Ephesus, which is called the "Robber Synod" on account of the peculiar violence and indecency of its proceedings, sustained the Monophysites. But two years later, in 451, the vanquished party, supported by Pope Leo the Great, at Rome, succeeded in assembling a Council at Chalcedon which laid down a definition of the Christian faith affirming the existence of two natures in one person, and which nevertheless condemned Nestorianism and Monophysitism, alike. Their success only inflamed the passions of the worshippers of the Virgin as the "Mother of God." "Everywhere monks were at the head of the religious revolution which threw off the yoke of the Council of Chalcedon." In Jerusalem "the very scenes of the Saviour's mercies ran with blood shed in his name by his ferocious self-called disciples." At Alexandria, a bishop was murdered in the baptistery of his church. At Constantinople, for sixty years, there went on a succession of bloody tumults and fierce revolutionary conspiracies which continually shook the imperial throne and disorganized every part of society, all turning upon the theological question of one nature or two in the incarnate Son of God. The Emperor Zeno "after a vain attempt to obtain the opinions of the chief ecclesiastical dignitaries, without assembling a new Council, a measure which experience had shown to exasperate rather than appease the strife, Zeno issued his famous Henoticon, or Edict of Union. . . . It aimed not at the reconcilement of the conflicting opinions, but hoped, by avoiding all expressions offensive to either party, to allow them to meet together in Christian amity." The Henoticon only multiplied the factions in number and heated the strife between them. The successor of Zeno, Anastasius, became a partisan in the fray, and through much of his reign of twenty-seven years the conflict raged more fiercely than ever. Constantinople was twice, at least, in insurrection. "The blue and green factions of the Circus—such is the language of the times—gave place to these more maddening conflicts. The hymn of the Angels in Heaven [the Trisagion] was the battle-cry on earth." At length the death of Anastasius ended the strife. His successor Justin (A. D. 518), bowed to the authority of the Bishop of Rome—the Pope Hormisdas—and invoked his aid. The Eastern world, exhausted, followed generally the emperor's example in taking the orthodoxy of Rome for the orthodoxy of Christianity. Nestorianism and Monophysitism in their extreme forms were driven from the open field in the Christian world, but both survived and have transmitted their remains to the present day. —H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity, bk.* 2, *ch.* 3–4, *bk.* 3, *ch.* 1, *and ch.* 3.

Also in: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 47.—J. Alzog, *Universal Church History, 2d epoch, ch.* 2.—See, also, Nestorians; Jacobite Church; and Monothelite Controversy.

NESTORIANS, The.—"Within the limits of the Roman empire . . . this sect was rapidly extirpated by persecution [see above, Nestorian and Monophysite Controversy]; and even in the patriarchate of Antioch, where, as we have seen, the tenets of Nestorius at first found greatest favour, it had disappeared as early as the time of Justinian [A. D. 527–565]. But another field lay open to it in the Persian kingdom of the Sassanidæ, and in this it ultimately struck its roots deeply. The Chaldæan church, which at the beginning of the fifth century was in a flourishing condition, had been founded by missionaries from Syria; its primate, or Catholicos, was dependent on the patriarch of Antioch, and in respect of language and discipline it was closely connected with the Syrian church. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that some of its members lent a ready ear to the Nestorian doctrines. This was especially the case with the church-teachers of the famous seminary at Edessa in Mesopotamia. . . . One of their number, Barsumas, who was bishop of the city of Nisibis from 435 to 489, by his long and active labours contributed most of all to the establishment of the Nestorian church in Persia. He persuaded the king Pherozes (Firuz) that the antagonism of his own sect to the doctrine of the established church of the Roman empire would prove a safeguard for Persia. . . . From that time Nestorianism became the only form of Christianity tolerated in Persia. . . . The Catholicos of Chaldæa now threw off his dependence on Antioch, and assumed the title of Patriarch of Babylon. The school of Edessa, which in 489 was again broken up by the Greek emperor, Zeno, was transferred to Nisibis, and in that place continued for several centuries to be an important centre of theological learning, and especially of biblical studies. . . . In the sixth century the Nestorians had established churches from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, and had preached the Gospel to the Medes, the Bactrians, the Huns, and the Indians, and as far as the coast of Malabar and the island of Ceylon. At a later period, starting from Balk and Samarcand, they spread Christianity among the nomad Tartar tribes in the remote valleys of the Imaus; and the inscription of Siganfu, which was discovered in China, and the genuineness of which is considered to be above suspicion, describes the fortunes of the Nestorian church in that country from the first mission, A. D. 636, to the year in which that monument was set up, A. D. 781. In the ninth century, during the rule of the caliphs at Bagdad, the patriarch removed to that city, and at this period twenty-five metropolitans were subject to him. . . . From the eleventh century onwards the prosperity of the Chaldæan church declined, owing to the terrible persecutions to which its members were exposed. Foremost among these was the attack of Timour the Tartar, who almost exterminated them. Within the present century their diminished numbers have been still further thinned by frightful massacres inflicted by the Kurds. Their headquarters now are a remote and rugged valley in the mountains of Kurdistan, on the banks of the Greater Zab. . . . Beyond the boundary which separates Turkey from Persia to the southward of Mount Ararat, a similar community is settled on the shores of Lake Urumia. A still larger colony is found at Mosul, and others . . . elsewhere in the neighbourhood of the Tigris. . . . Of their widely extended missions only one fragment now remains, in the Christians of St. Thomas on the Malabar coast of India."—H. F. Tozer, *The Church and the Eastern Empire, ch.* 5.

Also in: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch.* 47.

NETAD, Battle of. See Huns: A. D. 433.

NETHERLANDS.

The Land.—"The north-western corner of the vast plain which extends from the German ocean to the Ural mountains is occupied by the countries called the Netherlands [Low Countries]. This small triangle, enclosed between France, Germany, and the sea, is divided by the modern kingdoms of Belgium and Holland into two nearly equal portions. . . . Geographically and ethnographically, the Low Countries belong both to Gaul and to Germany. It is even doubtful to which of the two the Batavian island, which is the core of the whole country, was reckoned by the Romans. It is, however, most probable that all the land, with the exception of Friesland, was considered a part of Gaul. Three great rivers—the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheld—had deposited their slime for ages among the dunes and sandbanks heaved up by the ocean around their mouths. A delta was thus formed, habitable at last for man. It was by nature a wide morass, in which oozy islands and savage forests were interspersed among lagoons and shallows; a district lying partly below the level of the ocean at its higher tides, subject to constant overflow from the rivers, and to frequent and terrible inundations by the sea. . . . Here, within a half-submerged territory, a race of wretched ichthyophagi dwelt upon 'terpen,' or mounds, which they had raised, like beavers, above the almost fluid soil. Here, at a later day, the same race chained the tyrant Ocean and his mighty streams into subserviency, forcing them to fertilize, to render commodious, to cover with a beneficent network of veins and arteries, and to bind by watery highways with the farthest ends of the world, a country disinherited by nature of its rights. A region, outcast of ocean and earth, wrested at last from both domains their richest treasures. A race, engaged for generations in stubborn conflict with the angry elements, was unconsciously educating itself for its great struggle with the still more savage despotism of man. The whole territory of the Netherlands was girt with forests. An extensive belt of woodland skirted the sea-coast, reaching beyond the mouths of the Rhine. Along the outer edge of this barrier, the dunes cast up by the sea were prevented by the close tangle of thickets from drifting further inward, and thus formed a breastwork which time and art were to strengthen. The groves of Haarlem and the Hague are relics of this ancient forest. The Badahuenna wood, horrid with Druidic sacrifices, extended along the eastern line of the vanished lake of Flevo. The vast Hercynian forest, nine days' journey in breadth, closed in the country on the German side, stretching from the banks of the Rhine to the remote regions of the Dacians, in such vague immensity (says the conqueror of the whole country) that no German, after traveling sixty days, had ever reached, or even heard of, its commencement. On the south, the famous groves of Ardennes, haunted by faun and satyr, embowered the country, and separated it from Celtic Gaul. Thus inundated by mighty rivers, quaking beneath the level of the ocean, belted about by hirsute forests, this low land, nether land, hollow land, or Holland, seemed hardly deserving the arms of the all-accomplished Roman."—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, introd., sect.* 1.

The early inhabitants. See BELGÆ; NERVII; BATAVIANS; and FRISIANS.

A. D. 69.—Revolt of the Batavians under Civilis. See BATAVIANS.

4-9th Centuries.—Settlement and domination of the Franks. See FRANKS; also, GAUL: A. D. 855–861.

A. D. 843-870.—Partly embraced in the kingdom of Lotharingia.—The partitioning. See LORRAINE. A. D. 843–870.

(Flanders): A. D. 863-1383.—The Flemish towns and counts. See FLANDERS.

(Holland): A. D. 922-1345.—The early Counts of Holland.—"It was in the year 922 that Charles the Simple [of France] presented to Count Dirk the territory of Holland, by letters patent. This narrow hook of land, destined, in future ages, to be the cradle of a considerable empire, stretching through both hemispheres, was, thenceforth, the inheritance of Dirk's descendants. Historically, therefore, he is Dirk I., Count of Holland. . . . From the time of the first Dirk to the close of the 18th century there were nearly four hundred years of unbroken male descent, a long line of Dirks and Florences. This iron-handed, hot-headed, adventurous race, placed as sovereign upon its little sandy hook, making ferocious exertions to swell into large consequence, conquering a mile or two of morass or barren furze, after harder blows and bloodier encounters than might have established an empire under more favorable circumstances, at last dies out. The countship falls to the house of Avennes, Counts of Hainault. Holland, together with Zeland, which it had annexed, is thus joined to the province of Hainault. At the end of another half century the Hainault line expires. William the Fourth died childless in 1355 [1345 ?]."—J. L. Motley, *Rise of the Dutch Republic, introd., sect.* 5-6.

A. D. 13-15th Centuries.—Relations with the Hanseatic League. See HANSA TOWNS.

(Holland): A. D. 1345-1354.—The Rise of the Hooks and the Kabeljauws, or Cods.—"On the death of William IV. [Count of Holland] without issue in 1345, his sister, married to the Emperor Louis, became Countess of Zealand, Holland, Friezland and Hainault. But her husband dying soon afterwards, many of the noblesse, whom she had offended by the attempt to restrain their excesses, instigated her son to assume the sovereignty. In the sanguinary struggle which ensued, the people generally adhered to the cause of Margaret." They "looked forward to the necessities of a female reign as likely to afford them opportunities to win further immunities, as the condition of their support against the turbulent nobles. Did not these live, like the great fish, by devouring the smaller ones? And how could they be checked but by the hooks which, though insignificant in appearance, when aptly used would be too strong for them. Such was the talk of the people; and from these household words arose the memorable epithets, which in after years were heard in every civic brawl, and above the din and death-cry of many a battle-field. Certain of the nobles adhered to the cause of the Hooks, while some of the cities, among which were Delft, Haarlem, Dort, and Rotterdam, supported the Kabeljauws [or Cods]. The community was divided into parties rather

than into classes. . . . In the exasperation of mutual injury, the primary cause of quarrel was soon forgotten. The Hooks were proud of the accession of a lord to their ranks; and the Kabeljauws were equally glad of the valuable aid which a wealthy and populous town was able to afford. The majority of the cities,—perhaps the majority of the inhabitants in all of them,—favoured the Hook party, as the preponderance of the landowners lay in the opposite scale. But no adherence to antagonistic principles, or even a systematic profession of them, is traceable throughout the varying struggle. . . . In Friezland the two factions were designated by the recriminative epithets of 'Vet-Koopers' and 'Schieringers,'—terms hardly translateable. In the conflict which first marshalled the two parties in hostile array, the Hooks were utterly defeated;—their leaders who survived were banished, their property confiscated, and their dwellings razed to the ground. Margaret was forced to take refuge in England, where she remained until a short time previous to her death in 1354, when the four provinces acknowledged William V. as their undisputed lord. The succeeding reigns are chiefly characterised by the incessant struggles of the embittered factions. . . . Whatever progress was made during the latter half of the 14th century was municipal and commercial. In a national view the government was helpless and inefficient, entangled by ambitious family alliances with France, England, and Germany, and distracted by the rival powers and pretensions of domestic factions. Under the administration of the ill-fated Jacoba [or Jacqueline] these evils reached their full maturity."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial Hist. of Free Nations, ch.* 9 (*v.* 2).

14-15th Centuries.—Commercial and industrial superiority.—Advance in learning and art.—"What a scene as compared with the rest of Northern Europe, and especially with England . . . must have been presented by the Low Countries during the 14th century! In 1370, there are 3,200 woollen-factories at Malines and on its territory. One of its merchants carries on an immense trade with Damascus and Alexandria. Another, of Valenciennes, being at Paris during a fair, buys up all the provisions exposed for sale in order to display his wealth. Ghent, in 1340, contains 40,000 weavers. In 1389, it has 189,000 men bearing arms; the drapers alone furnish 18,000 in a revolt. In 1380, the goldsmiths of Bruges are numerous enough to form in war time an entire division of the army. At a repast given by one of the Counts of Flanders to the Flemish magistrates, the seats provided for the guests being unfurnished with cushions, they quietly folded up their sumptuous cloaks, richly embroidered and trimmed with fur, and placed them on the wooden benches. When leaving the table at the conclusion of the feast, a courtier called their attention to the fact that they were going without their cloaks. The burgomaster of Bruges replied: 'We Flemings are not in the habit of carrying away the cushions after dinner.' . . . Commines, the French chronicler, writing in the 15th century, says that the traveller, leaving France and crossing the frontiers of Flanders, compared himself to the Israelites when they had quitted the desert and entered the borders of the Promised Land. Philip the Good kept up a court which surpassed every other in Europe for luxury and magnificence. . . . In all such matters of luxury and display, England of the 16th or 17th century had nothing to compare with the Netherlands a hundred or even two hundred years before. After luxury, come comfort, intelligence, morality, and learning, which develop under very different conditions. In the course of time even Italy was outstripped in the commercial race. The conquest of Egypt by the Turks, and the discovery of a water passage to the Indies, broke up the overland trade with the East, and destroyed the Italian and German cities which had flourished on it. . . . Passing from the dominion of the House of Burgundy to that of the House of Austria, which also numbered Spain among its vast possessions, proved to them in the end an event fraught with momentous evil. Still for a time, and from a mere material point of view, it was an evil not unmixed with good. The Netherlanders were better sailors and keener merchants than the Spaniards, and, being under the same rulers, gained substantial advantages from the close connection. The new commerce of Portugal also filled their coffers; so that while Italy and Germany were impoverished, they became wealthier and more prosperous than ever. . . . With wealth pouring in from all quarters, art naturally followed in the wake of commerce. Architecture was first developed, and nowhere was its cultivation more general than in the Netherlands."—D. Campbell, *The Puritan in Holland, &c., ch.* 1. See TRADE, MEDIÆVAL.

(Holland and Hainault): A. D. 1417-1430.—The despoiling of Countess Jaqueline.—In 1417, Count William VI. of Holland, Hainault and Friesland, died, leaving no male heirs, but a daughter, Jacoba, or Jaqueline, whom most of the nobles and towns of the several states had already acknowledged as the heiress of her father's sovereignty. Though barely seventeen years of age, the countess Jake, as she was sometimes called, wore a widow's weeds. She had been married two years before to John, the second son of the king of France, who became presently thereafter, by his brother's death, the dauphin of France. John had died, a few months before Count William's death, and the young countess, fair in person and well endowed in mind, was left with no male support, to contend with the rapacity of an unscrupulous bishop-uncle (John, called The Godless, Bishop of Liège), who strove to rob her of her heritage. "Henry V. [of England] had then stood her friend, brought about a reconciliation, established her rights and proposed a marriage between her and his brother John, Duke of Bedford, who was then a fine young man of five or six and twenty. . . . But she was a high-spirited, wilful damsel, and preferred her first cousin, the Duke of Brabant, whose father was a brother of Jean Sans Peur [Duke of Burgundy]. . . . The young Duke was only sixteen, and was a weak-minded, passionate youth. Sharp quarrels took place between the young pair; the Duchess was violent and headstrong, and accused her husband of allowing himself to be governed by favourites of low degree. The Duke of Burgundy interfered in vain. . . . After three years of quarrelling, in the July of 1421 Jaqueline rode out early one morning, met a knight of Hainault called Escaillon, who had long been an Englishman at heart, and who brought her sixty horsemen, and galloped off for Calais, whence she came to England, where Henry received her

with the courtesy due to a distressed dame-errant, and she became a most intimate companion of the Queen. . . . She loudly gave out that she intended to obtain a separation from her husband on the plea of consanguinity, although a dispensation had been granted by the Council of Constance, and 'that she would marry some one who would pay her the respect due to her rank.' This person soon presented himself in the shape of Humfrey, duke of Gloucester, the King's youngest brother, handsome, graceful, accomplished, but far less patient and conscientious than any of his three elders." Benedict XIII., the anti-pope, was persuaded to pronounce the marriage of Jaqueline and John of Brabant null and void; "but Henry V. knew that this was a vain sentence, and intimated to his brother that he would never consent to his espousing the Duchess of Brabant; showing him that the wedlock could not be legal, and that to claim the lady's inheritance would lead to a certain rupture with the Duke of Burgundy, who could not but uphold the cause of his cousin of Brabant." Notwithstanding these remonstrances, the Duke Humfrey did marry the seductive Jaqueline, early in 1424. "He then sent to demand from the Duke of Brabant the possession of the lady's inheritance; and on his refusal the Hainaulters espoused whichever party they preferred and began a warfare among themselves." Soon afterwards the godless bishop of Liège died and "bequeathed the rights he pretended to have to Hainault, not to his niece, but to the Duke of Burgundy. Gloucester in the meantime invaded Hainault and carried on a 'bitter war there.' Burgundy assembled men-at-arms for its protection; and letters passed between the Dukes, ending in a challenge—not between Jaqueline's two husbands, who would have seemed the fittest persons to have fought out the quarrel, but between Gloucester and Burgundy." It was arranged that the question of the possession of Hainault should be decided by single combat. Humfrey returned to England to make preparations, leaving Jaqueline at Mons, with her mother. The latter proved false and allowed the citizens of Mons to deliver up the unhappy lady to Philip of Burgundy. Her English husband found himself powerless to render her much aid, and was possibly indifferent to her fate, since another woman had caught his fancy. Jaqueline, after a time, escaped from her captivity, and revived the war in Hainault, Gloucester sending her 500 men. "The Duke of Brabant died, and reports reached her that Gloucester had married Eleanor Cobham; but she continued to battle for her county till 1428, when she finally came to terms with Philippe [of Burgundy], let him garrison her fortresses, appointed him her heir, and promised not to marry without his consent. A year or two after, however, she married a gentleman of Holland called Frank of Borselem, upon which he was seized by the Burgundians. To purchase his liberty she yielded all her dominions, and only received an annual pension until 1436, when she died, having brought about as much strife and dissension as any woman of her time."—C. M. Yonge, *Cameos of Eng. Hist., series* 2, *c.* 33.

Also in: E. de Monstrelet, *Chronicles* (*trans. by Johnes*), *bk.* 1, *ch.* 164, 181, 234; *bk.* 2, *ch.* 22–32, 48–49.—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 1, *ch.* 5–6.

A. D. 1428-1430.—The sovereignty of the House of Burgundy established.—"Upon the surrender of Holland, Zealand, Friezland, and Hainault by Jacoba, Philip [the duke of Burgundy called Philip the Good] became possessed of the most considerable states of the Netherlands. John, duke of Burgundy, his father, had succeeded to Flanders and Artois, in right of his mother Margaret, sole heiress of Louis van der Male, count of Flanders. In the year 1429, Philip entered into possession of the county of Namur, by the death of Theodore, its last native prince, without issue, of whom he had purchased it during his lifetime for 132,000 crowns of gold. To Namur was added in the next year the neighbouring duchy of Brabant, by the death [A. D. 1430] of Philip (brother of John, who married Jacoba of Holland), without issue; although Margaret, countess-dowager of Holland, aunt of the late duke, stood the next in succession, since the right extended to females, Philip prevailed with the states of Brabant to confer on him, as the true heir, that duchy and Limburg, to which the Margraviate of Antwerp and the lordship of Mechlin were annexed. . . . The accession of a powerful and ambitious prince to the government of the county was anything but a source of advantage to the Dutch, excepting, perhaps, in a commercial point of view."—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 2, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 1451-1453.—Revolt of Ghent. See Ghent: A. D. 1451–1453.

A. D. 1456.—The Burgundian hand laid on Utrecht. See Utrecht: A. D. 1456.

A. D. 1473.—Guelderland taken into the Burgundian dominion. See Guelderland: A. D. 1079–1473.

A. D. 1477.—The severance from Burgundy.—Accession of the Duchess Mary.—The grant of the "Great Privilege."—On the fifth of January, 1477, Charles the Bold of Burgundy came to his end at Nancy, and Louis XI. of France laid prompt and sure hands on the Burgundian duchy, which remained thenceforth united to the French crown. It was the further intention of Louis to secure more or less of the Netherland domain of the late duke, and he began seizures to that end. But the Netherland states much preferred to acknowledge the sovereignty of the young duchess Mary, daughter and sole heiress of Charles the Bold, provided she would make proper terms with them. "Shortly after her accession, the nobles, to whose guardianship she had been committed by Charles before his departure, summoned a general assembly of the states of the Netherlands at Ghent, to devise means for arresting the enterprises of Louis, and for raising funds to support the war with France, as well as to consider the state of affairs in the provinces. . . . This is the first regular assembly of the states-general of the Netherlands. . . . Charles, and his father, Philip, had exercised in the Netherlands a species of government far more arbitrary than the inhabitants had until then been accustomed to. . . . It now appeared that a favourable opportunity offered itself for rectifying these abuses; and the assembly, therefore, made the consideration of them a preliminary to the grant of any supplies for the war. . . . They insisted so firmly on this resolution that Mary, finding they were determined to refuse any subsidies till their

grievances were redressed, consented to grant charters of privileges to all the states of the Netherlands. That of Holland and Zealand [was] commonly called the Great Charter."—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 2, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 1), *with foot-note.*—"The result of the deliberations [of the assembly of the states, in 1477] is the formal grant by Duchess Mary of the 'Groot Privilegie,' or Great Privilege, the Magna Charta of Holland. Although this instrument was afterwards violated, and indeed abolished, it became the foundation of the republic. It was a recapitulation and recognition of ancient rights, not an acquisition of new privileges. It was a restoration, not a revolution. Its principal points deserve attention from those interested in the political progress of mankind. 'The duchess shall not marry without consent of the estates of her provinces. All offices in her gift shall be conferred on natives only. No man shall fill two offices. No office shall be farmed. The Great Council and Supreme Court of Holland is re-established. Causes shall be brought before it on appeal from the ordinary courts. It shall have no original jurisdiction of matters within the cognizance of the provincial and municipal tribunals. The estates and cities are guaranteed in their right not to be summoned to justice beyond the limits of their territory. The cities, in common with all the provinces of the Netherlands, may hold diets as often and at such places as they choose. No new taxes shall be imposed but by consent of the provincial estates. Neither the duchess nor her descendants shall begin either an offensive or defensive war without consent of the estates. In case a war be illegally undertaken, the estates are not bound to contribute to its maintenance. In all public and legal documents, the Netherland language shall be employed. The commands of the duchess shall be invalid, if conflicting with the privileges of a city. The seat of the Supreme Council is transferred from Mechlin to the Hague. No money shall be coined, nor its value raised or lowered, but by consent of the estates Cities are not to be compelled to contribute to requests which they have not voted. The Sovereign shall come in person before the estates, to make his request for supplies.'. . . Certainly, for the fifteenth century, the 'Great Privilege' was a reasonably liberal constitution. Where else upon earth, at that day, was there half so much liberty as was thus guaranteed?"—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, introd., sect.* 8.

Also in: L. S. Costello, *Memoirs of Mary of Burgundy, ch.* 28–30.

A. D. 1477.—The Austrian marriage of Mary of Burgundy.—"Several husbands were proposed to the Princess of Burgundy, and every one was of opinion there was a necessity of her marrying, to defend those territories that she had left to her, or (by marrying the dauphin), to recover what she had lost [see Burgundy: A. D. 1477]. Several were entirely for this match, and she was as earnest for it as anybody, before the letters she had sent by the Lord of Humbercourt and the chancellor to the king [Louis XI.] were betrayed to the ambassadors from Ghent. Some opposed the match, and urged the disproportion of their age, the dauphin being but nine years old, and besides engaged to the King of England's daughter; and these suggested the son of the Duke of Cleves. Others recommended Maximilian, the emperor's son, who is at present King of the Romans." Duchess Mary made choice presently of Maximilian, then Archduke of Austria, afterwards King of the Romans and finally emperor. The husband-elect "came to Cologne, where several of the princess's servants went to meet him, and carry him money, with which, as I have been told, he was but very slenderly furnished; for his father was the stingiest and most covetous prince, or person, of his time. The Duke of Austria was conducted to Ghent, with about 700 or 800 horse in his retinue, and this marriage was consummated [Aug. 18, 1477], which at first sight brought no great advantage to the subjects of the young princess; for, instead of his supporting her, she was forced to supply him with money. His armies were neither strong enough nor in a condition to face the king's; besides which, the humour of the house of Austria was not pleasing to the subjects of the house of Burgundy, who had been bred up under wealthy princes, that had lucrative offices and employments to dispose of; whose palaces were sumptuous, whose tables were nobly served, whose dress was magnificent, and whose liveries were pompous and splendid. But the Germans are of quite a contrary temper; boorish in their manners and rude in their way of living."—Philip de Commines, *Memoirs, bk.* 6, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 2).

Also in: L. S. Costello, *Memoirs of Mary of Burgundy, ch.* 31.—See, also, Austria: A. D. 1477–1495.

A. D. 1482-1493.—Maximilian and the Flemings.—The end of the Hook party in Holland.—"According to the terms of the marriage treaty between Maximilian and Mary, their eldest son, Philip, succeeded to the sovereignty of the Netherlands immediately upon the death of his mother [March 26, 1482]. As he was at this time only four years of age, Maximilian obtained the acknowledgment of himself as guardian of the young count's person, and protector of his states, by all the provinces except Flanders and Guelderland. The Flemings having secured the person of Philip at Ghent, appointed a regency." To reduce the Flemings to obedience, Maximilian carried on two campaigns in their country, during 1484 and 1485, as the result of which Ghent and Bruges surrendered. "Maximilian was acknowledged protector of Flanders during the minority of Philip, who was delivered by the Ghenters into the hands of his father, and by him entrusted to the care of Margaret of York, Duchess-dowager of Burgundy, until he became of age." Three years later (1488)—Maximilian having been, in the meantime, crowned "King of the Romans," at Aix la Chapelle, and thus cadetted, so to speak, for his subsequent coronation as emperor—the Flemings rose again in revolt. Maximilian was at Bruges, and rumor accused him of a design to occupy the city with German troops. The men of Bruges forestalled the attempt by seizing him personally and making him a prisoner. They kept him in durance for nearly four months, until he had signed a treaty, agreeing to surrender the government of the Netherlands to the young Duke Philip, his son; to place the latter under the care of the princes of the blood (his relatives on the Burgundian side); to withdraw all foreign troops, and to use his endeavors to preserve peace with France. On these terms Maximilian

obtained his liberty; but, meantime, his father, the Emperor Frederic, had marched an army to the frontiers of Brabant for his deliverance, and the very honorable King of the Romans, making haste to the shelter of these forces, repudiated with alacrity all the engagements he had sworn to. His imperial father led the army he had brought into Flanders and laid siege to Ghent; but tired of the undertaking after six weeks and returned to Germany, leaving his forces to prosecute the siege and the war. The commotions in Flanders now brought to life the popular party of the "Hooks" in Holland, and war broke out in that province. In neither part of the Netherlands were the insurgents successful. The Flemings had been helped by France, and when the French king abandoned them they were forced to buy a peace on humiliating terms and for a heavy price in cash. In Holland, the revolt languished for a time, but broke out with fresh spirit in 1490, excited by an edict which summarily altered the value of the coin. In the next year it took the name of the "Casembrotspel," or Bread and Cheese War. This insurrection was suppressed in 1492, with the help of German troops, and proved only disastrous to the province. "It was the last effort made for a considerable time by the Hollanders against the increasing power and extortion of their counts. . . . The miserable remnant of the Hook or popular party melted so entirely away that we hear of them no more in Holland: the county, formerly a power respected in itself, was now become a small and despised portion of an overgrown state." In 1494, Philip having reached the age of seventeen, and Maximilian having become emperor by the death of his father, the latter surrendered and the former was installed in the government of the Netherlands.—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 2, *ch.* 3 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 1494-1519.—Beginning of the Austro-Spanish tyranny.—Absorption in the vast dominion of Charles V.—The seventeen Provinces, their independent constitutions and their States-General.—"In 1494, Philip, now 17 years of age, became sovereign of the Netherlands. But he would only swear to maintain the privileges granted by his grandfather and great-grandfather, Charles and Philip, and refused to acquiesce in the Great Privilege of his mother. The Estates acquiesced. For a time, Friesland, the outlying province of Holland, was severed from it. It was free, and it chose as its elective sovereign the Duke of Saxony. After a time he sold his sovereignty to the House of Hapsburg. The dissensions of the Estates had put them at the mercy of an autocratic family. Philip of Burgundy, in 1496, married Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella. In 1500 his son Charles was born, who was afterwards Charles V., Duke of the Netherlands, but also King of Spain, Emperor of Germany, King of Jerusalem, and, by the grant of Alexander VI., alias Roderic Borgia and Pope, lord of the whole new world. Joanna, his mother, through whom he had this vast inheritance, went mad, and remained mad during her life and his [see SPAIN: A. D. 1496–1517]. Charles not only inherited his mother's and father's sovereignties, but his grandfather's also [see AUSTRIA: A. D. 1496–1526]. . . . The peril which the liberties of the Netherlands were now running was greater than ever. The [illegible] had been drawn into the hands of that dynasty which, beginning with two little Spanish kingdoms [Castile and Aragon], had in a generation developed into the mightiest of monarchies. . . . Charles succeeded his father Philip as Count of Flanders in 1506. His father, Philip the Handsome, was at Burgos in Castile, where he was attacked by fever, and died when only 28 years of age. Ten years afterwards Charles became King of Spain (1516). When he was 19 years of age (1519) he was elected emperor [see GERMANY: A. D. 1519]. The three nations over whom he was destined to rule hated each other cordially. There was antipathy from the beginning between Flemings and Spaniards. The Netherlands nobles were detested in Spain, the Spaniards in the Low Countries were equally abhorred. . . . Charles was born in Flanders, and during his whole career was much more a Fleming than a Spaniard. This did not, however, prevent him from considering his Flemish subjects as mainly destined to supply his wants, and submit to his exactions. He was always hard pressed for money. The Germans were poor and turbulent. The conquest and subjection of the Moorish population in Spain had seriously injured the industrial wealth of that country. But the Flemings were increasing in riches, particularly the inhabitants of Ghent. They had to supply the funds which Charles required in order to carry out the operations which his necessities or his policy rendered urgent. He had been taught, and he readily believed, that his subjects' money was his own. Now just as Charles had come to the empire, two circumstances had occurred which have had a lasting influence over the affairs of Western Europe. The first of these was the conquest of Egypt by the Turks under Selim I (1512–20). . . . Egypt had for nearly two centuries been the only route by which Eastern produce, so much valued by European nations, could reach the consumer. . . . Now this trade, trifling to be sure to our present experience, was of the highest importance to the trading towns of Italy, the Rhine, and the Netherlands. . . . But the Netherlands had two industries which saved them from the losses which affected the Germans and Italians. They were still the weavers of the world. They still had the most successful fisheries. . . . The other cause was the revolt against the papacy" [the Reformation—see PAPACY: A. D. 1516–1517, and after].—J. E. T. Rogers, *The Story of Holland, ch.* 5–6.—The seventeen provinces comprehended under the name of the Netherlands, as ruled by Charles V., were the four duchies of Brabant, Limburg, Luxemburg, and Guelderland; the seven counties of Artois, Hainault, Flanders, Namur, Zutphen, Holland, and Zealand; the five seigniories or lordships of Friesland, Mechlin, Utrecht, Overyssel, and Groningen; and the margraviate of Antwerp. "Of these provinces," the four which adjoined the French border, and in which a French dialect was spoken, were called Walloon [see WALLOONS]; in the other provinces a dialect, more or less resembling German, prevailed, that of the midland ones being Flemish, that of the northern, Dutch. They differed still more in their laws and customs than in language. Each province was an independent state, having its own constitution, which secured more liberty to those who lived under it than was then commonly enjoyed in most other parts of Europe. . . . The only institutions

which supplied any links of union among the different provinces were the States-General, or assembly of deputies sent from each, and the Supreme Tribunal established at Mechlin, having an appellate jurisdiction over them all. The States-General, however, had no legislative authority, nor power to impose taxes, and were but rarely convened. . . . The members of the States-General were not representatives chosen by the people, but deputies, or ambassadors, from certain provinces. The different provinces had also their own States."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist of Modern Europe, v. 2, pp.* 221-222.

A. D. 1512.—Burgundian provinces included in the Circle of Burgundy. See GERMANY A. D. 1498-1519.

A. D. 1521-1555.—The Reformation in the Provinces.—The "Placards" and Persecutions of Charles V.—The Edict of 1550.—The Planting of the Inquisition.—"The people of the Netherlands were noted not less for their ingenuity shown in the invention of machines and implements, and for their proficiency in science and letters, than for their opulence and enterprise. It was their boast that common laborers, even the fishermen who dwelt in the huts of Friesland, could read and write, and discuss the interpretation of Scripture. . . . In such a population, among the countrymen of Erasmus, where, too, in previous ages, various forms of innovation and dissent had arisen, the doctrines of Luther must inevitably find an entrance. They were brought in by foreign merchants, 'together with whose commodities,' writes the old Jesuit historian Strada, 'this plague often sails.' They were introduced with the German and Swiss soldiers, whom Charles V. had occasion to bring into the country. Protestantism was also transplanted from England by numerous exiles who fled from the persecution of Mary. The contiguity of the country to Germany and France provided abundant avenues for the incoming of the new opinions. 'Nor did the Rhine from Germany, or the Meuse from France,' to quote the regretful language of Strada, 'send more water into the Low Countries, than by the one the contagion of Luther, by the other of Calvin, was imported into the same Belgic provinces.' The spirit and occupations of the people, the whole atmosphere of the country, were singularly propitious for the spread of the Protestant movement. The cities of Flanders and Brabant, especially Antwerp, very early furnished professors of the new faith. Charles V. issued, in 1521, from Worms, an edict, the first of a series of barbarous enactments or 'Placards,' for the extinguishing of heresy in the Netherlands; and it did not remain a dead letter. In 1523, two Augustinian monks were burned at the stake in Brussels. . . . The edicts against heresy were imperfectly executed. The Regent, Margaret of Savoy, was lukewarm in the business of persecution; and her successor, Maria, the Emperor's sister, the widowed Queen of Hungary, was still more leniently disposed. The Protestants rapidly increased in number. Calvinism, from the influence of France, and of Geneva, where young men were sent to be educated, came to prevail among them. Anabaptists and other licentious or fanatical sectaries, such as appeared elsewhere in the wake of the Reformation, were numerous; and their excesses afforded a plausible pretext for violent measures of repression against all who departed from the old faith. In 1550, Charles V. issued a new Placard, in which the former persecuting edicts were confirmed, and in which a reference was made to Inquisitors of the faith, as well as to the ordinary judges of the bishops. This excited great alarm, since the Inquisition was an object of extreme aversion and dread. The foreign merchants prepared to leave Antwerp, prices fell, trade was to a great extent suspended; and such was the disaffection excited, that the Regent Maria interceded for some modification of the obnoxious decree. Verbal changes were made, but the fears of the people were not quieted; and it was published at Antwerp in connection with a protest of the magistrates in behalf of the liberties which were put in peril by a tribunal of the character threatened. 'And,' says the learned Arminian historian, 'as this affair of the Inquisition and the oppression from Spain prevailed more and more, all men began to be convinced that they were destined to perpetual slavery.' Although there was much persecution in the Netherlands during the long reign of Charles, yet the number of martyrs could not have been so great as 50,000, the number mentioned by one writer, much less 100,000, the number given by Grotius."—G. P. Fisher, *The Reformation, ch.* 9.—"His hand [that of Charles V.] planted the inquisition in the Netherlands. Before his day it is idle to say that the diabolical institution ever had a place there. The isolated cases in which inquisitors had exercised functions proved the absence and not the presence of the system. . . . Charles introduced and organized a papal inquisition, side by side with those terrible 'placards' of his invention, which constituted a masked inquisition even more cruel than that of Spain. . . . The number of Netherlanders who were burned, strangled, beheaded, or buried alive, in obedience to his edicts . . . has been placed as high as 100,000 by distinguished authorities, and have never been put at a lower mark than 50,000. The Venetian envoy Navigero placed the number of victims in the provinces of Holland and Friesland alone at 30,000, and this in 1546, ten years before the abdication, and five before the promulgation of the hideous edict of 1550. . . 'No one,' said the edict [of 1550], 'shall print, write, copy, keep, conceal, sell, buy, or give in churches, streets, or other places, any book or writing made by Martin Luther, John Ecolampadius, Ulrich Zwinglius, Martin Bucer, John Calvin, or other heretics reprobated by the Holy Church; . . . nor break, or otherwise injure the images of the holy virgin or canonized saints; . . . nor in his house hold conventicles, or illegal gatherings, or be present at any such in which the adherents of the above-mentioned heretics teach, baptize, and form conspiracies against the Holy Church and the general welfare. . . . Moreover, we forbid . . . all lay persons to converse or dispute concerning the Holy Scriptures, openly or secretly, especially on any doubtful or difficult matters, or to read, teach, or expound the Scriptures, unless they have duly studied theology and been approved by some renowned university; . . . or to preach secretly, or openly, or to entertain any of the opinions of the above-mentioned heretics. . . . Such perturbators of the general quiet are to be executed, to wit: the men with the sword and the women to be buried alive, if they do not

persist in their errors; if they do persist in them they are to be executed with fire; all their property in both cases being confiscated to the crown.'" The horrible edict further bribed informers, by promising to them half the goods of a convicted heretic, while, at the same time, it forbade, under sharp penalties, any petitioning for pardon in favor of such heretics.—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 1, *ch.* 1, *and pt.* 2, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 1).

ALSO IN: J. H. Merle d'Aubigne, *Hist. of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin, bk.* 18, *ch.* 9-11 (*v.* 7).

A. D. 1539-1540.—The revolt and enslavement of Ghent. See GHENT: A. D. 1539-1540.

A. D. 1547.—Pragmatic Sanction of Charles V. changing the Relations of his Burgundian inheritance to the Empire.—In the Germanic diet assembled at Augsburg in 1547, after the Emperor's defeat of the Protestant princes at Muhlberg (see GERMANY: A. D. 1546-1552), he was able to exercise his will almost without opposition and decree arbitrarily whatever he chose. He there "proclaimed the Pragmatic Sanction for the Netherlands, whereby his old Burgundian inheritance was declared by his own law to be indivisible, the succession settled on the house of Hapsburg, it was attached to the German empire as a tenth district, had to pay certain contributions, but was not to be subject to the Imperial Chamber or the Imperial Court of Judicature. He thus secured the personal union of these territories with his house, and made it the duty of the empire to defend them, while at the same time he withdrew them from the jurisdiction of the empire; it was a union by which the private interests of the house of Hapsburg had everything to gain, but which was of no advantage to the empire."—L. Häusser, *The Period of the Reformation, ch.* 16.

A. D. 1555.—The Abdication of Charles V. —Accession of Philip II.—His sworn promises. —"In the autumn of this year [1555] the world was astonished by the declaration of the emperor's intention to resign all his vast dominions, and spend the remainder of his days in a cloister. . . . On the 25th of October, the day appointed for the ceremony [of the surrender of the sovereignty of the Netherlands], the knights of the Golden Fleece, and the deputies of all the states of the Netherlands assembled at Brussels. . . . On the day after the emperor's resignation the mutual oaths were taken by Philip and the states of Holland; the former swore to maintain all the privileges which they now enjoyed, including those granted or confirmed at his installation as heir in 1549. He afterwards renewed the promise made by Charles in the month of May preceding, that no office in Holland, except that of stadtholder, should be given to foreigners or to Netherlanders of those provinces in which Hollanders were excluded from offices. In the January of the next year [1556] the emperor resigned the crown of Spain to his son, reserving only an annuity of 100,000 crowns, and on the 7th of September following, having proceeded to Zealand to join the fleet destined to carry him to Spain, he surrendered the imperial dignity to his brother Ferdinand." He then proceeded to the cloister of St. Just, in Spain, where he lived in retirement until his death, which occurred August 21, 1558.—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 2, *ch.* 6 (*v.* 1).

ALSO IN: W. Stirling, *Cloister Life of Charles V.*—O. Delepierre, *Historical Difficulties, ch.* 10.

A. D. 1555-1559.—Opening of the dark and bloody reign of Philip II. of Spain.—His malignity.—His perfidy.—His evil and plotting industry.—"Philip, bred in this [Spanish] school of slavish superstition, taught that he was the despot for whom it was formed, familiar with the degrading tactics of eastern tyranny, was at once the most contemptible and unfortunate of men. . . . He was perpetually filled with one idea—that of his greatness; he had but one ambition—that of command; but one enjoyment—that of exciting fear. . . . Deceit and blood were his greatest, if not his only, deliglits. The religious zeal which he affected, or felt, showed itself but in acts of cruelty; and the fanatic bigotry which inspired him formed the strongest contrast to the divine spirit of Christianity. . . . Although ignorant, he had a prodigious instinct of cunning. He wanted courage, but its place was supplied by the harsh obstinacy of wounded pride. All the corruptions of intrigue were familiar to him; yet he often failed in his most deep-laid designs, at the very moment of their apparent success, by the recoil of the bad faith and treachery with which his plans were overcharged. Such was the man who now began that terrible reign which menaced utter ruin to the national prosperity of the Netherlands. . . . Philip had only once visited the Netherlands before his accession to sovereign power. . . . Every thing that he observed on this visit was calculated to revolt both [his opinions and his prejudices]. The frank cordiality of the people appeared too familiar. The expression of popular rights sounded like the voice of rebellion. Even the magnificence displayed in his honour offended his jealous vanity. From that moment he seems to have conceived an implacable aversion to the country, in which alone, of all his vast possessions, he could not display the power or inspire the terror of despotism. The sovereign's dislike was fully equalled by the disgust of his subjects. . . . Yet Philip did not at first act in a way to make himself more particularly hated. He rather, by an apparent consideration for a few points of political interest and individual privilege, and particularly by the revocation of some of the edicts against heretics, removed the suspicions his earlier conduct had excited; and his intended victims did not perceive that the despot sought to lull them to sleep, in the hopes of making them an easier prey. Philip knew well that force alone was insufficient to reduce such a people to slavery. He succeeded in persuading the states to grant him considerable subsidies, some of which were to be paid by instalments during a period of nine years. That was gaining a great step towards his designs. . . . At the same time he sent secret agents to Rome, to obtain the approbation of the pope to his insidious but most effective plan for placing the whole of the clergy in dependence upon the crown. He also kept up the army of Spaniards and Germans which his father had formed on the frontiers of France; and although he did not remove from their employments the functionaries already in place, he took care to make no new appointments to office among the natives of the Netherlands. . . . To lead his already deceived subjects the more surely into the snare, he announced his intended departure on a short visit

to Spain; and created for the period of his absence a provisional government, chiefly composed of the leading men among the Belgian nobility. He flattered himself that the states, dazzled by the illustrious illusion thus prepared, would cheerfully grant to this provisional government the right of levying taxes during the temporary absence of the sovereign. He also reckoned on the influence of the clergy in the national assembly, to procure the revival of the edicts against heresy, which he had gained the merit of suspending. . . . As soon as the states had consented to place the whole powers of government in the hands of the new administration for the period of the king's absence, the royal hypocrite believed his scheme secure, and flattered himself he had established an instrument of durable despotism. . . . The edicts against heresy, soon adopted [including a re-enactment of the terrible edict of 1550—see above], gave to the clergy an almost unlimited power over the lives and fortunes of the people. But almost all the dignitaries of the church being men of great respectability and moderation, chosen by the body of the inferior clergy, these extraordinary powers excited little alarm. Philip's project was suddenly to replace these virtuous ecclesiastics by others of his own choice [through a creation of new bishoprics], as soon as the states broke up from their annual meeting; and for this invention he had procured the secret consent and authority of the court of Rome. In support of these combinations, the Belgian troops were completely broken up and scattered in small bodies over the country. . . . To complete the execution of this system of perfidy, Philip convened an assembly of all the states at Ghent, in the month of July, 1559. . . . Anthony Perrenotte de Granvelle, bishop of Arras [afterwards cardinal], who was considered as Philip's favorite counsellor, but who was in reality no more than his docile agent, was commissioned to address the assembly in the name of his master, who spoke only Spanish. His oration was one of cautious deception." It announced the appointment of Margaret, duchess of Parma, a natural daughter of Charles V., and therefore half-sister of Philip, to preside as regent over the government of the Netherlands during the absence of the sovereign. It also urged with skilful plausibility certain requests for money on the part of the latter. "But notwithstanding all the talent, the caution, and the mystery of Philip and his minister, there was among the nobles one man [William of Nassau, prince of Orange and stadtholder, or governor, of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht] who saw through all. Without making himself suspiciously prominent, he privately warned some members of the states of the coming danger. Those in whom he confided did not betray the trust. They spread among the other deputies the alarm, and pointed out the danger to which they had been so judiciously awakened. The consequence was, a reply to Philip's demand, in vague and general terms, without binding the nation by any pledge; and an unanimous entreaty that he would diminish the taxes, withdraw the foreign troops, and entrust no official employments to any but natives of the country. The object of this last request was the removal of Granvelle, who was born in Franche-Comté. Philip was utterly astounded at all this. In the first moment of his vexation he imprudently cried out, 'Would ye, then, also bereave me of my place; I, who am a Spaniard?' But he soon recovered his self-command, and resumed his usual mask; expressed his regret at not having sooner learned the wishes of the state; promised to remove the foreign troops within three months; and set off for Zealand, with assumed composure, but filled with the fury of a discovered traitor and a humiliated despot." In August, 1559, he sailed for Spain.—T. C. Grattan, *Hist. of the Netherlands, ch.* 7.—"Crafty, saturnine, atrabilious, always dissembling and suspecting, sombre, and silent like night when brooding over the hatching storm, he lived shrunk within himself, with only the fellowship of his gloomy thoughts and cruel resolves. . . . There is something terrific in the secrecy, dissimulation and dogged perseverance with which Philip would, during a series of years, meditate and prepare the destruction of one man, or of a whole population, and something still more awful in the icy indifference, the superhuman insensibility, the accumulated cold-blooded energy of hoarded up vengeance with which, at the opportune moment, he would issue a dry sentence of extermination. . . . He seemed to take pleasure in distilling, slowly and chemically, the poison which, Python-like, he darted at every object which he detested or feared, or which he considered an obstacle in his path."—C. Gayarré, *Philip II. of Spain, ch.* 1.

A. D. 1559-1562.—The Spanish troops, the new bishoprics, and the shadow of the Inquisition.—The appeal of Brabant to its ancient "Joyeuse Entrée."—"The first cause of trouble, after Philip's departure from the Netherlands, arose from the detention of the Spanish troops there. The king had pledged his word . . . that they should leave the country by the end of four months, at farthest. Yet that period had long since passed, and no preparations were made for their departure. The indignation of the people rose higher and higher at the insult thus offered by the presence of these detested foreigners. It was a season of peace. No invasion was threatened from abroad; no insurrection existed at home. . . . Granvelle himself, who would willingly have pleased his master by retaining a force in the country on which he could rely, admitted that the project was impracticable. 'The troops must be withdrawn,' he wrote, 'and that speedily, or the consequence will be an insurrection.' . . . The Prince of Orange and Count Egmont threw up the commands intrusted to them by the king. They dared no longer hold them, as the minister added, it was so unpopular. . . . Yet Philip was slow in returning an answer to the importunate letters of the regent and the minister; and when he did reply, it was to evade their request. . . . The regent, however, saw that, with or without instructions, it was necessary to act. . . . The troops were ordered to Zealand, in order to embark for Spain. But the winds proved unfavorable. Two months longer they were detained, on shore or on board the transports. They soon got into brawls with the workmen employed on the dikes; and the inhabitants, still apprehensive of orders from the king countermanding the departure of the Spaniards, resolved, in such an event, to abandon the dikes, and lay the country under water! Fortunately, they were not driven to this extremity. In January, 1561, more than a year after the date

assigned by Philip, the nation was relieved of the presence of the intruders. . . . This difficulty was no sooner settled than it was followed by another scarcely less serious." Arrangements had been made for "adding 13 new bishoprics to the four already existing in the Netherlands. . . . The whole affair had been kept profoundly secret by the government. It was not till 1561 that Philip disclosed his views, in a letter to some of the principal nobles in the council of state. But, long before that time, the project had taken wind, and created a general sensation through the country. The people looked on it as an attempt to subject them to the same ecclesiastical system which existed in Spain. The bishops, by virtue of their office, were possessed of certain inquisitorial powers, and these were still further enlarged by the provisions of the royal edicts. . . . The present changes were regarded as part of a great scheme for introducing the Spanish Inquisition into the Netherlands. . . . The nobles had other reasons for opposing the measure. The bishops would occupy in the legislature the place formerly held by the abbots, who were indebted for their election to the religious houses over which they presided. The new prelates, on the contrary, would receive their nomination from the crown; and the nobles saw with alarm their own independence menaced by the accession of an order of men who would naturally be subservient to the interests of the monarch. . . . But the greatest opposition arose from the manner in which the new dignitaries were to be maintained. This was to be done by suppressing the offices of the abbots, and by appropriating the revenues of their houses to the maintenance of the bishops. . . . Just before Philip's departure from the Netherlands, a bull arrived from Rome authorizing the erection of the new bishoprics. This was but the initiatory step. Many other proceedings were necessary before the consummation of the affair. Owing to impediments thrown in the way by the provinces, and the habitual tardiness of the court of Rome, nearly three years elapsed before the final briefs were expedited by Pius IV."—W. H. Prescott, *Hist. of the Reign of Philip II., bk. 2, ch. 6 (v. 1).*—"Against the arbitrary policy embodied in the edicts, the new bishoprics and the foreign soldiery, the Netherlanders appealed to their ancient constitutions. These charters were called 'handvests' in the vernacular Dutch and Flemish, because the sovereign made them fast with his hand. As already stated, Philip had made them faster than any of the princes of his house had ever done, so far as oath and signature could accomplish that purpose, both as hereditary prince in 1549, and as monarch in 1555. . . . Of these constitutions, that of Brabant, known by the title of the 'joyeuse entrée' 'blyde inkomst,' or blythe entrance, furnished the most decisive barrier against the present wholesale tyranny. First and foremost, the 'joyous entry' provided, 'that the prince of the land should not elevate the clerical state higher than of old has been customary and by former princes settled; unless by consent of the other two estates, the nobility and the cities.' Again, 'the prince can prosecute no one of his subjects, nor any foreign resident, civilly or criminally, except in the ordinary and open courts of justice in the province, where the accused may answer and defend himself with the help of advocates.' Further, 'the prince shall appoint no foreigners to office in Brabant.' Lastly 'should the prince, by force or otherwise, violate any of these privileges, the inhabitants of Brabant, after regular protest entered, are discharged of their oaths of allegiance, and, as free, independent, and unbound people, may conduct themselves exactly as seems to them best.' Such were the leading features, so far as they regarded the points now at issue, of that famous constitution which was so highly esteemed in the Netherlands, that mothers came to the province in order to give birth to their children, who might thus enjoy, as a birthright, the privileges of Brabant. Yet the charters of the other provinces ought to have been as effective against the arbitrary course of the government. 'No foreigner,' said the constitution of Holland, 'is eligible as councillor, financier, magistrate, or member of a court. Justice can be administered only by the ordinary tribunals and magistrates. The ancient laws and customs shall remain inviolable. Should the prince infringe any of these provisions, no one is bound to obey him.' These provisions from the Brabant and Holland charters are only cited as illustrative of the general spirit of the provincial constitutions. Nearly all the provinces possessed privileges equally ample, duly signed and sealed."—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt. 2, ch. 2 (v. 1).*

Also in: E. E. Crowe, *Cardinal Granvelle (Eminent Foreign Statesmen, v. 1).*

A. D. 1562-1566.—Beginning of organized resistance to the tyranny and persecution of Philip.—The signing of the Compromise.—The League of the Gueux.—William of Orange now "claimed, in the name of the whole country, the convocation of the states-general. This assembly alone was competent to decide what was just, legal, and obligatory for each province and every town. . . . The ministers endeavored to evade a demand which they were at first unwilling openly to refuse. But the firm demeanor and persuasive eloquence of the prince of Orange carried before them all who were not actually bought by the crown; and Granvelle found himself at length forced to avow that an express order from the king forbade the convocation of the states, on any pretext, during his absence. The veil was thus rent asunder, which had in some measure concealed the deformity of Philip's despotism. The result was a powerful confederacy among all who held it odious, for the overthrow of Granvelle, to whom they chose to attribute the king's conduct. . . . Those who composed this confederacy against the minister were actuated by a great variety of motives. . . . It is doubtful if any of the confederates except the prince of Orange clearly saw that they were putting themselves in direct and personal opposition to the king himself. William alone, clear-sighted in politics and profound in his views, knew, in thus devoting himself to the public cause, the adversary with whom he entered the lists. This great man, for whom the national traditions still preserve the sacred title of 'father' (Vader-Willem), and who was in truth not merely the parent but the political creator of the country, was at this period in his 30th year. . . . Philip, . . . driven before the popular voice, found himself forced to the choice of throwing off the mask at once, or of sacrificing

Granvelle. An invincible inclination for manœuvring and deceit decided him on the latter measure; and the cardinal, recalled but not disgraced, quitted the Netherlands on the 10th of March, 1564. The secret instructions to the government remained unrevoked; the president Viglius succeeded to the post which Granvelle had occupied; and it was clear that the projects of the king had suffered no change. Nevertheless some good resulted from the departure of the unpopular minister. The public fermentation subsided; the patriot lords reappeared at court; and the prince of Orange acquired an increasing influence in the council and over the governant. . . . It was resolved to dispatch a special envoy to Spain, to explain to Philip the views of the council. . . . The count of Egmont, chosen by the council for this important mission, set out for Madrid in the month of February, 1565. Philip received him with profound hypocrisy; loaded him with the most flattering promises; sent him back in the utmost elation, and when the credulous count returned to Brussels, he found that the written orders, of which he was the bearer, were in direct variance with every word which the king had uttered These orders were chiefly concerning the reiterated subject of the persecution to be inflexibly pursued against the religious reformers. Not satisfied with the hitherto established forms of punishment, Philip now expressly commanded that the more revolting means decreed by his father in the rigor of his early zeal, such as burning, living burial, and the like, should be adopted . . . Even Viglius was terrified by the nature of Philip's commands; and the patriot lords once more withdrew from all share in the government, leaving to the duchess of Parma and her ministers the whole responsibility of the new measures. They were at length put into actual and vigorous execution in the beginning of the year 1566. The inquisitors of the faith, with their familiars, stalked abroad boldly in the devoted provinces, carrying persecution and death in their train. Numerous but partial insurrections opposed these odious intruders. Every district and town became the scene of frightful executions or tumultuous resistance."—T. C. Grattan, *Hist. of the Netherlands, ch.* 7.—In November, 1565, a meeting of Flemish nobles was held at Culenborg House, Brussels, where they formed a league, in which Philip de Marnix, Lord of Ste. Aldegonde, Count Louis of Nassau, a younger brother of the Prince of Orange, and Viscount Brederode, were the foremost leaders. "In a meeting held at Breda, in Jany. 1566, the league promulgated their views in a paper called the Compromise, attributed to the hand of Ste. Aldegonde. The document contained a severe denunciation of the inquisition as an illegal, pernicious and iniquitous tribunal; the subscribers swore to defend one another against any attack that might be made upon them; and declared, at the same time, that they did not mean to throw off their allegiance to the King. . . . In the course of two months the Compromise was signed by about 2,000 persons, including many Catholics; but only a few of the great nobles could be prevailed on to subscribe it. . . . The Prince of Orange at first kept aloof from the league, and at this period Egmont, who was of a more impulsive temper, seemed to act the leading part; but the nation relied solely upon William. The latter gave at least a tacit sanction to the league in the spring of 1566, by joining the members of it in a petition to the Regent which he had himself revised."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe, bk.* 3, *ch.* 7 (*v.* 2).—"The league had its origin in banquets, and a banquet gave it form and perfection. . . . Brederode entertained the confederates in Kuilemberg House; about 300 guests assembled; intoxication gave them courage, and their audacity rose with their numbers. During the conversation, one of their number happened to remark that he had overheard the Count of Barlaimont whisper in French to the regent, who was seen to turn pale on the delivery of the petitions, that 'she need not be afraid of a band of beggars (gueux).' . . . Now, as the very name for their fraternity was the very thing which had most perplexed them, an expression was eagerly caught up, which, while it cloaked the presumption of their enterprise in humility, was at the same time appropriate to them as petitioners. Immediately they drank to one another under this name, and the cry 'Long live the gueux!' was accompanied with a general shout of applause . . . What they had resolved on in the moment of intoxication they attempted, when sober, to carry into execution . . . In a few days, the town of Brussels swarmed with ash-gray garments, such as were usually worn by *mendicant friars and penitents.* Every confederate put his whole family and domestics in this dress Some carried wooden bowls thinly overlaid with plates of silver, cups of the same kind, and wooden knives; in short, the whole paraphernalia of the beggar tribe, which they either fixed round their hats or suspended from their girdles. . . . Hence the origin of the name 'Gueux,' which was subsequently borne in the Netherlands by all who seceded from popery, and took up arms against the king."—F. Schiller, *History of the Revolt of the Netherlands, bk.* 3.

Also in: J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 2, *ch.* 3-6 (*v.* 1).—F. von Raumer, *Hist. of the 16th and 17th Centuries ill. by original docs., letter* 16 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 1566-1568.—Field preaching under arms.—The riots of the Image-breakers.—Philip's schemes of revenge.—Discouragement and retirement of Orange.—Blindness of Egmont and Horn, and their fate.— "While the Privy Council was endeavouring to obtain a 'Moderation' of the Edicts, and . . . effected that the heretics should be no longer burnt but hung, and that the Inquisition should proceed 'prudently, and with circumspection,' a movement broke out among the people which mocked at all Edicts. The open country was suddenly covered with thousands of armed noblemen, citizens, and peasants, who assembled in large crowds in the open air to listen to some heretical preacher, Lutheran, Calvinist, or even an Anabaptist, and to hold forbidden services, with prayers and hymns, in the mother tongue. They sallied forth with pistols, arquebuses, flails, and pitchforks; the place of meeting was marked out like a camp, and surrounded by guards; from 10,000 to 20,000 assembled, the armed men outside, the women and children within. After the immense choir had sung a psalm, one of the excommunicated preachers appeared between two pikes (according to the 'Moderation' a price was set upon the head of every one of them), and expounded the

new doctrine from the Scriptures; the assembly listened in devout silence, and when the service was ended separated quietly, but defiantly. This was repeated day after day throughout the country, and nobody dared to attack the armed field preachers. The Regent was in a painful situation; she was always having it proclaimed that the Edicts were in force, but nobody cared. . . . It was all in vain unless foreign troops came to enforce obedience, and these she had neither power nor funds to procure. The King hesitated in his usual fashion, and left the Regent to the torments of powerlessness and uncertainty. Meanwhile the universal excitement bore fatal fruit. Instead of the dignified preachings and peaceful assemblies of May, in June and July there were wild excesses and furious mobs. Orange had just persuaded the Regent to permit the field preaching in the open country, if they avoided the towns, when the first great outbreak occurred in Antwerp. Two days after a great procession, on the 18th of August, 1566, at which the Catholic clergy of Antwerp had made a pompous display to the annoyance of the numerous Protestants, the beautiful cathedral was invaded by a furious mob, who destroyed without mercy all the images, pictures, and objects of art that it contained. This demolition of images, the stripping of churches, desecration of chapels, and destruction of all symbols of the ancient faith, spread from Antwerp to other places, Tournay, Valenciennes, &c. It was done with a certain moderation, for neither personal violence nor theft took place anywhere, though innumerable costly articles were lying about. Still, these fanatical scenes not only excited the ire of Catholics, but of every religious man; in Antwerp, especially, the seafaring mob had rushed upon everything that had been held sacred for centuries. In her distress the Regent wished to flee from Brussels, but Orange, Egmont, and Horn compelled her to remain, and induced her to proclaim the Act of the 25th of August, by which an armistice was decided on between Spain and the Beggars. In this the Government conceded the abolition of the Inquisition and the toleration of the new doctrines, and the Beggars declared that for so long as this promise was kept their league was dissolved. In consideration of this, the first men in the country agreed to quell the disturbances in Flanders, Antwerp, Tournay, and Malines, and to restore peace. Orange effected this in Antwerp like a true statesman, who knew how to keep himself above party spirit; but in Flanders, Egmont, on the contrary, went to work like a brutal soldier; he stormed against the heretics like Philip's Spanish executioners, and the scales fell from the eyes of the bitterly disappointed people. Meanwhile a decision had been come to at Madrid. . . . When at length the irresolute King had determined to proclaim an amnesty, though it was really rather a proscription, and to promise indulgence, while he was assuring the Pope by protocol before notaries that he never would grant any, the news came of the image riots of August, and a report from the Duchess in which she humbly begged the King's pardon for having allowed a kind of religious peace to be extorted from her, but she was entirely innocent; they had forced it from her as a prisoner in her palace, and there was one comfort, that the King was not bound by a promise made only in her name. Philip's rage was boundless. . . . He was resolved upon fearful revenge, even when he was writing that he should know how to restore order in his provinces by means of grace and mercy. . . . Well-informed as Orange was, he understood the whole situation perfectly; he knew that while the Regent was heaping flattery upon him, she and Philip were compassing his destruction; that her only object could be to keep the peace until the Spanish preparations were complete, and meanwhile, if possible, to compromise him with the people. He wrote to Egmont, and laid the dangers of their situation before him, and communicated his resolve either to escape Philip's revenge by flight, or to join with his friends in armed resistance to the expected attack of the Spanish army. But Egmont in his unhappy blindness had resolved to side with the Government which was more than ever determined on his destruction, and the meeting at Dendermonde, October, 1566, when Orange consulted him, Louis of Nassau, and Hogstraaten, as to a plan of united action, was entirely fruitless. . . . Admiral Horn, who had staked large property in the service of the Emperor and King, and had never received the least return in answer to his just demands, gave up his office, and, like a weary philosopher, retired into solitude. Left entirely alone, Orange thought of emigrating; in short, the upper circle of the previous party of opposition no longer existed. But it was not so with the mad leaders of the Beggars. While the zealous inhabitants of Valenciennes, incited by two of the most dauntless Calvinistic preachers, undertook to defend themselves against the royal troops with desperate bravery, Count Brederode went about the country with a clang of sabres, exciting disturbances in order to give the heretics at Valenciennes breathing-time by a happy diversion. . . . All that Philip wanted to enable him to gain the day was an unsuccessful attempt at revolt. The attack upon images and the Beggars' volunteer march did more for the Government than all Granvella's system; . . . drove every one who favoured the Catholics and loved peace into the arms of the Government. The reaction set in with the sanguinary defeat of the rebels at Valenciennes, who never again even made an attempt at resistance. Orange gave up the liberties of his country for lost. . . . Stating that he could never take the new oath of fealty which was required, because it would oblige him to become the executioner of his Protestant countrymen, he renounced his offices and dignities, . . . made a last attempt to save his friend Egmont, . . . and retired to Dillenburg, the ancient property of the family. He wished to be spared for better times; he saw the storm coming, and was too cool-headed to offer himself as the first sacrifice. In fact, just when he was travelling towards Germany, Duke Alba [more commonly called Alva], the hangman of the Netherlands, was on his way to his destination." Alva arrived in August, 1567, with an army of 10,000 carefully picked veterans, fully empowered to make the Netherlands a conquered territory and deal with it as such. His first important act was the treacherous seizure and imprisonment of Egmont and Horn. Then the organization of terror began. The imprisonment and the mockery of a trial of the two most distinguished victims was protracted until the 5th of June, 1568, when they were beheaded in the great square at Brussels.—L. Häusser, *The Period of the Reformation*, ch. 22-23.

ALSO IN: J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt. 2, ch. 6-10, and pt. 3, ch. 1-2.*—F. Schiller, *Hist. of the Revolt of the Netherlands, bk. 3-4.*

A. D. 1567.—The Council of Blood.—"In the same despatch of the 9th September [1567], in which the Duke communicated to Philip the capture of Egmont and Horn, he announced to him his determination to establish a new court for the trial of crimes committed during the recent period of troubles. This wonderful tribunal was accordingly created with the least possible delay. It was called the Council of Troubles, but it soon acquired the terrible name, by which it will be forever known in history, of the Blood-Council. It superseded all other institutions. Every court, from those of the municipal magistracies up to the supreme councils of the provinces, were forbidden to take cognisance in future of any cause growing out of the late troubles. The Council of State, although it was not formally disbanded, fell into complete desuetude, its members being occasionally summoned into Alva's private chambers in an irregular manner, while its principal functions were usurped by the Blood-Council. Not only citizens of every province, but the municipal bodies, and even the sovereign provincial Estates themselves, were compelled to plead, like humble individuals, before this new and extraordinary tribunal. It is unnecessary to allude to the absolute violation which was thus committed of all charters, laws, and privileges, because the very creation of the Council was a bold and brutal proclamation that those laws and privileges were at an end. . . . So well . . . did this new and terrible engine perform its work, that in less than three months from the time of its erection, 1,800 human beings had suffered death by its summary proceedings; some of the highest, the noblest, and the most virtuous in the land among the number; nor had it then manifested the slightest indication of faltering in its dread career. Yet, strange to say, this tremendous court, thus established upon the ruins of all the ancient institutions of the country, had not been provided with even a nominal authority from any source whatever. The King had granted it no letters patent or charter, nor had even the Duke of Alva thought it worth while to grant any commissions, either in his own name or as Captain-General, to any of the members composing the board. The Blood-Council was merely an informal club, of which the Duke was perpetual president, while the other members were all appointed by himself. Of these subordinate councillors, two had the right of voting, subject, however, in all cases, to his final decision, while the rest of the number did not vote at all. It had not, therefore, in any sense, the character of a judicial, legislative, or executive tribunal, but was purely a board of advice by which the bloody labours of the Duke were occasionally lightened as to detail, while not a feather's weight of power or of responsibility was removed from his shoulders. He reserved for himself the final decision upon all causes which should come before the Council, and stated his motives for so doing with grim simplicity. 'Two reasons,' he wrote to the King, 'have determined me thus to limit the power of the tribunal; the first that, not knowing its members, I might be easily deceived by them; the second, that the men of law only condemn for crimes which are proved; whereas your Majesty knows that affairs of state are governed by very different rules from the laws which they have here.' It being, therefore, the object of the Duke to compose a body of men who would be of assistance to him in condemning for crimes which could not be proved, and in slipping over statutes which were not to be recognised, it must be confessed that he was not unfortunate in the appointments which he made to the office of councillors. . . . No one who was offered the office refused it. Noircarmes and Berlaymont accepted with very great eagerness. Several presidents and councillors of the different provincial tribunals were appointed, but all the Netherlanders were men of straw. Two Spaniards, Del Rio and Vargas, were the only members who could vote, while their decisions, as already stated, were subject to reversal by Alva. Del Rio was a man without character or talent, a mere tool in the hands of his superiors, but Juan de Vargas was a terrible reality. No better man could have been found in Europe for the post to which he was thus elevated. To shed human blood was, in his opinion, the only important business and the only exhilarating pastime of life. . . . It was the duty of the different subalterns, who, as already stated, had no right of voting, to prepare reports upon the cases. Nothing could be more summary. Information was lodged against a man, or against a hundred men, in one document. The Duke sent the papers to the Council, and the inferior councillors reported at once to Vargas. If the report concluded with a recommendation of death to the man or the hundred men in question, Vargas instantly approved it, and execution was done upon the man, or the hundred men, within 48 hours. If the report had any other conclusion, it was immediately sent back for revision, and the reporters were overwhelmed with reproaches by the President. Such being the method of operation, it may be supposed that the councillors were not allowed to slacken in their terrible industry. The register of every city, village, and hamlet throughout the Netherlands showed the daily lists of men, women, and children thus sacrificed at the shrine of the demon who had obtained the mastery over this unhappy land. It was not often that an individual was of sufficient importance to be tried—if trial it could be called—by himself. It was found more expeditious to send them in batches to the furnace. Thus, for example, on the 4th of January, 84 inhabitants of Valenciennes were condemned; on another day, 95 miscellaneous individuals from different places in Flanders; on another, 46 inhabitants of Malines; on another, 35 persons from different localities, and so on. . . . Thus the whole country became a charnel-house; the death-bell tolled hourly in every village; not a family but was called to mourn for its dearest relatives, while the survivors stalked listlessly about, the ghosts of their former selves, among the wrecks of their former homes. The spirit of the nation, within a few months after the arrival of Alva, seemed hopelessly broken. The blood of its best and bravest had already stained the scaffold; men to whom it had been accustomed to look for guidance and protection, were dead, in prison, or in exile. Submission had ceased to be of any avail, flight was impossible, and the spirit of vengeance had alighted at every fireside.

The mourners went daily about the streets, for there was hardly a house which had not been made desolate. The scaffolds, the gallows, the funeral piles which had been sufficient in ordinary times, furnished now an entirely inadequate machinery for the incessant executions. Columns and stakes in every street, the door-posts of private houses, the fences in the fields, were laden with human carcases, strangled, burned, beheaded. The orchards in the country bore on many a tree the hideous fruit of human bodies. Thus the Netherlands were crushed, and, but for the stringency of the tyranny which had now closed their gates, would have been depopulated."—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 3, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1568.—Stupendous death-sentence of the Inquisition.—The whole population condemned.—"Early in the year, the most sublime sentence of death was promulgated which has ever been pronounced since the creation of the world. The Roman tyrant wished that his enemies' heads were all upon a single neck, that he might strike them off at a blow; the Inquisition assisted Philip to place the heads of all his Netherland subjects upon a single neck, for the same fell purpose. Upon the 16th February, 1568, a sentence of the Holy Office condemned all the inhabitants of the Netherlands to death as heretics. From this universal doom only a few persons, especially named, were excepted. A proclamation of the King, dated ten days later, confirmed this decree of the Inquisition, and ordered it to be carried into instant execution without regard to age, sex, or condition. This is probably the most concise death-warrant that was ever framed. Three millions of people, men, women, and children, were sentenced to the scaffold in three lines; and as it was well known that these were not harmless thunders, like some bulls of the Vatican, but serious and practical measures which it was intended should be enforced, the horror which they produced may be easily imagined. It was hardly the purpose of Government to compel the absolute completion of the wholesale plan in all its length and breadth, yet in the horrible times upon which they had fallen, the Netherlanders might be excused for believing that no measure was too monstrous to be fulfilled. At any rate, it was certain that when all were condemned, any might at a moment's warning be carried to the scaffold, and this was precisely the course adopted by the authorities. . . . Under this new decree, the executions certainly did not slacken. Men in the highest and the humblest positions were daily and hourly dragged to the stake. Alva, in a single letter to Philip, coolly estimated the number of executions which were to take place immediately after the expiration of Holy Week, 'at 800 heads.' Many a citizen, convicted of a hundred thousand florins, and of no other crime, saw himself suddenly tied to a horse's tail, with his hands fastened behind him, and so dragged to the gallows. But although wealth was an unpardonable sin, poverty proved rarely a protection. Reasons sufficient could always be found for dooming the starveling laborer as well as the opulent burgher. To avoid the disturbances created in the streets by the frequent harangues or exhortations addressed to the bystanders by the victims on their way to the scaffold, a new gag was invented. The tongue of each prisoner was screwed into an iron ring, and then seared with a hot iron. The swelling and inflammation, which were the immediate result, prevented the tongue from slipping through the ring, and of course effectually precluded all possibility of speech."—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 3, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1568-1572.—The arming of Revolt and beginning of War by the Prince of Orange.—Alva's successes, brutalities, and senseless taxation.—Quarrels with England and destruction of Flemish trade.—"So unprecedented already was the slaughter that even in the beginning of March 1568, when Alva had been scarcely six months in the country, the Emperor Maximilian, himself a Roman Catholic, addressed a formal remonstrance to the king on the subject, as his dignity entitled him to do, since the Netherlands were a part of the Germanic body. It received an answer which was an insult to the remonstrant from its defiance of truth and common sense, and which cut off all hope from the miserable Flemings. Philip declared that what he had done had been done 'for the repose of the Provinces,' . . . and almost on the same day he published a new edict, confirming a decree of the Inquisition which condemned all the inhabitants of the Netherlands to death as heretics, with the exception of a few persons who were named [see above]. . . . In their utter despair, the Flemings implored the aid of the Prince of Orange, who . . . had quitted the country. . . . He was now residing at Dillenbourg, in Nassau, in safety from Philip's threats, and from the formal sentence which, in addition to the general condemnation of the whole people, the Council of Blood had just pronounced against him by name. But he resolved that in such an emergency it did not become him to weigh his own safety against the claims his countrymen had on his exertions. After a few weeks energetically spent in levying troops and raising money to maintain them, he published a document which he entitled his 'Justification,' and which stated his own case and that of the Provinces with a most convincing clearness; and at the end of April he took the field at the head of a small force, composed of French Huguenots, Flemish exiles, . . . and German mercenaries. . . . Thus in the spring of 1568 began that terrible war which for 40 years desolated what, in spite of great natural disadvantages, had hitherto been one of the most prosperous countries of Europe. . . . To dwell on many of its details . . . would require volumes. . . . And, indeed, the pitched battles were few. At the outset [May 23, 1568] Count Louis of Nassau, the prince's brother, defeated and slew Count Aremberg, the Spanish governor of the province of Groningen, very nearly on the spot [near the convent of Heiliger-Lee, or the Holy Lion] on which, in the palmy days of Rome, the fierce valor of Arminius had annihilated the legions whose loss was so deeply imprinted on the heart of Augustus; and Alva had avenged the disaster by so complete a rout of Louis at Jemmingen, that more than half of the rebel army was slaughtered on the field, and Louis himself only escaped a capture, which would have delivered him to the scaffold, by swimming the Ems, and escaping with a mere handful of troops, all that were left of his army, into Germany. But after dealing this blow . . . Alva rarely fought a battle in the open field.

He preferred showing the superiority of his generalship by defying the endeavours of the prince and his brothers to bring him to action, miscalculating, indeed, the eventual consequences of such tactics, and believing that the protraction of the war must bring the rebels to his sovereign's feet by the utter exhaustion of their resources; while the event proved that it was Spain which was exhausted by the contest, that kingdom being in fact so utterly prostrated by continued draining of men and treasure which it involved, that her decay may be dated from the moment when Alva reached the Flemish borders. His career in the Netherlands seemed to show that, warrior though he was, persecution was more to his taste than even victory. Victorious, indeed, he was, so far as never failing to reduce every town which he besieged, and to baffle every design of the prince which he anticipated. . . Every triumph which he gained was sullied by a ferocious and deliberate cruelty, of which the history of no other general in the world affords a similar example. . . . Whenever Alva captured a town, he himself enjoined his troops to show no mercy either to the garrison or to the peaceful inhabitants Every atrocity which greed of rapine, wantonness of lust, and bloodthirsty love of slaughter could devise was perpetrated by his express direction. . . He had difficulties to encounter besides those of his military operations, and such as he was less skilful in meeting. He soon began to be in want of money. A fleet laden with gold and silver was driven by some French privateers into an English harbour, where Elizabeth at once laid her hands on it. If it belonged to her enemies, she had a right, she said, to seize it: if to her friends, to borrow it (she had not quite decided in which light to regard the Spaniards, but the logic was irresistible, and her grasp irremovable), and, to supply the deficiency, Alva had recourse to expedients which injured none so much as himself. To avenge himself on the Queen, he issued a proclamation [March, 1569] forbidding all commercial intercourse between the Netherlands and England; . . . but his prohibition damaged the Flemings more than the English merchants, and in so doing inflicted loss upon himself. . . . For he at the same time endeavoured to compel the States to impose, for his use, a heavy tax on every description of property, on every transfer of property, and even on every article of merchandise [the tenth penny, or ten per cent.] as often as it should be sold: the last impost, in the Provinces which were terrified into consenting to it, so entirely annihilating trade that it even roused the disapproval of his own council; and that, finding themselves supported by that body, even those Provinces which had complied, retracted their assent. . . . After a time [1572] he was forced first to compromise his demands for a far lower sum than that at which he had estimated the produce of his taxes, and at last to renounce even that. He was bitterly disappointed and indignant, and began to be weary of his post."—C. D. Yonge, *Three Centuries of Modern History, ch.* 5.

Also in: J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 3, *ch.* 2-7 (*v.* 2).—D. Campbell, *The Puritan in Holland, Eng., and Am., ch.* 3 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 1572.—The Beggars of the Sea and their capture of Brill.—Rapid Revolution in Holland and Zealand, but wholly in the name of the King and his Stadtholder, William of Orange.—The Provisional Government organized.—In the spring of 1572, Alva having re-established friendly relations with Queen Elizabeth, all the cruisers of the rebellious Netherlanders—"Beggars of the Sea" as they had styled themselves—were suddenly expelled from English ports, where they had previously found shelter and procured supplies. The consequence was unexpected to those who brought it about, and proved most favorable to the patriotic cause. Desperately driven by their need of some harbor of refuge, the fleet of these adventurers made an attack upon the important seaport of Brill, took it with little fighting and held it stubbornly. Excited by this success, the patriotic burghers of Flushing, on the isle of Walcheren, soon afterwards rose and expelled the Spanish garrison from their town. "The example thus set by Brill and Flushing was rapidly followed. The first half of the year 1572 was distinguished by a series of triumphs rendered still more remarkable by the reverses which followed at its close. . . . Enkhuizen, the key to the Zuyder Zee, the principal arsenal, and one of the first commercial cities in the Netherlands, rose against the Spanish Admiral, and hung out the banner of Orange on its ramparts. The revolution effected here was purely the work of the people—of the mariners and burghers of the city. Moreover, the magistracy was set aside and the government of Alva repudiated without shedding one drop of blood, without a single wrong to person or property. By the same spontaneous movement, nearly all the important cities of Holland and Zealand raised the standard of him in whom they recognized their deliverer. The revolution was accomplished under nearly similar circumstances everywhere. With one fierce bound of enthusiasm the nation shook off its chain. Oudewater, Dort, Harlem, Leyden, Gorcum, Loewenstein, Gouda, Medenblik, Horn, Alkmaar, Edam, Mounikendam, Purmerende, as well as Flushing, Veer, and Enkhuizen, all ranged themselves under the government of Orange as lawful stadholder for the King. Nor was it in Holland and Zealand alone that the beacon fires of freedom were lighted. City after city in Gelderland, Overyssel, and the See of Utrecht, all the important towns of Friesland, some sooner, some later, some without a struggle, some after a short siege, some with resistance by the functionaries of government, some by amicable compromise, accepted the garrisons of the Prince and formally recognized his authority. Out of the chaos which a long and preternatural tyranny had produced, the first struggling elements of a new and a better world began to appear. . . . Not all the conquests thus rapidly achieved in the cause of liberty were destined to endure, nor were any to be retained without a struggle. The little northern cluster of republics, which had now restored its honor to the ancient Batavian name, was destined, however, for a long and vigorous life. From that bleak isthmus the light of freedom was to stream through many years upon struggling humanity in Europe, a guiding pharos across a stormy sea; and Harlem, Leyden, Alkmaar—names hallowed by deeds of heroism such as have not often illustrated human annals, still breathe as trumpet-tongued and perpetual a defiance to despotism as

Marathon, Thermopylæ, or Salamis. A new board of magistrates had been chosen in all the redeemed cities by popular election. They were required to take an oath of fidelity to the King of Spain, and to the Prince of Orange as his stadholder; to promise resistance to the Duke of Alva, the tenth penny, and the Inquisition; 'to support every man's freedom and the welfare of the country; to protect widows, orphans, and miserable persons, and to maintain justice and truth.' Diedrich Sonoy arrived on the 2nd June at Enkhuizen. He was provided by the Prince with a commission, appointing him Lieutenant-Governor of North Holland or Waterland. Thus, to combat the authority of Alva, was set up the authority of the King. The stadholderate over Holland and Zealand, to which the Prince had been appointed in 1559, he now reassumed. Upon this fiction reposed the whole provisional polity of the revolted Netherlands. . . . The people at first claimed not an iota more of freedom than was secured by Philip's coronation oath. There was no pretence that Philip was not sovereign, but there was a pretence and a determination to worship God according to conscience, and to reclaim the ancient political 'liberties' of the land. So long as Alva reigned, the Blood Council, the Inquisition, and martial law, were the only codes or courts, and every charter slept. To recover this practical liberty and these historical rights, and to shake from their shoulders a most sanguinary government, was the purpose of William and of the people. No revolutionary standard was displayed. The written instructions given by the Prince to his lieutenant Sonoy were to 'see that the Word of God was preached, without, however, suffering any hindrance to the Roman Church in the exercise of its religion.' . . . The Prince was still in Germany, engaged in raising troops and providing funds."—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 3, *ch.* 6–7 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1572-1573.—Capture of Mons by Louis of Nassau and its recovery by the Spaniards. —Spanish massacres at Mechlin, Zutphen and Naarden.—The siege and capture of Haarlem. —"While William of Orange was in Germany, raising money and troops, he still directed the affairs of the Netherlands. His prospects were again brightened by the capture, by his gallant brother Louis of Nassau, of the important city of Mons . . . This last startling blow forced Alva to immediate action. He at once sent his son, Don Frederic, to lay siege to Mons. Soon after, the Duke of Medina Cœli, Alva's successor as governor of the Netherlands [to whom, however, Alva did not surrender his authority], arrived safely with his fleet, but another Spanish squadron fell with its rich treasures into the hands of the rebels. Alva was now so pressed for money that he agreed to abolish the useless tenth-penny tax, if the states-general of the Netherlands would grant him a million dollars a year. He had summoned the states of Holland to meet at the Hague on the 15th of July, but they met at Dort to renounce his authority, at the summons of William of Orange, who had raised an army in Germany, but was without means to secure the necessary three months' payment in advance. While still owning allegiance to the king, the states recognized Orange as stadtholder, empowered him to drive out the Spanish troops, and to maintain religious freedom. . . . Treating the Emperor Maximilian's peace orders as useless, the prince marched his army of 24,000 men to the relief of Mons. Most of the Netherland cities on the way accepted his authority, and everything looked favorable for his success, when an unforeseen and terrible calamity occurred. The French king, Charles IX., whose troops had been routed before Mons [by the Spaniards], had promised to furnish further aid to the provinces. Admiral Coligny was to join the forces of Orange with 15,000 men. The frightful massacre of St. Bartholomew in Paris, on the 24th of August, . . . was a terrible blow to the prince. It broke up all his plans. He had reached the neighborhood of Mons, which he was trying to reinforce, when a night attack was made by the Spaniards on his lines, September 11. . . . Obliged to leave his gallant brother Louis to his fate in Mons, Orange narrowly escaped being killed on his retreat. . . . Deserted by the cities that had been so earnest in his cause, sorrowful, but not despairing for his country, William had only his trust in God and his own destiny to sustain him. As Holland was the only province that clung to the hero patriot, he went there expecting and prepared to die for liberty. Louis of Nassau was forced, on the 21st of September, to abandon Mons to the Spaniards, who allowed Noircarmes . . . to massacre and pillage the inhabitants contrary to the terms of surrender. This wretch killed Catholics and Protestants alike, in order to secure their riches for himself. . . . The city of Mechlin, which had refused to admit a garrison of his troops, was even more brutally ravaged by Alva in order to obtain gold. . . . Alva's son, Don Frederic, now proved an apt pupil of his father, by almost literally executing his command to kill every man and burn every house in the city of Zutphen, which had opposed the entrance of the king's troops. The massacre was terrible and complete. The cause of Orange suffered still more by the cowardly flight of his brother-in-law, Count Van den Berg, from his post of duty in the provinces of Gelderland and Overyssel. By this desertion rugged Friesland was also lost to the patriot side. Holland alone held out against the victorious Spaniards. The little city of Naarden at first stoutly refused to surrender, but being weak was obliged to yield without striking a blow. Don Frederic's agent, Julian Romero, having promised that life and property should be spared, the people welcomed him and his soldiers at a grand feast on the 2d of December. Hardly was this over when 500 citizens, who had assembled in the town hall, were warned by a priest to prepare for death. This was the signal for the entrance of the Spanish troops, who butchered every one in the building. They then rushed furiously through the streets, pillaging and then setting fire to the houses. As the inmates came forth, they were tortured and killed by their cruel foes. . . . Alva wrote boastfully to the king that 'they had cut the throats of the burghers and all the garrison, and had not left a mother's son alive.' He ascribed this success to the favor of God in permitting the defence of so feeble a city to be even attempted. . . . As the city of Haarlem was the key to Holland, Don Frederic resolved to capture it at any cost. But the people were so bent upon resistance that they executed two of their magistrates for secretly negotiating with Alva. . . . Supported

the commandant of the Haarlem garrison, cheered soldiers and people by his heroic counsels, and through the efforts of Orange the city was placed under patriot rule. Amsterdam, which was in the enemy's hands, was ten miles distant, across a lake traversed by a narrow causeway, and the prince had erected a number of forts to command the frozen surface. As a thick fog covered the lake in these December days, supplies of men, provisions, and ammunition were brought into the city in spite of the vigilance of the besiegers. The sledges and skates of the Hollanders were very useful in this work. But against Don Frederic's army of 30,000 men, nearly equalling the entire population of Haarlem, the city with its extensive but weak fortifications had only a garrison of about 4,000. The fact that about 800 of these were respectable women, armed with sword, musket, and dagger, shows the heroic spirit of the people. The men were nerved to fresh exertions by these Amazons, who, led by their noble chief, the Widow Kenau Hasselaer, fought desperately by their side, both within and without the works. The banner of this famous heroine, who has been called the Joan of Arc of Haarlem, is now in the City Hall. A vigorous cannonade was kept up against the city for three days, beginning December 18, and men, women, and children worked incessantly in repairing the shattered walls. They even dragged the statues of saints from the churches to fill up the gaps, to the horror of the superstitious Spaniards. The brave burghers repelled their assaults with all sorts of weapons. Burning coals and boiling oil were hurled at their heads, and blazing pitch-hoops were skilfully caught about their necks. Astonished by this terrible resistance, which cost him hundreds of lives, Don Frederic resolved to take the city by siege." On the last day of January, 1573, Don Frederic having considerably shattered an outwork called the ravelin, ordered a midnight assault, and the Spaniards carried the fort. "They mounted the walls expecting to have the city at their mercy. Judge of their amazement to find a new and stronger fort, shaped like a half-moon, which had been secretly constructed during the siege, blazing away at them with its cannon. Before they could recover from their shock, the ravelin, which had been carefully undermined, blew up, and sent them crushed and bleeding into the air. The Spaniards outside, terrified at these outbursts, retreated hastily to their camp, leaving hundreds of dead beneath the walls. Two assaults of veteran soldiers, led by able generals, having been repelled by the dauntless burghers of Haarlem, famine seemed the only means of forcing its surrender. Starvation in fact soon threatened both besiegers and besieged. Don Frederic wished to abandon the contest, but Alva threatened to disown him as a son if he did so. . . . There was soon a struggle for the possession of the lake, which was the only means of conveying supplies to the besieged. In the terrible hand-to-hand fight which followed the grappling of the rival vessels, on the 28th of May, the prince's fleet, under Admiral Brand, was totally defeated. . . . During the month of June the wretched people of Haarlem had no food but linseed and rapeseed, and they were soon compelled to eat dogs, cats, rats, and mice. When these gave out they devoured shoe-leather and the boiled hides of horses and oxen, and tried to allay the pangs of hunger with grass and weeds. The streets were full of the dead and the dying." Attempts at relief by Orange were defeated. "As a last resort the besieged resolved to form a solid column, with the women and children, the aged and infirm, in the centre, to fight their way out; but Don Frederic, fearing the city would be left in ruins, induced them to surrender on the 12th of July, under promise of mercy. This promise was cruelly broken by a frightful massacre of 2,000 people, which gave great joy to Alva and Philip."—A. Young, *Hist. of the Netherlands, ch.* 10-11.

Also in: R. Watson, *Hist. of Philip II., bk.* 11-12.

A. D. 1573-1574.—Siege and deliverance of Alkmaar.—Displacement of Alva.—Battle of Mookerhyde and death of Louis of Nassau.—Siege and relief of Leyden.—The flooding of the land.—Founding of Leyden University.—After the surrender of Haarlem, a mutiny broke out among the Spanish troops that had been engaged in the siege, to whom 28 months' arrears of pay were due. "It was appeased with great difficulty at the end of seven weeks, when Alva determined to make a decisive attack on Holland both by land and water, and with this view commanded his son, Don Frederic di Toledo, to march to the siege of Alkmaar, and repaired in person to Amsterdam. . . . Don Frederic laid siege to Alkmaar at the head of 16,000 able and efficient troops; within the town were 1,800 armed burghers and 800 soldiers, as many perhaps as it was at that time capable of containing. With this handful of men the citizens of Alkmaar defended themselves no less resolutely than the Haarlemmers had done. The fierce onslaughts of the Spaniards were beaten back with uniform success on the part of the besieged; the women and girls were never seen to shrink from the fight, even where it was hottest, but unceasingly supplied the defenders with stones and burning missiles, to throw amongst their enemies. . . . But as there were no means of conveying reinforcements to the besieged from without, and their supplies began to fail, they resolved, after a month's siege, on the desperate measure of cutting through the dykes. Some troops sent by Sonnoy having effected this, and opened the sluices, the whole country was soon deluged with water. Don Frederic, astounded at this novel mode of warfare, and fearing that himself and his whole army would be drowned, broke up his camp in haste, and fled, rather than retreated, to Amsterdam. It seemed almost as though the blessing which the Prince of Orange had promised his people had come upon them. The capture of Geertruydenberg, about this time, by one of his lieutenants, was followed by a naval victory, as signal as it was important. The Admiral Bossu, to whom was given the command of the [Spanish] fleet at Amsterdam, having sailed through the Pampus with the design of occupying the Zuyderzee, and thus making himself master of the towns of North Holland, encountered the fleet of those towns, consisting of 24 vessels, commanded by Admiral Dirkson, stationed in the Zuyderzee to await his arrival." After several days of skirmishing, the Dutch fleet forced a close fight, "which lasted with little intermission from the afternoon of the 11th of October to midday of the 12th, during which time two of the royalist ships were sunk and a

third captured." The remainder fled or surrendered, Bossu, himself, being taken prisoner. "On intelligence of the issue of the battle, Alva quitted Amsterdam in haste and secrecy. This success delivered the towns of North Holland from the most imminent danger, and rendered the possession of Amsterdam nearly useless to the royalists." Alva was now forced, to call a meeting of the states-general, in the hope of obtaining a vote of money. "Upon their assembling at Brussels, the states of Holland despatched an earnest and eloquent address, exhorting them to emancipate themselves from Spanish slavery and the cruel tyranny of Alva, which the want of unanimity in the provinces had alone enabled him to exercise. . . . Their remonstrance appears to have been attended with a powerful effect, since the states-general could neither by threats or remonstrances be induced to grant the smallest subsidy. . . . Alva, having become heartily weary of the government he had involved in such irretrievable confusion, now obtained his recall; his place was filled by Don Louis de Requesens, grand commander of Castile. In the November of this year, Alva quitted the Netherlands, leaving behind him a name which has become a bye-word of hatred, scorn, and execration. . . . During the six years that he had governed the Netherlands, 18,000 persons had perished by the hand of the executioner, besides the numbers massacred at Naarden, Zutphen, and other conquered cities." The first undertaking of the new governor was an attempt to raise the siege of Middleburg, the Spanish garrison in which had been blockaded by the Gueux for nearly two years; but the fleet of 40 ships which he fitted out for the purpose was defeated, at Romers-waale, with a loss of ten vessels. "The surrender of Middleburg immediately followed, and with it that of Arnemuyden, which put the Gueux in possession of the principal islands of Zealand, and rendered them masters of the sea." But these successes were counterbalanced by a disaster which attended an expedition led from Germany by Louis of Nassau, the gallant but unfortunate brother of the Prince of Orange. His army was attacked and utterly destroyed by the Spaniards (April 14, 1574) at the village of Mookerheyde, or Mook, near Nimeguen, and both Louis and his brother Henry of Nassau were slain. "After raising the siege of Alkmaar, the Spanish forces, placed under the command of Francesco di Valdez on the departure of Don Frederic di Toledo, had for some weeks blockaded Leyden; but were recalled in the spring of this year to join the rest of the army on its march against Louis of Nassau. From that time the burghers of Leyden . . . had not only neglected to lay up any fresh stores of corn or other provision, but to occupy or destroy the forts with which the enemy had encompassed the town. This fact coming to the knowledge of Don Louis, he once more dispatched Valdez to renew the siege at the head of 8,000 troops. . . . Mindful of Haarlem and Alkmaar, the Spanish commander . . . brought no artillery, nor made any preparations for assault, but, well aware that there were not provisions in the town sufficient for three months, contented himself with closely investing it on all sides, and determined to await the slow but sure effects of famine." In this emergency, the States of Holland "decreed that all the dykes between Leyden and the Meuse and Yssel should be cut through, and the sluices opened at Rotterdam and Schiedam, by which the waters of those rivers, overflowing the valuable lands of Schieland and Rhynland, would admit of the vessels bringing succours up to the very gates of Leyden. The damage was estimated at 600,000 guilders. . . . The cutting through the dykes was a work of time and difficulty, as well from the labour required as from the continual skirmishes with the enemy. . . . Even when completed, it appeared as if the vast sacrifice were utterly unavailing. A steady wind blowing from the north-east kept back the waters. . . . Meanwhile the besieged, who for some weeks heard no tidings of their deliverers, had scarcely hope left to enable them to sustain the appalling sufferings they endured. . . . 'Then,' says the historian, who heard it from the mouths of the sufferers, 'there was no food so odious but it was esteemed a dainty.' . . . The siege had now lasted five months. . . . Not a morsel of food, even the most filthy and loathsome, remained . . . when, on a sudden, the wind veered to the north-west, and thence to the south-west; the waters of the Meuse rushed in full tide over the land, and the ships rode triumphantly on the waves. The Gueux, attacking with vigour the forts on the dykes, succeeded in driving out the garrisons with considerable slaughter. . . . On the . . . 3rd of October . . . Valdez evacuated all the forts in the vicinity. . . . In memory of this eventful siege, the Prince and States offered the inhabitants either to found an university or to establish a fair. They chose the former; but the States . . . granted both: the fair of Leyden was appointed to be held on the 1st of October in every year, the 3rd being ever after held as a solemn festival; and on the 8th of February in the next year, the university received its charter from the Prince of Orange in the name of King Philip. Both proved lasting monuments."—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 2, *ch.* 8-9 (*v.* 1-2).

Also in: J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 4, *ch.* 1-2 (*v.* 2).—W. T. Hewett, *The University of Leiden* (*Harper's Mag., March*, 1881).—C. M. Yonge, *Cameos from Eng. Hist., series* 5, *c.* 16.

A. D. 1575-1577.—Congress at Breda.—Offer of sovereignty to the English Queen.—Death of Requesens.—Mutiny of the Soldiery.—The Spanish Fury.—Alliance of Northern and Southern provinces under the Pacification of Ghent and the Union of Brussels.—Arrival of Don John of Austria.—"The bankrupt state of Philip II.'s exchequer, and the reverses which his arms had sustained, induced him to accept . . . the proffered mediation of the Emperor Maximilian, which he had before so arrogantly rejected, and a Congress was held at Breda from March till June 1575. But the insurgents were suspicious, and Philip was inflexible; he could not be induced to dismiss his Spanish troops, to allow the meeting of the States-General, or to admit the slightest toleration in matters of religion; and the contest was therefore renewed with more fury than ever. The situation of the patriots became very critical when the enemy, by occupying the islands of Duyveland and Schouwen, cut off the communication between Holland and Zealand; especially as all hope of succour from England had expired. Towards the close of the year envoys were

despatched to solicit the aid of Elizabeth, and to offer her, under certain conditions, the sovereignty of Holland and Zealand. Requesens sent Champagny to counteract these negociations, which ended in nothing. The English Queen was afraid of provoking the power of Spain, and could not even be induced to grant the Hollanders a loan. The attitude assumed at that time by the Duke of Alençon, in France, also prevented them from entering into any negociations with that Prince. In these trying circumstances, William the Silent displayed the greatest firmness and courage. It was now that he is said to have contemplated abandoning Holland and seeking with its inhabitants a home in the New World, having first restored the country to its ancient state of a waste of waters; a thought, however, which he probably never seriously entertained, though he may have given utterance to it in a moment of irritation or despondency. . . . The unexpected death of Requesens, who expired of a fever, March 5th 1576, after a few days' illness, threw the government into confusion. Philip II. had given Requesens a carte blanche to name his successor, but the nature of his illness had prevented him from filling it up The government therefore devolved to the Council of State, the members of which were at variance with one another; but Philip found himself obliged to intrust it 'ad interim' with the administration, till a successor to Requesens could be appointed. Count Mansfeld was made commander-in-chief, but was totally unable to restrain the licentious soldiery. The Spaniards, whose pay was in arrear, had now lost all discipline. After the raising of the siege of Leyden they had beset Utrecht and pillaged and maltreated the inhabitants, till Valdez contrived to furnish their pay. No sooner had Requesens expired than they broke into open mutiny, and acted as if they were entire masters of the country. After wandering about some time and threatening Brussels, they seized and plundered Alost, where they established themselves; and they were soon afterwards joined by the Walloon and German troops. To repress their violence, the Council of State restored to the Netherlanders the arms of which they had been deprived, and called upon them by a proclamation to repress force by force; but these citizen-soldiers were dispersed with great slaughter by the disciplined troops in various rencounters. Ghent, Utrecht, Valenciennes, Maestricht were taken and plundered by the mutineers; and at last the storm fell upon Antwerp, which the Spaniards entered early in November, and sacked during three days. More than 1,000 houses were burnt, 8,000 citizens are said to have been slain, and enormous sums in ready money were plundered. The whole damage was estimated at 24,000,000 florins. The horrible excesses committed in this sack procured for it the name of the 'Spanish Fury.' The government was at this period conducted in the name of the States of Brabant. On the 5th of September, De Hèze, a young Brabant gentleman who was in secret intelligence with the Prince of Orange, had, at the head of 500 soldiers, entered the palace where the Council of State was assembled, and seized and imprisoned the members. William, taking advantage of the alarm created at Brussels by the sack of Antwerp, persuaded the provisional government to summon the States-General, although such a course was at direct variance with the commands of the King. To this assembly all the provinces except Luxemburg sent deputies. The nobles of the southern provinces, although they viewed the Prince of Orange with suspicion, feeling that there was no security for them so long as the Spanish troops remained in possession of Ghent, sought his assistance in expelling them; which William consented to grant only on condition that an alliance should be effected between the northern and the southern, or Catholic provinces of the Netherlands. This proposal was agreed to, and towards the end of September Orange sent several thousand men from Zealand to Ghent, at whose approach the Spaniards, who had valorously defended themselves for two months under the conduct of the wife of their absent general Mondragon, surrendered, and evacuated the citadel. The proposed alliance was now converted into a formal union by the treaty called the Pacification of Ghent, signed November 8th 1576; by which it was agreed, without waiting for the sanction of Philip, whose authority however was nominally recognised, to renew the edict of banishment against the Spanish troops, to procure the suspension of the decrees against the Protestant religion, to summon the States-General of the northern and southern provinces, according to the model of the assembly which had received the abdication of Charles V., to provide for the toleration and practise of the Protestant religion in Holland and Zealand, together with other provisions of a similar character. About the same time with the Pacification of Ghent, all Zealand, with the exception of the island of Tholen, was recovered from the Spaniards. . . . It was a mistake on the part of Philip II. to leave the country eight months with only an 'ad interim' government. Had he immediately filled up the vacancy . . . the States could not have seized upon the government, and the alliance established at Ghent would not have been effected, by which an almost independent commonwealth had been erected. But Philip seems to have been puzzled as to the choice of a successor; and his selection, at length, of his brother Don John of Austria [a natural son of Charles V.], caused a further considerable delay. . . . The state of the Netherlands compelled Don John to enter them, not with the pomp and dignity becoming the lawful representative of a great monarch, but stealthily, like a traitor or conspirator. In Luxemburg alone, the only province which had not joined the union, could he expect to be received; and he entered its capital a few days before the publication of the treaty of Ghent, in the disguise of a Moorish slave, and in the train of Don Ottavio Gonzaga, brother of the Prince of Melfi. Having neither money nor arms, he was obliged to negociate with the provincial government in order to procure the recognition of his authority. At the instance of the Prince of Orange, the States insisted on the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, the maintenance of the treaty of Ghent, an act of amnesty for past offences, the convocation of the States-General, and an oath from Don John that he would respect all the charters and customs of the country. The new governor was violent, but the States were firm, and in January 1577 was formed the Union of Brussels, the professed objects of which were, the immediate expulsion of the Spaniards, and the execution of the Pacifica-

tion of Ghent; while at the same time the Catholic religion and the royal authority were to be upheld. This union, which was only a more popular repetition of the treaty of Ghent, soon obtained numberless signatures. . . . Meanwhile Rodolph II., the new Emperor of Germany, had offered his mediation, and appointed the Bishop of Liége to use his good offices between the parties; who, with the assistance of Duke William of Juliers, brought, or seemed to bring, the new governor to a more reasonable frame of mind. . . . Don John yielded all the points in dispute, and embodied them in what was called the Perpetual Edict, published March 12th, 1577. The Prince of Orange suspected from the first that these concessions were a mere deception."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe, bk.* 3, *ch.* 7-9 (*v.* 2).

ALSO IN: Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria, v.* 2, *ch.* 4-5.

A. D. 1577-1581.—The administration of Don John.—Orange's well-founded distrust.—Emancipation of Antwerp.—Battle of Gembloura.—Death of Don John and appointment of Parma.—Corruption of Flemish nobles.—Submission of the Walloon provinces.—Pretensions of the Duke of Anjou.—Constitution and declared independence of the Dutch Republic.—"It now seemed that the Netherlands had gained all they asked for, and that everything for which they had contended had been conceded. The Blood Council of Alva had almost extirpated the Reformers, and an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, with the exception of the Hollanders and Zelanders, belonged to the old Church, provided the Inquisition was done away with, and a religious peace was accorded. But Don John had to reckon with the Prince of Orange. In him William had no confidence. He could not forget the past. He believed that the signatures and concessions of the governor and Philip were only expedients to gain time, and that they would be revoked or set aside as soon as it was convenient or possible to do so. . . . He had intercepted letters from the leading Spaniards in Don John's employment, in which, when the treaty was in course of signature, designs were disclosed of keeping possession of all the strong places in the country, with the object of reducing the patriots in detail. . . . Above all, William distrusted the Flemish nobles. He knew them to be greedy, fickle, treacherous, ready to betray their country for personal advantage, and to ally themselves blindly with their natural enemies. . . . As events proved, Orange was in the right. Hence he refused to recognize the treaty in his own states of Holland and Zeland. As soon as it was published and sent to him, William, after conference with these states, published a severe criticism on its provisions. . . . In all seeming however Don John was prepared to carry out his engagements. He got together with difficulty the funds for paying the arrears due to the troops, and sent them off by the end of April. He caressed the people and he bribed the nobles. He handed over the citadels to Flemish governors, and entered Brussels on May 1st. Everything pointed to success and mutual good will. But we have Don John's letters, in which he speaks most unreservedly and most unflatteringly of his new friends, and of his designs on the liberties of the Netherlands. And all the while that Philip was soothing and flattering his brother, he had determined on ruining him, and on murdering the man [Escovedo] whom that brother loved and trusted. About this time, too, we find that Philip and his deputy were casting about for the means by which they might assassinate the Prince of Orange, 'who had bewitched the whole people!' An attempt of Don John to get possession of the citadel of Antwerp for himself failed, and the patriots gained it. The merchants of Antwerp agreed to find the pay still owing to the soldiers, on condition of their quitting the city. But while they were discussing the terms, a fleet of Zeland vessels came sailing up the Scheldt. Immediately a cry was raised, 'The Beggars are coming,' and the soldiers fled in dismay [August 1, 1577]. Then the Antwerpers demolished the citadel, and turned the statue of Alva again into cannon. After these events, William of Orange put an end to negotiations with Don John. Prince William was in the ascendant. But the Catholic nobles conspired against him, and induced the Archduke Matthias, brother of the German Emperor Rodolph, to accept the place of governor of the Netherlands in lieu of Don John. He came, but Orange was made the Ruwaard of Brabant, with full military power. It was the highest office which could be bestowed on him. The 'Union of Brussels' followed and was a confederation of all the Netherlands. But the battle of Gembloura was fought in February, 1578, and the patriots were defeated. Many small towns were captured, and it seemed that in course of time the governor would recover at least a part of his lost authority. But in the month of September, Don John was seized with a burning fever, and died on October 1st. . . . The new governor of the Netherlands, son of Ottavio Farnese, Prince of Parma, and of Margaret of Parma, sister of Philip of Spain, was a very different person from any of the regents who had hitherto controlled the Netherlands. He was, or soon proved himself to be, the greatest general of the age, and he was equally, according to the statesmanship of the age, the most accomplished and versatile statesman. He had no designs beyond those of Philip, and during his long career in the Netherlands, from October, 1578, to December, 1592, he served the King of Spain as faithfully and with as few scruples as Philip could have desired. . . . Parma was religious, but he had no morality whatever. . . . He had no scruple in deceiving, lying, assassinating, and even less scruple in saying or swearing that he had done none of these things. . . . He had an excellent judgment of men, and indeed he had experience of the two extremes, of the exceeding baseness of the Flemish nobles, and of the lofty and pure patriotism of the Dutch patriots. Nothing indeed was more unfortunate for the Dutch than the belief which they entertained, that the Flemings who had been dragooned into uniformity, could be possibly stirred to patriotism. Alva had done his work thoroughly. It is possible to extirpate a reformation. But the success of the process is the moral ruin of those who are the subjects of the experiment. Fortunately for Parma, there was a suitor for the Netherland sovereignty, in the person of the very worst prince of the very worst royal family that ever existed in Europe, i. e., the Duke of Anjou, of

the house of Valois [see FRANCE: A. D. 1577-1578]. This person was favoured by Orange, probably because he had detected Philip's designs on France, and thought that national jealousy would induce the French government, which was Catherine of Medici, to favour the low countries. Besides, Parma had a faction in every Flemish town, who were known as the Malcontents, who were the party of the greedy and unscrupulous nobles. And, besides Anjou, there was the party of another pretender, John Casimir, of Poland. He, however, soon left them. Parma quickly found in such dissensions plenty of men whom he could usefully bribe. He made his first purchases in the Walloon district, and secured them. The provinces here were Artois, Hainault, Lille, Douay, and Orchies. They were soon permanently reunited to Spain. On January 29, 1579, the Union of Utrecht, which was virtually the Constitution of the Dutch Republic, was agreed to. It was greater in extent on the Flemish side than the Dutch Republic finally remained, less on that of Friesland [comprising Holland, Zeland, Gelderland, Zutphen, Utrecht, and the Frisian provinces]. Orange still had hopes of including most of the Netherland seaboard, and he still kept up the form of allegiance to Philip. The principal event of the year was the siege and capture of Maestricht [with the slaughter of almost its entire population of 34,000]. . . . Mechlin also was betrayed by its commander, De Bours, who reconciled himself to Romanism, and received the pay for his treason from Parma at the same time. In March, 1580, a similar act of treason was committed by Count Renneberg, the governor of Friesland, who betrayed its chief city, Groningen. . . . In the same year, 1580, was published the ban of Philip. This instrument, drawn up by Cardinal Granvelle, declared Orange to be a traitor and miscreant, made him an outlaw, put a heavy price on his head (25,000 gold crowns), offered the assassin the pardon of any crime, however heinous, and nobility, whatever be his rank. . . . William answered the ban by a vigorous appeal to the civilized world. . . . Renneberg, the traitor, laid siege to Steenwyk, the principal fortress of Drenthe, at the beginning of 1581. . . . In February, John Norris, the English general, . . . relieved the town. Renneberg raised the siege, was defeated in July by the same Norris, and died, full of remorse, a few days afterwards. But the most important event in 1581 was the declaration of Dutch Independence formally issued at the Hague on the 26th of July. By this instrument, Orange, though most unwillingly, felt himself obliged to accept the sovereignty over Holland and Zeland, and whatever else of the seven provinces was in the hands of the patriots. The Netherlands were now divided into three portions. The Walloon provinces in the south were reconciled to Philip and Parma. The middle provinces were under the almost nominal sovereignty of Anjou, the northern were under William. . . . Philip's name was now discarded from public documents . . . ; his seal was broken, and William was thereafter to conduct the government in his own name. The instrument was styled an 'Act of Abjuration.'"—J. E. T. Rogers, *The Story of Holland*, *ch.* 11-12.

Also in: J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic*, *pt.* 5, *ch.* 4-5, *and pt.* 6, *ch.* 1-4.—Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, *v.* 2, *ch.* 8-10.

A. D. 1581-1584.—Refusal of the sovereignty of the United Provinces by Orange.—Its bestowal upon the Duke of Anjou.—Base treachery of Anjou.—The "French Fury" at Antwerp.—Assassination of the Prince of Orange.—"What, then, was the condition of the nation, after this great step [the Act of Abjuration] had been taken? It stood, as it were, with its sovereignty in its hand, dividing it into two portions, and offering it, thus separated, to two distinct individuals. The sovereignty of Holland and Zealand had been reluctantly accepted by Orange. The sovereignty of the United Provinces had been offered to Anjou, but the terms of agreement with that Duke had not yet been ratified. The movement was therefore triple, consisting of an abjuration and of two separate elections of hereditary chiefs; these two elections being accomplished in the same manner by the representative bodies respectively of the united provinces and of Holland and Zealand . . . Without a direct intention on the part of the people or its leaders to establish a republic, the Republic established itself. Providence did not permit the whole country, so full of wealth, intelligence, healthy political action—so stocked with powerful cities and an energetic population, to be combined into one free and prosperous commonwealth. The factious ambition of a few grandees, the cynical venality of many nobles, the frenzy of the Ghent democracy, the spirit of religious intolerance, the consummate military and political genius of Alexander Farnese, the exaggerated self-abnegation and the tragic fate of Orange, all united to dissever this group of flourishing and kindred provinces. The want of personal ambition on the part of William the Silent inflicted, perhaps, a serious damage upon his country. He believed a single chief requisite for the united states; he might have been, but always refused to become that chief; and yet he has been held up for centuries by many writers as a conspirator and a self-seeking intriguer. . . . 'These provinces,' said John of Nassau, 'are coming very unwillingly into the arrangement with the Duke of Alençon [soon afterwards made Duke of Anjou]. The majority feel much more inclined to elect the Prince, who is daily, and without intermission, implored to give his consent. . . . He refuses only on this account—that it may not be thought that, instead of religious freedom for the country, he has been seeking a kingdom for himself and his own private advancement. Moreover, he believes that the connexion with France will be of more benefit to the country and to Christianity.' . . . The unfortunate negotiations with Anjou, to which no man was more opposed than Count John, proceeded therefore. In the meantime, the sovereignty over the united provinces was provisionally held by the national council, and, at the urgent solicitation of the states-general, by the Prince. The Archduke Matthias, whose functions were most unceremoniously brought to an end by the transactions which we have been recording, took his leave of the states, and departed in the month of October. . . . Thus it was arranged that, for the present, at least, the Prince should exercise sovereignty over Holland and Zealand; although he had himself used his

utmost exertions to induce those provinces to join the rest of the United Netherlands in the proposed election of Anjou. This, however, they sternly refused to do. There was also a great disinclination felt by many in the other states to this hazardous offer of their allegiance, and it was the personal influence of Orange that eventually carried the measure through. . . . By midsummer [1581] the Duke of Anjou made his appearance in the western part of the Netherlands. The Prince of Parma had recently come before Cambray with the intention of reducing that important city. On the arrival of Anjou, however, . . . Alexander raised the siege precipitately and retired towards Tournay," to which he presently laid siege, and which was surrendered to him in November.—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic, pt.* 6, *ch.* 4–5 (*v.* 3).—Meantime, the Duke of Anjou had visited England, paying court to Queen Elizabeth, whom he hoped to marry, but who declined the alliance after making the acquaintance of her suitor. "Elizabeth made all the reparation in her power, by the honours paid him on his dismissal. She accompanied him as far as Canterbury, and sent him away under the convoy of the earl of Leicester, her chief favourite; and with a brilliant suite and a fleet of fifteen sail. Anjou was received at Antwerp with equal distinction; and was inaugurated there on the 19th of February [1582] as Duke of Brabant, Lothier, Limbourg, and Guelders, with many other titles, of which he soon proved himself unworthy. . . . During the rejoicings which followed this inauspicious ceremony, Philip's proscription against the Prince of Orange put forth its first fruits. The latter gave a grand dinner in the château of Antwerp, which he occupied, on the 18th of March, the birth-day of the duke of Anjou." As he quitted the dining hall, he was shot in the cheek by a young man who approached him with the pretence of offering a petition, and who proved to be the tool of a Spanish merchant at Antwerp, with whom Philip of Spain had contracted for the procurement of the assassination. The wound inflicted was severe but not fatal. "Within three months, William was able to accompany the duke of Anjou in his visits to Ghent, Bruges, and the other chief towns of Flanders; in each of which the ceremony of inauguration was repeated. Several military exploits now took place [the most important of them being the capture of Oudenarde, after a protracted siege, by the Prince of Parma]. . . . The duke of Anjou, intemperate, inconstant, and unprincipled, saw that his authority was but the shadow of power. . . . The French officers, who formed his suite and possessed all his confidence, had no difficulty in raising his discontent into treason against the people with whom he had made a solemn compact. The result of their councils was a deep-laid plot against Flemish liberty; and its execution was ere-long attempted. He sent secret orders to the governors of Dunkirk, Bruges, Termonde, and other towns, to seize on and hold them in his name; reserving for himself the infamy of the enterprise against Antwerp. To prepare for its execution, he caused his numerous army of French and Swiss to approach the city." Then, on the 17th of January, 1583, with his body guard of 200 horse, he suddenly attacked and slew the Flemish guards at one of the gates and admitted the troops waiting outside. "The astonished but intrepid citizens, recovering from their confusion, instantly flew to arms. All differences in religion or politics were forgotten in the common danger to their freedom. . . . The ancient spirit of Flanders seemed to animate all. Workmen, armed with the instruments of their various trades, started from their shops and flung themselves upon the enemy. . . . The French were driven successively from the streets and ramparts. . . . The duke of Anjou saved himself by flight, and reached Termonde. His loss in this base enterprise [known as the French Fury] amounted to 1,500; while that of the citizens did not exceed 80 men. The attempts simultaneously made on the other towns succeeded at Dunkirk and Termonde; but all the others failed. The character of the Prince of Orange never appeared so thoroughly great as at this crisis. With wisdom and magnanimity rarely equalled and never surpassed, he threw himself and his authority between the indignation of the country and the guilt of Anjou; saving the former from excess and the latter from execration. The disgraced and discomfited duke proffered to the states excuses as mean as they were hypocritical. . . . A new treaty was negotiated, confirming Anjou in his former station, with renewed security against any future treachery on his part. He in the mean time retired to France," where he died, June 10, 1584. Exactly one month afterwards (July 10), Prince William was murdered, in his house, at Delft, by Balthazar Gerard, one of the many assassins whom Philip II. and Parma had so persistently sent against him. He was shot as he placed his foot upon the first step of the great stair in his house, after dining in a lower apartment, and he died in a few moments. —T. C. Grattan, *Hist. of the Netherlands, ch.* 18.

Also in: J. A. Froude, *Hist. of England: Reign of Elizabeth, ch.* 26, 29, 31–32 (*v.* 5–6).—D. Campbell, *The Puritan in Holland, Eng., and Am., ch.* 4 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 1584-1585.—Limits of the United Provinces and the Spanish Provinces.—The Republican constitution of the United Provinces, and the organization of their government.—Disgraceful surrender of Ghent.—Practical recovery of Flanders and Brabant by the Spanish king.—At the time of the assassination of the Prince of Orange, "the limit of the Spanish or 'obedient' Provinces, on the one hand, and of the United Provinces on the other, cannot . . . be briefly and distinctly stated. The memorable treason—or, as it was called, the 'reconciliation' of the Walloon Provinces in the year 1583–4—had placed the Provinces of Hainault, Arthois, Douay, with the flourishing cities, Arras, Valenciennes, Lille, Tournay, and others—all Celtic Flanders, in short—in the grasp of Spain. Cambray was still held by the French governor, Seigneur de Balagny, who had taken advantage of the Duke of Anjou's treachery to the States, to establish himself in an unrecognized but practical petty sovereignty, in defiance both of France and Spain; while East Flanders and South Brabant still remained a disputed territory, and the immediate field of contest. With these limitations, it may be assumed, for general purposes, that the territory of the United States was that of the modern Kingdom of the Netherlands, while the obedient Provinces occupied what is now the territory of Belgium.

What now was the political position of the United Provinces at this juncture? The sovereignty which had been held by the Estates, ready to be conferred respectively upon Anjou and Orange, remained in the hands of the Estates. There was no opposition to this theory. . . . The people, as such, claimed no sovereignty. . . . What were the Estates? . . . The great characteristic of the Netherland government was the municipality. Each Province contained a large number of cities, which were governed by a board of magistrates, varying in number from 20 to 40. This college, called the Vroedschap (Assembly of Sages), consisted of the most notable citizens, and was a self-electing body — a close corporation — the members being appointed for life, from the citizens at large. Whenever vacancies occurred from death or loss of citizen ship, the college chose new members — sometimes immediately, sometimes by means of a double or triple selection of names, the choice of one from among which was offered to the stadtholder [governor, or sovereign's deputy] of the province. This functionary was appointed by the Count, as he was called, whether Duke of Bavaria or of Burgundy, Emperor, or King. After the abjuration of Philip [1581], the governors were appointed by the Estates of each Province. The Sage-Men chose annually a board of senators, or schepens, whose functions were mainly judicial; and there were generally two, and sometimes three, burgomasters, appointed in the same way. This was the popular branch of the Estates. But, besides this body of representatives, were the nobles, men of ancient lineage and large possessions, who had exercised, according to the general feudal law of Europe, high, low, and intermediate jurisdiction upon their estates, and had long been recognized as an integral part of the body politic, having the right to appear, through delegates of their order, in the provincial and in the general assemblies. Regarded as a machine for bringing the most decided political capacities into the administration of public affairs, and for organizing the most practical opposition to the system of religious tyranny, the Netherland constitution was a healthy, and, for the age, an enlightened one. . . . Thus constituted was the commonwealth upon the death of William the Silent. The gloom produced by that event was tragical. Never in human history was a more poignant and universal sorrow for the death of any individual. The despair was, for a brief season, absolute; but it was soon succeeded by more lofty sentiments. . . . Even on the very day of the murder, the Estates of Holland, then sitting at Delft, passed a resolution 'to maintain the good cause, with God's help, to the uttermost, without sparing gold or blood.' . . . The next movement, after the last solemn obsequies had been rendered to the Prince, was to provide for the immediate wants of his family. For the man who had gone into the revolt with almost royal revenues, left his estate so embarrassed that his carpets, tapestries, household linen — nay, even his silver spoons, and the very clothes of his wardrobe — were disposed of at auction for the benefit of his creditors. He left eleven children — a son and daughter by the first wife, a son and daughter by Anna of Saxony, six daughters by Charlotte of Bourbon, and an infant, Frederic Henry, born six months before his death. The eldest son, Philip William, had been a captive in Spain for seventeen years, having been kidnapped from school, in Leyden, in the year 1567. He had already become . . . thoroughly Hispaniolized under the masterly treatment of the King and the Jesuits. . . . The next son was Maurice, then 17 years of age. . . . Grandson of Maurice of Saxony, whom he resembled in visage and character, he was summoned by every drop of blood in his veins to do life-long battle with the spirit of Spanish absolutism, and he was already girding himself for his life's work. . . . Very soon afterwards the States General established a State Council, as a provisional executive board, for the term of three months, for the Provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, and such parts of Flanders and Brabant as still remained in the Union. At the head of this body was placed young Maurice, who accepted the responsible position, after three days' deliberation. . . . The Council consisted of three members from Brabant, two from Flanders, four from Holland, three from Zeeland, two from Utrecht, one from Mechlin, and three from Friesland — eighteen in all. They were empowered and enjoined to levy troops by land and sea, and to appoint naval and military officers, to establish courts of admiralty, to expend the moneys voted by the States, to maintain the ancient privileges of the country, and to see that all troops in service of the Provinces made oath of fidelity to the Union. Diplomatic relations, questions of peace and war, the treaty-making power, were not entrusted to the Council, without the knowledge and consent of the States General, which body was to be convoked twice a year by the State Council. . . . Alexander of Parma . . . was swift to take advantage of the calamity which had now befallen the rebellious Provinces. . . . In Holland and Zeeland the Prince's blandishments were of no avail. . . . In Flanders and Brabant the spirit was less noble. Those provinces were nearly lost already. Bruges [which had made terms with the King early in 1584] seconded Parma's efforts to induce its sister-city Ghent to imitate its own baseness in surrendering without a struggle, and that powerful, turbulent, but most anarchical little commonwealth was but too ready to listen to the voice of the tempter. . . . Upon the 17th August [1584] Dendermonde surrendered. . . . Upon the 7th September Vilvoorde capitulated, by which event the water-communication between Brussels and Antwerp was cut off. Ghent, now thoroughly disheartened, treated with Parma likewise; and upon the 17th September made its reconciliation with the King. The surrender of so strong and important a place was as disastrous to the cause of the patriots as it was disgraceful to the citizens themselves. It was, however, the result of an intrigue which had been long spinning. . . . The noble city of Ghent — then as large as Paris, thoroughly surrounded with moats, and fortified with bulwarks, ravelins, and counterscarps, constructed of earth, during the previous two years, at great expense, and provided with bread and meat, powder and shot, enough to last a year — was ignominiously surrendered. The population, already a very reduced and slender one for the great extent of the place and its former importance, had been estimated at 70,000. The number of houses was 85,000, so that, as the inhabitants were soon

farther reduced to one-half, there remained but one individual to each house. On the other hand, the 25 monasteries and convents in the town were repeopled. . . . The fall of Brussels was deferred till March, and that of Mechlin (19th July, 1585), and of Antwerp [see below] (19th August, 1585), till Midsummer of the following year; but the surrender of Ghent foreshadowed the fate of Flanders and Brabant. Ostend and Sluys, however, were still in the hands of the patriots, and with them the control of the whole Flemish coast. The command of the sea was destined to remain for centuries with the new republic."—J. L. Motley, *Hist. of the United Netherlands, ch.* 1 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 1584-1585.—The Siege and surrender of Antwerp.—Decay of the city.—"After the fall of Ghent, Farnese applied himself earnestly to the siege of Antwerp, one of the most memorable recorded in history. The citizens were animated in their defence by the valour and talent of Ste Aldegonde. It would be impossible to detail with minuteness in this general history the various contrivances resorted to on either side for the attack and the defence; and we must therefore content ourselves with briefly adverting to that stupendous monument of Farnese's military genius, the bridge which he carried across the Scheldt, below Antwerp, in order to cut off the communication of the city with the sea and the maritime provinces. From the depth and wideness of the river, the difficulty of finding the requisite materials, and of transporting them to the place selected in the face of an enemy that was superior on the water, the project was loudly denounced by Farnese's officers as visionary and impracticable; yet in spite of all these discouragements and difficulties, as the place seemed unapproachable in the usual way, he steadily persevered, and at last succeeded in an undertaking which, had he failed, would have covered him with perpetual ridicule. The spot fixed upon for the bridge was between Ordam and Kalloo, where the river is both shallower and narrower than at other parts. The bridge consisted of piles driven into the water to such distance as its depth would allow; which was 200 feet on the Flanders side and 900 feet on that of Brabant. The interval between the piles, which was 12 feet broad, was covered with planking; but at the extremities towards the centre of the river the breadth was extended to 40 feet, thus forming two forts, or platforms, mounted with cannon. There was still, however, an interstice in the middle of between 1,000 and 1,100 feet, through which the ships of the enemy, favoured by the wind and tide, or by the night, could manage to pass without any considerable loss, and which it therefore became necessary to fill up. This was accomplished by mooring across it the hulls of 32 vessels, at intervals of about 20 feet apart, and connecting them together with planks. Each vessel was planted with artillery and garrisoned by about 30 men; while the bridge was protected by a flota of vessels moored on each side, above and below, at a distance of about 200 feet. During the construction of the bridge, which lasted half a year, the citizens of Antwerp viewed with dismay the progress of a work that was not only to deprive them of their maritime commerce, but also of the supplies necessary for their subsistence and defence. At length they adopted a plan suggested by Gianbelli, an Italian engineer, and resolved to destroy the bridge by means of fireships, which seem to have been first used on this occasion. Several such vessels were sent down the river with a favourable tide and wind, of which two were charged with 6,000 or 7,000 lbs. of gunpowder each, packed in solid masonry, with various destructive missiles. One of these vessels went ashore before reaching its destination; the other arrived at the bridge and exploded with terrible effect. Curiosity to behold so novel a spectacle had attracted vast numbers of the Spaniards, who lined the shores as well as the bridge. Of these 800 were killed by the explosion, and by the implements of destruction discharged with the powder; a still greater number were maimed and wounded, and the bridge itself was considerably damaged. Farnese himself was thrown to the earth and lay for a time insensible. The besieged, however, did not follow up their plan with vigour. They allowed Farnese time to repair the damage, and the Spaniards, being now on the alert, either diverted the course of the fire-ships that were subsequently sent against them, or suffered them to pass the bridge through openings made for the purpose. In spite of the bridge, however, the beleaguered citizens might still have secured a transit down the river by breaking through the dykes between Antwerp and Lillo, and sailing over the plains thus laid under water, for which purpose it was necessary to obtain possession of the counter-dyke of Kowenstyn; but after a partial success, too quickly abandoned by Hohenlohe and Ste Aldegonde, they were defeated in a bloody battle which they fought upon the dyke. Antwerp was now obliged to capitulate; and as Farnese was anxious to put an end to so long a siege, it obtained more favourable terms than could have been anticipated (August 17th 1585). The prosperity of this great commercial city received, however, a severe blow from its capture by the Spaniards. A great number of the citizens, as well as of the inhabitants of Brabant and Flanders, removed to Amsterdam and Middelburg."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe, bk.* 3, *ch.* 9 (*v.* 2).—The downfall of the prosperity of the great capital "was instantaneous. The merchants and industrious citizens all wandered away from the place which had been the seat of a world-wide traffic. Civilization and commerce departed, and in their stead were the citadel and the Jesuits."—J. L. Motley, *Hist. of the United Netherlands, ch.* 5 (*v.* 1).

Also in: F. Schiller, *Siege of Antwerp.*

A. D. 1585-1586.—Proffered sovereignty of the United Provinces declined by France and England.—Delusive English succors.—The queen's treachery and Leicester's incompetency.—Useless battle at Zutphen.—"It was natural that so small a State, wasted by its protracted struggles, should desire, more earnestly than ever, an alliance with some stronger power; and it was from among States supposed to have sympathies with Protestants, that such an alliance was sought. From the Protestant countries of Germany there was no promise of help; and the eyes of the Dutch diplomatists were therefore turned towards France and England. In France, the Huguenots, having recovered from St. Bartholomew, now enjoyed toleration; and were a rising and hopeful party, under the patronage of Henry of Navarre. If the king of France

would protect Holland from Philip, and extend to its people the same toleration which he allowed his own subjects, Holland offered him the sovereignty of the united provinces. This tempting offer was declined: for a new policy was now to be declared, which united France and Spain in a bigoted crusade against the Protestant faith. The League, under the Duke de Guise, gained a fatal ascendency over the weak and frivolous king, Henry III., and held dominion in France. . . . Nor was the baneful influence of the League confined to France: it formed a close alliance with Philip and the Pope, with whom it was plotting the overthrow of Protestant England, the subjection of the revolted provinces of Spain, and the general extirpation of heresy throughout Europe. . . . The only hope of the Netherlands was now in England, which was threatened by a common danger; and envoys were sent to Elizabeth with offers of the sovereignty, which had been declined by France. So little did the Dutch statesmen as yet contemplate a republic, that they offered their country to any sovereign, in return for protection. Had bolder counsels prevailed, Elizabeth might, at once, have saved the Netherlands, and placed herself at the head of the Protestants of Europe. She saw her own danger, if Philip should recover the provinces: but she held her purse-strings with the grasp of a miser: she dreaded an open rupture with Spain; and she was unwilling to provoke her own Catholic subjects. Sympathy with the Protestant cause, she had none. . . . She desired to afford as much assistance as would protect her own realm against Philip, at the least possible cost, without precipitating a war with Spain. She agreed to send men and money: but required Flushing, Brill, and Rammekens to be held as a security for her loans. She refused the sovereignty of the States: but she despatched troops to the Netherlands, and sent her favourite, the Earl of Leicester, to command them. As she had taken the rebellious subjects of Spain under her protection, Philip retaliated by the seizure of British ships. Spanish vengeance was not averted, while the Netherlands profited little by her aid." —Sir T. E. May, *Democracy in Europe, ch.* 11 (*v.* 2).—Leicester sailed for the Hague in the middle of December, 1585, having been preceded by 8,000 English troops, eager to prevent or revenge the fall of Antwerp. "Had there been good faith and resolution, and had Lord Grey, or Sir Richard Bingham, or Sir John Norris been in command, 20,000 Dutch and English troops might have taken the field in perfect condition. The States would have spent their last dollar to find them in everything which soldiers could need. They would have had at their backs the enthusiastic sympathy of the population, while the enemy was as universally abhorred; and Parma, exhausted by his efforts in the great siege, with his chest empty, and his ranks thinned almost to extinction, could not have encountered them with a third of their numbers. A lost battle would have been followed by a renewed revolt of the reconciled Provinces, and Elizabeth, if she found peace so necessary to her, might have dictated her own conditions." But months passed and nothing was done, while Queen Elizabeth was treacherously negotiating with agents of Spain. In the summer of 1586, half and more than half of the brave men who had come over in the past September were dead. Their places were taken by new levies gathered in haste upon the highways, or by mutinous regiments of Irish kernes, confessed Catholics, and led by a man [Sir William Stanley] who was only watching an opportunity to betray his sovereign. . . . Gone was now the enthusiasm which had welcomed the landing of Leicester. In the place of it was suspicion and misgiving, distracted councils, and divided purposes. Elizabeth while she was diplomatising held her army idle. Parma, short-handed as he was, treated with his hand upon his sword, and was for ever carving slice on slice from the receding frontiers of the States. At the time of Leicester's installation he was acting on the Meuse. He held the river as far as Venloo. Venloo and Grave were in the hands of the patriots, both of them strong fortresses, the latter especially. . . . After the fall of Antwerp these two towns were Parma's next object. The siege of Grave was formed in January. In April Colonel Norris and Count Hohenlohe forced the Spanish lines and threw in supplies; but Elizabeth's orders prevented further effort. Parma came before the town in person in June, and after a bombardment which produced little or no effect, Grave, to the surprise of every one, surrendered. Count Hemart, the governor, was said to have been corrupted by his mistress. Leicester hanged him; but Hemart's gallows did not recover Grave or save Venloo, which surrendered also three weeks later. The Earl, conscious of the disgrace, yet seeing no way to mend it, . . . was willing at last to play into his mistress's hands. He understood her [Queen Elizabeth] at last, and saw what she was aiming at. 'As the cause is now followed,' he wrote to her on the 27th of June, 'it is not worth the cost or the danger. . . . They [the Netherlanders] would rather have lived with bread and drink under your Majesty's protection than with all their possessions under the King of Spain. It has almost broken their hearts to think your Majesty should not care any more for them. But if you mean soon to leave them they will be gone almost before you hear of it. I will do my best therefore, to get into my hands three or four most principal places in North Holland, so as you shall rule these men, and make war and peace as you list. Part not with Brill for anything. With these places you can have what peace you will in an hour, and have your debts and charges readily answered. But your Majesty must deal graciously with them at present, and if you mean to leave them keep it to yourself.' . . . No palliation can be suggested, of the intentions to which Leicester saw that she was still clinging, and which he was willing to further in spite of his oath to be loyal to the States. . . . The incapacity of Leicester . . . was growing evident. He had been used as a lay figure to dazzle the eyes of the Provinces, while both he and they were mocked by the secret treaty. The treaty was hanging fire. . . . The Queen had . . . so far opened her eyes as to see that she was not improving her position by keeping her army idle; and Leicester, that he might not part with his government in entire disgrace, having done absolutely nothing, took the field for a short campaign in the middle of August [1586]. Parma had established himself in Gelderland, at Zutphen, and Duesberg. The States held Deventer, further down the Issel; but

Deventer would probably fall as Grave and Venloo had fallen if the Spaniards kept their hold upon the river; Leicester therefore proposed to attempt to recover Zutphen. Every one was delighted to be moving. . . . The Earl of Essex, Sir William Russell, Lord Willoughby, and others who held no special commands, attached themselves to Leicester's staff; Sir Philip Sidney obtained leave of absence from Flushing; Sir John Norris and his brother brought the English contingent of the States army; Sir William Stanley had arrived with his Irishmen; and with these cavaliers glittering about him, and 9,000 men, Leicester entered Gelderland. Duesberg surrendered to him without a blow; Norris surprised a fort outside Zutphen, which commanded the river and straitened the communications of the town." Parma made an attempt, on the morning of September 22, to throw supplies into the town, and Leicester's knights and gentlemen, forewarned of this project by a spy, "Volunteered for an ambuscade to cut off the convoy. . . . Parma brought with him every man that he could spare, and the ambuscade party were preparing unconsciously to encounter 4,000 of the best troops in the world. They were in all about 500. . . . The morning was misty. The waggons were heard coming, but nothing could be seen till a party of horse appeared at the head of the train where the ambuscade was lying. Down charged the 500, much as in these late years 600 English lancers charged elsewhere, as magnificently and as uselessly. . . . Never had been a more brilliant action seen or heard of, never one more absurd and profitless. For the ranks of the Spanish infantry were unbroken, the English could not touch them, could not even approach them, and behind the line of their muskets the waggons passed steadily to the town. . . . A few, not many, had been killed; but among those whose lives had been flung away so wildly was Philip Sidney. He was struck by a musket ball on his exposed thigh, as he was returning from his last charge," and died a few weeks later. "Parma immediately afterwards entered Zutphen unmolested. . . . Leicester's presence was found necessary in England. With the natural sympathy of one worthless person for another, he had taken a fancy to Stanley; and chose to give him an independent command; and leaving the government to the Council of the States, and the army again without a chief, he sailed in November for London."—J. A. Froude, *Hist. of England: The Reign of Elizabeth, ch.* 33 (*v.* 6).

Also in: *Cor. of Leicester during his Govt. of the Low Countries* (*Camden Soc.* 27).—W. Gray, *Life and Times of Sir Philip Sidney, ch.* 10.—C. R. Markham, *The Fighting Veres, ch.* 7-8.

A. D. 1587-1588.—The ruin of the Spanish Provinces.—Great prosperity of the United Provinces.—Siege and capture of Sluys.—The last of Leicester.—"Though the United Provinces were distracted by domestic dissensions and enfeebled by mutual distrust, their condition, compared with that portion of the Netherlands reduced under the yoke of Spain, was such as to afford matter of deep gratulation and thankfulness. The miseries of war had visited the latter unhappy country in the fullest measure; multitudes of its inhabitants had fled in despair; and the sword, famine, and pestilence, vied with each other in destroying the remainder. . . . The rich and smiling pastures, once the admiration and envy of the less favoured countries of Europe, were now no more; woods, roads, and fields, were confounded in one tangled mass of copse and brier. In the formerly busy and wealthy towns of Flanders and Brabant, Ghent, Antwerp, and Bruges, members of noble families were seen to creep from their wretched abodes in the darkness of night to beg their bread, or to search the streets for bones and offal. A striking and cheering contrast is the picture presented by the United Provinces. The crops had, indeed, failed there also, but the entire command of the sea which they preserved, and the free importation of corn, secured plentiful supplies. . . . They continued to carry on, under Spanish colours, a lucrative half-smuggling traffic, which the government of that nation found it its interest to connive at and encourage. The war, therefore, instead of being, as usual, an hindrance to commerce, rather gave it a new stimulus; the ports were crowded with vessels. . . . Holland and Zealand had now for more than ten years been delivered from the enemy. . . . The security they thus offered, combined with the freedom of religion, and the activity of trade and commerce, drew vast multitudes to their shores; the merchants and artisans expelled, on account of their religion, from the Spanish Netherlands, transferred thither the advantages of their enterprise and skill. . . . The population of the towns became so overflowing that it was found impossible to build houses fast enough to contain it. . . . The miserable condition of the Spanish Netherlands, and the difficulty of finding supplies for his troops, caused the Duke of Parma to delay taking the field until late in the summer [1587]; when, making a feint attack upon Ostend, he afterwards . . . commenced a vigorous siege of Sluys. In order to draw him off from this undertaking, Maurice, with the Count of Hohenlohe, marched towards Bois-le-Duc. . . . The danger of Sluys hastened the return of the Earl of Leicester to the Netherlands, who arrived in Ostend with 7,000 foot and 500 horse. . . . Sluys had been besieged seven weeks, and the garrison was reduced from 1,600 men to scarcely half that number, when Leicester made an attempt to master the fort of Blankenburg, in the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp; but on intelligence that Parma was approaching to give him battle, he hastily retreated to Ostend," and Sluys was surrendered. "The loss of Sluys exasperated the dissensions between Leicester and the States into undisguised and irreconcilable hostility." He was soon afterwards recalled to England, and early in the following year the queen required him to resign his command and governorship in the Netherlands. In the meantime, the English queen had reopened negotiations with Parma, who occupied her attention while his master, Philip II. of Spain, was preparing the formidable Armada which he launched against England the next year [see England: A. D. 1588].—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 8, *ch.* 2-3 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1588-1593.—Successes of Prince Maurice.—Departure of Parma to France.—His death.—Appointment of Archduke Albert to the Government.—"The destruction of the great Spanish Armada by the English in 1588 infused new hopes into all the enemies of Spain, and animated the Dutch with such courage, that Maurice led his army against that of the Duke

of Parma, and forced him to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, at that time garrisoned by a portion of Leicester's army under the command of Sir Francis Vere. . . . The young Stadtholder was induced by this success to surprise the Castle of Blyenbeck, which was yielded to his arms in 1589; and the following year [March 1] he got possession of Breda by a 'ruse de guerre,'"—having introduced 70 men into the town by concealing them in a boat laden with turf. "The Duke of Parma was now recalled from the Low Countries into France [see FRANCE: A. D. 1590], and the old Peter Ernest, Count de Mansfeld, succeeded to the government of the Low Countries. . . . Maurice defeated the Spanish army in the open field at Caervorden, and took Nimeguen [October 21, 1591] and Zutphen [May 30, 1591; also, Deventer, June 10, of the same year]. . . . These successes added greatly to the reputation of Count Maurice, who now made considerable progress, so that in the year 1591 the Dutch saw their frontiers extended, and had well-grounded hopes of driving the Spaniards out of Friesland in another campaign. . . . The death of the Prince of Parma [which occurred December 3, 1592] delivered the Confederates from a formidable adversary; but old Count Mansfeld, at the head of an army of 30,000 men, took the field against them. Maurice, however, in 1593, notwithstanding this covering force, sat down before Gertruydenberg, advantageously situated on the frontier of Brabant." The siege was regarded as a masterpiece of the military art of the day, and the city was brought to surrender at the end of three months. "With the useful aid of Sir Francis Vere and the English, Maurice afterwards took Gronenburg and Grave, which formed part of his own patrimony. The Duke of Parma was succeeded in the government of the Netherlands by the Archduke Albert, a younger son of the Emperor Maximilian, who was married to Isabella, daughter of King Philip."—Sir E. Cust, *Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years' War: Maurice of Orange-Nassau, pp.* 25–28.

ALSO IN: C. R. Markham, *The Fighting Veres, pt.* 1, *ch.* 10–15.

A. D. 1594-1597.—Spanish operations in Northern France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1593–1598.

A. D. 1594-1609.—Steady decline of Spanish power.—Sovereignty of the provinces made over to the Infanta Isabella and the Archduke, her husband.—Death of Philip II.—Negotiations for peace.—A twelve years' truce agreed upon.—Acknowledgment of the independence of the republic.—"Philip's French enterprise had failed. The dashing and unscrupulous Henry of Navarre had won his crown, by conforming to the Catholic faith [see FRANCE. A. D. 1591–1598]. . . . Great was the shock given by his politic apostacy to the religious sentiments of Europe: but it was fatal to the ambition of Philip; and again the Netherlands could count upon the friendship of a king of France. Their own needs were great: but the gallant little republic still found means to assist the Protestant champion against their common enemy, the king of Spain. In the Netherlands the Spanish power was declining. The feeble successors of Parma were no match for Maurice of Nassau and the republican leaders: the Spanish troops were starving and mutinous: the provinces under Spanish rule were reduced to wretchedness and beggary. Cities and fortresses fell, one after another, into the hands of the stadtholder. The Dutch fleet joined that of England in a raid upon Spain itself, captured and sacked Cadiz [see SPAIN: A. D. 1596], raised the flag of the republic on the battlements of that famous city; and left the Spanish fleet burning in the harbour. Other events followed, deeply affecting the fortunes of the republic. Philip at length made peace with Henry of Navarre, and was again free to coerce his revolted provinces. But his accursed rule was drawing to a close. In 1598 he made over the sovereignty of the Netherlands to the Infanta Isabella and her affianced husband, the Archduke Albert, who had cast aside his cardinal's hat, his archbishopric, and his priestly vows of celibacy, for a consort so endowed. Philip had ceased to reign in the Netherlands; and a few months afterwards [September 13, 1598] he closed his evil life, in the odour of sanctity. . . . The tyrant was dead: the little republic, which he had scourged so cruelly, was living and prosperous. . . . Far different was the lot of the ill-fated provinces still in the grasp of the tyrant. The land lay waste and desolate: its inhabitants had fled to England or Holland, or were reduced to want and beggary. . . . That the republic should have outlived its chief oppressor was an event of happy augury: but years of trial and danger were still to be passed through. The victory of Nieuport [gained July 2, 1600, by an army of Dutch and English over the superior forces of the Archduke Albert] raised Prince Maurice's fame, as a soldier, to its highest point; and the gallant defence of Ostend, for upwards of three years [against a siege, conducted by the Spanish general Spinola, to which its garrison finally succumbed in 1604, when the town was a heap of ruins, and after 100,000 men are said to have been sacrificed on both sides] . . . proved that the courage and endurance of his soldiers had not declined during the protracted war [while Sluys was taken by the Prince the same year]. At sea the Dutch fleets won new victories over the Spaniards and Portuguese; and privateers made constant ravages upon the enemy's commerce. But there were also failures and reverses, on the side of the republic, dissensions among its leaders, and anxieties concerning the attitude of foreign States. And thus, with varied fortunes, this momentous war had now continued for upwards of forty years. . . . On both sides there was a desire for peace. The Dutch would accept nothing short of unconditional independence: the Spaniards almost despaired of reducing them to subjection, while they dreaded more republican victories at sea, and the extension of Dutch maritime enterprise in the East. Overtures for peace were first made cautiously and secretly by the archdukes ['this was the title of the archduke and archduchess'], and received by the States with grave distrust. Jealous and haughty was the bearing of the republic, in the negotiations which ensued. The states-general, in full session, represented Holland, and received the Spanish envoys. The independence of the States was accepted, on both sides, as the basis of any treaty: but, as a preliminary to the negotiations, the republic insisted upon its formal recognition, as a free and equal State, in words dictated by itself. . . . At length an armistice was signed, in order to arrange the

terms of a treaty of peace. It was a welcome breathing time: but peace was still beset with difficulties and obstacles. The Spaniards were insincere: they could not bring themselves to treat seriously, and in good faith, with heretics and rebels: they desired the re-establishment of the Church of Rome; and they claimed the exclusive right of trading with the East and West Indies. The councils of the republic were also divided. Barneveldt, the civilian, was bent upon peace: Prince Maurice, the soldier, was burning for the renewal of the war. But Barneveldt and the peace party prevailed, and negotiations were continued. Again and again, the armistice was renewed: but a treaty of peace seemed as remote as ever. At length [April 9, 1609], after infinite disputes, a truce for twelve years was agreed upon. In form it was a truce, and not a treaty of peace: but otherwise the republic gained every point upon which it had insisted. Its freedom and independence were unconditionally recognised: it accepted no conditions concerning religion: it made no concessions in regard to its trade with the Indies. The great battle for freedom was won: the republic was free: its troubles and perils were at an end. Its oppressors had been the first to sue for peace: their commissioners had treated with the states-general at the Hague; and they had yielded every point for which they had been waging war for nearly half a century."—Sir T. E. May, *Democracy in Europe, ch.* 11 (*v.* 2).

Also in: C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 3, *ch.* 3–4 (*v.* 2).—J. L. Motley, *Hist. of the United Netherlands, ch.* 30–52 (*v.* 3–4).—D. Campbell, *The Puritan in Holland, &c., ch.* 18 (*v.* 2).

A. D. 1594-1620.—Rise and growth of Eastern trade.—Formation of the Dutch East India Company.—"Previous to their assertion of national independence, the commerce of the Dutch did not extend beyond the confines of Europe. But new regions of traffic were now to open to their dauntless enterprise. It was in 1594 that Cornelius Houtman, the son of a brewer at Gouda, returned from Lisbon, where, having passed the preceding year, he had seen the gorgeous produce of the East piled on the quays of the Tagus. His descriptions fired the emulation of his friends at Amsterdam, nine of whom agreed to join stock and equip a little flotilla for a voyage round the Cape of Good Hope; Houtman undertook the command, and thus the marvellous commerce of the Dutch in India began. The influence which their trade with India and their settlements there exerted in maturing and extending the greatness of the Dutch, has often been overrated. It was a source, indeed, of infinite pride, and for a time of rapid and glittering profit; but it was attended with serious drawbacks, both of national expenditure and national danger. . . . From the outset they were forced to go armed. The four ships that sailed on the first voyage of speculation from Amsterdam, in 1595, were fitted out for either war or merchandise. They were about to sail into hitherto interdicted waters; they knew that the Portuguese were already established in the Spice Islands, whither they were bound; and Portugal was then a dependency of Spain. On their arrival at Java, they had, consequently, to encounter open hostility both from Europeans and the natives whom the former influenced against them. At Bali, however, they were better received; and, in 1597, they reached home with a rich cargo of spices and Indian wares. It was a proud and joyous day in Amsterdam when their return was known. . . . From various ports of Zealand and Holland 80 vessels sailed the following year to America, Africa, and India. Vainly the Portuguese colonists laboured to convince the native princes of the East that the Dutch were a mere horde of pirates with whom no dealings were safe. Their businesslike and punctilious demeanour, and probably, likewise, the judiciously selected cargoes with which they freighted their ships outwards, whereby they were enabled to offer better terms for the silk, indigo, and spice they wished to buy, rapidly disarmed the suspicion of several of the chiefs. . . . In 1602 the celebrated East India Company was formed under charter granted by the States-General,—the original capital being 6,000,000 guilders, subscribed by the merchants of Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn, Enkhuysen, Middleberg, but above all Amsterdam. They established factories at many places, both on the continent of India and in the islands; but their chief depot was fixed at Bantam," until, dissatisfied with certain taxes imposed on them by the lord of Bantam, they looked elsewhere for a station. "The sovereign of Java gladly offered them a settlement not above 100 miles distant, with full permission to erect such buildings as they chose, and an engagement that pepper (the chief spice thence exported) should be sent out of his dominions toll-free. These terms were accepted. Jocatra, a situation very propitious for traffic, was chosen as the site of their future factory. Warehouses of stone and mortar quickly rose; and dwellings, to the number of 1,000, were in a short time added. All nations had leave to settle and trade within its walls; and this was the origin of Batavia. In six years the Company sent out 46 vessels, of which 43 returned in due course laden with rich cargoes. . . . By the books of the Company it appeared that, during the next eleven years, they maintained 30 ships in the Eastern trade, manned by 5,000 seamen. . . . Two hundred per cent. was divided by the proprietors of the Company's stock on their paid-up capital in sixteen years. . . . But of all the proud results of their Indian commerce, that which naturally afforded to the Dutch the keenest sense of exultation, was the opportunity it afforded them of thoroughly undermining the once exclusive trade of Spain, not with foreign nations merely, but with her own colonies, and even at home. The infatuated policy of her government had prepared the way for her decline. . . . In the space of a few years the Dutch had taken and rifled 11 Spanish galleons, 'carkets and other huge ships, and made about 40 of them unserviceable.' So crippled was their colonial trade that, even for their own use, the Spaniards were obliged to buy nutmegs, cloves, and mace, from their hated rivals."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial Hist. of Free Nations, ch.* 18 (*v.* 2). See Malay Archipelago; Java; Sumatra; Borneo; Moluccas.

Also in: D. McPherson, *Annals of Commerce, v.* 2, *pp.* 206–296.

A. D. 1603-1619.—Calvinistic persecution of Arminianism.—The hunting down of John of Barneveldt by Prince Maurice.—Synod of Dort.—Calvin's doctrine of predestination was strongly expressed in what was called the Heidel-

berg Catechism. "A synod of the pastors of Holland had decreed that this must be signed by all their preachers, and be to them what the Thirty-nine Articles are to the English Church and the Confession of Augsburg to the Lutherans. Many preachers hesitated to pledge themselves to doctrines that they did not think Scriptural nor according to primitive faith, and still more, not accordant with the eternal mercy of God. Of these Jacob Hermann, a minister of Amsterdam, or as he Latinised his name, Arminius, was the foremost, and under his influence a number of clergy refused their signature. The University of Leyden in 1606 chose Arminius as their Professor of Theology. The opposite party, in great wrath, insisted on holding a synod, and the States-General gave permission, but at first only on condition that there should be a revision of the confession of faith and catechism. The ministers refused, but the States-General insisted, led by John Barneveldt, then Advocate and Keeper of the Seals, who declared in their name that as 'foster fathers and protectors of the churches to them every right belonged.' It was an Erastian sentiment, but this opinion was held by all reformed governments, including the English, and Barneveldt spoke in the hope of mitigating Calvinistic violence. The Advocate of the States-General was in fact their mouthpiece They might vote, but no one expressed their decisions at home or abroad save the Advocate; and Barneveldt, both from position and character, was thus the chief manager of civil affairs, and an equal if not a superior power to Maurice of Nassau, the Stadtholder and commander-in-chief, and recently, by the death of his elder brother, Prince of Orange. The question had even been mooted of giving him the sovereignty, but to this Barneveldt was strongly averse. Maurice knew very little about the argument, and his real feelings were Arminian, though jealousy of Barneveldt made him favour the opposite party, whose chief champion was Jacob Gomer, or Gomerus as he called himself. King James, though really holding with the Arminians, disliked Barneveldt and therefore threw all the weight of England into the scale against them. Arguments were held before Maurice and before the university, in which three champions on the one side were pitted against three on the other, but nothing came of them but a good deal of audacious profanity, till Arminius, in ministering to the sick during a visitation of the plague at Amsterdam, caught the disease and died. He was so much respected that the University of Leyden pensioned his widow. They chose a young Genevese, named Conrad Voorst or Vorstius, as his successor. Voorst had written two books, one on the nature of God, Tractatus Theologicus de Deo, and the other, Exegesis Apologetica, in which (by Fuller's account) there was a considerable amount of materialism, and likewise what amounted to a denial of the Divine Omniscience, being no doubt a reaction from extreme Calvinism. King James met with the book, and was horrified at its statements. He conceived himself bound to interfere both as protector to the States — which he said had been cemented with English blood — and because the University of Leyden was much frequented by the youth of England and Scotland, who often completed their legal studies there. He ordered Sir Ralf Winwood, his ambassador at the Hague, to deliver a sharp remonstrance to the States, and to read them a catalogue of the dangerous and blasphemous errors that he had detected, recommending the States to protest against the appointment, and burn the books. Barneveldt was much distressed, and uncertain whether James really was speaking out of zeal for orthodoxy, or to have an excuse for a quarrel. Letters and arguments passed without number. . . . Leyden supported the professor it had invited, and, together with Barneveldt, felt that to expel a man whom they had chosen, at the bidding of a foreign sovereign, was almost accepting a yoke like that of the Inquisition. . . . Maurice, on the other hand, was glad to set the English King against Barneveldt, and to represent that support of the foes of strict Calvinism meant treachery to the Republic and a betrayal to Spain. Winwood, on the King's part, insisted on Vorstius's dismissal and banishment. . . . Maurice's own preacher, Uytenbogen, wrote a remonstrance on behalf of the Arminians, who were therefore sometimes termed Remonstrants, while the Gomerists, from their answer, were called Counter-Remonstrants. Unfortunately, political jealousy of Barneveldt on the part of Maurice caused the influence of Uytenbogen to decline. Most of the preachers and of the populace held to the Counter-Remonstrants and their old-fashioned Calvinism, most of the nobles and magistrates were Remonstrants. The question began to branch into a second, namely, whether the state had power to control the faith of all its subjects, and whether when it convoked a synod it could control its decisions, or was bound to enforce them absolutely and without question. . . . Whichever party was predominant in a place turned the other out of church. Appeals were made to the Stadtholder, and he became angry. The States-General at large, with Barneveldt to speak for them, were Remonstrant; the states of Holland were Counter-Remonstrant; and one of the questions thus at issue was how far the power of the general government outweighed that of a particular state. . . . By steps here impossible to follow, Maurice destroyed the ascendency of Barneveldt, and the reports that the old statesman was playing into the hands of Spain grew more and more current. The magistrates of the Arminian persuasion found themselves depending for protection on the Waartgelders, a sort of burgher militia, who endeavoured to keep the peace between the furious mobs who struggled on either side. Accusations flew about freely that now Maurice, now Barneveldt wanted the sovereignty. England favoured the former; and after Henri IV. was dead, French support little availed the latter, but rather did him harm. Maurice did not scruple to raise the popular cry that there were two factions in Holland, for Orange or for Spain, though he must have known that there never had been a more steady foe of Spain than the old statesman. The public, however, preferred the general to the statesman, and bit by bit Maurice succeeded in exchanging Remonstrant magistrates for Counter-Remonstrant, or, as Barneveldt explained the matter to Sir Dudley Carleton, who had become ambassador from England, Puritan for double Puritan. . . . Sunday, the 17th of July, 1617, Uytenbogen preached against the assembly of a national synod, knowing well that it would only confirm and narrow the cruel doctrine. Maurice, who was bent on the synod came out in a rage. . . . Barneveldt

on this moved the States-General to refuse their consent to the synod as inconsistent with their laws. This was carried by a majority, and was called the Sharp Resolve. . . . The High Council by a majority of one set aside the Sharp Resolve, and decided for the synod. Barneveldt had a severe illness, during which Maurice's influence made progress, assisted by detestable accusations that the Advocate was in league with the Spaniards. At last Maurice mastered Utrecht, hitherto the chief hold of Arminianism. He disbanded the Waartgelders, and when the States-General came together in the summer of 1618, he had all prepared for sweeping his adversaries from his path. On the 29th of August, as Barneveldt was going to take his place at the States-General, he was told by a chamberlain that the Prince wished to speak with him, and in Maurice's ante-room was arrested by a lieutenant of the guard and locked up. In exactly the same manner was arrested his friend and supporter Pensionary Rambolt Hoogenboets, who had protested against the decree by which the High Council reversed that of the States-General, and Hugo Van Groot, or, as he called himself, Hugo Grotius, one of the greatest scholars who ever lived, especially in jurisprudence, and a strong adherent of the Advocate. . . . The synod met at Dordrecht [or Dort] in January, 1619, and lasted till April. The Calvinists carried the day completely, and Arminians were declared heretics, schismatics, incapable of preaching, or of acting as professors or schoolmasters, unless they signed the Heidelberg Catechism and Netherland Confession, which laid down the hard-and-fast doctrine that predestination excluded all free will on man's part, but divided the human race into vessels of wrath and vessels of mercy, without power on their own part to reverse the doom. . . . The trial of Barneveldt was going on at the same time with the Synod of Dordrecht after he had been many months in prison. Twenty-four commissioners were appointed, twelve from Holland, and two from each of the other states, and most of them were personal enemies of the prisoner. Before them he was examined day by day for three months, without any indictment; no witnesses, no counsel on either side; nor was he permitted pen and ink to prepare his defence, nor the use of his books and papers." Barneveldt and his family protested against the flagrant injustice and illegality of the so-called trial, but refused to sue for pardon, which Maurice was determined they should do. "It was submission that he wanted, not life"; but as the submission was not yielded he coldly exacted the life. Barneveldt was condemned and sentenced to be beheaded by the sword. The sentence was executed on the same day it was pronounced, May 12, 1619. Grotius was condemned to perpetual imprisonment, but made his escape, by the contrivance of his wife, in 1621.—C. M. Yonge, *Cameos from English History, series* 6, *c.* 9.

ALSO IN: J. L. Motley, *Life and Death of John of Barneveld, ch.* 14–22 (*v.* 2).—J. Arminius, *Works, etc.; ed. by Nichols, v.* 1.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1608-1620.—Residence of the exiled Independents who afterwards founded Plymouth Colony in New England. See INDEPENDENTS: A. D. 1604–1617.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1609.—The founding of the Bank of Amsterdam. See MONEY AND BANKING: 17TH CENTURY.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1609.—Henry Hudson's voyage of exploration. See AMERICA: A. D. 1609.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1610-1614.—Possession taken of New Netherland (New York). See NEW YORK: A. D. 1610–1614.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1621.—Incorporation of the Dutch West India Company. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1621–1646.

A. D. 1621-1633.—End of the Twelve Years Truce.—Renewal of war.—Death of Prince Maurice.—Reversion of the sovereignty of the Spanish Provinces to the king of Spain.—"In 1621, the twelve years' truce being expired, the King of Spain and the Archdukes offered to renew it, on the condition that the States would acknowledge their ancient sovereigns, one of whom, the Archduke Albert, died this year. Even if the States had been inclined to negotiate, the will of Maurice was in the ascendant, and the war was renewed. The Dutch, it is true, were now entirely insulated. James of England was making overtures to Spain and being cajoled. France, who had wished to save Barneveldt, was unfriendly in consequence of the manner in which her intercession had been treated. The Dutch party which was opposed to Maurice was exasperated, and the great counsellor was no more there to advise his country in its emergencies. The safety of Holland lay in the fact that the wars of religion were being waged on a wider and more distant field, for a larger stake, and with larger armies. Not content with murdering Barneveldt, Maurice took care to ruin his family. But at last, and just before his death in 1625, Maurice, in the bitterness of disappointment, said, 'As long as the old rascal was alive, we had counsels and money; now we can find neither one nor the other.' . . . The memory of Barneveldt was avenged, even though his reputation has not been rehabilitated. Frederic Henry, half-brother of Maurice, was at once made Captain and Admiral-General of the States, and soon after Stadtholder. . . . Very speedily the controversy which had threatened to tear Holland asunder was silenced by mutual consent, except in synods and presbyteries. In a few years, Holland became, as far as the government was concerned, the most tolerant country in the world, the asylum of those whom bigotry hunted from their native land. Hence it became the favourite abode of those wealthy and enterprising Jews, who greatly increased its wealth by aiding its external and internal commerce."—J. E. T. Rogers, *Story of Holland, ch.* 26.—"Marquis Spinola commenced the campaign by the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, with a considerable Spanish army, in 1622, but Maurice was enabled to meet him with the united forces of Mansfeld, Brunswick [see GERMANY: A. D. 1621–1623], and his own, and obliged the Marquis to raise the siege. He afterwards encountered Don Gonsalvo de Cordova, who endeavoured to stay their passage into Germany with a Spanish force near Fleurus; but he also was defeated. After this, however, Prince Maurice could effect nothing considerable, but maintained his ground solely by acting on the defensive during the entire year 1628. . . . He could not prevent the capture [by Spinola] of Breda, one of the strongest fortifications of the Low Countries. . . . The mortification at being unable to relieve this place during a long blockade of six months

preyed upon the mind of Prince Maurice, whose health had already begun to give way. . . . An access of fever obliged him to quit the field and withdraw to the Hague, where he died in 1625, at the age of 58 years."—Sir E. Cust, *Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years' War: Maurice of Orange-Nassau, p.* 47.—The new Stadtholder, Prince Frederic Henry, made every effort to raise the siege of Breda, but without success, and the place was surrendered (June 2, 1625) to the Spaniards. In the next year little was accomplished on either side; but in 1627 the Prince took Grel, after a siege of less than one month. In 1628 the Dutch Admiral Piet Heyn captured one of the Spanish silver-fleets, with a cargo, largely pure silver, valued at 12,000,000 florins. In 1629 the king of Spain and the Archduchess made overtures of peace, with offers of a renewed truce for 24 years. "But no sooner did the negotiations become public than they encountered general and violent opposition," especially from the West India Company, which found the war profitable, and from the ministers of the church. At the same time the operations of the war assumed more activity. The Prince laid siege to Bois-le-Duc, a Brabant town deemed impregnable, and the Spaniards, to draw him away, invaded Guelderland, and captured Amersfoort, near Utrecht. They laid waste the country, and were compelled to retire, without interrupting the siege of Bois-le-Duc, which presently was surrendered. In 1631 the Prince undertook the siege of Dunkirk, which had long been a rendezvous of pirates, troublesome to the commerce of all the surrounding nations; but on the approach of a Spanish relieving force, the deputies of the States, who had authority over the commander, required him to relinquish the undertaking. In 1632, the Prince achieved a great success, in the siege and reduction of Maestricht, which he accomplished, notwithstanding his lines were attacked by a Spanish army of 24,000 men, and by an army from Germany, under the Imperial general Pappenheim, who brought 16,000 men to assist in raising the siege. In the face of these two armies, Maestricht was forced to capitulate, and the fall of Limburg followed. Peace negotiations were reopened the same year, but came to nothing, and they were followed shortly by the death of the Archduchess Isabella. "At her death, the Netherlands, in pursuance of the terms of the surrender made by Philip II., reverted to the King of Spain, who placed the government, after it had been administered a short time by a commission, in the hands of the Marquis of Aitona, commander-in-chief of the army, until the arrival of his brother Ferdinand, cardinal and archbishop of Toledo [known as 'the Cardinal Infant'], whom he had, during the lifetime of the Archduchess, appointed her successor."—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 3, *ch.* 6 (*v.* 2).

Also in: C. R. Markham, *The Fighting Veres, pt.* 2, *ch.* 4.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1623.—The massacre of Amboyna. See India: A. D. 1600-1702.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1624-1661.—Conquests in Brazil and their loss. See Brazil: A. D. 1510-1661.

A. D. 1625.—The Protestant alliance in the Thirty Years War. See Germany: A. D. 1624-1626.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1635.—Alliance with France against Spain and Austria. See Germany: A. D. 1634-1639.

A. D. 1635-1638.—The Cardinal Infant in the government of the Spanish Provinces.—His campaigns against the Dutch and French.—Invasion of France.—Dutch capture of Breda.—In 1635, the Archduchess Isabella having recently died, it was thought expedient in Spain "that a member of the royal family should be intrusted with the administration of the Netherlands [Spanish Provinces] This appointment was accordingly conferred on the Cardinal Infant [Ferdinand, son of Philip III.], who was at that time in Italy, where he had collected a considerable army. With this force, amounting to about 12,000 men, he had passed in the preceding year through Germany, on his route to the Netherlands, and, having formed a junction with the Imperialists, under the King of Hungary, he greatly contributed to the victory gained over the Swedes and German Protestants, at Nordlingen [see Germany: A. D. 1634-1639]. . . . The Cardinal Infant entered on the civil and military government of the Spanish Netherlands nearly at the time when the seizure of the Elector of Treves had called forth from France an open declaration of war. By uniting the newly raised troops which he had brought with him from Italy to the veteran legions of the provinces, he found himself at the head of a considerable military force. At the same time, an army of 20,000 French was assembled under the inspection of their king at Amiens, and was intrusted to Chatillon, and Mareschal Brezé the brother-in-law of Richelieu. . . . It was intended, however, that this army should form a junction with the Dutch at Maestricht, after which the troops of both nations should be placed under the orders of Frederic Henry, Prince of Orange, who had inherited all the military talents of his ancestors. In order to counteract this movement, the Cardinal Infant separated his army into two divisions. One was ordered to confront the Dutch, and the other, under Prince Thomas of Savoy, marched to oppose the progress of the French. This latter division of the Spaniards encountered the enemy at Avein, in the territory of Liege; but though it had taken up a favourable position, it was totally defeated, and forced to retreat to Namur. The French army then continued its march with little farther interruption, and effected its intended union with the Dutch in the neighbourhood of Maestricht. After this junction, the Prince of Orange assumed the command of the allied army, which now stormed and sacked Tillemont, where great cruelties were committed. . . . The union of the two armies spread terror throughout the Spanish Netherlands, and the outrages practised at Tillemont gave the Catholics a horror at the French name and alliance. . . . The Flemings, forgetting their late discontents with the Spanish government, now made the utmost efforts against their invaders. . . . The Spanish prince . . . contrived to elude a general engagement. . . . His opponents . . . were obliged to employ their arms in besieging towns. It was believed for some time that they intended to invest Brussels, but the storm fell on Louvain" The Emperor now sent from Germany a force of 18,000 men, under Piccolomini, "to the succour of the Cardinal Infant. The

slowness of all the operations of the Prince of Orange afforded sufficient time for these auxiliaries to cut off the French supplies of provisions, and advance to the relief of Louvain. On the intelligence of their approach, the half-famished French abandoned the siege, and, after suffering severely in their retreat, retired to recruit at Ruremonde. The Dutch afforded them no assistance, and showed them but little sympathy in their disasters. Though the Dutch hated Spain, they were jealous of France, and dreaded an increase of its power in the Netherlands. . . . Mareschals Chatillon and Brezé, who were thus in a great measure the victims of the policy of their allies, were under the necessity of leading back beyond the Meuse, to Nimeguen, the wretched remains of their army, now reduced to 9,000 men. . . . After the departure of the French, the exertions of the Prince of Orange were limited, during this season, to an attempt for the recovery of the strong fortress of Skink, which had recently been reduced by the Spaniards. The Cardinal Infant, availing himself of the opportunity thus presented to him, quickly regained, by aid of the Austrian reinforcements, his superiority in the field. He took several fortresses from the Dutch, and sent to the frontiers of France detachments which levied contributions over great part of Picardy and Champagne. . . . Encouraged by these successes, Olivarez [the Spanish minister] redoubled his exertions, and now boldly planned invasions of France from three different quarters"—to enter Picardy on the north, Burgundy on the east, and Guienne at the south. "Of all these expeditions, the most successful, at least for a time, was the invasion of Picardy, which, indeed, had nearly proved fatal to the French monarchy. By orders of the Cardinal Infant, his generals, Prince Thomas of Savoy, Piccolomini, and John de Vert, or Wert, . . . began their march at the head of an army which exceeded 30,000 men, and was particularly strong in cavalry. . . . No interruption being . . . offered by the Dutch, the Spanish generals entered Picardy [1636], and seized almost without resistance on La Capelle and Catelet, which the French ministry expected would have occupied their arms for some months. The Count de Soissons, who was already thinking more of his plots against Richelieu than the defence of his country, did nothing to arrest the progress of the Spaniards, till they arrived at the Somme," and there but little. They forced the passage of the river with slight difficulty, and "occupied Roye, to the south of the Somme, on the river Oise; and having thus obtained an entrance into France, spread themselves over the whole country lying between these rivers. The smoke of the villages to which they set fire was seen from the heights in the vicinity of Paris; and such in that capital was the consternation consequent on these events that it seems probable, had the Spanish generals marched straight on Paris, the city would have fallen into their hands." But Prince Thomas was not bold enough for the exploit, and prudently "receded with his army to form the siege of Corbie. This town presented no great resistance to his arms, but the time occupied by its capture allowed the Parisians to recover from their consternation, and to prepare the means of defence." They raised an army of 60,000 men, chiefly apprentices and artisans of the capital, before which Prince Thomas was obliged to retreat. "The French quickly recovered all those fortified places in Picardy which had been previously lost by the incapacity, or, as Richelieu alleged, by the treachery of their governors. But they could not prevent the Spaniards from plundering and desolating the country as they retired. . . . The Cardinal Infant was obliged to remain on the defensive for some time after his retreat from Picardy to the Netherlands, which were anew invaded by a French force, under the Cardinal La Valette, a younger son of the Duke d'Epernon. But even while restricting his operations to defence, the Infant could not prevent the capture by the French of Ivry and Landreci in Hainault. While opposing the enemy in that quarter, he received intelligence of an unexpected attempt on Breda by the Dutch [1637]. He immediately hastened to its relief; but the Prince of Orange having rapidly collected 6,000 or 7,000 peasants, whom he had employed in forming intrenchments and drawing lines of circumvallation, was so well fortified on the arrival of the Cardinal Infant, who had crossed the Scheldt at Antwerp, and approached with not fewer than 25,000 men, that that Prince, in despair of forcing the enemy's camp, or in any way succouring Breda, marched towards Guelderland. In that province he took Venlo and Ruremonde; but Breda, as he had anticipated, surrendered to the Dutch after a siege of nine weeks. . . . Its capture greatly relieved the Dutch in Brabant, who now, for many years, had been checked by an enemy in the heart of their territories. . . . Early in the year 1638, the Infant resumed offensive operations, and again rendered himself formidable to his enemies. He frustrated the attempts which the Dutch had concerted against Antwerp. . . . In person he beat off the army of the Prince of Orange, who had invested Gueldres; and, about the same time, his active generals, Prince Thomas of Savoy and Piccolomini, compelled the French to raise the siege of St. Omer."—J. Dunlop, *Memoirs of Spain from* 1621 *to* 1700, *v.* 1, *ch.* 4.

A. D. 1643.—Invasion of France by the Spaniards and their defeat at Rocroi.—Loss of Thionville and the line of the Moselle. See FRANCE: A. D. 1642–1643; and 1643.

A. D. 1645-1646.—French campaign in Flanders, under Orleans and Enghien (Condé).—Siege and capture of Dunkirk.—"In 1645, Orleans led the [French] army into Flanders, and began the campaign with the capture of Mardyck. A few weeks of leisurely siege resulted in the conquest of some towns, and by the first of September Gaston sought rest at the Court. As it was now well towards the end of the season, the Hollanders were at last ready to coöperate, and they joined the French under Gassion and Rantzau. But the allied armies did little except march and countermarch, and at the end of the year the Spaniards surprised the French garrison at Mardyck and retook the only place of importance they had lost. . . . Gaston was, however, well content even with the moderate glory of such warfare. In 1646 he commanded an army of 35,000 men, one portion of which was led by Enghien himself. The Hollanders were under arms unusually early, but they atoned for this by accomplishing nothing. The French laid siege to Courtrai, which, in due time surrendered, and they then spent three weeks in a vigorous siege of Mardyck. This

place was finally captured for the second time in fourteen months. It was now late in August, and Orleans was ready to rest from a campaign which had lasted three months. . . . By the departure of Gaston the Duke of Enghien was left free to attempt some important movement, and his thoughts turned upon the capture of the city of Dunkirk. Dunkirk was situated on the shore of the North Sea, in a position that made it alike important and formidable to commerce. . . . Its harbor leading to a canal in the city where a fleet might safely enter, and its position near the shores of France and the British Channel, had rendered it a frequent retreat for pirates. The cruisers that captured the ships of the merchants of Havre and Dieppe, or made plundering expeditions along the shores of Picardy and Normandy, found safe refuge in the harbor of Dunkirk. Its name was odious through northern France, alike to the shipper and the resident of the towns along the coast. The ravages of the pirates of Dunkirk are said to have cost France as much as a million a year. . . . The position of Dunkirk was such that it seemed to defy attack, and the strangeness and wildness of its approaches added terror to its name. It was surrounded by vast plains of sand, far over which often spread the waters of the North Sea, and its name was said to signify the church of the dunes. Upon them the fury of the storms often worked strange changes. What had seemed solid land would be swallowed up in some tempest. What had been part of the ocean would be left so that men and wagons could pass over what the day before had been as inaccessible as the Straits of Dover. An army attempting a siege would find itself on these wild dunes far removed from any places for supplies, and exposed to the utmost severity of storm and weather. Tents could hardly be pitched, and the changing sands would threaten the troops with destruction. The city was, moreover, garrisoned by 3,000 soldiers, and by 8,000 of the citizens and 2,000 sailors. . . . The ardor of Enghien was increased by these difficulties, and he believed that with skill and vigor the perils of a siege could be overcome. This plan met the warm approval of Mazarin. . . . Enghien advanced with his army of about 15,000 men, and on the 19th of September the siege began. It was necessary to prevent supplies being received by sea. Tromp, excited to hearty admiration of the genius of the young general, sailed with ten ships into the harbor, and cut off communications. Enghien, in the meantime, was pressing the circumvallation of the city with the utmost vigor. . . . Half fed, wet, sleepless, the men worked on, inspired by the zeal of their leader. Piccolomini attempted to relieve the city, but he could not force Enghien's entrenchments, except by risking a pitched battle, and that he did not dare to venture. Mines were now carried under the city by the besiegers, and a great explosion made a breach in the wall. The French and Spanish met, but the smoke and confusion were so terrible that both sides at last fell back in disorder. The French finally discovered that the advantage was really theirs, and held the position. Nothing now remained but a final and bloody assault, but Leyde did not think that honor required him to await this. He agreed that if he did not receive succor by the 10th of October, the city should be surrendered. Piccolomini dared not risk the last army in Flanders in an assault on Enghien's entrenchments, and, on October 11th, the Spanish troops evacuated the town. A siege of three weeks had conquered obstacles of man and nature, and destroyed the scourge of French commerce."—J. B. Perkins, *France under [Richelieu and] Mazarin*, *ch.* 8 (*v.* 1).

ALSO IN: Lord Mahon, *Life of Condé*, *ch.* 2.

A. D. 1646-1648.—Final Negotiation of Peace between Spain and the United Provinces.—"The late campaign had been so unfortunate [to the Spaniards] that they felt their only possibility of obtaining reasonable terms, or of continuing the war with the hope of a change in fortune, was to break the alliance between Holland and France. A long debt of gratitude, assistance rendered in the struggle with Spain when assistance was valuable, the treaty of 1635 renewed in 1644, forbade Holland making a peace, except jointly with France. On the other hand, the States-General were weary of war, and jealous of the power and ambition of the French. . . . This disposition was skilfully fostered by the Spanish envoys. Pau and Knuyt, plenipotentiaries from Holland to the Congress at Münster [where, in part, the negotiations of the Peace of Westphalia were in progress—see GERMANY: A. D. 1648], were gained to the Spanish interest, as Mazarin claimed, by the promise to each of 100,000 crowns. But, apart from bribes, the Spanish used Mazarin's own plans to alarm the Hollanders. . . . It was intimated to the Hollanders that France was about to make a separate peace, that the Spanish Netherlands were to be given her, and that perhaps with the hand of the infanta might be transferred what claims Spain still made on the allegiance of the United Provinces. The French protested in vain they had never thought of making any treaty unless Holland joined, and that the proposed marriage of Louis with the infanta had been idle talk, suggested by the Spanish for the purpose of alarming the States-General. The Hollanders were suspicious, and they became still more eager for peace . . . In the spring of 1646, seventy-one proposed articles had been submitted to the Spanish for their consideration. The French made repeated protests against these steps, but the States-General insisted that they were only acting with such celerity as should enable them to have the terms of their treaty adjusted as soon as those of the French. The successes of 1646 and the capture of Dunkirk quickened the desires of the United Provinces for a treaty with their ancient enemy. . . . In December, 1646, articles were signed between Spain and Holland, to be inserted in the treaty of Münster, when that should be settled upon, though the States-General still declared that no peace should be made unless the terms were approved by France. Active hostilities were again commenced in 1647, but little progress was made in Flanders during this campaign. Though the Hollanders had not actually made peace with Spain, they gave the French no aid. . . . On January 30, 1648, the treaty was at last signed. 'One would think,' wrote Mazarin, 'that for eighty years France had been warring with the provinces, and Spain had been protecting them. They have stained their reputation with a shameful blemish.' It was eighty years since William of Orange had issued his proclamation inviting all the Nether-

lands to take up arms 'to oppose the violent tyranny of the Spaniards.' Unlike the truce of 1609, a formal and final peace was now made. The United Provinces were acknowledged as free and sovereign states. At the time of the truce the Spaniards had only treated with them 'in quality of, and as holding them for independent provinces.' By a provision which had increased the eagerness for peace of the burghers and merchants of the United Provinces, it was agreed that the Escaut [Scheldt] should be closed. The wealth and commerce of Antwerp were thus sacrificed for the benefit of Amsterdam. The trade with the Indies was divided between the two countries. Numerous commercial advantages were secured and certain additional territory was ceded to the States-General."—J. B. Perkins, *France under [Richelieu and] Mazarin, ch.* 8 (*v.* 1).—"It had . . . become a settled conviction of Holland that a barrier of Spanish territory between the United Provinces and France was necessary as a safeguard against the latter. But the idea of fighting to maintain that barrier had not yet arisen, though fighting was the outcome of the doctrine. All that the United Provinces now did, or could do, was simply to back out of the war with Spain, sit still, and look passively upon the conflict between her and France for possession of the barrier, until it should please the two belligerents to make peace."—J. Geddes, *Hist. of the Administration of John De Witt, bk.* 2, *ch.* 1, *sect.* 1 (*v.* 1).

(Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1647-1648.—The Spanish war with France.—Siege and Battle of Lens.—"While Condé was at the head of the army of the Netherlands, it at least suffered no disaster; but, while he was affording the enemy a triumph in Spain [by his failure at Lerida—see SPAIN: A. D. 1644-1646], the army which he left behind him was equally unfortunate. As he had taken some regiments with him to Spain, it did not exceed 16,000 men; and in 1647 was commanded by the two marshals, Gassion and Rantzau," who exercised the command on alternate days. Both were brave and skilful officers, but they were hostile to one another, and Rantzau was, unfortunately, a drunkard. "The Spanish army had been raised to 22,000 men, and besides being superior in numbers to them, was now under the command of a singularly active leader, the Archduke Leopold. He took town after town before their face; and towards the end of June laid siege to Landrecies. The danger of so important a place stimulated Mazarin to send some strong battalions, including the royal guards, to reinforce the army: and the two marshals made skilful dispositions to surprise the Spanish camp. By a night march of great rapidity, they reached the neighbourhood of the enemy without their presence being suspected; but the next morning, when the attack was to be made, it was Rantzau's turn to command; and he was too helplessly drunk to give the necessary orders. Before he had recovered his consciousness daylight had revealed his danger to the archduke, and he had taken up a position in which he could give battle with advantage. Greatly mortified, the French were forced to draw off, and leave Landrecies to its fate. As some apparent set-off to their losses, they succeeded in taking Dixmude, and one or two other unimportant towns, and were besieging Lens, when Gassion was killed; and though, a few days afterwards, that town was taken, its capture made but small amends. . . . Though the war was almost at an end in Germany, Turenne was still in that country; and, therefore, the next year there was no one who could be sent to replace Gassion but Condé and Grammont, who fortunately for the prince, was his almost inseparable comrade and adviser. . . . Though 16,000 men had been thought enough for Gassion and Rantzau, 30,000 were now collected to enable Condé to make a more successful campaign. The archduke had received no reinforcements, and had now only 18,000 men to make head against him; yet with this greatly inferior force he, for a while, balanced Condé's successes; losing Ypres, it is true, but taking Courtrai and Furnes, and defeating and almost annihilating a division with which the prince had detached Rantzau to make an attempt upon Ostend. At last, in the middle of August, he laid siege to Lens, the capture of which had, as we have already mentioned, been the last exploit of the French army in the preceding campaign, and which was now retaken without the garrison making the slightest effort at resistance. But, just as the first intelligence of his having sat down before it reached Condé, he was joined by the Count d'Erlach with a reinforcement of 5,000 men from the German army; and he resolved to march against the archduke in the hope of saving" the place. "He arrived in sight of the town on the 20th of August, a few hours after it had surrendered; and he found the archduke's victorious army in a position which, eager as he was for battle, he could not venture to attack. For Leopold had 18,000 men under arms, and the force that Condé had been able to bring with him did not exceed 14,000, with 18 guns. For the first time in his life he decided on retreating;" but early in the retreat his army was thrown into disorder by an attack from the archduke's cavalry, commanded by General Beck. "All was nearly lost, when Grammont turned the fortune of the day. He was in the van, but the moment that he learnt what was taking place behind him, he halted the advanced guard, and leading it back towards the now triumphant enemy, gave time for those regiments which had been driven in to rally behind the firm line which he presented. . . . It soon came to be a contest of hard fighting, unvaried by manœuvres on either side; and in hard fighting no troops could stand before those who might be lead by Condé. . . . At last victory declared for him in every part of his line. He had sustained a heavy loss himself, but less than that of the enemy, who left 3,000 of their number slain upon the field; while 5,000 prisoners, among whom was Beck himself, struck down by a mortal wound, and nearly all their artillery and baggage, attested the reality and greatness of his triumph."—C. D. Yonge, *Hist. of France under the Bourbons, ch.* 10 (*v.* 2).

ALSO IN: Sir E. Cust, *Lives of the Warriors of the Civil Wars, pt.* 1, *pp.* 149-152.

A. D. 1647-1650.—Suspension of the Stadtholdership.—Supremacy of the States of Holland.—The fourth stadtholder, William II., who succeeded his father, Frederick Henry, in 1647, "was young and enterprising, and not at all disposed to follow the pacific example of his father. . . . His attempt at a coup d'état only prepared

the way for an interregnum. . . . He was brother-in-law to the Elector of Brandenburg . . . and son-in-law to Charles I. of England and Henrietta Maria, the sister of Louis XIII. . . . The proud descendant of the Stuarts, the Princess Mary, who had been married to him when hardly more than a child, thought it beneath her not to be the wife of a sovereign, and encouraged her husband not to be satisfied to remain merely 'the official of a republic.' Thus encouraged, the son of Frederick Henry cherished the secret purpose of transforming the elective stadtholdership into an hereditary monarchy. . . . He needed supreme authority to enable him to render assistance to Charles I. . . . Finding in the opposition of the States an insurmountable obstacle to his wish of intervention, he sought the support of France, . . . and was now ready to come to an understanding with Mazarin to break the treaty of Munster and wrest the Netherlands from Spain. Mazarin promised in return to help him to assert his authority over the States. . . . But if William desired war, the United Provinces, and in particular the province of Holland, could not dispense with peace. . . . The States of Holland . . . fixed the period for the disbanding of the twenty-nine companies whose dismissal had been promised to them. After twelve days of useless deliberations they issued definite orders to that effect. The step had been provoked, but it was precipitate and might give rise to a legal contest as to their competency. The Prince of Orange, therefore, eager to hasten a struggle from which he expected an easy victory, chose to consider the resolution of the States of Holland as a signal for the rupture of the Union, and the very next day solemnly demanded reparation from the States-General, who in their turn issued a counter order. The Prince made skilful use of the rivalry of power between the two assemblies to obtain for himself extraordinary powers which were contrary to the laws of the Confederation. By the terms of the resolution, which was passed by only four provinces, of which two were represented by but one deputy each, he was authorised to take all measures necessary for the maintenance of order and peace, and particularly for the preservation of the Union. 'The States-General consequently commissioned him to visit the town councils of Holland, accompanied by six members of the States-General and of the Council of State, with all the pomp of a military escort, including a large number of officers. He was charged to address them with remonstrances and threats intended to intimidate the provincial States.' This was the first act of the coup d'état that he had prepared, and his mistake was quickly shown him." The Prince gained nothing by his visitation of the towns. At Amsterdam he was not permitted to enter the place with his following, and he returned to the Hague especially enraged against that bold and independent city. He planned an expedition to take it by surprise; but the citizens got timely warning and his scheme was baffled. He had succeeded, however, in arresting and imprisoning six of the most influential deputies of the Assembly of Holland, and his attitude was formidable enough to extort some concessions from the popular party, by way of compromise. A state of suspicious quiet was restored for the time, which William improved by renewing negotiations for a secret treaty with France. "Arrogating to himself already the right to dispose as he pleased of the republic, he signed a convention with Count d' Estrades, whom he had summoned to the Hague. By this the King of France and the Prince of Orange engaged themselves 'to attack conjointly the Netherlands on May 1, 1651, with an army of 20,000 foot and 10,000 horse, to break at the same time with Cromwell, to re-establish Charles II. as King of England, and to make no treaty with Spain excepting in concert with each other.' The Prince of Orange guaranteed a fleet of 50 vessels besides the land contingent, and in return for his co-operation was promised the absolute possession of the city of Antwerp and the Duchy of Brabant or Marquisate of the Holy Roman Empire. William thus interested France in the success of his cause by making ready to resume the war with Spain, and calculated, as he told his confidants, on profiting by her assistance to disperse the cabal opposed to him. . . . The internal pacification amounted then to no more than a truce, when three months later the Prince of Orange, having over-fatigued and heated himself in the chase, was seized with small-pox, of which in a few days he died. He was thus carried off at the age of 24, in the full force and flower of his age, leaving only one son, born a week after his father's death. . . . His attempt at a coup d'état was destined to press heavily and long upon the fate of the posthumous son, who had to wait 22 years before succeeding to his ancestral functions. It closed the succession to him for many years, by making the stadtholdership a standing menace to the public freedom. . . . The son of William II., an orphan before his birth, and named William like his father, seemed destined to succeed to little more than the paternal name. . . . Three days after the death of William II., the former deputies, whom he had treated as state prisoners and deprived of all their offices, were recalled to take their seats in the Assembly. At the same time the provincial Town Councils assumed the power of nominating their own magistrates, which had almost always been left to the pleasure of the Stadtholder, and thus obtained the full enjoyment of municipal freedom. The States of Holland, on their side, grasped the authority hitherto exercised in their province by the Prince of Orange, and claimed successively all the rights of sovereignty. The States of Zealand . . . exhibited the same eagerness to free themselves from all subjection. . . . Thus, before declaring the stadtholdership vacant, the office was deprived of its prerogatives. To complete this transformation of the government, the States of Holland took the initiative in summoning to the Hague a great assembly of the Confederation, which met at the beginning of the year 1651. . . . The congress was called upon to decide between two forms of constitution. The question was whether the United Provinces should be a republic governed by the States-General, or whether the government should belong to the States of each province, with only a reservation in favour of the obligations imposed by the Act of Union. Was each province to be sovereign in itself, or subject to the federal power?" The result was a suspension and practical abolition of the stadtholdership. "Freed from the counterbalancing power of the Stadtholder, Holland to a great extent absorbed the

federal power, and was the gainer by all that that power lost. . . . The States of Holland, . . . destined henceforward to be the principal instrument of government of the republic, was composed partly of nobles and partly of deputies from the towns. . . . The Grand Pensionary was the minister of the States of Holland. He was appointed for five years, and represented them in the States-General. . . . Called upon by the vacancy in the stadtholdership to the government of the United Provinces, without any legal power of enforcing obedience, Holland required a statesman who could secure this political supremacy and use it for her benefit. The nomination of John de Witt as Grand Pensionary placed at her service one of the youngest members of the assembly."—A. L. Pontalis, *John de Witt, ch.* 1-2 (*v.* 1).

(Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1648.—Still held to form a part of the Empire. See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

(United Provinces): A. D. 1648-1665.—Prosperity and pre-eminence of the Dutch Republic.—The causes.—"That this little patch of earth, a bog rescued from the waters, warred on ever by man and by the elements, without natural advantages except those of contact with the sea, should in the middle of the seventeenth century have become the commercial centre of Europe, is one of the phenomena of history. But in the explanation of this phenomenon history has one of its most instructive lessons. Philip II. said of Holland, 'that it was the country nearest to hell.' Well might he express such an opinion. He had buried around the walls of its cities more than three hundred thousand Spanish soldiers, and had spent in the attempt at its subjugation more than two hundred million ducats. This fact alone would account for his abhorrence, but, in addition, the republic was in its every feature opposed to the ideal country of a bigot and a despot. The first element which contributed to its wealth, as well as to the vast increase of its population, was its religious toleration. . . . This, of course, was as incomprehensible to a Spanish Catholic as it was to a High-Churchman or to a Presbyterian in England. That Lutherans, Calvinists, Anabaptists, Jews, and Catholics should all be permitted to live under the same government seemed to the rest of Europe like flying in the face of Providence. Critics at this time occasionally said that the Hollanders cared nothing for religion; that with them theology was of less account than commerce. To taunts like these no reply was needed by men who could point to their record of eighty years of war. This war had been fought for liberty of conscience, but more than all, as the greater includes the less, for civil liberty. During its continuance, and at every crisis, Catholics had stood side by side with Protestants to defend their country, as they had done in England when the Spanish Armada appeared upon her coast. It would have been a strange reward for their fidelity to subject them, as Elizabeth did, to a relentless persecution, upon the pretext that they were dangerous to the State. In addition to the toleration, there were other causes leading to the marvellous prosperity of the republic, which are of particular interest to Americans. In 1659, Samuel Lamb, a prominent and far-seeing London merchant, published a pamphlet, in the form of a letter to Cromwell, urging the establishment of a bank in England similar to the one at Amsterdam. In this pamphlet, which Lord Somers thought worthy of preservation, the author gives the reasons, as they occurred to him, which accounted for the vast superiority of Holland over the rest of Europe as a commercial nation. . . . As the foundation of a bank for England was the subject of the letter, the author naturally lays particular stress upon that factor, but the other causes which he enumerates as explaining the great trade of the republic are the following: First. The statesmen sitting at the helm in Holland are many of them merchants, bred to trade from their youth, improved by foreign travel, and acquainted with all the necessities of commerce. Hence, their laws and treaties are framed with wisdom. Second. In Holland when a merchant dies, his property is equally divided among his children and the business is continued and expanded, with all its traditions and inherited experience. In England, on the contrary, the property goes to the eldest son, who often sets up for a country gentleman, squanders his patrimony, and neglects the business by which his father had become enriched. Third. The honesty of the Hollanders in their manufacturing and commercial dealings. When goods are made up in Holland, they sell everywhere without question, for the purchaser knows that they are exactly as represented in quality, weight, and measure Not so with England's goods. Our manufacturers are so given to fraud and adulteration as to bring their commodities into disgrace abroad. 'And so the Dutch have the pre-eminence in the sale of their manufactures before us, by their true making, to their very files and needles.' Fourth. The care and vigilance of the government in the laying of impositions so as to encourage their own manufactures; the skill and rapidity with which they are changed to meet the shifting wants of trade; the encouragement given by ample rewards from the public treasury for useful inventions and improvements; and the promotion of men to office for services and not for favor or sinister ends. Such were the causes of the commercial supremacy of the Dutch as they appeared to an English merchant of the time, and all modern investigations support his view . . . ; Sir Joshua [Josiah] Child, writing a few years later ['A New Discourse of Trade, p. 2, and after—1665], gives a fuller explanation of the great prosperity of the Netherland Republic. He evidently had Lamb's pamphlet before him, for he enumerates all the causes set forth by his predecessor. In addition, he gives several others, as to some of which we shall see more hereafter. Among these are the general education of the people, including the women, religious toleration, care of the poor, low custom duties and high excise, registration of titles to real estate, low interest, the laws permitting the assignment of debts, and the judicial system under which controversies between merchants can be decided at one fortieth part of the expense in England. . . . Probably, no body of men governing a state were ever more enlightened and better acquainted with the necessities of legislation than were these burghers, merchants, and manufacturers who for two centuries gave laws to Holland. It was largely due to the intelligence displayed by these men that the republic, during the continuance of its war, was enabled to support a burden of taxa-

tion such as the world has rarely seen before or since. The internal taxes seem appalling. Rents were taxed twenty-five per cent.; on all sales of real estate two and a half per cent. were levied, and on all collateral inheritances five per cent. On beer, wine, meat, salt, spirits, and all articles of luxury, the tax was one hundred per cent., and on some articles this was doubled. But this was only the internal taxation, in the way of excise duties, which were levied on every one, natives and foreigners alike. In regard to foreign commodities, which the republic needed for its support, the system was very different. Upon them there was imposed only a nominal duty of one per cent., while wool, the great staple for the manufacturers, was admitted free. Here the statesmen of the republic showed the wisdom which placed them, as masters of political economy, at least two centuries in advance of their contemporaries."—D. Campbell, *The Puritan in Holland, England, and America*, v. 2, *pp.* 324–331.

Also in: W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial history of Free Nations*, v. 2: *The Dutch*, *ch.* 12.

(The United Provinces): A. D. 1651-1660.—The rule of Holland, and her Grand Pensionary, John de Witt.—"The Republic had shaken off the domination of a person; it now fell under the domination of a single province. Holland was overwhelmingly preponderant in the federation. She possessed the richest, most populous, and most powerful towns. She contributed more than one-half of the whole federal taxation. She had the right of naming the ambassadors at Paris, Stockholm, and Vienna. The fact that the States General met on her territory—at the Hague—necessarily gave her additional influence and prestige. . . . With the Stadtholder's power that of the States General also, as representing the idea of centralisation, had largely disappeared. The Provincial Estates of Holland, therefore, under the title of 'Their High Mightinesses,' became the principal power—to such an extent, indeed, that the term 'Holland' had by the time of the Restoration [the English Restoration, A. D. 1660] become synonymous among foreign powers with the whole Republic. Their chief minister was called 'The Grand Pensionary,' and the office had been since 1653 filled by one of the most remarkable men of the time, John de Witt. John de Witt therefore represented, roughly speaking, the power of the merchant aristocracy of Holland, as opposed to the claims of the House of Orange, which were supported by the 'noblesse,' the army, the Calvinistic clergy, and the people below the governing class. Abroad the Orange family had the sympathy of monarchical Governments. Louis XIV despised the Government of 'Messieurs les Marchands,' while Charles II., at once the uncle and the guardian of the young Prince of the house of Orange, the future William III. of England, and mindful of the scant courtesy which, to satisfy Cromwell, the Dutch had shown him in exile, was ever their bitter and unscrupulous foe. The empire of the Dutch Republic was purely commercial and colonial, and she held in this respect the same position relatively to the rest of Europe that England holds at the present day."—O. Airy, *The Eng. Restoration and Louis XIV.*, *ch.* 9.

Also in: J. Geddes, *Hist. of the Administration of John de Witt*, v. 1.

(Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1652.—Recovery of Dunkirk and Gravelines.—Invasion of France. See France: A. D. 1652.

(The United Provinces): A. D. 1652.—First Settlement at the Cape of Good Hope. See South Africa: A. D. 1486-1806.

(The United Provinces): A. D. 1652-1654.—War with the English Commonwealth. See England: A. D. 1652-1654.

(Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1653-1656.—Campaigns of Condé in the service of Spain against France. See France: A. D. 1653-1656.

(Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1657-1658.—England in alliance with France in the Franco-Spanish War.—Loss of Dunkirk and Gravelines. See France: A. D. 1655-1658.

(Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1659.—Cessions of territory to France by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. See France: A. D. 1659-1661.

(Holland): A. D. 1664.—The seizure of New Netherland by the English. See New York: A. D. 1664.

(Holland): A. D. 1665-1666.—War with England renewed.—"A formal declaration of war between Holland and England took place in March, 1665. The English nation, jealous of the commercial prosperity of Holland, eagerly seconded the views of the king against that country, and in regard to the war a remarkable degree of union prevailed throughout Great Britain. Such, however, was not the case with the Dutch, who were very much divided in opinion, and had many reasons to be doubtful of the support of France. One of the grand objects of Charles II. was undoubtedly . . . to restore his nephew the Prince of Orange to all the power which had been held by his ancestors in the United Provinces. But between Holland and England there existed, besides numerous other most fertile causes of discord, unsettled claims upon distant territories, rival colonies in remote parts of the world, maritime jealousy and constant commercial opposition. These were national motives for hostility, and affected a large body of the Dutch people. But, on the other hand, considerations of general interest were set aside by the political factions which divided the United Provinces, and which may be classed under the names of the Republican and the Monarchical parties. The Monarchical party was, of course, that which was attached to the interests of the House of Orange. . . . In the end of 1664, 136 Dutch merchantmen had been captured by England; acts of hostility had occurred in Guinea, at the Cape de Verd, [in New Netherland], and in the West Indies: but Louis [XIV. of France] had continued to avoid taking any active part against Great Britain, notwithstanding all the representations of De Witt, who on this occasion saw in France the natural ally of Holland. On the 13th of June [1665], however, a great naval engagement took place between the Dutch fleet, commanded by Opdam and Van Tromp, and the English fleet, commanded by the Duke of York and Prince Rupert. Opdam was defeated and killed; Van Tromp saved the remains of his fleet; and on the very same day a treaty was concluded between Arlington [the English minister] and an envoy of the Bishop of Munster, by which it was agreed that the warlike and restless prelate should invade the United Provinces with an army of 20,000 men, in consideration

of sums of money to be paid by England. This treaty at once called Louis into action, and he notified to the Bishop of Munster that if he made any hostile movement against the States of Holland he would find the troops of France prepared to oppose him. This fact was announced to the States by D'Estrades on the 22nd of July, together with the information that the French monarch was about to send to their assistance a body of troops by the way of Flanders. . . . Still, however, Louis hung back in the execution of his purposes, till the aspect of affairs in the beginning of 1666 forced him to declare war against England, on the 26th of January in that year, according to the terms of his treaty with Holland. . . . The part that France took in the war was altogether insignificant, and served but little to free the Dutch from the danger in which they were placed. That nation itself made vast efforts to obtain a superiority at sea; and in the beginning of June, 1666, the Dutch fleet, commanded by De Ruyter and Van Tromp, encountered the English fleet, under Monk and Prince Rupert, and a battle which lasted for four days, with scarcely any intermission, took place. It would seem that some advantage was gained by the Dutch; but both fleets were tremendously shattered, and retired to the ports of their own country to refit. Shortly after, however they again encountered, and one of the most tremendous naval engagements in history took place, in which the Dutch suffered a complete defeat; 20 of their first-rate men-of war were captured or sunk; and three admirals, with 4,000 men, were killed on the part of the States. The French fleet could not come up in time to take part in the battle, and all that Louis did was to furnish De Witt with the means of repairing the losses of the States as rapidly as possible. The energy of the grand pensionary himself, however, effected much more than the slow and unwilling succour of the French king. With almost superhuman exertion new fleets were made ready and manned, while the grand pensionary amused the English ministers with the prospect of a speedy peace on their own terms; and at a moment when England was least prepared, De Ruyter and Cornelius de Witt appeared upon the coast, sailed up the Thames attacked and took Sheerness, and destroyed a great number of ships of the line. A multitude of smaller vessels were burnt; and the consternation was so great throughout England, that a large quantity of stores and many ships were sunk and destroyed by order of the British authorities themselves, while De Ruyter ravaged the whole sea-coast from the mouth of the Thames to the Land's End. The negotiations for peace, which had commenced at Breda, were now carried on upon terms much more advantageous to Holland, and were speedily concluded; England, notwithstanding the naval glory she had gained, being fully as much tired of the war as the States themselves. A general treaty was signed on the 25th of July."—G. P. R. James, *Life and Times of Louis XIV.*, *v.* 2, *ch.* 6.—"The thunder of the Dutch guns in the Medway and the Thames woke England to a bitter sense of its degradation. The dream of loyalty was roughly broken. 'Everybody now-a-days,' Pepys tells us, 'reflect upon Oliver and commend him: what brave things he did, and made all the neighbour princes fear him.' But Oliver's successor was coolly watching this shame and discontent of his people with the one aim of turning it to his own advantage."—J. R. Green, *Hist. of the Eng. People*, *bk.* 8, *ch.* 1 (*v.* 3).

Also in: C. D. Yonge, *Hist. of the British Navy*, *v.* 2, *ch.* 5.

(The Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1667.—The claims and conquests of Louis XIV.—The War of the Queen's Rights.—In 1660 Louis XIV., king of France, was married to the Infanta of Spain, Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip IV., who solemnly renounced at the time, for herself and her posterity, all rights to the Spanish crown. The insincerity and hollowness of the renunciation was proved terribly at a later time by the long "war of the Spanish succession." Meantime Louis discovered other pretended rights in his Spanish wife on which he might found claims for the satisfaction of his territorial greed. These rested on the fact that she was born of her father's first marriage, and that a customary right in certain provinces of the Spanish Netherlands gave daughters of a first marriage priority of inheritance over sons of a second marriage. At the same time, in the laws of Luxembourg and Franche-Comté, which admitted all children to the partition of an inheritance, he found pretext for claiming, on behalf of his wife, one fourth of the former and one third of the principality last named. Philip IV. of Spain died in September, 1665, leaving a sickly infant son under the regency of an incapable and priest-ruled mother, and Louis began quickly to press his claims. Having made his preparations on a formidable scale, he sent forth in May, 1667, to all the courts of Europe, an elaborate "Treatise on the Rights of the Most Christian Queen over divers States of the monarchy of Spain," announcing at the same time his intention to make a "journey" in the Catholic Netherlands—the intended journey being a ruthless invasion, in fact, with 50,000 men, under the command of the great marshal-general, Turenne. The army began its march simultaneously with the announcement of its purpose, crossing the frontier on the 24th of May. Town after town was taken, some without resistance and others after a short, sharp siege, directed by Vauban, the most famous among military engineers Charleroi was occupied on the 2d of June; Tournay surrendered on the 24th; two weeks later Douai fell; Courtrai endured only four days of siege and Oudenarde but two; Lille was a more difficult prize and held Turenne and the king before it for twenty days. "All Walloon Flanders had again become French at the price of less effort and bloodshed than it had cost, in the Middle Ages, to force one of its places. . . September 1, the whole French army was found assembled before the walls of Ghent." But Ghent was not assailed, the French army being greatly fatigued and much reduced by the garrisoning of the conquered places. Louis, accordingly, returned to Saint-Germain, and Turenne, after taking Alost, went into winter quarters. Before the winter passed great changes of circumstance had occurred. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland and Sweden had been formed, Louis had made his secret treaty at Vienna with the Emperor, for the partitioning of the Spanish dominions, and his further "journey" in the Netherlands was postponed.—H. Martin, *Hist. of France: Age*

of Louis XIV. (*trans. by M. L. Booth*), *v.* 1, *ch.* 4.

ALSO IN: A. F. Pontalis, *John de Witt, ch.* 7 (*v.* 1).

(Holland): A. D. 1668.—The Triple Alliance with England and Sweden against the French king.—"The rapid conquests of the French king in Flanders during the last summer had drawn the eyes of Europe towards the seat of war in that country. The pope, Clement IX., through pity for the young king of Spain, and the States, alarmed at the approach of the French arms to their frontier, offered their mediation. To both Louis returned the same answer, that he sought nothing more than to vindicate the rights of his wife; that he should be content to retain possession of the conquests which he had already made, or to exchange them either for Luxembourg, or Franche-comté, with the addition of Aire, St. Omer, Donai, Cambrai, and Charleroi, to strengthen his northern frontier. . . . But Spain was not sufficiently humbled to submit to so flagrant an injustice. . . . If it was the interest of England, it was still more the interest of the States, to exclude France from the possession of Flanders. Under this persuasion, sir William Temple, the resident at Brussels, received instructions to proceed to the Hague and sound the disposition of de Witt; and, on his return to London, was despatched back again to Holland with the proposal of a defensive alliance, the object of which should be to compel the French monarch to make peace with Spain on the terms which he had previously offered. . . . Temple acted with promptitude and address: . . . he represented the danger of delay; and, contrary to all precedent at the Hague, in the short space of five days—had the constitutional forms been observed it would have demanded five weeks—he negotiated [January, 1668] three treaties which promised to put an end to the war, or, if they failed in that point, to oppose at least an effectual barrier to the further progress of the invader. The first was a defensive alliance by which the two nations bound themselves to aid each other against any aggressor with a fleet of forty men of war, and an army of 6,400 men, or with assistance in money in proportion to the deficiency in men; by the second, the contracting powers agreed by every means in their power to dispose France to conclude a peace with Spain on the alternative already offered, to persuade Spain to accept one part of that alternative before the end of May, and, in case of a refusal, to compel her by war, on condition that France should not interfere by force of arms. These treaties were meant for the public eye. the third was secret, and bound both England and the States, in case of the refusal of Louis, to unite with Spain in the war, and not to lay down their arms till the peace of the Pyrenees were confirmed. On the same day the Swedish ambassadors gave a provisional, and afterwards a positive assent to the league, which from that circumstance obtained the name of the Triple Alliance. Louis received the news of this transaction with an air of haughty indifference. . . . In consequence of the infirm state of Charles II. of Spain, he had secretly concluded with the emperor Leopold an 'eventual' treaty of partition of the Spanish monarchy on the expected death of that prince, and thus had already bound himself by treaty to do the very thing which it was the object of the allied powers to effect. . . . The intervention of the emperor, in consequence of the eventual treaty, put an end to the hesitation of the Spanish cabinet; the ambassadors of the several powers met at Aix-la-Chapelle [April–May, 1668]; Spain made her choice; the conquered towns in Flanders were ceded to Louis, and peace was re-established between the two crowns. . . . The States could ill dissemble their disappointment. They never doubted that Spain, with the choice in her hands, would preserve Flanders, and part with Franche-comté. . . . The result was owing, it is said, to the resentment of Castel-Rodrigo [the governor of the Spanish Netherlands], who, finding that the States would not join with England to confine France within its ancient limits, resolved to punish them by making a cession, which brought the French frontier to the very neighbourhood of the Dutch territory."—J. Lingard, *Hist. of Eng.*, *v.* 11, *ch.* 6.—"Dr. Lingard, who is undoubtedly a very able and well-informed writer, but whose great fundamental rule of judging seems to be that the popular opinion on a historical question cannot possibly be correct, speaks very slightingly of this celebrated treaty [of the Triple Alliance] . . . But grant that Louis was not really stopped in his progress by this famous league: still it is certain that the world then, and long after, believed that he was so stopped; and that this was the prevailing impression in France as well as in other countries. Temple, therefore, at the very least, succeeded in raising the credit of his country, and lowering the credit of a rival power."—Lord Macaulay, *Sir William Temple* (*Essays*).

ALSO IN: O. Airy, *The Eng. Restoration and Louis XIV., ch.* 14—Sir W. Temple, *Letters, Jan.* 1668 (*Works, v.* 1).—L. von Ranke, *Hist. of Eng., 17th Century, bk.* 15, *ch.* 4 (*v.* 3).—A. F Pontalis, *John de Witt, ch.* 7 (*v.* 1).

(Holland): A. D. 1670.—Betrayed to France by the English king. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1668–1670.

(Holland): A. D. 1672-1674.—The war with France and England.—Murder of the De Witts.—Restoration of the Stadtholdership.—"The storm that had been prepared in secret for Holland began to break in 1672. France and England had declared war at once by land and sea, without any cause of quarrel, except that Louis declared that the Dutch insulted him, and Charles complained that they would not lower their flag to his, and that they refused the Stadtholdership to his nephew, William of Orange. Accordingly, his fleet made a piratical attack on the Dutch ships returning from Smyrna, and Louis, with an immense army, entered Holland. . . . They [the French] would have attempted the passage of the Yssel, but the Dutch forces, under the Prince of Orange, were on the watch, and turned towards the Rhine, which was so low, in consequence of a drouth, that 2,000 adventurous cavalry were able to cross, half wading, half swimming, and gained a footing on the other side." This "passage of the Rhine" was absurdly celebrated as a great military exploit by the servile flatterers of the French king. "The passage thus secured, the King crossed the river the next day on a bridge of boats, and rapidly overran the adjoining country, taking the lesser towns, and offering to the Republic the most severe terms, destructive of their independence, but securing the nominal

Stadtholdership to the Prince of Orange. The magistrates of Amsterdam had almost decided on carrying the keys to Louis, and the Grand Pensionary himself was ready to yield; but William, who preferred ruling a free people by their own choice to being imposed on them by the conqueror, still maintained that perseverance would save Holland, that her dykes, when opened, would admit floods that the enemy could not resist, and that they had only to be firm. The spirit of the people was with him, and in Amsterdam, Dordrecht, and the other cities, there were risings with loud outcries of 'Orange boven,' Up with Orange, insisting that he should be appointed Stadtholder. The magistracy confirmed the choice, but Cornelius de Witt, too firm to yield to a popular cry, refused to sign the appointment, and thus drew on himself the rage of the people. He was arrested under an absurd accusation of having bribed a man to assassinate the Prince, and . . . [after torture] was sentenced to exile, whereupon his brother [the Grand Pensionary] announced that he should accompany him; but while he was with him in his prison at [the Hague], the atrocious mob again arose [Aug. 20, 1672], broke open the doors, and, dragging out the two brothers, absolutely tore them limb from limb."—C. M. Yonge, *Landmarks of Hist., pt.* 3, *ch.* 4, *pt.* 6.—The Prince of Orange, profiting by the murder of the De Witts, rewarded the murderers, and is smirched by the deed, whether primarily responsible for it or not; but the power which it secured to him was used ably for Holland. The dykes had already been cut, on the 18th of June, and "the sea poured in, placing a waste of water between Louis and Amsterdam, and the province of Holland at least was saved. The citizens worked with the intensest energy to provide for their defence. . . . Every fourth man among the peasantry was enlisted; mariners and gunners were drawn from the fleet." Meantime, on the 7th of June, the fleet itself, under De Ruyter, had been victorious, in Southwold Bay, or Solebay, over the united fleets of England and France. The victory was indecisive, but it paralyzed the allied navy for a season, and prevented a contemplated descent on Zealand. "All active military operations against Holland were now necessarily at an end. There was not a Dutch town south of the inundation which was not in the hands of the French; and nothing remained for the latter but to lie idle until the ice of winter should enable them to cross the floods which cut them off from Amsterdam. Leaving Turenne in command, Louis therefore returned to St. Germain on August 1." Before winter came, however, the alarm of Europe at Louis' aggressions had brought about a coalition of the Emperor Leopold and the Elector of Brandenburg, to succor the Dutch States. Louis was forced to call Turenne with 16,000 men to Westphalia and Condé with 17,000 to Alsace. "On September 12 the Austrian general Montecuculi, the Duke of Lorraine, and the Grand Elector effected their junction, intending to cross the Rhine and join William;" but Turenne, by a series of masterly movements, forced them to retreat, utterly baffled, into Franconia and Halberstadt. The Elector of Brandenburg, discouraged, withdrew from the alliance, and made peace with Louis, June 6, 1673. The spring of 1673 found the French king advantageously situated, and his advantages were improved. Turning on the Spaniards in their Belgian Netherlands, he laid siege to the important stronghold of Maestricht and it was taken for him by the skill of Vauban, on the 30th of June. But while this success was being scored, the Dutch, at sea, had frustrated another attempt of the Anglo-French fleet to land troops on the Zealand coast. On the 7th of June, and again on the 14th, De Ruyter and Van Tromp fought off the invaders, under Prince Rupert and D'Estrees, driving them back to the Thames. Once more, and for the last time, they made their attempt, on the 21st of August, and were beaten in a battle near the Zealand shore which lasted from daylight until dark. The end of August found a new coalition against Louis formed by treaties between Holland, Spain, the Emperor and the Duke of Lorraine. A little later, the Prince of Orange, after capturing Naarden, effected a junction near Bonn with Montecuculi, who had evaded Turenne. The Electors of Trèves and Mayence thereupon joined the coalition and Cologne and Munster made peace. By this time, public opinion in England had become so angrily opposed to the war that Charles was forced to arrange terms of peace with Holland, notwithstanding his engagements with Louis. The tide was now turning fast against France. Denmark had joined the coalition. In March it received the Elector Palatine; in April the Dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg came into the league; in May the Emperor procured from the Diet a declaration of war in the name of the Empire, and on the 1st of July the Elector of Brandenburg cast in his lot once more with the enemies of France. To effectually meet this new league of his foes, Louis resolved with heroic promptitude to abandon his conquests in the Netherlands. Maestricht and Grave, alone, of the places he had taken, were retained. But Holland still refused to make peace on the terms which the French king proposed, and held her ground in the league.—O. Airy, *The Eng. Restoration and Louis XIV., ch.* 19.

Also in: F. P. Guizot, *Hist. of France, ch.* 44 (*v.* 5).—C. D. Yonge, *Hist. of France under the Bourbons, ch.* 15 (*v.* 2).—A. F. Pontalis, *John de Witt, ch.* 12–14 (*v.* 2).—Sir W. Temple, *Memoirs, pt.* 2 (*works, v.* 2).—See, also, New York: A. D. 1673.

(Holland): A. D. 1673.—Reconquest of New Netherland from the English. See New York: A. D. 1673.

(The Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1673-1678.—Fresh conquests by Louis XIV. See Netherlands (Holland): A. D. 1672–1674, and 1674–1678; also, Nimeguen, Peace of.

(Holland): A. D. 1674.—The Treaty of Westminster.—Peace with England.—Relinquishment of New Netherland.—An offer from the Dutch to restore New Netherland to England "was extorted from the necessities of the republic, and its engagement with Spain. With the consent of the States General, the Spanish ambassador offered advantageous articles to the British government. Charles, finding that Louis refused him further supplies, and that he could not expect any from Parliament, replied that he was willing to accept reasonable conditions. . . . Sir William Temple was summoned from his retirement, and instructed to confer with the Spanish ambassador at London, the Marquis del Fresno, to whom the States General had sent full powers. In three days all the points were arranged, and a treaty

was signed at Westminster [February 19, 1674] by Arlington and four other commissioners on the part of Great Britain, and by Fresno on the part of the United Netherlands. The honor of the flag, which had been refused by De Witt, was yielded to England, the Treaty of Breda was revived; the rights of neutrals guaranteed; and the commercial principles of the Triple Alliance renewed. By the sixth article it was covenanted that 'all lands, islands, cities, havens, castles and fortresses, which have been or shall be taken by one party from the other, during the time of this last unhappy war, whether in Europe or elsewhere, and before the expiration of the times above limited for the duration of hostilities, shall be restored to the former Lord and Proprietor in the same condition they shall be in at the time that this peace shall be proclaimed.' This article restored New Netherland to the King of Great Britain. The Treaty of Breda had ceded it to him on the principle of 'uti possidetis.' The Treaty of Westminster gave it back to him on the principle of reciprocal restitution. Peace was soon proclaimed at London and at the Hague. The treaty of Westminster delivered the Dutch from fear of Charles, and cut off the right arm of Louis, their more dreaded foe. England, on her part, slipped out of a disastrous war. . . . By the treaty of Westminster the United Provinces relinquished their conquest of New Netherland to the King of England. The sovereign Dutch States General had treated directly with Charles as sovereign. A question at once arose at Whitehall about the subordinate interest of the Duke of York. It was claimed by some that James's former American proprietorship was revived. . . . The opinion of counsel having been taken, they advised that the duke's proprietorship had been extinguished by the Dutch conquest, and that the king was now alone seized of New Netherland, by virtue of the Treaty of Westminster. . . . A new patent to the Duke of York was therefore sealed. By it the king again conveyed to his brother the territories he had held before, and granted him anew the absolute powers of government he had formerly enjoyed over British subjects, with the like additional authority over 'any other person or persons' inhabiting his province. Under the same description of boundaries, New Jersey, and all the territory west of the Connecticut River, together with Long Island and the adjacent islands, and the region of Pemaquid, were again included in the grant. The new patent did not, as has been commonly, but erroneously stated, 'recite and confirm the former.' It did not in any way allude to that instrument. It read as if no previous English patent had ever existed. . . . As his colonial lieutenant and deputy, the duke, almost necessarily, appointed Major Edmund Andros, whom the king had directed in the previous March to receive New Netherland from the Dutch."—J. R. Brodhead, *History of the State of New York, v.* 2, *ch.* 5–6.

(Holland): A. D. 1674-1678. — Continued war of the Coalition against France.—"The enemies of France everywhere took courage. . . . Louis XIV. embraced with a firm glance the whole position, and, well advised by Turenne, clearly took his resolution. He understood the extreme difficulty of preserving his conquests, and the facility moreover of making others more profitable, while defending his own frontier. To evacuate Holland, to indemnify himself at the expense of Spain, and to endeavor to treat separately with Holland while continuing the war against the House of Austria,—such was the new plan adopted; an excellent plan, the very wisdom of which condemned so much the more severely the war with Holland. . . . The places of the Zuyder Zee were evacuated in the course of December by the French and the troops of Münster. . . . The evacuation of the United Provinces was wholly finished by spring. . . . Louis resolved to conquer Franche Comté in person; while Turenne covered Alsace and Lorraine, Schomberg went to defend Roussillon, and Condé labored to strengthen the French positions on the Meuse, by sweeping the enemy from the environs of Liege and Maestricht. On the ocean, the defensive was preserved." Louis entered Franche-Comté at the beginning of May with a small army of 8,000 infantry and 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry, but with Vauban, the great master of sieges, to do his serious work for him. A small corps had been sent into the country in February, and had already taken Gray, Vesoul and Lons-le-Saulnier. Besançon was now reduced by a short siege; Dole surrendered soon afterward, and early in July the subjugation of the province was complete "The second conquest of Franche-Comté had cost a little more trouble than the first; but it was definitive. The two Burgundies were no more to be separated, and France was never again to lose her frontier of the Jura. . . . The allies, from the beginning of the year, had projected a general attack against France. They had debated among themselves the design of introducing two great armies, one from Belgium into Champagne, the other from Germany into Alsace and Lorraine; the Spaniards were to invade Roussillon; lastly, the Dutch fleet was to threaten the coasts of France and attempt some enterprise there. The tardiness of the Germanic diet to declare itself" frustrated the first of these plans. Condé, occupying a strong position near Charleroi, from which the allies could not draw him, took quick advantage of an imprudent movement which they made, and routed them by a fierce attack, at the village of Seneffe (Aug. 11, 1674). But William of Orange rallied the flying forces—Dutch, German and Spanish now fighting side by side—so successfully that Condé was repulsed with terrible loss in the end, when he attempted to make his victory complete. The battle was maintained, by the light of the moon, until midnight, and both armies withdrew next morning, badly crippled. Turenne meantime, in June, had crossed the Rhine at Philippsburg and encountered the Imperialists, on the 16th, near Sinsheim, defeated them there and driven them beyond the Neckar. The following month, he again crossed the river and inflicted upon the Palatinate the terrible destruction which made it for the time being a desert, and which is the black blot on the fame of the great soldier. "Turenne ordered his troops to consume and waste cattle, forage, and harvests, so that the enemy's army, when it returned in force, as he foresaw it would do, could find nothing whereon to subsist." In September the city of Strasburg opened its gates to the Imperialists and gave them the control of its fortified bridge, crossing the Rhine. Turenne, hastening to prevent the disaster, but arriving too

late, attacked his enemies, Oct. 4, at the village of Ensisheim and gained an inconclusive victory. Then followed, before the close of the year, the most famous of the military movements of Turenne. The allies having been heavily reinforced, he retired before them into Lorraine, meeting and gathering up reinforcements of his own as he moved. Then, when he had completely deceived them as to his intentions, he traversed the whole length of the Vosges with his army, in December, and appeared suddenly at Belfort, finding their forces scattered and entirely unprepared. Defeating them at Mülhausen December 29, and again at Colmar, January 5, he expelled them from Alsace, and offered to Strasburg the renewal of its neutrality, which the anxious city was glad to accept. "Thus ended this celebrated campaign, the most glorious, perhaps, presented in the military history of ancient France. None offers higher instruction in the study of the great art of war." In the campaign of 1675, which opened in May, Turenne was confronted by Montecuculi, and the two masterly tacticians became the players of a game which has been the wonder of military students ever since. "Like two valiant athletes struggling foot to foot without either being able to overthrow the other, Turenne and Montecuculi manœuvred for six weeks in the space of a few square leagues [in the canton of Ortnau, Swabia] without succeeding in forcing each other to quit the place." At length, on the 27th of July, Turenne found an opportunity to attack his opponent with advantage, in the defile of Salsbach, and was just completing his preparations to do so, when a cannon-ball from one of the enemy's batteries struck him instantly dead. His two lieutenants, who succeeded to the command, could not carry out his plans, but fought a useless bloody battle at Altenheim and nearly lost their army before retreating across the Rhine. Condé was sent to replace Turenne. Before he arrived, Strasburg had again given its bridge to the Imperialists and they were in possession of Lower Alsace; but no important operations were undertaken during the remainder of the year. In other parts of the wide war field the French suffered disaster. Marshal de Créqui, commanding on the Moselle, was badly defeated at Konsaarbrück, August 11, and Trèves, which he defended, was lost a few weeks later. The Swedes, also, making a diversion in the north, as allies of France, were beaten back, at Fehrbellin—see SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1644–1697. But next year (1676) Louis recovered all his prestige. His navy, under the command of Duquesne and Tourville, fought the Dutch and Spaniards on equal terms, and defeated them twice in the Mediterranean, on the Sicilian coast. On land the main effort of the French was directed against the Netherlands. Condé, Bouchain and Aire were taken by siege; and Maestricht was successfully defended against Orange, who besieged it for nearly eight weeks. But Philippsburg, the most important French post on the Rhine, was lost, surrendering to the Duke of Lorraine. Early in 1677, Louis renewed his attacks on the Spanish Netherlands and took Valenciennes March 17, Cambrai April 4, and Saint-Omer April 20, defeating the Prince of Orange at Cassel (April 11) when he attempted to relieve the latter place. At the same time Créqui, unable to defend Lower Alsace, destroyed it—burning the villages, leaving the inhabitants to perish—and prevented the allies, who outnumbered him, from making any advance. In November, when they had gone into winter-quarters, he suddenly crossed the Rhine and captured Freiburg. The next spring (1678) operations began early on the side of the French with the siege of Ghent. The city capitulated, March 9, after a short bombardment. The Spanish governor withdrew to the citadel, but "surrendered, on the 11th, that renowned castle built by Charles V to hold the city in check. The city and citadel of Ghent had not cost the French army forty men." Ypres was taken the same month. Serious negotiations were now opened and the Peace of Nimeguen, between France and Holland, was signed August 11, followed early the next year by a general peace. The Prince of Orange, who opposed the peace, fought one bootless but bloody battle at Saint-Denis, near Mons, on the 14th of August, three days after it had been signed.—H. Martin, *Hist. of France: Age of Louis XIV.* (*trans. by M. L. Booth*), *v.* 1, *ch.* 5–6.—"It may be doubted whether Europe has fully realised the greatness of the peril she so narrowly escaped on this occasion. The extinction of political and mental freedom, which would have followed the extinction of the Dutch Republic, would have been one of the most disastrous defeats of the cause of liberty and enlightenment possible in the then condition of the world. . . . The free presses of Holland gave voice to the stifled thought and agony of mankind. And they were the only free presses in the world. But Holland was not only the greatest book mart of Europe, it was emphatically the home of thinkers and the birthplace of ideas. . . . The two men then living to whose genius and courage the modern spirit of mental emancipation and toleration owes its first and most arduous victories were Pierre Bayle and John Locke. And it is beyond dispute that if the French King had worked his will on Holland, neither of them would have been able to accomplish the task they did achieve under the protection of Dutch freedom. They both were forced to seek refuge in Holland from the bigotry which hunted them down in their respective countries. All the works of Bayle were published in Holland, and some of the earliest of Locke's writings appeared there also; and if the remainder saw the light afterwards in England, it is only because the Dutch, by saving their own freedom, were the means of saving that of England as well. . . . At least, no one can maintain that if Holland had been annihilated in 1672, the English revolution could have occurred in the form and at the time it did."—J. C. Morison, *The Reign of Louis XIV.* (*Fortnightly Rev., March*, 1874).

ALSO IN: H. M. Hozier, *Turenne, ch.* 12–13.—T. O. Cockayne, *Life of Turenne.*—Lord Mahon, *Life of Condé, ch.* 12.—See, also, NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF.

(Holland): A. D. 1689.—Invasion of England by the Prince of Orange.—His accession to the English throne. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1688 (JULY—NOVEMBER), to 1689 (JANUARY—FEBRUARY).

(Holland): A. D. 1689–1696.—The War of the League of Augsburg, or the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. See FRANCE: A. D. 1689–1690, to 1695–1696.

(The Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1690-1691.—The Battle of Fleurus and the loss of Mons. See FRANCE: A. D. 1689–1691.

(Holland): A. D. 1692.—The Naval Battle of La Hogue. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1692.

(The Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1692.—The loss of Namur and the Battle of Steenkerke. See FRANCE: A. D. 1692.

(The Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1693.—The Battle of Neerwinden. See FRANCE: A. D. 1693 (JULY).

(The Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1694-1696.—Campaigns without battles.—The recovery of Namur. See FRANCE: A. D. 1694; and 1695–1696.

A. D. 1697.—The Peace of Ryswick.—French conquests restored. See FRANCE: A. D. 1697.

A. D. 1698-1700.—The question of the Spanish Succession.—The Treaties of Partition. See SPAIN: A. D. 1698–1700.

(The Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1701.—Occupied by French troops. See SPAIN: A. D. 1701–1702.

(Holland): A. D. 1702.—The Second Grand Alliance against France and Spain. See SPAIN: A. D. 1701–1702; and ENGLAND: A. D. 1701–1702.

A. D. 1702.—The War of the Spanish Succession: The Expedition to Cadiz.—The sinking of the treasure ships in Vigo Bay. See SPAIN: A. D. 1702.

A. D. 1702-1704.—The War of the Spanish Succession: Marlborough's first campaigns.—"The campaign [of 1702] opened late in the Low Countries, owing, doubtless, to the death of king William. The elector of Bavaria, and his brother the elector of Cologne, took part with France. About the middle of April, the prince of Nassau-Saarbruck invested Keyserwerth, a place belonging to the latter elector, on the Rhine; whilst lord Athlone, with the Dutch army, covered the siege, in pursuance of the advice of lord Marlborough to the states. The place was strong; the French marshal Boufflers made efforts to relieve it; after a vigorous defence, it was carried by assault, with dreadful carnage, about the middle of June. Boufflers, unable to relieve Keyserwerth, made a rapid march to throw himself between Athlone and Nimeguen, with the view to carry that place by surprise; was defeated by a forced and still more rapid march of the Dutch, under Athlone, to cover it; and moved upon Cleves, laying the country waste with wanton barbarity along his line of march. Marlborough now arrived to take the command in chief. It was disputed with him by Athlone, who owed his military rank and the honours of the peerage to the favour of king William. Certain representatives of the states, who attended the army under the name of field deputies, thwarted him by their caution and incompetency; the Prussian and Hanoverian contingents refused to move without the orders of their respective sovereigns. Lord Marlborough, with admirable temper and adroitness, and, doubtless, with the ascendant of his genius, surmounted all these obstacles. The Dutch general cheerfully served under him; the confederates were reconciled to his orders; he crossed the Meuse in pursuit of the French; came within a few leagues of Boufflers' lines; and, addressing the Dutch field deputies who accompanied him, said, in a tone of easy confidence, 'I will now rid you of these troublesome neighbours.' Boufflers accordingly retreated,—abandoning Spanish Guelderland, and exposing Venloo, Ruremonde, and even Liège, which he had made a demonstration to cover. The young duke of Burgundy, grandson of Louis XIV., and elder brother of the king of Spain, had commanded the French army in name. He now returned to Versailles; and Boufflers could only look on, whilst Marlborough successively captured Venloo, Ruremonde, and Liège. The navigation of the Meuse and communication with Maestricht was now wholly free; the Dutch frontier was secure; and the campaign terminated with the close of October. . . . The duke of Marlborough resumed his command in the Low Countries about the middle of spring. He found the French strong and menacing on every side. Marshal Villars had, like Marlborough, fixed the attention of Europe for the first time in the late campaign. He obtained a splendid victory over the prince of Baden at Fredlingen, near the Black Forest. That prince lost 3,000 men, his cannon and the field. . . . Villars opened this year's campaign by taking Kehl, passed through the Black Forest into Bavaria, and formed a junction with the elector; whilst the prince of Baden was kept in check by a French army under marshal Tallard. . . . The imperial general, count Styrum was now moving to join the prince of Baden with 20,000 men. Villars persuaded the elector to cross the Danube and prevent this junction; attacked the imperialists in the plain of Hochstedt near Donawert; and put them to the rout. The capture of Augsburg followed: the road was open to Vienna, and the emperor thought of abandoning the capital. . . . Holland was once more threatened on her frontier. Marshal Villeroi, liberated by exchange, was again at the head of an army, and, in conjunction with Boufflers, commenced operations for recovering the ground and the strong places from which Marlborough had dislodged the French on the Meuse. The campaign had opened at this point of the theatre of war with the capture of Rheinberg. It was taken by the Prussians before the duke of Marlborough arrived. The duke's first operation was the capture of Bonne. He returned to the main army with the view to engage the French under Villeroi. That marshal abandoned his camp, and retired within his lines of defence on the approach of the English general. Marlborough was prevented from attacking the French by the reluctance of the Dutch generals and the positive prohibition of the Dutch field deputies. . . . The only fruit of Marlborough's movement was the easy capture of Huy. Boufflers obtained the slight advantage of surprising and defeating the Dutch general Opdam near Antwerp. Marlborough, still embarrassed by the Dutch field deputies, to whose good intentions and limited views he bowed with a facility which only proves the extent of his superiority, closed the campaign with the acquisition of Limburg and Guelders. . . . In the beginning of . . . [1704] the emperor, threatened by the French and Bavarians in the very capital of the empire, implored aid from the queen; and on the 19th of April, the duke of Marlborough left England to enter upon a campaign memorable for . . . [the] victory of Blenheim. . . . On his arrival at the Hague, he proposed to the states

general to alarm France for her frontier by a movement on the Moselle. Their consent even to this slight hazard for their own security, was not easily obtained. Villeroi, who commanded in Flanders, soon lost sight of him; so rapid or so well masked were his movements; Tallard, who commanded on the Moselle, thought only of protecting the frontier of France; and Marlborough, to the amazement of Europe, whether enemies or allies, passed in rapid succession the Rhine, the Maine, and the Necker. Intercepted letters, and a courier from the prince of Baden, apprised him that the French were about to join the Bavarians through the defiles of the Black Forest, and march upon Vienna. He now threw off the mask, sent a courier to the states, acquainting them that he was marching to the succour of the empire by order of the queen of England, and trusted they would permit their troops to share the glory of his enterprise. The pensionary Heinsius alone was in his confidence; and the states, though taken by surprise, conveyed to him their sanction and confidence with the best grace. He met Prince Eugene for the first time at Mindlesheim. Marlborough and Eugene are henceforth associated in the career of war and victory."— Sir J. Mackintosh, *The Hist. of England, v.* 9, *ch.* 4.

Also in: L. Creighton, *Life of Marlborough, ch.* 6-7.— G. Saintsbury, *Marlborough, ch.* 5.— W. Coxe, *Memoirs of Marlborough, ch.* 11-22 (*v.* 1).—J. H. Burton, *Hist. of the Reign of Queen Anne, ch.* 5-6 (*v.* 1).—See, also, Germany: A. D. 1702, and 1703.

(Holland): A. D. 1704.—The War of the Spanish Succession: The campaign on the Danube and victory at Blenheim. See Germany: A. D. 1704.

A. D. 1705.—The War of the Spanish Succession: A campaign spoiled.—After his campaign in Bavaria, with its great victory on the field of Blenheim (see Germany: A. D. 1704), Marlborough passed the winter in England and returned in the spring of 1705 to the Low Countries, where he had planned to lead, again, the campaign of the year. Prince Eugene was now in Italy, and the jealous, incapable Prince Louis of Baden, commanding the German army, was the coadjutor on whom he must depend. The latter assented to Marlborough's plans and promised co-operation. The Dutch generals and deputies also were reluctantly brought over to his views, which contemplated an invasion of France on the side of the Moselle. "Slight as were the hopes of any effective co-operation which Prince Louis gave, they were much more than he accomplished. When the time came he declared himself sick, threw up his command and set off to drink the waters of Schlangenbad. Count de Frise whom he named in his place brought to Marlborough only a few ragged battalions and, moreover, like his principal, showed himself most jealous of the English chief. . . . Marlborough nevertheless took the field and even singly desired to give battle. But positive instructions from Versailles precluded Villars [the commander of the French] from engaging. He intrenched himself in an extremely strong position at Sirk, where it was impossible for an inferior army to assail him. And while the war was thus unprosperous on the Moselle, there came adverse tidings from the Meuse. Marshal Villeroy had suddenly resumed the offensive, had reduced the fortress of Huy, had entered the city and invested the citadel of Liege." Marlborough, on this news, being applied to for immediate aid by the Dutch General Overkirk — the ablest and best of his colleagues — "set out the very next day on his march to Liege, leaving only a sufficient force as he hoped for the security of Treves." Villeroy "at once relinquished his design upon the citadel of Liege and fell back in the direction of Tongres, so that Marlborough and Overkirk effected their junction with ease. Marlborough took prompt measures to re-invest the fortress of Huy, and compelled it to surrender on the 11th of July. Applying his mind to the new sphere before him, Marlborough saw ground to hope that, with the aid of the Dutch troops, he might still make a triumphant campaign. The first object was to force the defensive lines that stretched across the country from near Namur to Antwerp, protected by numerous fortified posts and covered in other places by rivers and morasses, . . . now defended by an army of at least 60,000 men, under Marshal Villeroy and the Elector of Bavaria. Marlborough laid his plans before Generals Overkirk and Slangenberg as also those civilian envoys whom the States were wont to commission at their armies. But he found to his sorrow that for jealousy and slowness a Dutch deputy was fully a match for a German Margrave." He obtained with great difficulty a nominal assent to his plans, and began the execution of them; but in the very midst of his operations, and when one division of the Dutch troops had successfully crossed the river Dyle, General Slangenberg and the deputies suddenly drew back and compelled a retreat. Then Marlborough's "fertile genius devised another scheme — to move round the sources of the river [Dyle] and to threaten Brussels from the southern side. . . . On the 15th of August he began his march, as did also Overkirk in a parallel direction, and in two days they reached Genappe near the sources of the Dyle. There uniting in one line of battle they moved next morning towards Brussels by the main chaussée, or great paved road; their head-quarters that day being fixed at Frischermont, near the borders of the forest of Soignies. On the French side the Elector and Villeroy, observing the march of the allies, had made a corresponding movement of their own for the protection of the capital. They encamped behind the small stream of the Ische, their right and rear being partly covered by the forest. Only the day before they had been joined by Marsin from the Rhine, and they agreed to give battle sooner than yield Brussels. One of their main posts was at Waterloo. . . . It is probable, had a battle now ensued, that it would have been fought on the same, or nearly the same ground as was the memorable conflict a hundred and ten years afterwards. . . . But the expected battle did not take place." Once more the Dutch deputies and General Slangenberg interfered, refusing to permit their troops to engage; so that Marlborough was robbed of the opportunity for winning a victory which he confidently declared would have been greater than Blenheim. This practically ended the campaign of the year, which had been ruined and wasted throughout by the stupidity, the cowardice and the jealousies of the Dutch deputies and the general who counselled them.— Earl Stanhope, *Hist. of Eng.: Reign of Queen Anne, ch.* 6.—In Spain, a campaign of more

brilliancy was carried on by Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, in Catalonia. See SPAIN: A. D. 1705.

A. D. 1706-1707.—The War of the Spanish Succession: The Battle of Ramillies and its results.—"The campaign of 1706 was begun unusually late by Marlborough, his long stay on the Continent in the winter and his English political business detaining him in London till the end of April, and when he finally landed at the Hague his plans were still coloured by the remembrance of the gratuitous and intolerable hindrances which he had met with from his allies. . . . He had made up his mind to operate with Eugene in Italy, which, if he had done, there would probably have been seen what has not been seen for nearly two thousand years—a successful invasion of France from the south-east. But the kings of Prussia and Denmark, and others of the allies whom Marlborough thought he had propitiated, were as recalcitrant as the Dutch, and the vigorous action of Villars against the Margrave of Baden made the States-General more than ever reluctant to lose their sword and shield. So Marlborough was condemned to action on his old line of the Dyle, and this time fortune was less unkind to him. Secret overtures were made which induced him to threaten Namur, and as Namur was of all posts in the Low Countries that to which the French attached most importance, both on sentimental and strategical grounds, Villeroy was ordered to abandon the defensive policy which he had for nearly two years been forced to maintain, and to fight at all hazards. Accordingly the tedious operations which had for so long been pursued in this quarter were exchanged at once for a vigorous offensive and defensive, and the two generals, Villeroy with rather more than 60,000 men, Marlborough with that number or a little less, came to blows at Ramillies (a few miles only from the spot where the lines had been forced the year before) on May 23, 1706, or scarcely more than a week after the campaign had begun. Here, as before, the result is assigned by the French to the fault of the general. . . . The battle itself was one completely of generalship, and of generalship as simple as it was masterly. It was in defending his position, not in taking it up, that Villeroy lost the battle. . . . Thirteen thousand of the French and Bavarians were killed, wounded, and taken, and the loss of the allies, who had been throughout the attacking party, was not less than 4,000 men. . . . The Dutch, who bore the burden of the attack on Ramillies, had the credit of the day's fighting on the allied side, as the Bavarian horse had on that of the French. In hardly any of Marlborough's operations had he his hands so free as at Ramillies, and in none did he carry off a completer victory. . . . The strong places of Flanders fell before the allied army like ripe fruit. Brussels surrendered and was occupied on the fourth day after the battle, May 28. Louvain and Malines had fallen already. The French garrison precipitately left Ghent, and the Duke entered it on June 2. Oudenarde came in next day; Antwerp was summoned, expelled the French part of its garrison, and capitulated on September 7. And a vigorous siege in less than a month reduced Ostend, reputed one of the strongest places in Europe. In six weeks from the battle of Ramillies not a French soldier remained in a district which the day before that battle had been occupied by a network of the strongest fortresses and a field army of 80,000 men. The strong places on the Lys and the Dender, tributaries of the Scheldt, gave more trouble, and Menin, a small but very important position, cost nearly half the loss of Ramillies before it could be taken. But it fell, as well as Dendermonde and Ath, and nothing but the recrudescence of Dutch obstruction prevented Marlborough from finishing the campaign with the taking of Mons, almost the last place of any importance held by the French north of their own frontier, as that frontier is now understood But the difficulties of all generals are said to begin on the morrow of victory, and certainly the saying was true in Marlborough's case . . . The Dutch were, before all things, set on a strong barrier or zone of territory, studded with fortresses in their own keeping, between themselves and France: the Emperor naturally objected to the alienation of the Spanish-Austrian Netherlands. The barrier disputes were for years the greatest difficulty which Marlborough had to contend with abroad, and the main theme of the objections to the war made by the adverse party at home. . . . It was in the main due, no doubt, to these jealousies and hesitations, strengthened by the alarm caused by the loss of the battle of Almanza in Spain, and by the threatened invasion of Germany under Villars, that made the campaign of 1707 an almost wholly inactive one. . . . The campaign of this year is almost wholly barren of any military operations interesting to anyone but the mere annalist of tactics."—G. Saintsbury, *Marlborough, ch.* 6.—In Spain, several sharp changes of fortune during two years terminated in a disastrous defeat of the allies at Almanza in April, 1707, by the Duke of Berwick. See SPAIN: A. D. 1706 and 1707; see, also, GERMANY: A. D. 1706-1711.—Earl Stanhope, *Hist. of Eng.: Reign of Queen Anne, ch.* 7 *and* 9.

A. D. 1708-1709.—The War of the Spanish Succession: Oudenarde and Malplaquet.—To the great satisfaction of Marlborough, Prince Eugene of Savoy was sent by the Emperor to co operate with him, in the spring of 1708. The two generals met in April to discuss plans; after which Eugene returned into Germany to gather up the various contingents that would compose his army. He encountered many difficulties and delays, and was unable to bring his forces to the field until July. Marlborough, meantime, had been placed in a critical situation. "For whilst the English commander and Eugene had formed the plan to unite and overwhelm Vendôme, the Court of Versailles had, on its side, contemplated the despatch of a portion of the Army of the Rhine, commanded by the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Berwick, so to reinforce Vendôme that he might overwhelm Marlborough, and Berwick was actually on his march to carry out his portion of the plan." Prince Eugene crossed the Moselle on the 28th June, "reached Düren the 3rd July, and learning there that affairs were critical, hastened with an escort of Hussars, in advance of his army, to Brussels. On his arrival there, the 6th, he learned that the French had attacked and occupied the city of Ghent, and were then besieging the castle." The two commanders having met at Assche, to concert their movements, made haste to throw "a

reinforcement into the fortress of Oudenarde, then besieged by the French; and, convinced now that the conquest of that fortress by Vendôme would give him an unassailable position, they pushed forward their troops with all diligence to save it. The two armies united on the 8th. On the 9th they set out for Oudenarde, and crossed the Dender on the 10th. Before daybreak of the 11th Marlborough despatched General Cadogan with a strong corps to the Scheldt, to throw bridges over that river near Oudenarde and to reconnoitre the enemy. The main army followed at 7 o'clock." In the battle which ensued, Vendôme was hampered by the equal authority of the Duke of Burgundy—the king's grandson—who would not concur with his plans. "One after another the positions occupied by the French soldiers were carried. Then these took advantage of the falling night to make a retreat as hurried and disorderly as their defence had been wanting in tenacity. In no pitched battle, indeed, have the French soldiers less distinguished themselves than at Oudenarde. Fighting under a divided leadership, they were fighting virtually without leadership, and they knew it. The Duke of Burgundy contributed as much as either Marlborough or Eugene to gain the battle of Oudenarde for the Allies." The French army, losing heavily in the retreat, was rallied finally at Ghent. "The Allies, meanwhile, prepared to take advantage of their victory. They were within a circle commanded by three hostile fortresses, Ypres, Lille, and Tournay. After some consideration it was resolved, on the proposition of Eugene, that Lille should be besieged." The siege of Lille, the capital of French Flanders, fortified by the utmost skill and science of Vauban, and held by a garrison of 10,000 men under Marshal Boufflers, was a formidable undertaking. The city was invested on the 13th of August, and defended heroically by the garrison; but Vendôme, who would have attacked the besiegers, was paralyzed by the royal youth who shared his command. Lille, the town, was surrendered on the 22d of October and its citadel on the 9th of December. The siege of Ghent followed, and the capitulation of that city, on the 2d of January, 1709, closed the campaign. "The winter of 1709 was spent mainly in negotiations. Louis XIV. was humiliated, and he offered peace on terms which the Allies would have done well to accept." Their demands, however, rose too high, and the war went on. "It had been decided that the campaign in the Netherlands should be continued under the same skilful generals who had brought that of 1708 to so successful an issue. . . . On the 23rd of [June] . . . the allied army, consisting of 110,000 men, was assembled between Courtray and Menin. Marlborough commanded the left wing, about 70,000 strong; Eugene the right, about 40,000. Louis, on his side, had made extraordinary efforts. But even with these he had been able to put in the field an army only 80,000 strong [under Marshal Villars]. . . . Villars had occupied a position between Douai and the Lys, and had there thrown up lines, in the strengthening of which he found daily employment for his troops." Not venturing to attack the French army in its strong position, Marlborough and Eugene began operations by laying siege to Tournay. The town was yielded to them on the 30th of July and the citadel on the 3d of September. They next turned their attention to Mons, which the French thought it necessary to save at any cost. The attempt which the latter made to drive the allied army from the position it had gained between themselves and Mons had its outcome in the terribly bloody battle of Malplaquet—"the bloodiest known till then in modern history. The loss of the victors was greater than that of the vanquished. That of the former amounted to from 18,000 to 20,000 men; the French admitted a loss of 7,000, but German writers raise it to 15,000. Probably it did not exceed 11,000. . . . The results . . . were in no way proportionate to its cost. The French army retreated in good order, taking with it all its impedimenta, to a new position as strong as the former. There, under Berwick, who was sent to replace Villars, it watched the movements of the Allies. These resumed, indeed, the siege of Mons [which surrendered on the 20th of October]. . . . But this was the solitary result of the victory."—Col. G. B. Malleson, *Prince Eugene of Savoy, ch.* 10-11.

Also in: W. Coxe, *Memoirs of Marlborough, ch.* 66-83 (*v.* 4-5).—H. Martin, *Hist. of France: Age of Louis XIV.* (*tr. by M. L. Booth*), *v.* 2, *ch.* 5-6.—J. W. Gerard, *Peace of Utrecht, ch.* 17-19.

(Holland): A. D. 1709.—The Barrier Treaty with England. See England: A. D. 1709.

A. D. 1710-1712.—The War of the Spanish Succession: The last campaigns of Marlborough.—"As soon as it became clear that the negotiations [at Gertruydenberg] would lead to nothing, Eugene and Marlborough at once began the active business of the campaign. . . . Marlborough began . . . with the siege of Douai, the possession of which would be of the greatest importance to him. . . . In spite of Villars' boasts the French were unable to prevent the capture of Douai. . . . The campaign of 1710 was full of disappointment to Marlborough. He had hoped to carry the war into the heart of France. But after Douai fell, Villars so placed his army that [Marlborough] . . . was obliged to content himself with the capture of Bethune, St. Venant, and Aire. Heavy rains and a great deal of illness among his troops prevented further operations. Besides this, his energy was somewhat paralysed by the changes which had taken place in England," where the Duchess of Marlborough and the Whig party had lost the favor of the Queen, and the Tory opponents of Marlborough and the war had come into power.—L. Creighton, *Life of Marlborough, ch.* 15-16.—"In 1711, in a complicated series of operations round Arras, Marlborough, who was now alone, Eugene having been recalled to Vienna, completely outgeneraled Villars and broke through his lines. But he did not fight, and the sole result of the campaign was the capture of Bouchain at the cost of some 16,000 men, while no serious impression was made on the French system of defence. . . . Lille had cost 14,000; Tournay a number not exactly mentioned, but very large; the petty place of Aire 7,000. How many, malcontent Englishmen might well ask themselves, would it cost before Arras, Cambrai, Hesdin, Calais, Namur, and all the rest of the fortresses that studded the country, could be expected to fall? . . . Marlborough had himself, so to speak, spoilt his audience. He had given them four great vic-

tories in a little more than five years; it was perhaps unreasonable, but certainly not unnatural, that they should grow fretful when he gave them none during nearly half the same time. . . . The expense of the war was frightening men of all classes in England, and, independently of the more strictly political considerations, . . . it will be seen that there was some reason for wishing Marlborough anywhere but on or near the field of battle. He was got rid of none too honourably; restrictions were put upon his successor Ormond which were none too honourable either; and when Villars, freed from his invincible antagonist, had inflicted a sharp defeat upon Eugene at Denain, the military situation was changed from one very much in favour of the allies to one slightly against them, and so contributed beyond all doubt to bring about the Peace of Utrecht."—G. Saintsbury, *Marlborough. ch.* 7.

Also in: G. B. Malleson, *Prince Eugene of Savoy, ch.* 12.—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 3, *ch.* 11 (*v.* 3).—See, also, England: A. D. 1710–1712.

A. D. 1713-1714.—The Treaties of Utrecht. —Cession of the Spanish Provinces to the House of Austria.—Barrier towns secured. See Utrecht: A. D. 1712–1714.

(Holland): A. D. 1713-1715.—Second Barrier Treaty with England.—Barrier arrangements with France and the Emperor. — Connected with the other arrangements concluded in the treaties negotiated at Utrecht, the States, in 1713, signed a new Barrier Treaty with England, "annulling that of 1709, and providing that the Emperor Charles should be sovereign of the Netherlands [heretofore the 'Spanish Provinces,' but now become the 'Austrian Provinces'], which, neither in the whole nor in the part, should ever be possessed by France. The States, on their side, were bound to support, if required, the succession of the Electress of Hanover to the throne of England. . . . By the treaty concluded between France and the States, it was agreed that . . . the towns of Menin, Tournay, Namur, Ypres, with Warneton, Poperingen, Comines and Werwyk, Furnes, Dixmuyde, and the fort of Knokke, were to be ceded to the States, as a barrier, to be held in such a manner as they should afterwards agree upon with the Emperor." In the subsequent arrangement, concluded with the Emperor in 1715, "he permitted the boundary on the side of Flanders to be fixed in a manner highly satisfactory to the States, who sought security rather than extent of dominion. By the possession of Namur they commanded the passage of the Sambre and Meuse; Tournay ensured the navigation of the Scheldt; Menin and Warneton protected the Leye; while Ypres and the fort of Knokke kept open the communication with Furnes, Nieuport and Dunkirk. . . . Events proved the barrier, so earnestly insisted upon, to have been wholly insufficient as a means of defence to the United Provinces, and scarcely worth the labour and cost of its maintenance."—C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, ch.* 11 (*v.* 3)

(Holland): A. D. 1713-1725.—Continued Austro-Spanish troubles.—The Triple Alliance.—The Quadruple Alliance.—The Alliance of Hanover. See Spain: A. D. 1713–1725; also, Italy: A. D. 1715–1785.

(Holland): A. D. 1729-1731.—The Treaty of Seville.—The second Treaty of Vienna.—The Ostend Company abolished. See Spain: A. D. 1726–1731.

(Holland): A. D. 1731-1740.—The question of the Austrian Succession.—Guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. See Austria: A. D. 1718–1738; and 1740.

(Holland): A. D. 1740-1741.—Beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession. See Austria: A. D. 1740–1741.

(Holland): A. D. 1743.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Dutch Subsidies and Troops. See Austria: A. D. 1743; and 1743–1744.

(Austrian Provinces): A. D. 1744.—Invasion by the French. See Austria: A. D. 1743–1744.

(The Austrian Provinces): A. D. 1745.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Battle of Fontenoy.—French conquests.— In the spring of 1745, while events in the second Silesian War were still threatening to Frederick the Great (see Austria: A. D. 1744–1745), his allies, the French, though indifferent to his troubles, were doing better for themselves in the Netherlands. They had given to Marshal de Saxe who commanded there, an army of 76,000 excellent troops. "As to the Allies, England had furnished her full contingent of 28,000 men, but Holland less than half of the 50,000 she had stipulated, there were but eight Austrian squadrons, and the whole body scarcely exceeded 50,000 fighting men. The nominal leader was the young Duke of Cumberland, but subject in a great measure to the control of an Austrian veteran, Marshal Konigsegg, and obliged to consult the Dutch commander, Prince de Waldeck. Against these inferior numbers and divided councils the French advanced in full confidence of victory, and, after various movements to distract the attention of the Allies, suddenly, on the 1st of May, invested Tournay. . . . To relieve this important city, immediately became the principal object with the Allies; and the States, usually so cautious, nay, timorous in their suggestions, were now as eager in demanding battle. . . . On the other hand, the Mareschal de Saxe made most skilful dispositions to receive them. Leaving 15,000 infantry to cover the blockade of Tournay, he drew up the rest of his army, a few miles further, in an excellent position, which he strengthened with numerous works; and his soldiers were inspirited by the arrival of the King and Dauphin, who had hastened from Paris to join in the expected action. The three allied generals, on advancing against the French, found them encamped on some gentle heights, with the village of Antoin and the river Scheldt on their right, Fontenoy and a narrow valley in their front, and a small wood named Barré on their left The passage of the Scheldt, and, if needful, a retreat, were secured by the bridge of Calonne in the rear, by a tête de pont, and by a reserve of the Household Troops. Abbatis were constructed in the wood of Barré; redoubts between Antoin and Fontenoy; and the villages themselves had been carefully fortified and garrisoned. The narrow space between Fontenoy and Barré seemed sufficiently defended by cross fires, and by the natural ruggedness of the ground: in short, as the French officers thought, the strength of the position might bid defiance to the boldest assail-

ant. Nevertheless, the Allied chiefs, who had already resolved on a general engagement, drove in the French piquets and outposts on the 10th of May, New Style, and issued orders for their intended attack at daybreak. . . . At six o'clock on the morning of the 11th, the cannonade began. The Prince of Waldeck, and his Dutch, undertook to carry Antoin and Fontenoy by assault, while the Duke of Cumberland, at the head of the British and Hanoverians, was to advance against the enemy's left. His Royal Highness, at the same time with his own attack, sent General Ingoldsby, with a division, to pierce through the wood of Barré, and storm the redoubt beyond it." Ingoldsby's division and the Dutch troops were both repulsed, and the latter made no further effort. But the British and Hanoverians, leaving their cavalry behind and dragging with them a few field pieces, "plunged down the ravine between Fontenoy and Barré, and marched on against a position which the best Marshals of France had deemed impregnable, and which the best troops of that nation defended. . . . Whole ranks of the British were swept away, at once, by the murderous fire of the batteries on their left and right. Still did their column, diminishing in numbers not in spirit, steadily press forward, repulse several desperate attacks of the French infantry, and gain ground on its position. . . . The battle appeared to be decided: already did Marshal Konigsegg offer his congratulations to the Duke of Cumberland; already had Mareschal de Saxe prepared for retreat, and, in repeated messages, urged the King to consult his safety and withdraw, while it was yet time, beyond the Scheldt." The continued inactivity of the Dutch, however, enabled the French commander to gather his last reserves at the one point of danger, while he brought another battery to bear on the head of the advancing British column. "The British, exhausted by their own exertions, mowed down by the artillery in front, and assailed by the fresh troops in flank, were overpowered. Their column wavered — broke — fell back. . . . In this battle of Fontenoy (for such is the name it has borne), the British left behind a few pieces of artillery, but no standards, and scarce any prisoners but the wounded. The loss in these, and in killed, was given out as 4,041 British, 1,762 Hanoverians, and only 1,544 Dutch; while on their part the French likewise acknowledged above 7,000." As the consequence of the battle of Fontenoy, not only Tournay, but Ghent, likewise, was speedily surrendered to the French. "Equal success crowned similar attempts on Bruges, on Oudenarde, and on Dendermonde, while the allies could only act on the defensive and cover Brussels and Antwerp. The French next directed their arms against Ostend, . . . which . . . yielded in fourteen days. . . . Meanwhile the events in Scotland [the Jacobite rebellion — see SCOTLAND: A. D. 1745-1746] were compelling the British government to withdraw the greater part of their force; and it was only the approach of winter, and the retreat of both armies into quarters, that obtained a brief respite for the remaining fortresses of Flanders."— Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), *Hist. of Eng.*, 1713-1783, *ch.* 26 (*v.* 8).

ALSO IN: F. P. Guizot, *Popular Hist. of France, ch.* 52 (*v.* 6).—J. G. Wilson, *Sketches of Illustrious Soldiers: Saxe.*

A. D. 1746-1747.—The War of the Austrian Succession: French conquest of the Austrian provinces. — Humiliation of Holland. — The Stadtholdership restored.—"In the campaign in Flanders in 1746, the French followed up the successes which they had achieved in the previous year. Brussels, Antwerp, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, and other places successively surrendered to Marshal Saxe and the Prince of Conti. After the capture of Namur in September, Marshal Saxe, reuniting all the French forces, attacked Prince Charles of Lorraine at Raucoux [or Roucoux], between Liége and Viset, and completely defeated him, October 11; after which both sides went into winter quarters. All the country between the Meuse and the sea was now in the power of France, Austria retaining only Luxemburg and Limburg. . . . Ever since the year 1745 some negociations had been going on between France and the Dutch for the re-establishment of peace. The States-General had proposed the assembling of a Congress to the Cabinet of Vienna, which, however, had been rejected. In September 1746, conferences had been opened at Breda, between France, Great Britain, and the States-General; but as Great Britain had gained some advantages at sea, the negociations were protracted, and the Cabinets of London and Vienna had endeavoured to induce the Dutch to take a more direct and active part in the war. In this state of things the Court of Versailles took a sudden resolution to coerce the States-General. A manifest was published by Louis XV. April 17th 1747, filled with those pretexts which it is easy to find on such occasions: not, indeed, exactly declaring war against the Dutch Republic, but that he should enter her territories 'without breaking with her'; that he should hold in deposit the places he might conquer, and restore them as soon as the States ceased to succour his enemies. At the same time Count Löwendahl entered Dutch Flanders by Bruges, and seized in less than a month Sluys, Ysendick, Sas de Gand, Hulst, Axel, and other places. Holland had now very much declined from the position she had held a century before. There were indeed many large capitalists in the United Provinces, whose wealth had been amassed during the period of the Republic's commercial prosperity, but the State as a whole was impoverished and steeped in debt. . . . In . . . becoming the capitalists and money-lenders of Europe, they [the Dutch] had ceased to be her brokers and carriers. . . . Holland was no longer the entrepôt of nations. The English, the Swedes, the Danes, and the Hamburghers had appropriated the greater part of her trade. Such was the result of the long wars in which she had been engaged. . . . Her political consideration had dwindled equally with her commerce. Instead of pretending as formerly to be the arbiter of nations, she had become little more than the satellite of Great Britain; a position forced upon her by fear of France, and her anxiety to maintain her barriers against that encroaching Power. Since the death of William III., the republican or aristocratic party had again seized the ascendency. William III.'s collateral heir, John William Friso, had not been recognised as Stadtholder, and the Republic was again governed, as in the time of De Witt, by a Grand Pensionary and greffier. The dominant party had, however, become highly unpopular. It had sacrificed the

army to maintain the fleet, and the Republic seemed to lie at the mercy of France. At the approach of the French, consternation reigned in the provinces. The Orange party raised its head and demanded the re-establishment of the Stadtholdership. The town of Veere in Zealand gave the example of insurrection, and William IV. of Nassau-Dietz, who was already Stadtholder of Friesland, Gröningen and Gelderland, was ultimately proclaimed hereditary Stadtholder, Captain-General and Admiral of the United Provinces. William IV. was the son of John William Friso, and son-in-law of George II., whose daughter, Anne, he had married. The French threatening to attack Maestricht, the allies under the Duke of Cumberland marched to Lawfeld in order to protect it. Here they were attacked by Marshal Saxe, July 2nd 1747, and after a bloody battle compelled to recross the Meuse. The Duke of Cumberland, however, took up a position which prevented the French from investing Maestricht. On the other hand, Löwendahl [a Swedish general in the French service] carried Bergen-op-Zoom by assault, July 16th." The following spring (1748), the French succeeded in laying siege to Maestricht, notwithstanding the presence of the allies, and it was surrendered to them on the 7th of May. "Negociations had been going on throughout the winter, and a Congress had been appointed to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle, whose first conference took place April 24th 1748." The taking of Maestricht was intended to stimulate these negotiations for peace, and it undoubtedly had that effect. The treaties which concluded the war were signed the following October.—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe, bk.* 6, *ch* 4 (*v.* 3).

ALSO IN: C. M. Davies, *Hist. of Holland, pt.* 8, *ch.* 12, *pt.* 4, *ch.* 1.

(Holland): A. D. 1746-1787.—The restored Stadtholdership.—Forty years of peace.—War with England and trouble with Austria.—The razing of the Barriers.—Premature revolutions.—In their extremity, when the provinces of the Dutch Republic were threatened with invasion by the French, a cry for the House of Orange was raised once more. "The jealousies of Provincial magistratures were overborne, and in obedience to the voice of the people a Stadholder again arose. William of Nassau Dietz, the heir to William III., and the successor to a line of Stadholders who had ruled continuously in Friesland since the days of Philip II., was summoned to power. . . . William IV. had married, as William II. and William III. had done, the daughter of a King of England. As the husband of Anne, the child of George II., he had added to the consideration of his House; and he was now able to secure for his descendants the dignities to which he had himself been elected. The States General in 1747 declared that both male and female heirs should succeed to his honours. The constitution was thus in a measure changed, and the appointment of a hereditary chief magistrate appeared to many . . . to be a departure from the pure ideal of a Republic. The election of the new Stadholder brought less advantage to his people than to his family. He could not recall the glorious days of the great ancestors who had preceded him. Without abilities for war himself, and jealous of those with whom he was brought in contact, he caused disunion to arise among the forces of the allies. . . . When the terms at Aix La Chapelle restored their losses to the Dutch and confirmed the stipulations of previous treaties in their favour, it was felt that the Republic was indebted to the exertions of its allies, and not to any strength or successes of its own. It was well for the Republic that she could rest. The days of her greatness had gone by, and the recent struggle had manifested her decline to Europe. . . . The next forty years were years of peace. . . . When war again arrived it was again external circumstances [connected with the war between England and her revolted colonies in America] that compelled the Republic to take up arms. . . . She . . . contemplated, as it was discovered, an alliance with the American insurgents. The exposure of her designs drew on her a declaration of war from England, which was followed by the temporary loss of many of her colonies both in the East and West Indies. But in Europe the struggle was more equally sustained. The hostile fleets engaged in 1781 off the Dogger Bank; and the Dutch sailors fought with a success that made them claim a victory, and that at least secured them from the consequences of a defeat. The war indeed caused far less injury to the Republic than might have been supposed. . . . When she concluded peace in 1783, the whole of her lost colonies, with the one exception of Negapatam, were restored to her. But the occasion of the war had been made use of by Austria, and a blow had been meanwhile inflicted upon the United Provinces the fatal effect of which was soon to be apparent. The Emperor Joseph II. had long protested against the existence of the Barrier: and he had seized upon the opportunity to undo by an arbitrary act all that the blood and treasure of Europe had been lavished to secure. 'The Emperor will hear no more of Barriers,' wrote his minister; 'our connection with France has made them needless': and the fortresses for which William III. had schemed and Marlborough had fought, were razed to the ground [1782]. Holland, unable at the moment to resist, withdrew her garrisons in silence; and Joseph, emboldened by his success, proceeded to ask for more [1784]. The rectification of the Dutch frontiers, the opening of the Scheldt, and the release for his subjects from the long-enforced restrictions upon their trade did not appear too much to him. But the spirit of the Dutch had not yet left them. They fired at the vessels which dared to attempt to navigate the Scheldt, and war again appeared imminent. The support of France, however, upon which the Emperor had relied, was now given to the Republic, and Joseph recognized that he had gone too far. The Barrier, once destroyed, was not to be restored; but the claims which had been put forward were abandoned upon the payment of money compensation by the States. The feverous age of revolution was now at hand, and party spirit, which had ever divided the United Provinces, and had been quickened by the intercourse and alliance with America during the war, broke out in an insurrection against the Stadholder [William V.], which drove him from his country, and compelled him to appeal to Prussian troops for his restoration. Almost at the same time, in the Austrian provinces, a Belgic Republic was proclaimed [1787], the result in a great degree of imprudent changes which Joseph II. had

enforced. The Dutch returned to their obedience under Prussian threats [and invasion of Holland by an army of 30,000 men—September, 1787], and Belgium under the concessions of Leopold III. But these were the clouds foreshadowing the coming storm, beneath whose fury all Europe was to tremble."—C. F. Johnstone, *Historical Abstracts, ch.* 2.

ALSO IN: T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe, bk.* 6, *ch.* 8 (*v.* 8).—F. C. Schlosser, *Hist. of the 18th Century, period* 4, *ch.* 1, *sect.* 2, *and ch.* 2, *sect.* 2 (*v.* 5).

A. D. 1748.—Termination and results of the War of the Austrian Succession.—French conquests restored to Austria and to Holland. See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, THE CONGRESS.

(Holland): A. D. 1782.—Recognition of the United States of America. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1782 (APRIL).

A. D. 1792-1793.—The Austrian provinces occupied by the French revolutionary army.—Determination to annex them to the French Republic.—Preparations to attack Holland. See FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER); and 1792–1793 (DECEMBER—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1793 (February—April).—French invasion of Holland.—Defeat at Neerwinden and retreat.—Recovery of Belgian provinces by the Austrians. See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (FEBRUARY—APRIL).

(Holland): A. D. 1793 (March—September).—The Coalition against Revolutionary France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (MARCH—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1794.—French conquest of the Austrian Provinces.—Holland open to invasion. See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH—JULY).

(Holland): A. D. 1794-1795.—Subjugation and occupation by the French.—Overthrow of the Stadtholdership.—Establishment of the Batavian Republic, in alliance with France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1794–1795 (OCTOBER—MAY).

(Holland): A. D. 1797.—Naval defeat by the English in the Battle of Camperdown. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1797.

(Austrian Provinces): A. D. 1797.—Ceded to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY—OCTOBER).

(Holland): A. D. 1799.—English and Russian invasion.—Capture of the Dutch fleet.—Ignominious ending of the expedition.—Capitulation of the Duke of York.—Dissolution of the Dutch East India Company. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL—SEPTEMBER), and (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER).

(Holland): A. D. 1801.—Revolution instigated and enforced by Bonaparte.—A new Constitution. See FRANCE: A. D. 1801–1803.

(Holland): A. D. 1802.—The Peace of Amiens.—Recovery of the Cape of Good Hope and Dutch Guiana. See FRANCE: A. D. 1801–1802.

(Holland): A. D. 1806.—Final seizure of Cape Colony by the English. See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1486–1806.

A. D. 1806-1810.—Commercial blockade by the English Orders in Council and Napoleon's Decrees. See FRANCE: A. D. 1806–1810.

(Holland): A. D. 1806-1810.—The Batavian Republic transformed into the Kingdom of Holland.—Louis Bonaparte made King.—His fidelity to the country offensive to Napoleon.—His abdication.—Annexation of Holland to the French empire.—"While Bonaparte was the chief of the French republic, he had no objection to the existence of a Batavian republic in the north of France, and he equally tolerated the Cisalpine republic in the south. But after the coronation all the republics, which were grouped like satellites round the grand republic, were converted into kingdoms, subject to the empire, if not avowedly, at least in fact. In this respect there was no difference between the Batavian and Cisalpine republic. The latter having been metamorphosed into the kingdom of Italy, it was necessary to find some pretext for transforming the former into the kingdom of Holland. . . . The Emperor kept up such an extensive agency in Holland that he easily got up a deputation, soliciting him to choose a king for the Batavian republic. This submissive deputation came to Paris in 1806, to solicit the Emperor, as a favour, to place Prince Louis [Napoleon's brother] on the throne of Holland. . . . Louis became King of Holland much against his inclinat on, for he opposed the proposition as much as he dared, alleging as an objection the state of his health, to which certainly the climate of Holland was not favourable; but Bonaparte sternly replied to his remonstrance—'It is better to die a king than live a prince.' He was then obliged to accept the crown. He went to Holland accompanied by Hortense, who, however, did not stay long there. The new king wanted to make himself beloved by his subjects, and as they were an entirely commercial people, the best way to win their affections was . . . not to adopt Napoleon's rigid laws against commercial intercourse with England. Hence the first coolness between the two brothers, which ended in the abdication of Louis. I know not whether Napoleon recollected the motive assigned by Louis for at first refusing the crown of Holland, namely, the climate of the country, or whether he calculated upon greater submission in another of his brothers; but this is certain, that Joseph was not called from the throne of Naples to the throne of Spain, until after the refusal of Louis. . . . Before finally seizing Holland, Napoleon formed the project of separating from it Brabant and Zealand, in exchange for other provinces, the possession of which was doubtful: but Louis successfully resisted this first act of usurpation. Bonaparte was too intent on the great business in Spain, to risk any commotion in the north, where the declaration of Russia against Sweden already sufficiently occupied him. He therefore did not insist upon, and even affected indifference to the proposed augmentation of the territory of the empire. . . . But when he got his brother Joseph recognized, and when he had himself struck an important blow in the Peninsula, he began to change his tone to Louis. On the 20th of December [1808] he wrote to him a very remarkable letter, which exhibits the unreserved expression of that tyranny which he wished to exercise over all his family in order to make them the instruments of his despotism. He reproached Louis for not following his system of policy, telling him that he had forgotten he was a Frenchman, and that he wished to become a Dutchman. Among other things he said: . . . 'I have been obliged a second time to prohibit trade with Holland. In this state of things we may consider ourselves really at war. In my speech to the legislative body I manifested

my displeasure; for I will not conceal from you, that my intention is to unite Holland with France. This will be the most severe blow I can aim against England, and will deliver me from the perpetual insults which the plotters of your cabinet are constantly directing against me. The mouths of the Rhine, and of the Meuse, ought, indeed, to belong to me. . . . The following are my conditions:—First, the interdiction of all trade and communication with England. Second. The supply of a fleet of fourteen sail of the line, seven frigates and seven brigs or corvettes, armed and manned. Third, an army of 25,000 men. Fourth. The suppression of the rank of Marshals. Fifth. The abolition of all the privileges of nobility, which is contrary to the constitution. Your Majesty may negotiate on these bases with the Duke de Cadore, through the medium of your minister; but be assured, that on the entrance of the first packet-boat into Holland, I will restore my prohibitions, and that the first Dutch officer who may presume to insult my flag, shall be seized and hanged at the main-yard. Your Majesty will find in me a brother if you prove yourself a Frenchman; but if you forget the sentiments which attach you to our common country, you cannot think it extraordinary that I should lose sight of those which nature has raised between us. In short, the union of Holland and France will be, of all things, most useful to France, Holland and the Continent, because it will be most injurious to England. This union must be effected willingly, or by force.' . . . Here the correspondence between the two brothers was suspended for a time; but Louis still continued exposed to new vexations on the part of Napoleon. About the end of 1809, the Emperor summoned to Paris the sovereigns who might be called his vassals. Among the number was Louis, who, however, did not shew himself very willing to quit his states. He called a council of his ministers, who were of opinion that for the interest of Holland he ought to make this new sacrifice. He did so with resignation. Indeed, every day passed on the throne was a sacrifice to Louis. . . . Amidst the general silence of the servants of the empire, and even of the kings and princes assembled in the capital, he ventured to say:—'I have been deceived by promises which were never intended to be kept. Holland is tired of being the sport of France.' The Emperor, who was unused to such language as this, was highly incensed at it. Louis had now no alternative, but to yield to the incessant exactions of Napoleon, or to see Holland united to France. He chose the latter, though not before he had exerted all his feeble power in behalf of the subjects whom Napoleon had consigned to him; but he would not be the accomplice of him who had resolved to make those subjects the victims of his hatred against England. . . . Louis was, however, permitted to return to his states, to contemplate the stagnating effect of the continental blockade on every branch of trade and industry, formerly so active in Holland. Distressed at witnessing evils to which he could apply no remedy, he endeavoured by some prudent remonstrances to avert the utter ruin with which Holland was threatened. On the 23rd of March, 1810, he wrote . . . [a] letter to Napoleon. . . . Written remonstrances were not more to Napoleon's taste than verbal ones at a time when, as I was informed by my friends, whom fortune chained to his destiny, no one presumed to address a word to him, except to answer his questions. . . . His brother's letter highly roused his displeasure. Two months after he received it, being on a journey in the north, he addressed to Louis from Ostend a letter," followed in a few days by another in which latter he said: "'I want no more phrases and protestations. It is time I should know whether you intend, by your follies, to ruin Holland. I do not choose that you should again send a Minister to Austria, or that you should dismiss the French who are in your service. I have recalled my Ambassador, as I intend only to have a Chargé-d'affaires in Holland. The Sieur Serrurier, who remains there in that capacity, will communicate to you my intentions. My Ambassador shall no longer be exposed to your insults. Write to me no more those set phrases which you have been repeating for the last three years, and the falsehood of which is proved every day. This is the last letter I will ever write to you as long as I live.' . . . Thus reduced to the cruel alternative of crushing Holland with his own hands, or leaving that task to the Emperor, Louis did not hesitate to lay down his sceptre. Having formed this resolution, he addressed a message to the legislative body of the kingdom of Holland, explaining the motives of his abdication. . . . The French troops entered Holland under the command of the Duke de Reggio; and that Marshal, who was more King than the King himself, threatened to occupy Amsterdam. Louis then descended from his throne [July 1, 1810]. . . . Louis bade farewell to the people of Holland in a proclamation, after the publication of which he repaired to the waters of Toepiitz There he was living in tranquil retirement, when he learnt that his brother had united Holland to the Empire [December 10, 1810]. He then published a protest. . . . Thus there seemed to be an end of all intercourse between these two brothers, who were so opposite in character and disposition. But Napoleon, who was enraged that Louis should have presumed to protest, and that in energetic terms, against the union of his kingdom with the empire, ordered him to return to France, whither he was summoned in his character of Constable and French Prince. Louis, however, did not think proper to obey this summons, and Napoleon, faithful to his promise of never writing to him again, ordered . . . [a] letter to be addressed to him by M. Otto, . . . Ambassador from France to Vienna," saying: "'The Emperor requires that Prince Louis shall return, at the latest, by the 1st of December next, under pain of being considered as disobeying the constitution of the empire and the head of his family, and being treated accordingly.'"—M. de Bourrienne, *Private Memoirs of Napoleon, v.* 4, *ch.* 2.

Also in: D. A. Bingham, *Marriages of the Bonapartes, ch.* 11 (*v.* 2).—T. C. Grattan, *Hist. of the Netherlands, ch.* 22.—See, also, France: A. D. 1806 (January—October).

A. D. 1809.—The English Walcheren expedition against Antwerp. See England: A. D. 1809 (July—December).

(Holland): A. D. 1811.—Java taken by the English. See India: A. D. 1805-1816.

(Holland): A. D. 1813.—Expulsion of the French.—Independence regained.—Restoration of the Prince of Orange.—"The universal

fermentation produced in Europe by the deliverance of Germany [see GERMANY: A. D. 1812–1813, to 1813 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER)], was not long of spreading to the Dutch Provinces. The yoke of Napoleon, universally grievous from the enormous pecuniary exactions with which it was attended, and the wasting military conscriptions to which it immediately led, had been in a peculiar manner felt as oppressive in Holland, from the maritime and commercial habits of the people, and the total stoppage of all their sources of industry, which the naval war and long-continued blockade of their coasts had occasioned. They had tasted for nearly twenty years of the last drop of humiliation in the cup of the vanquished — that of being compelled themselves to aid in upholding the system which was exterminating their resources, and to purchase with the blood of their children the ruin of their country. These feelings, which had for years existed in such intensity, as to have rendered revolt inevitable but for the evident hopelessness at all former times of the attempt, could no longer be restrained after the battle of Leipsic had thrown down the colossus of French external power, and the approach of the Allied standards to their frontiers had opened to the people the means of salvation [see GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER) and (OCTOBER—DECEMBER)]. From the Hansa Towns the flame of independence spread to the nearest cities of the old United Provinces; and the small number of French troops in the country at once encouraged revolt and paved the way for external aid. At this period, the whole troops which Napoleon had in Holland did not exceed 6,000 French, and two regiments of Germans, upon whose fidelity to their colours little reliance could be placed. Upon the approach of the Allied troops under Bulow, who advanced by the road of Munster, and Winzingerode, who soon followed from the same quarter, the douaniers all withdrew from the coast, the garrison of Amsterdam retired, and the whole disposable force of the country was concentrated at Utrecht, to form a corps of observation, and act according to circumstances. This was the signal for a general revolt. At Amsterdam [Nov. 15], the troops were no sooner gone than the inhabitants rose in insurrection, deposed the Imperial authorities, hoisted the orange flag, and established a provisional government with a view to the restoration of the ancient order of things; yet not violently or with cruelty, but with the calmness and composure which attest the exercise of social rights by a people long habituated to their enjoyment. The same change took place, at the same time and in the same orderly manner, at Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Delft, Leyden, Haarlem, and the other chief towns; the people, everywhere, amidst cries of 'Orange Boven' and universal rapture, mounted the orange cockade, and reinstated the ancient authorities. . . . Military and political consequences of the highest importance immediately followed this uncontrollable outbreak of public enthusiasm. A deputation from Holland waited on the Prince Regent of England and the Prince of Orange, in London: the latter shortly after embarked on board an English line-of-battle ship, the Warrior, and on the 27th landed at Scheveling, from whence he proceeded to the Hague. Meantime the French troops and coast-guards, who had concentrated at Utrecht, seeing that the general effervescence was not as yet supported by any solid military force, and that the people, though they had all hoisted the orange flag, were not aided by any corps of the Allies, recovered from their consternation, and made a general forward movement against Amsterdam. Before they got there, however, a body of 300 Cossacks had reached that capital, where they were received with enthusiastic joy: and this advanced guard was soon after followed by General Benkendorf's brigade, which, after travelling by post from Zwoll to Harderwyk, embarked at the latter place, and, by the aid of a favourable wind, reached Amsterdam on the 1st December. The Russian general immediately advanced against the forts of Mayder and Halfweg, of which he made himself master, taking twenty pieces of cannon and 600 prisoners; while on the eastern frontier, General Oppen, with Bulow's advanced guards, carried Dornbourg by assault on the 23d, and, advancing against Arnheim, threw the garrison, 3,000 strong, which strove to prevent the place being invested, with great loss back into the town. Next day, Bulow himself came up with the main strength of his corps, and, as the ditches were still dry, hazarded an escalade, which proved entirely successful; the greater part of the garrison retiring to Nimeguen, by the bridge of the Rhine. The French troops, finding themselves thus threatened on all sides, withdrew altogether from Holland: the fleet at the Texel hoisted the orange flag, with the exception of Admiral Verhuel, who, with a body of marines that still proved faithful to Napoleon, threw himself with honourable fidelity into the fort of the Texel. Amsterdam, amidst transports of enthusiasm, received the beloved representative of the House of Orange. Before the close of the year, the tricolour flag floated only on Bergen-op-zoom and a few of the southern frontier fortresses; and Europe beheld the prodigy of the seat of war having been transferred in a single year from the banks of the Niemen to those of the Scheldt."—Sir A. Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, 1789–1815, *ch.* 82 (*v.* 17).

A. D. 1814 (May—June).—Belgium, or the former Austrian provinces and Liége, annexed to Holland, and the kingdom of the Netherlands created. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL—JUNE); and VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1815.—The Waterloo campaign.—Defeat and overthrow of Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JUNE).

A. D. 1816.—Accession to the Holy Alliance. See HOLY ALLIANCE.

A. D. 1830-1832.—Belgian revolt and acquisition of independence.—Dissolution of the kingdom of the Netherlands.—Creation of the kingdom of Belgium.—Siege of Antwerp citadel.—"In one sense the union" of Belgium with Holland, in the kingdom of the Netherlands created by the Congress of Vienna, "was defensible. Holland enjoyed more real freedom than any other Continental monarchy; and the Belgians had a voice in the government of the united territory. But, in another sense, the union was singularly unhappy. The phlegmatic Dutch Protestant was as indisposed to unite with the light-hearted Roman Catholic Belgian as the languid waters of the Saone with the impetuous torrent of the Rhone. Different as were the rivers, they met at last; and diplomatists probably hoped that Dutch and Belgians would simi-

larly combine. These hopes were disappointed, and the two people, incapable of union, endeavoured to find independent courses for themselves in separate channels. The grounds of Belgian dislike to the union were intelligible. Belgium had a population of 3,400,000 souls; Holland of only 2,000,000 persons. Yet both countries had an equal representation in the States-General. Belgium was taxed more heavily than Holland, and the produce of taxation went almost entirely into Dutch pockets. The Court, which was Dutch, resided in Holland. The public offices were in Holland. Four persons out of every five in the public service at home were Dutchmen. The army was almost exclusively commanded by Dutchmen. Dutch professors were appointed to educate the Belgian youths in Belgian schools, and a Dutch director was placed over the Bank of Brussels. The Court even endeavoured to change the language of the Belgian race, and to substitute Dutch for French in all judicial proceedings. The Belgians were naturally irritated. . . . On the 2nd of June, the States-General were dissolved; the elections were peacefully concluded; and the closest observers failed to detect any symptoms of the coming storm on the political horizon. The storm which was to overwhelm the union was, in fact, gathering in another country. The events of July [at Paris] were to shake Europe to the centre. 'On all sides crowns were falling into the gutter,' and the shock of revolution in Paris was felt perceptibly in Brussels. Nine years before the States-General had imposed a mouture, or tax upon flour. The tax had been carried by a very small majority; and the majority had been almost entirely composed of Dutch members. On the 25th of August, 1830, the lower orders in Brussels engaged in a serious riot, ostensibly directed against this tax. The offices of a newspaper, conducted in the interests of the Dutch, were attacked; the house of the Minister of Justice was set on fire; the wine and spirit shops were forced open; and the mob, maddened by liquor, proceeded to other acts of pillage. On the morning of the 26th of August the troops were called out and instructed to restore order. Various conflicts took place between the soldiers and the people; but the former gained no advantage over the rioters, and were withdrawn into the Place Royale, the central square of the town. Relieved from the interference of the military, the mob continued the work of destruction. Respectable citizens, dreading the destruction of their property, organised a guard for the preservation of order. Order was preserved; but the task of preserving it had converted Brussels into an armed camp. It had placed the entire control of the town in the hands of the inhabitants. Men who had unexpectedly obtained a mastery over the situation could hardly be expected to resign the power which events had given to them. They had taken up their arms to repress a mob; victors over the populace, they turned their arms against the Government, and boldly despatched a deputation to the king urging the concession of reforms and the immediate convocation of the States-General. The king had received the news of the events at Brussels with considerable alarm. Troops had been at once ordered to march on the city; and, on the 28th of August, an army of 6,000 men had encamped under its walls. The citizens, however, represented that the entrance of the troops would be a signal for the renewal of the disturbances; and the officer in command in consequence agreed to remain passively outside the walls. The king sent the Prince of Orange to make terms with his insurgent subjects. The citizens declined to admit the prince into the city unless he came without his soldiers. The prince, unable to obtain any modification of this stipulation, was obliged to trust himself to the people alone. It was already evident that the chief town of Belgium had shaken off the control of the Dutch Government. The king, compelled to submit to the demands of the deputation, summoned the States-General for the 13th of September. But this concession only induced the Belgians to raise their demands. They had hitherto only asked for reforms: they now demanded independence, the dissolution of the union, and the independent administration of Belgium. The revolution had originally been confined to Brussels: it soon extended to other towns. Civic guards were organised in Liege, Tournay, Mons, Verviers, Bruges, and other places. Imitating the example of Brussels, they demanded the dissolution of the union between Holland and Belgium. The troops, consisting of a mixed force of Dutch and Belgians, could not be depended on; and the restoration of the royal authority was obviously impossible. On the 13th of September the States-General met. The question of separation was referred to them by the king; and the Deputies leisurely applied themselves to its consideration, in conformity with the tedious rules by which their proceedings were regulated. Long before they had completed the preliminary discussions which they thought necessary the march of events had taken the question out of their hands. On the 19th of September fresh disturbances broke out in Brussels. The civic guard, attempting to quell the riot, was overpowered; and the rioters, elated with their success, announced their intention of attacking the troops, who were encamped outside the city walls. Prince Frederick of Orange, concluding that action was inevitable, at last made up his mind to attack the town. Dividing the forces under his command into six columns, he directed them, on the 23rd of September, against the six gates of the city. . . . Three of the columns succeeded, after a serious struggle, in obtaining possession of the higher parts of the city; but they were unable to accomplish any decisive victory. For four days the contest was renewed. On the 27th of September, the troops, unable to advance, were withdrawn from the positions which they had won. On the following day the Lower Chamber of the States-General decided in favour of a dissolution of the union. The crown of Belgium was evidently dropping into the gutter; but the king decided on making one more effort to preserve it in his family. On the 4th of October he sent the Prince of Orange to Antwerp, authorising him to form a separate Administration for the southern provinces of the kingdom, and to place himself at the head of it. . . . Arrangements of this character had, however, already become impossible. On the very day on which the prince reached Antwerp the Provisional Government at Brussels issued an ordonnance declaring the independence of Belgium and the immediate convocation of a National Congress. . . . On the 10th of October,

the Provisional Government, following up its former ordonnance, issued a second decree, regulating the composition of the National Congress and the qualifications of the electors. On the 12th the elections were fixed for the 27th of October. On the 10th of November the Congress was formally opened; and on the 18th the independence of the Belgian people was formally proclaimed by its authority. . . . On the 4th of November the Ministers of the five great Continental powers, assembled in London at the invitation of the King of Holland, declared that an armistice should immediately be concluded, and that the Dutch troops should be withdrawn from Belgium. The signature of this protocol, on the eve of the meeting of the National Congress, virtually led to the independence of the Belgian people, which the Congress immediately proclaimed."—S. Walpole, *Hist. of England from* 1815, *ch.* 11 (*v.* 2).—It still remained for the Powers to provide a king for Belgium, and to gain the consent of the Dutch and Belgian Governments to the territorial arrangements drawn up for them. The first difficulty was overcome in June, 1831, by the choice of Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg to be king of Belgium. The second problem was complicated by strong claims on both sides to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The Conference solved it by dividing the disputed territory between Belgium and Holland. The Belgians accepted the arrangement; the King of Holland rejected it, and was coerced by France and England, who expelled his forces from Antwerp, which he still held. A French army laid siege to the citadel, while an English fleet blockaded the river Scheldt. After a bombardment of 24 days, December, 1832, the citadel surrendered; but it was not until April, 1839, the final Treaty of Peace between Belgium and Holland was signed.—C. A. Fyffe, *Hist. of Modern Europe, v.* 2, *ch.* 5.

ALSO IN: Sir A. Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, 1815–1852, *ch.* 24–25 *and* 29.

A. D. 1830–1884.—Peaceful years of the kingdoms of Belgium and Holland.—Constitutional and material progress.—The contest of Catholics and Liberals in Belgium.—"After winning its independence (1830) Belgium has also been free to work out its own career of prosperous development. King Leopold I. during his long reign showed himself the model of a constitutional sovereign in furthering its progress. The first railway on the continent was opened in 1835 between Brussels and Malines, and its railway system is now most complete. Its population between 1830 and 1880 increased by more than one-third, and now is the densest in all Europe, numbering 5,900,000 on an area only twice as large as Yorkshire. . . . When Napoleon III. seized on power in France all Belgians feared that he would imitate his uncle by seizing Belgium and all land up to the Rhine; but the close connection of King Leopold [brother of Prince Albert, the Prince Consort] with the English royal house and his skilful diplomacy averted the danger from Belgium. The chief internal trouble has been the strife between the liberal and clerical parties. In 1850 there were over 400 monasteries, with some 12,000 monks and nuns, in the land, and the Liberals made strenuous efforts for many years to abolish these and control education; but neither party could command a firm and lasting majority. In the midst of these eager disputes King Leopold I. died (1865), after seeing his kingdom firmly established in spite of ministerial crises every few months. His son Leopold II. has also been a constitutional sovereign. In 1867 the Luxemburg question seemed to threaten the Belgian territory, for Napoleon III. had secretly proposed to Bismarck that France should take Belgium and Luxemburg, as well as all land up to the Rhine, as the price of his friendship to the new German Confederation [see GERMANY: A. D. 1866–1870]. . . . Again in 1870 the Franco-German war threw a severe strain on Belgium to guard its neutrality, but after Sedan this danger vanished. The strife between the liberal and clerical parties went on as fiercely in Belgium as in France itself, and after the rise and fall of many ministries the Liberals succeeded in closing the convents and gaining control over State education. The constitution is that of a limited monarchy with responsible ministers, Senate, and Chamber of Deputies. The electorate up to 1884 was limited to citizens paying 42 francs a year in direct taxes, but in 1884 it was extended by the clerical party acting for once in connection with the radicals." (On the revised constitution of 1893 see below: 1892–1893.) In the kingdom of the Netherlands (Holland), King William, after he had been forced to recognize Belgian independence, "abdicated [1840] in favour of his son. The latter soon restored a good understanding with Belgium, and improved the finances of his kingdom; so the upheavals of 1848 caused no revolution in Holland, and only led to a thorough reform of its constitution. The Upper House of the States-General consists of members chosen for nine years by the estates or councils of the provinces, those of the lower house by electors having a property qualification. The king's ministers are now responsible to the Parliament. Liberty of the press and of public worship is recognised. The chief questions in Holland have been the reduction of its heavy debt, the increase of its army and navy, the improvement of agriculture and commerce, and the management of large and difficult colonial possessions." Holland "has to manage 28,000,000 subjects over the seas, mostly in Malaysia. She there holds all Java, parts of Borneo, Sumatra, Timor, the Moluccas, Celebes, and the western half of New Guinea; in South America, Dutch Guiana and the Isle of Curaçoa. It was not till 1862 that the Dutch at a great cost freed the slaves in their West Indian possessions [viz., the islands of Curaçoa, Aruba, St. Martin, Bonaire, St. Eustache, and Saba]; but their rule in Malaysia is still conducted with the main purpose of securing revenue by means of an oppressive labour system. The Dutch claims in Sumatra are contested by the people of Acheen in the northern part of that great island."—J. H. Rose, *A Century of Continental History, ch.* 43.—"The politico-religious contest between Catholics and Liberals exists to a greater or less degree in all Catholic countries, and even in Protestant ones possessing, like Prussia, Catholic provinces: but nowhere is political life more completely absorbed by this antagonism than in Belgium, nowhere are the lines of the contest more clearly traced. . . . In order thoroughly to grasp the meaning of our politico-religious strife, we must cast a glance at its origin. We find this in the constitution adopted by the Congress after the Revolution of 1830. This constitution enjoins and sanc-

tions all the freedom and liberty which has long been the privilege of England, and of the States she has founded in America and Australia. A free press, liberty as regards education, freedom to form associations or societies, provincial and communal autonomy, representative administration—all exactly as in England. How was it that the Congress of 1830, the majority of whose members belonged to the Catholic party, came to vote in favour of principles opposed, not only to the traditions, but also the dogmas of the Catholic Church? This singular fact is explained by the writings of the celebrated priest and author, La Mennais, whose opinions at that time exercised the greatest influence. La Mennais's first book, 'L'Essai sur l'indifference en Matière de Religion,' lowered all human reasoning, and delivered up society to the omnipotent guidance of the Pope. This work, enthusiastically perused by bishops, seminarists, and priests, established the author as an unprecedented authority. When, after the year 1828, he pretended that the Church would regain her former power by separating herself from the State, retaining only her liberty, most of his admirers professed themselves of his opinion. . . . Nearly all Belgian priests were at that time La Mennaisiens. They accepted the separation of Church and State, and, in their enthusiastic intoxication, craved but liberty to reconquer the world. It was thus that Catholics and Liberals united to vote for Belgium the constitution still in existence after a half-century. In 1832, Pope Gregory XVI., as Veuillot tells us, 'hurled a thunderbolt at the Belgian constitution in its cradle.' In a famous Encyclical, since incessantly quoted, the Pope declared, *ex cathedrâ*, that modern liberties were a plague, 'a delirium,' from whence incalculable evils would inevitably flow. Shortly afterwards, the true author of the Belgian constitution, La Mennais, having been to Rome in the vain hope of converting the Pope to his views, was repulsed, and, a little later, cast out from the bosom of the Church. The separation was effected. There was an end to that 'union' of Catholics and Liberals which had overthrown King William and founded a new political order in Belgium. It was not, however, till after 1838 that the two parties distinctly announced their antagonism. . . . The Liberal party is composed of all who, having faith in human reason and in liberty, fear a return to the past, and desire reforms of all sorts. . . . When Catholics are mentioned as opposed to Liberals, it is as regards their political, not their religious opinions. The Liberals are all, or nearly all, Catholics also; at all events by baptism. . . . The Catholic party is guided officially by the bishops. It is composed, in the first place, of all the clergy, of the convents and monasteries, and of those who from a sentiment of religious obedience do as they are directed by the bishop of the diocese and the Pope, and also of genuine Conservatives, otherwise called reactionists—that is to say, of those who consider that liberty leads to anarchy, and progress to communism. This section comprises the great mass of the proprietors and cultivators of the soil and the country populations. . . . We see that in Belgium parties are divided, and fight seriously for an idea; they are separated by no material, but by spiritual interests. The Liberals defend liberty, which they consider menaced by the aims of the Church. The Catholics defend religion, which they look upon as threatened by their adversaries' doctrines. Both desire to fortify themselves against a danger, non-existent yet, but which they foresee. . . . The educational question, which has been the centre of the political life of the country during the last two years, deserves expounding in detail. Important in itself, and more important still in its consequences, it is everywhere discussed with passion. Primary education was organized here in 1842, by a law of compromise adopted by the two parties, thanks to M. J. B. Nothomb, one of the founders of the Belgian Constitution, who died recently in Berlin, where he had been Belgian Minister for a space of upwards of forty years. This law enacted that every parish should possess schools sufficient for the number of children needing instruction; but it allowed the 'commune' to adopt private schools. The inspection of the public schools and the control of the religious teaching given by the masters and mistresses, was reserved to the clergy. Advanced Liberals began to clamour for the suppression of this latter clause as soon as they perceived the preponderating influence it gave the priests over the lay teachers. The reform of the law of 1842 became the watchword of the Liberal party, and this was ultimately effected in July, 1879; now each parish or village must provide the schools necessary for the children of its inhabitants, and must not give support to any private school. Ecclesiastical inspection is suppressed. Religious instruction may be given by the ministers of the various denominations, in the school buildings, but out of the regular hours. This system has been in force in Holland since the commencement of the present century. Lay instruction only is given by the communal masters and mistresses; no dogmas are taught, but the school is open to the clergy of all denominations who choose to enter, as it is evidently their duty to do. This system, now introduced in Belgium, has been accepted, without giving rise to any difficulties, by both Protestants and Jews, but it is most vehemently condemned by the Catholic priesthood. . . . In less than a year they have succeeded in opening a private school in every commune and village not formerly possessing one. In this instance the Catholic party has shown a devotedness really remarkable. . . . At the same time in all the Churches, and nearly every Sunday, the Government schools have been attacked, stigmatized as 'écoles sans Dieu' (schools without God), to be avoided as the plague, and where parents were forbidden to place their children, under pain of committing the greatest sin. Those who disobeyed, and allowed their children still to frequent the communal schools, were deprived of the Sacraments of the Church. They were refused absolution at confession, and the Eucharist, even at Easter. All the schoolmasters and mistresses were placed under the ban of the Church, and the priests often even refused to pronounce a blessing on their marriage. It is only lately that, contrary instructions having been received from Rome, this extreme step is now very rarely resorted to. The Liberal majority in the House has ordered a Parliamentary inquiry—which is still in progress, and the results of which in this last six months, fill the columns of our newspapers—in order to ascertain by what means the clergy succeed in filling their schools. . . . As a natural consequence of

the excessive heat of the conflict, the two parties end by justifying the accusations of their adversaries. The Liberals become anti-religionists, because religion is—and is daily becoming more and more—anti-liberal; and the Catholics are afraid of liberty, because it is used against their faith, which is, in their opinion, the only true and the necessary foundation of civilization. . . . The existence in Belgium of two parties so distinctly and clearly separated, offers, however, some compensation: it favours the good working of Parliamentary government."—E. de Laveleye, *The Political Condition of Belgium* (*Contemporary Rev., April*, 1882), *pp.* 715–724, *with foot-note.*

(Belgium): A. D. 1876-1893.—The Congo Free State. See CONGO FREE STATE; also. AFRICA: A. D. 1885 and 1889.

(Holland, or the Kingdom of the Netherlands): A. D. 1887.—Revision of the Constitution.—The constitution of 1848 (see above), in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, was revised in 1887, but in a very conservative spirit. Attempts to make the suffrage universal, and to effect a separation of church and state, were defeated. The suffrage qualification by tax-payment was reduced to ten guilders, and certain classes of lodgers were also admitted to the franchise, more than doubling the total number of voters, which is now estimated to be about 290,000. All private soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the regular army are excluded from the franchise. The upper chamber of the States General is elected as before by the Provincial States, but its membership is raised to fifty. The second chamber, consisting of one hundred members, is chosen directly by the voters. In the new constitution, the succession to the throne is definitely prescribed, in the event of a failure of direct heirs. Three collateral lines of descent are designated, to be accepted in their order as follows: 1. Princess Sophia of Saxony and her issue; 2. the descendants of the late Princess Marian of Prussia; 3. the descendants of the late Princess Mary of Wied. The late king of the Netherlands, William III., died in 1890, leaving only a daughter, ten years old, to succeed him. The young queen, Wilhelmina, is reigning under the regency of her mother.—*The Statesman's Year-book*, 1894.

ALSO IN: *The Annual Register*, 1887.—*Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia*, 1887.

(Belgium): A. D. 1892-1893.—The revised Belgian Constitution.—Introduction of plural Suffrage.—A great agitation among the Belgian workingmen, ending in a formidable strike, in 1890, was only quieted by the promise from the government of a revision of the constitution and the introduction of universal suffrage. The Constituent Chambers, elected to perform the task of revision, were opened on the 11th of July, 1892. The amended constitution was promulgated on the 7th of September, 1893. It confers the suffrage on every citizen twenty-five years of age or over, domiciled in the same commune for not less than one year, and not under legal disqualification. The new constitution is made especially interesting by its introduction of a system of cumulative or plural voting. One supplementary vote is conferred on every married citizen (or widower), thirty-five years or more of age, having legitimate issue, and paying at least five francs per annum house tax; also on every citizen not less than twenty-five years old who owns real property to the value of 2,000 francs, or who derives an income of not less than 100 francs a year from an investment in the public debt, or from the savings bank. Two supplementary votes are given to each citizen twenty-five years of age who has received certain diplomas or discharged certain functions which imply the possession of a superior education. The same citizen may accumulate votes on more than one of these qualifications, but none is allowed to cast more than three. On the adoption of the new constitution, the Brussels correspondent of the "London Times" wrote to that journal: "This article, which adds to manhood suffrage as it exists in France, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, the United States, and the Australian colonies, the safeguard of a double and triple suffrage accorded to age, marriage, and paternity, as well as to the possession of money saved or inherited, or of a profession, will constitute one of the distinguishing marks of the new Belgian Constitution. As it reposes upon the just principle that votes must be considered in reference to their weight rather than to their numbers, it has had the effect of putting an immediate end to the violent political crisis which disturbed the country. It has been accepted without much enthusiasm, indeed, but as a reasonable compromise. The moderates of all classes, who do not go to war for abstract theories, think that it has a prospect of enduring." An attempt to introduce proportional representation along with the plural suffrage was defeated. The constitution of the Senate raised questions hardly less important than those connected with the elective franchise. Says the correspondent quoted above: "The advanced Radical and Socialist parties had proposed to supplement the Chamber, the political representation of the territorial interests of the country, by a Senate representing its economic interests. The great social forces—capital, labour, and science—in their application to agriculture, industry, and commerce, were each to send their representatives. It may be that this formula, which would have made of the Belgian Senate an Assembly sui generis in Europe, may become the formula of the future. The Belgian legislators hesitated before the novelty of the idea and the difficulty of its application. This combination rejected, there remained for the Senate only the alternative between two systems—namely, to separate that Assembly from the Chamber by its origin or else by its composition. The Senate and the Government preferred the first of these solutions, that is to say direct elections for the Chamber, an election by two degrees for the Senate, either by the members of the provincial councils or by specially elected delegates of the Communes. But these proposals encountered from all the benches in the Chamber a general resistance." The result was a compromise. The Senate consists of 76 members elected directly by the people, and 26 elected by the provincial councils. The term of each is eight years. The Senators chosen by the councils are exempted from a property qualification; those popularly elected are required to be owners of real property yielding not less than 12,000 francs of income, or to pay not less than 1,200 francs in direct taxes. The legislature is empowered to restrict the voting for Senators to citizens thirty years of age or more. The members of the Chamber of Repre-

sentatives are apportioned according to population and elected for four years, one half retiring every two years. The Senate and Chamber meet annually in November, and are required to be in session for at least forty days; but the King may convoke extraordinary sessions, and may dissolve the Chambers either separately or together. In case of a dissolution, the constitution requires an election to be held within forty days, and a meeting of the Chambers within two months. Only the Chamber of Representatives can originate money bills or bills relating to the contingent for the army. The executive consists of seven ministries, namely of Finance, of Justice, of Interior and Instruction, of War, of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, of Foreign Affairs, of Agriculture, Industry and Public Works. See text in CONSTITUTION OF BELGIUM.

NEUCHATÊL: Separation from Prussia. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1803–1848.

NEUENBERG: Capture by Duke Bernhard (1638). See GERMANY: A. D. 1634–1639.

NEUSTRIA. See AUSTRASIA.

NEUTRAL GROUND, The. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1780 (AUGUST—SEPT).

NEUTRAL NATION, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: HURONS, &c.

NEUTRAL RIGHTS. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1804–1809; 1808; 1808–1810; 1810–1812; 1814 (DEC.); and FRANCE: A. D. 1806–1810.

NEVADA: The aboriginal inhabitants. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.

A. D. 1848-1864.—Acquisition from Mexico.—Silver discoveries.—Territorial and State organization.—"Ceded to the United States at the same time, and, indeed, as one with California [see MEXICO: A. D. 1848], this region of the Spanish domain had not, like that west of the Sierra Nevada, a distinctive name, but was described by local names, and divided into valleys. In March following the treaty with Mexico and the discovery of gold, the inhabitants of Salt Lake valley met and organized the state of Deseret, the boundaries of which included the whole of the recently acquired Mexican territory outside of California, and something more." But Congress, failing to recognize the state of Deseret, created instead, by an act passed on the 9th of September, 1850, the Territory of Utah, with boundaries which embraced Nevada likewise. This association was continued until 1861, when the Territory of Nevada was organized by act of Congress out of western Utah. Meantime the discovery in 1859 of the extraordinary deposit of silver which became famous as the Comstock Lode, and other mining successes of importance, had rapidly attracted to the region a large population of adventurers. It was this which had brought about the separate territorial organization. Three years later the young territory was permitted to frame a state constitution and was admitted into the Union in October, 1864.—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States, v. 20: Nevada, p.* 66.

NEVELLE, Battle of (1381). See FLANDERS: A. D. 1379–1381.

NEVILLE'S CROSS, OR DURHAM, Battle of.—A crushing defeat suffered by an army of the Scots, invading England under their young king, David Bruce, who was taken prisoner. The battle was fought near Durham, October 17, 1346.—J. H. Burton, *Hist. of Scotland, ch.* 25 (*v.* 3).—See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1333–1370.

NEW ALBION, The County Palatine of.—By a royal charter, witnessed by the Deputy-General of Ireland, at Dublin, June 21, 1634, King Charles I. granted to Sir Edmund Plowden and eight other petitioners, the whole of Long Island ("Manitie, or Long Isle"), together with forty leagues square of the adjoining continent, constituting the said domain a county palatine and calling it New Albion, while the island received the name of Isle Plowden. "In this document the boundaries of New Albion are so defined as to include all of New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania embraced in a square, the eastern side of which, forty leagues in length, extended (along the coast) from Sandy Hook to Cape May, together with Long Island, and all other 'isles and islands in the sea within ten leagues of the shores of the said region.' The province is expressly erected into a county palatine, under the jurisdiction of Sir Edmund Plowden as earl, depending upon his Majesty's 'royal person and imperial crown, as King of Ireland.'" Subsequently, within the year 1634, the whole of the grant was acquired by and became vested in Plowden and his three sons. Sir Edmund, who died in 1659, spent the remainder of his life in futile attempts to make good his claim against the Swedes on the Delaware and the Dutch and in exploiting his magnificent title as Earl Palatine of New Albion. The claim and the title seem to have reappeared occasionally among his descendants until some time near the close of the 18th century.—G. B. Keen, *Note on New Albion.* (*Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., J. Winsor, ed., v.* 3, *pp.* 457–468).

ALSO IN: S. Hazard, *Annals of Penn., pp.* 36–38 *and* 108–112.

NEW AMSTERDAM.—The name originally given by the Dutch to the city of New York, and to the village out of which grew the city of Buffalo. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1624; 1653; 1786–1799.

NEW BRITAIN See MELANESIA.

NEW BRUNSWICK: Embraced in the Norumbega of the old geographers. See NORUMBEGA; also, CANADA: NAMES.

A. D. 1621-1668.—Included in Nova Scotia. See NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1621–1668.

A. D. 1713.—Uncertain disposition by the Treaty of Utrecht. See CANADA: A. D. 1711–1713.

A. D. 1820-1837.—The Family Compact. See CANADA: A. D. 1820–1837.

A. D. 1854-1866.—The Reciprocity Treaty with the United States. See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES AND CANADA): A. D. 1854–1866.

A. D. 1867.—Embraced in the Dominion of Canada. See CANADA: A. D. 1867.

NEW CÆSAREA, OR NEW JERSEY. See NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1664–1667.

NEW CALEDONIA. See MELANESIA.

NEW CARTHAGE. See CARTHAGENA.

NEW CHURCH, The. See SWEDENBORG AND THE NEW CHURCH.

NEW ENGLAND.*

The Aboriginal Inhabitants. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

The Norumbega of early geographers. See NORUMBEGA.

A. D. 1498.—First coasted by Sebastian Cabot. See AMERICA: A. D. 1498.

A. D. 1524.—Coasted by Verrazano. See AMERICA: A. D. 1523–1524.

A. D. 1602-1607.—The voyages of Gosnold, Pring and Weymouth. See AMERICA: A. D. 1602–1605.

A. D. 1604.—Embraced in the region claimed as Acadia by the French. See CANADA: A. D. 1603–1605.

A. D. 1605.—Coast explored by Champlain. See CANADA: A. D. 1603–1605.

A. D. 1606.—Embraced in the grant to the North Virginia Company of Plymouth. See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1606–1607.

A. D. 1607-1608.—The Popham Colony on the Kennebec.—The fruitless venture of the Plymouth Company. See MAINE: A. D. 1607–1608.

A. D. 1614.—Named, mapped and described by Captain John Smith. See AMERICA: A. D. 1614–1615.

A. D. 1620.—The voyage of the Mayflower and the planting of Plymouth Colony. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1620.

A. D. 1620-1623.—Incorporation of the Council for New England, successor to the Plymouth Company.—Its great domain and its monopoly of the Fisheries.—"While the king was engaged in the overthrow of the London company [see VIRGINIA: A. D. 1622–1624], its more loyal rival in the West of England [the Plymouth company, or North Virginia branch of the Virginia company] sought new letters-patent, with a great enlargement of their domain. The remonstrances of the Virginia corporation and the rights of English commerce could delay for two years, but not defeat, the measure that was pressed by the friends of the monarch. On the 3d of November, 1620, King James incorporated 40 of his subjects—some of them members of his household and his government, the most wealthy and powerful of the English nobility—as 'The Council established at Plymouth, in the county of Devon, for the planting, ruling, ordering, and governing New England in America.' The territory, which was conferred on them in absolute property, with unlimited powers of legislation and government, extended from the 40th to the 48th degree of north latitude, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The grant included the fisheries; and a revenue was considered certain from a duty to be imposed on all tonnage employed in them. The patent placed emigrants to New England under the absolute authority of the corporation, and it was through grants from that plenary power, confirmed by the crown, that institutions the most favorable to colonial independence and the rights of mankind came into being. The French derided the action of the British monarch in bestowing lands and privileges which their own sovereign, seventeen years before, had appropriated. The English nation was incensed at the largess of immense monopolies by the royal prerogative; and in April, 1621, Sir Edwin Sandys brought the grievance before the house of commons. . . . But the parliament was dissolved before a bill could be perfected. In 1622, five and thirty sail of vessels went to fish on the coasts of New England, and made good voyages. The monopolists appealed to King James, and he issued a proclamation, which forbade any to approach the northern coast of America, except with the leave of their company or of the privy council. In June, 1623, Francis West was despatched as admiral of New England, to exclude such fishermen as came without a license. But they refused to pay the tax which he imposed, and his ineffectual authority was soon resigned."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S.* (*Author's last rev.*), *pt.* 1, *ch.* 13 (*v.* 1).

ALSO IN: C. Deane, *New England* (*Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am.*, *v.* 8, *ch.* 9).—Sir Ferdinando Gorges, *Brief Narration* (*Maine Hist. Soc. Coll.*, *v.* 2).

A. D. 1621-1631.—The grants made by the Council for New England.—Settlements planted.—Nova Scotia, Maine and New Hampshire conferred.—Captain John Mason, a native of King's Lynn, in Norfolk, became governor of Newfoundland in 1615. "While there he wrote a tract entitled 'A Brief Discourse of the Newfoundland,' and sent it to his friend Sir John Scot of Edinburgh, to peruse, and to print if he thought it worthy. It was printed in the year 1620. . . . In the spring or summer of 1621, Mason returned into England, and immediately found proof of the effect of his little tract. . . . Sir William Alexander, afterwards Earl of Stirling, immediately sought him out. He had been appointed Gentleman of the Privy Chamber to Prince Henry, honored with Knighthood, and was Master of Requests for Scotland. He invited Mason to his house, where he discussed with him a scheme of Scotch colonization, and he resolved to undertake settling a colony in what is now Nova Scotia. He begged Mason to aid him in procuring a grant of this territory from the Council for New England, it being within their limits. Mason referred him to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, one of the Council and their Treasurer. The king readily recommended Alexander to Gorges, and Gorges heartily approved the plan. In September, 1621, Alexander obtained a Royal Patent for a tract of land which he called New Scotland, a name attractive to his countrymen. This must have been gratifying to Mason, who had urged Scotch emigration in his tract printed only a year before. The Council for New England, established in November, 1620, was now granting and ready to grant to associations or to individuals parcels of its vast domain in America. . . . The second patent for land granted by the Council was to Capt. John Mason, bearing date March 9, 1621–2. It was all the land lying between the Naumkeag and the Merrimac rivers, extending back from the sea-coast to the heads of both of these rivers, with all the islands within three miles of the shore. Mason called this Mariana. This tract of territory lies wholly within the present bounds of Massachusetts. We now arrive at a period when Mason and Gorges have a joint interest in New England. On the 10th of August, 1622, the Council made

*The greater part of New England history is given elsewhere, as the history of the several New England states, and is only indexed in this place, instead of being repeated.

a third grant. This was to Gorges and Mason jointly of land lying upon the sea-coast between the Merrimac and the Kennebec rivers, extending three-score miles into the country, with all islands within five leagues of the premises to be, or intended to be, called the Province of Maine. Thus was the territory destined seven years later to bear the name of New Hampshire, first carved from the vast domain of New England, whose boundaries were fixed by the great circles of the heavens. Thus was Capt. Mason joint proprietor of his territory afterwards known as New Hampshire, before a single settler had built a cabin on the Pascataqua. Capt. Robert Gorges, son of Sir Ferdinando, was authorized to give the grantees possession of this new Province. Great enthusiasm on the subject of colonization now prevailed in England, extending from the king, through all ranks. . . . Before the year 1622 closed, the Council issued many patents for land, in small divisions, to persons intending to make plantations. Among the grants, is one to David Thomson and two associates, of land on the Pascataqua. The bounds and extent of this patent are unknown. Only the fact that such a patent was granted is preserved. . . The Council for New England, in view of the many intended settlements, as well as the few already made, now proposed to set up a general government in New England. Capt. Robert Gorges, recently returned from the Venetian wars, was appointed Governor, with Capt. Francis West, Capt. Christopher Levett, and the governor of New Plymouth as his Council. Capt. Gorges arrived here the middle of September, 1623, having been preceded some months by Capt. West, who was Vice-Admiral of New England as well as Councillor. Capt. Levett came as late as November. . . . The next year, 1624, war between England and Spain broke out, and drew off for a while Gorges and Mason from their interests in colonization. Gorges was Captain of the Castle and Island of St. Nicholas, at Plymouth, a post that he had held for thirty years; and he was now wholly taken up with the duties of his office. Mason's services were required as a naval officer of experience. . . . In 1626 England plunged into a war with France, without having ended the war with Spain. Capt. Mason was advanced to be Treasurer and Paymaster of the English armies employed in the wars. There was no time now to think of American colonization. His duties were arduous. . . . In 1629 peace was made with France, and the war with Spain was coming to an end. No sooner were Gorges and Mason a little relieved from their public duties than they sprang at once to their old New England enterprise. They resolved to push forward their interests. They came to some understanding about a division of their Province of Maine. On the 7th of November, 1629, a day memorable in the history of New Hampshire, the Council granted to Mason a patent of all that part of the Province of Maine lying between the Merrimac and Pascataqua rivers; and Mason called it New Hampshire, out of regard to the favor in which he held Hampshire in England, where he had resided many years. . . . This grant had hardly been made when Champlain was brought to London, a prisoner, from Canada, by Kirke. The French had been driven from that region. Gorges and Mason procured immediately a grant from the Council of a vast tract of land in the region of Lake Champlain, supposed to be not only a fine country for peltry, but to contain vast mineral wealth. The Province was called Laconia on account of the numerous lakes supposed or known to be there, and was the most northern grant hitherto made by the Council. The patent bears date Nov. 17, 1629, only ten days later than Mason's New Hampshire grant. . . . For the purpose of advancing the interests of Gorges and Mason in Laconia as well as on the Pascataqua, they joined with them six merchants in London, and received from the Council a grant dated Nov. 3, 1631, of a tract of land lying on both sides of the Pascataqua river, on the seacoast and within territory already owned by Gorges and Mason in severalty. This patent, called the Pascataqua Patent, covered, on the west side of the river, the present towns of Portsmouth, New Castle, Rye and part of Greenland; on the east side, Kittery, Eliot, the Berwicks, and the western part of Lebanon."—C. W. Tuttle, *Captain John Mason* (*Prince Soc. Publications*, 1887), *pp.* 12–24.

ALSO IN: S. F. Haven, *Grants under the Great Council for New Eng.* (*Lowell Inst. Lects. I Early Hist. of Mass.*, *pp.* 127–162).—J. P. Baxter, ed., *Sir Ferdinando Gorges and his Province of Maine* (*Prince Soc. Pubs.* 1890).—J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New Eng.*, *v.* 1, *p.* 397, *foot-note.*—See also, MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1623–1629; and CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1631.

A. D. 1623-1629.—The Dorchester Company and the royal charter to the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1623–1629.

A. D. 1629.—The new patent to Plymouth Colony. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1623–1629 PLYMOUTH COLONY.

A. D. 1629-1630.—The immigration of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay with their charter. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1629–1630.

A. D. 1634-1637.—The pioneer settlements in Connecticut. See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1634–1637.

A. D. 1635.—Dissolution of the Council for New England and partitioning of its territorial claims by lot.—"The Council for New England, having struggled through nearly fifteen years of maladministration and ill-luck, had yielded to the discouragements which beset it. By the royal favor, it had triumphed over the rival Virginia Company, to be overwhelmed in its turn by the just jealousy of Parliament, and by dissensions among its members. The Council, having, by profuse and inconsistent grants of its lands, exhausted its common property, as well as its credit with purchasers for keeping its engagements, had no motive to continue its organization. Under these circumstances, it determined on a resignation of its charter to the king, and a surrender of the administration of its domain to a General Governor of his appointment, on the condition that all the territory, a large portion of which by its corporate action had already been alienated to other parties [see above: A. D. 1621–1631], should be granted in severalty by the king to the members of the Council. Twelve associates accordingly proceeded to a distribution of New England among themselves by lot; and nothing was wanting to render the transaction complete, and to transfer to them the

ownership of that region, except to oust the previous patentees, of whom the most powerful body were colonists in Massachusetts Bay. To effect this, Sir John Banks, Attorney-General, brought a writ of 'quo warranto' in Westminster Hall against the Massachusetts Company [see MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1634–1637]. . . . It seemed that, when a few more forms should be gone through, all would be over with the presumptuous Colony. . . . But . . . everything went on as if Westminster Hall had not spoken. 'The Lord frustrated their design.' The disorders of the mother country were a safeguard of the infant liberty of New England."—J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New Eng.*, *v.* 1, *ch.* 10.—In the parcelling of New England by lot among the members of the Council, the divisions were: (1) Between the St. Croix and Pemaquid, to William Alexander. (2) From Pemaquid to Sagadahoc, in part to the Marquis of Hamilton. (3) Between the Kennebec and Androscoggin; and (4) from Sagadahoc to Piscataqua, to Sir F. Gorges. (5) From Piscataqua to the Naumkeag, to Mason. (6) From the Naumkeag round the sea-coast, by Cape Cod to Narragansett, to the Marquis of Hamilton. (7) From Narragansett to the half-way bound, between that and the Connecticut River, and 50 miles up into the country, to Lord Edward Gorges. (8) From this midway point to the Connecticut River, to the Earl of Carlisle. (9 and 10) From the Connecticut to the Hudson, to the Duke of Lennox. (11 and 12) From the Hudson to the limits of the Plymouth Company's territory, to Lord Mulgrave.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Hist. of the U. S.*, *v.* 1, *p.* 337, *foot-note.*

ALSO IN: T. Hutchinson, *Hist. of the Colony of Mass. Bay*, *v.* 1, *p.* 48–50.

A. D. 1636.—Providence Plantation and Roger Williams. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1636; and RHODE ISLAND: A. D. 1636.

A. D. 1636-1639.—The first American constitution.—The genesis of a state. See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1636–1639.

A. D. 1636-1641.—Public Registry laws. See LAW, COMMON: A. D. 1630–1641.

A. D. 1637.—The Pequot War.—"The region extending from the bounds of Rhode Island to the banks of the Hudson was at the time of the colonization held in strips of territory mainly by three tribes of the natives, who had long had feuds among themselves and with other tribes. They were the Narragansetts, the Mohegans, and the Pequots. The Mohegans were then tributaries of the Pequots, and were restive under subjection to their fierce and warlike conquerors, who were estimated to number at the time 1,000 fighting men. . . . The policy of the whites was to aggravate the dissensions of the tribes, and to make alliance with one or more of them. Winthrop records in March, 1631, the visit to Boston of a Connecticut Indian, probably a Mohegan, who invited the English to come and plant near the river, and who offered presents, with the promise of a profitable trade. His object proved to be to engage the interest of the whites against the Pequots. His errand was for the time unsuccessful. Further advances of a similar character were made afterwards, the result being to persuade the English that, sooner or later, they would need to interfere as umpires, and must use discretion in a wise regard to what would prove to be for their own interest. In 1633 the Pequots had savagely mutilated and murdered a party of English traders, who, under Captain Stone, of Virginia, had gone up the Connecticut. The Boston magistrates had instituted measures to call the Pequots to account, but nothing effectual was done. The Dutch had a fort on the river near Hartford, and the English had built one at its mouth. In 1636 several settlements had been made in Connecticut by the English from Cambridge, Dorchester, and other places. John Oldham, of Watertown, had in that year been murdered, while on a trading voyage, by some Indians belonging on Block Island. To avenge this act our magistrates sent Endicott, as general, with a body of 90 men, with orders to kill all the male Indians on that island, sparing only the women and little children. He accomplished his bloody work only in part, but after destroying all the corn-fields and wigwams, he turned to hunt the Pequots on the main. After this expedition, which simply exasperated the Pequots, they made a desperate effort to induce the Narragansetts to come into a league with them against the English. It seemed for a while as if they would succeed in this, and the consequences would doubtless have been most disastrous to the whites. The scheme was thwarted largely through the wise and friendly intervention of Roger Williams, whose diplomacy was made effective by the confidence which his red neighbors had in him. The Narragansett messengers then entered into a friendly league with the English in Boston. All through the winter of 1637 the Pequots continued to pick off the whites in their territory, and they mutilated, tortured, roasted, and murdered at least thirty victims, becoming more and more vindictive and cruel in their doings. There were then in Connecticut some 250 Englishmen, and, as has been said, about 1,000 Pequot 'braves.' The authorities in Connecticut resolutely started a military organization, giving the command to the redoubtable John Mason, a Low-Country soldier, who had recently gone from Dorchester. Massachusetts and Plymouth contributed their quotas, having as allies the Mohegans, of whose fidelity they had fearful misgivings, but who proved constant though not very effective. Of the 160 men raised by Massachusetts, only about 20, under Captain Underhill,—a good fighter, but a sorry scamp,—reached the scene in season to join with Mason in surprising the unsuspecting and sleeping Pequots in one of their forts near the Mystic. Fire, lead, and steel with the infuriated vengeance of Puritan soldiers against murderous and fiendish heathen, did effectively the exterminating work. Hundreds of the savages, in their maddened frenzy of fear and dismay, were shot or run through as they were impaled on their own palisades in their efforts to rush from their blazing wigwams, crowded within their frail enclosures. The English showed no mercy, for they felt none. . . . A very few of the wretched savages escaped to another fort, to which the victorious English followed them. This, however, they soon abandoned, taking refuge, with their old people and children, in the protection of swamps and thickets. Here, too, the English, who had lost but two men killed, though they had many wounded, and who were now reinforced, pursued and surrounded them, allowing the aged and the children, by a parley, to come out. The men, however, were mostly slain, and

the feeble remnant of them which sought protection among the so-called river Indians, higher up the Connecticut, and among the Mohawks, were but scornfully received,—the Pequot sachem Sassacus, being beheaded by the latter. A few of the prisoners were sold in the West Indies as slaves, others were reduced to the same humiliation among the Mohegans, or as farm and house servants to the English. . . . But the alliances into which the whites had entered in order to divide their savage foes were the occasions of future entanglements in a tortuous policy, and of later bloody struggles of an appalling character. . . . In all candor the admission must be made, that the Christian white men . . . allowed themselves to be trained by the experience of Indian warfare into a savage cruelty and a desperate vengefulness."—G. E. Ellis, *The Indians of Eastern Mass.* (*Memorial Hist. of Boston, v.* 1. *pp.* 252–254).—"More than 800 [of the Pequots] had been slain in the war, and less than 200 remained to share the fate of captives. These were distributed among the Narragansets and Mohegans, with the pledge that they should no more be called Pequots, nor inhabit their native country again. To make the annihilation of the race yet more complete, their very name was extinguished in Connecticut by legislative act. Pequot river was called the Thames, Pequot town was named New London."—S. G. Arnold, *Hist. of Rhode Island, v.* 1, *ch.* 3.

Also in: G. H. Hollister, *Hist. of Conn., ch.* 2–3.—G. E. Ellis, *Life of John Mason* (*Library of Am. Biog., series* 2, *v.* 3).

A. D. 1638.—The purchase, settlement and naming of Rhode Island.—The founding of New Haven Colony. See Rhode Island: A. D. 1638–1640; and Connecticut: A. D. 1638.

A. D. 1639.—The Fundamental Agreement of New Haven. See Connecticut: A. D. 1639.

A. D. 1640-1644.—The growth of population and the rise of towns.—The end of the Puritan exodus.—"Over 20,000 persons are estimated to have arrived in New England in the fifteen years before the assembling of the Long Parliament [1640]; one hundred and ninety-eight ships bore them over the Atlantic; and the whole cost of their transportation, and of the establishment of the plantation, is computed at about £200,000, or nearly a million of dollars. The progress of settlement had been proportionally rapid. . . . Hingham was settled in 1634. Newbury, Concord, and Dedham were incorporated in 1635. And from that date to 1643, acts were passed incorporating Lynn, North Chelsea, Salisbury, Rowley, Sudbury, Braintree, Woburn, Gloucester, Haverhill, Wenham, and Hull. West of Worcester, the only town incorporated within the present limits of the state was Springfield, for which an act was passed in 1636. These little municipalities were, in a measure, peculiar to New England; each was sovereign within itself; each sustained a relation to the whole, analogous to that which the states of our Union hold respectively to the central power, or the constitution of the United States; and the idea of the formation of such communities was probably derived from the parishes of England, for each town was a parish, and each, as it was incorporated, was required to contribute to the maintenance of the ministry as the basis of its grant of municipal rights. Four counties were erected at this time: Suffolk, Essex, Middlesex, and Old Norfolk, all which were incorporated in 1643. Each of the first three contained eight towns, and Old Norfolk six."—J. S. Barry, *Hist. of Mass., v.* 1, *ch.* 8.—"Events in England had now [1640] reached a crisis, and the Puritan party, rising rapidly into power, no longer looked to America for a refuge. The great tide of emigration ceased to flow; but the government of Massachusetts went on wisely and strongly under the alternating rule of Winthrop, Dudley, and Bellingham. The English troubles crippled the holders of the Mason and Gorges grants, and the settlements in New Hampshire—whither Wheelwright had gone, and where turbulence had reigned—were gradually added to the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. In domestic matters everything went smoothly. There was some trouble with Bellingham, and Winthrop was again made Governor [1642]. The oath of allegiance to the King taken by the magistrates was abandoned, because Charles violated the privileges of Parliament, and the last vestige of dependence vanished. Massachusetts was divided into counties; and out of a ludicrous contest about a stray pig, in which deputies and magistrates took different sides, grew a very important controversy as to the powers of deputies and assistants, which resulted [1644] in the division of the legislature into two branches, and a consequent improvement in the symmetry and solidity of the political system."—H. C. Lodge, *Short Hist. of the Eng. Colonies, ch.* 18.—See, also, Township and Town-meeting.

A. D. 1640-1655.—Colonizing enterprises of New Haven on the Delaware. See New Jersey: A. D. 1640–1655.

A. D. 1643.—The confederation of the colonies.—In May, 1643, "a confederacy, to be known as the United Colonies of New England, was entered into at Boston, between delegates from Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven on the one hand, and the General Court of Massachusetts on the other. Supposed dangers from the Indians, and their quarrels with the Dutch of Manhattan, had induced the people of Connecticut to withdraw their formal objections to this measure. Two commissioners from each colony were to meet annually, or oftener, if necessary; the sessions to be held alternately at Boston, Hartford, New Haven, and Plymouth; but Boston was to have two sessions for one at each of the other places. The commissioners, all of whom must be church members, were to choose a president from among themselves, and everything was to be decided by six voices out of the eight. No war was to be declared by either colony without the consent of the commissioners, to whose province Indian affairs and foreign relations were especially assigned. The sustentation of the 'truth and liberties of the Gospel' was declared to be one great object of this alliance. All war expenses were to be a common charge, to be apportioned according to the number of male inhabitants in each colony. Runaway servants and fugitive criminals were to be delivered up, a provision afterward introduced into the Constitution of the United States; and the commissioners soon recommended, what remained ever after the practice of New England, and ultimately became, also, a provision of the United States Constitution, that judgments of courts of law and probates of wills in each colony should have full faith and credit in all the others.

The commissioners from Massachusetts, as representing by far the most powerful colony of the alliance, claimed an honorary precedence, which the others readily conceded. Plymouth, though far outgrown by Massachusetts, and even by Connecticut, had made, however, some progress. It now contained seven towns, and had lately adopted a representative system. But the old town of Plymouth was in decay, the people being drawn off to the new settlements. Bradford had remained governor, except for four years, during two of which he had been relieved by Edward Winslow, and the other two by Thomas Prince. New Haven was, perhaps, the weakest member of the alliance. Besides that town, the inhabitants of which were principally given to commerce, there were two others, Milford and Guilford, agricultural settlements; Southold, at the eastern extremity of Long Island, also acknowledged the jurisdiction of New Haven, and a new settlement had recently been established at Stamford. . . . The colony of Connecticut, not limited to the towns on the river, to which several new ones had already been added, included also Stratford and Fairfield, on the coast of the Sound, west of New Haven. . . . The town of Southampton, on Long Island, acknowledged also the jurisdiction of Connecticut. Fort Saybrook, at the mouth of the river, was still an independent settlement, and Fenwick, as the head of it, became a party to the articles of confederation. But the next year he sold out his interest to Connecticut, and into that colony Saybrook was absorbed. . . . Gorges's province of Maine was not received into the New England alliance, 'because the people there ran a different course both in their ministry and civil administration.' The same objection applied with still greater force to Aquiday and Providence."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S., ch.* 10 (*v.* 1).

Also in: J. S. Barry, *Hist. of Mass., v.* 1, *ch.* 11.—G. P. Fisher, *The Colonial Era, ch.* 8.

A. D. 1644.—The chartering of Providence Plantation, and the Rhode Island Union. See Rhode Island: A. D. 1638–1647.

A. D. 1649-1651.—Under Cromwell and the Commonwealth. See Massachusetts: A. D. 1649–1651.

A. D. 1650.—Adjustment of Connecticut boundaries with the Dutch. See New York: A. D. 1650.

A. D. 1651-1660.—The disputed jurisdiction in Maine.—The claims of Massachusetts made good. See Maine: A. D. 1648–1677.

A. D. 1656-1661.—The persecution of Quakers. See Massachusetts: A. D. 1656–1661.

A. D. 1657-1662.—The Halfway Covenant. See Boston: A. D 1657–1669.

A. D. 1660-1664.—The protection of the Regicides. See Connecticut: A. D. 1660–1664.

A. D. 1660-1665.—Under the Restored Monarchy.—The first collision of Massachusetts with the crown. See Massachusetts: A. D. 1660–1665.

A. D. 1662.—The Union of Connecticut and New Haven by Royal Charter. See Connecticut: A. D. 1662–1664.

A. D. 1663.—The Rhode Island charter, and beginning of boundary conflicts with Connecticut. See Rhode Island: A. D. 1660–1663.

A. D. 1674-1675.—King Philip's War: Its causes and beginning.—"The Pokanokets had always rejected the Christian faith and Christian manners, and their chief had desired to insert in a treaty, what the Puritans always rejected, that the English should never attempt to convert the warriors of his tribe from the religion of their race. The aged Massassoit—he who had welcomed the pilgrims to the soil of New England, and had opened his cabin to shelter the founder of Rhode Island—now slept with his fathers, and Philip, his son, had succeeded him as head of the allied tribes. Repeated sales of land had narrowed their domains, and the English had artfully crowded them into the tongues of land, as 'most suitable and convenient for them,' and as more easily watched. The principal seats of the Pokanokets were the peninsulas which we now call Bristol and Tiverton. As the English villages drew nearer and nearer to them, their hunting-grounds were put under culture, their natural parks were turned into pastures, their best fields for planting corn were gradually alienated, their fisheries were impaired by more skilful methods, till they found themselves deprived of their broad acres, and, by their own legal contracts, driven, as it were, into the sea. Collisions and mutual distrust were the necessary consequence. There exists no evidence of a deliberate conspiracy on the part of all the tribes. The commencement of war was accidental; many of the Indians were in a maze, not knowing what to do, and disposed to stand for the English; sure proof of no ripened conspiracy. But they had the same complaints, recollections, and fears; and, when they met, they could not but grieve together at the alienation of the domains of their fathers. They spurned the English claim of jurisdiction over them, and were indignant that Indian chiefs or warriors should be arraigned before a jury. And, when the language of their anger and sorrow was reported to the men of Plymouth colony by an Indian tale-bearer, fear professed to discover in their unguarded words the evidence of an organized conspiracy. The haughty Philip, who had once before been compelled to surrender his 'English arms' and pay an onerous tribute, was, in 1674, summoned to submit to an examination, and could not escape suspicion. The wrath of his tribe was roused, and the informer was murdered. The murderers, in their turn, were identified, seized, tried by a jury, of which one half were Indians, and, in June, 1675, on conviction, were hanged. The young men of the tribe panted for revenge; without delay, eight or nine of the English were slain in or about Swansey, and the alarm of war spread through the colonies. Thus was Philip hurried into 'his rebellion;' and he is reported to have wept as he heard that a white man's blood had been shed. . . . What chances had he of success? The English were united; the Indians had no alliance, and half of them joined the English, or were quiet spectators of the fight: the English had guns enough; few of the Indians were well armed, and they could get no new supplies: the English had towns for their shelter and safe retreat; the miserable wigwams of the natives were defenceless: the English had sure supplies of food; the Indians might easily lose their precarious stores. They rose without hope, and they fought without mercy. For them as a

nation there was no to-morrow. . . . At the first alarm, volunteers from Massachusetts joined the troops of Plymouth; on the twenty-ninth of June, within a week from the beginning of hostilities, the Pokanokets were driven from Mount Hope; and in less than a month, Philip was a fugitive among the Nipmucks, the interior tribes of Massachusetts. The little army of the colonists then entered the territory of the Narragansetts, and from the reluctant tribe extorted a treaty of neutrality, with a promise to deliver up every hostile Indian. Victory seemed promptly assured. But it was only the commencement of horrors. Canonchet, the chief sachem of the Narragansetts, was the son of Miantonomoh; and could he forget his father's wrongs? Desolation extended along the whole frontier. Banished from his patrimony where the pilgrims found a friend, and from his cabin which had sheltered exiles, Philip and his warriors spread through the country, awakening their race to a warfare of extermination."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (author's last rev.), pt.* 2, *ch.* 5 (*v.* 1).—"At this time, according to loose estimates, there may have been some 36,000 Indians and 60,000 whites in New England; 10,000 of the former fit for war, and 15,000 of the latter capable of bearing arms. . . . At the outset, the Narragansetts, numbering 2,000 warriors, did not actually second Philip's resistance. But Canonchet, their sachem, might well remember the death of his father Miantonomo [who, taken prisoner in a war with the Mohegans, and surrendered by them to the English, in 1643, with a request for permission to put him to death, was deliberately returned to his savage captors, on advice taken from the ministers at Boston — doomed to death without his knowledge]. . . . No efforts at conciliation seem to have been made by either party; for the whites felt their superiority (were they not 'the Lord's chosen people?'); and Philip knew the desperate nature of the struggle between united and well-armed whites, and divided uncontrolled savages; yet when the emergency came he met it, and never faltered or plead from that day forth."—C. W. Elliott, *The New Eng. Hist., v.* 1, *ch.* 40.

Also in: B. Church, *Hist. of King Philip's War* (*Prince Soc. Pub.* 1867).—S. G. Drake, *Aboriginal Races of N. Am., bk.* 3.

A. D. 1675 (July — September). — King Philip's War: Savage successes of the Indian enemy.—Increasing rage and terror among the colonists.—The Nipmucks, into whose country Philip retreated, "had already commenced hostilities by attacking Mendon. They waylaid and killed Captain Hutchinson, a son of the famous Mrs. Hutchinson, and 16 out of a party of 20 sent from Boston to Brookfield to parley with them. Attacking Brookfield itself, they burned it, except one fortified house. The inhabitants were saved by Major Willard, who, on information of their danger, came with a troop of horse from Lancaster, thirty miles through the woods, to their rescue. A body of troops presently arrived from the eastward, and were stationed for some time at Brookfield. The colonists now found that by driving Philip to extremity they had roused a host of unexpected enemies. The River Indians, anticipating an intended attack upon them, joined the assailants. Deerfield and Northfield, the northernmost towns on the Connecticut River, settled within a few years past, were attacked and several of the inhabitants killed and wounded. Captain Beers, sent from Hadley to their relief with a convoy of provisions, was surprised near Northfield and slain, with 20 of his men. Northfield was abandoned and burned by the Indians. . . . Driven to the necessity of defensive warfare, those in command on the river determined to establish a magazine and garrison at Hadley. Captain Lathrop, who had been dispatched from the eastward to the assistance of the river towns, was sent with 80 men, the flower of the youth of Essex county, to guard the wagons intended to convey to Hadley 3,000 bushels of unthreshed wheat, the produce of the fertile Deerfield meadows. Just before arriving at Deerfield, near a small stream still known as Bloody Brook, under the shadow of the abrupt conical Sugar Loaf, the southern termination of the Deerfield mountain, Lathrop fell into an ambush, and, after a brave resistance, perished there with all his company. Captain Moseley, stationed at Deerfield, marched to his assistance, but arrived too late to help him. That town, also, was abandoned, and burned by the Indians. Springfield, about the same time, was set on fire, but was partially saved by the arrival of Major Treat, with aid from Connecticut. Hatfield, now the frontier town on the north, was vigorously attacked, but the garrison succeeded in repelling the assailants. Meanwhile, hostilities were spreading; the Indians on the Merrimac began to attack the towns in their vicinity; and the whole of Massachusetts was soon in the utmost alarm. Except in the immediate neighborhood of Boston, the country still remained an immense forest, dotted by a few openings. The frontier settlements . . . were mostly broken up, and the inhabitants, retiring towards Boston, spread everywhere dread and intense hatred of 'the bloody heathen.' Even the praying Indians, and the small dependent and tributary tribes, became objects of suspicion and terror. . . . Not content with realities sufficiently frightful, superstition, as usual, added bugbears of her own. Indian bows were seen in the sky, and scalps in the moon. The northern lights became an object of terror. Phantom horsemen careered among the clouds, or were heard to gallop invisible through the air. The howling of wolves was turned into a terrible omen. The war was regarded as a special judgment in punishment of prevailing sins. . . . About the time of the first collision with Philip, the Tarenteens, or Eastern Indians, had attacked the settlements in Maine and New Hampshire, plundering and burning the houses, and massacring such of the inhabitants as fell into their hands. This sudden diffusion of hostilities and vigor of attack from opposite quarters, made the colonists believe that Philip had long been plotting and had gradually matured an extensive conspiracy, into which most of the tribes had deliberately entered, for the extermination of the whites. This belief infuriated the colonists, and suggested some very questionable proceedings. . . . But there is no evidence of any deliberate concert; nor, in fact, were the Indians united. Had they been so, the war would have been far more serious. The Connecticut tribes proved faithful, and that colony remained untouched. Even the Narragansetts, the most powerful confederacy in New

England, in spite of so many former provocations, had not yet taken up arms. But they were strongly suspected of intention to do so, and were accused, notwithstanding their recent assurances, of giving aid and shelter to the hostile tribes."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S.*, *v.* 1, *ch.* 14.

Also in: R. Markham, *Hist. of King Philip's War*, *ch.* 7-8.—G. H. Hollister, *Hist. of Conn.*, *v.* 1, *ch.* 12.—M. A. Green, *Springfield*, 1636-1886, *ch.* 9.

A. D. 1675 (October — December).—King Philip's War: The crushing of the Narragansetts.—"The attitude of the powerful Narragansett tribe was regarded with anxiety. It was known that, so far from keeping their compact to surrender such enemies of the English as should fall into their hands, they had harbored numbers of Philip's dispersed retainers and allies. While the Federal Commissioners were in session at Boston [October], Canonchet, sachem of the Narragansetts, came thither with other chiefs, and promised that the hostile Indians whom they acknowledged to be then under their protection should be surrendered within ten days. But probably the course of events on Connecticut River emboldened them. At all events, they did not keep their engagement. The day for the surrender came and went, and no Indians appeared. If that faithless tribe, the most powerful in New England, should assume active hostilities, a terrible desolation would ensue. The Commissioners moved promptly. The fifth day after the breach of the treaty found them reassembled after a short recess. They immediately determined to raise an additional force of 1,000 men for service in the Narragansett country. They appointed Governor Winslow, of Plymouth, to be commander-in-chief, and desired the colony of Connecticut to name his lieutenant. The General was to place himself at the head of his troops within six weeks, 'a solemn day of prayer and humiliation' being kept through all the colonies meanwhile. . . . Time was thus given to the Narragansetts to make their peace 'by actual performance of their covenants made with the Commissioners; as also making reparation for all damages sustained by their neglect hitherto, together with security for their further fidelity.' . . . It is not known whether Philip was among the Narragansetts at this time. Under whatever influence it was, whether from stupidity or from confidence, they made no further attempt at pacification. . . . The Massachusetts troops marched from Dedham to Attleborough on the day before that which had been appointed by the Commissioners for them to meet the Plymouth levy at the northeastern corner of the Narragansett country. The following day they reached Seekonk. A week earlier, the few English houses at Quinsigamond (Worcester) had been burned by a party of natives; and a few days later, the house of Jeremiah Bull, at Pettyquamscott, which had been designated as the place of general rendezvous for the English, was fired, and ten men and five women and children, who had taken refuge in it, were put to death. . . . The place where the Narragansetts were to be sought was in what is now the town of South Kingston, 18 miles distant, in a northwesterly direction, from Pettyquamscott, and a little further from that Pequot fort to the southwest, which had been destroyed by the force under Captain Mason forty years before. According to information afterwards received from a captive, the Indian warriors here collected were no fewer than 3,500. They were on their guard, and had fortified their hold to the best of their skill. It was on a solid piece of upland of five or six acres, wholly surrounded by a swamp. On the inner side of this natural defence they had driven rows of palisades, making a barrier nearly a rod in thickness; and the only entrance to the enclosure was over a rude bridge consisting of a felled tree, four or five feet from the ground, the bridge being protected by a block-house. The English [whose forces, after a considerable delay of the Connecticut troops, had been all assembled at Pettyquamscott on Saturday, December 18], breaking up their camp [on the morning of the 19th] while it was yet dark, arrived before the place at one o'clock after noon. Having passed, without shelter, a very cold night, they had made a march of 18 miles through deep snow, scarcely halting to refresh themselves with food. In this condition they immediately advanced to the attack. The Massachusetts troops were in the van of the storming column; next came the two Plymouth companies; and then the force from Connecticut. The foremost of the assailants were received with a well-directed fire," and seven of their captains were killed or mortally wounded. "Nothing discouraged by the fall of their leaders, the men pressed on, and a sharp conflict followed, which, with fluctuating success, lasted for two or three hours. Once the assailants were beaten out of the fort; but they presently rallied and regained their ground. There was nothing for either party but to conquer or die, enclosed together as they were. At length victory declared for the English, who finished their work by setting fire to the wigwams within the fort. They lost 70 men killed and 150 wounded. Of the Connecticut contingent alone, out of 300 men 40 were killed and as many wounded. The number of the enemy that perished is uncertain. . . . What is both certain and material is that on that day the military strength of the formidable Narragansett tribe was irreparably broken."—J. G. Palfrey, *Compendious Hist. of New Eng.*, *bk.* 3, *ch.* 3 (*v.* 2).

Also in: S. G. Arnold, *Hist. of Rhode Island*, *v.* 1, *ch.* 10.

A. D. 1676-1678.—King Philip's War: The end of the conflict.—"While the overthrow of the Narragansetts changed the face of things, it was far from putting an end to the war. It showed that when the white man could find his enemy he could deal crushing blows, but the Indian was not always so easy to find. Before the end of January Winslow's little army was partially disbanded for want of food, and its three contingents fell back upon Stonington, Boston, and Plymouth. Early in February the Federal Commissioners called for a new levy of 600 men to assemble at Brookfield, for the Nipmucks were beginning to renew their incursions, and after an interval of six months the figure of Philip again appears for a moment upon the scene. What he had been doing or where he had been, since the Brookfield fight in August, was never known. When in February, 1676, he reappeared, it was still in company with his allies the Nipmucks, in their bloody assault upon Lancaster. On the 10th of that month at sunrise the Indians came swarming into the lovely

village. Danger had already been apprehended, the pastor, Joseph Rowlandson, the only Harvard graduate of 1652, had gone to Boston to solicit aid, and Captain Wadsworth's company was slowly making its way over the difficult roads from Marlborough, but the Indians were beforehand. Several houses were at once surrounded and set on fire, and men, women, and children began falling under the tomahawk. The minister's house was large and strongly built, and more than forty people found shelter there until at length it took fire and they were driven out by the flames. Only one escaped, a dozen or more were slain, and the rest, chiefly women and children, taken captive. . . . Among the captives was Mary Rowlandson, the minister's wife, who afterward wrote the story of her sad experiences. . . . It was a busy winter and spring for these Nipmucks. Before February was over, their exploit at Lancaster was followed by a shocking massacre at Medfield. They sacked and destroyed the towns of Worcester, Marlborough, Mendon, and Groton, and even burned some houses in Weymouth, within a dozen miles of Boston. Murderous attacks were made upon Sudbury, Chelmsford, Springfield, Hatfield, Hadley, Northampton, Wrentham, Andover, Bridgewater, Scituate, and Middleborough. On the 18th of April Captain Wadsworth, with 70 men, was drawn into an ambush near Sudbury, surrounded by 500 Nipmucks, and killed with 50 of his men; six unfortunate captives were burned alive over slow fires. But Wadsworth's party made the enemy pay dearly for his victory; that afternoon 120 Nipmucks bit the dust. In such wise, by killing two or three for one, did the English wear out and annihilate their adversaries. Just one month from that day, Captain Turner surprised and slaughtered 300 of these warriors near the falls of the Connecticut river which have since borne his name, and this blow at last broke the strength of the Nipmucks. Meanwhile the Narragansetts and Wampanoags had burned the towns of Warwick and Providence. After the wholesale ruin of the great swamp fight, Canonchet had still some 600 or 700 warriors left, and with these, on the 26th of March, in the neighbourhood of Pawtuxet, he surprised a company of 50 Plymouth men, under Captain Pierce, and slew them all, but not until he had lost 140 of his best warriors. Ten days later, Captain Denison, with his Connecticut company, defeated and captured Canonchet, and the proud son of Miantonomo met the same fate as his father. He was handed over to the Mohegans and tomahawked. . . . The fall of Canonchet marked the beginning of the end. In four sharp fights in the last week of June, Major Talcott of Hartford slew from 300 to 400 warriors, being nearly all that were left of the Narragansetts; and during the month of July Captain Church patrolled the country about Taunton, making prisoners of the Wampanoags. Once more King Philip, shorn of his prestige, comes upon the scene. . . . Defeated at Taunton, the son of Massasoit was hunted by Church to his ancient lair at Bristol Neck and there," betrayed by one of his own followers, he was surprised on the morning of August 12, and shot as he attempted to fly. "His severed head was sent to Plymouth, where it was mounted on a pole and exposed aloft upon the village green, while the meeting-house bell summoned the townspeople to a special service of thanksgiving. . . . By midsummer of 1678 the Indians had been everywhere suppressed, and there was peace in the land. . . . In Massachusetts and Plymouth . . . the destruction of life and property had been simply frightful. Of 90 towns, 12 had been utterly destroyed, while more than 40 others had been the scene of fire and slaughter. Out of this little society nearly 1,000 staunch men . . . had lost their lives, while of the scores of fair women and poor little children that had perished under the ruthless tomahawk, one can hardly give an accurate account. . . . But . . . henceforth the red man figures no more in the history of New England, except as an ally of the French in bloody raids upon the frontier."—J. Fiske, *The Beginnings of New Eng., ch.* 5.

Also in: W. Hubbard, *Hist. of the Indian Wars in N. Eng., ed. by S. G. Drake, v.* 1.—Mrs. Rowlandson, *Narrative of Captivity*

A. D. 1684-1686.—The overthrow of the Massachusetts charter. See Massachusetts: A. D. 1671-1686

A. D. 1685-1687.—The overthrow of the Connecticut charter. See Connecticut: A. D. 1685-1687.

A. D. 1686.—The consolidation of the "Territory and Dominion of New England" under a royal governor-general.—"It was . . . determined in the Privy Council that Connecticut, New Plymouth, and Rhode Island should be united with Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, and the Narragansett country, and be made 'one entire government, the better to defend themselves against invasion.' This was good policy for England. It was the despotic idea of consolidation. It was opposed to the republican system of confederation. . . . Consolidation was indeed the best mode of establishing in his colonies the direct government which Charles had adopted in November, 1684, and which James was now to enforce. . . . For more than twenty years James had been trying his 'prentice hand' upon New York. The time had now come when he was to use his master hand on New England. . . . By the advice of Sunderland, James commissioned Colonel Sir Edmund Andros to be captain general and governor-in-chief over his 'Territory and Dominion of New England in America,' which meant Massachusetts Bay, New Plymouth, New Hampshire, Maine, and the Narragansett country, or the King's Province. Andros's commission was drawn in the traditional form, settled by the Plantation Board for those of other royal governors in Virginia, Jamaica, and New Hampshire. Its substance, however, was much more despotic. Andros was authorized, with the consent of a council appointed by the crown, to make laws and levy taxes, and to govern the territory of New England in obedience to its sovereign's Instructions, and according to the laws then in force, or afterward to be established. . . . To secure Andros in his government, two companies of regular soldiers, chiefly Irish Papists, were raised in London and placed under his orders."—J. R. Brodhead, *Hist. of the State of New York, v.* 2, *ch.* 9.—See, also, Massachusetts: A. D. 1671-1686; and Connecticut: A. D. 1685-1687.

A. D. 1688.—New York and New Jersey brought under the governor-generalship of Andros. See New York: A. D. 1688.

A. D. 1689.—The bloodless revolution, arrest of Andros, and proclamation of William and Mary. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1686–1689.

A. D. 1689-1697.—King William's War (the First Intercolonial War). See CANADA: A. D. 1689–1690; and 1692–1697

A. D. 1690.—The first Colonial Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1690.

A. D. 1692.—The charter to Massachusetts as a royal province.—Plymouth absorbed. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1689–1692.

A. D. 1692.—The Salem Witchcraft madness. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1692; and 1692–1693.

A. D. 1696-1749.—Suppression of colonial manufactures.—Oppressive commercial policy of England. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1696–1749.

A. D. 1702-1710.—Queen Anne's War (the Second Intercolonial War): Border incursions by the French and Indians.—The final conquest of Acadia.—"But a few years of peace succeeded the treaty of Ryswick. First came the contest in Europe over the Spanish succession," and then the recognition of "the Pretender" by Louis XIV. "This recognition was, of course, a challenge to England and preparations were made for war. William III. died in March, 1702, and was succeeded by Anne, the sister of his wife, and daughter of James II. War was declared by England against France, May 15th, 1702. The contest that followed is known in European history as the War of the Spanish Succession; in American history it is usually called Queen Anne's War; or the Second Intercolonial War. On one side were France, Spain, and Bavaria; on the other, England, Holland, Savoy, Austria, Prussia, Portugal, and Denmark. It was in this war that the Duke of Marlborough won his fame. To the people of New England, war between France and England meant the hideous midnight war-whoop, the tomahawk and scalping-knife, burning hamlets, and horrible captivity. To provide against it, a conference was called to meet at Falmouth, on Casco Bay, in June, 1703, when Governor Dudley, of Massachusetts, met many of the chiefs of the Abenaquis. The Indians, professing to have no thought of war, promised peace and friendship by their accustomed tokens. . . . But, as usual, only a part of the tribes had been brought into the alliance," and some lawless provocations by a party of English marauders soon drove the Abenaquis again into their old French Alliance. "By August, 500 French and Indians were assembled, ready for incursions into the New England settlements. They divided into several bands and fell upon a number of places at the same time. Wells, Saco, and Casco were again among the doomed villages, but the fort at Casco was not taken, owing to the arrival of an armed vessel under Captain Southwick. About 150 persons were killed or captured in these attacks." In February, the town of Deerfield, Massachusetts, was destroyed, 47 of the inhabitants were killed and 112 carried away captive. "On the 30th of July, the town of Lancaster was assailed, and a few people were killed, seven buildings burned, and much property destroyed. These and other depredations of war-parties along the coasts filled New England with consternation. . . . It was . . . resolved to fit out an expedition for retaliation, and as usual the people of Acadia were selected to expiate the sins of the Indians and Canadians. Colonel Benjamin Church was put in command of 550 men, 14 transports, and 36 whale-boats, convoyed by three ships of war. Sailing from Boston in May, 1704," Church ravaged the lesser French settlements on the Acadian coast, but ventured no attack on Port Royal. "In 1705, 450 men under Subercase—soldiers, Canadian peasants, adventurers, and Indians, well armed, and with rations for twenty days, blankets and tents—set out to destroy the English settlements in Newfoundland, marching on snow-shoes. They took Petit Havre and St. John's, and devastated all the little settlements along the eastern coast, and the English trade was for the time completely broken up. Subercase was made Governor of Acadia in 1706. The following spring New England sent Colonel March to Port Royal with two regiments, but he returned without assaulting the fort. Governor Dudley forbade the troops to land when they came back to Boston, and ordered them to go again. Colonel March was ill, and Colonel Wainwright took command; but after a pretence of besieging the fort for eleven days he retired with small loss, the expedition having cost Massachusetts £2,200. In 1708 a council at Montreal decided to send a large number of Canadians and Indians to devastate New England. But after a long march through the almost impassable mountain region of northern New Hampshire, a murderous attack on Haverhill, in which 30 or 40 were killed, was the only result. . . . In 1709 a plan was formed in England for the capture of New France by a fleet and five regiments of British soldiers aided by the colonists. But a defeat in Portugal called away the ships destined for America, and a force gathered at Lake Champlain under Colonel Nicholson for a land attack was so reduced by sickness—said to have resulted from the poisoning of a spring by Indians—that they burned their canoes and retreated. The next year, Nicholson was furnished with six ships of war, thirty transports, and one British and four New England regiments for the capture of Port Royal. Subercase had only 260 men and an insufficient supply of provisions." He surrendered after a short bombardment, "and on the 16th of October the starving and ragged garrison marched out to be sent to France. For the last time the French flag was hauled down from the fort, and Port Royal was henceforth an English fortress, which was re-named Annapolis Royal, in honor of Queen Anne."—R. Johnson, *Hist. of the French War, ch.* 8.—"With a change of masters came a change of names. Acadié was again called 'Nova Scotia'—the name bestowed upon it by James I. in 1621; and Port Royal, 'Annapolis.'"—R. Brown, *Hist. of the Island of Cape Breton, letter* 8.

ALSO IN: P. H. Smith, *Acadia, pp.* 108–111.—See, also, CANADA: A. D. 1711–1713.

A. D. 1722-1725.—Renewed war with the northeastern Indians. See NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1713–1730.

A. D. 1744.—King George's War (the Third Intercolonial War): Hostilities in Nova Scotia.—"The war that had prevailed for several years between Britain and Spain [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1739–1741], inflicted upon the greater number of the British provinces of America no

farther share of its evils than the burden of contributing to the expeditions of Admiral Vernon, and the waste of life by which his disastrous naval campaigns were signalized. Only South Carolina and Georgia had been exposed to actual attack and danger. But, this year [1744], by an enlargement of the hostile relations of the parent state, the scene of war was extended to the more northern provinces. The French, though professing peace with Britain, had repeatedly given assistance to Spain; while the British king, as Elector of Hanover, had espoused the quarrel of the emperor of Germany with the French monarch; and after various mutual threats and demonstrations of hostility that consequently ensued between Britain and France, war [the War of the Austrian Succession] was now formally declared by these states against each other [see AUSTRIA: A. D. 1718-1738, and after]. The French colonists in America, having been apprized of this event before it was known in New England, were tempted to improve the advantage of their prior intelligence by an instant and unexpected commencement of hostilities, which accordingly broke forth without notice or delay in the quarter of Nova Scotia. . . . On the island of Canso, adjoining the coast of Nova Scotia, the British had formed a settlement, which was resorted to by the fishermen of New England, and defended by a small fortification garrisoned by a detachment of troops from Annapolis. . . . Duquesnel, the governor of Cape Breton, on receiving intelligence of the declaration of war between the two parent states, conceived the hope of destroying the fishing establishments of the English by the suddenness and vigor of an unexpected attack. His first blow, which was aimed at Canso, proved successful (May 13, 1744). Duvivier, whom he despatched from his headquarters at Louisburg, with a few armed vessels and a force of 900 men, took unresisted possession of this island, burned the fort and houses, and made prisoners of the garrison and inhabitants. This success Duquesnel endeavoured to follow up by the conquest of Placentia, in Newfoundland, and of Annapolis in Nova Scotia; but at both these places his forces were repulsed. In the attack of Annapolis, the French were joined by the Indians of Nova Scotia; but the prudent forecast of Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, had induced the assembly of this province, some time before, to contribute a reinforcement of 200 men for the greater security of the garrison of Annapolis; and to the opportune arrival of the succour thus afforded the preservation of the place was ascribed. . . . The people of New England were stimulated to a pitch of resentment, apprehension, and martial energy, that very shortly produced an effort of which neither their friends nor their enemies had supposed them to be capable, and which excited the admiration of both Europe and America. . . . War was declared against the Indians of Nova Scotia, who had assisted in the attack upon Annapolis; all the frontier garrisons were reinforced; new forts were erected; and the materials of defence were enlarged by a seasonable gift of artillery from the king. Meanwhile, though the French were not prepared to prosecute the extensive plan of conquest which their first operations announced, their privateers actively waged a harassing naval warfare that greatly endamaged the commerce of New England. The British fisheries on the coast of Nova Scotia were interrupted; the fishermen declared their intention of returning no more to their wonted stations on that coast; and so many merchant vessels were captured and carried into Louisburg in the course of this summer, that it was expected that in the following year no branch of maritime trade would be pursued by the New England merchants, except under the protection of convoy."—J. Grahame, *Hist. [Colonial] of the U. S., bk.* 10, *ch* 1 (*v.* 2).

ALSO IN: P. H. Smith, *Acadia, pp.* 123-138.

A. D. 1745.—King George's War.—The taking of Louisburg.—"Louisburg, on which the French had spent much money [see CAPE BRETON ISLAND: A. D. 1720-1745], was by far the strongest fort north of the Gulf of Mexico. But the prisoners of Canso, carried thither, and afterward dismissed on parole, reported the garrison to be weak and the works out of repair. So long as the French held this fortress, it was sure to be a source of annoyance to New England, but to wait for British aid to capture it would be tedious and uncertain, public attention in Great Britain being much engrossed by a threatened invasion. Under these circumstances, Shirley proposed to the General Court of Massachusetts the bold enterprise of a colonial expedition, of which Louisburg should be the object. After six days' deliberation and two additional messages from the governor, this proposal was adopted by a majority of one vote. A circular letter, asking aid and co-operation, was sent to all the colonies as far south as Pennsylvania. In answer to this application, urged by a special messenger from Massachusetts, the Pennsylvania Assembly . . . voted £4,000 of their currency to purchase provisions. The New Jersey Assembly . . . furnished . . . £2,000 toward the Louisburg expedition, but declined to raise any men. The New York Assembly, after a long debate, voted £3,000 of their currency; but this seemed to Clinton a niggardly grant, and he sent, besides, a quantity of provisions purchased by private subscription, and ten eighteen-pounders from the king's magazine. Connecticut voted 500 men, led by Roger Wolcott, afterward governor, and appointed, by stipulation of the Connecticut Assembly, second in command of the expedition. Rhode Island and New Hampshire each raised a regiment of 300 men; but the Rhode Island troops did not arrive till after Louisburg was taken. The chief burden of the enterprise, as was to be expected, fell on Massachusetts. In seven weeks an army of 3,250 men was enlisted, transports were pressed, and bills of credit were profusely issued to pay the expense. Ten armed vessels were provided by Massachusetts, and one by each of the other New England colonies. The command in chief was given to William Pepperell, a native of Maine, a wealthy merchant, who had inherited and augmented a large fortune acquired by his father in the fisheries; a popular, enterprising, sagacious man, noted for his universal good fortune, but unacquainted with military affairs, except as a militia officer. . . . The enterprise . . . assumed something of the character of an anti-Catholic crusade. One of the chaplains, a disciple of Whitfield, carried a hatchet, specially provided to hew down the images in the French churches. Eleven days after embarking at Boston [April, 1745], the Massachusetts armament assembled at Casco, to

wait there the arrival of the Connecticut and Rhode Island quotas, and the melting of the ice by which Cape Breton was environed. The New Hampshire troops were already there; those from Connecticut came a few days after. Notice having been sent to England and the West Indies of the intended expedition, Captain Warren presently arrived with four ships of war, and, cruising before Louisburg, captured several vessels bound thither with supplies. Already, before his arrival, the New England cruisers had prevented the entry of a French thirty-gun ship. As soon as the ice permitted, the troops landed and commenced the siege, but not with much skill, for they had no engineers. . . . Five unsuccessful attacks were made, one after another, upon an island battery which protected the harbor. In that cold, foggy climate, the troops, very imperfectly provided with tents, suffered severely from sickness, and more than a third were unfit for duty. But the French garrison was feeble and mutinous, and when the commander found that his supplies had been captured, he relieved the embarrassment of the besiegers by offering to capitulate. The capitulation [June 17] included 650 regular soldiers, and near 1,300 effective inhabitants of the town, all of whom were to be shipped to France. The island of St. John's presently submitted on the same terms. The loss during the siege was less than 150, but among those reluctantly detained to garrison the conquered fortress ten times as many perished afterward by sickness. In the expedition of Vernon and this against Louisburg perished a large number of the remaining Indians of New England, persuaded to enlist as soldiers in the colonial regiments. Some dispute arose as to the relative merits of the land and naval forces, which had been joined during the siege by additional ships from England. Pepperell, however, was made a baronet, and both he and Shirley were commissioned as colonels in the British army. Warren was promoted to the rank of rear admiral. The capture of this strong fortress, effected in the face of many obstacles, shed, indeed, a momentary luster over one of the most unsuccessful wars in which Britain was ever engaged."—R. Hildreth, *Hist. of the U. S., ch.* 25 (*v.* 2).—"As far as England was concerned, it [the taking of Louisburg] was the great event of the war of the Austrian succession. England had no other success in that war to compare with it. As things turned out, it is not too much to say that this exploit of New England gave peace to Europe."—J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New Eng., bk.* 5, *ch.* 9 (*v.* 5).—"Though it was the most brilliant success the English achieved during the war, English historians scarcely mention it."—R. Johnson, *Hist. of the French War, ch.* 9.

Also in: T. C. Haliburton, *Hist. and Statistical Acc't of Nova Scotia, ch.* 3 (*v.* 1).—R. Brown, *Hist. of Cape Breton, letters* 12–14.—S. A. Drake, *The Taking of Louisburg.*—U. Parsons, *Life of Sir Wm. Pepperell, ch.* 3–5.—F. Parkman, *The Capture of Louisbourg* (*Atlantic Monthly, March—May*, 1891).

A. D. 1745-1748.—King George's War: The mortifying end.—Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and restoration of Louisburg to France.—"Elated by their success [at Louisburg], the Provincials now offered to undertake the conquest of Canada; but the Duke of Bedford, to whom Governor Shirley's plan had been submitted, disapproved of it, as exhibiting to the colonists too plainly their own strength. . . . He therefore advised to place the chief dependence on the fleet and army to be sent from England, and to look on the Americans as useful only when joined with others. Finally, the Whigs determined to send a powerful fleet to Quebec, at the same time that an army should attack Montreal, by the route of Lake Champlain; and so late as April, 1746, orders were issued to the several governors to levy troops without limitation, which, when assembled on the frontiers, the king would pay. From some unknown cause, the plan was abandoned as soon as formed. The general appointed to the chief command was ordered not to embark, but the instructions to enlist troops had been transmitted to America, and were acted on with alacrity. Massachusetts raised 3,500 men to co-operate with the fleet, which, however, they were doomed never to see. After being kept a long time in suspense, they were dispersed, in several places, to strengthen garrisons which were supposed to be too weak for the defenses assigned them. Upward of 3,000 men, belonging to other colonies, were assembled at Albany, undisciplined, without a commissariat, and under no control. After the season for active operations was allowed to pass away, they disbanded themselves, some with arms in their hands demanding pay of their governors, and others suing their captains. In addition to this disgraceful affair, the Provincials had the mortification to have a large detachment of their men cut off in Lower Horton, then known as Minas, situated nearly in the centre of Nova Scotia. The Canadian forces, which had traveled thither to co-operate with an immense fleet expected from France, determining to winter in that province, rendered it a subject of continued anxiety and expense to Massachusetts. Governor Shirley resolved, after again reinforcing the garrison at Annapolis, to drive them from the shores of Minas Basin, where they were seated; and in the winter of the year 1746, a body of troops was embarked at Boston for the former place. After the loss of a transport, and the greatest part of the soldiers on board, the troops arrived, and reembarked for Grand Pré in the district of Minas, in the latter end of December. . . . The issue was, that being cantoned at too great distances from each other, La Corne, a commander of the French, having intelligence of their situation, forced a march from Schiegnieto, through a most tempestuous snow-storm, and surprised them at midnight. After losing 160 of their men, in killed, wounded and prisoners, the party were obliged to capitulate, not, however, on dishonorable terms, and the French, in their turn, abandoned their post. On the 8th of May, 1749, peace was proclaimed at Boston [according to the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, concluded October 7, 1748], much to the mortification of the Provincials; Cape Breton was restored to France; and Louisburg, which had created so much dread, and inflicted such injuries on their commerce, was handed over to their inveterate enemies, to be rendered still stronger by additional fortifications. The French also obtained the islands of St. Pierre and Michelon, on the south coast of Newfoundland, as stations for their fisheries." England reimbursed the colonies to the extent of £183,000 for the expenses

of their vain conquest of Louisburg, and £185,000 for their losses in raising troops under the orders that were revoked.—T. C. Haliburton, *Rule and Misrule of the English in America, bk.* 3, *ch.* 1.

ALSO IN: J. Hannay, *Hist. of Acadia, ch.* 19.—S. G. Drake, *Particular Hist. of the Five Years French and Indian War, ch.* 6-9.—J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New England, bk.* 5, *ch.* 10 (*v.* 5).—See, also, AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: THE CONGRESS.

A. D. 1750-1753.—Dissensions among the colonies at the opening of the great French War. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1750-1753.

A. D. 1754.—The Colonial Congress at Albany.—Franklin's Plan of Union. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D 1754.

A. D. 1755-1760.—The last Intercolonial, or French and Indian War, and English conquest of Canada. See CANADA: A. D. 1750-1758, to 1760; NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755, 1755; OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1754, 1754, 1755; CAPE BRETON ISLAND: A. D. 1758-1760.

A. D. 1761.—Harsh enforcement of revenue laws.—The Writs of Assistance and Otis' speech. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1761.

A. D. 1763-1764.—Enforcement of the Sugar (or Molasses) Act. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1763-1764.

A. D. 1765-1766.—The Stamp Act.—Its effects and its repeal.—The Stamp Act Congress.—The Declaratory Act. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1765; and 1766.

A. D. 1766-1768.—The Townshend duties.—The Circular Letter of Massachusetts. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1766-1767; and 1767-1768.

A. D. 1768-1770.—The quartering of troops in Boston.—The "Massacre," and the removal of the troops. See BOSTON: A. D. 1768; and 1770.

A. D. 1769-1785.—The ending of Slavery. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1688-1781; 1769-1785; and 1774.

A. D. 1770-1773.—Repeal of the Townshend duties except on Tea.—Committees of Correspondence instituted.—The Tea Ships and the Boston Tea-party. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1770, and 1772-1773; and BOSTON: A. D. 1773.

A. D. 1774.—The Boston Port Bill, the Massachusetts Act, and the Quebec Act.—The First Continental Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1774.

A. D. 1775.—The beginning of the War of the American Revolution.—Lexington.—Concord.—The country in arms and Boston under siege.—Ticonderoga.—Bunker Hill.—The Second Continental Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775.

A. D. 1775-1783.—The War of the Revolution.—Independence achieved. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775 (APRIL), to 1783.

A. D. 1787-1789.—Formation and adoption of the Federal Constitution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1787; and 1787-1789.

A. D. 1808.—The Embargo and its effects. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1804-1809; and 1808.

A. D. 1812-1814.—Federalist opposition to the war with England. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1812.

A. D. 1814.—The Hartford Convention. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1814 (DECEMBER) THE HARTFORD CONVENTION.

A. D. 1824-1828.—Change of front on the tariff question. See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES). A. D. 1816-1824; and 1828.

A. D. 1831-1832.—The rise of the Abolitionists. See SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1828-1832.

A. D. 1861-1865.—The war for the Union. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (APRIL), and after.

NEW FOREST.—To create a new royal hunting ground in his English dominion, William the Conqueror ruthlessly demolished villages, manors, chapels, and parish churches throughout thirty miles of country, along the coast side of Hampshire, from the Avon on the west to Southampton Water on the east, and called this wilderness of his making The New Forest. His son William Rufus was killed in it—which people thought to be a judgment. The New Forest still exists and embraces no less than 66,000 acres, extending over a district twenty miles by fifteen in area, of woodland, heath, bog and rough pasture.—J. C. Brown, *Forests of Eng., pt.* 1, *ch.* 2, *D.*

NEW FRANCE. See CANADA.

NEW GRANADA. See COLOMBIAN STATES.

NEW GUINEA, OR PAPUA.—This great island is, after Australia, the largest body of land in the Pacific, from its northwestern to its southeastern extremity the distance is nearly 1500 miles; its area is equal to one and a half times that of France. It is abundantly watered and rich in varied productions. Nevertheless it has remained until our own time almost outside of the domain of civilized humanity. Most historians attribute the real discovery of the island, or at least of some among its attendant isles, to the Portuguese Jorge de Menezes, in 1526 or 1527. It was not, however, until 1606 that the insularity of the land was practically demonstrated by the Spanish pilot Torres. But that discovery, carefully concealed as a state secret, buried in the archives of Manila, was finally forgotten by the Spanish themselves, and, after more than a century and a half, was newly made by English navigators. The expedition of Captain Cook opened an era of modern exploration on the New Guinea coasts, in which English, Dutch and French took part. The Dutch were the first to attempt an occupation of any part of the island [see MOLUCCAS], and in 1828 their government officially proclaimed possession of the western part of the island as far east as to long. 141° E. of Greenwich.—É. Reclus, *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle, v.* 14, *pp.* 617-20.—Until recent years no other attempts at the occupation of the island were made; but, after Fiji had been ceded to the British crown, in 1874, there began to be an agitation in Australia of proposals for securing control of eastern New Guinea. "It appeared that the claims of the Dutch, who had undoubtedly been intimately connected with the island since the beginning of the 17th century, were confined to a somewhat uncertain portion of New Guinea towards the west, the eastern part being admittedly a sort of No-man's land. Its shores had been continually visited for survey purposes during the present century by British ships, but no assertion of sovereignty over the numerous aboriginal tribes had

been made by the British Government. On the occasion of the organization of Fiji [1874], strong representations as to the desirability of taking a similar course with regard to eastern New Guinea were made to the Secretary of State (Lord Carnarvon); but the Minister, after consulting the various Australasian governments, and finding them by no means unanimous, refused to take the step unless the colonies desiring it would undertake to contribute towards the expense likely to be incurred. The colonies were not prepared to assume this responsibility. . . . Thus the matter rested, until, at the close of the year 1877, the reported discovery of gold in New Guinea again brought the question prominently forward. The news immediately attracted numbers of Australian gold-diggers, and, following in their wake, crowds of less reputable characters, who not only attempted to settle, or rather to lodge, in New Guinea itself, but took irregular possession of more than one of the numerous islands lying between Australia and New Guinea in Torres Strait, within the coast line of Queensland. Here they caused considerable trouble; and the Queensland Government, after acting as police authority in the islands in question for some little time without legal warrant, endeavoured to make its position constitutional with regard to them. In this it was successful. The British Admiralty, on the report of Commander Heath, certified that there was no known claim to the islands in question by any foreign power, and that there appeared no serious objection to the alteration of the Queensland coast boundaries for the purpose of including them. . . . Also at the request of the Queensland Government, the Admiralty stationed a war-ship at Port Moresby in New Guinea. But the Imperial Government, though pressed by representative bodies of various kinds connected with the colonies, still firmly declined to extend the principle of absorption by annexing any part of New Guinea itself to the Empire. The pressure, however, became very great. Companies were formed in Australia for the development of New Guinea. The Queensland Government's agent at Port Moresby began to assume more and more the character of an administrator of the country near the Port. . . . In February of the year 1883 the matter assumed a new phase by the definite offer of the Queensland Government . . . to bear the expense of the administration of New Guinea, if the Imperial authorities would sanction its annexation. The reasons urged by Queensland were, the increasing traffic through Torres Strait, the rapid development of coast industries, such as beche-de-mer and pearl fishing, the danger of the escape of convicts from New Caledonia, and the inadequacy of the High Commissionership. The proposal of Queensland was being discussed by the Colonial Office in somewhat leisurely fashion, when the news reached Australia that a German association had been formed for the settlement of New Guinea. . . . Lord Granville (Foreign Secretary) declined to believe in the existence of the plan, at least so far as the German Government was concerned. The colonists took a different view; and, on the 4th April, 1883, the Queensland Government formally took possession of New Guinea in the name of Her Majesty. . . . Still . . . [the Imperial Government] declined to accede to the wishes of the colonists. . . . But the colonists did not intend to give way" and ultimately they carried their point. "In April 1886 Sir Edward Malet and Count Herbert Bismarck signed at Berlin a declaration which marks out the limits of mutual acquisition in the Western Pacific. The German possession of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, on the north-east coast of New Guinea, is definitely recognized; and an imaginary line, starting from its south-eastern corner, travels due east to the Salomon Islands, which it bisects, then north-east to the Marshall group, and finally due north to an indefinite point in the ocean. All to the west and north of this line is secured from British influence; Germany may not acquire any possession or protectorate to the south or east. Samoa, Tonga, and one or two other places, already provided for by other treaties, are excluded from the Declaration. The way being thus prepared, and the Queensland Government definitely undertaking to contribute for 15 years an annual sum not exceeding £15,000 towards the expenses of the new possession, British New Guinea was, in June 1888, in pursuance of a new Act of Parliament passed in 1887, definitely created a possession of the British Crown. . . . Shortly before this date, the New Hebrides question had been temporarily settled by the mutual withdrawal, on the part of both England and France, of all territorial claims."—E. Jenks, *The History of the Australasian Colonies, ch.* 14.—See, also, MELANESIA.

NEW HAMPSHIRE: The aboriginal inhabitants. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

A. D. 1623-1631.—Gorges' and Mason's grant and the division of it.—First colonies planted.—The naming of the province. See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1621-1681.

A. D. 1641-1679.—The claims of Massachusetts asserted and defeated.—According to its terms, the Massachusetts patent embraced a territory extending northward three miles beyond the head-waters of the Merrimack, and covered, therefore, the greater part of Mason's New Hampshire grant, as well as that of Gorges in Maine. In 1641, when this fact had been ascertained, the General Court of Massachusetts "passed an order (with the consent of the settlers at Dover and Strawberry-bank, on the Piscataqua), 'That from thenceforth, the said people inhabiting there are and shall be accepted and reputed under the Government of the Massachusetts,' etc. Mason had died, and confusion ensued, so that the settlers were mostly glad of the transfer. A long controversy ensued between Mason's heirs and Massachusetts as to the right of jurisdiction. The history of New Hampshire and Maine at this period was much the same. In 1660, at the time of the Restoration, the heirs of Mason applied to the Attorney-General in England, who decided that they had a good title to New Hampshire. The Commissioners who came over in 1664 attempted to re-establish them, but as the settlers favored Massachusetts, she resumed her government when they left. Mason's heirs renewed their claim in 1675, and in 1679 it was solemnly decided against the claim of the Massachusetts Colony, although their grant technically included all lands extending to three miles north of the waters of the Merrimack river. John Cutt was the first President in New Hampshire, and thenceforward, to the American Revolution, New Hampshire was treated as a

Royal province, the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors being appointed by the King, and the laws made by the people being subject to his revision."—C. W. Elliott, *The New England Hist.*, *v.* 1, *ch.* 26.

ALSO IN: G. Barstow, *Hist. of N. Hampshire*, *ch.* 2–5.—J. Belknap, *Hist. of N. Hampshire*, *v.* 1, *ch.* 2–9.—N. Adams, *Annals of Portsmouth*, *pp.* 28–64.—See, also, NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1640–1644.

A. D. 1675.—Outbreak of the Taranteens. See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1675.

A. D. 1744-1748.—King George's War and the taking of Louisburg. See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1744; 1745; and 1745–1748.

A. D. 1749-1774.—Boundary dispute with New York.—The grants in Vermont, and the struggle of the "Green Mountain Boys" to defend them. See VERMONT: A. D. 1749–1774.

A. D. 1754.—The Colonial Congress at Albany, and Franklin's Plan of Union. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1754.

A. D. 1755-1760.—The French and Indian War, and conquest of Canada. See CANADA: A. D. 1750–1753, to 1760; NOVA SCOTIA: A. D 1749–1755, 1755; OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748–1754, 1754, 1755; CAPE BRETON ISLAND: A. D. 1758–1760.

A. D. 1760-1766.—The question of taxation by Parliament.—The Sugar Act.—The Stamp Act and its repeal.—The Declaratory Act.—The Stamp Act Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1760–1775; 1763–1764; 1765; and 1766.

A. D. 1766-1768.—The Townshend duties.—The Circular Letter of Massachusetts. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1766–1767; and 1767–1768.

A. D. 1768-1770.—The quartering of troops in Boston.—The "Massacre" and the removal of the troops. See BOSTON: A. D. 1768; and 1770.

A. D. 1770-1773.—Repeal of the Townshend duties except on Tea.—Committees of Correspondence instituted.—The Tea Ships and the Boston Tea-party. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1770, and 1772–1773; and BOSTON. A. D. 1773.

A. D. 1774.—The Boston Port Bill, the Massachusetts Act, and the Quebec Act.—The First Continental Congress. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1774.

A. D. 1775.—The beginning of the War of the American Revolution.—Lexington.—Concord.—The country in arms and Boston beleaguered.—Ticonderoga.—Bunker Hill.—The Second Continental Congress.—See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1775.

A. D. 1775-1776.—The end of royal government.—Adoption of a constitution.—Declaration of Independence.—The New Hampshire Assembly, called by Governor Wentworth, came together June 12, 1775, in the midst of the excitements produced by news of Lexington and Ticonderoga. Meantime, a convention of the people had been called and was sitting at Exeter. Acting on a demand from the latter, the assembly proceeded first to expel from its body three members whom the governor had called by the king's writ from three new townships, and who were notorious royalists. "One of the expelled members, having censured this proceeding, was assaulted by the populace, and fled for shelter to the governor's house. The people demanded him, and, being refused, they pointed a gun at the governor's door; whereupon the offender was surrendered and carried to Exeter. The governor retired to the fort, and his house was pillaged. He afterwards went on board the Scarborough and sailed for Boston. He had adjourned the assembly to the 28th of September. But they met no more. In September, he issued a proclamation from the Isles of Shoals, adjourning them to April next. This was the closing act of his administration. It was the last receding step of royalty. It had subsisted in the province 95 years. The government of New Hampshire was henceforth to be a government of the people. . . . The convention which had assembled at Exeter was elected but for six months. Previous to their dissolution in November, they made provisions, pursuant to the recommendations of congress, for calling a new convention, which should be a more full representation of the people. They sent copies of these provisions to the several towns, and dissolved. The elections were forthwith held. The new convention promptly assembled, and drew up a temporary form of government. Having assumed the name of 'House of Representatives,' they adopted a constitution [January, 1776], and proceeded to choose twelve persons to constitute a distinct and a co-ordinate branch of the legislature, by the name of a Council." The constitution provided for no executive. "The two houses assumed to themselves the executive duty during the session, and they appointed a committee of safety to sit in the recess, varying in number from six to sixteen, vested with executive powers. The president of the council was president of the executive committee. . . . On the 11th of June, 1776, a committee was chosen by the assembly, and another by the council of New Hampshire, 'to make a draught of a declaration of the independence of the united colonies.' On the 15th, the committees of both houses reported a 'Declaration of Independence,' which was adopted unanimously, and a copy sent forthwith to their delegates in congress."—G. Barstow, *Hist. of New Hampshire*, *ch.* 9.

A. D. 1776.—The ending of Slavery. See SLAVERY, NEGRO. A. D. 1769–1785.

A. D. 1776-1783.—The War of Independence.—Peace with England. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776, to 1783

A. D. 1783.—Revision of the State constitution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778–1779.

A. D. 1788.—Ratification of the Federal constitution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1787–1789.

A. D. 1814.—The Hartford Convention. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1814 (DECEMBER) THE HARTFORD CONVENTION.

NEW HAVEN: A. D. 1638.—The planting of the Colony and the founding of the City. See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1638.

A. D. 1639.—The Fundamental Agreement. See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1639.

A. D. 1640-1655.—The attempts at colonization on the Delaware. See NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1640–1655.

A. D. 1643.—Progress and state of the colony.—The New England Confederation. See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1643.

A. D. 1660-1664.—The protection of the Regicides. See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1660-1664.

A. D. 1662-1664.—Annexation to Connecticut. See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1662-1664.

A. D. 1666.—The migration to Newark, N. J. See NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1664-1667.

A. D. 1779.—Pillaged by Tryon's marauders. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778-1779.

NEW HEBRIDES. See MELANESIA.

NEW HOPE CHURCH, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MAY—SEPTEMBER: GEORGIA).

NEW IRELAND. See MELANESIA.

NEW JERSEY: The aboriginal inhabitants. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: DELAWARES.

A. D. 1610-1664.—The Dutch in possession. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1610-1614; and 1621-1646.

A. D. 1620.—Embraced in the patent of the Council for New England. See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1620-1623.

A. D. 1634.—Embraced in the Palatine grant of New Albion. See NEW ALBION.

A. D. 1635.—Territory assigned to Lord Mulgrave on the dissolution of the Council for New England. See NEW ENGLAND: A. D. 1635.

A. D. 1640-1655.—The attempted colonization from New Haven, on the Delaware.—The London merchants who formed the leading colonists of New Haven, and who were the wealthiest among the pioneer settlers of New England, had schemes of commerce in their minds, as well as desires for religious freedom, when they founded their little republic at Quinnipiac. They began with no delay to establish a trade with Barbadoes and Virginia, as well as along their own coasts; and they were promptly on the watch for advantageous openings at which to plant a strong trading-post or two among the Indians. In the winter of 1638-39, one George Lamberton of New Haven, while trafficking Virginia-wards, discovered the lively fur trade already made active on Delaware Bay by the Dutch and Swedes [see Delaware: A. D. 1638-1640], and took a hand in it. His enterprising townsmen, when they heard his report, resolved to put themselves at once on some kind of firm footing in the country where this profitable trade could be reached. They formed a "Delaware Company," in which the Governor, the minister, and all the chiefs of the colony were joined, and late in the year 1640 they sent a vessel into Delaware Bay, commanded by Capt. Turner, who was one of their number. Capt. Turner "was instructed by the Delaware Company to view and purchase lands at the Delaware Bay, and not to meddle with aught that rightfully belonged to the Swedes or Dutch. . . . But New Haven's captain paid little heed to boundaries. He bought of the Indians nearly the whole southwestern coast of New Jersey, and also a tract of land at Passayunk, on the present site of Philadelphia, and opposite the Dutch fort Nassau. . . . On the 30th of August, 1641, there was a Town-Meeting at New Haven, which voted to itself authority over the region of the Delaware Bay. The acts of the Delaware Company were approved, and 'Those to whome the affaires of the towne is committed' were ordered to 'Dispose of all the affayres of Delaware Bay.' The first instalment of settlers had previously gone to the Bay. Trumbull says that nearly fifty families removed. As they went by New Amsterdam, Governor Kieft issued an unavailing protest, which was met, however, by fair words. The larger portion of the party settled in a plantation on Varkin's Kill (Ferkenskill, Hog Creek?), near what is now Salem, New Jersey. A fortified trading-house was built or occupied at Passayunk. This was the era of Sir Edmund Plowden's shadowy Palatinate of New Albion, and, if there is any truth in the curious 'Description,' there would seem to be some connection between this fort of the New Haven settlers and Plowden's alleged colony." The Dutch and the Swedes, notwithstanding their mutual jealousies, made common cause against these New England intruders, and succeeded in breaking up their settlements. The exact occurrences are obscurely known, but it is certain that the attempted colonization was a failure, and that, "slowly, through the winter and spring of 1643, the major part of [the settlers] . . . straggled home to New Haven. . . . The poverty and distress were not confined to the twoscore households who had risked their persons in the enterprise. The ill-starred effort had impoverished the highest personages in the town, and crippled New Haven's best financial strength." Yet the scheme of settlement on the Delaware was not abandoned. While claims against the Dutch for damages and for redress of wrongs were vigorously pressed, the town still looked upon the purchased territory as its own, and was resolute in the intention to occupy it. In 1651 a new expedition of fifty persons set sail for the Delaware, but was stopped at Manhattan by Peter Stuyvesant, and sent back, vainly raging at the insolence of the Dutch. All New England shared the wrath of New Haven, but confederated New England was not willing to move in the matter unless New Haven would pay the consequent costs. New Haven seemed rather more than half disposed to take up arms against New Netherland on her own responsibility; but her small quarrel was soon merged in the greater war which broke out between Holland and England. When this occurred, "concerted action on the part of the New Englanders would have given New Holland to the Allies, and extended New Haven's limits to the Delaware, without any one to gainsay or resist. After the Commissioners [of the United Colonies] declared for war, Massachusetts refused to obey, adopted the rôle of a secessionist, and checked the whole proceeding. New Haven, with whom the proposed war was almost a matter of life and death, was justified in adverting to the conduct of Massachusetts as 'A provoaking sinn against God, and of a scandalous nature before men.' The mutinous schemes of Roger Ludlow and of some New Haven malcontents complicated the problem still more both for Connecticut and New Haven. Finally, just as an army of 800 men was ready [1654] to march upon New Amsterdam, tidings came of a European peace, and New Haven's last chance was gone. But the town did not lose hope." Plans for a new colony were slowly matured through 1654 and 1655, but "the enterprise was completely thwarted by a series of untoward events," the most decisive of which was the conquest of New Sweden by Stuyvesant in October, 1655. "But the dream of Delaware was not forgotten."—C. H. Levermore, *The Republic of New Haven, ch. 8, sect. 5.*

ALSO IN: S. Hazard, *Annals of Penn., pp.* 57-178.

A. D. 1664-1667.—The English occupation and proprietary grant to Berkeley and Carteret.—The naming of the province.—The Newark immigration from New Haven.—"Before the Duke of York was actually in possession of his easily acquired territory [of New Netherlands, or New York—see NEW YORK: A. D. 1664], on the 23d and 24th of June, 1664, he executed deeds of lease and release to Lord John Berkeley, Baron of Stratton, and Sir George Carteret, of Saltrum in Devon, granting to them, their heirs and assigns, all that portion of his tract 'lying and being to the westward of Long Island and Manhitas Island, and bounded on the east part by the main sea, and part by Hudson's river, and hath upon the west, Delaware bay or river, and extending southward to the main ocean as far as Cape May, at the mouth of Delaware bay; and to the northward, as far as the northernmost branch of the said bay or river of Delaware, which is 41° 40′ of latitude, and crosseth over thence in a strait line to Hudson's river, in 41° of latitude; which said tract of land is hereafter to be called by the name or names of New Cæsarea, or New Jersey.' The name of 'Cæsarea' was conferred upon the tract in commemoration of the gallant defence of the Island of Jersey in 1649, by Sir George Carteret, then its governor, against the Parliamentarians; but the people preferred the English name of New Jersey, and the other was consequently soon lost. The grant of the Duke of York from the crown conferred upon him, his heirs and assigns, among other rights appertaining thereto, that most important one of government; the power of hearing and determining appeals being reserved to the king; but, 'relying,' says Chalmers, 'on the greatness of his connection, he seems to have been little solicitous to procure the royal privileges conferred on the proprietors of Maryland and Carolina,' whose charters conferred almost unlimited authority. 'And while as counts-palatine they exercised every act of government in their own names, because they were invested with the ample powers possessed by the prætors of the Roman provinces, he ruled his territory in the name of the king.' In the transfer to Berkeley and Carteret, they, their heirs and assigns, were invested with all the powers conferred upon the duke. . . . Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret, now sole proprietors of New Jersey, on the 10th February 1664, signed a constitution, which they made public under the title of 'The Concessions and agreement of the Lords Proprietors of New Jersey, to and with all and every of the adventurers, and all such as shall settle and plant there.'. . . On the same day that this instrument was signed, Philip Carteret, a brother to Sir George, received a commission as governor of New Jersey. . . . The ship Philip, having on board about 30 people, some of them servants, and laden with suitable commodities, sailed from England in the summer, and arrived in safety at the place now known as Elizabethtown Point, or Elizabeth Port, in August of the same year. What circumstance led to the governor's selection of this spot for his first settlement, is not now known, but it was, probably, the fact of its having been recently examined and approved of by others. He landed, and gave to his embryo town the name of Elizabeth, after the lady of Sir George. . . . Governor Carteret, so soon as he became established at Elizabethtown, sent messengers to New England and elsewhere, to publish the concessions of the proprietors and to invite settlers. In consequence of this invitation and the favorable terms offered, the province soon received large additions to its population."—W. A. Whitehead, *East Jersey under the Proprietary Governments* (*N. J. Hist. Soc Colls., v.* 1), *period* 2.—"In August, 1665, he [Governor Carteret] sent letters to New England offering to settlers every civil and religious privilege. Mr. Treat and some of his friends immediately visited New Jersey. They bent their steps toward the New Haven property on the Delaware Bay, and selected a site for a settlement near what is now Burlington. Returning by way of Elizabeth, they met Carteret, and were by him influenced to locate on the Passaic River. . . . Early in the spring of 1666, the remnant of the old New Haven, the New Haven of 1638, under the leadership of Robert Treat and Mathew Gilbert, sailed into the Passaic. . . . In June, 1667, the entire force of the little colony was gathered together in their new abode, to which the name 'Newark' was applied, in honor of Mr. Pierson's English home. [Mr. Pierson was the minister at Branford, in the New Haven colony, and his flock migrated with him to Newark almost bodily.] The Fundamental Agreement was revised and enlarged, the most notable expansion being the following article: 'The planters agree to submit to such magistrates as shall be annually chosen by the Friends from among themselves, and to such Laws as we had in the place whence we came.' Sixty four men wrote their names under this Bill of Rights, of whom 23 were from Branford, and the remaining 41 from New Haven, Milford, and Guilford. Most of them were probably heads of families, and, in all the company, but six were obliged to make their marks. . . . It seems to me that, after 1666, the New Haven of Davenport and Eaton must be looked for upon the banks, not of the Quinnipiac, but of the Passaic. The men, the methods the laws, the officers, that made New Haven Town what it was in 1640, disappeared from the Connecticut Colony, but came to full life again immediately in New Jersey. . . . Newark was not so much the product as the continuation of New Haven."—C. H. Levermore, *The Republic of N. Haven, ch* 4, *sect.* 6.

ALSO IN: *Docs. Rel. to the Col. Hist. N. J., v.* 1.

A. D. 1673.—The Dutch reconquest. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1673.

A. D. 1673-1682.—The sale to new Proprietors, mostly Quakers, and division of the province into East Jersey and West Jersey.—The free constitution of West Jersey.—In 1673 Lord Berkeley, one of the original proprietors, "sold his one-half interest in the Province for less than £5,000. John Fenwick and Edward Byllinge, two English Quakers, were the purchasers. A dispute arose between the new proprietors about the division of their property, and William Penn, who afterward became the founder of Pennsylvania, was chosen arbitrator to settle the difficulty, and succeeded to the satisfaction of all parties interested. Fenwick sailed from London, in 1675, in the ship 'Griffith,' with his family and a small company of Quakers. This was the first English vessel that came to

New Jersey with immigrants. The party sailed up the Delaware bay, and, entering a creek, landed on its banks three miles and a half from the Delaware. This creek, and the settlement founded on it, Fenwick named Salem. This was the first English settlement permanently established in West Jersey."—J. R. Sypher and E. A. Apgar, *Hist. of New Jersey, ch.* 1.—In July, 1676, the province was divided, Philip Carteret taking East Jersey, and the successors of Berkeley taking West Jersey. "Thereupon, Carteret, by will, devised his plantation of New Jersey to trustees to be sold for certain purposes, by him stated, in 1681–2. . . . He had not a peaceable time. Indeed, anything like constant peace was the lot of very few of New Jersey's early Governors. Governor Andros; of New York, disputed Carteret's authority; nay, failing by peaceable means to gain his point, he sent a party of soldiers by night [1678], who dragged Carteret from his bed, carried him to New York, and there kept him close until a day was set on which he was tried before his opponent himself in the New York Courts, and three times acquitted by the jury, who were sent back with directions to convict, but firmly each time refused. The authority of Carteret was confirmed by the Duke of York, and Andros was recalled. . . . The trustees of Sir George Carteret could not make sale of East Jersey. After ineffectual attempts at private sale they offered it at public auction, and William Penn and eleven associates, most if not all Quakers, bought it for £3,400. It was too heavy a purchase, apparently, for their management. Each sold half his right to another, and so were constituted the twenty-four Proprietors. They procured a deed of confirmation from the Duke of York March 14th, 1682, and then the twenty-four Lords Proprietors by sealed instrument established a council, gave them power to appoint overseers, and displace all officers necessary to manage their property, to take care of their lands, deed them, appoint dividends, settle the rights of particular Proprietors in such dividends, grant warrants of survey, in fine, to do everything necessary for the profitable disposition of all the territory. . . . The new Proprietors were men of rank. William Penn is known to all the world. With him were James, Earl of Perth, John Drummond, Robert Barclay, famous, like Penn, as a Quaker gentleman, and a controversialist for Quaker belief; David Barclay. . . . Each Proprietor had a twenty-fourth interest in the property, inheritable, divisible, and assignable, as if it were a farm instead of a province. And by these means the estate has come down to those who now own the property. . . . In New Jersey . . . our Legislature has nothing at all to do with our waste or unappropriated land It all belongs to the Proprietors, to those, namely, who own what are known as Proprietary rights, or rights of Proprietorship, and is subject to the disposition of the Board of Proprietors. . . . What is left in their control is now [1884] of comparatively slight value."—C. Parker, *Address, Bi-Centennial Celebration of the Board of Am. Proprietors of E. New Jersey.*—The division line between East Jersey and West Jersey, as established by the agreement between the Proprietors, began at Little Egg Harbor and extended northwestward to a point on the Delaware river in 41 degrees of north latitude. "After this line had been established, John Fenwick's interest in West Jersey was conveyed to John Eldridge and Edmund Warner in fee, and they were admitted into the number of proprietors. In order to establish a government for the Province of West Jersey, provisional authority was given to Richard Hartshore and Richard Guy, residents of East Jersey, and to James Wasse, who was sent especially from England to act on behalf of the proprietors These persons were commissioned on the 18th of August, 1676, by Byllinge and his trustees, in conjunction with Eldridge and Warner, and full power was given them to conduct the affairs of the government in accordance with instructions from the proprietors. Fenwick, who had founded a settlement at Salem, refused to recognize the transfer of his portion of the Province to Eldridge and Warner, and declared himself to be independent of this new government. It therefore became the first duty of the commissioners to settle this difficulty. All efforts, however, for that purpose failed. The original plan of the government was devised by William Penn and his immediate associates. It was afterward approved by all the proprietors interested in the Province, and was first published on the 3d of March, 1676, as 'The Concessions and Agreements of the proprietors, freeholders and inhabitants of the Province of West Jersey in America.' This constitution declared that no man or number of men on earth had power or authority to rule over men's consciences in religious matters; and that no person or persons within the Province should be in any wise called in question or punished, in person, estate or privilege, on account of opinion, judgment, faith or worship toward God in matters of religion. . . . That all the inhabitants of the Province should have the right to attend court and be present at all proceedings, 'to the end that justice may not be done in a corner, nor in any covert manner' . . . The executive authority of the government was lodged in the hands of commissioners, to be appointed at first by the proprietors or a majority of them; but after the further settlement of the Province they were to be chosen by the resident proprietors and inhabitants, on the 25th of March of each year. The first election for commissioners occurred in 1680. . . . One of the most remarkable features in this instrument is the fact that no authority is retained by the proprietary body. 'We put the power in the people,' was the language of the fundamental law."—J. R. Sypher and E. A. Apgar, *Hist. of New Jersey, ch.* 8.

ALSO IN: W. A. Whitehead, *East Jersey under the Proprietary Gov'ts, pp.* 66–99.—*Docs. Relating to the Col. Hist. of New Jersey, v.* 1.

A. D. 1674.—Final recovery by the English. See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1674.

A. D. 1688.—Joined with New England under the Governorship of Andros. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1688.

A. D. 1688-1738.—Extinguishment of the Proprietary political powers.—Union of the two Jerseys in one royal province.—"In New Jersey, had the proprietary power been vested in the people or reserved to one man, it might have survived, but it was divided among speculators in land, who, as a body, had gain, and not the public welfare, for their end. In April, 1688, 'the proprietors of East New Jersey had surrendered their pretended right of govern-

ment,' and the surrender had been accepted. In October of the same year, the council of the proprietaries of West New Jersey voted to the secretary-general for the dominion of New England the custody of 'all records relating to government.' Thus the whole province fell, with New York and New England, under the government of Andros. At the revolution, therefore [the English Revolution of 1688-89], the sovereignty over New Jersey had reverted to the crown; and the legal maxim, soon promulgated by the board of trade, that the domains of the proprietaries might be bought and sold, but not their executive power, weakened their attempts at the recovery of authority, and consigned the colony to a temporary anarchy. A community of husbandmen may be safe for a short season with little government. For twelve years, the province was not in a settled condition. From June, 1689, to August, 1692, East New Jersey had apparently no superintending administration, being, in time of war, destitute of military officers as well as of magistrates with royal or proprietary commissions. They were protected by their neighbors from external attacks; and there is no reason to infer that the several towns failed to exercise regulating powers within their respective limits. . . . The proprietaries, threatened with the ultimate interference of parliament in provinces 'where,' it was said, 'no regular government had ever been established,' resolved to resign their pretensions. In their negotiations with the crown, they wished to insist that there should be a triennial assembly; but King William, though he had against his inclination approved triennial parliaments for England, would never consent to them in the plantations. In 1702, the first year of Queen Anne, the surrender took place before the privy council. The domain, ceasing to be connected with proprietary powers, was, under the rules of private right, confirmed to its possessors, and the decision has never been disturbed. The surrender of 'the pretended' rights to government being completed, the two Jerseys were united in one province; and the government was conferred on Edward Hyde, Lord Cornbury, who, like Queen Anne, was the grandchild of Clarendon. Retaining its separate legislature, the province had for the next thirty-six years the same governors as New York. It never again obtained a charter: the royal commission of April 1702, and the royal instructions to Lord Cornbury, constituted the form of its administration. To the governor appointed by the crown belonged the power of legislation, with consent of the royal council and the representatives of the people. . . . The freemen of the colony were soon conscious of the diminution of their liberties."—G. Bancroft, *Hist. of the U. S. (author's last rev.), pt.* 3, *ch.* 2 (*v.* 2).

Also in: J. O. Raum, *Hist. of New Jersey, ch.* 8 (*v.* 1).

A. D. 1711.—Queen Anne's War. See Canada: A. D. 1711-1718.

A. D. 1744-1748.—King George's War. See New England: A. D. 1744; 1745; and 1745-1748.

A. D. 1760-1766.—The question of taxation by Parliament.—The Sugar Act.—The Stamp Act and its repeal.—The Declaratory Act.—The First Continental Congress. See United States of Am.: A. D. 1760-1775; 1763-1764; 1765; and 1766.

A. D. 1766-1774.—Opening events of the Revolution. See United States of Am.: A. D. 1766-1767, to 1774; and Boston: A. D. 1768, to 1773.

A. D. 1774-1776.—End of royal government.—Adoption of a State Constitution.— In the person of William Franklin, unworthy son of Benjamin Franklin, New Jersey was afflicted, at the outbreak of the Revolutionary struggle, with an arbitrary and obstinately royalist governor. Finding the assembly of the colony refractory and independent, he refused to convene it in 1774, when the people desired to send delegates to the Continental Congress. Thereupon a convention was held at New Brunswick, and this body not only commissioned delegates to the general Congress, but appointed a "general committee of correspondence" for the Province. The committee, in May of the following year, called together, at Trenton, a second Provincial Convention, which took to itself the title of the "Provincial Congress of New Jersey," and assumed the full authority of all the branches of the government, providing for the defense of the Province and taking measures to carry out the plans of the Continental Congress. "Governor Franklin convened the Legislature on the 16th of November, 1775. No important business was transacted, and on the 6th of December the Assembly was prorogued by the governor to meet on the 3d of January, 1776, but it never reassembled, and this was the end of Provincial legislation in New Jersey under royal authority. . . . Though the Provincial Congress of New Jersey had to a great extent assumed the control of public affairs in the Province, it had not renounced the royal authority. . . . On the 21th of June, a committee was appointed to draft a constitution. . . . New Jersey was, however, not yet disposed to abandon all hopes of reconciliation with the Crown, and therefore provided in the last article of this constitution that the instrument should become void whenever the king should grant a full redress of grievances, and agree to administer the government of New Jersey in accordance with the constitution of England and the rights of British subjects. But, on the 18th of July, 177[6] the Provincial Congress assumed the title of 'The Convention of the State of New Jersey,' declared the State to be independent of royal authority, and directed that all official papers, acts of Assembly and other public documents should be made in the name and by the authority of the State." Before this occurred, however, Governor Franklin had been placed under arrest, by order of Congress, and sent to Connecticut, where he was released on parole. He sailed immediately for England. "When the State government was organized under the new constitution, the Legislature enacted laws for the arrest and punishment of all persons who opposed its authority."—J. R. Sypher and E. A. Apgar, *Hist. of New Jersey, ch.* 10-11.

Also in: T. F. Gordon, *Hist. of New Jersey, ch.* 12.—See, also, United States of Am.: A. D. 1776-1779.

A. D. 1775.—The beginning of the War of the American Revolution.—Lexington.—Concord.—Siege of Boston.—Ticonderoga.—Bunker Hill.—The Second Continental Congress. See United States of Am.: A. D. 1775.

A. D. 1776-1778.—The battle ground of Washington campaigns. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1776; 1776-1777; and 1778 (JUNE).

A. D. 1777-1778.—Withholding ratification from the Articles of Confederation. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1781-1786.

A. D. 1778-1779.—British raids from New York. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778-1779.

A. D. 1778-1783.—The war on the Hudson, on the Delaware, and in the South.—Surrender of Cornwallis.—Peace with Great Britain. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1778, to 1783.

A. D. 1787.—Ratification of the Federal Constitution. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1787-1789.

NEW MADRID, The capture of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MARCH—APRIL: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).

NEW MARKET, OR GLENDALE, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE—JULY: VIRGINIA).

NEW MARKET (Shenandoah Valley), Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MAY—JUNE: VIRGINIA) THE CAMPAIGNING IN THE SHENANDOAH.

NEW MEXICO: Aboriginal Inhabitants. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PUEBLOS, APACHE GROUP, and SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.

A. D. 1846.—The American conquest and occupation by Kearney's expedition.—"While the heaviest fighting [of the Mexican War] was going on in Old Mexico [see MEXICO: A. D. 1846-1847], the Government [of the United States] easily took possession of New Mexico and California, by means of expeditions organized on the remote frontiers. New Mexico was wanted for the emigration to the Pacific. If we were to have California we must also have the right of way to it. In the hands of the Spaniards, New Mexico barred access to the Pacific so completely that the oldest travelled route was scarcely known to Americans at all, and but little used by the Spaniards themselves. If now we consult a map of the United States it is seen that the thirty-fourth parallel crosses the Mississippi at the mouth of the Arkansas, cuts New Mexico in the middle, and reaches the Pacific near Los Angeles. It was long the belief of statesmen that the great tide of emigration must set along this line, because it had the most temperate climate, was shorter, and would be found freer from hardship than the route by way of the South Pass. This view had set on foot the exploration of the Arkansas and Red Rivers. But if we except the little that Pike and Long had gathered, almost nothing was known about it. Yet the prevailing belief gave New Mexico, as related to California, an exceptional importance. These considerations weighed for more than acquisition of territory, though the notion that New Mexico contained very rich silver-mines undoubtedly had force in determining its conquest. . . . With this object General Kearney marched from Fort Leavenworth in June, 1846, for Santa Fé, at the head of a force of which a battalion of Mormons formed part. After subduing New Mexico, Kearney was to go on to California, and with the help of naval forces already sent there, for the purpose, conquer that country also. . . . General Kearney marched by the Upper Arkansas, to Bent's Fort, and from Bent's Fort over the old trail through El Moro and Las Vegas, San Miguel and Old Pecos, without meeting the opposition he expected, or at any time seeing any considerable body of the enemy. On the 18th of August, as the sun was setting, the stars and stripes were unfurled over the palace of Santa Fé, and New Mexico was declared annexed to the United States. Either the home government thought New Mexico quite safe from attack, or, having decided to reserve all its strength for the main conflict, had left this province to its fate. After organizing a civil government, and appointing Charles Bent of Bent's Fort, governor, General Kearney broke up his camp at Santa Fé, Sept. 25. His force was now divided. One part, under Colonel Doniphan, was ordered to join General Wool in Chihuahua. A second detachment was left to garrison Santa Fé, while Kearney went on to California with the rest of his troops. The people everywhere seemed disposed to submit quietly, and as most of the pueblos soon proffered their allegiance to the United States Government, little fear of an outbreak was felt. Before leaving the valley, a courier was met bearing the news that California also had submitted to us without striking a blow. This information decided General Kearney to send back most of his remaining force, while with a few soldiers only he continued his march through what is now Arizona for the Pacific."—S. A. Drake, *The Making of the Great West, pp.* 251-255.

ALSO IN: H. O. Ladd, *Hist. of the War with Mexico, ch.* 9-12.—P. St. G. Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and Cal.*—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States, v.* 12, *ch.* 17.—H. O. Ladd, *The Story of New Mexico, ch.* 16.

A. D. 1848.—Cession to the United States. See MEXICO: A. D. 1848.

A. D. 1850.—Territorial organization. See UTAH: A. D. 1849-1850.

A. D. 1875-1894.—Prospective admission to the Union.—A bill to admit New Mexico to the Union as a state was passed by both houses of Congress in 1875, but failed in consequence of an amendment made in the Senate too late for action upon it in the House of Representatives. Attempts to convert the scantily populated territory into a state were then checked for several years. At this writing (July 1894) a bill for organizing and admitting the state of New Mexico has again passed the House of Representatives, and is likely to have a favorable vote in the Senate.

NEW MODEL, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1645 (JANUARY—APRIL).

NEW NETHERLAND. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1610-1614.

NEW ORANGE. See NEW YORK: A. D. 1673.

NEW ORLEANS: A. D. 1718.—The founding of the city. See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1717-1718.

A. D. 1763.—Reserved from the cession to England in the Treaty of Paris, and transferred with western Louisiana to Spain. See SEVEN YEARS WAR: THE TREATIES.

A. D. 1768-1769.—Revolt against the Spanish rule.—A short-lived Republic and its

tragic ending. See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1766-1768; and 1769.

A. D. 1785-1803.—Fickle treatment of American traders. See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1785-1800; and 1798-1803.

A. D. 1796-1804.—Transferred to France and sold to the United States.—Incorporation as a city. See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1789-1803; and 1804-1812.

A. D. 1815.—Jackson's defense of the city and great victory. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1815 (JANUARY).

A. D. 1862 (April).—Farragut's capture of the city. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (APRIL: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).

A. D. 1862 (May—December).—The rule of General Butler. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MAY—DECEMBER: LOUISIANA).

A. D. 1866.—Riot and massacre.— See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1865-1867.

A. D. 1891.—The lynching of Italian assassins.—In the spring of 1891, the chief of police at New Orleans, David C. Hennessy, unearthed a murderous secret society, known as the Mafia, which seemed to be widely spread among Italians in that city and elsewhere. In the midst of his investigations he was waylaid and shot. Nine Italians, arrested for complicity in the crime, escaped conviction when brought to trial, and a belief prevailed that the jury had been either terrorized or bribed. A mass meeting of indignant citizens was accordingly held, and the meeting resolved itself into a mob The prison which held the alleged assassins was broken into and they were slain. The Italian government demanded redress and punishment for the deed; but the federal authorities at Washington had no power to deal with the affair, and a troublesome imbroglio arose. It was ended finally by a payment of $25,000 to the families of the men killed by the mob.

NEW PLYMOUTH. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1621, and after

NEW SCOTLAND. See NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1621-1668.

NEW SOUTH WALES: A. D. 1601-1821.—Discovery and early Exploration.—"Botany Bay."—Founding of penal colonies.—Beginning of sheep-farming and free immigration.—Administration of Governor Macquarie. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1601-1800; and 1800-1840.

A. D. 1821-1831.—Governors Brisbane and Darling.—First stage of a constitutional self-government.—"The end of Governor Macquarie's term of office marks the conclusion of the colony's infancy. . . . The next Governorship, that of Sir Thomas Brisbane, marks a definite stage in the history of New South Wales. The discovery of the Bathurst Plains [see AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1800-1840] had put an end to all doubts of the ultimate ability of the colony to sustain an increasing population; and now, for the first time, the tide of free immigration began to flow. . . . The great achievement of Governor Brisbane's administration was the introduction of institutions which ultimately served as the basis of self-government in Australia. . . . We are now entering upon a period in which institutions will gradually take the place of men. This period begins definitely in the year 1823, with the passing of the first Constitutional Statute which operated in Australia. . . . By it the former military administration of justice, by a Judge-Advocate and military assessors, was superseded by a Supreme Court on an English model, with a Chief Justice, and the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, if both the parties agreed upon it. But in criminal cases the jury was still to consist of military officers, seven in number, although the prisoner was to be entitled to challenge them on any grounds for which an ordinary juror could be objected to in England. His Majesty in Council was, however, authorized to extend the jury system in any way deemed desirable; and, as a matter of fact, it was not very long before the jury system was introduced into criminal trials in Australia. Moreover, convicts were no longer to be excluded from giving evidence in Courts of Justice. . . . The political innovations made by the statute were also important. They provided for the appointment of a Council with legislative and financial powers, albeit under certain very substantial limitations. . . . This Council at first consisted entirely of Government officials, and was of course subject to no process of popular election. But, as Lord Bathurst explained in his letter which covered the warrant of appointment, it was intended by the Home Government that the new Council should at least to some degree represent the views of non-official colonists; and this pledge was redeemed in the year 1825 by the nomination of three independent members. . . . The other great political object of the statute was the separation of Tasmania (then known as Van Diemen's Land) from the mother colony. . . . The Home Government, at the time of the passing of the Act, apparently hesitated between complete and partial separation, and took powers for both. Lord Bathurst ultimately decided in favour of partial separation only; and Van Diemen's Land had to wait many years before becoming completely independent of the Government at Sydney. . . . The mother colony of Australia now started upon a career of progress and developement which, in spite of stormy interludes, it maintained until the crisis of 1843. The marks of freedom and independence manifested themselves one by one. Freedom of the press was formally proclaimed in 1824, and although (as might have been expected) the liberty was at first abused, and caused much trouble during the governorship of Sir Ralph Darling (1825-1831), yet, under the more judicious rule of Sir Richard Bourke (1831-1837), the difficulties were removed. . . . In the year 1827 the colony was rich enough to support its own civil government; . . . and, a few years later, the Government of the colony began even to vote funds to assist the immigration of desirable colonists. . . . By a statute of the Imperial Parliament passed in the year 1828, the maximum number of the Council was raised to fifteen, and its legislative powers considerably increased. This important change virtually placed the official members of the Council in a minority in questions upon which the Government and the settlers as a whole were divided in opinion. . . . In the administration of justice still further steps towards a free model were taken; and the somewhat sweeping clause, which introduced the whole of existing English law en bloc, though it subsequently gave rise to some technical diffi-

culty, was obviously calculated to afford the ordinary colonist substantial protection against the arbitrary action of Government."—E. Jenks, *The History of the Australasian Colonies, ch.* 2–6.

A. D. 1831-1855.—Convict transportation abolished.—Immigration stimulated.—Self-government secured.—Governor Darling was succeeded by "Major-General Sir Richard Bourke, K. C. B., [who] arrived in Sydney on the 2nd of December, 1831. . . . The six years during which Bourke administered the affairs of the colony were not only free from class warfare, but were distinguished by the rapid growth of industry and commerce, and the steady development of national life under new forms. In fact, the history of the colony as a free State, so to speak, may be said to date from Bourke's time. . . . Trial by jury in the Superior Courts—that is, by civilian instead of by military jurors—was granted in an optional form in 1833; and although representative government was still withheld by the Home authorities, the administration of public affairs was conducted by Bourke on constitutional principles, with very little resort to the arbitrary power which had made his predecessor's rule distasteful to the whole community. . . . The history of the colony during the Administration of Sir George Gipps, a Captain in the Royal Engineers, who arrived in February, 1838, assumes proportions altogether unknown to it under the rule of his predecessors. It is no longer occupied with the melancholy records of the convict class, or the bitter feuds between the Emancipists and the Exclusives. The state of society had changed; free immigration had begun to flow in; capital was introduced by settlers from abroad and invested in sheep and cattle stations; the system of assigned servants ceased in 1838, and transportation itself, which had been yearly growing more unpopular, was abolished by an Order in Council two years later, although it was not finally extinguished until 1851. The most remarkable event of this period was the establishment of a new Constitution, under an Act passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1842. Representative institutions were at length conceded to the colony, although responsible government was still withheld. The new Legislative Council was composed of 36 members, of whom 24 were elected and 12 appointed by the Crown. . . .' From 1840 to 1846, the colony was plunged in a state of depression which brought the shadow of ruin to every man's door. This was to some extent the result of a re-action from the inflated state of prosperity which had existed a few years before, when prices of land and stock rose to a fictitious value, and speculation in land absorbed all the floating capital in the country. Among the immediate causes of depression were the cessation of Imperial expenditure on transportation, and the withdrawal of Government deposits from the banks; the consequent pressure brought to bear by those institutions on their customers; the substitution of free labour for that of the assigned servants, necessitating cash payment of wages; the locking up of capital in large purchases of land, which up to that time had been sold at five and subsequently twelve shillings an acre; and indulgence in excessive speculation, by which the ordinary industries of the country were deprived of capital. The result was that every branch of trade and industry fell into a state of utter collapse. . . . Politics at this time gave rise to a bitter struggle. Certain Crown Lands Regulations which Sir George Gipps had framed and issued in 1844, provoked determined opposition on the part of the squatters. . . . His proposal to tax the holders of Crown lands was denounced as tyranny. . . . The ultimate result was that the Council refused to renew the Land Act framed by Gipps, which had been passed for one year only, and the Governor's land policy was at an end. Sir George Gipps closed his career in New South Wales in July, 1846, and died in England the following February. . . Sir Charles Fitzroy arrived in Sydney at a time when the colony had entered on an era of prosperity hitherto unknown in its history. . . . In the first speech he addressed to the Legislative Council on its meeting in September, 1846, a month after his arrival, he congratulated its members on the general prosperity of the country—a prosperity the more remarkable, inasmuch as the colony was 'only just emerging from those difficulties which were experienced under that monetary depression which affected all classes of the community.' Among the many striking evidences of the new life which had been infused into the colony at this time, mainly as a result of free immigration and the rapid extension of settlement in the interior, the most conspicuous were the movements set on foot for the construction of railways and the establishment of steam communication with England. The gradual increase in the tide of immigration had greatly contributed to promote the prosperity of the people. . . . Flocks and herds were driven further and further inland as each new discovery made the resources of the interior known; but stock-owners and settlers were met with the ever-increasing difficulty of finding a sufficient supply of labour. Convict labour was nominally cheap, but really dear at any price. . . . It gradually became recognized as a principle of State policy, mainly owning to Wakefield's teaching, that the revenue arising from the land should be appropriated to the purpose of promoting immigration. Under that system money was remitted by the Colonial Government every year to be expended by a Board of Emigration Commissioners appointed in London, who selected and despatched the best emigrants they could get. But American competition was keenly felt in the labour market, and the Government had to tempt people to emigrate to Australia by paying half the passage money and offering small loans to mechanics, who could be induced to leave England on no other terms. . . . The conduct of public affairs by the Council, in which [William Charles] Wentworth was the principal figure, had been so distinguished for statesmanlike ability that the capacity of the colonists for self-government could no longer be denied. But a still more potent influence had been at work. The great gold discoveries, which took place in 1849, had, in Wentworth's phrase, precipitated the colony into a nation, and the demand for free institutions came upon the Home Government with a degree of force it was impossible to resist. When, therefore, the popular advocate of self-government obtained a committee in 1852 to prepare a new Constitution for the colony, in pursuance of the powers conferred on the Council by the Imperial Parliament, it was felt that the time had at last arrived when the life-long struggle of the patriot would be crowned with suc-

cess. The second reading of the Bill was moved by him in the session of the following year, and was carried by a majority of 34 to 8. It was strongly opposed by a considerable section of the public on the ground that the Members of the Upper House should be elected, instead of being nominated by the Crown. But the nominee principle was considered essential by the framers of the Bill, for the purpose of reproducing the Constitution of the British Parliament as closely as possible; and in deference to those views, the Bill was passed as it stood. . . . The Bill [subsequently enacted by the Imperial Parliament] . . . was received in the colony in October, 1855. The old Legislative Council was finally dissolved on the 19th of December following, and the new Constitution was formally inaugurated by the Governor-General, Sir William Denison, who had succeeded Sir Charles Fitzroy in the beginning of the year. The establishment of responsible government brought about so great a change in the political system of the colony that from that date the current of its history may be said to run in a totally different channel. Other actors come upon the scene. The martial figure of the Governor disappears, his place being occupied by men henceforth known as the responsible Ministers of the Crown."—*Historical Review of New South Wales*, by G. B. Barton, A. Sutherland, and F. J. Broomfield, in *Australasia Illustrated*, *v.* 1, *pp.* 84–98.

A. D. 1850.—Separation of the Colony of Victoria. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1839–1855.

A. D. 1855-1893.—The Colonial Constitution.—Liberalized Land Policy.—Public Education.—"The principles of the Constitution, as originally laid down, have never been altered, but there have been some changes in minor details. In New South Wales, as in the other Australian colonies, the democratic element was increasing, and before long the Electoral Act was amended and the franchise reduced to practically manhood suffrage. At the same time, the old system of voting was abolished, and all elections have since been conducted by means of the ballot-box. Various other amendments of the Electoral Act have taken place from time to time, and the few restrictions of political privilege which remained have been removed. The Legislative Council now [1893] contains 67 members—though there is no fixed limit of numbers—and there are 141 members of the Assembly. The tenure of a seat in the Council is for life, and the only qualification required of members is that they shall be 21 years of age, and naturalized or natural born subjects of the Queen, while the qualification of the Lower House is practically the same. . . . The duration of the Assembly is limited to three years, and the only condition at present necessary to obtain elective rights is six months' residence before the rolls are compiled. Within the first five years of responsible government, under the guidance of Sir John Robertson elaborate regulations were framed for the alienation and occupation of Crown lands. The circumstances of the colony had been greatly altered by the discovery of gold [see AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1839–1855; and MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1848–1893], and the question of land settlement had to be dealt with in an entirely new spirit to meet the wants of a class of a different type to that contemplated by the framers of former enactments. . . . The Government were beaten by a large majority on the question of 'free selection before survey.' The Governor was urged to dissolve Parliament, but this he declined to do, and before long public sentiment underwent a complete change; the cry of 'free selection before survey' was made the watchword of the democratic party; and the measure on its re-introduction consequently became law. The Act of 1861 was intended to facilitate the settlement of an industrial agricultural population, side by side with the pastoral tenants, by means of free selection in limited areas. . . . The new Parliament did not confine its liberalism to the administration of the Crown lands. Before it had been many years in existence an Act was passed abolishing all grants from the State Treasury in aid of religious denominations, while a further levelling measure found its place on the statute book in an Act providing for the abolition of the law of primogeniture. . . . The whole country was terrorised for many years following 1860 by the exploits of bushrangers, and for a time the executive appeared to be incapable of dealing with these offenders. . . . Eventually the law prevailed, and bushranging and its accompanying evils were completely stamped out. . . . The Public Schools Act of 1866 . . . provided for two distinct classes of schools, though all schools receiving aid from the State were placed by it nominally under a Council of Education. The public schools were entirely under the control of this board, but the denominational schools were still managed to some extent by the various religious bodies to which they had hitherto belonged. . . . In 1880, State aid to denominational education was finally abolished. By the new Act, which is still in force the entire educational system of the colony was remodelled; the Council of Education was dissolved, and a Minister of Public Instruction created in its place. Public schools to afford primary instruction to all children without sectarian or class distinction were established, as well as superior public schools, in which a more advanced course might be followed. . . . Pastoral industries are still the mainstay of the country."—G. Tregarthen, *The Story of Australasia*, *ch.* 11–12.

A. D. 1859.—Separation of the Moreton Bay District and its erection into the Colony of Queensland. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1859.

A. D. 1885-1892.—The Movement for Australian Federation. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1885–1892.

A. D. 1890.—Characteristics.—Comparative view. See AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1890.

A. D. 1891.—Rise of the Labor Party.—"The uprise of the Parliamentary Labour Party of New South Wales was a dramatic anti-climax to the defeat of Australian Trades Unionism in the disastrous maritime strike of 1890. . . . The workers were seemingly crushed in . . . [a] battle with the shipping interests in 1890. In 1891 the same bodies that had gone down in the Sedan of the year before emerged an organized Parliamentary force, holding the balance of power in the legislature of New South Wales. . . . The strike had injured many innocent interests, as it always did and always will. 'Could not a more enlightened remedy be found?' seemed to be one of the rational conclusions arrived at, and the Trades Unions co-operated with the victorious capitalists and their govern-

ment allies, through the means of a commission, in an effort to find a way of settling trade disputes by the peaceful methods of arbitration. These efforts succeeded and left the Labour organizations free to devote their energies to the carrying out of a programme of Parliamentary action. Labour made up its mind to send men from its own ranks to the Legislature. It resolved to be represented by its own and not by another class. There were no insuperable difficulties in the way, as in Great Britain and Ireland. Members were paid. The franchise was available, though not to the extent it soon afterwards became. Constituencies were small, and the mining, shearing, and maritime Labour elements were so comparatively large in the population of the colony that it only needed steady exertions in the constituencies to secure the return of a fair number of Labour members. Issues upon which differences existed in the Labour ranks were wisely subordinated to the one task of electing direct Labour men, and free traders, protectionists, and single taxers united in securing that object. They succeeded to an extent which astounded the whole public of Australia. In fact, a peaceful revolution had been created in the Parliamentary politics of New South Wales. The success at first seemed to be too great, and became, on that account, intoxicating and somewhat embarrassing afterwards. They won no less than 18 seats in Sydney alone, and emerged from the general election of June, 1891, 35 strong, while 5 more members were elected who called themselves Independents; with a government having only 49 supporters, and an opposition numbering 50."—M. Davitt, *Life and Progress in Australasia, ch.* 41.

A. D. 1891.—An ex-Governor's View of the Colony and its attitude toward the "Mother Country."—"So far, with one solitary exception, I have heard no public utterance in England that showed anything like an adequate apprehension of the point of view of these Colonies with regard to their own and imperial matters. That solitary exception is Lord Carrington. . . . Not long after his return from his five years' governorship of New South Wales, he read before a general meeting of the Imperial Institute a thoughtful and interesting summary of his impressions of Australia—'Australia as he saw it.' 'Five years ago,' he said, 'I landed in Australia with my wife and my children, hardly knowing a single soul by sight in the whole country, my great desire was to be free from prejudice and open to impressions.' Very quickly these impressions led him to see the magnitude of the differences between the social conditions of the two countries. 'A scattered population, according to European notions, in a vast country; a small proportion of that population settled upon the soil: freedom of mind and habits nurtured by more air, more sun, more space; influence centred in Sydney and in other of the larger towns, but not in the thinly-peopled country districts—all are striking features of New South Wales. The most salient feature of all was the power of growing and conscious strength.' The actual shape taken by this power did not escape him. 'Men,' he saw in this new land, 'have been so occupied with the vividness of the present, with the importance of their own individual affairs, that public opinion has not become so "crystallised," so keen and sharp, as in the Mother Country. But within the last ten years public opinion has been advancing, like everything else, by leaps and bounds, and is rapidly becoming a very strong "juvenile" indeed, with a will of its own, and the Australian will is a question which has to be faced. . . . The idea of Nationalism—a very different thing from Separation—is strongly growing and increasing in Australia, and the course of history, as usual, will probably be closely connected with ideas. . . . Neither England nor Australia will suffer dictation. . . . The people of Australia seem to be entering upon a new era of national life. . . . They consider that the age of tutelage is over.' . . . Lord Carrington's Bristol speech, delivered last November [1891], reached a larger and more important audience than that of the 'habitués' and 'protégés' of the Imperial Institute. . . . The most important part was his criticism of the Naval Defence Bill. This Bill . . . was passed promptly through all the Australian Assemblies with the exception of Queensland, where it was defeated and only ultimately accepted under protest. . . . Lord Carrington's treatment of the subject, considering that the Bill was passed in New South Wales almost without comment, and that it was not till some time later that public opinion in that colony ripened in the matter, shows a quickness at apprehending the real drift of things which is indeed remarkable. 'We all remember that troops were suddenly withdrawn from Australia some years ago. The Colonies asked for these troops to be allowed to remain, on the condition that they were to pay for their maintenance, at any rate for a time. The Colonial Office pointed out that the principle was all wrong, and the late Lord Lytton, Tory Secretary of State for the Colonies, said: "A Colony which is once accustomed to depend on Imperial soldiers never grows up to vigorous manhood." What is wrong in the army is right in the navy; and this colonial maintenance problem is being tried in Australia at the present time. This arrangement is as follows:—Seven ships built at the cost to the English taxpayer of nearly a million sterling have arrived at Sydney. Five of them are to be maintained at the cost of the Australians for ten years. England commissions the other two in case of war. It sounds all right, but will this experiment succeed? Ships should have only one commander, i. e., the admiral, and no fleet can exist under dual control. But how can you have taxation, even voluntary taxation, without representation? . . . And, to increase the difficulties, the Colonial Office has acknowledged a claim of Admiral Fairfax to precedence over everybody except the Governor of the colony in which he happens to be. . . . This claim, which shocked colonial sentiment, was received with a shout of laughter all over Australia, and is a dead letter and impossible to be enforced.'"—F. Adams, *The Australians, pp.* 263–71.

NEW SPAIN: The name given at first to Yucatan, and afterwards to the province won by Cortés. See AMERICA: A. D. 1517–1518; and MEXICO: A. D. 1521–1524.

NEW STYLE. See CALENDAR, GREGORIAN.

NEW SWEDEN. See DELAWARE: A. D. 1638–1640.

NEW WORLD, The. First use of the phrase. See AMERICA: A. D. 1500–1514.