

rebellion been suppressed than the Government proposed, to the Parliament of each country, the union of Great Britain and Ireland under a common legislature. This was no new idea. It had frequently been in the minds of successive generations of statesmen on both sides of the Channel; but had not yet been seriously discussed with a view to immediate action. Nothing could have been more safely predicted than that Ireland must, sooner or later, follow the precedent of Scotland, and yield her pretensions to a separate legislation. The measures of 1782, which appeared to establish the legislative independence of Ireland, really proved the vanity of such a pretension. . . . On the assembling of the British Parliament at the commencement of the year [1799], the question of the Union was recommended by a message from the Crown; and the address, after some opposition, was carried without a division. Pitt, at this, the earliest stage, pronounced the decision at which the Government had arrived to be positive and irrevocable. . . . Lord Cornwallis [then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland] also expressed his conviction that union was the only measure which could preserve the country. . . . The day before the intended Union was signified by a royal message to the English Parliament, the Irish Houses assembled; and the Viceroy's speech, of course, contained a paragraph relative to the project. The House of Lords, completely under the control of the Castle, agreed to an address in conformity with the speech, after a short and languid debate, by a large majority; but the Commons were violently agitated. . . . An amendment to the address pledging the House to maintain the Union was lost by one vote, after the House had sat twenty-one hours; but, on the report, the amendment to omit the paragraph referring to the Union was carried by a majority of four. . . . When it was understood that the Government was in earnest . . . there was little difficulty in alarming a people among whom the machinery of political agitation had, for some years, been extensively organised. The bar of Dublin took the lead, and it at once became evident that the policy of the Government had effected a union among Irishmen far more formidable than that which all the efforts of sedition had been able to accomplish. The meeting of the bar included not merely men of different religious persuasions, but, what was of more importance in Ireland, men of different sides in politics. . . . However conclusive the argument in favour of Union may appear to Englishmen, it was difficult for an Irishman to regard the Union in any other view than as a measure to deprive his country of her independent constitution, and to extinguish her national existence. Mr. Foster, the Speaker, took this view. . . . Sir John Parnell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, followed the Speaker. Mr. Fitzgerald, the Prime Serjeant, a law officer of the Crown, was on the same side. Ponsonby, the leader of the Whigs, was vehement against the scheme; so was Grattan; so was Curran. Great efforts were made by the Government to quiet the Protestants, and to engage the Catholics to support the Union. These efforts were so far successful that most of the Orange lodges were persuaded to refrain from expressing any opinion on the subject. The Catholic hierarchy were conciliated by the promise of a provision for the clergy, and of an

adjustment of the Tithe question. Hopes were held out, if promises were not actually made, to the Catholic community, that their civil disabilities would be removed. . . . If the Union was to be accomplished by constitutional means, it could be effected only by a vote of the Irish Parliament, concurring with a vote of the English Parliament; and if the Irish assembly were to pronounce an unbiassed judgment on the question of its extinction, it is certain that a very small minority, possibly not a single vote, would be found to support the measure. . . . The vote on the address was followed, in a few days, by an address to the Crown, in which the Commons pledged themselves to maintain the constitution of 1782. The majority in favour of national independence had already increased from five to twenty. . . . The votes of the Irish Commons had disposed of the question for the current session; but preparations were immediately made for its future passage through the Irish Houses. The foremost men in Ireland . . . had first been tempted, but had indignantly refused every offer to betray the independence of their country. Another class of leading persons was then tried, and from these, for the most part, evasive answers were received. The minister understood the meaning of these dubious utterances. There was one mode of carrying the Union, and one mode only. Bribery of every kind must be employed without hesitation and without stint." —W. Massey, *Hist. of Eng.: Reign of Geo. III., ch. 38 (v. 4)*.—"Lord Cornwallis had to work the system of 'negotiating and jobbing,' by promising an Irish Peerage, or a lift in that Peerage, or even an English Peerage, to a crowd of eager competitors for honours. The other specific for making converts was not yet in complete operation. Lord Castlereagh [the Irish Chief Secretary] had the plan in his portfolio:—borough proprietors to be compensated; . . . fifty barristers in parliament, who always considered a seat as the road to preferment, to be compensated; the purchasers of seats to be compensated; individuals connected either by residence or property with Dublin to be compensated. 'Lord Castlereagh considered that £1,500,000 would be required to effect all these compensations.' The sum actually paid to the borough-mongers alone was £1,260,000. Fifteen thousand pounds were allotted to each borough; and 'was apportioned amongst the various patrons.' . . . It had become a contest of bribery on both sides. There was an 'Opposition stock-purse,' as Lord Castlereagh describes the fund against which he was to struggle with the deeper purse at Whitehall. . . . During the administration of Lord Cornwallis, 29 Irish Peerages were created; of which seven only were unconnected with the question of Union. Six English Peerages were granted on account of Irish services; and there were 19 promotions in the Irish Peerage, earned by similar assistance." The question of Union was virtually decided in the Irish House of Commons on the 6th of February, 1800. Lord Castlereagh, on the previous day, had read a message from the Lord Lieutenant, communicating resolutions adopted by the parliament of Great Britain in the previous year. "The question was debated from four o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th to one o'clock in the afternoon of the 6th. During that time the streets of Dublin were the scene of a great riot, and the peace of the city was

maintained only by troops of cavalry. . . . On the division of the 6th there was a majority of 48 in favour of the Union." It was not, however, until the 7th of June, that the final legislative enactment—the Union Bill—was passed in the Irish House of Commons. The first article provided "that the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland should, upon the 1st of January, 1801, be united into one kingdom, by the name of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The United Kingdom was to be represented in one and the same parliament. In the United Parliament there were to be 28 temporal Peers, elected for life by the Irish Peerage; and four spiritual Peers, taking their places in rotation. There were to be 100 members of the Lower House; each county returning two, as well as the cities of Dublin and Cork. The University returned one, and 31 boroughs each returned one. Of these boroughs 23 remained close boroughs till the Reform Bill of 1831. . . . The Churches of England and Ireland were to be united. The proportion of Revenue to be levied was fixed at fifteen for Great Britain and two for Ireland, for the succeeding twenty years. Countervailing duties upon imports to each country were fixed by a minute tariff, but some commercial restrictions were to be removed."—C. Knight, *Popular Hist. of England*, v. 7, ch. 21.—"If the Irish Parliament had consisted mainly, or to any appreciable extent, of men who were disloyal to the connection, and whose sympathies were on the side of rebellion or with the enemies of England, the English Ministers would, I think, have been amply justified in employing almost any means to abolish it. . . . But it cannot be too clearly understood or too emphatically stated, that the legislative Union was not an act of this nature. The Parliament which was abolished was a Parliament of the most unqualified loyalists; it had shown itself ready to make every sacrifice in its power for the maintenance of the Empire, and from the time when Arthur O'Connor and Lord Edward Fitzgerald passed beyond its walls, it probably did not contain a single man who was really disaffected. . . . It must be added, that it was becoming evident that the relation between the two countries established by the Constitution of 1782 could not have continued unchanged. . . . Even with the best dispositions, the Constitution of 1782 involved many and grave probabilities of difference. . . . Sooner or later the corrupt borough ascendancy must have broken down, and it was a grave question what was to succeed it. . . . An enormous increase of disloyalty and religious animosity had taken place during the last years of the century, and it added immensely to the danger of the democratic Catholic suffrage, which the Act of 1798 had called into existence. This was the strongest argument for hurrying on the Union; but when all due weight is assigned to it, it does not appear to me to have justified the policy of Pitt."—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Eng. in the 18th Century*, ch. 32 (v. 8).

Also in: T. D. Ingram, *Hist. of the Legislative Union*.—R. Hassencamp, *Hist. of Ireland*, ch. 14.—Marquis Cornwallis, *Correspondence*, ch. 19-21 (v. 2-3).—Viscount Castlereagh, *Memoirs and Speeches*, v. 2-3.

A. D. 1801.—Pitt's promise of Catholic Emancipation broken by the king. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1801-1803.

A. D. 1801-1803.—The Emmet insurrection. —"Lord Hardwicke succeeded Lord Cornwallis as viceroy in May [1801]; and for two years, so far as the British public knew, Ireland was undisturbed. The harvest of 1801 was abundant. The island was occupied by a military force of 125,000 men. Distant rumours of disturbances in Limerick, Tipperary, and Waterford were faintly audible. Imports and exports increased. The debt increased likewise, but, as it was met by loans and uncontrolled by any public assembly, no one protested, and few were aware of the fact. Landlords and middlemen threw on high rents, and peasants as yet could live. . . . Early in 1803 the murmurs in the southwest became louder. Visions of a fixed price for potatoes began to shape themselves, and the invasion of 'strangers' ready to take land from which tenants had been ejected was resisted. The magistrates urged the viceroy to obtain and exercise the powers of the Insurrection Act; but the evil was not thought of sufficient magnitude, and their request was refused. Amidst the general calm, the insurrection of Robert Emmet in July broke like a bolt from the blue. A young republican visionary, whose brother had taken an active part in the rebellion, he had inspired a few score comrades with the quixotic hope of rekindling Irish nationality by setting up a factory of pikes in a back street of Dublin. On the eve of St. James's Day, Quigley, one of his associates, who had been sowing vague hopes among the villages of Kildare, brought a mixed crowd into Dublin. When the evening fell, a sky-rocket was fired. Emmet and his little band sallied from Marshalsea Lane into St. James's Street, and distributed pikes to all who would take them. The disorderly mob thus armed proceeded to the debtors' prison, which they attacked, killing the officer who defended it. Emmet urged them on to the Castle. They followed, in a confused column, utterly beyond his power to control. On their way they fell in with the carriage of the Chief Justice, Lord Kilwarden dragged him out, and killed him. By this time a few handfuls of troops had been collected. In half an hour two subalterns, with fifty soldiers each, had dispersed the whole gathering. By ten o'clock all was over, with the loss of 20 soldiers and 50 insurgents. Emmet and Russell, another of the leaders who had undertaken the agitation of Down and Antrim, were shortly afterwards taken and executed; Quigley escaped. Such was the last reverberation of the rebellion of 1798, or rather of the revolutionary fervour that led the way to that rebellion, before it had been tainted with religious animosity. Emmet died as Shelley would have died, a martyr and an enthusiast; but he knew little of his countrymen's condition, little of their aspirations, nothing of their needs. He had no successors."—J. H. Bridges, *pt. 3 of Two Centuries of Irish Hist.*, ch. 2.—"Emmet might easily have escaped to France if he had chosen, but he delayed till too late. Emmet was a young man, and Emmet was in love. 'The idol of his heart,' as he calls her in his dying speech, was Sarah Curran, the daughter of John Philpot Curran. . . . Emmet was determined to see her before he went. He placed his life upon the cast and lost it. . . . The White Terror which followed upon the failure of Emmet's rising was accompanied by almost all the horrors

which marked the hours of repression after the rebellion of '98. . . . The old devil's dance of spies and informers went merrily forward; the prisons were choked with prisoners."—J. H. McCarthy, *Ireland since the Union*, ch. 5-6.

ALSO IN: R. R. Madden, *The United Irishmen, their Lives and Times*, v. 3.—J. Wills, *Hist. of Ireland in the Lives of Irishmen*, v. 6, pp. 68-80.

A. D. 1811-1829.—O'Connell and the agitation for Catholic Emancipation and the Repeal of the Union.—Catholic disabilities removed.—"There is much reason to believe that almost from the commencement of his career" Daniel O'Connell, the great Irish agitator, "formed one vast scheme of policy which he pursued through life with little deviation, and, it must be added, with little scruple. This scheme was to create and lead a public spirit among the Roman Catholics; to wrest emancipation by this means from the Government; to perpetuate the agitation created for that purpose till the Irish Parliament had been restored; to disendow the Established Church; and thus to open in Ireland a new era, with a separate and independent Parliament and perfect religious equality. It would be difficult to conceive a scheme of policy exhibiting more daring than this. The Roman Catholics had hitherto shown themselves absolutely incompetent to take any decisive part in politics. . . . O'Connell, however, perceived that it was possible to bring the whole mass of the people into the struggle, and to give them an almost unexampled momentum and unanimity by applying to politics a great power that lay dormant in Ireland—the power of the Catholic priesthood. To make the priests the rulers of the country, and himself the ruler of the priests, was his first great object. . . . There was a party supported by Keogh, the leader in '98, who recommended what was called 'a dignified silence'—in other words, a complete abstinence from petitioning and agitation. With this party O'Connell successfully grappled. His advice on every occasion was, 'Agitate, agitate, agitate!' and Keogh was so irritated by the defeat that he retired from the society." O'Connell's leadership of the movement for Catholic Emancipation became virtually established about the beginning of 1811. "He avowed himself repeatedly to be an agitator with an 'ulterior object,' and declared that that object was the repeal of the Union. 'Desiring, as I do, the repeal of the Union,' he said in one of his speeches, in 1813, 'I rejoice to see how our enemies promote that great object. . . . They delay the liberties of the Catholics, but they compensate us most amply because they advance the restoration of Ireland. By leaving one cause of agitation, they have created, and they will embody and give shape and form to, a public mind and a public spirit.' . . . Nothing can be more untrue than to represent the Repeal agitation as a mere afterthought designed to sustain his flagging popularity. Nor can it be said that the project was first started by him. The deep indignation that the Union had produced in Ireland was fermenting among all classes, and assuming the form, sometimes of a French party, sometimes of a social war, and sometimes of a constitutional agitation. . . . It would be tedious to follow into minute detail the difficulties and the mistakes that obstructed the Catholic movement, and were finally overcome

by the energy or the tact of O'Connell. . . . Several times the movement was menaced by Government proclamations and prosecutions. Its great difficulty was to bring the public opinion of the whole body of the Roman Catholics actively and habitually into the question. . . . All preceding movements since the Revolution (except the passing excitement about Wood's halfpence) had been chiefly among the Protestants or among the higher order of the Catholics. The mass of the people had taken no real interest in politics, had felt no real pain at their disabilities, and were politically the willing slaves of their landlords. For the first time, under the influence of O'Connell, the great swell of a really democratic movement was felt. The simplest way of concentrating the new enthusiasm would have been by a system of delegates, but this had been rendered illegal by the Convention Act. On the other hand, the right of petitioning was one of the fundamental privileges of the constitution. By availing himself of this right O'Connell contrived, with the dexterity of a practised lawyer, to violate continually the spirit of the Convention Act, while keeping within the letter of the law. Proclamation after proclamation was launched against his society, but by continually changing its name and its form he generally succeeded in evading the prosecutions of the Government. These early societies, however, all sink into insignificance compared with that great Catholic Association which was formed in 1824. The avowed objects of this society were to promote religious education, to ascertain the numerical strength of the different religions, and to answer the charges against the Roman Catholics embodied in the hostile petitions. It also 'recommended' petitions (unconnected with the society) from every parish, and aggregate meetings in every county. The real object was to form a gigantic system of organisation, ramifying over the entire country, and directed in every parish by the priests, for the purpose of petitioning and in every other way agitating in favour of emancipation. The Catholic Rent [a system of small subscriptions—as small as a penny a month—collected from the poorest contributors, throughout Ireland] was instituted at this time, and it formed at once a powerful instrument of cohesion and a faithful barometer of the popular feeling. . . . The success of the Catholic Association became every week more striking. The rent rose with an extraordinary rapidity [from £350 a week in October to £700 a week in December, 1824]. The meetings in every county grew more and more enthusiastic, the triumph of priestly influence more and more certain. The Government made a feeble and abortive effort to arrest the storm by threatening both O'Connell and Sheil [Richard Lalor] with prosecution for certain passages in their speeches. . . . The formation of the Wellington Ministry [Wellington and Peel, 1828] seemed effectually to crush the present hopes of the Catholics, for the stubborn resolution of its leader was as well known as his Tory opinions. Yet this Ministry was destined to terminate the contest by establishing the principle of religious equality. . . . On the accession of the Wellington Ministry to power the Catholic Association passed a resolution to the effect that they would oppose with their whole energy any Irish member who consented to accept office under it. . . . An oppos-

tunity for carrying the resolution into effect soon occurred. Mr. Fitzgerald, the member for Clare, accepted the office of President of the Board of Trade, and was consequently obliged to go to his constituents for re-election." O'Connell entered the lists against him. "The excitement at this announcement rose at once to fever height. It extended over every part of Ireland, and penetrated every class of society. The whole mass of the Roman Catholics prepared to support him, and the vast system of organisation which he had framed acted effectually in every direction." For the first time, the landlords found that the voting of their tenants could not be controlled. Fitzgerald withdrew from the contest and O'Connell was elected. "Ireland was now on the very verge of revolution. The whole mass of the people had been organised like a regular army, and taught to act with the most perfect unanimity. . . . The Ministers, feeling further resistance to be hopeless, brought in the Emancipation Bill, confessedly because to withhold it would be to kindle a rebellion that would extend over the length and breadth of the land."—W. E. H. Lecky, *Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland: O'Connell*.—"Peel introduced the Relief Bill on the 5th March [1829]. The king had given to it a reluctant assent. At the last hour, the intrigues of Eldon and the Duke of Cumberland had so far influenced his weak and disingenuous mind that he withdrew his assent to his ministers' policy, on the pretence that he had not expected, and could not sanction, any modification of the Oath of Supremacy. He parted from his ministers with kisses and courtesy, and for a few hours their resignation was in his hands. But with night his discretion waxed as his courage waned; his ministers were recalled, and their measure proceeded. In its main provisions it was thorough and far-reaching. It admitted the Roman Catholic to Parliament, and to all lay offices under the Crown, except those of Regent, Lord Chancellor, whether of England or of Ireland, and Lord Lieutenant. It repealed the oath of abjuration, it modified the oath of supremacy. . . . It approximated the Irish to the English county franchise by abolishing the forty-shilling freeholder, and raising the voters' qualifications to £10. All monasteries and institutions of Jesuits were suppressed; and Roman Catholic bishops were forbidden to assume titles of sees already held by bishops of the Church of Ireland. Municipal and other officials were forbidden to wear the insignia of their office at Roman Catholic ceremonies. Lastly, the new Oath of Supremacy was available only for persons thereafter to be elected to Parliament"—which nullified O'Connell's election at Clare. This petty stroke of malice is said to have been introduced in the bill for the gratification of the king. The vote in the Commons on the Bill was 353 against 180, and in the Lords 217 to 112. It received the Royal assent on the 18th of April.—J. A. Hamilton, *Life of Daniel O'Connell*, ch. 5. Also in: J. McCarthy, *Sir Robert Peel*, ch. 2-7.—W. J. Fitzpatrick, *Correspondence of Daniel O'Connell, with notices of his Life and Times*, v. 1, ch. 1-5.—W. J. Amherst, *Hist. of Catholic Emancipation*.—W. O. Taylor, *Life and Times of Sir Robert Peel*, v. 1, ch. 16-18 and v. 2, ch. 1-2. A. D. 1820-1826.—Rise of the Ribbon Society.—"Throughout the half-century extending

from 1820 to 1870, a secret oath-bound agrarian confederacy, known as the 'Ribbon Society,' was the constant affliction and recurring terror of the landed classes of Ireland. The Vehmgericht itself was not more dreaded. . . . It is assuredly strange—indeed, almost incredible—that although the existence of this organisation was, in a general way, as well and as widely known as the fact that Queen Victoria reigned, or that Daniel O'Connell was once a living man; although the story of its crimes has thrilled judge and jury, and parliamentary committees have filled ponderous blue-books with evidence of its proceedings, there is to this hour the widest conflict of assertion and conclusion as to what exactly were its real aims, its origin, structure, character, and purpose. . . . I long ago satisfied myself that the Ribbonism of one period was not the Ribbonism of another; that the version of its aims and character prevalent amongst its own members in one county or district differed widely from that existing elsewhere. In Ulster it professed to be a defensive or retaliatory league against Orangeism. In Munster it was at first a combination against tithe-proctors. In Connaught it was an organisation against rack-renting and evictions. In Leinster it often was mere trade-unionism. . . . The Ribbon Society seems to have been wholly confined to small farmers, cottiers, labourers, and, in the towns, petty shopkeepers, in whose houses the 'lodges' were held. . . . Although from the inception, or first appearance, of Ribbonism the Catholic clergy waged a determined war upon it . . . the society was exclusively Catholic. Under no circumstances would a Protestant be admitted to membership. . . . The name 'Ribbon Society' was not attached to it until about 1826. It was previously known as 'Liberty Men'; the 'Religious Liberty System'; the 'United Sons of Irish Freedom'; 'Sons of the Shamrock'; and by other names. . . . It has been said, and probably with some truth, that it has been too much the habit to attribute erroneously to the Ribbon organisation every atrocity committed in the country, every deed of blood apparently arising out of agrarian combination or conspiracy. . . . But vain is all pretence that the Ribbon Society did not become, whatever the original design or intention of its members may have been, a hideous organisation of outrage and murder. . . . There was a period when Ribbon outrages had, at all events, a conceivable provocation; but there came a time when they sickened the public conscience by their wantonness. The vengeance of the society was ruthless and terrible. . . . From 1835 to 1855 the Ribbon organisation was at its greatest strength. . . . With the emigration of the labouring classes it was carried abroad, to England and to America. At one time the most formidable lodges were in Lancashire."—A. M. Sullivan, *New Ireland*, ch. 4.

A. D. 1831.—Establishment of National Schools. See EDUCATION, MODERN: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.—IRELAND

A. D. 1832.—Parliamentary Representation increased by the Reform Bill. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1830-1832.

A. D. 1840-1841.—Discontent with the results of the Union.—Condition of the people.—O'Connell's revival of agitation for Repeal.—"The Catholics were at length emancipated in 1829; and now, surely, their enemies suggested,

they must be contented and grateful for evermore? Perverse must the people be who, having got what they asked, are not satisfied. Let us see. What they asked was to be admitted to their just share, or, at any rate to some share, of the government of their native country, from which they had been excluded for five generations. But on the passing of the Emancipation Act not a single Catholic was admitted to an office of authority, great or small. The door was opened, indeed, but not a soul was permitted to pass in. There were murmurs of discontent, and the class who still enjoyed all the patronage of the State, the Church, the army, the magistracy, and the public service, demanded if there was any use in attempting to conciliate a people so intractable and unreasonable? The Catholic Association, which had won the victory, was rewarded for its public spirit by being dissolved by Act of Parliament. Its leader, who had been elected to the House of Commons, had his election declared void by a phrase imported into the Emancipation Act for this special purpose. The forty-shilling freeholders, whose courage and magnanimity had made the cause irresistible, were immediately deprived of the franchise. By means of a high qualification and an ingeniously complicated system of registry, the electors in twelve counties were reduced from upwards of 100,000 to less than 10,000. Englishmen cannot comprehend our dissatisfaction. . . . Emancipation was speedily followed by a Reform of the House of Commons. In England a sweeping and salutary change was made both in the franchise, and in the distribution of seats; but Ireland did not obtain either the number of representatives she was demonstrably entitled to by population and resources, or such a reduction of the franchise as had been conceded to England. The Whigs were in power, and Ireland was well-disposed to the party. . . . But the idea of treating Ireland on perfectly equal terms, and giving her the full advantage of the Union which had been forced on her, did not exist in the mind of a single statesman of that epoch. After Emancipation and Reform, O'Connell had a fierce quarrel with the Whigs, during which he raised the question of Ireland's right to be governed exclusively by her own Parliament. The people responded passionately to his appeal. The party of Protestant Ascendancy had demanded the Repeal of the Union before Emancipation, but that disturbing event altered their policy, and they withheld all aid from O'Connell. After a brief time he abandoned the experiment, to substitute for it an attempt to obtain what was called 'justice to Ireland.' In furtherance of this project he made a compact with the Whigs that the Irish Party under his lead should support them in parliament. The Whigs in return made fairer appointments to judicial and other public employments, restrained jury packing, and established an unsectarian system of public education; but the national question was thrown back for more than a generation. In 1840-1 O'Connell revived the question of Repeal, on the ground that the Union had wholly failed to accomplish the end for which it was said to be designed. Instead of bringing Ireland prosperity, it had brought her ruin. The social condition of the country during the half-century, then drawing to a close was, indeed, without parallel in

Europe. The whole population were dependent on agriculture. There were minerals, but none found in what miners call 'paying quantities.' There was no manufacture except linen, and the remnant of a woollen trade, slowly dying out before the pitiless competition of Yorkshire. What the island chiefly produced was food; which was exported to richer countries to enable the cultivator to pay an inordinate rent. Foreign travellers saw with amazement an island possessing all the natural conditions of a great commerce, as bare of commerce as if it lay in some byeway of the world where enterprise had not yet penetrated. . . . The great proprietors were two or three hundred—the heirs of the Undertakers, for the most part, and Absentees; the mass of the country was owned by a couple of thousand others, who lived in splendour, and even profusion; and for these the peasant ploughed, sowed, tended, and reaped a harvest which he never shared. Rent, in other countries, means the surplus after the farmer has been liberally paid for his skill and labour; in Ireland it meant the whole produce of the soil except a potato-pit. If a farmer strove for more, his master knew how to bring him to speedy submission. He could carry away his implements of trade by the law of distress, or rob him of his sole pursuit in life by the law of eviction. He could, and habitually did, seize the growing crop, the stools and pots in his miserable cabin, the blanket that sheltered his children, the cow that gave them nourishment. There were just and humane landlords, men who performed the duties which their position imposed, and did not exaggerate its rights; but they were a small minority. . . . Famines were frequent, and every other year destitution killed a crowd of peasants. For a hundred and fifty years before, whoever has described the condition of Ireland—English official, foreign visitor, or Irish patriot—described a famine more or less acute. Sometimes the tortured serfs rose in nocturnal jacquerie against the system; and then a cry of 'rebellion' was raised, and England was assured that these intractable barbarians were again (as the indictment always charged) 'levying war against the King's majesty.' There were indeed causes enough for national disaffection, but of these the poor peasant knew nothing; he was contending for so much miserable food as would save his children from starvation. There were sometimes barbarous agrarian murders—murders of agents and bailiffs chiefly, but occasionally of landlords. It would be shameful to forget that these savage crimes were often the result of savage provocation. . . . The country was naked of timber, the cabins of the peasantry were squalid and unfurnished. Mr. Carlyle reproves a lazy, thriftless people, who would not perform the simple operation of planting trees; and Mr. Froude frowns upon cottages whose naked walls are never draped by climbing roses or flowering creepers. But how much more eloquent is fact than rhetoric? The Irish landlords made a law that when the tenant planted a tree it became not his own property but his master's; and the established practice of four-fifths of the Irish landlords, when a tenant exhibited such signs of prosperity as a garden, or a white-washed cabin, was to reward his industry by increasing his rent. Peasants will not plant or make improvements on these

conditions, nor, I fancy, would philosophers. . . . It was sometimes made a boast in those days that rank, property, station, and professional success distinguished the minority in Ireland who were imperialists and Protestants. It was not an amazing phenomenon, that those upon whom the law had bestowed a monopoly of rank, property, and station, for a hundred and fifty years, should have still maintained the advantage a dozen years after Emancipation. It was a subject of scornful reproach that the districts inhabited by Protestants were peaceful and prosperous, while the Catholic districts were often poor and disorderly. There is no doubt of the facts; the contrast certainly existed. But the mystery disappears when one comes to reflect that in Down and Antrim the Squire regarded his tenantry with as much sympathy and confidence as a Squire in Devon or Essex, that their sons were trained to bear arms, and taught from the pulpit and platform that they belonged to a superior race, that all the local employments, paid out of the public purse, were distributed among them, that they had certain well understood rights over their holdings on which no landlord could safely trench, and that they met their masters, from time to time, in the friendly equality of an Orange lodge, while in Tipperary, the farmer was a tenant at will who never saw his landlord except when he followed the hounds across his corn, or frowned at him from the bench; whose rent could be raised, or his tenancy terminated at the pleasure of his master; who, on the smallest complaint, was carried before a bench of magistrates, where he had no expectation, and little chance, of justice; and who wanted the essential stimulus to thrift and industry, the secure enjoyment of his earnings. As a set-off to this long catalogue of discouragements, there were two facts of happy augury. In 1842 half a million of children were receiving education in the National Schools under a system designed to establish religious equality, and administered by Catholic and Protestant Commissioners. And the Teetotal movement was at its height. Thousands were accepting every week a pledge of total abstinence from Father Mathew, a young priest whom the gifts of nature and the accidents of fortune combined to qualify for the mission of a Reformer. . . . There was the beginning of political reforms also. The Whigs sent a Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary to Ireland who, for the first time since the fall of Limerick, treated the bulk of the nation as the social and political equals of the minority. The minority had been so long accustomed to make and administer the laws, and to occupy the places of authority and distinction, that they regarded the change as a revolt; and Lord Mulgrave and Thomas Drummond as the successors of Tyrconnel and Nugent. In the interval, since Emancipation, a few Catholics were elected to Parliament, two Catholic lawyers were raised to the bench, and smaller appointments distributed among laymen. . . . The exclusion of Catholics from juries was restrained, and the practice of appointing partisans of too shameful antecedents to public functions was interrupted. . . . It was under these circumstances that O'Connell for the second time summoned the Irish people to demand a Repeal of the Union."—Sir C. G. Duffy, *A Bird's-Eye View of Irish Hist.*, rev. ed., pp. 242-275.

ALSO IN: Lord E. Fitzmaurice and J. R. Thursfield, *pt. 4 of Two Centuries of Irish Hist.*, ch. 1-2.—R. M. Martin, *Ireland before and after the Union*.

A. D. 1841-1848.—O'Connell's last agitation.—His trial, imprisonment and release.—His death.—The "Young Ireland" Party and its rebellion.—In 1841, O'Connell "left England and went to Ireland, and devoted himself there to the work of organization. A succession of monster meetings were held all over the country, the far-famed one on Tara Hill being, as is credibly asserted, attended by no less than a quarter of a million of people. Over this vast multitude gathered together around him the magic tones of the great orator's voice swept triumphantly; awakening anger, grief, passion, delight, laughter, tears, at its own pleasure. They were astonishing triumphs, but they were dearly bought. The position was, in fact, an impossible one to maintain long. O'Connell had carried the whole mass of the people with him up to the very brink of the precipice, but how to bring them safely and successfully down again was more than even he could accomplish. Resistance he had always steadily denounced, yet every day his own words seemed to be bringing the inevitable moment of collision nearer and nearer. The crisis came on October the 5th. A meeting had been summoned to meet at Clontarf, near Dublin, and on the afternoon of the 4th the Government suddenly came to the resolution of issuing a proclamation forbidding it to assemble. The risk was a formidable one for responsible men to run. Many of the people were already on their way, and only O'Connell's own rapid and vigorous measures in sending out in all directions to intercept them hindered the actual shedding of blood. His prosecution and that of some of his principal adherents was the next important event. By a Dublin jury he was found guilty, sentenced to two years' imprisonment, and conveyed to prison, still earnestly entreating the people to remain quiet, an order which they strictly obeyed. The jury by which he had been condemned was known to be strongly biassed against him, and an appeal had been forwarded against his sentence to the House of Lords. So strong there, too, was the feeling against O'Connell, that little expectation was entertained of its being favourably received. Greatly to its honour, however, the sentence was reversed and he was set free. . . . The enthusiasm shown at his release was frantic and delirious. None the less those months in Richmond prison proved the death-knell of his power. He was an old man by this time; he was already weakened in health, and that buoyancy which had hitherto carried him over any and every obstacle never again revived. The 'Young Ireland' party, the members of which had in the first instance been his allies and lieutenants, had now formed a distinct section, and upon the vital question of resistance were in fierce hostility to all his most cherished principles. The state of the country, too, preyed visibly upon his mind. By 1846 had begun that succession of disastrous seasons which, by destroying the feeble barrier which stood between the peasant and a cruel death, brought about a national tragedy, the most terrible perhaps with which modern Europe has been confronted. This tragedy, though he did not live to see the whole of it, O'Connell—

himself the incarnation of the people—felt acutely. Deep despondency took hold of him. He retired, to a great degree, from public life, leaving the conduct of his organization in the hands of others. . . . In 1847 he resolved to leave Ireland, and to end his days in Rome. His last public appearance was in the House of Commons, where an attentive and deeply respectful audience hung upon the faltering and barely articulate accents which fell from his lips. In a few deeply moving words he appealed for aid and sympathy for his suffering countrymen, and left the House. . . . The camp and council chamber of the 'Young Ireland' party was the editor's room of 'The Nation' newspaper. There it found its inspiration, and there its plans were matured—so far, that is, as they can be said to have been ever matured. For an eminently readable and all things considered a wonderfully impartial account of this movement, the reader cannot do better than consult Sir Charles Gavan Duffy's 'Four Years of Irish History,' which has the immense advantage of being history taken at first hand, written that is by one who himself took a prominent part in the scenes which he describes. The most interesting figure in the party had, however, died before those memorable four years began. Thomas Davis, who was only thirty at the time of his death in 1845, was a man of large gifts, nay, might fairly be called a man of genius. . . . The whole movement in fact was, in the first instance, a literary quite as much as a political one. Nearly all who took part in it—Gavan Duffy, John Mitchell, Meagher, Dillon, Davis himself—were very young men, many fresh from college, all filled with zeal for the cause of liberty and nationality. The graver side of the movement only showed itself when the struggle with O'Connell began. At first no idea of deposing, or even seriously opposing the great leader seems to have been intended. The attempt on O'Connell's part to carry a formal declaration against the employment under any circumstances of physical force was the origin of that division, and what the younger spirits considered 'truckling to the Whigs' helped to widen the breach. When, too, O'Connell had partially retired into the background, his place was filled by his son, John O'Connell, the 'Head conciliator,' between whom and the 'Young Irelanders' there waged a fierce war, which in the end led to the indignant withdrawal of the latter from the Repeal council. Before matters reached this point, the younger camp had been strengthened by the adhesion of Smith O'Brien, who, though not a man of much intellectual calibre, carried no little weight in Ireland. . . . Early in January, 1847, O'Connell left on that journey of his which was never completed, and by the middle of May Ireland was suddenly startled by the news that her great leader was dead. The effect of his death was to produce a sudden and immense reaction. A vast revulsion of love and reverence sprang up all over the country; an immense sense of his incomparable services, and with it a vehement anger against all who had opposed him. Upon the 'Young Ireland' party, as was inevitable, the weight of that anger fell chiefly, and from the moment of O'Connell's death whatever claim they had to call themselves a national party vanished utterly. The men 'who killed the Liberator' could never again hope to carry with them the suffrages of any number

of their countrymen. This contumely, to a great degree undeserved, naturally reacted upon the subjects of it. The taunt of treachery and ingratitude flung at them wherever they went stung and nettled. In the general reaction of gratitude and affection for O'Connell, his son John succeeded easily to the position of leader. The older members of the Repeal Association thereupon rallied about him, and the split between them and the younger men grew deeper and wider. A wild, impracticable visionary now came to play a part in the movement. A deformed misanthrope, called James Lalor, endowed with a considerable command of vague, passionate rhetoric, began to write incentives to revolt in 'The Nation.' These growing more and more violent were by the editor at length prudently suppressed. The seed, however, had already sown itself in another mind. John Mitchell is described by Mr. Justin McCarthy as 'the one formidable man amongst the rebels of '48; the one man who distinctly knew what he wanted, and was prepared to run any risk to get it.' . . . To him it was intolerable that any human being should be willing to go further and to dare more in the cause of Ireland than himself, and the result was that after awhile he broke away from his connection with 'The Nation,' and started a new organ under the name of 'The United Irishmen,' one definitely pledged from the first to the policy of action. From this point matters gathered speedily to a head. Mitchell's newspaper proceeded to fling out challenge after challenge to the Government, calling upon the people to gather and to 'sweep this island clear of the English name and nation.' For some months these challenges remained unanswered. It was now, however, '48,' and nearly all Europe was in revolution. The necessity of taking some step began to be evident, and a Bill making all written incitement of insurrection felony was hurried through the House of Commons, and almost immediately after Mitchell was arrested. Even then he seems to have believed that the country would rise to liberate him. The country, however, showed no disposition to do anything of the sort. He was tried in Dublin, found guilty, sentenced to fourteen years' transportation, and a few days afterwards put on board a vessel in the harbour and conveyed to Spike Island, whence he was sent to Bermuda, and the following April in a convict vessel to the Cape, and finally to Tasmania. The other 'Young Irelanders,' stung apparently by their own previous inaction, thereupon rushed frantically into rebellion. The leaders—Smith O'Brien, Meagher, Dillon, and others—went about the country holding reviews of 'Confederates,' as they now called themselves, a proceeding which caused the Government to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, and to issue a warrant for their arrest. A few more gatherings took place in different parts of the country, a few more ineffectual attempts were made to induce the people to rise, one very small collision with the police occurred, and then the whole thing was over. All the leaders in the course of a few days were arrested and Smith O'Brien and Meagher were sentenced to death, a sentence which was speedily changed into transportation. Gavan Duffy was arrested and several times tried, but the jury always disagreed, and in the end his prosecution was abandoned. The 'Young

Ireland' movement, however, was dead, and never again revived."—E. Lawless, *The Story of Ireland*, ch. 55-56.

ALSO IN: Sir C. G. Duffy, *Young Ireland*.—The same, *Four Years of Irish Hist.*, 1845-1849.—The same, *Thomas Davis: Memoirs of an Irish Patriot*, 1840-1846.

A. D. 1843-1848.—The Devon Commission.—The Encumbered Estates Act.—In 1843, Mr. Sharman Crawford "succeeded in obtaining the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the 'occupation of land in Ireland.' This Commission, known from its chairman, Lord Devon, as the Devon Commission, marks a great epoch in the Irish land question. The Commissioners, in their Report, brought out strongly the facts that great misery existed in Ireland, and that the cause of the misery was the system of land tenure. The following extract from the Report indicates the general nature of its conclusions: 'A reference to the evidence of most of the witnesses will show that the agricultural labourer of Ireland continues to suffer the greatest privations and hardships; that he continues to depend upon casual and precarious employment for subsistence; that he is badly housed, badly fed, badly clothed, and badly paid for his labour. Our personal experience and observations during our enquiry have afforded us a melancholy confirmation of these statements, and we cannot forbear expressing our strong sense of the patient endurance which the labouring classes have generally exhibited under sufferings greater, we believe, than the people of any other country in Europe have to sustain.' And the remedy for the evil is to be found, continues the Report, in 'an increased and improved cultivation of the soil,' to be gained by securing for the tenant 'fair remuneration for the outlay of his capital and labour.' No sooner was this Report issued than great numbers of petitions were presented to the House of Lords, and supported by Lord Devon, praying for legislative reform of the land evils; and in June, 1845, a bill was introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Stanley, on behalf of the government of Sir Robert Peel, for 'the purpose of providing compensation to tenants in Ireland, in certain cases, on being dispossessed of their holdings, for such improvements as they may have made during their tenancy.' By the selfish opposition of the Irish landlords this bill was thrown out. Two days after its rejection in the House of Lords Mr. Sharman Crawford brought into the House of Commons a Tenant Right Bill, and met with as little success. In 1846 a government bill was introduced, bearing a strong resemblance to that of Lord Stanley; but the ministry was overthrown, and the bill was dropped. A Liberal ministry under Lord John Russell came into power in July, 1846, and Irish hopes again began to rise. In 1847 the indefatigable Mr. Crawford brought in a bill, whose purpose was to extend the Ulster custom to the whole of Ireland; it was thrown out. A well-meant but in the end unsuccessful attempt to relieve the burdens of embarrassed landlords without redressing the grievances of rack-rented tenants, was made in 1848 by the measure well known as the Encumbered Estates Act. This Act had for its object to restore capital to the land; but with capital it brought in a class of proprietors who lacked the virtues as well as the vices of their predecessors,

and were even more oppressive to the tenantry."—E. Thursfield, *England and Ireland*, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: H. L. Jephson, *Notes on Irish Questions*, ch. 15.—D. B. King, *The Irish Question*, ch. 9.

A. D. 1844.—The Maynooth Grant.—Towards the close of the session of Parliament in 1844, Sir Robert Peel undertook a measure "dealing with higher education in Ireland. Means were to be found, in some way, for the education of the upper classes of the Irish, and for the more efficient education of candidates for the Roman Catholic priesthood. Some provision already existed for the education of the Irish people. Trinity College, with its considerable endowments, afforded opportunities to wealthy Irish. The National Board, which Stanley had instituted, had under its control 3,153 schools, and 395,000 scholars. But Trinity College retained most of its advantages for the benefit of its Protestant students, and the 395,000 scholars, whom the National Board was educating, did not, after all, include one person in every twenty alive in Ireland. The Roman Catholic, since 1793, had been allowed to graduate at Trinity; but he could hold neither scholarship nor professorship. . . . Some steps had, indeed, been taken for the education of the Roman Catholic priesthood. In 1795, Fitzwilliam had proposed, and his successor, Camden, had approved, the appropriation of an annual sum of money to a college formed at Maynooth for the education of Roman Catholic priests. The Irish parliament had readily sanctioned the scheme; the payment of the grant had been continued, after the Union, by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and, though the sums voted had been reduced to £9,000 a year in 1808, this amount had been thenceforward regularly allotted to Maynooth. In some respects the grant was actually disadvantageous to the college; it was too small to maintain the institution; it was large enough to discourage voluntary contributions. The surroundings of the college were squalid; its professors were wretchedly paid; it was even impossible to assign to each of the 440 students a separate room; it was dubbed by Macaulay, in a memorable speech, a 'miserable Dotheboys' Hall,' and it was Peel's deliberate opinion that the absolute withdrawal of the grant would be better than the continuance of the niggardly allowance." The Government "asked Parliament to vote a sum of £30,000 to improve the buildings at Maynooth; it proposed that the Board of Works should in future be responsible for keeping them in repair; it suggested that the salaries of professors should be more than doubled; that the position of the students should be improved; that the annual grant should be raised from about £9,000 to about £26,000, and that this sum, instead of being subject to the approval of the legislature once a year, should be placed on the Consolidated Fund. Then arose a series of debates which have no parallel in the history of the British Parliament. . . . 'The Orangeman raises his howl,' said Macaulay, 'and Exeter Hall sets up its bray, and Mr. Mac-Nelle is horrified to think that a still larger grant is intended for the priests of Baal at the table of Jezebel, and the Protestant operatives of Dublin call for the impeachment of Ministers in exceedingly bad English.' A few years later a

man, who was both a Christian and a gentleman, declared the Irish famine to be a dispensation of Providence in return for the Maynooth grant. . . . Night after night it rained petitions; 298 petitions against the bill were presented on the 3rd of April, when Peel explained his scheme; 148 on the 8th; 254 on the 9th; 552 on the 10th; 2,262 on the 11th, when the bill was put down for a second reading; 662 on the 14th; 581 on the 15th; 420 on the 16th; 335 on the 17th; 371 on the 18th. The petitions hardly allowed a doubt to remain as to the opinion of the country. Peel, indeed, was again exposed to the full force of the strongest power which any British Minister can encounter. The Mussulman, driven to his last defence, raises the standard of the Prophet, and proclaims a holy war. But the Englishman, if Protestantism be in danger, shouts, 'No Popery!' and creates equal enthusiasm. . . . Yet, vast as was the storm which the Minister had provoked, the issues which he had directly raised were of the smallest proportions. Hardly anyone ventured to propose that the original vote to Maynooth should be withdrawn. A grant, indeed, which had been sanctioned by George III., which had been fixed by Perceval, which had been voted in an unreformed Parliament, almost without debate, and which had been continued for fifty years, could not be withdrawn. Peel's opponents, therefore, were compelled to argue that there was no harm in sacrificing £9,000 a year to Baal, but that a sacrifice of £26,000 was full of harm. . . . They debated the second reading of the bill for six nights, the third reading for three nights, and they seized other opportunities for protracting the discussion. Even the Lords forgot their customary habits and sat up till a late hour on three successive evenings to discuss an amendment for inquiring into the class of books used at Maynooth. But this unusual display of zeal proved useless. A majority in both Houses steadily supported the Minister, and zealous Protestants and old-fashioned Tories were unable to defeat a scheme which was proposed by Peel and supported by Russell."—S. Walpole, *Hist. of Eng. from 1815*, ch. 19 (v. 4).

Also in: H. Martineau, *Hist. of the Thirty Years' Peace*, bk. 6, ch. 8.

A. D. 1845-1847.—The Famine.—"In 1841 the population of Ireland was 8,175,124 souls. By 1845 it had probably reached to nearly nine millions. . . . To any one looking beneath the surface the condition of the country was painfully precarious. Nine millions of a population living at best in a light-hearted and hopeful hand-to-mouth contentment, totally dependent on the hazards of one crop, destitute of manufacturing industries, and utterly without reserve or resource to fall back upon in time of reverse; what did all this mean but a state of things critical and alarming in the extreme? Yet no one seemed conscious of danger. The potato crop had been abundant for four or five years, and respite from dearth and distress was comparative happiness and prosperity. Moreover, the temperance movement [of Father Mathew] had come to make the 'good times' still better. Everything looked bright. No one concerned himself to discover how slender and treacherous was the foundation for this general hopefulness and confidence. Yet signs of the coming storm had been given. Partial famine caused by

falling harvests had indeed been intermittent in Ireland, and, quite recently, warnings that ought not to have been mistaken or neglected had given notice that the esculent which formed the sole dependence of the peasant millions was subject to some mysterious blight. In 1844 it was stricken in America, but in Ireland the yield was healthy and plentiful as ever. The harvest of 1845 promised to be the richest gathered for many years. Suddenly, in one short month, in one week it might be said, the withering breath of a simoom seemed to sweep the land, blasting all in its path. I myself saw whole tracts of potato growth changed in one night from smiling luxuriance to a shrivelled and blackened waste. A shout of alarm arose. But the buoyant nature of the Celtic peasant did not yet give way. The crop was so profuse that it was expected the healthy portion would reach an average result. Winter revealed the alarming fact that the tubers had rotted in pit and store-house. Nevertheless the farmers, like hapless men who double their stakes to recover losses, made only the more strenuous exertions to till a larger breadth in 1846. Although already feeling the pinch of sore distress, if not actual famine, they worked as if for dear life; they begged and borrowed on any terms the means whereby to crop the land once more. The pawn-offices were choked with the humble finery that had shone at the village dance or the christening feast; the banks and local money-lenders were besieged with appeals for credit. Meals were stinted, backs were bared. Anything, anything to tide over the interval to the harvest of 'Forty-six.' O God, it is a dreadful thought that all this effort was but more surely leading them to ruin! It was this harvest of Forty-six that sealed their doom. Not partially but completely, utterly, hopelessly, it perished. As in the previous year, all promised brightly up to the close of July. Then, suddenly, in a night, whole areas were blighted; and this time, alas! no portion of the crop escaped. A cry of agony and despair went up all over the land. The last desperate stake for life had been played, and all was lost. The doomed people realised but too well what was before them. Last year's premonitory sufferings had exhausted them, and now?—they must die! My native district figures largely in the gloomy record of that dreadful time. I saw the horrible phantasmagoria—would God it were but that!—pass before my eyes. Blank stolid dismay, a sort of stupor, fell upon the people, contrasting remarkably with the fierce energy put forth a year before. It was no uncommon sight to see the cottier and his little family seated on the garden fence gazing all day long in moody silence at the blighted plot that had been their last hope. Nothing could arouse them. You spoke; they answered not. You tried to cheer them; they shook their heads. I never saw so sudden and so terrible a transformation. When first in the autumn of 1845 the partial blight appeared, wise voices were raised in warning to the Government that a frightful catastrophe was at hand; yet even then began that fatal circumlocution and inaptness which it maddens one to think of. It would be utter injustice to deny that the Government made exertions which judged by ordinary emergencies would be prompt and considerable. But judged by the awful magnitude of the evil then at hand or

actually befallen, they were fatally tardy and inadequate. When at length the executive did hurry, the blunders of precipitancy outdid the disasters of excessive deliberation. . . . In October 1845 the Irish Mansion House Relief Committee implored the Government to call Parliament together and throw open the ports. The Government refused. Again and again the terrible urgency of the case, the magnitude of the disaster at hand, was pressed on the executive. It was the obstinate refusal of Lord John Russell to listen to these remonstrances and entreaties, and the sad verification subsequently of these apprehensions, that implanted in the Irish mind the bitter memories which still occasionally find vent in passionate accusation of 'England.' Not but the Government had many and weighty arguments in behalf of the course they took. . . . The situation bristled with difficulties. . . . At first the establishment of public soup-kitchens under local relief committees, subsidised by Government, was relied upon to arrest the famine. I doubt if the world ever saw so huge a demoralisation, so great a degradation, visited upon a once high-spirited and sensitive people. All over the country large iron boilers were set up, in which what was called 'soup' was concocted; later on Indian-meal stirabout was boiled. Around these boilers on the roadside there daily moaned and shrieked and fought and scuffled crowds of gaunt, cadaverous creatures that once had been men and women made in the image of God. The feeding of dogs in a kennel was far more decent and orderly. . . . I frequently stood and watched the scene till tears blinded me and I almost choked with grief and passion. . . . The conduct of the Irish landlords throughout the famine period has been variously described, and has been, I believe, generally condemned. I consider the censure visited on them too sweeping. . . . On many of them no blame too heavy could possibly fall. A large number were permanent absentees; their ranks were swelled by several who early fled the post of duty at home—cowardly and selfish deserters of a brave and faithful people. Of those who remained, some may have grown callous; it is impossible to contest authentic instances of brutal heartlessness here and there. But . . . the overwhelming balance is the other way. The bulk of the resident Irish landlords manfully did their best in that dread hour. . . . In the autumn of 1846 relief works were set on foot, the Government having received parliamentary authority to grant baronial loans for such undertakings. There might have been found many ways of applying these funds in reproductive employment, but the modes decided on were draining and road-making. . . . The result was in every sense deplorable failure. The wretched people were by this time too wasted and emaciated to work. The endeavour to do so under an inclement winter sky only hastened death. They tottered at day-break to the roll-call; vainly tried to wheel the barrow or ply the pick, but fainted away on the 'cutting,' or lay down on the wayside to rise no more. As for the roads on which so much money was wasted, and on which so many lives were sacrificed, hardly any of them were finished. Miles of grass-grown earthworks throughout the country now mark their course and commemorate for posterity one of the gigantic blunders of the famine time. The first remarkable sign of the

havoc which death was making was the decline and disappearance of funerals. . . . Soon, alas! neither coffin nor shroud could be supplied. Daily in the street and on the footway some poor creature lay down as if to sleep, and presently was stiff and stark. In our district it was a common occurrence to find, on opening the front door in early morning, leaning against it, the corpse of some victim who in the night-time had 'rested' in its shelter. We raised a public subscription, and employed two men with horse and cart to go around each day and gather up the dead. One by one they were taken to a great pit at Ardnabrahair Abbey and dropped through the hinged bottom of a 'trap-coffin' into a common grave below. In the remoter rural districts even this rude sepulture was impossible. In the field and by the ditchside the victims lay as they fell, till some charitable hand was found to cover them with the adjacent soil. It was the fever which supervened on the famine that wrought the greatest slaughter and spread the greatest terror. . . . To come within the reach of this contagion was certain death. Whole families perished unvisited and unassisted. By levelling above their corpses the sheeling in which they died, the neighbours gave them a grave."—A. M. Sullivan, *New Ireland*, ch. 6.—"In July 1847 as many as three millions of persons were actually receiving separate rations. A loan of £8,000,000 was contracted by the Government, expressly to supply such wants, and every step was taken by two successive administrations, Sir Robert Peel's and Lord John Russell's, to alleviate the sufferings of the people. Nor was private benevolence lacking. The Society of Friends, always ready in acts of charity and love, was foremost in the good work. A British Association was formed for the relief of Ireland, including Jones Lloyd (Lord Overstone), Thomas Baring, and Baron Rothschild. A Queen's letter was issued. . . . Subscriptions were received from almost every quarter of the world. The Queen's letter alone produced £171,538. The British Association collected £268,000; the Society of Friends £48,000; and £168,000 more were entrusted to the Dublin Society of Friends. The Sultan of Turkey sent £1,000. The Queen gave £2,000, and £500 more to the British Ladies' Clothing Fund. Prince Albert gave £500. The National Club collected £17,980. America sent two ships of war, the 'Jamestown' and the 'Macedonian,' full of provisions; and the Irish residents in the United States sent upwards of £200,000 to their relatives, to allow them to emigrate."—L. Levi, *Hist. of British Commerce*, pt. 4, ch. 4.—"By the end of 1847 cheap supplies of food began to be brought into the country by the ordinary operation of the laws of supply and demand, at far cheaper rates, owing to an abundant harvest abroad, than if the Government had tried to constitute itself the sole distributor. The potato harvest of 1847, if not bountiful, was at least comparatively good. . . . By March, 1848, the third and last period of the famine may be said to have terminated. But, though the direct period of distress was over, the economic problems which remained for solution were of overwhelming magnitude. . . . A million and a half of the people had disappeared. The land was devastated with fever and the diseases which dog the steps of famine. . . . The waters of the great deep were indeed going down, but the

land was seen to be without form and void."—Lord E. Fitzmaurice and J. R. Thursfield, *pt. 4 of Two Centuries of Irish Hist., ch. 4.*—"The famine and plague of 1846-47 was accompanied, and succeeded, by a wholesale clearance of congested districts and by cruel evictions. The new landlords [who had acquired property under the Encumbered Estates Act], bent on consolidating their property, turned out their tenants by regiments, and in the autumn of 1847 enormous numbers were deported. It is absolutely necessary to bear this strictly in mind, if we would judge of the intense hatred which prevails amongst the Irish in America to Great Britain. The children of many of those who were exiled then have raised themselves to positions of affluence and prosperity in the United States. But they have often heard from their fathers, and some of them may perhaps recall, the circumstances under which they were driven from their old homes in Ireland. . . . But there is a further and awful memory connected with that time. The people who had been suffering from fever carried the plague with them on board, and the vessels sometimes became floating charnel-houses. During the year 1847, out of 106,000 emigrants who crossed the Atlantic for Canada and New Brunswick, 6,100 perished on the ocean, 4,100 immediately on landing, 5,200 subsequently in the hospitals, and 1,900 in the towns to which they repaired. . . . Undoubtedly, historical circumstances have . . . had much to do with the political hatred to Great Britain; but its newly acquired intensity is owing to the still fresh remembrances of what took place after the famine, and to the fact that the wholesale clearances of Irish estates were, to say the least, not discouraged in the writings and speeches of English lawgivers, economists and statesmen."—Sir R. Blennerhassett, *Ireland ("Reign of Queen Victoria," ed. by T. H. Ward, v. 1, p. 563-565).*—"The deaths from fever in the year 1846 were 17,145, in the following year 57,000, to which 27,000 by dysentery must be added."—J. F. Bright, *Hist. of Eng., period 4, p. 164.*—"Between the years 1847 and 1851 (both inclusive) the almost incredible number of over one million Irish—men, women, and children—were conveyed in emigrant ships to America—a whole population. In 1847, 215,444 emigrated; in 1849, 218,842, and in 1851, 249,721."—H. L. Jephson, *Notes on Irish Questions, p. 298.*—"The population of Ireland by March 30, 1851, at the same ratio of increase as held in England and Wales, would have been 9,018,799—it was 6,552,385. It was the calculation of the Census Commissioners that the deficit, independently of the emigration, represented by the mortality in the five famine years, was 985,366."—T. P. O'Connor, *The Parnell Movement, p. 125.*

A. D. 1846.—Defeat of Peel's Coercion Bill.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1846.

A. D. 1848-1852.—Tenant organizations.—The Ulster Tenant Right.—The Tenant League.—"The famine . . . and the evictions that followed it made the people more discontented than ever with the land system. The Democratic Association, organized about this time, adopted as its rallying cry, 'the land for the people.' . . . This association, whose aims are said to have been 'largely communistic and revolutionary,' opposed the Irish Alliance, the Nationalist Society organized by Charles Gavan

Duffy. . . . During the years '49 and '50 numerous Tenant Protection Societies were formed throughout the country, the Presbyterians of Ulster taking quite as active a part as the Celtic Catholics of the other provinces. In May, 1850, the Presbyterian Synod of Ulster . . . resolved, against the protest, it is true, of the more conservative men, to petition Parliament to extend to the rest of Ireland the benefits of rights and securities similar to those of the Ulster custom. . . . The Ulster tenant right . . . has occupied an important place in the Irish land question for a long time. . . . The right differs much on different estates. On no two does it seem to be precisely the same. It is therefore not a right capable of being strictly defined. Nor did it have any legal sanction until the year 1870. The law did not recognize it. One of its chief incidents was that the tenant was entitled to live on his farm from year to year indefinitely on condition of acting properly, and paying his rent, which the landlord might raise from time to time to a reasonable extent, but not so as to extinguish the tenant's interest. In the second place, if the tenant got in debt, and could not pay the rent, or wished for any other reason to leave the holding, he could sell his interest, but the landlord had a right to be consulted, and could object to the purchaser. In the third place, the landlord, if he wanted to take the land for his own purposes, must pay the tenant a fair sum for his tenant-right. In the fourth place, all arrears of rent must be paid before the interest was transferred. These are said to be universal characteristics of every Ulster tenant-right custom. There were often additional restrictions or provisions, usually in limitation of the tenant's right to sell, or of the landlord's right to raise the rent, veto the sale of land, or take it for his own use. There were commonly established usages in reference to fixing a fair rent. Valuers were generally employed, and on their estimates, and not on competition in open market, the rent was fixed. . . . The Irish Tenant League was organized August 6, 1850, in Dublin. Among the resolutions adopted was one, calling for 'a fair valuation of rent between landlord and tenant in Ireland,' and another, 'that the tenant should not be disturbed in his holding as long as he paid his rent.' The question of arrears received a great deal of attention. The great majority of the tenants of Ireland were in arrears, owing to the successive failures of the crops, and were of course liable to eviction. . . . The Tenant League was a very popular one and spread throughout the country. There was much agitation, and in the general election in 1852, when the excitement was at its height, fifty-eight Tenant Leaguers were elected to Parliament. The Tenant League members resolved to hold themselves 'independent of and in opposition to all governments which do not make it a part of their policy' to give the tenants a measure of relief such as the League desired. It looked as though the party would hold the balance of power and be able to secure its objects. When however Sadlier and Keogh, two of the most prominent men in the party and men of great influence, accepted positions in the new government, 'bribed by office,' it has always been charged by the Irish, 'to betray the cause to which they had been most solemnly pledged,' the party was broken up without accomplishing

its purpose."—D. B. King, *The Irish Question*, ch. 5 and 9.

Also in: Sir C. G. Duffy, *League of the North and South*.—A. M. Sullivan, *New Ireland*, ch. 13.—J. Godkin, *The Land War in Ireland*, ch. 17.

A. D. 1858-1867.—The Fenian Movement.—"The Fenian movement differed from nearly all previous movements of the same kind in Ireland, in the fact that it arose and grew into strength without the patronage or the help of any of those who might be called the natural leaders of the people. . . . Its leaders were not men of high position, or distinguished name, or proved ability. They were not of aristocratic birth; they were not orators; they were not powerful writers. It was not the impulse of the American Civil War that engendered Fenianism; although that war had great influence on the manner in which Fenianism shaped its course. Fenianism had been in existence, in fact, although it had not got its peculiar name, long before the American War created a new race of Irishmen—the Irish-American soldiers—to turn their energies and their military inclination to a new purpose. . . . The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, in consequence of the 1848 movement, led, as a matter of course, to secret association. Before the trials of the Irish leaders were well over in that year, a secret association was formed by a large number of young Irishmen in cities and towns. . . . After two or three attempts to arrange for a simultaneous rising had failed, or had ended only in little abortive and isolated ebullitions, the young men became discouraged. Some of the leaders went to France, some to the United States, some actually to England; and the association melted away. . . . Some years after this, the 'Phoenix' clubs began to be formed in Ireland. They were for the most part associations of the peasant class, and were on that account, perhaps, the more formidable and earnest. . . . The Phoenix clubs led to some of the ordinary prosecutions and convictions, and that was all. . . . After the Phoenix associations came the Fenians. 'This is a serious business now,' said a clever English literary man when he heard of the Fenian organisation; 'the Irish have got hold of a good name this time; the Fenians will last.' The Fenians are said to have been the ancient Irish militia. . . . There was an air of Celtic antiquity and of mystery about the name of Fenian which merited the artistic approval given to it by the impartial English writer whose observation has just been quoted. The Fenian agitation began about 1858, and it came to perfection about the middle of the American Civil War. It was ingeniously arranged on a system by which all authority converged towards one centre [called the Head-Centre], and those farthest away from the seat of direction knew proportionately less and less about the nature of the plans. They had to obey instructions only, and it was hoped that by this means weak or doubtful men would not have it in their power prematurely to reveal, to betray, or to thwart the purposes of their leaders. A convention was held in America, and the Fenian Association was resolved into a regular organised institution. A provisional government was established in the neighbourhood of Union Square, New York, with all the array and the mechanism of an actual working administration. . . . The Civil War had introduced a new

figure to the world's stage. This was the Irish-American soldier. . . . Many of these men—thousands of them—were as sincerely patriotic in their way as they were simple and brave. It is needless to say that they were fastened on in some instances by adventurers, who fomented the Fenian movement out of the merest and the meanest self-seeking. . . . Some were making a living out of the organisation—out of that, and apparently nothing else. The contributions given by poor Irish hack-drivers and servant girls, in the sincere belief that they were helping to man the ranks of an Irish army of independence, enabled some of these self-appointed leaders to wear fine clothes and to order expensive dinners. . . . But in the main it is only fair to say that the Fenian movement in the United States was got up, organised and manned by persons who . . . were single hearted, unselfish, and faithfully devoted to their cause. . . . After a while things went so far that the Fenian leaders in the United States issued an address, announcing that their officers were going to Ireland to raise an army there for the recovery of the country's independence. Of course the Government here were soon quite prepared to receive them; and indeed the authorities easily managed to keep themselves informed by means of spies of all that was going on in Ireland. . . . Meanwhile the Head Centre of Fenianism in America, James Stephens, who had borne a part in the movement of 1848, arrived in Ireland. He was arrested . . . [and] committed to Richmond Prison, Dublin, early in November, 1865; but before many days had passed the country was startled by the news that he had contrived to make his escape. The escape was planned with skill and daring. For a time it helped to strengthen the impression on the mind of the Irish peasantry that in Stephens there had at last been found an insurgent leader of adequate courage, craft, and good fortune. Stephens disappeared for a moment from the stage. In the meantime disputes and dissensions had arisen among the Fenians in America. The schism had gone so far as to lead to the setting up of two separate associations. There were of course distracted plans. One party was for an invasion of Canada; another pressed for operations in Ireland itself. The Canadian attempt actually was made [see CANADA: A. D. 1866-1871]. . . . Then Stephens came to the front again. It was only for a moment. He had returned to New York, and he now announced that he was determined to strike a blow in Ireland. Before long the impression was spread abroad that he had actually left the States to return to the scene of his proposed insurrection. The American-Irish kept streaming across the Atlantic, even in the stormy winter months, in the firm belief that before the winter had passed away, or at the farthest while the spring was yet young, Stephens would appear in Ireland at the head of an insurgent army. . . . Stephens did not reappear in Ireland. He made no attempt to keep his warlike promise. He may be said to have disappeared from the history of Fenianism. But the preparations had gone too far to be suddenly stopped. . . . It was hastily decided that something should be done. One venture was a scheme for the capture of Chester Castle [and the arms it contained]. . . . The Government were fully informed of the plot in advance; the police were actually on the

look-out for the arrival of strangers in Chester, and the enterprise melted away. In March, 1867, an attempt at a general rising was made in Ireland. It was a total failure; the one thing on which the country had to be congratulated was that it failed so completely and so quickly as to cause little bloodshed. Every influence combined to minimise the waste of life. The snow fell that spring as it had scarcely ever fallen before in the soft, mild climate of Ireland. . . . It made the gorges of the mountains untenable, and the gorges of the mountains were to be the encampments and the retreats of the Fenian insurgents. The snow fell for many days and nights, and when it ceased falling the insurrectionary movement was over. The insurrection was literally buried in that unlooked-for snow. There were some attacks on police barracks in various places—in Cork, in Kerry, in Limerick, in Tipperary, in Louth; there were some conflicts with the police; there were some shots fired, many captures made, a few lives lost; and then for the time at least all was over. The Fenian attempt thus made had not from the beginning a shadow of hope to excuse it." Some months afterwards a daring rescue of Fenian prisoners at Manchester stirred up a fresh excitement in Fenian circles. A policeman was killed in the affair, and three of the rescuers were hanged for his murder. On the 13th of December, 1867, an attempt was made to blow up the Clerkenwell House of Detention, where two Fenian prisoners were confined. "Six persons were killed on the spot; about six more died from the effects of the injuries they received; some 120 persons were wounded. . . . It is not necessary to follow out the steps of the Fenian movement any further. There were many isolated attempts, there were many arrests, trials, imprisonments, banishments. The effect of all this, it must be stated as a mere historical fact, was only to increase the intensity of dissatisfaction and discontent among the Irish peasantry. . . . There were some public men who saw that the time had come when mere repression must no longer be relied upon as a cure for Irish discontent."—J. McCarthy, *Hist. of Our Own Times*, ch. 53 (v. 4).

ALSO IN: T. P. O'Connor, *The Parnell Movement*, ch. 7.—G. P. Macdonell, *Fenianism*, pt. 5 of *Two Centuries of Irish Hist.*, ch. 4.

A. D. 1868.—Parliamentary Reform. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1865-1868.

A. D. 1868-1870.—Disestablishment of the Irish Church.—Mr. Gladstone's Land Bill. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1868-1870.

A. D. 1870-1894.—The land question and the recent land laws.—"The reason for exceptional legislation in Ireland rested chiefly on the essential difference between the landlord and tenant systems in England and in Ireland. In 1845 the Devon Royal Commission reported that the introduction of the English system would be extremely difficult, if not impracticable. The difference, it said, between the English and Irish systems 'consisted in this, that in Ireland the landlord builds neither dwelling-house nor farm offices, nor puts fences, gates, etc., into good order before he lets his land. In most cases, whatever is done in the way of building or fencing is done by the tenant; and, in the ordinary language of the country, houses, farm buildings, and even the making of fences are described by the general word "improvements," which is thus

employed to denote the necessary adjuncts to a farm without which in England or Scotland no tenant would be found to rent it.' Thirty years later, John Bright summarized the matter by saying that if the land of Ireland were stripped of the improvements made upon it by the labor of the occupier, the face of the country would be 'as bare and naked as an American prairie.' This fundamental difference between the English and Irish land systems has never been fully appreciated in England, where the landlord's expenditure on buildings, fences, drainage, farm roads, etc., and on maintenance absorbs a large part of the rental. Reform of the Irish system began in 1870. Before that time little had been done to protect the Irish tenant except to forbid evictions at night, on Christmas Day, on Good Friday, and the pulling off the roofs of houses until the inmates had been removed. The Land Act of 1870 recognized, in principle, the tenant's property in his improvements by giving him a right to claim compensation if disturbed or evicted. This was not what the tenants wanted, viz., security of tenure. The results of compensation suits by 'disturbed' tenants were uncertain; compensation for improvements was limited in various ways, and the animus of the courts administering the act was distinctly hostile to the tenants. Many works necessary to the existence of tenants on small farms were not improvements in the eyes of the landlord, of the law, or of the judges; it was often impossible to adduce legal evidence of costly works done little by little, and at intervals, representing the savings of labor embodied in drainage, reclamation, or fencing. Buildings and other works of a superior character might be adjudged 'unsuitable' to small farms, and therefore not the subject of any compensation; moreover, it was expressly laid down that the use and enjoyment by the tenant of works effected wholly at his expense were to be accounted compensation to him by the landlord, and that, therefore, by lapse of time, the tenant's improvements became the landlord's property. The act of 1870 tended to make capricious and heartless evictions expensive and therefore less common; but it gave no security of tenure, and left the landlord still at liberty to raise the rent of improving tenants. It left the tenant still in a state of dependence and servility; it gave him no security for his expenditure, for the landlord's right to keep the rent continually rising was freely exercised. Even if the act had been liberally administered, it would have failed to give contentment, satisfy the demands of justice, or encourage the expenditure of capital by tenant farmers. Measure after measure proposed by Irish members for further reforms were rejected by Parliament between 1870 and 1880, and discontent continued to increase. . . . The Land Law Act of 1881 was based on the Report in 1880 of the Bessborough Royal Commission, but many of the most useful suggestions made were disregarded. This act purported to give the Irish yearly tenants (1) the right to sell their tenancies and improvements; (2) the right to have a 'fair' rent fixed by the land courts at intervals of fifteen years; (3) security of tenure arising from this right to have the rent fixed by the court instead of by the landlord. . . . No definition of what constituted a fair rent was embodied in the act, but what is known as the Healy clause provided that 'no

rent shall be allowed or made payable in respect of improvements made by a tenant or his predecessors.' . . . When the Irish courts came to interpret it, they held that the term 'improvements' meant only that interest in his improvements for which the tenant might have obtained compensation under the Land Act of 1870 if he had been disturbed or evicted, and that the time during which the tenant had had the use and enjoyment of his own expenditure was still to be accounted compensation made to him by his landlord, so that by mere lapse of time the tenant's improvements became the landlord's property. . . . In view of the continually falling prices of agricultural produce and diminishing farm profits, the operation of the land laws has not brought about peace between landlords and tenants. . . . In 1887 the Cowper Commission reported that the 200,000 rents which had been fixed were too high in consequence of the continued fall in prices. As a result of the report of this commission the fair-rent provisions of the law were extended to leaseholders holding for less than sixty years; but the courts still adhering to their former methods of interpretation, numbers of leaseholders who had made and maintained all the buildings, improvements, and equipments of their farms found themselves either excluded on narrow and technical points, or expressly rented on their own expenditure. In 1891 the fair-rent provisions were further extended to leaseholders holding for more than sixty years by the Redemption of Rent Act, under which long leasehold tenants could compel their landlords either to sell to them, or allow a fair rent to be fixed on their farms. . . . Concurrently with these attempts to place the relations of landlord and tenant on a peaceful and equitable basis, a system of State loans to enable tenants to buy their farms has been in operation. . . . It is now proposed to have an inquiry by a select committee of the House of Commons into (1) the principles adopted in fixing fair rents, particularly with respect to tenants' improvements; (2) the system of purchase and security offered for the loans of public money; (3) the organization and administrative work of the Land Commission—a department which has cost the country about £100,000 a year since 1881. The popular demand for inquiry and reform comes as much from the Protestant North as from the Catholic South."—*The Nation*, Feb. 15, 1894.

A. D. 1873-1879.—The Home Rule Movement.—Organization of the Land League.—"For some years after the failure of the Fenian insurrection there was no political agitation in Ireland; but in 1873 a new national movement began to make itself felt; this was the Home Rule Movement. It had been gradually formed since 1870 by one or two leading Irishmen, who thought the time was ripe for a new constitutional effort; chief among them was Mr. Isaac Butt, a Protestant, an eminent lawyer, and an earnest politician. The movement spread rapidly, and took a firm hold of the popular mind. After the General Election of 1874, some sixty Irish Members were returned who had stood before their constituencies as Home Rulers. The Home Rule demand is clear and simple enough; it asks for Ireland a separate Government, still allied with the Imperial Government, on the principles which regulate the alliance between the United

States of America. The proposed Irish Parliament in College Green would bear just the same relation to the Parliament at Westminster that the Legislature and Senate of every American State bear to the head authority of the Congress in the Capitol at Washington. All that relates to local business it was proposed to delegate to the Irish Assembly; all questions of imperial policy were still to be left to the Imperial Government. There was nothing very startling, very daringly innovating, in the scheme. In most of the dependencies of Great Britain, Home Rule systems of some kind were already established. In Canada, in the Australasian Colonies, the principle might be seen at work upon a large scale; upon a small scale it was to be studied nearer home in the neighbouring Island of Man. . . . At first the Home Rule Party was not very active. Mr. Butt used to have a regular Home Rule debate once every Session, when he and his followers stated their views, and a division was taken and the Home Rulers were of course defeated. Yet, while the English House of Commons was thus steadily rejecting year after year the demand made for Home Rule by the large majority of the Irish Members, it was affording a strong argument in favour of some system of local Government, by consistently outvoting every proposition brought forward by the bulk of the Irish Members relating to Irish Questions. . . . Mr. Butt and his followers had proved the force of the desire for some sort of National Government in Ireland, but the strength of the movement they had created now called for stronger leaders. A new man was coming into Irish political life who was destined to be the most remarkable Irish leader since O'Connell. Mr. Charles Stuart Parnell, who entered the House of Commons in 1875 as Member for Meath, was a descendant of the English poet Parnell, and of the two Parnells, father and son, John and Henry, who stood by Grattan to the last in the struggle against the Union. He was a grand-nephew of Sir Henry Parnell, the first Lord Congleton, the advanced Reformer and friend of Lord Grey and Lord Melbourne. He was Protestant, and a member of the Protestant Synod. Mr. Parnell set himself to form a party of Irishmen in the House of Commons who should be absolutely independent of any English political party, and who would go their own way with only the cause of Ireland to influence them. Mr. Parnell had all the qualities that go to make a good political leader, and he succeeded in his purpose. The more advanced men in and out of Parliament began to look up to him as the real representative of the popular voice. In 1878 Mr. Butt died. . . . The leadership of the Irish Parliamentary Party was given to Mr. William Shaw, Member for Cork County, an able, intelligent man, who proved himself in many ways a good leader. In quieter times his authority might have remained unquestioned, but these were unquiet times. The decorous and demure attitude of the early Home Rule Party was to be changed into a more aggressive action, and Mr. Parnell was the champion of the change. It was soon obvious that he was the real leader recognised by the majority of the Irish Home Rule Members, and by the country behind them. Mr. Parnell and his following have been bitterly denounced for pursuing an obstructive policy. They are often written about

as if they had invented obstruction; as if obstruction of the most audacious kind had never been practised in the House of Commons before Mr. Parnell entered it. It may perhaps be admitted that the Irish Members made more use of obstruction than had been done before their time.

. . . The times undoubtedly were unquiet; the policy which was called in England obstructive and in Ireland active was obviously popular with the vast majority of the Irish people. The Land Question, too, was coming up again, and in a stronger form than ever. Mr. Butt, not very long before his death, had warned the House of Commons that the old land war was going to break out anew, and he was laughed at for his vivid fancy by the English Press and by English public opinion; but he proved a true prophet. Mr. Parnell had carefully studied the condition of the Irish tenant, and he saw that the Land Act of 1870 was not the last word of legislation on his behalf. Mr. Parnell was at first an ardent advocate of what came to be known as the Three F's, fair rent, fixity of tenure, and free sale. But the Three F's were soon to be put aside in favour of more advanced ideas. Outside Parliament a strenuous and earnest man was preparing to inaugurate the greatest land agitation ever seen in Ireland. Mr. Michael Davitt was the son of an evicted tenant. . . . When he grew to be a young man he joined the Fenians, and in 1870, on the evidence of an informer, he was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years' penal servitude; seven years later he was let out on ticket-of-leave. In his long imprisonment he had thought deeply upon the political and social condition of Ireland and the best means of improving it; when he came out he had abandoned his dreams of armed rebellion, and he went in for constitutional agitation to reform the Irish land system. The land system needed reforming; the condition of the tenant was only humanly endurable in years of good harvest. The three years from 1876 to 1879 were years of successive bad harvests. . . . Mr. Davitt had been in America, planning out a land organization, and had returned to Ireland to carry out his plan. Land meetings were held in many parts of Ireland, and in October Mr. Parnell, Mr. Davitt, Mr. Patrick Egan, and Mr. Thomas Brennan founded the Irish National Land League, the most powerful political organization that had been formed in Ireland since the Union. The objects of the Land League were the abolition of the existing landlord system and the introduction of peasant proprietorship."—J. H. McCarthy, *Outline of Irish Hist.*, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: T. P. O'Connor, *The Parnell Movement*, ch. 8-10.—A. V. Dickey, *England's Case against Home Rule*.—G. Baden Powell, ed., *The Truth about Home Rule*.

A. D. 1880.—The breach between the Irish Party and the English Liberals.—"The new Irish party which followed the lead of Mr. Parnell has been often represented by the humourist as a sort of Falstaffian 'ragged regiment.' . . . From dint of repetition this has come to be almost an article of faith in some quarters. Yet it is curiously without foundation. A large proportion of Mr. Parnell's followers were journalists. . . . Those who were not journalists in the Irish party were generally what is called well-to-do. . . . At first there seemed no reason to expect any serious disunion between the Irish

members and the Liberal party. . . . The Irish vote in England had been given to the Liberal cause. The Liberal speakers and statesmen, without committing themselves to any definite line of policy, had manifested friendly sentiments towards Ireland; and though indeed nothing was said which could be construed into a recognition of the Home Rule claim, still the new Ministry was known to contain men favourable to that claim. The Irish members hoped for much from the new Government; and, on the other hand, the new Government expected to find cordial allies in all sections of the Irish party. The appointment of Mr. Forster to the Irish Secretaryship was regarded by many Irishmen, especially those allied to Mr. Shaw and his following, as a marked sign of the good intentions of the Government towards Ireland. . . . The Queen's Speech announced that the Peace Preservation Act would not be renewed. This was a very important announcement. Since the Union Ireland had hardly been governed by the ordinary law for a single year. . . . Now the Government was going to make the bold experiment of trying to rule Ireland without the assistance of coercive and exceptional law. The Queen's Speech, however, contained only one other reference to Ireland, in a promise that a measure would be introduced for the extension of the Irish borough franchise. This was in itself an important promise. . . . But extension of the borough franchise did not seem to the Irish members in 1880 the most important form that legislation for Ireland could take just then. The country was greatly depressed by its recent suffering; the number of evictions was beginning to rise enormously. The Irish members thought that the Government should have made some promise to consider the land question, and above all should have done something to stay the alarming increase of evictions. Evictions had increased from 463 families in 1877 to 980 in 1878, to 1,288 in 1879; and they were still on the increase, as was shown at the end of 1880, when it was found that 2,110 families were evicted. An amendment to the Address was at once brought forward by the Irish party, and debated at some length. The Irish party called for some immediate legislation on behalf of the land question. Mr. Forster replied, admitting the necessity for some legislation, but declaring that there would not be time for the introduction of any such measure that session. Then the Irish members asked for some temporary measure to prevent the evictions. . . . ; but the Chief Secretary answered that while the law existed it was necessary to carry it out, and he could only appeal to both sides to be moderate. Matters slowly drifted on in this way for a short time. . . . Evictions steadily increased, and Mr. O'Connor Power brought in a Bill for the purpose of staying evictions. Then the Government, while refusing to accept the Irish measure, brought in a Compensation for Disturbance Bill, which adopted some of the Irish suggestions. . . . On Friday, June 25, the second reading of the Bill was moved by Mr. Forster, who denied that it was a concession to the anti-tenant agitation, and strongly denounced the outrages which were taking place in Ireland. . . . This was the point at which difference between the Irish party and the Government first became marked. The increase of evictions in Ireland, following as it did

upon the widespread misery caused by the failure of the harvests and the partial famine, had generated—as famine and hunger have always generated—a certain amount of lawlessness. Evictions were occasionally resisted with violence; here and there outrages were committed upon bailiffs, process-servers, and agents. In different places, too, injuries had been inflicted upon the cattle and horses of landowners and land agents.

... There is no need, there should be no attempt, to justify these crimes. But, while condemning all acts of violence, whether upon man or beast, it must be remembered that these acts were committed by ignorant peasants of the lowest class, maddened by hunger, want, and eviction, driven to despair by the sufferings of their wives and children, convinced of the utter hopelessness of redress, and longing for revenge. ... The Compensation for Disturbance Bill was carried in the Commons after long debates in which the Irish party strove to make its principles stronger. ... It was sent up to the Lords, where it was rejected on Tuesday, August 3, by a majority of 231. The Government answered the appeals of Irish members by refusing to take any steps to make the Lords retract their decision, or to introduce any similar measure that session. From that point the agitation and struggle of the past four years [1880-1884] may be said to date."—J. H. McCarthy, *England under Gladstone, 1880-1884*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: T. W. Reid, *Life of William Edward Forster*, v. 2, ch. 6-7.

A. D. 1881-1882.—The Coercion Bill and the Land Act.—Arrest of the Irish leaders.—Suppression of the Land League.—The alleged Kilmainham Treaty, and release of Mr. Parnell and others.—Early in 1881, the Government armed itself with new powers for suppressing the increased lawlessness which showed itself in Ireland, and for resisting the systematic policy of intimidation which the Nationalists appeared to have planned, by the passage of a measure known as the Coercion Bill. This was followed, in April, by the introduction of a Land Bill, intended to redress the most conspicuous Irish grievance by establishing an authoritative tribunal for the determination of rents, and by aiding and facilitating the purchase of small holdings by the peasants. The Land Bill became law in August; but it failed to satisfy the demands of the Land League or to produce a more orderly state of feeling in Ireland. Severe proceedings were then decided upon by the Government. "The Prime Minister, during his visit to Leeds in the first week of October, had used language which could bear only one meaning. The question, he said, had come to be simply this, 'whether law or lawlessness must rule in Ireland; the Irish people must not be deprived of the means of taking advantage of the Land Act by force or fear of force. He warned the party of disorder that 'the resources of civilisation were not yet exhausted.' A few days later Mr. Gladstone, speaking at the Guildhall, amid enthusiastic cheers, was able to announce that the long-delayed blow had fallen. Mr. Parnell was arrested in Dublin under the Coercion Act, and his arrest was followed by those of Mr. Sexton, Mr. Dillon, Mr. O'Kelly, and other prominent leaders of the agitation. The warnings of the Government had been met at first with derision and defiance, and the earlier arrests were furiously

denounced; but the energy and persistence of the Government soon began to make an impression. ... A Parthian shot was fired in the issue of a manifesto, purporting to be signed, not only by the 'suspects' in Kilmainham, but also by [Michael] Davitt, ... in Portland Prison, which adjured the tenantry to pay no rent whatever until the Government had done penance for its tyranny and released the victims of British despotism. This open incitement to defiance of legal authority and repudiation of legal right was instantly met by the Irish Executive in a resolute spirit. On the 20th of October a proclamation was issued declaring the League to be 'an illegal and criminal association, intent on destroying the obligation of contracts and subverting law,' and announcing that its operations would thenceforward be forcibly suppressed, and those taking part in them held responsible."—*Annual Summaries reprinted from The Times*, v. 2, p. 155.—"In the month of April [1882] Mr. Parnell was released from Kilmainham on parole—urgent business demanding his presence in Paris. This parole the Irish National leader faithfully kept. Whether the sweets of liberty had special charms for Mr. Parnell does not appear: but certain it is that after his return to Kilmainham, the Member for Cork wrote to Captain O'Shea, one of the Irish Members, and indirectly to the Government, intimating that if the question of arrears could be introduced in Parliament by way of relieving the tenants of holdings and lessening greatly the number of evictions in the country for non-payment of rent, and providing the purchase clauses of the Land Bill were discussed, steps might be taken to lessen the number of outrages. The Government had the intimation conveyed to them, in short, which gave to their minds the conviction that Messrs. Parnell, Dillon, and O'Kelly, once released, and having in view the reforms indicated to them, would range themselves on the side of law and order in Ireland. Without any contract with the three members the release of Messrs. Parnell, Dillon, and O'Kelly was ordered, after they had been confined for a period bordering on three months. Michael Davitt had been released, likewise, and had been elected for Meath; but the seat was declared vacant again, owing to the conditions of his ticket-of-leave not permitting his return. Much has been said, and much has been written with regard to the release of the three Irish M. P.'s. The 'Kilmainham Treaty' has been ... a term of scorn addressed to Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues. ... As a fact ... there was no Kilmainham Treaty. ... Mr. Forster [the Secretary for Ireland] resigned because he did not think it right to share the responsibility of the release of Messrs. Parnell, Dillon, and O'Kelly. The Government had detained the Queen's subjects in prison without trial for the purpose of preventing crime, not for punishment, Mr. Forster said in vindication. Mr. Forster contended that the unwritten law, as promulgated by them, had worked the ruin and the injury of the Queen's subjects by instructions of one kind and another—biddings carried out to such a degree that no power on earth could have allowed it to continue without becoming a Government not merely in name but in shame. Mr. Forster would have given the question of the release of the three consideration, if they had pledged themselves not to set their law up

against the law of the land, or if Ireland had been quiet, or if there had been an accession of fresh powers on behalf of the Government; but these conditions were wanting. What Mr. Forster desired was an avowal of a change of purpose. He entreated his colleagues 'not to try to buy obedience,' as he termed it, and not to rely on appearances. The Government did rely on the intimation of Mr. Parnell . . . ; there was no treaty."—W. M. Pimblett, *English Political History*, 1880-1885, ch. 10.

A. D. 1882.—The Phoenix Park murders.—Mr. Forster, Chief Secretary for Ireland, resigned in April, 1882, and was succeeded by Lord Frederick Cavendish, brother of the Marquis of Hartington and son of the Duke of Devonshire. Earl Spencer at the same time became Viceroy, in place of Lord Cowper, resigned. "On the night of Friday, May 5th, Earl Spencer and Lord Frederick Cavendish crossed over to Ireland, and arrived in Dublin on the following day. The official entry was made in the morning, when the reception accorded by the populace to the new officials was described as having been very fairly favourable. Events seemed to have taken an entirely prosperous turn, and it was hoped that at last the long winter of Irish discontent had come to an end. On Sunday morning there spread through the United Kingdom the intelligence that the insane hatred of English rule had been the cause of a crime, even more brutal and unprovoked than any of the numerous outrages that had, during the last three years, sullied the annals of Ireland. It appeared that Lord Frederick Cavendish, having taken the oaths at the Castle, took a car about half-past seven in order to drive to the Viceregal Lodge. On the way he met Mr. Burke, the Permanent Under-Secretary, who, though his life had been repeatedly threatened, was walking along, according to his usual custom, without any police escort. Lord Frederick dismissed his car, and walked with him through the Phoenix Park. There, in broad daylight—for it was a fine summer evening—and in the middle of a public recreation ground, crowded with people, they were surrounded and murdered. More than one spectator witnessed what they imagined to be a drunken brawl, saw six men struggling together, and four of them drive off outside a car, painted red, which had been waiting for them the while, the carman sitting still and never turning his head. The bodies of the two officials were first discovered by two shop-boys on bicycles who had previously passed them alive. Lord Frederick Cavendish had six wounds, and Mr. Burke eleven, dealt evidently with daggers used by men of considerable strength. Lord Spencer himself had witnessed the struggle from the windows of the Viceregal Lodge, and thinking that some pickpockets had been at work sent a servant to make inquiries. A reward of £10,000, together with full pardon to anyone who was not one of the actual murderers, was promptly offered, but for many long months the telegrams from Dublin closed with the significant information—'No definite clue in the hands of the police.' All parties in Ireland at once united to express their horror and detestation at this dastardly crime."—*Cassell's Illustrated History of England*, v. 10, ch. 50.

Also in: Sir C. Russell, *The Parnell Commission: Opening Speech*, pp. 282-291.

A. D. 1884.—Enlargement of the Suffrage.—Representation of the People Act. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1884-1885.

A. D. 1885-1886.—Change of opinion in England.—Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill and Irish Land Bill and their defeat.—"All through the Parliament which sat from 1880 till 1885, the Nationalists' party, led by Mr. Parnell, and including at first less than half, ultimately about half, of the Irish members, was in constant and generally bitter opposition to the Government of Mr. Gladstone. But during these five years a steady, although silent and often unconscious, process of change was passing in the minds of English and Scotch members, especially Liberal members, due to their growing sense of the mistakes which Parliament committed in handling Irish questions, and of the hopelessness of the efforts which the Executive was making to pacify the country on the old methods. First, they came to feel that the present system was indefensible. Then, while still disliking the notion of an Irish Legislature, they began to think it deserved consideration. Next they admitted, though usually in confidence to one another, that although Home Rule might be a bad solution, it was a probable one, toward which events pointed. Last of all, and not till 1884, they asked themselves whether, after all, it would be a bad solution, provided a workable scheme could be found. But as no workable scheme had been proposed, they still kept their views, perhaps unwisely, to themselves, and although the language held at the general election of 1885 showed a great advance in the direction of favoring Irish self-government, beyond the attitude of 1880, it was still vague and hesitating, and could the more easily remain so because the constituencies had not (strange as it may now seem) realized the supreme importance of the Irish question. Few questions were put to candidates on the subject, for both candidates and electors wished to avoid it. It was disagreeable; it was perplexing; so they agreed to leave it on one side. But when the result of the Irish elections showed, in December, 1885, an overwhelming majority in favor of the Home Rule party, and when they showed, also, that this party held the balance of power in Parliament, no one could longer ignore the urgency of the issue. There took place what chemists call a precipitation of substance held in solution. Public opinion on the Irish question had been in a fluid state. It now began to crystalize, and the advocates and opponents of Irish self-government fell asunder into two masses, which soon solidified. This process was hastened by the fact that Mr. Gladstone's view, the indications of which, given by himself some months before, had been largely overlooked, now became generally understood. . . . In the spring of 1886 the question could be no longer evaded or postponed. It was necessary to choose between . . . two courses; the refusal of the demand for self-government, coupled with the introduction of a severe Coercion Bill, or the concession of it by the introduction of a Home Rule Bill. . . . How the Government of Ireland Bill was brought into the House of Commons on April 8th, amid circumstances of curiosity and excitement unparalleled since 1882; how, after debates of almost unprecedented length, it was defeated in June, by a majority of thirty; how the policy it embodied

was brought before the country at the general election, and failed to win approval; how the Liberal party has been rent in twain upon the question; how Mr. Gladstone resigned, and has been succeeded by a Tory Ministry, which the dissentient Liberals, who condemn Home Rule, are now supporting—all this is . . . well known [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1885-1886]. . . . But the causes of the disaster may not be equally understood. . . . First, and most obvious, although not most important, was the weight of authority arrayed against the scheme. . . . The two most eminent leaders of the moderate Liberal, or, as it is often called, Whig, party, Lord Hartington and Mr. Goschen, both declared against the bill, and put forth all their oratory and influence against it. At the opposite extremity of the party, Mr. John Bright, the veteran and honored leader of the Radicals, Mr. Chamberlain, the younger and latterly more active and prominent chief of that large section, took up the same position of hostility. Scarcely less important was the attitude of the social magnates of the Liberal party all over the country. . . . As, at the preceding general election, in December, 1885, the Liberals had obtained a majority of less than a hundred over the Tories, a defection such as this was quite enough to involve their defeat. Probably the name of Mr. Bright alone turned the issue in some twenty constituencies, which might otherwise have cast a Home Rule vote. The mention of this cause, however, throws us back on the further question. Why was there such a weight of authority against the scheme proposed by Mr. Gladstone? How came so many of his former colleagues, friends, supporters, to differ and depart from him on this occasion? Besides some circumstances attending the production of the bill, . . . which told heavily against it, there were three feelings which worked upon men's minds, disposing them to reject it. The first of these was dislike and fear of the Irish Nationalist members. In the previous House of Commons this party had been uniformly and bitterly hostile to the Liberal Government. Measures intended for the good of Ireland, like the Land Act of 1881, had been ungraciously received, treated as concessions extorted, for which no thanks were due—inadequate concessions, which must be made the starting point for fresh demands. Obstruction had been freely practised to defeat not only bills restraining the liberty of the subject in Ireland, but many other measures. Some members of the Irish party, apparently with the approval of the rest, had systematically sought to delay all English and Scotch legislation, and, in fact, to bring the work of Parliament to a dead stop. . . . There could be no doubt as to the hostility which they, still less as to that which their fellow-countrymen in the United States, had expressed toward England, for they had openly wished success to Russia while war seemed impending with her, and the so-called Mahdi of the Sudan was vociferously cheered at many a Nationalist meeting. . . . To many Englishmen, the proposal to create an Irish Parliament seemed nothing more or less than a proposal to hand over to these men the government of Ireland, with all the opportunities thence arising to oppress the opposite party in Ireland and to worry England herself. It was all very well to urge that the tactics which the Nationalists had pursued

when their object was to extort Home Rule would be dropped, because superfluous, when Home Rule had been granted; or to point out that an Irish Parliament would probably contain different men from those who had been sent to Westminster as Mr. Parnell's nominees. Neither of these arguments could overcome the suspicious antipathy which many Englishmen felt. . . . The internal condition of Ireland supplied more substantial grounds for alarm. . . . Three-fourths of the people are Roman Catholics, one-fourth Protestants, and this Protestant fourth subdivided into bodies not fond of one another, who have little community of sentiment. Besides the Scottish colony in Ulster, many English families have settled here and there through the country. They have been regarded as intruders by the aboriginal Celtic population, and many of them, although hundreds of years may have passed since they came, still look on themselves as rather English than Irish. . . . Many people in England assumed that an Irish Parliament would be under the control of the tenants and the humbler class generally, and would therefore be hostile to the landlords. They went farther, and made the much bolder assumption that as such a Parliament would be chosen by electors, most of whom were Roman Catholics, it would be under the control of the Catholic priesthood, and hostile to Protestants. Thus they supposed that the grant of self-government to Ireland would mean the abandonment of the upper and wealthier class, the landlords and the Protestants, to the tender mercies of their enemies. . . . The fact stood out that in Ireland two hostile factions had been contending for the last sixty years, and that the gift of self-government might enable one of them to tyrannize over the other. True, that party was the majority, and, according to the principles of democratic government, therefore entitled to prevail. But it is one thing to admit a principle and another to consent to its application. The minority had the sympathy of the upper classes in England, because the minority contained the landlords. It had the sympathy of a large part of the middle class, because it contained the Protestants. . . . There was another anticipation, another forecast of evils to follow, which told most of all upon English opinion. This was the notion that Home Rule was only a stage in the road to the complete separation of the two islands."—J. Bryce, *Past and Future of the Irish Question* (New Princeton Rev., Jan., 1887).

A. D. 1886.—The "Plan of Campaign."—On the 11th of September Mr. Parnell had introduced in the House of Commons a bill to make temporary provision for the relief of suffering tenants in Ireland, and it had been defeated after a sharp debate by a majority of 95. The chief argument for the bill had been that "something must be done to stay evictions during the approaching winter. The rents would be due in November, and the fall in agricultural prices had been so great, that the sale of their whole produce by the tenants would not, it was contended, bring in money enough to enable them to pay in full. . . . The greatest public interest in the subject was roused by Lord Clanricarde's evictions at Woodford in Galway. . . . His quarrel with his Woodford tenants was of old standing. When the Home Rule Bill was before Parliament the National League urged them not to bring

matters to a crisis, but their sufferings were too great to be borne, and they set the National League at defiance, and established a Plan of Campaign of their own. Lord Clanricarde would grant them no reduction, and they leagued themselves together, 816 in number, and when the November rent day came round in 1885 they resolved not to pay any rent at all if twenty-five per cent. reduction was refused. This was refused, and they withheld their rent. . . . The eviction of four of these tenants, in August, 1886, attracted general attention by the long fight the people made for their homes. Each house was besieged and defended like some mediæval city. One stone house, built by a tenant at a cost of £200, got the name of Saunders's fort. It was held by a garrison of 24, who threw boiling water on their assailants, and in one part of the fight threw out among them a hive of bees. . . . To evict these four men the whole available forces of the Crown in Galway were employed from Thursday the 19th of August to Friday the 27th. Seven hundred policemen and soldiers were present to protect the emergency men who carried out the evictions, and 60 peasants were taken to Galway gaol. It was to meet cases of this kind that, after the rejection of Mr. Parnell's Tenants' Relief Bill, the Plan of Campaign was started. In a speech at Woodford on the 17th of October Mr. John Dillon gave an outline of the scheme on which he thought a tenants' campaign against unjust rents might be started and carried on all over the country. . . . On the 23rd of October the 'Plan of Campaign' was published in full detail in 'United Ireland.' The first question to be answered, said the 'Plan,' was, How to meet the November demand for rent? On every estate the tenantry were to come together and decide whether to combine or not in resistance to exorbitant rent. When they were assembled, if the priest were not with them, they were to 'appoint an intelligent and sturdy member of their body as chairman, and after consulting, decide by resolution on the amount of abatement they will demand.' A committee of six or more and the chairman were then to be elected, to be called a Managing Committee, to take charge of the half year's rent of each tenant should the landlord refuse it. Every one present was to pledge himself (1) To abide by the decision of the majority; (2) To hold no communication with the landlord or his agents, except in presence of the body of the tenantry; (3) To accept no settlement for himself that was not given to every tenant on the estate. Having thus pledged themselves each to the others they were to go to the rent office in a body on the rent day, or the gale day, as it is called in Ireland, and if the agent refused to see them in a body they were to depute the chairman to act as their spokesman and tender the reduced rent. If the agent refused to accept it, then the money was to be handed to the Managing Committee 'to fight the landlord with.' The fund thus got together was to be employed in supporting tenants who were dispossessed by sale or ejectment. The National League was to guarantee the continuance of the grants if needful after the fund was expended, or as long as the majority of the tenants held out."—P. W. Clayden, *England under the Coalition*, ch. 8.

A. D. 1888-1889.—The Parnell Commission. —Early in 1887, certain letters appeared in "The

Times" newspaper, of London, one of which, printed in facsimile, "implied Mr. Parnell's sanction to the Park murders of 1882." It created a great sensation, and, "after many bitter debates in Parliament, a commission was appointed (1888) consisting of three judges to inquire not only into the authenticity of this and other letters attributed to several persons as their authors, but into the whole course of conduct pursued by many of the Irish Members of Parliament, in reference to the previous agitation in Ireland and their connexion with an extreme faction in America, who tried to intimidate this country by dastardly attempts to blow up our public buildings on several occasions between the years 1884 and 1887. The court sat from the winter months of 1888 until the summer of the following year, and examined dozens of witnesses, including Mr. Parnell and most of the other accused members, as well as dozens of the Irish peasantry who could give evidence as to outrages in their several districts. One of the witnesses, a mean and discarded Dublin journalist named Pigott, turned out to be the forger of the letters; and, having fled from the avenging hand of justice to Madrid, there put an end to his life by means of a revolver. Meantime, the interest in the investigation had flagged, and the report of the Commission, which deeply implicated many of the Irish members as to their connexion with the Fenian Society previous to their entrance to Parliament, on their own acknowledgment, fell rather flat on the public ear, wearied out in reiteration of Irish crime from the introduction of the Land League until the attempt to blow up London Bridge by American filibusters (1886). The unfortunate man Pigott had sold his forged letters to the over credulous Times newspaper at a fabulous price; and even experts in handwriting, so dexterously had they been manipulated, were ready to testify in open court to the genuineness of the letters before the tragic end of their luckless author left not a particle of doubt as to their origin."—R. Johnston, *Short Hist. of the Queen's Reign*, p. 65.

ALSO IN: Sir C. Russell, *The Parnell Commission: Opening Speech for the Defence*.—M. Davitt, *Speech in Defence*.

A. D. 1889-1891.—Political fall and death of Mr. Parnell.—On the 28th of December, 1889, Captain O'Shea, one of the Irish Nationalist Members of Parliament, filed a petition for divorce from his wife on the ground of adultery with Mr. Parnell. The Irish leader tacitly confessed his guilt by making no answer, and in November, 1890, the divorce was granted to Captain O'Shea. In the following June Mr. Parnell and Mrs. O'Shea were married. The stigma which this affair put upon Mr. Parnell caused Mr. Gladstone, on behalf of the English Liberals, to demand his retirement from the leadership of the Home Rule Party. He refused to give way, and was supported in the refusal by a minority of his party. The majority, however, took action to depose him, and the party was torn asunder. A sudden illness ended Mr. Parnell's life on the 6th of October, 1891; but his death failed to restore peace, and the Irish Nationalists are still divided. ♣

A. D. 1893.—Passage of the Home Rule Bill by the British House of Commons.—Its defeat by the House of Lords. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1892-1893.

IRENE, Empress in the East (Byzantine, or Greek), A. D. 797-802.

IRISH NIGHT, The. See LONDON: A. D. 1688.

IRMINUS, The. See SAXONS: A. D. 772-804.

IRON AGE. See STONE AGE.

IRON CROSS, Order of the. — A Prussian order of knighthood instituted in 1815 by Frederick William III.

IRON CROWN, The Order of the. See FRANCE: A. D. 1804-1805.

IRON CROWN OF LOMBARDY, The. See LOMBARDY, THE IRON CROWN OF.

IRON MASK, The Man in the. — "It is known that a masked and unknown prisoner, the object of extraordinary surveillance, died, in 1703, in the Bastille, to which he had been taken from the St. Marguerite Isles in 1698; he had remained about ten years incarcerated in these isles, and traces of him are with certainty found in the fort of Exilles, and at Pignerol, as far back as about 1681. This singular fact, which began to be vaguely bruited a little before the middle of the 18th century, excited immense curiosity after Voltaire had availed himself of it in his *'Siècle de Louis XIV.'*, wherein he exhibited it in the most touching and tragic light. A thousand conjectures circulated: no great personage had disappeared in Europe about 1680. What interest so powerful had the government of Louis XIV. for concealing this mysterious visage from every human eye? Many explanations more or less plausible, more or less chimerical, have been attempted in regard to the 'man with the iron mask' (an erroneous designation that has prevailed; the mask was not of iron, but of black velvet; it was probably one of those 'loupes' so long in use), when, in 1837, the bibliophile Jacob (M. Paul Lacroix) published a very ingenious book on this subject, in which he discussed all the hypotheses, and skilfully commented on all the facts and dates, in order to establish that, in 1680, Fouquet was represented as dead; that he was masked, sequestered anew, and dragged from fortress to fortress till his real death in 1703. It is impossible for us to admit this solution of the problem; the authenticity of the minister Louvois' correspondence with the governor of the prison of Pignerol, on the subject of Fouquet's death, in March, 1680, appears to us incontestable; and did this material proof not exist, we still could not believe in a return of rigor so strange, so barbarous, and so unaccountable on the part of Louis XIV., when all the official documents attest that his resentment had gradually been appeased, and that an old man who asked nothing more than a little free air before dying had ceased to be feared. There are many more presumptions in favor of Baron Heiss' opinion, reproduced by several writers, and, in the last instance, by M. Delort (*'Histoire de l'homme au masque de fer'*, 1825), — the opinion that the 'man with a mask' was a secretary of the Duke of Mantua, named Mattioli, carried off by order of Louis XIV. in 1678, for having deceived the French government, and having sought to form a coalition of the Italian princes against it. But however striking, in certain respects, may be the resemblances between Mattioli and the 'iron mask,' equally guarded by the governor St. Mars at Pignerol and at Ex-

illes, however grave may be the testimony according to which Mattioli was transferred to the St. Marguerite Isles, the subaltern position of Mattioli, whom Catinat and Louvois, in their letters, characterize as a 'knave' and St. Mars threatens with a cudgel, ill accords, we do not say with the traditions relating to the profound respect shown the prisoner by the keepers, the governor, and even the minister, — these traditions may be contested, — but with the authentic details and documents given by the learned and judicious Father Griffet in regard to the extreme mystery in which the prisoner at the Bastille was enveloped, more than twenty years after the abduction of the obscure Mattioli, in regard to the mask that he never put off, in regard to the precautions taken after his death to annihilate the traces of his sojourn at the Bastille, which explains why nothing was found concerning him after the taking of that fortress. Many minds will always persist in seeking, under this impenetrable mask, a more dangerous secret, a mysterious accusing resemblance; and the most popular opinion, although the most void of all proof, will always doubtless be that suffered to transpire by Voltaire, under cover of his publisher, in the eighth edition of his *'Dictionnaire philosophique'* (1771). According to this opinion, the honor of the royal household was involved in the secret, and the unknown victim was an illegitimate son of Anne of Austria. The only private crime of which Louis XIV. was perhaps capable, was a crime inspired by fanaticism for monarchical honor. However this may be, history has no right to pronounce upon what will never emerge from the domain of conjecture." — II. Martin, *Hist. of France: Age of Louis XIV.*, v. 1, p. 40, foot-note. — "The Paris correspondent of the *'Daily Telegraph'* records a fact which, if it is correctly reported, goes a long way towards clearing up one of the problems of modern history. A letter to Louvois by Louis XIV., written in cipher, has been long in the archives of the Ministry of War, and has at length been deciphered. In it the King orders Louvois to arrest General de Burlonde for having raised the siege of Conti without permission, to send him to Pignerol, and to conceal his features under a 'loup' or black-velvet mask. The order was executed, and the presumption is therefore violent that the 'Man in the Iron Mask' — it was a black-velvet one with iron springs — was General de Burlonde. The story tallies with the known fact that the prisoner made repeated attempts to communicate his name to soldiers, that he was treated with respect by his military jailors, and that Louis XV., who knew the truth of the whole affair, declared it to be a matter of no importance. The difficulty is to discover the King's motive for such a precaution; but he may have feared discontent among his great officers, or the soldiery." — *The Spectator*, Oct. 14, 1893. — The cipher despatch above referred to, and the whole subject of the imprisonment of General de Burlonde, are discussed at length, in the light of official records and correspondence, by M. Émile Burgaud and Commandant Bazeries (the latter of whom discovered the key to the cipher), in a book entitled *"Le Masque de Fer: Révélation de la correspondance chiffrée de Louis XIV."* published at Paris in 1893. It seems to leave small doubt that the mysteriously masked prisoner was no other than General de Burlonde.

Also in: G. A. Ellis, *True Hist. of the State Prisoner commonly called the Iron Mask*.—E. Lawrence, *The Man in the Iron Mask* (*Harper's Mag.*, v. 48, p. 98).—M. Topin, *The Man in the Iron Mask* (*Cornhill Mag.*, v. 21, p. 333).—*Quarterly Rev.*, v. 34, p. 19.

IRONCLAD OATH.—An oath popularly styled the "Ironclad oath" was prescribed by the Congress of the United States, during the War of the Rebellion, in July, 1862, to be taken by every person elected or appointed to any office under the Government of the United States, the President only excepted. He was required to swear that he had "never voluntarily borne arms against the United States"; that he had "voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility to the National Government"; that he had "neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever under authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States"; that he had "never yielded a voluntary support to any pretended Government within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, v. 2, p. 88.

IRONSIDES, Cromwell's. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1643 (May).

"IRONSIDES, Old."—A name popularly given to the American frigate "Constitution." See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1814.

IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY, The.—According to their traditions, the founder of the League or confederacy which united the five nations of the Iroquois—the Mohawks, the Onondagas, the Oneidas, the Cayugas, and the Senecas (see AMERICAN ABORIGINES: IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY), was Hiawatha, the hero of Iroquois legend. He was an Onondaga chief, and is supposed to have lived about the middle of the 15th century. "Hiawatha had long beheld with grief the evils which afflicted not only his own nation, but all the other tribes about them, through the continual wars in which they were engaged, and the misgovernment and miseries at home which these wars produced. With much meditation he had elaborated in his mind the scheme of a vast confederation which would ensure universal peace. In the mere plan of a confederation there was nothing new. There are probably few, if any, Indian tribes which have not, at one time or another, been members of a league or confederacy. It may almost be said to be their normal condition. But the plan which Hiawatha had evolved differed from all others in two particulars. The system which he devised was to be not a loose and transitory league, but a permanent government. While each nation was to retain its own council and its management of local affairs, the general control was to be lodged in a federal senate, composed of representatives elected by each nation, holding office during good behavior, and acknowledged as ruling chiefs throughout the whole confederacy. Still further, and more remarkably, the confederation was not to be a limited one. It was to be indefinitely expansible. The avowed design of its proposer was to abolish war altogether. He wished the federation to extend until all the tribes of men should be included in it, and peace should everywhere reign. Such is the positive testimony of the Iroquois themselves: and their statement, as will be seen,

is supported by historical evidence. . . . His conceptions were beyond his time, and beyond ours; but their effect, within a limited sphere, was very great. For more than three centuries the bond which he devised held together the Iroquois nations in perfect amity. It proved, moreover, as he intended, elastic. The territory of the Iroquois, constantly extending as their united strength made itself felt, became the 'Great Asylum' of the Indian tribes. . . . Among the interminable stories with which the common people [of the Five Nations] beguile their winter nights, the traditions of Atotarho and Hiawatha became intermingled with the legends of their mythology. An accidental similarity, in the Onondaga dialect, between the name of Hiawatha and that of one of their ancient divinities, led to a confusion between the two, which has misled some investigators. This deity bears, in the sonorous Canienga tongue, the name of Taronhiawagon, meaning 'the Holder of the Heavens.' The Jesuit missionaries style him 'the great god of the Iroquois.' Among the Onondagas of the present day, the name is abridged to Taonhiawagi, or Tahiaawagi. The confusion between this name and that of Hiawatha (which, in another form, is pronounced Tahionwatha) seems to have begun more than a century ago. . . . Mr. J. V. H. Clark, in his interesting History of Onondaga, makes the name to have been originally Ta-own-ya-wat-ha, and describes the bearer as 'the deity who presides over fisheries and hunting-grounds.' He came down from heaven in a white canoe, and after sundry adventures, which remind one of the labors of Hercules, assumed the name of Hiawatha (signifying, we are told, 'a very wise man'), and dwelt for a time as an ordinary mortal among men, occupied in works of benevolence. Finally, after founding the confederacy and bestowing many prudent counsels upon the people, he returned to the skies by the same conveyance in which he had descended. This legend, or, rather, congeries of intermingled legends, was communicated by Clark to Schoolcraft, when the latter was compiling his 'Notes on the Iroquois.' Mr. Schoolcraft, pleased with the poetical cast of the story, and the euphonious name, made confusion worse confounded by transferring the hero to a distant region and identifying him with Manabozho, a fantastic divinity of the Ojibways. Schoolcraft's volume, which he chose to entitle 'The Hiawatha Legends,' has not in it a single fact or fiction relating either to Hiawatha himself or to the Iroquois deity Taronhiawagon. Wild Ojibway stories concerning Manabozho and his comrades form the staple of its contents. But it is to this collection that we owe the charming poem of Longfellow; and thus, by an extraordinary fortune, a grave Iroquois lawgiver of the fifteenth century has become, in modern literature, an Ojibway demigod, son of the West Wind, and companion of the tricky Paupukewis, the boastful lagoo, and the strong Kwasind. If a Chinese traveler, during the middle ages, inquiring into the history and religion of the western nations, had confounded King Alfred with King Arthur, and both with Odin, he would not have made a more preposterous confusion of names and characters than that which has hitherto disguised the genuine personality of the great Onondaga reformer."—H. Hale, ed., *The Iroquois Book of*

Rites (Brinton's Library of Aboriginal Am. Literature, no. 2, pp. 21-36).

IRREDENTISTS.—“This is the name given to a political organisation formed in 1878, with the avowed object of freeing all Italians from foreign rule, and of reuniting to the Italian kingdom all those portions of the Italy of old which have passed under foreign dominion. The operations of the ‘Italia Irredenta’ party are chiefly carried on against Austria, in consequence of the retention by that Empire of Trieste and the Southern Tyrol. Until these territories have been relinquished, Italy, or at least a certain part of it, will remain unsatisfied.”—J. S. Jeans, *Italy (National Life and Thought, ch. 8).*

ISAAC II. (Comnenus), Emperor in the East (Byzantine, or Greek), A. D. 1057-1059. . . . **Isaac II. (Angelus), Emperor in the East (Byzantine, or Greek), 1185-1195.**

ISABELLA, Queen of Castile (wife of Ferdinand II., King of Aragon), A. D. 1474-1504. . . . **Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 1833-1868.**

ISABELLA.—The city founded by Columbus on the island of Hispaniola, or Hayti. See AMERICA: A. D. 1493-1496.

ISANDLANA, The English disaster at (1879). See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1877-1879.

ISASZEG, Battle of (1849). See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

ISAURIAN DYNASTY, The. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 717-797.

ISAURIANS, The.—The Isaurians were a fierce and savage race of mountaineers, who occupied anciently a district in Asia Minor, between Cilicia and Pamphylia on the south and Phrygia on the north. They were persistently a nation of robbers, living upon the spoils taken from their neighbors, who were never able to punish them justly in their mountain fastnesses. Even the iron hand of the Romans failed to reduce the Isaurians to order, although P. Servilius, in 78 B. C., destroyed most of their strongholds, and Pompey, eleven years later, in his great campaign against the pirates, put an end to the lawless depredations on sea and land of the Cilicians, who had become confederated with the Isaurians. Five centuries afterwards, in the days of the Eastern Empire, the Isaurians were the best soldiers of its army, and even gave an emperor to the throne at Constantinople in the person of Zeno or Zenon.—E. W. Brooks, *The Emperor Zenon and the Isaurians (English Historical Rev., April, 1898).*

ISCA.—The name of two towns in Roman Britain, one of which is identified with modern Exeter and the other with Caerleon-on-Usk. The latter was the station of the 2d legion.—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome, bk. 8, ch. 5.*—See EXETER, ORIGIN OF; also, CAERLEON.

ISHMAELIANS, The. See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST: A. D. 908-1171; also, ASSASSINS; and CARMATHIANS.

ISIDORE, The False Decretals of. See PAPACY: A. D. 820-847.

ISINÆ. See CAUSENNÆ.

ISLAM.—“The religion founded by Mahomet is called Islam, a word meaning ‘the entire surrender of the will to God’; its professors are called Mussulmans—‘those who have surrendered themselves,’ or ‘Believers,’ as opposed to the ‘Rejectors’ of the Divine messengers, who are named ‘Kafirs,’ or ‘Mushrikin,’ that is,

‘those who associate, are companions or sharers with the Deity.’ Islam is sometimes divided under the two heads of Faith and Practical Religion. I. Faith (Iman) includes a belief in one God, omnipotent, omniscient, all-merciful, the author of all good; and in Mahomet as his prophet, expressed in the formula ‘There is no God but God, and Mahomet is the Prophet of God.’ It includes, also, a belief in the authority and sufficiency of the Koran, in angels, genii, and the devil, in the immortality of the soul, the resurrection, the day of judgment and in God’s absolute decree for good and evil. II. Practical religion (Din) consists of five observances: (1) Recital of the formula of Belief, (2) Prayer with Ablution, (3) Fasting, (4) Almsgiving, (5) the Pilgrimage. . . . The standard of Moslem orthodoxy is essentially the Koran and to it primary reference is made; but . . . some more extended and discriminating code became necessary. The deficiency was supplied by the compilation of the ‘Sunnah,’ or Traditional Law, which is built upon the sayings and practices of Mahomet, and, in the opinion of the orthodox, is invested with the force of law, and with some of the authority of inspiration. . . . In cases where both the Koran and the Sunnah afford no exact precept, the ‘Rule of Faith’ in their dogmatic belief, as well as the decisions of their secular courts, is based upon the teaching of one of the four great Imams, or founders of the orthodox sects, according as one or another of these prevails in any particular country. . . . The great Sunni sect is divided among the orthodox schools mentioned above, and is so called from its reception of the ‘Sunnah,’ as having authority concurrent with and supplementary to the Koran. In this respect it differs essentially from the Shias, or partisans of the house of Ali [the nephew of Mahomet and husband of his daughter Fatima] who, adhering to their own traditions, reject the authority of the ‘Sunnah.’ These two sects, moreover, have certain observances and matters of belief peculiar to themselves, the chief of which is the Shia doctrine, that the sovereign Imamat, or temporal and spiritual lordship over the faithful, was by divine right vested in Ali and in his descendants, through Hasan and Hosein, the children of Fatima, the daughter of the prophet. And thus the Persian Shias add to the formula of belief the confession, ‘Ali is the Caliph of God.’ In Persia the Shia doctrines prevail, and formerly so intense was sectarian hatred that the Sunni Mahometans paid a higher capitation tax there than the infidels. In Turkey the great majority are Sunni. In India the Shias number about one in twenty. The Shias, who reject this name, and call themselves Adliyah, or the ‘Society of the Just,’ are subdivided into a great variety of minor sects; but these . . . are united in asserting that the first three Caliphs, Abu Bekr, Omar, and Othman were usurpers, who had possessed themselves of the rightful and inalienable inheritance of Ali.”—J. W. H. Stobart, *Islam and its Founder, ch. 10.*—“The twelve Imams, or pontiffs, of the Persian creed, are Ali, Hassan, Hosein, and the lineal descendants of Hosein to the ninth generation. Without arms, or treasures, or subjects, they successively enjoyed the veneration of the people and provoked the jealousy of the reigning caliphs. . . . The twelfth and last of the Imams, conspicuous by the title of Mahadi, or the Guide,

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surpassed the solitude and sanctity of his predecessors. He concealed himself in a cavern near Bagdad: the time and place of his death are unknown; and his votaries pretend that he still lives and will appear before the day of judgment."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 50.

ALSO IN: E. Sell, *The Faith of Islam*.—S. Lane-Poole, *Studies in a Mosque*, ch. 3 and 7.—R. D. Osborn, *Islam under the Arabs*, pt. 2, ch. 1.—W. C. Taylor, *Hist. of Mohammedanism*, ch. 5-13.—R. Bosworth Smith, *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*.—T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, ch. 3.—See, also, MAHOMETAN CONQUEST.

ISLAM, Dar-ul-, and Dar-ul-harb. See DAR-UL-ISLAM.

ISLAND NUMBER TEN, The capture of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (MARCH—APRIL: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).

ISLE OF FRANCE.—The old French province containing Paris. Also the French name of Mauritius island, taken by England in 1810.

ISLE ROYALE. See CAPE BRETON: A. D. 1720-1745.

ISLES, Lords of the. See HEBRIDES. A. D. 1846-1804, and HARLAW, BATTLE OF.

ISLES OF THE BLESSED. See CANARY ISLANDS.

ISLY, Battle of (1843). See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1830-1846.

ISMAIL, Khedive of Egypt, The reign and the fall of. See EGYPT: A. D. 1840-1869; 1870-1883; and 1875-1882. . . . Ismail I., Shah of Persia, A. D. 1502-1523. . . . Ismail II., Shah of Persia, 1576-1577.

ISMAIL, Siege and capture of (1790). See TURKS: A. D. 1776-1792.

ISMAILEANS, OR ISHMAELIANS. See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST: A. D. 908-1171; also, ASSASSINS; and CARMATHIANS.

ISONOMY.—ISOTIMY.—ISAGORIA.—“The principle underlying democracy is the struggle for a legalised equality which was usually described [by the ancient Greeks] by the expressions Isonomy, or equality of law for all, —Isotimy, or proportionate regard paid to all, —Isagoria, or equal freedom of speech, with special reference to courts of justice and popular

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assemblies.”—G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece: The State*, pt. 2, ch. 12.

ISONZO, Battle of the (A. D. 489). See ROME: A. D. 488-526.

ISOPOLITY.—“Under Sp. Cassius [B. C. 493], Rome concluded a treaty with the Latins, in which the right of isopolity or the ‘jus municipi’ was conceded to them. The idea of isopolity changed in the course of time, but its essential features in early times were these: between the Romans and Latins and between the Romans and Caerites there existed this arrangement, that any citizen of the one state who wished to settle in the other, might forthwith be able to exercise there the rights of a citizen.”—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lects. on the Hist. of Rome*, lect. 13 (v. 1).

ISRAEL. See JEWS.

ISRAEL, Lost Ten Tribes of. See JEWS: THE KINGDOMS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH.

ISSUS, Battle of (B. C. 333). See MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330.

ISTÆVONES, The. See GERMANY: AS KNOWN TO TACITUS.

ISTAKR, OR STAKR.—The native name under the later, or Sassanian, Persian empire, of the ancient capital, Persepolis.—G. Rawlinson, *Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*, ch. 3, foot-note.

ISTER, The.—The ancient Greek name of the Danube, below the junction of the Theiss and the Save.

ISTHMIAN GAMES. See NEMEAN.

ISTRIA: Slavonic Occupation of. See SLAVONIC PEOPLES: SIXTH AND SEVENTH CENTURIES.

A. D. 1797.—Acquisition by Austria. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY—OCTOBER).

ISTRINIANS, The. See ILLYRIANS.

ISURIUM.—A Roman town in Britain, which had previously been the chief town of the British tribe of the Brigantes. It is identified with Aldborough, Yorkshire, “where the excavator meets continually with the tessellated floors of the Roman houses.”—T. Wright, *Celt, Roman and Saxon*, ch. 5.

ITALI, The. See ENOTRIANS.



ITALIAN WAR, The. See ROME: B. C. 90-88.

ITALIOTES. See SICELIOTES.

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Ancient.—Early Italians.—“It was not till the close of the Republic, or rather the beginning of the Empire, that the name of Italy was employed, as we now employ it, to designate the whole Peninsula, from the Alps to the Straits of Messina [see ROME: B. C. 275]. The term Italia, borrowed from the name of a primeval tribe who occupied the southern portion of the land, was gradually adopted as a generic title in the same obscure manner in which most of the countries of Europe, or (we may say) the Continents of the world, have received their appellations. In the remotest times the name only included Lower Calabria: from these narrow limits it gradually spread upwards, till about the time of the Punic Wars, its northern boundary ascended the little river Rubicon (between Umbria and Cisalpine Gaul), then followed the

ridge of the Appennines westward to the source of the Macra, and was carried down the bed of that small stream to the Gulf of Genoa. When we speak of Italy, therefore, in the Roman sense of the word, we must dismiss from our thoughts all that fertile country which was at Rome entitled the provincial district of Gallia Cisalpina, and Liguria.”—H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome*, introd., sect. 2.—“Philological research teaches us to distinguish three primitive Italian stocks, the Iapygian, the Etruscan, and that which we shall call the Italian. The last is divided into two main branches,—the Latin branch, and that to which the dialects of the Umbri, Marsi, Volsci and Samnites belong. As to the Iapygian stock, we have but little information. At the southeastern extremity of Italy, in the Messapian or Calabrian peninsula, inscriptions in a peculiar



extinct language have been found in considerable numbers; undoubtedly remains of the dialect of the Iapygians, who are very distinctly pronounced by tradition also to have been different from the Latin and Samnite stocks. . . . With the recognition of . . . a general family relationship or peculiar affinity between the Iapygians and Hellenes (a recognition, however, which by no means goes so far as to warrant our taking the Iapygian language to be a rude dialect of Greek), investigation must rest content. . . . The middle of the peninsula was inhabited, as far back as reliable tradition reaches, by two peoples or rather two branches of the same people, whose position in the Indo-Germanic family admits of being determined with greater precision than that of the Iapygian nation. We may with propriety call this people the Italian, since upon it rests the historical significance of the peninsula. It is divided into the two branch-stocks of the Latins and the Umbrians; the latter including their southern off-shoots, the Marsians and Samnites, and the colonies sent forth by the Samnites in historical times. . . . These examples [philological examples, given in the work, but omitted from this quotation], selected from a great abundance of analogous phenomena, suffice to establish the individuality of the Italian stock as distinguished from the other members of the Indo-Germanic family, and at the same time show it to be linguistically the nearest relative, as it is geographically the next neighbour, of the Greek. The Greek and the Italian are brothers; the Celt, the German and the Slavonian are their cousins. . . . Among the languages of the Italian stock, again, the Latin stands in marked contrast with the Umbro-Samnite dialects. It is true that of these only two, the Umbrian and the Samnite or Oscan, are in some degree known to us. . . . A conjoint view, however, of the facts of language and of history leaves no doubt that all these dialects belonged to the Umbro-Samnite branch of the great Italian stock. . . . It may . . . be regarded as certain that the Italians, like the Indians, migrated into their peninsula from the north. The advance of the Umbro-Sabellian stock along the central mountain-ridge of Italy, in a direction from north to south, can still be clearly traced; indeed its last phases belong to purely historical times. Less is known regarding the route which the Latin migration followed. Probably it proceeded in a similar direction along the west coast, long, in all likelihood, before the first Sabellian stocks began to move."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 1, ch. 2-3.—See also, ETRUSCANS; LATIUM; SABINES; SAMNITES; UMBRIANS; MAGNA GRÆCIA; also, ROME. B. C. 343-290, and 839-838.—"In the February number of the 'Civiltà Cattolica,' Padre de Cara pleads for a national effort on the part of Italian archaeologists to solve the question of the origin of their country's civilisation by the systematic exploration and excavation of Pelasgic Italy. . . . In a series of articles, extending over several years, the learned father has contended for the identity of the Hittites and Proto-Pelasgians on archaeological, etymological, and historical grounds; and he here repeats that, if 'Italic' means Aryan, then it is among the peoples speaking Oscan, Umbrian, Latin, and other dialects of the Indo-European family that the parentage of Italian civilisation must be sought; but that 'Italy'

meant in the first place the country of the Hittites (Hethel), and hence of the Pelasgians, and that name and civilisation are alike Pelasgic. Those who hold it to have been Aryan have not only the testimony of Greek and Roman writers against them, but also the facts that there were Pelasgians in Italy whose stone constructions are standing to this day, and that the Etruscan language and culture had no Aryan affinities. The writer further points out that the walls of Pelasgic cities, whether in Italy, Greece, or Asia Minor, all resemble each other, and that the origin of Greek civilisation was also Pelasgic. In Greece, as in Italy, the Aryans followed centuries after the Hittite-Pelasgians, and Aryan Greece carried the arts of Pelasgic Greece to perfection. He believes that, of two migratory bands of Hittites, one invaded Greece and the other Italy, about the same time. He also draws attention to the coincidence that it is not very long since Greece, like Italy at the present time, could date its civilisation no further back than 700 or 800 B. C. Schliemann recovered centuries for Greece, but 'Italy still remains imprisoned in the iron circle of the seventh century.' To break it, she must follow Schliemann's plan; and as he had steady faith in the excavation of the Pelasgic cities and cemeteries of Greece, so will like faith and conduct on the part of Italian archaeologists let in light upon this once dark problem."—*Academy*, March 31, 1894, p. 278.

Under the dominion of Rome. See ROME.

Invasions Repelled by Rome. See ROME: B. C. 390-347, 282-275; PUNIC WARS; CIMBRI AND TEUTONES; ALEMANNI; and RADAGAIUS.

A. D. 400-410.—Alaric's invasions. See GOTH (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 400-403; and ROME: A. D. 408-410.

A. D. 452.—Attila's invasion.—The origin of Venice. See HUNS: A. D. 452; and VENICE: A. D. 452.

A. D. 476-553.—The fall of the Western Roman Empire.—The Ostrogothic kingdom of Theodoric, and its fall.—Recovery of Italy by Justinian. See ROME: A. D. 455-476, to 535-553.

A. D. 539-553.—Frank invasions. See FRANKS: A. D. 539-553.

A. D. 554-800.—Rule of the Exarchs of Ravenna. See ROME: A. D. 554-800; and PAPACY: A. D. 728-774.

A. D. 568-800.—Lombard conquests and kingdom.—Rise of the Papal power at Rome.—Alliance of the Papacy with the sovereigns of the Franks.—Revival of the Roman Empire under Charlemagne.—"Since the invasion of Alboin, Italy had groaned under a complication of evils. The Lombards who had entered along with that chief in A. D. 568 [see LOMBARDS: A. D. 568-573, and after] had settled in considerable numbers in the valley of the Po, and founded the duchies of Spoleto and Benevento, leaving the rest of the country to be governed by the exarch of Ravenna as viceroy of the Eastern crown. This subjection was, however, little better than nominal. Although too few to occupy the whole peninsula, the invaders were yet strong enough to harass every part of it by inroads which met with no resistance from a population unused to arms, and without the spirit to use them in self-defence. . . . Tormented by their repeated attacks, Rome sought help in vain from Byzantium, whose forces, scarce able to repel from their

walls the Avars and Saracens, could give no support to the distant exarch of Ravenna. The Popes were the Emperor's subjects; they awaited his confirmation, like other bishops; they had more than once been the victims of his anger. But as the city became more accustomed in independence, and the Pope rose to a predominance, real if not yet legal [see ROME: A. D. 590-640, and PAPACY: A. D. 728-774], his tone grew bolder than that of the Eastern patriarchs. In the controversies that had raged in the Church, he had had the wisdom or good fortune to espouse (though not always from the first) the orthodox side: it was now by another quarrel of religion that his deliverance from an unwelcome yoke was accomplished. The Emperor Leo, born among the Isaurian mountains, where a purer faith may yet have lingered, and stung by the Mohammedan taunt of idolatry, determined to abolish the worship of images, which seemed fast obscuring the more spiritual part of Christianity. An attempt sufficient to cause tumults among the submissive Greeks, excited in Italy a fiercer commotion. The populace rose with one heart in defence of what had become to them more than a symbol: the exarch was slain: the Pope, though unwilling to sever himself from the lawful head and protector of the Church, must yet excommunicate the prince whom he could not reclaim from so hateful a heresy [see ICONOCLASTIC CONTROVERSY]. Liudprand, king of the Lombards, improved his opportunity: falling on the exarchate as the champion of images, on Rome as the minister of the Greek Emperor, he overran the one, and all but succeeded in capturing the other. The Pope escaped for the moment, but saw his peril: placed between a heretic and a robber, he turned his gaze beyond the Alps, to a Catholic chief who had just achieved a signal deliverance for Christendom on the field of Poitiers. Gregory II. had already opened communications with Charles Martel, mayor of the palace, and virtual ruler of the Frankish realm. As the crisis becomes more pressing, Gregory III. finds in the same quarter his only hope, and appeals to him in urgent letters, to haste to the succour of Holy Church. . . . Charles died before he could obey the call; but his son Pipin (surnamed the Short) made good use of the new friendship with Rome. He was the third of his family who had ruled the Franks with a monarch's full power [see FRANKS: A. D. 511-752]: it seemed time to abolish the pageant of Merovingian royalty; yet a departure from the ancient line might shock the feelings of the people. A course was taken whose dangers no one then foresaw: the Holy See, now for the first time invoked as an international power, pronounced the deposition of Childric, and gave to the royal office of his successor Pipin a sanctity hitherto unknown. . . . The compact between the chair of Peter and the Teutonic throne was hardly sealed, when the latter was summoned to discharge its share of the duties. Twice did Aistulf the Lombard assail Rome, twice did Pipin descend to the rescue: the second time at the bidding of a letter written in the name of St. Peter himself. Aistulf could make no resistance; and the Frank bestowed on the Papal chair all that belonged to the exarchate in North Italy, receiving as the meed of his services the title of Patrician [754]. . . . When on Pipin's death the restless Lombards again

took up arms and menaced the possessions of the Church, Pipin's son Charles or Charlemagne swept down like a whirlwind from the Alps at the call of Pope Hadrian, seized king Desiderius in his capital, assumed himself the Lombard crown, and made northern Italy thenceforward an integral part of the Frankish empire [see GERMANY: A. D. 687-800]. . . . For the next twenty-four years Italy remained quiet. The government of Rome was carried on in the name of the Patrician Charles, although it does not appear that he sent thither any official representative; while at the same time both the city and the exarchate continued to admit the nominal supremacy of the Eastern Emperor, employing the years of his reign to date documents."—J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 4.—"Thus, by German hands, the internal ascendancy of the German race in Italy, which had lasted, first under the Goths, and then under the Lombards, for 281 years, was finally broken. A German was still king over Italy, as for ages Germans were still to be. But Roman and native influence reconquered its supremacy in Italy, under the management and leadership of the bishops of Rome. The Lombards, already becoming Italianized, melted into provincial Italians. The Teutonic language disappeared, leaving a number of words to Italian dialects, and a number of names to Italian families. The last king of the Lombards bore an Italian name, Desiderius. The latest of Italian national heroes bears the Bavarian and Lombard name of Garibaldi. But the overthrow of the Lombards, and the gift of provinces and cities to St. Peter had even more eventful results. The alliance between the king of the Franks and the bishop of Rome had become one of the closest kind. . . . The German king and the Italian pope found themselves together at the head of the modern world of the West. But the fascination of the name of Rome still, as it had done for centuries, held sway over the Teutonic mind. . . . It was not unnatural that the idea should recommend itself, both to the king and the pope, of reviving in the West, in close connexion with the Roman primacy, that great name which still filled the imagination of the world, and which in Roman judgments, Greek Byzantium had wrongfully stolen away—the name of Cæsar Augustus, the claim to govern the world. There was a longing in the West for the restoration of the name and authority, 'lest,' as the contemporary writers express it, 'the heathen should mock at the Christian if the name of Emperor had ceased among them.' And at this moment, the government at Constantinople was in the hands of a woman, the Empress Irene. Charles's services to the pope were recompensed, and his victorious career of more than thirty years crowned, by the restoration at Rome, in his person, of the Roman empire and the imperial dignity. The same authority which had made him 'patrician,' and consecrated him king, now created him Emperor of the Romans. On Christmas day, 800, when Charles came to pay his devotions before the altar of St. Peter's, Pope Leo III.—without Charles's knowledge or wish, so Charles declared to his biographer, Einhard, and, it may be, prematurely, as regards Charles's own feeling—placed a golden crown on his head, while all the people shouted, 'to Charles, the most pious Augustus, crowned of God, the

great and peace-giving Emperor of the Romans, life and victory. . . . Thus a new power arose in Europe, new in reality and in its relations to society, though old in name. It was formally but the carrying on the line of the successors of Augustus and Constantine. But substantially it was something very different. Its authors could little foresee its destinies; but it was to last, in some sort the political centre of the world which was to be, for 1,000 years. And the Roman Church, which had done such great things, which had consecrated the new and mighty kings of the Franks, and had created for the mightiest of them the imperial claim to universal dominion, rose with them to a new attitude in the world. . . . The coronation of Charles at Rome, in the face of an imperial line at Constantinople, finally determined, though it did not at once accomplish, the separation of East and West, of Greek and Latin Christianity. This separation had long been impending, perhaps, becoming inevitable. . . . One Roman empire was still the only received theory. But one Roman empire, with its seat in the West, or one Roman empire, governed in partnership by two emperors of East and West, had become impossible in fact. The theory of its unity continued for ages; but whether the true successor of Augustus and Theodosius sat at Constantinople, or somewhere in the West, remained in dispute, till the dispute was ended by the extinction of the Eastern empire by the Turks on May 29, 1453."—R. W. Church, *The Beginning of the Middle Ages*, ch. 7.—See, also, FRANKS: A. D. 768-814.

A. D. 685-1014.—The founding of the duchy of Tuscany. See TUSCANY: A. D. 685-1115.

A. D. 781.—Erected into a separate kingdom by Charlemagne.—In the year 781 Charlemagne erected Italy and Aquitaine into two separate kingdoms, placing his infant sons Pipin and Ludwig on the thrones.—P. Godwin, *Hist. of France: Ancient Gaul*, ch. 16.

(Southern): A. D. 800-1016.—Conflict of Greeks, Saracens and Franks.—"The southern provinces [of Italy], which now compose the kingdom of Naples, were subject, for the most part [in the 8th and 9th centuries], to the Lombard dukes and princes of Beneventum—so powerful in war that they checked for a moment the genius of Charlemagne—so liberal in peace that they maintained in their capital an academy of thirty-two philosophers and grammarians. The division of this flourishing state produced the rival principalities of Benevento, Salerno, and Capua; and the thoughtless ambition or revenge of the competitors invited the Saracens to the ruin of their common inheritance. During a calamitous period of two hundred years, Italy was exposed to a repetition of wounds which the invaders were not capable of healing by the union and tranquillity of a perfect conquest. Their frequent and almost annual squadrons issued from the port of Palermo and were entertained with too much indulgence by the Christians of Naples: the more formidable fleets were prepared on the African coasts. . . . A colony of Saracens had been planted at Bari, which commands the entrance of the Adriatic Gulf; and their impartial depredations provoked the resentment and conciliated the union of the two emperors. An offensive alliance was concluded between Basil the Macedonian [of the Byzantine

Empire], the first of his race, and Lewis, the great grandson of Charlemagne; and each party supplied the deficiencies of his associate. . . . The fortress of Bari was invested by the infantry of the Franks and by the cavalry and galleys of the Greeks; and, after a defence of four years, the Arabian emir submitted [A. D. 871] to the clemency of Lewis, who commanded in person the operations of the siege. This important conquest had been achieved by the concord of the East and West; but their recent amity was soon embittered by the mutual complaints of jealousy and pride. . . . Whoever might deserve the honour, the Greek emperors, Basil and his son Leo, secured the advantage of the reduction of Bari. The Italians of Apulia and Calabria were persuaded or compelled to acknowledge their supremacy, and an ideal line from Mount Garganus to the Bay of Salerno leaves the far greater part of the [modern] kingdom of Naples under the dominion of the Eastern empire. Beyond that line the dukes or republics of Amalfi and Naples, who had never forfeited their voluntary allegiance, rejoiced in the neighbourhood of their lawful sovereign; and Amalfi was enriched by supplying Europe with the produce and manufactures of Asia. But the Lombard princes of Benevento, Salerno, and Capua, were reluctantly torn from the communion of the Latin world, and too often violated their oaths of servitude and tribute. The city of Bari rose to dignity and wealth as the metropolis of the new theme or province of Lombardy: the title of Patrician, and afterwards the singular name of Catapan, was assigned to the supreme governor. . . . As long as the sceptre was disputed by the princes of Italy, their efforts were feeble and adverse; and the Greeks resisted or eluded the forces of Germany which descended from the Alps under the imperial standard of the Othos. The first and greatest of those Saxon princes was compelled to relinquish the siege of Bari: the second, after the loss of his stoutest bishops and barons, escaped with honour from the bloody field of Crotona (A. D. 983). On that day the scale of war was turned against the Franks by the valour of the Saracens. . . . The Caliph of Egypt had transported 40,000 Moslems to the aid of his Christian ally. The successors of Basil amused themselves with the belief that the conquest of Lombardy had been achieved, and was still preserved, by the justice of their laws, the virtues of their ministers, and the gratitude of a people whom they had rescued from anarchy and oppression. A series of rebellions might dart a ray of truth into the palace of Constantinople; and the illusions of flattery were dispelled by the easy and rapid success of the Norman adventurers"—E. Gibbon *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 56.

A. D. 803-810.—Charlemagne's boundary treaties with the Byzantine Emperor.—Attempts of Pipin against the Venetians.—The founding of Modern Venice. See VENICE: A. D. 697-810.

A. D. 810-961.—Spread of Venetian commerce and naval prowess. See VENICE: A. D. 810-961.

A. D. 843-951.—In the breaking up of Charlemagne's Empire.—The founding of the Holy Roman Empire.—In the partition of Charlemagne's Empire among his three grandsons, by the treaty of Verdun, A. D. 843, Italy, together

with the new kingdom called Lotharingia, or Lorraine, was assigned to the elder, Lothar, who bore the title of Emperor. Lothar, who died in 855, redivided his dominions among three sons, and Lorraine, separated from Italy, was soon dismembered and shared between Germany and France. The Italian kingdom fell to Louis or Ludwig II., who was crowned Emperor, and on his death without issue, A. D. 875, it was seized, together with the imperial title, by the French Carolingian king, Charles the Bald. Two years afterwards he died, and Italy, together with the imperial crown, was acquired by the last legitimate survivor of the German Carolingian line, Charles the Fat, who died in 888. "At that memorable era (A. D. 888) the four kingdoms which this prince [Charles the Fat] had united fell asunder: West France, where Odo or Eudes [Duke of Paris, ancestor of the royal line of Capet] then began to reign, was never again united to Germany; East France (Germany) chose Arnulf; Burgundy split up into two principalities, in one of which (Transjurane) Rudolf proclaimed himself king, while the other (Cisjurane with Provence) submitted to Bosso; while Italy was divided between the parties of Berengar of Friuli and Guido of Spoleto. The former was chosen king by the estates of Lombardy; the latter, and on his speedy death his son Lambert, was crowned Emperor by the Pope. Arnulf's [the German king's] descent chased them away and vindicated the claims of the Franks, but on his flight Italy and the anti-German faction at Rome became again free. Berengar was made king of Italy, and afterwards Emperor. Lewis of Burgundy, son of Bosso, renounced his fealty to Arnulf, and procured the imperial dignity, whose vain title he retained through years of misery and exile, till A. D. 928. None of these Emperors were strong enough to rule well even in Italy; beyond it they were not so much as recognized. . . . In A. D. 924 died Berengar, the last of these phantom Emperors. After him Hugh of Burgundy and Lothar his son reigned as kings of Italy, if puppets in the hands of a riotous aristocracy can be so called. Rome was meanwhile ruled by the consul or senator Alberic [called variously senator, consul, patrician, and prince of the Romans], who had renewed her never quite extinct republican institutions, and in the degradation of the papacy was almost absolute in the city." Affairs in Italy were at this stage when Otto or Otho, the vigorous and chivalrous German king of the new line, came in 951 to re-establish and reconstitute the Roman Empire of Charlemagne (see GERMANY: A. D. 936-973) and to make it a lasting entity in European politics—the "Holy Roman Empire" of modern history.—J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: F. Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, lect. 24.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 49.—See, also, ROME: A. D. 903-964; and ROMAN EMPIRE, THE HOLY: A. D. 963.

A. D. 900-924.—Ravaged by the Hungarians.—"The vicinity of Italy had tempted their early inroads; but from their camp on the Brenta they beheld with some terror the apparent strength and populousness of the new-discovered country. They requested leave to retire; their request was proudly rejected by the Italian king; and the lives of 20,000 Christians paid the forfeit of his obstinacy and rashness. Among the cities

of the West the royal Pavia was conspicuous in fame and splendour; and the pre-eminence of Rome itself was only derived from the relics of the apostles. The Hungarians appeared; Pavia was in flames; forty-three churches were consumed; and, after the massacre of the people, they spared about 200 wretches who had gathered some bushels of gold and silver (a vague exaggeration) from the smoking ruins of their country. In these annual excursions from the Alps to the neighbourhood of Rome and Capua, the churches that yet escaped resounded with a fearful litany: 'Oh! save and deliver us from the arrows of the Hungarians!' But the saints were deaf or inexorable; and the torrent rolled forward, till it was stopped by the extreme land of Calabria."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 55.

A. D. 961-1039.—Subjection to Germany.—

"Otho I., his son Otho II., and his grandson Otho III., were successively acknowledged emperors and kings of Italy, from 961 to 1002. When this branch of the house of Saxony became extinct, Henry II. of Bavaria, and Conrad the Salic of Franconia, filled the throne from 1004 to 1039. During this period of nearly eighty years, the German emperors twelve times entered Italy at the head of their armies, which they always drew up in the plains of Roncaglia near Placentia; there they held the states of Lombardy, received homage from their Italian feudatories, caused the rents due to be paid, and promulgated laws for the government of Italy. A foreign sovereign, however, almost always absent, known only by his incursions at the head of a barbarous army, could not efficaciously govern a country which he hardly knew, and where his yoke was detested. . . . The emperors were too happy to acknowledge the local authorities, whatever they were, whenever they could obtain from them their pecuniary dues: sometimes they were dukes or marquises, whose dignities had survived the disasters of various invasions and of civil wars; sometimes the archbishops and bishops of great cities, whom Charlemagne and his successors had frequently invested with duchies and counties escheated to the crown, reckoning that lords elected for life would remain more dependent than hereditary lords; sometimes, finally, they were the magistrates themselves, who, although elected by the people, received from the monarch the title of imperial vicars, and took part with the nobles and prelates in the Placids (placita), or diets of Roncaglia. After a stay of some months, the emperor returned with his army into Germany; the nobles retired to their castles, the prelates and magistrates to their cities: neither of these last acknowledged a superior authority to their own, nor reckoned on any other force than what they could themselves employ to assert what they called their rights. Opposite interests could not fail to produce collision, and the war was universal."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 1.—During the reign of Henry II. (A. D. 1002-1024), against whom a rival king of Italy was set up by the Italians, "there was hardly any recognised government, and the Lombards became more and more accustomed, through necessity, to protect themselves, and to provide for their own internal police. Meanwhile the German nation had become odious to the Italians. The rude soldiery, insolent and

addicted to intoxication, were engaged in frequent disputes with the citizens, wherein the latter, as is usual in similar cases, were exposed first to the summary vengeance of the troops, and afterwards to penal chastisement for sedition. In one of these tumults, at the entry of Henry II. in 1004, the city of Pavia was burned to the ground, which inspired its inhabitants with a constant animosity against that emperor. Upon his death, in 1024, the Italians were disposed to break once more their connexion with Germany, which had elected as sovereign Conrad duke of Franconia. They offered their crown to Robert king of France and to William duke of Guienne." But neither of these princes would accept the troublesome diadem; and, in the end, the archbishop of Milan and other Lombard lords "repaired to Constance and tendered the crown to Conrad, which he was already disposed to claim as a sort of dependency upon Germany. It does not appear that either Conrad or his successors were ever regularly elected to reign over Italy; but whether this ceremony took place or not, we may certainly date from that time the subjection of Italy to the Germanic body. It became an unquestionable maxim, that the votes of a few German princes conferred a right to the sovereignty of a country which had never been conquered, and which had never formally recognised this superiority."—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, ch. 3, pt. 1 (v. 1).—"The Italian Kingdom of the Karlings, the kingdom which was reunited to Germany under Otto the Great, was . . . a continuation of the old Lombard kingdom. It consisted of that kingdom, enlarged by the Italian lands which fell off from the Eastern Empire in the eighth century; that is by the Exarchate and the adjoining Pentapolis, and the immediate territory of Rome itself."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geog. of Europe*, ch. 8, sect. 3.

(Southern): A. D. 1000-1090.—**Conquests and settlement of the Normans.**—"A pilgrimage first took the Normans to Southern Italy, where they were to found a kingdom. Here there were, if I may so speak, three wrecks, three ruins of nations—Lombards in the mountains, Greeks in the ports, Sicilian and African Saracens rambling over the coasts. About the year 1000, some Norman pilgrims assist the inhabitants of Salerno to drive out a party of Arabs, who were holding them to ransom. Being well paid for the service, these Normans attract others of their countrymen hither. A Greek of Bari, named Melo or Meles, takes them into pay to free his city from the Greeks of Byzantium. Next they are settled by the Greek republic of Naples at the fort of Aversa, which lay between that city and her enemies, the Lombards of Capua (A. D. 1026). Finally, the sons of a poor gentleman of the Cotentin, Tancred of Hauteville, seek their fortune here. Tancred had twelve children; seven by the same mother. It was during William's [the Conqueror's] minority, when numbers of the barons endeavoured to withdraw themselves from the Bastard's yoke, that these sons of Tancred's directed their steps towards Italy, where it was said that a simple Norman knight had become count of Aversa. They set off penniless, and defrayed the expenses of their journey by the sword (A. D. 1067). The Byzantine governor, or Katapan, engaged their services, and led them against the

Arabs. But their countrymen beginning to flock to them, they no sooner saw themselves strong enough than they turned against their paymasters, seized Apulia [A. D. 1042], and divided it into twelve countships. This republic of *Condottieri* held its assemblies at Melphi. The Greeks endeavoured to defend themselves, but fruitlessly. They collected an army of 60,000 Italians; to be routed by the Normans, who amounted to several hundreds of well-armed men. The Byzantines then summoned their enemies, the Germans, to their aid; and the two empires, of the East and West, confederated against the sons of the gentleman of Coutances. The all-powerful emperor, Henry the Black (Henry III.), charged Leo IX., who had been nominated pope by him, and who was a German and kin to the imperial family, to exterminate these brigands. The pope led some Germans and a swarm of Italians against them [1053]; but the latter took to flight at the very beginning of the battle, and left the warlike pontiff in the hands of the enemy. Too wary to ill-treat him, the Normans piously cast themselves at their prisoner's feet, and compelled him to grant them, as a fief of the Church, all that they had taken or might take possession of in Apulia, Calabria, and on the other side of the strait; so that, in spite of himself, the pope became the suzerain of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies (A. D. 1052-1053)." —J. Michelet, *Hist. of France*, bk. 4, ch. 2.—The two elder of the sons of Tancred were now dead, and the third son, Humphrey, died not long after. A fourth brother, Robert, surnamed Guiscard, who had lately arrived from Normandy with reinforcements, then established himself (A. D. 1057) with some difficulty in the leadership and succession. "He accomplished the reduction of almost all the country which composes the present kingdom of Naples, and, extinguishing the long dominion of the Beneventine Lombards and of the eastern empire in Italy [see *RENEVENTUM*, and *AMALFI*], finally received from Pope Nicholas II. the confirmation of the titles which he had assumed, of duke of Calabria and Apulia [A. D. 1080]. . . . While Robert Guiscard was perfecting his dominion on the continent, his younger brother Roger engaged in the astonishing design of conquering the large and beautiful island of Sicily from the Saracens with a few Norman volunteers. An air of romantic extravagance breathes over all the enterprises of the Normans in Italy; and, even if we discard the incredible tales which the legends and chronicles of the times have preserved of the valour and corporeal strength of these northern warriors, enough will remain in the authentic results of their expeditions to stagger the reason and warm the imagination with attractive visions of chivalrous achievement. . . . We are assured that 800 Christian knights were the greatest number which Roger could for many years bring into the field; and that 136 routed a prodigious host of Saracens at the battle of Ceramio. . . . But the Saracens were embroiled in internal discord, and their island was broken up into numerous petty states; we may, therefore, attribute to their dissensions a great part of the success which the chroniclers of the Normans have assigned to their good swords alone. Roger had, however, embarked in an arduous and laborious undertaking, which it required the unbending perseverance and patient valour of thirty years

[A. D. 1060-1090] to accomplish. . . . At length, all Sicily bowed to his sway; Norman barons were infeudated over its surface; and Roger, with the title of great count, held the island as a fief of his brother's duchy."—G. Proctor, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 2, pt. 2.

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 56.—J. W. Barlow, *Short Hist. of the Normans in South Europe*, ch. 1-7.

A. D. 1056-1122.—Beginning of the conflict of the Popes with the Emperors.—Hildebrand and Henry IV.—The War of Investitures. See PAPACY: A. D. 1056-1123; and GERMANY: A. D. 973-1123.

A. D. 1056-1152.—The rise of the republican cities.—“The war of investitures, which lasted more than sixty years, accomplished the dissolution of every tie between the different members of the kingdom of Italy. Civil wars have at least this advantage,—that they force the rulers of the people to consult the wishes of their subjects, oblige them to gain affections which constitute their strength, and to compensate, by the granting of new privileges, the services which they require. The prelates, nobles, and cities of Italy obeyed, some the emperor, others the pope, not from a blind fear, but from choice, from affection, from conscience, according as the political or religious sentiment was predominant in each. The war was general, but everywhere waged with the national forces. Every city armed its militia, which, headed by the magistrates, attacked the neighbouring nobles or towns of a contrary party. While each city imagined it was fighting either for the pope or the emperor, it was habitually impelled exclusively by its own sentiments: every town considered itself as a whole, as an independent state, which had its own allies and enemies; each citizen felt an ardent patriotism, not for the kingdom of Italy, or for the empire, but for his own city. At the period when either kings or emperors had granted to towns the right of raising fortifications, that of assembling the citizens at the sound of a great bell, to concert together the means of their common defence, had been also conceded. This meeting of all the men of the state capable of bearing arms was called a parliament. It assembled in the great square, and elected annually two consuls, charged with the administration of justice at home, and the command of the army abroad. . . . The parliament, which named the consuls, appointed also a secret council, called a *Consiglio di Credenza*, to assist the government, composed of a few members taken from each division; besides a grand council of the people, who prepared the decisions to be submitted to the parliament. . . . As industry had rapidly increased, and had preceded luxury,—as domestic life was sober, and the produce of labour considerable,—wealth had greatly augmented. The citizens allowed themselves no other use of their riches than that of defending or embellishing their country. It was from the year 900 to the year 1200 that the most prodigious works were undertaken and accomplished by the towns of Italy. . . . These three regenerating centuries gave an impulse to architecture, which soon awakened the other fine arts. The republican spirit which now fermented in every city, and gave to each of them constitutions so wise, magistrates so zealous, and citizens so patriotic, and so capable of great achievements,

had found in Italy itself the models which had contributed to its formation. The war of investitures had given wing to this universal spirit of liberty and patriotism in all the municipalities of Lombardy, in Piedmont, Venetia, Romagna, and Tuscany. But there existed already in Italy other free cities. . . . Venice, . . . Ravenna, . . . Genoa, . . . Pisa, . . . Rome, Gaëta, Naples, Anagni, Bari, were either never conquered by the Lombards, or in subjection too short a time to have lost their ancient walls, and the habit of guarding them. These cities served as the refuge of Roman civilization. . . . Those cities which had accumulated the most wealth, whose walls inclosed the greatest population, attempted, from the first half of the twelfth century, to secure by force of arms the obedience of such of the neighbouring towns as did not appear sufficiently strong to resist them, . . . to force them into a perpetual alliance, so as to share their good or evil fortune, and always place their armed force under the standard of the dominant city. . . . Two great towns in the plains of Lombardy surpassed every other in power and wealth: Milan, which habitually directed the party of the church; and Pavia, which directed that of the empire. Both towns, however, seem to have changed parties during the reigns of Lothario III. and Conrad II., who, from the year 1125 to 1152 placed in opposition the two houses of Guelphs and Ghibelines in Germany. . . . Among the towns of Piedmont, Turin took the lead, and disputed the authority of the counts of Savoy, who called themselves imperial vicars in that country. . . . The family of the Veronese marquises, . . . who from the time of the Lombard kings had to defend the frontier against the Germans, were extinct; and the great cities of Verona, Padua, Vicenza, Treviso, and Mantua, nearly equal in power, maintained their independence. Bologna held the first rank among the towns south of the Po. . . . Tuscany, which had also had its powerful marquises, saw their family become extinct with the countess Matilda, the contemporary and friend of Gregory VII. Florence had since risen in power, destroyed Fiesole, and . . . was considered the head of the Tuscan league; and the more so that Pisa at this period thought only of her maritime expeditions. . . . Such was the state of Italy, when the Germanic diet, assembled at Frankfort in 1152, conferred the crown on Frederick Barbarossa, duke of Swabia, and of the house of Hohenstaufen.”—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 1-2.

ALSO IN: E. A. Freeman, *Hist. Geog. of Europe*, ch. 8, sect. 3.—W. K. Williams, *The Communes of Lombardy* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, 9th series, 5-6).—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, ch. 3, pt. 1 (v. 1).—*Europe during the Middle Ages* (Lardner's Cabinet Cyclop., v. 1, ch. 1).—See, also, FLORENCE: 12TH CENTURY; and TRADE, MEDIEVAL.

A. D. 1063.—Birth of Pisan architecture. See PISA: A. D. 1063-1293.

A. D. 1077-1102.—Countess Matilda's donation. See PAPACY: A. D. 1077-1103.

(Southern): A. D. 1081-1194.—Robert Guiscard's invasions of the Eastern Empire.—Union of Sicily with Apulia, and creation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, or Naples.—“The success of his brother [Roger, in Sicily—see above: A. D. 1000-1090] furnished another

spur to the ambition of Robert Guiscard. Taking advantage of a dynastic revolution at Constantinople, he and his son Bohemund commenced a series of invasions of the Eastern Empire [see *BYZANTINE EMPIRE*: A. D. 1081-1085] which only ended with his death. These, though unsuccessful in their ultimate result, were influential causes of the first crusade, and deeply affected the relations of East and West for years to come. Meanwhile in Sicily Roger had been succeeded by his son [Roger II.], and, in 1127, this heir of the destinies of his race added the dukedom of Apulia to that of Sicily, obtained from Pope Anacletus the title of king, and finally established the Norman kingdom of Naples [also called the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies]. His character is thus described by a contemporary chronicler: 'He was a lover of justice and most severe avenger of crime. He abhorred lying; did everything by rule, and never promised what he did not mean to perform. He never persecuted his private enemies; and in war endeavoured on all occasions to gain his point without shedding of blood. Justice and peace were universally observed throughout his dominions.' During his reign the intercourse between England and Sicily was close. The government was organized on principles very similar to that of England. . . . Under his wise rule and that of his immediate successors, the south of Italy and Sicily enjoyed a transient gleam of prosperity and happiness. Their equal and tolerant government, far surpassing anything at that day in Europe, enabled the Saracen, the Greek, and the Italian to live together in harmony elsewhere unknown. Trade and industry flourished, the manufacture of silk enriched the inhabitants, and the kingdom of Naples was at peace until she was crushed under the iron heel of a Teutonic conqueror."—A. H. Johnson, *The Normans in Europe*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: E. A. Freeman, *The Normans at Palermo (Historical Essays, 3d series)*.—J. W. Barlow, *Short Hist. of the Normans in South Europe*, ch. 8-11.

A. D. 1096-1102.—The First Crusades. See *CRUSADES*: A. D. 1096-1099; and 1101-1102.

A. D. 1138.—The accession of the Hohenstaufens to the Imperial throne, and the origin, in Germany, of the Guelph and Ghibelline factions. See *GERMANY*: A. D. 1138-1268.

A. D. 1154-1162.—The first and second expeditions of Frederick Barbarossa.—Frederick I., the second of the emperors of the Hohenstaufen line, called by the Italians Frederick Barbarossa (Redbeard), was elected king at Frankfurt in March, 1152. In October, 1154, he crossed the Alps and entered Italy with a strong German army, having two purposes in view: 1. To receive the imperial crown, from the hands of the Pope, and to place on his own head, at Pavia, the iron crown of Lombardy or Italy. 2. To reduce to order and submission the rising city-republics of Lombardy and Tuscany, which had been growing rapidly in independence and power during the last four troubled imperial reigns. At Roncaglia, he held the diet of the kingdom, and listened to many complaints, especially against Milan, which had undoubtedly oppressed the weaker towns of its neighbourhood and abused its strength. Then he moved through the country, making a personal inspection of affairs, and giving a taste of his temper by burning the villages which failed to supply

provisions to his troops with satisfactory promptitude. At Tortona he ordered the inhabitants to renounce their alliance with the Milanese. They refused, and endured in the upper portion of the city a siege of two months. Forced by want of water to surrender, at last, they were permitted to go free, but their town was sacked and burned. Asti, Chieri, Rosate, and other places of more or less importance, were destroyed. Frederick did not venture yet to attack Milan, but proceeded to Rome, demanding the imperial crown. The pope (Adrian IV.) and the Romans were alike distrustful of him, and he was not permitted to bring his army into the city. After no little wrangling over ceremonious details, and after being compelled to lead the horse and to hold the stirrup of the haughty pontiff, Barbarossa was finally crowned at St. Peter's, in the Vatican suburb. The Romans attempted to interrupt the coronation and a terrible tumult occurred in which a thousand of the citizens were slain. But the Germans made no attempt to take possession of the city. On the contrary, they withdrew with haste, and the emperor led his army back to Germany, burning Spoleto on the way, because it failed in submissiveness, and marking a wide track of ruin and desolation through Italy as he went. This was in the summer of 1155. Three years passed, during which the Italian cities grew more determined in their independence, the emperor and his German subjects more bitter in hostility to them, and the pope and the emperor more antagonistic in their ambitions. In 1158 Frederick led a second expedition into Italy, especially determined to make an end of the contumacy of Milan. He began operations by creating a desert of blackened country around the offending city, being resolved to reduce it by famine. Mediators, however, appeared, who brought about a treaty of pacification, which interrupted hostilities for a few weeks. Then the Milanese found occasion to accuse the emperor of a treacherous violation of the terms of the treaty and again took up arms. The war was now to the death. But, before settling to the siege of Milan, Frederick gave himself the pleasure, first, of reducing the lesser city of Crema, which continued to be faithful among the allies of the Milanese. He held some children of the town in his hands, as hostages, and he bound them to the towers which he moved against the walls, compelling the wretched citizens to kill their own offspring in the act of their self-defense. By such atrocities as this, Crema was taken, at the end of seven months, and destroyed. Then Milan was assailed and beleaguered, harassed and blockaded, until, at the beginning of March, 1162, the starved inhabitants gave up their town. Frederick ordered the doomed city "to be completely evacuated, so that there should not be left in it a single living being. On the 25th of March, he summoned the militias of the rival and Ghibelline cities, and gave them orders to rase to the earth the houses as well as the walls of the town, so as not to leave one stone upon another. Those of the inhabitants of Milan whom their poverty, labour and industry attached to the soil, were divided into four open villages, built at a distance of at least two miles from the walls of their former city. Others sought hospitality in the neighbouring towns of Italy. . . . Their sufferings, the extent of their sacrifices, the recollection

of their valour, and the example of their noble sentiments, made proselytes to the cause of liberty in every city into which they were received." Meantime Frederick Barbarossa returned to Germany, with his fame as a puissant monarch much augmented.—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: U. Balzani, *The Popes and the Hohenstaufen*, ch. 3-5.—G. B. Testa, *Hist. of the War of Frederick I. against the Communes of Lombardy*, bk. 1-6.—E. A. Freeman, *Frederick the First, King of Italy* (*Historical Essays*, 1st series).

A. D. 1163-1164.—Third visitation of Frederick Barbarossa.—The rival Popes.—Frederick Barbarossa entered Italy for the third time in 1163, without an army, but imposingly escorted by his German nobles. He imagined that the country had been terrorized sufficiently by the savage measures of his previous visitation to need no more military repression. But he found the Lombard cities undismayed in the assertion of their rights, and drawing together in unions which had never been possible among them before. The hostility of his relations with the Papacy and with the greater part of the Church gave encouragement to political revolt. His quarrel with Pope Hadrian had been ended by the death of the latter, in 1159, but only to give rise to new and more disturbing contentions. It had grown so bitter before Hadrian died that the Pope had allied himself by treaty with Milan, Crema, and other cities resisting Frederick, and had promised to excommunicate the emperor within forty days. Sudden death frustrated the combination. At the election of Hadrian's successor there was a struggle of factions, each determined to put its representative in the papal chair, and each claiming success. Two rival popes were proclaimed and consecrated, one under the name of Alexander III., the other as Victor IV. Frederick recognized the latter, who made himself the emperor's creature. The greater part of Christendom soon gave its recognition to the former, although he had been driven to take refuge in France. Pope Alexander excommunicated Frederick and Frederick's pope, and Pope Victor retorted like anathemas. Whether the curses of Alexander were more effectual, or for other reasons, the authority of Victor dwindled, and he himself presently died (April 1164), while Frederick was making his third inspection of affairs in Italy. The emperor found it impossible to execute his unbending will without an army. Verona, Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso held a congress and openly associated themselves for common defense. Frederick attempted to make use of the militia forces of Pavia, Cremona, and other Ghibelline towns against them; but he found even these citizen-soldiers so mutinous with disaffection that he dared not pursue the undertaking. He returned to Germany for an army more in sympathy with his obstinate designs against Italian liberty.—U. Balzani, *The Popes and the Hohenstaufen*, ch. 4-5.

ALSO IN: H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 8, ch. 7-8.—G. B. Testa, *Hist. of the War of Frederick I. against the Communes of Lombardy*, bk. 7.

A. D. 1166-1167.—The fourth expedition of Frederick Barbarossa.—The League of Lombardy.—"When Frederick, in the month of October, 1166, descended the mountains of the Grisons to enter Italy [for the fourth time] by

the territory of Brescia, he marched his army directly to Lodi, without permitting any act of hostility on the way. At Lodi, he assembled, towards the end of November, a diet of the kingdom of Italy, at which he promised the Lombards to redress the grievances occasioned by the abuses of power by his podestàs, and to respect their just liberties; he was desirous of separating their cause from that of the pope and the king of Sicily; and to give greater weight to his negotiation, he marched his army into central Italy. . . . The towns of the Veronese marches, seeing the emperor and his army pass without daring to attack them, became bolder: they assembled a new diet, in the beginning of April, at the convent of Pontida, between Milan and Bergamo. The consuls of Cremona, of Bergamo, of Brescia, of Mantua and Ferrara met there and joined those of the marches. The union of the Guelphs and Ghibellines, for the common liberty, was hailed with universal joy. The deputies of the Cremonese, who had lent their aid to the destruction of Milan, seconded those of the Milanese villages in imploring aid of the confederated towns to rebuild the city of Milan. This confederation was called the League of Lombardy. The consuls took the oath, and their constituents afterwards repeated it, that every Lombard should unite for the recovery of the common liberty; that the league for this purpose should last twenty years; and, finally, that they should aid each other in repairing in common any damage experienced in this sacred cause, by any one member of the confederation: extending even to the past this contract for reciprocal security, the league resolved to rebuild Milan. The militias of Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, Mantua, Verona, and Treviso, arrived the 27th of April, 1167, on the ground covered by the ruins of this great city. They apportioned among themselves the labour of restoring the inclosing walls; all the Milanese of the four villages, as well as those who had taken refuge in the more distant towns, came in crowds to take part in this pious work; and in a few weeks the new-grown city was in a state to repel the insults of its enemies. Lodi was soon afterwards compelled, by force of arms, to take the oath to the league; while the towns of Venice, Placentia, Parma, Modena, and Bologna voluntarily and gladly joined the association."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 2.—Meantime Frederick Barbarossa had made himself master of the city of Rome. The Roman citizens had boldly ventured out to meet his German army and its allies on the Tusculan hills and had suffered a frightful defeat. Then some part of the walls of the Leonine City were carried by assault and the castellated church of St. Peter's was entered with ax and sword. Two German archbishops were among the leaders of the force which took the altars of the temple by storm and which polluted its floors with blood. Frederick's new anti-pope, Paschal III., successor to Victor IV., was now enthroned, and the empress was formally crowned in the apostolic basilica. Pope Alexander, who had been in possession of the city, withdrew, and the victorious emperor appeared to have the great objects of his burning ambition within his grasp. "Destiny willed otherwise. It was now August; the sun was burning the arid Campagna and oppressing the weary German troops. A slight

rain came to refresh them, but the following day sudden destruction fell upon the camp. Deadly fever attacked the army with terrible violence and reduced it daily. The men fell in heaps, and when struck down in the morning were dead by night. The disease took stronger hold owing to the superstitious fears of the army and the idea of divine vengeance, for the soldiers remembered in terror the profanation of St. Peter's, and they felt the keen edge of the destroying angel's sword. Decimated, dismayed, demoralised, the imperial army was hopelessly defeated, and Frederick was compelled to strike his tents and fly before the invisible destroyer. . . . The flower of his troops lay unburied in the furrows, and with difficulty could he manage to carry back to their native land the bodies of his noblest and truest knights. Never perhaps before had Frederick given proofs of such unshaken strength of mind. . . . He returned to Germany alone and almost a fugitive, his bravest knights dead, his army destroyed, and leaving behind him a whole nation of proud and watchful enemies. He returned alone, but his spirit was undaunted and dreamt of future victory and of final revenge."—U. Balzani, *The Popes and the Hohenstaufen*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: J. Miley, *Hist. of the Papal States*, bk. 6, ch. 2.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 8, ch. 10.—G. B. Testa, *Hist. of the War of Frederick I.*, bk. 8-9.

A. D. 1174-1183.—The last expedition of Frederick Barbarossa.—The Battle of Legnano, and the Peace of Constance.—It was not until 1174—seven years after his flight from the Roman pestilence—that Barbarossa was able to return to Italy and resume his struggle with Pope Alexander and the Lombard cities. He had been detained by troubles in Germany—the growing quarrel with his most powerful vassal, Henry the Lion, of Saxony, more particularly. Meantime, the League of the Lombard cities had spread and gained strength, and Pope Alexander III. was in active co-operation with it. To better fortify the frontiers of Lombardy, the League had built a strong new city, at the junction of the Tanaro and Bormida, had given it an immediate population of 15,000 people and had named it Alessandria, after the Pope. "The Emperor, whose arrival in Italy was urgently implored, was retained in Germany by his mistrust of Henry the Lion, who, in order to furnish himself with a pretext for refusing his assistance in the intended campaign without coming to an open breach, undertook a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, A. D. 1171; whence, after performing his devotions at the holy sepulchre, without unsheathing his sword in its defence, he returned to his native country. . . . At length, in 1174, Frederick Barbarossa persuaded the sullen duke to perform his duty in the field, and for the fourth time [with an army] crossed the Alps. A terrible revenge was taken upon Susa, which was burnt to the ground. Alexandria [Alessandria] withstood the siege. The military science of the age, every 'ruse de guerre,' was exhausted by both the besiegers and the besieged, and the whole of the winter was fruitlessly expended without any signal success on either side. The Lombard league meanwhile assembled an immense army in order to oppose Frederick in the open field, whilst treason threatened him on another side. . . . Henry also at length acted

with open disloyalty, and declared to the emperor, who lay sick at Chiavenna, on the lake of Como, his intention of abandoning him; and, unshaken by Frederick's exhortation in the name of duty and honour to renounce his perfidious plans, offered to provide him with money on condition of receiving considerable additions to his power in Germany, and the free imperial town of Goslar in gift. . . . Frederick, reduced to the alternative of either following his insolent vassal, or of exposing himself and his weakened forces to total destruction by remaining in his present position, courageously resolved to abide the hazard, and to await the arrival of fresh reinforcements from Germany; the Lombards, however, saw their advantage, and attacked him at Legnano, on the 29th of May, 1176. The Swabians (the southern Germans still remaining true to their allegiance) fought with all the courage of despair, but Berthold von Zähringen was taken prisoner, the emperor's horse fell in the thickest of the fight, his banner was won by the 'Legion of Death,' a chosen Lombard troop, and he was given up as dead. He escaped almost by a miracle, whilst his little army was entirely overwhelmed."—W. Menzel, *Hist. of Germany*, ch. 151.—After the disastrous battle of Legnano, Frederick "was at length persuaded, through the mediation of the republic of Venice, to consent to a truce of six years, the provisional terms of which were all favourable to the league. . . . At the expiration of the truce Frederick's anxiety to secure the crown for his son overcame his pride, and the famous Peace of Constance [A. D. 1183] established the Lombard republics in real independence. By the treaty of Constance the cities were maintained in the enjoyment of all the regalian rights, whether within their walls or in their district, which they could claim by usage. Those of levying war, of erecting fortifications, and of administering civil and criminal justice, were specially mentioned. The nomination of their consuls, or other magistrates, was left absolutely to the citizens; but they were to receive the investiture of their office from an imperial legate. The customary tributes of provision during the emperor's residence in Italy were preserved; and he was authorized to appoint in every city a judge of appeal in civil causes. The Lombard league was confirmed, and the cities were permitted to renew it at their own discretion; but they were to take every ten years an oath of fidelity to the emperor. This just compact preserved, along with every security for the liberties and welfare of the cities, as much of the imperial prerogatives as could be exercised by a foreign sovereign consistently with the people's happiness. . . . The Peace of Constance presented a noble opportunity to the Lombards of establishing a permanent federal union of small republics. . . . But dark, long-cherished hatreds, and that implacable vindictiveness which, at least in former ages, distinguished the private manners of Italy, deformed her national character. . . . For revenge she threw away the pearl of great price, and sacrificed even the recollection of that liberty which had stalked like a majestic spirit among the ruins of Milan."—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, ch. 8, pt. 1 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: U. Balzani, *The Popes and the Hohenstaufen*, ch. 6.—G. B. Testa, *Hist. of the War of Frederick I.*, bk. 10.—See, also, VENICE: A. D. 1177.

A. D. 1183-1250.—Frederick II. and the end of the Hohenstaufen struggles.—After the settlement of the Peace of Constance, Frederick Barbarossa made no further attempt to destroy the now well established liberties of the north Italian cities. On the contrary, he devoted himself, with considerable success, to the regaining of their confidence and good-will, as against the papacy, with which his relations were not improved. In southern Italy, he acquired an important footing by the marriage of his son Henry (already crowned King of Rome, as Henry VI.), to Constance, the sole heiress of the Norman kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Soon after which he went crusading to the Holy Land, and perished in Asia Minor (A. D. 1190). His son and successor, Henry VI., who survived him but seven years, was occupied so much in securing the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, already fallen to his wife (1194) by the death of the last of the Norman kings, that he had little time to trouble the peace of Lombardy or Germany. He was one of the meanest of kings, faithless and cold-blooded,—brutal to the Normans of the Sicilies and contemptible in his treatment of the English King Richard, when his vassal of Austria made a chance captive of the lion-hearted prince. He died in 1197, leaving as his heir a son but four years old—the Frederick II. of later years. There was war at once. Two rival kings were elected in Germany, by the two factions, Guelph and Ghibelline. The next year, one of them, Philip I., the Ghibelline, a younger son of Frederick Barbarossa, was assassinated; the other, Otho IV., a son of Henry the Lion, was recognized by his opponents, and went to Rome to claim the imperial crown. He received it, but soon quarrelled, as all his predecessors had done, with the pope (the great pope Innocent III. being now on the throne), and Guelph as he was, began to put himself in alliance with the Ghibellines of Italy. Meantime, the boy Frederick had become king of the Two Sicilies by the death of his mother, and Pope Innocent was his guardian. He was now brought forward by the latter as a claimant of the Germanic crown, against Otho, and was sent into Germany to maintain his claim. The civil war which followed was practically ended by the battle of Bouvines (July 27, 1214—see BOUVINES) in which Otho's cause was lost. Four years after, the latter died, and Frederick reigned in Germany, Italy and the Two Sicilies, without a rival, holding the three separate crowns for five years before he received the imperial crown, in 1220. Meantime Innocent III. died, and Frederick became involved, even more bitterly than his father or his grandfather had been, in quarrels with the succeeding popes. He was a man far beyond his age in intellectual independence (see GERMANY: A. D. 1138-1268) and freedom from superstitious servility to the priesthood. His tastes were cultivated, his accomplishments were many. He welcomed the refinements which Europe at that time could borrow from the Saracens, and his court was one of gaiety and splendor. His papal enemies execrated him as a heretic, a blasphemer and an "apocalyptic beast." His greatest original offenses had grown out of two promises which he made in his youth: 1. To lead a crusade for the recovery of Jerusalem,—which he was slow in fulfilling; 2. To resign his Italian possessions to his son, retaining only the sovereignty of Ger-

many for himself,—which promise he did not fulfil at all. The war of the Church against him was implacable, and he was under its ban when he died. The pope even pursued him with maledictions when he went, at last, upon his crusade, in 1228, and when he did, by negotiations, free Jerusalem for a time from the Moslems (see CRUSADES: A. D. 1216-1229). He was involved, moreover, in conflicts with the Lombard cities (see FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MEDIEVAL LEAGUE) which the papacy encouraged and stimulated, and, in 1236, he won a great victory over the League, at Cortenuova, capturing the famous "Carroccio" of the Milanese and sending it as a gift to the Roman Senate. But, attempting to use his victory too inflexibly, he lost the fruits of it, and all his later years were years of trouble and disastrous war—disastrous to Italy and to himself. He died on the 13th of December 1250. "Out of the long array of the Germanic successors of Charles, he [Frederick II.] is, with Otto III., the only one who comes before us with a genius and a frame of character that are not those of a Northern or a Teuton. There dwelt in him, it is true, all the energy and knightly valour of his father Henry and his grandfather Barbarossa. But along with these, and changing their direction, were other gifts, inherited perhaps from his Italian mother and fostered by his education among the orange-groves of Palermo—a love of luxury and beauty, an intellect refined, subtle, philosophical. Through the mist of calumny and fable it is but dimly that the truth of the man can be discerned, and the outlines that appear serve to quicken rather than appease the curiosity with which we regard one of the most extraordinary personages in history. A sensualist, yet also a warrior and a politician; a profound lawgiver and an impassioned poet; in his youth fired by crusading fervour, in later life persecuting heretics while himself accused of blasphemy and unbelief; of winning manners and ardently beloved by his followers, but with the stain of more than one cruel deed upon his name, he was the marvel of his own generation, and succeeding ages looked back with awe, not unmingled with pity, upon the inscrutable figure of the last Emperor who had braved all the terrors of the Church and died beneath her ban, the last who had ruled from the sands of the ocean to the shores of the Sicilian sea. But while they pitied they condemned. The undying hatred of the Papacy threw round his memory a lurid light; him and him alone of all the imperial line, Dante, the worshipper of the Empire, must perforce deliver to the flames of hell."—J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 18. —"The Emperor Frederick was a poet who could not only celebrate the charms of his sovereign lady, 'the flower of all flowers, the rose of May,' but could also exhibit his appreciation for the beauties of nature. . . . Frederick also delighted in sculpture, painting, and architecture. . . . Under his fostering influence every branch of learning was starting into life after the slumber of ages. Frederick's age can only be compared to that glorious era of the Renaissance, when the sun of learning, no longer shorn of his beams, poured a flood of light over the dark places of Europe. Frederick was not only distinguished for his love of polite literature, but also for his ardour in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. He was himself an author on

medical subjects. He was a great patron of natural history. He used his friendly relations with eastern kings to form a collection of animals not often seen in Europe—the elephant, camel, giraffe, and camelopard. He also wrote a treatise on Hawking, which is still cited with respect. He classifies birds, and treats generally of their habits. . . . But poetry and science were very far from occupying all the thoughts of this distinguished monarch. His great concern was the internal regulation of the kingdom committed to his charge. His code in Sicily and Naples was framed with the special view of securing equal rights to all classes of his subjects, and of delivering them from the yoke of the feudal oppressor. He stripped the nobles and prelates of their jurisdiction in criminal cases. He also decreed that any count or baron, carrying on war on his own account, should lose his head and his goods. These were amazing strides in the right direction, but the former was quite unprecedented in feudal kingdoms. Many justiciaries were appointed throughout the kingdom. No one might hold this office without the authorisation of the crown. He strove to make his officials as righteous as he was himself. He himself came before his courts. So great was his love of justice, that he would rather lose his cause than win it if he were in the wrong. No advocates were allowed to practise without an examination by the judicial bench. They were obliged to take an oath that they would allege nothing against their conscience. The court furnished widows, orphans, and the poor with champions free of expense. The law, by which it was guided, endeavoured to secure an even-handed administration of justice.”—A. B. Pennington, *The Emperor Frederick II. (Royal Hist. Soc., Trans., new series, v. 1)*.—Although arbitrary and despotic in temper, the political intelligence of Frederick led him to practical ideas of government which were extraordinarily liberal for his age. In his Sicilian kingdom “the towns were shorn to a great extent of their local privileges, but were taught to unite their strength for the common good. Twice, at least, in the course of his reign, in 1232 and in 1240, Frederick summoned their deputies to a conference or Parliament, ‘for the weal of the Kingdom and the general advantage of the State.’ Forty-seven cities, all belonging to the Imperial domain, sent two deputies each to the Assembly convoked, which must not be confounded with the Solemn Courts held by the Sovereign and his Barons for the purpose of revising charters, enacting Constitutions, and regulating the government. We should be mistaken in supposing that the Sicilian Parliament enjoyed much of the power implied by the name. There is no trace of any clamour against grievances, of any complaints against officials, or of any refusal to grant supplies. The only function of the deputies summoned seems to have been the assessing of the public burdens. The Emperor demanded a certain sum of money, and the deputies, meekly complying, regulated the ways and means of raising it. ‘Send your messengers,’ thus runs the writ, ‘to see the Serenity of our face on your behalf, and to bring you back our will.’ Later in the century, the Assembly acquired greater authority. It is just possible that Simon de Montfort, who is known to have visited the Imperial Court, may have borrowed

his famous improvement on the old English constitution from an Apulian source; the gathering of the Commons at Foggia certainly preceded their first meeting at Westminster by thirty years. Other countries besides our own were indebted to Frederick for a better mode of legislation. Shortly after his death, many of his innovations were borrowed by his cousin Alonzo the Wise, and were inserted in *Las Siete Partidas*, the new Code of Castile. The ideas of the Suiabian Emperor were evidently the model followed by St. Louis and his successors; in France, as well as in Southern Italy, the lawyer was feeling his way towards the enjoyment of the power wielded of old by the knight and the churchman; Philip the Fair was able to carry out the projects which Frederick had merely been able to sketch. The world made rapid strides between 1230 and 1300. The Northern half of Italy, distracted by endless struggles, was not insensible to the improvements introduced into the South by her mighty son. But in the North two fatal obstacles existed, the Papal power and the municipal spirit of the various States, which marred all Frederick's efforts in behalf of Italian unity.” Frederick's court was the most brilliant and refined in Europe. Mr. Kington, his historian, introduces us to one of the Emperor's banquets, in the following description: “A great variety of strangers meet at the banqueting hour. Ambassadors from the Greek Monarch arrive with a present of falcons. Some clerical visitors from Germany are astounded to find themselves seated close to the turbaned men of the East, and shudder on hearing that these are envoys from the Sultan of Cairo and the Old Man of the Mountain. The honest Germans whisper among themselves some remarks on the late end of the Duke of Bavaria, who was stabbed at Kelheim by a man, suspected to be an assassin, employed by the mysterious Old Man on Frederick's behalf. The Emperor himself eats and drinks very little. He is the very model of a host. . . . The Emperor, it must be allowed, is rather loose in his talk. Speaking of his late Crusade, he remarks: ‘If the God of the Jews had seen my Kingdom, the Terra di Lavoro, Calabria, Sicily, and Apulia, he would not have so often praised that land which he promised to the Jews and bestowed upon them.’ The Bishops treasure up this unlucky speech, which will one day be noised abroad all over Italy. When the meal is over, the company are amused by the feats of some of the Almehs, brought from the East. Two young Arab girls of rare beauty place themselves each upon two balls in the middle of the flat pavement. On these they move backwards and forwards, singing and beating time with cymbals and castanets, while throwing themselves into intricate postures. Games and musical instruments, procured for the Empress, form part of the entertainment. We hear moreover of a Saracen dancer from Aquitaine. Such sports are relished by the guests quite as much as the Greek wine and the viands prepared by Bernard the Court cook, who is famous for his scapece; this dish, consisting of fish boiled in salt water and sprinkled with saffron, popular to this day in the province of Lecce, has been derived from Apicius. . . . The Emperor now shows his guests the wild beasts, which he has brought from Africa and the East. There is the huge elephant, soon to be sent to Cremona, the

bearer of the Imperial banner, guarded by a troop of Saracens. There is the female camelopard, called Seraph by the Arabs and Italians. Next come the camels and dromedaries which carry the Emperor's treasures when he is on the march. Lions, leopards, panthers, and rare birds form part of the collection, and are tended by Saracen keepers. Frederick perhaps wishes to show his friends some sport in the Apulian plains; he has hawks of all breeds, each of which has its name; but what most astonishes strangers is his method of bringing down the deer. The cheetahs, or hunting leopards of the East, are mounted on horseback behind their keepers; these animals, as the Emperor says, 'know how to ride.' He is a strict preserver of game; he gives orders that the wolves and foxes, which prey upon the small animals in his warren at Melazzo, be destroyed by means of a poison called wolf's powder. He has many parks and fishponds, to which he contrives to attend, even in the midst of Lombard wars. He directs the plantation of woods, and when a storm blows down his trees, the timber is to be sold at Naples. . . . The treasures, with which Frederick dazzles the eyes of his visitors, rival those of Solomon. The Sultan of Egypt has given his Christian brother a tent of wonderful workmanship, displaying the movements of the sun and moon, and telling the hours of the day and night. This prodigy, valued at 20,000 marks, is kept at Venosa. There is also a throne of gold, decked with pearls and precious stones, doomed to become the prey of Charles of Anjou and Pope Clement. There are purple robes embroidered with gold, silks from Tripoli, and the choicest works of the Eastern loom. Frederick charms the ears of his guests with melodies played on silver trumpets by black slaves, whom he has had trained. He himself knows how to sing. Travellers, jesters, poets, philosophers, knights, lawyers, all find a hearty welcome at the Apulian Court; if they are natives of the Kingdom they address its Lord in the customary second person singular, 'Tu, Messer.' He can well appreciate the pretensions of each guest, since he is able to converse with all his many subjects, each in his own tongue. The Arab from Palestine, the Greek from Calabria, the Italian from Tuscany, the Frenchman from Lorraine, the German from Thuringia, find that Cæsar understands them all. With Latin, of course, he is familiar. Very different is Frederick from his Northern grandsire, who could speak nothing but German and very bad Latin. Troubadour, Crusader, Lawgiver; German by blood, Italian by birth, Arab by training; the pupil, the tyrant, the victim of Rome; accused by the world of being by turns a Catholic persecutor, a Mohammedan convert, an infidel freethinker; such is Frederick the Second. His character has been sketched for us by two men of opposite politics, Salimbene the Guelf and Jansilla the Ghibelline, both of whom knew him well. Each does justice to the wonderful genius of the Emperor, and to the rapid development of the arts and commerce under his fostering care. But all is not fair, whatever appearances may be. Every generation of the Hohenstaufen Kaisers seemed to add a vice to the shame of their house. Cruelty is the one dark stain in the character of Barbarossa; cruelty and treachery mar the soaring genius of Henry the Sixth; cruelty, treachery, and lewd-

ness are the three blots that can never be wiped away from the memory of Frederick the Second. He has painted his likeness with his own hand. His Registers with their varied entries throw more light upon his nature than any panegyrics or diatribes can do. One example will be enough. If he wishes to get an impregnable castle into his hands, he thus writes to his general:—'Pretend some business, and warily call the Castellan to you; seize on him if you can, and keep him till he cause the castle to be surrendered to you.' . . . Frederick's cruelty is indisputable. His leaden ropes, which weighed down the victims of his wrath until death came to the rescue, were long the talk of Italy and are mentioned by Dante.—T. L. Kington, *Hist. of Frederick the Second, Emperor of the Romans*, v. 1, ch. 9.—'After the death of Frederick II., an interval of twenty-three years passed without the appointment of a king of the Romans [the Great Interregnum—see GERMANY: A. D. 1250-1272], and an interval of sixty years without the recognition of an emperor in Italy.' Frederick's son Conrad, whom he had caused to be crowned, was driven out of Germany and died in 1254. Another son, Manfred, acquired the crown of Sicily and reigned for a time; but the unrelenting pope persuaded Charles of Anjou to make a conquest of the kingdom, and Manfred was slain in battle (A. D. 1266). Conrad's young son, Conradin, then attempted to recover the Sicilian throne, but was defeated, taken prisoner, and perished on the scaffold (1268). He was the last of the Hohenstaufen.—O. Browning, *Guelfs and Ghibellines*, ch. 2-3.

ALSO IN: J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 11-13.—E. A. Freeman, *The Emperor Frederick the Second (Historical Essays, v. 1, Essay 10)*.—Mrs. W. Busk, *Medieval Popes, Emperors, Kings, and Crusaders*, bk. 4 (v. 3-4).

A. D. 1198-1216.—The establishing of Papal Sovereignty in the States of the Church. See PAPACY: A. D. 1198-1216.

13th Century.—Political conditions which prepared the way for the despots.—'The struggle between the Popes and the Hohenstaufen left Italy in a political condition which differed essentially from that of the other countries of the West. While in France, Spain, and England the feudal system was so organised that, at the close of its existence, it was naturally transformed into a unified monarchy, and while in Germany it helped to maintain, at least outwardly, the unity of the empire, Italy had shaken it off almost entirely. The Emperors of the fourteenth century, even in the most favourable case, were no longer received and respected as feudal lords, but as possible leaders and supporters of powers already in existence; while the Papacy, with its creatures and allies, was strong enough to hinder national unity in the future, not strong enough itself to bring about that unity. Between the two lay a multitude of political units—republics and despots—in part of long standing, in part of recent origin, whose existence was founded simply on their power to maintain it. In them for the first time we detect the modern political spirit of Europe, surrendered freely to its own instincts, often displaying the worst features of an unbridled egoism, outraging every right, and killing every germ of a healthier culture. But, wherever this vicious tendency is overcome or in any way

compensated, a new fact appears in history—the state as the outcome of reflection and calculation, the state as a work of art. This new life displays itself in a hundred forms, both in the republican and in the despotic states, and determines their inward constitution, no less than their foreign policy. . . . The internal condition of the despotically governed states had a memorable counterpart in the Norman Empire of Lower Italy and Sicily, after its transformation by the Emperor Frederick II. Bred amid treason and peril in the neighbourhood of the Saracens, Frederick, the first ruler of the modern type who sat upon a throne, had early accustomed himself, both in criticism and action, to a thoroughly objective treatment of affairs. His acquaintance with the internal condition and administration of the Saracenic states was close and intimate; and the mortal struggle in which he was engaged with the Papacy compelled him, no less than his adversaries, to bring into the field all the resources at his command. Frederick's measures (especially after the year 1231) are aimed at the complete destruction of the feudal state, at the transformation of the people into a multitude destitute of will and of the means of resistance, but profitable in the utmost degree to the exchequer. He centralised, in a manner hitherto unknown in the West, the whole judicial and political administration by establishing the right of appeal from the feudal courts, which he did not, however, abolish, to the imperial judges. No office was henceforth to be filled by popular election, under penalty of the devastation of the offending district and of the enslavement of its inhabitants. Excise duties were introduced; the taxes, based on a comprehensive assessment, and distributed in accordance with Mohammedan usages, were collected by those cruel and vexatious methods without which, it is true, it is impossible to obtain any money from Orientals. Here, in short, we find, not a people, but simply a disciplined multitude of subjects. . . . The internal police, and the kernel of the army for foreign service, was composed of Saracens who had been brought over from Sicily to Nocera and Luceria—men who were deaf to the cry of misery and careless of the ban of the Church. At a later period the subjects, by whom the use of weapons had long been forgotten, were passive witnesses of the fall of Manfred and of the seizure of the government by Charles of Anjou; the latter continued to use the system which he found already at work. At the side of the centralising Emperor appeared an usurper of the most peculiar kind: his vicar and son-in-law, Ezzelino da Romano. . . . The conquests and usurpations which had hitherto taken place in the Middle Ages rested on real or pretended inheritance and other such claims, or else were effected against unbelievers and excommunicated persons. Here for the first time the attempt was openly made to found a throne by wholesale murder and endless barbarities, by the adoption, in short, of any means with a view to nothing but the end pursued. None of his successors, not even Cæsar Borgia, rivalled the colossal guilt of Ezzelino; but the example once set was not forgotten. . . . Immediately after the fall of Frederick and Ezzelino, a crowd of tyrants appeared upon the scene. The struggle between Guelph and Ghibellines was their opportunity. They came for-

ward in general as Ghibelline leaders, but at times and under conditions so various, that it is impossible not to recognise in the fact a law of supreme and universal necessity."—J. Burckhardt, *The Renaissance in Italy*, pt. 1, ch. 1, (v. 1).

A. D. 1215.—The beginning, at Florence, the causes and the meaning of the strife of the Guelphs and Ghibellines.—"In the year 1215 it chanced that a quarrel occurred at a festival between some young nobles of Florence. It was an event of as frivolous, and apparently unimportant, a character as thousands of other such broils; but this obscure quarrel has been treated by the whole body of Florentine historians as the origin and starting point of that series of civil wars which shaped the entire future fortunes of the community, and shook to its centre the whole fabric of society throughout central Italy. The story of it has become memorable therefore in Florentine annals, and has been rendered famous not only by the writers of history, but by many generations of poets, painters, novelists, and sculptors." Briefly sketched, the story is this: A handsome youth of the Buondelmonti family, mixing in a quarrel at the festival alluded to, struck one Oddo Arringhi del Fifi with his poniard. Common friends of the two brought about a reconciliation, by means of an arrangement of marriage between Buondelmonte and a niece of the injured man. But the lady was plain, and Buondelmonte, falling madly in love with another, more charming, whom evil chance and a scheming mother threw temptingly in his way, did not scruple to break his engagement, and to do it with insult. He wedded his new love, who was of the Donati family, on Easter Day, and on that same day he was slain by the Amidei, whose house he had so grossly affronted. "The assassins retired to their fortress houses, and left the bridal party to form itself as it might into a funeral procession. 'Great was the uproar in the city. He was placed on a bier; and his wife took her station on the bier also, and held his head in her lap, violently weeping; and in that manner they carried him through the whole of the city; and on that day began the ruin of Florence.' The last phrase of the above citation marks the significance which the Tuscan historians have attributed to this incident, and the important place that has always been assigned to it in Florentine history. We are told by all the earliest historians, especially by Malispini, in whose childhood these events must have happened, and whom Villani copies almost word for word, that from this quarrel began the great, fatal, and world-famous division of Florence into the parties of Guelph and Ghibelline. Dante goes so far as to consider the conduct of Buondelmonte in this affair so entirely the cause of the evils that arose from the Guelph and Ghibelline wars, that, had that cause not existed, no such misfortunes would have arisen. . . . Yet the historians admit that the party names of Guelph and Ghibelline were known in Florence long before; but they say that not till then did the city divide itself into two hostile camps under those rallying cries. It is curiously clear, from the accounts of Malispini and Villani, that, as usual in such matters, the Florentines had but a very hazy notion as to the meaning and origin of the two names [see GUELPHS AND Ghibellines, and GERMANY: A. D.

1138-1268], for the sake of which they were prepared to cut each other's throats. "Any name or watchword is good enough for a party rallying cry, when once passions have been connected with it; but the Florentines understood that Ghibelline meant attachment to the Empire in opposition to the Church, and Guelph attachment to the Church in opposition to the Empire. . . . But the quarrel of Guelph with Ghibelline in Florence was the expression of a still wider spread and more perennial conflict. . . . The Ghibellines were the old Imperial nobles, who, whether more anciently or more recently incorporated into the body of Florentine citizens, formed the aristocracy of the social body, and were naturally Imperialist in their sympathies. These Ghibellines were the high Tories of the Florentine community. The body of the people were Guelphs, naming themselves after the party professing attachment to the Church only because the Papacy was in opposition to the Empire. The Guelphs were the Whigs of Florence. The Radicals appeared on the scene in due time and normal sequence." From Florence, as its center, the strife of the two factions spread throughout Italy. "Ghibellinism was nearly universal in the north of Italy, divided among a number of more or less well known great families, of whom the principal were the Visconti at Milan, and the Della Scala at Verona. Naples and the States of the Church were Guelph; the former, as need hardly be suggested, from political circumstances, from opposition to the Empire, and from connection, rather than from principle. Tuscany and the whole of Central Italy were divided between the two, although the real strength and stronghold of genuine Guelphism was there. Without Florence, there would have been no Guelph party. Had those stout sandalled and leather-jerkined Florentine burghers of the 13th century not undertaken and persevered in that crusade against the feudal nobles and the Ghibelline principle, which . . . was the leading occupation and idea of the Commonwealth during all that century, Ghibellinism and Imperialism would have long since possessed and ruled Italy from the Alps to the toe of the boot."—T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 1, ch. 3, and bk. 3, ch. 1 (v. 1).—"One party called themselves the Emperor's liegemen, and their watchword was authority and law; the other side were the liegemen of Holy Church, and their cry was liberty; and the distinction as a broad one is true. But a democracy would become Ghibelline, without scruple, if its neighbour town was Guelph; and among the Guelph liegemen of the Church and liberty, the pride of blood and love of power were not a whit inferior to that of their opponents. Yet . . . it is not impossible to trace in the two factions differences of temper, of moral and political inclinations, which, though visible only on a large scale and in the mass, were quite sufficient to give meaning and reality to their mutual opposition. . . . The Ghibellines as a body reflected the worldliness, the license, the irreligion, the reckless selfishness, the daring insolence, and at the same time the gaiety and pomp, the princely magnificence and generosity and largeness of mind of the House of Swabia [the Hohenstaufen]; they were the men of the court and camp. . . . The Guelphs, on the other hand, were the party of the middle classes; they

rose out of and held to the people; they were strong by their compactness, their organisation in cities, their commercial relations and interests, their command of money. Further, they were professedly the party of strictness and religion. . . . The genuine Guelph spirit was austere, frugal, independent, earnest, religious, fond of its home and Church, and of those celebrations which bound together Church and home; . . . in its higher form intolerant of evil, but intolerant always of whatever displeased it. Yet there was a grave and noble manliness about it which long kept it alive in Florence."—R. W. Church, *Dante and other Essays*, pp. 15-18.—See, also, FLORENCE: A. D. 1215-1250.

A. D. 1236-1259.—The tyranny of Eccelino di Romano in the Veronese or Trevisan Marches, and the crusade against him. See VERONA: A. D. 1236-1259.

A. D. 1248-1278.—The wars of a generation of the Guelphs and Ghibellines in Tuscany. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1248-1278.

(Southern): A. D. 1250-1268.—Invasion and conquest of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by Charles of Anjou, on the invitation of the Pope.—"The death of the Emperor Frederic II., in 1250, had been followed in less than four years by that of his son and successor Conrad IV., from whose son Conradin, at that time an infant, the Crown of the Two Sicilies was usurped by his uncle Manfred, a natural child of the deceased Frederic. The hatred of the See of Rome, notwithstanding the frequent changes which had occurred in the Papal Chair, still pursued the Line of Hohenstaufen, even in this illegitimate branch, and it was transmitted as an hereditary possession from Innocent IV. through Alexander IV. and Urban IV., to the IVth Clement. Interference in Germany itself was forbidden by the independence of the Electoral Princes; and when it was found impossible to obtain the nomination of an Emperor decidedly in the Guelph interest, Alexander contented himself by endeavouring to separate the Throne of the Two Sicilies from that of Germany, and to establish upon the former a Feudatory, and therefore a Champion, of the Church. Various alliances for this purpose were projected by Alexander, and by his successors who adopted a similar policy; and the Crown, which was in truth to be conquered from Manfred, was offered as an investiture which Rome had a full right to bestow." After long negotiations with Henry III. of England, who coveted the Sicilian prize for his second son, Edmund, and who paid large sums to the papal treasury by way of earnest money, but who showed little ability to oust the possessor, Pope Urban, at length, closed a bargain with that ambitious speculator in royal claims and titles, Charles of Anjou, brother of St. Louis, king of France. The honesty of Louis was somewhat troubled by the unscrupulous transaction; but his conscience submitted itself to the instructions of the Holy Father, and he permitted his brother to embark in the evil enterprise. "Charles, accordingly, having first accepted the Senatorship of Rome, with which high magistracy he was invested by her citizens, negotiated with the Holy See, most ably and much to his advantage, for the loftier dignity of Kingship. In little more than a month after he had received the Crown from the hands of Clement IV., who had become Pope, he totally defeated and killed the

opponent Manfred, in the battle of Grandella [near Benevento, February, 1266]. Conradin, who had now arrived at years of discretion, was still his rival; but the capture of the young Prince at Tagliacozzo [1268], and his speedy committal to the executioner, confirmed Charles of Anjou in his Kingdom, at the everlasting expense of his good name. Few incidents in History are more calculated to awaken just indignation than the untimely end of the brave, wronged, and gallant Conradin. Charles of Anjou thus founded the first dynasty of his House which reigned over the Sicilies. The pretensions which Aragon afterwards advanced to the Crown of that Kingdom rested on a marriage between Pedro, the eldest son of King James, and Constance, a daughter of Manfred."—E. Smedley, *Hist. of France*, pt. 1, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: J. Michelet, *Hist. of France*, bk. 4, ch. 8.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 11, ch. 3 (v. 5).—Mrs. W. Busk, *Medieval Popes, Emperors, Kings, and Crusaders*, bk. 5 (v. 4).

A. D. 1250-1293.—Development of the popular Constitution of the Florentine Commonwealth. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1250-1293.

A. D. 1250-1520.—The Age of the Despots.—The rise of Principalities.—"From the death of Frederick the Second [A. D. 1250] . . . all practical power of an imperial kingdom in Italy may be said to have passed away. Presently begins the gradual change of the commonwealths into tyrannies, and the grouping together of many of them into larger states. We also see the beginning of more definite claims of temporal dominion on behalf of the Popes. In the course of the 300 years between Frederick the Second and Charles the Fifth, these processes gradually changed the face of the Italian kingdom. It became in the end a collection of principalities, broken only by the survival of a few oligarchic commonwealths and by the anomalous dominion of Venice on the mainland. Between Frederick the Second and Charles the Fifth, we may look on the Empire as practically in abeyance in Italy. The coming of an Emperor always caused a great stir for the time, but it was only for the time. After the grant of Rudolf of Habsburg to the Popes, a distinction was drawn between Imperial and papal territory in Italy. While certain princes and commonwealths still acknowledged at least the nominal superiority of the Emperor, others were now held to stand in the same relation of vassalage to the Pope."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geog. of Europe*, ch. 8, sect. 2.—"During the 14th and 15th centuries we find, roughly speaking, six sorts of despots in Italian cities. Of these the First class, which is a very small one, had a dynastic or hereditary right accruing from long seignorial possession, of their several districts. The most eminent are the houses of Montferrat and Savoy, the Marguises of Ferrara, the Princes of Urbino. . . . The Second class comprise those nobles who obtained the title of Vicars of the Empire, and built an illegal power upon the basis of imperial right in Lombardy. Of these, the Della Scala and Visconti families are illustrious instances. The Third class is important. Nobles charged with military or judicial power, as Capitani or Podestas, by the free burghs, used their authority to enslave the cities they were supposed to administer. It was thus that almost

all the numerous tyrants of Lombardy, Carraresi at Padua, Gonzaghi at Mantua, Rossi and Correggi at Parma, Torrensi and Visconti at Milan, Scotti at Piacenza, and so forth, erected their despotic dynasties. . . . In the Fourth class we find the principle of force still more openly at work. To it may be assigned those Condottieri who made a prey of cities at their pleasure. The illustrious Ugucione della Faggiuola, who neglected to follow up his victory over the Guelfs at Monte Catini, in order that he might cement his power in Lucca and Pisa, is an early instance of this kind of tyrant. His successor, Castruccio Castracane, the hero of Machiavelli's romance, is another. But it was not until the first half of the 15th century that professional Condottieri became powerful enough to found such kingdoms as that, for example, of Francesco Sforza at Milan. The Fifth class includes the nephews or sons of Popes. The Riario principality of Forli, the Della Rovere of Urbino, the Borgia of Romagna, the Farnese of Parma, form a distinct species of despotisms; but all these are of a comparatively late origin. Until the papacy of Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII. the Popes had not bethought them of providing in this way for their relatives. . . . There remains the Sixth and last class of despots to be mentioned. This again is large and of the first importance. Citizens of eminence, like the Medici at Florence, the Bentivogli at Bologna, the Baglioni of Perugia, the Gambacorti of Pisa, like Pandolfo Petrucci in Siena (1502), Roméo Pepoli, the usurer of Bologna (1323), the plebeian Altichinio and Agolanti of Padua (1313), acquired more than their due weight in the conduct of affairs, and gradually tended to tyranny. In most of these cases great wealth was the original source of despotic ascendancy. It was not uncommon to buy cities together with their Signory. . . . But personal qualities and nobility of blood might also produce despots of the Sixth class."—J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: The Age of the Despots*, ch. 2.

A. D. 1261-1264.—The supplanting of the Venetians by the Genese at Constantinople and in the Black Sea.—War between the Republics. See GENOA: A. D. 1261-1299.

A. D. 1273-1291.—Indifference of Rodolph of Hapsburg to his Italian dominions.—His neglect to claim the imperial crown. See GERMANY: A. D. 1273-1308.

A. D. 1277-1447.—Tyranny of the Visconti at Milan.—Their domination in Lombardy and their fall. See MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447.

A. D. 1282-1293.—War between Genoa and Pisa.—Battle of Meloria.—War of Florence and Lucca against Pisa. See PISA: A. D. 1063-1293.

(Southern): **A. D. 1282-1300.—The Sicilian Vespers.—Severance of the Two Sicilies.—End of the House of Anjou in the insular kingdom.**—"Peter, King of Aragon, had married Constance, the daughter of Manfred, and laid claim to the kingdom of Sicily in her right. He sent for help to Michael Palaiologos, the restorer of the Eastern Empire. The Emperor agreed to his proposals, for his Empire was threatened by Charles of Anjou. These negotiations were, it is said, carried on through Giovanni di Procida, a Sicilian exile, who, as the story goes, had suffered cruel wrongs from the French. Charles knew something of the plans of the allies, and both parties were preparing for war, but affairs

were brought to a crisis by a chance occurrence. On March 30, 1282, a brutal insult was offered by a French soldier to a bride in the presence of her friends and neighbours outside the walls of Palermo, and the smothered hatred of the people broke out into open violence. The cry 'Death to the French' was raised, and all who belonged to that nation in Palermo were slain without mercy. This massacre, which is called 'The Sicilian Vespers,' spread through the whole island; the yoke of the oppressor was broken and the land was delivered. Charles laid siege to Messina, but he was forced to retire by Peter of Aragon, who landed and was received as King. Pope Martin in vain excommunicated the rebels and their allies, and, in 1284, Charles received a great blow, for his son was defeated and taken prisoner by Roger of Loria, the Admiral of the Catalan fleet. Charles of Anjou died in 1286, and two years later his son, also called Charles, ransomed himself from prison."—W. Hunt, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 4.—Charles of Anjou "died of grief, leaving his son, the prince of Salerno, a prisoner, and Martin followed him, before he could proclaim a general crusade against the invader of the apostolic fief. Pedro, having enjoyed his two crowns to the day of his death, left them to his sons, Alphonso and James respectively, and both were excommunicated by Honorius IV. for their accession. The prince of Salerno, obtaining his release by the mediation of Edward of England, was absolved by Nicholas IV. from the conditions to which he had sworn, and crowned at Rome king of Apulia (i. e., Naples) and Sicily, A. D. 1289. His hopes of regaining the island were constantly disappointed. James, having succeeded to the crown of Arragon by the death of Alphonso, was persuaded to resign Sicily to Charles on condition of receiving his daughter in marriage, with an ample dowry. Boniface VIII. also graciously gave him leave to conquer the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, from the republics of Pisa and Genoa. The Sicilians, however, declining to be so bartered, bestowed their crown on James's brother Frederic [1295]; and though James contributed his fleet to reduce him, he retained the island throne [1300], while Charles and the pope were obliged to rest content with the continental kingdom. Their only satisfaction was to persist in calling Naples by the name of Sicily, and to stigmatise their rival as king of 'Trinacria.'"—G. Trevor, *Rome: from the Fall of the Western Empire*, p. 240.

ALSO IN: S. A. Dunham, *Hist. of Spain and Portugal*, bk. 3, sect. 2, ch. 4.

A. D. 1294-1299.—War between Venice and Genoa. See GENOA, A. D. 1261-1299.

A. D. 1297-1319.—The perfected aristocratic Constitution of Venice. See VENICE: A. D. 1032-1319.

A. D. 1300-1313.—New factions of Florence and Tuscany.—Bianchi and Neri. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1295-1300, and 1301-1313.

14th Century.—The Renaissance in its beginning.—"It was not the revival of antiquity alone, but its union with the genius of the Italian people, which achieved the conquest of the Western world. . . . The civilisation of Greece and Rome, which, ever since the fourteenth century, obtained so powerful a hold on Italian life, as the source and basis of culture, as the object and ideal of existence, partly also as an avowed reaction against preceding tendencies—this civilisation

had long been exerting a partial influence on mediæval Europe, even beyond the boundaries of Italy. The culture of which Charles the Great was a representative was, in face of the barbarism of the seventh and eighth centuries, essentially a Renaissance, and could appear under no other form. . . . But the resuscitation of antiquity took a different form in Italy from that which it assumed in the North. The wave of barbarism had scarcely gone by before the people, in whom the former life was but half effaced, showed a consciousness of its past and a wish to reproduce it. Elsewhere in Europe men deliberately and with reflection borrowed this or the other element of classical civilisation; in Italy the sympathies both of the learned and of the people were naturally engaged on the side of antiquity as a whole, which stood to them as a symbol of past greatness. The Latin language, too, was easy to an Italian, and the numerous monuments and documents in which the country abounded facilitated a return to the past. With this tendency other elements—the popular character which time had now greatly modified, the political institutions imported by the Lombards from Germany, chivalry and other northern forms of civilisation, and the influence of religion and the Church—combined to produce the modern Italian spirit, which was destined to serve as a model and ideal for the whole western world. How antiquity began to work in plastic art, as soon as the flood of barbarism had subsided, is clearly shown in the Tuscan buildings of the twelfth and in the sculptures of the thirteenth centuries. . . . But the great and general enthusiasm of the Italians for classical antiquity did not display itself before the fourteenth century. For this a development of civic life was required, which took place only in Italy, and there not till then. It was needful that noble and burgher should first learn to dwell together on equal terms, and that a social world should arise which felt the want of culture, and had the leisure and the means to obtain it. But culture, as soon as it freed itself from the fantastic bonds of the Middle Ages, could not at once and without help find its way to the understanding of the physical and intellectual world. It needed a guide, and found one in the ancient civilisation, with its wealth of truth and knowledge in every spiritual interest. Both the form and the substance of this civilisation were adopted with admiring gratitude; it became the chief part of the culture of the age."—J. Burckhardt, *Renaissance in Italy*, pt. 3, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: Age of the Despots*, ch. 1.—See RENAISSANCE; and LIBRARIES: RENAISSANCE.

A. D. 1305-1309.—Removal of the Papal Court to Lyons and then to Avignon.—The "Babylonish Captivity." See PAPACY: A. D. 1294-1348.

A. D. 1310-1313.—Visitation of the Emperor Henry VII.—Hostility of Florence and siege of the city.—Repulse from Rome.—The Emperor's death.—"No Emperor had come into Italy since the death of Frederic II. [1250]. Neither Rudolf nor his two successors [see GERMANY: A. D. 1273-1308] had been crowned Emperor, but on the death of Albert of Austria, the King of the Romans, in 1308, the electors chose Henry, Count of Luxemburg [Henry VII.]. In 1310 he entered Italy with a small German army. Unlike most of these Imperial expeditions, the

was approved of by the Pope. The French King Philip IV. was really master of Pope Clement V., who did not live in Italy, but sometimes within the French kingdom, or in the English territory of Bordeaux, or in Avignon, a city of the Empire. But Clement did not like bearing the French yoke, and was fearful lest some one of greater talents than Charles of Valois should make an attempt on Italy, and make it impossible for the Pope to get free from the power of the French. He therefore favoured the expedition of King Henry, and hoped that it would revive the Ghibelin party and counteract the influence of the Guelfs, who were on the side of France. Dante tells us the feelings which were roused by the coming of the King. He seemed to come as God's viceregent, to change the fortunes of men and bring the exiled home; by the majesty of his presence to bring the peace for which the banished poet longed, and to administer to all men justice, judgment and equity. Henry was worthy of these high hopes; for he was wise, just, and gracious, courageous in fight and honourable in council: but the task was too hard for him. At first all seemed to go well with him. The Ghibelins were ready to receive him as their natural lord; the Guelfs were inclined towards him by the Pope. In Milan the chief power was in the hands of Guido della Torre, the descendant of Pagano della Torre, who had done good service to the city after the battle of Corte Nuova. He was a strong Guelf, and was at the head of a large number of troops; for he was very rich. His great enemy was the Ghibelin Matteo Visconti, who continually struggled with Guido for the mastery. The king was willingly received by the Milanese, and Guido was not behindhand in bidding him welcome. While he was at Milan, on Christmas Day, 1310, he was crowned with the iron crown of the Italian kingdom, which was made of steel in the shape of laurel leaves, and studded with gems. He made both parties enter into an outward reconciliation, and the chiefs of both vied with one another in making him large presents. The King's need of money soon tired out the Milanese, and an insurrection was made in which both Matteo and Guido joined; but Matteo betrayed his rival, and Guido and all the Guelfs were driven out of Milan, which henceforth remained in the power of the Ghibelin Visconti [see MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447]. The King's demands for money made him unpopular, and each city, as he left it, rose against him. Pisa, and the other Tuscan enemies of Florence, received him with joy. But the great Guelfic city shut her gates against him, and made alliance with Robert, the Angevin King of Naples, the grandson of Charles of Anjou, and afterwards gave him [Robert] the signoria. Rome received a garrison from Naples, and the Imperial coronation had to be performed in the Church of St. John Lateran, — Henry being repulsed in an attempt to force his entrance to the quarter of the Vatican. — W. Hunt, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 4. — "The city [of Rome] was divided in feeling, and the emperor's position so precarious that he retired to Tivoli at the end of August, and moved towards Tuscany, ravaging the Etrurian territory on his way, being determined to bring Florence and all her allies to submission." By rapid movements he reached Florence and invested the city before his intentions were

understood. "A sudden assault would probably have carried the city, for the inhabitants were taken by surprise, were in a state of consternation, and could scarcely believe that the emperor was there in person: their natural energy soon returned, the Gonfaloniers assembled their companies, the whole population armed themselves, even to the bishop and clergy; a camp was formed within the walls, the outer ditch palisaded, the gates closed, and thus for two days they remained hourly expecting an assault. At last their cavalry [which had been cut off by the emperor's movement] were seen returning by various ways and in small detachments; succours also poured in from Lucca, Prato, Pistoia, Volterra, Colle, and San Gimignano; and even Bologna, Rimini, Ravenna, Faenza, Cesina, Agobbio, Città di Castello with several other places rendered their assistance: indeed so great and extensive was Florentine influence and so rapid the communication, that within eight days after the investment 4,000 men at arms and innumerable infantry were assembled at Florence! As this was about double the imperial cavalry and four times its infantry, the city gates were thrown open and business proceeded as usual, except through that entrance immediately opposite to the enemy. For two and forty days did the emperor remain within a mile of Florence, ravaging all the country, but making no impression on the town; after which he raised the siege and moved to San Casciano, eight miles south." Later, the Imperialist army was withdrawn to Poggibonzi, and in March, 1313, it was moved to Pisa, to prepare for a new campaign. "The Florentines had thus from the first, without much military skill or enterprise, proved themselves the boldest and bitterest enemies of Henry; their opposition had never ceased; by letters, promises, and money, they corrupted all Lombardy. . . . Yet party quarrels did not cease. . . . The emperor now turned all his energies to the conquest of Naples, as the first step towards that of Italy itself. For this he formed a league with Sicily and Genoa; assembled troops from Germany and Lombardy; filled his treasury in various ways, and soon found himself at the head of 2,500 German cavalry and 1,500 Italian men-at-arms, besides a Genoese fleet of 70 galleys under Lamba Doria and 50 more supplied by the King of Sicily, who with 1,000 men-at-arms had already invaded Calabria by capturing Reggio and other places." On the 5th of August, the emperor left Pisa upon his expedition against Naples; on the 24th of the same month he died at Buonconvento — not without suspicions of poison, although his illness began before his departure from Pisa. "The intelligence of this event spread joy and consternation amongst his friends and enemies; the army soon separated, and his own immediate followers with the Pisan auxiliaries carried his body back to Pisa where it was magnificently interred." — H. E. Napier, *Florentine History*, bk. 1, ch. 15 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 2, ch. 7 (v. 1).

A. D. 1312-1338. — The rising power and the reverses of the Scaligeri of Verona. — Mastino's war with Florence and Venice. See VERONA: A. D. 1260-1338.

A. D. 1313-1330. — Guelf leadership of King Robert of Naples. — Wars of Pisa and Florence. — The rise and threatening power of

Castruccio Castracani.—Siege of Genoa.—Visit of the Emperor Louis of Bavaria.—Subjection and deliverance of Pisa.—“While the unexpected death of Henry VII. deprived the Ghibelin party of its leader, and long wars between rival candidates for the succession to the German throne placed the imperial authority over Italy in abeyance [see GERMANY: A. D. 1314-1347], Robert, king of Naples, the chief of the Guelf party, the possessor of Provence, and the favourite of the church, began to aspire to the general sovereignty of Italy. He had succeeded to the crowns of Naples and Provence on the death of his father, Charles II., in opposition to the recognized laws of inheritance (A. D. 1309). His elder brother, Charles Martel, by his marriage with the heiress of Hungary, had been called to the throne of that kingdom, and had died before his father. His son, Carobert, the reigning king of Hungary, on the death of his grandfather, Charles II., asserted his just rights to all the dominions of that monarch; but Robert, hastening to Avignon, whither Clement V. had now removed his court, obtained from the pope, as feudal superior of the royal fief of Naples, a sentence which set aside the claims of his nephew in his own favour. The king of Hungary did not seriously attempt to oppose this decision, and Robert, a prince of wisdom and address, though devoid of military talents, soon extended his ambitious views beyond the kingdom over which he reigned undisturbed.” The death of Henry VII. “left him every opportunity both to attempt the subjugation of the Ghibelin states, and to convert his alliance with the Guelfs into the relation of sovereign and subject. . . . It was in Tuscany that the storm first broke over the Ghibelins after the loss of their imperial chief, and that the first ray of success unexpectedly beamed on their cause. Florence and the other Guelf cities of the province were no sooner delivered from the fear of Henry VII. than they prepared to wreak their vengeance against Pisa for the succours which she had furnished to the emperor. But that republic, in consternation at her danger, had taken into pay 1,000 German cavalry, the only part of the imperial army which could be prevailed upon to remain in Italy, and had chosen for her general Uguccione della Faggiuola, a celebrated Ghibelin captain. The ability of this commander, and the confidence with which he inspired the Pisans, turned the tide of fortune. . . . The vigour of his arms reduced the Guelf people of Lucca to sue for peace; they were compelled to restore their Ghibelin exiles; and then Uguccione, fomenting the dissensions which were thus created within the walls easily subjected one of the most wealthy and flourishing cities of Tuscany to his sword (A. D. 1314). The loss of so valuable an ally as Lucca alarmed the Florentines, and the whole Guelf party. . . . King Robert sent two of his brothers into Tuscany with a body of gens-d’armes; the Florentines and all the Tuscan Guelfs uniting their forces to this succour formed a large army; and the confederates advanced to relieve the castle of Montecatini which Uguccione was besieging.” The Ghibelin commander had a much smaller force to resist them with; but he gained, notwithstanding, “a memorable victory, near Montecatini, in which both a brother and a nephew of the king of Naples were numbered with the

slain (A. D. 1315). This triumph rendered Uguccione more formidable than ever; but his tyranny became insupportable both to the Pisans and Lucchese, and a conspiracy was formed in concert in both cities. . . . Excluded from both places and deserted by his troops, he retired to the court of the Scala at Verona (A. D. 1316). So Pisa recovered her liberty, but Lucca was less fortunate or wise, for her citizens only transferred the power which Uguccione had usurped to the chief of the Ghibelins, Castruccio Castracani degli Interminelli, one of the most celebrated names in Italian history. This extraordinary man . . . had early in life shared the common fate of exile with the White Guelfs or Ghibelins of Lucca. Passing ten years of banishment in England, France, and the Ghibelin cities of Lombardy, he had served a long apprenticeship to arms under the best generals of the age. . . . He had no sooner returned to Lucca with the Ghibelin exiles, who were restored by the terms of the peace with Pisa, than he became the first citizen of the state. His skill and courage mainly contributed to the subsequent victory of Montecatini, and endeared him to the Lucchese; his influence and intrigues excited the jealousy of Uguccione, and caused his imprisonment; and the insurrection which delivered Lucca from that chief, liberated Castruccio from chains and impending death to sovereign command. Chosen annual captain of the people at three successive elections, he at length demanded and obtained the suffrages of the senate and citizens for his elevation to the dignity of signor (A. D. 1320). . . . Under his government Lucca enjoyed repose for some years. . . . During these transactions in Tuscany, the Lombard plains were still desolated by incessant and unsparing warfare. The efforts of the Neapolitan king were mainly directed to crush Matteo Visconti [see MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447] and the Ghibelins in this part of Italy;” but the power of the latter was continually spreading. “In this prosperous state of the Ghibelin interests the domestic feuds of Genoa attracted the tide of war to her gates. The ambitious rivalry of her four great families, of the Grimaldi, the Fieschi, the Spinola, and the Doria, had long agitated the bosom of the republic; and at the period before us the two former, who headed the Guelf party, had, after various convulsions, gained possession of government. The Spinola and Doria, retiring from the city, fortified themselves in the smaller towns of the Genoese territory, and immediately invited the Ghibelin chiefs of Lombardy to their aid. The lords of Milan and Verona promptly complied with the demand, . . . and laid siege to the capital. The rulers of Genoa could then resort in their terror to no other protection than that of the Neapolitan king. Robert, conscious of the importance of preserving the republic from subjection to his enemies, hastened by sea to its defence, and obtained the absolute cession of the Genoese liberties into his hands for ten years as the price of his services. . . . After the possession of the suburbs and outworks of Genoa had been obstinately contested during ten months, the Ghibelins were compelled to raise the siege. But Robert had scarcely quitted the city to pass into Provence, when the exiles with aid from Lombardy again approached Genoa, and during four years continued a war of posts in its vicinity. But neither the Lombard signors nor

Robert engaged in this fruitless contest, and Lombardy again became the great theatre of warfare." But the power which Matteo Visconti was steadily building at Milan, for his family, could not be shaken, even though an invasion from France (1820), and a second from Germany (1822), was brought about through papal influence. At the same time Castruccio Castracani, having consolidated his despotism at Lucca, was making war upon the Florentines. When, in 1325, he succeeded in gaining possession of the Guelph city of Pistoia, "this acquisition, which was highly dangerous to Florence, produced such alarm in that republic that she called out her whole native force for the more vigorous prosecution of the war." Castruccio was heavily outnumbered in the campaign, but he gained, nevertheless, a great victory over the Florentines near the castle of Altopascio (November 23, 1325). "The whole Florentine territory was ravaged and plundered, and the conqueror carried his insults to the gates of the capital. . . . In the ruin which threatened the Guelph party in Tuscany, the Florentines had recourse to King Robert of Naples, with entreaties for aid," which he brought to them in 1326, but only on the condition "that his absolute command over the republic, which had expired in 1321, should be renewed for ten years in favour of his son Charles, duke of Calabria." But now a new danger to the Guelph interests appeared, in the approach of the emperor, Louis IV. of Bavaria. "After a long contest for the crown of Henry VII., Louis of Bavaria had triumphed over his rival, Frederic of Austria, and taken him prisoner at the sanguinary battle of Muhlendorf, in 1322. Having since passed five years in confirming his authority in Germany, Louis was now tempted by ambition and cupidity to undertake an expedition into Italy (A. D. 1327)." Halting for some time at Milan, where he received the iron crown of Lombardy, and where he deposed and imprisoned Galeazzo Visconti, he proceeded into Tuscany "on his march to Rome, where he intended to receive the imperial crown. He was welcomed with joy by the signor of Lucca, and the superior genius of Castruccio at once acquired the entire ascendant over the weaker mind of Louis. Against the united forces of the emperor and of Castruccio, the duke of Calabria and his Guelph army cautiously maintained themselves on the defensive; but the passage of Louis through Tuscany was attended with disastrous consequences to the most famous Ghibelin city of that province." Pisa, notwithstanding the long fidelity of that republic to the Ghibelin cause, was sacrificed by the emperor to the covetous ambition of Castruccio. The forces of the two were joined in a siege to which the unfortunate city submitted after a month. "She thus fell in reality into the hands of Castruccio, who shortly established his absolute authority over her capital and territory. After extorting a heavy contribution from the Pisans, and rewarding the services of Castruccio by erecting the state of Lucca into an imperial duchy in his favour, the rapacious emperor pursued his march to Rome. There he consumed in the frivolous ceremony of his coronation [January 17, 1328], and in the vain endeavour to establish an antipope, the time which he might have employed, with the forces at his command, and in conjunction with Frederic, king of Sicily, in crushing for ever the power of Rob-

ert of Naples and of all the Guelfs of Italy who depended on that monarch." In August of the same year Castruccio, who "had now attained an elevation which seemed to threaten . . . the total subjugation of all Italy," died suddenly of a fever. "Florence breathed again from impending oppression, Pisa recovered her freedom, and Lucca sank from ephemeral splendour into lasting obscurity. By the death of Castruccio the emperor had lost his best counsellor and firmest support, and he soon ceased to be formidable to the Guelfs. . . . Hastily returning into Tuscany, he plundered the infant orphans of Castruccio of their inheritance to sell Lucca to a new signor, and to impose ruinous contributions upon the Pisans, before his return into Lombardy delivered them from tyranny. . . . The first proceeding of Louis in Lombardy had been to ruin the Visconti, and to drain their states of money; almost his last act in the province was to make the restoration of this family to power a new source of profit." In 1330 the emperor returned to Germany, recalled by troubles in that part of his dominions.—G. Procter, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 4, pt. 2.

ALSO IN: N. Machiavelli, *The Florentine Histories*, bk. 2.—H. E. Napier, *Florentine History*, bk. 1, ch. 15-18 (v. 1).

A. D. 1314-1327.—The election and contest of rival emperors, Louis of Bavaria and Frederic of Austria. See GERMANY: A. D. 1814-1347.

A. D. 1341-1343.—Defeat of the Florentines by the Pisans, before Lucca.—Brief tyranny of the Duke of Athens at Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1841-1343.

(Southern): A. D. 1343-1389.—Troubled reign of Joanna I. in Naples.—Murder of her husband, Andrew of Hungary.—Political effects of the great Schism in the Church.—The war of Charles of Durazzo and Louis of Anjou.—Violent course of Pope Urban VI.—"In Naples itself the house of Anjou fell into disunion. Charles II. of Naples gained by marriage the dowry of Hungary [see HUNGARY: A. D. 1301-1342], which passed to his eldest son Charles Martel, while his second son, Robert, ruled in Naples. But Robert survived his only son, and left as heiress of the kingdom [1343] his grand-daughter Giovanna [better known as Joan, or Joanna]. The attempt to give stability to the rule of a female by marriage with her cousin, Andrew of Hungary, only aroused the jealousy of the Neapolitan nobles and raised up a strong party in opposition to Hungarian influence. Charles II. of Naples, Giovanna's great-grandfather, had left many sons and daughters, whose descendants of the great houses of Durazzo and Tarento, like those of the sons of Edward III. in England, hoped to exercise the royal power. When, in 1345, Pope Clement VI. was on the point of recognising Andrew as King of Naples, a conspiracy was formed against him, and he was murdered, with the connivance, as it was currently believed, of the Queen. Hereon the feuds in the kingdom blazed forth more violently than before; the party of Durazzo ranged itself against that of Tarento, and demanded punishment of the murderers. Giovanna, I., to protect herself, married Lewis of Tarento in 1347. King Lewis of Hungary, aided by the party of Durazzo, entered Naples to avenge his brother's death, and for a while all was confusion. On the death of Lewis of Tarento (1369),

Giovanna I. married James, King of Majorca, and on his death (1374), Otto, Duke of Brunswick. Giovanna I. was childless, and the slight lull which in the last years had come over the war of factions in Naples was only owing to the fact that all were preparing for the inevitable conflict which her death would bring." Neapolitan affairs were at this stage when the great schism occurred (see PAPACY: A. D. 1377-1417), which enthroned two rival popes, one (Urban VI.) at Rome, and one (Clement VII.) at Avignon. Queen Giovanna had inclined first to Urban, but was repelled, and gave her adhesion to Clement. Thereupon, Urban, on the 21st of April, 1386 "declared her deposed from her throne as a heretic, schismatic, and traitor to the Pope. He looked for help in carrying out his decree to King Lewis of Hungary, who had for a time laid aside his desire for vengeance against Giovanna, but was ready to resume his plans of aggrandisement when a favourable opportunity offered. . . . Lewis was not himself disposed to leave his kingdom; but he had at his court the son of his relative, Lewis of Durazzo, whom he had put to death in his Neapolitan campaign for complicity in Andrew's murder. Yet he felt compassion for his young son Charles, brought him to Hungary, and educated him at his court. As Giovanna was childless, Charles of Durazzo, or Carlo della Pace, as he was called in Italy, had a strong claim to the Neapolitan throne at her death. Charles of Durazzo was accordingly furnished with Hungarian troops for an expedition against Naples, and reached Rome in November, 1380. "Clement VII. on his side bestirred himself in behalf of his ally Giovanna, and for this purpose could count on the help of France. Failing the house of Durazzo, the house of Valois could put forward a claim to the Neapolitan throne, as being descended from the daughter of Charles II. The helpless Giovanna I. in her need adopted as her heir and successor Louis, Duke of Anjou, brother of the French king, and called him to her aid. Clement VII. hastened to confer on Louis everything that he could; he even formed the States of the Church into a kingdom of Adria, and bestowed them on Louis; only Rome itself, and the adjacent lands in Tuscany, Campania Maritima, and Sabina were reserved for the Pope. The Avignonese pretender was resolved to show how little he cared for Italy or for the old traditions of the Italian greatness of his office. Charles of Durazzo was first in the field, for Louis of Anjou was detained in France by the death of Charles V. in September, 1380. The accession of Charles VI. at the age of twelve threw the government of the kingdom upon the Council of Regency, of which Louis of Anjou was the chief member. He used his position to gratify his chief failing, avarice, and gathered large sums of money for his Neapolitan campaign. Meanwhile Charles of Durazzo was in Rome, where Urban VI. equipped him for his undertaking." In June, 1381, Charles marched against Naples, defeated Otto, the husband of Giovanna, at San Germano, and had the gates of Naples opened to him by a rising within the city on the 16th of July. Giovanna took refuge in the Castel Nuovo, but surrendered it on the 26th of August. After nine months of captivity, the unfortunate queen was "strangled in her prison on May 12, 1382, and her corpse was exposed for six days before burial that the certainty of her

death might be known to all. Thenceforth the question between Charles III. and Louis was not complicated by any considerations of Giovanna's rights. It was a struggle of two dynasties for the Neapolitan crown, a struggle which was to continue for the next century. Crowned King of Naples by Clement VII., Louis of Anjou quitted Avignon at the end of May, accompanied by a brilliant array of French barons and knights. He hastened through North Italy, and disappointed the hopes of the fervent partisans of Clement VII. by pursuing his course over Aquila, through the Abruzzi, and refusing to turn aside to Rome, which, they said, he might have occupied, seized Urban VI., and so ended the Schism. When he entered the territory of Naples he soon received large accessions to his forces from discontented barons, while 22 galleys from Provence occupied Ischia and threatened Naples." Charles, having inferior forces, could not meet his adversary in the field, but showed great tactical skill, acting on the defensive, "cutting off supplies, and harassing his enemy by unexpected sallies. The French troops perished miserably from the effects of the climate; . . . Louis saw his splendid army rapidly dwindling away." But quarrels now arose between Charles and Pope Urban; the latter went to Naples to interfere in affairs; the King made him practically a prisoner and extorted from him agreements which were not to his liking. But Urban, on the 1st of January, 1384, "proclaimed a crusade against Louis as a heretic and schismatic, and Charles unfurled the banner of the Cross." In May the Pope withdrew from Naples to Nocera, and there began a series of interferences which convinced Charles "that Urban was a more serious adversary than Louis." With the summer came attacks of the plague upon both armies; but that of Louis suffered most, and Louis himself died, in September, bequeathing his claims on Naples to his eldest son. "On the death of Louis the remnant of his army dispersed, and Charles was free from one antagonist. . . . War was now declared between the Pope and the King. . . . Charles found adherents amongst Urban's Cardinals." Urban discovered the plots of the latter and threw six of them into a dungeon, where he tortured them with brutality. Charles attacked Nocera and took the town, but the castle in which the Pope had fortified himself resisted a long siege. "Three or four times a day the dauntless Pope appeared at a window, and with bell and torch cursed and excommunicated the besieging army." In August, 1385, Urban was rescued by some of his partisans, who broke through the camp of the besiegers and carried him off, still clinging to his captive cardinals, all but one of whom he subsequently put to death. He made his way to Trani and was there met by Genoese galleys which conveyed him and his party to Genoa. He resided in Genoa rather more than a year, very much to the discomfort and expense of the Genoese, and then, after much difficulty, found shelter at Lucca until September, 1387. Meantime Charles III. had left Naples, returning to Hungary to head a revolt against the widowed queen and young daughter of Lewis, who died in 1382. There he was assassinated in February, 1386. "The death of Charles III. again plunged the kingdom of Naples into confusion. The Angevin party, which had been powerless against Charles, raised against

his son Ladislas, a boy of twelve years old, the claims of Louis II. of Anjou. The exactions of the Queen Regent Margaret awoke dissatisfaction, and led to the appointment in Naples of a new civic magistracy, called the *Otto di Buono Stato*, who were at variance with Margaret. The Angevins rallied under Tommaso of Sanseverino, and were reinforced by the arrival of Otto of Brunswick. The cause of Louis was still identified with that of Clement VII., who, in May 1385, had solemnly invested him with the kingdom of Naples. Urban VI., however, refused to recognise the claims of the son of Charles, though Margaret tried to propitiate him . . . and though Florence warmly supported her prayers for help." The Pope continued obstinate in this refusal until his death. He declared that the kingdom of Naples had lapsed to the Holy See, and he tried to gather money and troops for an expedition to secure it. As a means to that end, he ordered that the year 1390 should be a year of jubilee—a decade before the end of the century. It was his last desperate measure to obtain money. On the 15th of October 1389 he died and one of the most disastrous pontificates in the history of the Papacy came to an end.—M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy during the Period of the Reformation*, bk. 1, ch. 1 (p. 1).

ALSO IN: *Historical Life of Joanna of Sicily*.—Mrs. Jameson, *Memoirs of Celebrated Female Sovereigns*, v. 1, ch. 4.—St. C. Baddeley, *Charles III. of Naples and Urban VI.*

A. D. 1343-1393.—The "Free Companies."—Their depredations and the wars employing them.—The Great Company.—The Company of Sir John Hawkwood.—"The practice of hiring troops to fight the battles of the Commonwealth [of Florence—but in other Italian states no less] had for some time past been continually on the increase. . . . The demand for these mercenary troops,—a demand which . . . preferred strangers from beyond the Alps,—had filled Italy with bands of free lances, ready to take service with any tyrant, or any free city that was willing to pay them. They passed from one service to another, and from one side of a quarrel to the other, with the utmost indifference and impartiality. But from this manner of life to setting up for themselves and warring for their own behoof there was but one step. And no prudent man could have doubted that this step would ere long be taken. Every circumstance of the age and country combined to invite and facilitate it. . . . Already, immediately after the fall of the Duke of Athens [at Florence, 1343], a German adventurer, one Werner, known in Italian history as the Duke Guarneri, had induced a large number of the hired troops, who were then 'unattached' in Italy, mainly those dismissed at that time from the service of Pisa, to form themselves into an independent company and recognize him as their leader. With equal effrontery and accuracy this ruffian styled himself 'The enemy of God, of Pity, and of Mercy.' . . . This gang of bandits numbered more than 2,000 horsemen. Their first exploit was to threaten the city of Siena. Advancing through the Siennese territory towards the city, plundering, killing, and burning indiscriminately as they went, they inspired so sudden and universal a terror, that the city was glad to buy them off with a sum of 12,000 florins. From the Siennese territory they passed to that of Arezzo, and thence

to the district around Perugia; and then turning towards the Adriatic, overran Romagna, and the Rimini country, then governed by the Malatesta family. It is difficult adequately to describe, or even to conceive the sufferings, the destruction, the panic, the horror, which marked the track of such a body of miscreants." Finally, by the skilful management of the Lord of Bologna, the company was bought up and sent across the Alps, out of Italy, in detachments. "The relief was obtained in a manner which was sure to operate as an encouragement to the formation of other similar bands. And now, after the proclamation of the peace between Florence and the Visconti, on the 1st of April, 1353, . . . the experiment which had answered so well in the hands of the German 'Enemy to God and to Mercy,' was repeated on a larger scale by a French Knight Hospitaller of the name of Montreuil, known in Italian history as Frà Moriale. . . . Being out of place, it occurred to him to collect all the fighting men in Italy who were similarly circumstanced, and form an independent company after the example of Guarneri, with the avowed purpose of living by plunder and brigandage. He was so successful that he collected in a very short time 1,500 men-at-arms and 2,000 foot soldiers; who were subsequently increased to 5,000 cavaliers and 7,000 infantry; and this band was known as 'the Great Company.'" There was an attempt made, at first, to combine Florence, Siena and Perugia, with the Romagna, in resistance to the marauders; but it failed. "The result was that the Florentines were obliged to buy off the terrible Frà Moriale with a bribe of 28,000 florins, and Pisa with one of 16,000. . . . The chief . . . after Frà Moriale himself, was one Conrad, Count of Lando; and under him the Company marched towards Lombardy in search of fresh booty, while Moriale himself, remaining temporarily behind, went to Rome to confer privately, as it was believed, with the Colonna chiefs, respecting a project of employing his band against Rienzi, the tribune. But whether such was the object of his journey to Rome or not, it was fatal to the brigand chief. For Rienzi no sooner knew that the notorious Frà Moriale was within his jurisdiction than he arrested him, and summarily ordered him to execution as a common malefactor. The death of the chief, however, did not put an end to 'the Great Company'; for Conrad of Lando remained, and succeeded to the command of it." From 1356 to 1359, Italy in different parts was preyed upon by 'the Great Company,' sometimes in the service of the league of the lesser Lombard princes against the Visconti of Milan, and once in the employ of Siena against Perugia; but generally marauding on their own account, independently. Florence, alone, stood out in resistance to their exactions, and finally sent into the field against them 2,000 men-at-arms, all tried troops, 500 Hungarians, and 2,500 cross-bowmen, besides the native troops of the city. Subsequently the Florentine forces were joined by others from Milan, Padua, and elsewhere. The bandits marched all around the Florentine frontier, with much bluster, making great threats, but constantly evading an engagement. At length, on the 20th of July, 1359, the two armies were in such a position that it was thought in the Florentine camp that a decisive battle would be fought on the morrow.

But when that July morning dawned, Lando and his bandit host were already in full march northwards towards Genoa, with a precipitation that had all the appearance of flight. . . . 'The Great Company never again dared to show its face in Tuscany.'—T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 3, ch. 6 (v. 2).—
 "Another company, consisting principally of Englishmen [lately turned loose in France by the Peace of Bretigny, 1360, which terminated the invasion of Edward III.], was brought into Italy at a somewhat later period by the Marquis of Montferrat. . . . About the same time another, composed principally of Germans, and commanded by Amichino Baumgarten, was raised by Galeazzo Visconti, and afterwards employed by the Pisans. Another, entitled that of St. George, was formed by Ambrose, the natural son of Bernabos Visconti, and let loose by him on the territories of Perugia and Sienna. Thus, at the end of the 14th century, Italy was devastated at one and the same time by these four companies of adventurers, or, as they might more justly be called, professional robbers. . . . Of all these companies, the military reputation of the English was undoubtedly the greatest—a circumstance which may be ascribed, in some degree, to the physical superiority of the men, but still more to the talents of Sir John Hawkwood, by whom they were commanded."—W. P. Urquhart, *Life and Times of Francesco Sforza*, bk. 2, ch. 1 (v. 1).—One of the marauding companies left in France after the Peace of Bretigny, and which afflicted that wretched country so sorely (see FRANCE: A. D. 1360-1380), was called the White Company, and Sir John Hawkwood was one of its commanders. "The White Company crossed into Lombardy, under the command of one Albaret, and took service under the Marquis of Montferrat, then at war with the Duke of Milan. Hawkwood [called Giovanni Aguto by the Italians] entered the Pisan service, and next year, when the marquis, being unable to maintain his English troops, disbanded them, the Pisans engaged them, and gave Hawkwood the command." Hawkwood and his company served Pisa, in war with Florence, until 1364, when they experienced a great defeat, which led to peace and their discharge. During the next three years they lived as independent freebooters, the territories of Siena suffering most from their depredations. Then they took service with Bernabo Visconti, Lord of Milan, making war for him on Florence and its allies; but very soon their arms were turned against Milan, and they were fighting in the pay of Florence and the Pope. "Within the next five years he changed sides twice. He served Galeazzo Visconti against the Papal States; and then, brought back to fight for Holy Church, defeated his late employer in two pitched battles." After this, when the league against an aggressive and ambitious pontiff extended, and Florence, Bologna and other cities joined Milan, Hawkwood took money from both at the same time, and cheated both, preliminarily to fighting each in turn. While serving the Pope his ruffians wantonly destroyed the captured town of Casena, massacring between 4,000 and 5,000 people, women and children included. In 1378, when Gregory XI. died, peace followed, and Hawkwood's company resumed its old freebooting. In 1381 he was engaged in the Neapolitan civil war. In 1387 he seems to have be-

come permanently engaged in the service of Florence against the Duke of Milan. "In 1391, Florence concluded a general peace with all her enemies. Her foreign auxiliaries were dismissed, with the exception of Sir John Hawkwood and 1,000 men. Hawkwood henceforth remained in her service till his death, which took place on the 6th of March, 1393. He was buried at the public expense, as a valiant servant of the State."—*Sir John Hawkwood* (Bentley's Miscellany, v. 54, pp. 284-291).

ALSO IN: O. Browning, *Guelphs and Ghibellines*, ch. 12.

A. D. 1347-1354.—Rienzi's Revolution at Rome. See ROME: A. D. 1347-1354.

A. D. 1348-1355.—War of Genoa against Venice, the Greeks and Aragonese. See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1348-1355.

A. D. 1352-1378.—Subjugation and revolt of the States of the Church.—War of the Pope with Florence. See PAPACY: A. D. 1352-1378.

A. D. 1378-1427.—The democratizing of Florence.—Tumult of the Ciompi.—First appearance of the Medici. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1378-1427.

A. D. 1379-1381.—Final triumph of Venice over Genoa in the War of Chioggia. See VENICE: A. D. 1379-1381.

(Southern): A. D. 1386-1414.—Renewed Civil War in Naples.—Defeat of the Angevins and triumph of Ladislaus.—His ambitious career.—His capture and recapture of Rome.—
 "The death of Charles III. involved the kingdom of Naples in the most ruinous anarchy; and delivered it for many years a prey to all the disorders of a long minority and a disputed throne. Charles had left two children, Ladislaus, a boy of ten years old, and a daughter, Joanna; and his widow Margaret acted as regent for her son. On the other hand, the Sanseverini and other baronial families, rallying the Angevin party, proclaimed the young son of the late duke of Anjou king,—also under the guardianship of his mother, Maria,—by the title of Louis II. Thus Naples was disturbed by the rival pretensions of two boys, placed beneath the guidance of ambitious and intriguing mothers, and severally protected by two popes, who communicated each other, and laboured to crush the minors whom they respectively opposed, only that they might establish their own authority over the party which they supported. . . . For several years the Angevin party seemed to maintain the ascendancy. Louis II. was withheld in Provence from the scene of danger by his mother; but the barons who had raised his standard, forcing Margaret of Durazzo and the adherents of her son to retire to Gaeta, possessed themselves of the capital and great part of the kingdom. When Louis II., therefore, was at length suffered by his mother to appear at Naples, attended by a powerful fleet and a numerous train of the warlike nobles of France (A. D. 1390), he disembarked at the capital amidst the acclamations of his people, and would probably have overpowered the party of Durazzo with ease, if, as he advanced towards manhood, he had displayed any energy of character. But he proved very unequal, by his indolence and love of pleasure, to contend with the son of Charles III. Educated in the midst of alarms and danger, and surrounded from his infancy by civil wars and conspiracies, Ladislaus had early been exercised in

courageous enterprise, and trained to intrigue and dissimulation. At the age of 16, his mother Margaret committed him to the barons of her party to make his first essay in arms; and from this period he was ever at the head of his troops. . . . A fortunate marriage, which his mother had effected for him with Constance di Clermont, the heiress of the most opulent noble of Sicily, increased his resources by an immense dowry; and while he made an able use of these riches [meanly and heartlessly divorcing the wife who brought them to him, when they had been spent], the new Italian pope, Boniface IX., the successor of Urban VI., recognized him for the legitimate son and vassal of the church, because Louis was supported by the Avignon pontiff. This decision gained him many partizans; . . . his talents and valour hourly advanced his success; and at last the Sanseverini and all the barons of the Angevin party, following the tide of fortune, went over to his standards, and opened to him the gates of Naples (A. D. 1399). Louis . . . retired by sea to his Provençal dominions, and finally abandoned the kingdom of Naples. Ladislaus, having thus triumphed over his sluggish antagonist, had leisure to consolidate his stern authority over the licentious and turbulent feudal aristocracy of his kingdom. . . . He . . . crushed the Sanseverini and other great families, whose power might make them dangerous; and having rooted out the seeds of all resistance to his sway in his own dominions, he prepared to direct his vigorous ambition to schemes of foreign conquest."—G. Procter, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 5, pt. 3.—Until the death of Pope Boniface IX., Ladislaus supported that pontiff through the hard struggle in which he crushed the rebellious Colonna and made himself master of the city of Rome. But when Boniface died, in 1404, the Neapolitan king began to scheme for bringing the ancient capital and the possessions of the Church under his own control. "His plan was to set the Pope [the newly elected Innocent VII.] and the Roman people against one another, and by helping now one and now the other to get them both into his power. . . . He trusted that the rebellious Romans would drive the Pope from the city, and would then be compelled to submit to himself." He had entered Rome, four days after the papal election, ostensibly as a mediator between the rival factions, and between the Pope and the Roman people; and he was easily able to bring about an arrangement which gave him every opportunity for interference and for turning circumstances to his own advantage. Events soon followed as he had expected them, and as he helped, through his agents, to guide them. The turbulence of the people increased, until, in 1405, the Pope was driven to flight. "No sooner had the Pope left Rome than Giovanni Colonna, at the head of his troops, burst into the Vatican, where he took up his quarters. . . . The Vatican was sacked; even the Papal archives were pillaged, and Bulls, letters and registers were scattered about the streets. Many of these were afterwards restored, but the loss of historic documents must have been great." Ladislaus now thought his time for seizing Rome was come; but when he sent 5,000 horse to join the Colonna, the Romans took alarm, repelled the Neapolitan troops, and called back the Pope, who returned in January, 1406, but who died in the following November. Under the next Pope, Gregory XII.,

there were negotiations with Avignon for the ending of the great schism; and all the craft of Ladislaus was exerted to defeat that purpose; because a reunion of western Christendom would not be favorable to his designs. At last, a conference of the rival popes was arranged, to take place at Savona, near Genoa, and in August, 1407, Gregory XII. left Rome, moving slowly northwards, but finding reasons, equally with his competitor, for never presenting himself at the appointed meeting-place. In his absence the disorders of Rome increased, and when Ladislaus, in April, 1408, appeared before the city with an army of 12,000 horse and as many foot, it was surrendered to him without resistance. "The craft of Ladislaus had gained its end, and the temporal power of the Papacy had passed into his hands. . . . So utterly had the prestige of Rome, the memories of her glories, passed away from men's minds, that her sister republic of Florence could send and congratulate Ladislaus on the triumphal victory which God and his own manhood had given him in the city of Rome." When, in 1408, the disgusted cardinals of both papal courts joined in calling a general Council of the Church, to meet at Pisa the following year, Ladislaus threatened to prevent it. By this time "Gregory had sunk to the lowest pitch of degradation: he sold to Ladislaus for the small sum of 25,000 florins the entire States of the Church, and even Rome itself. After this bargain Ladislaus set out for Rome, intending to proceed into Tuscany and break up the Council." Early in April, 1409, he marched northwards and threatened Siena. But Florence had now undertaken the defense of the Council, and resisted him so effectually that the meeting at Pisa was undisturbed. The immediate result of the Council was the election of a third claimant of the Papacy, Alexander V. (see PAPACY: A. D. 1377-1417). Around the new Pope a league was now formed which embraced Florence, Siena, and Louis of Anjou, whose claim upon Naples was revived. The league made an attempt on Rome in the autumn of 1409, and failed; but the following January the Neapolitans were expelled and the city was occupied by the papal forces. In May, 1410, Alexander V. died, and was succeeded by Baldassare Cossa, who took the name of John XXIII. The new Pope hastened to identify his cause with Louis of Anjou, and succeeded, by his energy, in putting into the field an army which comprised the four chief "condottieri" in Italy, with their veteran followers. Ladislaus was attacked and routed completely at Rocca Secca, on the 19th of May, 1411. But the worthlessness of Louis and the mercenary character of his generals made the victory of no effect. Ladislaus bought over the best of the troops and their leaders, and before the end of summer Louis was back in Provence, again abandoning his Neapolitan claims. Ladislaus made peace, first, with Florence, by selling Cortona to that city, and then with the Pope, who recognized him as king, not only of Naples, but of Sicily as well. But Ladislaus was only gaining time by these treaties. In June, 1413, he drove the Pope from Rome, and his troops again occupied the city. He seemed to be now well prepared for realizing his ambition to found an extended Italian kingdom; but his career was cut short by a mortal disease, which ended his life on the 6th of August, 1414.—M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy during the Period of the Reformation*, bk. 1, ch. 8-8 (c. 1).

A. D. 1399-1402.—Resistance of Florence to the spreading tyranny of the Duke of Milan. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1890-1402.

A. D. 1391-1451.—Extension of the Italian dominions of the House of Savoy. See SAVOY: 11TH-15TH CENTURIES.

A. D. 1396-1409.—The sovereignty of Genoa yielded to the King of France. See GENOA: A. D. 1381-1422.

A. D. 1402-1406.—The crumbling of the Visconti dominion.—Aggrandizement of Venice.—Florentine purchase and conquest of Pisa.—Decline of that city.—“The little states of Romagna, which had for the most part been conquered by Gian-Galeazzo [Visconti, Duke of Milan], were at his death [1402] overrun by the Count of Barbiano, who with his famous company entered the service of Pope Boniface IX. . . . The Count of Savoy, the Marquess of Montferrat, and the lords of Padua, Ferrara, and Mantua, were the only independent Sovereigns in North Italy in 1402. Of these Francesco, lord of Padua, was soon to fall. On the death of Gian-Galeazzo he seized on Verona. Venice would not allow her old enemy to gain this advantage, and made alliance with Francesco di Gonzaga, lord of Mantua, and with his help took Verona, and closely besieged Padua. After a gallant resistance Francesco da Carrara was forced to yield, and he and his two sons were taken prisoners to Venice, and were there strangled by order of the Council of Ten. This war gave the Venetians great power on the mainland. They reconquered Treviso, and gained Feltro, Verona [1405], Vicenza, and Padua [1405], and from this time Venice became an Italian power. In Tuscany, the death of her great enemy delivered Florence from her distress, and Sienna, which now regained her liberty, placed herself under her protection. Pisa [which had been betrayed to Gian-Galeazzo in 1399] had been left to Gabriello Visconti, a bastard son of the late Duke. He put himself under the protection of Jean Boucicault, who governed Genoa for Charles VI., King of France, and with his consent he sold Pisa to the Florentines. The Pisans resisted this sacrifice of their freedom, and the war lasted a year, but in 1406 the city was forced to surrender. Many of the people left their homes; for, though Florence acted fairly towards her old enemy and new subject, yet the Pisans could not bear the yoke, and the greatness of the city, its trade and its wealth, vanished away.”—W. Hunt, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 6.—“From that day to this it [Pisa] has never recovered,—not its former greatness, wealth, and energy,—but even sufficient vitality to arrest it on the downward course. . . . Of the two great political tendencies which were then disputing the world between them it made itself the champion and the symbol of the losing one. Pisa went down in the world together with the feudalism and Ghibellinism with which it was identified.”—T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 4, ch. 6 (v. 2).—*The City in the Sea*, ch. 16.

ALSO IN: W. C. Hazlitt, *Hist. of the Venetian Republic*, ch. 21 (v. 3).—M. F. Robinson, *The End of the Middle Ages*, pp. 340-367.

A. D. 1409.—The Council of Pisa. See
PAPACY: A. D. 1377-1417.

A. D. 1412-1447.—Renewed civil war in Naples.—Defeat of the Angevins by Alfonso of Aragon and Sicily.—Reconquest of Lom-

hardy by Filippo Maria Visconti, and his wars with Florence, Venice and Naples.—On the death of Ladislaus, king of Naples (1414), "his sister, Joan II., widow of the son of the duke of Austria, succeeded him. She was 40 years of age; and, like her brother, abandoned to the most unrestrained libertinism. She left the government of her kingdom to her lovers, who disputed power by arms: they called into her service, or into that of her second husband, or of the rival princes whom she in turn adopted, the two armies of Sforza and Braccio [the two great mercenary captains of that time]. The consequence was the ruin of the kingdom of Naples; which ceased to menace the rest of Italy. The moment Ladislaus disappeared, a new enemy arose to disturb the Florentines—Filippo Maria Visconti [duke of Milan, second son of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, and successor to his elder brother Gian Maria, on the assassination of the latter, in 1412]. . . . Filippo . . . married the widow of Facino Cane, the powerful condottiere who had retained Gian Maria in his dependence, and who died the same day that Gian Maria was assassinated. By this sudden marriage he secured the army of Facino Cane,—which was, in fact, master of the greater part of the Milanese: with its aid he undertook, without delay, to recover the rest of his states from the hands of those tyrants who had divided amongst them the dominions of his father. . . . During the first year of his reign, which was to decide his existence as prince or subject, he fought with determined courage; but from that time, though he continually made war, he never showed himself to his armies. . . . In the battle of Monza, by which he acquired his brother's inheritance, and the only battle in which he was ever present, he remarked the brilliant courage of Francesco Carmagnola, a Piedmontese soldier of fortune, and immediately gave him a command. Carmagnola soon justified the duke's choice by the most distinguished talents for war, the most brilliant victories, and the most noble character. Francesco Carmagnola was, after a few years, placed at the head of the duke's armies; and, from the year 1412 to that of 1422, successively attacked all the tyrants who had divided the heritage of Gian Galeazzo, and brought those small states again under the dominion of the duke of Milan. Even the republic of Genoa submitted to him, in 1421, on the same conditions as those on which it had before submitted to the king of France,—reserving all its liberties; and granting the duke's lieutenant, who was Carmagnola himself, only those prerogatives which the constitution yielded to the doge. As soon as Filippo Maria had accomplished the conquest of Lombardy, he resumed the projects of his father against Romagna and Tuscany. He . . . renewed his intrigues against the republic of Florence, and combined them with those which he at the same time carried on in the kingdom of Naples. Joan, who had sent back to France her second husband, Jaques, count de la Marche, and who had no children, was persuaded, in 1420, by one of her lovers, to adopt Alphonso the Magnanimous, king of Aragon and Sicily, to whom she intrusted some of the fortresses of Naples. She revoked this adoption in 1423; and substituted in his place Louis III. of Anjou, son of Louis II. The former put himself at the head of the ancient party of Durazzo; the latter, of that of Anjou.

The consequence was a civil war, in which the two great captains, Sforza and Braccio, were opposed to each other, and acquired new titles to glory. The duke of Milan made alliance with Joan II. and Louis III. of Anjou: Sforza, named great constable of the kingdom, was their general. The Florentines remained constant to Braccio, whom Alphonso had made governor of the Abruzzi; and who had seized, at the same time, the signoria of Perugia, his native city. . . . But Sforza and Braccio both perished, as Italy awaited with anxiety the result of the struggle about to be commenced. Sforza was drowned at the passage of the Pescara, on the 4th of January, 1424; Braccio was mortally wounded at the battle of Aquila, on the 2d of June of the same year. Francesco, son of the former, succeeded to his father's name and the command of his army, both of which he was destined to render still more illustrious. The son of Braccio, on the contrary, lost the sovereignty of Perugia, which resumed its freedom on the 29th of July of the same year; and the remnant of the army formed by this great captain elected for his chief his most able lieutenant, Nicolo Piccinino. This was the moment which Filippo Maria chose to push on his army to Romagna, and vigorously attack the Florentines. . . . The Florentines, having no tried general at the head of their troops, experienced, from the 6th of September, 1428, to the 17th of October, 1425, no less than six successive defeats, either in Liguria or Romagna [at Forlì, 1423, Zagonara, 1424, Lamone, Rapallo, Angliari and Faggiola, 1425]. Undismayed by defeat, they reassembled their army for the seventh time: the patriotism of their rich merchants made up for the penury of their exhausted treasury. They, at the same time, sent their most distinguished statesmen as ambassadors to Venice, to represent to that republic that, if it did not join them while they still stood, the liberty of Italy was lost forever. . . . An illustrious fugitive, Francesco Carmagnola, who arrived about this time at Venice, accomplished what Florence had nearly failed in, by discovering to the Venetians the project of the duke of Milan to subjugate them." Carmagnola had been disgraced and discharged from employment by Filippo Maria, whose jealousy was alarmed by his great reputation, and he now took service against his late patron. "A league, formed between Florence and Venice, was successively joined by the marquis of Ferrara, the lord of Mantua, the Siennese, the duke Amadeus VIII. of Savoy, and the king Alphonso of Naples, who jointly declared war against Filippo Maria Visconti, on the 27th of January, 1426. . . . The good fortune of Carmagnola in war still attended him in the campaign of 1426. He was as successful against the duke of Milan as he had been for him: he took from him the city and whole province of Brescia. The duke ceded this conquest to the Venetians by treaty on the 30th of December, but he employed the winter in assembling his forces; and in the beginning of spring renewed the war." An indecisive engagement occurred at Casalesecco, July 12, 1427, and on the 11th of October following, in a marsh near Macalo, Carmagnola completely defeated the Milanese army commanded by Carlo Malatesta. A new peace was signed on the 18th of April, 1428; but war recommenced in the latter part of 1429. Fortune now abandoned Car-

magnola. He suffered a surprise and defeat at Soncino, May 17, 1431, and the suspicious senate of Venice caused him to be arrested, tortured and put to death. "During the remainder of the reign of Filippo Maria he was habitually at war with the two republics of Venice and Florence. He . . . almost always lost ground by his distrust of his own generals, his versatility, his taste for contradictory intrigues, his eagerness to sign peace every year, and to recommence hostilities a few weeks afterwards." In 1441, on making peace with the two republics, he granted his daughter Bianca in marriage to their general, Francesco Sforza, with two lordships for her dowry. But he was soon intriguing against his son in law, soon at war again with Florence and Venice, and Sforza was again in the service of the latter. But in 1447 he made offers of reconciliation which were accepted, and Sforza was on his way to Milan when news came to him of the death of the duke, which occurred August 18. "The war of Lombardy was complicated by its connexion with another war which at the same time ravaged the kingdom of Naples. The queen, Joan II., had died there, on the 2d of February, 1435; three months after the death of her adopted son, Louis III. of Anjou: by her will she had substituted for that prince his brother René, duke of Lorraine. But Alphonso, king of Aragon and Sicily, whom she had primarily adopted, . . . claimed the succession, on the ground of this first adoption, as well as of the ancient rights of Manfred, to whom he had succeeded in the female line. The kingdom of Naples was divided between the parties of Aragon and Anjou. The Genoese, who had voluntarily ranged themselves under the protection of the duke of Milan, offered their assistance to the duke of Anjou. . . . On the 5th of August, 1435, their fleet met that of Alphonso, before the island of Ponza. They defeated it in a great battle, in which Alphonso had been made prisoner." Delivered to the duke of Milan, Alphonso soon convinced the latter that his alliance with the French interest at Naples was a mistake and a danger to him, and was set at liberty, with promises of aid. The Genoese were indignant at this and drove the Milanese garrison from their city, in December, 1435, recovering their freedom. "Alphonso, seconded by the duke of Milan, recommenced the war against René of Anjou with greater advantage. On the 2d of June, 1442, he took from him the city of Naples; from that time peace was re-established in that kingdom, and Alphonso . . . established himself amidst a people which he had conquered, but whose hearts he gained; and returned no more either to Sicily or Aragon. He died at Naples, on the 27th of June, 1458."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Italian Republics*, ch. 9-10.

ALSO IN: W. P. Urquhart, *Life and Times of Francesco Sforza*, bk. 3-4 (v. 1).—H. E. Napier, *Florentine Hist.*, bk. 1, ch. 29-32, and bk. 2, ch. 1 (v. 3).—Mrs. Jameson, *Memoirs of Celebrated Female Sovereigns*, v. 1, ch. 5.—M. A. Hookham, *Life and Times of Margaret of Anjou*, v. 1, introd. and ch. 1.

A. D. 1433-1464.—The ascendancy of Cosimo de' Medici at Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1433-1464.

A. D. 1447-1454.—End of the Visconti in the duchy of Milan.—Disputed succession.—Francesco Sforza in possession.—War of

Venice, Naples and other states against Milan and Florence. See MILAN: A. D. 1447-1454.

A. D. 1447-1480.—The Pontificate of Nicolas V.—Regeneration of the Papacy.—Revival of letters and art.—Threatening advance of the Turks.—Fresh troubles in Naples.—Expulsion of the French from Genoa.—“The failure of the Council of Basel [see PAPACY: A. D. 1431-1448] restored the position of the Papacy, and set it free from control. The character and ability of Pope Nicolas [V., 1447-1455] made him respected, and the part which he took in politics made him rank amongst the great temporal powers in Italy. From this time onwards to the end of our history we shall see the Popes the undisputed Princes of Rome, and the lords of all that part of Italy which they claimed from the gift of Kings and Emperors, and not least from the will of the Countess Matilda. Pope Nicolas used this power better than any of those who came after him, for he used it in the cause of peace, and to forward learning and artistic taste. He applied himself to the general pacification of Italy, and brought about the Peace of Lodi in 1454, which was signed by Venice and Milan and by King Alfonso. Christendom had great need of peace, for, in 1453, Constantinople had been taken by the Infidels and Mahomet the Second was spreading his conquest over the East of Europe. Before the fall of the city a great many Greeks had come to Italy, on different missions, and especially to attend a Council at Florence, where terms of union were made between the Greek and Latin Churches. Their coming revived the taste for Greek learning, which had been so powerfully felt by Petrarca and Boccaccio. Pope Nicolas made Rome the centre of this literature, and others followed his example. Theodore of Gaza, George of Trebizond, and many more, found enlightened patrons in the Pope, the King of Naples, Cosmo de' Medici, and Federigo, Count of Urbino. The Pope was a lover and patron of art as well as of literature. He rebuilt the churches, palaces, and fortifications of Rome and the Roman States, and formed the scheme of raising a church worthy of the memory of St. Peter, and left behind him the Vatican Palace as a worthy residence for the Apostle's successors. The Papal Library had been scattered during the Captivity and the Schism, but Pope Nicolas made a large collection of manuscripts, and thus founded the Library of the Vatican. The introduction of printing into Italy about this time gave great strength to the revival of learning. In 1452 the Pope crowned Frederic the Third Emperor at Rome with great magnificence. But he was not without danger in his city, for the next year a wild plot was made against him. A large number of Romans were displeased at the great power of the Pope. They were headed by Stefano Porcario, who declared that he would free the city which had once been mistress of the world from the yoke of priests. The rising was to be ushered in by the slaughter of the Papal Court and the plunder of its treasures. The plot was discovered, and was punished with great severity. This was the last and most unworthy of the various attempts of the Romans to set up self-government. The advance of the Ottoman Turks during the latter part of the 15th century [see TURKS: A. D. 1451-1481] caused the greatest

alarm in Italy. Venice, from her possessions and her trade in the Levant, was most exposed to the attacks of the Infidels, and she became the great champion against them. The learned Aeneas Sylvius was chosen Pope, in 1458, and took the title of Pius the Second. He caused a crusade to be preached against the Turks, but he died in 1464, while the forces were gathering. The Venetians were constantly defeated in the Archipelago, and lost Eubura, Lesbos, and other islands [see GREECE: A. D. 1454-1479]. In 1477 a large Turkish army entered Italy by Friuli, defeated the Venetians, and crossed the Tagliamento. They laid waste the country as far as the Piave, and their destroying fires could be seen from the Campanile of St. Mark's. In 1480 Mahomet's great general, Ahmed Keduk, took the strong city of Otranto, and massacred its inhabitants. This expedition was secretly favoured by the Venetians to spite the King of Naples. The danger to all Italy was very great, for the Sultan eagerly longed to conquer the older Rome, but the death of Mahomet the Second, and a disputed succession to his throne, fortunately checked the further advance of the invaders. When Alfonso, King of Aragon, Naples, and Sicily, died in 1458, he left Aragon and Sicily, which he had inherited, to his legitimate son John; but the crown of Naples, which he had won for himself, he left to Ferdinand, his illegitimate son. Ferdinand was a cruel and suspicious man, and the barons invited John of Calabria to come and help them against him. John of Calabria was the son of René, who had been adopted by Queen Joanna, and who called himself King. He was the French Governor of Genoa, and so already had a footing in Italy. He applied to Sforza to help him, but the Duke of Milan was firmly attached to the Peace of Lodi, and was too justly fearful of the French power to do so. Lewis the Eleventh, King of France, was too wise to meddle in Italian politics. Florence, which was usually on the French side, was now under the influence of Cosmo de' Medici, and Cosmo was under the influence of Francesco Sforza, so that the Duke of Calabria found no allies. The Archbishop of Genoa, Paola Fregoso, excited the people to drive out the French [see GENOA: A. D. 1458-1464] and the Doge Prospero Adorno, who belonged to their party. He then defeated King René, and the Duke of Calabria was forced to give up his attempt on Naples [1464]. The new government of Genoa was so oppressive that the Genoese put themselves under the protection of Francesco; Lewis the Eleventh ceded all his rights to him, and the city thus became part of the Duchy of Milan. The hopes of the French party in Italy were thus for the present entirely crushed.”—W. Hunt, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy*, bk. 4, ch. 3-4 (v. 2).—W. P. Urquhart, *Life and Times of Francesco Sforza*, bk. 7 (v. 2).—L. Pastor, *Hist. of the Popes*, v. 2.

A. D. 1466-1469.—Florence under the five agents of Piero de' Medici. See FLORENCE: 1458-1469.

A. D. 1469-1492.—The government of Lorenzo de' Medici, the Magnificent, at Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1469-1492.

A. D. 1490-1498.—Savonarola at Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1490-1498.

A. D. 1492-1494.—Charles VIII. of France invited across the Alps to possess Naples.—

The hostile disunion of the Italian states.—With the death of Lorenzo de Medici, which occurred at Florence in the spring of 1492, "the power vanished which had hitherto kept Naples and Milan quiet, and which, with subtle diplomatic skill, had postponed the breach of the peace in Italy. We find the comparison used, that Florence with Lorenzo at her head stood like a rocky dam between two stormy seas. Italy was at that time a free land and independent of foreign policy. Venice, with her well-established nobles at her head; Naples under the Aragonese, a branch of the family ruling in Spain; Milan, with Genoa, under Sforza — all three able powers by land and sea — counterbalanced each other. Lorenzo ruled central Italy; the small lords of the Romagna were in his pay, and the pope was on the best terms of relationship with him. But in Milan the mischief lay hidden. Ludovico Sforza, the guardian of his nephew Gian Galeazzo, had completely usurped the power. He allowed his ward to pine away mentally and bodily; he was bringing the young prince slowly to death. But his consort, a Neapolitan princess, saw through the treachery, and urged her father to change by force their insufferable position. Sforza could not alone have resisted Naples. No dependence was to be placed on the friendship of Venice; Lorenzo mediated as long as he lived, but now, on his death, Naples was no longer to be restrained. The first thing that happened was [Piero de Medici's] alliance with this power, and at the same time Ludovico's appeal for help to France, where a young and ambitious king had ascended the throne. The death of Innocent VIII., and the election of Alexander Borgia to the papacy, completed the confusion which was impending. Long diplomatic campaigns took place before war actually broke out. The matter in question was not the interests of nations — of this there was no thought — nor even the caprices of princes alone. The nobles of Italy took a passionate concern in these disputes. The contests of corresponding intrigues were fought out at the French court. France had been robbed of Naples by the Aragonese. The exiled Neapolitan barons, French in their interests, whose possessions the Aragonese had given to their own adherents, ardently seized the idea of returning victoriously to their country; the cardinals, hostile to Borgia — foremost among these stood the Cardinal of San Piero in Vincula, a nephew of the old Sixtus, and the Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, Ludovico's brother — urged for war against Alexander VI.; the Florentine nobles, anticipating Piero's violent measures, hoped for deliverance through the French, and advocated the matter at Lyons, where the court was stationed, and a whole colony of Florentine families had in time settled. Sforza held out the bait of glory and his just claims to the old legitimate possession. The Aragonese, on the other hand, proposed an accommodation. Spain, who would not forsake her belongings, stood at their side; the pope and Piero dei Medici adhered to Naples, and the French nobility were not in favour of an expedition to Italy. Venice remained neutral; still she might gain by the war, and she did not dissuade from it; and this opinion, that something was to be gained, gradually took possession of all parties, even of those who had at first wished to preserve peace. Spain was a direct gainer from the first. France ceded to King

Ferdinand a disputed province, on the condition that he would afford no support to his Neapolitan cousins. Sforza, as lord of Genoa, wished to have Lucca and Pisa again, with all that belonged to them; the Visconti had possessed them of old, and he raised their claims afresh. We have said what were the hopes of Piero dei Medici [that he should be able to make himself Duke of Florence]. Pisa hoped to become free. The pope hoped by his alliance with Naples to make the first step towards the attainment of the great plans which he cherished for himself and his sons; he thought one day of dividing Italy among them. The French hoped to conquer Naples, and then to drive away the Turks in a vast crusade. As if for a crusade, the king raised the loan in his own country, which he required for the campaign. The Venetians hoped to bring the coast cities of the Adriatic Sea as much as possible under their authority. In the autumn of 1494, Charles of France placed himself at the head of his knights and mercenary troops, and crossed the Alps; whilst his fleet and artillery, the most fearful weapon of the French, went by sea from Marseilles to Genoa." — H. Grimm, *Life of Michael Angelo*, ch. 3, sect. 2 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 8, ch. 5.

A. D. 1492-1503.—**The Papacy in the hands of the Borgias.** See PAPACY: A. D. 1471-1513.

A. D. 1494-1496.—**The invasion by Charles VIII.**—His triumphant march, his easy conquest of Naples, and the speedy retreat.—**Effects of the expedition on France and Europe.**—"On the 1st of March [1494] Charles VIII. made his state entry into Lyons, to assume the command of the expedition; an advanced guard under the Scotchman d'Aubigny was already pushing towards the Neapolitan frontier, and the Duke of Orleans was at Genoa. The Neapolitans on their side sent the Prince of Altamura with 30 galleys towards Genoa, while the Duke of Calabria, an inexperienced youth, entered the Pontifical States, under the guidance of tried generals. . . . The Pope seemed to have lost his head, and no longer knew what course to adopt. . . . Charles the VIII., having passed the Monginevra, entered Asti in the first days of September. He soon received intelligence that Don Federico and the Neapolitan fleet had been repulsed with heavy losses before Porto Venere, and that the Duke of Orleans and his Swiss had entered Rapallo, sacked the place, and put all the inhabitants, even the sick in the hospital, to the sword, thereby striking terror into the Italians, who were unaccustomed to carry on war in so sanguinary a fashion. On reaching Piacenza, the king learnt that Gio Galeazzo, whom he had recently seen at Pavia, had just died there, poisoned, as all men said, by the Moor [Lodovico, the usurping uncle of Gio. Galeazzo the young Duke of Milan, was so called], who, after celebrating his obsequies at Milan, had entered St. Ambrogio, at the hour indicated by his astrologer, to consecrate the investiture already granted to him by Maximilian, King of the Romans. All this filled the minds of the French with suspicion, almost with terror; they were beginning to understand the nature of their closest ally's good faith. In fact, while Ludovico with one hand collected men and money for their cause, with the other he wove the threads

of a league intended to drive them from Italy, when the moment should arrive. . . . Nevertheless the fortunes of the French prospered rapidly. The Duke of Calabria, having entered Romagna, withdrew across the Neapolitan frontier at the first glimpse of D'Aubigny's forces; and the bulk of the French army, commanded by the King in person, marched through the Lunigiana without encountering obstacles of any kind. After taking Fivizzano, sacking it, and putting to the sword the hundred soldiers who defended it, and part of the inhabitants, they pushed on towards Sarzana, through a barren district, between the mountains and the sea, where the slightest resistance might have proved fatal to them. But the small castles, intended for the defence of these valleys, yielded one after the other, without any attempt to resist the invaders. and hardly had the siege of Sarzana commenced than Piero del Medici arrived, frightened out of his senses, surrendered at discretion, and even promised to pay 200,000 ducats. But on Piero's return to Florence, on the 8th of November, he found that the city had risen in revolt, and sent ambassadors to the French King on its own account to offer him an honourable reception; but that at the same time it was making preparations for defence in case of need [see FLORENCE: A. D. 1490-1498]. So great was the public indignation that Piero took flight to Venice, where his own ambassador, Soderini, hardly deigned to look at him, having meanwhile declared for the republican government just proclaimed in Florence, where everything had been rapidly changed. The houses of the Medici and their garden at St. Mark had been pillaged, exiles had been recalled and acquitted; a price put on Piero's head and that of his brother, the Cardinal. . . . The fabric, so long and so carefully built up by the Medici, was now suddenly crumbling into dust. On the 17th November Charles VIII., at the head of his formidable army, rode into Florence with his lance in rest, believing that that fact sufficed to make him master of the city. But the Florentines were armed, they had collected 6,000 soldiers within the walls, and they knew perfectly well that, from the vantage posts of towers and houses, they could easily worst an army scattered through the streets. They therefore repulsed the King's insolent proposals, and when he threatened to sound his trumpets, Piero Capponi, tearing up the offered treaty, replied that the Florentines were more ready to ring their bells. Through this firmness equitable terms were arranged. The Republic was to pay 120,000 florins in three quotas; the fortresses, however, were to be speedily restored to her. On the 28th November the French left the city, but not without stealing all that remained of the collection of antiquities in the Medici Palace. . . . Nevertheless the citizens were thankful to be finally delivered alike from old tyrants and new invaders. Having reached Rome, Charles VIII., in order to have done with the Pope, who now seemed inclined for resistance, pointed his guns against the Castle of St. Angelo, and thus matters were soon settled. . . . Scarcely encountering any obstacles, Charles led his army on to Naples." Ferdinand I., or Ferrante, had died on the 25th of January, 1494, and had been succeeded by his son Alfonso II., a prince more cruel and more hated than himself. The latter now renounced the throne in favor of his son,

Ferdinand II., and fled to Sicily. "Ferdinand II., or Ferrandino, as he was called, after vainly seeking aid from all, even from the Turk, made a fruitless stand at Monte San Giovanni, which was taken, destroyed, and all its population put to the sword. . . . Naples rebelled in favour of the French, who marched in on the 22d of February [1495]. The following day Ferrandino fled to Ischia, then to Messina. And shortly the ambassadors of the Italian States appeared to offer congratulations to the conqueror. Now at last the Venetians were aroused, and having sent their envoys to Milan to know if Ludovico were disposed to take up arms to drive out the French, they found him not only ready to do so, but full of indignation. . . . He advised that money should be sent to Spain and to Maximilian, to induce them to attack France; but added that care must be taken not to call them into Italy, 'since having already one fever here, we should then have two.' A league was in fact concluded between the Venetians, Ludovico, the Pope, Spain and Maximilian. . . . The Neapolitans, soon wearied of bad government, had risen in revolt, and Charles VIII. after a stay of only 50 days in Naples had to make his departure with excessive haste, before every avenue of retreat should be cut off, leaving hardly more than 6,000 men in the kingdom, and taking with him a numerous army, which however only numbered 10,000 real combatants. On the 6th of July a pitched battle took place at Fornuovo near the river Taro. The allies had assembled about 30,000 men, three-fourths of whom were Venetians, the rest composed of Ludovico's soldiers and a few Germans sent by Maximilian. . . . The battle was bloody, and it was a disputed question which side obtained the victory; but although the Italians were not repulsed, remaining indeed masters of the field, the French succeeded in cutting their way through, which was the chief object they had in view. . . . Ludovico, taking advantage of the situation, soon made an agreement with the French on his own account, without concerning himself about the Venetians. . . . The fortunes of the French now declined rapidly in Italy, and all the more speedily owing to their bad government in the Neapolitan kingdom, and their abominable behaviour towards the few friends who had remained faithful to them. . . . Ferdinand II., with the aid of the Spaniards under Consalvo di Cordova, advanced triumphantly through Calabria and entered Naples on the 7th of July, 1496. In a short time all the Neapolitan fortresses capitulated, and the French who had held them returned to their own country, more than decimated and in an altogether deplorable condition. On the 6th of October Ferdinand II. breathed his last, worn out by the agitation and fatigues of the war, and was succeeded by his uncle Don Federico, the fifth King [counting Charles VIII. of France] who had ascended the Neapolitan throne within the last five years. . . . Naples was now in the absolute power of the Spaniards, who were already maturing their iniquitous designs upon the kingdom; these, however, were only discovered at a later period."—P. Villari, *Machiavelli and his Times*, v. 1, ch. 4, sect. 2.—"In spite of its transitory character the invasion of Charles VIII. . . . was a great fact in the history of the Renaissance. It was, to use the pregnant phrase of Michelet, no less than the

revelation of Italy to the nations of the North. Like a gale sweeping across a forest of trees in blossom, and bearing their fertilizing pollen, after it has broken and deflowered their branches, to far distant trees that hitherto have bloomed in barrenness, the storm of Charles's army carried far and wide through Europe thought-dust, imperceptible, but potent to enrich the nations. The French, alone, says Michelet, understood Italy. . . . From the Italians the French communicated to the rest of Europe what we call the movement of the Renaissance. There is some truth in this panegyric of Michelet's. The passage of the army of Charles VIII. marks a turning point in modern history, and from this epoch dates the diffusion of a spirit of culture over Europe."—J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: The Age of the Despots*, ch. 9.

ALSO IN: P. Villari, *Hist. of Savonarola and his Times*, bk. 2, ch. 1-3 (v. 1).—J. Dennistoun, *Memoirs of the Dukes of Urbino*, ch. 14-15 (v. 1).—P. de Commynes, *Memoirs*, bk. 7-8.—L. von Ranke, *Hist. of the Latin and Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514*, bk. 1, ch. 1.—See, also, FRANCE: A. D. 1492-1515.

A. D. 1494-1503.—The growing power of Venice and the jealousies excited by it. See VENICE: A. D. 1494-1503.

A. D. 1494-1509.—The French deliverance of Pisa.—The long struggle and the Florentine reconquest. See PISA: A. D. 1494-1509.

A. D. 1499-1500.—Invasion and conquest of the Milanese by Louis XII. of France.—His claim in right of Valentine Visconti.—Charles VIII. died in April, 1498, and was succeeded by Louis of Orleans, who ascended the throne as Louis XII. On his coronation, Louis XII. "assumed, besides his title of King of France, the titles of King of Naples and of Jerusalem, and Duke of Milan. This was as much as to say that he would pursue . . . a warlike and adventurous policy abroad. . . . By his policy at home Louis XII. deserved and obtained the name of 'Father of the People;' by his enterprises and wars abroad he involved France still more deeply than Charles VIII. had in that mad course of distant, reckless, and incoherent conquests for which his successor, Francis I., was destined to pay by capture at Pavia and by the lamentable treaty of Madrid, in 1526, as the price of his release. . . . Outside of France, Milaness (the Milanese district) was Louis XII.'s first thought, at his accession, and the first object of his desire. He looked upon it as his patrimony. His grandmother, Valentine Visconti, widow of that Duke of Orleans who had been assassinated at Paris in 1407 by order of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, had been the last to inherit the duchy of Milan, which the Sforzas, in 1450, had seized. When Charles VIII. invaded Italy in 1494, 'Now is the time,' said Louis, 'to enforce the rights of Valentine Visconti, my grandmother, to Milaness.' And he, in fact, asserted them openly, and proclaimed his intention of vindicating them so soon as he found the moment propitious. When he became king, his chance of success was great. The Duke of Milan, Ludovic, the Moor, had by his sagacity and fertile mind, by his taste for arts and sciences and the intelligent patronage he bestowed upon them, by his ability in speaking, and by his facile character, obtained in Italy a position far beyond his real power. . . . Ludovic was, nevertheless, a

turbulent rascal and a greedy tyrant. . . . He had, moreover, embroiled himself with his neighbours, the Venetians, who were watching for an opportunity of aggrandizing themselves at his expense." Louis XII. promptly concluded a treaty with Venice, which provided for the making of war in common upon the Duke of Milan, to recover the patrimony of the king—the Venetians to receive Cremona and certain forts and territory adjacent as their share of the expected spoils. "In the month of August, 1499, the French army, with a strength of from 20,000 to 25,000 men, of whom 5,000 were Swiss, invaded Milaness. Duke Ludovic Sforza opposed to it a force pretty near equal in number, but far less full of confidence and of far less valour. In less than three weeks the duchy was conquered; in only two cases was any assault necessary; all the other places were given up by traitors or surrendered without a show of resistance. The Venetians had the same success on the eastern frontier of the duchy. . . . Louis was at Lyons when he heard of his army's victory in Milaness and of Ludovic Sforza's flight. He was eager to go and take possession of his conquest, and, on the 6th of October, 1499, he made his triumphal entry into Milan amidst cries of 'Hurrah! for France.' He reduced the heavy imposts established by the Sforzas, revoked the veratious game-laws, instituted at Milan a court of justice analogous to the French parliaments, loaded with favours the scholars and artists who were the honour of Lombardy, and recrossed the Alps at the end of some weeks, leaving as governor of Milaness John James Trivulzio, the valiant Condottiere, who, four years before, had quitted the service of Ferdinand II., King of Naples, for that of Charles VIII. Unfortunately Trivulzio was himself a Milanese and of the faction of the Guelphs. He had the passions of a partisan and the habits of a man of war; and he soon became as tyrannical and as much detested in Milaness as Ludovic the Moor had but lately been. A plot was formed in favour of the fallen tyrant, who was in Germany expecting it, and was recruiting, during expectancy, amongst the Germans and Swiss, in order to take advantage of it. On the 25th of January, 1500, the insurrection broke out; and two months later Ludovic Sforza had once more become master of Milaness, where the French possessed nothing but the castle of Milan. . . . Louis XII., so soon as he heard of the Milanese insurrection, sent into Italy Louis de la Trémoille, the best of his captains, and the Cardinal d'Amboise, his privy councillor and his friend. . . . The campaign did not last long. The Swiss who had been recruited by Ludovic and those who were in Louis XII.'s service had no mind to fight one another; and the former capitulated, surrendered the strong place of Novara, and promised to evacuate the country on condition of a safe-conduct for themselves and their booty." Ludovic attempted flight in disguise, but fell into the hands of the French and remained in captivity, at the castle of Loches, in Touraine, during the remainder of his life—eight years. "And 'thus was the duchy of Milan, within seven months and a half, twice conquered by the French,' says John d'Auton in his 'Chronique,' 'and for the nonce was ended the war in Lombardy, and the authors thereof were captives and exiles.'"—F. P. Guizot, *Popular Hist. of France*, ch. 27.

ALSO IN: A. M. F. Robinson, *The End of the Middle Ages: Valentine Visconti; The French claim to Milan.*—E. Walford, *Story of the Chevalier Bayard*, ch. 3-4.

15-16th Centuries.—Renaissance.—Intellectual advance and moral decline.—"At the end of the fifteenth century, Italy was the centre of European civilization: while the other nations were still plunged in a feudal barbarism which seems almost as far removed from all our sympathies as is the condition of some American or Polynesian savages, the Italians appear to us as possessing habits of thought, a mode of life, political, social, and literary institutions, not unlike those of to-day; as men whom we can thoroughly understand, whose ideas and aims, whose general views, resemble our own in that main, indefinable characteristic of being modern. They had shaken off the morbid monastic ways of feeling, they had thrown aside the crooked scholastic modes of thinking, they had trampled under foot the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages; no symbolical mists made them see things vague, strange, and distorted; their intellectual atmosphere was as clear as our own, and, if they saw less than we do, what they did see appeared to them in its true shape and proportions. Almost for the first time since the ruin of antique civilization, they could show well-organized, well-defined States; artistically disciplined armies; rationally devised laws; scientifically conducted agriculture; and widely extended, intelligently undertaken commerce. For the first time, also, they showed regularly built, healthy, and commodious towns; well-drained fields; and, more important than all, hundreds of miles of country owned not by feudal lords, but by citizens; cultivated not by serfs, but by free peasants. While in the rest of Europe men were floundering among the stagnant ideas and crumbling institutions of the effete Middle Ages, with but a vague half-consciousness of their own nature, the Italians walked calmly through a life as well arranged as their great towns, bold, inquisitive, and sceptical: modern administrators, modern soldiers, modern politicians, modern financiers, scholars, and thinkers. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, Italy seemed to have obtained the philosophic, literary, and artistic inheritance of Greece; the administrative, legal, and military inheritance of Rome, increased threefold by her own strong, original, essentially modern activities. Yet, at that very time, and almost in proportion as all these advantages developed, the moral vitality of the Italians was rapidly decreasing, and a horrible moral gangrene beginning to spread: liberty was extinguished; public good faith seemed to be dying out; even private morality flickered ominously; every free State became subject to a despot, always unscrupulous and often infamous; warfare became a mere pretext for the rapine and extortions of mercenaries; diplomacy grew to be a mere swindle; the humanists inoculated literature with the filthiest refuse cast up by antiquity; nay, even civic and family ties were loosened; assassinations and fratricides began to abound, and all law, human and divine, to be set at defiance. . . . The men of the Renaissance had to pay a heavy price for . . . intellectual freedom and self-cognizance, which they not only enjoyed themselves, but transmitted to the rest of the world; the price was the loss of all moral standard, of all fixed

public feeling. They had thrown aside all accepted rules and criteria, they had cast away all faith in traditional institutions, they had destroyed and could not yet rebuild. In their instinctive and universal disbelief in all that had been taught them, they lost all respect for opinion, for rule, for what had been called right and wrong. Could it be otherwise? Had they not discovered that what had been called right had often been unnatural, and what had been called wrong often natural? Moral teachings, remonstrances, and judgments belonged to that dogmatism from which they had broken loose; to those schools and churches where the foolish and the unnatural had been taught and worshiped; to those priests and monks who themselves most shamefully violated their teachings. To profess morality was to be a hypocrite; to reprobate others was to be narrow-minded. There was so much error mixed up with truth that truth had to share the discredit of error."—Vernon Lee, *Euphorion*, v. 1, pp. 27-29, 47-48.—"The conditions under which the Italians performed their task in the Renaissance were such as seem at first sight unfavourable to any great achievement. Yet it is probable that, the end in view being the stimulation of mental activity, no better circumstances than they enjoyed could have been provided. Owing to a series of adverse accidents, and owing also to their own instinctive preference for local institutions, they failed to attain the coherence and the centralised organisation which are necessary to a nation as we understand that word. Their dismemberment among rival communities proved a fatal source of political and military weakness, but it developed all their intellectual energies by competition to the utmost. At the middle of the fifteenth century their communes had lost political liberty, and were ruled by despots. Martial spirit declined. Wars were carried on by mercenaries; and the people found itself in a state of practical disarmament, when the neighboring nations quarrelled for the prize of those rich provinces. At the same time society underwent a rapid moral deterioration. When Machiavelli called Italy 'the corruption of the world,' he did not speak rhetorically. An impure and worldly clergy; an irreligious, though superstitious, laity; a self-indulgent and materialistic middle class; an idle aristocracy, excluded from politics and unused to arms; a public given up to pleasure and money-getting; a multitude of scholars, devoted to trifles, and vitiated by studies which clashed with the ideals of Christianity—from such elements in the nation proceeded a widely-spread and ever-increasing degeneracy. Public energy, exhausted by the civil wars and debilitated by the arts of the tyrants, sank deep and deeper into the lassitude of acquiescent lethargy. Religion expired in laughter, irony and licence. Domestic simplicity yielded to vice, whereof the records are precise and unmistakable. The virile virtues disappeared. What survived of courage assumed the forms of ruffianism, ferocity and treasonable daring. Still, simultaneously with this decline in all the moral qualities which constitute a powerful people, the Italians brought their arts and some departments of their literature to a perfection that can only be paralleled by ancient Greece. The anomaly implied in this statement is striking; but it is revealed to us by evidence too overwhelming to be rejected. . . . It was through

art that the creative instincts of the people found their true and adequate channel of expression. Paramount over all other manifestations of the epoch, fundamental beneath all, penetrative to the core of all, is the artistic impulse. The slowly self-consolidating life of a great kingdom, concentrating all elements of national existence by the centripetal force of organic unity, was wanting. Commonwealths and despotisms, representing a more imperfect stage of political growth, achieved completion and decayed. But art survived this disintegration of the medieval fabric; and in art the Italians found the cohesion denied them as a nation. While speaking thus of art, it is necessary to give a wide extension to that word. It must be understood to include literature. . . . We are justified in regarding the literary masterpieces of the sixteenth century as the fullest and most representative expression of the Italian temperament at the climax of its growth. The literature of the golden age implies humanism, implies painting. . . . It is not only possible but right to speak of Italy collectively when we review her work in the Renaissance. Yet it should not be forgotten that Italy at this time was a federation, presenting upon a miniature scale the same diversities in her component parts as the nations of Europe do now. . . . At the beginning of such a review, we cannot fail to be struck with the predominance of Florence. The superiority of the Tuscans was threefold. In the first place, they determined the development of art in all its branches. In the second place, they gave a language to Italy, which, without obliterating the local dialects, superseded them in literature when the right moment for intellectual community arrived. That moment, in the third place, was rendered possible by the humanistic movement, which began at Florence. . . . What the Lombards and Venetians produced in fine art and literature was of a later birth. Yet the novelists of Lombardy, the Latin lyrists of Garda, the school of romantic and dramatic poets at Ferrara, the group of sculptors and painters assembled in Milan by the Sforza dynasty, the maccaronic Muse of Mantua, the unrivalled magnificence of painting at Venice, the transient splendour of the Parmese masters, the wit of Modena, the learning of the princes of Mirandola and Carpi, must be catalogued among the most brilliant and characteristic manifestations of Italian genius. In pure literature Venice contributed but little. . . . Her place, as the home of Aldo's Greek press, and as the refuge for adventurers like Aretino and Folengo, when the rest of Italy was yielding to reactionary despotism, has to be commemorated. . . . The Romans who advanced Italian culture, were singularly few. The work of Rome was done almost exclusively by aliens, drawn for the most part from Tuscany and Lombardy. After Frederick II.'s brilliant reign, the Sicilians shared but little in the intellectual activity of the nation."—J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: Italian Literature*, ch. 17.

A. D. 1501-1504.—Perfidious treaty for the partition of Naples between Louis XII. of France and Ferdinand of Aragon.—Their joint conquest.—Their quarrel and war.—The French expelled.—The Spaniards in possession.—"In the spring of 1501, the French army was ready to pursue its march to Naples. King Frederick, alarmed at the storm which was gath-

ering round his head, had some months before renewed the propositions formerly made by his father Ferdinand to Charles VIII.; namely, to acknowledge himself a feudatory of France, to pay an annual tribute, and to pledge several maritime towns as security for the fulfilment of these conditions. Louis, however, would not hear of these liberal offers, although Ferdinand the Catholic [of Aragon] undertook to guarantee the payment of the tribute proffered by Frederick, and strongly remonstrated against the contemplated expedition of the French King. Ferdinand finding that he could not divert Louis from his project, proposed to him to divide Naples between them, and a partition was arranged by a treaty concluded between the two monarchs at Granada, November 11th, 1500. Naples, the Terra di Lavoro, and the Abruzzi were assigned to Louis, with the title of King of Naples and Jerusalem; while Ferdinand was to have Calabria and Apulia with the title of Duke." This perfidious arrangement was kept secret, of course, from Frederick. "Meanwhile the forces of Ferdinand, under Gonsalvo of Cordova [the 'Great Captain,' as he was styled after his Italian campaign], were admitted as friends into the Neapolitan fortresses, which they afterwards held as enemies. Frederick opened to them without suspicion his ports and towns, and thus became the instrument of his own ruin. The unhappy Frederick had in vain looked around for assistance. He had paid the Emperor Maximilian 40,000 ducats to make a diversion in his favour by attacking Milan, but Maximilian was detached from the Neapolitan alliance by a counter bribe, and consented to prolong the truce with France. Frederick had then had recourse to Sultan Bajazet II., with as little effect; and this application only served to throw an odium on his cause. . . . The French army, which did not exceed 13,000 men, began its march towards Naples about the end of May, 1501, under the command of Stuart d'Aubigny, with Cæsar Borgia [son of Pope Alexander VI.] for his lieutenant. When it arrived before Rome, June 25th, the French and Spanish ambassadors acquainted the Pope with the treaty of Granada, and the contemplated partition of Naples, in which the suzerainty of this kingdom was guaranteed to the Holy See; a communication which Alexander received with more surprise than displeasure, and he proceeded at once to invest the Kings of France and Aragon with the provinces which they respectively claimed. Attacked in front by the French, in the rear by Gonsalvo, Frederick did not venture to take the field. He cantoned his troops in Naples, Aversa, and Capua, of which the last alone made any attempt at defence. It was surprised by the French while in the act of treating for a capitulation (July 24th), and was subjected to the most revolting cruelty; 7,000 of the male inhabitants were massacred in the streets; the women were outraged; and forty of the handsomest reserved for Borgia's harem at Rome; where they were in readiness to amuse the Court at the extraordinary and disgusting fête given at the fourth marriage of Lucretia. Rather than expose his subjects to the horrors of a useless war, Frederick entered into negotiations with d'Aubigny, with the view of surrendering himself to Louis XII. . . . In October, 1501, he sailed for France with a small squadron, which remained to him. In return

for his abandonment of the provinces assigned to the French King, he was invested with the county of Maine, and a life pension of 30,000 ducats, on condition that he should not attempt to quit France; a guard was set over him to enforce the latter proviso, and this excellent prince died in captivity in 1504. Meanwhile Gonsalvo of Cordova was proceeding with the reduction of Calabria and Apulia. . . . The Spaniards entered Taranto March 1st, 1502; the other towns of southern Italy were soon reduced, and the Neapolitan branch of the House of Aragon fell for ever, after reigning 85 years. In the autumn of 1501, Louis had entered into negotiations with the Emperor, in order to obtain formal investiture of the Duchy of Milan. With this view, Louis's daughter Claude, then only two years of age, was affianced to Charles [afterwards the Emperor, Charles V.], grandson of Maximilian, the infant child of the Archduke Philip and Joanna of Aragon. A treaty was subsequently signed at Trent, October 13th, 1501, by Maximilian and the Cardinal d'Amboise, to which the Spanish sovereigns and the Archduke Philip were also parties. By this instrument Louis engaged, in return for the investiture of Milan, to recognise the pretensions of the House of Austria to Hungary and Bohemia, and to second Maximilian in an expedition which he contemplated against the Turks. It was at this conference that those schemes against Venice began to be agitated, which ultimately produced the League of Cambray. The treaty between Louis and Ferdinand for the partition of Naples was so loosely drawn, that it seemed purposely intended to produce the quarrels which occurred." Disputes arose as to the possession of a couple of provinces, and the Spaniards were driven out. "In the course of 1502 the Spaniards were deprived of everything, except Barletta and a few towns on the coast of Bari. It was in the combats round this place that Bayard, by his deeds of courage and generosity, won his reputation as the model of chivalry, and became the idol of the French soldiery." The crafty and unscrupulous king of Aragon now amused Louis with the negotiation of a treaty for the relinquishment of the whole Neapolitan domain to the lately affianced infants, Charles of Austria and Claude of France, while he diligently reinforced the "Great Captain." Then "Gonsalvo suddenly resumed the offensive with extraordinary vigour and rapidity, and within a week two decisive battles were fought"—at Seminara, in Calabria, April 21, 1503, and at Cerignola, near Barletta, April 28. In the last named battle the French army was dispersed and almost destroyed. On the 14th of May, Gonsalvo entered Naples, and by the end of July the French had completely evacuated the Neapolitan territory. The king of France made prompt preparations for vigorous war, not only in Naples but in Spain itself, sending two armies to the Pyrenees and one across the Alps. The campaign of the latter was ruined by Cardinal d'Amboise, who stopped its march near Rome, to support his candidacy for the papal chair, just vacated by the death of Alexander VI. Malaria made havoc in the ranks of the French, and they were badly commanded. They advanced to the seat of war in October, and forced the passage of the Garigliano, November 9. "Here their progress was arrested.

The seasons themselves were hostile to the

French; heavy rains set in with a constancy quite unusual in that climate; and the French soldiers perished by hundreds in the mud and swamps of the Garigliano. The Spanish army, encamped near Sessa, was better supplied and better disciplined; and at length, after two months of inaction, Gonsalvo, having received some reinforcements, assumed the offensive, and in his turn crossed the river. The French, whose quarters were widely dispersed, were not prepared for this attack, and attempted to fall back upon Gaeta; but their retreat soon became a disorderly flight; many threw down their arms without striking a blow; and hence the affair has sometimes been called the rout of the Garigliano [December 29, 1503]. Peter de' Medici, who was following the French army, perished in this retreat. . . . Very few of the French army found their way back to France. Gaeta surrendered at the first summons, January 1st, 1504. This was the most important of all Gonsalvo's victories, as it completed the conquest of Naples. The two attacks on Spain had also miscarried. . . . A truce of five months was concluded, November 15th, which was subsequently converted into a peace of three years."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 1, ch. 5-6 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: L. von Ranke, *Hist. of the Latin and Teutonic Nations*, 1494-1514, bk. 1, ch. 4, and bk. 2, ch. 1.—T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 9, ch. 8-9 (v. 4).—M. J. Quintana, *The Great Captain (Lives of Celebrated Spaniards)*.—G. P. R. James, *Memoirs of Great Commanders*, v. 1: *Gonzalvez de Cordoba*.—L. Larchey, *Hist. of Bayard*, bk. 2.

A. D. 1504-1506.—The Treaties of Blois.—Tortuous diplomacy of Louis XII.—His double renunciation of Naples.—"There was danger [to Louis XII. of France] that the loss of the Milanese should follow that of the kingdom of Naples. Maximilian was already preparing to assert his imperial rights beyond the Alps, and Gonsalvo de Cordova was marching toward the northern part of the peninsula. Louis XII. divided and disarmed his enemies by three treaties, signed at Blois on the same day (1504). By the first Louis and Maximilian agreed to attack Venice, and to divide the spoil; by the second Louis promised the king of the Romans 200,000 francs in return for the investiture of the Milanese; by the third he renounced the kingdom of Naples in favor of Maximilian's grandson Charles, who was to marry Claude, daughter of Louis XII., and receive as her dowry three French provinces,—Burgundy, Brittany, and Blois. A more disastrous agreement could not have been made. Charles was to obtain by inheritance from his father, Philip the Handsome, the Netherlands; from his mother, Castile; from his paternal grandfather, Austria; from his maternal grandfather, Aragon. And now he was assured of Italy, and France was to be dismembered for him. This was virtually giving him the empire of Europe. France protested, and Louis XII. seized the first occasion to respond to her wishes. He found it in 1505, when Ferdinand the Catholic married Germaine de Foix, niece of Louis XII. Louis by treaty made a second cession of his rights over the kingdom of Naples to his niece, thus breaking one of the principal conditions of his treaty with Maximilian. He convoked the States-General at Tours in order openly to break the others (1506). The Assembly

declared that the fundamental law of the state did not permit alienations of the domains of the crown, and besought the king to give his daughter in marriage to his heir presumptive, Francis, Duke of Angoulême, in order to insure the integrity of the territory and the independence of France. Louis XII. found little difficulty in acceding to their request. Maximilian and Ferdinand were at the time unable to protest."—V. Duruy, *Hist. of France*, ch. 38.

A. D. 1508-1509.—The League of Cambrai against Venice.—The continental provinces of the Republic torn away. See VENICE: A. D. 1508-1509.

A. D. 1510-1513.—Dissolution of the League of Cambrai and formation of the Holy League against France.—The French expelled from Milan and all Italy.—Restoration of the Medici.—Recovery of Venetian territories.—As the League of Cambrai began to weaken and fall in pieces, the vigorous republic of Venice "came forth again, retook Padua, and kept it through a long and terrible siege, at last forcing the Emperor to withdraw and send back his French allies. The Venetians recovered Vicenza, and threatened Verona; Maximilian, once more powerless, appealed to France to defend his conquests. Thus things stood [1510] when Julius II. made peace with Venice and began to look round him for allies against Louis XII. He negotiated with the foreign kings; but that was only in order thereby to neutralise their influence, sowing discord among them; it was on the Swiss mercenaries that he really leant. Now that he had gained all he wanted on the northern frontier of the States of the Church, he thought that he might safely undertake the high duty of protecting Italy against the foreigner: he would accomplish what Cæsar Borgia had but dreamed of doing, he would chase the Barbarian from the sacred soil of culture. . . . He 'thanked God,' when he heard of the death of the Cardinal of Amboise, 'that now he was Pope alone!' . . . He at once set himself to secure the Swiss, and found a ready and capable agent in Matthew Schynner, Bishop of Sion in the Valais. . . . Bishop Schynner was rewarded for this traffic with a cardinal's hat. And now, deprived by death of the guiding hand [of Cardinal d'Amboise], Louis XII. began to follow a difficult and dangerous line of policy: he called a National Council at Tours, and laid before it, as a case of conscience, the question whether he might make war on the Pope. The Council at once declared for the King, distinguishing, as well they might under Julius II., between the temporal and the spiritual in the Papacy, and declaring that any papal censure that might be launched would be null and void. Above all, an appeal was made to a General Council. . . . Meanwhile war went on in Italy. A broadly-planned attack on the Milanese, on Genoa, and Ferrara, concerted by Julius II. with the Venetians and Swiss, had come to nothing. Now the warlike pontiff—one knows his grim face from Raphael's picture, and his nervous grasp of the arms of his chair, as though he were about to spring forward into action—took the field in person. At Bologna he fell ill; they thought he would die; and Chaumont of Amboise was marching up with the French at his heels to surround and take him there. But by skilful treating with the French general Julius gained time, till a strong force of

Venetians had entered Bologna. Then the Pope rose from his sick-bed, in the dead of winter, and marched out to besiege Mirandola," 1511, which capitulated. "Bayard soon after attacked him, and all but took him prisoner. A congress at Mantua followed: but the Pope sternly refused to make terms with the French: the war must go on. Then Louis took a dangerous step. He convoked an ecclesiastical council at Pisa, and struck a medal to express his contempt and hatred for Julius II. . . . The Pope had gone back to Rome, and Bologna had opened her gates to the French; the coming council, which should depose Julius, was proclaimed through Northern Italy. But, though the moment seemed favourable, nothing but a real agreement of the European powers could give success to such a step. And how far men were from such an agreement Louis was soon to learn; for Julius, finding that the French did not invade the States of the Church, resumed negotiations with such success that in October 1511 a 'Holy League' was formed between the Pope, Venice, Ferdinand of Aragon, and Henry VIII. of England. Maximilian wavered and doubted; the Swiss were to be had—on payment. At first Louis showed a bold front; in spite of this strange whirl of the wheel of politics from the League of Cambrai to the Holy League, he persevered, giving the command of Milan to his nephew Gaston of Foix, Duke of Nemours, a man of 23 years, the most promising of his younger captains. He relieved Bologna, seized Brescia, and pillaged it [1512]; and then pushed on to attack Ravenna; it is said that the booty of Brescia was so great that the French soldiers, having made their fortunes, deserted in crowds, and left the army much weakened. With this diminished force Gaston found himself caught between the hostile walls of Ravenna, and a relieving force of Spaniards, separated from him only by a canal. The Spaniards, after their usual way of warfare, made an entrenched camp round their position. The French first tried to take the city by assault; but being driven back, determined to attack the Spanish camp." They made the assault [on Easter Day, 1512] and took the camp, with great slaughter; but in his reckless pursuit of the retreating enemy Gaston de Foix was slain. "The death of the young Prince more than balanced the great victory of the day: for with Gaston, as Guicciardini says, perished all the vigour of the French army. . . . Though Ravenna was taken, the French could no longer support themselves. Their communications with Milan were threatened by the Swiss: they left garrisons in the strong places and fell back. The council of Pisa also had to take refuge at Milan. When the Swiss came down from their mountain-passes to restore the Sforza dynasty, the harassed council broke up from Milan, and fled to Lyons; there it lingered a while, but it had become contemptible; anon it vanished into thin air. The Pope retook Bologna, Parma, Piacenza; the Medici returned to Florence [see FLORENCE: A. D. 1502-1569]; Maximilian Sforza was re-established [see MILAN: A. D. 1512], while the Grisons Leagues received the Valteline as their reward: the English annoyed the coast without any decisive result. . . . Ferdinand seized Navarre, which henceforward became Spanish to the Pyrenees. Before winter, not one foot of Italian soil remained to the French. Julius II., the

formidable centre of the Alliance, died at this moment (1518). . . . The allies secured the election of a Medicean Pope, Leo X., a pontiff hostile to France, and certain not to reverse that side of his predecessor's policy. . . . Louis, finding himself menaced on every side, suddenly turned about and offered his friendship to Venice. . . . Natural tendencies overbore all resentments on both sides, and a treaty between them both guaranteed the Milanese to Louis and gave him a strong force of Venetian soldiers. Meanwhile, Ferdinand had come to terms with Maximilian and boyish Henry VIII., who . . . had framed a scheme for the overthrow of France. The French king, instead of staying at home to defend his frontiers, was eager to retake Milan, and to join hands with the Venetians. . . . But the Swiss round Maximilian Sforza defended him without fear or treachery; and catching the French troops under La Trémoille in a wretched position not far from Novara, attacked and utterly defeated them (1518). The French withdrew beyond the Alps; the Venetians were driven off with great loss by the Spaniards, who ravaged their mainland territories down to the water's edge. For the short remainder of his life Louis XII. had no leisure again to try his fortunes in Italy: he was too busy elsewhere."—G. W. Kitchin, *Hist. of France*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: P. Villari, *Life and Times of Machiavelli*, bk. 1, ch. 12-14 (v. 3).—M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy*, bk. 5, ch. 15-16 (v. 4).—L. von Ranke, *Hist. of the Latin and Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514*, bk. 2, ch. 3.—Sir R. Comyn, *Hist. of the Western Empire*, ch. 37-38 (v. 2).—L. Larchey, *Hist. of Bayard*, bk. 2, ch. 21-44.—H. E. Napier, *Florentine History*, bk. 2, ch. 9 (v. 4).

A. D. 1515-1516.—Invasion and reconquest of Milan by Francis I.—His treaty with the Pope. See FRANCE: A. D. 1515; and 1515-1518.

A. D. 1516-1517.—Abortive attempt against Milan by the Emperor, Maximilian.—His peace with Venice and surrender of Verona. See FRANCE: A. D. 1516-1517.

A. D. 1520-1542.—Early Reformation movements and their want of popular support.—The Council of Trent. See PAPACY: A. D. 1537-1563.

A. D. 1521-1522.—Re-expulsion of the French from Milan.—The treason of the Constable Bourbon.—His appointment to the command of the Imperial army. See FRANCE: A. D. 1520-1523.

A. D. 1523-1527.—The double dealings of Pope Clement VII.—Invasion of Milanese by Francis I. and his defeat and capture at Pavia.—The Holy League against Charles V.—The attack on Rome by Constable Bourbon.—Giulio de' Medici, natural son of Giuliano de' Medici, and cousin of Leo X., had succeeded Adrian VI. in the Papacy in 1523, under the name of Clement VII. "Nothing could have been more unfortunate than the new Pope's first steps on the zig-zag path which he proposed to follow. Becoming alarmed at the preponderating power of Charles [the Fifth, Emperor, King of Spain and Naples, Duke of Burgundy, and ruler of all the Netherlands,—see AUSTRIA: A. D. 1496-1526; and GERMANY: A. D. 1519], in 1524 he entered into a league with Francis [the First, king of France]; but scarcely had this been concluded when the memorable battle of

Pavia [see FRANCE: A. D. 1523-1525], resulting in the entire defeat of the French, on the 24th of February, 1525, and the captivity of the French king, frightened him back again into seeking anew the friendship of Charles, in April of that year. Each of these successive treaties was of course duly sworn to and declared inviolable; but it could hardly be expected that he who exercised the power of annulling other men's oaths would submit to be bound by his own, when the observance of them became inconvenient. Clement accordingly was not prevented by the solemn treaty of April, 1525, from conspiring against his new ally in the July following. The object of this conspiracy was to induce Ferdinando Francesco d'Avalos, Marquis of Pescara, who commanded the army of Charles V. before Milan to revolt against his sovereign, and join the Italians in an attempt to put an end for ever to Spanish sway in Italy. . . . But the Spanish general had no sooner secured clear evidence of the plans of the conspirators, by pretending to listen to their proposals, than he reported the whole to Charles. The miscarriage of this scheme, and the exposure consequent upon it, necessarily threw the vacillating and terrified Pontiff once more into the arms of Francis. 'The Most Christian'—as the old Italian historians often elliptically call the Kings of France—obtained his release from his Madrid prison by promising on oath, on the 17th of January, 1526, all that Charles, driving a hard bargain, chose to demand of him [see FRANCE: A. D. 1525-1526]. And Clement hastened to prove the sincerity of his renewed friendship by a professional contribution to the success of their new alliance, in the welcome shape of a plenary absolution from all observance of the oaths so sworn. . . . On the 22nd of May following [at Cognac], the Pope entered into a formal league with Francis [called 'Holy,' for the reason that the Pope was a party to it]. Venice joined her troops to those of the Ecclesiastical States, and they marched together to the support of the Milanese, who had risen in revolt against the Emperor. Assistance had also been promised by Henry of England, who had stipulated, however, that he should not be named as a party to the alliance, but only considered as its protector. This was the most strenuous and most united attempt Italy had yet made to rid herself of the domination of the stranger, and patriotic hopes beat high in several Italian hearts. . . . It may be easily imagined that the 'Most Catholic' monarch [Charles V.] felt towards Clement at this time in a manner which led him to distinguish very nicely between the infallible head of the universal Church and the sovereign of the Ecclesiastical States. . . . Though he retained the utmost respect and reverence for the viceroy of heaven, he thought that a little correction administered to the sovereign of Rome would not be amiss, and nothing could be easier than to find means ready to his hand for the infliction of it. The Colonnas were of course ready for a rebellion on the slightest encouragement. . . . So when Don Ugo di Moncada, Charles's general at Naples, proposed to the Colonnas to join him in a little frolic at Clement's expense, the noble and most reverend members of that powerful family jumped at the proposal. . . . The united forces of the Viceroy and the Colonnas accordingly one morning entered Rome, altogether without opposition, and marched at

once to the Vatican. They completely sacked, not only the Pope's palace, and the residences of many gentlemen and prelates, but also, says the historian [Varchi], 'with unheard-of avarice and impiety,' robbed the sacristy of St. Peter of everything it contained. Clement had barely time to escape into the castle of St. Angelo; but as he found there neither soldiers nor ammunition, nor even food for above three days, . . . he consented to a treaty by which the Pope agreed to pardon the Colonnas freely for all they had done against him; to take no steps to revenge himself on them; to withdraw his troops from Lombardy; and to undertake nothing in any way, or under any pretext, against the Emperor." As a hostage for the fulfilment of this treaty, Pope Clement gave his dear friend Filippo Strozzi; but no sooner was he delivered from his captors than he hired seven "black companies" of adventurers and 2,000 Swiss, and began a furious war of extermination upon the Colonnas and all their dependents. At the same time he wrote private letters to the heads of his "Holy League," "warning them to pay no heed to any statement respecting a treaty made by him with the Emperor, and assuring them of his intention to carry on the war with the utmost energy." A little later, however, this remarkable Holy Father found it convenient to make another treaty with the Viceroy of Naples, for the release of his friend Strozzi, which bound him still more to friendly relations with the Emperor. This latter treaty, of March, 1527, "would seem in some sort to imply the reconciliation once again of the Pope and the Emperor." But Charles had already set forces in motion for the chastisement of the faithless Pope and his allies, which either he could not or did not care to arrest. "The Constable Bourbon, whom the gross injustice of Francis I., and the intolerable persecution of his infamous mother, Louise de Savoie, had driven to abandon his country and allegiance [see FRANCE: A. D. 1520-1523], . . . was now . . . marching southwards, with the imperial troops, to chastise the different members of the League against the Emperor, which Clement, as has been seen, had formed. George Frundsberg, a German leader of reputation, had also crossed the Alps with 15,000 men,—'all Lutherans and Lanzkuechts,' as the Italians write with horror and dismay,—and had joined these forces to the Spaniards under Bourbon. . . . The combined force was in all respects more like a rabble rout of brigands and bandits than an army; and was assuredly such as must, even in those days, have been felt to be a disgrace to any sovereign permitting them to call themselves his soldiers. Their pay was, as was often the case with the troops of Charles V., hopelessly in arrear, and discipline was of course proportionably weak among them. . . . The progress southward of this bandit army . . . filled the cities exposed to their inroad with terror and dismay. They had passed like a destroying locust swarm over Bologna and Imola, and crossing the Apennines, which separate Umbria from Tuscany, had descended into the valley of the Arno not far from Arezzo. Florence and Rome both trembled. On which would the storm burst? That was the all-absorbing question. Pope Clement, with his usual avarice-blinded imbecility, had, immediately on concluding the above-mentioned treaty with the Neapolitan viceroy, discharged all his

troops except a body-guard of about 600 men. Florence was nearly in as defenceless a position"; but a small army of the League, under the Duke of Urbino, was at Incisa, and it was "probably the presence of this army, little as it had hitherto done to impede the progress of the enemy, which decided Bourbon eventually to determine on marching towards Rome. It seems doubtful how far they were in so doing executing the orders, or carrying out the wishes, of the Emperor. . . . Upon the whole we are warranted in supposing that Bourbon and Frundsberg would hardly have ventured on the course they took, if they had not had reason to believe that it would not much displease their master. . . . On the 5th of May [1527] Bourbon arrived beneath the walls of Rome. . . . On the evening of the 6th of May the city was stormed and given over to the unbridled cupidity and brutality of the soldiers. . . . Bourbon himself had fallen in the first moments of the attack."—T. A. Trollope, *Hist. of the Commonwealth of Florence*, bk. 10, ch. 8 (v. 4).

ALSO IN: The same, *Filippo Strozzi*, ch. 7.—W. Robertson, *Hist. of the Reign of Charles V.*, bk. 4 (v. 2).—L. von Ranke, *Hist. of the Reformation in Germany*, bk. 4, ch. 1-3.

A. D. 1527.—The Sack of Rome by the Spanish and German Imperialists.—"Bourbon fell at the first assault; but by evening the Vatican suburb was in the hands of the enemy. Clement, who was even best informed of the state of things, had not anticipated such an issue. He scarcely saved himself by flight from the Vatican to the castle of St. Angelo, whither the fugitive population hurried, as the shipwrecked crew of an entire fleet hastens to a single boat which cannot receive them. In the midst of the thronging stream of men, the portcullis was lowered. Whoever remained without was lost. Benvenuto Cellini was at that time in Rome, and was among the defenders of the walls. He boasted that his ball had destroyed Bourbon. He stole fortunately into the citadel, before it was closed, and entered the Pope's service as bombardier. Even at this last moment, Clement might have saved Rome itself, which, situated on the opposite shore of the river, had not yet been entered by the enemy. They offered to spare it for a ransom; but finding this too high, and awaiting hourly Urbino's army, to which, though nothing was yet to be seen of it, he looked as a deliverer in the time of need, he would hear nothing of it. And thus the undefended city fell into the hands of the imperialists. Almost without resistance they entered Trastevere, a small quarter of the city lying to the west of the Tiber; and then crossing the bridges, which no one had demolished, they pressed forwards into the heart of Rome. It was the depth of the night. Benvenuto Cellini was stationed on the tower of the castle of St. Angelo, at the foot of the colossal angel, and saw the flames bursting forth in the darkness, and heard the sorrowful cry all around. For it was late before the soldiers began to cast off all restraint. They had entered quietly. The Germans stood in battalions. But when they saw the Spaniards broken up and plundering, the desire was aroused in them also; and now a spirit of emulation appeared, as to which nation could outdo the other in cruelty. The Spaniards, it is asserted by impartial Italians, carried the day. There had been no siege, no bombardment,

no flight of any great extent; but as if the earth had opened, and had disgorged a legion of devils, so suddenly came these hosts. Everything was in a moment abandoned to them. We must endeavour to conceive what kind of men these German soldiers were. They formed an intermediate class between the prime and the refuse of the people. Gathered together by the hope of booty, indifferent what end was assigned them, rendered wild by hunger and tardy pay, left without a master after the death of their commander, they found themselves unrestrained in the most luxurious city of the world—a city abounding with gold and riches, and at the same time decried for centuries in Germany, as the infernal nest of the popes, who lived there as incarnate devils, in the midst of their Babylonian doings. The opinion that the pope of Rome, and Clement VII. in particular, was the devil, prevailed not only in Germany, but in Italy and in Rome the people called him so. In the midst of plague and famine he had doubled the taxes and raised the price of bread. What with the Romans, however, was an invective arising from indignation, was an article of faith among the Germans. They believed they had to do with the real antichrist, whose destruction would be a benefit to Christendom. We must remember, if we would understand this fury of the German soldiery, in whose minds, as in those of all Germans, Lutheran ideas at that time prevailed, how Rome had been preached and written upon in the north. The city was represented to people as a vast abyss of sin; the men as villains, from the lowest up to the cardinals; the women as courtesans; the business of all as deceit, theft, and murder; and the robbing and deluding of men that had for centuries been emanating from Rome, was regarded as the universal disease from which the world was languishing. Thither for centuries the gold of Germany had flowed; there had emperors been humbled or poisoned; from Rome every evil had sprung. And thus, while satiating themselves with rapine and murder, they believed a good work was being done for the welfare of Christendom, and for the avenger of Germany. Never, however—this we know—does the nature of man exhibit itself more beast-like, than when it becomes furious for the sake of ideas of the highest character. Before the castle of St. Angelo, which, carefully fortified with walls and fosses, alone afforded resistance, the German soldiers proclaimed Martin Luther as pope. Luther's name was at that time a war-cry against pope and priestcraft. The rude multitude surmised not what Luther desired when he attacked the papacy. In front of St. Peter's church, they represented an imitation of the papal election with the sacred garments and utensils. They compelled one priest to give extreme unction to a dying mule. One protested that he would not rest until he had consumed a piece of the pope's flesh. It is true, Italians for the most part relate this, but the German reports themselves do not deny the excessive barbarity which was permitted. Ten millions of precious metal was carried away. How much blood did this money involve, and what was done to those from whom it was taken? Fewer were put to death than were plundered, says one of the records, but what does that imply? It is true, the Germans often quarrelled with the Spaniards, because the horrors which they saw

them practise were too terrible for them. Otherwise the sparing of human life was less an act of clemency than of covetousness. Prisoners of war were at that time regarded as slaves; they were carried away as personal property, or a ransom was extorted. . . . This system was carried to a great pitch in Rome. The possessors of palaces were obliged to purchase their ransom, the Spanish cardinals as well as the Italian—no difference was made. Thus at least escape was possible. . . . And as the people were treated, so were the things. Upon the inlaid marble floor of the Vatican, where the Prince of Orange took up his abode—the command of the army devolving upon him after Bourbon's death—the soldiers lighted their fire. The splendid stained glass windows, executed by William of Marseilles, were broken for the sake of the lead. Raphael's tapestries were pronounced excellent booty; in the paintings on the walls the eyes were put out; and valuable documents were given as straw to the horses which stood in the Sistine Chapel. The statues in the streets were thrown down; the images of the Mother of God in the churches were broken to pieces. For six months the city thus remained in the power of the soldiery, who had lost all discipline. Pestilence and famine appeared. Rome had more than 90,000 inhabitants under Leo X.; when Clement VII. returned a year after the conquest, scarcely a third of that number then existed—poor, famished people, who had remained behind, because they knew not whither to turn. All this lay on the conscience of the man who now for months had been condemned to look down upon this misery from the castle of St. Angelo, in which the Spaniards held him completely blockaded, and where pestilence and want of provisions appeared just as much as down below in Rome. At last, after waiting day after day, he saw Urbino's army approaching from afar: their watch-fires were to be perceived; and every moment he expected that the duke would attack and deliver the city. But he moved not. It is thought he intended now to avenge the rapine which the Medici under Leo X. had carried on against him. . . . After having rested for some time in sight of the city, in which the imperialists had opened their intrenchments round the castle of St. Angelo for a regular siege, he withdrew back again to the north, and left the pope to his fate."—H. Grimm, *Life of Michael Angelo*, ch. 10, sect. 3 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: Benvenuto Cellini, *Life*; tr. by J. A. Symonds, bk. 1, sect. 84-88 (v. 1).—*The same*; tr. by T. Roscoe, ch. 7.—J. S. Brewer, *The Reign of Henry VIII.*, ch. 25 (v. 2).

A. D. 1527-1529.—Siege and captivity of the Pope.—New league against the Emperor.—French invasion and disastrous siege of Naples.—Genoese independence recovered.—Treaties of Barcelona and Cambrai.—Francis renounces all pretensions beyond the Alps.—Charles V. supreme.—Shut up in Castle St. Angelo, the Pope, Clement VII., "deprived of every resource, and reduced to such extremity of famine as to feed on asses' flesh, was obliged to capitulate on such conditions as the conquerors were pleased to prescribe. He agreed to pay 400,000 ducats to the army; to surrender to the emperor all the places of strength belonging to the Church; and, besides giving hostages, to remain a prisoner himself until the chief articles

were performed. . . . The account of this extraordinary and unexpected event was no less surprising than agreeable to the emperor. But in order to conceal his joy from his subjects, who were filled with horror at the success and crimes of their countrymen, and to lessen the indignation of the rest of Europe, he declared that Rome had been assaulted without any order from him. He wrote to all the princes with whom he was in alliance, disclaiming his having had any knowledge of Bourbon's intention. He put himself and court into mourning; commanded the rejoicings which had been ordered for the birth of his son Philip to be stopped; and, employing an artifice no less hypocritical than gross, he appointed prayers and processions throughout all Spain for the recovery of the pope's liberty, which, by an order to his generals, he could have immediately granted him. . . . Francis and Henry [of France and England], alarmed at the progress of the imperial arms in Italy, had, even before the taking of Rome, entered into a closer alliance; and, in order to give some check to the emperor's ambition, had agreed to make a vigorous diversion in the Low Countries. The force of every motive which had influenced them at that time was now increased; and to these was added the desire of rescuing the pope out of the emperor's hands, a measure no less politic than it appeared to be pious. This, however, rendered it necessary to abandon their hostile intentions against the Low Countries, and to make Italy the seat of war. . . . Besides all . . . public considerations, Henry was influenced by one of a more private nature: having begun, about this time, to form his great scheme of divorcing Catharine of Aragon, towards the execution of which he knew that the sanction of papal authority would be necessary, he was desirous to acquire as much merit as possible with Clement, by appearing to be the chief instrument of his deliverance. . . . Henry . . . entered so eagerly into this new alliance, that, in order to give Francis the strongest proof of his friendship and respect, he formally renounced the ancient claim of the English monarchs to the crown of France, which had long been the pride and ruin of the nation; as a full compensation for which he accepted a pension of 50,000 crowns, to be paid annually to himself and his successors. The pope, being unable to fulfil the conditions of his capitulation, still remained a prisoner. . . . The Florentines no sooner heard of what had happened at Rome, than they ran to arms . . . and, declaring themselves a free state, reestablished their ancient popular government [see FLORENCE: A. D. 1502-1569]. The Venetians, taking advantage of the calamity of their ally, the pope, seized Ravenna, and other places belonging to the church, under pretext of keeping them in deposit. On the other hand, Lannoy, Charles' viceroy at Naples, "marched to Rome, together with Moncada and the Marquis del Guasto, at the head of all the troops which they could assemble in the kingdom of Naples. The arrival of this reinforcement brought new calamities on the unhappy citizens of Rome; for the soldiers, envying the wealth of their companions, imitated their license, and with the utmost rapacity gathered the gleanings which had escaped the avarice of the Spaniards and Germans. There was not now any army in Italy capable of making head against the imperialists."

But the troops who had enjoyed months of license and riotous pillage in Rome could not be brought back to discipline, and refused to quit the perishing city. They had chosen for their general the Prince of Orange, who "was obliged to pay more attention to their humours than they did to his commands. . . . This gave the king of France and the Venetians leisure to form new schemes, and to enter into new arrangements for delivering the pope, and preserving the liberties of Italy. The newly-restored republic of Florence very imprudently joined with them, and Lautrec . . . was . . . appointed generalissimo of the league. . . . The best troops in France marched under his command; and the king of England, though he had not yet declared war against the emperor, advanced a considerable sum towards carrying on the expedition. Lautrec's first operations [1527] were prudent, vigorous and successful. By the assistance of Andrew Doria, the ablest sea-officer of that age, he rendered himself master of Genoa, and reestablished in that republic the faction of the Fregosi, together with the dominion of France. He obliged Alexandria to surrender after a short siege, and reduced all the country on that side of the Tessino. He took Pavia, which had so long resisted the arms of his sovereign, by assault, and plundered it with . . . cruelty. . . . But Lautrec durst not complete a conquest which would have been so honourable to himself and of such advantage to the league. Francis . . . was afraid that, if Sforza were once reestablished in Milan, they [his confederates] would second but coldly the attack which he intended to make on the kingdom of Naples. . . . Happily the importunities of the pope and the solicitations of the Florentines, the one for relief, and the other for protection, were so urgent as to furnish him with a decent pretext for marching forward. . . . While Lautrec advanced slowly towards Rome, the emperor" came to terms with the pope, and Clement obtained his liberty at the cost of 350,000 crowns, a tenth of the ecclesiastical revenues of Spain, and an agreement to take no part in the war against Charles. The latter next made overtures to the French king, offering some relaxation of the treaty of Madrid; but they were received in a manner that irritated even his cold temper. He, in turn, provoked his antagonist, until a ridiculous exchange of defiance to personal combat passed between them. Meantime "Lautrec continued his operations, which promised to be more decisive. His army, which was now increased to 35,000 men, advanced by great marches towards Naples." The remains of the imperial army retreated, as he advanced, from Rome, where it had held riot for ten months, and took shelter behind the fortifications of the Neapolitan capital. Lautrec undertook (April, 1528) the siege of Naples, with the co-operation of the Genoese admiral, Doria, who blockaded its port. But he was neglected by his own frivolous king, and received little aid from the Pope, the king of England, or other confederates of the league. Moreover, Doria and the Genoese suffered treatment so insolent, oppressive and threatening, from the French court that the former opened negotiations with the emperor for a transfer of his services. "Charles, fully sensible of the importance of such an acquisition, granted him whatever terms he required. Doria sent back his commission, together with the collar of St.

Michael, to Francis, and, hoisting the imperial colours, sailed with all his galleys towards Naples, not to block up the harbour of that unhappy city, as he had formerly engaged, but to bring them protection and deliverance. His arrival opened the communication with the sea, and restored plenty in Naples, which was now reduced to the last extremity; and the French . . . were soon reduced to great straits for want of provisions." With the heat of summer came pestilence; Lautrec died, and the wasted French army, attempting to retreat, was forced to lay down its arms and march under guard to the frontiers of France. "The loss of Genoa followed immediately upon the ruin of the army in Naples." Doria took possession of the town; the French garrison in the citadel capitulated (September 12, 1528), and the citadel was destroyed. "It was now in Doria's power to have rendered himself the sovereign of his country, which he had so happily delivered from oppression." But he magnanimously refused any pre-eminence among his fellow citizens. "Twelve persons were elected to new-model the constitution of the republic. The influence of Doria's virtue and example communicated itself to his countrymen; the factions which had long torn and ruined the state seemed to be forgotten; prudent precautions were taken to prevent their reviving; and the same form of government which hath subsisted with little variation since that time in Genoa, was established with universal applause." In Lombardy, the French army, under St. Pol, was surprised, defeated and ruined at Landriano (June, 1529), as completely as the army in Naples had been a few months before. All parties were now desirous of peace, but feared to seem too eager in making overtures. Two women took the negotiations in hand and carried them to a conclusion. "These were Margaret of Austria, dutchess dowager of Savoy, the emperor's aunt, and Louise, Francis's mother. They agreed on an interview at Cambray, and, being lodged in two adjoining houses, between which a communication was opened, met together without ceremony or observation, and held daily conferences, to which no person whatever was admitted." The result was a treaty signed August 5, 1529, known as the Peace of Cambray, or "the Ladies' Peace," or "Peace of the Dames." By its terms, Francis was to pay 2,000,000 crowns for the ransom of his sons; restore such towns as he still held in the Milanese; resign and renounce his pretensions to Naples, Milan, Genoa, and every other place beyond the Alps, as well as to Flanders and Artois; and consummate his marriage with the emperor's sister, Eleanor. On the other hand, the emperor only agreed not to press his claims on Burgundy, for the present, but reserved them, in full force. Another treaty, that of Barcelona, had already, in 1529, been concluded between the emperor and the pope. The former gave up the papal states which he occupied, and agreed to reestablish the dominion of the Medici in Florence; besides giving his natural daughter in marriage to Alexander, the head of that family. In return he received the investiture of Naples, absolution for all concerned in the plundering of Rome, and the grant to himself and his brother of a fourth of the ecclesiastical revenues throughout their dominions.—W. Robertson, *Hist. of the Reign of Charles V.*, bk. 4-5.

ALSO IN: F. P. Guizot, *Popular Hist. of France*, ch. 28.—C. Coignat, *Francis I. and his Times*, ch. 9.—G. B. Malleson, *Studies from Genoese History*, ch. 1.

(Southern): A. D. 1528-1570.—Naples under the Spanish Viceroy.—Ravages of the Turks along the coast.—Successful revolt against the Inquisition.—Unsuccessful French invasion under Gulse.—"After the memorable and unfortunate expedition of Lautrec, in 1528, Philibert of Châlons, Prince of Orange, who commanded the Imperial army, exercised the severest vengeance [in Naples] on the persons and estates of all those nobles who had joined the French, or who appeared to demonstrate any attachment towards that nation. . . . These multiplied . . . acts of oppression received no effectual redress during the short administration [1529-1532] of Cardinal Colonna, who succeeded to the Prince of Orange. . . . In the place of Cardinal Colonna was substituted Don Pedro de Toledo, who governed Naples with almost unlimited powers, during the space of near 21 years. His viceroyalty, which forms a memorable Epoch in the annals of the country, demands and fixes attention. We are impressed with horror at finding, by his own confession, . . . that during the progress of his administration, he put to death near 18,000 persons, by the hand of the executioner. Yet a fact still more extraordinary is that Giannone, himself a Neapolitan, and one of the ablest as well as most impartial historians whom the 18th century has produced, not only acquits, but even commends Toledo's severity, as equally wholesome and necessary," on account of the terrible lawlessness and disorder which he found in the country. "The inflexible and stern character of the viceroy speedily redressed these grievances, and finally restored order in the capital. . . . All the provinces experienced equal attention, and became the objects of his personal inspection. The unprotected coasts of Calabria and of Apulia, subject to the continual devastation of the Turks, who landed from their galleys, were fortified with towers and beacons to announce the enemy's approach. . . . Repeated attempts were made by Solyman II., Emperor of the Turks, either alone or in conjunction with the fleets of France, to effect the conquest of Naples, during this period: but the exertions of Toledo were happily attended with success in repulsing the Turkish invaders. . . . In no part of the middle ages . . . were the coasts of Naples and Sicily so frequently plundered, ravaged, and desolated, as at this period. Thousands of persons of both sexes, and of all conditions, were carried off by Barbarossa, Dragut, Sinan, and the other Bashaws, or admirals of the Porte. Not content with landing on the shores and ravaging the provinces, their squadrons perpetually appeared in sight of Naples; laid waste the islands of Ischia and Procida, situate in its immediate vicinity; attacked the towns of Pouzzoli and Baiæ; and committed every outrage of wanton barbarity. . . . The invasion of 1552, when Dragut blocked up the harbour of Naples, with 150 large galleys, during near four weeks, spread still greater consternation; and if the fleet of France had arrived, as had been concerted, it is more than probable that the city must have fallen into their hands. But the delays of Henry II., Solyman's ally, proved its preservation. The Turkish admiral, corrupted by a present of 200,000 ducats, which the

Viceroy found means of conveying to him, retired and made sail for Constantinople. . . . The administration of Toledo . . . was . . . completely subverted from the moment that he attempted [1546] to introduce the Inquisition. . . . The Neapolitans, patient under every other species of oppression, instantly revolted. . . . They even forgot, in the general terror, the distinction of ranks; and the Barons united with their fellow-citizens to oppose that formidable tribunal. The Viceroy, returning to the capital, reinforced by 8,000 veteran Spaniards, determined nevertheless to support the measure. Hostilities took place, and the city, during near three months, was abandoned to anarchy, while the inhabitants, having invested the castle, besieged their governor. . . . The Emperor, convinced by experience of the impracticability of success in his attempt, at length desisted." Toledo died in 1553, and "was succeeded by the Cardinal Pacheco, as Viceroy; and the abdication of Charles V., in the following year, devolved on his son Philip II. the sovereignty of Naples. Alarmed at the preparations made by Henry II., King of France, in conjunction with Paul IV., who had newly ascended the papal throne, Philip dispatched Ferdinand, Duke of Alva, to the aid of his Neapolitan subjects; and to the vigorous measures embraced by him on his arrival was due the safety of the kingdom [see FRANCE: A. D. 1547-1559]. . . . The administration of the Duke of Alcala, to whom Philip delegated the supreme power soon after the recall of Alva [1558], lasted near 12 years, and was marked by almost every species of calamity."—Sir N. W. Wraxall, *Hist. of France, 1574-1610, ch. 9 (v. 2)*.—"The march of the Mareschal of Lautrec was the last important attempt of the French to reconquer Naples. . . . Spain remained in possession of this beautiful country for two centuries. . . . Their [the Spaniards'] ascendancy was owing as well to an iron discipline as to that inveterate character of their race, the firmness of purpose which had gradually developed itself in the long struggle for the country which they wrenched inch by inch from their tenacious enemies. The Neapolitans found that they had in the Spaniards different rulers from the French."—A. de Reumont, *The Carafas of Maddaloni: Naples under Spanish Dominion, bk. 1*.

A. D. 1529.—Siege of Florence by the Imperial forces.—Reinstatement of the Medici. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1502-1569.

A. D. 1530-1600.—Under the Spanish domination, and the Papacy of the Counter-Reformation.—The Inquisition.—The Jesuits.—The Vice-regal rule.—Deplorable state of the country.—"It will be useful, at this point, to recapitulate the net results of Charles's administration of Italian affairs in 1580. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with the island of Sardinia and the Duchy of Milan, became Spanish provinces, and were ruled henceforth by viceroys. The House of Este was confirmed in the Duchy of Ferrara, including Modena and Reggio. The Duchies of Savoy and Mantua and the Marquisate of Montferrat, which had espoused the Spanish cause, were undisturbed. Genoa and Siena, both of them avowed allies of Spain, the former under Spanish protection, the latter subject to Spanish coercion, remained with the name and empty privileges of republics. Venice had made her peace with

Spain, and though she was still strong enough to pursue an independent policy, she showed as yet no inclination, and had, indeed, no power, to stir up enemies against the Spanish autocrat. The Duchy of Urbino, recognised by Rome and subservient to Spanish influence, was permitted to exist. The Papacy once more assumed a haughty tone, relying on the firm alliance struck with Spain. This league, as years went by, was destined to grow still closer, still more fruitful of results. Florence alone had been excepted from the articles of peace. It was still enduring the horrors of the memorable siege when Clement left Bologna at the end of May. . . . Finally, on August 12, the town capitulated. Alessandro de' Medici, who had received the title of Duke of Florence from Charles at Bologna, took up his residence there in July 1531, and held the State by help of Spanish mercenaries under the command of Alessandro Vitelli. . . . Though the people endured far less misery from foreign armies in the period between 1580 and 1600 than they had done in the period from 1494 to 1527, yet the state of the country grew ever more and more deplorable. This was due in the first instance to the insane methods of taxation adopted by the Spanish viceroys, who held monopolies of corn and other necessary commodities in their hands, and who invented imposts for the meanest articles of consumption. Their example was followed by the Pope and petty princes. . . . The settlement made by Charles V. in 1530, and the various changes which took place in the duchies between that date and the end of the century, had then the effect of rendering the Papacy and Spain omnipotent in Italy. . . . What they only partially effected in Europe at large, by means of St. Bartholomew massacres, exterminations of Jews in Toledo and of Muslims in Granada, holocausts of victims in the Low Countries, wars against French Huguenots and German Lutherans, naval expeditions and plots against the state of England, assassinations of heretic princes, and occasional burning of free thinkers, they achieved with plenary success in Italy. . . . It is the tragic history of the eldest and most beautiful, the noblest and most venerable, the freest and most gifted of Europe's daughters, delivered over to the devilry that issued from the most incompetent and arrogantly stupid of the European sisterhood, and to the cruelty, inspired by panic, of an impious theocracy. When we use these terms to designate the Papacy of the Counter-Reformation, it is not that we forget how many of those Popes were men of blameless private life and serious views for Catholic Christendom. When we use these terms to designate the Spanish race in the sixteenth century, it is not that we are ignorant of Spanish chivalry and colonising enterprise, of Spanish romance, or of the fact that Spain produced great painters, great dramatists, and one great novelist in the brief period of her glory. We use them deliberately, however, in both cases; because the Papacy at this period committed itself to a policy of immoral, retrograde, and cowardly repression of the most generous of human impulses under the pressure of selfish terror; because the Spaniards abandoned themselves to a dark fiend of religious fanaticism; because they were merciless in their conquests and unintelligent in their administration of subjugated provinces; because they glutted their

lusts of avarice and hatred on industrious folk of other creeds within their borders; because they cultivated barren pride and self-conceit in social life; because at the great epoch of Europe's reawakening they chose the wrong side and adhered to it with fatal obstinacy. . . . After the year 1580 seven Spanish devils entered Italy. These were the devil of the Inquisition, with stake and torture-room, and war declared against the will and soul and heart and intellect of man; the devil of Jesuitry, with its sham learning, shameless lying, and casuistical economy of sins; the devil of vice-royal rule, with its life-draining monopolies and gross incapacity for government; the devil of an insolent soldiery, quartered on the people, clamorous for pay, outrageous in their lusts and violences; the devil of fantastical taxation, levying tolls upon the bare necessities of life, and drying up the founts of national well-being at their sources; the devil of petty-princedom, wallowing in sloth and cruelty upon a pinchbeck throne; the devil of effeminate hidalgoism, ruinous in expenditure, mean and grasping, corrupt in private life, in public ostentatious, vain of titles, cringing to its masters, arrogant to its inferiors. In their train these brought with them seven other devils, their pernicious offspring: idleness, disease, brigandage, destitution, ignorance, superstition, hypocritically sanctioned vice. These fourteen devils were welcomed, entertained, and voluptuously lodged in all the fairest provinces of Italy. The Popes opened wide for them the gates of outraged and depopulated Rome. . . . After a tranquil sojourn of some years in Italy, these devils had every where spread desolation and corruption. Broad regions, like the Patrimony of S. Peter and Calabria, were given over to marauding bandits; wide tracts of fertile country, like the Sienese Maremma, were abandoned to malaria; wolves prowled through empty villages round Milan; in every city the pestilence swept off its hundreds daily; manufactures, commerce, agriculture, the industries of town and rural district, ceased; the Courts swarmed with petty nobles, who vaunted paltry titles, and resigned their wives to cicisbei and their sons to sloth; art and learning languished; there was not a man who ventured to speak out his thought or write the truth; and over the Dead Sea of social putrefaction floated the sickening oil of Jesuitical hypocrisy."—J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: The Catholic Reaction*, pt. 1, ch. 1.

A. D. 1536-1544.—French invasion of Piedmont.—French and Turkish siege of Nice.—Turkish ravages on the coast.—The Treaty of Crespy. See FRANCE: A. D. 1532-1547.

A. D. 1545-1556.—Creation of the duchy of Parma and Placentia, under the rule of the House of Farnese. See PARMA: A. D. 1545-1592.

A. D. 1559-1580.—End of the French occupation of Savoy and Piedmont.—The notable reign of Emanuel Philibert. See SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: A. D. 1559-1580; and FRANCE: A. D. 1547-1559.

A. D. 1559-1600.—Peace without Prosperity.—Foreign and domestic Despotism.—Exhaustion and helplessness of the country.—"From the epoch of the treaty of Chateau Cambresis [1559] to the close of the 16th century, Italy remained, in one sense, in profound and uninterrupted peace. During this long period

of 41 years, her provinces were neither troubled by a single invasion of foreign armies, nor by any hostilities of importance between her own feeble and nerveless powers. But this half century presented, nevertheless, anything rather than the aspect of public happiness and prosperity. Her wretched people enjoyed none of the real blessings of peace. Subject either to the oppressive yoke of their native despots, or to the more general influence of the arch-tyrant of Spain, they were abandoned to all the exactions of arbitrary government, and compelled to lavish their blood in foreign wars and in quarrels not their own. While France, torn by religious and civil dissensions, sank for a time from her political station among the powers of the continent, and was no longer capable of affording protection or exciting jealousy, Philip II. was left free to indulge in the peninsula all the obdurate tyranny of his nature. . . . The popes were interested in supporting his career of bigotry and religious persecution; the other powers of Italy crouched before him in abject submission. To feed the religious wars, in which he embarked as a principal or an accessory, in the endeavour to crush the protestant cause in France, in the Low Countries, and in Germany, he drained Italy of her resources in money and in men. . . . While the Italian soldiery fought with the courage of freemen, they continued the slaves of a despot, and while the Italian youth were consumed in transalpine warfare, their suffering country groaned under an iron yoke, and was abandoned a prey to the unresisted assaults of the infidels. Her coasts, left without troops, or defences in fortifications and shipping, were insulted and ravaged by the constant descents of the corsairs of Turkey and Barbary. Her maritime villages were burnt, her maritime population dragged off into slavery; and her tyrants, while they denied the people the power of defending themselves, were unable or careless also to afford them protection and safety."—G. Procter, *Hist. of Italy*, ch. 9.

A. D. 1569.—Creation of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1502-1589.

A. D. 1597.—Annexation of Ferrara to the States of the Church. See PAPACY: A. D. 1597.

A. D. 1605-1607.—Venice under the guidance of Fra Paolo Sarpi.—Successful contest of the Republic with the Papacy. See VENICE: A. D. 1606-1607; and PAPACY: A. D. 1605-1700.

A. D. 1620-1626.—The Valtelline War. See FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626.

A. D. 1627-1631.—Disputed succession to the Duchy of Mantua.—War of France with Spain, Savoy and the Emperor.—"About Christmas in the year 1627, Vincenzo II., Duke of Mantua, of the house of Gonzaga, died without issue. His next of kin, beyond all controversy, was Charles Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers, whose family had settled in France some fifty years before, and acquired by marriage the dukedoms of Nevers and Rethel. Although there was a jealousy on the part both of Austria and Spain that French influences should be introduced into Upper Italy, there seems to have been no intention, in the first instance, of depriving Charles of his Italian inheritance. . . . But . . . when the old Duke Vincenzo's days were evidently numbered, Charles's son, the young Duke of Rethel, by collusion with the citizens, arrived at Mantua to seize the throne which in a little

while death would make vacant." At the same time, he took from a convent in the city a young girl who represented whatever claims might exist in the direct native line, and married her, the pope granting a dispensation. "Both the King of Spain and the Emperor . . . were incensed by conduct which both must needs have regarded as indicative of hostility, and the latter as an invasion of his feudal rights. Spain flew to arms at once. The emperor summoned the young duke before his tribunal, to answer the charges of having seized the succession without his investiture, and married his ward without his consent. . . . Charles, supported by the promises of Richelieu, refused to acknowledge the emperor's rights of superiority, or to submit to his jurisdiction."—B. Chapman, *Hist. of Gustavus Adolphus*, ch. 8.—"The emperor . . . sequestered the disputed territory, and a Spanish army invaded Montferrat [embraced in the dominions of the Duke of Mantua] and besieged Casale, the capital. Such was the paramount importance attached by Richelieu to his principle of opposition to the house of Austria, that he induced Louis to cross the Alps in person with 36,000 men, in order to establish the Duke of Nevers in his new possessions. The king and the cardinal forced the pass of Susa in March, 1629, in spite of the Duke of Savoy, who was another competitor for Montferrat, and so decisive was the superiority of the French arms that the duke immediately afterward signed a treaty of peace and alliance with Louis, by which he undertook to procure the abandonment of the siege of Casale and the retreat of the Spaniards into their own territory. This engagement was fulfilled, and the Duke of Nevers took possession of his dominions without farther contest. But the triumph was too rapid and easy to be durable."—N. W. Jervis, *Students' Hist. of France*, ch. 19.—"The Spaniards remained, however, in Milaness, ready to burst again upon the Duke of Mantua. The king was in a hurry to return to France. In order to finish the subjugation of the Reformers in the south, commanded by the Duke of Rohan. The cardinal placed little or no reliance upon the Duke of Savoy. . . . A league . . . was formed between France, the republic of Venice, the Duke of Mantua, and the Duke of Savoy, for the defence of Italy in case of fresh aggression on the part of the Spaniards; and the king, who had just concluded peace with England, took the road back to France. Scarcely had the cardinal joined him before Privas when an Imperialist army advanced into the Grisons and, supported by the celebrated Spanish general Spinola, laid siege to Mantua. Richelieu did not hesitate: he entered Piedmont in the month of March, 1680, to march before long on Pignerol, an important place commanding the passage of the Alps; it, as well as the citadel, was carried in a few days. . . . The Duke of Savoy was furious, and had the soldiers who surrendered Pignerol cut in pieces. The king [Louis XIII.] had put himself in motion to join his army. . . . The inhabitants of Chambéry opened their gates to him; Annecy and Montmélian succumbed after a few days' siege; Maurienne in its entirety made its submission, and the king fixed his quarters there, whilst the cardinal pushed forward to Casale [the siege of which had been resumed by Spinola] with the main body of the army. Rejoicings were still going on for a success gained before

Veillane over the troops of the Duke of Savoy, when news arrived of the capture of Mantua by the Imperialists. This was the finishing blow to the ambitious and restless spirit of the Duke of Savoy. He saw Mantua in the hands of the Spaniards, 'who never give back aught of what falls into their power' . . . ; it was all hope lost of an exchange which might have given him back Savoy; he took to his bed and died on the 28th of July, 1630, telling his son that peace must be made on any terms whatever." A truce was arranged, followed by negotiations at Ratisbon, and Casale was evacuated by both parties—the Spaniards having had possession of the city, while the citadel was held by the French. "It was only in the month of September, 1631, that the states of Savoy and Mantua were finally evacuated by the hostile troops. Pignerol had been given up to the new Duke of Savoy, but a secret agreement had been entered into between that prince and France: French soldiers remained concealed in Pignerol; and they retook possession of the place in the name of the king, who had purchased the town and its territory, to secure himself a passage into Italy. . . . The affairs of the emperor in Germany were in too bad a state for him to rekindle war, and France kept Pignerol."—F. P. Guizot, *Popular Hist. of France*, ch. 41.—"The peace left all parties very nearly in the condition in which they were when the war began; the chief loser was the emperor, who was now compelled to acknowledge De Nevers as Duke of Mantua and Montserrat; and the chief gainer was the Duke of Savoy, whose territories were enlarged by the addition of Alba, Trino, and some portions of the territory of Montserrat which lay nearest to his Piedmontese dominions. France, too, made some permanent acquisitions to compensate her for the cost of the war. She eluded the stipulation which bound her to evacuate Casal, and Victor Amedée subsequently suffered her to retain both that fortress and Pignerol, such permission, as was generally believed, . . . having furnished the secret reason which influenced Richelieu to consent to the duke's obtaining the portion of Montserrat already mentioned, the cardinal thus making the Duke of Mantua furnish the equivalent for the acquisitions made by Louis."—C. D. Yonge, *Hist. of France under the Bourbons*, ch. 7 (v. 1).

A. D. 1631.—Annexation of Urbino to the States of the Church. See PAPAcy: A. D. 1605-1700.

A. D. 1635.—Italian alliances of Richelieu against the Spaniards in Milan. See GERMANy: A. D. 1634-1689.

A. D. 1635-1659.—Invasion of Milanese by French and Italian armies.—Civil war and foreign war in Savoy and Piedmont.—The extraordinary siege of Turin.—Treaty of the Pyrenees.—Restoration of territory to Savoy.—"Richelieu . . . having obtained the alliance of the Dukes of Savoy, Parma, and Mantua, and having secured the neutrality of the Republics of Venice and Genoa, now bent all his efforts to expel the Spaniards from Milan, which was at that time but weakly defended. . . . In 1635, a French army of 15,000 men was accordingly assembled in Dauphiny, and placed under the command of Mareschal Créquy. Having crossed the Alps, it formed a junction with 8,000 troops under the Duke of Parma, and 12,000 under the Duke of Savoy, to whom the supreme command of this

formidable army of 85,000 men was entrusted. Such a force, if properly employed, ought to have proved sufficient to overwhelm the Dutchy of Milan, in its present unprotected condition. . . . But the confederates were long detained by idle disputes among themselves, their licentiousness and love of plunder." When they did advance into Milanese, their campaign was ineffective, and they finally "separated with mutual disgust," but "kept the field, ravaging the open and fertile plains of Milan. They likewise took possession of several towns, particularly Bremi, on the Po. . . . On hearing of the distress of Milan, the King of Spain took immediate steps for the relief of that bulwark of his Italian power. In 1636 he appointed to its government Diego Guzman, Marques of Leganez, who was a near relative of Olivarez. . . . He had not long entered on the government intrusted to him when he succeeded in expelling the enemy from every spot in Milan, with exception of Bremi, which they still retained. Milan having been thus delivered, Leganez transferred the theatre of war to the States of the Duke of Parma, and completely desolated those fertile regions," compelling the Duke to renounce his French alliance (1637). "The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, did not long survive these events; and it was strongly suspected, both in Spain and Italy, though probably on no just grounds, that he had been poisoned. . . . The demise of the Duke of Mantua occurred nearly about the same period; and on the decease of these two princes, the Court of Spain used every exertion to detach their successors from the French confederacy. Its efforts succeeded, at least to a certain extent, with the Dutchess-dowager of Mantua. . . . But the Dutchess of Savoy, . . . being the sister of Louis XIII., could not easily be drawn off from the French interests. Olivarez [the Spanish minister], despairing to gain this princess, excited by his intrigues the brothers of the late Duke [Cardinal Maurice and Prince Thomas] to dispute with her the title to the regency." Leganez, now (1638) laid siege to Bremi, and Marshal Crequi, in attempting to relieve the place, was killed by a cannon shot. "By the loss of Bremi, the French were deprived of the last receptacle for their supplies or forces in the Dutchy of Milan; and in consequence of the death of Crequi, they had now no longer any chief of their own nation in Italy. The few French nobility who were still in the army returned to their own country, and the soldiery dispersed into Montferrat and Piedmont. Leganez, availing himself of this favourable posture of affairs, marched straightway into Piedmont, at the head of an army of 20,000 men. . . . He first laid siege to Vercelli, which, from its vicinity to Milan, had always afforded easy access for the invasion of that dutchy, by the French and Savoyards." A new French army, of 18,000 men, under Cardinal La Valette, was sent to the relief of the place, but did not save it from surrender. "After the capture of Vercelli, the light troops of Leganez ravaged the principality of Piedmont as far as the gates of Turin."—J. Dunlop, *Memoirs of Spain, from 1621 to 1700*, v. 1, ch. 4.—Fabert and Turenne were now sent from France to the assistance of La Valette, "and soon changed the aspect of affairs. Turenne aided powerfully in driving back Leganez and Prince Thomas from Turin, in seizing Chivasso

and in organizing a decisive success." In November, 1639, the French, through want of provisions, were forced to retreat to Carignano, repelling an attack made upon them in the course of the retreat. The command was now handed over to Turenne, "with instructions to revictual the citadel of Turin, which was defended by French troops against Prince Thomas, who had gained most of the town. Turenne succeeded . . . in conveying food and munitions into the citadel. In the following spring d'Harcourt [resuming command] undertook to relieve Casale, which belonged to the Duke of Mantua. . . . The place was besieged by Leganez." The attempt succeeded, the besieging army was beaten, and the siege raised. "After the relief of Casale d'Harcourt resolved, on the advice of Turenne, to besiege Turin. The investment was made on the 10th May, 1640. This siege offered a curious spectacle; the citadel which the French held was besieged by Prince Thomas, who held the town. He himself was besieged by the French army, which in its turn was besieged in its lines of circumvallation by the Spanish army of Leganez. The place capitulated on the 17th September. . . . Prince Thomas surrendered; Leganez recrossed the Po; Marie Christine [the Dowager Dutchess] re-entered Turin; and d'Harcourt, being recalled to France by the cardinal, left the command of the army to Turenne."—H. M. Hozier, *Turenne, ch. 2*.—"The fall of Turin did not put an end to the civil war, but its main exploits were limited to the taking of Cuneo by Harcourt (September 15th, 1641), . . . and of Revel, which was reduced by the Piedmontese troops who fought on the French side. . . . In the meantime the Regent, no less than her opponents, began to grow weary of the burdensome protection of their respective allies. . . . Under such circumstances, a reconciliation between the hostile parties became practicable, and was indeed effected on the 24th of July, 1642. The Princes were admitted to a share of the Regent's power, and from that time they joined the French standard, and took from the Spaniards most of the places they had themselves placed in their hands. . . . In the meanwhile the great agitator of Europe, Richelieu, had died (1642), and had been followed by the King, Louis XIII., five months later. . . . The struggle between the two great rival powers, France and Spain, scarcely interrupted by the celebrated peace of Westphalia, which put an end to the Thirty Years' War in the North, in 1648, continued throughout the greatest part of this period; but the rapid decline of Spain, the factions of Alessio in Sicily and of Massaniello in Naples, as much paralysed the efforts of the Court of Madrid as the disorders of the Fronde weakened that of Paris. The warlike operations in North Italy were languid and dull. The taking of Valenza by the French (September 3rd, 1656) is the greatest event on record, and even that [was] void of results. By the treaty of the Pyrenees (November 17th, 1659) Savoy was restored to her possessions, and Vercelli was evacuated by the Spaniards. The citadel of Turin had been given up by the French two years before, owing to the influence of Mazarin, who married on that occasion his niece Olympia Mancini to Eugene Maurice, son of Thomas, Prince of Carignano, and first cousin to Charles Emanuel II. From that union, it is well known, was born in Paris, in

1638, Prince Eugene of Savoy. The French nation were highly displeased at the loss of the Turin citadel, and never forgave the Cardinal this mere act of just and tardy restitution. Pinerola and Perosa, however, still remained in their hands, and placed the Court of Turin entirely at their discretion."—A. Gallenga, *Hist of Piedmont*, v. 8, ch. 2.

A. D. 1644.—First publication of Gazettes or Newspapers. See PRINTING AND PRESS: A. D. 1612-1650.

A. D. 1646-1654.—French hostility to the Pope.—Siege of Orbitello.—Masaniello's revolt at Naples.—French intrigue and failures.—"The war [of France and Spain] in Italy had for some years languished, but hostility to the Pope [on the election of Innocent X., which Cardinal Mazarin, then supreme in France, had opposed] stirred it again into life. New vessels were fitted out for the navy, and large preparations were made for the invasion of Italy. . . . On April 26, 1646, the expedition set sail, and on the 9th of May it cast anchor off the important city of Orbitello. The fleet consisted of 156 sail, and was expected to land 10,000 men, and Mazarin wrote that all Italy was in terror. The ships were commanded by the Duke of Brézé, and no more skilful or gallant leader could have been found. . . . The command of the land forces was, however, entrusted to a leader whose deficiencies more than counterbalanced Brézé's skill. Mazarin desired an Italian prince to lead his expedition, and Prince Thomas of Savoy had been chosen for the command. . . . Fearing that disease would come with the hot weather, Mazarin urged Prince Thomas to press forward with the siege. But the most simple advances seemed beyond his skill. . . . A severe misfortune to the navy made the situation worse. In a sharp and successful engagement with the Spanish fleet, a cannon ball struck and killed the Duke of Brézé. His death was more disastrous than would have been the loss of 20 sail. The French fleet retired to Provence and left the sea open to the Spanish. Sickness was fast reducing the army on land, and on July 18th Prince Thomas raised the siege, which was no further advanced than when it was begun, and led back the remains of his command to Piedmont. . . . So mortifying an end to this expensive venture only strengthened Mazarin's resolution to make his power felt in Italy. The battered ships and fever-wasted soldiers were scarcely back in Provence, when the minister began to prepare a second expedition for the same end. . . . By September a fleet of 200 sail, with an army of 8,000 men commanded by the Marshals of La Meillerie and Du Plessis, was under way. The expedition was conducted with skill and success. Orbitello was not again attacked, but Porto Longoue, on the island of Elba, and Piombino, on the mainland, both places of much strategic importance, were captured after brief sieges. With this result came at once the change in the feelings of Innocent X. for which Mazarin had hoped," and certain objects of the latter's desire—including a cardinal's hat for his brother Michael—were brought within his reach. His attention was now turned to the more southerly portion of the peninsula. "During the expedition to Orbitello in 1646, Mazarin had closely watched Naples, whose coming revolution he foresaw. The ill-suppressed discontents of the city now

showed themselves in disturbances, sudden and erratic as the eruptions of Vesuvius, and they offered to France an opportunity for seizing the richest of the remaining possessions of Spain. After the vicissitudes of centuries, Naples and Sicily were now subject to the Spanish crown. They were governed by a viceroy, and were subjected to the drain of men and money which was the result of Spain's necessities and the characteristic of her rule. Burdened with taxation, they complained that their viceroy, the Duke of Arcos, was sending to Spain money raised solely for their own defence. The imposition of a duty on fruits, in a country where fruit formed a cheap article of diet for the poor, and where almost all were poor, kindled the long smouldering discontent. Under the leadership of a fisherman [Tommaso Aniello], nicknamed Masaniello, the people of Naples in 1647 rose in revolt. Springing from utter obscurity, this young man of twenty-seven, poor and illiterate, became powerful almost in a day. While the Duke of Arcos hid himself away from the revolt, Masaniello was made Captain-General of Naples. So sudden a change turned his head. At first he had been bold, popular, and judicious. He sought only, he said, to deliver the people from their taxes, and when that was done, he would return again to selling soles and red mullets. But political delirium seized him when he reached an elevation which, for him, was as dizzy as the throne of the Roman emperors, and like some who reached that terrible eminence, his brain was crazed by the bewilderment and ecstasy of power. He made wild and incoherent speeches. He tore his garments, crying out against popular ingratitude, attacking groups of passers-by, riding his horse wildly through the multitude, and striking with his lance to the right and left. The populace wearied of its darling. Exalted to power on July 7th, he was murdered on the 16th, with the approval of those who had worshipped him a week before. But the revolution did not perish with him. Successive chiefs were chosen and deposed by a fickle people. When the insurrection was active, the representatives of Spain promised untaxed fruits and the privileges allowed by Charles V., and they revoked their promises when it appeared to subside. In the meantime, Mazarin watched the movement, uncertain as to the course he should pursue. . . . While the minister hesitated, the chance was seized by one who was never accused of too great caution." This was the Duke of Guise—the fifth Henry of that Dukedom—a wild, madcap young nobleman, who accepted an invitation from the Neapolitan insurgents to become their chief. Guise landed at Naples on the 15th of November, 1647, with half a dozen attendants, and a month later he was followed by a French fleet. But the latter did nothing, and Guise was helplessly without means. "The truth was that Mazarin, even if desirous of crippling the Spaniards, was very averse to assisting Guise. He believed that the duke either desired to form a republic, of which he should be chief, or a monarchy, of which he should be king, and neither plan was agreeable to the cardinal." At the end of a fortnight the fleet sailed away. Guise held his ground as the leader of the revolt until the following April, when certain of the Neapolitan patriots, corrupted by the enemy, betrayed the city into the

hands of the Spaniards. "Guise endeavored, with a handful of followers, to escape towards Capua, but they were captured by a detachment of Spaniards. . . . By the petition of powerful friends, and by the avowal of France, Guise was saved from the public execution which some of his enemies demanded, but he was presently taken to Spain, and there was kept a prisoner during four years." Meantime, Mazarin had prepared another expedition, which appeared before Naples in the summer of 1648, but only to discover that the opportunity for deriving any advantage from the popular discontent in that city was past. "Receiving no popular aid, the expedition, after some ineffective endeavors, was abandoned." Six years afterwards, in 1654, Mazarin sent a third expedition to Naples, and entrusted it to the command of the Duke of Guise, who had lately been released from his captivity in Spain. "Guise hoped that the Neapolitans would rise in revolt when it was known that their former leader was so near, but not a person in the city showed any desire to start a movement in behalf of the Duke of Guise. The Spanish met him with superior forces." After some slight encounters the expedition sailed back to France.—J. B. Perkins, *France under Mazarin*, ch. 8 (v. 1), and 16 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: A. De Reumont, *The Carafas of Madaloni: Naples under Spanish Dominion*, bk. 3.—F. Midon, *Rise and Fall of Masaniello*.—Mrs. H. R. St. John, *Masaniello of Naples*.—H. G. Smith, *Romance of History*, ch. 1.

A. D. 1648.—The Peace of Westphalia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

A. D. 1701-1713.—Savoy and Piedmont.—The War of the Spanish Succession.—The Peace of Utrecht.—"Compelled to take part, with one of the contending parties [in the War of the Spanish Succession—see SPAIN: A. D. 1698-1700, and 1701-1702], Victor [Duke of Savoy] would have been prompted by his interest to an alliance with Austria; but he was beset on all sides by the combined forces of France and Spain, and was all the more at their mercy as Louis XIV. had (April 5th, 1701) obtained from Ferdinand Gonzaga of Mantua permission to garrison his capital, in those days already one of the strongest places in Italy. The Duke of Savoy had already, in 1697, married his daughter, Adelaide, to one of Louis's grandsons, the Duke of Burgundy; he now gave his younger daughter, Mary Louise, to Burgundy's brother, the new King of Spain (September 11th, 1701), and took the field as French commander-in-chief. He was opposed by his own cousin, Prince Eugene, at the head of the Imperial armies. The war in Lombardy was carried on with some remissness, partly owing to the natural repugnance or irresolution of the Duke of Savoy, partly to the suspicion with which, on that very account, he was looked upon by Catinat and Vaudemont, the French and Spanish commanders under him. The King, in an evil hour, removed his able marshal, Catinat, and substituted for him Villaroi, a carpet knight and court warrior, who committed one fault after another, allowed himself to be beaten by Eugene at Chiari (September 1st), and to be surprised and taken prisoner at Cremona (1702, January 21st), to the infinite relief of his troops. Vendôme restored the fortunes of the French, and a very brilliant but undecisive action was fought at Luzzara (August

15th), after which Prince Eugene was driven from the neighbourhood of Mantua, and fell back towards the mountains of Tyrol. With the success of the French their arrogance increased, and with their arrogance the disgust and ill-will of Victor Amadeus." The Duke withdrew from the camp and began to listen to overtures from the Powers in the Grand Alliance. "Report of the secret intercourse of the Duke with Austrian agents reached Louis XIV., who sent immediate orders to Vendôme to secure and disarm the Piedmontese soldiers (3,800 to 6,000 in number) who were fighting under French standards at Mantua. This was achieved by treachery, at San Benedetto, on the 29th of September, 1703. An attempt to seize the Duke himself, whilst hunting near Turin, miscarried. Savoy retaliated by the arrest of the French and Spanish ambassadors, and war was declared (October 5th). The moment was ill-chosen. Victor had barely 4,000 men under his orders. The whole of Savoy was instantly overrun; and in Piedmont Vercelli, Ivrea, Verrua, as well as Susa, Bard, and Pinerolo, and even Chivasso, fell into the enemy's hands during the campaigns of 1704 and 1705. In the ensuing year the tide of invasion reached Nice and Villafranca; nothing was left to Victor Amadeus but Cuneo and Turin, and the victorious French armies appeared at last under the very walls of the capital (March, 1706). The war had, however, been waged with different results beyond the Alps, where the allies had crushed the French at Blenheim (1704) and at Ramillies (1705). One of the heroes of those great achievements, Prince Eugene, now hastened to the rescue of his cousin. He met with a severe check at Cassano (August 16th, 1705), and again at Calcinato (April 19th, 1706); but his skilful antagonist, Vendôme, was called away to Flanders, and Prince Eugene so out-manœuvred his successors as to be able to join Victor at Turin. The French had begun the siege of this place on the 13th of May, 1706. They had between 50,000 and 60,000 men, and 170 pieces of artillery with them." When Prince Eugene, early in September, reached the neighborhood of Turin, he concerted with Victor Amadeus an attack on the investing army which destroyed it completely. "Its relics withdrew in awful disorder towards Pinerolo, pursued not only by the victorious troops but also by the peasantry, who, besides attachment to their princes, obeyed in this instance an instinct of revenge against the French, who had barbarously used them. Out of 50,000 or 60,000 men who had sat down before Turin in March, hardly 20,000 recrossed the Alps in September. Three of the French generals lay dead on the field; . . . 6,000 prisoners were marched through the streets of the liberated town, and 55 French banners graced the main altar of the cathedral. In the following year, Victor and Eugene, greatly against their inclination, were induced by the allies to undertake an expedition against Toulon, which, like all previous invasions of Provence, led to utter discomfiture, and the loss of 10,000 combatants (1707, July 1st to September 1st). An attack upon Briançon, equally undertaken against the sound judgment of the Duke of Savoy, in 1708, led to no better results; but Savoy won back Exilles, Perosa, Fenestrelles, and, one by one, all the redoubts with which during those wars the Alps were bristling. The war slackened in Italy, and

the states of Europe were decided in the Netherlands. . . . By the Peace of Utrecht [A. D. 1713] France renounced to Savoy all the invaded territories, and, besides, the valleys of Oulx, Cessanne, Bardonneche, and Castel Delfino, ancient possessions of Dauphiny, east of the Alps, from the 13th century, whilst, for her own part, Savoy gave up the western valley of Barcelonnette; thus the limits between the two nations (with the exception of Savoy and Nice) were at last fixed on the mountain-crest, at 'the parting of the waters.' By virtue of an agreement signed with Austria, November 8th, 1708, the whole of Montferrat, as well as Alessandria, Valenza, Lomellina, and Val Sesia, dependencies of the duchy of Milan, and the imperial fiefs in the Langhe (province of Alba), were ceded to Savoy."—A. Gallenga, *Hist. of Piedmont*, v. 3, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: Col. G. B. Malleson, *Prince Eugene of Savoy*, ch. 5, and 7-9.—H. Martin, *Hist. of France: Age of Louis XIV.*, v. 2, ch. 5-6.—W. Coxe, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch. 68, 69, 78-75, 77 (v. 2-3).—See, also, UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

A. D. 1713-1714.—Milan, Naples and Sardinia ceded to the House of Austria and Sicily to the Duke of Savoy. See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

A. D. 1715-1735.—Ambitions of Elizabeth Farnese, the Spanish queen.—The Austro-Spanish conflict.—The Quadruple Alliance.—Acquisition of Naples by the Spanish Bourbons.—By the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, Philip V. of Spain was left with no dominions in Italy, the Italian possessions of the Spanish monarchy having been transferred to Austria. Philip might have accepted this arrangement without demur. Not so his wife—"Elizabeth Farnese, a lady of the Italian family for whom the Duchy of Parma had been created by the Pope. The crown of Spain was settled on her step-son. For her own child the ambitious queen desired the honours of a crown. Cardinal Alberoni, a reckless and ambitious ecclesiastic, was the minister of the Spanish court. Under his advice and instigated by the queen, Philip claimed the possessions in Italy, which in the days of his grandfather had belonged to the Spanish crown. When his title to that crown was admitted, he denied the right of the other powers of Europe to alienate from it its possessions. This was not all: in right of his queen he claimed the duchies of Parma and of Tuscany. She determined to recover for him all the Italian possessions of the Spanish crown, and to add to them the duchies of Parma and Tuscany. The Duke of Parma was old and childless. The extinction of the reigning line of the Medici was near. Cosmo di Medici, the reigning sovereign, was old. His only son, Jean Gaston, was not likely to leave heirs. To Parma Elizabeth advanced her claims as heiress of the family of Farnese; to Tuscany she asserted a more questionable title in right of a descent from the family of Medici. These duchies she demanded for her son, Don Carlos, in whose behalf she was ready to waive her own claims. The success of these demands would have given to the Spanish monarchy even greater power than it had before enjoyed. To Naples, Sicily, and Milan, would have been added the territories of Parma and Tuscany. All Europe denounced the ambitious projects of Alberoni as entirely inconsistent with

that balance of power which it had then become a political superstition to uphold. Philip's French relatives were determined in opposition to his claims; and to resist them the quadruple alliance was formed between Holland, England, France and the emperor. The parties to this alliance offered to the Spanish Bourbons that the emperor should settle on Don Carlos the reversion to the duchies of Parma and Tuscany on their lapsing to him by the failure of the reigning families without heirs. These proposals were rejected, and it was not until the Spanish court found the combination of four powerful monarchs too strong for them, that they reluctantly acceded to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, and accepted for Don Carlos the promised reversion of Parma and Tuscany. To induce the emperor to accede to this arrangement the Duke of Savoy was compelled to surrender to him his newly-acquired kingdom of Sicily, receiving instead the island of Sardinia with its kingly title. It is as kings of Sardinia that the princes of Savoy have since been known in European history. The treaty of the quadruple alliance was thus the second by which at this period the European powers attempted to arrange the affairs of Italy. This treaty left the house of Austria in possession of Sicily and Naples. It was assented to by Spain in 1720. European complications unconnected with Italy produced new wars and a new treaty; and the treaty of Seville in 1724, followed by one entered into at Vienna two years later, confirmed Don Carlos in the duchy of Parma, of which, on the death of the last of the Farnese in 1734, he entered into possession. A dispute as to the election of a king of Poland gave the Spanish court an opportunity of once more attempting the resumption of the Neapolitan dominions. Don Carlos, the second son of Philip and Elizabeth, was now just grown to man's estate. His father placed in his hand the sword which he himself had received from Louis XIV. Don Carlos was but seventeen years old when he took possession of his sovereignty of Parma. In the same year [1734] he was called from it to invade the Sicilian dominions of Austria. He conquered in succession the continental territories, and the island of Sicily; and on the 15th of June, 1734, he was proclaimed as King of the Two Sicilies. The war of the Polish Succession was ended in the following year by a peace, the preliminaries of which were signed at Vienna. In this treaty an entirely new arrangement of Italian affairs was introduced. The rights of Don Carlos to the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily were recognised. Parma was surrendered to the emperor; and, lastly, the duchy of Tuscany was disposed of to a new claimant [Francis of Lorraine] for the honours of an Italian prince."—I. Butt, *Hist. of Italy*, v. 1, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: E. Armstrong, *Elizabeth Farnese*, ch. 2-10.—P. Colletta, *Hist. of the Kingdom of Naples*, 1734-1858, bk. 1, ch. 1-2.—See, also, SPAIN: A. D. 1718-1725; and FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.

A. D. 1719.—The Emperor and the Duke of Savoy exchange Sardinia for Sicily. See SPAIN: A. D. 1718-1725.

A. D. 1733-1735.—Franco-Austrian War.—Invasion of the Milanese by the French.—Naples and Sicily occupied by the Spaniards and erected into a kingdom for Don Carlos. See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.

A. D. 1741-1743.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Ambitious undertakings of Spain.—"The struggle between England and Spain [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1739-1741] had altogether merged in the great European war, and the chief efforts of the Spaniards were directed against the Austrian dominions in Italy. The kingdom of Naples, which had passed under Austrian rule during the war of the [Spanish] Succession, had, as we have seen, been restored to the Spanish line in the war which ended in 1740, and Don Carlos, who ruled it, was altogether subservient to Spanish policy. The Duke of Lorraine, the husband of Maria Theresa, was sovereign of Tuscany; and the Austrian possessions consisted of the Duchy of Milan, and the provinces of Mantua and Placentia. They were garrisoned at the opening of the war by only 15,000 men, and their most dangerous enemy was the King of Sardinia, who had gradually extended his dominions into Lombardy, and whose army was, probably, the largest and most efficient in Italy. 'The Milanese,' his father is reported to have said, 'is like an artichoke, to be eaten leaf by leaf,' and the skill and perseverance with which for many generations the House of Savoy pursued that policy, have in our own day had their reward. Spanish troops had landed at Naples as early as November 1741. The King of Sardinia, the Prince of Modena, and the Republic of Genoa were on the same side. Venice was completely neutral, Tuscany was compelled to declare herself so, and a French army was soon to cross the Alps. The King of Sardinia, however, at this critical moment, was alarmed by the ambitious projects openly avowed by the Spaniards, and he was induced by English influence to change sides. He obtained the promise of certain territorial concessions from Austria, and of an annual subsidy of £200,000 from England; and on these conditions he suddenly marched with an army of 80,000 men to the support of the Austrians. All the plans of the confederates were disconcerted by this defection. The Spaniards went into winter quarters near Bologna in October, fought an unsuccessful battle at Campo Santo in the following February [1743], and then retired to Rimini, leaving Lombardy in complete tranquillity. The British fleet in the Mediterranean had been largely strengthened by Carteret, and it did good service to the cause. It burnt a Spanish squadron in the French port of St. Tropez, compelled the King of Naples, by the threat of bombardment, to withdraw his troops from the Spanish army, and sign an engagement of neutrality, destroyed large provisions of corn collected by the Genoese for the Spanish army, and cut off that army from all communications by sea."—W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Eng.*, 18th Century, ch. 3 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: W. Coxe, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch. 102 (v. 3).

A. D. 1743.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Treaty of Worms.—"By a treaty between Great Britain, the Queen of Hungary, and the King of Sardinia, signed at Worms September 28th, 1743, Charles Emanuel renounced his pretensions to Milan; the Queen of Hungary ceding to him the Vigevanese, that part of the duchy of Pavia between the Po and the Tessino, the town and part of the duchy of Piacenza, and a portion of the district of Anghiera. Also whatever rights she might have to the mar-

quisate of Finale, hoping that the Republic of Genoa would facilitate this agreement, in order that the King of Sardinia might have a communication with the sea. The Queen of Hungary promised to increase her army in Italy to 80,000 men as soon as the affairs of Germany would permit; while the King of Great Britain engaged to keep a strong fleet in the Mediterranean, and to pay Charles Emanuel annually £200,000, so long as the war lasted, he keeping in the field an army of 45,000 men."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 6, ch. 4 (v. 3).

A. D. 1743.—The Bourbon Family Compact (France and Spain) for establishing Spanish claims. See FRANCE: A. D. 1743 (OCTOBER).

A. D. 1744.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Indecisive campaigns.—"In Italy, the discordant views and mutual jealousies of Maria Theresa and the king of Sardinia prevented the good effects which might have been derived from their recent union. The king was anxious to secure his own dominions on the side of France, and to conquer the marquisate of Finale; while Maria Theresa was desirous to direct her principal force against Naples, and recover possession of the two Sicilies. Hence, instead of co-operating for one great object, their forces were divided; and, after an arduous and active campaign, the Austrians were nearly in the same situation as at the commencement of the year. Prince Lobcowitz being reinforced, compelled the Spaniards to retreat successively from Pesara and Senegallia, attacked them at Loreto and Reconati, and drove them beyond the Fronto, the boundary of the kingdom of Naples. Alarmed by the advance of the Austrians, the king of Naples broke his neutrality, quitted his capital at the head of 15,000 men, and hastened to join the Spaniards. But Prince Lobcowitz . . . turned towards Rome, with the hope of penetrating into Naples on that side; and, in the commencement of June, reached the neighbourhood of Albano. His views were anticipated by the king of Naples, who, dividing the Spanish and Neapolitan troops into three columns, which were led by himself, the duke of Modena, and the count de Gages, passed through Anagni, Valmonte, and Monte Tortino, and reunited his forces at Veletri, in the Campagna di Roma. In this situation, the two hostile armies, separated only by a deep valley, harassed each other with continual skirmishes. At length prince Lobcowitz, in imitation of prince Eugene at Cremona, formed the project of surprising the head-quarters of the king of Naples. In the night of August 10th, a corps of Austrians, led by count Brown, penetrated into the town of Veletri, killed all who resisted, and would have surprised the king and the duke of Modena in their beds, had they not been alarmed by the French ambassador, and escaped to the camp. The Austrian troops, giving way to pillage, were vigorously attacked by a corps of Spaniards and Neapolitans, despatched from the camp, and driven from the town with great slaughter, and the capture of the second in command, the marquis de Novati. In this contest, however, the Spanish army lost no less than 8,000 men. This daring exploit was the last offensive attempt of the Austrian forces. Prince Lobcowitz perceiving his troops rapidly decrease by the effects of the climate, and the unwholesome air of the Pontine marshes, began his retreat in the begin-

ning of November, and though followed by an army superior in number, returned without loss to Rimini, Pesaro, Cesano, and Immola; while the combined Spaniards and Neapolitans took up their quarters between Viterbo and Civita Vecchia. In consequence of the expedition against Naples, the king of Sardinia was left with 30,000 men, many of them new levies, and 6,000 Austrians, to oppose the combined army of French and Spaniards, who advanced on the side of Nice. After occupying that place, the united army forced the intrenched camp of the Sardinians, though defended by the king himself, made themselves masters of Montalbano and Villafranca, and prepared to penetrate into Piedmont along the sea coast. The Genoese, irritated by the transfer of Finale, were inclined to facilitate their operations; but were intimidated by the presence of an English squadron which threatened to bombard their capital. The prince of Conti, who commanded under the infant Don Philip, did not, however, relinquish the invasion of Piedmont, but formed the spirited project of leading his army over the passes of the Alps, although almost every rock was a fortress, and the obstacles of nature were assisted by all the resources of art. He led his army, with a large train of artillery, and numerous squadrons of cavalry, over precipices and along beds of torrents, carried the fort of Chateau Dauphin, forced the celebrated Barricades which were deemed impregnable, descended the valley of the Stura, took Demont after a slight resistance, and laid siege to Coni. The king of Sardinia, having in vain attempted to stop the progress of this torrent which burst the barriers of his country, indignantly retired to Saluzzo, to cover his capital. Being reinforced by 6,000 Austrians, he attempted to relieve Coni, but was repulsed after a severe engagement, though he succeeded in throwing succours into the town. This victory, however, did not produce any permanent advantage to the confederate forces; Coni continuing to hold out, the approach of winter and the losses they had sustained, amounting to 10,000 men, compelled them to raise the siege and repass the Alps, which they did not effect without extreme difficulty."—W. Coxe, *Hist. of the House of Austria*, ch. 105 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: W. Russell, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, pt. 2, ch. 28.

A. D. 1745.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Successes of the Spaniards, French and Genoese.—"The Italian campaign of 1745, in boldness of design and rapidity of execution, scarcely finds a parallel in military history, and was most unpropitious to the Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia. The experience of preceding years had taught the Bourbon Courts that all attempts to carry their arms across the Alps would be fruitless, unless they could secure a stable footing in the dominions of some Italian state on the other side, to counteract the power of their adversary, who had the entire command of the passes between Germany and Italy, by means of which reinforcements could be continually drafted to the scene of action. Accordingly they availed themselves of the jealousy and alarm excited at Genoa, by the transfer of Finale to the King of Sardinia, to engage that republic on their side. The plan was to unite the two armies which had wintered on the distant frontiers of Naples and Provence, in the

vicinity of Genoa, where they were to be joined by 10,000 auxiliaries on the part of the republic. Charles Emanuel was sensible of the terrible consequences to himself, should the Genoese declare openly for the house of Bourbon, and sent General Pallavicini, a man of address and abilities, to renounce his pretensions to Finale, while Admiral Rowley, with a British fleet, hovered on their coasts. In spite of all this, nevertheless, the treaty of Aranjuez was concluded between France, Spain, and Genoa. After surmounting amazing difficulties, and making the most arduous and astonishing marches, the army commanded by Don Philip, who was accompanied by the French General Maillebois, and that commanded by Count de Gages, effected their junction on the 14th of June, near Genoa, when their united forces, now under Don Philip, amounted to 78,000 men. All that the King of Sardinia could do under these circumstances, was to make the best dispositions to defend the Milanese, the Parmesan, and the Plaisantine; but the whole disposable force under the King and Count Schulenburg, the successor of Lobkowitz, did not amount to above 45,000 men. Count Gages with 30,000 men was to be opposed to Schulenburg, and took possession of Serravalle, on the Scrivia; then advancing towards Alessandria he obliged the Austrians to retire under the cannon of Tortona. Don Philip made himself master of Acqui, so that the King of Sardinia, with the Austrian General, Count Schulenburg, had to retreat behind the Tanaro. On the 24th of July the strong citadel of Tortona was taken by the Spaniards, which opened the way to the occupation of Parma and Piacenza. The combined army of French, Spanish, Neapolitans, and Genoese being now masters of an extensive tract with all the principal towns south of the Po, they readily effected a passage near the confluence of the Ticino, and with a detachment surprised Pavia. The Austrians, fearful for the Milanese, separated accordingly from the Sardinian troops. The Bourbon force seeing this, suddenly reunited, gained the Tanaro by a rapid movement on the night of the 27th of September, forded it in three columns, although the water reached to the very necks of the soldiers, fell upon the unsuspecting and unprepared Sardinians, broke their cavalry in the first charge, and drove the enemy in dismay and confusion to Valenza. Charles Emanuel fled to Casale, where he reassembled his broken army, in order to save it from utter ruin. The confederate armies still advanced, drove the King back and took Trino and Verua, which last place lay but twenty miles from his capital: fearful now that this might be bombarded he hastened thither, withdrew his forces under its cannon, and ordered the pavement of the city to be taken up. Maillebois, on his side, penetrated into the Milanese, and by the month of October the territories of the house of Austria in Italy were wholly subdued. The whole of Lombardy being thus open, Don Philip made a triumphant entry into Milan on the 20th of December, fondly hoping that he had secured for himself an Italian kingdom, as his brother, Don Carlos, had done at Naples. The Austrian garrison, however, still maintained the citadel of Milan and the fortress of Mantua."—Sir E. Cust, *Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century*, v. 2, pp. 75-76.

ALSO IN: A. Gallenga, *Hist. of Piedmont*, v. 3, ch. 4.

A. D. 1746-1747.—The War of the Austrian Succession: A turn of fortune.—The Spaniards and French abandon North Italy.—The Austrians in Genoa, and their expulsion from the city.—“Of all the Austrian possessions in Lombardy, little remained except the fortress of Mantua and the citadel of Milan; while the citadels of Asti and Alessandria, the keys of Piedmont, were expected to fall before the commencement of the ensuing campaign. On the return of the season for action, the struggle for the mastery of Italy was renewed, and the queen of Spain already saw in imagination the crown of Lombardy gracing the brow of her second son. On the east, the French and Spanish armies had extended themselves as far as Reggio, Placentia, and Guastalla; on the north they were masters of the whole country between the Adda and Tesino; they blockaded the passages by the lake of Como and the Lago Maggiore, and were preparing to reduce the citadel of Milan; on the west their posts extended as far as Casale and Asti, though of the last the citadel was still held by the Sardinians. The main body of the French secured the communication with Genoa and the country south of the Po; a strong body at Reggio, Parma, and Placentia, covered their conquests on the east; and the Spaniards commanded the district between the Po and the mountains of Tyrol. The Sardinians were collected into the neighbourhood of Trino; while the Austrians fell back into the Novarese to effect a junction with the reinforcements which were daily expected from Germany. In this situation, a sudden revolution took place in the fortune of the war. The empress queen [Maria Theresa], by the conclusion of a peace with Prussia, was at liberty to reinforce her army in Italy, and before the end of February 30,000 men had already descended from the Trentine Alps, and spread themselves as far as the Po.” This change of situation caused the French court to make overtures to the king of Sardinia, which gave great offense to Spain. The wily Sardinian gained time by his negotiations with the French, until he found an opportunity, by suddenly ending the armistice, to capture the French garrison in Asti, to relieve the citadel of Alessandria and to lay siege to Valenza. “These disasters compelled Maillebois [the French general] to abandon his distant posts and concentrate his forces between Novi and Voghera, in order to maintain the communication with Genoa. Nor were the Spaniards beyond the Po in a less critical situation. A column of 10,000 Austrians under Berenclau having captured Codogno, and advanced to Lodi, the Spanish general was compelled to withdraw his troops from the passes towards the lakes, to send his artillery to Pavia and draw towards the Po. The infant had scarcely quitted Milan before a party of Austrian hussars entered the place.” Meantime the Spanish general Castelar, blockaded in Parma by the Austrians, broke through their lines and gained the eastern Riviera, with the loss of half his force. In June, the Spaniards and French, concentrated at Placentia, made a powerful attack on the Austrians, to arrest their progress, but were repulsed with heavy loss. The Sardinians soon afterwards formed a junction with the Austrians, which compelled the Spaniards and French to evacuate Placentia and retreat to Genoa, abandoning stores and artillery and losing many men. In the midst

of these disasters, the Spanish king, Philip V., died, and his widowed queen, Elizabeth Farnese—the “Spanish termagant,” Carlyle calls her—who had been the moving spirit of the struggle for Italy, lost the reins of government. His son (by his first wife, Maria Louisa of Savoy) who succeeded him, had no ambitions and no passions to interest him in the war, and resolved to escape from it. The marquis Las Minas, whom he sent to take command of the retreating army, speedily announced his intention to abandon Italy. “Thus deserted, the situation of the French and Genoese became desperate. . . . Maillebois, after exhorting the Genoese to defend their territory to the last extremity, was obliged to follow the example of Las Minas in withdrawing towards Provence. Abandoned to their fate, the Genoese could not withstand the combined attacks of the Austro-Sardinians, assisted by the British fleet. The city surrendered almost at discretion; the garrison were made prisoners of war; the stores, arms and artillery were to be delivered; the doge and six senators to repair to Vienna and implore forgiveness. The marquis of Botta, who had replaced Lichtenstein in the command, took possession of the place with 15,000 men, while the king of Sardinia occupied Finale and reduced Savona. In consequence of this success the Austrian court meditated the re-conquest of Naples and Sicily, which had been drained of troops to support the war in Lombardy.” But this project was overruled by the British government, and the allied army crossed the Var, to carry the war into the southeastern provinces of France. “Their progress was, however, instantly arrested by an insurrection at Genoa, occasioned by the exactions and oppressions of the Austrian commanders. The garrison was expelled by the tumultuary efforts of the populace; and the army, to obviate the mischiefs of this unexpected reverse, hastily measured back its steps. Instead of completing the disasters of the Bourbon troops, the Austro-Sardinians employed the whole winter in the investment of Genoa.” The siege was protracted but unsuccessful, and the allies were forced to abandon it the following summer, on the approach of the Bourbon forces, which resumed the offensive under Marshal Belleisle. After delivering Genoa, the latter sent a detachment of his army into Piedmont, where it met with disaster. No further operations of importance were undertaken before the conclusion of the peace, which was then being negotiated at Aix-la-Chapelle.—W. Coxe, *Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain*, ch. 46-48 (v. 3-4).

Also in: J. T. Bent, *Genoa*, ch. 16.

A. D. 1749-1792.—Peace in the Peninsula.—The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle “left nothing to Austria in Italy except the duchies of Milan and Mantua. Although the grand-duchy of Tuscany was settled on the family of Hapsburg-Lorraine, every precaution was taken to prevent that province from being united with the German possessions of their house. The arrangements of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle continued up to the period of the French revolution undisturbed. Those arrangements, although the result of a compromise of the interests and ambitions of rival statesmen, were not, considering the previous state of Italy, unfavourable to the cause of Italian independence. Piedmont, already recognised as the protector of Italian nationality, gained not only in rank, but in

substantial territory, by the acquisition of the island of Sardinia, still more by that of the High Novarese, and by extending her frontier to the Ticino. Naples and Sicily were released from the tyranny of viceroys, and placed under a resident king, with a stipulation to secure their future independence, that they should never be united to the Spanish crown. . . . In the 45 [?] years which elapsed between the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and the French revolution, Italy enjoyed a perfect and uninterrupted peace. In some, at least, of its principalities, its progress in prosperity and in legislation was rapid. Naples and Sicily, under the government of Charles III., and subsequently under the regency of his minister, Tanucci, were ruled with energy and prudence. Tuscany prospered under the sway of the princes of Lorraine, Milan and Mantua were mildly governed by the Austrian court; and Lombardy rose from the misery to which the exactions of Spanish viceroys had reduced even the great resources of that rich and fertile province. In the other Italian States at least no change had taken place for the worse. Industry everywhere flourished under the presence of the most essential of all blessings,—peace.”—I. Butt, *Hist. of Italy*, v. 1, ch. 5.

A. D. 1792-1793.—Annexation of Savoy and Nice to the French Republic.—Sardinia and the Two Sicilies in the coalition against France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER); and 1793 (MARCH—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1794-1795.—Passes of the Maritime Alps secured by the French.—The coalition abandoned by the Grand Duke of Tuscany.—French successes at Loano. See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER—MAY); and 1795 (JUNE—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1796-1797.—French invasion.—Bonaparte's first campaigns.—His victories and his pillage.—Expulsion of the Austrians.—French treaties with Genoa and Naples.—The Cispadane and Cisalpine Republics.—Surrender of Papal territories.—Peace preliminaries of Leoben. See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL—OCTOBER), and (OCTOBER); and 1796-1797 (OCTOBER—APRIL).

A. D. 1797 (May—October).—Creation of the Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics.—The Peace of Campo-Formio.—Lombardy relinquished by Austria.—Venice and Venetian territory made over to her. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1797-1798 (December—May).—French occupation of Rome.—Formation of the Roman Republic.—Removal of the Pope. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797-1798 (DECEMBER—MAY).

A. D. 1798-1799.—Overthrow of the Neapolitan Kingdom.—Creation of the Parthenopean Republic.—Relinquishment of Piedmont by the king of Sardinia.—French reverses. See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST—APRIL).

A. D. 1799 (April—August).—Successful Austro-Russian campaign.—Suwarrow's victories.—French evacuation of Lombardy, Piedmont and Naples. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1799 (August—December).—Austrian successes.—Expulsion of the French.—Fall of the Parthenopean and Roman Republics. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (AUGUST—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1800.—Bonaparte's Marengo campaign.—Northern Italy recovered by the

French.—Siege and capture of Genoa by the Austrians. See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (MAY—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1800-1801 (June—February).—The king of Naples spared by Napoleon.—Restoration of Papal authority at Rome. See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (JUNE—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1802.—Name of the Cisalpine Republic changed to Italian Republic.—Bonaparte president.—Annexation of part of Piedmont, with Parma and Elba, to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1803, and 1802 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1805.—Transformation of the Italian Republic into the Kingdom of Italy.—Election and coronation of Napoleon.—Annexation of Genoa to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1804-1805.

A. D. 1805.—Cession of Venetian territory by Austria to the Kingdom of Italy. See GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806.

A. D. 1805-1806.—Napoleon's dethronement of the dynasty of Naples.—Joseph Bonaparte made king of the Two Sicilies. See FRANCE: A. D. 1805-1806 (DECEMBER—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1807-1808.—Napoleon's visit.—His arbitrary changes in the constitution.—His public works.—His despotism.—His annexation of Tuscany to France, and seizure of the Papal States. See FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1808 (NOVEMBER—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1808 (July).—The crown of Naples resigned by Joseph Bonaparte (now king of Spain) and conferred on Joachim Murat. See SPAIN: A. D. 1808 (MAY—SEPTEMBER).

(Southern): A. D. 1808-1809.—Beginning of the reign of Murat at Naples.—Expulsion of the English from Capri.—Insolence of Murat's soldiery.—Popular discontent and hatred.—Rise of the Carbonari.—Civil war in Calabria.—“Joachim Murat, the new King of Naples, announced his accession to the nation [July, 1808]. ‘The august Napoleon,’ he said, ‘had given him the kingdom of the two Sicilies. Gratitude to the donor, and a desire to benefit his subjects, would divide his heart.’ . . . The commencement of Murat's reign was felicitous; the English, however, occupied the island of Capri, which, being placed at the opening of the gulf, is the key of the bay of Naples. Their presence stimulated all who were averse to the new government, intimidated its adherents, and impeded the freedom of navigation, to the manifest injury of commerce; besides, it was considered disgraceful, that one of the Napoleonides should suffer an enemy so near, and that enemy the English, who were at once so hated and so despised. The indolence of Joseph had patiently suffered the disgrace; but Joachim, a spirited soldier, was indignant at it, and he thought it necessary to commence his reign by some important enterprise. He armed therefore against Capri: Sir Hudson Lowe was there in garrison with two regiments collected from all the nations of Europe, and which were called the Royal Corsican and the Royal Maltese. . . . A body of French and Neapolitans were sent from Naples and Salerno, under the command of General Lamarque, to reduce the island; and they effected a landing, by means of ladders hung to the rocks by iron hooks, and thus possessed themselves of Anacapri, though not without great difficulty, as the English resolutely defended themselves.

... The siege proceeded but slowly—succours of men and ammunition reached the besieged from Sicily; but fortune favoured the enemy, as an adverse wind drove the English out to sea. The King, who superintended the operations from the shore of Massa, having waited at the point of Campanella, seizing the propitious moment, sent fresh squadrons in aid of Lamarque, and the English, being already broken, and the forts dismantled, now yielded to the conqueror. The Neapolitans were highly gratified by the acquisition of Capri, and from that event augured well of the new government. The kingdom of Naples contained three classes of people—barons, republicans, and populace. The barons willingly joined the party of the new king, because they were pleased by the honours granted to them, and they were not without hopes of recovering their ancient privileges, or at least of acquiring new ones. . . . The republicans were, on the contrary, inimical to Joachim, not because he was a king, for they easily accommodated themselves to royalty; but because his conduct in Tuscany, where he had driven them forth or bound them in chains like malefactors, had rendered him personally obnoxious to them. They were moreover disgusted by his incredible vanity, which led him to court and caress with the most zealous adulation every bearer of a feudal title. . . . The populace, who cared no more for Joachim than they had done for Joseph, would easily have contented themselves with the new government, if it had protected them from the oppressions of the barons, and had procured for them quiet and abundance. But Joachim, wholly intent on courting the nobles, neglected the people, who, oppressed by the barons and soldiery, became alienated from him. . . . The spirit of discontent was further increased by his introduction of the conscription laws of France. . . . Joachim, a soldier himself, permitted every thing to his soldiery; and an insupportable military license was the result. Hence, also, they became the sole support of his power, and it took no root in the affections of the people. The insolence of the troops continually augmented: not only every desire, but every caprice of the head of a regiment, nay, even of the inferior officers, was to be complied with, as if they were the laws of the realm; and whosoever even lamented his subjection to their will was ill-treated and incurred some risk of being declared an enemy to the King. . . . The discontents produced by the enormities committed by the troops of Murat gave hopes to the court of Palermo that its fortunes might be re-established in the kingdom beyond the Faro. Meanwhile, the civil war raged in Calabria; nor were the Abruzzi tranquil. In these disturbances there were various factions in arms, and various objects were pursued: some of those who fought against Joachim, and had fought against Joseph, were adherents of Ferdinand,—others were the partisans of a republican constitution. . . . The sect of the Carbonari arose at this period.”—C. Botta, *Italy during the Consulate and Empire of Napoleon*, ch. 5.—“The most famous, the most widely disseminated, and the most powerful of all the secret societies which sprang up in Italy was that of the Carbonari, or Charcoal-makers. . . . The Carbonari first began to attract attention in the Kingdom of Naples about the year 1808. A Genoese named Maghella, who burned with

hatred of the French, is said to have initiated several Neapolitans into a secret order whose purpose it was to goad their countrymen into rebellion. They quitted Naples, where Murat's vigilant policy kept too strict a watch on conspirators, and retired to the Abruzzi, where in order to disarm suspicion they pretended to be engaged in charcoal-burning. As their numbers increased, agents were sent to establish lodges in the principal towns. The Bourbon king, shut up in Sicily, soon heard of them, and as he had not hesitated at letting loose with English aid galley-prisoners, or at encouraging brigands, to harass Murat, so he eagerly connived with these conspirators in the hope of recovering his throne. Murat, having striven for several years to suppress the Carbonari, at last, when he found his power slipping from him, reversed his policy towards them, and strove to conciliate them. But it was too late: neither he nor they could prevent the restoration of the Bourbons under the protection of Austria. The sectaries who had hitherto foolishly expected that, if the French could be expelled, Ferdinand would grant them a Liberal government, were soon cured of their delusion, and they now plotted against him as sedulously as they had plotted against his predecessor. Their membership increased to myriads; their lodges, starting up in every village in the Kingdom of Naples, had relations with branch-societies in all parts of the Peninsula: to the anxious ears of European despots the name Carbonaro soon meant all that was lawless and terrible; it meant anarchy, chaos, assassination. But when we read the catechism, or confession of faith, of the Carbonari we are surprised by the reasonableness of their aims and tenets. The duties of the individual Carbonaro were, ‘to render to the Almighty the worship due to Him; to serve the fatherland with zeal; to reverence religion and laws; to fulfil the obligations of nature and friendship; to be faithful to promises; to observe silence, discretion, and charity; to cause harmony and good morals to prevail; to conquer the passions and submit the will; and to abhor the seven deadly sins.’ The scope of the Society was to disseminate instruction; to unite the different classes of society under the bond of love; to impress a national character on the people, and to interest them in the preservation and defense of the fatherland and of religion; to destroy by moral culture the source of crimes due to the general depravity of mankind; to protect the weak and to raise up the unfortunate. . . . It went still farther and asserted the un-Catholic doctrine of liberty of conscience: ‘to every Carbonaro,’ so reads one of its articles, ‘belongs the natural and unalterable right to worship the Almighty according to his own intuition and understanding.’ We must not be misled, however, by these enlightened professions, into a wrong notion of the real purposes of Carbonarism. Politics, in spite of a rule forbidding political discussion, were the main business; and ethics but the incidental concern of the conspirators. They organized their Order under republican forms as if to prefigure the ideal towards which they aspired. The Republic was subdivided into provinces, each of which was controlled by a grand lodge, that of Salerno being the ‘parent.’ There were also four ‘Tribes,’ each having a council and holding an annual diet. Each tribe had a Senate, which advised

House of Representatives, and this framed the laws which a magistracy executed. There were courts of the first instance, of appeal, and of cessation, and no Carbonaro might bring suit in the civil courts against a fellow member, unless he had first failed to get redress in one of these. . . . The Carbonari borrowed some of their rites from the Freemasons, with whom indeed they were commonly reported to be in such close relations that Freemasons who joined the 'Carbonic Republic' were spared the formality of initiation; other parts of their ceremonial they copied from the New Testament, with such additions as the special objects of the order called for."—W. R. Thayer, *The Dawn of Italian Independence*, bk. 2, ch. 4 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: P. Colletta, *Hist. of the Kingdom of Naples*, bk. 7 (v. 2).—T. Frost, *Secret Societies of the European Revolution*, v. 1, ch. 5.—Gen. Sir H. Bunbury, *The Great War with France*, p. 343, and after.—The Chevalier O'Clery, *Hist. of the Italian Rev.*, ch. 3.

A. D. 1809 (April–May).—Renewed war of Austria with France.—Austrian advance and retreat. See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JANUARY–JUNE).

A. D. 1809 (May–July).—Annexation of the Papal States to the French Empire.—Removal of the Pope to Savona.—Rome declared to be a free and imperial city. See PAPACY: A. D. 1808–1814.

A. D. 1812.—Removal of the captive Pope to Fontainebleau. See PAPACY: A. D. 1808–1814.

A. D. 1812.—Participation in Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (JUNE–SEPTEMBER), and after.

A. D. 1813.—Participation in the war in Germany. See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (APRIL–MAY).

A. D. 1814.—Desertion of Napoleon by Murat.—His treaty with the Allies.—Expulsion of the French from the Peninsula.—Murat, king of Naples, "foreseeing the downfall of the Emperor, had attempted to procure from Napoleon, as the price of his fidelity, the union under his own sceptre of all Italy south of the Po; but, failing in this, he prepared to abandon the cause of his benefactor. On the 11th January, 1814, he concluded a treaty with the Allies, by which he was guaranteed possession of Naples; and forthwith advancing on Rome with 20,000 men, occupied the second city in his brother-in-law's empire (Jan. 19); having previously published a flaming proclamation, in which the perfidy and violence of the imperial government were denounced in terms which came strangely from a chief of the Revolution. . . . At the end of December, 1813, Eugene had withdrawn to the Adige with 36,000 men, before Bellegarde and 50,000 Austrians; and he was already taking measures for a further retreat, when the proclamation of Murat, and his hostile advance, rendered such a movement inevitable. He had accordingly fallen back to the Mincio, when, finding himself threatened on the flank by a British expedition from Sicily under Lord William Bentinck, he determined on again advancing against Bellegarde, so as to rid himself of one enemy before he encountered another. The two armies, however, thus mutually acting on the offensive, passed each other, and an irregular action at last ensued on the Mincio (Feb. 8),

in which the advantage was rather with the French, who made 1,500 prisoners, and drove Bellegarde shortly after over the Mincio, about 3,000 being killed and wounded on each side. But, in other quarters, affairs were going rapidly to wreck. Verona surrendered to the Austrians on the 14th, and Ancona to Murat on the 16th; and the desertion of the Italians, unequal to the fatigues of a winter campaign, was so great that the Viceroy was compelled to fall back to the Po. Fouché meanwhile, as governor of Rome, had concluded a convention (Feb. 20) with the Neapolitan generals for the evacuation of Pisa, Leghorn, Florence, and other garrisons of the French empire in Italy. A proclamation, however, by the hereditary prince of Sicily, who had accompanied Bentinck from Sicily, gave Murat such umbrage that he separated his troops from the British, and commenced operations, with little success, against Eugene on the Po, in which the remainder of March passed away. Bentinck, having at length received reinforcements from Catalonia, moved forward with 12,000 men, and occupied Spezia on the 29th of March, and, driving the French (April 8) from their position at Sestri, forced his way through the mountains, and appeared on the 16th in front of Genoa. On the 17th the forts and positions before the city were stormed; and the garrison, seeing preparations made for a bombardment, capitulated on the 18th, on condition of being allowed to march out with the honours of war. Murat had by this time recommenced vigorous operations, and after driving the French (April 18) from the Taro, had forced the passage of the Stura; but the news of Napoleon's fall put an end to hostilities. By a convention with the Austrians, Venice, Palma-Nuova, and the other fortresses still held by the French, were surrendered; the whole of Lombardy was occupied by the Germans; and in the first week of May the French troops finally repassed the Alps."—*Epitome of Alison's Hist. of Europe*, sect. 775, and 807–808.

A. D. 1814–1815.—Return of the Despots.—Restoration of Austrian tyranny in the North.—The Pope in Rome again.—"With little resistance, Northern Italy was taken from the French. Had it been otherwise, had Murat and Beauharnais joined their forces, they might have long held the Austrians in check, perhaps even have made a descent on Vienna; and although this might not have hindered the ultimate overthrow of Napoleon, yet it must have compelled the Allies, at the day of settlement, to respect the wishes of the Italians. But disunited, and deluded into the belief that they were partners in a war of liberation, the Italians woke up to find that they had escaped from the talons of the French eagle, only to be caught in the clutch of the two-headed monstrosity of Austria. They were to be used, in the language of Joseph De Maistre, like coins, wherewith the Allies paid their debts. This was plain enough when the people of the just-destroyed Kingdom of Italy prepared to choose a ruler for themselves; one party favored Beauharnais, another wished an Austrian prince, a third an Italian, but all agreed in demanding independence. Austria quickly informed them that they were her subjects, and that their affairs would be decided at Vienna. Thus, almost without striking a blow, and without a suspicion of the lot awaiting them, the Northern Italians fell back under the domination

of Austria. In the spring and early summer of 1814 the exiled princelings returned: Victor Emanuel I. from his savage refuge in Sardinia to Turin; Ferdinand III. from Würzburg to Florence; Pius VII. from his confinement at Fontainebleau and Savona to Rome [see PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814]; Francis IV. to Modena. Other aspirants anxiously waited for the Congress of Vienna to bestow upon them the remaining provinces. The Congress . . . dragged on into the spring of the following year. . . . In Lombardy and Venetia, Metternich soon organized a thoroughly Austrian administration. The government of the two provinces was separate, that of Lombardy being centred at Milan, that of Venetia at Venice; but over all was placed an Austrian archduke as Viceroy. Each district had its civil and military tribunals, but the men who composed these being appointees of the viceroy or his deputies, their subservience could usually be reckoned upon. The trials were secret, a provision which, especially in political cases, made convictions easy. . . . Feudal privileges, which had been abolished by the French, could be recovered by doing homage to the Emperor and by paying specific taxes. In some respects there was an improvement in the general administration, but in others the deterioration was manifest. . . . Art, science, and literature were patronized, and they thrived as potted plants thrive under the care of a gardener who cuts off every new shoot at a certain height. . . . We may liken the people of the Austro-Italian provinces to those Florentine revelers who, at the time of the plague, tried to drive away their terror by telling each other the merry stories reported by Boccaccio. The plague which penetrated every corner of Lombardy and Venetia was the Austrian police. Stealthy, but sure, its unseen presence was dreaded in palace and hovel, in church, tribunal, and closet. . . . Every police-office was crammed with records of the daily habits of each citizen, of his visitors, his relatives, his casual conversations,—even his style of dress and diet were set down. . . . Such was the Metternichian system of police and espionage that counteracted every mild law and every attempt to lessen the repugnance of the Italians. They were not to be deceived by blandishments: Lombardy was a prison, Venetia was a prison, and they were all captives, although they seemed to move about unshackled to their work or pleasure.”—W. R. Thayer, *The Dawn of Italian Independence*, bk. 2, ch. 2 (v. 1).—See, also, VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF; AUSTRIA: A. D. 1815-1846; and HOLY ALLIANCE.

(Southern): A. D. 1815.—Murat's attempt to head a national movement.—His failure, downfall and death.—Restoration of the Bourbons at Naples.—“Wild as was the attempt in which, after Napoleon's return from Elba, the King of Naples lost his crown, we must yet judge of it both by his own character and the circumstances in which he was placed. . . . In the autumn of 1815 communications took place at Milan between Murat and the leaders of the secret societies which were then attempting to organize Italian patriotism in arms. In 1814, when the restoration of Austrian rule in Lombardy so cruelly disappointed the national hopes, these communications were renewed. The King of Naples was assured that he needed but to

raise the standard of Italian independence to rally round him thousands and tens of thousands of volunteers. . . . These calculations . . . were readily adopted by the rash and vain-glorious monarch to whom they were presented. . . . His proud spirit chafed and fretted under the consciousness that he had turned upon Napoleon, and the mortification of finding himself deserted by those in reliance upon whose faith this sacrifice had been made. The events in France had taken him by surprise. In joining the alliance against Napoleon he had not calculated on the deposition of the emperor, still less had he dreamed of the destruction of the empire. . . . He bitterly reproached his own conduct for having lent himself to such results. . . . When his mind was agitated with these mingled feelings, the intelligence reached him that Napoleon had actually left Elba, on that enterprise in which he staked everything upon regaining the imperial throne of France. It came to him direct from Napoleon. . . . He foresaw that the armies of the allied powers would be engaged in a gigantic struggle with the efforts which Napoleon would be sure to make. Under such circumstances, he fancied Italy an easy conquest; once master of this he became a power with whom, in the conflict of nations, any of the contending parties could only be too happy to treat. He determined to place himself at the head of Italian nationality, and strike one daring blow for the chieftainship of the nation. . . . His ministers, his friends, the French generals, even his queen, Napoleon's sister, dissuaded him from such a course. . . . But with an obstinacy by which the vacillating appear sometimes to attempt to atone for habitual indecision, he persevered in spite of all advice. . . . He issued a proclamation and ordered his troops to cross the Papal frontier. . . . The Pope appointed a regency and retired, accompanied by most of the cardinals, to Florence. . . . On the 30th of March his [Murat's] troops attacked the Austrian forces at Cesena. The Germans were driven, without offering much resistance, from the town. On the evening of that day he issued from Rimini his proclamation to the Italian people, which was against Austria a declaration of war. . . . A declaration of war on the part of Austria immediately followed. . . . The whole of the Italian army of Austria was ordered at once to march upon Naples; and a treaty was concluded with Ferdinand, by which Austria engaged to use all her endeavours to recover for him his Neapolitan dominions. . . . The army which Murat led northward, instead of numbering 80,000 as he represented in his proclamation, certainly never exceeded 34,000. . . . Nearly 60,000 Austrians defended the banks of the Po. . . . On the 10th of April, the troops of Murat, under the command of General Pepe, were driven back by the Austrians, who now in their turn advanced. . . . A retreat to the frontiers of Naples was unanimously resolved on. This retreat was one that had all the disasters without any of the redeeming glories of war. . . . At last, as they approached the confines of the Neapolitan kingdom, an engagement which took place between Macerata and Tolentino, on the 4th of May, ended in a total and ignominious rout. . . . At Macerata most of the troops broke up into a disorganised rabble, and with difficulty Murat led to Casua a small remnant of an army, that could

hardly be said to be defeated, because they were worsted without anything that deserves to be called a fight. From Capua, on the 12th of May, the king sent to Naples a proclamation granting a free constitution. To conceal the fact that this was wrung from him only in distress, he resorted to the miserable subterfuge of ante-dating it from Rimini, on the 30th of March." On the evening of the 18th of May, Murat entered Naples quietly on foot, and had his last interview with his queen and children. A British squadron was already in the harbor. The next night he slipped away to the island of Ischia, and thence to Frejus, while Queen Caroline remained to discharge the last duties of sovereignty. On the 20th Naples was surrendered to the Austrians, and the ex-queen took refuge on an English vessel to escape from a threatening mob of the lazzaroni. She was conveyed to Trieste, where the Austrian emperor had offered her an asylum. The restored Bourbon king, Ferdinand, made his entry into the capital on the 17th of June. Meantime, Murat, in France, had offered his services to Napoleon and they had been declined. After Waterloo, he escaped to Corsica, whence, in the following October, he made a foolhardy attempt to recover his kingdom, landing with a few followers at Pizzo, on the Neapolitan coast, expecting a rising of the people to welcome his return. But the rising that occurred was hostile instead of friendly. The party was quickly overpowered, Murat taken prisoner and delivered to Ferdinand's officers. He was summarily tried by court martial and shot, October 13, 1815.—*I. Butt, Hist. of Italy, v. 2, ch. 10-11.*

ALSO IN: P. Colletta, *Hist. of Naples*, bk. 7, ch. 5, and bk. 8, ch. 1 (v. 2).

A. D. 1820-1821.—Revolutionary insurrections in Naples and Sicily.—Perjury and duplicity of the king.—The revolt crushed by Austrian troops.—Abortive insurrection in Piedmont.—Its end at Novara.—Abdication of Victor Emmanuel I.—Accession of Charles Felix.—"In the last days of February, 1820, a revolution broke out in Spain. The object of its leaders was to restore the Constitution of 1812, which had been suppressed on the return of the Bourbons to the throne. . . . The Revolution proved successful, and for a short time the Spaniards obtained possession of a democratic Constitution. Their success stirred up the ardour of the Liberal party in the kingdom of the two Sicilies, and before many weeks were over a revolutionary movement occurred at Naples. The insurrection originated with the army under the command of General Pepé, and it is worthy of note that the movement was not directed against the reigning dynasty, and was not, even nominally, associated with any demand for national unity. All the insurgents asked for was the establishment of a Constitution similar to that then existing in Spain. After a very brief and feeble resistance, the King yielded to the demands of the military conspirators, who were strongly supported by popular feeling. On the 1st of October, a Parliament of the Neapolitan kingdom was opened by His Majesty Francis the First, who then and there took a solemn oath to observe the Constitution, and even went out of his way to profess his profound attachment for the principles on which the new Government was based. General Pepé there-

upon resigned the Dictatorship he had assumed, and constitutional liberty was deemed to have been finally established in Southern Italy by a bloodless revolution. The rising on the mainland was followed after a brief interval by a popular insurrection in Sicily. The main object, however, of the Sicilian Constitutionals was to bring about a legislative separation between the island and the kingdom of Naples proper. . . . The Sicilian insurrection afforded Francis I. the pretext he had looked for, from the commencement, for overthrowing the Constitution to which he had personally plighted his faith. The Allied Sovereigns took alarm at the outbreak of the revolutionary spirit in Sicily, and a Congress of the Great Powers was convoked at Laibach [see VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF] to consider what steps required to be taken for the protection of social order in the kingdom of Naples. . . . By the Neapolitan Constitution the Sovereign was not at liberty to leave the kingdom without the consent of the Parliament. This consent was only given, after much hesitation, in reliance upon the reiterated assurances of the King, both publicly and privately, that his one object in attending the Congress was to avert, if possible, a foreign intervention. His Majesty also pledged himself most solemnly not to sanction any change in the Constitution to which he had sworn allegiance, and . . . he promised further that he would not be a party to any reprisals being inflicted upon his subjects for the part they might have taken in the establishment of Constitutional liberty. As soon, however, as Francis the First had arrived at Laibach, he yielded without a protest to the alleged necessity for a foreign occupation of his kingdom, with the avowed object of putting down the Constitution. Without any delay being given, the Austrian regiments crossed the frontier, preceded by a manifesto from the King, calling upon his faithful subjects to receive the army of occupation not as enemies, but as friends. . . . The national troops, under General Pepé, were defeated with ease by the Austrians, who in the course of a few weeks effected, almost without opposition, the military occupation of the whole kingdom [February—March, 1821]. Forthwith reprisals commenced in grim earnest. On the plea that the resistance offered by the Constitutionals to the invading army constituted an act of high treason, the King declared himself absolved from all promises he had given previously to his departure. A reign of terror was set on foot. . . . Signor Botta thus sums up the net result of the punishments inflicted after the return of the King in the Neapolitan provinces alone. 'About a thousand persons were condemned to death, imprisoned, or exiled. Infinitely greater was the number of officers and officials who were deprived of their posts by the Commissioners of Investigation.' . . . The establishment of Constitutional Government in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the resolution adopted at the instigation of Austria, by the Congress of Laibach, to suppress the Neapolitan Constitution by armed force, produced a profound effect throughout Italy, and especially in Sardinia. The fact that internal reforms were incompatible with the ascendancy of Austria in the Peninsula was brought home to the popular mind, and, for the first time in the history of Italy, the desire for civil liberty became identified with the

national aversion to foreign rule. In Piedmont there was a powerful Constitutional party, composed chiefly of professional men, and a strong military caste, aristocratic by birth and conviction, but opposed on national grounds to the domination of Austria over Italy. These two parties coalesced for a time upon the common platform of Constitutional Reform and war with Austria; and the result was the abortive rising of 1821. The insurrection, however, though directed against the established Government, had about it nothing of an anti-dynastic, or even of a revolutionary character. On the contrary, the leaders of the revolt professed, and probably with sincerity, that they were carrying out the true wishes of their Sovereign. Their theory was, that Victor Emmanuel I. was only compelled to adhere to the Holy Alliance by considerations of foreign policy, and that, if his hands were forced, he would welcome any opportunity of severing himself from all complicity with Austria. Acting on this belief, they determined to proclaim the Constitution by a sort of coup d'état, and then, after having declared war on Austria, to invade Lombardy, and thus create a diversion in favour of the Neapolitans. It is certain that Victor Emmanuel I. gave no sanction to, and was not even cognisant of, this mad enterprise. . . . The troubles and calamities of his early life had exhausted his energy; and his one desire was to live at peace at home and abroad. On the other hand, it is certain that Charles Albert [Prince of Savoy-Carignan, heir presumptive to the throne of Sardinia] was in communication with the leaders of the insurrection, though how far he was privy to their actual designs has never yet been clearly ascertained. The insurrection broke out just about the time when the Austrian troops were approaching the Neapolitan frontiers. . . . The insurrection gained head rapidly, and the example of Alexandria was followed by the garrison of Turin. Pressure was brought to bear upon Victor Emmanuel I., and he was led to believe that the only means of averting civil war was to grant the Constitution. The pressure, however, overshot its mark. On the one hand, the King felt that he could not possibly withstand the demand for a Constitution at the cost of having to order the regiments which had remained loyal to fire upon the insurgents. On the other hand, he did not feel justified in granting the Constitution without the sanction of his brother and [immediate] heir. In order, therefore, to escape from this dilemma, his Majesty abdicated suddenly in favour of Charles Felix [his brother]. As, however, the new Sovereign happened to be residing at Modena, at the Court of his brother-in-law, the Prince of Savoy-Carignan was appointed Regent until such time as Charles Felix could return to the capital. Immediately upon his abdication, Victor Emmanuel quitted Turin, and Charles Albert was left in supreme authority as Regent of the State. Within twelve hours of his accession to power, the Regent proclaimed the Spanish Constitution as the fundamental law of Piedmont. . . . The probability is . . . that Charles Albert, or rather his advisers, were anxious to tie the hands of the new Sovereign. They calculated that Charles Felix, who was no longer young, and who was known to be bitterly hostile to all Liberal theories of Government, would abdicate sooner than accept the

Crown of a Constitutional kingdom. This calculation proved erroneous. . . . As soon as his Majesty learned the news of what had occurred in his absence, he issued a manifesto [March, 1821], declaring all the reforms granted under the Regency to be null and void, describing the authors of the Constitution as rebels, and avowing his intention, in the case of necessity, of calling upon the Allied Powers to assist him in restoring the legitimate authority of the Crown. Meanwhile, he refused to accept the throne till the restoration of order had given Victor Emmanuel full freedom to reconsider the propriety of abdication. This manifesto was followed by the immediate advance of an Austrian corps d'armée to the frontier stream of the Ticino, as well as by the announcement that the Russian Government had ordered an army of 100,000 men to set out on their march towards Italy, with the avowed object of restoring order in the Peninsula. The population of Piedmont recognised at once, with their practical good sense, that any effective resistance was out of the question. . . . The courage of the insurgents gave way in view of the obstacles which they had to encounter, and the last blow was dealt to their cause by the sudden defection of the Prince Regent. . . . Unable either to face his coadjutors in the Constitutional pronunciamento, or to assume the responsibility of an open conflict with the legitimate Sovereign, the Regent left Turin secretly [March 21, 1821], without giving any notice of his intended departure, and, on arriving at Novara, formally resigned his short-lived power. The leaders, however, of the insurrection had committed themselves too deeply to follow the example of the Regent. A Provisional Government was established at Turin, and it was determined to march upon Novara, in the hope that the troops collected there would fraternise with the insurgents. As soon as it was known that the insurgents were advancing in force from Turin, the Austrians, under General Bùbner, crossed the Ticino, and effected a junction with the Royal troops. When the insurgents reached Novara, they suddenly found themselves confronted, not by their own fellow-countrymen, but by an Austrian army. A panic ensued, and the insurrectionary force suffered a disastrous, though, fortunately, a comparatively bloodless, defeat. After this disaster the insurrection was virtually at an end. . . . The Austrians, with the consent of Charles Felix, occupied the principal fortresses of Piedmont. The old order of things was restored, and, upon Victor Emmanuel's formal refusal to withdraw his abdication, Charles Felix assumed the title of King of Sardinia. As soon as military resistance had ceased, the insurrection was put down with a strong hand." —E. Dicey, *Victor Emmanuel*, ch. 8-4. —"Henceforth the issue could not be misunderstood. The conflict was not simply between the Neapolitans and their Bourbon king, or between the Piedmontese and Charles Felix, but between Italian Liberalism and European Absolutism. Santarosa and Pepé cried out in their disappointment that the just cause would have won had their timid colleagues been more daring, had promises but been kept; we, however, see clearly that though the struggle might have been prolonged, the result would have been unchanged. Piedmont and Naples, had each of their citizens been a hero, could not have overcome the Holy

Alliance [see HOLY ALLIANCE], which was their real antagonist. The revolutionists had not directly attacked the Holy Alliance; they had not thrown down the gauntlet to Austria; they had simply insisted that they had a right to constitutional government; and Austria, more keen-witted than they, had seen that to suffer a constitution at Naples or Turin would be to acknowledge the injustice of those principles by which the Holy Alliance had decreed that Europe should be repressed to the end of time. So when the Carbonari aimed at Ferdinand they struck Austria, and Austria struck back a deadly blow. . . . But Austria and the Reactionists were not content with simple victory; treating the revolution as a crime, they at once proceeded to take vengeance. . . . Ferdinand, the perjured Neapolitan king, tarried behind in Florence, whilst the Austrians went down into his kingdom. . . . But as soon as Ferdinand was assured that the Austrian regiments were masters of Naples, he sent for that Prince of Canosa whom he had been forced unwillingly to dismiss on account of his outrageous cruelty five years before, and deputed to him the task of restoring genuine Bourbon tyranny in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. A better agent of vindictive wrath than Canosa could not have been found; he was troubled by no humane compunctions, nor by doubts as to the justice of his fierce measures; to him, as to Torquemada, persecution was a compound of duty and pleasure. . . . The right of assembling, no matter for what purpose, being denied, the universities, schools, and lyceums had to close; proscription lists were hurriedly drawn up, and they contained not only the names of those who had been prominent in the recent rising, but also of all who had incurred suspicion for any political acts as far back as 1793. . . . Houses were searched without warrant; seals were broken open; some of the revelations of the confessional were not sacred. The church-bells tolled incessantly for victims led to execution. To strike deeper terror, Canosa revived the barbarous torture of scourging in public. . . . How many victims actually suffered during this reign of terror we cannot tell. Canosa's list of the proscribed had, it is said, more than four thousand names. The prisons were choked with persons begging for trial; the galleys of Pantelleria, Procida, and the Ponza Islands swarmed with victims condemned for life; the scaffolds, erected in the public squares of the chief towns, were daily occupied. . . . At length, when his deputies had terrorized the country into apparent submission, and when the Austrian regiments made it safe for him to travel, Ferdinand quitted Florence and returned to Naples. . . . In Sicily the revolution smouldered and spluttered for years, in spite of remorseless efforts to stamp it out; on the mainland, robberies and brigandage, and outbreaks, now political and now criminal, proved how delusive was a security based on oppression and lies. Amid these conditions Ferdinand passed the later years of his infamous reign. . . . In Piedmont the retaliation was as effectual as in Naples, but less blood was shed there. Della Torre took command of the kingdom in the name of Charles Felix. . . . Seventy-three officers were condemned to death, one hundred and five to the galleys; but as nearly all of them had escaped, they were hanged in effigy; only two,

Lieutenant Lanari and Captain Garelli, were executed. The property of the condemned was sequestered, their families were tormented, and the commission, not content with sentencing those who had taken an active part in the revolution, cashiered two hundred and twenty-one officers who, while holding aloof from Santarosa, had refused to join Della Torre at Novara and fight against their countrymen. . . . The King . . . had soon reason to learn the truth of a former epigram of his, 'Austria is a bird lime which you cannot wash off your fingers when you have once touched it'; for Austria soon showed that her motive in bolstering falling monarchs on their shaky thrones was not simply philanthropic nor disinterested. General Bubna, on taking possession of Alessandria, sent the keys of that fortress to Emperor Francis, in order, he said, —and we wonder whether there was no sarcasm in his voice, — in order to give Charles Felix 'the pleasure of receiving them back from the Emperor's hand.' 'Although I found this a very poor joke,' wrote Charles Felix to his brother, 'I dissembled.' How, indeed, could he do otherwise? . . . Charles Felix had in truth become but the vassal of the hereditary enemy of his line, and that not by conquest, but by his own invitation."—W. R. Thayer, *The Dawn of Italian Independence*, bk. 2, ch. 7 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: P. Colletta, *Hist. of Naples*, bk. 9-10 (n. 2).—A. Gallenga, *Hist. of Piedmont*, v. 3, ch. 6.—R. H. Wrightson, *Hist. of Modern Italy*, ch. 2-3, and 6.

A. D. 1820-1822.—The Congresses of Troppau, Laybach and Verona. See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1830-1832.—Revolt in Modena, Parma, and the Papal States, suppressed by Austrian troops.—"The Revolution of 1830 [in France] made a natural impression in a country which had many evils to complain of and which had so lately been connected with France. The duke of Modena, Francis IV., sought to make use of the liberal movement to extend his rule over northern Italy. But at the last moment he was terrified by threats from Vienna, turned against his fellow-conspirators, and imprisoned them (Feb. 3, 1831). The people, however, were so alienated by his treachery that he fled with his prisoners to seek safety in Austrian territory. A provisional government was formed, and Modena was declared a free state. Meanwhile the election of a new pope, Gregory XVI., gave occasion for a rising in the papal states. Bologna took the lead in throwing off its allegiance to Rome, and in a few weeks its example was followed by the whole of Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches. The two sons of Louis Bonaparte, the late king of Holland, hastened to join the insurgents, but the elder died at Forlì (17 March), and thus an eventful career was opened to the younger brother, the future Napoleon III. Parma revolted against Maria Louisa, who followed the example of the duke of Modena and fled to Austria. The success of the movement, however, was very short-lived. Austrian troops marched to the assistance of the papacy, the rebellion was put down by force, and the exiled rulers were restored. Louis Philippe, on whom the insurgents had relied, had no sympathy with a movement in which members of the Bonaparte family were engaged. But a temporary revival of the insurrection brought the Austrians back

to Romagna, and a great outcry was raised in France against the king. To satisfy public opinion, Louis Philippe sent a French force to seize Ancona (Feb. 23, 1832), but it was a very harmless demonstration, and had been explained beforehand to the papal government. In Naples and Sardinia no disturbances took place. Ferdinand II. succeeded his father Francis I. on the Neapolitan throne in 1830, and satisfied the people by introducing a more moderate system of government. Charles Albert became king of Sardinia on the death of Charles Felix (27 April, 1831), and found himself in a difficult position between Austria, which had good reason to mistrust him, and the liberal party, which he had betrayed."—R. Lodge, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, ch. 25.

ALSO IN: L. G. Farini, *The Roman State*, 1815-1850, v. 1, ch. 3-5.

A. D. 1831-1848.—The Mission of Mazzini, the Revolutionist.—Young Italy.—"The Revolution of 1830, ineffectual as it seemed to its promoters, was yet most significant. It failed in Italy and Poland, in Spain and Portugal; it created a mongrel monarchy, neither Absolute nor Constitutional, in France; only in Belgium did it attain its immediate purpose. Nevertheless, if we look beneath the surface, we see that it was one of those epoch-marking events of which we can say, 'Things cannot be again what until just now they were.' . . . The late risings in the Duchies and Legations had brought no comfort to the conspirators, but had taught them, on the contrary, how ineffectual, how hopeless was the method of the secret societies. After more than fifteen years they had not gained an inch; they had only learned that their rulers would concede nothing, and that Austria, their great adversary, had staked her existence on maintaining thralldom in Italy. . . . Innumerable small outbursts and three revolutions had ended in the death of hundreds and in the imprisonment or proscription of thousands of victims. . . . Just when conspiracy, through repeated failures, was thus discredited, there arose a leader so strong and unselfish, so magnetic and patient and zealous, that by him, if by any one, conspiracy might be guided to victory. This leader, the Great Conspirator, was Joseph Mazzini, one of the half dozen supreme influences in European politics during the nineteenth century, whose career will interest posterity as long as it is concerned at all in our epoch of transition. For just as Metternich was the High Priest of the Old Régime, so Mazzini was the Prophet of a Social Order, more just, more free, more spiritual than any the world has known. He was an Idealist who would hold no parley with temporizers, an enthusiast whom half-concessions could not beguile; and so he came to be decried as a fanatic or a visionary. . . . Mazzini joined the Carbonari, not without suspecting that, under their complex symbolism and hierarchical mysteries they concealed a fatal lack of harmony, decision, and faith. . . . As he became better acquainted with Carbonarism, his conviction grew stronger that no permanent good could be achieved by it. . . . The open propaganda of his Republican and Unitarian doctrines was of course impossible; it must be carried on by a secret organization. But he was disgusted with the existing secret societies: they lacked harmony, they lacked faith, they had no distinct purpose; their Masonic mummeries were childish

and farcical. . . . Therefore, Mazzini would have none of them; he would organize a new secret society, and call it 'Young Italy,' whose principles should be plainly understood by every one of its members. It was to be composed of men under forty, in order to secure the most energetic and disinterested members, and to avoid the influence of older men, who, trained by the past generation, were not in touch with the aspirations and needs of the new. It was to awaken the People, the bone and sinew of the nation; whereas the earlier sects had relied too much on the upper and middle classes, whose traditions and interests were either too aristocratic or too commercial. Roman Catholicism had ceased to be spiritual; it no longer purified and uplifted the hearts of the Italians. . . . Young Italy aimed, therefore, to substitute for the mediæval dogmas and patent idolatries of Rome a religion based on Reason, and so simple as to be within the comprehension of the humblest peasant. . . . The doctrines of the new sect spread, but since secret societies give the census-taker no account of their membership, we cannot cite figures to illustrate the growth of Young Italy. Contrary to Mazzini's expectations, it was recruited, not so much from the People, as from the Middle Class, the professional men, and the tradesmen." In 1831 Mazzini was forced into exile, at Marseilles, from which city he planned an invasion of Savoy. The project was discovered, and the Sardinian government revenged itself cruelly upon the patriots within its reach. "In a few weeks, eleven alleged conspirators had been executed, many more had been sentenced to the galleys, and others, who had escaped, were condemned in contumacy. Among the men who fled into exile at this time were . . . Vincent Gioberti and Joseph Garibaldi. . . . To an enthusiast less determined than Mazzini, this calamity would have been a check; to him, however, it was a spur. Instead of abandoning the expedition against Savoy, he worked with might and main to hurry it on. . . . One column, in which were fifty Italians and twice as many Poles, . . . was to enter Savoy by way of Annemasse. A second column had orders to push on from Nyon; a third, starting from Lyons, was to march towards Chambéry. Mazzini, with a musket on his shoulder, accompanied the first party. To his surprise, the peasants showed no enthusiasm when the tricolor flag was unfurled and the invaders shouted, 'God and People! Liberty and the Republic!' before them. At length some carabineers and a platoon of troops appeared. A few shots were fired. Mazzini fainted; his comrades dispersed across the Swiss border, taking him with them. . . . His enemies attributed his fainting to cowardice; he himself explained it as the result of many nights of sleeplessness, of great fatigue, fever and cold. . . . To all but the few concerned in it, this first venture of Young Italy seemed a farce, the disproportion between its aim and its achievement was so enormous, and Mazzini's personal collapse was so ignominious. Nevertheless, Italian conspiracy had now and henceforth that head for lack of which it had so long floundered amid vague and contradictory purposes. The young Idealist had been beaten in his first encounter with obdurate Reality, but he was not discouraged. . . . Now began in earnest that 'apostolate' of his, which he had