

CHAPTER VIII.

THE GUNTOOR CIRCAR, BAZALET JUNG, AND THE NIZAM.
THE ORIGINAL POLICY AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL, 1775-1777.

WE may now proceed to consider those public measures which have been represented as bearing upon the general affairs of India, and to which it was originally sought to attribute, in great part, if not entirely, what was called the great confederacy, which resulted in the invasion of the Carnatic.

Before entering upon these charges of the Bill, it is important to notice, that in later times it has been still further sought to criminate Sir Thomas Rumbold by laying to his charge the reduction of the French fortress Mahé. This it appears afforded Hyder Ali a subject of complaint, of which he availed himself in order to justify the execution of projects which many circumstances concur in proving had been determined on long before. Ascribing this measure, however, especially to Sir Thomas Rumbold is a late notion. Nobody at the time laid the responsibility upon him. When the war with France was declared, the news was communicated to

Madras through Bombay, and thence to Bengal. It is a fact well authenticated, that it was determined in England that all the French settlements should be reduced, and instructions arrived immediately at Madras to begin with the capture of Pondicherry, if it was considered they had force sufficient to accomplish it.

That the expedition against Mahé was not inconsiderately resolved upon, will appear from some extracts which are here given from the Minutes of the President and of Sir Eyre Coote :—

November, 1778. —“ The President recommends to the serious consideration of the Board several points before any expedition should be set on foot for the reduction of Mahé.” Among others, “ Whether it will not be prudent to wait until we hear from Hyder Ali, and until we have more certain accounts of the disposition of the Rajahs whose countries border upon Mahé, and through which our troops must march? Whether, if the French from the islands, on hearing of the reduction of Pondicherry, should have landed a body of troops at Mahé, before the arrival of our squadron and land forces there, our detachment may not run a risk of being defeated by a superior European force,” &c.

Again, on the 4th of January, "The situation of affairs, the distress we are in for money, and the uncertainty of what steps may be taken by the French or the country powers, or, in particular, by Hyder Ali, who does not seem to be well pleased with our conquest of Pondicherry, makes it appear to me imprudent to move from the seat of Government at this juncture."

And on the 14th of January, "Our correspondence with Hyder Ali has not been attended with that readiness on his part which we expected from him; but I am persuaded we should not lose sight of the object, and nothing will so effectually bring it about as sending a suitable person to him. A proper pretence may be made use of, and we shall be able to judge of his intentions. It is better to know him for an enemy than a doubtful friend; and I confess I shall be under some apprehensions for our detachment now proceeding to Mahé, unless we are assured what line of conduct he means to observe." When, after a renewed solicitation from the President that Hyder would allow an interview to take place, the reply was decidedly hostile, it was a subject of serious deliberation whether the expedition should be recalled.

The President set before the Committee all

the most important reasons for and against the recal. He concludes by saying, "I have ever considered the alliance with Hyder Ali as our first and principal object; in that case Mahé would fall into our hands, of course, and every view of the French be entirely frustrated. One circumstance I must add, which is, if we desist from prosecuting the expedition, it is probable the factory of Tellicherry will fall into the hands of the French."

Sir Eyre Coote gave his opinion at length, and concluded by saying, "Upon the whole, as things are at present situated, I am against recalling the expedition," &c.

All the circumstances relating to this affair, with the deliberations of the Council of Fort St. George, are fully and fairly given in the first Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

In the second Report of the Committee, truth and fairness are sacrificed, and the Report becomes a personal censure of Sir Thomas Rumbold.

In the transactions relating to the Guntoor Circar, and the Nizam of the Deccan, in regard to which charges were alleged against Sir Thomas Rumbold in the Bill, and

which remain to be more fully described, Sir Thomas Rumbold was nearly concerned with Mr. Hastings. It is a task which of necessity devolves upon one who would give a true account of this portion of the history, to show, that, among the darker shades which belong to the character of that celebrated man, must be reckoned the conduct he pursued throughout the course of those events.

When the calamity of the Carnatic war took place, the cause of which is a problem in history never entirely solved, if the measures of Mr. Hastings were to be exempted from all reproach, on another the blame must fall.

The policy Mr. Hastings had pursued, whether skilfully devised or not, had been unsuccessful; and, *it was early known to him*, threatened very disastrous results; it had especially compromised him with the Nizam of the Deccan. In the embarrassments in which he was involved, Mr. Hastings allowed himself to disavow, on the most shallow pretext, the part he had originally taken in the affair of the Guntoor Circar, when it was first contemplated in 1775; and also the formal sanction he gave to the Treaty for the cession of it to the Company, as submitted to him by the presidency of Madras in 1779, when

he revised each article, and added to them others of his own. Mr. Hastings thus prepared the way for representing this affair as a principal cause of the confederacy against the English, which resulted in the invasion of the Carnatic.

It is also certain that all the accounts of those times that have been transmitted to us, are to be traced to the representations made by Mr. Hastings to the Court of Directors, and subsequently adopted by the Committee of Secrecy, although they were contradicted by facts and dates that had passed through their hands, and are still to be seen in the Appendices to the Reports.

It is much to be deplored that Sir Eyre Coote, who formed one of the Board of Madras, and co-operated in the affair of the Guntoor Circar, should have been, after the invasion of the Carnatic, so influenced by Mr. Hastings, as to follow and support him in his assertions, and to denounce this measure for a reason that sounds strangely from Sir Eyre Coote, "that it thwarted Hyder, who had views upon the Guntoor for himself." *

* Supplementary Appendix to the Second Report, and repeated elsewhere. In private correspondence of the time there is much proof that Sir Eyre Coote was a man of most honourable and

Leave then the whole responsibility of this affair upon Sir Thomas Rumbold, and admit that it thwarted Hyder, can any further vindication be needed for the policy of securing to the Company this important district, considered the key of the Carnatic, and which was in fact their own, by arming it against him"? It is known that Hyder had it in view to extirpate the Nizam, and make a partition of his territories: since Hyder had no claim upon the Guntoor, the possession of it by the English thwarted him, inasmuch as it stood in the way of these projects, and of his immediate design upon the Carnatic.

But Sir Eyre Coote proceeded to a still more extraordinary assertion. In the same letter to the Directors, we find him say, that "it was known as a thing certain that at the time the Treaty was carrying on with Bazalet Jung, Hyder would have entered into an alliance

generous, although sometimes hasty, impulses. It is apparent, indeed, from his angry and reiterated demand, that the refusal of the President of Madras to send a body-guard to Calcutta from the newly-arrived regiment, gave him great umbrage. With all allowance for this, and for the pressure of difficulties opening upon him in that disastrous war, it is still hard to believe that Sir Eyre Coote really dictated the representations we find given in the Reports of the Committee, and which were sent to the Directors, &c. •

offensive and defensive, with us.” * Was it forgotten by Sir Eyre Coote, and did the Secret Committee, in adopting this declaration, overlook, that at this very time, and before this time, the letters from the President to Hyder mentioned above, requesting an interview, &c., had been communicated to the Board, together with Hyder’s evasive replies ?

A history of these transactions, substantiated by the original documents or by full references, is subjoined.

As far as relates to the affair of the Guntoor Circar, the words are, for the most part, those of Sir Thomas Rumbold, and are a part of his “Answer to the Directors † and to the Committee of Secrecy,” of which “Answer” mention has been made. The statement commences by citing those Articles of the Treaty between the Nizam and the Company in 1768, which bear upon the case.

Upon the construction of these Articles, Sir Thomas Rumbold proceeds to say, it is clear

* Supplemental Appendix to Second Report, No. 9, and repeated elsewhere.

† It will be observed throughout the statement given from Sir Thomas Rumbold’s narrative, the references made by him are to the Reports of the Committee of Secrecy. The references to the Minutes of Evidence are added by the compiler.

that if Bazalet Jung should raise disturbances, or give protection, or assistance, to any enemies of the Company, the Company were at liberty immediately to take possession of the Guntoor Circar, without any reference or application to the Nizam.

No one Article of the Treaty with the Nizam was so impolitic as leaving the Guntoor Circar in the possession of Bazalet Jung. We had it in our power to make whatever terms we pleased. We had attained a decisive advantage in the war, and, by marching a detachment of troops towards the Nizam's capital, we had in a manner compelled him to sue for peace.

The Guntoor Circar nearly joins to the Cuddapah country. A small portion of the Carnatic runs between them, and, stretching eastward to the sea, contains one of the most commodious ports on the coast, called Mootapillee; it was there the French always landed their troops and stores. This Circar divides the Carnatic from all our northern possessions, which would otherwise run in one continual chain from Cape Comorin to Cuttach; we, therefore, by this concession made to the Soubah, left it in the power of a very doubtful friend to obstruct our communication. The Guntoor Circar contains many strong

posts and small forts in the hands of Government, whereas in all the other Circars the forts are in the hands of the Zemindars ; besides which the river Kistna bounds it to the northwards, a river at particular times of the year broad and rapid.

In the year 1775 the Board of Madras, at that time under the Presidency of Mr. Wynch, were justly alarmed by frequent letters from the Council of Masulipatam respecting the French force stationed in the Guntoor, which was receiving continual increase, and was, they represented, becoming dangerous to the settlement. A reference to the numbers 67-78, in the Appendix to the Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy, will show the whole correspondence, and what passed in the year 1775 relative to the French troops and the necessity of obtaining the Guntoor Circar for the Company.

The Committee of Secrecy observe (Second Report, page 284) that, "In the whole course of this correspondence, it appears that the Government of Madras, as well as the Governor-General and Council, never lost sight of the Treaty of 1768 ; but, on the contrary, that they made the Nizam the principal party in the negotiation." If, however, we examine the correspondence that took place between the two

presidencies, it will appear that the Governor-General and Council are uniform in stating the forfeiture of Bazalet Jung, and our right, in consequence, to take possession of the Circar.

In June, 1775, in consequence of the advices they had received, the Board of Madras first took the matter into consideration, and they agree (*vide* 68, Appendix, Second Report) “to endeavour at obtaining from Bazalet Jung Mootapillee and the other villages, or, if practicable, the whole Circar, at a certain reserved rent to him, which shall be mutually agreed upon for that purpose.” And they agree to write to the Governor-General and Council, fully stating every circumstance. In this letter they particularly say, “That the only mode which occurs to us for obviating the damage to be apprehended, is to prevail upon Bazalet Jung, if possible, to give up the port of Mootapillee for an adequate acknowledgment; or, if practicable, the whole Circar upon the same terms; or that he will admit of its being protected for him by the Company, he being at the expense of the force employed on that service. We much doubt that he will be brought to consent to either of the above propositions; but the evil consequences to be feared, should he continue as

heretofore to increase his force, and by such means give the French a permanent footing in the Circar, are too evident to be pointed out." On the 5th of July, the Governor-General and Council wrote an answer to the Madras President, in which they recommend the most spirited measures to be taken, and that the Nizam was to be considered, let it be observed, *only in the second instance.*

“FORT WILLIAM, *July 5th, 1775.*

“AFTER weighing maturely the subject of the advices, we have come to the resolution that no time is to be lost in endeavouring to remove the French from the Guntoor Circar. It is manifest to us that the number of foreigners entertained there by Bazalet Jung, and the considerable supply of troops, cannon, and ammunition, lately sent there, are in consequence of a concerted scheme with the French to secure to them the possession of that province, and to put them in a condition to attack our possessions in those parts with advantage on the first favourable opportunity. At all events, we deem it highly impolitic to leave the French in possession of the port of Mootapillee, which affords them so free and easy a communication with those coun-

try powers who may be supposed to entertain the greatest jealousy of the growing influence of the British nation. We mean Nizam al Mulck, Hyder Ali, and the Mahrattas.

“ For these reasons, and seeing that we have the sanction of a reversionary right for interfering to secure the independency of that district ; we authorise you immediately to take such steps as may be necessary for that effect, and recommend that you form a body of troops, if possible in conjunction with the Nabob of Arcot, and march them immediately to the frontiers of the territory of Bazalet Jung. You will then acquaint him that, seeing he has applied for the assistance of foreign troops, those of the Company are come to him for that purpose, as well as to secure the reversion of that Circar to them ; that you insist upon the immediate discharge of all foreigners from his service ; in failure of which, you will signify to him that your troops will take possession of his country, and that you will endeavour by a negociation with the Nizam, either by the offer of the whole revenues or otherwise, to obtain the immediate cession of it to the Company. This is the measure which suggests itself to us at present as the most expedient in this affair. We do not mean ex-

pressly to direct it, but only to give our sanction to your undertaking it, supposing you should think it advisable, considering the general posture of affairs in the Carnatic.

“ W. HASTINGS,
R. BARWELL,
J. CLAVERING,
P. FRANCIS,
G. MONSON.”*

Unfortunately, the recommendation of the Council of Bengal was not immediately followed. Time was suffered to pass away in consultations with the Nabob of Arcot and unnecessary debate. From the 4th of April, 1775, when the subject first engaged the attention of the Presidency, no reference had been made to the Nizam. The Board had considered themselves at liberty to treat directly with Bazalet Jung, in the way of amicable negotiation. On the 14th of August, General Smith was desired to make a return of the forces in hand; and stated it equal to the object, in case Bazalet Jung should not accept the terms. Yet they hesitated to carry into execution these hostile measures. Some of the Board are of opinion that the Nizam should

* Second Report, Appendix, 71.

be applied to in the first instance, and his influence with his brother (Bazalet Jung) desired, to induce him to dismiss the French troops. They consider, moreover, that an application to Bazalet Jung would be ineffectual to secure their object, as it might lead him to seek the further aid of mercenaries to resist their demand.

On the 13th of September it was resolved to address the Nizam, and a letter was accordingly written to him by the President, in which complaint was made of the conduct of Bazalet Jung, as an infraction of the treaty of 1768. The letter concluded by saying, "When your highness shall have considered the reversionary right which the English have to the Murlayanagur (or Guntoor) Circar, and that they might, conformably to the terms of the Treaty, take possession of that right, you will acquiesce in my insisting upon Bazalet Jung agreeing to one or other of these two propositions :—First, to let to the English the whole of the Circar at an annual rent; or, secondly, to dismiss the Europeans from your service, and trust to the Company for the protection of the country." *

On the 13th of September, the Presidency of Madras also acquaint the Governor-General and

* Minutes of Evidence, p. 344.

Council of Bengal with their having written to the Nizam, with a full statement of their reasons for having done so.* The Governor-General and Council made reply as follows:—

“As we observe you have addressed Nizam Ali Cawn in the terms we had suggested for removing the Europeans out of the Guntoor Circar, and securing the reversion of that district to the Company, we shall wait to hear the result of that letter before we send you any further instructions on this head.” †

During a long interval that intervened before the arrival of the Nizam's answer to the application of the Board, the subject was again brought forward by a motion of Sir Robert Fletcher, then Commander-in-Chief, to this effect:—

“That the letter last received from the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, under date of October 23rd, ought not to have prevented our adopting immediately the measure recommended in their letter of the 5th of July, because it appears to me nothing more than an unavoidable acquiescence in the letter this Board had written to the Soubah, (*i. e.*, the Nizam,) without containing anything that can be con-

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 74.

† *Ibid.*, No. 75.

strued as an approbation of this Board having declined to follow the idea recommended by the Governor-General and Council. Bazalet Jung's present preparations for war, and his correspondence with the French, give me apprehensions that every delay may add to the evil. I consider the Nizam in his heart as wishing his brother's removal from the Circar; but we should not have put the question to him.

“Frequent information has been received of the prejudice we have sustained from the encouragement given by Bazalet Jung to the desertion of our Europeans.” *

Other members of the Board take a similar view :—

“We should have sent an immediate force. Bazalet Jung has broken his Treaty. Mootapillee is of essential advantage to us. We must resume it upon the law of self-defence. Let us adopt the recommendation of Bengal,—take the country first, and make it up to Bazalet afterwards with a rent or pecuniary equivalent.” †

This motion was negatived, as is observed in the Report of the Committee of Secrecy, but the

* Minutes of Evidence, p. 353.

† Messrs. Johnson, Mackay, Jourdan, and Brook. Second Report, Appendix, No. 75.

reason is not there assigned; namely, “that, having written again to Bengal, it was deemed expedient to wait the Governor-General and Council’s reply.” But on the same day a second motion was made for immediate action, when, the Council “finding it difficult to frame a letter agreeably to the different opinions which had appeared in that day’s debates, it was agreed that a copy of their proceedings be transmitted to the Governor-General and Council for their opinion.”

On the 20th of November, 1775, arrived the first answer from the Nizam; evasive, as had been predicted by Sir Robert Fletcher. Of Mootapillee, not a word; but he has desired his brother to send away the troops, and he will impound the revenue of the villages allotted for their pay. He tacitly admits that what the letter of Madras had imputed to him, and he now offers to redress, was a violation of treaty; for he says, “Our treaty shall be kept to a hair’s breadth.”

The Board of Madras transmit this letter, which they represent as indirect and evasive, to the Governor-General and Council, and wait their reply. On the 2nd of January, 1776, Lord Pigot having arrived, and taken charge of the

government of Madras, an answer was received from the Governor-General and Council, and was read at the Board. It was very full and conclusive, and is here given at length.

“ FORT WILLIAM, *December 11th, 1775.*

“ As you have resolved to suspend taking any measures for the removal of the foreigners in Bazalet Jung’s service until you receive further instructions from us, we take the earliest opportunity of conveying to you our sentiments, to enable you to proceed without loss of time in this necessary business. In our letter of the 5th of July last, we left it open to you to take possession of the Guntoor Circar, unless Bazalet Jung should immediately consent to dismiss all the foreigners in his service. Without positively directing the measure, we authorized you to carry it into execution, if you should think it advisable, considering the general posture of affairs in the Carnatic.

“ By the answer of the Nabob Nizam Ali Cawn to the letter which your President wrote to him on that occasion, we perceive he engages that his brother shall remove his foreign troops from the sea-coast to Adoni, and to stop the revenues of the villages allotted for their pay. If this en-

gement be fulfilled, and if we are put in possession of Mootapillee, the object of our first instructions will be obtained; if not, we still continue to allow you the same latitude to take possession of the Circar, which we gave you in our letter of the 5th of July. In the first case, we think it proper to assign the revenues of Mootapillee to Bazalet Jung, after defraying the extraordinary expenses which may be incurred by that service; and, in the second case, to grant the revenues of the Circar to the Soubah, [that is, the Nizam, or Nabob, Ali Cawn, now written Ali Khan,] with the like reserve for defraying the expenses: but in either, our yielding up the revenues is founded on the supposition that Bazalet Jung, or Nizam Ali Cawn, respectively, do not oppose you in these operations.*

In the disturbed state of the Presidency of Madras that followed the arrival of Lord Pigot, the matter was suffered to rest here.

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 78.

CHAPTER. IX.

THE GUNTOOR CIRCAR, BAZALET JUNG, AND THE NIZAM.
PROCEEDINGS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF MR. (SIR THOMAS)
RUMBOLD AT MADRAS, IN 1778.

ON the arrival of Mr. (not yet Sir Thomas) Rumbold in Madras, on the 8th of February, 1778, not one step had been taken in this important affair. The Nizam had paid no regard to his promises : although he had engaged (as is observed by the Committee of Secrecy, Second Report, p. 23) that his brother (Bazalet Jung) should remove the French troops, and stop the revenues of the villages allotted for their pay, the^d engagement was not fulfilled. The possession of Mootapillee, the first object of the Governor-General and Council's instructions, was not obtained ; consequently the same latitude from the Governor-General and Council to take possession of the Circar still remained ; and the giving any part of the revenues, either to the Nizam or Bazalet Jung, was to depend on "neither of them, respectively, opposing our operations."

From the time of the arrival of Lord Pigot,

the Government of Madras, almost wholly engaged in attending to the contentions of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, had ceased to regard the growing influence of the French to the northwards. It cannot but appear extraordinary that the Governor-General and Council, who saw the affair in so serious a light, whose duty it was to watch over the power of our national enemies, and to preserve the peace of India, should have suffered above two years to elapse without inquiring what had been done with respect to the instructions they had sent. But the ruinous scheme of subjecting the Mahratta State to their views, and the contentions of their own Board, in consequence of the many expedients resorted to, distracted their attention from dangers, which, although at some distance, were always to be apprehended.

If the removal of the French force in the employ of Bazalet Jung, and the attainment of the Guntoor Circar, had been thought objects of so great importance by the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras, in time of profound peace, of how much more importance must the affair have appeared to Mr. Rumbold, with advice of a certain war, and under all the circumstances of the case.

Hyder Ali was known to be in alliance with the French, and the Soubah Nizam Ali was more in their interest than ours. Hyder had taken advantage of our troubles with the Mah-rattas to stretch his conquests to the northward, and wanted only the Guntoor to open to the French the prospect of becoming formidable in that part of India, where["] their influence before the peace was very great, and where they still had many attached to them.

Accordingly, on the 10th of July, 1778, the President entered a Minute on the subject in the Military Department. So far was Mr. Rumbold from entirely setting aside or passing by the Nizam, notwithstanding that he had failed in every engagement, and that the Governor-General and Council's letter of the 11th of December, 1775, would have authorized the Presidency, in consequence of that failure, to have possessed themselves immediately of the Guntoor Circar, that he particularly recommended that, in the first instance, a letter should be written to him on the subject.

The Committee of Secrecy, indeed, observe at page 24 of their Second Report that, on the 10th of January, 1778, (a month before Mr. Rumbold's arrival out in Madras,) "The President

and Select Committee expressed their conviction of the evil tendency of the influence of the French with Bazalet Jung." This, however, is a mistake, as there was then no Select Committee. It was, as has been said, on the 10th of July, 1778, that Mr. Rumbold entered a Minute to that effect, fully stating every circumstance that had come to his knowledge relative to the French troops, and the necessity of putting an immediate check to their growing power. The Board concurred unanimously in this opinion; and it was resolved that a letter should be written immediately to the Soubah Nizam Ali Cawn on the subject, which was done accordingly.

The whole of the Governor's Minute is given in the Appendix, No. 79, in the Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy; but no notice is taken in the Report of the letter written to the Nizam in consequence *

It was resolved also that Captain Barclay, the Commander at Ongole, be directed to stop all Europeans going into the Guntoor Circar, and send them to the Presidency:

The Nizam never answered this letter.

* This letter to the Nizam is in the Minutes of Evidence, p. 365.

The siege of Pondicherry took place soon after it was written; and he waited to see the event.

In less than a week after this resolution had been taken by the President and Board of Madras, orders arrived from England for forming a Select Committee, with extensive powers for transacting all political affairs on the coast of Coromandel, and for commencing hostilities against the French; and, if the Select Committee found, upon a review of the naval and military force on the coast, that they were equal to the attempt, they were to begin with the reduction of Pondicherry. Sir Thomas Rumbold states, that Sir Eyre Coote, being called upon before he left England, gave it as his opinion that the force upon the coast would not be sufficient for the purpose.

Upon receipt of the Company's orders, measures were taken to accomplish an object of so great importance. Troops were called from every part to form a sufficient army; and now the mistaken policy of suffering the French troops in the Guntour Circar to remain and strengthen themselves, as they had done, was very manifest. Instead of following the spirited and proper directions of the Governor-

General and Council, the Government of Madras had contented themselves with trifling debates and unnecessary letters, to which they received trifling answers and professions meaning nothing. Without calling the chief part of the forces from the Circars, we had not sufficient to attempt the siege of Pondicherry; and, consequently, our northern possessions were subjected to some risk, especially from the French troops under Mons. Lally, who were ready to take any advantage of our defenceless situation in those parts.

They were now evidently supported by the Government of Pondicherry; and Mons. de Bellecombe furnished all the officers under Mons. Lally with commissions from the French king. It was thought necessary to form a detachment of all the remaining troops at the disposal of the Company that could be spared from the different garrisons to the northward, leaving in them a scanty number of raw recruits, scarcely enough, indeed, for the common duty. The command was given to Major Mathews, an approved officer, and he was ordered to watch the motions of Mons. Lally's party, and to prevent his making any irruption into our northern territories. Notwithstanding this detachment, Mr. RumboId was not free from apprehensions of

Mons. Lally's party * proving too strong for the force at his disposal, and requested of the Governor-General a reinforcement, to insure the safety of our northern possessions.

It was Sir Thomas Rumbold's impression and belief, to the best of his recollection, that the Select Committee of Madras wrote to the same effect. Mons. Lally, however, did not think proper to risk his force against the detachment under Major Mathews. Pondicherry fell before the Company's troops; and after the surrender of Pondicherry, the French factory at Mahé, and the French force to the northward, formed the only interest of that nation remaining in India, and both became objects for the attention of the Madras Government.

Successful measures were taken for the reduction of Mahé; and the removal of the French from the borders of the Circars, by depriving our national enemies of the prospect of establishing a footing in that quarter, was undoubtedly a point of greater consequence than even the reduction of Mahé. Having possession of

* The numbers of the party under Mons. Lally are underrated, as described by Mr. Mill; they consisted of three thousand two hundred and fifty, of which above five hundred were Europeans.

—Evidences, p. 361.

the Guntour Circar gave a certainty of excluding the French from any communication either with Bazalet Jung, the Soubah, or any of the Rajahs or tributaries to the northward. It was impossible to divine that the Bengal Government would persist in the ruinous war with the Mahrattas, at the hazard of our own security in every part, and under such circumstances of hostility with the different powers of Europe as rendered it probable the French would endeavour to recover their footing in India.

After the surrender of Pondicherry, Bazalet Jung sent a Vakeel to Madras, and, of his own accord, proposed the delivering up of the Circar, and dismissing the French troops from his service. This was a point the two Presidencies had been long labouring to obtain; and nothing but insanity could have led the Presidency of Madras to decline the offer. Mr. Rumbold acquainted the Board, on the 30th of November, with the proposal made by Bazalet Jung, (*vide* No. 80, Appendix, Second Report,) and at the same time gave his sentiments on such articles as he judged might form the foundation of an agreement to be made with him. These articles were transmitted to Bazalet Jung, the 22nd of December, for his consideration. A letter was

agreed at the same time to be written to the Governor-General and Council, advising them of Bazalet Jung's proposal for a Treaty with the Company, and of the answer we had sent to him, and desiring their opinion on the subject.

The part of the letter relative to the Treaty with Bazalet Jung was as follows :—

Extract of a letter from the Madras Presidency to the Governor-General and Council, dated December 31st, 1778.

“ON referring to our records we observe that in the year 1775 several letters were written to you from this Presidency on the subject of the French troops in the service of Bazalet Jung, stationed in the Guntoor Circar, and supplied with warlike stores through the port of Mootapillee. It appears, however, that this business was not prosecuted by this Government further than by a correspondence with Nizam Ali Cawn, which ended in nothing. As we are thoroughly convinced of the necessity of removing these troops from the service of Bazalet Jung, we have lately taken up the subject again, and having received certain proposals from him relative to the Guntoor Circar, we returned such an answer to them as we thought necessary for the occa-

sion. We now enclose copies of those papers for your information. By letters from your Presidency, dated July 5th, and December 11th, 1775, we find ample authority from you to the former Government to proceed in effecting the dismissal of the French troops by Treaty, or in any other manner they might think proper. As so much time has elapsed since, we have thought it necessary to apply to you again on the subject, and request you will be pleased to favour us with your sentiments upon the articles we have proposed to Bazalet Jung, and your sanction, if you approve them, to enter into a Treaty or agreement with him.

“THOMAS RUMBOLD,
EYRE COOTE,
HECTOR MUNRO,
J. WHITEHILL,
C. SMITH.”*

The Nizam had taken no notice of Mr. Rumbold's letter to him of the 10th of July; but after the reduction of Pondicherry, he was written to again to acquaint him with that event, and to express the President's surprise that he had not answered his former letter.

* Appendix, Second Report, No. 81, 82; Evidences, p. 369.

This produced a reply, which, however, was not received until the 4th of February, 1779; and this letter was still more evasive than those preceding.*

“I persuade myself,” says Sir Thomas Rumbold, “I have now fully shown that it was not possible to effect the removal of the French through the means of the Nizam, who was himself a favourer of them, and that nothing was hastily or wantonly undertaken by the Presidency of Madras; but that they acted on the most mature consideration, with the view entirely to remove the influence of the French from Hindostan.”

The Governor-General and Council's answer to Mr. Rumbold's letter of the 31st of December, is dated the 25th of January. They perfectly understood at that time the full extent of President Rumbold's letter to them. They make no mention themselves of the Nizam. Bazalet Jung alone is the person to be treated with. They comment particularly on each article separately. Some they correct. The letter is as follows:—

“In regard to the alliance proposed to be formed with Bazalet Jung, we highly approve of

* See Minutes of Evidence, pp. 366, 365.

the measures in general, and leave it to you to negotiate and finally conclude a Treaty with him. That you may be acquainted with our sentiments, as far as the materials supplied by you will enable us to form them,* we shall make such remarks upon the different articles which you have proposed to Bazalet Jung as occur to us on the perusal of them.

“Firstly. Quota of troops of every denomination to be maintained by the Company for the service of the chief, should be mentioned. And these are recommended to be restricted as much as possible to natives, that your European force may not be weakened by this alliance.

“Secondly. The subsidy for them should be fixed at the utmost expense that will probably be incurred, and the surplus or deficiency ought to be on the part of the Company.

“Thirdly. That the troops should be confined

* Of these cautious expressions the Governor-General afterwards availed himself when he denied his participation in this transaction; but was there any deficiency of information? It has been shown that the Board had in 1775 forced every circumstance upon his attention, and all their difficulties with regard to the Nizam, and he had cut the knot and repeated the recommendation before given. By a reference to dates, it will appear that Mr. Hastings's measures had already brought him into difficulty with the Nizam; did he so early provide for future contingencies?

to the defence of Bazalet Jung's country is proper.

“Fourthly, &c., &c., &c.—proper,—proper, &c.” *

It might have been thought incredible that a public body, like the Council of Bengal, liable thus to be detected from their own records, should pretend that when they “gave their assent to this Treaty being concluded with Bazalet Jung, they had no more of the proceedings of the Madras Presidency before them than what was contained in the letter of the 31st of December, 1778.” Yet this is what actually happened.

“Before I proceed to state what follows,” says Sir Thomas, “I shall beg leave to introduce an extract from the Governor-General and Council's letter, dated October 10th, 1780, when they began to be alarmed for the consequences of their ill-judged Mahratta war, and the distress they had brought upon the Company by exhausting their treasure and resources, and dividing their forces, in the most wanton and inconsiderate manner, and which induced them

* All the articles are thus revised and approved in detail by the Governor-General and Council. See Appendix, Second Report, No. 82.

to the mean attempt to deny their own acts, in hopes of deceiving the public, and turning off their attention from the real cause that threatened the loss of Asia to the British Empire." *

"It is true," says the Governor-General, "that in our reply to your letter of the 31st of December, 1778, wherein you first mentioned the Treaty with Bazalet Jung, we gave our assent to it generally, which by no means implied that extent of latitude which you have taken, but required to be used with reference to the condition on which it had our original sanction, and which, without any declaration on your part, or any authority expressed on ours, ought always to be understood as the superior, indispensable, and permanent condition, in all negotiations, and in all acts of Government, the faith of Treaties actually existing.

"The following extract of a letter from this Presidency, dated October 23rd, 1775, is introduced here, as proof what our sentiments then were on this subject, and is a part of the correspondence quoted by you, as conveying ' ample authority to the then Government to proceed in effecting the dismissal of the French troops from the service of Bazalet Jung,' by Treaty, or

* Sir Thomas Rumbold's Manuscript Defence.

in any other manner they might think proper :—

“ ‘As we observe you have addressed the Nabob Nizam Ali Cawn through your President, in the terms we had suggested, for the removal of the Europeans out of the Guntoor Circar, and for the purpose of obtaining his consent for the reversion of that district to the Company, we shall wait to hear the result of that letter before we send you any further instructions on that head.’ ”

“ ‘When, therefore, we gave our assent generally to the terms of the Treaty marked out in your letter of December 31st, 1778, we had no more of your proceedings before us than what you had chosen to make known to us in that letter, and those formed, of course, the limits of our approbation.

“ ‘We knew not that you had wholly omitted the Nabob Nizam Ali Cawn in the negotiation ; we could not, therefore, authorise what you had concealed from our knowledge.

“ ‘You have made orders for commencing hostilities, and you have negotiated and concluded a Treaty of peace, without the consent and approbation of the Governor-General and Council first obtained. But as soon as we were ac-

quainted with it, and were enabled to give it our attention, we declared our disapprobation of it, and then first interposed our authority, to prevent it from taking effect, by requiring the instant surrender of the Circar of Guntoor.” *

So writes Mr. Hastings towards the close of 1780. Nevertheless, the evidence and extracts we have already given prove incontestably that the Governor-General and Council had distinctly authorised the Madras Presidency to take possession of the Guntoor Circar by force, if Bazalet Jung did not comply with the demands made on him. Bazalet Jung had not complied with those demands; and the Government of Madras was empowered, after taking possession of the Circar, to withhold all the revenues of it, both from the Nizam and Bazalet Jung, “if either of them, respectively, gave opposition to the measure.”

Nothing can show more clearly the light in which the Nizam was held by the Governor-General and Council, than the instructions given to Mr. Elliot, when he was sent to treat with the Rajah of Berar, dated July 18th, 1778, wherein it is said: “The Nizam Ali Cawn has always

* No. 100, Appendix to Second Report of Committee of Secrecy. The date of this Letter is October 23rd, 1780.

been connected with the French, and is now in close union with the Ministers at Poona.” * And so little attention did the Governor-General and Council pay to existing Treaties, that in these instructions to Mr. Elliot, one of the conditions by which was to be purchased the friendship of the Rajah of Berar, was the recovery of the conquests which had been made from his country by the Soubah Nizam Ali. “For the whole of this proceeding,” says Sir Thomas Rumbold, “I refer to the Bengal Records, now in the India House.”

Mr. Hollond, when deputed to the Nizam from the Madras Presidency, was particularly directed to state fully to him what had passed relative to the Guntoor Circar with his brother, and to endeavour to obtain his good offices for the completion of the arrangements proposed with respect to it. This Mr. Hollond neglected to do.

By these instructions Mr. Hollond had an explicit authority and direction to communicate the Treaty to the Nizam, and to procure his concurrence.†

* Sixth Report, Appendix, No. 70.

† Instructions to Mr. Hollond, (Appendix, No. 85,) and also a letter from the President to the Nizam, in which he refers him to Mr.

It is said in the Second Report, page 24, that "on the 22nd of April, much about the time of concluding the Treaty with Bazalet Jung, instructions were given to Mr. Hollond," &c., &c.

Here is a double misrepresentation. The Treaty was not signed until on or after the 12th of May, 1779. (See Appendix, No. 95; also No. 105.) Mr. Hollond had left Madras in February or March; his instructions were completed the 25th of February. As to Mr. Hollond's vague assertion, "that he was informed that it would be useless for him to mention the agreement with Bazalet Jung," (which forms an allegation in the Report,) not saying by whom he was told, or where, Mr. Hollond was never so told by the President or the Committee, and his statement is in absolute contradiction to his instructions.*

Hollond for full explanation respecting the Guntoor.—Evidences, p. 373.

In a letter from Bazalet Jung to the President, given in the First Report, Appendix, No. 36, he complains, that "the person sent by the Company to His Highness did not endeavour to reconcile this business to him, which might have set aside all his doubts." For further and fuller explanation as to Mr. Hollond's instructions on this and other points, the reader is referred to the next chapter, p. 130.

* Appendix, No. 95; also No. 100. Also Consultations, Appendix, No. 112.

It is made a ground of complaint that the Treaty was concluded in April, yet that the Governor-General and Council were not advised of it until December. A letter from the President and Council, to the Governor-General, acquainting him with troops being sent to Bazalet Jung, in consequence of the late negotiations, which was substantially a communication of the completion of the Treaty, (this letter is dated April 23rd, 1779,) concludes with desiring the Governor-General and Council to favour the Presidency with their sentiments and determination upon the matter contained in it as soon as possible. Yet to this no answer was ever sent.*

The seventh charge of the Bill, that offence was given to Hyder by the march of the troops over part of his dominions, may here be noticed, but need not detain us long. It is sufficient to say that the pass through which the troops were to go was an open pass, previously to the recent possession obtained by Hyder; but yet the passage through his country had been anxiously guarded against, and was only resorted to as a matter of absolute necessity; † that there was

* Evidences, p. 385.

† "Every subaltern in the army might have known" (the Directors say) "that by crossing the Kistna twice, Hyder's terri-

no expectation of opposition from him;* and furthermore, that, to avoid all cause of offence, Colonel Harpur was directed, before his march, to give notice to Hyder's managers of the district, and acquaint them with his objects and destination. The last order to Colonel Harpur, directing him to proceed, unless he should meet with great or insurmountable obstacles, was countermanded.

In Sir Thomas Rumbold's defence, as given substantially from his own manuscript in the last chapter, he does little more than point to the different articles of the evidence that had passed through the hands of the Committee of

tories might have been avoided." But Bazalet Jung, in a letter to Colonel Harpur, says, (Evidences, p. 392, dated June 26th, 1779,) "I have received your arzee, in which you informed me that you had received a letter from the Governor, ordering you not to march by any road through Hyder Ali's country, or that of the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah, but to march by any other road, if there is any. The rivers are swelled. It is proper you march by the Gaut of Atcoor; you would otherwise be obliged to cross two or three rivers. The road of Atcoor is now clear and free, as I wrote to you, since Hyder's people have left it. But as the Governor has wrote in this manner to you, I have made inquiries for another road. The head Hircarrahs of the Circar have been sent to conduct you," &c., &c.

* Appendix, No. 36.

Secrecy. With this complete chain of evidence before them, with a knowledge of the correspondence between the Board of Madras and Mr. Hastings in 1775, and again in 1779, could that Committee honestly assert that, under the directions of the Governor-General, "the Nizam had been made throughout the principal party in the negotiation?"

Let it here be added, and be noted, that the Court of Directors were constantly advised of the measures of the Presidency with regard to Bazalet Jung, as is fully set forth in the Appendix, Second Report.

When apprized of the conclusion of the Treaty of 1778, the Court of Directors commended the conduct of the Presidency as "very meritorious," and "the hints given by the Governor-General as very judicious."

Nevertheless, one of the Resolutions brought forward in the House of Commons, declared the whole affair to have been "a gross breach of solemn Treaties, which stained the national honour, and that Sir Thomas Rumbold was thereby guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour." And to this was added in the allegation of the Bill, that "it was done in a clandestine, treacherous, irregular, and unjustifiable manner;" but, as the framers

of the Bill could not quite overlook that it had been sanctioned by the Governor-General, they ascribe to him some mental reservation. "But it doth not appear," the Bill says, "that the said Governor-General intended, by such approbation, to authorize concluding the said Treaty without first obtaining the consent of the Nizam."

In Mr. Hastings's* private correspondence, as given by Mr. Gleig, he writes this version of the story (vol. ii., p. 331):—"The Circar of Mortazanagur, (or Guntoor,) forcibly taken by the Presidency of Fort St. George, in violation of the Treaty of 1768, has been returned to its proprietor, and other means taken to conciliate the Nabob Nizam Ali Cawn, who was upon the point of declaring war against us, and was the original author and instigator of the conspiracy planned for our extirpation." *

* We may open these pages and find much that is similar. An account, written by Mr. Hastings to Lord Shelburne, is thus prefaced:—"I will avail myself of the credit which I believe I possess with your Lordship for veracity, and of the sure means which you have of detecting me if I part from it, by affirming, without a long train of argument to prove it, that I have never in a single instance broken the faith of a Treaty. . . I affirm, also, my Lord, that the invasion of the Carnatic was not caused by the Mahratta war, but by the known weakness of the Carnatic, the dissipation of its forces, its poverty caused by private embezzlement, and by a

How much truth there was in the first of these assertions has been shown; nor is any more credit due to the second, "that the Guntoor had been returned to its proprietor;" or, as it is expressed in the Bill, "And whereas, on the 12th of June, 1780, the Government of Bengal wrote a letter to the Select Committee of Fort St. George, notifying their resolution to reinstate Bazalet Jung in the Guntoor Circar, and requiring their immediate compliance; and Bazalet Jung was accordingly reinstated," &c., &c.

Bazalet Jung never was reinstated; he was shuffled out of sight. We only hear that he died two years afterwards.

The Governor-General, no longer so scrupulous of Treaties, disregarded the faith pledged to Bazalet Jung, which might, at all events, have demanded some equivalent; and the Guntoor Circar was suffered to remain in the hands of the

•
general confederacy formed against all the governments in India,—a confederacy which was the avowed act of the Nabob Nizam Ali Cawn, *and declared by him to have been prompted by a consideration for his own security against the menaced hostilities of the Presidency of Fort St. George*; that his reliance on the faith and justice of this government had induced him to withdraw his support from this confederacy," &c.

Nizam, even after Lord Macartney had formally desired to address him, and claim the possession of it for the Company.

With regard to the third assertion of Mr. Hastings, that the Nizam was the author of the confederacy for the extirpation of the British from India, this part of the history is involved in much obscurity. Possibly the truth was better known to Mr. Hastings than to most others, since it appears he had very early knowledge of the existence of this confederacy.*

* Letter from the Governor-General to the Directors, Appendix, Sixth Report, No. 303.

CHAPTER X.

THE TRIBUTE TO THE NIZAM OF THE DECCAN.

It was made a charge against Sir Thomas Rumbold, that he solicited, through his ambassador, a remission or abatement of the tribute which the Company had bound themselves to pay for the Northern Circars.

The often repeated story of the tribute to the Nizam of the Deccan may be more fully understood by tracing it directly from the Appendix to the Second Report of the Secret Committee, than in following the continuation of the manuscript portion of Sir Thomas Rumbold's "Answer to the Committee;" or as it appears in the Defence by Mr. Hardinge, which is based upon it.

Before entering upon this subject, attention should be drawn to the low state of the Madras treasury, and the difficulty experienced by that Presidency in meeting the daily exigencies of the service. This will be found described, in some degree, in the extracts from letters to Bengal, and to the Court of Directors, which are placed at the end of the volume.

From the manner in which this subject has been treated, it might be supposed that the demand made for succour from Bengal was from the private resources of that Presidency ; whereas it was a point admitted, that the other Presidencies should, at their need, be supplied from the richer treasury of Bengal.* At this time, when war was impending, it had been enjoined that especial assistance should be afforded to Madras by Bengal.

There is one occasion on which Mr. Mill, in his history, has leaned to the side of justice with regard to the Presidency of Madras. It is where he speaks of the exaggerated representations made by Sir Eyre Coote, on his return to Madras, after the invasion of the Carnatic.

“ Not deficient, either in the virtues which inspire affection or command respect, Sir Eyre Coote, as he was somewhat disposed to enlarge

* Extract from Letter to Bengal.—Evidences, p. 506.

“ *London, August 31st, 1778.*

“ As hostilities have actually commenced between Great Britain and France, and as we think it probable that our servants on the coast of Coromandel may stand in need of assistance from you, we direct that you fail not upon their application to send them such assistance in money, or otherwise, as the exigence of the case may require.

“ G. WOMBWELL,” &c.

in praise of himself, so was somewhat apt to indulge in complaint of others. In the letter which, after his arrival in the Carnatic, he addressed to the Directors and to the Ministers of the King, he drew a picture, in the darkest colours, not only of the weak and disastrous condition into which the country was brought, but of the negligence and incapacity, if not the corruption and guilt, of those servants of the Company under whose management such misfortunes had arrived. It was, however, much more easy to point out what it was desirable should have been performed, than, with the defective revenue of the Presidency, to have performed it. That Presidency had repeatedly represented, both to the supreme Council and to the Directors, their utter incapacity, through want of money, to make any military exertion; and by both had been left to struggle with their necessities. It was the poverty of the Carnatic, and the unwillingness of all parties to act as if they believed in that poverty, much more, it is probable, than the negligence or corruption of the government, which produced the danger by which all were now alarmed."

But Professor Wilson, in his edition of Mr. Mill, has not let this pass. To a certain extent

he has been very candid ; and, from his observation of the evidences in defence of Sir Thomas Rumbold, has vindicated him from some of the charges which Mr. Mill has brought forward, fresh from the hands of the Directors ; but had Professor Wilson followed up this course, he would necessarily have inculcated Mr. Hastings, between whom and Sir Thomas Rumbold there must unfortunately be always an antagonism. From this point, therefore, Professor Wilson closes his eyes upon the Evidences, and with a disregard of the acknowledged fact, which was also proved and brought forward in one of Mr. Dundas's Resolutions, before the House of Commons, by a calculation based upon the last twelve years,* “ that the revenues of the Presidency of Fort St. George were barely sufficient to support a peace establishment,” Professor Wilson makes this comment upon Mr. Mill's statement, (chap. v., p. 143) :—

“ If the poverty of the Madras Presidency was the consequence of mismanagement and corruption, it only aggravated their culpability. The resources of the Carnatic were sufficient, if protected against the prodigality of the Nabob, the rapacity of his European adherents, and the

* See Parliamentary Records, vol. xxii., p. 1318.

ignorance and venality of the Company's servants, to have maintained the Presidency in a posture respectable, if not formidable, to its neighbours."

It was at this time of extreme embarrassment, when, as was afterwards described by Sir Thomas Rumbold in the House of Commons,* "the troops having been paid for one month, he knew not from whence the money would be supplied for the month following;" that three applications were made by the Nizam for the discharge of the tribute for the Northern Circar. This tribute had fallen into arrears before Sir Thomas Rumbold entered upon the government, and, with the current tribute, amounted to a sum the Presidency was unable to pay.†

While some writers have sufficient acquaintance with the earlier part of the history to agree, that "the view taken by the Governor," when he described this tribute as "unjust in its origin, and a sacrifice of the rights of the Company, was supported by reason," yet it is said, "The application of it can only be characterized as dishonest and disgraceful."

* "The army consisted of thirty thousand men. It required sevenlacs a month to pay them."

† See Parliamentary Register, vol. xxii, p. 1285.

Had these writers explained wherein the conduct of the Governor was dishonest and disgraceful, and what method they would have recommended in this case, it would have set their own opinions in a clearer light; but the best way is now to tell the true story of the facts, with the attendant circumstances:—

The Nizam had demanded the payment, and it has been shown that there were not the means of satisfying his demand. From Bengal, in answer to a statement of this very difficulty, the Government of Madras were told that no assistance could be afforded. Sir Thomas Rumbold knew that his administration was shortly drawing to a close. He might possibly have evaded the payment a little longer, and left it to his successor to battle with the difficulty. But the time seemed favourable to throw off so heavy a burden; altogether, if possible; or, at any rate, to make an effort to reduce the amount. The time appeared favourable, because, from bad seasons, and other causes, the revenue of the Circars had fallen so short, that this formed a reasonable plea for urging the remission at this juncture. The time appeared favourable, also, because the Nizam had, by his conduct, infringed the Treaty which assured this tribute to him, and

the Presidency of Madras might have been justified in withholding a payment which, they had grounds for supposing, would furnish an enemy with means to be used eventually against themselves.

The method pursued was, in fact, what had been drawn out by the original negotiator of the Treaty (General Caillaud).

In a letter, on record,* he stated "this concession to the Nizam as purely nominal, calculated more for homage and flattery to his pride, than recompense or payment; and that he" (General Caillaud) "entertained no manner of doubt, that when an opportunity may offer, to make *the giving it up an act of his own*, he will no longer persist in it." †

It had been deemed necessary, on several accounts, to depute a person to the court of the Nizam. The person selected for the mission was Mr. Hollond, in whose good faith Sir Thomas Rumbold appears to have placed entire reliance, and also to have entertained a high opinion of his abilities, since much discretionary power was intrusted to him.

* "Extract of a letter from General Caillaud, Fort St. George Military Department, December 8th, 1766."—Evidences, p. 397.

† See also Mr. Hardinge's Defence of Sir Thomas Rumbold.

Mr. Hollond was instructed to “explain what had taken place with Bazalet Jung, relating to the Guntoor Circar;” and he was the bearer of a letter from the President to the Nizam, in which he was especially referred to for a full explanation on that point.* He was also to endeavour to obviate any unfavourable impression that might have been caused by the march of a large body of troops from Bengal, across the country, to Surat. The conduct of the Nizam, in having hitherto disregarded the repeated demands made to him, to obtain the dismissal of the French troops from the service of his brother, was so great an infringement of his engagements, that the Presidency of Madras deemed it a sufficient reason to allege for the payment of the tribute having been delayed. Mr. Hollond was desired to give this explanation, and, at the same time, to assure the Nizam, “that, *in full confidence of every satisfaction being given with regard to the French troops*, the money should be duly paid.”

Mr. Hollond was also directed “to convey every necessary information to the Governor-General and Council as well as to them.” In a subsequent letter, Mr. Hollond was desired “to endeavour to engage the Soubah to take part in

Evidences, p. 374.

defence of his brother, and to promote in him a disposition favourable to their views." Great stress has been laid upon the direction given to Mr. Hollond to make this assurance of payment, on his first arrival at Hyderabad; while "yet the same Board, by subsequent credentials to the same Ambassador, insisted upon the remission of the tribute."

There is much fallacy in this representation. The Board never did insist upon the remission; and the conditional assurance of payment was not inconsistent with a request that the creditor would remit the debt. It must be remembered that the assurance was expressly declared to be upon condition "of full satisfaction being given with regard to the troops in Bazalet Jung's service;" and that this was immediately followed by a communication from Mr. Hollond, that the French troops had only left their former position, to be received by the Nizam himself.

When apprized of this fact, a strong remonstrance was addressed by the Council of Madras to the Nizam. The President wrote to this effect: "I observe what your Highness has said relative to the French troops lately dismissed from the service of Bazalet Jung. Your Highness may well remember that repeated applica-

tions were made to you to obtain their dismissal; but it is certain that point was not effected until we engaged with Bazalet Jung to supply him with a body of our own troops, on the express condition of his discharging every Frenchman in his service. Having taken so much pains to remove the people of that nation, with whom we are at war, from the territories of Bazalet Jung, I cannot help expressing my concern, that these same people should find protection and service from your Highness. Our wish was, that they should have been dispersed, and sent out of the country; but if your Highness entertains them, they are very little, if any thing, further removed from us, than they were at Adoni; and by being kept together in your Highness's country, they are nearly in the same condition to do us mischief. I beg your Highness will understand me. I have the utmost confidence in your attachment to the Company, but I fear it is not in your power to prevent these people corresponding and intriguing with their countrymen, to our prejudice; and as it is not conformable to the Treaty, that your Highness, who is in alliance with the Company, should openly encourage and protect their enemies, I hope you will cause them to be sent

out of the country, which will be a strong mark that your Highness desires to live on terms of the strictest friendship with the Company.” *

Mr. Hollond was also enjoined to urge, “that as the French were then the avowed enemies of the British nation, they should be directed to proceed to the sea-coast, that we might send them, with others of the same nation, now our prisoners, to their native country.” “We desire you will use your endeavours to effect their removal,” says the President to Mr. Hollond, “since we cannot but consider them now in the same point of view nearly as when they were employed in the service of Bazalet Jung.” †

It may be affirmed, that had the negotiation not been wrested out of the hands of the Presidency of Madras, and had Mr. Hollond been guided by them, and pursued their instructions

* Evidences, p. 425.

† See a letter in Bengal Secret Correspondence.

Extract from a letter from the Nabob of Arcot.—Evidences, p. 432.

“The conduct of the Nabob Nizam Ali Cawn wears an unfriendly appearance, since he has positively refused to dismiss the French from his services, and, on the contrary, has settled a lac of rupees per month for the pay of that body, together with five thousand country infantry attached to them; and, placing the greatest confidence in them, makes them the advanced body of his army.”