

bers of that empire, until, in the space of thirty-four years, she gained a decided ascendancy over the nations on this side the Euphrates; and having first taught them to obey her as allies, in the course of the following century reduced the whole of them into dependent provinces, or tributary kingdoms.

The alliance that had been concluded between the Romans and Etolians, opened to the former, the convenient harbour of Naupactus, on the Corinthian gulph. Hostilities commenced from this quarter, by taking Ceneadæ in Acarnania, and Anticyra in Locris. The houses and lands, according to a compact subsisting between the confederates, became the property of the Etolians: all things moveable, including the persons of the vanquished, were seized as booty by the Romans.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile the Acarnanians sent an embassy to Lacedæmon, in hopes of preventing that state from co-operating with barbarous invaders. The Etolians sent to the same place to confirm the Lacedæmonians in their engagements. Both ambassadors, Chlainias on the part of the Etolians, and Lyciscus on that of the Acarnanians, pleaded at great length before the Lacedæmonian assembly; and, in their speeches, gave opposite and equally unfair views of Grecian history. According to the Etolian, the kings of Macedon, from Philip, the father of Alexander, downwards, had always been the worst foes to Greece; hostile to its liberty and glory, and cruel persecutors of every citizen zealous to maintain these enjoyments. The forbearance of Antigonus Doson, in sparing the freedom, and even the dignity of Sparta, when conquered in a just war, Chlainias ascribed to motives altogether unworthy of so excellent a prince; "but whatever might be thought by others of that specious transaction, the Lacedæmonians had clearly shewn that they were not its dupes, since they had taken arms against the successor of Antigonus in the social war. After that time, nothing surely had happened that could inspire them with more favourable dispositions towards

The Acarnanians and Etolians endeavour respectively to gain the Lacedæmonians.

Olymp. cxlii. 2.  
B. C. 211.

They plead their respective causes before the Lacedæmonian assembly.

Polybius, l. xi. c. 6. Tit. Liv. l. xxv. c. 24.

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Macedon." Lyciscus replied ably and warmly, by contrasting the glorious exploits of Philip and his immortal son, with the mean predatory expeditions of the Etolians. He passed slightly over the reigns of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas, but dwelt with complacency on the mildness and magnanimity of Antigonus Doson, to whom the Spartans owed the privilege, now exercised by them, of holding their assemblies. Philip, the present king, he observed, had been desirous of treading in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor; it was matter of deep regret, that the Lacedæmonians had ever opposed his views; but though they had done this formerly, they ought not again to repeat and aggravate their error; for the circumstances were greatly changed by the confederacy of the Etolians with a more formidable foreign enemy, now lowering like a cloud in the west; who would first eclipse Macedon, but, ere long, would darken all Greece. He adjured the Lacedæmonians, by the glorious death of Leonidas, and by the sportive magnanimity of their ancestors, who buried the Persian ambassadors in a well, when they came to demand earth and water, not to take party with the Etolians and the barbarous invaders by whom they were abetted<sup>1</sup>. We are not informed of the immediate decision of the assembly; but the Lacedæmonians, shortly afterwards, embraced the worst resolution, and took the field to maintain it, under the direction of Machanidas, an able and active tyrant.

Manly resolutions of the Acarnanians, by which they save their country.  
Olymp. cxlii 2.  
B. C. 211.

The inroads to which Macedon was always liable on its northern frontier, having recalled Philip to the defence of his kingdom, the Etolians determined to seize the opportunity of prosecuting their success in Acarnania. Their preparations greatly alarmed the Acarnanians, who knew what they had to expect from the jealousy of the worst of neighbours, and the rage of the fiercest of enemies. Successive messengers were sent to hasten Philip's return: application was made to the Achæans and Epirots; but the dreadful appre-

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, l. ix. c. 28, and seqq.

hensions of the Acarnanians appeared chiefly in the domestic measures immediately adopted by them. They sent their women, children, and helpless old men to neighbouring strongholds in Epirus. All males in their country, from the age of fifteen to sixty, were commanded to take arms, and to bind themselves by oath, either to conquer or die. The most horrible imprecations were denounced against all who shunned the enemy, and all who might be tempted, by any false notions of humanity, to receive such cowards into their communion. This firm decree, together with the arrival of Philip in Thessaly, prevented, for the present, the Etolian invasion <sup>4</sup>.

To punish that people for the terror with which they had alarmed antient and most faithful allies to his family, Philip soon after formed the siege of Echinus, a city on the Malian gulph. The place was well fortified, and contained a considerable garrison; with which the Romans co-operated by sea, and Dorimachus, the Etolian pretor, by land. But Philip repelled these enemies from his camp, and prosecuted the siege in a manner worthy of the descendant of Poliorcetes. His engines threw stones of thirty and sixty pounds weight, until the besieged were driven from their works, and compelled, in hopes of saving their lives, to surrender at discretion <sup>5</sup>.

Besides gratifying his passion for sieges, Philip had another motive for occupying Echinus. From the moment that he began to form a naval force, Attalus, king of Pergamus, naturally became his rival. That prince, who in an able reign of thirty years had lost no opportunity of augmenting his diminutive territories, was warmly courted by the Etolians, and invested by them with the pretorship, in conjunction with their countryman Pyrrhias, who, in the absence of his royal colleague, exercised alone the functions of that office. By seizing the harbour of Echinus, directly opposite to the coast of Pergamus, and in the neighbourhood of other Etolian strongholds. Attalus would have been in a condition powerfully to

Philip takes  
Echinus.

Progress of  
Attalus king  
of Perga-  
mus.  
Olymp.  
cxlii. 3.  
B. C. 210.

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, l. ix. c. 40. Conf. xvi. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Polyb. ix. 41.

assist

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assist his new allies. Shortly afterwards, he sailed for that purpose to Ægina, and meanwhile aided them with some forces in Thessaly; the proconsul Sulpicius, who had succeeded Valerius in the command of the Roman fleet, sent them also a thousand of his men, as an earnest of more effectual succour.

Philip's success against the Etolians and Romans.  
Olymp. cxliii 1.  
B.C. 208.

Against Pyrrhias the Etolian pretor, thus reinforced by splendid allies, Philip fought successfully in Thessaly, until he drove his enemies from the field, and compelled them to take refuge within the strong walls of Lamia. From thence, for the sake of foraging, he proceeded to Phalara, on the Malian gulph, and was there met by the same ambassadors from Rhodes and Egypt, who had been so zealous in mediating the former peace. Philip assured them, that he would be always willing to treat on reasonable terms. He named a time when an assembly of the Achæans would meet to hear the proposals of their enemies; and immediately granted a month's truce to the Etolians. As he apprehended that Attalus might land on Eubœa, he reinforced his garrisons in that island, and proceeded southward with his cavalry and light infantry to Argos, that republic having chosen him to preside in their Heræan and Nemean games. After solemnising the first of these festivals, he proceeded to the Achæan assembly at Ægium. The Rhodians and Egyptians were present; they employed the same arguments in favour of peace that they had urged on former occasions; but the Etolians having just learned, that Attalus and the Romans had respectively sailed to Ægina and Naupactus, became more intractable than ever. Philip spurned their unwarrantable demands, especially after the recent success of his arms, and rejoiced in an opportunity of throwing on them, in presence of the ambassadors, the whole odium of the war. Having left part of his army to protect the Achæans, threatened on one side by the Etolians, and on the other by Machanidas tyrant of Sparta, he dissolved the assembly of Ægium, and returned to Argos, to celebrate the Nemean games; but that pleasing solemnity

was

was quickly interrupted by intelligence that the proconsul Sulpicius had sailed from Naupactus, and was committing dreadful ravages in the fertile territory <sup>6</sup> between Corinth and Sicyon. Philip hastened with his cavalry to oppose him, ordering his infantry to follow with all possible expedition. Sulpicius was attacked, defeated, and driven disgracefully to his ships <sup>7</sup>.

The fame of this exploit brightened the remainder of the festivity, during which Philip divested himself of his diadem and purple, and mingled in every scene of amusement with the familiarity and freedom of a private citizen. But unfortunately, this vain shew of equality was accompanied by the worst acts that can be sanctioned by power. The tyrant added murder to adultery in the case of the younger Aratus, whom he called his friend; he gave unrestrained career to his fierce <sup>8</sup> voluptuousness at Argos, to the disgrace and affliction of that ancient commonwealth, from which the kings of Macedon boasted their descent.

His profligacy during the Nemean games.

The games had no sooner terminated, than Philip undertook an expedition against the Elians, steady allies to the Etolians, and whose capital, Elis, was actually garrisoned by troops of that nation. He marched against the city in hopes of provoking to battle a people highly susceptible of irritation. He was not disappointed in this particular; but felt no small surprize at beholding Roman arms and standards glittering amidst the ranks of the Elians and Etolians. The proconsul Sulpicius had sailed to Cyllenè, and secretly thrown himself into Elis with four thousand soldiers. Philip would have declined the engagement, but it was no longer time to retreat either with honour or safety. He fought bravely at the head of his cavalry, till his horse was killed by a pilum, and then continued to combat on foot amidst the hostile squadrons, until he received pro-

His campaign in Elis, and personal bravery. Olymp. cxliiii. 1. B. C. 208.

<sup>6</sup> Agrum nobilissimæ fertilitatis. Tit. Liv. l. xxvii. c. 31.

<sup>7</sup> Id. ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, l. x. c. 26. Conf. Tit. Liv. l. xxvii. c. 31. & Plutarch in Arato.

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tection from his men, and, being placed on another horse, was carried from the field. The advantage gained over him could not have been considerable, since he encamped at the distance of only five miles from Elis, and next day committed great depredations<sup>9</sup> on the territory.

False report  
of his death.  
Invasion  
of Macedon.  
Olymp.  
cxliiii. 1.  
B. C. 208.

Soon afterwards, most alarming news were brought to him from Macedon. A report of his death being credited among the Barbarians, his northern and western frontiers were a prey to invaders. The false rumour arose from an incident in the late expedition, in which he had defeated the Romans near Sicyon, and driven them disgracefully to their ships. The impetuosity of his horse, carrying him against a tree, one of the wings of his helmet was broken off in the shock. The fragment, adorned with the king's arms, had been carried to Scerdilaidas in Illyricum; and through the artifices of that adversary, operating on gross ignorance, easily converted into a sure proof of the king's death, and a resistless excitement to the invasion of his dominions. Philip flew to their defence, having left little more than two thousand men for the protection of his allies<sup>10</sup>.

Philopœmen  
returns from  
Crete, and is  
entrusted  
with the  
command of  
the Achæan  
cavalry.

His sudden departure, at this crisis of the war, might have been fatal to the Achæans, had not the military arrangements of that people lately undergone an important change. Cycliadas, then pretor, was not distinguished by any pre-eminence of courage or ability; but the command of the horse, which was the second place in the army, had been conferred on Philopœmen, whose presence of mind and penetration, a dozen years before this period, had decided the famous battle of Sellasia. During this long interval, he had resided chiefly in Crete, and taken share in the incessant wars between the petty states in that island, which served as a nursery of men fertile in resources and bold in stratagem, whom we continually meet with fighting, on opposite sides, in all the wars of Alexander's successors. Philopœmen had learned every thing from the Cretans but their dis-

<sup>9</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxvii. c. 32.

<sup>10</sup> Id. *ibid.*

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His proceedings for improving it. Olymp. cxlii. 4. B. C. 209.

honest craft. His œconomy despised money, his spirit detested a lie; few loved their country more warmly, and fewer in time of war were better qualified to serve it. As a soldier, he united theory with practice. The different treatises on tacticks were familiar to him; but he delighted, above all, in the military historians of Alexander. That great conqueror, he perceived, had rendered the phalanx, which was imperfect in itself, a complete and resistleless instrument of war, by the improvement of its accompanying cavalry. Philopœmen set himself to imitate this accomplished model, and to infuse new emulation and energy into the corps which he commanded. The fame which he had acquired before leaving Peloponnesus, made him the frequent subject of discourse among his countrymen. His return, which had been long looked for, was a matter of public joy. He was received with a degree of fond partiality bordering on enthusiasm; and the qualities of his mind and body were peculiarly well calculated for confirming this disposition in his favour. In the vigour of manhood, his well adjusted frame displayed the utmost measure of strength that is consistent with agility. Frankness, simplicity, and dignity, were announced in his aspect; and with the skill of a great general, continual exercise in arms had enabled him to combine in real war such readiness and dexterity, as surpassed the most surprizing feats exhibited at the martial sports of Olympia. The authority acquired by his talents was farther upheld by his prudence: he was a man of few words; every opinion that he gave was well weighed; and every promise that he made might be firmly relied on. Such was Philopœmen, and such the character which he was zealous to stamp on his followers. The expensive finery, which the young Achæans had formerly employed about their dress and personal accommodations, he taught them to confine solely in future to their

*Polihim.* l. x. c. 25. l. xi. c. 8. & seq. Tit. Liv. l. xxxv. c. 28. & Plutarch in Philopœmen.

"He considered long speeches as the

greatest impediment to affairs, remembering the answer of the Athenian when asked what had ruined his republic: "provenere adolescentuli oratores." Id. *ibid.*

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horses and armour: their vanity itself was thus enlisted in the service of their country; and through the martial ardour which he inspired, his squadrons, in the course of a few months, were brought to perform the most intricate evolutions with such precision, that they seemed to be harmonised into a single body actuated by a single mind<sup>1</sup>.

His victories  
over the  
Elians and  
Etolians.  
Olymp.  
cxliii. 1.  
B. C. 208.

Shortly after the departure of Philip from Pelopponnesus, the Achæans were called to defend their possessions and their freedom against the Etolians and Elians. They defeated the enemy in two great battles, the description of which has not come down to us. The first was fought on the banks of the river Larissus, which separates Elis from Achaia. In this action, Philopœmen slew with his own hand Demophantus who commanded the enemy's cavalry, and who had advanced before the ranks to challenge him to single combat. The second victory, still more important, was gained in the neighbourhood of Messenè<sup>2</sup>.

Philip's ex-  
ertions a-  
gainst the  
Romans and  
their allies.  
Olymp.  
cxliii. 2.  
B. C. 207.

Philip, having repelled the Barbarians from his northern frontier, descended early in the spring to Demetrias in Thessaly. The Achæans, indeed, had, through the abilities of Philopœmen, prevailed over the enemy in Pelopponnesus; but the allies beyond the Isthmus, the Acarnanians Phocians Thessalians, as well as the islands of Eubœa and Peparathus, were threatened not only by the Etolians by land, but by the proconsul Sulpicius by sea, who, together with king Attalus and their combined fleets, had wintered at Ægina to the annoyance and impoverishment of that small island, in itself a mere rock in the Saronic gulph, but hitherto regarded as a wonder of industry and opulence. Philip threw fresh garrisons into the places on the coast most likely to be attacked, and, that he might the more seasonably resist the enemy's descents, caused provisions to be made for signals by fire<sup>3</sup> on the mountains of Phocis, in Peparathus, and

<sup>1</sup> Conf. Plutarch in Philop. & Polyb. l. xi. c. 8. & seq.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch in Philopœm.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius does not explain these signals

particularly, but nothing can surpass in simplicity the mode of making signals by fire proposed by himself, l. x. c. 43—46.

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His signals  
by fire.

in Eubœa. He himself erected a signal-house to correspond with them, on mount Tifæus in Thessaly. This precaution saved not Oreum in Eubœa, which Plator, its governor, treacherously surrendered to the Romans; but it enabled Philip seasonably to reinforce the more important city Chalcis. Through the same expedient, he was apprised that Attalus had made a predatory descent on Opus; he flew thither in great haste, and very narrowly failed in surprising him<sup>16</sup>. The Macedonians avenged the insult to Opus, by taking some Etolian strongholds in its neighbourhood. Philip's fleet being still imperfectly equipped, he ventured not to cope with the enemy by sea, but made ample amends by land, though fortune often intercepted the fruits of his diligence. It was thus, when the Etolians held a council at Heraclæa Trachinia in order to deliberate with their Roman and Pergamenian allies, that, after a march of extraordinary celerity, he was disappointed by a few hours in seizing his adversaries in full congress. He was anticipated by nearly as short an interval, in an hasty expedition against Machanidas tyrant of Lacedæmon, who, after long and strenuous preparations, had taken the field in Peloponnesus. His affairs, however, were on the whole prosperous, especially as Attalus had crossed into Asia through fear of his neighbour Prusias I. of Bithynia, and the Roman fleet had also returned to Ægina. About this time, Philip repaired to Ægium to meet the Achæan deputies. He expected also to find in that harbour a Carthaginian squadron, which, being joined to the ships now equipped by himself, would have enabled him to try a sea-fight with the Romans. But the Carthaginians, having learned that Attalus and Sulpicius had at once set sail, feared to be intercepted by them in the Corinthian gulph. They quitted, therefore, that inland sea, and proceeded to the friendly harbours of Acarnania.

Disappointed in his hopes from a Carthaginian fleet. Olymp. cxliii. 2. B. C. 207.

This disappointment hindered not Philip from addressing the Achæans in a speech full of alacrity and hope. He attested gods

His speech to the Achæan

<sup>16</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxviii. c. 7.

and

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deputies.

Olymp.

cxliii. 2.

B. C. 207.

and men, that his vigilance had watched and endeavoured to turn to profit every circumstance of time or place; and that he had spared no march, however fatiguing, that promised to bring him to action with the enemy. But the swiftness of their flight had, hitherto, eluded his own diligence in pursuit. They thus acknowledged, however, that to be defeated they needed only to be encountered. He trusted that the time was at hand, when the event itself would be as fatal to them, as their apprehensions of it were fearful".

His Thra-  
cian and  
Illyrian war.

Shortly after the dissolution of this assembly, Philip's affairs recalled him to Macedon. But with the ships already collected by him, he first made a predatory expedition across the Corinthian gulph to the coast of Etolia. The spoil was sent to Ægium under Nicias the Achæan pretor. Philip sailed to Corinth, and sending his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, visited Eubœa to reward the fidelity of Chalcis, and punish the cowardice of Oreum. At his return to Macedon, he caused the keels of an hundred ships of war to be laid at Cassandria. While this preparation was making against Attalus and the Romans, he marched to chastise the Thracian and Illyrian tribes most troublesome on his mountainous frontier.

Preparations  
for the battle  
of Mantinea.

While Philip was detained in this barbarous warfare, the Achæans were left to contend, single-handed, in Peloponnesus, against the Etolians, Elians, Messenians; above all, the Lacedæmonians invigorated by the dreadful energies of Machanidas their fierce military tyrant. Through arts similar to those of Dionysius and Agathocles, Machanidas now grasped in his own hand the resources of the public and of each individual; he had collected large bodies of mercenaries, and provided vast trains of catapults, to be used in the field as well as in sieges. The first stages of the campaign are not described to us; history records only its closing scene, the death of the tyrant and the glory of Philopœmen in the second " battle of Mantinea.

" Tit. Liv. l. xxviii. c. 8.

a hundred and fifty-five years before. See

" The first was fought by Epaminondas History of Ancient Greece, c. xviii.

That

That general had conducted thither almost the whole domestic troops of the Achæans, infantry and cavalry; together with a large body of mercenaries consisting in light armed foot, and that kind of desultory horse called Tarentines<sup>1</sup>, from the nature of their arms and disposition. Machanidas and the Spartans took post first at Tegea, also a city of Arcadia about twelve miles directly south of Mantinæa, and nearly at an equal distance from the Lacedæmonian frontier. In the hopes of either taking Mantinæa, or of bringing Philopœmen to a decisive engagement in its defence, the tyrant marched at day-break in three columns, the phalanx headed by himself in the middle, and his light armed troops and mercenaries on either side of it, and parallel to each other. The carriages bearing his engines followed behind. In the road to Mantinæa, and about a mile from its walls, there was a ravine or natural ditch, bordering a plain before the city, about two miles broad, and terminating on either hand in hills; those on the east were adorned by a temple of Neptune. Upon the enemy's approach, Philopœmen's troops issued from three gates of Mantinæa to occupy the borders of the ravine. His Tarentines and light infantry advanced along the road leading to the temple of Neptune, and occupied the foot of the hills and partly the hills themselves, near the eastern extremity of the plain. Before these troops, he posted the targeteers and Illyrians. The phalanx followed on the right of the targeteers, forming the centre of the army. The Achæan cavalry composed the right wing. Machanidas, as he advanced, made a show of attacking this right wing at the head of his column; but before he had proceeded beyond the point where it would have been no longer safe in presence of an enemy to change his line of march into an order of battle, his light troops and mer-

<sup>1</sup> These Tarentines belonged not to Tarentum in Italy, a republic long dissolved in luxury, and 60 years before this time, deprived of liberty. The "Tarentini" denoted a particular kind of troops, not a par-

ticular people; from which the verb *ταρακτινίζω*, as Eustathius observes, *ἐλθόντο τοῦ τῆς ἀπολλωνίου καὶ αἱ μάχαι χρησόμενοι ἐκπληκτικῶν πραιποσίτοις*. Eustath. in Dionys. Perieget.

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Second battle of Mantinea.  
Olymp. cxliii. 2.  
B. C. 207.

cenaries on the right posted themselves, by a rapid movement, opposite to those of Philopœmen; at the same time the phalanx, marching by its flank, seized the ground facing the phalanx of the enemy; and the cavalry on the left appeared in opposition to the right wing of the Achæans; so that the two armies were now drawn up parallel to each other on opposite sides of the ravine<sup>20</sup>.

When things were in this posture, Machanidas' line at once opened in various parts, through which issued his vast train of catapults, with men dextrous in working them. Philopœmen then perceived that his adversary had been well aware of the obstacle between the two armies, and meant not to pass it until he had thrown the Achæans into confusion by that unusual mode of war, of which Alexander had made such effectual use against the Thracians in passing the Danube, and against the Scythians in passing the Iaxartes<sup>21</sup>. To interrupt the play of the enemy's machines, Philopœmen darted across the ravine at the head of his swift Tarentines; they were followed by his light infantry. Machanidas opposed these troops by his own mercenaries, consisting also of the same kind of forces. A fierce and obstinate conflict ensued, in which, as had often happened in similar occasions, the mercenaries of the tyrant defeated those of the republic<sup>22</sup>; and Machanidas, at the head of the victors, pursued the flying enemy to the gates of Mantinea. Philopœmen, after vainly attempting to restrain their flight, took post at the head of his phalanx, which had been drawn up in two lines, divided by intervals into sections of sixteen files each, and the intervals of the second line corresponding with the sections of the foremost. By a rapid movement to the left, he filled up with the nearest of these sections, the space left empty by the flight of his mercena-

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, l. xi. c. 11<sup>2</sup>—18.

<sup>21</sup> Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. iv. c. 4.

<sup>22</sup> There are clear reasons according to Polybius, why this should often be the case. The mercenaries of tyrants are completely

ruined by defeat: the mercenaries of republics may often be ruined by too decided a victory, since they are employed only through necessity. l. xi. c. 13.

ries, at the same time ordering Polybius<sup>31</sup>, uncle to the historian of that name, to collect as many of the ~~latter~~ <sup>latter</sup> as had not been carried along in the route, and therewith to strengthen his left. By this seasonable movement, Philopœmen gained the advantage which Machanidas had rashly thrown away. He had it in his power to attack the Lacedæmonians in flank, while they advanced impetuously, elated with the success of their mercenaries. They were not stopped by the ravine, whose sides were of an easy ascent, unobstructed either by brushwood or water; and their emergence from this hollow was the critical moment, watched by Philopœmen, for charging them. The advantage of the ground decided the battle; many Lacedæmonians fell by the well-levelled points of the Achæan spears; and many perished in the ditch, trampled down by each other. The same skillful evolution, which enabled Philopœmen to out-flank the enemy, intercepted the junction of Machanidas with his disbanded infantry. When the tyrant came back from his ill-judged pursuit, he was forsaken by all but two horsemen, with whom he rode furiously along the ravine, hoping in some part to force his passage. Philopœmen espied him at a distance, for he was conspicuous from his purple and the trappings of his horse, and outstripping him in a parallel course on the opposite bank, arrested him as he sprung over the ravine, with the but end of his spear, and then turning the weapon, stabbed him with its point; thus adorning his victory by an exploit which illustrated the lessons of equestrian exercise in real action<sup>32</sup>. The Lacedæmonians lost above eight thousand men killed or taken. The city of Tegea, towards which the remainder fled, received promiscuously the fugitives and their pursuers, but readily submitted to the latter when they showed the bloody head of the

Its consequences.

<sup>31</sup> This famous battle was fought Olymp. cxliii. 2; and in the Olymp. cxlix. 4. that is, 26 years afterwards, Polybius the historian was too young for bearing public honours. Fragment. Legat. l. lvii. Notwithstanding which, the French translator by an elegant change

of persons in the narrative says, "Il m'ordonna aussi de rallier."

<sup>32</sup> Πληγὴν ἀλλήν ἐκ διαλήψεως. This last term, as we learn from Hesychius, is παλæstric: its import is not clearly explained.

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tyrant. The Achæans, shortly after, encamped on the banks of the Eurotas, and ravaged, without opposition, the richest districts in Laconia. Except the single city of Sparta, the whole country lay at their mercy. Sparta, which had long boasted her contempt for walls, now owed her safety to these defences, which had been raised and strengthened by successive usurpers; and which, on this occasion, enabled Nabis, a tyrant more ruthless than Machanidas himself, to seize and long<sup>22</sup> wield his bloody sceptre.

Highest pro-  
sperity of the  
Achæan  
league.  
Olymp.  
cxliiii. 3, 4.  
B. C. 206—  
205.

Meanwhile, Philip was occupied on his northern frontier; and the Romans having to oppose both Hannibal and Hasdrubal in Italy, made but feeble efforts beyond the Hadriatic. Delivered at once from the presence of a formidable enemy and an overwhelming ally, the Achæans had free scope for displaying their prowess and love of liberty; for performing great achievements, and for acquiring the praise due to real merit. A republic, established on principles the most equitable and liberal, once more stood at the head of Greece, and produced a sort of after-spring in that country, not unworthy of the harvest of glory which had preceded. The Achæan league was in its highest bloom during the two years which followed the defeat of Machanidas. It had begun to flourish about forty years before that event, under the guidance of Aratus; and about the same space of time after Philopœmen's victory at Mantinea, Achæia and the rest of Greece were buried under the rigours of an eternal winter. As sameness of situation naturally brings back a similarity of manners and sentiments, the Achæans and their allies exhibited during this short period, the enthusiasm inspired by valour exerted in defence of those advantages which genuine freedom always carries in her train. Shortly after the destruction of an odious and fierce tyrant, the Achæan pretor joined in the celebration of the Nemean games, devoted equally to the display of bodily and mental acquirements. From directing the martial exercises of his companions, he

Fourteen years. Tit. Liv. Conf. l. xxix. c. 12. & l. xxxv. c. 35.

proceeded

proceeded to hear and judge the musical compositions, and happened to enter the theatre as Pylades, a favourite performer, sung the following lines from "the Persians" of Timotheus:

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'Tis he who makes our cities gay,  
And crowns them with bright liberty.

Instantly all eyes were turned towards Philopœmen<sup>26</sup>, and the voice of grateful admiration associated his renown with the kindred glories of Cimon and Miltiades.

When Philip returned into Greece, he found his Achæan allies every where triumphant, and the most inveterate of their enemies heartily tired of the war. For reasons, which will afterwards appear, he likewise wished for the termination of hostilities. A peace therefore was hastily concluded between himself and the Etolians. each party also contracting in the name of its confederates<sup>27</sup>. This negotiation was scarcely finished, when the Romans, who, for upwards of two years, had abandoned their allies beyond the Hadriatic, crossed that sea with thirty-five ships of war, carrying ten thousand infantry, and a thousand horse. The proconsul Sempronius, who commanded this armament, having learned with much indignation that the Etolians had adjusted their differences without consulting the Roman senate, sent his lieutenant Lætorius with nearly one-half of his forces to the Etolian harbour Naupactus, to examine correctly the state of affairs, and, if possible, to disturb the peace. Meanwhile the proconsul himself made a descent on the coast of Illyricum, and infested Philip's dependencies in that country. The king of Macedon hastened to the aid of his allies, and having obliged the Romans to shut themselves up in Apollonia, marched to that place, and endeavoured without effect to provoke the enemy to battle. For this purpose, he ravaged the Apollonian territory; but proceeded not to besiege the city, which would have been the work of time: his thoughts, besides being turned to peace, he wished not by destroying

Philip makes  
peace with  
the Etolians.  
Olymp.  
exliiii. 4.  
B. C. 205.

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch in Philopœm.

<sup>27</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxix. c. 12.

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And with  
the Romans.  
Olymp.  
cxlii. 4.  
B. C. 205.

Apolloniâ, to widen the breach between himself and the Romans; and render it altogether irreparable.

The Epirots, now sunk into weakness and cowardice by division into a number of petty states, chiefly dependent on Macedon, also laboured to terminate the war between Philip and Sempronius. The proconsul, when he perceived all his machinations for again involving the Etolians in the quarrel to be fruitless, and reflected on the maxim of the Romans, never to carry on war in any country, where they had not powerful and zealous allies, consented to an interview with the king in Phœnicè, a city of Epirus. Here a truce was concluded for two months: and articles of peace were proposed, subject to the approval or rejection of the Roman tribes, all of which unanimously accepted them. By this treaty<sup>28</sup> the Romans adjusted with Philip their interests in some obscure districts in Illyricum, and obtained security for their ally Pleuratus, now the greatest native prince in that country. In the same negotiation were included their confederates, Attalus king of Pergamus, Nabis tyrant of the Lacedæmonians; the republics of the Elians, Messenians, and Athenians. Philip also specified his allies as parties to the treaty; namely, Prusias king of Bithynia, his son-in-law: the Achæans, Bœotians, Thessalians, Acarnanians, and Epirots. None of these states, in order to obtain peace, made any sacrifice that has been deemed worthy of mention: the thoughts of the Romans were engrossed by the war with Carthage, and vast prospects in the East made Philip anxious to procure tranquillity in Greece.

Partition  
treaty be-  
tween Philip  
and Antio-  
chus against  
Ptolemy  
Epiphanes.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 2.  
B. C. 203.

Shortly before the termination of hostilities in the latter country, Antiochus had returned to Syria from his triumphant expedition into Upper Asia, and Ptolemy Philopator had closed his inglorious reign in Egypt, leaving for his successor a child only five years old. Antiochus and Philip were both in the vigour of life; their natural ambition was heightened by prosperity; Antiochus was at the head

<sup>28</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxix. c. 12.

of an army supposed the greatest in the world, and Philip had by this time equipped a very considerable fleet. It consisted of about two hundred sail, and contained many vessels of such magnitude that trireme galleys were scarcely thought worthy to fight in his line. Between princes thus prepared for action, and devoid of all scruples to restrain their rapacity, an alliance was formed for invading by sea and land the dominions of young Ptolemy, afterwards surnamed Epiphanes, and for guaranteeing to each other their respective conquests<sup>29</sup>.

Conformably to this project, unsupported by any reason, uncloaked even by the slightest pretence, Antiochus entered Coele-Syria and Palestine; and, in the course of two campaigns, made himself master of these countries. Philip expelled the Egyptian garrisons from Ænos and Maronea, possessions long held by the Ptolemies on the southern coast of Thrace; seized Thasos, Samos, Chios, and the more considerable of the islands called Cyclades; conquered several seaports on the coast of Caria; and, in order to facilitate his designs against other maritime provinces in Asia Minor, directed his arms against the rich and well-fortified cities commanding the narrow seas which divide that peninsula from Europe. Lyfimachia, Chalcedon, and other places of less note successively submitted to his arms. He crossed the Propontis and laid siege to Cius<sup>30</sup>, situate at the eastern extremity of that sea; a commercial republic which had manfully maintained its independence against the kings of Bithynia, its nearest and most formidable neighbours. Here, he was resisted with a degree of obstinacy which he had not elsewhere encountered. The persevering valour of the Cians exasperated the fierceness of Philip. He disdained the intercession of neighbouring cities and isles in behalf of the besieged; to the interposition of the Rhodians, indeed,

Their success  
in this project.

His treacherous acquisition of Cius.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 2.  
B. C. 203.

<sup>29</sup> Polybius, l. xv. c. 20.

<sup>30</sup> The Propontis stretches two arms into Asia; the Cians bay deriving its name from Cius, and the bay of Astakus, distin-

guished by the city of that name and by Nicomedia, successive capitals of Bithynia. See above, vol. i. p. 570.

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whose fleet rendered them formidable, he paid more regard, sending to them assurances that, in compliance with their desire, he intended not to treat Cius with very uncommon severity. But while his ambassador harangued on this subject in the theatre at Rhodes, and expatiated before the assembled multitude on the magnanimity and mildness of his master, messengers arrived with the sad news, that Cius had been taken by Philip, every thing valuable in it plundered and the whole inhabitants either put to the sword, or dragged into captivity<sup>11</sup>.

Philip's war  
with Attalus  
and the  
Rhodians.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 3.  
B. C. 202.

From this time the Rhodians, perceiving that war was inevitable, would no longer hear the name of Philip mentioned in their assemblies. The kingdom of Pergamus lay near the scene of Philip's cruelties, and was provided with a considerable fleet in the harbour of Elæa. With equal spirit and good policy, Attalus, though far advanced in life, prepared to assume in person the command of his ships, and to join them with those of the Rhodians. But before this junction could take place, Philip, carried on by the impetuosity natural to his temper, invaded the territory of Pergamus. In this sudden irruption, he trusted to the assistance of Zeuxis, who governed Lydia for his ally Antiochus. Zeuxis, however, wished not to aggrandize Philip in the neighbourhood of his own satrapy, so that having fruitlessly assaulted the walls of Pergamus, the king of Macedonia returned to his ships, after he had heightened the odium in which he was held by burning the Nicephorium, a consecrated grove, containing many magnificent temples<sup>12</sup>. It had been planted by king Eumenes, the father of Attalus, to adorn the neighbourhood of his capital. Philip not only demolished the Pergamenian temples, but broke in pieces the vast blocks of marble composing them, that they might never be repaired. He also invaded the plain of Thebé, the site, anciently, of the opulent city of that name, celebrated by Homer, as "the sacred city of Aëtion"<sup>13</sup>, and justly so denominated,

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, l. xv. c. 22, 23.

<sup>12</sup> Id. l. xvi. c. i.

<sup>13</sup> Iliad. l. i. v. 366.

since

since it was one of those emporiums or staples, where, as formerly explained, trade was safely carried on under the protection of temples.

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By this aggression on the part of Philip, a war, chiefly maritime, commenced on the coasts and islands of Asia, while the Romans, intent on employing their main strength in Africa, were not at leisure to interfere in the affairs of the East. By the exertions of the confederates, Philip was checked in his career of conquest, and obliged to fight two great battles at sea, of which the whole honour was claimed for the Rhodians, by the partial patriotism of their historians Zeno and Antisthenes, but of which, according to less exceptionable testimony<sup>34</sup>, the glory was divided, and the success doubtful. The first of these engagements was fought in the narrow sea between Chios and the shores of Erythræ; and the particulars of it are related with such circumstantial minuteness, as throws much light on the naval transactions of antiquity. Philip was employed in besieging, by sea and land, an unnamed Ionian city, most probably Erythræ itself, when Attalus and the Rhodians came to its relief with sixty-five decked vessels, all exceeding in size the ordinary rate of trireme gallees. Philip had left part of his fleet to be equipped at Samos, which island he had recently conquered from the Egyptians, and was carrying on the siege with fifty-three large ships, reinforced however by a hundred and fifty long boats and undecked triremes. As he had begun to raise walls and sink mines against the place, and as his naval armament was fully equal to their own, Attalus and the Rhodian commanders, who well knew his obstinacy, doubted not that he would persevere in the siege, and therefore anchored at no great distance, until they perceived a fair opportunity for combat. But Philip, whose works had proceeded slower than expectation, came to the resolution of putting suddenly to sea,

Sea fight of  
Cafyste.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 3.  
B. C. 202.

<sup>34</sup> The letters written by the Admirals among the archives of Rhodes. Polybius, immediately after the action, and preserved l. xvi. c. 9 & 15.

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and sailing southward to Samos. His course was steered close to the Asian coast: Attalus, who had anchored nearest, immediately gave chase; and, through the vigorous exertions of his rowers, reached the foremost division of the enemy. In his own ship, he attacked an octireme, and by a fortunate stroke below water, sent her to the bottom. Without waiting farther signal, the other ships made haste to engage. A Macedonian vessel, carrying ten banks of oars, and commanded by Democrates, Philip's admiral, incautiously shocked with a bireme that had ventured under its prow: the bireme stuck fast in the enemy's hulk, and thereby impeding its movements, exposed it to be attacked on both sides, and sunk with all the men on board. Dinocrates and Dionysidorus, two brothers commanding under Attalus, had accidents of a different kind. Dinocrates, in engaging a Macedonian octireme, received a stroke above water, and returned it with such dexterity and force to the lower part of the enemy's ship, while her prow was elevated, that his own beak could not again be extracted, until Attalus bore down upon the octireme, and separated the two ships by the violence of his shock. The octireme was taken empty, her crew having wholly perished in battle. Dionysidorus, in assaulting an enemy's septireme, unfortunately missed his aim, and bared his own ship of her oars. The crash was heightened by the falling of her lofty engines: she sunk with all on board, except the captain and two others, who escaped by swimming to a friendly bireme. By this time the Rhodians, commanded by Theophiliscus, had attacked the rear division of the enemy. When the action engaged front to front, they maintained their usual superiority; for by dexterously depressing their own prows, they received unimportant damage, while they occasioned irreparable breaches to their enemies, by striking them in the parts below water. But as the Macedonians fought bravely from their decks, hand to hand, the Rhodians avoided as much as possible to persevere in a close engagement. They chose rather to dart through the adverse squadrons,

squadrons, breaking off their tiers of oars, and assailing, as opportunity occurred, sometimes their sterns, sometimes their sides, with a view either to pierce those weak parts, or to carry off the machinery most essential to their manœuvres. In the battle, there were properly two distinct actions; for that part of the Macedonians which turned to support their hindmost ships against the Rhodians, had approached the isle of Chios, whereas the other division engaged with Attalus combated near the coast of Asia. Philip, during all this time, had remained at a small intermediate island<sup>b</sup>: in this situation he watched the progress of the battle, until the following occurrence determined him personally to engage in it. A quinquereme belonging to the enemy, having separated too widely from her companions, was attacked by a Macedonian ship of greater force, and in danger of being sunk. King Attalus, who observed the unequal combat, hastened to give assistance with two quadriremes, one of which was the royal galley, bearing those gorgeous implements of ostentation and vanity, with which Asiatic princes were usually accompanied in all warlike expeditions. At the approach of the two hostile vessels, the Macedonian captain betook himself to flight. Attalus pursued him with too much eagerness, and thereby exposed himself to be intercepted from his own fleet by Philip, who in the critical moment darted with a small squadron from his harbour. The king of Pergamus, to avoid falling into the hands of his adversary, endeavoured to run his ship on the coast of Erythræ; and when Philip's foremost vessels were on the point of boarding him, his presence of mind suggested the following stratagem for eluding their grasp: He caused the showy appendages above mentioned, his purple vestments and golden goblets, to be carried on deck and displayed before the eager eyes of his pursuers. Intent only on rifling these precious effects, they neglected to secure the person of the king, who thus escaped

<sup>b</sup> There are here some small islands between Chios and the coast of Erythræ, called *ἵπποι*, the "horses." Strabo, l. xiv. p. 641.

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to the friendly city of Erythræ. Philip by this time approached, and causing the royal galley of Attalus to be fastened to his own, sailed back into the open sea, collected his scattered ships, and encouraged the whole fleet with shouts of victory. Dionysidorus, Attalus' admiral, thinking his master irrecoverably lost, gave signal to his fleet to make the friendly ports of Asia. At the same time the Macedonians, who on the other side of the battle had greatly suffered from the Rhodians, were glad to cease from combat, and rejoin their king; while the Rhodians, having tied the enemy's captured ships to their own, made sail for Chios. Philip claimed the victory on two accounts; first, because he had defeated Attalus, and captured the admiral galley; and secondly, because immediately after the battle, he anchored on the very scene of action, and thus kept possession, as it were, of the field. This was the sea before the harbour of Casysté<sup>36</sup>, better known under its modern name of Tcheshmé, where the Russian admiral Spiritoff, in 1770, by means of his fire ships, destroyed the whole Turkish fleet.

Its consequences.

Next day, to confirm his claim to victory, Philip endeavoured to recover the bodies of his slain. When he was thus employed, the enemy sailed from the harbour of Chios, offering to renew the battle. He did not think proper to accept the challenge, for in performing his present melancholy duty, he had perceived the whole coast strewn with Macedonian bodies. His loss had exceeded six thousand sailors and three thousand marines, whereas that of the enemy was inconsiderable. This disproportion arose from the great number of his small vessels, many of which had been run down, and their crews drowned; a misfortune which could not happen on the other side, because the Rhodians and Attalus fought chiefly in gallees exceeding the ordinary rate: they brought only nine biremes and three triremes to the engagement. Philip, besides, had lost twenty-

<sup>36</sup> Το καλειμενον λεγιμενον. Polyb. l. xvi. c. 17, which protects on the south the harbour of that is, Cape Blanc, the white promontory, Tcheshmé.

four of his largest ships, and two thousand seven hundred of his men had fallen into the hands of the enemy. His forces, therefore, were diminished by the number of nearly twelve thousand. Attalus lost four ships; the Rhodians, three; but the loss most grievous to these islanders was that of their admiral Theophiliscus. Having merited the double prize of skill and valour, he died next day of the wounds which he had received in one of the characteristic incidents of the battle. A Rhodian ship struck her adversary so forcibly, that she left her beak in the breach: the wounded vessel sunk, but the Rhodian also began to fill with water. Theophiliscus hastened to her relief; and, obstinate in his endeavour to save her, was surrounded on all sides by enemies. His exertions, and the alacrity with which he was supported, did not entirely disengage him, till he had received three wounds, which weakened his body, but only rendered his mind more ardent in subsequent scenes of the battle. Before his death, he wrote an account of the action to his country, and named provisionally a successor. The Rhodians confirmed his appointment, and decreed to his memory honours calculated not only to encourage his countrymen then living, but to inspire their distant posterity with patriotism and true valour<sup>7</sup>.

Had the Romans been at leisure strenuously to co-operate with their allies, the battle of Casystè might have proved fatal to Philip. But that sea fight happened about the same time with the famous victory at Zama, in Africa, which terminated the second Punic war; and the king of Macedon was not prevented by the loss of twenty-four large ships and twelve thousand men, from carrying on his operations against the Asiatic coast. Shortly after, we find him besieging the city Prinaſſus, in Caria, of which he made himself master by a stratagem. From the hardness of the ground on which Prinaſſus stood, his miners made not the expected progress. Philip, however, ordered the work to be continued with noise and bustle in the

Philip's conquests in Caria. Olymp. cxliv. 3. B. C. 202.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, xvi. 9.

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day, and in the secrecy of night caused earth to be carried from a distance, and piled up in vast mounds, indicating the extension of his mine many hundred feet in length. He then summoned the inhabitants to surrender, on pain of having their city laid in ruins, by the withdrawing of his props. The terror of this event made them instantly capitulate<sup>38</sup>.

Stormy weather obliged Philip to winter in Caria. During this season he made himself master of Jassus, Euromus, and several other free cities, as well as of the maritime district Peræa, directly opposite to Rhodes, and long subject to that island. Notwithstanding these conquests, his army was often in great want of provisions. Neither threats nor promises could induce the natives of Caria to furnish a regular market. There was little resource in Zeuxis, the jealous satrap of Lydia. The Macedonians, to relieve their wants, plundered Alabanda: they failed in attempting similar violence against Mylasia. The people of Magnesia, to whom they applied, assured them that they had not any corn to spare, but sent to them a large supply of figs, desiring however, in return for this present, that Philip would give them possession of the ancient city of Myus, of which he had just made himself master. The king, strange to tell! complied with their request, thus bartering, for some cargoes of Magnesian figs, the once proud capital of an independent republic<sup>39</sup>.

Proceedings  
of Attalus  
and the Rhodians.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 4.  
B. C. 201.

Soon after the battle of Casysté, Attalus and the Rhodians repaired their shattered ships in the harbours of Chios. They were quickly in a condition to fight Philip at sea, had the season of the year admitted of naval operations; but as they dreaded to encounter the Macedonian veterans by land, they allowed that prince to infest, without opposition, their allies or subjects in Caria, and to secure in that province his conquests of Peræa, Jassus, Prinaßus, and Bargylia. To compensate for the losses sustained on that side, they wrested from Philip several islands and strongholds near the narrow seas;

<sup>38</sup> Polybius, l. xvi. c. 11.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. c. 24.

they threw garrisons into those maritime cities of Asia which were most likely to be attacked, and which it was of most importance to defend; they pressed Rome for assistance by repeated embassies; and they occupied such stations with their ships, as might afford them the best opportunity of intercepting their adversary on his return to Macedon.

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By this time the Romans, having ended the second Punic war, and reduced Carthage to the state of a dependent tributary, began to direct their most serious attention to the affairs of the East. Immediately after the defeat of Hannibal, in the decisive battle of Zama, they sent an embassy to Egypt, to renew their friendly correspondence with Aristomenes the Acarnanian, protector of that kingdom, under the title of guardian to young Ptolemy, surnamed Epiphanes. The main object of this mission, which had orders to visit other eastern states, was to assure the court of Alexandria, that the Romans would not overlook the injuries committed by Philip and Antiochus against the Egyptians, their allies, who had been honourably known to them in that character ever since the dignified reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus; and from whose seasonable generosity, Italy had been succoured in the moment of its greatest exigency, the desolating ravages of the Hannibalic war. Shortly after this mission to Egypt, other embassies were deputed to Attalus, the Rhodians, and Athenians; in a word, to all those states which were named as Roman allies in the peace recently concluded with Philip.

Roman embassies to their eastern allies.  
Olymp. cxliv. 4.  
B. C. 201.

The Roman ambassadors sent to Athens arrived there at a moment peculiarly critical. While far distant provinces were involved in the calamities of war through Philip's ambition, the Athenians, amidst general tranquillity in Greece, had exposed themselves to the hostilities of that prince by an execrable act of cruelty\*. During the celebration of the mysteries of Ceres, two Acarnanian youths, travelling in Attica, unwarily strayed into the temple of Eleusis. By

Superstitious cruelty of the Athenians exposes them to Philip's resentment.

\* Tit. Liv. l. xxxii. c. 16.

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the ignorant questions which they put concerning what passed before them, they betrayed themselves as persons uninitiated, and were led before the presidents of the temple to answer for their rash impiety. Upon examination of their transgression, it fully appeared that their entrance into the temple at a forbidden time, had been a matter of mere accident, unaccompanied by any blamable intention; yet, by the merciless voice of superstition, they were condemned to death, and consigned to immediate execution. This odious event kindled a war between the Athenians and Acarnanians. Philip, as protector of the latter, took part in their quarrel, and while that prince ravaged Caria in person, his general Nicanor laid waste Attica.

They are  
protected by  
Attalus and  
the Rhodians.

Nicanor had carried his depredations to the suburbs of Athens, when the Roman ambassadors arrived in the Piræus. At the same time Attalus and the Rhodians, having gained some advantages over Philip's fleet<sup>a</sup>, but having failed in their attempt to intercept the return of that prince to Macedon, sailed to the island of Ægina, and cast anchor there in a harbour scarcely thirty miles distant from Athens. The threats of the Roman ambassadors, and still more, the powerful armament in his neighbourhood, made Nicanor desist from hostilities, and consent to withdraw from Attica. While the Macedonians evacuated that territory, Attalus and the commanders of the Rhodian fleet hastened into the Piræus, and were received by the Athenians as the saviours of their republic. As they proceeded from the harbour to the city, not only the members of the government, but the whole body of the people, came forth to meet them; the priests and priestesses were arranged on both sides of the way, and every temple was thrown open, as if the gods themselves had been eager to testify respect for those illustrious strangers. The first day of their arrival in the Piræus had, however, been entirely dedicated to the ambassadors of Rome, with whom they had important arrangements to make; and when the Athenians invited Attalus to

<sup>a</sup> Conf. Polyb. l. xvi. c. 15, & Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 14.

an assembly of the people, that judicious prince, to avoid the noisy acclamations and fulsome honours of the multitude, preferred, as more decent and more dignified, to transact the business by writing. He commemorated former services to Athens, made mention of his recent successes against Philip, and exhorted the assembly to seize the present opportunity of uniting against the common enemy with himself; the Rhodians, and the Romans. This letter was heard with the utmost extravagance of popular applause; war against Macedon was declared with every excess of superstitious formality; and such immoderate honours were heaped on king Attalus and the Rhodians, as could either be suggested by the example of Athenian flattery on former occasions, or devised by the inventions of men, still growing from age to age more shameless. In a magnificent pageant, the typified people of Rhodes were crowned with the first honours of victory; and to the ten tribes of Athens an eleventh, called the tribe of Attalus, was added, that the name of this illustrious benefactor might rank with the consecrated founders of the Athenian commonwealth<sup>42</sup>.

Having concluded the affairs of Athens so much to his satisfaction, Attalus returned to Ægina, and the Rhodians sailed to the Cyclades, nine of which they received into their alliance; the remaining three, Andros, Paros, and Cythnus, were too strongly guarded by the Macedonians. During Attalus' stay at Ægina, his emissaries were sent to the Etolians, and to all other states formerly leagued against Philip. Negotiations with these communities, particularly the Etolians, occupied much time, and proved ultimately fruitless. They considered Philip's power as too formidable, readily to engage in new hostilities against him. The Roman ambassadors also applied not only to the Etolians at Naupactus, but to the Achæans at Ægium: they travelled to Phœnice in Epirus, and to Athamania, a warlike district on the western frontier of that country. The

Endeavours  
of Attalus  
and the Ro-  
mans to stir  
up new ene-  
mies to  
Philip.

<sup>42</sup> Polybius, l. xvi. 25, & seq. Conf. Tit. Liv. xxxi. c. 15.

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His spirited  
exertions.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 4.  
B. C. 201.

Desperate  
resistance of  
Abydus.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 1.  
B. C. 200.

object of all these journies was to stir up new enemies to the king of Macedon.

While Philip's adversaries negotiated, that prince had taken the field. Instead of being intimidated by the threats of a Roman war, the encrease of danger only roused his energies<sup>6</sup>. Having appointed Philocles to succeed Nicanor and renew ravages in Attica, he ordered his fleet to the narrow seas, and hastened to co-operate with it there, at the head of a well appointed army. In that important quarter, he speedily recovered the places which he had lost, and added to them many others; Cypselæ, Doriscus, Callipolis, Madytos, Alepeconesus, Serrheum, and Sestus. But the siege of Abydus detained him long, and was attended with an ever memorable issue. This city standing opposite to Sestus, commanded on the side of Asia the Dardanelles, or shortest passage across the Hellespont, and was an acquisition essential to Philip for completing his plan of conquest. He besieged it vigorously by sea and land. But his floating batteries, which he brought to bear against its walls, were resisted efficaciously by engines and ignited weapons: there was much difficulty in saving from destruction those employed in this dangerous service. On the side of the land his miners at length brought down the outer wall; the besieged, however, had raised a new wall behind it: when this also was threatened with demolition, the Abydenians sent two of their citizens, Pantagnotus and Pythiades, to propose the following terms of capitulation:—That a handful of troops belonging to Attalus and the Rhodians, who had co-operated in their defence, should retire in safety with their arms and effects; and that all Abydenians of free condition should leave the city with the garments only that covered their bodies. Philip sternly rejected these terms, calculated to melt the most obdurate heart; and answered, that they must either defend themselves like men, or submit unconditionally. Upon the return of their deputies with this

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, l. xvi. c. 28.

dreadful message, the magistrates of Abydus assembled in council. They determined no longer to waste the strength of the citizens in attempting to countermine the enemy. Their women were sent into the temple of Diana; the children, assembled in the gymnasium, or place of exercise; their money and precious effects were collected in heaps, so as to be destroyed in a moment by fire, or thrown into the sea; the men of a military age then mounted the wall, bound under terrible imprecations, either to defend it against the enemy, or to perish in the breach. An oath still more tremendous was imposed on the old men who staid behind; that, if their fellow-citizens were overpowered, they should immediately butcher the women and children. On the part of the Abydenian youths, their desperate resolution was carried into full effect. They fought with the rage of lions rather than of men, for, when their weapons were broken or blunted, they darted with their collected bodies against the Macedonians, and grappled with them in a transport of inspired fury, until they forced from them their spears and javelins. Their resistance continued till almost all of them were slain, and until darkness made Philip recal his men from the assault.

Before morning, the old men, instead of performing the more atrocious part assigned them in this horrid tragedy, sent the priests and priestesses in their holy vestments to surrender the city, and implore the mercy of the conqueror. Philip arrived in time to save the treasures, which the Abydenians in case of defeat had prepared for swift destruction: but he was too late for seizing the captives and dragging them into slavery; for the citizens who survived the assault, exclaiming that their brave companions had been betrayed through perjury, flew to the massacre of their women, children, and fathers; and then plunged into their own breasts the weapons still reeking with kindred blood. Philip turned from this scene with disgust, unmixed with commiseration, saying unfeelingly, that he

<sup>a</sup> Polybius, l. xvi. c. 29. Conf. Tit. Liv. l. xxi. c. 17.

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Strait of  
Abydus con-  
trasted with  
that between  
the pillars of  
Hercules.

granted three days to the Abydenians to complete their own bloody execution. He then placed a garrison in a post now desolate, but highly important by its situation.

Such was the catastrophe of Abydus, a city which had long flourished in arts, industry, and commerce. Its narrow sea connected Europe and Asia, as the Strait of Gibraltar does Africa and Europe; but the historian who has described its unhappy destiny, observes, that the passage of the Hellespont, only two furlongs broad, compared with the Strait of Gibraltar about twice that number of leagues, seems to have been formed by the hand of nature, not only with some regard to the proportion between the Mediterranean and Atlantic, but also with a view to facilitate the infinitely more active intercourse which prevailed along the shores of the former. The busy traffic and perpetual navigation between Abydus and the coast of Thrace, formed, he observes, a striking contrast with the gloom and deadness, which surrounded the pillars of Hercules<sup>45</sup>.

Philip's al-  
tercation  
with Emilius  
Lepidus.

While the fate of Abydus still hung in suspense, Emilius Lepidus, one of the Roman ambassadors formerly sent to Egypt, and the youngest of the number, came to Philip's camp and desired an audience of the king. To his remonstrances against making war on the allies of Rome, Philip began a studied answer, the purport of which was to prove that Attalus and the Rhodians, allies of Rome, had themselves been the aggressors. As he dwelt on this topic, Emilius, interrupting him, asked, but were the Carians also the aggressors, or what injury had you received from the citizens of Abydus? Philip, unused to such rudeness, replied, there are three circumstances, Emilius, that tend to extenuate your ill-breeding: first, the inexperience of youth; secondly, the pride of beauty, for you are a very handsome young man; and thirdly, the insolence congenial to the Roman character. But return to your country and tell the Romans, that I wish them to remain faithful to the treaties

<sup>45</sup> Polybius, l. xvi. c. 29.

subsisting between us ; if not, by the help of the gods ! I will uphold the glory of the Macedonian name, a name not inferior to that of Roman “.” The siege of Abydus was hardly ended, when Philip received intelligence that the consul Sulpicius Galba had crossed the Adriatic even in the end of autumn, and purposed to winter his fleet in Corcyra and his army in Apollonia. The Romans thus commenced the first Macedonian war”, only a few months after they had made peace with Carthage.

“ Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 28. Conf. Polyb. l. xvi. c. 32.

“ The hostilities preceding the late treaty of peace between Philip and the Romans, Olymp. cxliii. 4. B. C. 205, brought neither

advantage nor honour to the former ; for which reason chiefly, historians, devoted to Rome, have not dignified them with the name of war.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

*State of Greece and Macedon at the Commencement of the War with Philip.—Surprize of Chalcis.—Ravages of Attica.—Philopæmen's successful Stratagem against Nabis.—Romans invade Epirus.—Sulpicius' and Villius' indecisive Campaigns against Philip.—His Successes.—His maritime Possessions attacked by Attalus and the Rhodians.—His imposing Attitude on Mount Æropus.—Quintius Flaminius takes the Field against him.—Thessaly ravaged by four Armies.—Romans baffled before Atrax.—Singular Bravery of 500 Achæan Youths.—Magnanimity of the Acarnanians.—Quintius' Surprize of Thebes.—Death of Attalus.—Battle of Kynoscephalæ.*

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Causes of the  
Macedonian  
war.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 1.  
B. C. 200.

**T**HE Romans had just grounds for war with Philip of Macedon. That prince had injured their allies and assisted their enemies. Four thousand of his troops had been made prisoners, while they sustained, in the battle of Zama, the declining cause of Carthage. He was at war with Attalus king of Pergamus, with the Rhodians, and with the Athenians, all of them confederates of Rome; and he had, in part, fulfilled his iniquitous treaty with Antiochus the Great, for dividing between them the rich inheritance of Ptolemy Epiphanes, a prince whom the Romans, in consideration of his youth and the merit of his great ancestor Ptolemy Philadelphus, affected to treat with the regard due to a dear hereditary friend; instead of the bold name of ally, honouring him with the more affectionate appellation of pupil'. But, notwithstanding this distinguished title, and the strong remonstrances of his tutors or protectors, Epiphanes had been stripped by Philip of his possessions in Caria and in Thrace, while Antiochus had dismembered Egypt of the valuable provinces of

\* Justin, l. xxx. c. 3.

Cœle Syria and Phœnicia. In this state of affairs the consul Sulpicius Galba crossed the Hadriatic with a powerful fleet, and an army consisting partly of veterans who had served with distinguished glory in Spain and in Africa.

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Before this armament arrived in the harbours of Corcyra and Apollonia, Philip had sacked Abydus, and was on his return from the Hellespont to his central stronghold of Demetrias in Thessaly. Hitherto, he had maintained against all his enemies an equality at sea, and a decided superiority by land. The ancient and proper Macedon was guarded by impracticable fastnesses, hardy soldiers, and hereditary renown. He had greatly extended it on the side both of Thrace and Illyricum; and towards his southern frontier, such was his hold of Greece, and such the condition of that country, as flattered him with strong hopes of maintaining his authority there against every invader. Of the nine states beyond the Isthmus, he was master of the fertile Thessaly, and had humbled the warlike Etolia. The Acarnanians, in the dangerous neighbourhood of Etolia, regarded Philip as their protector: his general Philocles was ravaging the territory of Attica; Boeotia averted hostility only by the poverty and contempt into which it had long sunk; and Macedonian garrisons overawed the four rocky districts of Phocis, Doris, Locris, and Megara. At the entrance of the Peloponnesus, Philip held the important city of Corinth, which, together with Chalcis in Eubœa, and Demetrias in Thessaly, he called the three fetters of Greece. Of the other states belonging to that peninsula, five composed the Achaean league. Sparta pursued a course still peculiar to herself, but as dishonourable in later times as it anciently had been glorious. Actuated by inveterate jealousy of Macedon and Achaia, and torn by domestic factions, the Lacedæmonians had destroyed their kings of the race of Hercules, and together with them all those distinctions and institutions most venerable in their country. A succession of military adventurers, remarkable for abilities and bold-

State of  
Macedon  
and Greece  
at that pe-  
riod.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 1.  
B. C. 200.

ness,

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ness, had usurped the government, at once the creatures and the tyrants of a sanguinary multitude. Nabis, the last of these tyrants, had now ruled six years. He had murdered or banished all men of worth and property whom his predecessors had left in the territory, and divided not only their estates, but their wives and families, among his mercenary partizans. His throne was upheld by emancipated slaves, unprincipled Cretans, and by a conflux of criminals and fugitives from all parts of Greece, in most of which he had his spies and agents. Yet, odious and cruel as he was, a robber abroad and a tyrant at home, the Romans avowed him for their ally, because his activity and energy formed a balance in Peloponnesus to the Achæan league, long confederate with Macedon.

Views of the  
consul Sul-  
picius.—His  
lieutenant  
Centho's  
celerity in  
surprising  
Chalcis.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 1.  
B. C. 200.

The consul Sulpicius had purposed to winter with his fleet at Corcyra, and his army in Apollonia. During the inactive season, he hoped to gain by negotiation, or intimidate by his arms, the inland Illyrian tribes, through whose mountainous territories he intended to march early in the spring, into the heart of Macedon and Thessaly. But he had scarcely landed on the coast, when Athenian ambassadors arrived, imploring that, without delay, he would deliver their country from depredation and their capital from a siege. The Rhodians had sent a small squadron for their protection; troops, in the pay of Attalus, reinforced the garrison of Athens; there was a considerable body of mercenaries in the pay of the republic; yet so fatally had the Athenians degenerated from their ancient prowess, that all these succours could not enable them to repel inroads on the side of Corinth and Megara, and more ruinous naval descents from Chalcis in Eubœa. The consul therefore listened to their request; and commanded Claudius Centho, with twenty trireme gallees, carrying a strong detachment of soldiers, to sail to the Piræus. With this force, Centho did not think it enough to act on the defensive; an opportunity occurred for executing, in the way of aggression, an en-

2 Polybius, l. xv. & xvi. *passim*.

terprize of great spirit. Some deserters from Chalcis informed him of the careless manner in which that city was guarded, though it commanded the narrow Euripus, a passage as important by sea, as is that of Thermopylæ by land; and though Chalcis was at once Philip's arsenal, his granary, and his state prison. Upon this intelligence, Cenchro sailed from the Piræus, and lay concealed on the western side of Cape Sunium, until the approach of night. When it was dark, he doubled that southern promontory of Attica; and by such vigorous plying of his oars in a calm sea, as will appear incredible to modern seamen, surprised Chalcis, about seventy miles distant, before morning. The gates were forced open; all citizens in arms, and many unarmed, were put to the sword. The market-place was set on fire. The flames extended to the storehouses of corn, and to the magazines of arms and engines. The prisoners confined by Philip were released; his statues, thrown down and mutilated; and the Romans, weary with destroying, returned loaded with booty to their ships.

Philip, whose signals by fire and posts of observation had been carefully distributed, speedily learned the arrival of the enemy in Eubœa. He hastened from Demetrias with five thousand light infantry, and a proportional body of horse, in hopes of saving his arsenal, or of taking vengeance on its destroyers. But the Romans had already departed; he came only in time to behold the smoking ruins of Chalcis. This mortifying event did not rob him of his presence of mind. From his early youth, he had now reigned twenty years, and as his character had gradually sunk in virtue, it should seem to have risen in energy; in an activity not to be tired out, in promptness of decision and boldness of enterprise. Without hesitating a moment, he proceeded across a bridge of boats on the Euripus, and advanced at the head of his army towards Athens, with the rapidity of a practised racer. Yet, swiftly as he marched, his speed

Philip's similar design against Athens.

\* Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 22. 22.

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was outstripped by one of those whom the Greeks called day-runners<sup>†</sup>, who, descrying the Macedonians from his watch-tower, seasonably alarmed the Athenians. Philip arrived a few hours after, and still before day-break. He could behold lights carrying in different directions, and perceive the commotion of the troops belonging to Attalus, of the mercenaries in the pay of Athens, above all, of the frightened townsmen. But he found the walls completely manned, and the gates strongly guarded. Having thus failed in his design of surprize, he allowed his men a short time for rest: and in the morning, led them against the northern gate called Dipylos, with a view to try whether he could force his entrance. Philip hated the Athenians above all other Greeks; and the animosity, as appeared on this occasion, was reciprocal. The gate Dipylos was far larger than any other: spacious streets connected it with the forum; and beyond it, without the city, a wide and well levelled road led to the principal gymnasium, the famed academy of Plato and his followers. The Athenians with their auxiliaries, after forming within the city, sallied forth from the Dipylos, and occupied part of the space between it and the academy. Their wives, and children, and parents, beheld them from the walls. At this sight, Philip was stimulated to new ardour. He spurred forward his horse into the midst of the enemy, calling aloud to his soldiers, that wherever the king was, there ought to be the standards and the army. The Athenians could not resist the onset of his cavalry. He pursued them towards the city gate, wounding many with his own hand. The havoc was greatest at the gate itself, from which the Macedonians, though excluded, made their retreat with little loss, because missile weapons could not be discharged from the towers without pouring destruction promiscuously on friends and foes.

His ravages  
in Attica,  
and destruc-

Philip did not renew his attack on the city, whose defenders were multiplied in the course of the day, by the arrival of Romans from

<sup>†</sup> Ημεροδρομοί.

the

the Piræus, and of a reinforcement belonging to Attalus from Ægina. But before his departure for Peloponnesus, upon a design that will be explained presently, he wreaked his vengeance on every thing in the neighbourhood of Athens, either pleasing by its beauty or venerable for its sanctity. The gymnasiums, Lyceum and Cynosarges, were levelled with the ground; the consecrated groves were set on fire; even the sepulchres of the dead were deformed by the blind impiety of his rage. Shortly afterwards, upon his return from Peloponnesus, he again invaded Attica in concert with his general Philocles, who conducted a reinforcement of two thousand Thracians and Macedonians from Eubœa. In this expedition, after a fruitless attempt against Athens and Eleusis, the ravages of the Athenian territory were still more extensive than formerly. The elegant temples and statues, that adorned the different towns and villages, were demolished; and the stones composing them were broken in pieces, lest their magnitude and fine workmanship should confer a degree of grandeur even on the ruins<sup>1</sup>. This was to wound the Athenians most sensibly, for, notwithstanding the decay of all other kinds of merit among them, the exquisite ingenuity of their artists still shone unrivalled; mount Pentelicus still afforded a profusion of precious marbles; and the Athenians were then, and continued long afterwards, the most vainly superstitious of all mankind.

The motive, that drew Philip into Peloponnesus was, that he might meet the Achæan council, then sitting at Argos. In the preceding year, the Achæans, headed by Philopœmen, had defied Nabis and his mercenaries; and by a well-concerted stratagem had considerably diminished the tyrant's formidable power. Philopœmen, having computed accurately the distances from Tegea, of all the places subject to the league, sent letters to the several cities most remote from it to the following purport: " Assemble instantly your fighting men; supply them with money and provisions for five days; conduct them

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tion of works  
of art.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 1.  
B. C. 200.

Philopœ-  
men's suc-  
cessful strata-  
gem against  
Nabis.  
Olymp.  
cxliv. 4.  
B. C. 201.

<sup>1</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 24. & seq.

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to the next city ; and, upon your arrival there, deliver the letter herewith sent to its pretor." By these orders, communicated from one city to another through all the different routes leading to Tegea, a great force would be collected on the Lacedæmonian frontier, without creating the least suspicion in those spies and gatherers of news, industriously dispersed by Nabis in every corner of the country. On the day when the arrival of the Achæans was expected at Tegea, Philopœmen sent from that place a select body of light armed troops, to infest the Lacedæmonian territories, with orders that, when attacked, they should retreat towards Scotita, a town situate between Tegea and Sparta. These troops concealed themselves during the night, and early next day commenced the business entrusted to them. Meanwhile the Achæans had arrived from different quarters at the time expected. Philopœmen made them take supper at an early hour, and then conducting them towards Scotita, posted them secretly in that neighbourhood. About this time, the light troops began their ravages. Nabis' mercenaries sallied forth in great force, chiefly from Pallênè, a city five miles from Sparta, and repelled the invaders with their accustomed vigour ; but, pursuing them beyond Scotita, were themselves unexpectedly assailed by Philopœmen, and all of them either slain or made prisoners.

Philip endeavours to embroil the Achæans with Rome.

This advantage on the side of the Achæans was counterbalanced by their appointment next year of a new and very unequal pretor in the room of Philopœmen. Cycliades, who succeeded to him, was practised in affairs, and knew how to manage popular assemblies ; but his military character did not inspire confidence. The Achæan youth reluctantly joined his standard, though some districts had been ravaged, and even some maritime cities endangered by the restless rapacity of Nabis. The Achæans had assembled at Argos to deliberate concerning the best means of raising forces sufficient to oppose the tyrant, when Philip unexpectedly made his appearance

\* Polybius, l. xvi. c. 36 & seq.

in the council. He told them, that he would remove their difficulty; his army was at hand; he would immediately march into Laconia, and transfer thither the whole terror of the war. His proposal being heard with applause, he added that, while he thus employed his arms for the benefit of Achaia, it was reasonable that they should send part of their youth to reinforce his garrisons in Eubœa and other places beyond the Isthmus. The Achæans perceived his drift: he wanted to involve them as deeply as himself in the war with Rome. Cycliades, though his friend, could not approve this design. He thought it unnecessary, however, to oppose it by any argument; and contented himself with observing, that the Achæan council could not deliberate concerning objects foreign to the cause of its meeting. With this repulse, Philip, having engaged a few volunteers in his service, returned to Attica, and after committing the depredations above mentioned in that country, hastened to Macedon in order to oppose the Romans, who threatened his western frontier.

The consul Sulpicius had left his winter quarters and encamped on the river Apfus, which flows into the Hadriatic sea between Apollonia and Epidamnus, eight miles to the north of the former city. From thence he sent his lieutenant Lucius Apultius to invade the inland districts of Epirus, whose principal towns and castles were held by Macedonian garrisons. Corragos, Gerrunium, and Orgessus were taken by the first assaults. Antipatria, strongly fortified at the entrance of a narrow valley, made an obstinate but unavailing resistance. The men fit to bear arms were put to the sword; and the town, after being plundered of every thing transportable, was burned to the ground. This dreadful example frightened into capitulation Codrion, a strong place in the neighbourhood, into which Apultius threw a garrison. He then took Hium, a name as renowned as the city bearing it in Epirus is unknown. In returning,

Romans invade Epirus.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 1.  
B. C. 200.

Tit. Liv. l. xix. c. 25. & Polybius, l. xvi. c. 38.

D D 2

however,

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Rugged  
western fron-  
tier of Ma-  
cedon—why  
the Romans  
made their  
attack on  
that side.

however, to the consul's camp, the Romans, heavy with booty, were surprised by Athenagoras, one of Philip's generals; and their rear guard was thrown into disorder. Apustius rode back at full speed, made his army face about, and put to rout the assailants, many of whom fell, and a still greater number surrendered<sup>1</sup>.

This successful expedition drew to the consul's camp several chieftains of the Illyrian tribes, whose barbarous independence alternately guarded and alarmed the security of Macedon. On the north of that kingdom, they inhabited Dardania, and from the confines of Dardania and mount Scardus, occupied the hilly country running southward above two hundred miles, distinguished in its course by the names Dassaretia<sup>2</sup>, Eordia, and Athamania, which, at the mean distance of fifty miles from the Hadriatic, shuts up the western frontiers of Macedon and Thessaly. This rough chain of abrupt hills and intricate vallies, most parts of which were still friendly to Philip, the consul would be obliged to cross before he could seriously distress his adversary. By attacking Macedon on this difficult frontier, the Romans indeed should seem to have exposed themselves to the vulgar reproach of seizing the bull by the horns. All the noble cities of that kingdom, enriched by the spoils of nations; Dium, Pella, Edeffa, and Philippi, lay at the other extremity of the country, and near the coasts of the Ægean. But Philip's possessions on that side, particularly the delightful region of Chalcidicè, contained garrisons proportional to their importance<sup>3</sup>; and his fleet lay at Demetrias, stationed there against Attalus and the Rhodians, but ready also to cope with the Romans, should they endeavour to make a naval descent on Macedon. Besides this, the Romans never did by fleets what might be effected by armies: their sailors dreaded a winter's voyage; and they had not waited the fittest season, in their haste to combat Philip immediately after the defeat of Hannibal.

<sup>1</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Commonly called Dassaretii, from the

tribe inhabiting it. Appian. Illyric.

<sup>3</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 45.

The consul, therefore, moved into the country of the Daffaretii, the northern division of the hilly chain above mentioned, and encamped on the river Bevus". The towns in that neighbourhood either surrendered or were taken; and their copious granaries of corn enabled the Romans to save the provisions which they had carried with them.

Philip had by this time sent his son Perseus, attended by able officers, to guard the passes from Dardania, and was proceeding in person to defend his western frontier. The trepidation of the Daffaretii, flying in crowds before the invaders, brought him the first news of the enemy. He dispatched some troops of horse on discovery, who encountered a body of Roman cavalry sent on the same errand. The battle between them was sharp but undecisive, and both of them returned to their respective camps without bringing back any important intelligence. Philip sent immediately to the field of action to recover the bodies of his slain. They were found to the number of forty, and brought for interment to the camp, where their yawning wounds, inflicted by the massy two-edged Roman sword, are said to have occasioned a very discouraging sensation". But Philip's army was twenty-four thousand strong, of which four thousand were cavalry. Directed by some deserters, he continued to advance, and seized a strong post at Athacus, which overlooked the Roman camp. Its orderly arrangement struck him as forcibly as it had formerly done Pyrrhus". A combat soon followed between the light troops, in which the Romans, always armed with their shield and buckler, had a decided advantage over the king's irregular skirmishers. Philip also failed in a design for drawing the enemy into an ambush; and, when the consul next day marched from his camp to offer battle, thought proper to decline the engagement. Sulpicius, after thus defying his adversary, ventured to decamp to a place called Octoluphus, eight miles distant,

Sulpicius' battles with Philip.—in decisive campaign. Olymp. cxlv. 1. B. C. 200.

" Tit. Liv. l. xxxix. c. 33. Ibid. c. 24. " See above, vol. i, p. 703.

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for the greater convenience of supplies. To infuse a false security into the Romans, Philip long kept within his rampart; and, when he found that great bodies of them had gone to forage, he sent part of his light troops and cavalry to surprise the stragglers, while the remainder beset the roads leading back to the Roman camp. To prevent any intelligence from reaching the consul, he ordered his men to give no quarter. These measures succeeded. A great many Romans were surprised, intercepted, and slain; and the advantages gained on these occasions would have been without alloy, had not Philip pursued too eagerly a party of horsemen flying towards their encampment, until they were met and protected by the Roman infantry. The fortune of the day then immediately changed: Philip lost four hundred of his *companions*, and by the fall of his wounded horse, was himself dismounted. But a Macedonian instantly alighted, and throwing him on a sound horse, saved the king's life at the expence of his own.

Philip sent speedily to the consul to crave a truce for burying the slain; and being told that he should have an answer in the morning, availed himself of the intermediate time to fly towards difficult mountains, whither the Romans would be unable to follow him, heavily laden as they were with spoil, and their march impeded by elephants, unseasonably carried with them as trophies of their Carthaginian victories. It was the first time that they had employed in war these cumbrous auxiliaries. Philip's purpose was now to harass the enemy in their passage through intricate vallies, by obstructing the defiles, and pouring down missile weapons from the contiguous heights. In this desultory warfare he succeeded so completely, that the consul thought proper to change his line of march. Having retreated with much danger from the country of the Dassariti to that of Eordia, he possessed himself in the latter, of the two cities of Pelium and Celitrum, and garrisoned them as useful posts  
in

in some succeeding invasion". He then returned to the banks of the Apfus and Apollonia, from whence he had commenced an expedition of great labour and very inadequate success.

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While the consul moved towards the Hadriatic, the necessity of Philip's affairs carried him in an opposite direction. This movement was occasioned by the restless rapacity of the Etolians, who, while the king fought in Illyricum, had broken into Thessaly. Before the commencement of the campaign, both the consul and Philip had sent ambassadors to this fierce people, and each urged plausible arguments for engaging them on his side. The Athenians also, enraged at Philip's recent proceedings in Attica, dispatched some of their popular orators to arraign the profaner of temples, the disturber of the ashes of the dead, the odious and abominable violator of rites due to supernal and infernal gods. The Etolians admitted the parties to a hearing at their general council of Naupactus, but Damocritus, who, as pretor for the year, presided in that assembly, had the address to prevent his countrymen from giving a decisive answer. He evaded the question, by recurring to a law of his republic which restrained the determination of war or peace to the annual Pan-Eolian convention at Thermum. It was supposed that he had been bribed by Philip; but he wished only to temporise, that the Etolians, by watching the success of the campaign, might be free to pursue whatever path appeared most profitable. Accordingly, after the first important success obtained by the Romans, they prepared to act as their auxiliaries. Six thousand of their warriors, indeed, whose proceedings will be explained hereafter, had recently sailed to Egypt; but they were reinforced by Amynder king of Athamania, the district of Epirus nearest to Thessaly; and the Dardanians, the fiercest of the Illyrian tribes, on the recall of Perseus from the pass of Pelagonia, had invaded the northern frontier of Macedon. Philip sent his general Athenagoras to oppose the

Negotiations with the Etolians — Philip's success against them.

" Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 36—40.

Dardanians :

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Attalus and  
the Rhodi-  
ans infect  
Philip's pos-  
sessions by  
sea.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 1.  
B. C. 200.

Dardanians: he marched in person into Thessaly against the Eto-  
lians and Athamanians. His success on both sides was complete<sup>15</sup>.

Meanwhile, with the return of spring, Apustius sailed from Cor-  
cyra, and met king Attalus in the Piræus. They were received  
with enthusiasm by the Athenians, who, individually and in their  
public decrees, poured out the most fulsome praises on their friends,  
and the most extravagant execrations against Philip. The united  
fleets first attacked the Cyclades, the most important of which were  
held by Macedonian garrisons. Cythrus made a successful resist-  
ance; Andros submitted after a siege; the territory fell under the  
jurisdiction of Attalus; all transportable booty belonged to the Ro-  
mans. It has been the fate of those beautiful islands to suffer at  
many different and very distant periods the most horrid oppression.  
Dicæarchus, when he failed to conquer them for Philip, raised altars  
to Injustice and Impiety<sup>16</sup>. The Turkish fleet might consistently  
invoke the same gods, when it sails yearly from Constantinople to  
the Isles, to extort exorbitant contributions<sup>17</sup>. When the ships of At-  
talus and the Romans were joined by twenty vessels belonging to  
the Rhodians, they ventured to attack Philip's important possessions  
in Chalcidicæ and in Eubœa, without fear of the Macedonian squa-  
dron stationed at Demetrias. They failed in the assault of Cassan-  
dria, which had a powerful garrison: they succeeded against Acan-  
thus in the same Chalcidic region; and they made themselves masters  
of Oreum in Eubœa, after a long siege. Having terminated these  
expeditions before the approach of winter, Attalus and the Rhodi-  
ans sailed to their respective harbours; and the Roman commander,  
leaving on his way thirty gallies in the Piræus, returned with the  
remainder of his fleet to Corcyra<sup>18</sup>.

Perturbed  
state of Phi-  
lip's affairs

The winter, which relieved others from labour and anxiety,  
brought no relief of either to Philip. Publius Villius had sailed to

<sup>15</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 41—43.

<sup>16</sup> Polybius, l. xviii. c. 37.

Eton's Turkish Empire, c. ix  
Tit. Liv. l. xxxi. c. 44 & seq.

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—his minister  
Heracles  
des given up  
by him.

Apollonia, as successor to the consul Sulpicius Galba, which indicated that the Romans were little satisfied with the slow proceedings of the latter. Philip had to dread not only the persevering exertions of his enemies, but the defection of his allies and the rebellion of his subjects. The Achæans had already shewn a reluctance to participate in his danger. A spirit of revolt had seized some places in Thessaly, particularly the city called Thaumaci, "the wonder," because in proceeding inland from the Malian gulph and Thermopylæ, the traveller here emerged from craggy rocks and narrow vallies, and first beheld at Thaumaci the rich plains of Thessaly stretching beyond his sight like the boundless ocean. The Macedonians, also, entitled to great privileges by their laws, had become dissatisfied with their king, and still more with his ministers. To obviate these evils, Philip assiduously courted the Achæans, and even withdrew garrisons, which his suspicion had long kept in Orchomenos and some other Achæan cities. He besieged Thaumaci in the heart of winter; and he appeased the Macedonians by sacrificing Heracles, recently commander of the fleet at Demetrias, and who, in the exercise of that and other high employments, had rendered himself peculiarly obnoxious by his rapacity and cruelty. Heracles had entered into the service of Philip like other unprincipled fugitives whom that prince received with open arms, as instruments the best fitted for every mischief. He was a native of Tarentum in Italy, and had successively betrayed his countrymen to the Romans, and the Romans to Hannibal. In time of profound peace, he had undertaken to burn the Rhodian fleet. He was a wretch polluted by every vice; of intolerable haughtiness to his inferiors, and the most slavish obsequiousness to men in power, uniting at once every thing base in perfidy and dangerous in audacity; and an example, among many others in the reign of Philip, that bad princes will never fail to find still worse instruments and accomplices.

\* Polybius, l. xiii. c. 4. &amp; Polyænus, l. v. c. 17.

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His imposing  
attitude on  
mount *Æro-*  
*pus*.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 2.  
B. C. 199.

The strong situation of Thaumaci enabled the place to hold out, until the necessity of Philip's affairs recalled him to the confines of Epirus<sup>20</sup>. He suspected that the consul Villius would take the field early in the spring; and, profiting by the errors of his predecessor, would endeavour to penetrate into Thessaly by remounting the river *Æöus*, which falls into the sea at Apollonia. In that case he must traverse Athamania, the southernmost part of the mountainous chain above-mentioned. Athenagoras proceeded thither with a part of the army: the king followed with the remainder, and, after examining the ground, and occupying with detachments less important passes, encamped on mounts *Æropus* and *Asnaus*, between which the *Æöus* flows in a narrow valley. Where the natural strength of the hills afforded not sufficient security, they were laboriously fortified by art; vast quantities of engines were skillfully disposed. The royal pavilion towered conspicuously in front of the encampment, bidding defiance to the enemy. This imposing attitude strangely disconcerted Villius. His intention, as Philip had foreseen, was to have avoided the dangerous route formerly pursued by Sulpicius, and to have passed through Athamania into Thessaly. But the sight of the king's camp, not by ordinary means to be forced, filled him with perplexity. He resolved, and changed his resolution, and continued still deliberating which course to pursue, when a messenger brought news that Titus Quintius Flaminius had been elected consul; that the province of Macedon had fallen to him by lot: and that he had already arrived in the harbour of Coreyra<sup>21</sup>.

The consul  
Flaminius  
sent to com-  
mand against  
Philip.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 3.  
B. C. 198.

The best excuse for the inactivity of Villius is, that Titus Quintius Flaminius, who came accompanied by his brother Lucius Quintius as commander of the fleet, and a reinforcement of eight thousand infantry, and eight hundred horse, remained forty days in sight of Philip without venturing to assault him. Titus Quintius was scarcely thirty years old when he became consul, having risen by his

<sup>20</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxii. c. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Id. *ibid.* c. 5. & seq.

merit and popularity to that high rank from the office of questor, without passing through the intermediate dignities of edile and pretor<sup>22</sup>. In the most illustrious age of Rome, he was the most accomplished of all the Romans. He rivalled the Greeks in their own pursuits; adding to a perfect acquaintance with their language and literature, a lively wit, the most winning affability, and such conciliatory manners that, at a time when his country was extending her empire over the greatest nations, he never once spoke of her power or resentment, but only of her good faith, her moderation, and her clemency. Though the province of Macedon devolved to him by lot, wisdom could not have committed the war to an abler general, or, after victory, to a more dextrous politician. In Macedon and Greece, he spent nearly a dozen years of his life; and after rendering the former country tributary, completely established the Roman ascendancy in the latter.

While the armies remained on both sides inactive, Philip was flattered with the hopes of peace by means of the chieftains of the Epirots, most of whom adhered to his interest. Through their intervention, for Quintius affected to treat them with much regard in order to gain the nation, a conference was held, during which the king and consul with their respective attendants stood on opposite banks of the Aöus. It was demanded, on the part of the Romans, that the places taken from their allies should be restored, and that all other injuries done to them, should either be repaired or compensated. Philip replied, that many cities and districts, beyond the limits of Macedon, had descended to him from his ancestors; that many others had been conquered by himself. That, for the sake of peace, he would withdraw his garrisons from the latter, and thereby restore them to freedom; but could not think of relinquishing the former, which he held by right of inheritance. As to the other wrongs complained of, the losses sustained in war, he was ready to

Conference  
between  
them.

<sup>22</sup> Plutarch in Flamin. Tit. Liv. l. xxxii. c. 7.

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submit them to the arbitration of any neutral power, which the Romans thought proper to name. Quintius replied, "that there could not be any room for arbitration, since Philip was manifestly the aggressor;" and then proceeding to mention the states that were to be emancipated, named first of all "the Thessalians." At this Philip exclaimed, "What harder condition could be imposed on me, when vanquished." The conference ended with such animosity on both sides, that it was well the river intervened to prevent mutual hostilities."

Battle on  
mount  
Æropus.

Next day the Macedonian polts were attacked with vigour, but as vigourously defended. From the loss, which he had sustained, the consul was led to despair of making a successful impression on them, when a shepherd sent by Charopus, a friendly chief of the Epirots, offered to conduct part of the Roman army through secret windings of the hills, to the rear of the Macedonian encampment. He had assurances of liberal rewards if found faithful, but was nevertheless delivered bound to a tribune, who departed in a moon-shine night, with a detachment of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. On the third morning, the tribune having rested in the day-time, and marched expeditiously during the night, found himself on an eminence, commanding the enemy's rear, and ready to execute the consul's orders. These consisted in setting fire to a pile of wood, for all those mountains were covered with trees, and thereby signifying his arrival; but he was not to raise the shout of war or alarm the enemy, until the action had commenced in front. During the intermediate time, Quintius had amused the king with slight skirmishes: but, on seeing the smoke made by his detachment, he led his whole army to a more serious attack. Philip, with imprudent gallantry, also sallied from his camp, and was driven back with considerable loss within the protection of his batteries. The Romans pursued him thither, and began in their turn to suffer very severely from the

<sup>2</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxii. c. 10.

perpetual discharge of his engines. But their ardour still carried them onward, until their retreat must have been accompanied with great danger, when the shouts of the Romans pouring down on the enemy's rear, spread an alarm in that quarter, which was quickly communicated to the whole Macedonian army<sup>2</sup>. Philip and his men, alike panic struck, betook themselves to a disorderly flight, and were transported by their terrors over ground where neither cavalry nor heavy infantry could follow them. The king did not recover from his consternation till he had reached a commanding eminence five miles distant. He then began to rally the fugitives: two thousand were missing; their camp was occupied by the Romans.

After this success, the consul paused to provide himself with proper guides from among the Epirots and Athamanians, and to consider in what manner he might with most safety pursue the enemy. The king, he found, had taken post on mount Lingon, whose northern side looked towards Macedon, and whose long eastern ridges shut up Thessaly. It was covered with thick forests, and its highest regions contained wide fields, and abundance of perennial springs. In this post Philip remained several days, uncertain whether to retreat towards his hereditary kingdom, or to make a stand in Thessaly and defend the most ancient and the most valuable of his Grecian provinces. The latter measure was adopted. He descended to the frontier town of Tricca, and thence following the course of the river Peneus, traversed in their utmost breadth the fertile plains of Thessaly even to the valley of Tempe and its mountains Olympus and Ossa, which overhang the Thermoë gulph. In his hasty progress through the country, he commanded the inhabitants of some defenceless towns to follow him with their most precious effects, lest they should fall a prey to the invaders. What could not be transported by the natives, was either burned or seized as booty by his soldiers. He had scarcely ended his march, when the Etolians and

Thessaly ravaged by four armies. Olymp. cxlv. 3. B. C. 198.

<sup>2</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxii. c. 12.

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a man devoted to Philip, had elected for pretor Aristænus, a warm partizan of Rome. The occasion seemed favourable for gaining that confederacy, especially by opening the prospect of recovering Corinth which had formerly belonged to it. With this proposal, ambassadors were sent from the Romans, from Attalus, from the Rhodians, and from the Athenians: the states of Achaia agreed to hear them at Sicyon, but at the same time called to the council Cleomedon, who, as ambassador from Philip, had long resided in the Peloponnesus. The first day was entirely consumed in hearing the speeches of the contending parties. The Athenians spoke last in reply to Philip's ambassador: as they had suffered the most from that prince, they were likely to make an impression proportional to their high and just resentment. Next day, the council met to deliberate. The herald, according to custom, invited the members to declare their opinions. But all kept silence. Their situation was, indeed, perplexing. Since the praise-worthy reign of Antigonus Doson, who had defended them against Sparta, and enabled them to cement their confederacy, they had been closely connected with the kings of Macedon. Their several states swore annually to Philip, under the name of his allies, an oath rather of fealty than friendship; but they detested the vices, and despised the levity of that prince. They knew his ill-will to Philopœmen, who had infused into many of his countrymen his own elevated patriotism. Philopœmen was now absent in Crete; but all those, who entered into his views, felt an aversion to foreign interference, disdaining Philip, and still more dreading the Romans. The less sound portion of the confederacy, was variously affected towards these powers. In this state of general suspense, the pretor Aristænus arose, observing, that he too would have kept silence, had he been in a private station: but that he felt it his public duty to answer the ambassadors, and that the answer could not be given before the Achæans had decided the nature of it by their decree. Let us therefore consider what fell yesterday from the several ambassadors, not as dictated

dictated by their respective interests, but as different opinions proposed for our deliberation, that we may adopt whichever appears most expedient for ourselves. Under this aspect, the alliance offered by Rome, ought doubtless to be preferred. Peloponnesus is almost an island; the Romans are masters at sea; and we are under the necessity of now accepting them for our friends, or of meeting them instantly as enemies <sup>29</sup>.

His discourse was heard with mixed applause and murmur. Not only the members of the council, but the ten demiurgi without whose consent the vote could not be put, were completely at variance. Five contended for the Roman alliance, five as warmly opposed it. Among the latter was Memnon, whose father Rhisiasus, a citizen of Pallènè, after urging with him every argument to withdraw his opposition, at length threatened him with death if he persisted in disobedience. By the defection of Memnon from his party, a majority of the demiurgi proposed the question: the alliance with Attalus, with the Rhodians, and with Rome was accepted by all the confederate cities, except Argos, Dymè, and Megalopolis. The deputies of these cities rose up and left the council. Argos had given kings to Macedon from whom Philip was descended; Dymè owed peculiar obligations to that prince; and Megalopolis was indebted to his predecessor Antigonus Dofon, not only for its greatness, but its existence as an independent branch of the Achæan confederacy <sup>30</sup>.

How rendered favourable to Rome. Olymp. cxlv. 3. B. C. 198.

The Romans thus obtained the alliance of Achaia, but could not pay the price at which they had agreed to purchase it. Corinth held out against its combined assailants; for Philip, who, from his camp at Tempé, sparingly succoured places of less importance, had been careful strongly to reinforce his garrison in the Corinthian citadel. The consul being obliged at the approach of winter to raise the siege, the Roman fleet sailed to Corcyra; that of Attalus and the Rhodians to the Piræus. For his failure at Corinth, Quintius made some com-

Conférences desired by Philip.

<sup>29</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxii. c. 19. & seq.

<sup>30</sup> Id. ibid. ubi supra. Conf. Polyb. l. ii. c. 48. & seq.

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penfation by taking Elatæa. The Macedonians in the place were allowed to depart unarmed, the citizens had their lives and liberties. The Roman army was then cantoned for the winter in Phocis and Locris. Shortly afterwards a fedition broke out at Opus, a city in the latter diftrict, one party wifhing to furrender it to the Etolians, the other to the Romans, while both were alike eager to expel the Macedonian garrifon. But this garrifon kept poffeffion of the citadel, and was on the point of being attacked by the conful, when ambaffadors came from Philip, faying, that he wifhed for a conference. Quintus listened to this request, becaufe he did not yet know, but expected almoft immediately to learn, whether the Romans had prorogued the term of his command, or appointed one of the new confuls for his fucceffor. In the latter cafe, he would give the conference a pacific turn, and thus enjoy the glory of putting an honourable end to the war; but if the Romans, pleafed with his fuccefs, fhould, as he greatly wifhed, again affign to him the province of Macedon, he determined to reject all terms of accommodation, until he had completely humbled the enemy. He therefore named a time and place for the interview: the time was fuch as fuited his own views; the place was Nicæa, a Locrian town on the Malian gulph, not far from Thermopylæ.

Singular  
bravery of  
500 Achæan  
youths.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 3.  
B. C. 198.

Before the conference took place, a very memorable fcene, in which Philip was concerned, had been tranfacted at Argos. We have feen how the deputies of Argos, from attachment to the Macedonian intereft, abruptly left the Achæan council rather than concur with the majority in concluding an alliance with Rome. They carried home with them this party fpirit, which made it neceffary for the Achæans to fend to Argos a garrifon, confifting of five hundred youths felectd from the different cities of the league, and zealoufly attached to its interefts. It was the cuftom at Argos, on the firft day of afsembly, to invoke the auspicious names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hercules, to which the name of Philip had of late years been added;

a cere-

a ceremony, that, according to the pliant superstition of the Greeks, seemed a becoming respect to the king, while he was regarded as protector of the Achæans; but as this people had just confederated with his enemies, the invocation of Philip was deemed improper by the herald, and therefore omitted by him. The partisans of Macedonia exclaimed against the omission: the honour, they said, had been legally decreed to the king; and the decree had never been rescinded. Philip, besides that his family claimed its descent from Argos, was highly popular in that city, in whose numerous festivities he had often with winning friendliness presided. The general voice of the assembly demanded that his name should be invoked as formerly. This circumstance escaped not the notice of Philocles, the Macedonian governor of Corinth. He hastened to Argos with a strong detachment, and took post in the night on Larissa, a hill so named commanding the city. In the morning, he descended in hostile array to make an easy conquest, as most of the Argives were well affected to his master, when he perceived advancing towards him the five hundred Achæan youths also in order of battle. He sent to them a herald with orders to stop their progress, and exhort them to return to their respective cities; while he shewed them how unable they were to contend even with the Argive citizens, much less to combat the Macedonians, who had so recently defeated the Romans and driven them from Corinth. The youths determined unanimously to obey their commander Ænefedemus of Dymē; and inadequate as their numbers were to a successful struggle, for the Argives by this time appeared in arms against them, resolved with one accord to fight and die for their country. But Ænefedemus, unwilling that the flower of Achaia should be untimely cropped, entered into a composition with Philocles for their departure in safety. In compliance with the orders of their leader, they left the field, Ænefedemus only remaining with a few Achæans attached to his person. Philocles sent a small band of Thracians to learn of him the reason

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Conferences  
at Nicæa.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

At length the time approached, in which the king and consul were to hold their proposed conference. Philip sailed for this purpose from Demetrias, in a large ship of war, attended by five smaller vessels. He carried with him his secretaries Apollodorus and Demosthenes, Macedonians; Brachylles a Bœotian; and Cycliades, recently pretor of the Achæans, but now living in exile since the confederacy of his republic with Rome". Quintius came to the shore to meet him with a more numerous and far nobler attendance. Amyntander, king of the Athamanians, Dionysodorus ambassador from king Attalus, Acesimbrotus commander of the Rhodian fleet, Phœnias pretor of the Etolians, with other leading men belonging to the Etolians and Achæans. At the sight of this great retinue, Philip kept aloof, and declined coming to land when beckoned by the consul. Upon which Quintius asked him of what he was afraid? He answered, the gods only are the objects of my fear, but I distrust many whom I see around you, and chiefly the Etolians. Trust, the Roman said, is not to be wantonly reposed in enemies, but here the danger is mutual and equal. That, rejoined Philip, is not true: for if Phœnias the Etolian were slain, his countrymen would easily find many new and fit pretors, but in case of the like accident to myself, the Macedonians must at this time be left with a minor for their king. This ill-breeding at the outset shocked all present; and Philip was desired to explain wherefore he had requested a meeting. He said, that it belonged rather to the consul to say wherefore he had

entered

entered his dominions, and on what conditions he would be contented to quit them. The conditions of peace which I shall propose, said Quintius, are clear and simple; you must relinquish every part of Greece, restoring all prisoners and deserters to their respective states: you must restore to the Romans the places occupied by you in Illyricum, in violation of your treaty formerly concluded with the senate: you must restore also to their friend and pupil Ptolemy Epiphanes, all the cities which you have wrested from him since the death of his father. Such are the demands of the Romans; their allies, here present, will speak for themselves. Attalus' ambassador then required that Philip should surrender to his master, the ships, together with their crews, taken in the famous battle of Chios or Caliste; and that he should restore the Nicæphorium, the sacred ornament of Pergamus, to the same splendid condition, in which his desolating invasion had found it. The Rhodians next insisted that he should withdraw his garrisons from Caria, the coasts of which rightfully belonged to them, and that he should evacuate Sestos and Abydos, and all other cities of traffic in Asia, or round the narrow seas. The Achæans demanded the restitution of Corinth and Argos. The Etolians spoke last, to the same effect as the Romans, that Philip should totally relinquish Greece, after he had restored to themselves in as good a condition as that in which they formerly stood, all the places which he had detached from their confederacy. These demands were made briefly by Phœnias the Etolian pretor. But there was a man called Alexander the Hæan, from his native city Ilius<sup>1</sup>, who passed among the Etolians for an able orator. This man availed himself of an opportunity to display his talents, by intervening against Philip in the most bitter terms, as a prince disgraced by every thing perfidious in negotiation, or cruel and cowardly in war. His merciless denunciations of defenceless districts, accompanied

<sup>1</sup> Strabo places Ilius in Bœotia, there must have been another place of the same name in Etolia.

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with the burning of sacred groves, and the demolition of temples, he contrasted with the glorious exploits of former Macedonian kings; of the great Alexander who conquered the Eastern world, less with a view to gratify his own resentment or ambition, than to promote the best interests even of the vanquished; of the numerous successors of that prince, who contended nobly with each other for empire, but never absurdly, by desolating countries and sacking cities, robbed all concerned of the just prizes of victory. What madness! to wage war merely for the sake of war, and to destroy those very objects on account of which it can ever reasonably be carried on! The Isian then took a review of Philip's reign, and shewed how obnoxious he had rendered himself to these reproaches. When his invective ended, the king approached nearer to land, and stood forward in his ship to reply. But he had not proceeded far in his discourse, when he was rudely interrupted by the pretor Phœnias, who told him that his excuses were useless and senseless; he had but one alternative, either to conquer in battle, or to submit to the conditions required of him. This, said Philip, is clear even to a blind man; for it happened that Phœnias had weak purblind eyes; and, after explaining the causes which had made him act on some occasions with a severity repugnant to his nature, arraigned in his turn a law of the Etolians, which permitted them "to take spoils from the spoils;" an execrable practice, he said, which both himself and other Greeks had often solemnly exhorted them to abolish, but with so little effect, that the only answer given was, that it would be as easy to separate Etolia from Etolia, as to rescind the law in question. The consul wondering what this might mean, Philip proceeded to describe the unprincipled proceedings of the Etolians, who treated alike friends and foes, and who, in all their wars, lost no opportunity of plundering their own allies, on pretence that these allies were thereby saved from being plundered by their enemies. Having thus explained the technical expression of "taking spoils from the spoils," employed by

by the Etolians to cloak their rapacity, he observed, that the condition imposed on him of relinquishing Greece, sounded harsh and haughty even in the Romans; but that, from the Etolians, such language was altogether intolerable; from men who had neither the laws nor manners of Greece, and many of whose townships had never been acknowledged to belong to that country. The districts of the Agræans, Apodotæ, and Amphilocheians, are indeed in Etolia, yet are no parts of Greece. These doubtless you resign to me. Quintius smiled at this conceit. Philip then said, that to the Achæans he would restore Argos, but not Corinth: to the Rhodians, that he would give back Peræa in Caria: that Attalus should have his ships with their crews, but for his grove of the Nicephorium, he knew not how to make the restitution required, except by sending to him some plants, with persons properly qualified to cultivate and rear them. Quintius again smiled at this taunt. The king then addressing himself to the consul, in particular, asked whether in his opinion it were just that he should part with the Greek cities that had been transmitted to him from his ancestors. To this the Roman not making any reply, the pretors of the Achæans and Etolians again rose to speak. But the day was far advanced, and Philip, besides, was unwilling to hear any more of their reproaches. He therefore desired that the conditions of peace might be given to him in writing: he wished, he said, to retire and consider them at leisure by himself, for he was there alone without any person to advise with. Quintius, who had listened with complaisance to the king's biting jests, thought that he ought not here to let slip the opportunity of being witty in his turn. He therefore said, perhaps Philip you are alone, because you have put to death your best friends. The king forced a reluctant grin, called the Sardonic smile; and the con-

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, l. xvii. c. 4—9. The wit on time is contrasted, as we shall see below, with his wit on the occasion of his death. The king's wit on time is contrasted, as we shall see below, with his wit on the occasion of his death. The king's wit on time is contrasted, as we shall see below, with his wit on the occasion of his death.

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ference thus ended as coarsely and brutally as it had begun". The conditions however were given to Philip in writing, and a second meeting was appointed. To this the king came at a late hour of the day, on pretence that he could not sooner make up his mind, but in reality to avoid the insulting declamations of his adversaries. At his earnest desire, he held a long discourse with the consul apart, the Greek deputies having for this purpose retired to a proper distance from the shore. Upon their return, Philip's propositions were communicated, and declared to be altogether unsatisfactory; but as the lateness of the hour did not admit of hearing their respective objections, a third conference was appointed for the following day at Thronium, a place five miles from Nicæa, and also on the sea shore. Here, after much altercation, it was finally determined that Philip should have a truce for two months, that he might have time to send ambassadors to the senate; and although this condescension was disapproved at first by the allies, the consul engaged them to consent to it, by representing, that as the resolutions of peace or war depended entirely on the senate, the present was the fittest occasion for consulting that council, when, on account of the severity of winter, it was yet impossible to take the field against the common enemy.

Negotiations  
at Rome.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

Quintius had by this time received from his friends at Rome flattering intimations but no positive assurances, that he would be continued in his province. He sent, therefore, together with Philip's ambassadors, a deputation from himself to the senate, and likewise Amyntander king of the Athamanians, whose royal title he thought would give him importance and weight, and whose pliancy of temper, he knew, would make him implicitly submit to the direction of those friends at Rome to whom he was addressed. Fit deputies were also sent from the Achæans, Etolians, and Athenians. By this management, the affair was not brought before the senate, until a decree had passed for continuing Quintius in Greece. The ambassadors then

\* Id. ibid.

desired

desired to be heard, and urged again with the senate precisely the same arguments which they had used at the preceding conferences with Philip, insisting chiefly, that there could be no safety for their several states, whatever concessions might be obtained in other points, while that prince kept hold of Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, which, with no less truth than insolence, he called the three fetters of Greece. When the king's ambassadors began to make reply, in a studied oration, their discourse was cut short, and an explicit answer demanded, whether their master was ready to withdraw his garrisons from the three cities in question? They acknowledged that their instructions did not extend thus far, and were dismissed from the senate, not unblamed by that assembly, for having presumed to appear in it with such imperfect powers<sup>36</sup>.

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In return for the truce granted to him, Philip had withdrawn his remaining garrisons from Locris and Phocis, so that Quintius enjoyed perfect ease and security during his winter quarters. Upon the approach of spring, the Romans voted him a reinforcement of five thousand foot and five hundred horse, to be conducted by Sulpicius and Villius, now appointed lieutenants to Quintius, in the same war which they had before carried on as generals. A supply of three thousand sailors was also decreed to the proconsul's brother Lucius, who remained at Corcyra as commander of the fleet. During the continuance of the truce, Philip had not been inactive in preparing for a renewal of hostilities, nor hesitated in adopting any measure, however unwarrantable, that promised to retrieve his affairs, or promote his security. Before he returned to Macedon, for the purpose of recruiting his army, he endeavoured to deprive the proconsul of the advantages which might be expected from his confederacy with the Achaean league. With this view Philip condescended to court his old enemy Nabis, and even surrendered to him the city of Argos; a city whose inhabitants had so recently shewn the warmest

Transactions  
with the ty-  
rant Nabis.  
Olymp. 2  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

<sup>36</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxii. c. 37.

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personal attachment to himself, but who, when it suited his convenience, were resigned by him into the hands of a merciless tyrant. This most disgraceful action Philip hoped indeed to colour, by the pretence that Argos was only given as a deposit, that it might be defended against his enemies. But Nabis did not thus understand the transaction. By the division of lands, and abolition of debts, two firebrands always employed by tyrannical demagogues, he quickly reduced Argos to the level of Sparta", and destroyed, or drove into exile, every family, and every individual of birth or fortune in the commonwealth. Having thus moulded the Argives agreeably to his own views, he was so regardless of Philip's interest, that he sent an embassy to Quintius at Elatæa, saying, that if he made a journey into Peloponnesus, he doubted not that matters for their common benefit would be amicably adjusted between them. Upon this message, the proconsul went to Anticyra, and sailed from thence to Sicyon with ten quinqueres, that had been brought round by his brother Lucius from Coreyra. He was met at Sicyon according to appointment, by king Attalus, whose fleet lay at Ægina; and by Nicostratus, pretor of the Achæans. Attalus advised the proconsul by no means to trust himself in Argos; the conference with the tyrant was therefore held at a place called Mycenica, a little distant from the city. The proconsul, with his brother Lucius, as well as Attalus and Nicostratus, all came unarmed. They found Nabis at the head of his soldiers. He began by apologising for this martial appearance, saying, that he had no distrust of any present, but that it was necessary for him to be on his guard against the Argive exiles. Quintius made two demands, that the tyrant should supply him with a body of men to act against Philip; and that he should conclude a peace with the Achæans. The former requisition was complied with; but instead of a peace, all that could be obtained

<sup>41</sup> Rogationem promulgavit unam de tabulis novis, alteram de agro viritum dividendo, duas faces novantibus res ad plebem in op-  
timates accendendam. Tit. Liv. lib. xxi. 38.

by Nicostratus was a truce for four months. Attalus also, who on every occasion espoused the cause of humanity and justice, failed in obtaining some mitigation of suffering for the unhappy Argives. Nabis positively refused to withdraw his mercenaries from their city, lest even those Argives who had shared with him the plunder of their superiors, might be disposed to take arms to avoid being plundered in their turn<sup>18</sup>.

Quintius was alone benefited by the transaction with Nabis, having derived from it a reinforcement of six hundred Cretans. With these, he paraded in his return to Anticyra before the gates of Corinth, in order to shew Philocles, who commanded there for Philip, that Nabis had deserted his master, and to induce that governor also to revolt. Philocles refused to betray his trust; but his behaviour was such as left room to conjecture that his loyalty was not unalterable. To promote the proconsul's views, Attalus had ordered his fleet into the harbour Cenchreæ. He proceeded to join it there, after visiting the little commonwealth of Sicyon, between which and himself there had long subsisted a connection founded on similarity of principles and pursuits, and strongly cemented by many mutual good offices. The king presented that community with ten talents of silver and ten thousand bushels of corn; the Sicyonians honoured him in return with altars and statues<sup>19</sup>.

Attalus in  
Sicyon.

The proconsul, as the season for taking the field approached, removed from Anticyra, near the southern extremity of Phocis, and fixed his quarters at Elatsæa, on the northern frontier of that province. From this commanding post, taking a view of his strength and alliances, he had just grounds for confidence. The neighbouring countries of Phocis, Doris, and Locris, were entirely at his devotion. The Peloponnæus was behind him, the whole of which was in his interest, except the single city of Corinth. On his right hand, the Athenians and Megareans were zealous allies; on his left the Eto-

Magnani-  
mity and  
good faith of  
the Acarna-  
nians.

<sup>18</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxii. c. 39 & 40.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, l. xvii. c. 5

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lians had equal inclination and far more power to serve him. The rich plains of Thessaly were in front, where, in all probability, Philip would make a stand, at once to defend those valuable possessions, and to resist the invasion of his hereditary kingdom. Yet this dazzling prospect did not tempt the proconsul to advance into Thessaly, until he had endeavoured to gain the only states behind him, which had not yet espoused his party. These were the Acarnanians on the west, and the Boeotians on the east. His brother Lucius failed therefore to the coast of Acarnania; and after all negotiation had failed with a people of high honour and invincibly firm in their friendships, laid siege to Leucas. His assaults were repelled, and the Acarnanians vindicated their good faith to Philip by deeds of heroic valour; nor did they submit to become allies to Rome, until that prince had been defeated in the decisive battle of Kynocéphalæ<sup>40</sup>.

Thebes  
gained by  
stratagem.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

The proconsul took on himself to secure the alliance of the Boeotians, and attained this object by a stratagem unworthy of his character. Having sent for Attalus to Elataæ, he marched, together with him and Aristænus, pretor of the Achæans, through Phocis, and fixed his camp at the distance of five miles from Thebes. Next day, escorted by a single manipule or company of soldiers, they proceeded to that city, the proconsul having taken care that two thousand armed men should follow them, at such an interval as sufficed to prevent suspicion. Antiphilus, the Boeotian pretor, who had recently obtained that office in preference to Brachylles, a man totally devoted to Philip, and now attending that prince, came forth to meet them with a crowd of citizens. As they approached the gates, Quintius proceeded more slowly, on pretence of saluting the multitude, but really with a view that his armed men (the *Hæstati* of two legions) might have time to come up. Amidst the curiosity and bustle of the multitude, the lictors driving before them the townf-

<sup>40</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 16. Conf. Polyb. l. iv. c. 30.

men who obstructed the procession, the Thebans did not immediately observe, or, observing, did not oppose, the entrance of two thousand Roman soldiers within their gates. When they found this body of men surrounding the place of hospitality appointed for the reception of their illustrious visitants, they immediately took the alarm, and doubted not that the city had been betrayed by their pretor. But the glories of Epaminondas and Pelopidas were forgotten: the Thebans were no longer a public spirited, or even a martial people; complaint would be unavailing and might prove dangerous; an assembly therefore was proclaimed for next day, to deliberate on the alliance with Rome; and, as all the inferior cities of Bœotia had on this occasion sent deputies to Thebes, the measure was carried with unanimous approbation\*. This assembly is memorable for a melancholy event which happened in it. Attalus, in the seventy-third year of his age, having overstrained his voice in urging the alliance with Rome, fell down in a fit, and died a few weeks afterwards, in consequence of the only transaction of his public life, of which, in a reign of forty-five years, he had reason to be ashamed. Since his glorious victory over the Gauls, in the first year of his reign, he had been formidable to his enemies, faithful to his allies, indulgent to his subjects, and bound in cordial domestic affection with a family of four sons and their respectable mother Apollonis or Apollonias, a humble native of Cyzicus, but whose virtues endeared her through a long life to her husband Attalus, and her sons Eumenes II. and Attalus surnamed Philadelphus, who followed him successively on the throne\*. To sooth the sufferings of Attalus, the

Death of  
Attalus.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

\* Tit. Liv. xxxiii. 1, 2.  
Polybius, l. xxi. c. 24. l. xxiii. c. 3 &  
c. 28. & Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 2, & l. xlii.  
c. 55. The other sons of Attalus were Phile-  
tarius and Athenæus. Liv. ibid. Apol-  
lonias thanked the gods, not for making her  
the wife and mother of kings, but for the  
concord that prevailed in the royal family.  
Plutarch de Fratern. Amore, p. 480. Her

religious procession through the temples of  
Cyzicus in the midst of her sons, her hands  
clasped in theirs, was a spectacle of delight to  
the companions of her humble days, the  
natives of Cyzicus. She was compared with  
the happy mother of Cleobis and Biton. See  
Herodotus, l. i. 31. & Cicero Tuscul. l. i.  
c. 47. Conf. Polyb. l. xxxiii. c. 18.

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proconsul remained longer than he would otherwise have done at Thebes. As soon as the king's condition permitted, he was conveyed to his ships, and set sail for Elæa, his principal harbour; while Quintius returned to Elatæa, and bent his whole thoughts to the prosecution of the war against Philip.

Movements  
preceding  
the battle of  
Kynoc-  
phalæ.

That prince had recruited his army, with much difficulty, in a country exhausted by six years of uninterrupted war. He was compelled to admit into the Macedonian phalanx many youths who had barely passed their sixteenth year, and many old men beyond the age of sixty. To this heavy armed body of sixteen thousand men, he added above five thousand lighter troops, with two thousand cavalry, and marched towards the frontier town of Dium, and afterwards to Larissa in Thessaly. The consul, about the same time, entered that province by the straits of Thermopylæ, commanding two Roman legions and about ten thousand allies; Greeks, Athamanians, and Epirots. His infantry was equal to the enemy's; his cavalry was more numerous than theirs, and also bolder and better disciplined; for the Thessalians, who had long languished under the dominion of Macedon, were no longer those fearless and gallant horsemen, who maintained such high renown under Jason and Menon, their native and hereditary leaders. The proconsul, adhering to his plan of leaving as few enemies as possible behind him, attacked, in his way to Pheræ, Phthian Thebes, in which city he had secret abettors. The enterprise failed; he advanced however into the heart of Thessaly, and encamped at the distance of five miles from Pheræ. It happened that, almost precisely at the same time, Philip encamped within three miles of the same city, but on the opposite side of it; for upon hearing of the operations against Phthian Thebes, and conjecturing that the enemy still remained in that neighbourhood, he had hastened southward with his whole army from Larissa. He arrived at Pheræ towards evening, and, at early dawn, sent forth some light troops on discovery. Quintius adopted the same measure; and the

the hostile parties had nearly met on the ridgy eminence that overlooks the city, when their armour, gleaming with the first rays of the sun, discovered them to each other. They both halted; and after sending notice to their respective camps of their mutual discovery, were both ordered to return. During the whole of that day they remained quiet. Next morning, a body of Roman and Etolian horse, with a due proportion of light infantry, proceeded to the road leading from Pheræ to Larissa; they were encountered there by a more numerous band of Thessalians and Macedonians: the conflict was obstinate but undecisive; both parties returned to camp, the Macedonians having suffered most in the action, so bravely had the Etolians fought under their leader Eupolemus, and so efficaciously had he exhorted the troops of Italy to follow their example<sup>42</sup>.

The event of this skirmish reminded Philip, that the ground about Pheræ, every where covered with inclosures, plantations, and gardens, was equally unfit for the operations of his phalanx, and the compact charge of his Thessalian horse. He wished besides to remove to Scotussa, about thirty miles northward, where he would find ample supplies of corn. The proconsul penetrated his design, so that the two armies again decamped at nearly the same time, and on this occasion marched in a parallel direction, the space between them being filled up by a hilly chain extending all the way from Pheræ to Scotussa, of no great loftiness, yet sufficient to conceal the armies from each other. Philip pursuing his march on the right, made his first halt on the banks of the Onchestus; the proconsul following the direct road, encamped the first night at Eretria. Next day, both parties prosecuting their begun course, Philip rested at Melambium, in the district of Scotussa, and Quintius at Thetidium, in that of Pharsalus. The following morning brought impetuous torrents of rain, accompanied by tremendous thunder; and so thick a darkness fell on the earth, that the soldiers could with difficulty

Parallel  
march to  
Kynoc-  
phalæ.

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Battle of  
Kynocce-  
phalæ.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

find their way. Philip, however, who was so near to Scotussa and the end of his journey, began to march, but afterwards thought proper again to encamp, having first detached a body of light troops to take possession of the heights between the two armies. Quintus continued in his camp at Thetidium, but sent out on discovery a body of light infantry, with ten troops of horse. This party fell in with the Macedonians on the heights above mentioned. A conflict ensued, and the Romans were in danger of being defeated, when a reinforcement of two thousand foot and five hundred horse came seasonably to their relief. The face of affairs now changed; the Macedonians were pressed in their turn, and forced to retreat back to the ground from which they had repelled the enemy. As the darkness began to disperse, Philip, who never suspected that he would be so soon compelled to come to a general engagement, had allowed numerous parties to leave the camp in quest of food. But being informed of the danger of his detachment, he ordered most of the Thessalian and Macedonian cavalry, with all his mercenaries, except the Thracians, to advance to its rescue, with positive orders to return quickly, after effecting this service. In the action which followed, the Macedonians were completely successful; their detachment was not only rescued, but the Romans were driven from the heights, and pursued with such slaughter and shouts of victory as spread general consternation through their camp. Their loss would have been still greater but for the incredible exertions of the Etolian cavalry, which, though often repelled, returned again as often to the charge. When the tumult of war first reached the proconsul, he drew his men from their intrenchments, and posted them near the foot of the hills, which were far less abrupt and rough on his own side than on that of the Macedonian encampment. Having addressed the soldiers in a short and suitable discourse, he ordered his right wing to remain in reserve, and at the head of his left moved towards the enemy. Meanwhile successive messengers came

to Philip, proclaiming with exultation that the Romans were put to flight; that he had only to advance and complete his victory. Philip liked neither the time nor the place; for his foragers had barely returned from their fatiguing excursions, and the heights which he must ascend were roughened by the protuberances of Kynoscephalæ<sup>44</sup>, so called because their rugged cliffs bore a fanciful resemblance to the heads of grinning dogs. Yet the sanguine ardour of his mind carried him into a situation that made a general engagement unavoidable. At the head of his targeteers and the right division of his phalanx, he marched in good order to seize the heights, commanding Nicanor to bring up the remainder and far larger division with all possible expedition. The king advanced to his ground in column, and then formed his line of battle to the left, thirty-two deep. The day would have been his own, had Nicanor pursued a similar course, or been able, from the nature of the ground, to proceed with equal celerity. But that general, to avoid loss of time in forming when he should reach the summit, brought forwards his men in order of battle; the sections of his line thus finding, some of them no difficulties, and others almost unsurmountable obstacles in their way, were separated from each other; their impatience to ascend only increased their disorder, and the greater part were still clambering over rocks and crevices, when Philip was compelled to engage the enemy. The Macedonians levelled their spears; and on this occasion the phalanx maintained the superiority which it always enjoyed in close engagement over all other kinds of military force. The Romans receded; and their retreat was soon so manifest, that a general, less skilful than Quintius, would have considered the battle as lost. In this difficulty his sole confidence was in his right wing, which had stood in reserve, fronted by a chain of elephants to break the first violent irruption of the phalanx. While his left gave way, this division had advanced

<sup>44</sup> Or Cynoscephalæ; the change of the first C into K better indicates the meaning of the name.

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against the Macedonians, who were still employed in surmounting the rocks of Kynoscephalæ; and who, in their disorder, being only encumbered by their long spears and heavy shields, were altogether unable to resist the Roman sword in a desultory combat. Quintius joined the victorious part of his army, and by completing, on this side, the overthrow of the enemy, made some compensation for the disgrace of his left wing. But in this state of affairs, a Roman tribune, whom historians do not name, fixed the fortune of the day, and obtained a great and ever-memorable victory.\* Leaving it to his companions to cut down the Macedonians that were flying before them, he withdrew from the pursuit twenty maniples or companies, and returned with the utmost speed to attack Philip's victorious division in rear. This assault was decisive, for the Macedonians were not headed by an Alexander, who, in such an emergency, would have availed himself of his great depth, to form the double-fronted phalanx, and thus have resisted the enemy behind him, without ceasing the action in front. But, as this movement was not attempted, as the Macedonian left wing was irrecoverably lost, and as the Romans, who had been repulsed by Philip, were still maintaining a running fight, and when they perceived the disorder in his line, began to act with reanimated hope, the havoc made by the tribune and his maniples, continually inflicting wounds which the enemy had no means either to ward off or retort, spread dismay through the whole phalanx. The greater part, throwing away their useless arms, betook themselves to a shameful flight. It is uncertain whether those, who retained them, received quarter; for in another scene of the action, Quintius had not been able to save a division of the enemy's left wing, who, on perceiving his approach, erected their spears in token of surrender. The Romans not understanding, or affecting not to understand the meaning of this manœuvre, cut most of them in pieces before the present

\* Polybius, l. xviii. c. 4. & seq. & Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 7. & seq.

by explaining its signification, could effectually interpose in their favour. This victory, whose consequences were so important, is said to have cost the Romans but seven hundred men; of the Macedonians eight thousand were slain, and five thousand made prisoners \*.

When Philip saw the troops under his immediate command throw down their arms, he fled with some horse and light infantry to a neighbouring eminence, from whence he could survey the whole extent of his disaster. He then hastened to Gonni, a strong post at the entrance of the narrow and intricate vale of Tempè, and about fifteen miles distant from the field of battle. In the fortified camp, which he had formerly occupied there, he determined to halt, until he should collect the sad remains of his discomfited army; sending orders meanwhile to Larissa, to burn all his letters and papers, which, upon marching against the Romans, he had deposited in that city. This cool recollection in the midst of such heavy calamities, does no small credit to the king, for had his correspondence been preserved, the discoveries contained in it would not only have exasperated the Romans against himself, but provoked their keenest resentment against many of his friends \*. While the Macedonians sought safety amidst the winding defiles of Tempè, the Romans had been anticipated by the Etolians, in plundering the king's camp at Kynoscephalæ; they secured, however, a gleanings of booty with their prisoners; and proceeded to Larissa, which, like the other cities of Thessaly, was now ready to open its gates to the victors. Thither Philip immediately sent heralds, on pretence of craving a suspension of arms that he might bury his slain, but really with a view to obtain the permission of entering into a negociation for peace. Quintus gratified the heralds to the full extent of their requests, desiring them to tell the king to be of good courage, and to hope every thing from the clemency of Rome. We shall presently see the Roman's motives for a moderation, which gave much offence to his allies, par-

Negotiations  
for peace.

\* Id. *ibid.*

Polyb. l. xviii. c. 17.

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Opposition  
made to it by  
the Etolians.

particularly the Etolians. This relentless people maintained, that there could be no security for themselves or the other states of Greece, until Philip was either slain or deprived of his kingdom. But the proconsul told them, that the Romans were not accustomed to carry on war with such implacable revenge. Good policy, he said, required that Philip should be humbled, not ruined. If the power of Macedon became extinct, what bulwark would remain to the Greeks against the Thracians, the Illyrians, the Treballi, and all the fierce nations around the Danube? Shortly afterwards two of Philip's friends, Demosthenes and Cyniadades, came to propose a conference between their master and the generals of the allies. The arrangements for this meeting were fixed by the proconsul; and all parties assembled at the entrance of the vale of Tempe on the day appointed. At this interview Philip appeared quite a new man: his coarseness and asperity had hitherto been offensive; he now conciliated the good-will of all by his urbanity and mildness. Instead of disputing the ground, as it were, inch by inch, and then either yielding angrily, or holding out obstinately, he was more forward to make concessions than his enemies were to require them. Alexander the Isian, and Phænias the Etolian pretor, alone remained obdurate; alike insensible to his misfortunes, and to the spirit with which he sustained them. When the king shewed the utmost readiness to relinquish not only the conquests made by himself, but even many possessions that had descended to him from his ancestors, Phænias demanded explicitly, do you then abandon to us Larissa, Pharsalus, Phthian Thebes and Echinus? Philip replied, take them all, and welcome. Upon this Quintius interposed, observing, that to those cities of Thessaly which had voluntarily accepted their alliance, neither himself nor the Etolians could lay any fair claim. Phthian Thebes alone, which had shut its gates and rejected the friendship of Rome, was a just and legitimate conquest<sup>47</sup>.

<sup>47</sup> Polyb. l. xviii. c. 19—22. Tit. Liv. l. xxx. c. 13.

This remark highly offended the Etolians, who objected to it the terms of their confederacy with the Romans in the former war, stipulating that all moveable spoil should belong to the latter ; but that conquered cities and territories should accrue to themselves. Quintus answered, that the treaty alluded to had been done away, when the Etolians in the former war made a separate peace with Philip, without consulting, as good faith required, their Roman allies. He might have added, but was probably restrained by a sense of dignity, that the Etolians had flagrantly violated the terms of their first confederacy with Rome, in being the foremost to plunder the king's camp at Kynoscephalæ, and thus depriving the Romans of any considerable share of the booty. The proconsul's resentment at this transaction, was heightened by the whole behaviour of that selfish and arrogant people. Not more rapacious of wealth than covetous of undeserved fame, their presumption claimed for themselves the chief, or rather sole honours of the war. According to their unblushing encomiasts<sup>48</sup>, the Etolians, rather than the Romans, had gained the battle of Kynoscephalæ, and to them fairly belonged the first prizes of victory. Indignation against these insolent allies, whose pretensions were re-echoed throughout Greece, concurred with other causes, that will be explained hereafter, to make Quintus come to a speedy adjustment with the common enemy. Philip was required to pay the sum of two hundred talents, and to surrender his younger son Demetrius, and a few other hostages. He was allowed in return to send ambassadors to the senate, with assurances from the proconsul, that if his negotiation failed, his hostages

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Provisional  
terms granted  
to Philip.  
Olymp.  
calv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

<sup>48</sup> One of these was the poet Alceus, who contrasted the bravery of the Etolians with the cowardice of Philip, who ran away from Kynoscephalæ, leaving the slain unburied. Philip, who was also a poet, parodied his impertinent verses by the following inscription for a gallows:—

Luxuriant once, I widely swept the ground,  
My fragrant boughs diffusing sweets around;  
But now, a sapless gibbet, doom'd to bear  
The traitor Alceus, rotting in the air.

Translated from Plut. in Flamin.

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and money should be restored to him". To allow full time for a happy accommodation of differences, a truce of four months was granted; an interval chequered with events, some of which were calculated to soften, while others had a tendency to aggravate the hard conditions of peace imposed on Philip by the senate.

<sup>49</sup> Polybius. l. xviii. c. 22.

## CHAPTER XIX.

*Progress of Antiochus.—His politic Views.—War in Greece.—Murders and Robberies in Bæotia.—The Rhodians oppose Antiochus.—Isthmian Games.—Proclamation of the Liberties of Greece.—Antiochus' Thracian Expedition.—Conferences at Lysimachia.—Conspiracy in Egypt.—The Usurpation of the Romans arraigned by Alexander the Etolian.—War against the Tyrant Nabis.—The Romans withdraw from Greece.—Glory of Quintius Flaminius.*

**H**AD the Romans made war on Philip, merely in defence of their allies, Antiochus, at the same time, ought to have become the object of their hostility. The latter prince had wrested from Ptolemy Epiphanes, whom they fondly denominated their pupil, both Coeleſyria and Phenicia<sup>1</sup>, and had availed himself of the resources of these provinces in men, timber, and iron, to equip a fleet, which gave great importance by sea to a power long formidable by land. After a seven years war in the East, during which, through the resistless vigour of the phalanx and its accompanying cavalry, he had disarmed the rebellion of Parthia and Bactria, and dispelled the contagion of revolt from neighbouring satrapies, Antiochus turned his arms westward, that he might restore the Syrian monarchy to the fullness of its ancient splendour. In the prosecution of this design, he respected neither the free cities on the coast of Lesser Asia, nor the allies of Rhodes in that peninsula, nor the dominions of Attalus king of Pergamus. Attalus, who was then zealously co-operating with the Romans in the war against Philip, their common enemy, sent ambassadors to the senate, requesting that either the le-

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Progress of  
Antiochus.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 3.  
B. C. 198.

Stopped  
partly by ne-  
gociation.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 3.  
B. C. 198.

Polybius, l. xvi. c. 18, & seqq. Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 19.

gions

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gions of Italy might be dispatched to defend him against Antiochus, or that he should be excused for abandoning the affairs of Greece; at a crisis peculiarly threatening to his hereditary kingdom. The Romans replied, that they could not employ their forces against Antiochus, that prince being their ally; but would send to him an embassy, desiring him to relinquish all hostile designs against Attalus, who was also in alliance with them; that kings, friends to the Romans, ought to live in friendship with each other. In consequence of remonstrances from Rome, joined to another cause still more powerful, Antiochus withdrew from Lesser Asia, and Attalus continued to prosecute unremittingly the war against Philip, both by arms and negociation, until, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, he fell a martyr to his zeal, and breathed out, as it were, his soul with his voice, in arraigning the common foe before the assembled Boeotians.

War in Syria.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 1-3.  
B. C. 200-  
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The cause that made Antiochus return hastily towards Syria, originated in Egypt. Those who governed that country during the nonage of Ptolemy Epiphanes, had beheld with much regret the dismemberment of Coelestria and Phenicia from their master's kingdom. Hopeless of recovering these provinces by cowardly Egyptians and degenerate Alexandrian Greeks, they had recourse to Scopas, formerly, as we have seen, pretor of the Etolians, but who from dissatisfaction at home, had come to Egypt in quest of riches and preferment. Scopas was sent back into Greece loaded with money, and with assurances of tempting pay to as many of his countrymen as he could engage to follow his standard. He returned to Egypt at the head of six thousand warlike Etolians, whom, without waiting the usual season for taking the field, he immediately conducted in the winter to the mountains of Coelestria and Judæa. His invasion was not to be resisted by the feeble garrisons left there by Antiochus. Most parts of the coast, as well as the inland cities, sub-

mitted to his arms ; and many of them experienced all the severity with which war was carried on by the most rapacious and relentless of enemies. Antiochus, when apprised of these proceedings, hastened from Lesser Asia into Syria, attacked the Etolians and Scopas, now greatly reinforced in point of numbers from Egypt ; defeated them in a great battle at the foot of mount Panius, near the sources of the Jordan, drove them from the field, and the most important of their strong holds ; and at length shut up Scopas himself, with ten thousand of his men, in Sidon. That city made an obstinate resistance, but was compelled by famine to capitulate. The Etolians and Egyptians only bargained for their lives ; and were allowed to depart unarmed and half naked into Egypt<sup>3</sup>.

On this occasion the Jews, instead of opposing Antiochus, greatly facilitated his success. Enraged at the mad impiety of Ptolemy Philopator, and exasperated by the recent rapacity of the Etolians, the inferior cities of Judæa as well as the capital itself, with its temple and castle, readily opened their gates to a milder and more magnanimous master. Antiochus, to confirm their good will, and to heighten the contrast between himself and the persecuting Philopator, published an edict prohibiting all strangers from entering the temple of Jerusalem. Many Jews from Palestine as well as many of their brethren from Babylonia, were settled by him in Lydia, Phrygia, and other districts of doubtful allegiance, because surrounded by the territories of his enemies. In all such places, Antiochus relied on the firmness and fidelity of the Jews, and therefore frequently reinforced their colonies<sup>4</sup>; a circumstance which accounts for the great numbers of that nation scattered over Lesser Asia at the first preaching of the gospel.

Antiochus' friendship with the Jews. Olymp. cxlv. 3. B. C. 198.

Having settled the affairs of the provinces, which he had thus successfully recovered, Antiochus went into winter quarters at An-

Politic views of Antiochus.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, l. xvi. c. 39. Conf. Hieronym. in Daniel, c. xi.

<sup>4</sup> Josephus, Antiq. Judaic. l. xii. c. 3.

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Olymp.

cxlv. 4.

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Antioch, but prepared early in the spring for renewing hostilities with the utmost vigour. His sons Ardyes and Mithridates, hereditary names in the family of the king of Pontus, to whose daughter he had been twenty-three years married, were sent before him at the head of a great army to Sardes; he took on himself the command of his fleet, amounting to more than a hundred galleys, with which he reduced the maritime cities along the southern coast of the peninsula, as far as Coracesium in Cilicia. While this place detained him before its walls, he received an embassy from Rhodes, which is memorable for the boldness with which so small a republic ventured to defy such a mighty monarch. The Rhodians, adopting the stile of Athens in the meridian of her power, forbade Antiochus, as the Athenians had done Artaxerxes<sup>1</sup>, to pass with an armed force beyond the Chelidonian isles. If he transgressed these boundaries, which lay opposite to Coracesium at the western entrance of the same bay, the Rhodians said, that they would oppose him with their utmost might. The king, dissembling his indignation, replied, that he had no hostile intentions against Rhodes, and that he was on good terms with its Roman allies; he added, that the Rhodians would soon receive from him an embassy in return, to remove every cause of jealousy<sup>2</sup>. Through these pacific declarations and successive missions to Rhodes and to Rome, he endeavoured to lull the suspicions of states, which, being themselves deeply engaged in the war against Philip, were not on their part unwilling to temperize. In whatever manner the fortune of that war should be decided, Antiochus expected to turn the event to his advantage. Should the Romans be repelled from Greece, their Rhodian and Pergamenian allies would no longer have courage to oppose his usurpations in Lesser Asia; should Philip's power, on the contrary, be greatly reduced by the war, the representative of Seleucus Nicator might retire with good

<sup>1</sup> History of Ancient Greece, c. xii. l. xviii. c. 22—24.

<sup>2</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 20. Conf. Polyb.

success

success his claims on Macedon. With these views Antiochus sailed round to Ephesus, and made that harbour the principal station for his fleet: his land army lay at Sardes: and that he might have no disturbance on his southern frontier, while he carried on his great designs in the west, he entered into a friendly correspondence with the regency of Egypt, and concluded a treaty of marriage between his daughter Cleopatra and Ptolemy Epiphanes, then in his eleventh year, with a promise, that when the young prince was of an age to consummate the nuptials, Cleopatra should bring him for her dower the restored allegiance of Coele-Syria and Phenicia<sup>7</sup>.

Meanwhile Philip, who had vainly expected assistance from his Syrian ally, was defeated in the decisive battle of Kynoscephalæ, and allowed a truce of four months to negotiate his peace with Rome. He had scarcely obtained this boon from the proconsul Quintus, when, as if no respite had been doomed to his exertions, he was obliged to hasten from Thessaly into Macedon, to repel an incursion of the Dardanians, the fiercest of the Illyrian tribes, his hereditary enemies. These Barbarians availed themselves of his absence, to break into his northern frontier, and to carry their devastations through the richest parts of his kingdom. Philip, at the head of six thousand infantry and five hundred horse, surprised and routed their main body at Stobi in Pæonia; and then directed his arms against their numerous parties which were scattered over the country. The Dardanians were defeated on all sides: most of them were put to the sword; a remnant escaped, carrying into their own forests and mountains, the terror of the Macedonian name.

After this fortunate expedition, Philip went into winter quarters at Thessalonica, formerly Therma, at the inmost recess of the Thermæ gulph, there anxiously to await the return of his ambassadors from Rome. During the interval between the battle of Kynosce-

Philip repels the Dardanians.  
Olymp. cxlv. 4.  
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His losses in Peloponnesus.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, l. xxviii. c. 19. Gens. Hic. Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 19. ronym. in Daniel, c. xi.

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phalæ and the conclusion of peace, his success against the Dardanians was the only circumstance that chequered the general gloom of his fortune. In the Peloponnesus, in Greece beyond the Isthmus, and on the coasts of Lesser Asia, his enemies were every where triumphant; for though the Romans had granted him a truce, this did not suspend the exertions of their Achæan and Rhodian allies. Androthènes, now commanding for him in Peloponnesus, was encountered by the Achæans at Cleonæ, near the eastern bank of the Nemea, a river dividing the territories of Corinth and Sicyon, and so named because it flows into the Corinthian gulph from the district Nemea in Argolis, renowned for the Nemean games. The Achæans were commanded by Nicostratus, then pretor, a general of abilities and enterprise. He totally defeated Androthènes, killed fifteen hundred of his men, and made three hundred prisoners. The remains of the discomfited army threw themselves into Corinth, the only retreat for them now open in all Peloponnesus<sup>9</sup>.

Submission  
of the Acarnanians.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

In Greece beyond the Isthmus, the only nations adverse to the Roman cause were the Acarnanians and Bœotians, the former out of fidelity to their ancient alliance with Philip, and their high sense of honour<sup>10</sup>; the latter from sentiments and principles of a quite contrary complexion. With uncommon bravery, seconded by skill and perseverance, the Acarnanians in their capital Leucas, opposed Lucius Quintius, the proconsul's brother, who had attacked them with his fleet from Corcyra; nor did they think of capitulation, until they learned the fatal issue of the battle of Kynoscephalæ. Upon this melancholy intelligence, the capital, as well as all the inferior cities of Acarnania, craved the protection of the victors<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 14. & seq. Philocles still held Corinth for Philip, but that general had afforded grounds for suspecting his fidelity; and fatally betrayed his master, as will be hereafter seen, in a concern still dearer to him than the Corinthian citadel. Philip's suspicions of Philocles had made him

commit his army in the field, about 6,000 men, to Androthènes; but he durst not punish, and feared to offend his Corinthian governor.

<sup>10</sup> Polybins, l. iv. c. 30.

<sup>11</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 17.

We have seen in a former chapter, how the Bœotians were surprised into a reluctant alliance with Rome. But Brachylles, their banished pretor, with many of his adherents, having followed the fortunes of Philip, had been taken among other prisoners in the service of that prince. Upon an application to the proconsul from the commonwealth of Bœotia, these prisoners were restored to their country rather through policy than generosity; for Quintius, who was apprised of the movements of Antiochus, foresaw new hostilities on the part of that prince, still more dangerous than those just terminated with Philip, and, therefore, thought it incumbent on him to establish throughout Greece, which was likely to be the scene of the approaching conflict, the fair renown of the Romans, not only for warlike valour, but for indulgence and clemency. Brachylles and his partizans had no sooner returned to their country, than its councils were filled with discord. Instead of ascribing their release to the indulgence of the Roman general, they procured a deputation of their countrymen to thank Philip, as if they had been solely indebted to him for that favour, in which he had really no share. Those of the Bœotians, who adhered to the cause of Rome, were calumniated or insulted; their pretensions were slighted at every competition for office or emolument: and in the room of Zeuxippus, a man highly acceptable to the Romans, Brachylles, chief of the adverse faction, was elected pretor. The defeated party felt the utmost indignation at these proceedings, and complained that, if their adversaries could behave with such insolence, when the legions were almost at their gates, their own condition would be altogether deplorable when these forces should return to Italy, and Bœotia be left at the mercy of the Macedonian faction. Zeuxippus knew no better method both for removing the immediate grievance, and warding off the apprehended danger, than the destruction of Brachylles. He proposed his assassination to Quintius; but the Roman declined to have any concern in so black a transaction. Brachylles, however, was assassinated, as he returned

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Factions in  
Bœotia.—  
Assassination  
of the pretor  
Brachylles.  
Olymp.  
cxlvi. 1.  
B. C. 196.

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of the A  
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returned from a drunken festival surrounded by a crowd of buffons and parasites, wretches contemptible for their profligacy in the most profligate of all the Greek commonwealths. His murderers were three Italians and three Etolians, who escaped undiscovered in the throng; and, as the death of Brachylles only increased the evils for which it had been deemed the remedy, Zeuxippus, the instigator of it, fled for refuge to Athens: Pisistratus, the most noted of his adherents, was accused, seized, and executed".

Romans in  
Bœotia roun-  
ded and  
murdered.

But the death of one of the conspirators and the banishment of the other, did not satisfy the Bœotians for the loss of their pretor Brachylles. They felt the most implacable animosity to the Romans, whom they regarded as accomplices in his murder, and as the original authors of all their own misfortunes. Conscious of total inability to carry on an open war, they determined to have recourse to vengeance more secret, but not less effectual. While the proconsul kept his head quarters at Elatæa in Phocis, his soldiers were indulged with furloughs to travel through the neighbouring districts, that they might, as inclination prompted them, gratify their curiosity or supply their wants. Of those who in such excursions entered the territory of Bœotia, few were observed to return: they were waylaid by assassins in secret lurking-places; sometimes they were decoyed to shops and taverns, designedly left empty for the purpose of murder. As the Roman soldiers were well provided with money, avarice extended the havoc which vengeance had begun; and not less than five hundred of them were missing. Quintius sent ambassadors into Bœotia, accompanied with a proper detachment of troops, to enquire into the robberies and murders which he suspected. Many dead bodies were dragged up from the lake Copais, into which they had been sunk by weights for concealment. The cities of Coronæa and Acræphia, in the neighbourhood of that lake, were found to

" Conf. Polybius, l. xviii. c. 26. l. xx. c. 7. l. xxiii. c. 2. & Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 27, 28.

have infamously distinguished themselves above all other places in Bœotia, in these deeds of darkness. Quintius demanded from the general council of Bœotia, that the assassins should be punished; and that a talent<sup>13</sup> should be paid for each Roman soldier that had disappeared. The Bœotians declined compliance, on pretence that, as nothing had been done by general consent, the public ought not to be punished for the crimes of individuals. The proconsul, therefore, after sending an embassy to the Achæans and Athenians to justify his resumption of arms, invaded the territory of Coronæa and Acræphia, and prepared to assault these obnoxious cities. In this extremity, the Bœotians thought proper to submit to whatever was required of them, only obtaining a mitigation of the mulct through the intercession of the Achæans<sup>14</sup>. Peace being thus re-established, the proconsul withdrew to his former quarters at Elatæa, after committing the government of Bœotia to such persons as he had the least reason to distrust.

During these proceedings of the Romans in Greece, their Rhodian allies had been diligent to avail themselves of Philip's defeat at Kynoscephalæ. They collected an army composed of Europeans, Asiatics, and even of many unknown nations of Africa, with all of whom their industrious island had been long linked in the bonds of amity and commerce; and invaded the Macedonian conquests in Caria, particularly the maritime district Peræa, which Philip in the height of his power had wrested from their republic. A battle was fought at Alabanda, in which the Rhodians obtained a decisive victory<sup>15</sup>. The strong holds of Stratonicæa and Bargylia saved the discomfited army, and were so ably defended by Dinocrates, Philip's general in Caria, that they continued to hold out, until assailed shortly afterwards by Antiochus, who usurped them to himself with equal disregard to the rights of the Rhodians his enemies, and of Philip his ally.

Operations  
of the Rhodians against  
Philip's general in  
Caria.  
Olymp.  
cxlv. 4.  
B. C. 197.

<sup>13</sup> 193 l. 15 s.

<sup>14</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 29.

<sup>15</sup> Id. ibid. c. 18.

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Articles  
of peace  
brought to  
Philip from  
Rome.  
Olymp.  
cxlvi. 1.  
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Amidst these various events, all of them so adverse to Philip, his ambassadors returned from Rome; and together with them, ten commissioners sent by the senate to assist Quintius in adjusting the peace with Macedon. The commissioners, among whom the Romans had taken care to send Sulpicius and Villius, who had successively commanded armies in Illyricum and Greece, repaired to the proconsul at his head quarters in Elatæa, to which place he had just returned after punishing the crimes of the Boeotians. In this Phocian city, the conditions of peace were specified, of which only the outline had been drawn by the senate, but of which the particular articles had been left to the future decision of Quintius and his assessors. Assuming their complete rights as conquerors, these Romans prescribed, that before the Isthmian games, the celebration of which was fast approaching, Philip should surrender to them those cities in Greece still held by his garrisons; that all others in that country should be declared free; that the Macedonian garrisons should be withdrawn from Thrace, from the narrow seas, and from Caria; and that all the Greek cities in those parts should resume their ancient laws and liberties. Philip was farther required to restore all prisoners and deserters; to surrender all his ships of war, except five small vessels, and a galley of sixteen banks of oars, destined rather for ostentation than use; and to pay a thousand talents, one-half of that sum immediately, the remainder in the course of ten years. His son Demetrius was to remain at Rome until these conditions were fulfilled<sup>16</sup>.

Isthmian  
games.—  
Proclama-  
tion of the  
liberties of  
Greece.  
Olymp.  
cxlvi. 1.  
B. C. 196.

Meantime the Isthmian games were at hand, a solemnity always crowded by spectators, both from the fondness of the Greeks for such shows, and from the central scene of exhibition. The Romans, also, were on this occasion to be present, from whom the Greeks expected publicly to hear their fate; and this circumstance, as it gave the deepest interest, brought vast accessions of people to the

<sup>16</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 30.

solemnity.

solemnity. Before the time appointed for the games, Quintius with the commissioners proceeded from Elataæa to Anticyra, and from thence sailed to Corinth. The religious ceremonies had been performed; the spectators had taken their seats; and the combatants were prepared to commence their accustomed exhibitions. A herald, as usual, proceeded into the middle of the arena, but, being previously instructed by Quintius, instead of declaring, as on ordinary occasions, well known particulars concerning the games and those offering to contend in them, he proclaimed with a loud and clear voice in the name of the Romans and Titus Quintius their general, complete liberty, both civil and political, to the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, the island of Eubœa, and the four districts of Thes-saly: thus particularising those communities that had longest submitted to the dominion of Macedon. The joy was greater than the minds of men could contain. Their sympathy with each other heightened its intensity. The herald was ordered by them to repeat sounds so pleasing to their ears; at the distinct hearing of which, the whole assembly was in commotion: the wrestlers and reciters disappeared, the noise of acclamation resounded from the two seas of Corinth, and such multitudes advanced to thank and salute the pro-consul, that nothing short of the vigour of youth (he was then in his thirty-third year) and the alacrity derived from seeing his labours rewarded with so much public happiness, could have saved him from being overwhelmed and stifled by their cumbersome kindness. For many succeeding days, the games being hastily flurred over without interest, and without attention", the deputies of the several states were solely occupied in congratulating each other, and in decreeing crowns and statues" to Quintius and the Romans; men who had passed the seas, and by their own exertions and dangers, unlocked the chains of Greece, and restored to that country its hereditary freedom. The generosity of those remote strangers appeared in the

" Plutarch in Flamin.

" Appian, l. ix. c. 2.

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Embassies  
from the  
Greek kings,  
particularly  
Antiochus.

more striking light, when contrasted with the selfish policy of Alexander's successors, who, though Greeks themselves, had so often deluded their unhappy brethren with unsubstantial prospects of liberty, only to plunge them the deeper into real servitude. But there was a nation, it seemed, in the western world, raised up by the bounty of heaven, to diffuse the inestimable blessings which itself enjoyed; to fight against unjust domination wherever it prevailed; and to spare neither labour, nor treasure, nor blood, to defend the cause of the injured, and to make law and right triumphant over brute force<sup>19</sup>.

To the celebration of the Isthmian games, which was regarded as the scene not merely of amusement, but of most important business; there had come ambassadors from Antiochus, Philip, Eumenes, and all the kings who, either from affection or policy, claimed connection with Greece. These ambassadors, as well as deputies from the several republics, had most of them very serious affairs to transact with the proconsul; and, according to the custom of antiquity, their transactions were public. From respect to so great a prince, the minister sent by Antiochus was heard first. The object of his commission was to persuade Quintius and his assessors, that the king of Syria wished to maintain peace with the Romans and their allies. But his professions on this subject were belied by the evidence of facts. Antiochus, when he advanced westward to the Grecian sea, had no sooner found that Philip was defeated at Kynoscephalæ, than he hastened to invade his possessions in Caria and Mysia, and had made himself master of Bargylæ in the former province, and Abydus in the latter. These proceedings were totally incompatible with the views of Rome, which purposed to emancipate the cities of Caria, and to restore them to their ancient confederacy with the Rhodians; and which had not ordered Abydus, and other places near the Hellespont, to be evacuated by Philip, that strongholds so important because commanding the passage between Asia and Europe, might be

<sup>19</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 33.

seized by a prince equally ambitious and still more powerful. Quintus therefore answered the Syrian ambassador without any of that reserve or ambiguity, which had been thought necessary before the humiliation of the king of Macedon. He told him, that his master must relinquish his unjust conquests; that he must abstain from all vexations of the Greeks in Asia; and that he must no longer entertain the design, which his usurpations near the narrow seas made manifest, of passing personally into Europe, or of sending an army thither<sup>20</sup>. After thus dismissing the Syrian, Quintus found little difficulty in settling all affairs amicably with the ambassadors of the other kings as well as with the Greek deputies<sup>21</sup>.

Those of the Etolians alone, exclaimed against the terms of peace. They said that, while many distant commonwealths in Asia were to be restored to their ancient independence, the cities in Proper Greece, garrisoned by Philip, were to be surrendered to the Romans; and that this, in effect, was nothing but a transfer from one master to another: at the same time they complained of their own unworthy treatment, boasting that, without their assistance, the Romans could neither have defeated the king of Macedon, nor even have set foot in Greece<sup>22</sup>. These remonstrances, not altogether absurd, might have had some weight, had they come from any other quarter. But all knew, that the Etolians were provoked at not being allowed to recover those fortresses in the territories of their neighbours, from which they had formerly carried on their depredations; and none could imagine for a moment, that any generous concern for the public safety actuated a people whose insolence, rapacity, and cruelty, rendered them a disgrace to the Grecian name.

When the business of the assembly was concluded, Quintus still remained in Corinth, that he might superintend the complete execution of the treaty in that and the neighbouring districts. Most of the Roman commissioners dispersed, for the same purpose, to Thrace,

Complaints  
of the Eto-  
lians.

Transactions  
of the Ro-  
man com-  
missioners. —  
Cornelius'  
advice to  
Philip and to  
the Etolians.

<sup>20</sup> Polyb. l. xviii. c. 30.

<sup>21</sup> Tit. Liv. l. xxxiii. c. 34.

<sup>22</sup> Id. ibid. c. 35.