

who dwelt in the town of the same name . . . near Lampascus, and also formed the subject population of Miletus, were the only remnants of this once famous nation. But their former greatness was attested by the Homeric poems, and the occurrence of the name Gergithians at various places in the Troad [see TROJA]. To this tribe belonged the Troy of the Grecian epic, the site of which, so far as it represents any historical city, is fixed at Hissarlik. In the Iliad the Trojan empire extends from the Aesepus to the Caicus; it was divided—or, at least, later historians speak of it as divided—into principalities which recognised Priam as their chief. But the Homeric descriptions of the city and its eminence are not to be taken as historically true. Whatever the power and civilisation of the ancient stronghold exhumed by Dr. Schliemann may have been, it was necessary for the epic poet to represent Priam and his nation as a dangerous rival in wealth and arms to the great kings of Mycenae and Sparta. . . . The traditional dates fix these colonies [of the Greeks in Asia Minor] in the generations which followed the Trojan war. . . . We may suppose that the colonisation of the Aegean and of Asia Minor by the Greeks was coincident with the expulsion of the Phoenicians. The greatest extension of the Phoenician power in the Aegean seems to fall in the 15th century B. C. From the 13th it was gradually on the decline, and the Greeks were enabled to secure the trade for themselves. . . . By 1100 B. C. Asia Minor may have been in the hands of the Greeks, though the Phoenicians still maintained themselves in Rhodes and Cyprus. But all attempts at chronology are illusory”—E. Abbott, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 4 (v. 1).

ALSO IN E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 2, ch. 3 (v. 1).—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 13-15.—J. A. Cramer, *Geog. and Hist. Description of Asia Minor*, sect. 6 (v. 1).—See, also, MILETUS, PHOECIANS.

B. C. 724-539.—Prosperity of the Greek Colonies.—Their Submission to Crœsus, King of Lydia, and their conquest and annexation to the Persian Empire.—“The Grecian colonies on the coast of Asia early rose to wealth by means of trade and manufactures. Though we have not the means of tracing their commerce, we know that it was considerable, with the mother country, with Italy, and at length Spain, with Phœnicia and the interior of Asia, whence the productions of India passed to Greece. The Milesians, who had fine woolen manufactures, extended their commerce to the Euxine, on all sides of which they founded factories, and exchanged their manufactures and other goods with the Scythians and the neighbouring peoples, for slaves, wool, raw hides, bees-wax, flax, hemp, pitch, etc. There is even reason to suppose that, by means of caravans, their traders bartered their wares not far from the confines of China [see MILETUS]. . . . But while they were advancing in wealth and prosperity, a powerful monarchy formed itself in Lydia, of which the capital was Sardes, a city at the foot of Mount Tmolus. Gyges, the first of the Mermaid dynasty of Lydian kings (see LYDIANS), whose reign is supposed to have begun about B. C. 724, turned his arms against the Ionian cities on the coast. During a century and a half the efforts of the Lydian monarchs to reduce these states were unavailing. At length (691, 55) [B. C. 546] the celebrated Crœsus

mounted the throne of Lydia, and he made all Asia this side of the River Halys (Lycia and Cilicia excepted) acknowledge his dominion. The Aeolian, Ionian and Dorian cities of the coast all paid him tribute, but, according to the usual rule of eastern conquerors, he meddled not with their political institutions, and they might deem themselves fortunate in being insured against war by the payment of an annual sum of money. Crœsus, moreover, cultivated the friendship of the European Greeks.” But Crœsus was overthrown, B. C. 546, by the conquering Cyrus and his kingdom of Lydia was swallowed up in the great Persian empire then taking form [see PERSIA: B. C. 549-521]. Cyrus, during his war with Crœsus, had tried to entice the Ionians away from the latter and win them to an alliance with himself. But they incurred his resentment by refusing. “They and the Æolians now sent ambassadors, praying to be received to submission on the same terms as those on which they had obeyed the Lydian monarch; but the Milesians alone found favour: the rest had to prepare for war. They repaired the walls of their towns, and sent to Sparta for aid. Aid, however, was refused; but Cyrus, being called away by the war with Babylon, neglected them for the present. Three years afterwards (Ol. 59, 2), Harpagus, who had saved Cyrus in his infancy from his grandfather Astyages, came as governor of Lydia. He instantly prepared to reduce the cities of the coast. Town after town submitted. The Teians abandoned theirs, and retired to Abdera in Thrace, the Phœceans, getting on shipboard, and vowing never to return, sailed for Corsica, and being there harassed by the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, they went to Rhegium in Italy, and at length founded Massalia (Marseilles) on the coast of Gaul. The Grecian colonies thus became a part of the Persian empire.”—T. Keightley, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 1, ch. 9.

ALSO IN Herodotus, *Hist.*, tr. and ed. by G. Rawlinson, bk. 1, and app.—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, bk. 8, ch. 6-7 (v. 6).

B. C. 501-493.—The Ionian revolt and its suppression. See PERSIA: B. C. 521-493.

B. C. 479.—Athens assumes the protection of Ionia. See ATHENS: B. C. 479-478.

B. C. 477.—Formation of Confederacy of Delos. See GREECE: B. C. 478-477.

B. C. 413.—Tribute again demanded from the Greeks by the Persian King.—Conspiracy against Athens. See GREECE: B. C. 413.

B. C. 413-412.—Revolt of the Greek cities from Athens.—Intrigues of Alcibiades. See GREECE: B. C. 413-412.

B. C. 412.—Re-submission to Persia. See PERSIA: B. C. 486-405.

B. C. 401-400.—Expedition of Cyrus the Younger, and Retreat of the Ten Thousand. See PERSIA: B. C. 401-400.

B. C. 399-387.—Spartan war with Persia in behalf of the Greek cities.—Their abandonment by the Peace of Antalcidas. See GREECE: B. C. 399-387.

B. C. 334.—Conquest by Alexander the Great. See MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330.

B. C. 301.—Mostly annexed to the Thracian Kingdom of Lysimachus. See MACEDONIA, &c.: B. C. 310-301.

B. C. 281-224.—Battle-ground of the warring monarchies of Syria and Egypt.—Changes of masters. See SELEUCIDÆ.

B. C. 191.—First Entrance of the Romans. — Their defeat of Antiochus the Great. — Their expansion of the kingdom of Pergamum and the Republic of Rhodes. See **SELUCIDÆ**. B C 224-187.

B. C. 120-65.—Mithridates. — Complete Roman Conquest. See **MITHRIDATIC WARS**, also **ROME**. B C 78-68 and 69-63.

A. D. 45-100.—Rise of Christian Churches. See **CHRISTIANITY**. A D 33-100.

A. D. 292.—Diocletian's seat of Empire established at Nicomedia. See **ROME**. A D 284-305.

A. D. 602-628.—Persian invasions. — Deliverance by Heraclius. See **ROME**. A D 565-628.

A. D. 1063-1092.—Conquest and ruin by the **Seljuk Turks**. See **TRKS (SELJUKS)**. A D 1063-1073 and 1073-1092.

A. D. 1097-1149.—Wars of the Crusaders. See **CRUSADES**. A D 1096-1099, and 1147-1149.

A. D. 1204-1261.—The Empire of Nicæa and the Empire of Trebizond. See **GREEK EMPIRE OF NICÆA**.

ASIENTO, OR ASSIENTO, The. See **SLAVERY**. A D 1698-1776, **UTRECHT**. A D 1712-1714, **AIX LA-CHAPELLE**, **THE CONGRESS OF**, **ENGLAND**. A D 1789-1741, and **GEORGIA**. A D 1788-1743.

ASKELON. See **PHILISTINES**.

ASKLEPIADS.—"Throughout all the historical ages [of Greece] the descendants of Asklepius [or Esculapius] were numerous and widely diffused. The many families or gentes called Asklepiads, who devoted themselves to the study and practice of medicine, and who principally dwelt near the temples of Asklepius, whither sick and suffering men came to obtain relief—all recognized the god, not merely as the object of their common worship, but also as their actual progenitor"—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt 1, ch 9.

ASMONEANS, The. See **JEWS**. B C 166-40.

ASOKA. See **INDIA**. B C 312—.

ASOV. See **AZOV**.

ASPADAN.—The ancient name of which that of Isaphan is a corrupted form.—G. Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies. Media*, ch 1.

ASPERN-ESSLINGEN (OR THE MARCHFELD), Battle of. See **GERMANY**: A D 1809 (JANUARY—JUNE).

ASPIS, The. See **PHALANX**.

ASPRÓMONTE, Defeat of Garibaldi at (1862). See **ITALY**. A D 1862-1866.

ASSAM, English Acquisition of. See **INDIA**. A D 1823-1838.

ASSANDUN, Battle of.—The sixth and last battle. A D 1016, between Edmund Ironsides, the English King, and his Danish rival, Cnut, or Canute, for the Crown of England. The English were terribly defeated and the flower of their nobility perished on the field. The result was a division of the kingdom; but Edmund soon died, or was killed. Ashington, in Essex, was the battle-ground. See **ENGLAND**: A D. 979-1016.

ASSASSINATIONS, Notable.—Abbas, **Phaşa of Egypt.** See **EGYPT**: A D. 1840-1869. . . . Alexander II. of Russia. See **RUSSIA**: A D. 1879-1881. . . . Beaton, Cardinal. See **SCOTLAND**: A D. 1546. . . . Becket, Thomas. See **ENG-**

LAND. A D 1162-1170. **Buckingham.** See **ENGLAND**: A D 1628. **Cæsar.** See **ROME**. B C 44.

Capo d'Istria, Count, President of Greece. See **GREECE**. A D 1830-1862. . . . Carnot, President. See **FRANCE**. A D 1804-1805. . . .

Cavendish, Lord Frederick, and Burke, Mr. See **IRELAND**. A D 1882. **Concini.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1610-1619. **Danilo, Prince of Montenegro (1860).** See **MONTENEGRO**.

Darnley. See **SCOTLAND**. A D 1561-1568. **Francis of Guise.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1560-1563.

Garfield, President. See **UNITED STATES OF AM**. A D 1881. **Gustavus III. of Sweden.** See **SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN)**. A D 1720-1792. **Henry of Guise.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1584-1589. **Henry III. of France.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1584-1589. **Henry IV. of France.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1589-1600. . . .

Hipparchus. See **ATHENS**. B C 560-510. . . . **John, Duke of Burgundy.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1415-1419. **Kleber, General.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1800 (JANUARY—JUNE). . . . **Kotzebue.** See **GERMANY**. A D 1817-1820. **Lincoln, President.** See **UNITED STATES OF AM**. A D 1865 (APRIL 14TH). **Marat.** See **FRANCE**. A D 1793 (JULY). **Mayo, Lord.** See **INDIA**. A D 1862-1876. **Murray, The Regent.** See **SCOTLAND**. A D 1561-1568. **Omar, Caliph.** See **MAROMETAN CONQUEST, &c**. A D 661.

Paul, Czar of Russia. See **RUSSIA**. A D 1801. **Perceval, Spencer.** See **ENGLAND**. A D. 1806-1812. **Peter III.** See **RUSSIA**. A D 1761-1762. **Philip of Macedon.** See **GREECE**. B C 357-336. **Prim, General (1870).** See **SPAIN**. A D 1866-1873. **Rizzio.** See **SCOTLAND**. A D 1561-1568. **Rossi, Count.** See **ITALY**. A D 1848-1849. **Wallenstein (1634).** See **GERMANY**. A D 1632-1634. **William the Silent.** See **NETHERLANDS**. A D 1581-1584. **Witt, John and Cornelius de.** See **NETHERLANDS**. A D 1672-1674.

ASSASSINS, The.—"I must speak of that wonderful brotherhood of the Assassins, which during the 12th and 13th centuries spread such terror through all Asia, Mussulman and Christian. Their deeds should be studied in Von Hammer's history of their order, of which however there is an excellent analysis in Taylor's History of Mohammedanism. The word Assassin, it must be remembered, in its ordinary signification, is derived from this order, and not the reverse. The Assassins were not so called because they were murderers, but murderers are called assassins because the Assassins were murderers. The origin of the word Assassin has been much disputed by oriental scholars; but its application is sufficiently written upon the Asiatic history of the 12th century. The Assassins were not, strictly speaking, a dynasty, but rather an order, like the Templars; only the office of Grand-Master, like the Caliphate, became hereditary. They were originally a branch of the Egyptian Ishmaelites [see **MAROMETAN CONQUEST**: A. D. 908-1171] and at first professed the principles of that sect. But there can be no doubt that their inner doctrine became at last a mere negation of all religion and all morality. 'To believe nothing and to dare everything' was the summary of their teaching. Their exoteric principle, addressed to the non-initiated members of the order, was simple blind obedience to the will of their superiors. If the Assassin was ordered to take off a Caliph or a Sultan by the dagger or the bow,

the deed was done; if he was ordered to throw himself from the ramparts, the deed was done likewise. . . . Their founder was Hassan Sabah, who, in 1090, shortly before the death of Malek Shah, seized the castle of Alamout—the Vulture's nest—in northern Persia, whence they extended their possessions over a whole chain of mountain fortresses in that country and in Syria. The Grand-Master was the Sheikh-al-Jebal, the famous Old Man of the Mountain, at whose name Europe and Asia shuddered."—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. and Conquests of the Saracens*, lect. 4.—"In the Fatimide Khalif of Egypt, they [the Assassins, or Ismailiens of Syria and Persia] beheld an incarnate deity. To kill his enemies, in whatever way they best could, was an action, the merit of which could not be disputed, and the reward for which was certain." Hassan Sabah, the founder of the Order, died at Alamout A. D. 1124. "From the day he entered Alamout until that of his death—a period of thirty-five years—he never emerged, but upon two occasions, from the seclusion of his house. Pitiless and inscrutable as Destiny, he watched the troubled world of Oriental politics, himself invisible, and whenever he perceived a formidable foe, caused a dagger to be driven into his heart." It was not until more than a century after the death of its founder that the fearful organization of the Assassins was extinguished (A. D. 1257) by the same flood of Mongol invasion which swept Bagdad and the Caliphate out of existence.—R. D. Osborn, *Islam under the Khalifs of Bagdad*, pt. 3, ch. 3.—W. C. Taylor, *Hist. of Mohammedanism and its Sects*, ch. 9.—The Assassins were rooted out from all their strongholds in Kuhistan and the neighboring region, and were practically exterminated, in 1257, by the Mongols under Khulagu, or Houlagou, brother of Mongu Khan, the great sovereign of the Mongol Empire, then reigning. Alamout, the Vulture's Nest, was demolished.—H. H. Howorth, *Hist. of the Mongols*, part 1, p. 193; and part 3, pp. 91–103.—See BAGDAD: A. D. 1258.

ASSAYE, Battle of (1803). See INDIA: A. D. 1798–1805.

ASSEMBLY OF THE NOTABLES IN FRANCE (1787). See FRANCE: A. D. 1774–1788.

ASSENISIPIA, The proposed State of. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1784.

ASSIDEANS, The. See CHASIDIM, THE.

ASSIENTO, The. See ASIENITO.

ASSIGNATS. See FRANCE: A. D. 1789–1791: 1794–1795 (JULY–APRIL); also, MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1789–1796.

ASSINARUS, Athenian defeat and surrender at the. See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415–413.

ASSINIBOIA, The. See NORTHWEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA.

ASSINIBOINS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

ASSIZE, The Bloody. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1685 (SEPTEMBER).

ASSIZE OF BREAD AND ALE.—The Assize of Bread and Ale was an English ordinance or enactment, dating back to the time of Henry III. in the 13th century, which fixed the price of those commodities by a scale regulated according to the market prices of wheat, barley and oats. "The Assize of bread was re-enacted so lately as the beginning of the last century and

was only abolished in London and its neighbourhood about thirty years ago"—that is, early in the present century.—G. L. Craik, *Hist. of British Commerce*, v. 1, p. 137.

ASSIZE OF CLARENDON, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1162–1170.

ASSIZE OF JERUSALEM, The.—"No sooner had Godfrey of Bouillon [elected King of Jerusalem, after the taking of the Holy City by the Crusaders, A. D. 1099] accepted the office of supreme magistrate than he solicited the public and private advice of the Latin pilgrims who were the best skilled in the statutes and customs of Europe. From these materials, with the counsel and approbation of the Patriarch and barons, of the clergy and laity, Godfrey composed the Assize of Jerusalem, a precious monument of feudal jurisprudence. The new code, attested by the seals of the King, the Patriarch, and the Viscount of Jerusalem, was deposited in the holy sepulchre, enriched with the improvements of succeeding times, and respectfully consulted as often as any doubtful question arose in the tribunals of Palestine. With the kingdom and city all was lost; the fragments of the written law were preserved by jealous tradition and variable practice till the middle of the thirteenth century. The code was restored by the pen of John d'Ibelin, Count of Jaffa, one of the principal feudatories; and the final revision was accomplished in the year thirteen hundred and sixty-nine, for the use of the Latin kingdom of Cyprus."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 58.

ASSIZES.—"The formal edicts known under the name of Assizes, the Assizes of Clarendon and Northampton, the Assize of Arms, the Assize of the Forest, and the Assizes of Measures, are the only relics of the legislative work of the period [reign of Henry II. in England]. These edicts are chiefly composed of new regulations for the enforcement of royal justice. . . . In this respect they strongly resemble the capitularies of the Frank Kings, or, to go farther back, the edicts of the Roman praetors. . . . The term Assize, which comes into use in this meaning about the middle of the twelfth century, both on the continent and in England, appears to be the proper Norman name for such edicts. . . . In the 'Assize of Jerusalem' it simply means a law; and the same in Henry's legislation. Secondly, it means a form of trial established by the particular law, as the Great Assize, the Assize of Mort d'Ancestor; and thirdly the court held to hold such trials, in which sense it is commonly used at the present day."—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 12.

ASSUR. See ASSYRIA.

ASSYRIA.—For matter relating to Assyrian history, the reader is referred to the caption SEMITES, under which it will be given. The subject is deferred to that part of this work which will go later into print, for the reason that every month is adding to the knowledge of the students of ancient oriental history and clearing away disputed questions. It is quite possible that the time between the publication of our first volume and our fourth or fifth may make important additions to the scanty literature of the subject in English. Modern excavation on the sites of the ancient cities in the East, bringing to light large library collections of inscribed clay tablets, sacred and historical writings, official records,

business contracts and many varieties of inscriptions,—have almost revolutionized the study of ancient history and the views of antiquity derived from it. "M. Botta, who was appointed French consul at Mosul in 1842, was the first to commence excavations on the sites of the buried cities of Assyria, and to him is due the honour of the first discovery of her long lost palaces. M. Botta commenced his labours at Kouyunjik, the large mound opposite Mosul, but he found here very little to compensate for his labours. New at the time to excavations, he does not appear to have worked in the best manner. M. Botta at Kouyunjik contented himself with sinking pits in the mound, and on these proving unproductive abandoning them. While M. Botta was excavating at Kouyunjik, his attention was called to the mounds of Khorsabad by a native of the village on that site, and he sent a party of workmen to the spot to commence excavation. In a few days his perseverance was rewarded by the discovery of some sculptures, after which, abandoning the work at Kouyunjik, he transferred his establishment to Khorsabad and thoroughly explored that site. . . . The palace which M. Botta had discovered . . . is one of the most perfect Assyrian buildings yet explored, and forms an excellent example of Assyrian architecture. Beside the palace on the mound of Khorsabad, M. Botta also opened the remains of a temple, and a grand porch decorated by six winged bulls.

The operations of M. Botta were brought to a close in 1845, and a splendid collection of sculptures and other antiquities, the fruits of his labours, arrived in Paris in 1846 and was deposited in the Louvre. Afterwards the French Government appointed M. Place consul at Mosul, and he continued some of the excavations of his predecessor. . . . Mr. Layard, whose attention was early turned in this direction, visited the country in 1840, and afterwards took a great interest in the excavations of M. Botta. At length, in 1845, Layard was enabled through the assistance of Sir Stratford Canning to commence excavations in Assyria himself. On the 8th of November he started from Mosul, and descended the Tigris to Nimroud. . . . Mr. Layard has described in his works with great minuteness his successive excavations, and the remarkable and interesting discoveries he made. . . . After making these discoveries in Assyria, Mr. Layard visited Babylonia, and opened trenches in several of the mounds there. On the return of Mr. Layard to England, excavations were continued in the Euphrates valley under the superintendence of Colonel (now Sir Henry) Rawlinson. Under his directions, Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, Mr. Loftus, and Mr. Taylor excavated various sites and made numerous discoveries, the British Museum receiving the best of the monuments. The materials collected in the national museums of France and England, and the numerous inscriptions published, attracted the attention of the learned, and very soon considerable light was thrown on the history, language, manners, and customs of ancient Assyria and Babylonia."—G. Smith, *Assyrian Discoveries*, ch. 1.—"One of the most important results of Sir A. H. Layard's explorations at Nineveh was the discovery of the ruined library of the ancient city, now buried under the mounds of Kouyunjik. The broken clay tablets belonging to this library not only furnished the student with an immense mass of literary matter,

but also with direct aids towards a knowledge of the Assyrian syllabary and language. Among the literature represented in the library of Kouyunjik were lists of characters, with their various phonetic and ideographic meanings, tables of synonymes, and catalogues of the names of plants and animals. This, however, was not all. The inventors of the cuneiform system of writing had been a people who preceded the Semites in the occupation of Babylonia, and who spoke an agglutinative language utterly different from that of their Semitic successors. These Accadians, as they are usually termed, left behind them a considerable amount of literature, which was highly prized by the Semitic Babylonians and Assyrians. A large portion of the Ninevite tablets, accordingly, consists of interlinear or parallel translations from Accadian into Assyrian, as well as of reading books, dictionaries, and grammars, in which the Accadian original is placed by the side of its Assyrian equivalent. . . . The bilingual texts have not only enabled scholars to recover the long forgotten Accadian language, they have also been of the greatest possible assistance to them in their reconstruction of the Assyrian dictionary itself. The three expeditions conducted by Mr. George Smith [1873-1876], as well as the later ones of Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, have added largely to the stock of tablets from Kouyunjik originally acquired for the British Museum by Sir A. H. Layard, and have also brought to light a few other tablets from the libraries of Babylonia."—A. H. Sayce, *Fresh Light from the Ancient Monuments*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: G. Rawlinson *Five Great Monarchies: The Second Monarchy*, ch. 9.—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity* bks 3-4.—See also, BABYLONIA; SEMITES; LIBRARIES, ANCIENT; EDUCATION, ANCIENT; MONEY AND BANKING.

ASSYRIA, Eponym Canon of.—"Just as there were archons at Athens and consuls at Rome who were elected annually, so among the Assyrians there was a custom of electing one man to be over the year, whom they called 'lumu,' or 'eponym'. . . . Babylonian and Assyrian documents were more generally dated by the names of these eponyms than by that of the reigning King. In 1862 Sir Henry Rawlinson discovered the fragment of the eponym canon of Assyria. It was one of the grandest and most important discoveries ever made, for it has decided definitely a great many points which otherwise could never have been cleared up. Fragments of seven copies of this canon were found, and from these the chronology of Assyria has been definitely settled from B. C. 1330 to about B. C. 620."—E. A. W. Budge, *Babylonian Life and History*, ch. 3.

ASTOLF, King of the Lombards, A. D. 749-759.

ASTRAKHAN: The Khanate. See MONGOLS. A. D. 1288-1391.

A. D. 1569.—Russian repulse of the Turks. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1569-1571.

ASTURIANS, The. See CANTABRIANS.

ASTURIAS: Resistance to the Moorish Conquest. See SPAIN: A. D. 713-737.

ASTY, OR ASTU, The.—The ancient city of Athens proper, as distinguished from its connected harbors, was called the Asty, or Asta.—J. A. St. John, *The Hellenes*, bk. 1, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: W. M. Leake, *Topography of Athens*, sect. 10.—See, also, ATHENS: AREA, &c.

later days.

modern conditions, the country of the Greeks gives no marked advantage to its inhabitants; but in the age of
aggles, when war among men was tribal, universal, and hand to hand, and when the larger possibilities of pacific
e were bounded by one small sea, its intersecting mountains, its separated valleys and plains, its penetrating gulfs
its clustered peninsulas in peninsulas, were helpful beyond measure to their social and political advance. In no
on of Europe could the independent city-states of ancient Hellas have grown up in shelter so safe, under skies so
aid influences from the outer world so urgent and so strong.

reasonable to say that these happy conditions had much to do with the shaping of the character and career of the
ople as a whole. But they differed very greatly from one another in their various political groups, and by differ-
t cannot be traced to varied surroundings of earth, or air, or sea, or human neighborhood. When every circumstance
distinguishes Athens in situation from Sparta, or from Corinth, or from Argos, has been weighed and reckoned, the
ls still parted from the Spartan, from the Corinthian and from the Argive, by a distinction which we name and do
in by calling it family or race.

me time in the unknown past, there had been a parting of kindred among the ancestors of the Greeks, and the
f descent ran, for many centuries, perhaps, in two clearly divided streams, which acquired (in what manner, who can
very different characteristics and qualities in their course. Then, in time, the great migrations, which are at the
g of the traditions of the Greeks, brought these two branches of the race (the Doric and the Ionic, as they are named)
ct again, and associated them in a common career. In the inherited nature of the Ionian Greeks there was some-
hich made them more sensitive to the finer delights of the mind, and prepared them to be more easily moved by every
toward philosophy and art, from the civilizations that were older than their own. In the Dorians there was less of
they shared in equal measure, perhaps, the keen, clear Greek intellect, but they narrowed it to commoner aims.
ossible that all which the Athenians came to be, their elder kindred, the Achaïans, might have been. Their peninsula
is is the peninsula of Attica in duplicate,—washed by the same waves, and reaching out to the same eastern world.
re first to touch hands with Phœnicia and with Egypt, and first to borrow arts and ideas from Memphis and Tyre. But
lization, which they had raised to the height which Homer portrays, was overwhelmed by the Doric conquest; and the
these invaders, succeeding to the same vantage ground, remained as poor in culture as the Argives and their final
the Spartans, appear to have been, gives evidence of the strange difference that was rooted in the constitution of the
ches of the race.

orce of this difference, the Spartans formed their state upon the grim lines of a military camp, and took leadership
the Greeks in practical affairs; the Athenians adorned a free city with great and beautiful works, made it hospitable
genius and all the knowledge of the time, and created a capital for the civilization of the ancient world.

all the Greek communities there was a primitive stage at which kings ruled over them in a patriarchal way. In most
the kingship surrendered to an oligarchy,—the oligarchy, in time, was overthrown by some bold adventurer, who
sing of the people and snatched power in the turmoil to make himself a "tyrant,"—and the tyrant in his turn fell,
long reign. In Athens, that course of revolution was run; but it did not end as with the rest. The Athenian tyranny
ay to the purest democracy that has ever had trial in the world.

at this Athenian democracy was wise in itself may be open to doubt; but it produced wise men, and, for the century of
career, it was wonderfully led. How far that came to it from superiority of race, and how far as the fruitage of free
ons, no man can say; but the succession of statesmen who raised Athens to her pitch of greatness, without shattering
ernment of the people by the people, has no parallel in the annals of so small a state.

rta, not Athens, was the military head of Greece; but when a great emergency came upon the whole Greek world, it
larger intelligence and higher spirit of the Attic state which inspired and guided the defence of the land and drove
sians back.

king prompt use of the ascendancy she had won in the Persian War, Athens rose rapidly in power and wealth. Under
se of a federation of the Ionian cities of the islands and of Asia Minor, she created an empire subject to her rule. She
aded the sea with superior fleets, and became first in commerce, as she was first in knowledge, in politics and in arts.
fers overran with the riches poured into them by her tribute-gatherers and her men of trade, and she employed them
noble prodigality upon her temples and the buildings of the state. Her abounding genius yielded fruits, in learning,
and art, which surpass the whole experience of the world, before and since, when measured against the smallness of
abers from which they came.

the power attained by the Athenian democracy was arrogantly and harshly used; its sovereignty was exercised
generosity or restraint. It provoked the hatred of its subjects, and the bitter jealousy of rival states. Hence war
time was inevitable, and Athens, alone in the war, was thrown down from her high estate. The last of the great
of her golden age died when her need of him was greatest, and her citizens were given over to demagogues who
d them to the ruin of the republic.

rta regained the supremacy in Greece, and her rude domination, imposed upon all, was harder to bear than the superi-
Athens had been. Under the lead of Epaminondas of Thebes—the most high-souled statesman who ever swayed
lenic race—the Spartan yoke was broken.

t, in breaking it, all unity in Hellas was destroyed, and all hope of resistance to any common foe. The foe who first
d was the half-Greek Macedonian, King Philip, who subdued the whole peninsula with ease, and found none to
it so heroically as the orator Demosthenes.

t the subjugated Greeks were not yet at the end of their career. With Philip's great son they went forth to a new
her destiny than the building of petty states. Unwittingly he made conquest of an empire for them, and not for him-

The Land.

Ionians and

Achalans.

Sparta.—A

B. C. 510.

Athenian c

B. C. 493—

The Persia

B. C. 477.

Confedera

B. C. 445—

Age of Pe

B. C. 431—

Peloponne

B. C. 404.

B. C. 379—

B. C. 338.

Macedoni

B. C. 334.

ASTYNOMI.—Certain police officials in ancient Athens, ten in number. "They were charged with all that belongs to street supervision, e. g., the cleansing of the streets, for which purpose the coprologi, or street-sweepers, were under their orders, the securing of morality and decent behaviour in the streets"—G F Schömann, *Antiq of Greece The State*, pt 3, ch 3.

ASUNCION: A. D. 1537.—The founding of the city. See PARAGUAY. A D 1515-1557.

ATABEGS, ATTABEGS, OR ATTABECKS.—"From the decline of the dynasty of Seljook to the conquest of Persia by Hulakoo Khan, the son of Chinghis, a period of more than a century, that country was distracted by the contests of petty princes, or governors, called Attabegs, who, taking advantage of the weakness of the last Seljookian monarchs, and of the distractions which followed their final extinction, established their authority over some of the finest provinces of the Empire. Many of these petty dynasties acquired such a local fame as, to this day, gives an importance to their memory with the inhabitants of the countries over which they ruled. The word Attabeg is Turkish: it is a compound word of 'atta,' master, or tutor, and 'beg' lord, and signifies a governor, or tutor, of a lord or prince"—Sir J

Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, v. 1, ch. 9—"It is true that the Atabeks appear but a short space as actors on the stage of Eastern history, but these 'tutors of princes' occupy a position neither insignificant nor unimportant in the course of events which occurred in Syria and Persia at the time they flourished"—W H Morley, *Preface to Mirkhond's Hist of the Atabeks*—See, also, SALADIN, THE EMPIRE OF.

ATAHUALPA, The Inca. See PERU. A D 1531-1533.

ATELIERS NATIONAUX OF 1848, AT PARIS. See FRANCE. A D 1848 (FEBRUARY—MAY) and (APRIL—DECEMBER).

ATHABASCA, The District of. See NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA.

ATHABASCANS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES ATHAPASCAN FAMILY.

ATHALAYAS. See SARDINIA, THE ISLAND. NAME AND EARLY HISTORY.

ATHEL.—ATHELING.—ATHEL-BONDE. See ADEL.

ATHENRY, Battle of.—The most desperate battle fought by the Irish in resisting the English conquest of Ireland. They were terribly slaughtered and the chivalry of Connaught was crushed. The battle occurred Aug. 10, A. D. 1316.—M Haverty, *Hist. of Ireland*, p. 282.

ATHENS.

The Preëminence of Athens.—"When we speak of Greece we think first of Athens.

To citizens and to strangers by means of epic recitations and dramatic spectacles, she presented an idealised image of life itself. She was the home of new ideas, the mother city from which poetry, eloquence, and philosophy spread to distant lands. While the chief dialects of Greece survive, each not as a mere dialect but as the language of literature,—a thing unknown in the history of any other people,—the Attic idiom, in which the characteristic elements of other dialects met and were blended, has become to us, as it did to the ancients, the very type of Hellenic speech. Athens was not only the 'capital of Greece,' the 'school of Greece,' it deserves the name applied to it in an epitaph on Euripides: 'his country is Athens, Greece of Greece.' The rays of the Greek genius here found a centre and a focus."—S H Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*, pp 38-39.—"Our interest in ancient history, it may be said, lies not in details but in large masses. It matters little how early the Arcadians acquired a political unity or what Nabis did to Mycenæ, that which interests us is the constitution of Athens, the repulse of Persia, the brief bloom of Thebes. Life is not so long that we can spend our days over the unimportant fates of uninteresting tribes and towns."

Area and Population.—"The entire circuit of the Asty [the lower city, or Athens proper], Long Walls and maritime city, taken as one in closure, is equal to about 17 English miles, or 148 stades. This is very different from the 200 stades which Dion Chrysostom states to have been the circumference of the same walls, an estimate exceeding by more than 20 stades even the sum of the peripheries of the Asty and Peiræic towns, according to the numbers of Thucydides. . . . Rome was circular, Syracuse

triangular and Athens consisted of two circular cities, joined by a street of four miles in length,—a figure, the superficies of which was not more than the fourth part of that of a city of an equal circumference, in a circular form. Hence, when to Rome within the walls were added suburbs of equal extent, its population was greater than that of all Attica. That of Athens, although the most populous city in Greece, was probably never greater than 200,000"—W M Leake, *Topography of Athens*, sect 10.


Ionian Origin. See DORIANS AND IONIANS.

The Beginning of the city-state.—How Attica was absorbed in its capital.—"In the days of Cecrops and the first kings [see ATTICA] down to the reign of Theseus, Attica was divided into communes, having their own town-halls and magistrates. Except in case of alarm the whole people did not assemble in council under the king, but administered their own affairs, and advised together in their several townships. Some of them at times even went to war with him, as the Eleusimians under Eumolpus with Erectheus. But when Theseus came to the throne, he, being a powerful as well as a wise ruler, among other improvements in the administration of the country, dissolved the councils and separate governments, and united all the inhabitants of Attica in the present city, establishing one council and town-hall. They continued to live on their own lands, but he compelled them to resort to Athens as their metropolis, and henceforward they were all inscribed in the roll of her citizens. A great city thus arose which was handed down by Theseus to his descendants, and from his day to this the Athenians have regularly celebrated the national festival of the Synœcia, or 'union of the communes' in honour of the goddess Athena. Before his time, what is now the Acropolis and the ground lying under it to the south was the



PLAN OF ATHENS

From "Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens, by Jane E Harrison and Margaret de G Verrall



HARBORS OF ATHENS.

city. Many reasons may be urged in proof of this statement."—Thucydides, *History* (Jowett's trans.), bk 2, sect 15.

Also in M. Dupeker, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 3, ch. 7 (v 2).

From the Dorian Migration to B. C. 683.—End of kingship and institution of the Archons.—At the epoch of the Boeotian and Dorian migrations (see GREEK THE MIGRATIONS), Attica was flooded by fugitives, both from the north and from the Peloponnesus. "But the bulk of the refugees passed on to Asia, and built up the cities of Ionia. When the swarms of emigrants cleared off and Athens is again discernable, the crown has passed from the old royal house of the Cecropidae to a family of exiles from Peloponnesus. A generation later the Dorian invasion, which had overwhelmed Corinth and torn away Megara from the Attic dominion, swept up to the very gates of Athens. An oracle declared that the city would never fall if its ruler perished by the hand of the invaders, therefore King Codrus disguised himself as a peasant, set out for the Dorian camp, struck down the first man he met, and was himself slain by the second. The invasion failed, and the Athenians, to perpetuate the memory of their monarch's patriotism, would not allow the title of 'king' to be borne by the descendants who succeeded him on the throne, but changed the name to 'archon,' or 'ruler'."

These legends evidently cover some obscure changes in the internal history of Attica.—C. W. C. Oman, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 11.—"After the death of Codrus the nobles, taking advantage, perhaps, of the opportunity afforded by the dispute between his sons, are said to have abolished the title of king, and to have substituted for it that of Archon. This change, however, seems to have been important, rather as it indicated the new, precarious tenure by which the royal power was held, than as it immediately affected the nature of the office. It was, indeed, still held for life, and Medon, the son of Codrus, transmitted it to his posterity. After twelve reigns, ending with that of Alcmaeon [B. C. 752], the duration of the office was limited to ten years; and through the guilt or calamity of Hippomenes, the fourth decennial archon, the house of Medon was deprived of its privilege, and the supreme magistracy was thrown open to the whole body of nobles. This change was speedily followed by one much more important. . . . The duration of the archonship was again reduced to a single year [B. C. 683], and, at the same time, its branches were severed and distributed among nine new magistrates. Among these, the first in rank retained the distinguishing title of the Archon, and the year was marked by his name. He represented the majesty of the state, and exercised a peculiar jurisdiction—that which had belonged to the king as the common parent of his people, the protector of families, the guardian of orphans and heiresses, and of the general rights of inheritance. For the second archon the title of king [basileus], if it had been laid aside, was revived, as the functions assigned to him were those most associated with ancient recollections. He represented the king as the high-priest of his people; he regulated the celebration of the mysteries and the most solemn festivals; decided all causes which affected the interests of religion. . . . The third

archon bore the title of Polemarch, and filled the place of the king as the leader of his people in war, and the guardian who watched over its security in time of peace. The remaining six archons received the common title of thesmothes, which literally signifies legislators, and was probably applied to them as the judges who determined the great variety of causes which did not fall under the cognizance of their colleagues, because, in the absence of a written code, those who declare and interpret the laws may be properly said to make them."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 11.—"We are in no condition to determine the civil classification and political constitution of Attica, even at the period of the Archonship of Kreon, 683 B. C., when authentic Athenian chronology first commences, much less can we pretend to any knowledge of the anterior centuries. . . . All the information which we possess respecting that old polity is derived from authors who lived after all or most of these great changes [by Solon, and later]—and who, finding no records, nor anything better than current legends, explained the foretime as well as they could by guesses more or less ingenious, generally attached to the dominant legendary names."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 10.

Also in G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece. The State*, pt. 3, ch. 3.—M. Dupeker, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 3, ch. 7 (v 2).

B. C. 624.—Under the Draconian Legislation.—"Drako was the first thesmothet, who was called upon to set down his thesmoi [ordinances and decisions] in writing, and thus to invest them essentially with a character of more or less generality. In the later and better-known times of Athenian law, we find these archons deprived in great measure of their powers of judging and deciding, and restricted to the task of first hearing of parties and collecting the evidence, next, of introducing the matter for trial into the appropriate dikastery, over which they presided. Originally, there was no separation of powers, the archons both judged and administered. . . . All of these functionaries belonged to the Eupatrids, and all of them doubtless acted more or less in the narrow interest of their order; moreover, there was ample room for favouritism in the way of connivance as well as antipathy on the part of the archons. That such was decidedly the case, and that discontent began to be serious, we may infer from the duty imposed on the thesmothet Drako, B. C. 624, to put in writing the thesmoi or ordinances, so that they might be 'shown publicly' and known beforehand. He did not meddle with the political constitution, and in his ordinances Aristotle finds little worthy of remark except the extreme severity of the punishments awarded: petty thefts, or even proved idleness of life, being visited with death or disfranchisement. But we are not to construe this remark as demonstrating any special inhumanity in the character of Drako, who was not invested with the large power which Solon afterwards enjoyed, and cannot be imagined to have imposed upon the community severe laws of his own invention. . . . The general spirit of penal legislation had become so much milder, during the two centuries which followed, that these old ordinances appeared to Aristotle intolerably rigorous."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 10 (v. 8).

B. C. 612-595.—Conspiracy of Cylon.—Banishment of the Alcmaeonids.—The first attempt at Athens to overturn the oligarchical government and establish a personal tyranny was made, B. C. 612, by Cylon (Kylon), a patrician, son-in-law of the tyrant of Megara, who was encouraged and helped in his undertaking by the latter. The conspiracy failed miserably. The partisans of Cylon, blockaded in the acropolis, were forced to surrender; but they placed themselves under the protection of the goddess Minerva and were promised their lives. More effectually to retain the protection of the goddess until their escape was effected, they attached a cord to her altar and held it in their hands as they passed out through the midst of their enemies. Unhappily the cord broke, and the archon Megacles at once declared that the safeguard of Minerva was withdrawn from them, whereupon they were massacred without mercy, even though they fled to the neighboring altars and clung to them. The treachery and bad faith of this cruel deed does not seem to have disturbed the Athenian people, but the sacrilege involved in it caused horror and fear when they had had time to reflect upon it. Megacles and his whole family—the Alcmaeonids as they were called, from the name of one of their ancestors—were held accountable for the affront to the gods and were considered polluted and accursed. Every public calamity was ascribed to their sin, and at length, after a solemn trial, they were banished from the city (about 596 or 595 B. C.), while the dead of the family were disinterred and cast out. The agitations of this affair exercised an important influence on the course of events, which opened the way for Solon and his constitutional reforms.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 10.

B. C. 610-586.—Struggle with Megara for Salamis.—Cirrhaean or First Sacred War.—"The petty state of Megara, which, since the earlier ages, had, from the dependent of Athens, grown up to the dignity of her rival, taking advantage of the internal dissensions in the latter city, succeeded in wresting from the Athenian government the isle of Salamis. It was not, however, without bitter and repeated struggles that Athens at last submitted to the surrender of the isle. But, after signal losses and defeats, as nothing is ever more odious to the multitude than unsuccessful war, so the popular feeling was such as to induce the government to enact a decree by which it was forbidden, upon pain of death, to propose reasserting the Athenian claims. . . . Many of the younger portion of the community, pining at the dishonour of their country, and eager for enterprise, were secretly inclined to countenance any stratagem that might induce the reversal of the decree. At this time there went a report through the city that a man of distinguished birth . . . had incurred the consecrating misfortune of insanity. Suddenly this person appeared in the market place, wearing the peculiar badge [a cap] that distinguished the sick. . . . Ascending the stone from which the heralds made their proclamations, he began to recite aloud a poem upon the loss of Salamis, boldly reproving the cowardice of the people, and inciting them again to war. His supposed insanity protected him from the law—his rank, reputation, and the circumstance of his being himself a

native of Salamis, conspired to give to his exhortation a powerful effect, and the friends he had secured to back his attempt loudly proclaimed their applauding sympathy with the spirit of the address. The name of the pretended madman was Solon, son of Exceestes, the descendant of Codrus. . . . The stratagem and the eloquence of Solon produced its natural effect upon his spirited and excitable audience, and the public enthusiasm permitted the oligarchical government to propose and effect the repeal of the law. An expedition was decreed and planned, and Solon was invested with its command. It was but a brief struggle to recover the little island of Salamis. . . . But the brave and resolute Megarians were not men to be disheartened by a single reverse; they persisted in the contest—losses were sustained on either side, and at length both states agreed to refer their several claims on the sovereignty of the island to the decision of Spartan arbiters. And this appeal from arms to arbitration is a proof how much throughout Greece had extended that spirit of civilisation which is but an extension of the sense of justice. . . . The arbitration of the umpires in favour of Athens only suspended hostilities; and the Megarians did not cease to watch (and shortly afterwards they found) a fitting occasion to regain a settlement so tempting to their ambition. The credit acquired by Solon in this expedition was shortly afterwards greatly increased in the estimation of Greece. In the Bay of Corinth was situated a town called Cirrha, inhabited by a fierce and lawless race, who, after devastating the sacred territories of Delphi, sacrilegiously besieged the city itself, in the desire to possess themselves of the treasures which the piety of Greece had accumulated in the Temple of Apollo. Solon appeared at the Amphictyonic council, represented the sacrilege of the Cirrhaeans, and persuaded the Greeks to arm in defence of the altars of their tutelary god [B. C. 595]. Cleisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon, was sent as commander-in-chief against the Cirrhaeans; and (according to Plutarch) the records of Delphi inform us that Alcmaeon was the leader of the Athenians. The war [known as the First Sacred War] was not very successful at the onset; the oracle of Apollo was consulted, and the answer makes one of the most amusing anecdotes of priestcraft. The besiegers were informed by the god that the place would not be reduced until the waves of the Cirrhaean Sea washed the territories of Delphi. The reply perplexed the army; but the superior sagacity of Solon was not slow in discovering that the holy intention of the oracle was to appropriate the lands of the Cirrhaeans to the profit of the temple. He therefore advised the besiegers to attack and to conquer Cirrha, and to dedicate its whole territory to the service of the god. The advice was adopted—Cirrha was taken [B. C. 586]; it became thenceforth the arsenal of Delphi, and the insulted deity had the satisfaction of seeing the sacred lands washed by the waves of the Cirrhaean Sea. . . . The Pythian games commenced, or were revived, in celebration of this victory of the Pythian god."—Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, *Athens: Its Rise and Fall*, bk. 2, ch. 1.—See, also, DELPHI.

B. C. 594.—The Constitution of Solon.—The Council of Four Hundred.—"Solon, Archon Ol. 46,1, was chosen mediator. Equity and moderation are described by the ancients as

the characteristics of his mind; he determined to abolish the privileges of particular classes, and the arbitrary power of officers, and to render all the participators in civil and political freedom equal in the eye of the law, at the same time ensuring to every one the integrity of those rights to which his real merits entitled him; on the other hand, he was far from contemplating a total subversion of existing regulations. . . . Whatever was excellent in prescription was incorporated with the new laws and thereby stamped afresh; but prescription as such, with the exception of some unwritten religious ordinances of the Eumolpids, was deprived of force. The law was destined to be the sole centre, whence every member of the political community was to derive a fixed rule of conduct"—Wachsmuth, *Historical Antiquities of the Greeks* sect 48 (v. 1)—"The factions, to allay the reviving animosities of which was Solon's immediate object, had, at that time, formed parties corresponding to the geographical division of the country, which we have already adverted to, the Pedieal, or inhabitants of the lowlands, insisted on a strict oligarchy, the Paralî, on the coast, who, did we not find the Alcmaeonid Megacles at their head, might be considered the wealthier portion of the people, wished for a mixed constitution, but the Diacrii or Hyperacrii [of the mountainous district] formed the great majority, who, in their impoverished state, looked for relief only from a total revolution. Solon might, had he so chosen, have made himself tyrant by heeding this populace, but he preferred acting as mediator, and with this view caused himself to be elected archon B C 594 as being an Eupatrid of the house of Codrus"—C F Hermann, *Manual of the Political Antiquities of Greece*, ch. 5, sect 106—"The chief power was vested in the collective people, but in order that it might be exercised with advantage it was necessary that they should be endowed with common rights of citizenship. Solon effected this by raising the lower class from its degradation, and by subjecting to legal control those who had till now formed the governing order, as well as by rendering the liberty of both dependent upon the law. . . . This change was brought about by two ordinances, which must not be regarded as mere remedies for the abuses of that period, but as the permanent basis of free and legal citizenship. The one was the Seisachtheia, this was enacted by Solon to afford relief to oppressed debtors, by reducing their debts in amount, and by raising the value of money in the payment of interest and principal; at the same time he abrogated the former rigorous law of debt by which the freeman might be reduced to servitude, and thus secured to him the unmolested possession of his legal rights. . . . A second ordinance enjoined, that their full and entire rights should be restored to all citizens who had incurred Atimia, except to absolute criminals. This was not only destined to heal the wounds which had been caused by the previous discussions, but as till that time the law of debt had been able to reduce citizens to Atimia, and the majority of the Atimoi pointed out by Solon were slaves for debt, that declaration stood in close connection with the Seisachtheia, and had the effect of a proclamation from the state of its intention to guarantee the validity of the new citizenship.

. . . The right of naturalization was granted by Solon to deserving aliens, when 6,000 citizens declared themselves in favour of the measure, but these new citizens were likewise deficient in a few of the privileges of citizenship. . . . The statement that Solon received a great many foreigners as citizens, and every artisan that presented himself, appears highly improbable, as Solon was the first legislator who systematically regulated the condition of the Metœci. The Metœci . . . probably took the place of the former Demiurgi; their position was one of sufferance, but the protection of the laws was guaranteed them. . . . The servile order, exclusively consisting of purchased aliens and their descendants, did not, as a body, stand in direct relation with the state, individual slaves became the property of individual citizens, but a certain number were employed by the state as clerks, etc., and were abandoned to the arbitrary pleasure of their oppressive taskmasters. . . . Those who were manumitted stood upon the footing of Metœci; the citizens who enfranchised them becoming their Prostatæ. . . . Upon attaining the age of puberty, the sons of citizens entered public life under the name of Ephebi. The state gave them two years for the full development of their youthful strength. . . . Upon the expiration of the second, and according to the most authentic accounts, in their eighteenth year, they received the shield and spear in the popular assembly, complete armour being given to the sons of those who had fallen in battle, and in the temple of Agrauios took the oath of young citizens, the chief obligations of which concerned the defence of their country, and then for the space of one or two years performed military service in the Attic border fortresses under the name of Peripoli. The ceremony of arming them was followed by enrolment in the book which contained the names of those who had attained majority; this empowered the young citizen to manage his own fortune, preside over a household, enter the popular assembly, and speak. When he asserted the last right, viz., the Isegoria, Parrhesia, he was denominated Rhetor, and this appellation denoted the difference between him and the silent member of the assembly, the Idiotæ. . . . Upon attaining his 30th year, the citizen might assert his superior rights; he was qualified for a member of the sworn tribunal entitled Heliaia. . . . The word Heliaist does not merely signify a judge, but the citizen who has fully attained maturity. . . . The judges of the courts of the Dietetæ and Ephetæ, which existed without the circle of the ordinary tribunals, were required to be still older men than the Heliastæ, viz., 50 or 60 years of age. Solon appointed gradations in the rights of citizenship, according to the conditions of a census in reference to offices of state. . . . Upon the principle of a conditional equality of rights, which assigns to every one as much as he deserves, and which is highly characteristic of Solon's policy in general, he instituted four classes according to a valuation; these were the Pentacosiomedimni [whose land yielded 500 measures of wheat or oil], the Hippeis [horsemen], the Zeugitæ [owners of a yoke of mules], and the Thetes [or laborers]. The valuation, however, only affected that portion of capital from which contributions to the state-burthens were required, consequently, according to

Böckh, a taxable capital . . . The Thetes the last of these classes, were not regularly summoned to perform military service, but only exercised the civic right as members of the assembly and the law-courts. . . the highest class exclusively supplied the superior offices, such as the archonship, and through this the council of the Areopagus. In lieu of the former council of administration, of which no memorial has been preserved Solon instituted a Council of four hundred citizens taken from the first three classes, 100 from every Phyle, of which no person under 30 years of age could be a member. The appointments were renewed annually, the candidates underwent an examination, and such as were deemed eligible drew lots."—W Wachsmuth, *Historical Antiquities of the Greeks*, sect 46-47 (v 1)

ALSO IN G F Schömann, *Antiq of Greece The State*, pt 3 ch 3, sect 4—E Abbott, *Hist of Greece*, pt 11, ch 3—G Grote, *Hist of Greece*, ch 11—Plutarch, *Solon*—Aristotle, *On the Const. of Athens* (tr. by E Poste), ch 5-13—See, also, AREOPAGUS, PRYTANES, HELIÆA, and DEBT

B. C. 560-510.—The tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.—"The constitution which he [Solon] framed was found to be insufficient even in his own life time. . . The poor citizens were still poor, in spite of the Seisachtheia and the reform of the constitution. At the same time the admission of the lowest class in the scale of property to the rights of Athenian citizenship, and the authority given to the General Assembly, had thrown a power into the hands of the masses which filled the more conservative citizens with resentment and alarm. And so the old party quarrels, which had divided Attica before the reforms of Solon, reappeared after them with even greater violence. The men of the plain were led by Miltiades, a grandson of the tyrant of Corinth, and Lycurgus, the son of Aristolaidas, the men of the shore by Megacles, the Alcmaeonid, who had recently strengthened the position of his family by his marriage with Agariste, the daughter of Cleisthenes of Sicyon. At the head of the mountaineers stood Pisistratus, a descendant of the royal stock of Nestor, who . . . had greatly distinguished himself in the Salaminian war. As he possessed property in the neighborhood of Marathon, Pisistratus may have been intimately known to the inhabitants of the adjacent hills. . . Solon watched the failure of his hopes with the deepest distress. He endeavoured to recall the leaders of the contending parties to a sense of their duty to the country, and to soothe the bitterness of their followers. With a true instinct he regarded Pisistratus as by far the most dangerous of the three. Pisistratus was an approved general, and the faction which he led was composed of poor men who had nothing to lose. . . Pisistratus met the vehement expressions of Solon by driving wounded into the market-place. The people's friend had suffered in the people's cause; his life was in danger. The incident roused the Athenians to an unusual exercise of political power. Without any previous discussion in the Council, a decree was passed by the people allowing Pisistratus to surround himself with a body-guard of fifty men, and to arm them with clubs. Thus protected, he threw off all disguises, and established himself in the Acropolis as tyrant of Athens [B. C. 560]. . .

Herodotus tells us that Pisistratus was a just and moderate ruler. He did not alter the laws or remove the existing forms of government. The Council was still elected, the Assembly continued to meet, though it is improbable that either the one or the other was allowed to extend its functions beyond domestic affairs. The archons still continued to be the executive magistrates of the city, and cases of murder were tried, as of old, at the Areopagus. The tyrant contented himself with occupying the Acropolis with his troops and securing important posts in the administration for his family or his adherents." Twice, however, Pisistratus was driven from power by the combination of his opponents, and into exile, for four years in the first instance and for ten years in the last, but Athens was compelled to accept him for a ruler in the end. "Pisistratus remained in undisturbed possession of the throne till his death in 527 B C. He was succeeded by his eldest son Hippias, with whom Hipparchus and Thessalus, his younger sons, were associated in the government." But these younger tyrants soon made themselves intolerably hateful, and a conspiracy formed against them by Harmodius and Aristogeiton was successful in taking the life of Hipparchus. Four years later, in 510 B C, with the help of Delphi and Sparta, Hippias was driven from the city. Cleisthenes, at the head of the exiled Alcmaeonids, was the master spirit of the revolution, and it was under his guidance that the Athenian democratic constitution was reorganized.—E Abbott, *Hist of Greece*, v 1, ch 15

ALSO IN G Grote, *Hist of Greece*, ch 11 and 80.

B. C. 510-507.—The constitution of Cleisthenes.—Advance of democracy.—"The expulsion of the Pisistratids left the democratical party, which had first raised them to power, without a leader. The Alcmaeonids had always been considered as its adversaries, though they were no less opposed to the faction of the nobles, which seems at this time to have been headed by Isagoras. . . Cleisthenes found himself, as his party had always been, unable to cope with it, he resolved, therefore, to shift his ground, and to attach himself to that popular cause which Pisistratus had used as the stepping stone of his ambition. His aims, however, were not confined to a temporary advantage over his rivals, he planned an important change in the constitution, which should forever break the power of his whole order, by dissolving some of the main links by which their sway was secured. For this purpose, having gained the confidence of the commonalty and obtained the sanction of the Delphic oracle, he abolished the four ancient tribes, and made a fresh geographical division of Attica into ten new tribes, each of which bore a name derived from some Attic hero. The ten tribes were subdivided into districts of various extent, called demes, each containing a town or village. . . Cleisthenes appears to have preserved the ancient phratries; but as they were now left insulated by the abolition of the tribes to which they belonged, they lost all political importance. . . Cleisthenes at the same time increased the strength of the commonalty by making a great many new citizens, and he is said to have enfranchised not only aliens—and these both residents and adventurers from abroad—but slaves. . . The whole frame of the state was reorganized to correspond

with the new division of the country. The Senate of the Four Hundred was increased to Five Hundred, that fifty might be drawn from each tribe, and the rotation of the presidency was adapted to this change, the fifty councillors of each tribe filling that office for thirty-five or thirty-six days in succession, and nine councillors being elected one from each of the other tribes to preside at the Council and the Assembly of the People, which was now called regularly four times in the month, certain business being assigned to each meeting. The *Heliæa* was also distributed into ten courts; and the same division henceforth prevailed in most of the public offices, though the number of the archons remained unchanged. To Cleisthenes also is ascribed the formal institution of the ostracism. . . . These changes, and the influence they acquired for their author, reduced the party of Isagoras to utter weakness, and they saw no prospect of maintaining themselves but by foreign aid." Isagoras, accordingly, applied for help to Cleomenes, one of the kings of Sparta, who had already interfered in Athenian affairs by assisting at the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ. Cleomenes responded by coming to Athens with a small force [B. C. 508], which sufficed to overawe the people, and, assuming dictatorial authority, he established Isagoras in power, with an attempted rearrangement of the government. "He began by banishing 700 families designated by Isagoras, and then proceeded to suppress the Council of the Five Hundred, and to lodge the government in the hands of Three Hundred of his friend's partisans. When, however, the councillors resisted this attempt, the people took heart, and, Cleomenes and Isagoras having occupied the citadel, rose in a body and besieged them there. As they were not prepared to sustain a siege, they capitulated on the third day. Cleomenes and Isagoras were permitted to depart with the Lacedæmonian troops, but they were compelled to abandon their adherents to the mercy of their enemies. All were put to death, and Cleisthenes and the 700 banished families returned triumphantly to Athens." Cleomenes soon afterwards raised a force with which to subdue Athens and restore Isagoras. The Athenians in their alarm sent an embassy to Sardis to solicit the protection of the Persians. Fortunately, nothing came of it, and Cleomenes was so much opposed in his project, by the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta, that he had to give it up.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 31.—E. Abbott, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 15.—Aristotle on the *Const. of Athens* (tr. by E. Poste), ch. 20-22.

B. C. 509-506.—Hostile undertakings of Cleomenes and Sparta.—Help solicited from the Persian king.—Subjection refused.—Failure of Spartan schemes to restore tyranny.—Protest of the Corinthians.—Successful war with Thebes and Chalcis.—"With Sparta it was obvious that the Athenians now had a deadly quarrel, and on the other side they knew that Hippias was seeking to precipitate on them the power of the Persian king. It seemed therefore to be a matter of stern necessity to anticipate the intrigues of their banished tyrant, and the Athenians accordingly sent ambassadors to Sardis to make an independent alliance with the Persian despot. The envoys, on being

brought into the presence of Artaphernes, the Satrap of Lydia, were told that Darius would admit them to an alliance if they would give him earth and water,—in other words, if they would acknowledge themselves his slaves. To this demand of absolute subjection the envoys gave an assent which was indignantly repudiated by the whole body of Athenian citizens. . . . Foiled for the time in his efforts, Cleomenes was not cast down. Regarding the Kleisthenian constitution as a personal insult to himself, he was resolved that Isagoras should be despot of Athens. Summoning the allies of Sparta [including the Bæotian League headed by Thebes, and the people of Chalcis in Eubœa], he led them as far as Eleusis, 12 miles only from Athens, without informing them of the purpose of the campaign. He had no sooner confessed it than the Corinthians, declaring that they had been brought away from home on an unrighteous errand, went back, followed by the other Spartan King, Demaratos, the son of Ariston; and this conflict of opinion broke up the rest of the army. This discomfiture of their enemy seemed to inspire fresh strength into the Athenians, who won a series of victories over the Boiotians and Euboians"—completely overthrowing the latter—the Chalcidians—taking possession of their city, and making it a peculiar colony and dependency of Athens.—See KLEOMENES. The anger of Cleomenes "on being discomfited at Eleusis by the defection of his own allies was heightened by indignation at the discovery that in driving out his friend Hippias he had been simply the tool of Kleisthenes and of the Delphian priestess whom Kleisthenes had bribed. It was now clear to him and to his countrymen that the Athenians would not acquiesce in the predominance of Sparta, and that if they retained their freedom, the power of Athens would soon be equal to their own. Their only safety lay, therefore, in providing the Athenians with a tyrant. An invitation was, therefore, sent to Hippias at Sigeion, to attend a congress of the allies at Sparta, who were summoned to meet on the arrival of the exiled despot." The appointed congress was held, and the Spartans besought their allies to aid them in humbling the Athenian Democracy, with the object of restoring Hippias to power. But again the Corinthians protested, bluntly suggesting that if the Spartans thought tyranny a good thing they might first try it for themselves. Hippias, speaking in his own behalf, attempted to convince them that the time was coming "in which they would find the Athenians a thorn in their side. For the present his exhortations were thrown away. The allies protested unanimously against all attempts to interfere with the internal administration of any Hellenic city, and the banished tyrant went back disappointed to Sigeion."—G. W. Cox, *The Greeks and the Persians*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 31 (v. 4).

B. C. 501-490.—Aid to Ionians against Persia.—Provocation of King Darius.—His wrath and attempted vengeance.—The first Persian invasions.—Battle of Marathon.—"It is undeniable that the extension of the Persian dominion over Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt gave a violent check to the onward movement of Greek life. On the other hand, it seemed as if the great

enterprise of Darius Hystaspis against the Scythians ought to have united the Greeks and Persians. It was of a piece with the general policy of Darius that, after defeating so many other adversaries, he undertook to prevent for all succeeding time a repetition of those inroads with which, some centuries before, the Scythians had visited Asia and the civilized world. He possessed authority enough to unite the different nations which obeyed his sceptre in a great campaign against the Scythians. . . . The Greeks were his best allies in his campaign, they built him the bridge by which he crossed the Bosphorus, and also the bridge of boats over the Danube by which he made his invasion into the enemy's territory. The result was not one which could properly be called unfortunate, yet it was certainly of a very doubtful character. . . . A great region, in which they had already obtained very considerable influence, was closed to them once more. The Persian army brought the populations upon the Strymon, many in number and individually weak, under the dominion of Persia, and even Amyntas, the king of Makedonia, one of a race of rulers of Greek origin, was compelled to do homage to the Great King. Thus the movement which had thrust back the Greeks from Egypt and Asia Minor made advances even into the regions of Europe which bordered upon Northern Hellas. It was an almost inevitable consequence of this that the Greeks were menaced and straitened even in their proper home. A pretext and opportunity for an attack upon the Greek islands was presented to the Persians by the questions at issue between the populations of the cities and the tyrants. The instrument by whom the crisis was brought about was not a person of any great importance. It is not always great natures, or natures strong in the consciousness of their own powers, that bring on such conflicts; this is sometimes the work of those flexible characters which, being at the point of contact between the opposing forces, pass from one side to the other. Such a character was Aristagoras of Miletus. . . . Morally contemptible, but gifted intellectually with a range of ideas of unlimited extent, Aristagoras made for himself an imperishable name by being the first to entertain the thought of a collective opposition to the Persians on the part of all the Greeks, even contemplating the possibility of waging a great and successful offensive war upon them. . . . He announced in Miletus his own resignation of power and the restoration to the people of their old laws. . . . A general overthrow of tyranny ensued [B. C. 501], involving a revolt from Persia, and Strategoi were everywhere appointed. The supreme power in the cities was based upon a good understanding between the holders of power and the Persians; the fact that one of these rulers found the authority of the Persians intolerable was the signal for a universal revolt. Aristagoras himself voluntarily renounced the tyranny, the other tyrants were compelled to take the same course; and thus the cities, assuming at the same time a democratic organization, came into hostility with Persia. . . . The cities and islands which had so often been forced to submission could not hope to resist the Persians by their own unaided efforts. Even Aristagoras could not have expected so much. . . . He visited Lakædæmon, the strongest of the Greek powers, in person, and en-

deavored to carry her with him in his plans. . . . Rejected by Sparta, Aristagoras betook himself to Athens. . . . The Athenians granted Aristagoras twenty ships, to which the Eretrians, from friendship to Miletus, added five more. The courage of the Ionians was thus revived, and an attack upon the Persian dominion commenced, directed, not indeed against Susa, but against Sardis, in their immediate neighborhood, the capital of the satrapy which imposed on them their heaviest burdens. . . . By the burning of Sardis, in which a sanctuary of Kybele had been destroyed, the Syriac nations had been outraged in the person of their gods. We know that it was part of the system of the Persians to take the gods of a country under their protection. Nor would the great king who thought himself appointed to be master of the world fail to resent an invasion of his dominions as an insult calling for revenge. The hostile attempts of the Ionians made no great impression upon him, but he asked who were the Athenians, of whose share in the campaign he had been informed. They were foreigners, of whose power the king had scarcely heard. . . . The enterprise of Aristagoras had meanwhile caused general commotion. He had by far the larger part of Cyprus, together with the Carians, on his side. All the country near the Propontis and the Hellespont was in revolt. The Persians were compelled to make it their first concern to suppress this insurrection, a task which, if attempted by sea, did not promise to be an easy one. In their first encounter with the Phœnicians the Ionians had the advantage. When, however, the forces of the great empire were assembled, the insurrection was everywhere put down. . . . It must be reckoned among the consequences of the battle of Lade, by which the combination against the Persian empire had been annihilated, that King Darius, not content with having consolidated his dominion in Ionia, once more resumed the plan of pushing forward into Europe, of which his enterprise against the Scythians formed part. With the execution of this project he commissioned one of the principal persons of the empire and the court, . . . Mardonius by name, whom he united to his family by marrying him to his daughter. . . . This general crossed the Hellespont with a large army, his fleet always accompanying him along the shore whilst he pushed on by the mainland. He once more subdued Makedonia, probably the districts which had not yet, like the Makedonian king, been brought into subjection, and gave out that his aim was directed against Eretria and Athens, the enemies of the king. . . . In the stormy waters near Mount Athos, which have always made the navigation of the Ægean difficult, his fleet suffered shipwreck. But without naval supports he could not hope to gain possession of an island and a maritime town situated on a promontory. Even by land he encountered resistance, so that he found it advisable to postpone the further execution of his undertakings to another time. . . . In order to subdue the recalcitrants, especially Athens and Eretria, another attempt was organized without delay. Under two generals, one of whom, Datis, was a Mede, the other, Artaphernes, the son of the satrap of Sardis of the same name, and brother of the Darius who was in alliance with Hippias, a maritime expedition was undertaken for the immediate subjugation of the

islands and the maritime districts. It was not designed for open hostility against the Greeks in general. . . . Their design was to utilize the internal dissensions of Greece in conquering the principal enemies upon whom the Great King had sworn vengeance, and presenting them as captives at his feet. The project succeeded in the case of Eretria. In spite of a brave resistance it fell by treachery into their hands, and they could avenge the sacrilege committed at Sardis by plundering and devastating Grecian sanctuaries. They expected now to be able to overpower Athens also without much trouble.

. . . It was a circumstance of great value to the Athenians that there was a man amongst them who was familiar with the Persian tactics. This was Miltiades, the son of Kimon. Although a Thracian prince, he had never ceased to be a citizen of Athens. Here he was impeached for having held a tyranny, but was acquitted and chosen strategus, for the democracy could not reject a man who was so admirably qualified to be at their head in the interchange of hostilities with Persia. Miltiades was conducting his own personal quarrel in undertaking the defence of Attica. The force of the Persians was indeed incomparably the larger, but the plans of Marathon, on which they were drawn up, prevented their proper deployment, and they saw with astonishment the Athenian hoplites displaying a front as extended as their own. These troops now rushed upon them with an impetus which grew swifter at every moment. The Persians easily succeeded in breaking through the centre of the Athenian army, but that was of no moment, for the strength of the onset lay in the two wings, where now began a hand to hand fight. The Persian sword, formidable elsewhere, was not adapted to do good service against the bronze armor and the spear of the Hellenes. On both flanks the Athenians obtained the advantage, and now attacked the Persian centre, which was not able to withstand the onslaught of men whose natural vigor was heightened by gymnastic training. The Persians, to their misfortune, had calculated upon desertion in the ranks of their opponents, foiled in this hope, they retreated to the shore and to their ships. Herodotus intimates that the Persians had secret intelligence with a party in Athens, and took their course round the promontory of Sunium toward the city, in the hope of surprising it. But when they came to anchor the Athenians had arrived also, and they saw themselves once more confronted by the victors of Marathon."—L. von Ranke, *Universal History*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: Herodotus, *History*, bk. 6.—V. Duruy, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 16 (v. 2).—See, also, PERSIA, B. C. 521-493, and GREECE: B. C. 492-491, and 490.

B. C. 489-480.—**Condemnation and death of Miltiades.**—The *Æginetan war*.—Naval power created by Themistocles.—"The victory of Marathon was chiefly due to Miltiades; it was he who brought on the engagement, and he was chief in command on the day when the battle was fought. Such a brilliant success greatly improved his position in the city, and excited in his enemies a still deeper hatred. Ever on the watch for an opportunity to pull down their rival, it was not long before they found one. Soon after his victory, Miltiades came before the Athenians with a request that a

squadron of 70 ships might be placed at his disposal. The purpose for which he required them he would not disclose, though pledging his word that the expedition would add largely to the wealth and prosperity of the city. The request being granted, he sailed with the ships to Paros, an island which at this time was subject to Persia. From the Parians he demanded 100 talents, and when they refused to pay he blockaded the city. So vigorous and successful was the resistance offered that, after a long delay, Miltiades, himself dangerously wounded, was compelled to return home. His enemies, with Xanthippus at their head at once attacked him for misconduct in the enterprise. . . . Miltiades was unable to reply in person, he was carried into court, while his friends pleaded his cause. The sentence was given against him, but the penalty was reduced from death to a fine of 50 talents. So large a sum was more than even Miltiades could pay, he was thrown into prison as a public debtor, where he soon died from the mortification of his wound. . . . His condemnation was one in a long series of similar punishments. The Athenians never learnt to be just to those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and errors of judgment. . . . We have very little information about the state of Athens immediately after the battle of Marathon. So far as we can tell, for the chronology is most uncertain, she was now engaged in a war with Ægina. . . . Meanwhile, a man was rising to power, who may be said to have created the history of Athens for the rest of the century,—Themistocles, the son of Neocles. . . . On the very day of Marathon, Themistocles had probably made up his mind that the Persians would visit Greece again. What was to keep them away, so long as they were masters of the Ægean? . . . With an insight almost incredible he perceived that the Athenians could become a maritime nation, that Athens possesses harbours large enough to receive an enormous fleet, and capable of being strongly fortified; that in possession of a fleet she could not only secure her own safety, but stand forth as a rival power to Sparta. But how could Themistocles induce the Athenians to abandon the line in which they had been so successful for a mode of warfare in which even Miltiades had failed? After the fall of the great general, the conduct of affairs was in the hands of Xanthippus . . . and Aristides. . . . They were by no means prepared for the change which Themistocles was meditating. This is more especially true of Aristides. He had been a friend of Clisthenes; he was known as an admirer of Spartan customs. . . . He had been second in command at Marathon, and was now the most eminent general at Athens. From him Themistocles could only expect the most resolute opposition. Xanthippus and Aristides could reckon on the support of old traditions and great connections. Themistocles had no support of the kind. He had to make his party. . . . Conscious of their own position, Aristides and Xanthippus looked with contempt upon the knot of men who began to gather round their unmannerly and uncultivated leader. And they might, perhaps, have maintained their position if it had not been for the Æginetan war. That unlucky struggle had begun, soon after the reforms of Clisthenes, with an unprovoked attack of the Æginetans on the

coast of Attica (506 B. C.), [Ægina being allied with Thebes in the war mentioned above—B. C. 509-506]. It was renewed when the Æginetans gave earth and water to the heralds of Darius in 491, and though suspended at the time of the Persian invasion, it broke out again with renewed ferocity soon afterwards. The Æginetans had the stronger fleet, and defeated the Athenian ships. "Such experiences naturally caused a change in the minds of the Athenians. . . . It was clear that the old arrangements for the navy were quite inadequate to the task which was now required of them. Yet the leaders of the state made no proposals." Themistocles now "came forward publicly with proposals of naval reform, and, as he expected, he drew upon himself the strenuous opposition of Aristides. . . . It was clear that nothing decisive could be done in the Æginetan war unless the proposals of Themistocles were carried; it was equally clear that they never would be carried while Aristides and Xanthippus were at hand to oppose them. Under these circumstances recourse was had to the safety-valve of the constitution. Ostracism was proposed and accepted; and in this manner, by 483 B. C., Themistocles had got rid of both of his rivals in the city. He was now master of the situation. The only obstacle to the realization of his plans was the expense involved in building ships. And this he was able to meet by a happy accident, which brought into the treasury at this time a large surplus from the silver mines from Laurium. . . . By the summer of 480, the Athenians . . . were able to launch 180 vessels, besides providing 20 for the use of the Chalcidians of Eubœa. . . . At the same time Themistocles set about the fortification of the Peiræus. . . . Could he have carried the Athenians with him, he would have made the Peiræus the capital of the country, in order that the ships and the city might be in close connection. But for this the people were not prepared."—E. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: Plutarch, *Aristides*.—*Themistocles*.

B. C. 481-479.—Congress at Corinth.—Organized Hellenic Union, under the headship of Sparta. See GREECE: B. C. 481-479.

B. C. 480-479.—The second Persian invasion.—Thermopylæ, Artemisium, Salamis, Platæa.—Abandonment of the City.—"The last days of Darius were clouded by the disaster of Marathon; 'that battle formed the turning point of his good fortune,' and it would seem that the news of it led to several insurrections, particularly that of Egypt; but they were soon put down. Darius died (Olymp. 73, 3), and Xerxes, who succeeded him, was prevented from taking revenge on the Athenians by the revolt of Egypt, which engaged his attention during the first years of his reign. But he completely conquered the insurgents after they had maintained themselves about four or five years; and he then made preparations for that vengeance on Athens for which his barbarian pride was longing. The account of the three years' preparations of Xerxes, how he assembled his army in Asia Minor, how he made a bridge across the Hellespont, how he cut a canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos to prevent his fleet being destroyed by storms—all this is known to every one who has read Herodotus. History is here so much interwoven with poetry, that they can no longer

be separated. . . . The Greeks awaited the attack (Olymp. 75, 1), 'but they were not agreed among themselves. The Argives from hatred of Sparta joined the Persians, and the miserable Boeotians likewise supported them. The others kept together only from necessity; and without the noble spirit of the Athenians Greece would have been lost, and that from the most paltry circumstances. A dispute arose as to who was to be honoured with the supreme command; the Athenians gave way to all, for their only desire was to save Greece. Had the Persians moved on rapidly, they would have met with no resistance, but they proceeded slowly, and matters turned out differently.' A Greek army was encamped at Tempe, at the entrance of Thessaly, and at first determined on defending Thessaly. But they must have seen that they could be entirely surrounded from Upper Thessaly; and when they thus discovered the impossibility of stopping the Persians, they retreated. The narrative now contains one inconceivable circumstance after another. . . . It is inconceivable that, as the Greeks did make a stand at Thermopylæ, no one else took his position there except King Leonidas and his Spartans, not including even the Lacedæmonians, for they remained at home! Only 1,000 Phocians occupied the heights, though that people might surely have furnished 10,000 men; 400 of the Boeotians were posted in the rear, as a sort of hostages, as Herodotus remarks, and 700 Thespians. Where were all the rest of the Greeks? . . . Countless hosts are invading Greece; the Greeks want to defend themselves, and are making active preparations at sea; but on land hundreds of thousands are met by a small band of Peloponnesians, 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans as hostages, and 1,000 Phocians, stationed on the heights! A pass is occupied, but only that one, and the others are left unguarded. . . . All this is quite unintelligible; it would almost appear as if there had been an intention to sacrifice Leonidas and his men; but we cannot suppose this. These circumstances alone suggest to us, that the numbers of the Persian army cannot have been as great as they are described; but even if we reduce them to an immense extent, it still remains inconceivable why they were not opposed by greater numbers of the Greeks, for as afterwards they ventured to attack the Persians in the open field, it was certainly much more natural to oppose them while marching across the hills. But however this may be, it is an undoubted fact, that Leonidas and his Spartans fell in the contest, of which we may form a conception from the description of Herodotus, when after a resistance of three days they were surrounded by the Persians. A few of the Spartans escaped on very excusable grounds, but they were so generally despised, that their life became unendurable, and they made away with themselves. This is certainly historical. . . . After the victory of Thermopylæ all Hellas lay open before the Persians, and they now advanced towards Athens, a distance which they could march in a few days. Thebes opened her gates, and joyfully admitted them from hatred of Athens. 'Meantime a portion of the army appeared before Delphi. It is almost inconceivable that the Persians did not succeed in taking the temple. . . . The miracles by which the temple is said to have been saved, are repeated in the same manner during the attack of

the Gauls. But the temple of Delphi was certainly not plundered'. . . The city of Athens had in the meantime been abandoned by all the people; the defenceless had taken refuge in the small island of Salamis, or of Troezen, 'and all the Athenians capable of bearing arms embarked in the fleet.' . . . The Persians thus took Athens without any resistance. . . . During the same days on which the battle of Thermopylae was fought, the Greek fleet was engaged in two indecisive but glorious battles near the promontory of Artemisium. 'In a third the Persians gained the upper hand, and when the Greeks at the same time heard of the defeat at Thermopylae, they withdrew, and doubling Cape Sunium sailed towards Salamis.' God sent them a storm whereby the Persians in their pursuit suffered shipwreck. . . . While the Greek fleet was stationed in the channel between the island of Salamis and Attica, towards Piraeus, discord broke out among the Greeks. The Peloponnesians thought only of themselves; they had fortified the Isthmus; there they were assembled, and there they wanted to offer resistance to the Persians. In their folly they forgot, that if the enemy with his superior fleet, should turn against Peloponnesus, they might land wherever they liked. . . . But Themistocles now declared, that all the hopes of the Athenians were directed towards the recovery of their own city, that, if the Peloponnesians should sacrifice them, and, thinking of themselves only, should abandon Attica to the barbarians, the Athenians would not be so childish as to sacrifice themselves for them, but would take their women and children on board their ships, and sail far away from the Persians to the island of Sardinia, or some other place where Greek colonies were established, that there they would settle as a free people, and abandon Peloponnesus to its fate; and that then the peninsula would soon be in the hands of the enemy. This frightened the Peloponnesians, and they resolved to stand by Athens. It is evident that, throughout that time, Themistocles had to struggle with the most intolerable difficulties, which the allies placed in his way, as well as with their jealousy, meanness, and insolence. 'The rudeness of the Spartans and Corinthians is nowhere more strongly contrasted with the refinement of the Athenians, than on that occasion.' But after he had tried everything, and overcome by every possible means a hundred different difficulties, he yet saw, that he could not rely on the perseverance of the Peloponnesians, and that they would turn to the Isthmus as soon as Xerxes should proceed in that direction. He accordingly induced the Persian king, by a false message, to surround the Greek fleet, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Peloponnesians. He declared himself ready to deliver the whole of the Greek fleet into his hands. This device was quite to the mind of the Persians; Xerxes believed him, and followed his advice. When Themistocles was thus sure of the Peloponnesians, the ever-memorable battle of Salamis commenced, which is as certainly historical as that of Cannae, or any modern battle, 'whatever the numbers may be.' The battle proceeded somewhat in the manner of the battle of Leipzig: when the issue was decided, a portion of those who ought to have joined their countrymen before, made common cause with the Greeks. . . . Their accession increased the victory of the Greeks. . . . Certain as the battle of Salamis is, all the accounts

of what took place after it, are very doubtful. This much is certain, that Xerxes returned, 'leaving a portion of his army under Mardonius in Greece;'. . . Winter was now approaching, and Mardonius withdrew from ravaged Attica, taking up his winter-quarters partly in Thessaly and partly in Boeotia. . . . The probability is, that the Athenians remained the winter in Salamis in sheds, or under the open sky. Mardonius offered to restore to them Attica uninjured, so far as it had not already been devastated, if they would conclude peace with him. They might at that time have obtained any terms they pleased, if they had abandoned the common cause of the Greeks, and the Persians would have kept the peace; for when they concluded treaties they observed them; they were not faithless barbarians. But on this occasion again, we see the Athenian people in all its greatness and excellence; it scorned such a peace, and preferred the good of the Peloponnesians. . . . Mardonius now again advanced towards Athens; the Spartans, who ought to have proceeded towards Cithaeron, had not arrived, and thus he again took possession of Attica and ravaged it completely. At length, however (Olymp 75, 2), the Athenians prevailed upon the Peloponnesians to leave the Isthmus, and they gradually advanced towards Boeotia. There the battle of Plataeae was fought. . . . In regard to the accounts of this battle, it is historically certain that it was completely won by the Greeks, and that the remnants of the Persian army retreated without being vigorously pursued. It must have reached Asia, but it then disappears. It is also historically certain, that Pausanias was the commander of the allied army of the Greeks. . . . After their victory, the Greeks advanced towards Thebes. In accordance with a vow which they had made before the war, Thebes ought to have been destroyed by the Greeks. But their opinions were divided. On the same day on which the battle of Plataeae was fought, the allied Greeks gained a complete victory at sea. . . . After this victory of Mycale, the Ionian cities revolted against the Persians"—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, v 1, lects 37 and 38.

Also in: Herodotus, *History*; trans. and ed. by H. Rawlinson, bk 7 (v. 4)—Plutarch, *Themistocles*—G. W. Cox, *The Greeks and Persians*.

B. C. 479-478.—Protection of Ionia assumed.—Siege and capture of Sestus.—Rebuilding and enlargement of the city and its walls.—Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.—"The advantages obtained by the Hellenes [in their war with Persia] came upon them so unexpectedly as to find them totally unprepared, and accordingly embarrassed by their own victories. What was to be done with Ionia? Was the whole country to be admitted into the Hellenic confederation? Too great a responsibility would, in the opinion of the Peloponnesians, be incurred by such a step. . . . It would be better to sacrifice the country, and establish the Ionians in settlements in other parts, at the expense of those who had favoured the Medes, i. e., of the Argives, Boeotians, Locrians, and Thessalians. . . . The Athenians, on the other hand, espoused the cause of the cities. . . . Ionia ought to be a bulwark against the Barbarians, and to belong to the Hellenes. . . . The Athenians found a support in the feeling

prevalent among the Ionians, who were naturally opposed to any forced settlement. Accordingly, in the first instance, Samos, Lesbos, Chios, and a number of other island-towns, were admitted into the confederation . . . and a new Hellas was formed, a Greek empire comprehending both sides of the sea. Considerations of caution made it necessary, above all, to secure the passage from Asia to Europe, for it was universally believed that the bridge over the Hellespont was either still in existence or had been restored. When it was found to have been destroyed, the Peloponnesians urged the termination of the campaign. The Athenians, on the other hand, declared themselves resolved . . . not to leave unfinished what they had begun. Sestus, the strongest fortress on the Hellespont, ought not to be left in the hands of the enemy, an attack on it ought to be risked without delay, before the city had prepared for a siege. They allowed the Peloponnesians to take their departure, and under the command of Xanthippus united with the ships of the Ionians and Hellespontians for the purpose of new undertakings. The Persians in Sestus resisted obstinately enduring a long siege, but were forced to surrender at last. "Meanwhile, the main point consisted in the Athenians having remained alone in the field, in their having fraternized with the Ionians as one naval power, and having after such successes attained to a confidence in victory, to which no enterprise any longer seemed either too distant or too difficult. Already they regarded their city as the centre of the coast-lands of Greece. But what was the condition of this city of Athens itself? A few fragments of the ancient city wall, a few scattered houses, which had served the Persian commanders as their quarters, were yet standing; the rest was ashes and ruins. After the battle of Plataeæ the inhabitants had returned from Salamis, Troezen, and Ægina, not even the fleet and its crews were at hand to afford them assistance. They endeavoured to make shift as best they could, to pass through the trials of the winter. As soon as the spring arrived, the restoration of the city was commenced with all possible activity. . . . But even now it was not the comforts of domesticity which occupied their thoughts, but, above all, the city as a whole and its security. To Themistocles, the founder of the port-town, public confidence was in this matter properly accorded." It was not possible "to carry out a new and regular plan for the city; but it was resolved to extend its circumference beyond the circle of the ancient walls, . . . so as to be able, in case of a future siege, to offer a retreat to the country-population within the capital itself. . . . But the Athenians were not even to be permitted to build their walls undisturbed; for, as soon as their grand plan of operations became known, the envy and insidious jealousy of their neighbours broke out afresh. . . . The Peloponnesian states, above all Ægina and Corinth, hastened to direct the attention of Sparta to the situation of affairs. . . . As at Sparta city walls were objected to on principle, and as no doubts prevailed with regard to the fact that a well-fortified town was impregnable to the military art of the Peloponnesians, it was actually resolved at any price to prevent the building of the walls in Attica." But, for shame's sake, the interference undertaken by Sparta was put upon the ground that in the event of a future

invasion of the country, only the peninsula could be successfully defended; that central Greece would necessarily be abandoned to the enemy, and that every fortified city in it would furnish him a dangerous base. "At such a crisis craft alone could be of avail. When the Spartans made their imperious demand at Athens, Themistocles ordered the immediate cessation of building operations, and with assumed submissiveness, promised to present himself at Sparta, in order to pursue further negotiations in person. On his arrival there, he allowed one day after the other to go by, pretending to be waiting for his fellow envoys." In the meantime, all Athens was toiling night and day at the walls, and time enough was gained by the audacious duplicity of Themistocles to build them to a safe height for defence. "The enemies of Athens saw that their design had been foiled, and were forced to put the best face upon their discomfiture. They now gave out that they had intended nothing beyond good advice"—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk 3, ch 2 (r 2).

ALSO IN G. W. Cox, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 2, ch. 7-8 (r 1-2).

B. C. 478-477.—Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta.—Formation of the Confederacy of Delos.—The founding of Athenian Empire. See GREECE B. C. 478-477.

B. C. 477-462.—Constitutional gains for the democracy.—Ascendency of Aristides.—Declining popularity and ostracism of Themistocles.—The sustentation of the commons.—The stripping of power from the Areopagus.—At the time when the Confederacy of Delos was formed, "the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula . . . were not less anxious to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Cos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Miletus and Byzantium. . . . Some sort of union, organised and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed, even with that aid, at the time when the Confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out, especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without. Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias." Pausanias, whose treasonable intrigues with the Persian king began at Byzantium (See GREECE: B. C. 478-477) was convicted some nine or ten years later, and suffered a terrible fate, being shut within a temple to which he had fled, and starved. "His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistocles. . . . The charge [against Themistocles] of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties. . . . The rivalry of Themistocles and Aristides had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of

coöperation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistokles stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristides is commander of the fleet and first organiser of the Confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistokles as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact. . . . From henceforth the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. . . . The triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover, the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. . . . The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. 'The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,' and instruments of the new vocation at Athens as head of the Delian Confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognised political inequalities. . . . Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenian constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest; no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded when we find that it was proposed by Aristides. . . . The popularity thus ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian Confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistokles, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathising with Aristides. . . . Of these the chief were Kimon [Cimon], (son of Miltiades), and Alkibiades. In 471 B. C. Themistokles was sent into exile by a vote of ostracism, and retired to Argos. Five years later he was accused of complicity in the treasonable intrigues of Pausanias, and fled to the court of the Persian king, where he spent the remainder of his days. Aristides died about three or four years after

the ostracism of Themistokles."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 44 (p. 5).—The constitutional effects of the Persian war, and the political situation of Athens immediately after the war, are represented somewhat differently from the account above, in the lately discovered work on the Constitution of Athens which is attributed to Aristotle. The following is quoted from one of the translations of the latter: "After the Median war the council of Areopagus [See AREOPAGUS] recovered strength and ruled the state, not that any law conferred the hegemony on them, but because the aristocratic party had the credit of the victory at Salamis. For when the generals had despaired of the country and proclaimed a *saue qui peut*, the Areopagus raised funds, gave every man eight drachmas (6s. 6d.) and induced them to man the ships. In consequence of this public service the Ecclesia yielded the ascendancy to the Areopagus, and public affairs were admirably administered during the following epoch. For they acquired the art of war, made their name honoured throughout the Hellenic world, and possessed themselves of the sovereignty of the sea with the consent of Lakedaimon. At this time the leaders of the commons were Aristides, son of Lusimachos, and Themistokles, son of Neokles; the latter studious of the arts of war, the former reputed eminent in statesmanship and honest beyond his contemporaries; which characters made their countrymen employ the one as a general, the other as a councillor. The rebuilding of the walls of Athens was their joint work, though they were otherwise at feud. The detachment of the Ionians from Persia and the formation of an alliance with Sparta were due to the counsels of Aristides, who seized the opportunity afforded by the discredit cast on the Lakonians by the conduct of Pausanias. He too originally apportioned, two years after the battle of Salamis, in the archonship [of Timosthenes (478 B. C.)], the contribution to be paid by the islanders. . . . Subsequently, when lofty thoughts filled every bosom and wealth was accumulating, Aristides advised them to administer the hegemony with their own hands, to leave their country occupations and fix their domicile in the city. Sustentation, he promised, would be provided for all, either as soldiers or sailors in active service, or as troops in garrison or as public servants; and then they could increase the vigour of their imperial sway. They followed his advice, and, taking the rule into their own hands, reduced their allies to the position of vassals, except the Chians, Lesbians, and Samians, whom they kept as satellites of their power, and permitted to retain their own constitutions and to rule their own dependencies: and they provided for their own sustentation by the method which Aristides indicated; for in the end the public revenues, the taxes and the tributes of the allies gave maintenance to more than 20,000. There were 6,000 dicasts or jurors, 1,600 archers, 1,200 cavalry, 500 senators, 500 soldiers of the dockyard garrison, 50 city guards, 700 home magistrates, 700 foreign magistrates, 2,500 heavy armed soldiers (this was their number at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war), 4,000 sailors manning 20 guardships, 2,000 sailors appointed by lot, manning 20 tribute-collecting ships, and in addition to these the Prutaneion, the orphans, the gaolers; and all

these persons were maintained at the expense of the national treasury. The sustentation of the commons was thus secured. The 17 years which followed the Median war were about the period during which the country continued under the ascendancy of the Areopagus though its aristocratic features were gradually on the wane. When the masses had grown more and more preponderant Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, reputed incorruptible in his loyalty to democracy, became leader of the commons and began to attack the Areopagus. First, he put to death many of its members by impeaching them of offences committed in their administration. Afterwards in the archonship of Konon (462 B. C.) he despoiled the council itself of all its more recently acquired attributes which were the keystone of the existing constitution, and distributed them among the Senate of 500, the Ecclesia and the courts of law. In this work he had the co-operation of Themistokles, who was himself an Areopagite, but expecting to be impeached for treasonable correspondence with Persia. Ephialtes and Themistokles kept accusing the Areopagus before the Senate of 500 and again before the commons, till finally they stripped it of all its principal functions. The assassination of Ephialtes by the instrumentality of Aristodikos of Tanagra followed not long after. Such were the circumstances of the overthrow of the Areopagus. After this the degradation of the constitution proceeded without intermission from the eagerness of politicians to win popular favour and at the same time there happened to be no organizer of the aristocratic party, whose head, Kimon, the son of Miltiades, was too young for some years to enter political life, besides which their ranks were much devastated by war. Expeditionary forces were recruited by conscription, and as the generals had no military experience and owed their appointment to the reputation of their ancestors, each expedition entailed the sacrifice of 2,000 or 3,000 lives, chiefly of the noblest sons of Athens, whether belonging to the wealthy classes or to the commons.—Aristotle, *On the Constitution of Athens* (tr. by E. Poste) ch. 23-26.—On the above, Dr. Abbott comments as follows: "So much of this account as refers to Themistokles may be at once dismissed as unhistorical. If the evidence of Thucydides is to count for anything, it is quite certain that Themistokles finally left Greece for Persia about 466 B. C. Plutarch says not a word about Themistokles. But the remainder of the account [of the attack on the Areopagus] is supported by all our authorities—if indeed it is not merely repeated by them"—E. Abbott, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 11, sect. 5.

Also in J. P. Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History* p. 96.—Plutarch, *Themistokles*.

See, also, below B. C. 466-454.

B. C. 470-466.—Continued war against the Persians.—Kimon's victories at the Eurymedon.—Revolt and subjugation of Naxos.—"Under the guidance of Athens, the war against the Persians was continued. Kimon [Kimon] sailed with a fleet to the coast of Thrace, and laid siege to Eion on the Strymon [B. C. 470]. The Persian garrison made a gallant defence; and finally Boges, the governor, rather than surrender, cast all his gold and silver into the river; and, having raised a huge pile of wood,

slew his wives, children and slaves, and laid their bodies on it, then setting fire to it, he flung himself into the flames. The garrison surrendered at discretion. Doriscus was attacked in vain, but all the other Persian garrisons in Europe were reduced. Kimon then, as executor of an Amphictyonic decree, turned his arms against the piratic Dolopians of the Isle of Scyros, whom he expelled, and filled the island with Athenian colonists. On this occasion he sought and found (as was supposed) the bones of the hero Theseus, who had died in this island 800 years before, and he brought them in his own trireme to Athens,—an act which gained him great favour with the people. By this time some of the confederates were grown weary of war, and began to murmur at the toils and expense to which it put them. The people of Naxos were the first who positively refused to contribute any longer, but the Athenians, who had tasted of the sweets of command, would not now permit the exercise of free will to their allies. Kimon appeared (Ol. 78, 3) [B. C. 466] with a large fleet before Naxos, the Naxians defended themselves with vigour, but were at length forced to submit, and the Athenians had the hardihood to reduce them to the condition of subjects to Athens—an example which they soon followed in other cases.

After the reduction of Naxos Kimon sailed over to the coast of Asia and learning that the Persian generals had assembled a large fleet and army in Pamphylia, he collected a fleet of 200 triremes at Knidos with which he proceeded to the coast of that country, and laid siege to the city of Phaselis, which, though Greek, obeyed the Persian monarch. Having reduced it to submission he resolved to proceed and attack the Persian fleet and army which he learned were lying at the river Eurymedon. On his arrival, the Persian fleet, of 350 triremes, fearing at first to fight till 80 Phoenician vessels, which they were expecting should come up, kept in the river, but finding that the Greeks were preparing to attack, they put out to sea and engaged them. The action did not continue long. The Barbarians fled to the land, 200 ships fell into the hands of the victors, and several were destroyed. Without a moment's delay, Kimon disembarked his men, and led them against the land forces. The resistance of the Persians was obstinate for some time, but at last they turned and fled, leaving their camp a prey to the conquerors, and Kimon had thus the rare glory of having gained two important victories in the one day. Hearing then that the 80 Phoenician vessels were at Hydros, in the Isle of Cyprus, he immediately sailed thither and took or destroyed the whole of them. The victory on the Eurymedon may be regarded as the termination of the conflict between Greece and Persia. The year after it (Ol. 78, 4) [B. C. 465], Xerxes was assassinated, and the usual confusion took place in the court of Susa."—T. Keightley, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 1, ch. 18.

Also in W. W. Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, ch. 27 (v. 1).

See also PERSIA. B. C. 486-405.

B. C. 466-454.—Leadership in the Delian confederacy changed to sovereignty.—Revolt and subjugation of Thasos.—Help to Sparta and its ungracious requital.—Fall and exile of Kimon.—Rise of Pericles and the democratic anti-Spartan policy.—Removal of the

federal treasury from Delos.—Building the Long Walls.—"It was now evident to the whole body of the allies of Athens that by joining the league they had provided themselves with a mistress rather than a leader. . . . Two years after the reduction of Naxos another powerful island-state broke out into rebellion against the supremacy of Athens. The people of Thasos had from very early times possessed territory on the mainland of Thrace opposite to their island. By holding this coast-strip they engrossed the trade of the Valley of the Strymon, and held the rich gold mines of Mount Pangæus. But the Athenians, after the capture of Eion, set themselves to develop that port as the commercial centre of Thrace. . . . A spot called 'The Nine Ways,' where that great river first begins to broaden out into its estuary, but can still be spanned by a bridge, was the chosen site of a fortress to secure the hold of Athens on the land. But the native Thracian tribes banded themselves together, and fell upon the invaders with such desperation that . . . the Athenian armies were defeated. . . . It was probably the discouragement which this defeat caused at Athens that emboldened Thasos to declare her secession from the Confederacy of Delos. She wished to save her Thracian trade, before Athens could make another attempt to divert it from her. The Thasians did not rely on their own resources alone, they enlisted the Thracians and Macedonians of the mainland, and sent to Sparta to endeavour to induce the ephors to declare war on Athens." The Spartans were well disposed to take up the cause of the Thasians, but at that moment they were overwhelmed by the calamity of the frightful Earthquake of 464, instantly followed by the rising of the Helots and the third Messenian war (See **MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD**). "The island-state was therefore left to its own resources; and these were so considerable that she held out against the force of the Athenian confederacy for two whole years. She was obliged at last to surrender to Cimon [B. C. 463], whose army had long been lying before her walls. Like Naxos, she was punished for her defection by the loss of her war fleet and her fortifications, and the imposition of a fine of many talents. Still more galling must have been the loss of her trade with Thrace, which now passed entirely into Athenian hands. . . . The Spartans were still engaged in a desperate struggle with their revolted subjects when the siege of Thasos came to an end. Cimon, who was now at the height of his reputation and power, saw with distress the troubles of the city he so much admired. He set himself to persuade the Athenians that they ought to forego old grudges, and save from destruction the state which had shared with them the glory of the Persian war. . . . His pleading was bitterly opposed by the anti-Spartan party at Athens, headed by two statesmen, Ephialtes and Pericles, who had already come into notice as antagonists of Cimon. But the more generous and unwise policy prevailed, and 4,000 hoplites were sent to the aid of Sparta [B. C. 462]. This army was pursued by misfortune, it was so unsuccessful in attacking Ithome that the Spartans attributed its failure to ill will rather than ill luck. They, therefore, began to treat their allies with marked discourtesy, and at last sent

them home without a word of thanks, merely stating that their services could be of no further use [See **MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD**]. This rudeness and ingratitude fully justified the anti-Spartan party at Athens. Cimon was now no longer able to deal with the policy of the state as he chose, and the conduct of affairs began to pass into the hands of men whose foreign and domestic policy were alike opposed to all his views. Ephialtes and Pericles proceeded to form alliances abroad with all the states which were ill disposed toward Sparta, and at home to commence a revision of the constitution. They were determined to carry out to its furthest logical development the democratic tendency which Cleisthenes had introduced into the Athenian polity. Of Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides, comparatively little is known. But Pericles . . . was the son of Xanthippus, the accuser of Miltiades in 489, B. C., and the victor of Mycale and Sestos, while, on his mother's side, he came of the blood of the Alcmaeonidae. Pericles was staid, self-contained, and haughty—a strange chief for the popular party. But his relationship to Cleisthenes, and the enmity which existed between his house and that of Cimon, urged him to espouse the cause of democracy. . . . While Cimon had Greece in his mind, Pericles could only think of Athens, and the temper of the times was favourable to the narrower policy. . . . The first aim which Pericles and Ephialtes set before themselves was the cutting down of the power of the Areopagus [See above: B. C. 477-462]. That body had since the Persian war become the stronghold of the Conservative and philo-Laconian party. . . . Ephialtes took the lead in the attack on the Areopagus. He chose a moment when Cimon was away at sea, bent on assisting a rebellion against the Great King which had broken out in Egypt. After a violent struggle, he succeeded in carrying a law which deprived the Areopagus of its ancient censorial power, and reduced it to a mere court to try homicides. . . . When Cimon came home from Egypt he was wildly enraged. . . . Recourse was had to the test of ostracism. It decided against Cimon, who therefore went into banishment [B. C. 459]. But this wrong against the greatest general of Athens was, not long after, avenged by an over-zealous and unscrupulous friend. Ephialtes was slain by assassins in his own house. . . . The immediate result of this murder was to leave Pericles in sole and undivided command of the democratic party. The foreign policy of Pericles soon began to involve Athens in troubles at home. He concluded alliances with Argos and Thessaly, both states at variance with Sparta, and thereby made a collision with the Lacedæmonian confederacy inevitable. He gave still more direct offence to Corinth, one of the most powerful members of that confederacy, by concluding a close alliance with Megara. . . . In Boeotia, too, he stirred up enmity, by giving an active support to the democratic party in that country. These provocations made a war inevitable. In 458 B. C. the storm burst. . . . At the moment of the outbreak of the first important naval war which she had to wage with a Greek enemy since the formation of her empire, Athens took two important steps. The first was destined to guard against the risk of misfortunes by sea; it consisted in the transference from Delos to Athens

[dated by different authorities between 461 and 454 B. C.] of the central treasury of the confederacy. . . . It was not long before the Athenians came to regard the treasury as their own, and to draw upon it for purely Attic needs, which had no connection with the welfare of the other confederates. . . . The second important event of the year 458 B. C. was the commencement of the famous 'Long Walls' of Athens [See LONG WALLS]. . . . When they were finished Athens, Peiræus, and Phalerum, formed the angles of a vast fortified triangle, while the space between them, a considerable expanse of open country, could be utilized as a place of refuge for the population of Attica, and even for their flocks and herds."—C. W. C. Oman, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 23-24.

Also in E. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens*, ch. 5-6.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 17 (v. 3).—Plutarch, *Cimon*; *Pericles*.

B. C. 460-449.—Disastrous expedition to Egypt.—Attacks on the Peloponnesian Coast.—Recall of Cimon.—His last enterprise against the Persians.—The disputed Peace of Cimon or Callias.—Five years truce with Sparta.—"Inarus, king of some of the Libyan tribes on the western border of Egypt, had excited an insurrection there against the Persians [about 460 B. C.], and his authority was acknowledged throughout the greater part of the country. Artaxerxes sent his brother Achæmenes with a great army to quell this rebellion. An Athenian armament of 200 galleys was lying at the time off Cyprus, and Inarus sent to obtain its assistance. The Athenian commanders, whether following their own discretion, or after orders received from home, quitted Cyprus, and having joined with the insurgents, enabled them to defeat Achæmenes, who fell in the battle by the hand of Inarus. They then sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where a body of Persians, and some Egyptians, who still adhered to their cause were in possession of one quarter of the city, called White Castle. The rest was subject to Inarus, and there the Athenians stationed themselves, and besieged the Persians. . . . Artaxerxes sent a Persian, named Megabazus, to Sparta, with a sum of money, to be employed in bribing the principal Spartans to use their influence, so as to engage their countrymen in an expedition against Attica. Megabazus did not find the leading Spartans unwilling to receive his money; but they seem to have been unable to render him the service for which it was offered. Ithome still held out: and Sparta had probably not yet sufficiently either recovered her strength or restored internal tranquility, to venture on the proposed invasion. Some rumours of this negotiation may have reached Athens, and have quickened the energy with which Pericles now urged the completion of the long walls. . . . But among his opponents there was a faction who viewed the progress of this great work in a different light from Cimon, and saw in it, not the means of securing the independence of Athens, but a bulwark of the hated commonalty. They too would have gladly seen an invading army in Attica, which might assist them in destroying the work and its authors." This party was accused of sympathy with the Spartan expedition which came to the help of Doris against the Phocians in 457 B. C., and which defeated the Athenians at Tanagra (See GREECE: B. C. 458-

456). In 455, "the Spartans were reminded that they were also liable to be attacked at home. An Athenian armament of 50 galleys, and, if we may trust Diodorus, with 4,000 heavy armed troops on board, sailed round Peloponnesus under Tolmides, burnt the Spartan arsenal at Gythium, took a town named Chalcis belonging to the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians, who attempted to oppose the landing of the troops. But the most important advantage gained in the expedition was the capture of Naupactus, which belonged to the Ozolian Locrians, and now fell into the hands of the Athenians at a very seasonable juncture. The third Messenian war had just come to a close. The brave defenders of Ithome had obtained honourable terms. . . . The besieged were permitted to quit Peloponnesus with their families, on condition of being detained in slavery if they ever returned. Tolmides now settled the homeless wanderers in Naupactus. . . . But these successes were counterbalanced by a reverse which befel the arms of Athens this same year in another quarter. After the defeat of Achæmenes, Artaxerxes, disappointed in his hopes of assistance from Sparta, . . . raised a great army, which he placed under the command of an abler general, Megabazus, son of Zopyrus. Megabazus defeated the insurgents and their allies, and forced the Greeks to evacuate Memphis, and to take refuge in an island of the Nile, named Prosopitis, which contained a town called Byblus, where he besieged them for 18 months. At length he resorted to the contrivance of turning the stream. . . . The Greek galleys were all left aground, and were fired by the Athenians themselves, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands. The Persians then marched into the island over the dry bed of the river: the Egyptians in dismay abandoned their allies, who were overpowered by numbers and almost all destroyed. . . . Inarus himself was betrayed into the hands of the Persians and put to death. . . . Egypt . . . was again reduced under the Persian yoke, except a part of the Delta, where another pretender, named Amyrtaeus, who assumed the title of king . . . maintained himself for several years against the power of the Persian monarchy. But the misfortune of the Athenians did not end with the destruction of the great fleet and army which had been first employed in the war. They had sent a squadron of 50 galleys to the relief of their countrymen, which, arriving before the news of the recent disaster had reached them, entered the Mendesian branch of the Nile. They were here surprised by a combined attack of the Persian land force and a Phoenician fleet, and but few escaped to bear the mournful tidings to Athens. Yet even after this calamity we find the Athenians, not suing for peace, but bent on extending their power, and annoying their enemies." Early in 454 they sent an expedition into Thessaly, to restore a ruler named Orestes, who had been driven out. "But the superiority of the Thessalians in cavalry checked all their operations in the field; they failed in an attempt upon Pharsalus, and were at length forced to retire without having accomplished any of their ends. It was perhaps to soothe the public disappointment that Pericles shortly afterwards embarked at Pegæ with 1,000 men, and, coasting the south side of the Corinthian gulf made a

descent on the territory of Sicyon, and routed the Sicyon force sent to oppose his landing. He then . . . laid siege to the town of Ceniadæ. . . . This attempt, however, proved unsuccessful; and the general result of the campaign seems not to have been on the whole advantageous or encouraging . . . It seems to have been not long after the events which have been just related that Cimon was recalled from his exile; and the decree for that purpose was moved by Pericles himself;—a fact which seems to intimate that some change had taken place in the relations or the temper of parties at Athens. . . . The three years next following Cimon's return, as we have fixed its date [B. C. 454 or 453], passed, happily for his contemporaries, without affording any matter for the historian, and this pause was followed by a five years' truce [with Sparta], in the course of which Cimon embarked in his last expedition, and died near the scene of his ancient glory. The pretender Amyrtæus had solicited succour from the Athenians. . . . Cimon was appointed to the command of a fleet of 200 galleys, with which he sailed to Cyprus, and sent a squadron of 60 to the assistance of Amyrtæus, while he himself with the rest laid siege to Citium. Here he was carried off by illness, or the consequences of a wound; and the armament was soon after compelled, by want of provisions, to raise the siege. But Cimon's spirit still animated his countrymen, who, when they had sailed away with his remains, fell in with a great fleet of Phœnician and Cilician galleys, near the Cyprian Salamis, and, having completely defeated them, followed up their naval victory with another which they gained on shore, either over the troops which had landed from the enemy's ships, or over a land force by which they were supported. After this they were joined by the squadron which had been sent to Egypt, and which returned, it would appear, without having achieved any material object, and all sailed home (B. C. 449). In after-times Cimon's military renown was enhanced by the report of a peace [sometimes called the Peace of Cimon, and sometimes the Peace of Callias], which his victories had compelled the Persian king to conclude on terms most humiliating to the monarchy. Within less than a century after his death it was, if not commonly believed, confidently asserted, that by this treaty, negotiated, as it was supposed, by Callias, son of Hipponicus, the Persians had agreed to abandon at least the military occupation of Asia Minor, to the distance of three days journey on foot, or one on horseback, from the coast, or, according to another account, the whole peninsula west of the Helles, and to abstain from passing the mouth of the Bosphorus and the Chelidonian islands, on the coast of Lycia, or the town of Phaselis, into the Western Sea. The mere silence of Thucydides on so important a transaction would be enough to render the whole account extremely suspicious." —C. Thirlwall *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 17 (v. 3). Mr. Grote accepts the Peace of Cimon as an historical fact; Prof. Curtius rejects it. —G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 45 (v. 5). —E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 3, ch. 2 (v. 2).

B. C. 458-456.—War for Megara with Corinth and Egina.—Victories of Myronides.—Siege and conquest of Egina.—Collision with the Spartans in Bœotia.—Defeat at Tanagra.

—Overthrow of the Thebans.—Recovered Ascendency. See GREECE B. C. 458-456.

B. C. 449-445.—Hostile revolution in Bœotia.—Defeat at Coroneia.—Revolt of Eubœa and Megara.—The thirty years' truce.—Territorial losses.—Spartan recognition of the Delian Confederacy. See GREECE B. C. 449-445.

B. C. 445-431.—Supremacy of Pericles and the popular arts by which he attained it.—The splendor of Athens and grandeur of the Athenian Empire under his rule.—"The conclusion of peace left the Athenians to their confederacy and their internal politics. . . . After the death of Cimon the oligarchical party at Athens had been led by Thucydides, the son of Melesias, a man of high character and a kinsman of Cimon. . . . Hitherto the members had sat here or there in the assembly as they pleased; now they were combined into a single body, and sat in a special place. Such a consolidation was doubtless needed if the party was to hold its own against Pericles, who was rapidly carrying all before him. For years past he had provided a subsistence for many of the poorer citizens by means of his numerous colonies—no fewer than 5 000 Athenians must have been sent out to the 'cleruchies' in the interval between 453 B. C. and 444 B. C. The new system of juries [See DICASTERIA] had also been established on the fall of the Areopagus, and the jurymen were paid—a second source of income to the poor. Such measures were beyond anything that the private liberality of Cimon—splendid as it was—could achieve; and on Cimon's death no other aristocrat came forward to aid his party with his purse. Pericles did not stop here. Since the cessation of the war with Persia there had been fewer drafts on the public purse, and the contributions of the allies were accumulating in the public treasury. A scrupulous man would have regarded the surplus as the money of the allies. . . . Pericles took another view. He plainly told the Athenians that so long as the city fulfilled the contract made with the allied cities, and kept Persian vessels from their shores, the surplus was at the disposal of Athens. Acting on this principle, he devoted a part of it to the embellishment of the city. With the aid of Pheidias, the sculptor, and Ictinus, the architect, a new temple began to rise on the Acropolis in honour of Athena—the celebrated Parthenon or 'Virgin's Chamber' [See PARTHENON]. . . . Other public buildings were also begun about this time. Athens was in fact a vast workshop, in which employment was found for a great number of citizens. Nor was this all. . . . For eight months of the year 60 ships were kept at sea with crews on board, in order that there might be an ample supply of practical seamen. . . . Thus by direct or indirect means Pericles made the state the paymaster of a vast number of citizens, and the state was practically himself, with these paid citizens at his back. At the same time the public festivals of the city were enlarged and adorned with new splendour. . . . That all might attend the theatre in which the plays were acted, Pericles provided that every citizen should receive from the state a sum sufficient to pay the charge demanded from the spectators by the lessee [See DIOROLY]. We may look on these measures as the arts of a demagogue. . . . Or we may say that Pericles

was able to gratify his passion for art at the expense of the Athenians and their allies. Neither of these views is altogether untenable, and both are far from including the whole truth. Pericles . . . was, if we please to say it, a demagogue and a connoisseur. But he was something more. Looking at the whole evidence before us with impartial eyes, we cannot refuse to acknowledge that he cherished aspirations worthy of a great statesman. He sincerely desired that every Athenian should owe to his city the blessing of an education in all that was beautiful, and the opportunity of a happy and useful life.

The oligarchs determined to pull down Pericles, if it were possible. . . . They proposed, in the winter of 445 B. C., that there should be an ostracism in the city. The people agreed, and the usual arrangements were made. But when the day came for decision, in the spring of 444 B. C. the sentence fell, not on Pericles, but on Thucydides. The sentence left no doubt about the feeling of the Athenian people, and it was accepted as final. Thucydides disappeared from Athens, and for the next fifteen years Pericles was master of the city.

While Athens was active organizing her confederacy and securing her communication with the north, the Peloponnesians had allowed the years to pass in apathy and inattention. At length they awoke to a sense of the situation. It was clear that Athens had abandoned all idea of war with Persia, and that the confederacy of Delos was transformed into an Athenian empire, of whose forces the great city was absolutely mistress. And meanwhile in visible greatness Athens had become far the first city in Greece.—E. Abbott, *Pericles*, ch. 10-11.—“A rapid glance will suffice to show the eminence which Athens had attained over the other states of Greece. She was the head of the Ionian League—the mistress of the Grecian seas, with Sparta, the sole rival that could cope with her armies and arrest her ambition, she had obtained a peace. Corinth was humbled—Ægina ruined—Megara had shrunk into her dependency and garrison. The states of Bœotia had received their very constitution from the hands of an Athenian general—the democracies planted by Athens served to make liberty itself subservient to her will, and involved in her safety. She had remedied the sterility of her own soil by securing the rich pastures of the neighbouring Eubœa. She had added the gold of Thasos to the silver of Laurion, and established a footing in Thessaly which was at once a fortress against the Asiatic arms and a mart for Asiatic commerce. The fairest lands of the opposite coast—the most powerful islands of the Grecian seas—contributed to her treasury, or were almost legally subjected to her revenge. . . . In all Greece, Myronides was perhaps the ablest general—Pericles . . . was undoubtedly the most highly educated, cautious and commanding statesman. . . . In actual possession of the tribute of her allies, Athens acquired a new right to its collection and its management, and while she devoted some of the treasures to the maintenance of her strength, she began early to uphold the prerogative of appropriating a part to the enhancement of her splendour. . . . It was now [about B. C. 444] resolved to make Athens also the seat and centre of the judicial authority. The subject-allies were compelled, not on minor, at least on all important cases,

to resort to Athenian courts of law for justice. And thus Athens became, as it were, the metropolis of the allies. . . . Before the Persian war, and even scarcely before the time of Cimon, Athens cannot be said to have eclipsed her neighbours in the arts and sciences. She became the centre and capital of the most polished communities of Greece, and she drew into a focus all the Grecian intellect; she obtained from her dependents the wealth to administer the arts, which universal traffic and intercourse taught her to appreciate, and thus the Odeon, and the Parthenon, and the Propylæa arose. During the same administration, the fortifications were completed, and a third wall, parallel and near to that uniting Piræus with Athens consummated the works of Themistocles and Cimon, and preserved the communication between the two fold city, even should the outer walls fall into the hands of an enemy.”—E. G. Bulwer Lytton, *Athens: Its Rise and Fall*, bk. 4, ch. 5, bk. 5, ch. 2.


ALSO IN: W. W. Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, —Plutarch, *Pericles*.

B. C. 445-429.—The Age of Pericles: Art.

—“The Greeks . . . were industrious, commercial, sensitive to physical and moral beauty, eager for discussion and controversy, they were proud of their humanity, and happy in the possession of their poets, their historians, their orators and artists. It is singular, in the history of nations, to meet with a people distinguished at once by mercantile aptitude, and by an exquisite feeling and sympathy for works of art, to see the vanity of wealth compatible with a nice discernment for the true principles of taste, to behold a nation, inconstant in ideas, inconceivably fickle in prejudice, worshipping a man one day and proscribing him the next, yet at the same time progressing with unheard of rapidity, within the space of a few years, traversing all systems of philosophy, all forms of government, laying the foundations of all sciences, making war on all its neighbors, yet, in the midst of this chaos of ideas, systems, and passions, developing art steadily and with calm intelligence, giving to it novelty, originality, and beauty, while preserving it pure from the aberrations and caprices of what we now call fashion. At the time of the battle of Salamis, 480 B. C., Athens had been destroyed, its territory ravaged, and the Athenians had nothing left but their ships, yet so great was the activity of this commercial but artistic people, that, only twenty years afterwards, they had built the Parthenon.”—E. E. Viollet-le-Duc, *Discourses on Architecture*, p. 66.

B. C. 445-429.—The Age of Pericles: Domestic life.—The Athenian house.—“For any one coming from Asia it seemed as if in entering Athens he was coming into an ant's nest. Possessing, at the epoch of its greatest power, the three ports of Munychia, Phalerum and the Piræus, it covered a district whose circumference measured two hundred stadia (twenty-four miles). But it was around the Acropolis that the houses were crowded together and the population always in activity. There wagons were passing to and fro, filled with merchandise from the ports or conveying it thither. The streets and public places in which people passed their lives presented a busy and noisy scene. Strangers, who came to buy or to sell, were continually entering or leaving the shops and places of manufacture, and slaves were carrying messages or

burdens. Women as well as men were to be seen in the streets, going to the markets, the public games and the meetings of corporate bodies. From the earliest hours of the day large numbers of peasants might be seen bringing in vegetables, fruit and poultry, and crying their wares in the streets. Houses of the higher class occupied the second zone; they generally possessed a garden and sometimes outbuildings of considerable extent. Around them were to be seen clients and parasites, waiting for the hour when the master should make his appearance; and while away the time discussing the news of the day, repeating the rumours, true or false, that were current in the city; getting the slaves to talk, and laughing among themselves at the strangers that happened to be passing, or addressing them with a view to make fun of their accent, garb or dress. The house of Chremylus, recently built in that second zone, was a subject of remark for all the idlers. Chremylus, who had lately become wealthy by means of commerce, and of certain transactions of more or less creditable character in the colonies, was an object of envy and criticism to most people, and of admiration for some who did justice to his intelligence and energy. He enjoyed a certain degree of influence in the public assemblies — thanks to his liberality; while he took care to secure the good graces of the archons and to enrich the temples.



PLAN OF ATHENIAN HOUSE.

We have [in the accompanying figure] the ground-plan of the residence of this Athenian citizen. The entrance x opens on the public road. The site is bounded on either side by narrow streets. This entrance x opens on the court O, which is surrounded by porticos. At A is the porter's lodge, and at B the rooms for the slaves, with kitchen at C and latrines at a.

From this first court, in the centre of which is a small fountain with a basin which receives the rain water, the passage D leads into the inner court E, which is larger and is likewise surrounded by porticos. At G is the reception room, at H the strong room for valuables, and at S the private altar. At F is a large storeroom containing provisions and wine; and at I the small dining room (triclinium); the cooking-room for the family being at J with latrines at b. The large triclinium is at K. The passage m admits to the gynæceum, containing the bedrooms P along the portico M, a common room for the women, with its small enclosed garden, and closets at e. The quarters for visitors are entered by the passage t, and consist of bedrooms V, a portico T, a small garden and closets f. At d is an opening into the lane for the servants, when required. The gardens extend in the direction Z. This house is situated on the slopes of the hill which to the south-west looks towards the Acropolis; thus it is sheltered from the violent winds which sometimes blow from this quarter. From the large dining-hall and from the terrace L, which adjoins it, there is a charming prospect; for, above the trees of the garden is seen the city overlooked by the Acropolis, and towards the left the hill of the Areopagus. From this terrace L there is a descent to the garden by about twelve steps. The position was chosen with a view to protection against the sun's heat and the troublesome winds. From the portico of the gynæceum are seen the hills extending towards the north, covered with houses surrounded by olive-trees; and in the background Mount Pentellicus. . . . In the dwelling of Chremylus the various departments were arranged at the proprietor's discretion, and the architect only conformed to his instructions. Thus the front part of the house is assigned to the external relations of the owner. In this court O assemble the agents or factors who come to give an account of the commissions they have executed, or to receive orders. If the master wishes to speak to any of them, he takes him into his reception room; his bedchamber being at R, he can easily repair to that reception-room or to the gynæceum reserved for the women and younger children. If he entertains friends, they have their separate apartments, which are shut off, not being in communication with the first court except through the passage t. All that part of the habitation which is beyond the wide entrance-hall D is consecrated to domestic life; and only the intimate friends of the family are admitted into the second court; for example, if they are invited to a banquet, — which is held in the great hall K. The master usually takes his meals with his wife and one or two members of his family who live in the house, in the smaller room I, the couches of which will hold six persons; whereas fifteen guests can be accommodated on the couches of the great hall K. Chremylus has spared nothing to render his house one of the most sumptuous in the city. The columns of Pentelican marble support architraves of wood, surmounted by friezes and cornices overlaid with stucco and ornamented with delicate painting. Everywhere the walls are coated with fine smooth plaster, adorned with paintings; and the ceilings are of timber artistically wrought and coloured." —E. Viollet-le-Duc, *The Habitations of Man in all Ages*, ch. 17.

B. C. 445-429.—The Age of Pericles: Law and its Administration.—Contrast with the Romans.—"It is remarkable that the 'equality' of laws on which the Greek democracies prided themselves—that equality which, in the beautiful drinking song of Callistratus, Harmodius and Aristogiton are said to have given to Athens—had little in common with the 'equity' of the Romans. The first was an equal administration of civil laws among the citizens, however limited the class of citizens might be, the last implied the applicability of a law, which was not civil law, to a class which did not necessarily consist of citizens. The first excluded a despot, the last included foreigners, and for some purposes slaves. There are two special dangers to which law, and society which is held together by law, appear to be liable in their infancy. One of them is that law may be too rapidly developed. This occurred with the codes of the more progressive Greek communities, which disembarassed themselves with astonishing facility from cumbrous forms of procedure and needless terms of art, and soon ceased to attach any superstitious value to rigid rules and prescriptions. It was not for the ultimate advantage of mankind that they did so, though the immediate benefit conferred on their citizens may have been considerable. One of the rarest qualities of national character is the capacity for applying and working out the law as such, at the cost of constant miscarriages of abstract justice, without at the same time losing the hope or the wish that law may be conformed to a higher ideal. The Greek intellect, with all its nobility and elasticity, was quite unable to confine itself within the strait waistcoat of a legal formula; and, if we may judge them by the popular courts of Athens, of whose working we possess accurate knowledge, the Greek tribunals exhibited the strongest tendency to confound law and fact. The remains of the Orators and the forensic commonplaces preserved by Aristotle in his *Treatise on Rhetoric*, show that questions of pure law were constantly argued on every consideration which could possibly influence the mind of the judges. No durable system of jurisprudence could be produced in this way. A community which never hesitated to relax rules of written law whenever they stood in the way of an ideally perfect decision on the facts of particular cases, would only, if it bequeathed any body of judicial principles to posterity, bequeath one consisting of the ideas of right and wrong which happened to be prevalent at the time. Such jurisprudence would contain no framework to which the more advanced conceptions of subsequent ages could be fitted. It would amount at best to a philosophy, marked with the imperfections of the civilisation under which it grew up. . . . The other liability to which the infancy of society is exposed has prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of primitive law, arising chiefly from its earlier association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their usages were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity, and *erastia* from these stocks have fertilised a few

modern societies; but it is still true that, over the larger part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the ground plan supposed to have been marked out by the original legislator. If intellect has in such cases been exercised on jurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts without discoverable departure from their literal tenour. I know no reason why the law of the Romans should be superior to the laws of the Hindoos, unless the theory of Natural Law had given it a type of excellence different from the usual one"—H. S. Maine, *Ancient Law*, ch. 3-4—"But both the Greek and the English trial by jury were at one time the great political safeguard against state oppression and injustice, and, owing to this origin, free nations become so attached to it that they are blind to its defects. And just as Ireland would now benefit beyond conception by the abolition of the jury system, so the secured Athenian (or any other) democracy would have thriven better had its laws been administered by courts of skilled judges. For these large bodies of average citizens, who, by the way, were not like our jurymen, unwilling occupants of the jury box, but who made it a paid business and an amusement, did not regard the letter of the law. They allowed actions barred by the reasonable limits of time; they allowed arguments totally beside the question, though this too was illegal, for there was no competent judge to draw the line, they allowed hearsay evidence, though that too was against the law; indeed the evidence produced in most of the speeches is of the loosest and poorest kind. Worse than all, there were no proper records kept of their decisions, and witnesses were called in to swear what had been the past decisions of a jury sitting in the same city, and under the same procedure. This is the more remarkable, as there were state archives, in which the decrees of the popular assembly were kept. . . . There is a most extraordinary speech of Lysias against a man called Nichomachus, who was appointed to transcribe the laws of Solon in four months, but who kept them in his possession for six years, and is accused of having so falsified them as to have substituted himself for Solon. Hence there can have been no recognized duplicate extant, or such a thing could not be attempted. So again, in the *Trapeziticus* of Isocrates, it is mentioned as a well known fact, that a certain Pythodorus was convicted of tampering with state-documents, signed and sealed by the magistrates, and deposited in the Acropolis. All these things meet us in every turn in the court speeches of the Attic orators. We are amazed at seeing relationships proved in will cases by a man coming in and swearing that such a man's father had told him that his brother was married to such a woman, of such a house. We find the most libellous charges brought against opponents on matters totally beside the question at issue, and even formal evidence of general bad character admitted. We find some speakers in consequence treating the jury with a sort of mingled deference and contempt which is amusing. 'On the former trial of this case,' they say, 'my opponent managed to tell you many well devised lies; of course you were deceived, how could it be other-

wise, and you made a false decision;' or else, 'You were so puzzled that you got at variance with one another, you voted at sixes and sevens, and by a small majority you came to an absurd decision.' 'But I think you know well,' says Isocrates, 'that the city has often repented so bitterly ere this for decisions made in passion and without evidence, as to desire after no long interval to punish those who misled it, and to wish those who had been calumniated were more than restored to their former prosperity. Keeping these facts before you, you ought not to be hasty in believing the prosecutors, nor to hear the defendants with interruption and ill temper. For it is a shame to have the character of being the gentlest and most humane of the Greeks in other respects, and yet to act contrary to this reputation in the trials which take place here. It is a shame that in other cities, where a human life is at stake, a considerable majority of votes is required for conviction, but that among you those in danger do not even get an equal chance with their false accusers. You swear indeed once a year that you will attend to both plaintiff and defendant, but in the interval only keep your oath so far as to accept whatever the accusers say, but you sometimes will not let those who are trying to refute them utter even a single word. You think those cities uninhabitable, in which citizens are executed without trial, and forget that those who do not give both sides a fair hearing are doing the very same thing.'—J. P. Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*, ch. 13.

B. C. 445-429.—The Age of Pericles: Political life.—The democracy.—'The real life of Athens lasted at the most for 200 years, and yet there are moments in which all that we have won by the toils of so many generations seems as if it would be felt to be but a small thing beside a single hour of Periklēs. The Democracy of Athens was in truth the noblest fruit of that self-developing power of the Greek mind which worked every possession of the common heritage into some new and more brilliant shape, but which learned nothing, nothing of all that formed its real life and its real glory, from the Barbarians of the outer world. Men tell us that Greece learned this or that mechanical invention from Phœnicia or Egypt or Assyria. Be it so; but stand in the Pnyx; listen to the contending orators; listen to the ambassadors of distant cities; listen to each side as it is fairly hearkened to, and see the matter in hand decided by the peaceful vote of thousands—here at least of a truth is something which Athens did not learn from any Assyrian despot or from any Egyptian priest. And we, children of the common stock, sharers in the common heritage, as we see man, Aryan man, in the full growth of his noblest type, we may feel a thrill as we think that Kleisthenēs and Periklēs were, after all, men of our own blood—as we think that the institutions which grew up under their hands and the institutions under which we ourselves are living are alike branches sprung from one stock, portions of one inheritance in which Athens and England have an equal right. In the Athenian Democracy we see a popular constitution taking the form which was natural for such a constitution to take when it was able to run its natural course in a commonwealth which consisted only of a single city. Wherever the Assembly really remains, in truth

as well as in name, an Assembly of the whole people in their own persons, it must in its own nature be sovereign. It must, in the nature of things, delegate more or less of power to magistrates and generals; but such power will be simply delegated. Their authority will be a mere trust from the sovereign body, and to that sovereign body they will be responsible for its exercise. That is to say, one of the original elements of the State, the King or chief, now represented by the elective magistracy, will lose its independent powers, and will sink into a body who have only to carry out the will of the sovereign Assembly. So with another of the original elements, the Council. This body too loses its independent being; it has no ruling or checking power; it becomes a mere Committee of the Assembly, chosen or appointed by lot to put measures into shape for more easy discussion in the sovereign body. As society becomes more advanced and complicated, the judicial power can no longer be exercised by the Assembly itself, while it would be against every democratic instinct to leave it in the arbitrary power of individual magistrates. Other Committees of the Assembly, Juries on a gigantic scale, with a presiding magistrate as chairman rather than as Judge, are therefore set apart to decide causes and to sit in judgment on offenders. Such is pure Democracy, the government of the whole people and not of a part of it only, as carried out in its full perfection in a single city. It is a form of government which works up the faculties of man to a higher pitch than any other; it is the form of government which gives the freest scope to the inborn genius of the whole community and of every member of it. Its weak point is that it works up the faculties of man to a pitch so high that it can hardly be lasting, that its ordinary life needs an enthusiasm, a devotion too highly strung to be likely to live through many generations. Athens in the days of her glory, the Athens of Periklēs, was truly 'the roof and crown of things'; her democracy raised a greater number of human beings to a higher level than any government before or since, it gave freer play than any government before or since to the personal gifts of the foremost of mankind. But against the few years of Athenian glory we must set the long ages of Athenian decline. Against the city where Periklēs was General we must set the city where Hadrian was Archon. On the Assemblies of other Grecian cities it is hardly needful to dwell. Our knowledge of their practical working is slight. We have one picture of a debate in the popular Assembly of Sparta, an Assembly none the less popular in its internal constitution because it was the assembly of what, as regarded the excluded classes of the State, was a narrow oligarchy. We see that there, as might be looked for, the chiefs of the State, the Kings, and yet more the Ephors, spoke with a degree of official, as distinguished from personal, authority which fell to the lot of no man in the Assembly of Athens. Periklēs reigned supreme, not because he was one of Ten Generals, but because he was Periklēs. . . . In the Ekklesiā which listened to Periklēs and Demosthenēs we feel almost as much at home as in an institution of our own land and our own times. At least we ought to feel at home there; for we have the full materials for calling up the political life of Athens in all its fullness, and within our own times one of the

greatest minds of our own or of any age has given its full strength to clear away the mists of error and calumny which so long shrouded the parent state of justice and freedom. Among the contemporaries and countrymen of Mr Grote it is shame indeed if men fail to see in the great Democracy the first state which taught mankind that the voice of persuasion could be stronger than a despot's will, the first which taught that disputes could be settled by a free debate and a free vote which in other lands could have been decided only by the banishment or massacre of the weaker side. . . . It must be constantly borne in mind that the true difference between an aristocratic and a democratic government, as those words were understood in the politics of old Greece, lies in this. In the Democracy all citizens, all who enjoy civil rights, enjoy also political rights. In the aristocracy political rights belong to only a part of those who enjoy civil rights. But, in either case, the highest authority of the State is the general Assembly of the whole ruling body, whether that ruling body be the whole people or only a part of it. . . . The slaves and strangers who were shut out at Athens were, according to Greek ideas, no Athenians, but every Athenian had his place in the sovereign assembly of Athens, while every Corinthian had not his place in the sovereign assembly of Corinth. But the aristocratic and the democratic commonwealth both agreed in placing the final authority of the State in the general Assembly of all who enjoy the highest franchise. . . . The people, of its own will, placed at its head men of the same class as those who in the earlier state of things had ruled it against its will. Periklēs, Nikias, Alkibiadēs, were men widely differing in character, widely differing in their relations to the popular government. But all alike were men of ancient birth, who, as men of ancient birth, found their way, almost as a matter of course, to those high places of the State to which Kleon found his way only by a strange freak of fortune. At Rome we find quite another story. There, no less than at Athens, the moral influence of nobility survived its legal privileges; but, more than this, the legal privileges of the elder nobility were never wholly swept away, and the inherent feeling of respect for illustrious birth called into being a younger nobility by its side. At Athens one stage of reform placed a distinction of wealth instead of a distinction of birth; another stage swept away the distinction of wealth also. But the reform, at each of its stages, was general; it affected all offices alike, save those sacred offices which still remained the special heritage of certain sacred families. . . . In an aristocratic commonwealth there is no room for Periklēs; there is no room for the people that hearkened to Periklēs; but in men of the second order, skilful conservative administrators, men able to work the system which they find established, no form of government is so fertile. . . . But everywhere we learn the same lesson, the inconsistency of commonwealths which boast themselves of their own freedom and exalt themselves at the cost of the freedom of others."—E. A. Freeman, *Comparative Politics*, lect. 5-6.—"Demos was himself King, Minister, and Parliament. He had his smaller officials to carry out the necessary details of public business, but he was most undoubtedly his own First Lord of the Treasury, his own Foreign Secretary, his own

Secretary for the Colonies. He himself kept up a personal correspondence both with foreign potentates and with his own officers on foreign service; the 'despatches' of Nikias and the 'notes' of Philip were alike addressed to no officer short of the sovereign himself; he gave personal audience to the ambassadors of other states, and clothed his own with just so great or so small a share as he deemed good of his own boundless authority. He had no need to entrust the care of his thousand dependencies to the mysterious working of a Foreign Office; he himself sat in judgment upon Mitylenian rebels, he himself settled the allotment of lands at Chalkis or Amphipolis; he decreed by his own wisdom what duties should be levied at the Sound of Byzantium, he even ventured on a task of which two-and-twenty ages have not lessened the difficulty, and undertook, without the help of a Lord High Commissioner, to adjust the relations and compose the seditions even of Korkyra and Zakynthos. He was his own Lord High Chancellor, his own Lord Primate, his own Commander-in-Chief. He listened to the arguments of Kleon on behalf of a measure, and to the arguments of Nikias against it, and he ended by bidding Nikias to go and carry out the proposal which he had denounced as extravagant or unjust. He listened with approval to his own 'explanations,' he passed votes of confidence in his own policy; he advised himself to give his own royal assent to the bills which he had himself passed, without the form of a second or third reading, or the vain ceremony of moving that the Prytanes do leave their chairs. . . . We suspect that the average Athenian citizen was, in political intelligence, above the average English Member of Parliament. It was this concentration of all power in an aggregate of which every citizen formed a part, which is the distinguishing characteristic of true Greek democracy. Florence had nothing like it, there has been nothing like it in the modern world, the few pure democracies which have lingered on to our own day have never had such mighty questions laid before them, and have never had such statesmen and orators to lead them. The great Democracy has had no fellow; but the political lessons which it teaches are none the less lessons for all time and for every land and people."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Essays* (v. 2): *The Athenian Democracy*. "The individual freedom which was enjoyed at Athens and which is extolled by Pericles was plainly an exception to the common usage of Greece, and is so regarded in the Funeral Speech. The word 'freedom,' it should be remembered, bore an ambiguous meaning. It denoted on the one hand political independence,—the exercise of sovereign power by the State and of political rights by the citizens. In this sense every Greek citizen could claim it as his birthright. Even the Spartans could tell the Persian Hydarnes that he had not, like them, tasted of freedom, and did not know whether it was sweet or not. But the word also denoted personal and social liberty,—freedom from the excessive restraints of law, the absence of a tyrannous public opinion and of intolerance between man and man. Pericles claims for Athens 'freedom' in this double sense. But freedom so far as it implies the absence of legal interference in the private concerns of life was but little known except at Athens."—S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects of Greek Genius*, pp.

70-71.—“To Athens . . . we look . . . for an answer to the question, What does history teach in regard to the virtue of a purely democratic government? And here we may safely say that, under favourable circumstances, there is no form of government which, while it lasts, has such a virtue to give scope to a vigorous growth and luxuriant fruitage of various manhood as a pure democracy. . . . But it does not follow that, though in this regard it has not been surpassed by any other form of government, it is therefore absolutely the best of all forms of government. . . . Neither, on the other hand, does it follow from the shortness of the bright reign of Athenian democracy — not more than 200 years from Clis-thenes to the Macedonians — that all democracies are short-lived, and must pay, like dissipated young gentlemen, with premature decay for the feverish abuse of their vital force. Possible no doubt it is, that if the power of what we may call a sort of Athenian Second Chamber, the Areiopagus, instead of being weakened as it was by Aristides and Pericles, had been built up according to the idea of Æschylus and the intelligent aristocrats of his day, such a body, armed, like our House of Lords, with an effective negative on all outbursts of popular rashness, might have prevented the ambition of the Athenians from launching on that famous Syracusan expedition which exhausted their force and maimed their action for the future. But the lesson taught by the short-lived glory of Athens, and its subjugation under the rough foot of the astute Macedonian, is not that democracies, under the influence of faction, and, it may be, not free from venality, will sell their liberties to a strong neighbour — for aristocratic Poland did this in a much more bluishless way than democratic Greece — but that any loose aggregate of independent States, given more to quarrel amongst themselves than to unite against a common enemy, whether democratic, or aristocratic, or monarchical in their form of government, cannot in the long run maintain their ground against the firm policy and the well-massed force of a strong monarchy. Athens was blotted out from the map of free peoples at Charonea, not because the Athenian people had too much freedom, but because the Greek States had too little unity. They were used by Philip exactly in the same way that Napoleon used the German States at the commencement of the present century.”—J. S. Blackie, *What does History Teach?* pp. 28-31 — “In Herodotus you have the beginning of the age of discussion. . . . The discourses on democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, which he puts into the mouth of the Persian conspirators when the monarchy was vacant, have justly been called absurd, as speeches supposed to have been spoken by those persons. No Asiatic ever thought of such things. You might as well imagine Saul or David speaking them as those to whom Herodotus attributes them. They are Greek speeches, full of free Greek discussions, and suggested by the experience, already considerable, of the Greeks in the results of discussion. The age of debate is beginning, and even Herodotus, the least of a wrangler of any man, and the most of a sweet and simple narrator, felt the effect. When we come to Thucydides, the results of discussion are as full as they have ever been; his light is pure, ‘dry light,’ free from the ‘humours’ of habit, and purged from consecrated usage. As

Grote’s history often reads like a report to Parliament, so half Thucydides reads like a speech, or materials for a speech, in the Athenian Assembly” —W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, pp. 170-171.

B. C. 440-437.—New settlements of Klerouchoi.—The founding of Amphipolis.—Revolt and subjugation of Samos.—“The great aim of Perikles was to strengthen the power of Athens over the whole area occupied by her confederacy. The establishment of settlers or Klerouchoi [see KLERUCHS], who retained their rights as Athenian citizens, had answered so well in the Lelantian plain of Euboia that it was obviously good policy to extend the system. The territory of Hestialia in the north of Euboia and the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, were thus occupied; and Perikles himself led a body of settlers to the Thracian Chersonesos where he repaired the old wall at the neck of the peninsula, and even to Sinope which now became a member of the Athenian alliance. A generation had passed from the time when Athens lost 10,000 citizens in the attempt to found a colony at the mouth of the Strymon. The task was now undertaken successfully by Hagnon, and the city came into existence which was to be the cause of disaster to the historian Thucydides and to witness the death of Brasidas and of Kleon [see AMPHIPOLIS]. . . . Two years before the founding of Amphipolis, Samos revolted from Athens. . . . In this revolt of Samos the overt action comes from the oligarchs who had seized upon the Ionian town of Priene, and defeated the Milesians who opposed them. The latter appealed to the Athenians, and received not only their aid but that of the Samian demos. The latter now became the ruling body in the island, fifty men and fifty boys being taken from the oligarchic families and placed as hostages in Lemnos, which, as we have seen, was now wholly occupied by Athenian Klerouchoi. But the Samian exiles (for many had fled rather than live under a democracy) entered into covenant with Pis-southnes, the Sardinian satrap, crossed over to Samos and seized the chief men of the demos, then falling on Lemnos succeeded in stealing away the hostages; and, having handed over to Pis-southnes the Athenian garrison at Samos, made ready for an expedition against Miletos. The tidings that Byzantium had joined in this last revolt left to the Athenians no room to doubt the gravity of the crisis. A fleet of sixty ships was dispatched to Samos under Perikles and nine other generals, of whom the poet Sophokles is said to have been one. Of these ships sixteen were sent, some to gather the allies, others to watch for the Phœnician fleet which they believed to be off the Karian coast advancing to the aid of the Samian oligarchs. With the remainder Perikles did not hesitate to engage the Samian fleet of seventy ships which he encountered on its return from Miletos off the island of Tragia. The Athenians gained the day; and Samos was blockaded by land and sea. But no sooner had Perikles sailed with sixty ships to meet the Phœnician fleet, than the Samians, making a vigorous sally, broke the lines of the besiegers and for fourteen days remained masters of the sea. The return of Perikles changed the face of things. Soon after the resumption of the siege the arrival of sixty fresh ships from Athens under five Strategoi in two detachments,

with thirty from Chios and Lesbos, damped the energy of the Samian oligarchs; and an unsuccessful effort at sea was followed by their submission in the ninth month after the beginning of the revolt, the terms being that they should raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their ships, and pay the expenses of the war. Following their example, the Byzantines also made their peace with Athens. The Phœnician fleet never came. The Athenians escaped at the same time a far greater danger nearer home. The Samians, like the men of Thasos, had applied for aid to the Spartans, who, no longer pressed by the Helot war, summoned a congress of their allies to discuss the question. For the truce which had still five-and-twenty years to run Sparta cared nothing; but she encountered an opposition from the Corinthians which perhaps she now scarcely expected. . . . The Spartans were compelled to give way, and there can be no doubt that when some years later the Corinthians claimed the gratitude of the Athenians for this decision, they took credit for an act of good service singularly opportune. Had they voted as Sparta wished Athens might by the extension of revolt amongst her allied cities have been reduced now to the condition to which, in consequence perhaps of this respite, she was not brought until the lifetime of a generation had been spent in desperate warfare."—G. W. Cox, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 3, ch. 1 (p. 2).

B. C. 431.—Beginning of the Peloponnesian War.—Its Causes.—"In B. C. 431 the war broke out between Athens and the Peloponnesian League, which, after twenty-seven years, ended in the ruin of the Athenian empire. It began through a quarrel between Corinth and Kerkyra, in which Athens assisted Kerkyra. A congress was held at Sparta; Corinth and other States complained of the conduct of Athens, and war was decided on. The real cause of the war was that Sparta and its allies were jealous of the great power that Athens had gained [see GREECE: B. C. 485-432 and 432-431]. A far greater number of Greek States were engaged in this war than had ever been engaged in a single undertaking before. States that had taken no part in the Persian war were now fighting on one side or the other. Sparta was an oligarchy, and the friend of the nobles everywhere; Athens was a democracy, and the friend of the common people; so that the war was to some extent a struggle between these classes all over Greece, and often within the same city walls the nobles and the people attacked one another, the nobles being for Sparta and the people for Athens. On the side of Sparta, when the war began, there was all Peloponnesus except Argos and Achæa, and also the oligarchical Boeotian League under Thebes besides Phokis, Lokris, and other States west of them. They were very strong by land, but the Corinthians alone had a good fleet. Later on we shall see the powerful State of Syracuse with its navy, acting with Sparta. On the side of Athens there were almost all the Ægean islands, and a great number of the Ægean coast towns as well as Kerkyra and certain States in the west of Greece. The Athenians had also made alliance with Sitalkes, the barbarian king of the interior of Thrace. Athens was far stronger by sea than Sparta, but had not such a strong land army. On the other hand it had a large treasure, and a

system of taxes, while the Spartan League had little or no money."—C. A. Fyffe, *Hist. of Greece (History Primers)*, p. 84.—The Ionian cities, called "allies" of Athens, were subjects in reality, and held in subjection by tyrannical measures which made the yoke odious, as is plainly explained by Xenophon, who says: "Some person might say, that it is a great support to the Athenians that their allies should be in a condition to contribute money to them. To the plebeians, however, it seems to be of much greater advantage that every individual of the Athenians should get some of the property of the allies, and that the allies themselves should have only so much as to enable them to live and to till the ground, so that they may not be in a condition to form conspiracies. The people of Athens seem also to have acted injudiciously in this respect, that they oblige their allies to make voyages to Athens for the decision of their lawsuits. But the Athenians consider only, on the other hand, what benefits to the state of Athens are attendant on this practice; in the first place they receive their dues throughout the year from the *prytaneis*; in the next place, they manage the government of the allied states while sitting at home, and without sending out ships; they also support suitors of the lower orders, and ruin those of an opposite character in their courts of law; but if each state had its own courts, they would, as being hostile to the Athenians, be the ruin of those who were most favourable to the people of Athens. In addition to these advantages, the Athenian people have the following profits from the courts of justice for the allies being at Athens, first of all the duty of the hundredth on what is landed at the Peireus affords a greater revenue to the city; next, whoever has a lodging-house makes more money by it, as well as whoever has cattle or slaves for hire; and the heralds, too, are benefited by the visits of the allies to the city. Besides, if the allies did not come to Athens for law, they would honour only such of the Athenians as were sent over the sea to them, as generals, and captains of vessels, and ambassadors; but now every individual of the allies is obliged to flatter the people of Athens, knowing that on going to Athens he must gain or lose his cause according to the decision, not of other judges, but of the people, as is the law of Athens; and he is compelled, too, to use supplication before the court, and, as any one of the people enters, to take him by the hand. By these means the allies are in consequence rendered much more the slaves of the Athenian people."—Xenophon, *On the Athenian Government (Minor Works, trans. by Rev. J. S. Watson)*, p. 235.—The revolt of these coerced and hostile "allies," upon the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, was inevitable.—The prominent events of the Peloponnesian war, in which most of the Greek States were involved, are properly narrated in their connection with Greek history at large (see GREECE: B. C. 481-429, and after). In this place it will only be necessary to take account of the consequences of the war as they affected the remarkable city and people whose superiority had occasioned it by challenging and somewhat offensively provoking the jealousy of their neighbors.

B. C. 431.—Peloponnesian invasions of Attica.—Siege of Athens.—"While the Peloponnesian

ponnesians were gathering at the Isthmus, and were still on their way, but before they entered Attica, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian generals, . . . repeated [to the Athenians] his previous advice; they must prepare for war and bring their property from the country into the city; they must defend their walls but not go out to battle; they should also equip for service the fleet in which lay their strength. . . . The citizens were persuaded, and brought into the city their children and wives, their household goods, and even the wood-work of their houses, which they took down. Their flocks and beasts of burden they conveyed to Euboea and the adjacent islands. The removal of the inhabitants was painful; for the Athenians had always been accustomed to reside in the country. Such a life had been characteristic of them more than of any other Hellenic people, from very early times. . . . When they came to Athens, only a few of them had houses or could find homes among friends or kindred. The majority took up their abode in the vacant spaces of the city, and in the temples and shrines of heroes. . . . Many also established themselves in the turrets of the walls, or in any other place which they could find; for the city could not contain them when they first came in. But afterwards they divided among them the Long Walls and the greater part of the Piræus. At the same time the Athenians applied themselves vigorously to the war, summoning their allies, and preparing an expedition of 100 ships against the Peloponnesians. While they were thus engaged, the Peloponnesian army was advancing: it arrived first of all at Oenoe, where Archidamus, the Spartan king, wasted much time in a fruitless siege and assault. "At last they marched on, and about the eightieth day after the entry of the Thebans into Plataea, in the middle of the summer, when the corn was in full ear, invaded Attica. . . . They encamped and ravaged, first of all, Eleusis and the plain of Thria. . . . At Acharnae they encamped, and remained there a considerable time, ravaging the country." It was the expectation of Archidamus that the Athenians would be provoked to come out and meet him in the open field; and that, indeed, they were eager to do; but the prudence of their great leader held them back. "The people were furious with Pericles, and, forgetting all his previous warnings, they abused him for not leading them to battle." But he was vindicated by the result. "The Peloponnesians remained in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, and then, taking a new route, retired through Boeotia. . . . On their return to Peloponnesus the troops dispersed to their several cities." Meantime the Athenian and allied fleets were ravaging the Peloponnesian coast. "In the same summer [B. C. 431] the Athenians expelled the Aeginetans and their families from Aegina, alleging that they had been the main cause of the war. . . . The Lacedaemonians gave the Aeginetan exiles the town of Thyrea to occupy and the adjoining country to cultivate. . . . About the end of the summer the entire Athenian force, including the metics, invaded the territory of Megara. . . . After ravaging the greater part of the country they retired. They repeated the invasion, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes with the whole Athenian army, every year during the war until Nisaea was taken [B. C. 424]."—Thucy-

dides, *History*; trans. by B. Jowett, bk. 2, sect. 13-31 (v. 1).

B. C. 430.—The funeral oration of Pericles.—During the winter of the year B. C. 431-430, "in accordance with an old national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public charge. The ceremony is as follows: Three days before the celebration they erect a tent in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and every one brings to his own dead any offering which he pleases. At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for all whose bodies are missing, and cannot be recovered after the battle. The procession is accompanied by any one who chooses, whether citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased are present at the place of interment and make lamentation. The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful spot outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon the dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were interred on the field. When the remains have been laid in the earth, some man of known ability and high reputation, chosen by the city, delivers a suitable oration over them; after which the people depart. Such is the manner of interment; and the ceremony was repeated from time to time throughout the war. Over those who were the first buried Pericles was chosen to speak. At the fitting moment he advanced from the sepulchre to a lofty stage, which had been erected in order that he might be heard as far as possible by the multitude, and spoke as follows:—"Most of those who have spoken here before me have commended the lawgiver who added this oration to our other funeral customs; it seemed to them a worthy thing that such an honour should be given at their burial to the dead who have fallen on the field of battle. But I should have preferred that, when men's deeds have been brave, they should be honoured in deed only, and with such an honour as this public funeral, which you are now witnessing. Then the reputation of many would not have been imperilled on the eloquence or want of eloquence of one, and their virtues believed or not as he spoke well or ill. For it is difficult to say neither too little nor too much; and even moderation is apt not to give the impression of truthfulness. The friend of the dead who knows the facts is likely to think that the words of the speaker fall short of his knowledge and of his wishes; another who is not so well informed, when he hears of anything which surpasses his own powers, will be envious and will suspect exaggeration. Mankind are tolerant of the praises of others so long as each hearer thinks that he can do as well or nearly as well himself, but, when the speaker rises above him, jealousy is aroused and he begins to be incredulous. However, since our ancestors have set the seal of their approval upon the practice, I must obey, and to the utmost of my power shall endeavour to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of all who hear me. I will speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and becoming that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory. There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valour

they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have received from them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And we ourselves assembled here to day, who are still most of us in the vigour of life, have chiefly done the work of improvement, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak, for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire became great. For I conceive, that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may profitably listen to them. Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but are an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment. And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; at home the style of our life is refined; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own. Then, again, our military training is in many respects superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face the Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, but with their whole confederacy following; we go alone into a neighbour's country;

and although our opponents are fighting for their homes and we on a foreign soil we have seldom any difficulty in overcoming them. Our enemies have never yet felt our united strength; the care of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged to send our own citizens everywhere. But they, if they meet and defeat a part of our army, are as proud as if they had routed us all, and when defeated they pretend to have been vanquished by us all. If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers? Since we do not anticipate the pain, although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as those who never allow themselves to rest; and thus too our city is equally admirable in peace and in war. For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household, and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character, and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger. In doing good, again, we are unlike others, we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favours. Now he who confers a favour is the firmer friend, because he would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an obligation, but the recipient is colder in his feelings, because he knows that in requiting another's generosity he will not be winning gratitude but only paying a debt. We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit. To sum up; I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact; and the assertion is verified by the position to which these qualities have raised the state. For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of such a city; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment, although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For we

have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died, they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them, and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf. I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I want to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have magnified them and men like them whose virtues made her glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said as of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance have been found equal to their fame! Methinks that a death such as theirs has been given the true measure of a man's worth, it may be the first revelation of his virtues, but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valour with which they have fought for their country, they have blotted out the evil with the good, and have benefited the state more by their public services than they have injured her by their private actions. None of these men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to resign the pleasures of life, none of them put off the evil day in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may one day become rich. But, deeming that the punishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they determined at the hazard of their lives to be honourably avenged and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness, but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives, they ran away from the word of dishonour, but on the battle field their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory. Such was the end of these men, they were worthy of Athens and the living need not desire to have a more heroic spirit although they may pray for a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words. Any one can discourse to you for ever about the advantages of a brave defence which you know already. But instead of listening to him I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her, and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it; who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres—I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion

both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men, not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no hope of a change for the better has less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far more bitter than death striking him unperceived at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hopes. Wherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of the dead who stand here, I would rather comfort them. You know that your life has been passed amid manifold vicissitudes, and that they may be deemed fortunate who have gained most honour, whether an honourable death like theirs, or an honourable sorrow like yours, and whose days have been so ordered that the term of their happiness is likewise the term of their life. I know how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness which once lightened your hearts. And sorrow is felt at the want of those blessings, not which a man never knew, but which were a part of his life before they were taken from him. Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better, not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger. To those of you who have passed their prime I say: "Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days, remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honour alone is ever young; and not riches, as some say, but honour is the delight of men when they are old and useless." To you who are the sons and brothers of the departed, I see that the struggle to emulate them will be an arduous one. For all men praise the dead, and, however pre eminent your virtue may be, hardly will you be thought, I do not say to equal, but even to approach them. The living have their rivals and detractors, but when a man is out of the way, the honour and good-will which he receives is unalloyed. And, if I am to speak of womanly virtues to those of you who will henceforth be widows, let me sum them up in one short admonition. To a woman not to show more weakness than is natural to her sex is a great glory, and not to be talked about for good or for evil among men. I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the law, making use of such fitting words as I had. The tribute of deeds has been paid in part; for the dead have been honourably interred, and it remains only that their children should be maintained at the public charge until they are grown up: this is the solid prize with which, as with a garland, Athens crowns

her sons living and dead, after a struggle like theirs. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there the noblest citizens are enlisted in the service of the state. And now, when you have duly lamented, every one his own dead, you may depart." Such was the order of the funeral celebrated in this winter, with the end of which ended the first year of the Peloponnesian War.—Thucydides, *History*, trans. by B. Jowett, v. 1, bk. 2, sect. 34-47.

B. C. 430-429.—The Plague in the city.—Death of Pericles.—Capture of Potidæa.—“As soon as the summer returned [B. C. 430] the Peloponnesians . . . invaded Attica, where they established themselves and ravaged the country. They had not been there many days when the plague broke out at Athens for the first time. . . . The disease is said to have begun south of Egypt in Æthiopia; thence it descended into Egypt and Libya, and after spreading over the greater part of the Persian Empire, suddenly fell upon Athens. It first attacked the inhabitants of the Piræus, and it was supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns, no conduits having as yet been made there. It afterwards reached the upper city, and then the mortality became far greater. As to its probable origin or the causes which might or could have produced such a disturbance of nature, every man, whether a physician or not, will give his own opinion. But I shall describe its actual course, and the symptoms by which any one who knows them beforehand may recognize the disorder should it ever reappear. For I was myself attacked, and witnessed the sufferings of others. The season was admitted to have been remarkably free from ordinary sickness; and if anybody was already ill of any other disease, it was absorbed in this. Many who were in perfect health, all in a moment, and without any apparent reason, were seized with violent heats in the head and with redness and inflammation of the eyes. Internally the throat and tongue were quickly suffused with blood and the breath became unnatural and fetid. There followed sneezing and hoarseness; in a short time the disorder, accompanied by a violent cough, reached the chest; then fastening lower down, it would move the stomach and bring on all the vomits of bile to which physicians have ever given names; and they were very distressing. . . . The body externally was not so very hot to the touch, nor yet pale; it was a livid colour inclining to red, and breaking out in pustules and ulcers. But the internal fever was intense. . . . The disorder which had originally settled in the head passed gradually through the whole body, and, if a person got over the worst, would often seize the extremities and leave its mark, attacking the privy parts and the fingers and toes; and some escaped with the loss of these, some with the loss of their eyes. . . . The crowding of the people out of the country into the city aggravated the misery; and the newly-arrived suffered most. . . . The mortality among them was dreadful and they perished in wild disorder. The dead lay as they had died, one upon another, while others hardly alive wallowed in the streets and crawled about every fountain craving for water. The temples in which they lodged were full of the corpses of those who died in them; for the violence of the calamity was such that men, not knowing where

to turn, grew reckless of all law, human and divine. . . . The pleasure of the moment and any sort of thing which conduced to it took the place both of honour and of expediency. No fear of God or law of man deterred a criminal.” Terrified by the plague, when they learned of it, the Peloponnesians retreated from Attica, after ravaging it for forty days; but, in the meantime, their own coasts had been ravaged, as before, by the Athenian fleet. And now, being once more relieved from the presence of the enemy, though still grievously afflicted by the plague, the Athenians turned upon Pericles with complaints and reproaches, and imposed a fine upon him. They also sent envoys to Sparta, with peace proposals which received no encouragement. But Pericles spoke calmly and wisely to the people, and they acknowledged their sense of dependence upon him by re-electing him general and committing again “all their affairs to his charge.” But he was stricken next year with the plague, and, lingering for some weeks in broken health, he died in the summer of 429 B. C. By his death the republic was given over to striving demagogues and factions, at just the time when a capable brain and hand were needed in its government most. The war went on, acquiring more ferocity of temper with every campaign. It was especially embittered in the course of the second summer by the execution, at Athens, of several Lacedæmonian envoys who were captured while on their way to solicit help from the Persian king. One of these unfortunate envoys was Aristæus, who had organized the defence of Potidæa. That city was still holding out against the Athenians, who blockaded it obstinately, although their troops suffered frightfully from the plague. But in the winter of 430-429 B. C. they succumbed to starvation and surrendered their town, being permitted to depart in search of a new home. Potidæa was then peopled anew, with colonists.—Thucydides, *History*, tr. by Jowett, bk. 2, sect. 8-70.

ALSO IN: E. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens*, ch. 13-15.—W. W. Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, ch. 64 (v. 2).—L. Whibley, *Political Parties in Athens during the Peloponnesian War*.—W. Wachsmuth, *Hist. Antiquities of the Greeks*, sects. 62-64 (v. 2).

B. C. 429-421.—After Pericles.—The rise of the Demagogues.—“When Pericles rose to power it would have been possible to frame a Pan-Hellenic union, in which Sparta and Athens would have been the leading states; and such a dualism would have been the best guarantee for the rights of the smaller cities. When he died there was no policy left but war with Sparta, and conquest in the West. And not only so, but there was no politician who could adjust the relations of domestic war and foreign conquest. The Athenians passed from one to the other, as they were addressed by Cleon or Alcibiades. We cannot wonder that the men who lived in those days of trouble spoke bitterly of Pericles, holding him accountable for the miseries which fell upon Athens. Other statesmen had bequeathed good laws, as Solon and Clisthenes, or the memory of great achievements, as Themistocles or Cimón, but the only changes which Pericles had introduced were thought, not without reason, to be changes for the worse; and he left his country involved in a ruinous war.”—E.

Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens*, pp. 362-363.—“The moral change which had . . . befallen the Attic community had, it is true, even during the lifetime of Pericles, manifested itself by means of sufficiently clear premonitory signs; but Pericles had, notwithstanding, up to the days of his last illness, remained the centre of the state; the people had again and again returned to him, and by subordinating themselves to the personal authority of Pericles had succeeded in recovering the demeanor which befitted them. But now the voice was hushed, which had been able to sway the unruly citizens, even against their will. No other authority was in existence—no aristocracy, no official class, no board of experienced statesmen—nothing, in fact, to which the citizens might have looked for guidance and control. The multitude had recovered absolute independence, and in proportion as, in the interval, readiness of speech and sophistic versatility had spread in Athens, the number had increased of those who now put themselves forward as popular speakers and leaders. But as, among all these, none was capable of leading the multitude after the fashion of Pericles, another method of leading the people, another kind of demagoguery, sprung into existence. Pericles stood above the multitude. . . . His successors were obliged to adopt other means; in order to acquire influence, they took advantage not so much of the strong as of the weak points in the character of the citizens, and achieved popularity by flattering their inclinations, and endeavoring to satisfy the cravings of their baser nature. . . . Now for the first time, men belonging to the lower class of citizens thrust themselves forward to play a part in politics,—men of the trading and artisan class, the culture and wealth of which had so vigorously increased at Athens. . . . The office of general frequently became a post of martyrdom; and the bravest men felt that the prospect of being called to account as to their campaigns by cowardly demagogues, before a capricious multitude, disturbed the straightforward joyousness of their activity, and threw obstacles in the way of their successes. . . . On the orators’ tribune the contrast was more striking. Here the first prominent successor of Pericles was a certain Eucrates, a rude and uneducated man, who was ridiculed on the comic stage as the ‘boar’ or ‘bear of Melite’ (the name of the district to which he belonged), a dealer in tow and mill-owner, who only for a short space of time took the lead in the popular assembly. His place was taken by Lysicles, who had acquired wealth by the cattle-trade. . . . It was not until after Lysicles, that the demagogues attained to power who had first made themselves a name by their opposition against Pericles, and, among them, Cleon was the first who was able to maintain his authority for a longer period of time; so that it is in his proceedings during the ensuing years of the war that the whole character of the new demagoguery first thoroughly manifests itself.”—E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, v. 3, ch. 2.—“The characters of the military commander and the political leader were gradually separated. The first germs of this division we find in the days of Kimon and Periklēs. Kimon was no mean politician; but his real genius clearly called him to warfare with the Barbarian. Periklēs was an able and successful general; but in him the

military character was quite subordinate to that of the political leader. It was a wise compromise which entrusted Kimon with the defence of the state abroad and Periklēs with its management at home. After Periklēs the separation widened. We nowhere hear of Demosthenēs and Phormion as political leaders; and even in Nikias the political is subordinate to the military character. Kleon, on the other hand, was a politician but not a soldier. But the old notion of combining military and political position was not quite lost. It was still deemed that he who proposed a warlike expedition should himself, if it were needful, be able to conduct it. Kleon in an evil hour was tempted to take on himself military functions; he was forced into command against Sphakteria; by the able and loyal help of Demosthenēs he acquitted himself with honour. But his head was turned by success; he aspired to independent command; he measured himself against the mighty Brasidas; and the fatal battle of Amphipolis was the result. It now became clear that the Demagogue and the General must commonly be two distinct persons. The versatile genius of Alkibiadēs again united the two characters; but he left no successor. . . . A Demagogue then was simply an influential speaker of popular politics. Demosthenēs is commonly distinguished as an orator, while Kleon is branded as a Demagogue; but the position of the one was the same as the position of the other. The only question is as to the wisdom and honesty of the advice given either by Kleon or by Demosthenēs.”—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, 2d ser., pp. 138-140.

B. C. 429-427.—Fate of Plataea.—Phormio's Victories.—Revolt of Lesbos.—Siege of Mitylene.—Cleon's bloody decree and its reversal. See GREECE: B. C. 429-427.

B. C. 425.—Seizure of Pylus by Demosthenes, the general.—Spartans entrapped and captured at Sphacteria.—Peace pleaded for and refused. See GREECE: B. C. 425.

B. C. 424-406.—Socrates as soldier and citizen.—The trial of the Generals.—“Socrates was born very shortly before the year 469 B. C. His father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, his mother, Phanarete, a midwife. Nothing definite is known of his moral and intellectual development. There is no specific record of him at all until he served at the siege of Potidæa (432 B. C.—429 B. C.) when he was nearly forty years old. All that we can say is that his youth and manhood were passed in the most splendid period of Athenian or Greek history. . . . As a boy he received the usual Athenian liberal education, in music and gymnastic, an education, that is to say, mental and physical. He was fond of quoting from the existing Greek literature, and he seems to have been familiar with it, especially with Homer. He is represented by Xenophon as repeating Prodicus’ fable of the choice of Heracles at length. He says that he was in the habit of studying with his friends ‘the treasures which the wise men of old have left us in their books:’ collections, that is, of the short and pithy sayings of the seven sages, such as ‘know thyself’; a saying, it may be noticed, which lay at the root of his whole teaching. And he had some knowledge of mathematics, and of science, as it existed in those days. He understood something of astronomy and of advanced geometry; and he

was acquainted with certain, at any rate, of the theories of his predecessors in philosophy, the Physical or Cosmical philosophers, such as Heraclitus and Parmenides, and, especially, with those of Anaxagoras. But there is no trustworthy evidence which enables us to go beyond the bare fact that he had such knowledge. All then that we can say of the first forty years of Socrates' life consists of general statements like these. During these years there is no specific record of him. Between 432 B. C. and 429 B. C. he served as a common soldier at the siege of Potidæa, an Athenian dependency which had revolted, and surpassed every one in his powers of enduring hunger, thirst, and cold, and all the hardships of a severe Thracian winter. At this siege we hear of him for the first time in connection with Alcibiades, whose life he saved in a skirmish, and to whom he eagerly relinquished the prize of valour. In 431 B. C. the Peloponnesian War broke out, and in 424 B. C. the Athenians were disastrously defeated and routed by the Thebans at the battle of Delium. Socrates and Laches were among the few who did not yield to panic. They retreated together steadily, and the resolute bearing of Socrates was conspicuous to friend and foe alike. Had all the Athenians behaved as he did, says Laches, in the dialogue of that name, the defeat would have been a victory. Socrates fought bravely a third time at the battle of Amphipolis [422 B. C.] against the Peloponnesian forces, in which the commanders on both sides, Cleon and Brasidas, were killed: but there is no record of his specific services on that occasion. About the same time that Socrates was displaying conspicuous courage in the cause of Athens at Delium and Amphipolis, Aristophanes was holding him up to hatred, contempt, and ridicule in the comedy of the *Clouds* [B. C. 423]. The *Clouds* is his protest against the immorality of free thought and the Sophists. He chose Socrates for his central figure, chiefly, no doubt, on account of Socrates' well-known and strange personal appearance. The grotesque ugliness, and flat nose, and prominent eyes, and Silenus-like face, and shabby dress, might be seen every day in the streets, and were familiar to every Athenian. Aristophanes cared little—probably he did not take the trouble to find out—that Socrates' whole life was spent in fighting against the Sophists. It was enough for him that Socrates did not accept the traditional beliefs, and was a good centre piece for a comedy. . . . The *Clouds*, it is needless to say, is a gross and absurd libel from beginning to end: but Aristophanes hit the popular conception. The charges which he made in 423 B. C. stuck to Socrates to the end of his life. They are exactly the charges made by popular prejudice, against which Socrates defends himself in the first ten chapters of the *Apology*, and which he says have been so long 'in the air.' He formulates them as follows: 'Socrates is an evil doer who busies himself with investigating things beneath the earth and in the sky, and who makes the worse appear the better reason, and who teaches others these same things.' . . . For sixteen years after the battle of Amphipolis we hear nothing of Socrates. The next events in his life, of which there is a specific record, are those narrated by himself in the twentieth chapter of the *Apology*. They illustrate, as he meant them to illustrate,

his invincible moral courage. . . . In 406 B. C. the Athenian fleet defeated the Lacedæmonians at the battle of Arginusæ, so called from some small islands off the south-east point of Lesbos. After the battle the Athenian commanders omitted to recover the bodies of their dead, and to save the living from off their disabled enemies. The Athenians at home, on hearing of this, were furious. The due performance of funeral rites was a very sacred duty with the Greeks, and many citizens mourned for friends and relatives who had been left to drown. The commanders were immediately recalled, and an assembly was held in which they were accused of neglect of duty. They defended themselves by saying that they had ordered certain inferior officers (amongst others, their accuser Thera menes) to perform the duty, but that a storm had come on which had rendered the performance impossible. The debate was adjourned, and it was resolved that the Senate should decide in what way the commanders should be tried. The Senate resolved that the Athenian people, having heard the accusation and the defence, should proceed to vote forthwith for the acquittal or condemnation of the eight commanders collectively. The resolution was grossly unjust, and it was illegal. It substituted a popular vote for a fair and formal trial.

Socrates was at that time a member of the Senate, the only office that he ever filled. The Senate was composed of five hundred citizens, elected by lot, fifty from each of the ten tribes, and holding office for one year. The members of each tribe held the Prytany, that is, were responsible for the conduct of business, for thirty-five days at a time, and ten out of the fifty were proedri or presidents every seven days in succession. Every bill or motion was examined by the proedri before it was submitted to the Assembly, to see if it were in accordance with law, if it was not, it was quashed. One of the proedri presided over the Senate and the Assembly each day, and for one day only. He was called the Epistates. It was his duty to put the question to the vote. In short he was the speaker. . . . On the day on which it was proposed to take a collective vote on the acquittal or condemnation of the eight commanders, Socrates was Epistates. The proposal was, as we have seen, illegal, but the people were furious against the accused, and it was a very popular one. Some of the proedri opposed it before it was submitted to the Assembly, on the ground of its illegality, but they were silenced by threats and subsided. Socrates alone refused to give way. He would not put a question which he knew to be illegal, to the vote. Threats of suspension and arrest, the clamour of an angry people, the fear of imprisonment or death, could not move him. . . . But his authority lasted only for a day; the proceedings were adjourned, a more pliant Epistates succeeded him, and the generals were condemned and executed."—F. J. Church, *Introd. to Trial and Death of Socrates*, pp. 9-23.—See, also, GREECE: B. C. 406.

B. C. 421.—End of the first period of the Peloponnesian War.—The Peace of Nicias.—“The first stage of the Peloponnesian war came to an end just ten years after the invasion of Attica by Archidamus in 431 B. C. Its results had been almost purely negative; a vast quan-

tity of blood and treasure had been wasted on each side, but to no great purpose. The Athenian naval power was unimpaired, and the confederacy of Delos, though shaken by the successful revolt of Amphipolis and the Thracian towns, was still left subsisting. On the other hand, the attempts of Athens to accomplish anything on land had entirely failed, and the defensive policy of Pericles had been so far justified. Well would it have been for Athens if her citizens had taken the lesson to heart, and contented themselves with having escaped so easily from the greatest war they had ever known.—C. W. C. Oman, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 341.—“The treaty called since ancient times the Peace of Nicias . . . put an end to the war between the two Greek confederations of states, after it had lasted for rather more than ten years, viz., from the attack of the Boeotians upon Plataea, Ol lxxvii 1 (beginning of April B. C. 431) to Ol lxxvii 3 (towards the middle of April B. C. 421). The war was for this reason known under the name of the Ten Years’ War, while the Peloponnesians called it the Attic War. Its end constituted a triumph for Athens, for all the plans of the enemies who had attacked her had come to naught, Sparta had been unable to fulfil a single one of the promises with which she had entered upon the war, and was ultimately forced to acknowledge the dominion of Athens in its whole extent,—notwithstanding all the mistakes and misgivings, notwithstanding all the calamities attributable or not, to the Athenians themselves, the resources of offence and defence which the city owed to Pericles had therefore proved their excellence, and all the fury of her opponents had wasted itself against her in vain. Sparta herself was satisfied with the advantages which the peace offered to her own city and citizens; but great was the discontent among her confederates, particularly among the secondary states, who had originally occasioned the war and obliged Sparta to take part in it. Even after the conclusion of the peace, it was impossible to induce Thebes and Corinth to accede to it. The result of the war to Sparta was therefore the dissolution of the confederation at whose head she had begun the war, she felt herself thereby placed in so dangerously isolated a position, that she was obliged to fall back upon Athens in self-defence against her own confederates. Accordingly the Peace of Nicias was in the course of the same year converted into a fifty years’ alliance, under the terms of which Sparta and Athens contracted the obligation of mutual assistance against any hostile attack.”—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 4, ch. 2 (r. 3).—See, also GREECE: B. C. 424-421.

B. C. 421-418.—New combinations.—Conflicting alliances with Sparta and the Argive Confederacy.—Rising influence of Alcibiades.—War in Argos and Arcadia.—Battle of Mantinea. See GREECE: B. C. 421-418.

B. C. 416.—Siege and conquest of Melos.—Massacre of the inhabitants. See GREECE B. C. 416.

B. C. 415.—The expedition against Syracuse.—Mutilation of the Hermæ (Hermæ).—A quarrel having broken out in Sicily, between the cities of Segesta and Selinous, “the latter obtained aid from Syracuse. Upon this, Segesta, having vainly sought help from Carthage, ap-

pealed to Athens, where the exiled Sicilians were numerous. Alcibiades had been one of the most urgent for the attack upon Melos, and he did not lose the present opportunity to incite the Athenians to an enterprise of much greater importance, and where he hoped to be in command . . . All men’s minds were filled with ambitious hopes. Everywhere, says Plutarch, were to be seen young men in the gymnasia, old men in workshops and public places of meeting, drawing the map of Sicily, talking about the sea that surrounds it, the goodness of its harbors, its position opposite Africa. Established there, it would be easy to cross over and subjugate Carthage, and extend their sway as far as the Pillars of Hercules. The rich did not approve of this rashness, but feared if they opposed it that the opposite faction would accuse them of wishing to avoid the service and costs of arming galleys. Nicias had more courage, even after the Athenians had appointed him general, with Alcibiades and Lamachos, he spoke publicly against the enterprise, showed the imprudence of going in search of new subjects when those they already had were at the moment in a state of revolt, as in Chalkidike, or only waited for a disaster to break the chain which bound them to Athens. He ended by reproaching Alcibiades for plunging the republic, to gratify his personal ambition, into a foreign war of the greatest danger. . . . One of the demagogues, however, replied that he would put an end to all this hesitation, and he proposed and secured the passage of a decree giving the generals full power to use all the resources of the city in preparing for the expedition (March 24, 415 B. C.). Nicias was completely in the right. The expedition to Sicily was impolitic and foolish. In the Ægean Sea lay the empire of Athens, and there only it could lie, within reach, close at hand. Every acquisition westward of the Peloponnesos was a source of weakness. Syracuse, even if conquered, would not long remain subject. Whatever might be the result of the expedition, it was sure to be disastrous in the end . . . An event which took place shortly before the departure of the fleet (8-9 June) threw terror into the city. One morning the hermai throughout the city were seen to have been mutilated . . . ‘These Hermæ, or half statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection of cross ways, in the public agora. . . . The religious feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciled where his statue stood, so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens,—political, social, commercial, or gymnastic.’ . . . To all pious minds the city seemed menaced with great misfortunes unless the anger of Heaven should be appeased by a sufficient expiation. While Alcibiades had many partisans, he had also violent enemies. Not long before this time Hyper-

bolos, a contemptible man, had almost succeeded in obtaining his banishment; and he had escaped this danger only by uniting his party with that of Nikias, and causing the demagogue himself to suffer ostracism. The affair of the hermai appeared to his adversaries a favourable occasion to repeat the attempt made by Hyperbolos, and we have good reason to believe in a political machination, seeing this same populace applauded, a few months later, the impious audacity of Aristophanes in his comedy of *The Birds*. An inquiry was set on foot, and certain metoikoi and slaves, without making any deposition as to the hermai, recalled to mind that before this time some of these statues had been broken by young men after a night of carousal and intoxication, thus indirectly attacking Alkibiades. Others in set terms accused him of having at a banquet parodied the Eleusinian Mysteries; and men took advantage of the superstitious terrors of the people to awake their political anxieties. It was repeated that the breakers of sacred statues, the profaners of mysteries, would respect the government even less than they had respected the gods, and it was whispered that not one of these crimes had been committed without the participation of Alkibiades; and in proof of this men spoke of the truly aristocratic license of his life. Was he indeed the author of this sacrilegious freak? To believe him capable of it would not be to calumniate him. Or, on the other hand, was it a scheme planned to do him injury? Although proofs are lacking, it is certain that among the rich, upon whom rested the heavy burden of the naval expenses, a plot had been formed to destroy the power of Alkibiades, and perhaps to prevent the sailing of the fleet. The demagogues, who had intoxicated the people with hope, were for the expedition; but the popularity of Alkibiades was obnoxious to them: a compromise was made between the two factions, as is often done in times when public morality is enfeebled, and Alkibiades found himself threatened on all sides. . . . Urging as a pretext the dangers of delay in sending off the expedition, they obtained a decree that Alkibiades should embark at once, and that the question of his guilt or innocence should be postponed until after his return. It was now the middle of summer. The day appointed for departure, the whole city, citizens and foreigners, went out to Peiræus at daybreak. . . . At that moment the view was clearer as to the doubts and dangers, and also the distance of the expedition; but all eyes were drawn to the immense preparations that had been made, and confidence and pride consoled those who were about to part."—V. Duruy, *Hist. of the Greek People*, ch. 25, sect. 3 (v. 3).

Also in: Thucydides, *History*, bk. 6, sect. 27-28. —G. W. Cox, *The Athenian Empire*, ch. 5. —G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 58 (v. 7).

B. C. 415-413.—Fatal end of the expedition against Syracuse.—"Alkibiades was called back to Athens, to take his trial on a charge of impiety. . . . He did not go back to Athens for his trial, but escaped to Peloponnesos, where we shall hear from him again. Meanwhile the command of the Athenian force in Sicily was left practically in the hands of Nikias. Now Nikias could always act well when he did act; but it was very hard to make him act; above all on an errand which he hated. One might say that Syracuse was saved through the delays of Nikias.

He now went off to petty expeditions in the west of Sicily, under cover of settling matters at Segesta. . . . The Syracusans by this time quite despised the invaders. Their horsemen rode up to the camp of the Athenians at Katane, and asked them if they had come into Sicily merely to sit down there as colonists. . . . The winter (B. C. 415-414) was chiefly spent on both sides in sending embassies to and fro to gain allies. Nikias also sent home to Athens, asking for horsemen and money, and the people, without a word of rebuke, voted him all that he asked. . . . But the most important embassy of all was that which the Syracusans sent to Corinth and Sparta. Corinth zealously took up the cause of her colony and pleaded for Syracuse at Sparta. And at Sparta Corinth and Syracuse found a helper in the banished Athenian Alkibiades, who was now doing all that he could against Athens. . . . He told the Spartans to occupy a fortress in Attica, which they soon afterwards did, and a great deal came of it. But he also told them to give vigorous help to Syracuse, and above all things to send a Spartan commander. The mere name of Sparta went for a great deal in those days; but no man could have been better chosen than the Spartan who was sent. He was Gylippos, the deliverer of Syracuse. He was more like an Athenian than a Spartan, quick and ready of resource, which few Spartans were. . . . And now at last, when the spring came (414) Nikias was driven to do something. . . . The Athenians . . . occupied all that part of the hill which lay outside the walls of Syracuse. They were joined by their horsemen, Greek and Sikel, and after nearly a year, the siege of Syracuse really began. The object of the Athenians now was to build a wall across the hill and to carry it down to the sea on both sides. Syracuse would thus be hemmed in. The object of the Syracusans was to build a cross-wall of their own, which should hinder the Athenian wall from reaching the two points it aimed at. This they tried more than once; but in vain. There were several fights on the hill, and at last there was a fight of more importance on the lower ground by the Great Harbour. . . . The Syracusans were defeated, as far as fighting went; but they gained far more than they lost. For Lamachos was killed, and with him all vigour passed away from the Athenian camp. At the same moment the Athenian fleet sailed into the Great Harbour, and a Syracusan attack on the Athenian works on the hill was defeated. Nikias remained in command of the invaders; but he was grievously sick, and for once in his life his head seems to have been turned by success. He finished the wall on the south side; but he neglected to finish it on the north side also, so that Syracuse was not really hemmed in. But the hearts of the Syracusans sank. . . . It was at this darkest moment of all that deliverance came. . . . A Corinthian ship, under its captain Gongylos, sailed into the Little Harbour. He brought the news that other ships were on their way from Peloponnesos to the help of Syracuse, and, yet more, that a Spartan general was actually in Sicily, getting together a land force for the same end. As soon as the good news was heard, there was no more talk of surrender. . . . And one day the Athenian camp was startled by the appearance of a Laocædæmonian herald, offering them a truce of five days, that they might get them

out of Sicily with bag and baggage. Gylippos was now on the hill. He of course did not expect that the Athenian army would really go away in five days. But it was a great thing to show both to the besiegers and to the Syracusans that the deliverer had come, and that deliverance was beginning. Nikias had kept such bad watch that Gylippos and his troops had come up the hill and the Syracusans had come out and met them, without his knowledge. The Spartan, as a matter of course, took the command of the whole force; he offered battle to the Athenians, which they refused; he then entered the city. The very next day he began to carry out his scheme. This was to build a group of forts near the western end of the hill, and to join them to the city by a wall running east and west, which would hinder the Athenians from ever finishing their wall to the north. Each side went on building, and some small actions took place. . . . Another winter (B. C. 414-413) now came on, and with it much sending of envoys. Gylippos went about Sicily collecting fresh troops. . . . Meanwhile Nikias wrote a letter to the Athenian people. . . . This letter came at a time when the Lacedæmonian alliance had determined to renew the war with Athens, and when they were making everything ready for an invasion of Attica. To send out a new force to Sicily was simple madness. We hear nothing of the debates in the Athenian assembly, whether any one argued against going on with the Sicilian war, and whether any demagogue laid any blame on Nikias. But the assembly voted that a new force equal to the first should be sent out under D  mosthen  s, the best soldier in Athens, and Eurymed  n. . . . Meanwhile the Syracusans were strengthened by help both in Sicily and from Peloponnesos. Their main object now was to strike a blow at the fleet of Nikias before the new force came. . . . It had been just when the Syracusans were most downcast that they were cheered by the coming of the Corinthians and of Gylippos. And just now that their spirits were highest, they were dashed again by the coming of D  mosthen  s and Eurymed  n. A fleet as great as the first, seventy-five ships, carrying 5,000 heavy-armed and a crowd of light troops of every kind, sailed into the Great Harbour with all warlike pomp. The Peloponnesians were already in Attica; they had planted a Peloponnesian garrison there, which brought Athens to great straits; but the fleet was sent out to Syracuse all the same. D  mosthen  s knew what to do as well as Lamachos had known. He saw that there was nothing to be done but to try one great blow, and, if that failed, to take the fleet home again. . . . The attack was at first successful, and the Athenians took two of the Syracusan forts. But the Thespian allies of Syracuse stood their ground, and drove the assailants back. Utter confusion followed. . . . The last chance was now lost, and D  mosthen  s was eager to go home. But Nikias would stay on. . . . When sickness grew in the camp, when fresh help from Sicily and the great body of the allies from Peloponnesos came into Syracuse, he at last agreed to go. Just at that moment the moon was eclipsed. . . . Nikias consulted his soothsayers, and he gave out that they must stay twenty-nine days, another full revolution of the moon. This resolve was the destruction of the besieging army. . . . It was

felt on both sides that all would turn on one more fight by sea, the Athenians striving to get out of the harbour, and the Syracusans striving to keep them in it. The Syracusans now blocked up the mouth of the harbour by mooring vessels across it. The Athenians left their position on the hill, a sign that the siege was over, and brought their whole force down to the shore. It was no time now for any skillful manoeuvres; the chief thing was to make the sea-fight as much as might be like a land-fight, a strange need for Athenians. . . . The last fight now began, 110 Athenian ships against 80 of the Syracusans and their allies. Never before did so many ships meet in so small a space. . . . The fight was long and confused; at last the Athenians gave way and fled to the shore. The battle and the invasion were over. Syracuse was not only saved; she had begun to take vengeance on her enemies. . . . The Athenians waited one day, and then set out, hoping to make their way to some safe place among the friendly Sikels in the inland country. The sick had to be left behind. . . . On the sixth day, after frightful toil, they determined to change their course. . . . They set out in two divisions, that of Nikias going first. Much better order was kept in the front division and by the time Nikias reached the river, D  mosthen  s was six miles behind. . . . In the morning a Syracusan force came up with the frightful news that the whole division of D  mosthen  s were prisoners. . . . The Athenians tried in vain to escape in the night. The next morning they set out, harassed as before, and driven wild by intolerable thirst. They at last reached the river Assinaros, which runs by the present town of Noto. There was the end. . . . The Athenians were so maddened by thirst that, though men were falling under darts and the water was getting muddy and bloody, they thought of nothing but drinking. . . . No further terms were made; most of the horsemen contrived to cut their way out; the rest were made prisoners. Most of them were embezzled by Syracusans as their private slaves; but about 7,000 men out of the two divisions were led prisoners into Syracuse. They were shut up in the stone-quarries, with no further heed than to give each man daily half a slave's allowance of food and drink. Many died; many were sold; some escaped, or were set free; the rest were after a while taken out of the quarries and set to work. The generals had made no terms for themselves. Hermokrates wished to keep them as hostages against future Athenian attempts against Sicily. Gylippos wished to take them in triumph to Sparta. The Corinthians were for putting them to death; and so it was done. . . . So ended the Athenian invasion of Sicily, the greatest attempt ever made by Greeks against Greeks, and that which came to the most utter failure."—E. A. Freeman, *The Story of Sicily*, pp. 117-187.

ALSO IN: Thucydides, *History*; trans. by B. Jowett, bk. 6-7 (c. 1).—See, also, SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.

B. C. 413-412.—Consequences of the Sicilian Expedition.—Spartan alliance with the Persians.—Plotting of Alcibiades.—The Decelion War.—"At Athens, where, even before this, every one had been in the most anxious suspense, the news of the loss of the expedition produced a consternation, which was certainly greater than

that at Rome after the battle of Cannae, or that in our own days, after the battle of Jena . . . At least 40,000 citizens, allies and slaves, had perished; and among them there may easily have been 10,000 Athenian citizens, most of whom belonged to the wealthier and higher classes. The flower of the Athenian people was destroyed, as at the time of the plague. It is impossible to say what amount of public property may have been lost; the whole fleet was gone. The consequences of the disaster soon shewed themselves. It was to be foreseen that Chios, which had long been wavering, and whose disposition could not be trusted, would avail itself of this moment to revolt; and the cities in Asia, from which Athens derived her large revenues, were expected to do the same. It was in fact, to be foreseen, that the four islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes, would instantly revolt. The Spartans were established at Decelea in Attica itself, and thence ravaged the country far and wide, so that it was impossible to venture to go to the coast without a strong escort. Although there were many districts in which no Spartan was seen from one year's end to the other, yet there was no safety anywhere, except in fortified places, and the Athenians were constantly obliged to guard the walls of their city, and this state of things had already been going on for the last twelve months. In this fearful situation, the Athenian people showed the same firmness as the Romans after the battle of Cannae. Had they but had one great man among them, to whom the state could have been entrusted, even more might perhaps have been done; but it is astonishing that, although there was no such man, and although the leading men were only second or third-rate persons, yet so many useful arrangements were made to meet the necessities of the case . . . The most unfortunate circumstance for the Athenians was, that Alcibiades, now an enemy of his country, was living among the Spartans; for he introduced into the undertakings of the Spartans the very element which before they had been altogether deficient in, namely energy and elasticity: he urged them on to undertakings, and induced them now to send a fleet to Ionia. . . Erythrae, Teos, and Miletus, one after another, revolted to the Peloponnesians, who now concluded treaties with Tissaphernes in the name of the king of Persia—Darius was then king—and in his own name as satrap; and in this manner they sacrificed to him the Asiatic Greeks. . . The Athenians were an object of antipathy and implacable hatred to the Persians; they had never doubted that the Athenians were their real opponents in Greece, and were afraid of them; but they did not fear the Spartans. They knew that the Athenians would take from them not only the islands, but the towns on the main land, and were in great fear of their maritime power. Hence they joined the Spartans; and the latter were not ashamed of negotiating a treaty of subsidies with the Persians, in which Tissaphernes, in the king's name, promised the assistance of the Phoenician fleet; and large subsidies, as pay for the army. . . In return for this, they renounced, in the name of the Greeks, all claims to independence for the Greek cities in Asia."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, v. 2, *lects.* 53 and 54.—See, also, GREECE: B. C. 418-412.

Also in: G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 61 (v. 7).

B. C. 413-412.—Revolt of Chios, Miletus, Lesbos and Rhodes from Athens.—Revolution of Samos. See GREECE: B. C. 418.

B. C. 413-411.—The Probuli.—Intrigues of Alcibiades.—Conspiracy against the Constitution.—The Four Hundred and the Five Thousand.—Immediately after the dreadful calamity at Syracuse became known, "extraordinary measures were adopted by the people; a number of citizens of advanced age were formed into a deliberative and executive body under the name of Probuli, and empowered to fit out a fleet. Whether this laid the foundation for oligarchical machinations or not, those aged men were unable to bring back men's minds to their former course, the prosecution of the Hermocypidae had been most mischievous in its results, various secret associations had sprung up and conspired to reap advantage to themselves from the distress and embarrassment of the state, the indignation caused by the infuriated excesses of the people during that trial, possibly here, as frequently happened in other Grecian states, determined the more respectable members of the community to guard against the recurrence of similar scenes in future, by the establishment of an aristocracy. Lastly, the watchful malice of Alcibiades, who was the implacable enemy of that populace, to whose blind fury he had been sacrificed, baffled all attempts to restore confidence and tranquillity, and there is no doubt that, whilst he kept up a correspondence with his partisans at home, he did everything in his power to increase the perplexity and distress of his native city from without, in order that he might be recalled to provide for its safety and defence. A favourable opportunity for the execution of his plans presented itself in the fifth year of his exile, OI 92 1, 411 B. C., as he had incurred the suspicion of the Spartans, and stood high in the favour of Tissaphernes, the Athenians thought that his intercession might enable them to obtain assistance from the Persian king. The people in Athens were headed by one of his most inveterate enemies, Androcles; and he well knew that all attempts to effect his return would be fruitless, until this man and the other demagogues were removed. Hence Alcibiades entered into negotiations with the commanders of the Athenian fleet at Samos, respecting the establishment of an oligarchical constitution, not from any attachment to that form of government in itself, but solely with the view of promoting his own ends. Phrynichus and Pisander were equally insincere in their co-operation with Alcibiades. . . Their plan was that the latter should reconcile the people to the change in the constitution which he wished to effect, by promising to obtain them the assistance of the great king; but they alone resolved to reap the benefit of his exertions. Pisander took upon himself to manage the Athenian populace. It was in truth no slight undertaking to attempt to overthrow a democracy of a hundred and twenty years' standing, and of intense development; but most of the able bodied citizens were absent with the fleet, whilst such as were still in the city were confounded by the imminence of the danger from without; on the other hand, the prospect of succour from the Persian king doubtless had some weight with them, and they possibly felt some symptoms of returning affection for their former favourite Alcibiades. Nevertheless, Pisan-

der and his accomplices employed craft and perfidy to accomplish their designs; the people were not persuaded or convinced, but entrapped into compliance with their measures. Pisander gained over to his purpose the above named clubs, and induced the people to send him with ten plenipotentiaries to the navy at Samos. In the mean time the rest of the conspirators prosecuted the work of remodelling the constitution."—W. Wachsmuth, *Hist. Antiquities of the Greeks*, v. 2, pp. 252-255.—The people, or an assembly cleverly made up and manipulated to represent the people, were induced to vote all the powers of government into the hands of a council of Four Hundred, of which council the citizens appointed only five members. Those five chose ninety-five more, to make one hundred, and each of that hundred then chose three colleagues. The conspirators thus easily made up the Four Hundred to their liking, from their own ranks. This council was to convene an assembly of Five Thousand citizens, whenever it saw fit to do so. But when news of this constitutional change reached the army at Samos, where the Athenian headquarters for the Ionian war were fixed, the citizen soldiers refused to submit to it—repudiated it altogether—and organized themselves as an independent state. The ruling spirit among them was Thrasybulus, and his influence brought about a reconciliation with Alcibiades, then an exile sheltered at the Persian court. Alcibiades was recalled by the army and placed at its head. Presently a reaction at Athens ensued, after the oligarchical party had given signs of treasonable communication with Sparta, and in June the people assembled in the Pnyx and reasserted their sovereignty. "The Council was deposed, and the supreme sovereignty of the state restored to the people—not, however, to the entire multitude; for the principle was retained of reserving full civic rights to a committee of men of a certain amount of property; and, as the lists of the Five Thousand had never been drawn up, it was decreed, in order that the desired end might be speedily reached, to follow the precedent of similar institutions in other states and to constitute all Athenians able to furnish themselves with a complete military equipment from their own resources, full citizens, with the rights of voting and participating in the government. Thus the name of the Five Thousand had now become a very inaccurate designation; but it was retained, because men had in the last few months become habituated to it. At the same time, the abolition of pay for civic offices and functions was decreed, not merely as a temporary measure, but as a fundamental principle of the new commonwealth, which the citizens were bound by a solemn oath to maintain. This reform was, upon the whole, a wise combination of aristocracy and democracy; and, according to the opinion of Thucydides, the best constitution which the Athenians had hitherto possessed. On the motion of Critias, the recall of Alcibiades was decreed about the same time; and a deputation was despatched to Samos, to accomplish the union between army and city."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 4, ch. 5.—Most of the leaders of the Four Hundred fled to the Spartan camp at Decelia. Two were taken, tried and executed.—Thucydides, *History*, bk. 8, sect. 48-51.—See, also, GREECE: B. C. 418-412.

Also in: V. Duruy, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 26 (v. 3).

B. C. 411-407.—Victories at Cynossema and Abydos.—Exploits of Alcibiades.—His triumphal return.—His appointment to command.—His second deposition and exile. See GREECE: B. C. 411-407.

B. C. 406.—The Peloponnesian War: Battle and victory of Arginusae.—Condemnation and execution of the Generals. See GREECE: B. C. 406; and above: B. C. 424-408.

B. C. 405.—The Peloponnesian War: Decisive defeat at Aigospotamoi. See GREECE: B. C. 405.

B. C. 404.—The Surrender to Lysander.—After the battle of Aegospotami (August, B. C. 405), which destroyed their navy, and cut off nearly all supplies to the city by sea, as the Spartans at Decelia had long cut off supplies upon the land side, the Athenians had no hope. They waited in terror and despair for their enemies to close in upon them. The latter were in no haste, for they were sure of their prey. Lysander, the victor at Aegospotami, came leisurely from the Hellespont, receiving on his way the surrender of the cities subject or allied to Athens, and placing Spartan harmosts and garrisons in them, with the local oligarchs established uniformly in power. About November he reached the Saronic gulf and blockaded the Athenian harbor of Piræus, while an overwhelming Peloponnesian land force, under the Lacedæmonian king Pausanias, arrived simultaneously in Attica and encamped at the gates of the city. The Athenians had no longer any power except the power to endure, and that they exercised for more than three months, mainly resisting the demand that their Long Walls—the walls which protected the connection of the city with its harbors—should be thrown down. But when famine had thinned the ranks of the citizens and broken the spirit of the survivors, they gave up. "There was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority, however, accepted them [the terms] and the acceptance was made known to Lysander. It was on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion,—about the middle or end of March,—that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus, twenty-seven years, almost exactly, after the surprise of Platea by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian War. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appear to have been serving with his army and assisting him with their counsel."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 65 (v. 8).—The Long Walls and the fortifications of Piræus were demolished, and then followed the organization of an oligarchical government at Athens, resulting in the reign of terror under "The Thirty."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 4, ch. 5.

Also in: Xenophon, *Hellenics*, bk. 2, ch. 2.—Plutarch, *Lysander*.

B. C. 404-403.—The tyranny of the Thirty.—The Year of Anarchy.—In the summer of B. C. 404, following the siege and surrender of Athens, and the humiliating close of the long Peloponnesian War, the returned leaders of the oligarchical party, who had been in exile, succeeded with the help of their Spartan friends, in overthrowing the democratic constitution of the city and establishing themselves in power. The revolution was accomplished at a public assem-

bly of citizens, in the presence of Lysander, the victorious Lacedæmonian admiral, whose fleet in the Piræus lay ready to support his demands. "In this assembly, Dracontidas, a scoundrel upon whom repeated sentences had been passed, brought forward a motion, proposing the transfer of the government into the hands of Thirty persons, and Theramenes supported this proposal which he declared to express the wishes of Sparta. Even now, these speeches produced a storm of indignation, after all the acts of violence which Athens had undergone, she yet contained men outspoken enough to venture to defend the constitution, and to appeal to the fact that the capitulation sanctioned by both parties contained no provision as to the internal affairs of Athens. But, hereupon, Lysander himself came forward and spoke to the citizens without reserve, like one who was their absolute master. By such means the motion of Dracontidas was passed, but only a small number of unpatriotic and cowardly citizens raised their hands in token of assent. All better patriots contrived to avoid participation in this vote. Next, ten members of the government were chosen by Critias and his colleagues [the Critias of Plato's Dialogues, pupil of Socrates, and now the violent and blood-thirsty leader of the anti-democratic revolution], ten by Theramenes, the confidential friend of Lysander, and finally ten out of the assembled multitude, probably by a free vote, and this board of Thirty was hereupon established as the supreme government authority by a resolution of the assembly present. Most of the members of the new government had formerly been among the Four Hundred, and had therefore long pursued a common course of action." The Thirty Tyrants so placed in power were masters of Athens for eight months, and executed their will without conscience or mercy, having a garrison of Spartan soldiers in the Acropolis to support them. They were also sustained by a picked body of citizens, "the Three Thousand," who bore arms while other citizens were stripped of every weapon. Large numbers of the more patriotic and high spirited Athenians had escaped from their unfortunate city and had taken refuge, chiefly at Thebes, the old enemy of Athens, but now sympathetic in her distress. At Thebes these exiles organized themselves under Thrasybulus and Anytus, and determined to expel the tyrants and to recover their homes. They first seized a strong post at Phyle, in Attica, where they gained in numbers rapidly, and from which point they were able in a few weeks to advance and occupy the Piræus. When the troops of The Thirty came out to attack them, they drew back to the adjacent height of Munychia and there fought a battle which delivered their city from the Tyrants. Critias, the master-spirit of the usurpation, was slain; the more violent of his colleagues took refuge at Eleusis, and Athens, for a time, remained under the government of a new oligarchical Board of Ten, while Thrasybulus and the democratic liberators maintained their headquarters at Munychia. All parties waited the action of Sparta. Lysander, the Spartan general, marched an army into Attica to restore the tyranny which was of his own creating; but one of the two Spartan kings, Pausanias, intervened, assumed the command in his own person, and applied his efforts to the arranging of peace

between the Athenian parties. The result was a restoration of the democratic constitution of the Attic state, with some important reforms. Several of The Thirty were put to death,—treacherously, it was said,—but an amnesty was extended to all their partisans. The year in which they and The Ten controlled affairs was termed in the official annals of the city the Year of Anarchy, and its magistrates were not recognized.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 4, ch. 5, and bk. 5, ch. 1.

ALSO IN Xenophon, *Hellenics*, bk. 2, ch. 3-4.—C. Sankey, *The Spartan and Theban Supremacies*, ch. 2-3.

B. C. 395-387.—**Confederacy against Sparta.**—Alliance with Persia.—The Corinthian War.—Conon's rebuilding of the Long Walls.—Athenian independence restored.—The Peace of Antalcidas. See GREECE, B. C. 399-387.

B. C. 378-371.—**Brief alliance with Thebes against Sparta.** See GREECE B. C. 379-371.

B. C. 378-357.—**The New Confederacy and the Social War.**—Upon the Liberation of Thebes and the signs that began to appear of the decline of Spartan power—during the year of the archonship of Nausimicus, B. C. 378-7, which was made memorable at Athens by various movements of political regeneration,—the organization of a new Confederacy was undertaken, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed a century before Athens was to be, "not the ruling capital, but only the directing city in possession of the primacy, the seat of the federal council." Callistratus was in a sense the Aristides of the new confederation and doubtless did much to bring about an agreement, it was likewise his work that, in place of the 'tributes' of odious memory, the payments necessary to the existence of the confederation were introduced under the gentler name of 'contributions.' Amicable relations were resumed with the Cyclades, Rhodes and Perinthus, in other words, the ancient union of navies was at once renewed upon a large scale and in a wide extent. Even such states joined it as had hitherto never stood in confederate relations with Athens, above all Thebes.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 6, ch. 1.—This second confederacy renewed much of the prosperity and influence of Athens for a brief period of about twenty years. But in 357 B. C., four important members of the Confederacy, namely, Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium leagued themselves in revolt, with the aid of Mausolus, prince of Caria, and an inglorious war ensued, known as the Social War, which lasted three years. Athens was forced at last to assent to the secession of the four revolted cities and to recognize their independence, which greatly impaired her prestige and power, just at the time when she was called upon to resist the encroachments of Philip of Macedonia.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 42.

B. C. 370-362.—**Alliance with Sparta against Thebes.**—Battle of Mantinea. See GREECE B. C. 371-362.

B. C. 359-338.—**The collision with Philip of Macedon.**—The Policy of Demosthenes and Policy of Phocion.—"A new period opens with the growth of the Macedonian power under Philip (359-336 B. C.) We are here chiefly concerned to notice the effect on the City-State [of Athens], not only of the strength and policy of this new power, but also of the efforts of the

Greeks themselves to counteract it. At the time of Philip's accession the so-called Theban supremacy had just practically ended with the death of Epaminondas. There was now a kind of balance of power between the three leading States, Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, no one of which was greatly stronger than the others, and such a balance could easily be worked upon by any great power from without. Thus when Macedon came into the range of Greek politics, under a man of great diplomatic as well as military capacity, who, like a Czar of to-day, wished to secure a firm footing on the sea-board of the Ægean [see GREECE, B. C. 359-338], she found her work comparatively easy. The strong imperial policy of Philip found no real antagonist except at Athens. Weak as she was, and straitened by the break up of her new confederacy, Athens could still produce men of great talent and energy, but she was hampered by divided counsels. Two Athenians of this period seem to represent the currents of Greek political thought, now running in two different directions. Demosthenes represents the cause of the City State in this age, of a union, that is, of perfectly free Hellenic cities against the common enemy. Phocion represents the feeling, which seems to have been long growing up among thinking men at Athens, that the City State was no longer what it had been, and could no longer stand by itself, that what was needed was a general Hellenic peace, and possibly even an arbiter from without, an arbiter not wholly un-Hellenic like the Persian, yet one who might succeed in stilling the fatal jealousies of the leading States. The efforts of Demosthenes to check Philip fall into two periods divided by the peace of Philocrates in 346 B. C. In the first of these he is acting chiefly with Athens alone; Philip is to him not so much the common enemy of Greece as the dangerous rival of Athens in the north. His whole mind was given to the internal reform of Athens so as to strengthen her against Philip. In her relation to other Greek States he perhaps hardly saw beyond a balance of power. After 346 his Athenian feeling seems to become more distinctly Hellenic. But what could even such a man as Demosthenes do with the Hellenas of that day? He could not force on the Greeks a real and permanent union; he could but urge new alliances. His strength was spent in embassies with this object, embassies too often futile. No alliance could save Greece from the Macedonian power, as subsequent events plainly showed. What was needed was a real federal union between the leading States, with a strong central controlling force; and Demosthenes' policy was hopeless just because Athens could never be the centre of such a union, nor could any other city. Demosthenes is thus the last, and in some respects the most heroic champion of the old Greek instinct for autonomy. He is the true child of the City-State, but the child of its old age and decrepitude. He still believes in Athens, and it is on Athens that all his hopes are based. He looks on Philip as one who must inevitably be the foe alike of Athens and of Greece. He seems to think that he can be beaten off as Xerxes was, and to forget that even Xerxes almost triumphed over the divisions of the Greek States, and that Philip is a nearer, a more prominent, and a far less barbarian foe. . . . Phocion was

the somewhat odd exponent of the practical side of a school of thought which had been gaining strength in Greece for some time past. This school was now brought into prominence by the rise of Macedon, and came to have a marked influence on the history of the City State. It began with the philosophers, and with the idea that the philosopher may belong to the world as well as to a particular city. . . . Athens was far more open to criticism now than in the days of Pericles, and a cynical dislike betrays itself in the Republic for the politicians of the day and their tricks, and a longing for a strong government of reason. Aristotle took the facts of city life as they were and showed how they might be made the most of. To him Macedon was assuredly not wholly barbarian; and war to the death with her kings could not have been to him as natural or desirable as it seemed to Demosthenes. And though he has nothing to tell us of Macedon, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that his desire was for peace and internal reform, even if it were under the guarantee of the northern power. . . . Of this philosophical view of Greek politics Phocion was in a manner the political exponent. But his policy was too much a negative one, it might almost be called one of indifference, like the feeling of Lessing and Goethe in Germany's most momentous period. So far as we know, Phocion never proposed an alliance of a durable kind, either Athenian or Hellenic, with Macedon, he was content to be a purely restraining influence. Athens had been constantly at war since 432, her own resources were of the weakest; there was little military skill to be found in her, no reserve force, much talk, but little solid courage. Athens was vulnerable at various points, and could not possibly defend more than one at a time, therefore Phocion despaired of war, and the event proved him right. The faithfulness of the Athenians towards him is a proof that they also instinctively felt that he was right. But he was wanting on the practical and creative side, and never really dominated either Athens, Greece, or Philip. . . . A policy of resistance found the City State too weak to defend itself; a policy of inaction would land it in a Macedonian empire which would still further weaken its remaining vitality. The first policy, that of Demosthenes, did actually result in disaster and the presence of Macedonian garrisons in Greek cities. The second policy then took its place, and initiated a new era for Greece. After the fatal battle of Chæronea (338 B. C.) Philip assumed the position of leader of the Greek cities.—W. W. Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*, ch. 10.—See, also, GREECE: 357-336.

B. C. 340.—Alliance with Byzantium against Philip of Macedon. See GREECE: B. C. 340.

B. C. 336-322.—End of the Struggle with the Macedonians.—Fall of Democracy.—Death of Demosthenes.—Athenian decline.—“An unexpected incident changes the whole aspect of things. Philip falls the victim of assassination; and a youth, who as yet is but little known, is his successor. Immediately Demosthenes institutes a second alliance of the Greeks; but Alexander suddenly appears before Thebes; the terrible vengeance which he here takes, instantly destroys the league; Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and several of their support

ers, are required to be delivered up; but Demades is at that time able to settle the difficulty and to appease the king. His strength was therefore enfeebled as Alexander departed for Asia; he begins to raise his head once more when Sparta attempts to throw off the yoke; but under Antipater he is overpowered. Yet it was about this very time that by the most celebrated of his discourses he gained the victory over the most eloquent of his adversaries; and Æschines was forced to depart from Athens. But this seems only to have the more embittered his enemies, the leaders of the Macedonian party; and they soon found an opportunity of preparing his downfall. When Harpalus, a fugitive from the army of Alexander, came with his treasures to Athens, and the question arose, whether he could be permitted to remain there, Demosthenes was accused of having been corrupted by his money, at least to be silent. This was sufficient to procure the imposition of a fine, and as this was not paid, he was thrown into prison. From thence he succeeded in escaping; but to the man who lived only for his country, exile was no less an evil than imprisonment. He resided for the most part in Ægina and at Træzen, from whence he looked with moist eyes toward the neighbouring Attica. Suddenly and unexpectedly a new ray of light broke through the clouds. Tidings were brought, that Alexander was dead. The moment of deliverance seemed at hand, the excitement pervaded every Grecian state; the ambassadors of the Athenians passed through the cities; Demosthenes joined himself to the number and exerted all his eloquence and power to unite them against Macedonia. In requital for such services, the people decreed his return; and years of sufferings were at last followed by a day of exalted compensation. A galley was sent to Ægina to bring back the advocate of liberty. . . . It was a momentary glimpse of the sun, which still darker clouds were soon to conceal. Antipater and Craterus were victorious; and with them the Macedonian party in Athens; Demosthenes and his friends were numbered among the accused, and at the instigation of Demades were condemned to die. . . . Demosthenes had escaped to the island Calauria in the vicinity of Træzen; and took refuge in the temple of Neptune. It was to no purpose that Archias, the satellite of Antipater, urged him to surrender himself under promise of pardon. He pretended he wished to write something; bit the quill, and swallowed the poison contained in it.—A. H. L. Heeren, *Reflections on the Politics of Ancient Greece*, trans. by G. Bancroft, pp. 278-280.—See, also, on the "Lamian War," the suppression of Democracy at Athens, and the expulsion of poor citizens, GREECE: B. C. 323-322.—"With the decline of political independence, . . . the mental powers of the nation received a fatal blow. No longer knit together by a powerful esprit de corps, the Greeks lost the habit of working for the common weal; and, for the most part, gave themselves up to the petty interests of home life and their own personal troubles. Even the better disposed were too much occupied in opposing the low tone and corruption of the times, to be able to devote themselves, in their moments of relaxation, to a free and speculative consideration of things. What could be expected in such an age, but that philosophy would take a decidedly practical

turn, if indeed it were studied at all? And yet such were the political antecedents of the Stoic and Epicurean systems of philosophy. . . . Stoic apathy, Epicurean self-satisfaction, and Sceptic imperturbability, were the doctrines which responded to the political helplessness of the age. They were the doctrines, too, which met with the most general acceptance. The same political helplessness produced the sinking of national distinctions in the feeling of a common humanity, and the separation of morals from politics which characterise the philosophy of the Alexandrian and Roman period. The barriers between nations, together with national independence, had been swept away. East and West, Greeks and barbarians, were united in large empires, being thus thrown together, and brought into close contact on every possible point. Philosophy might teach that all men were of one blood, that all were equally citizens of one empire, that morality rested on the relation of man to his fellow men, independently of nationalities and of social ranks, but in so doing she was only explicitly stating truths which had been already realised in part, and which were in part corollaries from the existing state of society."—E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, pp. 16-18—"What we have said concerning the evidence of comedy about the age of the first Diadochi amounts to this: Menander and his successors—they lasted barely two generations—printed in a few stereotypes a small and very worthless society at Athens. There was no doubt a similar set of people at Corinth, at Thebes, possibly even in the city of Lycurgus. These people, idle, for the most part rich, and in good society, spent their earlier years in debauchery, and their later in sentimental reflections and regrets. They had no serious object in life, and regarded the complications of a love affair as more interesting than the rise and fall of kingdoms or the gain and loss of a nation's liberty. They were like the people of our day who spend all their time reading novels from the libraries, and who can tolerate these eternal variations in twaddle not only without disgust but with interest. They were surrounded with slaves, on the whole more intelligent and interesting, for in the first place slaves were bound to exercise their brains, and in the second they had a great object—liberty—to give them a keen pursuit in life. The relations of the sexes in this set or portion of society were bad, owing to the want of education in the women, and the want of earnestness in the men. As a natural consequence a class was found, apart from household slaves, who took advantage of these defects, and, bringing culture to fascinate unprincipled men, established those relations which brought estrangements, if not ruin, into the home life of the day."—J. P. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 128-129.—"The amount of Persian wealth poured into Greece by the accidents of the conquest, not by its own industries, must have produced a revolution in prices not since equalled except by the influx of the gold of the Aztecs and Incas into Spain. I have already pointed out how this change must have pressed upon poor people in Greece who did not share in the plunder. The price of even necessary and simple things must have often risen beyond their means. For the adventurers brought home large fortunes, and the traders

and purveyors of the armies made them, and with these Eastern fortunes must have come in the taste for all the superior comforts and luxuries which they found among the Persian grandees. Not only the appointments of the table, in the way of plate and pottery, but the very tastes and flavours of Greek cookery must have profited by comparison with the knowledge of the East. So also the furniture, especially in carpets and hangings, must have copied Persian fashion, just as we still affect oriental stuffs and designs. It was not to be expected that the example of so many regal courts and so much royal ceremony should not affect those in contact with them. These influences were not only shown in the vulgar 'braggart captain,' who came to show off his sudden wealth in impudent extravagance among his old townspeople, but in the ordinary life of rich young men. So I imagine the personal appointments of Alcibiades, which were the talk of Greece in his day, would have appeared poor and mean beside those of Arctus, or of the generation which preceded him. Pictures and statues began to adorn private houses, and not temples and public buildings only—a change beginning to show itself in Demosthenes's day, but coming in like a torrent with the opening of Greece to the Eastern world. It was noticed that Phocion's house at Athens was modest in size and furniture, but even this was relieved from shabbiness by the quaint wall decoration of shining plates of bronze—a fashion dating from prehistoric times, but still admired for its very antiquity.—J. P. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 105-106.—The modern historians of Greece are much divided on the question where a history of Hellas ought to end. Curtius stops with the battle of Chaeroneia and the prostration of Athens before the advancing power of Macedon. Grote narrates the campaigns of Alexander, but stops short at the conclusion of the Lamian War, when Greece had in vain tried to shake off the supremacy of his generals. Thirlwall brings his narrative down to the time of Mummichus, the melancholy sack of Corinth and the constitution of Achaia as a Roman province. Of these divergent views we regard that of the German historian as the most correct. . . . The historic sense of Grote did not exclude prejudices, and in this case he was probably led astray by political bias. At the close of his ninety-sixth chapter, after mentioning the embassies sent by the degenerate Athenians to King Ptolemy, King Lysimachus, and Antipater, he throws down his pen in disgust, 'and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close.' Athens was no longer free and no longer dignified, and so Mr. Grote will have done with Greece at the very moment when the new Comedy was at its height, when the Museum was founded at Alexandria, when the plays of Euripides were acted at Babylon and Cabul, and every Greek soldier of fortune carried a diadem in his baggage. Surely the historian of Greece ought either to have stopped when the iron hand of Philip of Macedon put an end to the liberties and the political wranglings of Hellas, or else persevered to the time when Rome and Parthia crushed Greek power between them, like a ship between two icebergs. No doubt his reply would be, that he declined to regard the triumph abroad of Macedonian arms as a continuation of the history of Hellas. . . .

The truth is, that the history of Greece consists of two parts, in every respect contrasted one with the other. The first recounts the stories of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, and ends with the destruction of Thebes and the subjugation of Athens and Sparta. The Hellas of which it speaks is a cluster of autonomous cities in the Peloponnesus, the Islands, and Northern Greece, together with their colonies scattered over the coasts of Italy, Sicily, Thrace, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, and Africa. These cities care only to be independent, or at most to lord it over one another. Their political institutions, their religious ceremonies, their customs, are civic and local. Language, commerce, a common Pantheon, and a common art and poetry are the ties that bind them together. In its second phase, Greek history begins with the expedition of Alexander. It reveals to us the Greek as everywhere lord of the barbarian, as founding kingdoms and federal systems, as the instructor of all mankind in art and science, and the spreader of civil and civilized life over the known world. In the first period of her history Greece is forming herself, in her second she is educating the world. We will venture to borrow from the Germans a convenient expression, and call the history of independent Greece the history of Hellas, that of imperial Greece the history of Hellenism. . . . The Athens of Pericles was dictator among the cities which had joined her alliance. Corinth, Sparta, Thebes, were each the political head of a group of towns, but none of the three admitted these latter to an equal share in their councils, or adopted their political views. Even in the Olynthian League, the city of Olynthus occupied a position quite superior to that of the other cities. But the Greek cities had not tried the experiment of an alliance on equal terms. This was now attempted by some of the leading cities of the Peloponnesus, and the result was the Achaean League, whose history sheds a lustre on the last days of independent Greece, and whose generals will bear comparison with the statesmen of any Greek Republic [see GREECE B. C. 280-146].

On the field of Sellasia the glorious hopes of Cleomenes were wrecked, and the recently reformed Sparta was handed over to a succession of bloodthirsty tyrants, never again to emerge from obscurity. But to the Achaeans themselves the interference of Macedon was little less fatal. Henceforth a Macedonian garrison occupied Corinth, which had been one of the chief cities of the League, and King Antigonos Doson was the recognized arbiter in all disputes of the Peloponnesian Greeks. . . . In Northern Greece a strange contrast presented itself. The historic races of the Athenians and Boeotians languished in peace, obscurity, and luxury. With them every day saw something added to the enjoyments and elegancies of life, and every day politics drifted more and more into the background. On the other hand, the rude semi-Greeks of the West, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Epirotes, to whose manhood the repulse of the Gauls was mainly due, came to the front and showed the bold spirit of Greeks divorced from the finer faculties of the race. The Acarnanians formed a league somewhat on the plan of the Achaean. But they were overshadowed by their neighbors the Aetolians, whose union was of a different character. It was the first time that there had

been formed in Hellas a state framed in order to prey upon its neighbours. In the course of the Peloponnesian War Greek religion began to lose its hold on the Greeks. This was partly the work of the sophists and philosophers, who sought more lofty and moral views of Deity than were furnished by the tales of popular mythology. Still more it resulted from growing materialism among the people, who saw more and more of their immediate and physical needs, and less and less of the underlying spiritual elements in life. But though philosophy and materialism had made the religion of Hellas paler and feebler, they had not altered its nature or expanded it. It still remained essentially national, almost tribal. When, therefore, Greeks and Macedonians suddenly found themselves masters of the nations of the East, and in close contact with a hundred forms of religion, an extraordinary and rapid change took place in their religious ideas. In religion, as in other matters, Egypt set to the world the example of prompt fusion of the ideas of Greeks and natives. Into Greece proper, in return for her population which flowed out, there flowed in a crowd of foreign deities. Isis was especially welcomed at Athens, where she found many votaries. In every cult the more mysterious elements were made more of, and the brighter and more materialistic side passed by. Old statues which had fallen somewhat into contempt in the days of Pheidias and Praxiteles were restored to their places and received extreme veneration, not as beautiful, but as old and strange. On the coins of the previous period the representations of deities had been always the best that the die-cutter could frame, taking as his models the finest contemporary sculpture, but henceforth we often find them strange, uncouth figures, remnants of a period of struggling early art, like the Apollo at Amyclae, or the Hera of Samos. . . . In the intellectual life of Athens there was still left vitality enough to formulate the two most complete expressions of the ethical ideas of the times, the doctrines of the Stoics and the Epicureans, towards one or the other of which all educated minds from that day to this have been drawn. No doubt our knowledge of these doctrines, being largely drawn from the Latin writers and their Greek contemporaries, is somewhat coloured and unjust. With the Romans a system of philosophy was considered mainly in its bearing upon conduct, whence the ethical elements in Stoicism and Epicureanism have been by their Roman adherents so thrust into the foreground, that we have almost lost sight of the intellectual elements, which can have had little less importance in the eyes of the Greeks. Notwithstanding, the rise of the two philosophies must be held to mark a new era in the history of thought, an era when the importance of conduct was for the first time recognized by the Greeks. It is often observed that the ancient Greeks were more modern than our own ancestors of the Middle Ages. But it is less generally recognized how far more modern than the Greeks of Pericles were the Greeks of Aratus. In very many respects the age of Hellenism and our own age present remarkable similarity. In both there appears a sudden increase in the power over material nature, arising alike from the greater accessibility of all parts of the world

and from the rapid development of the sciences which act upon the physical forces of the world. In both this spread of science and power acts upon religion with a dissolving and, if we may so speak, centrifugal force, driving some men to take refuge in the most conservative forms of faith, some to fly to new creeds and superstitions, some to drift into unmeasured scepticism. In both the facility of moving from place to place, and finding a distant home, tends to dissolve the closeness of civic and family life, and to make the individual rather than the family or the city the unit of social life. And in the family relations, in the character of individuals, in the state of morality, in the condition of art, we find at both periods similar results from the similar causes we have mentioned.—P. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, ch. 15.

B. C. 317-316.—Siege by Polysperchon.—Democracy restored.—Execution of Phocion.—Demetrius of Phaleron at the head of the government. See GREECE B. C. 321-312.

B. C. 307-197.—Under Demetrius Poliorcetes and the Antigonids. See GREECE B. C. 307-197.

B. C. 288-263.—Twenty years of Independence.—Siege and subjugation by Antigonos Gonatas.—When Demetrius Poliorcetes lost the Macedonian throne, B. C. 288, his fickle Athenian subjects and late worshippers rose against his authority, drove his garrisons from the Museum and the Piræus and abolished the priesthood they had consecrated to him. Demetrius gathered an army from some quarter and laid siege to the city, but without success. The Athenians went so far as to invite Pyrrhus, the warrior king of Epirus, to assist them against him. Pyrrhus came and Demetrius retired. The dangerous ally contented himself with a visit to the Acropolis as a worshipper, and left Athens in possession, undisturbed, of her freshly gained freedom. It was enjoyed after a fashion for twenty years, at the end of which period, B. C. 268, Antigonos Gonatas, the son of Demetrius, having regained the Macedonian crown, reasserted his claim on Athens, and the city was once more besieged. The Lacedæmonians and Ptolemy of Egypt both gave some ineffectual aid to the Athenians, and the siege, interrupted on several occasions, was prolonged until B. C. 263, when Antigonos took possession of the Acropolis, the fortified Museum and the Piræus as a master (see MACEDONIA, &c., B. C. 277-244). This was sometimes called the Chremonidean War, from the name of a patriotic Athenian who took the most prominent part in the long defence of his city.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 61.

B. C. 229.—Liberation by the Achaian League. See GREECE, B. C. 280-146.

B. C. 200.—Vandalism of the second Macedonian Philip.—In the year B. C. 200 the Macedonian king, Philip, made an attempt to surprise Athens and failed. "He then encamped in the outskirts, and proceeded to wreak his vengeance on the Athenians, as he had indulged it at Thermus and Pergamus. He destroyed or defaced all the monuments of religion and of art, all the sacred and pleasant places which adorned the suburbs. The Academy, the Lyceum, and Cynosarges, with their temples, schools, groves and gardens, were all wasted with fire. Not even the sepulchres were spared."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 64.

B. C. 197-A. D. 138.—Under Roman rule.—"Athens . . . affords the disheartening picture of a commonwealth pampered by the supreme power, and financially as well as morally ruined. By rights it ought to have found itself in a flourishing condition. . . . No city of antiquity elsewhere possessed a domain of its own, such as was Attica, of about 700 square miles. . . . But even beyond Attica they retained what they possessed, as well after the Mithridatic War, by favour of Sulla, as after the Pharsalian battle, in which they had taken the side of Pompeius, by the favour of Caesar:—he asked them only how often they would still ruin themselves and trust to be saved by the renown of their ancestors. To the city there still belonged not merely the territory, formerly possessed by Haliartus, in Boeotia, but also on their own coast Salamis, the old starting point of their dominion of the sea, and in the Thracian Sea the lucrative islands Seyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, as well as Delos in the Aegean. . . . Of the further grants, which they had the skill to draw by flattery from Antoninus, Augustus, against whom they had taken part, took from them certainly Aegina and Eretria in Euboea, but they were allowed to retain the smaller islands of the Thracian Sea. . . . Hadrian, moreover, gave to them the best part of the great island of Cephalonia in the Ionian Sea. It was only by the Emperor Severus, who bore them no good will, that a portion of these extraneous possessions was withdrawn from them. Hadrian further granted to the Athenians the delivery of a certain quantity of grain at the expense of the empire, and by the extension of this privilege, hitherto reserved for the capital, acknowledged Athens, as it were, as another metropolis. Not less was the blissful institute of alimentary endowments, which Italy had enjoyed since Trajan's time, extended by Hadrian to Athens, and the capital requisite for this purpose certainly presented to the Athenians from his purse. Yet the community was in constant distress."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 7.

Also in J. P. Mahaffy, *The Greek World under Roman sway*.—See, also, GRIECL. B. C. 146-A. D. 180.

B. C. 87-86.—Siege and capture by Sulla.—Massacre of citizens.—Pillage and depopulation.—Lasting injuries.—The early successes of Mithridates of Pontus, in his savage war with the Romans, included a general rising in his favor among the Greeks [see *MITHRIDATIC WARS*], supported by the fleets of the Pontic king and by a strong invading army. Athens and the Piræus were the strongholds of the Greek revolt, and at Athens an adventurer named Aristion, bringing from Mithridates a body-guard of 2,000 soldiers, made himself tyrant of the city. A year passed before Rome, distracted by the beginnings of civil war, could effectively interfere. Then Sulla came (B. C. 87) and laid siege to the Piræus, where the principal Pontic force was lodged, while he shut up Athens by blockade. In the following March, Athens was starved to such weakness that the Romans entered almost unopposed and killed and plundered with no mercy; but the buildings of the city suffered little harm at their hands. The siege of the Piræus was carried on for some weeks longer, until Sulla had driven the Pontic forces from every part except Munychia, and that they evacu-

ated in no long time.—W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 7, ch. 17.—"Athens was . . . taken by assault. . . . The majority of the citizens was slain; the carnage was so fearfully great as to become memorable even in that age of bloodshed; the private movable property was seized by the soldiery, and Sulla assumed some merit to himself for not committing the rifeless houses to the flames. . . . The fate of the Piræus, which he utterly destroyed, was more severe than that of Athens. From Sulla's campaign in Greece the commencement of the ruin and depopulation of the country is to be dated. The destruction of property caused by his ravages in Attica was so great that Athens from that time lost its commercial as well as its political importance. The race of Athenian citizens was almost extirpated, and a new population, composed of a heterogeneous mass of settlers, received the right of citizenship."—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, ch. 1.

A. D. 54 (?).—The Visit of St. Paul.—Planting of Christianity.—"When the Jews of Thessalonica had knowledge that the word of God was proclaimed of Paul at Berea also, they came thither likewise, stirring up and troubling the multitude. And then immediately the brethren sent forth Paul to go as far as to the sea; and Silas and Timotheus abode there still. But they that conducted Paul brought him as far as Athens; and receiving a commandment unto Silas and Timotheus that they should come to him with all speed, they departed. Now while Paul waited for them at Athens, his spirit was provoked within him, as he beheld the city full of idols. So he reasoned in the synagogue with the Jews, and the devout persons, and in the market place every day with them that met with him. And certain also of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers encountered him. And some said, what would this babler say? other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods, because he preached Jesus and the resurrection. And they took hold of him, and brought him unto the Areopagus, saying, May we know what this new teaching is, which is spoken by thee? For thou bringest certain strange things to our ears: we would know therefore what these things mean. (Now all the Athenians and the strangers sojourning there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing.) And Paul stood in the midst of the Areopagus, and said, Ye men of Athens, in all things I perceive that ye are somewhat superstitious. For as I passed along and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with this inscription, 'To an Unknown God.' What therefore ye worship in ignorance, this set I forth unto you. . . . Now when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked; but others said, We will hear thee concerning this yet again. Thus Paul went out from among them. Howbeit certain men clave unto him, and believed; among whom also was Dionysius the Areopagite, and a woman named Damaris, and others with them."—*Acts of the Apostles, Revised Version*, ch. 17.—"Consider the difficulties which must have beset the planting of the Church in Athens. If the burning zeal of the great Apostle ever permitted him to feel diffidence in addressing an assembly, he may well have felt it when he addressed on Mars' Hill for the first time an Athenian crowd. No doubt the Athens of his time was in her decay, inferior in opulence and grandeur to many younger cities.

Yet even to a Jew, provided he had received some educational impressions beyond the fanatical shibboleths of Pharisaism, there was much in that wonderful centre of intelligence to shake his most inveterate prejudices and inspire him with unwilling respect. Shorn indeed of her political greatness, deprived even of her philosophical supremacy, she still shone with a brilliant after-glow of æsthetic and intellectual prestige. Her monuments flashed on the visitor memories recent enough to dazzle his imagination. Her schools claimed and obtained even from Emperors the homage due to her unique past. Recognising her as the true nurse of Hellenism and the chief missionary of human refinement, the best spirits of the age held her worthy of admiring love not unminged with awe. As the seat of the most brilliant and popular university, young men of talent and position flocked to her from every quarter, studied for a time within her colonnades, and carried thence the recollection of a culture which was not always deep, not always erudite, but was always and genuinely Attic. To subject to the criticism of this people a doctrine professing to come direct from God, a religion and not a philosophy, depending not on argument but on revelation, was a task of which the difficulties might seem insuperable. When we consider what the Athenian character was, this language will not seem exaggerated. Keen, subtle, capricious, satirical, sated with ideas, eager for novelty, yet with the eagerness of amused frivolity, not of the truth-seeker critical by instinct, exquisitely sensitive to the ridiculous or the absurd, disputatious, ready to listen, yet impatient of all that was not wit, satisfied with everything in life except its shortness, and therefore hiding all references to this unwelcome fact under a veil of complacent euphemism—where could a more uncongenial soil be found for the seed of the Gospel? . . . To an Athenian the Jew was not so much an object of hatred (as to the Roman), nor even of contempt (as to the rest of mankind), as of absolute indifference. He was simply ignored. To the eclectic philosophy which now dominated the schools of Athens, Judaism alone among all human opinions was as if non-existent. That Athenians should be convinced by the philosophy of a Jew would be a proposition expressible in words but wholly destitute of meaning. On the other hand, the Jew was not altogether uninfluenced by Greek thought. Wide apart as the two minds were, the Hebrew proved not insensible to the charm of the Hellenic; witness the Epistle to the Hebrews, witness Philo, witness the intrusion of Greek methods of interpretation even into the text-books of Rabbinism. And it was Athens, as the quintessence of Hellas, Athens as represented by Socrates, and still more by Plato, which had gained this subtle power. And just as Judæa alone among all the Jewish communities retained its exclusiveness wholly unimpaired by Hellenism, so Athens, more than any Pagan capital, was likely to ignore or repel a faith coming in the garb of Judaism. And yet within less than a century we find this faith so well established there as to yield to the Church the good fruits of martyrdom in the person of its bishop, and of able defences in the person of three of its teachers. The early and the later fortunes of the Athenian Church are buried in oblivion; it comes but for a brief period before the scene of history. But

the undying interest of that one dramatic moment when Paul proclaimed a bodily resurrection to the authors of the conception of a spiritual immortality, will always cause us to linger with a strange sympathy over every relic of the Christianity of Athens."—C. T. Cruttwell, *A Literary History of Early Christianity*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: W. J. Conybeare and J. S. Howson, *Life and Letters of St. Paul*, v. 1, ch. 10.—F. C. Baur, *Paul*, pt. 1, ch. 7 (v. 1).—On the inscription, see E. de Pressensé, *The Early Years of Christianity: The Apostolic Era*, bk. 2, ch. 1.

A. D. 125-134.—The works of Hadrian.—The Emperor Hadrian interested himself greatly in the venerable decaying capital of the Greeks, which he visited, or resided in, for considerable periods, several times, between A. D. 125 and 134. These visits were made important to the city by the great works of rebuilding which he undertook and supervised. Large parts of the city are thought to have been reconstructed by him, "in the open and luxurious style of Antioch and Ephesus." One quarter came to be called "Hadrianapolis," as though he had created it. Several new temples were erected at his command, but the greatest of the works of Hadrian at Athens was the completing of the vast national temple, the Olympieum, the beginning of which dated back to the age of Pisistratus, and which Augustus had put his hand to without finishing.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 66.

A. D. 267.—Capture of, by the Goths. See *Goths* A. D. 258-267.

A. D. 395.—Surrender to Alaric and the Goths.—When the Goths under Alaric invaded and ravaged Greece, A. D. 395, Athens was surrendered to them, on terms which saved the city from being plundered. "The fact that the depredations of Alaric hardly exceeded the ordinary license of a rebellious general, is perfectly established. The public buildings and monuments of ancient splendour suffered no wanton destruction from his visit, but there can be no doubt that Alaric and his troops levied heavy contributions on the city and its inhabitants."—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, ch. 2, sect. 8.

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 30.—See, also, *Goths* A. D. 395, *ALARIC'S INVASION OF GREECE*.

A. D. 529.—Suppression of the Schools by Justinian.—"The Attic schools of rhetoric and philosophy maintained their superior reputation from the Peloponnesian War to the reign of Justinian. Athens, though situate in a barren soil, possessed a pure air, a free navigation, and the monuments of ancient art. That sacred retirement was seldom disturbed by the business of trade or government; and the last of the Athenians were distinguished by their lively wit, the purity of their taste and language, their social manners, and some traces, at least in discourse, of the magnanimity of their fathers. In the suburbs of the city, the Academy of the Platonists, the Lyceum of the Peripatetics, the Portico of the Stoics and the Garden of the Epicureans were planted with trees and decorated with statues; and the philosophers, instead of being immured in a cloister, delivered their instructions in spacious and pleasant walks, which, at different hours, were consecrated to the exercises of the mind and body. The genius of the founders still lived in those venerable seats. . . .

The schools of Athens were protected by the wisest and most virtuous of the Roman princes. . . . Some vestige of royal bounty may be found under the successors of Constantine. . . . The golden chain, as it was fondly styled, of the Platonic succession, continued . . . to the edict of Justinian [A. D. 529] which imposed a perpetual silence on the schools of Athens, and excited the grief and indignation of the few remaining votaries of Greek science and superstition."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 40

A. D. 1205.—The founding of the Latin Dukedom.—"The portion of Greece lying to the south of the kingdom of Saloniki was divided by the Crusaders [after their conquest of Constantinople, A. D. 1204—see BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 1203-1204] among several great feudatories of the Empire of Romania. . . . The lords of Boudonitza, Salona, Negropont, and Athens are alone mentioned as existing to the north of the isthmus of Corinth, and the history of the petty sovereigns of Athens can alone be traced in any detail. . . . Otho de la Roche, a Burgundian nobleman, who had distinguished himself during the siege of Constantinople, marched southward with the army of Boniface the king marquis, and gained possession of Athens in 1205. Thebes and Athens had probably fallen to his share in the partition of the Empire, but it is possible that the king of Saloniki may have found means to increase his portion, in order to induce him to do homage to the crown of Saloniki for this addition. At all events, it appears that Otho de la Roche did homage to Boniface, either as his immediate superior, or as viceroy for the Emperor of Romania. . . . Though the Byzantine aristocracy and dignified clergy were severe sufferers by the transference of the government into the hands of the Franks, the middle classes long enjoyed peace and security. . . . The social civilization of the inhabitants, and their ample command of the necessities and many of the luxuries of life were in those days as much superior to the condition of the citizens of Paris and London as they are now inferior. . . . The city was large and wealthy, the country thickly covered with villages, of which the ruins may still be traced in spots affording no indications of Hellenic sites. . . . The trade of Athens was considerable, and the luxury of the Athenian ducal court was celebrated in all the regions of the West where chivalry flourished."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of Greece from its Conquest by the Crusaders*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: C. C. Felton, *Greece, Ancient and Modern*; 4th Course, lect. 5.

ATHERTON GAG, The. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1836

ATHLONE, Siege of (A. D. 1691). See IRELAND: A. D. 1689-1691.

ATHRAVAS. See MAGIANS.

ATIMIA.—The penalty of Atimia, under ancient Athenian law, was the loss of civic rights.—G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece: The State*, pt. 3, ch. 3.

ATIMUCA, The. See AMERICAN ARO-
RIGINES: TIMUCUA.

ATLANTA: A. D. 1864 (May-September).—Sherman's advance to the city.—Its siege and capture. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MAY: GEORGIA); and (MAY-SEPTEMBER: GEORGIA).

A. D. 1311-1456.—Under the Catalans and the Florentines. See CATALAN GRAND COMPANY.

A. D. 1456.—The Turks in possession.—Athens was not occupied by the Turks until three years after the conquest of Constantinople (see CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1453). In the meantime the reign of the Florentine dukes of the house of Acciafoli came to a tragical close. The last of the dukes, Maurice Acciafoli died, leaving a young son and a young widow, the latter renowned for her beauty and her talents. The duchess, whom the will of her husband had made regent, married a comely Venetian named Palmerio, who was said to have poisoned his wife in order to be free to accept her hand. Thereupon a nephew of the late duke, named Franco, stirred up insurrections at Athens and fled to Constantinople to complain to the sultan, Mahomet II. "The sultan, glad of all pretexts that coloured his armed intervention in the affairs of these principalities, ordered Omar, son of Tourakhan, chief of the permanent army of the Peloponnesus, to take possession of Athens, to dethrone the duchess and to confine her sons in his prisons of the citadel of Megara." This was done; but Palmerio, the duchess's husband, made his way to the sultan and interceded in her behalf. "Mahomet, by the advice of his viziers, feigned to listen equally to the complaints of Palmerio, and to march to reestablish the legitimate sovereignty. But already Franco, entering Megara under the auspices of the Ottomans, had strangled both the duchess and her son. Mahomet, advancing in turn to punish him for his vengeance, expelled Franco from Athens on entering it, and gave him, in compensation, the inferior and dependent principality of Thebes, in Boeotia. The sultan, as lettered as he was warlike, evinced no less pride and admiration than Sylla at the sight of the monuments of Athens. 'What gratitude,' exclaimed he before the Parthenon and the temple of Theseus, 'do not religion and the Empire owe to the son of Tourakhan, who has made them a present of these spoils of the genius of the Greeks?'"—A. Lamartine, *Hist. of Turkey*, bk. 13, sect. 10-12.

A. D. 1466.—Capture and plundering by the Venetians. See GREECE A. D. 1454-1479.

A. D. 1687.—Siege, bombardment and capture by the Venetians.—Destructive explosion in the Parthenon. See TURKS: A. D. 1684-1696.

A. D. 1821-1829.—The Greek revolution and war of independence.—Capture by the Turks. See GREECE A. D. 1821-1829.

A. D. 1864 (September-November).—Removal of inhabitants.—Destruction of the city. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER: GEORGIA), AND (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER: GEORGIA).

ATLANTIC CABLE. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY AND INVENTION: A. D. 1854-1866.

ATLANTIC OCEAN: The name.—The Atlantic Ocean is mentioned by that name in a single passage of Herodotus; "but it is clear, from the incidental way in which it [the name] is here introduced, that it was one well known in his day."—E. H. Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geog.*, ch. 7, sect. 1, note.—For a sketch of the history of the modern use of the name, see PACIFIC OCEAN.

ATREBATES.

ATREBATES, The.—This name was borne by a tribe in ancient Belgic Gaul, which occupied modern Artois and part of French Flanders, and, also, by a tribe or group of tribes in Britain, which dwelt in a region between the Thames and the Severn. The latter was probably a colony from the former. See *BELGÆ*; also *BRITAIN, CELTIC TRIBES*.

ATROPATENE. — MEDIA ATROPATENE.—"Atropatene, as a name for the Alpine land in the northwest of Iran (now Aderbeijan), came into use in the time of the Greek Empire [Alexander's]; at any rate we cannot trace it earlier. 'Athrapaiti' means 'lord of fire'; 'Athrapata,' 'one protected by fire'; in the remote mountains of this district the old fire-worship was preserved with peculiar zeal under the Seleucids."—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, bk. 7, ch. 4.—Atropatene "comprises the entire basin of Lake Urumiyeh, together with the country intervening between that basin and the high mountain chain which curves round the southwestern corner of the Caspian."—G. Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies: Media*, ch. 1.—Atropatene was "named in honour of the satrap Atropates, who had declared himself king after Alexander's death."—J. P. Mahaffy, *Story of Alexander's Empire*, ch. 13.

ATSINAS. See *AMERICAN ABORIGINES: BLACKFEET*.

ATTABEGS. See *ATABEGS*.

ATTACAPAN FAMILY, The. See *AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ATTACAPAN FAMILY*.

ATTAINER. — BILL OF ATTAINDER.—"An attainer ('attinctura') is a degradation or public dishonouring, which draws after it condemnation to death, and induces the disinheritance of the heirs of the condemned person, which can only be removed by means of parliament. A bill of attainder, or of pains and penalties, inflicts the consequences of a penal sentence on any state criminal. . . . By the instrumentality of such bill the penalties of high treason are generally imposed. Penalties may, however, be imposed at pleasure, either in accordance with, or in contravention of, the common law. No other court of law can protect a person condemned in such manner. The first bill of the kind occurred under Edward IV., when the commons had to confirm the statute condemning Clarence to death. This convenient method of getting rid of disagreeable opponents was in high favour during the reign of Henry VIII. . . . What had been an instrument of kingly despotism, under Tudor sway, was converted, under the Stuarts, into a parliamentary engine against the crown. The points of indictment against Strafford were so weak that the lords were for acquitting him. Thereupon, Sir Arthur Haselrig introduced a bill of attainder in the commons. The staunch friends of freedom, such as Pym and Hampden, did not support this measure. A bill of attainder may refer simply to a concrete case, and contrive penalties for acts which are not specially punishable by statute, whereas an impeachment applies to some violation of recognized legal principles, and is a solemn indictment preferred by the commons to the house of lords."—E. Fischel, *The Eng. Constitution*, bk. 7, ch. 9.—"By the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, forfeiture and attainder for treason or felony have been abolished."—T. P. Taswell-Lang-

ATTICA.

mead, *Eng. Const. Hist.*, ch. 10 (2d ed., p. 393), foot-note.

ATTAMAN, or HETMAN. See *COSSACKS*.

ATTECOTTI, The. See *OTADENT*; also, *BRITAIN, CELTIC TRIBES*.

ATTIC SALT.—Thyme was a favorite condiment among the ancient Greeks, "which thrived nowhere else so well as in Attica. Even salt was seasoned with thyme. Attic salt, however, is famed rather in the figurative than in the literal sense, and did not form an article of trade."—G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece: The State*, pt. 3, ch. 3.

ATTIC TALENT. See *TALENT*.

ATTIC WAR, The. See *TEN YEARS' WAR*.

ATTICA.—"It forms a rocky peninsula, separated from the mainland by trackless mountains, and jutting so far out into the Eastern Sea that it lay out of the path of the tribes moving from north to south. Hence the migratory passages which agitated the whole of Hellas left Attica untouched, and for this reason Attic history is not divided into such marked epochs as that of Peloponnesus; it possesses a superior unity, and presents an uninterrupted development of conditions of life native in their origin to the land. . . . On the other hand Attica was perfectly adapted by nature for receiving immigrants from the sea. For the whole country, as its name indicates, consists of coast-land; and the coast abounds in harbours, and on account of the depth of water in the roads is everywhere accessible; while the best of its plains open towards the coast. . . . Into the centre of the entire plain advances from the direction of Hymettus a group of rocky heights, among them an entirely separate and mighty block which, with the exception of a narrow access from the west, offers on all sides vertically precipitous walls, surmounted by a broad level sufficiently roomy to afford space for the sanctuaries of the national gods and the habitations of the national rulers. It seems as if nature had designedly placed this rock in this position as the ruling castle and the centre of the national history. This is the Acropolis of Athens. . . . So far from being sufficiently luxuriant to allow even the idle to find easy means of sustenance, the Attic soil was stony, devoid of a sufficient supply of water, and for the most part only adapted to the cultivation of barley; everywhere . . . labour and a regulated industry were needed. But this labour was not unremunerative. Whatever orchard and garden fruits prospered were peculiarly delicate and agreeable to the taste; the mountain herbs were nowhere more odorous than on Hymettus; and the sea abounded with fish. The mountains not only by the beauty of their form invest the whole scenery with a certain nobility, but in their depths lay an abundance of the most excellent building-stone and silver ore; in the lowlands was to be found the best kind of clay for purposes of manufacture. The materials existed for all arts and handicrafts; and finally Attica rejoiced in what the ancients were wise enough to recognize as a special favour of Heaven, a dry and transparent atmosphere. . . . The immigrants who domesticated themselves in Attica were . . . chiefly families of superior eminence, so that Attica gained not only in numbers of population, but also in materials of

ATTICA.

culture of every description."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 2, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: J. I. Lockhart, *Attica and Athens*.—See, also, ATHENS: THE BEGINNING.

ATTILA'S CONQUESTS AND EMPIRE. See HUNS.

ATTIOUANDARONK, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: HURONS, &c.

ATTYADÆ, The.—The first dynasty of the kings of Lydia, claimed to be sprung from Attya, son of the god Manes.—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, bk. 4, ch. 17.

AUBAINE, The right of.—"A prerogative by which the Kings of France claimed the property of foreigners who died in their kingdom without being naturalized." It was suppressed by Colbert, in the reign of Louis XIV.—J. A. Blanqui, *Hist. of Pol. Economy in Europe*, p. 285.

AUCH: Origin of the name. See AQUITAINE: THE ANCIENT TRIBES.

AUCKLAND, Lord, The Indian Administration of. See INDIA. A. D. 1836-1845.

AUDENARDE. See OUDINARDE.

AUDIENCIAS.—"For more than two centuries and a half the whole of South America, except Brazil, settled down under the colonial government of Spain, and during the greater part of that time this vast territory was under the rule of the Viceroy of Peru residing at Lima. The impossibility of conducting an efficient administration from such a centre . . . at once became apparent. Courts of justice called Audiencias were, therefore, established in the distant provinces, and their presidents, sometimes with the title of captains general, had charge of the executive under the orders of the Viceroy. The Audiencia of Charcas (the modern Bolivia) was established in 1559. Chile was ruled by captains general, and an Audiencia was established at Santiago in 1568. In New Grenada the president of the Audiencia, created in 1564, was also captain-general. The Audiencia of Quito, also with its president as captain-general, dated from 1542; and Venezuela was under a captain-general."—C. R. Markham, *Colonial Hist. of S. Am. (Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., v. 8, p. 295).*

AUERSTADT, Battle of. See GERMANY. A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER).

AUGEREAU, Marshal, Campaigns of. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (SEPTEMBER), GERMANY. A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER); SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (FEBRUARY—JUNE); and RUSSIA. A. D. 1812 (JUNE—SEPTEMBER); 1813 (AUGUST), (OCTOBER), (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

AUGHRIM, OR AGHRIM, Battle of (A. D. 1691). See IRELAND. A. D. 1689-1691.

AUGSBURG: Origin. See AUGUSTA VINDELICORUM.

A. D. 955.—Great defeat of the Hungarians. See HUNGARIANS: A. D. 934-955.

A. D. 1530.—Sitting of the Diet.—Signing and reading of the Protestant Confession of Faith.—The Imperial Decree condemning the Protestants. See PAPACY: A. D. 1530-1531.

A. D. 1555.—The Religious Peace concluded. See GERMANY: A. D. 1552-1561.

A. D. 1646.—Unsuccessful siege by Swedes and French. See GERMANY: A. D. 1646-1648.

A. D. 1686-1697.—The League and the War of the League. See GERMANY: A. D. 1686; and FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690, and after.

AUGURS.

A. D. 1703.—Taken by the French. See GERMANY: A. D. 1708.

A. D. 1801-1803.—One of six free cities which survived the Peace of Luneville. See GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1808.

A. D. 1806.—Loss of municipal freedom.—Absorption in the kingdom of Bavaria. See GERMANY. A. D. 1805-1806.

AUGURS. — PONTIFICES. — FETIALES.—"There was . . . enough of priesthood and of priests in Rome. Those, however, who had business with a god resorted to the god, and not to the priest. Every suppliant and inquirer addressed himself directly to the divinity . . . no intervention of a priest was allowed to conceal or to obscure this original and simple relation. But it was no easy matter to hold converse with a god. The god had his own way of speaking, which was intelligible only to those acquainted with it; but one who did rightly understand it knew not only how to ascertain, but also how to manage, the will of the god, and even in case of need to overreach or to constrain him. It was natural, therefore, that the worshipper of the god should regularly consult such men of skill and listen to their advice; and thence arose the corporations or colleges of men specially skilled in religious lore, a thoroughly national Italian institution, which had a far more important influence on political development than the individual priests or priesthoods. These colleges have been often, but erroneously, confounded with the priesthoods. The priesthoods were charged with the worship of a specific divinity . . . Under the Roman constitution and that of the Latin communities in general there were originally but two such colleges: that of the augurs and that of the pontifices. The six augurs were skilled in interpreting the language of the gods from the flight of birds; an art which was prosecuted with great earnestness and reduced to a quasi-scientific system. The five 'bridge builders' (pontifices) derived their name from their function, as sacred as it was politically important, of conducting the building and demolition of the bridge over the Tiber. They were the Roman engineers, who understood the mystery of measures and numbers, whence there devolved upon them also the duties of managing the calendar of the state, of proclaiming to the people the time of new and full moon and the days of festivals, and of seeing that every religious and every judicial act took place on the right day. . . . Thus they acquired (although not probably to the full extent till after the abolition of the monarchy) the general oversight of Roman worship and of whatever was connected with it. [The president of their college was called the Pontifex Maximus.] . . . They themselves described the sum of their knowledge as 'the science of things divine and human.' . . . By the side of these two oldest and most eminent corporations of men versed in spiritual lore may be to some extent ranked the college of the twenty state-heralds (fetiales, of uncertain derivation) destined as a living repository to preserve traditionally the remembrance of the treaties concluded with neighboring communities, to pronounce an authoritative opinion on alleged infractions of treatyrights, and in case of need to demand satisfaction and declare war."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 1, ch. 12.

Also in: E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect 103—See, also, AUSPICES, and FETIALES.

AUGUSTA TREVIRORUM. See TRÈVES, ORIGIN OF.

AUGUSTA VEROMANDUORUM.—Modern St. Quentin. See BELGÆ.

AUGUSTA VINDELICORUM.—"Augusta Vindellicorum is the modern Augsburg, founded, it may be supposed, about the year 740 [B. C. 14] after the conquest of Rætia by Drusus. . . The Itineraries represent it as the centre of the roads from Verona, Sirmium, and Treviri"—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch 36, note.

AUGUSTODUNUM.—The Emperor Augustus changed the name of Bibracte in Gaul to Augustodunum, which time has corrupted, since to Autun.

AUGUSTONEMETUM. See GERGOVIA OF THE ARVERNI.

AUGUSTUS.—AUGUSTA: The Title.—"Octavius [see ROME: B. C. 31-14] had warily declined any of the recognized designations of sovereign rule. Antonius had abolished the dictatorship, his successor respected the acclamations with which the people had greeted this decree. The voices which had saluted Cæsar with the title of king were peremptorily commanded to be dumb. Yet Octavius was fully aware of the influence which attached to distinctive titles of honour. While he scrupulously renounced the names upon which the breath of human jealousy had blown, he conceived the subtler policy of creating another for himself, which borrowing its original splendour from his own character, should reflect upon him an untarnished lustre.

The epithet Augustus . . . had never been borne by any man before. . . But the adjunct, though never given to a man had been applied to things most noble, most venerable and most divine. The rites of the gods were called august, the temples were august; the word itself was derived from the holy auguries by which the divine will was revealed, it was connected with the favour and authority of Jove himself. . . The illustrious title was bestowed upon the heir of the Cæsarian Empire in the middle of the month of January, 727 [B. C. 27], and thenceforth it is by the name of Augustus that he is recognized in Roman history."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch 30—"When Octavianus had firmly established his power and was now left without a rival, the Senate, being desirous of distinguishing him by some peculiar and emphatic title, decreed, in B. C. 27, that he should be styled Augustus, an epithet properly applicable to some object demanding respect and veneration beyond what is bestowed upon human things. . . This being an honorary appellation . . . it would, as a matter of course, have been transmitted by inheritance to his immediate descendants. . . Claudius, although he could not be regarded as a descendant of Octavianus, assumed on his accession the title of Augustus, and his example was followed by all succeeding rulers . . . who communicated the title of Augusta to their consorts."—W. Ramsay, *Manual of Roman Antiq.*, ch. 5.—See, also, ROME: B. C. 31—A. D. 14.

AULA REGIA. The. See CURIA REGIS OF THE NORMAN KINGS.

AULDEARN, Battle of (A. D. 1645). See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1644-1645.

AULERCI, The.—The Aulerci were an extensive nation in ancient Gaul which occupied the country from the lower course of the Seine to the Mayenne. It was subdivided into three great tribes—the Aulerci Cenomanni, Aulerci Diablintes and Aulerci Eburovices—Napoleon III., *Hist. of Cæsar*, bk 3, ch 2.

AULIC COUNCIL, The. See GERMANY: A. D. 1498-1519.

AUMALE, Battle of (1592). See FRANCE: A. D. 1591-1593.

AUNEAU, Battle of (1587). See FRANCE: A. D. 1584-1589.

AURANGZEB, Moghul Emperor, or Padishah of India, A. D. 1658-1707.

AURAY, Battle of (1365). See BRITTANY: A. D. 1341-1365.

AURELIAN, Roman Emperor. A. D. 270-275.

AURELIAN ROAD, The.—One of the great Roman roads of antiquity, which ran from Rome to Pisa and Luna—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk 4, ch 11.

AURELIO, King of Leon and the Asturias, or Oviedo, A. D. 768-774.

AURUNCANS, The. See AUSONIANS, also OSCANS.

AUSCI, The. See AQUITAINE, THE ANCIENT TRIBES.

AUSGLEICH, The. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1866-1867.

AUSONIANS, OR AURUNCANS, The.—A tribe of the ancient Volscians, who dwelt in the lower valley of the Liris, and who are said to have been exterminated by the Romans, B. C. 314—W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 3, ch. 10.—See, also, OSCANS.

AUSPICES, Taking the.—"The Romans, in the earlier ages of their history, never entered upon any important business whatsoever, whether public or private, without endeavouring, by means of divination, to ascertain the will of the gods in reference to the undertaking. . . This operation was termed 'sumere auspicia'; and if the omens proved unfavourable the business was abandoned or deferred. . . No meeting of the Comitia Curiata nor of the Comitia Centuriata could be held unless the auspices had been previously taken. . . As far as public proceedings were concerned, no private individual, even among the patricians, had the right of taking auspices. This duty devolved upon the supreme magistrate alone. . . In an army this power belonged exclusively to the commander-in-chief; and hence all achievements were said to be performed under his auspices, even although he were not present. . . The objects observed in taking these auspices were birds, the class of animals from which the word is derived ('Auspicium ab ave spicienda'). Of these, some were believed to give indications by their flight. . . others by their notes or cries. . . while a third class consisted of chickens ('pulli') kept in cages. When it was desired to obtain an omen from these last, food was placed before them, and the manner in which they comported themselves was closely watched. . . The manner of taking the auspices previous to the Comitia was as follows:—The magistrate who was to preside at the assembly arose immediately after midnight on the day for which it had been summoned, and called upon an augur to assist him. . . With his aid a region of the sky and

a space of ground, within which the auspices were observed, were marked out by the divining staff ('lituus') of the augur. This operation was performed with the greatest care. . . . In making the necessary observations, the president was guided entirely by the augur, who reported to him the result"—W. Ramsay, *Manual of Rom. Antiq.*, ch 4

Also in: W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk 6, ch 13—See, also, AUGUR.

AUSTERLITZ, Battle of. See FRANCE A D 1805 (MARCH—DECEMBER)

AUSTIN, Stephen F., and the settlement of Texas. See TEXAS A D 1819-1835

AUSTIN CANONS, OR CANONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE.—'About the middle of the 11th century an attempt had been made to redress the balance between the regular and secular clergy, and restore to the latter the influence and consideration in spiritual matters which they had, partly by their own fault, already to a great extent lost. Some earnest and thoughtful spirits, distressed at once by the abuse of monastic privileges and by the general decay of ecclesiastical order, sought to effect a reform by the establishment of a stricter and better organized discipline in those cathedral and other churches which were served by colleges of secular priests. . . . Towards the beginning of the twelfth century the attempts at canonical reform issued in the form of what was virtually a new religious order, that of the Augustinians, or Canons Regular of the order of S Augustine. Like the monks and unlike the secular canons, from whom they were carefully distinguished, they had not only their table and dwelling but all things in common, and were bound by a vow to the observance of their rule, grounded upon a passage in one of the letters of that great father of the Latin Church from whom they took their name. Their scheme was a compromise between the old-fashioned system of canons and that of the monastic confraternities, but a compromise leaning strongly towards the monastic side. . . . The Austin canons, as they were commonly called, made their way across the channel in Henry's reign"—K. Norgate, *England under the Angevin Kings*, v. 1, ch 1

Also in: E. L. Cutts, *Scenes and Characters of the Middle Ages*, ch 3

AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1601-1800.—Discovery and early exploration.—The founding of the penal colonies at Sydney and Norfolk Island.—"Australia has had no Columbus. It is even doubtful if the first navigators who reached her shores set out with any idea of discovering a great south land. At all events, it would seem, their achievements were so little esteemed by themselves and their countrymen that no means were taken to preserve their names in connexion with their discoveries. Holland long had the credit of bringing to light the existence of that island-continent, which until recent years was best known by her name. In 1661, however, Mr. Major, to whom we are indebted for more recent research upon the subject, produced evidence which appeared to demonstrate that the Portuguese had reached the shores of Australia in 1601, five years before the Dutch yacht *Duyphen*, or *Dove*,—the earliest vessel whose name has been handed down,—sighted, about March, 1606, what is believed to have been the coast near Cape York. Mr. Major,

in a learned paper read before the Society of Antiquaries in 1872, indicated the probability that the first discovery was made 'in or before the year 1581.' The dates of two of the six maps from which Mr. Major derives his information are 1531 and 1542. 'The latter clearly indicates Australia, which is called *Jave la Grande*. New Zealand is also marked"—F. P. Labilliere, *Early Hist. of the Colony of Victoria*, ch 1.—In 1606, De Quiros, a Spanish navigator, sailing from Peru, across the Pacific, reached a shore which stretched so far that he took it to be a continent. "He called the place 'Tierra Australis de Espiritu Santo,' that is 'Southern Land of the Holy Spirit.' It is now known that this was not really a continent, but merely one of the New Hebrides Islands, and more than a thousand miles away from the mainland. . . . In after years, the name he had invented was divided into two parts; the island he had really discovered being called *Espiritu Santo*, while the continent he thought he had discovered was called *Terra Australis*. This last name was shortened by another discoverer—Flinders—to the present term *Australia*." After the visit to the Australian coast of the small Dutch ship, the "Dove," it was touched, during the next twenty years, by a number of vessels of the same nationality. "In 1622 a Dutch ship, the 'Lecuwien,' or 'Lioness,' sailed along the southern coast and its name was given to the southwest cape of Australia. . . . In 1623 General Carpenter sailed completely round the large Gulf to the north, which has taken its name from this circumstance. Thus, by degrees, all the northern and western, together with part of the southern shores, came to be roughly explored, and the Dutch even had some idea of colonizing this continent. . . . During the next fourteen years we hear no more of voyages to Australia; but in 1642 Antony Van Diemen, the Governor of the Dutch possessions in the East Indies, sent out his friend Abel Jansen Tasman, with two ships, to make discoveries in the South Seas." Tasman discovered the island which he called Van Diemen's Land, but which has since been named in his own honor—Tasmania. "This he did not know to be an island; he drew it on his maps as if it were a peninsula belonging to the mainland of Australia." In 1699, the famous buccaneer, William Dampier, was given the command of a vessel sent out to the southern seas, and he explored about 900 miles of the north-western coast of Australia; but the description which he gave of the country did not encourage the adventurous to seek fortune in it. "We hear of no further explorations in this part of the world until nearly a century after; and, even then, no one thought of sending out ships specially for the purpose. But in the year 1770 a series of important discoveries were indirectly brought about. The Royal Society of London, calculating that the planet Venus would cross the disc of the sun in 1769, persuaded the English Government to send out an expedition to the Pacific Ocean for the purpose of making observations on this event which would enable astronomers to calculate the distance of the earth from the sun. A small vessel, the 'Endeavour,' was chosen; astronomers with their instruments embarked, and the whole placed under the charge of" the renowned sailor, Captain James Cook. The astronomical purposes of the expedition

were satisfactorily accomplished at Otaheite, and Captain Cook then proceeded to an exploration of the shores of New Zealand and Australia. Having entered a fine bay on the south-eastern coast of Australia, "he examined the country for a few miles inland, and two of his scientific friends—Sir Joseph Banks and Dr. Solander—made splendid collections of botanical specimens. From this circumstance the place was called Botany Bay, and its two head-lands received the names of Cape Banks and Cape Solander. It was here that Captain Cook . . . took possession of the country on behalf of His Britannic Majesty, giving it the name 'New South Wales,' on account of the resemblance of its coasts to the southern shores of Wales. Shortly after they had set sail from Botany Bay they observed a small opening in the land, but Cook did not stay to examine it, merely marking it on his chart as Port Jackson, in honour of his friend Sir George Jackson. . . . The reports brought home by Captain Cook completely changed the beliefs current in those days with regard to Australia. . . . It so happened that, shortly after Cook's return, the English nation had to deal with a great difficulty in regard to its criminal population. In 1776 the United States declared their independence, and the English then found they could no longer send their convicts over to Virginia, as they had formerly done. In a short time the gaols of England were crowded with felons. It became necessary to select a new place of transportation; and, just as this difficulty arose, Captain Cook's voyages called attention to a land in every way suited for such a purpose, both by reason of its fertility and of its great distance. Viscount Sydney, therefore, determined to send out a party to Botany Bay, in order to found a convict settlement there; and in May, 1787, a fleet was ready to sail." After a voyage of eight months the fleet arrived at Botany Bay, in January, 1788. The waters of the Bay were found to be too shallow for a proper harbour, and Captain Phillip, the appointed Governor of the settlement, set out, with three boats, to search for something better. "As he passed along the coast he turned to examine the opening which Captain Cook had called Port Jackson, and soon found himself in a winding channel of water, with great cliffs frowning overhead. All at once a magnificent prospect opened on his eyes. A harbour, which is, perhaps, the most beautiful and perfect in the world, stretched before him far to the west, till it was lost on the distant horizon. It seemed a vast maze of winding waters, dotted here and there with lovely islets. . . . Captain Phillip selected, as the place most suitable to the settlement, a small inlet, which, in honour of the Minister of State, he called Sydney Cove. It was so deep as to allow vessels to approach within a yard or two of the shore." Great difficulties and sufferings attended the founding of the penal settlement, and many died of actual starvation as well as of disease; but in twelve years the population had risen to between 6,000 and 7,000 persons. Meantime a branch colony had been established on Norfolk Island. In 1793 Governor Phillip, broken in health, had resigned, and in 1795 he had been succeeded by Governor Hunter. "When Governor Hunter arrived, in 1795, he brought with him, on board his ship, the *Reliance*, a young surgeon, George Bass,

and a midshipman called Matthew Flinders. They were young men of the most admirable character. . . . Within a month after their arrival they purchased a small boat about eight feet in length, which they christened the 'Tom Thumb.' Its crew consisted of themselves and a boy to assist." In this small craft they began a survey of the coast, usefully charting many miles of it. Soon afterwards, George Bass, in an open whale-boat, pursued his explorations southwards, to the region now called Victoria, and through the straits which bear his name, thus discovering the fact that Van Diemen's Land, or Tasmania, is an island, not a peninsula. In 1798, Bass and Flinders, again associated and furnished with a small sloop, sailed round and surveyed the entire coast of Van Diemen's Land. Bass now went to South America and there disappeared. Flinders was commissioned by the British Government in 1800 to make an extensive survey of the Australian coasts, and did so. Returning to England with his maps, he was taken prisoner on the way by the French and held in captivity for six years, while the fruits of his labor were stolen. He died a few years after being released.—A. and G. Sutherland, *Hist. of Australia*, ch. 1-3.

Also in: G. W. Rusden, *Hist. of Australia*, ch. 1-3 (v. 1).

A. D. 1800-1840.—Beginning of the Prosperity of New South Wales.—Introduction of sheep-farming.—The founding of Victoria and South Australia.—"For twenty years and more no one at home gave a thought to New South Wales, or 'Botany Bay,' as it was still erroneously called, unless in vague horror and compassion for the poor creatures who lived there in exile and starvation. The only civilizing element in the place was the presence of a devoted clergyman named Johnson, who had voluntarily accompanied the first batch of convicts. . . . Colonel Lachlan Macquarie entered on the office of governor in 1810, and ruled the settlement for twelve years. His administration was the first turning point in its history. . . . Macquarie saw that the best and cheapest way of ruling the convicts was to make them freemen as soon as possible. Before his time, the governors had looked on the convicts as slaves, to be worked for the profit of the government and of the free-settlers. Macquarie did all he could to elevate the class of emancipists, and to encourage the convicts to persevere in sober industry in the hope of one day acquiring a respectable position. He began to discontinue the government farms, and to employ the convicts in road-making, so as to extend the colony in all directions. When he came to Sydney, the country more than a day's ride from the town was quite unknown. The growth of the settlement was stopped on the west by a range called the Blue Mountains, which before his time no one had succeeded in crossing. But in 1813, there came a drought upon the colony: the cattle, on which everything depended, were unable to find food. Macquarie surmised that there must be plenty of pasture on the plains above the Blue Mountains: he sent an exploring party, telling them that a pass must be discovered. In a few months, not only was this task accomplished, and the vast and fertile pastures of Bathurst reached, but a road 130 miles long was made, connecting them with Sydney. The Lachlan and Macquarie rivers were

traced out to the west of the Blue Mountains. Besides this, coal was found at the mouth of the Hunter river, and the settlement at Newcastle formed. . . . When it became known that the penal settlement was gradually becoming a free colony, and that Sydney and its population were rapidly changing their character, English and Scotch people soon bethought them of emigrating to the new country. Macquarie returned home in 1822, leaving New South Wales four times as populous, and twenty times as large as when he went out, and many years in advance of what it might have been under a less able and energetic governor. The discovery of the fine pastures beyond the Blue Mountains settled the destiny of the colony. The settlers came up thither with their flocks long before Macquarie's road was finished, and it turned out that the downs of Australia were the best sheep-walks in the world. The sheep thrives better there, and produces finer and more abundant wool, than anywhere else. John Macarthur, a lieutenant in the New South Wales corps, had spent several years in studying the effect of the Australian climate upon the sheep, and he rightly surmised that the staple of the colony would be its fine wool. In 1803, he went to England and procured some pure Spanish merino sheep from the flock of George III. . . . The Privy Council listened to his wool projects, and he received a large grant of land. Macarthur had found out the true way to Australian prosperity. When the great upland pastures were discovered, the merino breed was well established in the colony, and the sheep owners, without waiting for grants, spread with their flocks over immense tracts of country. This was the beginning of what is called squatting. The squatters afterwards paid a quit rent to the government and thus got their runs, as they called the great districts where they pastured their flocks, to a certain extent secured to them. . . . Hundreds upon hundreds of square miles of the great Australian downs were now explored and stocked with sheep for the English wool market. . . . It was in the time of Macquarie's successor, Sir Thomas Brisbane, that the prospects of New South Wales became generally known in England. Free emigrants, each bringing more or less capital with him, now poured in; and the demand for labour became enormous. At first the penal settlements were renewed as depots for the supply of labour, and it was even proposed that the convicts should be sold by auction on their arrival; but in the end the influx of free labourers entirely altered the question. In Brisbane's time, and that of his successor, Sir Ralph Darling, wages fell and work became scarce in England, and English working men now turned their attention to Australia. Hitherto the people had been either convicts or free settlers of more or less wealth, and between these classes there was great bitterness of feeling, each, naturally enough, thinking that the colony existed for their own exclusive benefit. The free labourers who now poured in greatly contributed in course of time to fusing the population into one. In Brisbane's time, trial by jury and a free press were introduced. The finest pastures in Australia, the Darling Downs near Moreton Bay, were discovered and settled [1825]. The rivers which pour into Moreton Bay were explored: one of them was named the Brisbane, and a few miles from its mouth the town of the same name

was founded. Brisbane is now the capital of the colony of Queensland, and other explorations in his time led to the foundation of a second independent colony. The Macquarie was traced beyond the marshes, in which it was supposed to lose itself, and named the Darling; and the Murray river was discovered [1829]. The tracing out of the Murray river by the adventurous traveller Sturt, led to a colony on the site which he named South Australia. In Darling's time, the Swan River Colony, now called Western Australia, was commenced. Darling . . . was the first to sell the land at a small fixed price, on the system adopted in America.

Darling returned to England in 1831, and the six years administration of his successor, Sir Richard Bourke, marks a fresh turning point in Australian history. In his time the colony threw off two great offshoots. Port Phillip, on which now stands the great city of Melbourne, had been discovered in 1802, and in the next year the government sent thither a convict colony. This did not prosper, and this fine site was neglected for thirty years. When the sudden rise of New South Wales began, the squatters began to settle to the west and north of Port Phillip; and the government at once sent an exploring party, who reported most favourably of the country around. In 1836, Governor Bourke founded a settlement in this new land, which had been called, from its rich promise, Australia Felix, and under his directions the site of a capital was laid out, to be called Melbourne, in honour of the English Prime Minister. This was in 1837, so that the beginning of the colony corresponds nearly with that of Queen Victoria's reign, a circumstance which afterwards led to its being named Victoria. Further west still, a second new colony arose about this time on the site discovered by Sturt in 1829. This was called South Australia, and the first governor arrived there at the end of the year 1836. The intended capital was named Adelaide, in honour of the Queen of William IV. Both the new colonies were commenced on a new system, called from its inventor the Wakefield system, but the founders of South Australia were able to carry it out most effectually, because they were quite independent of the experience and the prejudices of the Sydney government. Mr Wakefield was an ingenious man and a clever writer. . . . His notion was that the new colonies ought to be made 'fairly to represent English society.' His plan was to arrest the strong democratic tendencies of the new community, and to reproduce in Australia the strong distinction of classes which was found in England. He wanted the land sold as dear as possible, so that labourers might not become land-owners; and the produce of the land was to be applied in tempting labourers to emigrate with the prospect of better wages than they got at home. A company was easily formed to carry out these ideas in South Australia. . . . Like the settlement of Carolina as framed by Locke and Somers, it was really a plan for getting the advantages of the colony into the hands of the non-labouring classes: and by the natural laws of political economy, it failed everywhere. Adelaide became the scene of an Australian 'bubble.' The land-jobbers and money-lenders made fortunes: but the people who emigrated, mostly belonging to the middle and upper

classes, found the scheme to be a delusion. Land rapidly rose in value, and as rapidly sank; and lots for which the emigrants had paid high prices became almost worthless. The labourers emigrated elsewhere, and so did those of the capitalists who had anything left. . . . The depression of South Australia, however, was but temporary. It contains the best corn land in the whole island: and hence it of course soon became the chief source of the food supply of the neighbouring colonies, besides exporting large quantities of corn to England. It contains rich mines of copper, and produces large quantities of wool."—E. J. Payne, *Hist. of European Colonies*, ch. 12. See SOUTH WALES, VICTORIA, and SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

ALSO IN: G. W. Rusden, *Hist. of Australia*.

A. D. 1839-1855.—Progress of the Port Phillip District.—Its Separation from New South Wales and erection into the colony of Victoria.—Discovery of Gold.—Constitutional organization of the colony.—"In 1839 the population of Port Phillip amounted to nearly 6,000, and was being rapidly augmented from without. The sheep in the district exceeded half a million, and of cattle and horses the numbers were in proportion equally large. The place was daily growing in importance. The Home Government therefore decided to send an officer, with the title of Superintendent, to take charge of the district, but to act under the Governor of New South Wales. Charles Joseph La Trobe, Esq., was appointed to this office. . . . He arrived at Melbourne on the 30th September, 1839. Soon after this all classes of the new community appear to have become affected by a mania for speculation. . . . As is always the case when speculation takes the place of steady industry, the necessities of life became fabulously dear. Of money there was but little, in consideration of the amount of business done, and large transactions were effected by means of paper and credit. From highest to lowest, all lived extravagantly. . . . Such a state of things could not last forever. In 1842, by which time the population had increased to 24,000, the crash came. . . . From this depression the colony slowly recovered, and a sounder business system took the place of the speculative one. . . . All this time, however, the colony was a dependency of New South Wales, and a strong feeling had gained ground that it suffered in consequence. . . . A cry was raised for separation. The demand was, as a matter of course, resisted by New South Wales, but as the agitation was carried on with increased activity, it was at last yielded to by the Home authorities. The vessel bearing the intelligence arrived on the 11th November, 1850. The news soon spread, and great was the satisfaction of the colonists. Rejoicings were kept up in Melbourne for five consecutive days. . . . Before, however, the separation could be legally accomplished, it was necessary that an Act should be passed in New South Wales to settle details. . . . The requisite forms were at length given effect to, and, on the 1st July, 1851, a day which has ever since been scrupulously observed as a public holiday, it was proclaimed that the Port Phillip district of New South Wales had been erected into a separate colony to be called Victoria, after the name of Her Most Gracious Majesty. At the same time the Superintendent, Mr. C. J. La Trobe, was raised to the rank of Lieutenant-

Governor. At the commencement of the year of separation the population of Port Phillip numbered 78,000, the sheep 6,000,000, the cattle 380,000. . . . In a little more than a month after the establishment of Victoria as an independent colony, it became generally known that rich deposits of gold existed within its borders. . . . The discovery of gold . . . in New South Wales, by Hargreaves, in February, 1851, caused numbers to emigrate to that colony. This being considered detrimental to the interests of Victoria, a public meeting was held in Melbourne on the 9th of June, at which a 'gold-discovery committee' was appointed, which was authorized to offer rewards to any that should discover gold in remunerative quantities within the colony. The colonists were already on the alert. At the time this meeting was held, several parties were out searching for, and some had already found gold. The precious metal was first discovered at Clunes, then in the Yarra ranges at Anderson's Creek, soon after at Buninyong and Ballarat, shortly afterwards at Mount Alexander, and eventually at Bendigo. The deposits were found to be richer and to extend over a wider area than any which had been discovered in New South Wales. Their fame soon spread to the adjacent colonies, and thousands hastened to the spot. . . . When the news reached home, crowds of emigrants from the United Kingdom hurried to our shores. Inhabitants of other European countries quickly joined in the rush. Americans from the Atlantic States were not long in following. Stalwart Californians left their own gold-yielding rocks and placers to try their fortunes at the Southern Eldorado. Last of all, swarms of Chinese arrived, eager to unite in the general scramble for wealth. . . . The important position which the Australian colonies had obtained in consequence of the discovery of gold, and the influx of population consequent thereon, was the occasion of the Imperial Government determining in the latter end of 1852 that each colony should be invited to frame such a Constitution for its government as its representatives might deem best suited to its own peculiar circumstances. The Constitution framed in Victoria, and afterwards approved by the British Parliament, was avowedly based upon that of the United Kingdom. It provided for the establishment of two Houses of Legislature, with power to make laws, subject to the assent of the Crown as represented generally by the Governor of the colony; the Legislative Council, or Upper House, to consist of 30, and the Legislative Assembly, or Lower House, to consist of 60 members. Members of both Houses to be elective and to possess property qualifications. Electors of both Houses to possess either property or professional qualifications [the property qualification of members and electors of the Lower House has since been abolished]. . . . The Upper House not to be dissolved, but five members to retire every two years, and to be eligible for re-election. The Lower House to be dissolved every five years [since reduced to three], or oftener, at the discretion of the Governor. Certain officers of the Government, four at least of whom should have seats in Parliament, to be deemed 'Responsible Ministers.' . . . This Constitution was proclaimed in Victoria on the 23d November, 1855."—H. H. Hayter, *Notes on the Colony of Victoria*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: F P Labilliere, *Early Hist of the Colony of Victoria*, v 2—W Westgarth, *First Twenty Years of the Colony of Victoria*.

A. D. 1859.—Separation of the Moreton Bay District from New South Wales.—Its erection into the colony of Queensland.—“Until December, 1859, the north west portion of the Fifth Continent was known as the Moreton Bay district, and belonged to the colony of New South Wales, but at that date it had grown so large that it was erected into a separate and independent colony, under the name of Queensland. It lies between lat 10° 43' S and 29° S, and long 138° and 153° E, bounded on the north by Torres Straits, on the north-east by the Coral Sea, on the east by the South Pacific; on the south by New South Wales and South Australia, on the west by South Australia and the Northern Territory, and on the north-west by the Gulf of Carpentaria. It covers an area twenty times as large as Ireland, twenty three times as large as Scotland, and eleven times the extent of England. Numerous good harbours are found, many of which form the outlets of navigable rivers. The principal of these [is] Moreton Bay, at the head of which stands Brisbane, the capital of the colony. The mineral wealth of Queensland is very great, and every year sees it more fully developed. Until the year 1867, when the Gympie field was discovered, gold mining as an industry was hardly known.”—C H Eden, *The Fifth Continent* ch 10.

A. D. 1885-1892.—Proposed Federation of the Colonies.—“It has been a common saying in Australia that our fellow countrymen in that part of the world did not recognise the term ‘Australian,’ each recognised only his own colony and the empire. But the advocates of combination for certain common purposes achieved a great step forward in the formation of a ‘Federal Council’ in 1885. It was to be only a ‘Council,’ its decisions having no force over any colony unless accepted afterwards by the colonial Legislature. Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, and West Australia joined, New South Wales, South Australia, and New Zealand standing out, and, so constituted, it met twice. The results of the deliberations were not unsatisfactory, and the opinion that the move was in the right direction rapidly grew. In February of 1890 a Federation Conference, not private but representative of the different Governments, was called at Melbourne. It adopted an address to the Queen declaring the opinion of the conference to be that the best interests of the Australian colonies require the early formation of a union under the Crown into one Government, both legislative and executive. Events proceed quickly in Colonial History. In the course of 1890 the hesitation of New South Wales was finally overcome, powerful factors being the weakening of the Free Trade position at the election of 1890, the report of General Edwards on the Defences, and the difficulties about Chinese immigration. A Convention accordingly assembled at Sydney in March, 1891, which agreed upon a Constitution to be recommended to the several Colonies.”—A. Caldecott, *English Colonisation and Empire*, ch 7, sect. 2.—“On Monday, March 2nd, 1891, the National Australasian Convention met at the Parliament House, Sydney, New South Wales, and was attended by seven representatives from each Colony, except New Zealand, which only sent

three. Sir Henry Parkes (New South Wales) was elected President of the Convention, and Sir Samuel Griffith (Queensland), Vice-President. A series of resolutions, moved by Sir Henry Parkes, occupied the attention of the Convention for several days. These resolutions set forth the principles upon which the Federal Government should be established, which were to the effect that the powers and privileges of existing Colonies should be kept intact, except in cases where surrender would be necessary in order to form a Federal Government, that intercolonial trade and intercourse should be free; that power to impose Customs duties should rest with the Federal Government and Parliament, and that the naval and military defence of Australia should be entrusted to the Federal Forces under one command. The resolutions then went on to approve of a Federal Constitution which should establish a Federal Parliament to consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, that a Judiciary, to consist of a Federal Supreme Court, to be a High Court of Appeal for Australia, should be established, and that a Federal Executive, consisting of a Governor-General, with responsible advisers, should be constituted. These resolutions were discussed at great length, and eventually were adopted. The resolutions were then referred to three Committees chosen from the delegates, one to consider Constitutional Machinery and the distribution of powers and functions, one to deal with matters relating to Finance, Taxation, and Trade Regulations, and the other to consider the question of the establishment of a Federal Judiciary. A draft Bill, to constitute the ‘Commonwealth of Australia,’ was brought up by the first mentioned of these Committees, and after full consideration was adopted by the Convention, and it was agreed that the Bill should be presented to each of the Australian Parliaments for approval and adoption. On Thursday, April 9th, the Convention closed its proceedings. The Bill to provide for the Federation of the Australasian colonies entitled ‘A Bill to constitute a Commonwealth of Australia,’ which was drafted by the National Australasian Convention, has been introduced into the Parliaments of most of the colonies of the group, and is still (October, 1892), under consideration. In Victoria it has passed the Lower House with some amendments.”—*Statesman's Year-book*, 1893, p 308.

A. D. 1890.—New South Wales and Victoria.—“New South Wales bears to Victoria a certain statistical resemblance. The two colonies have [1890] about the same population, and, roughly speaking, about the same revenues, expenditure, debt and trade. In each, a great capital collects in one neighbourhood more than a third of the total population. But . . . considerable differences lie behind and are likely to develop in the future. New South Wales, in the opinion of her enemies, is less enterprising than Victoria, and has less of the go-ahead spirit which distinguishes the Melbourne people. On the other hand she possesses a larger territory, abundant supplies of coal, and will have probably, in consequence, a greater future. Although New South Wales is three and a half times as large as Victoria, and has the area of the German Empire and Italy combined, she is of course much smaller than the three other but as yet less important colonies of the Australian continent [see

QUEENSLAND, SOUTH AUSTRALIA and WESTERN AUSTRALIA] As the country was in a large degree settled by assisted emigrants, of whom something like half altogether have been Irish, while the English section was largely composed of Chartists, . . . the legislation of New South Wales has naturally shown signs of its origin. Manhood suffrage was carried in 1858, the abolition of primogeniture in 1862, safe and easy transfer of land through the machinery of the Torrens Act in the same year, and also the abolition of state aid to religion. A public system of education was introduced, with other measures of democratic legislation. . . . Public education which in Victoria is free, is still paid for by fees in New South Wales, though children going to or returning from school are allowed to travel free by railway. In general it may be said that New South Wales legislation in recent times has not been so bold as the legislation of Victoria. . . . The land of New South Wales has to a large extent come into the hands of wealthy persons who are becoming a territorial aristocracy. This has been the effect firstly of grants and of squatting legislation, then of the perversion of the Act of 1861 [for 'Free Selection before Survey'] to the use of those against whom it had been aimed, and finally of natural causes—soil, climate and the lack of water. . . . The traces of the convict element in New South Wales have become very slight in the national character. The prevailing cheerfulness, running into fickleness and frivolity, with a great deal more vivacity than exists in England, does not suggest in the least the intermixture of convict blood. It is a natural creation of the climate, and of the full and varied life led by colonists in a young country. . . . A population of an excellent type has swallowed up not only the convict element, but also the unstable and thriftless element shipped by friends in Britain to Sydney or to Melbourne. The ne'er-do-weels were either somewhat above the average in brains, as was often the case with those who recovered themselves and started life afresh, or people who drank themselves to death and disappeared and left no descendants. The convicts were also of various classes, some of them were men in whom crime was the outcome of restless energy, as, for instance, in many of those transported for treason and for manslaughter; while some were people of average morality ruined through companions, wives, or sudden temptation, and some persons of an essentially depraved and criminal life. The better classes of convicts, in a new country, away from their old companions and old temptations, turned over a new leaf, and their abilities and their strong vitality, which in some cases had wrought their ruin in the old world, found healthful scope in subduing to man a new one. Crime in their cases was an accident, and would not be transmitted to the children they left behind them. On the other hand, the genuine criminals, and also the drunken ne'er-do-weels, left no children. Drink and vice among the 'assigned servants' class of convicts, and an absence of all facilities for marriage, worked them off the face of the earth, and those who had not been killed before the gold discovery generally drank themselves to death upon the diggings."—Sir C. W. Dilke, *Problems of Greater Britain*, pt. 2, ch. 2.

AUSTRASIA AND NEUSTRIA, OR NEUSTRASIA.—"It is conjectured by Luden, with great probability, that the Ripuarians were originally called the 'Eastern' people to distinguish them from the Salian Franks who lived to the West. But when the old home of the conquerors on the right bank of the Rhine was united with their new settlements in Gaul, the latter, as it would seem, were called Neustria or Neustrasia (New Lands), while the term Austrasia came to denote the original seats of the Franks, on what we now call the German bank of the Rhine. The most important difference between them (a difference so great as to lead to their permanent separation into the kingdoms of France and Germany by the treaty of Verdun) was this that in Neustria the Frankish element was quickly absorbed by the mass of Gallo-Romanism by which it was surrounded, while in Austrasia, which included the ancient seats of the Frankish conquerors, the German element was wholly predominant. The import of the word Austrasia (Austria, Austrifranzia) is very fluctuating. In its widest sense it was used to denote all the countries incorporated into the Frankish Empire, or even held in subjection to it, in which the German language and population prevailed, in this acceptance it included therefore the territory of the Alemanni, Bavarians, Thuringians, and even that of the Saxons and Frises. In its more common and proper sense it meant that part of the territory of the Franks themselves which was not included in Neustria. It was subdivided into Upper Austrasia on the Moselle, and Lower Austrasia on the Rhine and Meuse. Neustria (or, in the fulness of the monkish Latinity, Neustrasia) was bounded on the north by the ocean, on the south by the Loire, and on the southwest [southeast?] towards Burgundy by a line which, beginning below Gen on the Loire, ran through the rivers Long and Yonne, not far from their sources, and passing north of Auxerre and south of Troyes, joined the river Aube above Arcis"—W. C. Perry, *The Franks*, ch. 3—"The northeastern part of Gaul, along the Rhine, together with a slice of ancient Germany, was already distinguished, as we have seen, by the name of the Eastern Kingdom, or Osterrike, Latinized into Austrasia. It embraced the region first occupied by the Ripuarian Franks, and where they still lived the most compactly and in the greatest number. . . . This was, in the estimation of the Franks, the kingdom by eminence, while the rest of the north of Gaul was simply not it—'ne-osterrike,' or Neustria. A line drawn from the mouth of the Scheldt to Cambrai, and thence across the Marne at Chateau-Thierry to the Aube of Bar-sur-Aube, would have separated the one from the other, Neustria comprising all the northwest of Gaul, between the Loire and the ocean, with the exception of Brittany. This had been the first possession of the Salian Franks in Gaul. . . . To such an extent had they been absorbed and influenced by the Roman elements of the population, that the Austrasians scarcely considered them Franks, while they, in their turn, regarded the Austrasians as the merest untutored barbarians."—P. Godwin, *Hist. of France: Ancient Gaul*, bk. 3, ch. 18, with note. ALSO IN: E. A. Freeman, *Hist. Geog. of Europe*, ch. 5, sect. 5.—See, also, FRANKS (MEROVINGIAN EMPIRE): A. D. 511-752.

AUSTRIA.

The Name.—"The name of Austria, Oesterreich—Ostrich as our forefathers wrote it—is, naturally enough, a common name for the eastern part of any kingdom. The Frankish kingdom of the Merwings had its Austria; the Italian kingdom of the Lombards had its Austria also. We are half inclined to wonder that the name was never given in our own island either to Essex or to East-Anglia. But, while the other Austrias have passed away, the Oesterreich, the Austria, the Eastern mark of the German kingdom, its defence against the Magyar invader, has lived on to our own times. It has not only lived on, but it has become one of the chief European powers. And it has become so by a process to which it would be hard to find a parallel."—E. A. Freeman, *The Historical Geography of Europe*, v. 1, ch. 8, p. 305.

The birthplace.—"On the disputed frontier, in the zone of perpetual conflict, were formed and developed the two states which, in turn, were to dominate over Germany, namely, Austria and Prussia. Both were born in the midst of the enemy. The cradle of Austria was the Eastern march, established by Charlemagne on the Danube, beyond Bavaria, at the very gate through which have passed so many invaders from the Orient. . . . The cradle of Prussia was the march of Brandenburg, between the Elbe and the Oder, in the region of the exterminated Slavs."—E. Lavisse, *General View of the Political History of Europe*, ch. 3, sect. 13.

The Singularity of Austrian history.—"A power which is not a national power."—It is by no means an easy task to tell the story of the various lands which have at different times come under the dominion of Austrian princes, the story of each land by itself, and the story of them all in relation to the common power. A continuous narrative is impossible. . . . Much mischief has been done by one small fashion of modern speech. It has within my memory become usual to personify nations and powers on the smallest occasions in a way which was formerly done only in language more or less solemn, rhetorical or poetical. We now talk every moment of England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, as if they were persons. And as long as it is only England, France, Germany, Russia, or Italy of which we talk in this way, no practical harm is done; the thing is a mere question of style. For those are all national powers. . . . But when we go on to talk in this way of 'Austria,' of 'Turkey,' direct harm is done; thought is confused, and facts are misrepresented. . . . I have seen the words 'Austrian national honour'; I have come across people who believed that 'Austria' was one land inhabited by 'Austrians,' and that 'Austrians' spoke the 'Austrian' language. All such phrases are misapplied. It is to be presumed that in all of them 'Austria' means something more than the true Austria, the archduchy; what is commonly meant by them is the whole dominions of the sovereign of Austria. People fancy that the inhabitants of those dominions have a common being, a common interest, like that of the people of England, France, or Italy. . . . There is no Austrian language, no Austrian nation; therefore there can be no such thing as 'Austrian national honour.' Nor can there be an 'Austrian policy' in

the same sense in which there is an English or a French policy, that is, a policy in which the English or French government carries out the will of the English or French nation. . . . Such phrases as 'Austrian interests,' 'Austrian policy,' and the like, do not mean the interests or the policy of any land or nation at all. They simply mean the interests and policy of a particular ruling family, which may often be the same as the interests and wishes of particular parts of their dominions, but which can never represent any common interest or common wish on the part of the whole. . . . We must ever remember that the dominions of the House of Austria are simply a collection of kingdoms, duchies, etc., brought together by various accidental causes, but which have nothing really in common, no common speech, no common feeling, no common interest. In one case only, that of the Magyars in Hungary, does the House of Austria rule over a whole nation; the other kingdoms, duchies, etc., are only parts of nations, having no tie to one another, but having the 'closest ties to other parts of their several nations which lie close to them, but which are under other governments. The only bond among them all is that a series of marriages, wars, treaties, and so forth, have given them a common sovereign. The same person is king of Hungary, Archduke of Austria, Count of Tyrol, Lord of Trieste, and a hundred other things. That is all. . . . The growth and the abiding dominion of the House of Austria is one of the most remarkable phenomena in European history. Powers of the same kind have arisen twice before; but in both cases they were very short-lived, while the power of the House of Austria has lasted for several centuries. The power of the House of Anjou in the twelfth century, the power of the House of Burgundy in the fifteenth century, were powers of exactly the same kind. They too were collections of scraps, with no natural connexion, brought together by the accidents of warfare, marriage, or diplomacy. Now why is it that both these powers broke in pieces almost at once, after the reigns of two princes in each case, while the power of the House of Austria has lasted so long? Two causes suggest themselves. One is the long connexion between the House of Austria and the Roman Empire and kingdom of Germany. So many Austrian princes were elected Emperors as to make the Austrian House seem something great and imperial in itself. I believe that this cause has done a good deal towards the result; but I believe that another cause has done yet more. This is that, though the Austrian power is not a national power, there is, as has been already noticed, a nation within it. While it contains only scraps of other nations, it contains the whole of the Magyar nation. It thus gets something of the strength of a national power. . . . The kingdom of Hungary is an ancient kingdom, with known boundaries which have changed singularly little for several centuries; and its connexion with the archduchy of Austria and the kingdom of Bohemia is now of long standing. Anything beyond this is modern and shifting. The so-called 'empire of Austria' dates only from the year 1804. This is one of the simplest matters in the world, but one which is constantly forgotten. . . . A smaller point on which con-

fusion also prevails is this: All the members of the House of Austria are commonly spoken of as archdukes and archduchesses. I feel sure that many people, if asked the meaning of the word archduke, would say that it was the title of the children of the 'Emperor of Austria, as grand-duke is used in Russia and prince in most countries. In truth archduke is the title of the sovereign of Austria. He has not given it up, for he calls himself Archduke of Austria still, though he calls himself 'Emperor of Austria' as well. But by German custom the children of a duke or count are all called dukes and counts for ever and ever. In this way the Prince of Wales is called 'Duke of Saxony,' and in the same way all the children of an Archduke of Austria are archdukes and archduchesses. Formally and historically then the taking of an hereditary imperial title by the Archduke of Austria in 1804 and the keeping of it after the

growth, ages in which the idea of right, as embodied in law, was the leading idea of statesmen, and the idea of rights justified or justifiable by the letter of law, was a profound influence with politicians.

The house of Austria lays thus the foundation of that empire which is to be one of the great forces of the next age, not by fraud, not by violence, but here by a politic marriage, here by a well advocated inheritance, here by a claim on an imperial fief forfeited or escheated honestly where the letter of the law is in her favour, by chicanery it may be here and there, but that a chicanery that wears a specious garb of right. The imperial idea was but a small influence compared with the superstructure of right, inheritance, and suzerainty, that legal instincts and a general acquiescence in legal forms had raised upon it."—W. Stubbs, *Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History*, pp. 209-215.



prince who took it had ceased in 1806 to be King of Germany and Roman Emperor-elect, was a sheer and shameless imposture. But it is an imposture which has thoroughly well served its ends."—E. A. Freeman, *Preface to Leger's History of Austro-Hungary*.—"Medieval History is a history of rights and wrongs, modern History as contrasted with medieval divides itself into two portions, the first a history of powers, forces, and dynasties, the second, a history in which ideas take the place of both rights and forces. . . . Austria may be regarded as representing the more ancient form of right. . . . The middle ages proper, the centuries from the year 1000 to the year 1500, from the Emperor Henry II. to the Emperor Maximilian, were ages of legal

The Races.—"The ethnical elements of the population are as follows (1890 for Austria and 1880 for Hungary) on the basis of language.—Austria (1890) German 8,461,580, Bohemian, Moravian and Slovak 5,472,871, Polish 3,719,232, Ruthenian 3,105,221, Slovene 1,176,672; Serbian and Croatian 644,926, Italian and Latin 675,305, Roumanian 209,110, Magyar 8,139; Hungary (1880) German 1,972,115; Bohemian, Moravian and Slovak 1,892,806; Ruthenian 360,051, Slovene 86,401; Serbian and Croatian 2,859,708, Roumanian 2,428,387, Magyar 6,478,711, Gipsies 82,256; Others 83,940."—*Statesman's Year-Book*, 1893; ed. by J. S. Keltie.

A. D. 805-1246.—The Rise of the Margrave, and the creation of the Duchy, under the

history of Austria, so far as it has importance, is unique in being the history of a Family and not the history of a history of a Dynastic and not of a National Power. Territorially, the name was attached, until 1806, to an incon- ch-duchy, on the Danube in that corner of Teutonic Europe where the Germans of the Middle Ages fought back races and the Slaves. Dynastically, it became connected, in the 13th century, with a House, then insignificant, and to the future remarkable fortunes of that House the territory so named contributed little more than a strong tion and a capital town.

Count of Hapsburg, with whom the importance of Austrian history begins, was elected Emperor in 1273, for that his possessions were small and the resoluteness of his character was unknown. He disappointed the Electors the weight and reviving the power of the Imperial office, which they had not at all desired, and he used its rously for the benefit of himself and his own. The King of Bohemia resisted him and was defeated and slain; and the dominions which the Bohemian king had acquired, including Austria (then a duchy), Carniola and Styria, was d by Rodolph, for his sons. The House of Hapsburg thus became the House of Austria, and its history is what me of Austrian history from that time until 1806.

psburg family has never produced men of the higher intellectual powers, or the higher qualities of any kind; but e vitality has been proved in it, and a politic self-seeking capability, which has never, perhaps, persisted through erations in any other line. It owes to these qualities the acquisition, again and again, of the elective Imperial crown, own settled, at last, upon the heirs of the House, in practically hereditary succession, despite the wish of the ermany to keep it shifting among the weaker members of their order, and despite the rivalry of greater houses with ke its own. The prestige of the splendid Imperial title, and the influence derived from the theoretical functions eror—small as the actual powers that he held might be—were instruments of policy which the Austrian princes o use with enormous effect. Austrian marriages and Austrian diplomacy, often alluded to as examples of luck and ical affairs, show, rather, it may be, the consistent calculation and sagacity with which the House of Austria has aims.

riages, by diplomacy, and by pressures brought to bear from the headship of the Empire, the family plucked, one coronets of Tyrol and Carinthia (1363), Franche-Comté and Flanders, with the Low Countries entire (1477), and of Spain, Naples, Sicily and Sardinia (1516), Bohemia (including Moravia), and Hungary (1526). Its many dia- never moulded into one, but have been, from first to last, the carefully distinguished emblems of so many separate s, united in no way but by homage to a common prince.

e most fortunate acquisition of the House, which has given most stability to the heterogeneous structure of its e judgment of the ablest among modern historians, is the Hungarian crown. Its Burgundian and Spanish mar- ch brought to it the rich Netherlands and the vast realm of Ferdinand and Isabella, brought also a division of the d the rooting of a second stem in Spain; and while its grandeur among the dynasties of Europe was augmented,

on of the House in its older seat was small. But the Kingdom of Hungary has been a mass of very concrete politi- a its hands, and has supplied in some degree the weight of nationality that was otherwise wanting in the dominions se.

xture of races under the Austrian sovereigns is the most extraordinary in Europe. Their possessions exactly cover the continent in which its earlier and later invaders fought longest and most; where the struggle between them d where they mingled their settlements together. The Slavic peoples are predominant in numbers; the Germans more than one-fourth of the whole; and yet, until recent years, the Austrian power figured chiefly as a German e European politics, and took leadership in Germany itself. This position accrued to it through the persisting, potent e Imperial title which the Archdukes of Austria bore, with mediæval fictions from Rome and from Germany ther and clinging around it; and through the broken and divided condition of the German land, where petty courts ings disputed precedence with one another, and none could lead. When time raised up one strong and purely dom, to rally and encourage a German sentiment of nationality, then Austria—expelled by it from the Teutonic ound her true place in the politics of Europe.

many the relationship was never a fortunate one. Alien interests came constantly between the Emperors and the e proper subject of their care,—and they were drawn to alien sympathies by their connection with Spain. They

hateful temper of the Spanish Church, and fought the large majority of their German lieges, on the questions of tion, for a century and a half. Among the combatants of the frightful "Thirty Years War" they were chiefly for the death and ruin spread over the face of Germanic Europe. At no time did Germany find leading or strength al Emperors, nor in the states making up the hereditary possessions of their House. In the dark days when the e Napoleon threatened every neighbor of France, they deserted their station of command. It was the time which the House of Austria chose for abdicating the crown of the Holy Roman Empire—that lingering fiction of history, ssuming to be an Emperor still—the Emperor of an Empire which rested on the small duchy of Austria for its

unciation was timely; for now, when Germany rose to break the yoke of Napoleon, she found leadership within her of states. Then began the transformation in Germanic Europe which extinguished, after half a century, the last e false relations to it of the Austrian House. Prussia opened her eyes to the new conditions of the age; set the r at work among her children; made herself an example and a stimulus to all her neighbors. The Family d itself Austria did otherwise. It was blind, and it preferred blindness. It read lessons in nothing but the ce and the Treaty of Vienna. It listened to no teacher but Metternich. It made itself the resurrectionist of a o all the graveyards of Feudal Europe, and was hated for half a century as the supporter and champion of every ng in government. It had won Lombardy and Venice by its double traffic with Napoleon and with those who on down; and it enraged the whole civilized world by the cold brutality of its oppressions there. in due time brought the two "systems" of domestic polity—the Prussian and the Austrian—to account, and

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Babenbergs.—Changing relations to Bavaria.

—End of the Babenberg Dynasty.—"Austria, as is well known, is but the Latin form of the German-Oesterreich, the kingdom of the east [see above: AUSTRIA]. This celebrated historical name appears for the first time in 906, in a document signed by the emperor Otto III. ('in regione vulgari nomine Oesterichi'). The land to which it is there applied was created a march after the destruction of the Avar empire [805], and was governed like all the other German marches. Politically it was divided into two margraviates; that of Friuli, including Friuli properly so called, Lower Pannonia to the south of the Drave, Carinthia, Istria, and the interior of Dalmatia—the sea-coast having been ceded to the Eastern emperor;—the eastern margraviate comprising Lower Pannonia to the north of the Drave, Upper Pannonia, and the Ostmark properly so called. The Ostmark included the Traungau to the east of the Enns, which was completely German, and the Grunzvittigau. . . . The early history of these countries lacks the unity of interest which the fate of a dynasty or a nation gives to those of the Magyar and the Chekh. They form but a portion of the German kingdom, and have no strongly marked life of their own. The march, with its varying frontier, had not even a geographical unity. In 876, it was enlarged by the addition of Bavaria; in 890, it lost Pannonia, which was given to Bracislaw, the Croat prince, in return for his help against the Magyars, and in 937, it was destroyed and absorbed by the Magyars, who extended their frontier to the river Enns. After the battle of Lechfeld or Augsburg (955), Germany and Italy being no longer exposed to Hungarian invasions, the march was re-constituted and granted to the margrave Burkhard, the brother-in-law of Henry of Bavaria. Leopold of Babenberg succeeded him (973), and with him begins the dynasty of Babenberg, which ruled the country during the time of the Premyslides [in Bohemia] and the house of Arpad [in Hungary]. The Babenbergs derived their name from the castle of Babenberg, built by Henry, margrave of Nordgau, in honor of his wife, Baba, sister of Henry the Fowler. It reappears in the name of the town of Bamberg, which now forms part of the kingdom of Bavaria. . . . Though not of right an hereditary office, the margraviate soon became so, and remained in the family of the Babenbergs; the march was so important a part of the empire that no doubt the emperor was glad to make the defence of this exposed district the especial interest of one family. . . . The marriages of the Babenbergs were fortunate; in 1138 the brother of Leopold [Fourth of that name in the Margraviate] Conrad of Hohenstaufen, Duke of Franconia, was made emperor. It was now that the struggle began between the house of Hohenstaufen and the great house of Welf for Guelph: See GUELFs AND GIBELINES] whose representative was Henry the Proud, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria. Henry was defeated in the unequal strife, and was placed under the ban of the Empire, while the duchy of Saxony was awarded to Albert the Bear of Brandenburg, and the duchy of Bavaria fell to the share of Leopold IV. (1138). Henry the Proud died in the following year, leaving behind him a son under age, who was known later on as Henry the Lion. His uncle Welf would not submit to the forfeiture by his house of their old dominions, and marched

against Leopold to reconquer Bavaria, but he was defeated by Conrad at the battle of Weinsberg (1140). Leopold died shortly after this victory, and was succeeded both in the duchy of Bavaria and in the margraviate of Austria by his brother, Henry II. Henry II. endeavored to strengthen himself in Bavaria by marrying the widow of Henry the Proud, and by extorting from her son, Henry the Lion, a renunciation of the latter's rights. But Henry the Lion afterwards repudiated his renunciation, and in 1156 the German diet decided that Bavaria should be restored to him. Henry of Austria was wisely persuaded to yield to the decision, and Bavaria was given up. "He lost nothing by this unwilling act of disinterestedness, for he secured from the emperor considerable compensation. From this time forward, Austria, which had been largely increased by the addition of the greater part of the lands lying between the Enns and the Inn, was removed from its almost nominal subjection to Bavaria and became a separate duchy [Henry II. being the first hereditary Duke of Austria]. An imperial edict, dated the 21st of September, 1156, declares the new duchy hereditary even in the female line, and authorizes the dukes to absent themselves from all diets except those which were held in Bavarian territory. It also permits them, in case of a threatened extinction of their dynasty, to propose a successor. . . . Henry II. was one of the founders of Vienna. He constructed a fortress there, and, in order to civilize the surrounding country, sent for some Scotch monks, of whom there were many at this time in Germany." In 1177 Henry II. was succeeded by Leopold V., called the Virtuous. "In his reign the duchy of Austria gained Styria, an important addition to its territory. This province was inhabited by Slovenes and Germans, and took its name from the castle of Steyer, built in 980 by Otokar III., count of the Trungau. In 1056, it was created a margraviate, and in 1150 it was enlarged by the addition of the counties of Maribor (Marburg) and Cilly. In 1180, Otokar VI. of Styria (1164-1192) obtained the hereditary title of duke from the Emperor in return for his help against Henry the Lion." Dying without children, Otokar made Leopold of Austria his heir. "Styria was annexed to Austria in 1192, and has remained so ever since. . . . Leopold V. is the first of the Austrian princes whose name is known in Western Europe. He joined the third crusade, and quarrelled with Richard Coeur de Lion at the siege of St. Jean d' Acre. Afterwards, when Richard, returning home by the Adriatic, attempted to pass through Austrian territory incognito, Leopold revenged himself by seizing and imprisoning the English king, finally selling his royal captive to a still meaner Emperor for 20,000 marks. Leopold VI. who succeeded to the Austrian duchy in 1198, did much for the commerce of his country. "He made Vienna the staple town, and lent a sum of 30,000 marks of silver to the city to enable it to increase its trade. He adorned it with many new buildings, among them the Neue Burg." His son, called Frederick the Fighter (1230-1246) was the last of the Babenberg dynasty. His hand was against all his neighbors, including the Emperor Frederick II., and their hands were against him. He perished in June, 1246, on the banks of the Leitha, while at war with the Hungarians. — L. Leger, *Hist. of Austro-Hungary*, ch. 9

ALSO IN: E. F. Henderson, *Select Hist. Docs. of the Middle Ages*, bk 2, no. 7

A. D. 1246-1282.—Rodolph of Hapsburg and the acquisition of the Duchy for his family.—"The House of Austria owes its origin and power to Rhodolph of Hapsburgh, son of Albert IV count of Hapsburgh. The Austrian genealogists, who have taken indefatigable but ineffectual pains to trace his illustrious descent from the Romans, carry it with great probability to Ethico, duke of Alsace, in the seventh century, and unquestionably to Guntram the Rich, count of Alsace and Brisgau, who flourished in the tenth. A grandson of Guntram, Werner by name, "became bishop of Strasburgh, and on an eminence above Windisch, built the castle of Hapsburgh ['Habichtsburg' 'the castle of vultures'], which became the residence of the future counts, and gave a new title to the descendants of Guntram. . . . The successors of Werner increased their family inheritance by marriages, donations from the Emperors, and by becoming prefects, advocates, or administrators of the neighbouring abbeys, towns, or districts, and his great grandson, Albert III, was possessor of no inconsiderable territories in Suabia Alsace and that part of Switzerland which is now called the Argau, and held the landgraviate of Upper Alsace. His son, Rhodolph, received from the Emperor, in addition to his paternal inheritance, the town and district of Lauffenburgh, an imperial city on the Rhine. He acquired also a considerable accession of territory by obtaining the advocacy of Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden, whose natives laid the foundation of the Helvetic Confederacy, by their union against the oppressions of feudal tyranny"—W. Cox, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch. 1—"On the death of Rodolph in 1232 his estates were divided between his sons Albert IV and Rodolph II, the former receiving the landgraviate of Upper Alsace, and the county of Hapsburg, together with the patrimonial castle, the latter, the counties Rheinfelden and Lauffenburg, and some other territories. Albert espoused Hedwige, daughter of Ulrich, count of Kyburg, and from this union sprang the great Rodolph, who was born on the 1st of May 1218, and was presented at the baptismal font by the Emperor Frederic II. On the death of his father Albert in 1240, Rodolph succeeded to his estates, but the greater portion of these were in the hands of his paternal uncle, Rodolph of Lauffenburg; and all he could call his own lay within sight of the great hall of his castle. . . . His disposition was wayward and restless, and drew him into repeated contests with his neighbours and relations. . . . In a quarrel with the Bishop of Basle, Rodolph led his troops against that city, and burnt a convent in the suburbs, for which he was excommunicated by Pope Innocent IV. He then entered the service of Ottocar II. King of Bohemia, under whom he served, in company with the Teutonic Knights, in his wars against the Prussian pagans; and afterwards against Bela IV King of Hungary." The surprising election, in 1272, of this little known count of Hapsburg, to be King of the Romans, with the substance if not the title of the imperial dignity which that election carried with it, was due to a singular friendship which he had acquired some fourteen years before. When Archbishop Werner, Elector of Mentz, was on his way to Rome

in 1259, to receive the pallium, he "was escorted across the Alps by Rodolph of Hapsburg, and under his protection secured from the robbers who beset the passes. Charmed with the affability and frankness of his protector, the Archbishop conceived a strong regard for Rodolph," and when, in 1272, after the Great Interregnum [see GERMANY: A. D. 1250-1272], the Germanic Electors found difficulty in choosing an Emperor, the Elector of Mentz recommended his friend of Hapsburg as a candidate. "The Electors are described by a contemporary as desiring an Emperor but detesting his power. The comparative lowliness of the Count of Hapsburg recommended him as one from whom their authority stood in little jeopardy, but the claims of the King of Bohemia were vigorously urged, and it was at length agreed to decide the election by the voice of the Duke of Bavaria. Lewis without hesitation nominated Rodolph.

The early days of Rodolph's reign were disturbed by the contumacy of Ottocar, King of Bohemia. That Prince . . . persisted in refusing to acknowledge the Count of Hapsburg as his sovereign. Possessed of the duchies of Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, he might rely upon his own resources, and he was fortified in his resistance by the alliance of Henry, Duke of Lower Bavaria. But the very possession of these four great fiefs was sufficient to draw down the envy and distrust of the other German Princes. To all these territories, in deed, the title of Ottocar was sufficiently disputable. On the death of Frederic II. fifth duke of Austria [and last of the Babenberg dynasty] in 1246 that duchy, together with Styria and Carniola, was claimed by his niece Gertrude and his sister Margaret. By a marriage with the latter, and a victory over Bela IV. King of Hungary, whose uncle married Gertrude, Ottocar obtained possession of Austria and Styria; and in virtue of a purchase from Ulrich, Duke of Carinthia and Carniola, he possessed himself of those duchies on Ulrich's death in 1269, in defiance of the claims of Philip, brother of the late Duke. Against so powerful a rival the Princes assembled at Augsburg readily voted succours to Rodolph, and Ottocar having refused to surrender the Austrian dominions, and even hanged the heralds who were sent to pronounce the consequent sentence of proscription, Rodolph with his accustomed promptitude took the field [1276], and confounded his enemy by a rapid march upon Austria. In his way he surprised and vanquished the rebel Duke of Bavaria, whom he compelled to join his forces; he besieged and reduced to the last extremity the city of Vienna; and had already prepared a bridge of boats to cross the Danube and invade Bohemia, when Ottocar arrested his progress by a message of submission. The terms agreed upon were severely humiliating to the proud soul of Ottocar," and he was soon in revolt again, with the support of the Duke of Bavaria. Rodolph marched against him, and a desperate battle was fought at Marschfeld, August 26, 1278, in which Ottocar, deserted at a critical moment by the Moravian troops, was defeated and slain. "The total loss of the Bohemians on that fatal day amounted to more than 14,000 men. In the first moments of his triumph, Rodolph designed to appropriate the dominions of his deceased

enemy. But his avidity was restrained by the Princes of the Empire, who interposed on behalf of the son of Ottocar; and Wenceslaus was permitted to retain Bohemia and Moravia. The projected union of the two families was now renewed: Judith of Hapsburg was affianced to the young King of Bohemia; whose sister Agnes was married to Rodolph, youngest son of the King of the Romans." In 1282, Rodolph, "after satisfying the several claimants to those territories by various cessions of lands . . . obtained the consent of a Diet held at Augsburg to the settlement of Austria, Styria, and Carniola, upon his two surviving sons; who were accordingly jointly invested with those duchies with great pomp and solemnity; and they are at this hour enjoyed by the descendants of Rodolph of Hapsburg."—Sir R. Comyn, *Hist. of the Western Empire*, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: J. Planta, *Hist. of the Helvetic Confederacy*, bk. 1, ch. 5 (v. 1).

A. D. 1282-1315.—Relations of the House of Hapsburg to the Swiss Forest Cantons.—The Tell Legend.—The Battle of Morgarten. See SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS.

A. D. 1290.—Beginning of Hapsburg designs upon the crown of Hungary. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1114-1301.

A. D. 1291-1349.—Loss and recovery of the imperial crown.—Liberation of Switzerland.—Conflict between Frederick and Lewis of Bavaria.—The imperial crown lost once more.—Rudolf of Hapsburg desired the title of King of the Romans for his son. "But the electors already found that the new house of Austria was becoming too powerful, and they refused. On his death, in fact, in 1291, a prince from another family, poor and obscure, Adolf of Nassau, was elected after an interregnum of ten months. His reign of six years is marked by two events; he sold himself to Edward I. in 1294, against Philip the Fair, for 100,000 pounds sterling, and used the money in an attempt to obtain in Thuringia a principality for his family as Rudolf had done in Austria. The electors were displeased and chose Albert of Austria to succeed him, who conquered and killed his adversary at Göllheim, near Worms (1298). The ten years reign of the new king of the Romans showed that he was very ambitious for his family, which he wished to establish on the throne of Bohemia, where the Slavonic dynasty had lately died out, and also in Thuringia and Meissen, where he lost a battle. He was also bent upon extending his rights, even unjustly—in Alsace and Switzerland—and it proved an unfortunate venture for him. For, on the one hand, he roused the three Swiss cantons of Uri, Schwitz, and Unterwalden to revolt; on the other hand, he roused the wrath of his nephew John of Swabia, whom he defrauded of his inheritance (domains in Switzerland, Swabia, and Alsace). As he was crossing the Reuss, John thrust him through with his sword (1308). The assassin escaped. One of Albert's daughters, Agnes, dowager queen of Hungary, had more than a thousand innocent people killed to avenge the death of her father. The greater part of the present Switzerland had been originally included in the Kingdom of Burgundy, and was ceded to the empire, together with that kingdom, in 1033. A feudal nobility, lay and ecclesiastical, had gained a firm footing

there. Nevertheless, by the 12th century the cities had risen to some importance. Zurich, Basel, Bern, and Freiburg had an extensive commerce and obtained municipal privileges. Three little cantons, far in the heart of the Swiss mountains, preserved more than all the others their indomitable spirit of independence. When Albert of Austria became Emperor [King?] he arrogantly tried to encroach upon their independence. Three heroic mountaineers, Werner Stauffacher, Arnold of Melchthal, and Walter Fürst, each with ten chosen friends, conspired together at Rütli, to throw off the yoke. The tyranny of the Austrian bailiff Gessler, and William Tell's well-aimed arrow, if tradition is to be believed, gave the signal for the insurrection [see SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS]. Albert's violent death left to Leopold, his successor in the duchy of Austria, the care of repressing the rebellion. He failed and was completely defeated at Morgarten (1315). That was Switzerland's field of Marathon. . . . When Rudolf of Hapsburg was chosen by the electors, it was because of his poverty and weakness. At his death accordingly they did not give their votes for his son Albert. . . . Albert, however, succeeded in overthrowing his rival. But on his death they were firm in their decision not to give the crown for a third time to the new and ambitious house of Hapsburg. They likewise refused, for similar reasons, to accept Charles of Valois, brother of Philip the Fair, whom the latter tried to place on the imperial throne, in order that he might indirectly rule over Germany. They supported the Count of Luxembourg, who became Henry VII. By choosing emperors [kings?] who were poor, the electors placed them under the temptation of enriching themselves at the expense of the empire. Adolf failed, it is true, in Thuringia, but Rudolf gained Austria by victory; Henry succeeded in Bohemia by means of marriage, and Bohemia was worth more than Austria at that time because, besides Moravia, it was made to cover Silesia and a part of Lusatia (Oberlausitz). Henry's son, John of Luxembourg, married the heiress to that royal crown. As for Henry himself he remained as poor as before. He had a vigorous, restless spirit, and went to try his fortunes on his own account beyond the Alps. . . . He was seriously threatening Naples, when he died either from some sickness or from being poisoned by a Dominican in partaking of the host (1313). A year's interregnum followed; then two emperors [kings?] at once: Lewis of Bavaria and Frederick the Fair, son of the Emperor Albert. After eight years of war, Lewis gained his point by the victory of Mühldorf (1322), which delivered Frederick into his hands. He kept him in captivity for three years, and at the end of that time became reconciled with him, and they were on such good terms that both bore the title of King and governed in common. The fear inspired in Lewis by France and the Holy See dictated this singular agreement. Henry VII. had revived the policy of interference by the German emperors in the affairs of Italy, and had kindled again the quarrel with the Papacy which had long appeared extinguished. Lewis IV. did the same. . . . While Boniface VIII. was making war on Philip the Fair, Albert allied himself with him; when, on the other hand, the Papacy was reduced to the state of a

servile auxiliary to France, the Emperor returned to his former hostility. When ex-communicated by Pope John XXII., who wished to give the empire to the king of France, Charles IV., Lewis IV. made use of the same weapons. . . . Tired of a crown loaded with anxieties, Lewis of Bavaria was finally about to submit to the Pope and abdicate, when the electors perceived the necessity of supporting their Emperor and of formally releasing the supreme power from foreign dependency which brought the whole nation to shame. That was the object of the Pragmatic Sanction of Frankfurt, pronounced in 1338 by the Diet, on the report of the electors.

The king of France and Pope Clement VI., whose claims were directly affected by this declaration, set up against Lewis IV. Charles of Luxemburg, son of John the Blind, who became king of Bohemia in 1346, when his father had been killed fighting on the French side at the battle of Crécy. Lewis died the following year. He had gained possession of Brandenburg and the Tyrol for his house, but it was unable to retain possession of them. The latter county reverted to the house of Austria in 1363. The electors most hostile to the French party tried to put up, as a rival candidate to Charles of Luxemburg, Edward III., king of England, who refused the empire, then they offered it to a brave knight, Gunther of Schwarzburg, who died, perhaps poisoned, after a few months (1349). The king of Bohemia then became Emperor as Charles IV. by a second election.—V. Duruy, *The History of the Middle Ages*, bk. 9, ch. 30.—See, also, GERMANY, A. D. 1314-1347.

A. D. 1330-1364.—Forged charters of Duke Rudolf.—The Privilegium Majus.—His assumption of the Archducal title.—Acquisition of Tyrol.—Treaties of inheritance with Bohemia and Hungary.—King John, of Bohemia, had married his second son, John Henry, at the age of eight, to the afterwards notable Margaret Maultasche (Pouchmouth), daughter of the duke of Tyrol and Carinthia, who was then twelve years old. He hoped by this means to reunite those provinces to Bohemia. To thwart this scheme, the Emperor, Louis of Bavaria, and the two Austrian princes, Albert the Wise and Otto the Gay, came to an understanding. "By the treaty of Hagenau (1330), it was arranged that on the death of duke Henry, who had no male heirs, Carinthia should become the property of Austria, Tyrol that of the Emperor. Henry died in 1335, whereupon the Emperor, Louis of Bavaria, declared that Margaret Maultasche had forfeited all rights of inheritance, and proceeded to assign the two provinces to the Austrian princes, with the exception of some portion of the Tyrol which devolved on the house of Wittelsbach. Carinthia alone, however, obeyed the Emperor; the Tyrolean nobles declared for Margaret, and, with the help of John of Bohemia, this princess was able to keep possession of this part of her inheritance. . . . Carinthia also did not long remain in the undisputed possession of Austria. Margaret was soon divorced from her very youthful husband (1342), and shortly after married the son of the Emperor Louis of Bavaria, who hoped to be able to invest his son, not only with Tyrol, but also with Carinthia, and once more we find the houses of Hapsburg and Luxemburg united by a common interest. . . . When . . . Charles IV. of Bohemia was chosen em-

peror, he consented to leave Carinthia in the possession of Austria. Albert did homage for it. . . . According to the wish of their father, the four sons of Albert reigned after him; but the eldest, Rudolf IV., exercised executive authority in the name of the others [1358-1365]. . . . He was only 19 when he came to the throne, but he had already married one of the daughters of the Emperor Charles IV. Notwithstanding this family alliance, Charles had not given Austria such a place in the Golden Bull [see GERMANY: A. D. 1347-1402] as seemed likely to secure either her territorial importance or a proper position for her princes. They had not been admitted into the electoral college of the Empire, and yet their scattered possessions stretched from the banks of the Leitha to the Rhine. . . . These grievances were enhanced by their feeling of envy towards Bohemia, which had attained great prosperity under Charles IV. It was at this time that, in order to increase the importance of his house, Rudolf, or his officers of state, had recourse to a measure which was often employed in that age by princes, religious bodies, and even by the Holy See. It was pretended that there were in existence a whole series of charters which had been granted to the house of Austria by various kings and emperors, and which secured to their princes a position entirely independent of both empire and Emperor. According to these documents, and more especially the one called the 'privilegium majus,' the duke of Austria owed no kind of service to the empire, which was, however, bound to protect him; . . . he was to appear at the diets with the title of archduke, and was to have the first place among the electors. Rudolf pretended that these documents had just come to light, and demanded their confirmation from Charles IV., who refused it. Nevertheless on the strength of these lying charters, he took the title of palatine archduke, without waiting to ask the leave of Charles, and used the royal insignia. Charles IV., who could not fail to be irritated by these pretensions, in his turn revived the claims which he had inherited from Premysl Otakar II. to the lands of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. These claims, however, were simply theoretical, and no attempt was made to enforce them, and the mediation of Louis the Great, King of Hungary, finally led to a treaty between the two princes, which satisfied the ambition of the Habsburgs (1364). By this treaty, the houses of Habsburg in Austria and of Luxemburg in Bohemia each guaranteed the inheritance of their lands to the other, in case of the extinction of either of the two families, and the estates of Bohemia and Austria ratified this agreement. A similar compact was concluded between Austria and Hungary, and thus the boundaries of the future Austrian state were for the first time marked out. Rudolf himself gained little by these long and intricate negotiations, Tyrol being all he added to his territory. Margaret Maultasche had married her son Meinhard to the daughter of Albert the Wise, at the same time declaring that, in default of heirs male to her son, Tyrol should once more become the possession of Austria, and it did so in 1363. Rudolf immediately set out for Botzen, and there received the homage of the Tyrolean nobles. . . . The acquisition of Tyrol was most important to Austria. It united Austria Proper with the old possessions of the Habsburgs in Western Ger-

many, and opened the way to Italy. Margaret Maultasche died at Vienna in 1369. The memory of this restless and dissolute princess still survives among the Tyrolese."—L. Leger, *Hist. of Austro-Hungary*, pp. 143-148.

A. D. 1386-1388.—Defeats by the Swiss at Sempach and Naefels. See SWITZERLAND. A. D. 1386-1388.

A. D. 1437-1516.—Contests for Hungary and Bohemia.—The right of Succession to the Hungarian Crown secured.—"Europe would have had nothing to fear from the Barbarians, if Hungary had been permanently united to Bohemia, and had held them in check. But Hungary interfered both with the independence and the religion of Bohemia. In this way they weakened each other, and in the 15th century wavered between the two Slavonic and German powers on their borders (Poland and Austria) [see HUNGARY A. D. 1301-1442, and 1442-1458]. United under a German prince from 1455 to 1458, separated for a time under national sovereigns (Bohemia until 1471, Hungary until 1490), they were once more united under Polish princes until 1526, at which period they passed definitively into the hands of Austria. After the reign of Ladislas of Austria, who won so much glory by the exploits of John Hunniades, George Podiebrad obtained the crown of Bohemia, and Matthias Corvinus, the son of Hunniades, was elected King of Hungary (1458). These two princes opposed successfully the chimerical pretensions of the Emperor Frederick III. Podiebrad protected the Hussites and incurred the enmity of the Pope. Matthias victoriously encountered the Turks and obtained the favour of Paul II., who offered him the crown of Podiebrad, his father in law. The latter opposed to the hostility of Matthias the alliance of the King of Poland, whose eldest son, Ladislas, he designated as his successor. At the same time, Casimir, the brother of Ladislas, endeavoured to take from Matthias the crown of Hungary. Matthias, thus pressed on all sides, was obliged to renounce the conquest of Bohemia, and content himself with the provinces of Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia, which were to return to Ladislas if Matthias died first (1475-1478). The King of Hungary compensated himself at the expense of Austria. On the pretext that Frederick III. had refused to give him his daughter, he twice invaded his states and retained them in his possession [see HUNGARY A. D. 1471-1487]. With this great prince Christendom lost its chief defender, Hungary her conquests and her political preponderance (1490). The civilization which he had tried to introduce into his kingdom was deferred for many centuries. . . . Ladislas (of Poland), King of Bohemia, having been elected King of Hungary, was attacked by his brother John Albert, and by Maximilian of Austria, who both pretended to that crown. He appeased his brother by the cession of Silesia (1491), and Maximilian by vesting in the House of Austria the right of succession to the throne of Hungary, in case he himself should die without male issue. Under Ladislas, and under his son Louis II., who succeeded him while still a child, in 1516 Hungary was ravaged with impunity by the Turks."—J. Michélet, *A Summary of Modern History*, ch. 4.—See, also, BOHEMIA: A. D. 1458-1471.

A. D. 1488-1493.—The Imperial Crown lastingly regained.—The short reign of Albert II.,

and the long reign of Frederick III.—"After the death of Sigismund, the princes, in 1488, elected an emperor [king?] from the house of Austria, which, with scarcely any intermission, has ever since occupied the ancient throne of Germany. Albert II. of Austria, who, as son in law of the late Emperor Sigismund, had become at the same time King of Hungary and Bohemia, was a well-meaning, distinguished prince, and would, without doubt, have proved of great benefit to the empire, but he died . . . in the second year of his reign, after his return from an expedition against the Turks. . . . In the year 1431, during the reign of Sigismund, a new council was assembled at Basle, in order to carry on the work of reforming the church as already commenced at Constance. But this council soon became engaged in many perplexing controversies with Pope Eugene IV. . . . The Germans, for a time, took no part in the dispute; at length, however, under the Emperor [king?] Albert II., they formally adopted the chief decrees of the council of Basle, at a diet held at Mentz in the year 1439. . . . Amongst the resolutions then adopted were such as materially circumscribed the existing privileges of the pope. . . . These and other decisions, calculated to give important privileges and considerable independence to the German church, were, in a great measure, annulled by Albert's cousin and successor, Duke Frederick of Austria, who was elected by the princes after him in the year 1440, as Frederick III. . . . Frederick, the emperor, was a prince who meant well but, at the same time, was of too quiet and easy a nature; his long reign presents but little that was calculated to distinguish Germany or add to its renown. From the east the empire was endangered by the approach of an enemy—the Turks, against whom no precautionary measures were adopted. They, on the 29th of May, 1453, conquered Constantinople. . . . They then made their way towards the Danube, and very nearly succeeded also in taking Hungary [see HUNGARY: A. D. 1442-1458]. . . . The Hungarians, on the death of the son of the Emperor Albert II., Wladislas Posthumus, in the year 1457, without leaving an heir to the throne, chose Matthias, the son of John Corvinus, as king, being resolved not to elect one from amongst the Austrian princes. The Bohemians likewise selected a private nobleman for their king, George Padriabrad [or Podiebrad], and thus the Austrian house found itself for a time rejected from holding possession of either of these countries. . . . In Germany, meantime, there existed numberless contests and feuds, each party considered only his own personal quarrels. . . . The emperor could not give any weight to public measures; scarcely could he maintain his dignity amongst his own subjects. The Austrian nobility were even bold enough to send challenges to their sovereign; whilst the city of Vienna revolted, and his brother Albert, taking pleasure in this disorder, was not backward in adding to it. Things even went to such an extremity, that, in 1462, the Emperor Frederick, together with his consort and son, Maximilian, then four years of age, was besieged by his subjects in his own castle of Vienna. A plebeian burgher, named Holzer, had placed himself at the head of the insurgents, and was made burgomaster, whilst Duke Albert came to Vienna personally to superintend the siege of the castle, which was intrenched and bombarded. . . . The

German princes, however, could not witness with indifference such disgraceful treatment of their emperor, and they assembled to liberate him. George Podiebrad, King of Bohemia, was the first who hastened to the spot with assistance, set the emperor at liberty, and effected a reconciliation between him and his brother. The emperor, however, was obliged to resign to him, for eight years, Lower Austria and Vienna. Albert died in the following year. . . . In the Germanic empire, the voice of the emperor was as little heeded as in his hereditary lands. . . . The feudal system raged under Frederick's reign to such an extent, that it was pursued even by the lower classes. Thus, in 1471, the shoeblacks in Leipzig sent a challenge to the university of that place, and the bakers of the Count Palatine Lewis, and those of the Margrave of Baden defied several imperial cities in Swabia. The most important transaction in the reign of Frederick, was the union which he formed with the house of Burgundy, and which laid the foundation for the greatness of Austria. . . . In the year 1486, the whole of the assembled princes, influenced especially by the representations of the faithful and now venerable Albert, called the Achilles of Brandenburg, elected Maximilian, the emperor's son, King of Rome. Indeed, about this period a changed and improved spirit began to show itself in a remarkable degree in the minds of many throughout the empire, so that the profound contemplator of coming events might easily see the dawn of a new era. . . . These last years were the best in the whole life of the emperor, and yielded to him in return for his many sufferings that tranquillity which was so well merited by his faithful generous disposition. He died on the 19th of August, 1493, after a reign of 54 years. The emperor lived long enough to obtain, in the year 1490, the restoration of his hereditary estates by the death of King Matthias, by means of a compact made with Wladislas, his successor."—F. Kohlrach, *History of Germany*, ch. 14.—See GERMANY: A. D. 1347-1493.

A. D. 1468.—Invasion by George Podiebrad of Bohemia.—The crusade against him. See BOHEMIA: A. D. 1458-1471.

A. D. 1471-1491.—Hungarian invasion and capture of Vienna.—Treaty of Presburg.—Succession to the throne of Hungary secured.—"George, King of Bohemia, expired in 1471; and the claims of the Emperor and King of Hungary being equally disregarded, the crown was conferred on Wladislaus, son of Casimir IV. King of Poland, and grandson of Albert II. To this election Frederic long persisted in withholding his assent; but at length he determined to crush the claim of Matthias by formally investing Wladislaus with the kingdom and electorate of Bohemia, and the office of imperial cup-bearer. In revenge for this affront, Matthias marched into Austria: took possession of the fortresses of the Danube; and compelled the Emperor to purchase a cessation of hostilities by undertaking to pay an hundred thousand golden florins, one-half of which was disbursed by the Austrian states at the appointed time. But as the King of Hungary still delayed to yield up the captured fortresses, Frederic refused all further payment; and the war was again renewed. Matthias invaded and ravaged Austria; and though he experienced formidable resistance from several towns, his arms were

crowned with success, and he became master of Vienna and Neustadt. Driven from his capital the terrified Emperor was reduced to the utmost distress, and wandered from town to town and from convent to convent, endeavouring to arouse the German States against the Hungarians. Yet even in this exigency his good fortune did not wholly forsake him; and he availed himself of a Diet at Frankfort to procure the election of his son Maximilian as King of the Romans. To this Diet, however, the King of Bohemia received no summons, and therefore protested against the validity of the election. A full apology and admission of his right easily satisfied Wladislaus, and he consented to remit the fine which the Golden Bull had fixed as the penalty of the omission. The death of Matthias Corvinus in 1490, left the throne of Hungary vacant, and the Hungarians, influenced by their widowed queen, conferred the crown upon the King of Bohemia, without listening to the pretensions of Maximilian. That valorous prince, however, sword in hand, recovered his Austrian dominions; and the rival kings concluded a severe contest by the treaty of Presburg, by which Hungary was for the present secured to Wladislaus; but on his death without heirs was to vest in the descendants of the Emperor."—Sir R. Comyn, *The History of the Western Empire*, ch. 28 (v. 2).—See HUNGARY: A. D. 1471-1487, and 1487-1526.

A. D. 1477-1495.—Marriage of Maximilian with Mary of Burgundy.—His splendid dominion.—His joyous character.—His vigorous powers.—His ambitions and aims.—"Maximilian, who was as active and enterprising as his father was indolent and timid, married at eighteen years of age, the only daughter of Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy [see NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1477]. She brought him Flanders, Franche-Comté, and all the Low Countries. Louis XI., who disputed some of these territories, and who, on the death of the duke, had seized Burgundy, Picardy, Ponthieu, and Artois, as fiefs of France, which could not be possessed by a woman, was defeated by Maximilian at Guinegate; and Charles VIII., who renewed the same claims, was obliged to conclude a disadvantageous peace." Maximilian succeeded to the imperial throne on the death of his father in 1493.—W. Russell, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, letter 49 (v. 1).—"Between the Alps and the Bohemian frontier, the mark Austria was first founded round and about the castles of Krems and Melk. Since then, beginning first in the valley towards Bavaria and Hungary, and coming to the House of Habsburg, it had extended across the whole of the northern slope of the Alps until where the Slavish, Italian, and German tongues part, and over to Alsace; thus becoming an archduchy from a mark. On all sides the Archdukes had claims; on the German side to Switzerland, on the Italian to the Venetian possessions, and on the Slavish to Bohemia and Hungary. To such a pitch of greatness had Maximilian by his marriage with Maria of Burgundy brought the heritage received from Charles the Bold. True to the Netherlands' greeting, in the inscription over their gates, 'Thou art our Duke, fight our battle for us,' war was from the first his handicraft. He adopted Charles the Bold's hostile attitude towards France; he saved the greater part of his inheritance from the schemes of Louis XI. Day and night it was his whole

thought, to conquer it entirely. But after Maria of Burgundy's premature death, revolution followed revolution, and his father Frederick being too old to protect himself, it came about that in the year 1488 he was ousted from Austria by the Hungarians, whilst his son was kept a prisoner in Bruges by the citizens, and they had even to fear the estrangement of the Tyrol. Yet they did not lose courage. At this very time the father denoted with the vowels, A E I O U ('Alles Erdreich ist Oesterreich unterthan'—All the earth is subject to Austria), the extent of his hopes. In the same year, his son negotiated for a Spanish alliance. Their real strength lay in the imperial dignity of Maximilian, which they had from the German Empire. As soon as it began to bestir itself, Maximilian was set at liberty, as soon as it supported him in the persons of only a few princes of the Empire, he became lord in his Netherlands. . . . Since then his plans were directed against Hungary and Burgundy. In Hungary he could gain nothing except securing the succession to his house. But never, frequently as he concluded peace, did he give up his intentions upon Burgundy. Now that he had allied himself with a Sforza, and had joined the Liga, now that his father was dead, and the Empire was pledged to follow him across the mountains, and now, too, that the Italian complications were threatening Charles, he took fresh hope, and in this hope he summoned a Diet at Worms. Maximilian was a prince of whom, although many portraits have been drawn, yet there is scarcely one that resembles another, so easily and entirely did he suit himself to circumstances. . . . His soul is full of motion, of joy in things, and of plans. There is scarcely anything that he is not capable of doing. In his mind he is a good screener, in his armoury the best plater, capable of instructing others in new inventions. With musket in hand, he defeats his best marksman, George Purkhart, with heavy cannon, which he has shown how to cast, and has placed on wheels, he comes as a rule nearest the mark. He commands seven captains in their seven several tongues; he himself chooses and mixes his food and medicines. In the open country, he feels himself happiest. . . . What really distinguishes his public life is that presentiment of the future greatness of his dynasty which he has inherited of his father, and the restless striving to attain all that devolved upon him from the House of Burgundy. All his policy and all his schemes were concentrated, not upon his Empire, for the real needs of which he evinced little real care, and not immediately upon the welfare of his hereditary lands, but upon the realization of that sole idea. Of it all his letters and speeches are full. . . . In March, 1495, Maximilian came to the Diet at Worms. . . . At this Reichstag the King gained two momentous prospects. In Wurtemberg there had sprung of two lines two counts of quite opposite characters. . . . With the elder, Maximilian now entered into a compact. Wurtemberg was to be raised to a dukedom—an elevation which excluded the female line from the succession—and, in the event of the stock failing, was to be a 'widow's portion' of the realm to the use of the Imperial Chamber. Now as the sole hopes of this family centred in a weakling of a boy, this arrangement held out to Maximilian and his successors the prospect of acquiring a

splendid country. Yet this was the smaller of his two successes. The greater was the espousal of his children, Philip and Margaret, with the two children of Ferdinand the Catholic, Juana and Juan, which was here settled. This opened to his house still greater expectations,—it brought him at once into the most intimate alliance with the Kings of Spain. These matters might possibly, however, have been arranged elsewhere. What Maximilian really wanted in the Reichstag at Worms was the assistance of the Empire against the French with its world-renowned and much-envied soldiery. For at this time in all the wars of Europe, German auxiliaries were decisive. . . . If Maximilian had united the whole of this power in his hand, neither Europe nor Asia would have been able to withstand him. But God disposed that it should rather be employed in the cause of freedom than oppression. What an Empire was that which in spite of its vast strength allowed its Emperor to be expelled from his heritage, and did not for a long time take steps to bring him back again? If we examine the constitution of the Empire, not as we should picture it to ourselves in Henry III's time, but as it had at length become—the legal independence of the several estates, the emptiness of the imperial dignity, the electiveness of a head, that afterwards exercised certain rights over the electors,—we are led to inquire not so much into the causes of its disintegration, for this concerns us little, as into the way in which it was held together. What welded it together, and preserved it, would (leaving tradition and the Pope out of the question) appear, before all else, to have been the rights of individuals, the unions of neighbours, and the social regulations which universally obtained. Such were those rights and privileges that not only protected the citizen, his guild, and his quarter of the town against his neighbours and more powerful men than himself, but which also endowed him with an inner independence.

Next, the unions of neighbours. These were not only leagues of cities and peasantries, expanded from ancient fraternities—for who can tell the origin of the Huns, or the earliest treaty between Uri and Schwyz?—into large associations, or of knights, who strengthened a really insignificant power by confederations of neighbours, but also of the princes, who were bound together by joint inheritances, mutual expectancies, and the ties of blood, which in some cases were very close. This ramification, dependent upon a supreme power and confirmed by it, bound neighbour to neighbour; and, whilst securing to each his privilege and his liberty, blended together all countries of Germany in legal bonds of union. But it is only in the social regulations that the unity was really perceivable. Only as long as the Empire was an actual reality, could the supreme power of the Electors, each with his own special rights, be maintained; only so long could dukes and princes, bishops and abbots hold their neighbours in due respect, and through court offices or hereditary services, through fiefs and the dignity of their independent position give their vassals a peculiar position to the whole. Only so long could the cities enjoying immediateness under the Empire, carefully divided into free and imperial cities, be not merely protected, but also assured of a participation in the government of the whole. Under this sanctified and

traditional system of suzerainty and vassalage all were happy and contented, and bore a love to it such as is cherished towards a native town or a father's house. For some time past, the House of Austria had enjoyed the foremost position. It also had a union, and, moreover, a great faction on its side. The union was the Suabian League. Old Suabia was divided into three leagues—the league of the peasantry (the origin of Switzerland), the league of the knights in the Black Forest, on the Kocher, the Neckar, and the Danube; and the league of the cities. The peasantry were from the first hostile to Austria. The Emperor Frederick brought it to pass that the cities and knights, that had from time out of mind lived in feud, bound themselves together with several princes, and formed, under his protection, the league of the land of Suabia. But the party was scattered throughout the whole Empire.—L. von Ranke, *History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations*, bk 1, ch 3.

A. D. 1493-1519.—The Imperial reign of Maximilian.—Formation of the Circle of Austria.—The Aulic Council. See GERMANY: A. D. 1493-1519.

A. D. 1496-1499.—The Swabian War with the Swiss Confederacy and the Graubunden, or Grey Leagues (Grisons).—Practical independence of both acquired. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1396-1499.

A. D. 1496-1526.—Extraordinary aggrandizement of the House of Austria by its marriages.—The Heritage of Charles V.—His cession of the German inheritance to Ferdinand.—The division of the House into Spanish and German branches.—Acquisition of Hungary and Bohemia.—In 1496, Philip the Fair, son of Maximilian, Archduke and Emperor, by his marriage with Mary of Burgundy, "espoused the Infanta of Spain, daughter of Ferdinand [of Aragon] and Isabella of Castile. They had two sons, Charles and Ferdinand, the former of whom, known in history by the name of Charles V., inherited the Low Countries in right of his father, Philip (1506). On the death of Ferdinand, his maternal grandfather (1516), he became heir to the whole Spanish succession, which comprehended the kingdoms of Spain, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, together with Spanish America. To these vast possessions were added his patrimonial dominions in Austria, which were transmitted to him by his paternal grandfather, the Emperor Maximilian I. About the same time (1519), the Imperial dignity was conferred on this prince by the electors [see GERMANY: A. D. 1519]; so that Europe had not seen, since the time of Charlemagne, a monarchy so powerful as that of Charles V. This Emperor concluded a treaty with his brother Ferdinand; by which he ceded to him all his hereditary possessions in Germany. The two brothers thus became the founders of the two principal branches of the House of Austria, viz., that of Spain, which began with Charles V. (called Charles I. of Spain), and ended with Charles II. (1700); and that of Germany, of which Ferdinand I. was the ancestor, and which became extinct in the male line in the Emperor Charles VI. (1740). These two branches, closely allied to each other, acted in concert for the advancement of their reciprocal interests; moreover they gained each their own separate advantages by the marriage connexions which they

formed. Ferdinand I. of the German line married Anne (1521), sister of Louis King of Hungary and Bohemia, who having been slain by the Turks at the battle of Mohacs (1526), these two kingdoms devolved to Ferdinand of the House of Austria. Finally, the marriage which Charles V. contracted with the Infant Isabella, daughter of Emmanuel, King of Portugal, procured Philip II. of Spain, the son of that marriage, the whole Portuguese monarchy, to which he succeeded on the death of Henry, called the Cardinal (1580). So vast an aggrandisement of power alarmed the Sovereigns of Europe."—C. W. Koch, *The Revolutions of Europe*, period 6.

ALSO IN: W. Coxe, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch 25 and 27 (v 1).—W. Robertson, *Hist. of the Reign of Charles V.*, bk. 1.—See, also, SPAIN: A. D. 1496-1517.

A. D. 1519.—Death of Maximilian.—Election of Charles V., "Emperor of the Romans." See GERMANY: A. D. 1519.

A. D. 1519-1555.—The imperial reign of Charles V.—The objects of his policy.—His conflict with the Reformation and with France.—"Charles V. did not receive from nature all the gifts nor all the charms she can bestow, nor did experience give him every talent; but he was equal to the part he had to play in the world. He was sufficiently great to keep his many-jewelled diadem . . . His ambition was cold and wise. The scope of his ideas, which are not quite easy to divine, was vast enough to control a state composed of divers and distant portions, so as to make it always very difficult to amalgamate his armies, and to supply them with food, or to procure money. Indeed its very existence would have been exposed to permanent danger from powerful coalitions, had Francis I. known how to place its most vulnerable points under a united pressure from the armies of France, of England, of Venice, and of the Ottoman Empire. Charles V. attained his first object when he prevented the French monarch from taking possession of the inheritance of the house of Anjou, at Naples, and of that of the Viscontis at Milan. He was more successful in stopping the march of Solymán into Austria than in checking the spread of the Reformation in Germany. . . . Charles V. had four objects very much at heart: he wished to be the master in Italy, to check the progress of the Ottoman power in the west of Europe, to conquer the King of France, and to govern the Germanic body by dividing it, and by making the Reformation a religious pretext for oppressing the political defenders of that belief. In three out of four of these objects he succeeded. Germany alone was not conquered: if she was beaten in battle, neither any political triumph nor any religious results ensued. In Germany, Charles V. began his work too late, and acted too slowly; he undertook to subdue it at a time when the abettors of the Reformation had grown strong, when he himself was growing weaker. . . . Like many other brilliant careers, the career of Charles V. was more successful and more striking at the commencement and the middle than at the end, of its course. At Madrid, at Cambrai, at Nice, he made his rival bow down his head. At Crespy he again forced him to obey his will, but as he had completely made up his mind to have peace, Charles dictated it, in some manner, to his own detriment. At Passau he had to yield to the terms of his enemy

—of an enemy whom Charles V encountered in his old age, and when his powers had decayed. Although it may be said that the extent and the power of the sovereignty which Charles V. left to his successor at his death were not diminished, still his armies were weakened, his finances were exhausted, and the country was weary of the tyranny of the imperial lieutenants. The supremacy of the empire in Germany, for which he had struggled so much, was as little established at the end as at the beginning of his reign; religious unity was solemnly destroyed by the 'Recess' of Augsburg. But that which marks the position of Charles V. as the representative man of his epoch, and as the founder of the policy of modern times, is that, wherever he was victorious, the effect of his success was to crush the last efforts of the spirit of the middle ages, and of the independence of nations. In Italy, in Spain, in Germany, and in the Low Countries, his triumphs were so much gain to the cause of absolute monarchy and so much loss to the liberty derived from the old state of society. Whatever was the character of liberty in the middle ages—whether it were contested or incomplete, or a mockery—it played a greater part than in the four succeeding centuries. Charles V. was assuredly one of those who contributed the most to found and consolidate the political system of modern governments. His history has an aspect of grandeur. Had Francis I. been as sagacious in the closet as he was bold in the field, by a vigorous alliance with England, with Protestant Germany, and with some of the republics of Italy, he might perhaps have balanced and controlled the power of Charles V. But the French monarch did not possess the foresight and the solid understanding necessary to pursue such a policy with success. His rival, therefore, occupies the first place in the historical picture of the epoch. Charles V. had the sentiment of his position and of the part he had to play.—J. Van Praet, *Essays on the Political History of the 15th, 16th, and 17th Centuries*, pp. 190-194.—See, also, GERMANY A. D. 1519 to 1552-1561, and FRANCE A. D. 1520-1523, to 1547-1559.

A. D. 1525-1527.—Successful Contest for the Hungarian and Bohemian Crowns.—In Hungary, "under King Matthias the house of Zapolya, so called from a Slavonic village near Poschega, whence it originated, rose to peculiar eminence. To this house, in particular, King Wladislas had owed his accession to the throne, whence, however, it thought itself entitled to claim a share in the sovereign power, and even a sort of prospective right to the throne. Its members were the wealthiest of all the magnates, they possessed seventy-two castles. . . . It is said that a prophecy early promised the crown to the young John Zapolya. Possessed of all the power conferred by his rich inheritance, Count of Zips, and Wolwode of Transylvania, he soon collected a strong party around him. It was he who mainly persuaded the Hungarians, in the year 1506, to exclude all foreigners from the throne by a formal decree; which, though they were not always able to maintain in force, they could never be induced absolutely to revoke. In the year 1514 the Wolwode succeeded in putting down an exceedingly formidable insurrection of the peasants with his own forces; a service which the lesser nobility prized the more highly, because

it enabled them to reduce the peasantry to a still harder state of servitude. His wish was, on the death of Wladislas, to become Gubernator of the kingdom, to marry the deceased king's daughter Anne, and then to await the course of events. But he was here encountered by the policy of Maximilian. Anne was married to the Archduke Ferdinand, Zapolya was excluded from the administration of the kingdom, even the vacant Palatinate was refused him and given to his old rival Stephen Bathory. He was highly incensed. . . . But it was not till the year 1525 that Zapolya got the upper hand at the Rakosch. . . . No one entertained a doubt that he aimed at the throne. . . . But before anything was accomplished—on the contrary, just as these party conflicts had thrown the country into the utmost confusion, the mighty enemy, Soliman, appeared on the frontiers of Hungary, determined to put an end to the anarchy. . . . In his prison at Madrid, Francis I. had found means to entreat the assistance of Soliman, urging that it well beseemed a great emperor to succour the oppressed. Plans were laid at Constantinople, according to which the two sovereigns were to attack Spain with a combined fleet, and to send armies to invade Hungary and the north of Italy. Soliman, without any formal treaty, was by his position an ally of the Ligue, as the king of Hungary was, of the emperor. On the 23d of April, 1526, Soliman, after visiting the graves of his forefathers and of the old Moslem martyrs, marched out of Constantinople with a mighty host, consisting of about a hundred thousand men, and incessantly strengthened by fresh recruits on its road. . . . What power had Hungary, in the condition we have just described, of resisting such an attack? . . . The young king took the field with a following of not more than three thousand men. . . . He proceeded to the fatal plain of Mohacz, fully resolved with his small band to await in the open field the overwhelming force of the enemy. . . . Personal valour could avail nothing. The Hungarians were immediately thrown into disorder, their best men fell, the others took to flight. The young king was compelled to flee. It was not even granted him to die in the field of battle; a far more miserable end awaited him. Mounted behind a Silesian soldier, who served him as a guide, he had already been carried across the dark waters that divide the plain, his horse was already climbing the bank, when he slipped, fell back, and buried himself and his rider in the morass. This rendered the defeat decisive. . . . Soliman had gained one of those victories which decide the fate of nations during long epochs. . . . That two thrones, the succession to which was not entirely free from doubt, had thus been left vacant, was an event that necessarily caused a great agitation throughout Christendom. It was still a question whether such a European power as Austria would continue to exist;—a question which it is only necessary to state, in order to be aware of its vast importance to the fate of mankind at large, and of Germany in particular. The claims of Ferdinand to both crowns, unquestionable as they might be in reference to the treaties with the reigning houses, were opposed in the nations themselves, by the right of election and the authority of considerable rivals. In Hungary, as soon as the Turks had retired, John Zapolya appeared with the fine

army which he had kept back from the conflict; the fall of the king was at the same time the fall of his adversaries. . . . Even in Tokay, however, John Zapolya was saluted as king. Meanwhile, the dukes of Bavaria conceived the design of getting possession of the throne of Bohemia. . . . Nor was it in the two kingdoms alone that these pretenders had a considerable party. The state of politics in Europe was such as to insure them powerful supporters abroad. In the first place, Francis I was intimately connected with Zapolya in a short time a delegate from the pope was at his side, and the Germans in Rome maintained that Clement assisted the faction of the Woiwode with money. Zapolya sent an agent to Venice with a direct request to be admitted a member of the Ligue of Cognac. In Bohemia, too, the French had long had devoted partisans. . . . The consequences that must have resulted, had this scheme succeeded, are so incalculable, that it is not too much to say they would have completely changed the political history of Europe. The power of Bavaria would have outweighed that of Austria in both German and Slavonian countries, and Zapolya, thus supported, would have been able to maintain his station; the Ligue, and with it high ultra-montane opinions would have held the ascendancy in eastern Europe. Never was there a project more pregnant with danger to the growing power of the house of Austria. Ferdinand behaved with all the prudence and energy which that house has so often displayed in difficult emergencies. For the present, the all-important object was the crown of Bohemia. . . . All his measures were taken with such skill and prudence, that on the day of election, though the Bavarian agent had, up to the last moment, not the slightest doubt of the success of his negotiations, an overwhelming majority in the three estates elected Ferdinand to the throne of Bohemia. This took place on the 23d October, 1526. . . . On his brother's birth-day, the 24th of February, 1527, Ferdinand was crowned at Prague. . . . The affairs of Hungary were not so easily or so peacefully settled. . . . At first, when Zapolya came forward, full armed and powerful out of the general desolation, he had the uncontested superiority. The capital of the kingdom sought his protection, after which he marched to Stuhlweissenburg, where his partisans bore down all attempts at opposition: he was elected and crowned (11th of November, 1526); in Croatia, too, he was acknowledged king at a diet; he filled all the numerous places, temporal and spiritual, left vacant by the disaster of Mohacz, with his friends. . . . [But] the Germans advanced without interruption; and as soon as it appeared possible that Ferdinand might be successful, Zapolya's followers began to desert him. . . . Never did the German troops display more bravery and constancy. They had often neither meat nor bread, and were obliged to live on such fruits as they found in the gardens: the inhabitants were wavering and uncertain—they submitted, and then revolted again to the enemy; Zapolya's troops, aided by their knowledge of the ground, made several very formidable attacks by night; but the Germans evinced, in the moment of danger, the skill and determination of a Roman legion: they showed, too, a noble constancy under difficulties and privations. At Tokay they defeated Zapolya and compelled him

to quit Hungary. . . . On the 3d November, 1527, Ferdinand was crowned in Stuhlweissenburg: only five of the magnates of the kingdom adhered to Zapolya. The victory appeared complete. Ferdinand, however, distinctly felt that this appearance was delusive. . . . In Bohemia, too, his power was far from secure. His Bavarian neighbours had not relinquished the hope of driving him from the throne at the first general turn of affairs. The Ottomans, meanwhile, acting upon the persuasion that every land in which the head of their chief had rested belonged of right to them, were preparing to return to Hungary; either to take possession of it themselves, or at first, as was their custom, to bestow it on a native ruler—Zapolya, who now eagerly sought an alliance with them—as their vassal"—L. Von Ranke, *History of the Reformation in Germany*, bk. 4, ch. 4 (v. 2).

A. D. 1564-1618.—The tolerance of Maximilian II.—The bigotry and tyranny of Rodolph and Ferdinand II.—Prelude to the Thirty Years War.—“There is no period connected with these religious wars that deserves more to be studied than these reigns of Ferdinand I., Maximilian [the Second], and those of his successors who preceded the thirty years' war. We have no sovereign who exhibited that exercise of moderation and good sense which a philosopher would require, but Maximilian, and he was immediately followed by princes of a different complexion. . . . Nothing could be more complete than the difficulty of toleration at the time when Maximilian reigned; and if a mild policy could be attended with favourable effects in his age and nation, there can be little fear of the experiment at any other period. No party or person in the state was then disposed to tolerate his neighbour from any sense of the justice of such forbearance, but from motives of temporal policy alone. The Lutherans, it will be seen, could not bear that the Calvinists should have the same religious privileges with themselves. The Calvinists were equally opinionated and unjust, and Maximilian himself was probably tolerant and wise, chiefly because he was in his real opinions a Lutheran, and in outward profession, as the head of the empire, a Roman Catholic. For twelve years, the whole of his reign, he preserved the religious peace of the community, without destroying the religious freedom of the human mind. He supported the Roman Catholics, as the predominant party, in all their rights, possessions, and privileges; but he protected the Protestants in every exercise of their religion which was then practicable. In other words, he was as tolerant and just as the temper of society then admitted, and more so than the state of things would have suggested. . . . The merit of Maximilian was but too apparent the moment that his son Rodolph was called upon to supply his place. . . . He had always left the education of his son and successor too much to the discretion of his bigoted consort. Rodolph, his son, was therefore as ignorant and furious on his part as were the Protestants on theirs: he had immediate recourse to the usual expedients—force, and the execution of the laws to the very letter. . . . After Rodolph comes Matthias, and, unhappily for all Europe, Bohemia and the empire fell afterwards under the management of Ferdinand II. Of the different Austrian princes, it is the reign of Ferdinand

II. that is more particularly to be considered. Such was the arbitrary nature of his government over his subjects in Bohemia, that they revolted. They elected for their king the young Elector Palatine, hoping thus to extricate themselves from the bigotry and tyranny of Ferdinand. This crown so offered was accepted; and, in the event, the cause of the Bohemians became the cause of the Reformation in Germany, and the Elector Palatine the hero of that cause. It is this which gives the great interest to this reign of Ferdinand II., to these concerns of his subjects in Bohemia, and to the character of this Elector Palatine. For all these events and circumstances led to the thirty years' war."—W. Smyth, *Lectures on Modern History*, v. 1, lect. 13.—See BOHEMIA: A. D. 1611-1618, and GERMANY: A. D. 1618-1620.

A. D. 1567-1660.—Struggles of the Hapsburg House in Hungary and Transylvania to establish rights of sovereignty.—Wars with the Turks. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1567-1604, and 1606-1660.

A. D. 1618-1648.—The Thirty Years War.—The Peace of Westphalia.—"The thirty years' war made Germany the centre point of European politics. . . . No one at its commencement could have foreseen the duration and extent. But the train of war was everywhere laid, and required only the match to set it going, more than one war was joined to it, and swallowed up in it, and the melancholy truth, that war feeds itself, was never more clearly displayed. . . . Though the war, which first broke out in Bohemia, concerned only the house of Austria, yet by its originating in religious disputes, by its peculiar character as a religious war, and by the measures adopted both by the insurgents and the emperor, it acquired such an extent, that even the quelling of the insurrection was insufficient to put a stop to it. . . . Though the Bohemian war was apparently terminated, yet the flame had communicated to Germany and Hungary, and new fuel was added by the act of proscription promulgated against the elector Frederic and his adherents. From this the war derived that revolutionary character, which was henceforward peculiar to it; it was a step that could not but lead to further results, for the question of the relations between the emperor and his states, was in a fair way of being practically considered. New and bolder projects were also formed in Vienna and Madrid, where it was resolved to renew the war with the Netherlands. Under the present circumstances, the suppression of the Protestant religion and the overthrow of German and Dutch liberty appeared inseparable; while the success of the imperial arms, supported as they were by the league and the co-operation of the Spaniards, gave just grounds for hope. . . . By the carrying of the war into Lower Saxony, the principal seat of the Protestant religion in Germany (the states of which had appointed Christian IV. of Denmark, as duke of Holstein, head of their confederacy), the northern states had already, though without any beneficial result, been involved in the strife, and the Danish war had broken out. But the elevation of Albert of Wallenstein to the dignity of duke of Friedland and imperial general over the army raised by himself, was of considerably more importance, as it affected the whole course and character of the war. From this time the

war was completely and truly revolutionary. The peculiar situation of the general, the manner of the formation as well as the maintenance of his army, could not fail to make it such. . . . The distinguished success of the imperial arms in the north of Germany unveiled the daring schemes of Wallenstein. He did not come forward as conqueror alone, but, by the investiture of Mecklenburg as a state of the empire, as a ruling prince. . . . But the elevation and conduct of this novus homo, exasperated and annoyed the Catholic no less than the Protestant states, especially the league and its chief; all implored peace, and Wallenstein's discharge. Thus, at the diet of the electors at Augsburg, the emperor was reduced to the alternative of resigning him or his allies. He chose the former. Wallenstein was dismissed, the majority of his army disbanded, and Tilly nominated commander-in-chief of the forces of the emperor and the league. . . . On the side of the emperor sufficient care was taken to prolong the war. The refusal to restore the unfortunate Frederic, and even the sale of his upper Palatine to Bavaria, must with justice have excited the apprehensions of the other princes. But when the Jesuits finally succeeded, not only in extorting the edict of restitution, but also in causing it to be enforced in the most odious manner, the Catholic states themselves saw with regret that peace could no longer exist. . . . The greater the success that attended the house of Austria, the more actively foreign policy laboured to counteract it. England had taken an interest in the fate of Frederic V. from the first, though this interest was evinced by little beyond fruitless negotiations. Denmark became engaged in the quarrel mostly through the influence of this power and Holland. Richelieu, from the time he became prime minister of France, had exerted himself in opposing Austria and Spain. He found employment for Spain in the contests respecting Veltelin, and for Austria soon after, by the war of Mantua. Willingly would he have detached the German league from the interest of the emperor; and though he failed in this, he procured the fall of Wallenstein. . . . Much more important, however, was Richelieu's influence on the war, by the essential share he had in gaining Gustavus Adolphus' active participation in it. . . . The nineteen years of his [Gustavus Adolphus'] reign which had already elapsed, together with the Polish war, which lasted nearly that time, had taught the world but little of the real worth of this great and talented hero. The decisive superiority of Protestantism in Germany, under his guidance, soon created a more just knowledge, and at the same time showed the advantages which must result to a victorious supporter of that cause. . . . The battle at Leipzig was decisive for Gustavus Adolphus and his party, almost beyond expectation. The league fell asunder; and in a short time he was master of the countries from the Baltic to Bavaria, and from the Rhine to Bohemia. . . . But the misfortunes and death of Tilly brought Wallenstein again on the stage as absolute commander-in-chief, bent on plans not a whit less extensive than those he had before formed. No period of the war gave promise of such great and rapid successes or reverses as the present, for both leaders were determined to effect them; but the victory of

Lützen, while it cost Gustavus his life, prepared the fall of Wallenstein. Though the fall of Gustavus Adolphus frustrated his own private views, it did not those of his party. The school of Gustavus produced a number of men, great in the cabinet and in the field, yet it was hard, even for an Oxenstern, to preserve the importance of Sweden unimpaired, and it was but partially done by the alliance of Heilbronn.

If the forces of Sweden overrun almost every part of Germany in the following months, under the guidance of the pupils of the king, Bernard of Weimar and Gustavus Horn, we must apparently attribute it to Wallenstein's intentional inactivity in Bohemia. The distrust of him increased in Vienna the more, as he took but little trouble to diminish it, and though his fall was not sufficient to atone for treachery, if proved, it was for his equivocal character and imprudence. His death probably saved Germany from a catastrophe. A great change took place upon the death of Wallenstein, as a prince of the blood, Ferdinand, king of Hungary and Bohemia, obtained the command. Thus an end was put to plans of revolutions from this quarter. But in the same year the battle of Nordlingen gave to the imperial arms a sudden preponderance, such as it had never before acquired. The separate peace of Saxony with the emperor at Prague, and soon after an alliance, were its consequences. Sweden driven back to Pomerania, seemed unable of herself, during the two following years, to maintain her ground in Germany: the victory of Wittstock turned the scale in her favour. The war was prolonged and greatly extended by the active share taken in it by France, first against Spain, and soon against Austria. The German war, after the treaty with Bernhard of Weimar, was mainly carried on by France, by the arming of Germans against Germans. But the pupil of Gustavus Adolphus preferred to fight for himself rather than others, and his early death was almost as much coveted by France as by Austria. The success of the Swedish arms revived under Bauer. . . . At the general diet, which was at last convened, the emperor yielded to a general amnesty, or at least what was so designated. But when at the meeting of the ambassadors of the leading powers at Hamburg, the preliminaries were signed, and the time and place of the congress of peace fixed, it was deferred after Richelieu's death, (who was succeeded by Mazarin), by the war, which both parties continued, in the hope of securing better conditions by victory. A new war broke out in the north between Sweden and Denmark, and when at last the congress of peace was opened at Munster and Osnabruck, the negotiations dragged on for three years. . . . The German peace was negotiated at Munster between the emperor and France, and at Osnabruck between the emperor and Sweden; but both treaties, according to express agreement, Oct. 24, 1648, were to be considered as one, under the title of the Westphalian. —A. H. L. Heeren, *A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies*, pp. 91-99. —"The Peace of Westphalia has met manifold hostile comments, not only in earlier, but also in later, times. German patriots complained that by it the unity of the Empire was rent; and indeed the connection of the States, which even before was loose, was relaxed

to the extreme. This was, however, an evil which could not be avoided, and it had to be accepted in order to prevent the French and Swedes from using their opportunity for the further enslavement of the land. . . . The religious parties also made objections to the peace. The strict Catholics condemned it as a work of inexcusable and arbitrary injustice.

The dissatisfaction of the Protestants was chiefly with the recognition of the Ecclesiastical Reservation. They complained also that their brethren in the faith were not allowed the free exercise of their religion in Austria. Their hostility was limited to theoretical discussions, which soon ceased when Louis XIV took advantage of the preponderance which he had won to make outrageous assaults upon Germany, and even the Protestants were compelled to acknowledge the Emperor as the real defender of German independence." —A. Gindely, *History of the Thirty Years' War*, v 2, ch 10, sect 4 —See, also, GERMANY A D 1618-1620, to 1648, FRANCE A D 1624-1626, and ITALY A D 1627-1631.

A. D. 1621.—Formal establishment of the right of primogeniture in the Archducal Family. See GERMANY A D 1636-1637.

A. D. 1624-1626.—Hostile combinations of Richelieu.—The Valtelline war in Northern Italy. See FRANCE A D 1624-1626.

A. D. 1627-1631.—War with France over the succession to the Duchy of Mantua. See ITALY A D 1627-1631.

A. D. 1648-1715.—Relations with Germany and France. See GERMANY A D 1648-1715.

A. D. 1660-1664.—Renewed war with the Turks. See HUNGARY A D 1660-1664.

A. D. 1668-1683.—Increased oppression and religious persecution in Hungary. Revolt of Tekeli.—The Turks again called in.—Muscapha's great invasion and siege of Vienna.—Deliverance of the city by John Sobieski. See HUNGARY A D 1668-1683.

A. D. 1672-1714.—The wars with Louis XIV. of France: War of the Grand Alliance.—Peace of Ryswick.—"The leading principle of the reign [in France] of Louis XIV is the principle of war with the dynasty of Charles V —the elder branch of which reigned in Spain, while the descendants of the younger branch occupied the imperial throne of Germany. . . . At the death of Mazarin, or to speak more correctly, immediately after the death of Philip IV, . . . the early ambition of Louis XIV. sought to prevent the junior branch of the Austrian dynasty from succeeding to the inheritance of the elder branch. He had no desire to see reconstituted under the imperial sceptre of Germany the monarchy which Charles V. had at one time wished to transmit entire to his son, but which, worn out and weakened, he subsequently allowed without regret to be divided between his son and his brother. Before making war upon Austria, Louis XIV cast his eyes upon a portion of the territory belonging to Spain, and the expedition against Holland, begun in 1672 [see NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1672-1674, and 1674-1678], for the purpose of absorbing the Spanish provinces by overwhelming them, opened the series of his vast enterprises. His first great war was, historically speaking, his first great fault. He failed in his object: for at the end of six campaigns, during

which the French armies obtained great and deserved success, Holland remained unconquered. Thus was Europe warned that the lust of conquest of a young monarch, who did not himself possess military genius, but who found in his generals the resources and ability in which he was himself deficient, would soon threaten her independence. Condé and Turenne, after having been rebellious subjects under the Regency, were about to become the first and the most illustrious lieutenants of Louis XIV. Europe, however, though warned, was not immediately ready to defend herself. It was from Austria, more directly exposed to the dangers of the great war now commencing, that the first systematic resistance ought to have come. But Austria was not prepared to play such a part; and the Emperor Leopold possessed neither the genius nor the wish for it. He was, in fact, nothing more than the nominal head of Germany. . . . Such was the state of affairs in Europe when William of Orange first made his appearance on the stage. . . . The old question of supremacy, which Louis XIV. wished to fight out as a duel with the House of Austria, was now about to change its aspect, and, owing to the presence of an unexpected genius, to bring into the quarrel other powers besides the two original competitors. The foe of Louis XIV. ought by rights to have been born on the banks of the Danube, and not on the shores of the North Sea. In fact, it was Austria that at that moment most needed a man of genius, either on the throne or at the head of affairs. The events of the century would, in this case, doubtless have followed a different course: the war would have been less general, and the maritime nations would not have been involved in it to the same degree. The treaties of peace would have been signed in some small place in France or Germany, and not in two towns and a village in Holland, such as Nimeguen, Ryswick, and Utrecht. . . . William of Orange found himself in a position soon to form the Triple Alliance which the very policy of Louis XIV. suggested. For France to attack Holland, when her object was eventually to reach Austria, and keep her out of the Spanish succession, was to make enemies at one and the same time of Spain, of Austria, and of Holland. But if it afterwards required considerable efforts on the part of William of Orange to maintain this alliance, it demanded still more energy to extend it. It formed part of the Stadtholder's ulterior plans to combine the union between himself and the two branches of the Austrian family, with the old Anglo-Swedish Triple Alliance, which had just been dissolved under the strong pressure brought to bear on it by Louis XIV. . . . Louis XIV., whose finances were exhausted, was very soon anxious to make peace, even on the morrow of his most brilliant victories; whilst William of Orange, beaten and retreating, ardently desired the continuance of the war. . . . The Peace of Nimeguen was at last signed, and by it were secured to Louis XIV. *Franche-Comté*, and some important places in the Spanish Low Countries on his northern frontier [see NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF]. This was the culminating point of the reign of Louis XIV. Although the coalition had prevented him from attaining the full object of his designs against the House of Austria, which had been to absorb by conquest so much of the territory

belonging to Spain as would secure him against the effect of a will preserving the whole inheritance intact in the family, yet his armies had been constantly successful, and many of his opponents were evidently tired of the struggle. . . . Some years passed thus, with the appearance of calm. Europe was conquered, and when peace was broken, because, as was said, the Treaty of Nimeguen was not duly executed, the events of the war were for some time neither brilliant or important, for several campaigns began and ended without any considerable result. . . . At length Louis XIV. entered on the second half of his reign, which differed widely from the first. . . . During this second period of more than thirty years, which begins after the Treaty of Nimeguen and lasts till the Peace of Utrecht, events succeed each other in complete logical sequence, so that the reign presents itself as one continuous whole, with a regular movement of ascension and decline. . . . The leading principle of the reign remained the same, it was always the desire to weaken the House of Austria, or to secure an advantageous partition of the Spanish succession. But the Emperor of Germany was protected by the coalition, and the King of Spain, whose death was considered imminent, would not make up his mind to die.

During the first League, when the Prince of Orange was contending against Louis XIV. with the co-operation of the Emperor of Germany, of the King of Spain, and of the Electors on the Rhine, the religious element played only a secondary part in the war. But we shall see this element make its presence more manifest.

Thus the influence of Protestant England made itself more and more felt in the affairs of Europe, in proportion as the government of the Stuarts, from its violence, its unpopularity, and from the opposition offered to it, was approaching its end. The second coalition was neither more united nor more firm than the first had been; but, after the expulsion of the Stuarts, the germs of dissolution no longer threatened the same dangers. . . . The British nation now made itself felt in the balance of Europe, and William of Orange was for the first time in his life successful in war at the head of his English troops. This was the most brilliant epoch of the life of William III. . . . He was now at the height of his glory, after a period of twenty years from his start in life, and his destiny was accomplished, so that until the Treaty of Ryswick, which in 1698 put an end to his hostilities with France, and brought about his recognition as King of England by Louis XIV., not much more was left for him to gain; and he had the skill to lose nothing. . . . The negotiations for the Treaty of Ryswick were conducted with less ability and boldness, and concluded on less advantageous terms, than the Truce of Ratisbon or the Peace of Nimeguen. Nevertheless, this treaty, which secured to Louis the possession of Strasbourg, might, particularly as age was now creeping on him, have closed his military career without disgrace, if the eternal question, for the solution of which he had made so many sacrifices, and which had always held the foremost place in his thoughts, had not remained as unsettled and as full of difficulty as on the day when he had mounted the throne. Charles II. of Spain was not dead, and the question of the Spanish succession, which had so actively

employed the armies of Louis XIV., and taxed his diplomacy, was as undecided as at the beginning of his reign. Louis XIV. saw two alternatives before him: a partition of the succession between the Emperor and himself (a solution proposed thirty years before as a means to avoid war), or else a will in favour of France, followed of course by a recommencement of general hostilities. . . . Louis XIV. proposed in succession two schemes, not, as thirty years before, to the Emperor, but to the King of England, whose power and whose genius rendered him the arbiter of all the great affairs of Europe. . . . In the first of the treaties of partition, Spain and the Low Countries were to be given to the Prince of Bavaria; in the second, to the Archduke Charles. In both, France obtained Naples and Sicily for the Dauphin. . . . Both these arrangements . . . suited both France and England as a pacific solution of the question. . . . But events, as we know, derailed all these calculations, and Charles II., who, by continuing to live, had disappointed so much impatient expectation, by his last will provoked a general war, to be carried on against France by the union of England with the Empire and with Holland—a union which was much strengthened under the new dynasty, and which afterwards embraced the northern states of Germany. . . . William III. died at the age of fifty-two, on the 9th of March, 1702, at the beginning of the War of Succession. After him, the part he was to have played was divided. Prince Eugene, Marlborough, and Heinsius (the Grand Pensionary) had the conduct of political and especially of military affairs, and acted in concert. The disastrous consequences to France of that war, in which William had no part, are notorious. The battles of Blenheim, of Ramillies, and of Oudenarde brought the allied armies on the soil of France, and placed Louis XIV. on the verge of ruin."—J. Van Praet, *Essays on the Political History of the 15th, 16th, and 17th Centuries*, pp. 390-414 and 441-455.

ALSO IN: H. Martin, *Hist. of France: Age of Louis XIV.*, v. 2, ch. 2 and 4-6.—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 5, ch. 5-8 (p. 3).—See, also, GERMANY: A. D. 1686; and FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690 to 1697.

A. D. 1683-1687.—Merciless suppression of the Hungarian revolt.—The crown of Hungary made hereditary in the House of Hapsburg. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1687.

A. D. 1683-1699.—Expulsion of the Turks from Hungary.—The Peace of Carlowitz. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699.

A. D. 1699-1711.—Suppression of the Revolt under Rakoczy in Hungary. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1699-1718.

A. D. 1700.—Interest of the Imperial House in the question of the Spanish Succession. See SPAIN: A. D. 1698-1700.

A. D. 1701-1713.—The War of the Spanish Succession. See GERMANY: A. D. 1702, to 1704; ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713; SPAIN: A. D. 1702, to 1707-1710, and NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704, to 1710-1712.

A. D. 1711.—The War of the Spanish Succession.—Its Circumstances changed.—"The death of the Emperor Joseph I., who expired April 17, 1711, at the age of thirty-two, changed the whole character of the War of the Spanish Succession. As Joseph left no male heirs, the

hereditary dominions of the House of Austria devolved to his brother, the Archduke Charles; and though that prince had not been elected King of the Romans, and had therefore to become a candidate for the imperial crown, yet there could be little doubt that he would attain that dignity. Hence, if Charles should also become sovereign of Spain and the Indies, the vast empire of Charles V. would be again united in one person; and that very evil of an almost universal monarchy would be established, the prevention of which had been the chief cause for taking up arms against Philip V. . . . After an interregnum of half a year, during which the affairs of the Empire had been conducted by the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Saxony, as imperial vicars for South and North Germany, the Archduke Charles was unanimously named Emperor by the Electoral College (Oct. 12th). . . . Charles . . . received the imperial crown at Frankfurt, Dec. 23d, with the title of Charles VI.—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 5, ch. 6 (p. 3).

A. D. 1713-1714.—Ending of the War of the Spanish Succession.—The Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.—Acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands, Naples and Milan. See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

A. D. 1713-1719.—Continued differences with Spain.—The Triple Alliance.—The Quadruple Alliance. See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725.

A. D. 1714.—The Desertion of the Catalans. See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1714.

A. D. 1714-1718.—Recovery of Belgrade and final expulsion of the Turks from Hungary. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1699-1718.

A. D. 1718-1738.—The question of the Succession.—The Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VI., and its guarantee by the Powers.—"On the death [A. D. 1711] of Joseph, the hopes of the house of Austria and the future destiny of Germany rested on Charles [then, as titular king of Spain, Charles III., ineffectually contesting the Spanish throne with the Bourbon heir, Philip V.; afterwards, as Emperor, Charles VI.] who was the only surviving male of his illustrious family. By that event the houses of Austria, Germany and Europe were placed in a new and critical situation. From a principle of mistaken policy the succession to the hereditary dominions had never been established according to an invariable rule, for it was not clearly ascertained whether males of the collateral branches should be preferred to females in lineal descent, an uncertainty which had frequently occasioned many vehement disputes. To obviate this evil, as well as to prevent future disputes, Leopold [father of Joseph and Charles] had arranged the order of succession: to Joseph he assigned Hungary and Bohemia, and the other hereditary dominions; and to Charles the crown of Spain, and all the territories which belonged to the Spanish inheritance. Should Joseph die without issue male, the whole succession was to descend to Charles, and in case of his death, under similar circumstances, the Austrian dominions were to devolve on the daughters of Joseph in preference to those of Charles. This family compact was signed by the two brothers in the presence of Leopold. Joseph died without male issue; but left two daughters." He was succeeded by Charles in accordance with the compact. "On

the 2nd of August, 1718, soon after the signature of the Quadruple Alliance, Charles promulgated a new law of succession for the inheritance of the house of Austria, under the name of the Pragmatic Sanction. According to the family compact formed by Leopold, and confirmed by Joseph and Charles, the succession was entailed on the daughters of Joseph in preference to the daughters of Charles, should they both die without issue male. Charles, however, had scarcely ascended the throne, though at that time without children, than he reversed this compact, and settled the right of succession, in default of his male issue, first on his daughters, then on the daughters of Joseph, and afterwards on the queen of Portugal and the other daughters of Leopold. Since the promulgation of that decree, the Empress had borne a son who died in his infancy, and three daughters, Maria Theresa, Maria Anne and Maria Amelia. With a view to insure the succession of these daughters, and to obviate the dangers which might arise from the claims of the Josephine archduchesses, he published the Pragmatic Sanction, and compelled his nieces to renounce their pretensions on their marriages with the electors of Saxony and Bavaria. Aware, however, that the strongest renunciations are disregarded, he obtained from the different states of his extensive dominions the acknowledgement of the Pragmatic Sanction, and made it the great object of his reign, to which he sacrificed every other consideration, to procure the guaranty of the European powers. This guaranty was obtained in treaties with the several powers, as follows: Spain in 1725, Russia, 1726, renewed in 1733; Prussia, 1728, England and Holland, 1731; France, 1738, the Empire, 1732. The inheritance which Charles thus endeavored to secure to his daughter was vast and imposing. "He was by election Emperor of Germany, by hereditary right sovereign of Hungary, Transylvania, Bohemia, Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, the Tyrol, and the Brisgau, and he had recently obtained Naples and Sicily, the Milanese and the Netherlands"—W. Coxe, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch. 80, 84-85 (v. 3).—"The Pragmatic Sanction, though framed to legalize the accession of Maria Theresa, excludes the present Emperor's daughters and his grandchild by postponing the succession of females to that of males in the family of Charles VI."—J. D. Bouchier, *The Heritage of the Hapsburgs* (*Fortnightly Rev.*, March, 1889).

ALSO IN: H. Tuttle, *Hist. of Prussia*, 1740-1745, ch. 2.—S. A. Dunham, *Hist. of the Germanic Empire*, bk. 3, ch. 3 (v. 3).

A. D. 1719.—Sardinia ceded to the Duke of Savoy in exchange for Sicily. See SPAIN: A. D. 1718-1725; and ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

A. D. 1731.—The second Treaty of Vienna with England and Holland. See SPAIN: A. D. 1726-1731.

A. D. 1732-1733.—Interference in the election of the King of Poland. See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1738.

A. D. 1733-1735.—The war of the Polish Succession.—Cession of Naples and Sicily to Spain, and Lorraine and Bar to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735, and ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

A. D. 1737-1739.—Unfortunate war with the Turks, in alliance with Russia.—Humiliating

peace of Belgrade.—Surrender of Belgrade, with Servia, and part of Bosnia. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1725-1739.

A. D. 1740 (October).—Treachery among the Guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction.—The inheritance of Marie Theresa disputed.—"The Emperor Charles VI. . . died on the 20th of October, 1740. His daughter Maria Theresa, the heiress of his dominions with the title of Queen of Hungary, was but twenty-three years of age, without experience or knowledge of business, and her husband Francis, the titular Duke of Lorraine and reigning Grand Duke of Tuscany, deserved the praise of amiable qualities rather than of commanding talents. Her Ministers were timorous, irresolute, and useless. 'I saw them in despair,' writes Mr. Robinson, the British envoy, 'but that very despair was not capable of rendering them bravely desperate.' The treasury was exhausted, the army dispersed, and no General risen to replace Eugene. The succession of Maria Theresa was, indeed, cheerfully acknowledged by her subjects, and seemed to be secured amongst foreign powers by their guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction; but it soon appeared that such guarantees are mere worthless parchments where there is strong temptation to break and only a feeble army to support them. The principal claimant to the succession was the Elector of Bavaria, who maintained that the will of the Emperor Ferdinand the First devised the Austrian states to his daughter, from whom the Elector descended, on failure of male lineage. It appeared that the original will in the archives at Vienna referred to the failure, not of the male but of the legitimate issue of his sons; but this document, though ostentatiously displayed to all the Ministers of state and foreign ambassadors, was very far from inducing the Elector to desist from his pretensions. As to the Great Powers—the Court of France, the old ally of the Bavarian family, and mindful of its injuries from the House of Austria, was eager to exalt the first by the depression of the latter. The Bourbons in Spain followed the direction of the Bourbons in France. The King of Poland and the Empress of Russia were more friendly in their expressions than in their designs. An opposite spirit pervaded England and Holland, where motives of honour and of policy combined to support the rights of Maria Theresa. In Germany itself the Elector of Cologne, the Bavarian's brother, warmly espoused his cause; and 'the remaining Electors,' says Chesterfield, 'like electors with us, thought it a proper opportunity of making the most of their votes,—and all at the expense of the helpless and abandoned House of Austria!' The first blow, however, came from Prussia, where the King Frederick William had died a few months before, and been succeeded by his son Frederick the Second; a Prince surnamed the Great by poets."—Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *Hist. of Eng.*, 1718-1783, ch. 38 (v. 3).—"The elector of Bavaria acted in a prompt, honest, and consistent manner. He at once lodged a protest against any disposition of the hereditary estates to the prejudice of his own rights; insisted on the will of Ferdinand I.; and demanded the production of the original text. It was promptly produced. But it was found to convey the succession to the heirs of his daughter, the ancestress of the

elector, not, as he contended, on the failure of male heirs, but in the absence of more direct heirs born in wedlock Maria Theresa could, however, trace her descent through nearer male heirs, and had, therefore, a superior title. Charles Albert was in any event only one of several claimants. The King of Spain, a Bourbon, presented himself as the heir of the Hapsburg emperor Charles V. The King of Sardinia alleged an ancient marriage contract, from which he derived a right to the duchy of Milan. Even August of Saxony claimed territory by virtue of an antiquated title, which, it was pretended, the renunciation of his wife could not affect. All these were, however, mere vultures compared to the eagle [Frederick of Prussia] which was soon to descend upon its prey.—H. Tuttle, *Hist. of Prussia*, 1740-1745, ch. 2.

A. D. 1740 (October—November).—The War of the Succession.—Conduct of Frederick the Great as explained by himself.—"This Pragmatic Sanction had been guaranteed by France, England, Holland, Sardinia, Saxony, and the Roman empire; nay by the late King Frederic William [of Prussia] also, on condition that the court of Vienna should secure to him the succession of Juliers and Berg. The emperor promised him the eventual succession, and did not fulfil his engagements, by which the King of Prussia, his successor, was freed from this guarantee, to which his father, the late king, had pledged himself, conditionally. Frederic I., when he erected Prussia into a kingdom, had, by that vain grandeur, planted the scion of ambition in the bosom of his posterity, which, soon or late, must fructify. The monarchy he had left to his descendants was, if I may be permitted the expression, a kind of hermaprodite, which was rather more an electorate than a kingdom. Fame was to be acquired by determining the nature of this being: and this sensation certainly was one of those which strengthened so many motives, conspiring to engage the king in grand enterprises. If the acquisition of the duchy of Berg had not even met with almost insurmountable impediments, it was in itself so small that the possession would add little grandeur to the house of Brandenburg. These reflections occasioned the king to turn his views toward the house of Austria, the succession of which would become matter of litigation, at the death of the emperor, when the throne of the Cæsars should be vacant. That event must be favourable to the distinguished part which the king had to act in Germany, by the various claims of the houses of Saxony and Bavaria to these states; by the number of candidates which might canvass for the Imperial crown; and by the projects of the court of Versailles, which, on such an occasion, must naturally profit by the troubles that the death of Charles VI. could not fail to excite. This accident did not long keep the world in expectation. The emperor ended his days at the palace La Favorite, on the 26th [20th] day of October, 1740. The news arrived at Rheinsberg when the king was ill of a fever. . . . He immediately resolved to reclaim the principalities of Silesia, the rights of his house to which [long dormant, the claim dating back to a certain covenant of heritance-brotherhood with the duke of Liegnitz, in 1587, which the emperor of that day caused to be annulled by the States of Bohemia] were incontestable; and he prepared, at the same time, to support these pre-

tensions, if necessary, by arms. This project accomplished all his political views; it afforded the means of acquiring reputation, of augmenting the power of the state, and of terminating what related to the litigious succession of the duchy of Berg. . . . The state of the court of Vienna, after the death of the emperor, was deplorable. The finances were in disorder; the army was ruined and discouraged by ill success in its wars with the Turks; the ministry disunited, and a youthful unexperienced princess at the head of the government, who was to defend the succession from all claimants. The result was that the government could not appear formidable. It was besides impossible that the king should be destitute of allies. . . . The war which he might undertake in Silesia was the only offensive war that could be favoured by the situation of his states, for it would be carried on upon his frontiers, and the Oder would always furnish him with a sure communication. . . . Add to these reasons, an army fit to march, a treasury ready prepared, and, perhaps, the ambition of acquiring renown. Such were the causes of the war which the king declared against Maria Theresa of Austria, queen of Hungary and Bohemia"—Frederick II. (Frederick the Great), *Hist. of My Own Times. Posthumous Works* (trans. by Holcroft), v. 1, ch. 1-2.

A. D. 1740-1741.—The War of the Succession. Faithlessness of the King of Prussia.—The Macaulay verdict.—"From no quarter did the young queen of Hungary receive stronger assurances of friendship and support than from the King of Prussia. Yet the King of Prussia, the 'Anti-Machiavel,' had already fully determined to commit the great crime of violating his plighted faith, of robbing the ally whom he was bound to defend, and of plunging all Europe into a long, bloody, and desolating war, and all this for no end whatever except that he might extend his dominions and see his name in the gazettes. He determined to assemble a great army with speed and secrecy, to invade Silesia before Maria Theresa should be apprized of his design, and to add that rich province to his kingdom. . . . Without any declaration of war, without any demand for reparation, in the very act of pouring forth compliments and assurances of good will, Frederic commenced hostilities. Many thousands of his troops were actually in Silesia before the Queen of Hungary knew that he had set up any claim to any part of her territories. At length he sent her a message which could be regarded only as an insult. If she would but let him have Silesia, he would, he said, stand by her against any power which should try to deprive her of her other dominions: as if he was not already bound to stand by her, or as if his new promise could be of more value than the old one. It was the depth of winter. The cold was severe, and the roads deep in mire. But the Prussians pressed on. Resistance was impossible. The Austrian army was then neither numerous nor efficient. The small portion of that army which lay in Silesia was unprepared for hostilities. Glogau was blockaded; Breslau opened its gates; Ohlau was evacuated. A few scattered garrisons still held out; but the whole open country was subjugated: no enemy ventured to encounter the king in the field; and, before the end of January, 1741, he returned to receive the congratula-

tions of his subjects at Berlin. Had the Silesian question been merely a question between Frederic and Maria Theresa it would be impossible to acquit the Prussian king of gross perfidy. But when we consider the effects which his policy produced, and could not fail to produce, on the whole community of civilized nations, we are compelled to pronounce a condemnation still more severe. . . . The selfish rapacity of the king of Prussia gave the signal to his neighbours. . . . The evils produced by this wickedness were felt in lands where the name of Prussia was unknown; and, in order that he might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the great lakes of North America. Silesia had been occupied without a battle, but the Austrian troops were advancing to the relief of the fortresses which still held out. In the spring Frederic rejoined his army. He had seen little of war, and had never commanded any great body of men in the field. . . . Frederic's first battle was fought at Mollwitz [April 10, 1741], and never did the career of a great commander open in a more inauspicious manner. His army was victorious. Not only, however, did he not establish his title to the character of an able general, but he was so unfortunate as to make it doubtful whether he possessed the vulgar courage of a soldier. The cavalry, which he commanded in person, was put to flight. Unaccustomed to the tumult and carnage of a field of battle, he lost his self-possession, and listened too readily to those who urged him to save himself. His English gray carried him many miles from the field, while Schwerin, though wounded in two places, manfully upheld the day. The skill of the old Field-Marshal and the steadiness of the Prussian battalions prevailed, and the Austrian army was driven from the field with the loss of 8,000 men. The news was carried late at night to a mill in which the king had taken shelter. It gave him a bitter pang. He was successful, but he owed his success to dispositions which others had made, and to the valour of men who had fought while he was flying. So unpromising was the first appearance of the greatest warrior of that age"—Lord Macaulay, *Frederic the Great* (*Essays*, v. 4).

A. D. 1741 (April-May).—The War of the Succession: French responsibility.—The Carlyle verdict.—"The battle of Mollwitz went off like a signal shot among the Nations; intimating that they were, one and all, to go battling. Which they did, with a witness; making a terrible thing of it, over all the world, for above seven years to come. . . . Not that Mollwitz kindled Europe; Europe was already kindled for some two years past;—especially since the late Kaiser died, and his Pragmatic Sanction was superadded to the other troubles afoot. But ever since that image of Jenkins's Ear had at last blazed-up in the slow English brain, like a fiery constellation or Sign in the Heavens, symbolic of such injustices and unendurabilities, and had lighted the Spanish-English War [see ENGLAND; A. D. 1739-1741], Europe was slowly but pretty surely taking fire. France 'could not see Spain humbled,' she said: England (in its own *dû* feeling, and also in the fact of things), could not do at all without considerably humbling Spain. France, endlessly interested in that

Spanish-English matter, was already sending out fleets, firing shots,—almost, or altogether, putting her hand in it. 'In which case, will not, must not, Austria help us?' thought England,—and was asking, daily, at Vienna. . . . when the late Kaiser died. . . . But if not as cause, then as signal, or as signal and cause together (which it properly was), the Battle of Mollwitz gave the finishing stroke and set all in motion. . . . For directly on the back of Mollwitz, there ensued, first, an explosion of Diplomatic activity, such as was never seen before; Excellencies from the four winds taking wing towards Friedrich; and talking and insinuating, and fencing and furling, after their sort, in that Silesian camp of his, the centre being there. A universal rookery of Diplomats, whose loud cackle is now as if gone mad to us; their work wholly fallen putrescent and avoidable, dead to all creatures. And secondly, in the train of that, there ensued a universal European War, the French and the English being chief parties in it; which abounds in battles and feats of arms, spirited but delirious, and cannot be got stilled for seven or eight years to come; and in which Friedrich and his War swim only as an intermittent Episode henceforth. . . . The first point to be noted is, Where did it originate? To which the answer mainly is, with Monseigneur, the Maréchal de Belleisle principally, with the ambitious cupidities and baseless vanities of the French Court and Nation, as represented by Belleisle. . . . The English-Spanish War had a basis to stand on in this Universe. The like had the Prussian-Austrian one, so all men now admit. If Friedrich had not business there, what man ever had in an enterprise he ventured on? Friedrich, after such trial and proof as has seldom been, got his claims on Schlesien allowed by the Destinies. . . . Friedrich had business in this War; and Maria Theresa versus Friedrich had likewise cause to appear in Court, and do her utmost pleading against him. But if we ask, What Belleisle or France and Louis XV. had to do there? the answer is rigorously Nothing. Their own windy vanities, ambitions, sanctioned not by fact and the Almighty Powers, but by Phantasm and the babble of Versailles; transcendent self-conceit, intrinsically insane; pretensions over their fellow-creatures which were without basis anywhere in Nature, except in the French brain; it was this that brought Belleisle and France into a German War. And Belleisle and France having gone into an Anti-Pragmatic War, the unlucky George and his England were dragged into a Pragmatic one,—quitting their own business, on the Spanish Main, and hurrying to Germany,—in terror as at Doomsday, and zeal to save the Keystone of Nature there. That is the notable point in regard to this War: That France is to be called the author of it, who, alone of all the parties, had no business there whatever."—T. Carlyle, *Hist. of Friedrich II.*, bk. 12, ch. 11 (v. 4).—See, also, FRANCE: A. D. 1733.

A. D. 1741 (May-June).—Mission of Belleisle.—"The thickening of the Plot.—"The defeat of Maria Theresa's only army [at Mollwitz] swept away all the doubts and scruples of France. The fiery Belleisle had already set out upon his mission to the various German courts, armed with powers which were reluctantly granted by the cardinal [Fleury, the French minister], and were promptly enlarged by the ambassador to

suit his own more ambitious views of the situation. He travelled in oriental state. . . . The almost royal pomp with which he strode into the presence of princes of the blood, the copious eloquence with which he pleaded his cause, . . . were only the outward decorations of one of the most iniquitous schemes ever devised by an unscrupulous diplomacy. The scheme, when stripped of all its details, did not indeed at first appear absolutely revolting. It proposed simply to secure the election of Charles Albert of Bavaria as emperor, an honor to which he had a perfect right to aspire. But it was difficult to obtain the votes of certain electors without offering them the prospect of territorial gains, and impossible for Charles Albert to support the imperial dignity without greater revenues than those of Bavaria. It was proposed, therefore, that provinces should be taken from Maria Theresa herself, first to purchase votes against her own husband, and then to swell the income of the successful rival candidate. The three episcopal electors were first visited, and subjected to various forms of persuasion, — bribes, flattery, threats, — until the effects of the treatment began to appear; the count palatine was devoted to France; and these four with Bavaria made a majority of one. But that was too small a margin for Belle Isle's aspirations, or even for the safety of his project. The four remaining votes belonged to the most powerful of the German states, Prussia, Hanover, Saxony and Bohemia. . . . Bohemia, if it voted at all, would of course vote for the grand-duke Francis [husband of Maria Theresa]. Saxony and Hanover were already negotiating with Maria Theresa; and it was well understood that Austria could have Frederick's support by paying his price." Austria refused to pay the price, and Frederick signed a treaty with the king of France at Breslau on the 4th of June, 1741. "The essence of it was contained in four secret articles. In these the king of Prussia renounced his claim to Jülich-Berg in behalf of the house of Sulzbach, and agreed to give his vote to the elector of Bavaria for emperor. The king of France engaged to guarantee Prussia in the possession of Lower Silesia, to send within two months an army to the support of Bavaria, and to provoke an immediate rupture between Sweden and Russia."—H. Tuttle, *Hist. of Prussia*, 1740–1745, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: W. Coxe, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch. 99 (v. 3).

A. D. 1741 (June–September).—Maria Theresa and the Hungarians.—"During these anxious summer months Maria Theresa and the Austrian court had resided mainly at Presburg, in Hungary. Here she had been occupied in the solution of domestic as well as international problems. The Magyars, as a manly and chivalrous race, had been touched by the perilous situation of the young queen; but, while ardently protesting their loyalty, insisted not the less on the recognition of their own inalienable rights. These had been inadequately observed in recent years, and in consequence no little disaffection prevailed in Hungary. The magnates resolved, therefore, as they had resolved at the beginning of previous reigns, to demand the restoration of all their rights and privileges. But it does not appear that they wished to take any ungenerous advantage of the sex or the necessities of Maria Theresa. They were argu-

mentative and stubborn, yet not in a bargaining, mercenary spirit. They accepted in June a qualified compliance with their demands; and when on the 25th of that month the queen appeared before the diet to receive the crown of St. Stephen, and, according to custom, waved the great sword of the kingdom toward the four points of the compass, toward the north and the south, the east and the west, challenging all enemies to dispute her right, the assembly was carried away by enthusiasm, and it seemed as if an end had forever been put to constitutional technicalities. Such was, however, not the case. After the excitement caused by the dramatic coronation had in a measure subsided, the old contentions revived, as bitter and vexatious as before. These concerned especially the manner in which the administration of Hungary should be adjusted to meet the new state of things. Should the chief political offices be filled by native Hungarians, as the diet demanded? Could the co-regency of the grand-duke, which was ardently desired by the queen, be accepted by the Magyars? For two months the dispute over these problems raged at Presburg, until finally Maria Theresa herself found a bold, ingenious, and patriotic solution. The news of the Franco-Bavarian alliance and the fall of Passau determined her to throw herself completely upon the gallantry and devotion of the Magyars. It had long been the policy of the court of Vienna not to entrust the Hungarians with arms. . . . But Maria Theresa had not been robbed, in spite of her experience with France and Prussia, of all her faith in human nature. She took the responsibility of her decision, and the result proved that her insight was correct. On the 11th of September she summoned the members of the diet before her, and, seated on the throne, explained to them the perilous situation of her dominions. The danger, she said, threatened herself, and all that was dear to her. Abandoned by all her allies, she took refuge in the fidelity and the ancient valor of the Hungarians, to whom she entrusted herself, her children, and her empire. Here she broke into tears, and covered her face with her handkerchief. The diet responded to this appeal by proclaiming the 'insurrection' or the equipment of a large popular force for the defence of the queen. So great was the enthusiasm that it nearly swept away even the original aversion of the Hungarians to the grand-duke Francis, who, to the queen's delight, was finally, though not without some murmurs, accepted as co-regent. . . . This uprising was organized not an hour too early, for dangers were pressing upon the queen from every side."—H. Tuttle, *Hist. of Prussia*, 1740–1745, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: Duc de Broglie, *Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa*, ch. 4 (v. 2).

A. D. 1741 (August–November).—The French-Bavarian onset.—"France now began to act with energy. In the month of August [1741] two French armies crossed the Rhine, each about 40,000 strong. The first marched into Westphalia, and frightened George II. into concluding a treaty of neutrality for Hanover, and promising his vote to the Elector of Bavaria. The second advanced through South Germany on Passau, the frontier city of Bavaria and Austria. As soon as it arrived on German soil, the French officers assumed the blue and white cockade of

Bavaria, for it was the cue of France to appear only as an auxiliary, and the nominal command of her army was vested in the Elector. From Passau the French and Bavarians passed into Upper Austria, and on Sept. 11 entered its capital, Linz, where the Elector assumed the title of Archduke. Five days later Saxony joined the allies. Sweden had already declared war on Russia. Spain trumped up an old claim and attacked the Austrian dominions in Italy. It seemed as if Belleisle's schemes were about to be crowned with complete success. Had the allies pushed forward, Vienna must have fallen into their hands. But the French did not wish to be too victorious, lest they should make the Elector too powerful, and so independent of them. Therefore, after six weeks' delay, they turned aside to the conquest of Bohemia.—F. W. Longman, *Frederick the Great and the Seven Years War*, ch. 4, sect. 4.—“While . . . a portion of the French troops, under the command of the Count de Segur, was left in Upper Austria, the remainder of the allied army turned towards Bohemia, where they were joined by a body of Saxons, under the command of Count Rutowsky. They took Prague by assault, on the night of the 25th of November, while the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the husband of Maria Theresa, was marching to his relief. In Prague, 3,000 prisoners were taken. The elector of Bavaria hastened there, upon hearing of the success of his arms, was crowned King of Bohemia, during the month of December, and received the oath of fidelity from the constituted authorities. But while he was thus employed, the Austrian general, Khevenhüller, had driven the Count de Segur out of Austria, and had himself entered Bavaria, which obliged the Bavarian army to abandon Bohemia and hasten to the defence of their own country.”—Lord Dover, *Life of Frederick II*, bk. 2, ch. 2 (p. 1).

ALSO IN: Frederick II, *Hist. of My Own Times* (Posthumous Works, v. 1, ch. 5).

A. D. 1741 (October).—**Secret Treaty with Frederick.**—Lower Silesia conceded to him.—**Austrian success.**—“By October, 1741, the fortunes of Maria Theresa had sunk to the lowest ebb, but a great revulsion speedily set in. The martial enthusiasm of the Hungarians, the subsidy from England, and the brilliant military talents of General Khevenhüller, restored her armies. Vienna was put in a state of defence, and at the same time jealousies and suspicion made their way among the confederates. The Electors of Bavaria and Saxony were already in some degree divided; and the Germans, and especially Frederick, were alarmed by the growing ascendancy, and irritated by the haughty demeanour of the French. In the moment of her extreme depression, the Queen consented to a concession which England had vainly urged upon her before, and which laid the foundation of her future success. In October 1741 she entered into a secret convention with Frederick [called the convention of Ober-Schnellendorf], by which that astute sovereign agreed to desert his allies, and desist from hostilities, on condition of ultimately obtaining Lower Silesia, with Breslau and Neisse. Every precaution was taken to ensure secrecy. It was arranged that Frederick should continue to besiege Neisse, that the town should ultimately be surrendered to him, and that his troops should then retire into winter quarters, and take no further part in the war. As the

sacrifice of a few more lives was perfectly indifferent to the contracting parties, and in order that no one should suspect the treachery that was contemplated, Neisse, after the arrangement had been made for its surrender, was subjected for four days and four nights to the horrors of bombardment. Frederick, at the same time talked, with his usual cynical frankness, to the English ambassador about the best way of attacking his allies the French; and observed, that if the Queen of Hungary prospered, he would perhaps support her, if not—everyone must look for himself. He only assented verbally to this convention, and, no doubt, resolved to await the course of events, in order to decide which Power it was his interest finally to betray, but in the meantime the Austrians obtained a respite, which enabled them to throw their whole forces upon their other enemies. Two brilliant campaigns followed. The greater part of Bohemia was recovered by an army under the Duke of Lorraine, and the French were hemmed in at Prague, while another army, under General Khevenhüller, invaded Upper Austria, drove 10,000 French soldiers within the walls of Linz, blockaded them, defeated a body of Bohemians who were sent to the rescue, compelled the whole French army to surrender, and then, crossing the frontier, poured in a resistless torrent over Bavaria. The fairest plains of that beautiful land were desolated by hosts of irregular troops from Hungary, Croatia, and the Tyrol; and on the 12th of February the Austrians marched in triumph into Munich. On that very day the Elector of Bavaria was crowned Emperor of Germany, at Frankfort, under the title of Charles VII, and the imperial crown was thus, for the first time, for many generations, separated from the House of Austria.”—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Eng.*, 18th Century, ch. 3 (p. 1).

ALSO IN: F. Von Raumer, *Contributions to Modern Hist.* Frederick II and his Times, ch. 13-14.

A. D. 1741-1743.—**Successes in Italy.** See ITALY A. D. 1741-1743.

A. D. 1742 (January—May).—**Frederick breaks faith again.**—**Battle of Chotusitz.**—“The Queen of Hungary had assembled in the beginning of the year two considerable armies in Moravia and Bohemia, the one under Prince Lobkowitz, to defend the former province, and the other commanded by Prince Charles of Lorraine, her brother in law. This young Prince possessed as much bravery and activity as Frederick and had equally with him the talent of inspiring attachment and confidence. . . . Frederick, alarmed at these preparations and the progress of the Austrians in Bavaria, abruptly broke off the convention of Ober-Schnellendorf, and recommenced hostilities. . . . The King of Prussia became apprehensive that the Queen of Hungary would again turn her arms to recover Silesia. He therefore dispatched Marshal Schwerin to seize Olmutz and lay siege to Glatz, which surrendered after a desperate resistance on the 9th of January. Soon after this event, the King rejoined his army, and endeavoured to drive the Austrians from their advantageous position in the southern parts of Bohemia, which would have delivered the French troops in the neighbourhood and checked the progress of Khevenhüller in Bavaria. The king advanced to Iglau, on the frontiers of Bohemia, and, oc-