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TOPICS

FOR

INDIAN STATESMEN.

BY

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
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 ERRATA.

- Page 152, line 1, for "in the Civil Service," read "*not* in the Civil Service."
 Page 281, line 20, for "attempted," read "successful."

PREFACE

IN editing this book it is my desire to take on myself the responsibility of any errors that may have occurred. I feel the very great disadvantage my brother labours under in being unable to see his work through the press ; many additional illustrative facts which he has sent to me have arrived too late for insertion, and in any case where doubt has arisen it has been impossible to refer to him. For many years MR. NORTON has been endeavouring to rouse, in the words of LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, "the shameful apathy and indifference of England to the concerns of India." Hoping against hope, he has continued to write with this object. His last book, the "Rebellion in India," has never yet been answered, and why ? Because it is unanswerable. It has suited those who are interested in keeping India in its present state of darkness to ignore that book. It appears to me that every purpose for which MR. NORTON wrote the "Rebellion in India" has been achieved ; it was in advance of public opinion, which is now in accordance with his views,

both with regard to the double Government and the annexation policy ; and with respect to the injustice of the seizure of Oude, Government has endorsed his opinion in the famous Despatch of LORD ELLENBOROUGH. When MR. NORTON wrote the present work, the now defunct East India Company was only moribund ; I have in every case allowed the name to stand. It may serve as a warning, lest *nomine mutato* the same state of things be allowed to continue.

I think it right that I should state that in what is said of the future Home Government of India, the Author had only in contemplation the first India Bill, LORD PALMERSTON'S ; he could never surmise that, as by the wave of an enchanter's wand, the Court of Directors, with but slight alteration, would re-appear as the Council for India.

In conclusion, I wish to state that the book is entirely free from political bias, MR. NORTON has no party feelings. Party is not his guide, but Justice.

KENSINGTON GORE,

1st September, 1858.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

DURING the whole course of the rebellion I have collected copious notes illustrative of its progress, with the intention of publishing a second edition of the work which I put forth at its commencement. At the time I wrote, but few of the multitudinous facts, which have subsequently established the positions I then ventured to lay down, had occurred; and more than one of my critics has taken fair exception to the apparently scanty materials on which I based my conclusion—that the present crisis is not one of *mere mutiny*. But mere self-justification would not, in my humble judgment, be a sufficient plea for appearing again before the public. I am willing to leave to the events themselves, and to public opinion, the vindication of the correctness of the views which I formed rather early than hastily; contenting myself with this declaration, that I have seen no reason to alter, retract, or modify a word of what I have written: nor have I met with a refutation of *any* of the facts or arguments on which I based my propositions. Among the chief of these was this, that we should err in regarding the present outbreak as a *purely military revolt*; although it was to be expected that the most strenuous efforts would be made by those interested, to maintain that such was its character; also that it behoved us at such a crisis to take a review of *all* the elements of disaffection which might be lurking among the natives of India. Since then I have seen myself held up* as the leader of a party which declares that the condition

* *Bombay Times.*"

of the people is such, that there *ought* to be a *national* revolution, even if there is not; and which persuades itself, in spite of facts, that there is such a revolution.* (A candid perusal of my pages will show that this is mere distorted exaggeration. With the whole of the Madras Presidency tranquil, and the whole of Bombay nearly so; with the facts before me that out of some two hundred millions, probably not more than one million has risen in arms against us, I was not likely to fall into such an error, or to make any such statement. On the other hand, it is, I think, equally preposterous to limit the outbreak, either as to its origin or its character, to a mere military mutiny. We are still much in the dark as to the secret history of the rebellion; and the nation will probably not be satisfied without a thoroughly searching investigation, carried on by the most able and independent Commission it can appoint:† but much light has doubtless been cast upon the subject by what we have ourselves witnessed, altogether independent of official information. Viewing the matter by such lights as we at present possess, the truth stands out indisputably clear, that annexation is at the bottom of the rebellion; and that large and important classes, other than the military, have participated in the insurrection.)

At the same time it is not my intention now to enter upon a consideration of the full proofs of these assertions. The "Times" has said, with a strange mixture of truth and fallacy, that there is no use in looking back, and that our cares must be concentrated on the future of India. When I wrote, it would have been manifestly impertinent to have entered upon a long disquisition of the wants of India and the remedies requisite for her condition. The very existence of our continued supremacy was

* Put in other words, the argument stands just as rationally thus. This is purely a military mutiny. If so, the villagers ought not to take any part in it; therefore, they do not.

† The Court of Directors has already ordered the Governor-General to appoint a Commission for this purpose. But it is evident that any Commission appointed by the Supreme Government must of necessity be a mere blind; any inquiry which they may make, a mere sham inquiry. They have a particular theory to support, namely, that we have been suffering from a military-mutiny, not a rebellion. They have their measures to justify, and their policy to prove correct. Any persons whom they may appoint must almost certainly be their own servants, certainly open to the gravest suspicion. The judgment is scarcely likely to be deemed satisfactory when the accused select their own judges, and these judges from their own subordinates.

then questionable; and all men's thoughts were absorbed by the paramount interest of passing events. The eyes of the whole nation were straining into the far east, bent upon the progress of their countrymen; there was no sympathy, no patience for any matter not intimately connected with their condition, their sufferings, their heroism, their triumphs. To have craved a hearing at such a season for proposals of future reform, would have been impertinent folly; and, therefore, while lending my best aid to defeat the object of Lord Canning's Gagging Act, and striving to call the attention of the public to the true bearings of the crisis, I contented myself with such a hurried and brief sketch of the measures requisite for the regeneration of India, that even a friendly critic* has misunderstood my views, which, however, may be summed up in the single word—Justice.

Now, however, times are altered. The suppression of rebellion and restoration of order are a mere question of time; the representatives of the nation are about to deliberate on the future of India; and I conceive that one who has enjoyed the opportunities which I have, and gathered carefully the experience of sixteen years of active life in India, may usefully state his convictions, and pour forth his knowledge for the benefit of those, who, without similar advantages, will have to consider what the future policy of England towards India, and what the future government of India, shall be.

The greater portion of this present book will therefore be devoted to such topics; although I cannot admit the soundness of that advice which bids us not look back at all. How we are indeed to look forward with any prospect of utility or success, unless we first of all thoroughly understand the past; how we can safely apply a remedy unless we are first certain what is the evil; why in this particular instance we should voluntarily reject the teachings of history, I cannot understand. We cannot have too accurate a comprehension of the limits and character of the whole rebellion: for if, as it has been persistently asserted, it is really a pure military mutiny, and nothing more, the measures to be adopted are abundantly clear, simple, and easy. If it were a national rebellion, in the sense of a general simultaneous rising of the entire population between the Himalayas and Cape

* "Athenæum," London.

Comorin, remedy might be hopeless; but fortunately it is not that, though it might have been. If it be a rebellion commenced indeed by the soldiery in fact, but the result of premeditation and secret conspiracy among men of the higher classes, who used the sepoys as mere tools—and if large bodies of the people have risen against us,—then we may argue such a condition among them, and such latent general disaffection,* as requires the most delicate handling on the part of our statesmen and politicians.)

That this last will be found to be the true character of the rebellion, I entertain not the slightest doubt; the proofs, indeed, all tend one way, however selfish interest, influence, and ignorance may struggle to conceal the fact, and divert attention to other directions. If we impose upon ourselves in this particular, or if we suffer ourselves to be imposed upon, the results may be most calamitous both for England and India; and I would, therefore, without attempting any detail, beg to point to some of the more prominent facts, which will be suggestive enough for those who choose to follow up the inquiry for themselves. And this leads me directly to my first topic, which cannot be altogether passed over, although it deals with the past, and my principal concern is with the future.†

See L. Reid, Esq., House of Lords' Report, Question 2700.

† I shall have to quote largely from Indian journals of acknowledged reputation in this country; and I crave an attentive perusal of these extracts, for I can assure my readers that the selections will amply repay their perusal. I know that it is a very common practice to skip such passages, and pass on to the original matter. The journals in question, too, may be but little known, or not known to the English public; but a little reflection will convince those who wish to master Indian topics, that they can scarcely go to a better source than the respectable journals of India, whose editors devote their entire time to the task of collecting trustworthy materials, digesting voluminous records, and placing valuable information before their subscribers in a readable shape. Depend upon it, that Indian journals are safer guides on Indian subjects than even the most brilliant of the home press. I might, at a very little outlay of time and labour, have presented all those valuable contributions in the shape of original matter. But whatever others may do, I cannot bring myself to fish or suck the brains of other men without acknowledgment; and as my object is to open up sources of information and reflection, I trust a too common prejudice will not operate to prevent the perusal of quoted as well as original matter.

CHAPTER II.

TOPIC 1ST.

I. *What is the character of the Rebellion?* II. *What is its cause?*

THESE two questions are intimately connected; for unless the rebellion was, in its origin, a mere military mutiny, which assumed a totally different character as the infection spread and its dimensions grew beyond the control of the mutineers, it is obvious that the character of the rebellion has been determined, and may be judged of by its cause. Those who assert that the outbreak is purely a military mutiny are bound to establish two points. They must shew that it is confined to the sepoys, for only they can be *mutineers*; and they must assign some satisfactory reason for the sepoys suddenly rushing into mutiny.

It may be said, and that plausibly, that the panic into which the sepoys were thrown by the fear of losing their caste and their religion, by being compelled to bite the obnoxious cartridges, affords such reason—that the sepoy is the creature of impulse, ignorant to a degree, and a mere unreasoning child on such matters. The mutiny at Vellore may be quoted; and it may be argued that the merest trifles, a change of an article of dress or the like, has heretofore proved sufficient to kindle the suspicions of native soldiery, and to hurry them into mutiny. I am very far from saying that this plea of the cartridge was a mere pretext, so far as the sepoys were concerned, in the first instance. I think it must be admitted that a real *bonâ-fide* alarm was excited in the mind of the sepoys, both Hindoo and Mussulman, by their belief that the new cartridges were compounded of the fat of pigs and bullocks. But this will not account for the conduct of those sepoys who mutinied at a period long subsequent to the outbreak of the rebellion, at isolated stations, after the

proclamation of the Government; after the repeated assurances of their officers; after the fact that the men were permitted to make up their own cartridges; after the withdrawal or non-issue of the articles objected to; and after mutiny had become hopeless from the success of British arms. The question still remains, by whom was this cry against the cartridges first raised; was it a mere accidental circumstance, or was it not a cry pitched on with the most consummate craft by conspirators, in whose hands the sepoys were mere tools and puppets?

Now the trial of the King of Delhi has disclosed the existence of a conspiracy long previous to the first outbreak of the rebellion. We find him not only in communication with numerous rajahs and chiefs, but actually sending emissaries to the Shah of Persia during the late Persian war, to obtain his aid towards the extirpation of the English. The Delhi proclamations, we know, were sent to Oude, and the puppet boy-king of Lucknow affected to act as the appointee of the great Mogul at Delhi. I will not press hard upon a fallen man, or assert that the King of Oude is implicated in the conspiracy, though we know that he was arrested suddenly in Calcutta, has been a close prisoner ever since, and it is asserted on good authority that the Government is in possession of convincing evidence of his complicity. But every man is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty; and I will not follow the example of a pamphleteer who has sketched out the whole plot of the conspiracy in the minutest detail, and shewn what share of territory each conspirator was to obtain, down even to the division of Calcutta itself. It is quite certain that the sepoy regiments quartered in Delhi had, previous to the commencement of the Delhi mutinies, a good mutual understanding with the troops at Meerut;* for when the troopers from that station galloped into the city of Delhi, the infantry at once opened out so as to expose their officers to the fire of the cavalry, who rode up and pistolled them one by one. The whole then proceeded to the palace, they paid their allegiance to the king, attacked the arsenal, murdered the Europeans, and seized the city. The whole work was far too systematically done

* It is surmised that the native officers from Delhi who went to Meerut to sit on the court martial of the cavalry troopers, there entered into the arrangements for the outbreak with the Meerut troops.

to permit of the supposition that it was the result of mere momentary impulse. An entire regiment does not so give up its officers to murder.

Previous to the outbreak, as well as subsequently, bands of fakeers or holy mendicants had been wandering over the country. They had been in some instances detected in tampering with the sepoy's of the armies of Madras and Bombay. Whether the passage of the chupatties was a signal connected with the rebellion or not, I will not take upon myself to affirm, for I have not seen any sufficient evidence on the point;* but, independently of that, the facts point to but one explanation of the cartridge-cry, namely, that it did not originate with the sepoy's, but was selected with consummate tact and skill by those, who, behind the curtain, were casting about for a motive which should deeply stir both the Mussulman and Hindoo ranks of the Bengal army.

The outbreak at Meerut, caused as it was by the severity, and rendered successful by the imbecility, of the military authorities, was nevertheless a providential circumstance for us. The shell burst too soon. The plot was not quite ripe in all its parts. Could it have been kept without explosion until the Mohurram, I doubt whether there would have been a European left alive in India to tell the tale of the revolution. That is the festival when fanaticism is most widely and most easily excited; the Hindoo Dusserah falls about the same time, and it is reported that this was the season fixed upon for the fulfilment of that prophecy respecting the termination of the British Raj, which was so well calculated to bring about its own verification.

The greased cartridge-cry was the spark which fired the train; but the train had been most carefully laid. And if this does not

* The witness, Tut Mull, produced on the trial of the King of Delhi, so late as February 4th of this year, could give no explanation of this mysterious signal. He deposes as follows:—"I had heard the story of the circulation of chupatties throughout the country. I do not know what the signification of the chupatties was. I have never heard of any precedence among either Hindoo or Mussulman for such a deed. There were various meanings assigned by popular voice to the circumstance; some said they implied tampering with the religion of the people; some that it predicted that Government intended to interfere with their food. I do not know why such meanings were attached to the fact, but I know that they all had for their object poisoning the minds of the people against the Government."

afford us a sufficient solution of the mystery which those who maintain the pure military mutiny theory have to fathom, most assuredly we may look in vain for other causes of discontent in the ranks of the Bengal army, such as would serve to account for mutiny on their parts at this particular time. The moment had not arrived, though it must have arrived sooner or later, when an army, constituted like that of Bengal, was prepared to precipitate itself headlong into that death-struggle for dominion with its sovereign, which marks the history of all prætorian bands. On the contrary, of all conditions and classes of men in India, the Bengal army had the least cause to complain; they had few burthens to bear; no grievances without a remedy. They felt not the grinding of either the revenue or the judicial systems. Their lives and property were safe from the robber and the police; they were petted and pampered to the top of their bent;* discipline sat easy upon them; their pay was regular and ample. They could save while serving, and their retiring pensions were secure. Their officers were proud of them, and kind to them; indeed the men knew that they were masters of the situation. Centralization had deprived the commanding officer of his immediate authority; his representations met with but little favor at head-quarters; laxity of discipline was winked at, because it was useless to report it; petty demands were conceded to for the same reason. The sepoys' comforts were signally cared for. Compared with those who remained tillers of the earth, from which class they themselves chiefly sprung, they were as porcelain to clay; their lot was indeed every way enviable, and a subject of self-congratulation.

{The fact is, they were acted upon from without, not from within; } and though the rebellion began with the mutiny of a

* "Qui Hi," indisputably a Bengal officer of great experience and observation, remarks, that a great deal of nonsense has been talked about the pampering of the Bengal army. That they have not been spared from arduous duty; that the field of their duties has been vastly increased by the progress of annexation is unquestionably true. But the encouragement offered in every direction to the prejudices of caste; and the truckling to the impression on the sepoys' minds, that on all questions connected with this, head-quarters would yield to them; the disposition of officers to hush up matters; and the diminution of regimental officers' authority by that system of centralisation, which made the commanding officer powerless, and encouraged the men to slight his authority, may, I think, be most justly characterized as *pampering*.

few regiments, it was not a case of spontaneous combustion on the part of the army; but the army had been tampered with, and was the first weapon turned against us by those who were prepared to take themselves an active part in the attack, if success seemed hopeful, and the first attempt was not forthwith crushed.

If the true origin of the rebellion is not to be found in the pure military mutiny theory, still less sustainable is the assertion that the insurrection in its career has embraced none but military classes, and that the people have taken no part whatever in its horrors and its crimes. To refute this sweeping statement, it would suffice to point to Oude. That is now the focus of rebellion, to which, as to a common centre, all the flames of insurrection are drawn. It has been asserted that the people of Oude are longing for our return. The testimony of an eye-witness—my friend, the late Lieutenant Crump, of the Madras Artillery, the writer of the admirable letters which appeared in the “Saturday Review”—tells a totally different tale. He speaks of the whole population being up in arms; every village fortified and loop-holed; every man’s hand against us.* The significant fact that,

* The following is from Lieut. Crump’s description of the fight at Unao:—“On the 29th the advance towards Lucknow began in earnest. The force moved off at daylight, with the knowledge that they might expect to meet with opposition at a village called Unao, three or four miles on ahead, said to be occupied by some men and guns; hence, no one was surprised when, on nearing the place, three guns opened on us. Two of our field-pieces moved forward, and soon silenced their fire; but, as the troops moved on, a line of white puffs of smoke from the orchard and garden walls surrounding the place gave evidence that the matchlock men meant to shew fight. On this the skirmishers dashed forward, and soon drove them out of their orchards into the village; but when our men attempted to follow up their success, and clear the village, they were met by an opposition which fairly astonished the English soldiers.

“These mud-walled villages of Oude, and their fighting inhabitants, are among the most peculiar features of the country. Every hamlet is at chronic feud with its neighbours, and all of them look upon open rebellion against the farmer of their taxes as a sacred duty. The consequence is, that a century of practical experience in the art of self-defence has converted these villages into almost impregnable fortifications, and the villagers themselves into probably the best garrison troops in the world. A hundred Oude men will flee from ten on the open plain, but place ten of the same behind a loop-holed mud wall, and they will hold their own against a hundred, nor think it much to do. Such was the case now in the petty village of Unao. Our troops were in the place, and all round it, yet they could do comparatively nothing, and were dropping fast under the bullets of their unseen foes.

out of the 40,000 men who sat down to besiege Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, 20,000 went away to sow their fields, shews that not soldiery alone were leagued against us, even at that early period. The two retreats of Havelock; his close beleaguering after he had relieved the glorious garrison who had contended for eighty-seven days against artillery within fifty yards, and riflemen within ten; the murderous contest of Sir Colin Campbell when he relieved Havelock, and when 2,000 of the enemy were slain, in hand-to-hand conflict, in a single courtyard; the isolation of Sir James Outram in the Alumbagh; the forced retreat of Sir Colin Campbell before superior numbers; the preparations which he made for his final spring upon Lucknow, when four armies were launched simultaneously against Oude; the state of fortification of the capital, where every street was barricaded, and fresh earthworks of Cyclopean proportions attested the intention of the insurgents to die fighting at their posts;—all these facts unmistakeably prove that so far as Oude, at least, is concerned, we have to deal with a thoroughly national rebellion.

But it may be said that the case of Oude is special; that the people of Oude have a grievance, and a peculiar cause of ~~their~~ own to fight for; and that their condition proves nothing with regard to the feelings of the population of other parts of India. Passing by the damning admission that the Oudites *have* a cause of quarrel, which they are prepared to fight for to the death, I will make those who differ from me a present of Oude; let it be an exceptional case, and let us confine our attention to those other portions of India over which the rebellion has swept. Is it true that there also the outbreak has been a pure military mutiny; that the *people* have taken no share in the insurrection?

Here again I will make a present of all the budnashes of the cities, all the released felons and convicts from the gaols, all the scum which ever rises to the top of the cauldron when the broth is made sufficiently thick and slab. Such deductions being made, how stands the matter?

Thrice did a portion of the best regiment in the field charge a mud-walled enclosure containing a number of men, and thrice were they driven back with heavy loss of officers and men.

In dealing with this, it is impossible for me to give all, or even a tithe of the small but significant facts which the progress of the rebellion and the detailed account of personal narratives furnish. I have kept a copious register of such extracts, it is true, which any body may see; but I am compelled to point rather to large classes of facts than to individual events; and I must be content with suggestively enumerating the chief topics of evidence, which the reader can verify for himself.

In the first place, let me call attention to the extent of territory over which the struggle has rolled. Let the map be consulted for ascertaining how vast is the area, how many places and tracts of country are involved, *where no sepoy regiments have been present*. Next, let the reader reflect upon the significance of the numerous accounts in which he is told of burning *villages*, against the wholesale destruction of which and their inhabitants Lord Canning was forced to issue to the *civil authorities* that proclamation which has called down upon him so much unjustifiable censure for misplaced clemency. Let the reader recollect the innumerable accounts of contention with *matchlock men*, and *spear* or *bow-men*. (In all such cases he may rest assured that our opponents were not *mutineers*, who are armed with our percussion muskets, and have no villages to burn.) Then let him recal to mind the various published histories of European fugitives, in which the conduct of the country-people towards them is set forth. Here and there a friendly village is approached; a nabob or ranee protects and conceals the hunted European; but the general run of the story is the reverse of all this. The fugitives are plundered and ill-treated; they have to hide in jungles, and keep away from the high-roads; they dare not approach the villages, even for water; they are threatened and thrust forth; they can procure neither food nor carriage; they exhaust their resources in bribes, or are openly plundered. True, this strange intermingling of friendly and unfriendly populations, in close proximity, argues a very low state of civilization. It recalls to mind the accounts which we read of travels in the interior of Africa, but it forcibly reveals the real state of feeling of the people towards us; on which farther light is thrown by the singular account of the state of public feeling in *Rhotuck*, as we read it in the official despatches from Delhi. There the ubiquitous

Hodson found two parties or factions,—the English and the Anti-English; and I should not be surprised if a similar state of division were hereafter to be found largely prevalent in other towns and districts. Captain Gowan's singular narrative of his concealment in Rohilcund points to the same difference of sympathy. Captain Scott's interesting history of the fugitives' escape from Nawgong* shews that the whole district through which he passed was against us. "We all found," says he, "the villagers in the British territory mostly hostile." Next, let the reader remember the multitude of names of petty rajahs, with their followers, whom our forces have everywhere encountered. These are not *mutineers*; and, in all these cases, the rabble represent, indeed consist of, the *entire population* of the petty noble's dominions. After this, it will be well to reflect on the specific instances in which our own public native servants, revenue and judicial, have taken an active part against us. In some instances, not only have they fallen away from their allegiance, but have headed and urged on massacres and other atrocities. (Such, for instance, are the cases of the murder of Mr. Tucker, the judge, by his own judicial subordinate; the trial and execution of the civilians at Bareilly; and the massacre of our helpless women by Hydest Ally, when his master, less cruel than himself, would fain have shewn them mercy.)

When we come to select specific instances, the only difficulty consists in making a fitting choice from the abundance of our materials; and I must draw upon each man's recollection of what he has read, to a great extent; since it would fill an entire volume were I to descend into minute particulars. I must content myself with selecting some of those more general accounts which have appeared in the public prints, which forcibly portray, not so much individual adventure, as the state of feeling and the true condition of things over entire districts swept by the rebellion, or within the influence of its contagion.

If this be simply a military mutiny, how comes it that nowhere the civil officers of Government have been able to organize the people for resistance, even after the tide of fortune had turned in our favor, and when the natives were encouraged by the pre-

* "Further Papers (No. 4.) relative to the Mutinies, &c.," p. 121.

sence of our troops?*" If there be such instances, we should certainly have heard of them; for the Supreme Government is not slow to exalt the services of its civil servants, or to make the most of even professions of loyalty emanating from any body of the natives. Do not let it be supposed that I seek to cast any slur upon the civilians. They have, during this crisis, displayed a personal courage and devotion equal to that of our noble soldiers. We find them charging the enemy as volunteers; showing the way through streets full of rebels; giving the military the benefit of their knowledge of the country; their services acknowledged gratefully by general officers in public despatches. The wonderful defence of the house of Arrah by Wake and his companions has only been outmarvelled by the defence of the entrenchment at Lucknow.† But in all these cases we must, for our purpose, be careful to distinguish between individual prowess and the successful exertion of the public magistrate; between the gallant acts of self-defence and the force of the majesty of Civil Government organizing the people against rebels and mutineers.

Who, then, have joined the mutineers, admitting that our own army was the first to rise, as, indeed, was to be expected?

The petty rajahs and zemindars, who have been dispossessed by us by escheats, resumptions—confiscation under whatever name it takes. The "Friend of India," on the 2nd of July, 1857, wrote as follows:—"No idea can be formed as yet of the utter state of disorganization which prevails in the upper provinces. Trade is wholly destroyed; the public highways were here overrun by thieves; the *dispossessed zemindars* in nearly all the villages have emerged into daylight and ousted their successors; *scores of petty rajahs* have proclaimed their independence, and make up for defects of title by their ceaseless activity in the work of robbery and murder."

On the 13th of February last, Mr. Harrington introduced a

* Mr. Gubbins for a length of time preserved tranquillity at Benares by his personal influence and force of character; and Mr. Allan Hume, at a late period of the struggle, actually organized a force with which he successfully encountered the rebels. These are the only instances I know of, in which the civil power has been able to cope with the rebellion.

† See General Inglis's despatch.

Bill into the Legislative Council to facilitate the recovery of land wrongfully taken in the North-West Provinces. In his speech, explanatory of his Bill, the hon. gentleman mentioned that these resumptions had been made by the old proprietors, sometimes violently, under the foolish impression that our rule was drawing to a close; and, in order to indicate the extent to which these resumptions had taken place, he stated that in one zillah, through which he had lately passed, nearly one-half of the estates had changed hands. It is a significant fact, that these old proprietors appear to have been generally received without opposition by the cultivators; rebels themselves, they were not opposed by the people; what is the only inference that can be drawn? —

All the journals contain the following advertisement recorded by the Government, and a further notice warns the public against purchasing certain specified Government promissory notes of the aggregate value of £260,000, the property of "Narrain Rao and Madho Rao, adopted sons of the late Benaik Rao, of Lirwee in the Kirnee district, who are in open rebellion against the State."

NOTICE.

The public are hereby cautioned against purchasing any Government promissory notes, standing in the names of or belonging to the undermentioned individuals, who are or have been in open rebellion against the State:—

Nana Dhundoo Punt, of Bithoor.
 Hickmutoola, Deputy-collector of Futtehpore.
 Bukht Bulee, Rajah of Shahgurh.
 Luchmee Bae, Ranee of Jhansi.
 Khan Bahadoor Khan, of Rohilcund.
 Kooer Sing, of Jugdeespoor.
 Abdooor Ruhman Khan, Chief of Jhujjur.
 Toola Ram, an Aheer Chief.
 Futtee Bahadoor, *alias* Rajah Nusrut Jung.
 Banee Madhoo.
 Rajah Maun Sing.
 Hunwunt Sing.
 Bishonant Buxah.

Sillinant Bunus, of Baishpare.
 Bijee Bahadoor and his Kariddaz.
 Fyzabad Moulvee.
 Goolab Sing.
 Alooddeen.
 Dowlat Sing Thakoor, of Rogoogurh.
 Saudut Khan, Leader of Hoolkar's mutinous troops.
 Adit Mahomed Khan, of Ambapanee.
 Ranee Jeejee Bae.
 Begum Zeenut Muhal.
 Sadut Khan, Nawab of Bhopaul.
 Nawab of Bulmugurh.
 Rajah of Mynpoorie.
 Sobharam Kanth, inhabitant of Barrilly.
 Tuffuzul Hossein Khan, Nawab of Furruckabad.
 Warls Mahomed Khan, of Bhopaul.
 Rajah Murdun Sing, Rajah of Bampoor Chundeyree.
 Wabedad Khan, of Rohilcund.
 Nawab Ali Bahadoor, Nawab of Banda.
 Ummer Sing, Kooer Sing's brother.
 Summund Khan, father-in-law of Abdoor Ruhman Khan.
 Rajah Jyloll Sing, of Oudh.
 Rughooberdoyal Sing.
 Burjee's Kude, illegitimate son of the King of Oudh.
 Ramadhun, Rajah Maun Sing's brother.
 Bance Madho Buxsh.
 Singram Sing's son, of Allahabad.
 Honeyman Bunus, of Daneepare.
 Ramdyal.
 Rajah Madhoo Sing, of Amithee.
 Mendee Haussein.
 Thakoor of Ahwa in Marwar.
 Shoajaut Khan Pindaree.
 Fazil Mahomed Khan, of Bhisla, brother of Adit Mahomed
 Khan, of Ambapanee.
 Kooer Bhowanee Sing, eldest son of the Chief of Nursingpore.
 Bheo Rao Bhanslah.
 Nawab Wulayet Ali Khan.

Heera Sing.

Mahmed Hossein, Nazim of Goruckpore.

EDMUND DRUMMOND,

Accountant-General to the Government of India

Fort William, Loan-office,

the 2nd February, 1858.

And the *subsequent* Gazettes give further lists of chiefs, some of them ladies, whose property in the funds is forfeited by their participation in the rebellion. All these parties owe their prominence to the fact that they are the owners of Government bonds; a circumstance which, but for some paramount motive, might have guaranteed their fidelity. How many rajahs, ranees, zemindars, and the like, also, *who have not any Government bonds*, are implicated in the revolt, the Gazette does not disclose; but it may be inferred, from a consideration of the fact, that even those who had so much at stake were constrained by an influence, superior to that of their own pecuniary interest, to take up arms against us.

The late Mr. Colvin prepared a proclamation, declaring the whole of the North-West Provinces in a state of open rebellion. This document was speedily withdrawn. Subsequently, on the 17th of May, martial law was proclaimed in the North-West.

The Parliamentary Paper, No. 144, (11th Dec. 1857,) containing Lord Canning's defence of his Indian policy, gives a graphic description of the condition of the country, the wholesale massacre of villagers and the burning of villages, which compelled Lord Canning to issue his much-canvassed "clemency order" of the 31st of July, 1857.

Let us now peruse the testimony of various witnesses of different classes and characters. First, let Dr. Duff be called into court. He is every way an unexceptionable witness. He has extensive means of information; his intelligence is unquestionable; he is not connected with the press; he has no prejudices against the Government; he has no motive for over-colouring or distorting facts. In a letter addressed to Dr. Tweedie, which was published in the "Witness." Dr. Duff says:—

(" An intestine war is raging with fearful virulence among the

natives themselves, in the North-West and Central India Provinces. The strong arm of authority and restraint being removed, all the elements of wildest disorder are let loose. A terrible work of plunder and devastations seems everywhere to be carried on. While the great bulk of the mutinous sepoys are congregated in armies—here standing a siege, there carrying on another, and elsewhere fighting pitched battles with our British generals and soldiers—numbers of them, with twenty or thirty thousand criminals liberated from jail, and myriads more of habitual and reputed thieves and villains are scouring the country in all directions. While many of the populace in cities, and of the common ryots or agricultural population, are passive and apathetic—scarcely knowing, and not at all caring, who their supreme rulers may be, so long as their immemorial habits, manners, customs, and usages are not violently interfered with—it cannot be doubted that numbers of both classes are disaffected or actively hostile to the British and their Government. A gentleman of long experience in Tirhoot writes:—‘There is a strong sympathy with the mutineers throughout the country, every success or fresh rising of the mutineers was marked here with a look of satisfaction. Not one among the numerous zemindars with whom I have conversations either expresses sympathy for the Government or will give a single hint as to the reason of the risings, although I am perfectly convinced that all the better informed ones were perfectly aware of what was to happen!’ An intelligent gentleman at Agra, writing of the state of things when the British were obliged to abandon the city, and retire into the fort, says—‘The populace was all in arms, and there was nothing but plundering, bloodshed, and burning and destroying bungalows and public offices. In plundering, most of the Hindoostanees (*i. e.* up-country Hindoos) joined the Mohammedans. The Mohammedans to a man are against the British Government and three-fourths of the Hindoostanees.’ In narratives that are constantly reaching us from individuals that have escaped, we read that, amid occasional and solitary acts of kindness, they were most frequently mocked, abused, insulted, and illtreated by the villagers, even when already stripped of everything, so as to offer no temptation to acts of personal violence. Even poor harmless females—scorched

and blistered by exposure to a burning sun, half dead from hunger and fatigue, aye, and half distracted from being suddenly made childless and husbandless—have often met with little mercy at the hands of villagers. In many places, too, from lust of plunder, villagers are up in arms against villagers; while the native police, instead of attempting to maintain or establish order, are everywhere swelling the host of ruffians that are bent on pillage. While many rajahs and zemindars have hitherto remained ostensibly faithful to the British Crown, (others have been set up as chiefs by the mutineers, or have raised the standard of their own independence, or have proclaimed allegiance to the recently installed sovereign of Delhi.) In Oude many of the chiefs are in open rebellion. The Ranee of Jhansi, after aiding in the massacre of all the British there, has raised a body of 14,000 men, with twenty guns. The Jaloun chief has raised a body of about 12,000. Rover Singh of Shahabad, between the Soane and Benares, has a vast body of rebel followers—variously estimated from 20,000 to 40,000—now hanging threateningly over Mirzapore, one of the grandest emporiums of trade in the North-West, and where the British are now shut up within an intrenchment. The chief of Secundra Rao, with a body of cavalry and infantry, has taken possession of Coel and Allyghur, between Agra and Delhi, and proclaimed himself *Subadar*, or governor, for the King of Delhi, of all the country between these towns and Allahabad, that is the whole country between the Jumma and Ganges—collecting the revenue due to our Government, and exercising other prerogatives of royalty!

“From these and other facts of a similar kind—some of them formerly mentioned—how utterly erroneous and misleading must appear some of the representations in home journals, from the ‘Times’ downwards! What becomes of the oft reiterated assertion—‘It is a military revolt and nothing more?’ or of the assertion—‘The Bengal army has ceased to exist,’ when, though it has ceased to exist as our army, it continues in reality to exist as our deadliest enemy? or of such declarations as these—‘The entire non-military population, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, have stood aloof from the movement,’—‘Not a man has stirred,—the chiefs of Upper India vie with each other in tendering to Government their assurances of support and

attachment?' Unqualified statements of this description—so violently wide of the truth—cannot fail to prove mischievous by lulling the rulers and people of Great Britain into a false security, and a security as fatal as it is false.

“And if such be the disorganised, unsettled, lawless condition of the North-West now—when the country is, for the most part, impassable, from the plains being turned into marshes, and the loamy soil into yielding softness like that of the quicksand—when the driest summer brooks are swollen into torrents, and the larger streams into mighty rushing outspreading floods—what, unless God in mercy interpose for our deliverance, may we not expect to be the possible state of things two or three months hence, when the country will be completely dried up, and its now saturated soil turned into an iron pavement—when the torrents will entirely disappear, and the mightiest rivers be all but lost in their own sands—when the present outstanding crops shall be cut, gathered in, and safely garnered, and the seeds of the next spring harvest fairly committed to the bosom of the earth—when the whole military, and demi-military population of the North-West will thus be set free to buckle on their armour, and go forth, like their renowned ancestors in days of old, on expeditions of plunder, conflagration, murder, and *kingdom-taking*.

“I do not write thus as an alarmist. Far from it. For my own trust in the Lord has never wavered; nor my confidence that, after humbling us with deserved judgments, He will arise and scatter His and our enemies. But I do write to warn the ignorant, at home and elsewhere, against possible dangers, difficulties, and delays in the re-establishment of peace, order, and tranquillity, which, not anticipated, or seasonably provided for, might excite, in the event of disappointment, unreasonable apprehension and alarm.”

This witness is too valuable to be lost sight of, and accordingly this is his further testimony.

The following extract from a letter from the Rev. Dr. Duff, of the Free Church of Scotland, Calcutta, has appeared in a London journal:—

“That in different places intelligent zemindars and rajahs, who came to know our power and resources, have continued as

yet faithful in their allegiance, is a matter for congratulation. But that in many places zemindars and rajahs have scornfully thrown off all allegiance, and are up in arms—proclaiming their own independence, and committing depredations on their neighbours in all directions,—is now beyond all question. In this way we have now a King of Rohilcund, a King of Shahabad, with many others. In other cases, such as the town and district of Gorruckpore, recently abandoned by the British authorities, a Mahommedan chief has been set up as Nazim or Governor, in the name of the recently installed Emperor of Delhi. As regards the feelings of the great masses of the people towards the British Government, the most contradictory statements have been put forth. Extremes will be found wrong. That there ever was anything like affection or loyal attachment, in any true sense of these terms, on the part of any considerable portion of the native population towards the British power, is what no one who really knows them could honestly aver. Individual natives have become attached to individual Britons. But such isolated facts can prove nothing as to the feelings generally prevalent with respect to the British and their power. . . . After escaping from the murderous hands of mutineers, British ladies and gentlemen have, in particular instances, experienced kindness at the hands of the common villagers; but in far the greater number of instances they have experienced quite the reverse. On this account they have been constantly compelled to shun the villages altogether, and betake themselves to jungles and pathless forests, exposed to the attacks of beasts of prey, and to manifold privations, the narration of which makes one almost shudder. And among the murders ever and anon reported in our public journals, how often do we find this entry opposite a name, ‘killed by the villagers!’ One of a volunteer expedition, which lately went out into the district of Meerut, writes that it was ‘evident as they went along that the whole country was up,’—adding, ‘that on reaching Rerote, which city was considered friendly to us, they were at once received with a friendly salute of thirty matchlocks in their faces!’ Authentic notifications of a somewhat similar kind have also reached us from other places. A medical gentleman, who has recently published an elaborate account of the escape of himself, with other gentlemen, ladies, and children—amounting

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in all to twenty-seven in number—from Angur, in Central India, testifies that every villager was uncivil, and that the smile of respectful submission with which the European officer was wont to be greeted, was displayed by an angry scowl and haughty air towards the despicable Feringhee, whose *rajo* (or reign) was at an end.' Throughout their twelve days' wanderings, they continued to encounter the most terrible hardships and dangers from the hatred, incivility, and contempt of the villagers. This very day, in one of our public journals, a gentleman, long resident in the interior, thus writes:—' I have lost all my property ; but my principal object is to impress upon my countrymen (to convince the Government of this truth seems hopeless) the utter and most virulent hatred the natives have evinced throughout this outbreak, both to our Government and Europeans generally. In every instance where troops have mutinied, they have been joined by the inhabitants, not only of the bazar, but of the towns and villages adjacent, who not only assisted the sepoys in burning, looting (plundering), and destroying Government property, and that of the European settlers, and all Christians, and in killing any of them they could, but, after the departure of the mutineers, continued the devastation, and completed it. I am a very long resident in this country, and, having been in a position to hear the true sentiments of the natives (who neither feared me nor required anything from me) towards our Government and ourselves ; I have been long aware of their hatred towards both, and that opportunity alone was wanted to display it as they have now done ; and where it has not been shown, rest assured it is only from fear or interest, and when they did *not recognize opportunity*.' Now, in the face of these, and scores of other substantially similar statements from all parts of the North-West and Central India, what becomes of the lullaby declarations of those who would fain persuade the British public that nowhere among the general civic or rural population of India does there exist any feeling of ill-will, or discontent, or disaffection, towards the British or their Government ? All such unqualified declarations I do most solemnly regard as a gigantic (I do not say wilful) imposition on the British people—an imposition which, if not timously exposed or abandoned, is sure to prove as fatal to the re-establishment and perpetuity of British supremacy as it is in

itself gigantic. If the seeds of a deadly disease are lurking, though it may be but partially developed, in the very vitals of the constitution, and if the existence of these, in spite of obvious symptoms and warnings, be deliberately ignored, what can we expect, except that, one day or other, they will break forth into a raging virulence, which all the art of the most skilful physician can neither mitigate nor arrest?"

And again, Dr. Duff, in another letter published in the "Witness," says:—

"It is the fact, that it is not a mere 'military revolt,' but a rebellion—a revolution—which alone can account for the little progress hitherto made in extinguishing it, and, at the same time, precludes any reasonable hope of its early complete suppression. That it is a rebellion, and a rebellion, too, of no recent or mushroom growth, every fresh revelation tends more and more to confirm. And a rebellion long and deliberately concocted—a rebellion which has been able to array the Hindoo and Mahommedan in an unnatural confederacy—a rebellion which is now manifestly nurtured and sustained by the whole population of Oude, and, directly or indirectly, sympathised with and assisted by well nigh half that of the neighbouring provinces—is not to be put down by a few victories over mutinous sepoys, however decisive or brilliant.

"To earn for the present revolt the designation of 'rebellion,' it is surely not necessary that the entire mass of the people should have risen in active hostility against us. We talk of the rebellion of 'forty-five' in our own land, though only a section of the general population actually took up arms—known, however, to be sympathised with by numbers of partisans throughout the land. And is not the sway of the rebels at this moment vastly firmer and more extensive in Northern and Central India, than ever was that of Prince Charles and his followers throughout the British Isles?"

"That there is, even in Northern and Central India, an ordinarily quiet, simple, and industrious race, who, if let alone, would live on, under any paramount power, in profoundest apathy and unconcern, is what I have heretofore again and again asserted. But, from the first, it was strangely forgotten by many of our officials and leaders of public opinion, at home

and abroad, that, throughout our Northern and Central provinces, there are whole tribes of banditti, professional robbers and murderers—hosts of ‘budmashes,’ ever ready for any work of violence and rapine—endless discontented chiefs, with crowds of retainers, the descendants of marauders who, in their day, founded petty thrones and principalities—and that all of these, together with the multitudinous armed populace, long kept in check or under repression by the strong hand of a righteous Government, the mutiny at once released and turned adrift, as surging elements of mischief, to scour and scourge a desolated land.

“Even by those who were not altogether incognisant of the peculiar constitution of native society, it has been strangely forgotten how vast a proportion of the general population in Northern and Central India consist of those very elements of mischief which have now been let loose, free to follow their predatory instincts, and issue forth to mingle in the sanguinary fray. Aye, and it has been strangely overlooked how, in such a general *mêlée* of anarchy, the active or passive sympathies of numbers of the ordinary peaceable and industrious population must of necessity be excited in favour of the rebels, and against us—leading them readily to supply the former with provisions and information, while provisions are reluctantly doled out to us, and useful information never—thus greatly augmenting our difficulty in defeating their desperate enterprises, and rendering the task of quelling rebellion a far more formidable one than the persevering assertors of a mere military revolt can be prepared to anticipate.

“That there is a ‘military revolt’ is, alas! far too conspicuously written in characters of fire and blood through all the military stations of Northern and Central India. But, what all the friends and advocates of right measures for the restoration of settled peace and order must persist in reiterating is, that it is more than a mere ‘military mutiny’—that, from the very outset, it has been gradually assuming more and more the character of a ‘rebellion’—a rebellion, on the part of vast multitudes beyond the sepoy army, against British supremacy and sovereignty—and that our real contest never was wholly, and now less than ever, with mutinous sepoys. Had we only sepoys for our foes, the

country might soon be pacified.) But, having far worse enemies than the sepoys to overcome—even anarchy or utter lawlessness, the extinction of rule and authority, the dissolution of organised society, and the hereditary taste for war and rapine, on the part of millions, which has been evoked and exasperated by a very plethora of indulgence—we may expect the patience, the disinterestedness, and the energy of Christian principle to be taxed to the uttermost before the tremendous conflict shall issue in a solid and satisfactory peace.

“The representation now given I do believe to be, in its leading features, the only true one. And if men were seriously to reflect, it is the only one that can adequately account for the phenomena of the unparalleled struggle which has been carried on for months past. Never has the enemy been met without being routed, scattered, and his guns taken; but though constantly beaten, he ever more rallies, and appears again ready for a fresh encounter. No sooner is one city taken, or another relieved, than some other one is threatened. No sooner is one district pronounced safe, through the influx of British troops, than another is disturbed and convulsed. No sooner is a highway re-opened between places of importance, than it is again closed, and all communication, for a season, cut off. No sooner are the mutineers and rebels scoured out of one locality than they re-appear, with double or treble force, in another. No sooner does a moveable column force its way through hostile ranks, than these re-occupy the territory behind it. All gaps in the numbers of the foe seem to be instantaneously filled up; and no permanent clearance or impression appears anywhere to be made. (The passage of our brave little armies through these swarming myriads, instead of leaving the deep traces of a mighty ploughshare through a roughened field, seems more to resemble that of the eagle through the elastic air, or a stately vessel through the unfurrowed ocean.)

“Surely facts like these ought at length to open the eyes of incredulous politicians and dreamy speculators, to the dire reality of the condition of things with which we have to deal, and the prodigious magnitude of the task of subjugation and reconstruction that lies before us. I say not this under the influence of any depression but rather of buoyant hopefulness. Believing as I

have always done, that the God of Providence has given India to Britain for the accomplishment of the noblest, divinest ends—believing that the present calamities are righteous judgments on account of our culpable negligence in fulfilling the glorious trust committed to us—believing at the same time that our nation, with all its shortcomings, had enough of Christian principle to cause it, under the breath of Jehovah's Spirit, to awake, arise, kiss the rod, repent, and return to God in the path of appointed duty—I never for a moment doubted our ultimate success in re-establishing the British power, on a grander and firmer pedestal than ever, throughout these vast dominions. Even during those awful nights of panic-terror, when looking at the radiance of the setting sun, one did not know but its morning beams might be reflected from his dishonored blood, the uppermost assurance in my own mind was, that were Calcutta, the most conspicuous monument of the ascendancy of Great Britain in the East, burnt to the ground, and her sons and daughters buried amid its glaring ashes, such a catastrophe would only cause a mightier vibration to thrill through the heart of the British people, and rouse them to exertions for the reconquest and evangelization of India, such as the world never witnessed before."

The next witnesses are of a different country; they are natives themselves, and they describe the scenes which they actually saw in the country they passed through. The narrative is that of certain Hindoo ladies who proceeded up the Ganges on a pilgrimage, and whose graphic account bears, on every line of it, the stamp of truth.

BANKS OF THE JUMNA.—"A few months ago, sometime before the breaking out of the mutiny at Meerut and Delhi, a number of persons, chiefly Bengalee women of respectables families of this town, started on a pilgrimage to the shrines of Muttra and Brindabun in three boats. They arrived at Allahabad without meeting with any impediment or obstacle some days before the first of Joistee last, on which date they left that place and entered the Jumna. The mutiny of the 3rd cavalry at Meerut, and of the regiments at Delhi, had then taken place, but they heard at Allahabad nothing of the affair, beyond that some disturbances had occurred at those places. Proceeding up the Jumna for several days, they arrived at Humeerpore, the head-quarters of

the district, the authorities of which informed them of the dangers of the trip up the river; but on their persisting to proceed, allowed them four guards to accompany them to the end of their jurisdiction, strictly enjoining them on no account to cross the river, but always to keep along the Humeerpore bank of it. They got up with safety as far as Michreepore, where the guards left them, repeating to them the injunctions they had already received. From this latter place, they proceeded up to a place called Simarah, a few miles above Calpee, without much serious opposition, as the country was then comparatively peaceable. This last-mentioned village stands on the banks of the river, to which they had been prohibited to go; but the boatmen, fancying that the navigation along it was comparatively easier, imprudently crossed over, and moved the boats,—the number of which had increased to eight since they left Allahabad,—on an adjoining *chur*, for the purpose of cooking their food. They had not, however, been long here, before they could see a party of four or five hundred ruffians, mostly villagers, armed with swords, *latees*, and muskets too, descending down the shore with an intention, which they had no difficulty to conjecture. Fortunately, however, as the alarm had been given in time, they hastily got upon the boats any how they could, before the rascals could arrive on the spot and seize the boats. The river at this place being very narrow, the shouting and yelling of these desperadoes, furious at losing their prey, brought out masses of villagers on the other bank, to which the boatmen and the trembling, weak, and helpless pilgrims, were invited to come over, with offers of assistance and protection. But no sooner had they gone there, than they found that these men were not a whit better than the fellows on the other bank; for their head man told them in plain words that if they wished to be saved from being plundered and dishonored, they must immediately pay down to him and his followers a handsome sum of money as the price of his protection. Under these difficult and dangerous circumstances they handed him six hundred rupees, upon which he agreed to follow them with his men along the shore down to Calpee, where they were assured they would find protection from the zemindar, who had declared himself the rajah of the district. They were told, besides, that the voyage further up was very

dangerous, and that no less than twenty-nine boats, all filled with pilgrims like themselves, had been some days before plundered at Etawah. Accordingly the boats began to ply down, the head man and his men accompanying them along the bank; but what was their surprise when they saw fresh bodies of men appearing on both banks, shouting to them in the most abusive and threatening language to *lagow* the boats; the head man, however, be it said to his honor, still remained their friend, and but for him they had certainly been lost; for he told the boatmen to disregard their threats and use their utmost exertions to carry down the boats, till they reached Calpee, while he with his men employed some means to slacken the pursuit of those who were most furious for the prey. This, however, had the most fortunate effect of raising an altercation between the two parties, which enabled the fugitives to reach Calpee without further molestation. (One fact ought to be stated here very distinctly, that among the ruffians who had pursued them, setting all law at defiance, there was perhaps not one mutinous soldier, but that they were all villagers and people living along the banks of the river. This proves very clearly, notwithstanding anything that may be said to the contrary, that whole villages, at least in that part of the North-West, have turned rebellious, and done their best to disorganize the country. These men, it can scarcely be denied, have done their best to overturn the authority of Government, and have in most cases cheerfully obeyed the authority of any rebel zemindar, who had power or influence enough to proclaim himself rajah.)

“Arriving at last at Calpee, vainly hoping to see the end of their troubles, the fugitives were immediately surrounded by bodies of bravoos, calling themselves the rajah’s men, who came ostensibly with the purpose of protecting them, but really to see what they could get. Here they were detained for nearly two months, during which time, though they were not much molested, they had the mortification of being spectators of many an atrocious act, the principal of which was the cold-blooded assassination of an European gentleman and his lady. When the fugitives arrived at Calpee, they were still living, but only a few days after their arrival, when it is said a body of mutinous soldiers arrived at the place, those two helpless persons were murdered

under circumstances too revolting to allow for description being given. Suffice it to say, that under the heat of a burning sun, both the gentleman and his wife were made to run like horses up and down, till out of mere exhaustion they fell down half dead, when a number of the bloody miscreants hacked them to pieces with swords. The bodies were then thrown down the river like the carcase of an animal. It is unnecessary to state, that while this is being written, the writer is fervently praying to God that the Government may soon be enabled to take the most terrible vengeance,—a vengeance, the remembrance of which may last for centuries in the villages and hamlets of the North-West. At Calpee, too, the fugitives learnt with what feelings of hatred the people looked upon the English, and the desire prevalent among them of exterminating the whites.* One of them who had imprudently said that he could speak English, was brought to a serious scrape, out of which he was extricated with no little difficulty. They had with them several English books, which the boys used to read, and English shoes for their use, all of which they threw down in the water. The self-styled Rajah of Calpee, they also learnt, had given orders in the bazaar to sell Company's pice, which they call *lad shahee*, at thirty-two *gundahs* for the rupee, that is to say, at half their value, and the old copper coins of the place, which they call *balushahee*, at ten *gundahs* for the rupee; a rate which they never had. At Calpee the fugitives were joined by six of the twenty-nine plundered boats already spoken of, which had proceeded as far as Etawah. From the people in them they heard most horrid tales. All the fourteen boats were then allowed to leave on the 1st August last, not before they had been searched, on the payment of a fine of twelve rupees for each of the first eight boats, and six rupees for each of the other six.

* To show the real state of the country, I extract the following from the 'Friend of India.' "On the 24th March the Governor-General opened the railway as far as Futtehpore. The line, it is said, will soon be complete as far as Cawnpore; the line nearly all the way *proceeds through what may not inaptly be termed an enemy's country*. It has been found necessary *to burn the villages on their side of the line, and to post troops at every station*. The first station was protected by a guard composed of the remnant of the 12th N. I., at the second were two troops of Brazer's horse, and at the third some Madras troops with two guns. The affair went off very well; *the guard at the several stations prevented the rebels from attempting to carry off the Governor-General or obstructing the line.*"

As the river had then risen, they descended very swiftly down, without daring to stop anywhere, and notwithstanding the danger of the navigation in the Jumna, the boats were rowed even during the night. When they arrived at Humeerpore, they saw the bungalows of the Europeans looted and burnt, and the place in a state of complete disorganization. Further down Humeerpore, at a place called Churkha Murka, the villagers fired on them from both sides, and even pursued them to some distance on their heavy boats called *kachovah*. It was not, however, before they arrived at Allahabad, that they considered themselves out of all danger. The party has recently returned to town, having paid nearly one thousand rupees to different persons, as the price of their protection, as already stated.*

The following is the account of the condition of the country round Futtyghur, given by Ishuree Doss, a native Christian who escaped the massacre:—

“After the missionaries and other Europeans left the station, things grew worse in the zillah of Furruckabad. The civil officers, notwithstanding their most strenuous efforts for the preservation of order, lost all power of ruling out in the district. Police stations and *tuhseeldarees* began to be attacked by insurgents passing on the Grand Trunk Road, as well as by dacoits. The latter now lifted up their heads, and thought the time for them to work had arrived. Nothing was heard during the night but noise of firearms, insomuch that the very jackals ceased barking through fear. Our place, on account of the tent manufactory, was in great danger from dacoits; swords and firearms were, therefore, procured, and all the men were obliged to keep up in arms the whole night, and though very few in number compared with the adverse population of the surrounding country, and the extent of the premises to be guarded, were indeed successful in keeping them at bay. (Throughout the country, zemindars and others rose up against each other to settle or rather to avenge old differences that existed between them, and disorder and anarchy reigned supreme.”

In another account, a native lady, on a journey, had to disburse 180,000 rupees in bribes to marauders, who beset her path in different places, in order to be allowed to pursue her journey.

* “Hurkaru,” October 12th.

The next is an American, who thus details to the American people his opinion as to the character of the outbreak :—

“ It does not yet appear that the fall of Delhi has produced any very peaceful results among the natives of India. The rebellion is not checked, nor is the war ended. The greater part of the rebel garrison of Delhi has fled into the province of Oude, which will now probably be the great battle ground of the rebellion. Already a large body of armed rebels is collected there, and it is rumoured in Bombay that they have succeeded in shutting up General Outram and General Havelock in Lucknow, thus cutting off their anticipated return to Cawnpore with the relieved garrison of the Residency. Lucknow is yet to become a second Delhi of the war.

“ To those whose eyes are not bleared by English prejudices, it is evident that this formidable rebellion is a natural sequence of the annexation of Oude by the East India Company. And there are English presses in India bold enough and candid enough to assert this opinion, in spite of the Governor-General's gag law. The true history of that annexation is yet to be written. The Oude Blue Book, which has been presented to Parliament, is Lord Dalhousie's special plea in justification of the robbery. Many of its statements are absolutely false, and its argument may be considered a disgrace to the public morality of England. But it is, of course, the only account of the transaction which the East India Company and Parliament will consider authentic. It is generally true that the British rule in India has never taken any hold on the affections of the people, and nowhere is this truth more apparent than in the province of Oude. The Oudeans, who are, more than any other nationality in India, a warlike people, hate the English Government with a determination which has been conspicuously displayed by the massacres at Cawnpore and Futteyghur, and by the long, desperate siege of the British Residency at Lucknow. When, in February, 1855, the late King of Oude was ordered to abdicate his throne and his kingdom to the East India Company, and General Outram at Lucknow, with 13,000 English troops near by, stood ready to enforce the order, all the Hindoo and Mahomedan troops in the king's army bound themselves by an oath to defend their sovereign and their country with their lives; and the British

sepoys, who were drafted on the Oude frontier, pledged themselves to one another not to fire a shot upon their relatives in the king's service, should the king resist the annexation, and thus precipitate a war with the East India Company. The rajahs and zemindars of Oude also sent word to the king (during the three days which General Outram allowed him to consider the East India Company's command to surrender) that if he would give them authority they would raise an army of 100,000 men, with 1,000 pieces of artillery, to resist the Company's attempt at annexation.) But the king, filled with grief, considered that it would be useless to resist the rapacity of the East India Company. He disarmed his troops, dismounted his guns, and published to his subjects a proclamation of his intentions to surrender his throne and his kingdom. When, on the third day (February 7, 1856), General Outram visited the palace at Lucknow to learn whether the king would comply with the 'Honourable Company's' commands, he found the sentries on duty armed only with sticks. The king had surrendered; and immediately General Outram issued a proclamation, which Lord Dalhousie had prepared for him at Calcutta, declaring that 'the government of the territories of Oude is hereafter vested exclusively and for ever in the Honourable East India Company.' But when the Company began to organize the territories, all those who had been officers of Government under the deposed king refused to enter the new service. The soldiers of the disbanded army of the king refused to enter the new regiments which the Company raised, although every power of persuasion and intimidation was tried to bring them into the new ranks. These and similar facts and incidents of that 'annexation' have never been published that I know of—for the Oude Blue Book would be no place for them, but I recite them to you, at this time, because they possess a fresh interest when considered in connection with the events now transpiring in Upper India. (The present rebellion in Oude is eminently a national rebellion.) The sepoys, the budmashes, the ryots, the zemindars, are all in arms for their national grievances. Even the massacre at Cawnpore, perpetrated by Oude sepoys, may be considered as a retaliation for gross indignities thrust upon the ladies of the royal family of Oude by the British commissioner a little more than a year ago.)

^ You will find, on page 291 of the Oude Blue Book, a statement of General Outram, that he offered as a bribe to the queen-mother an annual stipend of one lac of rupees, if she would persuade the king to sign the treaty of abdication. The queen-mother refused. After the annexation was formally accomplished, and all the property of the deposed king and his family had been confiscated—including his palaces, parks, menageries, furniture, plate, jewellery, wardrobes, carriages, museum, and library containing 200,000 volumes of rare books and valuable manuscripts; and after his armoury, his valuable stud of Arabian and Persian horses, his dogs, camels, and elephants had been sold in auction at Lucknow, the commissioner turned his attention to the ladies of the royal household, who yet remained in the palace of Chuttur Munzul. The queen-mother has made a deposition that on the 23rd of August, 1856, all the ladies of the king's household were, in spite of their protest and humble petition, forcibly ejected from the palace at Lucknow, and their personal effects thrown after them into the street, by officers acting under the direction of the British commissioner; and also that a sum of money, left by the king for their support, was taken in possession and retained by the British authorities. (Do not these facts throw light upon some of the dark incidents of this rebellion?) With this conviction it is that I have been induced to occupy so much of your attention.

“ We have had here in Bombay a slight touch of the rebellion since I last wrote you. A native officer in the Marine Battalion, and a sepoy of the 10th Native Infantry, have been blown from a gun. The court-martial in the case met at Fort George on the 13th inst., and, that you may know how these things are done, I will give you an account of the proceedings. The charge against these two rebels was in these words:—‘ For having, on or about the night of the 3rd of October, 1857, attended a seditious meeting, held in a house in a part of the town of Bombay, called Sonapore, and at that meeting they, the said drill havildar Synd Hoossein and private Mungul Guddrea, made use of highly mutinous and seditious language, evincing a traitorous disposition towards the Government, tending to promote rebellion against the State, and to subvert the authority of the British Government.’ Under this charge the culprits were found guilty on the

15th inst., when the court 'sentenced them to suffer death by being blown away from the muzzle of a cannon,' and this sentence was executed the day before yesterday, in presence of all the troops in Bombay."

Lastly, the Supreme Government thus characterizes the rebellion in their "Narrative of Events," on September 12, 1857:—*

"In consequence of the *general nature of the rebellion* and the impossibility of identifying the majority of the rebels, or of bringing their crime home to them, the magistrate recommended the wholesale burning and destruction of *all villages* proved to have sent men to take *active part in the rebellion*."

So much for the character of the rebellion. †

It remains to say a few words about its cause. Here again Oude stares us in the face. Its present condition is a pregnant fact. It is the rallying point and final standing-place of the rebels; it is the representative of the principle which the rebellion embodies, a protest against the wicked and foolish policy of aggression and spoliation euphemized as annexation. It was this which lit the fire and banded together so many of the rajahs and nobles against us. They saw the shadow of events coming swiftly and inevitably on themselves. Their only hope was to anticipate the action of British policy, before, in the terse language of Runjeet Singh, the map should all "lal hoga:" (become red). Hence the conspiracy, and the determination, while it was yet time, to refer the continuance of their rights to that ultimate arbitrement of States—open war.

* See Note, "The Governor-General to the Court of Directors, Fort William, September 23, 1857." (Public, No. 111.) Par. 26 in Parliamentary Return, "Further Papers relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies" (No. 5).

† Dr. Buist thus recants his opinions:—"As it has all along been maintained that the recent rebellion has been nothing more than a mutiny of the Bengal army, it may not be amiss to take a glance at our position as we now stand, with a view of determining who have actually shared in the rising, and of forming some estimate of the amount of work still to be performed before India can be re-conquered and tranquillized. We confess we were long of those who took the exclusively mutiny view of the question, but further lights have dawned upon us since then, and shown that, though the rising of the army was an essential portion of the great plot for the subversion of the British empire in the East, it was after all but a portion of the plot. The disclosures on the trial of the King of Delhi plainly show that for a long period of years there was a deeply laid plan for the restoration of the Mogul empire, in the execution of which every Hindoo or Mahomedan was to lend his aid, each expecting in turn to regain the position and influence he had lost through British supremacy."

The King of Delhi, as was natural, appears from the revelations of his late trial, to have been the head of the conspiracy. This may be thought by some to argue an origin of the rebellion not immediately connected with annexation, and especially with the annexation of Oude. But the King of Delhi knew well that his tenure of royalty was most precarious. Seven years before, at the commencement of Lord Dalhousie's reign, his enforced abdication had been deliberated and determined on by the English Government; it is true that Lord Dalhousie did not deprive the heir apparent of his dignity, nor compel him to submit to terms, whereby, on his succession, he "should leave the palace of the Kootah, and that he should, as king, receive the Governor-General on terms of perfect equality." But the intended measure was perfectly well known, and commented on with sufficient publicity at the time. When Peer Ali, the head of the intended revolution at Patna was detected, "his correspondence proved him to have been in communication with Mussee Owl Yuman, of Cawnpore, *ever since the annexation of Oude*, and showed that a secret conspiracy had existed for some time in Patna, carried on under instructions from the North-West, for some great ulterior purpose." *

Two other facts speak volumes. Nana Sahib, at the date of the annexation of Oude, had £500,000 in the Company's funds. He had from that time been selling out gradually until but £30,000 stood in his name when he attacked the entrenchment at Cawnpore. When he sent by Mrs. Greenway to Sir Hugh Wheeler to offer terms of surrender, he expressly exempted from his affected clemency all those who had anything to do with Lord Dalhousie's government. The proclamation of Khan Bahadoor Khan, the retired principal Sudder Ameen of Bareilly, who set himself up as nabob of that place, was put in evidence on the trial of the King of Delhi. It throws much light upon the causes of the rebellion. It appeals to the religious fears of the populace; the motive of the writer is thus pithily detailed:—

"They have further forbidden that any adopted children shall succeed to the titles of the rajahs of the land, while in our shastres it is so written, that ten kinds of successors are allowed.

* Parliamentary Paper, No. 5 (p. 4), Further Papers on the Mutiny.

"In this manner will they eventually deprive you of all your possessions, as they have done those of Nagpore and Oude."

So far as I am personally concerned, I confess it is immaterial whether the responsibility of late events be fixed on the right shoulders or not: the adjustment of praise and blame will be settled by the historian and posterity, with an impartiality of which contemporary spectators are perhaps incapable. But it is to be observed that this is no question of parliamentary impeachment, no affair of pains and penalties, or criminal indictment; not even one of vote of censure; for it must be confessed that one ministry has been just as remiss as another in respect to India. Lord Derby and Mr. D'Israeli cannot point to any change of policy during their administration which evinced deeper intelligence, and a more lively conception of the condition of India, than that either of their predecessors or successors. But one of the gravest lessons ever read in history lies open before us, and it behoves us to read it right. We may depend on this, too, that, after peace is restored, we shall have as difficult a task before us as ever nation proposed to itself. Indeed the conquest of the future will, I fear, be even more difficult than that of the past. Everything depends upon the steps which we may take. A single false step may be our ruin. We have the confidence of vast masses to restore; as Mr. Lowe says, we cannot play the part of Jack the Giant Killer, and go quietly to breakfast as soon as the foe is laid low. We must gird up our loins to a Herculean task; prudence in our eyes, firmness in our feet, justice in our right hands; with these we must walk right onward. And unless we ascertain these two points, first the real origin of the crash, in which the "traditionary policy" has exploded; secondly, that we have the "right men in the right places," we shall fail. Let us then, as briefly as may be, consider the causes of the rebellion.

What a variety of reasons has been assigned for the outbreak! With some it has been purely a Mahomedan conspiracy, being planned for placing the great Mogul upon the throne of Delhi; the Hindoos have been their puppets and their dupes, soon to be their victims and slaves. But the Mahomedans are but a small portion of the Bengal army, and a small portion of the popula-

tion.* Mr. Samuels, the commissioner of Patna, indignantly repudiates this charge against the Mahomedans. He shows that the great Mussulman population of Patna and lower Bengal, which was left quite unprotected, are peaceable and loyal.† Others say it is the handywork of the crafty Brahmins, who see their sway slipping from them by the spread of education, and that they have made one last stand in favour of caste. Thus European literature and science have led to our calamity; and thus an argument is found against the further extension of knowledge by those whose policy is retrogressive. Some see in the rebellion the special finger of an offended God, angry at our not having used sufficiently our opportunities of spreading Christianity. Others regard it as immediately springing from our tampering too freely with the religion of the natives. We have, say these, to thank the missionaries. Suffice it to point out here the irreconcilable opposition of these two theories; tolerance and intolerance cannot both be guilty; their further consideration will fall under a separate topic. Some, without a tittle of evidence, have attributed our misfortunes to Russian intrigue. It has been traced to the "peculiar idiosyncrasy" of the natives, which tends to a sort of spontaneous combustion, without any assignable cause whatever. A small class has still faith in the Bengal sepoy. Colonel Sykes believes that the murders and the other horrors attributed to the "poor sepoy" will turn out to be the work of Mussulmen, budmashes, and released prisoners. But the so-termed "mild Hindoo" is one of the most cruel cold-blooded of animals, as his conduct towards his own countrymen, on dacoitees and other thuggeries, shows.

The sacrifice of poor young Macgregor by the Hindoos of the 50th regiment to the goddess Deva, before encountering the 28th

* At the Court of Inquiry held on the 34th Bengal N. I., the Colonel stated that the Mussulmen of the corps were very angry at what the Hindoos had done. Captain Aubert, when asked,—“Does the feeling of distrust embrace men of all castes?” replied, “No, it extends to the Brahmins only;” and all the officers of the regiment declared, that while they had no reliance in the Hindoos, their confidence in the Sheiks and Mussulmen remained unshaken.

† Mr. Samuels' statements respecting the loyalty of the Mussulman population, must, however, be taken with some reserve. He is writing up a favorite theory; and the Parliamentary Paper, No. 5, (Further Papers relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies) shows that there had been a Mussulman conspiracy to murder the Europeans, previous to Mr. Samuel's taking up his appointment in Patna.

Madras native infantry, is sufficient to controvert this theory. One old general writes to the papers; after the whole army, with the exception of some isolated regiments, had ceased to be, stating his faith in their loyalty, and fortifying his faith by citing instances of military devotion and loyalty from the annals of the last century; and Sir William Gomm cannot "divine" what has made the "miserable men" revolt. A feeble cry was attempted to be raised against the Indian press, which many would gladly have made the responsible cause of mutiny; but the audacity of this falsehood was too palpable, and the assertion itself too ridiculous, to receive even amomentary assent; and those who had sought to raise the cry were only too willing to preserve the safeguard of their own obscurity. One gentleman traced the origin of the insurrection to revenge for insults offered to the native women. Nothing, in short, was too absurd for speculation and hap-hazard random assertion.

The diversity of views entertained by those members of the Court of Directors who have addressed public meetings or written to the newspapers, is singular in the extreme. No two seem to think alike. Colonel Sykes and Mr. Mangles are utterly antagonistic. Mr. Willoughby contents himself with determining a great many points which are *not* the cause of the revolt, but does not inform us what is. The boasted "experience" of the India House, so necessary for the instruction of the Board of Control, is here manifestly at fault,—and if this be a specimen of the light the Directors throw upon questions in general, certainly there is not here the proverbial amount of safety in the multitude of the counsellors. It would be asking too much of poor human nature to expect those gentlemen to write their own condemnation; and it is not surprising, therefore, to find that they avert their eyes from the annexation policy which is straight before them, and that all such journals and periodicals as they can influence, start, like shy horses, when they come across this unpleasant object. But events beyond their control have unmistakeably pointed out the truth; and the squabble now is to see how responsibility can be most plausibly shaken off—whether the Board of Control or the India House must bear the blame. Let them settle that among themselves. The material point for consideration is not whom we shall blame, but what is the real origin of the rebel-

lion; for our object is not the punishment of the authors of a mistaken policy, but the recognition of sources of peril to be avoided for the future. It is for this purpose that I have endeavoured distinctly to state the immediate cause of the rebellion. When that rebellion was once a-foot, there was no doubt plenty of materials ready for its spread. These some may regard as so many causes of the rebellion. I am disposed to consider them rather as so many conditions favorable to its development and success. Thus, for instance, the lax state of discipline in the Bengal army was not the *cause* of its mutinying; but the condition which made mutiny not only a possibility, but a very probable contingency. Thus, too, there are various other circumstances to which the same remark is applicable. I will briefly enumerate them.

In the first place, no one who knows India will deny that there exists in the hearts of the natives a veneration for the old "Raj," however correct may be the comparison we so continually institute between the comparative merits of English and Native rule. Sir Charles Napier saw clearly enough the standing menace afforded to English supremacy by the presence of the Mogul dynasty at Delhi. "The Delhi king," he writes, "is a mere effigy, yet he forms a moral rallying point around which gathers the dreams of discontented princes, feeding upon prophecies. Such prophecies and traditions as those about Delhi oftentimes work out their own fulfilment. In the present case they are only rendered dangerous by the existence of the phantom king whom we there maintain at a vast expense." 2nd. There existed a wide-spread belief in the fulfilment of a prophecy that in this very year the British Empire would terminate in the East, and the old Mogul dynasty resume its sway over all India. 3rd. There was the expectation of higher pay and grants of land lavishly promised to all sepoys who would join the king of Delhi. 4th. The rumours of plunder obtained by the sack of public treasures, and the robbery of the private property of murdered Europeans; for, according to the Eastern proverb, "the sword ever goes with the pot." 5th. There was the hope of dominion, and license such as the army had never enjoyed under British rule; for it is to be remembered that the interval is wide between lax discipline and military license. 6th. There

was the utter ignorance of the vast resources and actual power of England, which led the plotters to imagine that by the extermination of the handful of Europeans in India, they had effectually up-rooted us from India. 7th. The paucity of European troops, accidentally prevailing at the moment, no doubt was a powerful argument with those who urged the opportunity as ripe for a rising. 8th. There was the natural antagonism of race; and so far as the Mussulman portion of the army is concerned, the religious fanaticism of extermination arrayed against us; and the feelings of consanguinity and nationality on which I have before observed. 9th. The contagious effect of example on large bodies.

But, as I have stated in "The Rebellion in India," we should be guilty of a grievous error were we to endeavour to confine the origin of the rebellion to any *one* cause. Various causes combine to produce every political event; and without wishing to assert that our policy of annexation is the *only* cause, I feel fortified in re-asserting now what I did not hesitate to assert at the very commencement of the rebellion, that its immediate cause was the long pursuit of that mistaken policy, till it culminated on the spoliation of the kingdom of Oude. The falsehood of the plea on which we thrust ourselves upon the people of Oude, namely, that they were suffering from a rule from which it was expedient, nay indispensable, that we should relieve them, has been indisputably proved by the whole nation rising as one man to resist our rule as soon as we had imposed it on them. The exaggerated and ex-parte reports, on the faith of which we professed to base our interference, have been characterized by Mr. Halliday, the lieutenant-governor of Bengal,* as exhibiting nothing which has not its parallel in our own

* "The administration of justice," he writes, "is nowhere alleged to be worse in Oude than it is within our own districts; and it could not be possible, in the most barbarous country in the world, to discover anything more atrocious as a system than is laid open in the recent report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the practice of torture in the territories of Madras."

That the people of Oude are no worse than their neighbours is shown by Mr. Lushington, who, in his evidence before the Lords' Committee, (21st April, 1853, Q. 4464) states as follows:—"In illustration of the trustworthiness of evidence, it has been frequently observed by officers whose districts lie on one side of the Ganges river, whilst the territory of Oude is on the other, *that in Oude they speak more truth now than they do in the Company's provinces.*"

territories, while for all that is evil in that kingdom we have ourselves only too much to answer for.*

The real character of the annexation policy was but little known in England. It flattered the vanity of our nation to behold kingdom after kingdom falling with the rapidity and facility of children's houses of cards. There seemed something almost akin to fate in the deaths of one potentate after another without natural heirs. The apparent submission, if not cheerfulness, with which the people of vast districts accepted the substitution of English for native rule, utterly deceived those who, without practical experience of India, thought about the matter at all. Admiration was excited towards the great man whose hand had spread the dominion of England over so extensive territories, and such various races, with an ease, a determination, and a success, which seemed to argue the presence of the loftiest

* There is a curious testimony to this effect recorded by Mr. R. Martens Bird, before the House of Commons' Committee, 2nd June, 1853.

Q. 5626. "On one occasion I had been encamped on the banks of the Gogra while transacting my business in Goruckpore, and I saw signs of smoke arising in various directions on the opposite shore. I sent to enquire what was the matter, and I found that one of the *tasildars* of the King of Oude was passing through the district, burning the villages, and seizing and imprisoning the people, because they did not pay him the revenue he demanded; and as soon as they found that I was making enquiry I was told that a number of the principal *zemindars* of Oude had come into Goruckpore, and that, if I liked, some of them would come and speak to me. While this was going on I received a letter from the commanding officer of the English detachment, who had been sent upon the most painful duty of supporting the Nabob's troops in these violences of theirs; he said that the Oude authority had applied to him to request me to seize all those *zemindars* and to send them over. They came to me and said, 'We have done nothing wrong; we can show you our papers; it was fixed at the beginning of the year that we were to pay such a sum for this year's revenue, (the revenue is always fixed there year by year,) and now there happens to be a fine crop they are asking half as much again; and it is because we will not pay that we are treated in this manner, so we hope that you will not send us over, or that if you send us that you will send some one whom you can trust to see what is done.' I said, 'I shall not send you; they have no right to demand of me to send you; I have nothing to do with it.' They then said, 'How very ill, in reality, you English treat us.' I said, 'What do you mean? I have not treated you ill that I am aware of.' 'No,' he said, 'if you take us under your own management, and manage as you manage the district of Goruckpore, we should be perfectly satisfied and happy; or if you would let us alone and let us manage our own affairs we should be perfectly satisfied and happy. We are quite equal to deal with this Mahomedan Prince; we can protect our own rights; but when you send out a detachment of troops to aid him and support him, they are allowed to do what they please with us, and then we

qualities of statesmanship. The numbers whom the great increase of patronage, consequent upon each annexation, enabled the Governor-General to provide for, rendered the measure necessarily popular in India,* where the recipients of finely paid appointments and almost unlimited power, sang the pœans of the bloodless and pacific conquest. These feelings were reflected at home, where numerous families were gratified at finding what a handsome provision had been made for their friends and relatives. The blessings which English Government would confer upon the people, its superior quality to native rule, and the apathetic indifference with which its substitution for the old regime was received, were all, through a thousand different channels, permeating the entire society of England. And to rivet the fasci-

consider that we owe many of the evils we suffer to you in supporting them in such injustice."

And this is singularly corroborated by the Directors themselves:—In their despatch of October 1st, 1828, I find them saying relative to the misrule in Oude, "We should delude ourselves were we to suppose, that for the state of things thus depicted the British Government is in no degree responsible, or that any one is more nearly concerned than Government in its being promptly and efficaciously remedied. Had it not been for our connection with Oude, although misrule might have attained to as great a height, *it would not have been of equal duration*. The subversion of the government by which it was produced or tolerated, and the substitution of a more vigorous and probably more moderate rule, would have been the speedy result.

"It is the British Government, which, by a systematic suppression of all kinds of resistance, has prolonged to the present time a state of organization, which can nowhere attain prominence, except where the shortsightedness and rapacity of a semi-barbarous government is armed with the military strength of a civilized one."

* The following scheme of an establishment, taken from the Governor-General's proclamation on the annexation of Nagpore, will serve to show the nature and extent of patronage arising from each act of annexation:—

	Rupees.
One Commissioner, at a salary of.....	60,000 per annum.
Two Deputies, each at	1,500 per mensem.
One Personal Assistant to Commissioner.....	900 " "
Two Deputy Commissioners, 1st Class, each	1,200 " "
Two Do. Do. 2nd do. do.	1,000 " "
Two Assistant Do. 1st do. do.	700 " "
Two Do. Do. 2nd do. do.	600 " "
Three Do. Do. do.	500 " "
Nine extra Assistants do.	500 " "
One Do.	300 " "
One Do.	250 " "
Three Do. each.....	150 " "
One Police Serjeant	500 " "

nation in which all classes were enchained, it was authoritatively shown, by official reports and returns, that this policy, so beneficial to the people, was actually effected at a vast saving to the State. "Annexation pays," was the catch-word; and it was everywhere taken up and repeated by an audience only too predisposed by its wishes to credulity. True, there were not a few who ominously shook their heads at the exceeding folly of our proceedings. Great names were cited against this policy of annexation. The authorities whom I have collected in "The Rebellion in India" formed a formidable phalanx; the voices of many experienced men, especially that of the late Mr. John Sullivan, whose posthumous letter* sounds like a voice from the tomb, were raised in vain warning and protest. It was shown to demonstration that annexation did *not* pay, but was effected only at a positive and heavy loss. The whole course of the financial results of Indian annexation, from the inauguration of that policy down to the present day, was traced in figures which have never been found incorrect.† The juggle by which our Indian accounts plausibly presented a balance-sheet in our favour was exposed over and over again. It was shown that any bankrupt concern which had any assets at all—the Surrey Zoological Gardens, or the London and Eastern Bank, for instance—might be made to appear paying by following the precedent of Indian financial statements; the principle of which consisted in taking credit for all returns, and sinking all expenditure, or charging it to other

And the following scale of establishment for Oude has appeared in print, and I believe is accurate. I have no official statement to refer to: that in the Oude Blue Book was only provisional:—

	Rupees.
One Chief Commissioner	5,000 per mensem.
One Financial Do.	4,000 " "
One Judicial Do.	4,000 " "
Four Local Commissioners, answering to Magistrates and Collectors, each	3,000 " "
Eight Deputy Commissioners, each	1,500 " "
Ten others, each	1,000 " "
Covenanted Assistants	3,000 " "

* See "Daily News," 7th November, 1857.

† See the petition of Mr. Hume and other proprietors of India Stock presented to Parliament, and published in the Appendix to the Parliamentary Reports for 1852-53. It will also be found set out in the "Rebellion in India," p. 159.

accounts.* The impolicy of depriving the entire native population of all stages for their restless ambition, and reducing all to the dull dead level of peon and pauper, was significantly pointed out. The boasted superiority of English to native government, and especially the preference of the people themselves for the former, were seriously questioned; above all, it was insisted on higher grounds, that the injustice of our course was so flagrant, our disregard of the most solemn treaties so wicked, our wriggles to slide through or over them so mean, our breaches of faith so palpable and dishonest, that not only our national character was lowered and dishonored, but that it was impossible our wickedness should ever prosper: that we could not trample as a nation, any more than as individuals, upon God's universal moral laws with impunity: that somewhere, in some way, and at some time, sooner or later, though man might not be able to predict either the precise moment, or mode, or place, we should inevitably find time bring about its own revenges; and that if we sowed the storm, we must expect to reap the whirlwind.† Some few saw yet more clearly, and ventured to foretell with singular sagacity both the character and the direction of that punishment which they declared could not be far distant; for they saw in the calm of Oude but the stillness of deep waters, and the ominous lull

* Thus, Madras garrisons Cuttack, Nagpore, Straits, Sholapore, and Pegu, at a cost of £1,225,759 per annum, not one fraction of which is charged against any of these States! see "The Rebellion in India," p. 167. In the "Punjab Commissioner's Report," there is a clear admission that the Punjab does *not* pay its expenses. "The pay of our army," it is there written, "has been estimated to be equal to 165 lakhs, or to £1,650,000. The expenditure of the various civil establishments, the commissariat, the executive departments, and the various works in progress, is probably equal to another million, *so that, really, double the revenues are at present spent on the country.*" Another specimen of this system of account keeping may be found in the evidence of Mr. Prideaux before the Parl. Com. Com., 30th May, 1853, 5233-43.

† See a remarkable passage in Mr. John Dickinson's pamphlet on Bureaucratic Government in India:—"Meanwhile the natives have a stereotyped expression for their communication with us, which gives us a false confidence. We tread on ice, and forget the current of passion flowing beneath, which imperils our footing. The natives seem what they know we expect them to appear, and we do not see their real feelings: we know not how hot the stove may be under its polished surface. For the fire is not out, we are obliged to keep it up by our native army, which may blaze into a conflagration, and burn the empire. There may be some Procida, matchless in diplomatic art and tenacity of purpose, who will travel for years to knit enemies against us; who will mine the ground under our feet, and lay

that precedes the burst of our tropical monsoon. But either they were not listened to, or they were scoffed at. They were visionaries; they were cowards; they were incendiaries; they were factious; England, despite of them, should ride on in her glory; and all the nations of India, doomed by their own innate weakness, should fall one after another under our sway, without a sign of opposition or a breath of murmur. Thus, for the season at least, the policy of annexation was irresistible. The Governor-General, like a huge boa-constrictor, woke up from time to time, to swallow some unfortunate potentate, as the repletion from the last meal subsided, and gave rise to a fresh craving for renewed absorption and deglutition.

But at last the policy was brought to the touchstone. Hitherto we had only annexed the kingdoms of "titular" princes—mere shadows without substance; if, indeed, the kingdom of Nagpore, with its formidable neighbourhood to the Nizam of Hyderabad, be not a perilous exception. The little state of Sattarah, the still smaller state of Jhansi, were incapable of resistance. In the Carnatic and Tanjore the royal families had, for half a century, been little more than splendid pensioners and state prisoners, without a foot of territory. The whole of the Carnatic, and the garden of the South, Tanjore, since the year 1800, have been mere ordinary collectorates, administered by the civil service precisely in the same manner as all other districts. Our success and impunity impelled us ever forward. We flew at higher game, and the robbery of the kingdom of Oude was definitively decided on. When we declared that the treaties made with pageant princes were no longer binding, our "allies" were forced to submit. No other course was open to them. There was no tribunal to which they could resort. The appeal to arms, that "ultima ratio regum" for settling disputed constructions of treaties, was obviously impossible where the one party had

the train of combustibles: there may be some outrage, which will suddenly raise a cry, terrible as that which broke forth when the bells of Moureale were sounding to vespers, a cry of 'Death to the Englishmen!' There may be some conspiracy, of which, as at Vellore, we have not even a suspicion, until the native regiments open their fire on our barracks: and, as a merchant who is obliged to throw all his treasure overboard to save the ship, a storm may arise in India which will cost us more to maintain our power than all we have gained, or can ever hope to gain, by our confiscation."—(Page 115, Government of India under a Bureaucracy.)

neither men nor money, and the other was supreme in power and resources. When we sold at public auction the jewels and clothes of the Ranees of Nagpore, we, no doubt, covered ourselves with shame in the eyes of every native in India. A friend of mine in the Mysore commission chanced to be present at that sale. He informs me that when the ladies' wearing apparel was put up, crowds of natives left the place, with their hands before their mouths, crying, "Appah! Appah!" an exclamation of sorrow and surprise. The fatuity of such meanness is indeed inconceivable. Better far would it have been to have thrown the whole of the jewels and the clothes into the Ganges, if they were not to be restored to their owners. But so it was; and the pettiness of our conduct on that occasion probably damaged us more in native estimation than our wickedness, which had, at any rate, the charm of a certain bad boldness; and, perhaps, our subjects had begun to look upon the painless extinction of old dynasties as the work of "*kismut*," or the irresistible decree of fate. But when we struck down Oude, with its armed inhabitants, turbulent among themselves, but rude chivalrous warriors, ready to avenge insult and resist injury; fanatics hating the Kaffir, and ready to die for their religion; when in our pride we slighted the fact that this Oude was the repertory and officina of our Bengal army, we at once brought the annexation policy to a crisis. In the first blush of the affair, it seemed to us that our attack was crowned with the most perfect success. The people made no movement; the king, indeed, positively forbad resistance, and counselled submission. The passive silence of the people was mistaken for acquiescence. The sullen nature of their mood was overlooked. It was the stupor of astonishment which kept them dumb. Our "establishment" entered upon their new duties with the most perfect complacency. They took up their abode in the dwellings of the old nobles with as much *nonchalance* as a man exhibits when he hangs up his hat in a furnished London lodging. They commenced at once upon that peculiar civilian hobby, "revision of the assessment;" the wily, pliant native cringed and dissimulated before them; the well-known flood of intrigue, corruption, jobbery, spread over the land. Money was to be made by the native agency out of this settlement, just as it had been made by similar instruments in Munro's

time; and this system—cut and dried—of civilian administration, which outroots the whole families, ruins the nobility, and aims at the elevation of the masses alone, was brought at once into full play, to the dismay of those who had anything to lose, and to the unsettlement of the minds of all.* So besotted, however, were we by our own arrogance, that even such warnings as were given we disregarded. When an official in Oude was vaunting the tranquillity attending our accession to the kingdom, “Wait till the hot weather,” was the reply of the native, “and see where you will be then.” Major Bird publicly stated at Manchester that the Bengal sepoys quartered in Oude had offered, at the very moment of annexation, to join the king’s forces in resisting

* Revision of assessment means raising the rent in every possible case; and that this was done in Oude is proved by the statement which appeared in the Calcutta papers at an advanced period of the rebellion, that the thakoors, during the insurrection of Lucknow, offered us their military services *if they might have their lands at their old rates*. The following letter, which appeared in the “Englishman,” will shew the state of confusion into which everything was thrown, the blunders we committed, and the angry feelings we engendered:—

“THE OUDE SETTLEMENT.—The natives of Oude believed in Lord Dalhousie’s proclamation offering to respect the people’s rights, and to shew favour and consideration to the servants of the late Government and to all *zemindars* in general, if they should assist the British power in effecting the change of governments with order and tranquillity. The people in general, and the servants of the king in particular, fulfilled all that was required of them by this proclamation: they gave over their country to an old friendly power with a new face, without a struggle, and without an attempt to disturb the general tranquillity of the country, and openly met the demands of the revenue officer without resistance or a single murmur. In one short year the British rule was as firmly established as if Oude were one of the oldest British provinces of Hindostan. For this voluntary act of reconciliation and submission of the people, let us see what degree of faith has been kept by the British officials in Oude, according to the offer made on the Dalhousie proclamation. After the first revenue year of the British era in Oude, the British commissioner in Oude made summary settlements of the land revenue—it was called summary, as there was no time to inquire into the rights of contending claimants, and it was necessary for purposes of revenue to go through the settlement at once. The principle then laid down by the genius of a Dalhousie was not to disturb any party in possession, but to take the revenue engagements from the party possessed, leaving it to a future day to inquire into, or to recognize officially, the proprietary rights of parties, whether in possession or not in possession, when the necessary mutations would be properly effected. The equity and justice of such a rule was apparent, and could never be too highly applauded, whether considered as a political or really financial measure. Jackson’s administration in Oude has been marked with the violation of the British faith, with respect to the rights to landed property which have been peculiar to Oude; and the chief commissioner, in giving effect to his arbitrary and impolitic decrees with

the Government; and on the 4th of December, 1856, there appeared in the "Central Star," one of the Calcutta journals, a most remarkable letter from Oude, which, however, excited no attention, plainly as it indicated what was coming. The following is an extract from this important communication:—

"How long, may I ask, do you fancy will the peace of Oude last? Take my word for it—not long. A storm is brewing, which when it comes will certainly sweep us off from the face of the province, like so much chaff. The landed proprietors, who are the greatest sufferers by the annexation, are not suffering their misfortunes in idleness, though in apparent quietness. They could at a beckon muster thousands of staunch followers, who,

respect to the settlement recently concluded, has fallen into the still greater error of entrusting the execution of his decrees into the hands of inexperienced men, who have committed the more serious error of turning men out of property whose possession to the same has dated from generations past; and in those instances where length of time could not be pleaded as a title, still the consent of the real zemindars has been given to the continuance of the possession of those found in possession, but without avail. The settlement officer has pulled down the proclamations of the 7th of February, guaranteeing to the people all existing rights, and has torn out of the Blue Book the rule of conduct which enjoined them to respect the rights of possession, as the best *prima-facie* title to the government revenue engagements, till a better proprietary right could be proved by a regular judicial investigation. The ephemeral popularity intended to be gained by this questionable bait thrown out to the agricultural masses, by turning out the leading men of the country (men noted for their wealth and influence over their own communities) from their estates, long possessed by them through several changes of government and for successive generations, and giving those estates to village occupants whose heritable and transferable rights had long been obliterated, or, if still existing, these could hardly be said to be decided fairly or justly without the trial of a strict judicial investigation. Nevertheless, the Oude settlement officer has taken the *ipse dixit* of such occupants of the soil to be judicial evidence against the proprietors in possession; the latter have been turned out, and the former have been put, to all intents and purposes, into the proprietary possession of those estates, the justification being, that the orders of Government are such 'that you shall deal with no one but *village occupants*.' 'By this injunction we are not bound to respect the rights of possession,' say the settlement officers; and by this arbitrary decree of Mr. Commissioner Jackson, a revolution has taken place in the laws of property in Oude that could not have been effected by the commotion of a civil war. It is not with any desire to cast odium on the administration of Lord Canning, whose character among all classes of the people, whether of Oude or our own provinces, for moderation and justice is highly appreciated, and to whose decisions people seeking redress directly from his lordship look up to with esteem and admiration; but as this *political blunder in Oude*, in estranging properties from people who have held the *prima-facie* rights to them, without the pretext of a judicial or impartial inquiry into the nature of the proprietary rights of one party or the other,

by the spoliation of their masters, have been sent roving about the country,—rife for any mischief. The continued want of decision and unanimity amongst themselves of our authorities tends more than any thing else to unsettle the minds of the people, and create distrust in and discontent with our measures. The late summary settlement, the more enlightened portion of them look upon as a perfect farce, made the more ridiculous by the ignorance of their parts displayed by the actors. In some instances the assessment has been laid on intolerably heavily; in others, so lightly that it is hardly felt; all owing to a want of knowledge of the true, or nearly true state of affairs in the settlement officer, and the cupidity and rascality of the Umlah, at

may lead to causes affecting the tranquillity of a whole, or a portion even of a province, public commentary need not be despised by the head of the Government, as the writer can have no motive to mislead or to create alarm where there are no existing causes for it: but that there is cause for alarm in the wrongful mutations made in the most arbitrary manner by the settlement officers of Oude, any one acquainted with the feelings of the people and the condition of the country would hardly attempt to gainsay. It is not impossible that Lord Canning may have before him at the present day appeals of parties aggrieved by these acts of the settlement officer. It will not meet the demands of justice to *shelve* these appeals on the mere caprice of a secretary, however high the character for intelligence, experience, and integrity of such an officer may be; or there is always a tendency in his estimation of a fact to side with the acts of the members of a service in which conventional ties breed sympathies, and where a wrong act may meet with a justification sooner than an exposure. The question regarding the blunders and injustice done in these Oude settlements is simple and short; and if the aid of any colleague were required, that colleague should be the law member of the Council; it will be left for him to say whether the Government of India, in giving to the people of Oude a foreign administration, could disturb the rights of parties in actual possession of estates without a judicial inquiry:—First, proving a wrong possession or a defective right, would any other process short of a judicial inquiry justify the acts of dispossession. It would be illiberal as it is unjust to embarrass these simple questions by any political considerations, or to raise a defence of the dubious policy aimed at for gaining a short-lived popularity with indigent masses, and making enemies of the wealthy and influential, who are always in the days of trouble the staunchest and best friends of order and good government. If his lordship were to decide the appeals that the people of Oude have sent before him by the dictates of his own conscience and judgment, there would be a chance of justice being done to the people, and the public mind would be relieved of the great excitement that now exists in Oude. By these illegal dispossessions an insurrectionary feeling is fast taking hold of the agricultural masses in our own older provinces; a new acquired country like Oude is but too likely to catch the infection, and our position would indeed be one of difficulty. All this might be averted by the act alone of Lord Canning. Let him do justice to the landed aristocracy, whatever that class of people may be called by the *bureaucracy* of Indian secretaries of Oude."

whose mercy things were more frequently left than to the consideration of the officers,—and behold the result!—universal dissatisfaction and discontent. Three years were allowed to roll over our heads after the subjugation of the Punjab, when the spirit of insurrection kindled itself throughout its length and breadth; the equity of our measures towards that country was never questioned—was not questionable—yet they were for a long time bitterly distasteful to the population; what then must be the feelings of the population of Oude, when the work of annexation, unlike that of the Punjab, has not been brought on by an act of their own, but cruelly forced on them by a stronger power! Depend upon it, not so long a time as three years will be allowed to run its course before the sparks fly about,—unless, indeed, the fire which is now smouldering amongst the ruins of their hearths and houses is quenched in time. For an ocular demonstration of the state of their feelings, all one has to do is to visit on a Friday the religious shrines in Lucknow and the interior, where may be seen myriads of all classes and creeds prostrating themselves and praying, with eyes suffused with tears, for relief from the present thralldom, and a restoration of the former state of things, however bad they may have been.”

As the drama of rebellion developed itself, it became more and more apparent that our seizure of Oude was the immediate exciting cause.* The first startling piece of intelligence which crept

* I would here call attention to a most remarkable piece of testimony corroborative of my views and statements. It is a paper from Shaik Hedazut Ali, subadar and sirdar bahadoor of the Bengal Sikh Police Battalion, a translation of which appeared in the “Times” of the 1st April. After enumerating many pre-existing causes disposing the sepoys to revolt, such as their fears for religion, caste, &c., their chronic state of insubordination for the last sixteen years, the impunity of their various breaches of discipline, and the like, he proceeds most distinctly to state that the annexation of Oude was the immediate cause of the rebellion. I will use his own words:—

“In 1856 the British Government annexed the kingdom of Oude. At the time of annexation it was the talk of the whole of Hindostan that the British Government had promised the ruler of Oude (I believe there was a treaty to the same effect) that the kingdom of Oude should never be taken by the English, because in former times the Kings of Oude had rendered valuable assistance to the British Government.

“When the Government of India issued the proclamation of the annexation throughout Oude, the King of Oude also issued a proclamation that on no account should any of his subjects resist the British authorities, and that when the British troops entered his territory all assistance in the shape of provisions should be afforded.