

ly do we hear of any proof made against them ; and therefore since the seditious interpositors, after all their tedious searches and examinations, have not been able to descry the dangers they pretend to fear, it is a sufficient principle of presumption, that their jealousies are ill grounded, that they find fault merely for the sake of finding fault, and like boys, having blown a soap-bubble from a walnut-shell, resolve to keep it up as long as they have breath to follow it. Nay, since they exhibit foul and dismal charges against the ministry, without referring to any act of the ministers to make it good, they prove nothing but that they are oppressed with envy and ill-nature ; for they are not so unskilful at improving the minutest piccadillos, that had they been furnished with any shadow of truth, they would not have smothered them, and therefore since they have produced none, the reader may justly conclude they have none to produce. And all undesigning men, notwithstanding all the scarecrows that are set up to fright us, may with great satisfaction and quiet depend upon his majesty's promise made to the House of Commons³ in answer to their address, viz. " That he will take the best care he can, that all sorts of mismanagements and irregularities shall be prevented or redressed." So that, upon the whole matter, our enemies crying out against the government in general terms, without being able to produce any thing worth the hearing, to justify their noise and clamours, they prove nothing but their want of breeding and better arguments, and their calumnies, when driven home, will recoil upon their own heads ; for they that charge others with crimes they cannot prove, indict and convict themselves of falsity ; and as this offence may be the parent of many disturbances, so, among our other real grievances, it calls for a timely redress, for it is infinitely below authority to indulge, or neglect, a humour that proceeds from nothing but invincible pride and peevishness. However,

Certainly causes there are, for all these complaints are not made for nothing. There can be no smook but there must be some fire ; and therefore, to be just to my reader, and satisfy my country, I must not smother them ; but in conscience and honesty am obliged to bring some of them upon the stage, and shew the reasons why there are so many complaints against the court, and the first I encounter is,

That many of the seditious mixture are under great disappointments. They want places of profit that they may repair their tattered fortunes at the expence of the public, and places of trust, that they may have it in their power to turn the scales, if ever the beam should begin to totter ; and shew their exquisite parts in doing nothing, and undoing all things. And the government being supplied at present with able and experienced statesmen, and that it is too long to go barefoot, till they can be recruited with dead men's shoes, they would pull them off, and force a way to their preferment, through the reputations of the present ministers, and for that end only, endeavour to make the present ministers uneasy to themselves, and hateful to others, that they may turn them out, and thrust themselves into their places ; and this chicanery they manage with so much art and industry, at their several clubs and eating-houses, as if all were going to ruin, unless they be speedily employed, and such methods observed to regulate disorders, as they only can propose, though when their notions come to be examined, it is a thousand to one but they are utterly impracticable, dangerous in the use, and destructive in the end ; but the vulgar not perceiving what's in the covered dish, they run into the same cry against the court, and eagerly spend their mouths in the chase, which their leaders have started, without knowing what the game is, how it must be dressed, or who must feed upon the carcass when they have helped to catch it.

Noise and nonsense is enough to set all the idle tools of the seditious mixture a madding, and therefore, having swallowed the infectious vehicle, it soon has its operation, and now they all applaud the contrivances and stratagems of these state empiricks, as

³ Martis, 4 die Aprilis 1699.—Orig. Note.

the only physicians that can cure all the distempers in the public administration: the only patriots that can heal our breaches, and restore to every factious and impoverish'd zealot, what he has a mind to. And in order to it, railing at the ministry is called liberty and property, and freedom of speech, and despising authority is called not fearing the face of men in their country's cause, when their country is no more concerned in their invectives and quarrels against the court, than they would be for their country, if it were in their power to serve it. Let these underminers of the ministry make what pretences they please, self-interest is at the bottom of all their raree-shews for reforming what is amiss, and the truth of the matter is, these gentlemen having their wants to lead, and the devil to drive, they can find no such expedient to supply the former, and please the latter, as by changing the ministry, and thrusting in themselves to accomplish what they aim at; and therefore prosecute the design accordingly with uncommon vigour. See them set round a table, with all their politics about them, affecting as zealous a look as if every man were a Machiavel, and as expert in redressing grievances, and preventing abuses, as Solon or Lycurgus, and now whatever opens their mouths against the government, nothing but the hopes of a place can shut them, and that does it effectually. As a late poet sings,

Attempts to purify the court,
Is damning men of places:
Till decently they send them home,
And get themselves put in their room,
And then they'll change their faces.

'Tis not because some in are bad,
That forms fears and pretences;
But wants of equipage and post,
And supplies at the public cost,
To keep coach and six, and wenches.

The most serious discourses amongst them, and of weightiest matters, at last center in their wants of preferment, and begin where they will, a place is the end of it. And though they may smother their desires and ambitious aims awhile, and appear only public-spirited patriots, yet their vizer at length drops off, and their designs are discovered, they want an office; a lively instance whereof I heard but the other day in a coffee-house, where a diminutive animal, of a late, and from a mean rise, though now arrived to a great estate, being heartily railing against the administration, and sighing out his fears for his dear country and poor England, a gentleman smartly reprimands the fop, tells him his family was once regarded as men in the true interest of the nation; and though his father's chair sliding from under him, the fall had swelled his spleen, turned his brain, and affected his uncle's by sympathy, he was sorry to see the son also discover more weakness and ill-nature in the family, in cursing and reviling the public management, and promoting discontents in the nation. To whom the upstart replied, "I will, and ought to do it, for the court has used me barbarously, and the place I was a candidate for they have given to another." In short, he overvalued himself, by aspiring to the degree of a statesman, and was angry that a fitter man had the preference; and now his disappointment must be called a national grievance and mismanagement. And if you search to the bottom of all our clamours, still the want of a place is the cause of them.

Some of the murmurers, it is true, are modester, or rather subtler, than others; yet all issue at last in the same thing, and though the poison does not break out at the mouth, yet they have their methods too, and slander the administration with their ears

and their looks; and whilst others clacks are running, accent and confirm their calumnies, by tipping the wink, shrugging the shoulders, and shaking the head so dismally, as suggests more crimes against the court than the world ever knew, or arithmetic can number. And if the stream runs against a minister they think their enemy, a familiar nod, or gracious smile from his lordship in mummary, confirms all the slanders which are broached at this cabal, and shall pass them as confidently as if they were mathematical demonstrations, when, peradventure, there is not one true syllable in all the clatter.

Others of this seditious mixture make their wants and necessities the cause of promoting discontents and jealousies, and raffle for preferments and places, for the same reasons that wise men think should utterly debar them; for hungry men ought not to be invited to scanty commons, their debauched, extravagant, and vain expences, having consumed their own estates, there is no reason to trust them with the public purse, or offices that may give them an opportunity of oppressing the subject to supply their necessities, and lengthen their own teathers by defrauding other men of their right of common. I am not insensible, that it is thought a great piece of policy in a prince to make frequent changes in his court, and when some have filled their pockets, to give them leisure to spend it, and oblige others of his subjects with the like advantages. I will not dispute whether this may prove advantageous to the crown; but I am of opinion it is detrimental to the subject, for the same reason that Tiberius gave to his friend, upon asking him that question: "I seldom," says he, "change my governors of provinces, because every new hungry comer racks the people by new exactions, till they have filled their coffers, and then are at quiet." And to this purpose told them, that a poor lazar having his sores covered with flies, which he endeavoured not to drive away from feeding on his flesh; the spectators believing it proceeded from his inability to do it, they went near to do that office for him; but he prayed them to let the flies alone; "for having now glutted themselves with my blood," saith he, "they don't suck so greedily but that I enjoy a little ease; but if you drive them away, fresh flies will light upon my sores, and suck me to death." Which, applied to beggarly pretenders for employments, puts a bar to their importunate solicitations, especially when they take such indirect courses to obtain what they seek for. Men's necessities may be great, but good men's loyalty will surmount their wants, and not put them upon robbing the king of his people's duty and affections, to fill their own bellies; but rather to suffer any thing for his majesty than cause him in the least to suffer by or for them. They have a great deal to answer for, who, by the state craft of pressing for redress of grievances, would amend their own circumstances, by raising hurricanos in the state, and stirring up such commotions as sometimes shatter the constitution, and, as our own memoirs can too sadly inform us, often entirely deface and overturn it. When these dangerous incendiaries first set out to awe the government, what pains do they take to shew themselves disaffected, and hope to get places by arguments of their disloyalty, and run against the court in hopes they will ask their price, and take them off by bestowing preferments upon them. For those methods being successful in former reigns, they revive in this.

King Charles the Second knew their game,
And places gave and pensions;
And had King William's money flown,
His majesty would soon have known
Their consciences dimensions.

¹ Epitome of Josephus, p. 483.—*Orig. Note.*

But he has wisely given them up,
 To work their own desires ;
 And laying arguments aside,
 As things which have in vain been try'd,
 To fastings, want, and prayers.

It is a lewd and unwarrantable step in politics, for seditious intermeddlers to expect to be gratified by profitable employments, for being intolerably vexatious to the government, and by all the sharking ways and means imaginable to place themselves at the helm ; for this cunning is not always crowned with success, but oftentimes the wild pursuers draw down ruinous consequences on their own heads, by attempting to rise by such notorious acts as call their fidelities into question ; for if men can be loyal no longer than they are bribed to their duties by preferments, the king leans on broken reeds, and cannot be secure till he has as many good places in his gift as he has bad and hungry subjects in his kingdom ; and if men would but consider that they have to do with a prince that is not to be hectored out of his favours, they would give over throwing obstacles in the way of their own rising, seeing there is no great feats to be done in this reign by such a fantastical conduct : Whereas the exercise of humility, loyalty, and modesty would melt his heroic soul into such gracious considerations as would put him upon considering how he might be still more beneficial to his people.

The reigning sins, pride, ambition, and atheism, are other grievances that call aloud for redress, and the neglect of suppressing them are to be reckoned among our real mismanagements, and as the cause of the molestations that afflict the state. Envy and obloquy spares nobody ; the most unblemished virtue is not shielded from their darts. 'Tis defined by Cicero, to be grief conceived in the mind at the good which another man enjoys, and that good especially by which the envious man receives no injury ; but they are sick because other men are well ; and the better it is with another, the worse it is with him. When men have consumed their own estates by idle and extravagant expences, they envy those that are grown rich by their industry ; and this makes them curious in enquiring and prying into other men's affairs, that they may find something to lessen them. A temper so far from being Christian, that there's nothing of humility, but much of the devil, in it. Hence it is that the rattling of a courtier's coach frights them out of their senses ; the sight of a fine coat makes them ready to tear their own clothes, though gayer, and puts them into such a heat, that nothing but the promise of a good place can cool their envy, or divert them from declaiming against the court, telling stories of mismanagement, detracting from their merits, and making large additions to their failings ; and if the court oblige them with some fine thing to play withal, their pretended consciencious clamours will submit to their interests, and then the court is the honestest place in Christendom.

Pride and vanity are other ingredients that contribute toward the composition of a malcontent ; for they swell the factions with such good opinions of themselves and their capacities for public employments, that there is a necessity for others to be turned out that they may have an opportunity to shew their rare qualifications : and then the most compendious ways to obtain their wishes are to calumniate the court, and cut down the oaks that the shrubs and underwood may flourish ; when all is but a grand mistake, for neither have the possessors deserved a writ of ease, nor is the intruder qualified either with brain or body for it ; but his pride and vanity screwed up his own price, and represented him of greater value than he was. But some lucky hand being so kind to plum the depth of his understanding, procured his dismissal ; and now, in revenge, king, church, court, city, country must go to wrack, and suffer all the reproaches that the wit and malice of the party can invent.

Haughty and ambitious antimonarchists are the other causes of all the fears and suspicions that are raised in England; for such elevating their minds above their ranks and the end of their institution, and wearing venerable titles, to humour ambitious freaks, some popular maggot or invented danger to withdraw subjects from their allegiance is started; and therefore, if we would not be choused out of our legal settlement before we imbibe their delusions, we had need make sharp enquiries, whether the specious pretences of their reformers don't design to juggle out that universal repose which we have enjoyed under his majesty's government, and therefore are all equally obliged to promote it. Innovations, which self-interested men would introduce into the administration of the kingdom, have sometimes unhinged our regular constitution; but we rarely hear that they have ever corroborated the old, or have enlarged the power of the kingdom or the advantages of the people. History swells with examples which confirm this truth. How unanimously have our laws sentenced all commotions, though gilded with the fairest colours that art could invent. 'Tis attested by the experience of all ages, that the horrible evils which factious innovators, by raising fears and jealousies, have brought in amongst us, have been a greater burthen to us than any other affliction that could have happened. This is, and ever will be, the necessary consequence of such endeavours; for if every sorry pretender of grievances should take a licence to disobey his superiors whensoever he has a mind to deliver himself of a complaint, then farewell society, for no form of government can subsist on these extravagant terms, since every one, hurried by his passions, would never want plausible reasons to ground his plea of resisting authority upon, and by this means our miseries would be endless.

Our laws enjoin us to obey the king as supreme head and governor, and forbid us entering into any engagements, that, by the widest constructions, may seem to clash with our duty. Now such as by an implicit surrender devote themselves to any person or embodied society which are superior to them, if that society have given any signs of disloyalty, or of advancing themselves, the people are in great danger of being stript of their fidelity to their liege lord, when their leaders, who ought to animate the allegiance of the lower orders of men, become themselves the first deserters. 'Tis enough we give men of quality the respect that is due to them, without being so much their vassals as to sell that liberty of ours, of which the king is the only master of. Not that I blame a deference paid to great men, but I would not have their authoritative influence, hand over head, betray us to comply with their criminal passions; 'tis worth the while therefore, first to observe, as I said before, whether these reformers of abuses themselves are loyal and steady in the interest of their sovereign, and whether there is not a snake hidden in the grass; and that, under pretence of rectifying disorders and mismanagements, they have not a crafty design to hook us into a combination that undermines the throne of our prince; for if we get any light that they drive at so black an attempt, we must disdainfully retreat from such perfidious designs, and generously sacrifice every glittering advantage which they cajoled us with to our duty; and whatsoever interest starts up, to cleave inviolably to the king, for as his side is the justest, so the advantages of sticking to it will be the most honourable and satisfactory.

'Tis only the effect of a giddy presumption that spirits on tumultuous subjects to quarrel with the administration of the state, imagining that public affairs would roll more smoothly if themselves were in the ministry, or things were managed by their fanciful schemes; whereas 'tis their duty to submit to the laws, to banish murmuring and stifle opposition, when a conformity to their regulations are required. But if abuses do insinuate into the government, no doubt but we ought to wish they were reformed, but let no man undertake it without a lawful commission, and certain evidence of the facts; for all extrajudicial attempts and sinister ends tend rather to the shaking of the monarchy than amending its defects. And after all that state-menders pretend to in-

changing the ministry, the king is the proper judge of every alteration; and though he should not agree to such demands as carry a fair plausibility of right for their being granted, still ought to acquiesce with confidence, that his non-concurrence is for the real good of his subjects; and though the reasons are behind the curtain to us, they are evident and demonstrative to himself and council. How happy are we then, that have a king that caresses his subjects as his children, and with an indefatigable application propagates the welfare of all under his charge! How dutiful and diligent therefore should all his subjects be in their several stations, who bask under that sunshine to smother the gusts and ill designs of the mixture early, before they become gloomy clouds, big with impending ruin to darken the lustre of royal grace.

Here I had the thoughts of easing my reader from the fatigue I have given him; but I find myself under a necessity of trailing him a little further, before I can dismiss him with entire satisfaction. For having shewed him that there is a design carrying on at several cabals, either utterly to deprive his majesty, or at least to lessen his authority, I must shew him now, that since it could not be done at once, as in the Assassination-Plot, they are now doing it by degrees, and as the wolves would, first rob the sheep of the assistance of their faithful allies, that they might become an easy prey to their devourers; so that the mixture might impose upon the king at pleasure, 'twas resolved at another club, and published by one of their secretaries in a pamphlet,¹ called "An Answer to the Balancing Letter," that,

"To preserve the honour of the government, none or few who have gainful offices should be members of the House of Commons."

Sure the gentlemen of this club are men of great interest and correspondence, and what they transact in their club-room strangely influences other places; for there is scarce a page in the whole libel that has not been the subject of debates and resolutions in more eminent associations, and then no wonder to see things go at this rate, and themselves so mightily concerned for the honour of the nation, which was never further in their thoughts than to make what earnings they could from their pretences of having served the government: for some are well known amongst them, that now rail at all above and below them, that are not of their faction, that have had their hands deeper in the king's pockets, and have received larger shares of his bounty than any men of their quality in England, and yet are so ungrateful that they never afford his majesty one good word, but, upon all occasions, detract from his virtues, eclipse his glory, and by all the power they have lessen his authority; and in this their favourite project, aim at nothing less than, if it were possible, to leave him friendless also, for under that name they would exclude his officers, which are but the late king's politics reversed, and tend to no other purpose but to express their ingratitude.

Every protestant gentleman in England, under such requisite qualifications as the law has established, have a right to be elected members of parliament, and nothing can look with a more arbitrary countenance upon the gentry of England, than a design of this nature; for it takes away their birth-rights, and sinks their honour in the esteem of the nation, as it distinguishes them as men unfit to serve their country, because they have the honour of serving their king. Is this for the honour of the government, to persuade the world, that they that serve the king are not to be trusted in the management of public affairs. What a manifest contradiction is this to common sense, that those which other whiles they call the king's friends, must have a mark set upon them as his greatest enemies: for if they truly love and faithfully serve the king, as I am inclined to think they do, because the mixture hate them, they will offer nothing, but what they apprehend will be of service both to king and country, whose interests can never be divided, but live and die together. To think to serve the king by inju-

¹ Page 7.—*Orig. Note.*

ring the country, is to discrown their master; and to think to oblige the nation, by lessening the king's authority, and impairing his revenue, is to behead the people; their interests, as I said before, are so interwoven together that one cannot suffer, but the other sensibly feels it; and therefore the mixture ought to give the officers some other name, or let them keep their places. Besides, is it for the honour of the government to disfranchise the electors, and ridicule them as ignorant animals, who don't know who are fit to be their representatives in parliament? Is not this arraigning the commons to think an office can corrupt them, and bias them from their duty to their country? What disingenuous reflections are these upon gentlemen, and what heart-burnings will it beget among us? How do they know which way these officers will vote, since some officers vote as constantly against what they call the court-party, as if they held their places by no other tenure; ought not every member to vote as his judgment directs him, without being censured at every drunken club for so doing? And why should the yea's be thought less judicious and conscientious than the no's, or the no's than the yea's? God forbid; for these are but bones of dissension thrown among us to set all at squabbling: and that the seditious may find their own account in fastening crimes on men of honour and worth, they neither know why nor wherefore: Whose jugglings may prove of dangerous consequence to the state, and to those who are over-reached by them.

The design they manage, in endeavouring to exclude all that have offices under the king out of the House of Commons is plain enough; they are afraid the king's and country's affairs should thrive too well, and therefore would have the House of Commons to be like themselves, all of a piece, and wholly against the king and court. I cannot but wonder how they dare make such reflections upon the House of Commons, as to insinuate there are any parties and factions among them, by pretending to distinguish who are for and against the interest of the king. What a liberty of censuring all the rest do they furnish conversation with, when they propose the turning out some particular member, under the supposition that they are in the royal interest, which is unkind to the parliament, and ungrateful to the king: And I am only sorry that I am not wholly at liberty to pursue and improve the results of my own thoughts upon that subject: Though they have partly spared me the labour in contriving their schemes so ill, that they are neither adapted to persuade the wise, nor to deceive the simple; their intrigues, and the slanders by which they manage them, being so open and barefaced, that had an enemy designed to expose their wickedness, he could not have fathered upon them more unlucky instances, than what is covered under this old trick of excluding members, which we hope the Lord's wisdom and goodness will prevent, lest the same club, when their designs are ripe, should think their lordships also dangerous and useless, and propose it as a grievance to be redressed. For what has been done may be done again, and the same cause will produce the same effects to the end of the chapter.

Which is as evident as demonstration can make it, by the next step the mixture took at a cabal held, as I take it, at the Old Devil of St Dunstan's, where to express their ingratitude to the height, and shew what sort of cards were trumps, when their spies and emissaries, and the agents and factors which they keep in all corners of the town, to fetch and carry, to traffic for news, and support the trade of promoting fears and jealousies, had brought in their straggling reports, they came to these unkind resolutions, and ordered them to be engrossed, and printed and published by their former secretary, viz.

“That letting in aliens diminishes the strength of the nation, and therefore the Dutch must be removed out of the kingdom, and a fatal day set for their departure.”

Without doubt the mixture will say these proceedings are for the honour of the government too. To invite strangers to our assistance, and when they have done our work, and contributed to the nation's deliverance from tyranny, and oppression, then to treat them with unkindness and ingratitude; which, as our case stands in expectation of what may happen, is as opposite to the honour and interest of England, as light is from darkness.

Though I've no Lilly in my belly,
This home-spun truth I'll boldly tell ye,
(And may I be no prophet)
If thus we serve our truest friends,
Some nameless sparks may have their ends:
And mischief may come of it.

Nay, those staunch senators I doubt,
Who with a vote French armies rout,
And quarrel who shall win most;
Should Monsieur land, would surely fly,
And turning tail, heroic cry,
The devil take the hindmost.

Certainly the gentlemen of this cabal are very loose in their sentiments, that find those aliens, now so great an eye-sore, that not long since they caressed with the highest expressions of respect, and made such acknowledgments of obligations to them, that they were never able to recompence. Pray, gentlemen, what have they done to merit your displeasure? Wherein have they misbehaved themselves towards you, that all of a sudden they must be shipped off as a dangerous people? How long have you been persuaded that they have diminished the strength of England? Were you of this opinion when they landed in Torbay, and with their swords in their hands, asserted your liberties? Could you have done the nation's work without them? If you could, why did you so earnestly request their assistance, and if you could not, why would you have them used so unkindly? For shame, give over affronting the honour of Englishmen with such ungrateful characters, and making the nation contemptible in the eyes of all the world, for the sake of a few mal-contented clubbers, and the next time you employ your secretaries pens, let it be to better purpose, and enjoin them, for the honour of your club room, to apologize for the slurs they have put upon the nation already.

But the decree of the cabal you see is peremptory. Our Dutch friends must march off, and the reason they give for it is a double one, viz.¹ For every foreigner living in England, say they, we have an Englishman the less. That's strange! Since, if we had not had their assistance, our quota during the war must have been greater, and consequently more Englishmen must have fallen a sacrifice to popery and slavery, than has done, and therefore we have more Englishmen left alive for having had their assistance, than in all probability we could have had, if we had wanted them; but this core against the Dutch lies deeper than every man's aware of; for these very men that proposed packing off the Dutch, not long since were as zealous for promoting a bill of naturalization for all the French: Though the latter nation are our known enemies, and the Dutch our faithful allies, and embarked in the same cause against them. But it seems the mixture knew what monarch protected the abdicated king, whose restoration is a great point among them, though kept behind the curtain; and where the court of St Germain's stood; and therefore were compounded with the two courts, by

¹ Lib. et p. predict.—*Orig. Note.*

shewing kindness to that nation, and sending away the Dutch, who, by interest as well as alliance, were obliged to assist us when occasion served against them both. I could urge a great deal more upon this head, but I know they are upon the fret already, for being touched in the galled place; and being unwilling to scour them more, or meddle with a wasp's nest, I won't attempt to put a statue of brass out of countenance, or hope to convince or silence men of their complexions.

The great reason why the Dutch must troop off, is still to come, and though they were always accounted as his majesty's domestick servants, and have for many years attended his royal person in his progresses, yet not a hoof must be left behind: and to enforce this proposal they draw their unanswerable argument from a hen-roost metaphor, and say,¹ "Strangers are the nest-eggs of a foreign invasion." See how these witty gentlemen tumble in their pretty tropes; rickety heads and arbitrary power, obedient subjects and puppy-dogs, invasions and nest-eggs. Typical, topical, tropical, my red is green. What pleasant sport might a man make with the grave speeches that have been made upon these heads, but I have no time to lose in winnowing chaff, or catching butterflies; and therefore shall proceed to shew how these gentlemen forget themselves, and say and unsay to uphold the great hypothesis of being perfect enemies to his majesty. When a probability of trouble from France was urged as a reason to keep up such a number of troops as might secure the nation from such attempts, then the mixture scoffed such obviating dangers as ridiculous imaginations. Then we hear of nothing but great courage, zeal, fidelity, and unanimosity of the English nation, in case of a French invasion; but when the talk was not about the Dutch staying or going, all those glorious epithets are shrunk into the meanest of spirit, and they shewed the nation in such a cowardly posture, as if they stood all shivering behind the door, for fear of — thousand Dutchmen; or that every one of those nest-eggs should hatch such a brood of shake-bags as would beat all the fighting-cocks in England. Thus are we represented as stout as lions, or as fearful as hares, as will best agree with the designs of the mixture: If the king would have land-forces proportionable to those of our enemies, then there were no need of any other guards than his halberteers; for in case of any invasion every individual man in England would be a soldier; but if it be thought reasonable, civil, and obliging, that the Dutch guards should remain in England, then up start fears and jealousies, and remonstrate such dismal accidents may follow such an act of gratitude as may subject us to a conquest, and make us all slaves to Holland. Did ever men make such wretched pretences? 'Tis a sad symptom that ill designs are brewing, when such positive people are driven to such sceptical and doubtful innuendo's, and are forced to take sanctuary in naked may-be's, and thwart and affront his majesty upon every trifling suggestion, arising from the principles of disloyalty; so that nothing must be done for him out of respect to his person, or the mighty deliverance he atchieved, till all demands of the cabals, how unreasonable soever, shall first be fully satisfied. But why should we wonder? 'tis natural for this mixture to be displeased with the grandeur and prosperity of the court. The height of the king's felicity frets their proud and envious minds, and they are never so apt to spy dangers, and complain of the badness of the times, as when the government is like to be most flourishing. They are incurable malcontents, and in dread of an arbitrary power, which they say they have no reason to suspect, yet are making encroachments upon the royal authority, and lying at catch for all advantages, and husbanding all opportunities to abate the sovereign prerogative, and to keep the monarchy low, by removing his friends, impoverishing his revenue, and being imperious and inexorable in their impositions; as may be easily read in their resolve to expel the Dutch, viz.² "That a fatal day be set for their departure."

¹ Page 23.

² Pamphl. predict, p. 23.—*Orig. Notes.*

And why a fatal day? They could not mean it to the Dutch guards, for they were but going home from whence they came to our succour; and therefore must mean it in respect of us, that it would be fatal when we want friends to be refused their assistance. They were pleased to call the Dutch a dead weight upon the nation, and I wish all others that are so had bore them company; and then, as we have fewer enemies, by being well rid of the latter, and so the balance would be equal. The libel has yet some fragments of history to give it a greater currency among the seditious intermeddlers; but being nothing to their purpose, I shall not reckon it so much to mine as to answer them; for since my whole design was only to expose these lewd scribblers, I hope I have done it to your content; and this affair being now amicably determined by the king and his parliaments, nothing more ought to be added but what I shall ever contend for, viz. a dutiful obedience to our superiors.

I have now shewed you the reigning evils of our present times; give me leave to acquaint you by what ways and means they are raised and continued to breed disturbances, and then I shall dismiss my reader.

The spring and progress of all our causeless fears and jealousies, and the unhappy consequences that have attended them, are owing to the more than ordinary industry of seditious men's trafficking for news, and employing a sort of idle peddling people to range up and down in quest of fresh intelligence, who importune all they meet to contribute to the stock of slandering the government; and if they chance to meet any of their associates upon the frontiers of their respective walks, they frankly impart what they have gained to each other, as beggars do their fragments: and seditious clubs are the common places of rendezvous, where they all unload, and every particular member partakes of the joint collections of the whole society, where a sullen grandee of the mixture will give a guinea for a tale that humours his designs, that will not part with half-a-crown to pay his just debt; and by this means all reports fly abroad with such winged speed as may flush the party to blazon them in all quarters of the town and country. And if they get a story by the end that looks a little a-squint upon the court, and yet is not in itself full enough of remark and wonder, the club vamps it with new circumstances of their own, alter, improve, and refine it, till they have made it foul enough to blacken the ministry. To this end they vouch it with grave nod and solemn face; they will talk shrewdly, and descant upon it with a thousand pretty conjectures; they will whisper in your ear some subtle and notable observation of circumstances; and with wise and politick forehead will suspect impossible plots upon the people's liberties; foresee unthought-of designs in the court to that purpose, and foretell strange and prodigious events that must necessarily follow; till by these and the like arts they make every false report able to walk alone, without the help of leading-strings, and maintain itself upon its own credit and reputation, till the public voice confirms it, and then you cannot for shame be so uncivil to demur upon the credibility of the brute, when it has received such an authoritative sanction. And yet if you would trace these streams to their fountain, you might as well seek the head of Nilus, which, though it falls with a mighty torrent, and overflows Egypt with its swelling streams, you must at last derive its original, as some of the ancients have done, from the mountains in the moon. So if a man would search for the authors of these malicious, but fabulous relations, he shall be sure to have them fathered upon some very credible persons without names, who had them from John-a-Nokes, who had it from John-a-Stiles, who had it from nobody. And if you will observe and examine all reports that bear the stamp of the intermixture, as Chrysippus did the oracular lies of Apollo, you will find, as he did, not one in five hundred that are not apparently forged and counterfeit; and therefore I shall take my leave of them in the words of a late poet:

"For shame, give o'er these senseless lies,
The very mob sees the disguise
Of your dull shams and fears;
In vain you employ them as a blind,
While we perceive you have a mind
To set us by the ears.

"Britain, which does to Cæsar own
Her liberty, is wiser grown,
Then these stale arts give o'er;
We know your wry, distorted faces
Are nought but tricks to get you places,
And won't be bubbled more.

"While Cæsar does the throne sustain,
You rail at monarchy in vain,
And idly think to rump it;
Though faction common good pretends,
To serve their undermining ends,
We'll cart their common strumpet."

A careful shunning of impostors and make-bates, and leaving them in the clouds they have raised, is therefore the duty of every good subject, lest, assisting the seditious in their vexatious contrivances against the government, you dash upon the rocks of offence, and ruin your present pretensions and future hopes. To avoid those dangers, study to be quiet; continue your allegiance to the king; be obedient to your equals, and civil to all men. The practice of these virtues will procure you friends, and imprint a belief in authority that you deserve their favour; it would be the best security of our privileges, of public good, and steady government. For there is in every virtuous and heroic soul such a sense of his subjects love and duty, that 'twould be an affront to the ingenuity of human nature to suppose that a prince can be severe upon a willing and obedient people.

A Letter directed to the Right Honourable the Earl of Perth, Governor to the Prince.
1700.

Die Lunæ, 17 Februarii, [O. S.] 1700.

This letter, which is passed over in silence by Bishop Burnet and other historians, was intercepted in the French mail of 19th February, N. S. and was instantly communicated to the House of Lords, and made public in order to excite a spirit of national defence and animosity to the French. It was fortunate for the court that they had such a counter-balance to oppose against the fears and jealousies which had been generally excited by the Barrier Treaty.

UPON reading this day a letter communicated to the house by his majesty's command, dated 18th February, 1701, and directed, To the Right Honourable the Earl of Perth, Governor to the Prince, These, It is ordered by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the Lord-Keeper of the Great Seal of England do give order that the said letter be forthwith printed and published.

MATTHEW JOHNSON, *Cleric' Parliamentor'*

Friday, 18th of February, 1701.

My Dst. Br.

Since I promised to put in writing what we had not time to talk fully of, I am set down to it in the morning, that my letter may be ready for the messenger, if any call.

I told you all that I had heard at Versailles, and the favourable audience I had of Madam de Maintenon, for which I beg it of you to return my most humble thanks to the queen, and beg of her to be so good as to thank Madam de Maintenon, and know from her what can be done in that matter. It will be a great charity in the queen.

I told you, amongst other things, the great fleet the king intends to put out this summer, the orders being given, and the money ready, the stores full, and every one concerned active in their stations. There is no doubt but this fleet will be master of the sea for some time, if not for all the summer, because the Dutch dare not stir till the English be ready, and they have long debates yet before they can be in a condition to act, if they have the will; and it is a question if they will have it at all.

The king never had so favourable a conjuncture, if he can persuade this king that his affairs are really in the circumstances they are in; but there is the difficulty.

The king and queen have more authority with the king, and with Madam de Maintenon, than any other in the world can have; but that's not all, there should be some one acceptable to the ministers, who should lay before them these proofs, their majesties cannot enter into the detail of, and explain the reasons, make plans and memoirs by their majesties approbation, to convince them of the necessity, and to shew the easiness of restoring the king, the glory it brings to their king, and the advantage to religion.

How this will be done their majesties are wise enough to consider, and I think it is not a subject fit for me to enter upon; but their friends in general, who know not the half of what I know in this matter, think that it will not be well done by a protestant minister, lazy in his temper, enemy to France by his inclination, tainted with commonwealth principles, and against the king's returning by any other power than that of the people of England, upon capitulation and terms, who is suspected of giving aim to the compounders, if not worse.

That Mr Carrell is qualified no man doubts, but in society with the other, these who must be instrumental will not trust him as he ought; so that so long as the other is within distance of penetrating the affairs, they will never think themselves secure.

And yet the king has no such game to play as by these very persons, who are thus diffident, namely, the true church of England party, the catholics, and the Earl of Arran; and I shall say something as to every one of them. The king cannot but be sensible that the true church of England party, and their principal head, now the Bishop of Norwich, has been silent of a long time, and their majesties may remember what weight the court of France laid upon their joining the king, (I mean the non-swearing clergy) in case of a landing.

Therefore all arts should be tried without delay, to get them to enter into correspondence again, and every impediment ought to be removed, I say, without exception; and though sometimes it is of hard digestion for sovereigns who ought to be obeyed without reserve, to yield to the humours of subjects, yet prudence should teach them, when

they cannot, without hurting their affairs, do what they would, to do what they can; and remember the fable of the dog, who lost the substance for the shadow.

Assurances from the non-swearers, the soundest and venerablest part of the English church, would be of great use at this time, to persuade France to undertake this great affair; for besides their own example at a landing, and their preaching and writing to the people, that their religion was in no danger, it is most certain they know better than any others can, what the church of England in general would do for the king's service, and they being to run all the hazard, would be better believed at the court of France than any other, as I found by experience.

As to the catholics and others associate with them, unfortunately for the king, they were thought to have too much inclination for me, and so have been reckoned as useless to the king; but I must beg leave to say, that undertaking was the best feather in his wing, and was most justly thought so by him, and by the court of France too, even to that degree, they pretended if this and the other article concerning the clergy could be made appear, they would concur with the king to invade England. They consisted of seven regiments of horse and dragoons; their arms, trumpets, kettle-drums, standards, &c. were all ready, and are yet in surety; their men were all listed, and their officers chosen, and they had twenty horses to a troop, which troops lying at a distance in a horse-country, twenty horses would soon have mounted the rest.

Those who could not divine the greatness and the use of the undertaking, blamed the rashness of it; and even some churchmen have not been disapproved for endeavouring undutifully (because contrary to the king's written orders) to break the design; but I desire you now, for all this, to believe, that you have not such another argument to use to the court of France as this; and if you could make it appear, as it might have been done some years ago, I should have very good hopes of this summer's work. Nay, let the king have what other hopes, or even promises, you please from the court of France, this is to be encouraged, and, if possible, to be put in the circumstances it was in; for if ever there be a landing in England to purpose, it must be before they can be armed, and they cannot be armed before the parliament come to a resolution concerning the war; and, considering the few troops in England, suppose these men to be no better than militia, what a diversion would it be?

It is not necessary for me to say any more of this article, till I know whether their majesties have as good an opinion of this undertaking as I have. If so, I shall shew what I think to be done in it; if otherwise, I shall save the pains.

As to the Earl of Arran, it would be of great use to have an understanding with him. He will have none where ——— can pry; his all is at stake, and he ought to be wary with whom he ventures to deal.

I think it better for the king's service, that the court-party prevailed in the manner they have done in the parliament of Scotland, than that the country-party should have got their will. Opposition swells the waters to a flood, and so long as the country-party is not discouraged, they gain more ground in the kingdom than they lose in government. So that the disaffection to the government will increase; and one may judge of the nation in general, which is of another temper than this pretended parliament, or rather presbyterian rabble, ill representing the nation. For since even in it there is such a struggle against the government, what would there be in a free parliament, which the P. of O. durst never hazard to call?

The nation then, at least a great part of it, being disaffected to this government, it is of the last consequence that E. Arran may know what to do in case of an invasion of England, or in case he and his friends be obliged, for self-preservation, to rise in their own defence.

The army, who are, and ever were, well-affected, are to be gained by money; and a little goes a great way with them.

The disbanded troops would be engaged, and the officers are well-inclined.

The places of strength would be secured; and such as can be put in defence (without expences) fortified.

To do all this, at least such a part of them as can be begun with, a small sum will serve, and he ought to have hopes of it, and of the command.

These being only heads to be discoursed of, and much to be said of every part, it is not to be thought that this letter can carry a final conclusion; for it may be upon discourse, I might change my mind, or be more confirmed in, and see further.

This makes me insist again to you, upon two things, as appearing to me absolutely necessary to put things upon a right foot.

The first is the removing of all impediments out of the way, and sending all suspected persons to Champain or Burgundy, according to their goust.

And the second is of the last use, both to their majesties and the prince, which is the establishing of such a number, under no qualification, to talk of their affairs in their majesty's presence, with whom we can freely converse and propose what may be for their majesties service.

As for the first, it will be for the king's reputation, both at the court of Rome, France, and with all his true friends in England, for many reasons——

As for the second, it is according to scripture, "In the multitude of counsellors there is safety."

Nothing is so dangerous as first to determine what one will do, and then hear reasons against it, and imitate the deaf adder, who harkens not to the voice of the charmer, let him charm never so sweetly. Reasons against a resolution taken, offend, and the more force they have, they offend the more; whilst before the resolution be taken, reason has its effect, and the determinations are not the effects of humour and faction, but of prudence and justice.

If in any thing I fail, I'll swear it's want of understanding, and not of will. And I beg that their majesties may be persuaded, that it is not humour nor vanity, but their service, I have in my view, who am,

My dst. br.

Most humbly yours.

There are no letters from England; I expect and am promised——

I forgot to tell you, that the conjuncture ought to be improven so long as the court of France have the ill opinion of the Pr. of Orange's treachery, discovered lately in their hands.

Superscription.

For the Right Honourable the
Earl of Perth, Governor to
the Prince,

These.

An Essay upon the present Interest of England. By George Stepney, Esq. 1701. To which are added, the Proceedings of the House of Commons in 1677, upon the French King's Progress in Flanders.

Nulla est acerbitas, quæ non omnibus hæc orbis terrarum perturbatione, impendere videatur.—Cic. Epist. Famil.

“ George Stepney, Esq. of the family of Pendergast, in Pembrokeshire, was son of Sir Thomas Stepney, Kt. His father resided in Westminster, where Mr Stepney was born in 1663. Fortunately for him he received his education at that place, where a mutual regard commenced between him and Charles Montague, Esq.; indeed they were inseparables both there and at Trinity College in Cambridge. The latter, after various state employments, rose to be Earl of Halifax, and had equally with his friend a taste for letters. Montague, viewing Stepney with partiality, determined to graft upon the writer of some very indifferent poetry the diplomatic character. Stepney had compared James II., on his accession, to Hercules; but the two friends deserted the cause of James II. when William came over, and enlisted under his banner, where they made a considerable figure. This minor poet was sent in a public capacity to the courts of the Emperor of Germany, the King of Poland, and the Electors of Saxony, Mentz, Treves, Cologne, Palatine, and Brandenburg; the Landgrave of Hesse; the Congress at Frankfort; and the States of Holland. These negotiations employed his time from 1692 to 1706; but he had been appointed a lord of trade in 1697. There can be little doubt he would have been a serviceable subject, having been so much employed, had he lived longer, but he died at Chelsea in 1707, aged 34. The poems he published are now little known, and less read. As a statesman he seems to have had great powers, and was an amiable and accomplished gentleman. Mr Stepney was buried in Westminster Abbey, where there is a monument to his memory. The same zeal which friendship shewed him living has portrayed his character on the marble, with an attention to dates so numerous and minute as to overlay the inscription, and confound rather than inform the reader.”—NOBLE, I. 175.

THE peace of Riswick had scarce composed the differences of Christendom; when the King of Spain's sickness, who is at length dead without issue, alarmed it afresh. The uncertainty of who should succeed to the vast dominions he was master of, some of which furnish all this part of the world with gold and silver, could not but give great concern to all his neighbouring states and princes. The known competitors for this great inheritance were the present emperor, the dauphin, and the Prince Electoral of Bavaria. The former is by all owned to be the next heir male of the house of Austria, which has reigned in Spain near two ages, and would be allowed, even by the French, to have an unquestionable title, if the salique law, which excludes females from the government, were of force in Spain as it is in France. But that wise constitution in the French government prevails not amongst its neighbours, who will blindly persevere to give France the same advantage over them, which the church enjoys over the laity in popish countries, viz. that it may ever be acquiring, and can never alienate. The defect of it in Spain, will, I fear, cost Christendom very dear at this conjuncture, since it opens a door to the French pretensions; it being well known that the dauphin's

claim was by his mother, who was daughter to Philip IV., sister to the deceased king, and married to the present King of France immediately after the Pyrenean treaty; by which treaty, most solemnly sworn to by both kings, the Spaniards thought they had sufficiently secured themselves from the French domination; and indeed so they had, if oaths or treaties, hitherto accounted the most sacred ties that God could enjoin, or mankind could devise, were of any force. For 'tis notorious, that Lewis XIV. and his queen did, upon their marriage, in the most solemn manner, renounce all pretensions that might accrue by it to them and their children upon the Spanish dominions. And 'tis as notorious that the same Lewis XIV. did, within these two years, order the Count d'Harcourt, his ambassador at Madrid, to assert the right of his son the dauphin to the Spanish succession. The occasion for his so doing was, that the King of Spain had made a will, declaring the Prince Electoral of Bavaria, the third pretender I mentioned, successor to the whole monarchy. The French ambassador obeyed his orders, and gave in a memorial, complaining of it as an injustice done to the dauphin, whom he asserted to have an undoubted right to succeed to that crown. The memorial I mention the rather, because it shews what a deference his most Christian majesty had at that time for the King of Spain's will. The young prince died soon after, which put a stop to the French instances, otherwise the peace of Europe might have been disturbed before the Spanish throne had been vacant. His death left the competition between the houses of Austria and Bourbon, and all the potentates of Christendom full of care for this great decision. The boundless ambition of the French king, who has been long observed to aim at universal monarchy, gave the world reason to fear that he would attempt the union of both monarchies, which, if compassed, would make it very easy to execute the remaining part of his vast projects. His power, so lately felt in a ten years war, waged against a confederacy of the most powerful states of Europe, made it evident that the emperor alone would not be able to defeat his enterprise, especially if we consider the advantages the situation of France gives him over his competitor, whose territories are not immediately contiguous to any part of the Spanish dominions, whereas France is not only contiguous to Spain, but separates it from the rest of the world, with no part of which, except Portugal, it can have any commerce otherwise than by sea; but the emperor has not a seaport, nor a ship in the world, and must, therefore, be beholden to others whenever he will attempt any thing upon Spain. Those others could be only the English or Dutch, they alone being able to cope with France at sea; so those two nations seemed to be under a necessary dilemma whenever the King of Spain should die, either to sit still and see the French quietly take possession of Spain and the West Indies, or to renew an expensive and hazardous war; unless some expedient were found out before the case happened, to satisfy the pretenders in such a manner as should be least prejudicial to ours and the Dutch interest. Such an expedient the treaty of partition was thought to be, and, as such, agreed to by France, the King of England, and the Dutch. The advantages which redounded to the French by the treaty, which annexed to their crown the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, with the provinces of Lorrain and Guipuscoa, besides some seaport towns in Italy, made it reasonable to believe they would have stuck to it rather than have ventured to draw on themselves another general war.

The king, who had the interest of England and Holland to manage on this occasion, was unwilling to engage 'em in a new war, which they would have been neither overwilling or able to sustain, if the King of Spain had died soon after the peace; and, therefore, thought it most adviseable to yield up to France such provinces of the Spanish dominion as would be least prejudicial to these nations. And such, 'tis evident, those above-named are, which if any one doubt, let him but consider whether the single town of Cadiz in French hands would not prove more destructive to us than all we have named, to say nothing of Flanders or the West Indies; all which, with the body

of Spain, could have been secured to the house of Austria no other way than by a war, or such a treaty.

I am not ignorant that many objections have been made against it; to answer all which were a proper task for one thoroughly acquainted with all the steps and transactions of that negociation, which I profess I am not, and I shall therefore, in vindication of it, only repeat, that it was designed and calculated purely to preserve the peace of these countries; which single argument ought surely to reconcile to it all those who were weary of the last war, who complained of the heavy taxes it occasioned, and of the great debt it hath left the nation loaded with, and who, out of their great tenderness to England, opposing all such equal and easy methods of raising money as would have kept us out of debt, took care the war should be felt, lest, said they, the king, whose ambition and delight was to head armies, might, by the ease he should find in paying them, be tempted to perpetuate the war.

If then the necessity of our affairs, flowing from the mistaken measures they took in furnishing supplies to his majesty upon land-banks, and other deficient funds, forced him to make a peace, which by this treaty he has endeavoured to perpetuate, will they find faults, and complain of the moderation of a prince, who has done violence to his own martial inclinations for the ease of his people? Or are the gentlemen I speak of on a sudden become such champions for the honour of England, and the interest of Europe, as to object that the continuation of a peace should not have been purchased at so inglorious a rate, as by giving up to France, Naples, Sicily, &c. whereby the balance of Europe would be greatly endangered, which 'tis our chief interest to support? If so, I heartily congratulate with them their new magnanimous resolutions, which they may soon have an occasion to exert, the treaty of partition being now quite out of doors; and the balance of Europe in far greater danger by the Duke of Anjou's accession to the crown of Spain.

But 'tis objected, that the danger we are now in is a consequence of the treaty, which compelled the King of Spain to make a will in favour of France. Now, granting this to be true, I appeal to any reasonable man, whether he ought from thence to infer, that we should sit still and suffer France quietly to reap the fruit of its perfidiousness. Does not experience teach us, that measures concerted with the greatest prudence, at least with the best intentions, do often fail of success? Or shall the falsehood of our enemies, which has defeated the end of a well-meant treaty, furnish us with an argument to neglect our own safety? I hope no Englishman will reason so extravagantly, nor be so blind, as to revenge upon himself and his country a supposed mismanagement of the court; were it not far better, if on all sides, waving an invidious retrospection of past miscarriages, we consulted with as much unanimity as our common danger requires, what measures are to be taken for our future security?

That we are in the greatest danger of losing our trade, our liberty, and our religion, will hardly be denied by any man who will seriously reflect on the consequences likely to attend the present union of France and Spain, unless he can suppose the French king's ambition satiated with this great success; and that as his power to do mischief shall increase, his ill will to us, and his hatred to our religion, shall be lessened. Or will it be said, to remove our fears, that he shall have no influence on the Spanish counsels; that the interest of France and Spain will remain distinct; and that the new king, forgetting his country, his obligations to his grandfather, nay, and his own interest, (for kings and their people may sometimes have different interests,) shall become a perfect Spaniard, and cultivate the old alliances of his crown? Will the examples of the dukes of Burgundy formerly, and of the dukes of Holstein, who proved the most bitter enemies to the houses of France and Denmark, of which they were descended, be alleged as proofs that brothers and kinsmen, when princes, do not agree better than mere strangers. This argument, I own, may be of force to prove that hereafter the

French and Spanish branches of the house of Bourbon, if they continue separated, may have quarrels and bloody wars. Nay, 'tis very likely that the descendants of the Duke of Burgundy (if he have any,) may, after their grandfather's example, protest against the validity of his renunciation to the Duke of Anjou: But 'tis our misfortune that ten years good agreement between the grandfather and grandson may do our business, and that the differences which may fall out afterwards between the two branches of the house of Bourbon will come too late to retrieve our lost religion and liberty.

It behoves us, therefore, chiefly to take care for the present, and to consider whether it be not most likely that nature and education, backed with the strongest ties imaginable of gratitude to a grandfather, who has not stuck at violating two most solemn treaties,¹ and hazarding a war, which may prove the ruin of his own country, and to a father who has renounced his own right to aggrandise this new king, will not incline him to have the utmost deference for his benefactors. Or should we suppose him so very a king as not to be acted by any principles of nature or gratitude, we must believe him also very blind to his own interest if he does not see that he will for a considerable time stand in need of his grandfather's aid and protection, to secure both himself and his new dominion against foreign enemies, and those intestine disturbances which generally attend changes of government in all countries. The fear of the French arms induced the late king's council to dictate a will in favour of a Frenchman, and has compelled the Spaniards to acquiesce in it, and so consequently gives to the Duke of Anjou's title all the strength it has: Let that fear be once removed, and 'twill be impossible for him to defend Milan and Flanders against the emperor, or even the body of Spain, in the condition 'tis now against the Portuguese.

Which makes it evident that he cannot depart from the protection of France without pulling on himself manifest ruin: And the continuation of that protection he will certainly enjoy no longer than while he deserves it, by the most absolute compliance with the directions he shall receive from thence. If he prove an undutiful child, and be refractory, will it not furnish the dauphin with a pretence to assert his own title, and invade Spain with the whole power of France, while the emperor endeavours to lop off some limb?

Would he not, besides, cut himself off from all hopes of succeeding to the crown of France, the prospect of which is not so remote as not to deserve his consideration. The Duke of Burgundy has no children, and 'tis generally thought in France that he will have none; till he have a son, I am sure 'tis the present King of Spain's interest to be a Frenchman, and most dutiful to his grandfather and father, especially since kings are allowed to have a power of disposing of their crowns by will; and, consequently, that upon any disgust given his parents, his youngest brother, the Duke of Berry, might be declared heir to the crown of France to his prejudice, as he has been to that of Spain to his father's and elder brother's.

It would be a wrong offered to the judgment of any impartial reader, if I should further insist on this argument, which but too plainly at first sight evinces the truth of what I would assert, to wit, That the Duke of Anjou will enjoy a kingship for some time purely titular, and be in effect no more than a crowned viceroy to his grandfather.

Yet if any man require a stronger proof of what I here advance, I send him to the French king for conviction: His preference of the will to the treaty of partition resolves the question. For since 'tis well known that the strongest lust of old tyrants is to extend their despotick empire, and that, notwithstanding he has disdained to accept of kingdoms, which, by adhering to the treaty, he might have annexed to his crown, can we suppose that he had less prospect in view than at present to govern the

¹ Pyrenees, and that of Partition.—*Orig. Note.*

whole monarchy of Spain, and of taking such measures as shall hereafter annex that empire to his own, or at least the most considerable members of it?

Now if it be granted that he has obtained that end, as it must necessarily be if England, by acquiescing to the will, abandons her allies, and suffers the new domination of France to take root, let us impartially consider whether, after such an accession of power to a prince, already too formidable, the loss of our religion, liberty, and trade, (as I have already said,) does not seem inevitable.

That it is the interest and desire of the French to destroy both the Dutch and us will easily be allowed, since 'tis we who for a long time have checked their pride and disappointed their ambitious designs. Our maritime power is terrible to her, nor will she readily forget the affront received at La Hogue; besides that king's affectation to be the champion of popery, and his usage of our protestant brethren in his dominions, tell us sufficiently what we are to expect from him.

The same superstitious principle will not fail to make the Spaniards concur cheerfully with any measures he shall propose to ruin our trade, which, being the great source of our wealth, is consequently the greatest support to the protestant religion, so much abhorred by them. And what opportunities they have of doing it, is but too obvious to any man that knows what a vast coast they possess in both worlds; to say nothing of the Streights-mouth, which, with the help of a French fleet, they command absolutely.

Nor is there any thing to hinder the French from monopolizing the wool of Spain, which would at once destroy our fine drapery, which perhaps is the only considerable manufacture in which we have no dangerous rival. What proportion this part of it bears to the whole I cannot determine, but certainly it is very considerable; since, besides the vast quantities of it exported to Turkey and Persia, we vent considerably of it every year to Hambourg, Holland, &c. whereas we shall then be obliged to supply ourselves with it from France for our own consumption.

Besides, can we doubt that whenever the French shall desire it, the Spaniards will clog our trade to Spain with such exorbitant duties, and give us such other trouble and vexations, that we shall be obliged to quit that gainful commerce, which will be engrossed by France, where all the money that comes from America will then centre, in return for the linen and woollen manufactures it will be able to supply their Indies and Spain withal. What if, besides these advantages, all the French subjects shall be naturalized Spaniards, and, as such, have liberty to trade freely from France to the West Indies? Is it not evident that this single privilege will enable them to under-sell us, though we should be allowed to trade on our old foot to Cadiz, and that consequently 'twill carry all the treasure of the new world to France? Or can we promise ourselves the continuance of that most beneficial trade carried on of late years by connivance from Jamaica, directly to the continent of their America? Can we, I say, promise ourselves any indulgencies of that kind from the Frenchified Spaniards, who will be governors in all their ports?

I might dwell much longer on this subject, but after what has been hinted, I appeal to any reasonable man, whether 'twill not be in the power of the French king to impoverish us more by a ten years peace, as things now stand, than 'tis probable a war of the same continuance would do?

When this mischief is felt, 'twill be in vain for us to repent our mistaken measures, in having preferred an ignominious and destructive peace to a war, which might have been made with advantage, safety, and glory. And if we shall then attempt a war against an enemy, whose wealth will be increased in the same, or a greater proportion than both ours, and the Dutch will be lessened, 'twill be too late, since we shall be destitute of those allies we first deserted, and shall have suffered such a diminution of our power at home, that 'twill then be madness to provoke an enemy so much above our

strength. But there is no fear of our being guilty of such rashness ; we shall then have learned humbler thoughts, and think ourselves happy if that invincible monarch will allow us peaceably to enjoy the product of our own island. But even that will in all probability be denied us, and the continuance of that inglorious peace, which many are now so fond of, must be purchased at the expence of our religion and liberty.

The abdicated prince will be imposed upon us, and, if we are stubborn, we shall be used as traitors to God and our lawful king.

That the French king will attempt to re-establish that family will easily be agreed to, if we consider that nothing can be imagined so agreeable to his interest, his resentment, his ambition, and his blind zeal for popery. To his interest, by humbling a free and powerful state, the liberty and flourishing condition of which must be great eyesores to a tyrant who would have all people as miserable as his own subjects, that they may more easily endure their slavery ; to his resentment and interest, by revenging himself upon those who have proved the main obstacle to his long-courted universal monarchy, and who, till they shall be humbled, will continue to be so. His ambition, 'tis well known, was never since his reign so foiled as by his forced compliance to own our present king, after a ten years war to support King James, whose interest he had so often publicly declared he would never abandon. And 'tis now the common discourse in France, that nothing is wanting to complete the glory of Lewis the Great, and to raise his name above Charlemaign's, but the re-establishment of the King of England.

When, therefore, to these considerations we add, that instigations will not be wanting from Rome to prosecute so pious and religious a work as the reduction of England to the catholick faith, (for that wise court will not only find its interest by our conversion, but will secure the peace of Italy, which is its great aim, by procuring such a diversion of the French arms,) when (I say) we consider all these matters seriously, we must be very scepticks if we can doubt that such a design will be set on foot as soon as there shall be a prospect of its being carried on successfully ; that if as soon as we, by acknowledging the new king of Spain, and by refusing to assist the emperor in his just pretensions to that monarchy, shall have forced both him and the Dutch to make the best terms with France for themselves, which, in their forsaken condition, they can obtain. From that day will cease the confidence so necessary to be kept up between us and our old confederates, and we shall stand upon our single bottom, exposed to the joint attempts of France, Spain, and Flanders, nay, perhaps of Holland too, if we, by deserting them at this time, shall either expose them to be conquered, or drive them to a necessity of securing themselves from that ruin, by throwing themselves into the protection of France. I ask any reasonable man, whether it is probable that in such a condition we can be thought able to withstand their joint attempts, divided as we are at home, and not so secure of the affections of Scotland and Ireland as were to be wished ?

So that in our present case I do not take the question to be, Whether we shall have war or peace ? but, Whether we shall, with a good grace, begin a just and honourable war, with the assistance of powerful allies, or by declining it shamefully at present, be forced in a short time, for our own defence, to make it with the utmost disadvantage ? Every honest Englishman will readily answer this question when so stated, and conclude for war.

If it be objected that the question is not fairly stated, one of these three things must be urged against the foregoing argument ; either that France and Spain will not attack us, nor endeavour to re-establish King James and popery :

Or, secondly, that if they should jointly attempt it, England alone would be able to defend itself against them :

Or, lastly, that though they should attack us, we shall find confederates able and willing to assist us.

As to the first objection, viz. That France and Spain will not attempt us, I think enough has already been said to prove, that it is the interest and desire of France; it remains, therefore, only to consider whether it be not most probable that Spain will concur to an undertaking so meritorious, according to the bigotted principles of that people, whose blind zeal will, on such an occasion, be roused and animated by all their priests, and other emissaries of the court of Rome: Besides, let any man reasonably shew how their present king and ministry can deny to France this, or much more, if required. It is by France, as we have already observed, that the Duke of Anjou must reign, his ministry be supported, and their monarchy be protected, all which will make their dependence so absolute upon that crown, that they dare refuse nothing; but 'tis needless, by argument, to confirm matter of fact; they have already outrun our fears and jealousies, nay, even the desires and hopes of the French king, who has not at this time in France vassals more servilely devoted to him, than the Spanish council has shewn itself to be by its late precipitate measures.

The Spaniards will moreover, by so doing, satisfy their resentment conceived against us for having presumed to divide their monarchy; for with what disdain and indignation they received the Treaty of Partition is apparent from the measures they have taken to elude the effect of it, since, to preserve their monarchy entire, they have received a king from France, and thrown themselves into the protection of the hereditary enemy of their monarchy and nation.

I pass now to consider the second objection, which I heartily wish could be made good, viz. That England alone will be able to defend itself against the united force of France, Spain, &c.

I have as honourable an opinion of my country as any man, and do truly believe, that if by an absolute composure of our intestine jealousies and divisions, these nations were put in a condition to exert their full strength, they might give work enough to whatever power should dare to invade them. But since such an union and mutual confidence is rather to be wished for than be depended on, and since we are wrangling and disputing in whose hands 'tis safest to trust our arms, and are only agreed in this, to have neither a standing force nor a well-regulated militia, we can hardly be thought to be in a good posture of defence. I would not here be mistaken, or thought to be arguing for a standing army; on the contrary, I know that in many ancient governments the whole body of the people was so trained and disciplined, as to answer all the ends of the best disciplined army; and 'twere to be wished that the people of England had virtue enough to put themselves on the like foot, and that our nobility and gentry, remitting something of their present ease and slothful luxury, would vouchsafe first to be taught themselves martial discipline, and afterwards, with a generous emulation, would instruct others. If such a spirit were once seen amongst them, the people would readily follow their example, and it would in a little time be thought no hardship, nor any way inconsistent with the liberty of the subject, if every man were obliged to spend two or three years of his youth in qualifying himself to defend his country; the sword being thus in the hands of the people, could never be employed to their disadvantage, and the nation would be secure from all foreign attempts, since no enemy would prove so adventurous as to attack so populous a country as England, where every man would be a soldier. But till some such method be taken, I do not think 'tis reflecting upon my country to say, that we should be hardly put to it to defend ourselves by our present militia against so formidable an enemy as we shall have to deal with. I ask them, if any prudent man would chuse to hazard all that is dear to him upon dubious events, when 'tis in our power, by a timely resolution, to prevent our enemies, and make their countries the seat of a war, which must otherwise be brought into England.

Or granting that we should, upon such an emergency, defend ourselves with so much

unanimity, valour, and good fortune, as to repel their first assault, what will become of us when our trade is lost? Or will our fleets avail us aught, when all the ports between Ostend and Sicily shall be shut against them? For 'tis certain, that in such a conjuncture, neither Portugal, nor the little Italian princes, will dare to receive our fleets, when every ship that would pass the Straights must either fight its way, or pay toll, and when our West India navigations will be rendered extremely dangerous by the number of men-of-war and privateers, which our enemies will be able to maintain along the vast continent they are masters of in America; when, I say, the sinews of war will be cut off by such a diminution, if not a total loss of our trade, must not our maritime power fall of course, and our island, by consequence, grow every day more defenceless, and exposed to fresh attempts? Let us then look about and see what assistance we shall find abroad in our distress.

This leads me to the third objection I proposed to consider, viz. That though England shall acknowledge the new king of Spain, and refuse to assist the emperor in his pretensions to that crown, we shall, notwithstanding, find confederates to assist us, whenever France and Spain shall endeavour to force King James and popery upon us: the contrary of which I fear will be too easy to be proved.

War being in itself an evil, and no ways desirable for its own sake, 'twill easily be granted, that no wise state or considerate prince will engage in it, but with a prospect of shunning some greater evil, or of gaining some advantage so considerable as to compensate for the mischief which necessarily attends it. If, therefore, we consider, first, what advantages the emperor proposes by this; then who will probably be his allies in it, and what motives will induce them to assist him; and that it be shewn afterwards, that our refusal to join with them will defeat all the hopes of the success they aim at, it will, I think, follow naturally, that none of them will hereafter be over-forward to undertake for us what we shall now refuse to do for them, especially if the assistance we may hereafter desire of them will no way answer the end they now propose, but, on the contrary, will expose them to far greater hazards than we should now risk by coming into their assistance.

To begin then, the emperor hopes by a war, with the assistance of his confederates, to get the monarchy of Spain for one of his sons, a prize certainly worth contending for. He hopes in this pretension, to have for allies all those who were guarantees of the Pyrenean Treaty, that is, most of the princes and states in Europe; and if the reasons which gave a foundation to that treaty, and particularly to that article of it where Lewis XIV. and his queen did renounce all future pretensions upon the Spanish dominions; if, I say, the same reasons specified in that treaty do still subsist, (which will hardly be denied,) the emperor seems with justice to demand of the guarantees that they will make good their engagements. But because treaties of late are found to be a very weak security, let us consider what more particular interests are likely to engage many potentates to assist him.

First then, 'tis probable the whole body of the empire will assist him powerfully, since, besides the reasons common to them and to other powers, as their being guarantees of the Pyrenean Treaty, and the general interest to keep the balance even, if possible, between the two great houses, the emperor has a claim to Milan, which it concerns them to assert, it being a fief of the empire, and by consequence, upon default of heirs male, it must return to the empire,* without the consent of which it cannot be alienated; insomuch, that though even the archduke had been called to the crown of Spain by the late king's will, he could not have enjoyed Milan without a new investiture from the emperor: And such is the constitution of the empire, that every prince and state is obliged to assert their own with the emperor's right in this case. The great

* Vid. Guicherdin, *Phil. de Commenis lib. 1. Tractatus varii de Principibus Italice* 2 Ed. D. P. 163.—Orig. Note.

security of each of them consisting in the obligation they are all under to defend each part of the empire, and to suffer no alienation from it, but by their own consent. And whoever should oppose in a diet their joint endeavours to assert that right, may be put to the bann of the empire, and be deprived of his estates: examples of which some of our royal family transplanted there may furnish us with. Some princes of Germany are yet under stricter engagements to the emperor; as the King of Prussia and Elector of Hanover, who, in return for their new dignities, have obliged themselves to furnish, on this occasion, considerably more than their quotas. The circle of the Lower Rhine is highly concerned to keep the French out of Flanders, since the countries of Liege, Cologne, Mentz, Treves, Juliers, and Cleves would be extremely exposed by such a neighbourhood; there being reason to apprehend that the French king would thereby be tempted to endeavour at making the Rhine the boundary of France, as it was of ancient Gaul. And if we take a view of the whole empire, we cannot doubt but 'twill act in concert, since all the great powers of it are known to be absolutely in the emperor's interest; and should any petty princes have a mind to gainsay, a majority in the diet concludes them.

The emperor has great reason to hope, that three other potent nations will assist him vigorously for their own sakes, their honour as well as safety evidently requiring it: All three have been treated by France with so much indignity, their present circumstances are so much alike, and the danger with which they are otherwise very nearly threatened is so much the same, that I shall not part them, as I wish they may not separate from each other at this critical juncture.

It will easily be understood, by what has been said, that I mean England, Portugal, and Holland: over the two last the King of Spain pretends a right of sovereignty, as the King of France keeps at St Germain some who have the like pretensions upon us. The trade of all three becomes, by this junction, equally precarious; or, if there be any difference, 'tis to the disadvantage of Holland, since the French, who are now become their neighbours in Flanders, may with great ease open the navigation of the Scheld, and restore the commerce of Antwerp to its ancient lustre, to the utter ruin of the Dutch.

Holland and Portugal, in one respect, seem indeed to be more exposed to their enemies than we, since they are upon the same continent with them; whereas our azure ramparts keep them at a greater distance; so that all the reasons urged to make England apprehensive of this union, ought more strongly to influence them.

If any man shall object, that the conformity of religion is a security to the Portuguese against the Castilians, let him consider what an inbred hatred there is, and has been for some ages, between those nations, and how much the indignation of the latter will be increased against a people deemed their vassals, for their presumption in having concurred with us to dismember their monarchy, and he may then change his opinion. It seems therefore indispensably to be the interest of these three nations to assist the emperor in dethroning the Duke of Anjou, since they have no other means to secure the independency of their governments. The English and Dutch are yet more nearly concerned, since, upon their refusal, the loss of their religion (which ought principally to be considered) must follow that of their liberty.

Whether the northern crowns will be engaged in this quarrel, or contribute any thing more than their quotas, as princes of the empire, is uncertain. The young Swedish hero has his hands full already; but 'tis not impossible that he may soon make a glorious end of his own war, and then come or send to our aid, in return for the good office we lately did him: this we may be sure of, that we shall not have both those crowns either for or against us.

The Duke of Savoy we must believe to be very uneasy; and 'tis probable that he desires nothing more than such an opportunity to declare against France as will not

expose him to manifest ruin, which would certainly be the consequence of his declaring for the emperor before there be a power in Italy to support him. But if the least favourable success of the league should ever open him a door to come into it, we cannot think him so blind as to stand out, for the following reasons :

First, Because 'tis his interest that there should be a power in Italy to protect him against such ill usage for the future as his ancestors and himself have heretofore frequently received from France, which at present there is not, the Milanese being now full of French troops.

Secondly, The French being already possessed of those countries near him, which are to be fought for, and being not of a temper to part with any thing till they are forced to it, 'tis not probable that they will give him any share of their new acquisition ; whereas the emperor, who is not yet possessed of any thing in Italy, and whose interest it is to engage that duke, will easily be brought to make him considerable offers, and to bestow a great part of the Milanese on him, if the war he is about making prove successful.

The other powers of Italy will probably be neutral, and do all they can to avoid taking any side, till they are forced to it by the strongest party.

The Switzers also will be lookers-on, and sell troops to all buyers ; and the most that can be expected from their zeal to the publick interest, even among the protestant cantons, is, that they shall sell their troops five per cent. cheaper to us than to France.

Having thus taken a short view of the great powers in Europe, and considered which of them will probably be induced to espouse the emperor's quarrel, and what will be their motives for so doing, to proceed in my argument, I am to shew, that without the assistance of England the emperor and his other confederates will not be able to compass the end they propose.

That end I take to be the dispossessing the Duke of Anjou of the whole Spanish monarchy ; or at least of Spain, the West-Indies, and Flanders, and placing the archduke in his room. That a war ought not to be undertaken with any less prospect is evident from this reason, viz. That nothing less than such a success can answer the main prospect of the confederates ; for so long as the French shall rule in Spain, which necessarily carries along with it the dominion of America, can England, Holland, and Portugal (but Portugal chiefly) think their liberties secure, and their trade not merely precarious ? Or so long as the French shall remain in Flanders, will not England and Holland, and all the princes bordering on the Rhine, think themselves in the greatest danger ? The Commons of England certainly reasoned thus in King Charles the Second's time, when so many addresses were presented by them : And the many millions given by them in this reign for the same purpose, do sufficiently justify this opinion.

The emperor and his partizans will, I believe, carry the thing further, and say, That so long as the French shall have Naples, Sicily, and Milan, the balance will be too much on their side, even though an Austrian prince were possessed of Spain, Flanders, and the West-Indies.

Supposing then that the design of the confederates is by a war to dispossess the new French King of Spain, it is asked, Whether, without the aid of England, 'tis probable they can succeed in that undertaking ? To which question, I am confident, that all who are against a war will readily answer, No ; and probably ask, Whether, with the assistance of England, 'tis an undertaking possible to be compassed ? That question I mean to consider in another place : And since 'tis sufficient for my present purpose to have it agreed to, that without us they will in vain undertake such an enterprize, I will, with my adversaries, take it too for granted, and from thence conclude, that since our refusal to join with him will defeat all the hopes of the success they aim at, it fol-

lows naturally that none of them will hereafter be forward to undertake for us, if we stand in need of their help, what we shall now refuse to do for them.

But because it may be objected against my conclusion, that resentment and passion ought not to influence the councils of wise governments, that particular piques are ever sacrificed to the interest of state, and that therefore the powers above-named, finding it to be their interest, may be induced to assist us hereafter in our distress, notwithstanding the dissatisfaction which our present desertion of them may occasion :

To remove the force of this objection, let us particularly examine what powers 'tis reasonable for us to expect will engage in our defence. Will the emperor turn champion for the protestant religion, and the liberty of a people who will have so highly disoblinded him, when his hope of preserving the Spanish monarchy in his family by our assistance will be for ever defeated, which hope was the main reason that has kept him our ally so long ? Is it not more reasonable to apprehend, that the pope may mediate an accommodation between him and France, by intermarrying, or procuring to him perhaps some province, which is more than he can ever, by his own force, wrest from France, if he should obstinately make war by himself ? On the contrary, such a war would ruin him, and disable him from assisting us ever, if he should have the will to do it.

Can any protestant, without horror, reflect on the fatal consequences which would attend such an accommodation ? I shall not, for brevity's sake, repeat any thing on that subject, which several pamphlets have already taken notice of, but proceed to examine from what other allies we may hope for assistance.

As for the protestant princes in Germany, 'tis not sure that they will preserve themselves free ; or, if they do, is it probable that they can give France such a diversion as would be necessary to save us, especially when such an alliance would furnish the emperor with a pretence to forward so holy a work as the destruction of heresy, towards which design 'tis most probable that his zeal and ambition will then direct him, when his other great hopes are vanished ?

The northern crowns are too remote and too poor to give any timely or effectual aid.

'Tis highly probable that the Hollanders will be able to preserve their government no other way than by throwing themselves into the protection of France ; and in this case their whole power by sea will be always ready to act against us at the will of France ; and their situation will besides cut us off from all communication with Germany. But if any one can suppose that they will be able to preserve their government upon easier terms, it must be so precariously that they will not dare to give the least jealousy to their watchful neighbour by coming to our relief.

From these considerations 'tis, I think, evident that if ever we want help, we shall not find allies able or willing to defend us. But it has been proved in the foregoing part of this discourse, from the consideration of the interest, will, and power of our enemies to attack us, and from our inability to defend ourselves, that we shall stand in need of alliance ; therefore the conclusion is too plain, we shall be a prey to our enemies.

Having thus, from principles which to me see undeniable, shewn what will be the necessary consequences of a peace, viz. The utter ruin and destruction of our trade, liberty, and religion, I would proceed next to offer some thoughts concerning a war, but that I have lately heard of an expedient proposed by some to salve all, without the hazard and expence of it. The rank of the persons I heard quoted for it, and the approbation which I found it met with from some who pass for men of good understandings, induced me to offer it to the consideration of my reader. But I do, beforehand, beg their pardons, if, after having thus raised their expectations, they shall judge

it to be the mountain's birth. 'Tis proposed then, for our security against the dangers we apprehend, that a treaty shall be made with France and Spain, wherein it shall be expressly stipulated, that neither of those crowns shall make any innovation, or give the least disturbance to our trade. On the contrary, 'tis said that France is so desirous to preserve the peace of Europe, that, rather than disoblige us, 'tis to be hoped they will condescend to make new treaties of commerce with us, more to our advantage than those which now subsist. It shall be moreover especially provided, that no attacks shall be made on the Hollanders, who, for their greater security, shall be allowed to maintain garrisons in some of the strong towns of Flanders, which, being in Dutch hands, will be so many pledges of the punctual execution of whatever shall be agreed on; and to enforce the more the religious observation of such a treaty, we are to put ourselves in a posture of defending ourselves against any breach thereof which our enemies might offer.

Now, of such who propose this noble expedient, I will crave leave to ask one question, that is, who shall be guarantee of such a treaty? It must either be God or man. But if the French would have accepted of God Almighty for guarantee of their treaties, or be bound by the reverence which even heathens pay to oaths, they durst never have broke the Pyrenean Treaty, which perhaps was the most solemnly and religiously covenanted of any that history mentions. From their violation of that, and, I believe, we may truly say, of all those ever made by their present king, 'tis manifest that the French exclude God Almighty from being guarantee of their treaties.

If man shall be guarantee of such a treaty, I demand who this man, or men, shall be? Will the emperor be one? But by the very state of the question we are supposed to have deserted him and his interest, and to have left him to shift for himself the best he can. Without him, is there a power in Europe sufficient to give the law to France and Spain united? Or, granting there be, shall we be sure that all the princes who must compose such a guarantee, will, on a sudden, reconcile their different interests, and engage themselves in a war to make it good, purely for the sake of two nations who will have set them a pattern to slight such engagements, by having so readily acquiesced in the notorious indignity so lately put upon them? Is it not therefore evident, that such a treaty will only expose us to the derision of our enemies, who, having thus clinched the first trick put upon us by a worse, will have reason to make sport of our fond credulity.

As to putting ourselves in a posture of defence, it can only mean increasing our forces by sea and land; that is, putting ourselves to near the same expence which would defray a war, to do nothing.

To evince more fully the insufficiency of any such project, and to shew, on the contrary, how subservient it would prove to the designs of those who mean to introduce popery and slavery, I will beg leave to make one supposition, which, for the better information of my reader, and for argument's sake, I hope I may be allowed to do.

Let us suppose then that France, ever watchful and ready to promote its interest in foreign countries, should have thought it advisable to entertain emissaries among us, whose business it should be not only to send over faithful advices of all that passes here, but likewise, by the credit they should endeavour to gain with the people of several ranks, to prepare the way for King James; and supposing that some Englishmen, either corrupted with French money, or acted by mistaken principles of zeal and loyalty, to what they call the right line, should prove base or blind enough to undertake such a part, how ought we reasonably to imagine that such men would act and speak? Do we not believe that in all their conversations they would cry up the advantages of peace? Would they not display their eloquence in setting forth the deplorable state of the nation, already exhausted by the great taxes of the last war, and made thereby unable to contribute towards the expences of a new one? Would not the peaceable dis-

position of the King of France, shewn by his willingness to purchase the peace of Reswick at a very dear rate, furnish them with specious arguments to prove that we have nothing to fear from an old prince, abandoned to the counsels of an older woman? If these or the like arguments failed of success, would they not endeavour to beget in people a diffidence of his majesty, by insinuating that we know not what secret practices have been managed between him and France? or how far both kings are agreed to enslave all Europe? That a sham war is necessary to blind folks, and to get a standing army, which is still the bottom of this whole design.

Such chimeras, whispered with a seeming concern for the liberty and good of England, might deceive the unthinking. But if any such emissaries, as I have supposed, should have had so much art and dexterity as to get access to his majesty's person and councils, how is it probable they would then direct their batteries?

If they had not to do with a prince whose great wisdom makes him as incapable of mistaking his own and his people's interest, as his high spirit makes it impossible that he should ever condescend to any measures that might lessen that glorious character he is so justly in possession of, they would certainly advise such a treaty with France, and boldly press to have the Duke of Anjou owned King of Spain immediately. Their advice might be enforced by creating a diffidence of the parliament's readiness to vindicate the honour of his majesty, and to provide for the common security; which diffidence might be founded on this false ground, that because the Commons of England would not in time of peace keep up standing armies, nor overlook the many abuses put upon his majesty by hungry courtiers, who wanted not a stomach to swallow all the estates of Ireland, if their rapine had been tolerated: it should therefore follow, that the same Commons would not take greater care to prevent King James's making grants of all the estates in England; or that the same zeal that moved them to take such wise precautions to prevent our own kings from bringing in slavery upon us by standing armies, would not warmly inspire them with such vigorous resolutions as may disappoint our enemies, who would force it upon us from abroad.

If, by such misrepresentations of English parliaments, a jealousy of them could once be raised, more troops, and a treaty with France, were a ready salvo; nor would there be wanting precedents in our own history to back their advice.

But his majesty's sublime genius being such as would certainly awe the most impudent and corrupt counsellors from proposing such wicked and shallow measures, and which proved so fatal to his predecessor, let us consider what other mischiefs their surreptitious favour might enable them to compass. Why, we may be sure they would affect popularity, by talking against taxes, and arguing against the necessity of a war, which would have this good effect, that the multitude, judging of the situation of affairs by the countenances of those who were at the helm, and finding all about court serene and unconcerned, would conclude they were in no danger, which mistake they might be confirmed in by the unshaken and steady temper of his majesty, whose magnanimity, so often tried in great adversities, might, by the unthinking, on this occasion, be misconstrued as a certain symptom of security; whereas, it seems to import extremely at this juncture, that people be made thoroughly acquainted with their danger, lest by some hasty and precipitate resolutions, they put it out of their power to provide against it.

The same emissaries would undoubtedly obstruct, as much as in them lay, any offers made by his majesty, or his parliament, at repairing, if possible, the great loss this nation has had by the death of his royal highness the Duke of Gloucester, since the protestant successor, that should be appointed, might prove a rub in the way of the Frenchified family; besides, that the concurrence which his present majesty should give to such a provision for the settlement of our religion and liberty upon a firm basis, would entirely secure to him the affections of his people, and destroy the false and ma-

licious insinuations they and their partisans would suggest; as if his majesty had no farther concern for our safety, than during his own life; the contrary of which is so manifest, by the great things he has already done for us, that it argues an incurable perverseness to surmise otherwise. For should men deny this truth, our records will transmit down to posterity, with a multitude of wholesome laws, and constitutions, the memory of this illustrious hero, who never thought it beneath his kingly dignity to gratify the just desires of his people, even by the diminution of his own prerogative.

But such is the levity of mankind, that groundless suspicions are often received as clear proofs; and should the pensioners above mentioned prove so industrious and successful as to get the places of greatest trust filled with men, who thought their rightful master were beyond sea, whose nice consciences could never be reconciled to his present majesty's title, and who were known enemies to those popular principles, which gave a birth and foundation to our present government, and by which alone it can, for the future, be supported:

Would not such unexpected measures seem to authorise very extravagant jealousies, and might they not startle men the best affected, by making them apprehensive, that some such bargain were driving on, as our histories give us an example of in King Stephen? Would not the fearful prudence of many rich men incline them in such a case, to make their private peace, and to be reconciled to those who might become our masters, (for there are not wanting examples of men, who even, during a war, have made private treaties of peace with the enemies of their country) and would not the multitude, judging itself abandoned by those from whom it expected protection, be prepared without opposition to wait for a new revolution?

If it be true, that men paid from France, and directed from St Germain's, would use such, or the like artifices, to bring about their wicked purposes, it is certainly incumbent on an English parliament, by taking opposite measures, to leave no room for such practices.

Our enemies desire to see such men amongst us advanced to places of trust and dignity, as are enemies to his majesty's person, and to that liberty he has so wonderfully secured to us. Since therefore the high state of kings make it difficult, if not impossible, for them, to be thoroughly acquainted with the principles of all those who have the honour to approach their persons, if ever it should happen that any such, with mischievous intentions, should insolently intrude themselves into posts of the greatest trust, does it not seem consistent with the allegiance and zeal a parliament ought to have for their prince, in the most humble manner, to lay before him the danger his person and government might be exposed to by a misplaced confidence?

The enemies of our religion and liberty wish that we may be as careless in providing for the succession of England, as our late allies the Spaniards were for theirs. Such an omission would furnish our good ally the King of France with a fair opportunity of shewing us as great marks of his friendship as he has done to Spain, by supplying us in time of need with a king of his own breeding up. What though he should exact of us to pay the charges of his education, and send us in a bill for the expence he has been at in attempting to restore him sooner, can we in gratitude do less than satisfy so just demands? And though we should not have ready money enough to pay immediately so just a debt, would it not be reasonable to give our obliging friend, the King of France, cautionary towns for a security, till it were punctually discharged; and to postpone, upon such a consideration, all the publick debts contracted in defence of an usurpation? Will an English parliament leave the least door open to such mischiefs? Sure it will not, but rather take warning from the example of a neighbouring nation, and take care that Count Tallard be not made a duke for services of the same nature in England, with those of the Duke D'Harcourt's in Spain.

If some provision be not made at their next session, will not our enemies both at home and abroad look upon such an omission as a tacit indication, that the nation is prepared to receive a prince that shall be nameless? And would not such a delay prove by so much of more fatal consequence to us, than the King of Spain's will did to that country, as that our religion runs the greatest of hazards by such a turn?

I know there are some, who would be thought protestants and freemen, who fondly flatter themselves, that a boy banished by England, almost as soon as born; who with his milk sucked in popery, and an aversion to England, which have been strongly inculcated into him till the age of thirteen by two most zealous, stubborn, and revengeful parents, will forget that his great-grand-mother and his grand-father had their heads cut off by the people of England; that the same people have twice forced his father into exile, deposed him, and reduced himself with both his parents to beg their bread in a foreign country; that, I say, forgetting all this, and laying aside all thoughts of promoting the same religion, and the same sort of government he has been taught in France, he will prove a defender of the protestant faith and the liberties of England.

Men so infatuated, God only can restore to their right senses by restoring him they wish for: Unless the sins of this nation should so far provoke divine vengeance as to bring such a revolution upon us, I despair these men can ever be persuaded of the necessity we are under to entail the crown of England upon protestants.

But lest any man of principles quite opposite, should be made a tool to them, and join with them in opposing the settlement of our succession, I beg leave to address myself to such as imagine, that when our present settlement is run out, a common-wealth may be set up, and are therefore against enlarging it. Their hopes I conceive to be ill founded for the following reasons:

First, Because there is a great majority against them throughout the people of England, nine in ten of which are for sticking to the ancient constitution.

Secondly, Because there are not ten common-wealths-men in England agreed upon any scheme or plan of government, for which reason 'tis impossible they should ever act with so much steadiness and unanimity as would be requisite. This truth is manifestly confirmed by the experience of that variety of governments which were set up successively after Cromwell's death; and which all ended in bringing in King Charles the Second of pious memory.

Thirdly, Because their adversaries would act in concert, being united under one head; and whatever may be objected against monarchy when settled, 'tis certainly, in turbulent times, the government most likely to prevail.

Fourthly, If by a common-wealth they mean a free government, and would be satisfied with the thing, though it want the name of republick, 'tis far more probable to attain that end by settling the succession, than by any other way; since it may be done with such limitations as will abundantly secure our freedom. 'Tis therefore to be hoped that the present parliament will take this matter into their serious consideration, and by complying with the earnest wishes of all honest men who expect it, defeat the artifices of our most dangerous domestick foes.

Our enemies wish the king may be disabled from resenting the most insolent affront put upon him, and that he may authorize their unparalleled perfidiousness, by acknowledging the Duke of Anjou; hoping that such a condescension may lessen that reputation of valour and wisdom, which has for so many years proved the greatest obstacle to their vast designs.

Is it not therefore to be hoped, that an English parliament will have a tender regard for the honour of a prince, whose reputation has hitherto stood us in such stead? For if so many princes of different religions and interest, as were confederated in the last war, armed in our defence, and by a perseverance scarce to be paralleled in any history, remained in firm union for eleven years, must it not be owned, that his majesty's great

genius first gave motion, and afterwards directed all the prings of the complicated machine? Shall not then the great council of our nation, when their advice is asked on this important affair, dissuade his majesty from making a step, which, by lessening his character, will lessen his power to do us good.

If I should say, that it nearly concerns the honour of England, as well as the king's, to resent the King of France's violation of the Treaty of Partition, I know it would disoblige some gentlemen, who are of a contrary opinion; because, say they, the people of England had no hand in making it. But of such I will ask, whether, though it had been ratified by the parliament, the King of France would have had greater regard to it? If not, and that France could not reasonably conclude, but that it would meet with a general approbation, which ought certainly to be supposed, till the legislative power had declared otherwise, it is evident, she has offered the highest affront to the nation as well as to his majesty.

If it be objected, that it would be of a very evil consequence, that the nation should be obliged to make good, at the expence of English blood and treasure, all such treaties as future kings may make, to the disadvantage of England; and that therefore we are to be no farther concluded by them, than our parliaments shall judge them to be for the honour and advantage of the publick; I answer, That no nation we shall treat with will, for the same reason, think itself bound by any thing stipulated with us, since whenever they shall be pressed to execute any treaty, which they shall think to their disadvantage, they may with truth object, that obligations, to be of force, ought to be mutual; whereas they can have no security of a compliance on our side, since 'twill be in the power of a parliament to disable our king from performing his part of the covenant.

If it be from hence inferred, that all treaties made between us and other nations signify just nothing, it belongs to our legislators to consider whether this be one of the many defects in our constitution, which 'tis their province to remedy; some provision against such cases for the future, is certainly more consistent with their wisdom at this dangerous conjuncture, than unseasonable cavils against the prerogative of a prince who has already done so much to better our constitution; that 'twill visibly be no fault of his, if under his reign it be not brought to the greatest perfection 'tis capable of being improved to.

Our enemies by a peace desire to secure themselves in an undisturbed possession of their ill-gotten acquisitions, and building upon our complaisance, and perhaps upon assurances given them from some English Portocarreros, are already forming projects to wrest from us our religion and liberty. And we, good-natured people, shall let the world see that Spain is not the only country where French money and artifices have prevailed over the national interest. Will not the parliament rather advise and enable his majesty once more to take upon him the glorious task of rescuing Europe from bondage, and setting bounds to the insatiable ambition of France?

How much such an enterprize, if it succeed, will redound to the glory, profit, and security of England, is needless to mention. It remains therefore only to consider what means we have to effect it; that is, what forces our confederates and we can bring to bear against France, and what she can probably oppose to us.

To begin with England, 'twill be allowed, that if she think fit to engage in a war, she can and will maintain a naval force; which, with the assistance of Holland, will be superior to that of our enemies in the ocean, the Mediterranean, and in America. The advantages which such a mastery at sea, well managed, may give us, are too many to be enumerated. That eight or ten thousand landmen on board our fleet, may frequently be of very great use, is likewise undeniable, and 150,000*l.* a year added to the present establishment of our guards and garrisons will enable us to spare such a force.

We are assured that the Emperor, before spring, will have increased the troops he

has on foot, which now exceed 70,000 men, to ninety-six thousand, of which seventy thousand will be employed offensively against France and in Italy. The remainder, with the militias of his hereditary countries, being a force more than sufficient to guard his frontiers. And we are likewise assured that a fund for the maintenance of them is actually settled.

The empire cannot be supposed to act with less than sixty thousand men, if we consider how many great princes of it are under strict engagements to the emperor; and that others, as the Elector Palatine, with all his ecclesiastical brothers, are most nearly concerned to remove the French from being their neighbours in the Spanish Netherlands. The King of Prussia and the house of Lunenbourg alone are known to keep in pay near fifty thousand men. It will therefore easily be allowed me, that if the whole empire will exert its utmost strength, it may bring into the field a far greater number, and there is no doubt but upon any emergency it will. But I would be now understood to speak only of such a force as will be constantly kept on the enemies frontiers ready for action, besides the garrisons which every prince will be careful to provide for his own security.

The Dutch have had on foot ever since the peace, forty thousand men, old troops, which, by filling up their regiments as they were in time of war, will in six weeks time make sixty thousand as good men and as well officered as any France can oppose to them. If that number be not thought sufficient for their defence, it is reasonable that England should assist them with a body of twelve thousand men at least, or money to pay such a body; or, by increasing our own naval force, and taking upon us a greater share of the war by sea, than was done last war, ease them of so considerable an expence as may be equivalent to such or a greater number of troops, which by that means they may be enabled to pay.

Thus we have already reckoned up above 200,000 men, against which France, if it mean to have any success, must have at least as many to oppose. For we have not found, during the last war, that she ever boasted of any advantage got over the confederacy with inferior numbers.

If, besides these, the King of Portugal be assisted by the confederacy, and that to the 20,000 men, which at least he is allowed to have on foot, 15,000 either Germans, English, or Dutch (though possibly popish troops would be most acceptable in that country), be added and commanded by the archduke in person, whom with such an army it must be our care to transport thither, let us consider how Spain will be able to oppose the impression such a force would make.

He that would form a just estimate of the power and wealth of Spain at this time, need only to consider that Ceuta has been besieged near ten years by not above five or six thousand rascally Moors. 'Tis true, sometimes there has been a greater force before it, but the greatest part of the time, the besiegers have not exceeded that number. And, to defend the place, Spain did within these four or five years desire the assistance of Portugal, which sent some companies thither, but they soon returned home half starved for want of the pay they had been promised.

Or, if we will look back to Barcelona, we shall find a town of that importance taken without ever having been besieged; for it never was so, properly speaking, the French army being not numerous enough to invest it, nor to hinder succours and refreshments of all kinds, or so much as the post from going in and out every day; notwithstanding which, and that the garrison as well as townsmen, defended it with great valour, it was forced to surrender, because all Spain was not in a condition to supply one single town with a sufficient garrison. And I am now credibly informed, that, excepting the German body under the Prince of Hesse, there are not six thousand men in all their country in a condition to march.

But 'twill be said, they may raise men, and have an army of their own, before you.

can have transported the force designed for Portugal. To which I shall only reply, That men are not to be raised without money, and how much their government wants that is evident, by the difficulties they have been at to raise a sufficient sum for the reception of their new king; notwithstanding their utmost effort on such an occasion, we are told, that the greatest part of his Spanish family stayed at Madrid for want of it, and that those who did go to meet him, made the journey at their own expence.

Nor let any man believe, that their new king, had he the wisdom of his grandfather, can so soon reform that unhinged government, as to make it contribute any thing considerable to its own defence, especially if a war be carried into the bowels of it immediately. For 'tis certain, that Spain has submitted to this change purely for fear of a war, which it is in no condition to make. If therefore it find, that instead of quiet and ease, which was the end it proposed, it has drawn on itself a more severe war than France could have made, is it not to be hoped, that the people will soon be very weary of their new king? That when the archduke, a prince of the family they have been so long governed by, shall appear among them, he will have a number of friends? For 'tis hardly to be imagined, that the house of Austria, which has reigned there near 200 years, should so suddenly have lost all its interest in that nation, as to have no friends left, if they durst declare and had a head to resort to. If we consider the natural antipathy the people of Spain have to the French, this will appear more probable. And indeed, all things considered, it is not easy to imagine, that France has any friends there, except a court cabal. The multitude, tricked and betrayed by courtiers, and finding no assistance or protection at hand, could do no less than submit patiently. But if such an army as is proposed were ready to give countenance to their mal-contents, 'tis not to be doubted but that the archduke would soon be saluted king, and the French party either driven out of Spain immediately, or be obliged to maintain a great army to oppose the confederates, who would be daily strengthened by Spaniards joining them, and in all probability would be able to beat the French out at last.

Those who know how expensive the last war in Italy proved to the French king, and that the small army he there maintained against the Duke of Savoy, cost him more than his vast armies of Flanders, will easily perceive, that if he be obliged to carry the war to the frontiers of Portugal, it must prove much more ruinous to him, since from his own frontiers thither is a march of above 500 miles, over many mountains as rugged as the Alps, and through a country barren and dispeopled, and where such a force as he must bring cannot subsist without convoys from France.

If therefore he will send an army of force sufficient to keep the field against that of the confederates, which I suppose to be of above 30,000 men, he must have besides his army in the field near half that number dispersed at convenient distances to secure the march of his convoys and ammunition, which, for the greatest part of so long a tract, must be carried on mules backs over mountainous and narrow passes, where the very peasants may intercept and plunder whatever is not strongly guarded.

How prodigious an expence such a war must draw upon him, the most unexperienced reader will readily judge; and I believe I may with great modesty affirm, that forty-five thousand men, which I suppose him obliged to maintain there, will cost him much more than three times that number in Flanders. If to this we add, that the whole coast of Spain will lie exposed to the insults of our fleet, that we may perhaps take Cadiz by the assistance of our confederate army in Portugal, and put all Andalusia, the richest province in Spain, under contribution, it seems reasonable to believe that Spain, to be delivered from such mischiefs, will side with the confederates to drive out the French, who will not probably behave themselves towards the Spaniards so as to lessen the natural aversion they have for each other.

If to what has been said, it be objected, that the King of Portugal has acknowledged the Duke of Anjou, and that therefore he will not join with us,

I answer, That till he could be secure that England and Holland, who alone can assist him effectually against Spain and France, would engage heartily in such a war, 'twas the most advisable course he could take to court an enemy he could not singly deal with. But we cannot believe but that a prince, who passes in the world to have courage, must be highly provoked by the slur lately put upon him by the French, who having omitted no arts to engage him to be a guarantee of the treaty of partition, and promised him Badajos and Alcantara, two Spanish towns on his frontiers, have thus basely tricked him. The interest he has besides to secure his crown to his descendants, is an invincible argument for him to oppose the present union of France and Spain.

For as high a conceit as the Portuguese have of their own valour, they cannot be so extravagant as to think themselves an equal match to Spain, when it shall be governed by a wise and active prince, backed with the fleets and armies of France. The ease with which Philip the Second conquered them, and the assistance they stood in need of from France and England to support their last defection from Spain, though Spain was then engaged in a war with France, and that Catalonia was revolted at the same time, make it evident that their great security consists in having for their neighbour a King of Spain, who shall always have such a jealousy of France as may divert him from the thoughts of reducing Portugal, and against whom they may be sure to be assisted by France, if he should attempt it. Which whether they are to expect hereafter, it behoves them to consider now.

But is it not far more probable that the King of France, whom we may certainly conclude resolved never to part with Flanders (even though we would suppose him willing to part with the body of the Spanish monarchy) will propose the conquest of Portugal for an equivalent to the Spaniards; such an expedient will seem agreeable to the interests and inclinations of both those crowns. For France has for some ages looked upon Flanders as a province dismembered from its patrimony, as it really was by the Dukes of Burgundy, and it has been long aiming to re-unite it. And as for Portugal, its situation contiguous to the body of Spain, makes it of greater consequence to that nation, than a province so remote and exposed as Flanders. Besides, they will be pleased with the thoughts of humbling, by the help of France, those proud vassals they have ever hated, even more than their Dutch heretick rebels. Their having lately added Portugal to the title of their new king, contrary to what was practised by his predecessor, and the arms of Portugal having been in some scutcheons lately quartered with those of the other kingdoms of Spain, do sufficiently tell the Portuguese how the Spaniards are inclined to them.

These considerations seem then to put it out of dispute, that the Portuguese will not miss such an opportunity as now presents itself of securing, by our assistance, their future independency, by placing on the throne of Spain a prince, who will be so highly obliged to them for such a service, that he will never have any desire to hurt them; or who, should he prove ungrateful, will not have it in his power, since France will be ever ready to hinder such an increase of dominion as Portugal would be to the archduke, should he become King of Spain.

Taking it therefore for granted, that the powers above-named can, and will, bring such a force as has been mentioned, to bear against our enemy, let us consider how able he will be to furnish out so many land armies, and provide at the same time for the defence of a coast several thousands of miles in extent. To make as near as may be a true estimate of his wealth and power, I shall give my reader an account he may depend upon, of some particulars relating to his revenues, and the number of his forces at different times.

His whole revenue did, in the year 1666, amount to 126 millions of livres, which reduced to English money, according as the exchange went then, that is, reckoning

thirteen livres to the pound sterling, would make nine millions and about six hundred thousand pounds; it produced the two last years only one hundred and seven millions, which reduced to English money, according as the exchange has gone for that time, viz. at fifteen livres to the pound sterling, (which difference of the exchange has been occasioned by the raising the standard of his coin) make about seven millions one hundred and forty thousand pounds; by which computation 'tis evident, they are sunk above two millions four hundred thousand pounds sterling, that is, at least one-fourth part of what they were at the time before-mentioned; which plainly shews, that the people and wealth of France are decreased since that time, at least in the same proportion, since we may reasonably conclude, that the king's revenues have been managed as carefully, and collected as rigorously, in his late times of need, as they were heretofore.

The king's income is diminished in a far greater proportion, it being clogged with a debt of five hundred millions only to the Hostell de Ville, or Town House of Paris, for which he pays interest at five per cent. twenty-five millions, that is, near one million seven hundred thousand pounds sterling. He pays besides another sort of interest, by way of salaries, for a considerable multitude of new offices erected and bought, many of them since the beginning of the last war, which amounts at least to so much as will make the interest money, already mentioned, exceed two millions sterling; so that he has coming in clear not full five millions sterling.

'Tis farther observable, that, since the peace, he has not paid one shilling of the capital, but instead thereof has taken up more money, which indeed has not increased the interest he pays, (unless it may be what he has borrowed these last twelve or eighteen months,) because he reduced the interest paid to all those who lent their money during his most pressing exigencies at six, seven, and eight per cent. to five, which defalcation he has appropriated to pay the interest of what he has since borrowed. 'Tis true, he has suppressed some of the erected new offices, which were most burthensome to the people. But how? Why, it being unreasonable that such as had assisted him with money during the war should be losers, he has graciously condescended that such provinces or towns as were most grieved by these offices, should repay to the persons possessed of them their principal purchase-money.

Before I say any more on this head, I will mention a word about his land forces, which, for some time during the war, are said to have exceeded 300,000 men, besides those on board his fleet. But since the last reduction, made about the latter end of the year 99, they were brought to be barely 120,000 men, and so continued till the King of Spain's death, just before which orders were issued for an augmentation to be made against January last, which was to have increased them to 156,000, and which is not yet fully perfected.

I know 'tis generally thought he was much stronger; but lists of all the regiments are to be had with ease, which, if regard be had to the reductions made at several times, will be found to agree perfectly with the account I give. Yet, notwithstanding so great a reduction of his forces, which ought to have lessened his expence, 'tis most certainly known that the very last year his expence exceeded his income one million sterling.

'Tis true, that, besides his ordinary revenue, he has had extraordinary ways of raising money; as the sale of offices already mentioned, frequently raising and falling the standard of his money, *dons gratuits*, which people are made to pay per force, registering titles of gentility, taxing partizans, that is, those who have had the managing of his revenues, who were last year forced to refund near a million sterling, and many other expedients, which, in time, we may be better acquainted with, if we are pleased to let him go on quietly; but these have all been so often made use of, that they will be

found to be of very small resource for the future in a country so much exhausted by them already.

What has stood him in greatest stead for some years during the last war was the capitation, which brought him in above three millions sterling yearly, and which he must again have recourse to : But how grievous an imposition that was thought, and how ruinous it must prove to his country, if he should be under the necessity of continuing it but a few years, I appeal to any who have been there, and heard the heavy complaints it occasioned. But a stronger proof cannot be required to shew how destructive the continuance of it would have proved, than that the king took it off ; for his most Christian majesty has generally been observed to lay as great a load on his people as they could bear. Since then he was pleased to ease them of this tax, when he wanted not so specious a pretence to continue it as the great debts he had contracted, we may be sure he knew it could not be done without utterly ruining and disabling them to pay at all.

Having thus briefly touched upon the present condition of France, and having a little before shewn that France, if it will make a successful war, will, besides the necessary garrisons of his sea-ports, be obliged to maintain 247,000 men, viz. 60,000 against the forces of the empire, 40,000 against that part of the emperor's troops which will act on the Rhine, 72,000 against the Dutch, 30,000 against the emperor's army in Italy, and 45,000 in Spain : If, besides, attention be made to what has been said concerning the prodigious expence of his last Italian war, which he must again renew, and to the reasons there are to believe that the war he must make in Spain will be liable to the same and greater inconveniences, since the seat of war will be three times at least more remote from his frontiers than Piedmont was, will not the greatest partizan of France own, that here is work enough cut out for that great monarch, who must immediately raise or hire at least 100,000 men, and equip out a prodigious fleet ? Or, if he will decline the expence of naval armies, he must considerably reinforce all his sea-port garrisons, and have a very great number of men to guard his coasts.

Then if it be true that his ordinary revenue fell short one million sterling of maintaining the ordinary expences of his government, and of 120,000 men, must not that million be made good, and must not near 200,000 landmen more, besides his fleet and the other necessary expences of a war, be defrayed out of the capitation, and out of such money as he must borrow ? But out of the capitation, supposing that it may again raise three millions, there can be applied but two millions towards these vast extraordinary expenses, which, if, by a modest computation, we shall reckon at six millions sterling, it is evident that he must every year contract a new debt of four millions sterling, besides a growing interest, which, added to his already immense debt, must in a few years absorb the greatest part of his revenue in interest.

'Twill, I know, be objected, that the last war has shewn his power to be matchless ; that he then maintained 400,000 men by sea and land ; why, therefore, may he not do the same again ? Why, for that very reason, because a man who has but one thousand pounds per ann. has for ten years together spent two thousand pounds yearly ; does it therefore follow, that he may do so ten years longer ? States in this resemble private men, that if they for a considerable time expend more than 'tis possible for their subjects to furnish yearly, they may, nay, must, inevitably be ruined. And that a state may become bankrupt, Spain sufficiently witnesseth, which had once a fund of wealth thought inexhaustible, and without comparison greater than that of France.

If I should, in the sequel of this discourse, propose our paying five millions yearly towards a war, and our maintaining eighty thousand English or foreign troops abroad, because we did so during the last war, the weakness of such an argument would be obvious, and I should with justice be answered, that we have thereby contracted a considerable debt, which every honest Englishman ought to desire to see paid off rather

than increased. And yet the parallel will not fully hold between England and France; because England never has been, and, I hope, never will be, screwed up like France to pay to the utmost extremity of what it is able, and for that reason might, comparatively with ease, get rid of a far greater debt than it now owes. Whereas France, unless it shall by our inactivity get the West-Indies, will never be able to pay its principal debt, but daily increase it to its utter ruin, if we neglect not this favourable opportunity of pressing her before the monarchy of Spain, which is at present a burthen to her, be so modelled as to make their united power irresistible.

From what has been said I leave it to my reader to draw conclusions, being unwilling to forestal his judgment concerning the success of a war carried on in the manner proposed. His own sagacity cannot but suggest to him many reflections to the advantage of England, which are naturally deducible from the foregoing discourse. I shall therefore hasten to the conclusion of it, and only take notice of the most material objections which can be made against a war, viz.

Either the necessary expence 'twill draw on us, or the prejudice we may sustain by the interruption of our trade.

To the first I answer, that in the manner it has been proposed that England shall make a war, we may do it at an annual expence, at most of one million eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds more than would otherwise be levied. For we will take it for granted, that though we remain in peace, we should find it necessary to maintain at least as great a sea force as was done the first year after the peace, that would cost us eight hundred thousand pounds, to which if we shall add one million two hundred thousand pounds for the war, 'twill abundantly strengthen our fleet, especially if we consider that out of the forces now on foot in the three kingdoms, eight or ten thousand men may be kept on board it, which will save the expence of near such a number of seamen. The aid proposed to be given the Dutch, whether in men or money, or in taking upon us a greater proportion of the war by sea, will come within 200,000*l*. The addition proposed to our forces in the three kingdoms, to fill up regiments to a necessary complement, may be limited to 150,000*l*. And if, besides all this, it be thought requisite to furnish 300,000*l*. yearly to enable the King of Portugal and archduke to press our enemies on their weak side, this whole additional expence will amount to 1,850,000*l*. which, whether England be not better able to bear than it has been shewn that France can, the necessary annual extraordinaries of 66,000,000*l*. sterling, which such a war must force it to levy, let the most partial Frenchman determine.

I will not then suppose that any Englishman will think the preservation of his religion and liberty too dearly purchased at this rate. Such an undervaluing of those blessings none can be capable of whose hearts are not hardened, and who are not doomed to utter perdition. But that cannot be thought of a people whom the hand of God hath so lately rescued from the imminent danger they were in of losing both; nor can it be presumed that they will now so far tempt his providence as to neglect the opportunity he has visibly put into their hands, not only of securing to themselves for ever those inestimable blessings, but likewise of propagating his holy gospel, by procuring ease to the many persecuted protestants both of France and Germany. For can the emperor now refuse us any thing of that kind which we shall think fit to stipulate? And may we not promise ourselves in a few years to have so far humbled France as will be necessary for so good an end? As to what may be objected concerning trade, I answer, that granting our trade to the Streights should suffer an interruption by the war, such an inconvenience would be far less than the total loss of it, not only thither, but to the West-Indies; besides the loss of the manufacture of our fine drapery, which, it has been proved, will be one of the necessary consequences of our sitting still.

Yet I can see no necessity of granting that our Turkey and Italian trades will suffer

by the war, if we will suppose our maritime affairs to be well managed. The war we are to make must be altogether by sea, and consequently implies a necessity of our having every summer a strong fleet in the Mediterranean, to harass our enemies there; why, then, our traders thither may not be protected by that same force, I cannot see. And if strict prohibitions be made against any ships going thither, but under the convoy of our men of war at set seasons, 'tis probable much fewer will be lost than were during the last war; for the convenience of being sheltered in Spanish ports proved a temptation then for many merchant ships to run without convoy; whereas none will now be so adventurous as to hazard a run to Turkey or to Italy along so vast a tract of an enemy's coast. Our trade to Spain itself, which I own to be very considerable, will indeed be at a stand, till the success of our confederate armies and fleets re-admit us thither; but then a moderate strength, well managed in America, will abundantly compensate for that loss.

Whoever knows the weakness of the Spaniards in those parts, and remembers that Pointi, with a handful of men, took Carthage, a well fortified town, and which had five times the number of men to defend it that he had on board his ships, cannot deny but there is a plentiful harvest for whoever can send a good fleet to gather it. If we take care to have a force in those seas superior to the French, our plantations are so conveniently situated, that not a galleon coming or going can escape us. How much such an interruption of all commerce thither would distress Spain is apparent, and it probably might be none of the weakest reasons to incline that people to side with us.

The wealth we shall thereby acquire will not only defray the expence of the force we shall maintain there, but, with good management, may go a great way towards the charge of the whole war: and 'twill be the fault of our commanders if all the French colonies there be not rooted out, which, for these reasons, we ought chiefly to aim at. 1st, It will greatly weaken the French power at sea, by destroying so great a nursery of their seamen. 2dly, We shall lose a dangerous rival in our sugar trade as well as in some others, which they have common with us by means of their colonies in the Southern Isles. 3dly, This will very much increase our trade in Africa for negroes, and ruin that of the French: For every one knows that none can carry on a trade for negroes but such as have a footing in America. The consequence therefore of our expelling the French will be, that the Spaniards must depend absolutely upon us for their negroes, without which their mines will be barren. Besides that, our power being freed from such a rivalship, will be so much superior to any thing in those parts of the world, that the Spaniards can have no balance nor force there to protect them against us: so that for fear of their Plate fleets, and of their very empire in America, 'twill be always in our power to obtain greater privileges from them in our trade thither than any other nation could pretend to, for which reasons I submit it to every Englishman, whether it ought not to be one of our great aims, by this war, utterly to extirpate the French out of America? Such an undertaking will appear more feasible, if we consider that matters may be so carried as to deprive the French from any assistance from the Spaniards, which, I believe, may be done by consenting to a neutrality with all the Spanish continent and islands, on condition they shall, during the war, allow us a free trade with them.

If such a neutrality can be managed, we shall not only with greater ease destroy the French there, which ought to be our principal aim, but probably be greater gainers by a free trade than by the plunder of their country. If we make war upon it, it would certainly prove more beneficial to the trading interest and manufactures of England. For if by our naval power there we hinder that vast country from being supplied with any European commodities from any other hand, shall we not have a prodigious vent for all the manufactures of our own growth, as well as for our East-India commodities and linen, &c.?

May not the access we shall thus get to those people introduce a vent for many of our commodities which the Spaniards have always industriously kept from their knowledge? Shall we not, likewise, trade to a far greater advantage than has been done hitherto, since we have always been obliged to trust the Spaniards at Cadiz, who certainly shared the profit with us? Besides the exorbitant indultos, or duties, exacted by the government, both in Europe and America.

May we not thus, during the war, give a beginning to such a commerce, directly from our plantations to the Spanish continent, as may be continued after a peace, to the unspeakable benefit of England? For when once the Americans will have discovered at how much more easy rates we can supply them than the Spaniards have done, will they not, for their own sakes, endeavour to continue it? And shall we not have reason to expect the allowance of it from the new king we shall have seated on the Spanish throne?

This notion of a neutrality may displease the Buccaneers, and perhaps our sea commanders, who would find their account better by plundering that rich country. And it may perhaps be thought ridiculous to suppose that the government of those provinces, who will have strict orders to do all they can to extirpate us, can ever be brought to consent to it. But to that I answer, that if we have a power sufficient to burn and destroy their country, 'tis much more probable that the present terror of our arms will prevail with that wealthy but defenceless people, than the orders they shall receive from the unsettled government of Spain; and that they will much more willingly part with their gold and silver, in return for our commodities, which 'tis in our power to hinder them from being supplied with any other way, than expose themselves to be plundered of their riches and their maritime provinces to utter destruction.

We know that the French fleets, during the last war, have frequently been supplied with refreshments of all kinds from the governors of several maritime towns of Spain itself; how much more likely is it then that the remote provinces we are speaking of, will, by a like compliance, endeavour to shun their utter ruin, especially when they will be in doubt of the fate of their mother country, or to which of the princes contending for the empire of it they will owe their obedience? In such an uncertainty, will not a weak and rich country incline to such measures as will bring security and profit? The advantages that would accrue to us from such a neutrality appear to be so great, that we ought carefully to court them to it. And should that method fail, we shall still have it in our power to make them repent their not accepting of it, and by harsher means to acquire an immense treasure.

Postscript.

Some addresses of the House of Commons to King Charles the Second, relating to Flanders, have been mentioned in the foregoing discourse; since the printing of which we have news from Paris, that orders are sent there to Mareschal Boufflers, not only to take possession of all the Spanish Netherlands, but to disarm and seize the Dutch troops in garrison there; and we have reason to fear that those orders are already executed. It may therefore not be unseasonable to offer to the publick the very addresses made to King Charles, with his answers, by which it will appear what was the sense of England at that time, upon the progress of the French arms in those provinces.

March the 6th, 1676. The House being resolved into a committee of the whole House, to consider of grievances,

Resolved,

That a committee be appointed to prepare an address, to represent unto his majesty

the danger of the power of France; and to desire his majesty, by such alliances as his majesty shall think fit, to secure his kingdoms, and quiet the fears of his people, and for the preservation and securing of the Spanish Netherlands.

March the 10th, Mr Powle reported from the committee the following address, which was presented, read and agreed to, *nemine contradicente*.

May it please your Majesty,

We your majesty's most loyal subjects, the knights, citizens and burgesses in parliament assembled, find ourselves obliged in duty and faithfulness to your majesty, and in discharge of the trust reposed in us, by those whom we represent, most humbly to offer to your majesty's serious consideration, that the minds of your majesty's people are much disquieted, with the manifest danger arising to your majesty's kingdoms by the growth and power of the French king; especially by the acquisitions already made, and the further progress likely to be made by him in the Spanish Netherlands, in the preservation and security whereof, we humbly conceive the interest of your majesty, and the safety of your people, are highly concerned; and therefore we most humbly beseech your majesty to take the same into your royal care, and to strengthen yourself with such stricter alliances, as may secure your majesty's kingdoms, and preserve and secure the said Netherlands, and thereby quiet the minds of your majesty's people.

Resolved,

That the concurrence of the lords be desired to the said address; and that Mr Powle do go up to the lords to desire their concurrence.

And upon the 15th of March, the lords sent word, That they had agreed to the address, and that his majesty had appointed both houses to attend him, to present their address to-morrow, at three of the clock in the afternoon, in the banqueting house at Whitehall.

March the 16th, The address was presented to his majesty by both houses.

And March the 17th, Mr Speaker reported to the house, that according to the order and command of the house, he had attended his majesty in presenting the address; and that the lord chancellor having introduced it with a short preface, and then read it, his majesty was pleased to return his answer to this effect.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

I am of the opinion of my two Houses of Parliament, that the conservation of Flanders is of great importance to England; and therefore I assure you, I will use all means for the preservation of Flanders, that can possibly consist with the peace and safety of the kingdom.

March the 19th, A motion being made for a farther address to his majesty, to enter into a strict and speedy alliance with the confederates;

Resolved,

That the debate of this motion be adjourned till Monday morning next, at ten of the clock.

Monday, March the 26th, The house then proceeded upon the debate of the motion for a further address to his majesty, to enter into a speedy and strict alliance with the confederates.

Resolved,

That a farther address be made to his majesty, giving him assurance that if (in pursuance of the address, presented to his majesty from both houses) his majesty shall find himself necessitated to enter into a war, this house will fully aid his majesty from time to time, and assist him in that war.

The 29th of March, The following address was reported, and agreed unto by the house.

May it please your Majesty,

We your majesty's most loyal subjects, the knights, citizens, and burgesses in parliament assembled, do, with unspeakable joy and comfort, present our humble thanks to your majesty, for your majesty's gracious acceptance of our late address, and that your majesty was pleased, in your princely wisdom, to express your concurrence and opinion with your two houses, in reference to the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands. And we do, with most earnest and repeated desires, implore your majesty, That you would be pleased to take timely care to prevent those dangers that may arise to these kingdoms by the great power of the French king, and the progress he daily makes in those Netherlands and other places. And therefore that your majesty would not defer the entering into such alliances as may obtain those ends; and in case it shall happen that, in pursuance of such alliances, your majesty shall be engaged in a war with the French king, we do hold ourselves obliged, and do with all humility and cheerfulness assure your majesty, that we your most loyal subjects shall always be ready, upon your signification thereof in parliament, fully, and from time to time, to assist your majesty with such aids and supplies, as, by the divine assistance, may enable your majesty to prosecute the same with success.

All which we do most humbly offer to your majesty, as the unanimous sense and desire of the whole nation.

March 30, 1677.

It was alledged against this address, that to press the king to make further alliances with the confederates against the French king, was in effect to press him to a war, that being the direct and unavoidable consequence thereof.

That the consideration of war was most proper for the king, who had intelligence of foreign affairs, and knew the *Arcana Imperii*.

That it was a dangerous thing hastily to incite the king to a war.

That our merchant-ships and effects would be presently seized by the French king within his dominions, and thereby he would acquire the value of, it may be, near a million to enable him to maintain the war against us.

That he would fall upon our plantations, and take, plunder, and annoy them.

That he would send out abundance of capers, and take and disturb all our trading ships in these seas, and the Mediterranean.

That we had not so many ships of war as he, and those thirty which were to be built with the 600,000*l.* now given, could not be finished in two years.

That we had not naval stores and ammunition, &c. sufficient for such a purpose, and if we had, yet the season of the year was too far advanced to set out a considerable fleet: and we could not now lay in beef, pork, &c.

That when we were engaged in a war, the Dutch would likely slip collar, leave us in the war, and so gain to themselves the singular advantage of sole trading in peace, which is the privilege we now enjoy, and should not be weary of.

That it was next to impossible to make alliances with the several parties, as might be expected, such and so various were the several interests and cross-biasses, of and amongst the Emperor, the Spaniard, the Dane, the Dutch, the Brandenburg, and the several lesser Princes of Germany, and others.

That we may easily enter into war, but it would be hard to find the way out of it, and a long war would be destructive to us; for though the Emperor, French, Spaniard, &c. use to maintain war for many years, yet a trading nation, as England is, could not endure a long-winded war.

On the other side it was said,

That they did not address for making war, but making leagues, which might be a means to prevent war.

That the best way to preserve a peace, was to be in a preparation for war.

That admitting a war should ensue thereupon, as was not unlikely, yet that would tend to our peace and safety in conclusion; for it must be agreed, that if the power of France were not reduced, and brought to a more equal balance with its neighbours, we must fight or submit first or last.

That it was commonly the fate of those that kept themselves neutral, when their neighbours were at war, to become a prey to the conqueror.

That now or never was the critical season to make war upon the French, whilst we may have so great auxiliary conjunction; and if it were a dangerous and formidable thing to encounter him now, how much more would it be so when this opportunity was lost, the confederacy disbanded, a peace made on the other side of the water, and we left alone to withstand him single.

That as to his seizing our merchants effects, the case was the same, and no other now than it would be three years hence, or at any time whensoever the war shall commence.

That as to our plantations and our traders, we must consider, though the French was powerful, he was not omnipotent, and we might as well defend them as the Dutch do theirs, by guards, convoys, &c. and chiefly when the French have so many enemies, and we shall have so many friends, as no other time is like to afford.

That they were sorry to hear we had no ships, stores, &c. equal to the French, and to our occasions, and hoped it would appear to be otherwise.

That the season was not so far spent but that a competent fleet might be set out this summer, and that however deficient we might be in this kind, the Dutch were forward and ready to make an effectual supplement in that behalf.

That howsoever ill and false some men might esteem the Dutch, yet interest will not lie, and it is so much their interest to confine and bring down the French, that it is not to be apprehended, but they will steadily adhere to every friend and every alliance they shall join with for that purpose.

That however cross and diverse the several confederates and their interests were, yet a common alliance may be made with them against the French, and as well as they have allied themselves together, as well may the alliance be extended to another, to be added to them, viz. The King of England.

That a numerous and vigorous conjunction against him, is the way to shorten the work, whereas, if he should hereafter attack us singly, he would continue the war on us as long as he pleased, till he pleased to make an end of it and us together, by our final destruction.

That if now we should neglect to make alliances, we had no cause to expect to have one friend, when the French should make peace beyond sea, and single us out for conquest; for all that are conjoined against the French are provoked and disobliged by reason of the great number of English, Scotch, and Irish, which have served, and do still serve the French, and it was proved at the bar of this house within this fortnight, that 1000 men were levied in Scotland, and sent to the French service in January last, and some of them by force and pressing.

Also that it was understood and resented, that we had mainly contributed to this overgrown greatness of the French, by selling Dunkirk, that special key and inlet of Flanders, by making war on the Dutch, in 1665. Whereupon the French joined with the Dutch, under which shelter and opportunity the French king laid the foundation of this great fleet he now hath; buying then many great ships of the Dutch, and

building many others: As to which, but for that occasion, the Dutch would have denied and hindered him, but not observing the triple league, and by our making a joint war with the French against the Dutch, in which the French yet proceeds and triumphs: So that in this respect we have much to redeem and retrieve.

That enmity against the French was the thing wherein this divided nation did unite; and this occasion was to be laid hold on, as an opportunity of moment amongst ourselves.

That the bent and weight of the nation did lean this way; and that was a strong inducement and argument to incline their representatives.

That it had been made appear, and that in parliament, that upon the balance of the French trade, this nation was determined yearly nine hundred thousand pounds, or a million, the value of the goods imported from France, annually so much exceeding that of the goods exported hence thither; whereby it is evident, that such a sum of the treasure and money of the nation was yearly exhausted and carried into France, and all this by unnecessary wines, silks, ribbons, feathers, &c. The saving and retrenching of which expence and exhaustion, will in a great degree serve to maintain the charge of a war.

That the present was the best time for the purpose; and that this would give reputation to the confederates, and comfort and courage to our best friends immediately, and safety to ourselves in futurity, against the old perpetual enemy of England.

The second address was presented to his majesty March the 30th; and no answer returned till April the 11th. In which interval the news came of the French taking of Valenciennes and St Omers, and the defeat of the Prince of Orange at Mont-Cassel. Upon which this following answer was offered to the speaker from his majesty by Mr Secretary Williamson:

C. R.

His majesty having considered your last address, and finding some late alterations in affairs abroad, thinks it necessary to put you in mind, that the only way to prevent the dangers which may arise to these kingdoms, must be by putting his majesty timely in a condition to make such fitting preparations, as may enable him to do what may be most for the security of them. And if for this reason you shall desire to sit any longer time, his majesty is content you may adjourn now before Easter; and meet again suddenly after to ripen this matter, and to perfect some of the most necessary bills now depending.

Given at our court at Whitehall, the 11th of April, 1677.

This occasioned a long debate, and concluded in voting the following answer, which was presented to his majesty by the speaker and the whole house, on Friday, April 13, 1677.

May it please your most excellent Majesty,

We your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the commons in this present parliament assembled, do with great satisfaction of mind observe the regard your majesty is pleased to express to our former addresses, by intimating to us the late alteration of affairs abroad, and do return our most humble thanks for your majesty's most gracious offer made to us thereupon in your last message: and having taken a serious deliberation of the same, and of the preparations your majesty hath therein intimated to us were fitting to be made in order to those publick ends, we have for the present provided a security in a bill for an additional duty of excise, upon which your majesty may raise the sum of 200,000*l*. And if your majesty shall think fit to call us together again for this purpose, in some short time after Easter, by any publick signification of your

majesty's pleasure, commanding our attendance, we shall at our next meeting not only be ready to reimburse your majesty what sums of money shall be expended upon such extraordinary preparations, as shall be made in pursuance of our former addresses, but shall likewise with most chearful hearts proceed both then, and at all other times, to furnish your majesty with so large proportions of assistance and supplies upon this occasion, as may give your majesty and the whole world an ample testimony of our loyalty and affection to your majesty's service, and as may enable your majesty, by the help of Almighty God, to maintain such stricter alliances as you shall have entered into against all opposition whatsoever.

This address was presented April 13th; and upon Easter Monday, April 16th, another message in writing from his majesty, was delivered by Secretary Williamson to the House of Commons, viz.

C. R.

His majesty having considered the answer of this house to his last message, about enabling him to make fitting preparations for the security of these kingdoms, finds by it that they have only enabled him to borrow 200,000*l.* upon a fund given him for other uses: His majesty desires therefore this house should know, and he hopes they will always believe of him, that not only that fund, but any other within his power, shall be engaged to the utmost for the preservation of his kingdoms; but as his majesty's condition is (which his majesty doubts not but is as well known to this house as himself) he must tell them plainly, that without the sum of 600,000*l.* or credit for such a sum, upon new funds, it will not be possible for him to speak or act those things which should answer the ends of their several addresses, without exposing the kingdom to much greater danger: His majesty doth further acquaint you, that having done his part, and laid the true state of things before you, he will not be wanting to use the best means for the safety of his people, which his present condition is capable of.

Given at our court at Whitehall, April 16, 1677.

Thereupon the house fell into present consideration of an answer, and in the first place, it was agreed to return great thanks to his majesty for his zeal for the safety of the kingdom, and the hopes he had given them that he was convinced and satisfied, so as he would speak and act according to what they had desired, and they resolved to give him the utmost assurance, that they would stand by him, and said no man could be unwilling to give a fourth or third part to save the residue. But they said they ought to consider that now they were a very thin house, many of their members being gone home, and that upon such a ground as they could not well blame them; for it was upon a presumption that the parliament should rise before Easter, as had been intimated from his majesty within this fortnight, and universally expected since: and it would be unparliamentary, and very ill taken by their fellow-members, if, in this their absence, they should steal the privilege of granting money, and the thanks which are given for it; that this was a national business, if ever any were, and therefore fit to be handled in a full national representative, and if it had hitherto seemed to go up hill, there was a greater cause to put the whole shoulder to it, and this would be assuring, animating, and satisfactory to the whole nation. But they said it was not their mind to give or suffer any delay; they would desire a recess but for three weeks or a month at most.

And the 200,000*l.* which they had provided for present use, was as much as could be laid out in the meantime; though his majesty had 00,000*l.* more ready told upon the table.

And therefore they thought it most reasonable and advisable, that his majesty should

suffer them to adjourn for such a time; in the interim of which his majesty might, if he pleased, make use of the 200,000*l.* and might also complete the desired alliances, and give notice by proclamation to all members to attend at the time appointed.

The answer is as followeth, and was read and agreed to the same day.

May it please your majesty,

We your majesty's most loyal subjects, the commons in this present parliament assembled, having considered your majesty's last message, and the gracious expressions therein contained, for employing your majesty's whole revenue at any time to raise money for the preservation of your majesty's kingdoms, do find great cause to return our most humble thanks to your majesty for the same, and to desire your majesty to rest assured, that you shall find as much duty and affection in us, as can be expected from a most loyal people, to their most gracious sovereign, and whereas your majesty is pleased to signify to us, that the sum of 200,000*l.* is not sufficient without a further supply, to enable your majesty to speak or act those things which are desired by your people, we humbly take leave to acquaint your majesty, that many of our members, (being upon an expectation of an adjournment before Easter,) are gone into their several counties, we cannot think it parliamentary in their absence, to take upon us the granting of money, but do therefore desire your majesty to be pleased that this house may adjourn itself for such a short time, before the sum of 200,000*l.* can be expended, as your majesty shall think fit, and by your royal proclamation, to command the attendance of all our members at the day of meeting. By which time we hope your majesty may have so formed your affairs, and fixed your alliances, in pursuance of our former addresses, that your majesty may be graciously pleased to impart them to us in parliament; and we no ways doubt but at our next assembling, your majesty will not only meet with a compliance in the supply your majesty desires, but withal, such farther assistance as the posture of your majesty's affairs should require. In consequence whereof, we hope your majesty will be encouraged, in the meantime, to speak and act such things as your majesty shall judge necessary for attaining those great ends, as we have formerly represented to your majesty.

Upon this the parliament was adjourned from April the 16th to the 21st of May following, when they met, and adjourned till Wednesday, May the 23d, at which time his majesty sent a message for the house to attend him presently at the banquetting house at Whitehall, where he made the following speech to them.

Gentlemen,

I have sent for you hither, that I might prevent those mistakes and distrusters which I find some are ready to make, as if I had called you together only to get money from you, for other uses than you would have it employed. I do assure you, on the word of a king, that you shall not repent any trust you repose in me, for the safety of my kingdoms; and I desire you to believe I would not break my credit with you; but as I have already told you, that it will not be possible for me to speak or act those things which should answer the ends of your several addresses without exposing my kingdoms to much greater dangers, so I declare to you again, I will neither hazard my own safety, nor yours, until I be in a better condition than I am able to put myself, both to defend my subjects and offend my enemies.

I do further assure you, I have not lost one day since your last meeting, in doing all I could for your defence; and I tell you plainly, it shall be your fault, and not mine, if your security be not sufficiently provided for.

The Commons returning to their house, and the speech being read, they resolved into a committee of the whole house to consider of it. There was an extraordinary full house, and the following vote passed, upon the question, with very general consent, there being but two negative voices to it.

Resolved,

That an address be made to the king, that his majesty would be pleased to enter into a league offensive and defensive with the States-General of the United Provinces, and to make such other alliances with others of the confederates, as his majesty shall think fit against the growth and power of the French king, and for the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands; and that a committee be appointed to draw up the address, with reasons why this house cannot comply with his majesty's speech, until such alliance be entered into; and further shewing the necessity of the speedy making such alliances; and, when such alliances are made, giving his majesty assurance of speedy and cheerful supplies, from time to time, for supporting and maintaining such alliances.

To which, (the speaker re-assuming the chair, and this being reported,) the house agreed, and appointed a committee.

And adjourned over Ascension-day till Friday.

In the interim the committee appointed met, and drew the address according to the above-mentioned order, a true copy of which is here annexed.

May it please your most excellent Majesty,

Your majesty's most loyal and dutiful subjects, the Commons in parliament assembled, having taken into their serious consideration your majesty's gracious speech, we do beseech your majesty, to believe it is a great affliction to them, to find themselves obliged, (at present) to decline the granting your majesty the supply your majesty is pleased to demand, conceiving it is not agreeable to the usage of parliament, to grant supplies for maintenance of wars and alliances, before they are signified in parliament, (which the two wars against the States of the United Provinces, since your majesty's happy restoration, and the league made with them in January, 1668, for preservation of the Spanish Netherlands, sufficiently prove, without troubling your majesty with instances of greater antiquity,) from which usage, if we should depart, the precedent might be of dangerous consequence in future times, though your majesty's goodness gives us great security during your majesty's reign, which we beseech God long to continue.

This consideration prompted us in our last address to your majesty, before our late recess, humbly to mention to your majesty, our hopes, that before our meeting again, your majesty's alliances might be so fixed, as that your majesty might be graciously pleased to impart them to us in parliament, that so our earnest desires of supplying your majesty, for prosecuting those great ends we had humbly laid before your majesty, might meet with no impediment or obstruction; being highly sensible of the necessity of supporting as well as making the alliances, humbly desired in our former addresses, and which we still conceive so important to the safety of your majesty and your kingdoms, that we cannot, (without unfaithfulness to your majesty and those we represent,) omit upon all occasions, humbly to beseech your majesty, as we do now, "to enter into a league, offensive and defensive, with the States General of the United Provinces against the growth and power of the French king, and for the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands, and to make such other alliances, with other such of the confederates, as your majesty shall think fit and useful to that end;" in doing which (that no time may be lost,) we humbly offer to your majesty these reasons for the expediting of it.

1. That if the entering into such alliances should draw on a war with the French king, it would be less detrimental to your majesty's subjects at this time of the year, they having now fewest effects within the dominion of that king.

2. That though we have great reason to believe the power of the French king to be dangerous to your majesty and your kingdoms, when he shall be at more leisure to molest us, yet we conceive the many enemies he has to deal with at present, together with the situation of your majesty's kingdoms, the unanimity of the people in this cause, the care your majesty hath been pleased to take of your ordinary guard for the sea, together with the credit provided by the late act, for an additional excise for three years, make the entering into, and declaring alliances very safe, until we may in a regular way give your majesty such further supplies, as may enable your majesty to support your alliances, and defend your kingdoms.

3. Because of the great danger and charge which must necessarily fall upon your majesty's kingdoms, if, (through want of that timely encouragement and assistance, which your majesty, joining with the States General of the United Provinces, and other confederates, would give them,) the said states, or any other considerable part of the confederates, should this next winter, or summer, make a peace or truce with the French king, (the prevention whereof must hitherto be acknowledged a singular effect of God's goodness to us,) which, if it should happen, your majesty would be afterwards necessitated with fewer, perhaps with no alliances or assistance, to withstand the power of the French king, which hath so long and so successfully contended with so many and so potent adversaries; and whilst he continues his overbalancing greatness, must always be dangerous to his neighbours, since he would be able to oppress any one confederate, before the rest could get together, and be in so good a posture of offending him as they now are, being jointly engaged in a war. And if he should be so successful as to make a peace, or disunite the present confederation against him, it is much to be feared, whether it would be possible ever to re-unite it, at least it would be a work of so much time and difficulty, as would leave your majesty's kingdoms exposed to much misery and danger.

Having thus discharged our duty, in laying before your majesty the dangers threatening your majesty and your kingdoms, and the only remedies we can think of, for the preventing, securing, and quieting the minds of your majesty's people, with some few of those reasons which have moved us to this, and our former addresses on this subject, we most humbly beseech your majesty to take this matter into your most serious consideration, and to take such resolutions as may not leave it in the power of any neighbouring prince to rob your people of that happiness which they enjoy, under your majesty's gracious government; beseeching your majesty to rest confident and assured, that when your majesty shall be pleased to declare such alliances in parliament, we shall hold ourselves obliged, not only by our promises and assurances given, and now with great unanimity renewed in a full house, but by the zeal and desires of those whom we represent, and by the interests of all our safeties, most cheerfully to give your majesty such speedy supplies and assistances as may fully and plentifully answer the occasions, and, by God's blessing, preserve your majesty's honour and the safety of the people.

All which is most humbly submitted to your majesty's great wisdom.

Friday, May 25th, 1677.

Sir John Trevor reported from the said committee the address, which was read and agreed to, and ordered that those members of the house, who were of his majesty's privy council, should move his majesty to know his pleasure, when the house might wait upon him with their address.

Saturday, May 26th, 1677.

The house being sat, had notice by Mr Secretary Coventry, That the king would receive their address at three in the afternoon ; at which time they attended the king with it at the Banqueting-house, in Whitehall, which being presented, the king answered, That it was long and of great importance, that he would consider of it, and give them an answer as soon as he could.

The house adjourned till Monday, May the 28th, when being sate, they received notice by Secretary Coventry, that the king expected them immediately in the Banqueting-House ; whither being come, the king made a speech to them on the subject of their address ; which speech, to prevent mistakes, his majesty read out of his paper, and then delivered the same to the speaker. And his majesty added a few words about their adjournment.

The king's speech is as followeth :

Gentlemen,

Could I have been silent, I would rather have chosen to be so, than to call to mind things so unfit for you to meddle with as are contained in some parts of your late addresses, wherein you have entrenched upon so undoubted a right of the crown, that I am confident it will appear in no age (when the sword was not drawn) that the prerogative of making peace and war hath been so dangerously invaded.

You do not content yourselves with desiring me to enter into such leagues as may be for the safety of the kingdom, but you tell me what sort of leagues they must be, and with whom ; and (as your address is worded) it is more liable to be understood to be by your leave, than at your request, that I should make such other alliances as I please with other of the confederates.

Should I suffer this fundamental power of making peace and war to be so far invaded (though but once) as to have the manner and circumstances of leagues prescribed to me by parliament, it's plain that no prince or state would any longer believe that the sovereignty of England rests in the crown ; nor could I think myself to signify any more to foreign princes than the empty sound of a king : Wherefore you may rest assured, that no condition shall make me depart from, or lessen, so essential a part of the monarchy. And I am willing to believe so well of this House of Commons, that I am confident these ill consequences are not intended by you.

These are, in short, the reasons why I can by no means approve of your address ; and yet, though you have declined to grant me that supply which is necessary to the ends of it, I do again declare to you, that as I have done all that lay in my power since your last meeting, so I will still apply myself, by all the means I can, to let the world see my care for the security and satisfaction of my people, although it may not be with those advantages to them which, by your assistances, I might have procured.

And having said this, he signified to them, they should adjourn till the 16th of July next. And, upon meeting then, were adjourned till the 3d day of December.

May it not be worth remembering, who advised his majesty to make such an answer to his parliament ?

Short Remarks upon the late Act of Resumption of the Irish Forfeitures, and upon the Manner of putting that Act in Execution. 1701.

When the nation had undergone a revulsion of sentiment towards King William, every flaw was industriously sought out which could serve to blemish his character.—“Among other complaints, one was, that the king had given grants of the confiscated estates in Ireland. It was told before, that a bill being sent up by the Commons, attainting the Irish that had been in arms, and applying their estates to the paying the public debts, leaving only a power to the king to dispose of the third part of them, was like to lye long before the Lords, many petitions being offered against it; upon which the king, to bring the session to a speedy conclusion, had promised that this matter should be kept entire till their next meeting; but the session going over without any proceeding, the king granted away all those confiscations; it being an undoubted branch of the royal prerogative, that all confiscations accrued to the crown, and might be granted away at the pleasure of the king. It was pretended that those estates came to a million and a half in value. Great objections were made to the merits of some who had the largest share in those grants. Attempts had been made in the parliament of Ireland to obtain a confirmation of them; but that which Ginkle, who was created Earl of Athlone, had, was only confirmed. Now it was become a popular subject of declamation to arraign both the grants and those who had them. Motions had been often made for a resumption of all the grants which had been made in this reign: but in answer to this it was said, that since no such motion had been made for a resumption of the grants made in Charles II.'s reign, notwithstanding the extravagant profusion of them, and the ill grounds upon which they were made, it shewed both a disrespect and black ingratitude, if, while no other grants were resumed, this king's only should be called in question. The court-party said often, let the retrospect go back to the year 1660, and they would consent to it, and that which might be got by it would be worth the while. It was answered, this was not the time, that so many sales, mortgages, and settlements had been made, pursuant to those grants; so all these attempts came to nothing. But now they fell on a more effectual method. A commission was given, by act of parliament, to seven persons named by the House of Commons, to enquire into the value of the confiscated estates in Ireland so granted away, and into the considerations upon which those grants were made.”—BURNET, IV. 421.

EVERY the least trade, or body of men in the kingdom, when they find themselves aggrieved by a law, are allowed the liberty of plainly representing their grievance, and petitioning for redress by the repeal of that law. I hope it will not be accounted a crime, nor an unbecoming assurance, in one who is a sufferer by the late bill for resumption of Irish forfeitures, to lay before the honourable House of Commons a few short remarks upon that bill, and the manner of the execution of it, whereby himself, and many others of his majesty's protestant subjects whose veins hold no other blood than what is English, have suffered to a very great degree, in hopes that the house may think that matter worthy of a review and second consideration.

2. I am firmly persuaded, that if the truth of the state of the Irish grants, or any thing near it, had been honestly represented to the House of Commons, whatever

schemes of affairs some particular enterprising gentlemen might have projected and framed to themselves, it would have been impossible to have gained a majority of that house to have passed the bill, at least not in the manner it is now framed.

3. As to the bill now depending in the house for the resumption of English grants, although probably there is not one of the grantees who is not represented by a member in whose election his grant gave him a right of voting, and although the matter being transacted here, it may reasonably be presumed that many members of both houses are thoroughly acquainted with the grants themselves, and the considerations for making them, the printed votes tell us every day, that as many petitions as are offered against the bill are easily received, and referred to the committee to whom the bill is committed: But unhappy Ireland is to be bound by a law made by persons never chosen to represent her; persons who cannot be presumed to be truly acquainted, of their own knowledge, with her present circumstances, interests, or affairs, and this too without giving her any opportunity of being heard for herself. It is not the intent of this paper to enter into the question of the right, (which some, however, think of considerable weight and consequence in the matter,) but to consider how a thing so unusual and extraordinary did prevail.

4. I do not presume by any means to arraign or censure the proceedings of a parliament; it is no reflection upon them to do things which carry a fair appearance of advantage to the publick, as they are represented to them, though deceits may be put upon them: And it's a sufficient reconciling of their proceedings to the rules of justice and equity, that they used all the caution that was necessary to obtain a true information of the state of the case; that they sent over commissioners, fortified with very large power, to make enquiries, and to report the matter to the house. It could not be presumed (and therefore a suggestion of that kind would have been ridiculed) that persons so employed would dare to make a report to such an assembly without due examination, and much less to affirm facts contrary to plain informations received; and it is no wonder, as the report stated matters to them, that it should move their indignation to the highest degree. I shall not offer to dispute the reasonableness of any one step taken by either house in the affair; I have learned to make my understanding submit to whatever the parliament judge to be reasonable and fitting to be done: But if many innocent families must unavoidably be ruined by the bill grounded upon that report; and if that information shall evidently appear to be grossly false in itself in many, nay, most particulars, and that those mistakes were not due to want of opportunities of being truly informed, but to a resolution to represent things quite otherwise than the truth was, perhaps the house may think itself concerned in honour to express some resentments, or a dislike at least, of such an abuse of the confidence reposed by them in their commissioners, which produced a bill so severe, to say nothing more of it.

5. The most avowed enemies of that unfortunate kingdom, though witty gentlemen (who although they despise it, and all that belong to it, yet, at the same time, contrary to the nature of contempt, make it the very mark of their envy,) must allow that the dull protestants of Ireland were great sufferers upon account of their religion and firm adherence to the interest of England; that such of them as were forced to fly for want of arms, or of a force capable of making a stand, were as forward to return and venture their lives for the asserting the English laws and liberties as any subjects whatever; and that such of them as could get into a body, and possess themselves of places of any strength, did defend those places to the wonder of mankind. And it cannot be denied, that by that defence, and the stand that they made there, the ravages and calamities that attend a war were kept in that poor country, of which war (without that opposition) England in all probability had been the seat.

6. These things could not soon slip out of memory, or be forgotten; nor could the interest that some of those sufferers and the protestants of Ireland had in those grants in general be unknown; and therefore the gentlemen who projected the creating of

beneficial offices to themselves, at the expence of a poor kingdom, were put to make use of all their skill to work up the minds of people into such a ferment as might master and overpower every thought of tenderness and compassion: And it's pretty well known what courses they took to do it; but time will quiet passions and discover truth. Two of the three reporting commissioners are soon to appear before the house. I think it may not be improper to give some hints of enquiries which the members, if they please, may make, in order to their having some certain measure of what they are to depend upon from the act, (for, as has been very well observed, the late report skillfully avoids every thing of this kind,) and that the poor soldiers, the persons concerned in the transport debt, &c. after a tedious waiting, may not find themselves deceived by such a fund as to make selling their debentures at fifty per cent. the most eligible part.

7. I will, for the present, admit that the general distaste which this bill has given to the body of the kingdom of Ireland, is not a false step in policy at this time: I will suppose too, that the apprehensions which many there have taken up, that it looks like a very breach of their constitution, is perfectly groundless, and of no consequence; (without doubt the gentleman, who said in discourse that it were better the bill should be lost, than the express repeal of an act of their parliament should be omitted, as he seemed perfectly master of the conduct of the whole bill, has some very extraordinary reasons for his saying so;) yet I am fully persuaded, if England had been made sensible that the act would be a certain ruin to so many English protestant families, that besides the resumption itself, (which would lie heavy enough upon many of the subjects of that kingdom,) the charges of making and attending their claims would be such as that kingdom is not able to bear; and that the effect of this would be only the creating offices of advantage to some particular gentlemen, with a very little return in ease of the English debts. I am persuaded that an English parliament would have scorned to take this course in easing herself in an inconsiderable sum, by laying such an overload upon her slave and drudge; much less would it have committed into the hands of some gentlemen such unlimited powers over a kingdom, as are without any precedent in English law or history: and perhaps their justice and compassion may incline them yet to find out some means of removing the load, and relieving the poor sufferers.

8. Instead of this it's reported abroad, that the gentlemen employed are not content with their present power, nor think themselves yet arbitrary enough, but solicit an enlargement of their authorities, as well as of their time, and consequently of their very good salaries. Whether that, or the finding some way of delivering a miserable people of such masters, be the more reasonable, a satisfactory answer to some few questions may perhaps in some measure determine.

9. The first report is before the house: It was that which raised the expectation of the parliament so high, that they thought reasonable to vary from their general course of proceeding, and to do things not common, by which several members expressed themselves sensible that some hardships would unavoidably fall upon particular persons, but the general good over-ruled such considerations; and they chose rather to strain a little, than not come at such a mine as was promised them towards easing a burden which lay very heavy on England. Two of the three who subscribed the first report, (as is said before) are soon to attend the house, particularly Mr Ansley, who after having delivered that report at the bar of the house, undertook to justify and answer all objections that should be made against it; for the truth of which I am confident I may appeal to the memory of several members who heard him, although perhaps he might have reason to be assured he did not run any great hazard of being at that time called upon to make good what he so strongly promised. I think it may be immediately expected, after a full year's further attendance upon that enquiry, he should be able to give a full, plain, and direct answer how far that revenue may be de-

pendent upon as a fund for what is charged upon it, (which are debts of honour and of great compassion,) and whether the produce of it will be an equivalent for the setting a precedent of investing a few gentlemen, not all of them perfectly skilled in the laws, or of visible fortunes, with so arbitrary a power of judging and determining the property of a whole kingdom, that the wisdom of the laws of England has not thought it safe to intrust the king, the House of Peers, and all the courts of justice in this land with any thing like it.

10. The estate commonly called the private estate, (those lands which were vested in the Duke of York before his accession to the throne, and afterwards granted to the Lady Orkney,) I take to be out of the compass of this enquiry: there was no need of furnishing out commissioners at such an expence, and such large powers relating to that.

There were very few claims to be heard; the commissioners, as I have been well assured, had an entry at large delivered to them, a perfect rent-roll of the estate; the gentlemen concerned in the management of it put that matter into such order for them, that Mr Hooper, (now a commissioner, and their then secretary,) said at the board, that had the like methods been observed in all returns, three months would have been sufficient to have completed their business. So that a very small expence of time and pains might ascertain the true state of those lands, as may be very easily judged, as well from what is above said, as from that very nice account given of this estate by a late ingenious author. If therefore there has been any considerable waste of time and expence in that matter, it has had some other end in it, than barely to be informed of the truth of that revenue. I hear the commissioners report those lands to be of a very extravagant value; at present I'll not concern myself further about them, than to caution people against being deceived by the same methods a second time, and to say that those lands may be disposed of without the yearly expence of forty thousand pounds in salaries, and other charges, to effect it. Jus Re

11. But it may be proper to have the house truly informed what has been made of things, properly called forfeitures, in a year's time. There can have been but little need of their judicial power of hearing and determining claims to personal estates; and therefore it's to be presumed that all those matters are over, and that they are able to give a perfect account of them.

It may then be reasonably demanded,

1st, What the value of those are? How much received, and what proportion those receipts bear to the first report? And in general how far the first report will be verified, in what particulars it will fall short, and how much?

2dly, Whether they have made any inventory of those personal goods and chattels that are vested in them, to whom they have sold them, and for how much?

The neglect or delay of doing this, is an abuse of the favour intended by the parliament to the purchasers of forfeited interests, as to the third part of their purchase-money, forasmuch as they are to receive part of the twenty-one thousand pounds, allotted to them out of the produce of the personal estates.

It may be demanded of them in general,

3dly, What cash remains now in the hands of their receivers, or cashiers, in Dublin, above the charge of their salaries and management; and whether in their accounts credit is given by what is made by the fees in several offices? It is conceived this ought to be done, in regard the whole expence is defrayed out of the produce of the forfeitures; and therefore it's reasonable that the fees should be esteemed so much neat money, and ought to be accounted for as such.

And it is to be hoped the house will require their laying before them their table of fees, which, (however moderate it may appear,) is an excessive charge to the king-

dom; for by the act the claimant is obliged in his claim, to set forth his title, and by what deeds he derives it: So that where the thing is of inconsiderable value, (which generally happens in cases of such as are least able to bear it,) the charge of attendance, and paying the court, exceeds the value of the interest claimed. The usual expence in the offices for an ordinary claim is about ten pounds, of greater claims abundantly more.

4thly, Have they proceeded to sell such part of the forfeited lands, as have not been claimed, or such as have been claimed and discussed? If so, to what value do the lands sold amount? If not, what is their reason for delaying the execution of that part of the act?

5thly, Whether they have given certificates to entitle the purchasers to their respective shares of the twenty-one thousand pounds? If they have given such certificates, when did they give the same, and whether such certificates have not been demanded, and refused by them? If so, upon what account was such refusal? Whether by such refusal the purchasers have not been hindered from receiving All Saints' rent, and will not also lose the rents becoming due this May? Have they allowed them interest for their shares of the twenty-one thousand pounds? Have they not been delayed of the advantage the act intended them of demanding the remainder of the money from those of whom they purchased, for want of such certificates? What was the number of those purchasers, and what was the expence of prosecuting each claim, in order to entitle such purchasers to their share of the twenty-one thousand pounds.

12. This right must be done to the trustees, that they have endeavoured in most cases to make the utmost of their trust; but whether by such methods and courses as the honour of an English parliament would endure, if they were acquainted with them, may be known by answers to the following particulars.

1st, The act requires such as are in possession of forfeited lands to return a true particular of the value, under a great penalty: Whether they have expected such a particular, according to the value that a tenant might reasonably give for the land to be set out to farm, or whether according to the rates which the lowest under-tenants, and small cotters, (who work out all that which is called their rent, and much more, with their landlords,) do agree to pay to the tenant, and what all such under-rent cast up together amount to?

This is the kind of enquiry which has been made in the private estate, to make its value appear considerable.

2dly, Whether they have not contracted with tenants for leases for one year, and what the returns of such contracts were? Whether they have not frequently set the same lands afterwards to other tenants, notwithstanding the former agreements, for a little more than the first tenant contracted for? And whether they have not dispossessed the first tenant, and compelled him, and by what means, to advance his rent, or quit the possession?

3dly, Whether they have not ordered their collectors, managers, and receivers, to demand more rents than the tenants contracted for, and not to allow what the tenant paid for quit-rents, or the land-tax; and in default of payment, to distrain? Whether they have not directed their receivers not to obey or regard any replevins, if the tenant should sue out such, and require sheriffs, (particularly the sheriff of the county of Limerick) not to issue or execute any replevin against any person distraining by their order? Have they any entries or copies of the orders given by them to their collectors and receivers? These would be worth perusal.

4thly, What is the reason why lessees, who are not liable to pay quit-rent, or any more than a moiety of the land-tax, have been obliged to pay their whole rent, with-

out allowance given for quit-rent, or for the landlord's part of the land-tax paid by them, only being promised an allowance for the money in some future half-year's rent? If the intent of this proceeding should be to make the rent-roll as considerable as possible, that were a deceitful representation to continue the house under the same mistake, into which the former report led them, which the house will hardly endure. It's past all dispute, that the incurring interest of allowed incumbrances, and arrears due for quit-rent, and for the land-tax, mightily swell the debt, and that they must be paid one time or other, unless the land be sold, and by that means, and by the clause in the act, the quit-rent and land-tax be cut off; but this would be such a piece of injustice, as it is to be hoped will not be suffered.

13. As to the hardships put upon the claimants, and the burden upon the whole kingdom, the irregularity of their proceedings, and the liberty they take by their supreme power of setting aside formal settled regular proceedings at law, it may be worth enquiring,

1st, The trustees being by the act empowered to send for persons as they shall think fit, (which seems so great a trust and authority, that it ought not to be put into other hands,) have they not committed that power of summoning persons to any clerk or clerks, and to whom? Have not several persons been summoned from remote parts of the kingdom, and after long attendance at Dublin, been dismissed without being examined? Have not blank summons been sent into the country, and filled up there? Have not claimants attended with their witnesses at the times their claims were posted to be heard, and been put off from day to day, yet obliged to attend at the peril of their claims being dismissed for want of prosecution? Have they not been so delayed and put off upon motion of the trustees' council, or of Mr White, upon a bare suggestion, that they should have evidence hereafter for the trust? Did the trustees in cases of this nature, when the claims had been regularly posted, and the times for their coming on were well known to Mr White, require an oath, or put them off upon bare allegations, or shewing of letters out of the country? Was not this very expensive to the claimants? Was any allowance made to them for such their loss and expence?

2dly, Where a protestant was in possession before the 13th of February, 1688, or since that time, upon mortgages, judgments, extents, or otherwise, of lands belonging to forfeited persons:

Whether the trustees have not dispossessed such protestants, and received the profits, although such protestants recovered at law, (after the forfeiture,) against the king or his grantee, whilst they had the estate of the forfeiting person in them, and were actually in possession when the act past?

3dly, When such protestant incumbrances have been allowed upon the claims of such protestants, whether they have again been put into possession, or been paid any part of the interest of their incumbrances by the trustees?

The act vesting the lands in the trustees, according to the several interests of the forfeiting persons, with a saving to the rights of others, whether they do carry the equal and indifferent hand which persons intrusted as judges ought, if they do first by their power first dispossess him who had a lawful title to the possession, because the act vests the lands in them, but afterwards, though the claimant's title be allowed, will not restore him to his possession, or allow him interest for his money?

14. The property of the subjects of Ireland, though not much valued and regarded by some people, is to them as dear as theirs is to the happier men, whose lot is fallen to them in England, and they wish for nothing more than to be subject to the same laws as Englishmen. Ireland has been famous to a proverb, for producing witnesses ready to assert any thing that may give them a prospect of yielding advantage: Such wit-

nesses, and the credit they deserve, are pretty well known to their neighbourhood, the inhabitants of that country, who have been long under the afflicting necessity of conversing with them: But they are not so unskilful in their trade, as not to be able to frame stories so consistent, that strangers to them and their behaviour (of which kind of persons the trust is for the greatest part composed) may easily be imposed upon by them. I mention not this out of a desire that more trustees of that kingdom should be appointed. That nation has had too sad experiences of the candour and good-will of some of her natives already, to make that her wish. But since the matters subject to their enquiry and determination are of so great value, and property is so highly concerned, whether it might not have been reasonable to have kept up to the old law of England, of enquiring by jury in some of the most difficult and considerable cases, if not in all, might surely be worthy of consideration, especially if what I hear some of the trustees pretend unto, and aim at, be true.

In a place that never had a privilege of holding parliaments of its own confirmed to it, let it be never so entirely subjected to the crown of England by an absolute conquest, or otherwise, yet if the benefit of English laws were once granted to it, I cannot believe that a parliament of England would think it reasonable to subject the estates and properties of persons living there, not guilty of any crime, nor under any accusation, to the arbitrary will and disposal of any number of men: yet according to the interpretation some of these gentlemen put upon their own authority, and which, as it is reported, they are endeavouring to get explained and established by new clauses, this seems to be the case of Ireland.

15. The words of the act do vest the estates of forfeiting persons in the trustees, and empower them to dispose of those estates. *A.* who is a forfeiting person, has lands called *D.* adjoining to the estate of *B.* A forfeiting person called *S.* *A.* is in possession of a piece of land, as parcel of his estate, but *B.* laid claim to it as a parcel of *S.* The trustees in this case are warranted by the act to adjudge that *B.*'s estate called *S.* is vested in them; but if they may go farther, and determine that that particular parcel of land, of which *A.* was in possession, is parcel of that of *S.* (the estate vested in them) and thereupon shall dispossess *A.* (such opinions and cases there have been) and this proceeding should be established, what man in Ireland can be safe? Or what estate is there in that kingdom that is not subject to their pleasure, and arbitrary determination, without jury, or other legal proceedings whatsoever, or any appeal of redress?

16. Might it not be of dangerous consequence to allow a power to persons (some of whom have shewed themselves not very well versed in legal proceedings) to ravel into the acts of courts of justice, and unsettle legal determinations, taking upon themselves a jurisdiction to determine between party and party, which of them has a right to the thing claimed, and by that determination in effect reversing a former decree, or other legal proceeding? For example: A debt claimed upon a forfeited estate by two several claimants, both of them fully, and to satisfaction, make the debt appear to be due; so that the trustees are by the act required to decree that it is a just debt: but what are the words of the act, or was it ever the intent of the parliament to take from the proper courts, and the ordinary course of law, the power of deciding to which of the contesting parties the debt belongs, and to make the trustees, the judges, and determiners of that which in no sort encreases or diminishes the sum to be raised? Yet such cases there are where the trustees have exerted their power, and taken upon themselves to adjudge (and that too contrary to former legal determinations in proper courts) to which of the parties the debt of right belongs, and have refused to form their decree in such terms as might have allowed the debt, and saved the right (whatever it was) of each party.

17. A few instances of this kind may shew how dangerous a thing the giving of a power, which seems unlimited, may prove, and what the consequences of their obtain-

ing a general confirmation of their proceedings, would be, which it seems they are endeavouring to procure.

18. The trustees by the act have a power to adjust accounts on penalties. A protestant incumbrancer is in possession by virtue of his incumbrance (for example, tenants by elegit or statute) the land is granted by the king in fee, and the grantee sells it: The purchaser (whose business and interest it then was to be as strict in exacting an account as possible) accounts with the tenant by elegit, &c. and after the best information he can get, settles the land, as if it were worth two shillings per acre, during the extent, and pays the ballance of the account settled: having now lost two-thirds of his purchase-money at least in effect, claims the remainder of the debt which he paid to the creditor, and has not received out of the profits of the land. The master to whom the account is referred charges the land as worth (by a value now set upon it) four shillings per acre, so as the debt is not only paid, but a great balance on the other side. Were it not a strange way of accounting in this case, to charge him that paid off the debt for clearing his purchase, with more profits made of the land than he could get allowed in his accounting with the creditors, though he used his utmost endeavours, and good husbandry, as it was his interest, all that he could get allowed being for what appeared then so much saved in his pocket; so that he may be concluded to have done his best?

19. Have not the trustees obliged all persons who had money secured to them by judgment, statute, or mortgage, since May 86, to prove the actual payment and loan of the money, and adjudged all securities on voluntary conveyances within the intent of the act, where there has not been actual proof of the payment of the money? And have not several persons lost their debts upon that account, though there was no ground of suspicion, or pretence of fraud, in acknowledging such statute or judgment; but for want of witnesses directly proving the payment of their money, have had their claims dismissed?

20. Have not the trustees protected all persons from arrests, who either are summoned as witnesses, or pretend to be able to do service by making out a title to lands in the trustees?

Have not several debtors been thus protected, who never did or could do such service? Does not Mr Abraham White their clerk give such summons as oft as asked; and enter any man's name as a discoverer who calls himself so? That entry makes his person sacred, till application is made to the trustees, who, it's true, of late have been less fond of protecting such persons than formerly: But the expence of moving the trustees, and procuring a report of the matter is so great, that few complain of the hardships of that kind which they lie under.

21. Upon the whole matter, if the parliament shall upon examination find the resumption itself, in the manner it now stands, a great blow to the protestant interest in Ireland, and a lessening the English interest there; if it be made evident to them, that the expences of attending by claimants and persons summoned to Dublin, by the power of the trustees, will amount to a greater charge upon that impoverished kingdom, than the whole enquiry will return neat to England; if they shall find that the powers given the trustees, either really in themselves, or as they are put in practice, do put a stop at present to the common course of justice in that kingdom, ravel into, and unsettle legal determinations as far beyond the common sense of the words of the act, as the powers themselves do exceed all that were ever yet granted; and if after all this the continuance of this act, and of the execution of it, will prove at last only an enriching of some particular persons out of the spoil of a poor harassed kingdom, and giving to a few opportunities of venting their private piques and animosities, without turning to any considerable advantage to England; it is humbly offered to the consideration of the

parliament, whether England will not think it worth its while to fall in with some more tolerable expedient of gaining out of those estates so much as they may bear, without the ruining many innocent families who have been faithful to its interests; and not insist upon the exerting of such an extraordinary power, so unprecedented in its frame, and fatal in its consequences?

22. The writer of this paper would not by any of his expressions be apprehended to charge all the trustees with the hardships and severities of which Ireland complains. He believes there are among them some very honest gentlemen who bear no particular grudge, in whose composition malice has no share, who are not so far engaged in point of reputation to maintain the first report, or linked with those who are, so as to break through rules of justice to do it: He wishes there were a few more of the same kind. The different carriage of those gentlemen upon the bench, and their candour in hearing fairly without asking captious questions, making such enquiries as shew that they search after truth, and are willing to hear the whole as well what makes against them as for them, does distinguish their behaviour, and shew that they intend to put the trust reposed in them honestly in execution, and (as some people have expressed it) to make no more hard cases than are made to their hands. But the skill of the resolved gentlemen is such, that there can be no publick distinction made; their debates and votes, like those of the inquisition, are private among themselves, and the sentence of the majority there, is pronounced generally upon the bench by one of them as the opinion of the whole number. I blame not the proceeding, but mention the course as an excuse for charging the trustees in general with things which I am satisfied some of them do abhor, and cannot submit to without indignation.

Thus have I endeavoured with candour and justice to lay things as they really are before the great and wise legislators of this nation, to whose determination I do with all humility submit the same.

A true List of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of this present Parliament, appointed by Proclamation to meet at Westminster, on Thursday, the 6th of February, 1700-1.

(Note, Those who have this mark [*] before them, were not members of the last parliament.)

Bedfordshire, 4.
The Right Hon. the Lord
Edward Russel
Sir William Gostwick, Kt.
and Bar.

Town of Bedford.
William Spencer, Esq.
* Samuel Rolt, Esq.

Berks, 9.
Sir Humphry Foster, Bar.

Richard Neville, Esq.
Borough of New Windsor.
The Rt. Hon. John Lord
Visc. Fitzharding
Richard Topham, Esq.
Borough of Reading.
Sir Owen Buckingham, Kt.
* Francis Knowles, Esq.
Borough of Wallingford.
* William Jennings, Esq.
* Thomas Randa, Esq.

Borough of Abingdon.
Symon Harcourt, Esq.

Bucks, 14.
The Right Hon. William
Lord Cheyne, Viscount
Newhaven
The Hon. Goodwin Whar-
ton, Esq.
Town of Buckingham.
Sir Richard Temple, Bar.

Sir Edmund Denton, Bar.
Borough of Chipping Wi-
comb.

Charles Godfrey, Esq.
* Fleetwood Dormer, Esq.
Borough of Aylesbury.

* Sir Thomas Lee, Bar.
The Hon. James Herbert,
Esq.

Borough of Agmondesham.
The Right Hon. William
Lord Cheyne, Viscount
Newhaven

Sir John Garrard, dead
Borough of Wendover.

John Backwell, Esq.
* Richard Hambden, Esq.
Borough of Great Marlow.

Sir James Etherege, Kt.
James Chase, Esq.

Cambridgeshire, 6.

The Right Hon. John Lord
Cutts

Sir Rushout Cullen, Bar.
University of Cambridge.
The Hon. Henry Boyle,
Esq.

Anthony Hammond, Esq.
Town of Cambridge.

Sir John Cotton, Bar.
Sir Henry Pickering, Bar.

Cheshire, 4.

Sir John Manwaring, Bar.
Sir Robert Cotton, Bar.

City of Chester.
* Sir Henry Bunbury, Bar.
Peter Shackerty, Esq.

Cornwall, 44.

The Rt. Hon. Hugh Bos-
cown, Esq.

John Speccot, Esq.
Borough of Dunhvid, alias
Lanceston.

The Rt. Hon. Henry Lord
Hyde

William Carey, Esq.
Borough of Leskard.

William Bridges, Esq.
Henry Darrel, Esq.

Borough of Lestwithiel.

* Sir John Molsworth, Bar.
* John Buller of Keverel,
Esq.

Borough of Truro.

Henry Vincent, Esq.
Hugh Fortescue, Esq.

Borough of Bodmin.

The Hon. Russel Robarts,
Esq.

John Hoblyn, Esq.

Borough of Helston.

Charles Godolphin, Esq.
Sidney Godolphin, Esq.

Borough of Saltash.

Alexander Pendarvis, Esq.
Francis Buller, Esq.

Borough of Camelford.

Dennis Glynn, Esq.

Henry Manaton, Esq.

Borough of Portwitham,
alias Westlow.

James Kendall, Esq.

John Mountstevens, Esq.

Borough of Crampound.

Sir William Scawen, Kt.
Francis Scobell, Esq.

Borough of Eastlow.

Sir Henry Seymour, Kt.

* — Godolphin, Esq.

Borough of Penryn.

Alex. Pendarvis, Esq.

Samuel Trefusis, Esq.

Borough of Tregony.

Francis Robarts, Esq.

Hugh Fortescue, Esq.

Borough of Bossiney.

The Hon. Francis Robarts,
Esq.

John Tregagle, Esq.

Borough of St. Ives.

James Praed, Esq.

* Benjamin Overton, Esq.

Borough of Foway.

The Hon. John Granville,
Esq.

* — Williams, Esq.

Borough of St German.

John Specott, Esq.

Daniel Eliot, Esq.

Borough of St Michael.

* Anthony Row, Esq.

* William Beau, Esq.

Borough of Newport.

* John Prideaux, Esq.

— Stratford, Esq.

Borough of St Mawes.

Sir Joseph Tredenham, Kt.

John Tredenham, Esq.

Borough of Callington.

Sir William Croyton, Bart.

Robert Roll, Esq.

Cumberland, 6.

* Richard Musgrave, Esq.

* Gilfrid Lawson, Esq.

City of Carlisle.

* Philip Howard, Esq.

James Lowther, Esq.

Borough of Cockermouth.

William Seymour, Esq.

George Fletcher, Esq.]

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The Right Hon. William
Lord Marquis of Har-
tington

The Right Hon. John Lord
Roos

Town of Derby.

The Rt. Hon. Lord James
Cavendish

* Sir Charles Pye, Bart.

Devonshire, 26.

Francis Roll, Esq.

* William Courtenay, Esq.

City of Exeter.

Sir Edward Seymour, Bar.

Sir Bartholomew Shower,
Kt.

Borough of Totness.

Francis Gwynne, Esq.

Thomas Colson, Esq.

Borough of Plymouth.

Charles Trelawney, Esq.

Henry Trelawney, Esq.

Town of Oakhampton.

William Harris, Esq.

Thomas Northmore, Esq.

Borough of Barnstaple.

Nicholas Hooper, Serj. at
Law

Arthur Champneys, Esq.

Borough of Plumpton.

Courtney Croker, Esq.

Martin Rider, Esq.

Borough of Honiton.

Sir Walter Young, Bar.

Sir William Drake, Bar.

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RusselThe Rt. Hon. Lord Edward
Russel*Borough of Ashburton.*

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Richard Duke, Esq.

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mouth and Hardnes.**Double Return.*

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* Thomas Vernon, Esq.

Frederick Herne, Esq.

* Nathaniel Herne, Esq.

Borough of Beralston.

Sir Rowland Gwyne, Kt.

* Peter King, Esq.

*Borough of Tiverton.*The Right Hon. Charles
Lord Spencer

Thomas Bere, Esq.

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Tho. Strangeways, Esq.

Thomas Freke, Esq.

Town of Poole.

Sir William Phipperd, Kt.

William Jolliff, Esq.

Borough of Dorchester.

Thomas Trenchard, Esq.

Nathaniel Napier, Esq.

Borough of Lyme Regis.

Robert Henley, Esq.

* Joseph Paice, Esq.

Borough of Weymouth.

The Hon. Hen. Thynn, Esq.

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Michael Harvey, Esq.

Borough of Bridport.

* William Gulson, Esq.

Alexander Pitfield, Esq.

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Thomas Chaffine, Esq.

Borough of Wareham.

Thomas Earle, Esq.

George Pitt, Esq.

Borough of Corfe-Castle.

Richard Frowns, Esq.

John Banks, Esq.

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William Lampton, Esq.

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gue, Esq.

Thomas Conyers, Esq.

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* Sir Francis Massam, Kt.

Borough of Colchester.

Sir Thomas Cooke, Kt.

Sir Isaac Rebow, Kt.

Borough of Malden.

Irby Montague, Esq.

* William Fitch, Esq.

Borough of Harwich.

Sir Thomas Davall, Kt.

* Dennis Lyddell, Esq.

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Sir Richard Cocks, Bar.

City of Gloucester.

William Selwin, Esq.

* John Bridgman, Esq.

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Esq.

Charles Cox, Esq.

Borough of Tewkesbury.

Richard Dowdswell, Esq.

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Henry Gorges, Esq.

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*Borough of Lempster.*The Right Hon. Thomas
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* John Dutton Colt, Esq.

Borough of Weobly.

* John Birch, Esq.

Henry Cornwall, Esq.

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Ralph Freeman, Esq.

Borough of St Albans.

George Churchill, Esq.

* Joshua Lomax, Esq.

Borough of Hertford.

* Thomas Filmer, Esq. dead

* Charles Cæsar, Esq.

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* John Dreyden, Esq.

*Borough of Huntingdon.*The Hon. Francis Wortley,
alias Montague, Esq.* The Hon. Charles Boyle,
Esq.*Kent, 10.*

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* Thomas Meredith, Esq.

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George Seyer, Esq.

Henry Lec, Esq.

*City of Rochester.*The Right Hon. Sir Joseph
Williamson, Kt.

Sir Cloudsley Shovel, Kt.

Borough of Maidstone.

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Borough of Queenborough.

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Thomas King, Esq.

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Roger Kirby, Esq.

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Thomas Leigh, Esq.
Borough of Wigan.
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 Orlando Bridgman, Esq.
Borough of Cilthero.
 Christopher Lister, Esq.
 Thomas Stringer, Esq.
Borough of Liverpool.
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 William Clayton, Esq.

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 John Wilkins, Esq.
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 Sir William Villers, Bar.
 Lawrence Carter, Esq.

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City of Lincoln.
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Borough of Grantham.
 Sir William Ellis, Bar.
 The Hon. Tho. Mannors,
 Esq.

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 of State
 * Thomas Cross, Esq.
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 Sir William Ashurst, Kt.

* Sir William Withers, Kt.
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Borough of Monmouth.
 * John Morgan, Esq.

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 * The Hon. Roger Town-
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 Sir Charles Turner, Kt.
Town of Great Yarmouth.
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Borough of Higham Ferrars.
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Borough of Morpeth.
 * The Hon. William How-
 ard, Esq.
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Town of Berwick upon Tweed.
 * The Hon. Ralph Grey,
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 Samuel Ogle, Esq.

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 Gervase Eyre, Esq.
Town of Nottingham.
 William Pierepoint, Esq.
 — Gregory, Esq.
Borough of East-Retford.
 John Thornhaugh, Esq.
 * Thomas White, jun. Esq.
Town of Newark upon Trent.
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 Sir Robert Jenkinson, Bar.
University of Oxon.
 Sir Christopher Musgrave,
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 * The Hon. Heneage Finch,
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 * Francis Norreys, Esq.
 Thomas Rowney, Esq.
Borough of New Woodstock.
 Sir Thomas Littleton, Bar.
 The Hon. James Bertie,
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Borough of Banbury.
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 * John Dormer, Esq.

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 Richard Halford, Esq.

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Robert Lloyd, Esq.

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Richard Mitton, Esq.

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Roger Pope, Esq.

Borough of Ludlow.

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George Weld, Esq.

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Charles Mason, Esq.

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Robert Yet, Esq.

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Alexander Popham, Esq.

City of Wells.

William Coward, serjeant at law.

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Edward Clarke, Esq.

Henry Portman, Esq.

Borough of Bridgwater.

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* John Gilbert, Esq.

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Borough of Ilcester.

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* James Anderton, Esq.

Borough of Milburn-Port.

Sir Thomas Travell, Kt.

* Sir Richard Newman,
Bar.

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Thomas Jervoise de Herriard, Esq.

* William Chandler, Esq.

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William Powlett.

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Esq.

Town of Southampton.

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* Mitford Crow, Esq.

Town of Portsmouth.

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Henry Holmes, Esq.

Anthony Morgan, Esq.

Borough of Petersfield.

* Ralph Bucknell, Esq.

* Richard Marks, Esq.

Borough of Newport, alias Medena.

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Cutts.

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Esq.

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John Pitt, Esq.

Borough of Newtown.

James Worsley of Pylewell,
Esq.

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Vis. Cornbury.

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Borough of Lymington.

Thomas Dore, Esq.

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Borough of Whitchurch.

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James Russel.

Richard Woollaston, Esq.

Borough of Andover.

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Esq.

* Francis Shepherd, Esq.

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Esq.

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City of Lichfield.

Richard Dyot, Esq.

* William Walmesley, Esq.

Borough of Stafford.

Thomas Foley, jun. of Whit-
ley, Esq.

* John Chetwind of Ing-
stree, Esq.

Borough of Newcastle under Line.

Sir John Leveson Gower,
Bar.

* ——— Cotton, Esq.

Borough of Tamworth.

Sir Henry Gough, Bar.

Thomas Guy, Esq.

Suffolk, 16.

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Dysert.

Sir Samuel Barnadiston,

Borough of Ipswich.

* Sir Charles Duncombe,
Kt.

* Joseph Martin, Esq.

Borough of Dunwich.

* Sir Charles Blois, Bar.

* ——— Kemp, Esq.

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* Sir Edmund Turner, Bar.

* Sir Edmund Bacon, Bar.

Borough of Aldborough.

Sir Henry Johnson, Kt.

William Johnson, Esq.

Borough of Sudbury.

* Sir Gervase Elways, Bar.

* Sir John Cordell, Bar.

Borough of Eye.

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ton, Esq.

Sir Joseph Jekyll, Kt.

Borough of St Edmonds-bury.

Sir Robert Davers, Kt.

John Harvey, Esq.

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John Weston, Esq.

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Borough of Blechingley.

* Sir Edward Gresham, Bar.

* John Ward, Esq.

Borough of Ryegate.

* Sir John Parsons, Kt.
Stephen Harvey, Esq.

Borough of Guilford.

Morgan Randy, Esq.

* Denzil Onslow, Esq.

Borough of Gatton.

Thomas Turgis, Esq.

Maurice Thompson, Esq.

Borough of Haslemere.

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Kt.

* George Woodroff, Esq.

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* Henry Cooper Esq.

Borough of Midhurst.

John Lewkener, Esq.

* Lawrence Alcock, Esq.

Borough of Lewis.

* Sir Thomas Trevor, Kt.

Thomas Pelham, Esq.

Borough of New Shoreham.

Charles Sergison, Esq.

* Nathaniel Gould, Esq.

Borough of Bramber.

* Thomas Owen, Esq.

William Stringer, Esq.

Borough of Steyning.

Sir John Fagg, dead.

Sir Edward Hungerford, Kt.
of the Bath.

Borough of East-Grimsted.

* Matthew Prior, Esq.

John Conyers, Esq.

Borough of Arundel.

John Cooke, Esq.

* Edmund Dummer, Esq.

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Sir Charles Shuckburgh,
Bar.

City of Coventry.

Sir Christopher Hales, Bar.

* Thomas Hopkins, Esq.

Borough of Warwick.

* The Hon. Francis Grevill,
Esq.

Sir Tho. Wagstaff, Kt.

Westmorland, 4.

Sir Christopher Musgrave,
Bar.

* Henry Graham, Esq.

Borough of Apulby.

The Hon. Gervase Peire-
point, Esq.

* Wharton Danche, Esq.

Wiltshire, 34.

Sir G. Hungerford, Bar.

* Richard Howe, Esq.

City of New Sarum.

* Sir Tho. Mompesson, Kt.

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Borough of Wilton.

John Gauntlet, Esq.

* Thomas Phipps, Esq.

Borough of Downeton.

Carew Rawleigh, Esq.

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Borough of Hindon.

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Borough of Heytersbury.

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Edward Ashe, Esq.

Borough of Westbury.

The Hon. R. Bertie, Esq.

Richard Lewis, Esq.

Borough of Calne.

* Walter Long, Esq.

* Walter Hungerford, Esq.

Borough of Devizes.

Sir Francis Child, Kt.

* Francis Merryweather,
Esq.

Borough of Chippenham.

* The Right Hon. the Lord
Mordant.

Walter White, Esq.

Borough of Malmsbury.

Edward Pauncefort, Esq.

* S. Shepherd, jun. Esq.

Borough of Cricklade.

Sir Stephen Fox, Kt.

* Edmund Dunche, Esq.

Borough of Great Bedwin.

Francis Stonehouse, Esq.

Charles Devenant, Esq.

Borough of Lugershall.

* Edmund Webb, sen. Esq.

John Webb, jun. Esq.

Borough of Old Sarum.

Charles Mompesson, Esq.

William Harvey, Esq.

Borough of Wootton Bassett.

* H. St John, jun. Esq.

Henry Pynhill, Esq.

Borough of Marlborough.

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Ranelagh.

* John Jefferys, Esq.

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Samuel Swift, Esq.

* Thomas Wild, Esq.

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Charles Cocks, Esq.

Borough of Evesham.

* Sir James Rushout, Bar.

John Rudge, Esq.

Borough of Bewdly.

Selway Winington, Esq.

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Fairfax.

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City of York.

Sir W. Robinson, Bar.

* Ed. Thompson, Esq.

Town of Kingston upon Hull.

Sir William St Quinton,
Bar.

* William Master, Esq.

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Robert Byerly, Esq.

Christopher Stockdale, Esq.

Borough of Scarborough.

The Right Honourable Ar-
thur Lord Viscount Irwin.

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Borough of Rippon.

John Aisleby, Esq.

Jonathan Jennings, Esq.

Borough of Richmond.

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Kt.

Anthony Duncombe, Esq.

Borough of Boroughbrigg.

The Right Honourable Sir

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Sir Brian Stapleton, Bar.

*Borough of Malton.** Sir William Strickland,
Bar.

William Palmes, Esq.

Borough of Thirsk.

Sir Godfrey Copley, Bar.

Sir Thomas Frankland, Bar.

Borough of Aldborough.

* Robert Muncton, Esq.

* Cyrill Arthington, Esq.

Borough of Beverly.

Sir Michael Warton, Kt.

Ralph Wharton, Esq.

Borough of Northallerton.

Sir William Husler, Kt.

Ralph Milbanck, Esq.

Borough of Pontefract.

Sir John Bland, Bar.

John Bright, Esq.

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Peter Got, Esq.

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The Hon. T. Newport, Esq.

Robert Bristow, Esq.

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* Sir Robert Austin, Bart.

Joseph Offley, Esq.

Town of New Rumney.

Sir Charles Sidley, Bar.

John Brewer, Esq.

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* — Boteler, Esq.

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cretary of State.

Matthew Aylmer, Esq.

Port of Sandwich.

* Sir Henry Furnese, Kt.

* John Taylor, Esq.

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Sir William Thomas, Bar.

William Lownds, Esq.

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Bulkeley.*Borough of Beaumaris.*

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Town of Brecon.

* Sir Jeffery Jefferys, Kt.

Cardigan, 2.

* Sir Hu. Mackworth.

*Town of Cardigan,*John Lewis of Coedmore,
Esq.*Carmarthen, 2.*

Sir Rice Rudd, Bar.

Town of Carmarthen.

Richard Vaughan, Esq.

Carnarvan, 2.

The Hon. T. Bulkeley, Esq.

Town of Carnarvan.

Sir J. Wynne, Bar.

Denbigh, 2.

Sir Rich. Middleton, Bart.

Town of Denbigh.

Edward Brereton, Esq.

Flint, 2.

Sir John Conway, Bar.

Town of Flint.

Thomas Moystin, Esq.

*Glamorgan, 2.*Thomas Mansell of Briton-
Ferry, Esq.*Town of Cardiffe.*

Sir Edward Stradling, Bar.

Merioneth, 1.

Hugh Nanny, Esq.

Montgomery, 2.

Edward Vaughan, Esq.

Town of Montgomery.

* John Vaughan, Esq.

*Pembroke, 3.**Town of Haverford-West.*

* William Wheeler, Esq.

Town of Pembroke.

Sir John Philips, Bar.

Radnor, 2.

Thomas Harley, Esq.

Town of Radnor.

Robert Harley, Esq.

In all 513.

The History of the Kentish Petition. 1740.

In the first year of the eighteenth century, the Tory party predominated in the House of Commons, and the Whigs in the House of Lords. The Commons had already commenced the memorable

impeachment of the seven lords who advised and carried through the Partition Treaty. The Whigs, on the other hand, had been active in stirring a popular aversion to the Tory ministers, and had formed a scheme of obtaining such a number of petitions from counties and corporations as should intimidate their opponents into a change of measures. The first presented was that of the gentlemen and yeomanry of Kent, which was couched in a style of remonstrance so petulant, that the gentlemen who presented it were ordered into custody, and remained in the Gatehouse until the parliament was prorogued. They had no cause, however, to regret this temporary confinement, which placed them at the head of their party, and recommended them to general notice and public esteem.

The Preface.

'TWOULD be hard to suspect him of errors in fact, who writes the story of yesterday: A historian of three weeks must certainly be just, for had he never so much mind to lie, it would be nonsense to expect the world could be imposed upon, every body's memory would be a living witness against him, and the effect would be only to expose himself.

Authors of histories generally apologize for their quotations, plead their industry in the search after truth, and excuse themselves by asserting to the faithfulness of their collections. The author of the following sheets is not afraid to let the world know, that he is so sure every thing that is related in this account is literally and positively true, that he challenges all the wit and malice the world abounds with, to confute the most trifling circumstance.

If aggravations are omitted, and some very ill-natured passages let go without observations, those persons who were guilty of them may observe that we have more good-nature than they have manners; and they ought to acknowledge it, since a great many rudenesses both against the king himself and the gentlemen concerned have escaped their scurrilous mouths which are not here animadverted upon.

And lest the world should think this presumptive, and that the accusation is only a surmise, we will query what they think of that kind remark of Mr J. How, finding the king's letter to the house, and the Kentish petition to come both on a day, and the substance to be the same, "that the king, and the Dutch, and the Kentish men were all in a plot against the House of Commons."

I could have swelled this pamphlet to a large volume if I should pretend to collect all the Billingsgate language of a certain house full of men, against the king, the lords, and the gentlemen of Kent; but it is a fitter subject for a satire than a history: they have abused the nation, and now are become a banter to themselves; and I leave them to consider of it, and reform.

I assure the world I am no Kentish man, nor was my hand to the petition: Though, had I been acquainted with it, I would have gone a hundred miles to have signed it, and a hundred more to have had the opportunity of serving my country, at the expence of an unjust confinement for it.

It may be fairly concluded, I am no Warwickshire man neither, with a petition in my pocket brought a hundred miles, and afraid to deliver it.

Nor my name Sir Robert Clayton, by which you may know that I did not promise the members, who were then in fear enough, to use my interest to stifle a city petition.

Nor is my name Legion; I wish it were, for I should have been glad to be capable of speaking so much truth, and so much to the purpose, as is contained in that unanswerable paper.

But I am an unconcerned spectator, and have been an exact observer of every pas-

sage, have been an eye and ear-witness of every most minute article, and am sure that every thing related, is as exactly true as the causes of it are all scandalous and burthensome to the nation.

As to the gentlemen of the House of Commons, I shall not pretend to enter into their character, because I care not to enter into captivity, nor come into the clutches of that worst of brutes, their serjeant.

Literally speaking, no member of the House of Commons can be a Jacobite, because they have taken the oaths to King William. But this may be observed, that the Jacobites in England are generally the only people who approve of their proceedings and applaud their measures; and it is observable, that at Paris and St Germans, the genteel compliment of a health in all English company is, *a la Sante Monsieur Jack How*; the truth of which there are not a few very good gentlemen in town can attest, from whence I think I may draw this observation, that either he is a Jacobite, or the Jacobites are a very good-natured people.

Noscitur ex socio qui non dignoscitur ex se.

The following sheets contain an exact history of the Kentish petition, and of the treatment the gentlemen who presented it met with, both from the House, the serjeant, and at last from their country.

The best way to come to a conclusion, whether the gentlemen petitioners were well or ill used, is to review the matter of fact; all panegyrics and encomiums come short of the natural reflections which flow from a true account of that proceeding, and the whole is collected in this form, and all the world may judge by a true light, and not to be imposed upon by partial and imperfect relations.

On the 29th of April, 1701, the quarter-sessions for the county of Kent began at Maidstone, where William Colepepper, of Hollingbourn, Esq. was chosen chairman, though he was then absent, and with an unusual respect the bench of justices proceeded to do business, and kept the chair for him for several hours, till he came.

The people of the county of Kent, as well as in most parts of the kingdom, had expressed great dissatisfaction at the slow proceedings of the parliament; and that the king was not assisted, nor the protestants abroad considered; and the country people began to say to one another in their language, "That they had sowed their corn, and the French were a-coming to reap it." And from hence it is allowed to proceed, that during the sitting of the session, several of the principal freeholders of the county applied themselves to the chairman aforesaid, and told him, it was their desire that the bench would consider of making some application to the parliament, to acquaint them of the apprehensions of the people.

The chairman replied, "It was the proper work of the grand jury to present the grievances of the country, and therefore he referred them to the said grand jury who were then sitting."

The grand jury being applied to, accepted the proposal, and addressing to the said Mr Colepepper, the chairman, acquainted him that they had approved of such a motion made as before, and desired that the bench would join with them; the chairman told them he would acquaint the justices of it, which he did, and they immediately approved of it also, and desired the said William Colepepper, Esq. their chairman, to draw a petition.

Mr Colepepper withdrew to compose it, and having drawn a petition, it was read and approved, and immediately ordered to be carried to the grand jury, being twenty-one in number, who all unanimously signed it, and brought it into court, desiring all the gentlemen on the bench would do the same; whereupon the chairman and three-and-

twenty of the justices signed it, and the freeholders of the county crowded in so fast, that the parchment was filled up in less than five hours time; and many thousands of hands might have been had to it, if the justices had not declined it, refusing to add any more rolls of parchment, as insisting more upon the merits of the petition, than the number of subscribers. By all which, it appears, how foolish and groundless their pretences are, who would suggest, that the petition was a private thing transacted by a few people; whereas 'tis plain 'twas the act and deed of the whole country.

As soon as the petition was signed, and there was no more room for any hands, it was delivered by the grand jury to the aforesaid William Colepepper, Esq. chairman of the session, and he was desired to present it in their names to the parliament, which at their request he promised to do, and the rest of the gentlemen, viz. Thomas Colepepper, Esq. Justinian Champneys, Esq. David Polhill, Esq. and William Hamilton, Esq. offered themselves to go with him.

On Tuesday the 6th of May, they came to town with the petition, and the next day they went up to the house, and applied themselves to Sir Thomas Hales, in order to desire him to present it to the house; he being one of the representatives of the county of Kent: Sir Thomas read the petition, and telling them it was too late to

* Of these gentlemen, Noble gives the following account:—"Justinian Champneys, Esq. was of an ancient family, originally of Somersetshire, but for many centuries resident in Kent. One of his ancestors was Sir John Chamneis, lord mayor of London, in the reign of Henry VIII. whence he returned to Hall-place, in Bexley. From Justinian, the youngest and only survivor of seven sons, this gentleman was descended, whose seat was at Boxley, having removed from Bexley; but purchasing the manor of Westenhanger in Stanford, Kent, he took down the ancient house, and built another upon its site, but much smaller, where he died at an advanced age, in 1748, leaving three sons; Justinian, who died abroad in 1754, s. p.; William, who was of Vintners in Boxley, and many years one of the commissioners of revenue in Ireland; and Henry, also of Vintners, who died in 1781, unmarried; so that all the property came to the two daughters and coheirs of William. Frances, one of them, is unmarried; Harriet, by John Burt, Esq. left several children.

"Sir Thomas Culpeper of Preston-hall, in Aylesford, Knt. was descended from a family who boasted a long list of knights, two creations of baronets, and one branch was ennobled. He had no issue by his lady, who died in 1691. He survived till 1723, and was buried by her side, in Aylesford church. There is nothing particularly worthy notice respecting him, but that he served the office of sheriff for Kent in 1704, and represented the town of Maidstone in parliament in 1705, 1708, 1710, and 1714. Alicia, his sister, became his heir, who was four times married, but had no children. This lady settled Preston-hall and her other estates upon the family of her fourth husband, John Milner, M. D.

"William Culpeper, Esq. a branch of Sir Thomas Culpeper's family, was of Hollingbourne in Kent, where he died, and was buried in 1726. He left, by Elizabeth his wife, three sons and three daughters. It is remarkable, that of the numerous branches of these Colepepers, or Culpepers, in Kent and Sussex, not an individual now remains in either country.

"James Hamilton, Esq. youngest son of James Hamilton who accompanied Charles II. in his exile, and became greatly and deservedly valued by that monarch. He was a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and a colonel, and died June the 6th, 1673, after having had one of his legs shot off in a naval engagement with the Dutch, when serving as a volunteer. Mr Hamilton married Elizabeth, eldest daughter of John Culpeper, Lord Culpeper, which accounts for this his son James having settled in Kent, whose mother died in 1709, and left him by her will her seat of Chilston, and the manor of Lenham, with other estates in Kent. By Margaret, daughter of Sir Thomas Culpeper of Hollingbourne, he left several children. The eldest son was John Hamilton, Esq. of Chilston, sheriff of Kent in 1719. James, the eldest brother of the petitioner, became the sixth Earl of Abercorn.

"David Polhill, Esq. of Chepsted in Kent, was eldest son of Thomas Polhill, Esq. and Elizabeth, daughter of Henry Ireton, lord-deputy of Ireland, by the daughter of Oliver Cromwell, lord protector. Mr Polhill was member of parliament for the city of Rochester from 1727 to 1754, and keeper of the records of the Tower. He died Jan. 15, 1754, aged 80, and was buried with his ancestors. The epitaph on his monument in Alford church asserts, that 'he was ever active and steady in promoting the true interests of his sovereign, and defending the just liberties of the subject, both civil and religious; with which laudable view he generously hazarded his own safety by being one of the Kentish petitioners in the reign of King William. His humanity to his dependants, generosity to his relations, tenderness and affection to his family, steadiness and sincerity to his friends, merited and gained him a very general approbation and esteem.' He had no issue by his two first wives; Elizabeth, daughter of Thomas Trevor, of Glynd Sussex, Esq.; and Gertrude, sister of the Duke of Newcastle; but several children by his third, Elizabeth, daughter of John Borrel of Shoreham in Kent, Esq. prothonotary of the court of Common Pleas. Charles Polhill, Esq. of Chepsted, his eldest son, lately died at that place."—Noble, III. 211.