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## XIV.

Reflection  
thereon.

The death of Ptolemy Philopator was thus followed by funeral games, worthy of such a prince, and descriptive of manners so infamous, and persons so contemptible, that nothing but their abuse of supreme power in a great kingdom could entitle them to a moment's regard. Agathocles, indeed, was the mere child of fortune, and ruined by the same odious vices through which he had risen to greatness under a profligate master. Both his exaltation and depression were thus occasioned by accidental and vulgar circumstances; they flowed not from inherent peculiarities in his own nature, like those of his execrable namesake the bloody tyrant of Sicily; whose destinies, frightful as they were, originating solely in his own tremendous energies, are thereby better calculated to excite interest in history. After the removal of Agathocles, the guardianship of young Ptolemy, and by consequence the government of Egypt, fell successively into the hands of Sosibius, of Cleopemus, and Aristomenes<sup>65</sup>. Of the two first, the administration was short and unimportant; but we shall be called in the course of this history, to commemorate the rare merits of Aristomenes.

Arts and  
letters under  
the reign of  
Philopator.

Notwithstanding the follies and the vices of Ptolemy Philopator, arts and sciences had taken such firm root in Alexandria, that it would have been impossible for that profligate prince to destroy them. But Philopator, detestable as his own character was, inherited from his ancestors a passion for letters and philosophy. He is said to have delighted in the conversation of Sphærus the Stoic<sup>66</sup>; and all the four ancient sects continued to flourish during his reign; as well as the four new schools, of criticism, geometry, astronomy, and medicine. Philopator dedicated a temple to Homer, adorned with the statue of that divine poet<sup>67</sup>. The poets of his own age attained not celebrity. Rhianus<sup>68</sup> treated an interesting subject, the ancient Messenian wars. Euphorion of Chalcis, a voluminous writer in

<sup>65</sup> Polybius. Conf. l. xvi. c. 22. & l. xv. c. 31.

<sup>66</sup> Diogen. Laert. l. vii. f. 185.

<sup>67</sup> Ælian Var. Hist. l. iv. c. 22.


<sup>68</sup> Pausanias Messenic.

heroic verse<sup>69</sup>, became librarian to Antiochus III., Philopator's rival and enemy. The historians Phylarchus and Chrysippus flourished in the same age<sup>70</sup>: we know not the merit of their matter, but their style, particularly that of the former<sup>71</sup>, was disgraced by those inelegancies and distortions which deformed the works of Hegesias, Duris, and other historians of whom we have before spoken. Aristophanes, the scholar of Eratosthenes, distinguished himself in the walks of philology and criticism; and, as a mechanician, Heron, who lived down to this reign, has left works<sup>72</sup> that may be still read with profit. But, in the time of Philopator, the most useful knowledge was often strangely misapplied. This is illustrated in his far-famed galley of forty tier of oars, surpassing in magnitude all moving castles before or after it. Since the enlargement of the rate of war ships under Alexander's first successors, the Greek kings of the East were no longer contented with quadriremes and quinqueremes, the rates most serviceable in battle, but vied with each other in constructing vessels of a stupendous magnitude, which answered no other purpose but that of gratifying a vanity alike idle and expensive. Philopator's quadragintareme measured 420 feet in length, and 72 feet in height to the loftiest ornaments of the stern<sup>73</sup>, far exceeding in dimensions a modern ship of the largest size carrying one hundred and twenty cannons. This unwieldy machine was impelled by 4,000 rowers, steered and manœuvred by 400 sailors, and its batteries were manned by 3000 marines. The same prince built a vessel 330 feet long, but of the disproportionate breadth of 45 feet, because designed chiefly for the navigation of the Nile. It was named *Thalamagus*<sup>74</sup>, as containing the haram, or womens'

<sup>69</sup> Suidas ad Voc.<sup>70</sup> Scholiast in Apollon, l. iv.<sup>71</sup> Dionys. Halicarn. de Compos. Verbor.<sup>72</sup> Hero, jun. de machin. bell. Conf.

Athenæus, l. xi. p. 497. et Fabricius, l. iii. c. 24.

<sup>73</sup> Vid. Athenæus, l. v. p. 203, et. seq. The breadth is not given.<sup>74</sup> Id. ibid.

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XIV. were the accommodations of the moving fortrefs, which will be de-  
 scribed hereafter, constructed by Hieron of Syracuse, and which  
is said to have actually sailed from that city to Alexandria<sup>75</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> Athenæus, l. v. p. 309.

## CHAPTER XV.

*State of Greece and Macedon at the Accession of Philip IV.—Outrageous Proceedings of the Etolians.—The Social War.—Achæans negotiate with Philip.—Cynætha in Arcadia; its brutishness.—Phillip's successful Operations; is recalled to Macedon by an Irruption of the Dordanians.—His Winter Campaign in Peloponnesus.—Guilty Intrigues of his Ministers.—He invades Etolia.—Desolation of Thermum, and Inscription on its Ruins.—Disgrace of the Minister Apelles, and Destruction of his Accomplices.—State of the Belligerent Powers.—News of Hannibal's great Victories in Italy.—End of the Social War.—Prophetic Speech of Agelaus.—High mindedness of the Peloponnesians.—Meanness of the Athenians.—Depravity of the Bæotians.*

HAVING, in the two preceding chapters, related those transactions in Syria and Egypt which prepared the way for a long series of Roman triumphs, I proceed, according to the method prescribed, to those contemporary events in Macedon and Greece, which strongly co-operated towards the same end. Under the prudent administration of Antigonus Doson, Macedon maintained a high ascendancy in Greece, without affecting sovereignty. Antigonus restrained and punished the dangerous rapacity of the Etolians; he defeated the proud and preposterous hopes of Sparta, but spared that city and its inhabitants; he was a steady friend to the Achæans and Acarnanians, because these nations were ever friendly to the maxims of moderation and justice. The greater part of Thessaly had remained long subject to Macedon. The Beotians, Phocians, and Epirots were submissive allies to the same kingdom; and, by his well-garrisoned strongholds of Corinth and Orchomenus, Antigonus was enabled seasonably and effectually to interpose in maintaining the

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State of  
Greece and  
Macedon at  
the accession  
of Philip IV.  
Olymp.  
cxxxix. 4.  
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The Etolians, their character and views.

the tranquillity of Peloponnesus. All these advantages descended to his successor Philip IV. together with unusual security on his northern frontier, and the hereditary friendship of Aratus, the virtuous and able pretor of the Achæan confederacy.

In this prosperous condition of Greece and Macedon, the public tranquillity was first disturbed by the Etolians, who contemned the youth of Philip, and saw but little to apprehend from those ministers whom Antigonus had appointed to guide his councils<sup>1</sup>. The maxims of the Etolians were different from those of the other states which had formerly been the prime movers in all wars and negotiations. The Spartans, Athenians, and Thebans had successively fought for pre-eminence; and when this object was defeated, through the preponderancy of Macedonian power, they were ready to lay down their arms. But the Etolians, careless of glory, were principally intent on plunder. Instead of the transient emotions of ambition, they were actuated by the permanent impulse of avarice; and with them, a good ground for war was never wanting, when depredations might be committed with impunity<sup>2</sup>. The death of Antigonus Doseon seemed highly propitious to their views. Notwithstanding the coercion of their encroachments by that able prince, they still possessed several strongholds in distant parts of Greece, which favoured their piracy by sea, as well as their robbery by land. They were masters of Ambracus, on the Ambracian gulph; of Pallé, in the island of Cephallenia; of the strong cities of Thebes and Echinus, both on the coast of Phthiotis. Their inland garrisons occupied Melitæa, and some smaller posts on the mountainous skirts of Theffaly. In this manner their scattered usurpations in the north, extended between the Ægæan and Ionian seas<sup>3</sup>; while on the side of Peloponnesus, they flattered themselves with the good will of the Elians and Spartans, inveterate enemies to the Achæan league, and had garrisoned<sup>4</sup> Phigalia, a city twelve miles from the sea, near the

Their possessions and allies.

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, l. iv. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Id. l. ii. c. 45. & seq.

<sup>3</sup> Id. l. iii. & iv. passim.

<sup>4</sup> Id. l. iv. c. 3.

northen

northern frontier of Messenia, the only district in the Peninsula which had escaped depredation in the Cleomenic war.

Conformably with the maxims of his nation, Dorimachus, a young Etolian of boiling courage, proceeded to Phigalia, and was speedily resorted to there, by a band of pirates. Although the general peace, which Antigonus had established throughout Greece, still subsisted in full force, the Etolian encouraged his pirates to carry off the herds of the Messenians from the sea coast, and afterwards to penetrate into the very centre of the country, and to commit depredations, chiefly in the night time, on the farms and villages. When repeated remonstrances against these proceedings were brought to Phigalia, the robber declared that he would come to Messenè itself, and there in person do justice to the injured. He was descended from a family pre-eminent, even among the Etolians, for deeds of rash and unprincipled audacity. Not to degenerate from his ancestors, he appeared at Messenè; and instead of making the reparation expected, treated those who urged their wrongs with the utmost indignity; deriding some, threatening others, and denying justice to all. While he still remained in Messenè, the pirates advanced within a small distance of its walls, assaulted in the night a village called the farm of Chiron, killed those who opposed their violence, and after binding the remainder, carried promiscuously slaves and cattle aboard their fleet\*. Nothing can more strongly attest the awe in which the peaceful Messenians then stood of the fierce Etolians, than their forbearance to take summary vengeance on Dorimachus, the author of this enormity. He was cited to appear before a council, composed of the principal members of the government\*. On this occasion, Sciron, one of the Ephori, advised that Dorimachus should not be allowed to leave the city, until the murderers were surrendered to justice. The other magistrates having assented to this opinion, Dorimachus upbraided their folly, in thinking to make him prisoner

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Dorimachus the Etolian, his audacious proceedings in Messenia. Olymp. cxxxix. 3. B. C. 222.

His insolence abashed by Sciron, one of the Messenian Ephori.

\* Id. *ibid.* c. 4, & seq.

\* Συμμετρία. Polyb. l. iv. c. 4.

without

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without provoking the vengeance of Etolia. This threat piqued Sciron, a man of no less spirit than probity, to whom the following circumstance afforded an opportunity of abashing the haughty robber. There lived in Messenè an infamous youth, so like in face and person to Dorimachus, that they might easily have been mistaken for each other; and, with this circumstance, the Etolian was well acquainted. Babyrtas was the name of the wretched Messenian, stigmatised for every vice most disgraceful to a man. In reply to Dorimachus, who had spoken with much vehemence, Sciron therefore asked, in a firm tone, "Do you think that we shall mind you, or your threats, Babyrtas?" The application of this single name covered Dorimachus with confusion<sup>7</sup>. He consented that restitution should be made, and that the guilty should be punished; but, being allowed shortly afterwards to return to Etolia, excited what is called the Social War, which lasted three years.

Commence-  
ment of the  
social war.  
Olymp.  
cxxxix. 4.  
B. C. 221.

Ariston at that time was pretor of the Etolians, who, on account of bodily infirmity, committed the military department of his office to his kinsman Scopas, a man also related to Dorimachus, and of a similar character. As two such persons readily concurred in the same rash views, and their most audacious measures were sure of meeting with approbation from the Etolian multitude, they did not wait for a decree of the assembly, or the authority of the senate<sup>8</sup>. In defiance of forms, sanctioned by law and long usage, they at once made war on the Messenians, as well as on those nations most likely to espouse the cause of the injured. Their pirates issued from Cephallenia, and ravaged the coasts of Epirus; another band assaulted, but without effect, Thyreum in Acarnania; beyond the southern extremity of Peloponnesus, a rich merchant vessel belonging to Macedon was captured off the island Cythera, and carried into a harbour of Etolia, where the ship, with all persons on board her,

<sup>7</sup> Id. *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ἀποκλήτοι*. A select body, whose concur-

rence was necessary in all public measures. Conf. Polyb. l. xx. c. 1, & l. xxi. c. 3.

was

was sold at public auction. By land, the proceedings of the Etolians were equally unwarrantable; particularly in surprising Clarium, a stronghold on the Arcadian frontier, which they purposed to render a depository for the spoil collected from the adjacent province of Messenia. But in this design they were defeated by Taurion, commander of the Macedonian garrison in Orchomenus, assisted by Timoxenus, then pretor of Achaia. Having united their forces, these generals marched hastily to Clarium, and, in the course of a few days, recovered that fortress.

The time now approached when Timoxenus, on the eleventh of May, was to lay down his office, and to make room for the fifteenth pretorship of Aratus, in the course of thirty years<sup>10</sup>. The Etolians, in order to anticipate this change, which seemed little favourable to their views, assembled a great army at Rhium, a promontory and harbour of Etolia, scarcely two miles distant from Anti-Rhium, in Achaia. Having transported their forces across the narrow frith, they proceeded through the districts of Patræ and Tritæa; their generals, Dorimachus and Scopas, though they affected unwillingness to offend the Achæan league, being at little pains to restrain the depredations of their followers. In this manner they marched through Achaia to the friendly province of Elis, and from thence to their stronghold Phigalia, from which they began to plunder unmercifully the best possessions of the Messenians. The Achæans had by this time convened in their vernal assembly. They were indignant at the wrongs done by the Etolians to some of the oldest members of their league; they compassionated the sufferings of the Messenians, though that people were neither united with them in government, nor parties to the confederacy subsisting between Achaia and Macedonia, comprehending most other Grecian commonwealths. But Timoxenus, the actual pretor, was a man of little enterprise: he knew that his countrymen, trusting to the stability of the last peace

Aratus, upon the resignation of Timoxenus, takes the field against them. Olymp. cxxxix. 4. B. C. 221.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch in Arat.



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Battle of  
Caphyæ, in  
Arcadia.  
Olymp.  
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in Peloponnesus, had neglected their arms and exercises. He declined therefore to lead the Achæans into the field, but readily resigned his office, five days before its appointed term, to the zeal and spirit of Aratus".

This illustrious patriot summoned the Achæans, through all their cities, to meet him in arms at Megalopolis, fifteen miles distant from Phigalia, the principal rendezvous of the enemy. When the army was fully assembled, not excepting the Lacedæmonians who had marched as declared friends to a confederacy which they secretly abhorred, Aratus sent heralds to the Etolians, commanding them immediately to quit Messenia, and to be careful, in their return homeward, not to enter Achaia. Upon receiving this message from a man commanding an army more numerous than their own, Dori-machus and Scopas prepared to comply with it. They ordered their transports to rendezvous at the island and harbour of Phlias, on the coast of Elis, and two days afterwards began to march thither. Aratus, upon assurances of this intention, dismissed the greater part of his army, and with a body of three thousand foot, and three hundred horse, besides the Macedonians under Taurion, followed at some distance the retiring enemy". When the Etolians discovered that their motions were watched, but by a force inferior to their own, they suddenly faced about, and returning towards the Achæans, found them encamped in the plain of Caphyæ, defended by a river in front, and also by several deep trenches. Not daring to attack this post, especially as the enemy showed great willingness to engage, they hastened across the plain to the adjacent heights; and the cavalry, which closed their march, had nearly reached the hill called Propus, when the Achæan pretor sent against them his light infantry and horse. Although this detachment began to skirmish with the rear, the Etolian cavalry still retired in good order, to gain the support of its infantry. Aratus mistaking this movement for

The Achæ-  
ans defeated.

" Polybius, l. iv. c. 6.

" Plutarch in Arato. Conf. Polyb. l. iv. c. 11. & seq.



flight, ordered his heavy armed troops to join in the pursuit. Before the first division of them approached the foot of the mountains, the Etolians had rallied in great force, and totally defeated the Achæan targeteers and cavalry. The heavy troops that came to their assistance, perplexed at the unexpected disaster, and being themselves in the loose order of march, also turned their backs, and were carried along with the fugitives; from whence it happened, that although five hundred Achæans only had engaged the enemy, those that now fled exceeded two thousand. Their flight would have been less dishonourable than salutary, had they found the main division, headed by Aratus in person, on the advantageous ground which it had originally occupied; but, as this division hastened towards them in a long and broken train, the evil was without remedy, and the rout became general. The neighbouring cities, particularly Caphyæ and Orchomenus, opened their friendly gates, otherwise the whole Achæan army must have perished disgracefully. The Etolians, elated with success, marched towards the Corinthian gulph, plundering the district of Sicyon and other Achæan dependencies in their way, and then hastened to their own country, loaded with booty, and with the weight of crimes not likely to pass unrevenged. Meanwhile the Achæans assembled in council at Ægeum. Their country had been twice invaded by a merciless enemy; but postponing the consideration of such injuries, the assembly resounded with complaints against the misconduct of Aratus. His enemies in the government accused him of bringing on a battle unnecessarily, and of fighting it unskilfully. Through what unaccountable folly could he break up his army, while the Etolians were still in the heart of Peloponnesus? Was it for this, that he had wrested the pretorship from Timoxenus five days before its legal expiration? He had been twice deluded by a most ordinary stratagem: first, when the Etolians made a pretence of retreating homewards, only that they might surprise his disbanded force; secondly,

Aratus accused of misconduct.

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condly, when in the action itself they affected to fly, only to return more vigorously to the charge. If, in opposition to all rules of prudence, he had determined to come to battle, he ought at least to have fought it on the plain; there, the heavy armed Achæans would have availed themselves of their military arrangements and their weapons. On the mountains, the Etolians found every thing best adapted to their arms, their tactics, and habits of warfare.

His defence.

These accusations, just as they were, did not discourage Aratus from making an animated defence. Having described his unwearied exertions in the service of the Achæan league, he maintained that his actions ought to be examined with indulgent candour, not with sharpness and severity. Faults in conduct he did not deny, nor would he attempt to palliate them; but his principles were sound, and his intentions pure. The multitude changed from anger against him to the highest favour; testifying much resentment at his accusers, and submitting in future all their affairs to his management".

Embassies of  
the Achæans  
to their con-  
federates.  
Olymp.  
cxxxix. 4.  
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A decree passed the council for assembling the Achæans in arms, and for summoning the aid of their allies. Ambassadors were dispatched to the Phocians, Acarnanians, Bœotians, Epirots, above all, to king Philip, stating the outrages of the Etolians, and requesting that the Messenians, who had so dreadfully suffered by them, might be admitted into the general confederacy". In Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians and Messenians agreed to furnish respectively a body of two thousand five hundred men; but instead of fulfilling this promise, the former people sent privately to make a treaty with the Etolians. Notwithstanding the flight of Cleomenes to Egypt, his partizans were all-powerful in Sparta; they had prevented the substitution of any new king in his stead, vainly expecting his return; and, in the mean time, the republic was governed by annual magistrates, deeply infected with the wild projects of Cleomenes, and inveterately hostile to Achaia and Macedon, by which powers,

" Plutarch, *ibid.* & Polyb. l. iv. c. 14.

" Id. l. iv. c. 15, & c. 26.

chiefly, his dangerous views had been defeated<sup>15</sup>. In the north of Greece, the motions of the confederates depended on those of Philip. The Thessalians were his subjects; the Epirots, since the extinction of the line of their renowned Pyrrhus, formed an inconsiderable and subservient republic; the Bœotians, Acarnanians, and Phocians had, all of them, been long accustomed to fear the Macedonians, and in the late reign to love and respect them. Under these circumstances, decisive measures on the part of Macedon might have restored public tranquillity. But Philip was only in his eighteenth year: his ministers, as will appear hereafter, were weak, perfidious, and at variance with each other, while such neighbours as the Thracians and Illyrians always appeared formidable to a new king of Macedon. Philip, therefore, though he agreed to admit the Messenians into the confederacy, yet hesitated about declaring war against the Etolians. It was usual with that people to commit unprovoked injuries, to break through all laws, to violate all engagements. In them, such proceedings, being matters of course, excited no surprise, and occasioned slight resentment; so true it is, that men are in all things guided by custom, and therefore more willing to overlook long continued and uniform habits of wickedness, than to pardon any new and unexpected act of injustice<sup>16</sup>.

Considerations which made Macedon reluctant in declaring war.

While the confederates still deliberated with little unanimity, the Etolians were already in the field. Having associated with them, through promise of plunder, some Illyrian pirates, they invaded the Peloponnesus, and entered the central province of Arcadia. In the north of that province, Cynætha was the head of a district, the wildest and roughest in the whole mountainous territory<sup>17</sup>. It was inhabited by rugged herdsmen, who scorned those arts that had been so successfully employed by their neighbours for taming savageness and polishing rusticity. Of all the Arcadians, the people of Cynætha

Cynætha in Arcadia—the brutishness of its inhabitants.

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch in Cleomen. & Polybius, l. iv. c. 16.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. c. 16.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. c. 16, & seq.

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Their dissensions and destruction.

alone disdained the culture of music, which was taught and exercised in Greece, not merely as an agreeable pastime, the soother of care and the sweetener of leisure, but as an art highly contributing towards the refinement of pleasure from voluptuousness, and of valour from ferocity. The brutishness of the Cynæthians made them despise this liberal pursuit; and their neglect of an acquirement, in which the other Arcadians universally took delight, heightened the depravity of their character, and the universal detestation accompanying it. Odious abroad, they were divided into cruel factions at home. One party banished three hundred of their adversaries, and submitted to the protection of the Achæans. The exiles, affecting repentance, solicited permission to return. The party, which had expelled them, referred this request to the Achæan council. The Achæans advised compliance and sincere reconciliation, thinking to excite gratitude in persons so highly benefited. But these unprincipled wretches had no sooner set foot on their native soil, than, as if they had meditated the most abominable treachery in their very act of swearing amity over the sacred victims, they entered into secret practices with the Etolians for betraying to them their city. To this atrocious engagement they were faithful. A portion of them, employed promiscuously with other inhabitants in the night-watch, assailed suddenly their partners in this service; and having put them to the sword, gave admission to the Etolians, who, according to concert, were at hand. Cynætha was thus taken, and treated most unmercifully; even the Cynæthian traitors being subjected to the same cruelties with their betrayed brethren. After the houses had been carefully ransacked, torture compelled the discovery of treasures yet concealed in them. The Etolians, before leaving Peloponnesus, offered the desolate city to their Elian allies, but as *they* refused the present, Cynætha was set on fire and abandoned to the flames. The neighbouring cities of Luffi and Cleitor were threatened with a similar fate. The former



purchased safety by surrendering some consecrated ornaments in the temple of Diana; and the latter was more honourably protected by the strength of its walls, and the bravery of its citizens. Without completely satiating their rapacity, the Etolians thus returned home by the way of Rhium; for their own coasts were in danger from another party of Illyrian pirates, in the interest of Macedon; and that kingdom was preparing to engage vigorously in the war<sup>18</sup>.

Shortly after their departure, Philip arrived at Corinth with a powerful escort. From thence he dispatched messengers to all the states in the league, inviting their deputations to concert with him the measures fittest to be pursued at the present juncture. Before the return of his couriers, he was informed that Sparta was torn by sedition. This news made him proceed southwards to Tegea. The Lacedæmonians, favourers to Gleomenes and his wild innovations, fearful that Philip's approach might give courage to their adversaries, had massacred those among them whom they deemed most dangerous. This enormity was speedily followed by other deeds equally atrocious; all of them committed under the pretence of liberty and equality, and terminating as outrageous proceedings in favour of political freedom naturally end, in the establishment of a severe and execrable tyranny, which lasted twenty years under the military usurpers Machanidas and Nabis.

On the present occasion, the party, now master of the government, sent deputies to Philip to vindicate their own innocence, and accuse the persons, who were slain, as authors of the tumult. At the same time they assured the king, that the Lacedæmonians were determined to observe most faithfully the terms of their alliance with him; and that no state whatever surpassed their sincerity, zeal, and complete devotion to his interests and those of the confederacy. When the deputies retired, Philip, who had heard them in council, desired the opinion of his ministers. All agreed that the enormity of

Philip  
marches into  
Pelopon-  
nesus.  
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Seditious in  
Sparta.

Philip's me-  
ditation and  
good policy  
in appealing  
them.

<sup>18</sup> Polybius, *ibid.*



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THE Spartans ought to not pass unpunished: the most moderate were of opinion, that the government should be wrested from the hands of men who had acquired it so unwarrantably: the more violent stimulated Philip to exemplary vengeance, exhorting him to signalize his accession to the throne by the destruction of sanguinary Sparta, as the great Alexander, however humane in his nature, had begun his reign by the demolition of perfidious and incorrigible Thebes. The king spoke last; and, being then only in his eighteenth year, the sentiments which he delivered are ascribed to the suggestion of Aratus. Philip said, "that in the domestic concerns of his allies, he did not think himself entitled to interfere. When great wrongs were committed, he would indeed interpose his advice and admonition with regard to the means best fitted either to redress them, or to prevent their recurrence. Farther than this, he was convinced that he had not any right to go. The case was different, when any of the allies manifestly violated the compact, by which they were all reciprocally bound to each other. But even then, the perverse communities were to be coerced, not by himself individually, but by the confederates in general. That the Lacedæmonians had done nothing against the league, with the terms of which, on the contrary, they had declared their resolution strictly and zealously to comply. That the regulation of their internal government, belonged to themselves only; and that, if he dealt with them rigorously for errors committed on that score, he could not fail to incur the censure of mankind, when they contrasted his behaviour with that of his predecessor, who had treated the same people with the utmost gentleness, after conquering them as enemies in a just war." Conformably with these sentiments, it was determined that no inquiry should be made concerning the recent transactions in Sparta. Ambassadors were sent however to that city, to administer the federal oath to its new magistrates; and

" Polybius, l. iv. c. 23 & seq.

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Convention  
of the allies  
at Corinth—  
fruitless ne-  
gociation  
with the  
Etolians.

Philip repaired to Corinth to meet the deputations which he summoned thither, from the different members of the league.

In this convention, there was not a single state that had not injuries to complain of from the lawless and impious Etolians. It was decreed that war should be carried on against that ferocious people, until they relinquished all their possessions, beyond the limits of their own narrow territory, and until all those cities, which, under the name of allies they oppressed as subjects, should be restored to the enjoyment of their ancient laws and hereditary government; and be left untaxed, ungarrisoned, and independent. Philip, with that moderation and forbearance, which distinguished all his measures, informed the Etolians by letter of this decree, that they might send deputies to the convention, if they had any thing to alledge in extenuation of their offences. The chiefs of the Etolians answered, that they would meet the king at Rhium, and endeavour to give him satisfaction. They thought, that either his fear or his pride would decline the meeting: but this expectation being disappointed, they wrote to him a second time, saying that, as the general assembly of the Etolians had not yet convened, it was not lawful for them to enter into discussions concerning national affairs. Their assembly met soon afterwards in September, for the Etolians held their annual elections at the autumnal equinox. Insensible to their past misconduct, they elected for pretor Scopas, the main coadjutor of Dorimachus in all his late outrages. They had shut their eyes to their own injustice, and foolishly treated the rest of mankind as blind<sup>20</sup>.

Yet much remained to be done before their wrongs could be redressed. It was necessary that the decree of the convention should be ratified by the assembly of each state in particular. So dreadful was the terror which the Etolians had diffused around them, that none of the confederates wished to be the first in arms. The Messenians, though distinguished by the severity of their sufferings, were over-

Various pas-  
sions and  
delays  
among the  
confederates.

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, l. iv. c. 24. & seq.

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awed by the neighbouring garrison of Phigalia. The Epirots, sadly degenerate from their ancient spirit, declined to march, till Philip was ready to reinforce them. The Acarnanians, though their country was immediately interposed between Epirus and Etolia, showed less reluctance than any other people to take the field, such was the manly sense of honour by which they were actuated; their zeal for liberty, and firmness in alliance<sup>21</sup>. Philip, meanwhile, had returned to Macedon to complete his preparations. The indulgence and good policy which he had shewn with regard to Sparta, had given to him many partizans in that city. Though the Etolians sent an agent thither, to renew their secret practices, the Lacedæmonians, in general, were so deeply affected by Philip's moderation, that they determined rather to adhere to their public engagements with Macedon and her allies. But this resolution had scarcely passed, when the baffled party cut off its authors in a new and more bloody sedition; and as accounts of Cleomenes' death just arrived from Egypt, named Lycurgus for his successor, a man who had no fair pretensions to the throne, and who made his way to that dignity through credit with the Etolians, and by bribing with a talent each of the five Ephori<sup>22</sup>. At the same time, Agesipolis, a child, was chosen king from the family of the Agidæ, merely by way of form.

Lycurgus  
a partizan of  
the Etolians,  
usurps the  
government  
of Sparta.

Bold enter-  
prize against  
the Achæan  
city Ægira.  
Olymp.  
cxl 1.  
B. C. 220.

Before Philip and his confederates had prepared for action; the Lacedæmonians, under Lycurgus, invaded the Argive territory; and the Elians, headed by Euripides an Etolian, entered the nearest districts of Achæia. Nor were the Etolians themselves remiss in forming new expeditions, worthy of their character. Ægira was a city seven stadia from the sea, midway between Sicyon and Ægium, situate on rough hills difficult of access, and overlooking the Corinthian gulph directly opposite to Delphi and Parnassus. A deserter from Etolia had been admitted into the place, and observed, that the gate towards Ægium was entrusted to men often stupified by wine,

<sup>21</sup> Polybius. l. iv. c. 30.

<sup>22</sup> Id. *ibid.* c. 35.

and always neglectful of duty. Upon this discovery, he applied to Dorimachus, who, being always ready for such enterprizes, crossed the gulph with a multitude of his countrymen in the night, and cast anchor in the river Crius, which ran by the city. The deserter was ready to receive them: he chose twenty of the most daring of the band; and having conducted them by different paths with which he was well acquainted, secretly penetrated into the place through the conduit of an aqueduct. He slew the heedless watchmen in their beds; broke the bars of the ill-guarded gate with hatchets; and threw open the entrance to his countrymen. The Etolians, who soon arrived in great numbers, behaved as if those, who had once gained admission into a city, were thereby its masters. The greater part of them separated for the purpose of depredation; and while their stragglers were employed in breaking open the houses and rifling their contents, the Ægirates had time to assemble in sufficient force to attack and repel those who still remained in a body. They were pursued with great fury; many were stifled at the gate, and many driven headlong down the precipices. Dorimachus having lost his boldest companions, disgracefully escaped to his boats<sup>21</sup>.

Defeated by  
the bravery  
of the Ægi-  
rates.

It was the misfortune of the Achæans, that their contingents of troops and their contributions in money were raised with extreme slowness. They thus allowed the Spartan Lycurgus to gain possession of several small fortresses in Arcadia, and Euripides, the Etolian general commanding the Elians, to seize others still more important in Achaia; from which he greatly infested that province. Dymè, Phara, and Tritæa suffered most by these incursions; and as they derived not any assistance from the confederacy, they applied the money due from them to the league to the raising of cavalry for the protection of their respective districts: a measure enforced by strong necessity, but of most pernicious example<sup>22</sup>.

Delays and  
impolicy of  
the Achæ-  
ans.

<sup>21</sup> Polybius, l. iv. c. 57. & seq.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. c. 60. Conf. Plut. in Arat.



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Philip enters  
the Etolian  
territories.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 1.  
B. C. 220.

Takes Am-  
bracus and  
restores it to  
the Epirots.

Expels the  
Etolians  
from their  
fortresses in  
Acarnania.

When the month of May came round, the Achæans chose the younger Aratus pretor in room of his father. Philip, in the same month, began his march from Macedon at the head of so great a force, that, had he at once penetrated into Etolia, he would have made a most seasonable diversion in favour of the Achæans, and in all probability have put a speedy end to the war<sup>25</sup>. But through the pressing instances of the Epirots, who had joined him in great numbers, he was prevailed on to lay siege to Ambracus, a place of much importance on the Ambracian gulph, which, penetrating above thirty miles inland, divides Epirus from Acarnania. Ambracus was well fortified by nature and art; being situate in the middle of a marsh, that could be passed by only one narrow causeway, and also strongly defended by a wall and out-works. It commanded the adjoining country, as well as the city of Ambracia; which had been the capital of Epirus under the renowned Pyrrhus, but which was now held by the Etolians. Philip spent forty days in forming mounds and approaches in the marsh, before the enemy were brought to capitulation through fear of being put to the sword. The fortress and all the neighbouring territory, he resigned to the Epirots their ancient owners.

He then crossed the Ambracian gulph, where narrowest, to an ancient temple of the Acarnanians, called Actium, and destined, under that name, to high renown in history, as the scene of action between Augustus and Antony for the mastership of the Roman world. At this place, the gulph is scarcely half a mile broad<sup>26</sup>, but it afterwards spreads into the expanse of ten miles, and extends twenty miles inland from Actium to Amphilocheian Argos. In Acarnania, Philip being joined by two thousand foot and two hundred

<sup>25</sup> Polybius, l. iv. c. 61.

<sup>26</sup> Before the strait at Actium, there is another still narrower at Anactorium, communicating immediately with the Ionian sea. From this sea, Actium is distant ten

miles, nearly a third part of the length of the whole gulph. Inattention to local circumstances has greatly perplexed the battle of Actium and the operations preceding and following it: but of this hereafter.



horse belonging to that republic, proceeded to the river Achelous, which flowing from mount Pindus into the Corinthian gulph, anciently separated Acarnania from Etolia. But the Etolians were now masters of both sides the river. Philip attacked their numerous strongholds extending thirty miles along the lower part of its course; and though many of them were well fortified by walls and towers, and ably defended, his perseverance prevailed in reducing Phætæa, Stratus, Illoria, Elæus, and Pæanium down to Oeniadæ at the mouth of the river. This last named place, distant only ten miles from Dymè in Achaia, Philip determined to secure in future, and began strongly to fortify it<sup>7</sup> with materials conveyed from other Etolian strongholds, which he had recently demolished. But his labours were interrupted by important intelligence from home.

While he was occupied by sieges at one extremity of the Etolian dominions, that people had drained their garrisons in the other, and made an irruption into the Pierian plain, one of the finest districts of Macedon. There, they had sacked the city of Dium venerable for its temples and festivals, and for the statues of Alexander's companions who fell in the battle of Granicus, as well as those of the long series of Macedonian kings. Philip had not suspended his operations on the first intelligence of this inroad, but he was now informed that the Dardanians, an Illyrian nation, were hovering on his northern frontier. At such a crisis, he could not safely proceed southward to Peloponnesus. He sent therefore to assure the Achæans, who plied him with successive embassies, that as soon as he had dissipated the present danger, he would think of nothing but how to afford them the most effectual aid. His unexpected return to Pella, of which the Illyrians were informed by deserters, struck these barbarians with such terror, that they immediately dispersed to their respective cantons. But, as the corn was now ripe, the Macedonians could not be withdrawn from home before they had reaped their harvest.

Is recalled  
by the inva-  
sion of Pieria  
and the mo-  
tions of the  
Dardanians.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, l. iv. c. 64, & 65.

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Philip's winter campaign in Peloponnesus. Olymp. cxi. 2. B. C. 219.

He surprizes and defeats the Elians.

Philip, however, proceeded to Larissa in Thessaly; the affairs of that province detained him there till winter, when, being again joined by his army, particularly three thousand brazen<sup>a</sup> shielded hypaspists, he passed into Eubœa to avoid the straits of Thermopylæ, crossed from Chalcis to Bœotia, and thence proceeded to Corinth.

His march was performed with so much celerity and at such an unusual season, that it totally escaped the notice of his enemies in Peloponnesus. To keep it still a secret, he shut the gates of Corinth, and made the roads in that neighbourhood be strictly guarded. Meanwhile he called the elder Aratus from Sicyon, and also wrote to his son of the same name, then pretor of the Achæans. He then marched towards Arcadia; and near Stymphalus, on the frontier of that province, surprized a body of three thousand Elians, who had advanced to ravage Sicyonia. Euripides, their Etolian leader, had gained information of Philip's approach, but did not think proper to communicate the intelligence to his troops, although, by counter marching, he had endeavoured to avoid the enemy. But it happened that while the Macedonian van mounted the hill Apelaurus, the foremost of the Elians also gained that rough ascent. Euripides with a few horsemen escaped through bye-ways to the stronghold of Psophis. His soldiers, though perplexed at the unaccountable flight of their leader, were persuaded to keep their ranks, being assured by those who succeeded to the command, that the troops whom they beheld could be no other than some contemptible Achæans who had at length taken courage to defend their possessions. The delusion was strengthened, on observing the brazen bucklers of the enemy: for Antigonus Doson had formerly armed, in that manner, the Megalopolitans whose uncommon zeal in the public cause would not fail to augment the Achæan army. But the nearer approach of the Macedonians having revealed the truth, the Elians threw down their arms and betook themselves to flight; scarcely one hundred of them

<sup>a</sup> I particularise these troops for a reason that will appear presently.

escaped

escaped captivity or death: this complete victory gave the first intimation of Philip's arrival in Peloponnesus\*.

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The Macedonians continued their march through Arcadia, and suffered much hardship in passing mountains then covered with deep snow. On the third day they arrived at Caphyæ, nearly midway between Stymphalus and Plophis, into which latter place, Euripides had thrown himself. The king halted two days for refreshment at Caphyæ, until he was joined by the younger Aratus, at the head of some Achæan forces, which made the whole army now exceed ten thousand men. His enemies were not likely to face him in the field, but it was Philip's intention to dispossess them of their strongholds, for which purpose he collected ladders and machines from all the cities through which he passed.

Is joined by  
the younger  
Aratus.

Plophis, against which he first directed his arms, was a very ancient city in the centre of Peloponnesus, and though within the Arcadian frontier, now strictly associated with the Elians, from whom it had received a garrison. It was inclosed between a deep torrent descending from mount Scaurus on the west, and not fordable in winter, and the famed river Erymanthus, ennobled by the exploits of Hercules. The two streams united a little beyond the southern walls of the city. Thus defended on three sides by water, a steep hill, skillfully fortified, served it on the north for a citadel. It was also surrounded by walls in complete repair, and of unusual height. These obstacles did not discourage Philip. He passed the Erymanthus by a bridge which the enemy unaccountably neglected to destroy. His scaling ladders were at once raised on every side, and the soldiers, who fell in the assault, were succeeded with such alacrity by fresh troops, that the besieged ceased from resistance and retreated into the citadel. Want of provisions obliged them to capitulate. Philip strictly observed the conditions granted to them, relieved their present necessities, and advised them to remain in their place of safety.

Takes Plo-  
phis and in-  
ferior cities  
in Arcadia.

\* Polybius, l. iv. c. 68. & seq.

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until his army had moved forward, lest any of them might be pillaged, or insulted by his soldiers. The tempestuous weather detained him a few days in Píophis. At his departure, he gave the city to the Achæans, accompanying the gift with many professions of good will to their commonwealth, and observing, that a city, which had long infested them, might now be converted into a place of arms for infesting their enemies. The surrender of Píophis occasioned that of Lasion and Stratus, smaller cities usurped by the Elians on that frontier. The former, Philip also gave to the Achæans; the latter, he restored to the Arcadians of Telphussa, from whose territory it had formerly been dismembered<sup>10</sup>.

Philip invades  
Elis.—Man-  
ners of the  
Elians.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 2.  
B. C. 219.

The king had now at his mercy the neighbouring province of Elis, to which the Etolians sent but feeble succours, and to which the Lacedæmonians, for a reason that will presently be explained, could not afford the smallest aid. He first proceeded to Olympia, and sacrificed to the gods of the place, as if to deprecate their wrath against his invasion of a territory long held sacred. But the Elians, by taking an active part in all recent commotions, and especially by their alliance with the Etolians the great disturbers of the public tranquillity, had stupidly forfeited the best of all national privileges, that of maintaining undisturbed peace, in the midst of inveterate and unceasing warfare. A remnant of their ancient manners, of their industry and innocence, still appeared in their passion for agriculture, and their fondness for retired rural life, which had formerly been carried to such a height, that many opulent families, settled in the country of Elis, had never once visited the capital of that name in the course of two or three generations<sup>11</sup>. The territory, therefore, was extremely populous, so that Philip made great numbers of prisoners among those who refused to embrace his cause, and had not time to escape to their strongholds. Of these, one of the principal was Thalamæ in the north of the province. It surrendered on the

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, l. iv. c. 72. & seq.

<sup>11</sup> Id. ibid. c. 73.



first assault, though Amphidamus, pretor of the Elians, commanded two hundred mercenaries in the place, which contained besides five thousand persons, and much valuable property. In the south of the province Philip was equally successful; the whole district of Triphylia, separating Elis from Messenia, and adorned by eight rich cities, submitted in the course of six days.

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His rapid conquests in that province.

This conquest brought Philip to the neighbourhood of Phigalia, which, as a fit post for infesting Messenia, had been occupied, as we have seen, by Etolian pirates, the original authors of the war. The Phigalians had been long weary of these insolent masters; whose injuries they now had it in their power to punish: they allowed them, however, to depart in safety with their effects; and then sent a deputation to Philip, inviting him to take possession of Phigalia. Shortly before this surrender, Philip had gained Alipheira, another fortress on the same western frontier of Arcadia, fifteen miles north of Phigalia, and then occupied by Elians. The town stood on a steep and craggy ridge above a mile in height; and the highest peak supported a strong citadel, ornamented with a brazen statue of Minerva, of uncommon magnitude and exquisite beauty. Upon what occasion or at whose expence this precious monument was erected at Alipheira, even the inhabitants did not pretend to explain. But all agreed, that it was the work of Hecatodorus and Sostratus in the noblest age<sup>30</sup> of art, and one of the most finished productions of those great masters<sup>31</sup>.

Phigalia surrendered to him;

and Alipheira.

Colossal statue of Minerva.

After this brilliant campaign, Philip, having secured his conquests, evacuated Arcadia, and spent the remainder of the winter in Argos. Early in the spring, he took the field in Achaia, with a view to expel the Elians from a stronghold called Teichos, on the verge of the Dymeian district. The place was of small extent, being scarcely a furlong and a half in circuit, but its strong walls rose to the height

Philip takes Teichos. — The height of its walls.

<sup>30</sup> Hecatodorus flourished in the 102 Olympiad, and Sostratus in the 114. Plin. N. H. l. xxxiv. c. 8. Both Pliny and Pausanias, l. viii. c. 26. call him Hypátodorus. <sup>31</sup> Polyb. l. iv. c. 78.



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of forty-five feet. In this enterprize, his good fortune continued to attend him. He gave the fortrefs to the Dymeans; and advancing beyond it into Elis with his army, collected much booty from the hitherto unravaged parts of that territory<sup>24</sup>.

Philip's ministers.—  
Their unworthy intrigues.

In his proceedings hitherto, Philip had been guided chiefly by the elder Aratus, to the great dissatisfaction of his Macedonian ministers. These men, who had not ventured to exhibit their true characters during the vigilant reign of Antigonus Dofon, stood in less awe of his youthful fucceffor. Antigonus, with that prudence which marked his conduct, had affigned to them by will, fuch diftinct departments in the fervice of his nephew, as feemed beft calculated to diminifh rivalry and prevent difcord. Apelles was appointed to attend his perfon as a guardian or counfellor; Leontius was fet over the infantry; Alexander commanded the body-guard; Megaleas was public fecretary; and Taurion, the king's lieutenant in Peloponnefus. Apelles however, by gaining the ear of the young prince, began to engrofs the whole power of adminiftration. Leontius and Megaleas had become his creatures: he openly arraigned the incapacity of Alexander; by infidious praifes, more dangerous than reproach, he laboured to ruin Taurion; but the elder Aratus was the main object of his jealousy. Apelles had infilled into Philip's mind, too fufceptible of ambition, that, inftead of the ally, he ought to make himfelf the mafter of the Achæans<sup>25</sup>. On feveral occafions he had taught the Macedonians to treat their auxiliaries with contumely; to diflodge them from their quarters, to deprive them of their due fhare in the common plunder. But at the interceffion of Aratus, Philip had redreffed thefe grievances, and even reprimanded his haughty counfellor, whofe authority over him was founded merely on the fuperiority of years, and on habit, without any correfponding enforcement from abilities or virtues. To regain his credit, Apelles began to tamper with thofe Achæan leaders who were at variance with

Philip prevailed on to  
oppofe Aratus.

<sup>24</sup> Polyb. l. iv. c. 83.

<sup>25</sup> Id. ibid. c. 76. & feq.

Aratus about employments in the state. He took care that Philip's ears should be frequently besieged by their complaints, and his mind corrupted by insinuations, that were the pretorship wrested from the family, or dependants of Aratus, the king would find it easy to direct, at pleasure, the affairs of Peloponnesus. To make this tempting experiment, Philip met the Achæans in their vernal assembly at Ægium; the younger Aratus laid down his office at its legal term: his father recommended Timoxenus to fill his place; but through the solicitations of Apelles, which were considered as those of Philip himself, Timoxenus was repulsed, and Eperatus, a citizen of Pharæ, elected pretor<sup>26</sup>.

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Apelles determined to follow up this victory; and an accidental occurrence greatly encouraged his design. When Amphidamus, the general of the Elians, as related above, was made prisoner in Thalamæ, he obtained admission to Philip, and convinced him, that without the labour of new battles and sieges, he might on easy terms make the Elians his friends. Philip said, that if they would quit their alliance with the Etolians, he would himself defend them from external danger, while their domestic concerns should be submitted wholly to their own management. Favourable as these conditions were, Ampidamus could not persuade his countrymen to accept them: though many of their cities and a great part of their territory, as well as innumerable prisoners, were in the hands of the enemy, they adhered obstinately and unaccountably to the worst of allies; men whose furious passions knew little distinction between friend and foe; and who frequently outraged intolerably the very nations whom they professed to defend. Apelles assured Philip, that Aratus and his son were at the bottom of this inexplicable perverseness. These refined and far-seeing politicians, he said, affected in their deep wisdom to discern much danger to Greece, from the entire submission of the Elians to Philip. To anticipate so perilous a re-

Apelles' calumnies  
against Aratus,  
detected.

<sup>26</sup> Polybius, l. iv. c. 82.

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sult, they had practised secretly with Ampidamus, at whose instigation his countrymen had rejected terms of peace with which they ought eagerly to have closed. Philip, giving too easy an ear to this calumny, instantly called the persons accused into his presence; Apelles urged his accusation with the utmost confidence; and, as the king remained silent, told them from himself, that his master was so much shocked with their double dealing and ingratitude, that he had determined to desire an extraordinary meeting of the Achæans, and to explain in that assembly his reasons for returning immediately to Macedon, and relinquishing all concern in their affairs. The elder Aratus requested Philip to suspend his judgment: that accusation was not proof: that he was fully conscious of his own innocence, and doubted not but he should defeat every machination by which Apelles might endeavour to impeach it. While Apelles was still preparing his evidence, Ampidamus suddenly arrived at Dymè. His zeal in exhorting his countrymen to accept Philip's offers of accommodation, had made them regard him as a traitor, and they had attempted to seize his person, that he might be sent a prisoner into Etolia. He had escaped their grasp, and now came to take refuge with Philip, for whose sake he had incurred so much danger. Upon the first news of his arrival, Aratus ran to the king, and requested that Ampidamus might be immediately sent for; observing, that none could give clearer evidence concerning the delinquency with which he himself was charged, than the person supposed to be his accomplice; and that none would disclose the truth more readily to Philip, than the man whose whole hopes centered in the royal protection. Ampidamus was called and questioned: the calumny was clearly detected"; but though the persons accused thereby rose in credit with Philip, yet the young prince could not break the chain of dependence in which Apelles had contrived to bind him.

" Polyb. l. iv. c. 86.

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State of the  
belligerent  
powers.

Eperatus, raised by that minister to the pretorship of Achaia, soon shewed himself unfit for so arduous a trust. Philip was obliged to have recourse to the influence of Aratus, before the Achæans would consent to pay to him his expected subsidies<sup>28</sup>. The three states, with which he was at war, had not hitherto afforded much assistance to each other. The Spartans had been rendered inactive abroad, by a new sedition at home, headed by a bold and popular youth named Chilon, who balanced the authority and threatened the life of Lycurgus; and the Etolians, though they carried their arms wherever plunder tempted them, and had lately ransacked even the venerable temple of Dodona in Epirus, yet shewed great backwardness to encounter the Macedonians in the field, and had made but feeble efforts in defence of their Elia allies. But as Lycurgus, the steady partizan of Etolia, had now recovered his ascendancy in Sparta, Philip had reason to fear that his enemies might begin to act with united vigour.

To prevent their co-operation, and at the same time to assail with seasonable celerity their widely separated possessions, he assembled his own and the Achæan fleet in Lechæum, the western harbour of Corinth<sup>29</sup>. The Macedonian soldiers were soon enured to the labour of the oar; and the character of that people leading them to perform zealously every service enjoined them, they soon became as expert at sea as on land, and equally brave on either element. Having stationed some vessels to guard the friendly shore of the Messenians, who had become active in the war since the expulsion of the Etolian pirates from Phigalia, and having left a considerable force to protect the inland frontiers of his allies, Philip sailed for Cephallenia, to attack Palus or Palle, the principal naval magazine of the enemy. The place was almost surrounded by precipices, or by the sea, and could be approached only by a narrow terrace, looking towards Zacynthus. But the

Philip attacks Palle in Cephallenia. Olymp. cxi. 2. B. C. 219.

<sup>28</sup> Fifty talents the day he took the field; corn, furnished Philip with an annual subsidy 10,000 measures of corn; and 17 talents of 37,000*l*. Polyb. l. v. c. 1.  
<sup>29</sup> Strabo, l. viii. p. 263.



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Macedonians, were full of alacrity; the neighbouring fields supplied them with a profusion of ripe corn; and Philip had been joined by many Epirots, Messenians, and Acarnanians, whose shores had been long infested from this Cephallenian harbour. His machines were advanced towards the only side on which the city was assailable; the defenders of Palus were driven from their outworks: and, a mine two hundred feet long being drawn under the walls, the place was summoned to capitulate. But as the Palleans rejected this alternative, Philip set fire to the wooden piles on which the fortifications were built: a dreadful ruin ensued, and the Macedonian hypaspists, the bravest body in the army, were commanded to enter by the breach <sup>40</sup>.

His enter-  
prize discon-  
certed by  
treachery.

But on this occasion, the intrigues of Leontius, which will be accounted for presently, defeated the near prospect of taking the place. He had practised with the officers serving under him to abet his villainy, and his men were led to the attack with such dexterous unskillness, that they were thrice disgracefully repulsed. The great number of the wounded deterred Philip from renewing the assault. He marked, however, the complicated treachery by which his enterprise had been frustrated; but, as he had learned that Dorimachus the Etolian pretor had marched with more than half his army into Thessaly, he hastened to the capital of Etolia itself, left nearly defenceless. On the second night he arrived with his fleet at Leucas, sailed through the shallow artificial channel <sup>41</sup> between that island and Acarnania by supporting his galleys on buoyant skiffs usually employed for that purpose, and then steering his course up the Ambra-cian gulph, arrived before day-break at the safe harbour of Limnæa. Here, he was speedily joined by the Acarnanians in a mass <sup>42</sup>, headed by their pretor Aristophantus, for the whole nation, even those long past the military age, were inflamed with keen desire to avenge their wrongs from the Etolians. The Epirots also flocked to his standard, but the great extent of their country rendered it more difficult for them to assemble. Philip marched from Limnæa in the evening and at

He invades  
Etolia.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 2.  
B. C. 219.

<sup>40</sup> Polyb. l. v. c. 4.

<sup>41</sup> Strabo, l. x. p. 451.

<sup>42</sup> Πανδημι. Polyb. l. v. c. 6.

the distance of six miles, allowing his troops to take some refreshment, continued his progress all night to the banks of the Achelous, between Stratus and Canopè. In the space of twelve hours he had marched thirty-five miles, and stood on the Etolian frontier, only twenty miles distant from the capital Thermum, the seat of religion and government, and the vast magazine into which this nation of robbers had collected the accumulating plunder of many ages.

The road to Thermum led through Metapa and Pamphla, towns on the lake Trichonis, embosomed in woody mountains, which can only be crossed by narrow and intricate defiles. Philip passed the Achelous, and proceeding twelve miles in an eastern direction, entered the rough and steep paths near Metapa, whose inhabitants took flight at his approach. He was careful, however, to leave guards at the narrow entrances, thereby to secure his retreat. He then came to Pamphla, which is half way between Metapa and Thermum, and about three miles distant from the latter, the whole way being almost a continued ascent, difficult throughout, and in many places made dreadful by vaulting rocks and yawning caverns, fit avenues to the terrible den of the savage and merciless Etolians. But the hitherto inviolated security of Thermum had rendered that people altogether unprepared for receiving an enemy. Both their territory and their city suffered similar injuries to those which they had been accustomed to inflict. The booty was immense; what could not easily be transported, was burned: among other articles of value, fifteen thousand suits of armour were committed to the flames. In those signal acts of vengeance, Philip did nothing inconsistent with the rights of conquest, as understood and acknowledged in his age and country. But when he called to mind the sacrilege recently committed by the Etolians at Dodona, the most ancient oracle in Greece; and still more, when he reflected on their outrages at Diom, the most venerated sanctuary of Macedon, his rage disdained all ordinary limits. The porticoes to the temple were set on fire:

Tremendous  
avenue to  
Thermum,  
the capital of  
that country.

Dreadful de-  
solation of  
Thermum.

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Inscription  
on its ruins.

its votive offerings, many of them works of exquisite art, were reduced to a heap of rubbish; the statues, almost two thousand in number, were overturned, and all of them defaced, except those bearing the form and superscription of some favourite divinity: the roof of the temple was burnt, and even the greater part of its walls demolished to the foundation. On a massy fragment of the ruin, the following verse was engraved: "Behold how far the bolts of Dium fly!" The line is parodied from one in Euripides<sup>43</sup>, and was the more energetic in Greek, because, by its double "meaning in that language, heaven itself was made a party in the king's ungoverned fury; and in the destruction of the temple of Thermum, the gods of Macedon were represented as taking vengeance on those of Etolia. The epigram, for it deserves not any better name, was the work of Samius, a youth who had been educated with the king, and whose ingenious witticisms were afterwards much celebrated. He was the son of Chrysogonus, who will appear presently in the character of a virtuous counsellor, as well as in that of an able general. But though Philip's courtiers and contemporaries approved his sacrilegious proceedings, both their impolicy and their impiety have been stigmatised by the impartial voice of history. His behaviour appeared equally weak and wicked, when contrasted with that of his three most illustrious predecessors; with the generosity of Antigonus Doseon at Sparta; with the indulgence of Philip, the father of Alexander, to the Athenians; above all, with the religious forbearance of Alexander himself, who protected from the slightest insult every thing sacred, even among the Persians, though those barbarians had demolished or prophaned the most venerable temples of Greece.

Philip's im-  
policy and  
impiety.

His return to  
the sea coast,  
and carousal  
with his ge-  
nerals.

The news of the invasion hastened Dorimachus from Thessaly. He had been prevented from descending into the rich Thessalian plain by Chrysogonus, just mentioned, then commanding in that

<sup>43</sup> Οὐρανὸν αὐτοῦ, ὡς βολὰς διακίρται.

Euripid. Supplic. v. 860,

<sup>44</sup> Τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλεγε, means either the divine darts, or the darts of Dium.

<sup>45</sup> Polybi. l. v. c. 10.

country;



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country; and he came home only in time to lament the desolation of his country. Philip returned to his ships by his former road; and, on his way to the sea coast, set fire to Pamphlia, and rased Metapa to the ground, the guards which he had posted at the gorges of the mountains repelling the hovering parties of the enemy, who might otherwise have obstructed the retreat of an army encumbered with booty. The Etolians had assembled in force at Stratus, on the right bank of the Achelous. Without having attempted to disturb Philip's passage of the river, they endeavoured to harass his rear, but they were repelled with considerable loss, and saved from total destruction only by the strength of their walls. Upon the safe arrival of the army at Limnæa, solemn sacrifices of thanks were offered to the gods, and Philip held a carousal with his officers, from which, according to the Greek fashion, it was shameful for any man to retire sober.


The truth, that is in wine, unmasked on this occasion Leontius and Megaleas, who, since their patron Apelles had sunk in credit with the king, had been co-operating with that minister in a scheme of the blackest perfidy. When Apelles, as we have before seen, was foiled in his attempt to ruin Aratus, and the latter thereby gained even new credit with Philip, the pangs of disappointed ambition exasperated a fierce mind into implacable resentment, both against his royal master and his triumphant rival. But the keener his animosity, the greater care he employed to conceal it. Affecting warm zeal for the service, while Philip yet prepared for his Etolian expedition, Apelles sailed to Chalcis, under pretence of expediting the equipments in that warlike magazine, and of being more conveniently situate there for corresponding with Thessaly and Macedon, and directing the financial administration of those countries. His real design in the voyage was to intercept the king's resources, while the other conspirators laboured with equal assiduity to tarnish his glory in the field.

Drunken  
fray, in  
which Ara-  
tus is in-  
sulted.



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Philip's ministers betray their villainous design.

We have seen how successfully Leontius obstructed the taking of Palle, in Cephalenia; the king, however, still kept on terms with him, fearful of his credit with the targeteers, whom he commanded; and because both he and his accomplices had hitherto concealed their hostility. But, at the breaking up of the drunken entertainment, Leontius and Megaleas ventured openly to assault Aratus: he was defended by his friends; a fray thus ensued between the adherents of either party; the king sent troops to end the vile contest, and secure the authors of it; Leontius slid unnoticed through the crowd, but Megaleas and Crinon, more daring at that moment, were conducted to Philip, and aggravated their guilt by declaring that they would not rest satisfied without inflicting condign punishment on their adversaries. The king reprimanded their insolence, imposed on each of them a fine of twenty talents, and ordered them to be taken into custody until the mulct were liquidated. Next day Leontius, attended by some favourite targeteers, repaired to the king's tent, to make inquiry concerning the arrest of his friends, and to know by whose authority they were confined. Philip, though in early youth, answered, "by mine," with an air of such intrepid dignity, that the conspirator was seized with the terror which he had hoped to inspire.

Their trial proves ineffectual.

As the fleet had now prepared for sailing back to Leucadia, the farther examination of the culprits was delayed until they arrived in that island. There, the king made an equitable partition among his forces of the plunder gained in Etolia; and a council of Macedonians, of the first rank in the court and army, met to try Megaleas and Crinon. Aratus was their accuser: among the proofs which he produced against them, many tended also to blacken Leontius and Apelles. But the court was contented with confirming the king's sentence against the persons accused. Leontius was even admitted as surety for Megaleas, who was therefore discharged; Crinon remained in confinement.

Philip's

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Philip's re-  
turn to Co-  
rinth, and  
invasion of  
Laconia.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 2.  
B. C. 219.

Philip's success in Etolia encouraged his hopes, and invigorated his activity. He staid but two days at Leucas, and early in the third morning sailed for Corinth, not omitting, in the course of his voyage, to ravage the Etolian coast, particularly the fertile district of Æanthè. From the harbour of Lechæum he sent couriers to his allies, desiring them to meet him in Arcadia, that their united forces might invade Laconia<sup>47</sup>. He then left Lechæum, and on the seventh day gained the hills that overlook Sparta, and encamped at Amyclæ, three miles south of that capital. Leaving Amyclæ, famous for its temple and colossal statue of Apollo<sup>48</sup>, and distinguished for its rich variety of trees and fruits, he carried his incursions southward to the promontory of Tenarus, and then retracing his route, passed the city and safe harbour of Gythium<sup>49</sup>; from thence skirting the inmost recesses of the Laconic gulph, he again proceeded southward to Bæa, near the promontory of Malea the western horn, as it were, of Laconia and Peloponnesus. From cape Malea he returned northward, and wasted the country on every side, particularly the beautiful plain of Helos, the largest and finest district in the whole territory. A predatory march of four days brought him back to his former encampment at Amyclæ.

Meanwhile the Spartan king Lycurgus could hardly give credit to Philip's celerity, having just heard of his expedition to Thermum, and of the ruin with which he had overwhelmed, only fifteen days before, a place a hundred and fifty miles distant from Sparta, and two hundred from cape Malea. While the invasion raged in the south of his country, Lycurgus had been occupied on the opposite frontier, and was returning from Glympes, where he had defeated a body of the allies hastening to join Philip, according to the instructions which, as before seen, they had received from that prince. As much elated by this victory as he was enraged at Philip's devastations,

His wonder-  
ful celerity.

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, l. x. c. 17. & seq.

<sup>48</sup> History of ancient Greece, c. xiv.

<sup>49</sup> The city Gythium, or Gytheum, is distant above two miles from the harbour.

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Bold operations in the neighbourhood of Sparta.

Lycurgus determined that his enemies should not repass Sparta without fighting a battle.

For understanding clearly his dispositions toward this end, it is necessary to advert to the situation of the Lacedæmonian capital, which, though commonly described as a round city<sup>30</sup> on a plain, was defended by mountains at no great distance from it. The Eurotas flows on the East of Sparta, a river too deep to be forded during the greatest part of the year, and whose eastern margin is roughened by the ridge called Menelaïum, from its towering temple of Menelaus, as well as from the tombs of that hero and his too celebrated queen. The hills of Menelaïum are of sufficient altitude to command the space between themselves and Sparta; which space, including the part occupied by the stream, does not exceed three hundred yards in breadth<sup>31</sup>. To interrupt Philip's return through this narrow ground, in his way from Amyclæ, Lycurgus in person occupied mount Menelaïum, with two thousand men, and gave orders to the far greater number which remained in the city, as soon as they beheld his signal, to issue from several gates at once, with their front towards the Eurotas, and in the place where that river flowed nearest to the city. His orders were obeyed with precision. Yet Philip, after twice defeating the Spartans, forced his way through the défile, and encamped securely at its northern extremity, about a quarter of a mile distant from Sparta. The post which he thus occupied commanded the only access to that city from all the northern parts of Peloponnesus, and was admirably adapted for making safe incursions into the adjacent districts. At breaking up his camp, Philip formed his men in proud array, thus defying his enemies before he began his retreat. As the Spartans stirred not from their walls, he converted his order of battle into a column of march. In his return northward he offered sacrifices of thanks to the mountains Eva and

<sup>30</sup> The circuit of Sparta was 48 stadia: that of a circle. Polybius, l. ix. c. 41. that of Megalopolis, 50.; yet the former was the larger city, its form being more nearly

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, l. v. c. 18, et seq.

Olympus, scenes already commemorated in the history of the Cleomenic war. He made a short halt at Tegea, to dispose of the heaviest part of his booty; and from thence passed through Argos to Corinth.

The kings of Macedon were never exposed to greater danger than after some brisk tide of prosperity. This peculiarity arose from the composition and character of their armies. In the battles near Sparta, the targeteers, headed by Leontius and his friends, had carried away the palm of victory. Their natural insolence, heightened by success, broke out into open mutiny, which was quelled by the presence of mind and spirit of the young king.

Philip quells  
a sedition  
raised by his  
ministers.

Leontius and Megaleas, seeing that their schemes against Philip had redounded to their own disgrace, sent for their coadjutor Apelles from Chalcis, that his great dexterity might be exerted towards re-establishing their influence. To grace his return, they sent to meet him the most distinguished divisions of men whom they commanded. His entrance to Corinth had thus the air of a triumph. But when he hastened to see the king, an attendant told him that Philip was busy: Apelles disdained to take a refusal; the guards, however, were firm in denying him admission. He then perceived that his perfidies had come to light; and the retinue that attended him also perceived the downfall of his authority. They immediately left him to the company of his own servants; for the estimation of men, as Polybius observes, is decided at courts, by a trifle; and they are either talents or farthings, just as the smile or frown of royalty stamps the impression on them". Megaleas, when apprised of the disgrace of a minister through whose means he had expected to recover his own credit, no longer endeavoured to maintain his ground. He fled from Corinth, unperceived, during a visit made by Philip across the gulph to Phocis, the motives for which, at this juncture, are not explained. Megaleas first took shelter in Athens, but was

They are de-  
fected in  
their machi-  
nations, and  
capitally pu-  
nished.

" Polybius, v. 26.



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expelled from that city as an enemy to the king: he afterwards found refuge in Thebes. In the voyage to Phocis, Philip carried with him Apelles, and even admitted him to his table, but without giving him much of his conversation, or any share of his confidence. He shortly returned from the northern side of the Corinthian gulph to Sicyon, and lodged in the house of Aratus, without regard to the affront thereby given to the invitation of Eperatus, actual pretor of the republic. When he learned the flight of Megaleas, he ordered his surety, Leontius, to be imprisoned, after he had taken the precaution of removing the targeteers to a distance; and though these troops clamoured with their usual licentiousness against the confinement of their leader, an incident now happened which enabled the king to set their resentment at defiance. The Etolians, humbled by a long series of misfortunes, had prevailed on the republics of Rhodes and Chios, commercial states, ever friendly to public tranquillity, to use their good offices in obtaining for them a truce with Philip, preparatory to a general pacification. To deliberate on this measure, Philip summoned the deputies of his allies to Patre, in Achaia. But at this place letters were brought to him, intercepted in Phocis, and written by Megaleas, in name of all the conspirators, to the Etolians, exhorting them strenuously to persevere in the war. This discovery afforded such convincing proofs of guilt, that the Macedonians concurred with their king in condemning Apelles, together with his son and Leontius, to death. Persons were sent to Thebes to cite Megaleas before the magistrates of that place, for the payment of the fine imposed on him, in order that his person might be surrendered to a heavier punishment. He escaped the sentence of the law by laying violent hands on himself".

The only survivor amongst them, Ptolemy, convicted and executed.

The Etolians, when they heard of these events, never doubted that the destruction of so many ministers and generals would create much confusion in Philip's government, and much dissatisfaction in

his army. Accordingly they broke off the negociation; a circumstance by no means displeasing to the king. As the winter was now far advanced, he sent home the Macedonians through Thessaly, and himself sailed to Demetrias, in that province. In this place he found Ptolemy, an officer of the targeteers, and the only person still alive who had been involved in the conspiracy. Ptolemy was publicly tried by the Macedonians, and, after clear conviction, sentenced to death<sup>14</sup>.

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Though all hopes of immediate peace had vanished, various circumstances kept the armies on both sides inactive during the first weeks of spring. New commotions in Sparta had driven Lycurgus from his country; and it was not until his return, that the Lacedæmonians resumed courage to co-operate with their Elian and Etolian allies. The northern frontiers of Macedon were invaded by hovering hordes of Dardanians. Before marching into Greece, Philip was obliged to fortify his dominions on that side, and particularly the valley, watered by the Axios, in Pæonia<sup>15</sup>, the easiest route from Dardania into Macedon. A considerable body of Macedonians, under Taurion in Peloponnesus, was obliged to keep on the defensive, because, through the bad administration of the pretor Eperatus, the Achæan army had dwindled to a mere shadow. But when the month of May came round, the elder Aratus was, for the sixteenth time, named to the pretorship. Under his direction, a decree passed for raising eight thousand infantry and five hundred horse; to which body of mercenaries the Achæans were to add three thousand foot and three hundred cavalry, all to be chosen from the wealthiest portion of their citizens, and to serve at their own expence. They were also to guard with stout galleys the coast of Argolis; and a squadron in the Corinthian gulph was to be kept in readiness for infesting the

State of the  
belligerent  
powers.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 3.  
B. C. 218.

<sup>14</sup> Id. l. v. c. 29. <sup>15</sup> The Dardanians had recently made an incursion that way, and taken the city Byzanzor, the largest in Pæonia. Philip expelled the enemy from this place, and secured the passes leading to it. Polyb. l. 5. c. 97.

Etolians.

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Etolians. Shortly after this resolution, operations commenced by reciprocal incursions: these open inroads were accompanied by surprises in the night and ambushes by day; but no pitched battle was fought, nor did any place of importance change masters. The Achæan fleet made several bold descents on the coast of Etolia, near Naupaëtus, and carried off much booty and many prisoners, among whom Cleonicus, a citizen of Naupaëtus, because he had been connected in hospitality with the Achæans, was enlarged without ransom<sup>56</sup>. His companions were sold for slaves. The generous treatment of Cleonicus, though not unusual on similar occasions, engaged him to prolong his stay in Achaia until Philip's arrival there, by whom we shall see him employed a few months afterwards in the negotiations for peace.

Aratus dexterously adjusts the differences among the Megalopolitans.

Amidst the tumult of military operations, Aratus was for a short time employed in a transaction peculiarly suitable to his character. The citizens of Megalopolis, since the disasters with which they had been afflicted in the Cleomenic war, had been a prey to those discontents which indigence is apt to create, even among a generous and high-minded people. Warm debates prevailed about the manner of rebuilding their city. One party contended that the ancient circuit of their walls, above five miles in extent, ought to be much contracted. Besides this alteration, which they represented as essential to security, they insisted that the richer citizens should severally relinquish a third part of their lands, in order to obtain an accession of new inhabitants. The other party absolutely refused to listen to either of these proposals. Their dissent was sanctioned by Prytanis, the peripatetic<sup>57</sup>, a man of great learning and authority, whom Antigonus Doson had formerly sent to Megalopolis to reform the laws of that state. But in the heat of faction, the reasonings of the philosopher were disregarded, or became the source of fresh discord.

<sup>56</sup> Id. v. 95.

<sup>57</sup> Καὶ τοῦτοις τῆς ἀρετῆς (viz. Aristoteliſm). How much Aristotle was an enemy to agra-

rian laws, and similar interferences with private property, appears from the 2d book of his politics throughout.

The

The dexterity of Aratus, whose whole life had united business with study, proved more successful. Through his skilful interposition, the parties in Megalopolis were perfectly reconciled to each other; and the conditions of their agreement were recorded on a pillar erected near Ægium, the seat of the Achæan council. In a grove adjacent to that city, a temple had been dedicated to Jupiter, "the lover of concord and protector of confederacies." Such an edifice seemed a fit receptacle for a marble record, commemorating the accommodation of all differences in Megalopolis, and its determined fidelity to the Achæan league".

Meanwhile Philip moved his army from Macedon, and began his campaign by an enterprise more immediately useful to himself. This was to expel the Etolians from their strongholds extending along the southern frontier of Thessaly, from the eastern extremity of Etolia to the Ægean sea. At Melitæa, one of the strongest of these fortresses, he failed in his assault through the shortness of his ladders. After an obstinate siege, he gained however Thebes, in Phthiotis, a place still more important, since, commanding the entrance of the Pelasgic gulph, it stood conveniently for infesting all the neighbouring districts of Thessaly". Philip then proceeded to Peloponnesus, to grace with his presence the Nemean games, which were ready to be celebrated at Argos. While he sat at this solemnity, a messenger arrived from Macedon, bringing news of the famous battle of Thymenus, in Tuscany, where Hannibal had defeated the Romans, and driven them from the open country within their walls. New Ambassadors arrived also from Rhodes and Chios, now accompanied by those of Egypt\* and Byzantium, all earnestly desirous of composing the differences that had too long reigned in Greece. Philip declared, as before, his readiness to listen to them, provided they could bring the Etolians to reasonable terms. The ambassadors re-

Philip takes  
Thebes, in  
Phthiotis.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 3.  
B. C. 218.

News of Han-  
nibal's victo-  
ries brought  
to him at  
Argos.

Negotiations  
for peace,  
through the  
intervention  
of maritime

12. 1. 33  
12. 1. 33

\* From Ptolemy Philopator, then in the fifth year of his profligate reign.

paired.



c. ii. A. 4.

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and com-  
mercial  
powers.

paired with this agreeable news to Etolia; but, before their return, the king had been strongly urged by Demetrius of Pharus, a man whose character will soon appear in its proper light, to put an end to the wars in Greece, and direct his views towards Italy. He therefore sent Cleonicus of Naupactus to soften, as much as possible, the fierce minds of his countrymen, but at the same time proceeded himself with his army to the Elia frontier, and stormed the city Lasion, that he might not seem too eager for peace. Cleonicus repassed several times between him and the Etolians, and finally returned with assurances, that the magistrates of that people wished only for a personal conference with the king, in which all differences might be adjusted. Philip, in order to second this disposition, proceeded to Panormus, a harbour in Achaia directly opposite to Naupactus in Etolia; writing at the same time to his allies to send thither their deputies, empowered to treat of a general pacification. While he expected their arrival, he, with his usual activity, visited Zacynthus, and settled to his own satisfaction the affairs of that island. The deputies had now joined him: the Etolians still pressed the negotiation: but Philip, in order completely to satisfy his doubts concerning that turbulent people, sent to them the elder Aratus and Taurion to penetrate their real intentions<sup>a</sup>.

End of the  
social war.

In one short conference, these able men fully satisfied themselves that the Etolians were sincere. They returned therefore without delay, bringing with them ambassadors to request that Philip would pass into Etolia, for the purpose of accommodating all disputes, more easily, in a personal interview with their magistrates. Philip embarked his troops, sailed across the Corinthian gulph, and encamped at the distance of two miles from Naupactus. The Etolians assembled without arms at a small distance from his camp. The negotiation began by a proposal from Philip, in the name of his allies, that peace should be established on the basis of actual possession. The

<sup>a</sup> Id. c. 101. & seq.

Etolians consented to this principle, though highly unfavourable to them, because they had lost in the war many important strongholds. But several conferences were requisite for settling all matters in detail, in one of which Agelaus of Naupactus spoke to the following purpose: "It were most earnestly to be wished, that the Greeks had always kept peace amongst themselves, and directed their hostilities against surrounding Barbarians. But that which would have been good policy at all times, is in the present juncture a matter of necessity. Consider the great and ambitious powers that have arisen in the west, and the vast exertions which they have been able to make by sea and land. They are actually engaged in a second and more desperate conflict; and whichever party prevails, think not that the victor will be contented with the spoils of his present adversary. He will look around him for new enemies, that may furnish him with materials for richer and more glorious triumphs. Instead of reducing to weakness and despondency any of the states of Greece, a king of Macedon ought to cherish them all, as members of his own body. The strength, resulting from such concord, will probably prevent aggression; if not, cordial co-operation will most certainly enable us to repel it. Placed at the head of united Greece and a watchful observer of foreign powers, Philip may seize opportunities for successful enterprise, that will place him in a rank with the most illustrious princes in his family; conquerors and civilisers of the world. Let us then hasten to conclude a lasting peace in the sincere spirit of amity; for, if we continue to grow weaker by unceasing divisions, and the storm which threatens in the west should assail us unprepared, I much fear there will be an end at once to our wars and our treaties, and all independent power in the management of our own affairs<sup>2</sup>." The sentiments of Agelaus met with much approbation from all present, especially from the king; and a general peace was concluded

Prophetic  
speech of  
Agelaus of  
Naupactus.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 4.  
B. C. 217.

<sup>2</sup> Id. c. 104.

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State of  
Greece at  
the end of  
the social  
war.—Pelo-  
ponnesians.

Republics  
beyond the  
isthmus,—  
Their dege-  
neracy and  
profligacy.

on the terms which Philip had proposed. In consequence of this transaction, the states of Peloponnesus obtained a breathing time, after the long wars in which their love of liberty had involved them. No people were better calculated than the Peloponnesians for innocent rural labours, and for enjoying with moderation all those gifts which industry and good polity bear in their train. Yet their unquenchable zeal for freedom, kept them in perpetual agitation and warfare after the principal states beyond the isthmus had submitted to a tranquil servitude. Thessaly had long been a province of Macedon; the Athenians unambitious of assuming their ancient rank, were contented with averting hostility by flattery, indecent, indiscriminate, and under their present magistrates, Euricleidas and Micion, carried to such an extravagant excess, as made it alike disgraceful to its objects and its authors. Yet the Bœotians had sunk still lower than any of their neighbours. Not satisfied with abandoning all concern for the public affairs of Greece, they could scarcely be brought to pay the smallest attention to those of their own community. Dead to every interest of the present age and posterity, they thought of nothing but how to pass the fleeting hour in undisturbed jollity. Those who were without children left their whole property to the clubs in which they had been accustomed to revel; and even many parents, to the impoverishment of their own offspring, bequeathed the greatest part of their fortunes to some contemptible use: so prevalent was this madness among them, that many Bœotians had a right to partake of more club-dinners monthly, than there were days in the month<sup>63</sup>.

Aratus and  
Agelaus re-  
spectively at  
the head of  
Achaia and  
Etolia.

Upon the conclusion of the war, Timoxenus was for the second time, appointed pretor of the Achæans. He was so entirely devoted to Aratus, that the whole weight of his office centered in his patron.

<sup>63</sup> Polybius describes this sottish state of he observes, that it began twenty-five years the Bœotians under Olymp. cxlvi. 4. but sooner.

At the autumnal equinox, four months afterwards, Agelaus was raised to the same dignity among the Etolians; an appointment highly seasonable, as that turbulent people had already grown weary of peace, which to them seemed idleness<sup>64</sup>. But Agelaus forced them, much against their inclination, to observe the conditions of the treaty which he had so happily procured for them.

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<sup>64</sup> Id. c. 107.



## CHAPTER XVI.

*Apollonia in Illyricum Contracts an Alliance with Rome.—The Romans usurp on the Carthaginians.—Indignation of Hamilcar Barcas.—His Plans of Vengeance.—Depredations of Illyrian Pirates.—Romans reduce Queen Teuta.—Their first Embassy to the States of Greece.—Expel Demetrius of Pharos from Illyricum.—His Flight to Philip of Macedon.—Hannibal sacks the Greek City Saguntum.—Philip's Conquests in Illyricum.—Second Punic War.—Hieron of Syracuse.—His wise Policy at Home and Abroad.—His Successor Hieronymus.—Siege of Syracuse.—Sicilians, their Glory in Arts and Letters.—Oppression and Degradation under the Romans.—Battle of Zama.—Peace granted to Carthage.*

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Connection  
of this his-  
tory.  
Olymp.  
c. li. 1.  
B. C. 216.

THE termination of the social war is the first historical event, in which the affairs of the East received their impulse and direction from those of the West. The great victories, gained by Hannibal in Italy, inspired Philip with the resolution of accommodating all differences between Greece and Macedon, in hopes of employing their united strength<sup>1</sup> against the powerful western republic, which, by her conquests in Illyria, only two years before this period, had carried her victorious arms to the very door of his kingdom. The causes producing these conquests remounted to an early origin, and afford a new proof that the history of the world is only to be connected and embodied by a diligent attention to that of the Greeks, a seafaring and commercial people, alike enterprizing and politic.

Apollonia  
in Illyricum.  
—Its condi-

The country, anciently called Illyria or Illyricum, formed, as it were, the counterpart to Italy on the opposite side of the Hadriatic ;

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, l. v. c. 105—108.

these

C H A P.  
XVI.tion previous  
to Olymp.  
cxxxviii. 3.  
B. C. 265.

these long strips<sup>2</sup> of territory nearly balancing each other, and either of them being nearly commensurate to the intervening gulph. The inlet to this gulph is formed by a strait of forty miles between the heel of Italy and the Acroceraunian mountains, which mark the northern frontier of Epirus. Immediately beyond this boundary, part of the Illyrian shore had been early occupied and planted by a chain of Greek colonies; Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Epidaurus, even to the little island of Pharos adjacent to the maritime district, still well known under the name of Dalmatia. Apollonia<sup>3</sup>, the first-mentioned of these Greek cities, stood six miles from the sea: its harbour was directly opposite to that of Brundisium in Italy; and, as a station for ships, deserved the praise of convenience even on a shore having generally deep water, and as abundant in good harbours as the corresponding coast of Italy is remarkably deficient in them. Thus favourably situate with regard to the sea, the territory of the little republic was on the land side sometimes infested by inroads, and always exposed to danger. About the time of Pyrrhus' repulse from Italy, the Apollonians trembled for their independence. They regarded the native Illyrians as irreclaimable Barbarians; they dreaded Antigonus Gonatas of Macedon as a prince equally insidious and rapacious; and the friendship of the Romans, who had recently defeated the Epirots, also dangerous neighbours to Apollonia, seemed to promise the best security against the eventual projects of any of the warlike powers, by which their flourishing little commonwealth was environed.

Accordingly, the Romans had no sooner occupied Brundisium, than ambassadors sailed thither from Apollonia, to congratulate with them on the success of their arms against Pyrrhus, and to solicit an alliance with their commonwealth. The strangers were escorted to Rome, received honourably, and favourably answered. But a quar-

Admitted  
into an alli-  
ance with  
Rome.  
Olymp.  
cxxxviii. 3.  
B. C. 266.

\* The Greeks considered Illyricum as extending thirty journeys in length and five in breadth. The Romans found it by ad-

measurement 600 miles long and 120 broad. Appian. Illyric. sub Init.

<sup>3</sup> Vid. Strabo, l. vii. p. 316. & seq.

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not falling out between them and some young Patricians, the ambassadors were insulted even with blows. The Romans, instead of abetting this brutality in their countrymen, determined severely to punish it. The culprits, though two of their number at that time held the honourable office of Edile, were solemnly surrendered into the hands of the injured Apollonians, that they might be carried home with them under a proper guard, and subjected to whatever vengeance the magistrates of the Greek state thought fit to inflict. These magistrates examined the affair, dispassionately and indulgently; and their proceedings equally politic and liberal, converted into warm friends a number of young patricians, afterwards of much weight in their country<sup>1</sup>. Shortly after this transaction, Rome was totally occupied in the first Punic war for twenty-four years; and, after its conclusion, half that space of time elapsed before as protectress of Apollonia, she sent her legions across the Hadriatic, and interposed, as we shall see presently, in the affairs of the adjacent countries with equal efficiency and dignity.

The Romans  
seize Sardinia.  
Olymp.  
cxxxv. 3.  
B. C. 238.

During the interval of twenty-three years between her two memorable conflicts with Carthage, her jealous attention was chiefly directed towards that state, which, though deprived of its boasted superiority at sea, divested of its rich possessions in Sicily, and even subjected to a disgraceful tribute, still enjoyed the means of again rendering itself formidable. The Carthaginians possessed an extensive territory; they were an industrious and frugal people; they commanded the rich inland traffic of Africa; and they were surrounded by numerous Nomadic nations, whom they had contrived to render, both in war and in commerce, entirely subservient to their interests. But, after the return of their armies from Sicily, they were engaged for three years in a disgraceful and dangerous conflict<sup>2</sup> with the numerous foreign mercenaries, always maintained by their re-

<sup>1</sup> Conf. Tit. Liv. Epitom. l. xv. Dion. Cass. Zonaras, & Valer. Maxim. l. vi. c. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, l. i. c. 65. & seq.

## FROM ALEXANDER TO AUGUSTUS.

C H A P.  
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public. Their general Hanno was unfortunate. The command was entrusted to his rival Hamilcar Barcas, who finished an odious and disgusting contest, remarkable only for the cruelty and perfidy with which it was, on both sides, carried on. During the height of this domestic commotion, the mercenaries serving in Sardinia imitated those of the capital. They destroyed the Carthaginian traders, and were themselves destroyed or expelled by the indignant natives of the island. Among the expelled mercenaries, many were Campanians, whose return into Italy apprised the Romans of an opportunity highly seasonable for gaining possession of Sardinia. The conquest was easily effected; and when the Carthaginians armed with a view to recover their dependancy, the threat of new hostilities on the part of Rome, made them not only cede all claim to the island, but consent to increase their stipulated contributions by the additional sum of 1,200 talents<sup>6</sup>. Their tameness in submitting to such demands might be occasioned by the deep wounds which they had recently received in two successive wars. But long before this time, their government had begun to experience the factious discontents incident to tyrannical and jealous aristocracies<sup>7</sup>. Wealth was the great source of all public distinction; and the wealthy, who had engrossed every preferment and honour, were fearful of war, and jealous of popular generals; solicitous chiefly for their pecuniary interests, insensible to public renown and national glory, and careless, as we shall see, of any other victories and conquests, but those accompanied with the prospect of extending commerce and augmenting revenue.

Other usurpations on Carthage.

Such was the character of the greater number; but such was not that of Hamilcar Barcas. We have seen this general quit Sicily, frowning on the Romans for their pride, and on his own countrymen for their meanness. His successful termination of the war

Indignation of Hamilcar Barcas.

<sup>6</sup> Conf. Polybius, l. i. c. 88. & l. iii. c. 10. Polybius, l. vi. c. 55. & Tit. Liv. l. xxx.  
<sup>7</sup> Conf. Aristot. Politic. l. ii. c. 9. & c. 40. & l. iii. c. 2. & l. iv. c. 1.



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His com-  
mand in  
Spain, and  
that of his  
son-in-law  
Asdrubal.  
Olymp.  
cxxxv. 4.  
cxl. 1.  
B. C. 237—  
220.

against the mercenaries, rendered it impossible for his enemies to discharge and dismiss his abilities with the occasion that had required them. He was sent to command in Spain, where the Carthaginians had long succeeded to the stubborn undertakings and bold enterprises of their Tyrian ancestors. The magistrates of Carthage flattered themselves with the hope of compensating late losses, by making the complete conquest of a country rich in the precious metals beyond every other in antiquity; and Hamilcar hoped in this command, which he should seem to have determined never to lay down, to form an army, qualified, as his country had now yielded its predominancy at sea, to attack the Romans by land, and to counterbalance their acquisitions in Sicily by a successful invasion of Italy. After nine years employed in extending the Carthaginian power and in creating a well-disciplined force, he fell in an obscure battle with the natives<sup>8</sup>. His son-in-law Asdrubal assumed his place in the army, and was confirmed in it by the government of Carthage. During eight years, he prosecuted the designs of his predecessor, when he also was slain, still more ingloriously, by the hand of a slave to avenge the blood of his master<sup>9</sup>. Besides great accessions of territory, acquired by policy<sup>10</sup> as well as arms, Asdrubal's administration was signalised by building New Carthage<sup>11</sup>, a city in the neighbourhood of rich mines, and admirably situate for commerce. His perpetual encroachments were viewed with much uneasiness by two Greek cities on the eastern coast, Emporiæ a colony of Massilia, and Saguntum a colony of Zacynthus<sup>12</sup>. Like Apollonia on a similar occasion, Saguntum had recourse to Rome, and was soon afterwards admitted into confederacy with that commonwealth; which had bound Asdrubal<sup>13</sup> by treaty that he should not pass the river

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, l. ii. c. 1. Conf. Tit. Liv. l. xx. c. 6. l. xxi. c. 1, 2.

<sup>9</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xx. c. 21. & l. xxi. c. 2, & Polyb. l. ii. c. 36.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, *ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xx. c. 31.

<sup>12</sup> Strabo, l. iii. p. 110. Conf. Appian de Reb. Punic. l. vii. c. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Conf. Polybius, l. ii. c. 13. l. iii. c. 27.

Iberus with an army, nor violate the security of her allies. We shall see how little these articles were respected by his successor Hannibal.

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Meanwhile the Romans employed themselves in a highly honourable undertaking on the eastern side of the Adriatic. The maritime districts " in Illyricum, united under a chief named Agron, began to create much terror by their boldness in piracy ". The navies of Athens and Corinth were no more; Rhodes and Byzantium were remote; Egypt was at a still greater distance, and the war galleys, equipped by Ptolemy Philadelphus, had been allowed, through the carelessness of his successor, to rot in their harbours. Thus unawed by any Greek power, the Illyrian freebooters extended their depredations from the inmost recesses of the Adriatic to the southern extremity of Peloponnesus. Agron, who is styled king of the Illyrians, having finished by intemperance a life sustained by rapine, was succeeded by his queen Teuta, who exercised her authority by Scerdilaidas, kinsman to her late husband, and Demetrius of Pharos, a small island on her coast inhabited by a Greek colony ". Teuta was eager to prosecute the lucrative career that had opened to her country. Private corsairs were more numerous than ever; and a public armament, more considerable than any equipped by Agron, gained possession of Phænice the most convenient sea-port in Epirus. Complaints were brought to the Romans from both sides of the Adriatic; from their subjects in Magna Græcia; from Epidamnus, Epidaurus, above all, Apollonia, their oldest ally in Illyricum.

Depredations of Illyrian pirates.  
Olymp.  
cxxxvi. 2 —  
4. B. C. 231  
—229.

Accordingly, an embassy was sent by the senate to remonstrate with queen Teuta against the obnoxious proceedings of her people. The ambassadors, two Cornucani, found the queen engaged in the siege of Tisa, and with difficulty obtained an audience, in the progress of which, Teuta displayed much impatience and haughtiness. When

Teuta, queen of the Illyrians, causes the assassination of a Roman ambassador.  
Olymp.  
cxxxvii. 4.  
B. C. 229.

" Those of the Taulantii, Ardyæi, Liburni, &c. Thucyd. Strabo, Polybius, and Stephan. Illyric.

" From the ill of Pharos. Diodor. l. xv. K. 13.

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their discourse was ended, she replied coldly, "that the Romans should not, she trusted, have reason to complain of any public injury; but that it was not customary with the kings of Illyricum to restrain their subjects from profiting individually by the sea." The younger of the brothers, Lucius Coruncanius, already piqued at her disdainful behaviour, replied sharply, "but it is customary with the Romans to exact public reparation for private wrongs, and in all cases to right the injured. With the help of the gods! we shall therefore reform the kingly maxims of Illyricum." The pride of Teuta was unable to brook such language: she dismissed the ambassadors from her presence; and knowing no bounds in her resentment, pursued them in their way home, and destroyed by assassins the speaker of the words by which she deemed herself insulted<sup>17</sup>.

Successful  
war against  
her by the  
consuls Ful-  
vius and  
Posthumius.  
Olymp.  
cxxxvii. 4.  
B. C. 229.

The Romans learned with much indignation this daring affront to the majesty of their commonwealth. They levied troops, and hastened to equip a fleet. Before they arrived in Illyricum, Teuta had made an unsuccessful attempt to surprize the city of Epidamnus. Her arms were more fortunate at Corcyra. Demetrius of Pharus was left with a garrison to maintain this important conquest, while the greater part of the troops returned to Epidamnus, in order to resume their operations against that valuable harbour. Another body of Illyrians still carried on the siege of Issa. Such the consul Fulvius found the situation of affairs when he crossed the Adriatic with two hundred ships of war. But he found also that disgusts had arisen between Demetrius of Pharus and his imperious mistress. This discovery made him direct his course for Corcyra. Demetrius welcomed his arrival, and surrendered to him the garrison with which he had been entrusted. The Corcyrians also received him with open arms, hoping, through help from the Romans, to be delivered from the yoke of the Illyrians<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, l. ii. c. 2-8.

<sup>18</sup> Id. l. ii. c. 9. & seq.

The defection of Demetrius ruined the affairs of Teuta. He accompanied Fulvius to Apollonia, and strenuously co-operated with him in all his measures. Shortly afterwards, the consul Posthumius arrived also at Apollonia, with 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse. The combined strength of the consuls brought relief successively to Epidamnus and Issa; and caused the sieges of these places to be raised. At Issa, a part of the besieging army revolted to Demetrius. Under his guidance, the Romans invaded the maritime parts of Illyricum, and received all the more valuable districts into their protection. Queen Teuta, with a handful of forces, was compelled to retire inland to a stronghold called Rizon, watered by a river of the same name. The Romans rewarded the services of Demetrius by annexing such extensive territories to his little island of Pharos, as made him a considerable potentate on the eastern shore of the Hydriatic. The consul Fulvius then returned to Italy with the greater part of the fleet and army. His colleague Posthumius retained only forty ships, and wintered in Illyricum with a small body of troops, reinforced by levies in that country<sup>19</sup>.

Early in the spring, Teuta anticipated further proceedings against her, by a suppliant embassy to Rome. She stipulated to cede all her dominions, a few places, and those of small importance, excepted; to pay tribute even for the little that was left her; and never to navigate beyond Lissus, her most southern harbour, in more than two vessels, and those unarmed. These conditions being admitted by the senate, the consul Posthumius notified to the principal states of Greece, then living in peace under the virtuous controul of Antigonus Doson, the beginning and conclusion of a war, which so nearly concerned them. A bare recital of facts, formed the highest panegyrick of the Romans. They had avenged the violated laws of heralds, deemed of all things the most sacred; they had punished pirates whose enormities were openly professed and insultingly vindicated;

Teuta submits and pays tribute for the narrow dominions left to her.  
Olymp.  
cxxxviii. 1.  
B. C. 228.

The first embassy of the Romans to the states of Greece.  
Olymp.  
cxxxviii. 1.  
B. C. 228.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, l. ii. c. 11. & seq.



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and they had reduced to the lowest humiliation a state rising fast in power, and marking every step of its progress by new aggravations of outrage. The Achæans, Etolians, Athenians, Corinthians all vied with each other in their respectful treatment of the first Roman ambassadors that ever appeared in Ancient Greece. The Corinthians admitted them to the Isthmian games, then ready to be celebrated, and even conferred on the Romans the right of participating thenceforward in a solemnity, till then exclusively appropriated to the Grecian name<sup>10</sup>.

Depredations of the Illyrians under Demetrius and Scerdilaidas. Olymp. cxxxix. 3. cxi. 1. B. C. 222—220.

For seven years after this period, the Illyrians were entitled to the comparative praise of committing few injuries. Queen Teuta abdicated her government, in favour of Scerdilaidas, kinsman to her late husband. Scerdilaidas, as successor to Teuta, was bound by treaty, and Demetrius of Pharos was bound by fealty and gratitude, to respect the commands imposed on them by Rome. But when the Romans were infested by those Gallic inroads, which ended only four years before the commencement of the second Punic war, and which made them muster and employ their whole forces in Italy, Demetrius and Scerdilaidas, presuming on impunity, began to collect ships, and renew their depredations. Demetrius, in particular, plundered the Roman allies or subjects in Illyricum, and subdued several of their cities<sup>11</sup>: and then uniting with Scerdilaidas, sailed beyond Issus with seventy armed vessels, and extended his ravages to the lesser islands of the Ægean. The Rhodians, indeed, prepared to restrain these enormities; but the Greeks on the continent, having engaged in the social war, were less solicitous about extirpating the Illyrian pirates, than desirous of obtaining their dishonourable aid in distressing each other<sup>12</sup>.

The consul Emilius sails to Illyricum

Meanwhile the Romans saw that a second conflict with Carthage was inevitable, though they little imagined that Hannibal would

<sup>10</sup> The Romans were masters of the continental part of Magna Græcia, and already connected by embassies with Apollonia a Greek colony, and Egypt a Greek conquest.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, l. ii. c. 11

<sup>12</sup> Id. l. iii. c. 16.

<sup>13</sup> Id. l. iv. c. 16.

have commenced hostilities so soon by taking Saguntum, and then carrying his arms into Italy. They determined therefore to employ the present interval of tranquillity in chastising the defection of Demetrius, and thereby maintaining that sort of authority, which resulted from their valour and renown, among the nations east of the Adriatic. Without any formal declaration of war against a rebel who, to his other odious crimes, added the blackest ingratitude, the consul Emilius sailed with a powerful armament to Illyricum. Demetrius anticipated the arrival of the enemy, by destroying all those of his subjects whose resentment he dreaded, and then committing his inferior cities to persons in whom he put most trust, reinforced his two principal strongholds of Dimalus on the continent, and Pharus in the island of the same name, with such supplies of men, provisions, and military stores, as might enable them to resist a long siege. Emilius began the war by making approaches to Dimalus on various sides at once, and gained it by storm on the seventh day. The inferior places in the neighbourhood all submitted through terror; but Demetrius with six thousand chosen men had thrown himself into Pharus. The consul, upon sailing thither and examining the place, perceived that a regular siege must be attended with much delay and many difficulties. He therefore chose a dark night for sending into the island the greater part of his troops, who concealed themselves till morning, in hollow dens thickly covered with wood. At dawn, he appeared off the harbour with twenty vessels; the Illyrians rushed from their gates to obstruct his landing; as the battle grew warm, new numbers flocked from Pharus to support those already engaged with the enemy, until nearly the whole of the Illyrians had quitted the defence of their walls. At this crisis, the Romans emerged from their ambush, and seized a strong post between the deserted city and the scene of action round the harbour. Demetrius suddenly changed his front and courageously assailed those newly discovered adversaries. But he was routed and put to flight;

C H A P.

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and expels  
Demetrius  
of Pharus  
from that  
country.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 2.  
B. C. 219.

a few

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a few of his men gained the city; many reached, by difficult paths, secret lurking places in the island: he himself escaped to a brigantine, which his guilty fears made him keep always ready for sea on a desert part of the coast, and in which he instantly embarked, to fly from his country and the Romans, to whom the taking of Dimalus and Pharus gave possession of all Illyricum<sup>23</sup>. Scerdilaidas, we know, was pardoned and afterwards protected by the victors; but what regulations they made for deriving benefit to themselves from the conquest, or in what manner, and under what conditions, the territory was divided among their allies, history does not record.

Demetrius  
of Pharus  
flies to king  
Philip.  
Olymp.  
cal. 2.  
B. C. 219.

Demetrius of Pharus sought refuge with king Philip, to whom his valour and misfortunes failed not to recommend him<sup>24</sup>. His vessel found that of the young prince on the Ambracian gulph, Philip being then on his way homeward to prepare for his famous expedition into Etolia<sup>25</sup>. Demetrius, at the king's desire, sailed to Corinth, and thence proceeded through Thessaly to Macedon. There, he was admitted into the number of the king's friends; and, as with his trade of a corsair, he could seasonably intermix the arts of a courtier, he gradually acquired a great and pernicious ascendancy over the Macedonian councils. His influence is said to have occasioned the rapacious and sacrilegious proceedings at Thermum; for Philip's great youth made his behaviour peculiarly liable to be moulded at will by his favourites, who stamped it alternately with the impressions of their opposite characters. Whenever he quitted the honourable path chalked out to him by Aratus and Chryfogonus, and behaved either cruelly to his enemies, or imperiously to his allies, men knew by whose sentiments he had been guided as surely as if they had overheard his deliberations. The unfeeling Taurion, the unprincipled Demetrius, villains who defied alike censure and danger, were known in such cases to be his advisers<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, l. iii. c. 18. Conf. l. iv. c. 37. 66. l. xxxii. c. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Id. *ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> See above, c. xv. p. 84.

<sup>26</sup> Polybius, l. v. c. 12. Conf. l. ix. c. 23.

At the instigation chiefly of Demetrius, Philip involved himself in hostilities with Rome and her allies, which lasted for a period of twenty years, but of which the longest portion is eclipsed in history, being contemporary with the second war between the Romans and Carthaginians, more properly called the war of Hannibal, since that general should seem to have undertaken it without the authority of his country", and certainly carried it on without any assistance from Carthage.

From his earliest years Hannibal had been inspired with relentless hatred to the Romans; the daring views of Hamilcar had been opened to him", and the vengeful soul of the father revived in the son, and flamed in his fiery breast with new intensity. During three years, he served under Asdrubal in Spain, the terror of the Spanish enemy, the idol of the Carthaginian army; by which, on the death of its general, he was called to the chief command. His preferment was ratified at Carthage: to dispute it would only have shewn the weakness of that government. Master of an army disciplined in seventeen campaigns, he speedily completed the conquest of all Spain south of the Iberus, except the single Greek city Saguntum. This place he next invested with an army, it is said, 150,000 strong. The Saguntines defended themselves eight months with equal skill and bravery; and when the sack of their city seemed inevitable, endeavoured, by destroying their most precious effects, to render the conquest of little value. Hannibal, however, recovered much gold and silver, highly useful to him in his transactions with the Gauls, who lay on his road to Italy. He saved also much elegant furniture, and much valuable merchandise, which, being useless to himself, he transported into Carthage. The inhabitants of Saguntum were either put to the sword, or divided as slaves among his soldiers".

C. II. A. P.  
XVI.

Encourages  
him to make  
war on the  
Romans..

Hannibal  
sacks Sagun-  
tum.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 2.  
B. C. 219.

" Fabius apud Polyb. l. iii. c. 8.

" Id. l. iii. c. 14.

" Conf. Tit. Liv. l. xxi. c. 4. & seq. &  
Polybius, l. iii. c. 13. & seq.

After



C H A P.  
XVI.

Crosses the  
Alps into  
Italy.  
Olymp.  
cal. 3.  
B. C. 218.

After this bloody prelude, he went into winter-quarters in New Carthage. The spring recalled him to the field: his brother Asdrubal was appointed to command in Spain; and, after all fit preparations, Hannibal undertook his long projected invasion of Italy. In the space of five months, he advanced from New Carthage to the foot of the Alps. In fifteen days, he crossed these mountains<sup>20</sup>. From characteristic circumstances<sup>21</sup>, specified in the military historian Polybius, his march over the Alps should seem to have lain through Chambery, Montmelian, Montier, and the little St. Bernard. It extended above a hundred miles in direct distance, from the commencement of the ascent at a place called Echelles, to Ivree, the ancient Eporedia, near to which the mountains first open into the great northern plain of Italy. This plain Hannibal entered with an army reduced to 20,000 infantry and 6,000 horse; part of forty elephants which he had taken with him also remained. They had rewarded his trouble in conducting them over so many obstacles, by the terror which their formidable appearance in armour inspired into the barbarous nations on his route<sup>22</sup>.

Military resources of that country.

With this inconsiderable force he had invaded a country, the circumstances of which might have deterred from such an undertaking even the most romantic valour. Seven years before his expedition, the Romans had been alarmed by those tumultuary<sup>23</sup> movements among the Gauls on both sides the Alps, which made them enter into a computation of the whole of their own strength in Italy, citizens, subjects, or allies. It amounted to 700,000 infantry and 70,000 horse<sup>24</sup>. The citizens alone fit to bear arms exceeded 250,000

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, l. iii. c. 56.

<sup>21</sup> Particularly the *Λεοκοπεριον οχημα*, c. 151, now La Roche Blanche, two marches from Montier; and the necessity of making the passage practicable at three marches from the plain of Eporedia, *τον κρημον εξωχοδουμι μετα πολλης ταλαιπωριας*, c. 55. At La Thuille (a corruption of Hauteville, as appears on comparing maps), agreeing with this dif-

tance, the road is still annually repaired with pine planks. These observations I owe to my friend General Melville, who examined the ground, with a view to the illustration of this celebrated march.

<sup>22</sup> Polyb. l. iii. c. 53.

<sup>23</sup> Gallici tumultus, Tit. Liv. passim.

<sup>24</sup> Id. l. ii. c. 24. Conf. Diodorus, l. vii. c. 5. & Tit. Liv. Epitom. lib. xx.

Accordingly

Accordingly, the Boii and Insubres, leagued with their brethren beyond the Alps, were totally defeated three years afterwards; stripped of their main stronghold Mediolanum, or Milan; and such of them as were permitted to remain in Italy, reduced to unconditional submission<sup>34</sup>. The Romans had forces in Sicily, Sardinia, Illyricum, and particularly in the territory which Hannibal had invaded, constituting the Cisalpine Gaul.

When apprised of the sack of Saguntum, Publius Scipio and Sempronius Longus, with their respective consular armies, were ordered, the former into Spain, the latter into Sicily: Scipio with 60 gallies, Sempronius with 220; for this great naval force seemed necessary for carrying the war into Africa. Scipio having touched at the long friendly emporium of Massilia, learned to his surprise that Hannibal was already in the country above a hundred miles north of him, preparing to pass the Rhone. Thither the consul hastened, but found that his adversary had crossed the river, and got the start of him by three days on his way to Italy. The consul Publius Scipio determined therefore to send part of the army with his brother Cneius into Spain, while the remainder embarked with himself, and sailed from Massilia to Pisa. From thence he marched northward, not doubting, after he had been reinforced by the troops in Cisalpine Gaul, to overwhelm the exhausted invaders, as they descended into that country from the Alps<sup>35</sup>. The armies met at the river Ticinus. Hannibal's infantry, the hardened remnant of so many labours and dangers, might be superior to that of the enemy, comparatively a militia: he had brought it into a situation that left no alternative but victory or death. But the success of this battle is ascribed wholly to his cavalry<sup>36</sup>. The consul was wounded; and his

Proceedings  
of the Con-  
suls Scipio  
and Sempro-  
nius.

Battles of  
Ticinus and  
Trebia.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 3.  
B. C. 218.

<sup>34</sup> Conf. Strabo, l. v. p. 213. Polyb. l. iii. c. 40. Tit. Liv. l. xxxiv. c. 39 & 40.

<sup>35</sup> Hannibal's war in Italy forms the most splendid portion of Livy's history. It runs through nine books, l. xxi—xxx. The sub-

ject derives peculiar interest from the eloquence of the historian, as well as from the enterprise of his hero.

<sup>36</sup> Conf. Polyb. l. iii. c. 24 & seq. & Tit. Liv. l. xxi. c. 46.

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life narrowly saved by the intrepidity of a son, then in his seventeenth year, the future conqueror of Carthage.

Of Trafime-  
nus.  
Olymp.  
cxl. 4.  
B. C. 217.

Hannibal's unexpected invasion, his more incredible victory, allies prepared for defection, and subjects for rebellion, made the Romans recal the consul Sempronius from Sicily, after he had defeated a Carthaginian fleet, and was preparing to make a descent on Africa. In forty days, he joined his colleague on the river Trebia. A new battle was fought, in which Hannibal prevailed, through a well-con-

Of Cannæ.  
Olymp.  
cxli. 1.  
B. C. 216.

trived ambush<sup>37</sup>. Next year he crossed the Appenines, and drew the Consul Flaminius into a snare, on the intricate banks of the lake Trasimenus in Tuscany, in which that rash commander perished, with the greater part of his army<sup>38</sup>. Having thus gained an ascendancy in the north by the battles of Ticinus and Trebia, and in the central district of Tuscany, by the battle of Trasimenus, he next year marched southward to Apulia, and surpassed all these exploits in his tremendous victory at Cannæ, by which the vengeance was satiated long brooding in the family of Barcas. The consuls Emilius and Varro had 80,000 foot: Hannibal's infantry had now augmented to 40,000; and his cavalry, so diligent had he been to encrease it, now surpassed in number that of the Romans. By advancing his Gauls and other auxiliaries in a crescent, with its convexity towards the enemy, while its horns rested on two wings of his own hardy veterans, he brought on a battle in which his centre, giving way to the Romans, the pursuers were attacked on both flanks by his veterans, and lost above fifty thousand men. The Carthaginian cavalry greatly contributed to the destructiveness of the rout. The consul Emilius was slain; 10,000 Romans, guarding the camp, were made prisoners: only seventy horsemen escaped with Varro to Venusia<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> Polyb. l. iii. c. 69 & seq. & Tit. Liv. l. xxi. c. 54—56.

<sup>38</sup> Polyb. l. iii. c. 84. Tit. Liv. l. xxii. c. 4.

<sup>39</sup> Polyb. l. iii. c. 115 & seq. Tit. Liv. xxii. c. 47 & seq.

Battles less memorable have overturned many a powerful kingdom; but even these confirmed the stability of the Roman commonwealth. Hannibal was indeed master of the open country, but in that age most cities in Italy were well fortified; some garrisoned by the Romans, the greater part defended by the bravery of their own citizens. The consul Varro assumed a commanding attitude at Venusia: Naples defied Hannibal from its walls: and he received a check from Marcellus in attempting Nola<sup>40</sup>. A better hope was founded on alienating, under the plausible pretence of liberty, the Roman subjects or allies. But the higher orders of men, in almost every dependant community, remained unalterably firm in their allegiance, and overawed sedition from within, while they manfully prepared to repel hostility from without<sup>41</sup>. Capua, the most shameless city of Campania, itself the most profligate district in all Italy, is thought to have done a real service to the Romans, by opening its gates to the invaders<sup>42</sup>. But had these invaders kept unsullied the supposed purity of their virtue, the ultimate issue of the conflict would not probably have been different. For Rome, according to the just comparison of Pyrrhus, was endowed with the renovating qualities of the Hydra<sup>43</sup>. An armed people, habituated from earliest youth to military exercises, afforded an inexhaustible supply of recruits; and the decree, investing every Roman who had borne the office of consul with temporary command, provided the immediate assistance of able generals. Though Hannibal remained thirteen years longer in Italy, where Gauls in the north, and Greeks in the south, often co-operated with him as allies, he gained not any fresh laurels. The Romans had sent Publius Scipio to reinforce his brother Cneius in Spain. They employed armies in Sicily, Sardinia, and the countries beyond the Hadriatic. Their exertions abroad, were not interrupted by the dangers threatening them at home; and when, five

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Hannibal's subsequent war in Italy. Causes that made it unsuccessful. Olymp. cxli. 1. — cxliv. 2. B. C. 216 — 203.

<sup>40</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxiii. c. 16.  
<sup>41</sup> ~~Id.~~ l. xxiii. c. 20.

<sup>42</sup> ~~Id.~~ c. 18. 1.  
<sup>43</sup> Plutarch in Pyrrho.



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years after the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal, in hopes of raising the siege of Capua, marched suddenly to surprise Rome, he found three armies in order of battle prepared to receive him. Having encamped on the banks of the Anio, scarcely four miles distant, he learned that the ground occupied by his army had brought its full value at a public auction, and that a body of Romans had marched through an opposite gate of the city, to reinforce the legions in Spain<sup>44</sup>. Yet in this long warfare, Hannibal's admirable abilities gave the Romans no opportunity of combating him with advantage. When they endeavoured to force him into action, they were generally losers by the attempt; but the system of procrastination and caution succeeded with them far better; and Fabius Maximus, who had first adopted it, was extolled to the skies as the saviour of his country<sup>45</sup>.

Philip's  
league with  
Hannibal,  
and prepa-  
rations.  
Olymp.  
cxli. 2.  
B. C. 215.

A few months after the battle of Cannæ, Philip of Macedon, at the instigation of Demetrius of Pharos, adopted three very decisive measures. He entered into an intimate alliance with Hannibal, including the states friendly to both parties, and ratified by awful invocations of the gods of Macedon and Carthage<sup>46</sup>. He began to build armed transports on the Illyrian model, as the fittest for conveying forces into Italy; and he attacked Scerdilaidas, the Roman ally, in Illyricum, and in a short time divested him of the greater part of his possessions<sup>47</sup>.

Death of  
Hieron of  
Syracuse.  
Olymp.  
cxli. 2.  
B. C. 215.

Shortly after Hannibal had cemented his league with Philip, the Romans lost a zealous friend in Hieron of Syracuse, who died in his 96th year, amidst strenuous exertions to suppress defection among the Roman subjects in Sicily. From the close of the first Punic war, that island had remained very unequally

<sup>44</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxvi. c. 11.

<sup>45</sup> Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.

Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem

Ergo postque, magisque viri nunc gloria claret.

Ennius.

Apud Cicer. de Offic. l. i. c. 24, & Plutarch. Fab. Maxim.

<sup>46</sup> Polyb. l. iii. c. 2, & l. vii. c. 9.

<sup>47</sup> Id. l. v. c. 108.

divided between Rome and her Syracusan ally. The dominion of Syracuse was confined to a narrow strip of land, stretching about fourscore miles along the eastern coast of Sicily, from Achææ to Tauromenium, and comprehending these frontier towns, together with several other places of note, particularly Leontium, Megara, and Elorus. But the government of Hieron, and his admirable management of his little territory, affords, as it were, a delightful resting place in our painful journey through scenes of perfidy and cruelty, of relentless ambition, and insatiable vengeance. His government was formed on the fairest model of the heroic age; the senate was called to deliberate, and the assembly to decide, while Gelon, the son of Hieron, himself in the maturity of years, co-operated in perfect cordiality with his father in the controul and execution of all public measures<sup>48</sup>. Hieron had wisely chosen his party between Rome and Carthage, but when the latter state was threatened with total ruin in the war above mentioned, with her own mercenaries, he employed his utmost endeavours to serve and save her; deeming the existence of Carthage essential to the independence of Syracuse, since the destruction of that republic would have laid him altogether at the mercy of Rome<sup>49</sup>. When Rome, on the other hand, seemed ready to sink under the impetuous shocks of Ticinus and Trebia, Trasimenus and Cannæ, Hieron spared neither gold nor blood to support her. His fleet and army was at the disposal of his allies; and the money, which he chiefly supplied, enabled the pretor Valerius seasonably to cross the Hadriatic, and to find such employment, at home, for king Philip, as rendered the alliance of that prince of little importance to Hannibal<sup>50</sup>.

His wife policy at home and abroad.

The vast wealth of Hieron flowed from the purest sources. He was the strenuous promoter of productive and commercial industry. The improvement of agriculture, the most profitable of all occupa-

Fortifications of Syracuse.

<sup>48</sup> Conf. Polybius, l. v. c. 88. l. vii. c. 8, & Tit. Liv. l. xxiv. c. 4, & seq.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. l. iii. c. 75. Conf. Tit. Liv. l. xxii. c. 37.

<sup>49</sup> Polybius, l. i. c. 83.

pations,

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tions, especially in such a country as Sicily, he forwarded by judicious regulations, by still more useful examples, and by wise and salutary precepts, contained in many valuable treatises which he wrote on that subject." The best blessings of peace he made permanent, by a constant preparation for war; and in an age, when skill in sieges kept not pace with other branches of military science, the vast extent of Syracuse was made on all sides impregnable. In this undertaking he was assisted by the great Archimedes, his friend, some say his kinsman, who, at the king's earnest desire, descended from those sublime speculations which occupied the Newton of antiquity, and applied his wonderful powers of combination and invention to matters of coarse mechanical practice". But of his extraordinary contrivances for the defence of Syracuse, there was not any occasion to make use in the long course of this politic and pacific reign.

Hieron's  
galley of 20  
tier of oars.

The prosperity of every Greek city was marked by a superabundance of inestimable productions in all the arts of design. The architectural embellishments of Syracuse were regarded among the brightest glories of Hieron's administration: he was distinguished by his magnificence<sup>31</sup> in religious games and solemnities, particularly in dramatic exhibitions; and so catching are the follies of our own times, that Hieron vied with contemporary Greek kings in constructing and equipping a galley of twenty tier of oars, uniting the strength of a fortress with all the conveniencies and elegancies of a royal palace. This moving castle, which Sicilian poets likened to mount *Ætna*, consumed the timber necessary for building sixty trireme galleys. It was compacted by iron bolts, weighing ten and fifteen pounds: its engines launched balls of 300 pounds to the distance of a furlong: one of its masts is said to have been transported

<sup>31</sup> Plin. N. H. l. xviii. c. 3.  
Plutarch in Marcello.

<sup>32</sup> Athenæus, l. v. p. 205.

from the mountains of Britain<sup>54</sup>; its cordage was composed of broom from Spain and hemp from Gaul: the commerce of the world was ransacked for its ornaments; ivory images of the gods, altars glowing with gems and breathing Indian perfumes, the marbles and more precious materials inlaying its lowest floor, and curiously disposed in mosaic, representing Homer's battles. This prodigy of ill-directed art, for whose safe passage Neptune is tremblingly<sup>55</sup> invoked by the poet, was built by Archias of Corinth, and launched on the waves by Phileas of Tauromenium; and is said to have been navigated from the harbour of Syracuse to that of Alexandria, as a present to Ptolemy Philadelphus, being, indeed, less absurdly adapted to the navigation of the Nile<sup>56</sup>.

Hieron, dying at the age of ninety-six, was succeeded by a youth of seventeen, born to his son Gelon by Nereis, daughter to Pyrrhus<sup>57</sup>. Hieronymus, for this was his name, is described as a prey to the vilest passions, but possessing a will of his own, and an ear open to contrariety of council. To this youth, who disdained submission to those naturally entitled to guide him, Hannibal sent Epicydes and Hippocrates, brothers, whose father, a native of Syracuse, had long lived in exile at Carthage. These men were agents in all respects worthy of their employer; bold, dextrous, deceitful; with resources in every difficulty, with intrepidity in every danger. At their persuasion, Hieronymus embraced measures highly offensive to the Romans, and when ambassadors came from that people to remonstrate with him, asked insultingly to hear from them a more accurate account, than had yet, he said, reached his ears of the battle of Cannæ<sup>58</sup>. The cruelty and contumely of Hieronymus provoked a conspiracy of his subjects, to which, after a reign of scarcely one

Reign of Hieronymus and distractions consequent on it. Olymp. cxli. 3. B. C. 214.

<sup>54</sup> If. Casaubon, however, reads *εν τοις* l. v. p. 209.

*ορεις της Βρεττανιας*, in the mountains of the Brutii. Animadvers. in Athen. l. v. p. 229.

<sup>55</sup> *Αλλα ποσειδων σωζε κατα γλαυκας σελμα τοδε ροβιν*. Archimelus Atheniensis apud Athen.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 207. & seq.

<sup>57</sup> Polybius, l. vii. c. 4.

<sup>58</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxiv. c. 6,



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year, he fell a sacrifice. The Syracusans were summoned to liberty: the ancient form of democracy returned with all its tumult and outrage; and one revolution succeeded to another, until the brothers, sent by Hannibal, made their way to supreme power by a series of lies and forgeries; of dark intrigues and daring assassinations<sup>5</sup>. This state of affairs occasioned the memorable siege of Syracuse which lasted nearly three years, and the event of which gave to the consul Marcellus possession of a city computed to be richer<sup>6</sup> than Carthage itself; besides that the complete reduction of Sicily, the natural consequence of his success, prepared the way for the Roman expedition into Africa, and the humiliation of Carthage into the state of a disarmed and tributary vassal.

Philip's unworthy proceedings.  
Olymp. cxli. 3.  
B. C. 214.

Meanwhile Philip, in conformity to his treaty with Hannibal, had equipped a fleet of a hundred Liburnians, in which he purposed to transport forces from Illyricum into Italy. But false intelligence communicated by some Sicilian merchantmen, that a squadron of Roman quinqueremes was ready to oppose his passage, determined him to sail back into harbour. Enraged at the deceit practised on him, and the loss of an opportunity of co-operating with his ally, his light and fiery mind, yet untamed by adversity, vented its ungoverned anger in proceedings as frantic as they were detestable. His general in Peloponnesus, in contravention to the peace recently established, seized the mountainous fortress Ithomè, commanding the Messenian capital<sup>7</sup>. Demetrius of Pharos said, that this was to hold the bull of Peloponnesus by the two horns; meaning thereby the Acro-Corinthus in the north and Ithomè in the south. But Aratus pleaded so strongly the cause of Messenè and of justice, that the king was prevailed on to let slip his victim. Shortly afterwards, he repented of his forbearance, and sent Demetrius to assault and recover the stronghold. The undertaking was as rashly conducted, as it had been wickedly concerted. Demetrius was repelled and slain; and

<sup>5</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxiv. c. 7—27.

<sup>6</sup> Id. l. xxv. c. 3 f.

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Philip avenged the death of a man so undeservedly dear to him, by merciless depredation on the Messenian territory, and by poisoning Aratus, whose honest remonstrances were no longer tolerable to a tyrant<sup>6</sup>. His instrument in this crime was the infamous Taurion, who had long been entrusted with his affairs in the Peloponnesus. Aratus bore the incurable effects of the poison with a composure worthy of his great character. The Achæans, over whom he presided as pretor for the seventeenth time, did not even suspect the cause of his declining health, which he never hinted at in public, though to Cephalaon a confidential friend who lamented at seeing him spit blood, "such," he said, "my dear Cephalaon, are the fruits of royal gratitude!" His country made every compensation in its power for the execrable perfidy which he had experienced. He was interred at Sicyon with unfeigned expressions of public sorrow; and all Achaia long joined with that city in commemorating his fame by rites held due to the most illustrious public benefactors<sup>7</sup>.

Death of  
Aratus.  
Olymp.  
cxli. 4.  
B. C. 213.

After the death of Demetrius of Pharus, his great adviser in the Roman war, Philip should seem to have adopted the resolution of first making himself completely master of Illyricum, before he ventured to pass into Italy. In this view, he besieged Oricum, and gained possession of that sea-port, which stood directly opposite to Hadruntum, on the narrowest part of the Strait. He was on the point also of taking Apollonia, the oldest Roman ally beyond the Hadriatic; when the pretor Valerius crossed that sea with a strong armament, recovered Oricum in which Philip had left but a feeble garrison; and then proceeding with silence and celerity to Apollonia, threw himself by an obscure path into the place, with a chosen detachment. His presence encouraged the Apollonians to attack the besieging army in the night. The enterprise was conducted with such secrecy and boldness, that even the royal pavilion was in danger. The Macedonians

The pretor  
Valerius ob-  
liges Philip  
to raise the  
siege of  
Apollonia.  
Olymp.  
cxli. 3.  
B. C. 214.

<sup>6</sup> Polybins, l. iii. c. 14.

him subsisted three centuries after his death.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch in Arato. Faint testimonies, Plut. p. 1052.

δωδεκα μύρα, of the honours once paid to

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fled in precipitation; three thousand of them were slain or taken; their camp became a booty to the Romans; only the battering engines were granted to the Apollonians, that the same machines which had been constructed against them, might thenceforward be employed in their defence<sup>64</sup>.

Philip's conquests in Illyricum. Olymp. cxli. 3. B. C. 214.

The Roman fleet wintered at Oricum and Apollonia, and left these places so well guarded, that Philip, after more vigorous preparations than formerly, thought proper to direct his arms against a different part of the coast. Lissus and its citadel Acro-Lissus stood an hundred miles north of Apollonia. They were deemed the most important and strongest places in the whole country. Philip gained both, by a stratagem well concerted and boldly executed. At the foot of Acro-Lissus, and between this fortress and the city, there was a hollow den overhung by thick wood: the remainder of the space between the city and citadel consisted of plain ground, well adapted to the approaches of besiegers. In the den, just mentioned, Philip had the address to plant an ambush of chosen men. The day afterwards, he proceeded with his light forces into the plain, as if he had intended to take measures for advancing his machines against the city. The troops and armed inhabitants in Lissus sallied from their gates: Philip gave way; the men, who garrisoned Acro-Lissus, hastened to join their companions in the pursuit; but had no sooner advanced beyond the den at the foot of that fortress, than the Macedonians rose from their ambush, and clambering over some adjacent crags, took possession of the deserted citadel. Philip, at the same time, turned unexpectedly on his pursuers, and drove them back in dismay to Lissus. That city was taken after repeated assaults, in which the king showed not less skill than courage: and the same of such conquests intimidated most cities in Illyricum into a voluntary surrender<sup>65</sup>.

<sup>64</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxiv. c. 40.

<sup>65</sup> Polybius, l. viii. c. 15. & seq.

Philip thus deprived the Romans of their conquests in that country; but, before he could entirely subdue it to himself, his politic adversaries gained over him a very decided advantage in negotiation.

This was a treaty which the pretor Valerius entered into with the Etolians, including all allies of the contracting parties. In consequence of this agreement, copies of which were inscribed in Jupiter's temple at Olympia, and in the Roman capitol<sup>66</sup>, Philip's designs against Italy were completely defeated through his necessity of encountering the same Grecian enemies with whom he had contended in the social war, the Etolians, Elians, and Spartans; in addition to these, the Messenians recently incensed by his wanton cruelties.

Meanwhile, Hannibal received not any succours from Carthage. A reinforcement of forty elephants and 4,000 Numidian horse had been, indeed, voted to him; but before this supply could be got ready to sail, its destination was changed from Italy to Spain<sup>67</sup>, in which latter country, his brother Asdrubal was now hardly pressed by the Scipios. Not only Spain, in which they had so many lucrative establishments, but even Sicily, in which, upon the commotions following the death of Hieron and the destruction of his family, they hoped once more to recover their ascendancy, appeared to the Carthaginians a scene of action more inviting than Italy, the theatre of great but unprofitable victories. To foment defection among the Roman subjects in Sicily, considerable armies had been already sent from Carthage; and these were speedily increased, when it was understood that the Syracusans, abused by the audacious artifices of Epicydes and Hippocrates, had violated their long peace with Rome, and set the resentment of that state at defiance<sup>68</sup>. The consul Marcellus, who had by this time reinforced the pretor Appius hitherto commanding in Sicily, immediately concerted with him the fittest means for besieging Syracuse by sea and land.

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Treaty between the Romans and Etolians. Olymp. cxlii. 1. B. C. 212

Events that caused the siege of Syracuse. Olymp. cxli. 3. B. C. 214.

<sup>66</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxvi. c. 24.

<sup>67</sup> Id. l. xxiii. c. 13, & 32.

<sup>68</sup> Id. l. xxiv. c. 27—33.



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Description  
of that city.

To explain clearly the events which happened in the course of this undertaking, it is necessary briefly to advert to the general plan of Syracuse, and to the distribution of the various parts of that great and rich city. It stood on a head-land, projecting in the form of a triangle from the eastern coast of Sicily. The base advanced into the sea, which flowed a considerable way up the sides. These sides extended westward over the craggy eminences Epipolæ, gradually approaching each other until they finally united in the rock Euryelus, forming the vertex of the triangle. Disposed in a shape, similar to that of the island of which it was the capital, Syracuse measured eighteen miles in circuit, and contained five divisions, deserving each of them the name of city, in point of strength as well as magnitude. The largest division, called Acradina, formed the basis of the triangle, its outward wall washed by the sea. The little island Ortygia lay before the southern extremity of Acradina, forming with it two harbours, one on either side of the island: the two next divisions, the more northern called Tycha, and the southern Neapolis, bordered on Acradina, only separated from it by walls. The last, and most inland division, consisted of the craggy eminences Epipolæ; a quarter taken within the city for the sake chiefly of security, with the rock Euryelus above-mentioned, towering at its extremity, and frowning in defiance over the circumjacent country<sup>69</sup>.

Operations  
against it.  
Olymp.  
ccli. 3.  
cxlii. 1.  
B. C. 214—  
212.

In the space of five days, Appius, with incredible diligence, had provided whatever seemed necessary for the siege by land; but the first memorable attack appears to have been made by Marcellus against Acradina with a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. Not trusting to the stones and javelins thrown from single vessels for clearing the enemies walls, he joined two quinqueremes together, by their respective sides, and covered them with a strong floor of wood. On this floor, he applied a huge ladder, provided on either side with

<sup>69</sup> For the dimensions and divisions of Syracuse, see Thucyd. l. vi. Cicero in Verr. l. iv. Few great cities are so distinctly described.

balustrades,

balustrades, and having at one end a firm stage encompassed with parapets. As this double quinquereme approached the walls, the ladder was raised aloft, and propped at it rose by beams of various lengths; so that the soldiers might safely mount it, and having reached the stage at top, drive the enemy from their battlements. This machine received the name of Sackbut, because it nearly resembled in shape this triangular harp; the swelling base of the instrument being represented by the joined quinqueremes; its sides and strings respectively, by the sloping ladder, and the various props by which it was supported.<sup>70</sup>

Now an opportunity first offered to Archimedes, for displaying, in all its powers, the wonderful machinery which, at the desire of king Hieron, he had erected. His philosophical mind, if insensible to personal glory, was not to that of his art. Syracuse, indeed, had fallen into bad hands; but he would still exert his abilities in defence of his country. Perhaps he was duped by the artifices through which Epicydes and Hippocrates had irritated the public mind against the Romans; a geometer is not the best judge in matters depending on moral evidence. But whatever motive determined him; glory, patriotism, the delusions, or even the threats of the unworthy usurpers of Syracuse, it is certain that his abilities long retarded, and might, but for events against which the utmost skill in defence could not avail, have ultimately defeated the operations against that unfortunate city. He had engines fitted to all distances: the hostile armament was battered while yet a furlong from the walls, and when the enemy waited darkness to make his approaches more safely, huge beaks projecting beyond the battlements, at the slightest touch of a cord, precipitated masses of stone and metal, weighing, many of them, ten talents.<sup>71</sup> By such means, the sackbuts, four in number, were broke in pieces, while any single vessels, that ventured to come near, were grappled by iron hands, and on the quarter seized, being raised

Its wonderful defence.

<sup>70</sup> Polybius, l. viii. c. 6—8.

<sup>71</sup> Lb. 600.

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to a fit height, suddenly replunged in the sea with destructive violence". Appius was not more successful in his assaults by land, than Marcellus in those by sea. The siege of Syracuse was therefore converted into a blockade under the pretor, while the consul, with one third of the army, marched to quell insurrection in other

"Polybius ubi supra. Conf. Plutarch in Marcell. Marcellus jested at this rude reception, saying, that his ships were entertained with brimful goblets, while the *sackbuts* were pelted with stones and driven disgracefully from the feast. Polyb. l. v. c. 37. The joke lies in the equivocal word *sackbut*, denoting not only the musical instrument, but the girl who played on it. Such girls were rudely dismissed when they displeased either by their music or their manners. I have not mentioned the burning glasses by which Archimedes is said to have destroyed the Roman fleet. Zonaras and Tzetzes, to whom we owe this report, lived 14 centuries after the siege of Syracuse; and are discredited by the silence of Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch. The verses of Tzetzes, Chil. ii. v. 119. & seq. are obscure and barbarous; they suggested, however, to Father Kircher the idea, that the effect ascribed to Archimedes' burning glasses, might be produced by a combination of plain mirrors; with 400 of which, so arranged as to reflect their heat on the same object, Buffon succeeded in the experiment of melting lead and tin at the distance of 140 feet. Mem. de L'Acad. des Sciences, An. 1746. Archimedes needs not the glory of this and other doubtful inventions, to support his fame: it rests on "the sphere and cylinder," the admirable work "on spiral lines;" and two other treatises, "*περί επιπέδων ισορροπιών*," and "*περί οχυμένων*," in which he explains the true principles of statics and hydrostatics. Conf. Fabric. Bibliothec. Græc. l. iii. c. 22. & Montucla Histoire des Mathematiques, part i. Liv. iv. In the treatise *περί οχυμένων*, we find principles affording the solution of the famous question referred to him con-

cerning the composition of Hieron's crown. The artist, instead of making this elegant piece of workmanship of pure gold, as the king had desired, combined in it a large portion of inferior metal. To find the quantities of each, Archimedes provided two masses, one of gold, another of the inferior metal; and each of the same weight with the crown. He then weighed these masses in water, to discover what proportions of their weight they respectively lost. The gold, he knew, being the more compact, would loose the least; because any body is less heavy in water, by the weight of a quantity of water equal to its own bulk. Having thus ascertained the parts of their weight lost respectively by the gold, the inferior metal, and the composite crown, it was easy to perceive that the quantity of gold in the composition must bear the same proportion to that of the inferior metal, as the difference of weights lost by the crown and inferior metal to the difference of weights lost by the crown and the gold. Another method of solving the same question is given by Vitruvius de Architect. l. ix. c. 3. It is that copied in all complements, though less ingenious, and therefore less worthy of Archimedes. The glassy sphere of Archimedes, representing the true picture of the Heavens, is best known by Claudian's Epigram. Jupiter, in parvo cum cerneret æthera vitro, Risit, et ad superos talia verba dedit: Hæcine mortalis progressa potentia curæ: Ecce Syracusii ludimur arte senis. Pope, if he did not borrow, has hit on, the same thought, Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape, And shewed a Newton as we shew an ape.

Essay on Man, Epist. ii. v. 33, 34.



parts of the island. He was opposed by 20,000 men, under Himilco, assisted by Hippocrates, who, while his brother Epicydes ably defended Syracuse, thought his own activity might be usefully employed in co-operating with the Carthaginian general. The flames of discord thus raged more widely: cities were taken, lost, and recovered; both parties were powerfully reinforced; and while other scenes of the war excited comparatively little interest, all men turned their eyes to the well sustained conflict in Sicily<sup>72</sup>. Marcellus, having compelled his opponents to shut themselves up in Agrigentum, returned to assist Appius in the siege of Syracuse. His assaults were as unprosperous as before; and when, by means of Syracusan exiles, who had joined him, he gained a strong party within the city, the intrigues of those traitors were disconcerted by Epicydes, a traitor of far greater dexterity.

The following occurrence, at length, opened a gleam of hope to the besiegers. Damippus, a Lacedæmonian, had been employed as a confidential agent between Hannibal and his coadjutor Epicydes on one side, and king Philip on the other. In his way to Macedon from Syracuse, Damippus had fallen into the hands of the Romans. Epicydes wished exceedingly to recover him; and Marcellus was the less unwilling to release him, because the Romans at this time were solicitous, as we have above shewn, to gain the friendship of the Lacedæmonians, his countrymen. In consequence of this disposition on both sides, deputations met to treat of his ransom at the fort of Galeagra, overlooking that part of the sea which washed the northern wall of the city. A Roman soldier availed himself of this opportunity to examine the wall narrowly, and having noted the spot where it was most affailable, communicated his observation to Marcellus. The general delayed, however, to proceed on this information, until apprized by deserters, that the Syracusans, in perfect security, were celebrating Diana's festival; that, amidst the scarcity of other luxuries,

Part of the  
city taken.  
Olymp.  
cxlii. 1.  
B. C. 212.

<sup>72</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxiv. c. 35. & seq. Conf. Plutarch in Marcell.



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wine had been distributed to them in great profusion : and that two preceding carousals would probably be outdone by the intemperance of the third and last day of the solemnity". Upon this intelligence, Marcellus selected a fit band of assailants, provided with ladders of the necessary height, for the soldier had carefully remarked the size of the stones and the number of layers in which they rose above each other. At that hour of the night, when Syracuse was most likely to be buried in sleep and wine, the wall was scaled by 1,000 men, who, finding the solitude around them disturbed only by a few drunken revellers, hastened westward to the Hexapyle, or "Six Gateways," forming so many entrances to the quarter called Tyche. Having burst open the least obstinate barricade, they admitted their watchful companions in such numbers, that the business was no longer to elude, but to terrify the enemy. The trumpets were sounded ; a general shout was raised ; and the guards in Tyche and Epipolæ only waked from their intoxication, to fall headlong from the walls, or to fly in terror through the streets.

Acradina  
and Ortygia  
defended by  
Epicyles.

The sound of arms had scarcely reached Acradina and Ortygia, in the latter of which Epicyles occupied the royal palace, when Marcellus at dawn entered the Hexapyle, with the greater part of his army. Epicyles hastened to repel the assailants, venting execrations against those who had allowed the wall to be scaled, and reproaching the cowards, who, flocking to him on his way, greatly increased, he said, by exaggerating, the danger. But when a nearer approach made him acquainted with the full extent of his misfortune, he returned with the utmost diligence to secure Acradina and the island, the only parts of the city which he judged to be still tenable. Meanwhile Marcellus, having gained the fortresses in Epipolæ, successively took possession of Tyche and Neapolis. The submission of the inhabitants saved their lives, but came too late to protect their property. Those regions of the city were subjected to a general pillage, extorted

<sup>77</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxv. c. 23. & seq.

rather

rather by the rapacity of the soldiers, than permitted through the cruel indulgence of the general; for Marcellus, at first entering the place, and viewing its vastness and magnificence from the heights which gave name to Epipolæ, shed tears of pity at the hard duty which the obstinacy and impolicy of the Syracusans had imposed on him<sup>21</sup>: he remembered the high renown of the commonwealth, its innumerable trophies over Carthage, and its signal triumph over Athens in the zenith of her glory; above all, the late virtuous reign of Hieron, during which Syracuse had continued for upwards of fifty years to be intimately connected with Rome in an alliance equally useful and honourable to both parties.

Meanwhile Epicydes exerted equal diligence and dexterity for the defence of Acradina and Ortygia; in which, chiefly, consisted the admired splendour of the city. The assaults of the Romans had been repelled vigourously on every side, when Hippocrates and Himilco arrived to succour the besieged at the head of a great army. Battles were fought with various success, and the combatants did not suffer more cruelly from each other, than from the pestilence, a common evil, which, after greatly afflicting both, finally swept away almost the whole Carthaginian army with the two generals commanding it. Their Sicilian auxiliaries dispersed into neighbouring cities; while Epicydes, though deprived of external aid, persevered in defending his walls with unabating energy<sup>22</sup>. This obstinacy of resistance, allowed time for a new effort in his favour. A fleet, consisting of 130 large galleys and 700 victuallers, sailed prosperously from Carthage to the southern coast of Sicily, and anchored, most of them, at a place called the Harbour of Ulysses, on the farther side of Pachynus; but a strong wind from the east rendered it impossible to double that promontory. The news of this vast armament, its first successful navigation, and long subsequent delay, excited alternate emotions of hope and fear among the besiegers and besieged. Epi-

The Carthaginians assist Syracuse by land and sea.

<sup>21</sup> Tit. Liv. & Plutarch ubi supra.

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Cowardice of  
Bomilcar  
their admiral.

cydes, who dreaded that, should the storm continue to blow from the east, Bomilcar, the Carthaginian admiral, would sail back to Carthage, determined to join him with the utmost expedition, leaving the defence of Syracuse, meanwhile, in the hands of his lieutenants; and Marcellus, who perceived that the Carthaginian partisans throughout Sicily were encouraged to new exertions by the prospect of such powerful assistance, hastened to sea, though with an inferior fleet, in the design of fighting the enemy. The two fleets were on opposite sides of Pachynus. The cessation of the tempestuous east wind enabled them to come in sight of each other. Epicydes exerted all his endeavours to inspire Bomilcar with confidence; but that commander no sooner perceived the Romans advancing towards him in full sail, than, being seized with a sudden panic, he bore away with the ships of war, and sent orders to the transports in Heraclæa and other harbours, to make all haste into Africa. Epicydes, totally disconcerted by his cowardice, instead of returning to Syracuse, which he considered as now lost<sup>76</sup>, sailed to Agrigentum, and after occasioning new troubles to the Romans there, finally escaped safe into Africa.

The remaining divisions of Syracuse taken through the treachery of Mericus a Spaniard. Olymp. cxlii. 1. B. C. 212.

The destruction of the Carthaginian army, followed by this shameful flight of the fleet, diffused consternation through a large body of Sicilian rebels, who had again assembled in the neighbourhood of Syracuse. They wished by any means to obtain forgiveness; and, for this purpose, while they applied directly to Metellus, they sent a numerous deputation into the besieged city, with a view to prevail on it to capitulate. The persons, employed in this transaction, intimated their commission only to such Syracusans as had been long connected with them in the bonds of old hereditary friendship; and they soon understood, that all attempts to bring about any offer of capitulation must prove fruitless, while those men remained alive, whom Epicydes had left in authority. This obstacle being removed

<sup>76</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxv. c. 27.



by the help of assassins, an embassy was sent to Marcellus in order to extenuate past errors, and to implore his clemency. But, before his answer could be received, Syracuse was subjected to a new calamity. The Roman deserters in the place well knew that the mercy which might be shewn to others, would not be extended to them; and had the address to make many bodies of Greek mercenaries unite with them, as in a common cause. The best part of the citizens were intimidated, the worst abetted the sedition. The gates were shut against the Romans, and guarded more carefully than ever. Yet, after the first ferment had subsided, it was determined that the persons sent to Marcellus should be re-admitted, and together with them a deputation from that general. Among the soldiers escorting his deputies, the Roman commander, who had learned, by secret intelligence, that one of the three gates of Acradina was entrusted to Mericus a Spaniard, sent a fit agent of that nation then serving among his auxiliaries. Through the persuasion of this auxiliary, his countryman was prevailed on to betray his post. The Romans, having thus entered Acradina by treachery, completed their success by arms, both there and in the island Ortygia connected with it by a bridge. Being exempted from observing any measures with the Syracusans, they imposed no bounds to their wanton abuse of victory, except what seemed necessary for securing to the Roman exchequer a due proportion of the booty, particularly the money contained in the royal treasury in Ortygia. Amidst innumerable acts of rage and cruelty, one only is pointedly commemorated, but by this alone, laurels, brighter than those of Marcellus, would be for ever blasted. The murder of Archimedes, in which the sanctity of science was violated, is so variously recorded, that the Romans should seem, through chance, never to have made any authentic report of it. A tomb, by order of the conqueror, was erected for him in the suburb, and inscribed, as had been his own desire, with a sphere and

The city  
plundered.

Death of  
Archimedes.

His tomb  
discovered at  
the distance  
of 139 years  
by Cicero.

<sup>77</sup> Conf. Tit. Liv. l. xxv. c. 31. & Plutarch in Marcell.



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cylinder. At the distance of 139 years from this period, Cicero, when questor in Sicily, asked the magistrates of Syracuse, who were officiously pointing out to him less interesting objects, for the tomb of Archimedes. They could not acquaint him with its site; and, to cloak their ignorance, denied the existence of any such monument. At his desire, he was then conducted beyond the gate to an ancient cemetery. After much search amidst brambles and rubbish, a stone was found, bearing a sphere and cylinder, with part also of the mouldering inscription on this great geometer. Cicero boasts of his discovery with honest exultation<sup>a</sup>, and contrasts his own keen curiosity with the careless indifference of the magistrates of Syracuse, one of the noblest cities of Greece, and once one of the most learned. But he considered not, or, considering, forbore to mention, the cause of this wretched degeneracy.

Glory of the  
Sicilians in  
arts and let-  
ters.

Geometry, indeed, since the decline of the Pythagoreans in Sicily, might be considered as a sort of exotic, transplanted laboriously from Egypt. But the Sicilians, while an independent nation, produced poets, orators, and historians, many of whom we have had occasion to commemorate. The eloquence of Gorgias, of Leontium, was admired even in Athens. The historians Antiochus<sup>b</sup>, Philistus, Callias, Antander, Timæus, furnished a chain of narrative downward from the 90th to the 129th Olympiad and the Punic wars, including the affairs of Sicily, and of all those countries with which that island was connected. But pastoral poetry was the peculiar boast of the Sicilians, and should seem to have flourished in their island from the fabulous times of Daphnis<sup>c</sup> and Diomus<sup>d</sup>, to those of Bion and Moschus, in the age of Ptolemy Philometor<sup>e</sup>. But in the space of seventy-three years from the death of Philometor, to the discovery of the tomb of Archimedes by Cicero, the Sicilian muses

<sup>a</sup> Tusculan. Quest. l. v. c. 3.

<sup>b</sup> Diodor. l. xii. p. 333. & Strabo, l. vi. crit. p. 254.

<sup>c</sup> Diodor. l. iv. sub fin. & Schol. in Thesop.

<sup>d</sup> Athenæus, l. xiv. p. 619.

<sup>e</sup> Suidas.

had become dumb, and both literature and science were totally neglected. Such was the change produced on this lively and ingenious people by the accumulating oppression of a foreign yoke!

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Marcellus stripped Syracuse of riches not inferior to what the sack of Carthage would have yielded, and of works of art, adorning public monuments, which no wealth could purchase. The Romans thus usurped the trophies reared over many foreign enemies by this long illustrious republic; and by decking their own capital with ornaments which they wanted contrivance to invent, and even industry to imitate, they exposed themselves to the just reproaches of all civilised nations, particularly of Greeks, in every division of the world". At the taking of Agrigentum by the consul Lævinus, the riches and elegancies of that city, the second in the island, were ransacked with equal avidity, and carefully transported to Rome. Lævinus then made himself master of six other cities by assault, of twenty by treachery, and of forty by voluntary surrender". The whole island thus fell under the dominion of Rome; and though its various communities were treated differently, according to their several deserts, yet the justice administered to all of them appears to have been measured on a scale of rigid severity. In what had formed the proper kingdom of Hieron, the regulations of that wise prince were upheld respecting tillage, tythes, and other matters of rural economy, because none more profitable could be devised"; and the fertile Sicily, long the seat of arts, arms, and tumultuary liberty, sunk into a peaceful farm, cultivated chiefly for the benefit of the Romans, and of which, before the age of Augustus, the whole superfluous produce was annually transported to feed their voracious capital".

Oppression  
and degra-  
dation under  
the Romans.

" Plutarch in Marcell. Conf. Polybius, l. ix. c. 10. & Tit. Liv. l. xxv. c. 40. l. xxvi. c. 30. & 31. l. xxvii. c. 10.

" Tit. Liv. l. xxvi. c. 40.

" Cicero in Verrem. l. ii. de Jurisdic. Siciliens & l. iii. Oratio Frumentaria.

" Strabo, l. vi. p. 273. Among the exports of Sicily he mentions corn, cattle, hides, wool, honey, saffron.

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## XVI.

War in  
Spain.  
Olymp.

cxlii. 1—

cxliii. 2.

B. C. 212—

207.

Scipio Afri-  
canus.

Asdrubal  
passes into  
Italy. De-  
feated and  
flain.

Olymp.

cxliii. 2.

B. C. 217.

The success of the Romans in the conquest of Syracuse, was balanced by contemporary and very disastrous events in Spain. The Scipios, Publius and Cneius, having separated their forces too widely, and being deserted by their Spanish auxiliaries, were in the space of one month successively cut off, with a great proportion of their respective armies. But the officers, who had commanded under them, especially Lucius Martius, a young Roman, endowed with talents far beyond his years or his rank, collected the scattered legions, and made head against the enemy<sup>\*</sup>, until the arrival in Spain, as proconsul, of the son of Publius Scipio. This new general, who bore also the name of Publius, assumed the command at the age of 24: seven years before this time he had saved his father's life in the battle of Ticinus: his talents, civil as well as military, were of the highest order; his zeal for the public service, his integrity, and magnanimity surpassed the glory of his talents. The Romans were inclined to regard the brightness of his unspotted merit with a superstitious reverence; and Scipio too well knew the influence of such prepossessions, not to employ fit means to confirm them, and to establish himself in the public mind as the peculiar favourite of heaven, destined to retrieve the misfortunes of his family, and to extend the renown of his country<sup>\*\*</sup>. His first exploit was the capture of New Carthage; and success is said thenceforward to have attended him for the space of ten years, till his victory over Hannibal in Africa gloriously terminated the war.

Yet, this account is not altogether consistent with those facts which the partiality of Roman historians could not venture to dissemble. Hannibal, disappointed in his succours from Carthage, and deceived in those promised from king Philip, looked with anxious expectation towards his brother Asdrubal, in Spain. For seven years Asdrubal was prevented from gratifying his hopes by the brothers Publius and Cneius; but in the fourth year after the son of Publius had assumed

<sup>\*</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxv. c. 37, & seq.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxvi. c. 18. & seq.

the command, Asdrubal marched through Gaul into Italy, and having passed the Po and the Rubicon, was totally defeated and slain on the Metaurus, in Umbria, by the consuls Livius and Nero. This decisive defeat was the work chiefly of Nero. He had been opposing Hannibal in Apulia, when Asdrubal's letters, desiring Hannibal to meet him in Umbria, were intercepted: Nero left his camp with a select detachment; marched northward two hundred and fifty miles along the sea coast, and by a seasonable junction with his colleague, defeated Asdrubal in the Metaurus, before Hannibal was apprised of the departure of 6,000 foot and 1,000 horse from lines opposite to his own. Nero marched back into Apulia, carrying with him the terror of a battle as bloody as that of Cannæ. At sight of his brother Asdrubal's head, Hannibal acknowledged with a sigh the sad destiny of Carthage. He quickly moved into the country of the Brutii, and contracted the few confederates that remained to him into that remote corner, where only he was still able to protect them<sup>90</sup>.

After the departure of Asdrubal from Spain, Scipio defeated four divisions of the Carthaginians, and successively expelled them from that country. The last division left it under Mago<sup>91</sup>, also son to Hamilcar, and not unworthy of his father and brothers. He escaped to the Balearic isles, from thence sailed to Genoa, and collected an army of Gauls and Ligurians, with whom, while he fought the pretor Quintius Varius near Milan, he was badly wounded and obliged to retreat to the sea-coast. In the bay of Genoa, he found some Carthaginian vessels bringing orders both to himself and to Hannibal, that they should return to the defence of their country<sup>92</sup>. The pressing necessities of Carthage required indeed this measure. Scipio, after driving the enemy from Spain, had been elected consul, and sailed into Sicily with Africa for his province<sup>93</sup>. His lieutenant Lælius had been sent to ravage the coast of Carthage, and to excite defection among the allies or subjects of that state: Masinissa the

Scipio's victories in Spain. He prepares to pass into Africa. Olymp. cxliiii. 4. B. C. 205.

Polybius, l. xi. c. 7. l. xv. c. 1. Tit. l. xxvii. c. 41. & seq.  
Tit. Liv. l. xxviii. c. 13.

<sup>90</sup> Polybius, l. xiv. c. 9. Tit. Liv. l. xxx. c. 18, 19.

<sup>91</sup> Id. l. xxviii. c. 45.



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S. Hist. l. i.

Olymp.

cxliv. 1.

B. C. 204.

Numidian, having already, amidst the misfortunes of the Carthaginians, revolted to Scipio in Spain. After employing the whole year of his consulship in preparations, wonderfully facilitated by the alacrity of all ranks of men both in Sicily and Italy, Scipio, with 400 transports, escorted by 50 gallies, had passed into Africa<sup>27</sup>. The number of his forces is uncertain, but its strength far surpassed any thing that could be brought against it. He was master of all the open country: he besieged Tunes and Utica, bastions, as it were, on either side of Carthage: Syphax<sup>28</sup>, rival to Masinissa, was his prisoner; and the flower of the Numidians, long the best auxiliaries to Carthage, now received orders from the proconsul.

Hannibal comes to the defence of Carthage.

His measures.

Olymp.

cxliv. 2.

B. C. 203.

Under these circumstances, Hannibal arrived at Hadrumetum<sup>29</sup>, eighty miles south of Tunes. His brother Mago, while on the voyage homeward, died at sea of his wound. Hannibal, finding the country round Carthage occupied by enemies, marched westward towards the river Bagradas. Scipio, apprised of his arrival, did not think it expedient to prosecute his attack against places on the sea coast. He therefore proceeded southward to offer battle to the enemy, now encamped near Zama, about sixty miles inland from Hadrumetum. By this time Hannibal had drawn to him the remains of vanquished armies, and all the forces that could be spared from any of the besieged cities. Besides his veterans from Italy, whose horses however he was obliged to leave behind him for want of transports, his standard was followed by that wide variety of nations, which distinguished the service of a people supplied chiefly by mercenaries. They consisted of Gauls, Ligurians, Spaniards, Moors, and tribes of Numidians hostile to Masinissa<sup>30</sup>. Throughout the whole of the present war, the Carthaginians had avoided to meet the Romans at sea. Their cowardice on this element, long propitious to their ancestors, prevented all co-operation between them and

<sup>27</sup> Id. l. xxix. c. 24, & seq.<sup>28</sup> He was king of the Massylians; Masinissa, of the Massylians. Conf. Tit. Liv.

xxviii. 17. xxix. 32. xxx. 11.

<sup>29</sup> Polybius, l. xv. c. 5.<sup>30</sup> Ibid. c. 3.

their

their ally Philip of Macedon. But Philip, having now with much labour created a fleet of his own, had sent to them 4,000 Macedonians. This reinforcement, however, which afterwards cost Philip so dear, left them far inferior to the enemy in strength as well as spirit. While Scipio was on the march to Zama, Hannibal dispatched three spies, who were detected and brought to the Roman camp. The general desired every thing to be shewn to them at much leisure, and then dismissed them under a safe conduct to make report to their employer<sup>97</sup>. The generosity of this proceeding made Hannibal desire a conference. Scipio consented; and for this purpose drew nearer the enemy, to a place called Nadagara<sup>98</sup>, a very advantageous post, and having water at command. Hannibal brought his army within three miles of him, and encamped on a hill, strong and otherwise convenient, but too far removed from water<sup>99</sup>. The conference was not productive of any good effect; and both parties prepared for battle on the adjacent plain.

Hannibal, inferior in other respects, had above eighty elephants, which he placed in his van, that their resistless strength and wild impetuous movements might disturb the Roman ranks. His army was drawn up in three lines, with cavalry, in which he was weak, on the wings. The first line contained the different bodies of mercenaries above enumerated; the second consisted of the domestic forces of Carthage; the third, in which he chiefly confided, of the veterans brought with him from Italy<sup>100</sup>. Scipio's men also formed in three lines; the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii: his cavalry was disposed on the wings; the right commanded by Masinissa, the left by Laelius. But in order to provide against any confusion in his order of battle, that might be occasioned by the enemy's elephants, he did not draw up his van in a full line, but separated its cohorts at

Battle of  
Zama.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 3.  
B. C. 202.

<sup>97</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxx. c. 29.

<sup>98</sup> Otherwise called Naraggara.

<sup>99</sup> Polyb. l. xv. c. 6.

<sup>100</sup> Polyb. l. xv. c. 8. & seq.

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wide intervals from each other<sup>101</sup>; his second and third lines were also provided with intervals corresponding with those in the front of the army. His men being thus arranged, not according to the chequer order<sup>102</sup> usual with the Romans, but by rank and file, in direct back-standing, the elephants, he expected, would find their way, without doing much harm, through the avenues left open for them. The battle began by desultory skirmishes of Numidian horsemen. The elephants were then brought forward, and being galled and enraged by the Velites, disposed in the intervals of the cohorts, either pursued them to the rear of the Roman army, or were carried towards the extremities of their own line, where they produced much disorder among the Carthaginian cavalry. At this crisis, Masinissa and Lælius made their attack, and put to rout the squadrons to which they were respectively opposed. Meanwhile Hannibal brought forward his first and second lines. The Romans advanced slowly and silently to meet them. Within a due distance, both armies raised a shout; that, on the side of the Carthaginians, confused and heterogeneous; that of the Romans in one according voice, and therefore louder and more terrible. The mercenaries, however, fought strenuously, but entirely unaided by the Carthaginians behind them, whereas the Principes of the Romans were always at hand, to support their Hastati, or first ranks. The mercenaries, being thus obliged to give way, turned their arms on the Carthaginians, by whose cowardice they had been so shamefully deserted. The Carthaginians, now driven to despair, were seized with a frantic rage, and exerted themselves with a boldness, or rather ferocity, altogether unusual to them, both against their own mercenaries and the

<sup>101</sup> Non confertas autem cohortes ante sua quamque signa instruebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se distantes, ut esset spatium, quo elephanti hostium accepti nihil ordines turbarent. Tit. Liv. xxx. 33.

<sup>102</sup> Καθὰ πτερ εὖρος ἡ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. (Polyb. xv. c. 9.) may be referred either to the chequer order of maniples or of soldiers. I take it in the latter sense, for the reasons given above. C. xii. p. 673—676.

Romans. At length, repelled by superior force, they hoped to be received into the line of veterans which Hannibal had kept in reserve; but as they approached, the veterans presented to them the points of their spears, so that only a feeble remnant was saved by flying to the wings. Scipio, on this occasion, as the ground, slippery with mud and gore, was interrupted with broken armour and heaps of carcases, and his ranks considerably disordered, commanded his *Haftati* to close to the centre, and his *Principes* and *Triarii* to gain the flanks, and form with the *Haftati* in one continued line. In this order, an obstinate battle began against Hannibal's veterans, the issue of which was not decided until the return of *Masinissa* and *Lælius*, who having defeated and dispersed the enemy's cavalry, now assailed in flank and rear, and totally destroyed Hannibal's only remaining resource<sup>103</sup>. He escaped with a few horsemen to *Hadrumentum*, and being recalled to Carthage, declared the war at an end.

The Carthaginians consented to every condition imposed on them. They had lost the possession, and now abandoned all right to Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, or any other foreign conquest. Even on their own continent, they bound themselves by oaths and hostages not to take arms without permission from the Romans. They surrendered all their galleys, ten only excepted; and had the mortification to see 500 armed vessels burnt by Scipio's order. By a clause of far less importance, they surrendered also all their elephants, and promised no longer to train for war any of those fierce animals: they agreed at the same time to pay 10,000 talents, at the rate of 200 talents yearly. The first payment being immediately exacted, the senate of Carthage was in tears. Hannibal laughed aloud; and being reproved for his indecency, maintained that there could not be any thing more laughable, than the absurdity of men who bewailed the loss of their money, more than that of their ships, arms, and independence<sup>104</sup>.

Peace—its  
conditions.

<sup>103</sup> Polybius, lxx. c. 9—16.

<sup>104</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxx. c. 44.



## CHAPTER XVII.

*The Etolians and Acarnanians endeavour respectively to gain the Lacedæmonians.—Manly Resolution of the Acarnanians saves their Country.—Philip defeats the Proconsul Sulpicius.—His Bravery in the Battle of Elis.—False Report of his Death.—Philopæmen's Return to Achaia.—His Character and Victories.—Philip's Exertions against the Romans and King Attalus.—Disappointed by the Carthaginians.—Machanidas Tyrant of Sparta.—Battle of Mantinea.—Prosperity of the Achæan League.—Philip's Alliance with Antiochus.—Great Prospects in the East.—Sea-fight off Casysté.—Philip's Conquests in Caria.—Destruction of Abydos.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

Transition to the events in Greece, contemporary with the second Punic war.

THE transactions of the Greeks, contemporary with the Hannibalic war, are too important to be considered as an under-plot. Philip, the chief enemy to Rome beyond the Adriatic, light and inconsiderate as he was, excites interest by his activity and spirit. His allies, the Achæans, boasted in Philopæmen a name not eclipsed by that of Marcellus or Scipio. Philip's first opponents, the Etolians, Elians, and Lacedæmonians, presented even in those latter times of Greece, many singular and momentous scenes, flowing from indelible peculiarities in their national manners; and the adversaries whom his injustice afterwards stirred up against him, I mean Attalus and the Rhodians, enjoyed solid and fair pre-eminences, surpassing the blood-stained pomp of mere military triumphs. This portion of history forms, besides, a natural prelude to the first Macedonian war, from the commencement of which, Rome was engaged in a perpetual series of hostilities or negotiations with the different mem-

\* Ο Απιδιακος πολεμος. Polyb. i. 3. ii. 37. iii. 1. vi. 51. & Appian. Απιδιακη. l. vii. p. 228.