

common report, because it is a very unfavourable season for the enemy to invade the Carnatic, with a body of horse especially, there being very little water in the rivers or tanks, and also very little grass for feed."

"Do you, from your knowledge, think any of the villages on the frontiers of the Carnatic would have been proper to have cantoned our troops in, previous to the invasion of Hyder Ali?"

Answer. "It would have answered no purpose to have carried them to the frontiers, as there were several passes through which the enemy could have come into the Carnatic, and surrounded us; and, as we had no cavalry, might have prevented any supplies being sent to us."

"What situation is the most centrical for assembling an army to cover the different garrisons?"

Answer. "I believe near Conjeveram and Wandewash."

"From your knowledge of the Nabob of Arcot, do you think that he was not apprehensive of such an invasion?"

Answer. "The report varied at the Durbar in the end of May and beginning of June, 1780, and then I heard the Nabob say that Hyder had sent a body of pioneers to clear the passes; and that

was the first time he seemed to think it certain that the Carnatic would be invaded."

"Do you think that in April, 1780, the army was in a proper situation to have taken the field against the enemy?"

Answer. "They were both in a proper state and situation, if bullocks and other common preparations had been provided."

Colonel Capper described the principal garrisons as amply supplied with stores, and "Arcot a perfect magazine of stores and ammunition." *

* Evidences, pp. 49-54. It may be seen, page 161, of the Minutes of Evidence, that the Counsel, for the prosecution abandoned these two paragraphs of the Bill—127 and 128—which charged Sir Thomas Rumbold with "culpable negligence in not preparing for the defence of the Carnatic," &c.; and also "the concealment imputed to him by Messrs. Smith and Johnson, members of the Select Committee of Fort St. George, of letters containing important intelligence of the preparations making by Hyder for an invasion of the Carnatic."

After Major Geils's evidence,—which was given very early, as he was under orders to return to India,—the first charge was withdrawn.

[Unfortunately, historians, writing under an unfriendly bias and inspiration against Sir Thomas Rumbold, and following each other's lead, instead of resorting to the original sources of evidence and information, have retained and handed on charges which the personal enemies and official antagonists and prosecutors of Sir Thomas Rumbold, in his lifetime, were compelled to abandon.]

Very particular testimony was also given by Major Geils, an artillery officer and field engineer. He stated, that "the fortifications of Madras were effected during the government of Sir Thomas Rumbold; that the artillery were complete with stores and carriages, and in high discipline;" that "a body of Lascars was raised, and attached to the artillery, which were found particularly useful in the field, as well as new corps trained, that the regular Sepoys might strengthen the army."

Major Geils gave it as his decided opinion that, "With any force they had to oppose Hyder Ali, they could not have prevented him from making himself master of the open country. He looked upon Madras, Velour, Trichinopoli, and Tanjore, as their principal garrisons. None of these had fallen, but with respect to the inferior garrisons, they ought to have been erased. I think," Major Geils repeated, "Hyder Ali might have entered the Carnatic, in spite of any disposition we could have made. Had Hyder entered by the northern pass, there were no other troops for the protection of the Northern Circars than Colonel Bailly's division."

In the small part of the evidence of these officers that has been cited, they are found to

agree in the opinion expressed by Sir Thomas Rumbold, in his letters to the Council of Bengal, that they could not protect the country from the ravages of Hyder, or guard all the passes; and justify the proposition, which he twice urged upon their consideration, that abandoning other projects and views, excepting those of necessary defence against the national enemy, "the three Presidencies should unite to check his power," and put an end to the war which was certainly impending.

Although in the course of what has been written, some passages from Mr. Hardinge's Defence of Sir Thomas Rumbold have been occasionally introduced, the compiler of these documents was not in possession of that Defence until the principal part of what is here set forth had been worked out from other sources. The Defence consists of three parts, and is to be met with in the British Museum; the first two parts are complete, the third part is in an abbreviated form.

It has been a question whether this Defence, admirable in power, as well as for its eloquence and wit, should be reprinted and circulated, in the hope of calling attention to a subject where

the truth has been too long suffered to remain disguised ; but this plan was not carried out, for the reason that the Defence enters into great detail ; and to be thoroughly understood requires some acquaintance with the very numerous charges of the Bill, and also with the speeches of the Counsel for the accusation, to whom a great part of it is addressed. This objection does not apply in the same degree to the concluding part, which is more general, and a summary of the rest.

A great portion of this is subjoined.

CHAPTER XVII.

EXTRACT FROM THE CONCLUDING CHAPTER OF MR. HARDINGE'S DEFENCE OF SIR THOMAS RUMBOLD.

AFTER a recapitulation of what took place on the subject of the Guntoor Circar in the year 1775, Mr. Hardinge continues :—

“ I recur to the duty of Sir Thomas Rumbold and his Council in 1778, and I ask, if under the sanction of the letters from Bengal, especially the latest, compared with the subsequent events, and the Nizam's violation of his promise, they were not authorized at one immediate stroke, (waiting for no further correspondence, either with Bengal or the Nizam,) to repossess the Guntoor. Every single step which the culprit before us pursued relative to the Guntoor was not only vindicated, but authorized, by the Governor General, Mr. Hastings. Over some parts of his conduct by Sir Thomas Rumbold, I would throw a veil, if I could; but here I affirm that I can fight in support of the *guilt* imputed by this Bill under the shield of *his*

genius and spirit. No doubt of the Company's right either to correspond or treat with Bazalet Jung had been suggested by the Council of Madras; and the only doubt which they had insinuated, was upon the single question of acquiring the Guntoor by force. But at Bengal, the right of treating with Bazalet, in a pacific form, or sword in hand, (as the Board of Madras might think most eligible,) is taken for granted; and the letter authorises an immediate force to be levied, for the purpose of a march to the borders of Guntoor. If this requisition should fail, say the Council of Bengal, and he should refuse instant obedience to it, act upon the other alternative yourselves, and after possession thus obtained, treaty for the cession, that is, for the terms of retaining the Circar, already taken into our hand, (by an act of justice to ourselves,) is to be formed with Bazalet's brother the Nizam."

"What is the conduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold and his Council? They had read the latest instructions from Bengal; they had read and seen how baffled those instructions had long been, partly by the debates of men who should have acted, and partly by the Nizam's breach of good faith; yet they could not but see, that Bengal had also been inactive, and had not pressed the

execution of his own plan, or censured the disregard shown to it by the inferior Council. In delicacy, therefore, to the superior Board, they pause; and before they direct those acts of hostility against the Nizam, which the Government of Bengal had even authorized, they write a letter to him; in the genuine spirit of the instructions before them. They tell him 'that if he will not consent, they will take effectual means with Bazalet Jung. They claim the Port of Mootapillee, at all events; but unless the enemy shall be dispossessed, they require the cession of not Mootapillee alone, but the whole Circar.' At the time of writing, an order was issued for intercepting the first European reinforcements that should enter the Guntoor at Mootapillee. The letter was never answered by the Nizam."

"At a later period, the war preceding the capture of Pondicherry took place. An abler and more spirited enterprise was never planned; an able and spirited enterprise was never better executed. The policy of it was, to rid us of the European competition first, and then direct our united force against the country powers, whom the invader had seduced or encouraged in their disaffection. For the support, however, of this

measure, the Northern Circars were in a manner evacuated, and almost at the mercy of Bazalet's friends in the Guntoor. After Pondicherry was captured, no European enemy remained, except the garrison of Mahé, and Lally's force in the Guntoor. It could scarce be imagined that a mad perseverance of the Government at Bengal in the war against the Mahrattas, with whom the Nizam and Hyder Ali were leagued, would counteract the benefit of such critical services. After this capture, Sir Thomas Rumbold again wrote, with no better success, to the Nizam. He desired an answer to the first letter, but no answer came. In the mean time, Bazalet, Jung, unsolicited, made an offer of the Guntoor upon terms."

"Upon the 22nd of December they apprise the Government at Bengal of the offer and of their Treaty, in the express terms of it. They state the arrangement as made with Bazalet alone, and the rent stipulated as a compensation to him. The very name of the Nizam is put aside, and laid upon the shelf, unless for the purpose of stating that he has neglected his duty, violated his word, and sent another shuffling letter, since Bazalet's offer had been accepted. They state the right of treating with Bazalet, or proceeding by force

against him, as authorized by the result of the correspondence between the Governments in 1775, and by the events which followed it."

"What is the conduct of the Government of Bengal, thus informed? They approve directly, and without reserve, the acceptance of this overture, and ratify the Articles of Treaty enclosed, except in two or three particulars, which they correct. They return it, so corrected, and in express terms authorize the Council of Madras to conclude this Treaty with Bazalet Jung. They speak of the 'alliance proposed as affecting *him*.' 'We leave it,' says the letter, 'to *you* to negotiate, and finally conclude with *him*.' Upon the Nizam, not a syllable is to be found. Could that Government have acted otherwise, at this later period of their politics, addressed evidently to the same object, and affected by the same principles? Could they have said, 'You should first have conciliated the Nizam?' Could they have stated his consent as the express or implied preliminary to the correspondence and agreement with his brother? Their own words upon record must have confuted them, and exposed the duplicity of their politics. Yet, in the year 1780, they misrepresent, or at least forget, the tenour of the letters written by

themselves in 1775, and preserved upon the Company's records."

" 'We took it for granted' (they have in 1780 the confidence to affirm) 'that you would keep your Treaties.' They quote a single passage, without the context, as proving the intention of Madras to consult the Nizam in 1775, which passage I have also stated and explained. It imports that having written to the Nizam the Council of Madras were to wait for his answer. But why omit the subsequent letter of the same Board upon the same topic, since the answer of the Nizam, for which alone they had waited, reached them? In 1780 we are told at Bengal, that 'when the Council there approved of this Treaty with Bazalet, in 1778, they had nothing before them but Sir Thomas Rumbold's letter, and had no conception of the disrespect shown to the Nizam by these measures.' Nothing? Had they received no letters in 1775? Had the objection of Treaties in the way never been stated? Had it not been pointedly alleged by the Council of Madras, and superseded by them? Were not these Treaties themselves before them enclosed expressly for the purpose of marking that Bazalet had violated them? Did they not look at these materials, and examine them? What advice have they given

after this examination ? They do not say, ‘Go to the Nizam first, with your Treaty in your hand ;’ but, ‘Go to ~~the~~ Circar ; take it out of dangerous hands : we must have it. When you have made it our own, treat for an equivalent, if the parties deserve that mark of attention to their interest, by opposing no force against this necessary act of justice to ourselves.’ ”

“Such then, after all, is the violation of those Treaties by the Council of Madras, or their President, (who it seems at this bar must always answer for them,) a violation ‘gross and shameful,’ as the Bill calls it ; that Bill which points only at the correspondence and agreement with Bazalet Jung, for the purpose of ingrafting those invectives upon it, and omits the authority given to possess the Guntoor by force ; omits the terms proposed by each of the Governments in the year 1775 ; omits Bazalet Jung’s violation of the subsisting Treaties ; omits the approbation given by the Directors themselves to the measure ; and omits the Nizam’s perfidy, in suffering, if not enabling, the European troops to form a junction with Hyder Ali ; for whom they were destined from the first.”

“By the way this injured ally, the Nizam, gave, soon after his brother had ceded the Guntoor, a

decisive and striking proof of his own perfidy, by a letter to that brother, in which he laments over the loss of the Guntoor, as a loss to their common interest. 'You should not,' said he, 'have given it up to the English. Hyder Ali should have been preferred.' Not a hint there of Treaties violated by our Government! In the very hand of Hyder himself,—in a letter to his own Vakeel at the Court of Bazalet (a direct violation of Treaty that such a Vakeel should have been there) we discover indignation against Bazalet for his preference of the English to him. 'You have given it,' says the appellant, the injured Hyder, 'to my bitter enemies, and have preferred them to me.'"

"The next article before us, is the conduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold in attempting to obtain from the Nizam a remission of that yearly sum which is called the peishcush. The charge relative to this conduct has made an impression upon the House, because the advocates who stated it, as well as the Bill, which is always insidious, have thrown a mist of prejudice over it. It has only to be understood, and the subtleties which entangle it will be at an end."

"The Bill calls the offence by two names, for two different purposes; and one or other of

them is, of necessity, false. But I shall prove that neither of them are true. First the application to the Nizam, in the form of a request that he would remit this tribute, is called by the name of Treaty, for the purpose of making that measure, so described, a positive disobedience of an Act of Parliament. But who will seriously affirm that, if I request an indulgence relative to some particulars of a right, upon the face of an existing Treaty, I form a new Treaty by that request? In the next breath, however, it is no Treaty, for it violates another; whereas Treaty assumes the arrangement of parties, without prejudice to the rights of either, and subject, of course, to their mutual assent or disapprobation as it proceeds. But call it either Treaty or application for an indulgence, it violated no good faith, it offered no injury to the most punctilious and irritable sense of honour: it could have no view but that of advantage to the Company, at a moment of the most critical peril.".....

"That a remission of this tribute was desirable, that it was just and wise to obtain it without offence to the Nizam, is perfectly agreed. The justice of it was obvious, and the letter of Treaty could alone interfere. Where, then, was the

iniquity, the violence, and the wrong of negotiating a dispensation with a law, if it may be so termed in this particular? The wisdom of the attempt is proved by the fact, that we could not pay the sum; a fact stated in other words by the accusing Counsel, as affording a reason against the attempt, viewed in the light of an injury to the Nizam. 'The House will remember,' said he, 'that at this period their want of resources, military and political, was extreme.' But was that a reason for sleeping over this oppressive claim, which hung about our necks and crushed every hope of exertion against the embarrassment of our political fortune?".....

"A strange inaccuracy occurs in the sentiments of Bengal disclosed by their letter. They, first, in express terms admit that no attempt had been made by the Council of Madras to obtain the remission of the peishcush against the Nizam's consent: yet, in the same letter, they insinuate the charge of an oppressive and most injurious violence to him, as marked in the very assurance given to him, that if the remission could not be obtained, the accrued and current tribute would be paid. The subtle ingenuity of their comment shall not be injured by me. I will state it without exaggeration. 'It is true

that you promise to pay; but you add, that you will pay when you can, and will resist violence: from which it is no strained inference to collect these two propositions. The first, that you will not pay at all; and the second, that you will resist any demand of payment by force.' A more sophistical fallacy never tortured plain words, and a context was never so mutilated. The words are:—'If all these four propositions fail, we will pay the balance due, when in cash. [We have no design to commence hostilities, or infringe any of his rights;]' (that paragraph is omitted by the commentator,) but, 'we are prepared to revenge any insults which may be offered.'"

"The only part of these instructions to Holland which point at the policy of addressing the Nizam in a firmer tone, applies itself to the support which he had given to Lally's force in the Guntoor; and with a view to that subject, it was politic as well as just. But no passage in the letter drops a hint that Holland should insist upon the remission proposed. . . . 'After all, (says the letter,) if you cannot obtain the remission of the entire peishcush, try to lower it; and learn if you can find an equivalent which you may tempt the Nizam to accept.'"

“I am now to lay before the House a very important fact in the conduct of the Supreme Government, and which I defy their advocates to vindicate as either politic or just. Upon the single credit of a letter from Mr. Hollond, the Resident of Madras at the Court of the Nizam, they write at once to that Prince, and suspend all further proceedings between Madras and him. Why could they not have corrected the erroneous policy of the inferior Council through that Council? Why not seem to act in concert with them, instead of disowning and affronting them at the Court of a native Prince? Their own words, which they falsely apply to Madras in the sequel, are with strict justice applicable here to themselves. ‘They proclaim to all India the disunion of interest between the two Presidencies.’ ”

“The Directors of the Company had, in express and emphatical terms, disapproved a similar interference upon a recent occasion; but the Council of Bengal have short memories. Upon their own records, we find a letter from hence * dated February 7th, 1777. Let the Counsel for the Bill explain, why the same thing was wrong

* [That is, from the East India Directors to the Council of Bengal.—ED.].

at Bombay, and right in 1779 at Madras. I shall quote from it without an anachronism. 'We disapprove your embassy to Poonah, without consulting first the Council of Bombay. You state, by your Ambassador, that you determine to annul their Treaty. This will degrade them in the eyes of the natives, and it will be impossible for them to conduct our affairs in future, with honour to themselves, or advantage to us.' "

"The result of this abrupt and wanton interference was of course a disagreement between the two Presidencies; but Madras bowed implicitly to the measure, disputing indeed the policy, the justice, and even the right of that control, which the Government had assumed, but making no opposition to it in fact. It is therefore clear of doubt, that if that measure had been conveyed through the Board of Madras, without any public offence to their honour, they would have co-operated most cheerfully, and surrendered their own opinions without reluctance."

"We are told that 'Madras used angry words to Bengal,' upon the occasion of this disagreement between them. It is childish to argue from angry words on either side in cases like these. It is at least a measuring cast between

the parties at variance; and, as to Bengal, the records of it contain such acrimony of debate, that you would suppose every day would produce one duel at least amongst the members of that Board. But in this correspondence I discover some facts and some arguments which strike me as commanding respect by their weight and importance. The Board of Madras first vindicate the policy of their own conduct; they lament the interference of Bengal, and the manner of it still more; they add, that nothing but misconception at the Court of the Nizam can account for his umbrage, *if it was even genuine*, at any of their propositions; they, however, much to their honour, give the point up, and surrender their own opinions to an act of power, though, in their sense of it, assumed and usurped. What is the answer from Bengal? 'You have yielded, and we will give you no reason.' Was that conciliatory language? But a fact appears in the letter of Madras which it imported the Council of Bengal to explain. Shah Allum had been dispossessed of his territories and his tribute by the Council of Bengal, without any reason assigned; whereas the Nizam, as it was admitted, and had been emphatically urged by the same Council, was meditating a league with the Mah-

rattas and French against the English Government.”

“The natural consequences of this imperious and wanton control at Bengal over the Board of Madras were soon marked by the event. It baffled the recovery of the Guntoor,—a measure which the Council of Bengal had recently authorized. It courted the Nizam to raise his demands: he claimed the Guntoor for himself. This was poetical justice to the Council of Bengal, who had courted him in such flattering terms, after they had betrayed him at the Court of Berar. Another inconvenience arose from the suspension of those arrangements which the Board of Madras were attempting at the Court of the Nizam. If Mr. Hollond had pursued their instructions with fidelity and good sense, an immediate payment of the peishcush could have been made the just price of Lally’s banishment from the Guntoor, whereas the result of this abject homage to the Nizam by the supreme Government, and of this blind confidence in his honour, was, that pretending to guard the enemies’ force, he connived at their escape into Hyder Ali’s quarters.”

“We are next accused of ‘recalling Mr. Hollond.’ A very singular and refined imputation it

is. We recalled that Resident, whose continuance in office had not been desired by either the Council of Bengal, by the Nizam, or by himself; that Resident, who had been of no use to us, but had merely acted as a partizan of the supreme Government; that Resident, *who had abused our confidence, and had paid the Council of Bengal for their protection of him, by furnishing them with a victim, in place of themselves*; who had offended the public justice of the kingdom by encouraging the Mahratta war, and affording opportunity to a desolating invader's ambition. We recalled a Resident, who had proved the duplicity of his politics by writing to us a letter of *confidence*, inconsistent with his letter to Bengal. He was recalled without offence to the Nizam or himself. The Nizam had marked a very abrupt and sudden change of politics, from the moment in which the Council of Bengal disowned and affronted Madras. He saw with pleasure the discord between the two Councils, and encouraged the instrument of it. We have upon the records of this period a letter to Bengal, written by the Nizam, and altered by Mr. Hollond; (a singular feature of his intrigue and cabal, which of itself disabled him for his office;) but the unaltered parts of that letter have

shrewd sense in them, humiliating to the little politics of Bengal, and a death blow to the influence of Madras.....But as if the affront put already upon the Council of Madras, by suspending their instructions, was not signal enough to degrade them for ever at the Court of the Nizam, they direct the agent; Mr. Hollond, whom that Council had recalled, (by the power which had appointed him,) to be their own Resident at the same Court, for the purpose of carrying into effect a new system irreconcilable to the policy which his first credentials had authorized him to pursue. Could any act be more injurious, more oppressive, and more grating to the inferior Board? It annihilated the respect which had hitherto been considered as due to the Government of Madras; it invited the servants of that power to disobey their immediate master, and look to Bengal for impunity. Fatal politics! which at an earlier period the same Government had encouraged, by their sanction to the calumnies of Mr. Sadlier." *

* This allusion is not explained. At a later period Mr. Sadlier appears to have been chiefly instrumental to the disunion of the Council of Madras, so disastrous in its effects; and he was encouraged to play the part of informant by Mr. Hastings.

“We may now take our leave of the peishcush. It is the accuser's fallacy upon this charge to convert an equitable request into a peremptory command,—an opinion imparted under the seal of confidence into a public letter of credentials,—which the Nizam is to read. It is another of his fallacies to convert the firmness of language applicable only to the Nizam's threat of hostilities to a firmness, if not a violence, applicable to our demand of the peishcush. By the same powers of magic, in the accuser's book Hollond's disobedience of orders to conciliate becomes the obstinate perseverance of those who employed him in the most offensive mode of application. The accuser can without embarrassment expatiate upon the policy and justice of Bengal in suspending the attempts for the remission of that very peishcush, which they have themselves compelled the Nizam to remit as long as the war shall continue. He approves their control of an important measure, set on foot by the subordinate Government,—a control at once imperious and weak,—but in the next breath he brands the recall of their own Resident by the Madras Board as the torch of discord and civil war between the two Presidencies, whose mutual inter-

est it was to appear, in the eyes of the natives, one united power.”

“We are next carried from the Nizam to Hyder Ali; and our hostilities to him in the Cuddapah are stated as injurious provocations of his power. The vindication of marching our troops through a part of his territories, in their way to Adoni, which is upon the western borders of the Guntoor, is very short, obvious, and complete. The equity of declared hostilities against him, at this period, was unquestionable; but I agree that it was an article of prudence to abstain from any wanton or offensive challenge to his abilities, resources, and high spirit. The same prudence warranted the risk of his displeasure upon this critical occasion. He had his eye fixed upon the Guntoor for himself: it was the direct and chief purpose of sending those troops at all to guard against him. We pass our troops through a little edge of the Cuddapah, his recent conquest, which intercepted our journey to Adoni; but we direct that offence to him or his agents may be averted by the most vigilant precautions. Yet this measure it seems, qualified as it was, ‘broke the law of nations, and provoked Hyder’ to enmity against the English. As if he waited for provocations, or the resentment of injuries

before he would feel that enmity, and would act upon it. Are we so ignorant of a fact, which every child knew at Madras, that Hyder had, long before this period, formed leagues with his French ally, for our extirpation? Is it forgot that Lally waited only for the most favourable season to improve Hyder's army by the European troops under his command,—by those troops which it was the policy of Bengal and Madras to banish from the Guntoor, as having been stationed there with no other view? Never, Sir, in the name of common sense, let us hear of Hyder's objections. What have they ever been, from the earliest period, but pretences of the minute (caught as he could find them, and selected with little care) for acts of hostility, operating upon a concerted and predetermined war?.....He catches at any little twig of complaint. We offended him by the measure of sending troops at all to Bazalet Jung, which he called a violation of our Treaties with him. We offended him by the civil commotions of our districts upon the border of his dominion; a complaint which he never could prove. He was offended by our capture of Mahé; and there, too, found a violation of our engagements to him. At other times he shifted the charge to Bombay,

and accused that Presidency. He complains that we forbore to assist him against the Mahrattas. But he adds to the heap an idle skirmish in his territories, which accident alone produced, and which it had been the most anxious policy of the Madras Council to obviate."

"I have at length, by many a painful step, reached the last article of charge in the accuser's volume. It states that Sir Thomas Rumbold neglected his military duties, and courted Hyder Ali's invasion, by leaving the Carnatic a sure conquest for him.....Prove but his guilt in this part of his conduct, and I will agree that he deserves, for that guilt alone, every censure in the power of this House to inflict;—except a Bill of pains and penalties;—I say, except such a Bill, because I, for one, am free to declare, that if a Minister of this country were to lose a third of the island by neglect and sleep, I could still hope to see him rescued from the torture and inquisition of Bills like these. But such being the importance of the charge, and such the effect of circulating it, before it assumed an authentic form, what is now the end of it? By an accident, we have called a witness to this part of the defence. before the accuser in his long

journey had arrived at the charge, as it stood in the Bill. That witness, the ablest engineer in the service, having detailed the whole compass of military defence, told you that everything *in specie*, the work of Sir Thomas Rumbold, was feature of peculiar activity and care.* He has also given his *general* testimony to the able and vigilant exertions of that Governor. So much for a defence against the charge thus anticipated: but what became of this charge in the adversary's own treatment of it? Not a shadow of proof attempted in support of it: the averment alone remains upon the face of the Bill, disowned by the evidence, abandoned by the accuser himself."

"The Counsel who opened the charge, whose doctrine it is that every allegation of such a Bill must criminate, and who took it for granted that evidence would justify that sting which he supposed every syllable to contain, stated round-

* [The expressions in the text are correctly printed from Mr. Hardinge's speech. It may be surmised that the meaning is, "everything after its kind," or every individual thing. But although Mr. Hardinge is close and powerful in argument, and although his composition is laboured and rhetorical, his English often reads like that of a Frenchman or (at least) a Welshman.—E D.]

ly to us all, that Sir Thomas Rumbold,* instead of putting the Carnatic in a posture of defence, had other things to mind, and prepared for his own journey to Europe: but other advocates, not professional, and long before the Bill was framed, circulated the same assertion; not because they believed that it was true, but upon other principles, and for other purposes. *They* had an interest that it 'should be received as true, and prejudge the victim, whom it was their policy to devote. But what said the Counsel who closed the evidence? His candour prompted him to admit, that he had neither proved, nor attempted in proof,* this important allegation; adding, with a very singular turn of argument, 'that Sir Thomas Rumbold may prove the reverse.' In other words, 'the accuser cannot stir his foot, unless we, the Counsel for the accused, will be so good as to make a case for him, by a weak defence of our client against a deserted imputation.'"

"Thus ends the neglect of the Carnatic. It is a false assertion of the Bill, and perfectly desperate, unless we should give a degree of

* [So the words stand in the carefully printed copy of the speech from which Miss Rumbold quotes, which is an elaborate specimen of typography.—ED.]

sanction to it by our improvident support of a character which calumny alone has impeached.

“But, ‘it is a negative.’ I deny it: in expression it is, in argument it is not. Suppose *neglect* the word: is that a negative term? Every fact proving the Carnatic defenceless, or defensible, is an affirmative. If this doctrine of negatives can prevail, it supplies a receipt for dispensing with proofs on every charge. Here, Sir, as before, evidence which no court of law could require, not only vindicates the injured character, but points out the danger of sporting with principles of testimony, and reversing the *onus probandi*. Three favourite articles of this kind are first experiments of the Bill, and I scarce know which is the most ungenerous. Sir Thomas Rumbold is to shake off Redhead, if he can: suspicion by a hair connects them in guilt: it is for him to disunite them.* His remittances are accused of a corrupt origin: he must account for every sixpence of them. The Carnatic shall be defenceless in consequence of his neglect, (says the accuser,) till he can prove the reverse. I single out these topics: but I could produce twenty more, out of the accuser’s volume, in which the rule of presuming inno-

cence till crime is proved, has been trampled under."

"So much for the singular candour of inviting us to fill up the accuser's blank, and put our own figure into the niche prepared for it. But another first experiment of the Bill is, that we are called upon to answer for our successor at Madras: (and why not for the successor of that successor?) The offences of Mr. Whitehill constitute part of the Bill; and, though not read against us, they are so connected with allegations which criminate our conduct, that it is very difficult for the reader to disentangle them."

"But I must not forget 'that Mr. Smith, one of the Council, imputes to Sir Thomas Rumbold a suppression of letters, which gave him early notice of Hyder Ali's designs.' Will it ever be credited in after-times, that such an allegation, even of a Legislative indictment, could have seen the light, in so admired a period of justice and liberty as the year 1782! Has the name of Mr. Smith, to an imputation destitute of proof, more weight, because he is a witness to it, than it would have carried if he had been the accuser in form, and had imputed by this Bill? It should have less: for he does not aver the fact; stating

only that he has reason to believe it, that he has been informed of it. I answer him thus : ' It is not the fact : prove it. ' "

" Here, too, it is the more ungenerous to name it, because the imputation, weak as it is in itself, deserved the less countenance upon account of the time, place, and other circumstances which attended the original delivery of it ; for, it will scarce be forgot, that it was first thrown upon the party accused behind his back, and out of his reach. But why not call Smith himself to the bar ? He is in England : and, sitting perhaps in your gallery, may have heard his own evidence read. This is indeed a new and most ingenious refinement of persecution ; that a witness in support of it may accuse upon paper, by affirming in that shape a fact, which the accuser in form is afraid of attempting to substantiate by that same witness at the bar. "

" I could now close the topic. But here, too, as in answer to half the Bill, I must fight against every shadow of suspicion, and accept every challenge with respect, if it calls in question the jealous honour of a character which calumny alone can ever depreciate. Here, too, I can state, though in the form of a Defence, not the pitiful ground of mere indemnity, or

exemption from blame, but the ingenuous pride of superior merit, and of exemplary services to the public."

"The immediate cause of the Carnatic war is a political and perhaps a very idle problem; but it is idler still to name the word provocation as applicable to Hyder Ali; to represent him as wanting provocation to justify his accommodating argument—the longer sword. But though I state the immediate cause of his invasion as problematical, I must yet lay stress upon the war against the Mahrattas; that war of Leadenhall Street, which originated in the fatal politics of Bombay, but was encouraged and fomented here. The Mahrattas are close to Hyder; they are his natural enemies; checks upon him if left alone; tools in his able hand if provoked by us to form a league with him. Self-defence, in that event, enslaves them to him; and he makes use of them, for his own general purposes of conquest, first against their persecutor, then against the suppliants themselves, persecuted by him in their turn."

"It has been sagely argued, 'that we provoked Hyder by arming the Gunttoor against him;' because he, it seems, 'had an eye upon it for himself.' The fact is important, and the

reason may shift for itself: to me it appears a little Irish. Of the fact we have proof. A letter of Hyder himself to his Vakeel at Bazalet's Court, has told us that he, for whose exclusion from that Court the famous Treaty of Hydrabad, in 1768, had stipulated with so anxious a foresight, is offended with Bazalet for giving up the Guntoor to his old and bitter enemies, the English. I ask no better panegyric of the measure than such a fact. Suppose Hyder to have wrested from us the Guntoor, while Madras and Bengal were asleep, in 1776 or 1777; it would have been a more important card for him than all his present acquisitions."

"It has been also observed by another shrewd politician, that Hyder himself throws no blame upon the Mahratta war. To be sure he does not. First, how could he blame it? The Mahrattas were his ancient and habitual enemies; but, in the next place, it would have been the obvious finesse of a much weaker politician than he has proved himself, to conceal their new confederacy with him, and assign other pretences for his war against us, upon the footing of his independent claim to redress by the sword."

"It has been said that we drove, or might have driven, the Nizam into the Mahratta war,

upon the side of our enemies ; yet the fact is notorious, that Hyder Ali had it in view by that war to extirpate the Nizam, and make a partition of his territories ! It will appear, too, that whatever share the Nizam took in the confederacy against us, it was prior to the date of any supposed offence on our part.”

“ Another cause of the Carnatic war may, with some probability, be resolved into the connivance of Madras and Bengal at Hyder’s known connexion with his French ally, in the Guntoor Circar, between 1775 and 1778. Lally’s force, during that interval, had so increased and accumulated, that Bazalet could not have guarded us against them, if the Nizam had left him to himself ; but he saved him from the risk of the attempt by taking them into his care,—till the birds were flown.”

“ As to the general suspicion of Hyder’s purposes, for some time before he entered the Carnatic, it is a fact agreed. The Bill, which is above attention to dates when the discovery of them forms the whole difference in the argument, remarks, that Sir Thomas Rumbold and his Council had notice of Hyder’s intention from the Nabob of Arcot. The fact is true ; but when had he such a notice ? Fourteen months before

Hyder left his capital the Nabob advised the Governor of Madras to assemble an army against him in the field. The answer of the Governor to this early notice from the Nabob is forgot by the accuser; (whose memory, as I must often observe, has whimsical flights of power and imperfection;) the answer stated as a fact that Hyder had retreated from the borders of the Carnatic to his capital; and the Nabob, apprised of that fact, had no other information, which led him to repeat the alarm during the whole remainder of Sir Thomas Rumbold's government. It was the policy of that Government partly to seem convinced of Hyder's pacific designs, and partly to conciliate him, without stooping to him; for he could not then be opposed with any chance of success. The invasion was in fact unprovoked. From so early a period as that of the first month in Sir Thomas Rumbold's government all the means in his power to conciliate Hyder were put in practice. The answers of that chief were insidious and false. But one fact is necessary to be observed, because it amounts to a most emphatical distinction between the policy of Madras and that of Bengal respecting him. I have said that it was a part of his finesse to hold himself out as the enemy

of the Mahrattas : upon the artful plea of that enmity he made propositions by his Vakeel at Madras in favour of Ragonaut Row ; but the Council of Bengal paid no attention to them ; they were too deep in their new politics of deserting that fugitive Prince as their ally, and of accepting the Rajah of Berar in exchange for him."

"But let us examine a little more closely Hyder's provocations. The first is, 'that in the capture of Mahé we broke our Treaty with him.' The second, 'that our agents or officers committed irregularities upon his borders ;' but he never attempts any evidence of the fact. As a third he states, 'A dispute with Bombay upon the subject of Tellicherry,' in which, to do that Presidency justice, the accusation was unmerited. As a fourth, 'Our help to Bazalet Jung ;' and that becomes a favourite article of complaint, though coupled in general with our capture of Mahé. He divides the remonstrance against our help to Bazalet into two parts ; complaining first of any assistance to him as a violation of Treaty ; and tacking to it our little skirmish with his military upon the borders of the Cuddapah in the march of our troops to Adoni. But not satisfied with all these attacks upon us, he tells

an old story of our perfidious conduct in declining to assist him against the Mahrattas. This too it seems was a violation of Treaty with him; but the complaint of it is most artfully urged in that moment, and confirms what I said of his finesse in affecting enmity against the Mahrattas, for the purpose of our delusion, while he was forming a league with them, and pointing it against us."

"Yet, Sir, any man of common discernment, if he is not an absolute novice and a child in Eastern politics, will tell you that none of these alleged provocations gave, or could have given, any real offence to him; that his provocation was the OPPORTUNITY of support from the Mahrattas and French, united in a firm league against the English Government. So much for notices, provocations, and causes of the Carnatic war."

"Let us now dissect the unprepared state of resistance, the inactivity and sleep of the Governor. His first answer shall be at Pondicherry, and the second at Mahé. Those eloquent scenes of action shall plead for him, displaying exertions no less able than spirited; the policy, that of extirpating the European competitor, and victory the mode of executing it. Sir Eyre

Coote shall speak for him in February, 1779, a testimony which does both of them honour. He shall distinguish the Board of Madras from all the other Presidencies, for their high spirit, zeal, and judicious conduct, in military as well as political resource, under a heavy load of expense, and encompassed with difficulties on every side.*

“In that same year (1779) the Board of Madras, with Sir Eyre Coote’s approbation, solicited a march of the Bengal troops to their aid, but solicited it in vain; the casting vote was against them. Resources from that quarter having been thus refused or impotent; what is the general tenor of conduct observed at Madras? An apparent confidence in Hyder’s professions, cold as they were; the most anxious attempts to avert the impending blow by terms with him; and, in the mean time, every possible exertion against possible impediment.”

“An army could not be assembled in the field a moment before it should be necessary to be assembled for immediate action; till that moment should call for it, the funds of the settlement were not equal to the expense of such a

* See Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to the Chairman of the Court of Directors. Appendix.

measure; and the necessity so described never in fact arose while Sir Thomas Rumbold continued at Madras. But an army was at hand; and the ablest commander-in-chief could not have arranged a defensive to that amount, in the same period of time, with more consummate skill. The evidence of Major Geils has given a decisive and most honourable testimony of this fact. Great cantonments were impracticable; the expense of them would have been enormous; and the Government had a sinking treasure scarcely equal to a peace establishment; words often repeated because they cannot be too often impressed."

"In January, 1780, a return was made of the military complement, ready at a short notice for the field. Let me ask the most accomplished military experience in the East, if the cantonments of that return could have been improved? The difficulties arising from situation alone were critical. They are obvious to those who are conversant in that scene; but they are perhaps new to many in this House."

"The dimensions and shape of the Carnatic are material to be known: it is from eighty to one hundred miles in breadth; in length it forms the compass of no less than five or six hundred;

its neighbourhood is no light feature in the argument, in this view of it; bordered by active enemies to the west, by the sea to the east, and by that Guntoor to the north, which cuts off the Carnatic from the Northern Circars, and which, though it might have been our own, we have recently given to a perfidious ally. The Circars are close to the Rajah of Berar, an ally of the Mahrattas. It is true that Bengal would have made him our ally if she could; but how? By engaging to support him against the Nizam, their later favourite."

"Trichinopoli, Palemcotta, Madurah, Caracoi, and Tanjore, the chief garrisons to the south, could not be left without any defence at all: they had only ten companies, and three battalions of Sepoys."

"Had Baillie, upon the first notice of Hyder's movements from his capital, after Sir Thomas Rumbold's departure, joined the main army, instead of marching into Cuddapah, the success of Hyder would have been at least obstructed, and the garrisons of the Carnatic would have been safe."

"The Directors had ordered the Board of Madras to reinforce the operations of the Mahratta war; that fatal measure which they obsti-

nately pursued, and felt it their point of honour to push; that measure to which the culprit of this Bill was uniformly averse, and marked his aversion at the memorable period of 1780. The Council of Madras during his government, united in that opinion, were against all detachments from their force in support of those fatal politics. Early in 1778 they refused a reinforcement asked of them by that Council of Bombay, who first advised the war. But a letter from the Directors, arriving soon after this refusal, commanded implicit obedience to any such requisitions in future."

"To Bengal, however, the Board of Madras importunately urged their distress and their fears; calling upon the deaf, again and again, for an additional force and supply of treasure; yet, with full notice of those difficulties, that feeling Board, whose charity they besought, had the conscience to direct a large reinforcement of their own troops from the military of Madras, amounting to six or seven hundred, (Europeans and artillery,) with a battalion of Sepoys. This, too, was a cheat upon Madras into the bargain. Stated as a force intended against the European enemy alone, and as an olive branch upon the sword, for the purpose of terminating the Mah-

ratta hostilities, it pursued the most intemperate measures and fed the war."

"One argument for the measure at Bengal was this: 'Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas may join.' Agreed. What then? Will you therefore detach to the Coast of Malabar the force of the Carnatic, known to be the object of this impending blow, and the most vulnerable, till you have dismantled all its garrisons, and left them to the mercy of Hyder, at their elbow?"

"But new difficulties arose. In the year 1780 a hundred men, formed of a company in Lord Macleod's regiment, our chief strength, was desired by Sir Eyre Coote, for his body guard. It was refused by Sir Thomas Rumbold; but the successor was more accommodating. In the mean time Bengal had sent a very inadequate supply, after delay upon delay and reiterated importunities."

"I have stated the necessity of paying some attention to the southern garrisons. Let us now look at the nearer cantonments. Conjeveram, or Wandewash, is agreed as forming the central position; and the distance to it from those cantonments was between forty and fifty miles. An army could have been brought into the field in three weeks. Baillie's detachment, stationed in

the Guntoor, was the only one at a distance. ('Why stationed in the Guntoor?' ask the timid and shuffling politics of Madras in the year 1775.) But leave him there, and recall the detachment sent by the orders of Bengal; the army will then be of this amount: forty-six artillery, two thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight infantry, seven thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven Sepoys: an army considered equal to any Indian service. But if Baillie and his force had been superadded in time, the whole must have been so formidable that we may doubt if Hyder would even have encountered it."

"Our evidence will compare these cantonments to those of the period in which the government of this inactive President began; that you may do justice to his improvements of the system. As to the little out garrisons, it was better policy to have left them undefended, and even dismantled, the master of the field being sure of them."

"Stores of every kind were ample, and well supplied. When Arcot fell, the fact was proved, there at least; and that capture was the more lamented upon this account. Indeed, no principal garrison of ours had been taken at so late a

period as February, 1782. In January, 1780, hopes were formed at Madras that Hyder would not invade. But Sir Thomas Rumbold owns to the Directors, without reserve, that he has no security, and looks at the sword as hung by a little thread over us, till the Mahratta war is closed.".....

"Sir Thomas Rumbold had not left Madras, when other assurances came that Hyder would not enter the Carnatic. He was then at his capital, and the season was far advanced. No letter from the Nabob communicated any alarming intelligence; and Baillie, who watched Hyder's motions, even after Sir Thomas Rumbold quitted Madras, had formed hopes that, for that year at least, we should be safe. We had only a defensive, and it would have been perfect madness to have drawn our force from Pondicherry, or the south, till the last extremity. Hyder did not move till June, or pass into the Carnatic till July 23rd.".....

"The field artillery was complete, no one principal garrison deficient; and every loan from each of them, for the sieges of Pondicherry or Mahé, strictly paid."

"The fortifications of Madras were favourite objects of Sir Thomas Rumbold, and formed the

most consummate works of the kind that India ever saw. We shall prove their merit by the ablest engineers in the service."

"In a system of defence thus complicated, against enemies on every side, an exhausted revenue, internal abuses, and the jealousy of the native, it was not in human power to disarm every cavil of political spleen. But who could, in general, have shown more activity, penetration, judgment, and spirit, than we have proved the features of his conduct, who, according to the Bill, deserted Madras almost in the act of opening its arms to the invader, and better prepared for his conquest, than for our defence against him?"

"Preparations against Hyder and his French ally! What else are his crimes? and what other stamp is marked upon them by the seal of truth? He prepared against these enemies of his Government the very day prior to the 24th of March,—which is the date of his first crime,—by directing the most accurate survey, and return of the defensive complement. He prepared against them, by extinguishing that flame of jealousy, the circuit: by correcting the intrigues of the subordinate: by conciliating the affections of the native at Madras: by improving

the revenue there: by assuring that improvement for a term, and by reconciling native to native, whose dissensions were always felt in the Company's treasure: by appointing Sitteram to be the Duan of a rich and extensive district; which, under his management, has proved the most liberal fund of resource to us in the war: by substituting a reform of system, in place of an odious prosecution against a personal victim, selected from his own Council, on a charge unauthenticated, and imputing to him the vice of general habit and custom: by earnest, though fruitless and baffled attempts, to extirpate Lally's troops from the Guntoor: by recovering that Guntoor into the Company's hand: by attempting the remission or diminution of a tax, which was a voluntary boon of ours in better times, accompanied by an assurance on the part of the Nizam that it never would be enforced; a tax that then we could not pay, and would have stripped ourselves to clothe our enemy: by political attentions to the Nabob, our firm ally, without prejudice to the revenue: by exclaiming, at every personal hazard, against the Mahratta war, now condemned on every side as the most animating spur to Hyder's invasion: by measures neither abject nor offensive, in his

treatment of Hyder's person : by the most rigid parsimony : by efforts almost incredible against every embarrassment, actual or foreseen : and, last of all, by the muster and arrangement of a force, which the confederates would never have looked in the face, if it had remained united, when the Carnatic received the first impression of Hyder's foot."

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.

ON MR. HASTINGS' POLICY IN REGARD TO THE WAR WITH HYDER, AND ON HIS RELATIONS WITH SIR THOMAS RUMBOLD'S SUCCESSORS AT MADRAS, MR. WHITEHILL AND LORD MACARTNEY, AS ILLUSTRATING HIS TREATMENT OF SIR THOMAS RUMBOLD.*

THE censure cast upon "the Authorities of the South" by Lord Macaulay, which has been noticed in some of the foregoing pages, is followed by a short account, magnificently given, of the calamity in the Carnatic, and the conduct of Mr. Hastings, on that occasion, according to the usually received opinions.

"Then it was, that the fertile genius and serene courage of Hastings achieved their most signal triumph. A swift ship, flying before the south-west monsoon, brought the evil tidings in a few days to Calcutta.....The struggle with Hyder was a struggle for life or death....It was no time for trifling. Hastings resolved to resort to an extreme exercise of power, to suspend the incapable Governor of Fort St. George,

* First Report, Appendix, No. 43.

to send Sir Eyre Coote to oppose Hyder, and to entrust that distinguished General with the whole administration of the war."

That it was in truth a struggle for life or death was probably now felt by Mr. Hastings, and that he had trifled too long. The dangers that were gathering round the Company had been for some time known to him: he had judged that the Nizam must be conciliated at any sacrifice. The army of the Rajah of Berar advanced to the confines of Bengal, in pursuance of the engagement entered into with the confederates, must be kept in check. Still the Governor-General persisted in his Mahratta projects, undertaken doubtless with some view, present or ulterior, for the benefit of the Company and the nation, but which the various explanations offered have never rendered very comprehensible, and which in the event proved of most unsound policy, since it led the different chiefs to compose their own disputes, and re-unite to direct their resentment against us. Yet Mr. Hastings flattered himself he should redeem the past by bringing all to a favourable issue. He had disregarded the serious expostulations addressed to him *for peace with the Mahrattas, on any moderate terms*; and even after the

departure of Sir Thomas Rumbold, deaf to the warnings of the Madras Board, that Hyder's projects were ripening, and then, that he had actually invaded the Carnatic, Mr. Hastings still held on. It was only when the news of Colonel Baillie's defeat reached Bengal that it was resolved, "That all minor objects should be sacrificed to the preservation of the Carnatic, the disputes with the Mahrattas must be accommodated, a large military force and a supply of money must be instantly sent to Madras."*

Even at this conjuncture Mr. Hastings had private feelings to gratify. For the summary measure of suspending Mr. Whitehill, Sir Thomas Rumbold's successor at Madras, Lord Macaulay and other writers have lent to Mr. Hastings motives that he did not allege for himself. No person can read the correspondence that passed on this occasion between the Governor-General and Mr. Whitehill, without being aware that it was not the "incapacity of the Governor of Fort St. George" that was the cause of his suspension. Neither had Mr. Hastings any ground for supposing that all the Board of Madras, including Mr. Whitehill, would not have accepted the authority of Sir

* Macaulay's Essay on Warren Hastings.

Eyre Coote as implicitly as Sir Hector Munro appears to have done. These are motives that have been supplied to Mr. Hastings, in order to extol his conduct on that occasion, and to justify the insults offered to the Presidency of Madras.

It is time to state the facts as they may be gathered from the Appendices to the Reports of the Committee. Mr. Hastings had required the surrender of the Guntoor,* as a bait to the Nizam, rendered necessary, perhaps, by the results of his own crooked policy, and, it may be added, from the unworthy motive of defeating the work of Sir Thomas Rumbold.

The demand of Mr. Hastings was taken into consideration by the Board at Madras, who demurred†

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 98.

† August 7th, 1780, Sir Hector Munro delivered the following Minute at Madras :—

“As the giving up the Guntoor Circar, after getting possession of it, (and that with the approbation of the Supreme Council of Bengal,) may be disapproved by our employers at home, I am of opinion the Governor-General and Council's last letter ought to be answered fully; reasons given why the Guntoor Circar should not be given up; and if ultimately they insist upon it, they must in every respect be made answerable for the consequences; and I am of opinion, if it is given up, that Bazalet Jung ought to have it given to him, and not the Nizam, as we had it from Bazalet Jung; but I am for holding our possession until we have an answer to our next letter on the subject from Bengal.”—Appendix to First Report, No. 8.

as to the justice and propriety of giving up the Guntoor to the Nizam, instead of restoring it to Bazalet Jung, by whom it had been ceded to them, and also from the apprehension that it would pass into the hands of Hyder; but the distress of their condition led them to comply strictly with the injunctions of the Governor-General. The Nizam was written to, to that effect; and Mr. Whitehill wrote an assurance to Mr. Hastings, that the affair should be concluded according to his desire, and as speedily as the nature of the circumstances would admit. This letter apologized for past delay, on the score of the great troubles that had intervened. Although Mr. Whitehill's letter was couched in respectful terms; yet, while yielding the Guntoor, he reminded the Governor-General that the conduct of the Presidency had been fully sanctioned by himself.*

Previously to this correspondence, every item of intelligence received at Madras respecting Hyder's motions was transmitted to Bengal, and with renewed solicitations for assistance.

On the 28th of June a letter of intelligence, dated from the Cape of Good Hope, was for-

* First Report, Appendix, No. 8.

warded to Bengal, and with it Mr. Whitehill wrote as follows :—

..“ You will be able to judge from these papers what credit is due to the report of a French armament preparing for India.....Should such an armament really come abroad, the object of it must be, we conceive, to aid the Mahrattas or Hyder Ali, and indeed the motions of this chief strongly indicate an expectation of powerful support from the French.....His army is now assembled at Bangalore, and equipped in every respect for immediate action. Part of it is actually advanced towards the frontiers of the Carnatic. Such is the appearance of things at present. If an invasion takes place, we shall act in the best manner we can for the defence of the country ; but we fear our difficulties will be great for want of money, as our ordinary supplies depend upon the growing revenues, which, in case of invasion, will fall very short.”*

Again, on the 25th of July :—

..“ Our last letter gave you information of the approach of Hyder Ali with a large army towards our frontiers ; we now transmit two papers of intelligence just received, by which

* First Report, Appendix, No. 40.

you will learn, that he has actually detached part of his cavalry into the Carnatic, and is preparing to follow with his whole army. We are taking measures to assemble our troops in a proper situation to oppose this, and defend the country in the best manner we are able ; but the alarms already occasioned, have driven the people from their habitations, and put an entire stop to the tillage of the ground.”*.....

And again on the 18th of August :—

“Hyder has employed a considerable body of horse in ravaging the Carnatic ; and he himself, with the rest of his army, has advanced as far as Arnee, and taken three or four small forts, which were garrisoned by the Nabob’s people.As it will be impossible for us to carry on this war without supplies from Bengal, we are anxious to be informed when, and to what extent, you may be able to supply us.”†

Meanwhile an attempt was made to raise money upon bonds, but with very inadequate success.

No heed having been paid to these letters, and others which are recorded in the Appendix to the First Report ; on the 14th of September,

* First Report, Appendix, No. 1.

† *Ibid.*, No. 8.

Sir Edward Hughes addressed this serious remonstrance to the Council of Bengal :—

“ I think it my indispensable duty to warn you, Sir, and gentlemen, of the evident necessity there now exists to guard not only the Company's territories on this coast, but even Fort St. George itself, from the arms of France and Hyder, at this time when the whole national strength is required to make head against the combined force of France and Spain, and our rebellious colonies ; and that this may be more easily and effectually done, I most earnestly wish and recommend that, laying aside all other plans of operation against the Mahrattas, or any other country powers, the three Presidencies do heartily concur by every means both of men, and money, and treaties, to reduce this habitual foe to the English nation within due bounds. As far as my knowledge of land service assists me, it appears to me, under the present circumstances, and with all the force this Presidency can possibly bring into the field, they will be in no condition to face the enemy, nor will troops alone save this sinking settlement ; for I am assured by the Governor they have no money in the treasury, nor any evident means of raising it, in any proportion adequate to their present exigen-