

CHAP. IV.

THE REVENUE.

THE whole revenue of the Caubul government, in settled times, may be reckoned at something near three crores * of rupees ; but of this upwards of a crore is remitted to different half-subdued princes, who are content to hold their revenue as a grant of the King's, but who never would have consented to give it up to him. This description of revenue cannot be considered among the King of Caubul's resources.

The real revenue falls a good deal within two crores.

Of this a great part (about half) is assigned in Tecool (Jageer), most of it was granted on condition of military service, and the benefit which the King derives from it will appear in the account of his army ; the rest is allotted to maintain the Moollahs or religious officers, or given in charity to dervises and Syuds.

The remaining sum was received by the King till the breaking out of the present troubles. By the best accounts, it amounted to upwards of nine million of rupees.

The principal source of the King's income is the land revenue, which is assessed on the produce according to fixed proportions, which vary with the nature of the land, and are different in different provinces. Some of the Afghaun tribes, and of the remoter provinces, are not subject to this mode of assessment, but pay a fixed sum annually. The other sources of the revenue are the town duties and

A crore of rupees is about a million of pounds sterling.

customs ; the produce of the royal demesne ; the produce of fines and forfeitures ; the profits of the mint, and perhaps some other trifling receipts.

The provisions supplied to the King's household, and part of his army, by the people through whose country he passes, even when they are not subject to the payment of revenue, must also be reckoned among the resources of the state.

Besides the above, another less fixed branch of revenue is created by accepting of the commutations in money for the troops which ought to be furnished by particular districts and tribes. Fines were at all times levied from Haukims on their appointment to profitable districts, and in these unsettled times, an unavowed profit is derived from the sale of offices.

The land revenue is collected by the head man of each village, and paid in some cases through the head of his tribe, and in others directly to the Haukim or his agents. The Haukim generally farms the revenue of his province from government, and lets out that of the districts under him. Once a year, he gives in his accounts, which pass through several officers before they receive the King's approbation. The expences of management, the assignments that have been given on the province, the price of articles commissioned by the King, and similar charges, are struck off, and the balance is either sent to the treasury, or more frequently, orders, equal to its amount, are given to the troops, and others who have claims on government.

Both in the course of the collections and of the payments, when they are made in this last manner, great peculation is practised by the Haukim.

The smaller provinces, under military Sirdars, are not farmed.

The King's principal expences are the payment of the army, the household, the court establishment, and the clergy.

The expences of the army are small in comparison to its strength, from the number of Tecools appropriated to maintain it.

The expences of the household are in some measure lightened by the payment in grain, sheep, and cattle, appropriated to that branch.

The pay of the great civil officers is small. They are in a great measure maintained by bribes and perquisites, which, although they have the most pernicious effect on the resources of the state, do not diminish the revenue actually brought to account.

The Moollahs are paid by Tecools, or receive orders on Haukims, or money from the treasury ; the expence is said to be considerable.

The whole expence of the King of Caubul, exclusive of that defrayed by Tecools, &c. was not much above half a crore of rupees in quiet years ; and what remained of the revenue, used to be kept as a fund for extraordinary expences.

The treasures of the crown have long since been dissipated, and the only wealth the King possesses consists in a very valuable collection of jewels, which, although greatly diminished since Timoor Shauh's reign, has in some measure been preserved by the difficulty of finding purchasers to whom parts of it might have been transferred during the distresses of the government.

CHAP. V

JUSTICE AND POLICE OF THE KINGDOM.

JUSTICE is administered in cities by the Cauzee, the Mooftes, the Ameenî Mehkemeh, and the Darogha of the Adawlut.

In civil suits, the Cauzy receives complaints and sends a summons by an officer of his own to the defendant. The cause is tried according to the rules and forms prescribed by the Shirra, or Mahommedan law, modified by certain acknowledged parts of the Pooshtoonwullee, or customary law. In doubtful cases, the Mooftes give their law opinion supported by quotations from books of authority.

The Cauzy's orders are never disobeyed; it being reckoned impious to refuse to conform to the Shirra. If he should be resisted, it is the duty of the Sirdar to enforce his decree.

The Ameenî Mehkemeh receives charge of deposits.

The Darogha i Adawlut is supervisor over the whole, and his duty is to see that all proceedings are conformable to law.

In criminal complaints, the rules are nearly the same, but the practice is different. Criminals are generally first brought to the Sirdar, and the Cauzy's sentence, in all important cases, is executed by him: this gives the Sirdar a degree of power, which is particularly felt when he disagrees with the Cauzee.

Where the King happens to reside, criminal complaints are made to him. In trifling matters, he refers them to the Cauzy, or desires the Arzbegee (the officer through whom representations are made to him) to settle them: serious complaints are always referred to the Cauzy, and the King orders the sentence to be executed, after a formal protestation, that the guilt of it, if unjust, is on the head of the judge.

There are Cauzees in all considerable towns in the Caubul dominions, and they have deputies over the whole country, except that of the three or four tribes who are reckoned to be in open rebellion.

The Cauzees no where interpose unless an application is made to them: this happens more rarely in the more remote parts of the country, where they are chiefly appealed to in civil cases. When a crime is not acknowledged by the accused, it is always referred to the Cauzy, but acknowledged crimes are most frequently decided on by Jirgas, in the manner already described.

The usefulness of the Cauzees' courts is in a great measure destroyed by the corruption which prevails in them; and, in towns and their neighbourhood, justice is further impeded by the power and influence of the great.

The Cauzees are appointed by the King, at the recommendation of the Imaum of the household.

A few only have salaries from the treasury. There is, however, in some places, if not in all, a small tax imposed on every family in the district, which goes entirely to the Cauzy. They have also fees on marriages; on affixing their seals to deeds; and perhaps on the causes they decide.

The Mooftes have a fee on every opinion they give; but this cannot by itself be enough to maintain them.

The police of towns is managed under the Sirdar by the Meershub, the Mohteseb, and the Darogha of the Bazars.

The Meershub answers to the Cutwal in India. He has watchmen under him called Kishikchees, who are posted on different guards in the town. In Peshawer, and probably in other towns, there are many other watchmen paid by the people of the ward which they guard. The Meershub goes the rounds at night, and takes up thieves, disturbers of the peace, and offenders against morals. Both the Meershubs and the Mohtesibs are odious and discreditable offices; and they are probably the source of much oppression. In Peshawer, at least, the Meershub paid an annual sum for his office, and extorted fees from gaming-houses, wine-shops, persons whom he took up on

suspicion, and from the few houses of ill fame that are tolerated there.

The Mohtesib inflicts the punishments prescribed by the Mussulman law, on persons who drink wine, or are guilty of similar irregularities : in Peshawer he does the duty of the Darogha of the Bazars.

There are Mohtesibs who go circuits twice or thrice a year in the country, and inspect the conduct of the inhabitants.

The Mohtesibs in towns have pay, and are entitled to a small tax on shops.

Those in the country levy their annual fees when on their circuits. The Mohtesib is always a Moollah.

The Darogha of the Bazars fixes prices, and superintends weights and measures : under him there is a head of each trade, called Cudkhoodah or Reeshsufeed, who is also employed in levying the taxes.

In the King's palaces and in camps there is a Cauzee Asker, or Judge of the army, and Mohtesib of the army, who do the same duties as those in towns.

In the country the people to whom the land belongs are answerable for the police. In cases of robbery and theft, if the chief of the village, or of the division of a tribe, in whose lands the crime was committed, fail to produce the thief, he pays the value of the property stolen, and levies it on the people under him.

In dangerous roads that are much frequented, there are parties stationed to protect travellers ; these are provided by the Khaun of the tribe in whose lands the road lies, but are paid by the King.

The police is after all very bad. In many parts of the kingdom, travellers enjoy security by engaging an escort of the tribe, or by paying customs to its chief ; but the King can do little to protect them, except by sending troops to ravage the lands of notoriously predatory tribes, and to bring in the chiefs. The police does not interfere in murders for retaliation, except in towns and their vicinity.

CHAP. VI.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

THE established army consists of Dooraunees, Gholauumi Shauhs, and Karra Nokur; there is also a sort of militia called Eeljauree, which is called out on extraordinary occasions; and volunteers are entertained in actual war under the denomination of Dawatullub.

The Dooraunee clans are obliged to furnish nearly twelve thousand men, as the condition on which they hold their Tecools, or rent-free lands, granted them by Ahmed Shah and Naudir. In addition to those, they receive three months pay in the year when on actual service. This is a sum equal to £10, which, with their lands, is reckoned to make their whole pay equal to £40 per annum.

They are called out by the King's order, issued to the chief of each clan, and by him notified to the Khauns under him. They assemble the men due by their several subdivisions, and bring them to the place appointed for the rendezvous of the army, where they are mustered and registered before the King.

The men of each clan form a separate corps, called Dusteh, subdivided and commanded according to descent, as in the civil arrangement of the clan.

The greater part of the Dooraunees only attend the King during military operations.

In wars carried on near the Dooraunee country, the King could raise as many Dooraunees as he could pay.

The establishment of the Gholaum Khauneh, or corps of Gholauumi Shauhs, is upwards of thirteen thousand men.

It was first formed by Ahmed Shah, of the different foreigners whom he found established in the Douraunee country, and of the troops of Naudir's army and other Persians who attached themselves to the Douraunee government.

He afterwards recruited them from the Taujiks of Caubul and the districts round it. An arrangement has since been made with the chiefs round Caubul and Peshawer, for supplying men from their tribes for this corps, and receiving payment by assignments of land.

The Cuzzilbaushes, who form about a third of the Gholaum Khauneh, are the best part of the whole. Though they have been so long settled in Caubul, and have engaged in trades, they still retain their original character of military adventurers; being good troops on service, but more thoughtless and debauched than even their countrymen in Persia.

They are more faithful than the Afghauns in civil wars, knowing that they may at some time be in the power of any prince they offend; and that one party will be less exasperated by their fidelity to its adversaries, than the other would be at their perfidy in deserting it.

The Gholaums suffer more hardship than any troops in the army. They enlist for perpetual service, and they have no means of obtaining redress of grievances, or even of securing their regular payment. If he could pay them regularly, the King could probably raise double the number from the Taujiks round Caubul.

The Gholaums are divided into Dustehs, commanded by officers named Kooler Aghausses. These officers are commonly dependents of the King's, and frequently Peshkhedmutts (personal attendants) and Eunuchs.

The number of Dustehs is generally from eight to ten: their strength is various.

The permanent troops, besides the Gholaums, are the Shaheenchees, men mounted on camels which carry large swivels. They are reckoned at seven or eight hundred.

The King of Caubul is said to have many guns, but Shaah Shuja

had only five, when he took the field at Peshawer in 1809. They were much worse in all respects than any I have ever seen among the native armies of India.

The King has a guard of a few hundred Hindostaunee Sepoys, which mounts at the gate of the Haram. They are dressed in imitation of our Sepoys, but seem to have no discipline.

The irregular infantry, who garrison forts, are paid from the revenue of the province they are situated in. There were only one hundred and fifty at most in the fort of Attock.

The troops kept up by governors of provinces, have been mentioned (where it could be ascertained) in the account of the provinces. They can seldom be employed, except in wars carried on in the province or its neighbourhood.

The Karra Nokur are furnished in time of war by the owners of land; at a rate fixed in former times. The expence of this service was provided for by a remission of revenue at the first settlement. The numbers vary; the courtiers pretend that a man is due for each plough; and the tribes near Caubul, perhaps furnish the number due on that principle: the more powerful, or more remote tribes supply a much smaller proportion, and some none at all. The Taujiks furnish a greater proportion than the Afghauns. On the whole, the number furnished is less than that either of the Dooraunees or Gholaums.

They are formed into Dustehs, and commanded by Dooraunee Sirdars; probably by those who have the government of their tribes. Each division has, besides, a subordinate chief of its own tribe. When they are ordered out, the Mulliks call upon the owners of land to furnish their proportion; and they have their choice to serve or pay for a substitute. The sum to be paid for a substitute, depends on the expected duration of the service, and generally is from five to seven tomans (from £10 to £14); from this the head of the village entertains a horseman, generally at three tomans; and there is no difficulty in procuring a person to serve from among the poorer people in the village or its neighbourhood.

The Dooraunee chief often takes the money instead of insisting on receiving the horseman, and by this means the real strength of the Karra Nokur is generally under what it is rated at.

Besides this, the King not unusually receives payment in money, instead of the number of Karra Nokur required from a particular tribe or district.

The men who go on service, are obliged to remain with the army till they are regularly dismissed, without any allowance from the King, or any further advance from the head of their village. Each division is, however, obliged to give an allowance of grain to the families of the horsemen furnished by it. Since the decline of the monarchy, the King may have been obliged, by the want of power to compel the Karra Nokur to serve, to make them some allowance while on service; but that is no part of the constitution of this body of men.

Except a corps not exceeding two thousand, which is due from the Cohistaun of Caubul, the Karra Nokur are all horse.

The Eeljauree are a militia raised on extraordinary occasions. It seems to be understood that the number to be furnished, ought to be equal to a tenth of the population, but that number probably never has been raised; and, on the other hand, it is admitted that the King may call out a still greater proportion, if he thinks it necessary. The persons who serve in the Eeljauree, are of the poorest classes. They receive a sum calculated to support them during the time for which their services are likely to be required; it seldom exceeds five rupees. This money is paid by the head of each village, and the expence is defrayed by a tax on all the inhabitants of the village (including Humsauehs, or tradesmen), who do not possess land, Moollahs, and other persons exempt from other taxes. I have heard that the owners of land who pay revenue, are not obliged to contribute to the Eeljauree; and, as the Karra Nokur are raised entirely at the expence of this description of men, the fact of their exemption seems very probable.

From the smallness of their pay, it is found difficult to get volunteers for this service, and compulsion is almost always resorted to. For this reason, it is only among the tribes about great towns, or on the roads made use of by armies, that the Eeljauree can be raised. As in most cases they cannot be kept long together, or carried to any distance from their own neighbourhood, the King makes little use of this force. The Haukims of provinces frequently assemble the Eeljauree, which, indeed, is in general the only description of troops they have to depend on. The Eeljauree of Peshawer has, however, been several times called out by the King, particularly on all expeditions against Cashmeer. That of Caubul has also been called out on military service.

The numbers of the Eeljauree of these two provinces seem to be nearly equal, and have been of different amount from four to six thousand each, according to the state of circumstances. They seem liable to be employed on public works, as well as on military service; those of Caubul, for instance, were once assembled by Timour Shauh to clear a canal near the city.

The Eeljauree are almost all infantry.

They receive no pay whatever from the King, unless they should be kept above three months in the field.

Dawatullub are only raised for particular expeditions.

They receive five tomans (£10) when they enlist, which is sufficient pay for one campaign, and they run the chance of the army's remaining longer in the field, in the hope of providing for themselves by plunder.

This description of troops are always most numerous in expeditions to India. On such occasions people even go without pay; in hopes of plunder.

In foreign invasions, use might be made of the general rising of the people, called in the Afghaun country Ooloossee. This sort of army has been described in speaking of the tribes. Only those of the tribes nearest the scene of action could be expected to rise;

they would be under no regulation on the King's part, and no good could be expected, in regular actions, from so ungovernable a multitude; but if properly applied, this kind of force would not be without its advantages. Important risings have often taken place for public objects, not immediately connected with the tribes which rose. Thus, in the Sheeah and Soonnee fray in Caubul, all the neighbouring tribes, especially the Cohistaunees, came to the aid of their religion.

Ooloossee troops get no pay.

The chief officers of the army are called Sirdars. They have always been few. In Shaah Shujau's time there were only three. This permanent military rank must be distinguished from the office of Sirdar in each province.

There is sometimes an officer called Sirdaree Sirdaraun, who takes rank of all the Sirdars, and commands every army where he is present. Shaah Mahmood has conferred this office on Futteh Khaun.

The Shaheenchee Baushee, or commander of the camel artillery, is a considerable officer. He must be a Baurikzye.

Almost the whole of the regular troops are cavalry. The horses belong to the men. Except about five hundred Peshkhedmut (personal servants of the King's), there is not one man mounted on a horse belonging to government. The chiefs have each some Peshkhedmut, mounted on horses belonging to them, and equipped at their expence. These are the best mounted and armed of the whole army. They are generally Kuzzilbaushes.

The horses are mostly from Uzbek Tartary, and the Toorcoman country along the Oxus. They are generally small, hardy, and active; well used to the mountainous country, in which they are employed, and capable of making very long marches.

The arms of the Dooraunees are, a Persian sword and a match-lock; a few of the best men have spears, which they put in the rest when they charge, not having the skilful use of this weapon which is common in India. A few among them have fire-locks. The chiefs

have generally pistols, as have a few of the common men. Shields were formerly in use among them, but are now discontinued.*

The Dooranees never serve as infantry.

The Gholams are armed much in the same way, but have more firelocks and spears.

The Ghiljies use the same arms as the Dooranees, with the addition of a small shield.

The eastern Afghans wear Hindoostanee swords, shields, lea-

* The following description of their troops is by Lieutenant Macartney who was himself a cavalry officer. He is speaking of the Populzyes.

“ Their arms and dress are the same as the other Dooranees, swords, daggers, battle-axes, short matchlocks, and some with locks (firelocks) not longer than a carabine, but with a larger bore, and some of them have bayonets to fix on them. They also carry long horse pistols, but few of them carry spears. They generally carry their arms under their clogha, or great cloak. Their dress is a pyrahun, or long shirt, over it a kuba, generally made of silk or chintz, with a kummer bund of shawl or loongee, and over all is a clogha, or great cloak, which hangs loose over their shoulders and reaches nearly to the ankle. Their head dress is generally a shawl or loongee put on in the form of a turban over a cap. They wear boots of the Hussar form made of deer skin. They are generally cavalry, and are mounted on small horses seldom exceeding fourteen, or fourteen and an inch high, but remarkably hardy and active, and perform some wonderful long marches; but as they are in the habit of turning their horses loose into the cultivation wherever they go, they have not much trouble after reaching their ground. They use snaffle bridles. Their saddles are of wood, very light, and the seat is covered with velvet, stuffed with cotton. They have a khogeer (a sort of pad) made generally of nummud (felt), under the saddle; some of the chiefs have very expensive ones. They appear far superior to the horsemen of Hindostan, but have not so good management of their horses, and might not be equal to them single-handed; but they must charge with much greater velocity, their horses not being checked by martingales or bits, and consequently they would have the advantage in a body. They appear to understand charging in line, and go with great speed. I never saw them charge in double line, but the troops which met the embassy as an escort, marched in divisions, and kept their regular wheeling distance. I did not see them wheel into line, but they increased and diminished their front, and also formed line to the front, and kept their files close and regular, but there is no discipline kept up among them. This party of course were picked men and horses, and must have received particular instructions to march in regular order with the embassy, but in general they appear just as irregular as the armies of Hindostan. They are small men, but stout and active. I have seen them go at speed over rugged rocky mountains, where if the horse happened to make a false step they would probably be dashed to pieces.”

ther cuirasses, matchlocks, and often spears: the use of the last mentioned weapon is however declining.

Each horseman carries provisions, consisting of bread and Kooroot, (a sort of hard cheese,) and a large leathern bottle of water.

The infantry have generally a sword, a shield, and a matchlock with a rest. Those of the Cohistan of Caubul, who are reckoned the best they have, carry a firelock, a pistol, and a short dagger, but no sword: the Ghiljies near Caubul, the Khyberees, and some other tribes, use a sort of knife about three feet long, instead of a sword.

On a march the men of each party generally keep together, but on the whole they move with very little order; though there are many officers whose duty it is to enforce regularity. They have few camp followers compared to an Indian army, and what they have are mostly mounted. The custom of carrying about women and children on service is not practised among them. They have light tents and little baggage, carried on horses, mules, and camels. A small bazar accompanies the army.

The government appears rarely to take any trouble about providing grain, or making preparations of any sort for their armies; and as the habits of the soldiers adapt themselves to this system, they have less difficulty about supplies than more regular troops.

The usual marches for armies are from twelve to sixteen miles.

The government sometimes gives grain to the troops, and on very particular occasions it sometimes distributes money to purchase provisions. In their eastern possessions, the inhabitants of which have something of the submissive character of the Indians, the Afghaun troops seize on grain, forage, firewood, and every thing else they want, without paying for any thing; and since the confusion in the government these irregularities have seldom or never been punished; but in the whole of the country west of the Khyber pass, they are obliged to pay for every article they require.

When their army is in an enemy's country, they send light detachments to make incursions (which they call by the Turkish name, *Chepawul* or *Chepow*) either against particular places which they endeavour to surprise, or to plunder the open country.

They are long detained by sieges, at which, as might be supposed, they are very unskillful, and which are prolonged by the nature of their armies and the badness of their artillery. When they come to a general engagement, their plan is to make a furious charge sword in hand, on the success of which depends the fate of the battle. The Persians appear always to oppose the fire of infantry to this charge, and frequently with success: this was the case in all Naudir's battles, and in the recent one at Heraut.

The conduct of the Dooraunees in their civil wars, gives a very mean idea of their military character. Their armies are very small, seldom exceeding ten thousand men on a side, and these are generally ill paid and disobedient. The victory is decided by some chief's going over to the enemy; on which the greater part of the army either follows his example or takes to flight. Even when the battle is decided by the sword, there is little bloodshed, and that is chiefly among the great Khauns, who are interested in the result, the common soldiers shewing much indifference to the issue.

CHAP. VII.

THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT.

THE following are the appointments held by Moollahs, besides the law offices mentioned in the section on Justice and Police.

The Moollah Baushee, who selects the Moollahs proper to be summoned to the Mujlis-e-Ulma, and is the channel of communication between the Moollahs and the King.

The King's Imaum or Peeshnumauz, who reads prayers to the King.

The Imaum Paurikaub, who attends the King on journeys or other occasions, when his ordinary Imaum may be absent.

The above belong to the royal household. The following compose the establishment of the great towns.

The Shekhool Islam : copies of all patents for stipends and pensions in money to Moollahs are deposited with him, he receives the amount ordered in each from the Haukim, and pays it to the Moollahs to whom it is due.

The Sudder of the city. He keeps a register of all church lands, whether granted by the King or left by private persons, and assigns them according to their original destination under the King's direction.

The Imaum of the King's mosque reads prayers there on Fridays, and on the two great festivals called the Eeds.

The second Imaum of the King's mosque reads the Mussulman service on every day but those above mentioned.

The Moollahi Khuteeb : his office is to read prayers at the Edgah without the city on the Eeds.

The Mooderris, or professor of the King's mosque, a Moollah selected for his learning to instruct students at the royal mosque.

There was till lately a great office of Meer Waez, or head preacher, but it has been discontinued since the rebellion of the last incumbent, the famous Syud Ahmed Meer Waez.

Besides the above are the Imaums of the mosques in towns.

The Imaums of towns have fees on marriages, burials, and some other ceremonies, and are maintained by them and the gifts of their congregation.

In the country the Imaums have grants of land from the head man of the tribe, or from the tribe itself, and also receive a tax on the principle of tythes, but by no means amounting to a tythe of the produce on which it is levied: all the other Moollahs, who were first mentioned, have salaries from the King, and some have fees besides.

Many Moollahs who do not hold offices, have pensions from the King, or lands assigned them by the crown, or by the charity of individuals. Lands are also left to mosques, and are managed by the Imaums belonging to them.

Students at the King's mosque have a daily allowance from His Majesty.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF CAUBUL, FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE DOORAUNEE MONARCHY.

LITTLE is known of the early history of the Dooraunees. By the best accounts * I can obtain, they appear to have been entirely independent till the beginning of the seventeenth century, when, being hard pressed by the Uzbeks, they agreed to pay tribute to Persia, as the price of protection. They perhaps remained on this footing till 1708, when the Ghiljies who had been subject to Persia, rose against the Georgian Prince Bagrathion, who was governor of Candahar, on the part of the last of the Sophies. At that time the Dooraunees seem mostly to have been settled in the mountains near Heraut, under the name of Abdaullees, and to have been already long engaged in hostilities with the Ghiljies.

In the year 1716, the Abdaullees, under Abdoollah Khaun Suddozye, invaded the Persian territory, defeated the governor of Heraut in the field, and took that city and many places in its neighbourhood. They were afterwards defeated in a battle with Mahmood Ghiljie, but as that Prince soon after conquered Persia, and, as his dynasty was occupied, during the short period of its dominion, in settling its conquests, and in wars with the Grand Signior, the Abdaullees remained for a long time unmolested. Not long after their defeat, Abdoollah was deposed, and perhaps poisoned, by Zemaun Khaun (the son of Dowlut Khaun and father of Ahmed Shauh), who took the lead among the Abdaullees, defeated a Persian army of double his number, and successfully resisted all attempts of that nation on Heraut. So

* Those of Hanway, who, from the excellence of his history of the Afghaun conquests, is entitled to attention when treating of the more obscure period which preceded those events.

rapid indeed was the increase of the power of the Abdaullees, that in the year 1722 they were able to besiege Meshhed nearly in the north-western extremity of Khorassaun.

A series of revolutions afterwards took place during which the Abdaullees, whose government was at all times democratic, were left for some time entirely without a leader, their affairs being managed most probably by a Jirga, or council of heads of families. At last in 1728, they were for the first time attacked by Naudir Shauh, and, after a short campaign of various success, were reduced to submit to the conqueror.

They rebelled again unter Zoolfikaur Khaun (the son of Zemaun Khaun and elder brother of Ahmed) who had alternately been in exile, and at the head of the Abdaullees, during the troubles above mentioned. They invaded the Persian territory, and defeated Ibrahim (Naudir Shauh's brother) in a pitched battle. They were besieging Meshhed, when Naudir moved against them in person, and drove them back into their own territory. He opened the siege of Heraut in the beginning of 1731, and took it after a most obstinate and active resistance of ten months, in which the Abdaullees received some assistance from the Ghiljies. He banished the leading Suddozyes to Moultan, and compelled a large force of Abdaullees to join his army.

The city of Heraut never rebelled again, but the Abdaullees in the country kept up the war for some time longer, in conjunction with the Ghiljies and Eimauks.

In the course of the next six years Naudir reduced the Ghiljies and took Candahar. Zoolfikaur Khaun and his brother Ahmed Shauh were prisoners in that city. They were released by Naudir, and sent into Mazenderaun in command of a force of their own tribe. The Abdaullees having in the mean time distinguished themselves in his service (particularly against the Porte), he rewarded them with the lands they now hold in Tecool, removing them from the west of Heraut to their present territory. He appears from this time to have shewn great attachment to the Afghauns. To this partiality, among other causes, is attributed his murder by the Persians in June 1747. On the day which succeeded that event, a battle took place between the Afghauns and Uzbeks under Ahmed Shauh on one side, and the Persians on the other. It is uncertain who began the attack, nor does the event appear to have decided any thing*.

As far as this I have generally followed Sir William Jones's translation of the Naudir Naumeh.

After this affair Ahmed Shauh fought his way through the greater part of Khorassaun, and passing the fortified places without attacking them, repaired to Candahar, where he arrived with a force not exceeding two or three thousand horse.

He there found that a treasure coming from India for Naudir had just been seized by the Dooraunees, and he immediately claimed it for himself: some of the chiefs at first hesitated to give it up to him, though his authority as head of the Suddozyes was now backed by a military force. He put some of the most obstinate to death, and met with no further opposition in his tribe.

In October 1747 he was crowned at Candahar: Dooraunee, Kuzzlebaush, Beloche, and Huzaura chiefs are mentioned as assisting at the coronation. Ahmed Shauh was then very young: a contemporary historian makes him only twenty-three years of age.

He spent the winter in Candahar, settling the country he had already acquired, and arranging his army for future expeditions. In framing his government he appears to have had the model of that of Persia before his eyes. The forms of his court, the great officers of state, the arrangement of the army, and the pretensions of the crown, were exactly the same as those of Naudir Shauh; but the difference in the situations of the two monarchs was apparent in the manner in which Ahmed Shauh was obliged to modify Naudir's plan, both in the administration of his internal government, and in the order of his measures for advancing his power at home and abroad.

The Persians had long been accustomed to entire submission to a despotic government, and had always been attached to their sovereigns. The dynasty which had long ruled them was overturned by the Afghauns; and in the beginning of Naudir's career, Persia was groaning under a foreign yoke: Naudir took on himself the character of the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of its native kings: he connected himself by marriage with the royal family; and when he had sufficiently secured the affections of the army, and the respect of the people, he confined the lawful King, and transferred his authority to himself.

Succeeding to an established monarchy, he met with no serious opposition in Persia, and was enabled from the moment of his accession, to employ the whole force of the kingdom in foreign conquests.

Ahmed Shauh, on the contrary, had to found a monarchy over a warlike and independent people, by no means attached to that form of government; those most accustomed to be governed by a King, had only felt his power in

the means which were used to compel them to pay tribute to a foreign state, and had ever regarded him as a powerful enemy, rather than a magistrate by whom they were protected, and to whom they owed loyalty and attachment. They had never been united under a native King; and, from the love of equality so conspicuous in their character, they were likely to view the exaltation of one of their own nation with even more jealousy than the tyranny of a foreign master.

This difference of the situation in which Ahmed Shah was placed, from that of Naudir, made a corresponding variation in his policy. His first object was to secure the affections of his own tribe, on whom he depended for permanent support, as well as for immediate assistance. For this purpose he confirmed the Dooraunes in the possession of their lands, requiring no sacrifice from them, but the attendance of their contingent of troops as fixed by Naudir. He distributed all the great offices of his new state among the leading Dooraunes, and established those offices in particular families, in the same manner in which he fixed the crown on his own; he left the hereditary chiefs in possession of their privileges, and seldom interfered in the internal government of their clans, except in such a degree as was necessary to keep up his army, and to preserve the general tranquillity; which he always effectually maintained. He took pains to improve the advantage he derived from the respect of the Dooraunes for the Suddozyes: although he probably regarded many of that family with jealousy, as his rivals in the attachment of his tribe; he always maintained their privileges, and enforced the exercise of the respect which was due to them. Stories are told of his severely punishing injuries to Suddozves, even when offered in supporting his own cause.

With the other tribes, except the Ghiljies, his plan was to endeavour to form a spirit of attachment to their native King, which he might hope to accomplish, by delivering them from foreign dominion, and by a moderate and gradual introduction of his own power.

His moderation towards the Afghauns may, however, have been caused in part by other motives, as he either felt, or pretended to feel, a strong attachment to his nation, and often gave as his reason for not attacking refractory tribes, that he was unwilling to bring any calamity upon his countrymen.

For the consolidation of his power at home, he relied, in a great measure, on the effects of his foreign wars. If these were successful, his victories would raise his reputation, and his conquests would supply him with the means of maintaining an army, and of attaching the Afghaun chiefs by favours

and rewards: the hopes of plunder would induce many tribes to join him, whom he could not easily have compelled to submit: by carrying the great men with his army, he would be able to prevent their increasing, or even preserving their influence in their tribes; and the habits of military obedience would prepare them for a cheerful submission to his government at home: the troops also, having the King continually before their eyes, and witnessing the submission of their hereditary chiefs, would learn to regard him as the head of the nation; and he might hope, as the event proved, that his popular manners, and the courage, activity, vigilance, and other military virtues which he possessed, would impress all ranks with respect, and strongly attach his soldiers to his person.

The state of the Afghaun nation and of the surrounding kingdoms, was favourable to the execution of this plan, as promising security to his own dominions, however ill organised, and offering every chance of success in his attacks on his neighbours.

The Dooraunees had acquired experience and discipline by their long and active warfare with the Persians, and afterwards by the employment of a large body of them under Naudir; and the preference shewn them by that great commander, had raised their spirit and confidence; so that they, with reason, considered themselves as the best troops in Asia. Their enemies, the Ghiljies, on the other hand, had been broken and dispirited by a long course of defeat and disaster. The remaining Afghauns had learned by the events of the period which had just closed, to despise the Indians, and to hate the Persians; and were, therefore, more likely, than at any former period, to favour the establishment of a King of their own nation.

The state of foreign powers was equally favourable. The weakness of the Indian and Uzbek empires had been exposed and increased by their contests with Naudir. The Beloches had also suffered from Naudir, and, probably, retained a sufficient dread of the Persians, to be well disposed to submit to a moderate subjection to their old allies, the Afghauns, rather than expose themselves to the severe government and rigid exactions of their other neighbours. Nusseer Khaun (the brother of Mohubbet the Beloch chief) had been a hostage with Naudir, and appears to have fallen into the hands of Ahmed Shauh. The Eimauchs and Hazzaurehs had never been formidable, and their vicinity to the capital and to the country of the Dooraunees, prevented all apprehension of their endeavouring to assert their independence.

The fate of Persia was as yet unsettled, but the dissensions which had broken out in Naudir's family, promised to disqualify that empire from molesting its neighbours; and subsequent experience shewed, that the chiefs of western Khorassaun took no great concern in the success of the Persians, but were ready to submit to the power which was most able to distress, or to protect them, and which was likely to use its ascendancy with the greatest moderation.

Such was the state of affairs when Ahmed began his conquests. He marched from Candahar in the spring of 1748, with twelve thousand men, composed of Dooraunees, Beloches, and others. He soon reduced the Ghiljies, and appointed Dooraunee governors over them on the footing on which they now stand. The governor whom Naudir had left in Ghuznee, fled on Ahmed's approach; but Nausser Khaun, who was governor of Caubul and Peshawer, declared for the great Mogul. He was, however, driven out of Caubul after a feeble resistance, and was already pressed by the Afghaun tribes of Peshawer, when Ahmed's advanced guards arrived, and forced him to cross the Indus.

Ahmed, with undiminished celerity, swam the Indus, and expelled him from Attak and Chuch; after which he proceeded with an army, increased by the Afghauns of Peshawer, to the invasion of Hindostan. The governor of Lahore, aware of his intention, called for succours from Delly; but Ahmed gave no time for preparation. He advanced rapidly through the Punjab, defeated the Indian troops in sight of Lahore, and entering that city in triumph, prepared to advance upon Delly. In the mean time Mahomed Shauh, the emperor of Hindostan, had sent off a powerful army, under his son and his vizier Cummerodeen Khaun, to oppose the invaders. This army advanced to the Sutledge, and took post in such a manner as to cover the usual fords. Ahmed, informed of their position, suddenly advanced, crossed the Sutledge at a point higher up the river, and leaving the Indians in his rear, hastened to Sirhind (where they had deposited their baggage and stores), and captured it before the enemy could move to its assistance.

The prince and vizier of Hindostan immediately marched to Sirhind, to attack Ahmed Shauh; but losing courage as they approached, they gave up their resolution, and took post in the neighbourhood of that city. Ahmed Shauh attacked them; and in the course of a canonade which lasted several days, the vizier was killed, and the actual command of the army devolved on his son Meer Munnoo, who conducted himself with so much skill.

that the Dooranees were obliged in their turn to stand on the defensive, and finally to retreat with precipitation during the night.

Soon after this, when the Indian army had set off on its return to Delly, Mahommed Shauh died, and his son, who had commanded at Sirhind, succeeded him: Sufdur Jung was made vizier, and Meer Munnoo left in the government of the Punjaub, while the new King continued his march to his capital.

As soon as this intelligence reached Ahmed Shauh, he countermanded the retreat of his army, and marched with his usual expedition against Lahore. Meer Munnoo, finding himself opposed to the Dooranee army, without the prospect of immediate assistance from Delly; and being, perhaps, disgusted with the preference shewn by his new sovereign to Sufdur Jung, submitted to Ahmed, and consented to hold the government of the Punjaub in his name, and to pay him the regular tribute of that province.

The affairs of the Punjaub being thus satisfactorily arranged, Ahmed marched back to Candahar. On his way, he settled the governments of Dera Ghauzee Khaun, Dera Ismael Khaun, Shikarpoor, and Moultan. It was, probably, at this time also, that the southern Afghaan tribes acknowledged Ahmed for King. The winter of this busy year must have nearly expired before Ahmed reached Candahar.

In the spring of 1749, Ahmed Shauh assembled an army of twenty-five thousand men, from the western part of his dominions. He first marched against Herat, which surrendered within a fortnight after it was attacked. He then advanced towards Meshhed, reducing all the places on his route.

Shauh Rokh Mirza, the son of Naudir Shauh, was then in possession of Meshhed. He came out to meet Ahmed Shauh, who received him with respect, and left him in possession of his city and territory.

From Meshhed he marched against Neeshapoor, and detached Shauh Pusund Khaun Ishaukzye against Muzeenaun and Subzwaur. Neeshapoor held out obstinately, and, while Ahmed was besieging it, he received intelligence of the failure of his attack on Muzeenaun, and of the defeat of his detachment. Being now apprehensive of an attack from without, he resolved to make a desperate attempt on Neeshapoor. He accordingly directed it to be assaulted by escalade, and was beat off with great loss. Before he had recovered this disaster, a strong force assembled by some other Khauns of Khorassaun came to the relief of Neeshapoor, and, while he was engaged with them, a vigorous sally was made from the place. The result was

very unfavourable to him, and he was compelled to retreat immediately to Meshhed, from whence he retired to Heraut.

In the spring of 1750, Ahmed again marched against Neeshapoor, which he now succeeded in taking. It was probably on this occasion that he reduced the most remote of those parts of Khorassaun that were permanently attached to his dominions.

The Dooraunee empire, I believe, never extended much beyond Neeshapoor on the west. Ahmed returned from this expedition to Heraut.

In the course of the winter, or early in the next year, 1751, Ahmed Shaah was recalled to Meshhed by a rebellion of Meer Allum Khaun, Chief of Kauin, who had seized on the treasure at Meshhed, and blinded and dethroned Shaah Rokh Meerza. Ahmed Shaah restored Shaah Rokh, and soon after took Kauin and put Meer Allum to death. At this time he also made an attempt on Asterabad, which was repelled by the Kudjirs.

In the summer of 1752, Ahmed Shaah marched into the Punjaub, and reduced Meer Munnoo, who had revolted in his absence. During the same campaign, he conquered Cashmeer, and obtained by negociation a cession of the country as far east as Sirhind, from the great Mogul.

After this, Ahmed returned to Candahar, and appears to have spent the four next years in tranquillity : his nephew Lokmaun Khaun, however, rebelled ; and the Ghiljies attempted an insurrection during that period, but both were easily quelled.

He probably employed this interval of leisure in settling Afghaunistaun, and the countries in its immediate neighbourhood.

In 1756, Meer Munnoo, the governor of the Punjaub, died. His death was followed by intrigues and rebellions, and the whole province fell into extreme confusion. This state of things induced the court of Delly to send a large force under the Vizier Ghauzoodeen into the Punjaub, for the purpose of annexing it to the Mogul dominions. The vizier succeeded without difficulty, and gave the government to Adeena Beg, who had been deputy to Shaah Nuwauz Khaun, and afterwards to Meer Munnoo ; and who was distinguished for his activity and spirit of intrigue. This done, the vizier returned to Delly.

Ahmed Shaah, on hearing of this aggression, left Candahar, crossed the Indus, drove Adeena out of the Punjaub, and marched straight to Delly. The tyranny of the vizier, and the reluctance with which the emperor submitted to his control, had thrown that capital into great confusion ; and,

after a faint effort to oppose Ahmed in the field, the emperor submitted, and the Afghauns entered Delly, which suffered severely from the rapacity of the conqueror, and the licence of his troops. After remaining for some time at Delly, Ahmed Shaah sent Sirdar Jehan Khaun against the Jauts. The Sirdar took Bullumgur, and then, advancing by a rapid march on Muttra, surprised the place during a Hindoo festival. A promiscuous slaughter took place on the army's entering the town, and many of the Hindoos were afterwards seized and carried into slavery. Sirdar Jehan Khaun then advanced against Agra, and was repulsed by the Jauts. The Dooraunees had now passed the whole of the summer in India, and as they were becoming extremely sickly, Ahmed found it necessary to retire to his own dominions. During his stay at Delly, he and his son Timoor Shaah married princesses of the royal family of India. Large portions were given with these ladies, and the emperor of India was compelled to bestow the Punjaub and Sind on Timoor Shaah.

Before Ahmed Shaah left Delly, he gave the office of vizier of India to a brother of Meer Munnoo, and that of general in chief to Nujeeb Khaun, the Afghaun chief of Seharunpoor, who had recommended himself to Ahmed by joining him near the Sutledge on his advance against Delly.

He left Timoor Shaah to command the provinces on the east of the Indus, under the guidance of Sirdar Jehaun Khaun. Their force consisted of a few Dooraunees and Persian guards with a body of troops raised in the country. The King wintered at Candahar, and was soon after engaged in settling disturbances which broke out in Persia and Toorkestaun; but of which I can gather no particulars.

He had scarcely left India, when Ghauzoodeen Khaun, who had fled to Furruckabad, then in possession of the Marhattas, returned with an army of that nation to Delly, and laid siege to the city. After some defence, Nujeeb Khaun evacuated the place and retired to Seharunpoor. Nearly at the same time, very serious disturbances commenced in the Punjaub. They were excited by Adeena Beg, who had fled on the Shaah's approach, and who had afterwards instigated the Siks to rebel, and defeated a division of the royal troops at Jalinder. He had also invited the Mahratta army which had expelled Nujeeb Khaun from Delly, to assist in recovering the Punjaub; and a force of that nation now advanced to Sirhind, commanded by Ragoba, the father of the present Paishwa.

On this, Timoor Shaah and Sirdar Jehaun Khaun, who were already

pressed by the Sikhs, and distrustful of their Hindoostanee troops, retired to Eminabad. Lahore, which they evacuated, was taken by the Sikhs.

The Mahrattas soon took Sirhind; and as they continued their march towards the west, Sirdar Jehan Khaun took the resolution of saving the prince and his remaining troops by retiring across the Indus. He effected his retreat in the night, unknown to his Hindoostanee troops, and with such precipitation, that his own family fell into the hands of the enemy, by whom they were soon after released. The Mahrattas being now unopposed, pushed their conquests beyond the Hydaspes, and sent a detachment which took possession of Moultan.

Timoor Shauh's flight took place in the middle of 1758, and Ahmed Shauh was preparing to march to India, when he was detained by the rebellion of Nusseer Khaun, chief of the Beloches.

The history of Belochistaun is remarkably obscure before this period, but it appears that Mohubbut Khaun, whom Naudir had fixed in the government *, had died, and was succeeded by his second brother Haujee Khaun. That chief appears to have disgusted his subjects by his tyranny, and offended Ahmed Shauh by taking part in Lokmaun Khaun's rebellion. It is certain, that he was deposed and imprisoned by means of Ahmed Shauh, and that Nusseer Khaun, his brother, succeeded him in the government. It is not known what induced Nusseer Khaun to throw off his dependence on the Dooraunee government; but he declared himself independent in the year 1758.

The vizier Shauh Wullee Khaun was first sent against him, and was defeated at a place in the neighbourhood of Shawl. Ahmed then marched in person to Belochistaun, where he probably arrived in autumn or in the end of summer. He engaged and defeated Nusseer Khaun, and obliged him to withdraw within the walls of Kelaut, to which Ahmed laid siege. It is said that the Dooraunee chiefs were by no means disposed to accomplish the entire subjection of the Beloche prince (in whose country they were always secure of a retreat when exposed to the anger of their own King), and that the vizier, in particular, maintained a correspondence with Nusseer and encouraged him to hold out by representing the disposition of the Dooraunee lords, and pointing out the embarrassment which the King would suffer from

* See Jones, *Histoire de Nadir Chah*. Livre IV. chap. 6.

the advanced season. The siege of Kelaut lasted forty days, during which time the Dooraunee cavalry suffered severely from the scarcity of forage.

The bad aspect of the King's affairs in India, added to his own impatience for a speedy conclusion of the war; and Nusseer having made an overture for peace, a negotiation was commenced, and an agreement concluded, which is still the basis of the connection between the King and the Beloches.

When the news of Timoor Shauh's retreat had reached the King, he had sent a small army under Nooroodeen Khaun Baumizye, across the Indus. By this time Adeena Beg was dead, and the whole of the Punjaub to the east of the Hydaspes, was under the controul of the Mahrattas. The Siks however, who had long been a sect of military fanatics, were beginning to aspire to the possession of territory, and the successors of Adeena Beg kept up some consequence by their nominal connection with the government of Delly, though the great Mogul had no real authority in the Punjaub. Nooroodeen advanced with ease to the Hydaspes, the tract between that river and the Indus being at that time held by the Kauters Guckurs, Jouds, and other original tribes of the country, who had embraced the Mahomedan religion, and who were inclined to the Dooraunees; nor did he meet with much opposition on his march to the Acesines, as the main body of the Mahrattas was now withdrawn to Delly, but he did not judge it prudent to advance farther till the King should arrive.

Ahmed Shauh's arrival was from various causes delayed till the winter of 1759, when he crossed the Indus and advanced to the Acesines by the road of Jummoo. From that river he continued his march through the north of the Punjaub, the Marattas retiring as he advanced: he crossed the Jumna, near Seharunpoor, and was joined at that city by Nujeeb Khaun and the Rohilla chiefs.

The Mahratta army, under Datta Patail and Junkojee Sindia, was at that time in his neighbourhood; but it retreated as he advanced, and continual skirmishes took place between the parties, till the Mahrattas reached the neighbourhood of Delly: they then crossed the Jumna, and advanced to Baudlee near Delly, so as to cover that city.

A severe action took place at Baudlee, in which the Mahrattas were totally defeated and Dattajee killed: a detachment was afterwards sent against Mulhar Row Holkar, who was advancing to support the Mahratta interests in that quarter; and Mulhar Row's army was surprised and totally defeated. Ahmed Shauh next took Delly, and forced Ghawzoodeen Khaun, who had

late~~ly~~ murdered the Emperor of India, Allumgeer II. to fly to the Jaut country, where Mulhar Row and the remains of the Mahratta army had taken refuge. Ahmed Shauh afterwards pursued the conquest of the Dooab, and marched as far as Anoopshehr, where he cantoned for the monsoon, and was joined by the Nawaub Shuja Oodoula, vizier of Hindostan.

In the course of this season the Mahrattas* exerted themselves to repair their losses, and a powerful army of their nation arrived from the Decan, commanded by Wisswas Row, the heir apparent of the empire, and Sheddashéo Row, whom the disastrous issue of this campaign has made so famous in India under the name of the Bhow. They besieged Delly, which was surrendered, after a spirited defence, by a small party of Dooraunees.

The Shauh was at this time cut off by the Jumna from assisting his troops on the right bank of that river. The same cause prevented his relieving Coonjpoora, sixty miles north of Delly, which was taken almost in sight of the Dooraunee army, now advanced to the river; but this misfortune exasperated the Shauh so much that he resolved immediately to cross the river at all hazards, and bring the enemy to action. His passage was effected, with some loss; and the Mahrattas, discouraged by the alacrity with which the King sought a battle, retired to Panniput, where they soon after entrenched themselves. With this position, and their vast train of artillery, they were secure from any attack; but the distresses of an army consisting chiefly of horse, cooped up in an entrenched camp, may be easily conceived, and they were augmented by the activity of the Dooraunees, who were unremitting in their exertions to cut off all supplies from the enemy's camp. The Mahrattas, however, remained in this state for three or four months, during which time many partial actions took place, and some indirect overtures of peace were made by them through Shoojaoodoula.

The Dooraunee army also suffered from the want of supplies; but the patience, vigilance, and activity of Ahmed Shauh, enabled him to surmount most of the difficulties that he met with; and the confidence which the troops reposed on him, and the temper and moderation with which he treated his

The transactions of this period, and the details of the battle of Panniput, are given with great spirit and appearance of accuracy by a contemporary historian, whose narrative appears in English, in the third volume of the Asiatic Researches. To that account I beg leave to refer my readers; but some passages in it present so lively a picture of the principal actors in these scenes, that I cannot refrain from quoting them in this place.

Indian allies, prevented any discontent or disaffection in his camp ; while the sufferings of the Mahrattas were borne with impatience, as they were universally imputed to the errors of their commander.

At last a large convoy, which was coming from the south of the Dooab, to the Mahrattas, under an escort of ten thousand horse, commanded by Govind Pundit, was surprised and dispersed between Delly and Meerut by Attaikhaun Populzye ; and another party, which was escorting treasure from Delly, having fallen into the hands of the Dooranees, the Mahrattas would no longer submit to a protraction of the war, which was indeed now become impossible.†

They accordingly marched out of their camp to attack the Dooranees, on the 7th of January 1761. The Dooranees got under arms, and the battle began a little before day‡. The details of this action need not be

* “ From the day of their arrival in their present camp, Ahmed Shaub Dooranee caused a small red tent to be pitched for him, a coss (about a mile and a half) in front of his camp, and he came to it every morning before sun-rise ; at which time, after performing his morning prayer, he mounted his horse and visited every post of the army, accompanied by his son Timoor Shaub, and forty or fifty horsemen. He also reconnoitred the camp of the enemy, and in a word, saw every thing with his own eyes, riding usually forty or fifty coss every day. After noon he returned to the small tent, and sometimes dined there, sometimes at his own tents in the lines ; and this was his daily practice.

“ At night there was a body of five thousand horse advanced as near as conveniently might be, towards the enemy’s camp, where they remained all night under arms ; other bodies went the rounds of the whole encampment ; and Ahmed Shaub used to say to the Hindostanee chiefs, “ Do you sleep, I will take care that no harm befalls you : ” and to say the truth, his orders were obeyed like destiny, no man daring to hesitate or delay one moment in executing them.

“ Every day the troops and cannon on both sides were drawn out, and a distant cannonade, with many skirmishes of horse took place : towards the evening both parties drew off to their camps. This continued for near three months : during this time there were three very severe though partial actions. And thus every day were the two armies employed, from morning to nine or ten at night, till at length the Hindostanee chiefs were out of all patience, and entreated the Shaub to put an end to their fatigues, by coming at once to a decisive action ; but his constant answer was, “ This is a matter of war, with which you are not acquainted. In other affairs do as you please, but leave this to me. Military operations must not be precipitated ; you shall see how I will manage this affair ; and at a proper opportunity will bring it to a successful conclusion.”

† “ In this last extremity, the Bhow wrote me a short note with his own hand, which he sent by one of his most confidential servants. The words of the note were these.

“ The cup is now full to the brim, and cannot hold another drop. If any thing can be done, do it, or else answer me plainly at once : hereafter there will be no time for writing or speaking.”

‡ “ The Navab’s havasrah brought word, that the Mahrattas were coming out of their lines, the artillery in front, and the troops following close behind.

chief of the Eimaux in the neighbourhood of Heraut: but Ahmed Shauh's health now began to decline, and a sensible diminution of his activity is observable from this time forward. His complaint was a cancer in his face; it seems to have first afflicted him severely in 1764, and it continued to do so till his death, which it occasioned. He was, however, compelled to exert himself in the course of a few years, by the increased power of the Sikhs, who seem to have become masters of all the open country as far west as the Hydaspes. Ahmed went in person against them in 1767, and drove them again into the mountains; but this expedition, the last he made in India, was attended by no permanent benefit: as soon as the Shauh had quitted the country, the Sikhs appeared in greater force than ever, and before the end of the next year (1768), they crossed the Hydaspes, and took the famous fortress of Rotass from the Dooraunees. The Shauh was about to exert himself to wipe off this disgrace, when his attention was called to a rebellion in Khorassaun, occasioned by Naussir Oollah Meerza, the son of Shauh Rokh Shauh.

The Afghauns state that all the chiefs in Persia, except Kereem Khaun Zend, were engaged in this war, and their combined force gave battle to Ahmed Shauh's army, under the command of his son prince Timoor, in the neighbourhood of Meshhed. The battle was well contested, and its issue was more than doubtful, when it was restored by the valour of Nusseer Khaun, the chief of the Beloches, and ended in a complete victory: the Persian army took refuge with Shauh Rookh Shauh, who favoured their escape, and admitted them into Meshhed. It is reckoned impious to fire on that sacred city, which contains the tomb of the Imaum Rezza; and Ahmed Shauh was, therefore, obliged to employ a blockade to reduce it, which succeeded after several months. Shauh Rokh Shauh gave his daughter to Timoor Shauh, and agreed to furnish a contingent of troops to serve with Ahmed Shauh.

During the siege of Meshhed, a detachment was sent to take Tubbus, which held out against the Dooraunees. It was defended by Alli Murdaun Khaun, an Arab chief of the Zengooee tribe. The detachment was under Sirdar Jechaun Khaun, and was in part composed of Beloches under Nusseer Khaun. It was completely successful; Alli Murdaun was killed, and Tubbus taken.

After this expedition, Ahmed Shauh returned to Candahar, where his health continued to decline, and prevented his engaging in any foreign expe-

dition. In the spring of 1773, he left Candahar for the hills of Toba in the Atchukzye country, where the summer is cooler than at Candahar. Here his malady increased, and in the beginning of June 1773, he died at Murgha, in the fiftieth year of his age.

The character of Ahmed Shauh appears to have been admirably suited to the situation in which he was placed. His enterprize and decision enabled him to profit by the confusion that followed the death of Naudir, and the prudence and moderation which he acquired from his dealings with his own nation, were no less necessary to govern a warlike and independent people, than the bold and commanding turn of his natural genius.

His military courage and activity are spoken of with admiration, both by his own subjects, and the nations with whom he was engaged either in wars or alliances. He seems to have been naturally disposed to mildness and clemency; and, though it is impossible to acquire sovereign power, and, perhaps in Asia, to maintain it, without crimes; yet the memory of no eastern prince is stained with fewer acts of cruelty and injustice.

In his personal character he seems to have been cheerful, affable, and good natured. He maintained considerable dignity on state occasions; but at other times his manners were plain and familiar; and with the Doo-raunees, he kept up the same equal and popular demeanour, which was usual with their Khaums before they assumed the title of King. He treated Moollahs and holy men with great respect, both from policy and inclination. He was himself a divine and an author, and was always ambitious of the character of a saint.

His policy towards the different parts of his dominions was, to rely principally on conciliation with the Afghauns and Beloches; with this difference between the nations, that he applied himself to the whole people in the first case, and only to the chief in the other. His possessions in Toorkistaun he kept under by force; but left the Tartar chiefs of the country unremoved, and used them with moderation. The Indian provinces were kept by force alone; and in Khorassaun he trusted to the attachment of some chiefs, took hostages from others, and was ready to carry his arms against any who disturbed his plans.

It has before been observed that Ahmed did wisely in choosing to lay the foundations of a great empire, rather than to complete a small one. The countries under his dominion extended, at his death, from the west of Khorassaun to Sirhind, and from the Oxus to the sea; all of which was secured

to him by treaties, or by actual possession : and had his plans been pursued, there is no doubt that a government sufficiently strong to have secured its own stability, would soon and easily have been introduced through the whole of this great empire.

The character of Ahmed's successor was unluckily very different from his, and it was in a great measure owing to the system of policy introduced by Timoor, that the power of the Dooraunees first became stationary, and has since declined.

Timoor Shauh was born at Meshhed in the month of December 1746, He was educated at his father's court, and accompanied him on many of his expeditions.

His situation did not lead him to adopt the character and manners of his countrymen ; and he seems never even to have been perfectly familiar with their language. While he was yet a youth, he was stationed in the Punjaub, and afterwards was appointed governor of Heraut, where the bulk of the inhabitants are Persians.

He was at Heraut when Ahmed Shauh's illness became serious, and he set off for the hills of Toba to see his father before he died ; and probably to watch over his own interests, when that event should take place. Before he reached Candahar, he received positive orders from the Shauh to return to his government, which he was obliged reluctantly to obey. These orders had been obtained by the vizier Shauh Wullee Khaun, who had before this entered into a conspiracy, with Sirdar Jehaun Khaun and some other Dooraunee chiefs, to set aside Timoor, and secure the crown, on Ahmed's decease, to Prince Soliman, who was married to the vizier's daughter. On Ahmed Shauh's death, the Dooraunee chiefs held a council at Candahar to fix on his successor : the vizier recommended Soliman, but another party, headed by Abdoollah Khaun Populzye (who held the great office of Dewaun Begee), declared for Timoor. After long debates, the council broke up without having come to any resolution ; and the vizier, of his own authority, placed Solimaun on the throne. Abdoollah and his partizans withdrew, and raised their clans to support Timoor's claim.

When this news reached Timoor, he marched for Candahar, with the force of his government, and such of the Dooraunees and Eimaux as had adopted his cause. The vizier also endeavoured to collect his army, but his attempt was unsuccessful, and he found he had no resource but in submission ; he accordingly repaired to the camp of Timoor, but he was not allowed to see the

prince, and was immediately tried and condemned to death on a charge of murder, brought forward to remove from the government the odium of his execution.

Timoor Shauh, having now obtained undisturbed possession of his father's kingdom, gave way to his natural indolence. His whole policy was directed to secure his tranquillity: he never appears to have thought of aggrandizing himself; and all the operations in which he was afterwards engaged, were intended merely for the defence of his dominions. As he knew that a strong party had been formed against him among the Dooraunees, and that the execution of the vizier had exasperated that tribe, he seems ever after to have regarded them with great distrust. He first shewed this in removing the seat of government from Candahar, in the midst of the Dooraunee country, to Caubul, which is inhabited by Tadjiks, the most quiet and submissive of all the subjects of the Afghaun monarchy. His choice of ministers shewed the same disposition. His chief counsellors, during his whole reign, were Cauzy Fyzoollah, a Moollah of the obscure clan of Dowlut Shahce, and Lootfetli Khaun, a native of Jaum in western Khorassaun. In general, he left the great dignities of the state in the Dooraunee families, on whom Ahmed Shauh had conferred them, but, by instituting new offices, and altering the duties of the old ones, he threw all the government into the hands of his own dependents.

The governments of the provinces, that were not left to their native chiefs, were bestowed on men of little weight or influence; by which Timoor hoped to secure himself from rebellions, and obtained for the present prompt obedience to his orders, and complete control over the revenue.

His finances were well regulated, and he observed a strict economy; by which means he rendered himself independent of military expeditions for the ordinary expences of his government, and was able to lay up a treasure against any unexpected emergency.

He retained the Dooraunee chiefs about his court; but as he had no troops of their tribe at the capital, they were entirely in his power, and had no means of disturbing his government.

The only troops whom he kept at all times embodied, were his own guards, the Gholami Shauhs; which were strong enough to keep the country in order, and being mostly Persians and Tadjiks, were unconnected with the Afghaun chiefs or people, and entirely devoted to the King. These troops were well paid, received much countenance from the King, and were invested

with some privileges, of a nature which tended to separate them from the rest of the people.

This policy succeeded moderately well in maintaining internal tranquillity : the provinces immediately under the King remained quiet, and, though there were some conspiracies during this reign, and two rebellions of pretenders to the throne, they were either discovered by the King's vigilance, or defeated by his full treasury and his well appointed guards ; but the remote provinces gradually withdrew themselves from the control of the court : the government lost its reputation and influence abroad ; and the states which had been obliged to preserve their own territories by submission to Ahmed Shauh, now began to meditate schemes for aggrandizing themselves at the expence of the Dooraunees.

The decay was not severely felt in Timoor Shauh's time ; but its commencement was even then observable, and it has advanced by rapid strides under the reigns of his successors.

The first remarkable event of Timoor's reign was the rebellion of his relation Abdoolkhaulik Khaun, which probably happened in 1774-5. Abdoolkhaulik succeeded in assembling a force of Dooraunees and Ghiljies superior in numbers to those the King had embodied ; the latter, however, were disciplined troops under experienced leaders, and would probably have been victorious, even if a determined resistance had been offered, but two chiefs, who were supposed to have raised their clans for Abdoolkhaulik, carried them straight to the King, and an unexpected turn of this kind is generally decisive in a Dooraunee civil war. Abdoolkhaulik was defeated, taken, and blinded, and the tranquillity of the Dooraunee country was soon restored. From this till 1781, though there were insurrections of various extent and consequence in Bulkh, Khorassaun, Seestaun, and Cashmeer, yet there is but one which requires particular notice.

It took place in the year 1779, and was undertaken by the Sahebzadda of Chumkunee, a dervise of great sanctity, for the purpose of murdering Timoor Shauh and placing his brother Prince Secunder on the throne. The instrument he employed was Feizoolah Khaun, a chief of the Khulleels, who entered on this conspiracy as the means of revenging his private wrongs.

This man obtained the King's permission to levy troops for an attack on the Punjaub, and soon assembled a considerable number of Afghauns, chiefly of the Khyber tribes. When his plot was ripe for execution, he marched his

troops to the citadel of Peshawer, on pretence of shewing them to the King : when he reached the citadel, he put the guards at the gates to death, and rushed with all his troops into the place. Timoor Shauh had only time to retire to the upper story of one of the buildings of the palace, from whence he made his situation known to his guards. The Gholami Shauhs, and the few Dooraunees who were there, immediately assembled, and made a terrible slaughter among Feizoollah's men. Feizoollah and his son were taken prisoners and put to death, after having endured the torture without discovering their accomplices. Strong suspicions afterwards fell on the Sahebzadeh, and the King was so far convinced of his guilt as to order him to be seized ; but the whole of the Afghaun chiefs at court interposing in his favour, no further enquiry was made.

It is not the least remarkable circumstance in this singular attempt, that very few of Feizoollah's troops were acquainted with his design against the King, and, that on discovering his intention after they had reached Balla Hissaur, many of them refused to stand by him. Among these was a nephew of his own, whom he cut down at the gate for refusing to enter the palace. No distinction was made between the innocent and the guilty in the slaughter which followed.

In 1781, Timoor Shauh went in person to recover Moultaun, which had been betrayed by the governor into the hands of the Siks. He sent a light force in advance against a Sik army near Moultaun, which moved on by very rapid marches, surprized the Siks, and totally defeated them. The city was taken after a siege of a few days, and the garrison was ordered to be escorted to their own country ; but from want of discipline in the army, they were afterwards attacked and pillaged, and some of them murdered.

About this time, broke out the rebellion of the Talpoorees, which ended in the expulsion of the governor of Sind. In the course of the next year, the King sent a force under Muddud Khaun to reduce the insurgents, which soon overran the whole province. The Talpoorees retired to their original desert, and the other inhabitants appear to have fled to the hills and jungles to avoid the Dooraunee army. Muddud Khaun laid waste the country with fire and sword ; and so severe were his ravages, that a dreadful famine followed his campaign ; and the province of Sind is said not yet to have recovered from what it suffered on that occasion. At last, Muddud Khaun returned to Candahar, leaving the deposed governor in undisturbed possession of the province ; but this quiet was of short duration : the Talpoorees returned as

soon as Muddud Khaun had retired, again expelled the governor, and recovered the whole of Sind.

Timoor Shauh allowed a considerable time to pass before he made any further attempt to reduce Sind, and it was probably as late as 1786 that he sent another army into that country, commanded by Ahmed Khaun Noorzye. This army was inferior to the first in force, and was evidently unskilfully commanded. The Talpoorees did not now fly from Sind, but collected troops and moved against Ahmed Khaun, who suffered himself to be led into an ambuscade, was defeated with great loss, and compelled to retreat to Shikarpoor. The Sindees who had before sent a vakeel to Timoor Shauh, now redoubled their efforts for an accommodation. Their vakeel appeased the King by the most humble professions, secured the ministers by great bribes, and at last, on the Talpoorees agreeing to pay the former revenue to the King, a rukhum was issued appointing the principal of them, Meer Futteh Alli, to the government.

The reduction of Azaud Khaun's rebellion in Cashmeer took place during the interval between the expeditions to Sind and that against Bahawul Khaun, in the beginning of 1788, but nothing of general importance to the kingdom occurred till the summer of that year, when a war broke out with the Uzbek Tartars. Shauh Moraud Bey, King of Bokhaura, had long been encroaching on the Dooraunee dominions, and during the King's expedition to Bahawulpoor, he carried his aggressions so far as to oblige Timoor Shauh to take decisive measures for the defence of his northern provinces. A letter which Timoor Shauh wrote to Shauh Moraud on this occasion, is in many people's hands at Caubul. It contains a distinct statement of the grounds of the war, and gives a clear view of Shauh Moraud's policy at that time. It states " that
" Ahmed Shauh had always been on friendly terms with the state of Bok-
" haura. That Timoor had maintained the same relations: that Shauh Moo-
" raud had for some time been encroaching on the Dooraunee empire, and
" had always averted a war by speedy explanations and humble professions;
" taking care, however, always to secure the point he had in view: that he
" had at last seized Mour * (or Merve), and driven away the Sheeah inhabi-
" tants, and had given as a reason, his wish to convert them to the true
" Mahommedan faith: it urges, that no state can have a right to interfere

Called Mour by the Uzbeks, and Merve by the Persians.

“ with the subjects of another on account of their religion ; and then points
“ out the inconsistency of Shaub Moraud’s zeal on this occasion, with his
“ detaining Timoor Shaub by his encroachments from clearing India of Hin-
“ doos, Jews, Christians, and other unbelievers ; and with his wars against
“ the people of Shehr Subz, and Khojend and the Tooremuns, who were un-
“ doubted Soonnees.” Timoor Shaub says “ these nations have appealed to
“ him, and he has been determined by Shaub Moraud’s conduct towards
“ himself, to take up their quarrel : he then announces his intention of
“ moving immediately to Toorkistan, and requires Shaub Moraud to come to
“ him in person to settle their differences.”

In the spring of 1789, Timoor Shaub marched from Caubul with an army which his subjects reckon at a hundred thousand men. He went by short marches, to allow time for overtures from Shaub Moraud ; and he was delayed for a short time by a march towards Coondooz, after which he advanced to Aukchek, the nearest town of the territory seized by the Uzbeks. On this, Shaub Moraud crossed the Oxus at Killif, with troops drawn from all parts of his dominions and their dependencies. He sent on his brother Omar Kooshbegee to Aukchek with a light force ; while Allaverdec, Tauz of Koorghan Tippeh, cut off the provisions and foragers of the Dooraunee army. Some partial and indecisive actions took place at Aukchek, and Shaub Moraud had met with no serious check, when he perceived that it was for his interest to make peace ; he accordingly opened a negociation, which he conducted with the skill and address for which he was celebrated, and with complete success.

He was aware that Timoor Shaub entered upon the war with reluctance, and would be happy to withdraw from the fatigue and danger of an Uzbek campaign, if he could do so without losing his reputation. He therefore gave him the credit of a victory and sent the principal Moollahs and religious men of Bokhaura to him to conjure him, by the Koraun, and their common faith, to spare the blood of the Mussulmans by yielding to his supplications for peace. Peace was accordingly made, and Shaub Moraud’s son was sent to Timoor’s camp, where he was honorably received, and immediately dismissed. Through the whole transaction, Shaub Moraud shewed the utmost respect and submission to Timoor Shaub ; but he retained all his conquests at the peace ; while the other failed in every object of his expedition, except that of securing his remaining dominions.

The winter was so far advanced before Timoor marched on his return,

that he was forced to leave his artillery in Bulkh, and many of his troops perished from the cold and snow in crossing the Indian Caucasus.

Arsilla Khaun, chief of the Upper Memunds, who had more than once distinguished himself in Timoor Shauh's foreign expeditions, had rebelled, during the war in Toorkistan, and had infested the roads between Peshawer and the capital. *

He afterwards gave himself up to the prince who commanded at Peshawer, and Timoor, without regarding his voluntary surrender, or the prince's solicitation for his pardon, ordered him to be delivered to some of his tribe with whom he had a deadly feud, and by them he was immediately put to death. This circumstance is regarded by the Afghauns as a great stain on Timoor's memory.

In the spring of 1793, Timoor Shauh was taken ill on a journey from Peshawer, and died at Caubul on the 20th of May, 1793.

At the time of Timoor Shauh's death †, nothing was settled respecting the succession to the throne. He had himself named no heir. The eldest and most conspicuous of the princes were absent. Hoomayoon was governor of Candahar, and Mahmood held the same office at Heraut. Prince Abbass was governor of Peshawer, but had joined his father on hearing of his illness. The other princes were all at Caubul, except Ferooz the full brother of Mahmood, who was with that prince at Heraut.

Timoor Shauh was no sooner dead than an intrigue was set on foot to secure the crown to Shauh Zemaun. It was carried on by Timoor Shauh's favourite queen, who prevailed on Sirafranz Khaun, the head of the Bawrikzyes to join in her scheme, and by his means secured the interest of most of the Dooraunee Khauns.

Arsilla Khaun was at one time compelled to disperse his followers and to take refuge in the country of the Otmaun Khail; and the following circumstance of his reception by that tribe is highly characteristic of Afghaun manners.

When Arsilla Khaun approached the first village of the Otmaun Khail, the heads of the village, alarmed at the prospect of drawing the King's displeasure on themselves, went out to meet the fugitive, and told him that their granting him the rights of hospitality would involve them in a contest with the King, to which they were perfectly unequal; and that they had therefore resolved to refuse him admittance into their village. Arsilla Khaun endeavoured to excite their compassion, and, while they were engaged in conversation with him, he sent a part of his baggage into the village by a circuitous route: when the chiefs found that Arsilla's people had entered their village, they immediately acknowledged that he was now under their protection, received him hospitably, and summoned their tribe to defend him.

† The facts contained in the following pages are entirely drawn from Mr. Alexander's history.

The princes of the royal family made an attempt to raise Abbass to the throne, but, though they behaved with much spirit, they shewed little skill: their persons were secured by a stratagem: the gates of the Balla Hissar, or citadel of Caubul, were seized by Zemâun's partisans; and that prince was declared King in a hasty meeting of the Dooraunee chiefs. He was immediately proclaimed, a largess was issued to the guards, the princes were sent into confinement in the upper fort of Caubul; and from that moment Shaub Zemaun entered quietly on the administration of the government.

Means were taken for assembling an army to establish the authority of the new King, and to subdue the rebellions that might be expected from his brothers.

His greatest apprehension was from Hoomayoon, who was certainly entitled to the throne, if primogeniture gave a claim, and who commanded at Candahar, in the heart of the Dooraunee country. He was, however, unpopular; he was deserted by some of his adherents, was defeated by a small force commanded by prince Shoojau (since King), and was compelled to take refuge in Belochistaun. Shaub Zemaun took possession of Candahar, and soon after received the submissions of Prince Mahmood (who as I have mentioned, was governor of Heraut), and then set off for Caubul.

As soon as Shaub Zemaun had secured himself from his competitors for the throne, he appears to have determined on an invasion of India; a measure to which he was stimulated by Merza Ahsun Bukht, a prince of the royal family of Dely, who had fled to Caubul in Timoor's reign, as well as by ambassadors who arrived about this time from Tippoo Sooltaun, and who made great pecuniary offers to the King, on condition that he should attack the British.

In the month of December, 1793, Shaub Zemaun marched to Peshawer, with the intention of immediately invading India; but this resolution was soon dropt, from the Shaub's conviction that his own dominions were not sufficiently settled, to admit of his embarking in foreign expeditions. Great confusion had indeed arisen in the remote provinces immediately on the death of Timoor, when the suspension of the powers of government, and the prospect of a disputed succession, encouraged foreign enemies, and induced ambitious subjects to attempt their own aggrandizement.

The most serious danger, that which threatened him on the side of Toorkistaun, had, however, passed over by this time. Shaub Moraud, who had

been checked in his plans of conquest to the south of the Oxus, by the exertions of Timoor Shaah, invaded Bulkh, immediately on that monarch's death. Mahommed Khaun Seeah Munsoor, the King of Caubul's governor, an officer of great activity and courage, was drawn into an ambuscade, with the greater part of his force, amounting to four thousand men, and was taken prisoner in the defeat which ensued. Shaah Moraud, expecting to profit by the consternation of the remaining troops, immediately advanced against the capital of the province; but the garrison showed a spirit which could scarce have been expected in such circumstances: the principal Dooranees took the management of affairs, on the capture of their governor, and prepared for a vigorous defence. The extensive and ruinous city of Bulkh was abandoned; but the fort held out for three or four months, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the enemy. Among other attempts to reduce the place, Shaah Moraud made use of the savage expedient of producing the governor under the walls, and offering to the garrison the alternative of procuring his liberty by an immediate capitulation, or of seeing him put to death, if they refused to surrender. The garrison adhering to their resolution to defend the place, Shaah Moraud's threat was barbarously executed before their eyes. At last Shaah Zemaun arrived at Caubul, after his success in Khorassaun, and Shaah Moraud, who expected that he would immediately march to the relief of Bulkh, sent ambassadors, offering to give up his claims on that province, on condition of Shaah Zemaun's observing the treaty formerly concluded with Timoor Shaah. Shaah Zemaun, who was at that time intent on the invasion of India, readily consented; and peace was concluded about the time of the King's arrival at Peshawer.

The remaining months of 1793, and part of 1794, were occupied in reducing Cashmeer, which had rebelled on Timoor's death; and in settling the southern provinces, whither the King went in person: on that occasion, he compelled the Ameers of Sind to pay two million four hundred thousand rupees, on account of the tribute due from them, after which he returned to Caubul.

He did not long remain at the capital, for Mahmood, who had only submitted from necessity, had now again rebelled, and the King soon after moved out against him, at the head of fifteen thousand men. The princes met at the Helmund, and a well contested action took place, in which Shaah Zemaun, after narrowly escaping a defeat, obtained a complete victory.

Almost all the chiefs of the Eimams, and many Dooraunees of rank, fell into his hands. These were all pardoned and released: Mahmood fled from the field of battle, and reached Heraut in safety.

The King, after sending a force to take possession of Furrah, returned to Candahar, from whence he proceeded to Peshawer, and again began to collect an army for his favourite project of invading India.

Before he left Candahar, he had dispatched Sheer Mahomed Khaun (son of the vizier Shauh Wullee) to settle the government of Belochistaun. Nusseer Khaun died in the spring of this year, 1794, and was succeeded by his son Meer Mahmood: his claim to the government was contested by Behraun Khaun, a nephew of Nusseer's, who had defeated Mahmood, and made himself master of a large portion of Belochistaun. Sheer Mahomed's mission was attended with success: he defeated Behraun, put all his strong places into the hands of Mahmood, and left the Beloch government, to all appearance restored: but that government had received a shock which it has never since recovered. The tribes in the south-west of Belochistaun had been but lately conquered by Nusseer, and were never perfectly subdued. They seized the occasion offered by these distractions, to throw off their allegiance, and Mahmood, whose spirit and capacity are very inferior to his father's, has never been able to recover much more than a nominal sovereignty over them. Meanwhile Shauh Zemaun's designs against India were again frustrated by fresh disturbances excited by his brother Hoomaulyoon. This prince had been confined by Nusseer Khaun, but had effected his escape, and, after a series of adventures, had succeeded in collecting an irregular army. Fortune, however, enabled him to gain an unexpected victory, the result of which was the capture of Candahar; but Shauh Zemaun soon returning to the west, Hoomaulyoon's troops deserted him, and it was not without difficulty that he escaped to the hills.

Shaugh Zemaun then returning to Peshawer, Hoomaulyoon again appeared at the head of a force, but he was defeated by the King's lieutenants, and after a long flight, he was seized at Leia, on the east of the Indus, was blinded, and passed the rest of his life in confinement.

Thus far Shaugh Zemaun's government had proceeded with reasonable conduct, and with great success. His claim to the throne was now undisputed, and his authority established over all the country left by Timoor Shaugh. The King himself was active and enterprising, and his capacity seemed sufficient, with the support of those qualities, to have remedied the mistakes of his

father's administration, and restored the Dooraunee affairs to the train in which they were left by Ahmed Shah.

Notwithstanding some defects in his character, and some erroneous maxims in his policy; Shah Zemaun would probably have fulfilled these expectations, if he had resolved to govern for himself; but by committing the whole of his powers and duties to an unworthy favourite, he involved himself in a system of measures which was ruinous to his own fortunes and to the prosperity of his nation.

The first object of his attention ought to have been to secure the support of his own tribe, on which so much depended in the original plan of the monarchy: had he succeeded in this particular, the internal quiet of his country would have been at once secured. In his foreign policy, his first object ought to have been to defend Khorassaun. The power of Persia was now consolidated in the hands of an active prince, who had already turned his attention to the conquest of that province; and some exertion on the part of Shah Zemaun was obviously required to check his progress; such a course was indeed necessary to the success even of his eastern expeditions. India was as much altered as Persia since the time of Ahmed Shah, and nothing was to be gained there, but by long and uninterrupted operations. There were no longer treasures at Delly to reward a march to that city; and the more desirable object of reducing the Punjaub, was not to be accomplished by a hasty incursion. The plan opposed by the Sikhs to Ahmed Shah, which was to evacuate their country on his approach, and return when his army was withdrawn, could only be baffled by keeping a force in the country sufficient to retain possession; and that measure could only be accomplished, when the western frontier was secure.

The plan actually adopted by Shah Zemaun was almost the reverse of that which has been sketched. He widened the breach between the Dooraunees and the court: he made no serious effort to save Khorassaun; and his ill-directed and ill-timed attempts at Indian conquest, tended only to frustrate that favourite object of his ambition.

The source of all his errors was his choice of Wuffadar Khaun for the office of vizier, and the implicit confidence which he reposed in that minister. Wuffadar was a Suddozye who had gradually gained the King's confidence by his supple and insinuating manners, and had used his ascendancy to overturn the power of Sirafranz Khaun, and all the great officers of the army and state: he seems to have perfectly understood the disposition of his

master, who, though proud and imperious, was easily led by flatterers, and who, with all his fondness for activity and enterprize, had not patience or application sufficient for managing the details of business. He was ambitious, and haughty to those who might claim equality with him, and jealous of any who could attempt to rival him in power or favour; but his arrogance and confidence in council were equalled by his timidity when exposed to personal danger; a circumstance which added contempt to the dislike with which he was otherwise regarded. His elevation and his subsequent conduct disgusted the Dooraunees, and, sensible of the ill will they bore him, he used every art to infuse jealousy and dissension between that tribe and the King. His avarice was not less hurtful to the state than his ambition: the governments of provinces and other offices were openly sold for his profit; and the decline of the revenue, which was the consequence of his embezzlements and those of his creatures, was severely felt under a Prince whose operations were so expensive as Shauh Zemaun's, and who had no share of the order and economy which distinguished his predecessor.

The rest of Shauh Zemaun's reign was spent in attempts to invade India, from which he was always recalled by the pressure of the dangers which he had left unprovided for in the west. Had he been allowed to have pursued his plan without interruption, its original defects would have been only the more conspicuous: he might have taken Delly from the Mahrattas, but the plunder would not have paid the expences of his advance, and if the invitation of the Rohillas, and the temptation of seizing the wealth of the vizier had led him on towards Lucknow, he would have been opposed by the army then formed for that purpose under Sir James Craig; there can be little doubt, from the Dooraunee mode of war, that he would have engaged in it, and still less that the result would have put an end to his projects in India.

Shauh Zemaun's first invasion of the Punjaub was commenced at the close of the year 1795. He crossed the Indus by a bridge of boats at Attok, and advanced three marches to Hussun Abdaul, from which place he detached a large force under Ahmed Khaun Shauheenchee Bauchee, to take possession of Rotass. This detachment succeeded in its object, and was joined by many Guckers, Juts, and other Mussulmans of the Punjaub; while the Sikhs fled in dismay to the mountains or beyond the Hyphasis.

Their alarm was however soon dissipated; for the King had only been a week at Hussun Abdaul, when he received intelligence of the invasion of the west of Khorassaun by Agha Mahomed Khaun Kujjur, King of Persia: this attack determined him immediately to return to the defence of his

dominions, and with such precipitation was his resolution executed, that he made but two marches from Hussun Abdaul to Peshawer*, where he arrived on the 3d of January 1796.

The Persian invasion had been designed for the capture of Meshhed, where great discontent prevailed against the family of Naudir Shauh. Naudir Meerza, the efficient ruler of the place, pursued a plan which had succeeded on a former occasion, and fled to Caubul as the Persians approached: his father, Shauh Rokh, was detained by his age and infirmities, and threw himself on the mercy of the conqueror; but his submission did not soften Agha Mahomed, whose disposition, naturally barbarous and unrelenting, was exasperated by the injuries which himself and family had suffered from Naudir Shauh. Shauh Rokh was seized on entering the Persian camp, torture was applied to make him give up his treasures, and after enduring all the torments which the cruelty and avarice of his persecutor could suggest, the old and blind grandson of Naudir Shauh was murdered in the Persian camp. Agha Mahomed then entered Meshhed, destroyed the tomb of Naudir Shauh, dug up that conqueror's bones, and sent them to Teheraun. It is remarkable that Naudir's family should be massacred and his grave dishonoured by Persians, after having been so long protected by the nation from whose yoke he had delivered his country.

As Meshhed had long been dependent on Caubul, this attack gave great cause both of indignation and alarm to Shauh Zemaun, and at first he seems to have been influenced by those feelings: he returned to Caubul prepared for war, and proposed to the Uzbeks to enter into a league against the Persians; but his ardor soon cooled, and an embassy from Agha Mahomed, together with the retreat of that monarch, succeeded in making him give up all fear for his remaining territories, and drop all thoughts of revenging the indignity he had suffered. Shauh Zemaun's infatuation for Indian expeditions seconded the views of the Persians on this occasion, and no sooner had Agha Mahomed withdrawn, than he set out for Peshawer and prepared to return to the Punjaub. He assembled a force of thirty thousand men, of whom one half were Dooranees, and in the end of November he began his march for India, and advanced unopposed to Lahore, which he entered on the 3d of January 1797.

Shauh Zemaun's general plan for reducing the country was founded on the practice of Ahmed Shauh. He sent frequent Chepawuls (light parties

* Upwards of seventy-seven miles.

moving by rapid marches) to attack the Siks in their retreats, to drive away their cattle, and seize or destroy their grain: he reduced such forts as were within his reach, and at the same time he gave great encouragement to any Sik chiefs who would submit to him: His plan was in some measure obstructed by the persuasions of his bigotted Moollahs, by the rapacity of the vizier, and by the licence of the soldiery; but in spite of those unfavourable circumstances, he made some progress in inducing the Siks to join him, and several of their chiefs attended his court at Lahore.

The advance of the Dooraunee army, and the occupation of Lahore, did not fail in creating a strong sensation throughout India. The weakness of the Mahrattas, the whole of whose forces were drawn to the southward by their own dissensions; the feebleness of the government of the Nabob vizier, and the disposition of the greater part of his subjects to insurrection and revolt; together with the anxiety of all the Mahommedans for the prevalence of their religion, and for the restoration of the house of Timour, had prepared that country for a scene of disorder and anarchy, which would doubtless have opened as soon as the Shauh had advanced to Delly. This state of affairs was early perceived by the powers whose safety was threatened. The Mahrattas indeed were struck with dismay, and made little preparation to defend themselves, except by soliciting the assistance of their neighbours; but the British government adopted more vigorous measures, and sent a powerful army to Anoopshelher to defend the frontier of its ally the Nabob vizier.

Nor were the partizans of Shauh Zemaun more inactive; intrigues were set on foot in many parts of Hindostan for the purpose of co-operating with that prince's invasion: the Rohillas had begun to assemble in arms, and every Mussulman, even in the remotest regions of the Deccan, waited in anxious expectation for the advance of the champion of Islaam. These hopes and these apprehensions were dispelled for the time by the failure of Shauh Zemaun's expeditions; but the impression of his advance was permanent. Some years elapsed before the Marattas were relieved from their expectation of the appearance of another Ahmed Shauh; and the principal object of the British mission to Persia in 1799, was to secure a three years suspension of the threatened attack of Shauh Zemaun.

Shauh Zemaun's retreat in 1797 was occasioned by intelligence which reached him of a rebellion in his own dominions. Prince Mahmood, though still allowed to retain his government of Heraut, had shewn an inclination to rebel before the King set out for India, and, during his absence, he had assem-

bled an army of twenty thousand men, mostly Persians of Khorassaun, with which he would probably have attacked Candahar, had he not been prevented by the King's speedy return.

Shauh Zemaun marched against him from Candahar on the 8th of September, 1797, and although his own injudicious arrangements had nearly exposed him to defeat, yet the effects of his Imprudence were counteracted by the treachery of Mahmood's adherents; Killich Khaun Teimoree seized the citadel of Heraut in his name, and was joined by the Dobraunee governor of the city: the army followed the example of disaffection, and Mahmood, reduced to despair, fled to Tooshish with his son Caumraun.

Shauh Zemaun immediately entered Heraut: two of Mahmood's advisers were executed for this rebellion, but no other measures of severity were adopted. These arrangements occupied Shauh Zemaun for some time, but as soon as he had a moment's leisure, he turned his attention to the Punjaub, where his cause had met with some reverses while he was engaged in the west. As soon as he had quitted the country, the Siks returned from their hiding places and began to retaliate on the Mussulmans the oppression which those of their own religion had suffered from the Dooraunees. They had even cut off a party of five thousand eastern Afghauns which had advanced to the Hydaspes under a chief of the King's; and the whole of the Punjaub was as far as ever from being conquered, when the King set out on his third expedition. He set off from Peshawer on the 25th of October, 1798, and advanced without molestation to Lahore. He persevered in his plan for conciliating the Siks, and by all accounts no outrage of any sort was offered to the inhabitants of the Punjaub during this campaign. Many Sik chiefs, and all the Mussulman Zemeendars attended the court, and before the King withdrew, all the chiefs had done homage in person or through their agents; and among the former was Runjeet Sing, now king of the Siks.

About the end of 1798, the Shauh received news of an invasion of Khorassaun by Futteh Ali Shauh, King of Persia, and set out on his return to Peshawer, which he reached on the 30th of January, 1799. His guns were lost in the Hydaspes, on his return, by a sudden rising of the river; but they were afterwards dug out and restored by Runjeet Sing and Saheb Sing.

After a short stay at Peshawer, Zemaun repaired to Heraut, where he resolved to spend the rest of the year; and he now appears at last to have seriously turned his attention to the defence of his western dominions. This disposition may have been produced by the presence of his brother Mahmood in the Persian army, and the fear of his receiving such support from the

Persians as should enable him to retake Heraut; or at least to secure for himself some other part of the Dooranee dominions in Persian Khorassaun. He had not, however, been long at Heraut, when he received accounts of the retreat of Futteh Alli Shaub, who had failed in all his attempts in Khorassaun: and soon after Shaub Zemaun withdrew to Candahar, where he remained during the winter of 1799.

Not long after Zemaun had arrived at Candahar, an unsuccessful attempt was made on Heraut by Shaub Mahmood.

The flight of that prince to Toorshish, on the taking of Heraut (in 1797), has already been mentioned; he soon after repaired to the Persian court, where he was kindly received.

In the spring of the next year (1798), he left the court and retired first to Cashaun and then to Ispahan. He remained there till the spring of 1799, when he accompanied the King of Persia on the expedition into Khorassaun, which I have just mentioned. He remained in Khorassaun after the King of Persia had retired, and endeavoured to stir up some of the chiefs of that country to assist him in the attack on Heraut. After failing in Toorshish and Tubbus, he succeeded in procuring the support of Mehr Alli Khaun, the ruler of Kauin and Berjend: and he now advanced against Heraut with ten thousand men belonging to that chief. He must have marched from Berjend within a month or two after Shaub Zemaun left Heraut.

At Izfezaur, he was encountered by a force sent by Prince Kyser from Heraut, which he defeated. He then advanced and invested Heraut: his operations were at first successful, but Wuffadar having managed by an artful expedient to render Mahmood suspicious of a design on the part of Mehr Alli to betray him, that timid prince suddenly quitted his camp in the night, and Mehr Alli was obliged to retreat with precipitation to his own territory, which he reached after encountering great difficulties in the desert tract between Heraut and Berjend.

Mahmood in the mean time continued his flight into Tartary, and at last reached the court of Bokhaura. He there met with a friendly and honorable reception, and had remained for some time at one of the King's palaces, when an agent arrived from Shaub Zemaun to remonstrate with Shaub Moraud for granting him an asylum, and to request that the King of Bokhaura would deliver him up to his own sovereign, against whom he had rebelled. The agent is said to have been authorized to promise a large pecuniary gratification to the King of Bokhaura on Mahmood's being delivered up. It is not quite certain how these applications were received: there can be little

doubt that Shauh Moraud replied to Zemaun's demands by very flattering professions. It is commonly believed that he was about to deliver up Mahmood, when that prince declared his intention of making a pilgrimage to Mecca, and, by thus introducing religion into the question of his liberation, interested the Ulama in his favour, and by their influence obtained leave to depart; but a more probable account is, that Shauh Moraud, equally unwilling to offend Shauh Zemaun by harbouring his rival, and to sacrifice his own reputation by betraying a guest, gave Mahmood notice of the machinations that were carrying on against him, and prevailed on him to remove all difficulty by quitting his dominions. On leaving Bokhaura, Shauh Mahmood fled to Khoarizm (or Oorgunge), where he was well received by the King. From Oorgunge he again returned to Persia.

During the time of Mahmood's wanderings, an event took place at Candahar which had a material effect on his future fortunes. Six of the principal Dooraunee and Kuzzlebaush lords, disgusted with the power and insolence of Wuffadar Khaun, had conspired to assassinate that minister, to depose Zemaun, and place his brother Shuja on the throne. The conspirators met often, and notwithstanding the precautions they observed, had at last excited Waffadur's suspicions, who had surrounded them with spies without being able to penetrate their design; when the whole plot was unexpectedly revealed by Mirza Shereef Khaun, the deputy of the Moonshee Baushee, to whom the secret had been disclosed by one of the conspirators.

The principal conspirators were Serafrauz Khaun, head of the Baurukzyes, Mahommed Azeem Khaun, head of the Alekkozyes, and Ameer Arslaun Khaun, head of the powerful Persian tribe of Jewaunsheer.

Mahommed Azeem, the most dangerous of the number, was first seized. An officer was then sent to apprehend Serafrauz Khaun. On his arrival at the house of that nobleman, he was received by his son Futteh Khaun (the same who has since made so great a figure in the Dooraunee transactions). Without shewing any suspicion of his intentions, Futteh Khaun apologized to the officer for his father's absence, and offered to go and call him: he then repaired to Serafrauz, told him that a guard was come to seize him, and with the same decision and the same indifference to the means which have since characterized him, proposed to assassinate the officer, seize the guards, and fly from Candahar. Serafrauz rejected these violent counsels, and attended the officer to the King. Ameer Arslaun was at court when the order for seizing him was issued, and the other conspirators were apprehended at their own houses.

Next morning, they were summoned before the King, and all beheaded. A short time after this execution, the Ameenool Moolk and Hookoomut Khaun Alekkozye were also put to death; and the King's and his minister's fears from this conspiracy were entirely removed. But the indignation excited by these sanguinary measures had in reality increased their danger, and it is from this time that the spirit of rebellion which occasioned the downfall of Shauh Zemaun took its rise.

In the spring of 1800, Futteh Alli Shauh a second time invaded Khorassaun. He was accompanied by Mahmood, whom he promised to place on the throne of Caubul. Shauh Zemaun marched to Heraut as soon as he heard of the advance of the King of Persia: he remained there during the summer, and early in autumn he set off, and proceeded with the greatest possible expedition to Caubul. He sent his army by the usual route, and went himself, with two or three thousand choice troops, through the Eimauk country, and the almost inaccessible mountains of the Hazaurehs. He made prodigious marches, and, as the road he chose was quite direct, he reached the capital in less than a fortnight. Futteh Ali Shauh retired from Subzwaur, at the same time that Shauh Zemaun left Heraut.

Shauh Mahmood who was left in Khorassaun, retired to Tubbus in despair of assistance from the Persians, and extremely disgusted with the conduct of their court. He was still attended by Akram Khaun Alizye, and two or three other Dooraunee chiefs, who had shared in all his fortunes: his prospects never wore a worse aspect than at this time; when the arrival of Futteh Khaun Baurikzye gave a new direction to his councils, and engaged him in an enterprize which ultimately led him to the throne. Futteh Khaun had fled to his castle of Girishk on the death of his father, but had been compelled to quit it, from his apprehension of the King's power. He was animated with the spirit of revenge and hatred to Shauh Zemaun and his minister; and his observation of the state of men's minds in the Dooraunee country, was sufficient to determine a man of his sanguine character to make a bold attempt to overthrow the government. His advice to Mahmood was to rely no longer on foreign aid, but to advance on Candahar, and trust to the Dooraunees for supporting his cause. The project must have been received with ardour by the Dooraunees, always disposed to bold enterprizes, and impatient of exile more than of all other calamities.

Shauh Mahmood left Tubbus with no more than fifty horsemen, crossed the desert into Seestaun, and advanced to Jellalabad the capital of that province. He was received with open arms by Behraum Khaun, the chief of

Seestaun; who gave his daughter to prince Caumraun, equipped Mahmood's friends, already worn out with their long march in the desert, and proposed to assist that prince with the force of his province. His offer was rejected, in pursuance of Futteh Khaun's plan; and Mahmood entered the Dooraunee country with the remains of his exhausted party.

His adviser had not misjudged the disposition of his countrymen: the Dooraunees flocked to Mahmood, and on his advance to Candahar, he assembled so great a force as to be able to face the Meer Akhor *, who had been left in command of the province. That officer encamped under the place till he was so much distressed by the partial but frequent attacks of the enemy, that he was obliged to retire within the walls.

The place was then invested by Mahmood, whose army continued to increase till the forty-second day of the siege, when Futteh Khaun contrived to get himself introduced, almost alone, into the town, and immediately threw himself on the honour of Abdoolla, a powerful chief of the garrison. The force of this method of solicitation is explained in another place; it had complete effect in this instance, Abdoolla declared for Mahmood, the Meer Akhor was compelled to fly; and Candahar opened its gates to the rebels.

While these things were passing, and even after accounts of their commencement had reached him, Shaugh Zemaun was assiduously employed in preparations for another invasion of Hindostan. It was not till he heard of the fall of Candahar, by which time he had arrived at Peshawer, that he was roused from this infatuation. He then gave up his plans on India, and returned to Caubul.

He did not, however, leave Peshawer without committing some fatal acts of imprudence.

Abdoollah Khaun Alekkozye, the governor of Cashmeer, had come to court, and was seized and tortured; on which his brother Sydaul Khaun who was at Candahar, went over to Mahmood with his whole clan (the Alekkozyes). Zemaun next detached an army of fifteen thousand men against Cashmeer, under Moollah Ahmed and Meer Vise Noorzye. This force which might have been so well employed in quelling Mahmood's rebellion, was dispersed before it reached Cashmeer, by the imprudence of its commander Moollah Ahmed.

Shauh Zemaun left a considerable force at Peshawer, under his brother

* Master of the Horse.

Shujau ool Moolk, and seems to have had no sense of the general disaffection, but to have reckoned on defeating Mahmood without any great exertion. When he reached Caubul, the true state of affairs broke in on his mind, and his security was succeeded by the utmost disquiet and alarm. Aware of the disaffection of the Dooraunee chiefs, he scarcely thought himself safe among them; his guards were doubted, and their customary appearance at the court was changed into constant duty over the palace. The King's distrust of his own tribe was farther marked by his anxious endeavours to gain the Ghiljies; and these precautions, while they gave confidence to the disaffected, disgusted many who were neutral or well disposed. The terrors of the vizier were still more conspicuous; and from his known timidity, it is probable the panic had seized him before it infected the King. He was more difficult of access than ever, his manner was become suspicious and distracted; and his resolutions were hasty and wavering. The distrust which the Court shewed of its own fortune, soon spread to the people, and, in a superstitious nation, omens were not wanting to confirm their expectation of some great reverse.

After some vain negociations, the King marched against the rebels with thirty thousand men: he sent on two parties in front of his army, of which the most advanced was under Ahmed Khaun Noorzye, and the King soon after fell into the rear, and ever after remained a march or two behind the army; a plan probably suggested by the fears of the minister, which added to the alarm of the troops.

Ahmed Khaun had many insults and injuries to revenge on the vizier, and so little was he trusted, that shortly before he got this important command, he was thought to have been marked out for execution by the minister; yet in this extremity Wuffadar Khaun seized on the hope, that by conferring honours and flattering appointments on Ahmed Khaun, he could bring him over to his interests. He was accordingly entrusted with the command of the vanguard; the conduct of which former experience had shewn generally to decide the fidelity or desertion of the army.

Ahmed Khaun was, however, undetermined what line of conduct to pursue when he left the main body; at least Futteh Khaun thought he was so, and the steps he took to secure his co-operation, though perfectly consistent with the headlong violence of Futteh Khaun's character, would be incredible, if imputed to any other person. He seized Abdoollah Khaun, the brother of Ahmed Khaun Noorzye, and threw him into close confinement,

threatening to put him to instant death, if his brother did not come over. Abdoola had joined Mahmood in an important crisis, and his fidelity was never doubted; but Futteh Khaun knew Ahmed's attachment to his brother, and was very careless about the justice of his measures, if they answered the end in view.

If Ahmed Khaun really wavered, this threat determined him; for, when he met Mahmood's advance at Sirreeasp, he joined it with the whole body under his command.

The main army commanded by prince Naussir was at Aubitauzee, not far from Sirreeasp, when news was received that the advanced guards were near each other, and soon after that they had engaged; on which the army halted and entrenched. The fact of Ahmed's desertion was soon after known, but produced no great sensation in the army. Its effect was different in the King's own little camp, where every decision was influenced by Wuffadar: all was given up for lost, and the King fled with precipitation towards Caubul. It was probably the knowledge of this desertion which first altered the conduct of the troops under prince Naussir: they soon became so mutinous, that the prince was obliged to quit the army, and fly towards Caubul; on which the army fell into entire disorder, and probably broke-up.

A party of two thousand men, under Futteh Khaun, was immediately sent by Mahmood to Caubul, and he soon after marched himself in the same direction.

In the mean time, Shauh Zemaun pursued his flight with the utmost precipitation, till he reached the Shainwaree country, worn out with hunger and fatigue. The vizier now proposed that the King should stop and refresh at the castle of Moollah Aushik, a dependent of his: the Meer Akhor remonstrated against the delay; but finding his arguments overruled, he quitted the party, and after many adventures arrived safe at Peshawer. The King, attended by the vizier and his two brothers, the Khauni Moollah, the Shautir Baushee, and a favourite Peshkhedmut, entered Moollah Aushik's castle. The Moolah received them hospitably; but at the same time took measures to prevent their escape, and sent off a messenger to Mahmood, who was now at Caubul, to announce their seizure.

In the mean time, Zemaun discovered that he was under restraint, and tried all means to persuade Moollah Aushik to refrain from an action so full of disgrace as betraying a guest who was at once his King and his benefactor: these arguments failing, he had recourse to force, which also proved ineffec-

tual. He then gave himself up to his fate, and bore his subsequent calamities with patience and firmness.

Assud Khaun, a brother of Futteh Khaun's, was instantly dispatched to secure Zemaun, and soon after an officer was sent with a surgeon to put out his eyes. The messengers met Zemaun on his way to Caubul, and performed their orders by piercing his eyes with a lancet. He was then carried to Caubul and confined in the Balla Hissaur.

He remained in confinement all Mahmood's reign, but was released on Shuja's accession ; he has since lived in comparative ease and comfort. Wuffadar and his brothers were executed soon after their seizure.

Mahmood's accession was at first joyfully welcomed by all ranks of men. Wuffadar had disgusted the great by his systematic depression of their order, as well as the poor by his exactions ; and the nation fondly hoped that by a change of government they might recover, if not the glorious and prosperous career of Ahmed, the tranquillity which they had enjoyed under his son. But the character of Shaah Mahmood was calculated to disappoint all their expectations : unprincipled, indolent, and timid, he shared as little in the cares of government as in the toils and dangers of war ; and while his own ease and safety were secure, he was indifferent to the conduct of his ministers and to the welfare of his people.

The government of the state was left entirely to Akram Khaun Alizye and Futteh Khaun Baurikzye. The first of these chieftains had all the characteristics of a Dooraunee nobleman. He was proud, high-spirited, and obstinate, frugal but not sordid in expence, steady in his attachment to his party, and strict in conforming to the notions of honor which prevail among his countrymen. Futteh Khaun has since become one of the most prominent characters in the Dooraunee history, and now holds the office of vizier, and enjoys the supreme power under the name of his reluctant sovereign. Excepting the short and turbulent period of Mahmood's success, the early part of his life was spent in intrigues and adventures, sometimes supporting a rebel force by plunder, and sometimes living in jealous and precarious friendship with the King. His character is such as such circumstances might be expected to form. As his misfortunes never reduced him to de-

* During his confinement he secreted the Coheenoor (one of the most valuable diamonds in the world), with some other jewels, in the wall of his apartment, where they were afterwards found on Shuja's accession.

pendence, his spirit remains unbroken, and his activity undiminished. He is acknowledged on all hands to be a man of talents and courage ; and by his own adherents, he is greatly beloved. He attaches his followers by the most profuse liberality, and the utmost laxity of discipline. As he is unrestrained by principle, and accustomed to sudden reverses, he employs the opportunities that fortune throws in his way, without discretion or moderation, to enrich his adherents and gratify their passions and his own. Though excessively addicted to wine, he never remits his vigilance over the interests of his party ; or if he does, his neglect is compensated by the promptitude of his resolutions, and his vigor and decision in executing them. In his person he is said to be tall and very handsome, though rather thin : his manners are gentle and modest, and form a strong contrast to his conduct, which is equally exempt from the influence of shame, fear, and compassion.

There were many other chiefs at the court of Mahmood, who enjoyed a less share of power derived from their birth or talents ; or more frequently from favour and from their tried attachment to the ruling party. In the licence of this reign, each of these was able to indulge his rapacity and satiate his private enmities without any restraint, except such as was imposed by the passions of his rivals. The utmost licentiousness prevailed among the soldiery, on whom the court relied ; and from the constant disturbances which lasted till Mahmood's deposition, his reign more resembled the temporary success of a military adventurer than the establishment of a regular government.

Mahmood's government was now fully established in the capital, but the provinces were as yet by no means under his authority.

Heraut had been given up to his brother Ferooz, who acknowledged Mahmood for King, but governed Heraut exactly as if he had been independent.

The north-eastern tribes still held out for Zemaun. The other provinces probably waited the final settlement of the dispute for the crown, without declaring for either party.

The principal opponent to Mahmood who now remained, was Prince Shuja Ool Moolk, the full brother of Shaah Zemaun. This prince, then about twenty years of age, had been left at Peshawer with a small party of guards. Shaah Zemaun's family, and almost all the jewels and other property of the crown had been committed to his charge. After the first panic that followed his brother's defeat, he took the resolution to proclaim himself King and prepare for a regular contest with the usurper. He accordingly

distributed large sums among the tribes round Peshawer, and soon saw the greater part of the Berdooraunees flock to his standard.

A considerable alarm appears to have prevailed at Mahmood's court in consequence of this step : his cause had already become unpopular from the general relaxation of all government, which left the bulk of the inhabitants of the country at the mercy of the courtiers and the soldiery ; and a plot in favour of Shoojau was discovered to have been entered on by Mokhtaur Ooddowla. That nobleman was however arrested, and the plot came to nothing.

On the 10th of September, 1801, Shoojaoool Moolk marched from Peshawer to attack Caubul. About half way between those cities, he found Mahmood's force, consisting of three thousand men, drawn up at Eshpaun, in a narrow plain surrounded with hills, and having the brook of Soorkhrood in their front. Shuja had at this time at least ten thousand men ; but they were Berdooraunees, and though accustomed to the battles of their clans, they were strangers to discipline and to regular war. Shuja's arms were, however, victorious in the beginning of the battle ; but his Berdooraunee troops, eager to profit by the confusion, quitted their line as soon as they thought the victory decided, and began to plunder the royal treasures, which Shuja had imprudently brought into the field. Futteh Khaun seized this opportunity, and charging at the head of his Baurikzyes, completed the confusion in Shuja's army. The battle was now decided, and Shuja escaped with some difficulty to the Khyber hills, where he remained till a fresh opportunity offered of asserting his claim to the throne.

The destruction of Shuja's army was far from restoring the quiet of the kingdom, for an insurrection now broke out which threatened to be fatal, not only to Mahmood's power, but to the existence of the Dooraunee government. The Ghiljies had remained in perfect tranquillity since the reign of Ahmed Shaah, and were now to appearance entirely reconciled to the Dooraunees : the descendants of their kings had been treated with kindness, and Abdooreheem, the representative of their royal family, enjoyed a pension from Shaah Zemaun, in addition to his paternal estates. The rest of the Ghiljies might still experience some injustice in common with the other tribes, but nothing done by the Dooraunees shewed any remains of particular enmity to them.

The ancient rivalry of the tribes was, however, still remembered by the Ghiljies, and the weakness of the Dooraunee government gave them a good opportunity of recovering their independence.

The rebellion was first planned at Caubul, where many of the Ghiljie chiefs happened to be. They offered the crown to Abdooreheem; who, though he had lately been injured by the government, was alarmed at the danger of an insurrection, and accepted their proposal with great reluctance. The chiefs then set off to prepare their tribes, and afterwards held other meetings, at which they settled the plan of their operations.

A force was appointed to check the Dooraunees of Candahar, and the rest of the troops were destined against Caubul. This last division moved first towards Ghuzni: they took several small places in their way, and defeated the governor of Ghuzni in the field; but the town held out, and the Ghiljies, after destroying the fields and orchards in the neighbourhood, advanced through Shilgur and Zoomul into Logur: many Ghiljies joined them on their march.

The Dooraunee government was so little on its guard against these preparations, that it was not till the advance of the Ghiljies to Ghuzni, that the King received any information of their intention to rebel. It is impossible to describe the consternation which this unexpected event created at Caubul. The government was new, and the greater part of the kingdom unsettled: the few troops the King had, were detached to Peshawer, and none remained about his person, but some Gholami Shauhs, and the retainers of the Dooraunee Khauns who were at court. The deficiency in numbers was, in some measure, compensated by the alacrity and unanimity which the common danger produced; the Khauns, their relations, and even their menial servants, armed and offered to serve without pay. Such as could not procure arms, were equipped from the King's armoury; and a body was thus formed, amounting to three or four thousand men.

Mookhtar Oodoulah was released from confinement on this occasion, and the chief direction of the King's troops was entrusted to him. They set out from Caubul on the 12th of November, and took the way to Ghuzni, but soon learned that the rebels had passed that city, and were advancing through Logur upon Caubul. On this the King's troops altered their course, and on their arrival at Sejawund, they met the Ghiljie army. This body was at least twenty thousand strong, but was composed almost entirely of infantry, all ill armed, and some with no weapon but a club. It was under little control, and entirely devoid of every thing like order. The Dooraunees drew up in line in three divisions, with their camel swivels in front, and halted in this form to receive the Ghiljies, who rushed on in a confused mass, regardless of the fire that was kept up on them. When they had passed the camel-

guns, they made a furious charge on the Dooraunee line : the division that was opposed to their column gave way, and the victory seemed to be decided in favour of the Ghiljies, till the unbroken part of the Dooraunees wheeling in on the flanks of the enemy, checked their progress, and forced them to attend to their own safety. The Ghiljies, though broken by this attack, were not dispersed, but retreated in a body to Killae Zirreen, a fort of their own in the hills, about six miles from the field of battle. The Dooraunees followed them for part of the way, but not being able to make any impression on them, they gave up the pursuit.

The Ghiljies received reinforcements in the night ; and early next morning they quitted Killae Zirreen, and marched in the direction of Caubul, leaving the Dooraunees at some distance on their left. They reached Killae Shauhee, within a few miles of Caubul, in the course of the evening, while the Dooraunees, having no intelligence, remained halted the whole of that day. Next morning they learned the movements of the Ghiljies, and marched in great haste and alarm to Killae Ameen Ool Moolk, between the enemy's army and the city.

The Ghiljies, who had hitherto behaved with some regularity, now broke out into rapine and violence : they plundered the villages in their neighbourhood during the night, in contempt of Abdooreheem's endeavours to restrain them ; and in the morning they marched out to attack the Dooraunees, without orders, and apparently without concert. They were entirely defeated with great slaughter ; three thousand men are said to have been killed in the battle and pursuit, and the rest dispersed to their own districts. The Dooraunees then returned to Caubul, where they erected a pyramid of the heads of the enemy that had fallen in the battle.

The setting in of the winter prevented any further hostilities at that time ; but, early in the spring of 1802, the Ghiljies rose as suddenly as before, and with more arrangement : almost the whole of the Ghiljie clans were now engaged. Their force is said to have amounted to fifty thousand men.

It was determined that a body under Abdooreheem should attack Caubul from the south, and an equal body, under Futteh Khaun Babukurzye, from the east ; while a force of ten thousand Ghiljies should keep the Dooraunees employed within their own boundaries. To each of these divisions a Dooraunee army was opposed, and three actions took place, all of which terminated in the entire success of the Dooraunees.

It is universally said (and the existence of the report, whether accurate or not, shews the state of the country at the time), that these three battles, the

defeat of the Khyberees under Shauh Shuja, and a victory over the Uzbeks in Bulkh, took place on the same day in March, 1802.

After this struggle, part of the King's force was detached to ravage the Ghiljie country, and in the course of its operations, it defeated a body of ten thousand Ghiljies at Moollah Shaudee *, which was the last stand made by that tribe.

The severities of the government ceased with the campaign; and after tranquillity was restored, the Ghiljies experienced exactly the same treatment as before their rebellion.

It has already been mentioned that prince Shujau sustained a defeat on the same day with the three great Ghiljie battles: that prince had advanced against Peshawer at the head of twelve thousand Khyberees, and was opposed by the regular troops of the city: a battle took place, in which the Khyberees were defeated with great slaughter, and the battle happening in summer, vast numbers perished from heat and thirst before they regained their mountains. Shujau, with difficulty, escaped to his former retreat.

The quiet of the kingdom was now entirely restored; but the government was left in a state of deplorable weakness: few of the provinces had been reduced; the Khaun of the Beloches, and many of the Afghaun tribes, refused to acknowledge so unsettled a government; and, as the treasury was empty, the King was destitute of the means of making a vigorous effort to restore the authority of the crown.

The Persians had profited by the distracted state of the monarchy, and had, in one campaign, almost completed the conquest of Persian Khorassaun. The last place they took was Meshhed, in which city Naudir Mirza, and thirty-eight other persons of Naudir Shauh's family, were taken prisoners, and carried to Teheraun, where they were all put to death, except one infant.

A son of Futteh Alli Shauh's was stationed at Meshhed, as governor of Persian Khorassaun; and the conquest of that country by the Persians may be dated from this period, though Toorshish was not reduced till 1810, and Kelaut Naudiree, I believe, still holds out. Meshhed was taken in the summer of 1802.

At the close of the Ghiljie war, and after the defeat of Shujau Ool Moolk, the Court found itself freed from all immediate danger, and at leisure to take

measures for reducing the rebellious provinces; but, as might be expected in such a government, the return of safety from without, was accompanied by dissensions among the chiefs of the ruling party, and particularly between the two great leaders, Akram Khaun Alizye and Futteh Khaun. The latter was, however, at length dispatched with a force to settle the south-east of the kingdom. He first proceeded to Peshawer, where he extorted money from the town, and received fifty thousand rupees from the chief of Cashmeer: he then marched to the south through Cohaut, Bunnoo, and Damaun, levying the revenue as he past: he spent a long time in endeavouring to reduce the Vizeerees, and after plundering their lands, he marched, settling the country as he passed, to Candahar, where he arrived in the summer of 1803.

Several important events had taken place in that quarter during his absence.

Shujau Ool Moolk had remained at Chora in the Afreedee country, from the time of his defeat, till Futteh Khaun's arrival at Peshawer. His former adherents still remained with him, and still treated him as King: but he seems himself to have given up all thoughts of any further struggle, and to have spent almost the whole of his time in reading and conversing with his military adherents, and some learned men, who had accompanied him in his retreat. The arrival of Futteh Khaun with such a force in Peshawer, rendered his residence at Chora unsafe, and he was compelled to retire further south, and take refuge among the mountains of the Caukers, where he continued to wander about, subsisting himself and his followers on the money which he occasionally obtained by the sale of his jewels, and by the casual hospitality of the people whose country he entered. He was in this condition in the depth of the winter of 1802, near the town of Shawl, or Zuetta, in Belochistaun. He sent Meer Abool Hussun Khaun, and the Zubtbegee, into Shawl, to endeavour to sell some jewels; but in such a place no purchaser could well be expected: on their return they met the prince, who, in his anxiety, had left his starving adherents, and rode out to meet them and learn their success. He was in despair when he found they had failed, and immediately assembled his principal adherents, to consult on the course to be pursued. In this extremity, the Zubtbegee mentioned that a large caravan had that day entered Shawl, and, notwithstanding the prince's reluctance, it was soon resolved to plunder it. The prince's troops accordingly surrounded the town, and the

merchants finding their retreat cut off, gave up their property, and received notes in the prince's name promising to pay the value at a future time.

This caravan was worth more than three lacks of rupees, and not only relieved the prince's present wants, but enabled him to assemble troops for an attack on Candahar, in which he was to be assisted by Muddud Khaun, son of the former chief of that name. The attempt, however, failed for want of concert, and Shuja was compelled to retire into the hills, where his army soon after dispersed.

In the mean time Mahmood's government was hastening to decay. The King's weakness and indolence had drawn universal contempt on his administration; his orders were disobeyed with impunity, and his officers scarcely possessed sufficient weight to maintain ordinary tranquillity in the capital.

The Gholami Shahs (the King's Kuzzilbaush guards), who joined the violence of their military habits to the natural licentiousness of their nation, were guilty of the greatest excesses, and raised the utmost indignation among the inhabitants of Caubul, who were not more irritated by their rapacity and oppression, than disgusted with their contempt for decency and sobriety, and their open profession of the Sheeah religion, which their prejudices led them to look on with peculiar aversion.

These disorders were aggravated, and the discontents they occasioned were rendered formidable by the absence of Futteh Khaun, and the death of Akram Khaun, which deprived the King of his boldest and most powerful ministers.

Frequent complaints were made of the conduct of the Gholams, but were disregarded by Mahmood, whose natural indolence was strengthened by his fondness for the manners which disgusted his subjects, and by the fear of offending those troops whom he considered as the best support of his power. His partiality increased the discontents of the populace, and there were not wanting men of higher rank, who were disposed to foment their disaffection, and to profit by its effects. The most prominent of these, at first, were Ahmed Khaun Noorzye, and Nawaub Khaun the lame, two noblemen of Ahmed Shah's court, who affected the virtues and prejudices of the Doo-raunees of former times; but the real mover of all the tumults which now ensued, was Mookhtar oo-Doulah, a man well calculated to take the lead on such an occasion.

He paid many of them after his accession.

Under the mask of moderation, and even contempt for worldly honours, he concealed the highest ambition. He had long borne with impatience, his exclusion from the office of vizier, which he considered as his birth-right; and the government, aware of his high pretensions, were induced to withhold the honours and confidence which he had merited by his own great services. His qualities were such as were sure, to gain popularity among his countrymen. His bravery was distinguished, and he possessed all the military accomplishments of his nation. He was entirely indifferent about money, except as an instrument of his ambition; he had the utmost contempt for pomp, he even affected the dress and manners of a dervise, and this simplicity in a man of his known rank and reputation as a soldier and a statesman, seems to have greatly endeared him to the people. Even when he was vizier, the meanest person had access to him, either in his house or when he went out, as he often did unattended, and sometimes on foot. He scarcely ever refused a favour, and if he could not tire out his suitors by his patience and composure, his only resource was in promises, of which he made more than he ever cared to perform. He had great good nature and moderation towards his enemies, whom he not only forgave for past offences, but allowed to molest him with impunity when he had them in his power. These qualities captivated the generality of men, who did not so easily perceive his ambition, his want of principle, his fondness for intrigue, and his turn for art and dissimulation. He was singularly qualified for conducting an insurrection in which religion could be brought to share: he had been obliged to fly to Belochistaun on the death of his father (the vizier Shaub Wullee Khaun), and had employed his banishment in study, so that he was now reckoned one of the most eminent Moollahs in the Afghaun dominions. He was more careless in the forms of devotion than Dooraunees generally are, but he had always affected, and probably felt, great zeal for the Soonnee religion. He was assiduous in paying court to men of learning and sanctity, and Syud Ahmed, commonly called the Meer Waez, who was eminent in both those characters, was his most confidential friend.

This man possessed great natural talents, and by frequent pilgrimages to Mecca, and by the purity and even austerity of his life, had gained the highest reputation and influence in Caubul. His authority was strengthened by the freedom with which he preached against the vices of the court, the general corruption of manners, and the encouragement which was openly given to Sheeahs, against whom, in consistency with the prejudices of the people, he declaimed as blasphemers and infidels. The Meer Waez had

already made himself conspicuous by a formal complaint to the King against the excesses of his guards, and may be considered as the avowed head of the mal-contents during the early stages of the insurrection.

The discontents of the people had risen to a great height, when an incident occurred which gave them an incitement; and a pretence for open tumult. This was the execution of a young man of Caubul, for the murder of a Kuzzilbaush, with whom he had quarrelled: the populace affected to consider his condemnation as dictated by Mahmood's partiality to the Sheeahs, and were marching to inter him with the honours of a martyr, when the procession was fired on by a party of Kuzzilbaushes, and they were obliged to retire with the corpse to the house of the Meer Waez. This fresh outrage raised the indignation of the populace to the highest pitch, and taking advantage of the absence of the Gholams, who were in attendance on the King, they attacked the quarters of one of their divisions, which, after a short resistance, they forced and plundered.

The battle was renewed with greater fury on the next day: numbers of the people of the country round Caubul, flocked in to assist the Soonnees; and many of the musketeers of the Cohistaun were led by a saint of their country to the aid of the same cause. Mookhtaur Oodowla and other Dooraunee lords were now seen openly exciting the populace to fight for their religion, while the Meer Waez promised the joys of paradise to those who should fall, and sprinkled the leaders of the attack with the waters of the holy fountain of Zemzem *, which he had himself brought from Mecca. Both parties were, however, exhausted by the length of an unusually hot summer's day, and towards evening an apparent reconciliation was brought about by the submission of the Persians. This tumult took place on the 4th and 5th of June. Both parties were now desirous of a temporary suspension of operations: the King wished to wait for Futteh Khaun, who was on his march with an army from Candahar; and Mokhtaur Oodoulah, for prince Shooja, whom he had invited to set up for King. Mahmood's fears, however, precipitated affairs before he was prepared for the crisis; he thought his only safety lay in seizing Mokhtaur, and that nobleman, being apprized of his design, fled from Caubul on the 8th of July, after instructing the Meer Waez to renew the tumults in the city. This was done, and the rage of the populace was dexterously turned from the Sheeahs to the King who patro-

* See Sale's Koraun, Niebuhr's Arabia, &c.

nized them. So effectual were these measures, that when Mokhtaur returned with Shooja ool Moolk, on the 12th of July, he found Mahmood besieged in the Balla Hissaur, which was closely invested by the populace. Neither he nor the prince, however, entered Caubul; both encamped without the town, and busied themselves in collecting troops to oppose Futteh Khaun, who now drew near with an army of eight or ten thousand men. An action took place soon after; Futteh Khaun was at first successful, he routed the part of the enemy which was immediately opposed to him, and was advancing to the city, when the desertion of a great lord to Shooja, threw the whole into confusion: his own party then fell off by degrees, till he found himself almost alone, and was obliged to provide for his safety by a precipitate flight.

Next morning Shaah Shuja entered Caubul in triumph. Mookhtaur Oodoulah walked on foot by the side of his horse, and many other Dooranee Ameer followed in his train. To keep up the impression of the triumph of the true faith, the heralds who preceded the King, were ordered to announce his approach by the watch-word of the Soonnee sect *, instead of the Toorkee form, which is required by the practice of the court.

The gates of the Balla Hissaur were thrown open on the King's approach; and Mahmood, deserted by all his adherents, suffered himself to be quietly conducted to the upper fort, where the princes of the blood are confined. His eyes were spared, but Shuja has unfortunately had sufficient reason to regret this clemency, of which he probably afforded the first example in his country.

This revolution, though it at the time improved the state of affairs, was not calculated to restore the power of the crown or the importance of the state. The new King, though his good qualities were amply sufficient to maintain the dignity of an established monarch, was deficient in the genius and energy which were requisite to restore a government so far sunk into anarchy and decay.

From what has been said of Mahmood's reign, it may be imagined that the great men were become powerful and unruly, that the army was impatient of discipline, that the government had in a great measure lost the attachment of its subjects, and that both the remote provinces and the neighbouring

* Dumi char yaur ("the life of the four friends,") an allusion to the four first Caliphs, three of whom are considered as usurpers by the Sheeahs.

powers had changed the awe with which they were used to view the Dooraunees, for a feeling of indifference bordering on contempt. Some circumstances in Shauh Shuja's situation added to his embarrassments, and prevented the government recovering its vigor. The King had been for two years a fugitive in his own dominions, during which time he had made several attempts to expel his rival. He had consequently incurred great obligations to the Dooraunees and other chiefs. These were rendered of the more importance by his own disposition, which was susceptible of gratitude and permanent attachment. His recal by Mookhtar-oo-doulah and his party brought a fresh set of claimants on him, whose services he could not deny, and whose power he was obliged to respect. The consequence was, that all the honours and appointments in the gift of the crown were insufficient to reward the King's adherents, and he was obliged to give away a large portion of his permanent revenue in grants to such as remained unprovided for : thus almost the whole revenue of Peshawer was settled on the Khyberees as the reward of their attachment, and much of the royal dues were alienated in other places in favour of Dooraunee chiefs. What remained of the revenue passed through the hands of the vizier, who, as soon as his interests were separated from those of the King, applied a large portion of the public money to his own use.

Had the King given his confidence entirely to the vizier, many of the inconveniences which were afterwards felt might have been avoided. It would have been the interest of that minister to raise the King's power : and his success in the beginning of Shuja's reign shewed that he had the talents and influence requisite for such an undertaking. This plan, however, was not tried. The King was not disposed to resign his own power into the hands of his minister ; and his old adherents, who were anxious to succeed to their share of power, early inspired him with jealousy of the vizier, and induced him to adopt a system of counteraction to his measures ; the want of harmony between the King and his minister prevented any vigorous exertion against their common enemy, and obliged each to lavish the resources of the state in securing partizans to himself.

In consequence of this weakness of the government, every nobleman who was discontented with the court, had it in his power to raise a rebellion, and to shelter himself, if he failed, either in the midst of his own tribe, or in some part of the country not easily within reach of the King. Nor was it difficult for him to procure a pardon, if he wished to be reconciled to the court ; for the state of the King's affairs rendered it more necessary for the

support of his authority to conciliate friends than to punish enemies. This certainty of impunity gave a peculiar character to the rebellions of this reign, which were raised on the most trifling grounds, and conducted with the utmost levity. The slightest provocation from the court drove a nobleman into rebellion: the slightest offence from one of the rebels sent him back to the court, or led him to set up a new party; and the whole had more the appearance of a game among children than of a civil war.

The jealousies between the King and the vizier, did not, however, shew themselves till some time after Shuja's accession, and the beginning of his reign was quiet and prosperous.

The first step he took was to release his brother Shauh Zemaun; and, soon after, Moollah Ashik, who had betrayed Zemaun, was apprehended, and suffered the punishment of his perfidy and ingratitude. This was the only execution that followed the change of government. All the other measures of Mokhtaur-oo-doulah's internal administration were calculated to conciliate, and to efface the memory of the civil dissensions which had so long prevailed. At the same time, he applied himself with great vigor and success to reduce the rebellious provinces, and to bring the empire into its ancient state.

The first expedition was sent to Candahar, which was still held by Prince Caumraun and Futteh Khaun. The place was taken without difficulty, and what was of greater importance, Futteh Khaun was soon after persuaded to make his submissions to the new King. An opportunity was now offered of securing the attachment of this powerful and active chief; but it was allowed to escape, and hence arose the misfortunes which disturbed the rest of Shauh Shoojau's reign, and which drove him at length from his throne. Futteh Khaun's demands from the court were moderate, and did not extend beyond the offices held by his father; but these were withheld, owing either to the imprudence of the King, or the jealousy of the vizier; and Futteh Khaun, after a short residence at the court, quitted it in disgust, and retired to his castle of Girishk.

The effects of his disaffection were early and severely felt, for in January, 1804, when the King had assembled an army of thirty thousand men at Peshawer, and was on the point of completing the settlement of his dominions, by intimidating the chiefs of Cashmeer and Sind, he received intelligence of a rebellion at Candahar, which obliged him immediately to relinquish his design. The rise and progress of this transaction will serve to illustrate what has been said of the levity and inconsistency which distinguish

the late Afghaun civil wars. The government of Candahar had been given prince Kyser (a son of Shauh Zemaun's), under the guidance of Ahmed Khaun Noorzye, whose desertion of Shauh Zemaun had been effaced by his zeal for the Soonnee religion. Futteh Khaun found means to persuade the young prince to imprison Ahmed Khaun, and endeavour to make himself King. Ahmed Khaun was accordingly seized, but, though he was treated with many insults and severities, and had been chained with the chains of an elephant, in derision of his gigantic stature, yet, as soon as the prince and Futteh Khaun were prepared to move out against Caubul, they released him, and entrusted him with the defence of the city.

The consequences might have been expected; Ahmed Khaun's son went over to Shooja, and occasioned the defeat of Kyser; while he himself, indifferent who was King, if he could but be revenged on Kyser, gave up Candahar to Caumraun, whom he invited from Furrah to occupy it. After the defeat of Kyser's army, the King was about to enter once more on the settlement of his eastern dominions, when he learned that Kyser and Futteh Khaun had recovered Candahar, and were again assembling troops. He then returned towards Candahar, which was evacuated on his approach; and Kyser soon after threw himself on the King's mercy, was affectionately received, and was reinstated in his government. Futteh Khaun, finding his schemes at Candahar defeated, repaired to Heraut, and insinuating himself into the confidence of prince Feerooz, persuaded him to assert his claim to the throne of Caubul. Feerooz appearing in arms, Shuja sent Kyser at the head of an army to oppose him, and at the same time offered terms, which Feerooz, who was naturally cautious, thought proper to accept; while Futteh quitted him in indignation, and again retired to Girisht.

The whole of the west being now settled, the King and the vizier set out from Candahar in the end of September, and marching first to Sind, they compelled the chiefs of that country to acknowledge the new government, and to pay seventeen lacks of rupees; after which the King moved up his eastern frontier, and settled all the provinces in his route. He reached Peshawer in April, 1805, and soon after received an ambassador from the King of Bokhaura, who came to propose a renewal of the alliance concluded by Zemaun, and to negotiate the double marriage of Shujau to the daughter of the King of Bokhaura, and of that King to a princess of Caubul. The ambassador was favourably received, but as it is contrary to the Dooraunee custom to give their daughters in marriage to foreigners, the part of the pro-

posal respecting the King of Bokhaura's marriage, was civilly declined : that of Shuja was nevertheless agreed to.

During all this time Kyser continued to serve the King with zeal and fidelity in the government of Candahar ; he had even contrived to seize Futteh Khaun, and had nearly been persuaded to gratify the revenge of his father Shauh Zemaun, by putting him to death ; but Futteh Khaun, having prevailed on the prince to visit him privately in prison, so far won on him by his insinuating manners, his allusions to former services, and his promises of future attachment, that Kyser not only set him free, but resumed his old connection with him, and began once more to aspire to the throne. Futteh Khaun, on his release, repaired to Girishk, where he began preparations for the intended enterprize ; but on his return to Candahar, he found Kyser under the influence of Khojeh Mahomed Khaun, another great nobleman, who had dissuaded him from his design of rebelling. On this, Futteh Khaun, equally incensed at the derangement of his plans, and at the preference of another's advice to his, openly renounced all connection with Kyser, and engaged to deliver up Candahar to Caumraun, whom he invited to occupy it. Caumraun, who was at this time at Furrah, immediately assembled a body of troops, and advanced to Eedgauh, a few miles from Candahar, and Kyser was about to quit the city, when a scene ensued, which is scarcely credible even to persons acquainted with the eccentricity of Futteh Khaun's character, and the sudden changes of affairs so common among Dooraunces. On the night before Kyser's flight, he desired to have a parting interview with Futteh Khaun ; and this meeting took place by torch light, on an open terrace in the market-place, which, with the surrounding streets, was filled with horsemen ready for a march. The conference began with mutual reproaches ; but the prince gradually softening his tone, reminded Futteh Khaun of his having saved his life, and besought him not to repay his benefits by driving him into exile. Futteh Khaun then recapitulated his designs in favour of Kyser, and complained of the neglect with which his advice was treated : on this Kyser assured him that he was ready for ever after to follow his counsels implicitly, and strengthened his assertions by such solemn oaths, that Futteh Khaun was shaken, and at last dismissed his resentment, and swore to support the prince in all extremities. Next morning the prince and Futteh Khaun moved out together to oppose Caumraun. Futteh Khaun advanced with his own division, and calling out to Caumraun, acquainted him with the change in his sentiments, and endeavoured to persuade him to retire. Caumraun was at first astonished at this revolution, but he resumed his courage, and

answered in terms of defiance; on which Futteh Khaun, without waiting for the other troops, charged the Prince sword in hand; and such was the effect of this unexpected attack, that Caumraun's troops broke, and he himself with difficulty effected his escape to Furrah.

Futteh Khaun's plan of placing Kyser on the throne was now resumed, apparently with that Prince's full concurrence; but its execution was artfully delayed by Khojeh Mahommed, who left no means of operating on the passions, the prudence, and even on the superstition of the conspirators, unpractised to defeat the scheme.

Meanwhile the King had prepared an expedition at Peshawer for the purpose of reducing Cashmeer, the only province that remained in rebellion. Abdoola Khaun, the governor, had fomented the troubles at Candahar with the view of diverting the attack on himself, and though that diversion was now at an end, Abdoola was saved for the present by the dissensions which prevailed among Shuja's own courtiers. The insinuations of Akram Khaun induced the King to refuse the command of the army to the vizier, and even to talk of assuming it himself. On this the vizier discouraged the expedition altogether, and found means to put off the march of the troops till a subsequent period, when the King's views were more accommodated to his own. This opportunity offered at Caubul, and the vizier was about to commence his march, when Akram Khaun prevailed on the King to call on him to pay a sum of money as the condition on which he should have the command. The King accordingly required three lacs of rupees; but about this time the vizier lost his favourite daughter, and was so much affected, that he declared he was resolved never to quit her grave, or to take any further concern in worldly affairs. The King was now reduced to solicit him to resume his office and carry on the war against Cashmeer. He consented with real or assumed reluctance, and the claim for money was no longer mentioned.

At length he set out on his march with an army of ten thousand men. The first opposition he encountered was at Mozufferabad, where he found the high and rocky bank of a rapid branch of the Hydaspes, occupied by the Cashmerian army: he nevertheless effected a passage in four divisions, and drove the enemy from their ground. One of his own sons was wounded in this engagement. The rest of the road to Cashmeer was through steep and barren mountains, and often along the face of precipices. The vizier's advance was consequently slow, and his provisions began to fail him long before he reached the valley. The vizier, however, encouraged his men by sharing their sufferings; he gave up his own store to the soldiers, and is said

to have suffered the extremities of hunger before he was able to procure relief for his army. So great was the distress of his troops, that when he came to a defile beyond which the enemy's army was encamped, he was not able to hold out till he tried the chance of a battle, which might have removed all his embarrassments. He therefore began to treat with Abdoollah Khaun : he told him his difficulties without reserve ; and Abdoolla, unwilling to drive him to desperation, listened to the terms which were offered, and agreed to supply him with provisions. Mokhtaur prolonged a delusive negotiation till he had secured some further advantages which he had in view, he then threw off the mask and hostilities were immediately renewed.

The armies, however, were still separated by the Hydaspes. At last Abdoollah threw a bridge over the river in the night, and crossing it without delay, appeared on the vizier's rear when he was entirely unprepared to oppose him ; the greater part of his troops were out foraging, and he could not collect above a hundred horse when he first moved out against the enemy. By degrees, however, the whole army was assembled, and was advancing with the vizier at its head, when a party which he had sent in front fell back on them in the greatest confusion. They had been routed in consequence of the cowardice of the vizier's son Atta Mahommed, who fled without striking a blow, and was followed by his disheartened troops. This example had nearly ruined the army, but its courage was restored by the firmness of the vizier, who received the broken troops with great serenity, attributed his son's flight to a concerted feint, and advanced with increased rapidity, as if to take advantage of the success of his stratagem. This onset had a very different issue from the former ; for, after an obstinate conflict, in which the vizier's courage was conspicuous, the Cashmeer army was routed and driven back on the river. The bridge was choaked by the crowds of fugitives : great part of the army, among which was Abdoolla Khaun, were forced to swim, and many were cut to pieces by the victors or drowned in the river.

Abdoolla Khaun now took refuge in his fort, where he had made every preparation for a long siege ; and the King's troops were prevented by the season and by the fatigues which they had suffered from attempting any operation during the rest of the winter.

Early in spring, the fort was attacked, and had held out for two months, when Abdoolla Khaun died. He was a man of good talents and great courage. He is still spoken of with affection by the Cashmerians, and by the Dooraunees who have served under him. He is commended for his love

of justice and his skill in administering it ; for his liberality, his affable manners, and his princely magnificence. He was also a great encourager of learning and poetry. Perhaps no Dooraunee has left a character so generally admired.

The fort was defended for two months after his death, when it surrendered on condition that Abdoollah Khaun's family and the chiefs in the fort should be allowed to reside unmolested either at Caubul or Peshawer. These terms were strictly observed, and Cashmeer was now completely reduced under the King's authority.

The vizier remained in Cashmeer for some months after the reduction of the province : but it is now necessary to turn to the events which took place in the west during the period of this long campaign.

The reconciliation between Futteh Khaun and Kyser was of no long duration : Khojeh Mahommed retained his ascendancy ; and Futteh Khaun retired to Girishk, and once more renewed his intrigues with Caumraun.

It might have been expected that this Prince would have been slow to embark in any enterprize with a person who had so lately deceived him ; but Caumraun, brought up amidst revolutions, and accustomed to put every thing to hazard, had no hesitation in entering on the project held out to him. He joined Futteh Khaun, and, as they advanced towards Candahar, they were met by part of the garrison, while Kyser fled into the country of the Beloches, where he waited for reinforcements from the King.

The King was at Peshawer when the news of this misfortune reached him. He sent without delay to recall the vizier from Cashmeer ; but that minister was unable or unwilling to join him, and he was obliged to command in person against the rebels.

Before he reached Candahar, his troops had been again defeated by Caumraun, who was reinforced by a body of six thousand men from Heraut, under the command of Mullik Caussim the son of Prince Feerooz.

That force was, however, soon recalled to Heraut by an attack of the Persians ; Caumraun fled, the King entered Candahar unopposed, and Futteh Khaun was soon after prevailed on to join him.

The attack of the Persians which recalled Mullik Caussim, had been brought on by an offensive operation of Feerooz Oodeens, and had been for some time threatened ; yet so secure was Feerooz, that he sent his best troops to the assistance of Caumraun, and made no preparations for his own defence till the Persians were assembled in great force within a short distance of his city. He then found his force confined to seven hundred Dooraunees

and two thousand Persian guards, but he was soon joined by five or six thousand Eimauks, who were raised to great enthusiasm against the Persians and Sheeahs, by the exhortations of Soofee Islaum, an Uzbek Moollah, who had long resided at Heraut, where he enjoyed great wealth and honour.

With this army Feerooz marched out to engage the Persians, who were superior in numbers, as well as in the character of their troops; instead of defending the passage of the Pooleemaulaun (Ochus), he injudiciously left that river in his rear; and no sooner had his army crossed, than the Persians sent a body of excellent infantry to occupy the only bridge. Nevertheless, the seven hundred Dooraunees charged the enemy with the utmost impetuosity: they broke through the first line of the Persians, which was composed of infantry, and threw the centre of the cavalry, who formed the second line, into great confusion; but being greatly out-numbered, they were soon surrounded, and cut off almost to a man. The Eimauks broke as soon as the Dooraunees were surrounded; and Feerooz fled without making any exertion. The slaughter was great: Soofee Islaum fell fighting gallantly at the head of a band composed of his own retainers, and of religious enthusiasts who accompanied him as volunteers. His body fell into the hands of the Persians, who burned it with every circumstance of indignity. The fugitives fared little better: many were drowned in the Ochus, and Feerooz himself escaped with great difficulty, after losing his horse.

The Persians immediately prepared to lay siege to Heraut; but Mullik Caussim was now on his return; the Eimauks and Dooraunees had time to assemble; and the Persians proposed terms to Feerooz, which that cautious Prince accepted. They were that he should pay 50,000 rupees, and give his son as a hostage for the discharge of the sum, and that he should give his daughter in marriage to the Persian Prince at Meshhed: the two first articles were fulfilled, but the third was disregarded.

This success of the Persians at first excited a strong sensation among the Dooraunees, and the King at one time intended to have moved to Heraut in person to vindicate the honour of the Afghaun name; but the internal state of the kingdom at this time was by no means such as to allow of foreign enterprizes.

The chief obstacle arose from the increased disunion between the King and the vizier, which was now rapidly tending to an open rupture. Whatever jealousy the King might have entertained of the vizier's power, he had hitherto been led to respect him by a sense of dependence on his influence and abilities; but he had now been left to quell a serious rebellion without

the advice or assistance of his minister : the success he had met with, encouraged him to place greater reliance on his own resources, and at last to oppose the vizier's wishes, and to treat his advice with contempt.

The vizier's disaffection augmented in proportion as his influence declined; and it has been suspected that he was the author of an attempt which took place at this time, to raise Abbass, one of the confined Princes, to the throne. The plan failed, but was not without serious consequences, as Mahmood effected his escape during the confusion which it occasioned.

Not long after, the vizier arrived from Cashmeer : he found the King resolved to proceed to Sind, a step from which he used all his influence to dissuade him ; and having now ascertained that his power over his master was gone, he resolved to lose no time in placing a more compliant prince upon the throne. He accordingly halted at Caubul, and entered into a strict connection with Prince Kyser, whom he persuaded to enter into his design.

In the mean time the King proceeded to Sind, and entered into an arrangement with the governors, which gave so much offence to their determined enemy, Futtch Khaun, that he took the earliest opportunity of quitting the army, with the three thousand troops under his command.

During these transactions, and probably before Futtch Khaun's flight, the King received intelligence that the vizier had proclaimed Prince Kyser King at Caubul ; and not long after, he learned that the city of Peshawer had fallen into the hands of the rebels. He resolved to direct his first operations against that city, and he succeeded in recovering it by the end of February.

About the same time the vizier and Kyser arrived in the neighbourhood, with a force amounting to twelve thousand men ; and, after a fruitless negotiation, the parties engaged on the 3d of March 1808.

The royal troops were broken at the first onset, and the King himself was about to quit the field, when the vizier, carried on by his natural courage, and by the near prospect of success, imprudently charged him at the head of a handful of men. The Khauns about the King made a desperate resistance, and the vizier was shot in the struggle. The King's troops rallied on this event, and the fate of the battle was soon turned in their favour.

The King entered Peshawer in triumph, the vizier's head was borne behind him on a spear.

This victory entirely restored the King's affairs in Peshawer ; but Cashmeer still held out for the vizier's party, under his son Atta Mahommed Khaun ; and the King was prevented undertaking any thing in that province by the more urgent difficulties which subsisted in Caubul and Candahar.

The Meer Waez who had remained at Caubul while the vizier marched for Peshawer, no sooner heard of the defeat and death of his friend, than he set all the imprisoned Princes at liberty, and prepared for a vigorous defence of the capital. He was obliged to desert the city on the King's approach, but he retired with Kyser into the strong country of the Cohistaun, where he continued for some time to resist the troops which were sent against him. At length Kyser was persuaded to come in, and was freely pardoned, and the King marched against Mahmood, who had been joined by Futteh Khaun and had taken Candahar. The rivals met on the east of that city, Mahmood was defeated and Candahar fell into the hands of the victor.

The King was now about to move towards Sind, but being anticipated by a payment from that province, he set out for Peshawer, which place he reached on the 10th of January 1809.

The Caubul mission arrived at Peshawer soon after this, and the succeeding events are related in the narrative of its proceedings.

APPENDIX B.

MR. DURIE'S NARRATIVE.

“ **I**N the evening arrived at the stone Mehmaun seroy *, which has a good deal of Persian verses inscribed all about it, — proceeded thence to Atuck, situated a little way off from it on the top of pretty high mountains, below which the river flows down with great rapidity and noise, — not being permitted to get in by the gate, I went to the village on the left hand side, where upwards of twenty Pytans were seated on cots (couches) in the chokee (guard-room), having a flag fixed; they had two or three culleeauns, and were smoking tobacco and talking. Having sullamed, I went and sat, and smoked also. They enquiring whence I came, I told them from Bengal, and was going on a pilgrimage to Bagdad Shurreef, and Mecca Mobaruck. On being told that I had been in the English service, one of them well dressed with a gown and a good redish coloured turban, talked curiously about the battle of Rampore; saying, the English not having fired, they were cut off to a great amount, but when only a few remained, they began to fire, upon which the Rohillas were driven back, killed, and their countries entirely taken. About candle-light almost all of them got out with their cots upon the open plain; about eight one of them observing I was hungry, got me some bread, asking why I had not mentioned it in time, and he would have got me some stuff with

* I have before mentioned (p. 205) that Mr. Durie wrote a narrative of his journey, and that I also asked him questions, and took notes of his replies. The following is his narrative, and the part within inverted commas is in his own language, except that I have altered the grammar, and sometimes the words, where the sense was obscured by the mistakes which Mr. Durie made in consequence of the hurry with which this was composed. I have not, however, altered much in this way, and the part between commas may be reckoned entirely Mr. Durie's own. The parts where Mr. Durie is mentioned in the third person are either abstracted from his narrative, or taken from my notes above alluded to; even there Mr. Durie's language is generally preserved.