Empire's debt; and (3) the claims of those now employed in the Covenanted and Uncovenanted Services. These interests, combined or singly, are so powerful that the question of giving up India to the Indians and the British retire from the land once and for all, may be dismissed from the mind. There is no conceivable Power in the East which could occupy our place and give us fair compensation for the 'going concern' which we hold in our hands. It goes without saying that these 'interests,' representing perhaps five hundred millions sterling, would not be 'confiscated' without a struggle.

It is not necessary seriously to consider such a contingency as the British retirement, 'bag and baggage' from India. For good or for evil,—so far the good above and beyond one important consideration is hard to find,—the highest concerns of England and India are bound together. We cannot, if we would, give up our great Eastern Empire. Nor, in spite of the discontent which is widely prevalent among our Indian fellow-subjects, is it, in the opinion of this writer, at all likely that we shall ever be driven from the scene of our rule by force of arms.

The situation, therefore, which has to be faced, necessarily involves the maintenance of our connection with India. The writer cannot forbear stating that he, for one, regarding the weal of the two hundred and fifty millions rather than the increased wealth of the thirty-five millions, extremely regrets that this is the case. He would rather, in the interest of the principle of

nationalities and for the development of divers races, see India with as many nations as has Europe, each progressive in its own way and not kept in a particular orbit by the centripetal force of a mighty power, but without the provocation to conflict and the frequent conflicts which are marked characteristics of European State existence. To hope for such a consummation as that, however, is to cry for the moon, and to strive for it is to expend effort in an entirely fruitless direction. Such a doctrine of perfection is too high for us as a nation; we cannot, as a people, attain thereunto.

We are not, therefore, in a *cul de sac*, shut up to the conclusion that all things, as they exist in India in this year of grace, are ideally perfect, in precisely that happy condition which a Beneficent Providence would desire, or even as cultivated and thoughtful human beings, animated by a spirit of justice, would wish; nor need we suppose Indian administration to be an Ark of the Covenant, to touch even the fringe of which would lead to the fate of Uzzah the son of Abinadab falling upon the rash and unanointed individual. On the contrary, this one thing is absolutely certain that Indian administration cannot long remain in its present position. The waters are rising,—we, by our educational arrangements, have opened the flood-gates,—and it is for us to provide channels through which they may flow. Otherwise, we shall find them,—not sweep us from the country, but,—the occasion of terrible mischief and cruel suffering. What is more: the feeling in England, so far as it has, at present, any coherence, any understandable voice, is glad to know

the waters are rising, and will resent any damming with the view of keeping them back. English opinion, the opinion of the millions who now, through the ballot boxes, are omnipotent, once touched with a knowledge of the actual physical suffering in India, especially in British India, and excited (as they easily may become excited) with the knowledge of the manner in which every avenue to distinction in their own land is closed against the people of India and the best places occupied by Englishmen,—English opinion, once informed and touched with this potent twin-fact, will make short work of the existing *regime*, and will replace it with another and a better. Especially, when it becomes clear, as a little consideration will show that it may become clear, such immense relief can be given and justice done without breaking a single engagement or imperilling the investment of a single five-pound note. Many years of democratic rule in Britain will not be required to carry out such reforms as shall vastly ameliorate the condition and raise the status of the average Indian, as well as make provision for the hopes of the intelligent and wisely-ambitious Indian.

Lord Canning, three years after the Mutiny, in a couple of sentences, indicated the first step to be taken. In what is known as The Adoption Despatch, his Excellency said:—

'Should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in the Native States.'

Again,—

'Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards Native States.'

That is the first step,—To make secure beyond all doubt, the existing Indian States.

The second step is,—To create more and more Indian States, until the whole Empire shall become a congeries of such States.

In those ways alone lies safety. Lord Canning had good reason to speak well of the loyalty of Indian Princes and Indian Statesmen to the British Over-Lord. He was Governor-General when the Mutiny broke out and remained in office until peace was ensured and security reigned. Those Native Indian States which he highly eulogises were so many barriers of loyalty; they broke the force of the onrush of rebellion, and rendered comparatively easy the task of overthrow and subjection. With the exception of one or two minor States, too small to be taken into account, the Indian States throughout that trying period, stood firmly by British supremacy. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharajahs Scindia and Holkar, and the late Maharajah of Jeypore, to take the leading Princes, remained staunchly loyal. It was not in Feudatory, but in British, India that the Mutiny broke out. Not Native-Indian, but British, misgovernment caused the outrush of violence. If a sense of gratitude were one of the attributes of

administration frequently displayed instead of capriciously (if ever) exhibited, those who are anxious for the stability of our rule in India would take care that the Nizam, Scindia and Holkar were fostered instead of, as, unfortunately (and discreditably) is the case, flouted. The truth of Lord Canning's remarks was demonstrated five years ago. On the outbreak of the war with Afghanistan the Indian Princes vied one with another in their offers of troops for service beyond the frontier. Ensured against annexation, preserved from Residential meddlesomeness and intrigue, and encouraged in the arts and practice of civilized governments with statesmanlike prescience, the Native-Indian States might soon be regarded as among the most trustworthy and resolute supporters of British supremacy. Unless a course of encouragement is followed so as to lead to this end it is quite certain that the sword which would otherwise be a sturdy weapon of offence will pierce the hand that holds it. There will be no Mutiny, but there will be continued unsettlement and disquiet.

CHAPTER II.

THE time has come to hark back to the wise words of Lord Canning. An anonymous contributor to *The Times*, whose letters on 'The Armies of the Native States of India,' recently appeared in the leading journal and attracted some attention, has published them in a collected form.* The republication is dedicated to the Earl of Dufferin, and we are told 'the student of history can hardly fail to recognise the probability of his having to imitate, in more than one particular, the policy of his great predecessor, Lord Dalhousie.'† Read in the light of the chapters which follow, only one inference can be drawn from the significant reference to Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie is chiefly remembered as the foe to independent or semi-independent Indian States. Annexation was his watch-word; annexation was his policy. In the passage quoted Lord Dufferin is clearly exhorted to end the disputes which worry the great men of the Calcutta Foreign Office by annexing the States: if by asking for justice

* Chapman and Hall, London.

† Lord Dufferin has already shown the manner in which he is disposed to treat this suggestion. Replying, on December 13, 1884, to an address from the Calcutta Municipality, he mentioned the names of preceding Governor-Generals whom he should strive to imitate. They were Cornwallis, Bentinck, Canning and Mayo. Dalhousie's name was conspicuous by its absence.

they provide a pretext so much the better for the annexationists; if the Princes and their Ministers are circumspect and loyal a pretext must be manufactured anyhow,—by fair means or by foul, the Feudatories must become Provinces and a series of palaces provided near Garden Reach for the Nizam, for Scindia, for Holkar, for the Begum of Bhopal; thereby the loneliness of the ex-King of Oudh will be mitigated. If there be no other reason for annexation, surely this kind consideration for a dethroned monarch is sufficient.

The collection of letters to which reference is now being made is one of the saddest conceivable instances of the maleficent influence which Indian bureaucracy can exert upon the generally fair mind of an Englishman. No lawyer's brief was ever more one-sided than are these communications. Truths are suppressed; suggestions are offered which are utterly untrue. Among the latter this remark may serve as a specimen. 'Nor are the shortcomings of these [*i.e.*, the Native Indian] administrations restricted to military expenditure. The *régime* is bad and it is costly. The Chief thinks only of hoarding up his treasure, and resents as an infraction of his right any request to expend it in the public cause.' Against no one is the parable taken up so viciously or urged with so much persistency as against the Nizam of Hyderabad and his Minister. The reader has had opportunity, in preceding pages, of judging how public-spirited and wise the Nizam's administration has been he can see for himself how utterly baseless is the assertion. From that assertion the partial and unfair

character of the whole work may be judged. The author surveys Native India, as he says, from the Himalayas to Adam's Bridge, and nowhere sees so much as a single redeeming feature. All is rotten; all is vile; even by accident good cannot come out of any Indian Nazareth. By the same reasoning everything done by the British and in British Districts is immaculate. When Sir Galahad discovered, after much search, the Holy Grail, it was not more mystic, wonderful, good, than, according to *The Times*' anonymous correspondent, is the English administration of India. So shockingly unfair is this work, which has been published while the writer of these pages is concluding his humble attempt to enlighten his countrymen on certain Indian matters, so incorrect (not to say false) are many of the statements put forward respecting much maligned races, that if he had not already undertaken the self-imposed task now before the reader he would have felt called upon, in the interest of common fairness, to attempt some such duty. There is too much reason to fear that these letters are a *balloon d'essai* put out to see which way the wind blows, and to ascertain whether it would be safe for Lord Dufferin to out-Dalhousie Lord Dalhousie and leave not a single spot on the map of India unmarked by the British red. Those who believe fairness and freedom should be the same for all men whatever the colour of their skin had need to be on the alert: there is mischief brewing.

The conclusion arrived at by *The Times*' favoured correspondent (favoured inasmuch as the largest news-

paper type and unlimited space were placed at his disposal by the most influential journal of the day) is that the armies of the Indian States must be abolished forthwith, and if the Princes object then they too must, be abolished. Certain figures regarding those armies are given. There can be little doubt the statements are exaggerated; in one or two instances they are clearly inexact. For example, on page 94, it is stated, 'A small army alone is maintained [in Mysore], and although the Maharajah has the right to keep up 2,000 cavalry and the same number of infantry, the force actually under arms does not much exceed one-fourth of that total.' There is a better authority on this point than the anonymous writer. Mr. Seshadri Iyer, the Minister of Mysore, was recently in counsel with the chief inhabitants of the State and laid before them the sad, half-ruined condition of the finances through British mis-government.* In his statement the Minister, discussing possible retrenchment, pointed out that the annual military expenditure was Rs. 7,38,009, that the soldiery consisted of three regiments of Silladar horse and three regiments of infantry. The total numerical strength is about 3,500 men, and the cost per man about Rs. 200 per annum.† For argument's sake, however, the writer's assertions throughout his series of letters may be taken as correct.

* Our author alludes to English interference as beneficial, and adds, 'The Mysoreans are only taxed at the same rate as if they were the immediate subjects of the Queen.' His information about Mysore seems antediluvian, that is, before the Famine of 1876-77.

† *Madras Mail*, Oct. 28, 1884.

This done, the endeavour will be made to prove that, so far from these armies constituting a reason why the Indian States should be abolished, they, on the contrary, provide a way whereby the most pressing problem of easing the taxation of the people and providing higher and better prospects for those worthy of them may be secured. The summarised statement given is as follows :—

STATES.	MEN.	GUNS.
1. The Mahratta States	59,600	116
2. The Hindoo States	188,475	3,096
3. Cashmere	27,000	160
4. The Mahomedan States	74,760	865
Totals	349,835	4,237

Having placed these figures on record, we may leave them for a while, and somewhat fully consider a reconstructive policy.

In glancing ahead in India there are three things, which have already been insisted upon, to be borne in mind. They may be stated thus.—

First,—British supremacy cannot be shaken, and, in the interests of all, it is undesirable that it should be overthrown ;

Second, — That administration in Native-Indian States is carried on with greater benefit to the inhabitants than is government in the British Provinces; and that, in the employment of Indians in the various offices of the State, and in the promotion of local industries, the good of the respective peoples is greatly promoted;

Third, — These points having been proved, and

always bearing in mind that the one object in view is that of ensuring the greatest good of the greatest number, the duty is imperative to show how it can be accomplished.

Perhaps the writer cannot make the views he humbly and with diffidence ventures to press upon the attention of his countrymen, and,—if they are found worthy of acceptance to ask for support in attempting their realization,—more clear than by putting them in a series of statements, amplifying each statement as occasion may show to be necessary.

CHAPTER III.

OUR attitude towards the Indian Princes should be changed. They must, henceforth, be regarded in the light of associates, and invited to co-operate with the supreme authorities in the good and effectual government of the Empire. Allowing for necessary change brought about by the altered circumstances of the case, the example of Germany towards the various States of Central Europe and their relationship towards the Emperor William should be followed.

On the first of January, 1877, on the historic Plain of Delhi a COUNCIL OF THE EMPIRE was called into existence. It was, probably, modelled after the similitude of the British Privy Council. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom and Empress of India, it was stated, 'being desirous of seeking from time to time in matters of importance the counsel and advice of the Princes and Chiefs of India, and of thus associating them with the Paramount Power in a manner honorable to themselves and advantageous to the general interests of the Empire,' nominated twenty Princes, Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, Members of the Viceroy's Council and others to be Councillors of the Empire. The Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and Members

of the Viceroy's Council were *ex-officio* members only. In that Council may be found the germ of a regenerated India and an England satisfied that she is in reality acting in her Eastern realms worthily of her name and reputation and in accordance with her highest and best wishes.

The Council of the Empire has, so far as appears on the face of things, remained what it was on the day of its creation, a Paper Council and nothing more. Nobody has ever heard of its assemblings. Has anyone seen a notification to the effect that the successors to the Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and Members of the Viceroy's Council in 1877 have been nominated to the honourable office of Imperial Councillor? The creation of the Council was the one good thing of the Delhi Assemblage. Let it be reconstituted, and let it receive a representative—either the reigning Prince or his Minister, the latter for choice — from each Indian State, and, among its members let there be all the officials mentioned in the original document. The Council should have a regular session, meeting for, say, a month or more in each year in some central locality, and to this body might be entrusted the consideration of and decisions concerning:—

(1) All military affairs, including the strength of the Imperial Forces, the location of troops, etc.;

(2) Foreign Affairs, for discussion, not for decision: decision should be left with the Viceroy's Cabinet, in which there should be a moiety of Indians;

(3) The Finances of the Empire;

(4) On a presentation of Reports from all the States and Provinces of the Empire (the Reports should be rigorously insisted upon from every State and Province, however small), consideration thereof, with open debate on merits and demerits in various modes of government.

The Queen-Empress has declared that it is her desire to associate the Princes and Chiefs of India with the Paramount Power 'in a manner honourable to themselves and advantageous to the general interests of the Empire.' In no way probably, certainly in no way yet described, could this worthy object be so well achieved as by making the Council of the Empire a reality, by enlisting the co-operation of the Princes and Chiefs in the Empire's Government, and thereby binding up all their interests with the interests of the Paramount Power. In a word they themselves would become depositories of that power and sharers in the exercise thereof. Half the sting to the people at large, would be taken out of decrees to which the Representatives of India themselves were parties.

The work undertaken by the Council should be of a very select character. The Councillors should deal only with the broad aspects of imperial questions. No detail affecting any particular State or Province should be submitted or considered save under certain contingencies for which special provision might be made. To this end another Reform, affecting principally, the

British Provinces, is urgently required. It should, if things could be arranged in logical sequence, be antecedent to the other, but may, not unfitly, come into being side by side with it. I refer to PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS for Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab. The essential features of this suggestion may be thus set forth :—

(1) A Presidency or Provincial Assembly, in which the members of the Executive Council, H.E. the Governor excepted, should have seats *ex officio*; also the Advocate General or chief law adviser of the Administration. In this Assembly, in addition, should sit (*a*) the Collectors (chief administrators of districts larger than many English counties); (*b*) European, Eurasian and Indian nominated members; and (*c*) European, Eurasian, and Indian elected members. Qualification for a vote might be found in the jury lists, proved ownership of landed property, a holding not less than [five] acres, or payment of the profession tax. (An Assembly should, for the present, be so constituted as to leave the Government a majority on any matter which might arouse much discussion and occasion great interest, or in relation to a measure which the rulers felt the interests of the country demanded should be carried, even though the majority of the Assembly thought otherwise.)

(2) To such an Assembly *Financial Control* should be given to this extent, viz., with the exception of Fixed Establishments, which should be discussed only with the consent of the Governor-General in Council first asked for and obtained, every vote of money should be open to scrutiny and question; and (if permission had previously been given to Government Members to vote as they thought fit) on a majority being recorded against any particular vote, it could not be passed.

(3) Non-official members to have the right to put questions to Government on their general policy, or on any public matter whatsoever.

(4) Non-official members to have the right to introduce Bills not dealing with public funds.

(5) The Budget to be annually presented, and debated upon. No money to be spent until the same had been voted, Fixed Establishments excepted.

(6) The Assembly to meet at certain fixed periods of the year.

(7) The Governor-General in Council to have the power to veto any Bill or Money Vote, subject to appeal to the Secretary of State for India, or to the Home Government.

So far as finances and magnitude of interests are concerned, the respective Parliaments would not suffer in

dignity for want of affairs of sufficient importance to consider. This will appear from the following figures :—

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF PROVINCES IN 1883.

Presidency or Province.	Population.	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.
		£	£	£
Bengal and Assam	71,572,882	18,577,272	8,372,796	10,204,476
North-Western Provinces and Oudh	44,107,869	8,873,058	3,962,536	4,910,522
Panjab	18,850,437	4,465,118	3,307,009	1,158,109
Central Provinces	9,838,791	1,479,180	997,922	481,258
British Burma	3,736,711	2,702,086	1,493,702	1,308,354
Madras	30,868,504	9,462,756	7,233,315	2,229,461
Bombay	16,489,274	10,644,657	9,929,731	714,929

During ten years—1872 to 1881—the various divisions of the Empire handed to the Supreme Government the sum of £108,741,649, as is shown in the annexed table :—

Presidency or Province:	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Difference. Deficit.	Average. Deficit.	Surplus.
	£	£	£	£	£
India	61,715,351	163,362,350	101,646,999 Surplus.	10,164,699	..
Bengal (including Assam)	172,609,876	72,418,066	100,191,810	..	10,019,181
North-Western Provinces (including Oudh)	78,487,544	31,364,975	47,122,569	..	4,712,256
Punjab	37,834,667	23,377,568	14,457,099	..	1,445,709
Central Provinces ..	11,058,116	7,517,528	4,540,588	..	454,058
British Burmah ..	17,598,902	9,158,855	8,440,047	..	844,004
Madras	84,881,564	69,066,663	15,814,901	..	1,581,490
Bombay	103,177,947	82,356,313	20,821,634	..	2,082,163
	£567,363,967	£458,622,318	£108,741,649	£10,164,699	£21,138,861
England ..	5,653,556	118,243,805	112,590,249*		
Total ..	£573,017,523	£576,866,123	£3,848,600	* Deficit.	

The whole of the surplus, and twelve millions sterling beside, were expended, on official account, in England.

There is no reason why, being charged with the general oversight and administration of the whole Empire, the Supreme Government, through the Council of the Empire, should not have the control of the sums now annually paid into the Treasury at Calcutta, and several millions beside, the latter to come from the Native-Indian States under circumstances and for purposes to be immediately stated. Enough, it is contended, is shown here in the mere statement of the large sums which the respective Parliaments would, in the expenditure on administration and public works, have to control; in short, the whole expenditure on maintenance and recuperation would be under the control of those who provided the money. The question of deciding upon warfare would continue the concern, as it now is, of the supreme authorities, who, in the criticism and acts of the several Assemblies would find a wholesome and proper check on their actions. These Assemblies would have to find the money needed for an adventurous policy and would, accordingly, have something to say about the carrying out of that policy.

Discontent with the British as such, in the not unnatural and certainly not ignorant impatience of taxation felt by the Eastern as fully as by the Western, would in a very large degree vanish. The people themselves would be associated with us in what we did and would have a Yea or Nay to express to our proposals. Half their discontent would be disarmed.

Through the working of these Presidency Assemblies Indians of capacity would be so trained as to become fit

for any post in the Empire, and no office should be closed to any man whose fitness for it is apparent or has been proved. Beyond our national prejudice (and it must be confessed, insular conceit) there is no reason why, even now, an Indian Financier should not occupy the position of Finance Minister in the Viceroy's Council. Given Presidency and Provincial Parliaments, with control of expenditure, and the prejudice now existing would, of necessity, speedily vanish not only in the particular just mentioned, but in all others likewise.

Coincident with the changes described should come others which would exercise a direct and not altogether pleasing, influence on a particular section of the English people. It would not, in the event considered, be possible to keep sufficiently able Indians out of the posts of Collectors, Secretaries of Departments, and the like. Probably, if there were sufficient wisdom and adequate good sense in the present generation of Britons and Anglo-Indians to allow of such reforms as have been described being carried out, there would not be lacking strength of mind and will to anticipate and to discount the contingency to which reference is now being made and to provide for it in the following, or some other feasible way, namely, to announce that, on and after a certain date, of the Indian appointments now open, by competitive examination to English youth, only one-fifth would be continued. Where now the Civil Service is recruited by one hundred persons only twenty should be accepted. Probably, for a generation or two, such an arrangement might stand fast:

even Indians themselves would admit that they would not suffer by a 'stiffening' of their ranks with a fair proportion of Englishmen. Not a little of the merit attending Sir Salar Jung's reforms in Hyderabad arose from the fact that he took English models and adapted them to Indian requirements; those models thus transmogrified, obtained a flexibility in working and adaptability to varied circumstances, to which, previously, they had been entire strangers.

The beneficial consequences of the adoption of the course recommended, or some such similar course, would be immediately apparent. First and foremost, home ability would be brought to bear upon the solution of home questions, and many costly blunders, which now occur through ignorance, would be avoided. Next, and of great economic importance, when the reform had worked into thoroughness, two consequences would follow,—(1) The duties required in the government of the State being performed by persons accustomed to the country, working in their own clime, salaries would be lowered, to the great relief of the taxpayer; and (2) two-thirds of the money paid for salaries and in emoluments generally would be spent in the country, and would be available for expenditure on higher-class education, among local tradesmen, and in a host of ways in the promotion of trade and industry. The 'turn-over' of money, and all the benefits circulation of money produces, would take place *in India* and be enjoyed *by Indians* (native or resident) instead of in Europe and for the benefit of European men of business. In this way, and

in this way alone, would what are termed 'English interests' suffer. Only a select and privileged class simply would be affected. These sectional interests, moreover, would, as will be shortly shown, be over-borne by the general greater benefit accruing, not less to the trade of England than to the general well-being of India.

The adoption of large and generous reforms of the character described, would not stop with the indirect yet very substantial benefits just detailed. Cease to regard the Indian Princes and Chiefs with suspicion, deal with them on the high and noble basis set forth in Lord Lytton's speech at the Delhi Assemblage, respect their sovereign rights when and where those rights do not conflict with the general rights of humanity, and the Viceroy would find the Princes co-operating with him in all that is for the general good of the Empire. If Indian Princes have been staunchly loyal in the face of such treatment as they have been compelled to endure in recent and distant years, but especially recently, from inappreciative and selfish administrators, what might not be expected from them if they were dealt with in a worthy and generous manner and associated, in a liberal and trusting spirit, with us in the high acts of supreme government? At present they are betwixt the Devil and the Deep Sea. The anonymous writer on the armies of the Indian States, to whom reference has been made, seems to rejoice at this condition of things. At least he quotes, in his Preface, a remark said to have been made by one of the Chiefs of the North-West when it was debated whether surrender

to Runjeet Singh or to the English was preferable. The Chief exclaimed, 'It is death for us in either event. If we are caught in the grip of Runjeet Singh we shall die with the sharp pangs of Asiatic cholera. If we come under the shadow of the British we shall pine away of slow consumption.' 'The prediction, although not realised at the time,' adds the Indian-hater, 'may prove true.' There is, however, no real reason why the British influence on Native Indian Princes should be of a withering character. The statement that it is so is the strongest possible indictment of our rule. The British people do not desire that it should be so, and, what is more, once they appreciate the situation, will not have it so. Yet, farther, they may one day demand an account from those who have degraded the British name by their unjust treatment of Feudatory Princes, and Chiefs, and Peoples.

CHAPTER IV.

A properly-constituted Council of the Empire, and an association of the Princes and Chiefs with us in the great task of ruling wisely and well the whole of India would put new life into their veins, and, what is more, provide a solution at one and the same time of the double danger of (1) the over-taxation of the people and (2) the continued existence of the Native State armies as independent forces.

Associate the Princes with the over-ruling Power in its task, treat them generously,—give the Nizam the Berars, hand over to Scindiah the fort at Gwalior, after having impoverished and partly denuded the State of Mysore of its population do not insist upon the increased tribute which the Maharajah cannot pay, without grinding the faces of his subjects, deal in like fashion with all the Princes: act thus, and the supreme government may then, with the concurrence of the respective rulers, take the armies of the Native States as a wing of the Imperial army and reduce its own forces. In the Council of the Empire military affairs would be dealt with, and the Princes and Chiefs, either in their own persons or in the persons of their representatives would have a share in the disposal of those

forces. Their soldiers would be enrolled members of an Imperial army. They themselves would become in reality Generals in the British forces, instead of, as in the cases of Scindiah and Holkar at the present moment, mocked with the shadow of that position. Ample compensation would, by the adoption of the various courses mentioned, be provided for the barren honour now possessed. The Princes, in such instance, would receive more than they gave. The British Raj, on the other hand, would lose nothing; it, also, would gain greatly. No longer would British Forces be required to watch and neutralize Native-Indian Forces. The one purpose of the combined army would be of a military character and its operations carried on only in opposition to a common enemy. Wielding the whole armed power of the Empire the Viceroy, on occasion, could stamp out disaffection in any one locality with the concurrence and goodwill of the majority. All the irritation and attrition which now mark military relations between the Supreme Government and the respective States would come to an end. An end, too, would be put to the silly vapourings of critics who reckon rust-eaten and dismounted guns as though they had just come from the Armstrong Foundries. In place of useless weapons, serviceable guns would be served to every battery and to each regiment.

This realized, and it is in every whit practicable, it may be well to note the consequences financially; these likewise would be of a beneficial character. To show how this is certain to be the case a few more figures

must be suffered by the patient reader. The offensive, defensive, and protective forces of India, under the control of the supreme government, are as follow*:—

ARMY—EUROPEAN.

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers & Privates.	Total.
Royal Artillery	601	11,576	12,177
Cavalry	252	4,095	4,347
Royal Engineers	330	—	330
Infantry	1,650	44,318	45,968
Invalid and Veterinary Establishment	40	106	146
Staff Corps	1,190	—	1,190
General List, Cavalry	74	—	74
" Infantry	187	—	187
Unattached Officers	9	—	
General Officers unemployed	81	—	81
Total	4,414	60,095	64,509

NATIVE.

Artillery	23	1,647	1,670
Body Guard	8	194	202
Cavalry	301	17,972	18,273
Sappers and Miners	241	3,019	3,260
Infantry	1,068	101,615	102,683
Total	1,641	124,447	126,088
Total of European and Native Army	6,055	184,542	190,597

POLICE.

	Total sanctioned strength.		Number of force armed with		
	Officers.	Men.	Firearms.	Swords.	Batons. only.
Bengal	3,561	21,395	4,259	1,326	18,585
Assam	522	3,600	2,856	121	1,156
N. W. Provinces and Oudh	4,643	20,537	7,178	11,731	6,395
Punjab	564	19,502	9,412	10,295	359
Central Provinces	1,331	7,262	3,143	554	4,896
British Burma	600	6,719	6,061	627	685
Ajmere	96	486	176	250	446
Berar	451	2,233	1,288	396	888
Mysore	499	4,379	615	155	4,417
Coorg	5	49	—	49	—
Madras	483	24,143	10,191	11,181	21,978
Bombay	3,221	16,126	8,921	6,617	3,867
Total	15,976	126,731	54,100	43,302	63,672

ARMY AND POLICE COMBINED.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Army	6,055	184,542	190,597
Police	15,976	126,731	142,707
Total	22,031	311,273	333,304

* The figures are those for 1881, as given in the Statistical Abstract.

The forces of the Native Indian States are (according to the authority already cited) as follows :—

Men.	Guns.
349,835	4,237

Combine together the Imperial Army and the Armies of the States and the result is,—

	No.
Imperial Army	190,597
Armies of the State	349,835
Total	540,432

Add to these the Police as a Force—(half of it is armed with guns and swords)—which makes for peace and good order, and the total number mounts to 683,189. These combined bodies constitute a fighting and order-keeping machine far beyond the requirements of the Empire. Once the Confederated Imperial Council is established the army *in India* would have little else but Police work of a higher order to do. Only the enemy beyond the gates would remain an object of dread and concern. That enemy, Russia, it is clear, without argument, would never so much as dream of attacking an India in which Princes and People, the Foreigner and the Native, were heartily united. Russia's only opportunity of attacking India with the faintest prospect of success lies in the discontent and disaffection which may exist within our borders. Discontent and disaffection now notoriously do exist in India,—not only (and not most seriously) in the Feudatory States, but much more seriously in

the British Provinces. All this peril would be removed by the adoption of a course embodying the chief features of the scheme set forth above. What is more, over and above the binding character which self-interest and the opportunities for distinction, for securing emoluments, and for the satisfaction of reasonable ambition would of necessity ensure, there would be the farther advantage of reduced taxation. The statement which follows will show where sensible and welcome relief for the Indian tax payer may be obtained :

		£
Military Expenditure of Supreme Government in India and England in 1883		17,440,250
Do. do, in Native States, on the basis of cost of the Native Army in the Nizam's Dominions (not reckoning the Contingent), viz., Rs. 155 per annum per man	Rs. 5,41,24,425	
Do. do., on the basis of the Force in Mysore, viz., Rs. 200 per man per annum	6,99,97,000	
Total	Rs. 12,40,91,425	
Take the mean of these two at Rs. 10 to the £ sterling..		6,204,571 *
		£23,644,821

* The writer of the Letters to *The Times* says that of the seventeen millions of revenue raised in the Native-Indian States twelve are expended 'for enabling the chief or prince to make a display suitable to his Oriental fancy.' He gives no data whatever for this statement. If it were correct, each soldier would cost on an average nearly £40 each per annum. All who know anything of the Native Indian soldier's mode of life will see the absurdity of the estimate. I think my own estimate too high. But, be that as it may, the reader is in possession of the data on which it is based.

Such an expenditure, however, as twenty-three millions sterling per annum on military account in India is altogether unnecessary. In 1855, before the strategic railways were in existence, less than eleven millions sufficed for all purposes. It is stated, over and over again, by Anglo-Indian authorities, that a large portion of the imperial troops in India are maintained to watch and overawe the armies of the Feudatory Princes and Chieftains. That statement may or may not be correct. Certain it is, that, during the Mutiny, in the State which is the object of the most intense hatred of the Indophobes of to-day, the Hyderabad Contingent was able to leave its cantonments and render gallant service to the cause of the over-ruling Power. Further, when war was declared with Afghanistan and, if the alarmists were correct, the opportunity of the malcontent Princes gave promise of coming, if indeed, it had not already come, these same Princes offered to denude their States of the soldiery they had trained and send them to fight by the side of the Empress's own troops. This, surely, is a strange way of exhibiting the dangerous propensities which are declared to inspire and control the waking thoughts and the midnight dreams of each and all of the Feudatories of the Empire.

Assume, nevertheless, the theory is correct, and a portion of our forces is employed in watching and overawing the Feudatory Armies. The most determined enemy, in the British press,* of the policy advocated in

* *The St. James's Gazette.*

these pages, the most strenuous assertor of Dalhousie-like annexation, states that the following forces in India are engaged in watching the State Armies:—

British Troops.

Artillery	.. ..	33 batteries
Cavalry ..	.. ..	8 regiments
Infantry	.. ..	19 ,,

Indian Troops.

Artillery	.. ..	4 batteries
Cavalry	.. ..	23 regiments
Infantry	.. ..	157 ,,

Constitute the State armies, duly equipped and made efficient, a wing of the Imperial army, let all their aspirations be for the Empire, and, on the showing of opponents, it is clear that a very great reduction might be made in our Indian army,—quite as large as is claimed later on. Military expenditure may be lowered. Our greatest warlike triumphs in India were, as Professor Seeley has reminded the English public, gained when a large proportion of the Queen-Empress's forces were Indian and not English. Such a reform in Indian administration as has been advocated would bring about a recurrence to those times. What was possible, with safety, a hundred years ago and less in India is, undoubtedly, more than possible now. In those days, when our European troops were few and our Indian allies many, the continent was not, as it now is, almost homogenous. Some of the most warlike races in India were not, as they are now, enlisted under our banner, but they were most

powerful foes. If we were only high-minded and heroic enough to treat the Indian people as our friends and were not afraid to associate them with ourselves at the Council Board and in the field, instead of sixty thousand British troops in India, which is now the muster, we should not need more than twenty thousand. It may be remarked that this is a purely military question upon which a layman should not venture to express an opinion: that, in such a matter, the views of experts should be taken, and if those views were contrary to what is stated, were to the effect that, in the condition of things surmised, twenty thousand more and not forty thousand fewer British soldiers would be wanted in our Eastern Empire, the counsel ought to be unquestioningly accepted. Such a contention is contrary to the experience of modern government. The civil government everywhere—not a military clique with the eternal horse-leech cries of 'Give us more troops:' 'There is nothing like guns, unless it be the bayonet,'—dictate what force shall be maintained for a country's defence. In the humble opinion here expressed the unprofessional standpoint is adopted: the writer takes the whole range of history in India since we have been connected with that country, he regards the several incidents of extreme peril which we have encountered, and he expresses what doubtless would be the opinion of all unprejudiced and unprofessional persons who would examine the matter for themselves, in asserting that twenty thousand British troops would, in the Reformed and Uplifted India, be sufficient.

If this contention is, for argument's sake, allowed, it will be easily seen how great a relief of taxation would follow. The cost of a British soldier in India, taking effectives and non-effectives together, is, roundly, £200 per annum. The cost of an Indian soldier, officered by Britons and not too economically administered, is, roundly, £40 per annum. The last-named sum might readily be reduced 25 per cent. Following out this calculation, and taking it for granted that the internal protection of the various States would need be provided for, that the Indian troops (from British Provinces and Indian States) should number more than twice the total of the Native Army at present we should have to face an annual expenditure thus set forth,—

No. of Troops.	Cost.
20,000 British Troops at £200 per soldier.. ..	£4,000,000
250,000 Indian Troops * at £30 per soldier.. ..	7,500,000
Total	£11,500,000

For this sum the adequate protection of the entire Empire could be secured. That is to say, the military budget would be £11,500,000, instead of £23,000,000,—a saving of £11,500,000. This eleven-and-a-half millions, however, are to be saved not out of the British-India revenue of £70,000,000, but out of £70,000,000 plus £6,000,000 which, it is assumed, the Native-Indian armies cost their respective countries. Halve the last-

* That is our own 120,000 Indian troops, and the pick of the Native States' armies. Or, considering the relative numbers of population, we might furnish 200,000 and the States 50,000.

named sum and apportion to the States £3,000,000 of the joint expenditure. That reduces the item to £8,500,000 so far as British India is concerned, and gives nine millions sterling per annum for reduction of taxation. It is not clear, however, that the matter is not put too favourably for the Indian States; £4,000,000 or even more might, with justice, be appropriated as the share to be paid by the Feudatories. If *The Times'* correspondent is correct, and their armies cost £12,000,000 a year, a large sum, even if they paid four four millions between them, would be freed for other purposes of expenditure. It is not clear, however, that the armies of the Feudatory States cost a moiety of twelve millions. There would be this farther gain to economy, that such expenditure as is really necessary would be minimised by unity of administration, and the abolition of costly and cumbersome staffs. But, be the details what they may, all who will approach the solution of the great Indian problem with generous ideas towards the Indian Princes and people and unprepossessed by civil or military professional bias, will, it may be asserted, be prepared to agree that, in the suggestions put forward are to be found means whereby discontent and danger in India may be removed, and in their place diminished taxation, increased security, greater loyalty to the British Crown, and enormously increased prosperity ensue first to India then to England.

There need be no concern as to the loyalty or bravery of the Imperial Army of the future, even if the proportion of Indian troops in comparison with British troops

is greatly increased. Lord Northbrook, in the praiseworthy attempts he has made to enlighten his countrymen on Indian affairs since he returned from India, has reminded us that, during the Mutiny, in 1857, the native troops raised in the Punjab under Edwardes and Nicholson, supported by the courage and the wisdom which made the name of John Lawrence dear to his fellow-countrymen, gave, at a most critical moment, assistance and support without which the struggle before Delhi might have had a very different result. 'And in the memorable siege of the Residency of Lucknow, in which the thoughts of every Englishman were absorbed during many months of suspense, faithful native soldiers shared all the privations and all the dangers of the British garrison. When Sir Frederick Roberts held, not without difficulty, his position at Kabul, the most distinguished regiments of the British Army saw the Goorkhas, the Sikhs, and the Guides side by side with them in every feat of arms. In Sir Donald Stewart's action near Ghazni, and in Sir Frederick Robert's decisive victory at Candahar, the native troops highly distinguished themselves in the field, while their discipline under great hardships throughout two campaigns had left nothing to be desired. But of the feats of the native army in Afghanistan, none would in future be remembered by them with greater pride, and by us with more lively gratitude and affection, than the defence of the Residency at Kabul by seventy-five men of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides. Here, again, as at Lucknow, many of the native soldiers were of the same

race and religion as their assailants, yet not a man among them deserted the four Englishmen whose lives it was their duty to protect at the cost of their own. For a long day they sustained the unequal conflict; and at last, when Cavagnari and Kelly had fallen, when Jenkyns and the gallant young Hamilton had lost their lives in charges against the Afghan guns, the last desperate sally was led by a native officer, Jemadar Jewan Sing. The mention of the name of this gallant native officer reminded him of the many high-spirited native officers whom he had seen in India. Not a few among them were men of rank; and there were remarkable instances of their having distinguished themselves upon service in command of detached bodies of troops.'

The spirit thus described permeates all sections of society. A remarkable instance of this was shown at a great meeting held in Bombay in December, 1884. The Hon. Budroodeen Tyabjee, in the course of an eloquent speech, eulogizing Lord Ripon's character and rule, proceeded to say:—'I ask you, has India ever been so tranquil, has she ever been so happy, has she ever been so devoted to Her Majesty's throne as during Lord Ripon's viceroyalty? During his Excellency's reign we have almost forgotten that we are living under a foreign government. It was not the Queen of England who was ruling over us, but the Empress of India. It mattered not to us that our gracious sovereign happened to be a native of Great Britain, any more than it mattered to our ancestors that the great and wise Akbar, the magnificent Shah Jehan, or the powerful

recorded had occurred. '*In many places where it* [famine distress] *was not thought to be severe the height of the death ratio has opened the eyes of Government Officers to the extent of the actual pressure.*' In spite of this *official* confession of failure, *The Times*, in one of its 'leaders' in its issue of February 5, 1885, says, 'We know, in general terms, that a handful of *our countrymen are conducting* WITH GREAT SUCCESS the government of a region two-thirds as large as Europe,' &c. The fact mentioned alone would be sufficient to make it advisable that the continuance of such a condition of things should be rendered impossible. Had Madras possessed, in the autumn of 1876, a Legislative Council, such as is sketched on preceding pages, the terrible scandal of the large portion of the time of the Governor and of the chief officials being occupied in preparing for, and in attending, the Delhi Assemblage could not have happened. While that pageantry was going on, the people of Southern India were dying of hunger by tens of thousands.

(2) The people are admirably fitted for the exercise of self-governing faculties. Says one who has known them well, 'I have worked on a Municipal Board and in numerous Committees with Indians of all races. I have found them able in debate, courteous, considerate, and moderate, whilst their usefulness and the special knowledge they bring to bear upon questions makes them invaluable.' Adminstration in India has become so fearfully complex and far-reaching that, with the best intentions in the world, we cannot continue to rule

satisfactorily upon the existing system. A few more years of the present state of things and a POOR-LAW FOR INDIA *may become necessary*, a Poor-Law not as in England for less than a million of people, but for ONE HUNDRED MILLIONS. Throughout their history Indians have not needed a Poor-Law,—castes and families have each cared for their poor; we are bringing a Poor-Law, with all its hideousness, on the country. It is time we took into our counsel men capable of avoiding the errors we make—not wilfully, but ignorantly.

(3) In those parts of the continent where Indian ideas have had freest play, or where Indian statesmen have had complete control, there is least poverty and greatest prosperity. Witness the Nizam's Dominions. See Travancore and Baroda, where the work Sir Madava Rao has done led Mr. Fawcett worthily to call him 'The Indian Turgot.' Given a fair field and no favour, scores of Salar Jungs and Madava Raos would be produced, as circumstances rendered them needful. The writer of these notes had an opportunity when in Bombay a few years ago, of ascertaining from an Indian gentleman, who, by the way, was no friend of Sir Madava Rao, but the reverse, the most perfect testimony as to the thoroughness of the work done in Baroda by Sir Madava, work which *could not* have been done by the ablest and most philanthropic of Englishmen. Legislative Councils such as are urged would provide an excellent training ground for men of this stamp, but what is of greater importance, would

furnish means for obtaining a knowledge of the country which cannot now, in the fewness of newspapers and other means, be secured.

(4) As an instance of the breadth of Indian views, note the following passages from a memorandum by the Minister to His Highness Holkar, proposing a simplification and reduction of duties:—

The system under which Sayer or Customs' duties are levied in these territories is not much in advance of the old Maratha one. It is far from having reference to scientific principles of taxation, and cannot but impede the growth of trade.

2. The system then imperatively calls for reform.

3. It has to be replaced by one better defined, more simple, more uniform, and far more equitable.

4. The subject is engaging my earnest attention, and, though beset with grave difficulties, I hope it may be successfully grappled with under proper encouragement and assistance.

5. I may briefly mention some of the leading principles I aim at carrying out:

(*a*) Food grains to be generally free;

(*b*) Necessaries to be taxed less than luxuries;

(*c*) A few classes of goods only to be liable to taxation;

(*d*) Places of levy to be as few as possible;

(*e*) Rates of levy to be uniform and intelligible;

(*f*) Transit duty to be abolished, only reserving to us the equitable right to levy a toll, fair and moderate, for the use of roads made at our expense and protected by our police.

6. To the extent these principles are approached trade will benefit, and the benefit will not be confined to these territories, it will extend to neighbouring territories also.

7. It is clear, however, that the reform I contemplate cannot be carried out without considerable loss of revenue; and as improved and improving administration has already entailed much additional expenditure on His Highness's treasury, and this expenditure must still increase, I am not in a position to ask His Highness to sacrifice much

revenue in the Sayer Department for the sake of the reforms I have in view.

8. Anxious, however, as I am to carry out these reforms, and thereby to bring about the development of trade (especially in reference to the railway approaching completion), I am in need of some external help. I think I may venture to suggest how the British Government may, if it feels disposed, grant us some help.

Then follow a number of practical suggestions which, for no good or sufficient reason, the Indian Government declined to accept, but instead thereof proceeded to acts of injustice and unfairness which could hardly be believed of a British administration. Had anything like open Councils existed in India, the wrongs alluded to in the foregoing pages, and hundreds of other wrongs, could not have been perpetrated.

(5) Such reform as is now urged would be in accord with the principles which have been practiced in India since the Queen assumed the government of the Empire in 1858. First, there were nominated non-official representatives on Local Funds Boards, then Municipalities with nominated members, then the elective principle was applied to Municipalities with most excellent results. One of the candidates, who fought his ward in true election fashion, addressing the electors at various meetings, was a grandson of Tipoo Sahib, who was elected, and who is serving on the Madras Municipality, whilst he is also a member of the Legislative Council of that Presidency. Lord Ripon recently took occasion to pay a compliment on the manner in which the work of the Indian Municipalities,

even when considered in comparison with English Municipal Corporations, is carried on.

(6) Provincial Legislatures should be broadened in their membership and should possess large powers and privileges. For nearly fifty years similar powers to those now advocated have been exercised in the Legislative Council of Ceylon, with remarkably good results. The results have only failed to be greater in that Island because all the non-official members of that Council have been nominated, and because only a very few have had seats in the Chamber.

(7) To be effective the Councils, must be, at least, *partially elective*. It is not claimed for the proposals put forward that they meet all the requirements of the situation, or are ideally perfect, but they, at least, form a basis for discussion and consideration. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the need which exists for enlisting the interest of the people in the work of government that is carried on for their benefit.

(8) If it be urged as an objection to action that there is no very serious agitation in India for reform, that the people, though they may clamour loudly, are not likely to go farther than words, and that therefore remedial changes ought not to be undertaken, then the answer is easy. If one thing more than another is to be deprecated in an Empire like India, it is popular agitation. This is especially true from the point of view of the few who rule. It should be our policy in India to *anticipate* wants, and to check the agitator-spirit by granting the reforms which are seen to be needed. If

agitation is required, the Indian people can stir themselves to action, as witness the agrarian riots in Bengal a few years ago, where a 'No-Rent' manifesto was not merely issued, but, to some extent, acted upon. Or, again, see the Santhals, who, when refused attention to their grievances, did not long consider whether they should or should not resist. From 'the thought to the thing,' was with them—it may be with others if we neglect our duty—but a leap. The unexampled display of national sentiment which accompanied and will render historical Lord Ripon's departure from India is an illustration of the fact, long known to some, that there are forces developing in India which it were well for us to direct while the chance of doing so is ours. It is unwise to the utmost extent of unwisdom to wait for mass meetings and excited discussions in India before granting reform.

(9) Full and adequate precautions can be taken, so as to prevent the Executive being out-voted, and Government rendered impossible. The time may come when it will be possible to remove further barriers; as to that time no account need now be taken. With a suspensory veto in the hands of the Governor or Governor-General, and with the power, held by the Secretary of State for India, of rejection of any measure, and the possibility of appeal to, and discussion in, the House of Commons, the most timorous need see no fear as to the stability of English rule in India being affected by a reform which, before all other things, is calculated to procure the knowledge of opinions and sentiments of a

vast population, which knowledge, as much as accurate statistics, is essential to good government.

(10) Although outwardly there is peace and content and a fair appearance of things, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the present system of despotism has failed. (*a*) The Imperial debt has become fearfully large, (*b*) taxation is most onerous, (*c*) the price of food-stuffs has alarmingly increased, (*d*) existence is daily becoming a more terrible struggle with all classes, (*e*) discontent with British supremacy is not unknown in the Native States. These untoward events have occurred under the *regime* of benevolent despotism. The few hundred English officers, who are seldom or never rooted in one spot, able to thoroughly know one part of the country, but who are always being changed from one place to another,—(Sir Richard Temple is an instance of this: in his Indian career he has been almost as peripatetic as the Wandering Jew),—even if endowed with supernatural power could not understand the people they rule, and the needs of the country in which they are, without a single exception, sojourners and strangers. If we could separate ourselves from our own connection with India, and see things unprejudicedly and with other eyes, English voices would be lifted up unceasingly against the injustice involved in the present course of action.

(11) *India needs to be ruled* IN INDIA, *not from England, nor, exclusively, according to the English ideas of Englishmen in India.* Far better than bringing Indian Princes or gentlemen to sit in the English Parliament is it to

provide on Indian soil institutions which shall afford a scope for those aspirations which we, by our mode of rule, have called forth, *and must satisfy*.

(12) For the present, at least, agitation in England is necessary. It is difficult to arouse and to sustain in this country an interest in India, shocking though the condition of things may be in our Eastern Empire. At this moment, however, by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances, a very great work may be done by Liberal Associations at the expenditure of comparatively little effort. If Liberals generally and the Liberal Associations will, at this juncture, rise to the height of the situation in which they are placed, and bring the tremendous power they possess to bear upon the House of Commons, a boon will be obtained for India, the importance and value of which, through all time, cannot be estimated. It is impossible to believe that Englishmen will permit a golden opportunity like the present to pass unheeded.

Against such reforms as have been advocated who could protest?

Not the Princes or the Peoples of India: the dignity and power of the former would be increased, while prosperity and all that serves to make life worth living, in opportunities for usefulness and distinction in a nation, would be enjoyed by the people to an extent now hardly conceivable;

Not the Queen, the Parliament, or the People of England: the monarch would acquire greater importance; the Legislature would find a guarantee in the respective Parliaments and Council which would be

constituted, for that close attention to Indian affairs which it desires to give, but, owing to the multiplicity of matters under its daily consideration, cannot afford; the last-named, in everything that tended to the advantage of their fellow-subjects in India, would find an ample reward: they would not, however, need to trust to that alone;

Not the Cotton Manufacturers of Lancashire whose trade with India has increased 1100 per cent. during the past forty years: Free Trade would continue in our Eastern Empire, the people would be increasingly prosperous and able to purchase more clothing as well as other things than they now can, (manufactories in India are not likely to beat the English factories);

Not the great army of investors in Indian Stock, whether it be of Debt or of Railways, whether the capital is sunk in mercantile houses on the Coast or in Tea and Coffee and Cinchona Plantations in the interior, for their dividends and interests would be carefully secured.

There is, nevertheless, one Class which would object, but that is a small one, and as the process of reform would be gradual, vested interests being saved, there would be little or no personal suffering. This Class need not be too carefully considered; the interests of two hundred and fifty millions far out-weigh the prospects of the children of a few thousands of Anglo-Indian families.

In a word, and making allowances for the imperfections and mistakes which attend upon all things

human, these Reforms, recognising as they do the high capacity and proved loyalty to the British Supremacy of Native-Indians, make for gain every way and for loss in no respect save in a single and selfish one.

APPENDIX.

THE ARMIES OF THE NATIVE STATES.

(From Preface to Memoir and Correspondence of General J. S. Fraser, by Colonel Hastings Fraser).

While the greater part of this book has been in type, four long articles, averaging four columns, have appeared in the *Times* (August 20, 26, September 2 and 10), headed "*The Native States of India*, from a Correspondent." These articles, placed in a position of such advantageous prominence, and reviving, as they do, all the contemptuous aspersions against Indian Princes and their rule, which were the prelude to Lord Dalhousie's annexations, are calculated to excite alarm and ill-feelling in every Native Court throughout India, among our protected Allies, as well as among our tributaries and feudatories. A few words of correction and warning may not, therefore, be out of place here.

The articles abound with blunders and misunderstandings as to matters of fact, that are somewhat remarkable in a writer who has evidently ransacked Blue Books for his information. For example, one of the articles (No. II, *The Mohammedan States*, August 26) is chiefly given up to "the most populous as well as the largest of all the Native States," Hyderabad, or the Nizam's dominions, and especially to what is said to be its "too lavish military expenditure." He very much overrates in numbers, and especially in the number of guns, the troops in the immediate service of the Nizam. Instead of that Prince having 725 guns in "his Army," he and the principal Chieftains holding lands under him on military tenure, have not altogether more than 30 guns equipped, a few horsed, and others with bullocks, capable of making their appearance on parade. The large number of guns mentioned in the article can only have been arrived at by counting up all the old guns, mounted and dismounted, for the most part mere old metal, lying about in dismantled

forts all over the country,—not the guns of "an Army," and not even capable of being so converted.

It is only by this enumeration of old honey-combed cannons without carriages or means of transport, that the ridiculous returns can have been made of "Hindoo armies with which the Central India Agency has to deal," of "not fewer than 3,180 Cavalry, 34,000 Infantry, and 434 guns, in addition"—it is added—"to the forces of Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopal."

PART IV.

THE OUTLOOK.

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THE OUTLOOK.

THE English people have not been suckled and brought up on the Evangelical creed of Christendom in vain. The central feature of the Evangelical creed is embodied in the sentence: 'Without shedding of blood there is no remission.' It matters not in what direction the eye is turned this doctrine finds full exemplification. Is reform needed in the land laws of Ireland? Then, 'without shedding of blood' by the assassin, reform cannot be accomplished: the greatest statesman of his age is not able to carry his reforms through a Liberal House of Commons without this (unsought and undesired) assistance. It has become a part of the common speech that a reform may not be hoped for in our railways until a Bishop or a Director has been slain. Even respecting so moderate and wise a change as the Franchise Bill of 1884, Lord Randolph Churchill declared he should not believe in the earnestness of the people for further reform unless the bad doings, the arsons, the attacks upon property, the assaults upon individuals, which marked the pre-Reform era fifty years ago, were repeated. 'Without shedding of blood there is no remission,' runs like a

scarlet thread through every department of our national existence: it marks every work we undertake and mars much that otherwise might be wholly beneficial.

In India we are exaggerating this national and Christian characteristic. Even with 'shedding of blood' there is not remission. Not wholly for want of will does this lamentable state of things exist; efforts are made but they run on old lines wherein the benefit proves to be for the foreigner and not for the native. Not, again, out of ill-will or desperate malice, but because foregone conclusions are acted upon. An Insurance Fund against Famine of one-and-a-half million a year is added to the taxation of the country. First, it is pounced upon to pay a portion of the expenses of a needless war in Afghanistan. Then, it is determined to expend the sum year by year upon railways and other means of communication: as though iron roads were, in a poverty-stricken and steadily-drained country, panaceas of famine, and as though the most disastrous famine of the century had not, within our immediate recollection, occurred in Provinces fairly well supplied with railways. We take the people's money to preserve them from famine, and all of it, except the mere cost of labour, is expended in England for supervision, for iron or steel rails, for engines and coaches; even the English investor finds an outlet secured for his surplus cash—in a guaranteed loan in many cases: where the loan is not guaranteed the reason is because there is a moral certainty of the projected line paying a dividend

better than is received from English Consols. This is taking one shilling from the Indian people, and spending the larger portion, say eightpence, for the profit of the English manufacturer and investor. Under such a system, and, in spite of the multiplication of railways, famines will increase in the land, the last state of the unfortunate people will be worse than the first, and the tale of blood exacted more and more fearful.

The pages of this little book were commenced in a hopeful spirit: in the spirit which finds expression in the dedication. It is concluded in a spirit of hopelessness. For, while the writer was arranging the facts he found very largely in the publications issuing from the India Office, and noted how the significance of the statements published were overlooked or wholly ignored by those whose duty it is to read them aright and to act upon the conclusions wherever those conclusions may lead; and when, further, he remembered the many good men and true who had taken up Indian subjects from John Dickinson to Henry Fawcett and the non-result which seems to have followed their earnest and devoted labours, his heart sank within him. 'Of all the duties I undertake,' said the late Mr. Fawcett a few years ago, 'there is none respecting which I feel so hopeless as about the duty I try to perform for India.' Lesser men than he who has just passed away, mourned by many millions who never saw him, may well feel despairing when such a Chief let the banner droop in his hands and almost drop from his grasp.

Yet, farther, a glance at the aspect of affairs in India

is calculated to deepen the gloom and intensify the despair. A mild reform, a mere effort with the little finger, was attempted by the Marquis of Ripon: it was met, on the part of Anglo-Indians, with an agitation the virulence and violence of which, even now that the echoes have died away, cause a shudder of shame as one recalls the narrowness of mind and the cruel illiberality of the agitators. The Ilbert Bill, the removal of the gag from the Native-Indian Press, and the Local Government Reforms of Lord Ripon being past history, what is there on the horizon of Indian politics to inspire hope? There is nothing, absolutely nothing. Nay, there is one exception: it is the anticipation inspired by the arrival of the Earl of Dufferin in Calcutta. That man, however, who, after considering the influences to which the Viceroy will become subjected, can find satisfaction in such an anticipation has a sanguine disposition almost beyond conception. In no single one of the Presidencies or Provinces is there aught, at this moment, to afford confidence to those who wish the future to be more full of benefit to the Indians than the past has been. Mr. Grant Duff went to Madras with a great reputation: he has frittered it away in trivial tasks, in composing portentous Minutes the paragraphs whereof may be numbered by hundreds, and which seem shovelled together in a pell mell fashion, in which all sense of proportion is lost,—a wayside weed receiving as much attention as a matter involving the well-being of a multitude. Worse than this he delivered the destinies of the town and district of Salem into the hands of

the most impulsive and least considerate member of the Madras Civil Service, with consequences—in the imprisonment as convicts at the Andamans of innocent citizens, and in other respects—which might profitably become the subject of debate at St. Stephen's when Parliamentary duties are resumed. In Bombay Sir James Fergusson's five years of office are nearing an end without any single attempt of a statesmanlike character having been made to improve the position of the people at large. He has let things 'drift.' Probably, with his political chief, whose dictum, uttered while he was Secretary of State for India, has already been quoted, he sees 'no terror in the prospect of "drifting."' The same blankness and monotony of effort are apparent when the gaze is turned to the Provinces of the North-West (Sir Alfred Lyall), and of the Punjab (Sir C. U. Aitchison). A civilian in each case is Lieutenant-Governor. Reform, therefore, in the sense of upsetting the thing that is, and substituting something better, must necessarily be looked for in vain. If the experience of Anglo-Indianism were gathered together and enshrined between the covers of a volume, the unwritten and unspoken belief in most cases, both written and spoken in a few, would be an adaptation of words familiar to the English ear. 'For we testify,' would run the comment on this experimental record, 'unto every man that seeth this account of wonderful work performed, if any man shall say the work is not perfectly done, there shall be added unto him all the plagues from which we have delivered the people of India: And, if any man

shall presume to suggest that a better way might have been taken, his part ought to be taken out of that great and glorious British nation which alone could furnish such wise administrators.' The reader of anything and everything written by Sir Richard Temple, Sir Lepel Griffin, and others of their kind concerning the All-Blessedness of British Rule in India will agree that any less expressive phraseology than that parodied above would fail to accurately hit the never-varying mood of the self-gratulatory historians of Anglo-Indian administration.

Alas! 'the people will have it so.' That is to say the English people *allow* it. To ordinary Britons India is a long way off, and if they hear in a dim sort of fashion of the sorrows and troubles of their fellow-subjects, they are apt to console themselves with the thought that, after all, what they have heard may not be true. Only a few individuals, they reason, say these things; there are hundreds who tell quite a different story; the latter cannot all be wrong. Thus, without examining a single fact at first hand, the average Englishman comforts himself with the belief that all's well: with his digestion undisturbed he turns to his Home politics, important enough in all conscience if he had no responsibility for what is done in India, but not all-important while India is administered in his name and under his authority. That which hath been shall be. The long and dismal record of British prosperity heightened at the expense of daily-increasing poverty to more millions in India than the British Isles contain, will

continue. Some day, however, a catastrophe more terrible than aught yet experienced will occur. What form it will take no man can positively tell. A very shrewd guess, nevertheless, may be made. It may not, to the conquering race, be as terrible as were the throes which the United States experienced when in the fulness of time the decree went forth that the African slaves should be free. In the paroxysm which, though it tarry, will surely come, it is probably not England which will suffer most severely: the weakest will go to the wall; upon unfortunate India the terror will chiefly fall. The English people will learn by one way only. They would not displace the Company of Merchants from supreme rule in India until there had been a frightful Mutiny due to misgovernment. In like manner *the* reform for which India is rife, which our experience in that country has shown to be above and beyond all things necessary, namely, a standing aside, a renunciation in course of time, more or less remote, of four-fifths of the offices now held by Englishmen, a creation of quasi-independent States, and a fostering of Indian ability, will not come until a great 'shedding of blood' procures remission. To the present writer it does not seem possible that the events of 1857 can be repeated. The inevitable catastrophe will take another course. It will involve a measure of suffering to our unfortunate fellow-subjects stretching over a long course of years, causing a wail of pain and distress which will resound through all the corridors of time and may, certainly ought, to be heard, by some, to their shame, in Eternity.

There need, in all conscience, be no longer waiting for the fulfilment of the British ideal: 'the shedding of blood' has taken place, is taking place. But the blood trickles, a few drops here a few drops there, in a hundred thousand villages on the plains and hills of India—no one troubles to mark the dropping and record the suffering: there is no broad crimson stream running wide like a river to catch the most careless eye and to command attention from the most listless. England in India is sowing bad seed; India, not England, is reaping the necessarily bad crop. So strong is England, so weak is India, that the laws of Nature are defied and over-ruled. For a hundred years this has happened, each year recording an increasing British strength and a corresponding Indian weakening. Are a hundred years to come to record the continuance of the same melancholy record? It rests with The People of England to reply. For the first time in English history *they* are becoming responsible. Power has passed from a Class to the Nation. Everybody, it has been said, is wiser than any body or any class. Let the wisdom and good sense, the kindly feeling and unselfishness, which, after all, *are* characteristics of our nation (too much, unfortunately, obscured) see to it that the task which can be performed is attempted. If any leading man or men were public spirited and energetic enough to arouse and quicken these qualities the clouds of despair which gather about all who wish well to India would disperse, and the Indian nations would be re-created. They would be born again, and would become new creatures

in all that constitutes a State in the highest and best sense of the word.