

of? What cities, what provinces, are we to have? Is the French navy to be burnt, or put into our hands? Are our old pretences to the French crown, at least to the maritime provinces, to be made good unto us? Or are we to reap nothing but the vain honour of having contributed towards the establishment of our neighbours, by our own ruin?

The duties of neighbourhood are mutual; and suppose them as strong and binding as the author of *A Letter to a Friend concerning the French Invasion* would make them, they plead as strongly for us as against us. There lies as great an obligation upon the confederates to assist us in the recovery of Normandy and Guyen, as upon us to recover the lost provinces in Flanders and upon the Rhine for them: No doubt our present king hath taken care for it in his treaties with the confederates; if he has not, it is a plain discovery that the interest of foreigners is dearer to him than that of England. How unjust is it to rob us of the fruits of so many millions spent, and of so many which are in hazard, with our religion, liberties, and our all to boot? If there be any effectual care taken for this by his treaties, it were very fit the nation were made acquainted with it, and that we certainly knew what we were to have, and what security the confederate princes have given for making good such treaties; it must be more than words and common security that can balance the real deeds and kindnesses which we are daily conferring upon them.

But I am afraid we have not so much as a bare promise of any thing. The increase and growing strength of our monarchy lies so visibly cross to the several pretences and interests of the confederates, that they would be deaf to any such proposal; and the prince depends too much upon them for the support of his present title, to press such ungrateful things. Can any man of reason believe that the Dutch and the house of Austria will agree to have the French fleet put into our hands, which would render us sovereigns of the ocean, as well as of the narrow seas? Or is it not next to frenzy to imagine that the house of Austria will ever give way that we should recover our ancient footing in France, either in whole or in part, by which so many catholick cities and provinces would be subjected to hereticks, the communication betwixt Spain and Flanders cut off, by shutting up the channel on both sides, and our monarchy put into such a condition as would visibly shock the ambitious designs of that house, which they would again resume upon recovery of their lost provinces? So that we are not to expect any new acquisitions with all this vast expence, but are to rest satisfied with the honour, or folly rather, of raising the house of Austria to its ancient greatness, and building up a power which would more fatally threaten us and the rest of Europe than that which we must be at such pains and expence to pull down.

If the prospect of a successful war be so little encouraging, what have we to fear and feel from an unfortunate issue? How sadly may we come to be whipped when we shall be obliged to take back our abdicated monarch, whether we will or no? There will be nothing then to trust to for the safety of our religion and liberties, but the good nature and true English temper of a prince, whom in that case we have injured, slighted, and despised to the last degree: Nay, upon the issue of a successful war against France, we may be obliged to undergo the same fate. So far will this war, in any event, be from terminating in an establishment of our present settlement, that it doth visibly tend to the contrary. This will appear no paradox to any man who doth exactly weigh the different interests and politicks of the several states of Europe, with relation to us, and amongst themselves. Such a curious and diligent observer will quickly discover how much more agreeable King James's restoration would be to the secret-concealed interest of all our neighbouring states, than the Prince of Orange's present royalty.

The good intentions of France towards it is not to be doubted. The house of Austria, after their pretences upon France are satisfied, do certainly become favourers of King James's restoration, both upon the account of religion, and to remove a Dutch stad-

holder from being king of Britain ; thereby to facilitate their ancient pretences upon those revolted provinces. The Dutch will heartily agree to his restoration, to get rid of their stadtholder, who presseth so hard upon their liberties ; they will be in no more fears from France from this supposed issue of the war ; and the interest of England would always oblige its monarch to cover and protect them from the ambition of the house of Austria. The best wishes of Sweden cannot be wanting, were it only by the admission of the Prince of Wales's right to place the Prince of Denmark a remove farther from the crown, since his accession to the royalty amongst us, by virtue of his princess's title, might endanger the conquests which that crown hath made upon Denmark. And since the politicks of Denmark, with relation to us, are solely levelled at his brother's interest, whenever the indignities done to the Prince and Princess of Denmark shall oblige them to resume that duty and loyalty which is due from them to their kind old father, who is still ready to receive them, and to secure unto them those advantages which they can never expect from the Prince of Orange ; the concurrence of that crown towards King James's restoration can be no longer wanting. I do but hint at things, which are of sufficient importance to make all true Englishmen, who love their country and their liberties, to bethink themselves seriously how to cover and secure all those great and valuable rights from the oppression of the Prince of Orange, the miseries, poverties, and dangers which will inevitably attend either a successful or unsuccessful war. We have thrown ourselves into a state-hurricane, from which there is no way of escaping, but by restoring the just and legal government of this nation into its ancient and unquestioned channel.

Having fully established and made out the first three motives assigned for King James's restoration, I shall enquire a little into the fourth and last, viz. The securing of the protestant religion for all future ages. This appears a great paradox to the author of *The Pretences of the French Invasion Examined* ; at which he falls into exclamations against mankind, as the oddest piece of the creation, for believing such incredible things. But it is not his bold, impudent, and false assertions, supported only by empty and noisy eloquence, which can hide the danger from us, that our religion, as well as our liberties and properties, lies under from this revolution. For clearing the truth and weight of this motive, I shall make it evident that our religion was in no probability of being overturned by King James's practices before this revolution ; that it was in our power to have secured it, even against our fears and jealousies, without any breach upon the ancient government ; that the dethroning of monarchs upon the pretence of religion, hath been fatal and destructive to all the several protestant states who attempted it ; that, according to all appearance, it will be equally fatal in our case and circumstances ; and, lastly, I shall make it evident, from a full and distinct answer to all the arguments adduced by the authors against King James's restoration, that the best, surest, and most infallible way, whereby to secure the protestant religion, our liberties and properties, upon lasting and durable foundations, is by returning to our duty, and restoring our abdicated monarch by as general a consent as he was chased away by us.

It is very natural and common with mankind, and with princes as well as others, to have some more particular regard towards those of their own religion, to wish them well, and to endeavour their ease when it lies in their power ; so that it was nothing extraordinary to find King James labouring to give his catholick subjects a right and title to that ease and security, which the laws of the land had deprived 'em of. I do not believe that liberty of conscience in general, and the covering of people from persecution on that score, can be rationally condemned as destructive and ruinous to the protestant religion ; we ought to have a better opinion of the principles of our faith, and be better convinced of their truth and excellency, than to be afraid to have 'em baffled or shaken, much less ruined, by the reasons of any other persuasion. That religion which dares not shew its face publicly, and stand the shock of all its adversaries,

without screening itself under the severity of penal laws, furnisheth great suspicion to curious and prying men of its weakness and insufficiency : But this, I hope, is not our case ; our most holy religion is built upon that rock of ages which can never be shaken ; is fortified by the testimonies of the law and the prophets, and expressly contained in the word of God, or derived from thence by clear and necessary consequences, and can subsist by its own worth and excellency without robbing the rest of mankind of that liberty their birth-right entitles them to, and enslaving consciences. So that King James his principle about liberty of conscience, if duly and legally established, will be allowed ; but it is the method we complained of, which discovered some farther design than bare liberty of conscience, and thereby did visibly threaten our civil rights and liberties, and endanger our religion.

Why truly the measures taken were unjustifiable, but we know to whose council and advice they were owing : The whole was a plot upon that prince, to spoil the project of liberty of conscience, which would have rivetted him in his throne, and to improve his inclinations for the Roman religion to his own ruin and destruction. But suppose something more was intended by some than a bare liberty, perhaps the opening a door of preferment to catholicks, or the propagating that religion over this island ; such an undertaking is irrational, foolish, and desperate, can never be accomplished ; and the impossibility of it is so plain and obvious, that no man, who understands the world, and knew England and Englishmen so well as King James did, could believe it practicable. And as to the miraculous and enterprizing faith of priest and new converts, the zeal, folly, and warmth of their brains, will always prevent any real mischiefs ; nay, King James his reign, even upon the supposition that it were as bad as is alleged, is an undeniable proof that the protestant religion cannot be undermined, nor the popish religion established in these kingdoms, by the address or authority of any prince.

I shall give it for granted, that all imaginable methods were taken for propagating the popish religion ; that they were indulged in the publick exercises of it ; that court preferments were thrown upon them, merely upon the account of their religion, without any virtue or merit to entitle them to it ; that protestants were absolute, and upon all occasions, discouraged ; that it was endeavoured to make the world believe that all favours and preferments were for the one, and nothing but disgraces and frowns for the other ; that there was the greatest care, pains, and application in the world, made use of to make converts of the army and courts of judicature. I do believe, by this supposition, I have out-done all that the most malicious enemies will urge against King James ; and yet all the world knows what little progress was made, how few converts were gained, and how really weak their best and surest precautions did appear when it came to the touch. If so many of his subjects, soldiers, and servants, were prevailed upon by fears and jealousies, which were maliciously and industriously heightened above what any reason, which was given for them, could well bear, what must then have been the consequence, if by real, publick, and undoubted discoveries, the king's intentions to ruin the established religion, had been made unquestionably plain and evident : Nothing less than an universal defection, and his perpetual banishment from the hearts and affections of every Englishman, could have followed.

The catholicks of Britain are not one of a hundred ; they have neither heads, hearts, nor hands enough to force a national conversion. As the protestants are the most numerous, so the laws and constitutions are upon their side ; their civil rights and liberties are twisted together with their religious, and whosoever strikes at the last, must infallibly wound the first. It is not easy to overturn the laws and fundamental constitutions, whereby religious and civil rights are secured to free-born people ; we are in possession by our laws of our religion, and of that liberty which distinguisheth our happiness from that of other subjects ; we love it, and know its true worth ; we value and esteem ourselves above other people, upon the account of our native freedoms, and

will not easily part with 'em ; all attempts and designs upon them have been unsuccessful. Ambitious princes, and arbitrary ministers, may be forming projects and designs, fortifying them the best way they can, and making parties for it ; but our constitution, together with the protestant religion, which is now become part of it, and our laws, will prove always too hard for them at last : Nothing can expose or betray our religion and constitution to any danger, but over-much fondness in the people to a prince, who, under some popular mask and pretence, covers close and fatal designs against either. Let us but examine the present condition of our neighbouring states, and we shall find that raptures of love in the people have overturned more constitutions, and built up more despotick governments, than the force or address of princes could ever do. It is commonly received for a truth, that love is blind and credulous, and certainly holds good with relation to a political affection. There is a certain allowable jealousy in the people which is very consistent with the duty, affection, and respect due to the prince, and guards and protects their laws and constitution. Without some measures of this jealousy, the constitution will be always in danger ; and this antidote can never be wanting in the protestant subjects of Britain under a popish king : His religion gives us such a lively and active jealousy of him, and makes us so watchful, and puts us so much upon our guard, that all the efforts of such a prince, though never so dexterous, supported by so weak and inconsiderable a party as the catholicks of Britain, can never endanger religion and liberty. Rather his circumstances and inclinations to those of his own religion, their ease and quiet, might have been improved into farther and more real securities for religion and liberty by a wise and discreet treaty, orderly managed in parliament.

To all this it may be alleged, that though the catholicks of Britain be not a party sufficient to carry on, and effectuate such designs, yet the forces of the Hector of France were still at the command and service of his dear and faithful ally, for carrying on so good and meritorious a work as that of reducing again Great Britain into the bosom of the Roman church : This is maliciously and artfully enough suggested, but let us examine it a little. How does it appear that King James was become so lost to all reason, morality, and discretion, as to resolve to call in a French power to over-run a country which was his own, and destroy a people who were living peaceably under him ; by which, from one of the most considerable and potent monarchs of Europe, he became the least and most contemptible ? His refusal of French troops and assistance, when threatened with a foreign invasion, seems to be no great proof of this ; and his betaking himself at that time to the love and affection of his subjects, as it was a plain discovery he was not conscious to himself of any real design which could destroy that mutual love and confidence betwixt prince and people, which is a debt due from the one to the other, however his measures might have been traduced, or maliciously poisoned ; so it may let us see how improbable it is to imagine, that a prince could ever form designs of destroying a people whose affections he durst trust in such an extremity. Again, what reason is there to imagine that the French king would be so ready to furnish troops, and be at the charge of such a reformation ? He is generally allowed to be a prince who studies his own interest the most of any, and fits all his maxims, his conduct, and alliances, exactly to it, and never takes a step, which, upon the remotest view, may seem to cross the interest of his crown and monarchy ; and if it do appear, as certainly it will to any judicious thinking man, that the reducing Great Britain to the bosom of the Roman church may greatly endanger the crown of France, then all fears of a French reformation will fall to the ground.

The English pretences to the most considerable maritime provinces, nay, upon the crown of France itself, are generally known ; and histories can inform us how troublesome, how dangerous, and how successfully they were many times carried on against those monarchs, partly by the natural boldness, spirit, and courage of the English, far

surpassing that of the French, but more especially from the inclination of the French themselves to live under a government which was so much easier, and more agreeable, than our own; it being natural for people to covet the same plenty and freedom which they see is enjoyed and possessed by their neighbour. Hence it was, that though we lost all our footing in France, yet still our forces and enmity was more dreadful to those monarchs than that of any other state in Europe, though more considerable for its native strength, and confining by dry marches upon 'em; and they always courted our friendship and alliance with the greatest submissions and applications imaginable: And until the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the French did always chuse rather to divert our invasions with their money and treaties, than to encounter them by force, being afraid to grapple with that power, which they had so often felt to their cost. Since that time neither our friendship hath been so much courted, nor our enmity so carefully avoided as formerly. This doth not proceed from the increase of the French power and decrease of ours, though the revenues and military force of France be strangely augmented since; ours, in proportion, hath received the same increase; our treasure is augmented, and that being the sinews of war, quickly furnisheth and maintains every thing else: And the other states of Europe are, from the circumstances of affairs, better disposed for alliances with us, than ever they were in the time of our ancestors. So that France is but still France, and England in the same proportion with it as to force and revenue, and in a more promising condition of making alliances, and of being more usefully served by them: Our pretences are still the same, and every whit as strong and just, and we as willing and desirous to make advantage of them; and yet we are in no respect so formidable to that crown as formerly, nor in a condition to shake that state, and make such impressions into the heart of France as our ancestors have done. The true reason is our difference in religion, for we being protestants and France popish, this sets the two nations at a greater distance from mutual correspondence and contrivances, which must necessarily precede and occasion important revolutions, than all their former animosities, emulation, and duty to their natural prince could ever do. Loyalty to princes, national considerations, and point of honour and reputation, do many times give way to present and future advantages; but when religion and point of conscience comes in to gather and cement all those divided interests together, and unite them, as it were, into one bundle, they become the more hard and difficult to overcome. This plain and evident reason cannot escape the knowledge and reflection of so wise a prince as the French king is acknowledged to be. The difference in religion is a much greater security to him against our attempts than his armies, fleets, or strength of his towns. The sense of religion doth many times rouse and inflame the courage and resolutions of men, when other humane considerations prove too weak to quicken their drooping spirits; catholicks will fight to the last to escape the dominion of such as they believe hereticks; when, perhaps, Frenchmen would be willing enough to come under the English government, which is so much easier and better than their own. I do not question but this very consideration alone will prove strong enough to keep the French king from endeavouring our re-union to the Roman church, which would make the pretences of an English monarch more dangerous than ever by our union with Scotland, which formerly gave such notable diversions to our forces both at home and in France. That prince's disputes with the pope for point of prerogative, shews plainly that he never will endanger his crown in his own person or posterity, to serve the interests and desires of the papal chair; from all which we may safely conclude, that the protestant religion in Britain was in no great danger of being ruined by King James, though really as bad as he was represented.

If our religion and liberties were placed so much out of danger of being overturned, by the laws and franchises we were then in possession of, how much better might we have established them for the future, and placed them above the shadow of any danger, by embracing and improving the offers which our lawful prince made us, of car-

ving out our own satisfaction and securities. He was surprised with an astonishing defection of his subjects, with a conspiracy of a great many princes and states against him. He knew no place but France to retire unto, where he might have a cover for his head, but could have no great expectations of being quickly restored to his throne by a power which had so much other diversion. He was unwilling in his old age to go into exile, was very desirous to leave a perfect calm to his son before his own death, which, by the course of nature, and the ordinary destiny of his family, he could not believe was very remote; and had a love and kindness to us still, as a father for his disobedient children. All which would have procured us, from our lawful king, a lasting, legal, full, and happy settlement; would have established our religion, bettered and secured our liberties upon lasting foundations, without any trouble, and with a great deal of innocency. How many crimes would have been avoided by following this method, and how many more prevented, which will be necessary if we be obstinate, to support and maintain the injustice we have done? How many millions of money, and how many lives might have been saved, or at least more profitably employed, by the conduct and good husbandry of our lawful king, for the honour of England, restraining the unbounded pretences of ambitious neighbours, and, in giving peace and quiet to Europe? There is no question, but a king who was so unwilling to leave us, and had so much of an English spirit, would have gone into any measures with relation to foreign affairs, that his parliament should have thought fitting; in which case, what returns of glory and profit would this nation and monarchy have reaped from this blood and treasure, which is now absolutely lost and thrown away, and our future expences and dangers daily growing upon us, with as little hope of success? My heart is so rent and torn with the thoughts of it, that my pen is ready to drop out of my hand as I write: But we wantonly longed for an abdication, without examining the true value of what we refused, and the consequences were to follow upon the other measures. We have made a religious war of it, which may be fatally returned upon us; and we never considered that defections upon pretences for the protestant religion, seldom or never terminate otherwise than by the destruction of religion and pretenders both. It seems God Almighty did always discover more of passion and worldly designs, than true zeal for religion, in those undertakings; and I am afraid, that since we deserve the like charge, our punishment may be the same, unless by a seasonable and early repentance we prevent it.

The first example I find in history is Zisca's war in Bohemia, against the Emperor Sigismund, which though managed as successfully in the beginning as any thing we can flatter ourselves with, yet had an end very fatal to the reformation in that kingdom. The civil wars in Germany, managed by the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse, against Charles V. had no better issue; many imperial cities and provinces were lopt off from our communion, and the principal actors themselves were remarkably sufferers by it, and their families wear the scars of it to this day. The second Bohemian war, under the elector palatine, whom they had chosen for their king, was yet more fatal to that kingdom than the first, and almost ruined the King of Denmark, did exceedingly weaken the protestant interest in Germany, and laid the foundation for the present grandeur of France, which is so terrible to Europe at this time: Upon the event of that war the civil rights and liberties of the subject, as well as the protestant religion in the kingdom of Bohemia, were entirely ruined and extinguished: The principal electorate of the empire, together with the Palatinate of Bavaria, were wrested out of a protestant, and placed in a popish family: Several other protestant princes and states were lost, and the French possessed of both the Alsacias, which hath since given infinite disturbances to that empire. And the Hungarian war commenced first upon pretence of religion, and came at last to be managed by Tekely, hath quite buried the protestant religion in Hungary and Transylvania; and it is very remark-

able, that so long as they kept petitioning as subjects, (though with arms in their hands for the free exercise of their religion,) they were constantly victorious, and got into the absolute possession of the greatest part of that kingdom; and might have fully secured their religion and liberties, by concessions and immunities which the emperor offered them in repeated treaties: And yet no sooner was the crown given to Tekely, and an alliance made with the Turks to support him in it, but by a series of misfortunes all their former successes were unravelled, and their affairs reduced to the miserable condition we now see them in.

What sad alarms may such instances give us? How truly do they point at our case, and perhaps our fate? Can any of the above-mentioned examples discover such plain and visible marks of worldly ambition, self-interest, and corrupted designs and artifices for their original, as have evidently actuated the contrivers of and principal agitators in our Revolution? And yet how fatally were they punished? And can we hope to escape? The Emperor Ferdinando was in a worse condition to resist the elector palatine, backed by the protestant princes of Germany, countenanced by Britain and Holland, and the present Emperor Rodolph was under harder circumstances to support a war against his Hungarian rebels and the Turkish power, than any that France hath to grapple with from us and our allies; and yet their numerous armies and strong allies, could not secure them from those miseries which did at last overtake them. There is no way for us to get safe from the precipices we have been walking upon, to retrieve our religion from the desperate danger we have run it into, and to settle and secure it, but by a national returning to our duty, which will sufficiently atone for so general a defection, by resuming that treaty we so foolishly broke off and refused; and thereby securing religion and property, by those concessions which our sovereign is still ready to grant us: Let us put it home to him, and lay it at his own door; let him have it in his choice to return by his people if he pleaseth; convince him that his protestant subjects, upon securing their religion and liberties, will repair their former errors, by contributing heartily towards his restoration. And if he declines to return upon a protestant and English foot, there is an end of the controversy, and of all disputes amongst protestants; for religion and liberty will never be sacrificed by true Englishmen.

I am come in the last place to the objections raised by the new authors, against King James's return, which are stuffed with virulent, false, and sophistical reasonings; and, in a great measure, taken off by what hath been already said. The first thing they endeavour to frighten us with is a conquest, and with popery and slavery as the necessary consequences of it, since it is impossible King James can return otherways, because King William will not abdicate. I abhor the thoughts of conquering my native country as much as any man; more, it seems, than The Author of a Letter to a Friend, who would allow of it in the person of King William, and I am against it in any case. But by whom are we to be conquered? and to whom must the conquest belong? Are we to be conquered by such troops as King James, in point of prudence, and according to the practices of all ages in the like case, must bring with him for the defence of his person, and the untying of that force which the prince hath put upon us? I know no reason why it may not be as lawful for King James to bring fifteen thousand men to assist him in recovering his throne, as it was for the P. of O. to bring the like number to chase him out of it, and that without giving any jealousy to us of a conquest. Thrice that number were too few to make a conquest of this island, and I hope they will be so well seconded, and so far out-numbered by the accession of his own subjects, upon a feeling discovery of the Prince of Orange's tyranny, as well as of the injustice done their king, as may justly stamp it a revolution brought about by Englishmen, who have conquered their passions and not their country, rescued and not enslaved the nation, and who have preserved and not endangered their religion.

Is this imaginary conquest to make us slaves to the French king, or catholicks and slaves to King James? I cannot believe the first: For I do not think King James so much in love with the French king as to make him a present of three crowns to the prejudice of himself and his posterity, and so become either his subject or his vassal. These are suppositions fit only to pass upon children, deserve no serious answer, and plainly shews the weakness of the cause, which can furnish no better reasons wherewith to defend it. As to the last, the French king will never force us to be catholicks, for the reason already assigned, and it doth as little agréé with his interest to have us slaves to our monarch. Friendships are seldom lasting amongst neighbouring princes, rarely continue during their own lives, and are never transmitted to their posterities; so many reasons and jealousies of state are falling in, which occasion frequent and unavoidable breaches: And a King of England, who is absolute and master of his subjects, would be a great deal more troublesome and dangerous to France than otherwise, and so it is not very probable that that monarch will ever contribute to make us a conquest to King James, and introduce popery and slavery amongst us. There is one sure way to prevent this danger of conquest, and that is by the vigorous endeavours of every Englishman, to repair the injury done to our abdicated monarch. King William's unwillingness to abdicate, which these authors threaten us with, can't put a stop to it: His breaches upon our laws and constitution, and his violation of the original contract made with himself, deserves it; and it is not all his partisans and troops can cover him from abdication, whenever the people of England think fit to declare it.

We are told next by these authors, "That King James is become so in love with the French government, that we shall never so much as have his promise for securing our religion and liberties, even though we have no reason to depend upon that or any other security he can give us, since he hath undertaken to the pope and King of France to make void all when he is upon his throne; and that it is visible from his carriage in Ireland to the protestants there, that neither the sad example of King Charles the First, who suffered for the like attempts towards arbitrary power, nor the fresh remembrances of his own misfortunes, will ever oblige him to lay aside his arbitrary designs: And however instrumental protestants may be in his return, that pardon for their former failings is all can be expected from him, without obtaining the least kind of regard to their religion or liberties on that score."

I would gladly know upon what grounds they assert that King James will grant no security at all for religion and liberty? Have they made the experiment and been refused? It is not a bare assertion can convince us of the truth of it, since we are assured to the contrary. I have heard of a Scotch plot for restoring King James; the particulars of it I am not acquainted with; only I have been told, "That upon the application of some few gentlemen of that nation unto him, he frankly granted them, under the broad seal of Scotland, all that was proposed for the security of religion and liberty, and agreed to several immunities which the Prince of Orange refused that nation, though he was solemnly engaged to grant them, when the crown of that kingdom was tendered unto him." Here is more than a bare promise, the concessions are passed under the broad seal, and granted by him when his affairs were in promising circumstances, at the desire of a few gentlemen who had been active against him, and who could make no such considerable addition unto his party as might induce him to it, unless his own inclinations, when free from the pressure of designing ministers, and readiness to rectify whatever was grievous to the people, had put him upon it. Can it be doubted after this, that he will deny any thing that is necessary for the good and happiness of his subjects, whenever they apply seriously unto him for it?

"But he must make good his engagements to the pope and King of France, and make void all when he remounts the throne, which his hard circumstances obliged him

to grant." If this were made plain unto us, there would be a great deal of weight in it, all the evidence we have for it is the veracity of the author, which goeth no great length; being founded only upon supposition, that he could not be countenanced by those princes without such an engagement. This is an argument that concludes more forcible against themselves, since it is reasonable to imagine that more solemn and sacred engagements in favour of the holy chair, and a conviction of more punctual and ready performances, were necessary to induce the pope and so many popish princes to countenance a protestant's mounting the throne, to the prejudice of a papist.

I am yet to learn what were the great merits of the Irish protestants since the Revolution, the fresh obligations laid upon him, and what were the new discoveries he gave us there of his hatred to protestants, and irregular arbitrary courses. I have seen a book written by Dr King, which these authors refer us to, as sufficient evidence to make good their charge; but it is so scandalously and notoriously false, and stuffed with so many gross errors, and wilful mistakes, in point of history and matter of fact, even in many things which fall under my own knowledge, that the doctor seems to have calculated his book for a virulent false libel; thereby to merit some benefice from this government, rather than for our information by a true and impartial history; and the world shall be obliged with a particular account of his falsehoods and calumnies, by a full and impartial account of those transactions. But to come close home to the charge; did not the Irish protestants generally declare for the Prince of Orange? Did they not actually either appear in arms for the prince, or quit the kingdom? And those who stayed, were not they rather lookers-on than actors, or any ways useful towards the asserting the king's rights? I do not design this as a satire against the protestants of Ireland; the measures taken there give them much better grounds for their fears than any we can pretend; but only to shew that the protestants of Ireland contributed no endeavours towards his restoration, but run generally along with the stream against it; and so cannot be said to have made any new experiment of his kindness to, and grateful sense of obligations performed by protestants. They never desired, or obtained, any new securities for their religion and liberties, upon the account of services performed for him; and so have no fresh breaches of promise to charge upon him, as our authors do insinuate, whereby to deter the protestants of Britain from contributing towards his restoration.

On the contrary, we have a very convincing argument, from his care of his protestant subjects there, though either actually enemies, or at best but idle spectators; and his constant endeavours to protect them from the insults and fury of the Irish, of whom he was not fully master; to persuade us of the gratitude and kind returns we may expect from him, when at liberty, and obliged by our services, to express it. How carefully did he preserve their estates and goods. With how much tenderness did he give free passage to the women and children from Londonderry, when by denying it he must infallibly have carried the town. With what exact discipline did he govern an army, serving without pay, until King William's protestant reforming troops, which were under pay, by their unheard-of plunderings, robberies, and oppressions, committed upon the poor protestants within their lines, gave such examples of insolence and loose discipline, that the Irish could be no longer restrained, as formerly, though they never acted so extravagantly as the others. And I dare appeal to all the Irish protestants, if the greatest part of the ruin of that miserable country be not due to the plunderings, abuses, and want of discipline, in King William's army; which, though protestant, and reformers, did far outdo the wild Irish in desolating the country, without regard to friend or foe: And I have heard many Irish protestants affirm, that their preservation and protection was due to King James's own particular care over them.

As to the proceedings of the Irish parliament, he did so much wrestle against them, was so little master of himself and actions, and so much in the hands of Irish, that he

is rather to be pitied than blamed for them: And 'tis very hard and unreasonable, that when a king is forced from a throne by his protestant subjects, and opposed by them in his endeavours after the recovery of his inheritance, and so necessitated to betake himself to the assistance, protection, and services of catholics, unless he would renounce his undoubted rights, which neither the laws of God nor man oblige him to; that acts of grace, which his circumstances, and the necessity of their assistance, forced from him, should be charged upon him as crimes. Let us labour for his restoration; let us get him into our hands, and deliver him from that cruel necessity, which carries him farther than his inclinations would otherwise do; and whenever he is at liberty to act as an Englishman, he will convince us that he is such.

The treatment that Charles I. met with is a sad instance of the vanity of all human greatness, and a lasting reproach to our nation; but reacheth a more pertinent and apposite reproof to King William's conduct than King James's. The most considerable and important points, which occasioned those fatal disputes betwixt that prince and his people, were illegal imprisonments, the undue refusal of liberty to prisoners upon bail, the free quarterings and plunderings of soldiers, and the unwarrantable exacting of money from the subject without consent of parliament. Are not all these illegal and arbitrary practices frequently repeated in this government, and without any precedent from King James's reign?

The many pages employed by the author of "A Letter to a Friend concerning the French Invasion," to prove, "that the non-swearing protestants, as well as others, can merit nothing by their endeavours for the king's restoration, but a bare pardon at most," discovers more logic and method in dividing of his text, than true, solid, and convincing reason: For since a few Scottish gentlemen, who had acted warmly and vigorously against him, and could contribute but little to his service, were able to procure not only pardon, but those great and important securities for their religion and the liberties of their country, which King William had refused to the desires and addresses of a parliament that had given him the crown, and pre-engaged his consent before the gift: Is it to be imagined, that so many worthy prelates, lords, gentlemen, and inferior clergy, who have testified so much zeal, firmness, and fidelity, by their sufferings, joined with the early repentance and vigorous endeavours of others for his service, who have been hitherto blinded and misled, will not prove of more weight, importance, and consideration, with him; be as kindly treated, and their country for their sakes: Or rather, will not all securities for religion and liberty be granted, from a due regard to their application, as well as from his own inclination? Neither is it to be feared that any of their former measures, which unhappily and accidentally have contributed towards that ferment which begot this Revolution, will be remembered against them, since the king is sensible how far he himself was imposed upon, as well as his subjects, by the cunning and artifice of wicked and corrupted ministers which were about him. And whatever jealousies this author may labour to infuse into the minds of people, of the fiery and lax principles of the Jacobites, with relation to the protestant religion, church of England, and English liberties, there are Jacobites, whose principles are better, more fixed and rational, who have already, and will upon all occasions never fail to give greater and more generous testimonies of their zeal and affection for the establishment and security of those great concerns, than any can be brought by our present ministers and topping reformers; and who will never be found with this author in justifying a conquest of their native country.

The caution which is given us against another revolution, lest the monarchy receive more vigour from a restoration, than is convenient for the liberties of the subject, which the author fortifies from an instance in the return of Charles II. at which time, betwixt zeal, flattery, and fear, the king increased in power, and the people lost their liberties, concludes very strongly against himself, and for what I have been all along pressing,

If we do but consider the true reason of those concessions made in favour of the monarchy, upon the return of King Charles, the nation was so wearied out, exhausted and undone, by the tyrannies and executions, taxes, imprisonments, and other arbitrary courses against their liberties and properties, that were practised during that anarchy which intervened betwixt the murder of the father and return of the son, that upon a prospect of some relief, by the re-establishment of the antient monarchy, the people fell into such raptures of joy, which never fails of making subjects so liberal to princes, as many times occasions a hearty but late repentance. If King William continues a little longer to oppress our liberties, and drain our purses, or if the title of conquest be advanced, we shall be infallibly exposed to the like hazard again; which cannot be prevented, but by an early return to our duty, whilst we have some patience, wit and money, left, to enable us to take care of ourselves and our posterity.

The hard and difficult questions which this author thinks he hath gravelled us with, and the obligation of the oaths of allegiance to King William comes next to be considered. The first question is, Whether we think ourselves bound in conscience to fight for popery against the protestant faith? I answer, not; nor doth this answer make any thing for King William, since in no sense can the fighting for the restoration of King James be called the fighting for popery against the protestant religion; for it is both King James's interest and his inclination to return upon a protestant foot; and by assisting him in it, we vindicate the honour of our religion, and rescue it from the dangers which threaten it from this reign.

The second question is, Whether we think ourselves bound in conscience to fight for our prince against the laws and liberties of our country? I answer in the negative; and we do assure the world, that it is from a tender regard to our laws and liberties, as well as from a sense of duty, to repair the injury done our exiled prince, that we resolve to contribute to his return. The antient constitution was broke in upon by the abdication, and our laws, rights, and liberties, have been more eminently and signally over-run during the Prince of Orange's kingship, than by any of our most violent and arbitrary princes, even when he was under the greatest obligation, clearest and distinct barriers placed against it; and we are possessed with reasonable fears, nay a certainty, of having 'em quite ruined and extinguished by his future conduct, which layeth an obligation upon all true Englishmen to repair these breaches made upon the constitution, and to vindicate and restore their oppressed and ruined laws and liberties, by returning King James and the P. of O. into their proper and respective stations.

But we are desired and pressed to have some care of the protestant religion, and church of Christ, which will be visibly endangered by the king's restoration all Europe over; and a due regard for the rights and liberties of all the princes of Europe, which will be sacrificed by it; that this ought to be more tenderly minded by us, since we are citizens of the world; and so the good of mankind, or the greatest part of it, layeth a more sacred obligation upon us, and is to be preferred to the particular interest of our own prince and country. The security of religion is a duty never to be forgotten by good protestants, and is never to be endangered and desperately hazarded by honest men. But, alas! this hath been little regarded by our late reformers. Have they not quite unhinged our constitution, of which the protestant religion was become a part? Have they not already, and are they not in a fair way to ruin our laws and liberties, which are the best fences about our religion? After we are become slaves, we may quickly be made any thing else; the multitude of new converts in France is an undeniable instance of this. Have they not unnecessarily exposed the protestant religion to the hazard of a rude and uncertain war, from the commencement of which we can form no great hopes of a successful issue, and that in conjunction with allies who are the greatest enemies of our religion; who, when their particular interests have been served by our blood and treasure, will certainly give us the slip, and nick some oppor-

tunity, which our present circumstances can never fail to furnish them with, of establishing themselves at the expence of our religious and civil rights and liberties? And finally, have we not dethroned our king upon the account of his religion; by which we have commenced a religious war, which may come to be fatally retorted upon us, and may endanger the whole protestant religion in Europe?

A religious war is carefully to be avoided by protestants, since they are the weakest; and no pretence ought to be furnished to the catholics for the like measure: For though particular animosities and interest seem to divide them at present, how quickly may these be adjusted by the necessities of one of the contending parties, and how easy will it be then for the pope to unite them together under the banners of religion, to give us, and the protestants of Europe, a Rowland for our Oliver? This is no chimera or dream; but we may probably expect to see and feel it. A far weaker pretence, *viz.* the union established amongst the protestants of Germany, at Leipsick and Smalcald, gave birth to the catholic league there; which over-run all the protestants, forced several princes and cities from their communion, and endangered Denmark. It is upon such weighty considerations, and to prevent the danger which threatens the protestant religion both at home and abroad, from our late measures, that all true Englishmen and good protestants ought to endeavour the restoration of our king.

As to the caution given us, to beware how we sacrifice the rights and liberties of all the princes in Europe, the greatest part of the princes and states of Europe are not engaged in this war against France, and consequently in no danger by it: The two northern crowns, Muscovy and Poland, Portugal, all the princes and states of Italy, except Savoy, together with the Switzers, are in perfect peace with France; and so the supposition of this author is, absolutely false; the original and ground of this war is purely private contests betwixt the crown of France and house of Austria, and such other princes as that house can draw into their interest. Do we not see that the princes of Germany themselves, who seem to have the most immediate concern in it, and should understand and be more alarmed at the consequences of it than we, do but make merchandize of their assistance, and engage in and withdraw from this war as it contributes most to their particular interests, and according as they are best paid by the several principals? Do not the northern crowns, whose territories and provinces lie more exposed to the consequences of this war than our islands, maintain an exact neutrality, which will give their subjects possession of the best part of the trade of Europe? We are the only fools who have been prevailed upon to engage inconsiderately in this war, to be at the greatest charge of it, to drain our blood and treasure, and to hazard our religion and liberties by it, without so much as proposing any return to balance this expence and danger. Our conduct is such an instance of folly and madness, as amazeth the present, and will not find credit in future ages.

As to the maxim established by the author, upon which he buildeth all his fine reasoning, it is false and phanatical to perfection. Can any man in his right wits assert, that the interest of our prince and country must give place to the interests of other states, suppose them the greatest part of mankind? Much less then to those of the house of Austria, which is the present case. Must the interest of the British monarchy be postponed to the interest of the Mahometan and pagan countries, which make the greatest part of mankind; or must the interest of Britain, and so of the protestant religion, which makes a part of it, give way to the interest of the pope and catholic princes, which make the greatest part of Europe? We may quickly guess what our fate would be by following such a rule, and may easily be persuaded that the cause must be very bad which requires such wretched maxims and reasonings to support it.

The last question is, Whether we would think ourselves bound to fight for him did we believe he would promote the same designs he did before, and what we would think ourselves obliged to do in the like case, and under the same circumstances, after he had

remounted the throne? The answer is plain and obvious: By this revolution, and the consequences of it, the Prince of Orange's ambition and share in these measures; with which King James was loaded, being sufficiently discovered to the world, together with the roguery of those ministers, who, to serve the prince's design, forced the king unwillingly enough upon those steps which we complained of, with a design to ruin him; by the restoration and punishment of those ministers, the king and people both will be safe from any repeated assaults of the prince's ambition, being so well cautioned by the first, and succeeding ministers will be terrified from such infidelities for the future. The author supposeth a case which will not probably fall out, and so is not weighty enough to restrain us from assisting our king in the recovery of his rights, which positive duty obligeth us unto: And whenever the like case occurs, such corrupt ministers, who advise such measures, will become a more justifiable and easier sacrifice for the averting such dangers, than our ancient government and constitution. And it is pleasant enough to imagine that wise and thinking men can be imposed upon to continue under much more weighty oppressions, greater and more visible dangers, threatening both religion and liberty, by King William's government, from a fear we may again fall under those lesser evils which we suffered under King James, and which were due rather to the contrivances of the P. of O. than the king's own depraved inclinations. And whereas it is complained, "That such pangs of loyalty are unseasonable now, and should rather have been employed for keeping him in his throne than restoring him to it;" why truly few people did suspect that the prince did really design what he so seriously and solemnly declared against; and every man was struck into a state lethargy by the suddenness of the prince's attempt, the wonderful success it met with in the beginning, and the charming wheedle of securing liberty and property, which we are sadly and severely roused from at last by unspeakable oppressions, by the expiring groans of liberty and property, and by the dreadful view of those miseries, which threaten us from all hands and in all events.

As to the obligations we lie under from the oaths of allegiance to the present government, the author himself acknowledgeth, that if we be convinced that our oaths to King James are still binding upon us, the obligation of the second is voided by it, which is a plain enough answer to his own argument; especially when we consider that King William's manifest infractions of that original contract which we made with him, upon the maintaining and preserving of which our allegiance was expressly founded, doth evidently and unanswerably dissolve and make void the obligation of our oaths, and much better solves all scruples upon that head than Dr Sherlock's providential reasoning: And whereas it is asserted by this author, that allegiance can never be expounded to a lower sense than to live peaceably under the present government, though we will not fight for it, and not to attempt any thing against their persons or crowns, not to hold correspondence with their enemies, nor to give any assistance to King James for the recovery of his thrones; in this he hath forgotten their own practice: For our reformers have taught us, that allegiance may be expounded to a much lower sense, even to the abdicating the monarch to whom the allegiance was due, to the filling of his throne, and transferring of that allegiance to another; and would take it very ill to be charged with perjury for it. *Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione loquentes?*

We are exhorted by our authors to beware of contributing towards King James's return, lest we engage our country in a civil war, and all the dreadful consequences of it; the destruction of our people, the utter consumption of our estates, the burning of our houses, the ravishing of our wives and daughters, the extirpation of families by sword or halter, and the utter ruining our cities, towns, and villages, are the infallible consequences of it. The mighty deluge of blood which was shed, and the unspeakable miseries which overwhelmed this nation, during the struggle betwixt the two roses, and our contests with King Charles I. are undeniable proofs, and may convince us how fa-

tal and destructive it is to beget and establish a competition of titles to the crown, and to dethrone monarchs ; and the calamities which over-run France and Germany by the civil wars, which begun upon the account of religion, may let us see how displeasing it is to God Almighty to have religion made a cover for ambitious and private designs. This civil war is already commenced, and we have established those grounds and sown that seed from which we shall not fail to reap a plentiful harvest of blood and ruin, without a speedy and vigorous prevention ; nay, we have been so fond of entailing certain misery upon ourselves and posterities, that we have coupled together two of the strongest motives in the world for a rude and lasting war, viz. repeated breaches in the royal line and succession, and the vacating the throne upon the pretence of religion ; either of which separately hath never failed to ruin whole nations, provinces, and cities. It is obvious at whose door this is to be charged ; they who forced away their king upon the account of his religion, inverted the nature of our monarchy and the succession, and refused all treaties and securities which were offered them, have laid infallible foundations for those mischiefs ; and they who wish and labour for the return of the king, are the only true and skilful physicians who clearly discover, and are willing to apply the most proper, nay only, cure which remains for our disease : And the authors' reasonings from the miseries of a civil war, doth evidently arraign their own practices, and concludes most forcibly against themselves as the promoters of it, since it is not to be supposed that a just right and title is to give place to force and usurpation, and fall a sacrifice to those necessities which we first bring ourselves under, and then plead for our excuse.

In the last place we are cautioned against the king's return, from the intolerable payments we must come under, for refunding those sums which he hath borrowed of France to maintain himself, to keep Ireland, and to discharge the forces that come to thrust him on us, which will prove a ten times greater tax for many years than those we pay for the support of this government, which are not considerable, reckoning the abatement of chimney-money, and are much easier than what the French are accustomed to ; and that we have paid as much formerly for assisting France to ruin Europe, and maintain vice at home ; and so may be very well satisfied with our present payments, which delivers Europe, and secures our native country and religion from utter destruction. Our celebrated authors could not have finished their fine pieces with reasonings which more perfectly resembled the pretences, motives, and grounds of this revolution, by their weakness, falsehood, and prevarications.

How well our present payments secure our native country and religion from destruction, may appear from the ruin of Ireland, the plunderings and free quarters practised in Britain, the breaches made upon our ancient monarchy and constitution, whereby a war is entailed upon us and our posterity ; from the violences done to our laws, rights, and liberties, and original contract made with King William ; and from the present visible and imminent dangers which our religion and liberties are threatened with by any probable issue of this war, " under a prince who hath quite overturned the liberties of his own native country, made fair advances towards the ruin of ours ; and was never yet successful in any enterprise he undertook, except when he invaded his father-in-law, contrary to all divine and human rules, (which perhaps God designed as a scourge to these nations for our sins,) and when he fought Luxemburgh's out-guards at St Dennis, with the peace in his pocket, contrary to the publick faith and law of nations, as if he were predestinated to be successful only in crimes, but unfortunate in heroick, brave, and generous actions ; such as restraining the ambitious encroachments of princes, and vindicating the rights and liberties of oppressed nations, having always practised in his own case what he pretended to reform in another's."

How little the deliverance of Europe is carried on by our present payments, is but too evident from the growing successes of France in Flanders, and the taking their

most considerable towns and fortresses in the sight, and under the nose, of our present monarch and those mighty confederate armies. It is equally false to insinuate, that our payments during King Charles the Second's reign bore any proportion with the taxes under this, and that they were employed only for assisting France to ruin Europe: for the subsidies we have already paid to this K. (which Sir Edward Seymor, who might very well know it, assured the House of Commons did amount to eighteen millions before the last impositions which were granted) do far exceed all the taxes paid to King Charles, joined with the several payments made to our Edwards, our Henries, and our Elizabeth, who raised the honour and reputation of this nation so high, and spread our conquests so far: And it was to King Charles his authority and mediation, the peaces of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nimiguen were due, which put then a stop to the French career. And I am afraid our present payments will very hardly bring about a peace again upon the foot of those treaties; and we are to take it as a very great favour, for which we are to be thankful to God and our present king, if the taxes we pay during this government fall any thing short of the French oppressions, and four millions a year, over and above an allowance for the abatement of chimney-money and the ordinary revenues of the crown, are but inconsiderable payments in the opinion of these authors. It seems their court preferments are great and rich, that they are so little sensible of those taxes, which are already become so heavy to this nation, and of which we see no end.

But "the growing debt to the French king for those sums already spent upon King James's subsistence, and the defence of Ireland, and to be farther expended for his restoration, will quite sink and undo this nation." It appears that these authors take it for granted, that the mercenary temper of the Dutch in demanding and obtaining satisfaction for their expences, which, out of a tender regard, forsooth, to our liberties, they bestowed upon our deliverance, will be exactly copied by other princes: But this is the first instance of such merchandise; and it is not to be believed that great princes who study fame, and tenderly regard their honour and glory, will imitate so base an example. But suppose they should, our author is as wide in his estimate of this expence as in his other reasonings. We are frightened with a charge ten times bigger for many years than our present payments, and yet will very much fall short of the half of one year's tax we pay now. The sums spent upon the king's subsistence in Ireland doth not amount to three hundred thousand *luidores*; and as for the charge of his return, I wish, and heartily pray, that all true Englishmen would unanimously concur together to prevent the pretence of demanding any such charges, the necessity of foreign troops, and even the remotest fears of French popery and slavery, by returning our king with as general a consent as he was forced from us, which will vindicate the protestant religion from the reproach of deposing principles, and establish it for the future; will resettle the ancient monarchy and constitution of this nation upon its old basis; will repair the injury done to our lawful king, whereby we may legally obtain those securities for our religion and liberties, which we are courting unsuccessfully amidst so many desperate dangers and difficulties; will infallibly relieve us from the weighty oppressions and manifest infractions of our choicest and most valuable rights, which we at present feel, and have so much reason to be apprehensive of for the future; will deliver us from the heavy burthen of so many taxes, which we have already paid, and which yet must be continued if we design to support a crazy and unjust settlement any longer; which, after all our blood and expence, must certainly fall to the ground, and give place to the natural force and weight of our ancient government and monarchy; to the just title and undoubted rights of our lawful sovereign and his posterity; to the love, affections, and native inclinations of Englishmen, when the present fit is over; and to the interests of our neighbouring princes and states, which lie visibly cross unto it, so soon as their present differences are at an end: And, lastly, by this method we shall be secured against those fatal influences upon our liberties, which

never fail to accompany all forced, irresistible, and unexpected returns of exiled monarchs.

I do humbly beseech Almighty God, that of his infinite mercy, for the good of these nations and of all Europe, he would open the Prince of Orange's eyes, give him a sight and discovery of the vanity as well as injustice of possessing his father's throne; and incline his heart to establish religion and liberty among us, and give peace to all Europe, by doing an act which would bury in oblivion the famed instances of Dioclesian and Charles V. and immortalize his name, even by restoring his old father to his right and inheritance. Was it really the danger our religion and liberties were in which put him upon coming to Britain, this would be an infallible way fully to secure them by new laws and concessions, against which there lay no objection; or was it to put himself at the head of the British forces, thereby to give a check to the towering ambition of the French monarch, this would more effectually do it, for either that king would think himself obliged, out of gratitude to a prince who is truly a martyr for a supposed French league, to give a reasonable peace to Europe, in order to King James's restoration; or by a refusal, our king was at liberty to consult his own interest, and to unite with the confederates by the advice of parliament, which would make such a general and vigorous application of the English forces that way, without any fear of domestick distraction, as would quickly oblige that great monarch to give ear to reason, and a peace to his neighbours; and the glory of having given peace to Europe, and subdued himself, would place the Prince of Orange's name upon the highest pinnacles of fame, furnish the greatest character imaginable for history, give a great and noble example to future ages, declare him the benefactor of the Christian world, and oblige all British subjects to acknowledge that he had most generously contributed his best endeavours for the securing of the protestant religion, and the free enjoyment of all our laws, rights, and liberties, under a just and legal government, according to his Declaration.

A French Conquest neither desirable nor practicable. Dedicated to the King of England.

The pamphlet was published while the designs of invasion from France were in the progress of ripening. They were finally blighted by the defeat of Tourville's squadron at the battle of La Hogue.

It must have been an obvious objection to the designs of the Jacobites that the counter-revolution, by which they hoped to replace the dynasty of Stuart, could not, in the nature of things, be executed without the assistance of a French army, which army, in the ensuing struggle, might prove dangerous to the independence of the British crown. A friend to the Jacobite cause has endeavoured, in the following Tract, to allay the suspicion to which the French alliance necessarily exposed it. The king, to whom it is dedicated, is of course the exiled monarch, James II. The "Grand Monarque" was probably of the same opinion, for had he judged it possible to acquire the kingdom of Britain by conquest, he would doubtless have made a serious attempt for so desirable an object.

But this Tract was particularly remarkable, because with the jacobitical production which follows, entitled *Remarks on the late Revolution and present Confederacy*, it gave occasion to the se-

vere fate of Anderton the printer. They were seized in his possession, and on the 1st of June, 1693, he was tried for composing, printing, and publishing the said treasonable papers. The evidence against him was very suspicious, consisting chiefly of the messenger or comptroller of the press and his assistant, who, as he could not read, could scarcely prove that the papers exhibited in court were those found in Anderton's custody. Of publishing or printing there was no direct proof. But Treby, Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, who presided at the poor man's trial, repelled the defences, although they were made with more address than could have been expected; and proved the printing of a libel to be treason, by reference to the case of Lord Cobham, who lived a century before the art of printing was discovered. This second Jefferies finding the jury favourably disposed towards the prisoner, reviled and reprimanded them, overruled their scruples, and absolutely dictated their verdict. Accordingly Anderton was at length found guilty, condemned, and executed. He suffered with great firmness, leaving a protest against the injustice of his sentence, and his forgiveness to the penitent jury.

To the King.

SIR,

NOTWITHSTANDING you have been traduced by your enemies for having ill designs upon the nation, and that those enemies have had too fatal a success in spreading such improbable suggestions, (too fatal for their native country as well as for you, who are the monarch of it,) yet I am so assured that your majesty jealously watches over the glory, and aims at the true interest of your kingdoms, that I am confident a discourse that proves a French conquest of this island to be neither the intention of your friends, nor your own, nor practicable in itself, will not be an unacceptable present.

Conquest is a harsh word, and it frightens weak minds. And that you yourself should conquer can be only wished for by such as intend their own interest more than yours, in your restoration; who intend to live upon prey, and would destroy half the nation that they might have the better share of the confiscations. But if that should be, yet the most remote surviving relations of those that are killed or executed when that horrid trial of skill shall be over, will have a mind to the estates of their ancestors; and the banished out-laws will be ready to stir up any enterprising prince abroad, or such as are discontented at home, to give future disturbances; so that these kingdoms will be still continued under convulsive agonies. And, after all, I beg leave to say, that no prince by conquering, or to speak more properly, reducing his rebellious subjects, can have any title to take away the laws and liberties of those that remained faithful.

I must confess I am one of those that can never (as well for his as our sake) assist any king that has the glorious title of succession, to debase it into the mean, hated, and precarious one of conquest. But I think our own hereditary and equal monarchy to be so much the most happy sort of government, both for prince and people, that I can very willingly run any hazard to settle things upon that foundation.

Come home, great sir, to restore our trade; to repair our naval reputation and strength; to make us the umpires of Europe; to deliver us from Dutch delusions; to preserve our church, as established by law, from being debauched by comprehension; to settle liberty of conscience in a duly elected parliament; and to establish all the liberties of the English subject.

It is because I am confident these are your royal resolutions that I wrote this short discourse, and now dedicate it to your majesty. The subject is of that importance to your affairs that it deserved to have been better handled, and I desired some abler pens to have undertaken it, but their thoughts were otherwise employed; yet, though I am sensible I have not done it all the justice they would, I think I may without vanity say, I have made it plain beyond the cavils, or at least reasonable objections, of your adversaries, and I hope it may have some effect upon them.

That God would restore your majesty to your throne, and to the hearts of all your subjects, is the unfeigned prayer of,

May it please your majesty,
Your majesty's most obedient,
Loyal subject,
N. N.

A French Conquest neither desirable nor practicable.

Since our enemies, in some of their pamphlets, and many of their discourses, amongst several other things wherewith they falsely charge those whose sole design is to restore the ancient and hereditary monarchy, together with all those securities we ever had, or are necessary for the preservation of the English liberties and protestant religion; I say, since our enemies, amongst other things, unjustly charge us with designing, or, at least, unwarily helping forward, a French conquest, I have determined to shew that such a conquest is neither desirable nor practicable; that we are neither such fools nor knaves as to think of such fatal projects against our native country. I shall endeavour to make out both the one and the other plainly, but not elaborately, since brevity and perspicuity is more proper to disabuse the honest and plain-hearted (for whose information I particularly write, and who are most misled by these insinuations) than long and artificial harangues, wherein the authors refine too much, or interlard too much learning.

I begin with the first head of my discourse, viz. That a French conquest is not desirable.

There is no sort of men desire it. I know nobody that would subject our fortunes, our liberties and lives to the power of France: They that urge it don't believe we would. We lament the taxes, the imprisonments, the plunderings, and the pillaging of England; the torturing against law, and the Glenco-Massacre in Scotland, together with all the other miseries that infest this island; we would not bring more upon it; we would not depopulate it; we would not make it a Golgotha: And that the world may be convinced that none of the Jacobites desire a French conquest, I shall shew it contrary to the interests and inclinations of every denomination of them to let the French have any footing here.

It is almost a jest to go about to prove the Whiggish Jacobites would not find their account in a French conquest. Can it be imagined, that men who have been always struggling with their own kings for more liberty, and to have their properties better guarded, who have been hitherto so jealous of the lowest imitations of French monarchy, should expect greater securities under a provincial French government, or desire to become subjects to a king whose own natural subjects they think are very hardly dealt with?

As to the Jacobites of the church of England, nothing can lie more cross to their notions and interest, than a French conquest. Can it be believed that those who venture all to preserve every gradation of the royal line, would convey over the tenure of the crown to one that has no pretence of right to it? Did they not oppose the Bill of Exclusion upon this principle, that it is not in the power of king and parliament too to alter the succession? Can they then give up the interest of our English monarchs all at once? No, their consciences will bid them oppose a French conquest with the hazard and expence of the last drop of their blood: And their interest will bid them to do so too; for a French conquest cannot be maintained here without so many outlandish Roman catholicks, as will be a very indifferent guard to the church of England; and if the French king should be king of England, he must in mere policy set up his own religion here, if he did not think himself obliged in conscience to do it.

I come, in the last place, to the Roman catholicks, (of whom our adversaries expect the world should believe any figment, though never so monstrous and absurd;) and I must say, that those among them who, by reason of their estates and sense, will always govern the rest, are not so little read in our histories, as to suppose, that, though such a conquest did at present make for them, (as it really will not) it would be lasting. They are now convinced, that it is by becoming Englishmen, and not by running counter to the English interest, that they must be happy; and they profess, that if we will once give them opportunity to shew how well they love our liberties, we shall see they place their hopes in the indulgence, they shall gain by the moderate and inoffensive carriage of their own party, and not on foreign dependencies. They know that the revulse of all such projects must extirpate them and their posterity together with the foreigners; and they know we must be entirely rooted out, or we shall root out all foreigners at last.

I must do that party still more justice. I thought always they were neither wisely nor religiously used by us; that we ought not to punish any man for mere opinions, and that we ought not in good sense to irritate men into treasons at home, or dependencies on foreign princes: This I always thought; but since the misfortunes of his majesty I have had occasion to converse more freely with the Roman catholicks, and I must say, I have found amongst many of that persuasion the same sense of liberty their ancestors had, and our old papists who have transmitted to us our *Magna Charta*, *Charta de Forresta*, &c. I have found amongst so many of that persuasion not only all the good impressions of that happiness we enjoy by our constitution, but so particular a detestation of all thoughts of a French conquest, that as I think no death too cruel for any body that would promote it, so I am confident whoever can be proved designing it, would be found guilty even by any jury of papists that can be summoned.

There are possibly some Roman priests, that may endeavour to blow up the laity to some unreasonable hopes and desigus; but I am well satisfied a French conquest is none of them, and besides the laity of that church begin to reflect upon the folly of the priests, when the king was here; and they now see, that the priests are light gentlemen, without families or fortunes, and so can better shift in a storm than the laity can, which makes ghostly politics much out of fashion even with the Roman catholicks, that have sense, quality, and estates; and they will always govern the rest in what concerns the security of their persons and estates.

Cambden, though in many respects an excellent historian, whether out of bigotry to his own church, or that he may enhance the character of Queen Elizabeth, who made and promoted such severe laws against both, never speaks favourably either of puritan or papist, and yet there drop from him expressions, which shew, although the Reformation was then so newly settled, and though the papists were then more numerous than they are now; nay, though they were not many of them satisfied of the legitimacy of Queen Elizabeth, yet the generality, and the most considerable papists would not join in the Spanish desigus; and they blamed the hot-headedness of Parsons the jesuit, &c. Read Cambden's Annals in English, page 113, 114, and 115, and you will find that in the Rebellion of the north, (which was the first in her reign,) though Chapine Vitelli, Marquis of Cotona, was sent over to head forces; which the Duke of Alva had promised the rebels; and Nicholas Morton, a priest, was sent at the same time by the pope to denounce Queen Elizabeth a heretick; yet most of the papists sent the letters they received from the rebels, together with the bearers of them, to the queen. Page 125, 126, you may read Pope Pius's bull against the queen, and that the modester papists disliked it, and were unwilling to bring mischief upon themselves; nay, the beginning of the next page tells you, "they contemned it as a vain crack of words!" Page 218, "the papists express such dislike of Parsons's fiery zeal against the queen, that they thought themselves to have delivered him into the magistrate's hands." Page

248, "the Roman catholicks mislike the notions, in politicks, of their priests; and J. Bishop, a man devoted to the Romish church, writes against them, and against the deposing doctrine." Other passages might be quoted out of that history; but here are enough, and perhaps some will think too many, for whose purpose it makes more to render the papists errant monsters.

Though, by reason that our adversaries are likeliest to be believed against the Roman catholicks, and prejudice our cause by the general prejudice that is against them, I have been the more particular about that party, yet I thank God no man is less liable to be proselyted to their opinions in matters of church-worship, than I am, or more loves, or will venture farther in all times for the characteristic liberties of the English subject; liberties that I will defend, as far as in me lies, not only from all foreign powers, but from all encroachments of our own monarchs too; though I must say at the same time, that I can distinguish between liberty and licentiousness, and like our own true and ancient hereditary and equal monarchy the best of all the several sorts of government; and know also that there are many prerogatives that are as necessary for the protection of the people as for the safety and grandeur of the prince.

The world is much mistaken in our notions; I wish they would hear 'em from ourselves, who can best tell the reasons of our dissent from the present government, and with what designs, and how far we do, and will serve King James; and they will find even the non-swearers of the church of England have in their loyalty to him a due regard to their country likewise. By this frankness all parties might come to understand one another better, and the late experiments have made all those of the several parties, that are for King James wiser and more temperate than formerly; the Jacobites wish their own disappointments had made the Williamites as much so; we know indeed they have made many of them wiser.

We are so far from wishing the King of France should conquer us, that we don't wish King James should. We will receive him, we will help him, as our father, as our king; but conqueror is not in the language of our loyalty. The church of England have been ever thought to carry the notions of prerogative the highest; but I believe amongst the non-swearing clergy, there will not be found one St Asaph, one Burnet; and we are heartily glad, that those who sit in the two houses ordered such a stigma for such nauseous flattery: And should the king be forced to reduce these kingdoms by a high hand, which many of the Jacobites are sure he is very unwilling to do, and we hope the nation will be wiser than to put him to it; yet even then all the wise and influencing Jacobites will interpose, will keep him (if he should be inclined to do otherwise) from pursuing revenge, and will tell him, that the end of civil war must be attended with moderation in the conqueror; or otherwise he that is one day victor by the sword, may be vanquished the next by jealousies. If he should unmercifully devour even his rebellious subjects, we ourselves should stand affrighted at him, as at a Polyphemus, and conclude he would feast upon us at last. Our Henry the Third had like to have lost himself by an intemperate use of his victory over the barons: And Edward the Second did lose himself by using extreme rigours after his victory at Burton upon Trent: Other instances of this sort may be found in our own histories; and if we rightly consider the present state of affairs, the defection was very general, and upon the account of mal-administration, and therefore the pardon ought to be without exceptions; and a rectification of those errors will restore the king to the hearts of all his people, as well as his kingdoms, without effusion of blood. They are state-quacks, who only understand phlebotomy. A good physician will sweeten and compose the mass of humours, and by proper lenitives quiet all our boiling spirits, and correct the temperament of the state into obedience, without creating faintnesses, or destroying our vitals. This all the considerable Jacobites are now satisfied of, this is their opinion. It is not the title of the king that is the dispute; then indeed wise kings have

after victories, been severe, as our Henry VII. was ; but the same Henry VII. was as merciful in Flammock's rebellion, though it was occasioned by collecting taxes that were granted by parliament. His son also, Henry VIII. (who was a prince of a high mind) when 30,000 were in arms in the Yorkshire rebellion, which was upon account of what they thought mal-administration, pardoned every man, and after quieted their minds by sending down a book amongst them to explain his intentions. It is by mercy and letting us see clearly in his royal heart, that our king, King James, must establish his throne ; and even they who believe passive obedience would not be active in the destruction of their country ; and though they think the church of England supports the monarchy, yet now they are satisfied nothing less will secure their church, than what makes our liberties safe. You know there are others in his interest, who will claim their rights in a bolder manner yet ; I bless God there are many of them, some of whom never touched with this government, and others who have been so disappointed by its ministers and administration, that they no longer expect a cure from the Prince of Orange's hands ; you cannot think either the one or the other of these desire to be a conquered people, nor do I know any one man that desires it.

Indeed this government has taken all methods by harassing and imprisonments, and such taxes as must undo us, to make the Jacobites do some desperate thing ; and if any thing would, such usage would make us wish for a French conquest, or any other change of torments ; but nothing can make us wish for a French conquest. They have not yet made us rise, that they might have the confiscation of our fortunes, and dub King William conqueror without controul : I hope we shall never rise, till we do it to the purpose, till the nation rises with us ; I hope we shall disappoint that design of parcelling out our inheritances amongst the sworn vassals of the Prince of Orange, as Ireland (which could easily have been made to follow the fortune of England at the beginning of this revolution, had not this project been in their head) has been shared amongst them. I hope we shall disappoint them here by a wise and temperate conduct. They care not what slaughters, what distresses, they bring upon the nation : but we would restore peace and plenty to it ; and whatever our enemies say, (who have all along had a great faculty of contriving lies and forming hobgoblins,) we love our country, our native country, too well to let any uneasiness make us have one thought, one wish for a French conquest.

The Prince of Orange, in his Declaration, says, One of the ends of his coming was to cover all men from persecution. He has kept that as well as the other parts ; for he cannot but know that many of those who refuse the oaths, do it out of conscience ; and how many (against whom no other crime has been proved, but the refusal of those oaths, and therefore in the sight of the law guilty of none else) have had their arms and horses seized, have been hindered from following their lawful business, put to find unreasonable bail, been laid up in loathsome prisons, and been forced to pay most part, if not all, their incomes ? If this is not persecution, I know not what is ; and I think he cannot but believe it is generally for conscience sake. Is not that venerable old man, Archbishop Sancroft, and several other bishops and dignified persons, who have shewn a sufficient concern for the protestant religion, and whose loyalty was not stupid, (to use Dr Sherlock's epithet,) but that they stood up for the laws,—are not many of these excellent persons reduced to great straights and poverty, because they have not supple, time-serving, providential consciences ? How many of the inferior clergy are sent to beg their bread, who made it a point of conscience to oppose the irregularities of King James's ministers, who, though they would have been, and are now willing to consent to liberty of conscience, parliamentarily settled, were not flexible to the tricks set on foot by those designing ministers ? There has been already, I think, a sufficient persecution of the Jacobites ; but the judges are commanded to set a greater forward still : however, that shall not provoke us to a rash attempt, neither to hurt our

selves nor our country, neither to make King William's hotchpotch title a conquest, nor to think of a French conquest.

We cannot swear away our allegiance which we owe to King James, as his birth-right, and which most of us have sworn to him; but if it had been thought fit to contrive an oath, which should have expressed our love of England and our abhorrence of a French conquest, whatever mulct had been laid upon the refusal of it, whoever had refused it would have been by us unpitied, though you had exacted the mulct never so severely, for we are all satisfied a French conquest is not desirable.

That a French conquest is contrary to the inclinations and interests of the several sorts of Jacobites, is a good argument that it is not practicable. But now I fall upon my second head, I presume I shall directly and irrefragably make out, that a French conquest is not practicable; and that, by shewing,

I. That a French conquest is as little King James's inclination as his interest.

II. That such a conquest is palpably opposite to the interest of all the princes and states of Europe.

And lastly, That to attempt a French conquest of England either for himself or King James, is not the interest of the King of France himself.

I omit shewing a French conquest is against the interest of King James, for I don't think it worth my while to prove that it is against a man's interest to have his estate taken from him, and his posterity destroyed. King James has a child, that he believes, and you believe too, (notwithstanding all the pains you take to be thought to believe that useful flam of your pretended imposture, which was at first taken up and industriously promoted, (like that of the Irish cutting the throats of all the people of England and Scotland,) to help forward this revolution,) to be a true Prince of Wales; and, at least, this innocent child has not disoblighed the king; and this is enough to make him take pity of the nation, however rebellious and ungrateful we have been to him: But, besides, he has several times since his exile expressed himself in so pathetic and extenuating a style concerning those subjects, that have used him so ill, that it would be almost incredible, if related: And though the Prince of Wales was dead, he retains even for the Princess of Orange such a fatherly affection, as plainly supersedes royal resentment; and I have heard one that was by say, that upon a gentleman's mentioning, even upon occasion of business, the fault of the Princess of Orange, and that with all the modesty imaginable, (and he must touch very tenderly upon that string who will make his court to the king, though such virulent pamphlets are licenced here against him,) the king replied, "That the Princess of Orange had natural foundations of goodness that Dr Burnet and the Bishop of London can never destroy." And further, they who have been at St Germain's know with what indignation the king treats all thoughts of restoring him by any other method than by a great concurrence of his own people. The king knows how obstinate the people of Britain, nay, many that are now his own friends, would resist any other method; and he knows that the riches of a country are the people of it: He would be himself, and he would have his son the King of Great Britain; and he does not think it worth his while to be king of trees, of beasts, and a desolated land, or to leave such a ruined kingdom to his son. When I weigh the good inclinations of the king, and the barbarous persecution and misrepres-

¹ James's counsellors ventured to differ from him on that subject; and such an opinion was very unceremoniously expressed by a sea-captain who had followed him to St Germain's. Some dispute had arisen on the comparative demerits of Queen Mary and the Princess Anne at the period of the Revolution. While the king was engaged in softening the part acted by his younger daughter, this gentleman, leaving the presence, muttered, as he shut the door, but in a tone loud enough to be heard through the whole apartment, "Both bitches, by God!"

resentation he has met with, I am shook with a double agony: I compassionate his wrongs, and am astonished at our ingratitude, and that we would not once try whether the things we complained of proceeded from his own nature or from those about him, whom the Prince of Orange had corrupted. The scene of his and our miseries is abundantly and admirably laid open in an excellent book printed last summer, called, *Great Britain's Just Complaint*; and if I would entertain the world upon that subject, I must either transcribe what may be found in that book, or relate the history of the same matter of fact, without doing the same justice to the cause of the king. That great and judicious author has discovered the whole mystery of iniquity; how such snares were laid for the king as an honest-minded man could scarce escape; how willing the king was to redress our grievances, when he found he had been in mistakes, and this before he went away; how he continued in the same mind when he was addressed to by some of his subjects of Scotland, who had appeared most vigorously to resent those mistakes, and this when he was under no pressure in his affairs. I will add no more to justify the inclinations of the king, but beseech every body who reads this, to read *Great Britain's Just Complaint*, which puts the nation upon the best method for us to know the inclinations of our king. He advises, p. 48, "to resume that treaty we so foolishly broke off and refused, and thereby to secure religion and property by those concessions which our sovereign is still ready to grant us." He goes on, "Let us put it home to him, and lay it at his own door; let him have it in his choice to return by his people, if he pleases. Convince him, that his protestant subjects, upon securing their religion and liberties, will repair their former errors, by contributing heartily towards his restoration. And, as that author says, if he declines to return upon a protestant and English foot, there is an end of the controversy, and of all disputes among protestants; for religion and liberty will never be sacrificed by true Englishmen." And I will add to what he says, If no true Englishman join with him, whatever forces they can transport upon us, neither can King James come home, nor can the French conquer us: But, God be praised, a great many true Englishmen will join to bring home the king, though I know not one so bad an Englishman as would join in a French conquest.

But I come in the second place to shew, that it is not the interest of any of the princes or states of Europe, that the French should make us a conquest. The excellent author of the above-named *Great Britain's Just Complaint* has proved, that whether this confederate war ends successfully or unsuccessfully, in all likelihood, and according to all the rules of policy, the restoration of King James must in a short time follow upon the determination of it: But it is my business to make it plain, that though it may be, and is the interest of all countries to have King James restored at the conclusion of this war, yet it is not the interest of any of them that the French should conquer us, have our kings their vassals, or be masters of our ports. Would the Spaniard have the channel shut up on both sides to Flanders? Would the Dutch have the English and Irish ports managed by such select committees, as the French would infallibly set up for trade? And how long would the Dutch resist ours and the French power, united under one absolute monarch? Would not the northern crowns, and all the princes of Germany, soon feel the weight of such a confluence of strength? The influence that such a conquest would have upon all the states of Europe, be they never so remote, is at first sight so evident, that there is not one of them who would be an idle spectator of our ruin. Every body now knows the danger their own house is in when their neighbour's is on fire. Every little politician knows how much greatness depends upon naval preparations and trade; therefore every body would be alarmed, every body in an uproar, when they saw such maritime kingdoms as ours like to be

! See the preceding Tract

made an accession to the numerous land-forces of France. They are idle brains that dream of universal monarchies at this day; and though whole kingdoms heretofore would not join in a common defence, whole Europe would now. However ambitious the King of France may be, he can never think of so unwieldy a project, in which he must not only encounter all England, all this island, all these three kingdoms, but all Europe too.

I come in the last place to shew, that it is not the interest of the King of France to attempt to make us a conquest, either for himself or King James. I would ask but two things to be granted me, which, I think, will be granted by most men: The one is, that the King of France tolerably understands his own interest; the other is, that he will follow it where he finds it. And now I shall proceed to prove, that it is not the interest of France to attempt to make us a conquest. The unwieldiness of the project is one very good reason against it. Less than one hundred thousand of his best men cannot make us a conquest, and keep us so; and he must only take possession of the land, and not expect to be master of the people, by reason of our religion; and whoever he sends to be his lieutenant here, will be under great temptation to revolt from him, and set up for himself, or become the first subject of these kingdoms, which we shall be willing to make him, and a greater subject than France has, rather than not get rid of the miseries of a provincial, and be restored to our own government. Consider how much danger the absolute power of France will run by a too free intercourse with the few surviving Britons, who will acquaint so many of his soldiers what were the freedoms of our land. Consider whether France can bear such an evacuation as is necessary to make and people us a province. We believe that the expulsion of the Hugonots let out too much of his people, too much of the vital blood of France: It did so doubtless. and a plantation of our island would endanger all he has upon the continent. What neighbour that envies him, would not be glad to see him make such an experiment, would not nick the lucky opportunity, and pull back all those towns and provinces, which he may now much more easily keep than he can gain us? Would any peace, any leagues they can have with him, be proof against such a promising temptation? To attempt the conquest of these kingdoms would indeed be grasping at a prodigious shadow, but he would not fail to lose a great deal of real substance. The King of France is not such a knight-errant, he does not love to venture over much: He, like Julius Cæsar, when he had attained the empire, loves to make good what he gets, and is not like the Macedonian rambler, greedy of difficult and bloody travels. Let the designs of France be as vast as they will, their king is no madman. Augustus and Tiberius (who were both skilful in government) are thought by very sensible men to have neglected Britain out of this wholesome state-maxim, That it was necessary to bound and moderate the Roman empire. It is certain those two emperors often thought of bounding the Roman empire, and of bringing it into a tenable compass; and it is plain, that mighty empire was at last overthrown by its own weight and largeness. The jurisdiction of France is of a prodigious growth for this age; and if the King of France thinks of subduing such a brave and populous country as we are, so united as we shall be, when we find only the French king's interest at the bottom of the plot, and so assisted as we shall be by all the potentates of Europe for their own sakes, he will miscarry in the enterprize, and France itself will tumble from its height. It is a bolder undertaking than was recorded of Alexander the Great; and though the King of France should overrun us, he would, like that Alexander, never be able to settle a government amongst us, but his very victories would shake his own.

Let it be farther considered, That though the French have been successful in wars near home, yet they have been unsuccessful in remote undertakings, where either the transporting by sea, or the uneasiness of the passage by land, have rendered succours hard and difficult to be sent. What rendered all their attempts upon the kingdom of

Naples and duchy of Milan ineffectual, but the difficulties they found in sending supplies to Naples by sea, and to Milan over the rough Alps? In our King John's time, Lewis, the then dauphin of France, was invited over and sworn to by many of the barons; but did not the difficulty of getting supplies to maintain his footing at last utterly defeat all his hopes? Would not our present sailors carry their ships to any part of the world, rather than to let them be carried into France? Is there not, think you, one great man left, whose fidelity to our own right line, and whose courage and vigilance is equal to Hubert de Burgh's? Think you there is no gallant man, who would by a sea-fight hinder the pouring in of fresh French succours, when we saw they aimed at the destruction of the right of our royal family, and our own rights? I am not over fond of the present age, yet there are many brave and loyal men in it, that would defeat any French design, that were injurious to our own legal monarchy. But to come to our own days: What enabled Spain to recover Catalonia in a great measure, and to pluck Messina in Sicily out of the present King of France's hands, when they were losing ground in the confining provinces, but the difficulty of sending supplies to the one over the Pyrenean mountains, and to the other by sea? And it is remarkable, that the uncertainties alone of wind and weather rendered the supplying of Messina impracticable, even when the French were masters of the seas, and had routed the Spanish and Dutch fleets, and killed the famous De Ruyter: How much more will the same uncertainties of wind and weather, joined with our brave ships, and braver seamen, render us safe, and all such designs as a French conquest impracticable? Did not also this present king of France, in our own memories, over-run, like a violent torrent, the United Provinces, and possess himself of a great part of their country, and yet was obliged to throw up all his conquests? And for what reason? Because there was the interposition of fifty or sixty miles that was not his own, which might have hindered the sending supplies. And will not the interposition of more miles of a tempestuous and uncertain sea, joined with the rebuffs which will be given him by our fleet, lay greater rubs in his way, and oblige him at last to disgorge, though he should by surprise gain ground upon us? What was it induced the Romans to maintain four-score thousand men in Britain, and to secure their frontiers in this island, by the famous walls of Adrian and Severus, as well as with such numerous troops, against the incursions of the Scots and Picts, who were confined within the little country now called Scotland; when at the same time they were able to protect their frontiers, with less numerous troops, from the insults of the Parthians and of the Germans, (which then included all modern Germany to the north and east of the Danube and Rhine the northern Crowns, Poland, and better part of Muscovy), each of which nations taken separately did possess countries six times bigger than France at this day? Was it not because of the difficulty of sending troops into Britain, occasioned by the uncertainty of wind and weather, though they were masters of the seas, and their enemies had no fleet to oppose them? What reason then have the French to dream of the conquest of our island, when all its inhabitants are united in one monarchy and government; when all nations are now equalized as to arms and discipline of war; and when our fleet, modestly speaking, is equal to any of our neighbours? Would it be reasonable for them, with forces less considerable than those of the Romans, with fewer encouragements from the advantage of military discipline and arms (in which the Romans did far surpass their enemies), and under many more discouragements from our fleet and otherwise, to attempt the conquest of a people much more great, rich, and numerous than the ancient Scots and Picts, who have the sense of religion as well as liberty, of all that is dear and valuable, to rouse and influence their courages; especially when from all histories, foreigners may learn this lesson, That nothing less than an annihilation can extinguish the sense of religion, honour, and liberty in English breasts?

I think I have already shewn, that it is not the interest of France to attempt to make us a conquest for themselves : And it is as easy to show, it is as little their interest to make us slaves to King James.

I am resolved I will advance, what will be thought a paradox, viz. That there is no one country so much concerned as France, that we should have good securities for our liberties under the Restoration ; and if I am challenged on this head, I can make this paradox plain to every body's understanding. I shall touch upon it briefly here. France is concerned to keep us from an absolute monarchy and popery too, and that by reason of our pretences upon the kingdom. It would be the greatest solecism in the French politics to make a king, that has such a claim, entire master of a people, who have such natural courage, and that love glory rather too immoderately, or to remove such a Shiboleth as our different creeds. It is the interest of France to promote and head our discontents, and not to lay the people at the king's mercy. They thought so formerly, and of late years. Did not Lewis, mentioned in my last paragraph, before he departed this realm, take care that Henry III. should give his oath, nay made him give it, that he would restore to the barons of the realm, and other his subjects, all their rights and privileges, for which the discord began between King John and his people? Baker's Chronicle, p. 114. Did not their great Richelieu, at the beginning of our late civil wars, send emissaries into Scotland to stir up the mal-contents, and that though we had so lately married a daughter of France, and so lately had had a quarrel with the Spaniard? Their kings must be ready to assist the people, if their rights are in real danger : When we have lost our rights, they may lose their crowns. "The friendships of neighbouring princes seldom last long, seldom during their own lives, and are more seldom transmitted to their posterities. Many reasons and jealousies of state are falling in, which occasion frequent and unavoidable breaches, and a king of England who is absolute, and master of his subjects, may be troublesome and dangerous to France, and may revive our old English pretences to the most considerable provinces, nay to the crown of France itself." So that it will be prudent in the French king to let us alone with our old quarrels, between prerogative and privilege, and let our ease be a check upon the ambition of our princes, when a daring and enterprising spirit may be upon the throne, one who may be willing to court difficulties and dangers, and try for what his forefathers have possessed. The King of France is so far from designing a conquest for himself, that he desires no retribution for what King James his misfortunes have cost him. And this I say from good authority. And as for conquering for King James, he too well knows his own interest to think it so, to make us slaves or papists, or either of them. Of this you may read more in Great Britain's Just Complaint.

I know how artful and indefatigable our adversaries are, and that though a man beats them out of all their strong-holds, yet they will at last retire and betake themselves to those arguments, that they, in their own minds, know have no real weight ; and I therefore foresee they will still endeavour to scare men with the remembrance of all our former pretended conquests ; and for that reason, and that there may remain no umbrage, not even the least, to imagine a French conquest practicable, I will take every one of those conquests into consideration, and handle them apart, that I may treat of them more distinctly : and I presume the reflections I shall make upon them will show not only a vast difference between the condition and circumstances of those that are said to be our conquerors, and the present French power, and between the state of the British affairs then, and what they are now, but also show a great disparity between the interests that those invaders proposed to themselves, and what the King of France can have at this day : So that whether in a genuine and strict sense they were conquests or no, I hope to make it plain that they will in nowise overthrow the positions I have been advancing.

If any man has a mind to examine whether they were properly conquests, he must consult our antiquities, and those treatises that are expressly written on that subject, wherein he will find the point warmly debated on both sides, and perhaps with more heat than judgment; I will refer this enquirer to those authors, and fall directly to consider our several invaders.

I will begin with Cæsar's invasion, which was the first of which we have any certain knowledge.

Julius Cæsar, who was then only an officer of the Roman state, but had laid in his own breast the design of seizing upon that empire, when he had subdued most part of the ancient Gallia, (which comprehends the modern France, Savoy, Switzerland, and Germany on this side the Rhine, and the Spanish Netherlands,) and by a potent faction at Rome had obtained it of the senate as his province for many years, thought it necessary to add to the glory of his name some attempt upon countries beyond the end of the world, (for so was Britain in those days thought at Rome,) that so his dazzling achievements might make his long-intended purpose more easy; I mean his design of raising himself from a servant to be master of his country. As to the Romans themselves, when they came first amongst us, their power was united, entire, and so much too big for all our neighbouring countries, that they had given law to every one of them, before they had attempted us, and we were divided into several petty governments, who would not join in a common defence.

Give me leave now to set down, that the King of France is already at the head of a government, and needs not risk what he has, to make him superior to those amongst whom he dwells. We are united under one monarchy. There are many princes confederate against France that are very powerful; and neutral princes enough to turn at any time the scale: Nor is there, as I said, amongst all the Jacobites that I know, one man who so little loves his own king and his own country, as that he would not hazard his life against the French, if they designed any thing in prejudice of our rightful monarch, or his posterity, or our constitution itself. Can any man think we have less sense of liberty than the Irish, who yet had not a different religion to caution them, as the protestant Jacobites have here? Indeed some of us are (like them) sometimes wheedled into too early and undue suspicions of the French, even by the emissaries of the Prince of Orange; and if any body talks of governing England by French power, I am sure they must be the Prince of Orange's pensioners; and though the Prince of Orange himself is not good at much, his agents have the art to foment jealousies.

Besides all this, there is a great disparity between the times in which the Romans came hither, and now, by reason of our skill in military affairs. I suppose few Englishmen will allow the French so much superior to us in the art of war, as the Romans were to the naked Britons. Our late taxes have been very ill bestowed, if our fleet does not hold the same disproportion; and yet in those days, though the Romans were so long amongst us, and though they governed us in great part by our own laws, and many of their lieutenants rather taught us the exercise of, than took away our liberties, nevertheless they never had (if our best historians may be credited) the whole land at any one time in subjection; and though such multitudes of the Britons were slain, the tribute the Romans got here cost them, in massacres and battles, more men than France will ever be able to spend upon the project of conquering these kingdoms.

Most of what is recorded of the manner of the coming, and being here of the Romans, is handed down to us by their own writers, with a naked and sedate narration; but cloistered clergymen (who used themselves to write hyperboles rather than precise truths) being those from whom we have most of our accounts of the Saxon times, we must expect swelling and legendary reports; but that wherein I shall consider, to shew the disparity between them and the French, and ours and those days, lies in a small compass, and will be granted on all hands.

The quarrels of the Roman empire had carried into France, under the banners of Maximus (one of the competitors for it) the flower and strength of Britain; and with the overthrow of Maximus by Theodosius, they either all perished, or seated themselves in Armorica. There was likewise another great transplantation of the British youth under Constantine; and at this time the Saxons were a very warlike people, and so overcharged with numbers, that they sent multitudes abroad to fight for a habitation. The frame of their government agreed very well with the British, and was very near what are at this day the fundamentals of our government. They were invited in, to preserve us from being over-run by the Scots and Picts, who were our fellow-islanders; and though I don't doubt the Saxons carried the merit of their successes against our enemies further than became our friends, yet I cannot imagine but that there was a more equal incorporation of the British stock, than we can discover at this distance of time, and from such passionate writers as are the relators of what passed then. And, after all, it was want of ships, and great divisions amongst the Britons, occasioned their overthrow, (for our monarchy was not perfected, and, as Milton says very well, Vortigern was rather chief than sole king.) These were the reasons why the Saxons so far mastered the Britons; and yet the Saxons often ran a risk of a final extirpation.

From this account of the Saxon invasion, the disparity is very obvious. I heartily lament the loss of so much English blood as has been spilt unnecessarily and unlawfully too, in these our deplorable distractions, into which we have brought ourselves, by inviting over a foreigner to rescue those liberties, which he has (as we might well suppose he would) more trampled upon than all the evil counsellors of King James. We would invite a foreign prince to do our own proper work, instead of endeavouring parliamentarily to redress our grievances, or rescuing ourselves and our liberties by an English insurrection; such a one as those whereby our ancestors obtained the confirmations of their charters, and which often ended (as all insurrections ought to do) without any real prejudice to the successive monarchy, and which (let it be called now as whiggish as they will, and those that were formerly were popish) is more justifiable either to prudence or religion, than the nobility, gentlemen, and clergy,* (who call themselves of the church of England) their invitation of a foreign prince, which (with all the charity and pity in the world for those who were inconsiderately misled, and are not so obstinate as to think with Catiline, that ill deeds must be made safe with worse) I beg leave to say was unnatural, and in despite of his relative, and their civil duty. I say, I heartily lament the loss of so much English blood as has been unwarrantably thrown away in Ireland, at sea, and in Flanders; and yet, God be praised, we have still left generous youth enough to make us the terror of all ambitious princes, if we would once again unite to take away all disputes of title, by restoring our rightful and lawful king, and betake ourselves to negotiate in the arbitration of Europe, rather than over hastily engage in wars abroad, which wars might be evidently proved destructive to this nation; and, would it not too much lengthen this discourse, would be no unuseful digression here, since our own woeful experience, from the time we have been hooked into this present quarrel of Europe, which is more the confederates than ours, has made it so proper a subject to be well considered of. I hope some person or other will handle it in a paper apart.

But I must return to shew the disparity between the British affairs now, and when the Saxons came amongst us, and that with a respect to the French nation; and I again bless God we are not yet drained by this confederate quarrel, we have hand over head

* Though the Prince of Orange's Declaration mentions lords spiritual, and some have raised a scandal upon Archbishop Smeroft, as if his hand was to the invitation of him, I am well assured that neither that right reverend prelate, nor his fellow sufferers, ever engaged in that design of calling over the Prince of Orange.—*Orig. Note,*

engaged in, of all those gallant men that should defend our island. But farther, Have not the French a land to live in? Is France so overstocked with people? Has their government any affinity with ours? Have we any fellow-islanders, who are of a distinct government that endeavour to destroy us? And lastly, Is not our government resolved into a natural monarchy, though, praised be God, it is a limited one?

As for the Danes, though their original is disputed, it is plain, by all the histories of those times, that they were rovers and robbers, that were to seek a country to live in, and possibly might be another swarm of the Saxons; and it is observable, that they were above two hundred years before they mastered this land; and that the reason they mastered us at last, was our want of ships; and after they had been attacking us about two hundred years, they were entirely massacred, man, woman, and child, all in less than four-and-twenty hours; and when Swain, the Danish king, (which was two hundred twenty and four years from the first entrances of the Danes) had forced King Ethelred into Normandy, Swain dying the next year, and the Danish army setting up Canute, or Knute, his son, the Saxon nobility and states were in such heart and power, that they sent messengers to Ethelred, declaring "they preferred none before their own native sovereign, if he would promise to govern better than he had done;" and accordingly, upon his promise to redress their grievances, they repossessed him of his throne, and continued it to his son, Edmond Ironside. I wish our English nobility and gentry would now send messengers to lay before the king all the mal-administrations of his ministers, and what are the proper securities against all such mal-administrations for the future; and I am confident the king will receive such a message very kindly, nay I know from very good authority he would, and that he is willing to give mankind all reasonable satisfaction. Here I must observe also, that there still remained amongst us distinct and quarrelling petty governments, (for the Saxon heptarchy was not entirely wrought up into a natural monarchy,) and yet Edmond Ironside had totally routed Canute, had it not been for that traitor Edrick, who at the battle of Alford by some wiles detained Edmond from pursuing him, which Edrick (as an example to traitors) was afterward put to death by Canute. I have another remark that I would set down concerning the Danish matters, which is, that the citizens and nobility of London stuck by Edmond Ironside, but the Sherlockian-providential-archbishops, abbots, and some of the noblemen, elected the conqueror Canute; as some bishops and too many of our nobles have done the Prince of Orange. I am sorry that the citizens of London have not more unanimously stuck to their natural and rightful monarch; but I hope they will yet have an opportunity to redeem their reputation, and that they will then unanimously call back their king, that they may blot out the guilt of their too general defection; and though too many have joined with the present usurpation, yet there are many worthy citizens that have retained their ancient loyalty during all this revolution; and the number of those who now see their error daily increaseth.

I have digressed a little, by repeating some things which are not altogether so pertinent to my main design; and since I am turned story-teller, I will put down the reason why Canute put Edrick to death, which was for slaying the Lord's anointed, Edmond Ironside; and that, though Edmond was Canute's enemy, and yet Canute himself made away the brother and children of Edmond, either of which had a better right to be the Lord's anointed in England than Canute had himself. This was such a piece of justice, as it is now of religion for our conquerors, William and Mary, to keep with solemnity the 30th of January and 29th of May. But though he was guilty of this mockery in point of private justice, yet, in relation to the constitution of England, he commanded the observation of the ancient Saxon laws (which were afterwards called the laws of Edward the Confessor), and at a convention of Danes at Oxford, it was agreed on between both parties to revive and keep those laws. I think

our present conquerors have not revived many of our good old, or made many new advantageous laws for us. It is by unreasonable fines, arbitrary imprisonments, pressing men contrary to law, &c. (against all which things the P. of O. his own Declaration inveighed, and our Bill of Rights provided,) that they maintain their conquest. These are their methods, instead of granting the Judges Bill, the Bill for Triennial Parliaments,¹ and the Bill for Mines; these are their methods, instead of courting the love of those they call their subjects.

I will add no more about the Danish invasion, but that their empire here lasted not many years, and that their kings who ruled us made this the seat of their dominions.

Let us now compare things with respect to the Danish invasion and the present posture of affairs. I must again say, the French are not a roving people, that live by pillage, and that are destitute of a dwelling; nor would they be willing to engage in a war of such continuance; nor would their monarch change the situation of his palace; nor can he spare from guarding his frontiers such an army as would be necessary to keep us in quiet, though we were subdued by a sudden fight; nor are we unprovided with ships, though I must confess I fear the Prince of Orange has not taken so much care of our fleet, as Mr Pepys's Memoirs, lately put forth, has proved King James did; which shews King James understood and prosecuted the true English interest, and is a sufficient confutation of that scandalous aspersion their celebrated Dr King casts upon his majesty. His expressions bespeak the king's inclinations to let the fleet of England sink, and the ships rot: But Mr Pepys has proved the contrary with a witness, and appeals to the books and men that are now in the Admiralty and Navy Offices. By this you may guess at the sincerity of Dr King in other particulars. King James, without taxes, repaired and added to our navy, and augmented its stores: But the vote which declares the sense of the House of Commons to be, "That the commission of the Admiralty should not be filled with men experienced in sea affairs," (though it looks like a jest) was well enough calculated for the humour of this prince, who is willing to put the nation under an absolute necessity of maintaining a vast standing army; though a pamphlet written and dispersed at the beginning of the last sessions, by the wiser Williamites themselves, called, "The Interest or State of Parties," had so evidently made it out, that the natural and only defence of England depended upon its wooden walls, and spake broadly of the insufficiency of the present Lords of the Admiralty. I suppose too, that they who occasioned our not making use last summer of our victory at sea (which even those who would fright us with the French power say was gained by a part only of our fleet, inferior in number and quality to the French, who attacked them,) and since have got Russel discharged from being admiral, instead of being rewarded with an earldom and garter for that victory, which did indeed destroy many of the French ships, though it was not the greatest victory that ever the sun saw, (as Dr Tillotson phrased it,) and yet it is the only time that we have not (by reason of our preposterous management) come off with loss and shame: I say, these men know how much better King William is pleased with land forces than tarpawlins; but how little care soever has been taken of our ships, whatever dangers the Prince of Orange would expose us to hereafter, that he may rule us more arbitrarily during his own time, yet the nation will find out his designs, feel their own strength, know whereon their own safety depends, time enough to hinder his, or a French conquest, though they will at the same time perceive it necessary to call home that prince whose claim is indisputed, and whose coming home, upon such concessions as we want, and he is ready to grant, will swallow up all factions. They will

¹ I have it from a good hand, that the Prince of Orange, a little before he refused the Triennial Bill, had in some discourse this expression, "I hear they think I will pass the Triennial Bill; but I promise them the crown shall be ne'er the worse for my wearing it."—*Orig. Note.*

ere long perceive it necessary to call him home upon such securities, even to secure their own interests. All remains of our petty governments are at an end; and since printing has been in the world, the French and all nations so well know how vindictive of their liberties the English have always been, that they will have but little mind to make us a province.

I have already intimated how unsafe it would be for the absolute power of France at home to let their soldiers hear from the surviving Britons what were our freedoms, and it would be yet much more unsafe for the French lieutenants to agree to the observation of our laws. But I will hasten to the Norman Conquest.

Before any body takes it for granted that William the First was a conqueror, I wish they would read the first part of the Historical Discourse of the Uniformity of the Government of England, written by Mr Nathaniel Bacon, and the latter end of the third part of Mr Will. Prynne's Historical Vindication of the Fundamental Liberties of English Freemen, together with all those authors these two writers refer to. But I resolved at first to wave examining whether we have ever, in a proper and strict sense, been conquered or no; and therefore must fall directly upon comparing those and our times, and the pretences of the Duke of Normandy, and what the French can have upon us.

I can find but one thing that has any shew of likeness with our present circumstances, and that is, Harold was an usurper, and had broke the protestation he had formerly made to Duke William, as much as the Prince of Orange has his Declaration to the People of England; and truly, if any thing can facilitate a French conquest, and if the times did not exceedingly differ in other respects, the breaches we have made upon the lineal succession, and the impotencies, irregularities, and exactions of the present government might make way for it: But those things that made a conquest feasible then, and are not in our present case, are very many.

The Normans came from Norway and Denmark, which places were surcharged with people, and there was no project so improbable in which their leaders could not easily engage them. The religion of the Normans and the inhabitants of Britain was the same. The conqueror had many pretences of title: Edward the Confessor's will, the donation of the pope, who also gave him a consecrated banner, an agnus of gold, and one of the hairs of St Peter. Besides his titles, here were several Normans within this land who helped him; he had been here himself to view our land, and make a party, as his own speech intimates; the then King of France helped him in his acquest; so did the Emperor Henry the Fourth; he likewise came and lived among us, and stipulated at his own coronation to defend the holy church of God, and the rectors of the same; to govern the universal people subject to him justly; to establish equal laws, and see them duly executed. "Nor did he (as the judicious Samuel Daniel well observes) ever claim any power by conquest, but, as a regular prince, submitted himself to the orders of the kingdom, desirous rather to have his testamentary title (however weak) to make good his succession, than his sword; and though the stile of Conqueror, by the flattery of the times, was after given him, he shewed by all the course of his government he assumed it not, introducing none of those alterations (which followed) by violence, but by a mild gathering upon the disposition of the state, and the occasions offered, and that by way of reformation." There are the words of Daniel, page 36.

Now I come to compare, I must once more repeat, that France has no occasion to send forth droves of people; and the religion of France will make the people of England resist a French conquest to all extremity. And if King James would sell his kingdoms, (as some ridiculously have suggested,) the people of England would hardly be brought to make good the bargain; and the pope's gift would as little influence our minds, though he should send with the arms of France all the reliques of Rome. We have, indeed, many French amongst us, but I think no one man fears they will assist their own king in such an adventure; they are so far from that, that they have not been

(which I am sorry to say) grateful to King James, who gave them protection and relief when they came hither in distress. And I have already proved, that it is not the interest of any prince abroad to join our three kingdoms to the French territories; and I believe, if the King of France should promise "to protect the protestant church of God, and the rectors of the same, to govern the universal people subject to him justly, to establish equal laws, and to see them duly executed," we should not take his word, nor would his own subjects be well pleased. It is King William only that is allowed to have a religion for his several dominions; that may be a synod-of-Dort-presbyterian in Holland, an episcopalian in England, of the kirk in Scotland, and a downright favourer of popery in Ireland, as is apparent by the Limerick treaty, and the pamphlet put out by the Irish gentlemen, Concerning the Proceedings of their late Parliament, and the depositions that are before the House of Lords.

I have told over our former conquests somewhat tediously, and will add very little about them; however, I desire the reader will reflect, that the neighbouring princes, because they did not animadvert how much greatness consisted in naval preparations and trade, and because we had not begun to make a figure in either, never thought themselves so much concerned, as all the potentates of Europe will now, what becomes of us. None of our neighbours ever helped us formerly, some of 'em did our invaders. Let the reader farther reflect, that it was not necessary for any of our former invaders to make such a total subversion of all our laws, as it will now be for the French king, and consequently composition and treaties more easily succeeded battles. "The former alterations rather meliorated than overthrew our constitution. They bundled up and refined our by-laws into national statutes, and introduced forms where the methods of justice seemed less articulate." And, lastly, let it be considered, though there are great divisions amongst us, some few for keeping the Prince of Orange, others for restoring the king, and several for something that they have not yet licked in form, yet all persons that make the respective parties of these divisions, will all of 'em join together to obstruct a French conquest.

There will be such divisions whenever men will commit violence upon the natural and ancient constitution, and I must confess these divisions are the most fatal symptoms that attend our distempered state, and may, and will certainly subject us (though not to a French conquest) to great calamities and devastations, unless we restore the king. I suppose I have sufficiently proved a French conquest to be neither desirable nor practicable, yet God knows what infinite mischiefs we may have brought upon ourselves by reviving a sort of quarrel which, by the mercy of God, has been so long extinguished. A dispute for title, which has in the days of our forefathers had so fatal an effect, which has so dismally wounded our state, and is left bleeding in the histories of so many reigns. Because you shall not think I aggravate the calamities, that were occasioned by the contention of the two roses, I will only transcribe some passages out of Trussel, and it cannot be supposed his history was written to serve a Jacobite-turn. Page 257, he says, "There were in the quarrel of the two roses, fourscore princes of the blood destroyed, and twice as many natives slain as were lost in the two conquests of France." Page 260, he says, "In the battle of Townton there were killed thirty-five thousand ninety and one Englishmen, and of strangers one thousand seven hundred forty-five, besides two hundred and thirty slain the day before at Ferry-bridge." In his last page his words are these: "The total of private soldiers that perished in these civil wars, and suffered punishment of immature death for taking part of the one side or the other, was fourscore thousand nine hundred ninety and eight persons, besides

Kings	.	.	2	Marquisses	.	2
Prince	.	.	1	Earls	.	21
Dukes	.	.	10	Viscounts	.	2

Lords	27	Knights	139
Lord Prior	1	Esquires	441
Judge	1		

The number of the gentry is uncertainly reported, and therefore Trussel omits them, but says, "That for the most part they are included in the number of private soldiers set down to be slain, to which he says you must add the number of six hundred and thirty and eight, (the total of all the persons not therein accounted,) and then there appeareth in all to be slain fourscore five thousand six hundred twenty-eight Christians, and most of this nation, not to be repeated (says the historian) without grief. nor remembered without deprecation, that the like may never happen more." He concludes his history with this saying,

Pax una triumphis innumeris potior.

The whole history of that quarrel sets before us such apposite lessons for our times, that I wish all who love England would seriously read and ponder it.

It is time to draw to a conclusion : I am not willing to prophesy the destruction of my country, and I beseech God Almighty to incline our hearts to the things that belong unto our peace, to our peace in this world, and to our everlasting peace in the world to come. I beseech God to incline the Prince of Orange not to forfeit an eternal weight of glory for a momentary crown, which has nothing of good in it, if it is not got by the acts of goodness. God grant that he may consider it as a more valuable character to be a virtuous and a Christian prince than a romantick hero ; and God grant that he may be so wise that his days may not end in tragedy. I wish he would review his own Declaration and the Memorial of the States, and that he would pursue those excellent ends for which he came, for which the States said they lent their ships, and which King James would have complied with, and is ready to comply with still. The king is willing to secure the liberties of England and the protestant religion, and had not the confederates made their quarrel unjust by giving way to an unnatural ambition in the Prince of Orange, and dispossessing King James, (whilst they pretended they formed this confederacy to repair the injuries done to them by the French,) King James, the injured King James, would have checked the growth of France, and kept Namur and Mons. He was far from a French league, and would have performed the part of a true guarantee ; for either the king would have prevented France coming before them, by reminding their king of the treaty of Nimiguen, or our arms would have had doubtless success when we had justice on our side, and the wishes and prayers of all Englishmen joined with the undertaking of our rightful indisputed king. How far he was from a French league, how unwilling to think ill of the Prince of Orange, and how unwilling to be too much beholden to France, his disbelief of all the advices of d'Avaux, and of many of his friends, his answer to Bonrepos, and his refusal to the last of any French assistance, sufficiently witness ; and as much as he has been beholden to France during his troubles, I am satisfied that even in his exiled state he thinks himself (as King of England) so naturally the arbiter of Europe, that he will mediate, as soon as his affairs a little more recover their figure, a reasonable peace for it. But the king need not much solicit it, for I am satisfied the King of France is willing to come into such a peace, upon condition that the king's restoration may be one of the terms of it, and that he will not be brought to make peace upon any other terms ; so that the restoration of King James would give a happy issue to the troubles of Europe and our own, which our experience (after all the blood and treasure spilt and spent to humble France) may shew us will be the only expedient to save us from the power we have so much envied ; and this we may learn from King William's own speeches to these two

last sessions of parliament, for he does not only make the obtaining an honourable peace from France to the confederates (instead of our conquest of France) the bounds of his hopes in this war, but allows the growth of France during this war so much, as to increase his stile from the *great* power of France (which were the words of his speech Michaelmas was twelve-months) to the *excessive* power of France, in his speech of the last sessions. This very consideration should move us. But farther.

Into what shambles are all the parts of Flanders, the Rhine, Catalonia, and Piedmont turned? What slaughter-houses may be erected in the unhappy isle of Britain? Unhappy, because she will blind herself against her own true interest and only cure. Our taxes grow heavy, but we have paid our blood, but we must pour it out yet more plentifully before this reckoning is over; if we will not return to our wits and our duty, civil distractions will overtake us; foreigners both on the one and the other side will be poured in upon us, and we shall become the cock-pit of the world; and though all the Jacobites abhor a French conquest, and so does the king too, yet if the nation will not come to such a temper as to restore him without their help, the king's friends cannot be blamed for being willing to admit of such a moderate number of French, or any other forces as may be necessary to cover them when they come to him, till they get together, and as may give them opportunity to rise. We had rather the nation looked so directly towards him, as that there should be no occasion for one man in arms to come with him. We had rather, he had much rather, nay, the King of France declares he had rather his restoration should be wholly owing to his own subjects. We will never agree that he should bring such a force as may give any the least just jealousy, that either he or France design to conquer; and he is perfectly resolved to come in that manner that shall be agreed to by such friends of his as the world must allow to be men of honour, regardful of the British rights, and of the protestant religion. With such men he will adjust the manner and time of his coming. They will see that his coming shall be safe to all those dear concerns for which we have so often struggled; and the measures and condescensions such, as that they may answer to God and men their engaging in his quarrel.

Can any man of sense believe that the Earl of Middleton, who could never during his whole ministry be drawn into any one irregular step, would go over upon any other errand? That great man is known to understand his duty to his country as well as his prince, and thinks he ought at the same time to be the minister of both, and his affection and firmness to protestancy was never once suspected: He will neither betray our laws nor his own religion; nor will he, to do the king but justice, be tempted to either; for all that we have misliked in the king's measures abroad, has proceeded from misrepresentations from hence; and my Lord Middleton is so fraught with the genuine interest as well as sense of these nations, that the most inveterate of our enemies will have hereafter no opportunities to clamour and exasperate. This is a truth which in a short time will want no vouchers. The future acts of state that come from that court, will prove he has discoursed many of the leading men, and compromised the grievances of all parties. And whereas some of the Prince of Orange's ministers have declared what great expectations they have from the quarrels at St Germain, I can assure them they will be deceived in their hopes; for there is so good an understanding between my Lord Middleton and those who had before entire credit with the king, that they don't only personally agree, but concur in sentiments relating to the British affairs; which is a full evidence that what we misliked there cannot be charged upon the disposition of the king, nor upon the depraved tempers of those about him, (as even some of his friends were apt to suspect,) but proceeded merely from their want of a true state of these nations, and the knowledge of what would satisfy us, till the Earl of Middleton went thither. Every day will make this truth plainer than other.

I cannot but wish that all men would so avowedly own their mistake, would so willingly sit down under our ancient, legal, limited, and hereditary monarchy, would so openly tell their dissatisfactions, and what they think proportionate securities, so fairly state the differences between the crown and people, so unanimously express their willingness to re-establish the old and natural frame of our government, that it might be advisable that we might advise him wholly to depend upon his British subjects. I like neither French, nor Dutch, nor Irish upon our island, though I cannot be afraid of any such numbers of either, or all, as will be much out-numbered by those of our fellow-subjects and fellow-islanders; who resolve to repair to the king as soon as he is landed. Oh! that we would recant our mistakes! that we would repent of our folly! that we would yet let our moderation, our civil and christian moderation, be known unto all men! Oh! that a nice security for the church of England, as the national church, (and best church too, as I think) as nice a security for our English liberties, and liberty of conscience were our only aims! that party and picque, faction and friendship, fears and fancies, did not predominate neither in the one nor the other party! that the ends, and not the forms of things were what we strove for! that our afflictions would make us wise! then the king would as little need as he wishes to bring any foreign force. See you an end of your troubles? Is your deliverer a fit instrument for so great a work? Do his measures hold any resemblance with his and your pretences? Are his ministers, Caer——n, and Nottingham, Trevor, Rochester, and Seymour, Ren——augh, Grey, Blathwaite, and convert-reconverted Sunderland, (behind the curtain;) together with his creature Br——n, (that indefatigable secretary to all turns, and to the high commission court, that assistant to the four popish bishops, ready evidence, and industrious informer;) and Con——by, of whose merits in Ireland the parliament here took so much notice, that he is since taken into the privy-council of England, for his undoubted integrity and unheard-of abilities; with the long roll of such sort of men, (though his sinking game has forced him to call some lately into his councils, who have not yet lost their reputation with the people,) fit guardians for that liberty and property which you so justly value? Think seriously, ought the people of England to trust these men, or have they reason to trust one another, even in the business of that master they pretend to serve? Awaken out of your dreams; get rid of your phantasms; consider as men, act as lovers of your country; rescue your rights, restore your king, who will confirm those rights with solid securities; do your own work, that after-ages may pity your mistakes, and give allowance for your resentment; and that you and your children's children may be happy: I beseech the God of order, that he will produce it out of our own confusions; that the king may have what is due to him, and that we may have what is as much due to us; and that the king and people may both praise the Almighty for his mercies to this land, this miserable and sinful land.

Let the sense of our miseries, our faults, and our duty stir us up. Let the sad example of former times exhort us. Let us, I say, call home the king, with an exact security to the church of England, as the national church, and with such solid securities for our liberties as may make all other religions harmless opinions, though we allow them a fair and impartial liberty; and yet let us not so hamper the crown, that it will not be able to protect us from our enemies and one another; let us not say that the hands of the nation are bound, and that it cannot call home the king; for if all those who plainly see that we shall be undone under this usurpation, and likewise that it is impossible this government should stand, (though it shifts about now, it is in an ill taking) would upon these terms join with those who are for the restoration of King James, as well in the English army, as all over the nation, from the sad prospect they have of the ruin of the liberty, (the mistaken jealousy and care of which was the only motive that hurried them into what they did) all the force the Prince of Orange has would soon dissolve, and he must be glad to return again and spend all his time at the

Loo (which our English money is making so fine a retreat) and at the Hague, which is the very worst, I call God to witness, that I ever wished him.

I am conscious I have not, in all the parts of this discourse, written with that brevity which I designed at the beginning of it, and may possibly be guilty of some redundancies, tautologies, and repetitions, as well in other places as I have in my Remarks upon our former invasions inserted some passages which crossed my way, though they were rather applicable to our present times than suitable to the thread of my discourse. When a man writes things of this nature, he is willing to be rid of them as fast as they are finished, though they may not be so correct; and notwithstanding the critics (for whose either praise or diversion I never scribble) may find many faults with them, I have set down things as I am persuaded in my own mind, and as I have heard them discoursed by the considerable and influencing Jacobites of the several denominations; though I must answer for my unskilful and careless clothing and ranging their thoughts, I hope I have generally kept in sight of my text, and I suppose also have upon the whole made good what I undertook to prove, viz. "That a French conquest is neither desirable nor practicable." If it is unsuitable to the interests and inclinations of the several sorts of Jacobites, and contrary to the king's inclinations, and the interests of all our neighbours; and the very attempt of it, either for himself or King James, contrary to the King of France's interest; if the condition and circumstances of the French power to make a conquest and interest in such an experiment, and that of our former invaders, and the state of the British affairs now and what they were then, so very much differ; I think we may infer that a French conquest is neither desirable nor practicable, and that it is as weak to suppose France can or will conquer us, as it is to believe we shall sack Paris and conquer France, with the Prince of Orange at the head of the British forces, who we see with them, and all the confederate strength, has so indifferently passed his campaigns in Flanders.

Remarks upon the present Confederacy, and late Revolution in England, &c. 1693.

This was the other Jacobite pamphlet which led to the fate of Anderton the printer. It is much more virulent than that which precedes it, being couched in the bitterest tone of political controversy. The points which it labours are four:—1. That the successful revolution made way for the confederacy. 2. That the rest of the allies desired to render the wealth of England subservient to their interest, and therefore favoured the revolution. 3. That England was to be the dupe of the confederacy, bearing all the expence, but reaping none of the advantages which might arise from the depression of the French power. 4. That instead of an advantageous exchange, the nation, by bartering King James for King William, was brought to the verge of destruction by the ambition, perfidy, and tyranny of the monarch *de facto*. All this argument is so expressed, that no government could overlook such a libel with safety; yet extravagant and virulent as the Tract appears, it does not vindicate the harsh and illegal proceedings against Anderton, the supposed printer.

THE most formidable enterprize, no doubt, that ever was levelled against the grow-

ing grandeur of France, during the long and successful reign of Lewis le Grand, was this late confederacy, formed by the most powerful princes in all Europe : An undertaking of so dangerous consequence to that prince, that if their career had not been stopped by a surprising providence, and diverted by the wonderful vigilance and activity of that truly greatest prince in all these parts of the world, that monarchy by this time had laid expiring. As the confederates had resolutely, and with prodigious prospects of advantage to themselves, agreed upon this design, so to facilitate it had sagaciously enough foreseen what remorse might lie in their way, and as resolutely determined to remove them, right or wrong. England, which had for some years past screened them from those violent, and otherwise irresistible shocks they were exposed to from France, was most feared at this time would stand in their way ; and to speak the truth, from the experience we have had of the French power and policy during this war, the least assistance from her, or a mere neutrality, had left them to the mercy and entire disposal of their enemy. This, I say, was politickly enough foreseen, and by most wicked and unjust means for some time at least prevented ; though by comparing the successes on both sides hitherto, cannot in all human probability be long protracted : But more of this afterwards. To accomplish this grand design of theirs, King James must be deposed, to make way for the ambition and pride of another, the most likely to carry on the war against France ; if we either consider that height of malice which he had long ago conceived against that monarch, chiefly from his being so frequently baffled in Holland and Flanders, by the bravery of his generals there ; or that natural malignity in his very constitution, derived from his ancestors, who had never been famous for their loyalty to their own princes, or affection for crowned heads. This they concluded feasible enough, not being ignorant of the ambitious designs the Prince of Orange had been carrying on for several years in England of mounting that throne, by having a hand in all the plots against King Charles the Second ; but especially his father-in-law, to exclude him, and what not ; and the dispositions he had laid in order to that end, by his corrupting the greatest ministers of state under that unfortunate prince, to take advantage from his religion, to which the English are naturally averse, to put him upon some acts which would in all likelihood alienate his subjects affections from him, and make the P. of O.'s access the more easy. All this being well known to many of the confederate princes, they had no more to do but to sound his inclination somewhat nearer, and proffer him their assistance for the obtaining of what he so eagerly desired, and by all indirect means pursued. To this end having engaged themselves and him in the strict bonds of a confederacy, they immediately lent him such assistance as was requisite to land him in England, where all things were ready to his hand, and there most wickedly deposed King James the Second.

I confess some are apt to alledge that the Prince of Orange exceeded his commission, and acted directly contrary to the determination of the confederacy, their sole aim being only by this invasion to draw King James into their designs : But if we consider those notable hints in the foreign papers upon this occasion, particularly *The General History of Europe*, published in French, at the Hague, by the authority of the States of Holland and West Friesland, we may be easily inclined to believe the contrary, out of which I shall present the reader with some remarkable passages, and leave it to him to judge whether what I have laid down for my principle does not look highly probable.

Historical Account for the Month of November, in the Article of Advice from England, 1688.

“ The king's fleet (that is, King James's,) is about forty-three men of war, ten fire-

ships; but though commanded by the Earl of Dartmouth, who is entirely for the king's interest, 'tis thought the seamen, and many of the officers, will not perform that duty which the king expects from them."

Reflections upon the Advice from Holland, the same Month.

"The expence that has been bestowed upon the fleet and army set forth from Holland, is a sign they are morally assured of the success of the enterprize, which I am apt to believe has been a long time ago in agitation, though it was carried on with that prudence and secrecy as not to be discovered till it could not be longer concealed."

Advice from Germany, December 1688.

"The confederates are arrived in Franconia, where they stay till General Dunewald comes up to join them with the emperor's forces, to the end they may march together, &c. Nevertheless, when they are joined, there is great probability they will do nothing, till they hear what the Prince of Orange does in England; for he is at present the *primum mobile* of all things."

Reflections upon the Advice from France, December 1688.

"'Tis thought that Monsieur Seignalay's journey to visit the coasts was particularly occasioned by the turn of affairs in England, &c. But now all those journeys will signify little; for if heaven continues prosperity to the Prince of Orange, of necessity the most Christian King must quit the ocean."

Reflections upon the Advice from England, the same Month.

"So soon as the enterprise of the Prince of Orange was discoursed of, all men imagined that he was sure of the greatest part of the nobility of England. Some put the question whether he will dethrone his father-in-law, or whether, &c. he'll be contented with the honour of having saved the protestant religion, and the liberty of the English nation.—For my part I believe an accommodation will be a difficult thing.—I make no question but the next parliament King James will be declared to have forfeited his crown."

Reflections on the Advice from Germany, February 1689.

"I am apt to believe they are not to be called by the name of politicians who imagine that the emperor caused the Marquis of Lusignan to be seized, that he might have an opportunity to enter into a negociation. Then again, what was befallen the emperor since unknown to us, that should enforce him to alter his conduct? If it had been that the affairs in England went ill on the P. of O.'s side, that had been a reason indeed;—but all the world knows there is no such thing; the Prince of Orange has been crowned, &c. To all which I shall add a remarkable passage out of the French king's declaration of war against Spain: Amongst other motives he declares, that he is informed what share the governor of the Spanish Low Countries had in the Prince of Orange's enterprise against England, but not believing what he did was done by his

master's command, his majesty was in good hopes to have persuaded his Most Catholick Majesty to have joined with him for the restoration of the lawful King of England, &c. To which purpose he made several proposals that were all received whilst the success of the Prince of Orange continued doubtful; but when 'twas known at Madrid that the King of England had left his kingdom, then nothing was thought of but war with France. That his majesty was also farther informed, that the Spanish ambassador in England visited the Prince of Orange every day, and importuned him to declare war against France, &c.; but finding that his Most Catholick Majesty was resolved," &c.—*Gen. Hist. of Europe, vol. I.*

Month Apr. 89.

As to this last passage I am sensible many prejudiced persons will be ready to object the little reputation the French king and his ministers have had for their veracity these many years, but if we reflect on the vast charge he is constantly at for intelligence in all places where he is concerned, and how much it imported him to find out the mystery of the confederacy, in ought, in some measure at least, to incline us to credit him, especially when it's notoriously known he had intimated to King James, some considerable time before he could give credit to it, the design of the Prince of Orange and the States General against him, and proffered him such assistance, that, if he had complied with it, would have effectually prevented this late revolution in Great Britain, and consequently this bloody and desperate war, which has been the sad effect of it. And there are some persons now living, of unquestionable integrity, and sufficient interest to know the truth of it, who assert, that Don Ronquillo, the late Spanish ambassador, plainly told King James, that if we would not be induced to join in the confederacy with the empire and Spain against France, he would run the hazard of losing his crown; so certain it is, that the revolution here was an immediate effect of the consultations and resolutions of the confederacy, though not publicly enough hitherto understood, to the great injury of the king, and perversion of his subjects.

These passages out of a publick Account of the Affairs of Europe, allowed to be published, and (as we are obliged to suppose) approved by the States General for the present, (till something more material be offered by more capable and intelligent persons,) may seem to any reasonable man a sufficient proof of my assertion, that what the Prince of Orange has lately transacted there, was not managed by him alone against the intentions of the rest of the confederacy? If so, why did not they remonstrate against his proceedings by their ambassadors to King James, and the Prince of Orange too; and, as in honour bound, contribute their assistance, when especially requested to it, towards his restoration? Nay, why did they on the contrary, by their respective ambassadors and envoys, congratulate the Prince and Princess of Orange's accession to the throne, and by this means virtually declare to all the world, that King James was justly deposed, and that the Prince and Princess of Orange were become the lawful and rightful King and Queen of England! So that the more nicely we examine the methods of the Prince of Orange's proceedings, the greater reason we have to conclude this objection to be a mere sham and excuse. His charging his father-in-law with maladministration, "violating the fundamental laws of the realm, with setting up the Roman catholick religion, imposing a supposititious heir upon the three kingdoms in order to put by the succession of his own children, merely on the account of religion," &c. What was all this to the business of France and the confederates? The only thing in the Prince of Orange's declaration that makes for the business pretended, is the private league, offensive and defensive, between King James and France; which, notwithstanding, could never be produced and exposed to the view of the world; and if it had

been so, could never be any just pretence for their assisting to invade him, unless it had been contrary to former alliances between him and them ; none of which appearing, it is altogether as frivolous as many other shams in that master-piece of villainy, the fore-mentioned declaration. Upon these suppositions then 'tis apparent, that that which was to give life unto the confederacy and bring it into act, was the pulling down King James and setting up the Prince of Orange, so that before all this was accomplished, the confederacy was but an embrio, and no better than a conditional stipulation ; and, upon the unsuccessfulness of the Prince of Orange, would have been stifled and vanished into nothing. There was no war declared before this gentleman was most traitorously proclaimed king, but by the Duke of Bavaria, Nov. 10, as you may see in the London Gazette : The emperor and Dutch did not till March 89, and in all probability it had not been done afterward on the confederates side if this *præluuium* to all the rest had miscarried. To this effect we may remember that the Dutch ambassador, when charged by King James in the behalf of his masters, the States General, with assisting the Prince of Orange with men, money, arms, &c. for his expedition, (against the express articles of peace and alliance made between King Charles the Second, of blessed memory, and the States of the United Netherlands, 1667, particularly the 11th article, wherein it was agreed, " That the said King of Great Britain, and the said States General, remain friends, confederates, united and allied for the defence and preservation of the rights, liberties, and immunities of either ally, and their subjects, against all who shall endeavour to disturb the peace of either by sea or land." And artic. 13, " That neither the said king, nor the said commonwealth, nor any of the subjects of either, inhabiting or residing within their jurisdiction, shall cherish and assist the rebels of either party, with any succour, counsel, or favour whatsoever ; but shall expose and effectually hinder all persons abiding, residing, or dwelling in either of their dominions, from supplying or furnishing any of those foresaid rebels by sea or land with arms, succour or assistance either in men, ships, arms, or warlike furniture," &c. And article 14, " That the King of Great Britain, and the said States General, shall mutually, sincerely, and faithfully, as there is occasion, assist each other against the rebels of either by sea or land, with men, ships," &c. Article 15, " That neither the said king, nor the said commonwealth, nor the subjects of either, shall in any of their jurisdictions, countries, &c. receive any rebel or rebels, fugitive or fugitives, declared, or to be declared," &c.) they pretended to know nothing of it ; which is a plain indication they would have insisted upon that denial, and urged it in their own vindication, if that project had not succeeded, to prevent a storm from King James and the King of France, and it would have equally served the rest of the confederates too : But as soon as they heard his enterprise had its desired effect, the next thing heard of was the States manifesto, owning the whole business, justifying themselves, and applauding the heroick attempt of the Prince of Orange. From what has been hitherto said, I shall beg leave to infer, that this revolution was the contrivance of the confederates in general, and not the Prince of Orange's separately from them, but in conjunction with them ; that all his motives, of what nature soever, were merely introductory to it, and that the most principal of them that seemed the most justifiable of his proceedings, were calculated only to serve the malicious and disaffected part of the nation, and to wheedle and amuse the rest into a compliance with him ; that if those had not been subtly thought on, others would not have been wanting ; that he had no design to secure religion, vindicate justice, to assert the liberties, or secure the properties of the people, but to execute the designs of the confederates in general, and to serve his own ambition and unsatisfied thirst after empire in particular ; that therefore the grand presumptions (as he terms it) of the supposititiousness of the Prince of Wales, of the private league between King James and the King of France, the introducing of arbitrary power, popery, &c. were mere cant, and nothing to the purpose, he having not performed any thing promised

in that declaration, but acted quite contrary; and for corroborating my main position, I shall proceed to shew what peculiar advantages the rest of the confederates proposed to themselves by such a revolution in England, which may induce all impartial readers to subscribe to the truth of what I have hitherto said.

The principal advantage the confederates in general, exclusive of the Prince of Orange, proposed to themselves by this revolution, was to have the kingdom of Great Britain, one of the strongest and most flourishing monarchies in Europe, at their entire devotion, to draw off men and money at their pleasure, so long as they could keep this new set-up king in the throne;—an advantage so considerable, that whilst they can do this, and any wealth remains in England, they are sure to make the cheapest experiment they could possibly devise, and withal the most powerful effort imaginable towards the reducing the growing power of France, and retrieving their former losses. And, however the infatuated and easily deluded populace of England may seem to despise the confederates in their discourse, yet it's evident enough, that so long as this confederacy holds, and no longer, shall they keep their new king; it being sufficiently apparent to any one of common sense, that if the whole and entire confederacy have had hitherto enough to do to oppose France, even in the lowest degree, it is more than demonstration that she alone will be able to do it least; for I must take it as granted, that if England breaks from the confederacy, the confederates must of necessity knock quite off, and make the best terms at any rate, and consequently unite with France against England, which we are well assured that king will oblige them to, in order to the completing that most glorious resolution which he has so often made, and will eternise his memory, of the restoring that unfortunate prince and martyr for his sake, the true and lawful King of England. This supposition, I hope, will, without much difficulty, be granted me, if we consider the great losses of the confederates on all sides, their apparent poverty and inability to carry on the war at their sole charge, that England is their principal support, and has been all this war, that without the continuation of assistance from hence, they must break, and England compelled to submit to her lawful and most injured sovereign again, which all these allies know they would not be easily or suddenly inclined to from the sense of their horrid guilt, and dread of his just resentment; and, therefore, till mere necessity and the utmost extremity drives them to it, they are sure to drain them at their pleasure.

Another advantage the confederates proposed to reap by the late revolution here, and by engaging these nations into the confederacy, is this, (supposing their successfulness in attacking France,) that whatever cities or territories should be recovered or won from the French, should either revert to their old respective owners, or be acquired to some of the rest of the confederates, exclusive of the Prince of Orange, as should be agreed by them. This is natural and easy enough to be supposed, for can any one imagine, should the late pretended design of the Prince of Orange to attempt the taking of Dunkirk, Ipres, or Namur, have been effected, that the King of Spain would have resigned his right in them to him, and permitted them to be annexed to the crown of England, since 'tis evident, beyond all contradiction, that the ground of this confederacy, as is published by them to all the world, was to make war upon France, in order to recover what they urged was some time since so unjustly ravished from them by that monarch; and nothing of this nature could ever be pretended with truth by the Prince of Orange as King of England, we having not lost one single town to the French. So that it is manifest all the prodigious expence we have been at to carry on the war in Flanders and Piedmont, was not in order to recover any thing from France that we had any right to, but only to assist the rest of the confederates in regaining what was lately theirs, and pray what advantage is this to us? And let the war in the conclusion be as successful as can be wished, we shall only have the honour in assisting to debilitate France by weakening ourselves, and enriching the confederates by impoverishing and

reducing poor England. But perhaps it may be alledged, that what has been urged in reference to the retaking of such places as have been unjustly taken from the confederates by France, will be readily granted; but what acquists the English shall make in France itself will be their own. As to this I answer: By the late project of invading France, we may be satisfied that there was no manner of appearance it would be so if it had been attempted and really succeeded; for, supposing, they had landed at Bayonne, marched into Provence and Dauphiny, it was with a design to join the Duke of Savoy's and the rest of the confederate forces, to make reprisals for what the French had acted in Savoy and Piedmont, or in order to retake such places as formerly belonged to that prince, now in the possession of the French. This is so probable, nay, next to certain, that it's nonsense to think otherwise, no possible acquists on that side being answerable either to the charge of taking or keeping by the English: Neither can it be congruous to common sense, that it could be of any interest to the Duke of Savoy to assist the others in subjugating any part of France to the English, whilst most of his own country was already subdued, and in the hands of the French. Again, granting that the other design of besieging Dunkirk with the transport forces from England had answered common expectation, Dunkirk, all the world knows, was formerly the Spaniards, the most important garrison and port that belonged to Flanders; and can any one so much as fancy that the King of Spain would ever have been contented it should be an appendage to England, when it was alone of greater consequence to that monarch to recover, than half of what he had hitherto lost in Flanders? Or do we think the English army alone was in a capacity to undertake the siege of such a garrison and carry it; or if it were jointly performed with the rest of the confederate army, that they would tamely let the Prince of Orange have the sole honour of winning and wearing it too? This can never enter into the head of the meanest dotard, and therefore the direct contrary must necessarily be admitted.

The next advantage, and that of no mean consequence neither, that the confederates have from our Revolution, besides that of making these experiments upon France at the vast expence of our blood and treasure, is, that if no possible hopes remain of attaining their ends upon their common enemy, as they phrase it, they have a fair opportunity of making their peace, whether England consent or not: This must be acknowledged a prodigious one, if duly considered; for when the worst comes to the worst, the leaving England (which in reality has been the most powerful, as well as the most malicious enemy) to the just resentments of France, will almost amount to an expiation for all the envious designs they have all this while formed against her; and by a timely desertion of her, or in conjunction with France against her, will in some measure atone for those injuries they have done to her lawful monarch, and indeed to themselves, and all the crowned heads in the world, by so wicked a precedent as they have given: This is a plain case, and must be owned a singular advantage on their side. All will agree 'tis no way feasible for England, resolving to maintain the P. of O. in the possession of the crown he has basely usurpt, ever to come to any sort of an accommodation with France, exclusive of them; and that they, if necessitated, can, and will, without him; it being impossible for us to wage war against France and them too, when we, with all the united forces of the allies, were not able to make the least impression against the former.

The objection that may be made to this advantage of the confederates, exclusive of England, is this, viz. That by the articles of the confederacy it is stipulated, that no one of them shall make a separate peace.

To this it may be replied, That this provision or caution at first sight may seem to be of some force, to keep such of them who are the weakest, and the most contiguous, within the bounds of it, for fear of being outraged, and treated as enemies by the rest; but as for the more potent or remote, it can be of little moment, especially after the

sad experience of their declining condition, and the sensible and irresistible growth of the hitherto so much envied power of France. The utmost fury of the allies has been already spent, and their utmost efforts by sea and land, and all to their own loss, and the interest of their enemy. That brave army under the command of the Duke of Lorraine, a great part of which consisted of those veteran troops that for several years had signalized themselves against the Turks, were broken and shattered in pieces the very first campaign; by which means the emperor has been extremely weakened, both in Hungary and Germany, and the enemy left at liberty to do what he pleases on the Rhine and the Moselle ever since; the strongest part of Flanders lost; the Duke of Savoy upon the brink of ruin; all Savoy gone; Piedmont in a sinking condition; the commerce in all these princes countries destroyed: So that what they took to be one of the surest methods of reducing France, has fallen most heavy upon themselves; nothing but misery and an universal discontent, with an utter despair of ever succeeding in their enterprizes against their enemy multiplying among them; and England, which has been their best support, hitherto growing less able and willing to go on with the war, and more disappointed perhaps than any of the rest. These considerations laid together, and seriously weighed, will more than evince my assertion, and confute the objection, since what has been for the most part practised in the like cases may be now; that it has been no unusual thing for some of a confederacy (when altogether worsted, and ready to be over-run by their adversaries,) to make their best advantage of a separate peace, when they could not bring down the haughty and stubborn spirits of the rest to their sentiments and resolutions; especially when convinced by woe-ful experience, that it would be their own honour and interest so to do, whereas at first they were really trickt into it against both. That this may be the case of some of these united princes, will be no hard task to demonstrate; as for instance, What honour was it for the Duke of Savoy to enter into the confederacy against his uncle, the best and most potent friend he had, whose annual pension to him for some years amounted to a greater sum than the revenues of his principality? What honour to his religion to entertain a hodgepodge of all opinions, contrary to the principles of his own; to permit them to preach up their filthy cant wherever they go, and to gratify their Gothish and brutish zeal in the profaning all that is sacred, and looks like good, by their irreligious and unchristian behaviour, and such villanies as are not fit to be named among Christians? What honour was it for him to let out his own native country for a cockpit to the rest of the confederates (and in particular to the king of Spain, and the Dutch; for I must reckon the P. of O. among them); who had violated all their former leagues with two crowned heads, to try tricks whether they could by that means divert the war from their own doors, to the devastation of his territories, and ruin of himself and poor subjects, beyond any recompence all of them together can ever make him, when he had such advantages at the same time offered him by France, of increasing his own and subjects wealth and prosperity beyond any of his ancestors? What honour is it for him to bring upon himself the just hatred and indignation of all his neighbouring princes, for the perpetual insults, ravages, and plunderings they are exposed to in quartering foreigners upon his account? What honour for that miserable infatuated prince to be complimented by the emperor and the King of Spain with the empty title of Generalissimo, and yet be over-ruled in all his projects and designs by their generals, as is evident from their refusing to attack Briançon and Queiras, where he might have put in strong garrisons, and from thence have summoned in the country to bring in their contributions, and have ordered every thing to better advantage, and with more reputation than he has done; and all this perhaps with as little loss as the taking of Guillestre and Ambrun, which he has been forced at last to quit shamefully? What honour was it to him, that the Germans, against his consent and remonstrances to the contrary, should commit such horrid barbarities by

their burning and destroying, for which he and his half-ruined country must be accountable, to the utter destruction of it; or at least be forced to such an accommodation (unless the French king be superlatively generous), as will in all probability leave only the empty title of Dukes of Savoy to him and his posterity? To conclude; What honour has it been to him, by the importunities of his perfidious and impotent allies, to persist in his stubbornness, and to refuse so many good overtures as have been made him, (since the loss of all Savoy, and the perpetual disappointments of competent succours articed for in the very alliances between him, the emperor, and Spain, &c. after his most pressing instances made for them at their respective courts, and as many empty promises from them,) and opportunities of healing himself again in due time, (the French king having proffered him blanks to write his own conditions,) and this since he was, humanly speaking, past all hopes of regaining any thing by the greatest opposition he could make? Since then 'tis evident, that this prince has engaged himself against his honour and interest, unless we will suppose him incapable of the least degree of good sense, and irrecoverably desperate, he will not, after so many fruitless attempts, and the base disappointments of all that assistance promised him from the empire, Spain, and England, reject those offers which are now made him of an accommodation by the French king and his holiness. All that he can expect from the confederacy is only a little subsistence-money to act defensively, since the French forces daily augment upon him, and all imaginable care is taken to strengthen the garrisons on that side by new works, and to shut him out of Provence and Dauphiny for the time to come. And since the rest of the confederates have been hitherto, notwithstanding their utmost endeavours to increase their forces, inferior to their enemy, and he grows stronger, and they weaker, and out of condition either to repair his losses, or prevent their own, there is no other method left him, but either to comply, or fall dishonourably and unpitied. There is no great difficulty to shew this to be the state of that deluded prince, since all the world is convinced that he had the best prospect of disembarassing his affairs this last campaign that ever he could or can expect. The P. of O. promised him to land an army at Bayonne, thence to march into Provence and Dauphiny to join him; as did likewise the King of Spain. England, by that casual advantage at sea, was entirely mistress in that element all the year (at least for that purpose), had a powerful navy wholly at leisure ever since to prosecute it, there being no probability of any opposition, and 16,000 men, with a vast train of artillery, and munitions of both sorts, originally designed for that enterprize, which, if it had been put in execution, would, in the opinion of all mankind, have exercised the finesse and politicks of France, more than any thing that ever was, or can be attempted for the future. This, I say, was the only nicking opportunity for Savoy, while the French were visibly weak at sea, and altogether unprovided to make any resistance at land on that side; but, by what fate I cannot tell, all these prospects utterly vanished, to the astonishment of all Europe, without leaving the least effect but want of policy, and the indelible character of a panic fear, downright cowardice or desperation, and more than an improbability of ever having the same opportunity again; besides the sad prognostic, that all's running down on the confederates side, and Providence clearly on that of France. As to what may be pretended, that the same designs may be prosecuted the next campaign, &c. it is easy to urge that there's no manner of likelihood it can be, since 'tis well known that France will be provided of as good, or a much better fleet than she ever had, by that time; and that since the world is now convinced that they can and will fight, and dare attempt any thing; and that 44 of their men of war were able to make good their parts against 99 of their enemies, and with the addition but of 20 more, in all probability had worsted them; that a fleet of the French by 20 inferior to the others, for the future, will be match enough for them: Nay, if we may credit our foreign advices, they'll have by the next spring a fleet every way equal to

that of England and Holland, let them both build, and put out what they can make; and then it's a clear case that the design of landing an army to join Savoy, or any where else on the French coasts, will be impracticable. But then again let us consider, Is there any greater likelihood that the confederates will be superior to the French by land the ensuing campaign than this last? They had made, we all know, their utmost efforts in order to it before; and yet the P. of O. told the States at his parting, that the cause of all the miscarriages of this last must be imputed to the inferiority of their forces to those of France; and we may modestly suppose, that 30,000 men will hardly recruit the confederates loss, by the sword, sickness, and desertion; and that their augmentation will not be near half part so great as that of their enemy: so that they must be inferior yet in a double respect, both in men and conduct, and if so, of doing less than ever; for France has not lost a quarter part so many as they, and it's reasonable enough to suppose they have raised near as many since the campaign was opened, upon the account of the descent from England, besides the standing regular troops of Irish, &c. in Normandy, and other provinces, that never came into any service; and his augmentation, besides recruits, our monthly account tells us will amount to above 40,000 men, (though I am inclined to think, by comparing the foreign accounts, they cannot amount to much less than 80,000.) Besides his cavalry will be prodigiously reinforced: We are told the Jews at Mets, Treves, and Luxemburgh, have engaged to procure him 20 or 30,000 horses, which, with the 2000 the Marquis d'Harcourt took from the Lunenburghers, those taken by De Lorge in the defeat of the Prince of Wirtenburgh, and which Bouffleurs drove away from the territories of Liege, Bois le Duc, &c. will be able to mount 40,000 men, without reckoning what France and all his new conquests will afford him. Add to these last considerations the vast wealth of France, as may appear by the free gift of several provinces, the numerous edicts for erecting new offices, (which we hear never want purchasers,) augmentations of salaries, and his standing revenues, besides the great sums of money, or equivalents to money, brought in by way of contribution, the multitudes of English and Dutch prizes, the prodigious wariness and sagacity of that prince in providing all sorts of ammunition and provisions for the use of the fleet and armies at the lowest rates, and managing all to the best advantage; here are such funds laid up for the carrying on all his designs, that, humanly speaking, he cannot readily miscarry in the execution of them, and such a prospect of success as all the power and malice of the confederates can never defeat. In short, the inference I draw from the premises is this, That in all probability Savoy must break off from his hitherto unfortunate alliance, and submit; that if he will do it, it is his true and only interest; that his allies have most ignominiously, and contrary to their treaty, exposed him to ruin, by failing in assisting him in those enterprizes which were most likely to serve him; by overruling his wisest resolutions and methods in managing the expedition into Dauphiny for his advantage; the confederacy cannot obstruct an accommodation between him and France, neither can they propose to themselves or him to be in a better condition to assist him, having lost their only opportunity, and being less able to stand upon their own defence for the future, much less to protect him.

To return: As to the confederates that are more contiguous, it being a point of somewhat less importance, though I first proposed it, yet shall take leave to speak to it now. I said in reference to them, that they could not so easily enter upon a treaty of a separate peace, without being liable to the insults of their neighbouring allies: This is true; but then we ought to consider what may be done in such a case, and that honestly and justly; if a confederate prince finds himself exposed to the common enemy, by the negligence or perfidiousness of the rest, (confederates generally importing mutual defence and protection,) in such a case common reason and equity will dictate that he is at liberty to make the best provision he can for himself; and if upon reiterated applications

and entreaties he finds no relief, his interest will compel him to make the best terms he can with his enemy. So that all that can be pretended from the articles of the confederacy providing that no one of them shall make a separate peace, can be of no obligation to any one of the allies to expose himself to certain and inevitable destruction against the dictates of reason and self-preservation, nor can any of the confederates be supposed so devoid of all sense of justice to themselves. All this being, as I humbly conceive, undeniable, we are in the next place to consider what is proper to be done in such instances in order to prevent their being treated by their fellows as common enemies, and then make a particular application of it to those of them who seem to be under such circumstances as render it altogether necessary, and their only interest to act accordingly. In these cases the most secure method is to join with their enemy, or at least to endeavour to maintain themselves in a neutrality; by which means they'll easily secure themselves, and perhaps reap such advantages by a timely conjunction with the prevailing side, as may in a great measure compensate their former losses both from their new ally, and their old ones too, in the concluding a peace: By the former they'll be in a condition to make reprisals on their perfidious self-interested confederates, who compelled them, or wheedled them into the war to their great detriment; or at least be enabled with their new ally to drive them to the necessity of making a peace, from which they may exceedingly profit themselves: By the latter maintain themselves in present security, and gain by both; which is far more eligible than to be devoured by their friends and enemy too. This is all I can imagine at present advisable in this point; and this seems to be the present case of some of the allies, in particular the Bishop of Liege, the Elector Palatine, the administrator of Wirtenbergh, the electors of Treves and Cologne, and the King of Spain himself. What devastations have been in those parts, and what acquists the French have made, is too notorious to be recited here. How meanly the confederates have acquitted themselves in defending those countries, is so well known, particularly in relieving Mons and Namur, when besieged; in preventing excursions into the territories of Liege, the Palatinate, the Dutchy of Wirtenbergh, Juliers, &c. is a shame, and grand reflection upon them to recount. And what motives should induce these respective princes to go on with the war, is the greatest riddle in the world. We have not one single instance of the unity of their councils yet in making one generous attempt on this side, in attacking or relieving any place of moment for these three years; so that hitherto they have done nothing answerable to the designs they have given out, and common expectation; and there are but small hopes, as has been hinted already, that they will ever be more unanimous or capable. So that if these last-mentioned allies should yet be inclinable to proceed with the war, it seems to be against all appearance of reason, and what prudence and foresight cannot persuade them to submit to, time and necessity will compel them, to their greater dishonour as well as disappointment.

Thus I have endeavoured to prove my first assertion, That the Revolution in England was the contrivance of the confederacy in general, and not the P. of O.'s separately from the rest of the allies, or effected by his sole interest, and insisted upon those singular advantages they proposed to themselves by it. But hitherto, I confess, they have not obtained any but the first; they have indeed drained our wealth, and occasioned our blood to be spilt most profusely; but as to their acquists upon France, or regaining their former losses, not a tittle is to be bragged of, they having not been able hitherto to defend themselves: All Savoy gone, Piedmont in danger, Mons and Namur, with most of their dependencies, in the hands of the French, and the rest of Flanders in a tottering condition; the Palatinate, territories of Liege, and the Dutchy of Wirtenbergh most miserably harassed and impoverished: In a word, the state of the confederacy so feeble in all parts, that although they had exerted their utmost this last campaign, and given out strange reports of grand attacks to be made upon France,

may in the sensible part too, they have been able to do just nothing. So that instead of carrying on a vigorous war against France, and humbling her, they have stood merely upon the defensive, which is only to suffer and endure the evils of war, waging war implying assaulting, attacking, or offending; but nothing of this hitherto, unless lately in Dauphiny, which has been sensibly retaliated in Germany, Liege, and the Palatinate, and without all peradventure will be in Piedmont, unless prevented by a sudden compliance.

But what shall we say to poor England? What advantages will she get by engaging herself into the confederacy, and by the late Revolution? Why truly I believe it would puzzle men and angels too, to name one at present; but since we are taught to call things by false names, I shall mention that presumed and most celebrated one, "The happiness of having a prince of the greatest reputation in the whole world for justice, religion, valour, conduct, and an indefatigable studiousness in promoting the good of his natural-born subjects." This is an advantage indeed, and no doubt worth the purchasing at the dearest rate. These are great characters, I confess, and would be extremely charming, if as true as easily said. If his invading his father's throne was rather owing to the contrivance of the confederacy, than the pretences he made in his Declaration, then it's manifest to all mankind, that he acted such a master-piece of injustice as can scarce be paralleled, and beyond all apology: To name some; he charged his father and mother with imposing a supposititious heir upon the three kingdoms, which himself never made the least doubt or scruple of, before he published his Declaration, and he had invaded the kingdom; upon whose birth he congratulated the king and queen, and caused him to be prayed for by name in his own chapel at the Hague, till a little before his expedition hither; and although in the aforesaid Declaration he promised the nation he would refer the enquiry into the birth of the Prince of Wales, and all things relating to it, and to the right of succession, to the parliament; yet it's notoriously known, the parliament never so much as went about it, nor himself ever moved it to them; neither could the reiterated petitions and desires of a great many persons of quality ever procure any such favour from them or him, to the great dissatisfaction of no inconsiderable part of this kingdom. Besides, let any one compare his Declaration with the original contract with him, or instrument of government since, and I challenge all the world to produce such an instance of injustice, and violation of promises, as this pretended saint and mirror of justice has afforded us. And though three preceding kings have been blackened by a set of villains and profligates, that are a scandal to all the rest of mankind, as Neroes, Julians, and imps of hell, to set off their dull, gloomy hero, yet we may with truth defy them to produce such instances of arbitrariness, and violation of property, since Henry the VIII. as his four years tyranny have produced. It may be said, I own, he is a severe punisher of thieves and clippers; but then, if we do but reflect what a necessity he has reduced some thousands of people unto for want of trade, and the ill example he has given himself, by invading three crowns, and sending the wealth out of the nation never to return again, and notwithstanding cried up by the *theologo-politicoes* for a saint, a saviour, a deliverer, &c. he has contributed exceedingly towards the taking off the edge of all religious restraint, and the searing men's consciences, and confirming them in wickedness; so that nothing but the terror of civil punishment remains to put a stop to all manner of injustice: And since it's undoubted that, by the severe infliction of punishment in such cases, he chiefly aims at his own interest, as usurpers and tyrants seldom do otherwise, I am afraid, notwithstanding such pretended justice, he will hardly avoid the imputation of being guilty of their blood, as well as in a great measure accessory to their crime. And I believe it will not be forgotten in haste, how one poor fellow laid his death to his charge at the very gallows, as being the sad occasion of it; and prayed for his true master, intimating, that if he had not been driven away, in all

probability he had never come to that dismal end. Again, let us call to mind the many sham plots that have been forged by his mirmidons, to keep up the rancour and malice of the people against their king and his friends, the illegal fining of persons beyond their known abilities, contrary to the instrument of government he subscribed as the condition of his having the crown, for mere trifles, as drinking King James's health, or praying for him; in murdering that worthy gentleman and excellent Christian, Mr Ashton, the poor chairman, and Mr Cross; in suborning and protecting from justice those bloody rascals, Blackhead, Young, and Fuller,* fellows that were selected out of all the gaols in town by one Pearson, and at his expence no doubt discharged of their debts, &c. and afterwards allowed salaries on purpose to swear all that he hates or fears out of their lives, when he thinks it expedient; the frequent illegal imprisonments of persons of the greatest quality, as well as others, and by all that does appear to the contrary, himself alone being the evidence, accuser, and judge; his shamefully detaining the soldiers and seamens pay, by misapplying it, contrary to the very acts of parliament that granted it; his vast debts to the transport ships ever since the beginning of the Revolution; the frequent embargoes; the refusal of convoys to secure the public trade of the nation, notwithstanding the custom and vast taxes granted upon that, as well as any other account; the ordering the public monies to contrary uses in general than originally designed, against the frequent promises in his speeches to both houses of parliament: These are such notorious violations of justice, that we may with as much truth give him the reputation of the handsomest man in the world as the character of just.

Then again for his religion: According to the rules of method I should have mentioned it first; but it's no great matter whether it be considered first or last, or indeed at all. What mortal wight can tell what religion he is of; or rather, Is it not a contradiction to say he has any? It's impossible he should be of the communion of the true church of England, which he found established by law, because he persecutes those with the utmost violence he can, whose defence he made one of the most specious pretences in his Declaration. Decl. parag. 15, and so readily consented to the rooting out episcopacy in Scotland, settled by several acts of convocation and parliament; and though he, with his usual arts of dissimulation, seemed to be very squeamish when he came to that clause of the Scotch coronation oath, "We shall be careful to root out hereticks," by declaring, "he did not mean by those words that he was under any obligation to become a persecuter," yet never made any scruple to set on foot and encourage one of the most violent persecutions we ever read of against the episcopal clergy there. Neither can we indeed with any certainty determine to what side he is really most inclined, whether the presbyterian or episcopalian, he constantly varying his favours to either, according to the emergencies of his present interests in Scotland itself. Sometimes he would seem to have good inclinations towards the episcopal party, when he has any just reason either to tear them or caress them; for we are all sensible enough that the main body of the nobility and gentry, and the better sort even of the commonalty of that kingdom, are most addicted to them, and though in the hurry and confusion of affairs there in the beginning of the Revolution, to gain the presbyterians and other sectaries, he underhand encouraged them to fall upon the bishops and regular clergy in a tumultuous manner, which was the most blessed juncture they could wish to vent their innate malice, and over-boiling zeal, against a party they hated, if possible, more than the devil himself, that he might have an opportunity

* Blackhead and Young endeavoured to involve the Bishop of Rochester, the Earl of Marlborough, and others, in an accusation of high treason. They dropped in the bishop's house a treasonable paper of their own writing, and laid their snare so skilfully, that it was discovered with difficulty. Fuller, a worthy of the same stamp, was pilloried as an impostor, for pretending to discover a plot in Lancashire.

to make good his engagements to those their agitators, who had been for some years plotting and juggling with him in Holland, to bring about this great deliverance; yet finding at length the impossibility of maintaining his interest there upon that foot, he has several times endeavoured, by his letters, &c. to procure an accommodation between them, by settling some of the episcopal clergy in livings, &c. resolving, no doubt, as soon as he can conveniently, to determine himself for that party which he can most safely rely upon. Neither has his management here in England been much different; he found the greatest part of the nation addicted to the principles of the church of England, as established by law, and some of their principles and doctrines opposite in the highest degree to his designs; therefore, like a true Machiavelist, he found it absolutely necessary to bring those principles into disreputation, and extirpate them, if possible, right or wrong; and to this purpose set up the noted latitudinarian gang, by the easy allurements of his favour, and the assurance of the best preferments, to decoy the rest of their brethren into a ready compliance with him, who immediately, in their preachings and writings, confessed and owned their former errors to the people, and in a short time rendered their so much celebrated passive obedience and non-resistance the most ridiculous doctrine and dangerous error in the world, gave us new comments on Rom. 13, telling us that higher powers must be obeyed, without any regard to lawful or unlawful; that allegiance and submission were all one; that in some cases it is lawful to violate the commandments of God; that religion and the public good knew no relations; that it is lawful to swear with reservation, or to take public oaths in private senses; that an oath to the present government did not interfere with the former to King James, &c. Nay, any pretences in the beginning were allowed and admitted of, provided they could but hook them into the interest of the government, and bring them off in some measure from their former principles, so firmly had it been resolved by this gentleman, and his cabinet, to ruin the old church of England and let loose her discipline, and by all imaginable arts and devices to render her odious and contemptible. Neither has this wicked and atheistical project wanted its success; in a moment of time her face was so altered, as scarce to be known again; her priesthood perjured and turned schismatical, and, like renegades, their new zeal and malice boiled up to that degree, that the liturgy must be altered, her ancient creeds expunged, her ceremonies left at liberty, or laid aside, and a comprehension established for bringing all their reverend brethren, the gifted cobblers, tinkers, tailors, &c. with the foreign reformed schismatics, into church-preferments; all the fences and hedges must be pulled down in order to unite these brethren in iniquity against the common enemy, though indeed the only design was to extirpate and run down those principles, which, whenever it pleases God Almighty to pull off the scales of the eyes of the honest and well-meaning, though deluded people of this nation, would set his worship a-packing, notwithstanding that security which he has promised himself from those horrid perjuries he has been the occasion of, and which themselves in all their common discourses own to have so little obligation, and shamefully call garrison oaths. Thus having, as far as possible he could, dissolved the true old church of England, and erected a new one upon a mere civil basis, such as 'tis, of rebellion, perjury, and usurpation, and rendered it impossible to retrieve the discipline of the church, and her sacred offices, during his government here; the next thing he endeavours is to profit himself of all parties in religion, (notwithstanding his popular pretence of uniting them all against the common enemy, viz. popery;) to this purpose he studies privately to dash them one against the other, by reviving old stories under the former reigns, and to keep up some necessary feuds amongst them, for fear of a good understanding and union, perhaps in time to throw him out of the saddle, when once they perceive their true interest; and therefore never omits to caress them, as his only friends he can rely upon when he has a prospect of making a particular advantage upon them, as in the manage-

ment of the election of mayors, sheriffs, and aldermen in the city of London, (and in the election of burgesses for parliament all over the nation,) is too notorious to be insisted upon, in order to oblige them to lend or grant money, &c. When one party begins to grow cold and indifferent, by disappointments, &c. then he underhand applies himself to another, and by stirring up animosities and quarrels among them, casts mists before their eyes, that being intent upon their private revenge, and little plots and contrivances one against another, they may take the less cognizance of the more public concerns, and be the more eager and emulous of serving him, in hopes of drawing him in to favour and assist their party. Thus he plays tricks, and juggles with religion, and that is the most orthodox which conduces most to the establishing himself in the government, and is always ready to vary his religion with his fortune, let it be what it will; and I dare engage Arch John,* and the rest of the Johns, shall readily concur with him at any time to set up what religion he pleases, provided it will suit their turn, as well as his. But I shall have occasion to speak more to this point afterwards, and therefore shall proceed to enquire, whether valour ought to be admitted as an ingredient of his reputation.

And as this quality, which, I must grant, never wants its charms to get into the affection of the noblest as well as popular and meanest minds, I would fain know what right he can put in for it, or what gallant proofs he has given of personal bravery, especially since his being amongst us. The victory at the Boyne indeed has made a great noise among his deluded bigotted mob; but it's well known he never ran the least risk in it, or passed the river (which was the greatest danger) till most of the army were over, nor ever was within reach of, much less gently kissed with a cannon-ball, or received the hurt there, whatever his parasitical mufti, and the pretended thanksgiving prayer roared out among the mob by his atheistical priests, a clear evidence of his and their religion, to dare to affront Heaven so profanely, merely to delude the poor innocent sheep, as if they believed there was no God to take vengeance of such open blasphemies, as well as of the rest of their impieties. Just such a silly story we had of his deliverance last year, when he lay encamped near Beaumont, of a bullet that fell in the very place where he stood under an oak, the very instant after he went from it, though I have been informed it was several hours after, which was cried up too for a signal-deliverance. And as to the engagement at Steinkirk, though all the Dutch courants are full of encomiums of his bravery in leading up of battalion after battalion, and of thanksgivings, and many godly ejaculations for his wonderful deliverance, we never, for all that, could be assured he was in the action at all, or in the least danger; and some who had reason enough to know, positively assert he was not. So that these are all nonsensical silly stories, made on purpose to keep up the hearts of the king-making rabble, and to instil into their credulous minds, that easily digest every report that makes for their side, without considering the truth or probability of what they hear, and to preserve the reputation of their idol's being the darling of Heaven; and two or three such whisking romances is all the return for four millions per annum, and all we must look for.

As little as we have to allege for his personal valour and bravery, yet I am sure much less can be produced for his pretended master-piece, conduct, which we are all told strikes such terror on all occasions into the French king. Pray what instances have we of it? As to the business at the Boyne, the grand divertisement for the Bartholomew mob, and not worthy to be taken notice of any way else, all sensible people are convinced that advantage was got by mere treachery, by the Germans laying down their arms, and absolutely refusing to fight, consequently betraying their posts; the treachery giving such reason of distrust to the poor Irish, that they turning tail, the ge-

* John Tillotson, Archbishop of Canterbury.

neral officers with much ado persuaded the king to consent to a retreat; and leave the field to his usurping son-in-law, though with such order, that the great hero, with his crew of rebels, could not do any considerable damage upon them, or have the honour of a pursuit to any effect; and besides, as his own officers are not afraid to own, after Schomberg's death, a sensible want of conduct attended all his enterprises all the remaining campaign. Was ever any thing more weakly undertaken than the siege of Limerick, more foolishly and inexpertly attacked? Or did ever any army, under such an incomparable general, come off so basely? What warlike policy, to undertake such a piece of work without heavy cannon and ammunition, &c. and to commit them to the care of so slender a guard? To lose about 8000 men to no purpose, and at last, through a panic fear, to run away *incognito* from his army, and steal over in a meal-boat! He who never saw siege in his life might have managed it in all points to better purpose; and yet, to our mortal grief, all this owing to the sage management and bravery of our Hogan Mogan William. But the next campaign must make amends for former oversights. The P. of O. was to be early at the Hague, to consult in all haste of the most effectual means to humble the pride of France; and while a parcel of grave, dull Germans and Dutch were sucking their whiskers and stuffing their paunches, the grand Hector of France had the confidence to sit down before Mons. The noise of this bold attempt reaching the ears of the butter-boxes, and the profound thinking noddle of the Britannic hero, away he goes to Hall, and before he could bethink himself what to do, or get out of his amusement, the town was surrendered; which so confounded his intellectuals, and stunned his considering pate, that he never could come to any resolution what to do the whole campaign after, but marched and countermarched from place to place, advancing, retiring, and running away, till he had spent all his money and provisions, and cunningly took his leave of the army as soon as he perceived Luxemburgh had pounded 'em up near Leuse, and was ready to give them a parting blow; noised it about immediately after, that this miscarriage was owing to the misconduct of the generals in his absence, the cowardly French taking the advantage of it, and so returned to his parliament, and told them, That truly the French king was very powerful. And yet we may remember that in the beginning of that summer it was rumoured about that Mons was to be retaken, Dinant or Philipville besieged, the French army to be beaten, the confederates having got together a much more powerful army than the enemy, who was reported all along the campaign to be hard put to it for want of money, forage, provisions, and the Lord knows what; but then, as mischief would have it, they always had the luck to be so strongly entrenched, (which our unthinking slaves were made to believe was out of fear to be attacked by his Britannic majesty, as they call him, and his bear-skins,) that the confederates could not come at them; as if that could be a disgrace to the French, which was ever the glory of the greatest generals, to encamp themselves so as not to be compelled to fight without a great advantage, especially when inferior in forces, and merely defensive, which is well known was Luxemburgh's case all along the two last summer campaigns; and yet in the former of these, though much inferior in number, he made a shift to fall upon their rear, and put them to the rout, killing a considerable number, and taking divers prisoners; and to conclude the campaign gloriously, this last, by a sudden march to take possession of the very ground, where there was plenty of forage that was untouched, which our brave generalissimo designed for his army, who wanted it exceedingly, entrenched himself; and in regard it could not be well avoided, but our protestant knight errant must either pass that way, or march round about, (which would have proved a horrid disgrace to him,) by this means forced him to attack him with his own men, his allies positively refusing to second him, and looking on the whole time; himself in the mean time being sensible of the great danger, and very prudently keeping out of harm's way: So that this attacking of the enemy was merely the effect of an absolute

necessity of his doing something, though to no purpose, and the conduct and foresight of the Crook-backed General, as this Thirsites called him, and his own folly besides in making an unaccountable (and ought to be an unpardonable) experiment too, in sacrificing the lives of so many thousands of English, Scotch, and Danes, to make an empty flash, and to keep up the undue opinion of his valour among the abused mob; for, in one word, all the politicks he is guilty of lies in caressing them; and so little sense he has, that so long as he can keep them on his side, he concludes all is safe and well. Here is conduct with a vengeance, and puts me in mind of a short passage, in an excellent author, who, comparing Alexander the Great and Cæsar together, writes thus: "The prudence of a general has two parts; the first respects the conservation of his own forces, and the other the destruction of his enemies. Alexander was defective in the former, because he frequently led his army into places where they sometimes died of hunger, or thirst, or by stones, (as in some narrow passages, with mountains on each side,) where he was forced to engage his enemies at all disadvantages of ground, &c. and consequently brought his men oftentimes merely to be butchered: Wherefore that speech of the grand Scipio will ever be applauded, 'That he had rather save one citizen than slay a thousand of his enemies.' Again, Alexander was wanting in the second, for whereas two things are necessary to the destruction of an enemy, force and conduct; he ordinarily depended upon, and succeeded by the former; which cannot be said of Cæsar, forasmuch as he took as much care of his men as a father, of his family, nor ever went upon any enterprise without great stores of provisions and all necessaries; if he had not corn enough, he made it up with flesh, and having an advantage over his enemy, chose rather to defeat him by policy than the sword: and in all occasions endeavoured to add industry to his force." This is but one part of the comparison of these two great men; and since our boobies will be thought to have made a wise choice of their king, as they call him, and he must be a great champion, let him be drest up with all the imperfections of Alexander, with whom they are pleased so often to compare; for I am sure nothing really honourable and commendable in that great man can ever suit their puny Hector: and then, for a conclusion, let them be so just withal, as to apply the character of Cæsar to his adversary, and judge what they may expect for the future from either.

Another famous instance of his military policy, is the tender care he takes in making provision for, and paying his soldiers by sea and land. It's not unknown to us all what numbers of seamen died of strange and unaccountable diseases the first summer after this revolution, through his notable frugality in furnishing the navy for the most part with old and decayed stores, and that abominable lie that was spread abroad in excuse of it, that their meat and salt were poisoned with nutgalls; whereas all physicians will grant, if a quantity of them were really mixed with them, they could not produce such effects, but would rather have proved an excellent medicine to have prevented, or cured the bloody or any other fluxes, which were very frequent among them, being a great astringent. But not to insist upon this senseless story, these old stores, however decayed, were thought a good expedient to save money to hire foreigners, and many other necessary uses. What care did he take to send over provisions for the army in Ireland, whereof at least ten thousand perished through want of all manner of necessaries, and were ready to leap at what our very dogs would refuse; while the Dutch and other foreigners wanted nothing, but were fat and well liking. And because this prince must be called and owned as generalissimo of the confederate forces in Flanders, and all advantages against the enemy there ascribed to his conduct, so it is not unreasonable to lay all the miscarriages there to his charge, as evidences of his sinister conduct. Whence proceeded that great scarcity, nay, absolute want of all sorts of provisions, even of tents and straw, in the beginning of the campaign, which occasioned a great deal of sickness, and the death of many men and horses, but from his negligence or want of money

to provide them, which is as inexcusable as the other; since that general who will go upon any enterprise without all things necessary, has been ever condemned as rash; and void of all military prudence? What a reflection is it upon the politicks of this mighty warrior to be unprovided in the beginning of that *annus mirabilis*, which raised the expectations of all Christendom, and was to decide the fate of all Europe, when he had engaged himself to be early in the field, and seemed resolute to oppose the French in all they could pretend to, and yet tamely to stand staring at the head of 100,000 men, without making the least attempt to raise the siege of Namur, the most important town in all Flanders, or to give the least diversion; and to serve only for an evidence of one of the bravest actions that ever was performed by any prince, and that indelible dishonour and loss to him and his allies, which they in all likelihood can never retrieve. Now, I say, the P. of O. committing so great an oversight in not making timely and competent provisions for his army in such a difficult time of the year, his army must be more than ordinarily fatigued, dispirited, and unfit for action, and never ready on the sudden to act offensively or defensively; and one thing which argues this was not a single error, but a perpetual miscarriage on the confederates' side all this war, is, that whereas the foreign prints have constantly given us an account of the early and indefatigable preparations of the French all this war, they seldom afford us the like instances in the confederates: let the true reason lie where it will, it's an argument of a double weakness, and that their success, whenever they have any, is an effect of chance, and not of their politicks and diligence. For want of timely and suitable preparations for an enterprise, it's odds but it must miscarry, especially when it cannot be relieved by prudence or stratagem; and how sagacious he is at a dead lift, let the world bear him witness, unless it be in throwing his miscarriages upon others, without any regard to truth, and honour. We have not found yet that he has been early enough out either by sea or land, but only by a mere accident at sea this last year, the crossness of the winds favouring, which is an advantage he cannot always promise himself. and had it not been for that, in all human probability, he would have for ever lost all opportunity of playing the fool again.

But this is not the only defect remarkable in the P. of O. as to military prudence (or providence), but his pay has been all along bad. Money is called the nerves, and the belly of war; the nerves, because it gives motion to, and maintains armies in their motion; (hence Thucydides observes, that few of the Grecians, in respect of the extent of their territories, went to the wars against Troy, and could never keep themselves long together, through want of money; and that the people of the Morea made short campaigns upon that account. It's generally for money and subsistence that men list themselves into the wars; and when once that fails, they sensibly grow weary and dead-hearted): and it's properly called the belly of war, because like as the belly distributes nourishment to all parts of the animal, so does money to an army. How far this P. has discharged himself in this point, nobody is ignorant from the highest to the lowest amongst us. The present arrears to the army in Ireland is an instance of injustice without parallel. Men that had ventured their lives, and endured all the hardships possible for human nature to sustain, in hopes at least of good pay, if not sharing the country for their service, having never received any other than a little subsistence money, and forced thereby to commit all the villanies in the world, by plundering and murdering, to the destruction of near a third part of the people, and three parts in four of the natural riches and product of the country; and at last told by their officers they must never expect their arrears, but exact pay for the time to come, and then immediately to be transported to Flanders to be made forlorn, is such a monument of inhumanity as we can scarce find in history, though at the same time a just reward from God for their rebellion against their lawful king, who ever tendered them as his chil-

drop, there being not one part of four alive of all those villains who had so basely deserted him and betrayed him.

This matter of fact about the arrears, if occasion should require, will be readily acknowledged by some hundreds of officers, particularly by Colonel Bierly, whose case being singular, I shall beg leave to insert it, which in short is this: The colonel was a gentleman of a plentiful fortune, and formerly very zealous for the P. of O.'s interest, and colonel of a regiment of horse from first to last, and hath expended between 5 and 6000*l.* of his estate in his service; and there being an arrear of above 4000*l.* due to him, for several months he solicited diligently for it, but without success: in conclusion, he told the lords of the treasury that his private affairs obliged him to go into the country to settle them, having been so long absent, therefore desired that he might know whether he might expect an order for his arrears or not, and he would stay a week longer to adjust that business. The lords commissioners told him that he might go into the country when he pleased, for he was to expect nothing from them, for they had no orders to pay any arrears: So he's gone into the country, where he spares no occasions to set forth the injustice and ingratitude of him, who was never guilty of doing a just or honourable action in his whole life. What a scandal and burning shame is it, that the poor seamen (whereof a great many have two or three years arrears due to them, and all the rest proportionably, having been exposed to all dangers, kept out at sea, and on shipboard, longer than ever was known, and been instrumental of that grand deliverance he had only to brag of in his speech,) should be defrauded of their pay; nay, not having so much as subsistence money; and yet tied up to the service by severe and repeated proclamations, without and against all former precedents, obliged to be at sea most part of this winter, and utterly forbidden their ancient privilege of making a short voyage or two to get bread for their poor wives and families, who, having bankrupt their former credit with shopkeepers, bakers, &c. are forced to beg and starve! This is such a hardship as they and their forefathers never knew before, and such a yoke as none but a Dutch boar could ever have fixed upon English necks. The cowardly and justly-to-be-abominated Dutch by all of our nation, after the defeat at sea two years ago, were taken into our hospitals before any of our countrymen were put in, tenderly provided for, and had a gratuity given by the Princess of Orange for their encouragement, were entertained, and got money from all sorts of people; and besides all this, this gracious governess promised to refit all their disabled ships at the public charge, to have pensions for the widows of the men that were lost in the fight, &c. as may be seen in the London Gazette of July 21, 90, in the article from the Hague, July 25. "On the 22d Mr Harbord arrived here from England, and the same evening had audience of the States-general,—to whom he represented, That he was commanded by the queen to let them know how much her majesty was concerned at the misfortune that had befallen their squadron in the late engagement, and that their not being seconded as they ought to have been, which matter her majesty had directed to be examined into, in order to recompense those that had done their duty, and to punish such as should be found to have deserved it: That her majesty had given orders for the refitting the Dutch ships that were disabled, at her own charge, and had commanded that all possible care should be taken of the sick and wounded seamen, and that rewards should be given to the widows of those that were killed, behaving themselves bravely in the fight, to encourage those that do well for the future." Here is a strange partiality and tenderness for the Dutch, rewards for their widows, encouragement promised to those of them that shall "do well for the future," besides particular care of their sick and wounded in our hospitals; while our own men were permitted to perish for want of necessary looking after, and under the unskilful hands of country surgeons little better than country farriers. What instances of such grace and compassion to the poor widows and orphans of the English, which are numberless in

Wapping, Chatham, and many other of our ports, who never as yet could get the just arrears due to their deceased husbands; and yet, which is most barbarous and unjust, the Dutch must have rewards and encouragements out of our pay, whilst the English are neglected and permitted to starve. This is a specimen of the affection our new governors have for the English nation, and a clear forerunner of our slavery, if God Almighty does not timely prevent it, which none but a degenerate and infatuated people to their own destruction would ever suffer themselves to groan under. But this is not all, the ancient encouragement of smart-money to the wounded is most fraudulently detained, the maimed exposed to mere beggary, for want of their usual pensions paid to them by the respective counties they belong to, and are become a publick nuisance in our cities and great towns. What is become of the wounded and maimed in Ireland and Flanders, who, no doubt, were very numerous? God only knows; the most reasonable conjecture is, they are either suffered to perish abroad, by being refused passage home, or knocked on the head to save their pay, and that they might not come home and tell tales of their hard usage, to the discouraging their fellow slaves from entering upon the service. The story of 50 wounded English being burnt in a barn by the Dutch, at the command of the P. of O. in Ireland, upon the absolute refusal of an English officer, who had some remains of compassion and natural affection for his own countrymen, is real matter of fact, and ought not to be forgotten; which was done, as is said, merely to avoid the trouble and charge of curing them. These are some of the hardships the soldiery groan under, and a specimen of the brutish temper, as well as unpolitickness of our usurper; and sooner or later he must expect to reap the just fruits of his cruelty and folly both. What glorious achievements can he ever pretend to do with soldiers, who must in due time (if there be so much mercy reserved in heaven,) have their eyes opened, see their error, and resent such ill usage and partiality? However our dull and unthinking bigots may flatter themselves with great expectations of what he has most sillily given out in his speech to both houses, of his resolution to make a descent, and do miracles in France, the soldiery are of the contrary opinion, and through mere despair of ever getting their pay, or effecting any thing upon their enemy, have deserted considerably, and really entertain low and mean thoughts of his conduct, see through the cheat, and are only hindered by the strictness of his discipline from running unanimously to their old and best master. They own, as many as get over, that they are hated in Flanders, abused at all rates by the Dutch, exposed upon all accounts as forlorns: They can tell you how divers of their officers were cashiered, and soldiers hanged, immediately after the battle at Steinkirk, for avoiding being knocked on the head by the French, when a numerous army stood looking on, and not one single troop or company permitted (though some of the English desired it, and were ready to hazard their lives to rescue their poor countrymen,) to go in to their assistance. By several letters from officers in Flanders in the English army, we have been informed, how the poor wounded men, through the intolerable pains they endured, cursed and damned to the pit of hell, with their breaths, him who brought them to that horrid butchery. They can tell you likewise what great numbers deserted his service immediately after the fight, choosing rather to run the hazard of being hanged, and losing all their pay and arrears, than to continue in his service. They can tell you how the English are universally hated by the country people there, that they'll scarce let them have necessaries for their money, and that the Flandersers have more respect for the enemy than for their pretended friends the allies, and much better usage for them. They can tell you that their wounded and prisoners, that fell into the hands of the French, were more kindly treated by them than among their friends; and how far such usage may work upon the minds of a people naturally generous, though at present bereaved of their senses, time may demonstrate. They can tell you how the P. of O. is undervalued and nosed by the confederates in general, dis-

trusted by the Dutch, despised by the inhabitants in all the cities and towns in Flanders, and hated by all, and for want of those qualifications we are made to admire, and so foolishly and superabundantly have hitherto magnified in him. What wonder then is it that our English seamen and soldiers mutiny, run away, &c., they can neither get their pay, nor good words, but at a dead lift; if they modestly demand their own, though incited to it by the keenest necessity, they are immediately hanged or shot to death without the least remorse or pity! Had we ever such unjust acts of parliament made in any kings reigns, for enslaving and punishing of seamen or landmen, as since this Revolution; so many brave men hanged or shot to death for trifles: such kidnapping our landmen, under pretence for sea-service, and sent the Lord knows whither? Nay, I am credibly informed, it has been no unusual thing to press landmen, and sell them for 5*l.* a head to the Dutch, or into other foreign service. What apology can be made for the wicked abuses of the mariners, a parcel of brave young fellows, who were kept on board till they were almost all dead of the small-pox and other distempers, the remainder cheated of and denied their pay, and then forced, in a sickly and most piteous condition, to beg from door to door, as London and other places can sufficiently testify? To recount all the miseries of our distressed countrymen, who are actually engaged under this government, would be an endless task; all I shall add under this head is, that this ill usage looks more like the effect of malice, and a perfect hatred and distrust, than of any necessity upon our governors; but if it be, our condition is deplorable and remediless, by all the supplies we are able to give, though never so willingly, and without our most just and present resentments, a certain forerunner of inevitable ruin; but if we have but one grain of sense, or reflection left, and be not benumbed all over, is an infallible indication of the stupidity of the generalissimo of the besotted and dull confederates; and what the effects of such politics may be, with relation to himself, I leave to the judgments of all ingenuous men to conjecture.

Thus we find his politicks are by no means adequate to his designs, or proportionable to those great undertakings his reputation, and the necessity of his affairs, as well as of these three kingdoms unhappily under his management, do absolutely require: and in reference to this last particular, I shall now enquire, whether an indefatigable and sincere studiousness to promote the publick good of these nations, ought to be admitted as a just ingredient of his character or reputation: I need not much enlarge upon this point, the direct contrary being easily deducible from what has been said all along, only for the assistance of our memories shall recapitulate. Our constitution both of church and state are reversed, and quite disjointed; our liberties and properties most unjustly invaded; and more instances of arbitrary power daily committed, than in several of the former reigns. Trade in general decreasing, basely and designedly betrayed, and rendered almost impracticable. A great part of our current coin either transported in specie, or melted into ingots, and recoined into Dutch schellings in Holland, and irrecoverably lost, to our vast impoverishment, and the enriching our sworn enemies. A million at least per annum, by the confession of favourites of the government, lost ever since this war, in shipping and merchandize, besides the produce of it in trade at home, to the undoing of multitudes of families in a short time; and this loss like to continue as long as we have any thing to lose, or the war lasts. Ireland a third part depopulated, and more than half of the intrinsic riches, or product of that kingdom, embezzled and wasted; and a third part of our seamen dead or deserted. The flower of our fighting English destroyed to no purpose. What excuse can be made for the detaining our Turkey fleet above twelve months, nay after our never-to-be-forgotten victory at sea, when we could have well spared half our fleet for convoys? the remainder with the Dutch being more than sufficient guards to the descent, (a design so senselessly managed, and shamefully mentioned at this time of day, as the only thing to buoy us up to sponge five or six millions more out of our purses,) and yet by their idling in our

ports and harbours, and doing nothing but lousing themselves, have suffered more ships to be lost since than in any one year since the war. I defy all mankind to satisfy us in this affair, of so near consequence to the very being almost of the English nation: And if the descent be urged as a proper excuse, what has been the occasion of its mis-carriage, to the astonishment of all Europe? It must either be occasioned through its impracticableness, or for want of necessaries to such an expedition; but neither of these can apologize for such an unpardonable frustration, being a certain sign of the incapacity of the authors and contrivers of it, neither foreseeing the difficulties nor charges necessarily attending such an enterprise; and thence we may conclude the great infelicity and disadvantages these miserable nations lie under, to be engaged in a war that our governors have no skill to manage: And then what can we expect but to be perpetually worsted, and to come off with infinite loss and disreputation, and in the end be forced to submit. So that unless our parliament, by their omnipotence, can supply them with more brains and better conduct, and instil into their skulls more wit to improve a victory when they can get it, it will be equal to us whether we beat or be beaten, and then how deplorable will our condition be?

The last blessing of this Revolution that I shall mention these unfortunate nations enjoy under the P. of O. (which is a plain inference from what has been hitherto insisted on,) is this, That they shall not, or cannot, enjoy their idol any longer than the confederacy holds tight with us, or we with them: This is so necessary a deduction that it cannot be evaded, because he is their creature, set up merely for their common interest; and his downfall may become an advantage to them in time, as well as his prosperity and grandeur, (as had been said.) Whatever figure of generalissimo we may fancy he makes among the confederates in Flanders, it's certain he has not the command of any forces (if really of those) but what he carries over from hence. How often has he been over-ruled in councils of war by the Spanish governor Castinago, and Bavaria since, Prince Waldeck, &c. is too notorious to be recounted here. So that his business is rather to be their providitore-general than any thing else, to furnish them with men, money, and stores, to build them forts, and repay their losses, (as in that instance lately produced of the Dutch squadron :) Nay, so unwilling are they so much as to find his soldiers quarters, that he is forced to transport part of his quota back again, and to be at the expence of fortifying two towns, Dixmuyde and Furnes, to lodge part of the remainder, send over provisions, and even coals for their subsistence; Ghent, Bruges, and some other places, refusing positively to entertain the rest, if not prevailed upon by the Duke of Bavaria. All the reward he has for the vast sum he annually pilfers for them out of our almost-exhausted coffers, is to king it here, and all he desires; and upon that account it's his personal interest to keep the war on foot whatsoever it costs us. From whence it's proper enough to infer, that if we be able or willing to furnish as many millions yearly as the support of the confederacy will require, we may yet keep the Dutch stadtholder for our king, and if not, we must part with him, and there's an end of the raree show.

As a corollary to this last advantage, we ought not to forget another as remarkable, (for we do every thing awkwardly, and pray and hope, as they say, backwards, and in opposition to all the rest of mankind that are not infatuated or grown mad,) and that is the blessing of never enjoying peace so long as the P. of O. lords it here. I confess in his speech the last sessions of parliament, and in his discourse to the States before, or after that, he promised he would do his utmost to humble France, and procure an honourable peace to all Europe; but in this, as well as in all other promises, he has deceived all our hopes, and none but half-witted people would ever be so deluded. 'Tis demonstration he can never do the one or the other now: France was never so powerful as at present, nay, is grown excessively powerful, as he tells the parliament in this last speech, and, I may add, the confederacy exceedingly weak; and England, that

must give life and vigour unto all, not excessively rich, nor, I hope, for ever abandoned to the highest degree of sottishness and insensibility. And as for a peace, himself is the only obstacle of it, and will first or last be cursed by all Europe on that account. The confederacy must of necessity have dropped long ere this, if we, through our zeal and malice against our lawful king, whatever we roar against *Louis le Grand*, had not been so prodigal of our wealth and blood, to maintain the abominable usurpation of a foreigner, and through all the course of his management a sworn enemy and hater of the English nation. And now, forsooth, in this last speech, (after all his ill-laid projects and designs baffled, and frustrated at sea and land; and that he had at the long run discovered that the power of France was excessive, *i. e.* in plain English, insuperable, by all the force and childish politicks of himself and the confederates,) he very humbly craves the advice of the parliament at a dead lift, when all lies at stake, which he never thought worthy of advising with before, and modestly asks at least an equal force to that of the last year; as if a force that was able to do nothing the last year, either by sea or land, (but by a mere accident,) would be able to do wonders the next against the augmented forces of his enemy by both. What pitiful cant is all this! Is it not plain by his speech that he dares not so much as flatter us with the hopes of any success against France the next campaign, since he is fearful even of asking such a supply as all intelligent men foresee will be absolutely necessary to oppose the prodigious preparations of the enemy? And can we hope with the same assistance we gave him the last year, which we experimentally found was insufficient even for the defensive part, by land especially, will be superior to him the next? We are certainly informed of the great preparations of all sorts of ammunitions the French are making in all their frontier garrisons upon the Sambre, the Maes, the Moselle, and the Rhine; the vast magazines of hay, straw, oats, and other grain and provisions they are erecting in those parts; their forces so disposed of in posts upon the Sambre and the Maes, that 30,000 can be got together at any time, upon any enterprise at a short warning; and upon the Moselle 20,000 on any occasion; and all without doubt to execute some great designs very early before the confederates can be in a condition to oppose them. And will it be sufficient for the confederates to stand upon the defensive, which they never could do to any effect? And is this the way to humble France, to reduce her to her ancient limits, and to restore peace and liberty to Europe? And then as for Savoy, what measures are concerted to preserve his territories from the French reprisals, or even to hinder them from being swallowed up? It's true indeed there are several of the emperor's troops quartered in Italy, besides those of some of the German princes; but then if we do but remind ourselves of the winter campaign, which the French king has already begun in Flanders, and on the Rhine; his resolutions (as we are informed by all the foreign gazettes and courants) to act in concert with the Turk, and to push on the war with all imaginable vigour during this season, while the other does the same in Hungary, (where, as we are told, the Ottoman forces increase daily, and by their motions and preparations it's generally conjectured they have present and great designs in hand, having lately assembled in great bodies between Belgrade and Semandria, as (it's thought) to fall into Sclavonia, or attack Peterwaraden,) in such a case as this, it's but reasonable to suppose that both the emperor and the foresaid princes will be necessitated to recall the greatest part of their forces; and then let the world judge whether 50,000, or, as some accounts say, 70,000 French will not probably prove too great a match for that prince to encounter, and especially in the winter time; for these prints do positively tell us, that all the troops in Dauphiny and thereabouts, with all the magazines that have been erecting for several months since, are actually removed towards the frontiers of Piedmont, and that the French design, in the month of February, if the season favour them, to besiege Coni, or Turin itself. The German and Spanish troops, notwithstanding the most pressing instances of the Duke of Savoy to detain them, are

marched into their quarters; Bavaria had recalled two of his regiments, if he had not been prevailed upon by the P. of O. to let them stay, upon his promise to maintain them this winter at his own charge, which, by the way, is a certain sign of the French forces increasing on that side, and therefore could not be conveniently spared: So that the only present security he has is the winter season and the deep snows; and as soon as the weather breaks, a force by much superior, and in all points better provided for, will fall into his country, and, in all probability, put a speedy period to the war on that side, either by an entire conquest, or by forcing him into a sudden compliance. We hear of no preparations answerable to those of France on the confederates' side, all being at a stand, waiting for the lucky news of more money from the parliament in England; and ere that be done, and preparations made, the enemy will have done his business, and have little to do but to dodge with them, and play with their noses the whole summer, and shew the world what fools they are. Again, what a piece of kindness is it to our parliament, and an honour too to tell them, the inconveniency of sending out of the kingdom great sums of money for the payment of the troops abroad; (he dares not say the English or Scotch;) is very considerable, and so much wishes it could be remedied, that if they can suggest to him any methods for the support of them which might lessen that inconveniency, he should be ready to receive them with all his heart. Why, truly, the case is plainly this, he finds it's no concealing any longer the transportation of all our money for the support of foreigners, and is afraid this trade will not hold long, either that England can pay the confederates unreasonable pensions, or that the confederates can be held together, notwithstanding the exactest payment of what he is engaged to them; therefore he is willing to go on with them, or knock off, as the parliament will advise him; (provided he mentions these things *bona fide*, and does not impose upon the rest, and the whole kingdom besides, by an assurance of a majority that will carry all, right or wrong, for his interest;) any thing so he may continue king, or have the satisfaction at least of ruining the nation with himself when he must fall. This is downright, (if he be in good earnest,) and the nation has a fit opportunity to look to herself. No means can be found out to avoid this inconvenience, and to maintain an army abroad at the same time: The only way is to take him at his word, recall our forces, break off the confederacy, and to stand upon our own legs; maintain a good army here at home, pay them well, and augment our navy. But yet this method has its difficulties too; so hard a thing it is to ensure any the least degree of mundane felicity: For should we leave the confederacy in the lurch, (which his present circumstances seem to incline or necessitate him to consent to, if the parliament think fit,) then the vast arrears owing to the allies, which they could never expect to get from him, would oblige them to unite with France, declare the P. of O. the common enemy, and England the seat of war. (That he is indebted to the confederates seems highly probable to me, by the Elector of Brandenburg's pressing the States and the King of Spain so hard for the subsidies, or pensions, due to him the last spring, representing to them, that without them he should not be in a condition to maintain the forces he had on foot, which the Elector of Saxony did likewise the same time; and, 'tis not unlikely, that was one principal reason of Hanover's slow proceedings the last campaign: And, if I be not much mistaken in my conjecture, the P. of O. must come in for a snack in that affair, as well as the States and Spain, especially if he be the *primum mobile* of the confederacy, as the monthly account, and one of the late slips, term him.) But to return, the latter would be insignificant, for reasons formerly mentioned; so that our case looks desperate. But if we should break up the confederacy by consent, these arrears must be paid, which, no doubt, will arise to a large sum, which would be hard for us to part with in these circumstances, and to support the charge of a war besides.

But, oh the descent! This must be carried on yet. "None can desire more than I that a descent should be made into France, and therefore, notwithstanding the disap-

pointment of that design the last summer, I intend to attempt it the next year with a much more considerable force," &c. What a parcel of stuff and contradiction huddled together, as if the noise of the cannon from Mons and Namur was not out of his head yet! To talk of a descent so publickly, so long beforehand, enough to frustrate the best laid project in the world. If it were impracticable the last year, much more the next. There are the same difficulties at least this year, if not ten times greater; but nothing will serve our turns, or be worth our noble attempts, but impossibilities. By the next year there will be a potent fleet to obstruct us, if not powerful enough to defeat and ruin us; more powerful diversion by land, early notice of this design, all possible means found out to prevent us by sea and land; and, it may be, a descent to anticipate ours, and what then? Ay, but "I intend to attempt it—with a more considerable force." Is not this a palpable contradiction to his modest request he had made before, of a force "at least as great by sea and land as we had the last year?" *i. e.* If we may be permitted to understand him, he desires, if it can't be otherwise, but the same assistance of men and money he had the last year, and he will attempt it; and if they enable him with a much more considerable force he will attempt it. If, notwithstanding all the forementioned greater opposition he is like to meet with the next year than the last, he intends yet to attempt it, though with equal forces to those he had before, why was it not attempted then when there were far less? Will he engage to be wiser next year than the last, or that the French shall be more fools? or that they shall be less able to oppose him with a more powerful navy, and a greater number of land forces the next than they had the last campaign, and he be stronger and abler to attack them with the same forces he had before? And suppose he be enabled with a more considerable force, can he assure us that their diligence in repairing their losses at sea, and the considerable augmentation of their land forces, will not exceed his more numerous forces, and render his good intention as impracticable as ever? This is just such a passionate desire as he had to fight Luxemburgh hand over head, without the least shadow of hope to get any advantage, but merely to keep up the opinion amongst fools of his being a fighting spark, and scorning to pass a whole campaign with doing nothing; so he is resolved to attempt something by sea, though he is sure to get nothing but hard blows, and expose some thousands of his English to be knocked on the head, or to die like fools to their immortal honour: And this is all he seems to promise in his speech, to attempt a landing in France, which was ever laughed at by sensible men before, and ought to be hissed at now.

Well! but here are grand motives to stir us up to support him with all the speed imaginable: "We are exposed to the attempts of France while the French king is in a condition to make them, and therefore the great advantage we have at this very tick of time, of being joined with the most of the princes and states of Europe against so dangerous an enemy, ought not to be slipt, especially our country and religion lying at stake, &c. and we have the same religion to defend," &c. What advantage have we now that we had not before? Are we but just now entered into the confederacy, or have we or they been asleep or drunk all this while? Why an advantage now? Are they stronger now, or more politick or resolute than before? Or if we have had little or no advantage in being joined with them all this while, what assurance have we of any from henceforward? I am sure some wise statesmen, who have transmitted to us the experience of former ages, do assure us, if a confederacy does not make some notable impression upon the common enemy the first or second campaign, they are never like to do it afterwards, but grow weaker and weaker till they sink into nothing; and as to these confederates, notwithstanding they have served almost an apprenticeship under one of the wisest masters of his craft in the whole world, have added so little to their skill, and approved themselves such notorious dunces, that we have no hopes of ever seeing a masterpiece from them, to their grand disparagement, and our infinite

loss. And after all this pother, are we exposed to the attempts of France, and is France a dangerous enemy, and the power of France excessive? Who may we thank for all this? Was it not the P. of O.'s being joined with most of the princes and states of Europe that brought us into these snares, upon a parcel of sham pretences and bug-bear stories, with his bearskins and Laplanders, and the devil knows what? And has not their senseless management of their affairs against their common enemy, as they call him, made him so strong and dangerous as he is? And is there any prospect they will be ever more politick and powerful for the future, and have better success in all their enterprizes? Can all the speed they make in getting money, providing necessities for the war, be answerable to his preparations, which are at this time so forward, as to wait only a proper season to employ them? And if from the nature of things they must be later, since all the world is convinced of the agility and diligence of the French, and that they are never guilty of losing opportunities, do we imagine that all the confederates can do will signify any thing? Then to what purpose is it to throw away our money, and to impoverish and weaken ourselves? All the good that our money is like to do the confederates, is only to discharge part of the contributions they are obliged to pay the French, to save their towns and villages from being laid in ashes; such brave fellows they are in defending their own liberties and properties, that continually sponge the money out of our pockets under the sham of being our saviours and deliverers: And so far from humbling their enemy, and carrying the war into his own bowels, that what he does not think worth the taking from them, they are forced to redeem from being destroyed at any rate, and we like fools deposite the money. Again, How strangely are all our measures, and those of our allies, broke in pieces in a trice? Our doughty P. of O. demands but modestly at least as great force at land and sea as the last year, consequently at least as much money, &c.; and no doubt the allies do what they can on their parts at the same time. Now if we consider the vast expences and losses the common enemy is like to put them to by this devilish winter campaign, (being destitute of magazines, of provisions for horse and man, ammunition, carriages, and all necessities, as we are well assured by the late instance of Charleroy being bombarded almost to ashes before they could get up to its relief, the carrying Furnes and Dixmuyde, and sixteen or seventeen days playing upon Rhinfelden and the Kat, before they were in any condition to attempt the relief of them,) by false alarms, taking their towns, and the bare attacking others to give them diversion, while they are in good earnest in other places, and (which at the same time shews they have not men enough to secure themselves on all sides, though the French have to beard them, and keep them in play, while they assault them in their tenderest and weakest part) we shall find in the upshot, that these at least as great sums of money will go near to be half expended before the summer campaign begins, (their designs reaching no farther;) and consequently all their hopes, if they have any, and projects of effecting any thing upon France crushed in the very shell. I know the saving of Rhinfeld is looked upon as a very great deliverance, and that *Te Deum* has been sung in Germany on that occasion, which is an argument of its great importance; but yet at the same time we are not ignorant that it was owing to the badness of the weather, more than to any thing else; and, for all I can see to the contrary, the confederates have no reason to think themselves secure, even as to that point; the town and castle, and the Kat, are miserably ruined, and before they can put them into any defensible condition, again, an indifferent good season may give the French an opportunity, if they have no better fish to fry, to attack it the second time, as undoubtedly they will, and with a stronger force; and then it must go. How the Germans will be able to supply their late losses in those parts, the whole country round having been most miserably plundered and harassed during the siege, and forced to pay swinging contributions; the vast expences in supplying that place with ammunition and provisions, to repair

the breaches, add new works, provide for the subsistence of their forces, and those many ruined families in the towns burnt by the French in their retreat, I cannot divine; But if we reflect upon the monies and monies worth raised by the French, in the several excursions made during that siege into divers parts, forcing the country to supply them with whatever they had for their convenience all the time, and what they have extorted from them since; I am morally assured the Germans have paid the whole charge of the others expedition. But to all this let us add; that since the taking of that place would have been of vast consequence to the facilitating of the designs of France upon the empire, (as generally was acknowledged and dreaded,) and the early taking of it yet would be so still upon the former supposition, (especially if the Turk, taking the advantages from the emperor's weakness and unpreparedness, make some early and vigorous attempt in Hungary or Sclavonia :) the effect will be this, the French will be able to penetrate so far into the empire, as to put all Germany into a convulsion, force that prince to draw all his forces out of Italy, (by which the Duke of Savoy must fall off, and consequently the war draw on to a period;) and though he should, by the adding those forces to the army in Hungary or on the Rhine, make some tolerable defence, yet being unable to do the same on the other side, he would be compelled to accept of any terms from the Turk and French king; and then farewell England and Holland too; the one must be glad to submit to her old master, and the other to such conditions as she can get. This is the game we are likely to see in a short time, the effect of our weakness as well as wickedness, notwithstanding our profuseness and readiness to support so wretched a cause to the ruin of these nations, if God be not the more merciful: Of our weakness, I say, abstracting all other considerations, because we will not learn wisdom and forecast from our enemy, in making provisions against the winter, when he's always most active; and we may take it for a certain maxim, grounded upon our experience all this war, that if we can't prevent the French from doing their business in the winter time, or very early in the spring, all our summer's expedition ends in nothing but marching and countermarching, running away, or getting a kick on the a—, and so home again, and tell our loving subjects some dreadful story of the great or excessive power of France, and desire more money.

Thus we are fooled and cajoled from year to year, with the perpetual outcries of the growing power and excessive power of France, their augmenting their forces by sea and land; put in mind of our being exposed to their attempts, the danger of our country, liberties, and properties; and to animate us to open our purses the wider, and bleed the more freely, he assures us in the word of a true protestant Dutchman, he has the same religion to defend. What pitiful nonsense is all this! It has been pretended all along this war, that the French king, in his negotiations with the pope and the Italian princes and states, to incline them to use their interest to procure a peace among the catholick princes, or to take part with him, has made it his business to persuade them, that the war carried on against him, so far as the protestant princes or states were concerned, was on the score of religion, which has been denied by the said protestant princes, and most of their writers on this occasion, and particularly by the author of the "General History of Europe," published by the authority of the States General, in the P. of O.'s Declaration published by Schomberg in Dauphiny; and in the articles of Limerick we find the P. of O. to the regret of many of our protestant rebels, has granted greater liberty and privileges to the Roman catholicks in Ireland, than ever they enjoyed in the reigns of any of our protestant kings. But to come nearer, he uses ambiguous terms, which look very suspiciously, "We have the same religion to defend." What same religion? The new latitudinarian religion, presbyterian, or the Oliverian independent, or what? Even what you please. We are presbyterians in Scotland, episcopals in England, Calvinists in Holland, and (if some

intelligent persons are not mistaken) Roman catholicks in Flanders; and, after all, every where atheists. There are those in the world who fear not to assert, that it was publickly enough reported at Rome by divers of the cardinals, and particularly the auditor of the Rota, some time before the Revolution, that he was reconciled to the church of Rome; and some stick not to assert, that he made his protest in the royal chapel at Brussels before the high altar, at his admission into the confederacy, that he would inevitably perform the articles of it; whereof one is this, if we may credit a copy printed here in England, of the resolution of the princes, allies, and confederates, which has been taken in the assembly at the Hague, &c. Art. 1. Having resolved to make a descent into France, &c. "We will make no peace with Lewis XIV. till he has made reparation to the holy see for whatsoever he has acted against it, and till he has annulled and made void all those infamous proceedings against the holy Innocent XI." If this be really one article of the confederacy, as there is a grand suspicion, if we consider the lukewarmness of that pope towards King James, as was frequently buzzed amongst us formerly, what figure he made in the confederacy, and his inveterateness against the French king, the bigotry of the emperor, and the inflexible temper of the Spaniard as to matters of religion, it's not to be conceived how they should enter into a negociation of this nature with the P. of O. without an assurance of his coming over to their persuasion, and resolution of promoting the Roman catholick interest in these kingdoms. Neither is it reasonable to suppose they would contribute their assistance to remove a prince of their own principles, though with a grand prospect of advancing their civil interest, to the hazard of impairing their religion to make way for an heretical prince. Besides, how can we imagine they would ever communicate such a secret to him, if they were not first sure of him, or could be sure of him without such an engagement? The sole refusal or discovery of it would have infallibly prevented all their designs, brought an indelible dishonour and scandal upon their religion, as well as their persons, and provoked King James and the French king to take the utmost vengeance upon them, and made them justly odious to all the rest of the christian world, of whatever persuasion: What a blemish would it have fixed upon the emperor, commonly characterized as a prince of a most devout temper, and actually engaged against the common enemy of Christianity, to be found in a design to depose a catholick prince, and at the same time to cut off all the hopes of ever propagating the catholick religion in three kingdoms? Neither is his usual partiality towards popish bishops, priests, and the Roman catholicks in general, one of the slightest arguments for this suspicion, though it's usually objected, that by his alliances he was obliged to shew some favour to them. Why was it not as well cautioned he should not set the mob upon their houses and chapels? and why did not those princes, by their interest with him, prevent the issue of so much blood, and put a timely stop to those horrid barbarities, and irreparable ruin of vast numbers of their own persuasion then, as to shew such favour and marks of distinction since? No, some severity was absolutely necessary in the beginning to get the affections of the people, and to his surer establishment in the throne; but since he has gained his point, and dipt all degrees and orders of men so deep in guilt against their lawful sovereign, that they fancy themselves beyond all hopes of pardon, he rides them at his pleasure, makes them believe what he lists, and readily stops their mouths, and entirely satisfies them with this excuse.

There might be some other very considerable arguments offered on this head if necessary or prudent; all that I shall add is this, that for my own part I shall ever believe him to be a papist, as much as any others fancy him either a presbyterian, or of the communion of the present pretended church of England, till he satisfies the world to the contrary, by taking some severe test and most solemn oath; and if this should prove true, (as it may, notwithstanding his communicating publickly according

to the form of the church of England, as many have done formerly to our knowledge before the test was advised to make the distinction,) how finely are we trump upon? However, let him urge this motive as far as he pleases, it's little to the present purpose; as the business of religion has been managed since his usurpation, 'tis no great matter what religion he or we profess; we have as good as renounced our Christianity already, to make and receive him as king; and I am sure nothing can be more contrary to it, or affrontive of the great God of heaven and earth, than our very prayers and devotions, wherein we beseech him to support and prosper one of the grandest pieces of villainy that ever was acted upon the face of the earth, to confound all justice and probity, which is as great an indignity to an holy and just God, as idolatry in the highest degree of it. Nay, more than that, all our preaching and prayers tend directly to nothing but the hardening and encouraging men to persevere in the horrid sins of rebellion and schism, with their concomitants, and by consequence, in the eye of reason, give an inlet to all other vices, it being as justifiable for a man to plead a necessity for whoring, theft, murder, &c. as to incur the guilt of perjury and rebellion for the preservation of religion; and the consequence is so visible and intelligible by all the debauchees and atheists of the age, that we, to our great sorrow, perceive the visible growth of both daily; and one John Tillotson has contributed more to the spreading and rooting of atheism than fifty Spinoza's, Hobbs's, or Vaninus's: So that let him insist as long as he pleases upon that old stale cant of religion to cover all the rest of his profligate designs, we are certain he has the least reason to name it of any person in the whole world; one may as soon with his arch-heretick, and schismatick, Don John, find out a place for the damned in the mansions of eternal bliss, after a certain period of suffering hell torments, or that the devils and damned sing hallelujahs in hell, or that they shall at length merit a release from those dreadful torments, by their supposed blasphemies against, or execrations of God Almighty, as the least spark of religion in him, if we reflect upon his practices, (which are ever the fruits of good or bad principles;) or as soon demonstrate that the emperor, the King of Spain, Dukes of Bavaria and Savoy, entered into the confederacy with him and the rest of the protestant princes, out of no other design but to preserve the church of England against the attempts of King James and the French king, as prove it ever was the least part of his intentions. For 'tis visible to any one that knows the difference between schism and the unity of the church, that he has persecuted ever since he came hither the members of the true established church of England; and the first effort that he made was to let loose all manner of schisms and heresies upon her to worry her to death if possible, the preservation of which he most impudently makes one of the plausible pretexts of his invasion; and if the latitudinarian gentlemen had not, out of a great zeal to preserve their preferments more than their religion, swallowed the oaths against their known duty and allegiance, had put the presbyterians and independants into the actual possession of all the churches in the kingdom, as is constantly urged by them in private as the only reason of their compliance, and so turned round, as they say, to keep rogues out. And here I must not forget to give them their due; they proved apt scholars and out-witted him: Nay more than that, by compelling them to compliances against all that they formerly taught and professed to believe to be their indispensable duty, he has been the occasion of such new lights and discoveries to them in matters of the nearest concernment to them, that in effect he has given the sham to the so glorious deliverance itself, and rendered himself for the future altogether useless. How natural is it now for them to urge, and indeed in some of their writings they have already, that though there might be some pretence in the late dark age of their imma-

* The high churchmen complained bitterly of the abuse of the press after the Revolution, in the article of heretical and schismatical works.

turity and childhood for his heroick and generous undertaking, there can be none now for his continuance, which by his unsuccessfulness, and the vast expences he puts the nation to, without any colour of hope to accomplish the remainder of his designs, has already dimmed the lustre of his first enterprize, and sunk it almost into oblivion. 'Tis not change in religion, let it be what it will, can affect them now; they've got a clue that will readily extricate them out of all such labyrinths, with the new arts of higher and lower sense, the distinction between submission and allegiance, as circumstances shall determine it: No oaths can now enslave them and tie them up, and no pretence of religion impose upon them. Christianity is not the same thing now that she was in her swaddling clothes; one thing is to be done in propagating the faith, another when she has taken firm rooting. That self-denial and passivity of the first ages was really necessary for the propagation of the faith; but now it's settled it's become an useless topic, especially since the state has added her sanction, and stamp't it into civil property; and Christianity, as to the *agenda*, requires little more than what the pure light of nature, cleared up from passion and prejudice, suggests of herself: Self-preservation is her prime law and dictate, and all the religion in the world cannot null it, without committing the greatest violence upon humanity itself. Besides, since salvation is not confined to any party or sect of Christians, but allowances must be made for human frailty, it must be diametrically opposite to the great law of charity itself to be strait laced in a point of such deep importance. Therefore let the P. of O. talk what he will as to religion, ours is as comprehensive as his, let it be what it will; we want only the much-desired opportunity to reap the blessings of our happy change, which if it cannot be obtained under him, we are ready for the next propitious providence; and let it come from whence it will, *modo hic sit bene*, if we may but continue Vicars of Bray still, we'll call it and celebrate it as the greatest deliverance we ever had yet.

These short reflections upon some passages of his speech, I thought fit to subjoin to my considerations on the last-mentioned disadvantage these nations have by this great Revolution, viz. the unlikelihood of ever enjoying peace under the present government. I might, if it were not to avoid being over tedious, enlarge myself upon a subject of fatal importance to these islands, the daily decay of trade; all that I shall say in reference unto it is only this, that it's impossible for us to retrieve it so long as the P. of O. continues here; because we can never hope to be at peace, or masters of the seas so as to secure it; and we must allow a million and a half at least to be yearly lost during this war, in shipping and goods, and all the possible product or increase of it in the way of commerce, near a third part to be deducted out of the trade in general, occasioned by excessive taxes and scarcity of money; a considerable part whereof is near lost already for want of seamen, convoys, and ships themselves, by such vast numbers being taken for transportation, the frequent embargoes, and unhappy detaining of our fleets, to the loss of their markets, wasting their provisions, and raising commodities to such high rates, that we had as good be without them; particularly the Newfoundland and Bank fishery suspended, if not lost, to the impoverishing of divers of our port towns, by reducing numerous families to downright beggary, to the excessive charge of the respective parishes they belong to. Then again, for our comfort, let us but consider the increase of the French shipping, by their perpetually snapping ours and the Dutch, the increase of their seamen by the vast encouragement of the privateers, the addition that will be made by the next summer to their navy, and we shall find trading by sea will in a little time be rendered almost impracticable. Add to this the P. of O.'s certain design to betray our trade to the Dutch; for it's impossible to avoid such a reflection, since no other reason can be given for the detaining our Turkey fleet above twelve months for want of convoys, after they were ordered to be in a readiness. What other account can be given of the ineffectualness of the petition