found ourselves at the entrance of the plain, which extends to Mosul." This is, however, to be understood with some exceptions: for he says, that the ground for some miles short (*i. e.* to the north) of *Tel-Escoff*, is rocky and uneven. *Escoff* itself lies at the *foot* of the inferior ridge. Dr. Howel, to avoid the danger of the direct road, made a circuit from Mosul, and ascended the hills, which he compares to those of *Highgate* and *Hampstead*; the country "broken by frequent ascents and descents."\* And between *Escoff* and *Assee* (at the southern foot of the Zaco hills) "the ground was irregular—we kept close to the hills "on the right" (the north-east). M. Sestini says, that the road was frequently intersected by the beds of torrents, that descend from the hills. And although Dr. Howel found the country broken and irregular, near the foot of the hills, yet Mr. Sullivan found a clear, well-cultivated tract, near the Tigris, between *Escoff* and Mosul. And on the whole, it may be collected, that the tract through which the Greeks marched the five days, previous to their arrival at the Zaco hills, if not answering perfectly to the description of *plain*, was by no means *hilly* or rough.

It is certain that there is no mention made of the Tigris, by Xenophon, from the day of the 3d march, to that of the 14th, when they arrived at the *overhanging* cliffs, which stopped their

\* It must have been on some part of this range of beautiful hills, that the camp of Alexander was formed, before he descended into the field of *Gaugamela*; commonly referred to *Arbela*. *Gaugamela* is now named *Camalis*.

progress. And it is very possible, that until the 12th march, they might never have *seen* it, although their line of march was never very far from it. It is to be concluded, that they were in no want of guides for the great roads, along or near the *general* course of the Tigris; because with attention, they might always be procured, in a well inhabited country. That such roads existed, cannot be doubted, because there are two well-known passes over the Tigris in that quarter; the one at Jezirah (the ancient *Bezabde*), the other, just below the Zaco hills; where Alexander may be supposed to have forded the river, in his way to the field of *Arbela*; as we learn from Arrian. (Lib. III.) See the note to page 63.

We come now, to the modern description of the hills of Zaco.

Dr. Howel came from the same quarter as the Greeks; that is, from the side of Mosul. He says (page 78), "We left Assee\* at day break—after marching 3 miles, we turned suddenly towards the hills, which we crossed by a very rocky and rugged path. These hills produce little else than a few shrubs of an insignificant size, &c. Having gained the plain," &c.†

Mr. Sullivan came from the opposite quarter, and dates his departure from Zaco, in the latter end of June.

He says, "We were this evening to pass a *ridge* of the *Kourdistan* mountains. The way over it, was difficult and dangerous, for *tahkt rewans*. We set out at 5 p. m. and at 9 found ourselves at the entrance of the plain, which extends to Mosul."

\* Apparently the same site with that of the village remarked by Xenophon. (Lib. III. c. 22.)

† That is, the plain on the side towards Jezirah.

The Abbé Sestini, says (page 145, Italian edition), "Leaving Zaco, we directed our march towards the south, across high and steep mountains—in effect, having with much difficulty crossed this whole chain of mountains, which makes a part of those of Kourdistan, we descended into a great plain, having on our right the mountains of Sinjar." [In *Mesopotamia*.]

These descriptions, although very brief, prove that the ridge of Zaco, shuts up the road, along the Tigris, between Mosul and Jezirah; that it has a base so wide, as to require 4 hours to cross it in a tahkt rewan; that it is lofty, steep, and rocky; and the path, rugged, difficult, and dangerous. And that it is a part of the Kourdistan region, cannot be doubted: because Messrs. Sullivan and Sestini say so in direct terms: and the former, in his journal, describes his leaving the Kourdistan mountains, at 5 miles, only, to the eastward, when at 16 miles to the N. W. of Zaco: and both Dr. Howel and M. Sestini describe the same mountains covered with snow, running parallel to the road between Zaco and Mosul. The reader is requested again to refer to the before mentioned Map, No. III.

Whether the Greeks crossed the ridge by the ordinary road, now in use, or at a point nearer to the great mountains, is of little consequence to the argument: but by the time which they remained on the hills, one might conclude, that it was by the latter; and that they took the first road that offered, in order to escape the enemy's cavalry, as soon as they could.

The history says, "whilst they were on their march, on the 5th day," [that is, the 5th day since they improved their order of march; but the 10th from the *Zabatus*] "they saw a

“ palace, and many villages lying round it. The road which led  
 “ to this place, lay over high hills that *reached down from the*  
 “ *mountain*, under which there stood a village.\* The Greeks were  
 “ rejoiced to see these hills, and with great reason, the enemy’s  
 “ forces consisting in horse. But after they had left the plain,  
 “ and ascended the first hill, while they were descending from  
 “ thence, in order to climb the next, the *barbarians* appeared,  
 “ and from the eminence showered down upon them, (under  
 “ the scourge) darts, stones, and arrows. They wounded  
 “ many; and had the advantage over the Greek light-armed  
 “ men; forcing them to retire within the body of the heavy-  
 “ armed; so that the slingers and archers were that day en-  
 “ tirely useless, being mixed with those who had the charge  
 “ of the baggage. And when the Greeks, being thus pressed,  
 “ endeavoured to pursue the enemy, as they were heavy-armed  
 “ men, they moved slowly to the top of the mountain, whilst  
 “ the enemy quickly retreated: and when the Greeks retired  
 “ to their main body, the same thing happened to them again.  
 “ They found the same difficulty in passing the second hill;  
 “ so that they determined not to order out the heavy-  
 “ armed men, from the third hill; but instead of that, they  
 “ brought up the targeteers to the top of the mountain, from  
 “ the right of the [oblong]† square. When these were got  
 “ above the enemy, they no longer molested our men in their  
 “ descent, fearing to be cut off from their own body, and that  
 “ we should attack them on both sides. In this manner we  
 “ marched the rest of the day; some in the road upon the

\* The village of Assee appears to occupy the same position at present. See Map No. III. and also Dr. Howel’s remark in page 155.

† This term occurs in the original, but is omitted both by Spelman and Larcher.

“ hills, and others abreast of them upon the mountain, till they came to the villages; when they appointed eight surgeons; for there were many wounded.” (Lib. III. c. 22.)

The modern descriptions of these hills, which are indeed much too brief for the purpose, do not mention distinct or separate ridges. It is probable that these were nothing more than the broken summits of the main ridge; and that the vallies were neither deep nor wide; for the passing of three hills, together with their intermediate vallies, would have employed more time than the description seems to warrant: but they seem to have taken up no great proportion of the days' march. Moreover, the villages in which they quartered this day, had been *in sight*, before they ascended the hills. It must be understood that the palace and villages stood on the slope of the greater mountains: and that in order to reach them, the inferior chain (of Zaco) must first have been crossed.

The expression, that the Greeks were “ *rejoiced to see the hills,*” because of the enemy's cavalry, seems to shew, that they were the first hills, of any degree of height, or steepness, that they had met with in their route, since they left the *Zabatus*.

In the villages on the mountain, they staid three days; both on account of the wounded, and because they found great plenty of provisions, laid up for the *satrape* of the country. This position must have been situated immediately *over* the present town of Zaco, which stands near the *northern* foot of the ridge denominated from it; as that of Assee\* does at the *southern* foot of the same ridge; and appears to answer decidedly to the village mentioned by Xenophon, which stood under† the high “ hills, that reached down from the mountain.”†

\* See Dr. Howel's account, at page 155.

† See above, page 157.

Zaco is the most considerable place that occurs between Mosul and Jezirah; and is surrounded by a fertile district, which produces a great variety of excellent fruits. Hence it agrees with the circumstance of laying in provisions for the satrape: and it may be supposed that Zaco was then, as now, the principal place of the province, which is found in Strabo, under the title of *Sacopodes*. Wine was also found in these villages: perhaps the palm wine before described in *Babylonia*, (page 120): and of which, according to Herodotus, great quantities were brought down the Tigris, from *Armenia*: that is, the quarter above Zaco.

Zaco stands in an island of the river Kurnib, which descends from the Kourdistan mountains; and falls into the Tigris, a few miles below the town. It is ordinarily navigable for Killecks, or floats: of which, many are made here. The Kurnib is a mountain torrent: and at times, contains a great volume of water. It has a fine stone bridge over it. As there is no mention made in the history, of crossing any river between the *Zabatus* and the ascent of the *Carduchian* mountains, it may be supposed that this river, and its adjunct, the Durnah, were both low, at the time the Greeks passed them.

## CHAPTER IX.

THE RETREAT CONTINUED, FROM THE HILLS OF ZACO TO  
THE CARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.

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*The Greeks again attacked, on their descent into the plain—Unmilitary practice of the Persians, of which the Greeks avail themselves, to steal a march—Geographical Discussion, relative to the distance arising on these marches—The enemy dislodged from the eminence which commanded the road, on the 14<sup>th</sup> March—The Carduchian (or Kourdistan) Mountains close on the bank of the Tigris; and shut up the passage, along it, with an overhanging cliff—Scheme for crossing the Tigris on floats, too hazardous—The Grecian Generals resolve to ascend the Carduchian mountains—Great address displayed, in executing this measure—Ascend, unperceived by the enemy, whilst within their reach—Enter the Carduchian territory, after having struggled with various difficulties, twenty-one days—New hostility with the Carduchians unavoidable—This mountainous region presents an Asylum to the Greeks; and saves them from eventual destruction, by the sword of the enemy.*

**D**ESCENDING again from the hills (of Zaco), the Greeks made only a short march on the morning of the 11<sup>th</sup> day;



being so closely pursued by the enemy, that they were constrained to halt in the first villages they came to, in the plain ; from the number of wounded men, and the loss of the services of those who carried and attended them. Here they availed themselves of the Persian custom of retiring to the distance of about 6 miles, to prevent a surprise in the night,\* to steal a march of about the same length ; which not only made up for the loss of distance during the day, but left their pursuers so far behind, (about 12 miles of course,) that they did not appear, during the next two marches ; the 12th and 13th.

There is no account given in the history, either of the nature of the country, or of the distance marched, during these two days. It appears clearly, however, that they came down into the *plain* again, on the 11th day : and that *late* on the 14th, or *last day's* march along the Tigris, the enemy were found in possession of the heights in their front. It may reasonably be supposed that Xenophon thought the description of the ground, unimportant, when nothing occurred to render a description necessary ; as appears to have been the case, on the two preceding days.

Messrs. Sullivan and Sestini give a good general idea of the ground, between the Zaco hills and Jezirah ; which latter, although the extreme limit of their observations, was short of the point, to which the Greeks ascended, along the bank of the Tigris. Nor is there any good modern account of the

\* “ The cavalry of a Persian army, are subject to great inconveniences ; for their horses are tied, and generally shackled, to prevent them from running away ; and if an alarm happens, a Persian has the housing to fix, his horse to bridle, and his cors-let to put on, before he can mount. All these things cannot be done in the night, without great difficulty ; particularly if there is an alarm. For this reason they always encamped at a distance from the Greeks.” (Lib. III. c. 23.)

ground above Jezirah. All that is known, is, the place where the great chain of Karadjy-Dagh\* (*Masius*) crosses the course of the Tigris, and joins to the Kourdistan (or *Carduchian* mountains): and this we derive from M. Niebuhr, who kept the mountains in view, and had an opportunity of determining in a general way, their line of direction.

It is known from the journals of the before mentioned gentlemen, that the plain extends from Zaco, to the distance of about 9 hours journey upwards, along the course of the Tigris; bounded on the opposite side by the great mountains, which are in this part, named *Jeudi*; answering to the *Carduchian*; and which, approach within 5 or 6 miles of the bank of the Tigris.

Near the northern extremity of this plain, stands the village of Nahrawan;† and soon after the ground rises, and gradually swells into a high mountain; over which the road lies, immediately above the Tigris.‡ But this must not be mistaken for the mountain by which the Greeks ascended finally

\* The Black mountains.

† This village, according to the Mahomedans, is denominated from the Patriarch Noah: and opposite to it, on the high mountains of *Jeudi* (the *Carduchian*), the Mahomedan *dervishes* have erected a small temple, in honour of him. For, according to their idea, the ark rested there. Mr. Sullivan saw the lights, which are kept constantly burning, in the temple. The name *Jeudi* is said to have a reference to the number of persons in the ark.

Since these mountains form a portion of *Armenia*, according to the former division of that country, (for both Herodotus and Moses of *Chorene* include the upper part of the course of the Tigris in *Armenia*) they appear to have at least an equal claim to the title of *ԱՐԱՐԱՏ*, with that celebrated mountain, near Irwân, called *Agri-dagh* by the Mahomedans, *Macis* by the Christian Armenians. For *Ararat* has a reference to *Armenia*, at large; not to a particular mountain.

‡ Mr. Sullivan's Journal.

into the region of the *Carduchians* ; because the road *still lies along the bank of the Tigris*, beyond the mountain in question : and it is well known that the Greeks ascended the *Carduchian* mountains, because *they could no longer march along the banks of the Tigris*.

Mr. Sullivan indeed says, that near *Nahrawan*, they had immense rocks of coarse gravel (cemented together), like that, of which the bed of the Tigris is formed, hanging over their heads, and also obstructing the passage, where fallen down. These might at first sight be taken for the overhanging cliffs of the *Carduchian* mountains, which arrested the progress of the Greeks : but the fact just mentioned, contradicts it ; and it is certain that the Oriental geographers state, and which is confirmed by Mr. Sullivan, that the mountains of *Jeudi*, are 4 miles within the eastern bank of the Tigris, at *Jezirah* ; which place is still 8 or 9 miles *higher* up, than the gravelly cliffs in question ; 10 or 11 *below* the place, where *M. Masius* closes on the *Carduchian* mountains, leaving only a passage for the Tigris : which in that place may be supposed to form the impending cliffs, beforementioned.

If the distance marched from the encampment above *Zaco*, to the place where the Greeks were finally impeded, be calculated, it will be found to reach far above the heights described by Mr. Sullivan. For the Greeks, as we have seen, arrived at the *Zaco Hills*, in their way from the southward, *early* on the tenth march : because they afterwards, in the course of the *same day's* march, not only passed over the 3 summits, where they were compelled to fight their way ; but marched also, *the rest of the day*, on the hills ; and finally, halted in villages, that appear to have been on the slope of the great mountains.

There must then be an allowance of distance, for the *remainder* of the 10th march; for the first part, *to the hills*, has been already fixed at two parasangas only, in the arrangement of the distance, between the *Zabatus* and the *Zaco* hills, in page 150. If 2 more parasangas be allowed for the remainder of the march, this will constitute *a new point of departure*, for the line of distance, northward; at 86 G. miles from the *Zabatus*.\*

The 11th march, even with the addition of the 60 stadia for the stolen march in the evening, would not probably be more than equal to an *ordinary* march, of 5 parasangas; because we are told, that after they had descended from the hills, and Tissaphernes had overtaken them, "they were compelled to halt at the first villages they came to."† The utmost then, probably, has been allowed. The 12th and 13th marches were made, without seeing the enemy; yet from the increased number of the wounded, great delays must have taken place; notwithstanding that one of the marches was through the plain, between *Zaco* and *Nahrawan*; the other, although on the heights above the latter, yet was not over a difficult road. Perhaps, 9 parasangas for the 2 days, or between 12 and 13 miles *per* day, may be sufficient; and then, the encampment of the 12th, would fall on the heights of *Nahrawan*; and that of the 13th, nearly opposite to the site of *Jezirah*. But on the 14th, (or *last march, along the Tigris*) considering the difficulties they had to encounter, in respect both of the enemy, and

\* See pages 151, 152, where 80 to 83 are allowed to the foot of the *Zaco* ridge.

† "Some being wounded, some employed in carrying them, and others employed in carrying the arms of the latter, great numbers were not in a condition to fight. But when they were encamped, the Greeks had greatly the advantage," &c. (Lib. III. c. 23)

the nature of the country, 4 parasangas, or a little more than 11 miles, may be sufficient.

The account will then give 18 parasangas, or about 50 British miles, by the trace of the road, from the station on the hills, over Zaco, to the highest point, to which the Greeks ascended, along the Tigris. And these, reduced to direct distance, will be  $38\frac{1}{2}$  G. miles; which will reach to a point 9 miles above Jezirah: whilst M. Niebuhr, describes the meeting of the ridges of Karadjy-Dagh and Jeudi (i. e. *Masius* and the *Carduchian* mountains), to be much in the same general position: that is, about 11 miles above Jezirah.\* And it may be concluded, that the place where “*exceeding high mountains*” hung over the river, and completely impeded the passage along the bank of the Tigris, could be no other than where it forces a passage between the above chains of mountains.†

It would, however, have been more satisfactory to have followed some modern traveller, in his journal to this strait, than to be necessitated to adopt the position, on the foundation of a distant view: but it may nevertheless be conceived, that the near coincidence of the position given, with that assumed from the history, contains much internal evidence of the truth of both.

But even if this point, be given up, the hills of Zaco must be allowed to approach as nearly as possible to a positive proof

\* Here follows a statement of the distances from the *Zabatus* to the ascent.

From the <i>Zabatus</i> to the southern foot of the Zaco ridge	-	80 G. M.
To the camp on the hills, on the day of the 10th march (2 paras.)		$4\frac{1}{2}$
Thence, to the overhanging cliffs	- - - -	$38\frac{1}{2}$
		<hr/>
Total		123 G. Miles.

† Lib. IV. at the beginning.

of the position of the Ten Thousand, *at that period* of their retreat. And as the remainder of their march, along the Tigris, was no more than about 40 G. miles, in direct distance, there is no great latitude for error, at any rate: and whether M. Niebuhr's position be admitted, or not, *that* of the Ten Thousand, at the time of their ascending the mountains, may be regarded as a near approximation, in the construction of this species of geography.

Having thus brought the Greeks, *geographically*, to the foot of the *Carduchian* mountains, it will be proper to add some remarks on their proceedings by the way: and also on occasion of their ascending those mountains, in the presence of a vast host of enemies.

It was late on the fourth day's march from the Zaco hills (making the 14th from the *Zabatus*), when the Greeks found a large body of the enemy in possession of certain heights, which commanded the road, in their front; (as we have observed in page 161); they having passed the Greeks in the night.\* Tissaphernes, at the same time, appeared in sight with the main body; threatening their rear. Much generalship, gallantry, and exertion, were employed in dispossessing the enemy, by a detachment led by Xenophon in person: and they finally passed the eminence, which appears to have been another projection, from the greater mountains; and descended into the plain beyond it.† This plain was situated immediately

\* Lib. III. c. 24.

† —“Xenophon observing the top of the mountain, that was above their own army, found there was a passage from that, to the hill, where the enemy was posted.—The enemy, who were upon the hill, the moment they saw them climb the mountain, advanced at the same time, striving to get there before them. Upon this occasion there

below the place where the steep and lofty mountains of the *Carduchians*, close on the bank of the Tigris ; effectually barring the passage upwards, and thus preventing their tracing it, till it became fordable.\* Here then they were totally at a stand : the river was found too deep to be forded ; and the enemy appeared in force on the opposite bank : no doubt prepared for this circumstance, which *they* had foreseen, though the Greeks could not.

It may be concluded from the subsequent conduct of the enemy, that they never entertained an idea, that the Greeks would be able, or would even attempt, to scale the mountains ; but conceived that they were completely entrapped ; and that they had only to wait patiently the operation of famine, to make them surrender. It was no doubt to hasten this event, that Tissaphernes attempted to burn the villages, from whence they derived their provisions ; the plain having many in it ; and those abounding in the necessaries of life.

In this dilemma, a Rhodian proposed to waft 4000 men at a time, across the Tigris, on rafts formed on inflated skins ; but this was over-ruled, as, however practicable in itself, it was incompatible with the general safety ; the enemy's cavalry being in full possession of the opposite shore.†

was a vast shout raised both by the Greek army, and that of Tissaphernes, each encouraging their own men. At last the Greeks gained the top of the mountain, and prevented the enemy ; upon which they fled every one as he could : and the Greeks remained masters of the eminence." (Lib. III. c. 24, 25, and 26.)

\* " The Greeks came to the place where the river Tigris is, both from its depth and breadth, absolutely impassable : and no road appeared ; the craggy mountains of the *Carduchians* hanging over the river." (Lib. IV. at the beginning.)

† This shows a well peopled and flourishing country, if appearances warranted the existence of 2000 domestic animals within reach, around the camp ; which the context supposes. (Lib. III. c. 27.)



It is said (in Lib. III. c. 27,) on occasion of the halt of the army, at the place where their progress was arrested by the overhanging cliffs; that the soldiers *retired to their tents*. But it is said, in the same book (c. 14), that they burned their *carriages* and *tents*; in consequence of a proposal made by Xenophon (in c. 12); who says truly, that “the tents were troublesome to carry, and of no use either in fighting or in supplying them with provisions;” whence one may conclude that the word *tents* in this place, meant nothing more than their stations in the camp.

However, M. Larcher supposes, (Vol. I. p. 241) that they only burnt their *superfluous* tents. But he could not have considered the matter practically. Had tents been in general use (as this idea necessarily supposes), there could not well have been less than 1000, reckoning every description of them. Let it then be considered, what a space, the beasts of burthen requisite to transport them, (admitting that they possessed them) would have taken up, within the hollow square; where all the baggage must have been placed, in order to its immediate security; as well as to keep the sides of the square clear for action.

Doubtless, then, they adopted the plan of *bivouacing*, like the armies in Spain and other countries during the late war: and especially since the necessity was so much greater. So that the retiring of the troops to their *tents*, certainly meant only to their station in the *bivouac*.

Had they been possessed of tents, at the time when the *Rhodian* (Lib. III. c. 27) proposed his plan, he would rather have made use of *them*, than have hazarded the chance of being able to catch 2000 animals, and incur the certain labour of

flaying them. For, at *Carmande* (Lib. I. c. 25) the soldiers did actually use the skins of which their tents were made, for the purpose of constructing floats, to cross the *Euphrates*.\*

On an examination of the prisoners, the Greek generals found that it was practicable to pass over the mountains into the territory of the CARDUCHIANS. (Lib. III. c. 28.) This nation, favoured by the natural strength of their country, had preserved their independence, in despite of the power of the great king. They are the ancestors of the modern KOURDS, who have extended themselves along the different ridges and vallies of mount *Taurus*, from Asia Minor to the neighbourhood of Ispahan: and who occupy the country named from themselves, KOURDISTAN.

Unfortunately, from the manner in which the Greeks entered their country, they could only be received as enemies; but it was the only alternative left them: and provided they could force their way through it, they were told that they would soon arrive in the open and plentiful country of Armenia; from whence they might march which way soever they pleased. The certainty of escaping the cavalry of the enemy, was, no doubt, a strong inducement to attempt it.

But to ascend the mountains in the face of so vast a host of enemies, as were now collected together against them, would have been absolutely impracticable, had the enemy been the least aware of what was intended, and had made use of

\* It may be remarked, that at *Cænæ*, at the Tigris, although previous to the destruction of the tents, it is only said that "the barbarians transported necessaries across the river, upon rafts made of skins;" and not that the Greeks crossed over themselves, as at *Carmande*. This might well be owing to the different circumstances under which they now were; when every kind of caution might have become necessary.

common precautions, only ; by getting before them, and seizing on commanding situations, from whence stones might be rolled down the steep face of the mountain. In such a case, there had been no mode of dislodging him, by the usual practice of ascending to a higher point, and attacking him from above. The ascending of the mountain, therefore, was a measure which required much delicacy in the execution : and the Greeks appear to have accomplished it, with their usual prudence, and address.

On the day preceding that of the ascent, they had *returned back* from their station near the cliffs, and quartered themselves in some fresh villages.\* The enemy wondered what was intended by this movement, and were at a loss how to act. The Greek generals had not, at that time, examined the prisoners ; nor, of course, determined on their future route ; and as their return, must, from circumstances, have been by a track *more inland*, than that by which they came, it was fortunate that the enemy did not, from the direction of the movement, suspect a design, which the Greeks had not, at that time, even formed. It was thus executed :

From their new position (*i. e.* at the end of the 15th march,) the Greeks decamped, whilst enough of the night remained for them to traverse the plain, and to arrive at the foot of the mountains, unobserved : for on this concealment their existence, probably, depended. They had the good fortune, not only to arrive, unobserved, at the mountain foot ; but even to escape the enemy's observation altogether, whilst it was in their power to annoy them, in ascending it. By this, it may be

\* This movement may be reckoned their 15th march. It must be supposed, from circumstances, to have been very short.

concluded, that the plain was of no great breadth in that part : for they decamped about the last watch of the night, and were got above the enemy, and out of their reach, before they were observed. They, no doubt, took care to point their march across the plain, in such a direction, as not to approach the quarters of the enemy ; and as we learn from Xenophon (see above, p. 161, note), that the Persian army, at the approach of night, always retired to some distance in the rear, to prevent surprises, it may be concluded that this very unmilitary custom greatly facilitated the enterprise. It also accounts for their not seeing the enemy, during the ascent. But it shows a total ignorance, or a total disregard of military knowledge, not, at least, to have stationed guards, that might have communicated an account of the motions of the Greeks. It is probable that the passage of the Tigris, was the only part, that was guarded or attended to.

Cheirisophus led the van, which was composed of all the light-armed troops ; and Xenophon brought up the rear, with the heavy-armed : because it was expected that the opposition, if any, would be in front : and the light-armed seemed best adapted to the service of repelling such attacks as they were the most exposed to.

The path being narrow, and the mountain lofty and steep, the Greeks employed *the whole day* in the ascent, and in the descent into the villages, situated in the recesses of the summits of the mountains : for it was dark soon after they began to descend. The *Carduchians*, although few in number, from their being taken unawares, attacked the rear of the Greeks with stones and arrows, in their descent, and convinced them of their danger, had they given more warning of their approach.\*

\* Lib. IV. at the beginning.

The *Carduchians* fled from their villages, leaving plenty of provisions for the Greeks; which they were compelled, from necessity, to use; but forebore to plunder their houses, in hopes of conciliating them. They, notwithstanding, continued their hostilities: nor could it well be otherwise. A body of 12,000 men, with their attendants, who are either unable to pay for what they take; or having both the means and the will, yet if unable to establish a friendly intercourse with the natives, must of necessity be compelled to plunder, in order to preserve their existence: and must consequently be regarded as enemies, wheresoever they come. And this would have been the case, in the most fertile and civilized country upon earth; when food for an additional multitude, is suddenly demanded: but the inconvenience and distress to the natives, must have been much greater, in a poor and thinly inhabited country, like that of the *Carduchians*. So that these people were equally enemies to the Greeks, as to the Persians: to the latter, through hereditary hatred, and dread of conquest, or coercion: and to the former as plunderers; or for want of a proper explanation in the beginning; which the necessity of the case, by urging them to a sudden irruption, prevented. And this hatred was probably heightened, by their native ferocity.\*

The choice, if it could so be called, of ascending the mountains, freed the Greeks from the pursuit of their old enemy, the Persians; who, doubtless, would not have quitted them, whilst their cavalry could act: and as the number of slain and

\* If an explanation could have taken place, it would, no doubt, have been more for the interest of the *Carduchians* to have let the Greeks pass through their country in peace. They would have got rid of them in half the time; saved the lives of their friends; and at least half of the provisions; not to mention acts of violence, and destruction, that might have been prevented.

wounded increased, the Greeks must at last have sunk, through mere weakness. For the losses on the part of the Persians, however great in point of numbers, operated only as a check at the moment; and could with ease be repaired: but the losses of the Greeks, though small in respect of numbers, were of course irreparable: and being continually repeated, must at length, have destroyed them.

The Greeks had made ~~fourteen~~ marches from the *Zabatus*; besides moving their camp on the 15th. In the course of these marches, they were repeatedly compelled to fight their way; and were still oftener harassed, or menaced: they also made 6 halts by the way, in the midst of the enemy: so that they had been 21 days, in a most forlorn situation; struggling with difficulties of every kind. And had the Persians been alert, they might, by sending detachments of cavalry before them, have destroyed all the provisions in the line of march.

As the massacre of the generals is supposed to have taken place about the latter end of October (401 years before Christ) the Greeks would have ascended into this lofty region at the beginning of winter. Mr. Sullivan saw snow lying on these very mountains in the latter end of June.\* The Greeks had no tents† or comforts of any kind, to alleviate the rigours of the season, having destroyed every article that did not administer to their defence, or to the simple calls of nature.

The *Carduchian* mountains, then, in effect, presented an asylum to the Greeks, who could no other way have escaped, at last, the reiterated attacks of such a host of enemies, whose numbers also were augmenting, instead of diminishing. But

\* He got snow at *Zaco*: so that the inhabitants must have been in the habit of using it.

† See the note to page 142.

as a Persian army could not subsist, or their cavalry act, within the wide range of these mountains; the Greeks, by ascending them, got rid of their dreaded enemy. And although in the mean time, they had to contend with an enemy much more brave and persevering, their numbers were fewer; and they might reasonably expect an earlier escape from them, than from the Persians. Had they known that the Tigris was fordable under the Zaco hills,\* and passed into *Mesopotamia*, they would still have been followed by the Persians: they would also have had the Euphrates to cross; a yet more difficult river, in the line which they must have pursued. Therefore, according to our limited view of things, it appears, that nothing less than such a barrier, as these mountains presented, could have saved the Greeks from eventual destruction, from the attacks of the Persians.

\* Alexander, by the distance at which he passed the Tigris from the field of *Gaugamela* (or *Arbela*) must have forded it near the end of the Zaco ridge. There is a passage at that place, recorded by Hajy-Kalifa. (See again the Map, No. III.)



## CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING THE CHANGE IN THE MILITARY DISPOSITION  
OF THE GREEKS, (Referred to from Chapter VIII.)

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*Observations on the Change in the Military Disposition, and Order of March, of the retreating army; after the fifth march—Great difficulty in comprehending the entire meaning of Xenophon, respecting this Change; the passage being evidently corrupted—They appear to have changed the equilateral for an oblong square; as affording a greater facility of movement, and greater security to the rear—Concerning the import of the Grecian Military term Lochos, which appears to have been used in different senses, at different periods of time.*

IT has been said, in pages 142 and 147, that the military disposition of the Greeks, on the march, was a hollow *equilateral* square, formed by the heavy-armed troops, or *phalanx*; with the baggage, &c. within it. And that as great inconveniences arose from this disposition, they changed it, after a trial of five days, to an *oblong* square: at the same time, making a new distribution of a certain portion of the troops, in order the better to provide for the safety of the rear. Xenophon thus describes the evils and the remedy.\*

\* Lib. III. c. 24. This passage has been translated by the Author's friend, Dr. Gillies.

“ The form of a regular square now appeared to be a bad arrangement for a retreating army, in presence of an enemy. For when the wings of the square were to be closed, on account of the narrowness of the road; mountains obstructing them on either side; or a bridge to be crossed; the heavy-armed soldiers must of necessity be crowded, and squeezed out of their ranks; and thereby exposed to much danger: as the pressure and confusion would deprive them of the use of their weapons. When emerging from the strait, the wings were to be again expanded; the soldiers that were formerly crowded and pressed together, would of necessity be so far divided, and distracted, as to leave a void between the wings, which could not fail to discourage those nearest to the vacuity, when closely pursued by an enemy. Besides this, in approaching a bridge, or any very narrow defile, it was natural for the men to hasten eagerly, all striving to be amongst the foremost to get over; in which disorderly hurry, they might be assailed at great disadvantage. To obviate these inconveniences, the generals formed six companies of an hundred men each; setting captains over them: and these companies were divided into bands of fifty; and these again into bands of twenty-five: each band with its proper officer. The companies, marching thus appointed, when at any time the wings were to be closed, halted and remained behind; so that the men in the wings might be no longer liable to compression or disorder.\* The companies then

\* This passage has also been given from high authority as follows:

—“ so as not to be in the way of the flanks.”

Lärcher has,—“ ne portoient point le trouble dans les bataillons, marchant à une certaine distance des ailes.”

But Spelman, “ so as not to disorder the rear,” &c. a meaning totally different from the others.

advanced and passed, altogether detached from the wings, and in such an arrangement as to fill up the vacancy left by their expansion: that is, in six bodies of 100 men each, when the vacancy was small; in twelve bodies of 50 each, when larger; and when very large, in twenty-four bodies of 25 each. The same contrivance obviated the danger that occurred in approaching a bridge, or any very narrow passage. For when these were to be crossed, there was no longer any cause for precipitation or hurry; since the companies, dividing themselves, according to local circumstances, passed over in succession; and were thus prepared to be useful in every part of the army, according to the exigency of the moment."

The text here, is, no doubt, corrupted; for this appears to be the universal opinion of all the readers of Greek: and very possibly, mutilated also. It would therefore be vain to seek the entire meaning from the *words* of the passage itself, as it now stands; and consequently, a part of the meaning must be obtained, if at all, from the reason of the thing.

The object in view, appears clearly to have been, the correction of a *faulty disposition*; which exposed them to great inconvenience and some loss: but neither is the cause explained with sufficient clearness, nor is the description of the mode of correcting it, (as it would appear,) free from corruptions. The evil is said to have arisen chiefly from the *equilateral form* of the square, which gave it *too extended a front*; and therefore it appears, they changed it for an *oblong square*, or *parallelogram*. Certain it is, that the disposition *still continued to be a square*; as may be learnt not only from the words of Xenophon (Lib. III. c. 22.) where he employs the term which signifies an *oblong square*, but from circumstances also. For

what purpose, principally, were the new companies formed, but to fill up the voids in the rear of that square? And it appears no less natural, than probable, that the oblong form should have been adopted; as the *equilateral* form, for a body of 10,000 men, presented too wide a front to make its way over ordinary ground: and a like extent of rear, seems to have made it difficult to close it up, *with the requisite dispatch*, whilst forming anew.\*

The inconvenience stated to arise from the compression of the wings, or flanks, into an irregular column, through the occasional straitness of the ground, would have been common to every kind of square. But the evil which Xenophon lays the most stress on, was the difficulty of filling up, promptly, the openings in the rear, made by the separation of the wings, on occasion of forming the square *anew*, after coming out of a defile. For it appears that they were then subject to attacks from the enemy (his cavalry, probably), who broke in and took the flanks *in reverse*; and perhaps attacked the baggage

\* It is worthy of remark, that neither Spelman, nor Larcher, mention the circumstance of the *oblong* square, in their text. Spelman says, "*the right of the square*;" Larcher, simply "*the right flank*:" although the original, (Lib. III. c. 22) has *πλαίσιον*, or *oblong* square, in contradistinction to *πλαίσιον ἰσοπλευρον*, or *equilateral* square, in c. 21. But M. Larcher, in a note on the equilateral square, in this last chapter, (vol. I. p. 225.) gives the Greek terms for both kinds of squares, although he omits the distinction of *oblong*, in its proper place, in the text. (See the distinction in the Tactics of Arrian.)

That the form of a square, although not equilateral, was still preserved, is proved, by Lib. III. c. 22, where the *light troops* are said to have sheltered themselves, *within the body of heavy armed*. Again, they are brought up, *from the right of the square*. And in c. 24, they are taken *from within the square*. All these transactions happened after the change of disposition.

also, which was of course exposed, through the same opening.\* The mischief might probably be occasioned by certain troops of the enemy, who had previously placed themselves in the open country, into which the wings had just *debouched*, from the defile; and were waiting the separation of those wings, to cut in between them.

But here, it may naturally be asked, why the troops which composed the *rear face* of the square, under the old disposition, (and who must be supposed to have marched close to the rear of the wings,) could not have filled up the opening, as fast as it was made; by forming (as well as the wings), as they cleared the mouth of the defile? One cannot well comprehend how the companies, under the *new disposition*, could extricate themselves from a defile, with more celerity than the troops which composed the rear face of the square, under the *old* one: or that, what could have been done by the one, could not have been done by the other, in respect of *filling up a void*. The corps of the army in general were already divided into companies (or into divisions, equivalent to them); otherwise, of course, they would have been unmanageable, both in respect of discipline, and of manœuvres.† Therefore, it can only be supposed, that the newly formed companies (or rather

\* One may suppose the following order of march to have taken place, through defiles, or narrow ground.

First, of course, the *front* of the square, in a column. Next, the baggage, with such a proportion of the light troops, intermixed with it, as might have been deemed necessary for its protection. Then the *wings* or *flanks*, either collectively, in one column; or separately, following each other; as the ground would permit. And lastly, the *rear* of the square, under the *first* disposition: and under the *improved* disposition, the *newly formed companies*; which probably answered the same purpose.

† These permanent companies were of 50 men each. (Lib. I. c. 9; and IV. c. 16.)

*divisions*) must have been in some respects differently constituted from the others; and that a part of the text is wanting, which might have explained it.

That the square, in its original state, was entire; that is, that it *had a rear face*, cannot reasonably be questioned: any more than that it consisted throughout, of *heavy-armed men*. (See Lib. III. c. 13, 20, 21.) For, unless it had been closed up, on every side, it would not have *answered the description* of a hollow square; nor would the army and baggage have been safe, a moment, closely surrounded as they were, by the numerous cavalry of the enemy,

What extent of *front* and *rear*, the *oblong* square might have had, cannot be known. The 600 men of the newly formed companies, cannot be supposed to have been adequate to form a rear face; since a depth of five ranks, is the least that can be reckoned on: for Polybius informs us, that in the order of the Macedonian phalanx, five ranks presented their pikes to the front. The six companies then, would only have given a front of 120 files: too narrow, as well as too weak, to resist the attacks of a powerful enemy; and for a rear closely pressed. So narrow a front, would have rendered their disposition of a *square*, almost nugatory. It has been already supposed (page 143,) that their order was *eight* deep, generally, throughout the square; since their numbers were such as to allow it; and at the same time to allow a sufficient extent to the fronts, and of space within the hollow of the square.

If it be supposed that under the new arrangement, the *oblong* square was formed with a breadth equal to half the length, the front and rear would have had somewhat more

than 200 files in each.\* This may have been the greatest breadth allowed, at any time; and it may have been contracted, as circumstances required. But still, unless the area within, had a considerable degree of breadth, it would not have afforded the space, requisite. It was to contain all the public stores, and private baggage, of the army; the sick and wounded; the followers of both sexes; the spare horses, and probably cattle for slaughter, &c. &c. The beasts of burthen, and cattle alone, must have occupied a very considerable space.† And finally, room must have been left, sufficient to admit the whole of the light-armed troops, on an emergency: and these must have been more than 2000, at that time. The *oblong* square, formed on the above proportions, would have presented a *front* of about 120 yards: but when in motion, would have extended its *flanks* to the length of nearly a quarter of a mile.

If it could be supposed, that there is an error in the *number* of the new companies; and that, instead of *six*, there might have been enough to form a *rear face* of sufficient depth, to the oblong square; a plausible hypothesis might be offered. For, in that case, many doubts would be removed; and in particular, that very perplexing one, respecting the *variation* in the *extent* of the *opening*, left in the rear. For, if it be supposed, that by the new disposition, the wings were only to separate to such an extent, as would suit the ground, on which they

\* Arrian has a specimen of a square of these proportions, in his *Tactics*: With a front of 200 and a depth of 8, *sixteen* companies would have been required, instead of *six*.

† The *Rhodian* who required 2000 skins for floats, appears to have reckoned upon nearly as many *girths* of sumpter horses, to fasten them with. (Lib. III. c. 27.)



were forming, and about to march over, (which to the author appears not improbable,) the extent of the opening, or in other words, that of the rear face of the square, would then vary with circumstances. And it might probably have been the system, according to the idea of Dr. Gillies,\* to dispose the companies in such a way as to fill up the opening, by adapting the depth to the front required; so as to employ the whole force: and which appears to have been necessary; as no part of it could with safety have remained on the outside of the square, whilst closely pursued. And as the *depth* of the companies, so disposed, must necessarily have increased with the *diminution* of their *front*, this may have given occasion to that part of the description, which in its present state, seems to many persons, so much like a paradox.

It is not necessary to suppose, that at the *moment* of filling up the void, *all* the companies should have been formed of an equal depth; but rather that they fell in, in such a way, as to occupy the whole space with the greatest expedition. For, as the extent of front required, might not be known, when they *began* to fill up the *void*; neither, of course, could the depth, which depended on the extent of that front, be known. It is probable that the companies, at the first, fell in, in the columns, in which they had been previously marching: and afterwards extended their fronts, as it became necessary.

It may be concluded with certainty, that their improved disposition was calculated *chiefly* to combine the advantage of such an extent of front, as might be reckoned secure; with that which afforded a facility of movement. And also to provide for the safety of the rear, under particular circumstances.

\* History of Greece, Vol. III. p. 214, Octavo Ed.

But at the same time Xenophon *describes* no other alteration, than that of forming the new companies: (for the change in the *form* of the square, is only mentioned *incidentally* :) and he observes, that after this measure was adopted, there was no longer any confusion of the kind that had before taken place.\*

If then, the Author's supposition be admitted, the newly formed companies (whatsoever their number may have been) are to be regarded as the constituent parts of the *rear face* of the *oblong square*. For, as it is said that "when the wings" were to be *closed*, these companies halted, and remained in "the rear; so that the men in the wings might be no longer liable to compression or disorder," it ought of course to be inferred, that at other times they marched *with them*; by which we should understand that they formed the rear of the square.

A difficulty however occurs, respecting an inconvenience which is stated to have existed under the *old disposition*; but which was removed by the formation of the new companies. It was, that "when they were approaching a bridge, or any other strait passage, each soldier would hasten to be amongst the foremost to get over:" and thus occasion disorder. But that subsequent to the improved disposition, "there was no longer any cause for precipitation; since the companies, divided according to local circumstances, passed in succession." If this refers to the army at large, it is difficult to be understood; although perfectly intelligible, if it refers to the rear alone.

\* One can hardly account for the omission, in the text, of the circumstance of the change in the form of the square, on any other ground, than that of the passage having been mutilated.

But it must be acknowledged, that the *text*, as it stands, *does seem* to have a reference to the army in general : and accordingly, some highly respectable authorities have supposed, that the evil, arising from the hurry and confusion, described to have prevailed, at the entrance into any narrow passage ; as well as the remedy applied to it ; extended to the army at large. But it does not appear to the author, how any part of the army, except the rear of the wings, or the rear of the square itself, could be exposed to attacks, from an enemy in close pursuit ; any more than how the *army in general* could be benefited by a body of men, whose services appear to have been confined to a particular part of it. Therefore, when it is said that the newly formed companies were always prepared “ to be useful in every part of the army, according to the exigency of the moment,” this could only have been, if at all, during the interval of time, when the square was *compressed* : but surely it appears more probable that the passage is corrupted ; since it involves a contradiction, in respect of the main facts. For let it only be considered, that this body of men had a specific duty to perform, in filling up the voids in the rear : so that their absence, even for a short space, might have been productive of the greatest mischief.

Nor does the narrative describe any Change, but what relates to *the rear of the square* : that is, to the new companies, which were said to have marched in the *rear of the wings*, whenever the square was compressed into a column.

It is possible, that the new companies, subdivided as they were into small bodies, each under the eye of a particular officer, may have been kept in better marching order : and, in consequence, that the pressure and confusion incident to the

hurried march of a large body of troops, on approaching a defile, may have been prevented : but it cannot well be understood to apply to any part, save the rear.

It must be acknowledged, however, that after all the suppositions that have been hazarded, much is still wanting, towards a clear understanding of the subject.

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*Concerning the Greek Military Term LOCHOS ; and its different Applications.*

Since the term LOCHOS is applied by Xenophon indifferently to a *permanent* company of a battalion, or regiment ; and to a *division* appointed for special services : and as the term is used by other historians, in senses totally different from the former, and also from each other ; it may be proper, in this place, to say a word respecting the modes in which the term has been applied.

It appears to the author, that it has been too much the practice to confound together, the different systems of the PHALANX, which prevailed in different ages : as for instance, the phalanx of the *Lacedæmonians*, at the date of the *Peloponnesian* war ; with the *Macedonian* phalanx of Alexander and of Perseus. For these, although agreeing perfectly in principle, and in general effect, differed considerably in the detail of their establishments ; as in the instance of the *lochos* and *lochagos*, which, in the time of Thucydides, were terms which meant respectively, a battalion, and its commander, or colonel ; but which Arrian applies to a *single file* of the phalanx, and its leader !

The term *lochos* would appear to intend, in its general acceptation, a DIVISION : and to have been applied, at different times, as well to a *division* of an *army*, as of a *battalion* ; and even to that of a *company*. Accordingly, the *lochos* of Thucydides (referring particularly to the date of the battle of *Mantineia*, 422 B. Christ) is, as we have said, a battalion ;\* that of Xenophon, little more than 20 years afterwards, is a company, or other division of a battalion ; and that of Ælian and Arrian, referring to times, down to 250 years after Xenophon, is a *single file* of sixteen men ; or as many as constituted the depth of their order of battle. Therefore, without entering any further into a comparison of the systems, we may be allowed to consider the *lochos* described by Xenophon, as the one which is alone applicable to the subject of the *Anabasis* ; and regard it, whether *permanent* or *casual*, as a division of a battalion.

According to the manner in which this term is used, on two different occasions in the *Anabasis*, the import of it, is that of a *permanent* division of a battalion, or corps ; formed for the purpose of facilitating the inspection, and for the internal œconomy and government, of the individuals of it ; agreeing with the modern idea of a *company*.

\* Thucydides (lib. v.) gives the following numbers for the divisions of a *lochos* or *battalion* :

The *lochos* consisted of 512 men ; under a commander (or colonel) styled *lochagos*.

The *lochos* was formed into 4 *pentacosties*, or companies, of 128 men, each under a *pentecontaleres*, or captain.

The *pentacosty* consisted of 4 *enomatæ* (or *platoons*) each of 32 men, drawn up 8 deep, and with a front of 4 : the front rank formed of *select* men (similar, perhaps, to the *lochagi* of Arrian). The commanders of these platoons were styled *enomatarcbi*.

\*\*\* One may conclude, from the term applied to the companies, that 50 had been the *original* strength of a company ; as those of the Romans having been originally of 100 (though afterwards more than doubled) gave the title of *centurion* to the commander.

In lib. I. c. 9; and in IV. c. 16; the term *lochos* must be understood to apply directly to a *permanent* division, into companies; and 50\* is the number given in both places. In the first, Menon is said to have lost *two companies* of his army, amounting to 100 men, heavy armed; in crossing mount *Taurus*. And in the other, at the crossing of the river *Centrites*, the commanders of companies are directed "to divide their companies into two distinct bodies of 25 men each; and to extend "their front, &c."

But the same term *lochos* is also employed in the *Anabasis*, to express certain divisions, formed for special, or occasional services; and without any reference to the permanent distribution, into companies; whose individual strength, as such, might have been insufficient for the purposes intended. There are also *two* occasions, where this occurs.

The first of these is the before-mentioned one of the 6 companies† (Lib. III. c. 21), formed for the security of the rear of the square. And in the other (Lib. IV. c. 44), the whole line of the phalanx was divided into *lochi*, of nearly 100 men each; and formed into *columns*, for the attack of the *Colchian* mountains.

As in the first of the two instances, they are said to have *formed* companies of 100 men each, it must be concluded, of course, that no such description of companies, already existed, as a permanent establishment. And in the latter instance, it may be supposed, that after having decided upon making the

\* Here the companies are again composed of the number, which originally impressed on them the name of *fifties*; although they had previously arisen to 128.

† Or, as many as might have been formed; admitting that the number *six* is a corruption.

attack with separate columns, they threw the line into as many *divisions*, as there were *columns* required; and which would have been determined, necessarily, by the extent of front to be attacked; and the force required to make the desired impression, on the points attacked. Thus it appears, that about 100 was determined to be a proper strength for each column: and this was of course without any reference to their original establishment of companies; although they might possibly have formed each of the new divisions, out of two of the old companies.

Xenophon, then, appears to intend, by *lochi*, certain divisions of a battalion, or corps; whether *permanent*, like our companies, or *casually* formed, for *special services*; in which latter case, they appear to have been formed of the requisite degree of strength, for the occasion; and consequently of arbitrary numbers. The disposition for the attack of the *Colchian* mountains, furnishes an instance of this kind: and it may be remarked, that the strength of the whole column united, being required here, nothing is said respecting a *subdivision* of the companies into *fifties* or *twenty-fives*, for the purpose of extending the front, when necessary; as at the passage of the *Centrites*. And it appears to the author, that the measure of dividing the companies at the *Centrites*, for the purpose of extending the front, throws some faint light on the disposition of the companies; in filling up the voids in the rear of the square.



## CHAPTER XI.

FROM THE ASCENT OF THE CARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS, TO  
THE DESCENT INTO ARMENIA.

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*Difficulty of tracing the route of the Greeks, from their uppermost station on the Tigris, to Trebisonde—General Observations on the Geography of their Route—Its direction appears to have been determined by casual circumstances, until they were far advanced into Armenia—The Greek system of Geography at that day, likely to mislead them, in their attempt to reach their Colonies on the Euxine—Remarks on the Geography of their Route across the Carduchian Territory—Pass of Bedlis—Force their way through the Carduchian mountains, by dint of continued exertion and valour—Nature of their Military Disposition and Warfare, totally different from that during the former part of the retreat—Further reduction of the baggage and followers—Bravery and determined obstinacy of the Enemy—Historical particulars relating to the Carduchians—The Greeks descend into the plains of Armenia, and cross (not without difficulty), the river Centrites; which appears to have been that, which passed by Tigranocerta; or Seert.*

HAVING now brought the GREEKS within the region of the *Carduchians*, it may not be useless, previous to the attempt to

follow them across it, to enquire concerning their plan of proceeding, in respect of the remaining part of their route : and whether the direction of it, was not dictated as much by necessity, as by judgment and choice.

It is not possible to follow the Ten Thousand, *geographically*, through the whole of their retreat, between the place where they ascended the *Carduchian* mountains, and *Trebisonde* ; in which they employed, in marching only, about 66 days (according to the history), in order to accomplish a distance of less than 300 British miles, in a straight line ; and certainly less than 400, by the road : but then, they wandered during about 3 weeks, between the Euphrates, and the Harpasus rivers, after they had lost their guide.

It appears, however, that to a point, several marches *beyond* the Euphrates,\* they kept nearly to the line of the ordinary road towards Trebisonde ; and that, bating the delay occasioned by the continued warfare in the mountains ; and by the deep snows, newly fallen, near the Euphrates ; their progress was at the ordinary rate of marching. And this includes an interval of more than 20 days ; chiefly during the month of December.

But from the place where the guide left them, they have left no mark to guide us ; as certainly wanting such themselves : no one therefore can undertake to delineate their track ; any more than that of a ship, in which no reckoning has been kept. Although the rivers *Phasis* and *Harpasus* may be recognised, in modern geography, yet the time *said* to be employed in marching between them, and in the neighbourhood

\* That is the Murad, or *eastern* branch, which rises in the quarter of *Bayazid* ; and is the Euphrates of Xenophon.

of the former, appears too great : and nothing more can be collected, than the *general outline* of the tract within which they wandered. Therefore, the time, as well of the reader, as of the geographer, would be unprofitably spent, should it be attempted to describe in detail, the track of the Greeks, after the guide left them. For even if the most exact survey of the ground was procured, the marches could not be traced on it, for want of objects to refer to, from the history : although the rivers and mountains may perhaps assist in forming an idea of the *limits* of the tract, within which their wandering was confined.

It may be conceived that the best informed amongst those Greeks, had general ideas of the geography, and outlines of the countries, inclosed between the Mediterranean, Euxine, and Caspian seas : and which must have been somewhat improved by their recent experience. But since the battle of *Cunaxa*, they had been led by so circuitous a route, that before they entered Armenia, it is probable that they could not form any distinct idea of the line of direction, in which any of their colonies on the Euxine, lay.\*.

After their arrival in Armenia, there is no direct intimation given, concerning the plan of their route : but as they were told by the guides, before they ascended the mountains, that “ when they should arrive in Armenia, they might, without difficulty, march which way soever they pleased ;” and as after their arrival there, they chose the northern road, it may be

\* It would appear, however, that in a matter which depended on his *own* observation, Xenophon was tolerably exact, when he states the distance of the *Zabatus* from *Iönia*, at about ten thousand stadia ; after they had made a *circuitous* march of more than 19 thousand to the *Zabatus*. (See the note to page 137).

presumed that they had laid aside their plan of going immediately towards *Lydia* and *Iönia*, because the continuation of mount *Taurus* (in that quarter, named *Niphates*, doubtless from its snowy summits;) obstructed their passage; as it runs in a northerly or north-west direction, for nearly a degree. They accordingly struck to the north, through the plains; perhaps because that road offered an easy passage, and a fair prospect of subsistence; objects of the greatest importance at all times; but now in appearance rendered absolutely necessary, from the long continued hardships that they had endured; from the number of wounded and disabled men; and from the near approach of the severe weather, experienced in the country of Armenia.\* And that having been induced by these circumstances to proceed a great way to the northward; and perhaps thinking themselves farther advanced than they really were (which is often the case); they formed the resolution of pushing for the Grecian colonies on the Euxine sea. But no design of this kind, is declared, at the commencement of the retreat: and it was probably adopted after they had crossed the Euphrates, and were arrived amongst a people who had some knowledge of those colonies.†

It is certain, however, that Diodorus says, (lib. xiv.) that having elected new generals, they set out from the *Zabatus* for *Paphlagonia* (meaning probably *Sinope* or *Amisus*, situated in that country). And this may possibly have been their

\* There is at present a caravan road; and probably there was, at that time, a great road, leading from the quarter of *Bedlis*, northward, through Armenia. This must have pointed very much in the direction taken by the Greeks.

† The speech of Xenophon at the attack of the *Colcbian* mountains, implies that they had long designed to proceed to *Trebisönde*; but the phrase is only comparative.

intention; considering it as an intermediate point of rest in their way to *Iönia*: for the *almost immeasurable length of way* from *Assyria* to *Iönia*,\* to men, circumstanced as they were, must have appalled even the Greeks! Diodorus, who evidently had recourse to other materials, besides the *Anabasis*, may perhaps have collected this fact from them.

Nor does the idea collected from Xenophon contradict Diodorus. He represents that the Greeks at the commencement of their retreat (from the *Zäbatus*), intended to trace the course of the Tigris, upwards, until they came to a fordable part. And it appears to have been equally their intention to arrange their marches, so as to cross the Euphrates (which they probably supposed to consist of a single stream), in the like manner; as the only mode of overcoming the difficulties, presented by those rivers. And perhaps, their return to *Iönia* might afterwards have been facilitated, by taking *Amisus* or *Sinope*, or both of them, in their way.

But the close pursuit of the enemy to the time of their arrival at the foot of the *Carduchian* mountains, confined their attention merely to the objects of *defence* and *subsistence*: otherwise they might, had they been so inclined, have forded the Tigris, as Alexander afterwards did, between Nineveh and the foot of the *Carduchian* mountains. The truth, however, is, that they never thought of crossing the Tigris, until the apparently greater obstacle of the *overhanging* mountains, compelled them to try it, as an alternative. And in that part, as we have seen, it was found too deep. But, as it has been already

\* Taken above (page 137) roundly at about a thousand British miles, from the *Zäbatus* to *Ephesus*. And very nearly as much to *Byzantium*.

remarked it would have been the most unsafe course they could have taken.

It may not be improper in this place, to remark, that the geography of the Greeks, at the date of Herodotus, and which may doubtless be applied to the time of Xenophon,\* extended the Euxine very much further to the east, than the truth; at the same time that they reckoned the peninsula of Asia Minor, very much too narrow.† The effect of this would have been, of course, to induce a belief in Xenophon, that the Grecian colonies in question were much more to the *south-east*, than they really were: so that it is not improbable, that he supposed Trebisonde to lie directly to the *north*, when he crossed the Euphrates, although it really lay to the *north-west*.

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Xenophon reckons in the aggregate, 7 marches through the *Carduchians'* country: but we cannot make out more than 5 marches, and 2 halts. Possibly the space of 7 days was intended to express the whole time of their being within the territory. Diodorus also says; that they passed through the mountains in 7 days. But whether they made 5 or 7 marches, the progress forward, could not be great. "They were continually fighting; and suffered more than from all the attempts of the king and Tissaphernes." (Lib. IV. c. 11.) Add to this, the roughness of the country, and the necessity

\* Scarcely a generation later: both were probably living, at the same time.

† Herodotus reckoned the *Isthmus* to be 5 journies only, across: but it is more than 4 degrees. Eratosthenes allows 3000 stades, which is nearly the truth. Pliny nearly 100 Roman miles too little. Again, Herman Moll was right; and M. D'Anville erred about a degree on the same side with Herodotus.

of often halting, to defend themselves by the way : besides, under such circumstances, they would regard the *quality* of the road, more than its absolute line of *direction*, when closely pressed ; and this would also have the effect of lessening their progress forwards.

It must moreover, be recollected, that the Greeks *traced back* a small portion of their route, near the Tigris, on the 15th day ; when they were about to ascend the mountain. This will also operate to reduce the line of distance, between their uppermost station on the Tigris, and the river *Centrites*, the northern boundary of the Carduchians' territory. And it is probable, that, when all the above allowances and deductions, are made, that the line of distance from the station on the Tigris, to the *Centrites*, short as it may appear, was not more than 28 G. miles, direct. The line of direction was probably north-eastward ; both because it was the shortest line by which they could reach the plains of Armenia ; and that it also leads through a valley, which seems to answer to one described by Cartwright, in the quarter of Cochakan ; and which lies in that direction.\*

According to the geographical construction, they must have descended the mountains, about midway between Sered or Seert (taken for *Tigranocerta*) and Bedlis ; in which quarter, the two ridges of *Taurus*, named *Niphates* and *Masius*, by their junction, form a very wide belt of mountains, generally named from their inhabitants, the *Kourds*, who are the descendants of

\* See Cartwright's, or the *Preacher's* Travels, in Purchas's Collection of Voyages ; Vol. II. This is the line of the caravan route, between Diyarbekir and Tabriz ; crossing that of the Ten Thousand.

The valley and town spoken of by Xenophon, occurs in Lib. IV. c. 10.



the *Carduchians* of antiquity. A description of the tract is given by Cartwright, and also by Taverniere; both of whom travelled through it, from west to east, in the line between Seert and Bedlis: as the Greeks appear to have done from south-west to north-east, intermediately between those places. It contains many fertile and beautiful vallies; and some of the mountain sides, are extremely well wooded. No mention is made of snow, by Xenophon: although at the end of November. Mr. Sullivan saw it on the *summits* fronting the Tigris, in June; but it was probably confined to the summits: and it appears that the first snow noticed by Xenophon, fell in the plains of Armenia, about 9 days after the Greeks had left the mountains.\*

The passes leading through this region, from *Mesopotamia* into *Armenia*, are so difficult of access, and so easily defended, that the chief of Bedlis, a large town, situated at the opening of the strongest of the passes, in the road from Diyarbekir to Wan and Tabriz, derives much consequence from his local situation, in the eyes of the *Porte*.

The march of the Greeks through this mountainous territory, presents a scene of continued labour, exertion, and valour. It is probable, however, that it is often passed over by that class of readers, who attend most to those parts of history, in which brilliant actions, comprised in short descriptions, are not likely to fatigue the attention. The march in question affords a variety of military stratagems, and displays much character. And although as a history, it *appears* to be little more than a narrative of the manner of passing the summits of mountains; and to have much of sameness in it; yet, if it

\* Heavy rain fell, during their passage over the mountains. Lib. IV. c. 7.

be analyzed, much variety will be found, in the different modes of getting possession of them : as well as in that of forcing their way through the difficult passages, generally. Many of these are well worth the attention and remembrance of military men ; and it is not the least to say of them, that they were thought worthy of being recorded by Xenophon.

We cannot help comparing the laborious and hazardous interval spent by the Greeks in the Carduchian mountains, with the state of Captain Cook, and his crew, in the Endeavour, whilst engaged in the intricate, and imminently dangerous navigation, amongst the reefs and shallows of New Holland. These long continued perils, are feelingly spoken of, by that GREAT NAVIGATOR, at their conclusion : but it is to be feared that very many, if not most, readers, turn over those leaves, without attending to their contents : chiefly, because a want of knowledge of sea affairs, renders them incapable of estimating the degree of danger, fatigue, and anxiety, that prevailed, during an interval of six weeks.\*

When the Greeks had ascended into the Carduchian territory, they soon found that their future order of march, must necessarily be the very reverse of that, which in the open country below, had, so successfully, resisted the rapid and sudden attacks of the Persian cavalry. In the narrow passages of the mountains, they could no longer concentrate, either their military force, or their baggage. The paucity, and dispersed state of the inhabitants, rendered provisions scarce, and even that scanty supply, became precarious ; because the inhabitants dwelt in situations difficult of access. The nature of the country, also<sup>†</sup> converted the roads into passes ; and the

\* See Captain Cook's Voyage, in Dr. Hawkesworth's Collection, Vol. II.

summits of the mountains into citadels; which commanded the ascent on both sides, by the simple operation of rolling down stones. In every sense then, it was a war of posts. Nor were the enemy formidable only, through their natural defences; their arrows of two cubits length, discharged from bows of nearly 3 cubits; and in which operation the left foot had a principal share, pierced the shields and corslets of the Greeks: and, in one instance, completely transfixed a man's head.

The first object of the Greek generals, was to reduce the baggage, and the attendants on the army.\* After this, they forced their way, either by sending detachments by circuitous ways, to surprise and dispossess the enemy of the *passes* and *summits*, or by open attack. In every instance they were successful: but the enemy were often nimble enough to return to the summit, in time to disturb the rear, in their descent. It was fortunate, that they were not more numerous. The *Cretan* bowmen were of the greatest service, here, although they had been less regarded in the plains, against the Persian cavalry, who were enabled to choose their distance.

Xenophon sums up the history of their warfare in these mountains, in the following manner. They were then arrived at the end of the Carduchian's territory. (Lib. IV. c. 11).

“ This day they staid in the villages situated above the

\* Although at the commencement of the retreat, they had reduced the baggage to a scale of mere necessity, as it respected their personal habits and œconomy; yet, the nature of the country, here, requiring a closer order of march; and the difficulty of obtaining provisions, inducing the necessity of lessening the consumption of them; the number of sumpter horses was reduced, and all the slaves recently taken were dismissed. By this arrangement another advantage was likewise gained: for the men who had the charge of them, now augmented the number of the combatants.

“ plain, that extends to the river *Centrites*.—Here they staid  
 “ with great satisfaction, having plenty of provisions: and  
 “ often calling to mind the difficulties they had undergone:  
 “ for during the 7 days, they had marched through the coun-  
 “ try of the *Carduchians*, they were continually fighting, and  
 “ suffered more than from all the attempts of the king and  
 “ *Tissaphernes*. Looking upon themselves, therefore, as  
 “ freed from these hardships, they rested with pleasure. But  
 “ as soon as it was day, they saw a body of horse, on the  
 “ other side of the river, completely armed, and ready to op-  
 “ pose their passage; and above the horse, another of foot,  
 “ drawn up, upon an eminence, to hinder them from pene-  
 “ trating into *Armenia*.” This accordingly was a fresh source  
 of disquiet; for on descending to the river side, (6 or 7 stadia  
 only, from the mountains,) it was found too deep to be conve-  
 niently forded, in the line of the road; and the *Carduchians*  
 were collecting in great numbers, on the eminence which the  
 Greeks had quitted.

The next day, however, a convenient ford was discovered:  
 and having, with great address, baffled all the attempts of the  
 enemy, on both sides of the river, they passed it, with very  
 little damage. And having crossed the valley through which  
 it flowed, and ascended the eminence beyond it,\* they came  
 into the plains of *Armenia*: in which, for a considerable inter-  
 val, they marched forward, relieved both from hostility, and

\* It appears, therefore, that there was a ridge of hills, or rather *rise*, beyond the *Centrites*, which flowed through a valley adjacent to the foot of the *Carduchian* mountains: moreover, that the summit of the *rise*, was the commencement of the plains of *Armenia*; and the valley, most probably worn down from the level of those plains, by the river.

great bodily fatigue; and accommodated with provisions in abundance. What a change of circumstances!

Although they were again entered into the dominions of the great king, yet they had now, only the proper force of Armenia, opposed to them: the nature and extent of the mountainous tract, which they had just quitted, effectually preventing the Persian army from penetrating it.

Xenophon gives the following historical fact, concerning the *Carduchians*, on the report of the Persian prisoners.

“That they were a warlike nation, and not subject to the king [of Persia]: and that once, the king’s army, consisting of 120,000 men, penetrated into their country; from whence not one of them returned; the roads being hardly passable.” (Book III. at the end.)

Plutarch informs us that Artaxerxes, (the same, against whom the expedition of Cyrus was undertaken) afterwards marched into the country of the *Carduchians*, at the head of a vast army of horse: and that this army had, in all probability, perished through famine, had not Teribazus, governor of Armenia, procured a peace.

It is an error to suppose that the posterity of these *Carduchians*, were the *Parthians* who subverted the throne of the *Seleucidæ*; and who defeated Crassus. The *Parthians* came from the province of that name, beyond the Caspian sea; and established a dynasty in Persia, at large. And those who defeated Crassus, were *Persians*, under the government of that *Parthian* dynasty. The practice of shooting arrows backwards in retreating, was as much Persian as Parthian; as we learn from the *Anabasis* (Lib. III. c. 15); although very commonly referred to the *Parthians* alone; perhaps,

because it was so fatally experienced by the Roman army, under Crassus.

It appears highly probable that the *Centrites* of Xenophon is the same with that, described by Hajy Kalifa, and other oriental geographers, as the river of Bedlis; as originating from, or passing very near to, that place, which has been so much celebrated on the score of its *pass*. (See above, page 196.) Hajy Kalifa conducts the river of Bedlis through the plain, to the southward of Seert, Sard, or Sered (the ancient *Tigranocerta*) situated within the great valley of Diyarbekir. It is by no means certain, however, that the river of Bedlis, is also the river of *Tigranocerta*, anciently called the *Nicephorius*; but that it passes through the plain, to the southward of it; for another, but smaller river, is said, by the same authority, to join the river of Bedlis, in that quarter; as will presently appear.

Again Hajy Kalifa says, that the river of Bedlis passes near *Kala Zerke*, situated also *in the plain*. Here then we obtain for certain, a point in the general course of this river, below the mountains: for *Zerke* occurs in a caravan route of M. Taverniere, at the distance of one stage to the eastward of Seert; (which is easily recognised in the *Ziarat* of that traveller :) and at a like distance to the westward of *Cochacan*, taken above, (page 195,) for the town and valley, in which the Greeks found themselves so much at their ease, when they had nearly accomplished their passage through Kourdistan. *Zerke* was also three caravan stages short of Bedlis itself. So that the river of Bedlis certainly passes at one caravan journey eastward from Seert; having then freed itself from the *Carduchian* mountains; and proceeding still more to the

west, or south-west, advances to the neighbourhood of Seert, and is there joined by a smaller river, which may possibly be that of *Tigranocerta*; as the *Nicephorius* seems to have been too easily forded by the army of Lucullus, to answer to the *Centrites*.

It appears then, that the river of Bedlis certainly penetrates the great body of the *Carduchian* mountains: as also, that it appears to be the same with the *Centrites* or *Kentrites*, of Xenophon. And although it may at first sight, appear improbable that so small a body of water, should sap so vast a mass of mountains; yet the fact is, that although the Greeks descended from those mountains, to the river, the descent towards Armenia is small, compared with the ascent from the side of *Mesopotamia*: and this may at once be understood by the circumstances of the case. The whole descent, that is, the whole length of the *slope*, was only 6 or 7 stadia: whereas the Greeks employed a whole day in the ascent; probably equal to 10 or 12 times the length of the other. Consequently the level of Armenia, must be very greatly elevated above that of *Mesopotamia*; and of course, the river of Bedlis must run on a very considerable declivity, to the Tigris.

The *Centrites* was said to be 200 feet in breadth. M. D'Anville supposed the river Khabour (of Armenia) to be the *Centrites*; but Hajy Kalifa says, that the Khabour flows by Zaco: so that this latter answers to the Kurnib of Sestini, which comes from Amadie in Kourdistan; and is perfectly distinct from the river of Bedlis.



## CHAPTER XII.

FROM THE CARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS, TO THE VILLAGES OF  
SHELTER AND REFRESHMENT, BEYOND THE EUPHRATES.

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*The TEN THOUSAND proceed northward through western Armenia, a beautiful Tract—Arrive at a point beyond the head of the Tigris—Geography of the Route, between the Centrites and the Euphrates—Cross the Teleboas, the Arsanius of Lucullus; a beautiful stream—Arrive at the first villages of refreshment, south of the Euphrates; supposed to be Yezidkoi—First snow of the winter—Petty warfare with the Satrape of Armenia—Enquiry into the position of the source of the Murad, or Eastern Euphrates—The Greeks ford it, in the district of the Chaoi, taken for Khanoos—Arrive at the second villages of refreshment, to the north of the Euphrates—Dreadful sufferings of the Grecian army, from cold and privations—Their lives preserved, by the shelter and food, afforded by these villages—Armenian winter houses described.*

FROM the *Centrites*, it appears that the Greeks marched *northwards*: and in 3 marches, according to Xenophon, they were advanced “above the head of the Tigris.”\* But the river

\* The reader is again referred to the Map No. II. for the geography of the retreat, after ascending the *Carduchian* mountains.

intended in this place, is not the one which either the Romans or the moderns, have regarded as the proper Tigris: for this springs from a place very far to the westward of the city of Diyarbekir; and so near to the course of the Euphrates of Xenophon (that is, the Murad) that *two* marches would have carried them from the one to the other; whereas, they made no less than *ten*, from the station in question: not to mention that the *Teleboas* river lay between. That head of the Tigris meant by Xenophon, was probably the remote eastern one, named Arzen, by the oriental geographers. Xenophon spoke of the only Tigris known to him: and which was perhaps pointed out to him, because that having got *beyond* it, the Greeks might, if they had been so inclined, have directed their course more to the west. And hence it had become an object of enquiry, and of attention, to them.\* And for a like reason, the eastern branch alone, of the Euphrates (the Murad) was known to them.

On crossing the *Centrites* the Greeks were said to have entered the *western part of Armenia*; described to be a country of "plains, intermixed with hills of an easy ascent." And this description seems to apply to the whole tract, till within 3 marches of the Euphrates: that is, an extent of ten marches from the *Centrites*. At this point, a chain of hills, or a lower order of mountains, occurred; in which was a pass, through which the road led; and where Teribazus, the Satrape of the country, took post, in order to oppose the passage of the

\* No branch whatsoever of the Tigris could, at this time, have interfered with their route, which lay very wide of that river. But perhaps, their thoughts had been so long bent on the measure of passing over the Tigris, to the westward; that the idea still occupied their minds, although the state of things was totally changed.

Greeks.\* However, he was himself surprised and defeated ; such was the close intelligence and active vigilance of the Greeks : and this was the only hostility that occurred, from the time of their leaving the Carduchian territory, to their encountering the united forces of the *Chaldaeans*, (or *Chalybians*,) *Taöchians*, and *Phasians*, at two marches beyond the river called *Phasis*, by Xenophon ; but truly the upper part of the *Araxes*.

From the pass just mentioned, to the Euphrates, in distance 3 marches, the country was said to be a desert ; but was then covered with snow : and beyond the river, (*i. e.* to the *northward*) plains, also covered with snow, the length of 3 other marches : after which, a fourth, through a hilly or mountainous tract, brought them to the villages, where they found such ample means of refreshment : and whose position forms the term of the present head of enquiry. So that the whole tract, from the mountains of the Carduchians, to a point four marches north of the Euphrates, 17 marches in all, was, with very few exceptions, “ a plain, interspersed with hills of an “ easy ascent.” \*But this plain is exceedingly elevated above those of *Mesopotamia* and *Assyria* ; as is the whole country of *Armenia* and its adjacencies : for, as it has been before remarked, the ascent of *Taurus*,† from the south, is out of all proportion greater, than the descent to the plain of *Armenia*, on the north. Accordingly, the great body of land, constituting the *two Armenias*, according to the ancient division,‡

\* This too, was after he had made an amicable treaty with them (Lib. iv. c. 19.)

† Called in that part, the *Carduchian* mountains ; and farther to the north-west, *Niphates*.

‡ That is, *Armenia major*, on the east of the Euphrates, or *Frat*, above *Taurus* ;

may be regarded as an upper level, or kind of *table-land*; from whence the rivers descend in every direction: and on the northern side of which *table*, the *Moschi* and *Sanni* mountains, form a steep descent towards the Black sea.

We shall now enquire, from these *data*, and other notices, and circumstances, into the probable situation of the ford of the Euphrates, where the Greeks crossed it; as well as into that of the villages of refreshment, both to the *north* and *south* of it.

When the Greeks enquired of the country-people, at the southern foot of the *Carduchian* mountains, concerning the roads; they were told amongst other particulars, that the road over the mountains, to the north, led to the *Carduchians*; and that beyond these people, was *Armenia*, a spacious and plentiful country; "from whence they might march which way soever they pleased." (Lib. III. at the end.)

After their arrival in *Armenia*, nothing is said respecting their line of direction, until they had crossed the Euphrates; when it is said, that the last day's march was very grievous, because "*the north wind blew full in their faces*:" (Lib. iv. c. 23.) As no good reason can be assigned, why their course should have been otherwise, at this point of their progress, than at any intermediate point, since they entered the open country; one may infer, that they had proceeded *north*, or much *northerly*, the whole way from the *Centrites*. This is all that can be collected from the history: but there are other circumstances, which render it probable that they went north, or very much northerly. One is, the position of mount

*Armenia minor*, on the west. The *western Armenia* of Xenophon<sup>o</sup>, was, however, included in the greater *Armenia*.

*Niphates*, which interposed between them and the line of direction towards Asia Minor: and another, that the river, to which they came in 6 marches from the *Centrites*; and which they named *Teleboas*; answers to the *Aksou*, or white river, in M. Delisle's map of Armenia; whose line of direction being northerly, and nearly in the meridian of the pass of the *Centrites*, would necessarily be intersected or skirted by the line of march.\* And lastly, that the fine plains of western Armenia, answer to those of Moosh (*Moxoene*) described by Abulfeda and Sherefeddin, as occupying a great part of the space between Moosh and Aklat: so that it may be conceived that the Greeks marched nearly in the midst, between the mountains of Moosh (*Niphates*) and the lake of Wan; on whose western shore Aklat is situated. And had they marched in the neighbourhood of such a range of snowy mountains as those of Moosh, it is probable that Xenophon would have mentioned them.† Upon the whole, then, it appears highly probable that

\* Xenophon says that the *Teleboas*, "though not large, was beautiful, and had many fine villages on its banks: this country was called the western part of Armenia." (Lib. iv. c. 19.)

This river answers to the *Arsanius* of Plutarch; to which Lucullus came, on the fourth march from the northern foot of *Taurus*; called in that part, the *Carducian* mountains. This river is also the *Arsinius* of Procopius, or a branch of it: for he only knew the northern, or Erzerum, branch, as the Euphrates; as Xenophon only knew the eastern one. Lucullus was at this time on his way from *Tigranocerta* towards *Artaxata*. Here he gained a decisive battle over Tigranes: but the near approach of an Armenian winter, made him relinquish his design of marching northwards.

There is no contradiction arising from the different lengths of the marches of Xenophon, and Lucullus, from the foot of *Taurus*, to the river in question; although both might have set off from the same point: the route of the one being north, the other north east, would intersect the river in different places, and at very unequal distances from the point of outset.

† Sherefeddin, in his history of Timur, relates that immediately to the westward of

the course was generally northward ; or perhaps inclining rather to the *west* : for it may be supposed, that as they had guides in this part of their way (as we are told Lib. iv. c. 23), they would naturally be conducted on some great road, that led towards the nearest parts of the Black sea ; which bore to the west of north from them.\*

The distance given on this northerly line, from the river *Centrites* to the villages of refreshment, lying to the NORTH of the Euphrates, and which necessarily includes the ford of that river, and the villages of refreshment to the SOUTH of it), is as follows :

From the *Centrites* to the *Teleboas* was six marches ; and three more to the villages of refreshment, *south* of the Euphrates, where they had the first snow. Thence to the pass where Teribazus was defeated, one *short* march ; and 3 more to the ford of the Euphrates : in all 13 marches from the *Centrites* to the *Euphrates* ; and four more to the villages of refreshment beyond, or to the north of it. In all 17.

The 9 marches which brought them to the *first* villages of refreshment ; and where the first snow fell, are given at 5 parasangas each ; equal to 45 parasangas ; and the 4 remaining ones, to the Euphrates, for which no distance is given, being through a deep snow, *newly fallen*, must of necessity,

Moosh, there were very high mountains, covered with snow, in the spring season : and that Timur in crossing them, lost many of his beasts of burthen, through the cold. Moosh is 4 journies to the N. E. by E. of Diyarbekir ; three west of Aklat ; the fine plain of Moosh lying between.

\* It appears by the travels of *Père Avril*, at the latter end of the 17th century, that there was a *caravan road*, between Bedlis and Erzerum : but no particulars are given, on an occasion where they are so much called for. It is merely said, that the journey was 8 or 10 days, in performing. He doubtless went by way of Yezidkoi, and Khanoos.

have been *very short*; as we are afterwards told that the horses sunk up to their bellies.\* One of the marches was, moreover, rather an *excursion* than a *march*; for it was no farther than they had previously ventured to go, from their camp, in order to surprise Teribazus; and to which camp they had returned the same day. It seems, therefore, that if 2 parasangas be taken, for the excursion to the pass, and  $7\frac{1}{2}$  for the other 3 days, through the snow, it may be deemed sufficient: and then the 13 days will give  $54\frac{1}{2}$  parasangas: equal to nearly 117 G. miles, in *direct* distance, between the *Centrites* and the Euphrates.

Before we endeavour to apply this line of distance, to the geography, it will be proper to lay before the reader, as much of the account of the geographical construction, relating to the place of the source, and future line of course of the Euphrates, (meaning the Murad, or *eastern* branch, which is the Euphrates of Xenophon)† as will enable him to judge for himself, how far the statement of the positions, on which the argument turns, deserves credit. It must, in the first instance, be assumed, that the surrounding positions of Diyarbekir, Jezirah, Moosh, Wan, Malazkerd, Bayazid, and Erzerum, are all placed upon the best authorities that could be obtained. The reader is again referred to the map No. II.

The source of the Murad was once thought to be *near*

\* The head man of the village north of the Euphrates, taught them to tie *bags* to the feet of the horses: without them, the horses sunk up to their bellies, in the newly fallen snow; which they measured, and found to be six feet deep. Lib. IV. c. 28.

† It seems scarcely necessary to remark that the Euphrates crossed by Xenophon at *Thapsacus*, in Syria, is formed of the joint waters of the one in question, (i. e. the Murad) and those of the Erzemum, or western branch (the Frat); the conflux taking place previous to the passage of the Euphrates, through *Anti-Taurus*.



Bayazid; but is now said to be at a place, 30 miles or more, farther to the westward. It was pointed out to Mr. James Morier, when at Diadin, at about 10 miles to the south-west of that place. However, it is certain that Hajy Kalifa says, that "the Murad, which has its fountain head in *Aladag* (the "mountains of *Ala*) traverses the plain of Bayazid." And this circumstance is added—"That in the same plain, the Murad is swallowed up; and issues out again at the distance of four hours travelling."\*

The mountains of *Ala* form a lofty ridge, which extends from west to east, between the source of the river Arash (*Araxes*), near Erzerum, and mount Ararat;† and which appears to *terminate* in the latter. On the south, *Ala* detaches a parallel ridge; and thus forms a spacious valley, of about an hundred miles in length; in the eastern quarter of which, the town of Bayazid is situated. The source of the Murad, pointed out to Mr. Morier, springs from the southern side of this valley: so that either the *southern* ridge is to be regarded as a *member* of *Ala*; or there are other sources nearer to Bayazid; (as H. Kalifa says that there are several springs). Certain it is, however, that Mr. Morier crossed no stream, whatsoever, in his way westward from Bayazid; the Murad at the same time flowing in the like direction, along the valley, and skirting his route on the left.

But as Bayazid contains an extensive district; in which a part at least, of the above valley is known to be included; (or it may be the greater part); may not the source near Diadin,

\* Hajy Kalifa's Geography of Armenia, translated by M. Hammer, of Vienna.

† That is, the mountain of that name near Irwân; but called *Macis* by the Armenians; *Agri-dagb*, by the Turks.

which certainly flows through the valley in question, be the fountain head of the Murad, intended by H. Kalifa?

This source appears to be the one spoken of by Pliny, (Lib. v. c. 24), on the report of Corbulo; as springing from the mountain of *Aba*, in the province of *Caranitis*, in Armenia. The name *Aba* or *Abi*, is said to be still known in Armenia: possibly the *Haboudja* of M. Delisle may have some relation to it.

The Murad is also the Euphrates of Strabo (page 521). So that the ancients, generally, applied the name of the *confluent* stream, to the eastern branch, as the natives do *Frat* (probably the origin of Euphrates) to the western. It may be supposed that Xenophon gave to the Greeks, the first distinct notices, concerning the general position and course of the Murad; to which he naturally gave the name of Euphrates; and was followed by the ancient geographers in general.

Pliny says that the Euphrates only takes that name, after having passed through the mountains: being previously named *Omiras*. He seems to have heard indistinctly, concerning the *Murad*, *Arsanius*, and other rivers, which flow into the Euphrates, or its branches: but it may be understood, that he did not consider the *Omiras* (Murad?) so much a branch, as the main river itself, under a different name. The *Arsanius* has been already spoken of, as the *Teleboas* of Xenophon, in the note to page 207: but it appears probable to the author, that through the great want of knowledge that had so long prevailed, concerning the subject of the upper branches of the Euphrates, and the countries through which they take their courses; that the name *Arsanius* has been very differently applied, by different persons amongst the ancients. But a

discussion of the subject, would not only be too long ; but out of place, here.

From Diadin, the Murad takes a general westerly course, through the valley above-mentioned ; by Utchkilisse, Alishgherd, and Turpakala : Mr. Morier's route, keeping either to its bank, or to its neighbourhood, during an extent of 60 or 70 miles : thus ascertaining to a moral certainty, that its course is such, as to agree with the march of Xenophon ; which requires that it should have kept to a high northern parallel, from its source, to the place where he crossed it : and which must have been after it had pierced the southern ridge of Ala-dagh, in its way to the west.\*

From thence, its general course bends more to the S. W. and even to the south ; so as to enter the great plain of Moosh : for this is its description, in the Armenian geography of Hajy Kalifa. It is, moreover, confirmed in this part also, by the map of M. Delisle, and by the report which Mr. Morier heard of it. It receives, by the way, several considerable streams, one of which is the Aksou, or *Teleboas*, before commemorated (page 207) ; and another, the *Karasou*, which joins it in the plain of Moosh.†

Hajy Kalifa describes very particularly, the town and province (or Sanjigat) of *Khanoos*, situated to the south-east of Erzerum, at the distance of three journies. It occurs also in a route given by M. Niebuhr, from Erzerum to Wan, under the name of *Kanis* ; at the distance of 20 hours travelling, from the former : and south-easterly, of course ; as pointing

\* M. D'Anville describes its course very differently : but M. Delisle's delineation agrees with Mr. Morier's report.

† Hajy Kalifa's Geography of Armenia. *Karasou* means the *Black river*.

towards the head of the lake of Wan. Ibrahim Effendi, also, in his map of Persia, &c. has *Kanis*, with the river of Murad near it. And to complete the information respecting this particular, Mr. Morier was informed that the Murad, after quitting the neighbourhood of Turpakala, passed through a province of the name of *Kensus*. One may readily conclude that there was an error, either in collecting the name, or in writing it down; and that *Khanoos* or *Kenus* was intended.

Here then is a satisfactory proof, not only that the province of Khanoos exists, in this general situation; but that the Murad, by its general course, must pass through it.

Now Diodorus, who (as we have before remarked,) evidently made use of other materials besides the *Anabasis*, attributed to Xenophon, says, that the Greeks, in their retreat, passed through the countries of the *Chaoi* and *Phasiani*; and afterwards traversed what was called the country of the *Chalcidians*. It is proper to state, that he omits the Euphrates, altogether; having, apparently, confounded it with the *Phasis* (or rather the *Araxes*). For he says, that from the *Phasis*, they passed through the countries of the *Chaoi* and *Phasiani* to that of the *Chalcidians*.\* Since then the districts of Khanoos (or Kanis) and Passin border on each other, at this day,† it appears probable that they represent the *Chaoi* and *Phasiani* of ancient times. And as the Euphrates of Xenophon (the Murad) really passes through, or by, the province of Khanoos, as

\* Diodorus, Lib. XIV. 49. He has transposed the order of time, in which some of the events and transactions, took place; as well as the geographical positions of places: as may be seen by a comparison of his history with the *Anabasis*; and indeed, with the reason of the thing. †By *Chalcidians*, he must be supposed to mean *Chaldeans*.

† Hajy Kalifa's Description of Armenia.

appears to have been satisfactorily shown, by combining the different notices derived from M. Delisle, Mr. Morier, and Hajy Kalifa; as well as those contained in the chart of Ibrahim Effendi, and the route given by M. Niebuhr; it can hardly be doubted, that the Ten Thousand really crossed the Murad, either within that province, or near its boundary. The northerly direction of their march, and the distance given, accord with this idea; for there are measured on the geographical construction (See Map No. II.) 103 or 104 G. miles, between the *Centrites* and the Murad, on that general course: and 117 is the result of the marches: taking the first 9, at Xenophon's statement of 5 parasangas each.\* But then, we have here calculated, as if the line of the road was generally straight; and as it might well have happened otherwise, a part of the difference, ( $13\frac{1}{2}$  miles) may be owing to *that*; and perhaps the remainder of it, to an erroneous construction of the Geography, and an over-rating of the original distance; which Xenophon is apt to do. (For it may be observed, that after crossing the Euphrates, *five* parasangas are allowed for each of the three marches, through a deep snow, newly fallen; that is the same rate, as when they were marching over a naked plain.)†

This arrangement, then, appears on the whole, to be satisfactory: and thus an important point in the retreat is established. For M. D'Anville and M. Larcher place the ford of the Euphrates, a degree and a half to the eastward of Khanoos: and for this, no other reason appears, than because Xenophon says "it was *not far* from its source." But this could only be

\* See above, page 208.

† Perhaps, however, an error of Editors or Copyists.