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duced into a province, the Lesser Asia was filled with Romans under a variety of characters, civil as well as military, and engaged in various pursuits both of a public and private nature, though the class employed in commerce seems to have been incomparably the most numerous. From the reports of their countrymen settled in the East, the Romans knew what to think of the impositions that would have been practised on them by Laodice<sup>a</sup> and her brother; and could not enough admire the frontless impudence of both. In contempt of their fictitious kings, the senate therefore declared the Cappadocians a free people, and gave orders for intimating this decree to all persons concerned in it<sup>26</sup>.

The Cappadocians acknowledge their unfitness for enjoying liberty.

The first opposition to a measure apparently so laudable, came from an unexpected quarter, that of the Cappadocians themselves. They confessed, that liberty was not a fit present for them, because they were not in a situation rightly to enjoy it. "In a commonwealth like Rome, long engaged in important transactions at home and abroad, there flourished many able and enlightened citizens, qualified to rule over each other in vicarious succession, and who had been trained by habit to command with temper, and obey with dignity. Such was not the condition of Cappadocia, a country still rude and undisciplined, but whose inhabitants, ignorant of other matters, yet knew enough of themselves to be convinced that they could not live without a king." The Romans, not a little astonished at this rejection of freedom, a blessing in their eyes so precious, gave intimation that the people of Cappadocia should choose themselves a king from their own nation. They chose Ariobarzanes, a person recommended by his nobility, his opulence, and his equity: for though a party clamoured for Gordius, the friend of Mithridates, yet the great majority of the Cappadocians regarded this candidate with horror<sup>27</sup>.

Chuse Ariobarzanes for king.

Sylla sent from Rome to secure his

To confirm Ariobarzanes in his high dignity, the senate employed Sylla, who had been pretor the preceding year at Rome, and had

<sup>26</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

<sup>27</sup> Justin, l. xxxviii. c. 5.

distinguished.

distinguished his pretorship by combats of lions and other wild beasts from Africa<sup>28</sup>. This reminded the Romans of the Numidian war, of which Sylla had carried off the chief glory by the capture of Jugurtha<sup>29</sup>. He was naturally pointed out, therefore, for an expedition in which he might have to encounter a prince as bold and crafty as Jugurtha, and far more powerful. But Mithridates, whose designs had been long meditated, did not think proper to risk their ultimate success by too sudden a disclosure of them. The affections of the Cappadocians running in a strong current for Ariobarzanes, he allowed him with little, and that only a secret opposition, to be established on the throne.

Sylla should seem to have made a progress with the new king through his dominions, since he appeared with him on the Euphrates, which separates Cappadocia and Armenia. On the banks of this river, a Parthian ambassador came to the Roman pretor, offering the friendship of his master, old Mithridates II. This was the first transaction between the Romans and Parthians, nations destined to war for three centuries with each other. Sylla received Orobazus, for that was the stranger's name, with much courtesy, except that in his tent he took his own seat between the Cappadocian king and the Parthian ambassador, thus claiming, in his quality of Roman magistrate, the most honourable place. For submitting without remonstrance to this degradation, Orobazus, upon his return home, was punished capitally, as a traitor to the dignity of his country. Yet his fault admitted extenuation on the principles at all times acknowledged in the East; for a soothsayer and physiognomist in his suite, on carefully observing Sylla, declared it as a matter of inevitable necessity that this Roman should attain unrivalled pre-eminence, and that the more he considered him, the more he was astonished that he had not already reached the highest pinnacle of fortune<sup>30</sup>.

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peaceful accession.  
Olymp.  
clxxii. 1.  
B. C. 92.

Sylla's progress with Ariobarzanes, and encounter with a Parthian ambassador on the banks of the Euphrates.

<sup>28</sup> Plutarch in Sylla.<sup>29</sup> Salust. Bell. Jugur.<sup>30</sup> Plutarch in Sylla.



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Tigranes II. of Armenia is persuaded by Mithridates to invade Cappadocia and dispossess Ariobarzanes. Olymp. clxxii. 3. B. C. 90.

The principal opposition which Sylla encountered in settling the government of Cappadocia arose, not from the inhabitants of that country, but from their neighbours the Armenians. This latter people, we know not for what reason, warmly espoused the interest of Gordius. Their king, Tigranes II. had long resided as a hostage in Parthia, but upon the death of his father of the same name, a lineal descendant of Artaxias, the founder of their monarchy, the son was restored to his birth-right on condition of ceding to the Parthians a large district in Armenia, denominated the seventy vallies. The accession of Tigranes II. happened fifteen years before the election of Ariobarzanes; during which period, especially during the declining age of Mithridates II. of Parthia, Tigranes had availed himself of favourable circumstances greatly to augment his kingdom. He was a man certainly of enlarged views, but vain, ostentatious, and inconsiderate, endowed with more activity than energy, insolent in his foreign policy, and imperious in his domestic government. To this prince the king of Pontus, not thinking the moment arrived for making war openly on Rome, applied in the warmest terms of attachment and confidence; he gave him his eldest daughter in marriage; and describing Ariobarzanes, as he really was, a man of a mild and feeble character, easily prevailed with Tigranes to send an army into Cappadocia, to expel the newly elected king, and to take possession of the country".

Socrates is assisted by him in expelling his brother Nicomedes III. king of Bithynia.

About this time, Nicomedes II. of Bithynia closed his long reign of fifty-six years, leaving for his successor a son of the same name, born of Nyssa, a dancing woman, but acknowledged as king by the Roman senate, probably for reasons of great cogency with the more corrupt members of that body. This Nicomedes III. had a brother named Socrates, whom Mithridates encouraged to claim the crown, under the plea that on the female side his descent was the more honourable. A war ensued between the brothers, and through the

<sup>31</sup> Appian. Mithridatic. c. 67. Justin, l. xxxviii. c. 3.

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The two de-  
prived kings  
restored by  
the authority  
of Roman  
commission-  
ers.  
Olymp.  
clxxii. 4.  
B. C. 89.

assistance furnished to him by the king of Pontus, Socrates, who assumed the title of Chrestos, the "Thrifty," prevailed in several encounters, and at length drove his rival from the country. The two expelled princes, Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes fled for redress to Rome, the scourge indeed of kings in their pride of power, but the ordinary refuge of dispossessed sovereigns. They were favourably heard in the senate, which immediately decreed their restoration; and for this purpose named at the head of a commission into Asia, Manius Aquilius, a man of consular dignity, who, ten years before this period, had happily terminated an insurrection of slaves in Sicily, by slaying with his own hand Athenio, their active and intrepid leader<sup>12</sup>. The proconsul, in the province of Pergamus, Lucius Cassius, had orders to co-operate, if necessary, with the commissioners; who, if they found themselves obliged to act in the character of generals, were entitled also to summon to their standard all the friendly powers of the East, not excepting even the king of Pontus, whom, as he had not yet openly declared himself, the Romans still affected to regard as their confederate. Vested with such authority, by the assistance only of a slight detachment from Pergamus, and some bodies of auxiliaries raised hastily in Galatia and Phrygia, Aquilius speedily reinstated the exiled kings; and resettled, for a time, the affairs of Cappadocia and Bithynia<sup>13</sup>. From the former country, the lieutenants of Tigranes passed beyond the Euphrates; and from the latter, Socrates escaped into the dominions of Mithridates, where his death, shortly afterwards, afforded that prince an opportunity of arraigning the blood thirsty persecution of Rome, to which, as the only expedient for preserving peace, he had been compelled, he said, to sacrifice an unfortunate prince who had fled to him for protection<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Diodorus, *Eclog.* p. 536.

<sup>13</sup> Appian, *Mithridatic.* c. 14. & seq.

<sup>14</sup> Justin, l. xxxviii. c. 5.

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Nicomedes  
plunders the  
Greek cities  
on the  
Euxine.  
Olymp.  
cxxxiii. 1.  
B. C. 88.

Forbearance  
of Mithri-  
dates — rea-  
sons thereof.

The facility with which Aquilius and his coadjutors had accomplished the business committed to them, made it be too hastily concluded, that the name of Rome inspired such terror as would sanction every outrage. Young Nicomedes had promised to the commissioners and the persons employed under them, large sums of money as remunerations for their good offices; he had also contracted heavy debts to the Roman traders and money lenders' abounding in all the cities of Lesser Asia. Solicited by his restorers to the throne, and pressed by his creditors, he was forced on speedier methods for contenting both, than those afforded by the slow annual revenues of a kingdom far richer in men than in money. On the promise of support from Rome, he therefore retaliated the injuries which he had received from Mithridates, by a sudden inroad into Paphlagonia, where he carried his depredations even to the wealthy city Amastris on the Euxine. Instead of retorting hostilities with that promptitude which might have been expected from a prince so powerful and so well prepared for action, Mithridates sent successive embassies with complaints of this aggression, both to the Roman senate, and to the Romans invested with power in Asia. He had several reasons for this forbearance, of which two chiefly deserve notice. Rome was about this time compelled to take up arms against her subjects in Italy, who had been encouraged by the popular faction in the capital, to claim the equal right of citizens. If Mithridates too soon threw off the mask of moderation, he feared lest his enemies should conclude peace at home, in order the more strenuously to carry on operations against himself abroad. He waited therefore, before taking the field, to see them deeply and inextricably involved in what is called the Marfic or Social war: a delay which turned out highly useful for him. His second reason was to prove to all those powers that either were, already, or whom he wished to make his allies, that the Romans deserved the whole blame of the approaching commotions likely to deform the fairest regions of Asia".

<sup>35</sup> Appian. Mithridatic. c. 12.

Meanwhile he concluded an intimate alliance with his son-in-law Tigranes, plainly meant for aggression, since that prince was to make prize of all moveables, not excepting the persons of the enemy; whereas Mithridates was to content himself with rifled towns and bare dispeopled territories<sup>36</sup>. To account for this singular compact, it must be observed that Tigranes was then building his new capital Tigranocerta<sup>37</sup>, near the Tigris, about three hundred miles south of his antient residence Artaxata on the Araxes. He needed men and moveables to people and replenish the vast circuit of the walls which his ostentatious vanity had traced: whereas Mithridates could easily fill up the void which such transportations might occasion, having under his dependency those parts of Scythia which have been emphatically styled the store-house of nations, and whose wandering inhabitants were always ready to exchange the keen air of their deserts for the softer and more voluptuous climates of Southern Asia.

The haughty answers which Mithridates received from the Roman generals, convinced him, before the return of his ambassadors, that war was ready to be levied on him. Without further delay he therefore marched his army, and expelling Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia, re-established there, according to his original plan, his own son under the soothing name of Ariarathes. Upon this decisive measure, the Roman generals, without waiting orders from their republick, took the field with a great army to recover Cappadocia, and with two divisions, each 40,000 strong, to defend Bithynia. Their ally Nicomedes mustered 50,000 foot, and 6,000 horse. The land forces of Mithridates amounted at this time to 290,000, of which 40,000 were cavalry; and his fleet on the Euxine consisted of 400 sail. The greater part of these mighty preparations were brought into action, but the events of a war equally disgraceful and calamitous to their country, the Roman historians

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Mithridates' treaty with Tigranes, by which the latter was to make prize of all moveables--causes of this condition. Olymp. clxxii. 3. B. C. 90.

Mithridates' success in a great war in all parts of Lesser Asia. Olymp. clxxiii. 1. B. C. 88.

<sup>36</sup> Justin, l. xxxviii. c. 3.<sup>37</sup> Strabo, l. xi. p. 532. Plutarch in Lucull.

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omitted circumstantially to record. We must be contented to know<sup>37</sup> that the first memorable engagement gained Bithynia to Mithridates, while it secured to him the possession of Cappadocia. This decisive battle was fought on the frontier of the former kingdom, and near to mount Scoroba, which, towering above the river Amnias, served as the antient boundary between Bithynia and the dominions of Pontus. For so important a victory Mithridates was much indebted to his Greek generals Archelaus and Taxiles, two brothers; Dorilaus, Craterus, Pelopidas, and Neoptolemus. To prosecute his good fortune, the conqueror hastened into the central province of Phrygia, and pitched his tents on a spot famous for the encampment of Alexander the Great, deeming this circumstance auspicious to his own lofty designs. From Phrygia, his army dispersed in three directions, to over-run the two sides and the front of the peninsula of Lesser Asia. Their squadrons of light Sarmatians swept the plains, and their enterprises against the walled cities were facilitated by the generous treatment bestowed on all captives, whose dress and language did not betray them for Romans<sup>38</sup>. Upon the sea-coast, Mithridates' fleet was equally triumphant; the enemies' guard ships were driven from the Bosphorus and the Hellespont.

Nicomedes  
and Ariobar-  
zanes again  
at Rome—  
Cruelties of  
Mithridates  
to the Ro-  
man gene-  
rals.

Amidst the shipwreck of all their fortunes, the authors of this fatal war endeavoured by flight to save their persons. The kings Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes again escaped to Rome. Aquilius, whose anguish of mind had weakened and disordered his body, fled to Mitylenè, in the isle of Lesbos. Appius, proconsul of Pamphylia, sought refuge in Laodicea; and Cassius, proconsul of Pergamus, expected, as we shall see, on better grounds, the same favour at Rhodes. Aquilius and Appius were surrendered on the first summons, as peace offerings to the conqueror. They were treated with equal indignity during life<sup>39</sup>; and Aquilius, whose boundless avarice

<sup>37</sup> Appian. de Bell. Mithridat. c. 15. & p. 612.  
seq.

<sup>38</sup> Appian. *ibid.* Conf. Diodorus, Excerpt.

<sup>39</sup> Cicero. *pro leg. Manil.* c. 5.



had occasioned so many evils, was subjected to a death of unexampled cruelty. After long following the victor's train, tied on the back of an ass, and compelled to proclaim with his own voice that he was Manius Aquilius, the Roman consul, his ignominy was ended at Pergamus by the pouring of melted gold down his throat<sup>40</sup>.

This inhuman punishment served as a prelude to a still more horrid enormity. Mithridates, who deemed his hold of Lesser Asia insecure, while its cities were crowded with Romans, formed a secret plan for destroying all of them in one day, and at a month's distance from the time that his measures for the massacre were concerted. Pergamus, Ephesus, Adramyttium, in general the Greek cities on the sea coast, were the main scenes of this unparalleled barbarity, which cut off 80,000<sup>41</sup>, another account says 150,000<sup>42</sup>, natives of Italy. Of this catastrophe, the accomplices and instruments were of various descriptions. Some Romans fell victims round the statues of the gods, whose protection they implored; some died supplicating pity on the hearths of once hospitable friends; a greater number perished by the hands of angry debtors and envious slaves, from neither of which classes they could expect mercy<sup>43</sup>.

When such disasters, and ignominy worse than disaster, assailed the Romans in Asia, their capital was a prey to that relentless discord, which in the course of six years ended in the dictatorship, or rather the despotism, of Sylla. This grand crisis in the commonwealth arose immediately out of the Social war, in which the Marsi and their allies, having obtained the object for which they contended, thereby doubled suddenly the already too numerous voters in the Roman assemblies. These new voters, however, were thrown into eight of the thirty-five ancient tribes<sup>44</sup>, and thus restricted to less than a fourth part of the right of suffrage and sovereignty exercised

Massacre  
of 80 0 0,  
others say  
150 000  
committed  
in Asia.  
Olymp.  
c'xxii. 1.  
B. C. 88.

The Romans  
compelled to  
terminate  
disgracefully  
the Social or  
Marsi war.  
Olymp.  
clxxiii. 1.  
B. C. 88.

<sup>40</sup> Plin. N. H. l. xxxiii. c. 3.

<sup>41</sup> Appian. de Bell. Mithridat. c. 22. &

<sup>42</sup> Memnon. apud Phot. c. xxxiii. p. 730. seq.

Valerius Maximus, l. ix. c. 2.

<sup>43</sup> Velleius Paterculus, l. ii. c. 20.

<sup>44</sup> Plutarch in Sylla. Dion. Legat. 37.

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by the Roman people ; a share of power which by no means contented them, though they acquiesced in it for the present, merely as a temporary expedient. In the height of their animosity to Rome, they had sent an embassy to Mithridates, craving his co-operation with them in Italy. But he wrote to them that he could not sail thither, until he had previously conquered Asia<sup>4</sup>, meaning thereby the western division of that continent: upon which answer, they first listened to negotiation, and soon afterwards concluded peace with Rome on the terms just mentioned.

Factions in  
Rome—  
Marius, his  
views.

But this peace was made with enmity rankling in their hearts, and ready to be called into action by bad men to gratify their own selfish ambition. The same profligate leaders, who of late courted popularity within the city by Agrarian laws and lavish distributions of corn, were now equally clamorous for the full and equal participation of all Italians in the right of citizenship. In the blindness of political faction, which can see nothing but its leader, and him always under a flattering and false aspect, the most zealous party-men, among the ancient citizens, abetted the cause of the new, though their real interests were evidently opposite. At the head of these seditious levellers were the tribune Sulpicius, Cethegus, Suetonius, Junius Brutus; the Marii father and son, the former of whom, Caius Marius, was the prime mover of all, and a man who, for the misfortune of his country, possessed the highest military abilities, without one civil attainment or one moral virtue. To oppose this barbarous soldier, totally destitute of arts, letters, and urbanity, all of which his bold ignorance contemned, Fortune raised up Sylla, whom that goddess claimed for her own, while he, as willingly, acknowledged her for his sovereign mistress. Yet the good fortune of Sylla consisted in his disregard of death and danger, in the conviction of his own superior powers, and in an habitual presence of mind, the fruit of anticipation and forethought. With such qualities, in a sub-

Sylla, his  
character.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus, Eclog. l. xxxiii. p. 540.

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ordinate station, he eclipsed the glory of Marius in the war with Jugurtha. For a dozen years after this sharp conflict, he seemed careless of public employments, being occupied chiefly in the cultivation of his taste and understanding, but mingling pleasure, or rather profligacy, with wit, letters, and refinement. From this inactive middle state, he emerged, as we have seen, to repress the first bold measures of Mithridates; and at the breaking out of the Marfic war, he engaged and served in it with peculiar zeal and energy, his abilities still enlarging with the occasion, and his fame still towering above that of Marius and every other general. At the ensuing elections in Rome, he first offered himself a candidate for the consulship in his fiftieth year, and then attained that well merited dignity, with the commission of making war, with six legions, on the king of Pontus. But while he marched towards Brundisium, to cross the Hadriatic into Greece, the tribune Sulpicius, by a tumultuary assembly of the tribes, in which the new citizens voted promiscuously with the old, divested him of his command, and constituted Marius, now on the verge of seventy, general against Mithridates, a prince in the vigour of life, and the meridian of military glory<sup>46</sup>.

Appointed general against Mithridates, but divested of command by an unlawful vote of the tribes. Olymp. clxxiii. 1. B. C. 88.

Sylla beheld the sudden storm that was ready to blast his fortunes, and determined to dispel it. None knew better, than he did, how to manage the minds of soldiers. To his legions encamped in Campania, he intimated the injustice done to him at Rome, and had the art of persuading them, that the insult offered to their general's honour, was levelled at their own emoluments. Marius, he said, had his creatures and favourites among the troops, whom he wished to gratify with the spoils of Asia; and that, with the appointment of a new commander in this lucrative service, new legions would also be employed. Accordingly, when officers arrived in the name of Marius to take charge of the men and stores, they were slain in a military tumult; an outrage which was speedily retorted on Sylla's

He marches to Rome, punishes his enemies, and restores the ancient government. Olymp. clxxiii. 1. B. C. 88.

<sup>46</sup> Plutarch in Sylla, & in Mario. Appian. de Bell. Civil. l. i. c. 50. & seq.

friends

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friends and relatives in the city. With a promptitude of decision that characterised all his measures, and always made them successful, Sylla marched towards Rome: his enemies either betook themselves to flight, or retired into the capital and other strongholds. He drove them from thence by setting the neighbouring streets on fire; and having thus destroyed or expelled the authors of sedition, abolished the legislation of the tribes, re-established the authority of the senate, and settled the government, in all other points, on the old aristocratic model<sup>47</sup>.

Mithridates  
unsuccessful  
against  
Rhodes and  
Magnaesia—  
causes there-  
of.

After this domestic victory, he hastened across the Adriatic, to oppose the enemies of the state. In the midst of general success, the troops of Mithridates had been foiled<sup>48</sup> in the assault of Magnesia, at the foot of mount Sipylus; and he himself, being defeated in a sea fight at Rhodes, thought fit to desist<sup>49</sup> from the siege of that illustrious island, then desperately defended by such Romans as had escaped from the battles and massacres in Lesser Asia. The pertinacious resistance of Magnesia may also, in some measure, be accounted for. In the neighbourhood of that city, the Scipios had triumphed over Antiochus the Great; and though that decisive victory dated beyond a century, yet its memory still inspired the Magnesians with awe for the Roman name, and a dread of revolting from a people whom they had been accustomed to regard with terror.

Athens sends  
an embassy  
to Mithri-  
dates, he  
gains the  
ambassador  
and throws  
a garrison  
into the city.

The same sentiments prevailed not in the cities of ancient Greece, and particularly in Athens, ever destined to act a principal part in the revolutions of that country. For the space of fifty years, the Greeks restrained from the unhappy licence of domestic warfare, enjoyed honourable tranquillity under the government of Rome, being indulged with the management of their municipal concerns, and the hereditary forms of their ancient free politics. The literary renown of Athens had recommended it, as we have seen, to the pe-

<sup>47</sup> Id. *ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Tit. Liv. *Epitom.* l. lxxxi.

<sup>49</sup> Diodor. *Excerpt.* p. 613.

cular favour of the victors; yet the Athenians, out of envy, pusillanimity, or mere levity, were the first of the Greeks to send an embassy to Mithridates, whose army commanded all Lesser Asia, except the district of mount Sipylus, and whose fleet overawed all the adjacent isles, with the single exception of Rhodes. The ambassador, chosen by the Athenians, was a certain Aristio, a philosopher or sophist, son of Athenio the Peripatetick, but himself an Epicurean, and among the vilest offspring of that sect, since, to the refined pleasures of social virtue and intellectual exertion, he preferred the gross gratifications of voluptuousness and tyranny<sup>50</sup>. He seemed, however, to Mithridates, a fit person for his purpose; and, being gained to his interest, was entrusted by him with a body of 2,000 men, who, under pretence of escorting some treasures from Delos destined to sacred uses, entered Athens, and procured for their leader, already powerful with the multitude, an absolute ascendancy in that city<sup>51</sup>.

Meanwhile Sylla advanced through Thessaly and Bœotia, every where restraining defection, or receiving tenders of submission. But Athens had shut her gates, and manned her walls, Aristio commanding in the city, and Archelaus, a Pontic general, holding possession of the Piræus. Both places were besieged with perseverance, and defended with obstinacy. The neighbouring cities were laid under contribution to supply materials and workmen. Twenty thousand mules were employed for the service of Sylla's carriages and engines. To pay his troops, he spared not the richest and most venerated of the Grecian temples, those of Delphi, Epidaurus, and Olympia. At length the Athenians, reduced to the utmost distress by famine, sent deputies to capitulate. That they might obtain better terms, they began to expatiate on the ancient virtues and renown of their republick; but Sylla replied abruptly and sternly, "I came hither to punish rebellion, not to be amused by oratory." Two days after,

Sylla arrives,  
takes Athens  
by assault.  
Olymp.  
clxxiii. 3.  
B. C. 86.

<sup>50</sup> Plutarch in Sylla.

<sup>51</sup> Posidonius apud Athenæum. l. v. p. 211. & seq.



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Mithridates  
betrayed by  
the same  
weakness  
which  
had ruined  
Antiochus  
the Great.

the city was taken by assault, upon which Archelaus sailed hastily from the Piræus, abandoning that harbour also to the enemy<sup>22</sup>.

During the siege of Athens, Mithridates, being master at sea, had repeatedly succoured the place, and sent successive divisions of his forces into Thrace, which at length amounted to two great armies. While he remained in person at Pergamus, settling the affairs of Lesser Asia, his intention was to fight, by his lieutenants, the Romans in Greece, which he considered as a sort of neutral ground between his own dominions and Italy. The design was unwise, for six veteran legions, and still more, Sylla who commanded them, required the hand and the head of a master-antagonist; but it is remarkable that Mithridates, at the commencement of his war with Rome, was betrayed by the same weakness which, on a similar occasion, proved ruinous to Antiochus the Great. In recently taking possession of Stratoniceæ in Caria, he had been smitten with the charms of Monima, daughter to Philopœmen, a Greek inhabitant of that place. This resistless beauty he raised to the partnership of his throne; and the festivities with which he celebrated his nuptials, and still more the intemperance of love and wine which accompanied and followed them, made the marriage of Monima as fatal to the interests of Mithridates<sup>23</sup>, as that of the fair maid of Chalcis had formerly proved to those of the king of Syria.

His great  
army in  
Greece—  
Dromichæ-  
tes the Thra-  
cian.

The Pontic forces in Thrace were joined by those of Dromichætes, a hereditary name among the chieftains of that untamed country, ever hostile to Rome, and always ready to abet any power that ventured to step forth as her antagonist. Besides Dromichætes the Thracian, these forces were led by Taxiles and other generals; but according to Mithridates' orders, the whole of them, upon their arrival in Greece, were to obey Archelaus, who left the Piræus abruptly, in order to put himself at their head. He, accordingly,

<sup>22</sup> Plutarch in Sylla, & Appian de Bell. Mithridat. c. 22. & seq.      <sup>23</sup> Id. ibid.

Joined

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joined the first division which had passed through Macedon into Thessaly<sup>44</sup>, driving before them the Romans employed in civil or military affairs in that province. Sylla, being apprised of the enemy's approach, hastened from Attica into Bœotia, and arrived in time to save the important city Chæronæa. Disappointed of admission into this place, Archelaus, with little attention to the nature of his troops, consisting, besides innumerable archers, of a phalanx of spearsmen, and a heavy cavalry richly caparisoned, chose his position on the hill of Thurium, which rises in the neighbourhood of Chæronæa, and ascending by various ledges of rocks, that form so many natural terraces, terminates at length in an abrupt and narrow summit. In such a post, the Asiatics, who were three times more numerous than the Romans, thought themselves secure from attack. They were disappointed. A citizen of Chæronæa made known to Sylla a secret path, by which he fell suddenly on their rear. This attack was decisive; and the battle a mere rout, and one of the most remarkable on record, if 100,000 Asiatics fell, with the loss of only 12 Romans, for Sylla related in his memoirs that 14 were missing, two of whom afterwards made their appearance. Archelaus, with about 10,000 fugitives, escaped to Chalcis in Eubœa<sup>45</sup>.

Battle of  
Thurium, in  
Bœotia in  
which Ar-  
chelaus is  
defeated  
with the loss  
of 100,000  
slain.  
Olymp.  
clxxiii. 3.  
B. C. 80.

Shortly after this memorable victory, Sylla learned that his absence from Rome had been followed by a renewal of disorders in that city. Cinna, though consul by his sufferance, had basely broke faith with him: Marius was restored from exile beyond seas, where his kindred vengeance had brooded over the gloomy ruins of Carthage<sup>46</sup>; the whole frame of the government was subverted; and Flaccus, with Fimbria for his lieutenant, had sailed with a reinforcement of two legions towards Greece, that he might command as consul in the Mithridatic war. Sylla, upon this intelligence, deter-

Battle of  
Orchomenos  
—the Asia-  
tic camp  
stormed.

<sup>44</sup> Macedon and Thessaly then formed one Roman province. See above, c. xxiy. Mithridat. c. 42. & seq.

<sup>45</sup> Plutarch in Mario.

<sup>46</sup> Plutarch in Sylla. Appian. de Bell.

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mined to treat the approaching legions as enemies, and hastened towards the Hadriatic to combat them at their first landing. But he had not proceeded beyond Theffaly, before he was informed that a new Asiatic army had entered the more southern parts of Greece which he had just quitted, and was making conquest of them for the king of Pontus. This new army, being transported to Eubœa, had joined forces with Archelaus at Chalcis. It was 80,000 strong, and consisted chiefly of cavalry. Its commander was Dorylaus, nephew to a general of the same name, who, from his skill in tactics, and his writings on that subject, was called Dorylaus the tactician. The uncle had been the friend and favourite of Mithridates V. Euergetes; the nephew rendered himself equally acceptable to the successor of that prince, who now dispatched him into Greece to co-operate with Archelaus". Upon returning southward, Sylla found the enemy in the plain of Orchomenos, a city ten miles distant from the scene of the former battle at Chæronæa. The district abounded in forage, and was well adapted to the operations of cavalry. Sylla descended into it by the heights nearest to the lake Copais, and took post among the adjacent marshes. From this position, he began to draw lines ten feet broad into the plain, but his workmen were soon obstructed, and they, as well as the troops that guarded them, thrown into great terror. The enemy, covered by the whole Pontic and Paphlagonian horse, advanced to a sudden assault. The Romans fell back, and their officers being unable to rally them, Sylla leaped from his horse, and seizing an ensign, rushed to oppose the assailants, crying aloud, "let it be made known at Rome that I was forsaken by my troops at Orchomenos". At that instant many officers sprang forward to second him; they were supported by the bravest troops; the remainder followed through shame; a sharp conflict ensued; and the enemy, being put to the rout, were pursued to their camp with the loss of 15,000, of whom 10,000 were ca-

" Strabo, l. x. p. 478.

" Plutarch in Sylla, & Appian, c. 49.

valry. Without allowing them time for recovering from this blow, the Romans, with compacted shields under the form of the testudo, attacked the Asiatic camp. The rampart was warmly defended, and the combat the more bloody, because the enemy, cooped up within a narrow space, could not make the ordinary and appropriate use of their arms, but collecting their arrows into fasces, fought with them hand to hand, as with swords. Many were slain in the camp, and many, being pursued towards the marshes of Copais, were there drowned, or cut in pieces, while they vainly implored mercy in languages unknown to the victors. Archelaus, with a feeble remnant, again escaped to Chalcis<sup>19</sup>.

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The dreadful defeats of Mithridates' generals spread revolt among his allies or conquests. The spirit of defection became the bolder and the more general, when the Roman army in the Marian interest, finding the Bosporus unguarded, passed from Byzantium into Asia. This army, in consequence of a deadly quarrel between Flaccus and his lieutenant Fimbria, had fallen into the hands of the latter; a man unprincipled and audacious, and who, having excited the soldiers to murder his own superior and their general, endeavoured to efface this enormity by acting with uncommon vigour against Mithridates<sup>20</sup>.

Operations  
of Fimbria a  
partizan of  
Marius.

At the same time, this prince was in danger from a more unexpected enemy. Sylla had carried as his questor into Greece, Lucullus, who, having conducted himself in that important office with equal ability and zeal, was commissioned, after the taking of Athens, to collect ships from Rhodes, Crete, Cyprus, Cyrenè, and Egypt. His requisitions were complied with in most of those countries, as well as on the coasts of Lycia and Pamphylia; and though his expedition, undertaken during the winter season, was exposed also to much danger from the fleets of Mithridates and from pirates, yet he finally

Lucullus  
Sylla's questor collects a  
powerful  
fleet.  
Olym.  
clxxiii 3.  
B. C. 86.

<sup>19</sup> Id. *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Appian, Plutarch, Velleius Paterculus, l. ii. c. 24.

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He refuses to co-operate with Fimbria in a promising attempt to seize the person of Mithridates at Pitarè.

assembled so considerable an armament as enabled him to ride triumphant in the *Ægean*“.

Pergamus had, for more than two years, been the head quarters of Mithridates. In this city he had made his arrangements for the disastrous expeditions into Greece; and from the same place he had sent forces to quell the insurrections that were breaking out in various parts of Asia; and which, instead of losing strength, had multiplied and augmented in consequence of the cruel and treacherous methods which he took to suppress them. The Chians, in particular, after being subjected to a mulct of 2,000 talents, were perfidiously embarked, the men in one set of vessels, the women and children in another“, to be transplanted from their fair island to some gloomy district in Pontus. But a few armed ships belonging to Heraclæa, a city long connected in commercial alliance with Chios, met and attacked the king's transports, and carried them into their own harbour. The Chians were received by their friends in Heraclæa, with the most cordial kindness, and were sent back, well provided with necessaries, to their native island“. The many detachments from Pergamus much exhausted that garrison; a circumstance that escaped not the vigilance of Fimbria. Having defeated some of the king's forces in Bithynia, that officer hastened to attack him in his head quarters. Pergamus was surprised and gained; and Mithridates compelled to take refuge in the neighbouring sea-port of Pitanè. At this crisis, Fimbria's messengers came to Lucullus, then in the harbour of Colophon in Ionia, imploring, in the name of Rome, that he would block up the common adversary by sea, while a Roman army besieged him by land. But Lucullus refused co-operation, preferring the interests of his party to those of his country; and the king, being thus enabled to escape to the island of Lesbos,

“ Plutarch in Lucullo.

p. 266.

“ Posidonius apud Athenæum. l. vi.

“ Memnon apud Phot. c. 35.



soon afterwards rallied his forces in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont<sup>64</sup>.

But several months before this time, Mithridates, upon the discomfiture of his army at Orchomenos, in despair of success in Greece, had written to Archelaus to conclude peace with Sylla on the best terms possible; intending to ratify or annul the treaty according to future contingencies. At the request of Archelaus, Sylla granted to that general an interview at Delium, on the coast of Bœotia. Their negociation did not linger; for Sylla also wished to terminate the war, that he might return to Italy, and punish his enemies there, as he openly declared to be his purpose. He required however that Mithridates should evacuate his western conquests; renounce all claims on Bithynia and Cappadocia in favour of Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes respectively; pay to the Romans 2,000 talents, and surrender to them seventy of his best galleys; on the fulfilment of which articles, Sylla promised to use his influence with the senate, to have him declared the friend of Rome. After concluding this transaction, of which Mithridates was apprised with due diligence, Archelaus accompanied Sylla into Thessaly, and from thence into Macedon; and was everywhere treated by him with such marked attentions, as countenanced the suspicion of treachery to his king, on the part of this Pontic general<sup>65</sup>.

In their way to the Hellespont, they were met by ambassadors from Mithridates, refusing the surrender of the galleys, and making difficulties as to certain districts in Paphlagonia, which the Romans regarded in the light of new conquests, but which the king affirmed to have descended to him from his ancestors. At the same time it was hinted, that should the negociation fail, Mithridates would apply to Fimbria, from whom he had reason to expect more favourable terms. At a name so odious, Sylla said, "Fimbria is a rebel whom I shall

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Archelaus' treaty of peace with Sylla. Olymp. clxxiii. 3. b. C. 86.

Ambassadors from the king— Sylla sternly silences their cavils.

<sup>64</sup> Plutarch in Lucull. Auctor de Vir. l. lxxxiii. Illust. in Fimbr. & Tit. Liv. Epitom.

<sup>65</sup> Appian, Dion, & Plutarch in Sylla.

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Sylla chastises the Thracians.

punish presently; when I have passed into Asia I shall know, too, the intentions of your master, who, instead of cavilling with me about trifles, ought to thank me on his knees for leaving to him that right hand with which he signed in one day the death-warrant of 100,000 Romans. The sternness with which these words were uttered, totally abashed the ambassadors; none of them had courage to reply: Archelaus only ventured to make intercession for the king and his ministers; and embracing Sylla's hands, entreated that he might be himself sent to Mithridates; since he had determined not to live, unless that prince accepted the peace which had been made for him. This request being granted, Sylla employed the interval of uncertainty concerning the king's real views, in chastising the Thracian tribes, who had recently betrayed their hostility, and who were, at all times, ready to disturb the quiet of the Macedonian frontier.

Interview between Sylla and Mithridates in the Trojan plain.

From this military excursion, he had returned to Philippi, when Archelaus presented himself with a joyous countenance, to say that Mithridates was willing to ratify all that had been agreed on, and anxiously desired a conference. This change of mind was occasioned by the boldness of Fimbria's operations, which we have already mentioned, and of which Mithridates had not to fear the renewal, should Sylla pass the Hellespont. He crossed that strait between Sestus and Abydos, with four legions, in vessels furnished by Lucullus. About the same time, Mithridates, with above 20,000 men, arrived at Dardanus in Troas. There, the interview of the chiefs took place, each attended by a few friends, in an intermediate part of the plain, between the two armies. At meeting, Mithridates tendered to Sylla his hand. The Roman, rejecting this offer, asked whether he was ready to abide by the peace which had been stipulated. The king remained silent. Sylla desired him to proceed with what he had to say, because he had come thither at his solicitation to hear him; "the conquered, who crave terms, must speak out; conquerors, when

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when they please, may keep silence." Mithridates then entered into a long discourse, tending to shew that the Romans were the aggressors, and that nothing short of the intolerable wrongs which he had suffered, could have induced him to take arms against such antient and such respected allies. He also made mention of his hereditary friendship with Sylla. The latter replied, "that he had heard nothing of the friendship between them, until he had slain 160 000 of the king's soldiers, and stormed two of his camps, of which the Romans had made prize:" then enumerating the many enormities committed by Mithridates, wherefore, he said, would you defend or extenuate deeds of such atrocity, for which, by means of Archelaus, you formerly begged pardon? Do you think that I, whom you feared at a distance, am come hither to debate with you about articles? The time for friendly discussion expired from the moment that we levied war to punish your crimes, and will continue to punish them while the occasion requires it. Mithridates replied, that he accepted the peace, such as agreed on by his ambassador. Sylla then embraced him, and this ceremony was the sole ratification of a treaty involving the fate of so many provinces<sup>66</sup>. No written document, as will appear, was required on either side.

When differences were thus settled, Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes, who attended in Sylla's camp, were sent for, and, being reconciled to Mithridates, had his consent to their peaceful re-establishment in their respective kingdoms. This, and the other articles of peace, were all carried into execution without farther difficulty; and Mithridates having surrendered seventy stout galleys, paid 2,000 talents, and evacuated his western conquests, retired into Pontus, secretly accusing the treachery of Archelaus of all the disgrace that had befallen him.

During the conference at Dardanus, Fimbria encamped at Thyatira in Lydia. Sylla had no sooner adjusted matters with Mithri-

Articles of peace carried into execution—Archelaus suspected of treachery by Mithridates. Olymp. clxxiii. 4. B. C. 85.

Fimbria deserted by his legions—he

<sup>66</sup> Appian, *ibid.* c. 55. & *see* Plutarch in Sylla.

<sup>66</sup> 14. *ibid.*

dates

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kills himself.  
Olymp.  
clxxiv. 1.  
B. C. 84.

dates than he matched thither. Fimbria's legions being on the point of deserting him, that profligate man endeavoured to save his own life by employing assassins against his adversary. But this execrable design being discovered, the danger which threatened their victorious and lavish general provoked Sylla's troops into fury. They surrounded Fimbria's camp, loading him with epithets of reproach. That officer appeared on the rampart, desiring to see Sylla, a favour which, with good reason, was denied him. But Rutilius, one of Sylla's lieutenants, advanced and told him, that if he chose to quit the Roman province of Asia, in which another was proconsul, a safe road would be open for him to the sea-coast. Fimbria replied, that he would find a better road for himself. He accordingly proceeded to Pergamus, and fell on his sword in the temple of Esculapius<sup>68</sup>.

Proceedings  
of Sylla in  
Lesser Asia,  
in Athens,  
and in Eu-  
boea.  
Olymp.  
clxxiv. 2.  
B. C. 83.

His two legions took the military oath to Sylla; who, at the head of a resistless army, speedily settled to his mind the affairs of Lesser Asia. That country was punished for its defection by a fine of 20,000 talents, to be paid by 44 districts into which it was now divided, to the end that their respective amercements might be proportioned to their several measures of delinquency<sup>69</sup>. Sylla, with his fleet and army, then sailed into Greece, and cast anchor in the Piræus. Athens was in ruins and desolation, in consequence of the obstinate resistance which it had made to him. He caused himself to be initiated, however, into its still venerated mysteries; ransacked the houses and effects of all who were found to have abetted the tyrant Aristio; and, on this occasion, made prize of the library of a certain Apellicon of Teios, containing the long unedited works of Aristotle. Being at this time attacked by the gout, Sylla passed over into Eubœa, and spent several weeks in that island for the benefit of the hot baths at Ædepsus; amusing himself, during his recovery, with buffoons and sophists, and all persons that he

<sup>68</sup> Auctor de Vir. Illust. in Fimbr. Tit.    <sup>69</sup> Cicero Orat. pro Flacco.  
Liv. Epitom. l. lxxxiij.

ould meet with of humourous or singular characters. He appeared indeed as perfectly at his ease, as if no important work had remained for him.

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Yet on his return to Italy, for which he now made preparations, he had to encounter with his six legions, somewhat reinforced in Greece and Macedon, fifteen generals, commanding collectively 225,000 men.<sup>70</sup> His old enemy Marius had died of a pleurisy contracted by hard drinking; Cinna, a fit successor to that bloody usurper, had perished in a military mutiny at Ancona, while he endeavoured to force his legions on ship-board, that they might carry the civil war into Thessaly. But the loss of these commanders was amply supplied by Norbanus, Scipio, Sertorius, Carbo, the young Marius, and many others, each of whom was likely to maintain a desperate conflict, and whose combined weight must have overwhelmed any general less pre-eminent than Sylla either in courage or in craft. It belongs to historians of the civil wars to explain how he seduced some armies and vanquished others, and, in the space of two years, made himself master of Rome, of Italy, and of the Roman empire<sup>70</sup>. In punishing his personal enemies, and those of the aristocracy, which he called purging the state, he at first claimed no other title to power than the right of the sword. Afterwards the dictatorship was revived in his favour, a dignity that had lain dormant for one hundred and twenty years. It was conferred on him for an indefinite time; but before the end of three years, he had finished the work which he had undertaken, of extinguishing popular sedition, re-establishing the just authority of the senate and comitia by centuries, and of enacting such salutary laws as seemed essential to the maintenance of a government founded on the natural prerogatives of wealth, abilities, and virtues. Having done all this, he procured Publius Servilius and Appius Claudius to be chosen consuls; and then appearing in the forum, made a public resignation of

Sylla's wonderful successes against his own and the public enemies.  
Olymp. clxiv. 3—  
clxv. 3.  
B. C. 82—  
79.

<sup>70</sup> Appian. de Bell. Civil. l. i. c. 81. & seqq



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Circumstances which damped his triumph and tarnished his character.

his dictatorship, declaring to the people, that if any citizen had matter of charge against him, he was ready to answer it. Having dismissed his twenty-four lictors, he continued to walk the streets accompanied by a few friends, and afterwards retired quietly to his villa near Cumæ. Of all men who have aimed at great and extraordinary designs, none was ever more fortunate in accomplishing them : he died peaceably, within a year after his retreat, victorious over all his enemies. The triumph which he enjoyed at the retrospect in his own mind must, however, have been damped in proportion to the depth of his sagacity. The expedient of employing a military force to settle party dissensions, which in the vile and sanguinary example of Marius, was calculated only to produce hatred and disgust, was likely, from his own glorious success in re-establishing the commonwealth, to be construed into a precedent by more profligate sons of ambition. Yet, notwithstanding this great blemish in his public life, his name continued to be popular and respected, when his sword was no longer formidable ; and he is the first of the Romans whose obsequies were celebrated with a magnificence of expence of which modern times cannot form an idea, since two hundred and ten loads of aromatics were consumed on his funeral pile<sup>71</sup>. From his contempt for unbounded power over a vast empire, from his perfect self-possession in moments of the greatest danger, from that lofty disdain of human affairs which made him despise even the fame of his own great actions, and ascribe them solely to the power of fortune, he might seem to have reached true magnanimity, if that noblest of the virtues were not totally incompatible with his deadly spirit of revenge<sup>72</sup>.

<sup>71</sup> Plutarch in Syll. Conf. Plin. N. H.    <sup>72</sup> Appian et Plutarch, ibid.  
l. xii. c. 18.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

*Sufferings of Achaia and Asia. — Tigranes diverted from the Roman war. — Improvements in Armenia. — The Romans defeated in Cappadocia. — Mithridates' Thanksgivings for Victory. — Cappadocia invaded by Tigranes, and drained of its Inhabitants. — Bithynia bequeathed to the Romans. — The Bequest intercepted by Mithridates. — Lucullus takes the Field against him. — His glorious Campaigns, and more glorious Administration. — Tigranocerta taken. — Mithridates' Letter to the Parthian. — Sack of Nisibis. — Intrigues in favour of Pompey. — He suppresses the Pirates. — His Success against Mithridates and Tigranes. — Nicopolis founded. — Syria reduced into a Province. — Transactions with the Parthians. — Meridian of Roman Greatness. — Proceedings of Pompey in Jerusalem. — Reflections thereon.*

**I**N the course of the first Mithridatic war, which lasted scarcely five years, the provinces of Achaia and of Asia suffered deeper wounds than had been inflicted on them during the long and obstinate struggles among Alexander's successors. The plunder of the richest temples of Achaia to pay Sylla's army, while the exchequer of Rome was in the hands of his enemies, and the imposition of a general fine of 20,000 talents<sup>1</sup> on the involuntary rebels in Asia, were tolerable grievances compared with the many particular penalties imposed on various places at different times by the king of Pontus and the Roman generals, as they happened alternately to prevail; above all, the licence granted to tax-gatherers, usurers, and greedy soldiers to prey on the property, and sport with the lives, of peaceful husbandmen and industrious citizens<sup>2</sup>. To fill up the measure of calamities in those two ill fated provinces, the confederacy of pirates, of whose

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Sufferings of Achaia and Asia in the first Mithridatic war — increase of the pirates. Olymp. clxxiv. 1. B. C. 84.

<sup>1</sup> Equivalent to nearly 4,000,000 l.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch in Sulla. & in Lucull. & Mith-

ridat. Orat. ad Milites, apud Justin. l. xxxviii. c. 7.

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origin we formerly gave an account<sup>1</sup>, made a rapid and alarming progress during relentless hostilities between the only powers that were able to repress them. Not contented with deforming the seas, they invaded Greece and the Greek colonies in Asia, desolated cities, plundered temples, and shewed uncommon skill, as well as diligence, in occupying such harbours as were fittest for the purposes either of concealment or defence. Even during Sylla's short continuance in Lesser Asia, they obtained possession of Iassus, Samos, Clazomenè, and Samothrace, after stripping a temple in the last named place of 1,000 talents. In the course of a few subsequent years, their strength amounted, as will be shewn, to 1200 well equipped galleys, and their strongholds to the number of 400; while the island of Crete, and the creeks in Cilicia, from Coracesium eastward, still continued to be the chief seats of their power, and great repositories of their plunder<sup>2</sup>.

Distracted  
state of Par-  
thia—ag-  
grandize-  
ment of  
Armenia.  
Olymp.  
clxxiii. 2—  
clxxv 4.  
B. C. 87—  
77.

In commencing his war with Rome, Mithridates had promised himself a powerful and zealous ally in Tigranes, king of Armenia. But shortly before the former of these princes invaded the Roman provinces, Arsaces IX. of Parthia closed his long and successful career. He left no child behind him, and his kingdom was thrown into a civil war by the rivalry of his kinsmen Mnaskires and Senatrockes or Sinatruces<sup>3</sup>, the former of whom boldly combated for a crown at the age of 86, and having prevailed in the contest, held a turbulent reign for ten years longer; without totally suppressing his antagonist, who then became his successor<sup>4</sup>. This distracted state of the Parthian empire altogether diverted Tigranes from the affairs of Lesser Asia, by opening to him new and great views for the extension

<sup>1</sup> See above, c. xxv.

<sup>2</sup> Appian de Bell. Mithridat. c. 92. & seq. Conf. Plutarch. in Pompeio.

<sup>3</sup> Phlegon. apud Phot. Cod. xcvi. p. 265. Sinatruces is called Sintricus by Appian, (de Bell. Mithridat. c. 204.) Sena-

truces by Suidas, Sinatruces by Dion. Sinatruces by Lucian in Macrob. On medals we read Sinatrockes. Conf. Eckhel Doctrin. Num. Veter. & Vaillant. Arsacid. p. 781.

<sup>4</sup> Id. ibid.

and improvement of Armenia. He recovered undisturbed possession of some frontier districts, which had been claimed by Parthia; and complete sovereignty of the seventy vallies<sup>7</sup> which he had hitherto held as a sort of feudatory of that more powerful neighbour. Far beyond the dominion of his ancestors, he made conquest of various satrapies in both Medias, and in Aturia; and when any of his satraps or dependent kings, as they were called, displeased him, he ordered them to Tigranocerta, and employed them in his court in mean personal services<sup>8</sup>. At the same time he afforded a safe asylum to many useful classes of men, whom the troubles in the Parthian empire drove from Upper Asia. By such means, the industry and opulence of Armenia made advances equally important and rapid. The cultivators of peaceful arts flocked from perturbed regions to scenes of quiet and safety; and Tigranes, to have carriers at hand to second the commerce of his people, attracted to him many tribes of Arabian nomades, who, when great profits were in view, feared not the most distant and hazardous journies<sup>9</sup>. Before the close of the first Mithridatic war, the fame of Tigranes had thus diffused itself through all the countries around him; insomuch, that only a few months after Sylla's return to Italy, and that of Mithridates to Pontus, when the Syrians, tired of unceasing dissensions among the Seleucidæ, determined to look out for more worthy and more powerful protection, all men cast their eyes on Tigranes. By this popular election, the king of Armenia became master of Syria<sup>10</sup>; from thence he made inroads into Cilicia and neighbouring provinces, carrying from them many of their Greek inhabitants to replenish the Armenian cities, particularly his new capital Tigranocerta<sup>11</sup>; and of several parts of Lesser Asia, as well as of all Syria, he kept possession for the space of fourteen years<sup>12</sup>, till a new conflict be-

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Tigranes  
proud magnificence.<sup>7</sup> See above, p. 271.<sup>8</sup> Plutarch in Lucull.<sup>9</sup> Appian. de Bell. Mithridat. c. 67. & seq.

Strabo, l. xi. p. 532. &amp; l. xii. p. 539. &amp; Plutarch in Lucull.

<sup>10</sup> Appian. de Reb. Syriac. c. 40. & seq.<sup>11</sup> Id. Mithridat. c. 67.<sup>12</sup> Justin, l. xi. c. 2. He says eighteen years, erroneously.

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Rebellion in  
Colchis —  
murder of  
the younger  
Mithridates.  
Olymp.  
clxxiv. 3.  
B. C. 82.

Archelaus  
persuades  
Muræna  
of the hostile  
designs of  
the king of  
Pontus.

tween the Romans and Mithridates, in which Tigranes finally and most unseasonably took part, destroyed the former of these princes, and laid the latter at the mercy of the victorious commonwealth.

The disgrace which the king of Pontus incurred in his warfare with Sylla, was attended with such consequences as might have been expected in his hastily raised empire. Colchis and Bosphorus were in arms; and the former kingdom demanded for its master a son of the sovereign from whom it had revolted. This son, named also Mithridates, had, unsuccessfully indeed, yet zealously served his father in combating Fimbria. The king, therefore appeased the sedition by sending him to govern the Colchians; but soon afterwards young Mithridates paid the sad forfeit of his popularity to the jealousy of the old<sup>13</sup>.

The disturbances in Bosphorus required a fleet and army to quell them. While Mithridates made preparations against this small but industrious and opulent state, Archelaus, his unfortunate general, sensible that he had fallen into disgrace with his master, seized an opportunity of effecting his escape to Muræna, who had been left by Sylla proconsul in Pergamus, with command of the Fimbrian legions. Muræna, in common with all his countrymen in military power, panted for the honours of a triumph, and was easily persuaded by the Pontic fugitive that the forces pretended to be levied against Bosphorus were destined really against the Asiatic dominions of Rome. Archelaus also apprised him, that Mithridates, under frivolous pretences, still retained garrisons in certain districts of Cappadocia. Upon this intelligence, Muræna took the field with a small but well appointed army, passed through Phrygia, which had long been annexed to the Roman province of Asia; and traversing Cappadocia, expelled the hostile garrisons from that kingdom<sup>14</sup>. He then entered Pontus, and having crossed mount Paryadres, surprised Comana, a city distant only a few miles from the mountain,

<sup>13</sup> Appian. Mithridat. c. 64.

<sup>14</sup> Id. *ibid.* c. 64—66.



and long distinguished by its superstition and its opulence, its fairs and its festivals<sup>15</sup>. When Mithridates heard of this unexpected invasion, he sent ambassadors to Muræna with complaints. But these ambassadors had been chosen with little judgment. They were, as usual, Greeks, but persons little satisfied with their master, and who therefore were at no pains to promote his views, or even to justify his proceedings. They remonstrated, however, against the invasion on the recent treaty with Sylla, and appealed to that treaty as proving Mithridates to have been entitled, before war was declared to him, to all the consideration and forbearance due to a Roman ally. But Muræna denied, truly, that he had ever seen any such treaty; for, as we before mentioned, in the king's negotiation with Sylla, no written document vouching the articles of peace, had been required on either side<sup>16</sup>.

Having thus dismissed the ambassadors, Muræna resumed his operations, and ravaged the rich districts on both sides mount Paryadres, though it does not appear that he made himself master of any of the strongholds on the mountain itself, where Mithridates kept his treasures; nor that he ventured to attack Cabira, near its southern roots, where the king had a park and a palace, and also some valuable mines, we know not of what metal. Here too (the modern reader will smile at the information) Mithridates had erected a water mill, moved by one of the many streams that form the eastern sources of the Halys<sup>17</sup>. But this seemed to antiquity a circumstance deserving of notice, since mills wrought by the power either of wind or water, were, of old, objects of great rarity. To grind corn by the aid of horses or oxen was then the prevailing fashion; slaves were also frequently employed in that severe labour; and the ordinary punishment of a worthless slave was compulsion to ply his hand mill<sup>18</sup> to

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Faintly written text in the right margin, possibly a reference or commentary.

The district Paryadres—its distinctions.

<sup>15</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 555.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, c. 64.

<sup>17</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 556.

<sup>18</sup> Servorum nequam in pistrinum dedici dicebantur. Senec. de Benefic. l. iv. c. 37. Plautus, & Terent. passim.

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the utmost measure of his natural strength, and often beyond it. After his two incursions into Pontus, Muræna, opposed only by a party of horse, which he cut off near Comana, returned into Phrygia loaded with booty.

Mithridates  
defeats the  
Romans in  
Cappadocia  
—a remnant  
of the van-  
quished es-  
capes into  
Phrygia.  
Olymp.  
clxxiv. 3.  
B. C. 82.

Meanwhile, Mithridates having sent complaints to Rome of the first injury that had been done to him, a deputy arrived from the senate to examine matters on the spot. Callidius, entrusted with this commission, met Muræna in Phrygia, and there told him in public that he must cease from hostilities. But, after a private interview between them, Muræna repassed the Halys, and having renewed his ravages in Pontus, reduced Mithridates to the necessity of repelling force by force. His old friend Gordius was first in the field, commanding the vanguard. The king followed in person. Muræna retreated across the eastern bank of the Halys into Cappadocia. Mithridates pursued him closely, forced him to a battle, and completely discomfited him. The greater part of the Romans was cut off; Muræna, with a feeble remnant, escaped by the mountains into Phrygia<sup>19</sup>; and Mithridates thus regained those districts of Cappadocia which had recently been wrested from him.

Mithridates'  
thanksgiving  
for victory—  
its fashion.

To celebrate his victory over enemies that had wantonly provoked his arms, the king of Pontus performed a sacrifice of thanks after the most solemn fashion of the great monarchs of Persia, from whom he claimed his descent. These princes were accustomed to sacrifice on the tops of the highest mountains, that the fiery symbols of their religious gratitude might embrace the whole circle of the heavens<sup>20</sup>. In constructing the sacred pyre, the king with his own hands laid the foundation. The fabric rose from a broad base in regular stories of wood, gradually contracting as they reached the summit. The recesses or terraces thus formed on its sides, contained offerings of milk and honey, of wine and oil, and an exuberant abundance of

<sup>19</sup> Appian, c. 65.

<sup>20</sup> This circle, Herodotus says, they con-

sidered and called god, l. i. c. 131.

the most precious perfumes. On the lowest story a copious banquet was provided for all present, and in which all present thought it their duty with thankfulness to partake. Such was the custom when the Great King sacrificed in *Pasagarda*<sup>21</sup>. But the lofty altar of Mithridates should seem to have been reared on mount Argæus, the highest in Cappadocia; from which travellers are said to behold at once the Euxine and Mediterranean<sup>22</sup>.

Shortly after this ceremony, and while Mithridates still continued in Cappadocia, Gabinius came to him as commissioner from Rome, or rather from Sylla, then absolute master of the commonwealth. Gabinius commanded *Muræna* to make peace in good earnest, and faithfully to maintain it. He then proceeded to the kings of Pontus and Cappadocia, to promote reconciliation between them. Through the interposition of a man, bearing the authority of Sylla, the whole business was speedily adjusted. Mithridates retained some districts in Cappadocia, to which he produced plausible titles, but gave one of his sons, a child four years old, as hostage to Ariobarzanes, that no farther encroachments should be made on him. To solemnize this peace, he held public carousals, at which he distributed rich prizes to those who quaffed the largest goblets, or sang the best songs. The skilful in repartee and buffoonery did not pass unrewarded. The Roman commissioner alone refused to take part in this disgraceful scene of intemperance and uproar<sup>23</sup>.

Mithridates' peace with the Romans—the carousals with which he celebrated it. Olymp. clxxv. 2. B. C. 79.

Having settled his differences in Lesser Asia Mithridates was at leisure to attend his concerns on the remote northern shores of the Euxine. There, on his way to Bosphorus, he had to punish the bloody and irreclaimable *Achæi* and *Heniochi*<sup>24</sup>, and did not reduce those mountaineers without losing great part of his army through the severity of the climate, co-operating with the fierceness and craft

Appoints his son *Machares* viceroy of Bosphorus.

<sup>21</sup> Appian, c. 66. Conf. Strabo, l. xv. c. 38. Appian, c. 66, 67. Conf. Cicero p. 6 Muræna.

<sup>22</sup> Strabo, l. xii p. 518.

<sup>24</sup> Appian, c. 102. Conf. Aristot. Politic.

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch in Sylla. Memnon apud Phot. l. viii. c. 4.

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of the enemy. We know not what opposition he encountered in Bosphorus; but at leaving that peninsula, he established in it as king, or rather viceroy, one of his own sons named Machares<sup>25</sup>, now the object of his affection, and shortly afterwards the victim of his vengeance.

Mithridates mortified in his attempt to obtain the ratification of peace in writing. Olymp. clxxvi. 1. B. C. 76.

This remote warfare did not divert his attention from the more important affairs of the West. None of his transactions with Rome had yet been recorded; they rested merely on oral testimony; and while this continued to be the case, Mithridates saw that he would lie at the mercy of every ambitious proconsul whom the Romans sent into Asia. Though historians, therefore, have considered the campaigns of Muraena, and the cessation of hostilities on the part of that general, as a distinct subject, forming what is called the second Mithridatic war, yet those expeditions seem not to have been viewed in the same light by the king of Pontus. He considered the work of peace as still unfinished, until the conditions of it should be formally confirmed at Rome, and transmitted to him duly authenticated in writing. For this purpose, his ambassadors were dispatched to the senate; but as Sylla died before their arrival, the various applications made by them were treated with neglect, and they returned, bringing to their master, instead of secure peace and the honourable title of "friend to the Roman people," nothing but such mortification and disgrace, as, by a mind far tamer than his, could not have been brooked with patience<sup>26</sup>.

Tigranes invades Cappadocia, and transplants its inhabitants. Olymp. clxxvi. 1. B. C. 76.

He set himself, therefore, with the utmost diligence, to recruit his army and replenish his magazines. While engaged in such preparations, he again applied to his son-in-law Tigranes, then in the height of his prosperity. The treaty between these princes had, for reasons above mentioned, produced no other effect than the depopulation of some districts in Cappadocia. In that kingdom, so closely allied with them, the Romans were most vulnerable. At the

<sup>25</sup> Appian, Mithridat. l. 67.

instigation of his father-in-law, Tigranes passed the Euphrates with a great army; and without deigning to employ any pretence for justifying his invasion, began to ravage Cappadocia, and to make spoil of its inhabitants. As persons rather than property was his object, he beset the whole country with armed men, and hunted, as it were, the flying Cappadocians into his toils. Three hundred thousand of them are said to have been carried with him into Armenia<sup>2</sup>.

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Before the Romans were ready to revenge this injury, for their vassal Ariobarzanes seems to have thought himself fortunate in eluding the grasp of the invader, Nicomedes III. of Bithynia died, in the seventeenth year of his reign, bequeathing to them that country. This destination of his kingdom seemed to Nicomedes the surest expedient for saving the Bithynians from similar evils to those which had just fallen on their neighbours the Cappadocians. But the event did not correspond to his views; for Mithridates was no sooner apprised of his death and testament, than he marched an army into Bithynia, and made himself master of the kingdom. Immediately before striking this blow, which destroyed all hopes of peace, the king of Pontus, having assembled his forces in Paphlagonia on the frontier of the devoted country, addressed them in a long and animated oration, expatiating on his own wrongs and the boundless rapacity of the Romans, heightened by more unbounded arrogance. Of that nation he had two persons of great distinction in his camp. Lucius Magius and Lucius Fannius, who, after the wreck of Fimbria's fortunes to which they had been devoted, rather than serve under his adversary Sylla, had taken refuge with the public enemy. Mithridates received them with open arms, treated them with great respect, and having sent them on an embassy into Spain, concluded an alliance with Sertorius, who, through his extraordinary influence over the native Spaniards, had upheld the Marian faction for five

Bithynia bequeathed by Nicomedes III. to the Romans—Mithridates intercepts this gift. Olymp. clxxvi. 2. B. C. 75.

Mithridates' treaty with Sertorius, who still upheld the Marian faction in Spain.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, Mithridat. c. 67. Conf. Strabo, l. xi. p. 532. & l. xii. p. 539.



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Advantages  
gained by it  
on either  
side.

years against Aufidius, Metellus, and Pompey; and continued to defend it three years longer, till he was treacherously slain at Ofca, near the roots of the Pyrenees, by his own lieutenant Perperna<sup>28</sup>. According to the treaty between Mithridates and this able chief, the former sent to the latter 3,000 talents and forty galleys; the latter in return sent to the king of Pontus, Marcus Varius, formerly a Roman senator, and now vested with proconsular authority by a senate which Sertorius had raised up in his own camp in Spain, to oppose the designs and measures of Rome. Varius was accompanied or followed by several officers and soldiers, well qualified to assist Mithridates in a plan, which shortly before this time he had adopted, for arming and disciplining a great proportion of his troops on the legionary model.

These advantages explained by Mithridates to his army.

In his discourse to his soldiers, the king of Pontus enlarged on the benefit to be expected from this Spanish alliance. The Romans, he said, would be attacked at once from the West and the East; the seas, it was well known, had long been unsafe for them; and the city of Rome, which had grown large and populous by a perpetual series of crimes, was already suffering through great scarcity, and would soon sink under the pressure of famine. The time was at hand to take vengeance on those plunderers of nations and of kings; they are now divided among themselves; the best and bravest of them (pointing to Varius and the two Lucii) renouncing a country unworthy of their virtues, have come hither to assist our councils and to share the glory of our arms<sup>29</sup>.

The consuls Lucullus and Cotta sent against him. Olymp. cxxxvi. 2. B. C. 75.

Meanwhile the Romans raised to the consulship Licinius Lucullus, the same person who had co-operated so ably with Sylla in the offices of questor and admiral. His colleague was Aurelius Cotta; the war with Mithridates was destined to both. It was intended that Lucullus should carry with him such reinforcements from Italy, as

Plutarch in Sertor. Sallust. Fragm.    <sup>28</sup> Appian, Mithridat. c. 69, 70.  
Histoir. l. iii. c. 15.

being

being joined by the troops in the Roman province of Asia, would raise his army to 30,000 infantry and 3,000 horse. Cotta preceded with a smaller army indeed, but accompanied with an admiral named Nudus, commanding a powerful fleet, the object peculiarly enjoined to him being the recovery of the maritime province of Bithynia. Cotta was a vain-glorious man, of abilities altogether inadequate to his pretensions. Flattered with the prospect of combating the king of Pontus before Lucullus' arrival, whose levies had been retarded by factious tribunes, and of thus appropriating exclusively the honours of a triumph, he wantonly exposed himself to bloody defeats both by sea and land, and then shut himself up with his admiral Nudus in Chalcedon, a strong city opposite to Byzantium. A bar, consisting of chains of iron, which had been thrown across the harbour at Chalcedon, was burst through; Mithridates burnt four, and captured sixty, gallees<sup>30</sup>.

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Cotta de-  
feated by sea  
and land at  
Chalcedon.  
Olymp.  
clxxvi. 3.  
B. C. 74.

Lucullus was informed of these disasters in his camp on the river Sangarius in Phrygia, towards which he had advanced, after employing proper means for remedying great evils in the ill-affected province of Asia. Through the cruelty of tax gatherers and iniquity of judges, many places in that province were so totally alienated from Rome, that upon Mithridates' invasion of Bithynia, they seemed ready to throw themselves once more into his arms. Disturbances had actually broken out in several districts; the proconsul Junius was unseasonably absent; and the insurrection would have become dangerous but for the following accident. It happened shortly before this period, that Julius Cæsar, having unsuccessfully arraigned Dolabella for malversation in his government of Macedon, failed for the isle of Rhodes in his twenty-third year, to receive the instructions of Apollonius, a celebrated master in rhetoric. His ship was captured by pirates, and carried into Pharmacusa, a small island near the coast of Miletus. There, he remained in captivity

Lucullus in  
Lesser Asia--  
his useful ex-  
ertions there.

First memo-  
rable public  
service of  
Julius Cæsar.  
Olymp.  
clxxvi. 3.  
B. C. 74.

<sup>30</sup> Appian, c. 71. Plutarch in Lucull.

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with his physician and two attendants, until other persons belonging to his retinue should raise fifty talents demanded for his ransom. The money was raised, probably at Miletus; and Cæsar, being set at liberty, sailed into the harbour of that city. Upon landing, he informed the Milesians of the presumptuous security of the pirates, and how easy it would be to surprise them. By the help of a very small proportion of the vessels then in the harbour, he offered to make the attempt next night, and to be answerable for the consequences. His proposal was accepted; the enterprize succeeded; and the pirates, who had carried him to Pharmacusa<sup>22</sup>, were now in their turn carried by him to Miletus, and from thence forwarded to Pergamus. It seems that Cæsar, while in their custody, had often threatened them in that coarse kind of raillery with which they were familiar, that, if ever he laid hands on them at any future time, he would certainly crucify them. Without waiting the orders of the proconsul, who was then in Bithynia, he determined to carry this threat into execution; though, in the adulatory language of historians, with the humanity that always characterised him, he first cut their throats, before he affixed their bodies to the cross<sup>23</sup>. Having thus punished the pirates, he pursued his destined voyage to Rhodes, but had not remained long in that island, when he learned Mithridates' invasion of Bithynia, and the growing defections in Asia. This intelligence made him hasten thither, with an intention of marching against the insurgents, at the head of such provincials as he could prevail on to follow him. His spontaneous exertions in the public service were attended with much success, and strenuously persevered in until Lucullus crossed the Hellespont vested with consular authority, and at the head of a great army. Yet equity, not arms, was the expedient to which this respectable commander had recourse for settling the discontents in Asia. He restrained abuses

<sup>21</sup> Sueton. in J. Cæsar, c. 4. Velleius Paterculus, l. ii. c. 41. Conf. Plutarch in Lucull.

<sup>22</sup> Sueton. in J. Cæsar, c. 74.

on the part of publicans and other Romans, and corrected their unjust proceedings against unhappy Asiatics, long exposed to their unchallenged peculations. The evils which he could not cure, he was studious to mitigate; giving assurances that, after reducing foreign enemies to submission, he would spare no pains to root out every domestic mischief from the province<sup>24</sup>.

Upon the news of his colleague's presumption and consequent disasters, Lucullus summoned a council. His principal officers were of opinion that the unfortunate Cotta ought to pay the forfeit of his folly, and to endure the evils of a siege in Chalcedon. Archelaus, Mithridates' revolted general, strongly abetted this advice, and exhorted Lucullus, without loss of time, to march forward into Pontus, where the enemy was most vulnerable. Lucullus dissented from the general opinion. He would not fly, he said, from the wild beast, to take possession of his lair; and to save the life of a single Roman, he declared to be, in his mind, a better service, than the acquisition of all the wealth in Pontus<sup>25</sup>. He therefore gave orders for proceeding with due speed to the relief of his colleague in Chalcedon.

Lucullus' generous resolution in favour of Cotta.

By this time Mithridates had assembled a mighty host, that, after gaining the strong cities of Chalcedon on the Bosphorus, and Cyzicus in an island of the Propontis, he might proceed southward, and overwhelm the Roman province of Asia. His gallies were 400; he had large bodies of horse; and his infantry is computed at 150,000 fighting men: their attendants, under the two general descriptions of servants and traders, far exceeded that number<sup>26</sup>. The Romans, however, having that full proportion of force, with which they had often triumphed over countless armies, eagerly demanded battle. The general restrained their ardour, because, from the intelligence which he received of the state of the enemy's provisions from different straggling parties that happened to fall into his hands, he conjectured

Views of Mithridates — his vast army.

<sup>24</sup> Plutarch, *ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Id. ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *Τρεσκοντα μυριαδες.* Appian, c. 72.

that,

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that, notwithstanding the supplies received by sea, so prodigious a host could not remain long in the narrow northern corner of the Peninsula. His conclusion was justified by the event<sup>37</sup>. Mithridates moved from the neighbourhood of the Bosporus, and fixed his camp at Adraestia, on the southern shore of the Propontis, directly opposite to the isle of Cyzicus<sup>38</sup>.

Lucullus follows and outwits him.  
Olymp. clxxvi. 3.  
B. C. 74.

Lucullus followed him at a due distance; and by a singular piece of good fortune, was enabled to occupy a post, near a village called Thraceia, most conveniently situate for distressing the enemy's camp. Lucius Magius, with the perfidy natural to deserters, found means of secretly communicating with Lucullus. In consequence of this intrigue, Magius persuaded Mithridates that it was unnecessary to guard the defiles leading to Thraceia, or to hinder Lucullus from fortifying that post in his neighbourhood. The nearer he approached, the more the king's affairs would be benefited; because the Fimbrian legions, composing the flower of the Roman army, would thereby find the greater facility in effecting their intended revolt. The mutinous spirit of these legions, not less notorious than their courage had been conspicuous, procured credit to the falsehood; and Lucullus thus possessed himself of a ground which, while his enemies besieged Cyzicus, was well fitted to intercept all resources from the great continent behind them. It might have been expected that the superiority of Mithridates' force would have encouraged him to break through the hostile lines; but he waited day after day in expectation of seeing the revolt of the Fimbrian legions, and when this hope failed him, he determined to prosecute, with the utmost vigour, the siege of Cyzicus, which contained vast stores of corn<sup>39</sup>.

Obliges him to raise the siege of Cyzicus.

But besides a granary of corn, this respectable commonwealth had two other magazines, one of arms, and another of military engines<sup>40</sup>. Detachments of its warlike citizens had perished indeed in

<sup>37</sup> Appian, Mithridat. c. 79—c. 72. Conf. Plutarch in Lucull.

<sup>38</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 575.

<sup>39</sup> Appian & Plutarch.

<sup>40</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 573.



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the double defeat of Cotta; but the great body of the people was animated with zeal in the cause of Rome, or rather of their own liberty. They resisted, therefore, one of the greatest armies ever brought into the field, and all the abilities of Mithridates seconded by skilful engineers and indefatigable artizans. Lucullus found means of communicating with the besieged, and intimating to them the great advantages which he continued to gain over the foraging parties of the enemy. These advices kept up their spirits, and encouraged them to hold out until the approach of winter, when the Euxine ceased to be safely navigable by victuallers. Mithridates being thus cut off from all regular supplies by sea as well as land, was reduced to the necessity of raising the siege. His vast army, weakened by disease, the consequence of scarcity or unwholesome diet, dissolved into still formidable masses, which pursued different directions. A numerous body, which marched westward towards the Hellespont, was destroyed by Lucullus, as it attempted to pass the *Æsepus* or *Granicus*, rivers twelve miles asunder, and both of them then swollen by heavy rains. The king, it is remarkable, preferred the dangers of the sea to an encounter with the enemy; probably on account of the mountainous district of *Olympus*, which lay on his road by land, and on which he must have fought the Romans, on ground highly unfavourable to him. He sailed at first towards the Hellespont, where the superiority of his fleet had given to him *Parium*, *Lampascus*, and other sea-ports, for allies. He then divided his armament, and leaving fifty ships with 10,000 men on board, to maintain his interest in that quarter, he proceeded with the far greater part on his voyage to *Pontus*.\*

The flight of Mithridates was no sooner known to the maritime cities of Asia, than they brought to Lucullus such reinforcements as enabled him to overpower the squadron of fifty sail left behind by the enemy. This squadron had three commanders; Varius, the Ro-

Captures at  
Chryse 50 of  
his ships  
with 10,000  
men.

\* Appian, *Mithridat.* c. 72. & seq. Plutarch in *Lucull.*

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man senator, of whom we have before made mention; Alexander, a Paphlagonian; and Dionysius, a eunuch. They were all three captured by Lucullus, in the small island Chryse, then an appendage to Lemnos, but since that time buried in the sea<sup>42</sup>. The eunuch drank poison; Lucullus ordered the death of the Roman; he reserved the Paphlagonian for his triumph<sup>43</sup>.

Dreadful  
calamity of  
Mithridates'  
fleet in the  
Euxine.

The misfortunes hitherto attending the king's arms were succeeded by a calamity far greater, and altogether without remedy. His fleet which he had raised with so much expence and industry, presumed to navigate the Euxine at a season when the reports of the moderns concur with those of the antients in representing this sea as highly dangerous. It was assailed by a sudden tempest which raged many days without intermission: sixty ships were sunk, with 10,000 men on board; the rest were scattered and tossed among remote shores, which at different intervals of time, they deformed with their wrecks. The king was saved in a brigantine<sup>44</sup>; and landed first at Sinopè, the principal harbour in Paphlagonia, and then at Amisus, the principal harbour in Pontus.

His mea-  
sures there-  
on.

Having witnessed at these places the dreadful extent of his disaster, he adopted, however, the best means in his power for yet withstanding the enemy. He wrote for assistance to his son Machares, viceroy in Bosphorus, and to his son-in-law, Tigranes, king of Armenia. He sent emissaries, with large sums of money, to allure the independant Scythians beyond Bosphorus to his standard. In person he marched southward from Amisus, through the beautiful plain Phanaræa; from whence remounting towards the source of the Iris, he crossed the lofty chain of Paryadres to his favourite stronghold Cabira<sup>45</sup>. In this mountainous district, an hundred miles distant from the sea, Mithridates had many fortified castles, containing his treasures, by a proper employment of which he expected, in the course of the winter, to be able again to collect a great army.

<sup>42</sup> Pausanias, l. viii. c. 33.

<sup>43</sup> Appian, c. 76.

<sup>44</sup> Appian, c. 78.

<sup>45</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 556.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile Lucullus, after enjoying *heroic* honours<sup>46</sup> at Cyzicus, prepared to march through Bithynia into Pontus. On the common frontier of those kingdoms he found but a precarious supply of provisions, but when he advanced into the heart of the latter, food, clothing, and every necessary of life was to be procured in the greatest abundance, and at the lowest prices<sup>47</sup>. The territory was naturally plentiful, and had been enriched by the culture of ages without being once foraged by an enemy. This virgin country was now left unguarded at the mercy of the invader, most of the cities readily entered into composition with him, and thereby, to the regret of his soldiers, escaped depredation. Three places only made a vigorous resistance; Sinopè and Amisus, on the sea coast, and Thermiscyra, on the banks of the Thermodon. These sieges occupied the remainder of winter, without overcoming the obstinacy of Sinopè and Amisus. But a new city, contiguous to Amisus, which Mithridates had called Eupatoria<sup>48</sup>, from his own surname, desired leave to capitulate.

Early in the spring, Lucullus prepared to pass over the heights of Paryadres, in order to offer battle to Mithridates, who, he was informed, had collected at Cabira an army 44,000 strong. Signals by fire announced to the king the approach of his enemy, but as the flower of his own troops consisted in cavalry, he anxiously waited for Lucullus' descent into the plain. The Roman general at length descended with much precaution; various skirmishes happened between advanced parties, in all of which the cavalry of Mithridates maintained a decided superiority: as often as the Romans were at-

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Lucullus  
marches into  
Pontus—extraordinary  
plenty of  
that country.  
Olymp.  
clxxvi. 4.  
B. C. 73.

Eupatoria  
capitulates.

Operations  
in Pontus—  
Mithridates'  
cavalry uniformly suc-  
cessful.  
Olymp.  
clxxvii. 1.  
B. C. 72.

<sup>46</sup> The favours of cities were deemed equal in honour to their founders. Diodorus, l. xx. f. 102.

<sup>47</sup> A slave cost four drachmas; an ox one; goats, sheep, clothing, &c. were cheap in proportion. Appian, c. 78. These prices perhaps indicate the rates at which soldiers sold their booty, of which the great quantity suddenly acquired, rendered it of little value.

<sup>48</sup> This Eupatoria must be distinguished from another city of the same name, fifteen miles from the sea, on the conflux of the Iris and Lycus, and nearly midway from the coast to Amasia, the birth-place of the geographer Strabo, on the conflux of the Iris and Scylax. Of the inland Eupatoria we shall afterwards have occasion to speak.



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Prefumption  
of the Asia-  
tics thereon  
—their  
rout and  
flight of the  
king into  
Armenia  
Olymp.  
clxxvii 2.  
B. C. 71.

tacked by the enemy's horse, they had no means of safety, but by returning to the mountains. They thus found it impossible to keep open a communication with Cappadocia, from which country they expected to derive the greater part of their supplies; and were on the point of being reduced to distress similar to that which Mithridates had suffered at Cyzicus. But from a situation fraught with danger, not unmixed with disgrace, they at length obtained an opportunity of extricating themselves through the extreme imprudence of the enemy. Flushed with repeated and signal success, the Asiatics gave way to that blind presumption which is congenial to their character. Impatient of persevering in the same plan of campaign, of which they had already experienced the efficacy, they passed the mountains in great force, and coming to action in an intricate and narrow valley, where their cavalry could not render any service, they met with a defeat that appeared the more disastrous, because it was altogether unexpected. Neither the king nor Lucullus were present in the engagement; but the former first learned its event, and determined instantly to move his camp, lest the severe blow which he had received, should be followed by one still more decisive. His favourites and courtiers, who penetrated this intention before general orders were issued, began to avail themselves of the discovery. Their servants and waggons, conveying those troublesome and operose luxuries which usually encumber Asiatic armies, crowded the gates of the camp. At this sight the soldiers took the alarm, imagining that they knew not the worst that had happened; the camp was in commotion; the gates became the scene of uproar and bloodshed; all were in haste to depart without waiting the king's orders: and when Mithridates started from his pavilion on horseback, to quell the tumult, he was obstructed by the throng and dismounted. In this humiliating condition he was hurried along in the crowd, till rescued by some of his menials; then seated on a new horse, he crossed the eastern descents of mount Paryadres. From thence he hastened northward, accom-

panied by a small body of cavalry, and remounting towards the sources of the Euphrates, concealed his flight and his disgrace amidst the intricate and almost inaccessible vallies of Armenia<sup>49</sup>.

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Of this confusion in the enemy's camp, the Romans had not been slow to avail themselves. They attacked, destroyed, or dispersed all those still employed in collecting or transporting the baggage; but the rich spoils which the barbarians left behind them, arrested the pursuit, and made the rout less bloody than it might otherwise have been rendered. Mithridates, at a critical moment, is said to have owed his safety to a mule laden with treasure. The sacks burst, and displayed a resistless temptation to some Roman horsemen, who were in full view of the flying king: by which accident or contrivance, for whether of the two is uncertain, he eluded his pursuers<sup>50</sup>.

How he  
escaped his  
pursuers.

Lucullus entered Cabira, and gave orders for summoning the strong castles in its neighbourhood, containing treasures or state prisoners. The whole dominions of Mithridates now lay at his mercy, and nothing remained in order to complete his triumph, but to make himself master of the king's person. With this view he directed his march according to the best advices which he had received, towards the south-eastern corner of the Euxine, through the country so graphically described by Xenophon, in his retreat of the ten thousand<sup>51</sup>. At Pharnacia, formerly Cerasus, he learned that Mithridates had sent orders for the death of his wives and female relations, inhabiting a castle in that neighbourhood; that some had hanged themselves, and that others had drank poison, or presented their bosoms to the dagger<sup>52</sup>. Grieved at this news, he proceeded to the district of the Tauriantii, from whom he understood that the king, in his flight, having kept to the eastward of his pursuers, had escaped four days before into Armenia, with an intention, as Lucullus had no doubt, of soliciting assistance from his son-in-law, Tigranes. Here,

Incidents in  
Pontus.  
Olymp.  
clxxvii. 3.  
B. C. 70.

<sup>49</sup> Appian, *Mithridat.* c. 81. & seq.

<sup>50</sup> Plutarch in *Lucull.*

<sup>51</sup> See *History of Ancient Greece*, c. xxvi.

<sup>52</sup> Plutarch & Appian, c. 82.

therefore,



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Appian  
Claudius  
sent ambaf-  
fador to  
Tigranes.

Treatment  
of the Greek  
cities in Per-  
tus—Sinopè,  
Amifus,  
Heraclæa.

Lucullus'  
wife financial  
regulations

therefore, the Roman paused : Armenia was a powerful kingdom ; its sovereign had wonderfully prospered in all his undertakings ; the dominions from the Euphrates to the Grecian sea were amply sufficient to gratify the ambition of Rome and her general. More anxious to consolidate than extend his conquests, Lucullus contented himself with sending an embassy to Tigranes, demanding the person of the king of Pontus. This mission was entrusted to Appian Claudius, a young patrician, who was afterwards consul and censor.

Meanwhile Lucullus, having received the submissions of the Chalybians and neighbouring tribes, returned westward along the shore of the Euxine. Many cities readily yielded on terms, to the regret of the Roman soldiery, who would rather have assaulted and sacked them. The two Greek sea-ports, Amifus and Sinopè, distinguished themselves by an obstinate resistance, the former defended by Callimachus, the ablest engineer of his age, and the latter reinforced by pirates, in the interest of the king of Pontus. Callimachus, by setting fire to Amifus, endeavoured to disappoint the Romans of their booty<sup>33</sup>; the pirates, when no longer able to hold out, betook themselves to their armed brigantines, and left the Sinopians at the mercy of the conqueror. Lucullus treated both places with a lenity as honourable to himself as it was offensive to his greedy followers; reinstating the prostrate citizens in their possessions, and confirming them in the enjoyment of their free governments and equal laws, which, though often overwhelmed by the Persian and Pontic kings, had never ceased to be dear to them. The fate of Heraclæa Pontica formed a contrast with that of Sinopè and Amifus. Its siege had been carried on twelve months, by Cotta and Triarius, successively; and its capture was attended with the plundering of its temples, the burning of the city, and the massacre of most of its inhabitants<sup>34</sup>.

In the progress of Lucullus westward, Ariobarzanes was firmly established in the dependant kingdom of Cappadocia, while Bithy-

<sup>33</sup> Plutarch in Lucull.

<sup>34</sup> Memnon apud Phot. p. 741—747.

nia, according to the will of its late king, was completely reduced into the form of a Roman province. But the longest and most meritorious labour of this able statesman as well as general, was to remove the deep and complicated grievances under which the Roman subjects had long laboured in Lower Asia, that is, the kingdom of Pergamus and its appendages. Among the regulations which endeared him to the inhabitants of this invaluable and long oppressed country, was his rescuing them from the gripe of tax gatherers and usurers. He appointed all contributions to be raised from income, not from property; and to render them in some measure optional, he made their proportion to depend on the magnitude of houses, and the multitude of slaves or servants<sup>15</sup>.

Lucullus had finished this useful work, before his ambassador Appius returned from Tigranes. Appius, it seems, upon entering Armenia, had been furnished with guides by order of the court. These men, whether to magnify their master's power by shewing the vast extent of his dominions, or to accomplish some unwarrantable design which they entertained against Appius and his attendants, conducted them by very circuitous roads towards the imperial residence of Tigranocerta, but carried them altogether wide of the king, who was actually at Antioch, in Syria. Upon discovering this treachery, Appius dismissed those royal guides, as they were called, and trusted to a Syrian in his suite, who led him by the nearest way to the once renowned capital of the Seleucidæ, now a secondary city belonging to an upstart king of Armenia. Before returning into the proper road, from which he had so widely roved, Appius had an opportunity of hearing the complaints of many tributary princes and nations, neighbours and enemies to the Armenians: the king of Corduene, a district among the mountains east of Tigranocerta, entered into an alliance with Rome; and the Greek cities in Syria expressed the warmest desire of throwing off the yoke of

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in Lesser  
Asia.  
Olymp.  
clxxvii. 3-  
B. C. 70.

Appius  
Claudius re-  
ports to Lu-  
cullus the  
incidents and  
issue of his  
embassy.  
Olymp.  
clxxvii. 4.  
B. C. 69.

<sup>15</sup> Appian, Mithridat. c. 83. Conf. Plutarch in Lucull.

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the Armenians, who had begun to exercise over them the odious prerogatives of injustice and cruelty, uniformly claimed, as we have seen, by every dominant nation in Asia. The rotten state of Tigranes' affairs might have encouraged Appius to execute his commission with boldness, had he been less eminently endowed with that quality. He found the king of kings, as he affected to be called, just returned to Antioch, after subduing a rebellion in Phœnicia. He was surrounded by dispossessed monarchs, who served him as the lowest menials. A pair of dethroned sovereigns attended him on each side when he rode out on horseback; and strings of kings or satraps, on days of public audience, appeared in the presence hall, their hands interlaced with each other in token of the lowest humiliation and most abject servitude. Amidst this tyrannic pomp, calculated to overawe cowards, but to provoke brave men to anger, young Appius was introduced: he had come, he said, to demand the person of Mithridates, due to the triumph of Lucullus; in case of refusal he denounced a just war, since the protectors of delinquents ought to share their punishment. Tigranes ill disguised the agony of wounded pride under a forced smile of contempt; answering, that he would not surrender Mithridates, and if the Romans committed any act of hostility, he would make them to repent their presumption. Notwithstanding this defiance, he sent to Appius, at his departure, the customary presents. The Roman, that he might avoid giving personal offence, and at the same time testify his disdain of the king's wealth, accepted a single cup or goblet, and hastened back to Lucullus to acquaint him with the incidents and issue of his embassy<sup>16</sup>.

Lucullus' march towards Tigranocerta to demand the person of

Upon learning the refusal of Tigranes to his requisition, Lucullus, who by this time had returned to Sinopè, determined to demand the person of his vanquished adversary by an armed force before the walls of Tigranocerta. With a view to this undertaking, he had

<sup>16</sup> Plutarch in Lucull.

contracted an alliance with Machares, king or viceroy of Bosporus on the opposite side of the Euxine. The treachery of this favourite son of Mithridates thus seemed to cut off his father's retreat on the north: towards the west, his kingdom of Pontus was already occupied by the Romans; it remained to follow and seize him in Armenia, for which purpose Lucullus crossed the Euphrates with two chosen legions, and the proportional contingents of cavalry and allies. In proceeding through Sophene and other districts commonly ascribed to the Lesser Armenia, the Romans observed the utmost forbearance and lenity; no hardship was imposed on the countries through which they marched. A castle was pointed out to them, said to contain great treasures; they wished to plunder it; but Lucullus shewing them at a distance the highlands in their way to Tigranocerta, "these," he said, "are the castles we must first take, and then all the others will be our own." They passed the mountains which supply some of the many sources of the Tigris, and descended into the great Armenian plain, not only without encountering an enemy, but before Tigranes suspected their approach.

Prosperity and flattery should seem to have robbed that prince of his senses. He had refused to assist his father-in-law during the dependance of his fortune. After Mithridates had lost his kingdom, Tigranes provoked a war in his behalf; yet, with strange inconsistency, in the course of sixteen months had never deigned once to admit the royal fugitive to his presence. His behaviour was equally extravagant on being informed of the Roman invasion: "Take off the slave's head," was his reproof to the first unlucky messenger; and when, at a considerable distance of time, Mithrobarzanes, a prime favourite, ventured to repeat the same ungrateful intelligence, he detached him from Tigranocerta, that he might seize Lucullus alive, and trample to death his followers. But in the attempt to execute this commission, the Armenians were defeated with great slaughter, and with the loss of their general. Tigranes, at the head

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Mithridates.  
Olymp.  
clxxvii. 4.  
B. C. 69.

Extravagant  
behaviour of  
Tigranes.

The Armenians de-  
feated and  
Tigranocerta  
besieged.

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of his guards, then quitted the gorgeous walls of his capital, which were fifty cubits high, and of which the lower parts contained stables for his numerous cavalry. Instead of proceeding immediately against the well fortified camp of the Romans, he thought proper to wait reinforcements which he had ordered to assemble. To disappoint this view, Lucullus divided his army; one part of it, under Sextilius, attacked some tribes of Arabs as they were advancing to join the king, and put them to the rout; another, under Muræna, surprised the king himself, as he was marching through a long and intricate valley, and forced him to a precipitate flight, with the loss of his whole baggage, and many of his best troops either slain or made prisoners. Lucullus in person, with the main body, laid siege to Tigranocerta<sup>37</sup>.

Tigranes disregards the sage advice of Mithridates and prepares for a new battle.

Humbled by his defeat in the valley, Tigranes condescended to see Mithridates. The latter exhorted his son-in-law by no means to risk a new battle, even for the relief of his capital. He must be contented, he said, to waste the country from which the Romans derived their supplies; to intercept their convoys, and to harass them by his light troops and cavalry, which would compel them to raise the siege, with the disadvantage of an enemy in full force behind them to annoy their retreat. This judicious advice gradually lost influence over the Armenian as his forces grew more numerous. They consisted not only of his native subjects, but of all whom his gold or his promises could draw to his standard; of the fierce independent tribes far beyond Artaxata on both sides the Araxes; of the Iberians, Albanians, and Mardi, the boldest warriors on the Caspian; of the Atyrians and Medes, under national chiefs or kings, recently emancipated from the broken power of Parthia. The whole army amounted to 200,000 foot and 55,000 horse; of which latter nearly one half were cataphracts, that is, as we have already seen, heavy cavalry, clad in steel, and armed with long spears. When

<sup>37</sup> Appian, c. 84—87. & Plutarch in Lucull.

Lucullus



Lucullus had news of the enemy, the specimens<sup>\*</sup> which he had already seen of their inefficiency, the necessary consequence of presumptuous folly and want of discipline, encouraged him to leave nearly half his strength under Muræna to continue the siege of Tigranocerta, while he hastened with the larger division, consisting of all his cavalry and 11,000 infantry, to oppose the Armenians, exceeding twenty times his numbers. He encamped behind one of the streams which, under the name of Nicephorius, falls into the Tigris. The king of Armenia had encamped on the opposite side, encumbered with all his operose luxuries; for, although Tigranocerta was invested, a party of his horse had penetrated to a castle in that neighbourhood, and brought to him in safety the royal concubines. The vastness of his army, contrasted with the paucity of the enemy, filled him with confidence; and as he had dismissed the cautious Mithridates, lest that prince should share the glory of his victory, his presumption, altogether uncontrouled, flourished in wilder luxuriance<sup>†</sup> under the rank flattery of his courtiers.

Before Lucullus could give battle, it was necessary to pass the river in his front. The shallowest part had been explored; it lay higher up the stream, which making a bend westward, gave to the Roman army in advancing to the ford the appearance of a retreat. The king beholding this movement from the eastern bank, exclaimed to those around him, behold the enemy in flight. Taxiles, whom we have before mentioned as one of Mithridates' unfortunate generals, had been left by him at parting with Tigranes, that he might use his utmost endeavours to make that prince avoid a decisive battle, and persevere in the slow but sure mode for relieving Tigranocerta, that had been so earnestly recommended to him. Taxiles had long been deterred by personal danger from interposing any advice obnoxious to the king's pride; but, on the present occasion, he ven-

Lucullus' decisive victory on the Nicephorius. Olymp. clxxviii. 4. B. C. 69.

<sup>\*</sup> Instead of terror, the Romans were a subject of derision. The king said, "they are numerous for an embassy, but too few for an army." Plut. in Lucull.

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tured to assure him, that the movement of the Romans in maniples, with bright vestments and shining armour, indicated, instead of flight, a resolution of coming to immediate action. He had hardly spoken when, by a brisk motion to the right, the standards bearing the eagles advanced into the well known ford; and the eastern bank being gained, the line of march was instantaneously converted into an order of battle. Lucullus availed himself of the nature of the ground contiguous to the enemy's encampment. Behind it, there was an eminence of easy ascent, which overlooked the troops guarding the baggage and beasts of burthen. The decisive attack he determined to direct against this part, for which purpose he sent forth his whole cavalry to provoke a loose engagement with the enemy, and thereby mask his own movement with only two chosen cohorts towards the eminence in question. He ascended it unperceived, and then shewing to his followers the baggage and infantry below them, while the horse skirmished on the plain, exclaimed, "the victory is our own". The Romans, completely covered with their bucklers, darted down with their massy and pointed swords to a massacre, not a battle. Surprise multiplied the terrors which they bore with them. The panic of those who guarded the baggage was communicated to the whole Armenian infantry; at the same time that the horse belonging to that nation being pressed on by crowds of fugitives from behind, now began to be vigorously assaulted in front and flank by the Roman cavalry. In this crowded scene, the long spears of the cataphracts proved altogether useless, being easily turned aside by the shorter and firmer weapons of their adversaries. The rout was now universal, and the pursuit being continued for twelve miles, until sun-set, was attended, it is said, with destruction to nearly half the fugitives. Tigranes, with his son of the same name, were foremost in the flight. The king, to avoid discovery, divested his head of the royal diadem. The bearer of it was made prisoner<sup>60</sup>.

<sup>59</sup> Νικημεν, ὡς ἄνδεον. Appian, c. 85.

<sup>60</sup> Id. *ibid*.

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Tigranocerta taken through the revolt of its Greek inhabitants—its vast riches. Olymp. clxxvii. 4. B. C. 69.

The dispersion of the Armenian army was followed by the capture of Tigranocerta. That proud city, decked at the expence of prostrate provinces, with its towers and palaces, its parks or paradises, and its immense opulence, became a prey to the Roman soldiers, and satiated their utmost avidity for plunder. The far greater part of the booty consisted in precious metals uncoined, and other valuable articles of finery or luxury; for offerings from all parts of his dominions replenished the treasury, and fed the vanity of Tigranes. Eight thousand talents<sup>a</sup>, however, were found in specie; from which each Roman soldier had the value of about thirty pounds sterling for his share. The capture of the place had been hastened by an ill-judged precaution employed for its safety. Mancæus, who commanded in it as governor, upon beholding from his watch tower the ruinous flight of his master, thought fit to disarm all the Greek inhabitants, fearing their concealed hatred to the Armenians. The Greeks, thus dishonoured, thought that some greater evil, perhaps a bloody massacre, awaited them. They assembled in crowds, communicated their complaints, seized such instruments of death as chance threw in their way, and uniting in one great body, with their garments thrown over their left arms instead of shields, defeated the Armenians who advanced to quell their mutiny. Having stripped the slain, they clothed themselves in their armour, gained possession of part of the wall between two bastions, or rather towers, invited the Romans within the place, and aided them in the conquest of it. This meritorious service did not pass unrewarded. Lucullus acknowledged to the Greeks the full extent of his obligation. All such of them as wished to return home, were sent back enriched to their respective cities; only those who were to have been employed by Tigranes as performers in his newly built theatre of Bacchus, were retained, by liberal rewards, to solemnize the

<sup>a</sup> Nearly 1,600,000*l*.

thanksgivings.

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The object of  
the war  
attained.

thankgivings of the Romans for their decisive and almost bloodless victories<sup>62</sup>.

Having divested Mithridates of his dominions, and chastised with due severity his proud Armenian ally, Lucullus wrote to the senate that the object of the war had been effected, and that commissioners might be forthwith sent to reduce into the form of a province the conquered kingdom of Pontus<sup>63</sup>.

Mithridates' compassionate behaviour to his son-in-law.

In the successive defeats of the father-in-law and of the son, the persons of both had eluded the grasp of the conqueror. Mithridates, from the slowness and caution with which he himself had been combated, had little suspected that the same assailants would overwhelm his ally, by audacity and celerity. He was distant several days journey from Tigranocerta, when the fatal blow was struck; and some flying parties, belonging to his son-in-law, first informed him, how that unfortunate prince, altogether unattended, and anxious only for the safety of his person, had escaped to almost inaccessible lurking places, in the northern and roughest parts of Armenia. Mithridates met him there, treated him with all the sympathy of a fellow sufferer, and having divided with him his own guard, and every other resource with which he was furnished, encouraged him to seek consolation in action, and strenuously to exert himself for collecting a new army, with which, better taught by experience, they might yet successfully make head against their common enemy<sup>64</sup>. At the same time both kings sent embassies into Parthia. The civil wars, which had torn that empire for nearly twenty years, ceased in the declining age of Sinatruces, who, to prevent the recurrence of similar evils, associated with him his son Phrahates III. in the government<sup>65</sup>, that it might devolve on him entire, without opposition,

<sup>62</sup> Appian, Mithridat. c. 84. & seq. Plutarch in Lucull. Memnon apud Phot. p. 754. Dion. l. xxxv.

<sup>63</sup> Plutarch in Lucull.

<sup>64</sup> Id. ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Phlegon. apud Phot. p. 267. Conf. Fragment. Sallust. Histor. l. iv.

after his father's demise. The same expedient, for obviating the calamities incident to disputed successions, had been employed, as we have seen, by the first races both of the Syrian and Egyptian kings.

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As Tigranes had long been at variance with Sinatruces, and had turned to his own advantage the internal disturbances of Parthia by usurping several of its dependencies, particularly northern Mesopotamia, with its great city Nisibis, he chose to make his application rather to Phrahates, the son of that prince; his actual coadjutor and destined successor. Mithridates, on the other hand, who had never been at war with Parthia, wrote directly to Sinatruces; and his letter, which is still on record, shews him to have been not less able in negotiation than he was strenuous and bold in action. To obviate the objection of exhorting the Parthians to mingle their own prosperous circumstances with the difficulties and dangers surrounding Tigranes and himself, he proved to them, by a clear deduction of facts, that peace was no longer in their power, now that the chance of arms had brought the Romans on their frontier. In this view he explained the proceedings of that people with regard to Macedon, Syria, and Pergamus: how they afterwards usurped dominion over Bithynia and Cappadocia: Pontus and Arminia, as nearest to those kingdoms in place, had also next to them, in point of time, experienced the dire effects of boundless ambition and insatiable avarice. Hitherto, the Romans had prevailed through the disunion of kings, whom reason, honour, justice, and the strongest interest, ought to have consolidated into a hearty confederacy against them. The time, however, was not yet passed for undertaking this natural, nay necessary warfare. From the Euphrates to the Indus, the Parthian empire, now happily at peace within itself, commanded populous provinces, and the greatest cities in the world. The check suffered by Tigranes, had afforded an instructive lesson; the injuries, inflicted on himself, had inspired immortal revenge. By seasonable exertions against the common enemy, the Parthians might yet avert depredation on their

His letter to  
Sinatruces  
king of Par-  
thia.  
Olymp.  
c. lxxviii. 4.  
B. C. 69.



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borders, and for ever humble a power that must either itself perish, or cause destruction to every other<sup>66</sup>. History has not preserved the answer to this spirited requisition. We are informed, however, that the government of Parthia was already in negotiation with Lucullus, and shortly afterwards treated more sincerely with the kings whom he had defeated.

Lucullus' proceedings in Cordyene which won the affections of the natives Olymp. clxxvii 4 B. C. 69.

After the battle of Tigranocerta, and the taking of that city, the conqueror set at liberty all the reluctant inhabitants of the place particularly the Cappadocians, who had been dragged thither, as we have seen, in such vast multitudes, though the number of 300,000 seems an angry exaggeration. He repaired also, to the utmost of his power, the injuries which his own arms, or the cruelty of his enemies, had inflicted. Among the allies, whom his fair renown had procured for him, the swift vengeance of Tygranes had indeed overtaken two persons of great consideration and dignity, before Lucullus could march eastward for their protection. The first of these was Zarbienus, king of Cordyene; the second was Cleopatra Selenè, formerly queen of Syria, and who still retained some strongholds in that country, with the hope of transmitting them to her children. Zarbienus, it should seem, had ill concealed the treaty which, as above-mentioned, he had entered into with Appius Claudius. In resentment of this transaction, which the pride of Tigranes construed into treason, that tyrant usurped the territories of his neighbour, and destroyed Zarbienus, with his wife and family. The intelligence of their destruction, incurred through zeal for Rome, gave much grief to Lucullus, which he expressed in a manner highly soothing to the afflicted Cordyenians. He acknowledged their late worthy sovereign for his particular friend, as well as for the respected ally of the Roman people. To the subjects of the bewailed prince, he extended his immediate protection, removing their grievances, supplying their exigences, and celebrating with them the obsequies

<sup>66</sup> Sallust. Fragment. Histor. l. iv.

of Zarbienus with a magnificence chiefly derived from the spoils of his murderer. With the royal treasures of Cordyenè, for much gold and silver had escaped the rapacity of Tigranes, he erected a sumptuous mausoleum to honour the memory of the prince, and gratify the honest pride of the people. Moved by condescensions very unusual with eastern conquerors, the Cordyenians opened their granaries to the Romans, containing 3,000,000 of bushels of corn; and were so much delighted with Lucullus, that they would willingly have followed him from their country with their wives and children <sup>67</sup>.

Selenè, the mother of Antiochus Eusebes, had, for an offence similar to that of Zarbienus, been murdered <sup>68</sup> in Seleucia, a castle so named in Mesopotamia, at the distance of a few miles from Zeugma, the ordinary passage of the Euphrates. Her two sons, Antiochus and Seleucus, would have shared Selenè's fate, had not their good fortune withdrawn them from the tyrant's rage. At that time they were on their return from Rome, whither they had gone to urge their pretensions to the crown of Egypt, in right of their mother, daughter to Ptolemy Physcon. Alexander, the grandson of that prince, had been made king, as above-mentioned, by Sylla; but Sylla was no more, and Alexander had incurred the resentment of his subjects, particularly of the inhabitants of his capital. His only competitor in Egypt was his cousin german, the bastard son of Lathyrus, who five years afterwards purchased the crown, as will be shewn from Cæsar and Pompey, and is known in history by the surname of Aulctes, the flute player, added to the common appellation of Ptolemy. Having failed in their application to the senate, the sons of Selenè prepared to return into Syria; and on their way thither, the elder of them, Antiochus, distinguished by the epithet Asiaticus, landing in the isle of Sicily, was stripped of his most precious effects

Selenè the queen mother of Syria murdered in her castle in Mesopotamia. Olymp. clxxvii. 3. B. C. 70.

Her son Antiochus Asiaticus

<sup>67</sup> Plutarch in Lucull. p. 512.

Strabo, l. xvi. p. 749.

<sup>68</sup> Josephus, Antiq. l. xiii. c. 24. Conf.

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restored.

Olymp.

clxxvii. 4.

B. C. 69.

by the profligate pretor Verres, in the manner so circumstantially described and so keenly arraigned by Cicero<sup>69</sup>. Upon his return to the east, Antiochus learned the death of his mother, and the calamities that had fallen on her murderer. He hastened to the camp of Lucullus, her avenger. Lucullus received him as his friend; acknowledged his rights to the throne of Syria, now vacant by the defeat and flight of Tigranes; and the protection of the Roman general enabled him to recover part of that country, and retain it for the space of four years, until the settlement of Syria, and all the other generous arrangements of Lucullus were disturbed or done away by Pompey, his invidious successor<sup>70</sup>.

Great views  
of Lucullus.

During Lucullus' stay in Cordyenè, he was informed that the Parthians, while they protracted negotiations with himself, were on the point of concluding a treaty with his enemies. Upon this intelligence he wrote to his lieutenants in the conquered provinces, that they should send to him all the troops that could be spared with the utmost expedition. His design was to avail himself of the terror which his victories over the kings of Pontus and Armenia had diffused, and to aim such a bold and sudden blow at the Parthians, as should cause them to repent their perfidy. But he had the mortification to learn, that for reasons which will be explained presently, not a soldier could be expected from Pontus, or any part of the Lesser Asia. He was under the necessity, therefore, of abandoning his expedition against the Parthians, and of confining himself to such undertakings as might be accomplished by the forces already under his standard. The district of Tigranocerta, which he commanded, was a beautiful and extensive plain, having the mountains of Cordyenè on the east, mount Niphates on the north, and a branch of mount Masius to the south. Mount Niphates was the ascent to the more northern and loftier regions of Armenia, into which Mithridates and Tigranes had thrown themselves to raise new forces, or to collect their scattered

<sup>69</sup> Cicero in Verrem, l. iv. c. 27. & seq. <sup>70</sup> Conf. Plutarch in Lucull. & in Pompeio.  
followers.

followers. Mount Masius may be considered as the solid base of Mesopotamia, whose sides are the Euphrates and Tigris; and the branch of the mountain just mentioned, separated the territory of Tigranocerta from the rich plain of Antiochia Mygdonia<sup>71</sup> or Nisibis, which great and strong city, with other places conquered by him in northern Mesopotamia, Tigranes purposed to restore to the Parthians as the price of their alliance. Lucullus had thus two objects before him; he might proceed southward and attack Nisibis, which was but forty miles distant from Tigranocerta; or he might cross Niphates in pursuit of the confederate kings, and either bring them to a new battle, or entirely expel them from Armenia<sup>72</sup>.

The taking of Nisibis was the easier of these enterprises, and tempted by the hope of a vast booty; but the more difficult passage of Niphates was also more important, more glorious, and in some measure indispensable, since the Romans never deemed any war to be ended, unless the kings of their enemies had either suffered death, or been made prisoners. This reason decided Lucullus to march northward. It was the summer solstice, yet in ascending the ridge of Niphates he found corn still green in the vallies. He gained possession, however, of magazines well replenished by the enemy. He intercepted their convoys, he severely foraged their country; but none of his measures could tempt them to a battle, until he determined to march towards the vast and rich city Artaxata. This city, in which Tigranes had lodged for safety his wife and children, was 300 miles distant from Tigranocerta. To reach it, Lucullus passed through part of the same country traversed by Xenophon in his immortal retreat, and came to a river called by that writer the Teleboas<sup>73</sup>, one of the largest tributaries to the Euphrates. On the northern bank of this river, the enemy had posted

He crosses  
mount Ni-  
phates in his  
march to  
Artaxata.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 1.  
B. C. 68.

<sup>71</sup> Strabo, l. xvi. p. 747.

<sup>72</sup> Plutarch in Lucull. Appian, Mithridatic. c. 84. & sc

<sup>73</sup> "Tel" in Arabic signifies a river. The Teleboas of Xenophon is plainly the Azanias of Plutarch.

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Defeat of the  
confederate  
kings on the  
banks of the  
Tigris.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 1.  
B. C. 68.

His army  
refuses to  
proceed to  
Artaxata.

themselves, determined once more to try the chance of arms. Tigranes, though assisted by the experience of his father-in-law, did not fight with more success than formerly. Their cavalry, indeed, sustained the first shock of the Roman horse, but the sight of the legions inspired terror into all parts of their army; and the rout was only less bloody than after the battle of Tigranocerta, because the numbers were less considerable, and the country more intricate<sup>74</sup>.

The confederate kings made their escape by being foremost in the flight: they pursued the road towards Artaxata, with a view to put that city in a posture of defence, since it was nearly 200 miles distant from the scene of their defeat on the Tigris, and a country interposed almost impassable for an army even at the autumnal equinox. The Romans had not long followed them through this rough tract before they found the roads covered with snow, and the rivers frozen over: the asperities of the ground cut and crippled the beasts of burden: among confined and intricate paths, the agitation of surrounding trees covered the bodies of the soldiers with their icy loads; and the cold, which was grievous on the march by day, became intolerable during the repose of night. Such sufferings might have provoked men not otherwise inclined to mutiny. But the seeds of every disorder, as will be explained presently, had been industriously sown in the army of Lucullus. He counteracted its seditious obliquity by all the expedients becoming an able commander; but no inducements could prevail with his men to advance a step further on the way to Artaxata, that hostile city, which, according to current report, Hannibal, the greatest enemy of the Romans, had planned<sup>75</sup>, and which now harboured Mithridates, an enemy not less inveterate.

At this crisis it became necessary to return southward, by the easiest way across the mountains, and to descend into the plain of Antiochia Mygdonia, or Nisibis. To distress the enemy and gratify his soldiers, Lucullus assaulted and sacked that rich and populous

Sack of  
Nisibis.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 1.  
B. C. 68.

<sup>74</sup> Id. *ibid.*<sup>75</sup> Plutarch in Lucull.

city.



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city. Guras, the governor, though brother to Tigranes, was treated indulgently ; but Callimachus, the same engineer who had defended and set fire to Amisus, could not obtain pardon. He submitted to the humblest petitions, and offered to reveal hidden depositories of treasure, with which none besides was acquainted. But provoked with the disgrace reflected on himself by the burning of Amisus, an Athenian colony, Lucullus denied all mercy to the deliberate perpetrator of so dreadful an enormity <sup>76</sup>.

The capture of Nisibis terminated the success of Lucullus, because from that moment the companions of his glory were converted into instruments of his disgrace. But the authors of his unmerited change of fortune were at a distance, and in the bosom of Rome itself. The proceedings in the Proper Asia, by which he had restrained the extortion of tax-gatherers, set bounds to the exorbitancy of usurers, and at once resisted the corruption of judges and the chicane of lawyers <sup>77</sup>, exposed him to the rancorous enmity of all concerned in such abuses, and particularly to the keen resentment of the whole body of Roman knights. The clamours thus excited against a most meritorious commander, gained strength and effect from the unhappy circumstances of the times. In the progress of luxury and vanity, operating on almost boundless accumulation of external advantages, the Romans had come to that degraded state of society, in which there are comparatively so few individuals of real worth, that those who can best assume the semblance of it, and thereby acquire popularity, are exalted into beings of a superior order, and become the fond idols of vile tribes of weak or worthless votaries. An idol of this kind public partiality had erected in the person of Cneius Pompeius, the son of Cneius Pompeius Strabo, the only general who had triumphed, and that without any very substantial suc-

Party against  
Lucullus at  
Rome.

Popularity  
of Pompey.

<sup>76</sup> Plutarch, *ibid.*

litium. Mithridat. Orat. ad Milites, apud

<sup>77</sup> Odium Romanis incussit rapacitas pro-  
consulum, sectio publicanorum, calumniae

Justin, l. xxxviii. c. 7.

cess,

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cess, in the dishonourable war with the allies. In the civil war, which immediately followed the social one, young Pompey took part with Sylla, and maintained that cause with glory at the head of armies in Italy, Sicily, Gaul, Africa, and Spain. At his return from Africa he was saluted by Sylla with the title of Great, before his twenty-fifth year, and triumphed for his victories over Domitius in Africa and Sertorius in Spain, while he had yet reached no higher civil dignity than that of a Roman knight; a thing unprecedented, and in every view unwarrantable, since the fundamental laws of the republic reserved the triumph for those only who had borne the offices of consul or pretor, and who, instead of suppressing, as Pompey had done, domestic rebels, had proved victorious over foreign enemies. Sylla perceived his too lofty pretensions, but as they aimed rather at honour than power, he viewed with little fear a man educated in his own school of policy, and who seemed to him totally devoted to the interests of the senate. He, besides, respected Pompey as one of the dearest of his personal friends, insomuch, that many were surprised when, at last, he shewed a decided preference to Lucullus, both by dedicating to him his memoirs, and by naming him for guardian to his son<sup>28</sup>.

His consul-  
ship with  
Crassus.  
Olymp.  
clxxvii. 3.  
B. C. 70.

After Sylla's death, and his own successful expedition into Spain against the rebel Sertorius, the last remnant of the Marian faction, Pompey obtained the consulship without having passed through any of the inferior offices of magistracy, which were the ordinary and legal steps for ascending to that dignity. His colleague was Licinius Crassus, a man ten years older than himself, distinguished both as an advocate and as an officer, but whose principal recommendation was his immense wealth, which enabled him to entertain the people at 10,000 tables, and to distribute among them corn for the supply of three months. The fortune of Crassus, after defraying these expensive gratuities, amounted to 7,100 talents, about 1,400,000 pounds

<sup>28</sup> Conf. Plutarch in Sylla, & in Pompeio.

sterling; but considering the exchangeable value of money in those days, equivalent to three times that sum. This extraordinary measure of opulence had been acquired chiefly by purchasing confiscated estates in Italy during the time of the proscriptions, and by purchasing houses at Rome when exposed to danger from decay or conflagration. Crassus maintained, as it were, trained bands of builders, carpenters, and other mechanics, who were watchful either to avert harm from the houses which he had bought, or always ready at hand to repair it. By this means, many streets of the capital had fallen into his possession; besides which source of income, he kept great numbers of slaves, exercised not only in coarse laborious trades, but in reading, writing, keeping accounts, and cookery; from whose skill, let to hire, he derived a vast revenue. It is said that he refused lending his money at interest, though he often accommodated his friends with considerable sums, never omitting, however, to have recourse to legal means for recovery, when payment was delayed beyond the stipulated day<sup>79</sup>.

The consulship of Pompey and Crassus, which happened in the same year that Lucullus conquered Pontus and pursued its fugitive king into Armenia, was marked by events fatal to the interest and the fame of that meritorious commander. By the authority of Pompey and the munificence of Crassus, and through the passion for popularity that domineered both, the constitution, which they had helped Sylla to establish at the price of so much blood, was completely overturned in the course of a few months. Within that space of time the senate lost its authority; the assembly by centuries, a legislature founded in property, was entirely set aside; the tribunes once more proposed laws in the tumultuary assembly by tribes; and the knights, of whom Pompey was regarded as the ornament and the patron, were again exclusively invested with nearly the

Changes introduced by them in the government.

<sup>79</sup> Plutarch in Crasso.

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Mutiny occasioned  
thereby in  
Lucullus' army.

whole judiciary power both in Rome and in the provinces. The effects of these alterations began soon to appear in the most distant parts of the empire, and more especially in the armies entrusted to Lucullus. By the creatures of Pompey, that general was accused of protracting the war, merely that he might enrich himself; the managers of the revenues and money lenders in Asia, consisting almost wholly of Roman knights, re-echoed the accusation; sedition was first sown among the troops whom Lucullus had left behind him in Pontus: it was quickly communicated to the army with which he pursued Mithridates into Armenia, where Publius Clodius, a young man destined to much future infamy on account of his factiousness and profligacy, though brother to Lucullus' wife, was among the foremost in crossing the designs and calumniating the character of his general. At the instigation chiefly of Clodius, the soldiers, after taking Nisibis, embraced the resolution of not advancing a step farther against the discomfited kings. Clodius confirmed their mutiny, by contrasting their own hardships in traversing mountains and deserts with the far happier lot of Pompey's soldiers, who, after short and easy services in Spain or Italy, had been settled in comfortable farms with their wives and families. Such as had still strength and spirits, he exhorted to reserve these advantages for a general worthy to command armies, and willing to enrich them; for the Great and generous Pompey<sup>80</sup>, who delighted to make citizens of his soldiers, and to procure for them, as the fair fruits of victory, happy domestic accommodations and high political honours.

Mithridates thus enabled to re-appear in arms.  
Olymp. clxxviii. 1.  
B. C. 68.

By the delay of the Romans at Nisibis and in the neighbouring districts of Tigranocerta and Cordyenè, Tigranes had time to fortify himself in the central parts of Armenia; and Mithridates, with 4,000 men furnished to him by that prince, and nearly an equal number who, amidst all his adversities, remained attached to his person, made an unexpected irruption into Pontus,

<sup>80</sup> Plutarch in Lucull. Conf. Dio. l. xxxvi. p. 15.

and

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and, wherever he came, revived in the breasts of his subjects that sentiment of loyalty which formed almost their only principle of virtue. The accessions thus acquired to his little army, enabled him to cope with the lieutenants whom Lucullus had left in the province. Fabius was defeated with the loss of 500 men, and shut up in Cabira. Triarius received a blow still more decisive on the banks of the Iris. Mithridates having put him to the rout, and taken possession of his camp, spoiled the bodies of the slain, who were found to exceed 7,000; and among them twenty-four legionary tribunes and one hundred and fifty centurions; a loss, in point of officers, rarely sustained by the Romans<sup>1</sup>. In both these actions Mithridates, in his 69th year, fought with a juvenile ardour, and in both was wounded. In the pursuit of Triarius his wound was inflicted by a Roman centurion, disguised like a Cappadocian attendant. As the king's head and body were well guarded in mail, the centurion aimed his thrust at the thigh, and deeply pierced it. An uproar was excited; the pursuit ceased; the assassin was discovered and instantly dispatched; and all ranks in the army crowded in confusion the plain around the body of their bleeding general. Timotheus, a Greek surgeon, dressed the wound, and causing the king to be raised aloft, shewed him full of life to his anxious followers; an incident deemed the more honourable to Mithridates, because it had formerly happened to the Great Alexander<sup>2</sup>.

His victories  
and wounds.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 2.  
B. C. 67.

When Lucullus heard reports (for no certain messenger arrived to him) of the sad disasters in Pontus, he endeavoured to rouse his soldiers, through a sense of shame, to accompany him into that country, and to prevent the province, which they had subdued, from again falling disgracefully into the hands of their vanquished enemy. They followed him, but without due respect for their general, or much unanimity among themselves. Upon entering Pontus, he found the

The Romans and their conquests saved by the exertions of Lucullus.

clxxviii. 2.  
B. C. 67.<sup>1</sup> Appian de Bell. Mithridat. c. 89.<sup>2</sup> Appian, *ibid.*



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troops there in sedition. It was with difficulty that he snatched the rash Triarius from their hands. By opposing this mutiny, he provoked still farther the general animosity against himself; and when it was understood that Acilius Glabrio, consul of the preceding year, had been named for his successor, the soldiers declared that they considered their service as ended, and demanded their dismissal. Lucullus omitted no expedient, however mortifying to his own dignity, to keep them six months longer under his standard; and his seasonable condescensions, as Acilius, a general of no account, never advanced beyond Bithynia, saved from the vengeance of the enemy those madmen themselves, as well as the conquests which, in their sounder mind, they had so gloriously achieved".

Proceedings  
of the party  
adverse to  
him at  
Rome—  
artifices of  
Pompey.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 2.  
B. C. 67.

The six months which Lucullus spent inactively, but, since he kept the enemy in check, not uselessly, in Pontus, were big with important events, which ultimately decided not only the fortune of the Mithridatic war, but the fate of the Roman commonwealth. Acilius Glabrio, a creature of Pompey's, had been sent to supersede Lucullus, but at the same time a commission of an extraordinary nature was conferred on Pompey himself, which would render it natural, nay, necessary, that he should in a short time supersede Acilius. This commission was granted on the motion of the tribune Gabinius; for Pompey knowing the senate and higher orders of men averse to all exorbitant prerogatives vested in any individual, applied himself wholly to the popular party, that is, to the assembly by tribes, and its managers the tribunes. As if no engine were too coarse for operating on such minds, he had taken an oath, at entering on his consulship, that after the expiration of it he would not accept, as usual with Roman magistrates, of any command or province abroad, by which he might enrich himself and his family. In fact, there was not any foreign employment vacant that could make

" Plutarch in Lucull.

him

him willing to leave the capital. The conduct of the war in Asia, long committed to other hands, was the only appointment which could compensate that sacrifice; and Pompey had the discernment to perceive, that, to render the war in Asia completely successful, it must be carried on by sea as well as land.

The Greek pirates had by this time become more formidable enemies than the confederate kings Mithridates and Tigranes. They had increased the number of their galleys and their strongholds. Their harbours, their places of deposit, their watch-towers and their prisons, were scattered over all the coasts of the Mediterranean; which were all of them, by turns, deformed by the rapacity and cruelty, the odious intemperance and noisy carousals of their crews. The vessels of the pirates exhibited a variety of forms the best adapted to different kinds of service; and to add insult to injury, many of them were adorned with the most preposterous magnificence; with purple sails, with gilded sterns; the very oars, it is said, were inlaid with silver. Not contented with capturing galleys at sea, they attacked the strongest harbours, and burnt the guard-ships of Rome in the port of Ostia; they invaded even the inland parts of Italy, carried off magistrates with their families, honourable matrons and noble virgins; every prize, in a word, that they deemed valuable intrinsically, or that tempted them with the hope of a rich ransom\*. Of these proceedings, Rome, as the mightiest power in the world, felt not only the principal shame, but, as a vast and most populous city, was exposed by them to peculiar danger. From the province of Africa, from Sicily, Sardinia, and from other fertile countries subject to her dominion, she imported annually above 70,000,000 modii of corn" (each modius weighing about twenty pounds), and requir-

Power of  
the Greek  
pirates and  
danger from  
them to  
Rome itself.

\* Appian de Bell. Mithridat. c. 92. & seq.

" About 40 years after this period, Augustus, as we shall see below, imported 10,000,000 of modii, or pecks of corn, from Egypt. Aurelius Victor. The quantity

imported from Africa was double that from Egypt. Joseph. de Bell. Judaic. l. ii. c. 16. Stating the importation from Sicily and Sardinia collectively at only 10,000,000 of modii, the whole will amount to 70,000,000.

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Methods  
hitherto  
taken with  
them un-  
successful.

Pompey's  
extraordi-  
nary com-  
mission  
against them.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 2.  
B. C. 67.

ing for its transport nearly <sup>86</sup> 700,000 tonnage of shipping. The obstruction given to the corn trade by pirates raised that article and all its substitutes to such a price in Italy, as threatened the whole country with famine. To obviate this evil, the Romans, in the course of the Mithridatic war, had fitted out various armaments, particularly, under Servilius, surnamed Isauricus, from his conquest of Isauria, the roughest and most warlike district in Pisidia; and under Metellus, a man of consular dignity, actually employed against the isle of Crete, which, next to Cilicia, was the main bulwark of the pirates <sup>87</sup>.

Notwithstanding partial successes under these and other admirals, the price of corn at Rome did not diminish. The pirates easily repaired the losses which they sustained at sea, and when expelled from one stronghold found refuge in another. To cure the malady which preceding remedies had not even palliated, the tribune Gabinus moved a resolution, that Pompey, for the space of three years, should be invested with dominion over all the seas navigated by the Romans, and all the shores subject to their authority, to the distance of fifty miles inland; a description of territory that comprehended nearly the whole of the Roman empire, consisting mostly of sea-coast. So extraordinary a decree was opposed by the senate, by the wiser and better part of the citizens, and most zealously resisted by the friends of Lucullus, who considered it as a plan for supplanting that general, and robbing him of his well-earned laurels. To overcome this opposition Gabinus had recourse to a singular expedient. He caused a banner to be painted, with the view of a magnificent house, which Lucullus, it seems, had ordered to be built, and had this banner paraded through the streets to stigmatize the rapacity and vanity of this upstart peculator <sup>88</sup>. The device succeeded; Lucullus became

<sup>86</sup> The weight of grain varies in different countries and seasons. The Gallic was the lightest, weighing 20 pounds the modius: The African was the heaviest, weighing 21 pounds nine ounces. Plin. N. H. l. viii. c. 7.

<sup>87</sup> Appian, *ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> Cicero pro P. Sextio, c. 43.

an object of reproach ; and Pompey was extolled to the skies as the only man fit to save the country. With pretended modesty, Pompey affected studiously to decline the vast power that was offered to him ; and to avoid envy, entered the city by night, while he made arrangements for raising and supporting an armament of unrivalled magnitude. He was to be furnished with five hundred gallies ; one hundred and twenty thousand sailors, soldiers, and marines ; a body of five thousand horse ; six thousand talents in ready money, and an unlimited command over the Roman exchequer and receivers of revenue in all parts of the empire. These mighty preparations were completed about the end of winter. He set sail in the beginning of spring, and effectually executed his commission by the middle of summer. Before he left Italy, the public confidence in all his undertakings occasioned a sensible diminution in the price of provisions at Rome, so that war, in this single instance, afforded the promise of plenty<sup>9</sup>.

The general expectation was not disappointed. None could have managed more skilfully than Pompey the extraordinary resources entrusted to him. Having chosen twenty-five lieutenant-generals or vice-admirals, for they were empowered to act in either capacity, he divided among them into as many departments<sup>10</sup> the whole expanse of the Mediterranean sea, allotting to each his particular station, while himself at the head of sixty stout gallies, sailed in pursuit of his prey, and chased the pirates, as it were, into the toils which he had industriously spread for them. He began with the coasts of Spain and Gaul, and the seas of Sardinia and Sicily ; and while his fleet sailed round the peninsula of Italy, he landed at Pæstum, and crossed the country to Brundisium, maintaining the state, and meeting with the submission due to a great monarch. The consul Piso, who was suspected of want of alacrity in obeying his orders, would have been

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His deep  
artifices and  
mighty pre-  
parations.

Pompey's  
judicious  
measures for  
subduing  
them.

<sup>9</sup> Plutarch in Pompeio.

<sup>10</sup> The numbers of the vice-admirals and

the departments are not stated uniformly.

deposed.

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deposed by the tribes on a motion of the tribune Gabinus, had not Pompey interfered to prevent his degradation. Having re-embarked at Brundisium, he pursued the same mode of warfare through all his eastern departments; the coasts of Greece and Macedon, of Asia Minor and the Isles, treating with well judged lenity such pirates as fell into his hands, which served as an inducement to others to make willing submission. In the space of forty days he had cleared the western seas; in about double that time, he as effectually swept the eastern. The pirates either submitted to his squadrons skilfully disposed for intercepting them, or stole to Coraceum and the neighbouring creeks of Cilicia, the primary source of their power, and also their last refuge.

His prudent treatment of the vanquished—the liberation of captives greatly redounds to his fame. Olymp. clxxviii 2. B C 67.

Pompey pursued them thither, well provided with engines of battery, as if obstinate sieges were to have been expected. But he conquered merely by the terror of his preparations, and the mercy which he shewed to his prostrate enemies. The pirates every where surrendered their shipping, with vast magazines of timber, sails, and cordage. In the course of the war 378 galleys were taken or sunk; and 120 harbours destroyed: 10,000 of the enemy were slain, and above 20,000 remained prisoners. By his proceedings towards these prisoners, the conqueror greatly increased his fame. He carefully inquired into their behaviour and characters, and separated those who had been seduced by the force of example and ill advice, from those deemed irreclaimable. To the former he assigned several districts in Cilicia, made desolate as we have seen, by the ravages of Tigranes; particularly the territories of Mallos, Adana, Epiphania, and Soli, which last named city being repaired and re-peopled by Pompey, assumed, in honour of its benefactor, the name of Pompeiopolis. Another incident greatly conducive to his renown, was the liberation of numerous prisoners, whom he found in the hands, or strongholds, of the pirates. As these consisted chiefly of persons of high rank, belonging to all the countries round the Mediterranean



diterranean sea, they spread far and wide the fame of their deliverer, and as it seemed, their restorer to life, since many of them at their return home, beheld cenotaphs that had been erected for them by their bewailing friends".

During these transactions on the continent, some obstinate cities in Crete were still besieged by Metellus. Lappa, one of these cities, sent offers of surrendering to Pompey; who, without any intimation to Metellus, dispatched his lieutenant Octavius to receive its submission. Metellus, the more justly piqued at this affront because the war of Crete had been committed to himself before Pompey was commissioned against the pirates, continued the siege of the place, and having taken it, dismissed Octavius disgracefully to his employer. In this bold act, the only one which shewed in those times that Pompey was not yet sole master of the commonwealth, Metellus was afterwards supported by the senate, and obtained a triumph and the surname of Creticus", from reducing to unconditional submission an island which had long abused its liberty. His triumph, however, was delayed three years through the opposition of Pompey's creatures". In point of right indeed, his conduct may be estimated variously. No part of Crete being fifty miles distant from the sea, the whole of that island might be ascribed to the extensive jurisdiction delegated to Pompey: but as the conquest of Crete was on the point of being completed before Pompey left Italy, it was highly invidious in him to interfere with a war so nearly terminated; and to treat with the Cretans, without the slightest intimation to Metellus, appears to have been equally irregular and arrogant.

Crete subdued by Metellus. Olymp. clxxviii. 2. B. C. 67.

The debates which might have arisen from this transaction were silenced by a question at Rome of far greater magnitude. Pompey having destroyed the pirates and restored plenty to Italy, it was pro-

Pompey obtains a commission by which he supersedes

" Appian, c. 95.

" Cicero Academ. l. ii. c. i. Conf.

" Appian, *ibid.* & in *Hist. Sicil.* l. vi. Dion, l. xxxvi. p. 8. Sallust. Catal. c. 30.

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Lucullus,  
and virtually  
subverts the  
common-  
wealth.

Olymp.  
cxxxviii. 3.  
B. C. 66.

Why abetted  
by Cæsar and  
by Cicero.

posed by Manlius, another tribune in his interest, that he should remain in the command of the same armament, and that the inland countries of Phrygia, Cappadocia, and Armenia, should be added to his province. This was not only to commit to him the war against the kings of Pontus and Armenia, but rather to subject to his authority the far greater part of the empire. The decree, highly offensive to the senate, was warmly opposed by Catulus and Hortensius. It was supported by Julius Cæsar, then in his 33d year, and who, having incurred the displeasure of good men, rather as a libertine than as a disturber of the state, in the affairs of which he had yet taken little part, was anxious to gain the multitude, and eager to trample on all those regulations which overawed the boldness of ambition. It was supported also by Cicero, a man of a totally different character, who then held the office of pretor, with a near prospect of the consulship. Cicero was in his 40th year, precisely of the same age with Pompey<sup>94</sup>, whose popular virtues he admired, and seven years older than Cæsar<sup>95</sup>, whose morals he held in abhorrence. It has been conjectured that in abetting pretensions in Pompey, which endangered the public liberty, Cicero was guided merely by interest, since his opposition on this occasion might have defeated his own election for consul. The writings, however, of this illustrious Roman, will warrant us in ascribing to him a different, though less obvious motive. With the love of virtue and the republic, which glowed intensely in the breast of Cicero, another passion unfortunately mingled of a less noble nature, the desire of popular fame. That this passion was immoderate, both his life and writings afford conspicuous proofs. Fame was the prize at which he aimed; his weakness of bodily constitution sought it through the most strenuous labours, his natural timidity of mind pursued it through the greatest dangers; Pompey, who had fortunately attained it, he contemplated as the happiest of men, and was

<sup>94</sup> Velleius, l. ii. c. 53. A. Gell. l. xv. c. 28. <sup>95</sup> Plutarch in Cæsar.

led from this illusion of fancy not only to speak of him, but really to think of him with a fondness of respect bordering on enthusiasm<sup>96</sup>. The glory that surrounded Pompey, concealed from Cicero his many and great imperfections; and seduced an honest citizen and the finest genius in Rome, into the prostitution of his incomparable talents for exalting an ambitious chief, and investing him with such exorbitant and unconstitutional powers, as virtually subverted the commonwealth.

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Pompey was in the midst of his friends in Cilicia, when he received intimation that the Romans had chosen him to be their general in the East. Affecting much displeasure at this intelligence, he rejected the congratulations of those around him, angrily knit his brows, and striking his thigh in passion, exclaimed, "Is there to be no term, then, to my labours? Will my enemies never cease to load me with invidious honours, destructive of my repose, and dangerous to my fame and fortunes?" This excess of affectation appeared contemptible in the eyes even of his vilest dependants<sup>97</sup>. They knew what pains he had taken to procure an appointment, which put the whole force of the republic at his disposal. They knew that the elevation just attained, was the fondest object of his ambition; nor were they ignorant that his joy in supplanting Lucullus, and intercepting the laurels due to that general, added peculiar zest to his delight, in contemplating the lofty prerogatives with which he was invested.

Pompey general in the East.  
Olymp. clxxviii. 3.  
B. C. 66.

Could the farce which Pompey's dissimulation acted, have concealed his real emotions, the secret, however, would have been betrayed by the measures which he instantly and eagerly pursued. Careless of other affairs, his whole attention was directed towards the Mithridatic war. He sent messengers to the Roman generals, dispatched ambassadors to foreign powers, and hastened in person into Upper Phrygia, that he might join Lucullus' army to his own, while

His proceedings—return of Lucullus to Rome.

<sup>96</sup> See examples of this, even when Pompey was no more; particularly Orat. pro Rege Dejotaro.

<sup>97</sup> Plutarch in Pompeio. Dion. l. xxxvi.



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his fleet, divided into separate squadrons, had orders to line the three seas that wash the peninsula of Asia. At Damalis, near the eastern frontier of Phrygia<sup>98</sup>, he had a conference with the commander, whom he had been eager to supersede; this interview was with difficulty brought about by the interposition of common friends, and ended, as might easily have been foreseen, in heightening mutual disgust. Shortly afterwards, Lucullus, escorted by sixteen hundred men, with great riches and a vast library, set sail for Italy to claim his well earned triumph, which was opposed invidiously, but unsuccessfully, by Pompey's partizans in the city<sup>99</sup>.

Negotiations  
with Phra-  
hates and  
Mithridates.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 3.  
B. C. 66.

Meanwhile Tigranes had been using his best endeavours to heal the wounds of Armenia, and Mithridates had taken post on the western frontier of Pontus, with thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. The latter of these princes sent to negotiate an alliance with Phraates III. of Parthia, but found, to his deep regret, his expectations in that quarter anticipated and frustrated by Pompey. He then dispatched ambassadors to the Roman camp, requesting to know on what terms he might obtain peace. Pompey replied, "If you instantly collect for me all Roman deserters, and together with them, surrender yourself<sup>100</sup>." This stern answer being communicated to the Cappadocian army, occasioned a degree of confusion and uproar that threatened a general mutiny. The deserters represented to their fancies the dreadful punishments prepared for them; the Cappadocians reflected on their own helplessness, should they be deprived of such zealous and skilful auxiliaries. To quell the rising tumult, Mithridates declared, "that no peace could be made with a merciless and insatiable enemy. He well knew the Romans; and if he had applied to them with an apparent view to accommodation, it was really that he might be the better enabled to ascertain their actual posture, and to penetrate their future designs<sup>101</sup>."

<sup>98</sup> Damalis is near the eastern extremity of Galatia, itself the eastern district of Phrygia. Strabo, l. xii. p. 567.

<sup>99</sup> Plutarch in Lucull.

<sup>100</sup> Appian de Bell. Mithridat. c. 98.

<sup>101</sup> Dion Cassius, l. xxxvi. p. 22.

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campaign  
against the  
latter.

These designs Pompey did not long leave doubtful. With an army superior to the Cappadocians, even in point of numbers, he passed the river Iris into the richest district of Pontus, eager to bring the campaign to the speediest decision possible. Mithridates retreated before him, desolating the adjacent country on his march. To obviate the wants thereby occasioned, Pompey made dispositions for securing supplies from behind; and, as he advanced eastward, instead of directly following Mithridates, threw himself to the right on Lesser Armenia<sup>102</sup>, a strip of land on this side the Euphrates, separating at a place called Synoria<sup>103</sup>, the kingdoms of Armenia and Pontus. Meanwhile Mithridates continued his retreat, regretting that by the desolation of one of his provinces, he had only forced the enemy to fall down on another. As he proceeded on his route, his army augmented by such numbers of irregular cavalry, that he began in his turn to want provisions and forage. This and other evils, suffered or apprehended, gave occasion to discontent and desertion: many fugitives made their escape; others were caught in the attempt, for which Mithridates punished them with the most barbarous cruelty; throwing them from precipices, boring out their eyes, and sometimes burning them alive<sup>104</sup>.

The frequency of desertion, joined to the want of supplies, at length determined Mithridates to the bold design of surprising the enemy in the Lesser Armenia. But as the Roman divisions kept on the alert, he was obliged to occupy a strong post in that province, and to act on the defensive; yet the irregulars who had lately joined him, were subjected to severe losses, owing to that undisciplined fury characteristic of Asiatic troops; their mad confidence in success, their equally frantic despondency under misfortune; and on one occasion, the impetuosity of a body of horsemen in sallying dismounted, and without orders from the camp<sup>105</sup>.

<sup>102</sup> *Ἀρμενία Βραχυντερος*. Appian, c. 90. & 105.<sup>104</sup> Appian, c. 97. Conf. Plutarch in<sup>103</sup> The word denotes the meeting of Lucull. & in Pomp. boundaries.<sup>105</sup> Appian, Mithridat. c. 100.



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Defeat of  
Mithridates  
near the  
designed site  
of Nicopolis.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii 3.  
B. C. 66.

In consequence of the enemy's dejection occasioned by these defeats, Pompey was enabled to get behind them, and to fortify a chain of posts in their rear. Upon learning this operation, Mithridates, fearful of being cooped up and starved, embraced the resolution of effecting his escape in the night, after he had slain not only his beasts of burthen, but all such sick and wounded as were unable to follow him. He then pursued his flight towards the nearest passage across the Euphrates, resting only in the hottest part of the day, and being closely pursued by the Romans, who by a forced march at the hour when the Cappadocians were in profound repose, again got between them and the river. Pompey, with admirable judgment, occupied the sides of a deep valley, through which the enemy had to pass, and into which they accordingly penetrated, believing that the Romans either followed far behind, or had entirely desisted from the pursuit. It was night; the moon had not yet risen; the Cappadocians were inclosed within the intricacies of a winding den. Under these circumstances, Pompey ordered the alarm to be sounded by shouts, trumpets, the clang of brazen vessels, and clashing shields, which complications of sound the neighbouring hills re-echoed and rendered more frightful. The Cappadocian horse and foot thronged on each other with much mutual injury, while the Roman darts and javelins inflicted dreadful wounds on defenceless crowds, since equipped for a march, and unsuspecting of being forced to a battle. When the moon arose, its deceitful light farther augmented the evil, for as it shone from behind the Romans, occupying the eastern eminences, the Cappadocians discharged their missile weapons against empty shadows, which they mistook for ranks of enemies, while their own close order exposed them as sure marks to the Roman pila<sup>106</sup>. In the surprise, the battle, and the rout, Mithridates lost a great army. Historians state the slain and taken at twenty thousand<sup>107</sup>; many considerable divisions,

Dion. Cassius, l. xxxvi. p. 23: & seq.

<sup>107</sup> Appian & Plutarch.

however,

however, effected their escape<sup>108</sup>, particularly a mixed brigade of Asiatics and Europeans, armed after the Roman fashion<sup>109</sup>.

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Mithridates  
flies to  
Armenia.

Towards the commencement of the action, the king, deeming his misfortune irretrievable, broke through a narrow outlet in the valley, at the head of 800 horse, and thus eluded the grasp of Pompey, as formerly that of Lucullus. Even this squadron, anxious for its own safety, gradually deserted him. He was left for three days with only three attendants, one of whom was his concubine Hipsycratea, mounting a Persian horse, and equipped like a Persian archer. This woman never departed from his side, nor ceased to soothe his sufferings, cautiously assisting him in traversing ravines or clambering over precipices, and, superior to fatigue as well as danger, dressed throughout the journey the king's horse and her own<sup>110</sup>. At length the fugitives encountered a body of 3,000 Cappadocian cavalry, which had assembled to reinforce their sovereign, and by whom Mithridates was conducted to the above-mentioned fortress of Synoria, the principal of seventy-five<sup>111</sup> strongholds in that neighbourhood, containing precious metals and other valuable effects. The treasures in Synoria were now distributed by their owner, to the amount of 6,000 talents. He also, from the same repository, supplied his attendants with poison, as their last refuge against the eager pursuit of insolent and relentless foes. His design was to throw himself on the protection of his son-in-law Tigranes, through whose powerful assistance he expected to be soon able to resume hostilities.

But Tigranes had recently slain two of his rebellious sons by the daughter of Mithridates, and was engaged in war with the third. He suspected that the grandfather of these disappointed parricides was not unconcerned in their treason. He therefore detained in custody the ambassadors from the flying king, and fixed a price on his own head. Upon this intelligence, Mithridates,

Then to  
Dicaearchus  
in Colchis.

<sup>108</sup> Dion, *ibid.*

Maxim. l. iv. c. 6.

<sup>109</sup> This body of men will appear hereafter.

<sup>111</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 555.

<sup>110</sup> Plutarch in *Pompeio*. Conf. Valer.

instead

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instead of approaching Artaxata, where Tigranes then resided, directed his course towards the head of the Euphrates, and having traversed the mountainous tracts that lead into Colchis, proceeded through that country, without halting, until he reached Dioscurias, on its northern frontier<sup>111</sup>. Here he stood on the confines of the fiercest nations of Scythia, many of them his friends, among all of whom his name was respected or terrible, and through whose encouragement he was stimulated to designs greater than any that he had yet meditated; and which were baffled, as will be seen, and made abortive, by a concurrence of incidents to be ascribed rather to the malignity of his own fortune, than to the power or policy of his Roman enemies.

Nicopolis  
built and  
peopled.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 3.  
B. C. 66.

Meanwhile, Pompey having contented himself with sending his light cavalry in pursuit of Mithridates, embraced measures for raising a lasting trophy to his fame in the new city Nicopolis, a name destined to commemorate a victory which he deemed altogether decisive. It was built near the scene of action, on the northern frontier of the Lesser Armenia, and in the neighbourhood both of the Araxes and Euphrates<sup>112</sup>, rivers taking their rise from mountainous sources only six miles asunder, though flowing, the former into the Caspian, the latter into the Persian gulph. Nicopolis was hastily peopled by aged or disabled soldiers, united with such natives of the neighbouring districts as chose to reinforce a community invested with many privileges, and sure of powerful protection<sup>113</sup>.

Pompey is  
joined by the  
younger  
Tigranes.

While Pompey was employed in raising this monument of his eastern conquests, he was joined by an illustrious fugitive, the son and heir to Tigranes, and himself bearing that royal name. By the assistance of Phrahates III. of Parthia, whose daughter he had obtained in marriage, this younger Tigranes had divested the elder of great part of Armenia, and was prosecuting the siege of Artaxata, when

<sup>111</sup> Plut. Appian, Dion.

<sup>112</sup> Conf. Strabo, ubi supra, & Plin. l. vi.

<sup>113</sup> Plut. in Pomp. & Dion. p. 25.

commotions on the Scythian frontier drew Phrahates homeward. After the departure of his powerful ally, the rebellious son was defeated by his father in a great battle; his followers were slain or dispersed. To avoid the dreadful effects of paternal vengeance, he at first fled towards his grandfather Mithridates, but upon learning the sad discomfiture of that prince, he saw no other resource than that of throwing himself on the protection of Pompey<sup>11</sup>.

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The general received him with that courtesy which the Romans always assumed towards those qualified to serve them. His father had provoked their resentment by invading Cappadocia, by desolating Cilicia, by possessing himself of Syria; above all, by abetting Mithridates, their mortal enemy. The military commission of Pompey embraced, therefore, Armenia, not less than Pontus; and now that Pontus had neither king nor army to defend it, and was ready to be occupied by legionary detachments by way of garrisons, an experienced and zealous guide was a matter of much importance in the invasion of a country so rough and intricate as Armenia. Such a guide having offered himself in the person of a fugitive prince, Pompey conducted the flower of his army into that kingdom, and advanced without making a halt until within sixteen miles of the capital. Terror preceded him to the palace of Artaxata; and a suppliant deputation came from the trembling king, whose abjectness in adversity was proportional to the odious insolence with which he had abused his good fortune. The deputies carried with them, as prisoners, the ambassadors recently sent to Artaxata by Mithridates, and surrendered them into the hands of Pompey. But this infamous present, instead of procuring favour, was treated by the Romans as an insult to the most sacred laws of nations; and their general, instigated by Tigranes the son, who expected to reap the fruits of his father's misfortune, would listen to no terms short of unconditional submission. To this sad disgrace the haughty Armenian was com-

Invasion of  
Armenia and  
abject sub-  
mission of its  
king.

Olymp.  
clxxxviii. 3.  
B. C. 66.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, c. 104. Plutarch in Pomp. & Dion Cassius, l. xxxvi.

pelled



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pelled to descend; and the same man now laboured, by every mean expedient, to excite commiseration in Pompey, who had long trampled without mercy on prostrate kings of the East. He divested himself of his sandals or robe of royalty, but retained the tiara encircled with the diadem, to indicate the lofty state from which he had fallen; and opening the gates of Artaxata, issued forth with his friends and relatives to implore the invader's clemency. Apprised of their approach, Pompey sent a party of distinguished officers to meet them. At sight of this martial cavalcade, the attendants of Tigranes took fright, and fled in different directions; but the king rode forward till met by two lictors, who dismounted him, saying that no stranger could enter a Roman camp on horseback. They instantly conducted him to the tribunal of the general, at whose feet Tigranes, in order to mitigate his doom, abjectly laid his diadem. Pompey ordered him to resume the royal ornament, and raising him to his right hand, the son of the abased prince occupying the left, "Your submission," he said, "Tigranes, instead of depriving you of a kingdom, has gained you the Romans for protectors. You must relinquish, however, all claims on our side of the Euphrates, and pay six thousand talents to indemnify us for the expence of the war. On these terms you shall still reign in Armenia, resigning only the small province of Sophenè, on the left bank of the river, to your son, in whose favour you will likewise settle the succession, to your crown<sup>116</sup>."

Brutal behaviour and punishment of his son.

This merciful decision, which filled the father with pleasing astonishment, exasperated the son to madness. That night, he refused Pompey's invitation to supper; he behaved to his father with brutal savageness; he immediately took measures for possessing himself of a fortress in Sophenè, which, as it contained the royal treasury, had been excepted in the grant of that district. The audacity of the young man, who laboured to excite a war on the part of Phra-

<sup>116</sup> Plutarch in Pomp. & Dion, p. 26.



hates III. of Parthia, subjected him to all the severity of Roman vengeance; he was, by command of Pompey, put in irons, and remained in that wretched condition until released by the hand of an executioner, after he had adorned the victor's triumph<sup>117</sup>. The father, meanwhile, readily discharged the fine of 6,000 talents imposed on him; and in addition to this sum, amounting nearly to 1,200,000*l.* bestowed a gratuity equivalent to thirty shillings on each Roman foldier; the value of thirty pounds on each centurion; and ten times the latter value on each tribune, that is, on every officer commanding a cohort or regiment<sup>118</sup>.

The cowardly munificence of Tigranes procured for his nation the title of a Roman ally. But as the first fruits of this coveted distinction, he had the mortification of seeing Pompey fix his winter quarters in the Armenian district Anaitis. This district, which was defended chiefly by the river Cyrus from the most warlike nations of Caucasus, derived its name from that of the goddess to whom it was immemorially consecrated. Either in her idol or in her worship, the Greeks recognised some affinity of Anaitis with their own Diana, and therefore too hastily distinguished her by that chaste name. For the temple of the Armenian Diana, being a great staple of trade, and a principal halting place for caravans, not only the ordinary attendants on the goddess, but many other females of the first families, sold their beauty without shame to wealthy strangers, and with the accumulated wages of prostitution were enabled, many of them, in the wane of their beauty, to purchase at will either husbands or lovers<sup>119</sup>.

Pompey's war against the Iberians and Albanians. Olymp. clxxviii 4. B. C. 65.

The Roman army had not long cantoned in Anaitis, when the mountaineers in its neighbourhood were in motion. They suspected that Pompey only waited the return of spring to invade their territories in pursuit of Mithridates, whose death or captivity seemed es-

His victories and return into the Lesser Armenia. Olymp. clxxviii 4. B. C. 65.

<sup>117</sup> Appian, c. 105—117.

<sup>118</sup> Plutarch in Pompeio.

<sup>119</sup> Strabo, l. xi. p. 532.

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fential, according to Roman maxims, to an honourable termination of the war. Among those fierce tenants of Caucasus, the two tribes of Iberians and Albanians were the most powerful; the former living towards the Euxine, the latter extending to the shores of the Caspian. They were both of them in friendship with Mithridates, both alike hostile to the threatening Romans, but unfortunately for the success of their arms, too jealous of each other to concert any solid plan for their common defence. The chieftain Oroëses, and his Albanians, were first in the field. Pompey, apprised of their movements, allowed them to cross the Cyrus, and then falling unexpectedly on enemies who had hoped to conquer him by surprise, defeated them with much slaughter, and drove them beyond the river. In the ensuing spring he invaded both the Albanians and the Iberians, who fighting singly, are said to have been successively subdued. Their numbers were formidable, since they sometimes mustered sixty thousand; but they trusted chiefly to their missile weapons, and they were clothed and defended only with the skins of wild beasts. When defeated, they found shelter in their deep woods; and the Romans, by setting fire to these lurking places, compelled various parties of both nations to surrender. But whatever may have been the extent of their submission, it is certain that Pompey, whether obstructed by the rudeness of the country, or by the obstinacy of the enemy, thought fit to return before winter into the Lesser Armenia, after a pursuit of Mithridates very unlike to that of Darius by the great Alexander<sup>120</sup>.

Mithridates  
in Bosphorus  
—Tragic  
death of his  
sons Ma-  
chares and  
Xiphares.  
Olymp.  
clxxviii. 4.  
B. C. 65.

The king of Pontus, meanwhile, had fortified himself in the Chersonesus Taurica<sup>121</sup>, anciently the seat of the little kingdom of Bosphorus, with whose history my readers are not unacquainted. In the meridian of his prosperity, Mithridates had bestowed this kingdom on a son named Machares, who having entered into a treasonable correspondence with the Romans, slew himself in despair<sup>122</sup>, when

<sup>120</sup> Dion, Appian, Plutarch. <sup>121</sup> The Peninsula of Crim Tartary. <sup>122</sup> Appian, c. 102.



he found that his father had survived the rout of Nicopolis, and was approaching Bosporus with a new army. The arrival of the king at Panticapæum, the principal city in the peninsula, proved fatal also to Xiphares, another of his sons. To this place, which stood on one side of the Cimmerian Bosporus, Xiphares accompanied his father; Stratonice, the mother of the young prince, then inhabited Phanagorea, situate on the opposite side of the strait in such a manner with regard to Panticapæum, that whatever passed at the one city might be distinctly seen from the other. In Panticapæum, Mithridates was informed that the same woman in whom he reposed such unlimited confidence, that he had entrusted to her Symphorium one of his richest treasuries, had betrayed her stronghold to Pompey, on his promise that he would spare her son Xiphares, should the chance of war ever throw that youth into his hands. The intelligence provoked the jealous king to a signal act of vengeance. Xiphares was slain publicly on one side of the strait, while Stratonice was compelled to behold his execution from the other<sup>123</sup>. In thus sacrificing an innocent son to the punishment of a guilty mother, Mithridates departed from the maxim that usually guided him, of observing a certain equitable discrimination even in his cruelties. Among those who were accomplices of Machares, the late rebellious king of Bosporus, he distinguished between such persons as he had himself recommended to that unworthy son, and those friends and ministers whom Machares had spontaneously chosen. The former he punished as traitors; the latter he freely pardoned, observing that they owed nothing to him, and had rightly obeyed their master<sup>124</sup>. His proceeding breathed the same spirit in the case of Attidius, a Roman exile of senatorian dignity, who, being taken into the king's confidence, basely conspired against his life. The Cappadocians concerned in this plot were subjected to lingering torture; Attidius' quality of senator procured for him the release of a speedy execution;

<sup>123</sup> Appian, c. 107.<sup>124</sup> Id. c. 102.

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His measures  
for invading  
Italy with  
the assistance  
of the Scy-  
thians and  
Bastarnæ.  
Olymp.  
clxxix. 1.  
B. C. 64.

no punishment whatever was inflicted on the freedmen belonging to this Roman, who had only abetted their patron <sup>125</sup>.

When Mithridates fled to the Chersonesus Taurica, he had higher objects in view than the mere safety of his person. The Romans were masters at sea; and Pompey, upon his return to the Lesser Armenia, had ordered his admirals in the Euxine to intercept all supplies to the fugitive king, and carefully to prevent his escape. But the forces aboard the Roman ships were unequal to the conquest of the Chersonesus. Besides hordes of warlike nomades from the confines of the Paulus Mæotis, Mithridates mustered sixty well disciplined cohorts, each cohort consisting of six hundred men. He had strongly garrisoned Panticapæum and Phanagorea, the firm fetters of the Bosporus; he had gained many Scythian chiefs, by betrothing to them his numerous daughters by Greek women, for such intermarriages the Scythians then still more affected than did their descendants the Turks and Tartars afterwards under the declining empire of Constantinople <sup>126</sup>. Even beyond the Scythians westward, Mithridates extended his alliances to the Bastarnæ, a German nation, as we have seen, though living on the right of the Vistula, through whose powerful co-operation he purposed to traverse Pannonia and Dacia, and to descend by the Rhetian Alps into Italy <sup>127</sup>. His plan was precisely the same with that which a century before had been concerted by the fourth and last Philip of Macedon, only that the intended expedition of Mithridates embraced a wider circle. Both these princes discerned the quarter on which Rome was assailable, and both had prepared the same engines by which Rome was finally overwhelmed; when the king of Pontus, as formerly that of Macedon, perished in the midst of batteries which he had most ably erected.

Conspiracy  
formed  
against him.

It is a remark favoring of Machiavelism, but nevertheless strictly true, that Mithridates, cruel and suspicious as he certainly was, fell a

<sup>125</sup> Appian, c. 90.

<sup>126</sup> Cantemir. History of the Ottoman

Empire, and Knolles's History of the Turks.

<sup>127</sup> Dion, Appian, Florus, l. iii. c. 5.

victim



victim to his forbearance and lenity. Stratonice had suffered in the execution of her son Xiphares, a pang sharper than death, and survived only to avenge him. This woman was the daughter of the Greek musician Castor, and had a kinsman of that name, whom like all her family, Mithridates had for her sake loaded with riches and honours<sup>128</sup>. Being in great authority in Phanagorea, Castor concerted a revolt with the inhabitants of that place, many of them of Greek descent and his countrymen. The conspiracy broke out by the murder of Tryphon, one of the king's favourite eunuchs. The citizens flew to arms; overpowered such of the garrison as ventured to oppose them, asserted their ancient freedom as a Greek colony, and laid siege to a fortified palace, inhabited by three sons and two daughters of Mithridates. The sons had Persian names; Artaphernes, Xerxes, and Axathres: the daughters were called Eupatra and Cleopatra: a distinction of names bearing reference to the mixed extraction of the kings of Pontus, who boasted in the male line Darius Hystaspis, and in the female, Seleucus Nicator. Four of Mithridates' children thus fell a prey to the insurgents: Cleopatra alone escaped through her own courage, and the aid of some armed vessels sent across the strait by her father.

The revolt was contagious among subjects oppressed by exactions; and whose labouring cattle had been slaughtered to afford in their tough tendons, strings for military engines. The sedition infected Theodosia, Nymphæum, and other sea-ports of the Chersonesus: a party of 500 soldiers, who escorted the betrothed daughters of Mithridates to their Scythian lords, massacred the eunuchs who had the care of these females, and conveyed the blooming prize to a Roman squadron on the coast: and even Pharnaces, whom Mithridates had often shewn to his army as the son whom he destined to wear his diadem, headed a conspiracy for shortening the life of a man in his 73d year, and still superior in his mind to the complica-

He discovers it, and pardons his son Pharnaces.

<sup>128</sup> Conf. Plutarch in Pomp. & Appian, c. 108.



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tion of evils which had assailed him: for in addition to war and treason, Mithridates was afflicted by an ulcer in his face; he was seen by none but the eunuchs skilled in physick, who attended him, and at length healed his wound; yet in this state of seclusion and suffering, he had discovered the perfidy of his son, and had been prevailed on to pardon it<sup>119</sup>.

His death  
and charac-  
ter.  
Olymp.  
clxxix 2.  
B. C. 63.

This pardon served only to deepen the guilt of Pharnaces. He well knew that the corps of Roman deserters was peculiarly adverse to the expedition against Italy. They best understood the difficulties of such an enterprise; and they reflected with horror on the punishments that awaited them, in case their invasion were unsuccessful. Pharnaces roused their sedition: their angry spirits were infused into the contiguous division guarding the citadel of Panticapæum, where Mithridates with part of his family resided. Upon hearing the tumultuary uproar, the old man sallied forth in arms; his horse was killed under him; yet he boldly fought his way back to his stronghold, and continued to maintain it, till finding the sedition gain ground, and receiving no answer to repeated overtures sent by him to his son, he gave poison to those around him, among whom were two marriageable daughters, Mithridatis and Nyssa, respectively betrothed to the kings of Egypt and Cyprus. He then had recourse himself to the same direful cup, imprecating the Furies (for he had adopted the religion of Homer with his poetry) against the parricidal Pharnaces. On a constitution hardened, nor withered by time, and fortified by antidotes of his own invention, the poison failed to operate. He therefore seized the dagger; and the firmness of his own hand was seconded by the kind cruelty of Bituitus, an old and faithful attendant<sup>120</sup>.

Thus died Mithridates, "the greatest of kings, next to Alexander<sup>121</sup>." In this pithy panegyric, by one of the best judges of merit,

<sup>119</sup> Appian, c. 110.

l. cii. Oros. l. vi. c. v.

<sup>120</sup> Conf. Appian, Mithridat. c. 108—114.

<sup>121</sup> Cicer. Academ. l. ii. c. 1.

Dion, l. xxxvi. p. 34. 35. Tit. Liv. Epitom.

much however is to be abated. In his royal virtues only, Mithridates resembled Alexander, and even here the likeness was a false one; for in the course of a long life he gave no indications of those lofty yet practicable enterprises, of which the Macedonian had in early youth set the example. Though conversant with Greek learning, and surrounded by companions, generals, and ministers of that nation, we see no marks of the zealous encouragement of arts and letters, which shone so conspicuously in the son of Philip; not to mention that his cruelty and lust and suspicion form a perpetual and dark contrast to that open frankness, that warmth of friendship, and that noble disdain for whatever is low and selfish in pleasure, which endear Alexander to our affections, not less than his vast designs and mighty achievements raise him, in our judgment, above all kings and conquerors.

In his reign of sixty years, Mithridates waged three wars with the Romans, which lasted collectively nearly half that period. Though neither his success in these wars, nor his judgment or enterprise in conducting them, corresponded with his bold threats and boastful preparations, yet the spirit and perseverance with which he so often renewed the contest, procured for him many warm and animated, rather than very discriminating eulogies. He is extolled as a general whose skill in contrivance was only surpassed by his boldness in execution, who was often superior in fortune, always pre-eminent in courage; and who, when apparently fallen beyond recovery, Antæus-like, sprung again from the earth with renewed hopes and increased vigour<sup>132</sup>. Yet it appears from the preceding narrative, that in his three successive wars with Rome, his exertions were ever less strenuous in the subsequent than in the preceding conflict: his mind, however, continued to the end unsubdued; and his last fell purpose of conducting an army of Scythians and Germans into Italy, throws a

<sup>132</sup> Conf. Appian, Dion, Plutarch. Valer. Maxim. l. iv. c. 6. Velleius Paterculus, l. ii. c. 18.

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Pompey  
takes possession of Pon-  
tus.

Mithridates'   
vast riches -   
how amassed   
by him.

deep ensanguined glare around his setting sun, not unworthy of the bloody fierceness of his blazing meridian.

Shortly after Pompey's return above-mentioned into the Lesser Armenia, he marched to reinforce his army in Pontus, that, although he had failed of seizing the lion, he might at least make sure of his den. In occupying the strongholds of Pontus, and reducing that country into a province, many particulars were brought to light respecting the domestic management of Mithridates, and all perfectly harmonizing with the character which his public transactions have stamped on him. Of his seventy-five fortresses, several were found in the custody of women, a sex which he treated alternately with all the fondness of love and all the cruelty of jealousy. One of those fortresses, Talaura, astonished the Romans by the endless variety of its precious contents; 2,000 onyx goblets, tipped with golden brims; cups and cooling vessels without number; beds, couches, and other furniture, inestimable for their workmanship and materials; to which were added, housings for horses, adorned with gold and gems, and a profusion of bridles and breast-plates of corresponding or still richer magnificence. Not less than a month was consumed in making the tiresome inventory<sup>115</sup>. Part of these valuable effects had descended to Mithridates from his ancestors: a considerable proportion of them had been fairly purchased by a prince ostentatiously splendid; but a third, and perhaps the largest share, had been extorted from their lawful owners by an unprincipled despot, who acknowledged no moral restraint to the unbounded gratification of all his passions. One of the principal victims of his rapacity was Alexander II. king of Egypt, to whom, as above-mentioned, he afterwards betrothed his daughter Mithridatis. That Egyptian prince, whom we shall see presently reduced to the state of a humble suitor in the camp of Pompey, had been sent in early youth to the isle of Cös by his grandmother, Cleopatra, in the midst of her relentless wars with her son, Ptolemy

<sup>115</sup> Appian, Mithridat. c. 115.