

## COMMERCIAL.

As security for property, and unrestrained freedom of industry, are admitted to be essentially necessary to commerce, it follows that, as the system of our commercial intercourse with India assimilates, or differs from the above admission, it must be acknowledged good, or pronounced defective. To determine which of these results is the fact with respect to our Indian trade, it will be expedient to examine the principles by which it is regulated, and their effects. As we are not sufficiently versed in political economy to guide us through the labyrinth of exchange, labour, and all the arcana of this complex question, we shall avoid the discussion of a subject which can alone be set at rest by public opinion, and remain satisfied with drawing the observation of those interested in the question to a topic, above all others indissolubly interwoven with the general weal. We shall therefore, in this place, merely advert to the most obvious principles of this intricate, and important matter. We are informed by those acquainted with that science, that so long as the re-

venues of a state only, are applied to the production, it is evident it can never exceed a certain amount ; but that when the resources of another state are brought into action, the product must increase in a proportion equal to the increased means. Again ; if the industry of a nation is equal to its capital, the deterioration of the former will diminish the latter. It therefore follows, so long as capital increases, industry cannot deteriorate. We are further told that commercial countries derive benefit only from their imports, and that exclusive bodies, although supported by privileges and monopolies, are the worst media through which a nation can carry on its foreign commerce. It must never be forgotten that when such bodies come to lose in part, or wholly, their commercial character, and assume that of sovereign, they not only become a still more unfit medium, but obtain a power inimical to the best interests of the state to which they belong, and ruinous to that over which they preside. For it is not to be expected they will abstain from using their executive influence, in a manner subservient to their commercial objects. The love of gain is not only the motive for trade, but the life and soul of commercial enterprize, and where authority can be brought to aid it, we must not depend upon the precarious virtue of a trading corporation, that no injuries are committed, nor unjustifiable measures adopted, to secure the greatest advantage derivable from a possession held under an uncertain tenure. Indeed, the

history of all such bodies is fraught with matter amply sufficient to prevent us from dwelling with any thing like hope upon the expectation of finding a noble disinterestedness in the character of exclusive corporations. Hence it follows as a matter of course ; that a free trade would prove beneficial to both England and India. Is not then the supineness of the British nation relative to Indian affairs, a surprising and melancholy instance of the entire absence of foresight, where we would be induced to look for the keenest discernment, roused into active being, for the purpose of applying a remedy for the starving condition of our manufacturing population, the increasing embarrassment of our domestic commerce, and the generally prevailing distress obvious throughout the land ? Indian commerce, if placed upon an equality with that of our other possessions, would prove valuable to England in a greater degree than all her colonies. Vast as is the importance of the subject, it appears to be treated with an indifference apparently the result of a questionable policy, at variance with the true interests of the British empire.

If the paralyzing duties laid upon the produce of the East Indies be necessary for the welfare of the merchants concerned in the West Indian trade, and the interests of those collaterally connected with it, it would appear to be a fair question, whether it would be more beneficial to the country at large to appropriate the million and a half which our colonies

cost the nation, to those who would suffer by throwing open our East India trade, and reducing the duties to a level with those of our other colonies, or allow it to remain as at present?

As the time is fast approaching, when this consideration will force itself upon the public attention, we earnestly hope the community at large will be prepared to argue upon the broad principles of common equity, a matter with which the best interests and dearest rights of the nation are inextricably blended.

We are told, by a recent writer of considerable experience and talent, that "It yet remains a problem, whether the possession of India should be considered as a source of treasure or weakness to the mother country." We must, therefore, understand, (and yet it appears incomprehensible,) that the immense importation and considerable exportation by which a great demand for labour is occasioned, is of no advantage, but a mere speculative question — an ideal good — a theory not to be solved by the experience of more than half a century. It is high time that the legislature should inform itself well upon matters of such deep importance, and prepare to decide upon the course best calculated to produce the greatest benefit that England can derive from her connexion with India, and in return, to secure to our Indian subjects the utmost benefit they can reap from their connexion with Great Britain. That such an opinion as that just alluded to should exist



in this enlightened age, is a lamentable illustration of the existence of an ignorance which it is difficult to imagine. Our author, in continuation, observes, "The possession of British India has contributed mainly to augment the resources of England, and to give it weight and influence amongst the nations of Europe." If this remark be true, and apparently it is correct, it would naturally lead to the consideration of a very serious question—Whether England, in the present changed condition of things, could maintain her exalted position amongst the nations of the world if stripped of her Indian possessions? If it be granted that India is of such material importance, it is self-evident that her importance principally rests upon the benefits to be derived from commercial intercourse with her; and if she be the ventricle which supplies our country with the blood of life, we are bound, as we value our existence, to act upon the necessity of self-preservation, minutely to examine every part of our commercial policy, and make such changes as will render our trade beneficial in the highest degree it is capable of proving to both countries.

If the charge of unfitness brought against the Company, as an organ through which our traffic to the East is to be carried on, by the author of "Colonial Policy" be true, it is manifest the continuation of its exclusive privileges must prove highly injurious to the rights of the community, and consequently at variance with the true interests of the nation. If a

free trade would increase the imports of England and India, and if the gain of a nation depends upon its imports, as all political writers tell us, they must mutually suffer from restrictions which necessarily become impolitic, and should be removed. Experience has proved the genius of monopolies to tend to the contraction and perversion of the laws of nature. They confine the copious and bountiful stream intended by Providence for the general good of mankind, within the narrow limits prescribed by the selfish and aggrandizing spirit of corporations, through the medium of an apathetic legislature. If, upon the expiration of the present charter, the blessings of a free trade be given to India, she will, in some measure, be compensated for all the wrongs and injuries she has endured. The British nation, too, will largely participate in the good effects consequent on the throwing open of our Eastern commerce. Competition will be attended by a fall in price, which will naturally lead to increased consumption, and thereby enable us to revise and decrease our excise and custom duties without sustaining loss of revenue. The comforts and conveniences of life will then spread widely amongst an improved and grateful people.

Our possessions in the East Indies, although not really colonial, should, with respect to foreign nations, be considered as strictly so, and all communication with them be conducted upon similar principles. We should then become the carriers of

Europe for India, by which our customs and marine establishment would be infinitely increased. All national restrictions should be done away, and international ones imposed ;—this would render England in a great measure independent of the commerce of Europe, the nations of which would be compelled to purchase from her, and she would naturally become the medium through which the commerce of the continental nations passed to the East, and *vice versa*. Her fleets and merchants would thus spread over the world ; and, as she is the acknowledged mistress of the ocean, so she would become the emporium of all civilized nations : the palpable advantage of which is fully illustrated by the flourishing condition of our trade with the East Indies during the war, and its present deteriorated state. All our possessions should trade freely with each other and the mother country, receiving, through her, the produce of foreign states for internal consumption.

Few things can exceed in magnitude or importance the manner in which the national commerce is regulated ; for upon it the power and character of the nation depends. As it affects Great Britain and its dependencies, there cannot be a more interesting or a more serious question. From the time of Lord Bacon down to the present day, we have been told that monopolies and exclusive companies, although necessary to trade carried on with barbarous nations, are pernicious, in the highest degree, to the true interests of commercial intercourse. Nothing

can be more wantonly extravagant, nor more cruelly unjust, than commercial restrictions and heavy duties. They impoverish and stunt the natural energies and enterprise of the nation in their very source. They undermine alike the industry and morals of the people ; and whilst they impede the progress of the public in the acquisition of comfort, distinction and wealth, they foster and forward the natural tendencies inherent in us to every species of crime that can degrade and pollute the mind. Let the restrictions upon our commerce be removed, our excise laws revised, and the duties on trade be diminished : our revenues will then be secured ; smuggling and illicit trade, with their attendant enormities, will be banished from the land. Nothing can be more pernicious than the manner in which our trade with India is carried on ; the system is alike injurious and intolerable, and at once shamefully and gratuitously lavish of the rights of the public. If that which contributes most to the improvement of the human mind, and thence to the condition of society, be unquestionably that which calls for the most thorough investigation, and as commerce has been traced and proved to be the great source from which intellect and wealth, the foundation of all national glory, flow, it is obviously that to which we should look with the greatest anxiety and most scrupulous solicitude.

## MILITARY.

“ It is not difficult to discover, that the present exalted situation of our Indian possessions has much less to hope than to fear from the chance of arms ; that in the prosecution of remote wars, the undertaking gradually becomes more difficult, the event more doubtful, the possession more precarious and less beneficial. The present character of our arms will add weight to the dignity of moderation, and we may preserve peace by a constant state of preparation for war.” Whilst we regulate our conduct by the principle of justice, we must shew to the nations upon our confines, that we are as little disposed to endure as to offer an injury. Under the influence of this principle we should look to the present condition of our army.

In contemplating the military branch of the present system, we should never forget that the British dominions in India have been achieved by our native army in conjunction with a very small European force, and that our sovereignty must be upheld by that army ; it consequently follows, that the honour,

comfort, and independence of the officers and men of which it is composed, are the principal, if not the sole means, by which its fidelity and devotion can be preserved ; and that these essentials, once tainted, the transition to discontent and indifference, and a conviction of having suffered wrong and of having been treated with ingratitude, is a natural and not improbable result. That such a disposition, or even a tendency to it, would be quickly discerned and taken advantage of by the native powers, requires no illustration ; but allowing, for the sake of argument, that it remained unheeded, the condition contains seeds within itself that must come, in the course of time, to a crisis, which could neither be averted by cajoling, nor removed by force. It matters little whether the officers or men, or both, are imbued with feelings that cannot but produce the most disastrous consequences, allowing even that they may not be attended by the immediate and utter annihilation of our dominion. Let us, therefore, a moment pause and dwell upon the former condition, and present state of our Indian army ; and, as we examine the changes which have necessarily taken place, endeavour to trace their effects. Such a course of proceeding is indispensable, if we are anxious to correct defects.

History informs us, that at the commencement of our career, when our superiority, being new, operated most powerfully, its influence was without limit, and without opposition. That the seat of war in these

early times was at the very doors of our soldiery, who were led by eminent commanders whom they idolized, and officered by distinguished men who were known, and beloved ; that both were associated with their interests, and glory, and participated alike in their dangers, fatigues, and privations. In times of peace their allowances were such as to enable them to lay by an independence, and in times of war ample for procuring every necessary and many comforts. Such was the condition of the men, and that of their officers was by no means less enviable. Present allowances ample, wealth and honors awaiting them, and an early return to their country with a wreath on their brow, and a fortune adequate to afford every rational enjoyment, was an object which cheered every man to exertion, and was not beyond the grasp of any who devoted their talents to their attainment. Let us now view the present condition of the army, and we shall see every thing reversed. Extended dominion naturally removes the soldiery further from home, fewer wars decrease the chance of advancement to rank, or independence, and increase in the opposite ratio the fatigue, and hardships of the field. The long continuance, too, of peace, at half batta stations,\* deprives the soldier of the means of providing for the extra expense and

\* There is not at present a single full batta station for our native soldiers on the Bengal establishment, and half batta ones are now established for our European officers, which has occasioned a feverish excitement throughout the army.

losses inseparable from a constant preparation for service, in which condition he must be ; neither can it be concealed that Government was more scrupulously attentive to its native army in former times than it is at present. Troops going upon foreign service used to be provided, not with necessaries only, but with luxuries. At present no such attention is paid to their convenience or their wants.\* In proof of this, let us look to some of the last volunteering detachments, and see how our troops were used at Ceylon under General \*\*\*\*\* , who made our Hindoos go to church, and tried to make them feed on salt provisions from our ships ! Let us again look to our army that went to Java, and consider the terms upon which they went abroad, and the treatment they received, and we shall be constrained to acknowledge they were not well used. They went abroad under a promise, either given or implied, that their officers should not be removed from their corps ; that they should, when the service was over, be immediately brought back. How was this pledge, that should have been considered sacred, and preserved inviolate, redeemed ? Their officers were removed according to contingencies, and they were not relieved, when they might have been, nor so soon as they had reason to expect ; the result of which was, they conceived their old officers to have been re-

\* The conduct of the Madras Government, under the late Sir T. Munro, to the Madras troops in Ava, forms a happy contrast to that of the sister presidency.



moved for the purpose of clearing the way to their being kept upon the island altogether. This impression led naturally enough to the contrivance of means to effect their deliverance from what they considered banishment, which they viewed with feelings aggravated by their love of home, and religious prejudice. The most obvious road to the attainment of the inestimable object in view, in comparison with which life was below consideration, was joining the standard of the deposed Rajah, under a positive stipulation, that when they had restored him to his lost dominions, he should restore them to their native land. In such a compact the most microscopic eye cannot detect the slightest tendency to a spirit of turbulence or rebellion, and every act to which their feelings impelled them must in fairness be attributed rather to the temerity, and bad faith of Government, than to a violent and insubordinate disposition amongst themselves. Their intention was, however, happily discovered; the ringleaders were seized, tried for mutiny, condemned, and some of them executed. The next instance we shall notice shall be more recent, that it may come home to the feelings more than circumstances long past, perhaps scarcely known, or long since forgotten, can possibly do. Our Burman war, it is well known to every person, however slightly acquainted with Indian affairs, has been carried on under the severest trials and privations to which a soldier can be exposed. Some native troops stationed at Barrack-

pore were ordered to march to the theatre of war ; a demand was made for the necessary aid, and not acquiesced with ; obedience was peremptorily insisted upon ; the troops remained sullen, and the dreadful catastrophe that followed is unhappily too generally known. They had no old officers with them, their colonel but just arrived from Europe, and previous to his joining them had long been employed upon the staff, and was of course a stranger. The other officers of the 47th were generally unknown to the men, in consequence of the many changes and removals attending the formation of the several battalions composing the army into regiments. At such a moment, and under such circumstances, would not the peculiarity of the exigency have warranted, if it did not imperatively demand, a minute and impartial investigation of a matter pregnant with present and future consequences of the last importance to our Eastern possessions ? Were effectual means taken ? If so, why not have published them, if they served to fix the brand of ingratitude and mutiny upon a refractory and licentious soldiery, that measures of such uncommon rigour might go forth into the world accompanied by some show of justice, and supported by some appearance of necessity ? No such proceedings were ever published ; nay, the Gazette of the following week announced to the world and the deeply injured army, the concession of what their slaughtered comrades had required. Is it possible to conceive an act of such

inconsistent imbecility? If the regiment had required that which was improper, it should never have been conceded; on the other hand, if it demanded a right or a requisite, it should have been freely acquiesced in, and the unwise proceeding would never have taken place, which at present sullies the reputation of an army, to whose valor and devotion we owe the conquest of our splendid empire, and whose deeds and fame must go down to posterity commingled with the glory of our country, so long as its remembrance shall endure.

The recollection of such fatal precipitation must continue to operate as an antidote against that affection and loyalty which is the very corner-stone upon which the mighty fabric we have raised in the East must be upborne. That the Indian army is entitled to the gratitude of our country cannot be denied, when we contemplate the deeds it has largely contributed to achieve, in perpetuation of the triumph of the genius of England in that distant land, the conquest of which bade defiance to the proud ambition of the Assyrian, the Greek, and the Roman. It therefore behoves us to recollect that an army, whose character has recently been exposed to obloquy, may at some and possibly at no distant day, be called upon to defend our sway against the gigantic efforts of the Czar of Russia. The policy of Peter the Great, and Catharine the Second, still continues to influence the councils of Saint Petersburg, and England may yet be compelled to meet

her in hostile array on the plains of Persia, or the shores of the Caspian. That this ill-timed concession was viewed by the army at large rather as a right forcibly wrung from unfeeling masters, than as a generous boon freely given by a liberal Government, careful of the welfare, and anxiously solicitous as to the comfort of its servants, cannot be doubted. Such acts are these quite enough to force a conviction upon the most sceptical mind, of the necessity of some radical change in the system by which the army is regulated and conducted. Let us see how the European part of it fare. For the perfect comprehension of its actual condition, it will be indispensable that we advert to its former situation, with reference to that of His Majesty's army serving in India. In former times the number of European officers in the army was comparatively few; and although their promotion was slow, they enjoyed the substantial equivalent of handsome allowances from the time they entered the service, neither was there any obstacle to their attaining the highest rank to which it was possible to arrive in the Company's service. At present the officers are trebled, their pay, allowances, and the advantages of staff situations reduced to a mere sufficiency for their necessities, — an insurmountable bar to their rise in the service established, and every avenue leading to the hope of being ultimately able, should they even survive the vicissitudes of an Indian climate and the common accidents of life for half a century, to visit

their native land in time to drop into the grave, essentially removed far beyond the reach of the most ardent spirit, and sanguine expectation.

Let us view the career of two young men proceeding at the same time to India, one an ensign in His Majesty's army, the other a cadet in the Honorable Company's service. The former of these can obtain the rank of a lieutenant-colonel in eight years, and that, too, by various means, either in the natural course of promotion, by purchase, family interest, or by brevet, which last includes three several roads to that rank, and two out of three even reach the rank of full colonel. Brevet is given for achievements in the field, so that it is not only possible, but sometimes occurs, that these young men commence their first campaign together. In the same field, within a few hundred yards of each other, they are both favored by fortune, and perform deeds which attract the notice of their commander-in-chief. One is rewarded by promotion to a lieutenancy, the other to a petty staff situation, such as the adjutancy of his regiment, when vacant, or a sub-assistant on the general staff. They again meet in the field under the partial influence of fortune, and are again distinguished above their associates in arms. Promotion to a company rewards the lieutenant; the ensign stands fast; he cannot be placed over the heads of those above him in the department; barren praise is his obvious and sole reward; he is however yet young, with a buoyant spirit, and a vigorous constitution,

which is sufficient to support the lofty aspirations of a noble mind. He again enters the lists, borne on the wings of hope, and impelled by emulation, and again meets his early but more fortunate companion in arms, and is again with him advanced in fame. A brevet majority and companionship of the Bath is the merited reward of His Majesty's officer, whilst his no less meritorious comrade continues stationary, or is possibly advanced in the regular course of promotion to a lieutenancy. The advance of the former is accelerated by the claims he derives from the honors he has achieved, and his nomination to a deputy adjutant-generalship, or of a deputy quarter-master-general, gives him the anxiously sought rank of lieutenant-colonel. He may then get the command of a regiment at home, and enjoy, in the spring and prime of life, independence in his native land, amidst his kindred and his friends, and look forward to reaching, in the summer of his days, the elevated and enviable rank of a general officer, by which period his early friend has reached, after a distinguished and honorable service of thirty years, the rank of a lieutenant-colonel: about which period another fortunate officer in His Majesty's army, who has served eight years, arrives upon the same day at the rank to which the Company's veteran soldier has just risen. What is the result that may now occur, and what is the result that must inevitably take place? The former is His Majesty's officer, and may, either by interest or a glorious chance, be promoted to be an aide-de-camp

to His Majesty, which gives him the permanent rank of colonel at once. What is now the second inevitable occurrence? Why, both officers being promoted to lieutenant-colonels' commissions on the same day, His Majesty's officer must take the precedence of the Company's whenever a brevet may be issued by the Crown, notwithstanding the latter arrived at his lieutenant-colonelcy in thirty, and the former in eight years. Here even this paralyzing supercession does not cease, but with a steady and undeviating step pursues its victim till the scene is closed by a shattered constitution, superannuation, and a broken spirit, in which condition he is driven from an ungrateful service in a foreign land, to his native country, where, when he arrives, he will be an isolated being, without rank, and without fortune, full of years, and weighed down by misery. Let us see for a moment the situation of His Majesty's soldier, who retires from the active duties of his profession, for the purpose of enjoying in tranquillity the remaining years of his life. His name, although he may be out of the army, continues in the list, and he retains by courtesy the rank he obtained in the service, and is received accordingly at the court of his own sovereign, as also at every court in Europe. But as if this long string of irreparable grievances was insufficient for the Company's officer, he is, whilst he continues in the performance of the duties of his profession, exposed to every degradation that supercession and a naturally partial commander can heap

upon him. In illustration of which, let us refer to the two most recent occasions—the Burmese war, and the siege of Bhurtpore,—and it will be found that the complaint herein made rests upon a foundation that is not to be shaken. An assertion may be refuted, but a fact is irrefragable. Who were the commandants of the divisions under Colonel Sir A. Campbell? They were generally officers of His Majesty's army. If this be termed an unjust and a cruel partiality, and it be asked why such undue favor was shewn to the officers of one service in prejudice to the rights of those of the other, it may be replied that there was no officer of rank in the Indian army present in the country, to whose talents, experience, energy, physical capacity, and character, such an important trust and arduous undertaking could have been confided, with any reasonable expectation, that the result would prove triumphant. Such a preposterous and unjustifiable reason could not be brought forward, as General Sir John Doveton, of the Madras army, was upon the spot; and the qualities of this distinguished officer of known talents, energy, experience, physical capacity, and knowledge of the character of the elements of which the army was composed, pointed him out as an individual eminently conspicuous and qualified to lead our arms to conquest in a foreign land. But, alas! he was unfit, and rendered so by the commission which he bore; he was a Company's officer, and that alone was sufficient. It therefore followed as a matter of course that as the chief was, so must



his aids be of the royal army. With the merits or conduct of the war we have no business in this place; our object is to draw the consideration of the public authorities to the degraded condition of the Indian army. Let us now turn to Bhurtpore, and we shall find a system of favoritism as unworthy, unjust, and pernicious in its chilling effects upon the hopes and energies of the Indian army, as that we have just left. Two king's major-generals were selected to command, under the commander-in-chief; could there have been a Company's general selected of sufficient talent to entitle him to a command? To this cruel and galling query we can answer in the affirmative. General Sir Gabriel Martindell was on the spot, and commanded at Cawnpore at the time that General Nichol was brought from Calcutta, a distance of one thousand miles. If this is not sufficient, let the treatment which that distinguished and celebrated veteran, Colonel Adams, experienced, speak the rest. He was in command of the citadel, with native troops; precautionary means had been adopted by him; the peace, lives, and properties of the people, as well as the honor of the British arms, were secure under his vigilance. The distinction of such a command was deented beyond the deserts of the colonel and his gallant band. His Majesty's 14th Foot, under Colonel M'Combe, (a junior colonel too) was selected; they marched in, with colours flying, the morning after the place had been taken. The natives under Colonel Adams marched out; the citadel and

part of the city was partially plundered. Such acts require no comment; the most culpable indifference is seldom blind to its own interests; and as those of the public are inseparable from the rights and honor of the Indian army, it is to be expected that the natural desire to preserve the one, will lead to the protection of the other. It is manifest our possessions were won by the valour and devotion of the army, and by it alone can our dominion be retained. Let it be divided, let dissensions be sown between it and His Majesty's army, and our empire will soon pass into other hands, or the numerous nations over whose destinies the genius of Great Britain presides, may be roused into action, and stimulated by the discord observed to reign throughout our army,—be induced to make a desperate struggle to regain an independence, the loss of which they have never ceased to mourn, and for the attainment of which they will never allow a favorable opportunity for making the attempt to pass by unheeded. The time therefore may arrive, and is probably not far distant, when the English nation (unless some remedy be soon applied to the existing evils) may be compelled to lament in the bitterness of unavailing repentance, its unaccountable apathy, and infatuated indifference to the unwise and invidious distinctions introduced into an army, upon whose unanimity and devotion it can alone repose in security.

In calling the notice of the public to this vitally important question, we shall insert in this place a

short extract from the speech of Colonel Cathcart, in the debate upon Mr. Chancellor Pitt's Bill in 1784, which every way merits the mature consideration of the statesmen, who preside over the councils which regulate the government of our Indian possessions. That able officer justly remarks, "Either, Sir, motives of humanity are to induce us to restore to the natives of India those territories which from avarice or ambition we have wrested from them, or motives of policy are to predominate, and we are to attempt by arms to preserve those distant provinces. What, Sir, upon this latter supposition, can be of more immediate consequence than the regulation of those armies which we must maintain, to secure the fidelity of many millions of subjects, whose hearts, God knows, have no reason to be impressed with gratitude for favours already received under our government ?

"Or, what, Sir, calls more loudly for the exercise of our humanity, than the consideration of what comforts we can point out for those soldiers who have embarked for that distant part of the world, in what it was their duty to consider their king's and country's cause ? While we talk here of zeal for the welfare of the state, they have proved theirs by the sweat of their brows, and with their blood."

Our Indian army can never continue in its present state ; it must either improve or deteriorate. It is now destitute of officers of rank, and will very shortly have nothing but old officers in subaltern

situations in its ranks. At present even, we are under the necessity of bringing lieutenant-colonel commandants into situations that should be filled by major-generals, in the possession of both mental and physical capacity. It is really melancholy to observe the systematic indifference with which the interests of our Indian army are treated ; neglect is fast eradicating every sentiment that should be cultivated in a soldier's mind, and every desire that should be cherished in his heart, -- the love of fame, the desire of distinction, gratitude to his employers, and devotion to their service ; without these he will dwindle into a mere mercenary, and prove but a broken reed in the hour of danger. It is obvious, then, that the Indian army must either be reorganized or transferred to the crown, and which of these alterations is to be pursued should be examined with a deliberate, patient and unprejudiced judgment.

In arranging for the improvement of the European officers of our army, the situation of our native officers should not be passed over. We should profit by the example we have before us in the French army previous to the revolution, in which the gentry of the land were debarred rising to rank, emolument and command. The European portion of our Indian armies may be, in some measure, likened to the noblesse of the old French armies ; and assuredly the day will come, unless timely provision be made, when the native gentry of India and the subordinate

native soldiers of our Indian army, will avail themselves of an opportunity to acquire by force, rights in which our policy denies them participation.

We shall conclude this part of our subject by recommending to the consideration of those whose duty it is to watch over our Indian interests, the maxim said in Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* to have existed in France in his time. "We have a maxim in France," replied he, "never to promote officers whose patience hath languished in subaltern offices; we regard them as persons whose understandings are straitened by a narrow sphere of action, and who, accustomed to little things, are become incapable of greater."

Never was there a wiser maxim, nor can there be a more obvious reason for accelerating promotion instead of thwarting it, as we do in our Indian army. We should court its affections, and conciliate its feelings, rather than alienate the one and violate the other, as is done every day by supercession and neglect.

The foregoing sheets were ready for the press before we happened to take up the 70th Number of the *Quarterly Review*, in which, to our astonishment, we read as follows, in page 490.

"That the Sepoy officers and soldiers were afraid of the Burman, there cannot be the smallest doubt; and, indeed, throughout the campaign they never could be safely trusted to lead in an attack, although, in defending a post, they always behaved

well. In the defence of Kemmendine they deserved great credit for their steady behaviour ; but in the attack of the stockades on the 15th December, after their retreat from before Rangoon, when ordered to the assault, the whole battalion actually laid themselves down, and the British troops marched to the assault over them." Again, in the same page, we find the following : — " Colonel Smith was ordered on an expedition a few miles from Rangoon, and from his high opinion of the Native troops, he requested that they alone might be employed in the enterprize. Sir Archibald Campbell indulged him, and the consequence was, that the Burmans, seeing there were no white faces, fought most courageously, and the Sepoys, unable to stand the assault, were panic struck and totally defeated." In page 500 we find stated, " We have strong grounds for believing that the unfortunate business at Barrackpore was, in a great degree, owing to the superstitious dread of the Burmese and their charms, nay, that this idea was not confined to the regiments then and there present, but at the time pervaded the Native soldiery to a very extraordinary extent. Yet these are the troops to whom we mainly owe, and by whom we hold an empire over seventy or eighty millions of people."

We fairly put it to the public. Is it probable that such an act of pusillanimity as is above asserted as a fact, could have occurred in the face of an army and escape observation ? Is it probable that, being

known, it would have been kept concealed? Is it probable that a public staff-officer, in the family of the commander-in-chief, his assistant in the political department, in detailing the proceedings of the army, in which an act, casting indelible disgrace upon the service, occurred, would have been silent upon it, or dared to refrain from expressing the indignation felt by the whole of the troops at such dastardly and ignominious conduct, feeling, as he must have felt, had it taken place, that concealment, in some cases, is as gross a dereliction of the duty of a narrator, as falsely asserting that which he knew to be untrue? Is it probable that a general officer, commanding an army in which a circumstance, pregnant with the utmost danger, threatening even the existence of the state, would presume to keep government in ignorance of that which it deeply concerned it to know and which it was his paramount duty to report? Or is it probable that government, upon being made acquainted with an act which must necessarily have shaken the confidence hitherto placed in an army whose reputation for zeal and courage had never been questioned, would have connived at its own ultimate annihilation, by abstaining from visiting with exemplary severity a cowardly and debased body which had abandoned every claim to consideration, and rendered itself obnoxious to disgrace and punishment? With so many concurring improbabilities opposed to the Quarterly Reviewer's *fact*, we shall leave it to its fate.

The next incident, Colonel Smith's having requested native troops alone to be sent on an expedition a few miles from Rangoon, is given on authority that may "be relied on," in a manner so totally different from the dispatches as published by government, as to render any elaborate notice of it in this place worse than useless. If we are not mistaken, the expedition a few miles from Rangoon was at a distance that occupied a march of twelve hours, the road, for the most part of the way, lying under water; that the enemy, in numbers, were found in a fortified position, and that Colonel Smith's detachment was unfurnished with guns, ladders, or any necessary for an escalade; and that, instead of a few miles, and in a known spot, the enemy was found at so great a distance, that the troops must have been exhausted by their fatiguing and distressing march before they were exposed to the enemy's fire from behind inaccessible stockades. Is the disastrous result of this expedition, or the successful one of the next day, composed entirely of Europeans, equipped with guns and ladders, a matter of astonishment, or a fit occasion for decrying the failure of an expedition which it was morally impossible could succeed under the circumstances of the case? This was, we believe, the second time the native troops had been detached by themselves, and without guns or ladders, to dispossess Burmese troops in positions strongly fortified.\* Sending

\* See the account of Colonel M'Dowell's expedition.



troops on a service in which defeat is nearly certain, would appear an admirable method of depriving them of confidence in themselves, and inspiring "a more than superstitious dread" of the result of attacks which it must have been evident could not succeed. We need not say any thing more upon Colonel Smith's affair. Let the authority that "may be relied on" be produced, until which time the public will pause before it yields credence to mere assertion.

We now come to the last charge brought forward upon "strong grounds," not indeed against any particular body, nor any particular presidency, but an unqualified accusation against the whole "native soldiery," and a more heartless libel never issued from the press.

The affair at Barrackpore had better not have been alluded to. It is wise to abstain from agitating circumstances that cannot but produce evil consequences ; and (to use the words of the late Mr. Huskisson) "not to descend into the arena where honour is not to be won, and where to be vanquished would be disgrace indeed." It behoves those who have had any active concern in participating the tragic event, so cruelly and unjustifiably perverted, to check the folly that would force a discussion, fatal in its effects to the characters of more than those who fell in that calamitous catastrophe. We shall take our leave of this accusation with the remark, that an enquiry into the cause of the occurrences of that fatal day

was instituted. Let the proceedings be given to the world, and if the memory of those who paid the penalty of their crime, with their lives, deserves the opprobrium so lavishly poured upon them and their brethren in arms, we shall retire with sorrow and humiliation from a cause justly meriting the brand of eternal disgrace.

We now come to the climax so exultingly put forth, "Yet these are the troops to whom we mainly owe, and by whom we hold an empire over seventy or eighty millions of people!" We can only reply, Yes, they are the troops, by whom England won, and with whom she must maintain her mighty dominion over seventy or eighty millions of people! Let the above exclamation, issued in the imagined triumph of arrogance, emanate from whence it may, it can only be viewed as a puerile attempt to traduce the reputation of those, who, as soldiers and men, are beyond their imitation, and above their reproach.

It is but lost labour to attack the unsullied honor and gallantry of the native soldiery; for the descendants of men who followed a Clive, a Lawrence, a Coote, a Cornwallis, a Lake, and a Wellington, condemn scurrilous abuse, and may fairly challenge the admiration of all whose applause is worth a soldier's ambition.

Yes, these are the troops who followed those renowned captains with a spirit upon which they could and did rely; and their descendants of the present day, would follow with unabated ardour,

and undeteriorated qualities, any commander who understood their character, respected their prejudices, or regarded their affections.

But let Government, under the fatal spell of infatuation, select officers to command them, whose characters are different from those of the great men, the recollection of whose fostering care, personal worth, and splendid deeds, is fondly cherished by a grateful and admiring posterity, and England may yet have to chaunt a requiem over the departure of that affection to which she owes her dominion in the East.

Sensible of the difficulty of restraining the expression of feelings wantonly violated, we would willingly obey the dictates of a natural repugnance to refute party writers ; but when the misrepresentation of a meritorious and highly distinguished body, whose services and blood have raised a proud monument to our country's glory in a distant land, is abruptly forced upon us, we cannot refrain from expressing our abhorrence of such aspersions.

III IND.

**CONSIDERATION,**

*&c. &c.*

**LONDON:**  
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**CONSIDERATION**  
**OF THE**  
**CLAIMS AND CONDUCT**  
**OF**  
**THE UNITED STATES**  
**RESPECTING THEIR**  
**NORTH EASTERN BOUNDARY,**  
**AND OF THE VALUE**  
**OF THE**  
**BRITISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA.**

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**LONDON:**  
**JOHN HATCHARD AND SON, PICCADILLY.**  
**1826.**



## CONSIDERATION,

§c §c.

THE dominions of Great Britain are so vast in extent, so divided in situation, and so various in their relations, that their general and respective interests must often distract, and sometimes perhaps escape, the attention even of the ablest and most vigilant government. The internal œconomy of a highly civilized and redundant population, and the foreign policy of war or peace in Europe, whose political questions are generally more important, and always more inviting, than those of distant and less cultivated Countries, so entirely engross the public mind, that it is not surprising, if the concerns of some remote and obscurer Provinces of the empire should sometimes meet with less consideration,



than is due, perhaps, either to the claims of that part, or the ultimate results upon the whole.

Examples of this kind are no where so frequently to be found, as in the history of our relations with America. The mistakes committed in the former management of that country, the disasters received in making war, the still greater disasters in making peace with it, may all be imputed to a false estimate, of its character and importance, its resources and increase. For a different degree of political foresight seems necessary for the old and new hemisphere, and anticipations, which would here be thought presumptuous or remote, have there proved comparatively certain and immediate, till it is now generally acknowledged, that the future destinies of our own country must, for good and evil, be principally connected with, or materially influenced by, those of America.

It is indeed an easy thing to console ourselves by turning to the unexampled successes, that have placed the Empire in the proud situation it now holds; but if we wish to consult the real power and permanence of that Empire; and not merely to flatter the nation's vanity on past achievements, it would be well perhaps to look more narrowly to that quarter, which offers least occasion for congratulation: where, however, we

may yet profit by experience, and if we cannot remedy the consequence of former errors, at least prevent their repetition. *For Great Britain still possesses the most valuable portion of the American Continent, and does not know it : and questions are now pending between her and the United States, by which, not only may that value be greatly impaired, but the very possession eventually lost.*

There was once a time, and within the memory of the present age, when almost the whole of North America belonged to the Crown of England : in 1783, the King renounced his rights of propriety and government to a certain portion, which has since formed the United States ; but the exact limits of that portion have never yet been ascertained. By the extraordinary increase, as well of the ceded Provinces as of those retained, what was considered of little moment in 1783, has now become of vital importance. Of the differences which have arisen between the two Governments, respecting their common Boundaries, some have been arranged by discussion before Commissioners, others are ready, on our part at least, for reference to a friendly Power ; and some (the object of the present inquiry) having been referred, are directed by the umpire to be settled by negotia-

tion. The pretensions of the two Governments are widely at variance, and, on the part of the American at least, most tenaciously maintained. In the present state of the question, it can be of little use to consider the arguments, on either side, in support of those pretensions: (negotiation, particularly with America, too commonly involves the idea of compromise :) but it may tend to the right understanding of the difference, to give a short statement of its origin, before entering upon the consequences.

The Provisional Treaty of 1783, by which the independence of the thirteen revolted Colonies was acknowledged, was negotiated on their part, by the profoundest statesman that country has ever produced; a man who, to a thorough acquaintance with the character and interests of America, united the deepest political sagacity, an impenetrable cunning, and most plausible address. It was not without reason perhaps, that he styled the statesmen of that period, as *‘too ignorant to judge, and too proud to learn;’* for he was able to obtain of our Ministry terms, which exceeded the expectation of his own Countrymen, and astonished their Allies. In compliance with his suggestion, or agreeably to his wishes, the Commissioner first sent to meet him, whose knowledge and penetration might

have proved less favourable to the objects had in view, was recalled ; and another substituted, whose qualities were the most opposite and most unequal to his opponent's, and whom, of all mankind perhaps, could he have chosen, he himself would have first selected. It is interesting to learn with how little disguise or moderation the crafty American proceeded to practise on the simplicity of his English admirer. The Loyalists, who had been plundered, persecuted, exiled, ruined, were easily given up, because they had misled the Government, or the Government had misled them. Their claim for compensation was met with demands of satisfaction for the damages done by them, and by the King's troops. Rights of fishery, which the most friendly nation in Europe had never the assurance to ask, were conceded, as a boon indeed, but a most politic one, to efface the memory of the past, and ensure a sincere reconciliation for the future. Whatever could not be demanded for the right of his own nation, was claimed for the benefit of ours. It was urged, (a remarkable coincidence with the opinions of certain æconomists of the present day,) that the real interests of Great Britain would be best promoted, by the surrender to the new Republic, of Canada and Nova Scotia ; and it was even suggested,

as a corollary to the same argument, that to secure her permanent prosperity, on that side of the Atlantic, it was only necessary to throw in the West Indies. The figure Mr. Oswald presents, at such a game, surrounded by the four American commissioners, Franklin, Adams, Jay, and Laurens, recalls the story lately circulating in the morning papers, of Lord Nottingham among the Sharpers, one of whom reproached his companions with wasting their time in gambling with such a flat, '*pick the fool's pocket at once and send him home.*' How easy had it then been for Great Britain, to have prescribed such limits as she thought fit. The Kennebec on the east; the Ohio on the west; and such a Line of boundary on the north, as should have secured to us the vast tract of vacant land between their settlements and the Lakes. They had no reason to claim, nor ability to enforce, a pretence to any thing more. Their ally, the King of France, it is now known, was well disposed, both to confine them to narrower limits, and to exclude them from the fisheries. But Mr. Oswald's mercantile ideas were alarmed with the threat, that though peace indeed might be procured on such terms, a good understanding, and above all, a renewal of commercial intercourse, could never be obtained, without more

liberal concessions : as if either nations or individuals could long be induced to trade from any other motives, than reciprocal advantage, or any advantages were elsewhere to be found superior to the British market. Accordingly a Boundary was settled and described, by which a vast extent of territory, exceeding that of the whole revolted Colonies together, already valuable for its trade in furs, and which has since become populous and powerful, was given, as a premium to rebellion, to establish the new Republic, and furnish, as it has ever since, an important part of their financial resources, and the means of almost infinite increase. A faint attempt was indeed made, to reserve some part of the western territories, as an asylum for the exiled Loyalists ; but Dr. Franklin *did not like such neighbours*, as he haughtily says ; and Mr. Oswald thought it better to offer all, as an atonement to our enemies, than retain any, as provision for our friends. It may be that the wounded pride of the Country, or Government, found some consolation in sending a man of this description to treat with the Americans, as though the disgrace of negotiating with Rebels could be alleviated or concealed by the obscurity of the negotiator ; (or was it that an Administration, every member of which had protested in parlia-

ment that the *war was unjust*, found themselves bound to act in office, consistently with their opinions in opposition?) but such unworthy indulgence either to the contempt, or indifference, or the party-spirit, of that period, has cost much to the best interests of every other. The boundary is thus described in the second article of the treaty :

“ From the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia,  
 “ viz. that Angle, which is formed by a line  
 “ drawn due north from the Source of St. Croix  
 “ River to the *Highlands*, along the said *High-*  
 “ *lands*, which divide those Rivers that empty  
 “ themselves into the *River St. Lawrence*, from  
 “ those which fall into the *Atlantic Ocean*, to  
 “ the north-western-most head of the Connecti-  
 “ cut River ; thence down along the middle of  
 “ that River, to the forty-fifth degree of north  
 “ latitude ; from thence by a line due west in  
 “ said latitude until it strikes the River Iroquois  
 “ or Cataraguy ; thence along the middle of said  
 “ River into Lake Ontario ; through the middle  
 “ of said Lake until it strikes the communication  
 “ by water, between that Lake and Lake Erie ;  
 “ thence along the middle of said communica-  
 “ tion into Lake Erie ; through the middle of  
 “ said Lake, until it arrives at the water com-  
 “ munication between that Lake and Lake

“ Huron; thence along the middle of said water  
 “ communication into Lake Huron; thence  
 “ through the middle of said Lake to the water  
 “ communication between that Lake and Lake  
 “ Superior; thence through Lake Superior  
 “ northward to the Isles Royal and Philipeaux,  
 “ to the Long Lake; thence through the middle  
 “ of said Long Lake and the water communica-  
 “ tion between it and the Lake of the Woods  
 “ to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through  
 “ the said Lake to the most north-western point  
 “ thereof; and from thence on a due west course,  
 “ to the River Mississippi; thence by a line to  
 “ be drawn along the middle of the said River  
 “ Mississippi until it shall intersect the northern-  
 “ most part of the thirty-first degree of north  
 “ latitude;—South, by a line to be drawn due  
 “ east from the determination of the line last  
 “ mentioned in the latitude of thirty-one degrees  
 “ north of the Equator to the middle of the River  
 “ Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along  
 “ the middle thereof to its junction with Flint  
 “ River; thence straight to the head of St. Mary’s  
 “ River; and thence down along the middle of  
 “ of St. Mary’s River to the Atlantic Ocean;  
 “ —East, by a line to be drawn along the middle  
 “ of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the



“ Bay of Fundy, to its source ; and from its  
 “ source directly north to the aforesaid High-  
 “ lands, which divide the rivers which fall  
 “ into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall  
 “ into the river St. Lawrence ; comprehending  
 “ all islands within twenty leagues of any part  
 “ of the shores of the United States, and lying  
 “ between lines to be drawn due east from the  
 “ points where the aforesaid boundaries between  
 “ Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Flo-  
 “ rida on the other, shall respectively touch *the*  
 “ *Bay of Fundy*, and *the Atlantic Ocean*, ex-  
 “ cepting such islands as now are, or heretofore  
 “ have been, within the limits of the said Pro-  
 “ vince of Nova Scotia.”

Mr. Oswald returned to England, to weep,  
 (he burst into tears), when convinced of what he  
 had betrayed ; and Franklin, to exult, and tell  
 his English friends, *they had now nothing to do*  
*but send deputies to the American Congress ;*  
 a jest, which excited but a smile in ~~those~~ days,  
 would provoke a sneer in these, but which yet  
 may have tears for posterity.

This Treaty was scarcely more injurious for its  
 enormous concessions, than its uncertainty in  
 defining the limits of what was still retained.  
 The questions that necessarily arose were many

and difficult, and the subtilty of the American government has contrived to add others, less obvious perhaps, but more vexatious. Of these, some have been settled, greatly to the dissatisfaction of our fellow subjects in that quarter, but among those which are still undetermined, it is the NORTH-EASTERN BOUNDARY, which involves the most serious consequences, and towards which it is the object of these pages, to solicit some attention. On this side, the first difficulty was, to ascertain which River was meant by the designation of St. Croix, and what branch of that River was its source; for our politic statesman had commenced his Boundary from a point altogether unknown, to be discovered by reference to another point equally uncertain, a River, whose mouth, and source, and name, were in dispute. By the treaty of 1794 this difference was referred to Commissioners. They disagreed. In that case, they were to nominate an umpire. A most unequal compromise was suggested and adopted. The British Commissioner was to have the nomination, but the umpire to be a Citizen of the United States. A person so chosen could hardly have been expected to decide otherwise, than that the Schoodic was the river St. Croix, and its *most eastern branch* the source; though, if the ancient boundaries of Nova Scotia de-

served any consideration, its charter had in express and very forcible terms appointed, *the most Western fountain or spring.*

The labours of this Commission extended no further than to ascertain the river St. Croix, and the point of commencement for the North line. The termination at THE HIGHLANDS, that is, the North-west Angle of N<sup>o</sup>va Scotia, remained unexplored. In this state of the question, the war of 1812 intervened; and the peace of 1815 was made, without any further settlement of the dispute, than the appointment of a second Commission; (except indeed that by inserting in the treaty the name of ‘*Grand Manan*,’ the Americans were admitted to add a new claim, which had never before been heard or imagined, and which was so ruinous to us, and so untenable in them, that it has been happily compromised by some minor sacrifice.) These Commissioners could not agree. The Emperor of Russia, to whom, agreeably to the treaty, the question was referred, decided that the parties should arrange it by negotiation. And negotiations for that purpose, it is believed, are now pending.

The spirit and intention of the Treaty of 1783, seem clearly to have been, to establish, between the two countries in this quarter, what is termed

an *arcifinius* BOUNDARY, such a line of separation, as should give to neither party the advantages for attack, but serve mutually for the defence of both, or especially of that, whose dominions were most likely to be invaded. Accordingly, having first recorded their regard "for the reciprocal advantages and mutual conveniences of both Nations," and their design "to settle the boundary upon such principles of liberal equity and reciprocity, that partial advantages, those seeds of discord, being excluded, such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the two Countries may be established, as may promote and secure to both perpetual peace," they proceed to delineate the only Land-marks, and to lay down the only principle, which in this quarter, could answer such ends, viz. *that Chain of Highlands which should divide the heads of Rivers, whose mouths and courses were within the actual Provinces of the respective claimants.* Thus the party possessing the mouth of any stream, would possess also its whole course to the fountain head. This was obviously the most equitable adjustment, and the most natural boundary. The entire course of the Penobscot, the Kennebec, and other Rivers, flowing into the Atlantic ocean,

would be thus secured to the United States, and a reciprocal advantage afforded to us in the possession of the Chaudiere, and other streams, that discharged their waters within our territories. Between two nations no separation is so distinct, no barrier so effectual, as a mountainous frontier; and as Rivers, in new countries, are the great High-ways of nature, and almost the only means of communication and transport, any other division must give to one party a most unequal advantage for invasion in war, and to both, continual disputes in trade and navigation in time of peace. The Line of separation was therefore to be drawn “from the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia, that is, the Angle formed by a due north line drawn from the source of the St. Croix to the HIGH LANDS, *along the said High Lands*, dividing the waters that fall into the Atlantic, from those that fall into the river St. Lawrence, to the North-western Head of the Connecticut river.” Now as no part of the British possessions, in this quarter (their western boundary being the St. Croix) touched the Atlantic, nor of the American the St. Lawrence, the principle and object of the treaty evidently was, *to give them the Heads of the Rivers that*

*flowed to the Ocean into and through their Territory, and us, of those that flowed into and through ours.* Indeed, the description in the treaty, coupled with this fact just stated, must be considered as quite synonymous with this interpretation.

Perhaps the fairest and most intelligible manner of stating the difference between the two Governments is this. The source of the St. Croix is ascertained: the North line surveyed: there are some where High Lands that divide the streams to the Atlantic from those to the St. Lawrence, because the Kennebec and the Chaudiere, Rivers of respectable magnitude, flow, in contrary directions, from neighbouring sources, on opposite sides of the same Heights, the latter to the St. Lawrence, the former to the ocean. So far are both parties agreed. The description of the treaty is in these points fully answered, according to the interpretation of both Countries. But the difficulty is, *that North Line, in which both parties acquiesce, does not intersect those High Lands, upon which both are agreed.* It was in this light perhaps that the question presented itself to the Russian Government, who seem to have considered this circumstance as *an omitted case*, which was most proper, (or most expedient), to be settled by