HISTORY
FOR READY REFERENCE

FROM THE BEST
HISTORIANS, BIOGRAPHERS. AND SPECIALISTS

THEIR OWN WORDS IN A COMPLETE

SYSTEM OF HISTORY

FOR ALL USES, EXTENDING TO ALL COUNTRIES AND SUBJECTS,
AND REPRESENTING FOR BOTH READERS AND STUDENTS THE BETTER AND
NEWER LITERATURE OF HISTORY IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE

BY

J. N. LARNED

WITH NUMEROUS HISTORICAL MAPS FROM ORIGINAL STUDIES AND DRAWINGS BY

ALAN C. REILEY

REVISED AND ENLARGED EDITION

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOLUME III—GES TO NEW WORLD

LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN
1906

LIST OF MAPS.

LOGICAL OUTLINE, IN COLORS.

GÊS TRIBES, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TUPI.—GUARANI.—TUPUYAS.

GESITHS.—GESITHCUND. The guard and private council of the early Anglo-Saxon kings. Apparently the gesith differed from the thegn only by a more strictly warlike character. See COMITATUS; and ENGLAND: A. D. 958.

GESORIACUM.—The principal Roman port and naval station on the Gallic side of the English Channel—afterwards called Bononia—modern Boulogne. "Gesoriacum was the terminus of the great highway, or military marching road, which had been constructed by Agrippa across Gaul."—H. M. Scarth, *Roman Britain, ch.* 4.

GETA, Roman Emperor, A. D. 211-212.

GETÆ, The. See DACIA; THRACIANS; SARMATIA; and GOTHS, ORIGIN OF.

GETTYSBURG, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (JUNE—JULY: PENNSYLVANIA).

GETULIANS, The. See LIBYANS.

GEWISSAS, The.—This was the earlier name of the West Saxons. See ENGLAND: A. D. 477-527.

GHAZNEVIDES, OR GAZNEVIDES. See TURKS: A. D. 999-1183.

GHENT: A. D. 1337.—Revolt under Jacques Van Arteveld. See FLANDERS: A. D. 1335-1337.

A. D. 1345.—The end of Jacques Van Arteveld. See FLANDERS: A. D. 1345.

A. D. 1379-1381.—The revolt of the White-Hoods.—The captaincy of Philip Van Arteveld. See FLANDERS: A. D. 1379-1381.

A. D. 1382-1384.—Resistance to the Duke of Burgundy. See FLANDERS: A. D. 1382.

A. D. 1451-1453.—Revolt against the taxes of Philip of Burgundy.—In 1450, Philip, Duke of Burgundy, having exhausted his usual revenues, rich as they were, by the unbounded extravagance of his court, laid a heavy tax on salt in Flanders. The sturdy men of Ghent were little disposed to submit to an imposition so hateful as the French "gabelle"; still less when, the next year, a new duty on grain was demanded from them. They rose in revolt, put on their white hoods, and prepared for war. It was an unfortunate contest for them. They were defeated in nearly every engagement; each encounter was a massacre, with no quarter given on either side; the surrounding country was laid waste and depopulated. A final battle, fought at Gavre, or Gaveren, July 22, 1453, went against them so murderously that they submitted and went on their knees to the duke—not metaphorically, but actually. "The citizens were deprived of the banners of their guilds; and the duke was henceforward to have an equal voice with them in the appointment of their magistrates, whose judicial authority was considerably abridged; the inhabitants likewise bound themselves to liquidate the expenses of the war, and to pay the gabelle for the future." The Hollanders and Zealanders lent their assistance to the duke against Ghent, and were rewarded by some important concessions.—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 2, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 1).—"The city lost her jurisdiction, her dominion over the surrounding country. She had no longer any subjects, was reduced to a commune, and a commune, too, in ward two gates, walled up forever, were to remind her of this grave change of state. The sovereign banner of Ghent, and the trades' banners, were handed over to Toison d'Or, who unceremoniously thrust them into a sack and carried them off."—J. Michelet, *Hist. of France, bk.* 12, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1482-1488.—In trouble with the Austrian ducal guardian. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1482-1493.

A. D. 1539-1540.—The last peal of the great bell Roland.—Once more, in 1539, Ghent became the scene of a memorable rising of the people against the oppressive exactions of their foreign masters. "The origin of the present dispute between the Ghenters and the court was the subsidy of 1,200,000 guilders, demanded by the governess [sister of the emperor Charles V.] in 1536, which . . . it was found impossible to levy by a general tax throughout the provinces. It was therefore divided in proportional shares to each; that of Flanders being fixed at 400,000 guilders, or one-third of the whole. . . . The citizens of Ghent . . . persisted in refusing the demand, offering, instead, to serve the emperor as of old time, with their own troops assembled under the great standard of the town. . . . The other cities of Flanders showed themselves unwilling to espouse the cause of the Ghenters, who, finding they had no hope of support from them, or of redress from the emperor, took up arms, possessed themselves of the forts in the vicinity of Ghent, and despatched an embassy to Paris to offer the sovereignty of their city to the king." The French king, Francis I., not only gave them no encouragement, but permitted the emperor, then in Spain, to pass through France, in order to reach the scene of disturbance more promptly. In the winter of 1540, the latter presented himself before Ghent, at the head of a German army, and the unhappy city could do nothing but yield itself to him.—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 2, *ch* 5 (*v.* 1).—At the time of this unsuccessful revolt and the submission of the city to Charles V., "Ghent was, in all respects, one of the most important cities in Europe. Erasmus, who, as a Hollander and a courtier, was not likely to be partial to the turbulent Flemings, asserted that there was no town in all Christendom to be compared to it for size, power, political constitution, or the culture of its inhabitants. It was, said one of its inhabitants at the epoch of the insurrection, rather a country than a city . . . Its streets and squares were spacious and elegant, its churches and other public buildings numerous and splendid. The sumptuous church of Saint John or Saint Bavon, where Charles V. had been baptized, the ancient castle whither Baldwin Bras de Fer had brought the daughter of Charles the Bald [see FLANDERS A. D. 863], the city hall with its graceful Moorish front, the well-known belfry, where for three centuries had perched the dragon sent by the Emperor Baldwin of Flanders from Constantinople, and where swung the famous Roland, whose iron tongue had called the citizens, generation after generation, to arms, whether to win battles over foreign kings at the head of their chivalry, or to plunge their swords in each others' breasts, were all conspicuous in the city and celebrated in the land. Especially the great bell was the object of the burghers' affection, and, generally, of the sovereign's hatred; while to all it seemed, as it were, a living historical personage, endowed with the human powers and passions which it had so long directed

and inflamed. . . . Charles allowed a month of awful suspense to intervene between his arrival and his vengeance. Despair and hope alternated during the interval. On the 17th of March, the spell was broken by the execution of 19 persons, who were beheaded as ringleaders. On the 29th of April, he pronounced sentence upon the city. . . . It annulled all the charters, privileges, and laws of Ghent. It confiscated all its public property, rents, revenues, houses, artillery, munitions of war, and in general everything which the corporation, or the traders, each and all, possessed in common. In particular, the great bell Roland was condemned and sentenced to immediate removal. It was decreed that the 400,000 florins, which had caused the revolt, should forthwith be paid, together with an additional fine by Ghent of 150,000, besides 6,000 a year, forever after."—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, introd., sect.* 11.

A. D. 1576.—The Spanish Fury.—The treaty of the "Pacification of Ghent." See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1575–1577.

A. D. 1584.—Disgraceful surrender to the Spaniards.—Decline of the city. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1584–1585.

A. D. 1678.—Siege and capture by the French. See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1674–1678.

A. D. 1678.—Restored to Spain. See NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF.

A. D. 1706.—Occupied by Marlborough. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1706–1707.

A. D. 1708-1709.—Taken by the French and retaken by the Allies. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1708–1709.

A. D. 1745-1748.—Surrendered to the French, and restored to Austria. See NETHERLANDS (AUSTRIAN PROVINCES): A. D. 1745; and AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: A. D. 1748.

A. D. 1814.—Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States.—Text of the Treaty. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1814 (DECEMBER).

GHERIAH, Battle of (1763). See INDIA: A. D. 1757–1772.

GHIBELINS. See GUELFS AND GHIBELLINES.

GHILDE. See GUILDS.

GHORKAS, OR GOORKAS, English war with the. See INDIA: A. D. 1805–1816.

GIAN GALEAZZO, Lord of Milan, A. D. 1378–1396; Duke, 1396–1402.....Gian Galeazzo II., Duke of Milan, 1476–1494.

GIBBORIM, The.—King David's chosen band of six hundred, his heroes, his "mighty men," his standing army.—H. Ewald, *Hist. of Israel, bk.* 3.

GIBEON, Battle of. See BETH-HORON, BATTLES OF.

GIBEONITES, The.—The Gibeonites were a "remnant of the Amorites, and the children of Israel had sworn unto them" (ii Samuel xxi., 2). Saul violated the pledged faith of his nation to these people and "sought to slay them." After Saul's death there came a famine which was attributed to his crime against the Gibeonites; whereupon David sought to make atonement to them. They would accept nothing but the execution of vengeance upon seven of Saul's family, and David gave up to them two sons of Saul's concubine, Rizpah, and five sons of Michel, the daughter of Saul, whom they hanged.—H. Ewald, *Hist. of Israel, bk.* 3.

GIBRALTAR, Origin of the name. See SPAIN: A. D. 711–713.

A. D. 1309-1460.—Taken by the Christians, recovered by the Moors, and finally wrested from them, after several sieges. See SPAIN: A. D. 1273–1460.

A. D. 1704.—Capture by the English. See SPAIN: A. D. 1703–1704.

A. D. 1713.—Ceded by Spain to England. See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712–1714.

A. D. 1727.—Abortive siege by the Spaniards.—The lines of San Roque. See SPAIN. A. D. 1726–1731.

A. D. 1780-1782.—Unsuccessful siege by the Spaniards and French. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1780–1782.

GILBERT, Sir Humphrey: Expedition to Newfoundland. See AMERICA: A. D. 1583.

GILBERT ISLANDS. See MICRONESIA.

GILDO, Revolt of. See ROME: A. D. 396–398.

GILDS. See GUILDS.

GILEAD. See JEWS: ISRAEL UNDER THE JUDGES.

GILLMORE, General Q. A.—Siege and reduction of Fort Pulaski. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: GEORGIA—FLORIDA) .... **The siege of Charleston.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (JULY: S. CAROLINA), and (AUGUST—DECEMBER: S. CAROLINA). **Florida Expedition.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (JAN.–FEB.: FLA.).

GILOLO, or Halmaheira. See MOLUCCAS, and MALAY ARCHIPELAGO.

GIPPS LAND. See VICTORIA.

GIPSIES. See GYPSIES.

GIRARD COLLEGE. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1848.

GIRONDINS.—GIRONDISTS, The. See FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (OCTOBER) to 1793–1794 (OCTOBER—APRIL).

GIRTON COLLEGE. See EDUCATION, MODERN: REFORMS, &c.: 1865–1883.

GITANOS. See GYPSIES.

GIURGEVO, Battle of (1595). See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES, 14TH–18TH CENTURIES (ROUMANIA, ETC.).

GLADIATORS, Revolt of the. See SPARTACUS.

GLADSTONE MINISTRIES. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1868–1870; 1873–1880 to 1885; 1885–1886; and 1892–1893.

GLATZ, Capture of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1760.

GLENCO, Massacre of. See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1692.

GLENDALE, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE—JULY: VIRGINIA).

GLENDOWER'S REBELLION. See WALES: A. D. 1402–1413.

GLENMALURE, Battle of (1580). See IRELAND: A. D. 1559–1603.

GLEVUM.—Glevum was a large colonial city of the Romans in Britain, represented by the modern city of Gloucester. It "was a town of great importance, as standing not only on the Severn, near the place where it opened out into the Bristol Channel, but also as being close to the great Roman iron district of the Forest of

Dean."—T. Wright, *Celt, Roman and Saxon, ch. 5.*

GLOGAU, The storming of (1642). See GERMANY: A. D. 1640–1645.

GLOSSATORS, The. See BOLOGNA: 11TH CENTURY.—SCHOOL OF LAW.

GLOUCESTER, Origin of. See GLEVUM.

A. D. 1643.—Siege of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1643 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER).

GLYCERIUS, Roman Emperor (Western), A. D. 473–474.

GNOSTICS—GNOSTICISM.—"In a word . . . Gnosticism was a philosophy of religion; but in what sense was it this? The name of Gnosticism — Gnosis — does not belong exclusively to the group of phenomena with whose historical explanation we are here concerned. Gnosis is a general idea; it is only as defined in one particular manner that it signifies Christian Gnosticism in a special sense: Gnosis is higher Knowledge, Knowledge that has a clear perception of the foundations on which it rests, and the manner in which its structure has been built up; a Knowledge that is completely that which, as Knowledge, it is called to be. In this sense it forms the natural antithesis to Pistis, Faith [whence Pistics, believing Christians]: if it is desired to denote Knowledge in its specific difference from faith, no word will mark the distinction more significantly than Gnosis. But we find that, even in this general sense, the Knowledge termed Gnosis is a religious Knowledge rather than any other; for it is not speculative Knowledge in general, but only such as is concerned with religion. . . . In its form and contents Christian Gnosticism is the expansion and development of Alexandrian religious philosophy; which was itself an offshoot of Greek philosophy. . . . The fundamental character of Gnosticism in all its forms is dualistic. It is its sharply-defined, all-pervading dualism that, more than anything else, marks it directly for an offspring of paganism. . . . In Gnosticism the two principles, spirit and matter, form the great and general antithesis, within the bounds of which the systems move with all that they contain. . . . A further leading Gnostic conception is the Demiurgus. The two highest principles being spirit and matter, and the true conception of a creation of the world being thus excluded, it follows in the Gnostic systems, and is a characteristic feature of them, that they separate the creator of the world from the supreme God, and give him a position subordinate to the latter. He is therefore rather the artificer than the creator of the world. . . . The oldest Gnostic sects are without doubt those whose name is not derived from a special founder, but only stand for the general notion of Gnosticism. Such a name is that of the Ophites or Naassenes. The Gnostics are called Ophites, brethren of the Serpent, not after the serpent with which the fathers compared Gnosticism, meaning to indicate the dangerous poison of its doctrine, and to suggest that it was the hydra, which as soon as it lost one head at once put forth another; but because the serpent was the accepted symbol of their lofty Knowledge. . . . The first priests and supporters of the dogma were, according to the author of the Philosophoumena, the so-called Naassenes — a name derived from the Hebrew name of the serpent. They afterwards called themselves Gnostics, because they asserted that they alone knew the things that are deepest. From this root the one heresy divided into various branches; for though these heretics all taught a like doctrine, their dogmas were various."—F. C. Baur, *The Church Hist. of the First Three Centuries, v. 1, pp.* 187–202.—"Bigotry has destroyed their [the Gnostics'] writings so thoroughly, that we know little of them except from hostile sources. They called themselves Christians, but cared little for the authority of bishops or apostles, and borrowed freely from cabalists, Parsees, astrologers, and Greek philosophers, in building up their fantastic systems. . . . Much as we may fear that the Gnostic literature was more remarkable for boldness in speculation than for clearness of reasoning or respect for facts, it is a great pity that it should have been almost entirely destroyed by ecclesiastical bigotry."—F. M. Holland, *The Rise of Intellectual Liberty, ch. 3, sect. 6.*

ALSO IN: J. L. von Mosheim, *Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity, century 1, sect.* 60–70, *century 2, sect.* 41–65.—C. W. King, *The Gnostics and their Remains.*—A. Neander, *General Hist. of the Christian Religion and Church, v. 2.*—See, also, DOCETISM.

GOA, Acquisition by the Portuguese (1510). See INDIA: A. D. 1498–1580.

GODERICH MINISTRY, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1827–1828.

GODFREY DE BOUILLON: His crusade and his kingdom of Jerusalem. See CRUSADES: A. D. 1096–1099; and JERUSALEM: A. D. 1099, and 1099–1144.

GODIN'S SOCIAL PALACE See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A. D. 1859–1887.

GODOY'S MINISTRY. See SPAIN: A. D. 1788–1808.

GODWINE, Earl: Ascendancy in England. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1042–1066.

GOIDEL, The. See CELTS, THE.

GOLD COAST.—A section of the African coast on the Gulf of Guinea; acquired by England, partly from the Danes, 1850, and partly from the Dutch, 1871.

GOLD DISCOVERIES. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1839–1855; and CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1848–1849.

GOLD PRODUCTION. See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1848–1893.

GOLDEN BIBLE, The. See MORMONISM: A. D. 1805–1830.

GOLDEN BOOK OF VENICE. See VENICE: A. D. 1032–1319.

GOLDEN BOUGH. The. See ARICIAN GROVE.

GOLDEN BULL, Byzantine.—A document to which the emperor attached his golden seal was called by the Byzantines, for that reason, a chrysobulum, or golden bull. The term was adopted in the Western or Holy Roman Empire.

GOLDEN BULL OF CHARLES IV., The. See GERMANY: A. D 1347–1493; 12TH and 13TH CENTURIES; and 13TH CENTURY.

GOLDEN BULL OF HUNGARY. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1114–1301.

GOLDEN CHERSONESE. See CHRYSE.

GOLDEN CIRCLE, Knights of the.—"David Christy published his 'Cotton is King' in the year [1856] in which Buchanan was elected [President of the United States], and the Knights

of the Golden Circle appear to have organized about the same time. The Golden Circle had its centre at Havana, Cuba, and with a radius of sixteen degrees (about 1,200 miles) its circumference took in Baltimore, St. Louis, about half of Mexico, all of Central America, and the best portions of the coast along the Caribbean Sea. The project was, to establish an empire with this circle for its territory, and by controlling four great staples — rice, tobacco, sugar, and cotton — practically govern the commercial world. Just how great a part this secret organization played in the scheme of secession, nobody that was not in its counsels can say; but it is certain that it boasted, probably with truth, a membership of many thousands."—Rossiter Johnson, *Short Hist. of the War of Secession, p.* 24.—During the American Civil War, the Order of the Knights of the Golden Circle was extended (1862–1864) through the Northern States, as a secret treasonable organization, in aid of the Southern Rebellion. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (OCTOBER).

GOLDEN FLEECE, Knights of the Order of the.—"It was on the occasion of his marriage [A. D. 1430] that Philip [Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, Count of Flanders, etc.], desirous of instituting a national order of knighthood, chose for its insignia a 'golden fleece,' with the motto, 'Pretium non vile laborum,' — not to be condemned is the reward of labour. . . . For the first time labour was given heraldic honours. The pride of the country had become laden with industrial recollections, its hope full of industrial triumphs; if feudalism would keep its hold, it must adopt or affect the national feeling. No longer despised was the recompense of toil; upon the honour of knighthood it should so be sworn; nay knighthood would henceforth wear appended to its collar of gold no other emblem than its earliest and most valued object — a golden fleece."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial Hist. of Free Nations, v.* 2, *ch.* 10.—"This order of fraternity, of equality between nobles, in which the duke was admonished, 'chaptered,' just the same as any other, this council, to which he pretended to communicate his affairs, was at bottom a tribunal where the haughtiest found the duke their judge; he could honour or dishonour them by a sentence of the order. Their scutcheon answered for them; hung up in St. Jean's, Ghent, it could either be erased or blackened. . . . The great easily consoled themselves for degradation at Paris by lawyers, when they were glorified by the duke of Burgundy in a court of chivalry in which kings took their seat."—J. Michelet, *Hist. of France, bk.* 12, *ch.* 4.—"The number of the members was originally fixed at 31, including the sovereign, as the head and chief of the institution. They were to be: 'Gentilshommes de nom et d'armes sans reproche.' In 1516, Pope Leo X. consented to increase the number to 52, including the head. After the accession of Charles V., in 1556, the Austro-Spanish, or, rather, the Spanish-Dutch line of the house of Austria, remained in possession of the Order. In 1700, the Emperor Charles VI. and King Philip of Spain both laid claim to it. . . . It now passes by the respective names of the Spanish or Austrian 'Order of the Golden Fleece,' according to the country where it is issued."—Sir B. Burke, *Book of Orders of Knighthood, p.* 6.

ALSO IN: J. F. Kirk, *Hist. of Charles the Bold, bk.* 1, *ch.* 2.

GOLDEN GATE, The.—"The Bay of San Francisco is separated by [from] the sea by low mountain ranges. Looking from the peaks of the Sierra Nevada, the coast mountains present an apparently continuous line, with only a single gap, resembling a mountain pass. This is the entrance to the great bay. . . . On the south, the bordering mountains come down in a narrow ridge of broken hills, terminating in a precipitous point, against which the sea breaks heavily. On the northern side, the mountain presents a bold promontory, rising in a few miles to a height of two or three thousand feet. Between these points is the strait — about one mile broad in the narrowest part, and five miles long from the sea to the bay. To this Gate I gave the name of Chrysopylæ, or Golden Gate; for the same reasons that the harbor of Byzantium (Constantinople afterwards), was called Chrysoceras, or Golden Horn. Passing through this gate, the bay opens to the right and left, extending in each direction about 35 miles, making a total length of more than 70, and a coast of about 275 miles."—J. C. Fremont, *Memoirs of my life, v.* 1, *p.* 512.

GOLDEN HORDE, The. See MONGOLS: A. D. 1238–1391.

GOLDEN HORN, The. See BYZANTIUM.

GOLDEN HORSESHOE, Knights of the. See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1710-1716.

GOLDEN HOUSE, The.—The imperial palace at Rome, as restored by Nero after the great fire, was called the Golden House. It was destroyed by Vespasian.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, ch.* 53 *and* 90.

GOLDEN, OR BORROMEAN, LEAGUE, The. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1579–1630.

GOLDEN SPUR, Order of the.—An order of knighthood instituted in 1550 by Pope Paul III.

GOLDSBORO, General Sherman's march to. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (FEBRUARY—MARCH: THE CAROLINAS), and (FEBRUARY—MARCH: N. CAROLINA).

GOLIAD, Massacre at (1836). See TEXAS: A. D. 1824–1836.

GOLOWSTSCHIN, Battle of (1708). See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1707–1718.

GOLYMIN, Battle of (1806). See GERMANY: A. D. 1806–1807.

GOMER, OR OMER, The. See EPHAH.

GOMERISTS. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1603–1619.

GOMPHI.—Gomphi, a city on the border of Thessaly, shut its gates against Cæsar, shortly before the battle of Pharsalia. He halted one day in his march, stormed the town and gave it up to his soldiers to be sacked.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic, v.* 5, *ch.* 15.

GONDS, The. See INDIA: THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS.

GONFALONIERE. See CARROCCIO.

GONZAGA, The House of.—"The house of Gonzaga held sovereign power at Mantua, first as captains, then as marquesses, then as dukes, for nearly 400 years" (1328–1708).—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geog. of Europe, v.* 1, *p.* 248.

GOOD ESTATE OF RIENZI, The. See ROME: A. D. 1347–1354.

GOOD HOPE, Cape of: The Discovery and the Name. See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1468–1498.

The Colonization. See SOUTH AFRICA.

GOORKAS, OR GURKHAS, OR GHORKAS, The. See INDIA: THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS; and A. D. 1805–1816.

GOOROO, OR GURU. See SIKHS.

GORDIAN I. and II., Roman Emperors, A. D. 238.....Gordian III., Roman Emperor, A. D. 238–244.

GORDIAN KNOT, Cutting the.—"It was about February or March 333 B. C., when Alexander reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time, giving to the troops which had been with him in Pisidia a repose doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure, said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as such by the Gods and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to untie. An oracle had pronounced that to the person who should untie it the empire of Asia was destined. . . . Alexander, on inspecting the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the cord in two. By everyone this was accepted as a solution of the problem."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt. 2, ch. 93.*

GORDON, General Charles George, in China. See CHINA: A. D. 1850–1864.....In the Soudan. See EGYPT: A. D. 1870–1883, and 1884–1885.

GORDON RIOTS, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1778-1780.

GORDYENE, OR CORDYENE, OR CORDUENE.—The tribes of the Carduchi which anciently occupied the region of northern Mesopotamia, east of the Tigris, have given their name permanently to the country, but in variously modified forms. In the Greek and Roman period it was known as Gordyene, Cordyene, Corduene; at the present day it is Kurdistan. Under the Parthian domination in Asia, Gordyene was a tributary kingdom. In the early part of the last century B. C. it was conquered by Tigranes, king of Armenia, who chose a site within it for building his vast new capital, Tigranocerta, to populate which twelve Greek cities were stripped of inhabitants. It was included among the conquests of Trajan for the Romans, but relinquished by Hadrian.—G. Rawlinson, *Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy, ch. 10, and after.*—See, also, CARDUCHI, THE.

GORGES, Sir Ferdinando, and the colonization of Maine. See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1621–1631, and 1635; also MAINE: A. D. 1639.

GORM, King of Denmark, A. D. 883–941.

GOROSZLO, Battle of (1601). See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14TH–18TH CENTURIES (ROUMANIA, &c.).

GORTYN. See CRETE.

GOSHEN, Land of. See JEWS: THE ROUTE OF THE EXODUS.

GOSNOLD'S VOYAGE TO NEW ENGLAND. See AMERICA: A. D. 1602–1605.

GOSPORT NAVY YARD, Abandonment and destruction of the. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (APRIL).

GOTHA, Origin of the Dukedom of. See SAXONY: A. D. 1180–1553.

GOTHI MINORES, The. See GOTHS: A. D. 341–381.

GOTHIA, in central Europe. See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 376.

GOTHIA, in Gaul.—Septimania, the strip of land along the Mediterranean between the Pyrenees and the Rhone, was the last possession of the Goths in Gaul, and the name Gothia became for a time attached to it.—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. Geog. of Europe, ch. 5, sect 5.*—See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 419–451.

GOTHINI, The.—The Gotini or Gothini were a people of ancient Germany who "are probably to be placed in Silesia, about Breslau." "The Gotini and Osi [who held a part of modern Gallicia, under the Carpathian mountains] are proved by their respective Gallic and Pannonian tongues, as well as by the fact of their enduring tribute, not to be Germans. . . . The Gotini, to complete their degradation, actually work iron mines."—Tacitus, *Minor Works, trans. by Church and Brodribb: The Germany, with geog. notes.*

GOTHLAND IN SWEDEN. See GOTHS: ORIGIN OF THE.

GOTHONES, The.—A tribe in ancient Germany, mentioned by Tacitus. They "probably dwelt on either side of the Vistula, the Baltic being their northern boundary. Consequently, their settlements would coincide with portions of Pomerania and Prussia. Dr. Latham thinks they were identical with the Æstii."—Church and Brodribb, *Geog. Notes to the Germany of Tacitus*—See GOTHS, ORIGIN OF THE.

GOTHS, Origin of the.—"The Scandinavian origin of the Goths has given rise to much discussion, and has been defied by several eminent modern scholars. The only reasons in favor of their Scandinavian origin are the testimony of Jornandes and the existence of the name of Gothland in Sweden; but the testimony of Jornandes contains at the best only the tradition of the people respecting their origin, which is never of much value; and the mere fact of the existence of the name of Gothland in Sweden is not sufficient to prove that this country was the original abode of the people When the Romans first saw the Goths, in the reign of Caracalla, they dwelt in the land of the Getæ [on the northern side of the lower Danube]. Hence Jornandes, Procopius, and many other writers, both ancient and modern, supposed the Goths to be the same as the Getæ of the earlier historians. But the latter writers always regarded the Getæ as Thracians; and if their opinion was correct, they could have had no connection with the Goths. Still, it is a startling fact that a nation called Gothi should have emigrated from Germany, and settled accidentally in the country of a people with a name so like their own as that of Getæ. This may have happened by accident, but certainly all the probabilities are against it. Two hypotheses have been brought forward in modern times to meet this difficulty. One is that of Grimm, in his History of the German Language, who supposes that there was no migration of the Goths at all, that they were on the Lower Danube from the beginning, and that they were known to the earlier Greek and Latin writers as Getæ: but the great objection to this opinion is the general belief of the earlier writers that the Getæ

were Thracians, and the latter were certainly not Germans. The other is that of Latham, who supposes, with much ingenuity, that the name of Get, or Goth, was the general name given by the Slavonic nations to the Lithuanians. According to this theory, the Goth-ones, or Guth-ones, at the mouth of the Vistula, mentioned by Tacitus and Ptolemy, are Lithuanians, and the Get-æ, on the Danube, belong to the same nation. Latham also believes that the Goths of a later period were Germans who migrated to the Danube, but that they did not bear the name of Goths till they settled in the country of the Getæ. See Latham, The Germania of Tacitus, Epil., p. xxxviii., seq."—W. Smith, *Note to Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 10.—"The first clear utterance of tradition among the Goths points to Sweden as their home. It is true that this theory of the Swedish origin of the Goths has of late been strenuously combatted, but until it is actually disproved (if that be possible) it seems better to accept it as a 'working hypothesis,' and, at the very least, a legend which influenced the thoughts and feelings of the nation itself. Condensing the narrative of Jornandes . . . we get some such results as these: 'The island of Scanzia [peninsula of Norway and Sweden] lies in the Northern Ocean, opposite the mouths of the Vistula, in shape like a cedar-leaf. In this island, a warehouse of nations ("officina gentium"), dwelt the Goths, with many other tribes,' whose uncouth names are for the most part forgotten, though the Swedes, the Fins, the Heruli, are familiar to us. 'From this island the Goths, under their king Berig, set forth in search of new homes. They had but three ships, and as one of these during their passage always lagged behind, they called her "Gepanta," "the torpid one," and her crew, who ever after showed themselves more sluggish and clumsy than their companions when they became a nation, bore a name derived from this circumstance, Gepidæ, the Loiterers'." Settling, first, near the mouth of the Vistula, these Gothic wanderers increased in numbers until they were forced once more to migrate southward and eastward, seeking a larger and more satisfactory home. In time, they reached the shores of the Euxine. "The date of this migration of the Goths is uncertain; but, as far as we can judge from the indications afforded by contemporary Roman events, it was somewhere between 100 and 200 A. D. At any rate, by the middle of the third century, we find them firmly planted in the South of Russia. They are now divided into three nations, the Ostrogoths on the East, the Visigoths on the West, the lazy Gepidæ a little to the rear—that is, to the North of both. . . . It is important for us to remember that these men are Teutons of the Teutons. . . . Moreover, the evidence of language shows that among the Teutonic races they belonged to the Low German family of peoples: more nearly allied, that is to say, to the Dutch, the Frieslanders, and to our own Saxon forefathers, all of whom dwelt by the flat shores of the German Ocean or the Baltic Sea, than to the Suabians and other High German tribes who dwelt among the hills."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, introd., ch.* 3 (*v.* 1).

Also in: T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome, bk.* 8, *ch.* 6.—T. Smith, *Arminius, pt.* 2, *ch.* 2.—See, also, Vandals.

Acquisition of Bosphorus.—"The little kingdom of Bosphorus, whose capital was situated on the straits through which the Mæotis communicates itself to the Euxine, was composed of degenerate Greeks and half-civilized barbarians. It subsisted as an independent state from the time of the Peloponnesian war, was at last swallowed up by the ambition of Mithridates, and, with the rest of his dominions, sunk under the weight of the Roman arms. From the reign of Augustus the kings of Bosphorus were the humble but not useless allies of the empire. By presents, by arms, and by a slight fortification drawn across the isthmus, they effectually guarded, against the roving plunderers of Sarmatia, the access of a country which, from its peculiar situation and convenient harbours, commanded the Euxine Sea and Asia Minor. As long as the sceptre was possessed by a lineal succession of kings, they acquitted themselves of their important charge with vigilance and success. Domestic factions, and the fears or private interest of obscure usurpers who seized on the vacant throne, admitted the Goths [already, in the third century, in possession of the neighboring region about the mouth of the Dneiper] into the heart of Bosphorus. With the acquisition of a superfluous waste of fertile soil, the conquerors obtained the command of a naval force sufficient to transport their armies to the coast of Asia."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 10.

A. D. 244-251.—First invasions of the Roman Empire.—As early as the reign of Alexander Severus A. D. (222–235) the Goths, then inhabiting the Ukraine, had troubled Dacia with incursions; but it was not until the time of the Emperor Philip, called the Arabian (244-249), that they invaded the Empire in force, passing through Dacia and crossing the Danube into Mœsia (Bulgaria). They had been bribed by a subsidy to refrain from pillaging Roman territory, but complained that their "stipendia" had not been paid. They made their way without opposition to the city of Marcianopolis, which Trajan had founded in honor of his sister, and which was the capital of one of the two provinces into which Mœsia had been divided. The inhabitants ransomed themselves by the payment of a large sum of money, and the barbarians retired. But their expedition had been successful enough to tempt a speedy repetition of it, and the year 250 found them, again, in Mœsia, ravaging the country with little hindrance. The following year they crossed the Hæmus or Balkan mountains and laid siege to the important city of Philippopolis—capital of Thrace, founded by Philip of Macedon. Now, however, a capable and vigorous emperor, Decius, was briefly wearing the Roman purple. He met the Goths and fought them so valiantly that 30,000 are said to have been slain; yet the victory remained with the barbarians, and Philippopolis was not saved. They took it by storm, put 100,000 of its inhabitants to the sword and left nothing in the ruins of the city worth carrying away. Meantime the enterprising Roman emperor had reanimated and recruited his troops and had secured positions which cut off the retreat of the Gothic host. The peril of the barbarians seemed so great, in fact, that they offered to surrender their whole booty and their captives, if they might, on so doing, march out of the country undisturbed. Decius sternly rejected the proposition, and so provoked his dangerous enemies to a despair which was fatal to him. In a terrible battle that was fought before

the close of the year 251, at a place in Mœsia called Forum Trebonii, the Roman emperor perished, with the greater part of his army. The successor of Decius, Gallus, made haste to arrange a payment of annual peace-money to the Goths, which persuaded them to retire across the Danube.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 10.

Also in: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, introd., ch.* 3 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 258-267.—Naval expeditions in the East.—Having acquired command of a port and a navy by their conquest of or alliance with the little kingdom of Bosporus in the Chersonesus Taurica (modern Crimea), the Goths launched forth boldly upon a series of naval marauding expeditions, which spread terror and destruction along the coasts of the Euxine, the Ægean and the straits between. The first city to suffer was Pityus, on the Euxine, which they totally destroyed, A. D. 258. The next was Trebizond, which fell a victim to the negligence with which its strong walls were guarded. The Goths loaded their ships with the enormous booty that they took from Trebizond, and left it almost a ruined city of the dead. Another expedition reached Bithynia, where the rich and splendid cities of Chalcedon, Nicea, Nicomedia, Prusa, Apamæa, and others were pillaged and more or less wantonly destroyed. "In the year 267, another fleet, consisting of 500 vessels, manned chiefly by the Goths and Heruls [or Heruli], passed the Bosphorus and the Hellespont. They seized Byzantium and Chrysopolis, and advanced, plundering the islands and coasts of the Ægean Sea, and laying waste many of the principal cities of the Peloponnesus. Cyzicus, Lemnos, Skyros, Corinth, Sparta, and Argos are named as having suffered by their ravages. From the time of Sylla's conquest of Athens, a period of nearly 350 years had elapsed, during which Attica had escaped the evils of war; yet when the Athenians were called upon to defend their homes against the Goths, they displayed a spirit worthy of their ancient fame. An officer, named Cleodamus, had been sent by the government from Byzantium to Athens, in order to repair the fortifications, but a division of these Goths landed at the Piræus and succeeded in carrying Athens by storm, before any means were taken for its defence. Dexippus, an Athenian of rank in the Roman service, soon contrived to reassemble the garrison of the Acropolis; and by joining to it such of the citizens as possessed some knowledge of military discipline, or some spirit for warlike enterprise, he formed a little army of 2,000 men. Choosing a strong position in the Olive Grove, he circumscribed the movements of the Goths, and so harassed them by a close blockade that they were soon compelled to abandon Athens. Cleodamus, who was not at Athens when it was surprised, had in the meantime assembled a fleet and gained a naval victory over a division of the barbarian fleet. These reverses were a prelude to the ruin of the Goths. A Roman fleet entered the Archipelago, and a Roman army, under the emperor Gallienus, marched into Illyricum; the separate divisions of the Gothic expedition were everywhere overtaken by these forces, and destroyed in detail. During this invasion of the empire, one of the divisions of the Gothic army crossed the Hellespont into Asia, and succeeded in plundering the cities of the Troad, and in destroying the celebrated temple of Diana of Ephesus. . . . The celebrity of Athens, and the presence of the historian Dexippus, have given to this incursion of the barbarians a prominent place in history; but many expeditions are casually mentioned which must have inflicted greater losses on the Greeks, and spread devastation more widely over the country."—G. Finlay, *Greece Under the Romans, ch.* 1, *sect.* 14.

Also in: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 10.

A. D. 268-270.—Defeat by Claudius.—"Claudius II. and his successor Aurelian, notwithstanding the shortness of their reigns, effectually dissipated the mosquito-swarms of barbarian invaders and provincial usurpers who were ruining the unhappy dominions of Gallienus. The two campaigns (of 268 and 269) in which the Emperor Claudius vanquished the barbarians are related with great brevity, and in such a shape that it is not easy to harmonise even the scanty details which are preserved for us. It seems clear, however, that the Goths (both Ostrogoths and Visigoths), with all their kindred tribes, poured themselves upon Thrace and Macedonia in vaster numbers than ever. The previous movements of these nations had been probably but robber-inroads: this was a national immigration. . . . A few years earlier, so vast an irruption must inevitably have ruined the Roman Empire. But now, under Claudius, the army, once more subjected to strict discipline, had regained, or was rapidly regaining, its tone, and the Gothic multitudes, vainly precipitating themselves against it, by the very vastness of their unwieldy masses, hastened their own destruction. A great battle was fought at Naissus (Nisch, in Servia), a battle which was not a complete victory, which according to one authority was even a defeat for the Romans, but since the barbarians as an immediate consequence of it lost 50,000 men, their doubtful victory may fairly be counted as a defeat. In the next campaign they were shut up in the intricate passes of the Balkans by the Roman cavalry. Under the pressure of famine they killed and eat the cattle that drew their waggons, so parting with their last chance of return to their northern homes. . . . At length the remnants of the huge host seem to have disbanded, some to have entered the service of their conqueror as 'foederati,' and many to have remained as hired labourers to plough the fields which they had once hoped to conquer. . . . The vast number of unburied corpses bred a pestilence, to which the Emperor fell a victim. His successor Aurelian, the conqueror of Zenobia . . . made peace wisely as well as war bravely, and, prudently determining on the final abandonment of the Roman province of Dacia, he conceded to the Goths the undisturbed possession of that region [A. D. 270], on condition of their not crossing the Danube to molest Moesia. Translating these terms into the language of modern geography, we may say, roughly, that the repose of Servia and Bulgaria was guaranteed by the final separation from the Roman Empire of Hungary, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia, which became from this time forward the acknowledged home of the Gothic nation. . . . For about a century (from 270 to 365) the Goths appear to have been with little exception at peace with Rome."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, introd., ch.* 8.

A. D. 341-381.—Conversion to Christianity.—The introduction of Christianity among the Goths seems to have begun while they were yet on the northern side of the Danube and the Black Sea. It first resulted, no doubt, from the influence of many Christian captives who were swept from their homes in Mœsia, Greece, and Asia Minor, and carried away to spend their lives in slavery among the barbarians. To these were probably added a considerable number of Christian refugees from Roman persecution, before the period of Constantine. But it was not until the time of Ulfilas, the great apostle and bishop of the Goths (supposed to have held the office of bishop among them from about A. D. 341 to 381), that the development and organization of Christianity in the Gothic nation assumed importance. Ulfilas is represented to have been a descendant of one of the Christian captives alluded to above. Either as an ambassador or as a hostage, he seems to have passed some years in his early manhood at Constantinople. There he acquired a familiar knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages, and became fitted for his great work — the reducing of the Gothic language to a written form, with an alphabet partly invented, partly adapted from the Greek, and the translation of the Bible into that tongue. The early labors of Ulfilas among his countrymen beyond the Danube were interrupted by an outbreak of persecution, which drove him, with a considerable body of Christian Goths, to seek shelter within the Roman empire. They were permitted to settle in Mœsia, at the foot of the Balkans, round about Nicopolis, and near the site of modern Tirnova. There they acquired the name of the Gothi Minores, or Lesser Goths. From this Gothic settlement of Ulfilas in Mœsia the alphabet and written language to which he gave form have been called Mœso-Gothic. The Bible of Ulfilas — the first missionary translation of the Scriptures — with the personal labors of the apostle and his disciples, were powerfully influential, without doubt, in the Christianizing of the whole body of the Goths, and of their German neighbors, likewise. But Ulfilas had imbibed the doctrines of Arianism, or of Semi-Arianism, at Constantinople, and he communicated that heresy (as it was branded by the Athanasian triumph) to all the barbarian world within the range of Gothic influence. It followed that, when the kingdoms of the Goths, the Vandals, and the Burgundians were established in the west, they had to contend with the hostility of the orthodox or Catholic western church, and were undermined by it. That hostility had much to do with the breaking down of those states and with the better success of the orthodox Franks.—C. A. A. Scott, *Ulfilas, Apostle of the Goths.*—See, also, FRANKS: A. D. 481-511.

(Ostrogoths) A. D. 350-375.—The empire of Ermanaric or Hermanric.—"Ermanaric, who seems to have been chosen king about the year 350, was a great warrior, like many of his predecessors; but his policy, and the objects for which he fought, were markedly different from theirs. . . . Ermanaric made no attempt to invade the provinces of the Roman Empire; but he resolved to make his Ostrogothic kingdom the centre of a great empire of his own. The seat of his kingdom was, as tradition tells us, on the banks of the Dnieper [and it extended to the Baltic]. . . . A Roman historian compares Ermanaric to Alexander the Great; and many ages afterwards his fame survived in the poetic traditions of Germans, Norsemen and Anglo-Saxons. . . . Ermanaric was the first king since Ostrogotha who belonged to the Amaling family. . . . Henceforward the kingship of the Ostrogoths became hereditary among the descendants of Ermanaric. During this time the Visigoths appear to have been practically independent, divided into separate tribes ruled by their own 'judges' or chieftains; but . . . it is probable that in theory they acknowledged the supremacy of the Ostrogothic king. . . . Ermanaric died in the year 375, and the Ostrogoths were subdued by the Hunnish king Balamber. For a whole century they remained subject to the Huns." One section of the Ostrogothic nation escaped from the Hunnish conquest and joined the Visigoths, who found a refuge on the Roman side of the Danube. The bulk of the nation bore the yoke until the death of the great Hun king, Attila, in 453, when the strife between his sons gave them an opportunity to throw it off.—H. Bradley, *Story of the Goths, ch.* 5.—"The forecast of European history which then [during the reign of Hermanric] seemed probable would have been that a great Teutonic Empire, stretching from the Danube to the Don, would take the place which the colossal Slav Empire now holds in the map of Europe, and would be ready, as a civilised and Christianised power, to step into the place of Eastern Rome when, in the fulness of centuries, the sceptre should drop from the nerveless hands of the Cæsars of Byzantium."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk.* 4, *ch.* 1.

(Visigoths) A. D. 376.—Admission into the Roman Empire.—"Let us suppose that we have arrived at the year (364) when the feeble and timid Valens was placed on the Eastern throne by his brother Valentinian. At that time, Ulfilas would be in the fifty-third year of his age and the twenty-third of his episcopate. Hermanric, king of the Ostrogoths, a centenarian and more, was still the most important figure in the loosely welded Gothic confederacy. His special royalty may possibly have extended over Northern Hungary, Lithuania, and Southern Russia. The 'torpid' Gepidæ, dwelt to the north of him, to the south and west the Visigoths, whose settlements may perhaps have occupied the modern countries of Roumania, Transylvania and Southern Hungary. The two great nations, the Ostrogoths and Visigoths, were known at this time to the Romans, perhaps among themselves also, by the respective names of the Gruthungi and Thervingi, but it will be more convenient to disregard these appellations and speak of them by the names which they made conspicuous in later history."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, introd., ch.* 8.—This was the situation of Gothia, or the Gothic Empire of Central Europe, when the Huns made their appearance on the scene. "An empire, formerly powerful, the first monarchy of the Huns, had been overthrown by the Sienpi, at a distance of 500 leagues from the Roman frontier, and near to that of China, in the first century of the Christian era. . . . The entire nation of the Huns, abandoning to the Sienpi its ancient pastures bordering on China, had traversed the whole north of Asia by a march of 1,300 leagues. This immense horde, swelled by all the conquered nations whom it carried along in its passage, bore down on the plains of the Alans, and defeated them on the banks of the Tanais in a great battle. It

received into its body a part of the vanquished tribe, accompanied by which it continued to advance towards the West; while other Alans, too haughty to renounce their independence, had retreated, some into Germany, whence we shall see them afterwards pass into Gaul; others into the Caucasian mountains, where they preserve their name to this day. The Goths, who bordered on the Alans, had fertilised by their labours the rich plains which lie to the north of the Danube and of the Black Sea. More civilised than any of the kindred Germanic tribes, they began to make rapid progress in the social sciences. . . . This comparatively fortunate state of things was suddenly interrupted by the appearance of the Huns,—the unlooked-for arrival of that savage nation, which, from the moment it crossed the Borysthenes, or the Dnieper, began to burn their villages and their crops; to massacre, without pity, men, women, and children; to devastate and destroy whatever came within the reach of a Scythian horseman. . . . The great Hermanric, whose kingdom extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would not have abandoned his sceptre to the Huns without a struggle; but at this very time he was murdered by a domestic enemy. The nations he had subjugated prepared on every side for rebellion. The Ostrogoths, after a vain resistance, broke their alliance with the Visigoths; while the latter, like an affrighted flock of sheep, trooping together from all parts of their vast territory to the right bank of the Danube, refused to combat those superhuman beings by whom they were pursued. They stretched out their supplicating hands to the Romans on the other bank, entreating that they might be permitted to seek a refuge from the butchery which threatened them, in those wilds of Mœsia and Thrace which were almost valueless to the empire." Their prayer was granted by the Emperor Valens, on the condition that they surrender their arms and that the sons of their chief men be given as hostages to the Romans. The great Visigothic nation was then (A. D. 376) transported across the Danube to the Mœsian shore — 200,000 warriors in number, besides children and women and slaves in proportion. But the Roman officers charged with the reception of the Goths were so busy in plundering the goods and outraging the daughters and wives of their guests that they neglected to secure the arms of the grim warriors of the migration. Whence great calamities ensued.—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 3 *and* 5 (*v.* 1).

(Visigoths): A. D. 378.—Defeat and destruction of Valens.—When the Visigothic nation was permitted to cross the Danube, A. D. 376, to escape from the Huns, and was admitted into Lower Mœsia, nothing seems to have been left undone that would exasperate and make enemies of these unwelcome colonists. Every possible extortion and outrage was practised upon them. To buy food, they were driven to part, first, with their slaves, then with their household goods, and finally with their children, whom they sold. In despair, at last, they showed signs of revolt, and the fatuous Roman commander precipitated it by a murderous outrage at Marcianople (modern Shumla). In a battle which soon followed near that town, the Romans were disastrously beaten. The Visigoths were now joined by a large body of Ostrogoths, who passed the Danube without resistance, and received into their ranks, moreover, a considerable force of Gothic soldiers who had long been in the service of the empire. The open country of Mœsia and Thrace was now fully exposed to them (the fortified cities they could not reduce), and they devastated it for a time without restraint. But Valens, the emperor in the east, and Gratian in the west, exerted themselves in co-operation to gather forces against them, and for two years there was a doubtful struggle carried on. The most serious battle, that of The Willows (Ad Salices), fought in the region now called the Dobrudscha, was a victory to neither side. On the whole the Romans appear to have had some advantage in these campaigns, and to have narrowed the range of the Gothic depredations. But the host of the barbarians was continually increased by fresh reinforcements from beyond the Danube. Even their own ferocious enemies, Huns and Alans, were permitted to join their standard. Yet, in face of this fact, the folly and jealousy of the Emperor Valens led him to stake all on the chances of a battle which he made haste to rush into, when he learned that his nephew Gratian was marching to his assistance from the west. He coveted the sole honors of a victory; but death and infamy for himself and an overwhelming calamity to the empire were what he achieved. The battle was fought near Hadrianople, on the 9th day of August, A. D. 378. Two thirds of the Roman army perished on the awful field, and the body of the emperor was never found.—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk.* 1, *ch.* 1.

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 26.—H. Bradley, *Story of the Goths, ch.* 8.—See, also, ROME: A. D. 363-379.

A. D. 379-382.—Settlement of the Goths by Theodosius, in Mœsia and Thrace.—"The forces of the East were nearly annihilated at the terrible battle of Adrianople: more than 60,000 Roman soldiers perished in the fight or in the pursuit; and the time was long past when such a loss could have been easily repaired by fresh levies. Nevertheless, even after this frightful massacre, the walls of Adrianople still opposed an unconquerable resistance to the barbarians. Valour may supply the place of military science in the open field, but civilised nations recover all the advantages of the art of war in the attack or defence of fortified towns . . . The Goths, leaving Adrianople in their rear, advanced, ravaging all around them, to the foot of the walls of Constantinople; and, after some unimportant skirmishes, returned westward through Macedonia, Epirus and Dalmatia. From the Danube to the Adriatic, their passage was marked by conflagration and blood. Whilst the European provinces of the Greek empire sunk under these calamities, the Asiatic provinces took a horrible vengeance on the authors of them." The Gothic youths who had been required as hostages when the nation crossed the Danube, and those who were afterwards sold by their starving parents, were now gathered together in different cities of the Asiatic provinces and massacred in cold blood, at a given signal, on the same day and hour. By this atrocious act, all possible reconciliation with the Goths might well seem to be destroyed. The prospect was discouraging enough to the new emperor who now ascended the vacant throne of Valens (A. D. 379),—the soldier Theodosius, son of Theodosius who delivered Britain from the Scots. Chosen by the

Emperor Gratian to be his colleague and Emperor of the East, Theodosius undertook a most formidable task. "The abandonment of the Danube had opened the entrance of the empire, not only to the Goths, but to all the tribes of Germany and Scythia. . . . The blood of the young Goths which had been shed in Asia was daily avenged with interest over all that remained of Mœsian, Thrasian, Dalmatian, or Grecian race. It was more particularly during these four years of extermination that the Goths acquired the fatal celebrity attached to their name, which is still that of the destroyers of civilisation. Theodosius began by strengthening the fortified cities, recruiting the garrisons, and exercising his soldiers in small engagements whenever he felt assured of success; he then waited to take advantage of circumstances; he sought to divide his enemies by intrigue, and, above all, strenuously disavowed the rapacity of the ministers of Valens, or the cruelty of Julius; he took every occasion of declaring his attachment and esteem for the Gothic people, and at length succeeded in persuading them that his friendship was sincere. . . . The very victories of the Goths, their pride, their intemperance, at length impaired their energy. Fritigern, who, in the most difficult moments, had led them on with so much ability, was dead; the jealousies of independent tribes were rekindled. . . . It was by a series of treaties, with as many independent chieftains, that the nation was at length induced to lay down its arms: the last of these treaties was concluded on the 30th of October, 382. It restored peace to the Eastern empire, six years after the Goths crossed the Danube. This formidable nation was thus finally established within the boundary of the empire of the East. The vast regions they had ravaged were abandoned to them, if not in absolute sovereignty, at least on terms little at variance with their independence. The Goths settled in the bosom of the empire had no kings; their hereditary chiefs were consulted under the name of judges, but their power was unchanged. . . . The Goths gave a vague sort of recognition to the sovereignty of the Roman emperor; but they submitted neither to his laws, his magistrates, nor his taxes. They engaged to maintain 40,000 men for the service of Theodosius; but they were to remain a distinct army. . . . It was, probably, at this period that their apostle, bishop Ulphilas, who had translated the Gospels into their tongue, invented the Mœso-Gothic character, which bears the name of their new abode."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 5 (*v.* 1).

Also in: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 26.

A. D. 395—Alaric's invasion of Greece.—"The death of Theodosius [A. D. 395] threw the administration of the Eastern Empire into the hands of Rufinus, the minister of Arcadius; and that of the Western into those of Stilicho, the guardian of Honorius. The discordant elements which composed the Roman empire began to reveal all their incongruities under these two ministers. . . . The two ministers hated one another with all the violence of aspiring ambition."—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans, ch.* 2, *sect.* 8.—"The animosity existing between Stilicho and the successive ministers of the Eastern Emperor (an animosity which does not necessarily imply any fault on the part of the former) was one most potent cause of the downfall of the Western Empire. . . . Alaric (the all-ruler) surnamed Baltha (the bold) was the Visigothic chieftain whose genius taught him the means of turning this estrangement between the two Empires to the best account. He was probably born about 360. His birth-place was the island Peuce, in the Delta of the Danube, apparently south of what is now termed the Sulina mouth of that river. We have already met with him crossing the Alps as a leader of auxiliaries in the army of Theodosius."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk.* 1, *ch.* 4.—"At this time [A. D. 395] Alaric, partly from disgust at not receiving all the preferment which he expected, and partly in the hope of compelling the government of the Eastern Empire to agree to his terms, quitted the imperial service and retired towards the frontiers, where he assembled a force sufficiently large to enable him to act independently of all authority. Availing himself of the disputes between the ministers of the two emperors, and perhaps instigated by Rufinus or Stilicho to aid their intrigues, he established himself in the provinces to the south of the Danube. In the year 395 he advanced to the walls of Constantinople; but the movement was evidently a feint. . . . After this demonstration, Alaric marched into Thrace and Macedonia, and extended his ravages into Thessaly. . . . When the Goth found the northern provinces exhausted, he resolved to invade Greece and Peloponnesus, which had long enjoyed profound tranquillity. . . . Thermopylæ was left unguarded, and Alaric entered Greece without encountering any resistance. The ravages committed by Alaric's army have been described in fearful terms; villages and towns were burnt, the men were murdered, and the women and children carried away to be sold as slaves by the Goths. . . . The walls of Thebes had been rebuilt, and it was in such a state of defence that Alaric could not venture to besiege it, but hurried forward to Athens. He concluded a treaty with the civil and military authorities, which enabled him to enter that city without opposition. . . . Athens evidently owed its good treatment to the condition of its population, and perhaps to the strength of its walls, which imposed some respect on the Goths; for the rest of Attica did not escape the usual fate of the districts through which the barbarians marched. The town of Eleusis, and the great temple of Ceres, were plundered and then destroyed. . . . Alaric marched unopposed into the Peloponnesus, and, in a short time, captured almost every city in it without meeting with any resistance. Corinth, Argos, and Sparta were all plundered by the Goths." Alaric wintered in the Peloponnesus; in the following spring he was attacked, not only by the forces of the Eastern Empire, whose subjects he had outraged, but by Stilicho, the energetic minister of the Roman West. Stilicho, in a vigorous campaign, drove the Goths into the mountains on the borders of Elis and Arcadia; but they escaped and reached Epirus, with their plunder (see Rome: A. D. 396–398). "The truth appears to be that Alaric availed himself so ably of the jealousy with which the court of Constantinople viewed the proceedings of Stilicho, as to negotiate a treaty, by which he was received into the Roman service, and that he really entered Epirus as a general of Arcadius. . . . He obtained the appointment of Commander-in-chief of the imperial forces in Eastern Illyricum, which he held for

four years. During this time he prepared his troops to seek his fortune in the Western Empire."—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans, ch.* 2, *sect.* 8.—"The birth of Alaric, the glory of his past exploits, and the confidence in his future designs, insensibly united the body of the nation under his victorious standard; and, with the unanimous consent of the barbarian chieftains, the Master-general of Illyricum was elevated, according to ancient custom, on a shield, and solemnly proclaimed king of the Visigoths."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 30.

A. D. 400.—Failure of Gainas at Constantinople.—His defeat and death. See ROME: A. D. 400–518.

(Visigoths): A. D. 400-403.—Alaric's first invasion of Italy.—After Alaric had become a commissioned general of the Eastern Empire and had been placed in command of the great prefecture of Eastern Illyricum, he "remained quiet for three years, arming and drilling his followers, and waiting for the opportunity to make a bold stroke for a wider and more secure dominion. In the autumn of the year 400, knowing that Stilicho was absent on a campaign in Gaul, Alaric entered Italy. For about a year and a half the Goths ranged almost unresisted over the northern part of the peninsula. The emperor, whose court was then at Milan, made preparations for taking refuge in Gaul; and the walls of Rome were hurriedly repaired in expectation of an attack. On the Easter Sunday of the year 402 (March 19), the camp of Alaric, near Pollentia, was surprised by Stilicho, who rightly guessed that the Goths would be engaged in worship, and would not imagine their Roman fellow-Christians less observant of the sacred day than themselves. Though unprepared for battle, the barbarians made a desperate stand, but at last they were beaten. . . . Alaric was able to retreat in good order, and he soon after crossed the Po with the intention of marching against Rome. However, his troops began to desert in large numbers, and he had to change his purpose. In the first place he thought of invading Gaul, but Stilicho overtook him and defeated him heavily at Verona [A. D. 403]. Alaric himself narrowly escaped capture by the swiftness of his horse. Stilicho, however, was not very anxious for the destruction of Alaric, as he thought he might some day find him a convenient tool in his quarrels with the ministers of Arcadius [the Emperor of the East]. So he offered Alaric a handsome bribe to go away from Italy"—[back to Illyria].—H. Bradley, *Story of the Goths, ch.* 10.

ALSO IN: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk.* 1, *ch.* 5.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 30.

(Visigoths): A. D. 408-410.—Alaric's three sieges and sack of Rome.—His death. See ROME: A. D. 408–410.

(Visigoths): A. D. 410-419.—Founding of the kingdom of Toulouse.—On the death of Alaric (A. D. 410), his brother-in-law, Ataulphus, or Atawulfs, was chosen king by the wandering Visigothic nation, and the new king succeeded in negotiating a treaty of peace with the court at Ravenna. As the result of it, the Goths moved northwards and, at the beginning of the year 412, they passed out of Italy into Gaul. A number of usurpers had risen in the western provinces, during the five years since 407, encouraged by the disorders of the time, and Ataulphus accepted a commission from Honorius to put them down and to restore the imperial authority in southern Gaul. The commission was faithfully executed in one of its parts, but the authority which the Gothic king established was, rather, his own, than that of the imperial puppet at Ravenna. Before the end of 413, he was master of most of the Gallic region on the Mediterranean (though Marseilles resisted him), and westward to the Atlantic. Then, at Narbonne, he married Galla Placidia, sister of Honorius, who had been a prisoner in the camp of the Goths for four years, but who was gallantly wooed, it would seem, and gently and truly won, by her Gothic lover. Apparently still commissioned by the Roman emperor, though half at war with him, and though his marriage with Placidia was haughtily forbidden and unrecognized, Ataulphus next carried his arms into Spain, already ravaged by Vandals, Alans and Suevic bands. But there he was cut off in the midst of his conquests, by assassination, in August, 415. The Goths, however, pursued their career under another valiant king, Wallia, who conquered the whole of Spain and meditated the invasion of Africa: but was persuaded to give up both conquests and prospects to Honorius, in exchange for a dominion which embraced the fairest portions of Gaul. "His victorious Goths, forty-three years after they had passed the Danube, were established, according to the faith of treaties, in the possession of the second Aquitaine, a maritime province between the Garonne and the Loire, under the civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Bordeaux. . . . The Gothic limits were enlarged by the additional gift of some neighboring dioceses; and the successors of Alaric fixed their royal residence at Toulouse, which included five populous quarters, or cities, within the spacious circuit of its walls. . . . The Gothic limits contained the territories of seven cities—namely, those of Bordeaux, Périgueux, Angoulême, Agen, Saintes, Poitiers, and Toulouse. Hence the district obtained the name of Septimania."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 31 (*with note by Dr. Wm. Smith*).—It was at the end of the year 418, that the Goths settled themselves in their new kingdom of Toulouse. The next year, Wallia died, and was succeeded by Theodoric, a valorous soldier of the race of the Balthings, who played a considerable part in the history of the next thirty years.—H. Bradley. *Story of the Goths, ch.* 11–12.

ALSO IN: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk.* 1, *ch.* 8 (*v.* 1).

(The Visigoths): A. D. 419-451.—The Kingdom of Toulouse.—"By the peace which their king Walia concluded with Honorius (416) after the restoration of Placidia, they [the Visigoths] had obtained legal possession of the district called Aquitania Secunda, together with the territory round Toulouse, all of which allotment went by the name of Septimania or Gothia. For ten years (419–429) there had been firm peace between Visigoths and Romans; then, for ten years more (429–439), fierce and almost continued war, Theodoric, king of the Visigoths, endeavouring to take Arles and Narbonne; Aetius and his subordinate Litorius striving to take the Gothic capital of Toulouse, and all but succeeding. And in these wars Aetius had availed himself of his long-standing friendship with the Huns to enlist them

as auxiliaries against the warriors of Theodoric, dangerous allies who plundered friends and enemies. . . . For the last twelve years (439–451) there had been peace, but scarcely friendship, between the Courts of Ravenna and Toulouse." —T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk. 2, ch. 8 (v. 2).*—As the successor of Wallia, who died in 419, the Visigoths chose Theoderic, "who seems to have been a Balthing, though not related either to Wallia or to Atawulf. You must be careful not to confound this Visigoth Theoderic, or his son of the same name, with the great Theoderic the Amaling, who began to reign over the Ostrogoths about the year 475. Theoderic the Visigoth was not such a great man as his namesake, but he must have been both a brave soldier and an able ruler, or he could not have kept the affection and obedience of his people for thirty-two years. His great object was to extend his kingdom, which was hemmed in on the north by the Franks, . . . and on the west by another people of German invaders, the Burgunds; while the Roman Empire still kept possession of some rich cities, such as Arles and Narbonne [the first named of which Theoderic besieged unsuccessfully in 425, the last named in 437], which were temptingly close to the Gothic boundary on the south. . . . In the year 450 the Visigoths and the Romans were drawn more closely together by the approach of a great common danger. . . . The Huns . . . had, under their famous king, Attila, moved westward, and were threatening to over-run both Gaul and Italy."—H. Bradley, *Story of the Goths, ch. 12.*—See HUNS: A. D 451.

(Ostrogoths and Visigoths): A. D. 451.—At the battle of Chalons. See HUNS: A. D. 451.

(Ostrogoths): A. D. 453.—Breaking the yoke of the Huns. See HUNS: A. D. 453.

(Visigoths): A. D. 453-484.—Extension of the kingdom of Toulouse.—"The Visigoths were governed from 453 to 466 by Theodoric the Second, son of Theodoric the First, and grandson of Alaric. . . . The reign of Theodoric was distinguished by conquests. On the one hand he drove the Suevians as far as the extremity of Gallicia. . . . On the other hand, in 462, he rendered himself master of the town of Narbon, which was delivered up to him by its count; he also carried his arms towards the Loire; but his brother Frederic, whom he had charged with the conquest of the Armorici, and who had taken possession of Chinon, was killed in 463 near Orleans, in a battle which he gave to Count Ægidius. Theodoric finally extended the dominion of the Visigoths to the Rhone; he even attacked Arles and Marseille, but he could not subjugate them. After a glorious reign of thirteen years, he was killed in the month of August, 466, by his brother Euric, by whom he was succeeded. . . . Euric . . . attacked, in 473, the province of Auvergne. . . . He conquered it in 475 and caused his possession of it to be confirmed by the emperor Nepos. He had at that period acquired the Loire and the Rhone as frontiers; in Spain he subjected the whole of the province of Taragon. . . . He afterwards conquered Provence, and was acknowledged a sovereign in Arles and at Marseille, towards the year 480. No prince, whether civilized or barbarian, was at that period so much feared as Euric; and, had he lived longer, it would undoubtedly have been to the Visigoths, and not to the Franks, that the honor would have belonged of reconstituting the Gallic provinces; but he died at Arles towards the end of the year 484, leaving an only son of tender age, who was crowned under the name of Alaric the Second."—J. C. L. S. de Sismondi, *The French under the Merovingians; trans. by Bellingham, ch. 4.*

(Ostrogoths): A. D. 473-474.—Invasions of Italy and Gaul.—"The Ostrogothic brother-kings, who served under Attila at the battle in Champagne, on the overthrow of the Hunnish Empire obtained for themselves a goodly settlement in Pannonia, on the western bank of the Danube. For near twenty years they had been engaged in desultory hostilities with their barbarian neighbours, with Sueves and Rugians on the north, with Huns and Sarmatians on the south. Now, as their countryman, Jornandes, tells us with admirable frankness, 'the spoils of these neighbouring nations were dwindling, and food and clothing began to fail the Goths.' . . . They clustered round their kings, and clamoured to be led forth to war — whither they cared not, but war must be. Theodemir, the elder king, took counsel with his brother Widemir, and they resolved to commence a campaign against the Roman Empire. Theodemir, as the more powerful chieftain, was to attack the stronger Empire of the East; Widemir, with his weaker forces, was to enter Italy. He did so, but, like so many of the northern conquerors, he soon found a grave in the beautiful but deathly land. His son, the younger Widemir, succeeded to his designs of conquest, but Glycerius [Roman emperor, for the moment] approached him with presents and smooth words, and was not ashamed to suggest that he should transfer his arms to Gaul, which was still in theory, and partially in fact, a province of the Empire The sturdy bands of Widemir's Ostrogoths descended accordingly into the valleys of the Rhone and the Loire; they speedily renewed the ancient alliance with the Visigothic members of their scattered nationality, and helped to ruin yet more utterly the already desperate cause of Gallo-Roman freedom."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk. 3, ch. 7 (v. 2).*

(Ostrogoths): A. D. 473-488.—Rise of Theodoric.—The greater mass of the Ostrogoth nation who followed Theodemir (or Theudemer) the elder of the royal brothers, into the territories of the Eastern Empire, were rapidly successful in their adventures. The Court at Constantinople made little attempt to oppose them with arms, but bribed them to peace by gifts of money and a large cession of territory in Macedonia. "Amongst the cities which were abandoned to them was Pella, famous as the birthplace of Alexander the Great. Just after the conclusion of this treaty (in the year 474) Theudemer died, and his son Theoderic, at the age of twenty years, began his long and glorious reign as king of the Ostrogoths." Theodoric had been reared in the imperial court at Constantinople, from his eighth to his eighteenth year, his father having pledged him to the emperor as a hostage for the fulfilment of a treaty of peace. He understood, therefore, the corrupt politics of the empire and its weakness, and he made the most of his knowledge. Sometimes at peace with the reigning powers and sometimes at war; sometimes ravaging the country to the very gates of the impregnable capital, and sometimes settled quietly on lands along the southern bank of the Danube which he had taken in exchange for the Macedonian

tract; sometimes in league and sometimes in furious rivalry with another Gothic chieftain and adventurer, called Theodoric Strabo, whose origin and whose power are somewhat of a mystery — the seriousness to the Eastern Empire of the position and the strength of Theodoric and his Ostrogoths went on developing until the year 488. That year, the statesmen at Constantinople were illuminated by an idea. They proposed to Theodoric to migrate with his nation into Italy and to conquer a kingdom there. The Emperor Zeno, to whom the Roman senate had surrendered the sovereignty of the Western Roman Empire, and into whose hands the barbarian who extinguished it, Odoacer, or Odovacar, had delivered the purple robes — the Emperor Zeno, in the exercise of his imperial function, authorized the conquest to be made. Theodoric did not hesitate to accept a commission so scrupulously legal.—H. Bradley, *Story of the Goths, ch.* 14–15.

(Ostrogoths): A. D. 488-526.—The kingdom of Theodoric in Italy. See Rome: A. D. 488–526.

(Ostrogoths): A. D. 493-525.—Theodoric in German legend. See Verona: A. D. 493–525.

(Visigoths): A. D. 507-509.—The kingdom of Toulouse overthrown by the Franks.—"If the successors of Euric had been endowed with genius and energy equal to his, it is possible that the Visigoths might have made themselves masters of the whole Western world. But there was in the kingdom one fatal element of weakness, which perhaps not even a succession of rulers like Euric could have long prevented from working the destruction of the State. The Visigoth kings were Arians; the great mass of their subjects in Gaul were Catholics, and the hatred between religious parties was so great that it was almost impossible for a sovereign to win the attachment of subjects who regarded him as a heretic." After 496, when Clovis, the king of the Franks, renounced his heathenism, professed Christianity, and was baptized by a Catholic bishop, the Catholics of Southern Gaul began almost openly to invite him to the conquest of their country. In the year 507 he responded to the invitation, and declared war against the Visigoth, giving simply as his ground of war that it grieved him to see the fairest part of Gaul in the hands of the Arians. "The rapidity of Clovis's advance was something quite unexpected by the Visigoths. Alaric still clung to the hope of being able to avoid a battle until the arrival of Theodoric's Ostrogoths [from his great kinsman in Italy] and wished to retreat," but the opinion of his officers forced him to make a stand. "He drew up his army on 'the field of Voclad' (the name still survives as Vouillé or Vouglé), on the banks of the Clain, a few miles south of Poitiers, and prepared to receive the attack of the Franks. The battle which followed decided the fate of Gaul. The Visigoths were totally defeated, and their king was killed. Alaric's son, Amalaric, a child five years of age, was carried across the Pyrenees into Spain. During the next two years Clovis conquered, with very little resistance, almost all the Gaulish dominions of the Visigoths, and added them to his own. The 'Kingdom of Toulouse' was no more. . . . But Clovis was not allowed to fulfil his intention of thoroughly destroying their [the Visigothic] power, for the great Theoderic of Italy took up the cause of his grandson Amalaric. The final result of many struggles between Theoderic and the Franks was that the Visigoths were allowed to remain masters of Spain, and of a strip of sea-coast bordering on the Gulf of Lyons. . . . This diminished kingdom . . . lasted just 200 years."—H. Bradley, *The Story of the Goths, ch.* 12.

Also in: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders, bk.* 4, *ch.* 9.—W. C. Perry, *The Franks, ch.* 2.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 38.—See, also, Arles: A. D. 508–510.

(Visigoths): A. D. 507-711.—The kingdom in Spain.—The conquests of Clovis, king of the Franks, reduced the dominion of the Visigoths on the northern side of the Pyrenees to a small strip of Roman Narbonensis, along the gulf of Lyons; but most of Spain had come under their rule at that time and remained so. Amalaric, son of Alaric II. (and grandson, on the maternal side, of the great Ostrogothic king, Theodoric, who ruled both Gothic kingdoms during the minority of Amalaric), reigned after the death of Theodoric until 531, when he was murdered. He had made Narbonne his capital, until he was driven from it, in a war with one of the sons of Clovis. It was recovered; but the seat of government became fixed at Toledo. During the reign of his successor, the Franks invaded Spain (A. D. 543), but were beaten back from the walls of Cæsaraugusta (modern Saragossa), and retreated with difficulty and disaster. The Visigoths were now able to hold their ground against the conquerors of Gaul, and the limits of their kingdom underwent little subsequent change, until the coming of the Moors. "The Gothic kings, in spite of bloody changes and fierce opposition from their nobility, succeeded in identifying themselves with the land and the people whom they had conquered. They guided the fortunes of the country with a distinct purpose and vigorous hand. By Leovigild (572–586) the power of the rebellious nobility was broken, and the independence and name of the Sueves of Gallicia extinguished. The still more dangerous religious conflict between the Catholic population and the inherited Arianism of the Goths was put down, but at the cost of the life of his son, Herminigild, who had married a Frank and Catholic princess, and who placed himself at the head of the Catholics. But Leovigild was the last Arian king. This cause of dissension was taken away by his son Reccared (568–601), who solemnly abandoned Arianism, and embraced with zeal the popular Catholic creed. He was followed by the greater part of his Arian subjects, but the change throughout the land was not accomplished without some fierce resistance. It led among other things to the disappearance of the Gothic language, and of all that recalled the Arian days, and to the destruction in Spain of what there was of Gothic literature, such as the translation of the Bible, supposed to be tainted with Arianism. But it determined the complete fusion of the Gothic and Latin population. After Reccared, two marked features of the later Spanish character began to show themselves. One was the great prominence in the state of the ecclesiastical element. The Spanish kings sought in the clergy a counterpoise to their turbulent nobility. The great church councils of Toledo became the legislative assemblies of the nation; the bishops in them took precedence of the nobles; laws were made there as well as canons; and seventeen of these councils are recorded between the end of

the fourth century and the end of the seventh. The other feature was that stern and systematic intolerance which became characteristic of Spain. Under Sisebut (612–620), took place the first expulsion of the Jews. . . . The Gothic realm of Spain was the most flourishing and the most advanced of the new Teutonic kingdoms. . . . But however the Goths in Spain might have worked out their political career, their course was rudely arrested. . . . While the Goths had been settling their laws, while their kings had been marshalling their court after the order of Byzantium, the Saracens had been drawing nearer and nearer."—R. W. Church, *The Beginning of the Middle Ages, ch.* 5.

Also in: H. Bradley, *Story of the Goths, ch.* 29–35.—S. A. Dunham, *Hist. of Spain and Portugal, bk.* 2.—H. Coppée, *Conquest of Spain by the Arab-Moors, bk.* 2.

(Ostrogoths): A. D. 535-553.—Fall of the kingdom of Theodoric.—Recovery of Italy by Justinian. See Rome: A. D. 535–553.

(Ostrogoths): A. D. 553.—Their disappearance from History.—"Totila and Teia, last of the race of Ostrogoth kings, fell as became their heroic blood, sword in hand, upon the field of battle. Then occurred a singular phenomenon, —the annihilation and disappearance of a great and powerful people from the world's history. . . . A great people, which had organized an enlightened government, and sent 200,000 fighting-men into the field of battle, is annihilated and forgotten. A wretched remnant, transported by Narses to Constantinople, were soon absorbed in the miserable proletariat of a metropolitan city. The rest fell by the sword, or were gradually amalgamated with the mixed population of the peninsula. The Visigoth kingdom in Gaul and Spain, which had been overshadowed by the glories of the great Theodoric, emerges into independent renown, and takes up the traditions of the Gothic name. In the annals of Europe, the Ostrogoth is heard of no more."—J. G. Sheppard, *The Fall of Rome, lect.* 6.

(Visigoths): A. D. 711-713.—Fall of the kingdom in Spain. See Spain: A. D. 711–713.

GOURGUES, Dominic de, The vengeance of. See Florida: A. D. 1567–1568.

GOWRIE PLOT, The. See Scotland: A. D. 1600.

GRACCHI, The. See Rome: B. C. 133–121.

GRACES OF CHARLES I. TO THE IRISH. See Ireland: A. D. 1625.

GRAF.—GRAFIO.—"The highest official dignitary of which the Salic law [law of the Salian Franks] makes mention is the Grafio (Graf, Count), who was appointed by the king, and therefore protected by a triple . . . leodis [were-gild]. His authority and jurisdiction extended over a district answering to the gau (canton) of later times, in which he acted as the representative of the king, and was civil and military governor of the people."—W. C. Perry, *The Franks, ch.* 10.—See, also, Margrave.

GRAFTON-CHATHAM MINISTRY, The. See England: A. D. 1765–1768, and 1770.

GRAHAM'S DIKE. See Roman Walls in Britain.

GRAMPIANS, OR MONS GRANPIUS.—Victoriously fought by the Romans under Agricola with the tribes of Caledonia, A. D. 86. Mr. Skene fixes the battle ground at the junction of the Isla with the Tay. See Britain: A. D. 78–84.

GRAN CHACO, The.—"This tract of flat country, lying between the tropic and 29° S., extends eastward to the Parana and Paraguay, and westward to the province of Santiago del Estero. Its area is 180,000 sq. miles. About one-third belongs to Paraguay, and a small part to Bolivia, but the bulk is in the Argentine Republic. . . . The Gran Chaco is no desert, but a rich alluvial lowland, fitted for colonization, which is hindered by the want of knowledge of the rivers and their shiftings."—*The Am. Naturalist, v.* 23 *p.* 799.—"In the Quitchoane language, which is the original language of Peru, they call 'chacu,' those great flocks of deer, goats, and such other wild animals, which the inhabitants of this part of America drive together when they hunt them; and this name was given to the country we speak of, because at the time Francis Pizarro made himself master of a great part of the Peruvian empire, a great number of its inhabitants took refuge there. Of 'Chacu', which the Spaniards pronounce 'Chacou', custom has made 'Chaco.' It appears that, at first, they comprehended nothing under this name but the country lying between the mountains of the Cordilliere, the Pilco Mayo, and the Red River; and that they extended it, in process of time, in proportion as other nations joined the Peruvians, who had taken refuge there to defend their liberties against the Spaniards."—Father Charlevoix, *Hist. of Paraguay, bk.* 3 (*v.* 1).—For an account of the tribes of the Gran Chaco, see American Aborigines: Pampas Tribes.

GRANADA: The rise of the city.—Granada "was small and unimportant until the year 1012. Before that time, it was considered a dependency of Elvira [the neighboring ancient Roman city of Illiberis]; but, little by little, the people of Elvira migrated to it, and as it grew Elvira dwindled into insignificance."—H. Coppée, *Conquest of Spain by the Arab-Moors, bk.* 6, *ch.* 5, *note* (*v.* 2).

A. D. 711.—Taken by the Arab-Moors. See Spain: A. D. 711–713.

A. D. 1238.—The founding of the Moorish kingdom.—Its vassalage to the King of Castile. See Spain: A. D. 1212–1238.

A. D. 1238-1273.—The kingdom under its founder.—The building of the Alhambra. See Spain: A. D. 1238–1273.

A. D. 1273-1460.—Slow decay and crumbling of the Moorish kingdom. See Spain: A. D. 1273–1460.

A. D. 1476-1492.—The fall of the Moorish kingdom. See Spain: A. D. 1476–1492.

GRANADA, Treaty of. See Italy: A. D. 1501–1504.

GRANADINE CONFEDERATION, The. See Colombian States: A. D. 1830–1886.

GRAND ALLIANCES against Louis XIV. See France: A. D. 1689–1690, to 1695–1696; Spain: A. D. 1701–1702; and England: A. D. 1701–1702.

GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC.—"The Grand Army of the Republic was organized April 6, 1866, in Decatur, the county seat of Macon County, Illinois. Its originator was Dr. Benjamin F. Stephenson, a physician of Springfield, Illinois, who had served during the war as

surgeon of the 14th Illinois Infantry. He had spent many weeks in study and plans so that the Order might be one that would meet with the general approval of the surviving comrades of the war, and thus insure their hearty co-operation. He made a draft of a ritual, and sent it by Captain John S. Phelps to Decatur, where two veterans, Messrs. Coltrin and Prior, had a printing-office. These gentlemen, with their employees, who had been in the service, were first obligated to secrecy, and the ritual was then placed in type in their office. Captain Phelps returned to Springfield with proofs of the ritual, but the comrades in Decatur were so interested in the project, that, with the active assistance of Captain M. F. Kanan and Dr. J. W. Routh, a sufficient number of names were at once secured to an application for charter, and these gentlemen went to Springfield to request Dr. Stephenson to return with them and organize a post at Decatur. The formation of a post was under way in Springfield, but not being ready for muster, Dr. Stephenson, accompanied by several comrades, proceeded to Decatur, and, as stated, on April 6, 1866, mustered post No. 1, with General Isaac C. Pugh as post commander, and Captain Kanan as adjutant. The latter gave material aid to Dr. Stephenson in the work of organizing other posts, and Dr. Routh served as chairman of a committee to revise the ritual. The title, 'The Grand Army of the Republic, U. S.,' was formally adopted that night. Soon after this, post No. 2 was organized at Springfield with General Jules C. Webber as commander. . . . Nothing was done in the Eastern States about establishing posts until the opportunity was given for consultation on this subject at a national soldiers' and sailors' convention, held in Pittsburg in September, 1866, when prominent representatives from Eastern States were obligated and authorized to organize posts. The first posts so established were posts Nos. 1 in Philadelphia, and 3 in Pittsburg, by charters direct from the acting commander-in-chief, Dr. Stephenson; and post 2, Philadelphia, by charter received from General J. K. Proudfit, department commander of Wisconsin. A department convention was held at Springfield, Illinois, July 12, 1866, and adopted resolutions declaring the objects of the G. A. R. General John M. Palmer was elected the first Department Commander. . . . The first national convention was held at Indianapolis, Ind., November 20, 1866. . . . General Stephen A. Hurlbut, of Illinois, was elected Commander-in-Chief. General Thomas B. McKean, of New York, Senior Vice-Commander-in-Chief; General Nathan Kimball, of Indiana, Junior Vice-Commander-in-Chief; and Dr. Stephenson, Adjutant-General. The objects of the Order cannot be more briefly stated than from the articles and regulations. '1. To preserve and strengthen those kind and fraternal feelings which bind together the Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines who united to suppress the late Rebellion, and to perpetuate the memory and history of the dead. 2. To assist such former comrades in arms as need help and protection, and to extend needful aid to the widows and orphans of those who have fallen. 3. To maintain true allegiance to the United States of America, based upon a paramount respect for, and fidelity to, its Constitution and laws, to discountenance whatever tends to weaken loyalty, incites to insurrection, treason, or rebellion, or in any manner impairs the efficiency and permanency of our free institutions, and to encourage the spread of universal liberty, equal rights, and justice to all men. Article IV. defines the qualifications of members in the following terms. Soldiers and Sailors of the United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps who served between April 12, 1861 and April 29, 1865, in the war for the suppression of the Rebellion, and those having been honorably discharged therefrom after such service, and of such State regiments as were called into active service and subject to the orders of United States general officers, between the dates mentioned, shall be eligible to membership in the Grand Army of the Republic. No person shall be eligible who has at any time borne arms against the United States. . . . The second national encampment was held in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., January 15, 1868. . . . General John A. Logan, of Illinois, was elected Commander-in-Chief. . . . That which tended most to attract public attention to the organization was the issuance of the order of General Logan early in his administration, in 1868, directing the observance of May 30th as Memorial Day. . . . At the national encampment, held May 11, 1870, at Washington, D. C., the following article was adopted as a part of the rules and regulations: 'The national encampment hereby establishes a Memorial Day, to be observed by the members of the Grand Army of the Republic, on the 30th day of May annually, in commemoration of the deeds of our fallen comrades. When such day occurs on Sunday, the preceding day shall be observed, except where, by legal enactment, the succeeding day is made a legal holiday, when such day shall be observed.' Memorial Day has been observed as such every year since throughout the country wherever a post of the Grand Army of the Republic has been established. In most of the States the day has been designated as a holiday."—W. H. Ward, *ed.*, *Records of Members of the Grand Army of the Republic*, *pp.* 6–9.

ALSO IN: G. S. Merrill, *The Grand Army of the Republic* (*New Eng. Mag.*, *August*, 1890).

GRAND ARMY REMONSTRANCE, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1648 (NOVEMBER—DECEMBER).

GRAND COUNCIL, The. See VENICE: A. D. 1032–1319.

GRAND MODEL, The.— The "fundamental constitutions" framed by the philosopher, John Locke, for the Carolinas, were so called in their day. See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1669–1693.

GRAND PENSIONARY, The. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1651–1660.

GRAND REMONSTRANCE, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1641 (NOVEMBER).

GRAND SERJEANTY. See FEUDAL TENURES.

GRAND SHUPANES. See SHUPANES.

GRANDELLA, Battle of (1266). See ITALY (SOUTHERN): A. D. 1250–1268.

GRANDI OF FLORENCE, The. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1250–1293.

GRANGE.—GRANGERS, The. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1877–1891; and SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A. D. 1866–1875.

GRANICUS, Battle of the (B. C. 334). See MACEDONIA: B. C. 334–330.

GRANSON, Battle of (1476). See BURGUNDY: A. D. 1476–1477.

GRANT, General Ulysses S.—First Battle at Belmont. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER: ON THE MISSISSIPPI)..... **Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JANUARY—FEBRUARY: KENTUCKY—TENNESSEE)..... **Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.** See UNITED STATES OF AM: A. D. 1862 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: TENNESSEE)..... **Under Halleck at Corinth.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (APRIL—MAY: TENNESSEE—MISSISSIPPI)..... **Command of the Armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE—OCTOBER: TENNESSEE—KENTUCKY)..... **Iuka and Corinth.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER: MISSISSIPPI)..... **Campaign against Vicksburg.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (JANUARY—APRIL: ON THE MISSISSIPPI), and (APRIL—JULY: ON THE MISSISSIPPI)..... **The Chattanooga campaign.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (OCTOBER—NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE)..... **In chief command of the whole army.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MARCH—APRIL)..... **Last campaign.** See UNITED STATES OF AM: A. D. 1864 (MAY: VIRGINIA) to 1865 (APRIL: VIRGINIA)..... **Report on the South.** See SAME: 1865 (JULY—DEC.)..... **President.** See SAME: 1868 (NOVEMBER) to 1876–1877.

GRANVELLE'S MINISTRY IN THE NETHERLANDS. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1555–1559, to 1562–1566.

GRASSHOPPER WAR, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SHAWANESE.

GRATIAN, Roman Emperor (Western), A. D. 367–383.

GRAUBUNDEN: Achievement of independence. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1396–1499.

The Valtelline revolt and war. See FRANCE: A. D. 1624–1626.

Dismemberment by Bonaparte. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY—OCTOBER).

GRAVE: A. D. 1586.—Siege and capture by the Prince of Parma. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1585–1586.

A. D. 1593.—Capture by Prince Maurice. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1588–1593.

GRAVELINES: A. D. 1383.—Capture and destruction by the English. See FLANDERS: A. D. 1383.

A. D. 1652.—Taken by the Spaniards. See FRANCE: A. D. 1652.

A. D. 1658.—Siege and capture by the French. See FRANCE: A. D. 1655–1658.

A. D. 1659.—Ceded to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1659–1661.

GRAVELOTTE, OR ST. PRIVAT, Battle of. See FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (JULY—AUGUST).

GRAYBACKS, BOYS IN GRAY. See BOYS IN BLUE.

GREAT BELL ROLAND, The. See GHENT: A. D. 1539–1540.

GREAT BRIDGE, Battle at (1775). See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1775–1776.

GREAT BRITAIN: Adoption of the name for the United Kingdoms of England and Scotland. See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1707.

GREAT CAPTAIN, The.—This was the title commonly given to the Spanish general, Gonsalvo de Cordova, after his campaign against the French in Italy. See ITALY: A. D. 1501–1504.

GREAT COMPANY, The. See ITALY: A. D. 1343–1393.

GREAT CONDÉ, The. See CONDÉ.

GREAT DAYS OF AUVERGNE, The. See FRANCE: A. D. 1665.

GREAT ELECTOR, The. See BRANDENBURG: A. D. 1640–1688.

GREAT INTERREGNUM, The. See GERMANY: A. D. 1250–1272.

GREAT KANAWHA, Battle of the. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1774.

GREAT KING, The.—A title often applied to the kings of the ancient Persian monarchy.

GREAT MEADOWS, Washington's capitulation at. See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1754.

GREAT MOGULS. The Mongol sovereigns of India. See INDIA: A. D. 1399–1605.

GREAT NAMAQUALAND. See GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA.

GREAT PEACE, The. See BRETIGNY.

GREAT POWERS, The.—The six larger and stronger nations of Europe,—England, Germany, France, Austria, Russia, and Italy,—are often referred to as "the great powers." Until the rise of united Italy the "great powers" of Europe were five in number.

GREAT PRIVILEGE, The. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1477 and after.

GREAT RUSSIA. See RUSSIA, GREAT.

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY, The founding of. See MORMONISM: A. D. 1846–1848.

GREAT SEAL, Lord Keeper of the. See LAW, EQUITY: A. D. 1538.

GREAT SCHISM, The. See PAPACY: A. D. 1377–1417: and ITALY: A. D. 1343–1389; 1378.

GREAT TREK, The. See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1806–1881.

GREAT WALL OF CHINA. See CHINA: THE ORIGIN OF THE PEOPLE.

GREAT WEEK, The. See FRANCE: A. D. 1830–1840.

GREAT YAHNI, Battle of (1877). See TURKS: A. D. 1877–1878.

GREAVES.—The greaves which formed part of the armour of the ancient Greeks were "leggings formed of a pewter-like metal, which covered the lower limbs down to the instep; and they were fastened by clasps. . . . Homer designates them as 'flexible'; and he frequently speaks of the Greek soldiery as being well-equipped with this important defence—not only, that is, well provided with greaves, but also having them so well formed and adjusted that they would protect the limbs of the warrior without in any degree affecting his freedom of movement and action. These greaves, as has been stated, appear to have been formed of a metal resembling the alloy that we know as pewter."—C. Boutell, *Arms and Armour in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, ch. 2, sect. 8.*

GREECE.*

The Land.—Its geographical characteristics, and their influence upon the People.—"The considerable part played by the people of Greece during many ages must undoubtedly be ascribed to the geographical position of their country. Other tribes having the same origin, but inhabiting countries less happily situated—such, for instance, as the Pelasgians of Illyria, who are believed to be the ancestors of the Albanians—have never risen above a state of barbarism, whilst the Hellenes placed themselves at the head of civilised nations, and opened fresh paths to their enterprise. If Greece had remained for ever what it was during the tertiary geological epoch—a vast plain attached to the deserts of Libya, and run over by lions and the rhinoceros—would it have become the native country of a Phidias, an Æschylos, or a Demosthenes? Certainly not. It would have shared the fate of Africa, and, far from taking the initiative in civilisation, would have waited for an impulse to be given to it from beyond. Greece, a subpeninsula of the peninsula of the Balkans, was even more completely protected by transverse mountain barriers in the north than was Thracia or Macedonia. Greek culture was thus able to develop itself without fear of being stifled at its birth by successive invasions of barbarians. Mounts Olympus, Pelion, and Ossa, towards the north and east of Thessaly, constituted the first line of formidable obstacles towards Macedonia A second barrier, the steep range of the Othrys, runs along what is the present political boundary of Greece. To the south of the Gulf of Lamia a fresh obstacle awaits us, for the range of the Œta closes the passage, and there is but the narrow pass of the Thermopylæ between it and the sea. Having crossed the mountains of the Locri and descended into the basin of Thebæ, there still remain to be crossed the Parnes or the spurs of the Cithæron before we reach the plains of Attica The 'isthmus' beyond these is again defended by transverse barriers, outlying ramparts, as it were, of the mountain citadel of the Peloponnesus, that acropolis of all Greece. Hellas has frequently been compared to a series of chambers, the doors of which were strongly bolted; it was difficult to get in, but more difficult to get out again, owing to their stout defenders. Michelet likens Greece to a trap having three compartments. You entered, and found yourself taken first in Macedonia, then in Thessaly, then between the Thermopylæ and the isthmus But the difficulties increase beyond the isthmus, and Lacedæmonia remained impregnable for a long time. At an epoch when the navigation even of a land-locked sea like the Ægean was attended with danger, Greece found herself sufficiently protected against the invasions of oriental nations; but, at the same time, no other country held out such inducements to the pacific expeditions of merchants Gulfs and harbours facilitated access to her Ægean coasts, and the numerous outlying islands were available as stations or as places of refuge. Greece, therefore, was favourably placed for entering into commercial intercourse with the more highly civilised peoples who dwelt on the opposite coasts of Asia Minor. The colonists and voyagers of Eastern Ionia not only supplied their Achæan and Pelasgian kinsmen with foreign commodities and merchandise, but they also imparted to them the myths, the poetry, the sciences, and the arts of their native country. Indeed, the geographical configuration of Greece points towards the east, whence she has received her first enlightenment. Her peninsulas and outlying islands extend in that direction, the harbours on her eastern coasts are most commodious, and afford the best shelter; and the mountain-surrounded plains there offer the best sites for populous cities. . . . The most distinctive feature of Hellas, as far as concerns the relief of the ground, consists in the large number of small basins, separated one from the other by rocks or mountain ramparts The features of the ground thus favoured the division of the Greek people into a multitude of independent republics. Every town had its river, its amphitheatre of hills or mountains, its acropolis, its fields, pastures, and forests, and nearly all of them had, likewise, access to the sea. All the elements required by a free community were thus to be found within each of these small districts, and the neighbourhood of other towns, equally favoured, kept alive perpetual emulation, too frequently degenerating into strife and battle. The islands of the Ægean Sea, likewise, had constituted themselves into miniature republics. Local institutions thus developed themselves freely, and even the smallest island of the Archipelago has its great representatives in history. But whilst there thus exists the greatest diversity, owing to the configuration of the ground and the multitude of islands, the sea acts as a binding element, washes every coast, and penetrates far inland. These gulfs and numerous harbours have made the maritime inhabitants of Greece a nation of sailors—amphibiæ, as Strabo called them From the most remote times the passion for travel has always been strong amongst them. When the inhabitants of a town grew too numerous to support themselves upon the produce of their land, they swarmed out like bees, explored the coasts of the Mediterranean, and, when they had found a site which recalled their native home, they built themselves a new city. . . . The Greeks held the same position relatively to the world of the ancients which is occupied at the present time by the Anglo-Saxons with reference to the entire earth. There exists, indeed, a remarkable analogy between Greece, with its archipelago, and the British Islands, at the other extremity of the continent. Similar geographical advantages have brought about similar results, as far as commerce is concerned [see TRADE, ANCIENT: GREEKS], and . . . time and space have effected a sort of harmony."—E. Reclus, *The Earth and its Inhabitants: Europe*, v 1, *pp* 36–38—"The independence of each city was a doctrine stamped deep on the Greek political mind by the very nature of the Greek land How truly this is so is hardly fully understood till we see that land with our own eyes. The map may do something; but no map can bring home to us the true nature of the Greek land till we have stood on a Greek hill-top, on the akropolis of Athens or the loftier akropolis of Corinth, and have seen how thoroughly the land was a land of valleys cut off by hills, of islands and peninsulas cut off by arms of sea,

* An important part of Greek history is treated more fully under the heading "Athens" (in Vol. 1), to which the reader is referred.

from their neighbours on either side. Or we might more truly say that, while the hills fenced them off from their neighbours, the arms of the sea laid them open to their neighbours. Their waters might bring either friends or enemies; but they brought both from one wholly distinct and isolated piece of land to another. Every island, every valley, every promontory, became the seat of a separate city; that is, according to Greek notions, the seat of an independent power, owning indeed many ties of brotherhood to each of the other cities which helped to make up the whole Greek nation, but each of which claimed the right of war and peace and separate diplomatic intercourse, alike with every other Greek city and with powers beyond the bounds of the Greek world. Corinth could treat with Athens and Athens with Corinth, and Corinth and Athens could each equally treat with the King of the Macedonians and with the Great King of Persia. . . . How close the Greek states are to one another, and yet how physically distinct they are from one another, it needs, for me at least, a journey to Greece fully to take in."—E. A. Freeman, *The Practical Bearings of European Hist.* (*Lect's to Am. Audiences*), *pp.* 243–244.

Ancient inhabitants.—Tribal divisions. See PELASGIANS; HELLENES; ACHAIA; ÆOLIANS; and DORIANS AND IONIANS.

The Heroes and their Age.—"The period included between the first appearance of the Hellenes in Thessaly and the return of the Greeks from Troy, is commonly known by the name of the heroic age, or ages. The real limits of this period cannot be exactly defined. The date of the siege of Troy is only the result of a doubtful calculation [ending B. C. 1183, as reckoned by Eratosthenes, but fixed at dates ranging from 33 to 63 years later by Isocrates, Callimachus and other Greek writers]; and . . . the reader will see that it must be scarcely possible to ascertain the precise beginning of the period: but still, so far as its traditions admit of anything like a chronological connexion, its duration may be estimated at six generations, or about 200 years [say from some time in the 14th to some time in the 12th century before Christ]. . . . The history of the heroic age is the history of the most celebrated persons belonging to this class, who, in the language of poetry, are called 'heroes.' The term 'hero' is of doubtful origin, though it was clearly a title of honour; but, in the poems of Homer, it is applied not only to the chiefs, but also to their followers, the freemen of lower rank, without, however, being contrasted with any other, so as to determine its precise meaning. In later times its use was narrowed, and in some degree altered: it was restricted to persons, whether of the heroic or of after ages, who were believed to be endowed with a superhuman, though not a divine, nature, and who were honoured with sacred rites, and were imagined to have the power of dispensing good or evil to their worshippers; and it was gradually combined with the notion of prodigious strength and gigantic stature. Here, however, we have only to do with the heroes as men. The history of their age is filled with their wars, expeditions, and adventures, and this is the great mine from which the materials of the Greek poetry were almost entirely drawn."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 5 (*v.* 1).—The legendary heroes whose exploits and adventures became the favorite subjects of Greek tragedy and song were Perseus, Hercules, Theseus, the Argonauts, and the heroes of the Siege of Troy.

The Migrations of the Hellenic tribes in the Peninsula.—"If there is any point in the annals of Greece at which we can draw the line between the days of myth and legend and the beginnings of authentic history, it is at the moment of the great migrations. Just as the irruption of the Teutonic tribes into the Roman empire in the 5th century after Christ marks the commencement of an entirely new era in modern Europe, so does the invasion of Southern and Central Greece by the Dorians, and the other tribes whom they set in motion, form the first landmark in a new period of Hellenic history. Before these migrations we are still in an atmosphere which we cannot recognize as that of the historical Greece that we know. The states have different boundaries, some of the most famous cities have not yet been founded, tribes who are destined to vanish occupy prominent places in the land, royal houses of a foreign stock are established everywhere, the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian is yet unknown. We cannot realize a Greece where Athens is not yet counted as a great city, while Mycenae is a seat of empire; where the Achaian element is everywhere predominant, and the Dorian element is as yet unknown. When, however, the migrations are ended, we at once find ourselves in a land which we recognize as the Greece of history. The tribes have settled into the districts which are to be their permanent abodes, and have assumed their distinctive characters. . . . The original impetus which set the Greek tribes in motion came from the north, and the whole movement rolled southward and eastward. It started with the invasion of the valley of the Peneus by the Thessalians, a warlike but hitherto obscure tribe, who had dwelt about Dodona in the uplands of Epirus. They crossed the passes of Pindus, and flooded down into the great plain to which they were to give their name. The tribes which had previously held it were either crushed and enslaved, or pushed forward into Central Greece by the wave of invasion. Two of the displaced races found new homes for themselves by conquest. The Arnaeans, who had dwelt in the southern lowlands along the courses of Apidanus and Enipeus, came through Thermopylae, pushed the Locrians aside to right and left, and descended into the valley of the Cephissus, where they subdued the Minyae of Orchomenus [see MINYI], and then, passing south, utterly expelled the Cadmeians of Thebes. The plain country which they had conquered received a single name. Boeotia became the common title of the basins of the Cephissus and the Asopus, which had previously been in the hands of distinct races. Two generations later the Boeotians endeavoured to cross Cithaeron, and add Attica to their conquests; but their king Xanthus fell in single combat with Melanthus, who fought in behalf of Athens, and his host gave up the enterprise. In their new country the Boeotians retained their national unity under the form of a league, in which no one city had authority over another, though in process of time Thebes grew so much greater than her neighbours that she exercised a marked preponderance over the other thirteen members of the confederation. Orchomenus, whose Minyan inhabitants had been subdued but not exterminated by the invaders, remained dependent on the league without being

at first amalgamated with it. A second tribe who were expelled by the irruption of the Thessalians were the Dorians, a race whose name is hardly heard in Homer, and whose early history had been obscure and insignificant. They had till now dwelt along the western slope of Pindus. Swept on by the invaders, they crossed Mount Othrys, and dwelt for a time in the valley of the Spercheius and on the shoulders of Oeta. But the land was too narrow for them, and, after a generation had passed, the bulk of the nation moved southward to seek a wider home, while a small fraction only remained in the valleys of Oeta. Legends tell us that their first advance was made by the Isthmus of Corinth, and was repulsed by the allied states of Peloponnesus, Hyllus the Dorian leader having fallen in the fight by the hand of Echemus, King of Tegea. But the grandsons of Hyllus resumed his enterprise, and met with greater success. Their invasion was made, as we are told, in conjunction with their neighbours the Aetolians, and took the Aetolian port of Naupactus as its base. Pushing across the narrow strait at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, the allied hordes landed in Peloponnesus, and forced their way down the level country on its western coast, then the land of the Epeians, but afterwards to be known as Elis and Pisatis. This the Aetolians took as their share, while the Dorians pressed further south and east, and successively conquered Messenia, Laconia, and Argolis, destroying the Cauconian kingdom of Pylos and the Achaian states of Sparta and Argos. There can be little doubt that the legends of the Dorians pressed into a single generation the conquests of a long series of years. . . . It is highly probable that Messenia was the first seized of the three regions, and Argos the latest . . . but of the details or dates of the Dorian conquests we know absolutely nothing. Of the tribes whom the Dorians supplanted, some remained in the land as subjects to their newly found masters, while others took ship and fled over sea. The stoutest-hearted of the Achaians of Argolis, under Tisamenus, a grandson of Agamemnon, retired northward when the contest became hopeless, and threw themselves on the coast cities of the Corinthian Gulf, where up to this time the Ionic tribe of the Aegialeans had dwelt. The Ionians were worsted, and fled for refuge to their kindred in Attica, while the conquerors created a new Achaia between the Arcadian Mountains and the sea, and dwelt in the twelve cities which their predecessors had built. The rugged mountains of Arcadia were the only part of Peloponnesus which were to escape a change of masters resulting from the Dorian invasion. A generation after the fall of Argos, new war-bands thirsting for land pushed on to the north and west, led by descendants of Temenus. The Ionic towns of Sicyon and Phlius, Epidaurus and Troezen, all fell before them. Even the inaccessible Acropolis which protected the Aeolian settlement of Corinth could not preserve it from the hands of the enterprising Aletes. Nor was it long before the conquerors pressed on from Corinth beyond the isthmus, and attacked Attica. Foiled in their endeavour to subdue the land, they at least succeeded in tearing from it its western districts, where the town of Megara was made the capital of a new Dorian state, and served for many generations to curb the power of Athens. From Epidaurus a short voyage of fifteen miles took the Dorians to Aegina, where they formed a settlement which, first as a vassal to Epidaurus, and then as an independent community, enjoyed a high degree of commercial prosperity. It is not the least curious feature of the Dorian invasion that the leaders of the victorious tribe, who, like most other royal houses, claimed to descend from the gods and boasted that Heracles was their ancestor, should have asserted that they were not Dorians by race, but Achaians. Whether the rude northern invaders were in truth guided by princes of a different blood and higher civilization than themselves, it is impossible to say. . . . In all probability the Dorian invasion was to a considerable extent a check in the history of the development of Greek civilization, a supplanting of a richer and more cultured by a poorer and wilder race. The ruins of the prehistoric cities, which were supplanted by new Dorian foundations, point to a state of wealth to which the country did not again attain for many generations. On the other hand, the invasion brought about an increase in vigour and moral earnestness. The Dorians throughout their history were the sturdiest and most manly of the Greeks. The god to whose worship they were especially devoted was Apollo, the purest, the noblest, the most Hellenic member of the Olympian family. By their peculiar reverence for this noble conception of divinity, the Dorians marked themselves out as the most moral of the Greeks." — C. W. C. Oman, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 5.

ALSO IN: M. Duncker, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 2 (*v.* 1). — C. O. Müller, *Hist. and Antiq. of the Doric Race, introd., and bk.* 1, *ch.* 1–5. — G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 3–8 (*v.* 2). — See, also, DORIANS AND IONIANS; ACHAIA; ÆOLIANS; THESSALY; and BŒOTIA.

The Migrations to Asia Minor and the Islands of the Ægean.—Æolian, Ionian and Dorian colonies. See ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES; and TRADE, ANCIENT.

Mycenæ and its kings.—The unburied memorials.—"Thucydides says that before the Dorian conquest, the date of which is traditionally fixed at B. C. 1104, Mycenae was the only city whence ruled a wealthy race of kings. Archaeology produces the bodies of kings ruling at Mycenae about the twelfth century and spreads their wealth under our eyes. Thucydides says that this wealth was brought in the form of gold from Phrygia by the founder of the line, Pelops. Archaeology tells us that the gold found at Mycenae may very probably have come from the opposite coast of Asia Minor which abounded in gold; and further that the patterns impressed on the gold work at Mycenae bear a very marked resemblance to the decorative patterns found on graves in Phrygia. Thucydides tells us that though Mycenae was small, yet its rulers had the hegemony over a great part of Greece. Archæology shews us that the kings of Mycenae were wealthy and important quite out of proportion to the small city which they ruled, and that the civilisation which centred at Mycenae spread over south Greece and the Aegean, and lasted for some centuries at least. It seems to me that the simplest way of meeting the facts of the case is to suppose that we have recovered at Mycenae the graves of the Pelopid race of monarchs. It will not of course do to go too far. . . . It would be too much to suppose that we have recovered the body of the Agamemnon who seems in the Iliad to be as familiar to us as Caesar or

Alexander, or of his father Atreus, or of his charioteer and the rest. We cannot of course prove the Iliad to be history; and if we could, the world would be poorer than before. But we can insist upon it that the legends of heroic Greece have more of the historic element in them than anyone supposed a few years ago. . . . Assuming then that we may fairly class the Pelopidae as Achaean, and may regard the remains at Mycenae as characteristic of the Achaean civilisation of Greece, is it possible to trace with bolder hand the history of Achaean Greece? Certainly we gain assistance in our endeavour to realize what the pre-Dorian state of Peloponnesus was like. We secure a hold upon history which is thoroughly objective, while all the history which before existed was so vague and imaginative that the clear mind of Grote refused to rely upon it at all. But the precise dates are more than we can venture to lay down, in the present condition of our knowledge. . . . The Achaean civilisation was contemporary with the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty (B. C. 1700–1400). It lasted during the invasions of Egypt from the north (1300–1100). When it ceased we cannot say with certainty. There is every historical probability that it was brought to a violent end in the Dorian invasion. The traditional date of that invasion is B. C. 1104. But it is obvious that this date cannot be relied upon."—P. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek Hist., ch.* 2–3.

ALSO IN: H. Schliemann, *Mycenæ.*—C. Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations, ch.* 4.

Ancient political and geographical divisions.—"Greece was not a single country. . . . It was broken up into little districts, each with its own government. Any little city might be a complete State in itself, and independent of its neighbours. It might possess only a few miles of land and a few hundred inhabitants, and yet have its own laws, its own government, and its own army. . . . In a space smaller than an English county there might be several independent cities, sometimes at war, sometimes at peace with one another. Therefore when we say that the west coast of Asia Minor was part of Greece, we do not mean that this coast-land and European Greece were under one law and one government, for both were broken up into a number of little independent States: but we mean that the people who lived on the west coast of Asia Minor were just as much Greeks as the people who lived in European Greece. They spoke the same language, and had much the same customs, and they called one another Hellenes, in contrast to all other nations of the world, whom they called barbarians . . . , that is, 'the unintelligible folk,' because they could not understand their tongue."—C. A. Fyffe, *Hist of Greece* (*History Primers*), *ch.* 1.—"The nature of the country had . . . a powerful effect on the development of Greek politics. The whole land was broken up by mountains into a number of valleys more or less isolated; there was no central point from which a powerful monarch could control it. Hence Greece was, above all other countries, the home of independence and freedom. Each valley, and even the various hamlets of a valley, felt themselves possessed of a separate life, which they were jealous to preserve."—E. Abbott, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 1, *ch.* 1.—See AKARNANIANS; ACHAIA; ÆGINA; ÆTOLIA; ARCADIA, ARGOS; ATHENS; ATTICA, BŒOTIA; CORINTH; DORIS AND DRYOPIS; ELIS; EPIRUS; EUBŒA; KORKYRA; LOCRI; MACEDONIA; MANTINEA; MEGALOPOLIS; MEGARA; MESSENE; OLYNTHUS; PHOKIANS; PLATÆA; SICYON; SPARTA; THEBES; and THESSALY.

Political evolution of the leading States.—Variety in the forms of Government.—Rise of democracy at Athens.—"The Hellenes followed no common political aim. . . . Independent and self-centred, they created, in a constant struggle of citizen with citizen and state with state, the groundwork of those forms of government which have been established in the world at large. We see monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, rising side by side and one after another, the changes being regulated in each community by its past experience and its special interests in the immediate present. These forms of government did not appear in their normal simplicity or in conformity with a distinct ideal, but under the modifications necessary to give them vitality. An example of this is Lakedæmon. If one of the families of the Heracleidæ [the two royal families—see SPARTA: THE CONSTITUTION] aimed at a tyranny, whilst another entered into relations with the native and subject population, fatal to the prerogatives of the conquerors, we can understand that in the third case, that of the Spartan community, the aristocratic principle was maintained with the greatest strictness. Independently of this, the divisions of the Lakedæmonian monarchy between two lines, neither of which was to have precedence was intended to guard against the repetition in Sparta of that which had happened in Argos. Above all, the members of the Gerusia, in which the two kings had only equal rights with the rest, held a position which would have been unattainable to the elders of the Homeric age. But even the Gerusia was not independent. There existed in addition to it a general assembly, which, whilst very aristocratic as regards the native and subject population, assumed a democratic aspect in contrast with the king and the elders. The internal life of the Spartan constitution depended upon the relations between the Gerusia and the aristocratic demos. . . . The Spartan aristocracy dominated the Peloponnesus. But the constitution contained a democratic element working through the Ephors, by means of which the conduct of affairs might be concentrated in a succession of powerful hands. Alongside of this system, the purely aristocratic constitutions, which were without such a centre, could nowhere hold their ground. The Bacchiadæ in Corinth, two hundred in number, with a prytanis at their head, and intermarrying only among themselves, were one of the most distinguished of these families. They were deprived of their exclusive supremacy by Kypselus, a man of humble birth on his father's side, but connected with the Bacchiadæ through his mother. . . . As the Kypselidæ rose in Corinth, the metropolis of the colonies towards the west, so in the corresponding eastern metropolis, Miletus, Thrasybulus raised himself from the dignity of prytanis to that of tyrant; in Ephesus, Pythagoras rose to power, and overthrew the Basilidæ; in Samos, Polycrates, who was master also of the Kyklades, and of whom it is recorded that he confiscated the property of the citizens and then made them a present of it again. By concentrating the forces of their several communities the tyrants obtained the means

of surrounding themselves with a certain splendor, and above all of liberally encouraging poetry and art. To these Polycrates opened his citadel, and in it we find Anacreon and Ibycus; Kypselus dedicated a famous statue to Zeus, at Olympia. The school of art at Sikyon was without a rival, and at the court of Periander were gathered the seven sages — men in whom a distinguished political position was combined with the prudential wisdom derived from the experience of life. This is the epoch of the legislator of Athens, Solon [see ATHENS: B. C. 594], who more than the rest has attracted to himself the notice of posterity. He is the founder of the Athenian democracy. . . . His proverb 'Nothing in excess' indicates his character. He was a man who knew exactly what the time has a right to call for, and who utilized existing complications to bring about the needful changes. It is impossible adequately to express what he was to the people of Athens, and what services he rendered them. That removal of their pecuniary burdens, the seisachtheia [see DEBT, LAWS CONCERNING: ANCIENT GREEK], made life for the first time endurable to the humbler classes. Solon cannot be said to have introduced democracy, but, in making the share of the upper classes in the government dependent upon the good pleasure of the community at large, he laid its foundations. The people were invested by him with attributes which they afterwards endeavored to extend. . . . Solon himself lived long enough to see the order which he established serve as the basis of the tyranny which he wished to avoid; it was the Four Hundred themselves who lent a hand to the change. The radical cause of failure was that the democratic element was too feebly constituted to control or to repress the violence of the families. To elevate the democracy into a true power in the state other events were necessary, which not only rendered possible, but actually brought about, its further development. The conflicts of the principal families, hushed for a moment, were revived under the eyes of Solon himself with redoubled violence. The Alcmæonidæ [banished about 595 B. C.—see ATHENS: B. C. 612–595] were recalled, and gathered around them a party consisting mainly of the inhabitants of the seacoast, who, favored by trade, had the money in their hands; the genuine aristocrats, described as the inhabitants of the plains, who were in possession of the fruitful soil, were in perpetual antagonism to the Alcmæonidæ; and, whilst these two parties were bickering, a third was formed from the inhabitants of the mountain districts, inferior to the two others in wealth, but of superior weight to either in the popular assemblies. At its head stood Peisistratus, a man distinguished by warlike exploits, and at an earlier date a friend of Solon. It was because his adherents did not feel themselves strong enough to protect their leader that they were induced to vote him a body-guard chosen from their own ranks. . . . As soon, however, as the first two parties combined, the third was at a disadvantage, so that after some time sentence of banishment was passed upon Peisistratus. . . . Peisistratus . . . found means to gather around him a troop of brave mercenaries, with whom, and with the support of his old adherents, he then invaded Attica. His opponents made but a feeble resistance, and he became without much trouble master both of the city and of the country [see ATHENS: B. C. 560–510]. He thus attained to power; it is true, with the approbation of the people, but nevertheless by armed force. . . . We have almost to stretch a point in order to call Peisistratus a tyrant—a word which carries with it the invidious sense of a selfish exercise of power. No authority could have been more rightly placed than his; it combined Athenian with Panhellenist tendencies. But for him Athens would not have been what she afterwards became to the world. . . . Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Peisistratus governed Athens absolutely, and even took steps to establish a permanent tyranny. He did, in fact, succeed in leaving the power he possessed to his sons, Hippias and Hipparchus. . . . Of the two brothers it was the one who had rendered most service to culture, Hipparchus, who was murdered at the festival of the Panathenæa. It was an act of revenge for a personal insult. . . . In his dread lest he should be visited by a similar doom, Hippias actually became an odious tyrant and excited universal discontent. One effect, however, of the loss of stability which the authority of the dominant family experienced was that the leading exiles ejected by Peisistratus combined in the enterprise which was a necessary condition of their return, the overthrow of Hippias. The Alcmæonidæ took the principal part. . . . The revolution to which this opened the way could, it might seem, have but one result, the establishment of an oligarchical government. . . . But the matter had a very different issue," resulting in the constitution of Cleisthenes and the establishment of democracy at Athens, despite the hostile opposition and interference of Sparta.—L. von Ranke, *Universal History: The oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks, ch.* 5.—See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 510-507, and 509-506.

B. C. 752.— The Archonship at Athens thrown open to the whole body of the people. See ATHENS: FROM THE DORIAN MIGRATION TO B. C. 683.

B. C. 624.—The Draconian legislation at Athens. See ATHENS: B. C. 624.

B. C. 610-600.—War of Athens and Megara for Salamis.—Spartan Arbitration. See ATHENS: B. C. 610–586.

B. C. 595-586.—The Cirrhæan or first Sacred War. See ATHENS: B. C. 610–586; and DELPHI.

B. C. 500-493.—Rising of the Ionians of Asia Minor against the Persians.—Aid rendered to them by the Athenians.—Provocation to Darius.—The Ionic Greek cities, or states, of Asia Minor, first subjugated by Crœsus, King of Lydia, in the sixth century B. C., were swallowed up, in the same century, with all other parts of the dominion of Crœsus, in the conquests of Cyrus, and formed part of the great Persian Empire, to the sovereignty of which Cambyses and Darius succeeded. In the reign of Darius there occurred a revolt of the Ionians (about 502 B. C.), led by the city of Miletus, under the influence of its governor, Aristagoras. Aristagoras, coming over to Greece in person, sought aid against the Persians, first at Sparta, where it was denied to him, and then, with better success, at Athens. Presenting himself to the citizens, just after they had expelled the Pisistratidæ, Aristagoras said to them "that the Milesians were colonists from Athens, and that it was just that the Athenians,

being so mighty, should deliver them from slavery. And because his need was great, there was nothing that he did not promise, till at the last he persuaded them. For it is easier, it seems, to deceive a multitude than to deceive one man. Cleomenes the Spartan, being but one man, Aristagoras could not deceive; but he brought over to his purpose the people of Athens, being thirty thousand. So the Athenians, being persuaded, made a decree to send twenty ships to help the men of Ionia, and appointed one Melanthius, a man of reputation among them, to be captain. These ships were the beginning of trouble both to the Greeks and the barbarians. . . . When the twenty ships of the Athenians were arrived, and with them five ships of the Eretrians, which came, not for any love of the Athenians, but because the Milesians had helped them in the old time against the men of Chalcis, Aristagoras sent an army against Sardis, but he himself abode in Miletus. This army, crossing Mount Tmolus, took the city of Sardis without any hindrance; but the citadel they took not, for Artaphernes held it with a great force of soldiers. But though they took the city they had not the plunder of it, and for this reason. The houses in Sardis were for the most part built of reeds, and such as were built of bricks had their roofs of reeds; and when a certain soldier set fire to one of these houses, the fire ran quickly from house to house till the whole city was consumed. And while the city was burning, such Lydians and Persians as were in it, seeing they were cut off from escape (for the fire was in all the outskirts of the city), gathered together in haste to the market-place. Through this market-place flows the river Pactolus, which comes down from Mount Tmolus, having gold in its sands, and when it has passed out of the city it flows into the Hermus, which flows into the sea. Here then the Lydians and Persians were gathered together, being constrained to defend themselves. And when the men of Ionia saw their enemies how many they were, and that these were preparing to give battle, they were stricken with fear, and fled out of the city to Mount Tmolus, and thence, when it was night, they went back to the sea. In this manner was burnt the city of Sardis, and in it the great temple of the goddess Cybele, the burning of which temple was the cause, as said the Persians, for which afterwards they burnt the temples in Greece. Not long after came a host of Persians from beyond the river Halys; and when they found that the men of Ionia had departed from Sardis, they followed hard upon their track, and came up with them at Ephesus. And when the battle was joined, the men of Ionia fled before them. Many indeed were slain, and such as escaped were scattered, every man to his own city. After this the ships of the Athenians departed, and would not help the men of Ionia any more, though Aristagoras besought them to stay. Nevertheless the Ionians ceased not from making preparations of war against the King, making to themselves allies, some by force and some by persuasion, as the cities of the Hellespont and many of the Carians and the island of Cyprus. For all Cyprus, save Amathus only, revolted from the King under Onesilus, brother of King Gorgus. When King Darius heard that Sardis had been taken and burned with fire by the Ionians and the Athenians, with Aristagoras for leader, at the first he took no heed of the Ionians, as knowing that they would surely suffer for their deed, but he asked, 'Who are these Athenians?' And when they told him he took a bow and shot an arrow into the air, saying, 'O Zeus, grant that I may avenge myself on these Athenians.' And he commanded his servant that every day, when his dinner was served, he should say three times, 'Master, remember the Athenians.' . . . Meanwhile the Persians took not a few cities of the Ionians and Æolians. But while they were busy about these, the Carians revolted from the King; whereupon the captains of the Persians led their army into Caria, and the men of Caria came out to meet them; and they met them at a certain place which is called the White Pillars, near to the river Mæander. Then there were many counsels among the Carians, whereof the best was this, that they should cross the river and so contend with the Persians, having the river behind them, that so there being no escape for them if they fled, they might surpass themselves in courage. But this counsel did not prevail. Nevertheless, when the Persians had crossed the Mæander, the Carians fought against them, and the battle was exceeding long and fierce. But at the last the Carians were vanquished, being overborne by numbers, so that there fell of them ten thousand. And when they that escaped—for many had fled to Labranda, where there is a great temple of Zeus and a grove of plane trees—were doubting whether they should yield themselves to the King or depart altogether from Asia, there came to their help the men of Miletus with their allies. Thereupon the Carians, putting away their doubts altogether, fought with the Persians a second time, and were vanquished yet more grievously than before. But on this day the men of Miletus suffered the chief damage. And the Carians fought with the Persians yet again a third time; for, hearing that these were about to attack their cities one by one, they laid an ambush for them on the road to Pedasus. And the Persians, marching by night, fell into the ambush, and were utterly destroyed, they and their captains. After these things, Aristagoras, seeing the power of the Persians, and having no more any hope to prevail over them—and indeed, for all that he had brought about so much trouble, he was of a poor spirit—called together his friends and said to them, 'We must needs have some place of refuge, if we be driven out of Miletus. Shall we therefore go to Sardinia, or to Myrcinus on the river Strymon, which King Darius gave to Histiæus?' To this Hecateus, the writer of chronicles, made answer, 'Let Aristagoras build a fort in Leros (this Leros is an island thirty miles distant from Miletus) and dwell there quietly, if he be driven from Miletus. And hereafter he can come from Leros and set himself up again in Miletus.' But Aristagoras went to Myrcinus, and not long afterwards was slain while he besieged a certain city of the Thracians." —Herodotus, *The Story of the Persian War* (*version of A. J. Church, ch.* 2).—See, also, PERSIA: B. C. 521–493; and ATHENS: B. C. 501–490.

B. C. 496.—War of Sparta with Argos.—Overwhelming reverse of the Argives. See ARGOS: B. C. 496–421.

B. C. 492-491.—Wrath of the Persian king against Athens.—Failure of his first expedition of invasion.—Submission of 'Medizing' Greek states.—Coercion of Ægina.—Enforced

union of Hellas.—Headship of Sparta recognized.—The assistance given by Athens to the Ionian revolt stirred the wrath of the Persian monarch very deeply, and when he had put down the rebellion he prepared to chastise the audacious and insolent Greeks. "A great fleet started from the Hellespont, with orders to sail round the peninsula of Mt. Athos to the Gulf of Therma, while Mardonius advanced by land. His march was so harassed by the Thracians that when he had effected the conquest of Macedonia his force was too weak for any further attempt. The fleet was overtaken by a storm off Mt. Athos, on whose rocks 300 ships were dashed to pieces, and 20,000 men perished. Mardonius returned in disgrace to Asia with the remnant of his fleet and army. This failure only added fury to the resolution of Darius. While preparing all the resources of his empire for a second expedition, he sent round heralds to the chief cities of Greece, to demand the tribute of earth and water as signs of his being their rightful lord. Most of them submitted: Athens and Sparta alone ventured on defiance. Both treated the demand as an outrage which annulled the sanctity of the herald's person. At Athens the envoy was plunged into the loathsome Barathrum, a pit into which the most odious public criminals were cast. At Sparta the herald was hurled into a well, and bidden to seek his earth and water there. The submission of Ægina, the chief maritime state of Greece, and the great enemy of Athens, entailed the most important results. The act was denounced by Athens as treason against Greece, and the design was imputed to Ægina of calling in the Persians to secure vengeance on her rival. The Athenians made a formal complaint to Sparta against the 'Medism' of the Æginetans; a charge which is henceforth often repeated both against individuals and states. The Spartans had recently concluded a successful war with Argos, the only power that could dispute her supremacy in Peloponnesus; and now this appeal from Athens, the second city of Greece, at once recognized and established Sparta as the leading Hellenic state. In that character, her king Cleomenes undertook to punish the Medizing party in Ægina 'for the common good of Greece'; but he was met by proofs of the intrigues of his colleague Demaratus in their favour. . . . Cleomenes obtained his deposition on a charge of illegitimacy, and a public insult from his successor Leotychides drove Demaratus from Sparta. Hotly pursued as a 'Medist,' he effected his escape to Darius, whose designs against Athens and Sparta were now stimulated by the councils of their exiled sovereigns, Hippias and Demaratus. Meanwhile, Cleomenes and his new colleague returned to Ægina, which no longer resisted, and having seized ten of her leading citizens, placed them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians. Ægina was thus effectually disabled from throwing the weight of her fleet into the scale of Persia: Athens and Sparta, suspending their political jealousies, were united when their disunion would have been fatal; their conjunction drew after them most of the lesser states: and so the Greeks stood forth for the first time as a nation prepared to act in unison, under the leadership of Sparta (B. C. 491). That city retained her proud position till it was forfeited by the misconduct of her statesmen."—P. Smith, *Hist. of the World: Ancient, ch.* 18 (*v.* 1).

ALSO IN: G. W. Cox, *The Greeks and the Persians, ch.* 6.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 36 (*v.* 4.)—See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.

B. C. 490.—The Persian Wars: Marathon.—The second and greater expedition launched by Darius against the Greeks sailed from the Cilician coast in the summer of the year 490 B. C. It was under the command of two generals,—a Mede, named Datis, and the king's nephew, Artaphernes. It made the passage safely, destroying Naxos on the way, but sparing the sacred island and temple of Delos. Its landing was on the shores of Eubœa, where the city of Eretria was easily taken, its inhabitants dragged into slavery, and the first act of Persian vengeance accomplished. The expedition then sailed to the coast of Attica and came to land on the plain of Marathon, which spreads along the bay of that name. "Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E. N. E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is 22 miles in length. . . [The plain] 'is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain; the southern is not very large and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats: but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 36 (*v.* 4).—The Athenians waited for no nearer approach of the enemy to their city, but met them at their landing-place. They were few in number—only 10,000, with 1,000 more from the grateful city of Platæa, which Athens had protected against Thebes. They had sent to Sparta for aid, but a superstition delayed the march of the Spartans and they came the day after the battle. Of all the nearer Greeks none came to the help of Athens in that hour of extreme need; and so much the greater to her was the glory of Marathon. The ten thousand Athenian hoplites and the one thousand brave Platæans confronted the great host of Persia, of the numbers in which there is no account. Ten generals had the right of command on successive days, but Miltiades was known to be the superior captain and his colleagues gave place to him. "On the morning of the seventeenth day of the month of Metagitnion (September 12th), when the supreme command according to the original order of succession fell to Miltiades, he ordered the army to draw itself up according to the ten tribes. . . . The troops had advanced with perfect steadiness across the trenches and palisadings of their camp, as they had doubtless already done on previous days. But as soon as they had approached the enemy within a distance of 5,000 feet they changed their march to a double-quick pace, which gradually rose to the rapidity of a charge, while at the same time they raised the war-cry with a loud voice. When the Persians saw these men rushing down from the heights, they

thought they beheld madmen: they quickly placed themselves in order of battle, but before they had time for an orderly discharge of arrows the Athenians were upon them, ready in their excitement to begin a closer contest, man against man in hand-to-hand fight, which is decided by personal courage and gymnastic agility, by the momentum of heavy-armed warriors, and by the use of lance and sword. Thus the well-managed and bold attack of the Athenians had succeeded in bringing into play the whole capability of victory which belonged to the Athenians Yet the result was not generally successful. The enemy's centre stood firm. . . . But meanwhile both wings had thrown themselves upon the enemy; and after they had effected a victorious advance, the one on the way to Rhamnus, the other towards the coast, Miltiades . . . issued orders at the right moment for the wings to return from the pursuit, and to make a combined attack upon the Persian centre in its rear. Hereupon the rout speedily became general, and in their flight the troubles of the Persians increased; . . . they were driven into the morasses and there slain in numbers."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 3, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 2).—The Athenian dead, when gathered for the solemn obsequies, numbered 192; the loss of the Persians was estimated by Herodotus at 6,400.—Herodotus, *Hist., bk.* 6.

Also in: E. S. Creasy, *Fifteen Decisive Battles, ch.* 1.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 14 (*v.* 2).—G. W. Cox, *The Greeks and Persians, ch.* 6.—Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, *Athens: Its Rise and Fall, bk.* 2, *ch.* 5.

B. C. 489-480.—The Æginetan War.—Naval power of Athens created by Themistocles. See Athens: B. C. 489–480.

B. C. 481-479.—Congress at Corinth.—Hellenic union against Persia.—Headship of Sparta.—"When it was known in Greece that Xerxes was on his march into Europe, it became necessary to take measures for the defence of the country. At the instigation of the Athenians, the Spartans, as the acknowledged leaders of Hellas and head of the Peloponnesian confederacy, called on those cities which had resolved to uphold the independence of their country to send plenipotentiaries to a congress at the Isthmus of Corinth. When the envoys assembled, a kind of Hellenic alliance was formed under the presidency of Sparta, and its unity was confirmed by an oath, binding the members to visit with severe penalties those Greeks who, without compulsion, had given earth and water to the envoys of Xerxes. This alliance was the nearest approach to a Hellenic union ever seen in Greece; but though it comprised most of the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achæa, the Megarians, Athenians and two cities of Bœotia, Thespiæ and Platæa, were the only patriots north of the Isthmus. Others, who would willingly have been on that side, such as the common people of Thessaly, the Phocians and Locrians, were compelled by the force of circumstances to 'medize.' From the time at which it met in the autumn or summer of 481 to the autumn of 480 B. C., the congress at the Isthmus directed the military affairs of Greece. It fixed the plan of operations. Spies were sent to Sardis to ascertain the extent of the forces of Xerxes; envoys visited Argos, Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse, in the hope, which proved vain, of obtaining assistance in the impending struggle. As soon as Xerxes was known to be in Europe, an army of 10,000 men was sent to hold the pass of Tempe, but afterwards, on the advice of Alexander of Macedon, this barrier was abandoned; and it was finally resolved to await the approaching forces at Thermopylæ and Artemisium. The supreme authority, both by land and sea, was in the hands of the Spartans, they were the natural leaders of any army which the Greeks could put into the field, and the allies refused to follow unless the ships also were under their charge. . . . When hostilities were suspended, the congress re-appears, and the Greeks once more meet at the Isthmus to apportion the spoil and adjudge the prizes of valour. In the next year we hear of no common plan of operations, the fleet and army seeming to act independently of each other; yet we observe that the chiefs of the medizing Thebans were taken to the Isthmus (Corinth) to be tried, after the battle of Platæa. It appears then that, under the stress of the great Persian invasion, the Greeks were brought into an alliance or confederation; and for the two years from midsummer 481 to midsummer 479 a congress continued to meet, with more or less interruption, at the Isthmus, consisting of plenipotentiaries from the various cities. This congress directed the affairs of the nation, so far as they were in any way connected with the Persian invasion. When the Barbarians were finally defeated, and there was no longer any alarm from that source, the congress seems to have discontinued its meetings. But the alliance remained; the cities continued to act in common, at any rate, so far as naval operations were concerned, and Sparta was still the leading power."—E. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, ch.* 8.

Also in: C. O. Müller, *Hist. and Antiq. of the Doric Race, v.* 1, *app.* 4.

B. C. 480.—The Persian War: Thermopylæ.—"Now when tidings of the battle that had been fought at Marathon [B. C. 490] reached the ears of King Darius, the son of Hystaspes, his anger against the Athenians," says Herodotus, "which had been already roused by their attack on Sardis, waxed still fiercer, and he became more than ever eager to lead an army against Greece. Instantly he sent off messengers to make proclamation through the several states that fresh levies were to be raised, and these at an increased rate; while ships, horses, provisions and transports were likewise to be furnished. So the men published his commands; and now all Asia was in commotion by the space of three years." But before his preparations were completed Darius died. His son Xerxes, who ascended the Persian throne, was cold to the Greek undertaking and required long persuasion before he took it up. When he did so, however, his preparations were on a scale more stupendous than those of his father, and consumed nearly five years. It was not until ten years after Marathon that Xerxes led from Sardis a host which Herodotus computes at 1,700,000 men, besides half a million more which manned the fleet he had assembled. "Was there a nation in all Asia," cries the Greek historian, "which Xerxes did not bring with him against Greece? Or was there a river, except those of unusual size, which sufficed for his troops to drink?" By a bridge of boats at Abydos the army crossed the Hellespont, and moved slowly through Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly; while the fleet, moving on the

coast circuit of the same countries, avoided the perilous promontory of Mount Athos by cutting a canal. The Greeks had determined at first to make their stand against the invaders in Thessaly, at the vale of Tempe; but they found the post untenable and were persuaded, instead, to guard the narrower Pass of Thermopylæ. It was there that the Persians, arriving at Trachis, near the Malian gulf, found themselves faced by a small body of Greeks. The spot is thus described by Herodotus: "As for the entrance into Greece by Trachis, it is, at its narrowest point, about fifty feet wide. This, however, is not the place where the passage is most contracted; for it is still narrower a little above and a little below Thermopylæ. At Alpeni, which is lower down than that place, it is only wide enough for a single carriage; and up above, at the river Phœnix, near the town called Anthela, it is the same. West of Thermopylæ rises a lofty and precipitous hill, impossible to climb, which runs up into the chain of Œta; while to the east the road is shut in by the sea and by marshes. In this place are the warm springs, which the natives call 'The Cauldrons'; and above them stands an altar sacred to Hercules. A wall had once been carried across the opening; and in this there had of old times been a gateway . . . King Xerxes pitched his camp in the region of Malis called Trachinia, while on their side the Greeks occupied the straits. These straits the Greeks in general call Thermopylæ (the Hot Gates); but the natives and those who dwell in the neighbourhood call them Pylæ (the Gates). . . . The Greeks who at this spot awaited the coming of Xerxes were the following:—From Sparta, 300 men-at-arms; from Arcadia, 1,000 Tegeans and Mantineans, 500 of each people; 120 Orchomenians, from the Arcadian Orchomenus; and 1,000 from other cities; from Corinth, 400 men; from Phlius, 200; and from Mycenæ 80. Such was the number from the Peloponnese. There were also present, from Bœotia, 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans. Besides these troops, the Locrians of Opus and the Phocians had obeyed the call of their countrymen, and sent, the former all the force they had, the latter 1,000 men. . . . The various nations had each captains of their own under whom they served; but the one to whom all especially looked up, and who had the command of the entire force, was the Lacedæmonian, Leonidas. . . . The force with Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as it was likely they might have done had they seen Sparta backward. They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army. The rest of the allies also intended to act similarly; for it happened that the Olympic festival fell exactly at this same period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylæ decided so speedily." For two days Leonidas and his little army held the pass against the Persians. Then, there was found a traitor, a man of Malis, who betrayed to Xerxes the secret of a pathway across the mountains, by which he might steal into the rear of the post held by the Greeks. A thousand Phocians had been stationed on the mountain to guard this path; but they took fright when the Persians came upon them in the early dawn, and fled without a blow. When Leonidas learned that the way across the mountain was open to the enemy he knew that his defense was hopeless, and he ordered his allies to retreat while there was yet time. But he and his Spartans remained, thinking it "unseemly" to quit the post they had been specially sent to guard. The Thespians remained with them, and the Thebans — known partisans at heart of the Persians — were forced to stay. The latter deserted when the enemy approached; the Spartans and the Thespians fought and perished to the last man.—Herodotus, *History* (*trans. by Rawlinson*), *bk.* 7.

ALSO IN: E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 3, *ch.* 1.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 40 (*v* 4). —See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 480–479.

B. C. 480.—The Persian Wars: Artemisium.—On the approach of the great invading army and fleet of Xerxes, the Greeks resolved to meet the one at the pass of Thermopylæ and the other at the northern entrance of the Eubœan channel. "The northern side of Eubœa afforded a commodious and advantageous station: it was a long beach, called, from a temple at its eastern extremity, Artemisium, capable of receiving the galleys, if it should be necessary to draw them upon the shore, and commanding a view of the open sea and the coast of Magnesia, and consequently an opportunity of watching the enemy's movements as he advanced towards the south; while, on the other hand, its short distance from Thermopylæ enabled the fleet to keep up a quick and easy communication with the land force."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 15 (*v.* 1). —The Persian fleet, after suffering heavily from a destructive storm on the Magnesian coast, reached Aphetæ, opposite Artemisium, at the mouth of the Pagasæan gulf. Notwithstanding its losses, it still vastly outnumbered the armament of the Greeks, and feared nothing but the escape of the latter. But, in the series of conflicts which ensued, the Greeks were generally victorious and proved their superior naval genius. They could not, however, afford the heavy losses which they sustained, and, upon hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ and the Persian possession of the all-important pass, they deemed it necessary to retreat.—W. Mitford, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 8, *sect.* 4 (*v.* 2).

B. C. 480.—The Persian Wars: Salamis.—Leonidas and his Spartan band having perished vainly at Thermopylæ, in their heroic attempt to hold the pass against the host of Xerxes, and the Greek ships at Artemisium having vainly beaten their overwhelming enemies, the whole of Greece north of the isthmus of Corinth lay completely at the mercy of the invader. The Thebans and other false-hearted Greeks joined his ranks, and saved their own cities by helping to destroy their neighbors. The Platæans, the Thespians and the Athenians abandoned their homes in haste, conducted their families, and such property as they might snatch away, to the nearer islands and to places of refuge in Peloponnesus. The Greeks of Peloponnesus rallied in force to the isthmus and began there the building of a defensive wall. Their fleet, retiring from Artemisium, was drawn together, with some re-enforcements, behind the island of Salamis, which stretches across the entrance to the bay of Eleusis, off the inner coast of Attica, near Athens

Meantime the Persians had advanced through Attica, entered the deserted city of Athens, taken the Acropolis, which a small body of desperate patriots resolved to hold, had slain its defenders and burned its temples. Their fleet had also been assembled in the bay of Phalerum, which was the more easterly of the three harbors of Athens. At Salamis the Greeks were in dispute. The Corinthians and the Peloponnesians were bent upon falling back with the fleet to the isthmus; the Athenians, the Eginetans and the Megarians looked upon all as lost if the present combination of the whole naval power of Hellas in the narrow strait of Salamis was permitted to be broken up. At length Themistocles, the Athenian leader, a man of fertile brain and overbearing resolution, determined the question by sending a secret message to Xerxes that the Greek ships had prepared to escape from him. This brought down the Persian fleet upon them at once and left them no chance for retreat. Of the memorable fight which ensued (Sept. 20 B. C. 480) the following is a part of the description given by Herodotus: "Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phœnicians; against the Lacedæmonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piræus, the Ionians. Of these last, a few only followed the advice of Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far otherwise. . . . Far the greater number of the Persian ships engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians or by the Eginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle could scarce be other than it was. Yet the Persians fought far more bravely here than at Eubœa, and indeed surpassed themselves; each did his utmost through fear of Xerxes, for each thought that the king's eye was upon himself. . . . During the whole time of the battle Xerxes sate at the base of the hill called Ægaleos, over against Salamis; and whenever he saw any of his own captains perform any worthy exploit he inquired concerning him; and the man's name was taken down by his scribes, together with the names of his father and his city. . . . When the rout of the barbarians began, and they sought to make their escape to Phalêrum, the Eginetans, awaiting them in the channel, performed exploits worthy to be recorded. Through the whole of the confused struggle the Athenians employed themselves in destroying such ships as either made resistance or fled to shore; while the Eginetans dealt with those which endeavoured to escape down the straits; so that the Persian vessels were no sooner clear of the Athenians than straightway they fell into the hands of the Eginetan squadron. . . . Such of the barbarian vessels as escaped from the battle fled to Phalêrum, and there sheltered themselves under the protection of the land army. . . . Xerxes, when he saw the extent of his loss, began to be afraid lest the Greeks might be counselled by the Ionians, or without their advice might determine, to sail straight to the Hellespont and break down the bridges there; in which case he would be blocked up in Europe and run great risk of perishing. He therefore made up his mind to fly."—Herodotus, *History* (*ed. and tr by Rawlinson*), *bk.* 8, *sect.* 85-97 (*v.* 4).

Also in: E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 8, *ch.* 1 (*v* 2).—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 4 (*v.* 4).—W. W. Goodwin, *The Battle of Salamis* (*Papers of the Am. School at Athens, v.* 1).

B. C. 479.—The Persian Wars: Platæa.—When Xerxes, after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis, fled back to Asia with part of his disordered host, he left his lieutenant, Mardonius, with a still formidable army, to repair the disaster and accomplish, if possible, the conquest of the Greeks. Mardonius retired to Thessaly for the winter, but returned to Attica in the spring and drove the Athenians once more from their shattered city, which they were endeavoring to repair. He made overtures to them which they rejected with scorn, and thereupon he destroyed everything in city and country which could be destroyed, reducing Athens to ruins and Attica to a desert. The Spartans and other Peloponnesians who had promised support to the Athenians were slow in coming, but they came in strong force at last. Mardonius fell back into Bœotia, where he took up a favorable position in a plain on the left bank of the Asopus, near Platæa. This was in September, B. C. 479. According to Herodotus, he had 300,000 "barbarian" troops and 50,000 Greek allies. The opposing Greeks, who followed him to the Asopus, were 110,000 in number. The two armies watched one another for more than ten days, unwilling to offer battle because the omens were on both sides discouraging. At length the Greeks undertook a change of position and Mardonius, mistaking this for a movement of retreat, led his Persians on a run to attack them. It was a fatal mistake. The Spartans, who bore the brunt of the Persian assault, soon convinced the deluded Mardonius that they were not in flight, while the Athenians dealt roughly with his Theban allies. "The barbarians," says Herodotus, "many times seized hold of the Greek spears and brake them; for in boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit inferior to the Greeks; but they were without bucklers, untrained, and far below the enemy in respect of skill in arms. Sometimes singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer and now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan ranks, and so perished. . . . After Mardonius fell, and the troops with him, which were the main strength of the army, perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedæmonians and took to flight. Their light clothing and want of bucklers were of the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such defence." Artabazus, who was second in command of the Persians, and who had 40,000 immediately under him, did not strike a blow in the battle, but quitted the field as soon as he saw the turn events had taken, and led his men in a retreat which had no pause until they reached and crossed the Hellespont. Of the remainder of the 300,000 of Mardonius' host, only 3,000, according to Herodotus, outlived the battle. It was the end of the Persian invasions of Greece. —Herodotus, *History* (*tr. by Rawlinson*), *bk.* 9.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 42 (*v.* 5).—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 16 (*v.* 1).—G. W. Cox, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 2, *ch.* 7 (*v.* 1).—In celebration of the victory an altar to Zeus was erected and consecrated by the united Greeks with solemn ceremonies, a quintennial festival, called the Feast of Liberty, was instituted at

Platæa, and the territory of the Platæans was declared sacred and inviolable, so long as they should maintain the appointed sacrifices and funeral honors to the dead. But these agreements did not avail to protect the Platæans when the subsequent Peloponnesian War broke out, and they stood faithfully among the allies of Athens. "The last act of the assembled army was the expedition against Thebes, in order, according to the obligation incumbent upon them, to take revenge on the most obstinate ally of the national enemy. Eleven days after the battle Pausanias appeared before the city and demanded the surrender of the party-leaders, responsible for the policy of Thebes. Not until the siege had lasted twenty days was the surrender obtained. . . . Timagenidas and the other leaders of the Thebans were executed as traitors against the nation, by order of Pausanias, after he had dismissed the confederate army."—E. Curtius, —*Hist. of Greece, bk.* 3, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 2).

B. C. 479.—The Persian Wars: Mycale.—The same day, in September, B. C. 479, on which the Greeks at Platæa destroyed the army of Mardonius, witnessed an almost equal victory won by their compatriots of the fleet, on the coast of Asia Minor. The Persian fleet, to avoid a battle with them, had retreated to Mycale on the narrow strait between the island of Samos and the mainland, where a land-army of 60,000 men was stationed at the time. Here they drew their ships on shore and surrounded them with a rampart. The Greeks, under Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, landed and attacked the whole combined force. The Ionians in the Persian army turned against their masters and helped to destroy them. The rout was complete and only a small remnant escaped to reach Sardis, where Xerxes was still lingering.—Herodotus, *History* (*tr. by Rawlinson*), *bk* 9.

Also in: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 16 (*v.* 1).—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 42 (*v.* 5).

B. C. 479-478.—Athens assumes the protection of Ionia.—Siege and capture of Sestus.—Rebuilding and enlargement of Athens and its walls.—Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles. See Athens: B. C. 479–478.

B. C. 478-477.—Reduction of Byzantium.—Mad conduct of Pausanias.—His recall.—Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta.—Their closer union with Athens.—Withdrawal of the Spartans from the war.—Formation of the Delian Confederacy.—"Sestos had fallen: but Byzantion and the Thrakian Doriskos, with Eion on the Strymon and many other places on the northern shores of the Egean, were still held by Persian garrisons, when, in the year after the battle of Plataiai, Pausanias, as commander of the confederate fleet, sailed with 20 Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships to Kypros (Cyprus) and thence, having recovered the greater part of the island, to Byzantion. The resistance here was as obstinate perhaps as at Sestos; but the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood for the moment at the head of a triumphant confederacy. It was now in her power to weld the isolated units, which made up the Hellenic world, into something like an organised society, and to kindle in it something like national life. . . . But she had no statesman capable, like Themistokles, of seizing on a golden opportunity, while in her own generals she found her greatest enemies." Pausanias "was, it would seem, dazzled by Persian wealth and enamoured of Persian pleasures. He had roused the indignation of his own people by having his name inscribed, as leader of all the Greek forces, on the tripod which was to commemorate the victory of Plataiai: and now his arrogance and tyranny were to excite at Byzantion a discontent and impatience destined to be followed by more serious consequences to his country as well as to himself. On the fall of Byzantion he sent to the Persian king the prisoners taken in the city, and spread the report that they had escaped. He forwarded at the same time, it is said, . . . a letter in which he informed Xerxes that he wished to marry his daughter and to make him lord of all Hellas." Xerxes opened negotiations with him, and "the head of this miserable man was now fairly turned. Clad in Persian garb, he aped the privacy of Asiatic despots; and when he came forth from his palace it was to make a royal progress through Thrace, surrounded by Median and Egyptian life guards, and to show his insolence to men who were at least his equals. The reports of this significant change in the behaviour of Pausanias led to his recall. He was put on his trial; but his accusers failed to establish the personal charges brought against him, while his Medism also was dismissed as not fully proved. The suspicion, however, was so strong that he was deprived of his command. . . . All these events were tending to alienate the Asiatic Greeks and the islanders of the Egean from a state which showed itself incapable of maintaining its authority over its own servants." Even before the recall of Pausanius, "the Asiatic Greeks intreated Aristeides the Athenian commander to admit them into direct relations with Athens; and the same change of feeling had passed over all the non-medising Greek states with the exception of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. In short, it had become clear that all Hellas was divided into two great sections, the one gravitating as naturally to Sparta, the great land power, as the other gravitated to Athens with her maritime preponderance. When therefore a Spartan commission headed by Dorkis arrived with a small force to take the place of Pausanias, they were met by passive resistance where they had looked for submission; and their retirement from the field in which they were unable to compel obedience left the confederacy an accomplished fact."—G. W. Cox, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 2, *ch.* 8 (*v.* 2).—This confederacy of the Asiatic Greeks with Athens, now definitely organized, is known as the Confederacy of Delos, or the Delian League. "To Athens, as decidedly the preponderant power, both morally and materially, was of necessity, and also with free good-will, consigned the headship and chief control of the affairs and conduct of the alliance; a position that carried with it the responsibility of the collection and administration of a common fund, and the presidency of the assemblies of delegates. As time went on and circumstances altered, the terms of confederation were modified in various instances; but at first the general rule was the contribution, not only of money or ships, but of actual personal service. . . . We have no precise enumeration of the allies of Athens at this early time, but the course of the history brings up the mention of many. . . . Crete was never directly affected by these events, and Cyprus was also soon to be left aside; but otherwise all the Greek

islands of the Aegean northwards—except Melos, Thera, Aegina, and Cythera—were contributory, including Euboea; as were the cities on the coasts of Thrace and the Chalcidic peninsula from the Macedonian boundary to the Hellespont; Byzantium and various cities on the coasts of the Propontis, and less certainly of the Euxine; the important series of cities on the western coast of Asia Minor—though apparently with considerable exceptions—Aeolian, Ionian, Dorian, and Carian, as far as Caunus at least on the borders of Lycia, if not even round to the Chelidonian isles. The sacred island of Delos was chosen as the depository of the common treasure and the place of meeting of the contributors. Apart from its central convenience and defensibleness as an island, and the sanctity of the temple, . . . it was a traditional centre for solemn reunions of Ionians from either side the Aegean. . . . At the distinct request of the allies the Athenians appointed Aristides to superintend the difficult process of assessing the various forms and amounts of contribution. . . . The total annual amount of the assessment was the large sum of 460 talents (£112,125), and this perhaps not inclusive of, but only supplementary to, the costly supply of equipped ships."—W. W. Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles, ch.* 14 (*v.* 1).

Also in: E. Abbott, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 6 *and* 8.

B. C. 477-462.—Advancing democracy of Athens.—Sustentation of the Commons from the Confederate Treasury.—The stripping of power from the Areopagus. See Athens: B. C. 477–462.

B. C. 477-461.—Athens as the head of the Delian League.—Triumph of Anti-Spartan policy at Athens and approach of war.—Ostracism of Cimon.—"Between the end of the Persian war and the year 464 B. C., Sparta had sunk from the champion of the whole of Hellas to the half-discredited leader of the Peloponnese only. Athens, on the contrary, had risen from a subordinate member of the league controlled by Sparta to be the leader and almost the mistress of a league more dangerous than that over which Sparta held sway. Sparta unquestionably entertained towards Athens the jealous hatred of a defeated rival. By what steps Athens was increasing her control over the Delian League, and changing her position from that of a president to that of an absolute ruler [see Athens: B. C. 466–454], will be explained. . . . She was at the same time prosecuting the war against Persia with conspicuous success. Her leader in this task was Cimon. In the domain of practice Athens produced no nobler son than this man. He was the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, and by heredity and inclination took his stand with the conservative party in Athens [see Athens: B. C. 477–462, to 460–449]. He succeeded here to the leading position of Aristides, and he possessed all that statesman's purity of character. . . . It was as a naval commander, and as a supporter of a forward policy against Persia, that Cimon won his greatest renown. But he had also a keen interest in the domestic development of Athens and her attitude to the other states of Greece. To maintain friendship with Sparta was the root of all his policy. His perfect honesty in supporting this policy was never questioned, and Sparta recognised his good will to them by appointing him Proxenus in Athens. It was his duty in this capacity to protect any Spartan resident in or visiting Athens. His character and personality were eminently attractive. . . . Under his guidance the Athenian fleet struck Persia blow on blow. . . . In 466, near the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia [see Athens: B. C. 470–466], the Persian fleet was destroyed, and after a fierce struggle her land forces also were defeated with very great slaughter. It was long before Persian influence counted for anything again on the waters of the Mediterranean. Cimon, with the personal qualities of Aristides, had obtained the successes of Themistocles. Opposition to Cimon was not wanting. The Athenian democracy had entered on a path that seemed blocked by his personal supremacy. And now the party of advancing democracy possessed a leader, the ablest and greatest that it was ever to possess. Pericles was about thirty years of age. . . . He was related to great families through both father and mother, and to great families that had championed the democratic side. His father Zanthippus had prosecuted Miltiades, the father of Cimon. . . . To lead the party of advanced democracy was to attack Cimon, against whom he had hereditary hostility. . . . When in 465 Thasos rebelled from Athens, defeat was certain unless she found allies. She applied to Sparta for assistance. Athens and Sparta were still nominally allies, for the creation of the Delian League had not openly destroyed the alliance that had subsisted between them since the days of the Persian war. But the Thasians hoped that Sparta's jealousy of Athens might induce her to disregard the alliance. And they reckoned rightly. The Spartan fleet was so weak that no interference upon the sea could be thought of, but if Attica were attacked by land the Athenians would be forced to draw off some part of their armament from Thasos. Sparta gave a secret promise that this attack should be made. But before they could fulfil their promise their own city was overwhelmed by a terrible earthquake. . . . Only five houses were left standing, and twenty thousand of the inhabitants lost their lives. King Archidamus saved the state from even more appalling ruin. While the inhabitants were dazed with the catastrophe, he ordered the alarm-trumpet to be blown; the military instincts of the Spartans answered to the call, and all that were left assembled outside of the city safe from the falling ruins. Archidamus's presence of mind saved them from even greater danger than that of earthquake. The disaster seemed to the masses of Helots that surrounded Sparta clear evidence of the wrath of the god Poseidon. . . . The Helots seized arms, therefore, and from all sides rushed upon Sparta. Thanks to Archidamus's action, they found the Spartans collected and ready for battle. They fell back upon Messenia, and concentrated their strength round Mount Ithome, the natural Acropolis of that district. . . . All the efforts of their opponents, never very successful in sieges, failed to dislodge them. At last, in 464, Sparta had to appeal to her allies for help against her own slaves; and, as Athens was her ally, she appealed to Athens. Should the help be granted? . . . Cimon advocated the granting of Sparta's demand with all his strength. . . . But there was much to be said on the other side, and it was said by Ephialtes and Pericles. The whole of Pericles's foreign

policy is founded on the assumption that union between Athens and Sparta was undesirable and impossible. In everything they stood at opposite poles of thought. . . . Cimon gained the vote of the people. He went at once with a force of four thousand heavy-armed soldiers to Ithome. Athenian soldiers enjoyed a great reputation for their ability in the conduct of sieges; but, despite their arrival, the Helots in Ithome still held out. And soon the Spartans grew suspicious of the Athenian contingent. The failure of Sparta was so clearly to the interest of Athens that the Spartans could not believe that the Athenians were in earnest in trying to prevent it; and at last Cimon was told that Sparta no longer had need of the Athenian force. The insult was all the more evident because none of the other allies were dismissed. Cimon at once returned to Athens [see MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD]. . . . On his return he still opposed those complete democratic changes that Pericles and Ephialtes were at this time introducing into the state. A vote of ostracism was demanded. The requisite number of votes fell to Cimon, and he had to retire into exile (461). . . . His ostracism doubtless allowed the democratic changes, in any case inevitable, to be accomplished without much opposition or obstruction, but it also deprived Athens of her best soldier at a time when she needed all her military talent. For Athens could not forget Sparta's insult. In 461 she renounced the alliance with her that had existed since the Persian wars; and that this rupture did not mean neutrality was made clear when, immediately afterwards, Athens contracted an alliance with Argos, always the enemy and now the dangerous enemy of Sparta, and with the Thessalians, who also had grounds of hostility to Sparta. Under such circumstances war could not be long in coming."—A. J. Grant, *Greece in the Age of Pericles, ch.* 5.

ALSO IN: Plutarch, *Cimon; Pericles.*—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 17 (*v.* 3).—E. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, ch.* 5-6.

B. C. 460-449.—Disastrous Athenian expedition to Egypt.—Cimon's last enterprise against the Persians.—The disputed Peace of Cimon, or Callias.—Five years truce between Athens and Sparta. See ATHENS: B. C. 430–449.

B. C. 458-456.—Alliance of Corinth and Ægina against Athens and Megara.—Athenian victories.—Siege and conquest of Ægina.—The Spartans in Bœotia.—Defeat of Athens at Tanagra.—Her success at Œnophyta.—Humiliation of Thebes.—Athenian ascendancy restored.—Crippled by the great earthquake of 464 B. C., and harassed by the succeeding Messenian War, "nothing could be done, on the part of Sparta, to oppose the establishment and extension of the separate alliance between Athens and Argos; and accordingly the states of Northern Peloponnesus commenced their armaments against Athens on their own account, in order to obtain by force what formerly they had achieved by secret intrigues and by pushing forward Sparta. To stop the progress of the Attic power was a necessary condition of their own existence; and thus a new warlike group of states formed itself among the members of the disrupted confederation. The Corinthians entered into a secret alliance with Ægina and Epidaurus, and endeavored to extend their territory and obtain strong positions beyond the Isthmus at the expense of Megara. This they considered of special importance to them, inasmuch as they knew the Megareans, whose small country lay in the midst between the two hostile alliances, to be allies little deserving of trust. . . . The fears of the Corinthians were realized sooner than they had anticipated. The Megareans, under the pressure of events, renounced their treaty obligations to Sparta, and joined the Attico-Argive alliance. . . . The passes of the Geranea, the inlets and outlets of the Doric peninsula, now fell into the hands of the Athenians; Megara became an outwork of Athens; Attic troops occupied its towns; Attic ships cruised in the Gulf of Corinth, where harbors stood open to them at Pegæ and Ægosthena. The Athenians were eager to unite Megara as closely as possible to themselves, and for this reason immediately built two lines of walls, which connected Megara with its port Nisæa, eight stadia off, and rendered both places impregnable to the Peloponnesians. This extension of the hostile power to the boundaries of the Isthmus, and into the waters of the western gulf, seemed to the maritime cities of Peloponnesus to force them into action. Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina commenced an offensive war against Athens—a war which opened without having been formally declared; and Athens unhesitatingly accepted the challenge thrown out with sufficient distinctness in the armaments of her adversaries. Myronides, an experienced general and statesman, . . . landed with an Attic squadron near Halieis (where the frontiers of the Epidaurians and Argives met), and here found a united force of Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Æginetans awaiting him. Myronides was unsuccessful in his campaign. A few months later the hostile fleets met off the island of Cecryphalea, between Ægina and the coast of Epidaurus. The Athenians were victorious, and the struggle now closed round Ægina itself. Immediately opposite the island ensued a second great naval battle. Seventy of the enemy's ships fell into the hands of the Athenians, whose victorious fleet without delay surrounded Ægina. The Peloponnesians were fully aware of the importance of Ægina to them. Three hundred hoplites came to the relief of the island, and the Corinthians marched across the Geranea into Megaris to the relief of Ægina. It seemed impossible that, while the fleet of the Athenians was fighting in the land of the Nile, and another was lying before Ægina, they should have a third army in readiness for Megara. But the Peloponnesians had no conception of the capabilities of action belonging to the Athenians. True, the whole military levy was absent from the country, and only enough men were left at home for the mere defence of the walls. Yet all were notwithstanding agreed that neither should Ægina be given up nor the new allies be left in the lurch. Myronides advanced to meet the Corinthians with troops composed of those who had passed the age of military service or not yet reached it. In the first fight he held his ground: when the hostile forces returned for the second time, they were routed with tremendous loss. Megara was saved, and the energy of the Athenians had been most splendidly established. In attestation of it the sepulchral pillars were erected in the Ceramicus, on which were inscribed

the names of the Athenian soldiers who had fallen in one and the same year (Ol. lxxx 3; B. C. 458–7) off Cyprus, in Egypt, Phœnicia, Halieis, Ægina, and Megara. A fragment of this remarkable historical document is preserved to this day. While thus many years' accumulation of combustible materials had suddenly broken out into a flame of the fiercest war in Central Greece, new complications also arose in the north. The Thebans, who had suffered so deep a humiliation, believed the time to have arrived when the events of the past were forgotten, and when they could attain to new importance and power. In opposition to them the Phocians put forth their strength . . . After the dissolution of the Hellenic Confederation, and the calamities which had befallen the Spartans, the Phocians thought they might venture an attack upon the Dorian tetrapolis, in order to extend their frontiers in this direction. . . . For Sparta it was a point of honor not to desert the primitive communities of the Dorian race. She roused herself to a vigorous effort, and, notwithstanding all her losses and the continuance of the war in Messenia, was able to send 11,500 men of her own troops and those of the confederates across the Isthmus before the Athenians had time to place any obstacles in their way [B. C. 457]. The Phocians were forced to relinquish their conquests. But when the Spartan troops were about to return home across the Isthmus they found the mountain-passes occupied by Athens, and the Gulf of Corinth made equally insecure by the presence of hostile ships. Nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians but to march into Bœotia, where their presence was welcome to Thebes. They entered the valley of the Asopus, and encamped in the territory of Tanagra, not far from the frontiers of Attica. Without calculating the consequences, the Athenians had brought themselves into an extremely dangerous situation. . . . Their difficulties increased when, contemporaneously, evil signs of treasonable plots made their appearance in the interior of the city [see ATHENS: B. C. 460–449]. . . . Thus, then, it was now necessary to contend simultaneously against foes within and foes without, to defend the constitution as well as the independence of the state. Nor was the question merely as to an isolated attack and a transitory danger; for the conduct of the Spartans in Bœotia clearly showed that it was now their intention to restore to power Thebes . . . because they were anxious to have in the rear of Athens a state able to stop the extension of the Attic power in Central Greece. This intention could be best fulfilled by supporting Thebes in the subjugation of the other Bœotian cities. For this purpose the Peloponnesians had busily strengthened the Theban, i. e. the oligarchical party, in the whole of the country, and encircled Thebes itself with new fortifications. Thebes was from a country town to become a great city, an independent fortified position, and a base for the Peloponnesian cause in Central Greece. Hence Athens could not have found herself threatened by a more dangerous complication. The whole civic army accordingly took the field, amounting, together with the Argives, and other allies, to 14,000 men, besides a body of Thessalian cavalry. In the low ground by the Asopus below Tanagra the armies met. An arduous and sanguinary struggle ensued, in which for the first time Athens and Sparta mutually tested their powers in a regular battle. For a long time the result was doubtful; till in the very thick of the battle the cavalry went over to the enemy, probably at the instigation of the Laconian party. This act of treason decided the day in favor of Sparta, although patriotic Athenians would never consent to count this among the battles lost by Athens. The Spartans were far from fulfilling the expectations of the party of the Oligarchs. As soon as they knew that the passes of the Isthmus were once more open, they took their departure, towards the fall of the year, through Megara, making this little country suffer for its defection by the devastation of its territory. . . . They reckoned upon Thebes being for the present strong enough to maintain herself against her neighbors; for ulterior offensive operations against Athens, Tanagra was to serve as a base. The plan was good, and the conjuncture of affairs favorable. But whatever the Spartans did, they did only by halves: they concluded a truce for four months, and quitted the ground. The Athenians, on the other hand, had no intention of allowing a menacing power to establish itself on the frontiers of their country. Without waiting for the return of the fair season, they crossed Mount Parnes two months after the battle, before any thoughts of war were entertained in Bœotia; Myronides, who was in command, defeated the Theban army which was to defend the valley of the Asopus, near Œnophyta. This battle with one blow put an end to all the plans of Thebes; the walls of Tanagra were razed. Myronides continued his march from town to town; everywhere the existing governments were overthrown, and democratic constitutions established with the help of Attic partisans. . . . Thus, after a passing humiliation, Athens was soon more powerful than ever, and her sway extended as far as the frontiers of the Phocians. Nay, during the same campaign she extended her military dominion as far as Locris. . . . Meanwhile the Æginetans also were gradually losing their power of resistance. For nine months they had resisted the Attic squadron. . . . Now their strength was exhausted; and the proud island of the Æacidæ, which Pindar had sung as the mother of the men who in the glorious rivalry of the festive games shone out before all other Hellenes, had to bow down before the irresistible good fortune of the Athenians, and was forced to pull down her walls, to deliver up her vessels of war, and bind herself to the payment of tribute. Contemporaneously with this event, the two arms of walls [at ATHENS] . . . between the upper and lower town were completed. Athens was now placed beyond the fear of any attack. . . . The Peloponnesian confederation was shaken to its very foundations; and Sparta was still let and hindered by the Messenian revolt, while the Athenians were able freely to dispose of their military and naval forces."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 8, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 2).

ALSO IN: G. W. Cox, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 2, *ch.* 9 (*v.* 2).—Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* (*tr. by Jowett*), *bk.* 1, *sect.* 107–108.

B. C. 449-445.—Quarrel of Delphians and Phocians.—Interference of Sparta and Athens.—Bœotian revolution.—Defeat of Athenians at Coroneia.—Revolt of Eubœa and Megara.—The Thirty Years Truce.—In 449 B. C. "on

occasion of a dispute between the Delphians and the Phocians as to which should have the care of the temple and its treasures, the Lacedæmonians sent an army, and gave them to the former; but as soon as they were gone, Pericles led thither an Athenian army, and put the Phocians in possession. Of this the Lacedæmonians took no notice. The right of Promanty, or first consulting the oracle, which had been given to Sparta by the Delphians, was now assigned to Athens by the Phocians; and this honor was probably the cause of the interference of both states. As the Athenians had given the upper hand to the democratic party in Bœotia, there was of course a large number of the opposite party in exile. These had made themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæroncia, and some other places, and if not checked in time, might greatly endanger the Athenian influence. Tolmidas, therefore, led an army and took and garrisoned Chæroneia; but, as he was returning, he was attacked at Coroneia by the exiles from Orchomenus, joined by those of Eubœa and their other friends. Tolmidas fell, and his troops were all slain or made prisoners. (Ol. 83, 2.) [B. C. 447.] The Athenians, fearing a general war, agreed to a treaty, by which, on their prisoners being restored, they evacuated Bœotia. The exiles returned to their several towns, and things were placed on their old footing. . . . Eubœa was now (Ol. 83, 3) [B. C. 446] in revolt; and while Pericles was at the head of an army reducing it, the party in Megara adverse to Athens rose and massacred all the Athenian garrisons except that of Nisæa. Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians came to their aid; and the Peloponnesians, led by one of the Spartan kings, entered and wasted the plain of Eleusis. Pericles led back his army from Eubœa, but the enemy was gone; he then returned and reduced that island, and having expelled the people of Hestiæa, gave their lands to Athenian colonists; and the Athenians, being unwilling to risk the chance of war with the Dorian confederacy, gladly formed (Ol. 83, 4) [B. C. 445] a truce for thirty years, surrendering Nisæa and Pegæ, and withdrawing a garrison which they had in Trœzen, and ceasing to interfere in Achaia."—T. Keightley, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 1.—"The Athenians saw themselves compelled to give up their possessions in Peloponnesus, especially Achaia, as well as Trœzene and Pagæ, an important position for their communication with the peninsula. Even Nisæa was abandoned. Yet these losses, sensibly as they affected their influence upon the Grecian continent, were counterbalanced by a concession still more significant, the acknowledgment of the Delian League. It was left open to states and cities which were members of neither confederacy to join either at pleasure. These events happened in Ol. 83, 3 (B. C. 445)—the revolt of Megara and Eubœa, the invasion of Pleistoanax, the re-conquest of Eubœa, and the conclusion of the treaty, which assumed the form of an armistice for thirty years. Great importance must be attributed to this settlement, as involving an acknowledgment which satisfied both parties and did justice to the great interests at stake on either side. If Athens renounced some of her possessions, the sacrifice was compensated by the fact that Sparta recognized the existence of the naval supremacy of Athens, and the basis on which it rested. We may perhaps assume that the compromise between Pericles and Pleistoanax was the result of the conviction felt by both these leading men that a fundamental dissociation of the Peloponnesian from the Delian league was a matter of necessity. The Spartans wished to be absolutely supreme in the one, and resigned the other to the Athenians."—L. von Ranke, *Universal Hist.: The Oldest Hist. Group of Nations and the Greeks, ch.* 7, *sect.* 2.

ALSO IN: Sir E. B. Lytton, *Athens: Its Rise and Fall, bk.* 5, *ch.* 1.

B. C. 445-431.—Splendor of Athens and greatness of the Athenian Empire under the rule of Pericles. See ATHENS: B. C. 445–431.

B. C. 440.—Subjugation of revolted Samos by the Athenians.—Spartan interference prevented by Corinth. See ATHENS: B. C. 440–437.

B. C. 435-432.—Causes of the Peloponnesian War.—"In B. C. 431 the war broke out between Athens and the Peloponnesian League, which, after twenty-seven years, ended in the ruin of the Athenian empire. It began through a quarrel between Corinth and Kerkyra [or Korkyra or Corcyra], in which Athens assisted Kerkyra. A congress was held at Sparta; Corinth and other States complained of the conduct of Athens, and war was decided on. The real cause of the war was that Sparta and its allies were jealous of the great power that Athens had gained. A far greater number of Greek States were engaged in this war than had ever been engaged in a single undertaking before. States that had taken no part in the Persian war were now fighting on one side or the other. Sparta was an oligarchy, and the friend of the nobles everywhere; Athens was a democracy, and the friend of the common people; so that the war was to some extent a struggle between these classes all over Greece."—C. A. Fyffe, *Hist. of Greece* (*History Primer*), *ch.* 5.—"The Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like period of time. Never were so many cities captured and depopulated—some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves fighting against one another; and several of them after their capture were repeopled by strangers. Never were exile and slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about by civil strife. . . . There were earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war."—Thucydides, *History* (*tr. by Jowett*), *bk.* 1, *sect.* 23.—The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, out of which, as an immediate excitement, the Peloponnesian War grew, concerned "the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo—a colony founded by the

Korkyreans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf, considerably to the north of their own island." The oligarchy of Epidamnus, driven out by the people, had allied themselves with the neighboring Illyrians and were harassing the city. Korkyra refused aid to the latter when appealed to, but Corinth (of which Korkyra was itself a colony) promptly rendered help. This involved Corinth and Korkyra in hostilities, and Athens gave support to the latter.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, v. 3, *bk.* 4.

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 19–30.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 47–48 (*v.* 5).

B. C. 432.—Great Sea-fight of the Corinthians with the Korkyrians and Athenians.—Revolt of Potidæa.—"Although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements. The Corinthians lost no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of 150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra. The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt. After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships, they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and, still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians, supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force, hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service, supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians, far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to her. . . . Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard to their own interests. Their object was to send these prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic city."—G. W. Cox, *General Hist. of Greece, bk.* 3, *ch.* 1.—"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct. Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated; the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt; and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them; but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent messengers to Sparta, entreating support, where they met deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an army under Phormion to lay siege to it.—*Early Hist. of Greece* (*Enc. Metropolitana*), *p.* 283.

B. C. 432-431.—Charges brought by Corinth against Athens.—The hearing and the Congress at Sparta.—Decision for war.—Theban attack on Plataea.—The Peloponnesian War begun.—The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded by several other members of the confederacy, who had also wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans for redress. . . . It happened that at this time Athenian envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in Sparta. They

desired permission to attend and address the assembly. . . . When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for instant war. . . . The deputies of the allies were then informed of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if decided on, might be decreed by common consent. . . . The congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace, and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not, perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the gods, to banish all who remained among them of that blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand, they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of Pausanias. . . . Still, war had been only threatened, not declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C. 431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an event took place which closed all prospects of peace, precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night, the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans, commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded, as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the market-place. . . . The Platæans, who were not in the plot, imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. . . . Having barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other preparations as they thought necessary, a little before daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time, raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet. . . . The main body, which had kept together, entered a large building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans, who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been concerted that as large a force as could be raised should march the same night to support them. The distance between the two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. . . . The Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise, confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released; and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as soon as they had transported their movable property out of the country into the town, put to death all the prisoners — amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with provisions, and removed the

women and children and all persons unfit for service in a siege. After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed day for the invasion of Attica."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 19 (*v.* 1).

Also in: Thucydides, *History, bk.* 1–2.

B. C. 431-429.—The Peloponnesian War: How Hellas was divided.—The opposing camps.—Peloponnesian invasions of Attica.—The Plague at Athens.—Death of Pericles.—Surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians.—"All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two chief cities. . . . The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. . . . The general indignation against the Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway. . . . The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos and Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money. Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character of their respective forces. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians determined to invade Attica, and sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for a foreign expedition. The various states made their preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time, with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each, met at the Isthmus." Then followed the invasion of Attica, the siege of Athens, the plague in the city, the death of Pericles, and the success won by the indomitable Athenians, at Potidaea, in the midst of their sore distress.—Thucydides, *History* (*trans. by Jowett*), *bk.* 2, *sect.* 8–70 (*v.* 1).

Also in: E. Abbott, *Pericles, ch.* 13–15.—See Athens: B. C. 431 and 430–429.

B. C. 429-427.—The Peloponnesian War: Siege, capture and destruction of Platæa.—"In the third spring of the war, the Peloponnesians changed their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica for two following summers, tho much injury had been done to the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the booty was far from paying the expence of the expedition; the enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle, and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was determined to direct the principal effort. . . . Under the command still of Archidamus, the confederate army accordingly entered the Platæid, and ravage was immediately begun. . . . The town was small, as may be judged from the very small force which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only 400 Platæans, with 80 Athenians. There were besides in the place 110 women to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress; the neighboring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then, in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a force sufficient for assault might ascend. . . . Such was at that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the science of his age. . . . To oppose this mode of attack, the first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and, within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the neighboring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in baskets. This requiring more labor to remove, the besieged undermined the mound; and thus, for a long time unperceived, prevented it from gaining height. Still, however, fearing that the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built, in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first at the extremities. These extended, on either side, beyond the mound; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less favorable situation. . . . A ram, advanced upon the Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the Platæan rampart, and shook it violently; to the great alarm of the

garrison, but with little farther effect. Other machines of the same kind were employed against different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose. . . . No means however were neglected by the besiegers that either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could devise, to promote their purpose; yet, after much of the summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring woods of Cithæron, gave them more than ordinary facility. Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on-fire. The conflagration was such as was never before known says Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands of men. . . . But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brought on by a thunderstorm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing, the Peloponnesians determined immediately to reduce the siege to a blockade. . . . To the palisade, which already surrounded the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch, one without, and one within. A sufficient body of troops being then appointed to the guard of these works, the Bœotians undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy, and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the army was dismissed for the winter." —W. Mitford, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 15, *sect.* 1 (*v.* 2). —When the blockade had endured for more than a year, and food in the city grew scarce, about half of the defending force made a bold dash for liberty, one stormy night, scaled the walls of circumvallation, and escaped. The remainder held out until some time in the next year, when they surrendered and were all put to death, the city being destroyed. The families of the Plateans had been sheltered at Athens before the siege began.—Thucydides, *History, bk.* 2-3.

B. C. 429-427.—The Peloponnesian War: Phormio's sea-fights.—Revolt of Lesbos.—Siege and capture of Mitylene.—The ferocious decree of Cleon reversed.—"At the same time that Archidamus laid siege to Plataea, a small Peloponnesian expedition, under a Spartan officer named Cnemus, had crossed the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, and joined the land forces of the Leucadians and Ambraciots. They were bent on conquering the Acarnanians and the Messenians of Naupactus, the only continental allies whom Athens possessed in Western Greece. . . . When Cnemus had been joined by the troops of Leucas and the other Corinthian towns, and had further strengthened himself by summoning to his standard a number of the predatory barbarian tribes of Epirus, he advanced on Stratus, the chief city of Acarnania. At the same time a squadron of Peloponnesian ships collected at Corinth, and set sail down the gulf towards Naupactus. The only Athenian force in these waters consisted of twenty galleys under an able officer named Phormio, who was cruising off the straits of Rhium, to protect Naupactus and blockade the Corinthian Gulf. Both by land and by sea the operations of the Peloponnesians miscarried miserably. Cnemus collected a very considerable army, but as he sent his men forward to attack Stratus by three separate roads, he exposed them to defeat in detail. . . . By sea the defeat of the Peloponnesians was even more disgraceful; the Corinthian admirals Machaon and Isocrates were so scared, when they came across the squadron of Phormio at the mouth of the gulf, that, although they mustered 47 ships to his 20, they took up the defensive. Huddling together in a circle, they shrank from his attack, and allowed themselves to be hustled and worried into the Achaian harbour of Patrae, losing several ships in their flight. Presently reinforcements arrived; the Peloponnesian fleet was raised to no less than 77 vessels, and three Spartan officers were sent on board, to compel the Corinthian admirals, who had behaved so badly, to do their best in future. The whole squadron then set out to hunt down Phormio. They found him with his 20 ships coasting along the Aetolian shore towards Naupactus, and at once set out in pursuit. The long chase separated the larger fleet into scattered knots, and gave the fighting a disconnected and irregular character. While the rear ships of Phormio's squadron were compelled to run on shore a few miles outside Naupactus, the 11 leading vessels reached the harbour in safety. Finding that he was now only pursued by about a score of the enemy—the rest having stayed behind to take possession of the stranded Athenian vessels—Phormio came boldly out of port again. His 11 vessels took 6, and sunk one of their pursuers; and then, pushing on westward, actually succeeded in recapturing most of the 9 ships which had been lost in the morning. This engagement, though it had no great results, was considered the most daring feat performed by the Athenian navy during the whole war. . . . The winter passed uneventfully, and the war seemed as far as ever from showing any signs of producing a definite result. But although the Spartan invasion of 428 B. C. had no more effect than those of the preceding years, yet in the late summer there occurred an event so fraught with evil omens for Athens, as to threaten the whole fabric of her empire. For the first time since the commencement of hostilities, an important subject state made an endeavour to free itself by the aid of the Spartan fleet. Lesbos was one of the two Aegean islands which still remained free from tribute, and possessed a considerable war-navy. Among its five towns Mitylene was the chief, and far exceeded the others in wealth and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, who had long been yearning to revolt, and had made careful preparation by accumulating war-like stores and enlisting foreign mercenaries. . . . The whole island except Methymna, where a democracy ruled, rose in arms, and determined to send for aid to Sparta. The Athenians at once despatched against Mitylene a squadron of 40 ships under Cleïppides, which had just been equipped for a cruise in Peloponnesian waters. This force had an engagement with the Lesbian fleet, and drove it back into the harbour of Mitylene. To gain time for assistance from across the Aegean to arrive, the Lesbians now pretended

to be anxious to surrender, and engaged Cleippides in a long and fruitless negotiation, while they were repeating their demands at Sparta. But at last the Athenian grew suspicious, established a close blockade of Mitylene by sea, and landed a small force of hoplites to hold a fortified camp on shore. . . . Believing the revolt of the Lesbians to be the earnest of a general rising of all the vassals of Athens, the Peloponnesians determined to make a vigorous effort in their favour. The land contingents of the various states were summoned to the Isthmus — though the harvest was now ripe, and the allies were loath to leave their reaping — while it was also determined to haul over the Corinthian Isthmus the fleet which had fought against Phormio, and *then to despatch it to relieve* Mitylene. . . . The Athenians were furious at the idea that their vassals were now about to be stirred up to revolt, and strained every nerve to defend themselves. While the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, and 100 galleys cruised in the Aegean to intercept any succours sent to Lesbos, another squadron of 100 ships sailed round Peloponnesus and harried the coastland with a systematic ferocity that surpassed any of their previous doings. To complete the crews of the 250 ships now afloat and in active service proved so great a drain on the military force of Athens, that not only the Thetes but citizens of the higher classes were drafted on shipboard. Nevertheless the effect which they designed by this display of power was fully produced. To defend their own harvests the confederates who had met at the Isthmus went homewards, while the dismay at the strength of the Athenian fleet was so great that the plan of sending naval aid to Lesbos was put off for the present. . . . All through the winter of 428–7 B. C. the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, though its maintenance proved a great drain on the resources of Athens. On the land side a considerable force of hoplites under Paches strengthened the troops already on the spot, and made it possible to wall the city in with lines of circumvallation. . . . When the spring of 427 B. C. arrived, the Spartans determined to make a serious attempt to send aid to Lesbos; but the fear of imperilling all their naval resources in a single expedition kept them from despatching a fleet of sufficient size. Only 42 galleys, under an admiral named Alcidas, were sent forth from Corinth. This squadron managed to cross the Aegean without meeting the Athenians, by steering a cautious and circuitous course among the islands. But so much time was lost on the way, that on arriving off Embatum in Ionia, Alcidas found that Mitylene had surrendered just seven days before. . . . Learning the fall of Mitylene, he made off southward, and, after intercepting many merchant vessels off the Ionian coast and brutally slaying their crews, returned to Corinth without having struck a single blow for the cause of Sparta. Paches soon reduced Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha, the three Lesbian towns which had joined in the revolt of Mitylene, and was then able to sail home, taking with him the Laconian general Salaethus, who had been caught in hiding at Mitylene, together with the other leaders of the revolt. When the prisoners arrived at Athens Salaethus was at once put to death without a trial. But the fate of the Lesbians was the subject of an important and characteristic debate in the Ecclesia. Led by the demagogue Cleon, the Athenians at first passed the monstrous resolution that the whole of the Mitylenaeans, not merely the prisoners at Athens, but every adult male in the city, should be put to death, and their wives and families sold as slaves. It is some explanation but no excuse for this horrible decree that Lesbos had been an especially favoured ally, and that its revolt had for a moment put Athens in deadly fear of a general rising of Ionia and Aeolis. Cleon the leather-seller, the author of this infamous decree, was one of the statesmen of a coarse and inferior stamp, whose rise had been rendered possible by the democratic changes which Pericles had introduced into the state. . . . On the eve of the first day of debate the motion of Cleon had been passed, and a galley sent off to Paches at Mitylene, bidding him slay all the Lesbians; but on the next morning . . . the decree of Cleon was rescinded by a small majority, and a second galley sent off to stay Paches from the massacre. . . . By extraordinary exertions the bearers of the reprieve contrived to reach Lesbos only a few hours after Paches had received the first despatch, and before he had time to put it into execution. Thus the majority of the Mitylenaeans were saved; but all their leaders and prominent men, not less than 1,000 in number, were put to death. . . . The land of the Lesbians was divided into 3,000 lots, of which a tenth was consecrated to the gods, while the rest were granted out to Athenian cleruchs, who became the landlords of the old owners."—C. W. C. Oman, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 23.

Also in: Thucydides, *History, bk.* 2, *sect.* 80–92, *and bk.* 3, *sect.* 1–50.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 4, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 3).

B. C. 425.—The Peloponnesian War: Spartan catastrophe at Sphacteria.—Peace pleaded for and refused by Athens.—In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 425), the enterprising Athenian general, Demosthenes, obtained permission to seize and fortify a harbor on the west coast of Messenia, with a view to harassing the adjacent Spartan territory and stirring up revolt among the subjugated Messenians. The position he secured was the promontory of Pylus, overlooking the basin now called the Bay of Navarino, which latter was protected from the sea by the small island of Sphacteria, stretching across its front. The seizure of Pylus created alarm in Sparta at once, and vigorous measures were taken to expel the intruders. The small force of Demosthenes was assailed, front and rear, by a strong land army and a powerful Peloponnesian fleet; but he had fortified himself with skill and stoutly held his ground, waiting for help from Athens. Meantime his assailants had landed 420 men on the island of Sphacteria, and these were mostly hoplites, or heavy-armed soldiers, from the best citizenship of Sparta. In this situation an Athenian fleet made its sudden and unexpected appearance, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet completely, took possession of the harbor and surrounded the Spartans on Sphacteria with a ring from which there was no escape. To obtain the release of these citizens the Spartans were reduced to plead for peace on almost any terms, and Athens had her opportunity to end the war at that moment with great advantage to herself. But Cleon, the demagogue, persuaded the people to refuse peace. The beleaguered hoplites on Sphacteria were made prisoners by force, and little came of it in the

end.—Thucydides, *Hist.*, *bk.* 4, *sect.* 2-38.—Pylus remained in the possession of the Athenians until B. C. 408, when it was retaken by the Spartans. —G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 52.

Also in: E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 4, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 3).

B. C. 424-421.—The Peloponnesian War: Brasidas in Chalcidice.—Athenian defeat at Delium.—A year's Truce.—Renewed hostilities.—Death of Brasidas and Cleon at Amphipolis.—The Peace of Nikias (Nicias).—"About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas understood that the most effective method of assailing the Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia; especially since Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike, and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only 700 Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded, through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about 1,000 men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of 1,700 hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this adventurous and important expedition. He started in the spring of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and Thessaly. He effected the march with great daring and wisdom, and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides, to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances; yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he composed his history. . . . The revolution of the allied cities in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424, to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking, however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. A force of 7,000 hoplites [among them, Socrates, the philosopher—see Delium], several hundred horsemen, and 25,000 light-armed, under command of Hippokrates, took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated, overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found themselves attacked by an army of 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse, and 500 peltasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat, and were driven away with great loss. Such was the change of affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding year they could have ended the war in a manner most advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other cities of Macedonia, they were still masters of Pylos, of Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in Sphakteria; so that there was now an equality of advantages and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused to send him any assistance whatever. The opportunity, therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace. . . . Such were the arguments by which Nikias and his party finally gained the ascendency over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423 B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to the destructive war by a lasting peace. Unfortunately, the armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians. Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his promises of assistance. The warlike party at Athens, taking advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians, seeing that the war was continued, sent an ample force to Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the meantime become angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose the Lacedæmonians in their passage. The year of the armistice passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in Chalkidike. . . . The Athenians decided to forward a new force, and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August, 422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with 1,200 hoplites, 300 horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic

world. All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him at the public expense, in front of the market-place of Amphipolis. . . . Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of the war — its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of this peace, known in history as the 'peace of Nikias,' were as follows: 1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of the time of Aristeides. 2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. 3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right to adopt such measures as they pleased. 4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum to the Athenians. When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily refused their consent. The Peloponnesian war was now considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its beginning. Both the combatants came out from it terribly maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object — the emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the Athenians — but even officially recognized this tyranny, by consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as they choose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal allies. . . . Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the increase of the common hatred."—T. T Timayenis, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 5, *ch.* 4 (*v.* 1).

Also in: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 23 (*v.* 3).

B. C. 421-418.—The Peloponnesian War: New combinations.—The Argive League against Sparta.—Conflicting alliances of Athens with both —Rising influence of Alcibiades. —War in Argos.—Spartan victory at Mantinea.—Revolution in Argos.—"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days . . . , probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of Sparta. . . . The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. . . . The consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced her, because they found themselves given over to the Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not ventured to think of, and . . . became the centre of an alliance with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis, and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their union, the three people of the country had separated themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos. Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to Athens, and when it became evident that this was the consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece, and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. . . . After much delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the singular agreement (Olymp. 89, 4), that the Athenians should retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans, Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not appear to have had honest intentions in any way. . . . While thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed between Athens and Argos (Olymp. 89, 4) through the influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an hereditary proxenus to Argos. A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and by it the

Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a decisive influence upon the fate of his country. . . . We generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing, and we forget that part of his character which history reveals to us. . . . Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises the fact that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that, if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among the great statesmen of antiquity. . . . Alcibiades is quite a peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have sometimes thought of Caesar. . . . Alcibiades was opposed to the peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean, motives. . . . It was on his advice that Athens concluded the alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act quickly, before it should be too late The alliance with Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens, for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them, whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore, the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta . . . King Agis had set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the Argives (Olymp. 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle was fought (Olymp. 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans, and part of the Arcadians (' the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct of the Argives, had abandoned their cause '), on the one hand, and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution took place, in which an oligarchical government was instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of Sparta (Olymp. 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lects on Ancient Hist., lect.* 49 (v. 2)

Also in: Plutarch, *Alcibiades.*—W. Mitford, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 17 (*v.* 3).

B. C. 416.—Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians.—Massacre of the inhabitants.—"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias." —G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 56.—"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city. The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in breaking through part of the wall built round them by the enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived; and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery; and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender unconditionally. . . . There was no question of quarter. All the islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the women and children to slavery."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 4, *ch.* 4 (*v.* 3).

Also in: Thucydides, *History, bk.* 5, *sect.* 84–116.

B. C. 415.—The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens. See Athens: B. C. 415.

B. C. 415-413.—The Peloponnesian War: Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse.—Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta.—His enmity to Athens. See Syracuse: B. C. 415–413.

B. C. 413.—The Peloponnesian War: Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition.—Prostration of Athens.—Strengthening of Sparta.—Negotiations with the Persians against Athens.—Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.—The Decelian War.—"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to

this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of horror. . . . Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass, that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on the other all was won. . . . When the Athenians recovered from the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had arrived. . . . Athens had risked all her military and naval resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than 200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted. . . . But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships, and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens, and which was more dangerous in her case than in that of any other state, because her whole power was based on the fear inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica, — in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious dominion of Athens. . . .

Sparta, on the other hand, had in the course of a few months, without sending out an army or incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of the most important and momentous transaction of the entire war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the exception of Argos and Elis, all her allies were on amicable terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. . . . Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities. Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of Archidamus. . . . Nothing was now required, except pecuniary means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the meantime occurred in the Persian empire. . . . Everywhere [in that empire] sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs, rose in revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son, Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria. After the fall of Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King. Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime provinces. He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King (possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied. Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia; and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced to pursue a war policy. . . . Everything now depended for the satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all the more important cities of which a Persian party existed. . . . The most important and only independent power in Ionia was Chios. Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity contrived to retain the government. . . . It was their government which now became the focus of the conspiracy against Athens, in the first instance establishing a connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian forces. The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern province. . . . Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their alliance. . . . While thus the most dangerous combinations were on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to commence direct hostilities. . . .

A Peloponnesian army under Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B. C. 413 (Ol. xci. 3); at which date it was already to be anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of former wars had been effaced. The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while at the same time

it was now impossible to take vengeance upon the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved, instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a fortified position on Attic soil." The invaders seized a strong position at Decelea, only fourteen miles northward from Athens, on a rocky peak of Mount Parnes, and fortified themselves so strongly that the Athenians ventured on no attempt to dislodge them. From this secure station they ravaged the surrounding country at pleasure. "This success was of such importance that even in ancient times it gave the name of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the connecting link between the Sicilian War and the Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. . . . Its immediate object . . . it failed to effect; inasmuch as the Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea. The city was cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. . . . One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping watch."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 4, *ch.* 4–5 (*v.* 3).

Also in: G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 61 (*v.* 7).

B. C. 413-412.—The Peloponnesian War: Revolt of Chios, Miletus, Lesbos, and Rhodes from Athens.—Revolution at Samos.—Intrigues of Alcibiades for a revolution at Athens and for his own recall.—"Alkibiades . . . persuaded the Spartans to build a fleet, and send it over to Asia to assist the Ionians in revolting. He himself crossed at once to Chios with a few ships, in order to begin the revolt. The government of Chios was in the hands of the nobles; but they had hitherto served Athens so well that the Athenians had not altered the government to a democracy. Now, however, they revolted (B. C. 413). This was a heavy blow to Athens, for Chios was the most powerful of the Ionian States, and others would be sure to follow its example. Miletus and Lesbos revolted in B. C. 412. The nobles of Samos prepared to revolt, but the people were in favour of Athens, and rose against the nobles, killing 200 of them, and banishing 400 more. Athens now made Samos its free and equal ally, instead of its subject, and Samos became the head-quarters of the Athenian fleet and army. . . . The Athenians . . . had now manned a fresh navy. They defeated the Peloponnesian and Persian fleets together at Miletus, and were only kept from besieging Miletus by the arrival of a fleet from Syracuse. [This reinforcement of the enemy held them powerless to prevent a revolt in Rhodes, carried out by the oligarchs though opposed by the people.] Alkibiades had made enemies among the Spartans, and when he had been some time in Asia Minor an order came over from Sparta to put him to death. He escaped to Tissaphernes, and now made up his mind to win back the favour of Athens by breaking up the alliance between Tissaphernes and the Spartans. He contrived to make a quarrel between them about the rate of pay, and persuaded Tissaphernes that it would be the best thing for Persia to let the Spartans and Athenians wear one another out, without giving help to either. Tissaphernes therefore kept the Spartans idle for months, always pretending that he was on the point of bringing up his fleet to help them. Alkibiades now sent a lying message to the generals of the Athenian army at Samos that he could get Athens the help of Tissaphernes, if the Athenians would allow him to return from his exile: but he said that he could never return while there was a democracy, so that if they wished for the help of Persia they must change the government to an oligarchy (B. C. 412). In the army at Samos there were many rich men willing to see an oligarchy established at Athens, and peace made with Sparta. . . . Therefore, though the great mass of the army at Samos was democratical, a certain number of powerful men agreed to the plan of Alkibiades for changing the government. One of the conspirators, named Pisander, was sent to Athens to instruct the clubs of nobles and rich men to work secretly for this object. In these clubs the overthrow of the democracy was planned. Citizens known to be zealous for the constitution were secretly murdered. Terror fell over the city, for no one except the conspirators knew who did, and who did not, belong to the plot; and at last, partly by force, the assembly was brought to abolish the popular government."—C. A. Fyffe, *Hist. of Greece* (*Hist. Primer*), *ch.* 5, *sect.* 36–39.

Also in: G. W. Cox, *The Athenian Empire, ch.* 6.—Thucydides, *History, bk.* 8, *ch.* 4–51.

B. C. 411-407.—The Peloponnesian War: Athenian victories at Cynossema and Abydos.—Exploits of Alcibiades.—His return to Athens and to supreme command.—His second deposition and exile.—While Athens was in the throes of its revolution, "the war was prosecuted with vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus, who now commanded the Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length by the often-broken promises of Tissaphernes, and the scanty and irregular pay which he furnished, set sail from Miletus and proceeded to the Hellespont, with the intention of assisting the satrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if possible, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies in that quarter. Hither he was pursued by the Athenian fleet under Thrasyllus. In a few days an engagement ensued (in August, 411 B. C.), in the famous straits between Sestos and Abydos, in which the Athenians, though with a smaller force, gained the victory, and erected a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema [see Cynossema], near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the reduction of Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or two afterward, another obstinate engagement took place between the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets near Abydos, which lasted a whole day, and was at length decided in favour of the Athenians by the arrival of Alcibiades with his squadron of 18 ships from Samos."—W. Smith, *Smaller Hist. of Greece, ch.* 13.—Alcibiades, although recalled, had

"resolved to delay his return until he had performed such exploits as might throw fresh lustre over his name, and endear him to all classes of his fellow-citizens. With this ambition he sailed with a small squadron from Samos, and having gained information that Mindarus, with the Peloponnesian fleet, had gone in pursuit of the Athenian navy, he hastened to afford his countrymen succour. Happily he arrived at the scene of action, near Abydos, at a most critical moment; when, after a severe engagement, the Spartans had on one side obtained an advantage, and were pursuing the broken lines of the Athenians. . . . He speedily decided the fortune of the day, completely routed the Spartans, . . . broke many of their ships in pieces, and took 30 from them. . . . His vanity after this signal success had, however, nearly destroyed him; for, being desirous of appearing to Tissaphernes as a conqueror instead of a fugitive, he hastened with a splendid retinue to visit him, when the crafty barbarian, thinking he should thus appease the suspicions of the Spartans, caused him to be arrested and confined in prison at Sardis. Hence, however he found means to escape. . . . He sailed immediately for the Athenian camp to diffuse fresh animation among the soldiers, and induce them hastily to embark on an expedition against Mindarus and Pharnabazus who were then with the residue of the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicum" (Cyzicus). Mindarus was defeated and killed and Pharnabazus driven to flight (B. C. 410). "Alcibiades pursued his victory, took Cyzicum without difficulty, and, staining his conquest with a cruelty with which he was not generally chargeable, put to death all the Peloponnesians whom he found within the city. A very short space of time elapsed after this brilliant success before Alcibiades found another occasion to deserve the gratitude of Athens," by defeating Pharnabazus, who had attacked the troops of Thrasyllus while they were wasting the territory of Abydos. He next reduced Chalcedon, bringing it back into the Athenian alliance, and once more defeating Pharnabazus, when the Persian satrap attempted to relieve the town. He also recovered Selymbria, and took Byzantium (which had revolted) after a severe fight (B. C. 408). "Alcibiades having raised the fortunes of his country from the lowest state of depression, not only by his brilliant victories, but his conciliating policy, prepared to return and enjoy the praises of his successes. He entered the Piræus [B. C. 407] in a galley adorned with the spoils of numerous victories, followed by a long line of ships which he had taken from the foe. . . . The whole city came down to the harbour to see and welcome him, and took no notice of Thrasybulus or Theramenes, his fellow-commanders. . . . An assembly of the people being convened, he addressed them in a gentle and modest speech, imputing his calamities not to their envy, but to some evil genius which pursued him. He exhorted them to take courage, bade them oppose their enemies with all the fresh inspiration of their zeal, and taught them to hope for happier days. Delighted with these assurances, they presented him with a crown of brass and gold, which never was before given to any but the Olympic victors, invested him with absolute control over their naval and military affairs, restored to him his confiscated wealth, and ordered the ministers of religion to absolve him from the curses which they had denounced against him. Theodorus, however, the high-priest, evaded the last part of the decree, by alleging that he had never cast any imprecation on him, if he had committed no offence against the republic. The tablets on which the curses against him had been inscribed were taken to the shore, and thrown with eagerness into the sea. His next measure heightened, if possible, the brief lustre of his triumph. In consequence of the fortification of Decelea by the Lacedæmonians, and their having possession of the passes of the country, the procession to Eleusis, in honour of Athene, had been long unable to take its usual course, and being conducted by sea, had lost many of its solemn and august ceremonials. He now, therefore, offered to conduct the solemnity by land. . . . His proposal being gladly accepted, he placed sentinels on the hills; and, surrounding the consecrated band with his soldiers, conducted the whole to Eleusis and back to Athens, without the slightest opposition, or breach of that order and profound stillness which he had exhorted the troops to maintain. After this graceful act of homage to the religion he was once accused of destroying, he was regarded by the common people as something more than human; they looked on him as destined never to know defeat, and believed their triumph was certain so long as he was their commander. But, in the very height of his popularity, causes of a second exile were maturing. The great envied him in proportion to the people's confidence, and that confidence itself became the means of his ruin: for, as the people really thought the spell of invincibility was upon him, they were prepared to attribute the least pause in his career of glory to a treacherous design. He departed with a hundred vessels, manned under his inspection, with colleagues of his own choice, to reduce the isle of Chios to obedience. At Andros he once more gained a victory over both the natives and the Spartans, who attempted to assist them. But, on his arrival at the chief scene of action, he found that he would be unable to keep the soldiers from deserting, unless he could raise money to pay them sums more nearly equal to those which the Lacedæmonians offered, than the pay he was able to bestow. He was compelled, therefore, to leave the fleet [at Notium] and go into Caria in order to obtain supplies. While absent on this occasion, he left Antiochus in the command. . . . To this officer Alcibiades gave express directions that he should refrain from coming to an engagement, whatever provocations he might receive. Anxious, however, to display his bravery, Antiochus took the first occasion to sail out in front of the Lacedæmonian fleet, which lay near Ephesus, under the command of Lysander, and attempt, by insults, to incite them to attack him. Lysander accordingly pursued him; the fleets came to the support of their respective admirals, and a general engagement ensued, in which Antiochus was slain, and the Athenians completely defeated. On receiving intelligence of this unhappy reverse, Alcibiades hastened to the fleet, and eager to repair the misfortune, offered battle to the Spartans; Lysander, however, did not choose to risk the loss of his advantage by accepting the challenge, and the Athenians were compelled to retire. This event, for which no blame really attached to Alcibiades, completed the ruin of his influence at Athens. It was believed that this,

the first instance of his failure, must have arisen from corruption, or, at least, from a want of inclination to serve his country. He was also accused of leaving the navy under the direction of those who had no other recommendation to the charge but having been sharers in his luxurious banquets, and of having wandered about to indulge in profligate excesses. . . . On these grounds, the people in his absence took from him his command, and confided it to other generals. As soon as he heard of this new act of ingratitude, he resolved not to return home, but withdrew into Thrace, and fortified three castles . . . near to Perinthus. Here, having collected a formidable band, as an independent captain, he made incursions on the territories of those of the Thracians who acknowledged no settled form of government, and acquired considerable spoils."—Sir T. N. Talfourd, *Early Hist. of Greece* (*Encyclop. Metropolitana*), *ch.* 11.

Also in: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 29 (*v.* 4).—Plutarch, *Alcibiades.*—Xenophon, *Hellenica, bk.* 1, *ch.* 1–4.

B. C. 406.—The Peloponnesian War: Battle of Arginusæ.—Trial and execution of the generals at Athens.—Alcibiades was succeeded by Conon and nine colleagues in command of the Athenian fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. The Athenians, soon afterwards, were driven into the harbor of Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, by a superior Peloponnesian fleet, commanded by Callicratidas, and were blockaded there with small chance of escape. Conon contrived to send news of their desperate situation to Athens, and vigorous measures were promptly taken to rescue the fleet and to save Mitylene. Within thirty days, a fleet of 110 triremes was fitted out at the Piræus, and manned with a crew which took nearly the last able-bodied Athenian to make it complete. At Samos these were joined by 40 more triremes, making 150 in all, against which Callicratidas was able to bring out only 120 ships from Mitylene, when the relieving armament approached. The two fleets encountered one another near the islands of Arginusæ, off Cape Malea, the southern promontory of Lesbos. In the battle that ensued, which was the greatest naval conflict of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were completely victorious; Callicratidas was drowned and no less than 77 of the Peloponnesian ships were destroyed, while the Athenians themselves lost 25. As the result of this battle Sparta again made overtures of peace, as she had done after the battle of Cyzicus, and Athens, led by her demagogues, again rejected them. But the Athenian demagogues and populace did worse. They summoned home the eight generals who had won the battle of Arginusæ, to answer to a charge of having neglected, after the victory, to pick up the floating bodies of the Athenian dead and to rescue the drowning from the wrecked ships of their fleet. Six of the accused generals came home to meet the charge; but two thought it prudent to go into voluntary exile. The six were brought to trial; the forms of legality were violated to their prejudice and all means were unscrupulously employed to work up the popular passion against them. One man, only, among the prytanes—senators, that is, of the tribe then presiding, and who were the presidents of the popular assembly—stood out, without flinching, against the lawless rage of his fellow citizens, and refused, in calm scorn of all fierce threats against himself, to join in taking the unconstitutional vote. That one was the philosopher Socrates. The generals were condemned to death and received the fatal draught of hemlock from the same populace which pressed it a little later to the lips of the philosopher. "Thus died the son of Pericles and Aspasia [one of the generals, who bore his father's name], to whom his father had made a fatal gift in obtaining for him the Attic citizenship, and with him Erasinides, Thrasylus, Lysias, Aristocrates, and Diomedon. The last-named, the most innocent of all, who had wished that the whole fleet should immediately be employed in search of the wrecked, addressed the people once more; he expressed a wish that the decree dooming him to death might be beneficial to the state, and called upon his fellow-citizens to perform the thanksgiving offerings to the saving gods which they, the generals, had vowed on account of their victory. These words may have sunk deep into the hearts of many of his hearers; but their only effect has been to cast a yet brighter halo in the eyes of subsequent generations around the memory of these martyrs. Their innocence is best proved by the series of glaring infractions of law and morality which were needed to ensure their destruction, as well as by the shame and repugnance which seized upon the citizens, when they had recognized how fearfully they had been led astray by a traitorous faction."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 4, *ch.* 5 (*v.* 3).—Mr. Grote attempts to uphold a view more unfavorable to the generals and less severe upon the Athenian people.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt* 2, *ch.* 64.

Also in: Xenophon, *Hellenica, bk.* 1, *ch.* 5–7. See, also, Athens: B. C. 424–406.

B. C. 405.—The Peloponnesian War: Decisive battle of Aigospotamoi.—Defeat of the Athenians.—After the execution of the generals, "no long time passed before the Athenians repented of their madness and their crimes: but, yielding still to their old besetting sin, they insisted, as they had done in the days of Miltiades and after the catastrophe at Syracuse, on throwing the blame not on themselves but on their advisers. This great crime began at once to produce its natural fruits. The people were losing confidence in their officers, who, in their turn, felt that no services to the state could secure them against illegal prosecutions and arbitrary penalties. Corruption was eating its way into the heart of the state, and treason was losing its ugliness in the eyes of many who thought themselves none the worse for dallying with it. . . . The Athenian fleet had fallen back upon Samos; and with this island as a base, the generals were occupying themselves with movements, not for crushing the enemy, but for obtaining money. . . . The Spartans, whether at home or on the Asiatic coast, were now well aware that one more battle would decide the issue of the war; for with another defeat the subsidies of the Persians would be withdrawn from them as from men doomed to failure, and perhaps be transferred to the Athenians. In the army and fleet the cry was raised that Lysandros was the only man equal to the emergency. Spartan custom could not appoint the same man twice to the office of admiral, but when Arakos was sent out with Lysandros [Lysander] as his secretary, it was understood that the latter was really the

man in power." In the summer of 405 B. C. Lysandros made a sudden movement from the southern Ægean to the Hellespont, and laid siege to the rich town of Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side. The Athenians followed him, but not promptly enough to save Lampsacus, which they found in his possession when they arrived. They took their station, thereupon, at the mouth of the little stream called the Aigospotamoi (the Goat's Stream), directly opposite to Lampsacus, and endeavored for four successive days to provoke Lysandros to fight. He refused, watching his opportunity for the surprise which he effected on the fifth day, when he dashed across the narrow channel and caught the Athenian ships unprepared, their crews mostly scattered on shore. One only, of the six Athenian generals, Conon, had foreseen danger and was alert. Conon, with twelve triremes, escaped. The remaining ships, about one hundred and seventy in number, were captured almost without the loss of a man on the Peloponnesian side. Of the crews, some three or four thousand Athenians were pursued on shore and taken prisoners, to be afterwards slaughtered in cold blood. Two of the incapable generals shared their fate. Of the other generals who escaped, some at least were believed to have been bribed by Lysandros to betray the fleet into his hands. The blow to Athens was deadly. She had no power of resistance left, and when her enemies closed around her, a little later, she starved within her walls until resistance seemed no longer heroic, and then gave herself up to their mercy.—G. W. Cox, *The Athenian Empire, ch.* 7.

Also in: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 30 (*v.* 4).—Plutarch, *Lysander.*—Xenophon, *Hellenica, bk.* 2, *ch.* 1.

B. C. 404.—End of the Peloponnesian War.—Fall of Athens. See Athens: B. C. 404.

B. C. 404-403.—The Year of Anarchy at Athens.—Reign of the Thirty. See Athens: B. C. 404–403.

B. C. 401-400.—The expedition of Cyrus, and the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. See Persia: B. C. 401–400.

B. C. 399-387.—Spartan war with Persia.—Greek confederacy against Sparta.—The Corinthian War.—Peace of Antalcidas.—The successful retreat of the Ten Thousand from Cunaxa, through the length of the Persian dominions (B. C. 401–400), and the account which they brought of the essential hollowness of the power of the Great King, produced an important change among the Greeks in their estimate of the Persian monarchy as an enemy to be feared. Sparta became ashamed of having abandoned the Greek cities of Asia Minor to their old oppressors, as she did after breaking the strength of their protector, Athens, in the Peloponnesian War. When, therefore, the Persians began to lay siege to the coast cities which resisted them, Sparta found spirit enough to interfere (B. C. 399) and sent over a small army, into which the surviving Cyreans were also enlisted. The only immediate result was a truce with the Persian satrap. But, meantime, the Athenian general Conon—he who escaped with a few triremes from Ægospotami and fled to Cyprus—had there established relations with the Persian court at Susa and had acquired a great influence, which he used to bring about the creation of a powerful Persian armament against Sparta, himself in command. The news of this armament, reaching Sparta, provoked the latter to a more vigorous prosecution of the war in Asia Minor. King Agesilaus took the field in Ionia with a strong army and conducted two brilliant campaigns (B. C. 396–395), pointing the way, as it were, to the expedition of Alexander a couple of generations later. The most important victory won was on the Pactolus, not far from Sardis. But, in the midst of his successes, Agesilaus was called home by troubles which arose in Greece. Sparta, by her arrogance and oppressive policy, had already alienated all the Greek states which helped her to break down Athens in the Peloponnesian War. Persian agents, with money, had assisted her enemies to organize a league against her. Thebes and Athens, first, then Argos and Corinth, with several of the lesser states, became confederated in an agreement to overthrow her domination. In an attempt to crush Thebes, the Spartans were badly beaten at Haliartus (B. C. 395), where their famous Lysander, conqueror of Athens, was killed. Their power in central and northern Greece was virtually annihilated, and then followed a struggle with their leagued enemies for the control of the Corinthian isthmus, whence came the name of the Corinthian War. It was this situation of things at home which called back King Agesilaus from his campaigns in Asia Minor. He had scarcely crossed the Hellespont on his return, in July B. C. 394, before all his work in Asia was undone by an overwhelming naval victory achieved at Cnydus by the Athenian Conon, commanding the Persian-Phœnician fleet. With his veteran army, including the old Cyreans, now returning home after seven years of incredible adventures and hardships, he made his way through all enemies into Bœotia and fought a battle with the league at Coronea, in which he so far gained a victory that he held the field, although the fruits of it were doubtful. The Spartans on the isthmus had also just gained a considerable success near Corinth, on the banks of the Nemea. On the whole, the results of the war were in their favor, until Conon and the Persian satrap, Pharnabazus, came over with the victorious fleet from Cnydus and lent its aid to the league. The most important proceeding of Conon was to rebuild (B. C. 393), with the help of his Persian friends, the Long Walls of Athens, which the Peloponnesians had required to be thrown down eleven years before. By this means he restored to Athens her independence and secured for her a new career of commercial prosperity. During six years more the war was tediously prolonged, without important or decisive events, while Sparta intrigued to detach the Persian king from his Athenian allies and the latter intrigued to retain his friendship. In the end, all parties were exhausted—Sparta, perhaps, least so—and accepted a shameful peace which was practically dictated by the Persian and had the form of an edict or mandate from Susa, in the following terms: "The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with those who share my views. This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money." By this,

called the Peace of Antalcidas (B. C. 387) from the Lacedæmonian who was instrumental in bringing it about, the Ionian Greeks were once more abandoned to the Persian king and his satraps, while Sparta, which assumed to be the administrator and executor of the treaty, was confirmed in her supremacy over the other Grecian states.—Xenophon, *Hellenica* (*tr. by Dakyns*), *bk.* 3–5 (*v.* 2).

Also in: C. Sankey, *The Spartan and Theban Supremacies, ch.* 7–9.—W. Mitford, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 24–25 (*v.* 4).—G. Rawlinson, *The Five Great Monarchies, v.* 3; *Persia, ch.* 7

B. C. 385.—Destruction of Mantinea by the Spartans.—The Mantineians, having displayed unfriendliness to Sparta during the Corinthian War, were required by the latter, after the Peace of Antalcidas, to demolish their walls. On their refusal, king Agesipolis was sent to subdue them. By damming up the waters of the river Ophis he flooded the city and brought it to terms. "The city of Mantineia was now broken up, and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantineia as a village. Each village was placed under oligarchical government and left unfortified."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 76 (*v.* 9).

Also in: Xenophon, *Hellenica, bk.* 5, *ch.* 2.

B. C. 383.—The betrayal of Thebes to the Spartans.—When the Spartans sent their expedition against Olynthus, in 383 B. C., it marched in two divisions, the last of which, under Phœbidas, halted at Thebes, on the way, probably having secret orders to do so. "On reaching Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium. Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, being the respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, would not come anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the other hand, was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was established between them, he made a proposal as follows: 'You have it in your power,' he said, addressing Phœbidas, 'this very day to confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel.'"—Xenophon, *Hellenica* (*tr. by Dakyns*), *bk.* 5, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 2).—"On the day of the Thesmophoria, a religious festival celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis, or Kadmeia, was consecrated to their exclusive use, Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat of a summer's noon had driven every one out of the streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened to his order as Polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. . . . The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes [was] . . . received at Sparta with the greatest surprise as well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction Everywhere throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognised public law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. . . . It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan power. . . . Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two really formidable enemies."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 76.

Also in: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 37 (*v.* 5).

B. C. 383-379.—Overthrow of the Olynthian confederacy by Sparta.—Among the Greek cities which were founded at an early day in that peninsula of Macedonia called Chalcidice, from Chalcis, in Eubœa, which colonized the greater number of them, Olynthus became the most important. It long maintained its independence against the Macedonian kings, on one hand, and against Athens, when Athens ruled the Ægean and its coasts, on the other. As it grew in power, it took under its protection the lesser towns of the peninsula and adjacent Macedonia, and formed a confederacy among them, which gradually extended to the larger cities and acquired a formidable character. But two of the Chalcidian cities watched this growth of Olynthus with jealousy and refused to be confederated with her. More than that, they joined the Macedonians in sending an embassy (B. C. 383) to Sparta, then all-powerful in Greece, after the Peace of Antalcidas, and invoked her intervention, to suppress the rising Olynthian confederacy. The response of Sparta was prompt, and although the Olynthians defended themselves with valor, inflicting one severe defeat upon the Lacedæmonian allies, they were forced at last (B. C. 379) to submit and the confederacy was dissolved. "By the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. . . . She gave the victory to Amyntas [king of Macedonia], and prepared the indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not only Olynthus, but . . . the major part of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 76 (*v.* 9).

Also in: E. A. Freeman, *Hist. of Federal Govt., ch.* 4, *sect.* 3.

B. C. 379-371.—The liberation of Thebes and her rise to supremacy.—The humbling of Sparta.—For three years after the betrayal of the Acropolis, or Cadmea, of Thebes to the Spartans, the city groaned under the tyranny of the oligarchical party of Leontiades, whom the Spartans supported. Several hundreds of the more prominent of the democratic and patriotic party found a refuge at Athens, and the deliverance of Thebes was effected at last, about December, B. C. 379,

by a daring enterprise on the part of some of these exiles. Their plans were concerted with friends at Thebes, especially with one Phyllidas, who had retained the confidence of the party in power, being secretary to the polemarchs. The leader of the undertaking was Melon. "After a certain interval Melon, accompanied by six of the trustiest comrades he could find among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They were armed with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day they lay concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the city gates in the guise of labourers returning home with the latest comers from the fields. Having got safely within the city, they spent the whole of that night at the house of a man named Charon, and again the next day in the same fashion. Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns of the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on going out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was to take this opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking, which was the introduction of certain women to the polemarchs. They were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be found in Thebes. . . . Supper was over, and, thanks to the zeal with which the master of the ceremonies responded to their mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and fetched Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the rest as their attendant maidens. . . . It was preconcerted that as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside their veils and strike home. That is one version of the death of the polemarchs. According to another, Melon and his friends came in as revellers, and so despatched their victims."—Xenophon, *Hellenica* (*tr. by Dakyns*), *bk.* 5, *ch.* 4.—Having thus made way with the polemarchs, the conspirators surprised Leontiades in his own house and slew him. They then liberated and armed the prisoners whom they found in confinement and sent heralds through the city to proclaim the freedom of Thebes. A general rally of the citizens followed promptly. The party of the oppression was totally crushed and its prominent members put to death. The Spartan garrison in the Cadmea capitulated and was suffered to march out without molestation. The government of Thebes was reorganized on a more popular basis, and with a view to restoring the Bœotian League, in a perfected state, with Thebes for its head (see THEBES: B. C. 378). In the war with Sparta which followed, Athens was soon involved, and the Spartans were driven from all their footholds in the Bœotian towns. Then Athens and Thebes quarreled afresh, and the Spartans, to take advantage of the isolation of the latter, invaded her territory once more. But Thebes, under the training of her great statesman and soldier, Epaminondas, had become strong enough to face her Lacedæmonian enemy without help, and in the momentous battle of Leuctra, fought July 6, B. C. 371, on a plain not far from Platææ, the domineering power of Sparta was broken forever. "It was the most important of all the battles ever fought between Greeks. On this day Thebes became an independent power in Greece, and a return of Spartan despotism was henceforth impossible for all times."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, *bk.* 6, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 4).

ALSO IN: Plutarch, *Pelopidas*.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, *pt.* 2, *ch.* 77-78.—C. Sankey, *The Spartan and Theban Supremacies*, *ch.* 10-11.

B. C. 378-357.—The new Athenian Confederacy.—The Social War. See ATHENS: B. C. 378-357.

B. C. 371.—The Arcadian union.—Restoration of Mantinea.—Building of Megalopolis. —One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra (B. C. 371), which ended the domination of Sparta in Greek affairs, was to emancipate the Arcadians and to work great changes among them. Mantinea, which the Spartans had destroyed, was rebuilt the same year. Then "the chiefs of the parties opposed to the Spartan interest in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a plan for securing the independence of Arcadia, and for raising it to a higher rank than it had hitherto held in the political system of Greece. With a territory more extensive than any other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land, and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of the nation; the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of foreign powers. . . The object was to unite the Arcadian people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs, particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a military force for the protection of the public safety. . . . Within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of Arcadians from all the principal towns was held to deliberate on the measure; and under its decree a body of colonists, collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City). The site chosen was on the banks of the Helisson, a small stream tributary to the Alpheus. . . . The city was designed on a very large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings corresponded to its extent; the theatre was the most spacious in Greece. . . . The population was to be drawn . . . from a great number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by their inhabitants."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, *ch.* 39 (*v.* 5).—"The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it."—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, *pt.* 2, *ch.* 78.

B. C. 371-362.—Popular fury in Argos.—Arcadian union and disunion.—Restoration of Mantinea.—Expeditions of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus.—His attempts against Sparta.—His victory and death at Mantinea. —"In many of the Peloponnesian cities, when the power of Sparta seemed visibly on the wane, internal commotions had arisen, and much blood had been shed on both sides. But now Argos displayed the most fearful example of popular

fury recorded in Greek annals, red as they are with tales of civil bloodshed. The democratic populace detected a conspiracy among the oligarchs, and thirty of the chief citizens were at once put to death. The excitement of the people was inflamed by the harangues of demagogues, and the mob, arming itself with cudgels, commenced a general massacre. When 1,200 citizens had fallen, the popular orators interfered to check the atrocities, but met with the same fate; and, sated at length with bloodshed, the multitude stayed the deadly work. But where the pressure of Spartan interference had been heaviest and most constant, there the reaction was naturally most striking. The popular impulses which were at work in Arkadia [see above] found their first outlet in the rebuilding of Mantineia." But there was far from unanimity in the Arkadian national movement. "In Tegea . . . public opinion was divided. The city had been treated by Sparta with special consideration, and had for centuries been her faithful ally; hence the oligarchical government looked with disfavour upon the project of union. But the democratical party was powerful and unscrupulous; and, with the help of the Mantineians, they effected a revolution, in which many were killed, and 800 exiles fled to Sparta." The Spartans, under Agesilaos, avenged them by ravaging the plain in front of Mantineia. "This invasion of Arkadia is chiefly important for the pretext which it furnished for Theban intervention. The Mantineians applied for help at first to Athens, and, meeting with a refusal, went on to Thebes. For this request Epameinondas must have been thoroughly prepared beforehand, and he was soon on the march with a powerful army. . . . On his arrival in the Peloponnese [B. C. 370], he found that Agesilaos had already retired; and some of the Theban generals, considering the season of the year, wished at once to return." But Epameinondas was persuaded by the allies of Thebes to make an attempt upon Sparta itself. "In four divisions the invading host streamed into the land which, according to the proudest boast of its inhabitants, had felt no hostile tread for 600 years. At Sellasia, not ten miles distant from Sparta, the army reunited; and, having plundered and burnt the town, swept down into the valley of the Eurotas, and marched along the left bank till it reached the bridge opposite the city. Within Sparta itself, though a universal terror prevailed, one man rose equal to the emergency. While the men fainted in spirit as they thought how few they were, and how wide their unwalled city, . . . Agesilaos accepted, not without mistrust, the services of 6,000 helots, collected reinforcements, preserved order, suppressed conspiracy, stamped out mutiny, posted guards on every vantage-ground, and refused to be tempted to a battle by the taunts of foes or the clamours of over-eager friends. . . . After one unsuccessful cavalry skirmish, the Theban general, who, in a campaign undertaken on his sole responsibility, dared not risk the chance of defeat, decided to leave the 'wasps'-nest' untaken. He completed his work of devastation by ravaging the whole of southern Lakonia, . . . and then turned back into Arkadia to devote himself to the more permanent objects of his expedition." Messene was now rebuilt (see MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD), and "the descendants of the old Messenian stock were gathered to form a new nation from Rhegion and Messene [Sicily], and from the parts of Lybia round Kyrene. . . . By thus restoring the Messenians to their ancient territory, Epameinondas deprived Sparta at one blow of nearly half her possessions. . . . At last Epameinondas had done his work; and, leaving Pammenes with a garrison in Tegea, he hastened to lead his soldiers home. At the Isthmus he found a hostile army from Athens," which had been persuaded to send succor to Sparta; but the Athenians did not care to give battle to the conquering Thebans, and the latter passed unopposed. On the arrival of Epameinondas at Thebes, "the leaders of a petty faction threatened to bring him and his colleagues to trial for retaining their command for four months beyond the legal term of office. But Epameinondas stood up in the assembly, and told his simple tale of victorious generalship and still more triumphant statesmanship; and the invidious cavils of snarling intriguers were at once forgotten." Sparta and Athens now formed an alliance, with the senseless agreement that command of the common forces "should be given alternately to each state for five days. . . . The first aim of the confederates was to occupy the passes of the isthmus," but Epameinondas forced a passage for his army, captured Sikyon, ravaged the territory of Epidauros, and made a bold but unsuccessful attempt to surprise Corinth. Then, on the arrival of reinforcements to the Spartans from Syracuse, he drew back to Thebes (B. C. 368). For a time the Thebans were occupied with troubles in Thessaly, and their Arkadian protégés in Peloponnese were carrying on war against Sparta independently, with so much momentary success that they became over-confident and rash. They paid for their foolhardiness by a frightful defeat, which cost them 10,000 men, whilst no Spartan is said to have fallen; hence the fight was known in Sparta as the Tearless Battle. "This defeat probably caused little grief at Thebes, for it would prove to the arrogant Arkadians that they could not yet dispense with Theban aid; and it decided Epameinondas to make a third expedition into the Peloponnese." The result of his third expedition was the enrolment of a number of Achaian cities as Theban allies, which gave to Thebes "the control of the coast-line of the Corinthian gulf." But the broad and statesmanlike terms on which Epameinondas arranged these alliances were set aside by his narrow-minded fellow citizens, and a policy adopted by which Achaia was "converted from a lukewarm neutral into an enthusiastic supporter of Sparta. In this unsettled state of Greek politics the Thebans resolved to have recourse, like the Spartans before them, to the authority of the Great King. Existing treaties, for which they were not responsible, acknowledged his right to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece." Pelopidas and other envoys were accordingly sent to Susa (B. C. 366), where they procured from Artaxerxes a rescript "which recognised the independence of Messene and ordered the Athenians to dismantle their fleet." But the mandate of the Great King proved void of effect. "After this the confusion in Greece grew infinitely worse. An accident transferred the town of Oropos . . . from the hands of Athens to those of Thebes; and as the Peloponnesian allies of the Athenians refused to help them to regain it, they broke with them, and, in spite of

the efforts of Epameinondas, formed an alliance with Arkadia. . . . The Athenians made soon after a vain attempt to seize the friendly city of Corinth, and the disgusted Corinthians, together with the citizens of Epidauros and Phlious, . . . obtained the grudging consent of Sparta, and made a separate peace with Thebes. As soon as tranquillity was restored in one quarter, in another the flame of war would again burst forth." Its next outbreak (B. C. 365) was between Elis and Arkadia, the former being assisted by Sparta, and its principal event was a desperate battle fought for the possession of Olympia. The Arkadians held part of the city and acquired possession of the sacred treasures in the Olympian temple, which they determined to apply to the expenses of the war. "Raising the cry of sacrilege, the Mantineians, who were jealous both of Tegea and Megalopolis, at once broke loose and shut their gates." Soon afterwards, Mantineia separated herself wholly from the Arkadian confederacy and entered the Spartan alliance. This was among the causes which drew Epameinondas once more, and for the last time, into the Peloponnese (B. C. 362). "The armies of Greece were now gathering from all quarters for the great struggle. On the one side stood Sparta, Athens, Elis, Achaia, and a part of Arkadia, led by Mantineia; on the other side were ranged Boiotia [Thebes], Argos, Messenia, and the rest of Arkadia, while a few of the smaller states — as Phokis, Phlious, and Corinth — remained neutral." At the outset of his campaign, Epameinondas made a bold attempt, by a rapid night march, to surprise Sparta; but a traitorous warning had been given, the Spartans were barricaded and prepared for defence, and the undertaking failed. Then he marched quickly to Mantineia, and failed in his design there, likewise. A pitched battle was necessary to decide the issue, and it was fought on the plain between Mantineia and Tegea, on the 3d day of July, B. C. 362. The fine discipline of the Theban troops and the skilful tactics of Epameinondas had given the victory into his hands, when, "suddenly, the aspect of the battle changed. Except among the light troops on the extreme right, the advance was everywhere stayed The Spartan hoplites were in full flight, but the conquerors did not stir a step in the pursuit. . . . The fury of the battle had instantly ceased. . . . Epameinondas had fallen wounded to death, and this was the result. . . . Every heart was broken, every arm paralysed. . . . Both sides claimed the victory in the battle and erected the usual trophies, but the real advantage remained with the Thebans. . . . By the peace that ensued, the independence of Messenia was secured, and Megalopolis and the Pan-Arkadian constitution were preserved from destruction. The work of Epameinondas, though cut short, was thus not thrown away; and the power of Sparta was confined within the limits which he had assigned."—C. Sankey, *The Spartan and Theban Supremacies, ch.* 12.

Also in: Xenophon, *Hellenica, bk.* 5-6.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 6, *ch.* 2.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 80 (*v.* 10).

B. C. 359-358.—First proceedings of Philip of Macedonia.—His acquisition of Amphipolis.—The famous Philip of Macedon succeeded to the Macedonian throne in 359 B. C., at the age of 23. In his youth he had been delivered to the Thebans as one of the hostages given upon the conclusion of a treaty of peace in 368. "His residence at Thebes gave him some tincture of Grecian philosophy and literature; but the most important lesson which he learned at that city was the art of war, with all the improved tactics introduced by Epaminondas. Philip . . . displayed at the beginning of his reign his extraordinary energy and abilities. After defeating the Illyrians he established a standing army, in which discipline was preserved by the severest punishments. He introduced the far-famed Macedonian phalanx, which was 16 men deep, armed with long projecting spears. Philip's views were first turned towards the eastern frontiers of his dominions, where his interests clashed with those of the Athenians. A few years before the Athenians had made various unavailing attempts to obtain possession of Amphipolis, once the jewel of their empire, but which they had never recovered since its capture by Brasidas in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war."—W. Smith, *Smaller Hist. of Greece, ch.* 19.—The importance of Amphipolis to the Athenians arose chiefly from its vicinity to "the vast forests which clothed the mountains that enclose the basin of the Strymon, and afforded an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber." For the same reason that the Athenians desired ardently to regain possession of Amphipolis their enemies were strong in the wish to keep it out of their hands. Moreover, as the Macedonian kingdom became well-knitted in the strong hands of the ambitious Philip, the city of "the Nine Ways" assumed importance to that rising power, and Philip resolved to possess it. It was at this point that his ambitions first came into conflict with Athens. But the Athenians were not aware of his aims until too late. He deceived them completely, in fact, by a bargain to give help in acquiring Amphipolis for them, and to receive help in gaining Pydna for himself. But when his preparations were complete, he suddenly laid siege to Amphipolis and made himself master of the city (B. C. 358), besides taking Pydna as well. At Athens, "Philip was henceforth viewed as an open enemy, and this was the beginning—though without any formal declaration—of a state of hostility between the two powers, which was called, from its origin, the Amphipolitan War."—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 42 (*v.* 5).

B. C. 357-336.—Advancement of Philip of Macedonia to supremacy.—The Sacred Wars and their consequences.—The fatal field of Chæronea.—Philip's preparations for the invasion of Asia.—His assassination.—A war between the Thebans and their neighbors, the Phocians, which broke out in 357 or 356 B. C., assumed great importance in Greek history and was called the Sacred War,—as two earlier contests, in which Delphi was concerned, had been likewise named. It is sometimes called the Ten Years Sacred War. Thebes, controlling the shadowy Amphictyonic Council, had brought a charge of sacrilege against the Phocians and procured a decree imposing upon them a heavy fine. The Phocians resisted the decree with unexpected energy, and, by a bold and sudden movement, gained possession of Delphi, where they destroyed the records of the Amphictyonic judgment against them. Having the vast accumulation of the sacred treasures of the Delphic temple in their hands, they did not scruple to appropriate them, and were able to maintain a powerful army of mercenaries, gathered from

every part of Greece, with which they ravaged the territories of Bœotia and Locris, and acquired control of the pass of Thermopylæ. In the midst of their successes they were called upon for help by the tyrant of Pheræ in Thessaly, then being attacked by Philip of Macedon (B. C. 353). The Phocians opposed Philip with such success, at first, that he retreated from Thessaly; but it was only to recruit and reanimate his army. Returning presently he overthrew the Phocian army, with great slaughter — Onomarchus, its leader, being slain — and made himself master of all Thessaly. Both Athens and Sparta were now alarmed by this rapid advance into Central Greece of the conquering arms of the ambitious Macedonian, and both sent forces to the help of the Phocians. The former was so energetic that an army of 5,000 Athenian foot-soldiers and 400 horse reached Thermopylæ (May 352 B.C.) before Philip had been able to push forward from Thessaly. When he did advance, proclaiming his purpose to rescue the Delphian temple from sacrilegious robbers, he was repulsed at the pass and drew back. It was the beginning of the struggle for Greek independence against Macedonian energy and ambition. A few months later Demosthenes delivered the first of his immortal orations, called afterwards Philippics, in which he strove to keep the already languishing energy of the Athenians alive, in unfaltering resistance to the designs of Philip. For six years there was a state of war between Philip and the Athenians with their allies, but the conquests of the former in Thrace and the Chalcidian peninsula were steadily pressed. At length (B. C. 346) Athens was treacherously persuaded into a treaty of peace with Philip (the Peace of Philocrates) which excluded the Phocians from its terms. No sooner had he thus isolated the latter than he marched quickly to Thermopylæ, secured possession of the pass and declared himself the supporter of Thebes. The Sacred War was ended, Delphi rescued, Phocis punished without mercy, and Greece was under the feet of a master. This being accomplished, the Peace of Philocrates was doubtfully maintained for about six years. Then quarrels broke out which led up to still another Sacred War, and which gave Philip another opportunity to trample on the liberties of Greece. Curiously, the provoking causes of this outbreak were an inheritance from that more ancient Sacred War which brought ruin upon the town of Cirrha and a lasting curse upon its soil. The Locrians of Amphissa, dwelling near to the accursed territory, had ventured in the course of years to encroach upon it with brick-kilns, and to make use of its harbor. At a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council, in the spring of B. C. 339, this violation of the Sacred Law was brought to notice, by way of retaliation for some offence which the deputies of Amphissa had given to those of Athens. Hostilities ensued between the citizens of Delphi, pushed on by the Amphictyons, on one side, and the Amphissians on the other. The influence of Philip in the Amphictyonic Council was controlling, and his partisans had no difficulty in summoning him to act for the federation in settling this portentous affair. He marched into Bœotia, took possession of the strong city of Elatea, and very soon made it manifest that he contemplated something more than mere dealing with the refractory trespassers of Amphissa. Athens watched his movements with terror, and even Thebes, his former ally, took alarm. Through the exertions of Demosthenes, Thebes and Athens, once more, but too late, gave up their ancient enmity and united their strength and resources in a firm league. Megara, Corinth and other states were joined to them and common cause was made with the Locrians of Amphissa. These movements consumed a winter, and war opened in the spring. Philip gained successes from the beginning. He took Amphissa by surprise and carried Naupactus by storm But it was not until August — the first day of August, B. C. 338 — that the two combatants came together in force. This occurred in the Bœotian valley of the Cephisus, near the town of Chæronea, which gave its name to the battle. The Sacred Band of Thebes and the hoplites of Athens, with their allies, fought obstinately and well; but they were no match for the veterans of the Macedonian phalanx and most of them perished on the field. It was the last struggle for Grecian independence. Henceforth, practically at least, Hellas was swallowed up in Macedonia. We can see very plainly that Philip's "conduct towards Athens after the victory, under the appearance of generosity, was extremely prudent. His object was, to separate the Thebans from the Athenians, and he at once advanced against the former The Athenian prisoners he sent home, free and clothed, accompanied by Antipater; he ordered the dead bodies to be burned, and their ashes to be conveyed to Athens, while the Thebans had to purchase their dead from him. He then entered Thebes, which he seems to have taken without any resistance, placed a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, and, with the same policy which Sparta had followed at Athens after the Peloponnesian war, he established an oligarchy of 300 of his partizans, who were for the most part returned exiles, and who now, under the protection of the garrison in the Cadmea, ruled like tyrants, and raged in a fearful manner. . . . Philip accepted all the terms which were agreeable to the Athenians; no investigations were to be instituted against his enemies, and none of them was to be sent into exile. Athens was not only to remain a perfectly sovereign city, but retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, nay even Samos and Chersonnesus, though he might have taken the latter without any difficulty, and though the Athenians had most cleruchiae in Samos. Thus he bought over the Athenians through this peace, against which Demosthenes and others, who saw farther, could not venture to protest, because Philip offered more than they could give him in return. . . . The only thing which the Athenians conceded to Philip, was, that they concluded a symmachia with him, and conferred upon him the supreme command in the Persian war. For with great cunning Philip summoned an assembly of the Greeks whom he called his allies, to Corinth, to deliberate upon the war against Persia. The war of revenge against the Persians had already become a popular idea in Greece . . . Philip now entered Peloponnesus with his whole army, and went to the diet at Corinth, where the Greek deputies received his orders. In Peloponnesus he acted as mediator, for he was invited as such by the Arcadians, Messenians, and Argives, to decide their disputes with Lacedaemon, and they demanded that he should restore to them their ancient territories. The Arcadians had

formerly possessed many places on the Eurotas, and the Messenians were still very far from having recovered all their ancient territories. He accordingly fixed the boundaries, and greatly diminished the extent of Laconia. . . . The Spartans, on that occasion, behaved in a dignified manner; they were the only ones who refused to acknowledge Philip as generalissimo against Persia. . . . Even the ancients regarded the day of Chaeronea as the death-day of Greece; every principle of life was cut off; the Greeks, indeed, continued to exist, but in spirit, and politically, they were dead. . . . Philip was now at the height of his power. Byzantium, and the other allied cities, had submitted to the conqueror, when he sent his army against them, and he was already trying to establish himself in Asia. 'A detachment of troops, under Attalus, had been sent across, to keep open the road for the great expedition, and had encamped on mount Ida.' Philip was thus enabled to commence his passage across the Hellespont whenever he pleased. But the close of his career was already at hand." He was assassinated in August, B. C. 336, by a certain Pausanias, at the instigation, it is said, of Olympias, one of Philip's several wives — and the mother of his famous son Alexander — whom he had repudiated to please a younger bride. "Philip was unquestionably an uncommon and extraordinary man, and the opinion of several among the ancients, that by the foundation of the Macedonian state he did something far greater than Alexander by the application of the powers he inherited, is quite correct. . . . When we regard him as the creator of his state, by uniting the most different nations, Macedonians and Greeks; . . when we reflect what a man he must have been, from whom proceeded the impulse to train such great generals, . . . to whom Alexander, it must be observed, did not add one, for all Alexander's generals proceeded from the school of Philip, and there is not one whom Alexander did not inherit from Philip; — when we perceive the skill with which he gained over nations and states, . . we cannot but acknowledge that he was an extraordinary man."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lects. on Ancient Hist., lects.* 69 *and* 66 (*v.* 2).

Also in: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 43–46 (*v.* 5–6).—T. Leland, *Hist. of the Life and Reign of Philip of Macedon, bk.* 2–5.

B. C. 351-348.—The Olynthian War. — Destruction of Olynthus by Philip of Macedonia. — After the overthrow of Spartan domination in Greece, Olynthus recovered its independence and regained, during the second quarter of the fourth century B. C., a considerable degree of prosperity and power. It was even helped in its rise by the cunning, dangerous hand of Philip of Macedon, who secured many and great advantages in his treacherous diplomacy by playing the mutual jealousies of Athens and Olynthus against one another. The Olynthian Confederacy, formed anew, just served its purpose as a counterpoise to the Athenian Confederacy, until Philip had no more need of that service. He was the friend and ally of the former until he had secured Amphipolis, Methone, and other necessary positions in Macedonia and Thrace. Then the mask began to slip and Olynthus (B. C. 351) got glimpses of the true character of her subtle neighbor. Too late, she made overtures to Athens, and Athens, too late, saw the vital importance of a league of friendship between the two Greek confederacies, against the half Hellenic, half barbaric Macedonian kingdom. Three of the great speeches of Demosthenes — the "Olynthiac orations"— were made upon this theme, and the orator succeeded for the first time in persuading his degenerated countrymen to act upon his clear view of the situation. Athens and Olynthus were joined in a defensive league and Athenian ships and men were sent to the Chalcidian peninsula,— too late. Partly by the force of his arms and partly by the power of his gold, buying traitors, Philip took Olynthus (B. C. 348) and all the thirty-two lesser towns that were federated with her. He took them and he destroyed them most brutally. "The haughty city of Olynthus vanished from the face of the earth, and together with it thirty-two towns inhabited by Greeks and flourishing as commercial communities. . . . The lot of those who saved life and liberty was happy in comparison with the fate of those who, like the majority of the Olynthians, fell into the hands of the conqueror and were sold into slavery, while their possessions were burnt to ashes or flung as booty to the mercenaries. . . . The mines continued to be worked for the royal treasury; with this exception the whole of Chalcidice became a desert."—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, bk.* 7, *ch.* 3 (*v.* 5).

Also in: A. M. Curteis, *Rise of the Macedonian Empire, ch.* 4–5.—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lects. on Ancient Hist., lect.* 66–68 (*v.* 2).

B. C. 340.—Siege of Byzantium by Philip of Macedonia.—The enmity between Athens and Byzantium yielded in 340 B. C. to their common fear of Philip of Macedon, and the exertions of Demosthenes brought about an alliance of the two cities, in which Perinthus, the near neighbor of Byzantium, was also joined. Philip, in wrath, proceeded with a fleet and army against both cities, laying siege, first to Perinthus and afterwards to Byzantium, but without success in either case. He was compelled to withdraw, after wasting several months in the fruitless undertaking. It was one of the few failures of the able Macedonian.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 90 (*v.* 11).

B. C. 336-335.—Northern campaign of Alexander of Macedonia.—Revolt at Thebes.—Destruction of the city.—"Alexander . . . took up and continued the political and military schemes which his father had begun. We first make acquaintance with him and his army during his campaign against the tribes on the northern frontier of Makedonia. This campaign he carried out with energy equal to that of Philip, and with more success (spring of 335 B. C.). The distinctive feature of the war was that the Makedonian phalanx, the organization and equipment of which were adapted from Grecian models, everywhere won and maintained the upper hand. . . . Even at this epoch Byzantium was rising into importance. That city had, owing to its hostility with Persia, deserted the side of the Greeks for that of the Makedonians. It was from Byzantium that Alexander summoned triremes to help him against the island in the Danube on which the king of the Triballi had taken refuge. . . . The great successes of Alexander induced all the neighboring nationalities to accept the proposals of friendship which he made to them. . . . In Greece false reports concerning the progress of events in the north had raised to

fever heat the general ferment which naturally existed. Alexander relied upon the resolutions of the League of the Public Peace [formed by the Congress at Corinth], which had recognized his father and afterwards himself as its head But he was now opposed by all those who were unable to forget their former condition, and who preferred the alliance with Persia which had left them independent, to the league with Makedonia which robbed them of their autonomy. . . . Thebes took the lead of the malcontents, and set about ridding herself of the garrison which Philip had placed in the Cadmeia. She thus became the centre of the whole Hellenic opposition. The enemies of Makedon, who had been exiled from every city, assembled in Thebes. . . . The same party was stirring in Lakedæmon, in Arcadia, in Ætolia, and, above all, at Athens. From Athens the Thebans were supplied, through the mediation of Demosthenes, and doubtless by means of Persian gold, with arms, of which they were likely to stand in need. . . . Alexander had no sooner settled with his enemies in the north than he turned to Hellas. So rapid was his movement that he found the pass of Thermopylæ still open, and, long before he was expected, appeared before the walls of Thebes." The fate of the city was decided by a battle in which the Makedonians were overwhelmingly victorious. "In the market-place, in the streets, in the very houses, there ensued a hideous massacre . . The victors were, however, not satisfied with the slaughter. Alexander summoned a meeting of his League, by which the complete destruction of Thebes was decreed, and this destruction was actually carried out (October, 335 B. C.). [At the same time Platæa, which Thebes had destroyed, was ordered to be rebuilt.] In Grecian history it was no unheard-of event that the members of the defeated nation should be sold into slavery, and so it happened on this occasion. The sale of the slaves supplied Alexander with a sum of money which was no inconsiderable addition to his military chest. But his main object was to strike terror, and this was spread through Greece by the ruthless destruction of the city of Œdipus, of Pindar, and of Epameinondas. . . . Deep and universal horror fell upon the Greeks. . . . The close connection that existed at this moment between Grecian and Persian affairs forbade him to lose a moment in turning his arms towards Asia. . . . A war between Alexander and Persia was inevitable, not only on account of the relation of the Greeks to Makedon, whose yoke they were very loth to bear, but on account of their relation to Persia, on whose support they leaned. . . . The career which Philip had begun, and in which Alexander was now proceeding, led of necessity to a struggle with the power that held sway in Asia Minor. Until that power were defeated, the Makedonian kingdom could not be regarded as firmly established."—L. von Ranke, *Universal History: The Oldest Hist. Group of Nations and the Greeks, ch.* 10, *pt.* 2.

ALSO IN: Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander, bk.* 1, *ch.* 1–10.—T. A. Dodge, *Alexander, ch.* 14–17.

B. C. 334-323.—Asiatic conquests of Alexander the Great. See MACEDONIA: B. C. 334–330; and 330–323.

B. C. 323-322.—Attempt to break the Macedonian yoke.—The Lamian War.—Subjugation of Athens.—Suppression of democracy.—Expulsion of poor citizens.—Death of Demosthenes.—On the death of Alexander the Great, B. C. 323, a party at Athens which still hoped for freedom in Greece set on foot a vigorous movement designed to break the Macedonian yoke. A league was formed in which many cities joined—a larger assemblage of Hellenic states, says Mr. Grote, than that which resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. A powerful army of Greek citizens and mercenaries was formed and placed under the command of a capable Athenian, Leosthenes, who led it into Thessaly, to meet the Macedonian general Antipater, who now ruled Greece (see MACEDONIA: B. C. 323–316). The latter was defeated in a battle which ensued, and was driven into the fortified Thessalian town of Lamia, where he was besieged Unfortunately, Leosthenes was killed during the progress of the siege, and a long interval occurred before a new commander could be agreed on. This gave Antipater time to obtain succor from Asia. A Macedonian army, under Leonnatus, crossed the Hellespont, and the besiegers of Lamia were forced to break up their camp in order to meet it. They did so with success; Leonnatus was slain and his army driven back. But meantime Antipater escaped from Lamia, joined the defeated troops and retreated into Macedonia. The war thus begun, and which took the name of the Lamian War, was continued, not unfavorably to the confederates, on the whole, until the following summer—August, 322 B. C.—when it was ended by a battle fought on the plain of Krannon, in Thessaly. Antipater, who had been joined by Kraterus, from Asia, was the victor, and Athens with all her allies submitted to the terms which he dictated. He established a Macedonian garrison in Munychia, and not only suppressed the democratic constitution of Athens, but ordered all the poorer citizens—all who possessed less than 2,000 drachmæ's worth of property, being 12,000 out of the 21,000 who then possessed the Athenian franchise—to be driven from the city; thus leaving a selected citizenship of 9,000 of the richer and more manageable men. The banished or deported 12,000 were scattered in Thrace, Illyria, Italy and even in northern Africa. The leaders of the anti-Macedonian rising were pursued with unrelenting animosity. Demosthenes, the great orator, who had been conspicuous among them, was dragged from a temple at Kalauria, to which he had fled, and took poison to escape the worse death which probably awaited him.—G. Grote *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 95 (*v.* 12).

B. C. 323-301.—Wars of the Diadochi or Successors of Alexander. See MACEDONIA: B. C. 323–316; 315–310; and 310–301.

B. C. 321-312.—The contest for Athens and Peloponnesus, between Cassander and Polysperchon.—Execution of Phocion.—Restoration of Thebes.—"Antipater, after the termination of the Lamian war, passed over to Asia and took part in the affairs there [see MACEDONIA: A. D. 323–316]. Being appointed guardian to the Kings, as the children and relatives of Alexander were called, he returned to Macedonia, leading them with him. . . . Antipater died (Ol. 115, 3) shortly after his return to Macedonia. He directed that Polysperchon, his ancient mate in arms, should succeed him in his office, while to his son Cassander he left only the second place. But Cassander, an ambitious youth, looked upon his father's authority as his inheritance; and

relying on the aid of the aristocratic party in the Grecian states, of Ptolemæus, who ruled in Egypt, and of Antigonus, the most powerful general in Asia, he resolved to dispute it with Polysperchon. Under pretext of going a-hunting, he escaped out of Macedonia, and passed over to Asia to concert matters with Antigonus. Polysperchon, seeing war inevitable, resolved to detach Greece, if possible, from Cassander. Knowing that the oligarchies established in the different states by Antipater would be likely to espouse the cause of his son, he issued a pompous edict, in the name of the Kings, restoring the democracies. . . . At Athens (Ol. 115, 4) [B. C. 317], Nicanor, who commanded in the Munychia, finding that the people were inclined toward Polysperchon, secretly collected troops, and seized the Piræeus. The people sent to him Phocion, Conon the son of Timotheüs, and Clearchus, men of distinction, and his friends; but to no purpose. A letter also came to him from Olympias, Alexander's mother, whom Polysperchon had recalled from Epeirus, and given the charge of her infant grandson, ordering him to surrender both the Munychia and the Piræeus; but to as little effect. Finally, Polysperchon's son Alexander entered Attica with an army, and encamped before the Piræeus. Phocion and other chiefs of the aristocracy went to Alexander, and advised him not to give these places up to the people, but to hold them himself till the contest with Cassander should be terminated. They feared, it is evident, for their own safety, and not without reason; for the people, ferocious with the recovery of power, soon after held an assembly, in which they deposed all the former magistrates, appointed the most furious democrats in their room, and passed sentences of death, banishment, and confiscation of goods on those who had governed under the oligarchy. Phocion and his friends fled to Alexander, who received them kindly, and sent them with letters in their favor to his father, who was now in Phocis. The Athenians also despatched an embassy, and, yielding to motives of interest, Polysperchon sent his suppliants prisoners to Athens, to stand a trial for their lives before the tribunal of an anarchic mob . . . The prisoners were condemned and led off to prison, followed by the tears of their friends and the triumphant execrations of their mean-spirited enemies. They drank the fatal hemlock-juice, and their bodies were cast unburied beyond the confines of Attica. Four days after the death of Phocion, Cassander arrived at the Piræeus with 35 ships, carrying 4,000 men, given him by Antigonus. Polysperchon immediately entered Attica with 20,000 Macedonian foot and 4,000 of those of the allies, 1,000 horse, and 65 elephants, which he had brought from Asia, and encamped near the Piræeus. But as the siege was likely to be tedious, and sufficient provisions for so large an army could not be had, he left a force such as the country could support with his son Alexander, and passed with the remainder into Peloponnesus, to force the Megalopolitans to submit to the Kings; for they alone sided with Cassander, all the rest having obeyed the directions to put to death or banish his adherents. The whole serviceable population of Megalopolis, slaves included, amounted to 15,000 men; and under the directions of one Damis, who had served in Asia under Alexander, they prepared for a vigorous defence. Polysperchon sat down before the town, and his miners in a short time succeeded in throwing down three towers and a part of the wall. He attempted a storm, but was obliged to draw off his men, after an obstinate conflict. . . . The Athenians meantime saw themselves excluded from the sea, and from all their sources of profit and enjoyment, while little aid was to be expected from Polysperchon, who had been forced to raise the siege of Megalopolis, and whose fleet had just now been destroyed by Antigonus in the Hellespont. A citizen of some consideration ventured at length to propose in the assembly an arrangement with Cassander. The ordinary tumult at first was raised, but the sense of interest finally prevailed. Peace was procured, on the conditions of the Munychia remaining in Cassander's hands till the end of the present contest; political privileges being restricted to those possessed of ten minas and upwards of property, and a person appointed by Cassander being at the head of the government. The person selected for this office was Demetrius of Phaleron, a distinguished Athenian citizen; and under his mild and equitable rule the people were far happier than they could have been under a democracy, for which they had proved themselves no longer fit. Cassander then passed over into Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Tegea. While here, he heard that Olympias had put to death several of his friends in Macedonia; among the rest, Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydice, members of the royal family. He at once (Ol. 116, 1) [B. C. 316] set out for Macedonia; and, as the pass of Pylæ was occupied by the Ætolians, he embarked his troops in Locris, and landed them in Thessaly. He besieged Olympias in Pydna, forced her to surrender, and put her to death. Macedonia submitted to him, and he then set forth for Peloponnesus, where Polysperchon's son Alexander was at the head of an army. He forced a passage through Pylæ, and coming into Bœotia, announced his intention of restoring Thebes, which had now lain desolate for twenty years. The scattered Thebans were collected; the towns of Bœotia and other parts of Greece (Athens in particular), and even of Italy and Sicily, aided to raise the walls and to supply the wants of the returning exiles, and Thebes was once more numbered among the cities of Greece. As Alexander guarded the Isthmus, Cassander passed to Megara, where he embarked his troops and elephants, and crossed over to Epidaurus. He made Argos and Messene come over to his side, and then returned to Macedonia. In the conflict of interests which prevailed in this anarchic period, Antigonus was ere long among the enemies of Cassander. He sent one of his generals to Laconia, who, having obtained permission from the Spartans to recruit in Peloponnesus, raised 8,000 men. The command in Peloponnesus was given to Polysperchon, whose son Alexander was summoned over to Asia to accuse Cassander of treason before the assembly of the Macedonian soldiers. Cassander was proclaimed a public enemy unless he submitted to Antigonus; at the same time the Greeks were declared independent, Antigonus hoping thus to gain them over to his side. He then sent Alexander back with 500 talents; and when Ptolemæus of Egypt heard what Antigonus had done, he also hastened to declare the independence of the Greeks; for all the contending generals were anxious to stand well with the people of Greece, from which country, exclusive

of other advantages, they drew their best soldiers. . . . Antigonus, to show the Greeks that he was in earnest in his promise to restore them to independence, sent one of his generals, named Telesphorus, with a fleet and army to Peloponnesus, who expelled Cassander's garrisons from most of the towns. The following year (Ol. 117, 1) [B. C 312] he sent an officer, named Ptolemæus, with another fleet and army to Greece. Ptolemæus landed in Bœotia, and being joined by 2,200 foot, and 1,300 horse of the Bœotians, he passed over to Eubœa; where having expelled the Macedonian garrison from Chalcis (the only town there which Cassander held), he left it without any foreign garrison, as a proof that Antigonus meant fairly. He then took Orôpus, and gave it to the Bœotians; he entered Attica, and the people forced Demetrius Phalereus to make a truce with him, and to send to Antigonus to treat of an alliance. Ptolemæus returned to Bœotia, expelled the garrison from the Cadmeia, and liberated Thebes."—T. Keightley, *Hist. of Greece, pt.* 3, *ch.* 5.

ALSO IN: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 58 (*v.* 7).

B. C. 307-197.—Demetrius and the Antigonids.—In the spring of the year 307 B. C. Athens was surprised by an expedition sent from Ephesus by Antigonus, under his adventurous son Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes (see MACEDONIA: B. C. 310–301). The city had then been for ten years subject to Cassander, the ruling chief in Macedonia for the time, and appears to have been mildly governed by Cassander's lieutenant, Demetrius the Phalerian. The coming of the other Demetrius offered nothing to the Athenians but a change of masters, but they welcomed him with extravagant demonstrations. Their degeneracy was shown in proceedings of Asiatic servility. They deified Demetrius and his father Antigonus, erected altars to them and appointed ministering priests. After some months spent at Athens in the enjoyment of these adulations, Demetrius returned to Asia, to take part in the war which Antigonus was waging with Ptolemy of Egypt and Lysimachus of Thrace, two of his former partners in the partition of the empire of Alexander. He was absent three years, and then returned, at the call of the Athenians, to save them from falling again into the hands of Cassander. He now made Athens his capital, as it were, for something more than a year, while he acquired control of Corinth, Argos, Sicyon, Chalcis in Eubœa and other important places, greatly reducing the dominion of the Macedonian, Cassander. His treatment at Athens, during this period, was marked by the same impious and disgraceful servility as before. He was called the guest of the goddess Athene and lodged in the Parthenon, which he polluted with intolerable debaucheries. But in the summer of 301 B. C. this clever adventurer was summoned again to Asia to aid his father in the last great struggle, which decided the partition of the empire of Alexander between his self-constituted heirs. At the battle of Ipsus (see MACEDONIA: B. C. 310–301), Antigonus perished and Demetrius was stripped of the kingdom he expected to inherit. He turned to Athens for consolation, and the fickle city refused to admit him within her walls. But after some period of wanderings and adventures the unconquerable prince got together a force with which he compelled the Athenians to receive him, on more definite terms of submission on their part and of mastery on his. Moreover, he established his rule in the greater part of Peloponnesus, and finally, on the death of Cassander (B. C. 297), he acquired the crown of Macedonia Not satisfied with what fortune had thus given him, he attempted to recover the Asiatic kingdom of his father, and died, B. C. 283, a captive in the hands of the Syrian monarch, Seleucus His Macedonian kingdom had meantime been seized by Pyrrhus of Epirus; but it was ultimately recovered by the eldest legitimate son of Demetrius, called Antigonus Gonatus From that time, for a century, until the Romans came, not only Macedonia, but Greece at large, Athens included, was ruled or dominated by this king and his descendants, known as the Antigonid kings.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist of Greece, ch.* 59–60 (*v.* 7–8).

B. C. 297-280.—Death of Cassander.—Intrigues and murders of Ptolemy Keraunos and his strange acquisition of the Macedonian throne. See MACEDONIA: B. C. 297–280.

B. C. 280-279.—Invasion by the Gauls. See GAULS: B. C. 280–279.

B. C. 280-275.—Campaigns of Pyrrhus in Italy and Sicily. See ROME: B. C. 282–275

B. C. 3d Century.—The Hellenistic world.—As the result of the conquests of Alexander and the wars of his successors, there were, in the third century before Christ, three great Hellenistic kingdoms, "Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, which lasted, each under its own dynasty, till Rome swallowed them up. The first of these, which was the poorest, and the smallest, but historically the most important, included the ancestral possessions of Philip and Alexander—Macedonia, most of Thrace, Thessaly, the mountainous centre of the peninsula, as well as a protectorate more or less definite and absolute over Greece proper, the Cyclades, and certain tracts of Caria. . . . Next came Egypt, including Cyrene and Cyprus, and a general protectorate over the sea-coast cities of Asia Minor up to the Black Sea, together with claims often asserted with success on Syria, and on the coast lands of Southern Asia Minor. . . . Thirdly came what was now called Syria, on account of the policy of the house of Seleucus, who built there its capital, and determined to make the Greek or Hellenistic end of its vast dominions its political centre of gravity. The Kingdom of Syria owned the south and south-east of Asia Minor, Syria, and generally Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the mountain provinces adjoining it on the East, with vague claims further east when there was no king like Sandracottus to hold India and the Punjaub with a strong hand. There was still a large element of Hellenism in these remote parts. The kingdom of Bactria was ruled by a dynasty of kings with Greek names—Euthydemus is the chief—who coined in Greek style, and must therefore have regarded themselves as successors to Alexander. There are many exceptions and limitations to this general description, and many secondary and semi-independent kingdoms, which make the picture of Hellenism infinitely various and complicated. There was, in fact, a chain of independent kingdoms reaching from Media to Sparta, all of which asserted their complete freedom, and generally attained it by balancing the great powers one against the other. Here they are in their order. Atropatene was the kingdom in the northern and western parts

of the province of Media, by Atropates, the satrap of Alexander, who claimed descent from the seven Persian chiefs who put Darius I. on the throne. Next came Armenia, hardly conquered by Alexander, and now established under a dynasty of its own. Then Cappadocia, the land in the heart of Asia Minor, where it narrows between Cilicia and Pontus, ruled by sovereigns also claiming royal Persian descent. . . . Fourthly, Pontus, under its equally Persian dynast Mithridates — a kingdom which makes a great figure in Eastern history under the later Roman Republic. There was moreover a dynast of Bithynia, set up and supported by the robber state of the Celtic Galatians, which had just been founded, and was a source of strength and of danger to all its neighbours. Then Pergamum, just being founded and strengthened by the first Attalid, Philetærus, an officer of Lysimachus, and presently to become one of the leading exponents of Hellenism. . . . Almost all these second-rate states (and with them the free Greek cities of Heracleia, Cyzicus, Byzantium, &c.) were fragments of the shattered kingdom of Lysimachus. . . . We have taken no account of a very peculiar feature extending all through even the Greek kingdoms, especially that of the Seleucids — the number of large Hellenistic cities founded as special centres of culture, or points of defence, and organized as such with a certain local independence. These cities, most of which we only know by name, were the real backbone of Hellenism in the world. Alexander had founded seventy of them, all called by his name. Many were upon great trade lines, like the Alexandria which still exists. Many were intended as garrison towns in the centre of remote provinces, like Candahar — a corruption of Iskanderieh, Iskendar being the Oriental form for Alexander. Some were mere outposts, where Macedonian soldiers were forced to settle, and guard the frontiers against the barbarians, like the Alexandria on the Iaxartes. . . . As regards Seleucus . . . we have a remarkable statement from Appian that he founded cities through the length and breadth of his kingdom, viz., sixteen Antiochs called after his father, five Laodiceas after his mother, nine Seleucias after himself, three Apamcias and one Stratoniceia after his wives. . . . All through Syria and Upper Asia there are many towns bearing Greek and Macedonian names — Berea, Edessa, Perinthos, Achæa, Pella, &c. The number of these, which have been enumerated in a special catalogue by Droysen, the learned historian of Hellenism, is enormous, and the first question which arises in our mind is this: where were Greek-speaking people found to fill them? It is indeed true that Greece proper about this time became depopulated, and that it never has recovered from this decay. . . . Yet . . . the whole population of Greece would never have sufficed for one tithe of the cities — the great cities — founded all over Asia by the Diadochi. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that but a small fraction, the soldiers and officials of the new cities, were Greeks — Macedonians, when founded by Alexander himself — generally broken down veterans, mutinous and discontented troops, and camp followers To these were associated people from the surrounding country, it being Alexander's fixed idea to discountenance sporadic country life in villages and encourage town communities. The towns accordingly received considerable privileges. . . . The Greek language and political habits were thus the one bond of union among them, and the extraordinary colonizing genius of the Greek once more proved itself."—J. P. Mahaffy, *The Story of Alexander's Empire, ch.* 10.—See, also, HELLENIC GENIUS AND INFLUENCE.

B. C. 280-146.—The Achaian League.—Its rise and fall. - Destruction of Sparta.— Supremacy of Rome.—The Achaian League, which bore a leading part in the affairs of Greece during the last half of the third and first half of the second century before Christ, was in some sense the revival of a more ancient confederacy among the cities of Achaia in Peloponnesus. The older League, however, was confined to twelve cities of Achaia and had little weight, apparently, in general Hellenic politics. The revived League grew beyond the territorial boundaries which were indicated by its name, and embraced the larger part of Peloponnesus. It began about 280 B. C. by the forming of a union between the two Achaian cities of Patrai and Dyme. One by one their neighbors joined them, until ten cities were confederated and acting as one. "The first years of the growth of the Achaian League are contemporary with the invasion of Macedonia and Greece by the Gauls and with the wars between Pyrrhos and Antigonos Gonatas [see MACEDONIA, &C.: B. C. 277-244]. Pyrrhos, for a moment, expelled Antigonos from the Macedonian throne, which Antigonos recovered while Pyrrhos was warring in Peloponnesos. By the time that Pyrrhos was dead, and Antigonos again firmly fixed in Macedonia, the League had grown up to maturity as far as regarded the cities of the old Achaia. . . . Thus far, then, circumstances had favoured the quiet and peaceful growth of the League." It had had the opportunity to grow firm enough and strong enough, on the small scale, to offer some lessons to its disunited and tyrannized neighbors and to exercise an attractive influence upon them. One of the nearest of these neighbors was Sikyon, which groaned under a tyranny that had been fastened upon it by Macedonian influence. Among the exiles from Sikyon was a remarkable young man named Aratos, or Aratus, to whom the successful working of the small Achaian League suggested some broader extension of the same political organism. In B. C. 251, Aratos succeeded in delivering his native city from its tyrant and in bringing about the annexation of Sikyon to the Achaian League. Eight years later, having meantime been elected to the chief office of the League, Aratos accomplished the expulsion of the Macedonians and their agents from Corinth, Megara, Troizen and Epidauros, and persuaded those four cities to unite themselves with the Achaians. During the next ten years he made similar progress in Arkadia, winning town after town to the federation, until the Arkadian federal capital, Megalopolis, was enrolled in the list of members, and gave to the League its greatest acquisition of energy and brain. In 229 B. C. the skill of Aratos and the prestige of the League, taking advantage of disturbances in Macedonia, effected the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons from Athens and the liberation of that city, which did not become confederated with its liberators, but entered into alliance with them. Argos was emancipated and annexed, B. C. 228, and "the League was

now the greatest power of Greece. A Federation of equal cities, democratically governed, embraced the whole of old Achaia, the whole of the Argolic peninsula, the greater part of Arkadia, together with Phlious, Sikyon, Corinth, Megara, and the island of Aigina." The one rival of the Achaian League in Peloponnesus was Sparta, which looked with jealousy upon its growing power, and would not be confederated with it. The consequences of that jealous rivalry were fatal to the hopes for Greece which the Achaian union had seemed to revive. Unfortunately, rather than otherwise, the Lacedæmonian throne came to be occupied at this time by the last of the hero-kings of the Herakleid race —Kleomenes. When the inevitable collision of war between Sparta and the League occurred (B. C. 227–221), the personal figure of Kleomenes loomed so large in the conflict that it took the name of the Kleomenic War. Aratos was the worst of generals, Kleomenes one of the greatest, and the Achaians were steadily beaten in the field. Driven to sore straits at last, they abandoned the whole original purpose of their federation, by inviting the king of Macedonia to help them crush the independence of Sparta. To win his aid they gave up Corinth to him, and under his leadership they achieved the shameful victory of Sellasia (B. C. 221), where all that is worthy in Lacedæmonian history came to an end. The League was now scarcely more than a dependency of the Macedonian kingdom, and figured as such in the so-called Social War with the Ætolian League, B. C. 219–217. The wars of Rome with Macedonia which followed renewed its political importance considerably for a time. Becoming the ally of Rome, it was able to maintain a certain dignity and influence until the supremacy of the Roman arms had been securely proved, and then it sank to the helpless insignificance which all Roman alliances led to in the end. It was in that state when, on some complaint from Rome (B. C. 167), a thousand of the chief citizens of Achaia were sent as prisoners to Italy and detained there until less than 300 survived to return to their homes. Among them was the historian Polybios. A little later (B. C. 146) there was a wild revolt from the Roman yoke, in which Corinth took the lead. A few months of war ensued, ending in a decisive battle at Leukopetra. Then Corinth was sacked and destroyed by the Roman army and the Achaian League disappeared from history.—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. of Federal Govt., ch.* 5–9.

Also in: C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 61–66 (v. 8).—Polybius, *History.*

B. C. 214-146.—The Roman conquest.—The series of wars in which the Romans made themselves masters of Greece were known in their annals as the Macedonian Wars. At the beginning, they were innocent of aggression. A young and ambitious but unprincipled king of Macedonia—Philip, who succeeded the able Antigonos Doson—had put himself in alliance with the Carthaginians and assailed the Romans in the midst of their desperate conflict with Hannibal. For the time they were unable to do more than trouble Philip so far as to prevent his bringing effective reinforcements to the enemy at their doors, and this they accomplished in part by a treaty with the Ætolians, which enlisted that unscrupulous league upon their side. The first Macedonian war, which began B. C. 214, was terminated by the Peace of Dyrrachium, B. C. 205. The Peace was of five years duration, and Philip employed it in reckless undertakings against Pergamus, against Rhodes, against Athens, every one of which carried complaints to Rome, the rising arbiter of the Mediterranean world, whose hostility Philip lost no opportunity to provoke. On the Ides of March, B. C. 200, the Roman senate declared war. In the spring of B. C. 197 this second Macedonian War was ended at the battle of Cynoscephalæ—so called from the name of a range of hills known as the Dog-heads—where the Macedonian army was annihilated by the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus. At the next assembly of the Greeks for the Isthmian Games, a crier made proclamation in the arena that the Roman Senate and T. Quinctius the General, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians, declared all the Greeks who had been subject to the king free and independent. Henceforth, whatever freedom and independence the states of Greece enjoyed were according to the will of Rome. An interval of twenty-five years, broken by the invasion of Antiochus and his defeat by the Romans at Thermopylæ (see Seleucidæ: B. C. 224–187), was followed by a third Macedonian War. Philip was now dead and succeeded by his son Perseus, known to be hostile to Rome and accused of intrigues with her enemies. The Roman Senate forestalled his intentions by declaring war. The war which opened B. C. 171 was closed by the battle of Pydna, fought June 22, B. C. 168, where 20,000 Macedonians were slain and 11,000 taken prisoners, while the Romans lost scarcely 100 men. Perseus attempted flight, but was soon driven to give himself up and was sent to Rome. The Macedonian kingdom was then extinguished and its territory divided between four nominal republics, tributary to Rome. Twenty years after, there was an attempt made by a pretender to re-establish the Macedonian throne, and a fourth Macedonian War occurred; but it was soon finished (B. C. 146—see above, B. C. 280–146). The four republics then gave way, to form a Roman province of Macedonia and Epirus, while the remainder of Greece, in turn, became the Roman province of Achaia.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece, ch.* 64–66 (*v.* 8).

Also in: H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome, ch.* 39, 43 *and* 45.—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. of Federal Govt., ch.* 8–9.—Polybius, *General History.*

B. C. 191.—War of Antiochus of Syria and the Romans. See Seleucidæ: B. C. 224–187.

B. C. 146—A. D. 180.—Under the Romans, to the reign of Marcus Aurelius.—Sufferings in the Mithridatic war and revolt, and in the Roman civil wars.—Treatment by the emperors.—Munificence of Herodes Atticus.—"It was some time [after the Roman conquest] before the Greeks had great reason to regret their fortune. A combination of causes, which could hardly have entered into the calculations of any politician, enabled them to preserve their national institutions, and to exercise all their former social influence, even after the annihilation of their political existence. Their vanity was flattered by their admitted superiority in arts and literature, and by the respect paid to their usages and prejudices by the Romans. Their political subjection was at first not very burdensome; and a considerable portion of the nation was allowed to retain the appearance of independence. Athens

and Sparta were honoured with the title of allies of Rome. [Athens retained this independent existence, partaking something of the position of Hamburg in the Germanic body, until the time of Caracalla, when its citizens were absorbed into the Roman empire.—Footnote.] The nationality of the Greeks was so interwoven with their municipal institutions, that the Romans found it impossible to abolish the local administration; and an imperfect attempt made at the time of the conquest of Achaia was soon abandoned. . . . The Roman senate was evidently not without great jealousy and some fear of the Greeks; and great prudence was displayed in adopting a number of measures by which they were gradually weakened, and cautiously broken to the yoke of their conquerors. . . . It was not until after the time of Augustus, when the conquest of every portion of the Greek nation had been completed, that the Romans began to view the Greeks in the contemptible light in which they are represented by the writers of the capital. Crete was not reduced into the form of a province until about eight years after the subjection of Achaia, and its conquest was not effected without difficulty, after a war of three years, by the presence of a consular army. The resistance it offered was so obstinate that it was almost depopulated ere the Romans could complete its conquest. . . . The Roman government . . . soon adopted measures tending to diminish the resources of the Greek states when received as allies of the republic. . . . If we could place implicit faith in the testimony of so firm and partial an adherent of the Romans as Polybius, we must believe that the Roman administration was at first characterised by a love of justice, and that the Roman magistrates were far less venal than the Greeks. . . . Less than a century of irresponsible power effected a wonderful change in the conduct of the Roman magistrates. Cicero declares that the senate made a traffic of justice to the provincials. . . . But as the government of Rome grew more oppressive, and the amount of the taxes levied on the provinces was more severely exacted, the increased power of the republic rendered any rebellion of the Greeks utterly hopeless. . . . For sixty years after the conquest of Achaia, the Greeks remained docile subjects of Rome. . . . The number of Roman usurers increased, and the exactions of Roman publicans in collecting the taxes became more oppressive, so that when the army of Mithridates invaded Greece, B. C. 86, while Rome appeared plunged in anarchy by the civil broils of the partisans of Marius and Sylla, the Greeks in office conceived the vain hope of recovering their independence [see MITHRIDATIC WARS; and ATHENS: B. C. 87–86] . . . Both parties, during the Mithridatic war, inflicted severe injuries on Greece. . . . Many of the losses were never repaired. The foundations of national prosperity were undermined, and it henceforward became impossible to save from the annual consumption of the inhabitants the sums necessary to replace the accumulated capital of ages, which this short war had annihilated." —G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans, ch.* 1.— "Scarcely had the storm of Roman war passed by, when the Cilician pirates, finding the coasts of Greece peculiarly favorable for their marauding incursions, and tempted by the wealth accumulated in the cities and temples, commenced their depredations on so gigantic a scale that Rome felt obliged to put forth all her military forces for their suppression. The exploits of Pompey the Great, who was clothed with autocratic power to destroy this gigantic evil, fill the brightest chapter in the history of that celebrated but too unfortunate commander [see CILICIA, PIRATES OF]. . . . The civil wars in which the great Republic expired had the fields of Greece for their theatre. Under the tramp of contending armies, her fertile plains were desolated, and Roman blood, in a cause not her own, again and again moistened her soil [see ROME: B. C. 48, 44–42, and 31]. But at length the civil wars have come to an end, and the Empire introduces, for the first time in the melancholy history of man, a state of universal peace. Greece still maintains her pre-eminence in literature and art, and her schools are frequented by the sons of the Roman aristocracy. Her elder poets serve as models to the literary genius of the Augustan age. . . . The historians form themselves on Attic prototypes, and the philosophers of Rome divide themselves among the Grecian sects, while in Athens the Platonists, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and the Epicureans still haunt the scenes with which the names of their masters were inseparably associated. . . . The establishment of the Empire made but little change in the administration of Greece. Augustus, indeed, showed no great solicitude, except to maintain the country in subjection by his military colonies,—especially those of Patræ and Nicopolis. He even deprived Athens of the privileges she had enjoyed under the Republic, and broke down the remaining power of Sparta, by declaring the independence of her subject towns. Some of his successors treated the country with favor, and endeavored, by a clement use of authority, to mitigate the sufferings of its decline. Even Nero, the amiable fiddler of Rome, was proud to display the extent of his musical abilities in their theatres. . . . The noble Trajan allowed the Greeks to retain their former local privileges, and did much to improve their condition by his wise and just administration. Hadrian was a passionate lover of Greek art and literature. Athens especially received the amplest benefits from his taste and wealth. He finished the temple of Olympian Zeus; established a public library; built a pantheon and a gymnasium; rebuilt the temple of Apollo at Megara; improved the old roads of Greece and made new ones. . . . Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius showed good will to Greece. The latter rebuilt the temple at Eleusis, and improved the Athenian schools, raising the salaries of the teachers, and in various ways contributing to make Athens, as it had been before, the most illustrious seat of learning in the world. It was in the reign of this Emperor, in the second century of our era, that one of the greatest benefactors of Athens and all Greece lived,—Herodes Atticus, distinguished alike for wealth, learning, and eloquence. Born at Marathon, . . . educated at Athens by the best teachers his father's wealth could procure, he became on going to Rome, in early life, the rhetorical teacher of Marcus Aurelius himself. Antoninus Pius bestowed on him the honor of the consulship; but he preferred the career of a teacher at Athens to the highest political dignities . . . , and he was followed thither by young men of the most eminent Roman families, from the Emperor's down. . . . At Athens, south of

the Ilissus, he built the stadium . . . and the theatre of Regilla. . . . At Corinth he built a theatre; at Olympia, an aqueduct; at Delphi, a race-course; and at Thermopylæ, a hospital. Peloponnesus, Eubœa, Bœotia, and Epeirus experienced his bounty, and even Italy was not forgotten in the lavish distribution of his wealth. He died in A. D. 180."—C. C. Felton, *Greece, Ancient and Modern, 4th course, lect.* 3 (*v.* 2) — On the influence which Greek genius and culture exercised upon the Romans, see HELLENIC GENIUS AND INFLUENCE.

ALSO IN: T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome: The Provinces, ch.* 7 (*v.* 1).—J. P. Mahaffy, *The Greek World under Roman Sway.*—See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 197–A. D. 138.

B. C. 48.—Cæsar's campaign against Pompeius.—Pharsalia. See ROME: B. C. 48.

A. D. 258-395.—Gothic invasions. See GOTHS.

A. D. 330.—Transference of the capital of the Roman Empire to Byzantium (Constantinople). See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 330.

A. D. 394-395.—Final division of the Roman Empire between the sons of Theodosius.—Definite organization of the Eastern Empire under Arcadius. See ROME: A. D. 394–395.

A. D. 425.—Legal separation of the Eastern and Western Empires. See Rome: A. D. 423–450.

A. D. 446.—Devastating invasion of the Huns. See HUNS: A. D. 441–446.

A. D. 527-567.—The reign of Justinian at Constantinople.—His recovery of Italy and Africa. See ROME: A. D. 527–567, and 535–553.

7th Century.—Slavonic occupation of the Peninsula. See SLAVONIC PEOPLES: 6TH AND 7TH CENTURIES.

A. D. 717-1205.—The Byzantine Empire to its fall. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 717, to 1204–1205; and TRADE, MEDIÆVAL.

A. D. 1205-1261.—Overthrow of the Byzantine Empire by the Crusaders.—The Latin Empire of Romania; the Greek Empire of Nicæa; the dukedoms of Athens and Naxos; the principality of Achaia. See ROMANIA; GREEK EMPIRE OF NICÆA; ATHENS: A. D. 1205; ACHAIA: A. D. 1205–1387; and NAXOS.

A. D. 1261-1453.—The restored Byzantine or Greek Empire. See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1261–1453; and BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 1261–1453.

A. D. 1453-1479. The Turkish Conquest. See TURKS: A. D. 1451–1481; CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1453, and 1453–1481; and ATHENS: A. D. 1456.

A. D. 1454-1479.—War of Turks and Venetians in the Peninsula.—Siege of Corinth.—Sack of Athens.—Massacres at Negropont and Croia.—"The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, and the captivity of the Venetians settled in Pera, threatened [the power of Venice] . . . in the East; and she felt no repugnance to enter into a treaty with the enemies of her religion. After a year's negotiation, terms were concluded [1454] between the Sultan and Venice; by which her possessions were secured to her, and her trade guaranteed throughout the empire. In virtue of this treaty she continued to occupy Modon, Coron, Napoli di Romania, Argos, and other cities on the borders of the Peninsula, together with Eubœa (Negropont) and some of the smaller islands. But this good understanding was interrupted in 1463, when the Turks contrived an excuse for attacking the Venetian territory. Under pretence of resenting the asylum afforded to a Turkish refugee, the Pasha of the Morea besieged and captured Argos; and the Republic felt itself compelled immediately to resent the aggression. A re-inforcement was sent from Venice to Napoli, and Argos was quickly recaptured. Corinth was next besieged, and the project of fortifying the isthmus was once more renewed. . . . The labour of 30,000 workmen accomplished the work in 15 days: a stone wall of more than 12 feet high, defended by a ditch and flanked by 136 towers, was drawn across the isthmus. . . But the approach of the Turks, whose numbers were probably exaggerated by report, threw the Venetians into distrust and consternation; and, unwilling to confide in the strength of their rampart, they abandoned the siege of Corinth, and retreated to Napoli, from which the infidels were repulsed with the loss of 5,000 men. The Peloponnesus was now exposed to the predatory retaliations of the Turks and Venetians; and the Christians appeared anxious to rival or surpass the Mahomedans in the refinement of their barbarous inflictions. . . . In the year 1465, Sigismondo Malatesta landed in the Morea with a re-inforcement of 1,000 men; and, without effecting the reduction of the citadel, captured and burned Misitra [near the ruins of ancient Sparta]. In the following year, Vittore Cappello, with the Venetian fleet, arrived in the straits of Euripus; and landing at Aulis marched into Attica. After making himself master of the Piræus, he laid siege to Athens; her walls were overthrown; her inhabitants plundered; and the Venetians retreated with the spoil to the opposite shores of Eubœa. The victorious career of Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary, for a time diverted the Sultan from the war in the Morea; but . . . in the beginning of the year 1470 a fleet of 108 gallies, besides a number of smaller vessels, manned by a force 70,000 strong, issued from the harbour of Constantinople, and sailed for the straits of Euripus. . . . The army landed without molestation on the island, which they united to the mainland by a bridge of boats, and immediately proceeded to lay siege to the city of Negropont. . . The hopes of the besieged were now centred in the Venetian fleet, which, under the command of Nicolo Canale, lay at anchor in the Saronic Gulf. But that admiral, whilst he awaited a re-inforcement, let slip the favourable opportunity of preventing the debarcation of the enemy, or of shutting up the Turks in the island by the destruction of their half-deserted fleet and bridge of boats. By an unaccountable inactivity, he suffered the city to be attacked, which, after a vigorous resistance of nearly a month, was carried by assault [July 12, 1470]; and all the inhabitants, who did not escape into the citadel, were put to the sword. At length that fortress was also taken; and the barbarous conqueror, who had promised to respect the head of the intrepid governor, deemed it no violation of his word to saw his victim in halves. After this decisive blow, which reduced the whole island, Mahomed led back his conquering army to Constantinople. . . . This success encouraged the Turks to attack the Venetians in their Italian territory; and the Pasha of Bosnia invaded Istria and Friuli, and carried fire and sword almost to the gates of Udine. In the following year [1474], however, the Turks were baffled in their attempt to reduce Scutari in

Albania, which had been delivered by the gallant Scanderbeg to the guardian care of Venice. Some abortive negotiations for peace suspended hostilities until 1477, when the troops of Mahomed laid siege to Croia in Albania, which they reduced to the severest distress. But a new incursion into Friuli struck a panic into the inhabitants of Venice, who beheld, from the tops of their churches and towers, the raging flames which devoured the neighbouring villages." The Turks, however, withdrew into Albania, where the siege of Croia was terminated by its surrender and the massacre of its inhabitants, and the Sultan, in person, renewed the attack on Scutari. The stubborn garrison of that stronghold, however, resisted, with fearful slaughter, a continuous assault made upon their walls during two days and a night. Mahomed was forced to convert the siege into a blockade, and his troops reappeared in Friuli. "These repeated aggressions on her territories made Venice every day more anxious to conclude a peace with the Sultan," and a treaty was signed in April, 1479. "It was agreed that the islands of Negropont and Mitylene, with the cities of Croia and Scutari in Albania, and of Tenaro in the Morea, should be consigned to the Turk; whilst other conquests were to be reciprocally restored to their former owners. A tribute of 10,000 ducats was imposed upon Venice, and the inhabitants of Scutari [now reduced to 500 men and 150 women] were to be permitted to evacuate the city."—Sir R. Comyn, *Hist. of the Western Empire, ch.* 31 (*v.* 2).

ALSO IN: Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks, ch.* 5.

A. D. 1645-1669.—The war of Candia.—Surrender of Crete to the Turks by the Venetians. See TURKS: A. D. 1645–1669.

A. D. 1684-1696.—Conquests by the Venetians from the Turks. See TURKS: A. D. 1684–1696.

A. D. 1699.—Cession of part of the Morea to Venice by the Turks. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683–1699.

A. D. 1714-1718.—The Venetians expelled again from the Morea by the Turks. — Corfu defended. See TURKS: A. D. 1714–1718.

A. D. 1770-1772.—Revolt against the Turkish rule.—Russian encouragement and desertion. See TURKS: A. D. 1768–1774.

A. D. 1821-1829.—Overthrow of Turkish rule.—Intervention of Russia, England and France.—Battle of Navarino.—Establishment of national independence.—"The Spanish revolution of 1820 [see SPAIN: A. D. 1814–1827], which was speedily followed by the revolutions of Naples, Sicily, and Piedmont, caused a great excitement throughout Europe, and paved the way for the Greek revolution of 1821. Since the beginning of the century the Greeks had been preparing for the struggle; in fact, for more than fifty years there had been a general movement in the direction of independence. . . . There had been many insurrections against the Turkish authority, but they were generally suppressed without difficulty, though with the shedding of much Greek blood. Nearly every village in Greece suffered from pillage by the Turks, and the families were comparatively few that did not mourn a father, son, or brother, killed by the Turks or carried into slavery, or a daughter or sister transported to a Turkish harem. . . . Notwithstanding their subjugation, many of the Greeks were commercially prosperous, and a large part of the traffic of the East was in their hands. They conducted nearly all the coasting trade of the Levant, and a few years before the revolution they had 600 vessels mounting 6,000 guns (for defence against pirates) and manned by 18,000 seamen. . . . In laying their plans for independence the Greeks resorted to the formation of secret societies, and so well was the scheme conducted that everything was ripe for insurrection before the Turkish rulers had any suspicion of the state of affairs. A great association was formed which included Greeks everywhere, not only in Greece and its islands, but in Constantinople, Austria, Germany, England, and other countries, wherever a Greek could be found. Men of other nationalities were occasionally admitted, but only when their loyalty to the Greek cause was beyond question, and their official positions gave them a chance to aid in the work. Several distinguished Russians were members, among them Count Capo D'Istria, a Greek by birth, who held the office of private secretary to the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia. The society was known as the Hetaira, or Hetairist, and consisted of several degrees or grades. The highest contained only sixteen persons, whose names were not all known, and it was impossible for any member of the lower classes to ascertain them. . . . All the Hetairists looked hopefully towards Russia, partly in consequence of their community of religion, and partly because of the fellow-feeling of the two countries in cordially detesting the Turk. . . . The immediate cause of the revolution, or rather the excuse for it, was the death of the Hospodar of Wallachia, January 30, 1821, followed by the appointment of his successor. During the interregnum, which naturally left the government in a weakened condition, the Hetairists determined to strike their blow for liberty. A band of 150 Greeks and Arnauts, under the command of Theodore Vladimiruko, formerly a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian service, marched out of Bucharest and seized the small town of Czernitz, near Trajan's Bridge, on the Danube. There Theodore issued a proclamation, and such was the feeling of discontent among the people, that in a few days he had a force of 12,000 men under his command. Soon afterwards there was an insurrection in Jassy, the capital of Moldavia, headed by Prince Alexander Ipsilanti, an officer in the Russian service. He issued a proclamation in which the aid of Russia was distinctly promised, and as the news of this proclamation was carried to Greece, there was a general movement in favor of insurrection. The Russian minister assured the Porte that his government had nothing to do with the insurrection, and the Patriarch and Synod of Constantinople issued a proclamation emphatically denouncing the movement, but in spite of this assurance and proclamation the insurrection went on. Count Nesselrode declared officially that Ipsilanti's name would be stricken from the Russian army list, and that his act was one for which he alone was responsible. This announcement was the deathblow of the insurrection in Moldavia and Wallachia, as the forces of Theodore and Ipsilanti were suppressed, after some sharp fighting, by the hordes of Moslems that were brought against them. . . . Nearly the whole of Greece was in full insurrection in a few months, and with far better prospects than had the insurrection on the

Danube. Turks and Greeks were embittered against each other; the war-cry of the Turk was, 'Death to the Christian!' while that of the Christian was, 'Death to the Turk!' The example was set by the Turks, and, to the eternal disgrace of the Turkish government, slaughter in cold blood was made official. It was by the order and authority of the Porte that Gregory, Patriarch of Constantinople, a revered prelate, eighty years of age, was seized on Easter Sunday, as he was descending from the altar where he had been celebrating divine service, and hanged at the gate of his archiepiscopal palace, amid the shouts and howls of a Moslem mob. After hanging three hours, the body was cut down and delivered to some Jews, who dragged it about the streets and threw it into the sea, whence it was recovered the same night by some Christian fishermen. Some weeks later it was taken to Odessa and buried with great ceremony. This act of murder was the more atrocious on the part of the Turks, since the Patriarch had denounced the insurrection in a public proclamation, and his life and character were most blameless and exemplary. It is safe to say that this barbarity had more to do with fanning the fires of revolt than any other act of the Turkish government. But it was by no means the only act of the kind of which the Turks were guilty. The Patriarch of Adrianople with eight of his ecclesiastics was beheaded, and so were the dragoman of the Porte and several other eminent residents of Constantinople, descended from Greek settlers of two or three centuries ago. Churches were everywhere broken open and plundered; Greek citizens of the highest rank were murdered, their property stolen, and their wives and daughters sold as slaves; on the 15th of June five archbishops and a great number of laymen were hanged in the streets, and 450 mechanics were sold and transported into slavery; at Salonica the battlements of the town were lined with Christian heads, from which the blood ran down and discolored the water in the ditch. In all the great towns of the empire there were similar atrocities; some were the work of mobs, which the authorities did not seek to restrain, but the greater part of them were ordered by the governors or other officials, and met the approval of the Porte. At Smyrna, the Christian population was massacred by thousands without regard to age or sex, and in the island of Cyprus a body of 10,000 troops sent by the Porte ravaged the island, executed the metropolitan, five bishops, and thirty-six other ecclesiastics, and converted the whole island into a scene of rapine, bloodshed, and robbery. Several thousand Christians were killed before the atrocities ceased, and hundreds of their wives and daughters were carried into Turkish harems. These and similar outrages plainly told the Greeks that no hope remained except in complete independence of the Turks, and from one end of Greece to the other the fires of insurrection were everywhere lighted. The islands, as well as the mainland, were in full revolt, and the fleet of coasting vessels, nearly all of them armed for resisting pirates, gave the Turks a great deal of trouble. . . . On the land, battle followed battle in different parts of the country, and the narration of the events of the insurrection would fill a bulky volume. . . . During the latter part of 1821, the advantages to the Greeks were sufficient to encourage them to proclaim their independence, which was done in January, 1822. In the same month the Turks besieged Corinth, and in the following April they besieged and captured Chios (Scio), ending the capture with the slaughter of 40,000 inhabitants, the most horrible massacre of modern times. In July, the Greeks were victorious at Thermopylæ, in the same month Corinth fell, with great slaughter of the defenders. In April, 1823, the Greeks held a national congress at Argos, the victories of Marco Bozzaris occurred in the following June, and in August he was killed in a night attack upon the Turkish camp, in August, too, Lord Byron landed at Athens to take part in the cause of Greece, which was attracting the attention of the whole civilized world. The first Greek loan was issued in England in February, 1824; Lord Byron died at Missolonghi in the following April; in August the Capitan Pasha was defeated at Samos with heavy loss; in October, the provisional government of Greece was set up; and the fighting became almost continuous in the mountain districts of Greece. In February, 1825, Ibrahim Pasha arrived with a powerful army from Egypt, which captured Navarino in May, and Tripolitza in June of the same year. In July, the provisional government invoked the aid of England; in the following April (1826), Ibrahim Pasha took Missolonghi after a long and heroic defence [for twelve months], and nearly a year later Reschid Pasha captured Athens. Down to the beginning of 1826, the Greeks had felt seriously the deprivation of Russian sympathy and aid for which they had been led to look before the revolution. The death of Alexander I., and the accession of Nicholas in December, 1825, caused a change in the situation. The British government sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg ostensibly to congratulate Nicholas on his elevation to the throne, but really to secure concert of action in regard to Greece. On the 4th of April a protocol was signed by the Duke of Wellington, Prince Lieven, and Count Nesselrode, which may be considered the foundation of Greek independence. Out of this protocol grew the treaty of July 6, 1827, between England, Russia, and France, by which it was stipulated that those nations should mediate between the contending Greeks and Turks. They proposed to the Sultan that he should retain a nominal authority over the Greeks, but receive from them a fixed annual tribute. . . . The Sultan . . . refused to listen to the scheme of mediation, and immediately made preparations for a fresh campaign, and also for the defence of Turkey in case of an attack. Ships and reinforcements were sent from Constantinople, and the Egyptian fleet, consisting of two 84-gun ships, twelve frigates, and forty-one transports, was despatched from Alexandria with 5,000 troops, and reached Navarino towards the end of August, 1827. The allied powers had foreseen the possibility of the Porte's refusal of mediation, and taken measures accordingly, an English fleet under Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, and a French fleet under Admiral De Rigny, were in the Mediterranean, and were shortly afterwards joined by the Russian fleet under Admiral Heiden. . . . The allied admirals held a conference, and decided to notify Ibrahim Pasha that he must stop the barbarities of plundering and burning villages and slaughtering their inhabitants. But Ibrahim would not listen to their remonstrances, and to show his utter disregard for the powers, he commanded

four of his ships to sail to the Gulf of Patras to occupy Missolonghi and relieve some Turkish forts, in effect to clear those waters of every Greek man-of-war which was stationed there. This he did easily, the allied squadrons being temporarily absent. Admiral Codrington pursued him and, without difficulty, drove him back to Navarino. . . . A general muster of all the ships was ordered by Admiral Codrington, Commander-in-Chief of the squadron. . . . The allied fleet mounted 1,324 guns, while the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleet mounted 2,240 guns. To this superiority in the number of guns on board must be added the batteries on shore, which were all in the hands of the Turks. But the Christians had a point in their favor in their superiority in ships of the line, of which they possessed ten, while the Turks had but three. . . . The allied fleet entered the Bay of Navarino about two o'clock on the afternoon of October 20, 1827. . . . In less than four hours from the beginning of the contest the Ottoman fleet had ceased to be. Every armed ship was burnt, sunk, or destroyed; the only remaining vessels belonging to the Turks and Egyptians were twenty-five of the smallest transports, which were spared by order of Admiral Codrington. It was estimated that the loss in men on the Turkish and Egyptian vessels was fully 7,000. On the side of the allies, no vessels were destroyed, but the Asia, Albion, and Genoa of the English fleet were so much injured, that Admiral Codrington sent them to Malta for repairs which would enable them to stand the voyage home to England. Seventy-five men were killed and 197 wounded on the British fleet, and the loss of the French was 43 killed and 117 wounded. The Russian loss was not reported. . . . It was feared that when the news of the event at Navarino reached Constantinople, the lives of all Europeans in that city, including the foreign ambassadors, would be in great danger, but happily there was no violence on the part of the Turks. The ambassadors pressed for an answer to their note of August 16th, and at length the Sultan replied: 'My positive, absolute, definitive, unchangeable, eternal answer is, that the Sublime Porte does not accept any proposition regarding the Greeks, and will persist in its own will regarding them even to the last day of judgment.' The Porte even demanded compensation for the destruction of the fleet, and satisfaction for the insult, and that the allies should abstain from all interference in the affairs of Greece. The reply of the ambassadors was to the effect that the treaty of July obliged them to defend Greece, and that the Turks had no claim whatever for reparation for the affair of Navarino. The ambassadors left Constantinople on the 8th December, and soon afterwards Count Capo D'Istria, who had been elected President of Greece, took his seat, and issued a proclamation, declaring that the Ottoman rule over the country was at an end after three centuries of oppression. Thus was the independence of Greece established. There was little fighting after the events of Navarino, and early in 1828 Admiral Codrington and Ibrahim Pasha held a convention and agreed upon measures for evacuating the land of the Hellenes. During the summer and autumn Patras, Navarino, and Modon were successively surrendered to the French, and the Morea was evacuated by the Turks. Missolonghi was surrendered to Greece early in 1829, and by the Treaty of Adrianople in September of the same year the Porte acknowledged the independence of Greece, which was henceforth to be one in the family of nations."—T. W. Knox, *Decisive Battles since Waterloo, ch.* 8.

ALSO IN: C. A. Fyffe, *Hist. of Modern Europe, v.* 2, *ch.* 4.—S. G. Howe, *Historical Sketch of the Greek Rev.*—T. Gordon, *Hist. of the Greek Rev.*—Lord Byron, *Letters and Journals*, 1823-4 (*v.* 2).—E. J. Trelawny, *Records of Shelley, Byron, etc., ch.* 19-20 (*v.* 2).—S. Walpole, *Hist. of Eng., ch.* 9 *and* 11 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1822-1823.—The Congress of Verona. See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1830-1862.—The independent kingdom constituted under Otho of Bavaria.—Its unsatisfactoriness.—Dethronement of King Otho.—Election of Prince George of Denmark.—"On February 3d, 1830, a protocol was signed which constituted Greece an independent State; and on the 11th of the same month Prince Leopold of Belgium accepted the crown which was offered to him by the Powers. He, however, soon resigned the honour, giving for his main reason the hopelessness of establishing a Greek kingdom from which Krete, Epeiros, and Thessaly were to be excluded. The northern boundary, as drawn in 1830, stretched from the Gulf of Zeitoun to the mouth of the Aspropotamos, thus depriving Greece of the greater part of Akarnania and Aitolia. After the assassination [by the family of an insurgent chief] of Count Capodistria (who was the popularly elected President of Greece from April 14th, 1827, to October 9th, 1831), and after the Powers had selected Prince Otho of Bavaria for the position declined by Prince Leopold, an arrangement was concluded between England, France, Russia, and Turkey, whereby the boundary was drawn from the Gulf of Arta to the same termination in the Gulf of Zeitoun. But a few months later the district of Zeitoun, north of the Spercheios, was added to Greece; and the new kingdom paid to the Porte an indemnity of 40,000,000 piastres, or about £460,000. The Powers guaranteed a loan to Greece of 60,000,000 francs, out of which the payment of the indemnity was made; and thus, at last, in the autumn of 1832, the fatherland of the Greeks was redeemed. Under Otho of Bavaria the country was governed at first by a Council of Regency, consisting of Count Armansperg, Professor Maurer, and General Heideck. Maurer was removed in 1834, and Armansperg in 1837; and at the close of the latter year, after the trial of another Bavarian as president of the Council, a Greek was for the first time appointed to the principal post in the Ministry. The greatest benefit conferred upon the country by its German rulers was the reinforcement of the legal system, and the elevation of the authority of the law. But, on the other hand, an unfortunate attempt was made to centralize the whole administration of Greece, her ancient municipal rights and customs were overlooked, taxation was almost as indiscriminate and burdensome as under the Turks, whilst large sums of money were spent upon the army, and on other objects of an unremunerative or insufficiently remunerative character, so that the young State was laden with pecuniary liabilities before anything had been done to developé her resources. . . . No national assembly was convened, no anxiety was shown to con-

ciliate the people, liberty of expression was curtailed, personal offence was given by the foreigners, and by Armansperg in particular; brigandage and piracy flourished, and Greece began to suffer all the evils which might have been expected to arise from the government of unsympathetic aliens. . . . In addition to the rapid and alarming increase of brigandage by land and piracy by sea, there were popular insurrections in Messenia, Maina, Akarnania, and elsewhere. One of the most capable Englishmen who have ever espoused the cause of the Greeks, General Gordon, was commissioned in 1835 to clear northern Greece of the marauders by whom it was overrun. He executed his mission in an admirable manner, sweeping the whole of Phokis, Aitolia, and Akarnania, and securing the coöperation of the Turkish Pasha at Larissa. Hundreds of brigands were put to flight,—but only to return again next year, and to enjoy as great immunity as ever. . . . In the absence of a strong and active organization of the national forces, brigandage in Greece was an ineradicable institution; and, as a matter of fact it was not suppressed until the year 1870. Gradually the discontent of the people, and the feebleness and infatuation of the Government, were breeding a revolution. . . . The three Guaranteeing Powers urged on Otho and his advisers the necessity of granting a Constitution, which had been promised on the establishment of the kingdom; and moral support was thus given to two very strong parties, known by the titles of Philorthodox and Constitutional, whose leaders looked to Russia and England respectively. The King and the Government neglected symptoms which were conspicuous to all besides, and the revolution of 1843 found them practically unprepared and helpless. On the 15th of September, after a well-contrived demonstration of the troops, which was acquiesced in and virtually sanctioned by the representatives of the three Powers, King Otho gave way, and signed the decrees which had been submitted to him. The Bavarian Ministers were dismissed, Mavrokordatos was made Premier, a National Assembly was convoked, and a Constitution was granted. For the first time since the Roman conquest, Greece resumed the dignity of self-government. The Constitution of 1844 was by no means an adequate one. It did not fully restore the privileges of local self-rule, and it only partially modified the system of centralization, from which so many evils had sprung. But it was nevertheless a great advance towards popular liberty. . . . The difficulties which arose between Russia and Turkey in 1853, and which led up to the Crimean War, inspired the Greeks with a hope that their 'grand idea'—the inheritance of the dominion of Turkey in Europe, so far as the Greek-speaking provinces are concerned—might be on the eve of accomplishment. . . . The Russian army crossed the Pruth in July, 1853, and preparations were at once made by the Greeks to invade Turkey. . . . The temper of the whole country was such that England and France deemed it necessary to take urgent measures for preventing an alliance between Russia and Greece. In May, 1854, an Anglo-French force was landed at the Peiraios, where it remained until February, 1857. Pressure was thus brought to bear upon King Otho, who was not in a position to resist it. . . . The humiliation of the Greeks under the foreign occupation weakened the authority of the King and his Ministers, and the unhappy country was once more a prey to rapine and disorder. . . . From the year 1859 a new portent began to make itself apparent in Greece. As the insurrection of 1821 may be said to have derived some of its energy from the upheaval of France and Europe in the preceding decades, so the Greek revolution of 1862 was doubtless hastened, if not suggested, by the Italian regeneration of 1848–1861. . . . On February 13th, 1862, the garrison of Nauplia revolted; other outbreaks followed; and at last, in October, during an ill-advised absence of the Monarch from his capital, the garrison of Athens broke out into open insurrection. A Provisional Government was nominated; the deposition of King Otho was proclaimed; and when the royal couple hurried back to the city they were refused an entrance. The representatives of the Powers were appealed to in vain; and the unfortunate Bavarian, after wearing the crown for thirty years, sailed from the Peiraios never to return. The hopes of the Greeks at once centred in Prince Alfred of England for their future king. . . . But the agreement of the three Powers on the establishment of the kingdom expressly excluded from the throne all members of the reigning families of England, France, and Russia; and thus, although Prince Alfred was elected king with practical unanimity, the English Government would not sanction his acceptance of the crown. The choice eventually and happily fell upon Prince George of Denmark, the present King of the Hellenes; and neither Greece nor Europe has had reason to regret the selection . . . From this time forward the history of modern Greece enters upon a brighter phase."—L. Sergeant, *Greece, ch.* 5.

ALSO IN: The same, *New Greece, pt.* 2, *ch.* 8–10.

A. D. 1846-1850.—Rude enforcement of English claims.—The Don Pacifico Affair.—"Greek independence had been established under the joint guardianship of Russia, France, and England. Constitutional government had been guaranteed. It had however been constantly delayed. Otho, the Bavarian Prince, who had been placed upon the throne, was absolute in his own tendencies, and supported by the absolute Powers; and France, eager to establish her own influence in the East, . . . had sided with the Absolutists, leaving England the sole supporter of constitutional rule. The Government and administration were deplorably bad. . . . Any demands raised by the English against the Government—and the bad administration afforded abundant opportunity for dispute—were certain to encounter the opposition of the King, supported by the advice of all the diplomatic body. Such questions had arisen. Ionians, claiming to be British subjects, had been maltreated. the boat's crew of a Queen's ship roughly handled, and in two cases the money claims of English subjects against the Government disregarded. They were trivial enough in themselves; a piece of land belonging to a Mr. Finlay [the historian of mediæval and modern Greece], a Scotchman, had been incorporated into the royal garden, and the price—no doubt somewhat exorbitant—which he set upon it refused. The house of Don Pacifico, a Jew, a native of Gibraltar, had been sacked by a mob, without due interference on the part of the police. He demanded compensation for ill-usage, for property destroyed, and for the loss of certain papers,

the only proof as he declared of a somewhat doubtful claim against the Portuguese Government. Such claims in the ordinary course of things should have been made in the Greek Law Court. But Lord Palmerston, placing no trust in the justice to be there obtained, made them a direct national claim upon the Government. For several years, on various pretences, the settlement of the question had been postponed, and Palmerston had even warned Russia that he should some day have to put strong pressure upon the Greek Court to obtain the discharge of their debts. At length, at the close of 1849, his patience became exhausted. Admiral Parker, with the British fleet, was ordered to the Piræus. Mr. Wyse, the English Ambassador, embarked in it. The claims were again formally laid before the King, and upon their being declined the Piræus was blockaded, ships of the Greek navy captured, and merchant vessels secured by way of material guarantee for payment. The French and the Russians were indignant at this unexpected act of vigour." The Russians threatened; the French offered mediation, which was accepted. The French negotiations at Athens had no success; but at London there was promise of a friendly settlement of the matter, when Mr. Wyse, the English Minister at the Greek Court, being left in ignorance of the situation, brought fresh pressure to bear upon King Otho and extorted payment of his claims. The French were enraged and withdrew their Minister from London. "For the time, this trumpery little affair caused the greatest excitement, and, being regarded as a typical instance of Lord Palmerston's management of the Foreign Office, it formed the ground of a very serious attack upon the Government." —J. F. Bright, *Hist. of Eng., period* 4, *pp.* 200–203.

ALSO IN: S. Walpole, *Hist. of Eng., from* 1815, *ch.* 22 (*v.* 4).—J. McCarthy, *Hist of Our Own Times, ch.* 19 (*v.* 2).—See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1849–1850.

A. D. 1862.—Annexation of the Ionian Islands. See IONIAN ISLANDS: A. D. 1815–1862.

A. D. 1862-1881.—The Cretan struggle and defeat.—The Greek question in the Berlin Congress.—Small cession of territory by Turkey.—"The annexation of the Heptannesos [the seven (Ionian) islands] was a great benefit to Hellas. It was not only a piece of good fortune for the present but an earnest of the future. . . . There still remained the delusion of the Integrity of the Turkish Empire; but the Christians of the East really cannot believe in the sincerity of all the Powers who proclaim and sustain this extraordinary figment, any more than they are able to fall a prey to the hallucination itself. The reunion of the Heptannesos with the rest of Hellas was therefore regarded as marking the beginning of another and better era—a sanction to the hopes of other re-unions in the future. The first of the Hellenes who endeavoured to gain for themselves the same good fortune which had fallen upon the Ionians were again the Cretans. They defied Turkey for three years, 1866–7–8. With the exception of certain fortresses, the whole island was free. Acts of heroism and sacrifice such as those which had rendered glorious the first War of Independence, again challenged the attention of the world. Volunteers from the West recalled the Philhellenic enthusiasm of old days. The Hellenes of the mainland did not leave their brethren alone in the hour of danger; they hastened to fight at their side, while they opened in their own homes a place of refuge for the women and children of the island. Nearly 60,000 fugitives found protection there. For a while there was room for believing that the deliverance of Crete was at last accomplished. Russia and France were favourably disposed. Unhappily the good-will of these two Powers could not overcome the opposition of England, strongly supported by Austria. Diplomacy fought for the enslavement of the Cretans with as much persistence and more success than those with which it had opposed the deliverance of Greece. Freedom has not yet come for Crete. The islanders obtained by their struggle nothing but a doubtful amelioration of their condition by means of a sort of charter which was extracted from the unwillingness of the Porte in 1868, under the name of the 'Organic Regulation.' This edict has never been honestly put in force. However, even if it had been carried out, it would not have been a settlement of the Cretan question. The Cretans have never concealed what they want, or ceased to proclaim their intention of demanding it until they obtain it. At the time of the Congress of Berlin they thought once more that they would succeed. They got nothing but another promise from the Porte 'to enforce scrupulously the Organic Regulation of 1868, with such modifications as might be judged equitable.'. . . The history of the Greek Question at the Congress of Berlin and the conferences which followed it, is not to be treated in detail here. The time is not come for knowing all that took place. . . . We do not know why Hellas herself remained so long with her sword undrawn during the Russo-Turkish War—what promises or what threats held her back from moving when the armies of Russia, checked before Plevna, would have welcomed a diversion in the West, and when the Hellenic people both within and without the Kingdom were chafing at the do-nothing attitude of the Government of Athens. Everyone in Greece felt that the moment was come. The measures taken by hordes of Bashi-Bazooks were hardly sufficient to repress the insurrection which was ready in all quarters, and which at length broke out in the mountains of Thessaly. . . . It was only at the last moment, when the war was on the point of being closed by the treaty which victorious Russia compelled Turkey to grant at San Stefano, that the Greek Government, under the Presidency of Koumoundouros, yielded tardily to the pressure of the nation, and allowed the army to cross the frontier. It was too late for the diversion to be of any use to Russia, and it could look for no support from any other Government in Europe. This fact was realized at Athens, but men felt, at the same time, that it was needful to remind the world at any price that there is a Greek Question connected with the Eastern Question. The step was taken, but it was taken with a hesitation which betrayed itself in act as well as in word. . . . Diplomacy saw the danger of the fresh conflagration which the armed intervention of Greece was capable of kindling. The utmost possible amount of pressure was therefore brought to bear upon the Government of Athens in order to induce it to retrace the step, and in the result an order was obtained to the Greek Commander-in-Chief to

recross the frontier, upon the solemn assurance of the great Powers, that the national aspirations and interests of the Greek populations should be the subject of the deliberations of the approaching Congress.' . . . On July 5, 1878, the Congress accepted the resolution proposed by the French plenipotentiary, 'inviting the Porte to come to an understanding with Greece for a rectification of the frontiers in Thessaly and Epiros, a rectification which may follow the valley of the Peneus upon the Eastern side, and that of the Thyamis (or Kalamas) upon the Western.' In other words, they assign to Hellas the whole of Thessaly and a large part of Epiros. Notwithstanding the abandonment of the island of Crete, this was some satisfaction for the wrongs which she had suffered at the delimitation of the Kingdom. . . . But the scheme suggested by the Congress and sanctioned by the Conference of Berlin on July 1, 1880, was not carried out. When Turkey found that she was not confronted by an Europe determined to be obeyed, she refused to submit. And then the Powers, whose main anxiety was peace at any price, instead of insisting upon her compliance, put upon Hellas all the pressure which they were able to exercise, to induce her to submit the question of the frontiers to a fresh arbitration. . . . Hellas had to yield, and on July 2, 1881, three years after the signing of the famous Protocol of Berlin, she signed the convention by which Turkey ceded to her the flat part of Thessaly and a small scrap of Epiros."—D. Bikelas, *Seven Essays on Christian Greece, essay 6*

A. D. 1864-1893.—Government under the later constitution.—A new constitution, framed by the National Assembly, "was ratified by the King on November 21, 1864. Abolishing the old Senate, it established a Representative Chamber of 150 deputies, since increased to 190, and again to 307, elected by ballot by all males over the age of twenty-one, from equal electoral districts (they were afterwards elected by nomarchies; the system now is by eparchies). Mr. Sergeant gives the number of electors (in 1879) at 311 per 1,000, but I do not know what he does with the women and minors, who must be about 75 per cent of the population. The present [1893] number of electors is 450,000, or 205 per 1,000. The King has considerable power. he is irresponsible; he appoints and dismisses his ministers and all officers and officials; and he can prorogue or suspend Parliament Nor is his power merely nominal. In 1866 the Chamber behaved illegally, and the King promptly dissolved it; in 1875 again the King successfully steered his country out of a whirlpool of corruption; and, lastly, in 1892, his Majesty, finding M. Deleyannes obstinate in his financial dilatoriness, dismissed him. . . . Before King Otho there were 4 administrations; under his rule 24 (13 before the Constitution was granted and 11 after), 10 in the interregnum, and 42 under King George. This gives 70 administrations in 62 years, or about one every 10½ months, or, deducting the two kingless periods, 56 administrations in 60 years—that is, with an average duration of nearly 13 months. This compares for stability very well with the duration of French Ministries, 28 of which have lasted 22 years, or about 9½ months each. It should also be stated that there has been a distinct tendency to greater Ministerial longevity of late years in Greece. Under King Otho there were seven Parliaments in 18 years, which allows 2 years and 7 months for each Parliamentary period. Under King George there have been 13 in 28 years, or with a life of 2 years and 2 months each. However, we know that Parliament had not the same free play under the first King that it has had under the second; and, besides, the present Parliament, considering the Prime Minister's enormous majority, is likely to continue some time, and bring up the Georgian average. . . . There have been no notable changes of the Greek Constitution since its first promulgation, though there has been a natural expansion, especially in the judicial section. This very fact is of itself a vindication of Hellenic national stability."—R. A. H. Bickford-Smith, *Greece under King George, ch.* 18.

GREEK, Origin of the name. See HELLAS.

GREEK CHURCH, The. See CHRISTIANITY: A. D. 330–1054.

GREEK EDUCATION. See EDUCATION, ANCIENT.

GREEK EMPIRE, called Byzantine: A.D. 700-1204. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE.

GREEK EMPIRE OF CONSTANTINOPLE (A. D. 1261-1453). See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1261–1453.

GREEK EMPIRE OF NICÆA: A. D. 1204-1261.—The conquest of Constantinople by the Venetians and the Crusaders, in 1204, broke the Byzantine Empire into many fragments, some of which were secured by the conquerors and loosely bound together in the feudal empire of Romania, while others were snatched from the ruin and preserved by the Greeks, themselves. For the sovereignty of these latter numerous claimants made haste to contend. Three fugitive emperors were wandering in the outer territories of the shattered realm. One was that Alexius III., whose deposition of Isaac Angelos had afforded a pretext for the crusading conquest, and who had fled when Isaac was restored. A second was Alexius V. (Murtzuphlos), who pushed Isaac Angelos and his son Alexius IV. from the shaking throne when Constantinople resolved to defend itself against the Christians of the West, but who abandoned the city in the last hours of the siege. The third was Theodore Lascaris, son-in-law of Alexius III., who was elected to the imperial office as soon as the flight of Alexius V. became known—even after the besiegers had entered the city—and who, then, could do nothing but follow his fugitive predecessors. This last was the only one of the three who found a piece of defensible territory on which to set up his throne. He established himself in Bithynia, associating his claims with those of his worthless father-in-law, and contenting himself with the title of Despot, at first. But the convenient though objectionable father-in-law was not permitted to enjoy any share of the sovereignty which he acquired. Theodore, in fact, managed his affairs with great vigor and skill. The district in which his authority was recognized widened rapidly and the city of Nicæa became his capital. There, in 1206, he received the imperial crown, more formally and solemnly, anew, and rallied the Greek resistance which was destined to triumph, a little more than half a century later, over the insolent aggression of the Latin West. The small empire of Nicæa had to contend, not merely with

the Latins in Constantinople and Greece, and with the Turkish Sultan of Iconium, but also with another ambitious fragment of Greek empire at Trebizond, which showed itself persistently hostile. His successors, moreover, were in conflict with a third such fragment in Europe, at Thessalonica. But, ten years after the flight of Theodore from Constantinople, his empire of Nicæa "extended from Heraclea on the Black Sea to the head of the Gulf of Nicomedia; from thence it embraced the coast of the Opsikian theme as far as Cyzicus; and then descending to the south, included Pergamus, and joined the coast of the Ægean. Theodore had already extended his power over the valleys of the Hermus, the Caister, and the Mæander." Theodore Lascaris died in 1222, leaving no son, and John Dukas Vatatzes, or Vataces as his name is written by some historians, a man of eminent abilities and high qualities, who had married Theodore's daughter, was elected to the vacant throne. He was saluted as John III. — assuming a continuity from the Byzantine to the Nicæan series of emperors. In a reign of thirty-three years, this prudent and capable emperor, as Gibbon expresses the fact, "rescued the provinces from national and foreign usurpers, till he pressed on all sides the imperial city [Constantinople], a leafless and sapless trunk, which must fall at the first stroke of the axe." He did not live to apply that blow nor to witness the fall of the coveted capital of the East. But the event occurred only six years after his death, and owed nothing to the energy or the capability of his successors. His son, Theodore II, reigned but four years, and left at his death, in 1258, a son, John IV., only eight years old. The appointed regent and tutor of this youth was soon assassinated, and Michael Paleologos, an able officer, who had some of the blood of the imperial Angelos family in his veins, was made in the first instance tutor to the young emperor, and soon afterwards raised to the throne with him as a colleague. In 1260 the new emperor made an attack on Constantinople and was repulsed. But on the 25th of July in the next year the city was taken by a sudden surprise, while 6,000 soldiers of its garrison were absent on an expedition against Daphnusia in the Black Sea. It was acquired almost without resistance, the Latin emperor, Baldwin II., taking promptly to flight. The destruction of life was slight; but the surprising party fired a considerable part of the city, to cover the smallness of its numbers, and Constantinople suffered once more from a disastrous conflagration. On the recovery of its ancient capital, the Greek empire ceased to bear the name of Nicæa, and its history is continued under the more imposing appellation of the Greek empire of Constantinople.—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine and Greek Empires, from 716 to 1453, bk. 4, ch. 1 (v. 2).*

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. 62.*

GREEK EMPIRE OF TREBIZOND. See TREBIZOND: A. D. 1204–1461.

GREEK FIRE.—"The important secret of compounding and directing this artificial flame was imparted [in the later part of the seventh century to the Greeks, or Byzantines, at Constantinople] by Callinicus, a native of Heliopolis, in Syria, who deserted from the service of the caliph to that of the emperor. The skill of a chemist and engineer was equivalent to the succour of fleets and armies; and this discovery or improvement of the military art was fortunately reserved for the distressful period when the degenerate Romans of the East were incapable of contending with the warlike enthusiasm and youthful vigour of the Saracens. The historian who presumes to analyze this extraordinary composition should suspect his own ignorance and that of his Byzantine guides, so prone to the marvellous, so careless, and, in this instance, so jealous of the truth. From their obscure, and perhaps fallacious hints, it should seem that the principal ingredient of the Greek fire was the naphtha, or liquid bitumen, a light, tenacious, and inflammable oil, which springs from the earth. . . . The naphtha was mingled, I know not by what methods or in what proportions, with sulphur and with the pitch that is extracted from evergreen firs. From this mixture, which produced a thick smoke and a loud explosion, proceeded a fierce and obstinate flame . . . ; instead of being extinguished it was nourished and quickened by the element of water; and sand, urine, or vinegar were the only remedies that could damp the fury of this powerful agent. . . . It was either poured from the ramparts [of a besieged town] in large boilers, or launched in red-hot balls of stone and iron, or darted in arrows and javelins, twisted round with flax and tow, which had deeply imbibed the inflammable oil; sometimes it was deposited in fire-ships . . . and was most commonly blown through long tubes of copper, which were planted on the prow of a galley, and fancifully shaped into the mouths of savage monsters, that seemed to vomit a stream of liquid and consuming fire. This important art was preserved at Constantinople, as the palladium of the state. . . . The secret was confined, above 400 years, to the Romans of the East. . . . It was at length either discovered or stolen by the Mahometans; and, in the holy wars of Syria and Egypt, they retorted an invention, contrived against themselves, on the heads of the Christians. . . . The use of the Greek, or, as it might now be called, the Saracen fire, was continued to the middle of the fourteenth century."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. 52.*

GREEK GENIUS AND INFLUENCE. See HELLENIC GENIUS, &c.

GREELEY, Horace, and the Peace Conference at Niagara. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (JULY).... **Presidential candidacy and defeat.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1872.

GREEN, Duff, in the "Kitchen Cabinet" of President Jackson. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1829.

GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS. See VERMONT: A. D. 1749–1774.

GREENBACK PARTY, The. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1880.

GREENE, General Nathaniel, and the American Revolution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (MAY—AUGUST); 1780–1781; and 1781 (JANUARY—MAY).

GREENLAND: A. D. 876-984.—Discovery and settlement by the Northmen. See NORMANS.—NORTHMEN: A. D. 876–984.

A. D. 1450-1585.—The lost Icelandic colony, absorbed by Eskimo.—Rediscovery of the

country. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ESKIMAUAN FAMILY.

GREENS, Roman Faction of the. See CIRCUS, FACTIONS OF THE ROMAN.

GREENVILLE TREATY. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1790–1795.

GREGORIAN CALENDAR. — GREGORIAN ERA. See CALENDAR, GREGORIAN.

GREGORIAN CHANT. See MUSIC.

GREGORY I. (called The Great), Pope. See PAPACY: A. D. 461–604; and MUSIC. . . . . **Gregory II., Pope, 715–731. . . . . Gregory III., Pope, 731–741. . . . . Gregory IV., Pope, 827–844. . . . . Gregory V., Pope, 996–999. . . . . Gregory VI., Pope, 1044–1046. . . . . Gregory VII., Pope, 1075–1085.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1056–1122; GERMANY: A. D. 973–1122; and CANOSSA. . . . . **Gregory VIII., Pope, 1187, October to December. . . . . Gregory IX., Pope, 1227–1241. . . . . Gregory X., Pope, 1271–1276. . . . . Gregory XI., Pope, 1371–1378. . . . . Gregory XII., Pope, 1406–1415. . . . . Gregory XIII., Pope, 1572–1585. . . . . Gregory XIV., Pope, 1590–1591. . . . . Gregory XV., Pope, 1621–1623. . . . . Gregory XVI., Pope, 1831–1846.**

GRENVILLE MINISTRY, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1760–1763; and 1765–1768.

GRÉVY, Jules, President of the French Republic. See FRANCE: A. D. 1875–1889.

GREY, Earl, The Ministry of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1830–1832; and 1834–1837.

GREY FRIARS. See MENDICANT ORDERS.

GREY LEAGUES, The. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1396–1499.

GREYS, of Florence, The. See BIGI.

GRIERSON'S RAID. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (APRIL—MAY: MISS.).

GRINNELL EXPEDITIONS. See POLAR EXPLORATION: A. D. 1850–1851 · 1853–1855.

GRIPPE, LA, Early Appearances of. See PLAGUE: A. D. 1485–1593; and 18TH CENTURY.

GRIQUAS.—GRIQUALAND.—"The Griquas, or Baastards, a mixed race sprung from the intercourse of the 'Boers' [of South Africa] with their Hottentot slaves," migrated from Cape Colony after the Emancipation Act of 1833, "and, under the chiefs Waterboer and Adam Kok, settled in the country north of the confluence of the Orange and Vaal, the present Griqualand West Subsequently, in 1852, Adam Kok's section of the Griquas again migrated to the territory then called No Man's Land, between Kafraria and southern Natal, now known as Griqualand East, or New Griqualand. . . . In consequence of the discovery of diamonds in the Griqua country in 1867, and the rush thither of thousands of Europeans from all the surrounding states, as well as from Europe, America, and Australia, the chief Waterboer ceded his rights to the British Government, and this region was annexed to the Cape Colony as the Lieutenant-Governorship of Griqualand West in 1871." —Hellwald-Johnston, *Africa, ch.* 28, *sect.* 5.

GRISONS, The. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1396–1499; and FRANCE: A. D. 1624–1626.

GROCHOW, Battles of (1831). See POLAND: A. D. 1830–1832.

GROL, Capture of (1627). See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1621–1633.

GRONINGEN: A. D. 1593.—Capture by Maurice. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. [illegible]

GROS VENTRE INDIANS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: HIDATSA, and ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

GROSS BEEREN, Battle of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (AUGUST).

GROSS GORSCHEN, OR LUTZEN, Battle of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (APRIL—MAY).

GROSSE RATH, The. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1848–1890.

GROSSWARDEIN, Treaty of. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1526–1567.

GROTIUS, HUGO, Imprisonment and escape of. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1608–1619.

GROVETON, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER).

GRUTHUNGI, The. See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 376.

GRÜTLI, OR RÜTLI, The Meadow of. See SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS.

GRYNEUM, The Oracle of. See ORACLES OF THE GREEKS.

GUADACELITO OR SALADO, Battle of (1340.) See SPAIN: A. D. 1273–1460.

GUADALETE, Battle of the. See SPAIN: A. D. 711–713.

GUADALOUPE. See WEST INDIES.

GUADALOUPE HIDALGO, Treaty of. See MEXICO: A. D. 1848.

GUADALUPES. See GACHUPINES.

GUAICARUS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.

GUAJIRA, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: COAJIRO.

GUAM. See MARIANNES.

GUANAJUATO, Battles of. See MEXICO: A. D. 1810–1819.

GUANAS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.

GUANCHES. See LIBYANS.

GUAP. See CAROLINE ISLANDS.

GUARANI, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TUPI.

GUASTALLA, Battle of (1734). See FRANCE: A. D. 1733–1735.

GUATEMALA: The name.—"According to Fuentes y Guzman, derived from 'Coctecmalan'—that is to say 'Palo de leche,' milk-tree, commonly called 'Yerba mala,' found in the neighborhood of Antigua Guatemala. . . . In the Mexican tongue, if we may believe Vasquez, it was called 'Quauhtimali,' rotten-tree. . . . Others derive it from 'Uhatezmalha,' signifying 'the hill which discharges water'; and Juarros suggests that it may be from Juitemal, the first king of Guatemala."—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States, v.* 1, *p.* 620, *foot-note.*

Aboriginal inhabitants, and ruins of ancient civilization. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: MAYAS, and QUICHES; also, MEXICO, ANCIENT.

A. D. 1524.—Conquest by Alvarado, the lieutenant of Cortés. See MEXICO: A. D. 1521–1524.

A. D. 1821–1894.—Separation from Spain.—Brief Annexation to Mexico.—Contests over Central American Federation.—The wars of the states. See CENTRAL AMERICA: A. D. 1821–1871; 1871–1885; and 1886–1894.

GUAYANAS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.

GUCK OR COCO TRIBES. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: GUCK OR COCO GROUP.

GUELDERLAND: A. D. 1079-1473.—Under the House of Nassau.—Acquisition by the Duke of Burgundy.—"The arable extent of Guelderland, its central position, and the number of its ancient towns, rendered it at all times of great importance. The men of Zutphen and Arnheim were foremost among the claimants of civic freedom; and at Tiel and Bommel industry struck early root, and struggled bravely to maturity through countless storms of feudal violence and rapine. Guelderland was constituted a county, or earldom, by Henry III. [Emperor, A. D. 1079], and bestowed on Otho, count of Nassau; and thus originated the influence of that celebrated family in the affairs of the Netherlands. Three centuries later the province was created a duchy of the empire. Vigour and ability continued to distinguish the house of Nassau, and they were destined to become eventually the most popular and powerful family in the nation. Apart from their influence, however, Guelderland hardly occupies as important a place in the general history of the country as Utrecht or Holland." In 1473, when the House of Burgundy had acquired sovereignty over most of the Netherland states, Charles the Bold availed himself of a domestic quarrel between the reigning prince of Guelderland and his heir "to purchase the duchy from the former for 92,000 crowns of gold. The old duke died before the pecuniary portion of the bargain was actually completed; and, the rightful heir being detained in prison, the grasping lord of Burgundy entered into possession of his purchase, for which no part of the price was ever paid."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial Hist. of Free Nations. ch.* 8 *and* 10 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1713.—The Spanish province ceded to Prussia. See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

GUELF PARTY, Captains of the. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1358.

Guelfic origin of the House of Hanover, or Brunswick-Lüneburg. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1714; also, GUELFS AND GHIBELLINES; and ESTE, HOUSE OF.

GUELFS, OR GUELPHS, AND GHIBELLINES: German origin of these Factions and their feuds.—On the death (A. D. 1125) of Henry V., the last of the Franconian dynasty of Germanic emperors, Lothaire, Duke of Saxony, was elected emperor, in rather a tumultuous and irregular manner. Lothaire, and the Saxons generally, were embittered in enmity against the house of Franconia, and against the new family —the Suabian or Hohenstauffen—which succeeded by inheritance, through the female line, to the Franconian claims. It was the object of his reign, moreover, to pass the imperial crown from his own head to that of his son-in-law, Henry the Proud. Hence arose a persecution of the Suabian family, under Lothaire, which stirred deep passions. Henry the Proud, for whose succession Lothaire labored, but vainly, united in himself several ancient streams of noble blood. He "was fourth in descent from Welf [or Guelf], son of Azon marquis of Este, by Cunegonda, heiress of a distinguished family, the Welfs of Altorf in Suabia." His ancestor, Welf, had been invested with the duchy of Bavaria. He himself represented, by right of his mother, the ancient ducal house of Saxony; and, by favor of his imperial father-in-law, the two powerful duchies, Bavaria and Saxony, were both conferred on him. He also received Hanover and Brunswick as the dowry of his wife. "On the death of Lothaire in 1138 the partisans of the house of Suabia made a hasty and irregular election of Conrad [one of the Hohenstauffen princes], in which the Saxon faction found itself obliged to acquiesce. The new emperor availed himself of the jealousy which Henry the Proud's aggrandizement had excited. Under pretence that two duchies could not legally be held by the same person, Henry was summoned to resign one of them, and on his refusal, the diet pronounced that he had incurred a forfeiture of both. Henry made but little resistance, and before his death, which happened soon afterwards, saw himself stripped of all his hereditary as well as acquired possessions. Upon this occasion the famous names of Guelf [or Guelph] and Ghibelin were first heard, which were destined to keep alive the flame of civil dissension in far distant countries, and after their meaning had been forgotten. The Guelfs, or Welfs, were, as I have said, the ancestors of Henry, and the name has become a sort of patronymic in his family. The word Ghibelin is derived from Wibelung, a town in Franconia, whence the emperors of that line are said to have sprung. The house of Suabia were considered in Germany as representing that of Franconia; as the Guelfs may, without much impropriety, be deemed to represent the Saxon line."—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages, ch.* 5 (*v.* 2).—Sir Andrew Halliday, in his "Annals of the House of Hanover," traces the genealogy of the Guelfs with great minuteness and precision—with more minuteness, perhaps, in some remote particulars, and more precision, than seems consistent with entire credibility. He carries the line back to Edico, king or prince of the Heruli, or Rugil, or Scyrii,—the stock from which came Odoacer, who overturned the Western Roman Empire and made himself the first king of Italy. Edico, who was subject to Attila, and the favorite adviser of the king of the Huns, is thought to have had a son or brother named Guelf or Welf, who fell in battle with the Ostrogoths. It is to him that Sir Andrew is disposed to assign the honor of being the historical chief of the great family of the Guelfs. If not from this shadowy Guelf, it is from another of like name in the next generation—a brother of Odoacer—that he sees the family spring, and the story of its wide-branching and many-rooted growth, in Friuli, Altdorf, Bavaria, old Saxony, Brunswick, Hanover,—and thence, more royally than ever, in England,—is as interesting as a narrative of highly complicated genealogy can be.—Sir A. Halliday, *Annals of the House of Hanover.*—From the Guelf uncertainly indicated above were descended two Marquesses of Este, "successively known in German and Italian story as the first and second of that name. . . . Azo, the second Marquess of Este in Italy (born A. D. 995, died 1097), the head of the Italian (junior) branch of Guelphs [see ESTE], married Cunigunda, the sole heiress of the German Guelphs of Altdorf, thus uniting in his family the blood, wealth, and power of both branches

of the old Guelphs, and becoming the common father of the later German and Italian princes of the name of Guelph. No wonder, then, that he was elected by the Emperor, Henry III., as his representative in Italy. . . . Cunigunda, the first wife of Azo II., bore him one son, Guelph, who was known in German history as Guelph VI. He succeeded to his mother's titles and vast estates on her death, A. D. 1055, and to those of his father, A. D. 1097. . . Henry IV. invested him with the Duchy of Bavaria, A. D. 1071—a title first assumed 170 years before (A. D. 900) by his almost mythological ancestor, Henry of the Golden Charlot" This Guelph VI. was the grandfather of Henry the Proud, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, referred to above.—P. M. Thornton, *The Brunswick Accession, ch.* 1.

ALSO IN: O. Browning, *Guelfs and Ghibellines.*

—See, also, SAXONY: A. D. 1178–1183; and GERMANY: A. D. 1138–1268; and, also, ESTE, HOUSE OF.

The outcrop of the contention in Italy.—Its beginnings, causes, course and meaning. See ITALY: A. D. 1215; and FLORENCE: A. D. 1248–1278.

GUÉLFS, White and Black (Bianchi and Neri). See FLORENCE: A. D. 1295–1300; and 1301–1313.

GUELPHS OF HANOVER, The Order of the.—"The Hanoverian troops having much distinguished themselves at the battle of Waterloo, George IV. (then prince regent) determined to found an order of merit which might, with especial propriety, be conferred upon such of them as deserved the distinction, and the 12th of August, 1815, was fixed upon as the date of its foundation. By the second statute, the Order is inseparably annexed to the possession of the Hanoverian crown, by vesting the grand-mastership in the sovereign of that country for the time being."—C. R. Dodd, *Manual of Dignities, pt.* 3.

GUERANDE, Treaty of. See BRITTANY: A. D. 1341–1365.

GUERNSEY, The Isle of. See JERSEY AND GUERNSEY.

GUERRA DOS CABANOS. See BRAZIL: A. D. 1825–1865.

GUERRILLAS.—A term of Spanish origin, derived from 'guerilla', signifying little or petty warfare, and applied to small, irregular bands of troops, carrying on war against an enemy by harassing, destructive raids.

GUEUX OF THE NETHERLAND REVOLT. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1562–1566.

GUIANA: The aboriginal inhabitants. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIB.

16th Century.—The search for El Dorado. See EL DORADO.

A. D. 1580-1814.—Dutch, French and English settlements and conquests.—"There was one European nation which was not likely to hunt for a golden city, when gold was to be earned by plain and matter of fact commerce. The Dutch had as early as 1542 established a systematic if contraband trade with the Spanish Main; and in 1580 they began to settle in Guiana by planting a depôt on the river Pomeroon, in what is now the county of Essequibo. In 1599 they built two forts at the mouth of the Amazon, but were driven out by the Portuguese; and about 1613 they established a colony on the Essequibo, building the fort of 'Kyk over al', 'Look over all,' on an island where the Massaruni flows into the Essequibo. The colony was founded by Zeeland merchants, was known as Nova Zeelandia, and came under the control of the Netherlands West India Company, which was incorporated in 1621. Shortly afterwards colonisation began further to the east on the Berbice river. The founder was a Flushing merchant, Van Peere by name; he founded his settlement about 1624, and he held his rights under contract with the Chamber of Zeeland. . . . Thus was the present province of British Guiana colonised by Dutchmen. . . . While English discovery was attracted to the west and Orinoco, the first attempts at English settlement were far to the east on the Wyapoco or Oyapok river. Here, in 1604, while Ralegh was in prison, Captain Charles Leigh founded a colony at the mouth of the river. . . . In 1609 Robert Harcourt of Stanton Harcourt in Oxfordshire took up the work in which Leigh had failed. . . . In 1613 he obtained from King James a grant of 'all that part of Guiana or continent of America lying between the river of Amazones and the river of Dessequebe,' which was not actually possessed or inhabited by any Christian power in friendship with England. . . . In 1619 a scheme was started for an Amazon Company, the leading spirit in which was Captain Roger North. . . . The company was fortunate enough to secure the powerful patronage of the Duke of Buckingham. Harcourt threw in his lot with them, and on the 19th of May 1627 a royal grant was made to the Duke of Buckingham and 55 other adventurers, including the Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, who were incorporated under the title of 'the governor and company of noblemen and gentlemen of England for the plantation of Guiana.' The Duke of Buckingham was Governor, North was Deputy-Governor, and the grant included the 'royal' river of the Amazon. For about two years the company did some solid work, sending out four ships and 200 colonists; an attempt was then made in 1629 to bring the territory covered by their grant immediately under royal protection, and upon its failure their efforts at colonisation appear to have gradually died away. The English were not the only Europeans who tried their hand at settlement in the east of Guiana. . . . In 1613, 160 French families settled in Cayenne. The first colony failed, but in 1624 and 1626 fresh attempts were made a little to the west on the rivers Sinamari and Cananama; and in 1643 a Rouen Company, incorporated under the name of the Cape North Company, sent out three or four hundred men to Cayenne under the Sieur de Bretigny. Bretigny ruined the scheme by savage ill-treatment of Indians and colonists alike, and the remains of the settlement were absorbed by a new and more powerful Normandy Company." This failed in its turn, and gave way to a "French Equinoctial Company," organized under the auspices of Colbert, which sent out 1,200 colonists and fairly established them at Cayenne. Colbert, in 1665, placed the colony, "with all the other French possessions in the West Indies, under one strong West India Company. Such were the beginnings of colonisation in the west and east of Guiana. Between them lies the district now known as Dutch Guiana or Surinam." The first settlement in this was made

in 1630 by 60 English colonists, under a Captain Marshall. The colony failed, and was revived in 1650 by Lord Willoughby, then representing the fugitive King Charles II., as Governor of Barbadoes. In 1663, after the Restoration, Lord Willoughby, in conjunction with Lawrence Hyde, second son of the Earl of Clarendon, received Letters Patent "constituting them lords and proprietors of the district between the Copenam and the Maroni (which included the Surinam river) under the name of Willoughby Land." Soon afterwards "war broke out with the Dutch, and in March 1667 the colony capitulated to the Dutch admiral Crynsenn. The peace of Breda between Great Britain and the Netherlands, which was signed in the following July, provided that either nation should retain the conquests which it had made by the preceding 10th of May, and under this arrangement Surinam was ceded to the Netherlands, while New York became a British possession. . . . Thus ended for many long years all British connexion with Guiana. . . . When at length the English returned [in 1796 and 1803, during the subjection of the Dutch to Napoleon, and while they were forced to take part in his wars], they came as conquerors rather than as settlers, and by a strange perversity of history, the original Dutch colonies on the Berbice and Essequibo became a British dependency, while the Netherlanders retain to this day the part of Guiana which Lord Willoughby marked out for his own." These arrangements were settled in the convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands signed at London in 1814.—C. P. Lucas, *Hist. Geog. of the British Colonies, v. 2, sect. 2, ch. 8.*

ALSO IN: H. G. Dalton, *Hist. of British Guiana.*

GUIENNE, OR GUYENNE.—A corruption of the name of Aquitaine, which came into use, apparently, about the 13th century. See AQUITAINE: A. D. 884–1151.

GUILDS, OR GILDS, Mediæval.—"The history of the Gild Merchant begins with the Norman Conquest. The latter widened the horizon of the English merchant even more than that of the English annalist. The close union between England and Normandy led to an increase in foreign commerce, which in turn must have greatly stimulated internal trade and industry. Moreover, the greatly enhanced power of the English crown tempered feudal turbulence, affording a measure of security to traders in England that was as yet unknown on the continent. . . . With this expansion of trade the mercantile element would become a more potent factor in town life, and would soon feel the need of joint action to guard its nascent prosperity against encroachments. Not until there was something of importance to protect, not until trade and industry began to predominate over agriculture within the borough, would a protective union like the Gild Merchant come into being. Its existence, in short, presupposes a greater mercantile and industrial development than that which prevailed in England in the tenth century. This circumstance and the absence of all mention of the Gild Merchant in the records of the Anglo-Saxon period render it probable that this fraternity first appeared in England soon after the Conqueror had established his sway and restored order in the land. Whether it was merely a reorganization of older gilds, a spontaneous adaptation of the gild idea to the newly-begotten trade interests, or a new institution directly transplanted from Normandy, we have no means of determining with certainty. The last-mentioned view is strongly favoured by the circumstance that, at the time of the Conquest, the Gild Merchant doubtless existed in Northern France and Flanders. From the Frenchmen who became burgesses of English towns, and from the Norman merchants who thronged the marts of England after the Conquest, the English would soon ascertain the advantages of formal trade organization. The earliest distinct references to the Gild Merchant occur in a charter granted by Robert Fitz-Hamon to the burgesses of Burford (1087–1107), and in a document drawn up while Anselm was Archbishop of Canterbury (1093–1109). . . . Whether we place the inception of the fraternity immediately before or after the Norman Conquest, whether we make it a continuation of older Anglo-Saxon gilds, or a derivative from Normandy, or a wholly new and spontaneous growth, it was doubtless at first merely a private society, unconnected with the town government, having for its object the protection of its members, the tradesmen of the borough, and the maintenance of the newly invigorated trade interests. During the twelfth century it gradually became a recognised part of the town constitution, thus entering upon its second stage of development. How this came to pass can be easily realised from the later history of English gilds in general. For in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries . . . a simple social-religious gild at times attained such power in a community that it came to be regarded as an important constituent element of the civic administration. Quite similar must have been the growth of the Gild Merchant, which from the outset was doubtless composed of the most influential burgesses, and which, as the exponent of the mercantile interests, must always have been greatly concerned in the increase of the privileges and prosperity of the borough in general. It was very natural that the town authorities should use such a society for public purposes, entrusting to it the surveillance of the trade monopoly, in which its members were particularly interested,—allowing it to gradually become an important part of the civic administrative machinery. . . . The beginning of this third and final stage of development cannot be definitely fixed; for in some places it was of an earlier date than in others. The fourteenth century may in general be called the period of gradual transition. In the fifteenth century the transformation was completed. In this and the following centuries the term 'Gilda Mercatoria' became less and less frequent. In many places it soon wholly disappeared. Where it continued to subsist, the Gild no longer had an individuality of its own. Its alderman and other peculiar officers, its whole organization as a distinctive entity, had vanished. It had merged its identity in that of the general municipal organism. The head of the fraternity was now the head of the town; borough and Gild, burgesses and gildsmen were now identical. What had once been a distinct integral part of the civic body politic became vaguely blended with the whole of it. The old Gild Merchant was now rarely mentioned in connection with the municipal trade restrictions and regulations, the

latter being commonly applied to burgesses, craftsmen, freemen, or 'foreigners.' The exegesis of this transformation . . . was due mainly to three causes: (1) the expansion of trade and the multiplication of the craft and mercantile fraternities, which absorbed the ancient functions of the Gild Merchant and rendered it superfluous; (2) the growth of the select governing body, which usurped most of the privileges of the old burghers at large, and hence tended to obliterate the distinction between them, or their less privileged successors, and the ancient gildsmen, leaving both only certain trade immunities; (3) the decay of the leet — the rallying point of the old burghers as distinguished from that of the gildsmen — the functions of which passed, in part, to the crafts, but mainly to the select body and to the justices of the peace. But even after the Gild Merchant and the borough had thus become identical, the old dual idea did not completely disappear, the Gild being often regarded as a particular phase or function of the town, namely, the municipality in its character of a trade monopoly. Hence the modern survivals of the Gild Merchant help to elucidate its actual functions in ancient times. In a few boroughs the select governing body of the town — the narrow civic corporation, in distinction from the burgesses or freemen at large — succeeded to the name and traditions of the Gild Merchant. In some of these cases the signification of the latter gradually dwindled down to a periodical civic feast of the privileged few. . . . In the eighteenth century we meet the word much less frequently than in the seventeenth; and toward the beginning of the present century it became very rare. The Municipal Corporations Commission, in 1835, found it still used in only a few boroughs. The remnants of the Gild Merchant and of the craft fraternities were rapidly vanishing before the new ideas of a more liberal age, — the age of laissez faire. The onerous, self-destructive restrictions of gilds were now being superseded by the stimulating measures of Chambers of Commerce. More than six centuries elapsed before the enactment of Magna Carta that all merchants 'may go through England, by land and water, to buy and sell, free from all unjust imposts,' became a realised fact throughout the realm. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 provided that 'every person in any borough may keep any shop for the sale of all lawful wares and merchandizes by wholesale or retail, and use every lawful trade, occupation, mystery, and handicraft, for hire, gain, sale, or otherwise, within any borough.' In a single town of England the Gild Merchant still subsists, but only as the shadow of its former self — a spectre from the distant past. At Preston the Gild Merchant has been 'celebrated' regularly once every twenty years for more than three centuries, on which occasions the burgesses renew their freedom and indulge in all the festivities of a civic carnival. The last Gild Merchant was held in 1882. There was then much feasting and dancing, there were gay processions of townsmen, and much talk of the glories of the past. And yet how few even of the scholars and noblemen there assembled from various parts of Great Britain knew what an important rôle the Gild Merchant had played in the annals of English municipal history, what strange vicissitudes it had undergone, what a remarkable transformation the centuries had wrought in it."—C. Gross, *The Gild Merchant, ch. 1 and 9 (v. 1).*—"The rise of the craft gilds is, roughly speaking, a century later [than the rise of the merchant gilds]; isolated examples occur early in the twelfth century, they become more numerous as the century advances, and in the thirteenth century they appear in all branches of manufacture and in every industrial centre. Craft gilds were associations of all the artisans engaged in a particular industry in a particular town, for certain common purposes. . . . Their appearance marks the second stage in the history of industry, the transition from the family system to the artisan (or gild) system. In the former there was no class of artisans properly so called; no class, that is to say, of men whose time was entirely or chiefly devoted to a particular manufacture; and this because all the needs of a family or other domestic group, whether of monastery or manor-house, were satisfied by the labours of the members of the group itself. The latter, on the contrary, is marked by the presence of a body of men each of whom was occupied more or less completely in one particular manufacture. The very growth from the one to the other system, therefore, is an example of 'division of labour,' or, to use a better phrase, of 'division of employments.' . . . When the place of the young manufactures of the twelfth century in the development of mediæval society is thus conceived, the discussion as to a possible Roman 'origin' of the gilds loses much of its interest. No doubt modern historians have exaggerated the breach in continuity between the Roman and the barbarian world; no doubt the artisans in the later Roman Empire had an organization somewhat like that of the later gilds. Moreover, it is possible that in one or two places in Gaul certain artisan corporations may have had a continuous existence from the fifth to the twelfth century. It is even possible that Roman regulations may have served as models for the organization of servile artisans on the lands of monasteries and great nobles, — from which, on the continent, some of the later craft gilds doubtless sprang. But when we see that the growth of an artisan class, as distinguished from isolated artisans here and there, was impossible till the twelfth century, because society had not yet reached the stage in which it was profitable or safe for a considerable number of men to confine themselves to any occupation except agriculture; and that the ideas which governed the craft gilds were not peculiar to themselves but common to the whole society of the time; then the elements of organization which may conceivably have been derived from or suggested by the Roman artisan corporations become of quite secondary importance. There is, as we have said, little doubt that some of the craft gilds of France and Germany were originally organizations of artisan serfs on the manors of great lay or ecclesiastical lords. This may also have been the case in some places in England, but no evidence has yet been adduced to show that it was so. . . . The relation of the craft gilds to the merchant gild is a still more difficult question. In many of the towns of Germany and the Netherlands a desperate struggle took place during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries between a burgher oligarchy, who monopolized the municipal government, and were still further strengthened in many cases by union in a merchant gild, and the

artisans organized in their craft gilds; the craftsmen fighting first for the right of having gilds of their own, and then for a share in the government of the town. These facts have been easily fitted into a symmetrical theory of industrial development; the merchant gilds, it is said, were first formed for protection against feudal lords, but became exclusive, and so rendered necessary the formation of craft gilds; and in the same way the craft gilds became exclusive afterwards, and the journeymen were compelled to form societies of their own for protection against the masters. . . . The very neatness of such a theory, the readiness with which it has been accepted by popular writers in spite of the paucity of English evidence, have perhaps led some historians to treat it with scant consideration. . . . At the end of the reign of Edward III. there were in London forty-eight companies or crafts, each with a separate organization and officers of its own, a number which had increased to at least sixty before the close of the century."—W. J. Ashley, *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, bk.* 1, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 1)—"The unions known by the names of mystery, faculty, trade, fellowship, or (from the fact of possessing particular costumes) livery company, existed in large numbers throughout the realm, and were frequently divided into two or three categories. Thus in London the principal crafts were the twelve 'substantial companies' or 'livery companies' [Mercers, Grocers, Drapers, Fishmongers, Goldsmiths, Skinners, Merchant Tailors, Haberdashers, Salters, Ironmongers, Vintners, Clothworkers]. . . . A perfect acquaintance with the details of the trade and the desire as well as the ability to produce good work were in all cases preliminary requisites [of membership]. In fact the main provisions of the craft, the very soul of its constitution, were the regulations intended to ensure the excellence of the products and the capacity of the workman. . . . The whole character of the craft guild is explained by these regulations"—E. R. A. Seligman, *Mediæval Guilds of England* (*Am. Econ. Ass'n v.* 2, *no.* 5), *pt.* 2, *sect.* 2.

Also in: W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng., ch.* 11.—W. Herbert, *Hist. of Twelve Great Livery Companies.* See Hansa Towns; Commune; and Social Movements: A. D. 1720–1800.

GUILDS OF FLANDERS.—"In the course of the tenth century Bruges had waxed great and wealthy through its trade with England, while the Ghent people constructed a port at the junction of their two rivers. The Flemings, nevertheless, were still noted for the boorishness of their demeanour, their addiction to intemperance, and their excessive turbulence. Their pagan ancestors had been accustomed to form associations for their mutual protection against accidents by fire or water, and similar misadventures. These unions were called 'Minne,' or Friendships—an idea reproduced in the 'Amicitiæ,' to which allusion is so frequently made in the deeds of ancient corporations. . . . After a time the name of 'Minne' came to be supplanted by that of 'Ghilde,' meaning a feast at the common expense. Each ghilde was placed under the tutelage of a departed hero, or demigod, and was managed by officers elected by the members—social equality being the foundation of each fraternity. Subsequent to the introduction of Christianity the demigod was replaced by a saint, while the members were enjoined to practise works of piety. . . . The Ghildes were the base of the municipal administration, and gradually assumed the government of the town, but took another form and appellation. The word was thenceforward applied, in its restricted sense of Guild, as referring to trade corporations, while the previous organisation came to be described in French and Latin documents as Commune or Communia, and embraced all who were entitled to gather together in the cauter, or public place, when the bell rang out the summons from the town belfry. In Flanders the Communes grew out of popular institutions of ancient date, and, though, no doubt, their influence was sensibly increased by their confirmation at the hands of King or Count, they did not owe their origin to royal or seigniorial charters."—J. Hutton, *James and Philip Van Artevelde, pt.* 1, *ch.* 1.

GUILDS OF FLORENCE. See Florence: A. D. 1250–1293.

GUILFORD COURT HOUSE, Battle of (1781). See United States of Am.: A. D. 1780–1781.

GUILLOTINE, The origin of the.—"It was during these winter months [of the session of the French National Assembly, 1790] that Dr. Guillotin read his long discourse upon the reformation of the penal code; of which the 'Moniteur' has not preserved a single word. This discourse attracts our attention on two accounts:—First, it proposed a decree that there should be but one kind of punishment for capital crimes; secondly, that the arm of the executioner should be replaced by the action of a machine, which Dr. Guillotin had invented. 'With the aid of my machine,' said the glib doctor, 'I will make your head spring off in the twinkling of an eye, and you will suffer nothing.' Bursts of laughter met this declaration; nevertheless, the Assembly listened with attention, and adopted the proposal."—G. H. Lewes, *Life of Robespierre, ch.* 10.

Also in: G. Everitt, *Guillotine the Great and her Successors.*—J. W. Croker, *Hist. of the Guillotine.*

GUINEGATE, Battle of (1478).—A bloody but indecisive battle, fought between the French, on one side, and Flemish and Burgundian troops on the other, in the war produced by the attempt of Louis XI. to rob Mary of Burgundy of her heritage. It was followed by a long truce, and a final treaty.—E. Smedley, *Hist. of France, pt.* 1, *ch.* 17.

Battle of (1513). See France: A. D. 1513–1515.

GUINES, Treaty of (1547). See France: A. D. 1532–1547.

GUISCARD, Robert, and Roger and the Norman conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily. See Italy: A. D. 1000–1090; and 1081–1194.

GUISE, Dukes of, Assassination. See France: A. D. 1560–1563; 1584–1589.

GUISES, The. See France: A. D. 1547–1559.

GUIZOT'S MINISTRY. See France: A. D. 1841–1848.

GUJERAT, Battle of (1849). See India: A. D. 1845–1849.

GUNBOATS, Jefferson's. See United States of Am.: A. D. 1804–1805

GUNPOWDER PLOT, The. See England: A. D. 1605.

GURKHAS, OR GOORKAS, The. See India: The aboriginal inhabitants.

GURU, OR GOOROO. See Sikhs.

GUSTAVUS (I.) Vasa, King of Sweden, A. D. 1523–1560. See Scandinavian States: A. D. 1397–1527, and 1523–1604.....**Gustavus (II.) Adolphus, King of Sweden, 1611–1632.—Campaigns and death in Germany.** See Germany: A. D. 1630–1631, to 1631–1632.....**Gustavus III., King of Sweden, 1771–1792.....Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 1792–1809.**

GUTBORM, King of Norway, A. D. 1204–1205.

GUTENBERG, and the invention of Printing. See Printing: A. D. 1430–1456.

GUTSTADT, Battle of. See Germany: A. D. 1807 (February—June).

GUTHRIE, The founding of the city of. See United States of Am.: A. D. 1889–1890.

GUTTONES, The. See Prussian Language, The Old.

GUUCHIES, The. See American Aborigines: Pampas Tribes.

GUY FAWKES' DAY.—November 5, the anniversary of the day on which the conspirators of the "Gunpowder Plot" intended to blow up King and Parliament, in England. See England: A. D. 1605.

GWENT. See Britain: 6th Century.

GWLEDIG.—A Welsh title, signifying ruler, or prince, which was taken by the native leader in Britain after the Romans left. He was the successor of the Roman Duke of Britain.—J. Rhys, *Celtic Britain, ch.* 8.—See, also, Arthur, King.

GWYNEDD. See Britain: 6th Century.

GYLIPPUS, and the defense of Syracuse. See Syracuse: B. C. 415–413.

GYMNASIA, German. See Education, Modern: European Countries.—Prussia: A. D. 1874.

GYMNASIA, Greek.—"Amongst public buildings [of the ancient Greeks] we mentioned first the gymnasia, which, originating in the requirements of single persons, soon became centre-points of Greek life. Corporeal exercise was of great importance amongst the Greeks, and the games and competitions in the various kinds of bodily skill . . . formed a chief feature of their religious feasts. This circumstance reacted on both sculpture and architecture, in supplying the former with models of ideal beauty, and in setting the task to the latter of providing suitable places for these games to be celebrated. For purposes of this kind (as far as public exhibition was not concerned) the palæstrai and gymnasia served. In earlier times these two must be distinguished. In the palæstra . . . young men practised wrestling and boxing. As these arts were gradually developed, larger establishments with separate compartments became necessary. Originally such places were, like the schools of the grammarians, kept by private persons; sometimes they consisted only of open spaces, if possible near a brook and surrounded by trees. Soon, however, regular buildings—gymnasia—became necessary. At first they consisted of an uncovered court surrounded by colonnades, adjoining which lay covered spaces, the former being used for running and jumping, the latter for wrestling. In the same degree as these exercises became more developed, and as grown-up men began to take an interest in these youthful sports, and spent a great part of their day at the gymnasia, these grew in size and splendour. They soon became a necessary of life, and no town could be without them, larger cities often containing several."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans, sect.* 25.—Of gymnasia "there were many at Athens, though three only, those of the Academy, Lyceum, and Cynosarges, have acquired celebrity. The site of the first of these gymnasia being low and marshy was in ancient times infested with malaria, but having been drained by Cimon and planted with trees it became a favourite promenade and place of exercise. Here, in walks shaded by the sacred olive, might be seen young men with crowns of rushes in flower upon their heads, enjoying the sweet odour of the smilax and the white poplar, while the platanos and the elm mingled their murmurs in the breeze of spring. The meadows of the Academy, according to Aristophanes the grammarian, were planted with the Apragmosune, a sort of flower so called as though it smelt of all kind of fragrance and safety, like our heart's-ease or flower of the Trinity. This place is supposed to have derived its name from Ecadamos, a public-spirited man who bequeathed his property for the purpose of keeping it in order. . . . The name of the Lyceum, sometimes derived from Lycus, son of Pandion, probably owed its origin to the temenos of Lycian Apollo there situated. It lay near the banks of the Ilissos, and was adorned with stately edifices, fountains and groves. . . . In this place anciently the Polemarch held his court and the forces of the republic were exercised before they went forth to war. Appended to the name of the Cynosarges, or third gymnasium surrounded with groves, was a legend which related that when Diomos was sacrificing to Hestia, a white dog snatched away a part of the victim from the altar, and running straightway out of the city deposited it on the spot where this gymnasium was afterwards erected."—J. A. St. John, *The Hellenes, bk.* 2, *ch.* 5—"The name of that most illustrious of the Athenian gymnasia, the Academy, has been preserved through the dark ages, and exactly in the situation indicated by ancient testimony. We are informed that the Academy was six or eight stades distant from a gate in the wall of the asty named Dipylum, and that the road from thence to the Academy led through that part of the outer Ceramicus, in which it was a custom to bury the Athenian citizens who had fallen in battle on important occasions. Dipylum was the gate from whence began the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. . . . It appears also that the Academy lay between the Sacred Way and the Colonus Hippius, a height near the Cephissus, sacred to Neptune, and the scene of the Œdipus Coloneus of Sophocles; for the Academy was not far from Colonus, and the latter was ten stades distant from the city. That part of the plain which is near the olive-groves, on the northeastern side of Athens, and is now called Akadhimia, is entirely in conformity with these data. It is on the lowest level, where some water-courses from the ridges of Lycabettus are consumed in gardens and olive plantations."—W. M. Leake, *Topography of Athens, sect.* 2.—See, also, Education, Ancient: Greece.

GYMNASIARCH. See LITURGIES.

GYPSIES, The.—"Having in various and distant countries lived in habits of intimacy with these people, I have come to the following conclusions respecting them: that wherever they are found, their manners and customs are virtually the same, though somewhat modified by circumstances, and that the language they speak amongst themselves, and of which they are particularly anxious to keep others in ignorance, is in all countries one and the same, but has been subjected more or less to modification; and lastly, that their countenances exhibit a decided family resemblance, but are darker or fairer according to the temperature of the climate, but invariably darker, at least in Europe, than the natives of the countries in which they dwell, for example, England and Russia, Germany and Spain. The names by which they are known differ with the country, though, with one or two exceptions, not materially; for example, they are styled in Russia, Zigani; in Turkey and Persia, Zingarri; and in Germany, Zigeuner; all which words apparently spring from the same etymon, which there is no improbability in supposing to be 'Zincali,' a term by which these people, especially those of Spain, sometimes designate themselves, and the meaning of which is believed to be, 'The black men of Zend or Ind.' In England and Spain they are commonly known as Gypsies and Gitanos, from a general belief that they were originally Egyptians, to which the two words are tantamount; and in France as Bohemians, from the circumstance that Bohemia was the first country in civilized Europe where they made their appearance; though there is reason for supposing that they had been wandering in the remote regions of Sclavonia for a considerable time previous, as their language abounds with words of Sclavonic origin, which could not have been adopted in a hasty passage through a wild and half populated country. But they generally style themselves and the language which they speak, Rommany. This word . . . is of Sanscrit origin, and signifies, 'The Husbands,' or that which pertaineth unto them. From whatever motive this appellation may have originated, it is perhaps more applicable than any other to a sect or caste like them, who have no love and no affection beyond their own race; who are capable of making great sacrifices for each other, and who gladly prey upon all the rest of the human species, whom they detest, and by whom they are hated and despised. It will perhaps not be out of place to observe here, that there is no reason for supposing that the word Roma or Rommany is derived from the Arabic word which signifies Greece or Grecians, as some people not much acquainted with the language of the race in question have imagined. . . . Scholars have asserted that the language which they speak proves them to be of Indian stock, and undoubtedly a great number of their words are Sanscrit. . . . There is scarcely a part of the habitable world where they are not to be found; their tents are alike pitched on the heaths of Brazil and the ridges of the Himalayan hills, and their language is heard at Moscow and Madrid, in the streets of London and Stamboul."—G. Borrow, *The Zincali*, *v.* 1, *pp.* 2–5.—"One day, 450 years ago, or thereabouts, there knocked at the gates of the city of Lüneburg, on the Elbe, as strange a rabble rout as had ever been seen by German burgher. There were 300 of them, men and women, accompanied by an extraordinary number of children. They were dusky of skin, with jet-black hair and eyes; they wore strange garments; they were unwashed and dirty even beyond the liberal limits tolerated by the cold-water-fearing citizens of Lüneburg; they had with them horses, donkeys, and carts; they were led by two men whom they described as Duke and Count. . . . All the Lüneburgers turned out to gaze open-mouthed at these pilgrims, while the Duke and the Count told the authorities their tale, which was wild and romantic. . . . Many years before, they explained, while the tears of penitence stood in the eyes of all but the youngest children, they had been a Christian community, living in ortho doxy, and therefore happiness, in a far-off country known as Egypt. . . . They were then a happy Christian flock. To their valley came the Saracens, an execrable race, worshipping Mahound. Yielding, in an evil hour, to the threats and persecutions of their conquerors, they—here they turned their faces and wept aloud—they abjured Christ. But thereafter they had no rest or peace, and a remorse so deep fell upon their souls that they were fain to arise, leave their homes, and journey to Rome in hope of getting reconciliation with the Church. They were graciously received by the Pope, who promised to admit them back into the fold after seven years of penitential wandering. They had letters of credit from King Sigismund—would the Lüneburgers kindly look at them?—granting safe conduct and recommending them to the protection of all honest people. The Lüneburg folk were touched at the recital of so much suffering in a cause so good; they granted the request of the strangers. They allowed them to encamp. . . . The next day the strangers visited the town. In the evening a good many things were missed, especially those unconsidered trifles which a housewife may leave about her doorway. Poultry became suddenly scarce; eggs doubled in price; it was rumoured that purses had been lost while their owners gazed at the strangers; cherished cups of silver were not to be found. . . . While the Lüneburgers took counsel, in their leisurely way, how to meet a case so uncommon, the pilgrims suddenly decamped, leaving nothing behind them but the ashes of their fires and the picked bones of the purloined poultry. . . . This was the first historical appearance of Gipsies. It was a curious place to appear in. The mouth of the Elbe is a long way from Egypt, even if you travel by sea, which does not appear to have been the case, and a journey on land not only would have been infinitely more fatiguing, but would, one would think, have led to some notice on the road before reaching Lüneburg. There, however, the Gipsies certainly are first heard of, and henceforth history has plenty to say about their doings. From Lüneburg they went to Hamburg, Lübeck, Rostock, Griefswald, travelling in an easterly direction. They are mentioned as having appeared in Saxony, where they were driven away, as at Lüneburg, for their thievish propensities. They travelled through Switzerland, headed by their great Duke Michael, and pretending to have been expelled from Egypt by the Turks. Their story in these early years, though it varied in particulars,

remained the same in essentials. In Provence they called themselves Saracens; in Swabia they were Egyptians doomed to everlasting wanderings for having refused hospitality to the Virgin and Joseph; at Bâle, where they exhibited letters of safe conduct from the Pope, they were also Egyptians. Always the Land of the Nile; always the same pretence, or it may be reminiscence, of sojourn in Egypt; always, to soothe the suspicions of priests, faithful and submissive sons of the Church. From the very first their real character was apparent. They lie, cheat, and steal at Lüneburg; they lie and steal everywhere; they tell fortunes and cut purses, they buy and sell horses, they poison pigs, they rob and plunder, they wander and they will not work. They first came to Paris in the year 1427, when more people went to see them, we are told, than ever crowded to the Fair of Laudet. . . . They remained at St. Denis for a month, when they received peremptory orders to quit for the usual reason. . . . In the 16th century trouble began for the Roman folk. By this time their character was perfectly well known. They were called Bohemians, Heathen, Gitanos, Pharaohites, Robbers, Tartars, and Zigeuner. They had abandoned the old lying story of the penitential wanderings; they were outcasts; their hand was against every man's hand; their customs were the same then as they are described now by Leland or Borrow."—*Gipsies and their Friends* (*Temple Bar*, *v.* 47), *pp.* 65–67.—"Since the publication of Pott's book upon the gypsies [*Die Zigeuner in Europa und Asien*]—about 30 years ago—we have come to regard the origin of this singular people with considerable unanimity of opinion. Almost nobody doubts now that they are Indians; and the assumption that all the gypsies scattered throughout Europe are descended from one parent stock meets with little contradiction. Both of these beliefs are the outcome of the investigation of their language. . . . Pott, in the introduction to his book, and quoting from the 'Shah-Name' of Firdousi, informs us that, during the 5th century of our era, the Persian monarch, Behram Gour, received from an Indian king 12,000 musicians of both sexes, who were known as Luris. Now, as this is the name by which the gypsies of Persia are known even at the present day, and as, moreover, the author of the Persian work 'Modjmal at-tawarikh' emphatically says that the Luris or Lulis of modern Persia are the descendants of these same 12,000 musicians, there is no hazard in the assumption that we have here the first recorded gypsy migration. Confirmation of this is afforded by the Arabian historian, Hamza of Ispahan, who wrote half a century before Firdousi, and who was well versed in the history of the Sassanides. It is related by this author that Behram Gour caused 12,000 musicians, called Zott, to be sent from India for the benefit of his subjects. And 'Zott' is the name by which the gypsies were known to the Arabs, and which they even bear in Damascus at the present day. In the Arabic dictionary 'al-Kamus' this entry occurs: 'Zott, arabicized from Jatt, a people of Indian origin. The word might be pronounced Zatt with equal correctness.' . . . For the fatherland of these Zott, or Jatt, we have not long to seek. . . . Istakhri and Ibn-Haukal, the celebrated 10th-century geographers, recount as follows:—'Between al-Mansura and Mokran the waters of the Indus have formed marshes, the borders of which are inhabited by certain Indian tribes, called Zott; those of them who dwell near the river live in huts, like the huts of the Berbers, and subsist chiefly on fish and water-fowl; while those occupying the level country further inland live like the Kurds, supporting themselves on milk, cheese, and maize.' In these same regions there are yet two more tribes placed by these geographers, namely, the Bodha and the Meid. The former are properly, according to Ibn Haukal, a subdivision of the Zott. . . . In course of time the Meds (to adopt the spelling favoured by Sir Henry Elliott) overcame the Zotts, whom they treated with such severity that they had to leave the country. The Zotts then established themselves on the river Pehen, where they soon became skilful sailors"; while those living farther to the north, known as Kikan, became famed as breeders of horses and herders of buffalos. When the Arabs, in their career of conquest, came in contact with the Zotts, the latter joined them, and large colonies of them were removed, for some reason, to western Asia, and settled with their herds on the lower Euphrates and Tigris, and in Syria. The Zotts on the Tigris became strong and troublesome in time, and in 834 the khalif Motacem, after subjugating them by force, removed them from the country, to the number of 27,000, sending them to Ainzarba, on the northern frontier of Syria. In 855, Ainzarba was captured by the Byzantines, who carried off the Zotts, with all their buffalo herds. "Here, then, we have the first band of gypsies brought into the Greek Empire. . . . As regards the destinies of the Zotts after they had been brought to Asia Minor from Ainzarba, in the year 855, I have been unable—in the course of a hurried search—to discover anything. But, now that we know the year in which they entered Byzantine territory, others may be more successful. Whether the name Zott, or rather its Indian form Jatt (or Jaut), has also been brought with them into Europe, I am, of course, as little able to say."—M. J. de Goeje, *A Contribution to the Hist of the Gypsies* (In "*Acc'ts of the Gypsies of India*," *ed by D MacRitchie*).—"Students of the gipsies, and especially those who have interested themselves in the history of the race, will have read with regret the announcement of the death, at Paris, on March 1st, of the veteran 'tsiganologue,' M. Paul Bataillard. For the last half century he had devoted his leisure time to the study of the early notices of the presence of gipsies in Europe. . . . It was his opinion that there have been gipsies in Eastern Europe since prehistoric times, and that it is to them Europe owes its knowledge of metallurgy. Heterodox although this opinion may be, it has recently been observed by Mr. F. H. Groome that 'Bataillard's theory is gaining favour with foreign archæologists, among whom MM. Mortillet, Chantre, and Burnouf had arrived independently at similar conclusions.'"—*The Athenæum*, *March* 31, 1894.

ALSO IN: C. G. Leland, *English Gipsies*, *ch.* 8–10.—W. Simson, *Hist. of the Gipsies*.

GYRWAS.—"Fen-folk"—the name taken by a body of Engle freebooters who occupied the islands in the Fen district of England for a long time before they were able to possess the Roman-British towns and country on its border. —J. R. Green, *The Making of England*, *ch.* 2.—See ENGLAND: A. D. 547–633.

H.

HAARLEM. Siege and capture by Alva. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1572–1573.

HABEAS CORPUS, Act and Writ of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1679 (MAY)..... **President Lincoln's suspension of the Writ.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861–1863.

HABSBURG, or HAPSBURGH, Origin of the house of. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1246–1282.

HABSBURG-LORRAINE, The House of. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1745 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER).

HACKINSACKS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

HADRIAN, Roman Emperor, A. D. 117–138.....Hadrian I., Pope, 772–795.....Hadrian II., Pope, 867–872.....Hadrian III., Pope, 884–885.....Hadrian IV., Pope, 1154–1159.....Hadrian V., Pope, 1276, July to August.

HADRIANOPLE. See ADRIANOPLE.

HADRIAN'S MAUSOLEUM. See CASTLE ST. ANGELO.

HADRIAN'S WALL. See ROMAN WALLS IN BRITAIN.

HADRUMETUM, OR ADRUMETUM. See CARTHAGE, THE DOMINION OF.

HÆDUI, The. See ÆDUI.

HÆMUS, Mount.—The ancient name of the Balkan chain of mountains.

HÆRRED, The. See HUNDRED, THE.

HAGENAU, Treaty of (1330). See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1330–1364.

HAGUE, The: Origin and Name.—"Unlike other Dutch cities, the Hague owed its importance, not to commerce or manufactures, but to having early been made the seat of government of the United Provinces, and to the constant presence of the officers of state and the foreign ministers accredited to the republic. For four centuries the abode of the counts of Holland, it derives its name from the 'Haeg' or hedge encircling the magnificent park which formed their ancient hunting ground."—J. R. Brodhead, *Hist. of the State of N. Y.*, v. 1 *p.* 61.

HAGUENAU: Cession to France. See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

HAHNEMANN, and Homœopathy. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: 17TH–18TH CENTURIES.

HAIDAS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SKITTAGETAN FAMILY.

HAIDERABAD, OR HYDERABAD, The Nizam of. See INDIA: A. D. 1662–1748; and 1877.

HAINAULT.—Hainault, the region of the Netherlands occupied anciently by the Nervii, became a county under hereditary lords in the 9th century. In the 11th century it was joined by marriage to the territories of the counts of Flanders, and so remained until the beginning of the 14th century. In 1300 Hainault and Holland became joined under the same family of counts. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 922–1345.

HAITI. See HAYTI.

HAKO, OR HAKON I. (called the Good), King of Norway, A. D. 940–968.....Hako II. (Jarl), King of Norway, 977–995.....Hako III., King of Norway, 1202–1204.....Hako IV., King of Norway, 1207–1263.....Hako V., King of Norway, 1299–1319.....Hako VI., King of Norway, 1343–1380.

HALF-BREEDS. See STALWARTS.

HALFWAY COVENANT, The. See BOSTON: A. D. 1657–1669.

HALIARTUS, Battle of (B. C. 395). See GREECE: B. C. 399–387.

HALICARNASSUS. See CARIANS; and ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES; also, MACEDONIA: B. C. 334–330.

HALIDON HILL, Battle of (1333). See BERWICK-UPON-TWEED: A. D. 1293–1333; and SCOTLAND: A. D. 1332–1333.

HALIFAX: A. D. 1749.—The founding of the city.—"In the year [1749] after the peace [of Aix-la-Chapelle] the land forces in Great Britain were reduced to little more than 18,000 men; those in Minorca, Gibraltar, and the American plantations, to 10,000; while the sailors retained in the Royal Navy were under 17,000. From the large number both of soldiers and seamen suddenly discharged, it was feared that they might be either driven to distress or tempted to depredation. Thus, both for their own comfort and for the quiet of the remaining community, emigration seemed to afford a safe and excellent resource. The province of Nova Scotia was pitched upon for this experiment, and the freehold of fifty acres was offered to each settler, with ten acres more for every child brought with him, besides a free passage, and an exemption from all taxes during a term of ten years. Allured by such advantages, above 4,000 persons, with their families, embarked under the command of Colonel Cornwallis, and landed at the harbour of Chebuctow. The new town which soon arose from their labours received its name from the Earl of Halifax, who presided at the Board of Trade, and who had the principal share in the foundation of this colony. In the first winter there were but 300 huts of wood, surrounded by a palisade."—Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *Hist. of Eng.*, 1713–1783, *ch.* 31 (*v.* 4).—See, also, NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749–1755.

HALIFAX CURRENCY.—"For many years Canada used what was called 'Halifax currency,' in which the nomenclature of sterling money was that employed, but having a pound of this currency valued at four dollars."—G. Bryce, *Short Hist. of the Canadian People*, *p.* 488.

HALIFAX FISHERY AWARD. See FISHERIES, NORTH AMERICAN: A. D. 1877–1888.

HALLECK, General Henry W. Command in Missouri. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (JULY—NOVEMBER)....., **Command in the Valley of the Mississippi.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: TENNESSEE); (APRIL—MAY: TENNESSEE—MISSISSIPPI); (JUNE—OCTOBER: TENNESSEE—KENTUCKY)..... **Command of all the armies.**—See SAME: 1862 (SEPT.—OCT.: MISS.).

HALMAHEIRA. See MOLUCCAS.

HAMADAN.—The capital city of ancient Media.

HAMATH, Kingdom of.—"It is impossible to doubt that the Hamathites are identical with the Canaanitish tribe that was settled in the town of Hamath, afterwards called Epiphania, on the Orontes, between the Hittites and the Amorites of Kadesh. After the time of David they were succeeded in that town by the Aramæans."—F. Lenormant, *Manual of Ancient Hist. of the East*, *bk.* 6, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 2).

HAMBURG: In the Hanseatic League. See HANSA TOWNS.

A. D. 1801-1803.—One of six Free Cities which survived the Peace of Luneville. See GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803.

A. D. 1806.—Occupied and oppressed by the French. See GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1810.—Annexation to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (FEBRUARY—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1810-1815.—Loss and recovery of the autonomy of a Free City. See CITIES, IMPERIAL AND FREE, OF GERMANY.

A. D. 1813.—Expulsion of the French. See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813.

A. D. 1813.—Defense by Marshal Davoust. See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1815.—Once more a Free City and a member of the Germanic Confederation. See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1888.—Surrender of free privileges.—Absorption in the Zollverein and Empire. See GERMANY: A. D. 1888

HAMILCAR BARCA, and the First Punic War. See PUNIC WAR, THE FIRST.

HAMILTON, Alexander, and the Federal Constitution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1787, and 1787-1789. . . . . **Financial Statesmanship.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1789-1792; also, TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1789-1791. . . . . **The Federal Party.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1789-1792; and 1797-1799. . . . . **Fatal Duel.** See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1806-1807.

HAMILTON COLLEGE. See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1793-1812.

HAMITES.—HAMITIC LANGUAGES.—The name Hamites, as now used among ethnologists, is restricted more closely than it once was to certain African races, whose languages are found to be related. The languages classed as Hamitic are those of the ancient Egyptians and the modern Copts, most of the Abyssinian tribes, the Gallas and the Berbers. Some of the older writers, Lenormant, for example, embraced the Phœnicians and all their Canaanite neighbors among the Hamites; but this is not now an accepted view. It was undoubtedly formed under the influence of the theory from which the name Hamites came, namely that the people so designated were descendants of Ham; and it sought to adjust a division of the Hamitic family to four lines of descent, indicated by the Biblical account of the four sons of Ham,—Cush, Mizraim, Phut, and Canaan. This hypothesis identified the Cushites with the Ethiopians (modern Abyssinians and Nubians), the descendants of Mizraim with the Egyptians, those of Phut with the Libyans, and those of Canaan with the Canaanites, including the Phœnicians. Some held that the Hamites occupied originally a great part of western and southern Asia; that they were the primitive inhabitants of southern Mesopotamia, or Chaldea, southern Persia, and southern Arabia, and were displaced by the Semites; also that they once inhabited the most of Asia Minor, and that the Carians were a surviving remnant of them. But the more conservative sense in which the term Hamite is now used restricts it, as stated above, to certain races which are grouped together by a relationship in their languages. Whether or not the Hamitic tongues have an affinity to the Semitic seems still an open question; and, in fact, the whole subject is in an undetermined state, as may be inferred from the following extract: "The so-called Hamitic or sub-Semitic languages of Northern Africa . . . exhibit resemblances to the language of ancient Egypt as well as to those of the Semitic family. In the Libyan dialects we find the same double verbal form employed with the same double function as in Assyrian, and throughout the 'Hamitic' languages the causative is denoted by a prefixed sibilant as it was in the parent Semitic speech. We cannot argue, however, from language to race, . . . and the Libyans have ethnologically no connection with the Semites or the Egyptians. Moreover, in several instances the 'Hamitic' dialects are spoken by tribes of negro or Nubian origin, while the physiological characteristics of the Egyptians are very different from those of the Semite."—A. H. Sayce, *The Races of the Old Testament, ch* 4.

HAMPDEN, John. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1634-1637; 1640-1641; 1642 (JANUARY), (OCTOBER—DECEMBER); and 1643 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER).

HAMPDEN CLUBS. See ENGLAND. A. D. 1816-1820.

HAMPTON COURT CONFERENCE. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1604.

HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE. See UNITED STATES: A. D. 1865 (FEBRUARY).

HAN, Children of. See CHINA.

HANAU, Battle of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

HANCOCK, John, and the American Revolution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (MAY—AUGUST); and 1776 (JULY).

HANDVESTS. See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1559-1562.

HANES.—An ancient Egyptian city, once mentioned in the Bible by that name (Isaiah xxx. 4). Its ruins have been identified, about 70 miles above Cairo, on the western bank of the Nile. The Egyptian name of the city was Chenensu; the Greek name Heracleopolis.—R. S. Poole, *Cities of Egypt, ch.* 3.

HANNIBAL, The war of, with Rome. See PUNIC WAR, THE SECOND.

HANOVER, OR BRUNSWICK-LÜNEBURG: Origin of the Kingdom and House. See SAXONY: THE OLD DUCHY, and A. D. 1178-1183.

The Guelf connection. See GUELFS AND GHIBELLINES; and ESTE, HOUSE OF.

A. D. 1529.—The Duke joins in the Protest which gave origin to the name Protestants. See PAPACY. A. D. 1525-1529.

A. D. 1546.—Final separation from the Wolfenbüttel branch of the House.—The two principalities of Brunswick and Lüneburg, which had been divided, were reunited by Ernest, called the Confessor. On his death, in 1546, they were again divided, the heir of his elder son taking Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, or Brunswick, and the younger receiving Brunswick-Lüneburg, or Hanover. From the latter branch sprang the Electoral House of Hanover, and the present royal family of England; from the former descended the Ducal Brunswick family.—Sir A. Halliday, *Annals of the House of Hanover, bk.* 9 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1648.—Losses and acquisitions in the Peace of Westphalia.—The alternating Bishopric. See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

A. D. 1692.—Rise to Electoral rank. See GERMANY: A. D. 1648–1705; and 1125–1272.

A. D. 1694-1696.—The war of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. See FRANCE: A. D. 1694; and 1695–1696.

A. D. 1701.—Settlement of the Succession of the Brunswick-Lüneberg line to the English Crown. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1701.

A. D. 1714.—Succession of the Elector to the British Crown. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1714.

A. D. 1720.—Acquisition of the duchies of Bremen and Verden by the Elector. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN). A. D. 1719–1721.

A. D. 1741.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Neutrality declared. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (AUGUST—NOVEMBER).

A. D. 1745.—The English-Hanoverian defeat at Fontenoy. See NETHERLANDS (THE AUSTRIAN PROVINCES): A. D. 1745.

A. D. 1757-1762.—French attack and British defense of the electorate in the Seven Years War. See GERMANY: A. D. 1757 (JULY—DECEMBER), to 1761–1762.

A. D. 1763.—The Peace of Paris, ending the Seven Years War. See SEVEN YEARS WAR: THE TREATIES.

A. D. 1776.—Troops hired to Great Britain for service in the American War. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776 (JANUARY—JUNE).

A. D. 1801-1803.—Annexation of Osnabruck. See GERMANY: A. D. 1801–1803.

A. D. 1803-1806.—Seizure by the French.—Cession to Prussia. See FRANCE: A. D. 1802–1803; and GERMANY: 1806 (JANUARY—AUGUST).

A. D. 1807.—Absorbed in the kingdom of Westphalia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE—JULY).

A. D. 1810.—Northern part annexed to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (FEBRUARY—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1813.—Deliverance from Napoleon.—Restoration to the King of England. See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1815.—Raised to the rank of a kingdom, with territorial enlargement. See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1837.—Separation of the Crown from that of Great Britain.—"From the hour that the Crown of these kingdoms [Great Britain and Ireland] devolved upon Queen Victoria, dates a change which was a real blessing in the relations of the Sovereign to the Continent of Europe. Hanover was at that instant wholly separated from Great Britain. By the law of that country a female could not reign except in default of heirs male in the Royal family. But in addition to the great advantage of separating the policy of England wholly from the intrigues and complications of a petty German State, it was an immediate happiness that the most hated and in some respects the most dangerous man in these islands was removed to a sphere where his political system might be worked out with less danger to the good of society than amongst a people where his influence was associated with the grossest follies of Toryism and the darkest designs of Orangeism. On the 24th of June the duke of Cumberland, now become Ernest Augustus, King of Hanover, left London. On the 28th he made a solemn entrance into the capital of his states, and at once exhibited to his new subjects his character and disposition by refusing to receive a deputation of the Chambers, who came to offer him their homage and their congratulations. By a proclamation of the 5th of July he announced his intention to abolish the representative constitution, which he had previously refused to recognize by the customary oath. We shall have little further occasion to notice the course of this worst disciple of the old school of intolerance and irresponsible government, and we may therefore at once state that he succeeded in depriving Hanover of the forms of freedom under which she had begun to live; ejected from their offices and banished some of the ablest professors of the University of Göttingen, who had ventured to think that letters would flourish best in a free soil; and reached the height of his ambition in becoming the representative of whatever in sovereign power was most repugnant to the spirit of the age."—C. Knight, *Popular Hist. of Eng.*, *v.* 8, *ch.* 23. See GERMANY: A. D. 1817–1840.

A. D. 1866.—Extinction of the kingdom. See GERMANY: A. D. 1866.

HANOVER, The Alliance of. See SPAIN: A. D. 1713–1725.

HANOVER JUNCTION, Engagement at. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY—JUNE: VIRGINIA).

HANSA TOWNS, The.—"In consequence of the liberty and security enjoyed by the inhabitants of the free towns [of Germany—see CITIES: IMPERIAL AND FREE, OF GERMANY], while the rest of the country was a prey to all the evils of feudal anarchy and oppression, they made a comparatively rapid progress in wealth and population. Nuremberg, Augsburg, Worms, Spires, Frankfort, and other cities, became at an early period celebrated alike for the extent of their commerce, the magnificence of their buildings, and the opulence of their citizens. . . . The commercial spirit awakened in the north about the same time as in the south of Germany. Hamburgh was founded by Charlemagne in the beginning of the ninth century, in the intention of serving as a fort to bridle the Saxons, who had been subjugated by the emperor. Its favourable situation on the Elbe necessarily rendered it a commercial emporium. Towards the close of the twelfth century, the inhabitants, who had already been extensively engaged in naval enterprizes, began to form the design of emancipating themselves from the authority of their counts, and of becoming a sovereign and independent state; and in 1189 they obtained an Imperial charter which gave them various privileges, including among others the power of electing councillors, or aldermen, to whom, in conjunction with the deputy of the count, the government of the town was to be entrusted. Not long after Hamburgh became entirely free. In 1224 the citizens purchased from Count Albert the renunciation of all his rights, whether real or pretended, to any property in or sovereignty over the town, and its immediate vicinity. And the government was thus early placed on that liberal footing on which it has ever since remained. Lubeck, situated on the Trave, was founded about the middle of the twelfth century. It rapidly grew to be a place of great trade. It

became the principal emporium for the commerce of the Baltic, and its merchants extended their dealings to Italy and the Levant. At a period when navigation was still imperfect, and when the seas were infested with pirates, it was of great importance to be able to maintain a safe intercourse by land between Lubeck and Hamburgh, as by that means the difficult and dangerous navigation of the Sound was avoided. And it is said by some, that the first political union between these cities had the protection of merchandise carried between them by land for its sole object. But this is contradicted by Lambec in his 'Origines Hamburgenses' (lib. xi., pa 26). . . . But whatever may have been the motives which led to the alliance between these two cities, it was the origin of the famous Hanseatic League, so called from the German word 'hansa,' signifying a corporation. There is no very distinct evidence as to the time when the alliance in question was established; but the more general opinion seems to be that it dates from the year 1241. . . . From the beginning of the twelfth century, the progress of commerce and navigation in the north was exceedingly rapid. The countries which stretch along the bottom of the Baltic from Holstein to Russia, and which had been occupied by barbarous tribes of Sclavonic origin, were then subjugated by the Kings of Denmark, the Dukes of Saxony, and other princes. The greater part of the inhabitants being exterminated, their place was filled by German colonists, who founded the towns of Stralsund, Rostock, Wismar, etc. Prussia and Poland were afterwards subjugated by the Christian princes, and the Knights of the Teutonic order. So that in a comparatively short period, the foundations of civilization and the arts were laid in countries whose barbarism had ever remained impervious to the Roman power. The cities that were established along the coasts of the Baltic, and even in the interior of the countries bordering upon it, eagerly joined the Hanseatic confederation. They were indebted to the merchants of Lubeck for supplies of the commodities produced in more civilized countries, and they looked up to them for protection against the barbarians by whom they were surrounded. The progress of the league was in consequence singularly rapid. Previously to the end of the thirteenth century it embraced every considerable city in all those vast countries extending from Livonia to Holland; and was a match for the most powerful monarchs. . . . The principal factory of the League was at Bruges in the Netherlands. Bruges became, at a very early period, one of the first commercial cities of Europe, and the centre of the most extensive trade carried on to the north of Italy. The art of navigation in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was so imperfect, that a voyage from Italy to the Baltic and back again could not be performed in a single season, and hence, for the sake of their mutual convenience, the Italian and Hanseatic merchants determined on establishing a magazine or store-house of their respective products in some intermediate situation. Bruges was fixed upon for this purpose, a distinction which it seems to have owed as much to the freedom enjoyed by the inhabitants, and the liberality of the government of the Low Countries, as to the convenience of its situation."—*History of the Hanseatic League* (*Foreign Quart. Rev., Jan.*, 1831).

—"Under cities we are to understand fortified places in the enjoyment of market-jurisdiction (marktrecht), immunity and corporate self-government. The German as well as the French cities are a creation of the Middle Ages. They were unknown to the Frankish as well as to the old Germanic public law; there was no organic connection with the Roman town-system . . . All cities were in the first place markets, only in market-jurisdiction are we to seek the starting point for civic jurisdiction The market cross, the same emblem which already in the Frankish period signified the market peace imposed under penalty of the king's ban, became in the Middle Ages the emblem of the cities . After the 12th century we find it to be the custom in most German and many French cities to erect a monumental town-cross in the market place or at different points on the city boundary. Since the 14th century the place of this was often taken in North-German cities by the so-called Roland-images. . . All those market-places gradually became cities in which, in addition to yearly markets, weekly markets and finally daily markets were held. Here there was need of coins and of scales, of permanent fortifications for the protection of the market-peace and the objects of value which were collected together; here merchants settled permanently in growing numbers, the Jews among them especially forming an important element. Corporative associations of the merchants resulted, and especially were civic and market tribunals established. . . . From the beginning such a thing as free cities, which were entirely their own masters, had not existed. Each city had its lord; who he was depended on to whom the land belonged on which they stood. If it belonged to the empire or was under the administration (vogtei) of the empire, the city was a royal or imperial one. The oldest of these were the Pfalz-cities (Pfalzstädte) which had developed from the king's places of residence (Königspfälze). . . . Beginning with the 12th century and in course of the 13th century all cities came to have such an organ [i. e. a body of representatives] called the Stadtrath (consilium, consules) with one or more burgomasters (magistri civium) at their head. Herewith did the city first become a public corporation, a city in the legal sense. . . . Of the royal cities many since the time of Frederick II. had lost their direct dependence on the empire (Reichsunmittelbarkeit) and had become territorial or provincial cities, through having been sold or pledged by the imperial government. As soon as the view had gained ground that the king had no right to make such dispositions and thus to disregard the privileges that had been granted to the cities, people spoke no longer of royal cities but of cities of the empire. These had, all of them, in course of time, even where the chief jurisdiction remained in the hand of an imperial official, attained a degree of independence approximating to the territorial supremacy of the princes. They had their special courts as corporations before the king. Since the second half of the 18th century they rejoiced in an autonomy modified only by the laws of the realm; they had the disposal of their own armed contingents and the sole right of placing garrisons in their fortresses. They had accordingly also the right of making leagues and carrying on feuds, the right to lordless lands