OUR REAL DANGER IN INDIA.

BY

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

Dedicated,

IN RESPECTFUL REMEMBRANCE,

TO THE MEMORY OF

THE LATE LORD ELPHINSTONE,

GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY DURING THE PERIOD OF

THE INDIAN MUTINY,

BY

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THE object of this little work is twofold. It is intended, first, to explain the causes of the Mutiny which threatened to deprive us of our possession of India in 1857; and, secondly, to show how the present aggressive conduct of Russia is more than likely to occasion the most serious fears in regard to the future of India

The book consists of three chapters. In the first I have tried to prove that Sir John Kaye, the only writer who has attempted a full historical account of the "Sepoy War," is mistaken in his views as to the causes which produced it; in the second I have endeavoured to give a more intelligible and accurate statement of the circumstances which led to the outbreak in Bengal, as well as a narrative of the measures which were adopted to check the extension of mischief from the open manifestation of Sepoy disaffection in Bombay; and in the concluding chapter I have stated the causes of danger

to India arising from the Russo-Turkish war, and the means by which that danger might yet be averted.

In the preventive and precautionary measures taken in Bombay during the Mutiny, my share was a very prominent one, and I have found it impossible to exclude all mention of myself in the relation of those incidents, and I solicit, in consequence, the indulgence of the reader for the obtrusive but unavoidable display of egotism.

I have deemed it a duty to dedicate this little volume to the memory of the late Lord Elphinstone, in admiration of his efforts in the cause of order during the period of the Mutiny, and from feelings of official gratitude But for Lord Elphinstone, I should, in all probability, both at Belgaum and in Bombay, have been superseded for having presumed, under critical circumstances, to act in contravention of the orders of Government

C F

9th September, 1877


RACE COURSE
CAMMATTEE POORA
C
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D
A
JOONA MUSJID
MARINE BATTALION
SEPOY'S LINES
RAILWAY TERMINUS
FORT
BEACH

OUR REAL DANGER IN INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

TWENTY years have elapsed since the outbreak of the memorable Indian Mutiny. The more important results which have followed the transfer of the government to the Crown, and which mark the successive periods of the new Viceregal administration, have, in point of interest and public concern, begun to be regarded as portions of the political history of Great Britain The siege of Delhi, the relief of Lucknow, the massacre of Cawnpoor are as familiar subjects of table talk as any of the remarkable events in our past national history The story of that fearful mutiny has already been told, but it has been told only as a story full of danger and daring, of horror and heroism. Some of the more striking events have been related with the view of exciting sympathy or repulsion, according to the taste and bent of the narrator; but we have not as yet had anything like a reasonable and satisfactory explanation of the causes which led to the outbreak. The event itself is now recorded, with its details and dates, in all text-books of modern

history, but no attempt has been made to unravel the skein of antecedent circumstances, so as to discover a clue which shall be sufficient to account for the occurrence.

I had long wished to undertake the task of stating those circumstances, but a writer of such literary reputation as the late Sir John Kaye, had elaborately represented his own views on the subject, and supported them on evidence so specious, and in language so emphatic, that the world at large, I doubted not, had arrived at the conclusion that the reasons set forth by the author of "The Sepoy War" were those which led to that terrible military outbreak. To one, moreover, who had spent much of his time in the saddle, and very little at the desk, the thought of engaging in such a conflict was by no means encouraging. It was therefore abandoned, but the recent visit of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to India has led to misconceived views as to our military organisation in the East. The statement too of politicians who believe the existence of Turkey in Europe to be an anachronism, and the utterances of the Secretary of State for India at the banquet of Merchant Tailors, on the evening of the 11th of June last, of seeing no reason to share in the apprehensions of those around him as to danger to India from the Eastern question, have led to the desire to overcome all feelings of reluctance, and, however feeble the effort, to engage in indicating the causes which, in my humble opinion,

led to the Indian Mutiny, and to show, also, that if Turkey in Europe is displaced by Russia, or if Russia is allowed to pursue her course of aggression in Central Asia, or in Asia Minor, how inevitably disastrous either result would be as regards our hold on India

Before giving my own account of the causes of the Indian Mutiny, I shall briefly examine Sir John Kaye's explanations My object is not to write a book, but merely to give prominence to facts that are in themselves incontrovertible.

The reasons assigned by Sir John Kaye may be generalised into—(1) The baneful consequences of annexation, (2) The unrighteous enforcement of the "right of lapse," by withholding from the adopted heir, succession to the titular dignities and territorial sovereignty of the deceased; (3) The resumption of the holdings of the talookdar, or revenue contractor; (4) The confiscation of eenam, or rent-free tenure; (5) The measures of private individuals for the propagation of Christianity, and the identification of Government with educational and social progress.

The readers of "The Sepoy War" will have remarked, however, that the terms of condemnation in which these measures are commented on, are far from unqualified. The baneful consequences of annexation are generally described in language which leaves one in doubt as to whether the writer was in earnest in

exhibiting annexation as one of the causes which brought about the Indian Mutiny.

Of the several instances of annexation to which the Indian Government deemed it necessary to give effect, that of the kingdom of Oude may be cited as the most prominent in point of territorial and ethnological importance

With reference to this annexation, Sir John Kaye states (vol. i., page 112) "There was still another province to be absorbed into the British Empire under the administration of Lord Dalhousie—not by conquest, for its rulers had ever been our friends, and its people had recruited our armies; not by lapse, for there had always been a son, or a brother, or some member of the royal house, to fulfil, according to the Mahomedan law of succession, the conditions of heirship, and there was still a king, the son of a king, upon the throne; but by a simple assertion of the dominant will of the British Government. This was the province of Oude, in the very heart of Hindoostan, which had long tempted us, alike by its local situation and the reputed wealth of its natural resources"

The last lines contain an accusation against the Indian Administration, as grave as it is thoughtless and unreasonable This great province, in the very heart of Hindoostan, it is stated, "*had long tempted us.*" An act of moral and political courage, in bringing it under our rule, is thus represented as one of

spoliation, and elsewhere as having been accompanied with violence and pillage. Happily, it is not necessary for me to vindicate the grounds on which this annexation had become a duty as necessary as it was imperative. Sir John Kaye has himself set forth this vindication with much emphasis and justice. In vol. i., page 114, he states: "Never were the coils of misrule more horribly apparent; never were the vices of an indolent and rapacious Government productive of a greater sum of misery. The extravagance and profligacy of the Court were written in hideous characters on the desolated face of the country. It was left to the Nabob's Government to dispense justice: justice was not dispensed. It was left to the Nabob's Government to collect the revenue: it was wrung from the people at the point of the bayonet. The Court was sumptuous and profligate: the people poor and wretched. The expenses of the royal household were enormous. Hundreds of richly-caparisoned voracious elephants ate up the wealth of whole districts, or carried it in glittering apparel on their backs. A multitudinous throng of unserviceable attendants, bands of dancing-girls, flocks of parasites, costly feasts and ceremonies, folly, and pomp, and profligacy of every conceivable description drained the coffers of the State. A vicious and extravagant Government soon beget a poor and a suffering people; a poor and a suffering people, in turn, perpetuate the curse of a bankrupt Government. The

process of retaliation is sure. To support the lavish expenditure of the Court, the mass of the people were persecuted, and outraged. Bands of armed mercenaries were let loose upon the ryots, in support of the rapacity of the aumils, or revenue-farmers, whose appearance was a terror to the people. Under such a system of cruelty and extortion, the country soon became a desert, and the Government then learnt, by hard experience, that the prosperity of the people is the only true source of wealth. The lesson was thrown away. The decrease of the revenue was not accompanied by a corresponding diminution of the profligate expenditure of the Court, or by any effort to introduce a better administrative system. Instead of this, every new year saw the unhappy country lapsing into worse disorder, with less disposition, as time advanced, on the part of the local Government, to remedy the evils beneath which it was groaning. Advice, protestation, remonstrance were in vain Lord Cornwallis advised, protested, remonstrated; Sir John Shore advised, protested, remonstrated; but all proved unavailing"!

This was up to the year 1798. Further trials were made, with the object of awakening the Nabob and his officials to a sense of their responsibility; but they allowed things to take their course. "Sunk in voluptuousness (vol. i., page 120) and pollution, often too horribly revolting to be described, they gave themselves up to the guidance of panders and para-

sites, and cared not so long as these wretched creatures administered to their sensual appetites. Affairs of state were pushed aside as painful intrusions. Corruption stalked openly abroad. Every one had his price. Place, honour, justice—everything—was to be bought. Fiddlers and barbers, pimps and mountebanks became great functionaries."

This was up to the year 1817. The period of probation was still further prolonged. Advice, remonstrance, and protest again and again proved unavailing. Then warning succeeded warning, each more earnest than the one that preceded it, but with the same abortive result. And while the Court was indulging in high carnivals of profligacy, "the talookdars (vol. i., page 135) kept the country in a perpetual state of disturbance, and rendered life, property, and industry everywhere insecure. Whenever they quarrelled with each other, or with the local authorities of the Government, from whatever cause, they took to indiscriminate plunder and murder, over all lands not held by men of the same class. No road, town, village, or hamlet was secure from their merciless attacks. Robbery and murder became their diversion, their sport; and they thought no more of taking the lives of men, women, and children than those of deer and wild hogs."

The career of anarchy and wild misrule had long been such as to have sufficed to exhaust a heaven-born forbearance. But it was not till the year 1856, after

a painful experience extending over considerably more than half a century, during which three generations of kings had succeeded each other, that the annexation was proclaimed!

Provided with materials of information in abundance, the author of "The Sepoy War" could not but have been aware that no interference in the affairs of territorial and titular princes was ever sought after, but forced on the Indian administration by misrule, which it was not possible otherwise to prevent. This being so, his observations in respect to the subsidiary force provided to the King of Oude, for the internal as well as external defence of his dominions, are singularly uncalled for He states (vol. i, p 113) that although the Nabob possessed in abundance the raw material of soldiers, he had not been able to organise an army sufficient for the requirements of the State, and so was fain to avail himself of the superior military skill and discipline of the white men, and to hire British battalions to do his work At first, he says, this was done in an irregular, desultory kind of way, but afterwards it assumed a more formal and recognised shape, and solemn engagements were entered into with the Nawab by which we undertook, in consideration of certain money payments, to provide a certain number of British troops for the defence of his dominions, which, the author adds, was, in truth, a *vicious* system, one that could not be too severely condemned; that by it we established a

double government of the worst kind; that the political and military government was in our hands, while the internal administration of the country still rested with the Nawab; that, in other words, hedged in and protected by the British battalions, a bad race of Eastern princes were suffered to do, or not to do, what they pleased, and that under such influence it was not strange that disorder of every kind ran riot over the whole length and breadth of the land

How was such interference to be avoided? The reports of Colonel Sleeman and other political functionaries, quoted in more than a single instance by Sir John Kaye, contain evidence by no means limited in scope, of the licentiousness practised by sovereign and inferior princes, by their minions, by talookdars and their adherents, and, in fact, by every one who had it in his power to play the despot. This was so, notwithstanding the presence of the British battalions and the influence of British officers; what then would have been the state had such preventive influence been wanting? It is by no means difficult to conceive that law and morality and every sacred tie, violated as they have been under these checks, would have been immeasurably more so violated had they been wanting.

The next question is the unrighteous enforcement of lapse. The Shaster, or holy writ of the Hindoos, enjoins that the funeral pile of the deceased shall be lighted by his son, whether begotten or adopted; or

in the absence of such son, by the nearest of kin, or that the family or other priest, "bhut," shall perform that rite in order to ensure the deliverance of the departed from "the hell called Put." The author of "The Sepoy War," in maintaining that lapse "pursued the victim beyond the grave," and that its significance to the deceased was "nothing short of eternal condemnation," has attached to it an unreal and exaggerated importance

The lapses (enumerated in book i , chapter xi., of vol. i.) all took place within a few years of each other, since 1848, and may be said to have been coeval with the annexation of the Oude territory.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the principalities which so lapsed, and had been incorporated with British territory, had all been created by the British Government after conquests which, in each instance, had been so signal and complete as to supersede the necessity for pursuing a conciliatory course towards any of the princes in relation with the paramount powers, whose systematic perfidy towards the British, notwithstanding engagements the most solemn and binding, had brought about their overthrow. These, as well as a large number of other principalities, were created, as is well known, in pursuance of a deeply-cherished policy, devised by the wisest and most philanthropic of our Indian statesmen, with the view that India might be, as largely as possible, studded with indigenous centres, where those

to whom our own administrative institutions afforded no opening, might find occupation and employment. Great hopes were at the same time entertained that the princes so established, would be influenced by our example, imitate our principles of government, and encourage the social, intellectual, and moral improvement of their respective subjects, and thus, it was believed, British connection with the East would be made a blessing to the millions of its population. But bitter disappointment was the result. These princes abandoned themselves, as a rule, to sensual indulgences. The profligacy of the different Courts kept pace with the baseness and profligacy of intriguing courtesans and unscrupulous panders. Favouritism swayed every department of the provinces, and incompetency, mismanagement, and cruel oppression were the results

The Sattara and Nagpore principalities had been revived by the British Government in the persons of the older surviving representatives of the family which last occupied the throne. The former was a prisoner in the hands of Bajee Roa, the Peshwa, and on his defeat and the conquest of the Deccan, was liberated and placed on the throne of Sattara. With reference to the cases of both Sattara and Nagpore, Sir John Kaye states that "the princes had forfeited their rights, the one by hidden treachery and rebellion, the other by open hostility. The one, after full inquiry, had been deposed; the other, many years before, had been

driven into the jungle, and had perished in obscurity, a fugitive and an outcast. In both cases, therefore, the crime had been committed which the natives of India are so willing to recognise as a legitimate reason for the punishment of the weaker State by the stronger." But the offence, it is said, had been condoned, and the sovereignty had been suffered to survive—other members of the reigning family being set up by the paramount State in place of the offending princes. This is perfectly true; but what was the object of the condonation and the re-establishment of these thrones? To evince to the people of India at large that the British Government was influenced by no selfish views, but that *their* good was its object. It was also done with the hope that the princes so favoured would carefully study the welfare and the good government of their subjects. The result, however, was the same bitter disappointment; and the howl of the oppressed from these as well as other principalities still continued to sound forth clarion-toned, so that the British Government was driven to the necessity of taking advantage of lapses on the failure of direct heirs.

With reference to the third question, the resumption of the holding of the talookdars, or revenue contractors, the reports of Colonel Sleeman and other officers, quoted by Sir John Kaye, prove, as clearly as anything can be proved, that it was not possible to surpass their acts of oppression and violence, nor

to equal their worse than brutal disregard of human life. To have maintained them in the several provinces over which the right of conquest gave us the supremacy, would have been to perpetuate and encourage the most unbridled licentiousness. Like the talookdars of northern India, there were talookdars, or deshmooks, all over southern India at the time of the conquest of the Deccan. Happily, Mountstewart Elphinstone, who, previous to the conquest, was Resident at the Court of the Peshwa, had made every branch of the Peshwa's administration his study, and was well acquainted with the shortcomings of the deshmooks; and under his auspices, Mr. Chaplin, who was appointed Commissioner for the settlement of the conquered provinces, superseded them, and substituted the village communities in their dearly-cherished tenant-right, and entrusted the collection of the revenue to stipendiary native officers, supervised by European assistant-commissioners, one of whom, I believe, was Mr. John Warden, who at a later period stoutly resisted the operations of the Eenam Commission. For some years the revenue was collected yearly, on a valuation of the crops; but this practice was not found to work satisfactorily, and led to the introduction of the revenue survey and assessment, and, in connection with them, to a thirty years' permanent settlement, which not only placed the cess payable to the Government on a satisfactory footing, but it opened the way for the agricultural

classes to free themselves from their normal condition of deep indebtedness to the village banyan, or money-lender, to whom, under the deshmook or talookdaree system, they were so tied down by mortgages that they could not call their agricultural implements, nor their tillage cattle, nor their houses their own. Surely no specious reasoning is necessary to show that the new method of collecting the revenue was immeasurably preferable to the one which it had supplanted

With reference to the fourth question, namely, the confiscation of rent-free tenures, it is necessary, in the first place, to notice that these rent-free or eenam villages were not the oases in a "barren, sandy desert," but that in consequence of the rack-rent practices of the holders of such villages, and the oppressive exactions with which they were followed, they were the plague-spots amid the broad Government lands occupied by a tenantry who were contented under the operations of the revenue survey and assessment, and made happy in the freedom they enjoyed from the uncertainties of taxation.

The tenants of these rent-free villages, finding their friends and neighbours so favourably circumstanced and themselves racked by a heavy cess, were naturally led to complain to British officers, who, owing to the exemption from control which the holders of those tenures enjoyed, were able to afford them no redress. Those who have indulged in a free and flippant condemnation of the Eenam Commission,

however, will probably be surprised to learn that the idea of constituting that Board suggested itself to the Government from the complaints which poured in to them from the sufferers, who not only brought to notice the manner in which they were treated, but, at the same time, they exposed the fraudulent means by which the eenamdars possessed themselves of the villages they held—means that had not the sanction of the State No lengthened inquiry was needed to show that this was so. The fact was notorious. The Peshwas of the later times, though personally licentious, were by no means given to the indiscriminate alienation of land, and, happily, their prime ministers were men of probity

The Court of Bajee Roa, however, was proverbially profligate. The influence exercised over him by adherents and feudatories, especially by the Scindia, was baneful; so much so, that another high feudatory, Jeswunt Roa Holkar, marched with an army to the capital with the object of relieving his liege lord from their thraldom. A battle was fought, in which Holkar was victorious; but it was followed by no court reformation. Tradition, however, has handed down the names of a triumvirate—the prime minister, the general of his forces, and the keeper of the public records—as the uncontaminated three. Of these, the prime minister and the record keeper made entries in the duftar, or public records, of none but *bonâ fide* grants. The first step, therefore, taken by

the Eenam Commission, was to establish the rule that the period of sixty years should form the prescriptive proprietary limit, and that the right of eenamdars who held possession in excess of sixty years should remain unquestioned. With reference to cases within the limit, search was made among the Poona records for entries, and in respect to those found recorded, the inquiry was at once arrested. When there appeared to be no record, the eenamdar was allowed every opportunity to make good his claim, and had conceded to him the weakest probability of right in his favour; and resumption followed only when there was no doubt that the possession was unauthorised and illegal The acts of the Eenam Commission, however, were questioned chiefly by Mr John Warden, at the time a member of Council of the Bombay Government, but notwithstanding his highly influential position, the Commission was able to hold its own, for their dealings with eenams were based upon grounds at once sound and consistent. And it was only when the Indian Mutiny had excited the feelings of England to the condition of fever-heat, that instructions were sent out, I believe, to do away with the Commission, which, however, in the meantime, had put an end to a very great deal of the oppression practised by eenamdars.

The author of "The Sepoy War," basing his views on the opinions said to have been entertained by Lord Hardinge, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John

Malcolm, the Honourable Mountstewart Elphinstone, and Lord Metcalfe, has declared, in terms bordering on deep lamentation, that, in extinguishing loyal native states by annexation, or by taking advantage of lapses, and in doing away with talookdars, and in resuming eenam or rent-free tenures, we undermined the confidence of the people, weakened their allegiance, excited widespread dissatisfaction, and so paved the way for the outbreak which shook British power in India to its very foundation But were these the causes that brought about the Mutiny? Suppositions have been largely indulged in, but of evidence that may be viewed as being at all reliable, there is none

In regard to the annexation of Oude, Sir John Kaye states that "*it was not to be doubted*" that the measure itself made a very bad impression on the minds of the people of India, not because of the deposition of a king who had abused his powers, not because of a new system of administration for the benefit of the people, but because the humanity of the act was soiled by the profit we derived from it (page 152, vol i) It is only necessary to revert to page 137, where it will be seen that Colonel Sleeman, in writing to the Governor-General of India, strongly urged the assumption of the administration of Oude, stating. "What the people want, and most earnestly pray for, is that our Government should take upon itself the responsibility of governing them

well and permanently. All classes, save the knaves who now surround and govern the king, earnestly pray for this: the educated classes, because they would then have a chance of respectable employment, which none of them now have, the middle classes, because they find no protection or encouragement, and no hope that their children would be permitted to inherit the property they leave, not invested in our Government securities; and the humbler classes, because they are now abandoned to the merciless rapacity of the starving troops and other public establishments, and of the landowners, driven and invited to rebellion by the present state of misrule."

Colonel Sleeman was at the same time of opinion that the British Government, after assuming the administration, should honestly and distinctly disclaim all interested motives, and appropriate the whole of the revenue to the benefit of the people and royal family of Oude. The Governor-General, however, thought otherwise, and considered annexation the only effective remedy. He did so with the view, no doubt, of putting an end to the state of feverish excitement under which, from long-continued misrule, the people laboured; and also to guard against the likelihood of any course short of annexation keeping them in a state of suspense, and leading them to suppose that fear had restricted our interference to simply the administrative measure.

But have annexations had the effect stated by the

author of "The Sepoy War?" Speaking from an experience of forty years of Indian official life, as topographical surveyor; as translator in Hindoostanee and Mharatta; as sheriff; as head of the Poona police; as subordinate and chief uncovenanted assistant-judge; as superintendent of police in the southern Mharatta country, and commissioner of police in Bombay, I have been in close, constant, and familiar intercourse with all classes of natives of India and having been born there, and lived among them for a very great portion of the time, I venture to state that, with the exception of those whom Colonel Sleeman himself declares to be "the knaves who surround and govern the king," and those who surrounded native princes and talookdars and cenamdars, there were no others who made annexations or lapses or resumptions the reason for impugning the integrity of the British Government, or for concluding that the humanity of its acts had been "soiled" by the profit said to have been derived from them If, on the other hand, the princes of India, and others, have so viewed the actions of the Government, the impression produced upon them, it is to be hoped, has been salutary and conducive to personal morality and to good government.

The question may also be asked, What evidence is there to show that the acts of the Government, so freely animadverted upon, had occasioned a deep-seated disloyalty to our rule in India, and that the

Mutiny had been incited by those whose position and importance our measures had been the means of crushing? Much is advanced in the way of conjecture. It is stated that the sepoy disliked annexation because it placed him on the dead level of British subjects; that under the all-prevailing lawlessness and misrule which had so long over-ridden the province, the sepoy in the English service, whatever might be the wrongs of others, was always sure of a full measure of justice on appeal to the British Resident. Either he himself or some member of his family is a small yeoman, with certain rights in the land, and in all the disputes and contentions in which these interests involved him, he had the protection and assistance of the Resident, and, "*right or wrong, carried his point.*" Here an imputation is cast on British integrity, the gravity of which it is impossible to gauge; but happily it calls for no vindication, for since the days of Impey and Oomichund, British probity throughout India has been avowedly far beyond the reach of doubt or suspicion Further on it is stated: "Many were the strange glosses which were given to the acts of the British Government; various were the ingenious fictions woven for the purpose of unsettling the minds and uprooting the fidelity of the sepoy. If we annexed a province it was to facilitate our proselytising operations and to increase the number of our converts. Our resumption operations were instituted for the purpose of destroying all the

religious endowments of the country. Our legislative enactments were all tending to the same result—the subversion of Hindooism and Mahomedanism." I venture with perfect confidence to aver, that the veriest novice of British cadets would denounce the idea that any sepoy was to have been drawn into the belief of tales so monstrously absurd. As a rule, the sepoys were men of great intelligence, especially those of the Bengal army, who were all high-caste men, and their officers—the native captains and lieutenants—were pre-eminently men of good judgment. If there was any matter with reference to which their convictions could have remained unshaken, it was that the Government would never tamper with their religion. Christian missionaries may have been sedulous in their efforts to proselytise, and addresses may have been extensively circulated in Bengal by Christian propagandists, to the effect that the "time had come when earnest consideration should be given to the question whether or not all mankind should embrace the same religion;" and there may have been some solitary instances of officers of sepoy regiments who, from conscientious but mistaken ideas of Christian obligation, had been so imprudent as to address natives on the doctrines of Christianity. But in such cases Sir John Kaye himself acknowledges that these addresses were never made either in the sepoy lines or in the regimental bazaar; and while one or two such officers acted the missionary, the major

portion of their brother officers, I have no doubt, held up their conduct to the ridicule of their men. I have myself known and heard of such instances. Hence, whatever the amount of zeal displayed by the Christian missionary and his lay imitator, there could have been no misconception on the part of the native soldiery as to the freedom of the Government from complicity in such acts.

The instrumentality by which sepoy allegiance was impaired is thus stated. That the men whose business it was to corrupt our sepoys were, *perhaps*, the agents of some of the old princely houses which we had destroyed, or members of the baronial families which we brought to poverty and disgrace. That they were, *perhaps*, the emissaries of Bhraminical societies whose precepts we were turning into folly, and whose power we were setting at naught. That they were, *perhaps*, mere visionaries and enthusiasts, moved only by their own disordered imaginations to proclaim the coming of some new prophet or some fresh avatar of the Deity, and the consequent downfall of Christian supremacy in the East; but, whatsoever the nature of their mission, and whatever the guise they assumed, whether they appeared in the lines as passing travellers, as journeying hawkers, as religious mendicants, or as wandering puppet-showmen, the seed of sedition which they scattered struck root in a soil well prepared to receive it, and waited only for the ripening sun of circumstances to develop a harvest of revolt. Such is said to have been the

instrumentality by which sepoy allegiance was impaired. All this is mere imagination, and, in my opinion, quite out of place in a work professing to deal with the facts of authentic history.

That religious toleration in regard to all creeds in India was maintained by the British Government with uncompromising firmness, was a fact perfectly well understood by every class of our native subjects in the Bombay Presidency, and I have no hesitation in stating, that it was equally well understood throughout the rest of India.

As chief uncovenanted assistant-judge* of Ahmednuggar, I was, *ex-officio*, president of the committee of the Government vernacular schools in that town, and two high caste leading Hindoo merchants, and the native magistrate of the place, who was a Bhramin, were my colleagues. It was not usual to admit the children of Mhars, and other low classes, into these schools; but I had only to point out the hardship of their exclusion from a privilege which it was the intention of a paternal Government should be enjoyed by all classes of its subjects, for my colleagues to recognise and adopt the suggestion at once. They were strong in the conviction that toleration to all classes and creeds was the governing principle of British rule, and that the proposal covered no hidden desire for levelling any caste distinctions, nor for introducing any measure of Christian proselytism.

* Principal Sudder Ameen.

In 1847, a high caste Bhramin convert instituted a civil suit at Ahmednuggar for the recovery of his son, who was born a month or two before the man embraced the Christian faith. He had failed to persuade his wife to join him, and over her he could exercise no legal control. But after the boy had attained the age of seven years, he took possession of him. The mother then complained to the magistrate, who ordered the convert to give up his son to her. he did so, and filed a suit in my court for his recovery. The trial was exciting a great deal of sensation among the large Bhraminical population of the place. In all Indian courts a Hindoo and a Mahomedan law officer are provided by the Government to assist the judges with expositions of the Hindoo and Mahomedan laws on points which bear upon the cases that come before them for adjudication. His exposition of the law texts, quoted by the Hindoo law officer in this case, was against the convert's claim, but happily, I happened to have by me the books which the law officer had consulted, and a reference to his texts clearly showed that they did not admit of the law officer's deductions. Having afterwards well considered all the special and technical grounds which led me to the conclusion that judgment ought to be in favour of the convert, I thought I should invite two Bhramins who were reputed for their learning in the Bhraminical laws, to discuss the merits of the case. After much deliberation, they arrived at the opinion

that the only course open to me was to give judgment in favour of the convert. Judgment was accordingly pronounced. An appeal was made to the judge, and my judgment was annulled. The convert then, under the guidance of the Rev. Mr. Ballantine, appealed to the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut, which at the time was the highest civil court in the land, and ultimately the judge's decree was reversed and mine confirmed. Both judgment and appeal form the Appendix A.

When a native wished to become a Christian, he was obliged to take refuge with the missionary to avoid being persecuted by his friends and relations. Previous to my connection with the police, it was usually the practice for a large number of castemen and idlers to make an attack upon the missionary and the intended convert, and to damage all the property that could be laid hands on The police, as a rule, reached the scene after the disturbance was at an end, and the missionary invariably obtained no redress.

During the year of the Indian Mutiny, the Rev. Doctor Wilson called one day at the police office, and mentioned to me that a young man of the Sied, or chief Mahomedan class, wished to become a Christian, but that having a very lively remembrance of the violence he had suffered in person and property on previous occasions, when the candidates were not of a class so fanatical as the Sieds, he thought he should not take any steps in the matter without seeing me, and he said it was absolutely necessary to afford the

young man shelter in his house, or he would be disposed of by poison on his intention becoming known. On the following day the young man went to the doctor's house. Aware that an attack upon them would meet with no impunity, the priests and leaders among the Mahomedans called at the police office, and represented that they could not submit to the insult offered them and the indignity put upon Mahomedanism, and that such an outrage had never before been perpetrated. As soon as I thought they had exhausted the pleas they wished to put forward, I asked them if they knew the Padree-Lord? (The native distinction of the Bishop of Bombay.) They replied "Yes." "Well, try and make a Mussulman of him, and if you succeed, I promise you that I shall take care the European population do not interfere with you." At the same time I seriously cautioned them against any breach of the peace. "Adopt legal measures," I said, "to any extent you think proper," or see what argument might do in winning back your apostate, and I shall be present to see that you have fair play." I was not again troubled in this matter.

A year or two after, a body of Mahomedan priests walked into the police office, and informed me that a European wished to embrace Mahomedanism, but that they declined to admit him without learning my views on the subject. I said if it was the man's wish to become a Mahomedan, I could have nothing to say

against it. They then offered to call upon and ask him to see me, and accompanied him to the police office. He was a European of about five-and-twenty, a German by birth, and a Protestant, spoke English fluently, showed no want of intelligence, and expressed his belief in Mahomedanism with a degree of fervour which left me no alternative but to let him follow his own inclination.

On another occasion, five young Parsees of seventeen to twenty years of age, went away to Dr Wilson's to become Christians Soon after, there was a crowd of Parsees at the police office, complaining of the "seduction, by the Christian missionary, of boys who were not old enough to form any judgment or opinion regarding their own religion." "Beware of committing any breach of the peace," was my advice. "Adopt all possible legal measures, or try the efficacy of dissuasion, by means of argument" In this case the latter expedient was adopted. I named 10 a.m. on the following day for the meeting. To avoid confusion I thought it necessary to limit the number to half a dozen Parsees priests and friends; and as the doctor was not in robust health, I appointed the meeting to take place at his residence. I was there at the hour named. The Parsees, too, were in attendance, and the discussion commenced very soon after. There was no outburst of passion on either side; all was calm, quiet reasoning. The relative merits of Christianity and Zoroastrianism were fairly

discussed. It was interesting to see these young men, who were students of the Scottish college, and of fair intellectual training, attending first to the arguments of the missionary, then to those of the Parsees, then thoughtfully weighing the expositions of each, and often taking part in the discussion themselves. The meeting was prolonged till about three o'clock, and the result was that four of them returned home to their friends, and one remained, and was shortly after admitted to the rite of Christian baptism.

No missionary, previous to my time, could preach the gospel even in his own private grounds without being molested and very often assaulted by native bigots But this was soon put a stop to, and proper police precautions secured freedom of access to teachers of all creeds and denominations, to the Christian missionary, the Parsee mobid, the Mahomedan kazee, and the Hindoo pundit alike. Soon after the commencement of the Mutiny, the Mahomedans of Kurrachee, it appears, fell into a state of excitement on seeing a board hung up in a missionary's verandah with the text, "He that believeth in Jesus, and is baptised, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned" The Mahomedan priests applied to Sir Bartle Frere, who was then Commissioner of Scinde, to have it removed, on the ground that the public exhibition of such a text was derogatory to Mahomedanism. The application, for good reasons

no doubt, was attended to, and the missionary desired to remove the board, which he did under a strong protest. This circumstance was followed by an application in Bombay by a body of Mahomedans, to prohibit Christian missionaries from preaching publicly, though standing upon their own grounds, as such preaching was a degradation of the religion of the Mahomedans My answer to them was, "Put a stop to the practice, by all means, if you will. Make it worth the missionaries' while to sell you their grounds; and if you are prepared to make the purchase, go and tell them, with my salams, that I had asked you to call upon them. These," I added, "were the only terms on which the preaching could be put a stop to;" and I gave them clearly to understand that I should not be influenced by the Kurrachee example I heard nothing more on the subject.

The following circumstances will give a fair idea of the confidence which the Bhramin priesthood of Western India had in British integrity and toleration. In order to discourage the preaching of European missionaries, and to influence the natives against their teaching, the Bhramin priests of Bombay—a large and influential body—availing themselves of the presence from the interior of a number of their most learned men, invited the missionaries to a discussion on the relative merits of Christianity and Bhraminism. In Bombay there are no spacious

buildings for the accommodation of large gatherings. These meetings were therefore held on the open sea-beach, and excited a deep and widespread interest. The Bhramins necessarily formed a very large majority, and the priests wishing to guard against the possibility of a breach of the peace by their followers, suggested to the missionaries that the attendance of the police should be requested A deputation from both parties called at the police office for that purpose, and I arranged to go myself, and was present at five of their meetings. It was quite clear that there would be no conversion of Bhramins to Christianity; nor was it less clear that there would be no leading of any Christian missionary into the fold of Bhraminism. I therefore proposed that the meetings should be brought to a close. This was at once assented to by the missionaries; but the high priest of the Bhramins, exclaiming, "Hold on, sir! I have a question or two to put to the missionaries," unfolded a piece of paper which he held in his hands and read out a long list of the different Christian denominations, with a visible feeling of triumph, and addressing the missionaries, said, "Sirs, you are all Christians, professing to serve a triune God, and seeking salvation in the atonement offered up by Jesus Christ, and how do you explain these distinctions?" The missionaries made a reply, which was patiently listened to; and then, in a tone of great gravity, the Bhramin rejoined, "Sirs, your explanation

is by no means satisfactory. I will give you one that is much more consistent. The approach to Bombay is not limited to a single beaten path. There are many ways of reaching it, and so are there many ways of reaching heaven. Your several ways have been vouchsafed to you; to Bhramins, Bhraminism is the way; to Mahomedans, Mahomedanism; to Parsees, Zoroastrianism, and so on;" and repeating some Sanscrit verses in a tone of exultation, he concluded by observing that it was best for each to keep to his own religion.

Had I the inclination to dwell upon the subject it would not be difficult to show the lamentable extent to which Christianity has been blighted in India by our own divisions. And it would be by no means very flattering to our pride and superior intelligence to learn the opinion of the Bhramin priests on the extravagant views and practices of the ultra high church section of English Protestantism.

During my official experience and free intercourse with the people, extending over a great many years, I had never heard the slightest whisper of suspicion with reference to complicity, or favouritism, or partiality, or bias on the part of any public functionary; and with regard to the "sirkar," the confidence of the people I always found to be unbounded. In the southern Mharatta country, where there had been a good number of lapses and eenam resumptions, the people at large were jubilant, and discontent was

confined only within palace recesses. In Bombay itself the detective organisation in connection with the police was of too perfect a kind to admit of the probability—I may say, the possibility—of such impression being existent without its being brought to my notice; and I have the strongest conviction in stating that in respect to the religious element having had anything to do with weakening sepoy allegiance, the statements of the author of "The Sepoy War" are without any base to rest upon

But is Sir John Kaye right in saying that our measures of annexation and resumption had so undermined the confidence of the people in British integrity and excited discontent so widespread as to have paved the way for the outbreak of the Mutiny? If want of confidence in British rule was so universal, how are we to account for the loyal conduct of Holkar, of Scindia, and a host of other feudatories, whose names appear in the pages of "The Sepoy War?" The revolt of Holkar's troops was brought on by the contaminating influences of our own troops at Mhow. It was so unexpected, and the attack upon the residency so sudden, that terror and confusion reigned supreme within the palace. The reports brought to Holkar as to the cause of the outbreak were wild, contradictory, and bewildering, and the mysterious flight of the British Resident from Indore, Holkar's chief councillor in all circumstances of difficulty and danger, made the confusion still more confounding.

Immediately after this the mutiny at Mhow took place, and the sepoys, marching to Indore, united with the forces of Holkar, and for a time at least made common cause with them. Holkar, however, identified himself with the British, and with a sublime forgetfulness of self and the personal danger he incurred, afforded an instance of loyalty which the most unreasonably sceptical only would venture to question. Scindia's conduct, too, has been throughout most brilliantly loyal. The same may be said of the Chief of Joobooah, the Begum of Bhopal, the Rajas of Puteeala, Jheend, Mahidpoor, Jahodpore, Bhurtpoor, Jyepoor, Ulwar, Dholepoor, the Maharana of Oodeypoor, and the chiefs of Rajpootana, and no doubt of a large number of others. I am strong in the conviction that loyalty to the British cause would have been general but for the fear inspired by the mutineers.

Under the influence of fear and the promptings of the natural instinct of self-preservation, the strongest feelings of loyalty might cease to exist. The inhabitants of Bombay, than whom there is not a more devotedly loyal people in any part of the world, were also painfully swayed by feelings of apprehension in consequence of the persistence with which the mutineers at Cawnpoor, Lucknow, and Delhi, were able to maintain their ground. And I have no hesitation in stating that if the sepoy regiments in Bombay had mutinied, and by

some chance obtained a temporary advantage, devotedly loyal as Bombay was, not a single man in it would have had the courage to engage openly in our defence, but would at once, though most unwillingly, have sided with the stronger party. Private and secret succour we should have had to the fullest extent; but from everything involving danger to person and property, they would have strictly abstained. Could we have expected more in the disturbed districts?

They regarded the crisis with great anxiety on account of their own safety; for the sepoys, who were trained in our school of discipline and warfare and had helped us to effect the conquest of India, were maintaining their stand against the Government successfully and with great valour and determination. The bare possibility of the mutineers being successful inspired the people of Bombay with great fear; and the large number of letters I received from native friends in the interior, as to the fears entertained by the people generally of the possible success of the mutineers, left no doubt in my mind, that that fear was general and by no means limited.

Were the people of India a united nation, they would have had no cause of apprehension; but largely intersected as they are by caste and class distinctions, and still more so by religious prejudices, and having at the same time both personal experience and traditional knowledge of the anarchy common to native

rule, and conscious of the antagonisms that would pervade the length and breadth of India in the event of the expulsion of the British—if there was any one matter in respect to which the feelings of India were united, it was in the wish that the mutineers might not be the successful party. The voice of allegiance may not have been audible to most English ears, but it was sufficiently audible to satisfy, most fully, those who were familiar with the feelings and characteristics of the natives.

The native princes who "presented a revolting picture of the worst type of misrule, of feebleness worse than despotism, of apathy more productive of human suffering than the worst forms of tyrannous activity; who, abstaining from all controlling authority, permitted the strong to carry on everywhere a war of extermination against the weak," were just those whom it was found necessary, in the exercise of a wise policy, to set aside by means of annexation or by the opportunity afforded by lapses. These chiefs and the talookdars, with their rabble adherents, finding the native army in a high state of inflammation, and freely boasting of their valour as being equal to that of the European, were no doubt gradually tempted to inspire the sepoys with the belief that a revolt on their part would prove a most popular act. In this too they must have found it necessary to act with the greatest caution; to satisfy themselves that the ground upon which they stood was no quagmire, and

that sepoy allegiance was in a state of disruption; for nothing but the clearest evidence of this would have tempted the Nana, or the King of Delhi, or any one else, whether prince, noble, or commoner, to dare to tamper with sepoy fidelity.

In 1802, when it was proposed to the Peshwa of Poona that the British should enlist a body of native horse, designated Spiller's Horse, and more commonly known as the Poona Horse, and to enrol a couple of native battalions, known as Ford's regiments, both prince and courtiers received the proposal with an ecstasy of delight, believing that it would work for their advantage, as the men enlisted would be the Peshwa's subjects, and in the event of any exigency presenting itself, all that would need be done would be to order them to join the Peshwa's forces. The exigency did present itself. The request to join was conveyed to both horse and foot. The reception that the request met with, is matter of history.

The chief rissaldar or native captain of the body of horse was Dajee Saib, a descendant of Tanajee Malosroy, who was the general of the forces of Shivajee Maharaj, the founder of the Mharatta empire. It is said that finding the impregnable hill-fort of Shewghur (lion's den), in the neighbourhood of Poona so guarded, that the only means of effecting its capture was by a surprise, Tanajee Roa had provided himself with an animal known in India as the ghorepudde, possessed of wonderful tenacity of grip, and

remarkable for the ease with which it can run up a wall. He attached a rope to its waist, took advantage of a dark night, approached the fort with his party, and letting the animal ascend the fortification, was the first who pulled himself up by means of the rope. An alarm was raised by the garrison, and was followed by a challenge, the reply to which was an arrow from Tanajee Roa's bow discharged into the challenging sentry who was killed on the spot. The garrison immediately mustered to arms, Tanajee was slain, and his party attempted to retreat, but were rallied by his brother Sooriajee, who had, in the meantime, gained the heights with the rest of the men. A fierce struggle ensued, and the fort was captured. When the success of the expedition was reported to Shivajee, he exclaimed in sorrow, "The den has been taken, but the lion that captured it is no more." In commemoration of the event, the family has ever since been surnamed Ghorepudde. The above circumstances, well known in Poona, were repeated afresh to Dajee Saib, the native captain of the Poona Horse, by the Peshwa's emissaries. The sorrow and admiration expressed by Shivajee for the devotion with which his ancestor encountered death in the discharge of his duty to his sovereign, were vividly dwelt upon in order to revive his feelings of allegiance and loyalty to his native prince; but all was in vain. The native officers of both horse and foot promised fairly and received the bribes offered

them; but when the moment arrived the enemy made the discovery that they had misplaced their confidence. Aided by these men, who were led on by only three or four European officers, the small European force, then at our disposal, encountered the hosts marshalled against us by the enemy, and inflicted upon them an irretrievable defeat,—the body of horse, numbering under a thousand, led on by Captain Spiller, charging most successfully the enemy's horse five thousand strong All this the Nana was perfectly aware of These and other no less signal victories were achieved by our forces, assisted by the native army, during periods when the faith of the native soldier was strong in the omnipotence of the white man's fighting power and indomitable pluck But we dispelled the charm and suffered the consequent penalty.

It is often strongly dwelt upon by Sir John Kaye, that there would have been no sepoy outbreak if we had treated the princes and feudatories and talookdars and others as they should have been treated; that is, if we permitted them to outrage humanity without let or hindrance, and violate every principle of law and morality. Even on grounds of political expediency the extenuation of such conduct would hardly be attempted; and the author of "The Sepoy War" himself would have found it an impossible undertaking to reconcile the sanction and encouragement of extreme cruelty and turpitude with the stern

and uncompromising dictates of morality, and with those principles of duty, due from the governing body to the governed, which political experience in all ages of the world has laid down as an inviolable axiom, namely, the good government and the welfare of the people.

General Sir George le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., who, in his "Western India," following the footsteps of his great prototype, the author of "The Sepoy War," has uttered a groan, and implied that he could utter a deeper groan, has given, under the title of Female Rulers, Plot and Counter-plot, and Succession Troubles—terms in themselves of no small significance—instances of depravity and misrule, which exemplify the wisdom of the Government in carrying out the measures which Sir John Kaye and General Jacob strongly deprecate Of the female rulers, she whom the General designates as the heroine of his "story," made away, successively, with her father-in-law, her husband, and her son, because they stood in her way; then to quiet the qualms of her conscience, she placed the principality for the time in her daughter-in-law's charge, and proceeded on a distant pilgrimage. During her absence, the daughter-in-law, equally ambitious to rule, arranged to forestall the heroine, who on her return, finding the palace inaccessible to her, proceeded some hundreds of miles away to the British Resident, and beset him with her grievances, and corrupted his native subordinates with

her gold. Finding this ineffective, she returned, raised the country, "enrolled cut-throats," "took the field," had an engagement, in which one of her chiefs was killed at her side, and eventually, by means chiefly of bribery and corruption, reinstated herself. It then became the turn of the daughter-in-law to beset the British Resident with her ineffective wail.

The next is the case of a prince who died leaving three widows, apparently without hope of issue. Each of these women did her best to promote her own views and ends, and they vied with each other in bribing the native officials of the Residency. Intrigue succeeded intrigue. Troops, or as the General has more correctly described them in another part, cut-throats, were raised, which rendered repressive measures necessary. At this stage, one of the widows was declared to be pregnant. Various means became necessary to test the truth of this, but it was no easy matter, for no male, not even a brother, after childhood, can see a young Rajpoot lady of rank. There was satisfactory evidence, however, of the pregnancy, and steps the most conclusively effective were taken, to guard against a spurious substitution if the child should prove to be a girl. But plots and counterplots still continued; the General himself was very nearly poisoned; and such was the scepticism of the opposite party, that there were no means of convincing them that fair play was intended by the British authorities. The woman was at last in the pains of labour; the

European surgeon of the Residency was in attendance, and the opposing ladies were sent for to be present at the birth. They declined at first to come; but the General was urgent, and they yielded They arrived after the birth had taken place. The child was a boy, and though the evidence that it had been just then born was in all respects positive, they would not be convinced, and went away denouncing it all to be a sham and a subterfuge! And this was followed by the Resident and his assistant, the General, being accused of guilty connivance and court intrigue.

The next case of succession troubles is one in which the death of a Nabob left three claimants to the estate, the first of whom was his stepson, who held a formal deed of succession from the deceased, but which, during lifetime, the deceased had treated as null and void. He had associated with his own, the name of the second claimant, who was his own son, and in all state papers proclaimed him heir, and treated him as such. The mother of the third claimant was of royal blood, and held that her son had the best right. The right of the second son, however, was acknowledged by the British Government. A plot was immediately set on foot, followed by the enrolment of armed mercenaries, which rendered necessary a display of military force. After an interview, which the General had had with the elder of the disputants, he was so surrounded and held

by Arab mercenaries, that but for a commendable exercise of patience and good judgment, he would have been cut down These disputes led to the disorganisation of the principality, and to insurgent gangs raising the standard of revolt, against whom the General found it necessary to march with British troops. In the meantime a plot was matured for shooting the prince who was placed on the throne by the British Government, and it was only after a great deal of trouble and some bloodshed that the tranquillity of the principality was restored

Another principality was then thrown into a state of confusion for reasons of disputed succession, which too was only quelled by a march up and show of force. This was followed by another similar disturbance, with an array of forces on both sides, which was not quelled without a collision, attended with some slaughter and bloodshed.

Such is about the normal condition of successions in India The General has confined himself to matters connected with his political and military occupations, but it is easy to imagine the very great extent to which the peace and quiet of the general population must have been disturbed, and the hardship and oppression they must have been subjected to.

But it is argued that the native mind is essentially conservative; that our system of government might be far better and more civilised than their system, but that the people did not like it better; that they clung

to their own institutions, however rude and defective, and were averse to any change, even though it were a change for the better. It is impossible to say by what means this notion of the conservatism of India was arrived at. To suppose that any race of men would prefer grinding despotism to a rule of justice and equity, to suppose that systematic oppression, accompanied by murder, pillage, incendiarism, and gang robbery would be a more desirable condition, than a life of peace and safety, under the protecting wings of an impartial and powerful Government, is to suppose something that is contradicted by the most ordinary experience and the plain common sense of mankind.

When the trial of the Gaeekwar, on the charge of having poisoned Colonel Phayre, was in prosecution, the agricultural and artisan classes, who form a very large proportion of the population, petitioned Government that the country might not be absorbed, but continued to that prince Surprise, I am aware, was expressed at the time, that such a petition should have been submitted, and conclusions were hastily drawn, that though the people might deem our administration free from oppression, they still preferred their own native rule, with all its defects and disadvantages. Neither the agricultural nor artisan classes would, of course, have thought of such a petition, without its having been suggested to them. And were the truth known—and there were many, no doubt, who were

cognisant of the truth—it would have been seen that the consideration which influenced them in signing the petition was, if the country was annexed, they would not be worse treated by the British Government for having signed the petition, but if, on the other hand, they declined to take part in the petition, and the government of the Gaeekwar was continued, their refusal to sign was sure to be visited by some additional impost, and hence the signatories deemed it prudent to take part in the petition. This is the true and simple explanation of the matter.

Again, what evidence is there that those who are supposed to have incited the Mutiny, or to have made common cause with the mutineers after the outbreak, would not have done so but for the dispossession and the ruin they are said to have suffered. The King of Delhi had been subjected to neither dispossession nor ruin; but on the contrary, was rescued from the condition of a prisoner, and maintained by the British Government in all the pomp and parade of regal splendour. He lived on from childhood to adolescence, from adolescence to manhood, and from manhood to years of decrepitude, without, in all probability, a single thought of discontent ever crossing his mind or that of his sons; or a single idea suggesting itself that he or they could sway a sceptre with safety to themselves or with advantage to the country. The universally acknowledged omnipotence of British power could have left no room for such a thought: nor, till

latterly, was there any reason to doubt sepoy allegiance or sepoy devotion to the British cause. But the cartridge question was then in agitation, and in some regiments there was insubordination, and if not actual mutiny, something very much akin to it.

That the Mutiny sprung from causes inherent in the organisation of the sepoy army, and that it was not the result of incitement, I hope in another chapter to be able to show The insubordination and the state of disquietude among the sepoys were, no doubt, known to the king, but the outbreak at Meerut with the murder of most of the European officers, the march of the mutineers to Delhi, their coalition with the regiments stationed at Delhi, the slaughter there of Europeans, the advance to the palace, and the proposal to the king to have him installed as their sovereign, accompanied probably with some show of coercion, were circumstances which must have convinced him that the British power had become cankered And the mutineers, too, must have looked forward to the prestige which a union with the ancient house of Timour was calculated to impart That the presence of such a person as the King of Delhi at the head of the rebel hosts tended to foster rebellion, and, by affording a centre of convergence, imparted hope, encouragement, and strength to the mutineers, and that the combinations which centred in Delhi were such as had immeasurably augmented the difficulties which the Government had to contend

with, are beyond question. Would these difficulties have been what they proved to be if the king had not been present at Delhi? Other instances in the Bengal Presidency may be mentioned, in which princes, feudatories, and others made common cause with the mutineers after several of the outbreaks had taken place.

In the Bombay Presidency there were the Rajas of Kolapoor. The succession was secured to them by a double line. Both princes were young There was no probability of a failure of progeny, nor was any portion of their territorial possession subjected to the process of amputation, but still, suspicion against the younger prince of complicity with the mutineers was so strong that General Jacob found it necessary to recommend and carry out his deportation to Scinde, his presence at Kolapoor being considered to be dangerous

There is also the case of the Nurgoond chief, whose only grievance was said to be the prospect of refusal by the Government to allow him to adopt He was a man of middle age, and no native, with the freedom to marry more wives than one, abandons the hope of an heir to inherit his possessions. On finding that the native regiments in Bengal had proved disloyal, and that those who had established themselves at Delhi had not been evicted, and also that the regiment at Kolapoor had mutinied, and those at Belgaum and Dharwar were very largely tainted, he

too thought, no doubt, that he should try in time to get what he could; and to his unfortunate act of rebellion he added the atrocity of murdering Mr. Manson

These instances of active and overt disloyalty clearly showed that the annexations and lapses and resumptions, so loudly denounced by the author of "The Sepoy War," and others, are not to be viewed as unmitigated evils, such as they have been represented to be On the other hand, considering the terrible disasters inflicted by the Sepoy Mutiny, that the conflagration was spreading far and wide, that the European forces in the country were merely a handful, that the sepoy hosts, disciplined and trained in the arts of war by ourselves, were overwhelming in their numbers and daring, and, notwithstanding all the efforts to dislodge them, exhibited considerable judgment in being able to maintain their hold in Delhi,—considering all these circumstances, is it surprising that some among the vast populations of India should have been bold, ambitious, and enterprising?—some who, by plunging into the perils of treason, should choose to run the gauntlet of any and all dangers? To this extent I am prepared to admit the existence of rebellion during the period of the Mutiny—that bold men, men of enterprise and daring, men prompted by personal advantage, by the cravings of self-interest, did make common cause with the hydra-headed monster, mutiny, after it had fully exhibited its

destructive tendency But that the Nana, or any one else, had incited the mutiny, I hold to be a myth.

What are the grounds upon which it is stated that the Nana was the prime mover in the work of seducing the sepoys from their allegiance? I shall quote from the author of "The Sepoy War" (page 578, vol 1) —"By this Dhundo-pant Nana Saib, by all who were festering with resentment against the English, and malignantly biding their time, the annexation of Oude had been welcomed as a material aid to the success of their machinations It was no sudden thought, born of the accident of the greased cartridges, that took the disappointed Bhramin and his Mahomedan friend to Lucknow in the spring of the year of trouble For months—for years, indeed—ever since the failure of the mission to England had been apparent, they had been quietly spreading their network of intrigue all over the country From one native court to another native court, from one extremity to another of the great continent of India, the agents of the Nana Saib had passed with overtures and invitations, discreetly, perhaps mysteriously worded, to princes and chiefs of different races and religions—but most hopefully of all to the Mharattas. At the great Mharatta families, the families of the Raja of Suttarah, of the Peshwa, and of the Bhosla, Lord Dalhousie had struck deadly blows. In the southern Mharatta country, indeed, it seemed that

princes and nobles were alike ripe for rebellion.* It was a significant fact that the agents of the great Suttarah and Poona families had been doing their masters' work in England about the same time, that both had returned to India rank rebels, and that the first year of Lord Canning's administration, found Rungo Bapoojee as active for evil in the south as Agimoollah was in the north—both able and unscrupulous men, and hating the English with a deadlier hatred for the very kindness that had been shown to them. But it was not until the crown had been set upon the annexations of Lord Dalhousie by the seizure of Oude that the Nana Saib and his accomplices saw much prospect of success. That event was the turning-point of their career of intrigue What had before been difficult was now made easy by this last act of English usurpation Not only were the ministers of the King of Oude tampering with the troops at the Presidency, and sowing dangerous lies broadcast over the length and breadth of the land, but such was the impression made by the last of our annexations, that men asked each other who was safe, and what use was there in fidelity when so faithful a friend and ally as the King of Oude was stripped of his dominions by the Government whom he had aided

* The state in which I found the Belgaum division of the Southern Mharatta country, the measures adopted in reorganising and reforming the police, and the opposition met with and overcome—to which the safety of the Southern Mharatta country during the Mutiny was in a very great measure due,—are stated under Appendix D.