

the more impossible will it be for us to tolerate gross oppression and misgovernment in Native States.

The problems to be solved are difficult, especially in those States, the most interesting in India, and the most worthy of preservation, where old political institutions still survive. Where the ruler is a petty despot, with few or no checks on his power, the principles on which we ought to act are easier to define. No real progress in such States is possible while their governments remain purely personal, and while the authority of the paramount power is exercised on no fixed system, but spasmodically, by special acts of intervention as necessity arises.

The first serious attempt to regulate in a definite and permanent shape the relations of the Imperial Government towards some at least of the Native States of India was made by Lord Lytton when he was Viceroy. In 1830 the administration of Mysore had fallen into a miserable condition. Offices were sold to the highest bidder, the people were oppressed and impoverished, and at last broke into revolt. Lord William Bentinck, who was then Governor-General, ordered, as the only sufficient remedy, the transfer of the entire administration into the hands of British officers. Mysore was fortunate in finding in Sir Mark Cubbon an admirable Governor. 'The history of the province under his rule (I quote from an official report) is the history of a people made happy by release from serfdom, and of a ruined state restored to financial prosperity.'

In 1868 the deposed Rájá died, and the British Government resolved that when his adopted son, who was then only six years old, attained his majority, the Government of the State should be entrusted to him.

In 1879 it became necessary to settle the manner in which this resolution should be carried out; it was clear that more than 4,000,000 people, who had been under our Government for fifty years, could not be made over like sheep, and the following conditions were laid down:—

1st. A clear distinction must be drawn and permanently maintained between the private fortune of the Chief and the public revenues of the State; a civil list of fixed amount must be assigned to the Chief, and the rest of the revenues must remain available for public purposes only, through appropriation by constituted authorities.

2nd. There must be permanent security for the observance of established laws, rights, and usages, and the laws must only be altered by suitable legislative machinery.

3rd. Provision must be made for the judicial independence of the civil and criminal courts, and justice must be dispensed by regularly constituted tribunals.

4th. The assessment and collection of the revenues must be made under fixed rules; all rights in the land must be defined and maintained, and no fresh taxation imposed except in accordance with law.

Under the principles thus laid down, the administration was made over, in 1881, to the Native Chief. His civil list was fixed at 130,000*l.* a year, and he cannot appropriate more than that sum for his personal expenditure. The revenue of the State is about 1,000,000*l.* The administration is carried on by the Máharája with the assistance of a Council. It consists of three members, with a Diwán, or chief minister; he is the head of all departments, and he conducts the executive administration. The Diwán and the Councillors are all Natives.

When the Government was transferred it was provided that all laws then in force should be maintained until altered by competent authority; new laws can only be made under a regular system of procedure, and they require the sanction of the Governor-General in Council.

The objects with which this system was initiated were summed up as follows by the Government of India :—

‘The experiment of placing the Máharája of Mysore at the head of a constitutional government—that is, a government conducted upon fixed and fundamental principles—makes a new departure in the policy of the Imperial Government towards the Native States of India. To determine the proper method of dealing with these States, and of discharging the responsibilities which they entail upon the paramount power, has always been, and still is, a problem of great difficulty; for the improvement of their condition, and their gradual assimilation to the general system and standard of the Imperial Government, is almost essential to their preservation . . . The Supreme Government has been obliged of late years to interpose frequently in the affairs of Native States. The incapacity or grave misconduct of a ruler has produced complications which have demanded immediate and stringent remedies, or the interval of a long minority has made it necessary to superintend more closely a State’s management. . . . The policy now framed proceeds upon the broad principle that in order to guard against chronic misrule in a Native State, and to obviate the necessity for frequent and arbitrary interposition by the Supreme Government to remedy the consequences of such misrule, it is expedient to avail ourselves of every opportunity of placing some reasonable limitations upon the personal power of the ruler, or of the minister to whom the administration may be entrusted. The limitations thus imposed must be brought on public record, in order to place them beyond question or controversy, and in certain cases the general power of supervision to be exercised by the Supreme Government may need to be strengthened and extended. These principles may form

the groundwork of a settled policy which will guide the Government of India in the general discharge of its responsibilities towards Feudatory States. A new and valuable precedent will have been established, and this, with the experience which will have been gained in Mysore, may enable us in future to deal systematically with similar questions of reorganisation or reform. The contrast presented by the steady growth of orderly civilisation in British India, and the increased publicity that is now given to the internal condition of our Feudatory States, are likely to render more and more imperative the duty of interference in restraint of serious mismanagement. We may thus hope gradually to raise the general standard of administration in Native States, and to make some progress toward the important political object of consolidating their institutions upon an improved and stable foundation.’¹

The system thus introduced into Mysore appears to be working in a highly efficient manner. More or less similar plans, but of a less elaborate kind, have been adopted with success in some other cases, and I hope that the time is not distant when the principles on which these measures have been based may be generally applied in the Native States of India, and the abuses and maladministration may cease that are now so frequent.

I have not yet referred to the armies of the Native States. They look formidable on paper, for they are said to number altogether about 380,000 men, of whom 69,000 are cavalry and 11,000 artillery, with some 4,000 guns. These figures are very deceptive. A small portion only of these so-called armies has any military organisation. They consist for the most part of men who can hardly be called soldiers. The majority of them are maintained for purposes of display, without the least idea that they can ever be

¹ Despatch from Government of India to Secretary of State, May 22, 1879. Parliamentary Return, Mysore, 1881.

used for fighting. The so-called army includes multitudes of the armed retainers of the chiefs and nobles, and nearly the whole of the men whom we should class as police. There are only two cases in which it seems, at the present time, possible that the armies of the Native States might become causes of anxiety to our Government.

The first is the army of Gwalior. Among all the armies of the Native States this is the most completely organised. It consists of about 11,000 men, of whom about 6,000 are cavalry, all fairly drilled and disciplined, with several fully equipped batteries of artillery. It has often been said that Sindhia's force is really stronger than it appears to be, because a system, similar to that adopted in Europe, has been introduced, by which a strong reserve is formed by passing rapidly a large proportion of the population through the army. There is no foundation for such statements. A very small part of Sindhia's troops consists of men recruited in his own country. The great majority of them come from our territories, and chiefly from the classes which before the mutinies of 1857 supplied the bulk of our Bengal army. The Government of Sindhia is, as I have shown, that of a foreign dynasty; the people are unwarlike and disinclined for military service. The strength of the forces which Sindhia may maintain is regulated by treaty with the British Government.

The largest of the armies of the Native States is that of the Nizam of Hyderabad, also a foreigner in the country belonging to him. It is so heterogeneous a body that it is difficult to state its numbers, but that part of it which may with some reason be called an army consists of about 45,000 men. 'Many of these (I am quoting

from the Report of the Indian Army Commission) are foreign mercenaries from remote parts of India, and from the Afghan highlands beyond our northern frontier, who take service under the Nizam and his chiefs; they engage in faction fights and raids within his territory, and have recently shown themselves ready to join any discontented men who may be willing to pay them for raiding into British districts.' . A considerable part of the Nizam's army has been reorganised and improved. The Indian Army Commission has pointed out in strong language the evils arising from the maintenance of these riotous mercenaries. While they perform no useful service to the Nizam, it is necessary to watch and overawe them, and the necessity is imposed on our treasury of always keeping a large force of British and Native troops at Hyderabad. A Native force, called the Hyderabad Contingent, consisting of more than 7,000 men of all arms, under the command of British officers, is also maintained by our Government at Hyderabad. The charges for the Contingent are met from the revenues of the Berár districts, which were assigned to us for the purpose in 1853 by treaty with the Nizam.

The armies of Sindhia and the Nizam, and especially the latter, might undoubtedly, under circumstances not difficult to conceive, become sources of anxiety. Being mainly composed of foreign mercenaries, their fidelity to their chiefs, themselves of foreign origin, cannot always be trusted. This was shown in 1857, when the troops of Sindhia, who was himself loyal, mutinied and joined in the revolt of the Bengal army. This is a difficult subject, and it has not hitherto been dealt with satisfactorily.

The troops of the Rájputána States consist, on paper, of more than 100,000 men, with 1,400 guns, but these

figures have no military significance. The men are not, for the most part, soldiers in the service of the State, but the members of a military class. None of the guns are equipped for service. There is no doubt of the loyalty of the Rájput chiefs or of their followers.

The troops of the Sikh States deserve mention. 'They are composed (the Indian Army Commission tells us) of good material; they are well officered, and have on occasions done excellent service for the British Crown. They are devoted to their chiefs, who are conspicuously loyal, and bound to the British Government by mutual goodwill and good offices, which have extended over many years.'

The troops of no Native State possess arms of precision; they have no breech-loading rifles, no rifled ordnance, and very little organised artillery. They are, for the most part, as Sir Lepel Griffin says, 'an undrilled, wretchedly armed rabble, and two or three of our regiments, with a battery of horse artillery, would disperse 50,000 of them.' With the exceptions that I have named, they cannot cause us anxiety. They are not armies in the ordinary sense of the term.

LECTURE XII.

BENGAL—CONCLUSION

EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER OF BENGAL AND ITS PEOPLE—THE BENGAL LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORSHIP—NATURAL FEATURES, AREA, AND POPULATION—PRODUCTS—SCENERY—CLIMATE—CITIES—ART—HINDUS AND MOHAMMEDANS—LORD MACAULAY'S DESCRIPTION OF THE BENGÁLIS—THEIR EXTRAORDINARY EFFEMINACY—THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT—ZEMINDARS AND RYOTS—THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT—LOSS OF PUBLIC REVENUE—CONFISCATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEASANTRY—WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT—ABSENCE OF RECORDS OF AGRICULTURAL RIGHTS—FORMER CONSTITUTION OF THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT—ITS INEFFICIENCY—A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT CONSTITUTED—IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION—DIFFICULTY OF PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED—GREAT INCREASE IN RENTALS OF THE ZEMINDARS AND LOSS BY THE RYOTS—CONSEQUENT INJUSTICE TO OTHER PROVINCES—MAINTENANCE OF CONDITIONS OF THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT—CLAIMS OF THE ZEMINDARS FOR EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION—THE PROPER REMEDIES FOR EXISTING EVILS—RATES ON THE LAND—CHANGES IN THE BENGAL RENT-LAW—CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE IN BEHÁR—THE TENANCY ACT—EFFECTS OF ENGLISH EDUCATION—ATTITUDE OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING BENGÁLIS—POLITICAL AGITATION—NEGLECT OF SOCIAL QUESTIONS—REASONS FOR AVOIDING DISCUSSION—THE EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE—THE PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED AND AVOIDED—POLITICAL HYPOCRISY—THE DUTY OF MAINTAINING OUR DOMINION—OFFICES TO BE RETAINED BY ENGLISHMEN—THE SO-CALLED NATIVES OF INDIA OFTEN AS MUCH FOREIGNERS AS ENGLISHMEN—THE MANLIER RACES OF INDIA CANNOT BE RULED THROUGH BENGÁLIS—CONCLUSION—THE RESULTS OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT—THE POPULARITY OF OUR GOVERNMENT—LORD LAWRENCE'S OPINION—REASONS WHY OUR GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE POPULAR—THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT MUST BE CARRIED ON.

I HAVE endeavoured to give you some general idea of what India is, and to illustrate the manner in which the administration of a British province is carried on, and I have told you something of the government of the Native Princes who still rule a third part of India and a fifth of its population. Before concluding these lectures I

propose to give some sketches of another great British Province, Bengal. I am the more desirous of doing this because Englishmen are frequently under the impression that Bengal and Bengális are types of India and its people, the truth being that there is no province which is in all respects so exceptional, and no people so curiously distinct.

I have explained the various significations which the name Bengal has had at different times. It now usually means the country included within the Bengal Lieutenant-Governorship, but this again includes four provinces—Bengal Proper, comprising the tracts between the Ganges and Bráhma-putra, and the deltas of those rivers; Behár, on the north-west of Bengal Proper, adjoining the North-Western Provinces, to which in its physical character it is very similar; Chota Nagpur, a wild and hilly country between Bengal Proper and Central India; and Orissa, south-west from Calcutta, the country of the river Máhánadi, with the sea on its eastern side.

A description of any one of these provinces would be wholly inapplicable to the rest. Their physical conditions, the character of the population, and their languages are all different. The Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal covers an area as large as that of France, and contains 67,000,000 people. As Sir William Hunter has observed, 'its elements exhibit every stage of human enlightenment and superstition, from the sceptical educated classes, represented by the Hindu gentleman who distinguishes himself at a London Inn of Court, to the hill chieftain, who a few years ago sacrificed an idiot on the top of a mountain to obtain a favourable decision in a Privy Council appeal.'¹ Although I shall have to

¹ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Art. 'India.'

make some references to Behár, it is almost solely of Bengal Proper that I now propose to speak. It is the largest and most populous and richest of the provinces that make up the Lieutenant-Governorship. It has an area of more than 70,000 square miles, and contains a population of 35,500,000.

Bengal Proper is everywhere intersected by the channels and tributaries of the Ganges and Bráhma-putra. Some two hundred miles from the sea the two rivers begin to throw out branches, and lower down they join their waters. Sir William Hunter has given, in the 'Imperial Gazetteer of India,' a graphic description of this part of the province :—

'The delta of the Ganges,' he says, 'where it borders on the sea, becomes a labyrinth of creeks and rivers, running through the dense forests of the Sundarbans, and exhibiting during the annual inundations the appearance of an immense sea. Higher up, the rice-fields, to the extent of thousands of square miles, are submerged. The scene presents to a European eye a panorama of singular novelty and interest—the crops covered with water; the ears of grain floating on the surface; the stupendous embankments, which restrain, without altogether preventing, the excesses of the inundations; and peasants in all quarters going out to their daily work with their cattle in canoes or on rafts. The navigable streams which fall into or diverge from the Ganges intersect the country in every direction, and afford abundant facilities for internal communication. In many parts, boats can approach, by means of lakes, rivulets, and water-courses, to the door of almost every cottage. The lower region of the Ganges is the richest and most productive portion of Bengal, and abounds in valuable produce.'

The inundation of the Bráhma-putra produces similar conditions. The rivers in Lower Bengal render, to a great extent, the services which are rendered in other countries by the roads. In many parts of the province a well-to-do man keeps his boat as elsewhere

he would keep his cart. Railways have penetrated into some of the districts, but they will not diminish the usefulness of the rivers or the traffic which they carry. Marts are held every year, on a great scale, at convenient places on the chief rivers, and the agricultural produce of the country is carried off in all directions by the navigable channels. The list of the useful products of Bengal would be a long one. Almost everything is provided in abundance that a people in a tropical climate requires. Rice, jute, indigo, opium, oilseeds, and tea are the principal articles which come into the export trade from Calcutta, but tea is only cultivated on the mountainous borders of the province, and not in Bengal Proper, and the opium comes from Behár and the North-Western Provinces. The great agricultural staple, more important than any other, is rice which constitutes the chief food of the people.

Although the endless stretches of the rice-fields are monotonous, few flat countries can be more beautiful than parts of Bengal. A constant succession of admirable pictures is afforded by the reaches of the rivers, busy with traffic; the boats with their great sails; the cocoanuts, and other palms, huge figs, tamarinds and mangoes, bamboos and plantains; the villages, with tanks green with slime and water-lilies; neat cottages covered with creeping gourds and cucumbers and melons; the delicate forms of the men and women, in scanty but graceful costume—these, and a thousand picturesque details, and the colouring of its hot and steamy atmosphere, make Bengal one of the most beautiful countries of India. Nor is it so disagreeable for Englishmen to live in as might be supposed. Although it has not the advantage of the pleasantly cold winter of Northern India, the heat of the summer is tempered by the greater moisture

and by the nearness of the sea. Heat like that of June at Agra or Lahore is unknown, and for three or four months in the winter the climate is very agreeable.

Although there is hardly any part of India where trade is so active, there are few cities and important towns. With the exception of Calcutta, which with its suburbs contains 870,000 people, and is in population the second city in the British Empire, there is hardly a town in Bengal Proper which, according to a European standard, can be called large. Dacca, with 79,000 people, is the largest. Almost the whole population is rural. There are scarcely any manufactures, except of common cloth and other articles which can be made by the ordinary village artisans. Bengal has never, within historical times, been distinguished, as other Indian countries have been, for excellence in art. The native portion of Calcutta, although full of wealth, can hardly be surpassed in mean ugliness; people who are comparatively rich are often content to live in hovels; and among the zemindars and rajas of Bengal, with incomes which even in England would be thought immense, there is hardly one who lives in a house which in its architecture and decoration is not detestable. In this respect the modern native city of Bombay is a striking contrast to that of Calcutta. The western and eastern capitals of India have grown up under not very dissimilar circumstances; but while the latter, in its native quarter, is everywhere contemptible, the former can show streets which in picturesqueness and decoration are inferior to those of few modern cities in Europe. The admirable Indian styles of architecture which are living arts in other provinces are practically unrepresented in Bengal.

Throughout nearly the whole of Bengal Proper the

people speak the same language, Bengáli. About one-half of them are classified as Hindu, and half as Mohammedan. In some of the Eastern districts the Mohammedans constitute three-fourths of the whole population. But, as I have already observed, in speaking of the religions of Northern India, they are often Mohammedans in name only, and the religion of multitudes of them might not unfitly be classed among the varieties of Hinduism. Changes, however, have been in progress in this respect during the last half century, and there has been a tendency among the Mohammedans of Bengal towards the purification of their faith from Hindu superstitions and from Brahmanical influence. The great mass of the Mussulman population is agricultural, but, even where it is most numerous, wealth and property in land are chiefly in the hands of the Hindus. If we look merely to numbers, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal is, as Sir William Hunter says, 'as great a Mussulman power as the Sultan of Turkey himself,' but in our political speculations we need not alarm ourselves about the millions of Mohammedans in Bengal.

The educated Mohammedans deserve to be named with respect. They are not very numerous or wealthy, but they often present, by their loyalty and good sense, a happy contrast to the English-speaking Hindus, of whom I shall have again to speak.

I shall not attempt to give any detailed account of the people or of the administration. I can only point out a few of the more remarkable facts.

Many years ago Lord Macaulay gave a description of the Natives of Bengal. There is good reason, as I have already said, for calling in question the accuracy of some of his historical pictures, based on fallacious

records, which have taught to thousands of Englishmen almost all that they know about India, but when Lord Macaulay wrote his character of the Bengális he was describing, from personal knowledge and observation, a people among whom he had himself lived. Its accuracy has hardly been denied by the Bengális themselves, and will be disputed by no Englishman.

‘The men,’ he writes, ‘by whom this rich tract was peopled, enervated by a soft climate and accustomed to peaceful employments, bore the same relation to other Asiatics which the Asiatics generally bear to the bold and energetic children of Europe. The Castilians have a proverb that in Valencia the earth is water and the men women ; and this description is at least equally applicable to the vast plain of the Lower Ganges. Whatever the Bengalee does he does languidly. His favourite pursuits are sedentary. He shrinks from bodily exertion ; and, though voluble in dispute, and singularly pertinacious in the war of chicane, he seldom engages in a personal conflict, and scarcely ever enlists as a soldier. There never, perhaps, existed a people so thoroughly fitted by habit for a foreign yoke.’¹

In another passage Lord Macaulay has passed upon the Bengális a similar judgment. I will quote a portion of it :—

‘The physical organisation of the Bengalee is feeble even to effeminacy. He lives in a constant vapour-bath. His pursuits are sedentary, his limbs delicate, his movements languid. During many ages he has been trampled upon by men of bolder and more hardy breeds. . . . His mind bears a singular analogy to his body. It is weak even to helplessness for purposes of manly resistance ; but its suppleness and tact move the children of sterner climates to admiration not unmingled with contempt. . . . Nor does he lack a certain kind of courage which is often wanting to his masters. To inevitable evils he is sometimes found to oppose a passive fortitude, such as the Stoics attributed to their ideal sage. An European warrior who rushes

¹ *Macaulay's Essays.* ‘Lord Clive.’

on a battery of cannon with a loud hurrah will sometimes shriek under the surgeon's knife, and fall into an agony of despair at the sentence of death. But the Bengalee, who would see his country overrun, his house laid in ashes, his children murdered or dishonoured, without having the spirit to strike one blow, has yet been known to endure torture with the firmness of Mucius, and to mount the scaffold with the steady step and even pulse of Algernon Sidney.'¹

Lord Macaulay would have been the first to declare that you might find Bengális of a different stamp. Courage is no more an invariable virtue among the hardiest races of Europe than cowardice an invariable infirmity among the population of Bengal. There have been many changes since Lord Macaulay wrote, but the general character of the people throughout a great part of the province remains as he represented it. His description may be applied without exaggeration to the majority of the people of Western Bengal, and especially to those with whom Englishmen come most into communication in Calcutta and the neighbouring districts. The Mohammedan peasantry of the eastern portion of the province are men of robuster character. It has often been said, and it is probably true, that Bengal is the only country in the world where you can find a great population among whom personal cowardice is looked upon as in no way disgraceful. This is no invention of their enemies; the Bengális have themselves no shame or scruple in declaring it to be a fact.

Although it cannot, I am afraid, be said that English education, which has taken so deep a root, has hitherto made any class of Bengális more manly, it is, we may hope, encouraging the growth of this among other virtues. For a Bengáli it is something to have begun to talk in grandiloquent English about patriotism

¹ *Macaulay's Essays*. 'Warren Hastings.'

and manliness and courage. Even the academic admiration of such things is perhaps a mark of progress. The people generally are acute and intelligent, patient and industrious, and when they get more knowledge they may become more self-reliant, less timid, and less helpless against wrong.

Leaving speculations on possible changes that may come to pass if our dominion should last sufficiently long, and looking to present facts, it is difficult to conceive for Bengal any independent political future. What expectations can be formed for a people that no necessity would induce to fight? In all the Native armies of India there is not, and I suppose there never has been, a Bengáli soldier. We may think of troopers from the Punjab riding with Englishmen in a Balaclava charge, of Sikhs and Gúrkhas fighting as French and Germans fought at Gravelotte, but is it possible by the wildest stretch of the imagination to suppose such things of Bengális? But for the presence of our power, Bengal would inevitably and immediately become the prey of the hardier races of other Indian countries. It is for such reasons that Englishmen who know Bengal, and the extraordinary effeminacy of its people, find it difficult to treat seriously many of the political declamations in which the English-speaking Bengális are often fond of indulging.

The condition of the people of Bengal has been profoundly affected by action taken nearly a century ago by the British Government. In 1793 the so-called Permanent Settlement of the Land Revenue was introduced.

We found in Bengal, when we succeeded to the Government, a class of middle-men, called Zemindars, who collected the land revenue and the taxes, and we

continued to employ them. As a matter of convenience and expediency, but not of right, the office of zemindar was often hereditary. The zemindars had never been in any sense the owners of the land, but it was supposed by Lord Cornwallis and the English rulers of the time that it would be an excellent thing for Bengal to have a class of landlords something like those of England; the zemindars were the only people that seemed available for the purpose, and they were declared to be the proprietors of the land. It was by no means intended that injustice should thus be done to others.

Excepting the State, there was only one great class, that of the ryots or actual cultivators, which, according to immemorial custom, could be held to possess permanent rights in the land. The existence of those rights was recognised, and, as it was supposed, guarded by the law. It was provided that 'the Governor-General in Council will, whenever he may deem it proper, enact such regulations as he may think necessary for the protection of the dependent talookdars, ryots, and other cultivators of the soil.' There has been much dispute as to the exact nature of the rights given to the zemindars, but every one agrees that it was not the intention of the authors of the Permanent Settlement to confiscate anything which, according to the customs of the country, had belonged to the cultivators. The right of property given to the zemindars was a portion of those rights which had always been exercised by the State, and of which the State was at liberty to dispose; it was not intended that they should receive anything else. The land revenue, representing the share of the produce or rental to which the State was entitled, was fixed in perpetuity. The ryots were to continue to hold their lands permanently at the

‘rates established in the purgunnah;’ when the amount of these rates was disputed it was to be settled by the courts; so long as rents at those rates were paid, the ryot could not be evicted. The intention was to secure to the ryot fixity of tenure and fixity of rent. Unfortunately, these rights were only secured upon paper.

If the intentions with which the Permanent Settlement was made had been carried out, the result would, at any rate, have been beneficial to the ryots of Bengal, whatever might have been the effect on the interests of the State. I described in a former lecture¹ the nature of the right which the ruling power has always exercised in India, of reserving for its own purposes a portion of the rent of the land. It was a right which had been exercised in Bengal from time immemorial. This resource, which would have gone on growing with the increasing prosperity of the country, has been thrown away in Bengal. The consequences at the present time are these:—Even if it be assumed that the share of the rent which the State can wisely take is smaller than the share which any Government, Native or English, has ever taken or proposed to take in India, the amount now received by the State from the land in Bengal must be held to fall short of what it might be by a sum that can hardly be less than 5,000,000*l.* a year; this is a moderate computation; probably the loss is much more. This is given away in return for no service to the State or to the public; the zemindars are merely the receivers of rent; with exceptions so rare as to deserve no consideration, they take no part in the improvement of the land, and, until a very few years ago they bore virtually no share of the public burdens. The result of these proceedings of the last century, to

¹ Lecture III., p. 75.

the maintenance of which for ever the faith of the British Government is said to have been pledged, is that the poorer classes in poorer provinces have to make good to the State the millions which have been thrown away in Bengal.

If this were all, it would be bad enough, but worse remains to be told. More serious evils have followed in the train of the Permanent Settlement. The crowning misfortune has been the destruction or non-recognition of those rights of the masses of the agricultural population which the authors of the Settlement undoubtedly intended to preserve.

'The original intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement [I am quoting from Sir George Campbell] was to record all rights. The Canoongoes (District Registrars) and Putwarees (Village Accountants) were to register all holdings, all transfers, all rent-rolls, and all receipts and payments; and every five years there was to be filed in the public offices a complete register of all land tenures. But the task was a difficult one; there was delay in carrying it out. English ideas of the rights of a landlord, and of the advantage of non-interference, began more and more to prevail in Bengal. The executive more and more abrogated the functions of recording rights and protecting the inferior holders, and left everything to the judicial tribunals. The putwarees fell into disuse or became the mere servants of the zemindars; the canoongoes were abolished. No record of the rights of the ryots and inferior holders was ever made, and even the quinquennial register of superior rights, which was maintained for a time, fell into disuse. When a regular police was established, the zemindars were in practice freed from any effective responsibility for the suppression of crime, or other administrative functions. They became in every sense mere rent-receivers.'¹

The consequences of the Permanent Settlement did not become immediately prominent. At the beginning

¹ *System of Land Tenures in Various Countries*, published by the Cobden Club, p. 176.

of this century the population was far smaller, there was much waste land to be occupied, and there was little disposition or power on the part of the zemindars to disregard the old customary terms on which the land was held. But, as time went on, and population and wealth increased, as cultivators were more readily found, and custom began to give way to competition, the position of the ryots became worse and that of the zemindars became stronger. Other circumstances helped the process of confiscation of the rights of the peasantry. For more than half a century after the Permanent Settlement was made, the executive Government in Bengal was extremely weak. The English principle that in the ordinary affairs of life the less the State interferes with individual action the better, and that for the protection of private rights little more is required than the maintenance of order, with good courts of justice accessible to all, is admirable when applied to the government of Englishmen, but there could be no people to which it was less applicable than the people of Bengal. This principle of non-interference was carried out to an extent unknown in any other part of India. Nothing would have so much helped the timid people of Bengal in social and political progress as the just and active and masterful administration of Englishmen, resolute that the rights should be respected of those who had not the courage or the knowledge to protect themselves. To talk of self-reliance and self-government among such a people as that of Bengal was, and is, little better than childish. You cannot govern an infant school on a system appropriate for grown men.

I showed in a former lecture¹ that in other provinces of India an elaborate machinery has been spread over

¹ Lecture IX., pp. 243-249.

the whole country, extending its ramifications into every village, for the purpose of maintaining an accurate record of the rights and liabilities of all classes of the agricultural population. In Bengal nothing of the sort exists. There has been no cadastral survey and no record of agricultural rights. Under the arrangements of the Permanent Settlement, the Government has no anxiety about the collection of its land revenue. The whole responsibility for punctual payment falls upon the zemindar. If he does not pay at the district treasury on the appointed date, no questions are asked; there may or may not have been causes which make immediate payment difficult; these are matters with which the Government does not concern itself; it is enough that the revenue is due; the estate is put up to public auction, and the demand of the State is the first claim on the proceeds of the sale. In consequence of this system, the executive Government, so far as the collection of the land revenue is concerned, has little to do in the interior of a Bengal district, and financially there is no direct reason for interference with any interests in the land.

There were other causes for the weakness of government in Bengal. This being the province in which British authority was first established on that side of India, and from which our chief conquests were gradually made, the Government of Bengal was for a long time the Supreme Government in British India. Until 1833, the Governor-General was called the Governor-General of Fort William in Bengal, not the Governor-General of India, and it was not until 1853 that he was relieved from the duty of governing Bengal. While the empire was being constantly extended, he could spend comparatively little time in Calcutta. When he was there, he was by law Governor, but it was impossible for him to

attend personally to the details of Bengal administration. When he was absent from Calcutta, the senior member of Council for the time being became Deputy Governor. Thus there was a frequent change of rulers, and no one man was long responsible for the good government of the province. At last, the contrast between the condition of Bengal and that of other parts of India became too obvious to be neglected. This was especially seen when Bengal was compared with the neighbouring province on the north, which in 1835 had been placed under a separate Government. When the North-Western Provinces, under their admirable Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Thomason, were becoming a model of good and vigorous administration, Bengal was the most backward of the great provinces of the empire. There were almost no roads or bridges or schools, and there was no proper protection to life and property. The police was worthless, and robberies and violent crimes by gangs of armed men, which were unheard of in other provinces, were common not far from Calcutta.

By the Act of 1853 a separate provincial Government was constituted for Bengal, and a Lieutenant-Governor was appointed. From that time a great change began, and constant improvement has been going on ever since. The courts have been purified, the police has been organised, crimes of violence have almost ceased, public works have been constructed, education has made great progress, and, although still weak when judged by the standard of other provinces, the executive administration has become stronger. Not the least beneficial of these changes were the measures which soon began to be adopted, but of which we have not nearly seen the end, for the protection of the rights of the agricultural population.

The difficulty of the problems to be solved in Bengal has been and still is great. The confiscation of the rights of the ryots has reached vast proportions. In 1793 the rental left to the zemindars under the Permanent Settlement, after payment of the land revenue, is supposed not to have exceeded 400,000*l.*; according to some estimates it was less. If the intentions of the Government had been carried out, it was to the ryots that the greater portion of any future increase in the annual value of the land would have belonged, in those parts at least of the province which were at that time well cultivated. It is not possible to state with confidence the present gross annual rental of the landlords of Bengal. An imperfect valuation made some years ago showed it to be 13,000,000*l.* It is now called 17,000,000*l.*, but there can be little doubt that it is much more. Thus, after deducting the land revenue, which is about 3,800,000*l.*,¹ the net rental has risen from 400,000*l.* in the last century to more than 13,000,000*l.* at the present time. No portion of this increase has been due to the action of the zemindars. It has been due to the industry of the ryots, to whom the greater part of it rightfully belonged, to the peaceful progress of the country, and to the expenditure of the State, an expenditure mainly defrayed from the taxation of poorer provinces. If ever there was an 'unearned increment,' it is this.

~~We~~ We cannot now restore to the ryots the vast property of which they have been deprived, but they may

¹ The demand on account of land revenue from the permanently settled estates, which constitute 93 per cent. of the whole number of estates in Bengal, is 3,230,000*l.* The remaining 7 per cent. of estates have been temporarily assessed since the Permanent Settlement, and the revenue paid by them is about 580,000*l.* The total land revenue of Bengal is about 3,810,000*l.*

at least be saved from further spoliation, and the people of other provinces may be protected against the necessity of bearing burdens on behalf of the landlords of Bengal. When other Indian countries understand that, in consequence of an unwise arrangement entered into in Bengal a century ago, they are compelled to pay every year several millions of taxation which would otherwise have been unnecessary, their demands for justice will be too strong to be disregarded. They do not yet know the truth. In the words of Mr. H. S. Cunningham, 'the richest province of India has been, to a large extent, defended, administered, educated, supplied with roads, barracks, hospitals, railways and canals, and relieved in famine,¹ at the expense of the rest of the community. Ryots have been toiling in Madras, and toiling in the Deccan, in order that gentlemen like the Rajas of Durbunga and Burdwan may enjoy incomes of several hundred thousand pounds a year, free from the rude contact of the tax collector's hand.'² It must not, however, be supposed that the land of Bengal now belongs to a very small and wealthy class of proprietors. Although some of the estates of the zemindars are great tracts of country, yielding immense incomes to their owners, a constant process of subdivision has been going on. In 1883 there were 110,456 estates on the revenue-roll of Bengal and Behár, and about 88 per cent. of these had an area of less than 500 acres.

I am not suggesting that pledges given at the time of the Permanent Settlement should be set aside, nor that the zemindars should be deprived of privileges

¹ In 1874, nearly 7,000,000*l.* was expended by the Government from the general revenues of India on the relief of famine in Bengal.

² *British India and its Rulers*, p. 169.

which, although wrongfully acquired, have been enjoyed through a long course of years. The evils that I have been describing can, I believe, be sufficiently if not completely remedied by measures which are open to no reasonable objection.

The zemindars have repeatedly put forward the claim that in consequence of the stipulations of the Permanent Settlement, they are entitled to exemption for ever from all taxation upon profits derived from the land. In 1859, when an income tax was first imposed on every kind of property throughout India, they loudly protested that the conditions of the Settlement were violated, and that the Government had been guilty of a gross breach of faith. In 1871, and again in 1877, they demanded, on similar grounds, exemption from liability to rates imposed on land and other immoveable property for local and provincial roads and other public works. These claims have always been rejected, and the time has passed in which there was danger that any British Government would listen to the preposterous pretension that it was the design of the framers of the Permanent Settlement that no taxation should ever fall upon profits drawn from the land. The intention of the Settlement was simply to fix permanently the share of the produce or rental to which the State, in its capacity of superior landlord, intended to limit its demand. No questions of taxation were touched or involved. In the words of Sir James Stephen, the Permanent Settlement 'reduced to a certainty one particular charge on the land, which had previously been of variable amount, and so freed the landholders from uncertainty which had previously hung over them in respect of it. . . . Since the Permanent Settlement the proprietary right of the zemindars has been undoubted, and the line between

their property and that of the State has been clearly defined, and is no longer subject to increase "in consequence [to use the words of the Permanent Settlement itself] of the improvement of their respective estates."¹

As Sir James Stephen goes on to say, to affirm, that because this has been done the land has been freed from that liability to taxation which is the common liability of all property in all countries, is a confusion of thought against which it is difficult to argue. The rates levied under the Acts passed in 1871 and 1877, and consolidated by Bengal Act IX. of 1880, yielded in 1886-87 about 757,000*l*. By these rates, and by the previous imposition of the income tax, the principle that profits derived from the land are liable to taxation both for local and imperial purposes was affirmed, and if these examples be wisely followed, no questions of interference with the pledges of the Permanent Settlement need arise when the zemindars are compelled, as they some day will be, to contribute their proper share towards meeting the liabilities of the State.

The first serious effort for the improvement of the rent-law of Bengal was made in 1859, when an Act dealing with the subject was passed. It was described by Lord Canning as 'a real and earnest attempt to improve the position of the ryots of Bengal, and to open to them a prospect of freedom and independence which they have not hitherto enjoyed, by clearly defining their rights, and by placing restrictions on the power of the zemindars such as ought long ago to have been provided.' The intentions of the Legislature were excellent, but the Act proved imperfect and insufficient, and in some respects made matters worse than they were before. As time went on the difficulties increased.

¹ Speech in the Legislative Council, April 6, 1871.

In Eastern Bengal the state of affairs became highly unsatisfactory; combinations of ryots occurred, and violent collisions took place between them and the zemindars, aggravated by the fact that the former were mostly Mohammedans and the latter Hindus. In 1876 it became necessary to legislate for the prevention of agrarian disputes.

In Behár the case was more serious. This great province of Bengal has an area of 44,000 square miles, and a population of 23,000,000. There is hardly any part of British India possessing greater natural advantages of soil and climate, and no part where the condition of the agricultural population is so wretched. This was a cause of much anxiety to Lord Lawrence, and he stated his belief that legislation would become necessary for the protection of the ryot, 'and make him what he is now only in name, a free man.' In 1878, Sir Ashley Eden, then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, described the ryots of Behár as 'poor, helpless, discontented men, bound down to a state of extreme depression and misery, tenants of the richest province in Bengal, yet the poorest and most wretched class we find in the country. . . . The loose system of zemindari accounts, the entire absence of leases and counterparts, the universal prevalence of illegal distraint, the practice of amalgamating holdings so as to destroy evidence of continuous occupation, are evils which necessarily prevent any possible development of agricultural prosperity among the tenant class, and place them entirely at the mercy of their landlords.' The Indian Famine Commissioners, not long afterwards, pressed the same subject on the attention of the Government.

'Where,' they said, 'as in Behár, the relations of landlord and tenant are those of a high-handed proprietary body on the one

hand, habitually disregarding the law, and on the other a tenantry, ignorant, very helpless, and sunk in the most abject poverty, the onus of bringing complaints ought not to be laid on the tenants, and the first and most important duty of the Bengal Government and of the officials would seem to be to guard zealously against infringements of the law by the rich, and to put them down as if they were offences against the public peace.' 'It was proved,' writes Mr. Finucane, the head of the Agricultural Department in Bengal, 'by indisputable evidence that the rents of ryots in Behár have during the past fifty years, been illegally and arbitrarily enhanced out of all proportion to what the landlords were under the law entitled to demand, and to what the tenants were legally liable to pay. Though the rent law gave the ryot certain rights, he was so helpless or so ignorant that he was unable to assert these rights out of court, or to go into court to enforce them.'

I will make a few more extracts from official reports regarding the condition of the people in parts of Behár.

'The gross rental of permanently settled estates being at the lowest estimate five times the amount payable by landholders as Government revenue, there can, as a matter of course, be no difficulty in realising that revenue under the sunset law. But there are certain tracts in which, though the permanently settled land revenue may be realised, yet the sums realised by the Government have had again to be expended, many fold increased, on charitable relief which became necessary in order to prevent mortality by starvation. Such pre-eminently is the province of Behár, and specially the three northern districts of Darbhanga, Mozaffarpur, and Sáran. Within a period of seventeen years there have been five in which a portion of the people of this part of the province have died of starvation. The whole conditions of agricultural industry are such as to render it precarious. It is impossible for the people to fall back in one year of partial failure of crops on the accumulated reserves of a previous year, whether of grain, property, money, or credit. Thus, in the one district of Darbhanga, which is taken as being the worst of all in these respects—a district which is one of the most fertile, best cultivated, and highly favoured by nature in all India—it was

necessary for the Government to expend in one year, on one famine in 1874, by way of charitable relief, no less than 370,000*l.* in cash, and 118,000 tons of grain, valued in Burma at 9*l.* per ton. If to this be added the cost of transport, and cost of famine establishment, it will not be too much to put down the net cost of famine to Government in this single district at 1,500,000*l.*, the Government revenue being less than 50,000*l.* per annum. The famine expenditure in this district, in one year, was more than thirty times the amount of the Government revenue, and far more than its capitalised value. . . . Yet the rental of the district was no less than twelve times the amount of the Government revenue. It is not alone on famine relief that enormous sums have been expended in this part of the country. There has been also a great outlay on State railways, which, though they may facilitate the importation of grain in times of distress, can in ordinary times be of little benefit to the mass of the peasantry; for it is evident that so long as landlords are permitted to take advantage of the local competition for land in order to enhance rents illegally, it is they, and they only, who appropriate the profits resulting from that rise in prices which attends the opening up of means of communication. Besides 200,000*l.* expended on a temporary famine railway to Darbhanga in 1874, there has been an expenditure on the Tirhut State railway of 1,300,000*l.* within the past ten years.¹

Some of the zemindars of Behár are among the richest men in India. The estates of the Raja of Darbhanga, in the district just mentioned, have an area of 2,400 square miles, a population of 750,000, and a rental exceeding 200,000*l.* a year.

Happily, the condition of the peasantry in the greater part of Bengal Proper is much better than in Behár. The confiscation of their rights has been lamentable, and the necessity for their future protection has been, and still is urgent, but they have not been reduced to a condition such as that common in Behár, and they live, as a rule, in reasonable comfort.

¹ Report of the Agricultural Department in Bengal for 1886.

The discussion of the measures required for placing the law of landlord and tenant throughout Bengal on a better footing has continued for many years. The opposition on the part of the zemindars and their advocates to every proposal which had for its object the diminution of the arbitrary powers of landlords, and the protection of ryots against oppression and the further destruction of their rights, was unceasing and powerful, but at last, in 1885, the 'Bengal Tenancy Act' was passed by the Governor-General in Council. I will not attempt to describe all its provisions, but its value cannot be doubted. It is an attempt to give protection to the ryots without interfering with the rights of landlords. It defines the position of the various classes of landlords and tenants, the incidents of the various tenures, the conditions under which rights of occupancy in the land are acquired and maintained, the manner in which rents are to be regulated, enhanced, and reduced, the circumstances under which evictions may take place; it imposes penalties for illegal exactions, lays down rules regarding compensation for improvements, gives power to the Government to order surveys and the preparation of records of rights, and deals with a multitude of other matters of importance.

The passing of this Act has been an excellent measure, but more is required. I have shown that in other parts of British India there has been a survey of every field, and that a permanent and continuous record is maintained of all rights and interests in the land. This, in other provinces, is the basis of our system of administration. Without such basis, in a country where nearly the whole population is agricultural, neither the executive authorities nor the courts of justice have the means of obtaining the knowledge essential to the pro-

tection of the most important interests of the people. In Bengal there are virtually no surveys, no maps, no records of rights; there is universal ignorance of almost all facts connected with the greatest industry of the country and which it is the most necessary to know. Until this want has been supplied there will be no really efficient government in Bengal, and no adequate relief for sufferings such as those of the ryots of Behár. I cannot doubt that Mr. Finucane is right when he says of those unfortunate people that a mere declaration of their rights, recorded in the statute-book and published in the Gazette, will afford to them little or no relief. I look forward, however, with much hope to the future of the peasantry of Bengal, because I see that the rising generation of Englishmen in India has, in respect to these matters, different ideas from those of the generation that is passing away.

English education has unfortunately hardly begun to penetrate to the cultivating classes in Bengal, and until lately they have found few champions among their own countrymen. The sympathies and the support of that section of the English-speaking Bengális which has been able or desirous to make its voice heard have been for the most part enlisted on the side of the zemindars, and to the detriment of the ryots. The time will come when this will cease to be true—already, I hope, things are better than they were—but hitherto the ryots have had mainly to look to their English rulers for the defence of their interests.

Every measure of political importance is discussed by the organs of the educated classes in Bengal. Not long ago there could be no doubt as to what would be the reception of any measure that seemed to threaten the interests of the zemindars. No taxation affecting

them could be imposed without the cry being raised that the solemn pledges of the Permanent Settlement were being violated by an unscrupulous Government. Every measure which has had for its object the more just distribution of the public burdens has, as a rule, met with nothing but opposition. We were told that to reduce the salt tax was folly; let it be increased if the Government wants more money. The abolition of customs duties on cotton goods was solely prompted by the desire to benefit the manufacturers of Manchester, and by the base political purpose of gaining votes in Lancashire. Educated Bengális were not to be deceived by the profession that we desired to give to the people of India cheaper salt and cheaper clothing.

Thus, through the influence of the associations and the newspapers of Bengális taught in our schools and colleges, English education in Bengal has given frequent aid to the perpetuation of past injustice and to the prevention of reform. I am happy to believe that this is now less true than it was, for I am told that the ryots of Bengal are beginning to find earnest and capable friends among their own people. Still, I fear, there can be no doubt that, for a long time to come, it will be only to their English rulers that they will be able to look for protection and justice. I said in a former lecture¹ that an unfortunate result of our system of higher education in India has been the want of sympathy which many of the English-speaking Natives, especially in Bengal, show towards the poorer and less instructed classes of their countrymen. The shallow and imperfect education, which is all that they usually obtain, is derived entirely from English sources. They learn enough of English habits of thought to enable

¹ Lecture VII., p. 196.

them to imitate us, sometimes in things that are good, but sometimes in things that it would have been better to avoid. They learn almost nothing about their own country, and seem frequently to care little for their own people. I need hardly say that there are very many honourable exceptions to be made to general statements of this kind. Some of the most benevolent and most enlightened men that I have known in India have been educated natives of Bengal.

It is a serious misfortune that discredit should so often be thrown on the results of English education by the foolish talk and disloyal writing of a section of the English-speaking Bengális. Many of them are gifted with a very remarkable faculty of fluent speech and writing. I have heard of no men in any country enamoured of their own verbosity in so extraordinary a degree. Although to our taste their English is often ridiculously magniloquent, few foreigners master so completely the difficulties of our language. Their newspapers, published in English, are sometimes, so far as their style is concerned, extremely well written, but, with honourable exceptions, they are disloyal, foolish, and sometimes shamefully scurrilous.

There is no province in India without customs which we think must be repugnant to all civilised men, but which are almost universally respected because they are believed to have been divinely ordained, or to have come down from a remote antiquity. There is hardly a province in which horrid and cruel practices would not instantly spring into vigorous life if our watchfulness were relaxed. The prohibition of the burning of widows was, and is still, utterly disapproved by all but a small minority of Hindus. I do not believe that the majority even of the most highly educated

classes approve it. I gave you, in a previous lecture, an account of the wholesale murder of female children, which has gone on for centuries, a custom against which no Hindu, however enlightened, raises his voice, and which, with all our efforts, we have not yet succeeded in eradicating. But for us, even in the provinces where education has made its greatest progress, Káli would still claim her human victims. Not many years ago, in a time of drought, near a railway station twenty-five miles from Calcutta, a human head was found before her idol, decked with flowers; and in another temple in Bengal a boy was savagely murdered and offered to the goddess.¹ While this book was passing through the press, a ghastly story came from the Central Provinces of the sacrifice of a young man to the local gods, in obedience to a widely prevalent belief and ancient practice that this is a sure means of obtaining a plentiful harvest. Horrors such as these receive no general condemnation in India, nor does the determination of our Government that they shall be suppressed gain for us any approval even from the educated classes.

There are in India many questions of another order which it is far more difficult to solve, because we cannot deal with them by the strong hand of the law. I will mention one only as an illustration, the custom of child marriage. It would be difficult to imagine anything more abominable than its frequent consequences, by which multitudes of girls of ten or twelve or less are given over to outrage, or are doomed to lives of miserable and degraded widowhood. Some of the most holy Brahmans of Bengal 'make a living by being husbands. A child of twelve is given as perhaps the fortieth or fiftieth wife of some old man; sometimes

¹ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Art. 'India.'

two sisters are given to the same man, and sometimes to one who has not long to live. Though it may be certain that the girl must soon be a widow, even this is considered preferable to allowing her to remain unmarried. Everyone has heard of the wretched fate which widowhood in India involves.¹

What could be more valuable and interesting than to learn the opinions, and receive the advice of highly educated Natives of India on such subjects as these, and to know that they were striving, by the example of their own lives, to teach their less instructed countrymen to abandon these abominations? What greater encouragement could be given to those who desire to see educated Natives admitted to a larger share in the administration than the certainty that they were anxious to help us towards ampler knowledge of the wants and feelings of the people, and to make us better able to deal with problems that now seem too hard to solve?

You would be much mistaken if you supposed that in regard to any of these great social questions the Government has ever received advice or assistance from the much talking section of the Bengális. I must class with them a considerable number of the Marátha Brahmans of Bombay, and of the English-speaking Hindus of Madras. You might search the proceedings of their societies, you might examine the files of their newspapers and the reports of their speeches at their public meetings, and you would not find one word of reprobation of the atrocious practices which, under the cover of immemorial custom, are followed throughout India, or one word of a desire to help our Government to suppress them.

¹ *Modern Hinduism*, by W. J. Wilkins p. 347.

It is not difficult to understand why these terrible questions are avoided. Some of these Native gentlemen are silent because they dare not, by speaking of them, bring themselves into collision with the cherished beliefs and prejudices of their countrymen; others, and I have no doubt the majority, are silent because in regard to these matters they are at heart as intensely conservative as the mass of the population, and have no desire for changes in social and religious usages which have come down from a venerable antiquity. It is much safer to talk about 'political enfranchisement,' and it is easy in this way to obtain the applause of Englishmen who know nothing of the facts and the difficulties with which the true friends of Indian progress have to deal, but who have an undoubting faith that so-called popular institutions are good for all men under all circumstances.

I have now before me the report of a great political gathering, the so-called 'Indian National Congress.' This, we are informed by the report, 'was a political body met together to represent to our rulers our political aspirations,' and we are expressly told that it had nothing to do with social questions. The object aimed at was 'the political enfranchisement of the country' by the introduction of representative institutions.

I do not propose to refer at any length to the declared objects of these political agitators who have lately been making themselves more and more prominent in India. If you look at their voluminous speeches and proceedings, you will not discern the smallest recognition of the terrible problems of which I have given some illustrations, but you will find no lack of sedition and hatred of the British Government thinly veiled under frequent and fulsome expressions of devo-

tion and loyalty.¹ I am far from believing that the majority of these gentlemen are really disloyal. They are, for the most part, well meaning men of small education, but with a good knowledge of our language, who have learnt to pour forth the commonplaces of English politics, and who listen with delight to their own eloquence, which they half believe to be inspired by feelings akin to those which they have read about in Burke and Macaulay. They easily obtain a hearing from sentimental philanthropists and from those Englishmen who see nothing good in any political institutions except those of their own peculiar type, and assume that certain abstract principles are always applicable to the government of all sorts and conditions of men. Many Englishmen who read these harangues honestly believe that they are listening to the genuine expression of the just expectations of the great 'People of India,' which has no existence, but the non-existence of which I am afraid they are not likely to learn.

Men of a very different stamp, who well deserve the respect of their countrymen and of their rulers, have not unfrequently been drawn into apparent and partial agreement with these political agitators by the legitimate feeling that Natives of India do not obtain their just share in the public administration. This is a feeling which has my sympathy. There are political aspirations which loyal Natives may with complete propriety express, and which it is right that we should endeavour to satisfy; but let us take care that we satisfy them wisely.

I said, in a previous lecture,² that I should return to the subject of the admission of the Natives of India

¹ See Appendix.

² Lecture X, pp. 261, 262.

to the more important public offices. I showed that the greater part of the civil administration is already in their hands, that the Native Civil Service performs its duties, as a whole, with high efficiency, but at the same time I stated my opinion that much remains to be done in throwing open to Natives posts now reserved for Englishmen.

Subject to certain conditions, the true principle on which we ought to treat this question of the wider employment of Natives in posts of importance was laid down in the Act of Parliament passed in 1870 to which I have already referred, but I cannot think that it has hitherto been properly applied. That principle is that almost all offices in India shall be open to Natives, but to those only 'of proved merit and ability.'

In the case of Englishmen, whether in India or at home, it is safe to say that appointments to offices in the higher branches of the public service shall ordinarily be filled by those who, in competitive examinations in their boyhood, are successful in satisfying certain literary and other tests ; but to think of applying such a system to the Natives of India is nothing less than absurd. Not the least important part of the competitive examination of the young Englishman was passed for him by his forefathers, who, as we have a right to assume, have transmitted to him not only their physical courage, but the powers of independent judgment, the decision of character, the habits of thought, and generally those qualities that are necessary for the government of men, and the discharge of the various duties of civilised life, and which have given us our empire. The stock-in-trade with which Englishmen start in life is not that of Bengális ; but I must not say this of Englishmen only, for it is equally true of

the nobler races of India, although their time has not come for competitive examinations.

Few would go further than I would go in opening the public service in India to Natives 'of proved merit and ability,' but it is well to avoid 'political hypocrisy.' 'Is there,' Lord Salisbury asked, 'any man who will have the hardihood to tell me that it is within the range of possibility that a man in India should be appointed Lieutenant-Governor of a province, or Chief Commissioner, or Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or Viceroy, without any regard whatever to his race?' Some will answer even this question in the affirmative. There will always be people ready to accept with composure any political folly, provided that it involves some triumph of sentiment over sense, and some appearance of national humiliation. When we say that we cannot always, in our government of India, ignore differences of race, this is only another way of saying that the English in India are a handful of foreigners governing 250 millions of people. I have said that we are not foreigners in India in the sense in which we are foreigners in Paris, and that the people of one Indian province are often as much foreigners to the people of another province as we are ourselves; still, we are foreigners, and although I suppose that no foreign government was ever accepted with less repugnance than that with which the British Government is accepted in India, the fact remains that there never was a country, and never will be, in which the government of foreigners is really popular. It will be the beginning of the end of our empire when we forget this elementary fact, and entrust the greater executive powers to the hands of Natives, on the assumption that they will always be faithful and strong supporters

of our government. In this there is nothing offensive or disparaging to the Natives of India. It simply means that we are foreigners, and that, not only in our own interests, but because it is our highest duty towards India itself, we intend to maintain our dominion. We cannot foresee the time in which the cessation of our rule would not be the signal for universal anarchy and ruin, and it is clear that the only hope for India is the long continuance of the benevolent but strong government of Englishmen. Let us give to the Natives the largest possible share in the administration. In some branches of the service there is almost no limit to the share of public employment which they may properly receive. This is especially true of the judicial service, for which Natives have shown themselves eminently qualified, and in which the higher offices are equal in importance and dignity and emolument to almost any of the great offices of the State. I would grudge them no such offices. But let there be no hypocrisy about our intention to keep in the hands of our own people those executive posts—and there are not very many of them—on which, and on our political and military power, our actual hold of the country depends. Our Governors of provinces, the chief officers of our army, our magistrates of districts and their principal executive subordinates ought to be Englishmen under all circumstances that we can now foresee.

It is not only in regard to the employment in India of our own countrymen that we ought never to forget differences of race. It is quite as essential to remember them in connection with the employment of Natives. I have, in these lectures, repeatedly insisted on the fact that there is really no such country as India; that such terms as 'People of India' and 'Natives of

India' are meaningless in the sense in which they are frequently used; that no countries and no peoples in Europe differ from each other so profoundly as countries and peoples differ in India; that it would be as reasonable to suppose that English, French, Spaniards, Greeks, and Germans will ultimately become one nation as to suppose such a thing of Bengális, Sikhs, Maráthas, Rájputs, and Patháns. No good administration or permanent political security is possible unless facts of this kind are remembered. It ought never to be forgotten that you can never assume that because a man is a 'Native of India' he has any natural claim, different in kind from that of an Englishman, to be employed in the public service in every part of India. Often, indeed, you may go much further. I used no terms of exaggeration when I said that a Native of Calcutta is more of a foreigner to the hardy races on the frontiers of Northern India than an Englishman can be. To suppose that the manlier races of India could ever be governed through feeble and effeminate foreigners of another Indian country, however intellectually acute those foreigners may be—that Sikhs and Patháns, for instance, should submit to be ruled by Bengális—is to suppose an absurdity. The Mohammedan gentleman, who remembers the position which his ancestors once held, accepts with natural regret, but with no humiliation, the government of Englishmen. Although he may not love them, he admits that they must be respected. But the thought of being subject to the orders of a Bengáli fills him with indignation and contempt. The educated Bengáli, although his reasons might be very different, would feel equal disgust at the thought of having his affairs administered by Sikhs and by Patháns. To allow Natives 'of proved merit and ability' to take a larger

part in the administration of their own country is right and politic; to affirm that they have any similar claims in countries where they are foreigners is foolish.

I remember a conversation which I once had with a Native of Northern India, a man of great sagacity, whose position, wealth, and influence made him one of the most important personages in his province. Discussions were going on respecting the propriety of making it easier for Natives of India to enter the Covenanted Civil Service, and on the suggestion that with that object competitive examinations should be held in India as well as in England. I asked him what he thought about this proposal, and his first answer, given in a manner which showed that he took little interest in the subject, was to the effect that he supposed it was a good one. 'I am afraid,' I said, 'that for a long time to come there would be no candidates from this part of India: it is only in Bengal that young men could be found who would have any chance of success in such an examination as that required. The result would be that you would some day have a Bengáli as your chief district officer.' I shall not forget the scorn with which he drew himself up and replied to me, 'And does anyone think that we, the men of this country, would stand that? Do you suppose that you could govern us with Bengális? Never!'

This book was almost ready for the press when the reports reached England of some remarkable speeches made by Sir Syad Ahmad Khan at two great meetings of Mohammedans in Northern India. I referred in a previous lecture to Sir Syad Ahmad Khan, and to the work to which his life has been devoted.¹ I mention these speeches because they illustrate, with greater

¹ Lecture VII., pp. 175-179.

authority than that of any Englishman, the practical importance of the fact on which I have repeatedly insisted, with which I began these lectures, and with which I wish to end them, that the most essential of all things to be learnt about India is that India is a continent filled with the most diverse elements. The special aim of Sir Syad Ahmad Khan was to protest on behalf of his Mohammedan fellow-countrymen against the notion that they—‘men of the blood of those who made not only Arabia but Asia and Europe to tremble, who for seven hundred years in India had imperial sway’—could be treated as belonging to the same nation as Bengális, and to express his contempt for the political nostrums which the so-called ‘National Congresses’ propose to apply throughout India. If these were adopted, the result, he says, would be that ‘there would be no **part** of the country in which we should see at the tables of **justice and authority** any faces except those of Bengális. I am delighted to see the Bengális making progress, but what would be the result on the public administration? Do you think that the Rájput and the fiery Pathán would remain in peace under Bengális?’ These are illustrations of the opinions of a man universally honoured, who is entitled to speak on behalf of all that is best and most enlightened among the Mohammedans of Northern India.

‘It is better,’ says Machiavelli, ‘to follow the real truth of things than an imaginary view of them. For many republics and princedoms have been imagined which were never seen or known to exist in reality.’ If intelligent people in England would make themselves acquainted with ‘the real truth of things,’ they would appreciate at their true value the utterances of those agitators who, with some success in this country, pose

as the representatives of an imaginary Indian nation, 'never seen or known to exist in reality.'

I must now bring these lectures to a close. I have endeavoured to give to you some general idea of what India is and of the results which she has obtained from the establishment of our power. No reasonable man can doubt the answer that we must give to the question whether the 200 millions of our Indian subjects have benefited by our government.

The first great and obvious fact, overshadowing all other facts in significance, is this, that in place of a condition of society given up, as it was immediately before our time, to anarchy and to the liability to every conceivable form of violence and oppression, you have now absolute peace. Let not this unspeakable blessing of the Pax Britannica be forgotten. There are not many European countries where protection to life and property is so complete. Excepting England and her colonies and the United States of America, there is hardly a country in the world where there is so little needless interference on the part of the Government with personal liberty, or such freedom in the public expression of opinion in matters of politics and religion. Except when sometimes for a moment the fanaticism and intolerance of rival sects of Mohammedans and Hindus burst into violent conflict, and show what would instantly follow if the strong hand of our Government were withdrawn, unbroken tranquillity prevails. Justice is administered under laws of unequalled excellence and simplicity. There is no country possessing a civilised administration where taxation is so light or commerce is more free. Mr. J. S. Mill declared his belief that the British Government in India was 'not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in

act, ever known among mankind.' I do not doubt that this is still truer now.

Whether all this makes our Government really popular is another question.

When Lord Lawrence was Viceroy, in 1867, many of the most experienced officers in India were invited to give their opinion whether our Government was more generally popular than that in the Native States. As might have been anticipated, nearly all the answers were affirmative, but I shall only refer to that of Lord Lawrence himself. His conclusion was given in these words: 'The masses of the people are incontestably more prosperous, and—*sua si bona nôrint*—far more happy in British territory than they are under Native rulers.' No Englishman knew India better than Lord Lawrence. That the people had been made more prosperous by our administration was, in his opinion, beyond controversy, but when it came to the question of their happiness and of our popularity, well—yes; at any rate they *ought* to be more happy. The proviso is significant, *sua si bona nôrint*.

The truth is that, in a country in the condition of India, the more actively enlightened our Government becomes, the less likely it is to be popular. Our Government is highly respected; the confidence of the people in our justice is unlimited. That accomplished traveller, Baron von Hübner, says in his excellent book, 'Through the British Empire,' that if proof were needed to show how deeply rooted among the people is this trust in English justice, he would quote the fact that throughout India the Native prefers, in civil and still more in criminal cases, to go before an English judge. 'I think,' he says, 'it would be impossible to render a more flattering testimony to British rule.'

The duty was once imposed upon me of transferring a number of villages which had long been included in a British district to one of the best governed of the Native States. I shall not forget the loud and universal protests of the people against the cruel injustice with which they considered they were being treated. Everyone who has had experience of similar cases tells the same story. Nevertheless, I cannot say that our Government is loved ; it is too good for that.

The sympathies between the people and their English rulers can hardly be anything but imperfect. The system of caste and the differences in all our habits make social intimacy difficult. The stories that are sometimes told about the frequent insolence and brutality of Englishmen are false, but it cannot be denied that the ordinary Englishman is too rough and vigorous and straightforward to be a very agreeable person to the majority of the Natives of India. These, however, are not reasons which seriously affect the popularity of our Government. I repeat that because it is good it can hardly be popular.

I never heard of a great measure of improvement that was popular in India, even among the classes that have received the largest share of education. The people are intensely conservative and intensely ignorant, wedded, to an extent difficult for Europeans to understand, to every ancient custom, and between their customs and religion no line of distinction can be drawn. We often deceive ourselves in regard to the changes that are taking place. We believe that our Western knowledge, our railways, and our telegraphs must be breaking up the whole fabric of Hinduism, but these things have touched in reality only the merest fringe of the ideas and beliefs of the population of India. The

vast masses of the people remain in a different world from ours. They hate everything new, and they especially hate almost everything that we look upon as progress.

It would thus be an error to suppose that the British Government is administered in a manner that altogether commends itself to the majority of the Indian population. This we cannot help. Considerations of political prudence compel us to tolerate much that we should wish to alter, but, subject to this condition, our duty is plain. It is to use the power which we possess for no other purpose than to govern India on the principles which our superior knowledge tells us are right, although they may often be unpopular, and may offend the prejudices and superstitions of the people. I will quote to you Sir James Stephen's summary of the principles which would be really popular in India, and of those which we enforce, and with it I may fitly close these lectures :—

‘The English in India are the representatives of a belligerent civilisation. The phrase is epigrammatic, but it is strictly true. The English in India are the representatives of peace compelled by force. The Mohammedans would like to tyrannise over Hindus in particular, and in general to propose to everyone the alternative between the Koran, the tribute, and the sword. The Hindus would like to rule—over Hindus at least—according to the principles of the Brahmanical religion. They would like to be able to condemn to social infamy everyone who, being born a Hindu, did not observe their rites. They would like to see *suttee* practised, to prevent the remarriage of widows who were not burnt, to do away with the laws which prevent a change of religion from producing civil disabilities, to prevent a low-caste man from trying or even testifying against a Brahman; and Mohammedans, and Hindus, and Sikhs would all alike wish to settle their old accounts and see who is master. The belligerent civilisation of which I spoke consists in the suppression

'by force of all these pretensions, and in compelling by force all sorts and conditions of men in British India to tolerate each other. Should the British Government abdicate its functions, it would soon turn order into chaos. No country in the world is more orderly, more quiet, or more peaceful than British India as it is; but if the vigour of the Government should ever be relaxed, if it should lose its essential unity of purpose, and fall into hands either weak or unfaithful, chaos would come again like a flood.'

APPENDIX.

IN the last of these lectures, referring to the speeches and writings of the political agitators who have lately been making themselves prominent in India, I said that 'You will find in them no lack of sedition and hatred of the British Government thinly veiled under frequent and fulsome expressions of devotion and loyalty.'

It would be easy, by extracts from newspapers and other publications, to justify language far stronger than any that I have used on this subject, but it has been said that these are not the sources from which we can learn the truth regarding the views of the acknowledged leaders of native political thought, and that for this we must go to the authorised reports of the proceedings of the great gatherings of the 'Indian National Congress,' held at Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, in 1885, 1886, and 1887. I will give, therefore, from those proceedings, some illustrations of the manner in which these gentlemen are carrying on their work.

In the Report of the Congress for 1887 we are told that 'The National Party have undertaken through the Congress the political regeneration of two hundred millions of men.' Among the methods by which 'the awakening of the masses' is to be accomplished, much importance is assigned to 'the missionary labours' of the members of the Congress. It is stated that 'throughout the year, in and near their homes, as standing congress committees and sub-committees, by lectures, public meetings, and the distribution of tens of thousands of single tracts in the local vernaculars, they were expected to spread from mind to mind an elementary knowledge of the burning political questions of the day, and, generally, of the rights and duties of all good citizens

of a civilised state. It is to the eternal honour alike of England, the beneficent teacher, and India, the docile pupil, that at the close of this the Third Congress, we are in a position to assert that there is not one of these objects that has not been already partially achieved, and not one single one of them of which the perfect accomplishment, in a not distant future, does not appear to be, humanly speaking, certain.'

Translations of two of the tracts thus referred to are appended to the Report of the Congress; we are told that 30,000 copies of one of them had been circulated in Tamil in Southern India, and that 25,000 copies of the other had been circulated in Northern India, in Urdu and Hindi. It was subsequently stated in April, 1888, that these tracts 'are to be met with in every one of the twelve languages of India, and perhaps half a million copies will be circulated during the present year.'

The tract circulated in Northern India, in the Punjab, in the North-Western Provinces, and in Oudh, is in the form of a conversation between a native barrister of the High Court and a villager called Rambaksh. The latter begins by relating how a Bengali gentleman had come to his village. 'We told him how bad the times were, and how the police bullied us, and how hard the zemindar and the money-lender were, and how everything seemed going wrong. Then he said it was all our own fault, that if we chose to undergo all this and all the trouble that pervaded the country, that was our look-out; no one could help us if we did not help ourselves. . . . He said, by yourselves you are very weak and can do nothing; you are very ignorant, and can hardly see beyond the ends of your own fields; but for all that, if all you ryots all over the country would join those of your countrymen who are better off and better educated, in calling upon the Government to concede to us "Representative Institutions," then the good people in England would insist on these being given to us, and then soon many things would be altered for the better, and many of your causes of complaint would be removed.' Rambaksh says that he thinks this is all nonsense, but still he would like to know what 'Representation' and 'Representative Institutions' mean, and this the Barrister proceeds to explain. There are two kinds of government, he says, one of which is good and the other bad, and to enable Rambaksh

to understand the difference his attention is directed to the extraordinary contrast between his own village called Kam-bakhtpur and another village called Shamshpur in the same neighbourhood. The latter is described as a model of contentment and prosperity. There are never any law suits, there are no liquor shops, and it is managed on behalf of the proprietors of the village, of whom there are 200, by their own good old Lumberdar or Head-man. 'Though he is ten times as rich and as clever as any of the rest he never does anything without consulting them. There is not a farthing of village expenses but what every shareholder has his say about it.'

Rambaksh's village, on the other hand, belongs to an absentee Rája, and is managed by his servants who are strangers to the place. Not a day passes without litigation in the courts, the people are growing poorer and poorer, the land is going out of cultivation, there are scarcely oxen enough for ploughing, half of the houses are in ruins, and the liquor shops that the Government has set up are always full.

'The Rája,' says Rambaksh, 'never comes near us, and never reads any of our petitions and never consults any of us; indeed he won't see us, but sends out an order for us to speak to the Naib (agent) or the Gomashtah (factor), who lives in the Rája's house here; and as for the Gomashtah, he never knows anything about us or the village, for one comes for six months and then goes, and then another comes for a couple of years, and then he goes, and then another comes and so on. . . . I don't say that the Rája is a bad man, but we never see him. So far as any good is concerned, he might be dead, but for all that he must have his money, and almost every year, more money and more money, till we poor people are almost skin and bone. Ah! if we were only cattle, as the Sahib said, we might perhaps make a rupee or two out of our skins; it is about all we have left. . . . The Rája's agents order this and order that, press us for money in season and out of season; they know nothing of village matters themselves, and they won't hear a word from us because they think they are all wise and we utter fools—and under such a system how can a village be otherwise than ruined? What does it matter that the Rája is not a bad man, or that his agents don't purposely injure us; nay, at times

some of them, after their own fashion, try to help us. It is the bad system that is ruining us.'

'Ah, Rambaksh,' says the Barrister, 'this evil system that is ruining you and your neighbours and village is the "Despotic" system; and when rulers govern their subjects in this same way we call theirs a "Despotic" Government, and "Despotic" governments always ruin the countries in which they are carried on for long. They may be necessary in the infancy of a nation; they become crimes when it grows up. Now you have a practical knowledge of both systems; you see how Shamshpur is prospering under a "Constitutional" system, and you know only too thoroughly what Kambakhtpur is coming to under the "Despotic" system. . . . Well, now, you are only a villager, but you are a thoughtful man, and how would you call our present government: may its shadow never be less? Do you think our government is a constitutional one, or do you think it is a despotic one? . . . Take the trouble to think it out; compare the management of this country under our present rulers with the management of Shamshpur and with that of Kambakhtpur by the Rájá and his agents, and say which does it most resemble.'

'Well,' answers Rambaksh, 'there is our good Queen-Empress. She never comes here certainly, and we never see her, and I hear the people sent her a petition last year, but she never took any notice of it. But they say she is so busy there, over in England, and has so many countries elsewhere belonging to her that she has no time to attend to us Indians. And when I come to think of it, may God long preserve her, but I don't know that it does signify much to us who sits upon the throne over there in England. I must say that all this is rather like our Rájá's system. Certainly I never heard that she consulted any of us Indians on any point, and as to village expenses, well—I have heard what millions and millions of money are every year spent by the European gentlemen and without consulting any one! No! This is not at all like the Shamshpur system.'

'And then look,' says the Barrister, 'at the agents she sends. Are they not like your Rájá? Very respectable men, no doubt; they don't take bribes, they don't certainly try to injure us, but what do they know of us and our real wants?

Don't they pooh-pooh our old customs, and each who comes insists on introducing some newfangled device for improving the condition of the country, which not infrequently does it harm.'

'Ah,' says Rambaksh, 'I see now what you mean, and I suppose our government is what you call a despotic one, and that perhaps is why the whole country is discontented, and everything seems, from all I hear, to be going wrong.'

The Barrister then goes on to explain how all this is to be remedied by transforming the present despotic government into a constitutional one, and a graphic description follows of a former English magistrate and collector of the district, Mr. Zabardast or Bully. He rides into Rambaksh's village, and is told there is no grass for his horses. Rambaksh is said to be responsible for this, and he relates what followed:—'Oh, said the sahib, striking me with his whip, you are the son of a pig, the misbegotten. I'll teach you how to attend to orders. Here, tent-pitcher, tie him up and give him thirty blows with a cane, and lay it well in. . . . I tried to explain, but the sahib hit me over the mouth and face with his whip, shouting out, "Hold your tongue, I'll teach you, tie him up, flog his life out." And I was dragged away and flogged till I became insensible. It was a month before I could walk. Yes, he was a bad one; many collectors have I known, some good, some indifferent, but this was the only real devil.' This, we are told, was twenty years ago, and there are no men quite so bad in the service now, but there are still many who grossly abuse their powers, and the remedy is to be found in 'Representative Institutions.' 'That is a huge bundle of stalks that you have here tied up,' says the Barrister. 'It must be very heavy and strong. Do you think you could break it over your knee?' 'Break it over my knee,' replies Rambaksh; 'no, nor could the Rája's elephant, let him try ever so! But what do you mean?' 'See,' said the Barrister, 'I pull out one stem and I break it easily over my knee, and now another and now a third and a fourth. See! in about ten minutes I could break the whole. Let that teach you that weak and feeble as you and your fellows are, if once you all unite in good earnest in a good cause you will be so powerful that no Rája's elephant can break you.' 'But surely,' rejoins

Rambaksh, 'you don't want us to join together and fight with the Government. If we killed all the Europeans how should we get along? All would be anarchy. You cannot mean this.' 'God forbid,' says the Barrister, 'this would be a sin. Why should we kill the poor Europeans? Many of them are really good men, most of them mean at any rate, to do right. They are ignorant no doubt of the rights of most matters concerning us; they blunder, they cause us misery, but they do it from ignorance—from an ignorance unavoidable under the system which they work on, and which, even did they wish it, they could not change without our help. Besides, though we of the new generation are growing up able to assist them, and to do much for the country, the whole of us put together have not yet sufficient experience and self-reliance to manage the administration entirely without their help. Kill the Europeans! No, Rambaksh, let us say rather God bless all of them (and there are many such) who feel kindly towards us in their hearts, and according to their lights mean well towards us, and God forgive those amongst them (and let us hope they are not many) who dislike and despise us, and care nothing what becomes of us.'

The English at home, the Barrister goes on to explain, have none of the prejudices of those in India on these matters, and 'if once they saw us all, high and low, banded together and determined to obtain these "Representative Institutions," then they have too much common sense not to allow us to have them. Now, perhaps, you understand what I meant by the bundle of stalks, that union is strength. . . . You want some one to write a little book about these matters? Well, if such a book be written, we should want at least five thousand copies for this district only, for there must be at least one copy for every village and hamlet, and in the larger places there should be two, three, five, ten, twenty copies according to the size of the place. . . . If the truths I have been trying to impress upon your mind are to be imprinted within any reasonable period on the minds of the entire population, merely distributing the books will not do. We must have earnest and clever men to go round from village to village and expound them, and though some of us, whenever we have leisure, do this, such work is intermittent,

and we want men who will do nothing else but keep at it every day and all day; and though such men may do it for the love of their country, still they must live; and it is not among the rich and happy that we can usually look for such, but rather amongst those who are poor and have suffered, and can therefore feel for all the suffering so rife amongst us.'

The tract circulated in Southern India is called a 'Catechism of the Indian National Congress.' Although less offensively disloyal than that of which I have given some account, its tendency is the same. India, the people are told, is a vast country with a population of 250 millions; the English are natives of a small island and number only 35 millions. The English at home have an excellent government, but they are not aware of the grievances of India. The English officials in India never report the truth, and they know that their salaries or their powers would certainly be reduced if the English public were to learn it. Representative Councils, similar to the Parliament of Great Britain, must be elected by the people of India. No law must be passed or tax imposed except by these councils, and 'we should then have arrived at the commencement of the political regeneration of India. We should constantly press on the British people the paramount necessity of carrying into effect these reforms, through the telegraph, associations, newspapers, and delegates. It is only by persisting in the agitation that we can make our grievances heard in England. If the English nation begin to evince interest in the affairs of this country, the opposition of the Anglo-Indian officials, who wish to keep matters as they are, will soon cease to be effective.' The whole object of the tract is to convince the people to whom it is addressed that the British Government in India is oppressive and ignorant, that until it is reconstructed on a representative basis no improvement is possible, and that the necessary changes can certainly be gained if all classes throughout the country join in demanding them. 'The Congress will gradually, when India is fit for this, be converted into an Indian Parliament, which will take the place of the sham councils of the present day. . . . If the Congress goes on meeting regularly once a year, and working throughout the year, and the whole nation join in electing their delegates to it, and in making plain that they approve and ratify